A HISTORY OF GREECE

I · LEGENDARY GREECE

II · GRECIAN HISTORY TO THE REIGN OF PEISISTRATUS AT ATHENS

BY GEORGE GROTE

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HISTORY

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

GEORGE GROTE.

HISTORY OF GREECE.

I. Legendary Greece.

II. Grecian History to the Reign of Peisistratus at Athens.

BY
GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.

VOL. I.

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PART I.—LEGENDARY GREECE

Ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων θεῖον γένος, οἳ καλέονται
Ἡμίθεοι προτέρῃ γενέῃ.—Hesiod

PART II.—HISTORICAL GREECE.

… Πόλιες μερόπων ἀνθρώπων.—Homer

PREFACE.

THE first idea of this History was conceived many years ago, at a time when ancient Hellas was known to the English public chiefly through the pages of Mitford; and my purpose in writing it was to rectify the erroneous statements as to matter of fact which that History contained, as well as to present the general phenomena of the Grecian world under what I thought a juster and more comprehensive point of view. My leisure, however, was not at that time equal to the execution of any large literary undertaking; nor is it until within the last three or four years that I have been able to devote to the work that continuous and exclusive labor, without which, though much may be done to illustrate detached points, no entire or complicated subject can ever be set forth in a manner worthy to meet the public eye.

Meanwhile the state of the English literary world, in reference to ancient Hellas, has been materially changed in more ways than one. If my early friend Dr. Thirlwall's History of Greece had appeared a few years sooner, I should probably never have conceived the design of the present work at all; I should certainly not have been prompted to the task by any deficiencies, such as those which I felt and regretted in Mitford. The comparison of the two authors affords, indeed, a striking proof of the progress of sound and enlarged views respecting the ancient world during the present generation. Having studied of course the same evidences as Dr. Thirwall, I am better enabled than others to bear testimony to the learning, the sagacity, and the candor which pervade his excellent work: and it is the more incumbent on me to give expression to this sentiment, since the particular points on which I shall have occasion to advert to it will, unavoidably, be points of dissent oftener than of coincidence.

The liberal spirit of criticism, in which Dr. Thirwall stands so much distinguished from Mitford, is his own: there are other features of superiority which belong to him conjointly with his age. For during the generation since Mitford's work, philological studies have been prosecuted in Germany with remarkable success: the stock of facts and documents, comparatively scanty, handed down from the ancient world, has been combined and illustrated in a thousand different ways: and if our witnesses cannot be multiplied, we at least have numerous interpreters to catch, repeat, amplify, and explain their broken and half-inaudible depositions. Some of the best writers in this department—Boeckh, Niebuhr, O. Müller—have been translated into our language; so that the English public has been enabled to form some idea of the new lights thrown upon many subjects of antiquity by the inestimable aid of German erudition. The poets, historians, orators, and philosophers of Greece, have thus been all rendered both more intelligible and more instructive than they were to a student in the last century; and the general picture of the Grecian world may now be conceived

with a degree of fidelity, which, considering our imperfect materials, it is curious to contemplate.

It is that general picture which an historian of Greece is required first to embody in his own mind, and next to lay out before his readers;—a picture not merely such as to delight the imagination by brilliancy of coloring and depth of sentiment, but also suggestive and improving to the reason. Not omitting the points of resemblance as well as of contrast with the better-known forms of modern society, he will especially study to exhibit the spontaneous movement of Grecian intellect, sometimes aided but never borrowed from without, and lighting up a small portion of a world otherwise clouded and stationary. He will develop the action of that social system, which, while insuring to the mass of freemen a degree of protection elsewhere unknown, acted as a stimulus to the creative impulses of genius, and left the superior minds sufficiently unshackled to soar above religious and political routine, to overshoot their own age, and to become the teachers of posterity.

To set forth the history of a people by whom the first spark was set to the dormant intellectual capacities of our nature,—Hellenic phenomena, as illustrative of the Hellenic mind and character,—is the task which I propose to myself in the present work; not without a painful consciousness how much the deed falls short of the will, and a yet more painful conviction, that full success is rendered impossible by an obstacle which no human ability can now remedy,—the insufficiency of original evidence. For, in spite of the valuable expositions of so many able commentators, our stock of information respecting the ancient world still remains lamentably inadequate to the demands of an enlightened curiosity. We possess only what has drifted ashore from the wreck of a stranded vessel; and though this includes some of the most precious articles amongst its once abundant cargo, yet if any man will cast his eyes over the citations in Diogenes Laërtius, Athenæus, or Plutarch, or the list of names in Vossius de Historicis Græcis, he will see with grief and surprise how much larger is the proportion which, through the enslavement of the Greeks themselves, the decline of the Roman Empire, the change of religion, and the irruption of barbarian conquerors, has been irrecoverably submerged. We are thus reduced to judge of he whole Hellenic world, eminently multiform as it was, from a few compositions; excellent, indeed, in themselves, but bearing too exclusively the stamp of Athens. Of Thucydides and Aristotle, indeed, both as inquirers into matter of fact, and as free from narrow local feeling, it is impossible to speak too highly; but, unfortunately, that work of the latter which would have given us the most copious information regarding Grecian political life—his collection and comparison of one hundred and fifty distinct town constitutions—has not been preserved: and the brevity of Thucydides often gives us but a single word where a sentence would not have been too much, and sentences which we should be glad to see expanded into paragraphs.

Such insufficiency of original and trustworthy materials, as compared with those resources which are thought hardly sufficient for the historian of any modern king-

dom, is neither to be concealed nor extenuated, however much we may lament it. I advert to the point here on more grounds than one. For it not only limits the amount of information which an historian of Greece can give to his readers,—compelling him to leave much of his picture an absolute blank,—but it also greatly spoils the execution of the remainder. The question of credibility is perpetually obtruding itself, and requiring a decision, which, whether favorable or unfavorable, always introduces more or less of controversy; and gives to those outlines, which the interest of the picture requires to be straight and vigorous, a faint and faltering character. Expressions of qualified and hesitating affirmation are repeated until the reader is sickened; while the writer himself, to whom this restraint is more painful still, is frequently tempted to break loose from the unseen spell by which a conscientious criticism binds him down,—to screw up the possible and probable into certainty, to suppress counterbalancing considerations, and to substitute a pleasing romance in place of half-known and perplexing realities. Desiring, in the present work, to set forth all which can be ascertained, together with such conjectures and inferences as can be reasonably deduced from it, but nothing more,—I notice, at the outset, that faulty state of the original evidence which renders discussions of credibility, and hesitation in the language of the judge, unavoidable. Such discussions, though the reader may be assured that they will become less frequent as we advance into times better known, are tiresome enough, even with the comparatively late period which I adopt as the historical beginning; much more intolerable would they have proved, had I thought it my duty to start from the primitive terminus of Deukaliôn or Inachus, or from the unburied Pelasgi and Leleges, and to subject the heroic ages to a similar scrutiny. I really know nothing so disheartening or unrequited as the elaborate balancing of what is called evidence,—the comparison of infinitesimal probabilities and conjectures all uncertified,—in regard to these shadowy times and persons.

The law respecting sufficiency of evidence ought to be the same for ancient times as for modern; and the reader will find in this History an application, to the former, of criteria analogous to those which have been long recognized in the latter. Approaching, though with a certain measure of indulgence, to this standard, I begin the real history of Greece with the first recorded Olympiad, or 776 B. C. To such as are accustomed to the habits once universal, and still not uncommon, in investigating the ancient world, I may appear to be striking off one thousand years from the scroll of history; but to those whose canon of evidence is derived from Mr. Hallam, M. Sismondi, or any other eminent historian of modern events, I am well assured that I shall appear lax and credulous rather than exigent or sceptical. For the truth is, that historical records, properly so called, do not begin until long after this date: nor will any man, who candidly considers the extreme paucity of attested facts for two centuries after 776 B. C., be astonished to learn that the state of Greece in 900, 1000, 1100, 1200, 1300, 1400 B. C., etc.,—or any earlier century which it may please chronologists to include in their computed genealogies,—cannot be described to him upon anything like decent evidence. I shall hope, when I come to the lives of Socrates and

Plato, to illustrate one of the most valuable of their principles,—that conscious and confessed ignorance is a better state of mind, than the fancy, without the reality, of knowledge. Meanwhile, I begin by making that confession, in reference to the real world of Greece anterior to the Olympiads; meaning the disclaimer to apply to anything like a general history,—not to exclude rigorously every individual event.

The times which I thus set apart from the region of history are discernible only through a different atmosphere,—that of epic poetry and legend. To confound together these disparate matters is, in my judgment, essentially unphilosophical. I describe the earlier times by themselves, as conceived by the faith and feeling of the first Greeks, and known only through their legends,—without presuming to measure how much or how little of historical matter these legends may contain. If the reader blame me for not assisting him to determine this,—if he ask me why I do not undraw the curtain and disclose the picture,—I reply in the words of the painter Zeuxis, when the same question was addressed to him on exhibiting his master-piece of imitative art: "The curtain is the picture." What we now read as poetry and legend was once accredited history, and the only genuine history which the first Greeks could conceive or relish of their past time: the curtain conceals nothing behind, and cannot, by any ingenuity, be withdrawn. I undertake only to show it as it stands,—not to efface, still less to repaint it.

Three-fourths of the two volumes now presented to the public are destined to elucidate this age of historical faith, as distinguished from the later age of historical reason: to exhibit its basis in the human mind,—an omnipresent religious and personal interpretation of nature; to illustrate it by comparison with the like mental habit in early modern Europe; to show its immense abundance and variety of narrative matter, with little care for consistency between one story and another; lastly, to set forth the causes which overgrew and partially supplanted the old epical sentiment, and introduced, in the room of literal faith, a variety of compromises and interpretations.

The legendary age of the Greeks receives its principal charm and dignity from the Homeric poems: to these, therefore, and to the other poems included in the ancient epic, an entire chapter is devoted, the length of which must be justified by the names of the Iliad and Odyssey. I have thought it my duty to take some notice of the Wolfian controversy as it now stands in Germany, and have even hazarded some speculations respecting the structure of the Iliad. The society and manners of the heroic age, considered as known in a general way from Homer's descriptions and allusions, are also described and criticized.

I next pass to the historical age, beginning at 776 B. C.; prefixing some remarks upon the geographical features of Greece. I try to make out, amidst obscure and scanty indications, what the state of Greece was at this period; and I indulge some cautious conjectures, founded upon the earliest verifiable facts, respecting the steps

immediately antecedent by which that condition was brought about. In the present volumes, I have only been able to include the history of Sparta and the Peloponnesian Dorians, down to the age of Peisistratus and Crœsus. I had hoped to have comprised in them the entire history of Greece down to this last-mentioned period, but I find the space insufficient.

The history of Greece falls most naturally into six compartments, of which the first may be looked at as a period of preparation for the five following, which exhaust the free life of collective Hellas.

I. Period from 776 B. C. to 560 B. C., the accession of Peisistratus at Athens and of Crœsus in Lydia.

II. From the accession of Peisistratus and Crœsus to the repulse of Xerxes from Greece.

III. From the repulse of Xerxes to the close of the Peloponnesian war and overthrow of Athens.

IV. From the close of the Peloponnesian war to the battle of Leuktra.

V. From the battle of Leuktra to that of Chæroneia.

VI. From the battle of Chæroneia to the end of the generation of Alexander.

The five periods, from Peisistratus down to the death of Alexander and of his generation, present the acts of an historical drama capable of being recounted in perspicuous succession, and connected by a sensible thread of unity. I shall interweave in their proper places the important but outlying adventures of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks,—introducing such occasional notices of Grecian political constitutions, philosophy, poetry, and oratory, as are requisite to exhibit the many-sided activity of this people during their short but brilliant career.

After the generation of Alexander, the political action of Greece becomes cramped and degraded,—no longer interesting to the reader, or operative on the destinies of the future world. We may, indeed, name one or two incidents, especially the revolutions of Agis and Kleomenês at Sparta, which are both instructive and affecting; but as a whole, the period, between 300 B. C. and the absorption of Greece by the Romans, is of no interest in itself, and is only so far of value as it helps us to understand the preceding centuries. The dignity and value of the Greeks from that time forward belong to them only as individual philosophers, preceptors, astronomers, and mathematicians, literary men and critics, medical practitioners, etc. In all these respective capacities, especially in the great schools of philosophical speculation they still constitute the light of the Roman world; though, as communities, they have lost their own orbit, and have become satellites of more powerful neighbors.

I propose to bring down the history of the Grecian communities to the year 300 B. C., or the close of the generation which takes its name from Alexander the Great, and I hope to accomplish this in eight volumes altogether. For the next two or three volumes I have already large preparations made, and I shall publish my third (perhaps my fourth) in the course of the ensuing winter.

There are great disadvantages in the publication of one portion of a history apart from the remainder; for neither the earlier nor the later phenomena can be fully comprehended without the light which each mutually casts upon the other. But the practice has become habitual, and is indeed more than justified by the well-known inadmissibility of "long hopes" into the short span of human life. Yet I cannot but fear that my first two volumes will suffer in the estimation of many readers by coming out alone,—and that men who value the Greeks for their philosophy, their politics, and their oratory, may treat the early legends as not worth attention. And it must be confessed that the sentimental attributes of the Greek mind—its religious and poetical vein—here appear in disproportionate relief, as compared with its more vigorous and masculine capacities,—with those powers of acting, organizing, judging, and speculating, which will be revealed in the forthcoming volumes. I venture, however, to forewarn the reader, that there will occur numerous circumstances in the after political life of the Greeks, which he will not comprehend unless he be initiated into the course of their legendary associations. He will not understand the frantic terror of the Athenian public during the Peloponnesian war, on the occasion of the mutilation of the statues called Hermæ, unless he enters into the way in which they connected their stability and security with the domiciliation of the gods in the soil: nor will he adequately appreciate the habit of the Spartan king on military expeditions,—when he offered his daily public sacrifices on behalf of his army and his country,—"always to perform this morning service immediately before sunrise, in order that he might be beforehand in obtaining the favor of the gods,"[1] if he be not familiar with the Homeric conception of Zeus going to rest at night and awaking to rise at early dawn from the side of the "white-armed Hêrê." The occasion will, indeed, often occur for remarking how these legends illustrate and vivify the political phenomena of the succeeding times, and I have only now to urge the necessity of considering them as the beginning of a series,—not as an entire work.

London, March 5, 1846.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION OF VOLUMES I. AND II.

In preparing a Second Edition of the first two volumes of my History, I have profited by the remarks and corrections of various critics, contained in Reviews, both English and foreign. I have suppressed, or rectified, some positions which had been pointed out as erroneous, or as advanced upon inadequate evidence. I have strengthened my argument in some cases where it appeared to have been imperfectly understood,—adding some new notes, partly for the purpose of enlarged illustration, partly to defend certain opinions which had been called in question. The greater number of these alterations have been made in Chapters XVI. and XXI. of Part I., and in Chapter VI. of Part II.

I trust that these three Chapters, more full of speculation, and therefore more open to criticism than any of the others, will thus appear in a more complete and satisfactory form. But I must at the same time add that they remain for the most part unchanged in substance, and that I have seen no sufficient reason to modify my main conclusions even respecting the structure of the Iliad, controverted though they have been by some of my most esteemed critics.

In regard to the character and peculiarity of Grecian legend, as broadly distinguished throughout these volumes from Grecian history, I desire to notice two valuable publications with which I have only become acquainted since the date of my first edition. One of these is, A Short Essay on Primæval History, by John Kenrick, M. A. (London, 1846, published just at the same time as these volumes,) which illustrates with much acute reflection the general features of legend, not only in Greece but throughout the ancient world,—see especially pages 65, 84, 92, *et seq.* The other work is, Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official, by Colonel Sleeman,—first made known to me through an excellent notice of my History in the Edinburgh Review for October 1846. The description given by Colonel Sleeman, of the state of mind now actually prevalent among the native population of Hindostan, presents a vivid comparison, helping the modern reader to understand and appreciate the legendary era of Greece. I have embodied in the notes of this Second Edition two or three passages from Colonel Sleeman's instructive work: but the whole of it richly deserves perusal.

Having now finished six volumes of this History, without attaining a lower point than the peace of Nikias, in the tenth year of the Peloponnesian war,—I find myself compelled to retract the expectation held out in the preface to my First Edition, that the entire work might be completed in eight volumes. Experience proves to me how impossible it is to measure beforehand the space which historical subjects will require. All I can now promise is, that the remainder of the work shall be executed

with as much regard to brevity as is consistent with the paramount duty of rendering it fit for public acceptance.

LONDON, April 3, 1849.

NAMES OF GODS, GODDESSES, AND HEROES.

FOLLOWING the example of Dr. Thirlwall and other excellent scholars, I call the Greek deities by their real Greek names, and not by the Latin equivalents used among the Romans. For the assistance of those readers to whom the Greek names may be less familiar, I here annex a table of the one and the other.

Greek.	*Latin.*
Zeus,	Jupiter.
Poseidôn,	Neptune.
Arês,	Mars.
Dionysus,	Bacchus.
Hermês,	Mercury.
Hêlios,	Sol.
Hêphæstus,	Vulcan.
Hadês,	Pluto.
Hêrê,	Juno.
Athênê,	Minerva.
Artemis,	Diana.
Aphroditê,	Venus.
Eôs,	Aurora.
Hestia,	Vesta.
Lêtô,	Latona.
Dêmêtêr,	Ceres.
Hêraklês,	Hercules.
Asklêpius,	Æsculapius.

A few words are here necessary respecting the orthography of Greek names adopted in the above table and generally throughout this history. I have approximated as nearly as I dared to the Greek letters in preference to the Latin; and on this point I venture upon an innovation which I should have little doubt of vindicating before the reason of any candid English student. For the ordinary practice of substituting, in a Greek name, the English C in place of the Greek K, is, indeed, so obviously incorrect, that it admits of no rational justification. Our own K, precisely and in every point, coincides with the Greek K: we have thus the means of reproducing the Greek name to the eye as well as to the ear, yet we gratuitously take the wrong letter in preference to the right. And the precedent of the Latins is here against us rather than in our favor, for their C really coincided in sound with the Greek K, whereas our C entirely departs from it, and becomes an S, before *e*, *i*, *æ*, *œ*, and *y*. Though our C has so far deviated in sound from the Latin C, yet there is some warrant for our continuing to use it in writing Latin names,—because we thus reproduce the name to the eye, though not to the ear. But this is not the case when we employ our C to designate the Greek K, for we depart here not less from the visible than

from the audible original; while we mar the unrivalled euphony of the Greek language by that multiplied sibilation which constitutes the least inviting feature in our own. Among German philologists, the K is now universally employed in writing Greek names, and I have adopted it pretty largely in this work, making exception for such names as the English reader has been so accustomed to hear with the C, that they may be considered as being almost Anglicised. I have, farther, marked the long *e* and the long *o* (η, ω,) by a circumflex (Hêrê) when they occur in the last syllable or in the penultimate of a name.

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HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART I.

LEGENDARY GREECE.

CHAPTER I.

LEGENDS RESPECTING THE GODS.

THE mythical world of the Greeks opens with the gods, anterior as well as superior to man: it gradually descends, first to heroes, and next to the human race. Along with the gods are found various monstrous natures, ultra-human and extra-human, who cannot with propriety be called gods, but who partake with gods and men in the attributes of free-will, conscious agency, and susceptibility of pleasure and pain,—such as the Harpies, the Gorgons, the Grææ, the Sirens, Scylla and Charybdis, Echidna, Sphinx, Chimæra, Chrysaor, Pegasus, the Cyclôpes, the Centaurs, etc. The first acts of what may be termed the great mythical cycle describe the proceedings of these gigantic agents—the crash and collision of certain terrific and overboiling forces, which are ultimately reduced to obedience, or chained up, or extinguished, under the more orderly government of Zeus, who supplants his less capable predecessors, and acquires precedence and supremacy over gods and men—subject, however to certain social restraints from the chief gods and goddesses around him, as well as to the custom of occasionally convoking and consulting the divine agora.

I recount these events briefly, but literally, treating them simply as mythes springing from the same creative imagination, addressing themselves to analogous tastes and feelings, and depending upon the same authority, as the legends of Thebes and Troy. It is the inspired voice of the Muse which reveals and authenticates both, and from which Homer and Hesiod alike derive their knowledge—the one, of the heroic, the other, of the divine, foretime. I maintain, moreover, fully, the character of these great divine agents as Persons, which is the light in which they presented themselves to the Homeric or Hesiodic audience. Uranos, Nyx, Hypnos and Oneiros (Heaven, Night, Sleep and Dream), are Persons, just as much as Zeus and Apollo. To resolve them into mere allegories, is unsafe and unprofitable: we then depart from the point of view of the original hearers, without acquiring any consistent or philosophical point of view of our own.[2] For although some of the attributes and actions ascribed to these persons are often explicable by allegory the whole series and system of them never are so: the theorist who adopts this course of explanation finds that, after one or two simple and obvious steps, the path is no longer open, and he is forced to clear a way for himself by gratuitous refinements and conjectures. The allegorical persons and attributes are always found mingled with other persons and attributes not allegorical; but the two classes cannot be severed without breaking up the whole march of the mythical events, nor can any explanation which drives us to such a necessity be considered as admissible. To suppose indeed that these legends could be all traced by means of allegory into a coherent body of physical doctrine, would be inconsistent with all reasonable presumptions respecting the age or society in which they arose. Where the allegorical mark is clearly set upon any particular character, or

attribute, or event, to that extent we may recognize it; but we can rarely venture to divine further, still less to alter the legends themselves on the faith of any such surmises. The theogony of the Greeks contains some cosmogonic ideas; but it cannot be considered as a system of cosmogony, or translated into a string of elementary, planetary, or physical changes.

In the order of legendary chronology, Zeus comes after Kronos and Uranos; but in the order of Grecian conception, Zeus is the prominent person, and Kronos and Uranos are inferior and introductory precursors, set up in order to be overthrown and to serve as mementos of the prowess of their conqueror. To Homer and Hesiod, as well as to the Greeks universally, Zeus is the great and predominant god, "the father of gods and men," whose power none of the other gods can hope to resist, or even deliberately think of questioning. All the other gods have their specific potency and peculiar sphere of action and duty, with which Zeus does not usually interfere; but it is he who maintains the lineaments of a providential superintendence, as well over the phænomena of Olympus as over those of earth. Zeus and his brothers Poseidôn and Hadês have made a division of power: he has reserved the æther and the atmosphere to himself—Poseidôn has obtained the sea—and Hadês the under-world or infernal regions; while earth, and the events which pass upon earth, are common to all of them, together with free access to Olympus.[3]

Zeus, then, with his brethren and colleagues, constitute the present gods, whom Homer and Hesiod recognize as in full dignity and efficiency. The inmates of this divine world are conceived upon the model, but not upon the scale, of the human. They are actuated by the full play and variety of those appetites, sympathies, passions and affections, which divide the soul of man; invested with a far larger and indeterminate measure of power, and an exemption as well from death as (with some rare exceptions) from suffering and infirmity. The rich and diverse types thus conceived, full of energetic movement and contrast, each in his own province, and soaring confessedly above the limits of experience, were of all themes the most suitable for adventure and narrative, and operated with irresistible force upon the Grecian fancy. All nature was then conceived as moving and working through a number of personal agents, amongst whom the gods of Olympus were the most conspicuous; the reverential belief in Zeus and Apollo being only one branch of this omnipresent personifying faith. The attributes of all these agents had a tendency to expand themselves into illustrative legends—especially those of the gods, who were constantly invoked in the public worship. Out of this same mental source sprang both the divine and heroic mythes—the former being often the more extravagant and abnormous in their incidents, in proportion as the general type of the gods was more vast and awful than that of the heroes.

As the gods have houses and wives like men, so the present dynasty of gods must have a past to repose upon;[4] and the curious and imaginative Greek, whenever he does not find a recorded past ready to his hand, is uneasy until he has cre-

ated one. Thus the Hesiodic theogony explains, with a certain degree of system and coherence, first the antecedent circumstances under which Zeus acquired the divine empire, next the number of his colleagues and descendants.

First in order of time (we are told by Hesiod) came Chaos; next Gæa, the broad, firm, and flat Earth, with deep and dark Tartarus at her base. Erôs (Love), the subduer of gods as well as men, came immediately afterwards.[5]

From Chaos sprung Erebos and Nyx; from these latter Æthêr and Hêmera. Gæa also gave birth to Uranos, equal in breadth to herself, in order to serve both as an overarching vault to her, and as a residence for the immortal gods; she further produced the mountains, habitations of the divine nymphs, and Pontus, the barren and billowy sea.

Then Gæa intermarried with Uranos, and from this union came a numerous offspring—twelve Titans and Titanides, three Cyclôpes, and three Hekatoncheires or beings with a hundred hands each. The Titans were Oceanus, Kœos, Krios, Hyperiôn, Iapetos, and Kronos: the Titanides, Theia, Rhea, Themis, Mnêmosynê, Phœbê, and Têthys. The Cyclôpes were Brontês, Steropês, and Argês,—formidable persons, equally distinguished for strength and for manual craft, so that they made the thunder which afterwards formed the irresistible artillery of Zeus.[6] The Hekatoncheires were Kottos, Briareus, and Gygês, of prodigious bodily force.

Uranos contemplated this powerful brood with fear and horror; as fast as any of them were born, he concealed them in cavities of the earth, and would not permit them to come out. Gæa could find no room for them, and groaned under the pressure: she produced iron, made a sickle, and implored her sons to avenge both her and themselves against the oppressive treatment of their father. But none of them, except Kronos, had courage to undertake the deed: he, the youngest and the most daring, was armed with the sickle and placed in suitable ambush by the contrivance of Gæa. Presently night arrived, and Uranos descended to the embraces of Gæa: Kronos then emerged from his concealment, cut off the genitals of his father, and cast the bleeding member behind him far away into the sea.[7] Much of the blood was spilt upon the earth, and Gæa in consequence gave birth to the irresistible Erinnys, the vast and muscular Gigantes, and the Melian nymphs. Out of the genitals themselves, as they swam and foamed upon the sea, emerged the goddess Aphroditê, deriving her name from the foam out of which she had sprung. She first landed at Kythêra, and then went to Cyprus: the island felt her benign influence, and the green herb started up under her soft and delicate tread. Erôs immediately joined her, and partook with her the function of suggesting and directing the amorous impulses both of gods and men.[8]

Uranos being thus dethroned and disabled, Kronos and the Titans acquired their liberty and became predominant: the Cyclôpes and the Hekatoncheires had been cast by Uranos into Tartarus, and were still allowed to remain there.

Each of the Titans had a numerous offspring: Oceanus, especially, marrying his sister Têthys, begat three thousand daughters, the Oceanic nymphs, and as many sons: the rivers and springs passed for his offspring. Hyperiôn and his sister Theia had for their children Hêlios, Selênê, and Eôs; Kœos with Phœbê begat Lêtô and Asteria; the children of Krios were Astræos, Pallas, and Persês,—from Astræos and Eôs sprang the winds Zephyrus, Boreas, and Notus. Iapetos, marrying the Oceanic nymph Clymenê, counted as his progeny the celebrated Promêtheus, Epimêtheus, Menœtius, and Atlas. But the offspring of Kronos were the most powerful and transcendent of all. He married his sister Rhea, and had by her three daughters—Hestia, Dêmêtêr, and Hêrê—and three sons, Hadês, Poseidôn, and Zeus, the latter at once the youngest and the greatest.

But Kronos foreboded to himself destruction from one of his own children, and accordingly, as soon as any of them were born, he immediately swallowed them and retained them in his own belly. In this manner had the first five been treated, and Rhea was on the point of being delivered of Zeus. Grieved and indignant at the loss of her children, she applied for counsel to her father and mother, Uranos and Gæa, who aided her to conceal the birth of Zeus. They conveyed her by night to Lyktus in Crête, hid the new-born child in a woody cavern on Mount Ida, and gave to Kronos, in place of it, a stone wrapped in swaddling clothes, which he greedily swallowed, believing it to be his child. Thus was the safety of Zeus ensured.[9] As he grew up his vast powers fully developed themselves: at the suggestion of Gæa, he induced Kronos by stratagem to vomit up, first the stone which had been given to him,—next, the five children whom he had previously devoured. Hestia, Dêmêtêr, Hêrê, Poseidôn and Hadês, were thus allowed to grow up along with Zeus; and the stone to which the latter owed his preservation was placed near the temple of Delphi, where it ever afterwards stood, as a conspicuous and venerable memorial to the religious Greek. [10]

We have not yet exhausted the catalogue of beings generated during this early period, anterior to the birth of Zeus. Nyx, alone and without any partner, gave birth to a numerous progeny: Thanatos, Hypnos and Oneiros; Mômus and Oïzys (Grief); Klôthô, Lachesis and Atropos, the three Fates; the retributive and equalizing Nemesis; Apatê and Philotês (Deceit and amorous Propensity), Gêras (Old Age) and Eris (Contention). From Eris proceeded an abundant offspring, all mischievous and maleficent: Ponos (Suffering), Lêthê, Limos (Famine), Phonos and Machê (Slaughter and Battle), Dysnomia and Atê (Lawlessness and reckless Impulse), and Horkos, the ever watchful sanctioner of oaths, as well as the inexorable punisher of voluntary perjury. [11]

Gæa, too, intermarrying with Pontus, gave birth to Nereus, the just and righteous old man of the sea; to Thaumas, Phorkys and Kêtô. From Nereus, and Doris daughter of Oceanus, proceeded the fifty Nereids or Sea-nymphs. Thaumus also married Elektra daughter of Oceanus, and had by her Iris and the two Harpies, Allô and

Okypetê,—winged and swift as the winds. From Phorkys and Kêtô sprung the Dragon of the Hesperides, and the monstrous Grææ and Gorgons: the blood of Medusa, one of the Gorgons, when killed by Perseus, produced Chrysaor and the horse Pegasus: Chrysaor and Kallirrhoê gave birth to Geryôn as well as to Echidna,—a creature half-nymph and half-serpent, unlike both to gods and to men. Other monsters arose from the union of Echidna with Typhaôn,—Orthros, the two-headed dog of Geryôn; Cerberus, the dog of Hadês, with fifty heads, and the Lernæan Hydra. From the latter proceeded the Chimæra, the Sphinx of Thêbes, and the Nemean lion.[12]

A powerful and important progeny, also, was that of Styx, daughter of Oceanus, by Pallas; she had Zêlos and Nikê (Imperiousness and Victory), and Kratos and Bia (Strength and Force). The hearty and early coöperation of Styx and her four sons with Zeus was one of the main causes which enabled him to achieve his victory over the Titans.

Zeus had grown up not less distinguished for mental capacity than for bodily force. He and his brothers now determined to wrest the power from the hands of Kronos and the Titans, and a long and desperate struggle commenced, in which all the gods and all the goddesses took part. Zeus convoked them to Olympus, and promised to all who would aid him against Kronos, that their functions and privileges should remain undisturbed. The first who responded to the call, came with her four sons, and embraced his cause, was Styx. Zeus took them all four as his constant attendants, and conferred upon Styx the majestic distinction of being the Horkos, or oath-sanctioner of the Gods,—what Horkos was to men, Styx was to the Gods.[13]

Still further to strengthen himself, Zeus released the other Uranids who had been imprisoned in Tartarus by their father,—the Cyclôpes and the Centimanes,—and prevailed upon them to take part with him against the Titans. The former supplied him with thunder and lightning, and the latter brought into the fight their boundless muscular strength.[14] Ten full years did the combat continue; Zeus and the Kronids occupying Olympus, and the Titans being established on the more southerly mountain-chain of Othrys. All nature was convulsed, and the distant Oceanus, though he took no part in the struggle, felt the boiling, the noise, and the shock, not less than Gæa and Pontus. The thunder of Zeus, combined with the crags and mountains torn up and hurled by the Centimanes, at length prevailed, and the Titans were defeated and thrust down into Tartarus. Iapetos, Kronos, and the remaining Titans (Oceanus excepted) were imprisoned, perpetually and irrevocably, in that subterranean dungeon, a wall of brass being built around them by Poseidôn, and the three Centimanes being planted as guards. Of the two sons of Iapetos, Menœtius was made to share this prison, while Atlas was condemned to stand for ever at the extreme west, and to bear upon his shoulders the solid vault of heaven.[15]

Thus were the Titans subdued, and the Kronids with Zeus at their head placed in possession of power. They were not, however, yet quite secure; for Gæa, intermarry-

ing with Tartarus, gave birth to a new and still more formidable monster called Typhôeus, of such tremendous properties and promise, that, had he been allowed to grow into full development, nothing could have prevented him from vanquishing all rivals and becoming supreme. But Zeus foresaw the danger, smote him at once with a thunderbolt from Olympus, and burnt him up: he was cast along with the rest into Tartarus, and no further enemy remained to question the sovereignty of the Kronids. [16]

With Zeus begins a new dynasty and a different order of beings. Zeus, Poseidôn, and Hadês agree upon the distribution before noticed, of functions and localities: Zeus retaining the Æthêr and the atmosphere, together with the general presiding function; Poseidôn obtaining the sea, and administering subterranean forces generally; and Hadês ruling the under-world or region in which the half-animated shadows of departed men reside.

It has been already stated, that in Zeus, his brothers and his sisters, and his and their divine progeny, we find the *present* Gods; that is, those, for the most part, whom the Homeric and Hesiodic Greeks recognized and worshipped. The wives of Zeus were numerous as well as his offspring. First he married Mêtis, the wisest and most sagacious of the goddesses; but Gæa and Uranos forewarned him that if he permitted himself to have children by her, they would be stronger than himself and dethrone him. Accordingly when Mêtis was on the point of being delivered of Athênê, he swallowed her up, and her wisdom and sagacity thus became permanently identified with his own being.[17] His head was subsequently cut open, in order to make way for the exit and birth of the goddess Athênê.[18] By Themis, Zeus begat the Hôræ, by Eurynomê, the three Charities or Graces; by Mnêmosynê, the Muses; by Lêtô (Latona), Apollo and Artemis; and by Dêmêtêr, Persephonê. Last of all he took for his wife Hêrê, who maintained permanently the dignity of queen of the Gods; by her he had Hêbê, Arês, and Eileithyia. Hermês also was born to him by Maia, the daughter of Atlas: Hêphæstos was born to Hêrê, according to some accounts, by Zeus; according to others, by her own unaided generative force.[19] He was born lame, and Hêrê was ashamed of him: she wished to secrete him away, but he made his escape into the sea, and found shelter under the maternal care of the Nereids Thetis and Eurynome.[20] Our enumeration of the divine race, under the presidency of Zeus, will thus give us,[21]—

1. The twelve great gods and goddesses of Olympus,—Zeus, Poseidôn, Apollo, Arês, Hêphæstos, Hermês, Hêrê, Athênê, Artemis, Aphroditê, Hestia, Dêmêtêr.

2. An indefinite number of other deities, not included among the Olympic, seemingly because the number *twelve* was complete without them, but some of them not inferior in power and dignity to many of the twelve:—Hadês, Hêlios, Hekatê, Dionysos, Lêtô, Diônê, Persephonê, Selênê, Themis, Eôs, Harmonia, the Charities,

the Muses, the Eileithyiæ, the Mœræ, the Oceanids and the Nereids, Proteus, Eidothea, the Nymphs, Leukothea, Phorkys, Æolus, Nemesis, etc.

3. Deities who perform special services to the greater gods:—Iris, Hêbê, the Horæ, etc.

4. Deities whose personality is more faintly and unsteadily conceived:—Atê, the Litæ, Eris, Thanatos, Hypnos, Kratos, Bia, Ossa, etc.[22] The same name is here employed sometimes to designate the person, sometimes the attribute or event not personified,—an unconscious transition of ideas, which, when consciously performed, is called Allegory.

5. Monsters, offspring of the Gods:—the Harpies, the Gorgons, the Grææ, Pegasus, Chrysaor, Echidna, Chimæra, the Dragon of the Hesperides, Cerberus, Orthros, Geryôn, the Lernæan Hydra, the Nemean lion, Scylla and Charybdis, the Centaurs, the Sphinx, Xanthos and Balios the immortal horses, etc.

From the gods we slide down insensibly, first to heroes, and then to men; but before we proceed to this new mixture, it is necessary to say a few words on the theogony generally. I have given it briefly as it stands in the Hesiodic Theogonia, because that poem—in spite of great incoherence and confusion, arising seemingly from diversity of authorship as well as diversity of age—presents an ancient and genuine attempt to cast the divine foretime into a systematic sequence. Homer and Hesiod were the grand authorities in the pagan world respecting theogony; but in the Iliad and Odyssey nothing is found except passing allusions and implications, and even in the Hymns (which were commonly believed in antiquity to be the productions of the same author as the Iliad and the Odyssey) there are only isolated, unconnected narratives. Accordingly men habitually took their information respecting their theogonic antiquities from the Hesiodic poem, where it was ready laid out before them; and the legends consecrated in that work acquired both an extent of circulation and a firm hold on the national faith, such as independent legends could seldom or never rival. Moreover the scrupulous and sceptical Pagans, as well as the open assailants of Paganism in later times, derived their subjects of attack from the same source; so that it has been absolutely necessary to recount in their naked simplicity the Hesiodic stories, in order to know what it was that Plato deprecated and Xenophanês denounced. The strange proceedings ascribed to Uranos, Kronos and Zeus, have been more frequently alluded to, in the way of ridicule or condemnation, than any other portion of the mythical world.

But though the Hesiodic theogony passed as orthodox among the later Pagans, [23] because it stood before them as the only system anciently set forth and easily accessible, it was evidently not the only system received at the date of the poem itself. Homer knows nothing of Uranos, in the sense of an arch-God anterior to Kronos. Uranos and Gæa, like Oceanus, Têthys and Nyx, are with him great and venerable Gods, but neither the one nor the other present the character of predecessors of

Kronos and Zeus.[24] The Cyclôpes, whom Hesiod ranks as sons of Uranos and fabricators of thunder, are in Homer neither one nor the other; they are not noticed in the Iliad at all, and in the Odyssey they are gross gigantic shepherds and cannibals, having nothing in common with the Hesiodic Cyclops except the one round central eye.[25] Of the three Centimanes enumerated by Hesiod, Briareus only is mentioned in Homer, and to all appearance, not as the son of Uranos, but as the son of Poseidôn; not as aiding Zeus in his combat against the Titans, but as rescuing him at a critical moment from a conspiracy formed against him by Hêrê, Poseidôn and Athênê.[26] Not only is the Hesiodic Uranos (with the Uranids) omitted in Homer, but the relations between Zeus and Kronos are also presented in a very different light. No mention is made of Kronos swallowing his young children: on the contrary, Zeus is the eldest of the three brothers instead of the youngest, and the children of Kronos live with him and Rhea: there the stolen intercourse between Zeus and Hêrê first takes place without the knowledge of their parents.[27] When Zeus puts Kronos down into Tartarus, Rhea consigns her daughter Hêrê to the care of Oceanus: no notice do we find of any terrific battle with the Titans as accompanying that event. Kronos, Iapetos, and the remaining Titans are down in Tartarus, in the lowest depths under the earth, far removed from the genial rays of Hêlios; but they are still powerful and venerable, and Hypnos makes Hêrê swear an oath in their name, as the most inviolable that he can think of.[28]

In Homer, then, we find nothing beyond the simple fact that Zeus thrust his father Kronos together with the remaining Titans into Tartarus; an event to which he affords us a tolerable parallel in certain occurrences even under the presidency of Zeus himself. For the other gods make more than one rebellious attempt against Zeus, and are only put down, partly by his unparalleled strength, partly by the presence of his ally the Centimane Briareus. Kronos, like Laërtes or Pêleus, has become old, and has been supplanted by a force vastly superior to his own. The Homeric epic treats Zeus as present, and, like all the interesting heroic characters, a father must be assigned to him: that father has once been the chief of the Titans, but has been superseded and put down into Tartarus along with the latter, so soon as Zeus and the superior breed of the Olympic gods acquired their full development.

That antithesis between Zeus and Kronos—between the Olympic gods and the Titans—which Homer has thus briefly brought to view, Hesiod has amplified into a theogony, with many things new, and some things contradictory to his predecessor; while Eumêlus or Arktinus in the poem called Titanomachia (now lost) also adopted it as their special subject.[29] As Stasinus, Arktinus, Leschês, and others, enlarged the Legend of Troy by composing poems relating to a supposed time anterior to the commencement, or subsequent to the termination of the Iliad,—as other poets recounted adventures of Odysseus subsequent to his landing in Ithaka,—so Hesiod enlarged and systematized, at the same time that he corrupted, the skeleton theogony which we find briefly indicated in Homer. There is violence and rudeness in the

Homeric gods, but the great genius of Grecian epic is no way accountable for the stories of Uranos and Kronos,—the standing reproach against Pagan legendary narrative.

How far these stories are the invention of Hesiod himself is impossible to determine.[30] They bring us down to a cast of fancy more coarse and indelicate than the Homeric, and more nearly resembling some of the Holy Chapters (ἱεροὶ λὀγοι) of the more recent mysteries, such (for example) as the tale of Dionysos Zagreus. There is evidence in the Theogony itself that the author was acquainted with local legends current both at Krête and at Delphi; for he mentions both the mountain-cave in Krête wherein the new-born Zeus was hidden, and the stone near the Delphian temple—the identical stone which Kronos had swallowed—"placed by Zeus himself as a sign and wonder to mortal men." Both these two monuments, which the poet expressly refers to, and had probably seen, imply a whole train of accessory and explanatory local legends—current probably among the priests of Krête and Delphi, between which places, in ancient times, there was an intimate religious connection. And we may trace further in the poem,—that which would be the natural feeling of Krêtan worshippers of Zeus,—an effort to make out that Zeus was justified in his aggression on Kronos, by the conduct of Kronos himself both towards his father and towards his children: the treatment of Kronos by Zeus appears in Hesiod as the retribution foretold and threatened by the mutilated Uranos against the son who had outraged him. In fact the relations of Uranos and Gæa are in almost all their particulars a mere copy and duplication of those between Kronos and Rhea, differing only in the mode whereby the final catastrophe is brought about. Now castration was a practice thoroughly abhorrent both to the feelings and to the customs of Greece;[31] but it was seen with melancholy frequency in the domestic life as well as in the religious worship of Phrygia and other parts of Asia, and it even became the special qualification of a priest of the Great Mother Cybelê,[32] as well as of the Ephesian Artemis. The employment of the sickle ascribed to Kronos seems to be the product of an imagination familiar with the Asiatic worship and legends, which were connected with and partially resembled the Krêtan.[33] And this deduction becomes the more probable when we connect it with the first genesis of iron, which Hesiod mentions to have been produced for the express purpose of fabricating the fatal sickle; for metallurgy finds a place in the early legends both of the Trojan and of the Krêtan Ida, and the three Idæan Dactyls, the legendary inventors of it, are assigned sometimes to one and sometimes to the other.[34]

As Hesiod had extended the Homeric series of gods by prefixing the dynasty of Uranos to that of Kronos, so the Orphic theogony lengthened it still further.[35] First came Chronos, or Time, as a person, after him Æthêr and Chaos, out of whom Chronos produced the vast mundane egg. Hence emerged in process of time the first-born god Phanês, or Mêtis, or Hêrikapæos, a person of double sex, who first generated the Kosmos, or mundane system, and who carried within him the seed of

the gods. He gave birth to Nyx, by whom he begat Uranos and Gæa; as well as to Hêlios and Selêne.[36]

From Uranos and Gæa sprang the three Mœræ, or Fates, the three Centimanes and the three Cyclôpes: these latter were cast by Uranos into Tartarus, under the foreboding that they would rob him of his dominion. In revenge for this maltreatment of her sons, Gæa produced of herself the fourteen Titans, seven male and seven female: the former were Kœos, Krios, Phorkys, Kronos, Oceanus, Hyperiôn and Iapetos; the latter were Themis, Têthys, Mnêmosynê, Theia, Diônê, Phœbê and Rhea.[37] They received the name of Titans because they avenged upon Uranos the expulsion of their elder brothers. Six of the Titans, headed by Kronos the most powerful of them all, conspiring against Uranos, castrated and dethroned him: Oceanus alone stood aloof and took no part in the aggression. Kronos assumed the government and fixed his seat on Olympos; while Oceanus remained apart, master of his own divine stream.[38] The reign of Kronos was a period of tranquillity and happiness, as well as of extraordinary longevity and vigor.

Kronos and Rhea gave birth to Zeus and his brothers and sisters. The concealment and escape of the infant Zeus, and the swallowing of the stone by Kronos, are given in the Orphic Theogony substantially in the same manner as by Hesiod, only in a style less simple and more mysticized. Zeus is concealed in the cave of Nyx, the seat of Phanês himself, along with Eidê and Adrasteia, who nurse and preserve him, while the armed dance and sonorous instruments of the Kurêtes prevent his infant cries from reaching the ears of Kronos. When grown up, he lays a snare for his father, intoxicates him with honey, and having surprised him in the depth of sleep, enchains and castrates him.[39] Thus exalted to the supreme mastery, he swallowed and absorbed into himself Mêtis, or Phanês, with all the preëxisting elements of things, and then generated all things anew out of his own being and conformably to his own divine ideas.[40] So scanty are the remains of this system, that we find it difficult to trace individually the gods and goddesses sprung from Zeus beyond Apollo, Dionysos, and Persephonê,—the latter being confounded with Artemis and Hekatê.

But there is one new personage, begotten by Zeus, who stands preëminently marked in the Orphic Theogony, and whose adventures constitute one of its peculiar features. Zagreus, "the horned child," is the son of Zeus by his own daughter Persephonê: he is the favorite of his father, a child of magnificent promise, and predestined, if he grow up, to succeed to supreme dominion as well as to the handling of the thunderbolt. He is seated, whilst an infant, on the throne beside Zeus, guarded by Apollo and the Kurêtes. But the jealous Hêrê intercepts his career and incites the Titans against him, who, having first smeared their faces with plaster, approach him on the throne, tempt his childish fancy with playthings, and kill him with a sword while he is contemplating his face in a mirror. They then cut up his body and boil it in a caldron, leaving only the heart, which is picked up by Athênê and carried to Zeus, who in his wrath strikes down the Titans with thunder into Tartarus; whilst

Apollo is directed to collect the remains of Zagreus and bury them at the foot of Mount Parnassus. The heart is given to Semelê, and Zagreus is born again from her under the form of Dionysos.[41]

Such is the tissue of violent fancies comprehended under the title of the Orphic Theogony, and read as such, it appears, by Plato, Isokratês and Aristotle. It will be seen that it is based upon the Hesiodic Theogony, but according to the general expansive tendency of Grecian legend, much new matter is added: Zeus has in Homer one predecessor, in Hesiod two, and in Orpheus four.

The Hesiodic Theogony, though later in date than the Iliad and Odyssey, was coeval with the earliest period of what may be called Grecian history, and certainly of an age earlier than 700 B. C. It appears to have been widely circulated in Greece, and being at once ancient and short, the general public consulted it as their principal source of information respecting divine antiquity. The Orphic Theogony belongs to a later date, and contains the Hesiodic ideas and persons, enlarged and mystically disguised: its vein of invention was less popular, adapted more to the contemplation of a sect specially prepared than to the taste of a casual audience, and it appears accordingly to have obtained currency chiefly among purely speculative men.[42] Among the majority of these latter, however, it acquired greater veneration, and above all was supposed to be of greater antiquity, than the Hesiodic. The belief in its superior antiquity (disallowed by Herodotus, and seemingly also by Aristotle[43]), as well as the respect for its contents, increased during the Alexandrine age and through the declining centuries of Paganism, reaching its maximum among the New-Platonists of the third and fourth century after Christ: both the Christian assailants, as well as the defenders, of paganism, treated it as the most ancient and venerable summary of the Grecian faith. Orpheus is celebrated by Pindar as the harper and companion of the Argonautic maritime heroes: Orpheus and Musæus, as well as Pamphôs and Olên, the great supposed authors of theogonic, mystical, oracular, and prophetic verses and hymns, were generally considered by literary Greeks as older than either Hesiod or Homer:[44] and such was also the common opinion of modern scholars until a period comparatively recent. It has now been shown, on sufficient ground, that the compositions which passed under these names emanate for the most part from poets of the Alexandrine age, and subsequent to the Christian æra; and that even the earliest among them, which served as the stock on which the later additions were engrafted, belong to a period far more recent than Hesiod; probably to the century preceding Onomakritus (B. C. 610-510). It seems, however, certain, that both Orpheus and Musæus were names of established reputation at the time when Onomakritus flourished; and it is distinctly stated by Pausanias that the latter was himself the author of the most remarkable and characteristic mythe of the Orphic Theogony—the discerption of Zagreus by the Titans, and his resurrection as Dionysos.[45]

The names of Orpheus and Musæus (as well as that of Pythagoras,[46] looking at one side of his character) represent facts of importance in the history of the Grecian mind—the gradual influx of Thracian, Phrygian, and Egyptian, religious ceremonies and feelings, and the increasing diffusion of special mysteries,[47] schemes for religious purification, and orgies (I venture to anglicize the Greek word, which contains in its original meaning no implication of the ideas of excess to which it was afterwards diverted) in honor of some particular god—distinct both from the public solemnities and from the gentile solemnities of primitive Greece,—celebrated apart from the citizens generally, and approachable only through a certain course of preparation and initiation—sometimes even forbidden to be talked of in the presence of the uninitiated, under the severest threats of divine judgment. Occasionally such voluntary combinations assumed the form of permanent brotherhoods, bound together by periodical solemnities as well as by vows of an ascetic character: thus the Orphic life (as it was called) or regulation of the Orphic brotherhood, among other injunctions partly arbitrary and partly abstinent, forbade animal food universally, and on certain occasions, the use of woollen clothing.[48] The great religious and political fraternity of the Pythagoreans, which acted so powerfully on the condition of the Italian cities, was one of the many manifestations of this general tendency, which stands in striking contrast with the simple, open-hearted, and demonstrative worship of the Homeric Greeks.

Festivals at seed-time and harvest—at the vintage and at the opening of the new wine—were doubtless coeval with the earliest habits of the Greeks; the latter being a period of unusual joviality. Yet in the Homeric poems, Dionysos and Dêmêtêr, the patrons of the vineyard and the cornfield, are seldom mentioned, and decidedly occupy little place in the imagination of the poet as compared with the other gods: nor are they of any conspicuous importance even in the Hesiodic Theogony. But during the interval between Hesiod and Onomakritus, the revolution in the religious mind of Greece was such as to place both these deities in the front rank. According to the Orphic doctrine, Zagreus, son of Persephonê, is destined to be the successor of Zeus, and although the violence of the Titans intercepts this lot, yet even when he rises again from his discerption under the name of Dionysos, he is the colleague and coëqual of his divine father.

This remarkable change, occurring as it did during the sixth and a part of the seventh century before the Christian æra, may be traced to the influence of communication with Egypt (which only became fully open to the Greeks about B. C. 660), as well as with Thrace, Phrygia, and Lydia. From hence new religious ideas and feelings were introduced, which chiefly attached themselves to the characters of Dionysos and Dêmêtêr. The Greeks identified these two deities with the great Egyptian Osiris and Isis, so that what was borrowed from the Egyptian worship of the two latter naturally fell to their equivalents in the Grecian system.[49] Moreover the worship of Dionysos (under what name cannot be certainly made out) was indigenous in

Thrace,[50] as that of the Great Mother was in Phyrgia, and in Lydia—together with those violent ecstasies and manifestations of temporary frenzy, and that clashing of noisy instruments, which we find afterwards characterizing it in Greece. The great masters of the pipe—as well as the dythyramb,[51] and indeed the whole musical system appropriated to the worship of Dionysos, which contrasted so pointedly with the quiet solemnity of the Pæan addressed to Apollo—were all originally Phrygian.

From all these various countries, novelties, unknown to the Homeric men, found their way into the Grecian worship: and there is one amongst them which deserves to be specially noticed, because it marks the generation of the new class of ideas in their theology. Homer mentions many persons guilty of private or involuntary homicide, and compelled either to go into exile or to make pecuniary satisfaction; but he never once describes any of them to have either received or required purification for the crime.[52] Now in the time subsequent to Homer, purification for homicide comes to be considered as indispensable: the guilty person is regarded as unfit for the society of man or the worship of the gods until he has received it, and special ceremonies are prescribed whereby it is to be administered. Herodotus tells us that the ceremony of purification was the same among the Lydians and among the Greeks: [53] we know that it formed no part of the early religion of the latter, and we may perhaps reasonably suspect that they borrowed it from the former. The oldest instance known to us of expiation for homicide was contained in the epic poem of the Milesian Arktinus,[54] wherein Achillês is purified by Odysseus for the murder of Thersitês: several others occurred in the later or Hesiodic epic—Hêraklês, Pêleus, Bellerophôn, Alkmæôn, Amphiktyôn, Pœmander, Triopas,—from whence they probably passed through the hands of the logographers to Apollodôrus, Diodôrus, and others.[55] The purification of the murderer was originally operated, not by the hands of any priest or specially sanctified man, but by those of a chief or king, who goes through the appropriate ceremonies in the manner recounted by Herodotus in his pathetic narrative respecting Crœsus and Adrastus.

The idea of a special taint of crime, and of the necessity as well as the sufficiency of prescribed religious ceremonies as a means of removing it, appears thus to have got footing in Grecian practice subsequent to the time of Homer. The peculiar rites or orgies, composed or put together by Onomakritus, Methapus,[56] and other men of more than the ordinary piety, were founded upon a similar mode of thinking, and adapted to the same mental exigencies. They were voluntary religious manifestations, superinduced upon the old public sacrifices of the king or chiefs on behalf of the whole society, and of the father on his own family hearth—they marked out the details of divine service proper to appease or gratify the god to whom they were addressed, and to procure for the believers who went through them his blessings and protection here or hereafter—the exact performance of the divine service in all its specialty was held necessary, and thus the priests or Hierophants, who alone were familiar with the ritual, acquired a commanding position.[57] Generally speaking,

these peculiar orgies obtained their admission and their influence at periods of distress, disease, public calamity and danger, or religious terror and despondency, which appear to have been but too frequent in their occurrence.

The minds of men were prone to the belief that what they were suffering arose from the displeasure of some of the gods, and as they found that the ordinary sacrifices and worship were insufficient for their protection, so they grasped at new suggestions proposed to them with the view of regaining the divine favor.[58] Such suggestions were more usually copied, either in whole or in part, from the religious rites of some foreign locality, or from some other portion of the Hellenic world; and in this manner many new sects or voluntary religious fraternities, promising to relieve the troubled conscience and to reconcile the sick or suffering with the offended gods, acquired permanent establishment as well as considerable influence. They were generally under the superintendence of hereditary families of priests, who imparted the rites of confirmation and purification to communicants generally; no one who went through the prescribed ceremonies being excluded. In many cases, such ceremonies fell into the hands of jugglers, who volunteered their services to wealthy men, and degraded their profession as well by obtrusive venality as by extravagant promises: [59] sometimes the price was lowered to bring them within reach of the poor and even of slaves. But the wide diffusion, and the number of voluntary communicants of these solemnities, proves how much they fell in with the feeling of the time and how much respect they enjoyed—a respect, which the more conspicuous establishments, such as Eleusis and Samothrace, maintained for several centuries. And the visit of the Kretan Epimenidês to Athens—in the time of Solôn, and at a season of the most serious disquietude and dread of having offended the gods—illustrates the tranquillizing effect of new orgies[60] and rites of absolution, when enjoined by a man standing high in the favor of the gods and reputed to be the son of a nymph. The supposed Erythræan Sibyl, and the earliest collection of Sibylline prophecies,[61] afterwards so much multiplied and interpolated, and referred (according to Grecian custom) to an age even earlier than Homer, appear to belong to a date not long posterior to Epimenidês. Other oracular verses, such as those of Bakis, were treasured up in Athens and other cities: the sixth century before the Christian æra was fertile in these kinds of religious manifestations.

Amongst the special rites and orgies of the character just described, those which enjoyed the greatest Pan-Hellenic reputation were attached to the Idæan Zeus in Krête, to Dêmêtêr at Eleusis, to the Kabeiri in Samothrace, and to Dionysos at Delphi and Thebes.[62] That they were all to a great degree analogous, is shown by the way in which they unconsciously run together and become confused in the minds of various authors: the ancient inquirers themselves were unable to distinguish one from the other, and we must be content to submit to the like ignorance. But we see enough to satisfy us of the general fact, that during the century and a half which elapsed between the opening of Egypt to the Greeks and the commencement of their

struggle with the Persian kings, the old religion was largely adulterated by importations from Egypt, Asia Minor,[63] and Thrace. The rites grew to be more furious and ecstatic, exhibiting the utmost excitement, bodily as well as mental: the legends became at once more coarse, more tragical, and less pathetic. The manifestations of this frenzy were strongest among the women, whose religious susceptibilities were often found extremely unmanageable,[64] and who had everywhere congregative occasional ceremonies of their own, apart from the men—indeed, in the case of the colonists, especially of the Asiatic colonists, the women had been originally women of the country, and as such retained to a great degree their non-Hellenic manners and feelings.[65] The god Dionysos,[66] whom the legends described as clothed in feminine attire, and leading a troop of frenzied women, inspired a temporary ecstasy, and those who resisted the inspiration, being supposed to disobey his will, were punished either by particular judgments or by mental terrors; while those who gave full loose to the feeling, in the appropriate season and with the received solemnities, satisfied his exigencies, and believed themselves to have procured immunity from such disquietudes for the future.[67] Crowds of women, clothed with fawn-skins and bearing the sanctified thyrsus, flocked to the solitudes of Parnassus, or Kithærôn, or Taygetus, during the consecrated triennial period, passed the night there with torches, and abandoned themselves to demonstrations of frantic excitement, with dancing and clamorous invocation of the god: they were said to tear animals limb from limb, to devour the raw flesh, and to cut themselves without feeling the wound.[68] The men yielded to a similar impulse by noisy revels in the streets, sounding the cymbals and tambourine, and carrying the image of the god in procession.[69] It deserves to be remarked, that the Athenian women never practised these periodical mountain excursions, so common among the rest of the Greeks: they had their feminine solemnities of the Thesmophoria,[70] mournful in their character and accompanied with fasting, and their separate congregations at the temples of Aphroditê, but without any extreme or unseemly demonstrations. The state festival of the Dionysia, in the city of Athens, was celebrated with dramatic entertainments, and the once rich harvest of Athenian tragedy and comedy was thrown up under its auspices. The ceremonies of the Kurêtes in Krête, originally armed dances in honor of the Idæan Zeus, seem also to have borrowed from Asia so much of fury, of self-infliction, and of mysticism, that they became at last inextricably confounded with the Phrygian Korybantes or worshippers of the Great Mother; though it appears that Grecian reserve always stopped short of the irreparable self-mutilation of Atys.

The influence of the Thracian religion upon that of the Greeks cannot be traced in detail, but the ceremonies contained in it were of a violent and fierce character, like the Phrygian, and acted upon Hellas in the same general direction as the latter. And the like may be said of the Egyptian religion, which was in this case the more operative, inasmuch as all the intellectual Greeks were naturally attracted to go and visit the wonders on the banks of the Nile; the powerful effect produced upon them is attested by many evidences, but especially by the interesting narrative of Herodotus.

Now the Egyptian ceremonies were at once more licentious, and more profuse in the outpouring both of joy and sorrow, than the Greek;[71] but a still greater difference sprang from the extraordinary power, separate mode of life, minute observances, and elaborate organization, of the priesthood. The ceremonies of Egypt were multitudinous, but the legends concerning them were framed by the priests, and as a general rule, seemingly, known to the priests alone: at least they were not intended to be publicly talked of, even by pious men. They were "holy stories," which it was sacrilege publicly to mention, and which from this very prohibition only took firmer hold of the minds of the Greek visitors who heard them. And thus the element of secrecy and mystic silence—foreign to Homer, and only faintly glanced at in Hesiod—if it was not originally derived from Egypt, at least received from thence its greatest stimulus and diffusion. The character of the legends themselves was naturally affected by this change from publicity to secrecy: the secrets when revealed would be such as to justify by their own tenor the interdict on public divulgation: instead of being adapted, like the Homeric mythe, to the universal sympathies and hearty interest of a crowd of hearers, they would derive their impressiveness from the tragical, mournful, extravagant, or terror-striking character of the incidents.[72] Such a tendency, which appears explicable and probable even on general grounds, was in this particular case rendered still more certain by the coarse taste of the Egyptian priests. That any recondite doctrine, religious or philosophical, was attached to the mysteries or contained in the holy stories, has never been shown, and is to the last degree improbable though the affirmative has been asserted by many learned men.

Herodotus seems to have believed that the worship and ceremonies of Dionysos generally were derived by the Greeks from Egypt, brought over by Kadmus and taught by him to Melampus: and the latter appears in the Hesiodic Catalogue as having cured the daughters of Prœtus of the mental distemper with which they had been smitten by Dionysos for rejecting his ritual. He cured them by introducing the Bacchic dance and fanatical excitement: this mythical incident is the most ancient mention of the Dionysiac solemnities presented in the same character as they bear in Euripidês. It is the general tendency of Herodotus to apply the theory of derivation from Egypt far too extensively to Grecian institutions: the orgies of Dionysos were not originally borrowed from thence, though they may have been much modified by connection with Egypt as well as with Asia. The remarkable mythe composed by Onomakritus respecting the dismemberment of Zagreus was founded upon an Egyptian tale very similar respecting the body of Osiris, who was supposed to be identical with Dionysos:[73] nor was it unsuitable to the reckless fury of the Bacchanals during their state of temporary excitement, which found a still more awful expression in the mythe of Pentheus,—torn in pieces by his own mother Agavê at the head of her companions in the ceremony, as an intruder upon the feminine rites as well as a scoffer at the god.[74] A passage in the Iliad (the authenticity of which has been contested, but even as an interpolation it must be old)[75] also recounts how Lykurgus was struck blind by Zeus for having chased away with a whip "the nurses of the mad

Dionysos," and frightened the god himself into the sea to take refuge in the arms of Thetis: and the fact, that Dionysos is so frequently represented in his mythes as encountering opposition and punishing the refractory, seems to indicate that his worship under its ecstatic form was a late phænomenon and introduced not without difficulty. The mythical Thracian Orpheus was attached as Eponymos to a new sect, who seem to have celebrated the ceremonies of Dionysos with peculiar care, minuteness and fervor, besides observing various rules in respect to food and clothing. It was the opinion of Herodotus, that these rules, as well as the Pythagorean, were borrowed from Egypt. But whether this be the fact or not, the Orphic brotherhood is itself both an evidence, and a cause, of the increased importance of the worship of Dionysos, which indeed is attested by the great dramatic poets of Athens.

The Homeric Hymns present to us, however, the religious ideas and legends of the Greeks at an earlier period, when the enthusiastic and mystic tendencies had not yet acquired their full development. Though not referable to the same age or to the same author as either the Iliad or the Odyssey, they do to a certain extent continue the same stream of feeling, and the same mythical tone and coloring, as these poems—manifesting but little evidence of Egyptian, Asiatic, or Thracian adulterations. The difference is striking between the god Dionysos as he appears in the Homeric hymn and in the Bacchæ of Euripidês. The hymnographer describes him as standing on the sea-shore, in the guise of a beautiful and richly-clothed youth, when Tyrrhenian pirates suddenly approach: they seize and bind him and drag him on board their vessel. But the bonds which they employ burst spontaneously, and leave the god free. The steersman, perceiving this with affright, points out to his companions that they have unwittingly laid hands on a god,—perhaps Zeus himself, or Apollo, or Poseidôn. He conjures them to desist, and to replace Dionysos respectfully on the shore, lest in his wrath he should visit the ship with wind and hurricane: but the crew deride his scruples, and Dionysos is carried prisoner out to sea with the ship under full sail. Miraculous circumstances soon attest both his presence and his power. Sweet-scented wine is seen to flow spontaneously about the ship, the sail and mast appear adorned with vine and ivy-leaves, and the oar-pegs with garlands. The terrified crew now too late entreat the helmsman to steer his course for the shore, and crowd round him for protection on the poop. But their destruction is at hand: Dionysos assumes the form of a lion—a bear is seen standing near him—this bear rushes with a loud roar upon the captain, while the crew leap overboard in their agony of fright, and are changed into dolphins. There remains none but the discreet and pious steersman, to whom Dionysos addresses words of affectionate encouragement, revealing his name, parentage and dignity.[76]

This hymn, perhaps produced at the Naxian festival of Dionysos, and earlier than the time when the dithyrambic chorus became the established mode of singing the praise and glory of that god, is conceived in a spirit totally different from that of the Bacchic Telatæ, or special rites which the Bacchæ of Euripidês so abundantly extol,—

rites introduced from Asia by Dionysos himself at the head of a thiasus or troop of enthusiastic women,—inflaming with temporary frenzy the minds of the women of Thebes,—not communicable except to those who approach as pious communicants, —and followed by the most tragical results to all those who fight against the god.[77] The Bacchic Teletæ, and the Bacchic feminine frenzy, were importations from abroad, as Euripidês represents them, engrafted upon the joviality of the primitive Greek Dionysia; they were borrowed, in all probability, from more than one source and introduced through more than one channel, the Orphic life or brotherhood being one of the varieties. Strabo ascribes to this latter a Thracian original, considering Orpheus, Musæus, and Eumolpus as having been all Thracians.[78] It is curious to observe how, in the Bacchæ of Euripidês, the two distinct and even conflicting ideas of Dionysos come alternately forward; sometimes the old Grecian idea of the jolly and exhilarating god of wine—but more frequently the recent and imported idea of the terrific and irresistible god who unseats the reason, and whose *œstrus* can only be appeased by a willing, though temporary obedience. In the fanatical impulse which inspired the votaries of the Asiatic Rhea or Cybelê, or of the Thracian Kotys, there was nothing of spontaneous joy; it was a sacred madness, during which the soul appeared to be surrendered to a stimulus from without, and accompanied by preternatural strength and temporary sense of power,[79]—altogether distinct from the unrestrained hilarity of the original Dionysia, as we see them in the rural demes of Attica, or in the gay city of Tarentum. There was indeed a side on which the two bore some analogy, inasmuch as, according to the religious point of view of the Greeks, even the spontaneous joy of the vintage feast was conferred by the favor and enlivened by the companionship of Dionysos. It was upon this analogy that the framers of the Bacchic orgies proceeded but they did not the less disfigure the genuine character of the old Grecian Dionysia.

Dionysos is in the conception of Pindar the Paredros or companion in worship of Dêmêtêr:[80] the worship and religious estimate of the latter has by that time undergone as great a change as that of the former, if we take our comparison with the brief description of Homer and Hesiod: she has acquired[81] much of the awful and soul-disturbing attributes of the Phrygian Cybelê. In Homer, Dêmêtêr is the goddess of the corn-field, who becomes attached to the mortal man Jasiôn; an unhappy passion, since Zeus, jealous of the connection between goddesses and men, puts him to death. In the Hesiodic Theogony, Dêmêtêr is the mother of Persephonê by Zeus, who permits Hadês to carry off the latter as his wife: moreover Dêmêtêr has, besides, by Jasiôn a son called Plutos, born in Krête. Even from Homer to Hesiod, the legend of Dêmêtêr, has been expanded and her dignity exalted; according to the usual tendency of Greek legend, the expansion goes on still further. Through Jasiôn, Dêmêtêr becomes connected with the mysteries of Samothrace; through Persephonê, with those of Eleusis. The former connection it is difficult to follow out in detail, but the latter is explained and traced to its origin in the Homeric Hymn to Dêmêtêr.

Though we find different statements respecting the date as well as the origin of the Eleusinian mysteries, yet the popular belief of the Athenians, and the story which found favor at Eleusis, ascribed them to the presence and dictation of the goddess Dêmêtêr herself; just as the Bacchic rites are, according to the Bacchæ of Euripidês, first communicated and enforced on the Greeks by the personal visit of Dionysos to Thêbes, the metropolis of the Bacchic ceremonies.[82] In the Eleusinian legend, preserved by the author of the Homeric Hymn, she comes voluntarily and identifies herself with Eleusis; her past abode in Krête being briefly indicated.[83] Her visit to Eleusis is connected with the deep sorrow caused by the loss of her daughter Persephonê, who had been seized by Hadês, while gathering flowers in a meadow along with the Oceanic Nymphs, and carried off to become his wife in the underworld. In vain did the reluctant Persephonê shriek and invoke the aid of her father Zeus: he had consented to give her to Hadês, and her cries were heard only by Hekatê and Hêlios. Dêmêtêr was inconsolable at the disappearance of her daughter, but knew not where to look for her: she wandered for nine days and nights with torches in search of the lost maiden without success. At length Hêlios, the "spy of gods and men," revealed to her, in reply to her urgent prayer, the rape of Persephonê, and the permission given to Hadês by Zeus. Dêmêtêr was smitten with anger and despair: she renounced Zeus and the society of Olympus, abstained from nectar and ambrosia, and wandered on earth in grief and fasting until her form could no longer be known. In this condition she came to Eleusis, then governed by the prince Keleos. Sitting down by a well at the wayside in the guise of an old woman, she was found by the daughters of Keleos, who came hither with their pails of brass for water. In reply to their questions, she told them that she had been brought by pirates from Krête to Thorikos, and had made her escape; she then solicited from them succor and employment as a servant or as a nurse. The damsels prevailed upon their mother Metaneira to receive her, and to entrust her with the nursing of the young Dêmophoôn, their late-born brother, the only son of Keleos. Dêmêtêr was received into the house of Metaneira, her dignified form still borne down by grief: she sat long silent and could not be induced either to smile or to taste food, until the maid-servant Iambê, by jests and playfulness, succeeded in amusing and rendering her cheerful. She would not taste wine, but requested a peculiar mixture of barley-meal with water and the herb mint.[84]

The child Dêmophoôn, nursed by Dêmêtêr, throve and grew up like a god, to the delight and astonishment of his parents: she gave him no food, but anointed him daily with ambrosia, and plunged him at night in the fire like a torch, where he remained unburnt. She would have rendered him immortal, had she not been prevented by the indiscreet curiosity and alarm of Metaneira, who secretly looked in at night, and shrieked with horror at the sight of her child in the fire.[85] The indignant goddess, setting the infant on the ground, now revealed her true character to Metaneira: her wan and aged look disappeared, and she stood confest in the genuine majesty of her divine shape, diffusing a dazzling brightness which illuminated the

whole house. "Foolish mother," she said, "thy want of faith has robbed thy son of immortal life. I am the exalted Dêmêtêr, the charm and comfort both of gods and men: I was preparing for thy son exemption from death and old age; now it cannot be but he must taste of both. Yet shall he be ever honored, since he has sat upon my knee and slept in my arms. Let the people of Eleusis erect for me a temple and altar on yonder hill above the fountain; I will myself prescribe to them the orgies which they must religiously perform in order to propitiate my favor."[86]

The terrified Metaneira was incapable even of lifting up her child from the ground; her daughters entered at her cries, and began to embrace and tend their infant brother, but he sorrowed and could not be pacified for the loss of his divine nurse. All night they strove to appease the goddess.[87]

Strictly executing the injunctions of Dêmêtêr, Keleos convoked the people of Eleusis and erected the temple on the spot which she had pointed out. It was speedily completed, and Dêmêtêr took up her abode in it,—apart from the remaining gods, still pining with grief for the loss of her daughter, and withholding her beneficent aid from mortals. And thus she remained a whole year,—a desperate and terrible year: [88] in vain did the oxen draw the plough, and in vain was the barley-seed cast into the furrow,—Dêmêtêr suffered it not to emerge from the earth. The human race would have been starved, and the gods would have been deprived of their honors and sacrifice, had not Zeus found means to conciliate her. But this was a hard task; for Dêmêtêr resisted the entreaties of Iris and of all the other goddesses and gods whom Zeus successively sent to her. She would be satisfied with nothing less than the recovery of her daughter. At length Zeus sent Hermês to Hadês, to bring Persephonê away: Persephonê joyfully obeyed, but Hadês prevailed upon her before she departed to swallow a grain of pomegranate, which rendered it impossible for her to remain the whole year away from him.[89]

With transport did Dêmêtêr receive back her lost daughter, and the faithful Hekatê sympathized in the delight felt by both at the reunion.[90] It was now an easier undertaking to reconcile her with the gods. Her mother Rhea, sent down expressly by Zeus, descended from Olympus on the fertile Rharan plain, then smitten with barrenness like the rest of the earth: she succeeded in appeasing the indignation of Dêmêtêr, who consented again to put forth her relieving hand. The buried seed came up in abundance, and the earth was covered with fruit and flowers. She would have wished to retain Persephonê constantly with her, but this was impossible; and she was obliged to consent that her daughter should go down for one-third of each year to the house of Hadês, departing from her every spring at the time when the seed is sown. She then revisited Olympus, again to dwell with the gods; but before her departure, she communicated to the daughters of Keleos, and to Keleos himself, together with Triptolemus, Dioklês and Eumolpus, the divine service and the solemnities which she required to be observed in her honor.[91] And thus began the venerable mysteries of Eleusis, at her special command: the lesser mysteries, cele-

brated in February, in honor of Persephonê; the greater, in August, to the honor of Dêmêtêr herself. Both are jointly patronesses of the holy city and temple.

Such is a brief sketch of the temple legend of Eleusis, set forth at length in the Homeric Hymn to Dêmêtêr. It is interesting not less as a picture of the Mater Dolorosa (in the mouth of an Athenian, Dêmêtêr and Persephonê were always the Mother and Daughter, by excellence), first an agonized sufferer, and then finally glorified,—the weal and woe of man being dependent upon her kindly feeling,—than as an illustration of the nature and growth of Grecian legend generally. Though we now read this Hymn as pleasing poetry, to the Eleusinians, for whom it was composed, it was genuine and sacred history. They believed in the visit of Dêmêtêr to Eleusis, and in the mysteries as a revelation from her, as implicitly as they believed in her existence and power as a goddess. The Eleusinian psalmist shares this belief in common with his countrymen, and embodies it in a continuous narrative, in which the great goddesses of the place, as well as the great heroic families, figure in inseparable conjunction. Keleos is the son of the Eponymous hero Eleusis, and his daughters, with the old epic simplicity, carry their basins to the well for water. Eumolpus, Triptolemus, Dioklês, heroic ancestors of the privileged families who continued throughout the historical times of Athens to fulfil their special hereditary functions in the Eleusinian solemnities, are among the immediate recipients of inspiration from the goddess; but chiefly does she favor Metaneira and her infant son Dêmophoôn, for the latter of whom her greatest boon is destined, and intercepted only by the weak faith of the mother. Moreover, every incident in the Hymn has a local coloring and a special reference. The well, overshadowed by an olive-tree near which Dêmêtêr had rested, the stream Kallichorus and the temple-hill, were familiar and interesting places in the eyes of every Eleusinian; the peculiar posset prepared from barley-meal with mint was always tasted by the Mysts (or communicants) after a prescribed fast, as an article in the ceremony,—while it was also the custom, at a particular spot in the processional march, to permit the free interchange of personal jokes and taunts upon individuals for the general amusement. And these two customs are connected in the Hymn with the incidents, that Dêmêtêr herself had chosen the posset as the first interruption of her long and melancholy fast, and that her sorrowful thoughts had been partially diverted by the coarse playfulness of the servant-maid Iambê. In the enlarged representation of the Eleusinian ceremonies, which became established after the incorporation of Eleusis with Athens, the part of Iambê herself was enacted by a woman, or man in woman's attire, of suitable wit and imagination, who was posted on the bridge over the Kephissos, and addressed to the passers-by in the procession,[92] especially the great men of Athens, saucy jeers, probably not less piercing than those of Aristophanês on the stage. The torch-bearing Hekatê received a portion of the worship in the nocturnal ceremonies of the Eleusinia: this too is traced, in the Hymn, to her kind and affectionate sympathy with the great goddesses.

Though all these incidents were sincerely believed by the Eleusinians as a true history of the past, and as having been the real initiatory cause of their own solemnities, it is not the less certain that they are simply mythes or legends, and not to be treated as history, either actual or exaggerated. They do not take their start from realities of the past, but from realities of the present, combined with retrospective feeling and fancy, which fills up the blank of the aforetime in a manner at once plausible and impressive. What proportion of fact there may be in the legend, or whether there be any at all, it is impossible to ascertain and useless to inquire; for the story did not acquire belief from its approximation to real fact, but from its perfect harmony with Eleusinian faith and feeling, and from the absence of any standard of historical credibility. The little town of Eleusis derived all its importance from the solemnity of the Dêmêtria, and the Hymn which we have been considering (probably at least as old as 600 B. C.) represents the town as it stood before its absorption into the larger unity of Athens, which seems to have produced an alteration of its legends and an increase of dignity in its great festival. In the faith of an Eleusinian, the religious as well as the patriotic antiquities of his native town were connected with this capital solemnity. The divine legend of the sufferings of Dêmêtêr and her visit to Eleusis was to him that which the heroic legend of Adrastus and the Siege of Thêbes was to a Sikyonian, or that of Erechtheus and Athênê to an Athenian grouping together in the same scene and story the goddess and the heroic fathers of the town. If our information were fuller, we should probably find abundance of other legends respecting the Dêmêtria: the Gephyræi of Athens, to whom belonged the celebrated Harmodios and Aristogeitôn, and who possessed special Orgies of Dêmêtêr the Sorrowful, to which no man foreign to their Gens was ever admitted,[93] would doubtless have told stories not only different but contradictory; and even in other Eleusinian mythes we discover Eumolpus as king of Eleusis, son of Poseidôn, and a Thracian, completely different from the character which he bears in the Hymn before us.[94] Neither discrepancies nor want of evidence, in reference to alleged antiquities, shocked the faith of a non-historical public. What they wanted was a picture of the past, impressive to their feelings and plausible to their imagination; and it is important to the reader to remember, while he reads either the divine legends which we are now illustrating or the heroic legends to which we shall soon approach, that he is dealing with a past which never was present,—a region essentially mythical, neither approachable by the critic nor mensurable by the chronologer.

The tale respecting the visit of Dêmêtêr, which was told by the ancient Gens, called the Phytalids,[95] in reference to another temple of Dêmêtêr between Athens and Eleusis, and also by the Megarians in reference to a Dêmêtrion near their city, acquired under the auspices of Athens still further extension. The goddess was reported to have first communicated to Triptolemus at Eleusis the art of sowing corn, which by his intervention was disseminated all over the earth. And thus the Athenians took credit to themselves for having been the medium of communication from the gods to man of all the inestimable blessings of agriculture, which they affirmed

to have been first exhibited on the fertile Rharian plain near Eleusis. Such pretensions are not to be found in the old Homeric hymn. The festival of the Thesmophoria, celebrated in honor of Dêmêtêr Thesmophoros at Athens, was altogether different from the Eleusinia, in this material respect, as well as others, that all males were excluded, and women only were allowed to partake in it: the surname Thesmophoros gave occasion to new legends in which the goddess was glorified as the first authoress of laws and legal sanctions to mankind.[96] This festival, for women apart and alone, was also celebrated at Paros, at Ephesus, and in many other parts of Greece.[97]

Altogether, Dêmêtêr and Dionysos, as the Grecian counterparts of the Egyptian Isis and Osiris, seem to have been the great recipients of the new sacred rites borrowed from Egypt, before the worship of Isis in her own name was introduced into Greece: their solemnities became more frequently recluse and mysterious than those of the other deities. The importance of Dêmêtêr to the collective nationality of Greece may be gathered from the fact that her temple was erected at Thermopylæ, the spot where the Amphiktyonic assemblies were held, close by the temple of the Eponymous hero Amphiktyôn himself, and under the surname of the Amphiktyonic Dêmêtêr.[98]

We now pass to another and not less important celestial personage—Apollo.

The legends of Dêlos and Delphi, embodied in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, indicate, if not a greater dignity, at least a more widely diffused worship of that god than even of Dêmêtêr. The Hymn is, in point of fact, an aggregate of two separate compositions, one emanating from an Ionic bard at Dêlos, the other from Delphi. The first details the birth, the second the mature divine efficiency, of Apollo; but both alike present the unaffected charm as well as the characteristic peculiarities of Grecian mythical narrative. The hymnographer sings, and his hearers accept in perfect good faith, a history of the past; but it is a past, imagined partly as an introductory explanation to the present, partly as a means of glorifying the god. The island of Dêlos was the accredited birth-place of Apollo, and is also the place in which he chiefly delights, where the great and brilliant Ionic festival is periodically convened in his honor. Yet it is a rock narrow, barren, and uninviting: how came so glorious a privilege to be awarded to it? This the poet takes upon himself to explain. Lêtô, pregnant with Apollo, and persecuted by the jealous Hêrê, could find no spot wherein to give birth to her offspring. In vain did she address herself to numerous places in Greece, the Asiatic coast and the intermediate islands; all were terrified at the wrath of Hêrê, and refused to harbor her. As a last resort, she approached the rejected and repulsive island of Dêlos, and promised that, if shelter were granted to her in her forlorn condition, the island should become the chosen resort of Apollo as well as the site of his temple with its rich accompanying solemnities.[99] Dêlos joyfully consented, but not without many apprehensions that the potent Apollo would despise her unworthiness, and not without exacting a formal oath from Lêtô,—who was then admitted to

the desired protection, and duly accomplished her long and painful labor. Though Diônê, Rhea, Themis and Amphitritê came to soothe and succor her, yet Hêrê kept away the goddess presiding over childbirth, Eileithyia, and thus cruelly prolonged her pangs. At length Eileithyia came, and Apollo was born. Hardly had Apollo tasted, from the hands of Themis, the immortal food, nectar and ambrosia, when he burst at once his infant bands, and displayed himself in full divine form and strength, claiming his characteristic attributes of the bow and the harp, and his privileged function of announcing beforehand to mankind the designs of Zeus. The promise made by Lêtô to Dêlos was faithfully performed: amidst the numberless other temples and groves which men provided for him, he ever preferred that island as his permanent residence, and there the Ionians with their wives and children, and all their "bravery," congregated periodically from their different cities to glorify him. Dance and song and athletic contests adorned the solemnity, and the countless ships, wealth, and grace of the multitudinous Ionians had the air of an assembly of gods. The Delian maidens, servants of Apollo, sang hymns to the glory of the god, as well as of Artemis and Lêtô, intermingled with adventures of foregone men and women, to the delight of the listening crowd. The blind itinerant bard of Chios (composer of this the Homeric hymn, and confounded in antiquity with the author of the Iliad) had found honor and acceptance at this festival, and commends himself, in a touching farewell strain, to the remembrance and sympathy of the Delian maidens.[100]

But Dêlos was not an oracular spot: Apollo did not manifest himself there as revealer of the futurities of Zeus. A place must be found where this beneficent function, without which mankind would perish under the innumerable doubts and perplexities of life, may be exercised and rendered available. Apollo himself descends from Olympus to make choice of a suitable site: the hymnographer knows a thousand other adventures of the god which he might sing, but he prefers this memorable incident, the charter and patent of consecration for the Delphian temple. Many different places did Apollo inspect; he surveyed the country of the Magnêtes and the Perrhæbians, came to Iôlkos, and passed over from thence to Eubœa and the plain of Lelanton. But even this fertile spot did not please him: he crossed the Euripus to Bœotia, passed by Teumêssus and Mykalêssus, and the then inaccessible and unoccupied forest on which the city of Thêbes afterwards stood. He next proceeded to Onchêstos, but the grove of Poseidôn was already established there; next across the Kêphissus to Okalea, Haliartus, and the agreeable plain and much-frequented fountain of Delphusa, or Tilphusa. Pleased with the place, Apollo prepared to establish his oracle there, but Tilphusa was proud of the beauty of her own site, and did not choose that her glory should be eclipsed by that of the god.[101] She alarmed him with the apprehension that the chariots which contended in her plain, and the horses and mules which watered at her fountain would disturb the solemnity of his oracle; and she thus induced him to proceed onward to the southern side of Parnassus, overhanging the harbor of Krissa. Here he established his oracle, in the mountainous site not frequented by chariots and horses, and near to a fountain, which however

was guarded by a vast and terrific serpent, once the nurse of the monster Typhaôn. This serpent Apollo slew with an arrow, and suffered its body to rot in the sun: hence the name of the place, Pythô,[102] and the surname of the Pythian Apollo. The plan of his temple being marked out, it was built by Trophônios and Agamêdês, aided by a crowd of forward auxiliaries from the neighborhood. He now discovered with indignation, however, that Tilphusa had cheated him, and went back with swift step to resent it. "Thou shalt not thus," he said, "succeed in thy fraud and retain thy beautiful water; the glory of the place shall be mine, and not thine alone." Thus saying, he tumbled down a crag upon the fountain, and obstructed her limpid current: establishing an altar for himself in a grove hard by near another spring, where men still worship him as Apollo Tilphusios, because of his severe vengeance upon the once beautiful Tilphusa.[103]

Apollo next stood in need of chosen ministers to take care of his temple and sacrifice, and to pronounce his responses at Pythô. Descrying a ship, "containing many and good men," bound on traffic from the Minoian Knossus in Krête, to Pylus in Peloponnêsus, he resolved to make use of the ship and her crew for his purpose. Assuming the shape of a vast dolphin, he splashed about and shook the vessel so as to strike the mariners with terror, while he sent a strong wind, which impelled her along the coast of Peloponnêsus into the Corinthian Gulf, and finally to the harbor of Krissa, where she ran aground. The affrighted crew did not dare to disembark: but Apollo was seen standing on the shore in the guise of a vigorous youth, and inquired who they were, and what was their business. The leader of the Krêtans recounted in reply their miraculous and compulsory voyage, when Apollo revealed himself as the author and contriver of it, announcing to them the honorable function and the dignified post to which he destined them.[104] They followed him by his orders to the rocky Pythô on Parnassus, singing the solemn Io-Paian such as it is sung in Krête, while the god himself marched at their head, with his fine form and lofty step, playing on the harp. He showed them the temple and site of the oracle, and directed them to worship him as Apollo Delphinios, because they had first seen him in the shape of a dolphin. "But how," they inquired, "are we to live in a spot where there is neither corn, nor vine, nor pasturage?" "Ye silly mortals," answered the god, "who look only for toil and privation, know that an easier lot is yours. Ye shall live by the cattle whom crowds of pious visitors will bring to the temple: ye shall need only the knife to be constantly ready for sacrifice.[105] Your duty will be to guard my temple, and to officiate as ministers at my feasts: but if ye be guilty of wrong or insolence, either by word or deed, ye shall become the slaves of other men, and shall remain so forever. Take heed of the word and the warning."

Such are the legends of Dêlos and Delphi, according to the Homeric Hymn to Apollo. The specific functions of the god, and the chief localities of his worship, together with the surnames attached to them, are thus historically explained, being connected with his past acts and adventures. Though these are to us only interesting

poetry, yet to those who heard them sung they possessed all the requisites of history, and were fully believed as such, not because they were partially founded in reality, but because they ran in complete harmony with the feelings; and, so long as that condition was fulfilled, it was not the fashion of the time to canvass truth or falsehood. The narrative is purely personal, without any discernible symbolized doctrine or allegory, to serve as a supposed ulterior purpose: the particular deeds ascribed to Apollo grow out of the general preconceptions as to his attributes, combined with the present realities of his worship. It is neither history nor allegory, but simple mythe or legend.

The worship of Apollo is among the most ancient, capital, and strongly marked facts of the Grecian world, and widely diffused over every branch of the race. It is older than the Iliad or Odyssey, in the latter of which both Pythô and Dêlos are noted, though Dêlos is not named in the former. But the ancient Apollo is different in more respects than one from the Apollo of later times. He is in an especial manner the god of the Trojans, unfriendly to the Greeks, and especially to Achilles; he has, moreover, only two primary attributes, his bow and his prophetic powers, without any distinct connection either with the harp, or with medicine, or with the sun, all which in later times he came to comprehend. He is not only, as Apollo Karneius, the chief god of the Doric race, but also (under the surname of Patrôus) the great protecting divinity of the gentile tie among the Ionians:[106] he is moreover the guide and stimulus to Grecian colonization, scarcely any colony being ever sent out without encouragement and direction from the oracle at Delphi: Apollo Archêgetês is one of his great surnames.[107] His temple lends sanctity to the meetings of the Amphiktyonic assembly, and he is always in filial subordination and harmony with his father Zeus: Delphi and Olympia are never found in conflict. In the Iliad, the warm and earnest patrons of the Greeks are Hêrê, Athênê, and Poseidôn: here too Zeus and Apollo are seen in harmony, for Zeus is decidedly well-inclined to the Trojans, and reluctantly sacrifices them to the importunity of the two great goddesses.[108] The worship of the Sminthian Apollo, in various parts of the Troad and the neighboring territory, dates before the earliest periods of Æolic colonization:[109] hence the zealous patronage of Troy ascribed to him in the Iliad. Altogether, however, the distribution and partialities of the gods in that poem are different from what they become in later times,—a difference which our means of information do not enable us satisfactorily to explain. Besides the Delphian temple, Apollo had numerous temples throughout Greece, and oracles at Abæ in Phôkis, on the Mount Ptôon, and at Tegyra in Bœotia, where he was said to have been born,[110] at Branchidæ near Milêtus, at Klarus in Asia Minor, and at Patara in Lykia. He was not the only oracular god: Zeus at Dodona and at Olympia gave responses also: the gods or heroes Trophônius, Amphiaraus, Amphilochus, Mopsus, etc., each at his own sanctuary and in his own prescribed manner, rendered the same service.

The two legends of Delphi and Dêlos, above noticed, form of course a very insignificant fraction of the narratives which once existed respecting the great and venerated Apollo. They serve only as specimens, and as very early specimens,[111] to illustrate what these divine mythes were, and what was the turn of Grecian faith and imagination. The constantly recurring festivals of the gods caused an incessant demand for new mythes respecting them, or at least for varieties and reproductions of the old mythes. Even during the third century of the Christian æra, in the time of the rhêtôr Menander, when the old forms of Paganism were waning and when the stock of mythes in existence was extremely abundant, we see this demand in great force; but it was incomparably more operative in those earlier times when the creative vein of the Grecian mind yet retained its pristine and unfaded richness. Each god had many different surnames, temples, groves, and solemnities; with each of which was connected more or less of mythical narrative, originally hatched in the prolific and spontaneous fancy of a believing neighborhood, to be afterwards expanded, adorned and diffused by the song of the poet. The earliest subject of competition[112] at the great Pythian festival was the singing of a hymn in honor of Apollo: other *agones* were subsequently added, but the ode or hymn constituted the fundamental attribute of the solemnity: the Pythia at Sikyôn and elsewhere were probably framed on a similar footing. So too at the ancient and celebrated Charitêsia, or festival of the Charites, at Orchomenos, the rivalry of the poets in their various modes of composition both began and continued as the predominant feature:[113] and the inestimable treasures yet remaining to us of Attic tragedy and comedy, are gleanings from the once numerous dramas exhibited at the solemnity of the Dionysia. The Ephesians gave considerable rewards for the best hymns in honor of Artemis, to be sung at her temple.[114] And the early lyric poets of Greece, though their works have not descended to us, devoted their genius largely to similar productions, as may be seen by the titles and fragments yet remaining.

Both the Christian and the Mahomedan religions have begun during the historical age, have been propagated from one common centre, and have been erected upon the ruins of a different pre-existing faith. With none of these particulars did Grecian Paganism correspond. It took rise in an age of imagination and feeling simply, without the restraints, as well as without the aid, of writing or records, of history or philosophy: it was, as a general rule, the spontaneous product of many separate tribes and localities, imitation and propagation operating as subordinate causes; it was moreover a primordial faith, as far as our means of information enable us to discover. These considerations explain to us two facts in the history of the early Pagan mind: first, the divine mythes, the matter of their religion, constituted also the matter of their earliest history; next, these mythes harmonized with each other only in their general types, but differed incurably in respect of particular incidents. The poet who sung a new adventure of Apollo, the trace of which he might have heard in some remote locality, would take care that it should be agreeable to the general conceptions which his hearers entertained respecting the god. He would not ascribe the cestus or

amorous influences to Athênê, nor armed interference and the ægis to Aphroditê; but, provided he maintained this general keeping, he might indulge his fancy without restraint in the particular events of the story.[115] The feelings and faith of his hearers went along with him, and there were no critical scruples to hold them back: to scrutinize the alleged proceedings of the gods was repulsive, and to disbelieve them impious. And thus these divine mythes, though they had their root simply in religious feelings, and though they presented great discrepancies of fact, served nevertheless as primitive matter of history to an early Greek: they were the only narratives, at once publicly accredited and interesting, which he possessed. To them were aggregated the heroic mythes (to which we shall proceed presently),—indeed the two are inseparably blended, gods, heroes and men almost always appearing in the same picture,—analogous both in their structure and their genesis, and differing chiefly in the circumstance that they sprang from the type of a hero instead of from that of a god.

We are not to be astonished if we find Aphroditê, in the Iliad, born from Zeus and Dionê,—and in the Theogony of Hesiod, generated from the foam on the sea after the mutilation of Uranos; nor if in the Odyssey she appears as the wife of Hêphæstos, while in the Theogony the latter is married to Aglaia, and Aphroditê is described as mother of three children by Arês.[116] The Homeric hymn to Aphroditê details the legend of Aphroditê and Anchisês, which is presupposed in the Iliad as the parentage of Æneas: but the author of the hymn, probably sung at one of the festivals of Aphroditê in Cyprus, represents the goddess as ashamed of her passion for a mortal, and as enjoining Anchisês under severe menaces not to reveal who the mother of Æneas was;[117] while in the Iliad she has no scruple in publicly owning him, and he passes everywhere as her acknowledged son. Aphroditê is described in the hymn as herself cold and unimpressible, but ever active and irresistible in inspiring amorous feelings to gods, to men, and to animals. Three goddesses are recorded as memorable exceptions to her universal empire,—Athênê, Artemis, and Hestia or Vesta. Aphroditê was one of the most important of all the goddesses in the mythical world; for the number of interesting, pathetic and tragical adventures deducible from misplaced or unhappy passion was of course very great; and in most of these cases the intervention of Aphroditê was usually prefixed, with some legend to explain why she manifested herself. Her range of action grows wider in the later epic and lyric and tragic poets than in Homer.[118]

Athênê, the man-goddess,[119] born from the head of Zeus, without a mother and without feminine sympathies, is the antithesis partly of Aphroditê, partly of the effeminate or womanized god Dionysos—the latter is an importation from Asia, but Athênê is a Greek conception—the type of composed, majestic and unrelenting force. It appears however as if this goddess had been conceived in a different manner in different parts of Greece. For we find ascribed to her, in some of the legends, attributes of industry and home-keeping; she is represented as the companion of

Hêphæstos, patronizing handicraft, and expert at the loom and the spindle: the Athenian potters worshipped her along with Promêtheus. Such traits of character do not square with the formidable ægis and the massive and crushing spear which Homer and most of the mythes assign to her. There probably were at first at least two different types of Athênê, and their coalescence has partially obliterated the less marked of the two.[120] Athênê is the constant and watchful protectress of Hêraklês: she is also locally identified with the soil and people of Athens, even in the Iliad: Erechtheus, the Athenian, is born of the earth, but Athênê brings him up, nourishes him, and lodges him in her own temple, where the Athenians annually worship him with sacrifice and solemnities.[121] It was altogether impossible to make Erechtheus son of Athênê,—the type of the goddess forbade it; but the Athenian mythe-creators, though they found this barrier impassable, strove to approach to it as near as they could, and the description which they give of the birth of Erichthonios, at once un-Homeric and unseemly, presents something like the phantom of maternity.[122]

The huntress Artemis, in Arcadia and in Greece proper generally, exhibits a well-defined type with which the legends respecting her are tolerably consistent. But the Ephesian as well as the Tauric Artemis partakes more of the Asiatic character, and has borrowed the attributes of the Lydian Great Mother as well as of an indigenous Tauric Virgin:[123] this Ephesian Artemis passed to the colonies of Phokæa and Milêtus.[124] The Homeric Artemis shares with her brother Apollo in the dexterous use of the far-striking bow, and sudden death is described by the poet as inflicted by her gentle arrow. The jealousy of the gods at the withholding of honors and sacrifices, or at the presumption of mortals in contending with them,—a point of character so frequently recurring in the types of the Grecian gods,—manifests itself in the legends of Artemis: the memorable Kalydônian boar is sent by her as a visitation upon Œneus, because he had omitted to sacrifice to her, while he did honor to other gods.[125] The Arcadian heroine Atalanta is however a reproduction of Artemis, with little or no difference, and the goddess is sometimes confounded even with her attendant nymphs.

The mighty Poseidôn, the earth-shaker and the ruler of the sea, is second only to Zeus in power, but has no share in those imperial and superintending capacities which the Father of gods and men exhibits. He numbers a numerous heroic progeny, usually men of great corporeal strength, and many of them belonging to the Æolic race: the great Neleid family of Pylus trace their origin up to him; and he is also the father of Polyphêmus the Cyclôps, whose well-earned suffering he cruelly revenges upon Odysseus. The island of Kalaureia is his Dêlos,[126] and there was held in it an old local Amphiktyony, for the purpose of rendering to him joint honor and sacrifice: the isthmus of Corinth, Helikê in Achaia, and Onchêstos in Bœotia, are also residences which he much affects, and where he is solemnly worshipped. But the abode which he originally and specially selected for himself was the Acropolis of Athens, where by a blow of his trident he produced a well of water in the rock: Athênê came afterwards and claimed the spot for herself, planting in token of possession the olive-

tree which stood in the sacred grove of Pandrosos: and the decision either of the autochthonous Cecrops, or of Erechtheus, awarded to her the preference, much to the displeasure of Poseidôn. Either on this account, or on account of the death of his son Eumolpus, slain in assisting the Eleusinians against Erechtheus, the Attic mythes ascribed to Poseidôn great enmity against the Erechtheid family, which he is asserted to have ultimately overthrown: Theseus, whose glorious reign and deeds succeeded to that family, is said to have been really his son.[127] In several other places,—in Ægina, Argos and Naxos,—Poseidôn had disputed the privileges of patron-god with Zeus, Hêrê and Dionysos: he was worsted in all, but bore his defeat patiently.[128] Poseidôn endured a long slavery, in common with Apollo, gods as they were,[129] under Laomedôn, king of Troy, at the command and condemnation of Zeus: the two gods rebuilt the walls of the city, which had been destroyed by Hêraklês. When their time was expired, the insolent Laomedôn withheld from them the stipulated reward, and even accompanied its refusal with appalling threats; and the subsequent animosity of the god against Troy was greatly determined by the sentiment of this injustice.[130] Such periods of servitude, inflicted upon individual gods, are among the most remarkable of all the incidents in the divine legends. We find Apollo on another occasion condemned to serve Admêtus, king of Pheræ, as a punishment for having killed the Cyclôpes, and Hêraklês also is sold as a slave to Omphalê. Even the fierce Arês, overpowered and imprisoned for a long time by the two Alôids,[131] is ultimately liberated only by extraneous aid. Such narratives attest the discursive range of Grecian fancy in reference to the gods, as well as the perfect commingling of things and persons, divine and human, in their conceptions of the past. The god who serves is for the time degraded: but the supreme god who commands the servitude is in the like proportion exalted, whilst the idea of some sort of order and government among these superhuman beings was never lost sight of. Nevertheless the mythes respecting the servitude of the gods became obnoxious afterwards, along with many others, to severe criticism on the part of philosophers.

The proud, jealous, and bitter Hêrê,—the goddess of the once-wealthy Mykênæ, the *fax et focus* of the Trojan war, and the ever-present protectress of Jasôn in the Argonautic expedition,[132]—occupies an indispensable station in the mythical world. As the daughter of Kronos and wife of Zeus, she fills a throne from whence he cannot dislodge her, and which gives her a right perpetually to grumble and to thwart him.[133] Her unmeasured jealousy of the female favorites of Zeus, and her antipathy against his sons, especially against Hêraklês, has been the suggesting cause of innumerable mythes: the general type of her character stands here clearly marked, as furnishing both stimulus and guide to the mythopœic fancy. The "Sacred Wedding," or marriage of Zeus and Hêrê, was familiar to epithalamic poets long before it became a theme for the spiritualizing ingenuity of critics.

Hêphæstos is the son of Hêrê without a father, and stands to her in the same relation as Athênê to Zeus: her pride and want of sympathy are manifested by her

casting him out at once in consequence of his deformity.[134] He is the god of fire, and especially of fire in its practical applications to handicraft, and is indispensable as the right-hand and instrument of the gods. His skill and his deformity appear alternately as the source of mythical stories: wherever exquisite and effective fabrication is intended to be designated, Hêphæstos is announced as the maker, although in this function the type of his character is reproduced in Dædalos. In the Attic legends he appears intimately united both with Promêtheus and with Athênê, in conjunction with whom he was worshipped at Kolônus near Athens. Lemnos was the favorite residence of Hêphæstos; and if we possessed more knowledge of this island and its town Hêphæstias, we should doubtless find abundant legends detailing his adventures and interventions.

The chaste, still, and home-keeping Hestia, goddess of the family hearth, is far less fruitful in mythical narratives, in spite of her very superior dignity, than the knavish, smooth-tongued, keen, and acquisitive Hermês. His function of messenger of the gods brings him perpetually on the stage, and affords ample scope for portraying the features of his character. The Homeric hymn to Hermês describes the scene and circumstances of his birth, and the almost instantaneous manifestation, even in infancy, of his peculiar attributes; it explains the friendly footing on which he stood with Apollo,—the interchange of gifts and functions between them,—and lastly, the inviolate security of all the wealth and offerings in the Delphian temple, exposed as they were to thieves without any visible protection. Such was the innate cleverness and talent of Hermês, that on the day he was born he invented the lyre, stringing the seven chords on the shell of a tortoise:[135] and he also stole the cattle of Apollo in Pieria, dragging them backwards to his cave in Arcadia, so that their track could not be detected. To the remonstrances of his mother Maia, who points out to him the danger of offending Apollo, Hermês replies, that he aspires to rival the dignity and functions of Apollo among the immortals, and that if his father Zeus refuses to grant them to him, he will employ his powers of thieving in breaking open the sanctuary at Delphi, and in carrying away the gold and the vestments, the precious tripods and vessels.[136] Presently Apollo discovers the loss of his cattle, and after some trouble finds his way to the Kyllênian cavern, where he sees Hermês asleep in his cradle. The child denies the theft with effrontery, and even treats the surmise as a ridiculous impossibility: he persists in such denial even before Zeus, who however detects him at once, and compels him to reveal the place where the cattle are concealed. But the lyre was as yet unknown to Apollo, who has heard nothing except the voice of the Muses and the sound of the pipe. So powerfully is he fascinated by hearing the tones of the lyre from Hermês, and so eager to become possessed of it, that he is willing at once to pardon the past theft, and even to conciliate besides the friendship of Hermês.[137] Accordingly a bargain is struck between the two gods and sanctioned by Zeus. Hermês surrenders to Apollo the lyre, inventing for his own use the syrinx or panspipe, and receiving from Apollo in exchange the golden rod of wealth, with empire over flocks and herds as well as over horses and oxen and the wild animals of

the woods. He presses to obtain the gift of prophecy, but Apollo is under a special vow not to impart that privilege to any god whatever: he instructs Hermês however how to draw information, to a certain extent, from the Mœræ or Fates themselves; and assigns to him, over and above, the function of messenger of the gods to Hadês.

Although Apollo has acquired the lyre, the particular object of his wishes, he is still under apprehension that Hermês will steal it away from him again, together with his bow, and he exacts a formal oath by Styx as security. Hermês promises solemnly that he will steal none of the acquisitions, nor ever invade the sanctuary of Apollo; while the latter on his part pledges himself to recognize Hermês as his chosen friend and companion, amongst all the other sons of Zeus, human or divine.[138]

So came to pass, under the sanction of Zeus, the marked favor shown by Apollo to Hermês. But Hermês (concludes the hymnographer, with frankness unusual in speaking of a god) "does very little good: he avails himself of the darkness of night to cheat without measure the tribes of mortal men."[139]

Here the general types of Hermês and Apollo, coupled with the present fact that no thief ever approached the rich and seemingly accessible treasures of Delphi, engender a string of expository incidents cast into a quasi-historical form and detailing how it happened that Hermês had bound himself by especial convention to respect the Delphian temple. The types of Apollo seem to have been different in different times and parts of Greece: in some places he was worshipped as Apollo Nomios,[140] or the patron of pasture and cattle; and this attribute, which elsewhere passed over to his son Aristæus, is by our hymnographer voluntarily surrendered to Hermês, combined with the golden rod of fruitfulness. On the other hand, the lyre did not originally belong to the Far-striking King, nor is he at all an inventor: the hymn explains both its first invention and how it came into his possession. And the value of the incidents is thus partly expository, partly illustrative, as expanding in detail the general preconceived character of the Kyllênian god.

To Zeus more amours are ascribed than to any of the other gods,—probably because the Grecian kings and chieftains were especially anxious to trace their lineage to the highest and most glorious of all,—each of these amours having its representative progeny on earth.[141] Such subjects were among the most promising and agreeable for the interest of mythical narrative, and Zeus as a lover thus became the father of a great many legends, branching out into innumerable interferences, for which his sons, all of them distinguished individuals, and many of them persecuted by Hêrê, furnished the occasion. But besides this, the commanding functions of the supreme god, judicial and administrative, extending both over gods and men, was a potent stimulus to the mythopœic activity. Zeus has to watch over his own dignity,—the first of all considerations with a god: moreover as Horkios, Xenios, Ktêsios, Meilichios, (a small proportion of his thousand surnames,) he guaranteed oaths and punished perjurers, he enforced the observance of hospitality, he guarded the family

hoard and the crop realized for the year, and he granted expiation to the repentant criminal.[142] All these different functions created a demand for mythes, as the means of translating a dim, but serious, presentiment into distinct form, both self-explaining and communicable to others. In enforcing the sanctity of the oath or of the tie of hospitality, the most powerful of all arguments would be a collection of legends respecting the judgments of Zeus Horkios or Xenios; the more impressive and terrific such legends were, the greater would be their interest, and the less would any one dare to disbelieve them. They constituted the natural outpourings of a strong and common sentiment, probably without any deliberate ethical intention: the preconceptions of the divine agency, expanded into legend, form a product analogous to the idea of the divine features and symmetry embodied in the bronze or the marble statue.

But it was not alone the general type and attributes of the gods which contributed to put in action the mythopœic propensities. The rites and solemnities forming the worship of each god, as well as the details of his temple and its locality, were a fertile source of mythes, respecting his exploits and sufferings, which to the people who heard them served the purpose of past history. The exegetes, or local guide and interpreter, belonging to each temple, preserved and recounted to curious strangers these traditional narratives, which lent a certain dignity even to the minutiæ of divine service. Out of a stock of materials thus ample, the poets extracted individual collections, such as the "Causes" (Αἴτια) of Kallimachus, now lost, and such as the Fasti of Ovid are for the Roman religious antiquities.[143]

It was the practice to offer to the gods in sacrifice the bones of the victim only, inclosed in fat: how did this practice arise? The author of the Hesiodic Theogony has a story which explains it: Promêtheus tricked Zeus into an imprudent choice, at the period when the gods and mortal men first came to an arrangement about privileges and duties (in Mekônê). Promêtheus, the tutelary representative of man, divided a large steer into two portions: on the one side he placed the flesh and guts, folded up in the omentum and covered over with the skin: on the other, he put the bones enveloped in fat. He then invited Zeus to determine which of the two portions the gods would prefer to receive from mankind. Zeus "with both hands" decided for and took the white fat, but was highly incensed on finding that he had got nothing at the bottom except the bones.[144] Nevertheless the choice of the gods was now irrevocably made: they were not entitled to any portion of the sacrificed animal beyond the bones and the white fat; and the standing practice is thus plausibly explained.[145] I select this as one amongst a thousand instances to illustrate the genesis of legend out of religious practices. In the belief of the people, the event narrated in the legend was the real producing cause of the practice: but when we come to apply a sound criticism, we are compelled to treat the event as existing only in its narrative legend, and the legend itself as having been, in the greater number of cases, engendered by the practice,—thus reversing the supposed order of production.

In dealing with Grecian mythes generally, it is convenient to distribute them into such as belong to the Gods and such as belong to the Heroes, according as the one or the other are the prominent personages. The former class manifests, more palpably than the latter, their real origin, as growing out of the faith and the feelings, without any necessary basis, either of matter of fact or allegory: moreover, they elucidate more directly the religion of the Greeks, so important an item in their character as a people. But in point of fact, most of the mythes present to us Gods, Heroes and Men, in juxtaposition one with the other and the richness of Grecian mythical literature arises from the infinite diversity of combinations thus opened out; first by the three class-types, God, Hero, and Man; next by the strict keeping with which each separate class and character is handled. We shall now follow downward the stream of mythical time, which begins with the Gods, to the Heroic legends, or those which principally concern the Heroes and Heroines; for the latter were to the full as important in legend as the former.

CHAPTER II.

LEGENDS RELATING TO HEROES AND MEN.

THE Hesiodic theogony gives no account of anything like a creation of man, nor does it seem that such an idea was much entertained in the legendary vein of Grecian imagination; which commonly carried back the present men by successive generations to some primitive ancestor, himself sprung from the soil, or from a neighboring river or mountain, or from a god, a nymph, etc. But the poet of the Hesiodic "Works and Days" has given us a narrative conceived in a very different spirit respecting the origin of the human race, more in harmony with the sober and melancholy ethical tone which reigns through that poem.[146]

First (he tells us) the Olympic gods made the golden race,—good, perfect, and happy men, who lived from the spontaneous abundance of the earth, in ease and tranquillity like the gods themselves: they suffered neither disease nor old age, and their death was like a gentle sleep. After death they became, by the award of Zeus, guardian terrestrial dæmons, who watch unseen over the proceedings of mankind—with the regal privilege of dispensing to them wealth, and taking account of good and bad deeds.[147]

Next, the gods made the silver race,—unlike and greatly inferior, both in mind and body, to the golden. The men of this race were reckless and mischievous towards each other, and disdainful of the immortal gods, to whom they refused to offer either worship or sacrifice. Zeus in his wrath buried them in the earth: but there they still enjoy a secondary honor, as the Blest of the under-world.[148]

Thirdly, Zeus made the brazen race, quite different from the silver. They were made of hard ash-wood, pugnacious and terrible; they were of immense strength and adamantine soul, nor did they raise or touch bread. Their arms, their houses, and their implements were all of brass: there was then no iron. This race, eternally fighting, perished by each other's hands, died out, and descended without name or privilege to Hadês.[149]

Next, Zeus made a fourth race, far juster and better than the last preceding. These were the Heroes or demigods, who fought at the sieges of Troy and Thêbes. But this splendid stock also became extinct: some perished in war, others were removed by Zeus to a happier state in the islands of the Blest. There they dwell in peace and comfort, under the government of Kronos, reaping thrice in the year the spontaneous produce of the earth.[150]

The fifth race, which succeeds to the Heroes, is of iron: it is the race to which the poet himself belongs, and bitterly does he regret it. He finds his contemporaries mis-

chievous, dishonest, unjust, ungrateful, given to perjury, careless both of the ties of consanguinity and of the behests of the gods: Nemesis and Ædôs (Ethical Self-reproach) have left earth and gone back to Olympus. How keenly does he wish that his lot had been cast either earlier or later![151] This iron race is doomed to continual guilt, care, and suffering, with a small infusion of good; but the time will come when Zeus will put an end to it. The poet does not venture to predict what sort of race will succeed.

Such is the series of distinct races of men, which Hesiod, or the author of the "Works and Days," enumerates as having existed down to his own time. I give it as it stands, without placing much confidence in the various explanations which critics have offered. It stands out in more than one respect from the general tone and sentiment of Grecian legend: moreover the sequence of races is neither natural nor homogeneous,—the heroic race not having any metallic denomination, and not occupying any legitimate place in immediate succession to the brazen. Nor is the conception of the dæmons in harmony either with Homer or with the Hesiodic theogony. In Homer, there is scarcely any distinction between gods and dæmons, while the gods are stated to go about and visit the cities of men in various disguises for the purpose of inspecting good and evil proceedings.[152] But in the poem now before us, the distinction between gods and dæmons is generic. The latter are invisible tenants of earth, remnants of the once happy golden race whom the Olympic gods first made: the remnants of the second or silver race are not dæmons, nor are they tenants of earth, but they still enjoy an honorable posthumous existence as the Blest of the under-world. Nevertheless the Hesiodic dæmons are in no way authors or abettors of evil: on the contrary, they form the unseen police of the gods, for the purpose of repressing wicked behavior in the world.

We may trace, I think, in this quintuple succession of earthly races, set forth by the author of the "Works and Days," the confluence of two veins of sentiment, not consistent one with the other, yet both coëxisting in the author's mind. The drift of his poem is thoroughly didactic and ethical: though deeply penetrated with the injustice and suffering which darken the face of human life, he nevertheless strives to maintain, both in himself and in others, a conviction that on the whole the just and laborious man will come off well,[153] and he enforces in considerable detail the lessons of practical prudence and virtue. This ethical sentiment, which dictates his appreciation of the present, also guides his imagination as to the past. It is pleasing to him to bridge over the chasm between the gods and degenerate man, by the supposition of previous races,—the first altogether pure, the second worse than the first, and the third still worse than the second; and to show further how the first race passed by gentle death-sleep into glorious immortality; how the second race was sufficiently wicked to drive Zeus to bury them in the under-world, yet still leaving them a certain measure of honor; while the third was so desperately violent as to perish by its own animosities, without either name or honor of any kind. The conception of the

golden race passing after death into good guardian dæmons, which some suppose to have been derived from a comparison with oriental angels, presents itself to the poet partly as approximating this race to the gods, partly as a means of constituting a triple gradation of post-obituary existence, proportioned to the character of each race whilst alive. The denominations of gold and silver, given to the first two races, justify themselves, like those given by Simonidês of Amorgos and by Phokylidês to the different characters of women, derived from the dog, the bee, the mare, the ass, and other animals; and the epithet of brazen is specially explained by reference to the material which the pugnacious third race so plentifully employed for their arms and other implements.

So far we trace intelligibly enough the moralizing vein: we find the revolutions of the past so arranged as to serve partly as an ethical lesson, partly as a suitable preface to the present.[154] But fourth in the list comes "the divine race of Heroes:" and here a new vein of thought is opened by the poet. The symmetry of his ethical past is broken up, in order to make way for these cherished beings of the national faith. For though the author of the "Works and Days" was himself of a didactic cast of thought, like Phokylidês, or Solôn, or Theognis, yet he had present to his feelings, in common with his countrymen, the picture of Grecian foretime, as it was set forth in the current mythes, and still more in Homer and those other epical productions which were then the only existing literature and history. It was impossible for him to exclude, from his sketch of the past, either the great persons or the glorious exploits which these poems ennobled; and even if he himself could have consented to such an exclusion, the sketch would have become repulsive to his hearers. But the chiefs who figured before Thêbes and Troy could not be well identified either with the golden, the silver, or the brazen race: moreover it was essential that they should be placed in immediate contiguity with the present race, because their descendants, real or supposed, were the most prominent and conspicuous of existing men. Hence the poet is obliged to assign to them the fourth place in the series, and to interrupt the descending ethical movement in order to interpolate them between the brazen and the iron race, with neither of which they present any analogy. The iron race, to which the poet himself unhappily belongs, is the legitimate successor, not of the heroic, but of the brazen. Instead of the fierce and self-annihilating pugnacity which characterizes the latter, the iron race manifests an aggregate of smaller and meaner vices and mischiefs. It will not perish by suicidal extinction—but it is growing worse and worse, and is gradually losing its vigor, so that Zeus will not vouchsafe to preserve much longer such a race upon the earth.

We thus see that the series of races imagined by the poet of the "Works and Days" is the product of two distinct and incongruous veins of imagination,—the didactic or ethical blending with the primitive mythical or epical. His poem is remarkable as the most ancient didactic production of the Greeks, and as one of the first symptoms of a new tone of sentiment finding its way into their literature, never af-

terwards to become extinct. The tendency of the "Works and Days" is anti-heroic: far from seeking to inspire admiration for adventurous enterprise, the author inculcates the strictest justice, the most unremitting labor and frugality, and a sober, not to say anxious, estimate of all the minute specialties of the future. Prudence and probity are his means,—practical comfort and happiness his end. But he deeply feels, and keenly exposes, the manifold wickedness and short-comings of his contemporaries, in reference to this capital standard. He turns with displeasure from the present men, not because they are too feeble to hurl either the spear of Achilles or some vast boundary-stone, but because they are rapacious, knavish, and unprincipled.

The dæmons first introduced into the religious atmosphere of the Grecian world by the author of the "Works and Days," as generically different from the gods, but as essentially good, and as forming the intermediate agents and police between gods and men,—are deserving of attention as the seed of a doctrine which afterwards underwent many changes, and became of great importance, first as one of the constituent elements of pagan faith, then as one of the helps to its subversion. It will be recollected that the buried remnants of the half-wicked silver race, though they are not recognized as dæmons, are still considered as having a substantive existence, a name, and dignity, in the under-world. The step was easy, to treat them as dæmons also, but as dæmons of a defective and malignant character: this step was made by Empedoclês and Xenocratês, and to a certain extent countenanced by Plato.[155] There came thus to be admitted among the pagan philosophers dæmons both good and bad, in every degree: and these dæmons were found available as a means of explaining many phænomena for which it was not convenient to admit the agency of the gods. They served to relieve the gods from the odium of physical and moral evils, as well as from the necessity of constantly meddling in small affairs; and the objectionable ceremonies of the pagan world were defended upon the ground that in no other way could the exigencies of such malignant beings be appeased. They were most frequently noticed as causes of evil, and thus the name (*dæmon*) came insensibly to convey with it a bad sense,—the idea of an evil being as contrasted with the goodness of a god. So it was found by the Christian writers when they commenced their controversy with paganism. One branch of their argument led them to identify the pagan gods with dæmons in the evil sense, and the insensible change in the received meaning of the word lent them a specious assistance. For they could easily show that not only in Homer, but in the general language of early pagans, all the gods generally were spoken of as dæmons—and therefore, verbally speaking, Clemens and Tatian seemed to affirm nothing more against Zeus or Apollo than was employed in the language of paganism itself. Yet the audience of Homer or Sophoklês would have strenuously repudiated the proposition, if it had been put to them in the sense which the word *dæmon* bore in the age and among the circle of these Christian writers.

In the imagination of the author of the "Works and Days," the dæmons occupy an important place, and are regarded as being of serious practical efficiency. When he is remonstrating with the rulers around him upon their gross injustice and corruption, he reminds them of the vast number of these immortal servants of Zeus who are perpetually on guard amidst mankind, and through whom the visitations of the gods will descend even upon the most potent evil doers.[156] His supposition that the dæmons were not gods, but departed men of the golden race, allowed him to multiply their number indefinitely, without too much cheapening the divine dignity.

As this poet has been so much enslaved by the current legends as to introduce the Heroic race into a series to which it does not legitimately belong, so he has under the same influence inserted in another part of his poem the mythe of Pandora and Promêtheus,[157] as a means of explaining the primary diffusion, and actual abundance, of evil among mankind. Yet this mythe can in no way consist with his quintuple scale of distinct races, and is in fact a totally distinct theory to explain the same problem,—the transition of mankind from a supposed state of antecedent happiness to one of present toil and suffering. Such an inconsistency is not a sufficient reason for questioning the genuineness of either passage; for the two stories, though one contradicts the other, both harmonize with that central purpose which governs the author's mind,—a querulous and didactic appreciation of the present. That such was his purpose appears not only from the whole tenor of his poem, but also from the remarkable fact that his own personality, his own adventures and kindred, and his own sufferings, figure in it conspicuously. And this introduction of self imparts to it a peculiar interest. The father of Hesiod came over from the Æolic Kymê, with the view of bettering his condition, and settled at Askra in Bœotia, at the foot of Mount Helicon. After his death his two sons divided the family inheritance: but Hesiod bitterly complains that his brother Persês cheated and went to law with him, and obtained through corrupt judges an unjust decision. He farther reproaches his brother with a preference for the suits and unprofitable bustle of the agora, at a time when he ought to be laboring for his subsistence in the field. Askra indeed was a miserable place, repulsive both in summer and winter. Hesiod had never crossed the sea, except once from Aulis to Eubœa, whither he went to attend the funeral games of Amphidamas, the chief of Chalkis: he sung a hymn, and gained as prize a tripod, which he consecrated to the muses in Helicon.[158]

These particulars, scanty as they are, possess a peculiar value, as the earliest authentic memorandum respecting the doing or suffering of any actual Greek person. There is no external testimony at all worthy of trust respecting the age of the "Works and Days:" Herodotus treats Hesiod and Homer as belonging to the same age, four hundred years before his own time; and there are other statements besides, some placing Hesiod at an earlier date than Homer, some at a later. Looking at the internal evidences, we may observe that the pervading sentiment, tone and purpose of the poem is widely different from that of the Iliad and Odyssey, and analogous to what

we read respecting the compositions of Archilochus and the Amorgian Simonidês. The author of the "Works and Days" is indeed a preacher and not a satirist: but with this distinction, we find in him the same predominance of the present and the positive, the same disposition to turn the muse into an exponent of his own personal wrongs, the same employment of Æsopic fable by way of illustration, and the same unfavorable estimate of the female sex,[159] all of which may be traced in the two poets above mentioned, placing both of them in contrast with the Homeric epic. Such an internal analogy, in the absence of good testimony, is the best guide which we can follow in determining the date of the "Works and Days," which we should accordingly place shortly after the year 700 B. C. The style of the poem might indeed afford a proof that the ancient and uniform hexameter, though well adapted to continuous legendary narrative or to solemn hymns, was somewhat monotonous when called upon either to serve a polemical purpose or to impress a striking moral lesson. When poets, then the only existing composers, first began to apply their thoughts to the cut and thrust of actual life, aggressive or didactic, the verse would be seen to require a new, livelier and smarter metre; and out of this want grew the elegiac and the iambic verse, both seemingly contemporaneous, and both intended to supplant the primitive hexameter for the short effusions then coming into vogue.

CHAPTER III.

LEGEND OF THE IAPETIDS.

THE sons of the Titan god Iapetus, as described in the Hesiodic theogony, are Atlas, Menœtius, Promêtheus and Epimêtheus.[160] Of these, Atlas alone is mentioned by Homer in the Odyssey, and even he not as the son of Iapetus: the latter himself is named in the Iliad as existing in Tartarus along with Kronos. The Homeric Atlas "knows the depths of the whole sea, and keeps by himself those tall pillars which hold the heaven apart from the earth."[161]

As the Homeric theogony generally appears much expanded in Hesiod, so also does the family of Iapetus, with their varied adventures. Atlas is here described, not as the keeper of the intermediate pillars between heaven and earth, but as himself condemned by Zeus to support the heaven on his head and hands;[162] while the fierce Menœtius is thrust down to Erebus as a punishment for his ungovernable insolence. But the remaining two brothers, Promêtheus and Epimêtheus, are among the most interesting creations of Grecian legend, and distinguished in more than one respect from all the remainder.

First, the main battle between Zeus and the Titan gods is a contest of force purely and simply—mountains are hurled and thunder is launched, and the victory remains to the strongest. But the competition between Zeus and Promêtheus is one of craft and stratagem: the victory does indeed remain to the former, but the honors of the fight belong to the latter. Secondly, Promêtheus and Epimêtheus (the fore-thinker and the after-thinker[163]) are characters stamped at the same mint and by the same effort, the express contrast and antithesis of each other. Thirdly, mankind are here expressly brought forward, not indeed as active partners in the struggle, but as the grand and capital subjects interested,—as gainers or sufferers by the result. Promêtheus appears in the exalted character of champion of the human race, even against the formidable superiority of Zeus.

In the primitive or Hesiodic legend, Promêtheus is not the creator or moulder of man; it is only the later additions which invest him with this character.[164] The race are supposed as existing, and Promêtheus, a member of the dispossessed body of Titan gods, comes forward as their representative and defender. The advantageous bargain which he made with Zeus on their behalf, in respect to the partition of the sacrificial animals, has been recounted in the preceding chapter. Zeus felt that he had been outwitted, and was exceeding wroth. In his displeasure he withheld from mankind the inestimable comfort of fire, so that the race would have perished, had not Promêtheus stolen fire, in defiance of the command of the Supreme Ruler, and brought it to men in the hollow of a ferule.[165]

Zeus was now doubly indignant, and determined to play off a still more ruinous stratagem. Hêphæstos, by his direction, moulded the form of a beautiful virgin; Athênê dressed her, Aphroditê and the Charities bestowed upon her both ornament and fascination, while Hermês infused into her the mind of a dog, a deceitful spirit, and treacherous words.[166] The messenger of the gods conducted this "fascinating mischief" to mankind, at a time when Promêtheus was not present. Now Epimêtheus had received from his brother peremptory injunctions not to accept from the hands of Zeus any present whatever; but the beauty of Pandôra (so the newly-formed female was called) was not to be resisted. She was received and admitted among men, and from that moment their comfort and tranquillity was exchanged for suffering of every kind.[167] The evils to which mankind are liable had been before enclosed in a cask in their own keeping: Pandôra in her malice removed the lid of the cask, and out flew these thousand evils and calamities, to exercise forever their destroying force. Hope alone remained imprisoned, and therefore without efficacy, as before—the inviolable lid being replaced before she could escape. Before this incident (says the legend) men had lived without disease or suffering; but now both earth and sea are full of mischiefs, while maladies of every description stalk abroad by day as well as by night,[168] without any hope for man of relief to come.

The Theogony gives the legend here recounted, with some variations—leaving out the part of Epimêtheus altogether, as well as the cask of evils. Pandôra is the ruin of man, simply as the mother and representative of the female sex.[169] And the variations are thus useful, as they enable us to distinguish the essential from the accessory circumstances of the story.

"Thus (says the poet, at the conclusion of his narrative) it is not possible to escape from the purposes of Zeus."[170] His mythe, connecting the calamitous condition of man with the malevolence of the supreme god, shows, first, by what cause such an unfriendly feeling was raised; next, by what instrumentality its deadly results were brought about. The human race are not indeed the creation, but the protected flock of Promêtheus, one of the elder or dispossessed Titan gods: when Zeus acquires supremacy, mankind along with the rest become subject to him, and are to make the best bargain they can respecting worship and service to be yielded. By the stratagem of their advocate Promêtheus, Zeus is cheated into such a partition of the victims as is eminently unprofitable to him; whereby his wrath is so provoked, that he tries to subtract from man the use of fire. Here however his scheme is frustrated by the theft of Promêtheus: but his second attempt is more successful, and he in his turn cheats the unthinking Epimêtheus into the acceptance of a present (in spite of the peremptory interdict of Promêtheus) by which the whole of man's happiness is wrecked. This legend grows out of two feelings; partly as to the relations of the gods with man, partly as to the relation of the female sex with the male. The present gods are unkind towards man, but the old gods, with whom man's lot was originally cast, were much kinder—and the ablest among them stands forward as the indefatigable pro-

tector of the race. Nevertheless, the mere excess of his craft proves the ultimate ruin of the cause which he espouses. He cheats Zeus out of a fair share of the sacrificial victim, so as both to provoke and justify a retaliation which he cannot be always at hand to ward off: the retaliation is, in his absence, consummated by a snare laid for Epimêtheus and voluntarily accepted. And thus, though Hesiod ascribes the calamitous condition of man to the malevolence of Zeus, his piety suggests two exculpatory pleas for the latter: mankind have been the first to defraud Zeus of his legitimate share of the sacrifice—and they have moreover been consenting parties to their own ruin. Such are the feelings, as to the relation between the gods and man, which have been one of the generating elements of this legend. The other element, a conviction of the vast mischief arising to man from women, whom yet they cannot dispense with, is frequently and strongly set forth in several of the Greek poets—by Simonidês of Amorgos and Phokylidês, not less than by the notorious misogynist Euripidês.

But the miseries arising from woman, however great they might be, did not reach Promêtheus himself. For him, the rash champion who had ventured "to compete in sagacity"[171] with Zeus, a different punishment was in store. Bound by heavy chains to a pillar, he remained fast imprisoned for several generations: every day did an eagle prey upon his liver, and every night did the liver grow afresh for the next day's suffering. At length Zeus, eager to enhance the glory of his favorite son Hêraclês, permitted the latter to kill the eagle and rescue the captive.[172]

Such is the Promêthean mythe as it stands in the Hesiodic poems; its earliest form, as far as we can trace. Upon it was founded the sublime tragedy of Æschylus, "The Enchained Promêtheus," together with at least one more tragedy, now lost, by the same author.[173] Æschylus has made several important alterations; describing the human race, not as having once enjoyed and subsequently lost a state of tranquillity and enjoyment, but as originally feeble and wretched. He suppresses both the first trick played off by Promêtheus upon Zeus respecting the partition of the victim—and the final formation and sending of Pandôra—which are the two most marked portions of the Hesiodic story; while on the other hand he brings out prominently and enlarges upon the theft of fire,[174] which in Hesiod is but slightly touched. If he has thus relinquished the antique simplicity of the story, he has rendered more than ample compensation by imparting to it a grandeur of *idéal*, a large reach of thought combined with appeals to our earnest and admiring sympathy, and a pregnancy of suggestion in regard to the relations between the gods and man, which soar far above the Hesiodic level—and which render his tragedy the most impressive, though not the most artistically composed, of all Grecian dramatic productions. Promêtheus there appears not only as the heroic champion and sufferer in the cause and for the protection of the human race, but also as the gifted teacher of all the arts, helps, and ornaments of life, amongst which fire is only one:[175] all this against the will and in defiance of the purpose of Zeus, who, on acquiring his empire, wished to destroy the human race and to beget some new breed.[176] Moreover, new relations between

Promêtheus and Zeus are superadded by Æschylus. At the commencement of the struggle between Zeus and the Titan gods, Promêtheus had vainly attempted to prevail upon the latter to conduct it with prudence; but when he found that they obstinately declined all wise counsel, and that their ruin was inevitable, he abandoned their cause and joined Zeus. To him and to his advice Zeus owed the victory: yet the monstrous ingratitude and tyranny of the latter is now manifested by nailing him to a rock, for no other crime than because he frustrated the purpose of extinguishing the human race, and furnished to them the means of living with tolerable comfort.[177] The new ruler Zeus, insolent with his victory over the old gods, tramples down all right, and sets at naught sympathy and obligation, as well towards gods as towards man. Yet the prophetic Promêtheus, in the midst of intense suffering, is consoled by the foreknowledge that the time will come when Zeus must again send for him, release him, and invoke his aid, as the sole means of averting from himself dangers otherwise insurmountable. The security and means of continuance for mankind have now been placed beyond the reach of Zeus—whom Promêtheus proudly defies, glorying in his generous and successful championship,[178] despite the terrible price which he is doomed to pay for it.

As the Æschylean Promêtheus, though retaining the old lineaments, has acquired a new coloring, soul and character, so he has also become identified with a special locality. In Hesiod, there is no indication of the place in which he is imprisoned; but Æschylus places it in Scythia,[179] and the general belief of the Greeks supposed it to be on Mount Caucasus. So long and so firmly did this belief continue, that the Roman general Pompey, when in command of an army in Kolchis, made with his companion, the literary Greek Theophanês, a special march to view the spot in Caucasus where Promêtheus had been transfixed.[180]

CHAPTER IV.

HEROIC LEGENDS.—GENEALOGY OF ARGOS.

HAVING briefly enumerated the gods of Greece, with their chief attributes as described in legend, we come to those genealogies which connected them with historical men.

In the retrospective faith of a Greek, the ideas of worship and ancestry coalesced. Every association of men, large or small, in whom there existed a feeling of present union, traced back that union to some common initial progenitor; that progenitor being either the common god whom they worshipped, or some semi-divine person closely allied to him. What the feelings of the community require is, a continuous pedigree to connect them with this respected source of existence, beyond which they do not think of looking back. A series of names, placed in filiation or fraternity, together with a certain number of family or personal adventures ascribed to some of the individuals among them, constitute the ante-historical past through which the Greek looks back to his gods. The names of this genealogy are, to a great degree, gentile or local names familiar to the people,—rivers, mountains, springs, lakes, villages, demes, etc.,—embodied as persons, and introduced as acting or suffering. They are moreover called kings or chiefs, but the existence of a body of subjects surrounding them is tacitly implied rather than distinctly set forth; for their own personal exploits or family proceedings constitute for the most part the whole matter of narrative. And thus the genealogy was made to satisfy at once the appetite of the Greeks for romantic adventure, and their demand for an unbroken line of filiation between themselves and the gods. The eponymous personage, from whom the community derive their name, is sometimes the begotten son of the local god, sometimes an indigenous man sprung from the earth, which is indeed itself divinized.

It will be seen from the mere description of these genealogies that they included elements human and historical, as well as elements divine and extra-historical. And if we could determine the time at which any genealogy was first framed, we should be able to assure ourselves that the men then represented as present, together with their fathers and grandfathers, were real persons of flesh and blood. But this is a point which can seldom be ascertained; moreover, even if it could be ascertained, we must at once set it aside, if we wish to look at the genealogy in the point of view of the Greeks. For to them, not only all the members were alike real, but the gods and heroes at the commencement were in a certain sense the most real; at least, they were the most esteemed and indispensable of all. The value of the genealogy consisted, not in its length, but in its continuity; not (according to the feeling of modern aristocracy) in the power of setting out a prolonged series of human fathers and grandfathers, but in the sense of ancestral union with the primitive god. And the

length of the series is traceable rather to humility, inasmuch as the same person who was gratified with the belief that he was descended from a god in the fifteenth generation, would have accounted it criminal insolence to affirm that a god was his father or grandfather. In presenting to the reader those genealogies which constitute the supposed primitive history of Hellas, I make no pretence to distinguish names real and historical from fictitious creations; partly because I have no evidence upon which to draw the line, and partly because by attempting it I should altogether depart from the genuine Grecian point of view.

Nor is it possible to do more than exhibit a certain selection of such as were most current and interesting; for the total number of them which found place in Grecian faith exceeds computation. As a general rule, every deme, every gens, every aggregate of men accustomed to combined action, religious or political, had its own. The small and unimportant demes into which Attica was divided had each its ancestral god and heroes, just as much as the great Athens herself. Even among the villages of Phokis, which Pausanias will hardly permit himself to call towns, deductions of legendary antiquity were not wanting. And it is important to bear in mind, when we are reading the legendary genealogies of Argos, or Sparta, or Thêbes, that these are merely samples amidst an extensive class, all perfectly analogous, and all exhibiting the religious and patriotic retrospect of some fraction of the Hellenic world. They are no more matter of historical tradition than any of the thousand other legendary genealogies which men delighted to recall to memory at the periodical festivals of their gens, their deme, or their village.

With these few prefatory remarks, I proceed to notice the most conspicuous of the Grecian heroic pedigrees, and first, that of Argos.

The earliest name in Argeian antiquity is that of Inachus, the son of Oceanus and Têthys, who gave his name to the river flowing under the walls of the town. According to the chronological computations of those who regarded the mythical genealogies as substantive history, and who allotted a given number of years to each generation, the reign of Inachus was placed 1986 B. C., or about 1100 years prior to the commencement of the recorded Olympiads.[181]

The sons of Inachus were Phorôneus and Ægialeus; both of whom however were sometimes represented as autochthonous men, the one in the territory of Argos, the other in that of Sikyôn. Ægialeus gave his name to the north-western region of the Peloponnêsus, on the southern coast of the Corinthian Gulf.[182] The name of Phorôneus was of great celebrity in the Argeian mythical genealogies, and furnished both the title and the subject of the ancient poem called Phorônis, in which he is styled "the father of mortal men."[183] He is said to have imparted to mankind, who had before him lived altogether isolated, the first notion and habits of social existence, and even the first knowledge of fire: his dominion extended over the whole Peloponnêsus. His tomb at Argos, and seemingly also the place called the Phorônic

city, in which he formed the first settlement of mankind, were still shown in the days of Pausanias.[184] The offspring of Phorôneus, by the nymph Teledikê, were Apis and Niobê. Apis, a harsh ruler, was put to death by Thelxiôn and Telchin, having given to Peloponnêsus the name of Apia:[185] he was succeeded by Argos, the son of his sister Niobê by the god Zeus. From this sovereign Peloponnêsus was denominated Argos. By his wife Evadnê, daughter of Strymôn,[186] he had four sons, Ekbasus, Peiras, Epidaurus, and Kriasus. Ekbasus was succeeded by his son Agênôr, and he again by his son Argos Panoptês,—a very powerful prince who is said to have had eyes distributed over all his body, and to have liberated Peloponnêsus from several monsters and wild animals which infested it:[187] Akusilaus and Æschylus make this Argos an earth-born person, while Pherekydês reports him as son of Arestôr. Iasus was the son of Argos Panoptês by Ismênê, daughter of Asôpus. According to the authors whom Apollodôrus and Pausanias prefer, the celebrated Iô was his daughter: but the Hesiodic epic (as well as Akusilaus) represented her as daughter of Peiras, while Æschylus and Kastor the chronologist affirmed the primitive king Inachus to have been her father.[188] A favorite theme, as well for the ancient genealogical poets as for the Attic tragedians, were the adventures of Iô, of whom, while priestess of Hêrê, at the ancient and renowned Hêræon between Mykênæ and Argos, Zeus became amorous. When Hêrê discovered the intrigue and taxed him with it, he denied the charge, and metamorphosed Iô into a white cow. Hêrê, requiring that the cow should be surrendered to her, placed her under the keeping of Argos Panoptês; but this guardian was slain by Hermês, at the command of Zeus: and Hêrê then drove the cow Iô away from her native land by means of the incessant stinging of a gadfly, which compelled her to wander without repose or sustenance over an immeasurable extent of foreign regions. The wandering Iô gave her name to the Ionian Gulf, traversed Epirus and Illyria, passed the chain of Mount Hæmus and the lofty summits of Caucasus, and swam across the Thracian or Cimmerian Bosporus (which also from her derived its appellation) into Asia. She then went through Scythia, Cimmeria, and many Asiatic regions, until she arrived in Egypt, where Zeus at length bestowed upon her rest, restored her to her original form, and enabled her to give birth to his black son Epaphos.[189]

Such is a general sketch of the adventures which the ancient poets, epic, lyric, and tragic, and the logographers after them, connect with the name of the Argeian Iô,—one of the numerous tales which the fancy of the Greeks deduced from the amorous dispositions of Zeus and the jealousy of Hêrê. That the scene should be laid in the Argeian territory appears natural, when we recollect that both Argos and Mykênæ were under the special guardianship of Hêrê, and that the Hêræon between the two was one of the oldest and most celebrated temples in which she was worshipped. It is useful to compare this amusing fiction with the representation reported to us by Herodotus, and derived by him as well from Phœnician as from Persian antiquarians, of the circumstances which occasioned the transit of Iô from Argos to Egypt,—an event recognized by all of them as historical matter of fact. According to

the Persians, a Phœnician vessel had arrived at the port near Argos, freighted with goods intended for sale to the inhabitants of the country. After the vessel had remained a few days, and disposed of most of her cargo, several Argeian women, and among them Iô the king's daughter, coming on board to purchase, were seized and carried off by the crew, who sold Iô in Egypt.[190] The Phœnician antiquarians, however, while they admitted the circumstance that Iô had left her own country in one of their vessels, gave a different color to the whole by affirming that she emigrated voluntarily, having been engaged in an amour with the captain of the vessel, and fearing that her parents might come to the knowledge of her pregnancy. Both Persians and Phœnicians described the abduction of Iô as the first of a series of similar acts between Greeks and Asiatics, committed each in revenge for the preceding. First came the rape of Eurôpê from Phœnicia by Grecian adventurers,—perhaps, as Herodotus supposed, by Krêtans: next, the abduction of Mêdeia from Kolchis by Jasôn, which occasioned the retaliatory act of Paris, when he stole away Helena from Menelaos. Up to this point the seizures of women by Greeks from Asiatics, and by Asiatics from Greeks, had been equivalents both in number and in wrong. But the Greeks now thought fit to equip a vast conjoint expedition to recover Helen, in the course of which they took and sacked Troy. The invasions of Greece by Darius and Xerxes were intended, according to the Persian antiquarians, as a long-delayed retribution for the injury inflicted on the Asiatics by Agamemnôn and his followers.[191]

The account thus given of the adventures of Iô, when contrasted with the genuine legend, is interesting, as it tends to illustrate the phænomenon which early Grecian history is constantly presenting to us,—the way in which the epical furniture of an unknown past is recast and newly colored so as to meet those changes which take place in the retrospective feelings of the present. The religious and poetical character of the old legend disappears: nothing remains except the names of persons and places, and the voyage from Argos to Egypt: we have in exchange a sober, quasi-historical narrative, the value of which consists in its bearing on the grand contemporary conflicts between Persia and Greece, which filled the imagination of Herodotus and his readers.

To proceed with the genealogy of the kings of Argos, Iasus was succeeded by Krotôpus, son of his brother Agênôr; Krotôpus by Sthenelas, and he again by Gelanôr.[192] In the reign of the latter, Danaos came with his fifty daughters from Egypt to Argos; and here we find another of those romantic adventures which so agreeably decorate the barrenness of the mythical genealogies. Danaos and Ægyptos were two brothers descending from Epaphos, son of Iô: Ægyptos had fifty sons, who were eager to marry the fifty daughters of Danaos, in spite of the strongest repugnance of the latter. To escape such a necessity, Danaos placed his fifty daughters on board of a penteconter (or vessel with fifty oars) and sought refuge at Argos; touching in his voyage at the island of Rhodes, where he erected a statue of Athênê at Lindos, which was long exhibited as a memorial of his passage. Ægyptos and his

sons followed them to Argos and still pressed their suit, to which Danaos found himself compelled to assent; but on the wedding night he furnished each of his daughters with a dagger, and enjoined them to murder their husbands during the hour of sleep. His orders were obeyed by all, with the single exception of Hypermnêstra, who preserved her husband Lynkeus, incurring displeasure and punishment from her father. He afterwards, however, pardoned her; and when, by the voluntary abdication of Gelanôr, he became king of Argos, Lynkeus was recognized as his son-in-law and ultimately succeeded him. The remaining daughters, having been purified by Athênê and Hermês, were given in marriage to the victors in a gymnic contest publicly proclaimed. From Danaos was derived the name of Danai, applied to the inhabitants of the Argeian territory,[193] and to the Homeric Greeks generally.

From the legend of the Danaïdes we pass to two barren names of kings, Lynkeus and his son Abas. The two sons of Abas were Akrisios and Prœtos, who, after much dissension, divided between them the Argeian territory; Akrisios ruling at Argos, and Prœtos at Tiryns. The families of both formed the theme of romantic stories. To pass over for the present the legend of Bellerophôn, and the unrequited passion which the wife of Prœtos conceived for him, we are told that the daughters of Prœtos, beautiful, and solicited in marriage by suitors from all Greece, were smitten with leprosy and driven mad, wandering in unseemly guise throughout Peloponnêsus. The visitation had overtaken them, according to Hesiod, because they refused to take part in the Bacchic rites; according to Pherekydês and the Argeian Akusilaus,[194] because they had treated scornfully the wooden statue and simple equipments of Hêrê: the religious character of the old legend here displays itself in a remarkable manner. Unable to cure his daughters, Prœtos invoked the aid of the renowned Pylian prophet and leech, Melampus son of Amythaôn, who undertook to remove the malady on condition of being rewarded with the third part of the kingdom. Prœtos indignantly refused these conditions: but the state of his daughters becoming aggravated and intolerable, he was compelled again to apply to Melampus; who, on the second request, raised his demands still higher, and required another third of the kingdom for his brother Bias. These terms being acceded to, he performed his part of the covenant. He appeased the wrath of Hêrê by prayer and sacrifice; or, according to another account, he approached the deranged women at the head of a troop of young men, with shouting and ecstatic dance,—the ceremonies appropriate to the Bacchic worship of Dionysos,—and in this manner effected their cure. Melampus, a name celebrated in many different Grecian mythes, is the legendary founder and progenitor of a great and long-continued family of prophets. He and his brother Bias became kings of separate portions of the Argeian territory: he is recognized as ruler there even in the Odyssey, and the prophet Theoklymenos, his grandson, is protected and carried to Ithaca by Telemachus.[195] Herodotus also alludes to the cure of the women, and to the double kingdom of Melampus and Bias in the Argeian land: he recognizes Melampus as the first person who introduced to the knowledge of the Greeks the name and worship of Dionysos, with its appropriate sacrifices and phallic

processions. Here again he historicizes various features of the old legend in a manner not unworthy of notice.[196]

But Danaê, the daughter of Akrisios, with her son Perseus acquired still greater celebrity than her cousins the Prœtides. An oracle had apprized Akrisios that his daughter would give birth to a son by whose hand he would himself be slain. To guard against this danger, he imprisoned Danaê in a chamber of brass under ground. But the god Zeus had become amorous of her, and found means to descend through the roof in the form of a shower of gold: the consequence of his visits was the birth of Perseus. When Akrisios discovered that his daughter had given existence to a son, he enclosed both the mother and the child in a coffer, which he cast into the sea.[197] The coffer was carried to the isle of Seriphos, where Diktys, brother of the king Polydektês, fished it up, and rescued both Danaê and Perseus. The exploits of Perseus, when he grew up, against the three Phorkides or daughters of Phorkys, and the three Gorgons, are among the most marvellous and imaginative in all Grecian legend: they bear a stamp almost Oriental. I shall not here repeat the details of those unparalleled hazards which the special favor of Athênê enabled him to overcome, and which ended in his bringing back from Libya the terrific head of the Gorgon Medusa, endued with the property of turning every one who looked upon it into stone. In his return, he rescued Andromeda, daughter of Kêpheus, who had been exposed to be devoured by a sea-monster, and brought her back as his wife. Akrisios trembled to see him after this victorious expedition, and retired into Thessaly to avoid him; but Perseus followed him thither, and having succeeded in calming his apprehensions, became competitor in a gymnic contest where his grandfather was among the spectators. By an incautious swing of his quoit, he unintentionally struck Akrisios, and caused his death: the predictions of the oracle were thus at last fulfilled. Stung with remorse at the catastrophe, and unwilling to return to Argos, which had been the principality of Akrisios, Perseus made an exchange with Megapenthês, son of Prœtos king of Tiryns. Megapenthês became king of Argos, and Perseus of Tiryns: moreover, the latter founded, within ten miles of Argos, the far-famed city of Mykênæ. The massive walls of this city, like those of Tiryns, of which remains are yet to be seen, were built for him by the Lykian Cyclôpes.[198]

We here reach the commencement of the Perseid dynasty of Mykênæ. It should be noticed, however, that there were among the ancient legends contradictory accounts of the foundation of this city. Both the Odyssey and the Great Eoiai enumerated, among the heroines, Mykênê, the Eponyma of the city; the former poem classifying her with Tyrô and Alkmênê, the latter describing her as the daughter of Inachus and wife of Arestôr. And Akusilaus mentioned an Eponymus Mykêneus, the son of Spartôn and grandson of Phorôneus.[199]

The prophetic family of Melampus maintained itself in one of the three parts of the divided Argeian kingdom for five generations, down to Amphiaraos and his sons Alkmæôn and Amphilochos. The dynasty of his brother Bias, and that of

Megapenthês, son of Prœtos, continued each for four generations: a list of barren names fills up the interval.[200] The Perseids of Mykênæ boasted a descent long and glorious, heroic as well as historical, continuing down to the last sovereigns of Sparta.[201] The issue of Perseus was numerous: his son Alkæos was father of Amphitryôn; another of his sons, Elektryôn, was father of Alkmênê;[202] a third, Sthenelos, father of Eurystheus.

After the death of Perseus, Alkæos and Amphitryôn dwelt at Tiryns. The latter became engaged in a quarrel with Elektryôn respecting cattle, and in a fit of passion killed him:[203] moreover the piratical Taphians from the west coast of Akarnania invaded the country, and slew the sons of Elektryôn, so that Alkmênê alone was left of that family. She was engaged to wed Amphitryôn; but she bound him by oath not to consummate the marriage until he had avenged upon the Têleboæ the death of her brothers. Amphitryôn, compelled to flee the country as the murderer of his uncle, took refuge in Thêbes, whither Alkmênê accompanied him: Sthenelos was left in possession of Tiryns. The Kadmeians of Thêbes, together with the Locrians and Phocians, supplied Amphitryôn with troops, which he conducted against the Têleboæ and the Taphians:[204] yet he could not have subdued them without the aid of Komæthô, daughter of the Taphian king Pterelaus, who conceived a passion for him, and cut off from her father's head the golden lock to which Poseidôn had attached the gift of immortality.[205] Having conquered and expelled his enemies, Amphitryôn returned to Thêbes, impatient to consummate his marriage: but Zeus on the wedding-night assumed his form and visited Alkmênê before him: he had determined to produce from her a son superior to all his prior offspring,—"a specimen of invincible force both to gods and men."[206] At the proper time, Alkmênê was delivered of twin sons: Hêraklês the offspring of Zeus,—the inferior and unhonored Iphiklês, offspring of Amphitryôn.[207]

When Alkmênê was on the point of being delivered at Thêbes, Zeus publicly boasted among the assembled gods, at the instigation of the mischief-making Atê, that there was on that day about to be born on earth, from his breed, a son who should rule over all his neighbors. Hêrê treated this as an empty boast, calling upon him to bind himself by an irremissible oath that the prediction should be realized. Zeus incautiously pledged his solemn word; upon which Hêrê darted swiftly down from Olympus to the Achaic Argos, where the wife of Sthenelos (son of Perseus, and therefore grandson of Zeus) was already seven months gone with child. By the aid of the Eileithyiæ, the special goddesses of parturition, she caused Eurystheus, the son of Sthenelos, to be born before his time on that very day, while she retarded the delivery of Alkmênê. Then returning to Olympus, she announced the fact to Zeus: "The good man Eurystheus, son of the Perseid Sthenelos, is this day born of thy loins: the sceptre of the Argeians worthily belongs to him." Zeus was thunderstruck at the consummation which he had improvidently bound himself to accomplish. He seized Atê his evil counsellor by the hair, and hurled her forever away from Olympus: but he

had no power to avert the ascendency of Eurystheus and the servitude of Hêraklês. "Many a pang did he suffer, when he saw his favorite son going through his degrading toil in the tasks imposed upon him by Eurystheus."[208]

The legend, of unquestionable antiquity, here transcribed from the Iliad, is one of the most pregnant and characteristic in the Grecian mythology. It explains, according to the religious ideas familiar to the old epic poets, both the distinguishing attributes and the endless toil and endurances of Hêraklês,—the most renowned and most ubiquitous of all the semi-divine personages worshipped by the Hellênes,—a being of irresistible force, and especially beloved by Zeus, yet condemned constantly to labor for others and to obey the commands of a worthless and cowardly persecutor. His recompense is reserved to the close of his career, when his afflicting trials are brought to a close: he is then admitted to the godhead and receives in marriage Hêbê.[209] The twelve labors, as they are called, too notorious to be here detailed, form a very small fraction of the exploits of this mighty being, which filled the Hêrakleian epics of the ancient poets. He is found not only in most parts of Hellas, but throughout all the other regions then known to the Greeks, from Gadês to the river Thermôdôn in the Euxine and to Scythia, overcoming all difficulties and vanquishing all opponents. Distinguished families are everywhere to be traced who bear his patronymic, and glory in the belief that they are his descendants. Among Achæans, Kadmeians, and Dôrians, Hêraklês is venerated: the latter especially treat him as their principal hero,—the Patron Hero-God of the race: the Hêrakleids form among all Dôrians a privileged gens, in which at Sparta the special lineage of the two kings was included.

His character lends itself to mythes countless in number as well as disparate in their character. The irresistible force remains constant, but it is sometimes applied with reckless violence against friends as well as enemies, sometimes devoted to the relief of the oppressed. The comic writers often brought him out as a coarse and stupid glutton, while the Athênian philosopher Prodikos, without at all distorting the type, extracted from it the simple, impressive, and imperishable apologue still known as the Choice of Hercules.

After the death and apotheosis of Hêraklês, his son Hyllos and his other children were expelled and persecuted by Eurystheus: the fear of his vengeance deterred both the Trachinian king Kêyx and the Thêbans from harboring them, and the Athênians alone were generous enough to brave the risk of offering them shelter. Eurystheus invaded Attica, but perished in the attempt by the hand of Hyllos, or by that of Iolaos, the old companion and nephew of Hêraklês.[210] The chivalrous courage which the Athênians had on this occasion displayed in behalf of oppressed innocence, was a favorite theme for subsequent eulogy by Attic poets and orators.

All the sons of Eurystheus lost their lives in the battle along with him, so that the Perseid family was now represented only by the Hêrakleids, who collected an army

and endeavored to recover the possessions from which they had been expelled. The united forces of Iônians, Achæans, and Arcadians, then inhabiting Peloponnêsus, met the invaders at the isthmus, when Hyllos, the eldest of the sons of Hêraklês, proposed that the contest should be determined by a single combat between himself and any champion of the opposing army. It was agreed, that if Hyllos were victorious, the Hêrakleids should be restored to their possessions—if he were vanquished, that they should forego all claim for the space of a hundred years, or fifty years, or three generations,—for in the specification of the time, accounts differ. Echemos, the hero of Tegea in Arcadia, accepted the challenge, and Hyllos was slain in the encounter; in consequence of which the Hêrakleids retired, and resided along with the Dôrians under the protection of Ægimios, son of Dôrus.[211] As soon as the stipulated period of truce had expired, they renewed their attempt upon Peloponnêsus conjointly with the Dôrians, and with complete success: the great Dôrian establishments of Argos, Sparta, and Messênia were the result. The details of this victorious invasion will be hereafter recounted.

Sikyôn, Phlios, Epidauros, and Trœzen[212] all boasted of respected eponyms and a genealogy of dignified length, not exempt from the usual discrepancies—but all just as much entitled to a place on the tablet of history as the more renowned Æolids or Hêrakleids. I omit them here because I wish to impress upon the reader's mind the salient features and character of the legendary world,—not to load his memory with a full list of legendary names.

CHAPTER V.

DEUKALION, HELLEN, AND SONS OF HELLEN.

In the Hesiodic Theogony, as well as in the "Works and Days," the legend of Promêtheus and Epimêtheus presents an import religious, ethical, and social, and in this sense it is carried forward by Æschylus; but to neither of the characters is any genealogical function assigned. The Hesiodic Catalogue of Women brought both of them into the stream of Grecian legendary lineage, representing Deukaliôn as the son of Promêtheus and Pandôra, and seemingly his wife Pyrrha as daughter of Epimêtheus.[213]

Deukaliôn is important in Grecian mythical narrative under two points of view. First, he is the person specially saved at the time of the general deluge: next, he is the father of Hellên, the great eponym of the Hellenic race; at least this was the more current story, though there were other statements which made Hellên the son of Zeus.

The name of Deukaliôn is originally connected with the Lokrian towns of Kynos and Opus, and with the race of the Leleges, but he appears finally as settled in Thessaly, and ruling in the portion of that country called Phthiôtis.[214] According to what seems to have been the old legendary account, it is the deluge which transferred him from the one to the other; but according to another statement, framed in more historicizing times, he conducted a body of Kurêtes and Leleges into Thessaly, and expelled the prior Pelasgian occupants.[215]

The enormous iniquity with which earth was contaminated—as Apollodôrus says, by the then existing brazen race, or as others say, by the fifty monstrous sons of Lykaôn—provoked Zeus to send a general deluge.[216] An unremitting and terrible rain laid the whole of Greece under water, except the highest mountain-tops, whereon a few stragglers found refuge. Deukaliôn was saved in a chest or ark, which he had been forewarned by his father Promêtheus to construct. After floating for nine days on the water, he at length landed on the summit of Mount Parnassus. Zeus having sent Hermês to him, promising to grant whatever he asked, he prayed that men and companions might be sent to him in his solitude: accordingly Zeus directed both him and Pyrrha to cast stones over their heads: those cast by Pyrrha became women, those by Deukaliôn men. And thus the "stony race of men" (if we may be allowed to translate an etymology which the Greek language presents exactly, and which has not been disdained by Hesiod, by Pindar, by Epicharmus, and by Virgil) came to tenant the soil of Greece.[217] Deukaliôn on landing from the ark sacrificed a grateful offering to Zeus Phyxios, or the God of escape; he also erected altars in Thessaly to the twelve great gods of Olympus.[218]

The reality of this deluge was firmly believed throughout the historical ages of Greece: the chronologers, reckoning up by genealogies, assigned the exact date of it, and placed it at the same time as the conflagration of the world by the rashness of Phaëtôn, during the reign of Krotôpas king of Argus, the seventh from Inachus.[219] The meteorological work of Aristotle admits and reasons upon this deluge as an unquestionable fact, though he alters the locality by placing it west of Mount Pindus, near Dôdôna and the river Achelôus.[220] He at the same time treats it as a physical phenomenon, the result of periodical cycles in the atmosphere, thus departing from the religious character of the old legend, which described it as a judgment inflicted by Zeus upon a wicked race. Statements founded upon this event were in circulation throughout Greece even to a very late date. The Megarians affirmed that Megaros, their hero, son of Zeus by a local nymph, had found safety from the waters on the lofty summit of their mountain Geraneia, which had not been completely submerged. And in the magnificent temple of the Olympian Zeus at Athens, a cavity in the earth was shown, through which it was affirmed that the waters of the deluge had retired. Even in the time of Pausanias, the priests poured into this cavity holy offerings of meal and honey.[221] In this, as in other parts of Greece, the idea of the Deukalionian deluge was blended with the religious impressions of the people and commemorated by their sacred ceremonies.

The offspring of Deukaliôn and Pyrrha were two sons, Hellên and Amphiktyôn, and a daughter, Prôtogeneia, whose son by Zeus was Aëthlius: it was however maintained by many, that Hellên was the son of Zeus and not of Deukaliôn. Hellên had by a nymph three sons, Dôrus, Xuthus, and Æolus. He gave to those who had been before called Greeks,[222] the name of Hellênes, and partitioned his territory among his three children. Æolus reigned in Thessaly; Xuthus received Peloponnêsus, and had by Creüsa as his sons, Achæus and Iôn; while Dôrus occupied the country lying opposite to the Peloponnêsus, on the northern side of the Corinthian Gulf. These three gave to the inhabitants of their respective countries the names of Æolians, Achæans and Iônians, and Dôrians.[223]

Such is the genealogy as we find it in Apollodôrus. In so far as the names and filiation are concerned, many points in it are given differently, or implicitly contradicted, by Euripidês and other writers. Though as literal and personal history it deserves no notice, its import is both intelligible and comprehensive. It expounds and symbolizes the first fraternal aggregation of Hellênic men, together with their territorial distribution and the institutions which they collectively venerated.

There were two great holding-points in common for every section of Greeks. One was the Amphiktyonic assembly, which met half-yearly, alternately at Delphi and at Thermopylæ; originally and chiefly for common religious purposes, but indirectly and occasionally embracing political and social objects along with them. The other was, the public festivals or games, of which the Olympic came first in importance; next, the Pythian, Nemean and Isthmian,—institutions which combined religious solemni-

ties with recreative effusion and hearty sympathies, in a manner so imposing and so unparalleled. Amphiktyôn represents the first of these institutions, and Aëthlius the second. As the Amphiktyonic assembly was always especially connected with Thermopylæ and Thessaly, Amphiktyôn is made the son of the Thessalian Deukaliôn; but as the Olympic festival was nowise locally connected with Deukaliôn, Aëthlius is represented as having Zeus for his father, and as touching Deukaliôn only through the maternal line. It will be seen presently, that the only matter predicted respecting Aëthlius is, that he settled in the territory of Elis, and begat Endymiôn: this brings him into local contact with the Olympic games, and his function is then ended.

Having thus got Hellas as an aggregate with its main cementing forces, we march on to its subdivision into parts, through Æolus, Dôrus and Xuthus, the three sons of Hellen;[224] a distribution which is far from being exhaustive: nevertheless, the genealogists whom Apollodôrus follows recognize no more than three sons.

The genealogy is essentially post-Homeric; for Homer knows Hellas and the Hellênes only in connection with a portion of Achaia Phthiôtis. But as it is recognized in the Hesiodic Catalogue[225]—composed probably within the first century after the commencement of recorded Olympiads, or before 676 B. C.—the peculiarities of it, dating from so early a period, deserve much attention. We may remark, first, that it seems to exhibit to us Dôrus and Æolus as the only pure and genuine offspring of Hellên. For their brother Xuthus is not enrolled as an eponymus; he neither founds nor names any people; it is only his sons Achæus and Iôn, after his blood has been mingled with that of the Erechtheid Kreüsa, who become eponyms and founders, each of his own separate people. Next, as to the territorial distribution, Xuthus receives Peloponnêsus from his father, and unites himself with Attica (which the author of this genealogy seems to have conceived as originally unconnected with Hellên) by his marriage with the daughter of the indigenous hero, Erechtheus. The issue of this marriage, Achæus and Iôn, present to us the population of Peloponnêsus and Attica conjointly as related among themselves by the tie of brotherhood, but as one degree more distant both from Dôrians and Æolians. Æolus reigns over the regions about Thessaly, and called the people in those parts Æolians; while Dôrus occupies "the country over against Peloponnêsus on the opposite side of the Corinthian Gulf," and calls the inhabitants after himself, Dôrians.[226] It is at once evident that this designation is in no way applicable to the confined district between Parnassus and Œta, which alone is known by the name of Dôris, and its inhabitants by that of Dôrians, in the historical ages. In the view of the author of this genealogy, the Dôrians are the original occupants of the large range of territory north of the Corinthian Gulf, comprising Ætôlia, Phôkis, and the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians. And this farther harmonizes with the other legend noticed by Apollodôrus, when he states that Ætolus, son of Endymiôn, having been forced to expatriate from Peloponnêsus, crossed into the Kurêtid territory,[227] and was there hospitably received by Dôrus, Laodokus and Polypœtês, sons of Apollo and Phthia. He slew his hosts, acquired the territory, and

gave to it the name of Ætôlia: his son Pleurôn married Xanthippê, daughter of Dôrus; while his other son, Kalydôn, marries Æolia, daughter of Amythaôn. Here again we have the name of Dôrus, or the Dôrians, connected with the tract subsequently termed Ætôlia. That Dôrus should in one place be called the son of Apollo and Phthia, and in another place the son of Hellên by a nymph, will surprise no one accustomed to the fluctuating personal nomenclature of these old legends: moreover the name of Phthia is easy to reconcile with that of Hellên, as both are identified with the same portion of Thessaly, even from the days of the Iliad.

This story, that the Dôrians were at one time the occupants, or the chief occupants, of the range of territory between the river Achelôus and the northern shore of the Corinthian Gulf, is at least more suitable to the facts attested by historical evidence than the legends given in Herodotus, who represents the Dôrians as originally in the Phthiôtid; then as passing under Dôrus, the son of Hellên, into the Histiæôtid, under the mountains of Ossa and Olympus; next, as driven by the Kadmeians into the regions of Pindus; from thence passing into the Dryopid territory, on Mount Œta; lastly, from thence into Peloponnêsus.[228] The received story was, that the great Dôrian establishments in Peloponnêsus were formed by invasion from the north, and that the invaders crossed the gulf from Naupaktus,—a statement which, however disputable with respect to Argos, seems highly probable in regard both to Sparta and Messênia. That the name of Dôrians comprehended far more than the inhabitants of the insignificant tetrapolis of Dôris Proper, must be assumed, if we believe that they conquered Sparta and Messênia: both the magnitude of the conquest itself, and the passage of a large portion of them from Naupaktus, harmonize with the legend as given by Apollodôrus, in which the Dôrians are represented as the principal inhabitants of the northern shore of the gulf. The statements which we find in Herodotus, respecting the early migrations of the Dôrians, have been considered as possessing greater historical value than those of the fabulist Apollodôrus. But both are equally matter of legend, while the brief indications of the latter seem to be most in harmony with the facts which we afterwards find attested by history.

It has already been mentioned that the genealogy which makes Æolus, Xuthus and Dôrus sons of Hellên, is as old as the Hesiodic Catalogue; probably also that which makes Hellên son of Deukaliôn. Aëthlius also is an Hesiodic personage: whether Amphiktyôn be so or not, we have no proof.[229] They could not have been introduced into the legendary genealogy until after the Olympic games and the Amphiktyonic council had acquired an established ascendancy and universal reverence throughout Greece.

Respecting Dôrus the son of Hellên, we find neither legends nor legendary genealogy; respecting Xuthus, very little beyond the tale of Kreüsa and Iôn, which has its place more naturally among the Attic fables. Achæus however, who is here represented as the son of Xuthus, appears in other stories with very different parentage and accompaniments. According to the statement which we find in Dionysius of Hali-

carnassus, Achæus, Phthius and Pelasgus are sons of Poseidôn and Larissa. They migrate from Peloponnêsus into Thessaly, and distribute the Thessalian territory between them, giving their names to its principal divisions: their descendants in the sixth generation were driven out of that country by the invasion of Deukaliôn at the head of the Kurêtes and the Leleges.[230] This was the story of those who wanted to provide an eponymus for the Achæans in the southern districts of Thessaly: Pausanias accomplishes the same object by different means, representing Achæus, the son of Xuthus as having gone back to Thessaly and occupied the portion of it to which his father was entitled. Then, by way of explaining how it was that there were Achæans at Sparta and at Argos, he tells us that Archander and Architelês, the sons of Archæus, came back from Thessaly to Peloponnêsus, and married two daughters of Danaus: they acquired great influence at Argos and Sparta, and gave to the people the name of Achæans after their father Achæus.[231]

Euripidês also deviates very materially from the Hesiodic genealogy in respect to these eponymous persons. In the drama called Iôn, he describes Iôn as son of Kreüsa by Apollo, but adopted by Xuthus: according to him, the real sons of Xuthus and Kreüsa are Dôrus and Achæus,[232]—eponyms of the Dôrians and Achæans in the interior of Peloponnêsus. And it is a still more capital point of difference, that he omits Hellên altogether—making Xuthus an Achæan by race, the son of Æolus, who is the son of Zeus.[233] This is the more remarkable, as in the fragments of two other dramas of Euripidês, the Melanippê and the Æolus, we find Hellên mentioned both as father of Æolus and son of Zeus.[234] To the general public even of the most instructed city of Greece, fluctuations and discrepancies in these mythical genealogies seem to have been neither surprising nor offensive.

CHAPTER VI.

THE ÆOLIDS, OR SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF ÆOLUS.

If two of the sons of Hellên, Dôrus and Xuthus, present to us families comparatively unnoticed in mythical narrative, the third son, Æolus, richly makes up for the deficiency. From him we pass to his seven sons and five daughters, amidst a great abundance of heroic and poetical incident.

In dealing however with these extensive mythical families, it is necessary to observe, that the legendary world of Greece, in the manner in which it is presented to us, appears invested with a degree of symmetry and coherence which did not originally belong to it. For the old ballads and stories which were sung or recounted at the multiplied festivals of Greece, each on its own special theme, have been lost: the religious narratives, which the Exegêtês of every temple had present to his memory, explanatory of the peculiar religious ceremonies and local customs in his own town or Dême, have passed away: all these primitive elements, originally distinct and unconnected, are removed out of our sight, and we possess only an aggregate result, formed by many confluent streams of fable, and connected together by the agency of subsequent poets and logographers. Even the earliest agents in this work of connecting and systematizing—the Hesiodic poets—have been hardly at all preserved. Our information respecting Grecian mythology is derived chiefly from the prose logographers who followed them, and in whose works, since a continuous narrative was above all things essential to them, the fabulous personages are woven into still more comprehensive pedigrees, and the original isolation of the legends still better disguised. Hekatæus, Pherekydês, Hellanikus, and Akusilaus lived at a time when the idea of Hellas as one great whole, composed of fraternal sections, was deeply rooted in the mind of every Greek; and when the fancy of one or a few great families, branching out widely from one common stem, was more popular and acceptable than that of a distinct indigenous origin in each of the separate districts. These logographers, indeed, have themselves been lost; but Apollodôrus and the various scholiasts, our great immediate sources of information respecting Grecian mythology, chiefly borrowed from them: so that the legendary world of Greece is in fact known to us through them, combined with the dramatic and Alexandrine poets, their Latin imitators, and the still later class of scholiasts—except indeed such occasional glimpses as we obtain from the Iliad and the Odyssey, and the remaining Hesiodic fragments, which exhibit but too frequently a hopeless diversity when confronted with the narratives of the logographers.

Though Æolus (as has been already stated) is himself called the son of Hellên along with Dôrus and Xuthus, yet the legends concerning the Æolids, far from being dependent upon this genealogy, are not all even coherent with it: moreover the

name of Æolus in the legend is older than that of Hellên, inasmuch as it occurs both in the Iliad and Odyssey.[235] Odysseus sees in the under-world the beautiful Tyrô, daughter of Salmôneus, and wife of Krêtheus, son of Æolus.

Æolus is represented as having reigned in Thessaly: his seven sons were Krêtheus, Sisyphus, Athamas, Salmôneus, Deiôn, Magnês and Periêrês: his five daughters, Canacê, Alcyonê, Peisidikê, Calycê and Perimêdê. The fables of this race seem to be distinguished by a constant introduction of the god Poseidôn, as well as by an unusual prevalence of haughty and presumptuous attributes among the Æolid heroes, leading them to affront the gods by pretences of equality, and sometimes even by defiance. The worship of Poseidôn must probably have been diffused and preëminent among a people with whom these legends originated.

SECTION I.—SONS OF ÆOLUS.

Salmôneus is not described in the Odyssey as son of Æolus, but he is so denominated both in the Hesiodic Catalogue, and by the subsequent logographers. His daughter Tyrô became enamoured of the river Enipeus, the most beautiful of all streams that traverse the earth: she frequented the banks assiduously, and there the god Poseidôn found means to indulge his passion for her, assuming the character of the river god himself. The fruit of this alliance were the twin brothers, Pelias and Nêleus: Tyrô afterwards was given in marriage to her uncle Krêtheus, another son of Æolus, by whom she had Æsôn, Pherês and Amythaôn—all names of celebrity in the heroic legends.[236] The adventures of Tyrô formed the subject of an affecting drama of Sophoklês, now lost. Her father had married a second wife, named Sidêrô, whose cruel counsels induced him to punish and torture his daughter on account of her intercourse with Poseidôn. She was shorn of her magnificent hair, beaten and ill-used in various ways, and confined in a loathsome dungeon. Unable to take care of her two children, she had been compelled to expose them immediately on their birth in a little boat on the river Enipeus; they were preserved by the kindness of a herdsman, and when grown up to manhood, rescued their mother, and revenged her wrongs by putting to death the iron-hearted Sidêrô.[237] This pathetic tale respecting the long imprisonment of Tyrô is substituted by Sophoklês in place of the Homeric legend, which represented her to have become the wife of Krêtheus and mother of a numerous offspring.[238]

Her father, the unjust Salmôneus, exhibited in his conduct the most insolent impiety towards the gods. He assumed the name and title even of Zeus, and caused to be offered to himself the sacrifices destined for that god: he also imitated the thunder and lightning, by driving about with brazen caldrons attached to his chariot and casting lighted torches towards heaven. Such wickedness finally drew upon him the wrath of Zeus, who smote him with a thunderbolt, and effaced from the earth the city which he had founded, with all its inhabitants.[239]

Pelias and Nêleus, "both stout vassals of the great Zeus," became engaged in dissension respecting the kingdom of Iôlkos in Thessaly. Pelias got possession of it, and dwelt there in plenty and prosperity; but he had offended the goddess Hêrê by killing Sidêrô upon her altar, and the effects of her wrath were manifested in his relations with his nephew Jasôn.[240]

Nêleus quitted Thessaly, went into Peloponnêsus, and there founded the kingdom of Pylos. He purchased by immense marriage presents, the privilege of wedding the beautiful Chlôris, daughter of Amphiôn, king of Orchomenos, by whom he had twelve sons and but one daughter[241]—the fair and captivating Pêrô, whom suitors from all

the neighborhood courted in marriage. But Nêleus, "the haughtiest of living men,"[242] refused to entertain the pretensions of any of them: he would grant his daughter only to that man who should bring to him the oxen of Iphiklos, from Phylakê in Thessaly. These precious animals were carefully guarded, as well by herdsmen as by a dog whom neither man nor animal could approach. Nevertheless, Bias, the son of Amythaôn, nephew of Nêleus, being desperately enamored of Pêrô, prevailed upon his brother Melampus to undertake for his sake the perilous adventure, in spite of the prophetic knowledge of the latter, which forewarned him that though he would ultimately succeed, the prize must be purchased by severe captivity and suffering. Melampus, in attempting to steal the oxen, was seized and put in prison; from whence nothing but his prophetic powers rescued him. Being acquainted with the language of worms, he heard these animals communicating to each other, in the roof over his head, that the beams were nearly eaten through and about to fall in. He communicated this intelligence to his guards, and demanded to be conveyed to another place of confinement, announcing that the roof would presently fall in and bury them. The prediction was fulfilled, and Phylakos, father of Iphiklos, full of wonder at this specimen of prophetic power, immediately caused him to be released. He further consulted him respecting the condition of his son Iphiklos, who was childless; and promised him the possession of the oxen on condition of his suggesting the means whereby offspring might be ensured. A vulture having communicated to Melampus the requisite information, Podarkês, the son of Iphiklos, was born shortly afterwards. In this manner Melampus obtained possession of the oxen, and conveyed them to Pylos, obtaining for his brother Bias the hand of Pêrô.[243] How this great legendary character, by miraculously healing the deranged daughters of Prœtos, procured both for himself and for Bias dominion in Argos, has been recounted in a preceding chapter.

Of the twelve sons of Nêleus, one at least, Periklymenos,—besides the ever-memorable Nestôr,—was distinguished for his exploits as well as for his miraculous gifts. Poseidôn, the divine father of the race, had bestowed upon him the privilege of changing his form at pleasure into that of any bird, beast, reptile, or insect.[244] He had occasion for all these resources, and he employed them for a time with success in defending his family against the terrible indignation of Hêraklês, who, provoked by the refusal of Nêleus to perform for him the ceremony of purification after his murder of Iphitus, attacked the Nêleids at Pylos. Periklymenos by his extraordinary powers prolonged the resistance, but the hour of his fate was at length brought upon him by the intervention of Athênê, who pointed him out to Hêraklês while he was perched as a bee upon the hero's chariot. He was killed, and Hêraklês became completely victorious, overpowering Poseidôn, Hêrê, Arês, and Hadês, and even wounding the three latter, who assisted in the defence. Eleven of the sons of Nêleus perished by his hand, while Nestôr, then a youth, was preserved only by his accidental absence at Gerêna, away from his father's residence.[245]

The proud house of the Nêleids was now reduced to Nestôr; but Nestôr singly sufficed to sustain its eminence. He appears not only as the defender and avenger of Pylos against the insolence and rapacity of his Epeian neighbors in Elis, but also as aiding the Lapithæ in their terrible combat against the Centaurs, and as companion of Thêseus, Peirithöus, and the other great legendary heroes who preceded the Trojan war. In extreme old age his once marvellous power of handling his weapons has indeed passed away, but his activity remains unimpaired, and his sagacity as well as his influence in counsel is greater than ever. He not only assembles the various Grecian chiefs for the armament against Troy, perambulating the districts of Hellas along with Odysseus, but takes a vigorous part in the siege itself, and is of preëminent service to Agamemnôn. And after the conclusion of the siege, he is one of the few Grecian princes who returns to his original dominions, and is found, in a strenuous and honored old age, in the midst of his children and subjects,—sitting with the sceptre of authority on the stone bench before his house at Pylos,—offering sacrifice to Poseidôn, as his father Nêleus had done before him,—and mourning only over the death of his favorite son Antilochus, who had fallen, along with so many brave companions in arms, in the Trojan war.[246]

After Nestôr the line of the Nêleids numbers undistinguished names,—Bôrus, Penthilus, and Andropompus,—three successive generations down to Melanthus, who on the invasion of Peloponnêsus by the Herakleids, quitted Pylos and retired to Athens, where he became king, in a manner which I shall hereafter recount. His son Kodrus was the last Athênian king; and Nêleus, one of the sons of Kodrus, is mentioned as the principal conductor of what is called the Ionic emigration from Athens to Asia Minor.[247] It is certain that during the historical age, not merely the princely family of the Kodrids in Milêtus, Ephesus, and other Ionic cities, but some of the greatest families even in Athens itself, traced their heroic lineage through the Nêleids up to Poseidôn: and the legends respecting Nestôr and Periklymenos would find especial favor amidst Greeks with such feelings and belief. The Kodrids at Ephesus, and probably some other Ionic towns, long retained the title and honorary precedence of kings, even after they had lost the substantial power belonging to the office. They stood in the same relation, embodying both religious worship and supposed ancestry, to the Nêleids and Poseidôn, as the chiefs of the Æolic colonies to Agamemnôn and Orestês. The Athenian despot Peisistratus was named after the son of Nestôr in the Odyssey; and we may safely presume that the heroic worship of the Nêleids was as carefully cherished at the Ionic Milêtus as at the Italian Metapontum.[248]

Having pursued the line of Salmôneus and Nêleus to the end of its lengendary career, we may now turn back to that of another son of Æolus, Krêtheus,—a line hardly less celebrated in respect of the heroic names which it presents. Alkêstis, the most beautiful of the daughters of Pelias,[249] was promised by her father in marriage to the man that could bring him a lion and a boar tamed to the yoke and drawing together. Admêtus, son of Pherês, the eponymus of Pheræ in Thessaly, and thus

grandson of Krêtheus, was enabled by the aid of Apollo to fulfil this condition, and to win her;[250] for Apollo happened at that time to be in his service as a slave (condemned to this penalty by Zeus for having put to death the Cyclôpes), in which capacity he tended the herds and horses with such success, as to equip Eumêlus (the son of Admêtus) to the Trojan war with the finest horses in the Grecian army. Though menial duties were imposed upon him, even to the drudgery of grinding in the mill,[251] he yet carried away with him a grateful and friendly sentiment towards his mortal master, whom he interfered to rescue from the wrath of the goddess Artemis, when she was indignant at the omission of her name in his wedding sacrifices. Admêtus was about to perish by a premature death, when Apollo, by earnest solicitation to the Fates, obtained for him the privilege that his life should be prolonged, if he could find any person to die a voluntary death in his place. His father and his mother both refused to make this sacrifice for him, but the devoted attachment of his wife Alkêstis disposed her to embrace with cheerfulness the condition of dying to preserve her husband. She had already perished, when Hêraklês, the ancient guest and friend of Admêtus, arrived during the first hour of lamentation; his strength and daring enabled him to rescue the deceased Alkêstis even from the grasp of Thanatos (Death), and to restore her alive to her disconsolate husband.[252]

The son of Pelias, Akastus, had received and sheltered Pêleus when obliged to fly his country in consequence of the involuntary murder of Eurytiôn. Krêthêis, the wife of Akastus, becoming enamored of Pêleus, made to him advances which he repudiated. Exasperated at his refusal, and determined to procure his destruction, she persuaded her husband that Pêleus had attempted her chastity: upon which Akastus conducted Pêleus out upon a hunting excursion among the woody regions of Mount Pêlion, contrived to steal from him the sword fabricated and given by Hêphæstos, and then left him, alone and unarmed, to perish by the hands of the Centaurs or by the wild beasts. By the friendly aid of the Centaur Cheirôn, however, Pêleus was preserved, and his sword restored to him: returning to the city, he avenged himself by putting to death both Akastus and his perfidious wife.[253]

But amongst all the legends with which the name of Pelias is connected, by far the most memorable is that of Jasôn and the Argonautic expedition. Jasôn was son of Æsôn, grandson of Krêtheus, and thus great-grandson of Æolus. Pelias, having consulted the oracle respecting the security of his dominion at Iôlkos, had received in answer a warning to beware of the man who should appear before him with only one sandal. He was celebrating a festival in honor of Poseidôn, when it so happened that Jasôn appeared before him with one of his feet unsandaled: he had lost one sandal in wading through the swollen current of the river Anauros. Pelias immediately understood that this was the enemy against whom the oracle had forewarned him. As a means of averting the danger, he imposed upon Jasôn the desperate task of bringing back to Iôlkos the Golden Fleece,—the fleece of that ram which had carried Phryxos from Achaia to Kolchis, and which Phryxos had dedicated in the latter country as an

offering to the god Arês. The result of this injunction was the memorable expedition —of the ship Argô and her crew called the Argonauts, composed of the bravest and noblest youths of Greece—which cannot be conveniently included among the legends of the Æolids, and is reserved for a separate chapter.

The voyage of the Argô was long protracted, and Pelias, persuaded that neither the ship nor her crew would ever return, put to death both the father and mother of Jasôn, together with their infant son. Æsôn, the father, being permitted to choose the manner of his own death, drank bull's blood while performing a sacrifice to the gods. At length, however, Jasôn did return, bringing with him not only the golden fleece, but also Mêdea, daughter of Æêtês, king of Kolchis, as his wife,—a woman distinguished for magical skill and cunning, by whose assistance alone the Argonauts had succeeded in their project. Though determined to avenge himself upon Pelias, Jasôn knew he could only succeed by stratagem: he remained with his companions at a short distance from Iôlkos, while Mêdea, feigning herself a fugitive from his ill-usage, entered the town alone, and procured access to the daughters of Pelias. By exhibitions of her magical powers she soon obtained unqualified ascendency over their minds. For example, she selected from the flocks of Pelias a ram in the extremity of old age, cut him up and boiled him in a caldron with herbs, and brought him out in the shape of a young and vigorous lamb:[254] the daughters of Pelias were made to believe that their old father could in like manner be restored to youth. In this persuasion they cut him up with their own hands and cast his limbs into the caldron, trusting that Mêdea would produce upon him the same magical effect. Mêdea pretended that an invocation to the moon was a necessary part of the ceremony: she went up to the top of the house as if to pronounce it, and there lighting the fire-signal concerted with the Argonauts, Jasôn and his companions burst in and possessed themselves of the town. Satisfied with having thus revenged himself, Jasôn yielded the principality of Iôlkos to Akastus, son of Pelias, and retired with Mêdea to Corinth. Thus did the goddess Hêrê gratify her ancient wrath against Pelias: she had constantly watched over Jasôn, and had carried the "all-notorious" Argô through its innumerable perils, in order that Jasôn might bring home Mêdea to accomplish the ruin of his uncle.[255] The misguided daughters of Pelias departed as voluntary exiles to Arcadia: Akastus his son celebrated splendid funeral games in honor of his deceased father.[256]

Jasôn and Mêdea retired from Iôlkos to Corinth, where they resided ten years: their children were—Medeius, whom the Centaur Cheirôn educated in the regions of Mount Pêlion,[257]—and Mermerus and Pherôs, born at Corinth. After they had resided there ten years in prosperity, Jasôn set his affections on Glaukê, daughter of Kreôn[258] king of Corinth; and as her father was willing to give her to him in marriage, he determined to repudiate Mêdea, who received orders forthwith to leave Corinth. Stung with this insult and bent upon revenge, Mêdea prepared a poisoned robe, and sent it as a marriage present to Glaukê: it was unthinkingly accepted and

put on, and the body of the unfortunate bride was burnt up and consumed. Kreôn, her father, who tried to tear from her the burning garment, shared her fate and perished. The exulting Mêdea escaped by means of a chariot with winged serpents furnished to her by her grandfather Hêlios: she placed herself under the protection of Ægêus at Athens, by whom she had a son named Mêdus. She left her young children in the sacred enclosure of the Akræan Hêrê, relying on the protection of the altar to ensure their safety; but the Corinthians were so exasperated against her for the murder of Kreôn and Glaukê, that they dragged the children away from the altar and put them to death. The miserable Jasôn perished by a fragment of his own ship Argô, which fell upon him while he was asleep under it,[259] being hauled on shore, according to the habitual practice of the ancients.

The first establishment at Ephyrê, or Corinth, had been founded by Sisyphus, another of the sons of Æolus, brother of Salmôneus and Krêtheus.[260] The Æolid Sisyphus was distinguished as an unexampled master of cunning and deceit. He blocked up the road along the isthmus, and killed the strangers who came along it by rolling down upon them great stones from the mountains above. He was more than a match even for the arch thief Autolycus, the son of Hermês, who derived from his father the gift of changing the color and shape of stolen goods, so that they could no longer be recognized: Sisyphus, by marking his sheep under the foot, detected Autolycus when he stole them, and obliged him to restore the plunder. His penetration discovered the amour of Zeus with the nymph Ægina, daughter of the river-god Asôpus. Zeus had carried her off to the island of Œnônê (which subsequently bore the name of Ægina); upon which Asôpus, eager to recover her, inquired of Sisyphus whither she was gone: the latter told him what had happened, on condition that he should provide a spring of water on the summit of the Acro-Corinthus. Zeus, indignant with Sisyphus for this revelation, inflicted upon him in Hadês the punishment of perpetually heaving up a hill a great and heavy stone, which, so soon as it attained the summit, rolled back again in spite of all his efforts, with irresistible force into the plain.[261]

In the application of the Æolid genealogy to Corinth, Sisyphus, the son of Æolus, appears as the first name: but the old Corinthian poet Eumêlus either found or framed an heroic genealogy for his native city independent both of Æolus and Sisyphus. According to this genealogy, Ephyrê, daughter of Oceanus and Têthys, was the primitive tenant of the Corinthian territory, Asôpus of the Sikyônian: both were assigned to the god Hêlios, in adjusting a dispute between him and Poseidôn, by Briareus. Hêlios divided the territory between his two sons Æêtês and Alôeus: to the former he assigned Corinth, to the latter Sikyôn. Æêtês, obeying the admonition of an oracle, emigrated to Kolchis, leaving his territory under the rule of Bunos, the son of Hermês, with the stipulation that it should be restored whenever either he or any of his descendants returned. After the death of Bunos, both Corinth and Sikyôn were possessed by Epôpeus, son of Alôeus, a wicked man. His son Marathôn left him in

disgust and retired into Attica, but returned after his death and succeeded to his territory, which he in turn divided between his two sons Corinthos and Sikyôn, from whom the names of the two districts were first derived. Corinthos died without issue, and the Corinthians then invited Mêdea from Iôlkos as the representative of Æêtês: she with her husband Jasôn thus obtained the sovereignty of Corinth.[262] This legend of Eumêlus, one of the earliest of the genealogical poets, so different from the story adopted by Neophrôn or Euripidês, was followed certainly by Simonidês and seemingly by Theopompus.[263] The incidents in it are imagined and arranged with a view to the supremacy of Mêdea; the emigration of Æêtês and the conditions under which he transferred his sceptre, being so laid out as to confer upon Mêdea an hereditary title to the throne. The Corinthians paid to Mêdea and to her children solemn worship, either divine or heroic, in conjunction with Hêrê Akræa,[264] and this was sufficient to give to Mêdea a prominent place in the genealogy composed by a Corinthian poet, accustomed to blend together gods, heroes and men in the antiquities of his native city. According to the legend of Eumêlus, Jasôn became (through Mêdea) king of Corinth; but she concealed the children of their marriage in the temple of Hêrê, trusting that the goddess would render them immortal. Jasôn, discovering her proceedings, left her and retired in disgust to Iôlkos; Mêdea also, being disappointed in her scheme, quitted the place, leaving the throne in the hands of Sisyphus, to whom, according to the story of Theopompus, she had become attached. [265] Other legends recounted, that Zeus had contracted a passion for Mêdea, but that she had rejected his suit from fear of the displeasure of Hêrê; who, as a recompense for such fidelity, rendered her children immortal:[266] moreover Mêdea had erected, by special command of Hêrê, the celebrated temple of Aphroditê at Corinth. The tenor of these fables manifests their connection with the temple of Hêrê: and we may consider the legend of Mêdea as having been originally quite independent of that of Sisyphus, but fitted on to it, in seeming chronological sequence, so as to satisfy the feelings of those Æolids of Corinth who passed for his descendants.

Sisyphus had for his sons Glaukos and Ornytiôn. From Glaukos sprang Bellerophôn, whose romantic adventures commence with the Iliad, and are further expanded by subsequent poets: according to some accounts he was really the son of Poseidôn, the prominent deity of the Æolid family.[267] The youth and beauty of Bellerophôn rendered him the object of a strong passion on the part of the Anteia, wife of Prœtos king of Argos. Finding her advances rejected, she contracted a violent hatred towards him, and endeavored by false accusations to prevail upon her husband to kill him. Prœtos refused to commit the deed under his own roof, but despatched him to his son-in-law the king of Lykia in Asia Minor, putting into his hands a folded tablet full of destructive symbols. Conformably to these suggestions, the most perilous undertakings were imposed upon Bellerophôn. He was directed to attack the monster Chimæra and to conquer the warlike Solymi as well as the Amazons: as he returned victorious from these enterprises, an ambuscade was laid for him by the bravest Lykian warriors, all of whom he slew. At length the Lykian king

recognized him "as the genuine son of a god," and gave him his daughter in marriage together with half of his kingdom. The grand-children of Bellerophôn, Glaukos and Sarpêdôn,—the latter a son of his daughter Laodameia by Zeus,—combat as allies of Troy against the host of Agamemnon.[268] Respecting the winged Pegasus, Homer says nothing; but later poets assigned to Bellerophôn this miraculous steed, whose parentage is given in the Hesiodic Theogony, as the instrument both of his voyage and of his success.[269] Heroic worship was paid at Corinth to Bellerophôn, and he seems to have been a favorite theme of recollection not only among the Corinthians themselves, but also among the numerous colonists whom they sent out to other regions.[270]

From Ornytiôn, the son of Sisyphus, we are conducted through a series of three undistinguished family names,—Thoas, Damophôn, and the brothers Propodas and Hyanthidas,—to the time of the Dôrian occupation of Corinth[271], which will be hereafter recounted.

We now pass from Sisyphus and the Corinthian fables to another son of Æolus, Athamas, whose family history is not less replete with mournful and tragical incidents, abundantly diversified by the poets. Athamas, we are told, was king of Orchomenos; his wife Nephelê was a goddess, and he had by her two children, Phryxus and Hellê. After a certain time he neglected Nephelê, and took to himself as a new wife Inô, the daughter of Kadmus, by whom he had two sons, Learchus and Melikertês. Inô, looking upon Phryxus with the hatred of a step-mother, laid a snare for his life. She persuaded the women to roast the seed-wheat, which, when sown in this condition, yielded no crop, so that famine overspread the land. Athamas sent to Delphi to implore counsel and a remedy: he received for answer, through the machinations of Inô with the oracle, that the barrenness of the fields could not be alleviated except by offering Phryxus as a sacrifice to Zeus. The distress of the people compelled him to execute this injunction, and Phryxus was led as a victim to the altar. But the power of his mother Nephelê snatched him from destruction, and procured for him from Hermês a ram with a fleece of gold, upon which he and his sister Hellê mounted and were carried across the sea. The ram took the direction of the Euxine sea and Kolchis: when they were crossing the Hellespont, Hellê fell off into the narrow strait, which took its name from that incident. Upon this, the ram, who was endued with speech, consoled the terrified Phryxus, and ultimately carried him safe to Kolchis: Æêtês, king of Kolchis son of the god Hêlios and brother of Circê, received Phryxus kindly, and gave him his daughter Chalciopê in marriage. Phryxus sacrificed the ram to Zeus Phyxios, and suspended the golden fleece in the sacred grove of Arês.

Athamas—according to some both Athamas and Inô—were afterwards driven mad by the anger of the goddess Hêrê; insomuch that the father shot his own son Learchus, and would also have put to death his other son Melikertês, if Inô had not snatched him away. She fled with the boy, across the Megarian territory and Mount

Geraneia, to the rock Moluris, overhanging the Sarônic Gulf: Athamas pursued her, and in order to escape him she leaped into the sea. She became a sea-goddess under the title of Leukothea; while the body of Melikertês was cast ashore on the neighboring territory of Schœnus, and buried by his uncle Sisyphus, who was directed by the Nereïds to pay to him heroic honors under the name of Palæmôn. The Isthmian games, one of the great periodical festivals of Greece, were celebrated in honor of the god Poseidôn, in conjunction with Palæmôn as a hero. Athamas abandoned his territory, and became the first settler of a neighboring region called from him Athmantia, or the Athamantian plain.[272]

The legend of Athamas connects itself with some sanguinary religious rites and very peculiar family customs, which prevailed at Alos, in Achaia Phthiôtis, down to a time[273] later than the historian Herodotus, and of which some remnant existed at Orchomenos even in the days of Plutarch. Athamas was worshipped at Alos as a hero, having both a chapel and a consecrated grove, attached to the temple of Zeus Laphystios. On the family of which he was the heroic progenitor, a special curse and disability stood affixed. The eldest of the race was forbidden to enter the prytaneion or government-house; and if he was found within the doors of the building, the other citizens laid hold of him on his going out, surrounded him with garlands, and led him in solemn procession to be sacrificed as a victim at the altar of Zeus Laphystios. The prohibition carried with it an exclusion from all the public meetings and ceremonies, political as well as religious, and from the sacred fire of the state: many of the individuals marked out had therefore been bold enough to transgress it. Some had been seized on quitting the building and actually sacrificed; others had fled the country for a long time to avoid a similar fate.

The guides who conducted Xerxês and his army through southern Thessaly detailed to him this existing practice, coupled with the local legend, that Athamas, together with Inô, had sought to compass the death of Phryxus, who however had escaped to Kolchis; that the Achæans had been enjoined by an oracle to offer up Athamas himself as an expiatory sacrifice to release the country from the anger of the gods; but that Kytissoros, son of Phryxus, coming back from Kolchis, had intercepted the sacrifice of Athamas,[274] whereby the anger of the gods remained still unappeased, and an undying curse rested upon the family.[275]

That such human sacrifices continued to a greater or less extent, even down to a period later than Herodotus, among the family who worshipped Athamas as their heroic ancestor, appears certain: mention is also made of similar customs in parts of Arcadia, and of Thessaly, in honor of Pêleus and Cheirôn.[276] But we may reasonably presume, that in the period of greater humanity which Herodotus witnessed, actual sacrifice had become very rare. The curse and the legend still remained, but were not called into practical working, except during periods of intense national suffering or apprehension, during which the religious sensibilities were always greatly aggravated. We cannot at all doubt, that during the alarm created by the presence of the

Persian king with his immense and ill-disciplined host, the minds of the Thessalians must have been keenly alive to all that was terrific in their national stories, and all that was expiatory in their religious solemnities. Moreover, the mind of Xerxês himself was so awe-struck by the tale, that he reverenced the dwelling-place consecrated to Athamas. The guides who recounted to him the romantic legend, gave it as the historical and generating cause of the existing rule and practice: a critical inquirer is forced (as has been remarked before) to reverse the order of precedence, and to treat the practice as having been the suggesting cause of its own explanatory legend.

The family history of Athamas, and the worship of Zeus Laphystios, are expressly connected by Herodotus with Alos in Achæa Phthiôtis—one of the towns enumerated in the Iliad as under the command of Achilles. But there was also a mountain called Laphystion, and a temple and worship of Zeus Laphystios between Orchomenos and Korôneia, in the northern portion of the territory known in the historical ages as Bœotia. Here also the family story of Athamas is localized, and Athamas is presented to us as king of the districts of Korôneia, Haliartus and Mount Laphystion: he is thus interwoven with the Orchomenian genealogy.[277] Andreus (we are told), son of the river Pêneios, was the first person who settled in the region: from him it received the name Andrêis. Athamas, coming subsequently to Andreus, received from him the territory of Korôneia and Haliartus with Mount Laphystion: he gave in marriage to Andreus, Euippê, daughter of his son Leucôn, and the issue of this marriage was Eteoklês, said to be the son of the river Kêphisos. Korônos and Haliartus, grandsons of the Corinthian Sisyphus, were adopted by Athamas, as he had lost all his children: but when his grandson Presbôn, son of Phryxus, returned to him from Kolchis, he divided his territory in such manner that Korônos and Haliartus became the founders of the towns which bore their names. Almôn, the son of Sisyphus, also received from Eteoklês a portion of territory, where he established the village Almônes.[278]

With Eteoklês began, according to a statement in one of the Hesiodic poems, the worship of the Charites or Graces, so long and so solemnly continued at Orchomenos in the periodical festival of the Charitêsia, to which many neighboring towns and districts seem to have contributed.[279] He also distributed the inhabitants into two tribes—Eteokleia and Kêphisias. He died childless, and was succeeded by Almos, who had only two daughters, Chrysê and Chrysogeneia. The son of Chrysê by the god Arês was Phlegyas, the father and founder of the warlike and predatory Phlegyæ, who despoiled every one within their reach, and assaulted not only the pilgrims on their road to Delphi, but even the treasures of the temple itself. The offended god punished them by continued thunder, by earthquakes, and by pestilence, which extinguished all this impious race, except a scanty remnant who fled into Phokis.

Chrysogeneia, the other daughter of Almos, had for issue, by the god Poseidôn, Minyas: the son of Minyas was Orchomenos. From these two was derived the name both of Minyæ for the people, and of Orchomenos for the town.[280] During the reign

of Orchomenos, Hyêttus came to him from Argos, having become an exile in consequence of the death of Molyros: Orchomenos assigned to him a portion of land, where he founded the village called Hyêttus.[281] Orchomenos, having no issue, was succeeded by Klymenos, son of Presbôn, of the house of Athamas: Klymenos was slain by some Thêbans during the festival of Poseidôn at Onchêstos; and his eldest son, Erginus, to avenge his death, attacked the Thêbans with his utmost force;—an attack, in which he was so successful, that the latter were forced to submit, and to pay him an annual tribute.

The Orchomenian power was now at its height: both Minyas and Orchomenos had been princes of surpassing wealth, and the former had built a spacious and durable edifice which he had filled with gold and silver. But the success of Erginus against Thêbes was soon terminated and reversed by the hand of the irresistible Hêraklês, who rejected with disdain the claim of tribute, and even mutilated the envoys sent to demand it: he not only emancipated Thêbes, but broke down and impoverished Orchomenos.[282] Erginus in his old age married a young wife, from which match sprang the illustrious heroes, or gods, Trophônius and Agamêdês; though many (amongst whom is Pausanius himself) believed Trophônius to be the son of Apollo.[283] Trophônius, one of the most memorable persons in Grecian mythology, was worshipped as a god in various places, but with especial sanctity as Zeus Trophônius at Lebadeia: in his temple at this town, the prophetic manifestations outlasted those of Delphi itself.[284] Trophônius and Agamêdês, enjoying matchless renown as architects, built[285] the temple of Delphi, the thalamus of Amphitryôn at Thêbes, as well as the inaccessible vault of Hyrieus at Hyria, in which they are said to have left one stone removable at pleasure, so as to reserve for themselves a secret entrance. They entered so frequently, and stole so much gold and silver, that Hyrieus, astonished at his losses, at length spread a fine net, in which Agamêdês was inextricably caught: Trophônius cut off his brother's head and carried it away, so that the body, which alone remained, was insufficient to identify the thief. Like Amphiaraos, whom he resembles in more than one respect, Trophônius was swallowed up by the earth near Lebadeia.[286]

From Trophônius and Agamêdês the Orchomenian genealogy passes to Ascalaphos and Ialmenos, the sons of Arês by Astyochê, who are named in the Catalogue of the Iliad as leaders of the thirty ships from Orchomenos against Troy. Azeus, the grandfather of Astyochê in the Iliad, is introduced as the brother of Erginus[287] by Pausanias, who does not carry the pedigree lower.

The genealogy here given out of Pausanias is deserving of the more attention, because it seems to have been copied from the special history of Orchomenos by the Corinthian Kallippus, who again borrowed from the native Orchomenian poet, Chersias: the works of the latter had never come into the hands of Pausanias. It illustrates forcibly the principle upon which these mythical genealogies were framed, for almost every personage in the series is an Eponymus. Andreus gave his name to the

country, Athamas to the Athamantian plain; Minyas, Orchomenos, Korônus, Haliartus, Almos and Hyêttos, are each in like manner connected with some name of people, tribe, town or village; while Chrysê and Chrysogeneia have their origin in the reputed ancient wealth of Orchomenos. Abundant discrepancies are found, however, in respect to this old genealogy, if we look to other accounts. According to one statement, Orchomenos was the son of Zeus by Isionê, daughter of Danaus; Minyas was the son of Orchomenos (or rather of Poseidôn) by Hermippê, daughter of Bœôtos; the sons of Minyas were Presbôn, Orchomenos, Athamas and Diochthôndas.[288] Others represented Minyas as son of Poseidôn by Kallirrhoê, an Oceanic nymph,[289] while Dionysius called him son of Arês, and Aristodêmus, son of Aleas: lastly, there were not wanting authors who termed both Minyas and Orchomenos sons of Eteoklês.[290] Nor do we find in any one of these genealogies the name of Amphiôn, the son of Iasus, who figures so prominently in the Odyssey as king of Orchomenos, and whose beautiful daughter Chlôris is married to Nêleus. Pausanias mentions him, but not as king, which is the denomination given to him in Homer.[291]

The discrepancies here cited are hardly necessary in order to prove that these Orchomenian genealogies possess no historical value. Yet some probable inferences appear deducible from the general tenor of the legends, whether the facts and persons of which they are composed be real or fictitious.

Throughout all the historical age, Orchomenos is a member of the Bœôtian confederation. But the Bœôtians are said to have been immigrants into the territory which bore their name from Thessaly; and prior to the time of their immigration, Orchomenos and the surrounding territory appear as possessed by the Minyæ, who are recognized in that locality both in the Iliad and in the Odyssey,[292] and from whom the constantly recurring Eponymus, King Minyas, is borrowed by the genealogists. Poetical legend connects the Orchomenian Minyæ on the one side, with Pylos and Tryphylia in Peloponnêsus; on the other side, with Phthiôtis and the town of Iôlkos in Thessaly; also with Corinth,[293] through Sisyphus and his sons. Pherekydês represented Nêleus, king of Pylos, as having also been king of Orchomenos.[294] In the region of Triphylia, near to or coincident with Pylos, a Minyeian river is mentioned by Homer; and we find traces of residents called Minyæ even in the historical times, though the account given by Herodotus of the way in which they came thither is strange and unsatisfactory.[295]

Before the great changes which took place in the inhabitants of Greece from the immigration of the Thesprôtians into Thessaly, of the Bœôtians into Bœôtia, and of the Dôrians and Ætôlians into Peloponnêsus, at a date which we have no means of determining, the Minyæ and tribes fraternally connected with them seem to have occupied a large portion of the surface of Greece, from Iôlkos in Thessaly to Pylos in the Peloponnêsus. The wealth of Orchomenos is renowned even in the Iliad;[296] and when we study its topography in detail, we are furnished with a probable explanation both of its prosperity and its decay. Orchomenos was situated on the northern bank

of the lake Kôpaïs, which receives not only the river Kêphisos from the valleys of Phôkis, but also other rivers from Parnassus and Helicôn. The waters of the lake find more than one subterranean egress—partly through natural rifts and cavities in the limestone mountains, partly through a tunnel pierced artificially more than a mile in length—into the plain on the north-eastern side, from whence they flow into the Eubœan sea near Larymna:[297] and it appears that, so long as these channels were diligently watched and kept clear, a large portion of the lake was in the condition of alluvial land, preëminently rich and fertile. But when the channels came to be either neglected, or designedly choked up by an enemy, the water accumulated to such a degree, as to occupy the soil of more than one ancient town, to endanger the position of Kôpæ, and to occasion the change of the site of Orchomenos itself from the plain to the declivity of Mount Hyphanteion. An engineer, Kratês, began the clearance of the obstructed water-courses in the reign of Alexander the Great, and by his commission—the destroyer of Thêbes being anxious to reëstablish the extinct prosperity of Orchomenos. He succeeded so far as partially to drain and diminish the lake, whereby the site of more than one ancient city was rendered visible: but the revival of Thêbes by Kassander, after the decease of Alexander, arrested the progress of the undertaking, and the lake soon regained its former dimensions, to contract which no farther attempt was made.[298]

According to the Thêban legend,[299] Hêraklês, after his defeat of Erginus had blocked up the exit of the waters, and converted the Orchomenian plain into a lake. The spreading of these waters is thus connected with the humiliation of the Minyæ; and there can be little hesitation in ascribing to these ancient tenants of Orchomenos, before it became bœotized, the enlargement and preservation of these protective channels. Nor could such an object have been accomplished, without combined action and acknowledged ascendency on the part of that city over its neighbors, extending even to the sea at Larymna, where the river Kôphisos discharges itself. Of its extended influence, as well as of its maritime activity, we find a remarkable evidence in the ancient and venerated Amphiktyony at Kalauria. The little island so named, near the harbor of Trœzên, in Peloponnêsus, was sacred to Poseidôn, and an asylum of inviolable sanctity. At the temple of Poseidôn, in Kalauria, there had existed, from unknown date, a periodical sacrifice, celebrated by seven cities in common—Hermionê, Epidaurus, Ægina, Athens, Prasiæ, Nauplia, and the Minyeian Orchomenos. This ancient religious combination dates from the time when Nauplia was independent of Argos, and Prasiæ of Sparta: Argos and Sparta, according to the usual practice in Greece, continued to fulfil the obligation each on the part of its respective dependent.[300] Six out of the seven states are at once sea-towns, and near enough to Kalauria to account for their participation in this Amphiktyony. But the junction of Orchomenos, from its comparative remoteness, becomes inexplicable, except on the supposition that its territory reached the sea, and that it enjoyed a considerable maritime traffic—a fact which helps to elucidate both its legendary connection with Iôlkos, and its partnership in what is called the Iônic emigration.[301] The

mythical genealogy, whereby Ptôos, Schœneus and Erythrios are enumerated among the sons of Athamas, goes farther to confirm the idea that the towns and localities on the south-east of the lake recognized a fraternal origin with the Orchomenian Minyæ, not less than Korôneia and Haliartus on the south-west.[302]

The great power of Orchomenos was broken down, and the city reduced to a secondary and half-dependent position by the Bœôtians of Thêbes; at what time, and under what circumstances, history has not preserved. The story, that the Thêban hero, Hêraklês, rescued his native city from servitude and tribute to Orchomenos, since it comes from a Kadmeian and not from an Orchomenian legend, and since the details of it were favorite subjects of commemoration in the Thêbian temples,[303] affords a presumption that Thêbes was really once dependent on Orchomenos. Moreover the savage mutilations inflicted by the hero on the tribute-seeking envoys, so faithfully portrayed in his surname Rhinokoloustês, infuse into the mythe a portion of that bitter feeling which so long prevailed between Thêbes and Orchomenos, and which led the Thêbans, as soon as the battle of Leuctra had placed supremacy in their hands, to destroy and depopulate their rival.[304] The ensuing generation saw the same fate retorted upon Thêbes, combined with the restoration of Orchomenos. The legendary grandeur of this city continued, long after it had ceased to be distinguished for wealth and power, imperishably recorded both in the minds of the nobler citizens and in the compositions of the poets; the emphatic language of Pausanias shows how much he found concerning it in the old epic.[305]

SECTION II.—DAUGHTERS OF ÆOLUS.

With several of the daughters of Æolus memorable mythical pedigrees and narratives are connected. Alcyonê married Kêyx, the son of Eôsphoros, but both she and her husband displayed in a high degree the overweening insolence common in the Æolic race. The wife called her husband Zeus, while he addressed her as Hêrê, for which presumptuous act Zeus punished them by changing both into birds.[306]

Canacê had by the god Poseidôn several children, amongst whom were Epôpeus and Alôeus.[307] Alôeus married Imphimêdea, who became enamored of the god Poseidôn, and boasted of her intimacy with him. She had by him two sons, Otos and Ephialtês, the huge and formidable Alôids,—Titanic beings, nine fathoms in height and nine cubits in breadth, even in their boyhood, before they had attained their full strength. These Alôids defied and insulted the gods in Olympus; they paid their court to Hêrê and Artemis, and they even seized and bound Arês, confining him in a brazen chamber for thirteen months. No one knew where he was, and the intolerable chain would have worn him to death, had not Eribœa, the jealous stepmother of the Alôids, revealed the place of his detention to Hermês, who carried him surreptitiously away when at the last extremity; nor could Arês obtain any atonement for such an indignity. Otos and Ephialtês even prepared to assault the gods in heaven, piling up Ossa on Olympus and Pêlion on Ossa, in order to reach them. And this they would have accomplished had they been allowed to grow to their full maturity; but the arrows of Apollo put a timely end to their short-lived career.[308]

The genealogy assigned to Calycê, another daughter of Æolus, conducts us from Thessaly to Elis and Ætôlia. She married Aëthlius (the son of Zeus by Prôtogeneia, daughter of Deukaliôn and sister of Hellên), who conducted a colony out of Thessaly and settled in the territory of Elis. He had for his son Endymiôn, respecting whom the Hesiodic Catalogue and the Eoiai related several wonderful things. Zeus granted him the privilege of determining the hour of his own death, and even translated him into heaven, which he forfeited by daring to pay court to Hêrê: his vision in this criminal attempt was cheated by a cloud, and he was cast out into the under-world.[309] According to other stories, his great beauty caused the goddess Sêlêne to become enamored of him, and to visit him by night during his sleep:—the sleep of Endymiôn became a proverbial expression for enviable, undisturbed, and deathless repose.[310] Endymiôn had for issue (Pausanias gives us three different accounts, and Apollodôrus a fourth, of the name of his wife) Epeios, Ætôlus, Pæôn, and a daughter Eurykydê. He caused his three sons to run a race on the stadium at Olympia, and Epeios, being victorious, was rewarded by becoming his successor in the kingdom: it was after him that the people were denominated Epeians.

Both the story here mentioned, and still more, the etymological signification of the names Aëthlius and Endymiôn, seem plainly to indicate (as has before been remarked) that this genealogy was not devised until after the Olympic games had become celebrated and notorious throughout Greece.

Epeios had no male issue, and was succeeded by his nephew Eleios, son of Euykydê by the god Poseidôn: the name of the people was then changed from Epeians to Eleians. Ætôlus, the brother of Epeios, having slain Apis, son of Phorôneus, was compelled to flee from the country: he crossed the Corinthian gulf and settled in the territory then called Kurêtis, but to which he gave the name of Ætôlia.[311]

The son of Eleios,—or, according to other accounts, of the god Hêlios, of Poseidôn, or of Phorbas,[312]—is Augeas, whom we find mentioned in the Iliad as king of the Epeians or Eleians. Nestôr gives a long and circumstantial narrative of his own exploits at the head of his Pylian countrymen against his neighbors the Epeians and their king Augeas, whom he defeated with great loss, slaying Mulios, the king's son-in-law, and acquiring a vast booty.[313] Augeas was rich in all sorts of rural wealth, and possessed herds of cattle so numerous, that the dung of the animals accumulated in the stable or cattle enclosures beyond all power of endurance. Eurystheus, as an insult to Hêraklês, imposed upon him the obligation of cleansing this stable: the hero, disdaining to carry off the dung upon his shoulders, turned the course of the river Alpheios through the building, and thus swept the encumbrance away.[314] But Augeas, in spite of so signal a service, refused to Hêraklês the promised reward, though his son Phyleus protested against such treachery, and when he found that he could not induce his father to keep faith, retired in sorrow and wrath to the island of Dulichiôn.[315] To avenge the deceit practised upon him, Hêraklês invaded Elis; but Augeas had powerful auxiliaries, especially his nephews, the two Molionids (sons of Poseidôn by Molionê, the wife of Aktôr), Eurytos and Kteatos. These two miraculous brothers, of transcendent force, grew together,—having one body, but two heads and four arms.[316] Such was their irresistible might, that Hêraklês was defeated and repelled from Elis: but presently the Eleians sent the two Molionid brothers as *Theôri* (sacred envoys) to the Isthmian games, and Hêraklês, placing himself in ambush at Kleônæ, surprised and killed them as they passed through. For this murderous act the Eleians in vain endeavored to obtain redress both at Corinth and at Argos; which is assigned as the reason for the self-ordained exclusion, prevalent throughout all the historical age, that no Eleian athlête would ever present himself as a competitor at the Isthmian games.[317] The Molionids being thus removed, Hêraklês again invaded Elis, and killed Augeas along with his children,—all except Phyleus, whom he brought over from Dulichiôn, and put in possession of his father's kingdom. According to the more gentle narrative which Pausanias adopts, Augeas was not killed, but pardoned at the request of Phyleus.[318] He was worshipped as a hero[319] even down to the time of that author.

It was on occasion of this conquest of Elis, according to the old mythe which Pindar has ennobled in a magnificent ode, that Hêraklês first consecrated the ground of Olympia, and established the Olympic games. Such at least was one of the many fables respecting the origin of that memorable institution.[320]

Phyleus, after having restored order in Elis, retired again to Dulichiôn, and left the kingdom to his brother Agasthenês, which again brings us into the Homeric series. For Polyxenos, son of Agasthenês, is one of the four commanders of the Epeian forty ships in the Iliad, in conjunction with the two sons of Eurytos and Kteatos, and with Diôrês son of Amarynceus. Megês, the son of Phyleus, commands the contingent from Dulichiôn and the Echinades.[321] Polyxenos returns safe from Troy, is succeeded by his son Amphimachos,—named after the Epeian chief who had fallen before Troy,—and he again by another Eleios, in whose time the Dôrians and the Hêrakleids invade Peloponnêsus.[322] These two names, barren of actions or attributes, are probably introduced by the genealogists whom Pausanias followed, to fill up the supposed interval between the Trojan war and the Dôrian invasion.

We find the ordinary discrepancies in respect to the series and the members of this genealogy. Thus some called Epeios son of Aëthlius, others son of Endymiôn: [323] a third pedigree, which carries the sanction of Aristotle and is followed by Conôn, designated Eleios, the first settler of Elis, as son of Poseidôn and Eurypylê, daughter of Endymiôn, and Epeios and Alexis as the two sons of Eleios.[324] And Pindar himself, in his ode to Epharmostus the Locrian, introduces with much emphasis another king of the Epeians named Opus, whose daughter, pregnant by Zeus, was conveyed by that god to the old and childless king Locrus: the child when born, adopted by Locrus and named Opus, became the eponymous hero of the city so called in Locris.[325] Moreover Hekatæus the Milesian not only affirmed (contrary both to the Iliad and the Odyssey) that the Epeians and the Eleians were different people, but also added that the Epeians had assisted Hêraklês in his expedition against Augeas and Elis; a narrative very different from that of Apollodôrus and Pausanias, and indicating besides that he must have had before him a genealogy varying from theirs.[326]

It has already been mentioned that Ætôlus, son of Endymiôn, quitted Peloponnêsus in consequence of having slain Apis.[327] The country on the north of the Corinthian gulf, between the rivers Euênus and Achelôus, received from him the name of Ætôlia instead of that of Kurêtis: he acquired possession of it after having slain Dôrus, Laodokus and Polypœtes, sons of Apollo and Phthia, by whom he had been well received. He had by his wife Pronoê (the daughter of Phorbas) two sons, Pleurôn and Kalydôn, and from them the two chief towns in Ætôlia were named.[328] Pleurôn married Xanthippê, daughter of Dôrus, and had for his son Agênôr, from whom sprang Portheus, or Porthaôn, and Demonikê: Euênos and Thestius were children of the latter by the god Arês.[329]

Portheus had three sons, Agrius, Melas and Œneus: among the offspring of Thestius were Althæa and Lêda,[330]—names which bring us to a period of interest in the legendary history. Lêda marries Tyndareus and becomes mother of Helena and the Dioskuri: Althæa marries Œneus, and has, among other children, Meleager and Deianeira; the latter being begotten by the god Dionysus, and the former by Arês. [331] Tydeus also is his son, the father of Diomêdês: warlike eminence goes hand in hand with tragic calamity among the members of this memorable family.

We are fortunate enough to find the legend of Althæa and Meleager set forth at considerable length in the Iliad, in the speech addressed by Phœnix to appease the wrath of Achilles. Œneus, king of Kalydôn, in the vintage sacrifices which he offered to the gods, omitted to include Artemis: the misguided man either forgot her or cared not for her;[332] and the goddess, provoked by such an insult, sent against the vineyards of Œneus a wild boar, of vast size and strength, who tore up the trees by the root and laid prostrate all their fruit. So terrible was this boar, that nothing less than a numerous body of men could venture to attack him: Meleager, the son of Œneus, however, having got together a considerable number of companions, partly from the Kurêtes of Pleurôn, at length slew him. But the anger of Artemis was not yet appeased, and she raised a dispute among the combatants respecting the possession of the boar's head and hide,—the trophies of victory. In this dispute, Meleager slew the brother of his mother Althæa, prince of the Kurêtes of Pleurôn: these Kurêtes attacked the Ætôlians of Kalydôn in order to avenge their chief. So long as Meleager contended in the field the Ætôlians had the superiority. But he presently refused to come forth, indignant at the curses imprecated upon him by his mother: for Althæa, wrung with sorrow for the death of her brother, flung herself upon the ground in tears, beat the earth violently with her hands, and implored Hadês and Persephonê to inflict death upon Meleager,—a prayer which the unrelenting Erinnys in Erebus heard but too well. So keenly did the hero resent this behavior of his mother, that he kept aloof from the war; and the Kurêtes not only drove the Ætôlians from the field, but assailed the walls and gates of Kalydôn, and were on the point of overwhelming its dismayed inhabitants. There was no hope of safety except in the arm of Meleager; but Meleager lay in his chamber by the side of his beautiful wife Kleopatra, the daughter of Idas, and heeded not the necessity. While the shouts of expected victory were heard from the assailants at the gates, the ancient men of Ætôlia and the priests of the gods earnestly besought Meleager to come forth,[333] offering him his choice of the fattest land in the plain of Kalydôn. His dearest friends, his father Œneus, his sisters, and even his mother herself added their supplications, but he remained inflexible. At length the Kurêtes penetrated into the town and began to burn it: at this last moment, Kleopatra his wife addressed to him her pathetic appeal, to avert from her and from his family the desperate horrors impending over them all. Meleager could no longer resist: he put on his armor, went forth from his chamber, and repelled the enemy. But when the danger was over, his countrymen withheld from him the splendid presents which they had promised, because he had

rejected their prayers, and had come forth only when his own haughty caprice dictated.[334]

Such is the legend of Meleager in the Iliad: a verse in the second book mentions simply the death of Meleager, without farther details, as a reason why Thoas appeared in command of the Ætôlians before Troy.[335] Though the circumstance is indicated only indirectly, there seems little doubt that Homer must have conceived the death of the hero as brought about by the maternal curse: the unrelenting Erinnys executed to the letter the invocations of Althæa, though she herself must have been willing to retract them.

Later poets both enlarged and altered the fable. The Hesiodic Eoiai, as well as the old poem called the Minyas, represented Meleager as having been slain by Apollo, who aided the Kurêtes in the war; and the incident of the burning brand, though quite at variance with Homer, is at least as old as the tragic poet Phrynichus, earlier than Æschylus.[336] The Mœræ, or Fates, presenting themselves to Althæa shortly after the birth of Meleager, predicted that the child would die so soon as the brand then burning on the fire near at hand should be consumed. Althæa snatched it from the flames and extinguished it, preserving it with the utmost care, until she became incensed against Meleager for the death of her brother. She then cast it into the fire, and as soon as it was consumed the life of Meleager was brought to a close.

We know, from the sharp censure of Pliny, that Sophoklês heightened the pathos of this subject by his account of the mournful death of Meleager's sisters, who perished from excess of grief. They were changed into the birds called Meleagrides, and their never-ceasing tears ran together into amber.[337] But in the hands of Euripidês —whether originally through him or not,[338] we cannot tell—Atalanta became the prominent figure and motive of the piece, while the party convened to hunt the Kalydônian boar was made to comprise all the distinguished heroes from every quarter of Greece. In fact, as Heyne justly remarks, this event is one of the four aggregate dramas of Grecian heroic life,[339] along with the Argonautic expedition, the siege of Thêbes, and the Trojan war. To accomplish the destruction of the terrific animal which Artemis in her wrath had sent forth, Meleager assembled not merely the choice youth among the Kurêtes and Ætôlians (as we find in the Iliad), but an illustrious troop, including Kastôr and Pollux, Idas and Lynkeus, Pêleus and Telamôn, Thêseus and Peirithous, Ankæus and Kêpheus, Jasôn, Amphiaraus, Admêtus, Eurytiôn and others. Nestôr and Phœnix, who appear as old men before the walls of Troy, exhibited their early prowess as auxiliaries to the suffering Kalydônians.[340] Conspicuous amidst them all stood the virgin Atalanta, daughter of the Arcadian Schœneus; beautiful and matchless for swiftness of foot, but living in the forest as a huntress and unacceptable to Aphroditê.[341] Several of the heroes were slain by the boar, others escaped by various stratagems: at length Atalanta first shot him in the back, next Amphiaraus in the eye, and, lastly, Meleager killed him. Enamoured of the beauty of Atalanta, Meleager made over to her the chief spoils of the animal, on the plea that

she had inflicted the first wound. But his uncles, the brothers of Thestius, took them away from her, asserting their rights as next of kin,[342] if Meleager declined to keep the prize for himself: the latter, exasperated at this behavior, slew them. Althæa, in deep sorrow for her brothers and wrath against her son, is impelled to produce the fatal brand which she had so long treasured up, and consign it to the flames.[343] The tragedy concludes with the voluntary death both of Althæa and Kleopatra.

Interesting as the Arcadian huntress, Atalanta, is in herself, she is an intrusion, and not a very convenient intrusion, into the Homeric story of the Kalydônian boar-hunt, wherein another female Kleopatra, already occupied the foreground.[344] But the more recent version became accredited throughout Greece, and was sustained by evidence which few persons in those days felt any inclination to controvert. For Atalanta carried away with her the spoils and head of the boar into Arcadia; and there for successive centuries hung the identical hide and the gigantic tusks of three feet in length, in the temple of Athênê Alea at Tegea. Kallimachus mentions them as being there preserved, in the third century before the Christian æra;[345] but the extraordinary value set upon them is best proved by the fact that the emperor Augustus took away the tusks from Tegea, along with the great statue of Athênê Alea, and conveyed them to Rome, to be there preserved among the public curiosities. Even a century and a half afterwards, when Pausanias visited Greece, the skin worn out with age was shown to him, while the robbery of the tusks had not been forgotten. Nor were these relics of the boar the only memento preserved at Tegea of the heroic enterprise. On the pediment of the temple of Athênê Alea, unparalleled in Peloponnêsus for beauty and grandeur, the illustrious statuary Skopas had executed one of his most finished reliefs, representing the Kalydônian hunt. Atalanta and Meleager were placed in the front rank of the assailants, and Ankæus, one of the Tegean heroes, to whom the tusks of the boar had proved fatal,[346] was represented as sinking under his death-wound into the arms of his brother Epochos. And Pausanias observes, that the Tegeans, while they had manifested the same honorable forwardness as other Arcadian communities in the conquest of Troy, the repulse of Xerxês, and the battle of Dipæ against Sparta—might fairly claim to themselves, through Ankæus and Atalanta, that they alone amongst all Arcadians had participated in the glory of the Kalydônian boar-hunt.[347] So entire and unsuspecting is the faith both of the Tegeans and of Pausanias in the past historical reality of this romantic adventure. Strabo indeed tries to transform the romance into something which has the outward semblance of history, by remarking that the quarrel respecting the boar's head and hide cannot have been the real cause of war between the Kurêtes and the Ætôlians; the true ground of dispute (he contends) was probably the possession of a portion of territory.[348] His remarks on this head are analogous to those of Thucydidês and other critics, when they ascribe the Trojan war, not to the rape of Helen, but to views of conquest or political apprehensions. But he treats the general fact of the battle between the Kurêtes and the Ætôlians, mentioned in the Iliad, as something unquestionably real and historical—recapitulating at the same time a variety of discrepancies

on the part of different authors, but not giving any decision of his own respecting their truth or falsehood.

In the same manner as Atalanta was intruded into the Kalydônian hunt, so also she seems to have been introduced into the memorable funeral games celebrated after the decease of Pelias at Iôlkos, in which she had no place at the time when the works on the chest of Kypselus were executed.[349] But her native and genuine locality is Arcadia; where her race-course, near to the town of Methydrion, was shown even in the days of Pausanias.[350] This race-course had been the scene of destruction for more than one unsuccessful suitor. For Atalanta, averse to marriage, had proclaimed that her hand should only be won by the competitor who could surpass her in running: all who tried and failed were condemned to die, and many were the persons to whom her beauty and swiftness, alike unparalleled, had proved fatal. At length Meilaniôn, who had vainly tried to win her affections by assiduous services in her hunting excursions, ventured to enter the perilous lists. Aware that he could not hope to outrun her except by stratagem, he had obtained by the kindness of Aphroditê, three golden apples from the garden of the Hesperides, which he successively let fall near to her while engaged in the race. The maiden could not resist the temptation of picking them up, and was thus overcome: she became the wife of Meilaniôn and the mother of the Arcadian Parthenopæus, one of the seven chiefs who perished in the siege of Thêbes.[351]

We have yet another female in the family of Œneus, whose name the legend has immortalized. His daughter Deianeira was sought in marriage by the river Achelôus, who presented himself in various shapes, first as a serpent and afterwards as a bull. From the importunity of this hateful suitor she was rescued by the arrival of Hêraklês, who encountered Achelôus, vanquished him and broke off one of his horns, which Achelôus ransomed by surrendering to him the horn of Amaltheia, endued with the miraculous property of supplying the possessor with abundance of any food or drink which he desired. Hêraklês was rewarded for his prowess by the possession of Deianeira, and he made over the horn of Amaltheia as his marriage-present to Œneus.[352] Compelled to leave the residence of Œneus in consequence of having in a fit of anger struck the youthful attendant Eunomus, and involuntarily killed him, [353] Hêraklês retired to Trachin, crossing the river Euênus at the place where the Centaur Nessus was accustomed to carry over passengers for hire. Nessus carried over Deianeira, but when he had arrived on the other side, began to treat her with rudeness, upon which Hêraklês slew him with an arrow tinged by the poison of the Lernæan hydra. The dying Centaur advised Deianeira to preserve the poisoned blood which flowed from his wound, telling her that it would operate as a philtre to regain for her the affections of Hêraklês, in case she should ever be threatened by a rival. Some time afterwards the hero saw and loved the beautiful Iolê, daughter of Eurytos, king of Œchalia: he stormed the town, killed Eurytos, and made Iolê his captive. The misguided Deianeira now had recourse to her supposed philtre: she sent as a

present to Hêraklês a splendid tunic, imbued secretly with the poisoned blood of the Centaur. Hêraklês adorned himself with the tunic on the occasion of offering a solemn sacrifice to Zeus on the promontory of Kênæon in Eubœa: but the fatal garment, when once put on, clung to him indissolubly, burnt his skin and flesh, and occasioned an agony of pain from which he was only relieved by death. Deianeira slew herself in despair at this disastrous catastrophe.[354]

We have not yet exhausted the eventful career of Œneus and his family—ennobled among the Ætôlians especially, both by religious worship and by poetical eulogy—and favorite themes not merely in some of the Hesiodic poems, but also in other ancient epic productions, the Alkmæênis and the Cyclic Thêbais.[355] By another marriage, Œneus had for his son Tydeus, whose poetical celebrity is attested by the many different accounts given both of the name and condition of his mother. Tydeus, having slain his cousins, the sons of Melas, who were conspiring against Œneus, was forced to become an exile, and took refuge at Argos with Adrastus, whose daughter Deipylê he married. The issue of this marriage was Diomêdês, whose brilliant exploits in the siege of Troy were not less celebrated than those of his father at the siege of Thêbes. After the departure of Tydeus, Œneus was deposed by the sons of Agrios, and fell into extreme poverty and wretchedness, from which he was only rescued by his grandson Diomêdês, after the conquest of Troy.[356] The sufferings of this ancient warrior, and the final restoration and revenge by Diomêdês, were the subject of a lost tragedy of Euripidês, which even the ridicule of Aristophanês demonstrates to have been eminently pathetic.[357]

Though the genealogy just given of Œneus is in part Homeric, and seems to have been followed generally by the mythographers, yet we find another totally at variance with it in Hekatæus, which he doubtless borrowed from some of the old poets: the simplicity of the story annexed to it seems to attest its antiquity. Orestheus, son of Deukaliôn, first passed into Ætôlia, and acquired the kingdom: he was father of Phytios, who was father of Œneus. Ætôlus was son of Œneus.[358]

The original migration of Ætolus from Elis to Ætôlia—and the subsequent establishment in Elis of Oxylus, his descendant in the tenth generation, along with the Dôrian invaders of Peloponnêsus—were commemorated by two inscriptions, one in the agora of Elis, the other in that of the Ætôlian chief town, Thermum, engraved upon the statues of Ætôlus and Oxylus,[359] respectively.

CHAPTER VII.

THE PELOPIDS.

AMONG the ancient legendary genealogies, there was none which figured with greater splendor, or which attracted to itself a higher degree of poetical interest and pathos, than that of the Pelopids—Tantalus, Pelops, Atreus and Thyestês, Agamemnôn and Menelaus and Ægisthus, Helen and Klytæmnêstra, Orestês and Elektra and Hermionê. Each of these characters is a star of the first magnitude in the Grecian hemisphere: each name suggests the idea of some interesting romance or some harrowing tragedy: the curse which taints the family from the beginning inflicts multiplied wounds at every successive generation. So, at least, the story of the Pelopids presents itself, after it had been successively expanded and decorated by epic, lyric and tragic poets. It will be sufficient to touch briefly upon events with which every reader of Grecian poetry is more or less familiar, and to offer some remarks upon the way in which they were colored and modified by different Grecian authors.

Pelops is the eponym or name-giver of the Peloponnêsus: to find an eponym for every conspicuous local name was the invariable turn of Grecian retrospective fancy. The name Peloponnêsus is not to be found either in the Iliad or the Odyssey, nor any other denomination which can be attached distinctly and specially to the entire peninsula. But we meet with the name in one of the most ancient post-Homeric poems of which any fragments have been preserved—the Cyprian Verses—a poem which many (seemingly most persons) even of the contemporaries of Herodotus ascribed to the author of the Iliad, though Herodotus contradicts the opinion.[360] The attributes by which the Pelopid Agamemnôn and his house are marked out and distinguished from the other heroes of the Iliad, are precisely those which Grecian imagination would naturally seek in an eponymus—superior wealth, power, splendor and regality. Not only Agamemnôn himself, but his brother Menelaus, is "more of a king" even than Nestôr or Diomêdês. The gods have not given to the king of the "much-golden" Mykênæ greater courage, or strength, or ability, than to various other chiefs; but they have conferred upon him a marked superiority in riches, power and dignity, and have thus singled him out as the appropriate leader of the forces.[361] He enjoys this preëminence as belonging to a privileged family and as inheriting the heaven-descended sceptre of Pelops, the transmission of which is described by Homer in a very remarkable way. The sceptre was made "by Hêphæstos, who presented it to Zeus; Zeus gave it to Hermês, Hermês to the charioteer Pelops; Pelops gave it to Atreus, the ruler of men; Atreus at his death left it to Thyestês, the rich cattle-owner; Thyestês in his turn left it to his nephew Agamemnôn to carry, that he might hold dominion over many islands and over all Argos."[362]

We have here the unrivalled wealth and power of the "king of men, Agamemnôn," traced up to his descent from Pelops, and accounted for, in harmony with the recognized epical agencies, by the present of the special sceptre of Zeus through the hands of Hermês; the latter being the wealth-giving god, whose blessing is most efficacious in furthering the process of acquisition, whether by theft or by accelerated multiplication of flocks and herds.[363] The wealth and princely character of the Atreids were proverbial among the ancient epic poets. Paris not only carries away Hellen, but much property along with her:[364] the house of Menelaus, when Têlemachus visits it in the Odyssey, is so resplendent with gold and silver and rare ornament,[365] as to strike the beholder with astonishment and admiration. The attributes assigned to Tantalus, the father of Pelops, are in conformity with the general idea of the family—superhuman abundance and enjoyments, and intimate converse with the gods, to such a degree that his head is turned, and he commits inexpiable sin. But though Tantalus himself is mentioned, in one of the most suspicious passages of the Odyssey (as suffering punishment in the under-world), he is not announced, nor is any one else announced, as father of Pelops, unless we are to construe the lines in the Iliad as implying that the latter was son of Hermês. In the conception of the author of the Iliad, the Pelopids are, if not of divine origin, at least a mortal breed specially favored and ennobled by the gods—beginning with Pelops, and localized at Mykênæ. No allusion is made to any connection of Pelops either with Pisa or with Lydia.

The legend which connected Tantalus and Pelops with Mount Sipylus may probably have grown out of the Æolic settlements at Magnêsia and Kymê. Both the Lydian origin and the Pisatic sovereignty of Pelops are adapted to times later than the Iliad, when the Olympic games had acquired to themselves the general reverence of Greece, and had come to serve as the religious and recreative centre of the Peloponnêsus—and when the Lydian and Phrygian heroic names, Midas and Gygês, were the types of wealth and luxury, as well as of chariot driving, in the imagination of a Greek. The inconsiderable villages of the Pisatid derived their whole importance from the vicinity of Olympia: they are not deemed worthy of notice in the Catalogue of Homer. Nor could the genealogy which connected the eponym of the entire peninsula with Pisa have obtained currency in Greece unless it had been sustained by preëstablished veneration for the locality of Olympia. But if the sovereign of the humble Pisa was to be recognized as forerunner of the thrice-wealthy princes of Mykênæ, it became necessary to assign some explanatory cause of his riches. Hence the supposition of his being an immigrant, son of a wealthy Lydian named Tantalus, who was the offspring of Zeus and Ploutô. Lydian wealth and Lydian chariot-driving rendered Pelops a fit person to occupy his place in the legend, both as ruler of Pisa and progenitor of the Mykenæan Atreids. Even with the admission of these two circumstances there is considerable difficulty, for those who wish to read the legends as consecutive history, in making the Pelopids pass smoothly and plausibly from Pisa to Mykênæ.

I shall briefly recount the legends of this great heroic family as they came to stand in their full and ultimate growth, after the localization of Pelops at Pisa had been tacked on as a preface to Homer's version of the Pelopid genealogy.

Tantalus, residing near Mount Sipylus in Lydia, had two children, Pelops and Niobê. He was a man of immense possessions and preëminent happiness, above the lot of humanity: the gods communicated with him freely, received him at their banquets, and accepted of his hospitality in return. Intoxicated with such prosperity, Tantalus became guilty of gross wickedness. He stole nectar and ambrosia from the table of the gods, and revealed their secrets to mankind: he killed and served up to them at a feast his own son Pelops. The gods were horror-struck when they discovered the meal prepared for them: Zeus restored the mangled youth to life, and as Dêmêtêr, then absorbed in grief for the loss of her daughter Persephonê, had eaten a portion of the shoulder, he supplied an ivory shoulder in place of it. Tantalus expiated his guilt by exemplary punishment. He was placed in the under-world, with fruit and water seemingly close to him, yet eluding his touch as often as he tried to grasp them and leaving his hunger and thirst incessant and unappeased.[366] Pindar, in a very remarkable passage, finds this old legend revolting to his feelings: he rejects the tale of the flesh of Pelops having been served up and eaten, as altogether unworthy of the gods.[367]

Niobê, the daughter of Tantalus, was married to Amphiôn, and had a numerous and flourishing offspring of seven sons and seven daughters. Though accepted as the intimate friend and companion of Lêtô, the mother of Apollo and Artemas,[368] she was presumptuous enough to triumph over that goddess, and to place herself on a footing of higher dignity, on account of the superior number of her children. Apollo and Artemas avenged this insult by killing all the sons and all the daughters: Niobê, thus left a childless and disconsolate mother, wept herself to death, and was turned into a rock, which the later Greeks continued always to identify on Mount Sipylus.[369]

Some authors represented Pelops as not being a Lydian, but a king of Paphlagônia; by others it was said that Tantalus, having become detested from his impieties, had been expelled from Asia by Ilus the king of Troy,—an incident which served the double purpose of explaining the transit of Pelops to Greece, and of imparting to the siege of Troy by Agamemnôn the character of retribution for wrongs done to his ancestor.[370] When Pelops came over to Greece, he found Œnomaus, son of the god Arês and Harpinna, in possession of the principality of Pisa, immediately bordering on the district of Olympia. Œnomaus, having been apprized by an oracle that death would overtake him if he permitted his daughter Hippodameia to marry, refused to give her in marriage except to some suitor who should beat him in a chariot-race from Olympia to the isthmus of Corinth;[371] the ground here selected for the legendary victory of Pelops deserves attention, inasmuch as it is a line drawn from the assumed centre of Peloponnêsus to its extremity, and thus comprises the whole terri-

tory with which Pelops is connected as eponym. Any suitor overmatched in the race was doomed to forfeit his life; and the fleetness of the Pisan horses, combined with the skill of the charioteer Myrtilus, had already caused thirteen unsuccessful competitors to perish by the lance of Œnomaus.[372] Pelops entered the lists as a suitor: his prayers moved the god Poseidôn to supply him with a golden chariot and winged horses; or according to another story, he captivated the affections of Hippodameia herself, who persuaded the charioteer Myrtilus to loosen the wheels of Œnomaus before he started, so that the latter was overturned and perished in the race. Having thus won the hand of Hippodameia, Pelops became Prince of Pisa.[373] He put to death the charioteer Myrtilus, either from indignation at his treachery to Œnomaus, [374] or from jealousy on the score of Hippodameia: but Myrtilus was the son of Hermês, and though Pelops erected a temple in the vain attempt to propitiate that god, he left a curse upon his race which future calamities were destined painfully to work out.[375]

Pelops had a numerous issue by Hippodameia: Pittheus, Trœzen and Epidaurus, the eponyms of the two Argolic cities so called, are said to have been among them: Atreus and Thyestês were also his sons, and his daughter Nikippê married Sthenelus of Mykênæ, and became the mother of Eurystheus.[376] We hear nothing of the principality of Pisa afterwards: the Pisatid villages became absorbed into the larger aggregate of Elis, after a vain struggle to maintain their separate right of presidency over the Olympic festival. But the legend ran that Pelops left his name to the whole peninsula: according to Thucydidês, he was enabled to do this because of the great wealth which he had brought with him from Lydia into a poor territory. The historian leaves out all the romantic interest of the genuine legends—preserving only this one circumstance, which, without being better attested than the rest, carries with it, from its commonplace and prosaic character, a pretended historical plausibility.[377]

Besides his numerous issue by Hippodameia, Pelops had an illegitimate son named Chrysippus, of singular grace and beauty, towards whom he displayed so much affection as to rouse the jealousy of Hippodameia and her sons. Atreus and Thyestês conspired together to put Chrysippus to death, for which they were banished by Pelops and retired to Mykênæ,[378]—an event which brings us into the track of the Homeric legend. For Thucydidês, having found in the death of Chrysippus a suitable ground for the secession of Atreus from Pelops, conducts him at once to Mykênæ, and shows a train of plausible circumstances to account for his having mounted the throne. Eurystheus, king of Mykênæ, was the maternal nephew of Atreus: when he engaged in any foreign expedition, he naturally entrusted the regency to his uncle; the people of Mykênæ thus became accustomed to be governed by him, and he on his part made efforts to conciliate them, so that when Eurystheus was defeated and slain in Attica, the Mykênæan people, apprehensive of an invasion from the Hêrakleids, chose Atreus as at once the most powerful and most acceptable person for his successor.[379] Such was the tale which Thucydidês derived "from

those who had learnt ancient Peloponnêsian matters most clearly from their forefathers." The introduction of so much sober and quasi-political history, unfortunately unauthenticated, contrasts strikingly with the highly poetical legends of Pelops and Atreus, which precede and follow it.

Atreus and Thyestês are known in the Iliad only as successive possessors of the sceptre of Zeus, which Thyestês at his death bequeathes to Agamemnôn. The family dissensions among this fated race commence, in the Odyssey, with Agamemnôn the son of Atreus, and Ægisthus the son of Thyestês. But subsequent poets dwelt upon an implacable quarrel between the two fathers. The cause of the bitterness was differently represented: some alleged that Thyestês had intrigued with the Krêtan Aeropê, the wife of his brother; other narratives mentioned that Thyestês procured for himself surreptitiously the possession of a lamb with a golden fleece, which had been designedly introduced among the flocks of Atreus by the anger of Hermês, as a cause of enmity and ruin to the whole family.[380] Atreus, after a violent burst of indignation, pretended to be reconciled, and invited Thyestês to a banquet, in which he served up to him the limbs of his own son, and the father ignorantly partook of the fatal meal. Even the all-seeing Hêlios is said to have turned back his chariot to the east in order that he might escape the shocking spectacle of this Thyestêan banquet: yet the tale of Thyestêan revenge—the murder of Atreus perpetrated by Ægisthus, the incestuous offspring of Thyestês by his daughter Pelopia—is no less replete with horrors.[381]

Homeric legend is never thus revolting. Agamemnôn and Menelaus are known to us chiefly with their Homeric attributes, which have not been so darkly overlaid by subsequent poets as those of Atreus and Thyestês. Agamemnôn and Menelaus are affectionate brothers: they marry two sisters, the daughters of Tyndareus king of Sparta, Klytæmnêstra and Helen; for Helen, the real offspring of Zeus, passes as the daughter of Tyndareus.[382] The "king of men" reigns at Mykênæ; Menelaus succeeds Tyndareus at Sparta. Of the rape of Helen, and the siege of Troy consequent upon it, I shall speak elsewhere: I now touch only upon the family legends of the Atreids. Menelaus, on his return from Troy with the recovered Helen, is driven by storms far away to the distant regions of Phœnicia and Egypt, and is exposed to a thousand dangers and hardships before he again sets foot in Peloponnêsus. But at length he reaches Sparta, resumes his kingdom, and passes the rest of his days in uninterrupted happiness and splendor: being moreover husband of the godlike Helen and son-in-law of Zeus, he is even spared the pangs of death. When the fulness of his days is past he is transported to the Elysian fields, there to dwell along with "the golden-haired Rhadamanthus" in a delicious climate and in undisturbed repose.[383]

Far different is the fate of the king of men, Agamemnôn. During his absence, the unwarlike Ægisthus, son of Thyestês, had seduced his wife Klytæmnêstra, in spite of the special warning of the gods, who, watchful over this privileged family, had sent their messenger Hermês expressly to deter him from the attempt.[384] A venerable

bard had been left by Agamemnôn as the companion and monitor of his wife, and so long as that guardian was at hand, Ægisthus pressed his suit in vain. But he got rid of the bard by sending him to perish in a desert island, and then won without difficulty the undefended Klytæmnêstra. Ignorant of what had passed, Agamemnôn returned from Troy victorious and full of hope to his native country; but he had scarcely landed when Ægisthus invited him to a banquet, and there with the aid of the treacherous Klytæmnêstra, in the very hall of festivity and congratulation, slaughtered him and his companions "like oxen tied to the manger." His concubine Kassandra, the prophetic daughter of Priam, perished along with him by the hand of Klytæmnêstra herself.[385] The boy Orestês, the only male offspring of Agamemnôn, was stolen away by his nurse, and placed in safety at the residence of the Phokian Strophius.

For seven years Ægisthus and Klytæmnêstra reigned in tranquillity at Mykênæ on the throne of the murdered Agamemnôn. But in the eighth year the retribution announced by the gods overtook them: Orestês, grown to manhood, returned and avenged his father by killing Ægisthus, according to Homer; subsequent poets add, his mother also. He recovered the kingdom of Mykênæ, and succeeded Menelaus in that of Sparta. Hermionê, the only daughter of Menelaus and Helen, was sent into the realm of the Myrmidons in Thessaly, as the bride of Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, according to the promise made by her father during the siege of Troy.[386]

Here ends the Homeric legend of the Pelopids, the final act of Orestês being cited as one of unexampled glory.[387] Later poets made many additions: they dwelt upon his remorse and hardly-earned pardon for the murder of his mother, and upon his devoted friendship for Pylades; they wove many interesting tales, too, respecting his sisters Iphigeneia and Elektra and his cousin Hermionê,—names which have become naturalized in every climate and incorporated with every form of poetry.

These poets did not at all scruple to depart from Homer, and to give other genealogies of their own, with respect to the chief persons of the Pelopid family. In the Iliad and Odyssey, Agamemnôn is son of Atreus: in the Hesiodic Eoiai and in Stesichorus, he is son of Pleisthenês the son of Atreus.[388] In Homer, he is specially marked as reigning at Mykênæ; but Stesichorus, Simonidês and Pindar[389] represented him as having both resided and perished at Sparta or at Amyklæ. According to the ancient Cyprian Verses, Helen was represented as the daughter of Zeus and Nemesis: in one of the Hesiodic poems she was introduced as an Oceanic nymph, daughter of Oceanus and Têthys.[390] The genealogical discrepancies, even as to the persons of the principal heroes and heroines, are far too numerous to be cited, nor is it necessary to advert to them, except as they bear upon the unavailing attempt to convert such legendary parentage into a basis of historical record or chronological calculation.

The Homeric poems probably represent that form of the legend, respecting Agamemnôn and Orestês, which was current and popular among the Æolic colonists. Orestês was the great heroic chief of the Æolic emigration; he, or his sons, or his descendants, are supposed to have conducted the Achæans to seek a new home, when they were no longer able to make head against the invading Dôrians: the great families at Tenedos and other Æolic cities even during the historical æra, gloried in tracing back their pedigrees to this illustrious source.[391] The legends connected with the heroic worship of these mythical ancestors form the basis of the character and attributes of Agamemnôn and his family, as depicted in Homer, in which Mykênæ appears as the first place in Peloponnêsus, and Sparta only as the second: the former the special residence of "the king of men;" the latter that of his younger and inferior brother, yet still the seat of a member of the princely Pelopids, and moreover the birth-place of the divine Helen. Sparta, Argos and Mykênæ are all three designated in the Iliad by the goddess Hêrê as her favorite cities;[392] yet the connection of Mykênæ with Argos, though the two towns were only ten miles distant, is far less intimate than the connection of Mykênæ with Sparta. When we reflect upon the very peculiar manner in which Homer identifies Hêrê with the Grecian host and its leader, —for she watches over the Greeks with the active solicitude of a mother, and her antipathy against the Trojans is implacable to a degree which Zeus cannot comprehend, [393]—and when we combine this with the ancient and venerated Hêræon, or temple of Hêrê, near Mykênæ, we may partly explain to ourselves the preëminence conferred upon Mykênæ in the Iliad and Odyssey. The Hêræon was situated between Argos and Mykênæ; in later times its priestesses were named and its affairs administered by the Argeians: but as it was much nearer to Mykênæ than to Argos, we may with probability conclude that it originally belonged to the former, and that the increasing power of the latter enabled them to usurp to themselves a religious privilege which was always an object of envy and contention among the Grecian communities. The Æolic colonists doubtless took out with them in their emigration the divine and heroic legends, as well as the worship and ceremonial rites, of the Hêræon; and in those legends the most exalted rank would be assigned to the close-adjoining and administering city.

Mykênæ maintained its independence even down to the Persian invasion. Eighty of its heavy-armed citizens, in the ranks of Leonidas at Thermopylæ, and a number not inferior at Platæa, upheld the splendid heroic celebrity of their city during a season of peril, when the more powerful Argos disgraced itself by a treacherous neutrality. Very shortly afterwards Mykênæ was enslaved and its inhabitants expelled by the Argeians. Though this city so long maintained a separate existence, its importance had latterly sunk to nothing, while that of the Dôrian Argos was augmented very much, and that of the Dôrian Sparta still more.

The name of Mykênæ is imperishably enthroned in the Iliad and Odyssey; but all the subsequent fluctuations of the legend tend to exalt the glory of other cities at its

expense. The recognition of the Olympic games as the grand religious festival of Peloponnêsus gave vogue to that genealogy which connected Pelops with Pisa or Elis and withdrew him from Mykênæ. Moreover, in the poems of the great Athenian tragedians, Mykênæ is constantly confounded and treated as one with Argos. If any one of the citizens of the former, expelled at the time of its final subjugation by the Argeians, had witnessed at Athens a drama of Æschylus, Sophoklês, or Euripidês, or the recital of an ode of Pindar, he would have heard with grief and indignation the city of his oppressors made a partner in the heroic glories of his own.[394] But the great political ascendency acquired by Sparta contributed still farther to degrade Mykênæ, by disposing subsequent poets to treat the chief of the Grecian armament against Troy as having been a Spartan. It has been already mentioned that Stêsichorus, Simonidês and Pindar adopted this version of the legend: we know that Zeus Agamemnôn, as well as the hero Menelaus, was worshipped at the Dôrian Sparta, [395] and the feeling of intimate identity, as well as of patriotic pride, which had grown up in the minds of the Spartans connected with the name of Agamemnôn, is forcibly evinced by the reply of the Spartan Syagrus to Gelôn of Syracuse at the time of the Persian invasion of Greece. Gelôn was solicited to lend his aid in the imminent danger of Greece before the battle of Salamis: he offered to furnish an immense auxiliary force, on condition that the supreme command should be allotted to him. "Loudly indeed would the Pelopid Agamemnôn cry out (exclaimed Syagrus in rejecting this application), if he were to learn that the Spartans had been deprived of the headship by Gelôn and the Syracusans."[396] Nearly a century before this event, in obedience to the injunctions of the Delphian oracle, the Spartans had brought back from Tegea to Sparta the bones of "the Lacônian Orestês," as Pindar denominates him:[397] the recovery of these bones was announced to them as the means of reversing a course of ill-fortune, and of procuring victory in their war against Tegea. [398] The value which they set upon this acquisition, and the decisive results ascribed to it, exhibit a precise analogy with the recovery of the bones of Theseus from Skyros by the Athenian Cimôn shortly after the Persian invasion.[399] The remains sought were those of a hero properly belonging to their own soil, but who had died in a foreign land, and of whose protection and assistance they were for that reason deprived. And the superhuman magnitude of the bones, which were contained in a coffin seven cubits long, is well suited to the legendary grandeur of the son of Agamemnôn.

CHAPTER VIII.

LACONIAN AND MESSENIAN GENEALOGIES.

The earliest names in Lacônian genealogy are, an autochthonous Lelex and a Naiad nymph Kleochareia. From this pair sprung a son Eurôtas, and from him a daughter Sparta, who became the wife of Lacedæmôn, son of Zeus and Taygetê, daughter of Atlas. Amyklas, son of Lacedæmôn, had two sons, Kynortas and Hyacinthus—the latter a beautiful youth, the favorite of Apollo, by whose hand he was accidentally killed while playing at quoits: the festival of the Hyacinthia, which the Lacedæmônians generally, and the Amyklæans with special solemnity, celebrated throughout the historical ages, was traced back to this legend. Kynortas was succeeded by his son Periêrês, who married Gorgophonê, daughter of Perseus, and had a numerous issue —Tyndareus, Ikarius, Aphareus, Leukippus, and Hippokoon. Some authors gave the genealogy differently, making Periêrês, son of Æolus, to be the father of Kynortas, and Œbalus son of Kynortas, from whom sprung Tyndareus, Ikarius and Hippokoon. [400]

Both Tyndareus and Ikarius, expelled by their brother Hippokoon, were forced to seek shelter at the residence of Thestius, king of Kalydôn, whose daughter, Lêda, Tyndareus espoused. It is numbered among the exploits of the omnipresent Hêraklês, that he slew Hippokoon and his sons, and restored Tyndareus to his kingdom, thus creating for the subsequent Hêrakleidan kings a mythical title to the throne. Tyndareus, as well as his brothers, are persons of interest in legendary narrative: he is the father of Kastôr, of Timandra, married to Echemus, the hero of Tegea,[401] and of Klytæmnêstra, married to Agamemnôn. Pollux and the ever-memorable Helen are the offspring of Lêda by Zeus. Ikarius is the father of Penelopê, wife of Odysseus: the contrast between her behavior and that of Klytæmnêstra and Helen became the more striking in consequence of their being so nearly related. Aphareus is the father of Idas and Lynkeus, while Leukippus has for his daughters, Phœbê and Ilaëira. According to one of the Hesiodic poems, Kastôr and Pollux were both sons of Zeus by Lêda, while Helen was neither daughter of Zeus nor of Tyndareus, but of Oceanus and Têthys.[402]

The brothers Kastôr and (Polydeukês, or) Pollux are no less celebrated for their fraternal affection than for their great bodily accomplishments: Kastôr, the great charioteer and horse-master; Pollux, the first of pugilists. They are enrolled both among the hunters of the Kalydônian boar and among the heroes of the Argonautic expedition, in which Pollux represses the insolence of Amykus, king of the Bebrykes, on the coast of Asiatic Thrace—the latter, a gigantic pugilist, from whom no rival has ever escaped, challenges Pollux, but is vanquished and killed in the fight.[403]

The two brothers also undertook an expedition into Attica, for the purpose of recovering their sister Helen, who had been carried off by Thêseus in her early youth, and deposited by him at Aphidna, while he accompanied Perithous to the underworld, in order to assist his friend in carrying off Persephonê. The force of Kastôr and Pollux was irresistible, and when they re-demanded their sister, the people of Attica were anxious to restore her: but no one knew where Thêseus had deposited his prize. The invaders, not believing in the sincerity of this denial, proceeded to ravage the country, which would have been utterly ruined, had not Dekelus, the eponymus of Dekeleia, been able to indicate Aphidna as the place of concealment. The autochthonous Titakus betrayed Aphidna to Kastôr and Pollux, and Helen was recovered: the brothers in evacuating Attica, carried away into captivity Æthra, the mother of Thêseus. In after-days, when Kastôr and Pollux, under the title of the Dioskuri, had come to be worshipped as powerful gods, and when the Athenians were greatly ashamed of this act of Thêseus—the revelation made by Dekelus was considered as entitling him to the lasting gratitude of his country, as well as to the favorable remembrance of the Lacedæmônians, who maintained the Dekeleians in the constant enjoyment of certain honorary privileges at Sparta,[404] and even spared that dême in all their invasions of Attica. Nor is it improbable that the existence of this legend had some weight in determining the Lacedæmônians to select Dekelia as the place of their occupation during the Peleponnêsian war.

The fatal combat between Kastôr and Polydeukês on the one side, and Idas and Lynkeus on the other, for the possession of the daughters of Leukippus, was celebrated by more than one ancient poet, and forms the subject of one of the yet remaining Idylls of Theocritus. Leukippus had formally betrothed his daughters to Idas and Lynkeus; but the Tyndarids, becoming enamored of them, outbid their rivals in the value of the customary nuptial gifts, persuaded the father to violate his promise, and carried off Phoebê and Ilaëira as their brides. Idas and Lynkeus pursued them and remonstrated against the injustice: according to Theocritus, this was the cause of the combat. But there was another tale, which seems the older, and which assigns a different cause to the quarrel. The four had jointly made a predatory incursion into Arcadia, and had driven off some cattle, but did not agree about the partition of the booty—Idas carried off into Messênia a portion of it which the Tyndarids claimed as their own. To revenge and reimburse themselves, the Tyndarids invaded Messênia, placing themselves in ambush in the hollow of an ancient oak. But Lynkeus, endued with preternatural powers of vision, mounted to the top of Taygetus, from whence, as he could see over the whole Peleponnêsus, he detected them in their chosen place of concealment. Such was the narrative of the ancient Cyprian Verses. Kastôr perished by the hand of Idas, Lynkeus by that of Pollux. Idas, seizing a stone pillar from the tomb of his father Aphareus, hurled it at Pollux, knocked him down and stunned him; but Zeus, interposing at the critical moment for the protection of his son, killed Idas with a thunderbolt. Zeus would have conferred upon Pollux the gift of immortality, but the latter could not endure existence without his brother: he en-

treated permission to share the gift with Kastôr, and both were accordingly permitted to live, but only on every other day.[405]

The Dioskuri, or sons of Zeus,—as the two Spartan heroes, Kastôr and Pollux, were denominated,—were recognized in the historical days of Greece as gods, and received divine honors. This is even noticed in a passage of the Odyssey,[406] which is at any rate a very old interpolation, as well as in one of the Homeric hymns. What is yet more remarkable is, that they were invoked during storms at sea, as the special and all-powerful protectors of the endangered mariner, although their attributes and their celebrity seem to be of a character so dissimilar. They were worshipped throughout most parts of Greece, but with preëminent sanctity at Sparta.

Kastôr and Pollux being removed, the Spartan genealogy passes from Tyndareus to Menelaus, and from him to Orestês.

Originally it appears that Messênê was a name for the western portion of Lacônia, bordering on what was called Pylos: it is so represented in the Odyssey, and Ephorus seems to have included it amongst the possessions of Orestês and his descendants. Throughout the whole duration of the Messênico-Dôrian kingdom, there never was any town called Messênê: the town was first founded by Epameinondas, after the battle of Leuctra. The heroic genealogy of Messênia starts from the same name as that of Lacônia—from the autochthonous Lelex: his younger son, Polykaôn, marries Messênê, daughter of the Argeian Triopas, and settles the country. Pausanias tells us that the posterity of this pair occupied the country for five generations; but he in vain searched the ancient genealogical poems to find the names of their descendants.[407] To them succeeded Periêrês, son of Æolus; and Aphareus and Leukippus, according to Pausanias, were sons of Periêrês. Idas and Lynkeus are the only heroes, distinguished for personal exploits and memorable attributes, belonging to Messênia proper. They are the counterpart of the Dioskuri, and were interesting persons in the old legendary poems. Marpêssa was the daughter of Euênus, and wooed by Apollo: nevertheless Idas[408] carried her off by the aid of a winged chariot which he had received from Poseidôn, Euênus pursued them, and when he arrived at the river Lykormas, he found himself unable to overtake them: his grief caused him to throw himself into the river, which ever afterwards bore his name. Idas brought Marpêssa safe to Messênia, and even when Apollo there claimed her of him, he did not fear to risk a combat with the god. But Zeus interfered as mediator, and permitted the maiden to choose which of the two she preferred. She attached herself to Idas, being apprehensive that Apollo would desert her in her old age: on the death of her husband she slew herself. Both Idas and Lynkeus took part in the Argonautic expedition and in the Kalydônian boar-hunt.[409]

Aphareus, after the death of his sons, founded the town of Arênê, and made over most part of his dominions to his kinsman Nêleus, with whom we pass into the Pylian genealogy.

CHAPTER IX.

ARCADIAN GENEALOGY.

THE Arcadian divine or heroic pedigree begins with Pelasgus, whom both Hesiod and Asius considered as an indigenous man, though Akusilaus the Argeian represented him as brother of Argos and son of Zeus by Niobê, daughter of Phorôneus: this logographer wished to establish a community of origin between the Argeians and the Arcadians.

Lykaôn son of Pelasgus and king of Arcadia, had, by different wives, fifty sons, the most savage, impious and wicked of mankind: Mænalus was the eldest of them. Zeus, in order that he might himself become a witness of their misdeeds, presented himself to them in disguise. They killed a child and served it up to him for a meal; but the god overturned the table and struck dead with thunder Lykaôn and all his fifty sons, with the single exception of Nyktimus, the youngest, whom he spared at the earnest intercession of the goddess Gæa (the Earth). The town near which the table was overturned received the name of Trapezus (Tabletown).

This singular legend (framed on the same etymological type as that of the ants in Ægina, recounted elsewhere) seems ancient, and may probably belong to the Hesiodic Catalogue. But Pausanias tells us a story in many respects different, which was represented to him in Arcadia as the primitive local account, and which becomes the more interesting, as he tells us that he himself fully believes it. Both tales indeed go to illustrate the same point—the ferocity of Lykaôn's character, as well as the cruel rites which he practised. The latter was the first who established the worship and solemn games of Zeus Lykæus: he offered up a child to Zeus, and made libations with the blood upon the altar. Immediately after having perpetrated this act, he was changed into a wolf.[410]

"Of the truth of this narrative (observes Pausanias) I feel persuaded: it has been repeated by the Arcadians from old times, and it carries probability along with it. For the men of that day, from their justice and piety, were guests and companions at table with the gods, who manifested towards them approbation when they were good, and anger if they behaved ill, in a palpable manner: indeed at that time there were some, who having once been men, became gods, and who yet retain their privileges as such—Aristæus, the Krêtan Britomartis, Hêraklês son of Alkmêna, Amphiaraus the son of Oiklês, and Pollux and Kastôr besides. We may therefore believe that Lykaôn became a wild beast, and that Niobê, the daughter of Tantalus, became a stone. But in my time, wickedness having enormously increased, so as to overrun the whole earth and all the cities in it, there are no farther examples of men exalted into gods, except by mere title and from adulation towards the powerful: moreover the anger of

the gods falls tardily upon the wicked, and is reserved for them after their departure from hence."

Pausanias then proceeds to censure those who, by multiplying false miracles in more recent times, tended to rob the old and genuine miracles of their legitimate credit and esteem. The passage illustrates forcibly the views which a religious and instructed pagan took of his past time—how inseparably he blended together in it gods and men, and how little he either recognized or expected to find in it the naked phænomena and historical laws of connection which belonged to the world before him. He treats the past as the province of legend, the present as that of history; and in doing this he is more sceptical than the persons with whom he conversed, who believed not only in the ancient, but even in the recent and falsely reported miracles. It is true that Pausanias does not always proceed consistently with this position: he often rationalizes the stories of the past, as if he expected to find historical threads of connection; and sometimes, though more rarely, accepts the miracles of the present. But in the present instance he draws a broad line of distinction between present and past, or rather between what is recent and what is ancient: his criticism is, in the main, analogous to that of Arrian in regard to the Amazons—denying their existence during times of recorded history, but admitting it during the early and unrecorded ages.

In the narrative of Pausanias, the sons of Lykaôn, instead of perishing by thunder from Zeus, become the founders of the various towns in Arcadia. And as that region was subdivided into a great number of small and independent townships, each having its own eponym, so the Arcadian heroic genealogy appears broken up and subdivided. Pallas, Orestheus, Phigalus, Trapezeus, Mænalus, Mantinêus, and Tegeatês, are all numbered among the sons of Lykaôn, and are all eponyms of various Arcadian towns.[411]

The legend respecting Kallistô and Arkas, the eponym of Arcadia generally, seems to have been originally quite independent of and distinct from that of Lykaôn. Eumêlus, indeed, and some other poets made Kallistô daughter of Lykaôn; but neither Hesiod, nor Asius, nor Pherekydês, acknowledged any relationship between them. [412] The beautiful Kallistô, companion of Artemis in the chase, had bound herself by a vow of chastity. Zeus, either by persuasion or by force, obtained a violation of the vow, to the grievous displeasure both of Hêrê and Artemis. The former changed Kallistô into a bear, the latter when she was in that shape killed her with an arrow. Zeus gave to the unfortunate Kallistô a place among the stars, as the constellation of the Bear: he also preserved the child Arkas, of which she was pregnant by him, and gave it to the Atlantid nymph Maia to bring up.[413]

Arkas, when he became king, obtained from Triptolemus and communicated to his people the first rudiments of agriculture; he also taught them to make bread, to spin, and to weave. He had three sons—Azan, Apheidas, and Elatus: the first was the

eponym of Azania, the northern region of Arcadia; the second was one of the heroes of Tegea; the third was father of Ischys (rival of Apollo for the affections of Korônis), as well as of Æpytus and Kyllên: the name of Æpytus among the heroes of Arcadia is as old as the Catalogue in the Iliad.[414]

Aleus, son of Apheidas and king of Tegea, was the founder of the celebrated temple and worship of Athênê Alea in that town. Lykurgus and Kêpheus were his sons, Augê his daughter, who was seduced by Hêraklês, and secretly bore to him a child: the father, discovering what had happened, sent Augê to Nauplius to be sold into slavery: Teuthras, king of Mysia in Asia Minor, purchased her and made her his wife: her tomb was shown at Pergamus on the river Kaïkus even in the time of Pausanias. [415]

The child Têlephus, exposed on Mount Parthenius, was wonderfully sustained by the milk of a doe: the herdsmen of Korythus brought him up, and he was directed by the Delphian oracle to go and find his parents in Mysia. Teuthras adopted him, and he succeeded to the throne: in the first attempt of the army of Agamemnôn against Troy, on which occasion they mistook their point and landed in Mysia, his valor signally contributed to the repulse of the Greeks, though he was at last vanquished and desperately wounded by the spear of Achilles—by whom however he was afterwards healed, under the injunction of the oracle, and became the guide of the Greeks in their renewed attack upon the Trojans.[416]

From Lykurgus,[417] the son of Aleus and brother of Augê, we pass to his son Ankæus, numbered among the Argonauts, finally killed in the chase of the Kalydônian boar, and father of Agapenôr, who leads the Arcadian contingent against Troy,—(the adventurers of his niece, the Tegeatic huntress Atalanta, have already been touched upon),—then to Echemus, son of Aëropus and grandson of the brother of Lykurgus, Kêpheus. Echemus is the chief heroic ornament of Tegea. When Hyllus, the son of Hêraklês, conducted the Hêrakleids on their first expedition against Peloponnêsus, Echemus commanded the Tegean troops who assembled along with the other Peloponnêsians at the isthmus of Corinth to repel the invasion: it was agreed that the dispute should be determined by single combat, and Echemus, as the champion of Peloponnêsus, encountered and killed Hyllus. Pursuant to the stipulation by which they had bound themselves, the Hêrakleids retired, and abstained for three generations from pressing their claim upon Peloponnêsus. This valorous exploit of their great martial hero was cited and appealed to by the Tegeates before the battle of Platæa, as the principal evidence of their claim to the second post in the combined army, next in point of honor to that of the Lacedæmônians, and superior to that of the Athenians: the latter replied to them by producing as counter-evidence the splendid heroic deeds of Athens,—the protection of the Hêrakleids against Eurystheus, the victory over the Kadmeians of Thêbes, and the complete defeat of the Amazons in Attica.[418] Nor can there be any doubt that these legendary glories were both recited

by the speakers, and heard by the listeners, with profound and undoubting faith, as well as with heart-stirring admiration.

One other person there is—Ischys, son of Elatus and grandson of Arkas—in the fabulous genealogy of Arcadia whom it would be improper to pass over, inasmuch as his name and adventures are connected with the genesis of the memorable god or hero Æsculapius, or Asklêpius. Korônis, daughter of Phlegyas, and resident near the lake Bœbëis in Thessaly, was beloved by Apollo and became pregnant by him: unfaithful to the god, she listened to the propositions of Ischys son of Elatus, and consented to wed him: a raven brought to Apollo the fatal news, which so incensed him that he changed the color of the bird from white, as it previously had been, into black.[419] Artemis, to avenge the wounded dignity of her brother, put Korônis to death; but Apollo preserved the male child of which she was about to be delivered, and consigned it to the Centaur Cheirôn to be brought up. The child was named Asklêpius or Æsculapius, and acquired, partly from the teaching of the beneficent leech Cheirôn, partly from inborn and superhuman aptitude, a knowledge of the virtues of herbs and a mastery of medicine and surgery, such as had never before been witnessed. He not only cured the sick, the wounded, and the dying, but even restored the dead to life. Kapaneus, Eriphylê, Hippolytus, Tyndareus and Glaukus were all affirmed by different poets and logographers to have been endued by him with a new life.[420] But Zeus now found himself under the necessity of taking precautions lest mankind, thus unexpectedly protected against sickness and death, should no longer stand in need of the immortal gods: he smote Asklêpius with thunder and killed him. Apollo was so exasperated by this slaughter of his highly-gifted son, that he killed the Cyclôpes who had fabricated the thunder, and Zeus was about to condemn him to Tartarus for doing so; but on the intercession of Latôna he relented, and was satisfied with imposing upon him a temporary servitude in the house of Admêtus at Pheræ.

Asklêpius was worshipped with very great solemnity at Trikka, at Kôs, at Knidus, and in many different parts of Greece, but especially at Epidaurus, so that more than one legend had grown up respecting the details of his birth and adventures: in particular, his mother was by some called Arsinoê. But a formal application had been made on this subject (so the Epidaurians told Pausanias) to the oracle of Delphi, and the god in reply acknowledged that Asklêpius was his son by Korônis.[421] The tale above recounted seems to have been both the oldest and the most current. It is adorned by Pindar in a noble ode, wherein however he omits all mention of the raven as messenger—not specifying who or what the spy was from whom Apollo learnt the infidelity of Korônis. By many this was considered as an improvement in respect of poetical effect, but it illustrates the mode in which the characteristic details and simplicity of the old fables[422] came to be exchanged for dignified generalities, adapted to the altered taste of society.

Machaôn and Podaleirius, the two sons of Asklêpius, command the contingent from Trikka, in the north-west region of Thessaly, at the siege of Troy by Agamemnôn.[423] They are the leeches of the Grecian army, highly prized and consulted by all the wounded chiefs. Their medical renown was further prolonged in the subsequent poem of Arktinus, the Iliu-Persis, wherein the one was represented as unrivalled in surgical operations, the other as sagacious in detecting and appreciating morbid symptoms. It was Podaleirius who first noticed the glaring eyes and disturbed deportment which preceded the suicide of Ajax.[424]

Galen appears uncertain whether Asklêpius (as well as Dionysus) was originally a god, or whether he was first a man and then became afterwards a god;[425] but Apollodôrus professed to fix the exact date of his apotheosis.[426] Throughout all the historical ages the descendants of Asklêpius were numerous and widely diffused. The many families or gentes called Asklêpiads, who devoted themselves to the study and practice of medicine, and who principally dwelt near the temples of Asklêpius whither sick and suffering men came to obtain relief—all recognized the god not merely as the object of their common worship, but also as their actual progenitor. Like Solôn, who reckoned Nêleus and Poseidôn as his ancestors, or the Milêsian Hekatæus, who traced his origin through fifteen successive links to a god—like the privileged gens at Pêlion in Thessaly,[427] who considered the wise Centaur Cheirôn as their progenitor, and who inherited from him their precious secrets respecting the medicinal herbs of which their neighborhood was full,—Asklêpiads, even of the later times, numbered and specified all the intermediate links which separated them from their primitive divine parent. One of these genealogies has been preserved to us, and we may be sure that there were many such, as the Asklêpiads were found in many different places.[428] Among them were enrolled highly instructed and accomplished men, such as the great Hippocratês and the historian Ktêsias, who prided themselves on the divine origin of themselves and their gens[429]—so much did the legendary element pervade even the most philosophical and positive minds of historical Greece. Nor can there be any doubt that their means of medical observation must have been largely extended by their vicinity to a temple so much frequented by the sick, who came in confident hopes of divine relief, and who, whilst they offered up sacrifice and prayer to Æsculapius, and slept in his temple in order to be favored with healing suggestions in their dreams, might, in case the god withheld his supernatural aid, consult his living descendants.[430] The sick visitors at Kôs, or Trikka, or Epidaurus, were numerous and constant, and the tablets usually hung up to record the particulars of their maladies, the remedies resorted to, and the cures operated by the god, formed both an interesting decoration of the sacred ground and an instructive memorial to the Asklêpiads.[431]

The genealogical descent of Hippocratês and the other Asklêpiads from the god Asklêpius is not only analogous to that of Hekatæus and Solôn from their respective ancestoral gods, but also to that of the Lacedæmônian kings from Hêraklês, upon

the basis of which the whole supposed chronology of the ante-historical times has been built, from Eratosthenês and Apollodôrus down to the chronologers of the present century.[432] I shall revert to this hereafter.

CHAPTER X.

ÆAKUS AND HIS DESCENDANTS.—ÆGINA, SALAMIS, AND PHTHIA.

THE memorable heroic genealogy of the Æakids establishes a fabulous connection between Ægina, Salamis, and Phthia, which we can only recognize as a fact, without being able to trace its origin.

Æakus was the son of Zeus, born of Ægina, daughter of Asôpus, whom the god had carried off and brought into the island to which he gave her name: she was afterwards married to Aktôr, and had by him Menœtius, father of Patroclus. As there were two rivers named Asôpus, one between Phlius and Sikyôn, and another between Thêbes and Platæa—so the Æginêtan heroic genealogy was connected both with that of Thêbes and with that of Phlius: and this belief led to practical consequences in the minds of those who accepted the legends as genuine history. For when the Thêbans, in the 68th Olympiad, were hard-pressed in war by Athens, they were directed by the Delphian oracle to ask assistance of their next of kin: recollecting that Thêbê and Ægina had been sisters, common daughters of Asôpus, they were induced to apply to the Æginêtans as their next of kin, and the Æginêtans gave them aid, first by sending to them their common heroes, the Æakids, next by actual armed force.[433] Pindar dwells emphatically on the heroic brotherhood between Thêbes, his native city, and Ægina.[434]

Æakus was alone in Ægina: to relieve him from this solitude, Zeus changed all the ants in the island into men, and thus provided him with a numerous population, who, from their origin, were called Myrmidons.[435] By his wife Endêis, daughter of Cheirôn, Æakus had for his sons Pêleus and Telamôn: by the Nereid Psamathê, he had Phôkus. A monstrous crime had then recently been committed by Pelops, in killing the Arcadian prince, Stymphalus, under a simulation of friendship and hospitality: for this the gods had smitten all Greece with famine and barrenness. The oracles affirmed that nothing could relieve Greece from this intolerable misery except the prayers of Æakus, the most pious of mankind. Accordingly envoys from all quarters flocked to Ægina, to prevail upon Æakus to put up prayers for them: on his supplications the gods relented, and the suffering immediately ceased. The grateful Greeks established in Ægina the temple and worship of Zeus Panhellênius, one of the lasting monuments and institutions of the island, on the spot where Æakus had offered up his prayer. The statues of the envoys who had come to solicit him were yet to be seen in the Æakeion, or sacred edifice of Æakus, in the time of Pausanias: and the Athenian Isokratês, in his eulogy of Evagoras, the despot of Salamis in Cyprus (who traced his descent through Teukrus to Æakus), enlarges upon this signal miracle, recounted and believed by other Greeks as well as by the Æginêtans, as a proof both of the great qualities and of the divine favor and patronage displayed in the career of

the Æakids.[436] Æakus was also employed to aid Poseidôn and Apollo in building the walls of Troy.[437]

Pêleus and Telamôn, the sons of Æakus, contracting a jealousy of their bastard brother, Phôkus, in consequence of his eminent skill in gymnastic contests, conspired to put him to death. Telamôn flung his quoit at him while they were playing together, and Pêleus despatched him by a blow with his hatchet in the back. They then concealed the dead body in a wood, but Æakus, having discovered both the act and the agents, banished the brothers from the island.[438] For both of them eminent destinies were in store.

While we notice the indifference to the moral quality of actions implied in the old Hesiodic legend, when it imputes distinctly and nakedly this proceeding to two of the most admired persons of the heroic world—it is not less instructive to witness the change of feeling which had taken place in the age of Pindar. That warm eulogist of the great Æakid race hangs down his head with shame, and declines to recount, though he is obliged darkly to glance at the cause which forced the pious Æakus to banish his sons from Ægina. It appears that Kallimachus, if we may judge by a short fragment, manifested the same repugnance to mention it.[439]

Telamôn retired to Salamis, then ruled by Kychreus, the son of Poseidôn and Salamis, who had recently rescued the island from the plague of a terrible serpent. This animal, expelled from Salamis, retired to Eleusis in Attica, where it was received and harbored by the goddess Dêmêtêr in her sacred domicile.[440] Kychreus dying childless left his dominion to Telamôn, who, marrying Peribœa, daughter of Alkathoos, and grand-daughter of Pelops, had for his son the celebrated Ajax. Telamôn took part both in the chase of the Kalydônian boar and in the Argonautic expedition: he was also the intimate friend and companion of Hêraklês, whom he accompanied in his enterprise against the Amazons, and in the attack made with only six ships upon Laomedôn, king of Troy. This last enterprise having proved completely successful, Telamôn was rewarded by Hêraklês with the possession of the daughter of Laomedôn, Hêsionê—who bore to him Teukros, the most distinguished archer amidst the host of Agamemnôn, and the founder of Salamis in Cyprus.[441]

Pêleus went to Phthia, where he married the daughter of Eurytiôn, son of Aktôr, and received from him the third part of his dominions. Taking part in the Kalydônian boar-hunt, he unintentionally killed his father-in-law Eurytiôn, and was obliged to flee to Iôlkos, where he received purification from Akastus, son of Pelias: the danger to which he became exposed by the calumnious accusations of the enamoured wife of Akastus has already been touched upon in a previous section. Pêleus also was among the Argonauts; the most memorable event in his life however was his marriage with the sea-goddess Thetis. Zeus and Poseidôn had both conceived a violent passion for Thetis. But the former, having been forewarned by Promêtheus that Thetis was destined to give birth to a son more powerful than his father, compelled

her, much against her own will, to marry Pêleus; who, instructed by the intimations of the wise Cheirôn, was enabled to seize her on the coast called Sêpias in the southern region of Thessaly. She changed her form several times, but Pêleus held her fast until she resumed her original appearance, and she was then no longer able to resist. All the gods were present, and brought splendid gifts to these memorable nuptials: Apollo sang with his harp, Poseidôn gave to Pêleus the immortal horses Xanthos and Balios, and Cheirôn presented a formidable spear, cut from an ash-tree on Mount Pêlion. We shall have reason hereafter to recognize the value of both these gifts in the exploits of Achilles.[442]

The prominent part assigned to Thetis in the Iliad is well known, and the post-Homeric poets of the Legend of Troy introduced her as actively concurring first to promote the glory, finally to bewail the death of her distinguished son.[443] Pêleus, having survived both his son Achilles and his grandson Neoptolemus, is ultimately directed to place himself on the very spot where he had originally seized Thetis, and thither the goddess comes herself to fetch him away, in order that he may exchange the desertion and decrepitude of age for a life of immortality along with the Nêreids.[444] The spot was indicated to Xerxês when he marched into Greece by the Iônians who accompanied him, and his magi offered solemn sacrifices to her as well as to the other Nêreids, as the presiding goddesses and mistresses of the coast.[445]

Neoptolemus or Pyrrhus, the son of Achilles, too young to engage in the commencement of the siege of Troy, comes on the stage after the death of his father as the indispensable and prominent agent in the final capture of the city. He returns victor from Troy, not to Phthia, but to Epirus, bringing with him the captive Andromachê, widow of Hectôr, by whom Molossus is born to him. He himself perishes in the full vigor of life at Delphi by the machinations of Orestês, son of Agamemnôn. But his son Molossus—like Fleance, the son of Banquo, in Macbeth—becomes the father of the powerful race of Molossian kings, who played so conspicuous a part during the declining vigor of the Grecian cities, and to whom the title and parentage of Æakids was a source of peculiar pride, identifying them by community of heroic origin with genuine and undisputed Hellênes.[446]

The glories of Ajax, the second grandson of Æakus, before Troy, are surpassed only by those of Achilles. He perishes by his own hand, the victim of an insupportable feeling of humiliation, because a less worthy claimant is allowed to carry off from him the arms of the departed Achilles. His son Philæus receives the citizenship of Athens, and the gens or dême called Philaidæ traced up to him its name and its origin: moreover the distinguished Athenians, Miltiadês and Thucydidês, were regarded as members of this heroic progeny.[447]

Teukrus escaped from the perils of the siege of Troy as well as from those of the voyage homeward, and reached Salamis in safety. But his father Telamôn, indignant at his having returned without Ajax, refused to receive him, and compelled him to

expatriate. He conducted his followers to Cyprus, where he founded the city of Salamis: his descendant Evagoras was recognized as a Teukrid and as an Æakid even in the time of Isokratês.[448]

Such was the splendid heroic genealogy of the Æakids,—a family renowned for military excellence. The Æakeion at Ægina, in which prayer and sacrifice were offered to Æakus, remained in undiminished dignity down to the time of Pausanias.[449] This genealogy connects together various eminent gentes in Achaia Phthiôtis, in Ægina, in Salamis, in Cyprus, and amongst the Epirotic Molossians. Whether we are entitled to infer from it that the island of Ægina was originally peopled by Myrmidones from Achaia Phthiôtis, as O. Müller imagines,[450] I will not pretend to affirm. These mythical pedigrees seem to unite together special clans or gentes, rather than the bulk of any community—just as we know that the Athenians generally had no part in the Æakid genealogy, though certain particular Athenian families laid claim to it. The intimate friendship between Achilles and the Opuntian hero Patroclus—and the community of name and frequent conjunction between the Locrian Ajax, son of Oïleus, and Ajax, son of Telamôn—connect the Æakids with Opus and the Opuntian Locrians, in a manner which we have no farther means of explaining. Pindar too represents Menœtius, father of Patroclus, as son of Aktôr and Ægina, and therefore maternal brother of Æakus.[451]

CHAPTER XI.

ATTIC LEGENDS AND GENEALOGIES.

The most ancient name in Attic archæology, as far as our means of information reach, is that of Erechtheus, who is mentioned both in the Catalogue of the Iliad and in a brief allusion of the Odyssey. Born of the Earth, he is brought up by the goddess Athênê, adopted by her as her ward, and installed in her temple at Athens, where the Athenians offer to him annual sacrifices. The Athenians are styled in the Iliad, "the people of Erechtheus."[452] This is the most ancient testimony concerning Erechtheus, exhibiting him as a divine or heroic, certainly a superhuman person, and identifying him with the primitive germination (if I may use a term, the Grecian equivalent of which would have pleased an Athenian ear) of Attic man. And he was recognized in this same character, even at the close of the fourth century before the Christian æra, by the Butadæ, one of the most ancient and important Gentes at Athens, who boasted of him as their original ancestor: the genealogy of the great Athenian orator Lykurgus, a member of this family, drawn up by his son Abrôn, and painted on a public tablet in the Erechtheion, contained as its first and highest name, Erechtheus, son of Hêphæstos and the Earth. In the Erechtheion, Erechtheus was worshipped conjointly with Athênê: he was identified with the god Poseidôn, and bore the denomination of Poseidôn Erechtheus: one of the family of the Butadæ, chosen among themselves by lot, enjoyed the privilege and performed the functions of his hereditary priest.[453] Herodotus also assigns the same earth-born origin to Erechtheus:[454] but Pindar, the old poem called the Danais, Euripidês and Apollodôrus—all name Erichthonius, son of Hêphæstos and the Earth, as the being who was thus adopted and made the temple-companion of Athênê, while Apollodôrus in another place identifies Erichthonius with Poseidôn.[455] The Homeric scholiast treated Erechtheus and Erichthonius as the same person under two names:[456] and since, in regard to such mythical persons, there exists no other test of identity of the subject except perfect similarity of the attributes, this seems the reasonable conclusion.

We may presume, from the testimony of Homer, that the first and oldest conception of Athens and its sacred acropolis places it under the special protection, and represents it as the settlement and favorite abode of Athênê, jointly with Poseidôn; the latter being the inferior, though the chosen companion of the former, and therefore exchanging his divine appellation for the cognomen of Erechtheus. But the country called Attica, which, during the historical ages, forms one social and political aggregate with Athens, was originally distributed into many independent dêmes or cantons, and included, besides, various religious clans or hereditary sects (if the expression may be permitted); that is, a multitude of persons not necessarily living together

in the same locality, but bound together by an hereditary communion of sacred rites, and claiming privileges, as well as performing obligations, founded upon the traditional authority of divine persons for whom they had a common veneration. Even down to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the demots of the various Attic dêmes, though long since embodied in the larger political union of Attica, and having no wish for separation, still retained the recollection of their original political autonomy. They lived in their own separate localities, resorted habitually to their own temples, and visited Athens only occasionally for private or political business, or for the great public festivals. Each of these aggregates, political as well as religious, had its own eponymous god or hero, with a genealogy more or less extended, and a train of mythical incidents more or less copious, attached to his name, according to the fancy of the local exegetes and poets. The eponymous heroes Marathôn, Dekelus, Kolônus, or Phlius, had each their own title to worship, and their own position as themes of legendary narrative, independent of Erechtheus, or Poseidôn, or Athênê, the patrons of the acropolis common to all of them.

But neither the archæology of Attica, nor that of its various component fractions, was much dwelt upon by the ancient epic poets of Greece. Theseus is noticed both in the Iliad and Odyssey as having carried off from Krête Ariadnê, the daughter of Minos—thus commencing that connection between the Krêtan and Athenian legends which we afterwards find so largely amplified—and the sons of Thêseus take part in the Trojan war.[457] The chief collectors and narrators of the Attic mythes were, the prose logographers, authors of the many compositions called Atthides, or works on Attic archæology. These writers—Hellanikus, the contemporary of Herodotus, is the earliest composer of an Atthis expressly named, though Pherekydês also touched upon the Attic fables—these writers, I say, interwove into one chronological series the legends which either greatly occupied their own fancy, or commanded the most general reverence among their countrymen. In this way the religious and political legends of Eleusis, a town originally independent of Athens, but incorporated with it before the historical age, were worked into one continuous sequence along with those of the Erechtheids. In this way, Kekrops, the eponymous hero of the portion of Attica called Kekropia, came to be placed in the mythical chronology at a higher point even than the primitive god or hero Erechtheus.

Ogygês is said to have reigned in Attica[458] 1020 years before the first Olympiad, or 1796 years B. C. In his time happened the deluge of Deukaliôn, which destroyed most of the inhabitants of the country: after a long interval, Kekrops, an indigenous person, half man and half serpent, is given to us by Apollodôrus as the first king of the country: he bestowed upon the land, which had before been called Actê, the name of Kekropia. In his day there ensued a dispute between Athênê and Poseidôn respecting the possession of the acropolis at Athens, which each of them coveted. First, Poseidôn struck the rock with his trident, and produced the well of salt water which existed in it, called the Erechthêis: next came Athênê, who planted the sacred

olive-tree ever afterwards seen and venerated in the portion of Erechtheion called the cell of Pandrosus. The twelve gods decided the dispute; and Kekrops having testified before them that Athênê had rendered this inestimable service, they adjudged the spot to her in preference to Poseidôn. Both the ancient olive-tree and the well produced by Poseidôn were seen on the acropolis, in the temple consecrated jointly to Athênê and Erechtheus, throughout the historical ages. Poseidôn, as a mark of his wrath for the preference given to Athênê, inundated the Thriasian plain with water. [459]

During the reign of Kekrops, Attica was laid waste by Karian pirates on the coast, and by invasions of the Aônian inhabitants from Bœôtia. Kekrops distributed the inhabitants of Attica into twelve local sections—Kekropia, Tetrapolis, Epakria, Dekeleia, Eleusis, Aphidna, Thorikus, Braurôn, Kythêrus, Sphêttus, Kêphisius, Phalerus. Wishing to ascertain the number of inhabitants, he commanded each man to cast a single stone into a general heap: the number of stones was counted, and it was found that there were twenty thousand.[460]

Kekrops married the daughter of Aktæus, who (according to Pausanias's version) had been king of the country before him, and had called it by the name of Aktæa. [461] By her he had three daughters, Aglaurus, Ersê and Pandrosus, and a son, Erysichthôn. Kekrops is called by Pausanias contemporary of the Arcadian Lykaôn, and is favorably contrasted with that savage prince in respect of his piety and humanity.[462] Though he has been often designated in modern histories as an immigrant from Egypt into Attica, yet the far greater number of ancient authorities represent him as indigenous or earth-born.[463]

Erysichthôn died without issue, and Kranaus succeeded him,—another autochthonous person and another eponymus,—for the name Kranai was an old denomination of the inhabitants of Attica.[464] Kranaus was dethroned by Amphiktyôn, by some called an autochthonous man; by others, a son of Deukaliôn: Amphiktyôn in his turn was expelled by Erichthonius, son of Hêphæstos and the Earth,—the same person apparently as Erechtheus, but inserted by Apollodôrus at this point of the series. Erichthonius, the pupil and favored companion of Athênê, placed in the acropolis the original Palladium or wooden statue of that goddess, said to have dropped from heaven: he was moreover the first to celebrate the festival of the Panathenæa. He married the nymph Pasithea, and had for his son and successor Pandiôn.[465] Erichthonius was the first person who taught the art of breaking in horses to the yoke, and who drove a chariot and four.[466]

In the time of Pandiôn, who succeeded to Erichthonius, Dionysus and Dêmêtêr both came into Attica: the latter was received by Keleos at Eleusis.[467] Pandiôn married the nymph Zeuxippê, and had twin sons, Erechtheus and Butês, and two daughters, Prokne and Philomêla. The two latter are the subjects of a memorable and well-known legend. Pandiôn having received aid in repelling the Thêbans from Têreus,

king of Thrace, gave him his daughter Proknê in marriage, by whom he had a son, Itys. The beautiful Philomêla, going to visit her sister, inspired the barbarous Thracian with an irresistible passion: he violated her person, confined her in a distant pastoral hut, and pretended that she was dead, cutting out her tongue to prevent her from revealing the truth. After a long interval, Philomêla found means to acquaint her sister of the cruel deed which had been perpetrated; she wove into a garment words describing her melancholy condition, and despatched it by a trusty messenger. Proknê, overwhelmed with sorrow and anger, took advantage of the free egress enjoyed by women during the Bacchanalian festival to go and release her sister: the two sisters then revenged themselves upon Têreus by killing the boy Itys, and serving him up for his father to eat: after the meal had been finished, the horrid truth was revealed to him. Têreus snatched a hatchet to put Proknê to death: she fled, along with Philomêla, and all the three were changed into birds—Proknê became a swallow, Philomêla a nightingale, and Têreus an hoopoe.[468] This tale, so popular with the poets, and so illustrative of the general character of Grecian legend, is not less remarkable in another point of view—that the great historian Thucydidês seems to allude to it as an historical fact,[469] not however directly mentioning the final metamorphosis.

After the death of Pandiôn, Erechtheus succeeded to the kingdom, and his brother, Butês, became priest of Poseidôn Erichthonius, a function which his descendants ever afterwards exercised, the Butadæ or Eteobutadæ. Erechtheus seems to appear in three characters in the fabulous history of Athens—as a god, Poseidôn Erechtheus[470]—as a hero, Erechtheus, son of the Earth—and now, as a king, son of Pandiôn: so much did the ideas of divine and human rule become confounded and blended together in the imagination of the Greeks in reviewing their early times.

The daughters of Erechtheus were not less celebrated in Athenian legend than those of Pandiôn. Prokris, one of them, is among the heroines seen by Odysseus in Hadês: she became the wife of Kephalus, son of Deionês, and lived in the Attic dême of Thorikus. Kephalus tried her fidelity by pretending that he was going away for a long period; but shortly returned, disguising his person and bringing with him a splendid necklace. He presented himself to Prokris without being recognized, and succeeded in triumphing over her chastity. Having accomplished this object, he revealed to her his true character: she earnestly besought his forgiveness, and prevailed upon him to grant it. Nevertheless he became shortly afterwards the unintentional author of her death: for he was fond of hunting, and staid out a long time on his excursions, so that Prokris suspected him of visiting some rival. She determined to watch him by concealing herself in a thicket near the place of his midday repose; and when Kephalus implored the presence of Nephelê (a cloud) to protect him from the sun's rays, she suddenly started from her hiding-place: Kephalus, thus disturbed, cast his hunting-spear unknowingly into the thicket and slew his wife. Erechtheus in-

terred her with great magnificence, and Kephalus was tried for the act before the court of Areopagus, which condemned him to exile.[471]

Kreüsa, another daughter of Erechtheus, seduced by Apollo, becomes the mother of Iôn, whom she exposes immediately after his birth in the cave north of the acropolis, concealing the fact from every one. Apollo prevails upon Hermês to convey the new-born child to Delphi, where he is brought up as a servant of the temple, without knowing his parents. Kreüsa marries Xuthus, son of Æolus, but continuing childless, she goes with Xuthus to the Delphian oracle to inquire for a remedy. The god presents to them Iôn, and desires them to adopt him as their son: their son Achæus is afterwards born to them, and Iôn and Achæus become the eponyms of the Iônians and Achæans.[472]

Oreithyia, the third daughter of Erechtheus, was stolen away by the god Boreas while amusing herself on the banks of the Ilissus, and carried to his residence in Thrace. The two sons of this marriage, Zêtês and Kalaïs, were born with wings: they took part in the Argonautic expedition, and engaged in the pursuit of the Harpies: they were slain at Tênos by Hêraklês. Kleopatra, the daughter of Boreas and Oreithyia, was married to Phineus, and had two sons, Plexippus and Pandiôn; but Phineus afterwards espoused a second wife, Idæa, the daughter of Dardanus, who, detesting the two sons of the former bed, accused them falsely of attempting her chastity, and persuaded Phineus in his wrath to put out the eyes of both. For this cruel proceeding he was punished by the Argonauts in the course of their voyage.[473]

On more than one occasion the Athenians derived, or at least believed themselves to have derived, important benefits from this marriage of Boreas with the daughter of their primæval hero: one inestimable service, rendered at a juncture highly critical for Grecian independence, deserves to be specified.[474] At the time of the invasion of Greece by Xerxês, the Grecian fleet was assembled at Chalcis and Artemision in Eubœa, awaiting the approach of the Persian force, so overwhelming in its numbers as well by sea as on land. The Persian fleet had reached the coast of Magnêsia and the south-eastern corner of Thessaly without any material damage, when the Athenians were instructed by an oracle "to invoke the aid of their son-in-law." Understanding the advice to point to Boreas, they supplicated his aid and that of Oreithyia, most earnestly, as well by prayer as by sacrifice,[475] and the event corresponded to their wishes. A furious north-easterly wind immediately arose, and continued for three days to afflict the Persian fleet as it lay on an unprotected coast: the number of ships driven ashore, both vessels of war and of provision, was immense, and the injury done to the armament was never thoroughly repaired. Such was the powerful succor which the Athenians derived, at a time of their utmost need, from their son-in-law Boreas; and their gratitude was shown by consecrating to him a new temple on the banks of the Ilissus.

The three remaining daughters of Erechtheus—he had six in all[476]—were in Athenian legend yet more venerated than their sisters, on account of having voluntarily devoted themselves to death for the safety of their country. Eumolpus of Eleusis was the son of Poseidôn and the eponymous hero of the sacred gens called the Eumolpids, in whom the principal functions, appertaining to the mysterious rites of Dêmêtêr at Eleusis, were vested by hereditary privilege: he made war upon Erechtheus and the Athenians, with the aid of a body of Thracian allies; indeed it appears that the legends of Athens, originally foreign and unfriendly to those of Eleusis, represented him as having been himself a Thracian born and an immigrant into Attica.[477] Respecting Eumolpus however and his parentage, the discrepancies much exceed even the measure of license usual in the legendary genealogies, and some critics, both ancient and modern, have sought to reconcile these contradictions by the usual stratagem of supposing two or three different persons of the same name. Even Pausanias, so familiar with this class of unsworn witnesses, complains of the want of native Eleusinian genealogists,[478] and of the extreme license of fiction in which other authors had indulged.

In the Homeric Hymn to Dêmêtêr, the most ancient testimony before us,—composed, to all appearance, earlier than the complete incorporation of Eleusis with Athens,—Eumolpus appears (to repeat briefly what has been stated in a previous chapter) as one of the native chiefs or princes of Eleusis, along with Triptolemus, Dioklês, Polyxeinus and Dolichus: Keleos is the king, or principal among these chiefs, the son or lineal descendant of the eponymous Eleusis himself. To these chiefs, and to the three daughters of Keleos, the goddess Dêmêtêr comes in her sorrow for the loss of her daughter Persephonê: being hospitably entertained by Keleos she reveals her true character, commands that a temple shall be built to her at Eleusis, and prescribes to them the rites according to which they are to worship her.[479] Such seems to have been the ancient story of the Eleusinians respecting their own religious antiquities: Keleos, with Metaneira his wife, and the other chiefs here mentioned, were worshipped at Eleusis, and from thence transferred to Athens as local gods or heroes.[480] Eleusis became incorporated with Athens, apparently not very long before the time of Solôn; and the Eleusinian worship of Dêmêtêr was then received into the great religious solemnities of the Athenian state, to which it owes its remarkable subsequent extension and commanding influence. In the Atticized worship of the Eleusinian Dêmêtêr, the Eumolpids and the Kêrŷkes were the principal hereditary functionaries: Eumolpus, the eponym of this great family, came thus to play the principal part in the Athenian legendary version of the war between Athens and Eleusis. An oracle had pronounced that Athens could only be rescued from his attack by the death of the three daughters of Erechtheus; their generous patriotism consented to the sacrifice, and their father put them to death. He then went forth confidently to the battle, totally vanquished the enemy, and killed Eumolpus with his own hand.[481] Erechtheus was worshipped as a god, and his daughters as goddesses, at Athens.[482] Their names and their exalted devotion were cited along with those of the war-

riors of Marathôn, in the public assembly of Athens, by orators who sought to arouse the languid patriot, or to denounce the cowardly deserter; and the people listened both to one and the other with analogous feelings of grateful veneration, as well as with equally unsuspecting faith in the matter of fact.[483]

Though Erechtheus gained the victory over Eumolpus, yet the story represents Poseidôn as having put an end to the life and reign of Erechtheus, who was (it seems) slain in the battle. He was succeeded by his son Kekrops II., and the latter again by his son Pandiôn II.,[484]—two names unmarked by any incidents, and which appear to be mere duplication of the former Kekrops and Pandiôn, placed there by the genealogizers for the purpose of filling up what seemed to them a chronological chasm. The Attic legends were associated chiefly with a few names of respected eponymous personages; and if the persons called the children of Pandiôn were too numerous to admit of their being conveniently ascribed to one father, there was no difficulty in supposing a second prince of the same name.

Apollodôrus passes at once from Erechtheus to his son Kekrops II., then to Pandiôn II., next to the four sons of the latter, Ægeus, Pallas, Nisus and Lykus. But the tragedians here insert the story of Xuthus, Kreüsa and Iôn; the latter being the son of Kreüsa by Apollo, but given by the god to Xuthus, and adopted by the latter as his own. Iôn becomes the successor of Erechtheus, and his sons Teleon, Hoplês, Argadês and Aigikorês become the eponyms of the four ancient tribes of Athens, which subsisted until the revolution of Kleisthenês. Iôn himself is the eponym of the Iônic race both in Asia, in Europe, and in the Ægean islands: Dôrus and Achæus are the sons of Kreüsa by Xuthus, so that Iôn is distinguished from both of them by being of divine parentage.[485] According to the story given by Philochorus, Iôn rendered such essential service in rescuing the Athenians from the attack of the Thracians under Eumolpus, that he was afterwards made king of the country, and distributed all the inhabitants into four tribes or castes, corresponding to different modes of life,—soldiers, husbandmen, goatherds, and artisans.[486] And it seems that the legend explanatory of the origin of the festival Boëdromia, originally important enough to furnish a name to one of the Athenian months, was attached to the aid thus rendered by Iôn.[487]

We pass from Iôn to persons of far greater mythical dignity and interest,—Ægeus and his son Thêseus.

Pandiôn had four sons, Ægeus, Nisus, Lykus, and Pallas, between whom he divided his dominions. Nisus received the territory of Megaris, which had been under the sway of Pandiôn, and there founded the seaport of Nisæa. Lykus was made king of the eastern coast, but a dispute afterwards ensued, and he quitted the country altogether, to establish himself on the southern coast of Asia Minor among the Termilæ, to whom he gave the name of Lykians.[488] Ægeus, as the eldest of the four, became king of Athens; but Pallas received a portion both of the south-western coast

and the interior, and he as well as his children appear as frequent enemies both to Ægeus and to Thêseus. Pallas is the eponym of the dême Pallênê, and the stories respecting him and his sons seem to be connected with old and standing feuds among the different dêmes of Attica, originally independent communities. These feuds penetrated into the legend, and explain the story which we find that Ægeus and Thêseus were not genuine Erechtheids, the former being denominated a supposititious child to Pandiôn.[489]

Ægeus[490] has little importance in the mythical history except as the father of Thêseus: it may even be doubted whether his name is anything more than a mere cognomen of the god Poseidôn, who was (as we are told) the real father of this great Attic Hêraklês. As I pretend only to give a very brief outline of the general territory of Grecian legend, I cannot permit myself to recount in detail the chivalrous career of Thêseus, who is found both in the Kalydônian boar-hunt and in the Argonautic expedition—his personal and victorious encounters with the robbers Sinnis, Procrustês, Periphêtês, Scirôn and others—his valuable service in ridding his country of the Krommyonian sow and the Marathônian bull—his conquest of the Minotaur in Krête, and his escape from the dangers of the labyrinth by the aid of Ariadnê, whom he subsequently carries off and abandons—his many amorous adventures, and his expeditions both against the Amazons and into the under-world along with Peirithous.[491]

Thucydidês delineates the character of Thêseus as a man who combined sagacity with political power, and who conferred upon his country the inestimable benefit of uniting all the separate and self-governing dêmes of Attica into one common political society.[492] From the well-earned reverence attached to the assertion of Thucydidês, it has been customary to reason upon this assertion as if it were historically authentic, and to treat the romantic attributes which we find in Plutarch and Diodôrus as if they were fiction superinduced upon this basis of fact. Such a view of the case is in my judgment erroneous. The athletic and amorous knight-errant is the old version of the character—the profound and long-sighted politician is a subsequent correction, introduced indeed by men of superior mind, but destitute of historical warranty, and arising out of their desire to find reasons of their own for concurring in the veneration which the general public paid more easily and heartily to their national hero. Thêseus, in the Iliad and Odyssey, fights with the Lapithæ against the Centaurs: Thêseus, in the Hesiodic poems, is misguided by his passion for the beautiful Æglê, daughter of Panopeus:[493] and the Thêseus described in Plutarch's biography is in great part a continuation and expansion of these same or similar attributes, mingled with many local legends, explaining, like the Fasti of Ovid, or the lost Aitia of Kallimachus, the original genesis of prevalent religious and social customs.[494] Plutarch has doubtless greatly softened down and modified the adventures which he found in the Attic logographers as well as in the poetical epics called Thêsêis. For in his preface to the life of Thêseus, after having emphatically declared that he is about to

transcend the boundary both of the known and the knowable, but that the temptation of comparing the founder of Athens with the founder of Rome is irresistible, he concludes with the following remarkable words: "I pray that this fabulous matter may be so far obedient to my endeavors as to receive, when purified by reason, the aspect of history: in those cases where it haughtily scorns plausibility and will admit no alliance with what is probable, I shall beg for indulgent hearers, willing to receive antique narrative in a mild spirit."[495] We see here that Plutarch sat down, not to recount the old fables as he found them, but to purify them by reason and to impart to them the aspect of history. We have to thank him for having retained, after this purification, so much of what is romantic and marvellous; but we may be sure that the sources from which he borrowed were more romantic and marvellous still. It was the tendency of the enlightened men of Athens, from the days of Solôn downwards, to refine and politicize the character of Thêseus:[496] even Peisistratus expunged from one of the Hesiodic poems the line which described the violent passion of the hero for the fair Æglê:[497] and the tragic poets found it more congenial to the feelings of their audience to exhibit him as a dignified and liberal sovereign, rather than as an adventurous single-handed fighter. But the logographers and the Alexandrine poets remained more faithful to the old fables. The story of Hekalê, the hospitable old woman who received and blessed Thêseus when he went against the Marathônian bull, and whom he found dead when he came back to recount the news of his success, was treated by Kallimachus:[498] and Virgil must have had his mind full of the unrefined legends when he numbered this Attic Hêraklês among the unhappy sufferers condemned to endless penance in the under-world.[499]

Two however among the Thêseian fables cannot be dismissed without some special notice,—the war against the Amazons, and the expedition against Krête. The former strikingly illustrates the facility as well as the tenacity of Grecian legendary faith; the latter embraces the story of Dædalus and Minos, two of the most eminent among Grecian ante-historical personages.

The Amazons, daughters of Arês and Harmonia,[500] are both early creations and frequent reproductions of the ancient epic—which was indeed, we may generally remark, largely occupied both with the exploits and sufferings of women, or heroines, the wives and daughters of the Grecian heroes—and which recognized in Pallas Athênê the finished type of an irresistible female warrior. A nation of courageous, hardy and indefatigable women, dwelling apart from men, permitting only a short temporary intercourse for the purpose of renovating their numbers, and burning out their right breast with a view of enabling themselves to draw the bow freely,—this was at once a general type stimulating to the fancy of the poet and a theme eminently popular with his hearers. Nor was it at all repugnant to the faith of the latter—who had no recorded facts to guide them, and no other standard of credibility as to the past except such poetical narratives themselves—to conceive communities of Amazons as having actually existed in anterior time. Accordingly we find these war-

like females constantly reappearing in the ancient poems, and universally accepted as past realities. In the Iliad, when Priam wishes to illustrate emphatically the most numerous host in which he ever found himself included, he tells us that it was assembled in Phyrgia, on the banks of the Sangarius, for the purpose of resisting the formidable Amazons. When Bellerophôn is to be employed on a deadly and perilous undertaking,[501] by those who indirectly wish to procure his death, he is despatched against the Amazons. In the Æthiopis of Arktinus, describing the post-Homeric war of Troy, Penthesileia, queen of the Amazons, appears as the most effective ally of the besieged city, and as the most formidable enemy of the Greeks, succumbing only to the invincible might of Achilles.[502] The Argonautic heroes find the Amazons on the river Thermôdon, in their expedition along the southern coast of the Euxine. To the same spot Hêraclês goes to attack them, in the performance of the ninth labor imposed upon him by Eurystheus, for the purpose of procuring the girdle of the Amazonian queen, Hippolytê;[503] and we are told that they had not yet recovered from the losses sustained in this severe aggression when Thêseus also assaulted and defeated them, carrying off their queen, Antiopê.[504] This injury they avenged by invading Attica,—an undertaking (as Plutarch justly observes) "neither trifling nor feminine," especially if according to the statement of Hellanikus, they crossed the Cimmerian Bosporus on the winter ice, beginning their march from the Asiatic side of the Paulus Mæotis.[505] They overcame all the resistances and difficulties of this prodigious march, and penetrated even into Athens itself, where the final battle, hard-fought and at one time doubtful, by which Theseus crushed them, was fought—in the very heart of the city. Attic antiquaries confidently pointed out the exact position of the two contending armies: the left wing of the Amazons rested upon the spot occupied by the commemorative monument called the Amazoneion; the right wing touched the Pnyx, the place in which the public assemblies of the Athenian democracy were afterwards held. The details and fluctuations of the combat, as well as the final triumph and consequent truce, were recounted by these authors with as complete faith and as much circumstantiality as those of the battle of Platæa by Herodotus. The sepulchral edifice called the Amazoneion, the tomb or pillar of Antiopê near the western gate of the city—the spot called the Horkomosion near the temple of Thêseus—even the hill of Areiopagus itself, and the sacrifices which it was customary to offer to the Amazons at the periodical festival of the Thêseia—were all so many religious mementos of this victory;[506] which was moreover a favorite subject of art both with the sculptor and the painter, at Athens as well as in other parts of Greece.

No portion of the ante-historical epic appears to have been more deeply worked into the national mind of Greece than this invasion and defeat of the Amazons. It was not only a constant theme of the logographers, but was also familiarly appealed to by the popular orators along with Marathôn and Salamis, among those antique exploits of which their fellow-citizens might justly be proud. It formed a part of the retrospective faith of Herodotus, Lysias, Plato and Isokratês,[507] and the exact date of the event was settled by the chronologists.[508] Nor did the Athenians stand alone in

such a belief. Throughout many other regions of Greece, both European and Asiatic, traditions and memorials of the Amazons were found. At Megara, at Trœzen, in Laconia near Cape Tænarus, at Chæroneia in Bœôtia, and in more than one part of Thessaly, sepulchres or monuments of the Amazons were preserved. The warlike women (it was said), on their way to Attica, had not traversed those countries, without leaving some evidences of their passage.[509]

Amongst the Asiatic Greeks the supposed traces of the Amazons were yet more numerous. Their proper territory was asserted to be the town and plain of Themiskyra, near the Grecian colony of Amisus, on the river Thermôdôn, a region called, after their name by Roman historians and geographers.[510] But they were believed to have conquered and occupied in early times a much wider range of territory, extending even to the coast of Iônia and Æolis. Ephesus, Smyrna, Kymê, Myrina, Paphos and Sinopê were affirmed to have been founded and denominated by them.[511] Some authors placed them in Libya or Ethiopia; and when the Pontic Greeks on the north-western shore of the Euxine had become acquainted with the hardy and daring character of the Sarmatian maidens,—who were obliged to have slain each an enemy in battle as the condition of obtaining a husband, and who artificially prevented the growth of the right breast during childhood,—they could imagine no more satisfactory mode of accounting for such attributes than by deducing the Sarmatians from a colony of vagrant Amazons, expelled by the Grecian heroes from their territory on the Thermôdôn.[512] Pindar ascribed the first establishment of the memorable temple of Artemis at Ephesus to the Amazons. And Pausanias explains in part the preëminence which this temple enjoyed over every other in Greece by the widely diffused renown of its female founders,[513] respecting whom he observes (with perfect truth, if we admit the historical character of the old epic), that women possess an unparalleled force of resolution in resisting adverse events, since the Amazons, after having been first roughly handled by Hêraklês and then completely defeated by Thêseus, could yet find courage to play so conspicuous a part in the defence of Troy against the Grecian besiegers.[514]

It is thus that in what is called early Grecian history, as the Greeks themselves looked back upon it, the Amazons were among the most prominent and undisputed personages. Nor will the circumstance appear wonderful if we reflect, that the belief in them was first established at a time when the Grecian mind was fed with nothing else but religious legend and epic poetry, and that the incidents of the supposed past, as received from these sources, were addressed to their faith and feelings, without being required to adapt themselves to any canons of credibility drawn from present experience. But the time came when the historians of Alexander the Great audaciously abused this ancient credence. Amongst other tales calculated to exalt the dignity of that monarch, they affirmed that after his conquest and subjugation of the Persian empire, he had been visited in Hyrcania by Thalestris, queen of the Amazons, who admiring his warlike prowess, was anxious to be enabled to return into

her own country in a condition to produce offspring of a breed so invincible.[515] But the Greeks had now been accustomed for a century and a half to historical and philosophical criticism—and that uninquiring faith, which was readily accorded to the wonders of the past, could no longer be invoked for them when tendered as present reality. For the fable of the Amazons was here reproduced in its naked simplicity, without being rationalized or painted over with historical colors.

Some literary men indeed, among whom were Dêmêtrius of Skepsis, and the Mitylenæan Theophanês, the companion of Pompey in his expeditions, still continued their belief both in Amazons present and Amazons past; and when it becomes notorious that at least there were none such on the banks of the Thermôdôn, these authors supposed them to have migrated from their original locality, and to have settled in the unvisited regions north of Mount Caucasus.[516] Strabo, on the contrary, feeling that the grounds of disbelief applied with equal force to the ancient stories and to the modern, rejected both the one and the other. But he remarks at the same time, not without some surprise, that it was usual with most persons to adopt a middle course,—to retain the Amazons as historical phænomena of the remote past, but to disallow them as realities of the present, and to maintain that the breed had died out.[517] The accomplished intellect of Julius Cæsar did not scruple to acknowledge them as having once conquered and held in dominion a large portion of Asia;[518] and the compromise between early, traditional, and religious faith on the one hand, and established habits of critical research on the other, adopted by the historian Arrian, deserves to be transcribed in his own words, as illustrating strikingly the powerful sway of the old legends even over the most positive-minded Greeks:—"Neither Aristobulus nor Ptolemy (he observes), nor any other competent witness, has recounted this (visit of the Amazons and their queen to Alexander): nor does it seem to me that the race of the Amazons was preserved down to that time, nor have they been noticed either by any one before Alexander, or by Xenophôn, though he mentions both the Phasians and the Kolchians, and the other barbarous nations which the Greeks saw both before and after their arrival at Trapezus, in which marches they must have met with the Amazons, if the latter had been still in existence. Yet *it is incredible to me* that this race of women, celebrated as they have been by authors so many and so commanding, *should never have existed at all*. The story tells of Hêraklês, that he set out from Greece and brought back with him the girdle of their queen Hippolytê; also of Thêseus and the Athenians, that they were the first who defeated in battle and repelled these women in their invasion of Europe; and the combat of the Athenians with the Amazons has been painted by Mikôn, not less than that between the Athenians and the Persians. Moreover Herodotus has spoken in many places of these women, and those Athenian orators who have pronounced panegyrics on the citizens slain in battle, have dwelt upon the victory over the Amazons as among the most memorable of Athenian exploits. If the satrap of Media sent any equestrian women at all to Alexander, I think that they must have come from some

of the neighboring tribes, practised in riding and equipped in the costume generally called Amazonian."[519]

There cannot be a more striking evidence of the indelible force with which these ancient legends were worked into the national faith and feelings of the Greeks, than these remarks of a judicious historian upon the fable of the Amazons. Probably if any plausible mode of rationalizing it, and of transforming it into a quasi-political event, had been offered to Arrian, he would have been better pleased to adopt such a middle term, and would have rested comfortably in the supposition that he believed the legend in its true meaning, while his less inquiring countrymen were imposed upon by the exaggerations of poets. But as the story was presented to him plain and unvarnished, either for acceptance or rejection, his feelings as a patriot and a religious man prevented him from applying to the past such tests of credibility as his untrammelled reason acknowledged to be paramount in regard to the present. When we see moreover how much his belief was strengthened, and all tendency to scepticism shut out by the familiarity of his eye and memory with sculptured or painted Amazons[520]—we may calculate the irresistible force of this sensible demonstration on the convictions of the unlettered public, at once more deeply retentive of passive impressions, and unaccustomed to the countervailing habit of rational investigation into evidence. Had the march of an army of warlike women, from the Thermôdôn or the Tanais into the heart of Attica, been recounted to Arrian as an incident belonging to the time of Alexander the Great, he would have rejected it no less emphatically than Strabô; but cast back as it was into an undefined past, it took rank among the hallowed traditions of divine or heroic antiquity,—gratifying to extol by rhetoric, but repulsive to scrutinize in argument.[521]

CHAPTER XII.

KRETAN LEGENDS.—MINOS AND HIS FAMILY.

To understand the adventures of Thêseus in Krête, it will be necessary to touch briefly upon Minôs and the Krêtan heroic genealogy.

Minôs and Rhadamanthus, according to Homer, are sons of Zeus, by Europê,[522] daughter of the widely-celebrated Phœnix, born in Krête. Minôs is the father of Deukaliôn, whose son Idomeneus, in conjunction with Mêrionês, conducts the Krêtan troops to the host of Agamemnôn before Troy. Minôs is ruler of Knossus, and familiar companion of the great Zeus. He is spoken of as holding guardianship in Krête—not necessarily meaning the whole of the island: he is farther decorated with a golden sceptre, and constituted judge over the dead in the under-world to settle their disputes, in which function Odysseus finds him—this however by a passage of comparatively late interpolation into the Odyssey. He also had a daughter named Ariadnê, for whom the artist Dædalus fabricated in the town of Knossus the representation of a complicated dance, and who was ultimately carried off by Thêseus: she died in the island of Dia, deserted by Thêseus and betrayed by Dionysos to the fatal wrath of Artemis. Rhadamanthus seems to approach to Minôs both in judicial functions and posthumous dignity. He is conveyed expressly to Eubœa, by the semi-divine sea-carriers the Phæacians, to inspect the gigantic corpse of the earth-born Tityus—the longest voyage they ever undertook. He is moreover after death promoted to an abode of undisturbed bliss in the Elysian plain at the extremity of the earth.[523]

According to poets later than Homer, Europê is brought over by Zeus from Phœnicia to Krête, where she bears to him three sons, Minôs, Rhadamanthus and Sarpêdôn. The latter leaves Krête and settles in Lykia, the population of which, as well as that of many other portions of Asia Minor, is connected by various mythical genealogies with Krête, though the Sarpêdôn of the Iliad has no connection with Krête, and is not the son of Europê. Sarpêdôn having become king of Lykia, was favored by his father, Zeus, with permission to live for three generations.[524] At the same time the youthful Milêtus, a favorite of Sarpêdôn, quitted Krête, and established the city which bore his name on the coast of Asia Minor. Rhadamanthus became sovereign of and lawgiver among the islands in the Ægean: he subsequently went to Bœôtia, where he married the widowed Alkmênê, mother of Hêraklês.

Europê finds in Krête a king Astêrius, who marries her and adopts her children by Zeus: this Astêrius is the son of Krês, the eponym of the island, or (according to another genealogy by which it was attempted to be made out that Minôs was of Dôrian race) he was a son of the daughter of Krês by Tektamus, the son of Dôrus, who had migrated into the island from Greece.

Minôs married Pasiphaê, daughter of the god Hêlios and Perseïs, by whom he had Katreus, Deukaliôn, Glaukus, Androgeos, names marked in the legendary narrative,—together with several daughters, among whom were Ariadnê and Phædra. He offended Poseidôn by neglecting to fulfil a solemnly-made vow, and the displeased god afflicted his wife Pasiphaê with a monstrous passion for a bull. The great artist Dædalus, son of Eupalamus, a fugitive from Athens, became the confidant of this amour, from which sprang the Minôtaur, a creature half man and half bull.[525] This Minôtaur was imprisoned by Minôs in the labyrinth, an inextricable inclosure constructed by Dædalus for that express purpose, by order of Minôs.

Minôs acquired great nautical power, and expelled the Karian inhabitants from many of the islands of the Ægean, which he placed under the government of his sons on the footing of tributaries. He undertook several expeditions against various places on the coast—one against Nisus, the son of Pandiôn, king of Megara, who had amongst the hair of his head one peculiar lock of a purple color: an oracle had pronounced that his life and reign would never be in danger so long as he preserved this precious lock. The city would have remained inexpugnable, if Scylla, the daughter of Nisus, had not conceived a violent passion for Minôs. While her father was asleep, she cut off the lock on which his safety hung, so that the Krêtan king soon became victorious. Instead of performing his promise to carry Scylla away with him to Krête, he cast her from the stern of his vessel into the sea:[526] both Scylla and Nisus were changed into birds.

Androgeos, son of Minôs having displayed such rare qualities as to vanquish all his competitors at the Panathenaic festival in Athens, was sent by Ægeus the Athenian king to contend against the bull of Marathôn,—an enterprise in which he perished, and Minôs made war upon Athens to avenge his death. He was for a long time unable to take the city: at length he prayed to his father Zeus to aid him in obtaining redress from the Athenians, and Zeus sent upon them pestilence and famine. In vain did they endeavor to avert these calamities by offering up as propitiatory sacrifices the four daughters of Hyacinthus. Their sufferings still continued, and the oracle directed them to submit to any terms which Minôs might exact. He required that they should send to Krête a tribute of seven youths and seven maidens, periodically, to be devoured by the Minôtaur,[527]—offered to him in a labyrinth constructed by Dædalus, including countless different passages, out of which no person could escape.

Every ninth year this offering was to be despatched. The more common story was, that the youths and maidens thus destined to destruction were selected by lot—but the logographer Hellanikus said that Minôs came to Athens and chose them himself.[528] The third period for despatching the victims had arrived, and Athens was plunged in the deepest affliction, when Thêseus determined to devote himself as one of them, and either to terminate the sanguinary tribute or to perish. He prayed to Poseidôn for help, and the Delphian god assured him that Aphroditê would sustain and extricate him. On arriving at Knossus he was fortunate enough to captivate the

affections of Ariadnê, the daughter of Minôs, who supplied him with a sword and a clue of thread. With the former he contrived to kill the Minôtaur, the latter served to guide his footsteps in escaping from the labyrinth. Having accomplished this triumph, he left Krête with his ship and companions unhurt, carrying off Ariadnê, whom however he soon abandoned on the island of Naxos. On his way home to Athens, he stopped at Dêlos, where he offered a grateful sacrifice to Apollo for his escape, and danced along with the young men and maidens whom he had rescued from the Minôtaur, a dance called the Geranus, imitated from the twists and convolutions of the Krêtan labyrinth. It had been concerted with his father Ægeus, that if he succeeded in his enterprise against the Minôtaur, he should on his return hoist white sails in his ship in place of the black canvas which she habitually carried when employed on this mournful embassy. But Thêseus forgot to make the change of sails; so that Ægeus, seeing the ship return with her equipment of mourning unaltered, was impressed with the sorrowful conviction that his son had perished, and cast himself into the sea. The ship which made this voyage was preserved by the Athenians with careful solicitude, being constantly repaired with new timbers, down to the time of the Phalerian Dêmêtrius: every year she was sent from Athens to Dêlos with a solemn sacrifice and specially-nominated envoys. The priest of Apollo decked her stern with garlands before she quitted the port, and during the time which elapsed until her return, the city was understood to abstain from all acts carrying with them public impurity, so that it was unlawful to put to death any person even under formal sentence by the dikastery. This accidental circumstance becomes especially memorable, from its having postponed for thirty days the death of the lamented Socratês. [529]

The legend respecting Thêseus, and his heroic rescue of the seven noble youths and maidens from the jaws of the Minôtaur, was thus both commemorated and certified to the Athenian public, by the annual holy ceremony and by the unquestioned identity of the vessel employed in it. There were indeed many varieties in the mode of narrating the incident; and some of the Attic logographers tried to rationalize the fable by transforming the Minôtaur into a general or a powerful athlete, named Taurus, whom Thêseus vanquished in Krête.[530] But this altered version never overbore the old fanciful character of the tale as maintained by the poets. A great number of other religious ceremonies and customs, as well as several chapels or sacred enclosures in honor of different heroes, were connected with different acts and special ordinances of Thêseus. To every Athênian who took part in the festivals of the Oschophoria, the Pyanepsia, or the Kybernêsia, the name of this great hero was familiar, and the motives for offering to him solemn worship at his own special festival of the Thêseia, became evident and impressive.

The same Athenian legends which ennobled and decorated the character of Thêseus, painted in repulsive colors the attributes of Minôs; and the traits of the old Homeric comrade of Zeus were buried under those of the conqueror and oppressor

of Athens. His history like that of the other legendary personages of Greece, consists almost entirely of a string of family romances and tragedies. His son Katreus, father of Aëropê, wife of Atreus, was apprized by an oracle that he would perish by the hand of one of his own children: he accordingly sent them out of the island, and Althæmenês, his son, established himself in Rhodes. Katreus having become old, and fancying that he had outlived the warning of the oracle, went over to Rhodes to see Althæmenês. In an accidental dispute which arose between his attendants and the islanders, Althæmenês inadvertently took part and slew his father without knowing him. Glaukus, the youngest son of Minôs, pursuing a mouse, fell into a reservoir of honey and was drowned. No one knew what had become of him, and his father was inconsolable; at length the Argeian Polyeidus, a prophet wonderfully endowed by the gods, both discovered the boy and restored him to life, to the exceeding joy of Minôs.[531]

The latter at last found his death in an eager attempt to overtake and punish Dædalus. This great artist, the eponymous hero of the Attic gens or dême called the Dædalidæ, and the descendant of Erechtheus through Mêtion, had been tried at the tribunal of Areiopagus and banished for killing his nephew Talos, whose rapidly improving skill excited his envy.[532] He took refuge in Krête, where he acquired the confidence of Minôs, and was employed (as has been already mentioned) in constructing the labyrinth; subsequently however he fell under the displeasure of Minôs, and was confined as a close prisoner in the inextricable windings of his own edifice. His unrivalled skill and resource however did not forsake him. He manufactured wings both for himself and for his son Ikarus, with which they flew over the sea: the father arrived safely in Sicily at Kamikus, the residence of the Sikanian king Kokalus, but the son, disdaining paternal example and admonition, flew so high that his wings were melted by the sun and he fell into the sea, which from him was called the Ikarian sea.[533]

Dædalus remained for some time in Sicily, leaving in various parts of the island many prodigious evidences of mechanical and architectural skill.[534] At length Minôs bent upon regaining possession of his person, undertook an expedition against Kokalus with a numerous fleet and army. Kokalus affecting readiness to deliver up the fugitive, and receiving Minôs with apparent friendship, ordered a bath to be prepared for him by his three daughters, who, eager to protect Dædalus at any price, drowned the Krêtan king in the bath with hot water.[535] Many of the Krêtans who had accompanied him remained in Sicily and founded the town of Minoa, which they denominated after him. But not long afterwards Zeus roused all the inhabitants of Krête (except the towns of Polichna and Præsus) to undertake with one accord an expedition against Kamikus for the purpose of avenging the death of Minôs. They besieged Kamikus in vain for five years, until at last famine compelled them to return. On their way along the coast of Italy, in the Gulf of Tarentum, a terrible storm destroyed their fleet and obliged them to settle permanently in the country: they

founded Hyria with other cities, and became Messapian Iapygians. Other settlers, for the most part Greeks, immigrated into Krête to the spots which this movement had left vacant, and in the second generation after Minôs occurred the Trojan war. The departed Minôs was exceedingly offended with the Krêtans for coöperating in avenging the injury to Menelaus, since the Greeks generally had lent no aid to the Krêtans in their expedition against the town of Kamikus. He sent upon Krête, after the return of Idomeneus from Troy, such terrible visitations of famine and pestilence, that the population again died out or expatriated, and was again renovated by fresh immigrations. The intolerable suffering[536] thus brought upon the Krêtans by the anger of Minôs, for having coöperated in the general Grecian aid to Menelaus, was urged by them to the Greeks as the reason why they could take no part in resisting the invasion of Xerxês; and it is even pretended that they were advised and encouraged to adopt this ground of excuse by the Delphian oracle.[537]

Such is the Minôs of the poets and logographers, with his legendary and romantic attributes: the familiar comrade of the great Zeus,—the judge among the dead in Hadês,—the husband of Pasiphaê, daughter of the god Hêlios,—the father of the goddess Ariadnê, as well as of Androgeos, who perishes and is worshipped at Athens,[538] and of the boy Glaukus, who is miraculously restored to life by a prophet,—the person beloved by Scylla, and the amorous pursuer of the nymph or goddess Britomartis,[539]—the proprietor of the Labyrinth and of the Minôtaur, and the exacter of a periodical tribute of youths and maidens from Athens as food for this monster,—lastly, the follower of the fugitive artist Dædalus to Kamikus, and the victim of the three ill-disposed daughters of Kokalus in a bath. With this strongly-marked portrait, the Minôs of Thucydidês and Aristotle has scarcely anything in common except the name. He is the first to acquire *Thalassokraty*, or command of the Ægean sea: he expels the Karian inhabitants from the Cyclades islands, and sends thither fresh colonists under his own sons; he puts down piracy, in order that he may receive his tribute regularly; lastly, he attempts to conquer Sicily, but fails in the enterprise and perishes.[540] Here we have conjectures, derived from the analogy of the Athenian maritime empire in the historical times, substituted in place of the fabulous incidents, and attached to the name of Minôs.

In the fable, a tribute of seven youths and seven maidens is paid to him periodically by the Athenians; in the historicized narrative this character of a tribute-collector is preserved, but the tribute is money collected from dependent islands;[541] and Aristotle points out to us how conveniently Krête is situated to exercise empire over the Ægean. The expedition against Kamikus, instead of being directed to the recovery of the fugitive Dædalus, is an attempt on the part of the great thalassokrat to conquer Sicily. Herodotus gives us generally the same view of the character of Minôs as a great maritime king, but his notice of the expedition against Kamikus includes the mention of Dædalus as the intended object of it.[542] Ephorus, while he described Minôs as a commanding and comprehensive lawgiver imposing his commands under

the sanction of Zeus, represented him as the imitator of an earlier lawgiver named Rhadamanthus, and also as an immigrant into Krête from the Æolic Mount Ida, along with the priests or sacred companions of Zeus called the Idæi Dactyli. Aristotle too points him out as the author of the Syssitia, or public meals common in Krête as well as at Sparta,—other divergences in a new direction from the spirit of the old fables. [543]

The contradictory attributes ascribed to Minôs, together with the perplexities experienced by those who wished to introduce a regular chronological arrangement into these legendary events, has led both in ancient and in modern times to the supposition of two kings named Minôs, one the grandson of the other,—Minôs I., the son of Zeus, lawgiver and judge,—Minôs II., the thalassokrat,—a gratuitous conjecture, which, without solving the problem required, only adds one to the numerous artifices employed for imparting the semblance of history to the disparate matter of legend. The Krêtans were at all times, from Homer downward, expert and practised seamen. But that they were ever united under one government, or ever exercised maritime dominion in the Ægean is a fact which we are neither able to affirm nor to deny. The Odyssey, in so far as it justifies any inference at all, points against such a supposition, since it recognizes a great diversity both of inhabitants and of languages in the island, and designates Minôs as king specially of Knôssus: it refutes still more positively the idea that Minôs put down piracy, which the Homeric Krêtans as well as others continue to practise without scruple.

Herodotus, though he in some places speaks of Minôs as a person historically cognizable, yet in one passage severs him pointedly from the generation of man. The Samian despot "Polykratês (he tells us) was the first person who aspired to nautical dominion, excepting Minôs of Knôssus, and others before him (if any such there ever were) who may have ruled the sea; but Polykratês is the first of that which is called *the generation of man* who aspired with much chance of success to govern Iônia and the islands of the Ægean."[544] Here we find it manifestly intimated that Minôs did not belong to the generation of man, and the tale given by the historian respecting the tremendous calamities which the wrath of the departed Minôs inflicted on Krête confirms the impression. The king of Knôssus is a god or a hero, but not a man; he belongs to legend, not to history. He is the son as well as the familiar companion of Zeus; he marries the daughter of Hêlios, and Ariadnê is numbered among his offspring. To this superhuman person are ascribed the oldest and most revered institutions of the island, religious and political, together with a period of supposed antehistorical dominion. That there is much of Krêtan religious ideas and practice embodied in the fables concerning Minôs can hardly be doubted: nor is it improbable that the tale of the youths and maidens sent from Athens may be based in some expiatory offerings rendered to a Krêtan divinity. The orgiastic worship of Zeus, solemnized by the armed priests with impassioned motions and violent excitement, was of ancient date in that island, as well as the connection with the worship of Apollo both

at Delphi and at Dêlos. To analyze the fables and to elicit from them any trustworthy particular facts, appears to me a fruitless attempt. The religious recollections, the romantic invention, and the items of matter of fact, if any such there be, must forever remain indissolubly amalgamated as the poet originally blended them, for the amusement or edification of his auditors. Hoeckh, in his instructive and learned collection of facts respecting ancient Krête, construes the mythical genealogy of Minôs to denote a combination of the orgiastic worship of Zeus, indigenous among the Eteokrêtes, with the worship of the moon imported from Phœnicia, and signified by the names Europê, Pasiphaê, and Ariadnê.[545] This is specious as a conjecture, but I do not venture to speak of it in terms of greater confidence.

From the connection of religious worship and legendary tales between Krête and various parts of Asia Minor,—the Trôad, the coast of Milêtus and Lykia, especially between Mount Ida in Krête and Mount Ida in Æôlis,—it seems reasonable to infer an ethnographical kindred or relationship between the inhabitants anterior to the period of Hellenic occupation. The tales of Krêtan settlement at Minoa and Engyiôn on the south-western coast of Sicily, and in Iapygia on the Gulf of Tarentum, conduct us to a similar presumption, though the want of evidence forbids our tracing it farther. In the time of Herodotus, the Eteokrêtes, or aboriginal inhabitants of the island, were confined to Polichna and Præsus; but in earlier times, prior to the encroachments of the Hellênes, they had occupied the larger portion, if not the whole of the island. Minôs was originally their hero, subsequently adopted by the immigrant Hellênes,—at least Herodotus considers him as barbarian, not Hellenic.[546]

CHAPTER XIII.

ARGONAUTIC EXPEDITION.

The ship Argô was the theme of many songs during the oldest periods of the Grecian epic, even earlier than the Odyssey. The king Æêtês, from whom she is departing, the hero Jasôn, who commands her, and the goddess Hêrê, who watches over him, enabling the Argô to traverse distances and to escape dangers which no ship had ever before encountered, are all circumstances briefly glanced at by Odysseus in his narrative to Alkinous. Moreover, Eunêus, the son of Jasôn and Hypsipylê, governs Lemnos during the siege of Troy by Agamemnôn, and carries on a friendly traffic with the Grecian camp, purchasing from them their Trojan prisoners.[547]

The legend of Halus in Achaia Phthiôtis, respecting the religious solemnities connected with the family of Athamas and Phryxus (related in a previous chapter), is also interwoven with the voyage of the Argonauts; and both the legend and the solemnities seem evidently of great antiquity. We know further, that the adventures of the Argô were narrated not only by Hesiod and in the Hesiodic poems, but also by Eumêlus and the author of the Naupactian verses—by the latter seemingly at considerable length.[548] But these poems are unfortunately lost, nor have we any means of determining what the original story was; for the narrative, as we have it, borrowed from later sources, is enlarged by local tales from the subsequent Greek colonies—Kyzikus, Heraklêia, Sinopê, and others.

Jasôn, commanded by Pelias to depart in quest of the golden fleece belonging to the speaking ram which had carried away Phryxus and Hellê, was encouraged by the oracle to invite the noblest youth of Greece to his aid, and fifty of the most distinguished amongst them obeyed the call. Hêraklês, Thêseus, Telamôn and Pêleus, Kastôr and Pollux, Idas and Lynkeus—Zêtês and Kalaïs, the winged sons of Boreas—Meleager, Amphiaraus, Kêpheus, Laertês, Autolykus, Menœtius, Aktôr, Erginus, Euphêmus, Ankæus, Pœas, Periklymenus, Augeas, Eurytus, Admêtus, Akastus, Kæneus, Euryalus, Pêneleôs and Lêitus, Askalaphus and Ialmenus, were among them. Argus the son of Phryxus, directed by the promptings of Athênê, built the ship, inserting in the prow a piece of timber from the celebrated oak of Dodona, which was endued with the faculty of speech:[549] Tiphys was the steersman, Idmôn the son of Apollo and Mopsus accompanied them as prophets, while Orpheus came to amuse their weariness and reconcile their quarrels with his harp.[550]

First they touched at the island of Lêmnos, in which at that time there were no men; for the women, infuriated by jealousy and ill-treatment, had put to death their fathers, husbands and brothers. The Argonauts, after some difficulty, were received with friendship, and even admitted into the greatest intimacy. They staid some

months, and the subsequent population of the island was the fruit of their visit. Hypsipylê, the queen of the island, bore to Jasôn two sons.[551]

They then proceeded onward along the coast of Thrace, up the Hellespont, to the southern coast of the Propontis, inhabited by the Doliones and their king Kyzikus. Here they were kindly entertained, but after their departure were driven back to the same spot by a storm; and as they landed in the dark, the inhabitants did not know them. A battle took place, in which the chief, Kyzikus, was killed by Jasôn; whereby much grief was occasioned as soon as the real facts became known. After Kyzikus had been interred with every demonstration of mourning and solemnity, the Argonauts proceeded along the coast of Mysia.[552] In this part of the voyage they left Hêraklês behind. For Hylas, his favorite youthful companion, had been stolen away by the nymphs of a fountain, and Hêraklês, wandering about in search of him, neglected to return. At last he sorrowfully retired, exacting hostages from the inhabitants of the neighboring town of Kius that they would persist in the search.[553]

They next stopped in the country of the Bebrykians, where the boxing contest took place between the king Amykus and the Argonaut Pollux:[554] they then proceeded onward to Bithynia, the residence of the blind prophet Phineus. His blindness had been inflicted by Poseidôn as a punishment for having communicated to Phryxus the way to Kolchis. The choice had been allowed to him between death and blindness, and he had preferred the latter.[555] He was also tormented by the harpies, winged monsters who came down from the clouds whenever his table was set, snatched the food from his lips and imparted to it a foul and unapproachable odor. In the midst of this misery, he hailed the Argonauts as his deliverers—his prophetic powers having enabled him to foresee their coming. The meal being prepared for him, the harpies approached as usual, but Zêtês and Kalaïs, the winged sons of Boreas, drove them away and pursued them. They put forth all their speed, and prayed to Zeus to be enabled to overtake the monsters; when Hermês appeared and directed them to desist, the harpies being forbidden further to molest Phineus,[556] and retiring again to their native cavern in Krête.[557]

Phineus, grateful for the relief afforded to him by the Argonauts, forewarned them of the dangers of their voyage and of the precautions necessary for their safety; and through his suggestions they were enabled to pass through the terrific rocks called Symplêgades. These were two rocks which alternately opened and shut, with a swift and violent collision, so that it was difficult even for a bird to fly through during the short interval. When the Argô arrived at the dangerous spot, Euphêmus let loose a dove. which flew through and just escaped with the loss of a few feathers of her tail. This was a signal to the Argonauts, according to the prediction of Phineus, that they might attempt the passage with confidence. Accordingly they rowed with all their might, and passed safely through: the closing rocks, held for a moment asunder by the powerful arms of Athênê just crushed the ornaments at the stern of their vessel. It had been decreed by the gods, that so soon as any ship once got

through, the passage should forever afterwards be safe and easy to all. The rocks became fixed in their separate places, and never again closed.[558]

After again halting on the coast of the Mariandynians, where their steersman Tiphys died, as well as in the country of the Amazons, and after picking up the sons of Phryxus, who had been cast away by Poseidôn in their attempt to return from Kolchis to Greece, they arrived in safety at the river Phasis and the residence of Æêtês. In passing by Mount Caucasus, they saw the eagle which gnawed the liver of Prometheus nailed to the rock, and heard the groans of the sufferer himself. The sons of Phryxus were cordially welcomed by their mother Chalciopê.[559] Application was made to Æêtês, that he would grant to the Argonauts, heroes of divine parentage and sent forth by the mandate of the gods, possession of the golden fleece: their aid in return was proffered to him against any or all of his enemies. But the king was wroth, and peremptorily refused, except upon conditions which seemed impracticable.[560] Hêphæstos had given him two ferocious and untamable bulls, with brazen feet, which breathed fire from their nostrils: Jasôn was invited, as a proof both of his illustrious descent and of the sanction of the gods to his voyage, to harness these animals to the yoke, so as to plough a large field and sow it with dragon's teeth.[561] Perilous as the condition was, each one of the heroes volunteered to make the attempt. Idmôn especially encouraged Jasôn to undertake it,[562] and the goddesses Hêrê and Aphroditê made straight the way for him.[563] Mêdea, the daughter of Æêtês and Eidyia, having seen the youthful hero in his interview with her father, had conceived towards him a passion which disposed her to employ every means for his salvation and success. She had received from Hekatê preëminent magical powers, and she prepared for Jasôn the powerful Prometheian unguent, extracted from an herb which had grown where the blood of Promêtheus dropped. The body of Jasôn having been thus pre-medicated, became invulnerable[564] either by fire or by warlike weapons. He undertook the enterprise, yoked the bulls without suffering injury, and ploughed the field: when he had sown the dragon's teeth, armed men sprung out of the furrows. But he had been forewarned by Mêdea to cast a vast rock into the midst of them, upon which they began to fight with each other, so that he was easily enabled to subdue them all.[565]

The task prescribed had thus been triumphantly performed. Yet Æêtês not only refused to hand over the golden fleece, but even took measures for secretly destroying the Argonauts and burning their vessel. He designed to murder them during the night after a festal banquet; but Aphroditê, watchful for the safety of Jasôn,[566] inspired the Kolchian king at the critical moment with an irresistible inclination for his nuptial bed. While he slept, the wise Idmôn counselled the Argonauts to make their escape, and Mêdea agreed to accompany them.[567] She lulled to sleep by a magic potion the dragon who guarded the golden fleece, placed that much-desired prize on board the vessel, and accompanied Jasôn with his companions in their flight, carrying along with her the young Apsyrtus, her brother.[568]

Æêtês, profoundly exasperated at the flight of the Argonauts with his daughter, assembled his forces forthwith, and put to sea in pursuit of them. So energetic were his efforts that he shortly overtook the retreating vessel, when the Argonauts again owed their safety to the stratagem of Mêdea. She killed her brother Apsyrtus, cut his body in pieces and strewed the limbs round about in the sea. Æêtês on reaching the spot found these sorrowful traces of his murdered son; but while he tarried to collect the scattered fragments, and bestow upon the body an honorable interment, the Argonauts escaped.[569] The spot on which the unfortunate Apsyrtus was cut up received the name of Tomi.[570] This fratricide of Mêdea, however, so deeply provoked the indignation of Zeus, that he condemned the Argô and her crew to a trying voyage, full of hardship and privation, before she was permitted to reach home. The returning heroes traversed an immeasurable length both of sea and of river: first up the river Phasis into the ocean which flows round the earth—then following the course of that circumfluous stream until its junction with the Nile,[571] they came down the Nile into Egypt, from whence they carried the Argô on their shoulders by a fatiguing land-journey to the lake Tritônis in Libya. Here they were rescued from the extremity of want and exhaustion by the kindness of the local god Tritôn, who treated them hospitably, and even presented to Euphêmus a clod of earth, as a symbolical promise that his descendants should one day found a city on the Libyan shore. The promise was amply redeemed by the flourishing and powerful city of Kyrênê,[572] whose princes the Battiads boasted themselves as lineal descendants of Euphêmus.

Refreshed by the hospitality of Tritôn, the Argonauts found themselves again on the waters of the Mediterranean in their way homeward. But before they arrived at Iôlkos they visited Circê, at the island of Ææa, where Mêdea was purified for the murder of Apsyrtus: they also stopped at Korkyra, then called Drepanê, where Alkinous received and protected them. The cave in that island where the marriage of Mêdea with Jasôn was consummated, was still shown in the time of the historian Timæus, as well as the altars to Apollo which she had erected, and the rites and sacrifices which she had first instituted.[573] After leaving Korkyra, the Argô was overtaken by a perilous storm near the island of Thêra. The heroes were saved from imminent peril by the supernatural aid of Apollo, who, shooting from his golden bow an arrow which pierced the waves like a track of light, caused a new island suddenly to spring up in their track and present to them a port of refuge. The island was called Anaphê; and the grateful Argonauts established upon it an altar and sacrifices in honor of Apollo Æglêtês, which were ever afterwards continued, and traced back by the inhabitants to this originating adventure.[574]

On approaching the coast of Krête, the Argonauts were prevented from landing by Talôs, a man of brass, fabricated by Hêphæstos, and presented by him to Minôs for the protection of the island.[575] This vigilant sentinel hurled against the approaching vessel fragments of rock, and menaced the heroes with destruction. But

Mêdea deceived him by a stratagem and killed him; detecting and assailing the one vulnerable point in his body. The Argonauts were thus enabled to land and refresh themselves. They next proceeded onward to Ægina, where however they again experienced resistance before they could obtain water—then along the coast of Eubœa and Locris back to Iôlkos in the gulf of Pagasæ, the place from whence they had started. The proceedings of Pelias during their absence, and the signal revenge taken upon him by Mêdea after their return, have already been narrated in a preceding section.[576] The ship Argô herself, in which the chosen heroes of Greece had performed so long a voyage and braved so many dangers, was consecrated by Jasôn to Poseidôn at the isthmus of Corinth. According to another account, she was translated to the stars by Athênê, and became a constellation.[577]

Traces of the presence of the Argonauts were found not only in the regions which lay between Iôlkos and Kolchis, but also in the western portion of the Grecian world —distributed more or less over all the spots visited by Grecian mariners or settled by Grecian colonists, and scarcely less numerous than the wanderings of the dispersed Greeks and Trojans after the capture of Troy. The number of Jasonia, or temples for the heroic worship of Jasôn, was very great, from Abdêra in Thrace,[578] eastward along the coast of the Euxine, to Armenia and Media. The Argonauts had left their anchoring-stone on the coast of Bebrykia, near Kyzikus, and there it was preserved during the historical ages in the temple of the Jasonian Athênê.[579] They had founded the great temple of the Idæan mother on the mountain Dindymon, near Kyzikus, and the Hieron of Zeus Urios on the Asiatic point at the mouth of the Euxine, near which was also the harbor of Phryxus.[580] Idmôn, the prophet of the expedition, who was believed to have died of a wound by a wild boar on the Mariandynian coast, was worshipped by the inhabitants of the Pontic Hêrakleia with great solemnity, as their Heros Poliuchus, and that too by the special direction of the Delphian god. Autolykus, another companion of Jasôn, was worshipped as Œkist by the inhabitants of Sinopê. Moreover, the historians of Hêrakleia pointed out a temple of Hekatê in the neighboring country of Paphlagonia, first erected by Mêdea;[581] and the important town of Pantikapæon, on the European side of the Cimmerian Bosporus, ascribed its first settlement to a son of Æêtês.[582] When the returning ten thousand Greeks sailed along the coast, called the Jasonian shore, from Sinopê to Hêrakleia, they were told that the grandson of Æêtês was reigning king of the territory at the mouth of the Phasis, and the anchoring-places where the Argô had stopped were specially pointed out to them.[583] In the lofty regions of the Moschi, near Kolchis, stood the temple of Leukothea, founded by Phryxus, which remained both rich and respected down to the times of the kings of Pontus, and where it was an inviolable rule not to offer up a ram.[584] The town of Dioskurias, north of the river Phasis, was believed to have been hallowed by the presence of Kastôr and Pollux in the Argô, and to have received from them its appellation.[585] Even the interior of Mêdea and Armenia was full of memorials of Jasôn and Mêdea and their son Mêdus, or of Armenus the son of Jasôn, from whom the Greeks deduced not only the

name and foundation of the Medes and Armenians, but also the great operation of cutting a channel through the mountains for the efflux of the river Araxes, which they compared to that of the Peneius in Thessaly.[586] And the Roman general Pompey, after having completed the conquest and expulsion of Mithridatês, made long marches through Kolchis into the regions of Caucasus, for the express purpose of contemplating the spots which had been ennobled by the exploits of the Argonauts, the Dioskuri and Hêraklês.[587]

In the west, memorials either of the Argonauts or of the pursuing Kolchians were pointed out in Korkyra, in Krête, in Epirus near the Akrokeraunian mountains, in the islands called Apsyrtides near the Illyrian coast, at the bay of Caieta as well as at Poseidônia on the southern coast of Italy, in the island of Æthalia or Elba, and in Libya. [588]

Such is a brief outline of the Argonautic expedition, one of the most celebrated and widely-diffused among the ancient tales of Greece. Since so many able men have treated it as an undisputed reality, and even made it the pivot of systematic chronological calculations, I may here repeat the opinion long ago expressed by Heyne, and even indicated by Burmann, that the process of dissecting the story, in search of a basis of fact, is one altogether fruitless.[589] Not only are we unable to assign the date or identify the crew, or decipher the log-book, of the Argô, but we have no means of settling even the preliminary question, whether the voyage be matter of fact badly reported, or legend from the beginning. The widely-distant spots in which the monuments of the voyage were shown, no less than the incidents of the voyage itself, suggests no other parentage than epical fancy. The supernatural and the romantic not only constitute an inseparable portion of the narrative, but even embrace all the prominent and characteristic features; if they do not comprise the whole, and if there be intermingled along with them any sprinkling of historical or geographical fact,—a question to us indeterminable,—there is at least no solvent by which it can be disengaged, and no test by which it can be recognized. Wherever the Grecian mariner sailed, he carried his religious and patriotic mythes along with him. His fancy and his faith were alike full of the long wanderings of Jasôn, Odysseus, Perseus, Hêraklês, Dionysus, Triptolemus or Iô; it was pleasing to him in success, and consoling to him in difficulty, to believe that their journeys had brought them over the ground which he was himself traversing. There was no tale amidst the wide range of the Grecian epic more calculated to be popular with the seaman, than the history of the primæval ship Argô and her distinguished crew, comprising heroes from all parts of Greece, and especially the Tyndarids Kastôr and Pollux, the heavenly protectors invoked during storm and peril. He localized the legend anew wherever he went, often with some fresh circumstances suggested either by his own adventures or by the scene before him. He took a sort of religious possession of the spot, connecting it by a bond of faith with his native land, and erecting in it a temple or an altar with appropriate commemorative solemnities. The Jasonium thus established, and

indeed every visible object called after the name of the hero, not only served to keep alive the legend of the Argô in the minds of future comers or inhabitants, but was accepted as an obvious and satisfactory proof that this marvellous vessel had actually touched there in her voyage.

The epic poets, building both on the general love of fabulous incident and on the easy faith of the people, dealt with distant and unknown space in the same manner as with past and unrecorded time. They created a mythical geography for the former, and a mythical history for the latter. But there was this material difference between the two: that while the unrecorded time was beyond the reach of verification, the unknown space gradually became trodden and examined. In proportion as authentic local knowledge was enlarged, it became necessary to modify the geography, or shift the scene of action, of the old mythes; and this perplexing problem was undertaken by some of the ablest historians and geographers of antiquity,—for it was painful to them to abandon any portion of the old epic, as if it were destitute of an ascertainable basis of truth.

Many of these fabulous localities are to be found in Homer and Hesiod, and the other Greek poets and logographers,—Erytheia, the garden of the Hesperides, the garden of Phœbus,[590] to which Boreas transported the Attic maiden Orithyia, the delicious country of the Hyperboreans, the Elysian plain,[591] the fleeting island of Æolus, Thrinakia, the country of the Æthiopians, the Læstrygones, the Kyklôpes, the Lotophagi, the Sirens, the Cimmerians and the Gorgons,[592] etc. These are places which (to use the expression of Pindar respecting the Hyperboreans) you cannot approach either by sea or by land:[593] the wings of the poet alone can carry you thither. They were not introduced into the Greek mind by incorrect geographical reports, but, on the contrary, had their origin in the legend, and passed from thence into the realities of geography,[594] which they contributed much to pervert and confuse. For the navigator or emigrant, starting with an unsuspicious faith in their real existence, looked out for them in his distant voyages, and constantly fancied that he had seen or heard of them, so as to be able to identify their exact situation. The most contradictory accounts indeed, as might be expected, were often given respecting the latitude and longitude of such fanciful spots, but this did not put an end to the general belief in their real existence.

In the present advanced state of geographical knowledge, the story of that man who after reading Gulliver's Travels went to look in his map for Lilliput, appears an absurdity. But those who fixed the exact locality of the floating island of Æolus or the rocks of the Sirens did much the same,[595] and, with their ignorance of geography and imperfect appreciation of historical evidence, the error was hardly to be avoided. The ancient belief which fixed the Sirens on the islands of Sirenusæ off the coast of Naples—the Kyklôpes, Erytheia, and the Læstrygones in Sicily—the Lotophagi on the island of Mêninx[596] near the Lesser Syrtis—the Phæakians at Korkyra—and the goddess Circê at the promontory of Circeium—took its rise at a time when these regions

were first Hellenized and comparatively little visited. Once embodied in the local legends, and attested by visible monuments and ceremonies, it continued for a long time unassailed; and Thucydidês seems to adopt it, in reference to Korkyra and Sicily before the Hellenic colonization, as matter of fact generally unquestionable,[597] though little avouched as to details. But when geographical knowledge became extended, and the criticism upon the ancient epic was more or less systematized by the literary men of Alexandria and Pergamus, it appeared to many of them impossible that Odysseus could have seen so many wonders, or undergone such monstrous dangers, within limits so narrow, and in the familiar track between the Nile and the Tiber. The scene of his weather-driven course was then shifted further westward. Many convincing evidences were discovered, especially by Asklepiadês of Myrlea, of his having visited various places in Ibêria:[598] several critics imagined that he had wandered about in the Atlantic Ocean outside of the Strait of Gibraltar,[599] and they recognized a section of Lotophagi on the coast of Mauritania, over and above those who dwelt on the island of Mêninx.[600] On the other hand, Eratosthenês and Apollodôrus treated the places visited by Odysseus as altogether unreal, for which scepticism they incurred much reproach.[601]

The fabulous island of Erytheia,—the residence of the three headed Geryôn with his magnificent herd of oxen, under the custody of the two-headed dog Orthrus, and described by Hesiod, like the garden of the Hesperides, as extra-terrestrial, on the farther side of the circumfluous ocean;—this island was supposed by the interpreters of Stesichorus the poet to be named by him off the south-western region of Spain called Tartêssus, and in the immediate vicinity of Gadês. But the historian Hekatæus, in his anxiety to historicize the old fable, took upon himself to remove Erytheia from Spain nearer home to Epirus. He thought it incredible that Hêraklês should have traversed Europe from east to west, for the purpose of bringing the cattle of Geryôn to Eurystheus at Mykênæ, and he pronounced Geryôn to have been a king of Epirus, near the Gulf of Ambrakia. The oxen reared in that neighborhood were proverbially magnificent, and to get them even from thence and bring them to Mykênæ (he contended) was no inconsiderable task. Arrian, who cites this passage from Hekatæus, concurs in the same view,—an illustration of the license with which ancient authors fitted on their fabulous geographical names to the real earth, and brought down the ethereal matter of legend to the lower atmosphere of history.[602]

Both the track and the terminus of the Argonautic voyage appear in the most ancient epic as little within the conditions of reality, as the speaking timbers or the semi-divine crew of the vessel. In the Odyssey, Æêtês and Circê (Hesiod names Mêdea also) are brother and sister, offspring of Hêlios. The Ææan island, adjoining the circumfluous ocean, "where the house and dancing-ground of Eôs are situated, and where Hêlios rises," is both the residence of Circê and of Æêtês, inasmuch as Odysseus, in returning from the former, follows the same course as the Argô had previously taken in returning from the latter.[603] Even in the conception of Mimner-

mus, about 600 B. C., Æa still retained its fabulous attributes in conjunction with the ocean and Hêlios, without having been yet identified with any known portion of the solid earth;[604] and it was justly remarked by Dêmêtrius of Skêpsis in antiquity[605] (though Strabo vainly tries to refute him), that neither Homer nor Mimnermus designates Kolchis either as the residence of Æêtês, or as the terminus of the Argonautic voyage. Hesiod carried the returning Argonauts through the river Phasis into the ocean. But some of the poems ascribed to Eumêlus were the first which mentioned Æêtês and Kolchis, and interwove both of them into the Corinthian mythical genealogy.[606] These poems seem to have been composed subsequent to the foundation of Sinopê, and to the commencement of Grecian settlement on the Borysthenês, between the years 600 and 500 B. C. The Greek mariners who explored and colonized the southern coast of the Euxine, found at the extremity of their voyage the river Phasis and its barbarous inhabitants: it was the easternmost point which Grecian navigation (previous to the time of Alexander the Great) ever attained, and it was within sight of the impassable barrier of Caucasus.[607] They believed, not unnaturally, that they had here found "the house of Eôs (the morning) and the rising place of the sun," and that the river Phasis, if they could follow it to its unknown beginning, would conduct them to the circumfluous ocean. They gave to the spot the name of Æa, and the fabulous and real title gradually became associated together into one compound appellation,—the Kolchian Æa, or Æa of Kolchis.[608] While Kolchis was thus entered on the map as a fit representative for the Homeric "house of the morning," the narrow strait of the Thracian Bosporus attracted to itself the poetical fancy of the Symplêgades, or colliding rocks, through which the heaven-protected Argô had been the first to pass. The powerful Greek cities of Kyzikus, Hêrakleia and Sinopê, each fertile in local legends, still farther contributed to give this direction to the voyage; so that in the time of Hekatæus it had become the established belief that the Argô had started from Iôlkos and gone to Kolchis.

Æêtês thus received his home from the legendary faith and fancy of the eastern Greek navigators: his sister Circê, originally his fellow-resident, was localized by the western. The Hesiodic and other poems, giving expression to the imaginative impulses of the inhabitants of Cumæ and other early Grecian settlers in Italy and Sicily, [609] had referred the wanderings of Odysseus to the western or Tyrrhenian sea, and had planted the Cyclôpes, the Læstrygones, the floating island of Æolus, the Lotophagi, the Phæacians, etc., about the coast of Sicily, Italy, Libya, and Korkyra. In this way the Ææan island,—the residence of Circê, and the extreme point of the wanderings of Odysseus, from whence he passes only to the ocean and into Hadês—came to be placed in the far west, while the Æa of Æêtês was in the far east,—not unlike our East and West Indies. The Homeric brother and sister were separated and sent to opposite extremities of the Grecian terrestrial horizon.[610]

The track from Iôlkos to Kolchis, however, though plausible as far as it went, did not realize all the conditions of the genuine fabulous voyage: it did not explain the

evidences of the visit of these maritime heroes which were to be found in Libya, in Krêtê in Anaphê, in Korkyra, in the Adriatic Gulf, in Italy and in Æthalia. It became necessary to devise another route for them in their return, and the Hesiodic narrative was (as I have before observed), that they came back by the circumfluous ocean; first going up the river Phasis into the circumfluous ocean; following that deep and gentle stream until they entered the Nile, and came down its course to the coast of Libya. This seems also to have been the belief of Hekatæus.[611] But presently several Greeks (and Herodotus among them) began to discard the idea of a circumfluous ocean-stream, which had pervaded their old geographical and astronomical fables, and which explained the supposed easy communication between one extremity of the earth and another. Another idea was then started for the returning voyage of the Argonauts. It was supposed that the river Ister, or Danube, flowing from the Rhipæan mountains in the north-west of Europe, divided itself into two branches, one of which fell into the Euxine Sea, and the other into the Adriatic.

The Argonauts, fleeing from the pursuit of Æêtês, had been obliged to abandon their regular course homeward, and had gone from the Euxine Sea up the Ister; then passing down the other branch of that river, they had entered into the Adriatic, the Kolchian pursuers following them. Such is the story given by Apollônius Rhodius from Timagêtus, and accepted even by so able a geographer as Eratosthenês—who preceded him by one generation, and who, though sceptical in regard to the localities visited by Odysseus, seems to have been a firm believer in the reality of the Argonautic voyage.[612] Other historians again, among whom was Timæus, though they considered the ocean as an outer sea, and no longer admitted the existence of the old Homeric ocean-stream, yet imagined a story for the return-voyage of the Argonauts somewhat resembling the old tale of Hesiod and Hekatæus. They alleged that the Argô, after entering into the Palus Mæotis, had followed the upward course of the river Tanais; that she had then been carried overland and launched in a river which had its mouth in the ocean or great outer sea. When in the ocean, she had coasted along the north and west of Europe until she reached Gadês and the Strait of Gibraltar, where she entered into the Mediterranean, and there visited the many places specified in the fable. Of this long voyage, in the outer sea to the north and west of Europe, many traces were affirmed to exist along the coast of the ocean.[613] There was again a third version, according to which the Argonauts came back as they went, through the Thracian Bosporus and the Hellespont. In this way geographical plausibility was indeed maintained, but a large portion of the fabulous matter was thrown overboard.[614]

Such were the various attempts made to reconcile the Argonautic legend with enlarged geographical knowledge and improved historical criticism. The problem remained unsolved, but the faith in the legend did not the less continue. It was a faith originally generated at a time when the unassisted narrative of the inspired poet sufficed for the conviction of his hearers; it consecrated one among the capital exploits

of that heroic and superhuman race, whom the Greek was accustomed at once to look back upon as his ancestors and to worship conjointly with his gods: it lay too deep in his mind either to require historical evidence for its support, or to be overthrown by geographical difficulties as they were then appreciated. Supposed traces of the past event, either preserved in the names of places, or embodied in standing religious customs with their explanatory comments, served as sufficient authentication in the eyes of the curious inquirer. And even men trained in a more severe school of criticism contented themselves with eliminating the palpable contradictions and softening down the supernatural and romantic events, so as to produce an Argonautic expedition of their own invention as the true and accredited history. Strabo, though he can neither overlook nor explain the geographical impossibilities of the narrative, supposes himself to have discovered the basis of actual fact, which the original poets had embellished or exaggerated. The golden fleece was typical of the great wealth of Kolchis, arising from gold-dust washed down by the rivers; and the voyage of Jasôn was in reality an expedition at the head of a considerable army, with which he plundered this wealthy country and made extensive conquests in the interior.[615] Strabo has nowhere laid down what he supposes to have been the exact measure and direction of Jasôn's march, but he must have regarded it as very long, since he classes Jasôn with Dionysus and Hêraklês, and emphatically characterizes all the three as having traversed wider spaces of ground than any moderns could equal. [616] Such was the compromise which a mind like that of Strabo made with the ancient legends. He shaped or cut them down to the level of his own credence, and in this waste of historical criticism, without any positive evidence, he took to himself the credit of greater penetration than the literal believers, while he escaped the necessity of breaking formally with the bygone heroic world.

CHAPTER XIV.

LEGENDS OF THEBES.

THE Bœôtians generally, throughout the historical age, though well endowed with bodily strength and courage,[617] are represented as proverbially deficient in intelligence, taste and fancy. But the legendary population of Thêbes, the Kadmeians, are rich in mythical antiquities, divine as well as heroic. Both Dionysus and Hêraklês recognize Thêbes as their natal city. Moreover, the two sieges of Thêbes by Adrastus, even taken apart from Kadmus, Antiopê, Amphiôn and Zethus, etc., are the most prominent and most characteristic exploits, next to the siege of Troy, of that preëxisting race of heroes who lived in the imagination of the historical Hellênes.

It is not Kadmus, but the brothers Amphiôn and Zethus, who are given to us in the Odyssey as the first founders of Thêbes and the first builders of its celebrated walls. They are the sons of Zeus by Antiopê, daughter of Asôpus. The scholiasts who desire to reconcile this tale with the more current account of the foundation of Thêbes by Kadmus, tell us that after the death of Amphiôn and Zethus, Eurymachus, the warlike king of the Phlegyæ, invaded and ruined the newly-settled town, so that Kadmus on arriving was obliged to re-found it.[618] But Apollodôrus, and seemingly the older logographers before him, placed Kadmus at the top, and inserted the two brothers at a lower point in the series. According to them, Bêlus and Agenôr were the sons of Epaphus, son of the Argeian Iô, by Libya. Agenôr went to Phœnicia and there became king: he had for his offspring Kadmus, Phœnix, Kilix, and a daughter Eurôpa; though in the Iliad Eurôpa is called daughter of Phœnix.[619] Zeus fell in love with Eurôpa, and assuming the shape of a bull, carried her across the sea upon his back from Egypt to Krête, where she bore to him Minôs, Rhadamanthus and Sarpêdôn. Two out of the three sons sent out by Agenôr in search of their lost sister, wearied out by a long-protracted as well as fruitless voyage, abandoned the idea of returning home: Kilix settled in Kilikia, and Kadmus in Thrace.[620] Thasus, the brother or nephew of Kadmus, who had accompanied them in the voyage, settled and gave name to the island of Phasus.

Both Herodotus and Euripidês represent Kadmus as an emigrant from Phœnicia, conducting a body of followers in quest of Eurôpa. The account of Apollodôrus describes him as having come originally from Libya or Egypt to Phœnicia: we may presume that this was also the statement of the earlier logographers Pherekydês and Hellanikus. Conôn, who historicizes and politicizes the whole legend, seems to have found two different accounts; one connecting Kadmus with Egypt, another bringing him from Phœnicia. He tries to melt down the two into one, by representing that the Phœnicians, who sent out Kadmus, had acquired great power in Egypt—that the seat of their kingdom was the Egyptian Thêbes—that Kadmus was despatched, under

pretence indeed of finding his lost sister, but really on a project of conquest—and that the name Thêbes, which he gave to his new establishment in Bœôtia, was borrowed from Thêbes in Egypt, his ancestorial seat.[621]

Kadmus went from Thrace to Delphi to procure information respecting his sister Eurôpa, but the god directed him to take no further trouble about her; he was to follow the guidance of a cow, and to found a city on the spot where the animal should lie down. The condition was realized on the site of Thêbes. The neighboring fountain Areia was guarded by a fierce dragon, the offspring of Arês, who destroyed all the persons sent to fetch water. Kadmus killed the dragon, and at the suggestion of Athênê sowed his teeth in the earth:[622] there sprang up at once the armed men called the Sparti, among whom he flung stones, and they immediately began to assault each other until all were slain except five. Arês, indignant at this slaughter, was about to kill Kadmus; but Zeus appeased him, condemning Kadmus to an expiatory servitude of eight years, after which he married Harmonia, the daughter of Arês and Aphroditê—presenting to her the splendid necklace fabricated by the hand of Hêphæstos, which had been given by Zeus to Eurôpa.[623] All the gods came to the Kadmeia, the citadel of Thêbes, to present congratulations and gifts at these nuptials, which seem to have been hardly less celebrated in the mythical world than those of Pêleus and Thetis. The issue of the marriage was one son, Polydôrus, and four daughters, Autonoê, Inô, Semelê and Agavê.[624]

From the five who alone survived of the warriors sprung from the dragon's teeth, arose five great families or gentes in Thêbes; the oldest and noblest of its inhabitants, coeval with the foundation of the town. They were called Sparti, and their name seems to have given rise, not only to the fable of the sowing of the teeth, but also to other etymological narratives.[625]

All the four daughters of Kadmus are illustrious in fabulous history. Inô, wife of Athamas, the son of Æolus, has already been included among the legends of the Æolids. Semelê became the mistress of Zeus, and inspired Hêrê with jealousy. Misguided by the malicious suggestions of that goddess, she solicited Zeus to visit her with all the solemnity and terrors which surrounded him when he approached Hêrê herself. The god unwillingly consented, and came in his chariot in the midst of thunder and lightning, under which awful accompaniments the mortal frame of Semelê perished. Zeus, taking from her the child of which she was pregnant, sewed it into his own thigh: after the proper interval the child was brought out and born, and became the great god Dionysus or Bacchus. Hermês took him to Inô and Athamas to receive their protection. Afterwards, however, Zeus having transformed him into a kid to conceal him from the persecution of Hêrê, the nymphs of the mountain Nysa became his nurses.[626]

Autonoê, the third daughter of Kadmus, married the pastoral hero or god Aristæus, and was mother of Aktæôn, a devoted hunter and a favorite companion of

the goddess Artemis. She however became displeased with him—either because he looked into a fountain while she was bathing and saw her naked—or according to the legend set forth by the poet Stesichorus, because he loved and courted Semelê—or according to Euripidês, because he presumptuously vaunted himself as her superior in the chase. She transformed him into a stag, so that his own dogs set upon and devoured him. The rock upon which Aktæôn used to sleep when fatigued with the chase, and the spring whose transparent waters had too clearly revealed the form of the goddess, were shown to Pausanias near Platæa, on the road to Megara.[627]

Agavê, the remaining daughter of Kadmus, married Echiôn, one of the Sparti. The issue of these nuptials was Pentheus, who, when Kadmus became old succeeded him as king of Thêbes. In his reign Dionysus appeared as a god, the author or discoverer of the vine with all its blessings. He had wandered over Asia, India and Thrace, at the head of an excited troop of female enthusiasts—communicating and inculcating everywhere the Bacchic ceremonies, and rousing in the minds of women that impassioned religious emotion which led them to ramble in solitary mountains at particular seasons, there to give vent to violent fanatical excitement, apart from the men, clothed in fawn-skins and armed with the thyrsus. The obtrusion of a male spectator upon these solemnities was esteemed sacrilegious. Though the rites had been rapidly disseminated and fervently welcomed in many parts of Thrace, yet there were some places in which they had been obstinately resisted and their votaries treated with rudeness; especially by Lykurgus, king of the Edonian Thracians, upon whom a sharp and exemplary punishment was inflicted by Dionysus.

Thêbes was the first city of Greece to which Dionysus came, at the head of his Asiatic troop of females, to obtain divine honors and to establish his peculiar rites in his native city. The venerable Kadmus, together with his daughters and the prophet Teiresias, at once acknowledged the divinity of the new god, and began to offer their worship and praise to him along with the solemnities which he enjoined. But Pentheus vehemently opposed the new ceremonies, reproving and maltreating the god who introduced them: nor was his unbelief at all softened by the miracles which Dionysus wrought for his own protection and for that of his followers. His mother Agavê, with her sisters, and a large body of other women from Thêbes, had gone out from Thêbes to Mount Kithærôn to celebrate their solemnities under the influence of the Bacchic frenzy. Thither Pentheus followed to watch them, and there the punishment due to his impiety overtook him. The avenging touch of the god having robbed him of his senses, he climbed a tall pine for the purpose of overlooking the feminine multitude, who detected him in this position, pulled down the tree, and tore him in pieces. Agavê, mad and bereft of consciousness, made herself the foremost in this assault, and carried back in triumph to Thêbes the head of her slaughtered son. The aged Kadmus, with his wife Harmonia, retired among the Illyrians, and at the end of their lives were changed into serpents, Zeus permitting them to be transferred to the Elysian fields.[628]

Polydôrus and Labdakus successively became kings of Thêbes: the latter at his death left an infant son, Laius, who was deprived of his throne by Lykus. And here we approach the legend of Antiopê, Zêthus and Amphiôn, whom the fabulists insert at this point of the Thêban series. Antiopê is here the daughter of Nykteus, the brother of Lykus. She is deflowered by Zeus, and then, while pregnant, flies to Epôpeus king of Sikyôn: Nykteus dying entreats his brother to avenge the injury, and Lykus accordingly invades Sikyôn, defeats and kills Epôpeus, and brings back Antiopê prisoner to Thêbes. In her way thither, in a cave near Eleutheræ, which was shown to Pausanias,[629] she is delivered of the twin sons of Zeus—Amphiôn and Zêthus—who, exposed to perish, are taken up and nourished by a shepherd, and pass their youth amidst herdsmen, ignorant of their lofty descent.

Antiopê is conveyed to Thêbes, where, after undergoing a long persecution from Lykus and his cruel wife Dirkê, she at length escapes, and takes refuge in the pastoral dwelling of her sons, now grown to manhood. Dirkê pursues and requires her to be delivered up; but the sons recognize and protect their mother, taking an ample revenge upon her persecutors. Lykus is slain, and Dirkê is dragged to death, tied to the horns of a bull.[630] Amphiôn and Zêthus, having banished Laius, become kings of Thêbes. The former, taught by Hermês, and possessing exquisite skill on the lyre, employs it in fortifying the city, the stones of the walls arranging themselves spontaneously in obedience to the rhythm of his song.[631]

Zêthus marries Aêdôn, who, in the dark and under a fatal mistake, kills her son Itylus: she is transformed into a nightingale, while Zêthus dies of grief.[632] Amphiôn becomes the husband of Niobê, daughter of Tantalus, and the father of a numerous offspring, the complete extinction of which by the hands of Apollo and Artemis has already been recounted in these pages.

Here ends the legend of the beautiful Antiopê and her twin sons—the rude and unpolished, but energetic, Zêthus—and the refined and amiable, but dreamy, Amphiôn. For so Euripidês, in the drama of Antiopê unfortunately lost, presented the two brothers, in affectionate union as well as in striking contrast.[633] It is evident that the whole story stood originally quite apart from the Kadmeian family, and so the rudiments of it yet stand in the Odyssey; but the logographers, by their ordinary connecting artifices, have opened a vacant place for it in the descending series of Thêban mythes. And they have here proceeded in a manner not usual with them. For whereas they are generally fond of multiplying entities, and supposing different historical personages of the same name, in order to introduce an apparent smoothness in the chronology—they have here blended into one person Amphiôn the son of Antiopê and Amphiôn the father of Chlôris, who seem clearly distinguished from each other in the Odyssey. They have further assigned to the same person all the circumstances of the legend of Niobê, which seems to have been originally framed quite apart from the sons of Antiopê.

Amphiôn and Zêthus being removed, Laius became king of Thêbes. With him commences the ever-celebrated series of adventures of Œdipus and his family. Laius forewarned by the oracle that any son whom he might beget would kill him, caused Œdipus as soon as he was born to be exposed on Mount Kithærôn. Here the herdsmen of Polybus king of Corinth accidentally found him and conveyed him to their master, who brought him up as his own child. In spite of the kindest treatment, however, Œdipus when he grew up found himself exposed to taunts on the score of his unknown parentage, and went to Delphi to inquire of the god the name of his real father. He received for answer an admonition not to go back to his country; if he did so, it was his destiny to kill his father and become the husband of his mother. Knowing no other country but Corinth, he accordingly determined to keep away from that city, and quitted Delphi by the road towards Bœôtia and Phôkis. At the exact spot where the roads leading to these two countries forked, he met Laius in a chariot drawn by mules, when the insolence of one of the attendants brought on an angry quarrel, in which Œdipus killed Laius, not knowing him to be his father. The exact place where this event happened, called the Divided Way[634], was memorable in the eyes of all literary Greeks, and is specially adverted to by Pausanias in his periegesis.

On the death of Laius, Kreôn, the brother of Jokasta, succeeded to the kingdom of Thêbes. At this time the country was under the displeasure of the gods, and was vexed by a terrible monster, with the face of a woman, the wings of a bird, and the tail of a lion, called the Sphinx[635]—sent by the wrath of Hêrê and occupying the neighboring mountain of Phikium. The Sphinx had learned from the Muses a riddle, which she proposed to the Thêbans to resolve: on every occasion of failure she took away one of the citizens and ate him up. Still no person could solve the riddle; and so great was the suffering occasioned, that Kreôn was obliged to offer both the crown and the nuptials of his sister Jokasta to any one who could achieve the salvation of the city. At this juncture Œdipus arrived and solved the riddle: upon which the Sphinx immediately threw herself from the acropolis and disappeared. As a recompense for this service, Œdipus was made king of Thêbes, and married Jokasta, not aware that she was his mother.

These main tragical circumstances—that Œdipus had ignorantly killed his father and married his mother—belong to the oldest form of the legend as it stands in the Odyssey. The gods (it is added in that poem) quickly made the facts known to mankind. Epikasta (so Jokasta is here called) in an agony of sorrow hanged herself: Œdipus remained king of the Kadmeians, but underwent many and great miseries, such as the Erinnyes, who avenge an injured mother, inflict.[636] A passage in the Iliad implies that he died at Thêbes, since it mentions the funeral games which were celebrated there in honor of him. His misfortunes were recounted by Nestôr, in the old Cyprian verses, among the stories of aforetime.[637] A fatal curse hung both upon himself and upon his children, Eteoklês, Polynikês, Antigonê and Ismênê. According to that narrative which the Attic tragedians have rendered universally current, they

were his children by Jokasta, the disclosure of her true relationship to him having been very long deferred. But the ancient epic called Œdipodia, treading more closely in the footsteps of Homer, represented him as having after her death married a second wife, Euryganeia, by whom the four children were born to him: and the painter Onatas adopted this story in preference to that of Sophoklês.[638]

The disputes of Eteoklês and Polynikês for the throne of their father gave occasion not only to a series of tragical family incidents, but also to one of the great quasi-historical events of legendary Greece—the two sieges of Thêbes by Adrastus, king of Argos. The two ancient epic poems called the Thêbaïs and the Epigoni (if indeed both were not parts of one very comprehensive poem) detailed these events at great length, and as it appears, with distinguished poetical merit; for Pausanias pronounces the Cyclic Thêbaïs (so it was called by the subsequent critics to distinguish it from the more modern Thêbaïs of Antimachus) inferior only to the Iliad and Odyssey; and the ancient elegiac poet Kallinus treated it as an Homeric composition. [639] Of this once-valued poem we unfortunately possess nothing but a few scanty fragments. The leading points of the legend are briefly glanced at in the Iliad; but our knowledge of the details is chiefly derived from the Attic tragedians, who transformed the narratives of their predecessors at pleasure, and whose popularity constantly eclipsed and obliterated the ancient version. Antimachus of Kolophôn, contemporary with Euripidês, in his long epic, probably took no less liberties with the old narrative. His Thêbaïd never became generally popular, but it exhibited marks of study and elaboration which recommended it to the esteem of the Alexandrine critics, and probably contributed to discredit in their eyes the old cyclic poem.

The logographers, who gave a continuous history of this siege of Thêbes, had at least three preëxisting epic poems—the Thêbaïs, the Œdipodia, and the Alkmæônis, —from which they could borrow. The subject was also handled in some of the Hesiodic poems, but we do not know to what extent.[640] The Thêbaïs was composed more in honor of Argos than of Thêbes, as the first line of it, one of the few fragments still preserved, betokens.[641]

SIEGES OF THEBES.

The legend, about to recount fraternal dissension of the most implacable kind, comprehending in its results not only the immediate relations of the infuriated brothers, but many chosen companions of the heroic race along with them, takes its start from the paternal curse of Œdipus, which overhangs and determines all the gloomy sequel.

Œdipus, though king of Thêbes and father of four children by Euryganeia (according to the Œdipodia), has become the devoted victim of the Erinnyes, in consequence of the self-inflicted death of his mother, which he has unconsciously caused, as well as of his unintentional parricide. Though he had long forsworn the use of all the ornaments and luxuries which his father had inherited from his kingly progenitors, yet when through age he had come to be dependent upon his two sons, Polynikês one day broke through this interdict, and set before him the silver table and the splendid wine-cup of Kadmus, which Laius had always been accustomed to employ. The old king had no sooner seen these precious appendages of the regal life of his father, than his mind was overrun by a calamitous phrenzy, and he imprecated terrible curses on his sons, predicting that there would be bitter and endless warfare between them. The goddess Erinnys heard and heeded him; and he repeated the curse again on another occasion, when his sons, who had always been accustomed to send to him the shoulder of the victims sacrificed on the altar, caused the buttock to be served to him in place of it.[642] He resented this as an insult, and prayed the gods that they might perish each by the hand of the other. Throughout the tragedians as well as in the old epic, the paternal curse, springing immediately from the misguided Œdipus himself, but remotely from the parricide and incest with which he has tainted his breed, is seen to domineer over the course of events—the Erinnys who executes that curse being the irresistible, though concealed, agent. Æschylus not only preserves the fatal efficiency of the paternal curse, but even briefly glances at the causes assigned for it in the Thêbaïs, without superadding any new motives. In the judgment of Sophoklês, or of his audience, the conception of a father cursing his sons upon such apparently trifling grounds was odious; and that great poet introduced many aggravating circumstances, describing the old blind father as having been barbarously turned out of doors by his sons to wander abroad in exile and poverty. Though by this change he rendered his poem more coherent and self-justifying, yet he departed, from the spirit of the old legend, according to which Œdipus has contracted by his unconscious misdeeds an incurable taint destined to pass onward to his progeny. His mind is alienated, and he curses them, not because he has suffered seriously by their guilt, but because he is made the blind instrument of an avenging Erinnys for the ruin of the house of Laius.[643]

After the death of Œdipus and the celebration of his funeral games, at which amongst others, Argeia, daughter of Adrastus (afterwards the wife of Polynikês), was present,[644] his two sons soon quarrelled respecting the succession. The circumstances are differently related; but it appears that, according to the original narrative, the wrong and injustice was on the part of Polynikês, who, however, was obliged to leave Thêbes and to seek shelter with Adrastus, king of Argos. Here he met Tydeus, a fugitive, at the same time, from Ætôlia: it was dark when they arrived, and a broil ensued between the two exiles, but Adrastus came out and parted them. He had been enjoined by an oracle to give his two daughters in marriage to a lion and a boar, and he thought this occasion had now arrived, inasmuch as one of the combatants carried on his shield a lion, the other a boar. He accordingly gave Deipylê in marriage to Tydeus, and Argeia to Polynikês: moreover, he resolved to restore by armed resistance both his sons-in-law to their respective countries.[645]

On proposing the expedition to the Argeian chiefs around him he found most of them willing auxiliaries; but Amphiaräus—formerly his bitter opponent, but now reconciled to him, and husband of his sister Eriphylê—strongly opposed him.[646] He denounced the enterprise as unjust and contrary to the will of the gods. Again, being of a prophetic stock, descended from Melampus, he foretold the certain death both of himself and of the principal leaders, should they involve themselves as accomplices in the mad violence of Tydeus or the criminal ambition of Polynikês. Amphiaräus, already distinguished both in the Kalydônian boar-hunt and in the funeral games of Pelias, was in the Thêban war the most conspicuous of all the heroes, and absolutely indispensable to its success. But his reluctance to engage in it was invincible, nor was it possible to prevail upon him except through the influence of his wife Eriphylê. Polynikês, having brought with him from Thêbes the splendid robe and necklace given by the gods to Harmonia on her marriage with Kadmus, offered it as a bribe to Eriphylê, on condition that she would influence the determination of Amphiaräus. The sordid wife, seduced by so matchless a present, betrayed the lurking-place of her husband, and involved him in the fatal expedition.[647] Amphiaräus, reluctantly dragged forth, and foreknowing the disastrous issue of the expedition both to himself and to his associates, addressed his last injunctions, at the moment of mounting his chariot, to his sons Alkmæôn and Amphilochus, commanding Alkmæôn to avenge his approaching death by killing the venal Eriphylê, and by undertaking a second expedition against Thêbes.

The Attic dramatists describe this expedition as having been conducted by seven chiefs, one to each of the seven celebrated gates of Thêbes. But the Cyclic Thêbaïs gave to it a much more comprehensive character, mentioning auxiliaries from Arcadia, Messênê, and various parts of Peloponnêsus;[648] and the application of Tydeus and Polynikês at Mykênæ in the course of their circuit made to collect allies, is mentioned in the Iliad. They were well received at Mykênæ; but the warning signals given by the gods were so terrible that no Mykenæan could venture to accompany

them.[649] The seven principal chiefs however were Adrastus, Amphiaräus, Kapaneus, Hippomedôn, Parthenopæus, Tydeus and Polynikês.[650] When the army had advanced as far as the river Asôpus, a halt was made for sacrifice and banquet; while Tydeus was sent to Thêbes as envoy to demand the restoration of Polynikês to his rights. His demand was refused; but finding the chief Kadmeians assembled at the banquet in the house of Eteoklês, he challenged them all to contend with him in boxing or wrestling. So efficacious was the aid of the goddess Athênê that he overcame them all; and the Kadmeians were so indignant at their defeat, that they placed an ambuscade of fifty men to intercept him in his way back to the army. All of them perished by the hand of this warrior, small in stature and of few words, but desperate and irresistible in the fight. One alone was spared, Mæon, in consequence of special signals from the gods.[651]

The Kadmeians, assisted by their allies the Phôkians and the Phlegyæ, marched out to resist the invaders, and fought a battle near the Ismênian hill, in which they were defeated and forced to retire within the walls. The prophet Teiresias acquainted them that if Menœkeus, son of Kreôn, would offer himself as a victim to Arês, victory would be assured to Thêbes. The generous youth, as soon as he learnt that his life was to be the price of safely to his country, went and slew himself before the gates. The heroes along with Adrastus now commenced a vigorous attack upon the town, each of the seven selecting one of the gates to assault. The contest was long and strenuously maintained but the devotion of Menœkeus had procured for the Thêbans the protection of the gods. Parthenopæus was killed with a stone by Periklymenus; and when the furious Kapaneus, having planted a scaling-ladder, had mounted the walls, he was smitten by a thunderbolt from Zeus and cast down dead upon the earth. This event struck terror into the Argeians, and Adrastus called back his troops from the attack. The Thêbans now sallied forth to pursue them, when Eteoklês, arresting the battle, proposed to decide the controversy by single combat with his brother. The challenge, eagerly accepted by Polynikês, was agreed to by Adrastus: a single combat ensued between the two brothers, in which both were exasperated to fury and both ultimately slain by each other's hand. This equal termination left the result of the general contest still undetermined, and the bulk of the two armies renewed the fight. In the sanguinary struggle which ensued the sons of Astakus on the Thêban side displayed the most conspicuous and successful valor. One of them,[652] Melanippus, mortally wounded Tydeus—while two others, Leades and Amphidikus, killed Eteoklus and Hippomedôn. Amphiaräus avenged Tydeus by killing Melanippus; but unable to arrest the rout of the army, he fled with the rest, closely pursued by Periklymenus. The latter was about to pierce him with his spear, when the beneficence of Zeus rescued him from this disgrace—miraculously opening the earth under him, so that Amphiaräus with his chariot and horses was received unscathed into her bosom.[653] The exact spot where this memorable incident happened was indicated by a sepulchral building, and shown by the Thêbans down to the days of Pausanias—its sanctity being attested by the fact, that no animal would consent to touch the

herbage which grew within the sacred inclosure. Amphiaräus, rendered immortal by Zeus, was worshipped as a god at Argos, at Thêbes and at Orôpus—and for many centuries gave answers at his oracle to the questions of the pious applicant.[654]

Adrastus, thus deprived of the prophet and warrior whom he regarded as "the eye of his army," and having seen the other chiefs killed in the disastrous fight, was forced to take flight singly, and was preserved by the matchless swiftness of his horse Areiôn, the offspring of Poseidôn. He reached Argos on his return, bringing with him nothing except "his garments of woe and his black-maned steed."[655]

Kreôn, father of the heroic youth Menœkeus, succeeding to the administration of Thêbes after the death of the two hostile brothers and the repulse of Adrastus, caused Eteoklês to be buried with distinguished honor, but cast out ignominiously the body of Polynikês as a traitor to his country, forbidding every one on pain of death to consign it to the tomb. He likewise refused permission to Adrastus to inter the bodies of his fallen comrades. This proceeding, so offensive to Grecian feeling, gave rise to two further tales; one of them at least of the highest pathos and interest. Antigonê, the sister of Polynikês, heard with indignation the revolting edict consigning her brother's body to the dogs and vultures, and depriving it of those rites which were considered essential to the repose of the dead. Unmoved by the dissuading counsel of an affectionate but timid sister, and unable to procure assistance, she determined to brave the hazard and to bury the body with her own hands. She was detected in the act; and Kreôn, though forewarned by Teiresias of the consequences, gave orders that she should be buried alive, as having deliberately set at naught the solemn edict of the city. His son Hæmôn, to whom she was engaged to be married, in vain interceded for her life. In an agony of despair he slew himself in the sepulchre to which the living Antigonê had been consigned; and his mother Eurydikê, the wife of Kreôn, inconsolable for his death, perished by her own hand. And thus the new light which seemed to be springing up over the last remaining scion of the devoted family of Œdipus, is extinguished amidst gloom and horrors—which overshadowed also the house and dynasty of Kreôn.[656]

The other tale stands more apart from the original legend, and seems to have had its origin in the patriotic pride of the Athenians. Adrastus, unable to obtain permission from the Thêbans to inter the fallen chieftains, presented himself in suppliant guise, accompanied by their disconsolate mothers, to Thêseus at Eleusis. He implored the Athenian warrior to extort from the perverse Thêbans that last melancholy privilege which no decent or pious Greeks ever thought of withholding, and thus to stand forth as the champion of Grecian public morality in one of its most essential points, not less than of the rights of the subterranean gods. The Thêbans obstinately persisting in their refusal, Thêseus undertook an expedition against their city, vanquished them in the field, and compelled them by force of arms to permit the sepulture of their fallen enemies. This chivalrous interposition, celebrated in one of the preserved dramas of Euripidês, formed a subject of glorious recollection to the Athe-

nians throughout the historical age: their orators dwelt upon it in terms of animated panegyric; and it seems to have been accepted as a real fact of the past time, with not less implicit conviction than the battle of Marathôn.[657] But the Thêbans, though equally persuaded of the truth of the main story, dissented from the Athenian version of it, maintaining that they had given up the bodies for sepulture voluntarily and of their own accord. The tomb of the chieftains was shown near Eleusis even in the days of Pausanias.[658]

A large proportion both of the interesting persons and of the exalted acts of legendary Greece belongs to the female sex. Nor can we on this occasion pass over the name of Evadnê, the devoted widow of Kapaneus, who cast herself on the funeral pile of her husband and perished.[659]

The defeat of the seven chiefs before Thêbes was amply avenged by their sons, again under the guidance of Adrastus:—Ægialeus son of Adrastus, Thersander son of Polynikês, Alkmæôn and Amphilochus, sons of Amphiaräus, Diomêdês son of Tydeus, Sthenelus son of Kapaneus, Promachus son of Parthenopæus, and Euryalus son of Mekistheus, joined in this expedition. Though all these youthful warriors, called the Epigoni, took part in the expedition, the grand and prominent place appears to have been occupied by Alkmæôn, son of Amphiaräus. Assistance was given to them from Corinth and Megara, as well as from Messênê and Arcadia; while Zeus manifested his favorable dispositions by signals not to be mistaken.[660] At the river Glisas the Epigoni were met by the Thêbans in arms, and a battle took place in which the latter were completely defeated. Laodamas, son of Eteoklês, killed Ægialeus, son of Adrastus; but he and his army were routed and driven within the walls by the valor and energy of Alkmæôn. The defeated Kadmeians consulted the prophet Teiresias, who informed them that the gods had declared for their enemies, and that there was no longer any hope of successful resistance. By his advice they sent a herald to the assailants offering to surrender the town, while they themselves conveyed away their wives and children, and fled under the command of Laodamas to the Illyrians,[661] upon which the Epigoni entered Thêbes, and established Thersander, son of Polynikês, on the throne.

Adrastus, who in the former expedition had been the single survivor amongst so many fallen companions, now found himself the only exception to the general triumph and joy of the conquerors: he had lost his son Ægialeus, and the violent sorrow arising from the event prematurely cut short his life. His soft voice and persuasive eloquence were proverbial in the ancient epic.[662] He was worshipped as a hero both at Argos and at Sikyôn, but with especial solemnity in the last-mentioned place, where his Herôum stood in the public agora, and where his exploits as well as his sufferings were celebrated periodically in lyric tragedies. Melanippus, son of Astakus, the brave defender of Thêbes, who had slain both Tydeus and Mekistheus, was worshipped with no less solemnity by the Thêbans.[663] The enmity of these two heroes rendered it impossible for both of them to be worshipped close upon the same spot.

Accordingly it came to pass during the historical period, about the time of the Solonian legislation at Athens, that Kleisthenês, despot of Sikyôn, wishing to banish the hero Adrastus and abolish the religious solemnities celebrated in honor of the latter by the Sikyonians, first applied to the Delphian oracle for permission to carry this banishment into effect directly and forcibly. That permission being refused, he next sent to Thêbes an intimation that he was anxious to introduce their hero Melanippus into Sikyôn. The Thêbans willingly consented, and he assigned to the new hero a consecrated spot in the strongest and most commanding portion of the Sikyonian prytaneium. He did this (says the historian) "knowing that Adrastus would forthwith go away of his own accord; since Melanippus was of all persons the most odious to him, as having slain both his son-in-law and his brother." Kleisthenês moreover diverted the festivals and sacrifices which had been offered to Adrastus, to the newly established hero Melanippus; and the lyric tragedies from the worship of Adrastus to that of Dionysus. But his dynasty did not long continue after his decease, and the Sikyonians then reëstablished their ancient solemnities.[664]

Near the Prœtid gate of Thêbes were seen the tombs of two combatants who had hated each other during life even more than Adrastus and Melanippus—the two brothers Eteoklês and Polynikês. Even as heroes and objects of worship, they still continued to manifest their inextinguishable hostility: those who offered sacrifices to them observed that the flame and the smoke from the two adjoining altars abhorred all communion, and flew off in directions exactly opposite. The Thêban exegetes assured Pausanias of this fact. And though he did not himself witness it, yet having seen with his own eyes a miracle not very dissimilar at Pioniæ in Mysia, he had no difficulty in crediting their assertion.[665]

Amphiaräus when forced into the first attack of Thêbes—against his own foreknowledge and against the warnings of the gods—had enjoined his sons Alkmæôn and Amphilochus not only to avenge his death upon the Thêbans, but also to punish the treachery of their mother, "Eriphylê, the destroyer of her husband."[666] In obedience to this command, and having obtained the sanction of the Delphian oracle, Alkmæôn slew his mother;[667] but the awful Erinnys, the avenger of matricide, inflicted on him a long and terrible punishment, depriving him of his reason, and chasing him about from place to place without the possibility of repose or peace of mind. He craved protection and cure from the god at Delphi, who required him to dedicate at the temple, as an offering, the precious necklace of Kadmus, that irresistible bribe which had originally corrupted Eriphylê.[668] He further intimated to the unhappy sufferer, that though the whole earth was tainted with his crime, and had become uninhabitable for him, yet there was a spot of ground which was not under the eye of the sun at the time when the matricide was committed, and where therefore Alkmæôn yet might find a tranquil shelter. The promise was realized at the mouth of the river Achelôus, whose turbid stream was perpetually depositing new earth and forming additional islands. Upon one of these, near Œniadæ, Alkmæôn settled, permanently

and in peace: he became the primitive hero of Akarnania, to which his son Akarnan gave name.[669] The necklace was found among the treasures of Delphi, together with that which had been given by Aphroditê to Helen, by the Phôkian plunderers who stripped the temple in the time of Philip of Macedôn. The Phôkian women quarrelled about these valuable ornaments: and we are told that the necklace of Eriphylê was allotted to a woman of gloomy and malignant disposition, who ended by putting her husband to death; that of Helen to a beautiful but volatile wife, who abandoned her husband from a preference for a young Epirot.[670]

There were several other legends respecting the distracted Alkmæôn, either appropriated or invented by the Attic tragedians. He went to Phêgeus, king of Psôphis in Arcadia, whose daughter Arsinoê he married, giving as a nuptial present the necklace of Eriphylê. Being however unable to remain there, in consequence of the unremitting persecutions of the maternal Erinnys, he sought shelter at the residence of king Achelôus, whose daughter Kallirhoê he made his wife, and on whose soil he obtained repose.[671] But Kallirhoê would not be satisfied without the possession of the necklace of Eriphylê, and Alkmæôn went back to Psôphis to fetch it, where Phêgeus and his sons slew him. He had left twin sons, infants, with Kallirhoê, who prayed fervently to Zeus that they might be preternaturally invested with immediate manhood, in order to revenge the murder of their father. Her prayer was granted, and her sons Amphoterus and Akarnan, having instantaneously sprung up to manhood, proceeded into Arcadia, slew the murderers of their father, and brought away the necklace of Eriphylê, which they carried to Delphi.[672]

Euripidês deviated still more widely from the ancient epic, by making Alkmæôn the husband of Mantô, daughter of Teiresias, and the father of Amphilochus. According to the Cyclic Thêbaïs, Mantô was consigned by the victorious Epigoni as a special offering to the Delphian god; and Amphilochus was son of Amphiaräus, not son of Alkmæôn.[673] He was the eponymous hero of the town called the Amphilochian Argos, in Akarnania, on the shore of the Gulf of Ambrakia. Thucydidês tells us that he went thither on his return from the Trojan war, being dissatisfied with the state of affairs which he found at the Peloponnêsian Argos.[674] The Akarnanians were remarkable for the numerous prophets which they supplied to the rest of Greece: their heroes were naturally drawn from the great prophetic race of the Melampodids.

Thus ends the legend of the two sieges of Thêbes; the greatest event, except the siege of Troy, in the ancient epic; the greatest enterprise of war, between Greeks and Greeks, during the time of those who are called the Heroes.

CHAPTER XV.

LEGEND OF TROY.

We now arrive at the capital and culminating point of the Grecian epic,—the two sieges and capture of Troy, with the destinies of the dispersed heroes, Trojan as well as Grecian, after the second and most celebrated capture and destruction of the city.

It would require a large volume to convey any tolerable idea of the vast extent and expansion of this interesting fable, first handled by so many poets, epic, lyric and tragic, with their endless additions, transformations and contradictions,—then purged and recast by historical inquirers, who under color of setting aside the exaggerations of the poets, introduced a new vein of prosaic invention,—lastly, moralized and allegorized by philosophers. In the present brief outline of the general field of Grecian legend, or of that which the Greeks believed to be their antiquities, the Trojan war can be regarded as only one among a large number of incidents upon which Hekatæus and Herodotus looked back as constituting their fore-time. Taken as a special legendary event, it is indeed of wider and larger interest than any other, but it is a mistake to single it out from the rest as if it rested upon a different and more trustworthy basis. I must therefore confine myself to an abridged narrative of the current and leading facts; and amidst the numerous contradictory statements which are to be found respecting every one of them, I know no better ground of preference than comparative antiquity, though even the oldest tales which we possess—those contained in the Iliad—evidently presuppose others of prior date.

The primitive ancestor of the Trojan line of kings is Dardanus, son of Zeus, founder and eponymus of Dardania:[675] in the account of later authors, Dardanus was called the son of Zeus by Elektra, daughter of Atlas, and was further said to have come from Samothrace, or from Arcadia, or from Italy;[676] but of this Homer mentions nothing. The first Dardanian town founded by him was in a lofty position on the descent of Mount Ida; for he was not yet strong enough to establish himself on the plain. But his son Erichthonius, by the favor of Zeus, became the wealthiest of mankind. His flocks and herds having multiplied, he had in his pastures three thousand mares, the offspring of some of whom, by Boreas, produced horses of preternatural swiftness. Trôs, the son of Erichthonius, and the eponym of the Trojans, had three sons—Ilus, Assaracus, and the beautiful Ganymêdês, whom Zeus stole away to become his cup-bearer in Olympus, giving to his father Trôs, as the price of the youth, a team of immortal horses.[677]

From Ilus and Assaracus the Trojan and Dardanian lines diverge; the former passing from Ilus to Laomedôn, Priam and Hectôr; the latter from Assaracus to Capys,

Anchisês and Æneas. Ilus founded in the plain of Troy the holy city of Ilium; Assaracus and his descendants remained sovereigns of Dardania.[678]

It was under the proud Laomedôn, son of Ilus, that Poseidôn and Apollo underwent, by command of Zeus, a temporary servitude; the former building the walls of the town, the latter tending the flocks and herds. When their task was completed and the penal period had expired, they claimed the stipulated reward; but Laomedôn angrily repudiated their demand, and even threatened to cut off their ears, to tie them hand and foot, and to sell them in some distant island as slaves.[679] He was punished for this treachery by a sea-monster, whom Poseidôn sent to ravage his fields and to destroy his subjects. Laomedôn publicly offered the immortal horses given by Zeus to his father Trôs, as a reward to any one who would destroy the monster. But an oracle declared that a virgin of noble blood must be surrendered to him, and the lot fell upon Hesionê, daughter of Laomedôn himself. Hêraklês arriving at this critical moment, killed the monster by the aid of a fort built for him by Athênê and the Trojans,[680] so as to rescue both the exposed maiden and the people; but Laomedôn, by a second act of perfidy, gave him mortal horses in place of the matchless animals which had been promised. Thus defrauded of his due, Hêraklês equipped six ships, attacked and captured Troy and killed Laomedôn,[681] giving Hesionê to his friend and auxiliary Telamôn, to whom she bore the celebrated archer Teukros.[682] A painful sense of this expedition was preserved among the inhabitants of the historical town of Ilium, who offered no worship to Hêraklês.[683]

Among all the sons of Laomedôn, Priam[684] was the only one who had remonstrated against the refusal of the well-earned guerdon of Hêraklês; for which the hero recompensed him by placing him on the throne. Many and distinguished were his sons and daughters, as well by his wife Hekabê, daughter of Kisseus, as by other women.[685] Among the sons were Hectôr,[686] Paris, Dêiphobus, Helenus, Trôilus, Politês, Polydôrus; among the daughters Laodikê, Kreüsa, Polyxena, and Kassandra.

The birth of Paris was preceded by formidable presages; for Hekabê dreamt that she was delivered of a firebrand, and Priam, on consulting the soothsayers, was informed that the son about to be born would prove fatal to him. Accordingly he directed the child to be exposed on Mount Ida; but the inauspicious kindness of the gods preserved him, and he grew up amidst the flocks and herds, active and beautiful, fair of hair and symmetrical in person, and the special favorite of Aphroditê.[687]

It was to this youth, in his solitary shepherd's walk on Mount Ida, that the three goddesses Hêrê, Athênê, and Aphroditê were conducted, in order that he might determine the dispute respecting their comparative beauty, which had arisen at the nuptials of Pêleus and Thetis,—a dispute brought about in pursuance of the arrangement, and in accomplishment of the deep-laid designs, of Zeus. For Zeus, remarking with pain the immoderate numbers of the then existing heroic race, pitied the earth for the overwhelming burden which she was compelled to bear, and determined to

lighten it by exciting a destructive and long-continued war.[688] Paris awarded the palm of beauty to Aphroditê, who promised him in recompense the possession of Helena, wife of the Spartan Menelaus,—the daughter of Zeus and the fairest of living women. At the instance of Aphroditê, ships were built for him, and he embarked on the enterprise so fraught with eventual disaster to his native city, in spite of the menacing prophecies of his brother Helenus, and the always neglected warnings of Kassandra.[689]

Paris, on arriving at Sparta, was hospitably entertained by Menelaus as well as by Kastôr and Pollux, and was enabled to present the rich gifts which he had brought to Helen.[690] Menelaus then departed to Krête, leaving Helen to entertain his Trojan guest—a favorable moment which was employed by Aphroditê to bring about the intrigue and the elopement. Paris carried away with him both Helen and a large sum of money belonging to Menelaus—made a prosperous voyage to Troy—and arrived there safely with his prize on the third day.[691]

Menelaus, informed by Iris in Krête of the perfidious return made by Paris for his hospitality, hastened home in grief and indignation to consult with his brother Agamemnôn, as well as with the venerable Nestôr, on the means of avenging the outrage. They made known the event to the Greek chiefs around them, among whom they found universal sympathy: Nestôr, Palamêdês and others went round to solicit aid in a contemplated attack of Troy, under the command of Agamemnôn, to whom each chief promised both obedience and unwearied exertion until Helen should be recovered.[692] Ten years were spent in equipping the expedition. The goddesses Hêrê and Athênê, incensed at the preference given by Paris to Aphroditê, and animated by steady attachment to Argos, Sparta and Mykênæ, took an active part in the cause; and the horses of Hêrê were fatigued with her repeated visits to the different parts of Greece.[693]

By such efforts a force was at length assembled at Aulis[694] in Bœôtia, consisting of 1186 ships and more than 100,000 men,—a force outnumbering by more than ten to one anything that the Trojans themselves could oppose, and superior to the defenders of Troy even with all her allies included.[695] It comprised heroes with their followers from the extreme points of Greece—from the north-western portions of Thessaly under Mount Olympus, as well as the western islands of Dulichium and Ithaca, and the eastern islands of Krête and Rhodes. Agamemnôn himself contributed 100 ships manned with the subjects of his kingdom of Mykênæ, besides furnishing 60 ships to the Arcadians, who possessed none of their own. Menelaus brought with him 60 ships, Nestôr from Pylus 90, Idomeneus from Krête and Diomêdês from Argos 80 each. Forty ships were manned by the Eleians, under four different chiefs; the like number under Megês from Dulichium and the Echinades, and under Thoas from Kalydôn and the other Ætôlian towns. Odysseus from Ithaca, and Ajax from Salamis, brought 12 ships each. The Abantes from Eubœa, under Elephênôr, filled 40 vessels; the Bœôtians, under Peneleôs and Lêitus, 50; the inhabi-

tants of Orchomenos and Aspledôn, 30; the light-armed Locrians, under Ajax son of Oileus,[696] 40; the Phôkians as many. The Athenians, under Menestheus, a chief distinguished for his skill in marshalling an army, mustered 50 ships; the Myrmidons from Phthia and Hellas, under Achilles, assembled in 50 ships; Protesilaus from Phylakê and Pyrasus, and Eurypylus from Ormenium, each came with 40 ships; Machaôn and Podaleirius, from Trikka, with 30; Admêtus, from Pheræ and the lake Bœbêis, with 11; and Philoktêtês from Melibœa with 7: the Lapithæ, under Polypœtês, son of Peirithous, filled 40 vessels; the Ænianes and Perrhæbians, under Guneus,[697] 22; and the Magnêtês under Prothous, 40; these last two were from the northernmost parts of Thessaly, near the mountains Pêlion and Olympus. From Rhodes, under Tlêpolemus, son of Hêraklês, appeared 9 ships; from Symê under the comely but effeminate Nireus, 3; from Kôs, Krapathus and the neighboring islands, 30, under the orders of Pheidippus and Antiphus, sons of Thessalus and grandsons of Hêraklês.[698]

Among this band of heroes were included the distinguished warriors Ajax and Diomêdês, and the sagacious Nestôr; while Agamemnôn himself, scarcely inferior to either of them in prowess, brought with him a high reputation for prudence in command. But the most marked and conspicuous of all were Achilles and Odysseus; the former a beautiful youth born of a divine mother, swift in the race, of fierce temper and irresistible might; the latter not less efficient as an ally from his eloquence, his untiring endurance, his inexhaustible resources under difficulty, and the mixture of daring courage with deep-laid cunning which never deserted him:[699] the blood of the arch-deceiver Sisyphus, through an illicit connection with his mother Antikleia, was said to flow in his veins,[700] and he was especially patronized and protected by the goddess Athênê. Odysseus, unwilling at first to take part in the expedition, had even simulated insanity; but Palamêdês, sent to Ithaca to invite him, tested the reality of his madness by placing in the furrow where Odysseus was ploughing, his infant son Telemachus. Thus detected, Odysseus could not refuse to join the Achæan host, but the prophet Halithersês predicted to him that twenty years would elapse before he revisited his native land.[701] To Achilles the gods had promised the full effulgence of heroic glory before the walls of Troy; nor could the place be taken without both his coöperation and that of his son after him. But they had forewarned him that this brilliant career would be rapidly brought to a close; and that if he desired a long life, he must remain tranquil and inglorious in his native land. In spite of the reluctance of his mother Thetis, he preferred few years with bright renown, and joined the Achæan host.[702] When Nestôr and Odysseus came to Phthia to invite him, both he and his intimate friend Patroclus eagerly obeyed the call.[703]

Agamemnôn and his powerful host set sail from Aulis; but being ignorant of the locality and the direction, they landed by mistake in Teuthrania, a part of Mysia near the river Kaïkus, and began to ravage the country under the persuasion that it was the neighborhood of Troy. Telephus, the king of the country,[704] opposed and repelled them, but was ultimately defeated and severely wounded by Achilles. The

Greeks now, discovering their mistake, retired; but their fleet was dispersed by a storm and driven back to Greece. Achilles attacked and took Skyrus, and there married Deidamia, the daughter of Lycomêdês.[705] Telephus, suffering from his wounds, was directed by the oracle to come to Greece and present himself to Achilles to be healed, by applying the scrapings of the spear with which the wound had been given: thus restored, he became the guide of the Greeks when they were prepared to renew their expedition.[706]

The armament was again assembled at Aulis, but the goddess Artemis, displeased with the boastful language of Agamemnôn, prolonged the duration of adverse winds, and the offending chief was compelled to appease her by the well-known sacrifice of his daughter Iphigeneia.[707] They then proceeded to Tenedos, from whence Odysseus and Menelaus were despatched as envoys to Troy, to redemand Helen and the stolen property. In spite of the prudent counsels of Antenôr, who received the two Grecian chiefs with friendly hospitality, the Trojans rejected the demand, and the attack was resolved upon. It was foredoomed by the gods that the Greek who first landed should perish: Protesilaus was generous enough to put himself upon this forlorn hope, and accordingly fell by the hand of Hectôr.

Meanwhile the Trojans had assembled a large body of allies from various parts of Asia Minor and Thrace: Dardanians under Æneas, Lykians under Sarpedôn, Mysians, Karians, Mæonians, Alizonians,[708] Phrygians, Thracians, and Pæonians.[709] But vain was the attempt to oppose the landing of the Greeks: the Trojans were routed, and even the invulnerable Cycnus,[710] son of Poseidôn, one of the great bulwarks of the defence, was slain by Achilles. Having driven the Trojans within their walls, Achilles attacked and stormed Lyrnêssus, Pêdasus, Lesbos and other places in the neighborhood, twelve towns on the sea-coast and eleven in the interior; he drove off the oxen of Æneas and pursued the hero himself, who narrowly escaped with his life: he surprised and killed the youthful Trôilus, son of Priam, and captured several of the other sons, whom he sold as prisoners into the islands of the Ægean.[711] He acquired as his captive the fair Brisêis, while Chrysêis was awarded to Agamemnôn: he was moreover eager to see the divine Helen, the prize and stimulus of this memorable struggle; and Aphroditê and Thetis contrived to bring about an interview between them.[712]

At this period of the war the Grecian army was deprived of Palamêdês, one of its ablest chiefs. Odysseus had not forgiven the artifice by which Palamêdês had detected his simulated insanity, nor was he without jealousy of a rival clever and cunning in a degree equal, if not superior, to himself; one who had enriched the Greeks with the invention of letters, of dice for amusement, of night-watches, as well as with other useful suggestions. According to the old Cyprian epic, Palamêdês was drowned while fishing, by the hands of Odysseus and Diomêdês.[713] Neither in the Iliad nor the Odyssey does the name of Palamêdês occur: the lofty position which Odysseus occupies in both those poems—noticed with some degree of displeasure even by Pin-

dar, who described Palamêdês as the wiser man of the two—is sufficient to explain the omission.[714] But in the more advanced period of the Greek mind, when intellectual superiority came to acquire a higher place in the public esteem as compared with military prowess, the character of Palamêdês, combined with his unhappy fate, rendered him one of the most interesting personages in the Trojan legend. Æschylus, Sophoklês and Euripidês each consecrated to him a special tragedy; but the mode of his death as described in the old epic was not suitable to Athenian ideas, and accordingly he was represented as having been falsely accused of treason by Odysseus, who caused gold to be buried in his tent, and persuaded Agamemnôn and the Grecian chiefs that Palamêdês had received it from the Trojans.[715] He thus forfeited his life, a victim to the calumny of Odysseus and to the delusion of the leading Greeks. In the last speech made by the philosopher Socratês to his Athenian judges, he alludes with solemnity and fellow-feeling to the unjust condemnation of Palamêdês, as analogous to that which he himself was about to suffer, and his companions seem to have dwelt with satisfaction on the comparison. Palamêdês passed for an instance of the slanderous enmity and misfortune which so often wait upon superior genius.[716]

In these expeditions the Grecian army consumed nine years, during which the subdued Trojans dared not give battle without their walls for fear of Achilles. Ten years was the fixed epical duration of the siege of Troy, just as five years was the duration of the siege of Kamikus by the Krêtan armament which came to avenge the death of Minôs:[717] ten years of preparation, ten years of siege, and ten years of wandering for Odysseus, were periods suited to the rough chronological dashes of the ancient epic, and suggesting no doubts nor difficulties with the original hearers. But it was otherwise when the same events came to be contemplated by the historicizing Greeks, who could not be satisfied without either finding or inventing satisfactory bonds of coherence between the separate events. Thucydidês tells us that the Greeks were less numerous than the poets have represented, and that being moreover very poor, they were unable to procure adequate and constant provisions: hence they were compelled to disperse their army, and to employ a part of it in cultivating the Chersonese,—a part in marauding expeditions over the neighborhood. Could the whole army have been employed against Troy at once (he says), the siege would have been much more speedily and easily concluded.[718] If the great historian could permit himself thus to amend the legend in so many points, we might have imagined that the simpler course would have been to include the duration of the siege among the list of poetical exaggerations, and to affirm that the real siege had lasted only one year instead of ten. But it seems that the ten years' duration was so capital a feature in the ancient tale, that no critic ventured to meddle with it.

A period of comparative intermission however was now at hand for the Trojans. The gods brought about the memorable fit of anger of Achilles, under the influence of which he refused to put on his armor, and kept his Myrmidons in camp. According to the Cypria, this was the behest of Zeus, who had compassion on the Trojans: ac-

cording to the Iliad, Apollo was the originating cause,[719] from anxiety to avenge the injury which his priest Chrysês had endured from Agamemnôn. For a considerable time, the combats of the Greeks against Troy were conducted without their best warrior, and severe indeed was the humiliation which they underwent in consequence. How the remaining Grecian chiefs vainly strove to make amends for his absence—how Hectôr and the Trojans defeated and drove them to their ships—how the actual blaze of the destroying flame, applied by Hectôr to the ship of Protesilaus, roused up the anxious and sympathizing Patroclus, and extorted a reluctant consent from Achilles, to allow his friend and his followers to go forth and avert the last extremity of ruin—how Achilles, when Patroclus had been killed by Hectôr, forgetting his anger in grief for the death of his friend, reëntered the fight, drove the Trojans within their walls with immense slaughter, and satiated his revenge both upon the living and the dead Hectôr—all these events have been chronicled, together with those divine dispensations on which most of them are made to depend, in the immortal verse of the Iliad.

Homer breaks off with the burial of Hectôr, whose body has just been ransomed by the disconsolate Priam; while the lost poem of Arktinus, entitled the Æthiopis, so far as we can judge from the argument still remaining of it, handled only the subsequent events of the siege. The poem of Quintus Smyrnæus, composed about the fourth century of the Christian æra, seems in its first books to coincide with the Æthiopis, in the subsequent books partly with the Ilias Minor of Leschês.[720]

The Trojans, dismayed by the death of Hectôr, were again animated with hope by the appearance of the warlike and beautiful queen of the Amazons, Penthesileia, daughter of Arês, hitherto invincible in the field, who came to their assistance from Thrace at the head of a band of her countrywomen. She again led the besieged without the walls to encounter the Greeks in the open field; and under her auspices the latter were at first driven back, until she too was slain by the invincible arm of Achilles. The victor, on taking off the helmet of his fair enemy as she lay on the ground, was profoundly affected and captivated by her charms, for which he was scornfully taunted by Thersitês: exasperated by this rash insult, he killed Thersitês on the spot with a blow of his fist. A violent dispute among the Grecian chiefs was the result, for Diomêdês, the kinsman of Thersitês, warmly resented the proceeding; and Achilles was obliged to go to Lesbus, where he was purified from the act of homicide by Odysseus.[721]

Next arrived Memnôn, son of Tithônus and Eôs, the most stately of living men, with a powerful band of black Æthiopians, to the assistance of Troy. Sallying forth against the Greeks, he made great havoc among them: the brave and popular Antilochus perished by his hand, a victim to filial devotion in defence of Nestôr.[722] Achilles at length attacked him, and for a long time the combat was doubtful between them: the prowess of Achilles and the supplication of Thetis with Zeus finally prevailed; whilst Eôs obtained for her vanquished son the consoling gift of immortal-

ity. His tomb, however,[723] was shown near the Propontis, within a few miles of the mouth of the river Æsêpus, and was visited annually by the birds called Memnonides, who swept it and bedewed it with water from the stream. So the traveller Pausanias was told, even in the second century after the Christian æra, by the Hellespontine Greeks.

But the fate of Achilles himself was now at hand. After routing the Trojans and chasing them into the town, he was slain near the Skæan gate by an arrow from the quiver of Paris, directed under the unerring auspices of Apollo.[724] The greatest efforts were made by the Trojans to possess themselves of the body, which was however rescued and borne off to the Grecian camp by the valor of Ajax and Odysseus. Bitter was the grief of Thetis for the loss of her son: she came into the camp with the Muses and the Nêreids to mourn over him; and when a magnificent funeral-pile had been prepared by the Greeks to burn him with every mark of honor, she stole away the body and conveyed it to a renewed and immortal life in the island of Leukê in the Euxine Sea. According to some accounts he was there blest with the nuptials and company of Helen.[725]

Thetis celebrated splendid funeral games in honor of her son, and offered the unrivalled panoply, which Hêphæstos had forged and wrought for him, as a prize to the most distinguished warrior in the Grecian army. Odysseus and Ajax became rivals for the distinction, when Athênê, together with some Trojan prisoners, who were asked from which of the two their country had sustained greatest injury, decided in favor of the former. The gallant Ajax lost his senses with grief and humiliation: in a fit of phrenzy he slew some sheep, mistaking them for the men who had wronged him, and then fell upon his own sword.[726]

Odysseus now learnt from Helenus son of Priam, whom he had captured in an ambuscade,[727] that Troy could not be taken unless both Philoktêtês, and Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, could be prevailed upon to join the besiegers. The former, having been stung in the foot by a serpent, and becoming insupportable to the Greeks from the stench of his wound, had been left at Lemnus in the commencement of the expedition, and had spent ten years[728] in misery on that desolate island; but he still possessed the peerless bow and arrows of Hêraklês, which were said to be essential to the capture of Troy. Diomêdês fetched Philoktêtês from Lemnus to the Grecian camp, where he was healed by the skill of Machaôn,[729] and took an active part against the Trojans—engaging in single combat with Paris, and killing him with one of the Hêrakleian arrows. The Trojans were allowed to carry away for burial the body of this prince, the fatal cause of all their sufferings; but not until it had been mangled by the hand of Menelaus.[730] Odysseus went to the island of Skyrus to invite Neoptolemus to the army. The untried but impetuous youth gladly obeyed the call, and received from Odysseus his father's armor, while on the other hand, Eurypylus, son of Têlephus, came from Mysia as auxiliary to the Trojans and rendered to them valuable service—turning the tide of fortune for a time against the Greeks, and killing some of

their bravest chiefs, amongst whom was numbered Peneleôs, and the unrivalled leech Machaôn.[731] The exploits of Neoptolemus were numerous, worthy of the glory of his race and the renown of his father. He encountered and slew Eurypylus, together with numbers of the Mysian warriors: he routed the Trojans and drove them within their walls, from whence they never again emerged to give battle: nor was he less distinguished for his good sense and persuasive diction, than for forward energy in the field.[732]

Troy however was still impregnable so long as the Palladium, a statue given by Zeus himself to Dardanus, remained in the citadel; and great care had been taken by the Trojans not only to conceal this valuable present, but to construct other statues so like it as to mislead any intruding robber. Nevertheless the enterprising Odysseus, having disguised his person with miserable clothing and self-inflicted injuries, found means to penetrate into the city and to convey the Palladium by stealth away: Helen alone recognized him; but she was now anxious to return to Greece, and even assisted Odysseus in concerting means for the capture of the town.[733]

To accomplish this object, one final stratagem was resorted to. By the hands of Epeius of Panopeus, and at the suggestion of Athênê, a capacious hollow wooden horse was constructed, capable of containing one hundred men: the *élite* of the Grecian heroes, Neoptolemus, Odysseus, Menelaus and others, concealed themselves in the inside of it, and the entire Grecian army sailed away to Tenedos, burning their tents and pretending to have abandoned the siege. The Trojans, overjoyed to find themselves free, issued from the city and contemplated with astonishment the fabric which their enemies had left behind: they long doubted what should be done with it; and the anxious heroes from within heard the surrounding consultations, as well as the voice of Helen when she pronounced their names and counterfeited the accents of their wives.[734] Many of the Trojans were anxious to dedicate it to the gods in the city as a token of gratitude for their deliverance; but the more cautious spirits inculcated distrust of an enemy's legacy; and Laocoôn, the priest of Poseidôn, manifested his aversion by striking the side of the horse with his spear. The sound revealed that the horse was hollow, but the Trojans heeded not this warning of possible fraud; and the unfortunate Laocoôn, a victim to his own sagacity and patriotism, miserably perished before the eyes of his countrymen, together with one of his sons,—two serpents being sent expressly by the gods out of the sea to destroy him. By this terrific spectacle, together with the perfidious counsels of Sinon, a traitor whom the Greeks had left behind for the special purpose of giving false information, the Trojans were induced to make a breach in their own walls, and to drag the fatal fabric with triumph and exultation into their city.[735]

The destruction of Troy, according to the decree of the gods, was now irrevocably sealed. While the Trojans indulged in a night of riotous festivity, Sinon kindled the fire-signal to the Greeks at Tenedos, loosening the bolts of the wooden horse, from out of which the enclosed heroes descended. The city, assailed both from within and

from without, was thoroughly sacked and destroyed, with the slaughter or captivity of the larger portion of its heroes as well as its people. The venerable Priam perished by the hand of Neoptolemus, having in vain sought shelter at the domestic altar of Zeus Herkeios; but his son Deiphobus, who since the death of Paris had become the husband of Helen, defended his house desperately against Odysseus and Menelaus, and sold his life dearly. After he was slain, his body was fearfully mutilated by the latter.[736]

Thus was Troy utterly destroyed—the city, the altars and temples,[737] and the population. Æneas and Antenôr were permitted to escape, with their families, having been always more favorably regarded by the Greeks than the remaining Trojans. According to one version of the story, they had betrayed the city to the Greeks: a panther's skin had been hung over the door of Antenôr's house as a signal for the victorious besiegers to spare it in the general plunder.[738] In the distribution of the principal captives, Astyanax, the infant son of Hectôr, was cast from the top of the wall and killed, by Odysseus or Neoptolemus: Polyxena, the daughter of Priam, was immolated on the tomb of Achilles, in compliance with a requisition made by the shade of the deceased hero to his countrymen;[739] while her sister Kassandra was presented as a prize to Agamemnôn. She had sought sanctuary at the altar of Athênê, where Ajax, the son of Oileus, making a guilty attempt to seize her, had drawn both upon himself and upon the army the serious wrath of the goddess, insomuch that the Greeks could hardly be restrained from stoning him to death.[740] Andromachê and Helenus were both given to Neoptolemus, who, according to the Ilias Minor, carried away also Æneas as his captive.[741]

Helen gladly resumed her union with Menelaus: she accompanied him back to Sparta, and lived with him there many years in comfort and dignity,[742] passing afterwards to a happy immortality in the Elysian fields. She was worshipped as a goddess with her brothers the Dioskuri and her husband, having her temple, statue and altar at Therapnæ and elsewhere, and various examples of her miraculous interventions were cited among the Greeks.[743] The lyric poet Stesichorus had ventured to denounce her, conjointly with her sister Klytæmnêstra, in a tone of rude and plain-spoken severity, resembling that of Euripidês and Lycophrôn afterwards, but strikingly opposite to the delicacy and respect with which she is always handled by Homer, who never admits reproaches against her except from her own lips.[744] He was smitten with blindness, and made sensible of his impiety; but having repented and composed a special poem formally retracting the calumny, was permitted to recover his sight. In his poem of recantation (the famous palinode now unfortunately lost) he pointedly contradicted the Homeric narrative, affirming that Helen had never been to Troy at all, and that the Trojans had carried thither nothing but her image or *eidôlon*.[745] It is, probably, to the excited religious feelings of Stesichorus that we owe the first idea of this glaring deviation from the old legend, which could never have been recommended by any considerations of poetical interest.

Other versions were afterwards started, forming a sort of compromise between Homer and Stesichorus, admitting that Helen had never really been at Troy, without altogether denying her elopement. Such is the story of her having been detained in Egypt during the whole term of the siege. Paris, on his departure from Sparta, had been driven thither by storms, and the Egyptian king Prôteus, hearing of the grievous wrong which he had committed towards Menelaus, had sent him away from the country with severe menaces, detaining Helen until her lawful husband should come to seek her. When the Greeks reclaimed Helen from Troy, the Trojans assured them solemnly, that she neither was, nor ever had been, in the town; but the Greeks, treating this allegation as fraudulent, prosecuted the siege until their ultimate success confirmed the correctness of the statement, nor did Menelaus recover Helen until, on his return from Troy, he visited Egypt.[746] Such was the story told by the Egyptian priests to Herodotus, and it appeared satisfactory to his historicizing mind. "For if Helen had really been at Troy (he argues) she would certainly have been given up, even had she been mistress of Priam himself instead of Paris: the Trojan king, with all his family and all his subjects, would never knowingly have incurred utter and irretrievable destruction for the purpose of retaining her: their misfortune was, that while they did not possess, and therefore could not restore her, they yet found it impossible to convince the Greeks that such was the fact." Assuming the historical character of the war of Troy, the remark of Herodotus admits of no reply; nor can we greatly wonder that he acquiesced in the tale of Helen's Egyptian detention, as a substitute for the "incredible insanity" which the genuine legend imputes to Priam and the Trojans. Pausanias, upon the same ground and by the same mode of reasoning, pronounces that the Trojan horse must have been in point of fact a battering-engine, because to admit the literal narrative would be to impute utter childishness to the defenders of the city. And Mr. Payne Knight rejects Helen altogether as the real cause of the Trojan war, though she may have been the pretext of it; for he thinks that neither the Greeks nor the Trojans could have been so mad and silly as to endure calamities of such magnitude "for one little woman."[747] Mr. Knight suggests various political causes as substitutes; these might deserve consideration, either if any evidence could be produced to countenance them, or if the subject on which they are brought to bear could be shown to belong to the domain of history.

The return of the Grecian chiefs from Troy furnished matter to the ancient epic hardly less copious than the siege itself, and the more susceptible of indefinite diversity, inasmuch as those who had before acted in concert were now dispersed and isolated. Moreover the stormy voyages and compulsory wanderings of the heroes exactly fell in with the common aspirations after an heroic founder, and enabled even the most remote Hellenic settlers to connect the origin of their town with this prominent event of their ante-historical and semi-divine world. And an absence of ten years afforded room for the supposition of many domestic changes in their native abode, and many family misfortunes and misdeeds during the interval. One of these heroic "Returns," that of Odysseus, has been immortalized by the verse of Homer.

The hero, after a series of long-protracted suffering and expatriation, inflicted on him by the anger of Poseidôn, at last reaches his native island, but finds his wife beset, his youthful son insulted, and his substance plundered, by a troop of insolent suitors; he is forced to appear as a wretched beggar, and to endure in his own person their scornful treatment; but finally, by the interference of Athênê coming in aid of his own courage and stratagem, he is enabled to overwhelm his enemies, to resume his family position, and to recover his property. The return of several other Grecian chiefs was the subject of an epic poem by Hagias, which is now lost, but of which a brief abstract or argument still remains: there were in antiquity various other poems of similar title and analogous matter.[748]

As usual with the ancient epic, the multiplied sufferings of this back-voyage are traced to divine wrath, justly provoked by the sins of the Greeks; who, in the fierce exultation of a victory purchased by so many hardships, had neither respected nor even[749] spared the altars of the gods in Troy; and Athênê, who had been their most zealous ally during the siege, was so incensed by their final recklessness, more especially by the outrage of Ajax, son of Oïleus, that she actively harassed and embittered their return, in spite of every effort to appease her. The chiefs began to quarrel among themselves; their formal assembly became a scene of drunkenness; even Agamemnôn and Menelaus lost their fraternal harmony, and each man acted on his own separate resolution.[750] Nevertheless, according to the Odyssey, Nestôr, Diomêdês, Neoptolemus, Idomeneus and Philoktêtês reached home speedily and safely: Agamemnôn also arrived in Peloponnêsus, to perish by the hand of a treacherous wife; but Menelaus was condemned to long wanderings and to the severest privations in Egypt, Cyprus and elsewhere, before he could set foot in his native land. The Lokrian Ajax perished on the Gyræan rock.[751] Though exposed to a terrible storm, he had already reached this place of safety, when he indulged in the rash boast of having escaped in defiance of the gods: no sooner did Poseidôn hear this language, than he struck with his trident the rock which Ajax was grasping and precipitated both into the sea.[752] Kalchas the soothsayer, together with Leonteus and Polypœtês, proceeded by land from Troy to Kolophôn.[753]

In respect however to these and other Grecian heroes, tales were told different from those in the Odyssey, assigning to them a long expatriation and a distant home. Nestôr went to Italy, where he founded Metapontum, Pisa and Hêrakleia:[754] Philoktêtês[755] also went to Italy, founded Petilia and Krimisa, and sent settlers to Egesta in Sicily. Neoptolemus, under the advice of Thetis, marched by land across Thrace, met with Odysseus, who had come by sea, at Maroneia, and then pursued his journey to Epirus, where he became king of the Molossians.[756] Idomeneus came to Italy, and founded Uria in the Salentine peninsula. Diomêdês, after wandering far and wide, went along the Italian coast into the innermost Adriatic gulf, and finally settled in Daunia, founding the cities of Argyrippa, Beneventum, Atria and Diomêdeia: by the favor of Athênê he became immortal, and was worshipped as a

god in many different places.[757] The Lokrian followers of Ajax founded the Epizephyrian Lokri on the southernmost corner of Italy,[758] besides another settlement in Libya. I have spoken in another place of the compulsory exile of Teukros, who, besides founding the city of Salamis in Cyprus, is said to have established some settlements in the Iberian peninsula.[759] Menestheus the Athenian did the like, and also founded both Elæa in Mysia and Skylletium in Italy.[760] The Arcadian chief Agapenôr founded Paphus in Cyprus.[761] Epeius, of Panopeus in Phôkis, the constructor of the Trojan horse with the aid of the goddess Athênê, settled at Lagaria near Sybaris on the coast of Italy; and the very tools which he had employed in that remarkable fabric were shown down to a late date in the temple of Athênê at Metapontum.[762] Temples, altars and towns were also pointed out in Asia Minor, in Samos and in Krête, the foundation of Agamemnôn or of his followers.[763] The inhabitants of the Grecian town of Skionê, in the Thracian peninsula called Pallênê or Pellênê, accounted themselves the offspring of the Pellênians from Achæa in Peloponnêsus, who had served under Agamemnôn before Troy, and who on their return from the siege had been driven on the spot by a storm and there settled.[764] The Pamphylians, on the southern coast of Asia Minor, deduced their origin from the wanderings of Amphilochus and Kalchas after the siege of Troy: the inhabitants of the Amphilochian Argos on the Gulf of Ambrakia revered the same Amphilochus as their founder.[765] The Orchomenians under Ialmenus, on quitting the conquered city, wandered or were driven to the eastern extremity of the Euxine Sea; and the barbarous Achæans under Mount Caucasus were supposed to have derived their first establishment from this source.[766] Merionês with his Krêtan followers settled at Engyion in Sicily, along with the preceding Krêtans who had remained there after the invasion of Minôs. The Elyminians in Sicily also were composed of Trojans and Greeks separately driven to the spot, who, forgetting their previous differences, united in the joint settlements of Eryx and Egesta.[767] We hear of Podaleirius both in Italy and on the coast of Karia;[768] of Akamas son of Thêseus, at Amphipolis in Thrace, at Soli in Cyprus, and at Synnada in Phrygia;[769] of Guneus, Prothous and Eurypylus, in Krête as well as in Libya.[770] The obscure poem of Lycophrôn enumerates many of these dispersed and expatriated heroes, whose conquest of Troy was indeed a Kadmeian victory (according to the proverbial phrase of the Greeks), wherein the sufferings of the victor were little inferior to those of the vanquished.[771] It was particularly among the Italian Greeks, where they were worshipped with very special solemnity, that their presence as wanderers from Troy was reported and believed.[772]

I pass over the numerous other tales which circulated among the ancients, illustrating the ubiquity of the Grecian and Trojan heroes as well as that of the Argonauts,—one of the most striking features in the Hellenic legendary world.[773] Amongst them all, the most interesting, individually, is Odysseus, whose romantic adventures in fabulous places and among fabulous persons have been made familiarly known by Homer. The goddesses Kalypso and Circê; the semi-divine mariners of Phæacia, whose ships are endowed with consciousness and obey without a steers-

man; the one-eyed Cyclôpes, the gigantic Læstrygones, and the wind-ruler Æolus; the Sirens who ensnare by their song, as the Lotophagi fascinate by their food—all these pictures formed integral and interesting portions of the old epic. Homer leaves Odysseus reëstablished in his house and family; but so marked a personage could never be permitted to remain in the tameness of domestic life: the epic poem called the Telegonia ascribed to him a subsequent series of adventures. After the suitors had been buried by their relatives, he offered sacrifice to the Nymphs, and then went to Elis to inspect his herds of cattle there pasturing: the Eleian Polyxenus welcomed him hospitably, and made him a present of a bowl: Odysseus then returned to Ithaka, and fulfilled the rites and sacrifices prescribed to him by Teiresias in his visit to the under-world. This obligation discharged, he went to the country of the Thesprotians, and there married the queen Kallidikê: he headed the Thesprotians in a war against the Brygians, the latter being conducted by Arês himself, who fiercely assailed Odysseus; but the goddess Athênê stood by him, and he was enabled to make head against Arês until Apollo came and parted them. Odysseus then returned to Ithaka, leaving the Thesprotian kingdom to Polypœtês, his son by Kallidikê. Telegonus, his son by Circê, coming to Ithaka in search of his father, ravaged the island and killed Odysseus without knowing who he was. Bitter repentance overtook the son for his undesigned parricide: at his prayer and by the intervention of his mother Circê, both Penelopê and Têlemachus were made immortal: Telegonus married Penelopê, and Têlemachus married Circê.[774]

We see by this poem that Odysseus was represented as the mythical ancestor of the Thesprotian kings, just as Neoptolemus was of the Molossian.

It has already been mentioned that Antenôr and Æneas stand distinguished from the other Trojans by a dissatisfaction with Priam and a sympathy with the Greeks, which is by Sophoklês and others construed as treacherous collusion,[775]—a suspicion indirectly glanced, though emphatically repelled, by the Æneas of Virgil.[776] In the old epic of Arktinus, next in age to the Iliad and Odyssey, Æneas abandons Troy and retires to Mount Ida, in terror at the miraculous death of Laocoôn, before the entry of the Greeks into the town and the last night-battle: yet Leschês, in another of the ancient epic poems, represented him as having been carried away captive by Neoptolemus.[777] In a remarkable passage of the Iliad, Poseidôn describes the family of Priam as having incurred the hatred of Zeus, and predicts that Æneas and his descendants shall reign over the Trojans: the race of Dardanus, beloved by Zeus more than all his other sons, would thus be preserved, since Æneas belonged to it. Accordingly, when Æneas is in imminent peril from the hands of Achilles, Poseidôn specially interferes to rescue him, and even the implacable miso-Trojan goddess Hêrê assents to the proceeding.[778] These passages have been construed by various able critics to refer to a family of philo-Hellenic or semi-Hellenic Æneadæ, known even in the time of the early singers of the Iliad as masters of some territory in or near the Troad, and professing to be descended from, as well as worshipping, Æneas. In the

town of Skêpsis, situated in the mountainous range of Ida, about thirty miles eastward of Ilium, there existed two noble and priestly families who professed to be descended, the one from Hectôr, the other from Æneas. The Skêpsian critic Dêmêtrius (in whose time both these families were still to be found) informs us that Skamandrius son of Hectôr, and Ascanius son of Æneas, were the archegets or heroic founders of his native city, which had been originally situated on one of the highest ranges of Ida, and was subsequently transferred by them to the less lofty spot on which it stood in his time.[779] In Arisbê and Gentinus there seem to have been families professing the same descent, since the same archegets were acknowledged.[780] In Ophrynium, Hectôr had his consecrated edifice, and in Ilium both he and Æneas were worshipped as gods:[781] and it was the remarkable statement of the Lesbian Menekratês, that Æneas, "having been wronged by Paris and stripped of the sacred privileges which belonged to him, avenged himself by betraying the city, and then became one of the Greeks."[782]

One tale thus among many respecting Æneas, and that too the most ancient of all, preserved among the natives of the Troad, who worshipped him as their heroic ancestor, was, that after the capture of Troy he continued in the country as king of the remaining Trojans, on friendly terms with the Greeks. But there were other tales respecting him, alike numerous and irreconcilable: the hand of destiny marked him as a wanderer (*fato profugus*), and his ubiquity is not exceeded even by that of Odysseus. We hear of him at Ænus in Thrace, in Pallênê, at Æneia in the Thermaic Gulf, in Delus, at Orchomenos and Mantineia in Arcadia, in the islands of Kythêra and Zakynthus, in Leukas and Ambrakia, at Buthrotum in Epirus, on the Salentine peninsula and various other places in the southern region of Italy; at Drepana and Segesta in Sicily, at Carthage, at Cape Palinurus, Cumæ, Misenum, Caieta, and finally in Latium, where he lays the first humble foundation of the mighty Rome and her empire.[783] And the reason why his wanderings were not continued still further was, that the oracles and the pronounced will of the gods directed him to settle in Latium.[784] In each of these numerous places his visit was commemorated and certified by local monuments or special legends, particularly by temples and permanent ceremonies in honor of his mother Aphroditê, whose worship accompanied him everywhere: there were also many temples and many different tombs of Æneas himself.[785] The vast ascendency acquired by Rome, the ardor with which all the literary Romans espoused the idea of a Trojan origin, and the fact that the Julian family recognized Æneas as their gentile primary ancestor,—all contributed to give to the Roman version of his legend the preponderance over every other. The various other places in which monuments of Æneas were found came thus to be represented as places where he had halted for a time on his way from Troy to Latium. But though the legendary pretensions of these places were thus eclipsed in the eyes of those who constituted the literary public, the local belief was not extinguished: they claimed the hero as their permanent property, and his tomb was to them a proof that he had lived and died among them.

Antenôr, who shares with Æneas the favorable sympathy of the Greeks, is said by Pindar to have gone from Troy along with Menelaus and Helen into the region of Kyrênê in Libya.[786] But according to the more current narrative, he placed himself at the head of a body of Eneti or Veneti from Paphlagonia, who had come as allies of Troy, and went by sea into the inner part of the Adriatic Gulf, where he conquered the neighboring barbarians and founded the town of Patavium (the modern Padua); the Veneti in this region were said to owe their origin to his immigration.[787] We learn further from Strabo, that Opsikellas, one of the companions of Antenôr, had continued his wanderings even into Ibêria, and that he had there established a settlement bearing his name.[788]

Thus endeth the Trojan war; together with its sequel, the dispersion of the heroes, victors as well as vanquished. The account here given of it has been unavoidably brief and imperfect; for in a work intended to follow consecutively the real history of the Greeks, no greater space can be allotted even to the most splendid gem of their legendary period. Indeed, although it would be easy to fill a large volume with the separate incidents which have been introduced into the "Trojan cycle," the misfortune is that they are for the most part so contradictory as to exclude all possibility of weaving them into one connected narrative. We are compelled to select one out of the number, generally without any solid ground of preference, and then to note the variations of the rest. No one who has not studied the original documents can imagine the extent to which this discrepancy proceeds; it covers almost every portion and fragment of the tale.[789]

But though much may have been thus omitted of what the reader might expect to find in an account of the Trojan war, its genuine character has been studiously preserved, without either exaggeration or abatement. The real Trojan war is that which was recounted by Homer and the old epic poets, and continued by all the lyric and tragic composers. For the latter, though they took great liberties with the particular incidents, and introduced to some extent a new moral tone, yet worked more or less faithfully on the Homeric scale: and even Euripidês, who departed the most widely from the feeling of the old legend, never lowered down his matter to the analogy of contemporary life. They preserved its well-defined object, at once righteous and romantic, the recovery of the daughter of Zeus and sister of the Dioskuri—its mixed agencies, divine, heroic and human—the colossal force and deeds of its chief actors—its vast magnitude and long duration, as well as the toils which the conquerors underwent, and the Nemesis which followed upon their success. And these were the circumstances which, set forth in the full blaze of epic and tragic poetry, bestowed upon the legend its powerful and imperishable influence over the Hellenic mind. The enterprise was one comprehending all the members of the Hellenic body, of which each individually might be proud, and in which, nevertheless, those feelings of jealous and narrow patriotism, so lamentably prevalent in many of the towns, were as much as possible excluded. It supplied them with a grand and inexhaustible

object of common sympathy, common faith, and common admiration; and when occasions arose for bringing together a Pan-Hellenic force against the barbarians, the precedent of the Homeric expedition was one upon which the elevated minds of Greece could dwell with the certainty of rousing an unanimous impulse, if not always of counterworking sinister by-motives, among their audience. And the incidents comprised in the Trojan cycle were familiarized, not only to the public mind but also to the public eye, by innumerable representations both of the sculptor and the painter, —those which were romantic and chivalrous being better adapted for this purpose, and therefore more constantly employed, than any other.

Of such events the genuine Trojan war of the old epic was for the most part composed. Though literally believed, reverentially cherished, and numbered among the gigantic phænomena of the past, by the Grecian public, it is in the eyes of modern inquiry essentially a legend and nothing more. If we are asked whether it be not a legend embodying portions of historical matter, and raised upon a basis of truth,—whether there may not really have occurred at the foot of the hill of Ilium a war purely human and political, without gods, without heroes, without Helen, without Amazons, without Ethiopians under the beautiful son of Eôs, without the wooden horse, without the characteristic and expressive features of the old epical war,—like the mutilated trunk of Deïphobus in the under-world; if we are asked whether there was not really some such historical Trojan war as this, our answer must be, that as the possibility of it cannot be denied, so neither can the reality of it be affirmed. We possess nothing but the ancient epic itself without any independent evidence: had it been an age of records indeed, the Homeric epic in its exquisite and unsuspecting simplicity would probably never have come into existence. Whoever therefore ventures to dissect Homer, Arktinus and Leschês, and to pick out certain portions as matters of fact, while he sets aside the rest as fiction, must do so in full reliance on his own powers of historical divination, without any means either of proving or verifying his conclusions. Among many attempts, ancient as well as modern, to identify real objects in this historical darkness, that of Dio Chrysostom deserves attention for its extraordinary boldness. In his oration addressed to the inhabitants of Ilium, and intended to demonstrate that the Trojans were not only blameless as to the origin of the war, but victorious in its issue—he overthrows all the leading points of the Homeric narrative, and re-writes nearly the whole from beginning to end: Paris is the lawful husband of Helen, Achilles is slain by Hectôr, and the Greeks retire without taking Troy, disgraced as well as baffled. Having shown without difficulty that the Iliad, if it be looked at as a history, is full of gaps, incongruities and absurdities, he proceeds to compose a more plausible narrative of his own, which he tenders as so much authentic matter of fact. The most important point, however, which his Oration brings to view is, the literal and confiding belief with which the Homeric narrative was regarded, as if it were actual history, not only by the inhabitants of Ilium, but also by the general Grecian public.[790]

The small town of Ilium, inhabited by Æolic Greeks,[791] and raised into importance only by the legendary reverence attached to it, stood upon an elevated ridge forming a spur from Mount Ida, rather more than three miles from the town and promontory of Sigeium, and about twelve stadia, or less than two miles, from the sea at its nearest point. From Sigeium and the neighboring town of Achilleium (with its monument and temple of Achilles), to the town of Rhœteium on a hill higher up the Hellespont (with its monument and chapel of Ajax called the Aianteium[792]), was a distance of sixty stadia, or seven miles and a half in the straight course by sea: in the intermediate space was a bay and an adjoining plain, comprehending the embouchure of the Scamander, and extending to the base of the ridge on which Ilium stood. This plain was the celebrated plain of Troy, in which the great Homeric battles were believed to have taken place: the portion of the bay near to Sigeium went by the name of the Naustathmon of the Achæans (*i. e.* the spot where they dragged their ships ashore), and was accounted to have been the camp of Agamemnôn and his vast army.[793]

Historical Ilium was founded, according to the questionable statement of Strabo, during the last dynasty of the Lydian kings,[794] that is, at some period later than 720 B. C. Until after the days of Alexander the Great—indeed until the period of Roman preponderance—it always remained a place of inconsiderable power and importance, as we learn not only from the assertion of the geographer, but also from the fact that Achilleium, Sigeium and Rhœteium were all independent of it.[795] But inconsiderable as it might be, it was the only place which ever bore the venerable name immortalized by Homer. Like the Homeric Ilium, it had its temple of Athênê,[796] wherein she was worshipped as the presiding goddess of the town: the inhabitants affirmed that Agamemnôn had not altogether destroyed the town, but that it had been reoccupied after his departure, and had never ceased to exist.[797] Their acropolis was called Pergamum, and in it was shown the house of Priam and the altar of Zeus Herkeius where that unhappy old man had been slain: moreover there were exhibited, in the temples, panoplies which had been worn by the Homeric heroes,[798] and doubtless many other relics appreciated by admirers of the Iliad.

These were testimonies which few persons in those ages were inclined to question, when combined with the identity of name and general locality; nor does it seem that any one did question them until the time of Dêmêtrius of Skêpsis. Hellanikus expressly described this Ilium as being the Ilium of Homer, for which assertion Strabo (or probably Dêmêtrius, from whom the narrative seems to be copied) imputes to him very gratuitously an undue partiality towards the inhabitants of the town.[799] Herodotus relates, that Xerxês in his march into Greece visited the place, went up to the Pergamum of Priam, inquired with much interest into the details of the Homeric siege, made libations to the fallen heroes, and offered to the Athênê of Ilium his magnificent sacrifice of a thousand oxen: he probably represented and believed himself to be attacking Greece as the avenger of the Priamid family. The Lacedæmonian

admiral Mindarus, while his fleet lay at Abydus, went personally to Ilium to offer sacrifice to Athênê, and saw from that elevated spot the battle fought between the squadron of Dorieus and the Athenians, on the shore near Rhœteium.[800] During the interval between the Peloponnesian war and the Macedonian invasion of Persia, Ilium was always garrisoned as a strong position; but its domain was still narrow, and did not extend even to the sea which was so near to it.[801] Alexander, on crossing the Hellespont, sent his army from Sestus to Abydus, under Parmenio, and sailed personally from Elæeus in the Chersonese, after having solemnly sacrificed at the Elæuntian shrine of Prôtesilaus, to the harbor of the Achæans between Sigeium and Rhœteium. He then ascended to Ilium, sacrificed to the Iliean Athênê, and consecrated in her temple his own panoply, in exchange for which he took some of the sacred arms there suspended, which were said to have been preserved from the time of the Trojan war. These arms were carried before him when he went to battle by his armor-bearers. It is a fact still more curious, and illustrative of the strong working of the old legend on an impressible and eminently religious mind, that he also sacrificed to Priam himself, on the very altar of Zeus Herkeius from which the old king was believed to have been torn by Neoptolemus. As that fierce warrior was his heroic ancestor by the maternal side, he desired to avert from himself the anger of Priam against the Achilleid race.[802]

Alexander made to the inhabitants of Ilium many munificent promises, which he probably would have executed, had he not been prevented by untimely death: for the Trojan war was amongst all the Grecian legends the most thoroughly Pan-Hellenic, and the young king of Macedôn, besides his own sincere legendary faith, was anxious to merge the local patriotism of the separate Greek towns in one general Hellenic sentiment under himself as chief. One of his successors, Antigonus,[803] founded the city of Alexandreia in the Trôad, between Sigeium and the more southerly promontory of Lektum; compressing into it the inhabitants of many of the neighboring Æolic towns in the region of Ida,—Skêpsis, Kebrên, Hamaxitus, Kolônæ, and Neandria, though the inhabitants of Skêpsis were subsequently permitted by Lysimachus to resume their own city and autonomous government. Ilium however remained without any special mark of favor until the arrival of the Romans in Asia and their triumph over Antiochus (about 190 B. C.). Though it retained its walls and its defensible position, Dêmêtrius of Skêpsis, who visited it shortly before that event, described it as being then in a state of neglect and poverty, many of the houses not even having tiled roofs.[804] In this dilapidated condition, however, it was still mythically recognized both by Antiochus and by the Roman consul Livius, who went up thither to sacrifice to the Iliean Athênê. The Romans, proud of their origin from Troy and Æneas, treated Ilium with signal munificence; not only granting to it immunity from tribute, but also adding to its domain the neighboring territories of Gergis, Rhœteium and Sigeium—and making the Ilieans masters of the whole coast[805] from the Peræa (or continental possessions) of Tenedos (southward of Sigeium) to the boundaries of Dardanus, which had its own title to legendary reverence as the spe-

cial sovereignty of Æneas. The inhabitants of Sigeium could not peaceably acquiesce in this loss of their autonomy, and their city was destroyed by the Ilieans.

The dignity and power of Ilium being thus prodigiously enhanced, we cannot doubt that the inhabitants assumed to themselves exaggerated importance as the recognized parents of all-conquering Rome. Partly, we may naturally suppose, from the jealousies thus aroused on the part of their neighbors at Skêpsis and Alexandreia Trôas—partly from the pronounced tendency of the age (in which Kratês at Pergamus and Aristarchus at Alexandria divided between them the palm of literary celebrity) towards criticism and illustration of the old poets—a blow was now aimed at the mythical legitimacy of Ilium. Dêmêtrius of Skêpsis, one of the most laborious of the Homeric critics, had composed thirty books of comment upon the Catalogue in the Iliad: Hestiæa, an authoress of Alexandreia Trôas, had written on the same subject: both of them, well-acquainted with the locality, remarked that the vast battles described in the Iliad could not be packed into the narrow space between Ilium and the Naustathmon of the Greeks; the more so, as that space, too small even as it then stood, had been considerably enlarged since the date of the Iliad by deposits at the mouth of the Skamander.[806] They found no difficulty in pointing out topographical incongruities and impossibilities as to the incidents in the Iliad, which they professed to remove by the startling theory that the Homeric Ilium had not occupied the site of the city so called. There was a village, called the village of the Ilieans, situated rather less than four miles from the city in the direction of Mount Ida, and further removed from the sea; here, they affirmed the "holy Troy" had stood.

No positive proof was produced to sustain the conclusion, for Strabo expressly states that not a vestige of the ancient city remained at the Village of the Ilieans:[807] but the fundamental supposition was backed by a second accessory supposition, to explain how it happened that all such vestiges had disappeared. Nevertheless Strabo adopts the unsupported hypothesis of Dêmêtrius as if it were an authenticated fact—distinguishing pointedly between Old and New Ilium, and even censuring Hellanikus for having maintained the received local faith. But I cannot find that Dêmêtrius and Hestiæa have been followed in this respect by any other writer of ancient times excepting Strabo. Ilium still continued to be talked of and treated by every one as the genuine Homeric Troy: the cruel jests of the Roman rebel Fimbria, when he sacked the town and massacred the inhabitants—the compensation made by Sylla, and the pronounced favor of Julius Cæsar and Augustus,—all prove this continued recognition of identity.[808] Arrian, though a native of Nicomedia, holding a high appointment in Asia Minor, and remarkable for the exactness of his topographical notices, describes the visit of Alexander to Ilium, without any suspicion that the place with all its relics was a mere counterfeit: Aristidês, Dio Chrysostom, Pausanias, Appian, and Plutarch hold the same language.[809] But modern writers seem for the most part to have taken up the supposition from Strabo as implicitly as he took it from Dêmêtrius. They call Ilium by the disrespectful appellation of *New* Ilium—while the traveller in

the Trôad looks for *Old* Ilium as if it were the unquestionable spot where Priam had lived and moved; the name is even formally enrolled on the best maps recently prepared of the ancient Trôad.[810]

Strabo has here converted into geographical matter of fact an hypothesis purely gratuitous, with a view of saving the accuracy of the Homeric topography; though in all probability the locality of the pretended Old Ilium would have been found open to difficulties not less serious than those which it was introduced to obviate.[811] It may be true that Dêmêtrius and he were justified in their negative argument, so as to show that the battles described in the Iliad could not possibly have taken place if the city of Priam had stood on the hill inhabited by the Ilieans. But the legendary faith subsisted before, and continued without abatement afterwards, notwithstanding such topographical impossibilities. Hellanikus, Herodotus, Mindarus, the guides of Xerxês, and Alexander, had not been shocked by them: the case of the latter is the strongest of all, because he had received the best education of his time under Aristotle—he was a passionate admirer and constant reader of the Iliad—he was moreover personally familiar with the movements of armies, and lived at a time when maps, which began with Anaximander, the disciple of Thalês, were at least known to all who sought instruction. Now if, notwithstanding such advantages, Alexander fully believed in the identity of Ilium, unconscious of these many and glaring topographical difficulties, much less would Homer himself, or the Homeric auditors, be likely to pay attention to them, at a period, five centuries earlier, of comparative rudeness and ignorance, when prose records as well as geographical maps were totally unknown.[812] The inspired poet might describe, and his hearers would listen with delight to the tale, how Hectôr, pursued by Achilles, ran thrice round the city of Troy, while the trembling Trojans were all huddled into the city, not one daring to come out even at this last extremity of their beloved prince—and while the Grecian army looked on, restraining unwillingly their uplifted spears at the nod of Achilles, in order that Hectôr might perish by no other hand than his; nor were they, while absorbed by this impressive recital, disposed to measure distances or calculate topographical possibilities with reference to the site of the real Ilium.[813] The mistake consists in applying to Homer and to the Homeric siege of Troy, criticisms which would be perfectly just if brought to bear on the Athenian siege of Syracuse, as described by Thucydidês;[814] in the Peloponnesian war[815]—but which are not more applicable to the epic narrative than they would be to the exploits of Amadis or Orlando.

There is every reason for presuming that the Ilium visited by Xerxês and Alexander was really the "holy Ilium" present to the mind of Homer; and if so, it must have been inhabited, either by Greeks or by some anterior population, at a period earlier than that which Strabo assigns. History recognizes neither Troy the city, nor Trojans, as actually existing; but the extensive region called Trôas, or the Trôad (more properly Trôïas), is known both to Herodotus and to Thucydidês: it seems to include the territory westward of an imaginary line drawn from the north-east corner of the

Adramyttian gulf to the Propontis at Parium, since both Antandrus, Kolônæ, and the district immediately round Ilium, are regarded as belonging to the Trôad.[816] Herodotus further notices the Teukrians of Gergis[817] (a township conterminous with Ilium, and lying to the eastward of the road from Ilium to Abydus), considering them as the remnant of a larger Teukrian population which once resided in the country, and which had in very early times undertaken a vast migration from Asia into Europe.[818] To that Teukrian population he thinks that the Homeric Trojans belonged:[819] and by later writers, especially by Virgil and the other Romans, the names Teukrians and Trojans are employed as equivalents. As the name Trojans is not mentioned in any contemporary historical monument, so the name *Teukrians* never once occurs in the old epic. It appears to have been first noticed by the elegiac poet Kallinus, about 660 B. C., who connected it by an alleged immigration of Teukrians from Krête into the region round about Ida. Others again denied this, asserting that the primitive ancestor, Teukrus, had come into the country from Attica,[820] or that he was of indigenous origin, born from Skamander and the nymph Idæa—all various manifestations of that eager thirst after an eponymous hero which never deserted the Greeks. Gergithians occur in more than one spot in Æolis, even so far southward as the neighborhood of Kymê:[821] the name has no place in Homer, but he mentions Gorgythion and Kebriones as illegitimate sons of Priam, thus giving a sort of epical recognition both to Gergis and Kebrên. As Herodotus calls the old epical Trojans by the name Teukrians, so the Attic Tragedians call them Phrygians; though the Homeric hymn to Aphroditê represents Phrygians and Trojans as completely distinct, specially noting the diversity of language;[822] and in the Iliad the Phrygians are simply numbered among the allies of Troy from the far Ascania, without indication of any more intimate relationship.[823] Nor do the tales which connect Dardanus with Samothrace and Arcadia find countenance in the Homeric poems, wherein Dardanus is the son of Zeus, having no root anywhere except in Dardania.[824] The mysterious solemnities of Samothrace, afterwards so highly venerated throughout the Grecian world, date from a period much later than Homer; and the religious affinities of that island as well as of Krête with the territories of Phrygia and Æolis, were certain, according to the established tendency of the Grecian mind, to beget stories of a common genealogy.

To pass from this legendary world,—an aggregate of streams distinct and heterogeneous, which do not willingly come into confluence, and cannot be forced to intermix,—into the clearer vision afforded by Herodotus, we learn from him that in the year 500 B. C. the whole coast-region from Dardanus southward to the promontory of Lektum (including the town of Ilium), and from Lektum eastward to Adramyttium, had been Æolized, or was occupied by Æolic Greeks—likewise the inland towns of Skêpsis[825] and Krebên. So that if we draw a line northward from Adramyttium to Kyzikus on the Propontis, throughout the whole territory westward from that line, to the Hellespont and the Ægean Sea, all the considerable towns would be Hellenic, with the exception of Gergis and the Teukrian population around it,—all the towns

worthy of note were either Ionic or Æolic. A century earlier, the Teukrian population would have embraced a wider range—perhaps Skêpsis and Krebên, the latter of which places was colonized by Greeks from Kymê:[826] a century afterwards, during the satrapy of Pharnabazus, it appears that Gergis had become Hellenized as well as the rest. The four towns, Ilium, Gergis, Kebrên and Skêpsis, all in lofty and strong positions, were distinguished each by a solemn worship and temple of Athênê, and by the recognition of that goddess as their special patroness.[827]

The author of the Iliad conceived the whole of this region as occupied by people not Greek,—Trojans, Dardanians, Lykians, Lelegians, Pelasgians, and Kilikians. He recognizes a temple and worship of Athênê in Ilium, though the goddess is bitterly hostile to the Trojans: and Arktinus described the Palladium as the capital protection of the city. But perhaps the most remarkable feature of identity between the Homeric and the historical Æolis, is, the solemn and diffused worship of the Sminthian Apollo. Chrysê, Killa and Tenedos, and more than one place called Sminthium, maintain the surname and invoke the protection of that god during later times, just as they are emphatically described to do by Homer.[828]

When it is said that the Post-Homeric Greeks gradually Hellenized this entire region, we are not to understand that the whole previous population either retired or was destroyed. The Greeks settled in the leading and considerable towns, which enabled them both to protect one another and to gratify their predominant tastes. Partly by force—but greatly also by that superior activity, and power of assimilating foreign ways of thought to their own, which distinguished them from the beginning—they invested all the public features and management of the town with an Hellenic air, distributed all about it their gods, their heroes and their legends, and rendered their language the medium of public administration, religious songs and addresses to the gods, and generally for communications wherein any number of persons were concerned. But two remarks are here to be made: first, in doing this they could not avoid taking to themselves more or less of that which belonged to the parties with whom they fraternized, so that the result was not pure Hellenism; next, that even this was done only in the towns, without being fully extended to the territorial domain around, or to those smaller townships which stood to the town in a dependent relation. The Æolic and Ionic Greeks borrowed from the Asiatics whom they had Hellenized, musical instruments and new laws of rhythm and melody, which they knew how to turn to account: they further adopted more or less of those violent and maddening religious rites, manifested occasionally in self-inflicted suffering and mutilation, which were indigenous in Asia Minor in the worship of the Great Mother. The religion of the Greeks in the region of Ida as well as at Kyzikus was more orgiastic than the native worship of Greece Proper, just as that of Lampsacus, Priapus and Parium was more licentious. From the Teukrian region of Gergis, and from the Gergithes near Kymê, sprang the original Sibylline prophecies, and the legendary Sibyll who plays so important a part in the tale of Æneas: the mythe of the Sibyll, whose

prophecies are supposed to be heard in the hollow blast bursting out from obscure caverns and apertures in the rocks,[829] was indigenous among the Gergithian Teukrians, and passed from the Kymæans in Æolis, along with the other circumstances of the tale of Æneas, to their brethren the inhabitants of Cumæ in Italy. The date of the Gergithian Sibyll, or rather of the circulation of her supposed prophecies, is placed during the reign of Crœsus, a period when Gergis was thoroughly Teukrian. Her prophecies, though embodied in Greek verses, had their root in a Teukrian soil and feelings; and the promises of future empire which they so liberally make to the fugitive hero escaping from the flames of Troy into Italy, become interesting from the remarkable way in which they were realized by Rome.[830]

At what time Ilium and Dardanus became Æolized we have no information. We find the Mitylenæans in possession of Sigeium in the time of the poet Alkæus, about 600 B. C.; and the Athenians during the reign of Peisistratus, having wrested it from them and trying to maintain their possession, vindicate the proceeding by saying that they had as much right to it as the Mitylenæans, "for the latter had no more claim to it than any of the other Greeks who had aided Menelaus in avenging the abduction of Helen."[831] This is a very remarkable incident, as attesting the celebrity of the legend of Troy, and the value of a mythical title in international disputes—yet seemingly implying that the establishment of the Mitylenæans on that spot must have been sufficiently recent. The country near the junction of the Hellespont and the Propontis is represented as originally held[832] by Bebrykian Thracians, while Abydus was first occupied by Milesian colonists in the reign and by the permission of the Lydian king Gygês[833]—to whom the whole Trôad and the neighboring territory belonged, and upon whom therefore the Teukrians of Ida must have been dependent. This must have been about 700 B. C., a period considerably earlier than the Mitylenæan occupation of Sigeium. Lampsacus and Pæsus, on the neighboring shores of the Propontis, were also Milesian colonies, though we do not know their date: Parium was jointly settled from Miletus, Erythræ and Parus.

CHAPTER XVI.

GRECIAN MYTHES, AS UNDERSTOOD, FELT AND INTERPRETED BY THE GREEKS THEMSELVES.

The preceding sections have been intended to exhibit a sketch of that narrative matter, so abundant, so characteristic and so interesting, out of which early Grecian history and chronology have been extracted. Raised originally by hands unseen and from data unassignable, it existed first in the shape of floating talk among the people, from whence a large portion of it passed into the song of the poets, who multiplied, transformed and adorned it in a thousand various ways.

These mythes or current stories, the spontaneous and earliest growth of the Grecian mind, constituted at the same time the entire intellectual stock of the age to which they belonged. They are the common root of all those different ramifications into which the mental activity of the Greeks subsequently diverged; containing, as it were, the preface and germ of the positive history and philosophy, the dogmatic theology and the professed romance, which we shall hereafter trace each in its separate development. They furnished aliment to the curiosity, and solution to the vague doubts and aspirations of the age; they explained the origin of those customs and standing peculiarities with which men were familiar; they impressed moral lessons, awakened patriotic sympathies, and exhibited in detail the shadowy, but anxious presentiments of the vulgar as to the agency of the gods: moreover they satisfied that craving for adventure and appetite for the marvellous, which has in modern times become the province of fiction proper.

It is difficult, we may say impossible, for a man of mature age to carry back his mind to his conceptions such as they stood when he was a child, growing naturally out of his imagination and feelings, working upon a scanty stock of materials, and borrowing from authorities whom he blindly followed but imperfectly apprehended. A similar difficulty occurs when we attempt to place ourselves in the historical and quasi-philosophical point of view which the ancient mythes present to us. We can follow perfectly the imagination and feeling which dictated these tales, and we can admire and sympathize with them as animated, sublime, and affecting poetry; but we are too much accustomed to matter of fact and philosophy of a positive kind, to be able to conceive a time when these beautiful fancies were construed literally and accepted as serious reality.

Nevertheless it is obvious that Grecian mythes cannot be either understood or appreciated except with reference to the system of conceptions and belief of the ages in which they arose. We must suppose a public not reading and writing, but seeing, hearing and telling—destitute of all records, and careless as well as ignorant of posi-

tive history with its indispensable tests, yet at the same time curious and full of eagerness for new or impressive incidents—strangers even to the rudiments of positive philosophy and to the idea of invariable sequences of nature either in the physical or moral world, yet requiring some connecting theory to interpret and regularize the phænomena before them. Such a theory was supplied by the spontaneous inspirations of an early fancy, which supposed the habitual agency of beings intelligent and voluntary like themselves, but superior in extent of power, and different in peculiarity of attributes. In the geographical ideas of the Homeric period, the earth was flat and round, with the deep and gentle ocean-stream flowing around and returning into itself: chronology, or means of measuring past time, there existed none; but both unobserved regions might be described, the forgotten past unfolded, and the unknown future predicted—through particular men specially inspired by the gods, or endowed by them with that peculiar vision which detected and interpreted passing signs and omens.

If even the rudiments of scientific geography and physics, now so universally diffused and so invaluable as a security against error and delusion, were wanting in this early stage of society, their place was abundantly supplied by vivacity of imagination and by personifying sympathy. The unbounded tendency of the Homeric Greeks to multiply fictitious persons, and to construe the phænomena which interested them into manifestations of design, is above all things here to be noticed, because the form of personal narrative, universal in their mythes, is one of its many manifestations. Their polytheism (comprising some elements of an original fetichism, in which particular objects had themselves been supposed to be endued with life, volition, and design) recognized agencies of unseen beings identified and confounded with the different localities and departments of the physical world. Of such beings there were numerous varieties, and many gradations both in power and attributes; there were differences of age, sex and local residence, relations both conjugal and filial between them, and tendencies sympathetic as well as repugnant. The gods formed a sort of political community of their own, which had its hierarchy, its distribution of ranks and duties, its contentions for power and occasional revolutions, its public meetings in the agora of Olympus, and its multitudinous banquets or festivals.[834] The great Olympic gods were in fact only the most exalted amongst an aggregate of quasi-human or ultra-human personages,—dæmons, heroes, nymphs, eponymous (or name-giving) genii, identified with each river, mountain,[835] cape, town, village, or known circumscription of territory,—besides horses, bulls, and dogs, of immortal breed and peculiar attributes, and monsters of strange lineaments and combinations, "Gorgons and Harpies and Chimæras dire." As there were in every *gens* or family special gentile deities and foregone ancestors who watched over its members, forming in each the characteristic symbol and recognized guarantee of their union, so there seem to have been in each guild or trade peculiar beings whose vocation it was to coöperate or to impede in various stages of the business.[836]

The extensive and multiform personifications, here faintly sketched, pervaded in every direction the mental system of the Greeks, and were identified intimately both with their conception and with their description of phenomena, present as well as past. That which to us is interesting as the mere creation of an exuberant fancy, was to the Greek genuine and venerated reality. Both the earth and the solid heaven (Gæa and Uranos) were both conceived and spoken of by him as endowed with appetite, feeling, sex, and most of the various attributes of humanity. Instead of a sun such as we now see, subject to astronomical laws, and forming the centre of a system the changes of which we can ascertain and foreknow, he saw the great god Hêlios, mounting his chariot in the morning in the east, reaching at mid-day the height of the solid heaven, and arriving in the evening at the western horizon, with horses fatigued and desirous of repose. Hêlios, having favorite spots wherein his beautiful cattle grazed, took pleasure in contemplating them during the course of his journey, and was sorely displeased if any man slew or injured them: he had moreover sons and daughters on earth, and as his all-seeing eye penetrated everywhere, he was sometimes in a situation to reveal secrets even to the gods themselves—while on other occasions he was constrained to turn aside in order to avoid contemplating scenes of abomination.[837] To us these now appear puerile, though pleasing fancies, but to an Homeric Greek they seemed perfectly natural and plausible. In his view, the description of the sun, as given in a modern astronomical treatise, would have appeared not merely absurd, but repulsive and impious. Even in later times, when the positive spirit of inquiry had made considerable progress, Anaxagoras and other astronomers incurred the charge of blasphemy for dispersonifying Hêlios, and trying to assign invariable laws to the solar phænomena.[838] Personifying fiction was in this way blended by the Homeric Greeks with their conception of the physical phænomena before them, not simply in the way of poetical ornament, but as a genuine portion of their every-day belief.

It was in this early state of the Grecian mind, stimulating so forcibly the imagination and the feelings, and acting through them upon the belief, that the great body of the mythes grew up and obtained circulation. They were, from first to last, personal narratives and adventures; and the persons who predominated as subjects of them were the gods, the heroes, the nymphs, etc., whose names were known and reverenced, and in whom every one felt interested. To every god and every hero it was consistent with Grecian ideas to ascribe great diversity of human motive and attribute: each indeed has his own peculiar type of character, more or less strictly defined; but in all there was a wide foundation for animated narrative and for romantic incident. The gods and heroes of the land and the tribe belonged, in the conception of a Greek, alike to the present and to the past: he worshipped in their groves and at their festivals; he invoked their protection, and believed in their superintending guardianship, even in his own day: but their more special, intimate, and sympathizing agency was cast back into the unrecorded past.[839] To give suitable utterance to this general sentiment,—to furnish body and movement and detail to these divine

and heroic pre-existences, which were conceived only in shadowy outline,—to lighten up the dreams of what the past must have been,[840] in the minds of those who knew not what it really had been—such was the spontaneous aim and inspiration of productive genius in the community, and such were the purposes which the Grecian mythes preëminently accomplished.

The love of antiquities, which Tacitus notices as so prevalent among the Greeks of his day,[841] was one of the earliest, the most durable, and the most widely diffused of the national propensities. But the antiquities of every state were divine and heroic, reproducing the lineaments, but disregarding the measure and limits, of ordinary humanity. The gods formed the starting-point, beyond which no man thought of looking, though some gods were more ancient than others: their progeny, the heroes, many of them sprung from human mothers, constitute an intermediate link between god and man. The ancient epic usually recognizes the presence of a multitude of nameless men, but they are introduced chiefly for the purpose of filling the scene, and of executing the orders, celebrating the valor, and bringing out the personality, of a few divine or heroic characters.[842] It was the glory of bards and storytellers to be able to satisfy those religious and patriotic predispositions of the public, which caused the primary demand for their tales, and which were of a nature eminently inviting and expansive. For Grecian religion was many-sided and many colored; it comprised a great multiplicity of persons, together with much diversity in the types of character; it divinized every vein and attribute of humanity, the lofty as well as the mean—the tender as well as the warlike—the self-devoting and adventurous as well as the laughter-loving and sensual. We shall hereafter reach a time when philosophers protested against such identification of the gods with the more vulgar appetites and enjoyments, believing that nothing except the spiritual attributes of man could properly be transferred to superhuman beings, and drawing their predicates respecting the gods exclusively from what was awful, majestic and terror-striking in human affairs. Such restrictions on the religious fancy were continually on the increase, and the mystic and didactic stamp which marked the last century of paganism in the days of Julian and Libanius, contrasts forcibly with the concrete and vivacious forms, full of vigorous impulse and alive to all the capricious gusts of the human temperament, which people the Homeric Olympus.[843] At present, however, we have only to consider the early, or Homeric and Hesiodic paganism, and its operation in the genesis of the mythical narratives. We cannot doubt that it supplied the most powerful stimulus, and the only one which the times admitted, to the creative faculty of the people; as well from the sociability, the gradations, and the mutual action and reaction of its gods and heroes, as from the amplitude, the variety, and the purely human cast, of its fundamental types.

Though we may thus explain the mythopœic fertility of the Greeks, I am far from pretending that we can render any sufficient account of the supreme beauty of their chief epic and artistical productions. There is something in the first-rate productions

of individual genius which lies beyond the compass of philosophical theory: the special breath of the Muse (to speak the language of ancient Greece) must be present in order to give them being. Even among her votaries, many are called, but few are chosen; and the peculiarities of those few remain as yet her own secret.

We shall not however forget that Grecian language was also an indispensable requisite to the growth and beauty of Grecian mythes—its richness, its flexibility and capacity of new combinations, its vocalic abundance and metrical pronunciation: and many even among its proper names, by their analogy to words really significant, gave direct occasion to explanatory or illustrative stories. Etymological mythes are found in sensible proportion among the whole number.

To understand properly then the Grecian mythes, we must try to identify ourselves with the state of mind of the original mythopœic age; a process not very easy, since it requires us to adopt a string of poetical fancies not simply as realities, but as the governing realities of the mental system;[844] yet a process which would only reproduce something analogous to our own childhood. The age was one destitute both of recorded history and of positive science, but full of imagination and sentiment and religious impressibility; from these sources sprung that multitude of supposed persons around whom all combinations of sensible phænomena were grouped, and towards whom curiosity, sympathies, and reverence were earnestly directed. The adventures of such persons were the only aliment suited at once both to the appetites and to the comprehension of an early Greek; and the mythes which detailed them, while powerfully interesting his emotions, furnished to him at the same time a quasi-history and quasi-philosophy: they filled up the vacuum of the unrecorded past, and explained many of the puzzling incognita of the present.[845] Nor need we wonder that the same plausibility which captivated his imagination and his feelings was sufficient to engender spontaneous belief; or rather, that no question as to truth or falsehood of the narrative suggested itself to his mind. His faith is ready, literal and uninquiring, apart from all thought of discriminating fact from fiction, or of detecting hidden and symbolized meaning; it is enough that what he hears be intrinsically plausible and seductive, and that there be no special cause to provoke doubt. And if indeed there were, the poet overrules such doubts by the holy and all-sufficient authority of the Muse, whose omniscience is the warrant for his recital, as her inspiration is the cause of his success.

The state of mind, and the relation of speaker to hearers, thus depicted, stand clearly marked in the terms and tenor of the ancient epic, if we only put a plain meaning upon what we read. The poet—like the prophet, whom he so much resembles—sings under heavenly guidance, inspired by the goddess to whom he has prayed for her assisting impulse: she puts the word into his mouth and the incidents into his mind: he is a privileged man, chosen as her organ and speaking from her revelations.[846] As the Muse grants the gift of song to whom she will, so she sometimes in her anger snatches it away, and the most consummate human genius is

then left silent and helpless.[847] It is true that these expressions, of the Muse inspiring and the poet singing a tale of past times, have passed from the ancient epic to compositions produced under very different circumstances, and have now degenerated into unmeaning forms of speech; but they gained currency originally in their genuine and literal acceptation. If poets had from the beginning written or recited, the predicate of singing would never have been ascribed to them; nor would it have ever become customary to employ the name of the Muse as a die to be stamped on licensed fiction, unless the practice had begun when her agency was invoked and hailed in perfect good faith. Belief, the fruit of deliberate inquiry and a rational scrutiny of evidence, is in such an age unknown: the simple faith of the time slides in unconsciously, when the imagination and feeling are exalted; and inspired authority is at once understood, easily admitted, and implicitly confided in.

The word mythe (μῦθος, *fabula*, *story*), in its original meaning, signified simply a statement or current narrative, without any connotative implication either of truth or falsehood. Subsequently the meaning of the word (in Latin and English as well as in Greek) changed, and came to carry with it the idea of an old personal narrative, always uncertified, sometimes untrue or avowedly fictitious.[848] And this change was the result of a silent alteration in the mental state of the society,—of a transition on the part of the superior minds (and more or less on the part of all) to a stricter and more elevated canon of credibility, in consequence of familiarity with recorded history, and its essential tests, affirmative as well as negative. Among the original hearers of the mythes, all such tests were unknown; they had not yet learned the lesson of critical disbelief; the mythe passed unquestioned from the mere fact of its currency, and from its harmony with existing sentiments and preconceptions. The very circumstances which contributed to rob it of literal belief in after-time, strengthened its hold upon the mind of the Homeric man. He looked for wonders and unusual combinations in the past; he expected to hear of gods, heroes and men, moving and operating together upon earth; he pictured to himself the fore-time as a theatre in which the gods interfered directly, obviously and frequently, for the protection of their favorites and the punishment of their foes. The rational conception, then only dawning in his mind, of a systematic course of nature was absorbed by this fervent and lively faith. And if he could have been supplied with as perfect and philosophical a history of his own real past time, as we are now enabled to furnish with regard to the last century of England or France, faithfully recording all the successive events, and accounting for them by known positive laws, but introducing no special interventions of Zeus and Apollo—such a history would have appeared to him not merely unholy and unimpressive, but destitute of all plausibility or title to credence. It would have provoked in him the same feeling of incredulous aversion as a description of the sun (to repeat the previous illustration) in a modern book on scientific astronomy.

To us these mythes are interesting fictions; to the Homeric and Hesiodic audience they were "rerum divinarum et humanarum scientia,"—an aggregate of religious,

physical and historical revelations, rendered more captivating, but not less true and real, by the bright coloring and fantastic shapes in which they were presented. Throughout the whole of "mythe-bearing Hellas"[849] they formed the staple of the uninstructed Greek mind, upon which history and philosophy were by so slow degrees superinduced; and they continued to be the aliment of ordinary thought and conversation, even after history and philosophy had partially supplanted the mythical faith among the leading men, and disturbed it more or less in the ideas of all. The men, the women, and the children of the remote dêmes and villages of Greece, to whom Thucydidês, Hippocratês, Aristotle, or Hipparchus were unknown, still continued to dwell upon the local fables which formed their religious and patriotic antiquity. And Pausanias, even in his time, heard everywhere divine or heroic legends yet alive, precisely of the type of the old epic; he found the conceptions of religious and mythical faith, coëxistent with those of positive science, and contending against them at more or less of odds, according to the temper of the individual. Now it is the remarkable characteristic of the Homeric age, that no such coëxistence or contention had yet begun. The religious and mythical point of view covers, for the most part, all the phænomena of nature; while the conception of invariable sequence exists only in the background, itself personified under the name of the Mœræ, or Fates, and produced generally as an exception to the omnipotence of Zeus for all ordinary purposes. Voluntary agents, visible and invisible, impel and govern everything. Moreover this point of view is universal throughout the community,—adopted with equal fervor, and carried out with equal consistency, by the loftiest minds and by the lowest. The great man of that day is he who, penetrated like others with the general faith, and never once imagining any other system of nature than the agency of these voluntary Beings, can clothe them in suitable circumstances and details, and exhibit in living body and action those types which his hearers dimly prefigure. Such men were the authors of the Iliad and the Odyssey; embodying in themselves the whole measure of intellectual excellence which their age was capable of feeling: to us, the first of poets —but to their own public, religious teachers, historians, and philosophers besides— inasmuch as all that then represented history and philosophy was derived from those epical effusions and from others homogeneous with them. Herodotus recognizes Homer and Hesiod as the main authors of Grecian belief respecting the names and generations, the attributes and agency, the forms and the worship of the gods.[850]

History, philosophy, etc., properly so called and conforming to our ideas (of which the subsequent Greeks were the first creators), never belonged to more than a comparatively small number of thinking men, though their influence indirectly affected more or less the whole national mind. But when positive science and criticism, and the idea of an invariable sequence of events, came to supplant in the more vigorous intellects the old mythical creed of omnipresent personification, an inevitable scission was produced between the instructed few and the remaining community. The opposition between the scientific and the religious point of view was not slow in manifesting itself: in general language, indeed, both might seem to stand together, but in ev-

ery particular case the admission of one involved the rejection of the other. According to the theory which then became predominant, the course of nature was held to move invariably on, by powers and attributes of its own, unless the gods chose to interfere and reverse it; but they had the power of interfering as often and to as great an extent as they thought fit. Here the question was at once opened, respecting a great variety of particular phænomena, whether they were to be regarded as natural or miraculous. No constant or discernible test could be suggested to discriminate the two: every man was called upon to settle the doubt for himself, and each settled it according to the extent of his knowledge, the force of his logic, the state of his health, his hopes, his fears, and many other considerations affecting his separate conclusion. In a question thus perpetually arising, and full of practical consequences, instructed minds, like Periklês, Thucydidês, and Euripidês, tended more and more to the scientific point of view,[851] in cases where the general public were constantly gravitating towards the religious.

The age immediately prior to this unsettled condition of thought is the really mythopœic age; in which the creative faculties of the society know no other employment, and the mass of the society no other mental demand. The perfect expression of such a period, in its full peculiarity and grandeur, is to be found in the Iliad and Odyssey,—poems of which we cannot determine the exact date, but which seem both to have existed prior to the first Olympiad, 776 B. C., our earliest trustworthy mark of Grecian time. For some time after that event, the mythopœic tendencies continued in vigor (Arktinus, Leschês, Eumêlus, and seemingly most of the Hesiodic poems, fall within or shortly after the first century of recorded Olympiads); but from and after this first century, we may trace the operation of causes which gradually enfeebled and narrowed them, altering the point of view from which the mythes were looked at. What these causes were, it will be necessary briefly to intimate.

The foremost and most general of all is, the expansive force of Grecian intellect itself,—a quality in which this remarkable people stand distinguished from all their neighbors and contemporaries. Most, if not all nations have had mythes, but no nation except the Greeks have imparted to them immortal charm and universal interest; and the same mental capacities, which raised the great men of the poetic age to this exalted level, also pushed forward their successors to outgrow the early faith in which the mythes had been generated and accredited.

One great mark, as well as means, of such intellectual expansion, was the habit of attending to, recording, and combining, positive and present facts, both domestic and foreign. In the genuine Grecian epic, the theme was an unknown and aoristic past; but even as early as the Works and Days of Hesiod, the present begins to figure: the man who tills the earth appears in his own solitary nakedness, apart from gods and heroes—bound indeed by serious obligations to the gods, but contending against many difficulties which are not to be removed by simple reliance on their help. The poet denounces his age in the strongest terms as miserable, degraded and

profligate, and looks back with reverential envy to the extinct heroic races who fought at Troy and Thêbes. Yet bad as the present time is, the Muse condescends to look at it along with him, and to prescribe rules for human life—with the assurance that if a man be industrious, frugal, provident, just and friendly in his dealings, the gods will recompense him with affluence and security. Nor does the Muse disdain, while holding out such promise, to cast herself into the most homely details of present existence and to give advice thoroughly practical and calculating. Men whose minds were full of the heroes of Homer, called Hesiod in contempt the poet of the Helots; and the contrast between the two is certainly a remarkable proof of the tendency of Greek poetry towards the present and the positive.

Other manifestations of the same tendency become visible in the age of Archilochus (B. C. 680-660). In an age when metrical composition and the living voice are the only means whereby the productive minds of a community make themselves felt, the invention of a new metre, new forms of song and recitation, or diversified accompaniments, constitute an epoch. The iambic, elegiac, choric, and lyric poetry, from Archilochus downwards, all indicate purposes in the poet, and impressibilities of the hearers, very different from those of the ancient epic. In all of them the personal feeling of the poet and the specialties of present time and place, are brought prominently forward, while in the Homeric hexameter the poet is a mere nameless organ of the historical Muse—the hearers are content to learn, believe, and feel, the incidents of a foregone world, and the tale is hardly less suitable to one time and place than to another. The iambic metre (we are told) was first suggested to Archilochus by the bitterness of his own private antipathies; and the mortal wounds inflicted by his lampoons, upon the individuals against whom they were directed, still remain attested, though the verses themselves have perished. It was the metre (according to the well-known judgment of Aristotle) most nearly approaching to common speech, and well suited both to the coarse vein of sentiment, and to the smart and emphatic diction of its inventor.[852] Simonidês of Amorgus, the younger contemporary of Archilochus, employed the same metre, with less bitterness, but with an anti-heroic tendency not less decided. His remaining fragments present a mixture of teaching and sarcasm, having a distinct bearing upon actual life,[853] and carrying out the spirit which partially appears in the Hesiodic Works and Days. Of Alkæus and Sapphô, though unfortunately we are compelled to speak of them upon hearsay only, we know enough to satisfy us that their own personal sentiments and sufferings, their relations private or public with the contemporary world, constituted the soul of those short effusions which gave them so much celebrity:[854] and in the few remains of the elegiac poets preserved to us—Kallinus, Mimnermus, Tyrtæus—the impulse of some present motive or circumstance is no less conspicuous. The same may also be said of Solôn, Theognis and Phokylidês, who preach, encourage, censure, or complain, but do not recount—and in whom a profound ethical sensibility, unknown to the Homeric poems, manifests itself: the form of poetry (to use the words of Solôn himself) is made the substitute for the public speaking of the agora.[855]

Doubtless all these poets made abundant use of the ancient mythes, but it was by turning them to present account, in the way of illustration, or flattery, or contrast, —a tendency which we may usually detect even in the compositions of Pindar, in spite of the lofty and heroic strain which they breathe throughout. That narrative or legendary poetry still continued to be composed during the seventh and sixth centuries before the Christian æra is not to be questioned; but it exhibited the old epical character without the old epical genius; both the inspiration of the composer and the sympathies of the audience had become more deeply enlisted in the world before them, and disposed to fasten on incidents of their own actual experience. From Solôn and Theognis we pass to the abandonment of all metrical restrictions and to the introduction of prose writing,—a fact, the importance of which it is needless to dwell upon,—marking as well the increased familiarity with written records, as the commencement of a separate branch of literature for the intellect, apart from the imagination and emotions wherein the old legends had their exclusive root.

Egypt was first unreservedly opened to the Greeks during the reign of Psammetichus, about B. C. 660; gradually it became much frequented by them for military or commercial purposes, or for simple curiosity, and enlarged the range of their thoughts and observations, while it also imparted to them that vein of mysticism, which overgrew the primitive simplicity of the Homeric religion, and of which I have spoken in a former chapter. They found in it a long-established civilization, colossal wonders of architecture, and a certain knowledge of astronomy and geometry, elementary indeed, but in advance of their own. Moreover it was a portion of their present world, and it contributed to form in them an interest for noting and describing the actual realities before them. A sensible progress is made in the Greek mind during the two centuries from B. C. 700 to B. C. 500, in the record and arrangement of historical facts: an *historical sense* arises in the superior intellects, and some idea of evidence as a discriminating test between fact and fiction. And this progressive tendency was further stimulated by increased communication and by more settled and peaceful social relations between the various members of the Hellenic world, to which may be added material improvements, purchased at the expense of a period of turbulence and revolution, in the internal administration of each separate state. The Olympic, Pythian, Nemean, and Isthmian games became frequented by visitors from the most distant parts of Greece: the great periodical festival in the island of Dêlos brought together the citizens of every Ionic community, with their wives and children, and an ample display of wealth and ornaments.[856] Numerous and flourishing colonies were founded in Sicily, the south of Italy, the coasts of Epirus and of the Euxine Sea: the Phokæans explored the whole of the Adriatic, established Massalia, and penetrated even as far as the south of Ibêria, with which they carried on a lucrative commerce.[857] The geographical ideas of the Greeks were thus both expanded and rectified: the first preparation of a map, by Anaximander the disciple of Thalês, is an epoch in the history of science. We may note the ridicule bestowed by Herodotus both upon the supposed people called Hyperboreans and upon the idea of

a circumfluous ocean-stream, as demonstrating the progress of the age in this department of inquiry.[858] And even earlier than Herodotus, Xanthus had noticed the occurrence of fossil marine productions in the interior of Asia Minor, which led him to reflections on the changes of the earth's surface with respect to land and water.[859]

If then we look down the three centuries and a half which elapsed between the commencement of the Olympic æra and the age of Herodotus and Thucydidês, we shall discern a striking advance in the Greeks,—ethical, social and intellectual. Positive history and chronology has not only been created, but in the case of Thucydidês, the qualities necessary to the historiographer, in their application to recent events, have been developed with a degree of perfection never since surpassed. Men's minds have assumed a gentler as well as a juster cast; and acts come to be criticized with reference to their bearing on the internal happiness of a well-regulated community, as well as upon the standing harmony of fraternal states. While Thucydidês treats the habitual and licensed piracy, so coolly alluded to in the Homeric poems, as an obsolete enormity, many of the acts described in the old heroic and Theogonic legends were found not less repugnant to this improved tone of feeling. The battles of the gods with the Giants and Titans,—the castration of Uranus by his son Kronus,—the cruelty, deceit and licentiousness, often supposed both in the gods and heroes, provoked strong disapprobation. And the language of the philosopher Xenophanês, who composed both elegiac and iambic poems for the express purpose of denouncing such tales, is as vehement and unsparing as that of the Christian writers, who, eight centuries afterwards, attacked the whole scheme of paganism.[860]

Nor was it alone as an ethical and social critic that Xenophanês stood distinguished. He was one of a great and eminent triad—Thalês and Pythagoras being the others—who, in the sixth century before the Christian æra, first opened up those veins of speculative philosophy which occupied afterwards so large a portion of Grecian intellectual energy. Of the material differences between the three I do not here speak; I regard them only in reference to the Homeric and Hesiodic philosophy which preceded them, and from which all three deviated by a step, perhaps the most remarkable in all the history of philosophy. In the scheme of ideas common to Homer and to the Hesiodic Theogony (as has been already stated), we find nature distributed into a variety of personal agencies, administered according to the free-will of different Beings more or less analogous to man—each of these Beings having his own character, attributes and powers, his own sources of pain and pleasure, and his own especial sympathies or antipathies with human individuals; each being determined to act or forbear, to grant favor or inflict injury in his own department of phænomena, according as men, or perhaps other Beings analogous to himself, might conciliate or offend him. The Gods, properly so called, (those who bore a proper name and received some public or family worship,) were the most commanding and capital members amidst this vast network of agents visible and invisible, spread over the universe.[861] The whole view of nature was purely religious and subjective, the

spontaneous suggestion of the early mind. It proceeded from the instinctive tendencies of the feelings and imagination to transport, to the world without, the familiar type of free-will and conscious personal action: above all, it took deep hold of the emotions, from the widely extended sympathy which it so perpetually called forth between man and nature.[862]

The first attempt to disenthral the philosophic intellect from this all-personifying religious faith, and to constitute a method of interpreting nature distinct from the spontaneous inspirations of untaught minds, is to be found in Thalês, Xenophanês and Pythagoras, in the sixth century before the Christian æra. It is in them that we first find the idea of Person tacitly set aside or limited, and an impersonal Nature conceived as the object of study. The divine husband and wife, Oceanus and Têthys, parents of many gods and of the Oceanic nymphs, together with the avenging goddess Styx, are translated into the material substance *water*, or, as we ought rather to say, the Fluid: and Thalês set himself to prove that water was the primitive element, out of which all the different natural substances had been formed.[863] He, as well as Xenophanês and Pythagoras, started the problem of physical philosophy, with its objective character and invariable laws, to be discoverable by a proper and methodical application of the human intellect. The Greek word Φὐσις, denoting *nature*, and its derivatives *physics* and *physiology*, unknown in that large sense to Homer or Hesiod, as well as the word *Kosmos*, to denote the mundane system, first appears with these philosophers.[864] The elemental analysis of Thalês—the one unchangeable cosmic substance, varying only in appearance, but not in reality, as suggested by Xenophanês,—and the geometrical and arithmetical combinations of Pythagoras,—all these were different ways of approaching the explanation of physical phænomena, and each gave rise to a distinct school or succession of philosophers. But they all agreed in departing from the primitive method, and in recognizing determinate properties, invariable sequences, and objective truth, in nature—either independent of willing or designing agents, or serving to these latter at once as an indispensable subject-matter and as a limiting condition. Xenophanês disclaimed openly all knowledge respecting the gods, and pronounced that no man could have any means of ascertaining when he was right and when he was wrong, in affirmations respecting them:[865] while Pythagoras represents in part the scientific tendencies of his age, in part also the spirit of mysticism and of special fraternities for religious and ascetic observance, which became diffused throughout Greece in the sixth century before the Christian æra. This was another point which placed him in antipathy with the simple, unconscious and demonstrative faith of the old poets, as well as with the current legends.

If these distinguished men, when they ceased to follow the primitive instinct of tracing the phænomena of nature to personal and designing agents, passed over, not at once to induction and observation, but to a misemployment of abstract words, substituting metaphysical *eideôla* in the place of polytheism, and to an exaggerated

application of certain narrow physical theories—we must remember that nothing else could be expected from the scanty stock of facts then accessible, and that the most profound study of the human mind points out such transition as an inevitable law of intellectual progress.[866] At present, we have to compare them only with that state of the Greek mind[867] which they partially superseded, and with which they were in decided opposition. The rudiments of physical science were conceived and developed among superior men; but the religious feeling of the mass was averse to them; and the aversion, though gradually mitigated, never wholly died away. Some of the philosophers were not backward in charging others with irreligion, while the multitude seems to have felt the same sentiment more or less towards all—or towards that postulate of constant sequences, with determinate conditions of occurrence, which scientific study implies, and which they could not reconcile with their belief in the agency of the gods, to whom they were constantly praying for special succor and blessings.

The discrepancy between the scientific and the religious point of view was dealt with differently by different philosophers. Thus Socratês openly admitted it, and assigned to each a distinct and independent province. He distributed phænomena into two classes: one, wherein the connection of antecedent and consequent was invariable and ascertainable by human study, and therefore future results accessible to a well-instructed foresight; the other, and those, too, the most comprehensive and important, which the gods had reserved for themselves and their own unconditional agency, wherein there was no invariable or ascertainable sequence, and where the result could only be foreknown by some omen, prophecy, or other special inspired communication from themselves. Each of these classes was essentially distinct, and required to be looked at and dealt with in a manner radically incompatible with the other. Socratês held it wrong to apply the scientific interpretation to the latter, or the theological interpretation to the former. Physics and astronomy, in his opinion, belonged to the divine class of phænomena, in which human research was insane, fruitless, and impious.[868]

On the other hand, Hippocratês, the contemporary of Socratês, denied the discrepancy, and merged into one those two classes of phænomena,—the divine and the scientifically determinable,—which the latter had put asunder. Hippocratês treated all phænomena as at once both divine and scientifically determinable. In discussing certain peculiar bodily disorders found among the Scythians, he observes, "The Scythians themselves ascribe the cause of this to God, and reverence and bow down to such sufferers, each man fearing that he may suffer the like; and I myself think too that these affections, as well as all others, are divine: no one among them is either more divine or more human than another, but all are on the same footing, and all divine; nevertheless each of them has its own physical conditions, and not one occurs without such physical conditions."[869]

A third distinguished philosopher of the same day, Anaxagoras, allegorizing Zeus and the other personal gods, proclaimed the doctrine of one common pervading Mind, as having first established order and system in the mundane aggregate, which had once been in a state of chaos—and as still manifesting its uninterrupted agency for wise and good purposes. This general doctrine obtained much admiration from Plato and Aristotle; but they at the same time remarked with surprise, that Anaxagoras never made any use at all of his own general doctrine for the explanation of the phænomena of nature,—that he looked for nothing but physical causes and connecting laws,[870]—so that in fact the spirit of his particular researches was not materially different from those of Demokritus or Leukippus, whatever might be the difference in their general theories. His investigations in meteorology and astronomy, treating the heavenly bodies as subjects for calculation, have been already noticed as offensive, not only to the general public of Greece, but even to Socratês himself among them: he was tried at Athens, and seems to have escaped condemnation only by voluntary exile.[871]

The three eminent men just named, all essentially different from each other, may be taken as illustrations of the philosophical mind of Greece during the last half of the fifth century B. C. Scientific pursuits had acquired a powerful hold, and adjusted themselves in various ways with the prevalent religious feelings of the age. Both Hippocratês and Anaxagoras modified their ideas of the divine agency so as to suit their thirst for scientific research. According to the former, the gods were the really efficient agents in the production of all phænomena,—the mean and indifferent not less than the terrific or tutelary. Being thus alike connected with all phænomena, they were specially associated with none—and the proper task of the inquirer was, to find out those rules and conditions by which (he assumed) their agency was always determined, and according to which it might be foretold. And this led naturally to the proceeding which Plato and Aristotle remark in Anaxagoras,—that the all-governing and Infinite Mind, having been announced in sublime language at the beginning of his treatise, was afterward left out of sight, and never applied to the explanation of particular phænomena, being as much consistent with one modification of nature as with another. Now such a view of the divine agency could never be reconciled with the religious feelings of the ordinary Grecian believer, even as they stood in the time of Anaxagoras; still less could it have been reconciled with those of the Homeric man, more than three centuries earlier. By him Zeus and Athênê were conceived as definite Persons, objects of special reverence, hopes, and fears, and animated with peculiar feelings, sometimes of favor, sometimes of wrath, towards himself or his family or country. They were propitiated by his prayers, and prevailed upon to lend him succor in danger—but offended and disposed to bring evil upon him if he omitted to render thanks or sacrifice. This sense of individual communion with, and dependence upon them was the essence of his faith; and with that faith, the all-pervading Mind proclaimed by Anaxagoras—which had no more concern with one man or one phænomenon than with another,—could never be brought into harmony. Nor

could the believer, while he prayed with sincerity for special blessings or protection from the gods, acquiesce in the doctrine of Hippocratês, that their agency was governed by constant laws and physical conditions.

That radical discord between the mental impulses of science and religion, which manifests itself so decisively during the most cultivated ages of Greece, and which harassed more or less so many of the philosophers, produced its most afflicting result in the condemnation of Socratês by the Athenians. According to the remarkable passage recently cited from Xenophôn, it will appear that Socratês agreed with his countrymen in denouncing physical speculations as impious,—that he recognized the religious process of discovery as a peculiar branch, coördinate with the scientific,—and that he laid down a theory, of which the basis was, the confessed divergence of these two processes from the beginning—thereby seemingly satisfying the exigencies of religious hopes and fears on the one hand, and those of reason, in her ardor for ascertaining the invariable laws of phænomena, on the other. We may remark that the theory of this religious and extra-scientific process of discovery was at that time sufficiently complete; for Socratês could point out, that those anomalous phænomena which the gods had reserved for themselves, and into which science was forbidden to pry, were yet accessible to the seekings of the pious man, through oracles, omens, and other exceptional means of communication which divine benevolence vouchsafed to keep open. Considering thus to how great an extent Socratês was identified in feeling with the religious public of Athens, and considering moreover that his performance of open religious duties was assiduous—we might wonder, as Xenophôn does wonder,[872] how it could have happened that the Athenian dikasts mistook him at the end of his life for an irreligious man. But we see, by the defence which Xenophôn as well as Plato gives for him, that the Athenian public really considered him, in spite of his own disclaimer, as homogeneous with Anaxagoras and the other physical inquirers, because he had applied similar scientific reasonings to moral and social phænomena. They looked upon him with the same displeasure as he himself felt towards the physical philosophers, and we cannot but admit that in this respect they were more unfortunately consistent than he was. It is true that the mode of defence adopted by Socratês contributed much to the verdict found against him, and that he was further weighed down by private offence given to powerful individuals and professions; but all these separate antipathies found their best account in swelling the cry against him as an over-curious sceptic, and an impious innovator.

Now the scission thus produced between the superior minds and the multitude, in consequence of the development of science and the scientific point of view, is a fact of great moment in the history of Greek progress, and forms an important contrast between the age of Homer and Hesiod and that of Thucydidês; though in point of fact even the multitude, during this later age, were partially modified by those very scientific views which they regarded with disfavor. And we must keep in view the primitive religious faith, once universal and unobstructed, but subsequently disturbed

by the intrusions of science; we must follow the great change, as well in respect to enlarged intelligence as to refinement of social and ethical feeling, among the Greeks, from the Hesiodic times downward, in order to render some account of the altered manner in which the ancient mythes came to be dealt with. These mythes, the spontaneous growth of a creative and personifying interpretation of nature, had struck root in Grecian associations at a time when the national faith required no support from what we call evidence. They were *now* submitted, not simply to a feeling, imagining, and believing public, but also to special classes of instructed men,—philosophers, historians, ethical teachers, and critics,—and to a public partially modified by their ideas[873] as well as improved by a wider practical experience. They were not intended for such an audience; they had ceased to be in complete harmony even with the lower strata of intellect and sentiment,—much more so with the higher. But they were the cherished inheritance of a past time; they were interwoven in a thousand ways with the religious faith, the patriotic retrospect, and the national worship, of every Grecian community; the general type of the mythe was the ancient, familiar, and universal form of Grecian thought, which even the most cultivated men had imbibed in their childhood from the poets,[874] and by which they were to a certain degree unconsciously enslaved. Taken as a whole the mythes had acquired prescriptive and ineffaceable possession: to attack, call in question, or repudiate them, was a task painful even to undertake, and far beyond the power of any one to accomplish.

For these reasons the anti-mythic vein of criticism was of no effect as a destroying force, but nevertheless its dissolving decomposing and transforming influence was very considerable. To accommodate the ancient mythes to an improved tone of sentiment and a newly created canon of credibility, was a function which even the wisest Greeks did not disdain, and which occupied no small proportion of the whole intellectual activity of the nation.

The mythes were looked at from a point of view completely foreign to the reverential curiosity and literal imaginative faith of the Homeric man; they were broken up and recast in order to force them into new moulds such as their authors had never conceived. We may distinguish four distinct classes of minds, in the literary age now under examination, as having taken them in hand—the poets, the logographers, the philosophers, and the historians.

With the poets and logographers, the mythical persons are real predecessors, and the mythical world an antecedent fact; but it is divine and heroic reality, not human; the present is only half-brother of the past (to borrow[875] an illustration from Pindar in his allusion to gods and men), remotely and generically, but not closely and specifically, analogous to it. As a general habit, the old feelings and the old unconscious faith, apart from all proof or evidence, still remain in their minds; but recent feelings have grown up which compel them to omit, to alter, sometimes even to reject and condemn, particular narratives.

Pindar repudiates some stories and transforms others, because they are inconsistent with his conceptions of the gods. Thus he formally protests against the tale that Pelops had been killed and served up at table by his father, for the immortal gods to eat; he shrinks from the idea of imputing to them so horrid an appetite; he pronounces the tale to have been originally fabricated by a slanderous neighbor. Nor can he bring himself to recount the quarrels between different gods.[876] The amours of Zeus and Apollo are no way displeasing to him; but he occasionally suppresses some of the simple details of the old mythe, as deficient in dignity: thus, according to the Hesiodic narrative, Apollo was informed by a raven of the infidelity of the nymph Korônis: but the mention of the raven did not appear to Pindar consistent with the majesty of the god, and he therefore wraps up the mode of detection in vague and mysterious language.[877] He feels considerable repugnance to the character of Odysseus, and intimates more than once that Homer has unduly exalted him, by force of poetical artifice. With the character of the Æakid Ajax, on the other hand, he has the deepest sympathy, as well as with his untimely and inglorious death, occasioned by the undeserved preference of a less worthy rival.[878] He appeals for his authority usually to the Muse, but sometimes to "ancient sayings of men," accompanied with a general allusion to story-tellers and bards,—admitting, however, that these stories present great discrepancy, and sometimes that they are false.[879] Yet the marvellous and the supernatural afford no ground whatever for rejecting a story: Pindar makes an express declaration to this effect in reference to the romantic adventures of Perseus and the Gorgon's head.[880] He treats even those mythical characters, which conflict the most palpably with positive experience, as connected by a real genealogical thread with the world before him. Not merely the heroes of Troy and Thêbes, and the demigod seamen of Jasôn and the ship Argô, but also the Centaur Cheirôn, the hundred-headed Typhôs, the giant Alkyoneus, Antæus, Bellerophôn and Pegasus, the Chimæra, the Amazons and the Hyperboreans—all appear painted on the same canvas, and touched with the same colors, as the men of the recent and recorded past, Phalaris and Krœsus; only they are thrown back to a greater distance in the perspective.[881] The heroic ancestors of those great Æginetan, Thessalian, Thêban, Argeian, etc. families, whose present members the poet celebrates for their agonistic victories, sympathize with the exploits and second the efforts of their descendants: the inestimable value of a privileged breed and of the stamp of nature is powerfully contrasted with the impotence of unassisted teaching and practice.[882] The power and skill of the Argeian Theæus and his relatives as wrestlers, are ascribed partly to the fact that their ancestors Pamphaês in aforetime had hospitably entertained the Tyndarids Kastôr and Pollux.[883] Perhaps however the strongest proof of the sincerity of Pindar's mythical faith is afforded when he notices a guilty incident with shame and repugnance, but with an unwilling confession of its truth, as in the case of the fratricide committed on Phôkus by his brothers Pêleus and Telamôn.[884]

Æschylus and Sophoklês exhibit the same spontaneous and uninquiring faith as Pindar in the legendary antiquities of Greece, taken as a whole; but they allow themselves greater license as to the details. It was indispensable to the success of their compositions that they should recast and group anew the legendary events, preserving the names and general understood relation of those characters whom they introduced. The demand for novelty of combination increased with the multiplication of tragic spectacles at Athens: moreover the feelings of the Athenians, ethical as well as political, had become too critical to tolerate the literal reproduction of many among the ancient stories.

Both of them exalted rather than lowered the dignity of the mythical world, as something divine and heroic rather than human. The Promêtheus of Æschylus is a far more exalted conception than his keen-witted namesake in Hesiod, and the more homely details of the ancient Thêbaïs and Œdipodia were in like manner modified by Sophoklês.[885] The religious agencies of the old epic are constantly kept prominent, and the paternal curse,—the wrath of deceased persons against those from whom they have sustained wrong,—the judgments of the Erinnys against guilty or foredoomed persons, sometimes inflicted directly, sometimes brought about through dementation of the sufferer himself (like the Homeric Atê),—are frequent in their tragedies.[886]

Æschylus in two of his remaining pieces brings forward the gods as the chief personages, and far from sharing the objection of Pindar to dwell upon dissensions of the gods, he introduces Promêtheus and Zeus in the one, Apollo and the Eumenidês in the other, in marked opposition. The dialogue, first superinduced by him upon the primitive Chorus, gradually became the most important portion of the drama, and is more elaborated in Sophoklês than in Æschylus. Even in Sophoklês, however, it still generally retains its ideal majesty as contrasted with the rhetorical and forensic tone which afterwards crept in; it grows out of the piece, and addresses itself to the emotions more than to the reason of the audience. Nevertheless, the effect of Athenian political discussion and democratical feeling is visible in both these dramatists. The idea of rights and legitimate privileges as opposed to usurping force, is applied by Æschylus even to the society of the gods: the Eumenidês accuse Apollo of having, with the insolence of youthful ambition, "ridden down" their old prerogatives[887]—while the Titan Promêtheus, the champion of suffering humanity against the unfriendly dispositions of Zeus, ventures to depict the latter as a recent usurper reigning only by his superior strength, exalted by one successful revolution, and destined at some future time to be overthrown by another,—a fate which cannot be averted except through warnings communicable only by Promêtheus himself.[888]

It is commonly understood that Æschylus disapproved of the march of democracy at Athens during his later years, and that the Eumenidês is intended as an indirect manifestation in favor of the senate of Areiopagus. Without inquiring at present whether such a special purpose can be distinctly made out, we may plainly see that

the poet introduces, into the relations of the gods with each other, a feeling of political justice, arising out of the times in which he lived and the debates of which he was a witness. But though Æschylus incurred reproaches of impiety from Plato, and seemingly also from the Athenian public, for particular speeches and incidents in his tragedies,[889] and though he does not adhere to the received vein of religious tradition with the same strictness as Sophoklês—yet the ascendency and interference of the gods is never out of sight, and the solemnity with which they are represented, set off by a bold, figurative, and elliptical style of expression (often but imperfectly intelligible to modern readers), reaches its maximum in his tragedies. As he throws round the gods a kind of airy grandeur, so neither do his men or heroes appear like tenants of the common earth: the mythical world from which he borrows his characters is peopled only with "the immediate seed of the gods, in close contact with Zeus, in whom the divine blood has not yet had time to degenerate:"[890] his individuals are taken, not from the iron race whom Hesiod acknowledges with shame as his contemporaries, but from the extinct heroic race which had fought at Troy and Thêbes. It is to them that his conceptions aspire, and he is even chargeable with frequent straining, beyond the limits of poetical taste, to realize his picture. If he does not consistently succeed in it, the reason is because consistency in such a matter is unattainable, since, after all, the analogies of common humanity, the only materials which the most creative imagination has to work upon, obtrude themselves involuntarily, and the lineaments of the man are thus seen even under a dress which promises superhuman proportions.

Sophoklês, the most illustrious ornament of Grecian tragedy, dwells upon the same heroic characters, and maintains their grandeur, on the whole, with little abatement, combining with it a far better dramatic structure, and a wider appeal to human sympathies. Even in Sophoklês, however, we find indications that an altered ethical feeling and a more predominant sense of artistic perfection are allowed to modify the harsher religious agencies of the old epic; occasional misplaced effusions[891] of rhetoric, as well as of didactic prolixity, may also be detected. It is Æschylus, not Sophoklês, who forms the marked antithesis to Euripidês; it is Æschylus, not Sophoklês, to whom Aristophanês awards the prize of tragedy, as the poet who assigns most perfectly to the heroes of the past those weighty words, imposing equipments, simplicity of great deeds with little talk, and masculine energy superior to the corruptions of Aphroditê, which beseem the comrades of Agamemnôn and Adrastus.[892]

How deeply this feeling, of the heroic character of the mythical world, possessed the Athenian mind, may be judged by the bitter criticisms made on Euripidês, whose compositions were pervaded, partly by ideas of physical philosophy learnt under Anaxagoras, partly by the altered tone of education and the wide diffusion of practical eloquence, forensic as well as political, at Athens.[893] While Aristophanês assails Euripidês as the representative of this "young Athens," with the utmost keenness of sarcasm,—other critics also concur in designating him as having vulgarized the myth-

ical heroes, and transformed them into mere characters of common life,—loquacious, subtle, and savoring of the market-place.[894] In some of his plays, sceptical expressions and sentiments were introduced, derived from his philosophical studies, sometimes confounding two or three distinct gods into one, sometimes translating the personal Zeus into a substantial Æthêr with determinate attributes. He put into the mouths of some of his unprincipled dramatic characters, apologetic speeches which were denounced as ostentatious sophistry, and as setting out a triumphant case for the criminal.[895] His thoughts, his words, and the rhythm of his choric songs, were all accused of being deficient in dignity and elevation. The mean attire and miserable attitude in which he exhibited Œneus, Têlephus, Thyestês, Inô, and other heroic characters, were unmercifully derided,[896] though it seems that their position and circumstances had always been painfully melancholy; but the effeminate pathos which Euripidês brought so nakedly into the foreground, was accounted unworthy of the majesty of a legendary hero. And he incurred still greater obloquy on another point, on which he is allowed even by his enemies to have only reproduced in substance the preëxisting tales,—the illicit and fatal passion depicted in several of his female characters, such as Phædra and Sthenobœa. His opponents admitted that these stories were true, but contended that they ought to be kept back and not produced upon the stage,—a proof both of the continued mythical faith and of the more sensitive ethical criticism of his age.[897] The marriage of the six daughters to the six sons of Æolus is of Homeric origin, and stands now, though briefly stated, in the Odyssey: but the incestuous passion of Macareus and Canacê, embodied by Euripidês[898] in the lost tragedy called *Æolus*, drew upon him severe censure. Moreover, he often disconnected the horrors of the old legends with those religious agencies by which they had been originally forced on, prefacing them by motives of a more refined character, which carried no sense of awful compulsion: thus the considerations by which the Euripidean Alkmæôn was reduced to the necessity of killing his mother appeared to Aristotle ridiculous.[899] After the time of this great poet, his successors seem to have followed him in breathing into their characters the spirit of common life, but the names and plot were still borrowed from the stricken mythical families of Tantalus, Kadmus, etc.: and the heroic exaltation of all the individual personages introduced, as contrasted with the purely human character of the Chorus, is still numbered by Aristotle among the essential points of the theory of tragedy.[900]

The tendency then of Athenian tragedy—powerfully manifested in Æschylus, and never wholly lost—was to uphold an unquestioning faith and a reverential estimate of the general mythical world and its personages, but to treat the particular narratives rather as matter for the emotions than as recitals of actual fact. The logographers worked along with them to the first of these two ends, but not to the second. Their grand object was, to cast the mythes into a continuous readable series, and they were in consequence compelled to make selection between inconsistent or contradictory narratives; to reject some narratives as false, and to receive others as true. But their preference was determined more by their sentiments as to what was appropri-

ate, than by any pretended historical test. Pherekydês, Akusilaus and Hellanikus[901] did not seek to banish miraculous or fantastic incidents from the mythical world; they regarded it as peopled with loftier beings, and expected to find in it phænomena not paralleled in their own degenerate days. They reproduced the fables as they found them in the poets, rejecting little except the discrepancies, and producing ultimately what they believed to be not only a continuous but an exact and trustworthy history of the past—wherein they carry indeed their precision to such a length, that Hellanikus gives the year, and even the day of the capture of Troy.[902]

Hekatæus of Milêtus (500 B. C.), anterior to Pherekydês and Hellanikus, is the earliest writer in whom we can detect any disposition to disallow the prerogative and specialty of the mythes, and to soften down their characteristic prodigies, some of which however still find favor in his eyes, as in the case of the speaking ram who carried Phryxus over the Hellespont. He pronounced the Grecian fables to be "many and ridiculous;" whether from their discrepancies or from their intrinsic improbabilities we do not know: and we owe to him the first attempt to force them within the limits of historical credibility; as where he transforms the three-headed Cerberus, the dog of Hadês, into a serpent inhabiting a cavern on Cape Tænarus—and Geryôn of Erytheia into a king of Epirus rich in herds of oxen.[903] Hekatæus traced the genealogy of himself and the gens to which he belonged through a line of fifteen progenitors up to an initial god,[904]—the clearest proof both of his profound faith in the reality of the mythical world, and of his religious attachment to it as the point of junction between the human and the divine personality.

We have next to consider the historians, especially Herodotus and Thucydidês. Like Hekatæus, Thucydidês belonged to a gens which traced its descent from Ajax, and through Ajax to Æakus and Zeus.[905] Herodotus modestly implies that he himself had no such privilege to boast of.[906] Their curiosity respecting the past had no other materials to work upon except the mythes; but these they found already cast by the logographers into a continuous series, and presented as an aggregate of antecedent history, chronologically deduced from the times of the gods. In common with the body of the Greeks, both Herodotus and Thucydidês had imbibed that complete and unsuspecting belief in the general reality of mythical antiquity, which was interwoven with the religion and the patriotism, and all the public demonstrations of the Hellenic world. To acquaint themselves with the genuine details of this foretime, was an inquiry highly interesting to them: but the increased positive tendencies of their age, as well as their own habits of personal investigation, had created in them an *historical sense* in regard to the past as well as to the present. Having acquired a habit of appreciating the intrinsic tests of historical credibility and probability, they found the particular narratives of the poets and logographers, inadmissible as a whole even in the eyes of Hekatæus, still more at variance with their stricter canons of criticism. And we thus observe in them the constant struggle, as well as the resulting compromise, between these two opposite tendencies; on one hand a firm be-

lief in the reality of the mythical world, on the other hand an inability to accept the details which their only witnesses, the poets and logographers, told them respecting it.

Each of them however performed the process in his own way. Herodotus is a man of deep and anxious religious feeling; he often recognizes the special judgments of the gods as determining historical events: his piety is also partly tinged with that mystical vein which the last two centuries had gradually infused into the religion of the Greeks—for he is apprehensive of giving offence to the gods by reciting publicly what he has heard respecting them; he frequently stops short in his narrative and intimates that there is a sacred legend, but that he will not tell it: in other cases, where he feels compelled to speak out, he entreats forgiveness for doing so from the gods and heroes. Sometimes he will not even mention the name of a god, though he generally thinks himself authorized to do so, the names being matter of public notoriety.[907] Such pious reserve, which the open-hearted Herodotus avowedly proclaims as chaining up his tongue, affords a striking contrast with the plain-spoken and unsuspecting tone of the ancient epic, as well as of the popular legends, wherein the gods and their proceedings were the familiar and interesting subjects of common talk as well as of common sympathy, without ceasing to inspire both fear and reverence.

Herodotus expressly distinguishes, in the comparison of Polykratês with Minôs, the human race to which the former belonged, from the divine or heroic race which comprised the latter.[908] But he has a firm belief in the authentic personality and parentage of all the names in the mythes, divine, heroic and human, as well as in the trustworthiness of their chronology computed by generations. He counts back 1600 years from his own day to that of Semelê, mother of Dionysus; 900 years to Hêraklês, and 800 years to Penelopê, the Trojan war being a little earlier in date.[909] Indeed even the longest of these periods must have seemed to him comparatively short, seeing that he apparently accepts the prodigious series of years which the Egyptians professed to draw from a recorded chronology—17,000 years from their god Hêraklês, and 15,000 years from their god Osiris or Dionysus, down to their king Amasis[910] (550 B. C.) So much was his imagination familiarized with these long chronological computations barren of events, that he treats Homer and Hesiod as "men of yesterday," though separated from his own age by an interval which he reckons as four hundred years.[911]

Herodotus had been profoundly impressed with what he saw and heard in Egypt. The wonderful monuments, the evident antiquity, and the peculiar civilization of that country, acquired such preponderance in his mind over his own native legends, that he is disposed to trace even the oldest religious names or institutions of Greece to Egyptian or Phœnician original, setting aside in favor of this hypothesis the Grecian legends of Dionysus and Pan.[912] The oldest Grecian mythical genealogies are thus made ultimately to lose themselves in Egyptian or Phœnician antiquity, and in the full extent of these genealogies Herodotus firmly believes. It does not seem that any

doubt had ever crossed his mind as to the real personality of those who were named or described in the popular mythes: all of them have once had reality, either as men, as heroes, or as gods. The eponyms of cities, dêmes and tribes, are all comprehended in this affirmative category; the supposition of fictitious personages being apparently never entertained. Deukaliôn, Hellên, Dôrus,[913]—Iôn, with his four sons, the eponyms of the old Athenian tribes,[914]—the autochthonous Titakus and Dekelus,[915]—Danaus, Lynkeus, Perseus, Amphitryôn, Alkmêna, and Hêraklês,[916]—Talthybius, the heroic progenitor of the privileged heraldic gens at Sparta,—the Tyndarids and Helena,[917]—Agamemnôn, Menelaus, and Orestes,[918]—Nestôr and his son Peisistratus,—Asôpus, Thêbê, and Ægina,—Inachus and Iô, Æêtês and Mêdea, [919]—Melanippus, Adrastus, and Amphiaräus, as well as Jasôn and the Argô,[920]—all these are occupants of the real past time, and predecessors of himself and his contemporaries. In the veins of the Lacedæmonian kings flowed the blood both of Kadmus and of Danaus, their splendid pedigree being traceable to both of these great mythical names: Herodotus carries the lineage up through Hêraklês first to Perseus and Danaê, then through Danaê to Akrisios and the Egyptian Danaus; but he drops the paternal lineage when he comes to Perseus (inasmuch as Perseus is the son of Zeus by Danaê, without any reputed human father, such as Amphitryôn was to Hêraklês), and then follow the higher members of the series through Danaê alone. [921] He also pursues the same regal genealogy, through the mother of Eurysthenês and Proclês, up to Polynikês, Œdipus, Laius, Labdakus, Polydôrus and Kadmus; and he assigns various ancient inscriptions which he saw in the temple of the Ismenian Apollo at Thêbes, to the ages of Laius and Œdipus.[922] Moreover, the sieges of Thêbes and Troy,—the Argonautic expedition,—the invasion of Attica by the Amazons,—the protection of the Herakleids, and the defeat and death of Eurystheus, by the Athenians,[923]—the death of Mêkisteus and Tydeus before Thêbes by the hands of Melanippus, and the touching calamities of Adrastus and Amphiaräus connected with the same enterprise,—the sailing of Kastôr and Pollux in the Argô,[924]—the abductions of Iô, Eurôpa, Mêdea and Helena,—the emigration of Kadmus in quest of Eurôpa, and his coming to Bœôtia, as well as the attack of the Greeks upon Troy to recover Helen,[925]—all these events seem to him portions of past history, not less unquestionably certain, though more clouded over by distance and misrepresentation, than the battles of Salamis and Mykalê.

But though Herodotus is thus easy of faith in regard both to the persons and to the general facts of Grecian mythes, yet when he comes to discuss particular facts taken separately, we find him applying to them stricter tests of historical credibility, and often disposed to reject as well the miraculous as the extravagant. Thus even with respect to Hêraklês, he censures the levity of the Greeks in ascribing to him absurd and incredible exploits; he tries their assertion by the philosophical standard of nature, or of determinate powers and conditions governing the course of events. "How is it consonant to nature (he asks), that Hêraklês, being, as he was, according to the statement of the Greeks, *a man*, should kill many thousand persons? I pray

that indulgence may be shown to me both by gods and heroes for saying so much as this." The religious feelings of Herodotus here told him that he was trenching upon the utmost limits of admissible scepticism.[926]

Another striking instance of the disposition of Herodotus to rationalize the miraculous narratives of the current mythes, is to be found in his account of the oracle of Dôdôna and its alleged Egyptian origin. Here, if in any case, a miracle was not only in full keeping, but apparently indispensable to satisfy the exigences of the religious sentiment; anything less than a miracle would have appeared tame and unimpressive to the visitors of so revered a spot, much more to the residents themselves. Accordingly, Herodotus heard, both from the three priestesses and from the Dodonæans generally, that two black doves had started at the same time from Thêbes in Egypt: one of them went to Libya, where it directed the Libyans to establish the oracle of Zeus Ammon; the other came to the grove of Dôdôna, and perched on one of the venerable oaks, proclaiming with a human voice that an oracle of Zeus must be founded on that very spot. The injunction of the speaking dove was respectfully obeyed.[927]

Such was the tale related and believed at Dôdôna. But Herodotus had also heard, from the priests at Thêbes in Egypt, a different tale, ascribing the origin of all the prophetic establishments, in Greece as well as in Libya, to two sacerdotal women, who had been carried away from Thêbes by some Phœnician merchants and sold, the one in Greece, the other in Libya. The Theban priests boldly assured Herodotus that much pains had been taken to discover what had become of these women so exported, and that the fact of their having been taken to Greece and Libya had been accordingly verified.[928]

The historian of Halicarnassus cannot for a moment think of admitting the miracle which harmonized so well with the feelings of the priestesses and the Dodonæans.[929] "How (he asks) could a dove speak with human voice?" But the narrative of the priests at Thêbes, though its prodigious improbability hardly requires to be stated, yet involved no positive departure from the laws of nature and possibility, and therefore Herodotus makes no difficulty in accepting it. The curious circumstance is, that he turns the native Dodonæan legend into a figurative representation, or rather a misrepresentation, of the supposed true story told by the Theban priests. According to his interpretation, the woman who came from Thêbes to Dôdôna was called a dove, and affirmed to utter sounds like a bird, because she was non-Hellenic and spoke a foreign tongue: when she learned to speak the language of the country, it was then said that the dove spoke with a human voice. And the dove was moreover called black, because of the woman's Egyptian color.

That Herodotus should thus bluntly reject a miracle, recounted to him by the prophetic women themselves as the prime circumstance in the *origines* of this holy place, is a proof of the hold which habits of dealing with historical evidence had ac-

quired over his mind; and the awkwardness of his explanatory mediation between the dove and the woman, marks not less his anxiety, while discarding the legend, to let it softly down into a story quasi-historical and not intrinsically incredible.

We may observe another example of the unconscious tendency of Herodotus to eliminate from the mythes the idea of special aid from the gods, in his remarks upon Melampus. He designates Melampus "as a clever man, who had acquired for himself the art of prophecy;" and had procured through Kadmus much information about the religious rites and customs of Egypt, many of which he introduced into Greece[930]—especially the name, the sacrifices, and the phallic processions of Dionysus: he adds, "that Melampus himself did not accurately comprehend or bring out the whole doctrine, but wise men who came after him made the necessary additions."[931] Though the name of Melampus is here maintained, the character described[932] is something in the vein of Pythagoras—totally different from the great seer and leech of the old epic mythes—the founder of the gifted family of the Amythaonids, and the grandfather of Amphiaräus.[933] But that which is most of all at variance with the genuine legendary spirit, is the opinion expressed by Herodotus (and delivered with some emphasis as *his own*), that Melampus "was a clever man, who had acquired for himself prophetic powers." Such a supposition would have appeared inadmissible to Homer or Hesiod, or indeed to Solôn, in the preceding century, in whose view even inferior arts come from the gods, while Zeus or Apollo bestows the power of prophesying.[934] The intimation of such an opinion by Herodotus, himself a thoroughly pious man, marks the sensibly diminished omnipresence of the gods, and the increasing tendency to look for the explanation of phenomena among more visible and determinate agencies.

We may make a similar remark on the dictum of the historian respecting the narrow defile of Tempê, forming the embouchure of the Pêneus and the efflux of all the waters from the Thessalian basin. The Thessalians alleged that this whole basin of Thessaly had once been a lake, but that Poseidôn had split the chain of mountains and opened the efflux;[935] upon which primitive belief, thoroughly conformable to the genius of Homer and Hesiod, Herodotus comments as follows: "The Thessalian statement is reasonable. For whoever thinks that Poseidôn shakes the earth, and that the rifts of an earthquake are the work of that god, will, on seeing the defile in question, say that Poseidôn has caused it. For the rift of the mountains is, as appeared to me (when I saw it), the work of an earthquake." Herodotus admits the reference to Poseidôn, when pointed out to him, but it stands only in the background: what is present to his mind is the phænomenon of the earthquake, not as a special act, but as part of a system of habitual operations.[936]

Herodotus adopts the Egyptian version of the legend of Troy, founded on that capital variation which seems to have originated with Stesichorus, and according to which Helen never left Sparta at all—her *eidôlon* had been taken to Troy in her place. Upon this basis a new story had been framed, midway between Homer and Stesicho-

rus, representing Paris to have really carried off Helen from Sparta, but to have been driven by storms to Egypt, where she remained during the whole siege of Troy, having been detained by Prôteus, the king of the country, until Menelaus came to reclaim her after his triumph. The Egyptian priests, with their usual boldness of assertion, professed to have heard the whole story from Menelaus himself—the Greeks had beseiged Troy, in the full persuasion that Helen and the stolen treasures were within the walls, nor would they ever believe the repeated denials of the Trojans as to the fact of her presence. In intimating his preference for the Egyptian narrative, Herodotus betrays at once his perfect and unsuspecting confidence that he is dealing with genuine matter of history, and his entire distrust of the epic poets, even including Homer, upon whose authority that supposed history rested. His reason for rejecting the Homeric version is that it teems with historical improbabilities. If Helen had been really in Troy (he says), Priam and the Trojans would never have been so insane as to retain her to their own utter ruin: but it was the divine judgment which drove them into the miserable alternative of neither being able to surrender Helen, nor to satisfy the Greeks of the real fact that they had never had possession of her—in order that mankind might plainly read, in the utter destruction of Troy, the great punishments with which the gods visit great misdeeds. Homer (Herodotus thinks) had heard this story, but designedly departed from it, because it was not so suitable a subject for epic poetry.[937]

Enough has been said to show how wide is the difference between Herodotus and the logographers with their literal transcript of the ancient legends. Though he agrees with them in admitting the full series of persons and generations, he tries the circumstances narrated by a new standard. Scruples have arisen in his mind respecting violations of the laws of nature: the poets are unworthy of trust, and their narratives must be brought into conformity with historical and ethical conditions, before they can be admitted as truth. To accomplish this conformity, Herodotus is willing to mutilate the old legend in one of its most vital points: he sacrifices the personal presence of Helena in Troy, which ran through every one of the ancient epic poems belonging to the Trojan cycle, and is indeed, under the gods, the great and present moving force throughout.

Thucydidês places himself generally in the same point of view as Herodotus with regard to mythical antiquity, yet with some considerable differences. Though manifesting no belief in present miracles or prodigies,[938] he seems to accept without reserve the preexistent reality of all the persons mentioned in the mythes, and of the long series of generations extending back through so many supposed centuries: in this category, too, are included the eponymous personages, Hellen, Kekrops, Eumolpus, Pandiôn, Amphilochus the son of Amphiaräus, and Akarnan. But on the other hand, we find no trace of that distinction between a human and an heroic ante-human race, which Herodotus still admitted,—nor any respect for Egyptian legends. Thucydidês, regarding the personages of the mythes as men of the same breed and

stature with his own contemporaries, not only tests the acts imputed to them by the same limits of credibility, but presumes in them the same political views and feelings as he was accustomed to trace in the proceedings of Peisistratus or Periklês. He treats the Trojan war as a great political enterprise, undertaken by all Greece; brought into combination through the imposing power of Agamemnôn, not (according to the legendary narrative) through the influence of the oath exacted by Tyndareus. Then he explains how the predecessors of Agamemnôn arrived at so vast a dominion—beginning with Pelops, who came over (as he says) from Asia with great wealth among the poor Peloponnêsians, and by means of this wealth so aggrandized himself, though a foreigner, as to become the eponym of the peninsula. Next followed his son Atreus, who acquired after the death of Eurystheus the dominion of Mykênæ, which had before been possessed by the descendants of Perseus: here the old legendary tale, which described Atreus as having been banished by his father Pelops in consequence of the murder of his elder brother Chrysippus, is invested with a political bearing, as explaining the reason why Atreus retired to Mykênæ. Another legendary tale—the defeat and death of Eurystheus by the fugitive Herakleids in Attica, so celebrated in Attic tragedy as having given occasion to the generous protecting intervention of Athens—is also introduced as furnishing the cause why Atreus succeeded to the deceased Eurystheus: "for Atreus, the maternal uncle of Eurystheus, had been entrusted by the latter with his government during the expedition into Attica, and had effectually courted the people, who were moreover in great fear of being attacked by the Herakleids." Thus the Pelopids acquired the supremacy in Peloponnêsus, and Agamemnôn was enabled to get together his 1200 ships and 100,000 men for the expedition against Troy. Considering that contingents were furnished from every portion of Greece, Thucydidês regards this as a small number, treating the Homeric catalogue as an authentic muster-roll, perhaps rather exaggerated than otherwise. He then proceeds to tell us why the armament was not larger: many more men could have been furnished, but there was not sufficient money to purchase provisions for their subsistence; hence they were compelled, after landing and gaining a victory, to fortify their camp, to divide their army, and to send away one portion for the purpose of cultivating the Chersonese, and another portion to sack the adjacent towns. This was the grand reason why the siege lasted so long as ten years. For if it had been possible to keep the whole army together, and to act with an undivided force, Troy would have been taken both earlier and at smaller cost.[939]

Such is the general sketch of the war of Troy, as given by Thucydidês. So different is it from the genuine epical narrative, that we seem hardly to be reading a description of the same event; still less should we imagine that the event was known, to him as well as to us, only through the epic poets themselves. The men, the numbers, and the duration of the siege, do indeed remain the same; but the cast and juncture of events, the determining forces, and the characteristic features, are altogether heterogeneous. But, like Herodotus, and still more than Herodotus, Thucy-

didês was under the pressure of two conflicting impulses—he shared the general faith in the mythical antiquity, but at the same time he could not believe in any facts which contradicted the laws of historical credibility or probability. He was thus under the necessity of torturing the matter of the old mythes into conformity with the subjective exigencies of his own mind: he left out, altered, recombined, and supplied new connecting principles and supposed purposes, until the story became such as no one could have any positive reason for calling in question: though it lost the impressive mixture of religion, romance, and individual adventure, which constituted its original charm, it acquired a smoothness and plausibility, and a poetical *ensemble*, which the critics were satisfied to accept as historical truth. And historical truth it would doubtless have been, if any independent evidence could have been found to sustain it. Had Thucydidês been able to produce such new testimony, we should have been pleased to satisfy ourselves that the war of Troy, as he recounted it, was the real event; of which the war of Troy, as sung by the epic poets, was a misreported, exaggerated, and ornamented recital. But in this case the poets are the only real witnesses, and the narrative of Thucydidês is a mere extract and distillation from their incredibilities.

A few other instances may be mentioned to illustrate the views of Thucydidês respecting various mythical incidents. 1. He treats the residence of the Homeric Phæakians at Corkyra as an undisputed fact, and employs it partly to explain the efficiency of the Korkyrean navy in times preceding the Peloponnesian war.[940] 2. He notices, with equal confidence, the story of Têreus and Proknê, daughter of Pandiôn, and the murder of the child Itys by Proknê his mother, and Philomêla; and he produces this ancient mythe with especial reference to the alliance between the Athenians and Têrês, king of the Odrysian Thracians, during the time of the Peloponnesian war, intimating that the Odrysian Têrês was neither of the same family nor of the same country as Têreus the husband of Proknê.[941] The conduct of Pandiôn, in giving his daughter Proknê in marriage to Têreus, is in his view dictated by political motives and interests. 3. He mentions the Strait of Messina as the place through which Odysseus is said to have sailed.[942] 4. The Cyclôpes and the Læstrygones (he says) were the most ancient reported inhabitants of Sicily; but he cannot tell to what race they belonged, nor whence they came.[943] 5. Italy derived its name from Italus, king of the Sikels. 6. Eryx and Egesto in Sicily were founded by fugitive Trojans after the capture of Troy; also Skionê, in the Thracian peninsula of Pallênê, by Greeks from the Achæan town of Pellênê, stopping thither in their return from the siege of Troy: the Amphilochian Argos in the Gulf of Ambrakia was in like manner founded by Amphilochus son of Amphiaräus, in his return from the same enterprise. The remorse and mental derangement of the matricidal Alkmæôn, son of Amphiaräus, is also mentioned by Thucydidês,[944] as well as the settlement of his son Akarnan in the country called after him Akarnania.[945]

Such are the special allusions made by this illustrious author in the course of his history to mythical events. From the tenor of his language we may see that he accounted all that could be known about them to be uncertain and unsatisfactory; but he has it much at heart to show, that even the greatest were inferior in magnitude and importance to the Peloponnesian war.[946] In this respect his opinion seems to have been at variance with that which was popular among his contemporaries.

To touch a little upon the later historians by whom these mythes were handled, we find that Anaximenês of Lampsacus composed a consecutive history of events, beginning from the Theogony down to the battle of Mantineia.[947] But Ephorus professed to omit all the mythical narratives which are referred to times anterior to the return of the Herakleids, (such restriction would of course have banished the siege of Troy,) and even reproved those who introduced mythes into historical writing; adding, that everywhere truth was the object to be aimed at.[948] Yet in practice he seems often to have departed from his own rule.[949] Theopompus, on the other hand, openly proclaimed that he could narrate fables in his history better than Herodotus, or Ktesias, or Hellanikus.[950] The fragments which remain to us, exhibit some proof that this promise was performed as to quantity;[951] though as to his style of narration, the judgment of Dionysius is unfavorable. Xenophôn ennobled his favorite amusement of the chase by numerous examples chosen from the heroic world, tracing their portraits with all the simplicity of an undiminished faith. Kallisthenês, like Ephorus, professed to omit all mythes which referred to a time anterior to the return of the Herakleids; yet we know that he devoted a separate book or portion of his history to the Trojan war.[952] Philistus introduced some mythes in the earlier portions of his Sicilian history; but Timæus was distinguished above all others for the copious and indiscriminate way in which he collected and repeated such legends.[953] Some of these writers employed their ingenuity in transforming the mythical circumstances into plausible matter of history: Ephorus, in particular, converted the serpent Pythô, slain by Apollo, into a tyrannical king.[954]

But the author who pushed this transmutation of legend into history to the greatest length, was the Messenian Euêmerus, contemporary of Kassander of Macedôn. He melted down in this way the divine persons and legends, as well as the heroic—representing both gods and heroes as having been mere earth-born men, though superior to the ordinary level in respect of force and capacity, and deified or heroified after death as a recompense for services or striking exploits. In the course of a voyage into the Indian sea, undertaken by command of Kassander, Euêmerus professed to have discovered a fabulous country called Panchaia, in which was a temple of the Triphylian Zeus: he there described a golden column, with an inscription purporting to have been put up by Zeus himself, and detailing his exploits while on earth.[955] Some eminent men, among whom may be numbered Polybius, followed the views of Euêmerus, and the Roman poet Ennius[956] translated his Historia Sacra; but on the whole he never acquired favor, and the unblushing inventions which he put into cir-

culation were of themselves sufficient to disgrace both the author and his opinions. The doctrine that all the gods had once existed as mere men offended the religious pagans, and drew upon Euêmerus the imputation of atheism; but, on the other hand, it came to be warmly espoused by several of the Christian assailants of paganism,—by Minucius Felix, Lactantius, and St. Augustin, who found the ground ready prepared for them in their efforts to strip Zeus and the other pagan gods of the attributes of deity. They believed not only in the main theory, but also in the copious details of Euêmerus; and the same man whom Strabo casts aside as almost a proverb for mendacity, was extolled by them as an excellent specimen of careful historical inquiry.[957]

But though the pagan world repudiated that "lowering tone of explanation," which effaced the superhuman personality of Zeus and the great gods of Olympus, the mythical persons and narratives generally came to be surveyed more and more from the point of view of history, and subjected to such alterations as might make them look more like plausible matter of fact. Polybius, Strabo, Diodôrus, and Pausanias, cast the mythes into historical statements—with more or less of transformation, as the case may require, assuming always that there is a basis of truth, which may be discovered by removing poetical exaggerations and allowing for mistakes. Strabo, in particular, lays down that principle broadly and unequivocally in his remarks upon Homer. To give pure fiction, without any foundation of fact, was in his judgment utterly unworthy of so great a genius; and he comments with considerable acrimony on the geographer Eratosthenês, who maintains the opposite opinion. Again, Polybius tells us that the Homeric Æolus, the dispenser of the winds by appointment from Zeus, was in reality a man eminently skilled in navigation, and exact in predicting the weather; that the Cyclôpes and Læstrygones were wild and savage real men in Sicily; and that Scylla and Charybdis were a figurative representation of dangers arising from pirates in the Strait of Messina. Strabo speaks of the amazing expeditions of Dionysus and Hêraklês, and of the long wanderings of Jasôn, Menelaus, and Odysseus, in the same category with the extended commercial range of the Phœnician merchant-ships: he explains the report of Thêseus and Peirithöus having descended to Hadês, by their dangerous earthly pilgrimages,—and the invocation of the Dioskuri as the protectors of the imperiled mariner, by the celebrity which they had acquired as real men and navigators.

Diodôrus gave at considerable length versions of the current fables respecting the most illustrious names in the Grecian mythical world, compiled confusedly out of distinct and incongruous authors. Sometimes the mythe is reproduced in its primitive simplicity, but for the most part it is partially, and sometimes wholly, historicized. Amidst this jumble of dissentient authorities we can trace little of a systematic view, except the general conviction that there was at the bottom of the mythes a real chronological sequence of persons, and real matter of fact, historical or ultra-historical. Nevertheless, there are some few occasions on which Diodôrus brings us back a

step nearer to the point of view of the old logographers. For, in reference to Hêraklês, he protests against the scheme of cutting down the mythes to the level of present reality, and contends that a special standard of ultra-historical credibility ought to be constituted, so as to include the mythe in its native dimensions, and do fitting honor to the grand, beneficent, and superhuman personality of Hêraklês and other heroes or demi-gods. To apply to such persons the common measure of humanity (he says), and to cavil at the glorious picture which grateful man has drawn of them, is at once ungracious and irrational. All nice criticism into the truth of the legendary narratives is out of place: we show our reverence to the god by acquiescing in the incredibilities of his history, and we must be content with the best guesses which we can make, amidst the inextricable confusion and numberless discrepancies which they present.[958] Yet though Diodôrus here exhibits a preponderance of the religious sentiment over the purely historical point of view, and thus reminds us of a period earlier than Thucydidês—he in another place inserts a series of stories which seem to be derived from Euêmerus, and in which Uranus, Kronus, and Zeus appear reduced to the character of human kings celebrated for their exploits and benefactions.[959] Many of the authors, whom Diodôrus copies, have so entangled together Grecian, Asiatic, Egyptian, and Libyan fables, that it becomes impossible to ascertain how much of this heterogeneous mass can be considered as at all connected with the genuine Hellenic mind.

Pausanias is far more strictly Hellenic in his view of the Grecian mythes than Diodôrus: his sincere piety makes him inclined to faith generally with regard to the mythical narratives, but subject nevertheless to the frequent necessity of historicizing or allegorizing them. His belief in the general reality of the mythical history and chronology is complete, in spite of the many discrepancies which he finds in it, and which he is unable to reconcile.

Another author who seems to have conceived clearly, and applied consistently, the semi-historical theory of the Grecian mythes, is Palæphatus, of whose work what appears to be a short abstract has been preserved.[960] In the short preface of this treatise "concerning Incredible Tales," he remarks, that some men, from want of instruction, believe all the current narratives; while others, more searching and cautious, disbelieve them altogether. Each of these extremes he is anxious to avoid. On the one hand, he thinks that no narrative could ever have acquired credence unless it had been founded in truth; on the other, it is impossible for him to accept so much of the existing narratives as conflicts with the analogies of present natural phænomena. If such things ever had been, they would still continue to be—but they never have so occurred; and the extra-analogical features of the stories are to be ascribed to the license of the poets. Palæphatus wishes to adopt a middle course, neither accepting all nor rejecting all: accordingly, he had taken great pains to separate the true from the false in many of the narratives; he had visited the localities wherein they had taken place, and made careful inquiries from old men and others.[961] The

results of his researches are presented in a new version of fifty legends, among the most celebrated and the most fabulous, comprising the Centaurs, Pasiphaê, Aktæôn, Kadmus and the Sparti, the Sphinx, Cycnus, Dædalus, the Trojan horse, Æolus, Scylla, Geryôn, Bellerophôn, etc.

It must be confessed that Palæphatus has performed his promise of transforming the "incredibilia" into narratives in themselves plausible and unobjectionable, and that in doing so he always follows some thread of analogy, real or verbal. The Centaurs (he tells us) were a body of young men from the village of Nephelê in Thessaly, who first trained and mounted horses for the purpose of repelling a herd of bulls belonging to Ixiôn king of the Lapithæ, which had run wild and done great damage: they pursued these wild bulls on horseback, and pierced them with their spears, thus acquiring both the name of *Prickers* (κἐντορες) and the imputed attribute of joint body with the horse. Aktæôn was an Arcadian, who neglected the cultivation of his land for the pleasures of hunting, and was thus eaten up by the expense of his hounds. The dragon whom Kadmus killed at Thêbes, was in reality Drako, king of Thêbes; and the dragon's teeth which he was said to have sown, and from whence sprung a crop of armed men, were in point of fact elephants' teeth, which Kadmus as a rich Phœnician had brought over with him: the sons of Drako sold these elephants' teeth and employed the proceeds to levy troops against Kadmus. Dædalus, instead of flying across the sea on wings, had escaped from Krête in a swift sailing-boat under a violent storm: Kottus, Briareus, and Gygês were not persons with one hundred hands, but inhabitants of the village of Hekatoncheiria in Upper Macedonia, who warred with the inhabitants of Mount Olympus against the Titans: Scylla, whom Odysseus so narrowly escaped, was a fastsailing piratical vessel, as was also Pegasus, the alleged winged horse of Bellerophôn.[962]

By such ingenious conjectures, Palæphatus eliminates all the incredible circumstances, and leaves to us a string of tales perfectly credible and commonplace, which we should readily believe, provided a very moderate amount of testimony could be produced in their favor. If his treatment not only disenchants the original mythes, but even effaces their generic and essential character, we ought to remember that this is not more than what is done by Thucydidês in his sketch of the Trojan war. Palæphatus handles the mythes consistently, according to the semi-historical theory, and his results exhibit the maximum which that theory can ever present. By aid of conjecture, we get out of the impossible, and arrive at matters intrinsically plausible, but totally uncertified; beyond this point we cannot penetrate, without the light of extrinsic evidence, since there is no intrinsic mark to distinguish truth from plausible fiction.[963]

It remains that we should notice the manner in which the ancient mythes were received and dealt with by the philosophers. The earliest expression which we hear, on the part of philosophy, is the severe censure bestowed upon them on ethical grounds by Xenophanês of Kolophôn, and seemingly by some others of his contem-

poraries.[964] It was apparently in reply to such charges, which did not admit of being directly rebutted, that Theagenês of Rhêgium (about 520 B. C.) first started the idea of a double meaning in the Homeric and Hesiodic narratives,—an interior sense, different from that which the words in their obvious meaning bore, yet to a certain extent analogous, and discoverable by sagacious divination. Upon this principle, he allegorized especially the battle of the gods in the Iliad.[965] In the succeeding century, Anaxagoras and Metrodôrus carried out the allegorical explanation more comprehensively and systematically; the former representing the mythical personages as mere mental conceptions, invested with name and gender, and illustrative of ethical precepts,—the latter connecting them with physical principles and phænomena. Metrodôrus resolved not only the persons of Zeus, Hêrê, and Athênê, but also those of Agamemnôn, Achilles, and Hectôr, into various elemental combinations and physical agencies, and treated the adventures ascribed to them as natural facts concealed under the veil of allegory.[966] Empedoklês, Prodikus, Antisthenês, Parmenidês, Hêrakleidês of Pontus, and in a later age, Chrysippus, and the Stoic philosophers generally,[967] followed more or less the same principle of treating the popular gods as allegorical personages; while the expositors of Homer (such as Stesimbrotus, Glaukôn, and others, even down to the Alexandrine age), though none of them proceeded to the same extreme length as Metrodôrus, employed allegory amongst other media of explanation for the purpose of solving difficulties, or eluding reproaches against the poet.

In the days of Plato and Zenophôn, this allegorizing interpretation was one of the received methods of softening down the obnoxious mythes—though Plato himself treated it as an insufficient defence, seeing that the bulk of youthful hearers could not see through the allegory, but embraced the story literally as it was set forth.[968] Pausanias tells us, that when he first began to write his work, he treated many of the Greek legends as silly and undeserving of serious attention; but as he proceeded, he gradually arrived at the full conviction, that the ancient sages had designedly spoken in enigmatical language, and that there was valuable truth wrapped up in their narratives: it was the duty of a pious man, therefore, to study and interpret, but not to reject, stories current and accredited respecting the gods.[969] And others,—arguing from the analogy of the religious mysteries, which could not be divulged without impiety to any except such as had been specially admitted and initiated,—maintained that it would be a profanation to reveal directly to the vulgar, the genuine scheme of nature and the divine administration: the ancient poets and philosophers had taken the only proper course, of talking to the many in types and parables, and reserving the naked truth for privileged and qualified intelligences.[970] The allegorical mode of explaining the ancient fables[971] became more and more popular in the third and fourth centuries after the Christian æra, especially among the new Platonic philosophers; being both congenial to their orientalized turn of thought, and useful as a shield against the attacks of the Christians.

It was from the same strong necessity, of accommodating the old mythes to a new standard both of belief and of appreciation, that both the historical and the allegorical schemes of transforming them arose; the literal narrative being decomposed for the purpose of arriving at a base either of particular matter of fact, or of general physical or moral truth. Instructed men were commonly disposed to historicize only the heroic legends, and to allegorize more or less of the divine legends: the attempt of Euêmerus to historicize the latter was for the most part denounced as irreligious, while that of Metrodôrus to allegorize the former met with no success. In allegorizing, moreover, even the divine legends, it was usual to apply the scheme of allegory only to the inferior gods, though some of the great Stoic philosophers carried it farther, and allegorized all the separate personal gods, leaving only an all-pervading cosmic Mind,[972] essential as a co-efficient along with Matter, yet not separable from Matter. But many pious pagans seem to have perceived that allegory pushed to this extent was fatal to all living religious faith,[973] inasmuch as it divested the gods of their character of Persons, sympathizing with mankind and modifiable in their dispositions according to the conduct and prayers of the believer: and hence they permitted themselves to employ allegorical interpretation only to some of the obnoxious legends connected with the superior gods, leaving the personality of the latter unimpeached.

One novelty, however, introduced seemingly by the philosopher Empedoklês and afterwards expanded by others, deserves notice, inasmuch as it modified considerably the old religious creed by drawing a pointed contrast between gods and dæmons,—a distinction hardly at all manifested in Homer, but recognized in the Works and Days of Hesiod.[974] Empedoklês widened the gap between the two, and founded upon it important consequences. The gods were good, immortal, and powerful agents, having free-will and intelligence, but without appetite, passion, or infirmity: the dæmons were of a mixed nature between gods and men, ministers and interpreters from the former to the latter, but invested also with an agency and dispositions of their own. They were very long-lived, but not immortal, and subject to the passions and propensities of men, so that there were among them beneficent and maleficent dæmons with every shade of intermediate difference.[975] It had been the mistake (according to these philosophers) of the old mythes to ascribe to the gods proceedings really belonging to the dæmons, who were always the immediate communicants with mortal nature, inspiring prophetic power to the priestesses of the oracles, sending dreams and omens, and perpetually interfering either for good or for evil. The wicked and violent dæmons, having committed many enormities, had thus sometimes incurred punishment from the gods: besides which, their bad dispositions had imposed upon men the necessity of appeasing them by religious ceremonies of a kind acceptable to such beings: hence, the human sacrifices, the violent, cruel, and obscene exhibitions, the wailings and fastings, the tearing and eating of raw flesh, which it had become customary to practise on various consecrated occasions, and especially in the Dionysiac solemnities. Moreover, the discreditable actions imputed to

the gods,—the terrific combats, the Typhonic and Titanic convulsions, the rapes, abductions, flight, servitude, and concealment,—all these were really the doings and sufferings of bad dæmons, placed far below the sovereign agency—equable, undisturbed, and unpolluted—of the immortal gods. The action of such dæmons upon mankind was fitful and intermittent: they sometimes perished or changed their local abode, so that oracles which had once been inspired became after a time forsaken and disfranchized.[976]

This distinction between gods and dæmons appeared to save in a great degree both the truth of the old legends and the dignity of the gods: it obviated the necessity of pronouncing either that the gods were unworthy, or the legends untrue. Yet although devised for the purpose of satisfying a more scrupulous religious sensibility, it was found inconvenient afterwards, when assailants arose against paganism generally. For while it abandoned as indefensible a large portion of what had once been genuine faith, it still retained the same word *dæmons* with an entirely altered signification. The Christian writers in their controversies found ample warrant among the *earlier* pagan authors[977] for treating all the gods as dæmons—and not less ample warrant among the *later* pagans for denouncing the dæmons generally as evil beings.[978]

Such were the different modes in which the ancient mythes were treated, during the literary life of Greece, by the four classes above named—poets, logographers, historians, and philosophers.

Literal acceptance, and unconscious, uninquiring faith, such as they had obtained from the original auditors to whom they were addressed, they now found only among the multitude—alike retentive of traditional feeling[979] and fearful of criticizing the proceedings of the gods.[980] But with instructed men they became rather subjects of respectful and curious analysis—all agreeing that the Word as tendered to them was inadmissible, yet all equally convinced that it contained important meaning, though hidden yet not undiscoverable. A very large proportion of the force of Grecian intellect was engaged in searching after this unknown base, by guesses, in which sometimes the principle of semi-historical interpretation was assumed, sometimes that of allegorical, without any collateral evidence in either case, and without possibility of verification. Out of the one assumption grew a string of allegorized phænomenal truths, out of the other a long series of seeming historical events and chronological persons,—both elicited from the transformed mythes and from nothing else.[981]

The utmost which we accomplish by means of the semi-historical theory, even in its most successful applications, is, that after leaving out from the mythical narrative all that is miraculous or high-colored or extravagant, we arrive at a series of credible incidents—incidents which *may, perhaps*, have really occurred, and against which no intrinsic presumption can be raised. This is exactly the character of a well-written

modern novel (as, for example, several among the compositions of Defoe), the whole story of which is such as may well have occurred in real life: it is plausible fiction, and nothing beyond. To raise plausible fiction up to the superior dignity of truth, some positive testimony or positive ground of inference must be shown; even the highest measure of intrinsic probability is not alone sufficient. A man who tells us that, on the day of the battle of Platæa, rain fell on the spot of ground where the city of New York now stands, will neither deserve nor obtain credit, because he can have had no means of positive knowledge; though the statement is not in the slightest degree improbable. On the other hand, statements in themselves very improbable may well deserve belief, provided they be supported by sufficient positive evidence; thus the canal dug by order of Xerxês across the promontory of Mount Athos, and the sailing of the Persian fleet through it, is a fact which I believe, because it is well-attested—notwithstanding its remarkable improbability, which so far misled Juvenal as to induce him to single out the narrative as a glaring example of Grecian mendacity. [982] Again, many critics have observed that the general tale of the Trojan war (apart from the superhuman agencies) is not more improbable than that of the Crusades, which every one admits to be an historical fact. But (even if we grant this position, which is only true to a small extent), it is not sufficient to show an analogy between the two cases in respect to negative presumptions alone; the analogy ought to be shown to hold between them in respect to positive certificate also. The Crusades are a curious phænomenon in history, but we accept them, nevertheless, as an unquestionable fact, because the antecedent improbability is surmounted by adequate contemporary testimony. When the like testimony, both in amount and kind, is produced to establish the historical reality of a Trojan war, we shall not hesitate to deal with the two events on the same footing.

In applying the semi-historical theory to Grecian mythical narrative, it has been often forgotten that a certain strength of testimony, or positive ground of belief, must first be tendered, before we can be called upon to discuss the antecedent probability or improbability of the incidents alleged. The belief of the Greeks themselves, without the smallest aid of special or contemporary witnesses, has been tacitly assumed as sufficient to support the case, provided only sufficient deduction be made from the mythical narratives to remove all antecedent improbabilities. It has been taken for granted that the faith of the people must have rested originally upon some particular historical event, involving the identical persons, things, and places which the original mythes exhibit, or at least the most prominent among them. But when we examine the pyschagogic influences predominant in the society among whom this belief originally grew up, we shall see that their belief is of little or no evidentiary value, and that the growth and diffusion of it may be satisfactorily explained without supposing any special basis of matters of fact. The popular faith, so far as it counts for anything, testifies in favor of the entire and literal mythes, which are now universally rejected as incredible.[983] We have thus the very minimum of positive proof, and the maximum of negative presumption: we may diminish the latter by conjec-

tural omissions and interpolations, but we cannot by any artifice increase the former: the narrative ceases to be incredible, but it still remains uncertified,—a mere commonplace possibility. Nor is fiction always, or essentially, extravagant and incredible. It is often not only plausible and coherent, but even more like truth (if a paradoxical phrase may be allowed) than truth itself. Nor can we, in the absence of any extrinsic test, reckon upon any intrinsic mark to discriminate the one from the other.[984]

In the semi-historical theory respecting Grecian mythical narrative, the critic unconsciously transports into the Homeric age those habits of classification and distinction, and that standard of acceptance or rejection, which he finds current in his own. Amongst us, the distinction between historical fact and fiction is highly valued as well as familiarly understood: we have a long history of the past, deduced from a study of contemporary evidences; and we have a body of fictitious literature, stamped with its own mark and interesting in its own way. Speaking generally, no man could now hope to succeed permanently in transferring any striking incident from the latter category into the former, nor could any man deliberately attempt it without incurring well-merited obloquy. But this *historical sense*, now so deeply rooted in the modern mind that we find a difficulty in conceiving any people to be without it, is the fruit of records and inquiries, first applied to the present, and then preserved and studied by subsequent generations; while in a society which has not yet formed the habit of recording its present, the real facts of the past can never be known; the difference between attested matter of fact and plausible fiction—between truth and that which is like truth—can neither be discerned nor sought for. Yet it is precisely upon the supposition that this distinction is present to men's habitual thoughts, that the semi-historical theory of the mythes is grounded.

It is perfectly true, as has often been stated, that the Grecian epic contains what are called traditions respecting the past—the larger portion of it, indeed, consists of nothing else. But what are these traditions? They are the matter of those songs and stories which have acquired hold on the public mind; they are the creations of the poets and storytellers themselves, each of whom finds some preëxisting, and adds others of his own, new and previously untold, under the impulse and authority of the inspiring Muse. Homer doubtless found many songs and stories current with respect to the siege of Troy; he received and transmitted some of these traditions, recast and transformed others, and enlarged the whole mass by new creations of his own. To the subsequent poets, such as Arktinus and Leschês, these Homeric creations formed portions of preëxisting tradition, with which they dealt in the same manner; so that the whole mass of traditions constituting the tale of Troy became larger and larger with each successive contributor. To assume a generic difference between the older and the newer strata of tradition—to treat the former as morsels of history, and the latter as appendages of fiction—is an hypothesis gratuitous at the least, not to say inadmissible. For the further we travel back into the past, the more do we recede from the clear day of positive history, and the deeper do we plunge into the unsteady

twilight and gorgeous clouds of fancy and feeling. It was one of the agreeable dreams of the Grecian epic, that the man who travelled far enough northward beyond the Rhipæan mountains, would in time reach the delicious country and genial climate of the virtuous Hyperboreans—the votaries and favorites of Apollo, who dwelt in the extreme north beyond the chilling blasts of Boreas. Now the hope that we may, by carrying our researches up the stream of time, exhaust the limits of fiction, and land ultimately upon some points of solid truth, appears to me no less illusory than this northward journey in quest of the Hyperborean elysium.

The general disposition to adopt the semi-historical theory as to the genesis of Grecian mythes, arises in part from reluctance in critics to impute to the mythopœic ages extreme credulity or fraud; together with the usual presumption, that where much is believed some portion of it must be true. There would be some weight in these grounds of reasoning, if the ages under discussion had been supplied with records and accustomed to critical inquiry. But amongst a people unprovided with the former and strangers to the latter, credulity is naturally at its maximum, as well in the narrator himself as in his hearers: the idea of deliberate fraud is moreover inapplicable,[985] for if the hearers are disposed to accept what is related to them as a revelation from the Muse, the *œstrus* of composition is quite sufficient to impart a similar persuasion to the poet whose mind is penetrated with it. The belief of that day can hardly be said to stand apart by itself as an act of reason. It becomes confounded with vivacious imagination and earnest emotion; and in every case where these mental excitabilities are powerfully acted upon, faith ensues unconsciously and as a matter of course. How active and prominent such tendencies were among the early Greeks, the extraordinary beauty and originality of their epic poetry may teach us.

It is, besides, a presumption far too largely and indiscriminately applied, even in our own advanced age, that where much is believed, something must necessarily be true—that accredited fiction is always traceable to some basis of historical truth.[986] The influence of imagination and feeling is not confined simply to the process of retouching, transforming, or magnifying narratives originally founded on fact; it will often create new narratives of its own, without any such preliminary basis. Where there is any general body of sentiment pervading men living in society, whether it be religious or political—love, admiration, or antipathy—all incidents tending to illustrate that sentiment are eagerly welcomed, rapidly circulated and (as a general rule) easily accredited. If real incidents are not at hand, impressive fictions will be provided to satisfy the demand. The perfect harmony of such fictions with the prevalent feeling stands in the place of certifying testimony, and causes men to hear them not merely with credence, but even with delight: to call them in question and require proof, is a task which cannot be undertaken without incurring obloquy. Of such tendencies in the human mind, abundant evidence is furnished by the innumerable religious legends which have acquired currency in various parts of the world, and of which no country was more fertile than Greece—legends which derived their origin, not from

special facts misreported and exaggerated, but from pious feelings pervading the society, and translated into narrative by forward and imaginative minds—legends, in which not merely the incidents, but often even the personages are unreal, yet in which the generating sentiment is conspicuously discernible, providing its own matter as well as its own form. Other sentiments also, as well as the religious, provided they be fervent and widely diffused, will find expression in current narrative, and become portions of the general public belief—every celebrated and notorious character is the source of a thousand fictions exemplifying his peculiarities. And if it be true, as I think present observation may show us, that such creative agencies are even now visible and effective, when the materials of genuine history are copious and critically studied—much more are we warranted in concluding that, in ages destitute of records, strangers to historical testimony, and full of belief in divine inspiration both as to the future and as to the past, narratives purely fictitious will acquire ready and uninquiring credence, provided only they be plausible and in harmony with the preconceptions of the auditors.

The allegorical interpretation of the mythes has been by several learned investigators, especially by Creuzer, connected with the hypothesis of an ancient and highly instructed body of priests, having their origin either in Egypt or in the East, and communicating to the rude and barbarous Greeks religious, physical, and historical knowledge under the veil of symbols. At a time (we are told) when language was yet in its infancy, visible symbols were the most vivid means of acting upon the minds of ignorant hearers: the next step was to pass to symbolical language and expressions —for a plain and literal exposition, even if understood at all, would at least have been listened to with indifference, as not corresponding with any mental demand. In such allegorizing way, then, the early priests set forth their doctrines respecting God, nature, and humanity—a refined monotheism and a theological philosophy—and to this purpose the earliest mythes were turned. But another class of mythes, more popular and more captivating, grew up under the hands of the poets—mythes purely epical, and descriptive of real or supposed past events. The allegorical mythes, being taken up by the poets, insensibly became confounded in the same category with the purely narrative mythes—the matter symbolized was no longer thought of, while the symbolizing words came to be construed in their own literal meaning—and the basis of the early allegory, thus lost among the general public, was only preserved as a secret among various religious fraternities, composed of members allied together by initiation in certain mystical ceremonies, and administered by hereditary families of presiding priests. In the Orphic and Bacchic sects, in the Eleusinian and Samothracian mysteries, was thus treasured up the secret doctrine of the old theological and philosophical mythes, which had once constituted the primitive legendary stock of Greece, in the hands of the original priesthood and in ages anterior to Homer. Persons who had gone through the preliminary ceremonies of initiation, were permitted at length to hear, though under strict obligation of secrecy, this ancient religious and cosmogonic doctrine, revealing the destination of man and the certainty of posthu-

mous rewards and punishments—all disengaged from the corruptions of poets, as well as from the symbols and allegories under which they still remained buried in the eyes of the vulgar. The mysteries of Greece were thus traced up to the earliest ages, and represented as the only faithful depository channels of that purer theology and physics which had originally been communicated, though under the unavoidable inconvenience of a symbolical expression, by an enlightened priesthood coming from abroad to the then rude barbarians of the country.[987]

But this theory, though advocated by several learned men, has been shown to be unsupported and erroneous. It implies a mistaken view both of the antiquity and the purport of the mysteries, which cannot be safely carried up even to the age of Hesiod, and which, though imposing and venerable as religious ceremonies, included no recondite or esoteric teaching.[988]

The doctrine, supposed to have been originally symbolized and subsequently overclouded, in the Greek mythes, was in reality first intruded into them by the unconscious fancies of later interpreters. It was one of the various roads which instructed men took to escape from the literal admission of the ancient mythes, and to arrive at some new form of belief, more consonant with their ideas of what the attributes and character of the gods ought to be. It was one of the ways of constituting, by help of the mysteries, a philosophical religion apart from the general public, and of connecting that distinction with the earliest periods of Grecian society. Such a distinction was both avowed and justified among the superior men of the later pagan world. Varro and Scævola distributed theology into three distinct departments,—the mythical or fabulous, the civil, and the physical. The first had its place in the theatre, and was left without any interference to the poets; the second belonged to the city of political community as such,—it comprised the regulation of all the public worship and religious rites, and was consigned altogether to the direction of the magistrate; the third was the privilege of philosophers, but was reserved altogether for private discussion in the schools, apart from the general public.[989] As a member of the city, the philosopher sympathized with the audience in the theatre, and took a devout share in the established ceremonies, nor was he justified in trying what he heard in the one or saw in the other by his own ethical standard. But in the private assemblies of instructed or inquisitive men, he enjoyed the fullest liberty of canvassing every received tenet, and of broaching his own theories unreservedly, respecting the existence and nature of the gods. By these discussions, the activity of the philosophical mind was maintained and truth elicited; but it was such truth as the body of the people ought not to hear, lest their faith in their own established religious worship should be overthrown. In thus distinguishing the civil theology from the fabulous, Varro was enabled to cast upon the poets all the blame of the objectionable points in the popular theology, and to avoid the necessity of pronouncing censure on the magistrates, who (he contended) had made as good a compromise with the settled prejudices of the public as the case permitted.

The same conflicting sentiments which led the philosophers to decompose the divine mythes into allegory, impelled the historians to melt down the heroic mythes into something like continuous political history, with a long series of chronology calculated upon the heroic pedigrees. The one process as well as the other was interpretative guesswork, proceeding upon unauthorized assumptions, and without any verifying test or evidence: while it frittered away the characteristic beauty of the mythe into something essentially anti-mythical, it sought to arrive both at history and philosophy by impracticable roads. That the superior men of antiquity should have striven hard to save the dignity of legends which constituted the charm of their literature as well as the substance of the popular religion, we cannot be at all surprised; but it is gratifying to find Plato discussing the subject in a more philosophical spirit. The Platonic Socratês, being asked whether he believed the current Attic fable respecting the abduction of Oreithyia (daughter of Erechtheus) by Boreas, replies, in substance,—"It would not be strange if I disbelieved it, as the clever men do; I might then show my cleverness by saying that a gust of Boreas blew her down from the rocks above while she was at play, and that, having been killed in this manner, she was reported to have been carried off by Boreas. Such speculations are amusing enough, but they belong to men ingenious and busy-minded overmuch, and not greatly to be envied, if it be only for this reason, *that, after having set right one fable, they are under the necessity of applying the same process to a host of others*—Hippocentaurs, Chimæras, Gorgons, Pegasus, and numberless other monsters and incredibilities. A man, who, disbelieving these stories, shall try to find a probable basis for each of them, will display an ill-placed acuteness and take upon himself an endless burden, for which I at least have no leisure: accordingly, I forego such researches, and believe in the current version of the stories."[990]

These remarks of Plato are valuable, not simply because they point out the uselessness of digging for a supposed basis of truth in the mythes, but because they at the same time suggest the true reason for mistrusting all such tentatives. The mythes form a class apart, abundant as well as peculiar: to remove any individual mythe from its own class into that of history or philosophy, by simple conjecture, and without any collateral evidence, is of no advantage, unless you can perform a similar process on the remainder. If the process be trustworthy, it ought to be applied to all; and *e converso*, if it be not applicable to all, it is not trustworthy as applied to any one specially; always assuming no special evidence to be accessible. To detach any individual mythe from the class to which it belongs, is to present it in an erroneous point of view; we have no choice except to admit them as they stand, by putting ourselves approximatively into the frame of mind of those for whom they were destined and to whom they appeared worthy of credit.

If Plato thus discountenances all attempts to transform the mythes by interpretation into history or philosophy, indirectly recognizing the generic difference between them—we find substantially the same view pervading the elaborate precepts in his

treatise on the Republic. He there regards the mythes, not as embodying either matter-of-fact or philosophical principle, but as portions of religious and patriotic faith, and instruments of ethical tuition. Instead of allowing the poets to frame them according to the impulses of their own genius, and with a view to immediate popularity, he directs the legislator to provide types of his own for the characters of the gods and heroes, and to suppress all such divine and heroic legends as are not in harmony with these preëstablished canons. In the Platonic system, the mythes are not to be matters of history, nor yet of spontaneous or casual fiction, but of prescribed faith: he supposes that the people will believe, as a thing of course, what the poets circulate, and he therefore directs that the latter shall circulate nothing which does not tend to ennoble and improve the feelings. He conceives the mythes as stories composed to illustrate the general sentiments of the poets and the community, respecting the character and attributes of the gods and heroes, or respecting the social relations, and ethical duties as well as motives of mankind: hence the obligation upon the legislator to prescribe beforehand the types of character which shall be illustrated, and to restrain the poets from following out any opposing fancies. "Let us neither believe ourselves (he exclaims), nor permit any one to circulate, that Thêseus son of Poseidôn and Peirithöus son of Zeus, or any other hero or son of a god, could ever have brought themselves to commit abductions or other enormities such as are now falsely ascribed to them. We must compel the poets to say, either that such persons were not the sons of gods, or that they were not the perpetrators of such misdeeds."[991]

Most of the mythes which the youth hear and repeat (according to Plato) are false, but some of them are true: the great and prominent mythes which appear in Homer and Hesiod are no less fictions than the rest. But fiction constitutes one of the indispensable instruments of mental training as well as truth; only the legislator must take care that the fiction so employed shall be beneficent and not mischievous.[992] As the mischievous fictions (he says) take their rise from wrong preconceptions respecting the character of the gods and heroes, so the way to correct them is to enforce, by authorized compositions, the adoption of a more correct standard.[993]

The comments which Plato has delivered with so much force in his Republic, and the enactments which he deduces from them, are in the main an expansion of that sentiment of condemnation, which he shared with so many other philosophers, towards a large portion of the Homeric and Hesiodic stories.[994] But the manner in which he has set forth this opinion, unfolds to us more clearly the real character of the mythical narratives. They are creations of the productive minds in the community, deduced from the supposed attributes of the gods and heroes: so Plato views them, and in such character he proposes to amend them. The legislator would cause to be prepared a better and truer picture of the foretime, because he would start from truer (that is to say, more creditable) conceptions of the gods and heroes. For Plato rejects the mythes respecting Zeus and Hêrê, or Thêseus and Peirithöus, not

from any want of evidence, but because they are unworthy of gods and heroes: he proposes to call forth new mythes, which, though he admits them at the outset to be fiction, he knows will soon be received as true, and supply more valuable lessons of conduct.

We may consider, then, that Plato disapproves of the attempt to identify the old mythes either with exaggerated history or with disguised philosophy. He shares in the current faith, without any suspicion or criticism, as to Orpheus, Palamêdês, Dædalus, Amphiôn, Thêseus, Achilles, Cheirôn, and other mythical personages;[995] but what chiefly fills his mind is, the inherited sentiment of deep reverence for these superhuman characters and for the age to which they belonged,—a sentiment sufficiently strong to render him not only an unbeliever in such legends as conflict with it, but also a deliberate creator of new legends for the purpose of expanding and gratifying it. The more we examine this sentiment, both in the mind of Plato as well as in that of the Greeks generally, the more shall we be convinced that it formed essentially and inseparably a portion of Hellenic religious faith. The mythe both presupposes, and springs out of, a settled basis, and a strong expansive force of religious, social, and patriotic feeling, operating upon a past which is little better than a blank as to positive knowledge. It resembles history, in so far as its form is narrative; it resembles philosophy, in so far as it is occasionally illustrative; but in its essence and substance, in the mental tendencies by which it is created as well as in those by which it is judged and upheld, it is a popularized expression of the divine and heroic faith of the people.

Grecian antiquity cannot be at all understood except in connection with Grecian religion. It begins with gods and it ends with historical men, the former being recognized not simply as gods, but as primitive ancestors, and connected with the latter by a long mythical genealogy, partly heroic and partly human. Now the whole value of such genealogies arises from their being taken entire; the god or hero at the top is in point of fact the most important member of the whole;[996] for the length and continuity of the series arises from anxiety on the part of historical men to join themselves by a thread of descent with the being whom they worshipped in their gentile sacrifices. Without the ancestorial god, the whole pedigree would have become not only acephalous, but worthless and uninteresting. The pride of the Herakleids, Asklêpiads, Æakids, Nêleids, Dædalids, etc. was attached to the primitive eponymous hero and to the god from whom they sprung, not to the line of names, generally long and barren, through which the divine or heroic dignity gradually dwindled down into common manhood. Indeed, the length of the genealogy (as I have before remarked) was an evidence of the humility of the historical man, which led him to place himself at a respectful distance from the gods or heroes; for Hekatæus of Milêtus, who ranked himself as the fifteenth descendant of a god, might perhaps have accounted it an overweening impiety in any living man to claim a god for his immediate father.

The whole chronology of Greece, anterior to 776 B. C., consists of calculations founded upon these mythical genealogies, especially upon that of the Spartan kings and their descent from Hêraklês,—thirty years being commonly taken as the equivalent of a generation, or about three generations to a century. This process of computation was altogether illusory, as applying historical and chronological conditions to a case on which they had no bearing. Though the domain of history was seemingly enlarged, the religious element was tacitly set aside: when the heroes and gods were chronologized, they became insensibly approximated to the limits of humanity, and the process indirectly gave encouragement to the theory of Euêmerus. Personages originally legendary and poetical were erected into definite landmarks for measuring the duration of the foretime, thus gaining in respect to historical distinctness, but not without loss on the score of religious association. Both Euêmerus and the subsequent Christian writers, who denied the original and inherent divinity of the pagan gods, had a great advantage in carrying their chronological researches strictly and consistently upwards—for all chronology fails as soon as we suppose a race superior to common humanity.

Moreover, it is to be remarked that the pedigree of the Spartan kings, which Apollodôrus and Eratosthenês selected as the basis of their estimate of time, is nowise superior in credibility and trustworthiness to the thousand other gentile and family pedigrees with which Greece abounded; it is rather indeed to be numbered among the most incredible of all, seeing that Hêraklês as a progenitor is placed at the head of perhaps more pedigrees than any other Grecian god or hero.[997] The descent of the Spartan king Leonidas from Hêraklês rests upon no better evidence than that of Aristotle or Hippocratês from Asklêpius,[998]—of Evagoras or Thucydidês from Æakus,—of Socratês from Dædalus,—of the Spartan heraldic family from Talthybius,—of the prophetic Iamid family in Elis from Iamus,—of the root-gatherers in Pêlion from Cheirôn,—and of Hekatæus and his gens from some god in the sixteenth ascending line of the series. There is little exaggeration in saying, indeed, that no permanent combination of men in Greece, religious, social, or professional, was without a similar pedigree; all arising out of the same exigences of the feelings and imagination, to personify as well as to sanctify the bond of union among the members. Every one of these *gentes* began with a religious and ended with an historical person. At some point or other in the upward series, entities of history were exchanged for entities of religion; but where that point is to be found we are unable to say, nor had the wisest of the ancient Greeks any means of determining. Thus much, however, we know, that the series taken as a whole, though dear and precious to the believing Greek, possesses no value as chronological evidence to the historian.

When Hekatæus visited Thêbes in Egypt, he mentioned to the Egyptian priests, doubtless with a feeling of satisfaction and pride, the imposing pedigree of the gens to which he belonged,—with fifteen ancestors in ascending line, and a god as the initial progenitor. But he found himself immeasurably overdone by the priests "who ge-

nealogized against him."[999] They showed to him three hundred and forty-one wooden colossal statues, representing the succession of chief priests in the temple in uninterrupted series from father to son, through a space of 11,300 years. Prior to the commencement of this long period (they said), the gods dwelling along with men, had exercised sway in Egypt; but they repudiated altogether the idea of men begotten by gods or of heroes.[1000]

But these counter-genealogies, are, in respect to trustworthiness and evidence, on the same footing. Each represents partly the religious faith, partly the retrospective imagination, of the persons from whom it emanated; in each, the lower members of the series (to what extent we cannot tell) are real, the upper members fabulous; but in each also the series derived all its interest and all its imposing effect from being conceived unbroken and entire. Herodotus is much perplexed by the capital discrepancy between the Grecian and Egyptian chronologies, and vainly employs his ingenuity in reconciling them. There is no standard of objective evidence by which either the one or the other of them can be tried: each has its own subjective value, in conjunction with the faith and feelings of Egyptians and Greeks, and each presupposes in the believer certain mental prepossessions which are not to be found beyond its own local limits. Nor is the greater or less extent of duration at all important, when we once pass the limits of evidence and verifiable reality. One century of recorded time, adequately studded with authentic and orderly events, presents a greater mass and a greater difficulty of transition to the imagination than a hundred centuries of barren genealogy. Herodotus, in discussing the age of Homer and Hesiod, treats an anterior point of 400 years as if it were only yesterday; the reign of Henry VI. is separated from us by an equal interval, and the reader will not require to be reminded how long that interval now appears.

The mythical age was peopled with a mingled aggregate of gods, heroes, and men, so confounded together that it was often impossible to distinguish to which class any individual name belonged. In regard to the Thracian god Zalmoxis, the Hellespontic Greeks interpreted his character and attributes according to the scheme of Euêmerism. They affirmed that he had been a man, the slave of the philosopher Pythagoras at Samos, and that he had by abilities and artifice established a religious ascendency over the minds of the Thracians, and obtained from them divine honors. Herodotus cannot bring himself to believe this story, but he frankly avows his inability to determine whether Zalmoxis was a god or a man,[1001] nor can he extricate himself from a similar embarrassment in respect to Dionysus and Pan. Amidst the confusion of the Homeric fight, the goddess Athênê confers upon Diomêdês the miraculous favor of dispelling the mist from his eyes, so as to enable him to discriminate gods from men; and nothing less than a similar miracle could enable a critical reader of the mythical narratives to draw an ascertained boundary-line between the two. [1002] But the original hearers of the mythes felt neither surprise nor displeasure from this confusion of the divine with the human individual. They looked at the past with a

film of faith over their eyes—neither knowing the value, nor desiring the attainment, of an unclouded vision. The intimate companionship, and the occasional mistake of identity between gods and men, were in full harmony with their reverential retrospect. And we, accordingly, see the poet Ovid in his Fasti, when he undertakes the task of unfolding the legendary antiquities of early Rome, re-acquiring, by the inspiration of Juno, the power of seeing gods and men in immediate vicinity and conjunct action, such as it existed before the development of the critical and historical sense. [1003]

To resume, in brief, what has been laid down in this and the preceding chapters respecting the Grecian mythes:—

1. They are a special product of the imagination and feelings, radically distinct both from history and philosophy: they cannot be broken down and decomposed into the one, nor allegorized into the other. There are indeed some particular and even assignable mythes, which raise intrinsic presumption of an allegorizing tendency; and there are doubtless some others, though not specially assignable, which contain portions of matter of fact, or names of real persons, embodied in them. But such matter of fact cannot be verified by any intrinsic mark, nor we are entitled to presume its existence in any given case unless some collateral evidence can be produced.

2. We are not warranted in applying to the mythical world the rules either of historical credibility or chronological sequence. Its personages are gods, heroes, and men, in constant juxtaposition and reciprocal sympathy; men, too, of whom we know a large proportion to be fictitious, and of whom we can never ascertain how many may have been real. No series of such personages can serve as materials for chronological calculation.

3. The mythes were originally produced in an age which had no records, no philosophy, no criticism, no canon of belief, and scarcely any tincture either of astronomy or geography—but which, on the other hand, was full of religious faith, distinguished for quick and susceptible imagination, seeing personal agents where we look only for objects and connecting laws;—an age, moreover, eager for new narrative, accepting with the unconscious impressibility of children (the question of truth or falsehood being never formally raised) all which ran in harmony with its pre-existing feelings, and penetrable by inspired prophets and poets in the same proportion that it was indifferent to positive evidence. To such hearers did the primitive poet or story-teller address himself: it was the glory of his productive genius to provide suitable narrative expression for the faith and emotions which he shared in common with them, and the rich stock of Grecian mythes attests how admirably he performed his task. As the gods and the heroes formed the conspicuous object of national reverence, so the mythes were partly divine, partly heroic, partly both in one.[1004] The adventures of Achilles, Helen, and Diomêdês, of Œdipus and Adrastus, of Meleager and Athæa, of Jasôn and the Argô, were recounted by the same tongues, and ac-

cepted with the same unsuspecting confidence, as those of Apollo and Artemis, of Arês and Aphroditê, of Poseidôn and Hêraklês.

4. The time however came, when this plausibility ceased to be complete. The Grecian mind made an important advance, socially, ethically, and intellectually. Philosophy and history were constituted, prose writing and chronological records became familiar; a canon of belief more or less critical came to be tacitly recognized. Moreover, superior men profited more largely by the stimulus, and contracted habits of judging different from the vulgar: the god Elenchus[1005] (to use a personification of Menander) the giver and prover of truth, descended into their minds. Into the new intellectual medium, thus altered in its elements, and no longer uniform in its quality, the mythes descended by inheritance; but they were found, to a certain extent, out of harmony even with the feelings of the people, and altogether dissonant with those of instructed men. But the most superior Greek was still a Greek, and cherished the common reverential sentiment towards the foretime of his country. Though he could neither believe nor respect the mythes as they stood, he was under an imperious mental necessity to transform them into a state worthy of his belief and respect. Whilst the literal mythe still continued to float among the poets and the people, critical men interpreted, altered, decomposed, and added, until they found something which satisfied their minds as a supposed real basis. They manufactured some dogmas of supposed original philosophy, and a long series of fancied history and chronology, retaining the mythical names and generations even when they were obliged to discard or recast the mythical events. The interpreted mythe was thus promoted into a reality, while the literal mythe was degraded into a fiction.[1006]

The habit of distinguishing the interpreted from the literal mythe has passed from the literary men of antiquity to those of the modern world, who have for the most part construed the divine mythes as allegorized philosophy, and the heroic mythes as exaggerated, adorned, and over-colored history. The early ages of Greece have thus been peopled with quasi-historical persons and quasi-historical events, all extracted from the mythes after making certain allowances for poetical ornament. But we must not treat this extracted product as if it were the original substance; we cannot properly understand it except by viewing it in connection with the literal mythes out of which it was obtained, in their primitive age and appropriate medium, before the superior minds had yet outgrown the common faith in an all-personified Nature, and learned to restrict the divine free-agency by the supposition of invariable physical laws. It is in this point of view that the mythes are important for any one who would correctly appreciate the general tone of Grecian thought and feeling; for they were the universal mental stock of the Hellenic world—common to men and women, rich and poor, instructed and ignorant; they were in every one's memory and in every one's mouth,[1007] while science and history were confined to comparatively few. We know from Thucydidês how erroneously and carelessly the Athenian public of his day retained the history of Peisistratus, only one century past;[1008] but the adventures of

the gods and heroes, the numberless explanatory legends attached to visible objects and periodical ceremonies, were the theme of general talk, and any man unacquainted with them would have found himself partially excluded from the sympathy of his neighbors. The theatrical representations, exhibited to the entire city population, and listened to with enthusiastic interest, both presupposed and perpetuated acquaintance with the great lines of heroic fable: indeed, in later times even the pantomimic dancers embraced in their representations the whole field of mythical incident, and their immense success proves at once how popular and how well known such subjects were. The names and attributes of the heroes were incessantly alluded to in the way of illustration, to point out a consoling, admonitory, or repressive moral: the simple mention of any of them sufficed to call up in every one's mind the principal events of his life, and the poet or rhapsode could thus calculate on touching chords not less familiar than susceptible.[1009]

A similar effect was produced by the multiplied religious festivals and processions, as well as by the oracles and prophecies which circulated in every city. The annual departure of the Theôric ship from Athens to the sacred island of Dêlos, kept alive, in the minds of Athenians generally, the legend of Thêseus and his adventurous enterprise in Krete;[1010] and in like manner most of the other public rites and ceremonies were of a commemorative character, deduced from some mythical person or incident familiarly known to natives, and forming to strangers a portion of the curiosities of the place.[1011] During the period of Grecian subjection under the Romans, these curiosities, together with their works of art and their legends, were especially clung to as a set-off against present degradation. The Thêban citizen who found himself restrained from the liberty enjoyed by all other Greeks, of consulting Amphiaräus as a prophet, though the sanctuary and chapel of the hero stood in his own city—could not be satisfied without a knowledge of the story which explained the origin of such prohibition,[1012] and which conducted him back to the originally hostile relations between Amphiaräus and Thêbes. Nor can we suppose among the citizens of Sikyôn anything less than a perfect and reverential conception of the legend of Thêbes, when we read the account given by Herodotus of the conduct of the despot Kleisthenês in regard to Adrastus and Melanippus.[1013] The Trœzenian youths and maidens,[1014] who universally, when on the eve of marriage, consecrated an offering of their hair at the Herôon of Hippolytus, maintained a lively recollection of the legend of that unhappy recusant whom Aphroditê had so cruelly punished. Abundant relics preserved in many Grecian cities and temples, served both as mementos and attestations of other legendary events; and the tombs of the heroes counted among the most powerful stimulants of mythical reminiscence. The sceptre of Pelops and Agamemnôn, still preserved in the days of Pausanias at Chæroneia in Bœôtia, was the work of the god Hêphæstos. While many other alleged productions of the same divine hand were preserved in different cities of Greece, this is the only one which Pausanias himself believed to be genuine: it had been carried by Elektra, daughter of Agamemnôn to Phôkis, and received divine honors from the citizens of Chæroneia.

[1015] The spears of Mêrionês and Odysseus were treasured up at Engyium in Sicily, that of Achilles at Phasêlis; the sword of Memnôn adorned the temple of Asklêpius at Nicomêdia; and Pausanias, with unsuspecting confidence, adduces the two latter as proofs that the arms of the heroes were made of brass.[1016] The hide of the Kalydônian boar was guarded and shown by the Tegeates as a precious possession; the shield of Euphorbus was in like manner suspended in the temple of Branchidæ near Milêtus, as well as in the temple of Hêrê in Argos. Visible relics of Epeius and Philoktêtês were not wanting, while Strabo raises his voice with indignation against the numerous Palladia which were shown in different cities, each pretending to be the genuine image from Troy.[1017] It would be impossible to specify the number of chapels, sanctuaries, solemnities, foundations of one sort or another, said to have been first commenced by heroic or mythical personages,—by Hêraklês, Jasôn, Mêdea, Alkmæôn, Diomêdês, Odysseus, Danaus, and his daughters,[1018] etc. Perhaps in some of these cases particular critics might raise objections, but the great bulk of the people entertained a firm and undoubted belief in the current legend.

If we analyze the intellectual acquisitions of a common Grecian townsman, from the rude communities of Arcadia or Phôkis even up to the enlightened Athens, we shall find that, over and above the rules of art or capacities requisite for his daily wants, it consisted chiefly of the various mythes connected with his gens, his city, his religious festivals, and the mysteries in which he might have chosen to initiate himself, as well as with the works of art and the more striking natural objects which he might see around him,—the whole set off and decorated by some knowledge of the epic and dramatic poets. Such was the intellectual and imaginative reach of an ordinary Greek, considered apart from the instructed few: it was an aggregate of religion, of social and patriotic retrospect, and of romantic fancy, blended into one indivisible faith. And thus the subjective value of the mythes, looking at them purely as elements of Grecian thought and feeling, will appear indisputably great, however little there may be of objective reality, either historical or philosophical, discoverable under them.

Nor must we omit the incalculable importance of the mythes as stimulants to the imagination of the Grecian artist in sculpture, in painting, in carving, and in architecture. From the divine and heroic legends and personages were borrowed those paintings, statues, and reliefs, which rendered the temples, porticos, and public buildings, at Athens and elsewhere, objects of surpassing admiration; and such visible reproduction contributed again to fix the types of the gods and heroes familiarly and indelibly on the public mind.[1019] The figures delineated on cups and vases, as well as on the walls of private houses, were chiefly drawn from the same source—the mythes being the great storehouse of artistic scenes and composition.

To enlarge on the characteristic excellence of Grecian art would here be out of place: I regard it only in so far as, having originally drawn its materials from the mythes, it reacted upon the mythical faith and imagination—the reaction imparting

strength to the former as well as distinctness to the latter. To one who saw constantly before him representations of the battles of the Centaurs or the Amazons, [1020] of the exploits performed by Perseus and Bellerophôn, of the incidents composing the Trojan war or the Kalydônian boar-hunt—the process of belief, even in the more fantastic of these conceptions, became easy in proportion as the conception was familiarized. And if any person had been slow to believe in the efficacy of the prayers of Æakus, whereby that devout hero once obtained special relief from Zeus, at a moment when Greece was perishing with long-continued sterility, his doubts would probably vanish when, on visiting the Æakeion at Ægina, there were exhibited to him the statues of the very envoys who had come on the behalf of the distressed Greeks to solicit that Æakus would pray for them.[1021] A Grecian temple[1022] was not simply a place of worship, but the actual dwelling-place of a god, who was believed to be introduced by the solemn dedicatory ceremony, and whom the imagination of the people identified in the most intimate manner with his statue. The presence or removal of the statue was conceived as identical with that of the being represented,—and while the statue was solemnly washed, dressed, and tended with all the respectful solicitude which would have been bestowed upon a real person,[1023] miraculous tales were often rife respecting the manifestation of real internal feeling in the wood and the marble. At perilous or critical moments, the statue was affirmed to have sweated, to have wept, to have closed its eyes, or brandished the spear in its hands, in token of sympathy or indignation.[1024] Such legends, springing up usually in times of suffering and danger, and finding few men bold enough openly to contradict them, ran in complete harmony with the general mythical faith, and tended to strengthen it in all its various ramifications. The renewed activity of the god or hero both brought to mind and accredited the preëxisting mythes connected with his name. When Boreas, during the invasion of Greece by Xerxês, and in compliance with the fervent prayers of the Athenians, had sent forth a providential storm, to the irreparable damage of the Persian armada,[1025] the sceptical minority (alluded to by Plato), who doubted the mythe of Boreas and Oreithyia, and his close connection thus acquired with Erechtheus, and the Erechtheids generally, must for the time have been reduced to absolute silence.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE GRECIAN MYTHICAL VEIN COMPARED WITH THAT OF MODERN EUROPE.

I HAVE already remarked that the existence of that popular narrative talk, which the Germans express by the significant word *Sage* or *Volks-Sage*, in a greater or less degree of perfection or development, is a phænomenon common to almost all stages of society and to almost all quarters of the globe. It is the natural effusion of the unlettered, imaginative, and believing man, and its maximum of influence belongs to an early state of the human mind; for the multiplication of recorded facts, the diffusion of positive science, and the formation of a critical standard of belief, tend to discredit its dignity and to repress its easy and abundant flow. It supplies to the poet both materials to recombine and adorn, and a basis as well as a stimulus for further inventions of his own; and this at a time when the poet is religious teacher, historian, and philosopher, all in one,—not, as he becomes at a more advanced period, the mere purveyor of avowed, though interesting, fiction.

Such popular stories, and such historical songs (meaning by historical, simply that which is accepted as history) are found in most quarters of the globe, and especially among the Teutonic and Celtic populations of early Europe. The old Gothic songs were cast into a continuous history by the historian Ablavius;[1026] and the poems of the Germans respecting Tuisto the earth-born god, his son Mannus, and his descendants the eponyms of the various German tribes,[1027] as they are briefly described by Tacitus, remind us of Hesiod, or Eumêlus, or the Homeric Hymns. Jacob Grimm, in his learned and valuable Deutsche Mythologie, has exhibited copious evidence of the great fundamental analogy, along with many special differences, between the German, Scandinavian, and Grecian mythical world; and the Dissertation of Mr. Price (prefixed to his edition of Warton's History of English Poetry) sustains and illustrates Grimm's view. The same personifying imagination—the same ever-present conception of the will, sympathies, and antipathies of the gods as the producing causes of phænomena, and as distinguished from a course of nature with its invariable sequence—the same relations between gods, heroes, and men, with the like difficulty of discriminating the one from the other in many individual names—a similar wholesale transfer of human attributes to the gods, with the absence of human limits and liabilities—a like belief in Nymphs, Giants, and other beings, neither gods nor men—the same coalescence of the religious with the patriotic feeling and faith—these are positive features common to the early Greeks with the early Germans: and the negative conditions of the two are not less analogous—the absence of prose writing, positive records, and scientific culture. The preliminary basis and encouragements for the mythopœic faculty were thus extremely similar.

But though the prolific forces were the same in kind, the results were very different in degree, and the developing circumstances were more different still.

First, the abundance, the beauty, and the long continuance of early Grecian poetry, in the purely poetical age, is a phænomenon which has no parallel elsewhere.

Secondly, the transition of the Greek mind from its poetical to its comparatively positive state was self-operated, accomplished by its own inherent and expansive force—aided indeed, but by no means either impressed or provoked, from without. From the poetry of Homer, to the history of Thucydidês and the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, was a prodigious step, but it was the native growth of the Hellenic youth into an Hellenic man; and what is of still greater moment, it was brought about without breaking the thread either of religious or patriotic tradition—without any coercive innovation or violent change in the mental feelings. The legendary world, though the ethical judgments and rational criticisms of superior men had outgrown it, still retained its hold upon their feelings as an object of affectionate and reverential retrospect.

Far different from this was the development of the early Germans. We know little about their early poetry, but we shall run no risk of error in affirming that they had nothing to compare with either Iliad or Odyssey. Whether, if left to themselves, they would have possessed sufficient progressive power to make a step similar to that of the Greeks, is a question which we cannot answer. Their condition, mental as well as political, was violently changed by a foreign action from without. The influence of the Roman empire introduced artificially among them new institutions, new opinions, habits, and luxuries, and, above all, a new religion; the Romanized Germans becoming themselves successively the instruments of this revolution with regard to such of their brethren as still remained heathen. It was a revolution often brought about by penal and coercive means: the old gods Thor and Woden were formally deposed and renounced, their images were crumbled into dust, and the sacred oaks of worship and prophecy hewn down. But even where conversion was the fruit of preaching and persuasion, it did not the less break up all the associations of a German with respect to that mythical world which he called his past, and of which the ancient gods constituted both the charm and the sanctity: he had now only the alternative of treating them either as men or as dæmons.[1028] That mixed religious and patriotic retrospect, formed by the coalescence of piety with ancestral feeling, which constituted the appropriate sentiment both of Greeks and of Germans towards their unrecorded antiquity, was among the latter banished by Christianity: and while the root of the old mythes was thus cankered, the commemorative ceremonies and customs with which they were connected, either lost their consecrated character or disappeared altogether. Moreover, new influences of great importance were at the same time brought to bear. The Latin language, together with some tinge of Latin literature—the habit of writing and of recording present events—the idea of a systematic law and pacific adjudication of disputes,—all these formed a part of the general working

of Roman civilization, even after the decline of the Roman empire, upon the Teutonic and Celtic tribes. A class of specially-educated men was formed, upon a Latin basis and upon Christian principles, consisting too almost entirely of priests, who were opposed, as well by motives of rivalry as by religious feeling, to the ancient bards and storytellers of the community: the "lettered men"[1029] were constituted apart from "the men of story," and Latin literature contributed along with religion to sink the mythes of untaught heathenism. Charlemagne, indeed, at the same time that he employed aggressive and violent proceedings to introduce Christianity among the Saxons, also took special care to commit to writing and preserve the old heathen songs. But there can be little doubt that this step was the suggestion of a large and enlightened understanding peculiar to himself. The disposition general among lettered Christians of that age is more accurately represented by his son Louis le Debonnaire, who, having learned these songs as a boy, came to abhor them when he arrived at mature years, and could never be induced either to repeat or tolerate them.[1030]

According to the old heathen faith, the pedigree of the Saxon, Anglian, Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish kings,—probably also those of the German and Scandinavian kings generally,—was traced to Odin, or to some of his immediate companions or heroic sons.[1031] I have already observed that the value of these genealogies consisted not so much in their length, as in the reverence attached to the name serving as primitive source. After the worship attached to Odin had been extinguished, the genealogical line was lengthened up to Japhet or Noah,—and Odin, no longer accounted worthy to stand at the top, was degraded into one of the simple human members of it.[1032] And we find this alteration of the original mythical genealogies to have taken place even among the Scandinavians, although the introduction of Christianity was in those parts both longer deferred, so as to leave time for a more ample development of the heathen poetical vein—and seems to have created a less decided feeling of antipathy (especially in Iceland) towards the extinct faith.[1033] The poems and tales composing the Edda, though first committed to writing after the period of Christianity, do not present the ancient gods in a point of view intentionally odious or degrading.

The transposition above alluded to, of the genealogical root from Odin to Noah, is the more worthy of notice, as it illustrates the genuine character of these genealogies, and shows that they sprung, not from any erroneous historical data, but from the turn of the religious feeling; also that their true value is derived from their being taken entire, as connecting the existing race of men with a divine original. If we could imagine that Grecian paganism had been superseded by Christianity in the year 500 B. C., the great and venerated gentile genealogies of Greece would have undergone the like modification; the Herakleids, Pelopids, Æakids, Asklêpiads, etc., would have been merged in some larger aggregate branching out from the archæology of the Old Testament. The old heroic legends connected with these ancestral names would either have been forgotten, or so transformed as to suit the new vein of

thought; for the altered worship, ceremonies, and customs would have been altogether at variance with them, and the mythical feeling would have ceased to dwell upon those to whom prayers were no longer offered. If the oak of Dôdôna had been cut down, or the Theôric ship had ceased to be sent from Athens to Dêlos, the mythes of Theseus and of the two black doves would have lost their pertinence, and died away. As it was, the change from Homer to Thucydidês and Aristotle took place internally, gradually, and imperceptibly. Philosophy and history were superinduced in the minds of the superior few, but the feelings of the general public continued unshaken—the sacred objects remained the same both to the eye and to the heart—and the worship of the ancient gods was even adorned by new architects and sculptors who greatly strengthened its imposing effect.

While then in Greece the mythopœic stream continued in the same course, only with abated current and influence, in modern Europe its ancient bed was blocked up, and it was turned into new and divided channels. The old religion—though as an ascendent faith, unanimously and publicly manifested, it became extinct—still continued in detached scraps and fragments, and under various alterations of name and form. The heathen gods and goddesses, deprived as they were of divinity, did not pass out of the recollection and fears of their former worshippers, but were sometimes represented (on principles like those of Euêmerus) as having been eminent and glorious men—sometimes degraded into dæmons, magicians, elfs, fairies, and other supernatural agents, of an inferior grade and generally mischievous cast. Christian writers, such as Saxo Grammaticus and Snorro Sturleson, committed to writing the ancient oral songs of the Scandinavian Scalds, and digested the events contained in them into continuous narrative—performing in this respect a task similar to that of the Grecian logographers Pherekydês and Hellanikus, in reference to Hesiod and the Cyclic poets. But while Pherekydês and Hellanikus compiled under the influence of feelings substantially the same as those of the poets on whom they bestowed their care, the Christian logographers felt it their duty to point out the Odin and Thor of the old Scalds as evil dæmons, or cunning enchanters, who had fascinated the minds of men into a false belief in their divinity.[1034] In some cases, the heathen recitals and ideas were modified so as to suit Christian feeling. But when preserved without such a change, they exhibited themselves palpably, and were designated by their compilers, as at variance with the religious belief of the people, and as associated either with imposture or with evil spirits.

A new vein of sentiment had arisen in Europe, unsuitable indeed to the old mythes, yet leaving still in force the demand for mythical narrative generally. And this demand was satisfied, speaking generally, by two classes of narratives,—the legends of the Catholic Saints and the Romances of Chivalry, corresponding to two types of character, both perfectly accommodated to the feelings of the time,—the saintly ideal and the chivalrous ideal.

Both these two classes of narrative correspond, in character as well as in general purpose, to the Grecian mythes—being stories accepted as realities, from their full conformity with the predispositions and deep-seated faith of an uncritical audience, and prepared beforehand by their authors, not with any reference to the conditions of historical proof, but for the purpose of calling forth sympathy, emotion, or reverence. The type of the saintly character belongs to Christianity, being the history of Jesus Christ as described in the gospels, and that of the prophets in the Old Testament; whilst the lives of holy men, who acquired a religious reputation from the fourth to the fourteenth century of the Christian æra, were invested with attributes, and illustrated with ample details, tending to assimilate them to this revered model. The numerous miracles, the cure of diseases, the expulsion of dæmons, the temptations and sufferings, the teachings and commands, with which the biography of Catholic saints abounds, grew chiefly out of this pious feeling, common to the writer and to his readers. Many of the other incidents, recounted in the same performances, take their rise from misinterpreted allegories, from ceremonies and customs of which it was pleasing to find a consecrated origin, or from the disposition to convert the etymology of a name into matter of history: many have also been suggested by local peculiarities, and by the desire of stimulating or justifying the devotional emotions of pilgrims who visited some consecrated chapel or image. The dove was connected, in the faith of the age, with the Holy Ghost, the serpent with Satan; lions, wolves, stags, unicorns, etc. were the subjects of other emblematic associations; and such modes of belief found expression for themselves in many narratives which brought the saints into conflict or conjoint action with these various animals. Legends of this kind, so indefinitely multiplied and so preëminently popular and affecting, in the Middle Ages, are not exaggerations of particular matters of fact, but emanations in detail of some current faith or feeling, which they served to satisfy, and by which they were in turn amply sustained and accredited.[1035]

Every reader of Pausanias will recognize the great general analogy between the stories recounted to him at the temples which he visited, and these legends of the Middle Ages. Though the type of character which the latter illustrate is indeed materially different, yet the source as well as the circulation, the generating as well as the sustaining forces, were in both cases the same. Such legends were the natural growth of a religious faith, earnest, unexamining, and interwoven with the feelings at a time when the reason does not need to be cheated. The lives of the Saints bring us even back to the simple and ever-operative theology of the Homeric age; so constantly is the hand of God exhibited even in the minutest details, for the succor of a favored individual,—so completely is the scientific point of view, respecting the phænomena of nature, absorbed into the religious.[1036] During the intellectual vigor of Greece and Rome, a sense of the invariable course of nature and of the scientific explanation of phænomena had been created among the superior minds, and through them indirectly among the remaining community; thus limiting to a certain extent the ground open to be occupied by a religious legend. With the decline of the

pagan literature and philosophy, before the sixth century of the Christian æra, this scientific conception gradually passed out of sight, and left the mind free to a religious interpretation of nature not less simple and *naïf* than that which had prevailed under the Homeric paganism.[1037] The great religious movement of the Reformation, and the gradual formation, of critical and philosophical habits in the modern mind, have caused these legends of the Saints,—once the charm and cherished creed of a numerous public,[1038] to pass altogether out of credit, without even being regarded, among Protestants at least, as worthy of a formal scrutiny into the evidence,—a proof of the transitory value of public belief, however sincere and fervent, as a certificate of historical truth, if it be blended with religious predispositions.

The same mythopœic vein, and the same susceptibility and facility of belief, which had created both supply and demand for the legends of the Saints, also provided the abundant stock of romantic narrative poetry, in amplification and illustration of the chivalrous ideal. What the legends of Troy, of Thêbes, of the Kalydônian boar, of Œdipus, Thêseus, etc. were to an early Greek, the tales of Arthur, of Charlemagne, of the Niebelungen, were to an Englishman, or Frenchman, or German, of the twelfth or thirteenth century. They were neither recognized fiction nor authenticated history: they were history, as it is felt and welcomed by minds unaccustomed to investigate evidence, and unconscious of the necessity of doing so. That the Chronicle of Turpin, a mere compilation of poetical legends respecting Charlemagne, was accepted as genuine history, and even pronounced to be such by papal authority, is well known; and the authors of the Romances announce themselves, not less than those of the old Grecian epic, as being about to recount real matter of fact.[1039] It is certain that Charlemagne is a great historical name, and it is possible, though not certain, that the name of Arthur may be historical also. But the Charlemagne of history, and the Charlemagne of romance, have little except the name in common nor could we ever determine, except by independent evidence (which in this case we happen to possess), whether Charlemagne was a real or a fictitious person.[1040] That illustrious name, as well as the more problematical Arthur, is taken up by the romancers, not with a view to celebrate realities previously verified, but for the purpose of setting forth or amplifying an ideal of their own, in such manner as both to rouse the feelings and captivate the faith of their hearers.

To inquire which of the personages of the Carlovingian epic were real and which were fictitious,—to examine whether the expedition ascribed to Charlemagne against Jerusalem had ever taken place or not,—to separate truth from exaggeration in the exploits of the Knights of the Round Table,—these were problems which an audience of that day had neither disposition to undertake nor means to resolve. They accepted the narrative as they heard it, without suspicion or reserve; the incidents related, as well as the connecting links between them, were in full harmony with their feelings, and gratifying as well to their sympathies as to their curiosity: nor was anything far-

ther wanting to induce them to believe it, though the historical basis might be ever so slight or even non-existent.[1041]

The romances of chivalry represented, to those who heard them, real deeds of the foretime—"glories of the foregone men," to use the Hesiodic expression[1042]—at the same time that they embodied and filled up the details of an heroic ideal, such as that age could conceive and admire—a fervent piety, combined with strength, bravery, and the love of adventurous aggression, directed sometimes against infidels, sometimes against enchanters or monsters, sometimes in defence of the fair sex. Such characteristics wore naturally popular, in a century of feudal struggles and universal insecurity, when the grand subjects of common respect and interest were the Church and the Crusades, and when the latter especially were embraced with an enthusiasm truly astonishing.

The long German poem of the Niebelungen Lied, as well as the Volsunga Saga and a portion of the songs of the Edda, relate to a common fund of mythical, superhuman personages, and of fabulous adventure, identified with the earliest antiquity of the Teutonic and Scandinavian race, and representing their primitive sentiment towards ancestors of divine origin. Sigurd, Brynhilde, Gudrun, and Atle, are mythical characters celebrated as well by the Scandinavian Scalds as by the German epic poets, but with many varieties and separate additions to distinguish the one from the other. The German epic, later and more elaborated, includes various persons not known to the songs in the Edda, in particular the prominent name of Dieterich of Bern—presenting, moreover, the principal characters and circumstances as Christian, while in the Edda there is no trace of anything but heathenism. There is, indeed, in this the old and heathen version, a remarkable analogy with many points of Grecian mythical narrative. As in the case of the short life of Achilles, and of the miserable Labdakids of Thêbes—so in the family of the Volsungs, though sprung from and protected by the gods—a curse of destiny hangs upon them and brings on their ruin, in spite of preëminent personal qualities.[1043] The more thoroughly this old Teutonic story has been traced and compared, in its various transformations and accompaniments, the less can any well-established connection be made out for it with authentic historical names or events. We must acquiesce in its personages as distinct in original conception from common humanity, and as belonging to the subjective mythical world of the race by whom they were sung.

Such were the compositions which not only interested the emotions, but also satisfied the undistinguishing historical curiosity, of the ordinary public in the middle ages. The exploits of many of these romantic heroes resemble in several points those of the Grecian: the adventures of Perseus, Achilles, Odysseus, Atalanta, Bellerophôn, Jasôn, and the Trojan war, or Argonautic expedition generally, would have fitted in perfectly to the Carlovingian or other epics of the period.[1044] That of the middle ages, like the Grecian, was eminently expansive in its nature: new stories were successively attached to the names and companions of Charlemagne and Arthur, just as

the legend of Troy was enlarged by Arktinus, Leschês, and Stesichorus,—that of Thêbes, by fresh miseries entailed on the fated head of Œdipus,—and that of the Kalydônian boar, by the addition of Atalanta. Altogether, the state of mind of the hearers seems in both cases to have been much the same,—eager for emotion and sympathy, and receiving any narrative attuned to their feelings, not merely with hearty welcome, but also with unsuspecting belief.

Nevertheless, there were distinctions deserving of notice, which render the foregoing proposition more absolutely exact with regard to Greece than with regard to the middle ages. The tales of the epic, and the mythes in their most popular and extended signification, were the only intellectual nourishment with which the Grecian public was supplied, until the sixth century before the Christian æra: there was no prose writing, no history, no philosophy. But such was not exactly the case at the time when the epic of the middle ages appeared. At that time, a portion of society possessed the Latin language, the habit of writing, and some tinge both of history and philosophy: there were a series of chronicles, scanty, indeed, and imperfect, but referring to contemporary events and preventing the real history of the past from passing into oblivion: there were even individual scholars, in the twelfth century, whose acquaintance with Latin literature was sufficiently considerable to enlarge their minds and to improve their judgments. Moreover, the epic of the middle ages, though deeply imbued with religious ideas, was not directly amalgamated with the religion of the people, and did not always find favor with the clergy; while the heroes of the Grecian epic were not only linked in a thousand ways with existing worship, practices, and sacred localities, but Homer and Hesiod pass with Herodotus for the constructors of Grecian theology. We thus see that the ancient epic was both exempt from certain distracting influences by which that of the middle ages was surrounded, and more closely identified with the veins of thought and feeling prevalent in the Grecian public. Yet these counteracting influences did not prevent Pope Calixtus II. from declaring the Chronicle of Turpin to be a genuine history.

If we take the history of our own country as it was conceived and written from the twelfth to the seventeenth century by Hardyng, Fabyan, Grafton, Hollinshed, and others, we shall find that it was supposed to begin with Brute the Trojan, and was carried down from thence, for many ages and through a long succession of kings, to the times of Julius Cæsar. A similar belief of descent from Troy, arising seemingly from a reverential imitation of the Romans and of their Trojan origin, was cherished in the fancy of other European nations. With regard to the English, the chief circulator of it was Geoffrey of Monmouth, and it passed with little resistance or dispute into the national faith—the kings from Brute downward being enrolled in regular chronological series with their respective dates annexed. In a dispute which took place during the reign of Edward I. (A. D. 1301) between England and Scotland, the descent of the kings of England from Brute the Trojan was solemnly embodied in a document put forth to sustain the rights of the crown of England, as an argument

bearing on the case then in discussion: and it passed without attack from the opposing party,[1045]—an incident which reminds us of the appeal made by Æschinês, in the contention between the Athenians and Philip of Macedôn, respecting Amphipolis, to the primitive dotal rights of Akamas son of Thêseus—and also of the defence urged by the Athenians to sustain their conquest of Sigeium, against the reclamations of the Mitylenæans, therein the former alleged that they had as much right to the place as any of the other Greeks who had formed part of the victorious armament of Agamemnôn.[1046]

The tenacity with which this early series of British kings was defended, is no less remarkable than the facility with which it was admitted. The chroniclers at the beginning of the seventeenth century warmly protested against the intrusive scepticism which would cashier so many venerable sovereigns and efface so many noble deeds. They appealed to the patriotic feelings of their hearers, represented the enormity of thus setting up a presumptuous criticism against the belief of ages, and insisted on the danger of the precedent as regarded history generally.[1047] How this controversy stood, at the time and in the view of the illustrious author of Paradise Lost, I shall give in his own words, as they appear in the second page of his History of England. After having briefly touched upon the stories of Samothes son of Japhet, Albion son of Neptune, etc., he proceeds:—

"But now of Brutus and his line, with the whole progeny of kings to the entrance of Julius Cæsar, we cannot so easily be discharged: descents of ancestry long continued, laws and exploits not plainly seeming to be borrowed or devised, which on the common belief have wrought no small impression: *defended by many, denied utterly by few*. For what though Brutus and the whole Trojan pretence were yielded up, seeing they, who first devised to bring us some noble ancestor, were content at first with Brutus the Consul, till better invention, though not willing to forego the name, taught them to remove it higher into a more fabulous age, and by the same remove lighting on the Trojan tales, in affectation to make the Briton of one original with the Roman, pitched there: *Yet those old and inborn kings, never any to have been real persons, or done in their lives at least some part of what so long hath been remembered, cannot be thought without too strict incredulity.* For these, and those causes above mentioned, that which hath received approbation from so many, I have chosen not to omit. Certain or uncertain, be that upon the credit of those whom I must follow: *so far as keeps aloof from impossible or absurd*, attested by ancient writers from books more ancient, I refuse not, as the due and proper subject of story."[1048]

Yet in spite of the general belief of so many centuries—in spite of the concurrent persuasion of historians and poets—in spite of the declaration of Milton, extorted from his feelings rather than from his reason, that this long line of quasi-historical kings and exploits could not be *all* unworthy of belief—in spite of so large a body of authority and precedent, the historians of the nineteenth century begin the history of England with Julius Cæsar. They do not attempt either to settle the date of king

Bladud's accession, or to determine what may be the basis of truth in the affecting narrative of Lear.[1049] The standard of historical credibility, especially with regard to modern events, has indeed been greatly and sensibly raised within the last hundred years.

But in regard to ancient Grecian history, the rules of evidence still continue relaxed. The dictum of Milton, regarding the ante-Cæsarian history of England, still represents pretty exactly the feeling now prevalent respecting the mythical history of Greece: "Yet those old and inborn kings (Agamemnôn, Achilles, Odysseus, Jasôn, Adrastus, Amphiaräus, Meleager, etc.), never any to have been real persons, or done in their lives at least some part of what so long hath been remembered, cannot be thought without too strict incredulity." Amidst much fiction (we are still told), there must be some truth: but how is such truth to be singled out? Milton does not even attempt to make the severance: he contents himself with "keeping aloof from the impossible and the absurd," and ends in a narrative which has indeed the merit of being sober-colored, but which he never for a moment thinks of recommending to his readers as true. So in regard to the legends of Greece,—Troy, Thêbes, the Argonauts, the Boar of Kalydôn, Hêraklês, Thêseus, Œdipus,—the conviction still holds in men's minds, that there must be something true at the bottom; and many readers of this work may be displeased, I fear, not to see conjured up before them the Eidôlon of an authentic history, even though the vital spark of evidence be altogether wanting. [1050]

I presume to think that our great poet has proceeded upon mistaken views with respect to the old British fables, not less in that which he leaves out than in that which he retains. To omit the miraculous and the fantastic, (it is that which he really means by "the impossible and the absurd,") is to suck the lifeblood out of these once popular narratives,—to divest them at once both of their genuine distinguishing mark, and the charm by which they acted on the feelings of believers. Still less ought we to consent to break up and disenchant in a similar manner the mythes of ancient Greece,—partly because they possess the mythical beauties and characteristics in far higher perfection, partly because they sank deeper into the mind of a Greek, and pervaded both the public and private sentiment of the country to a much greater degree than the British fables in England.

Two courses, and two only, are open; either to pass over the mythes altogether, which is the way in which modern historians treat the old British fables, or else to give an account of them as mythes; to recognize and respect their specific nature, and to abstain from confounding them with ordinary and certifiable history. There are good reasons for pursuing this second method in reference to the Grecian mythes; and when so considered, they constitute an important chapter in the history of the Grecian mind, and indeed in that of the human race generally. The historical faith of the Greeks, as well as that of other people, in reference to early and unrecorded times, is as much subjective and peculiar to themselves as their religious faith:

among the Greeks, especially, the two are confounded with an intimacy which nothing less than great violence can disjoin. Gods, heroes, and men—religion and patriotism—matters divine, heroic, and human—were all woven together by the Greeks into one indivisible web, in which the threads of truth and reality, whatever they might originally have been, were neither intended to be, nor were actually, distinguishable. Composed of such materials, and animated by the electric spark of genius, the mythical antiquities of Greece formed a whole at once trustworthy and captivating to the faith and feelings of the people; but neither trustworthy nor captivating, when we sever it from these subjective conditions, and expose its naked elements to the scrutiny of an objective criticism. Moreover, the separate portions of Grecian mythical foretime ought to be considered with reference to that aggregate of which they form a part: to detach the divine from the heroic legends, or some one of the heroic legends from the remainder, as if there were an essential and generic difference between them, is to present the whole under an erroneous point of view. The mythes of Troy and Thêbes are no more to be handled objectively, with a view to detect an historical base, than those of Zeus in Krête, of Apollo and Artemis in Dêlos, of Hermês, or of Promêtheus. To single out the Siege of Troy from the other mythes, as if it were entitled to preëminence as an ascertained historical and chronological event, is a proceeding which destroys the true character and coherence of the mythical world: we only transfer the story (as has been remarked in the preceding chapter) from a class with which it is connected by every tie both of common origin and fraternal affinity, to another with which it has no relationship, except such as violent and gratuitous criticism may enforce.

By drawing this marked distinction between the mythical and the historical world,—between matter appropriate only for subjective history, and matter in which objective evidence is attainable,—we shall only carry out to its proper length the just and well-known position long ago laid down by Varro. That learned man recognized three distinguishable periods in the time preceding his own age: "First, the time from the beginning of mankind down to the first deluge; a time wholly unknown. Secondly, the period from the first deluge down to the first Olympiad, which is called *the mythical period*, because many fabulous things are recounted in it. Thirdly, the time from the first Olympiad down to ourselves, which is called *the historical period*, because the things done in it are comprised in true histories."[1051]

Taking the commencement of true or objective history at the point indicated by Varro, I still consider the mythical and historical periods to be separated by a wider gap than he would have admitted. To select any one year as an absolute point of commencement, is of course not to be understood literally: but in point of fact, this is of very little importance in reference to the present question, seeing that the great mythical events—the sieges of Thêbes and Troy, the Argonautic expedition, the Kalydônian boar-hunt, the Return of the Hêrakleids, etc.—are all placed long anterior to the first Olympiad, by those who have applied chronological boundaries to the mythi-

cal narratives. The period immediately preceding the first Olympiad is one exceedingly barren of events; the received chronology recognizes four hundred years, and Herodotus admitted five hundred years, from that date back to the Trojan war.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Xenophon, Repub. Lacedæmon. cap. xiii. 3. Ἀεὶ δὲ, ὅταν θύηται, ἄρχεται μὲν τούτου τοῦ ἔργου ἔτι κνεφαῖος, προλαμβάνειν βουλόμενος τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ εὔνοιαν.

[2] It is sufficient, here, to state this position briefly: more will be said respecting the allegorizing interpretation in a future chapter.

[3] See Iliad, viii. 405, 463; xv. 20, 130, 185. Hesiod, Theog. 885.

This unquestioned supremacy is the general representation of Zeus: at the same time the conspiracy of Hêrê, Poseidôn, and Athênê against him, suppressed by the unexpected apparition of Briareus as his ally, is among the exceptions. (Iliad, i. 400.) Zeus is at one time vanquished by Titan, but rescued by Hermês. (Apollodôr. i. 6, 3).

[4] Arist. Polit. i. 1. ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἑαυτοῖς ἀφομοιοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι, οὕτως καὶ τοὺς βίους, τῶν θεῶν.

[5] Hesiod, Theog. 116. Apollodôrus begins with Uranos and Gæa (i. 1.); he does not recognize Erôs, Nyx, or Erebos.

[6] Hesiod, Theog. 140, 156. Apollod. *ut sup.*

[7] Hesiod, Theog. 160, 182. Apollod. i. 1, 4.

[8] Hesiod, Theog. 192. This legend respecting the birth of Aphroditê seems to have been derived partly from her name (ἀφρὸς, *foam*), partly from the surname Urania, Ἀφροδίτη Οὐρανία, under which she was so very extensively worshipped, especially both in Cyprus and Cythêra, seemingly originated in both islands by the Phœnicians. Herodot. i. 105. Compare the instructive section in Boeckh's Metrologie, c. iv. § 4.

[9] Hesiod, Theog. 452, 487. Apollod. i. 1, 6.

[10] Hesiod, Theog. 498.—

> Τὸν μὲν Ζεὺς στήριξε κατὰ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης
>
> Πυθοῖ ἐν ἠγαθέῃ, γυάλοις ὑπὸ Παρνησσοῖο,
>
> Σῆμ᾽ ἔμεν ἐξοπίσω, θαῦμα θνητοῖσι βροτοῖσι.

[11] Hesiod, Theog. 212-232.

[12] Hesiod, Theog. 240-320. Apollodôr. i. 2, 6, 7.

[13] Hesiod, Theog. 385-403.

[14] Hesiod, Theog. 140, 624, 657. Apollodôr. i. 2, 4.

[15] The battle with the Titans, Hesiod, Theog. 627-735. Hesiod mentions nothing about the Gigantes and the Gigantomachia: Apollodôrus, on the other hand, gives this latter in some detail, but despatches the Titans in a few words (i. 2, 4; i. 6, 1). The Gigantes seem to be only a second edition of the Titans,—a sort of duplication to which the legendary poets were often inclined.

[16] Hesiod, Theog. 820-869. Apollod. i. 6, 3. He makes Typhôn very nearly victorious over Zeus. Typhôeus, according to Hesiod, is father of the irregular, violent, and mischievous winds: Notus, Boreas, Argestês and Zephyrus, are of divine origin (870).

[17] Hesiod, Theog. 885-900.

[18] Apollod. i. 3, 6.

[19] Hesiod, Theog. 900-944.

[20] Homer, Iliad, xviii. 397.

[21] See Burckhardt, Homer, und Hesiod. Mythologie, sect. 102. (Leipz. 1844).

[22] Λιμὸς—*Hunger*—is a person, in Hesiod, Opp. Di. 299.

[23] See Göttling, Præfat. ad Hesiod. p. 23.

[24] Iliad, xiv. 249; xix. 259. Odyss. v. 184. Oceanus and Têthys seem to be presented in the Iliad as the primitive Father and Mother of the Gods:—

Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν, καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν. (xiv. 201).

[25] Odyss. ix. 87.

[26] Iliad, i. 401.

[27] Iliad, xiv. 203-295; xv. 204.

[28] Iliad, viii. 482; xiv. 274-279. In the Hesiodic Opp. et Di., Kronos is represented as ruling in the Islands of the Blest in the neighborhood of Oceanus (v. 168).

[29] See the few fragments of the Titanomachia, in Düntzer, Epic. Græc. Fragm. p. 2; and Hyne, ad Apollodôr. I. 2. Perhaps there was more than one poem on the subject, though it seems that Athenæus had only read one (viii. p. 277).

In the Titanomachia, the generations anterior to Zeus were still further lengthened by making Uranos the son of Æthêr (Fr. 4. Düntzer). Ægæon was also represented as son of Pontus and Gæa, and as having fought in the ranks of the Titans; in the Iliad he (the same who is called Briareus) is the fast ally of Zeus.

A *Titanographia* was ascribed to Musæus (Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. iii. 1178; compare Lactant. de Fals. Rel. i. 21).

[30] That the Hesiodic Theogony is referable to an age considerably later than the Homeric poems, appears now to be the generally admitted opinion; and the reasons for believing so are, in my opinion, satisfactory. Whether the Theogony is composed by the same author as the Works and Days is a disputed point. The Bœotian literati in the days of Pausanias decidedly denied the identity, and ascribed to their Hesiod only the Works and Days: Pausanias himself concurs with them (ix. 31. 4; ix. 35. 1), and Völcker (Mithologie des Japetisch. Geschlechts, p. 14) maintains the same opinion, as well as Göttling (Præf. ad Hesiod. xxi.): K. O. Müller (History of Grecian Literature, ch. 8. § 4) thinks that there is not sufficient evidence to form a decisive opinion.

Under the name of Hesiod (in that vague language which is usual in antiquity respecting authorship, but which modern critics have not much mended by speaking of the Hesiodic school, sect, or family) passed many different poems, belonging to three classes quite distinct from each other, but all disparate from the Homeric epic:—1. The poems of legend cast into historical and genealogical series, such as the Eoiai, the Catalogue of Women, etc. 2. The poems of a didactic or ethical tendency, such as the Works and Days, the Precepts of Cheirôn, the Art of Augural Prophecy, etc. 3. Separate and short mythical compositions, such as the Shield of Hêraklês, the Marriage of Keyx (which, however, was of disputed authenticity, Athenæ. ii. p. 49), the Epithalamium of Pêleus and Thetis, etc. (See Marktscheffel, Præfat. ad Fragment. Hesiod. p. 89).

The Theogony belongs chiefly to the first of these classes, but it has also a dash of the second in the legend of Promêtheus, etc.: moreover in the portion which respects Hekatê, it has both a mystic character and a distinct bearing upon present life and customs, which we may also trace in the allusions to Krête and Delphi. There seems reason to place it in the same age with the Works and Days, perhaps in the half century preceding 700 B. C., and little, if at all, anterior to Archilochus. The poem is evidently conceived upon one scheme, yet the parts are so disorderly and incoherent, that it is difficult to say how much is interpolation. Hermann has well dissected the exordium; see the preface to Gaisford's Hesiod (Poetæ Minor. p. 63).

K. O. Müller tells us (*ut sup.* p. 90), "The Titans, according to the notions of Hesiod, represent a system of things in which elementary beings, natural powers, and notions of order and regularity are united to form a whole. The Cyclôpes denote the transient disturbances of this order of nature by storms, and the Hekatoncheires, or hundred-handed Giants, signify the fearful power of the greater revolutions of nature." The poem

affords little presumption that any such ideas were present to the mind of its author, as, I think, will be seen if we read 140-155, 630-745.

The Titans, the Cyclôpes, and the Hekatoncheires, can no more be construed into physical phænomena than Chrysaor, Pegasus, Echidna, the Grææ, or the Gorgons. Zeus, like Hêraklês, or Jasôn, or Perseus, if his adventures are to be described, must have enemies, worthy of himself and his vast type, and whom it is some credit for him to overthrow. Those who contend with him or assist him must be conceived on a scale fit to be drawn on the same imposing canvas: the dwarfish proportions of man will not satisfy the sentiment of the poet or his audience respecting the grandeur and glory of the gods. To obtain creations of adequate sublimity for such an object, the poet may occasionally borrow analogies from the striking accidents of physical nature, and when such an allusion manifests itself clearly, the critic does well to point it out. But it seems to me a mistake to treat these approximations to physical phænomena as forming the *main scheme* of the poet,—to look for them everywhere, and to presume them where there is little or no indication.

[31] The strongest evidences of this feeling are exhibited in Herodotus, iii. 48; viii. 105. See an example of this mutilation inflicted upon a youth named Adamas by the Thracian king Kotys, in Aristot. Polit. v. 8, 12, and the tale about the Corinthian Periander, Herod. iii. 48.

It is an instance of the habit, so frequent among the Attic tragedians, of ascribing Asiatic or Phrygian manners to the Trojans, when Sophoclês in his lost play Troilus (ap. Jul. Poll. x. 165) introduced one of the characters of his drama as having been castrated by order of Hecuba, Σκαλμῇ γὰρ ὄρχεις βασιλὶς ἐκτέμνουσ᾽ ἐμούς,—probably the Παιδαγωγὸς, or guardian and companion of the youthful Troilus. See Welcker, Griechisch. Tragöd. vol. i. p. 125.

[32] Herodot. viii. 105, εὐνοῦχοι. Lucian, De Deâ Syriâ, c. 50. Strabo, xiv. pp. 640-641.

[33] Diodôr. v. 64. Strabo, x. p. 460. Hoeckh, in his learned work Krêta (vol. i. books 1 and 2), has collected all the information attainable respecting the early influences of Phrygia and Asia Minor upon Krête: nothing seems ascertainable except the general fact; all the particular evidences are lamentably vague.

The worship of the Diktæan Zeus seemed to have originally belonged to the Eteokrêtes, who were not Hellens, and were more akin to the Asiatic population than to the Hellenic. Strabo, x. p. 478. Hoeckh, Krêta, vol. i. p. 139.

[34] Hesiod, Theogon. 161,

> Αἶψα δὲ ποιήσασα γένος πολιοῦ ἀδάμαντος,
>
> Τεῦξε μέγα δρέπανον, etc.

See the extract from the old poem *Phorônis* ap. Schol. Apoll. Rhod. 1129; and Strabo, x. p. 472.

[35] See the scanty fragments of the Orphic theogony in Hermann's edition of the Orphica, pp. 448, 504, which it is difficult to understand and piece together, even with the aid of Lobeck's elaborate examination (Aglaophamus, p. 470, etc.). The passages are chiefly preserved by Proclus and the later Platonists, who seem to entangle them almost inextricably with their own philosophical ideas.

The first few lines of the Orphic Argonautica contain a brief summary of the chief points of the theogony.

[36] See Lobeck, Aglaoph. p. 472-476, 490-500, Μῆτιν σπέρμα φέροντα θεῶν κλυτὸν Ἠρικεπαῖον; again, Θῆλυς καὶ γενέτωρ κρατερὸς θεὸς Ἠρικέπαιος. Compare Lactant. iv. 8, 4: Suidas, v. Φάνης: Athenagoras, xx. 296: Diodôr. i. 27.

This egg figures, as might be expected, in the cosmogony set forth by the Birds, Aristophan. Av. 695. Nyx gives birth to an egg, out of which steps the golden Erôs, from Erôs and Chaos spring the race of birds.

[37] Lobeck, Ag. p. 504. Athenagor. xv. p. 64.

[38] Lobeck, Ag. p. 507. Plato, Timæus, p. 41. In the Διονύσου τρόφοι of Æschylus, the old attendants of the god Dionysos were said to have been cut up and boiled in a caldron, and rendered again young, by Medeia. Pherecydês and Simonidês said that Jasôn himself had been so dealt with. Schol. Aristoph. Equit. 1321.

[39] Lobeck, p. 514. Porphyry, de Antro Nympharum, c. 16. φησὶ γὰρ παρ᾽ Ὀρφεῖ ἡ Νὺξ, τῷ Διῒ ὑποτιθεμένη τὸν διὰ τοῦ μέλιτος δόλον,

Εὖτ᾽ ἂν δή μιν ἴδηαι ὑπὸ δρυσὶν ὑψικόμοισι

Ἔργοισιν μεθύοντα μελισσάων ἐριβόμβων,

Αὖτικά μιν δῆσον.

Ὃ καὶ πάσχει ὁ Κρόνος καὶ δεθεὶς ἐκτέμνεται, ὡς Οὐρανός.

Compare Timæus ap. Schol. Apoll. Rhod. iv. 983.

[40] The Cataposis of Phanês by Zeus one of the most memorable points of the Orphic Theogony. Lobeck, p. 519.; also Fragm. vi. p. 456 of Hermann's Orphica.

From this absorption and subsequent reproduction of all things by Zeus, flowed the magnificent string of Orphic predicates about him,—

Ζεὺς ἀρχὴ, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ᾽ ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται,—

an allusion to which is traceable even in Plato, de Legg. iv. p. 715. Plutarch, de Defectu Oracul. T. ix. p. 379. c. 48. Diodôrus (i. 11) is the most ancient writer remaining to us who mentions the name of Phanês, in a line cited as proceeding from Orpheus; wherein, however, Phanês is identified with Dionysos. Compare Macrobius, Saturnal. i. 18.

[41] About the tale of Zagreus, see Lobeck, p. 552, *sqq.* Nonnus in his Dionysiaca has given many details about it:—

Ζαγρέα γειναμένη κέροεν βρέφος, etc. (vi. 264).

Clemens Alexandrin. Admonit. ad Gent. p. 11, 12, Sylb. The story was treated both by Callimachus and by Euphoriôn, Etymolog. Magn. v. Ζαγρεὺς, Schol. Lycophr. 208. In the old epic poem Alkmæônis or Epigoni, Zagreus is a surname of Hadês. See Fragm. 4, p. 7, ed. Düntzer. Respecting the Orphic Theogony generally, Brandis (Handbuch der Geschichte der Griechisch-Römisch. Philosophie, c. xvii., xviii.), K. O. Müller (Prolegg. Mythol. pp. 379-396), and Zoega (Abhandlungen, v. pp. 211-263) may be consulted with much advantage. Brandis regards this Theogony as *considerably older* than the first Ionic philosophy, which is a higher antiquity than appears probable: some of the ideas which it contains, such, for example, as that of the Orphic egg, indicate a departure from the string of purely personal generations which both Homer and Hesiod exclusively recount, and a resort to something like physical analogies. On the whole, we cannot reasonably claim for it more than half a century above the age of Onomakritus. The Theogony of Pherekydês of Syros seems to have borne some analogy to the Orphic. See Diogen. Laërt. i. 119, Sturz. Fragment. Pherekyd. § 5-6, Brandis, Handbuch, *ut sup.* c. xxii. Pherekydês partially deviated from the mythical track or personal successions set forth by Hesiod. ἐπεὶ οἵ γε *μεμιγμένοι* αὐτῶν καὶ *τῷ μὴ μυθικῶς* ἅπαντα λέγειν, οἷον Φερεκύδης καὶ ἕτεροί τινες, etc. (Aristot. Metaphys. N. p. 301, ed. Brandis). Porphyrias, de Antro Nymphar. c. 31, καὶ τοῦ Συρίου Φερεκύδου μυχοὺς καὶ βόθρους καὶ ἄντρα καὶ θύρας καὶ πύλας λέγοντος, καὶ διὰ τούτων αἰνιττομένου τὰς τῶν ψυχῶν γενέσεις καὶ ἀπογενέσεις, etc. Eudêmus the Peripatetic, pupil of Aristotle, had drawn up an account of the Orphic Theogony as well as of the doctrines of Pherekydês, Akusilaus and others, which was still in the hands of the Platonists of the fourth century, though it is now lost. The extracts which we find seem all to countenance the belief that the Hesiodic Theogony formed the basis upon which they worked. See about Akusilaus, Plato, Sympos. p. 178. Clem. Alex. Strom. p. 629.

[42] The Orphic Theogony is never cited in the ample Scholia on Homer, though Hesiod is often alluded to. (See Lobeck, Aglaoph. p. 540). Nor can it have been present to the minds of Xenophanês and Herakleitus, as representing any widely diffused Grecian belief: the former, who so severely condemned Homer and Hesiod,

would have found Orpheus much more deserving of his censure: and the latter could hardly have omitted Orpheus from his memorable denunciation:—Πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην, αὖτις δὲ Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἑκαταῖον. Diog. Laër. ix. 1. Isokratês treats Orpheus as the most censurable of all the poets. See Busiris, p. 229; ii. p. 309, Bekk. The Theogony of Orpheus, as conceived by Apollônius Rhodius (i. 504) in the third century B. C., and by Nigidius in the first century B. C. (Servius ad Virgil. Eclog. iv. 10), seems to have been on a more contracted scale than that which is given in the text. But neither of them notice the tale of Zagreus, which we know to be as old as Onomakritus.

[43] This opinion of Herodotus is implied in the remarkable passage about Homer and Hesiod, ii. 53, though he never once names Orpheus—only alluding once to "Orphic ceremonies," ii. 81. He speaks more than once of the prophecies of Musæus. Aristotle denied the past existence and reality of Orpheus. See Cicero de Nat. Deor. i. 38.

[44] Pindar Pyth. iv. 177. Plato seems to consider Orpheus as more ancient than Homer. Compare Theætêt. p. 179; Cratylus, p. 402; De Republ. ii. p. 364. The order in which Aristophanês (and Hippias of Elis, ap. Clem. Alex. Str. vi. p. 624) mentions them indicates the same view, Ranæ, 1030. It is unnecessary to cite the later chronologers, among whom the belief in the antiquity of Orpheus was universal; he was commonly described as son of the Muse Calliopê. Androtiôn seems to have denied that he was a Thracian, regarding the Thracians as incurably stupid and illiterate. Androtiôn, Fragm. 36, ed. Didot. Ephorus treated him as having been a pupil of the Idæan Dactyls of Phrygia (see Diodôr. v. 64), and as having learnt from them his τελετὰς and μυστήρια, which he was the first to introduce into Greece. The earliest mention which we find of Orpheus, is that of the poet Ibycus (about B. C. 530), ὀνομάκλυτον Ὀρφῆν. Ibyci Fragm. 9, p. 341, ed. Schneidewin.

[45] Pausan. viii. 37, 3. Τιτᾶνας δὲ πρῶτον ἐς ποίησιν ἐσήγαγεν Ὅμηρος, θεοὺς εἶναι σφᾶς ὑπὸ τῷ καλουμένῳ Ταρτάρῳ· καὶ ἔστιν ἐν Ἡρᾶς ὅρκῳ τὰ ἔπη· παρὰ δὲ Ὁμήρου Ὀνομάκριτος, παραλαβὼν τῶν Τιτάνων τὸ ὄνομα, Διονύσῳ τε συνέθηκεν ὄργια, καὶ εἶναι τοὺς Τιτᾶνας τῷ Διονύσῳ τῶν παθημάτων ἐποίησεν αὐτουργούς. Both the date, the character and the function of Onomakritus are distinctly marked by Herodotus, vii. 6.

[46] Herodotus believed in the derivation both of the Orphic and Pythagorean regulations from Egypt—ὁμολογέουσι δὲ ταῦτα τοῖσι Ὀρφικοῖσι καλεομένοισι καὶ Βακχικοῖσι, ἐοῦσι δὲ Αἰγυπτίοισι (ii. 81). He knows the names of those Greeks who have borrowed from Egypt the doctrine of the metempsychosis, but he will not mention them (ii. 123): he can hardly allude to any one but the Pythagoreans, many of whom he probably knew in Italy. See the curious extract from Xenophanês respecting the doctrine of Pythagoras, Diogen. Laërt. viii. 37; and the quotation from the Silli of Timôn, Πυθαγόραν δὲ γοήτος ἀποκλίναντ᾽ ἐπὶ δόξαν, etc. Compare Porphyr. in Vit. Pythag. c. 41.

[47] Aristophan. Ran. 1030.—

> Ὀρφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετὰς θ᾽ ἡμῖν κατέδειξε, φόνων τ᾽ ἀπέχεσθαι·
>
> Μουσαῖος τ᾽, ἐξακέσεις τε νόσων καὶ χρησμούς· Ἡσίοδος δὲ,
>
> Γῆς ἐργασίας, καρπῶν ὥρας, ἀρότους· ὁ δὲ θεῖος Ὅμηρος
>
> Ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμὴν καὶ κλέος ἔσχεν, πλὴν τοῦθ᾽, ὅτι χρήστ᾽ ἐδίδασκεν,
>
> Ἀρετὰς, τάξεις, ὁπλίσεις ἀνδρῶν; etc.

The same general contrast is to be found in Plato, Protagoras, p. 316; the opinion of Pausanias, ix. 30, 4. The poems of Musæus seem to have borne considerable analogy to the Melampodia ascribed to Hesiod (see Clemen. Alex. Str. vi. p. 628); and healing charms are ascribed to Orpheus as well as to Musæus. See Eurip. Alcestis, 986.

[48] Herod. ii. 81; Euripid. Hippol. 957, and the curious fragment of the lost Κρῆτες of Euripidês. Ὀρφικοὶ βίοι, Plato, Legg. vii. 782.

[49] Herodot. ii. 42, 59, 144.

[50] Herodot. v. 7, vii. 111; Euripid. Hecub. 1249, and Rhêsus, 969, and the Prologue to the Bacchæ; Strabo, x. p. 470; Schol. ad Aristophan. Aves, 874; Eustath. ad Dionys. Perieg. 1069; Harpocrat. v. Σάβοι;

Photius, Εὐοῖ Σαβοῖ. The "Lydiaca" of Th. Menke (Berlin, 1843) traces the early connection between the religion of Dionysos and that of Cybelê, c. 6, 7. Hoeckh's Krêta (vol. i. p. 128-134) is instructive respecting the Phrygian religion.

[51] Aristotle, Polit. viii. 7, 9. Πᾶσα γὰρ Βάκχεια καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις μάλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς αὐλοῖς· τῶν δ᾽ ἁρμονίων ἐν τοῖς Φρυγιστὶ μέλεσι λαμβάνει ταῦτα τὸ πρέπον, οἷον ὁ διθύραμβος δοκεῖ ὁμολογουμένως εἶναι Φρύγιον. Eurip. Bacch. 58.—

Αἴρεσθε τἀπιχώρι᾽ ἐν πόλει Φρυγῶν

Τύμπανα, Ῥέας τε μητρὸς ἐμὰ θ᾽ εὑρήματα, etc.

Plutarch, Εἰ. in Delph. c. 9; Philochor. Fr. 21, ed. Didot, p. 389. The complete and intimate manner in which Euripidês identifies the Bacchic rites of Dionysos with the Phrygian ceremonies in honor of the Great Mother, is very remarkable. The fine description given by Lucretius (ii. 600-640) of the Phrygian worship is much enfeebled by his unsatisfactory allegorizing.

[52] Schol. ad Iliad, xi. 690—οὐ διὰ τὰ καθάρσια Ἰφίτου πορθεῖται ἡ Πύλος, ἐπεί τοι Ὀδυσσεὺς μείζων Νέστορος, καὶ παρ᾽ Ὁμήρῳ οὐκ οἴδαμεν φονέα καθαιρόμενον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀντιτίνοντα ἢ φυγαδευόμενον. The examples are numerous, and are found both in the Iliad and the Odyssey. Iliad, ii. 665 (*Tlêpolemos*); xiii. 697 (*Medôn*); xiii. 574 (*Epeigeus*); xxiii. 89 (*Patroclos*); Odyss. xv. 224 (*Theoclymenos*); xiv. 380 (an *Ætôlian*). Nor does the interesting mythe respecting the functions of Atê and the Litæ harmonize with the subsequent doctrine about the necessity of purification. (Iliad, ix. 498).

[53] Herodot. i. 35—ἔστι δὲ παραπλησίη ἡ κάθαρσις τοῖσι Λυδοῖσι καὶ τοῖσι Ἕλλησι. One remarkable proof, amongst many, of the deep hold which this idea took of the greatest minds in Greece, that serious mischief would fall upon the community if family quarrels or homicide remained without religious expiation, is to be found in the objections which Aristotle urges against the community of women proposed in the Platonic Republic. It could not be known what individuals stood in the relation of father, son or brother: if, therefore, wrong or murder of kindred should take place, the appropriate religious atonements (αἱ νομιζόμεναι λύσεις) could not be applied, and the crime would go unexpiated. (Aristot. Polit. ii. 1, 14. Compare Thucyd. i. 125-128).

[54] See the Fragm. of the Æthiopis of Arktinus, in Düntzer's Collection, p. 16.

[55] The references for this are collected in Lobeck's Aglaophamos. Epimetr. ii. ad Orphica, p. 968.

[56] Pausanias (iv. 1, 5)—μετεκόσμησε γὰρ καὶ Μέθαπος τῆς τελετῆς (the Eleusinian Orgies, carried by Kaukon from Eleusis into Messênia), ἔστιν ἅ. Ὁ δὲ Μέθαπος γένος μὲν ἦν Ἀθηναῖος, τελετῆς τε καὶ *ὀργίων παντοίων συνθέτης*. Again, viii. 37, 3, Onomakritus Διονύσῳ *συνέθηκεν* ὄργια, etc. This is another expression designating the same idea as the Rhêsus of Euripidês, 944.—

Μυστηρίων τε τῶν ἀπορρήτων φάνας

Ἔδειξεν Ὀρφεύς.

[57] Têlinês, the ancestor of the Syracusan despot Gelô, acquired great political power as possessing τὰ ἱρὰ τῶν χθονίων θεῶν (Herodot. vii. 153); he and his family became hereditary Hierophants of these ceremonies. How Têlinês acquired the ἱρὰ Herodotus cannot say—ὅθεν δὲ αὐτὰ ἔλαβε, ἢ αὐτὸς ἐκτήσατο, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχω εἶπαι. Probably there was a traditional legend, not inferior in sanctity to that of Eleusis, tracing them to the gift of Dêmêtêr herself.

[58] See Josephus cont. Apiôn. ii. c. 35; Hesych. Θεοὶ ξένιοι; Strabo, x. p. 471; Plutarch, Περὶ Δεισιδαιμον. c. iii. p. 166; c. vii. p. 167.

[59] Plato, Republ. ii. p. 364; Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 79, p. 313. The δεισιδαίμων of Theophrastus cannot be comfortable without receiving the Orphic communion monthly from the Orpheotelestæ (Theophr. Char. xvi.). Compare Plutarch, Περὶ τοῦ μὴ χρᾶν ἔμμετρα, etc., c. 25, p. 400. The comic writer Phrynichus indicates the existence of these rites of religious excitement, at Athens, during the Peloponnesian war. See the short fragment of his Κρόνος, ap. Schol. Aristoph. Aves, 989—

Ἀνὴρ χορεύει, καὶ τὰ τοῦ καλῶς·

Βούλει Διοπείθη μεταδράμω καὶ τύμπανα;

Diopeithês was a χρησμόλογος, or collector and deliverer of prophecies, which he sung (or rather, perhaps, recited) with solemnity and emphasis, in public. ὥστε ποιοῦντες χρησμοὺς αὐτοὶ Διδόασ᾽ ᾄδειν Διοπείθει τῷ παραμαινομένῳ. (Ameipsias ap. Schol. Aristophan. *ut sup.*, which illustrates Thucyd. ii. 21).

[60] Plutarch, Solôn, c. 12; Diogen. Laërt. i. 110.

[61] See Klausen, "Æneas und die Penaten:" his chapter on the connection between the Grecian and Roman Sibylline collections is among the most ingenious of his learned book. Book ii. pp. 210-240; see Steph. Byz. v. Γέργις.

To the same age belong the χρησμοὶ and καθαρμοὶ of Abaris and his marvellous journey through the air upon an arrow (Herodot. iv. 36).

Epimenidês also composed καθαρμοὶ in epic verse; his Κουρήτων and Κορυβάντων γένεσις, and his four thousand verses respecting Minôs and Rhadamanthys, if they had been preserved, would let us fully into the ideas of a religious mystic of that age respecting the antiquities of Greece. (Strabo, x. p. 474; Diogen. Laërt. i. 10). Among the poems ascribed to Hesiod were comprised not only the Melampodia, but also ἔπη μαντικὰ and ἐξηγήσεις ἐπὶ τέρασιν. Pausan. ix. 31, 4.

[62] Among other illustrations of this general resemblance, may be counted an epitaph of Kallimachus upon an aged priestess, who passed from the service of Dêmêtêr to that of the Kabeiri, then to that of Cybelê, having the superintendence of many young women. Kallimachus, Epigram. 42. p. 308, ed. Ernest.

[63] Plutarch, (Defect. Oracul. c. 10, p. 415) treats these countries as the original seat of the worship of Dæmons (wholly or partially bad, and intermediate between gods and men), and their religious ceremonies as of a corresponding character: the Greeks were borrowers from them, according to him, both of the doctrine and of the ceremonies.

[64] Strabo, vii. p. 297. Ἅπαντες γὰρ τῆς δεισιδαιμονίας ἀρχηγοὺς οἴονται τὰς γυναῖκας· αὐταὶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας προκαλοῦνται ἐς τὰς ἐπὶ πλέον θεραπείας τῶν θεῶν, καὶ ἑορτὰς, καὶ ποτνιασμούς. Plato (De Legg. x. pp. 909, 910) takes great pains to restrain this tendency on the part of sick or suffering persons, especially women, to introduce new sacred rites into his city.

[65] Herodot. i. 146. The wives of the Ionic original settlers at Miletos were Karian women, whose husbands they slew.

The violences of the Karian worship are attested by what Herodotus says of the Karian residents in Egypt, at the festival of Isis at Busiris. The Egyptians at this festival manifested their feeling by beating themselves, the Karians by cutting their faces with knives (ii. 61). The Καρικὴ μοῦσα became proverbial for funeral wailings (Plato, Legg. vii. p. 800): the unmeasured effusions and demonstrations of sorrow for the departed, some times accompanied by cutting and mutilation self-inflicted by the mourner was a distinguishing feature in Asiatics and Egyptians as compared with Greeks. Plutarch, Consolat. ad Apollôn. c. 22, p. 123. Mournful feeling was, in fact, a sort of desecration of the genuine and primitive Grecian festival, which was a season of cheerful harmony and social enjoyment, wherein the god was believed to sympathize (εὐφροσύνη). See Xenophanes ap. Aristot. Rhetor. ii. 25; Xenophan. Fragm. 1. ed. Schneidewin; Theognis, 776; Plutarch, De Superstit. p. 169. The unfavorable comments of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in so far as they refer to the festivals of Greece, apply to the foreign corruptions, not to the native character, of Grecian worship.

[66] The Lydian Hêraklês was conceived and worshipped as a man in female attire: this idea occurs often in the Asiatic religions. Mencke, Lydiaca, c. 8, p. 22. Διόνυσος ἄῤῥην καὶ θῆλυς. Aristid. Or. iv. p. 28; Æschyl. Fragm. Edoni, ap. Aristoph. Thesmoph. 135. Ποδαπὸς ὁ γύννις; τίς πάτρα; τίς ἡ στολή;

[67] Melampos cures the women (whom Dionysos has struck mad for their resistance to his rites), παραλαβὼν τοὺς δυνατωτάτους τῶν νεανίων μετ᾽ ἀλαλαγμοῦ καὶ τινος ἐνθέου χορείας. Apollodôr. ii. 2, 7. Compare Eurip. Bacch. 861.

Plato (Legg. vii. p. 790) gives a similar theory of the healing effect of the Korybantic rites, which cured vague and inexplicable terrors of the mind by means of dancing and music conjoined with religious ceremonies—αἱ τὰ τῶν Κορυβάντων ἰάματα τελοῦσαι (the practitioners were women), αἱ τῶν ἐκφρόνων Βακχείων ἰάσεις—ἡ τῶν ἔξωθεν κρατεῖ κίνησις προσφερομένη τὴν ἐντὸς φοβερὰν οὖσαν καὶ μανικὴν κίνησιν—ὀρχουμένους δὲ καὶ αὐλουμένους μετὰ θεῶν, οἷς ἂν καλλιερήσαντες ἕκαστοι θύωσιν, κατειργάσατο ἀντὶ μανικῶν ἡμῖν διαθέσεων ἕξεις ἔμφρονας ἔχειν.

[68] Described in the Bacchæ of Euripidês (140, 735, 1135, etc.). Ovid, Trist. iv. i. 41. "Utque suum Bacchis non sentit saucia vulnus, Cum furit Edonis exululata jugis." In a fragment of the poet Alkman, a Lydian by birth, the Bacchanal nymphs are represented as milking the lioness, and making cheese of the milk, during their mountain excursions and festivals. (Alkman. Fragm. 14. Schn. Compare Aristid. Orat. iv. p. 29). Clemens Alexand. Admonit. ad Gent. p. 9, Sylb.; Lucian, Dionysos, c. 3, T. iii. p. 77, Hemsterh.

[69] See the tale of Skylês in Herod. iv. 79, and Athenæus, x. p. 445. Herodotus mentions that the Scythians abhorred the Bacchic ceremonies, accounting the frenzy which belonged to them to be disgraceful and monstrous.

[70] Plutarch, De Isid. et Osir. c. 69, p. 378; Schol. ad Aristoph. Thesmoph. There were however Bacchic ceremonies practised to a certain extent by the Athenian women. (Aristoph. Lysist. 388).

[71] "Ægyptiaca numina fere plangoribus gaudent, Græca plerumque choreis, barbara autem strepitu cymbalistarum et tympanistarum et choraularum." (Apuleius, De Genio Socratis, v. ii. p. 149, Oudend).

[72] The legend of Dionysos and Prosymnos, as it stands in Clemens, could never have found place in an epic poem (Admonit. ad Gent. p. 22, Sylb.). Compare page 11 of the same work, where however he so confounds together Phrygian, Bacchic, and Eleusinian mysteries, that one cannot distinguish them apart.

Demêtrius Phalêreus says about the legends belonging to these ceremonies—Διὸ καὶ τὰ μυστήρια λέγεται ἐν ἀλληγορίαις *πρὸς ἔκπληξιν καὶ φρίκην*, ὥσπερ ἐν σκότῳ καὶ νυκτί. (De Interpretatione, c. 101).

[73] See the curious treatise of Plutarch, De Isid. et Osirid. c. 11-14. p. 356, and his elaborate attempt to allegorize the legend. He seems to have conceived that the Thracian Orpheus had first introduced into Greece the mysteries both of Dêmêtêr and Dionysos, copying them from those of Isis and Osiris in Egypt. See Fragm. 84, from one of his lost works, tom, v. p. 891, ed. Wyttenb.

[74] Æschylus had dramatized the story of Pentheus as well as that of Lykurgus: one of his tetralogies was the Lykurgeia (Dindorf, Æsch. Fragm. 115). A short allusion to the story of Pentheus appears in Eumenid. 25. Compare Sophocl. Antigon. 985, and the Scholia.

[75] Iliad, vi. 130. See the remarks of Mr. Payne Knight *ad loc.*

[76] See Homer, Hymn 5, Διόνυσος ἢ Λῆσται.—The satirical drama of Euripidês, the Cyclôps, extends and alters this old legend. Dionysos is carried away by the Tyrrhenian pirates, and Silênus at the head of the Bacchanals goes everywhere in search of him (Eur. Cyc. 112). The pirates are instigated against him by the hatred of Hêrê, which appears frequently as a cause of mischief to Dionysos (Bacchæ, 286). Hêrê in her anger had driven him mad when a child, and he had wandered in this state over Egypt and Syria; at length he came to Cybela in Phrygia, was purified (καθαρθεὶς) by Rhea, and received from her female attire (Apollodôr. iii. 5, 1, with Heyne's note). This seems to have been the legend adopted to explain the old verse of the Iliad, as well as the maddening attributes of the god generally.

There was a standing antipathy between the priestesses and the religious establishments of Hêrê and Dionysos (Plutarch, Περὶ τῶν ἐν Πλαταιαις Δαιδάλων, c. 2, tom. v. p. 755, ed. Wytt). Plutarch ridicules the legendary reason commonly assigned for this, and provides a symbolical explanation which he thinks very satisfactory.

[77] Eurip. Bacch. 325, 464, etc.

[78] Strabo, x. p. 471. Compare Aristid. Or. iv. p. 28.

[79] In the lost *Xantriæ* of Æschylus, in which seems to have been included the tale of Pentheus, the goddess Λύσσα was introduced, stimulating the Bacchæ, and creating in them spasmodic excitement from head to foot: ἐκ ποδῶν δ᾽ ἄνω Ὑπέρχεται σπαραγμὸς εἰς ἄκρον κάρα, etc. (Fragm. 155, Dindorf). His tragedy called

Edoni also gave a terrific representation of the Bacchanals and their fury, exaggerated by the maddening music: Πίμπλησι μέλος, Μανίας ἐπαγωγὸν ὁμοκλάν (Fr. 54).

Such also is the reigning sentiment throughout the greater part of the Bacchæ of Euripidês; it is brought out still more impressively in the mournful Atys of Catullus:—

"Dea magna, Dea Cybele, Dindymi Dea, Domina,

Procul a meâ tuus sit furor omnis, hera, domo:

Alios age incitatos: alios age rabidos!"

We have only to compare this fearful influence with the description of Dikæopolis and his exuberant joviality in the festival of the rural Dionysia (Aristoph. Acharn. 1051 *seq.*; see also Plato. Legg. i. p. 637), to see how completely the foreign innovations recolored the old Grecian Dionysos,—Διόνυσος πολυγηθὴς,—who appears also in the scene of Dionysos and Ariadnê in the Symposion of Xenophôn, c. 9. The simplicity of the ancient Dionysiac processions is dwelt upon by Plutarch, De Cupidine Divitiarum, p. 527; and the original dithyramb addressed by Archilochus to Dionysos is an effusion of drunken hilarity (Archiloch. Frag. 69, Schneid.).

[80] Pindar, Isthm. vi. 3. χαλκοκρότου πάρεδρον Δημήτερος,—the epithet marks the approximation of Dêmêtêr to the Mother of the Gods. ᾗ κροτάλων τυπάνων τ᾽ ἰαχὴ, σὺν τε βρόμος αὐλῶν Εὔαδεν (Homer. Hymn, xiii.),—the Mother of the Gods was worshipped by Pindar himself along with Pan; she had in his time her temple and ceremonies at Thêbes (Pyth. iii. 78; Fragm. Dithyr. 5, and the Scholia *ad l.*) as well as, probably, at Athens (Pausan. i. 3, 3).

Dionysos and Dêmêtêr are also brought together in the chorus of Sophoklês, Antigonê, 1072. μέδεις δὲ παγκοίνοις Ἐλευσινίας Δηοῦς ἐν κόλποις; and in Kallimachus, Hymn. Cerer. 70. Bacchus or Dionysos are in the Attic tragedians constantly confounded with the Dêmêtrian Iacchos, originally so different,—a personification of the mystic word shouted by the Eleusinian communicants. See Strabo, x. p. 468.

[81] Euripidês in his Chorus in the Helena (1320 *seq.*) assigns to Dêmêtêr all the attributes of Rhea, and blends the two completely into one.

[82] Sophocl. Antigon. Βακχᾶν μητρόπολιν Θήβαν.

[83] Homer, Hymn. Cerer. 123. The Hymn to Dêmêtêr has been translated, accompanied with valuable illustrative notes, by J. H. Voss (Heidelb. 1826).

[84] Homer, Hymn. Cerer. 202-210.

[85] This story was also told with reference to the Egyptian goddess Isis in her wanderings. See Plutarch, De Isid. et Osirid. c. 16, p. 357.

[86] Homer, Hymn. Cerer. 274.—

Ὄργια δ᾽ αὐτὴ ἐγὼν ὑποθήσομαι, ὡς ἂν ἔπειτα

Εὐαγέως ἔρδοντες ἐμὸν νόον ἱλάσκησθε.

The same story is told in regard to the infant Achilles. His mother Thetis was taking similar measures to render him immortal, when his father Pêleus interfered and prevented the consummation. Thetis immediately left him in great wrath (Apollôn. Rhod. iv. 866).

[87] Homer, Hymn. 290.—

τοῦ δ᾽ οὐ μειλίσσετο θυμὸς,

Χειρότεραι γὰρ δή μιν ἔχον τρόφοι ἠδὲ τιθῆναι.

[88] Homer, H. Cer. 305.—

Αἰνότατον δ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐπὶ χθόνα πουλυβότειραν

Ποίησ᾽ ἀνθρώποις, ἰδὲ κύντατον.

[89] Hymn, v. 375.

[90] Hymn, v. 443.

[91] Hymn, v. 475.—

Ἡ δὲ κιοῦσα θεμιστοπόλοις βασιλεῦσι

Δεῖξεν, Τριπτολέμῳ τε, Διοκλεΐ τε πληξίππῳ,

Εὐμόλπου τε βίῃ, Κελεῷ θ᾽ ἡγήτορι λαῶν,

Δρησμοσύνην ἱερῶν· καὶ ἐπέφραδεν ὄργια παισὶν

Πρεσβυτέρῃς Κελέοιο, etc.

[92] Aristophanês, Vesp. 1363. Hesych. v. Γεφυρίς. Suidas, v. Γεφυρίζων. Compare about the details of the ceremony, Clemens Alexandr. Admon. ad Gent. p. 13. A similar license of unrestrained jocularity appears in the rites of Dêmêtêr in Sicily (Diodôr. v. 4; see also Pausan. vii. 27, 4), and in the worship of Damia and Auxesia at Ægina (Herodot. v. 83).

[93] Herodot. v. 61.

[94] Pausan. i. 38, 3; Apollodôr. iii. 15, 4. Heyne in his Note admits several persons named Eumolpus. Compare Isokratês, Panegyr. p. 55. Philochorus the Attic antiquary could not have received the legend of the Eleusinian Hymn, from the different account which he gave respecting the rape of Persephonê (Philoch. Fragm. 46, ed. Didot), and also respecting Keleos (Fr. 28, *ibid.*).

[95] Phytalus, the Eponym or godfather of this gens, had received Dêmêtêr as a guest in his house, when she first presented mankind with the fruit of the fig-tree. (Pausan. i. 37, 2.)

[96] Kallimach. Hymn. Cerer. 19. Sophoklês, Triptolemos, Frag. 1. Cicero, Legg. ii. 14, and the note of Servius ad Virgil. Æn. iv. 58.

[97] Herodot. vi. 16, 134. ἔρκος Θεσμοφόρου Δήμητρος—τὸ ἐς ἔρσενα γόνον ἄῤῥητα ἱερά.

[98] Herodot. vii. 200.

[99] According to another legend, Lêtô was said to have been conveyed from the Hyperboreans to Dêlos in twelve days, in the form of a she-wolf, to escape the jealous eye of Hêrê. In connection with this legend, it was affirmed that the she-wolves always brought forth their young only during these twelve days in the year (Aristot. Hist. Animal. vii. 35).

[100] Hom. Hymn. Apoll. i. 179.

[101] Hom. Hymn. Apoll. 262.

[102] Hom. Hymn. 363—πύθεσθαι, *to rot*.

[103] Hom. Hymn. Apoll. 381.

[104] Hom. Hymn. Apoll. 475 *sqq.*

[105] Homer. Hymn. Apoll. 535.—

Δεξιτέρῃ μάλ᾽ ἕκαστος ἔχων ἐν χειρὶ μάχαιραν

Σφάζειν αἰεὶ μῆλα· τὰ δ᾽ ἄφθονα πάντα πάρεσται,

Ὅσσα ἐμοίγ᾽ ἀγάγωσι περίκλυτα φῦλ᾽ ἀνθρώπων.

[106] Harpocration v. Ἀπόλλων πατρῶος and Ἑρκεῖος Ζεύς. Apollo Delphinios also belongs to the Ionic Greeks generally. Strabo, iv. 179.

[107] Thucydid. vi. 3; Kallimach. Hymn. Apoll. 56.—

Φοῖβος γὰρ ἀεὶ πολίεσσι φιληδεῖ

Κτιζομέναις, αὐτὸς δὲ θεμείλια Φοῖβος ὑφαίνει.

[108] Iliad, iv. 30-46.

[109] Iliad, i. 38, 451; Stephan. Byz. Ἴλιον, Τένεδος. See also Klausen, Æneas und die Penaten, b. i. p. 69. The worship of Apollo Sminthios and the festival of the Sminthia at Alexandria Troas lasted down to the time of Menander the rhêtôr, at the close of the third century after Christ.

[110] Plutarch. Defect. Oracul. c. 5, p. 412; c. 8, p. 414; Steph. Byz. v. Τεγύρα. The temple of the Ptôan Apollo had acquired celebrity before the days of the poet Asius. Pausan. ix. 23, 3.

[111] The legend which Ephorus followed about the establishment of the Delphian temple was something radically different from the Homeric Hymn (Ephori Fragm. 70, ed. Didot): his narrative went far to politicize and rationalize the story. The progeny of Apollo was very numerous, and of the most diverse attributes; he was father of the Korybantes (Pherekydes, Fragm. 6, ed. Didot), as well as of Asklêpios and Aristæus (Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. ii. 500; Apollodôr. iii. 10, 3).

[112] Strabo, ix. p. 421. Menander the Rhetor (Ap. Walz. Coll. Rhett. t. ix. p. 136) gives an elaborate classification of hymns to the gods, distinguishing them into nine classes,—κλητικοὶ, ἀποπεμπτικοὶ, φυσικοὶ, μυθικοὶ, γενεαλογικοὶ, πεπλασμένοι, εὐκτικοὶ, ἀπευκτικοὶ, μικτοί:—the second class had reference to the temporary absences or departure of a god to some distant place, which were often admitted in the ancient religion. Sappho and Alkman in their *kletic* hymns invoked the gods from many different places,—τὴν μὲν γὰρ Ἄρτεμιν ἐκ μυρίων μὲν ὀρέων, μυρίων δὲ πόλεων, ἔτι δὲ ποταμῶν, ἀνακαλεῖ,—also Aphroditê and Apollo, etc. All these songs were full of adventures and details respecting the gods,—in other words of legendary matter.

[113] Pindar, Olymp. xiv.; Boeckh, Staatshaushaltung der Athener, Appendix, § xx. p. 357.

[114] Alexander Ætolus, apud Macrobium, Saturn. v. 22.

[115] The birth of Apollo and Artemis from Zeus and Lêtô is among the oldest and most generally admitted facts in the Grecian divine legends. Yet Æschylus did not scruple to describe Artemis publicly as daughter of Dêmêtêr (Herodot. ii. 156; Pausan. viii. 37, 3). Herodotus thinks that he copied this innovation from the Egyptians, who affirmed that Apollo and Artemis were the sons of Dionysos and Isis.

The number and discrepancies of the mythes respecting each god are attested by the fruitless attempts of learned Greeks to escape the necessity of rejecting any of them by multiplying homonymous personages,—three persons named Zeus; five named Athênê; six named Apollo, etc. (Cicero. de Natur. Deor. iii. 21: Clemen. Alexand. Admon. ad Gent. p. 17).

[116] Hesiod, Theogon. 188, 934, 945; Homer, Iliad, v. 371; Odyss. viii. 268.

[117] Homer, Hymn. Vener. 248, 286; Homer, Iliad, v. 320, 386.

[118] A large proportion of the Hesiodic epic related to the exploits and adventures of the heroic women,—the Catalogue of Women and the Eoiai embodied a string of such narratives. Hesiod and Stesichorus explained the conduct of Helen and Klytæmnêstra by the anger of Aphroditê, caused by the neglect of their father Tyndareus to sacrifice to her (Hesiod, Fragm. 59, ed. Düntzer; Stesichor. Fragm. 9, ed. Schneidewin): the irresistible ascendency of Aphroditê is set forth in the Hippolytus of Euripidês not less forcibly than that of Dionysos in the

Bacchæ. The character of Daphnis the herdsman, well-known from the first Idyll of Theocritus, and illustrating the destroying force of Aphroditê, appears to have been first introduced into Greek poetry by Stesichorus (see Klausen, Æneas und die Penaten, vol. i. pp. 526-529). Compare a striking piece among the Fragmenta Incerta of Sophoklês (Fr. 63, Brunck) and Euripid. Troad. 946, 995, 1048. Even in the Opp. et Di. of Hesiod, Aphroditê is conceived rather as a disturbing and injurious influence (v. 65).

Adonis owes his renown to the Alexandrine poets and their contemporary sovereigns (see Bion's Idyll and the Adoniazusæ of Theocritus). The favorites of Aphroditê, even as counted up by the diligence of Clemens Alexandrinus, are however very few in number. (Admonitio ad Gent. p. 12, Sylb.)

[119] Ἀνδροθέᾳ δῶρον … Ἀθάνᾳ Simmias Rhodius; Πέλεκυς, ap. Hephæstion. c. 9. p. 54, Gaisford.

[120] Apollodôr. ap. Schol. ad Sophokl. Œdip. vol. 57; Pausan. i. 24, 3; ix. 26, 3; Diodôr. v. 73; Plato, Legg. xi. p. 920. In the Opp. et Di. of Hesiod, the carpenter is the servant of Athênê (429): see also Phereklos the τέκτων in the Iliad, v. 61: compare viii. 385; Odyss. viii. 493; and the Homeric Hymn, to Aphroditê, v. 12. The learned article of O. Müller (in the Encyclopædia of Ersch and Gruber, since republished among his Kleine Deutsche Schriften, p. 134 *seq.*), *Pallas Athênê*, brings together all that can be known about this goddess.

[121] Iliad, ii. 546; viii. 362.

[122] Apollodôr. iii. 4, 6. Compare the vague language of Plato, Kritias, c. iv., and Ovid, Metamorph. ii. 757.

[123] Herodot. iv. 103; Strabo, xii. p. 534; xiii. p. 650. About the Ephesian Artemis, see Guhl, Ephesiaca (Berlin, 1843), p. 79 *sqq.*; Aristoph. Nub. 590; Autokrates in Tympanistis apud Ælian. Hist. Animal. xii. 9; and Spanheim ad Kallimach. Hymn. Dian. 36. The dances in honor of Artemis sometimes appear to have approached to the frenzied style of Bacchanal movement. See the words of Timotheus ap. Plutarch. de Audiend. Poet. p. 22, c. 4, and περὶ Δεισιδ. c. 10, p. 170, also Aristoph. Lysist. 1314. They seem to have been often celebrated in the solitudes of the mountains, which were the favorite resort of Artemis (Kallimach. Hymn. Dian. 19), and these ὀρειβάσιαι were always causes predisposing to fanatical excitement.

[124] Strabo, iv. p. 179.

[125] Iliad, ix. 529.

[126] Strabo, viii. p. 374. According to the old poem called Eumolpia, ascribed to Musæus, the oracle of Delphi originally belonged to Poseidôn and Gæa, jointly: from Gæa it passed to Themis, and from her to Apollo, to whom Poseidôn also made over his share as a compensation for the surrender of Kalaureia to him. (Pausan. x. 5, 3).

[127] Apollodôr. iii. 14, 1; iii. 15, 3, 5.

[128] Plutarch, Sympos. viii. 6, p. 741.

[129] Iliad, ii. 716, 766; Euripid. Alkêstis, 2. See Panyasis, Fragm. 12, p. 24, ed. Düntzer.

[130] Iliad, vii. 452; xxi. 459.

[131] Iliad, v. 386.

[132] Iliad, iv. 51; Odyss. xii. 72.

[133] Iliad, i. 544; iv. 29-38; viii. 408.

[134] Iliad, xviii. 306.

[135] Homer. Hymn. Mercur. 18.—

> Ἦρος γεγονὼς, μέσῳ ἤματι ἐγκιθάριζεν,
>
> Ἑσπέριος βοῦς κλέψεν ἑκηβόλου Ἀπόλλωνος, etc.

[136] Homer. Hymn. Merc. 177.—

Εἰμὶ γὰρ ἐς Πύθωνα, μέγαν δόμον ἀντιτορήσων,
Ἔνθεν ἄλις τρίποδας περικαλλέας, ἠδὲ λέβητας
Πορθήσω καὶ χρυσὸν, etc.

[137] Homer. Hymn. Merc. 442-454.

[138] Homer. Hymn. Merc. 504-520.—

Καὶ τὸ μὲν Ἑρμῆς
Λητοΐδην ἐφίλησε διαμπερὲς, ὡς ἔτι καὶ νῦν, etc.
. . . . .
Καὶ τότε Μαίαδος υἱὸς ὑποσχόμενος κατένευσε
Μή ποτ᾽ ἀποκλέψειν, ὅσ᾽ Ἑκήβολος ἐκτεάτισται,
Μηδέ ποτ᾽ ἐμπελάσειν πυκίνῳ δόμῳ· αὐτὰρ Ἀπόλλων
Λητοΐδης κατένευσεν ἐπ᾽ ἀρθμῷ καὶ φιλότητι
Μή τινα φίλτερον ἄλλον ἐν ἀθανάτοισιν ἔσεσθαι
Μήτε θεὸν, μήτ᾽ ἄνδρα Διὸς γόνον, etc.

[139] Homer. Hymn. Merc. 574.—

Παῦρα μὲν οὖν ὀνίνησι, τὸ δ᾽ ἄκριτον ἠπεροπεύει
Νύκτα δι᾽ ὀρφναίην φῦλα θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.

[140] Kallimach. Hymn. Apoll. 47.

[141] Kallimach. Hymn. Jov. 79. Ἐκ δὲ Διὸς βασιλῆες, etc.

[142] See Herodot. i. 44. Xenoph. Anabas. vii. 8, 4. Plutarch, Thêseus, c. 12.

[143] Ovid, Fasti, iv. 211, about the festivals of Apollo:—

"Priscique imitamina facti
Æra Deæ comites raucaque terga movent."

And Lactantius, v. 19, 15. "Ipsos ritus ex rebus gestis (deorum) vel ex casibus vel etiam ex mortibus, natos:" to the same purpose Augustin. De Civ. D. vii. 18; Diodôr. iii. 56. Plutarch's Quæstiones Græcæ et Romaicæ are full of similar tales, professing to account for existing customs, many of them religious and liturgic. See Lobeck, Orphica, p. 675.

[144] Hesiod, Theog. 550.—

Φῆ ῥα δολοφρονέων· Ζεὺς δ᾽ ἄφθιτα μήδεα εἰδὼς
Γνῶ ῥ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἠγνοίησε δόλον· κακὰ δ᾽ ὄσσετο θυμῷ
Θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποισι, τὰ καὶ τελέεσθαι ἔμελλεν.
Χερσὶ δ᾽ ὅγ᾽ ἀμφοτέρῃσιν ἀνείλετο λευκὸν ἄλειφαρ·
Χώσατο δὲ φρένας, ἀμφὶ χόλος δέ μιν ἵκετο θυμὸν,
Ὡς ἴδεν ὀστέα λευκὰ βοὸς δολίῃ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ.

In the second line of this citation, the poet tells us that Zeus saw through the trick, and was imposed upon by his own consent, foreknowing that after all the mischievous consequences of the proceeding would be visited on man. But the last lines, and indeed the whole drift of the legend, imply the contrary of this: Zeus was really taken in, and was in consequence very angry. It is curious to observe how the religious feelings of the poet drive him to save in words the prescience of Zeus, though in doing so he contradicts and nullifies the whole point of the story.

[145] Hesiod, Theog. 557.—

Ἐκ τοῦ δ᾽ ἀθανάτοισιν ἐπὶ χθονὶ φῦλ᾽ ἀνθρώπων
Καίουσ᾽ ὀστέα λευκὰ θυηέντων ἐπὶ βωμῶν.

[146] Hesiod, as cited in the Etymologicon Magnum (probably the Hesiodic Catalogue of Women, as Marktscheffel considers it, placing it Fragm. 133), gives the parentage of a certain *Brotos*, who must probably be intended as the first of men: Βρότος, ὡς μὲν Εὐήμερος ὁ Μεσσήνιος, ἀπὸ Βρότου τινὸς αὐτόχθονος· ὁ δὲ Ἡσίοδος, ἀπὸ Βρότου τοῦ Αἴθερος καὶ Ἡμέρας.

[147] Opp. Di. 120.—

Αὐτὰρ ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ γαῖα κάλυψεν
Τοὶ μὲν δαίμονές εἰσι Διὸς μεγάλου διὰ βουλὰς
Ἐσθλοὶ, ἐπιχθόνιοι, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων·
Οἵ ῥα φυλάσσουσίν τε δίκας καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα,
Ἠέρα ἐσσάμενοι, πάντη φοιτῶντες ἐπ᾽ αἶαν
Πλουτόδοται· καὶ τοῦτο γέρας βασιληΐον ἔσχον.

[148] Opp. Di. 140.—

Αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ γαῖα κάλυψε,
Τοὶ μὲν ὑποχθόνιοι μάκαρες θνητοὶ καλέονται
Δεύτεροι, ἀλλ᾽ ἔμπης τιμὴ καὶ τοῖσιν ὀπηδεῖ.

[149] The ash was the wood out of which spear-handles were made (Iliad, xvi. 142): the Νύμφαι Μέλιαι are born along with the Gigantes and the Erinnyes (Theogon. 187),—"gensque virûm truncis et duro robore nata" (Virgil, Æneid, viii. 315),—*hearts of oak*.

[150] Opp. Di. 157.—

Ἀνδρῶν Ἡρώων θεῖον γένος, οἳ καλέονται
Ἡμίθεοι προτέρῃ γενεῇ κατ᾽ ἀπείρονα γαῖαν.

[151] Opp. Di. 173.—

Μηκέτ᾽ ἔπειτ᾽ ὤφειλον ἐγὼ πέμπτοισι μετεῖναι
Ἀνδράσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ πρόσθε θανεῖν, ἢ ἔπειτα γενέσθαι.
Νῦν γὰρ δὴ γένος ἐστὶ σιδήρεον….

[152] Odyss. xvii. 486.

[153] There are some lines, in which he appears to believe that, under the present wicked and treacherous rulers, it is not the interest of any man to be just (Opp. Di. 270):—

Νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ μήτ᾽ αὐτὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποισι δίκαιος
Εἴην, μήτ᾽ ἐμὸς υἱός· ἐπεὶ κακόν ἐστι δίκαιον
Ἔμμεναι, εἰ μείζω γε δίκην ἀδικώτερος ἕξει·
Ἀλλὰ τόδ᾽ οὔπω ἔολπα τελεῖν Δία τερπικέραυνον.

On the whole, however, his conviction is to the contrary.

Plutarch rejects the above four lines, seemingly on no other ground than because he thought them immoral and unworthy of Hesiod (see Proclus *ad loc.*). But they fall in perfectly with the temper of the poem: and the rule of Plutarch is inadmissible, in determining the critical question of what is genuine or spurious.

[154] Aratus (Phænomen. 107) gives only three successive races,—the golden, silver, and brazen; Ovid superadds to these the iron race (Metamorph. i. 89-144): neither of them notice the heroic race.

The observations both of Buttmann (Mythos der ältesten Menschengeschlechter, t. ii. p. 12 of the Mythologus) and of Völcker (Mythologie des Japetischen Geschlechts, § 6, pp. 250-279) on this series of distinct races, are ingenious, and may be read with profit. Both recognize the disparate character of the fourth link in the series, and each accounts for it in a different manner. My own view comes nearer to that of Völcker, with some considerable differences; amongst which one is, that he rejects the verses respecting the dæmons, which seem to me capital parts of the whole scheme.

[155] See this subject further mentioned—*infra*, chap. xvi. p. 565.

[156] Opp. Di. 252. Τρὶς γὰρ μύριοί εἰσιν ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ, etc.

[157] Opp. Di. 50-105.

[158] Opp. Di. 630-650, 27-45.

[159] Compare the fable (αἶνος) in the "Works and Days," v. 200, with those in Archilochus, Fr. xxxviii. and xxxix., Gaisford, respecting the fox and the ape; and the legend of Pandôra (v. 95 and v. 705) with the fragment of Simonidês of Amorgos respecting women (Fr. viii. ed. Welcker, v. 95-115); also Phokylidês ap. Stobæum Florileg. lxxi.

Isokratês assimilates the character of the "Works and Days" to that of Theognis and Phokylidês (ad Nikokl. Or. ii. p. 23).

[160] Hesiod, Theog. 510.

[161] Hom. Odyss. i. 120.—

Ἄτλαντος θυγατὴρ ὀλοόφρονος, ὅστε θαλάσσης
Πάσης βένθεα οἶδε, ἔχει δέ τε κίονας αὐτὸς
Μακρὰς, αἳ γαῖάν τε καὶ οὐρανὸν ἀμφὶς ἔχουσιν.

[162] Hesiod, Theog. 516.—

Ἄτλας δ᾽ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχει κρατερῆς ὑπ᾽ ἀνάγκης
Ἑστηὼς, κεφαλῇ τε καὶ ἀκαμάτοισι χέρεσσι.

Hesiod stretches far beyond the simplicity of the Homeric conception.

[163] Pindar extends the family of Epimêtheus and gives him a daughter, Πρόφασις (Pyth. v. 25), *Excuse*, the offspring of After-thought.

[164] Apollodôr. i. 7. 1. Nor is he such either in Æschylus, or in the Platonic fable (Protag. c. 30), though this version became at last the most popular. Some hardened lumps of clay, remnants of that which had been employed by Promêtheus in moulding man, were shown to Pausanias at Panopeus in Phokis (Paus. x. 4, 3).

The first Epigram of Erinna (Anthol. i. p. 58, ed. Branck) seems to allude to Promêtheus as moulder of man. The expression of Aristophanês (Aves, 689)—πλάσματα πηλοῦ—does not necessarily refer to Promêtheus.

[165] Hesiod, Theog. 566; Opp. Di. 52.

[166] Theog. 580; Opp. Di. 50-85.

[167] Opp. Di. 81-90.

[168] Opp. Di. 93. Pandôra does not *bring with her* the cask, as the common version of this story would have us suppose: the cask exists fast closed in the custody of Epimêtheus, or of man himself, and Pandôra commits the fatal treachery of removing the lid. The case is analogous to that of the closed bag of unfavorable winds which Æolus gives into the hands of Odysseus, and which the guilty companions of the latter force open, to the entire ruin of his hopes (Odyss. x. 19-50). The idea of the two casks on the threshold of Zeus, lying ready for dispensation—one full of evils the other of benefits—is Homeric (Iliad, xxiv. 527):—

Δοιοὶ γάρ τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει, etc.

Plutarch assimilates to this the πίθος opened by Pandôra, Consolat. ad Apollôn. c. 7. p. 105. The explanation here given of the Hesiodic passage relating to Hope, is drawn from an able article in the Wiener Jahrbücher, vol. 109 (1845), p. 220, Ritter; a review of Schömmann's translation of the Promêtheus of Æschylus. The diseases and evils are inoperative so long as they remain shut up in the cask: the same mischief-making influence which lets them out to their calamitous work, takes care that Hope shall still continue a powerless prisoner in the inside.

[169] Theog. 590.—

Ἐκ τῆς γὰρ γένος ἐστὶ γυναικῶν θηλυτεράων,
Τῆς γὰρ ὀλώιόν ἐστι γένος· καὶ φῦλα γυναικῶν,
Πῆμα μέγα θνητοῖσι μετ᾽ ἀνδράσι ναιετάουσι, etc.

[170] Opp. Di. 105.—

Οὕτως οὔτι πῆ ἐστὶ Διὸς νόον ἐξαλέασθαι.

[171] Theog. 534. Οὔνεκ᾽ ἐρίζετο βουλὰς ὑπερμενέϊ Κρονίωνι.

[172] Theog. 521-532.

[173] Of the tragedy called Προμηθεὺς Λυόμενος some few fragments yet remain: Προμηθεὺς Πύρφορος was a satyric drama, according to Dindorf. Welcker recognizes a third tragedy, Προμηθεὺς Πύρφορος, and a satyric drama, Προμηθεὺς Πυρκαεύς (Die Griechisch. Tragödien, vol. i. p. 30). The story of Promêtheus had also been handled by Sapphô in one of her lost songs (Servius ad Virgil. Eclog. vi. 42).

[174] Apollodôrus too mentions only the theft of fire (i. 7. 1).

[175] Æsch. Prom. 442-506.—

Πᾶσαι τέχναι βροτοῖσιν ἐκ Προμηθέως.

[176] Æsch. Prom. 231.—

βροτῶν δὲ τῶν ταλαιπώρων λόγον
Οὐκ ἔσχεν οὐδέν᾽, ἀλλ᾽ ἀϊστώσας γένος
Τὸ πᾶν, ἔχρῃζεν ἄλλο φιτῦσαι νέον.

[177] Æsch. Prom. 198-222. 123.—

διὰ τὴν λίαν φιλότητα βροτῶν.

[178] Æsch. Prom. 169-770.

[179] Prometh. 2. See also the Fragments of the Promêtheus Solutus, 177-179, ed. Dindorf, where Caucasus is specially named; but v. 719 of the Promêtheus Vinctus seems to imply that Mount Caucasus is a place different from that to which the suffering prisoner is chained.

[180] Appian, Bell. Mithridat. c. 103.

[181] Apollodôr. ii. 1. Mr. Fynes Clinton does not admit the historical reality of Inachus; but he places Phorôneus seventeen generations, or 570 years prior to the Trojan war, 978 years earlier than the first recorded Olympiad. See Fasti Hellenici, vol. iii. c. 1. p. 19.

[182] Pausan. ii. 5, 4.

[183] See Düntzer, Fragm. Epic. Græc. p. 57. The Argeian author Akusilaus treated Phorôneus as the first of men, Fragm. 14. Didot ap. Clem. Alex. Stromat i. p. 321. Φορωνῆες, a synonym for Argeians; Theocrit. Idyll. xxv. 200.

[184] Apollodôr. ii. 1, 1; Pausan. ii. 15, 5; 19, 5; 20, 3.

[185] Apis in Æschylus is totally different: ἰατρόμαντις or medical charmer, son of Apollo, who comes across the gulf from Naupactus, purifies the territory of Argos from noxious monsters, and gives to it the name of *Apia* (Æschyl. Suppl. 265). Compare Steph. Byz. v. Ἀπίη; Soph. Œdip. Colon. 1303. The name Ἀπία for Peloponnêsus remains still a mystery, even after the attempt of Buttmann (Lexilogus, s. 19) to throw light upon it.

Eusebius asserts that Niobê was the wife of Inachus and mother of Phorôneus, and pointedly contradicts those who call her daughter of Phorôneus—φασὶ δέ τινες Νιόβην Φορωνέως εἶναι θυγατέρα, ὅπερ οὐκ ἀληθές (Chronic. p. 23, ed. Scalig.): his positive tone is curious, upon such a matter.

Hellanikus in his Argolica stated that Phorôneus had three sons, Pelasgus, Iasus and Agênôr, who at the death of their father divided his possessions by lot. Pelasgus acquired the country near the river Erasinus, and built the citadel of Larissa: Iasus obtained the portion near to Elis. After their decease, the younger brother Agênôr invaded and conquered the country, at the head of a large body of horse. It was from these three persons that Argos derived three epithets which are attached to it in the Homeric poems—Ἄργος Πελασγικὸν, Ἴασον, Ἱππόβοτον (Hellanik. Fr. 38, ed. Didot; Phavorin. v. Ἄργος). This is a specimen of the way in which legendary persons as well as legendary events were got up to furnish an explanation of Homeric epithets: we may remark as singular, that Hellanikus seems to apply Πελασγικὸν Ἄργος to a portion of Peloponnêsus, while the Homeric Catalogue applies it to Thessaly.

[186] Apollod. *l. c.* The mention of Strymôn seems connected with Æschylus Suppl. 255.

[187] Akusil. Fragm. 17, ed. Didot; Æsch. Prometh. 568; Pherekyd. Fragm. 22, ed. Didot; Hesiod. Ægimius. Fr. 2, p. 56, ed. Düntzer: among the varieties of the story, one was that Argos was changed into a peacock (Schol. Aristoph. Aves, 102). Macrobius (i. 19) considers Argos as an allegorical expression of the starry heaven; an idea which Panofska also upholds in one of the recent Abhandlungen of the Berlin Academy, 1837, p. 121 *seq.*

[188] Apollod. ii. 1, 1; Pausan. ii. 16, 1; Æsch. Prom. v. 590-663.

[189] Æschyl. Prom. v. 790-850; Apollod. ii. 1. Æschylus in the Supplices gives a different version of the wanderings of Iô from that which appears in the Promêtheus: in the former drama he carries her through Phrygia, Mysia, Lydia, Pamphylia and Cilicia into Egypt (Supplic. 544-566): nothing is there said about Promêtheus, or Caucasus or Scythia, etc.

The track set forth in the Supplices is thus geographically intelligible, that in the Promêtheus (though the most noticed of the two) defies all comprehension, even as a consistent fiction; nor has the erudition of the commentators been successful in clearing it up. See Schutz, Excurs. iv. ad Prometh. Vinct. pp. 144-149; Welcker, Æschylische Trilogie, pp. 127-146, and especially Völcker, Mythische Geographie der Griech. und Römer, part i. pp. 3-13.

The Greek inhabitants at Tarsus in Cilicia traced their origin to Argos: their story was, that Triptolemus had been sent forth from that town in quest of the wandering Iô, that he had followed her to Tyre, and then renounced the search in despair. He and his companions then settled partly at Tarsus, partly at Antioch (Strabo, xiv. 673; xv. 750). This is the story of Kadmos and Eurôpê inverted, as happens so often with the Grecian mythes.

Homer calls Hermês Ἀργειφόντης; but this epithet hardly affords sufficient proof that he was acquainted with the mythe of Iô, as Völcker supposes: it cannot be traced higher than Hesiod. According to some authors, whom Cicero copies, it was on account of the murder of Argos that Hermês was obliged to leave Greece and go into Egypt: then it was that he taught the Egyptians laws and letters (De Natur. Deor. iii. 22).

[190] The story in Parthênius (Narrat. 1) is built upon this version of Iô's adventures.

[191] Herodot. i. 1-6. Pausanias (ii. 15, 1) will not undertake to determine whether the account given by Herodotus, or that of the old legend, respecting the cause which carried Iô from Argos to Egypt, is the true one: Ephorus (ap. Schol. Apoll. Rhod. ii. 168) repeats the abduction of Iô to Egypt, by the Phœnicians, subjoining a strange account of the Etymology of the name Bosporus. The remarks of Plutarch on the narrative of Herodotus are curious: he adduces as one proof of the κακοήθεια (bad feeling) of Herodotus, that the latter inserts so discreditable a narrative respecting Iô, daughter of Inachus, "whom all Greeks believe to have been divinized by foreigners, to have given name to seas and straits, and to be the source of the most illustrious regal families." He also blames Herodotus for rejecting Epaphus, Iô, Iasus and Argos, as highest members of the Perseid genealogy. He calls Herodotus φιλοβάρβαρος (Plutarch, De Malign. Herodoti, c. xi. xii. xiv. pp. 856, 857).

[192] It would be an unprofitable fatigue to enumerate the multiplied and irreconcilable discrepancies in regard to every step of this old Argeian genealogy. Whoever desires to see them brought together, may consult Schubart, Quæstiones in Antiquitatem Heroicam, Marburg, 1832, capp. 1 and 2.

The remarks which Schubart makes (p. 35) upon Petit-Radel's Chronological Tables will be assented to by those who follow the unceasing string of contradictions, without any sufficient reason to believe that any one of them is more worthy of trust than the remainder, which he has cited:—"Videant alii, quomodo genealogias heroicas, et chronologiæ rationes, in concordiam redigant. Ipse abstineo, probe persuasus, stemmata vera, historiæ

fide comprobata, in systema chronologiæ redigi posse: at ore per sæcula tradita, a poetis reficta, sæpe mutata, prout fabula postulare videbatur, ab historiarum deinde conditoribus restituta, scilicet, brevi, qualia prostant stemmata—chronologiæ secundum annos distributæ vincula semper recusatura esse."

[193] Apollod. ii. 1. The Supplices of Æschylus is the commencing drama of a trilogy on this subject of the Danaïdes,—Ἱκετίδες, Αἰγύπτιοι, Δαναΐδες. Welcker, Griechisch. Tragödien, vol. i. p. 48: the two latter are lost. The old epic poem called Danaïs or Danaïdes, which is mentioned in the Tabula Iliaca as containing 5000 verses, has perished, and is unfortunately very little alluded to: see Düntzer, Epic. Græc. Fragm. p. 3; Welcker, Der Episch. Kyklus, p. 35.

[194] Apollod. 1. c.; Pherekyd. ap. Schol. Hom. Odyss. xv. 225; Hesiod, Fragm. Marktsch. Fr. 36, 37, 38. These Fragments belong to the Hesiodic Catalogue of Women: Apollodôrus seems to refer to some other of the numerous Hesiodic poems. Diodôrus (iv. 68) assigns the anger of Dionysos as the cause.

[195] Odyss. xv. 240-256.

[196] Herod. ix. 34; ii. 49: compare Pausan. ii. 18, 4. Instead of the Prœtides, or daughters of Prœtos, it is the Argeian women generally whom he represents Melampus as having cured, and the Argeians generally who send to Pylus to invoke his aid: the heroic personality which pervades the primitive story has disappeared.

Kallimachus notices the Prœtid virgins as the parties suffering from madness, but he treats Artemis as the healing influence (Hymn. ad Dianam 235).

[197] The beautiful fragment of Simonidês (Fragm. vii. ed. Gaisford. Poet. Min.), describing Danaê and the child thus exposed, is familiar to every classical reader.

[198] Paus. ii. 15, 4; ii. 16, 5. Apollod. ii. 2. Pherekyd. Fragm. 26, Dind.

[199] Odyss. ii. 120. Hesiod. Fragment. 154. Marktscheff.—Akusil. Fragm. 16. Pausan. ii. 16, 4. Hekatæus derived the name of the town from the μύκης of the sword of Perseus (Fragm. 360, Dind.). The Schol. ad Eurip. Orest. 1247, mentions Mykêneus as son of Spartôn, but grandson of Phêgeus the brother of Phorôneus.

[200] Pausan. ii. 18, 4.

[201] Herodot. vi. 53.

[202] In the Hesiodic Shield of Hêraklês, Alkmênê is distinctly mentioned as daughter of Elektryôn; the genealogical poet, Asios, called her the daughter of Amphiaraos and Eriphyle (Asii Fragm. 4, ed. Markt. p. 412). The date of Asios cannot be precisely fixed; but he may be probably assigned to an epoch between the 30th and 40th Olympiad.

Asios must have adopted a totally different legend respecting the birth of Hêraklês and the circumstances preceding it, among which the deaths of her father and brothers are highly influential. Nor could he have accepted the received chronology of the sieges of Thêbes and Troy.

[203] So runs the old legend in the Hesiodic Shield of Hêraklês (12-82). Apollodôrus (or Pherekydês, whom he follows) softens it down, and represents the death of Elektryôn as accidentally caused by Amphitryôn. (Apollod. ii. 4, 6. Pherekydês, Fragm. 27, Dind.)

[204] Hesiod, Scut. Herc. 24. Theocrit. Idyll. xxiv. 4. Teleboas, the Eponym of these marauding people, was son of Poseidôn (Anaximander ap. Athenæ. xi. p. 498).

[205] Apollod. ii. 4, 7. Compare the fable of Nisus at Megara, *infra*, chap. xii. p. 302.

[206] Hesiod, Scut. Herc. 29. ὅφρα θεοῖσιν Ἀνδράσι τ᾽ ἀλφηστῇσιν ἀρῆς ἀλκτῆρα φυτεύσῃ.

[207] Hesiod. Sc. H. 50-56.

[208] Homer, Iliad, xix. 90-133; also viii. 361.—

Τὴν αἰεὶ στενάχεσχ᾽, ὅθ᾽ ἑὸν φίλον υἱὸν ὀρῷτο

Ἔργον ἀεικὲς ἔχοντα, ὑπ᾽ Εὐρυσθῆος ἀέθλων.

[209] Hesiod, Theogon. 951, τελέσας στονόεντας ἀέθλους. Hom. Odyss. xi. 620; Hesiod, Eœæ, Fragm. 24, Düntzer, p. 36, πονηρότατον καὶ ἄριστον.

[210] Apollod. ii. 8, 1; Hecatæ. ap. Longin. c. 27; Diodôr. iv. 57.

[211] Herodot. ix. 26; Diodôr. iv. 58.

[212] Pausan. ii. 5, 5; 12, 5; 26, 3. His statements indicate how much the predominance of a powerful neighbor like Argos tended to alter the genealogies of these inferior towns.

[213] Schol. ad Apollôn. Rhod. iii. 1085. Other accounts of the genealogy of Deukaliôn are given in the Schol. ad Homer. Odyss. x. 2, on the authority both of Hesiod and Akusilaus.

[214] Hesiodic Catalog. Fragm. xi.; Gaisf. lxx. Düntzer—

> Ἤτοι γὰρ Λοκρὸς Λελέγων ἡγήσατο λαῶν,
>
> Τούς ῥά ποτε Κρονίδης Ζεὺς ἄφθιτα μήδεα εἰδὼς,
>
> Λεκτοὺς ἐκ γαίης λάας πόρε Δευκαλίωνι.

The reputed lineage of Deukaliôn continued in Phthia down to the time of Dikæarchus, if we may judge from the old Phthiot Pherekratês, whom he introduced in one of his dialogues as a disputant, and whom he expressly announced as a descendant of Deukaliôn (Cicero, Tuscul. Disp. i. 10).

[215] The latter account is given by Dionys. Halic. i. 17; the former seems to have been given by Hellanikus, who affirmed that the ark after the deluge stopped upon Mount Othrys, and not upon Mount Parnassus (Schol. Pind. *ut. sup.*) the former being suitable for a settlement in Thessaly.

Pyrrha is the eponymous heroine of Pyrrhæa or Pyrrha, the ancient name of a portion of Thessaly (Rhianus, Fragm. 18, p. 71, ed. Düntzer).

Hellanikus had written a work, now lost, entitled Δευκαλιώνεια: all the fragments of it which are cited have reference to places in Thessaly, Lokris and Phokis. See Preller, ad Hellanitum, p. 12 (Dörpt. 1840). Probably Hellanikus is the main source of the important position occupied by Deukaliôn in Grecian legend. Thrasybulus and Akestodôrus represented Deukaliôn as having founded the oracle of Dôdôna, immediately after the deluge (Etm. Mag. v. Δωδωναῖος).

[216] Apollodôrus connects this deluge with the wickedness of the brazen race in Hesiod, according to the practice general with the logographers of stringing together a sequence out of legends totally unconnected with each other (i. 7, 2).

[217] Hesiod, Fragm. 135. ed. Markts. ap. Strabo. vii. p. 322, where the word λάας, proposed by Heyne as the reading of the unintelligible text, appears to me preferable to any of the other suggestions. Pindar, Olymp. ix. 47. Ἄτερ δ᾽ Εὐνᾶς ὀμόδαμον Κτησάσθαν λίθινον γόνον· Λαοὶ δ᾽ ὠνόμασθεν. Virgil, Georgic i. 63. "Unde homines nati, durum genus." Epicharmus ap. Schol. Pindar. Olymp. ix. 56. Hygin. f. 153. Philochorus retained the etymology, though he gave a totally different fable, nowise connected with Deukaliôn, to account for it; a curious proof how pleasing it was to the fancy of the Greek (see Schol. ad Pind. 1. c. 68).

[218] Apollod. i. 7, 2. Hellanic. Fragm. 15. Didot. Hellanikus affirmed that the ark rested on Mount Othrys, not on Mount Parnassus (Fragm. 16. Didot). Servius (ad Virgil. Eclog. vi. 41) placed it on Mount Athôs—Hyginus (f. 153) on Mount Ætna.

[219] Tatian adv. Græc. c. 60, adopted both by Clemens and Eusebius. The Parian marble placed this deluge in the reign of Kranaos at Athens, 752 years before the first recorded Olympiad, and 1528 years before the Christian æra; Apollodôrus also places it in the reign of Kranaos, and in that of Nyctimus in Arcadia (iii. 8, 2; 14, 5).

The deluge and the *ekpyrosis* or conflagration are connected together also in Servius ad Virgil. Bucol. vi. 41: he refines both of them into a "mutationem temporum."

[220] Aristot. Meteorol. i. 14. Justin rationalizes the fable by telling us that Deukaliôn was king of Thessaly, who provided shelter and protection to the fugitives from the deluge (ii. 6, 11).

[221] Pausan. i. 18, 7; 40, 1. According to the Parian marble (s. 5), Deukaliôn had come to Athens after the deluge, and had there himself founded the temple of the Olympian Zeus. The etymology and allegorization of the names of Deukaliôn and Pyrrha, given by Völcker in his ingenious Mythologie des Iapetischen Geschlechts (Giessen, 1824), p. 343, appears to me not at all convincing.

[222] Such is the statement of Apollodôrus (i. 7, 3); but I cannot bring myself to believe that the name (Γραϊκοὶ) Greeks is at all old in the legend, or that the passage of Hesiod, in which Græcus and Latinus purport to be mentioned, is genuine.

See Hesiod, Theogon. 1013, and Catalog. Fragm. xxix. ed. Göttling, with the note of Göttling; also Wachsmuth, Hellen. Alterth. i. 1. p. 311, and Bernhardy, Griech. Literat. vol. i. p. 167.

[223] Apollod. i. 7, 4.

[224] How literally and implicitly even the ablest Greeks believed in eponymous persons, such as Hellên and Iôn, as the real progenitors of the races called after him, may be seen by this, that Aristotle gives this common descent as the definition of γένος (Metaphysic. iv. p. 118, Brandis):—

Γένος λέγεται, τὸ μὲν … τὸ δὲ, ἀφ᾽ οὗ ἂν ὦσι πρώτου κινήσαντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι. Οὕτω γὰρ λέγονται οἱ μὲν, Ἕλληνες τὸ γένος, οἱ δὲ, Ἴωνες· τῷ, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ Ἕλληνος, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Ἴωνος, εἶναι πρώτου γεννήσαντος.

[225] Hesiod, Fragm. 8. p. 278, ed. Marktsch.—

Ἕλληνος δ᾽ ἐγένοντο θεμιστόπολοι βασιλῆες
Δῶρός τε, Ξοῦθός τε, καὶ Αἴολος ἱππιοχάρμης.
Αἰολίδαι δ᾽ ἐγένοντο θεμιστόπολοι βασιλῆες
Κρηθεὺς ἠδ᾽ Ἀθάμας καὶ Σίσυφος αἰολομήτης
Σαλμωνεύς τ᾽ ἄδικος καὶ ὑπέρθυμος Περιήρης.

[226] Apollod. i. 7, 3. Ἕλληνος δὲ καὶ Νύμφης Ὀρσηΐδος (?), Δῶρος, Ξοῦθος, Αἴολος. Αὐτὸς μὲν οὖν ἀφ᾽ αὑτοῦ τοὺς καλουμένους Γραϊκοὺς προσηγόρευσεν Ἕλληνας, τοῖς δὲ παισὶν ἐμέρισε τὴν χώραν. Καὶ Ξοῦθος μὲν λαβὼν τὴν Πελοπόννησον, ἐκ Κρεούσης τῆς Ἐρεχθέως Ἀχαιὸν ἐγέννησε καὶ Ἴωνα, ἀφ᾽ ὧν Ἀχαιοὶ καὶ Ἴωνες καλοῦνται. Δῶρος δὲ, *τὴν πέραν χώραν Πελοποννήσου λαβὼν, τοὺς κατοίκους ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ Δωριεῖς ἐκάλεσεν*. Αἴολος δὲ, βασιλεύων τῶν περὶ τὴν Θετταλίαν τόπων, τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας Αἰολεῖς προσηγόρευσε.

Strabo (viii. p. 383) and Conôn (Narr. 27), who evidently copy from the same source, represent Dôrus as going to settle in the territory property known as Dôris.

[227] Apollod. i. 7, 6. Αἰτωλὸς … φυγὼν εἰς τὴν Κουρήτιδα χώραν, κτείνας τοὺς ὑποδεξαμένους Φθίας καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος υἱοὺς, Δῶρον καὶ Λαόδοκον καὶ Πολυποίτην, ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ τὴν χώραν Αἰτωλίαν ἐκάλεσε. Again, i. 8, 1. Πλευρὼν (son of Ætôlus) γήμας Ξανθίππην τὴν Δώρου, παῖδα ἐγέννησεν Ἀγήνορα.

[228] Herod. i. 56.

[229] Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. iv. 57. Τὸν δὲ Ἐνδυμίωνα Ἡσίοδος μὲν Ἀεθλίου τοῦ Διὸς καὶ Καλύκης παῖδα λέγει…. Καὶ Πείσανδρος δὲ τὰ αὐτά φησι, καὶ Ἀκουσίλαος, καὶ Φερεκύδης, καὶ Νίκανδρος ἐν δευτέρῳ Αἰτωλικῶν, καὶ Θεόπομπος ἐν Ἐποποιΐαις.

Respecting the parentage of Hellên, the references to Hesiod are very confused. Compare Schol. Homer. Odyss. x. 2, and Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. iii. 1086. See also Hellanic. Frag. 10. Didot.

Apollodôrus, and Pherekydês before him (Frag. 51. Didot), called Protôgeneia daughter of Deukaliôn; Pindar (Olymp. ix. 64) designated her as daughter of Opus. One of the stratagems mentioned by the Scholiast to get rid of this genealogical discrepancy was, the supposition that Deukaliôn had two names (διώνυμος); that he was also named Opus. (Schol. Pind. Olymp. ix. 85).

That the Deukalidæ or posterity of Deukaliôn reigned in Thessaly, was mentioned both by Hesiod and Hekatæus, ap. Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. iv. 265.

[230] Dionys. H. A. R. i. 17.

[231] Pausan. vii. 1, 1-3. Herodotus also mentions (ii. 97) Archander, son of Phthius and grandson of Achæus, who married the daughter of Danaus. Larcher (Essai sur la Chronologie d'Hérodote, ch. x. p. 321) tells us that this cannot be the Danaus who came from Egypt, the father of the fifty daughters, who must have lived two centuries earlier, as may be proved by chronological arguments: this must be another Danaus, according to him.

Strabo seems to give a different story respecting the Achæans in Peloponnêsus: he says that they were the original population of the peninsula, that they came in from Phthia with Pelops, and inhabited Laconia, which was from them called Argos Achaicum, and that on the conquest of the Dôrians, they moved into Achaia properly so called, expelling the Iônians therefrom (Strabo, viii p. 365). This narrative is, I presume, borrowed from Ephorus.

[232] Eurip. Ion, 1590.

[233] Eurip. Ion, 64.

[234] See the Fragments of these two plays in Matthiae's edition; compare Welcker, Griechisch. Tragöd. v. ii. p. 842. If we may judge from the Fragments of the Latin Melanippê of Ennius (see Fragm. 2, ed. Bothe), Hellên was introduced as one of the characters of the piece.

[235] Iliad, vi. 154. Σίσυφος Αἰολίδης, etc. Again Odyss. xi. 234.—

Ἔνθ' ἦτοι πρώτην Τυρὼ ἴδον *εὐπατέρειαν*,

Ἣ φάτο Σαλμωνῆος ἀμύμονος ἔκγονος εἶναι,

Φῆ δὲ Κρηθῆος γυνὴ ἔμμεναι *Αἰολίδαο*.

[236] Homer, Odyss. xi. 234-257; xv. 226.

[237] Diodôrus, iv. 68. Sophoklês, Fragm. 1. Τυρώ. Σαφῶς Σιδηρὼ καὶ φέρουσα τοὔνομα. The genius of Sophoklês is occasionally seduced by this play upon the etymology of a name, even in the most impressive scenes of his tragedies. See Ajax, 425. Compare Hellanik. Fragm. p. 9, ed. Preller. There was a first and second edition of the Tyrô—τῆς δευτέρας Τυροῦς. Schol. ad Aristoph. Av. 276. See the few fragments of the lost drama in Dindorf's Collection, p. 53. The plot was in many respects analogous to the Antiopê of Euripidês.

[238] A third story, different both from Homer and from Sophoklês, respecting Tyrô, is found in Hyginus (Fab. lx.): it is of a tragical cast, and borrowed, like so many other tales in that collection, from one of the lost Greek dramas.

[239] Apollod. i. 9, 7. Σαλμωνεύς τ' ἄδικος καὶ ὑπέρθυμος Περιήρης. Hesiod, Fragm. Catal. 8. Marktscheffel.

Where the city of Salmôneus was situated, the ancient investigators were not agreed; whether in the Pisatid, or in Elis, or in Thessaly (see Strabo, viii. p. 356). Euripidês in his Æolus placed him on the banks of the Alpheius (Eurip. Fragm. Æol. 1). A village and fountain in the Pisatid bore the name of Salmônê; but the mention of the river Enipeus seems to mark Thessaly as the original seat of the legend. But the *naïveté* of the tale preserved by Apollodôrus (Virgil in the Æneid, vi. 586, has retouched it) marks its ancient date: the final circumstance of that tale was, that the city and its inhabitants were annihilated.

Ephorus makes Salmôneus king of the Epeians and of the Pisatæ (Fragm. 15, ed. Didot).

The lost drama of Sophoklês, called Σαλμωνεὺς, was a δρᾶμα σατυρικόν See Dindorf's Fragm. 483.

[240] Hom. Od. xi. 280. Apollod. i. 9, 9. κρατέρῳ θεραπόντε Διὸς, etc.

[241] Diodôr. iv. 68.

[242] Νηλέα τε μεγάθυμον, ἀγαυότατον ζωόντων (Hom. Odyss. xv. 228).

[243] Hom. Od. xi. 278; xv. 234. Apollod. i. 9, 12. The basis of this curious romance is in the Odyssey, amplified by subsequent poets. There are points however in the old Homeric legend, as it is briefly sketched in the fifteenth book of the Odyssey, which seem to have been subsequently left out or varied. Nêleus seizes the prop-

erty of Melampus during his absence; the latter, returning with the oxen from Phylakê, revenges himself upon Nêleus for the injury. Odyss. xv. 233.

[244] Hesiod, Catalog. ap. Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. i. 156; Ovid, Metam. xii. p. 556; Eustath. ad Odyss. xi. p. 284. Poseidôn carefully protects Antilochus son of Nestôr, in the Iliad, xiii. 554-563.

[245] Hesiod, Catalog. ap. Schol. Ven. ad Iliad. ii. 336; and Steph. Byz. v. Γερηνία; Homer, Il. v. 392; xi. 693; Apollodôr. ii. 7, 3; Hesiod, Scut. Herc. 360; Pindar, Ol. ix. 32.

According to the Homeric legend, Nêleus himself was not killed by Hêraklês: subsequent poets or logographers, whom Apollodôrus follows, seem to have thought it an injustice, that the offence given by Nêleus himself should have been avenged upon his sons and not upon himself; they therefore altered the legend upon this point, and rejected the passage in the Iliad as spurious (see Schol. Ven. ad Iliad. xi. 682).

The refusal of purification by Nêleus to Hêraklês is a genuine legendary cause: the commentators, who were disposed to spread a coating of history over these transactions, introduced another cause,—Nêleus, as king of Pylos, had aided the Orchomenians in their war against Hêraklês and the Thêbans (see Sch. Ven. ad Iliad. xi. 689).

The neighborhood of Pylos was distinguished for its ancient worship both of Poseidôn and of Hadês: there were abundant local legends respecting them (see Strabo, viii. pp. 344, 345).

[246] About Nestôr, Iliad, i. 260-275; ii. 370; xi. 670-770; Odyss. iii. 5, 110, 409.

[247] Hellanik. Fragm. 10, ed. Didot; Pausan. vii. 2, 3; Herodot. v. 65; Strabo, xiv. p. 633. Hellanikus, in giving the genealogy from Nêleus to Melanthus, traces it through Periklymenos and not through Nestôr: the words of Herodotus imply that *he* must have included Nestôr.

[248] Herodot. v. 67; Strabo, vi. p. 264; Mimnermus, Fragm. 9, Schneidewin.

[249] Iliad, ii. 715.

[250] Apollodôr. i. 9, 15; Eustath. ad Iliad. ii. 711.

[251] Euripid. Alkêst. init. Welcker; Griechisch. Tragœd. (p. 344) on the lost play of Sophoklês called Admêtus or Alkêstis; Hom. Iliad., ii. 766; Hygin. Fab. 50-51 (Sophoklês, Fr. Inc. 730; Dind. ap. Plutarch. Defect. Orac. p. 417). This tale of the temporary servitude of particular gods, by order of Zeus as a punishment for misbehavior, recurs not unfrequently among the incidents of the mythical world. The poet Panyasis (ap. Clem. Alexand. Adm. ad Gent. p. 23)—

Τλῆ μὲν Δημήτηρ, τλῆ δὲ κλυτὸς Ἀμφιγυήεις,

Τλῆ δὲ Ποσειδάων, τλῆ δ᾽ ἀργυρότοξος Ἀπολλὼν

Ἀνδρὶ παρὰ θνητῷ θητεύσεμεν εἰς ἐνιαυτόν·

Τλῆ δὲ καὶ ὀβριμόθυμος Ἄρης ὑπὸ πατρὸς ἀνάγκης.

The old legend followed out the fundamental idea with remarkable consistency: Laômedôn, as the temporary master of Poseidôn and Apollo, threatens to bind them hand and foot, to sell them in the distant islands, and to cut off the ears of both, when they come to ask for their stipulated wages (Iliad, xxi. 455). It was a new turn given to the story by the Alexandrine poets, when they introduced the motive of love, and made the servitude voluntary on the part of Apollo (Kallimachus, Hymn. Apoll. 49; Tibullus, Elegii. 3, 11-30).

[252] Eurip. Alkêstis, Arg.; Apollod. i. 9, 15. To bring this beautiful legend more into the color of history, a new version of it was subsequently framed: Hêraklês was eminently skilled in medicine, and saved the life of Alkêstis when she was about to perish from a desperate malady (Plutarch. Amator c. 17. vol. iv. p. 53, Wytt.).

[253] The legend of Akastus and Pêleus was given in great detail in the Catalogue of Hesiod (Catalog. Fragm. 20-21, Marktscheff.); Schol. Pindar Nem. iv. 95. Schol. Apoll. Rhod. i. 224; Apollod. iii. 13, 2.

[254] This incident was contained in one of the earliest dramas of Euripidês, the Πελιάδες, now lost. Moses of Chorênê (Progymnasm. ap. Maii ad Euseb. p. 43), who gives an extract from the argument, says that the poet "extremos mentiendi fines attingit."

The Ῥιζότομοι of Sophoklês seems also to have turned upon the same catastrophe (see Fragm. 479, Dindorf.).

[255] The kindness of Hêrê towards Jasôn seems to be older in the legend than her displeasure against Pelias; at least it is specially noticed in the Odyssey, as the great cause of the escape of the ship Argô: Ἀλλ᾽ Ἥρη παρέπεμψεν, ἐπεὶ φίλος ἦεν Ἰήσων. (xii. 70). In the Hesiodic Theogony Pelias stands to Jasôn in the same relation as Eurystheus to Hêraklês,—a severe taskmaster as well as a wicked and insolent man,—ὑβριστὴς Πελίης καὶ ἀτάσθαλος, ὀβριμόεργος. (Theog. 995). Apollônius Rhodius keeps the wrath of Hêrê against Pelias in the foreground, i. 14; iii. 1134; iv. 242; see also Hygin, f. 13.

There is great diversity in the stories given of the proximate circumstances connected with the death of Pelias: Eurip. Mêd. 491; Apollodôr. i. 9, 27; Diodôr. iv. 50-52; Ovid, Metam. vii. 162, 203, 297, 347; Pausan. viii. 11, 2; Schol. ad Lycoph. 175.

In the legend of Akastus and Pêleus as recounted above, Akastus was made to perish by the hand of Pêleus. I do not take upon me to reconcile these contradictions.

Pausanias mentions that he could not find in any of the poets, so far as he had read, the names of the daughters of Pelias, and that the painter Mikôn had given to them names (ὀνόματα δ᾽ αὐταῖς ποιητὴς μὲν ἔθετο οὐδείς, ὅσα γ᾽ ἐπελεξάμεθα ἡμεῖς, etc., Pausan. viii. 11, 1). Yet their names are given in the authors whom Diodôrus copied; and Alkêstis, at any rate, was most memorable. Mikôn gave the names Asteropeia and Antinoê, altogether different from those in Diodôrus. Both Diodôrus and Hyginus exonerate Alkêstis from all share in the death of her father (Hygin. f. 24).

The old poem called the Νόστοι (see Argum. ad Eurip. Mêd., and Schol. Aristophan. Equit. 1321) recounted, that Mêdea had boiled in a caldron the old Æsôn, father of Jasôn, with herbs and incantations, and that she had brought him out young and strong. Ovid copies this (Metam. vii. 162-203). It is singular that Pherêkydês and Simonidês said that she had performed this process upon Jasôn himself (Schol. Aristoph. *l. c.*). Diogenes (ap. Stobæ. Florileg. t. xxix. 92) rationalizes the story, and converts Mêdea from an enchantress into an improving and regenerating preceptress. The death of Æsôn, as described in the text, is given from Diodôrus and Apollodôrus. Mêdea seems to have been worshipped as a goddess in other places besides Corinth (see Athenagor. Legat. pro Christ. 12; Macrobius, i. 12, p. 247, Gronov.).

[256] These funeral games in honor of Pelias were among the most renowned of the mythical incidents: they were celebrated in a special poem by Stesichorus, and represented on the chest of Kypselus at Olympia. Kastôr, Meleager, Amphiaraos, Jasôn, Pêleus, Mopsos, etc. contended in them (Pausan. v. 17. 4; Stesichori Fragm. 1. p. 54, ed. Klewe; Athên. iv. 172). How familiar the details of them were to the mind of a literary Greek is indirectly attested by Plutarch, Sympos. v. 2, vol. iii. p. 762, Wytt.

[257] Hesiod, Theogon. 998.

[258] According to the Schol. ad Eurip. Mêd. 20, Jasôn marries the daughter of Hippotês the son of Kreôn, who is the son of Lykæthos. Lykæthos, after the departure of Bellerophôn from Corinth, reigned twenty-seven years; then Kreôn reigned thirty-five years; then came Hippotês.

[259] Apollodôr. i. 9, 27; Diodôr. iv. 54. The Mêdea of Euripidês, which has fortunately been preserved to us, is too well known to need express reference. He makes Mêdea the destroyer of her own children, and borrows from this circumstance the most pathetic touches of his exquisite drama. Parmeniskôs accused him of having been bribed by the Corinthians to give this turn to the legend; and we may regard the accusation as a proof that the older and more current tale imputed the murder of the children to the Corinthians (Schol. Eurip. Mêd. 275, where Didymos gives the story out of the old poem of Kreophylos). See also Ælian, V. H. v. 21; Pausan. ii. 3, 6.

The most significant fact in respect to the fable is, that the Corinthians celebrated periodically a propitiatory sacrifice to Hêrê Akræa and to Mermerus and Pherês, as an atonement for the sin of having violated the sanctuary of the altar. The legend grew out of this religious ceremony, and was so arranged as to explain and account for it (see Eurip. Mêd. 1376, with the Schol. Diodôr. iv. 55).

Mermerus and Pherês were the names given to the children of Mêdea and Jasôn in the old Naupaktian Verses; in which, however, the legend must have been recounted quite differently, since they said that Jasôn and Mêdea had gone from Iôlkos, not to Corinth, but to Corcyra; and that Mermerus had perished in hunting on the opposite continent of Epirus. Kinæthôn again, another ancient genealogical poet, called the children of Mêdea and Jasôn Eriôpis and Mêdos (Pausan. ii. 3, 7). Diodôrus gives them different names (iv. 34). Hesiod, in the Theogony, speaks only of Medeius as the son of Jasôn.

Mêdea does not appear either in the Iliad or Odyssey: in the former, we find Agamêdê, daughter of Augeas, "who knows all the poisons (or medicines) which the earth nourishes" (Iliad, xi. 740); in the latter, we have Circê, sister of Æêtês, father of Mêdea, and living in the Ææan island (Odyss. x. 70). Circê is daughter of the god Hêlios, as Mêdea is his grand-daughter,—she is herself a goddess. She is in many points the parallel of Mêdea; she forewarns and preserves Odysseus throughout his dangers, as Mêdea aids Jasôn: according to the Hesiodic story, she has two children by Odysseus, Agrius and Latinus (Theogon. 1001).

Odysseus goes to Ephyrê to Ilos the son of Mermerus, to procure poison for his arrows: Eustathius treats this Mermerus as the son of Mêdea (see Odyss. i. 270, and Eust.). As Ephyrê is the legendary name of Corinth, we may presume this to be a thread of the same mythical tissue.

[260] See Euripid. Æol.—Fragm. 1, Dindorf; Dikæarch. Vit. Græc. p. 22.

[261] Respecting Sisyphus, see Apollodôr. i. 9, 3; iii. 12, 6. Pausan. ii. 5, 1. Schol. ad Iliad. i. 180. Another legend about the amour of Sisyphus with Tyrô, is in Hygin. fab. 60, and about the manner in which he overreached even Hadês (Pherekydês ap. Schol. Iliad. vi. 153). The stone rolled by Sisyphus in the under-world appears in Odyss. xi. 592. The name of Sisyphus was given during the historical age to men of craft and stratagem, such as Derkyllidês (Xenoph. Hellenic. iii. 1, 8). He passed for the real father of Odysseus, though Heyne (ad Apollodôr. i. 9, 3) treats this as another Sisyphus, whereby he destroys the suitableness of the predicate as regards Odysseus. The duplication and triplication of synonymous personages is an ordinary resource for the purpose of reducing the legends into a seeming chronological sequence.

Even in the days of Eumêlus a religious mystery was observed respecting the tombs of Sisyphus and Nêleus,—the latter had also died at Corinth,—no one could say where they were buried (Pausan. ii. 2, 2).

Sisyphus even overreached Persephonê, and made his escape from the under-world (Theognis, 702).

[262] Pausan. ii. 1, 1; 3, 10. Schol. ad Pindar, Olymp. xiii. 74. Schol. Lycoph. 174-1024. Schol. Apoll. Rhod. iv. 1212.

[263] Simonid. ap. Schol. ad Eurip. Mêd. 10-20; Theopompus, Fragm. 340, Didot; though Welcker (Der Episch. Cycl. p. 29) thinks that this does not belong to the historian Theopompus. Epimenidês also followed the story of Eumêlus in making Æêtês a Corinthian (Schol. ad Apoll. Rhod. iii. 242).

[264] Περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰς Κόρινθον μετοικήσεως, Ἵππυς ἐκτίθεται καὶ Ἑλλάνικος· ὅτι δὲ βεβασίλευκε τῆς Κορίνθου ἡ Μήδεια, Εὔμηλος ἱστορεῖ καὶ Σιμωνίδης· Ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἀθάνατος ἦν ἡ Μήδεια, Μουσαῖος ἐν τῷ περὶ Ἰσθμίων ἱστορεῖ, ἅμα καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς Ἀκραίας Ἥρας ἑορτῶν ἐκτιθείς. (Schol. Eurip. Mêd. 10). Compare also v. 1376 of the play itself, with the Scholia and Pausan. ii. 3, 6. Both Alkman and Hesiod represented Mêdea as a goddess (Athenagoras, Legatia pro Christianis, p. 54, ed. Oxon.).

[265] Pausan. ii. 3, 10; Schol. Pindar. Olymp. xiii. 74.

[266] Schol. Pindar. Olymp. xiii. 32-74; Plutarch, De Herodot. Malign. p. 871.

[267] Pindar, Olymp. xiii. 98. and Schol. ad 1; Schol. ad Iliad, vi. 155; this seems to be the sense of Iliad, vi. 191.

The lost drama called *Iobatês* of Sophoklês, and the two by Euripidês called *Sthenebœa* and *Bellerophôn*, handled the adventures of this hero. See the collection of the few fragments remaining in Dindorf, Fragm. Sophok. 280; Fragm. Eurip. p. 87-108; and Hygin. fab. 67.

Welcker (Griechische Tragöd. ii. p. 777-800) has ingeniously put together all that can be divined respecting the two plays of Euripidês.

Völcker seeks to make out that Bellerophôn is identical with Poseidôn Hippios,—a separate personification of one of the attributes of the god Poseidôn. For this conjecture he gives some plausible grounds (Mythologie des Japetisch. Geschlechts, p. 129 *seq.*).

[268] Iliad, vi. 155-210.

[269] Hesiod, Theogon. 283.

[270] Pausan. ii. 2, 4. See Pindar, Olymp. xiii. 90, addressed to Xenophôn the Corinthian, and the Adoniazusæ of the Syracusan Theocritus, a poem in which common Syracusan life and feeling are so graphically depicted, Idyll xv. 91.—

Συρακοσίαις ἐπιτάσσεις;

Ὡς δ᾽ εἰδῇς καὶ τοῦτο, Κορίνθιαι εἶμες ἄνωθεν

Ὡς καὶ ὁ Βελλερόφων· Πελοποννασιστὶ λαλεῦμες.

[271] Pausan. ii. 4, 3.

[272] Eurip. Mêd. 1250, with the Scholia, according to which story Inô killed both her children:—

Ἴνω μανεῖσαν ἐκ θεῶν, ὅθ᾽ ἡ Διὸς

Δάμαρ νιν ἐξέπεμψε δώματων ἄλῃ.

Compare Valckenaer, Diatribe in Eurip.; Apollodôr. i. 9, 1-2; Schol. ad Pindar. Argum. ad Isthm. p. 180. The many varieties of the fable of Athamas and his family may be seen in Hygin. fab. 1-5; Philostephanus ap. Schol. Iliad, vii. 86: it was a favorite subject with the tragedians, and was handled by Æschylus, Sophoklês and Euripidês in more than one drama (see Welcker, Griechische Tragöd. vol. i. p. 312-332; vol. ii. p. 612). Heyne says that the proper reading of the name is *Phrixus*, not *Phryxus*,—incorrectly, I think: Φρύξος connects the name both with the story of roasting the wheat (φρύγειν), and also with the country Φρυγία, of which it was pretended that Phryxus was the Eponymus. Inô, or Leukothea, was worshipped as a heroine at Megara as well as at Corinth (Pausan. i. 42, 3): the celebrity of the Isthmian games carried her worship, as well as that of Palæmôn, throughout most parts of Greece (Cicero, De Nat. Deor. iii. 16). She is the only personage of this family noticed either in the Iliad or Odyssey: in the latter poem she is a sea-goddess, who has once been a mortal, daughter of Kadmus; she saves Odysseus from imminent danger at sea by presenting to him her κρήδεμνον (Odyss. v. 433; see

the refinements of Aristidês, Orat. iii. p. 27). The voyage of Phryxus and Hellê to Kolchis was related in the Hesiodic Eoiai: we find the names of the children of Phryxus by the daughter of Æêtês quoted from that poem (Schol. ad Apollôn. Rhod. ii. 1123) both Hesiod and Pherekydês mentioned the golden fleece of the ram (Eratosthen. Catasterism. 19; Pherekyd. Fragm. 53, Didot).

Hekatæus preserved the romance of the speaking ram (Schol. Apoll. Rhod. i. 256) but Hellanikus dropped the story of Hellê having fallen into the sea: according to him she died at Pactyê in the Chersonesus (Schol. Apoll. Rhod. ii. 1144).

The poet Asius seems to have given the genealogy of Athamas by Themistô much in the same manner as we find it in Apollodôrus (Pausan. ix. 23, 3).

According to the ingenious refinements of Dionysius and Palæphatus (Schol. ad Apoll. Rhod. ii. 1144; Palæphat. de Incred. c. 31) the ram of Phryxus was after all a man named Krios, a faithful attendant who aided in his escape; others imagined a ship with a ram's head at the bow.

[273] Plutarch, Quæst. Græc. c. 38. p. 299. Schol. Apoll. Rhod. ii. 655.

[274] Of the Athamas of Sophoklês, turning upon this intended, but not consummated sacrifice, little is known, except from a passage of Aristophanês and the Scholia upon it (Nubes, 258).—

ἐπὶ τί στέφανον; οἴμοι, Σώκρατες,

ὥσπερ με τὸν Ἀθάμανθ᾽ ὅπως μὴ θύσετε.

Athamas was introduced in this drama with a garland on his head, on the point of being sacrificed as an expiation for the death of his son Phryxus, when Hêraklês interposes and rescues him.

[275] Herodot. vii. 197. Plato, Minôs, p. 315.

[276] Plato, Minôs, c. 5. Καὶ οἱ τοῦ Ἀθάμαντος ἔκγονοι, οἵας θυσίας θύουσιν, Ἕλληνες ὄντες. As a testimony to the fact still existing or believed to exist, this dialogue is quite sufficient, though not the work of Plato.

Μόνιμος δ᾽ ἱστορεῖ, ἐν τῇ τῶν θαυμασίων συναγωγῇ, ἐν Πέλλῃ τῆς Θετταλίας Ἀχαιὸν ἄνθρωπον Πηλεῖ καὶ Χείρωνι καταθύεσθαι. (Clemens Alexand. Admon. ad Gent. p. 27, Sylb.) Respecting the sacrifices at the temple of Zeus Lykæus in Arcadia, see Plato, Republ. viii. p. 565. Pausanias (viii. p. 38, 5) seems to have shrunk, when he was upon the spot, even from inquiring what they were—a striking proof of the fearful idea which he had conceived of them. Plutarch (De Defectu Oracul. c. 14) speaks of τὰς πάλαι ποιουμένας ἀνθρωποθυσίας. The Schol. ad Lycophron. 229, gives a story of children being sacrificed to Melikertês at Tenedos; and Apollodôrus (ad Porphyr. de Abstinentiâ, ii. 55, see Apollod. Fragm. 20, ed. Didot) said that the Lacedæmonians had sacrificed a man to Arês—καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους φησὶν ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῷ Ἄρει θύειν ἄνθρωπον. About Salamis in Cyprus, see Lactantius, De Falsâ Religione, i. c. 21. "Apud Cypri Salaminem, humanam hostiam Jovi Teucrus immolavit, idque sacrificium posteris tradidit: quod est nuper Hadriano imperante sublatum."

Respecting human sacrifices in historical Greece, consult a good section in K. F. Hermann's Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen (sect. 27). Such sacrifices had been a portion of primitive Grecian religion, but had gradually become obsolete everywhere—except in one or two solitary cases, which were spoken of with horror. Even in these cases, too, the reality of the fact, in later times, is not beyond suspicion.

[277] Pausan. ix. 34, 4.

[278] Pausan. ix. 34, 5.

[279] Ephorus, Fragm. 68, Marx.

[280] Pausan. ix. 36, 1-3. See also a legend, about the three daughters of Minyas, which was treated by the Tanagræan poetess Korinna, the contemporary of Pindar (Antonin. Liberalis, Narr. x.).

[281] This exile of Hyêttus was recounted in the Eoiai. Hesiod, Fragm. 148, Markt.

[282] Pausan. ix. 37, 2. Apollod. ii. 4, 11. Diodôr. iv. 10. The two latter tell us that Erginus was slain. Klymenê is among the wives and daughters of the heroes seen by Odysseus in Hadês: she is termed by the Schol. daughter of Minyas (Odyss. xi. 325).

[283] Pausan. ix. 37, 1-3. Λέγεται δὲ ὁ Τροφώνιος Ἀπόλλωνος εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ Ἐργίνου· καὶ ἐγὼ τε πείθομαι, καὶ ὅστις παρὰ Τροφώνιον ἦλθε δὴ μαντευσόμενος.

[284] Plutarch, De Defectu Oracul. c. 5, p. 411. Strabo, ix. p. 414. The mention of the honeyed cakes, both in Aristophanês (Nub. 508) and Pausanias (ix. 39, 5), indicates that the curious preliminary ceremonies, for those who consulted the oracle of Trophônius, remained the same after a lapse of 550 years. Pausanias consulted it himself. There had been at one time an oracle of Teiresias at Orchomenos: but it had become silent at an early period (Plutarch. Defect. Oracul. c. 44, p. 434).

[285] Homer. Hymn. Apoll. 296. Pausan. ix. 11, 1.

[286] Pausan. ix. 37, 3. A similar story, but far more romantic and amplified, is told by Herodotus (ii. 121), respecting the treasury vault of Rhampsinitus, king of Egypt. Charax (ap. Schol. Aristoph. Nub. 508) gives the same tale, but places the scene in the treasury-vault of Augeas, king of Elis, which he says was built by Trophônius, to whom he assigns a totally different genealogy. The romantic adventures of the tale rendered it eminently fit to be interwoven at some point or another of legendary history, in any country.

[287] Pausan. ix. 38, 6; 29, 1.

[288] Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. i. 230. Compare Schol. ad Lycophron. 873.

[289] Schol. Pindar, Olymp. xiv. 5.

[290] Schol. Pindar, Isthm. i. 79. Other discrepancies in Schol. Vett. ad Iliad. ii. Catalog. 18.

[291] Odyss. xi. 283. Pausan. ix. 36, 3.

[292] Iliad, ii. 5, 11. Odyss. xi. 283. Hesiod, Fragm. Eoiai, 27, Düntz. Ἴξεν δ᾽ Ὀρχόμενον Μινυήϊον. Pindar, Olymp. xiv. 4. Παλαιγόνων Μινυᾶν ἐπίσκοποι. Herodot. i. 146. Pausanias calls them Minyæ even in their dealings with Sylla (ix. 30, 1). Buttmann, in his Dissertation (Über die Minyæ der Ältesten Zeit, in the Mythologus, Diss. xxi. p. 218), doubts whether the name Minyæ was ever a real name; but all the passages make against his opinion.

[293] Schol. Apoll. Rhod. ii. 1186. i. 230. Σκήψιος δὲ Δημήτρός φησι τοὺς περὶ τὴν Ἰωλκὸν οἰκοῦντας Μινύας καλεῖσθαι; and i. 763. Τὴν γὰρ Ἰωλκὸν οἱ Μίνυαι ᾤκουν, ὥς φησι Σιμωνίδης ἐν Συμμικτοῖς: also Eustath. ad Iliad. ii. 512. Steph. Byz. v. Μινύα. Orchomenos and Pylos run together in the mind of the poet of the Odyssey, xi. 458.

[294] Pherekyd. Fragm. 56, Didot. We see by the 55th Fragment of the same author, that he extended the genealogy of Phryxos to Pheræ in Thessaly.

[295] Herodot. iv. 145. Strabo, viii. 337-347. Hom. Iliad, xi. 721. Pausan. v. 1, 7. ποταμὸν Μινυήϊον, near Elis.

[296] Iliad, ix. 381.

[297] See the description of these channels or Katabothra in Colonel Leake's Travels in Northern Greece, vol. ii. c. 15, p. 281-293, and still more elaborately in Fiedler, Reise durch alle Theile des Königreichs Griechenlands, Leipzig, 1840. He traced fifteen perpendicular shafts sunk for the purpose of admitting air into the tunnel, the first separated from the last by about 5900 feet: they are now of course overgrown and stopped up (vol. i. p. 115).

Forchhammer states the length of this tunnel as considerably greater than what is here stated. He also gives a plan of the Lake Kôpaïs with the surrounding region, which I have placed at the end of the second volume of this History. See also *infra*, vol. ii. ch. iii. p. 391.

[298] We owe this interesting fact to Strabo, who is however both concise and unsatisfactory, viii. p. 406-407. It was affirmed that there had been two ancient towns, named Eleusis and Athênæ, originally founded by Cecrôps, situated on the lake, and thus overflowed (Steph. Byz. v. Ἀθῆναι Diogen. Laërt. iv. 23. Pausan. ix. 24, 2). For the plain or marsh near Orchomenos, see Plutarch, Sylla, c. 20-22.

[299] Diodôr. iv. 18. Pausan. ix. 38, 5.

[300] Strabo, viii. p. 374. Ἦν δὲ καὶ Ἀμφικτυονία τις περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦτο, ἔπτα πόλεων αἳ μετεῖχον τῆς θυσίας· ἦσαν δὲ Ἑρμιών, Ἐπίδαυρος, Αἴγινα, Ἀθῆναι, Πρασιεῖς, Ναυπλιεῖς, Ὀρχόμενος ὁ Μινύειος. Ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν

τῶν Ναυπλιέων Ἀργεῖοι, ὑπὲρ Πρασιέων δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ξυνετέλουν.

[301] Pausan. ix. 17, 1; 26, 1.

[302] See Müller, Orchomenos und die Minyer, p. 214. Pausan. ix. 23, 3; 24, 3. The genealogy is as old as the poet Asios.

[303] Herod. i. 146. Pausan. vii. 2, 2.

[304] Theocrit. xvi. 104.—

Ὦ ᾽Ετεόκλειοι θύγατρες θεαὶ, αἱ Μινύειον

᾽Ορχόμενον φιλέοισαι, ἀπεχθόμενόν ποκα Θήβαις.

The scholiast gives a sense to these words much narrower than they really bear. See Diodôr. xv. 79; Pausan. ix. 15. In the oration which Isokratês places in the mouth of a Platæan, complaining of the oppressions of Thêbes, the ancient servitude and tribute to Orchomenos is cast in the teeth of the Thêbans (Isokrat. Orat. Plataic. vol. iii. p. 32, Auger).

[305] Pausan. ix. 34, 5. See also the fourteenth Olympic Ode of Pindar, addressed to the Orchomenian Asopikus. The learned and instructive work of K. O. Müller, Orchomenos und die Minyer, embodies everything which can be known respecting this once-memorable city; indeed the contents of the work extends much farther than its title promises.

[306] Apollodôr. i. 7, 4. A. Kêyx,—king of Trachin,—the friend of Hêraklês and protector of the Hêrakleids to the extent of his power (Hesiod, Scut. Hercul. 355-473: Apollodôr. ii. 7, 5; Hekatæ. Fragm. 353, Didot.).

[307] Canacê, daughter of Æolus, is a subject of deep tragical interest both in Euripidês and Ovid. The eleventh Heroic Epistle of the latter, founded mainly on the lost tragedy of the former called Æolus, purports to be from Canacê to Macareus, and contains a pathetic description of the ill-fated passion between a brother and sister: see the fragments of the Æolus in Dindorf's collection. In the tale of Kaunos and Byblis, both children of Milêtos, the results of an incestuous passion are different but hardly less melancholy (Parthenios, Narr. xi.).

Makar, the son of Æolus, is the primitive settler of the island of Lesbos (Hom. Hymn. Apoll. 37): moreover in the Odyssey, Æolus son of Hippotês, the dispenser of the winds, has six sons and six daughters, and marries the former to the latter (Odyss. x. 7). The two persons called Æolus are brought into connection genealogically (see Schol. ad Odyss. *l. c.*, and Diodôr. iv. 67), but it seems probable that Euripidês was the first to place the names of Macareus and Canacê in that relation which confers upon them their poetical celebrity. Sostratus (ap. Stobæum, t. 614, p. 404) can hardly be considered to have borrowed from any older source than Euripidês. Welcker (Griech. Tragöd. vol. ii. p. 860) puts together all that can be known respecting the structure of the lost drama of Euripidês.

[308] Iliad, v. 386; Odyss. xi. 306; Apollodôr. i. 7, 4. So Typhôeus, in the Hesiodic Theogony, the last enemy of the gods, is killed before he comes to maturity (Theog. 837). For the different turns given to this ancient Homeric legend, see Heyne, ad Apollodôr. l. c, and Hyginus, f. 28. The Alôids were noticed in the Hesiodic poems (ap. Schol. Apoll. Rhod. i. 482). Odysseus does not see *them* in Hadês, as Heyne by mistake says; he sees their mother Iphimêdea. Virgil (Æn. vi. 582) assigns to them a place among the sufferers of punishment in Tartarus.

Eumêlus, the Corinthian poet, designated Alôeus as son of the god Hêlios and brother of Æêtês, the father of Mêdea (Eumêl. Fragm. 2, Marktscheffel). The scene of their death was subsequently laid in Naxos (Pindar, Pyth. iv. 88): their tombs were seen at Anthêdôn in Bœôtia (Pausan. ix. 22, 4). The very curious legend alluded to by Pausanias from Hegesinoos, the author of an Atthis,—to the effect that Otos and Ephialtês were the first to establish the worship of the Muses in Helicôn, and that they founded Ascra along with Œoklos, the son of Poseidôn,—is one which we have no means of tracing farther (Pausan. ix. 29, I).

The story of the Alôids, as Diodôrus gives it (v. 51, 52), diverges on almost every point: it is evidently borrowed from some Naxian archæologist, and the only information which we collect from it is, that Otos and Ephialtês received heroic honors at Naxos. The views of O. Müller (Orchomenos, p. 387) appear to me unusually vague and fanciful.

Ephialtês takes part in the combat of the giants against the gods (Apollodôr. t. 6, 2), where Heyne remarks, as in so many other cases, "Ephialtês hic non confundendus cum altero Alôei filio;" an observation just indeed, if we are supposed to be dealing with personages and adventures historically real, but altogether misleading in regard to these legendary characters; for here the general conception of Ephialtês and his attributes is in both cases the same; but the particular adventures ascribed to him cannot be made to consist, as facts, one with the other.

[309] Hesiod, Akusilaus and Pherekydês, ap. Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. iv, 57. Ἴν δ᾽ αὐτῷ θανάτου ταμίης. The Scholium is very full of matter, and exhibits many of the diversities in the tale of Endymiôn: see also Apollodôr i. 7, 5; Pausan. v. 1, 2; Conôn. Narr. 14.

[310] Theocrit. iii. 49; xx. 35; where, however, Endymiôn is connected with Latmos in Caria (see Schol. *ad loc.*).

[311] Pausan. v. 1. 3-6; Apollodôr. i. 7, 6.

[312] Apollodôr. ii. 5, 5; Schol. Apoll. Rhod. i. 172. In all probability, the old legend made Augeas the son of the god Hêlios: Hêlios, Augeas and Agamêdê are a triple series parallel to the Corinthian genealogy, Hêlios, Æêtês and Mêdia; not to mention that the etymology of Augeas connects him with Hêlios. Theocritus (xx. 55) designates him as the son of the god Hêlios, through whose favor his cattle are made to prosper and multiply with such astonishing success (xx. 117).

[313] Iliad, xi. 670-760; Pherekyd. Fragm. 57, Didot.

[314] Diodôr. iv. 13. Ὕβρεως ἕνεκεν Εὐρυσθεὺς προσέταξε καθᾶραι· ὁ δὲ Ἡρακλῆς τὸ μὲν τοῖς ὤμοις ἐξενεγκεῖν αὐτὴν ἀπεδοκίμασεν, ἐκκλίνων τὴν ἐκ τῆς ὕβρεως αἰσχύνην, etc. (Pausan. v. 1. 7; Apollodôr. ii. 5, 5).

It may not be improper to remark that this fable indicates a purely pastoral condition, or at least a singularly rude state of agriculture; and the way in which Pausanias recounts it goes even beyond the genuine story: ὡς καὶ τὰ πολλὰ τῆς χώρας αὐτῷ ἤδη διατελεῖν ἀργὰ ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν βοσκημάτων τῆς κόπρου. The slaves of Odysseus however know what use to make of the dung heaped before his outer fence (Odyss. xvii. 299); not so the purely carnivorous and pastoral Cyclôps (Odyss. ix. 329). The stabling into which the cattle go from their pasture, is called κόπρος in Homer,—Ἐλθούσας ἐς κόπρον, ἐπὴν βοτανῆς κορέσωνται (Odyss. x. 411): compare Iliad, xviii. 575—Μυκηθμῷ δ᾽ ἀπὸ κόπρου ἐπεσσεύοντο πέδονδε.

The Augeas of Theocritus has abundance of wheat-land and vineyard, as well as cattle: he ploughs his land three or four times, and digs his vineyard diligently (xx. 20-32).

[315] The wrath and retirement of Phyleus is mentioned in the Iliad (ii. 633), but not the cause of it.

[316] These singular properties were ascribed to them both in the Hesiodic poems and by Pherekydês (Schol. Ven. ad Il. xi. 715-750, et ad Il. xxiii. 638), but not in the Iliad. The poet Ibykus (Fragm. 11, Schneid. ap. Athenæ. ii. 57) calls them ἅλικας ἰσοκεφάλους, ἐνιγυίους, Ἀμφοτέρους γεγαῶτας ἐν ὠέῳ ἀργυρέῳ.

There were temples and divine honors to Zeus Moliôn (Lactantius. de Falsâ Religione, i. 22).

[317] Pausan. v. 2, 4. The inscription cited by Pausanias proves that this was the reason assigned by the Eleian athlêtes themselves for the exclusion; but there were several different stories.

[318] Apollodôr. ii. 7, 2. Diodôr. iv. 33. Pausan. v. 2, 2; 3, 2. It seems evident from these accounts that the genuine legend represented Hêraklês as having been defeated by the Molionids: the unskilful evasions both of Apollodôrus and Diodôrus betray this. Pindar (Olymp. xi. 25-50) gives the story without any flattery to Hêraklês.

[319] Pausan. v. 4, 1.

[320] The Armenian copy of Eusebius gives a different genealogy respecting Elis and Pisa: Aëthlius, Epeius, Endymiôn, Alexinus; next Œnomaus and Pêlops, then Hêraklês. Some counted ten generations, others *three*, between Hêraklês and Iphitus, who renewed the discontinued Olympic games (see Armen. Euseb. copy c. xxxii. p. 140).

[321] Iliad, ii. 615-630.

[322] Pausan. v. 3, 4.

[323] Schol. Pindar, Olymp. ix. 86.

[324] Schol. Ven. ad II. xi. 687; Conôn, Narrat. xv. ap. Scriptt. Mythogr. West p. 130.

[325] Pindar, Olymp. ix. 62: Schol. *ibid.* 86. Ὀποῦντος ἦν θυγάτηρ Ἠλείων βασιλέως, ἣν Ἀριστοτέλης Καμβύσην καλεῖ.

[326] Ἑκαταῖος δὲ ὁ Μιλήσιος ἑτέρους λέγει τῶν Ἠλείων τοὺς Ἐπείους· τῷ γοῦν Ἡρακλεῖ συστρατεῦσαι τοὺς Ἐπείους καὶ συνανελεῖν αὐτῷ τόν τε Αὐγέαν καὶ τὴν Ἦλιν (Hekat. ap. Strab. viii. p. 341).

[327] Ephorus said that Ætôlus had been expelled by Salmôneus king of the Epeians and Pisatæ (ap. Strabo. viii. p. 357): he must have had before him a different story and different genealogy from that which is given in the text.

[328] Apollodôr. i. 7, 6. Dôrus, son of Apollo and Phthia, killed by Ætôlus, after having hospitably received him, is here mentioned. Nothing at all is known of this; but the conjunction of names is such as to render it probable that there was some legend connected with them: possibly the assistance given by Apollo to the Kurêtes against the Ætôlians, and the death of Meleager by the hand of Apollo, related both in the Eoiai and the Minyas (Pausan. x. 31, 2), may have been grounded upon it. The story connects itself with what is stated by Apollodôrus about Dôrus son of Hellên (see *supra*, p. 136).

[329] According to the ancient genealogical poet Asius, Thestius was son of Agênôr the son of Pleurôn (Asii Fragm. 6, p. 413, ed. Marktsch.). Compare the genealogy of Ætôlia and the general remarks upon it, in Brandstäter, Geschichte des Ætol. Landes, etc., Berlin, 1844, p. 23 *seq.*

[330] Respecting Lêda, see the statements of Ibykus, Pherekydês, Hellanikus, etc. (Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. i. 146). The reference to the Corinthiaca of Eumêlus is curious: it is a specimen of the matters upon which these old genealogical poems dwelt.

[331] Apollodôr. i. 8, 1; Euripidês, Meleager, Frag. 1. The three sons of Portheus are named in the Iliad (xiv. 116) as living at Pleurôn and Kalydôn. The name Œneus doubtless brings Dionysus into the legend.

[332] Ἦ λάθετ', ἢ οὐκ ἐνόησεν· ἀάσατο δὲ μέγα θυμῷ. (Iliad, ix. 533). The destructive influence of Atê is mentioned before, v. 502. The piety of Xenophôn reproduces this ancient circumstance,—Οἴνεως δ' ἐν γήρᾳ ἐπιλαθομένου τῆς θεοῦ, etc. (De Venat. c. i.)

[333] These priests formed the Chorus in the Meleager of Sophoklês (Schol. ad Iliad. *ib.* 575).

[334] Iliad, ix. 525-595.

[335] Iliad, ii. 642.

[336] Pausan. x. 31. 2. The Πλευρώνιαι, a lost tragedy of Phrynichus.

[337] Plin. H. N. xxxvii. 2, 11.

[338] There was a tragedy of Æschylus called Ἀταλάντη, of which nothing remains (Bothe, Æschyli Fragm. ix. p. 18).

Of the more recent dramatic writers, several selected Atalanta as their subject (See Brandstäter, Geschichte Ætoliens, p. 65).

[339] There was a poem of Stesichorus, Συόθηραι (Stesichor. Fragm. 15. p. 72).

[340] The catalogue of these heroes is in Apollodôr. i. 8, 2; Ovid, Metamor. viii. 300; Hygin. fab. 173. Euripidês, in his play of Meleager, gave an enumeration and description of the heroes (see Fragm. 6 of that play, ed. Matth.). Nestôr, in this picture of Ovid, however, does not appear quite so invincible as in his own speeches in the Iliad. The mythographers thought it necessary to assign a reason why Hêraklês was *not* present at the Kalydônian adventure: he was just at that time in servitude with Omphalê in Lydia (Apollod. ii. 6, 3). This seems to have been the idea of Ephorus, and it is much in his style of interpretation (see Ephor. Fragm. 9. ed. Didot.).

[341] Euripid. Meleag. Fragm. vi. Matt.—

Κύπριδος δὲ μίσημ', Ἀρκὰς Ἀταλάντη, κύνας

Καὶ τόξ' ἔχουσα, etc.

There was a drama "Meleager" both of Sophoklês and Euripidês: of the former hardly any fragments remain,—a few more of the latter.

[342] Hyginus, fab. 229.

[343] Diodôr, iv. 34. Apollôdorus (i. 8; 2-4) gives first the usual narrative, including Atalanta; next, the Homeric narrative with some additional circumstances, but not including either Atalanta or the fire-brand on which Meleager's life depended. He prefaces the latter with the words οἱ δὲ φασι, etc. Antoninus Liberalis gives this second narrative only, without Atalanta, from Nicander (Narrat. 2).

The Latin scenic poet, Attius, had devoted one of his tragedies to this subject, taking the general story as given by Euripidês: "Remanet gloria apud me: exuvias dignavi Atalantæ dare," seems to be the speech of Meleager. (Attii Fragm. 8, ap. Poet. Scen. Lat. ed. Bothe, p. 215). The readers of the Æneid will naturally think of the swift and warlike virgin Camilla, as the parallel of Atalanta.

[344] The narrative of Apollodôrus reads awkwardly—Μελέαγρος ἔχων γυναῖκα Κλεοπάτραν, βουλόμενος δὲ καὶ ἐξ Ἀταλάντης τεκνοποιήσασθαι, etc. (i. 8, 2).

[345] Kallimachus, Hymn. ad Dian. 217.—

Οὔ μιν ἐπικλητοὶ Καλυδώνιοι ἀγρευτῆρες

Μέμφονται κάπροιο· τὰ γὰρ σημήϊα νίκης

Ἀρκαδίην εἰσῆλθεν, ἔχει δ᾽ ἔτι θηρὸς ὀδόντας.

[346] See Pherekyd. Frag. 81, ed. Didot.

[347] Pausan. viii. 45, 4; 46, 1-3; 47, 2. Lucian, adv. Indoctum, c. 14. t. iii. p. 111, Reiz.

The officers placed in charge of the public curiosities or wonders at Rome (οἱ ἐπὶ τοῖς θαύμασιν) affirmed that one of the tusks had been accidentally broken in the voyage from Greece: the other was kept in the temple of Bacchus in the Imperial Gardens.

It is numbered among the memorable exploits of Thêseus that he vanquished and killed a formidable and gigantic sow, in the territory of Krommyôn near Corinth. According to some critics, this Krommyônian sow was the mother of the Kalydônian boar (Strabo, viii. p. 380).

[348] Strabo, x. p. 466. Πολέμου δ᾽ ἐμπεσόντος τοῖς Θεστιάδαις πρὸς Οἰνέα καὶ Μελέαγρον, ὁ μὲν Ποιητὴς, ἀμφὶ συὸς κεφαλῇ καὶ δέρματι, κατὰ τὴν περὶ τοῦ κάπρου μυθολογίαν· ὡς δὲ τὸ εἰκὸς, περὶ μέρους τῆς χώρας, etc. This remark is also similar to Mr. Payne Knight's criticism on the true causes of the Trojan war, which were (he tells us) of a political character, independent of Helen and her abduction (Prolegom. ad Homer. c. 53).

[349] Compare Apollodôr. iii. 9, 2, and Pausan. v. 17, 4. She is made to *wrestle* with Pêleus at these funeral games, which seems foreign to her character.

[350] Pausan. viii. 35, 8.

[351] Respecting the varieties in this interesting story, see Apollod. iii. 9, 2; Hygin. f. 185; Ovid, Metam. x. 560-700; Propert. i. 1, 20; Ælian, V. H. xiii. i. Μειλανίωνος σωφρονέστερος. Aristophan. Lysistrat. 786 and Schol. In the ancient representation on the chest of Kypselus (Paus. v. 19, 1), Meilaniôn was exhibited standing near Atalanta, who was holding a fawn: no match or competition in running was indicated.

There is great discrepancy in the naming and patronymic description of the parties in the story. Three different persons are announced as fathers of Atalanta, Schœneus, Jasus and Mænalos; the successful lover in Ovid (and seemingly in Euripidês also) is called Hippomenês, not Meilaniôn. In the Hesiodic poems Atalanta was daughter of Schœneus; Hellanikus called her daughter of Jasus. See Apollodôr. *l. c.*; Kallimach. Hymn to Dian. 214, with the note of Spanheim; Schol. Eurip. Phœniss. 150; Schol. Theocr. Idyll. iii. 40; also the ample commentary of Bachet de Meziriac, Sur les Epîtres d'Ovide, vol. i. p. 366. Servius (ad Virg. Eclog. vi. 61; Æneid, iii. 113) calls Atalanta a native of Scyros.

Both the ancient scholiasts (see Schol. Apoll. Rhod. i. 769) and the modern commentators, Spanheim and Heyne, seek to escape this difficulty by supposing two Atalantas,—an Arcadian and a Bœôtian: assuming the

principle of their conjecture to be admissible, they ought to suppose at least three.

Certainly, if personages of the Grecian mythes are to be treated as historically real, and their adventures as so many exaggerated and miscolored facts, it will be necessary to repeat the process of multiplying entities to an infinite extent. And this is one among the many reasons for rejecting the fundamental supposition.

But when we consider these personages as purely legendary, so that an historical basis can neither be affirmed nor denied respecting them, we escape the necessity of such inconvenient stratagems. The test of identity is then to be sought in the attributes, not in the legal description,—in the predicates, not in the subject. Atalanta, whether born of one father or another, whether belonging to one place or another, is beautiful, cold, repulsive, daring, swift of foot and skilful with the bow,—these attributes constitute her identity. The Scholiast on Theocritus (iii. 40), in vindicating his supposition that there were two Atalantas, draws a distinction founded upon this very principle: he says that the Bœôtian Atalanta was τοξοτὶς, and the Arcadian Atalanta δρομαία. But this seems an over-refinement: both the shooting and the running go to constitute an accomplished huntress.

In respect to Parthenopæus, called by Euripidês and by so many others the son of Atalanta, it is of some importance to add, that Apollodôrus, Aristarchus, and Antimachus, the author of the Thebaid, assigned to him a pedigree entirely different,—making him an Argeian, the son of Talaos and Lysimachê, and brother of Adrastus. (Apollodôr. i. 9, 13; Aristarch. ap. Schol. Soph. Œd. Col. 1320; Antimachus ap. Schol. Æschyl. Sep. Theb. 532; and Schol. Supplem. ad Eurip. Phœniss. t. viii. p. 461, ed. Matth. Apollodôrus is in fact inconsistent with himself in another passage).

[352] Sophokl. Trachin. 7. The horn of Amaltheia was described by Pherekydês (Apollod. ii. 7, 5); see also Strabo, x. p. 458 and Diodôr. iv. 35, who cites an interpretation of the fables (οἱ εἰκάζοντες ἐξ αὐτῶν τἀληθές) to the effect that it was symbolical of an embankment of the unruly river by Hêraklês, and consequent recovery of very fertile land.

[353] Hellanikus (ap. Athen. ix. p. 410) mentioning this incident, in two different works, called the attendant by two different names.

[354] The beautiful drama of the Trachiniæ has rendered this story familiar: compare Apollod. ii. 7, 7. Hygin. f. 36. Diodôr. iv. 36-37.

The capture of Œchalia (Οἰχαλίας ἅλωσις) was celebrated in a very ancient epic poem by Kreophylos, of the Homeric and not of the Hesiodic character: it passed with many as the work of Homer himself. (See Düntzer, Fragm. Epic. Græcor. p. 8. Welcker, Der Epische Cyclus, p. 229). The same subject was also treated in the Hesiodic Catalogue, or in the Eoiai (see Hesiod, Fragm. 129, ed. Marktsch.): the number of the children of Eurytos was there enumerated.

This exploit seems constantly mentioned as the last performed by Hêraklês, and as immediately preceding his death or apotheosis on Mount Œta: but whether the legend of Deianeira and the poisoned tunic be very old, we cannot tell.

The tale of the death of Iphitos, son of Eurytos, by Hêraklês, is as ancient as the Odyssey (xxi. 19-40): but it is there stated, that Eurytos dying left his memorable bow to his son Iphitos (the bow is given afterwards by Iphitos to Odysseus, and is the weapon so fatal to the suitors),—a statement not very consistent with the story that Œchalia was taken and Eurytos slain by Hêraklês. It is plain that these were distinct and contradictory legends. Compare Soph. Trachin. 260-285 (where Iphitos dies before Eurytos), not only with the passage just cited from the Odyssey, but also with Pherekydês, Fragm. 34, Didot.

Hyginus (f. 33) differs altogether in the parentage of Deianeira: he calls her daughter of Dexamenos: his account of her marriage with Hêraklês is in every respect at variance with Apollodôrus. In the latter, Mnêsimachê is the daughter of Dexamenos; Hêraklês rescues her from the importunities of the Centaur Eurytiôn (ii. 5, 5).

[355] See the references in Apollod. i, 8, 4-5. Pindar, Isthm. iv. 32. Μελέταν δὲ σοφισταῖς Διὸς ἔκατι πρόσβαλον σεβιζόμενοι Ἐν μὲν Αἰτωλῶν θυσίαισι φαενναῖς Οἰνεΐδαι κρατεροὶ, etc.

[356] Hekat. Fragm. 341, Didot. In this story Œneus is connected with the first discovery of the vine and the making of wine (οἶνος): compare Hygin. f. 129, and Servius ad Virgil. Georgic. i. 9.

[357] See Welcker (Griechisch. Tragöd. ii. p. 583) on the lost tragedy called Œneus.

[358] Timoklês, Comic. ap. Athenæ. vii. p. 223.—

Γέρων τις ἀτυχεῖ; κατέμαθεν τὸν Οἰνέα.

Ovid. Heroid. ix. 153.—

"Heu! devota domus! Solio sedet Agrios alto

Œnea desertum nuda senecta premit."

The account here given is in Hyginus (f. 175): but it is in many points different both from Apollodôrus (i. 8, 6; Pausan. ii. 25) and Pherekydês (Fragm. 83, Didot). It seems to be borrowed from the lost tragedy of Euripidês. Compare Schol. ad Aristoph. Acharn. 417. Antonin. Liberal. c. 37. In the Iliad, Œneus is dead before the Trojan war (ii. 641).

The account of Ephorus again is different (ap. Strabo. x. p. 462); he joins Alkmæôn with Diomêdês: but his narrative has the air of a tissue of quasi-historical conjectures, intended to explain the circumstance that the Ætôlian Diomêdês is king of Argos during the Trojan war.

Pausanias and Apollodôrus affirm that Œneus was buried at Œnoê between Argos and Mantineia, and they connect the name of this place with him. But it seems more reasonable to consider him as the eponymous hero of Œniadæ in Ætôlia.

[359] Ephor. Fragm. 29. Didot ap. Strab. x.

[360] Hesiod. ii. 117. Fragment. Epicc. Græc. Düntzer, ix. Κύπρια, 8.—

Αἶψα τε Λυγκεὺς

Ταΰγετον προσέβαινε ποσὶν ταχέεσσι πεποιθὼς,

Ἀκρότατον δ᾽ ἀναβὰς διεδέρκετο νῆσον ἅπασαν

Τανταλίδεω Πέλοπος.

Also the Homeric Hymn. Apoll. 419, 430, and Tyrtæus, Fragm. 1.—

(*Εὐνομία*)—Εὐρεῖαν Πέλοπος νῆσον ἀφικόμεθα.

The Schol. ad Iliad, ix. 246, intimates that the name Πελοπόννησος occurred in one or more of the Hesiodic epics.

[361] Iliad, ix. 37. Compare ii. 580. Diomêdês addresses Agamemnôn—

Σοὶ δὲ διάνδιχα δῶκε Κρόνου παῖς ἀγκυλομήτεω·

Σκήπτρῳ μέν τοι δῶκε τετιμῆσθαι περὶ πάντων·

Ἀλκὴν δ᾽ οὔ τοι δῶκεν, ὅ,τε κράτος ἐστὶ μέγιστον.

A similar contrast is drawn by Nestôr (Il. i. 280) between Agamemnôn and Achilles. Nestôr says to Agamemnôn (Il. ix. 69)—

Ἀτρεΐδη, σὺ μὲν ἄρχε· σὺ γὰρ *βασιλεύτατός* ἐσσι.

And this attribute attaches to Menelaus as well as to his brother. For when Diomêdês is about to choose his companion for the night expedition into the Trojan camp, Agamemnôn thus addresses him (x. 232):

Τὸν μὲν δὴ ἕταρόν γ᾽ αἱρήσεαι, ὅν κ᾽ ἐθέλῃσθα
Φαινομένων τὸν ἄριστον, ἐπεὶ μεμάασί γε πολλοί·
Μηδὲ σύ γ᾽ αἰδόμενος σῇσι φρεσὶ, τὸν μὲν ἀρείω
Καλλείπειν, σὺ δὲ χείρον᾽ ὀπάσσεαι αἰδοῖ εἴκων
Ἐς γενεὴν ὀρόων, εἰ καὶ βασιλεύτερός ἐστιν.
Ὣς ἔφατ᾽, ἔδδεισε δὲ περὶ ξανθῷ Μενελάῳ.

[362] Iliad, ii. 101.

[363] Iliad, xiv. 491. Hesiod. Theog. 444. Homer, Hymn. Mercur. 526-568, Ὄλβου καὶ πλούτου δώσω περικάλλεα ῥάβδον. Compare Eustath. ad Iliad. xvi. 182.

[364] Iliad, iii. 72; vii. 363. In the Hesiodic Eoiai was the following couplet (Fragm. 55. p. 43, Düntzer):—

Ἀλκὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκεν Ὀλύμπιος Αἰακίδῃσιν,
Νοῦν δ᾽ Ἀμυθαονίδαις, πλοῦτον δ᾽ ἔπορ᾽ Ἀτρείδῃσι.

Again, Tyrtæus, Fragm. 9, 4.—

Οὐδ᾽ εἰ Τανταλίδεω Πέλοπος βασιλεύτερος εἴη, etc.

[365] Odyss. iv. 45-71.

[366] Diodôr. iv. 77. Hom. Odyss. xi. 582. Pindar gives a different version of the punishment inflicted on Tantalus: a vast stone was perpetually impending over his head, and threatening to fall (Olymp. i. 56; Isthm. vii. 20).

[367] Pindar, Olymp. i. 45. Compare the sentiment of Iphigeneia in Euripidês, Iph. Taur. 387.

[368] Sapphô (Fragm. 82, Schneidewin)—

Λατὼ καὶ Νιόβα μάλα μὲν φίλαι ἦσαν ἑταῖραι.

Sapphô assigned to Niobê eighteen children (Aul. Gell. N. A. iv. Δ. xx. 7); Hesiod gave twenty; Homer twelve (Apollod. iii. 5).

The Lydian historian Xanthus gave a totally different version both of the genealogy and of the misfortunes of Niobê (Parthen. Narr. 33).

[369] Ovid, Metam. vi. 164-311. Pausan. i. 21, 5; viii. 2, 3.

[370] Apollôn. Rhod. ii. 358, and Schol.; Ister. Fragment. 59, Dindorf; Diodôr. iv. 74.

[371] Diodôr. iv. 74.

[372] Pausanias (vi. 21, 7) had read their names in the Hesiodic Eoiai.

[373] Pindar, Olymp. i. 140. The chariot race of Pelops and Œnomaus was represented on the chest of Kypselus at Olympia: the horses of the former were given as having wings (Pausan. v. 17, 4). Pherekydês gave the same story (ap. Schol. ad Soph. Elect. 504).

[374] It is noted by Herodotus and others as a remarkable fact, that no mules were ever bred in the Eleian territory: an Eleian who wished to breed a mule sent his mare for the time out of the region. The Eleians them-

selves ascribed this phænomenon to a disability brought on the land by a curse from the lips of Œnomaus (Herod. iv. 30; Plutarch, Quæst. Græc. p. 303).

[375] Paus. v. 1, 1; Sophok. Elektr. 508; Eurip. Orest. 985, with Schol., Plato, Kratyl. p. 395.

[376] Apollod. ii. 4, 5. Pausan. ii. 30, 8; 26, 3; v. 8, 1. Hesiod. ap. Schol. ad Iliad. xx. 116.

[377] Thucyd. i. 5.

[378] We find two distinct legends respecting Chrysippus: his abduction by Laius king of Thêbes, on which the lost drama of Euripidês called Chrysippus turned (see Welcker, Griech. Tragödien, ii. p. 536), and his death by the hands of his half-brothers. Hyginus (f. 85) blends the two together.

[379] Thucyd. i. 9. λέγουσι δὲ οἱ τὰ Πελοποννησίων σαφέστατα μνήμῃ παρὰ τῶν πρότερον δεδεγμένοι. According to Hellanikus, Atreus the elder son returns to Pisa after the death of Pelops with a great army, and makes himself master of his father's principality (Hellanik. ap Schol. ad Iliad, ii. 105). Hellanikus does not seem to have been so solicitous as Thucydidês to bring the story into conformity with Homer. The circumstantial genealogy given in Schol. ad Eurip. Orest. 5. makes Atreus and Thyestês reside during their banishment at Makestus in Triphylia: it is given without any special authority, but may perhaps come from Hellanikus.

[380] Æschyl. Agamem. 1204, 1253, 1608; Hygin. 86; Attii Fragm. 19. This was the story of the old poem entitled Alkmæônis; seemingly also of Pherekydês, though the latter rejected the story that Hermês had produced the golden lamb with the special view of exciting discord between the two brothers, in order to avenge the death of Myrtilus by Pelops (see Schol. ad Eurip. Orest. 996).

A different legend, alluded to in Soph. Aj. 1295 (see Schol. *ad loc.*), recounted that Aeropê had been detected by her father Katreus in unchaste commerce with a low-born person; he entrusted her in his anger to Nauplius, with directions to throw her into the sea: Nauplius however not only spared her life, but betrothed her to Pleisthenês, father of Agamemnôn and son of Atreus.

The tragedy entitled *Atreus* of the Latin poet Attius, seems to have brought out, with painful fidelity, the harsh and savage features of this family legend (see Aul. Gell. xiii. 2, and the fragments of Attius now remaining, together with the tragedy called Thyestês, of Seneca).

[381] Hygin. fab. 87-88.

[382] So we must say, in conformity to the ideas of antiquity: compare Homer, Iliad, xvi. 176 and Herodot. vi. 53.

[383] Hom. Odyss. iii. 280-300; iv. 83-560.

[384] Odyss. i. 38; iii. 310.—ἀνάλκιδος Αἰγίσθοιο.

[385] Odyss. iii. 260-275; iv. 512-537; xi. 408. Deinias in his Argolica, and other historians of that territory, fixed the precise day of the murder of Agamemnôn,—the thirteenth of the month Gamêliôn (Schol. ad Sophokl. Elektr. 275).

[386] Odyss. iii. 306; iv. 9

[387] Odyss. i. 299.

[388] Hesiod. Fragm. 60. p. 44, ed. Düntzer; Stesichor. Fragm. 44, Kleine. The Scholiast ad Soph. Elektr. 539, in reference to another discrepancy between Homer and the Hesiodic poems about the children of Helen, remarks that we ought not to divert our attention from that which is moral and salutary to ourselves in the poets (τὰ ἠθικὰ καὶ χρήσιμα ἡμῖν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι), in order to cavil at their genealogical contradictions.

Welcker in vain endeavors to show that Pleisthenês was originally introduced as the father of Atreus, not as his son (Griech. Tragöd. p. 678).

[389] Schol. ad Eurip. Orest. 46. Ὅμηρος ἐν Μυκήναις φησὶ τὰ βασιλεῖα τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος· Στησίχορος δὲ καὶ Σιμωνίδης, ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ. Pindar, Pyth. xi. 31; Nem. viii. 21. Stêsichorus had composed an Ὀρέστεια, copied in many points from a still more ancient lyric Oresteia by Xanthus: compare Athen. xii. p. 513, and Ælian, V. H. iv. 26.

[390] Hesiod, ap. Schol. ad Pindar, Nem. x. 150.

[391] See the ode of Pindar addressed to Aristagoras of Tenedos (Nem. xi. 35; Strabo, xiii. p. 582). There were Penthilids at Mitylênê, from Penthilus, son of Orestês (Aristot. Polit v. 8, 13, Schneid.).

[392] Iliad, iv. 52. Compare Euripid. Hêrakleid. 350

[393] Iliad, iv. 31. Zeus says to Hêrê,—

Δαιμονίη, τί νύ σε Πρίαμος, Πριάμοιό τε παῖδες
Τόσσα κακὰ ῥέζεσκον ὅτ᾽ ἀσπερχὲς μενεαίνεις
Ἰλίου ἐξαλάπαξαι ἐϋκτίμενον πτολίεθρον;
Εἰ δὲ σύ γ᾽, εἰσελθοῦσα πύλας καὶ τείχεα μακρὰ,
Ὠμὸν βεβρώθοις Πρίαμον Πριάμοιό τε παῖδας,
Ἄλλους τε Τρῶας, τότε κεν χόλον ἐξακέσαιο.

Again, xviii. 358,—

ἦ ῥά νυ σεῖο
Ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐγένοντο καρηκομόωντες Ἀχαιοί.

[394] See the preface of Dissen to the tenth Nem. of Pindar.

[395] Clemens Alexandr. Admonit. ad Gent. p. 24. Ἀγαμέμνονα γοῦν τινα Δία ἐν Σπάρτῃ τιμᾶσθαι Στάφυλος ἱστορεῖ. See also Œnomaus ap. Euseb. Præparat. Evangel. v. 28.

[396] Herodot. vii. 159. Ἦ κε μέγ᾽ οἰμώξειεν ὁ Πελοπίδης Ἀγαμέμνων, πυθόμενος Σπαρτιήτας ἀπαραιρῆσθαι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ὑπὸ Γέλωνός τε καὶ τῶν Συρακουσίων: compare Homer, Iliad, vii. 125. See what appears to be an imitation of the same passage in Josephus, De Bello Judaico, iii. 8, 4. Ἦ μεγάλα γ᾽ ἂν στενάξειαν οἱ πάτριοι νόμοι, etc.

[397] Pindar. Pyth. xi. 16.

[398] Herodot. i 68.

[399] Plutarch. Thêseus, c. 36, Cimôn, c. 8; Pausan. iii. 3, 6.

[400] Compare Apollod. iii. 10, 4. Pausan. iii. 1, 4.

[401] Hesiod. ap Schol. Pindar, Olymp. xi. 79.

[402] Hesiod. ap. Schol. Pindar, Nem. x. 150. Fragm. Hesiod. Düntzer, 58. p. 44. Tyndareus was worshipped as a god at Lacedæmôn (Varro ap. Serv. ad Virgil. Æneid. viii. 275).

[403] Apollôn. Rhod. ii. 1-96. Apollod. i. 9, 20. Theocrit. xxii. 26-133. In the account of Apollônius and Apollôdorus, Amykus is slain in the contest; in that of Theocritus he is only conquered and forced to give in, with a promise to renounce for the future his brutal conduct; there were several different narratives. See Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. ii. 106.

[404] Diodôr. ix. 63. Herod. iv. 73. Δεκελέων δὲ τῶν τότε ἐργασαμένων ἔργον χρήσιμον ἐς τὸν πάντα χρόνον, ὡς αὐτοὶ Ἀθηναῖοι λέγουσι. According to other authors, it was Akadêmus who made the revelation, and the spot called Akadêmia, near Athens, which the Lacedæmônians spared in consideration of this service (Plutarch, Thêseus, 31, 32, 33, where he gives several different versions of this tale by Attic writers, framed with the view of exonerating Thêseus). The recovery of Helen and the captivity of Æthra were represented on the ancient chest of Kypselus, with the following curious inscription:

Τυνδαρίδα Ἑλέναν φέρετον, Αἴθραν δ᾽ Ἀθέναθεν

Ἕλκετον.

Pausan. v. 19, 1.

[405] Cypria Carm. Fragm. 8. p. 13, Düntzer. Lycophrôn, 538-566 with Schol. Apollod. iii. 11, 1. Pindar, Nem. x. 55-90. ἑτερήμερον ἀθανασίαν: also Homer, Odyss. xi. 302, with the Commentary of Nitzsch, vol. iii. p. 245.

The combat thus ends more favorably to the Tyndarids; but probably the account least favorable to them is the oldest, since their dignity went on continually increasing, until at last they became great deities.

[406] Odyss. xxi. 15. Diodôr. xv. 66.

[407] Pausan. iv. 2, 1.

[408] Iliad, ix. 553. Simonidês had handled this story in detail (Schol. Ven. II. ix. p. 553). Bacchylidês (ap. Schol. Pindar. Isthm. iv. 92) celebrated in one of his poems the competition among many eager suitors for the hand of Marpêssa, under circumstances similar to the competition for Hippodameia, daughter of Œnomaus. Many unsuccessful suitors perished by the hand of Euênus: their skulls were affixed to the wall of the temple of Poseidôn.

[409] Apollod. i. 7, 9. Pausan. iv. 2, 5. Apollônius Rhodius describes Idas as full of boast and self-confidence, heedless of the necessity of divine aid. Probably this was the character of the brothers in the old legend, as the enemies of the Dioskuri.

The wrath of the Dioskuri against Messênia was treated, even in the historical times, as the grand cause of the subjection of the Messênians by the Spartans: that wrath had been appeased at the time when Epameinondas reconstituted Messênê (Pausan. iv. 27, 1).

[410] Apollodôr. iii. 8, 1. Hygin. fab. 176. Eratosthen. Catasterism. 8. Pausan. viii. 2, 2-3. A different story respecting the immolation of the child is in Nikolaus Damask. Frag. p. 41, Orelli. Lykaôn is mentioned as the first founder of the temple of Zeus Lykæus in Schol. Eurip. Orest. 1662; but nothing is there said about the human sacrifice or its consequences. In the historical times, the festival and solemnities of the Lykæa do not seem to have been distinguished materially from the other agônes of Greece (Pindar, Olymp. xiii. 104; Nem. x. 46): Xenias the Arcadian, one of the generals in the army of Cyrus the younger, celebrated the solemnity with great magnificence in the march through Asia Minor (Xen. Anab. i. 2, 10). But the fable of the human sacrifice, and the subsequent transmutation of the person who had eaten human food into a wolf, continued to be told in connection with them (Plato, de Republic. viii. c. 15. p. 417). Compare Pliny, H. N. viii. 34. This passage of Plato seems to afford distinct indication that the practice of offering human victims at the altar of the Lykæan Zeus was neither prevalent nor recent, but at most only traditional and antiquated; and it therefore limits the sense or invalidates the authority of the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue, Minos, c. 5.

[411] Paus. viii. 3. Hygin. fab. 177.

[412] Apollod. iii. 8, 2.

[413] Pausan. viii. 3, 2. Apollod. iii. 8, 2. Hesiod. apud Eratosthen. Catasterism. 1. Fragm. 182, Marktsch. Hygin. f. 177.

[414] Homer, Iliad, ii. 604. Pind. Olymp. vi. 44-63.

The tomb of Æpytus, mentioned in the Iliad, was shown to Pausanias between Pheneus and Stymphalus (Pausan. viii. 16, 2). Æpytus was a cognomen of Hermês (Pausan. viii. 47, 3).

The hero Arkas was worshipped at Mantineia, under the special injunction of the Delphian oracle (Pausan. viii. 9, 2).

[415] Pausan. viii. 4, 6. Apollod. iii. 9, 1. Diodôr. iv. 33.

A separate legend respecting Augê and the birth of Têlephus was current at Tegea, attached to the temple, statue, and cognomen of Eileithyia in the Tegeatic agora (Pausan. viii. 48, 5).

Hekatæus seems to have narrated in detail the adventures of Augê (Pausan. viii. 4, 4; 47, 3. Hekatæ. Fragm. 345, Didot.).

Euripidês followed a different story about Augê and the birth of Têlephus in his lost tragedy called Augê (See Strabo, xiii. p. 615). Respecting the Μυσοὶ of Æschylus, and the two lost dramas, Ἀλεαδαὶ and Μυσοὶ of Sophoklês, little can be made out. (See Welcker, Griechisch. Tragöd. p. 53, 408-414).

[416] Têlephus and his exploits were much dwelt upon in the lost old epic poem, the Cyprian Verses. See argument of that poem ap. Düntzer, Ep. Fragm. p. 10. His exploits were also celebrated by Pindar (Olymp. ix. 70-79); he is enumerated along with Hectôr, Cycnus, Memnôn, the most distinguished opponents of Achilles (Isthm. iv. 46). His birth, as well as his adventures, became subjects with most of the great Attic tragedians.

[417] There were other local genealogies of Tegea deduced from Lykurgus: Bôtachus, eponym of the Dême Bôtachidæ at that place, was his grandson (Nicolaus ap. Steph. Byz. v. Βωταχίδαι).

[418] Herodot. ix. 27. Echemus is described by Pindar (Ol. xi. 69) as gaining the prize of wrestling in the fabulous Olympic games, on their first establishment by Hêraklês. He also found a place in the Hesiodic Catalogue as husband of Timandra, the sister of Helen and Klytæmnêstra (Hesiod, Fragm. 105, p. 318, Marktscheff.).

[419] Apollodôr. iii. 10, 3; Hesiod, Fragm. 141-142, Marktscheff.; Strab. ix. p. 442; Pherekydês, Fragm. 8; Akusilaus, Fragm. 25, Didot.

> Τῷ μὲν ἄρ᾽ ἄγγελος ἦλθε κόραξ, ἱερῆς ἀπὸ δαιτὸς
>
> Πυθὼ ἐς ἠγαθέην, καὶ ῥ᾽ ἔφρασεν ἔργ᾽ ἀΐδηλα
>
> Φοίβῳ ἀκερσεκόμῃ, ὅτι Ἴσχυς γῆμε Κόρωνιν
>
> Εἰλατίδης, Φλεγύαο διογνήτοιο θύγατρα. (Hesiod, Fr.)

The change of the color of the crow is noticed both in Ovid, Metamorph. ii. 632, in Antonin. Liberal. c. 20, and in Servius ad Virgil. Æneid. vii. 761, though the name "*Corvo* custode ejus" is there printed with a capital letter, as if it were a man named *Corvus*.

[420] Schol. Eurip. Alkêst. 1; Diodôr. iv. 71; Apollodôr. iii. 10, 3; Pindar, Pyth. iii. 59; Sextus Empiric. adv. Grammatic. i. 12. p. 271. Stesichorus named Eriphylê—the Naupaktian verses, Hippolytus—(compare Servius ad Virgil. Æneid. vii. 761); Panyasis, Tyndareus; a proof of the popularity of this tale among the poets. Pindar says that Æsculapius was "tempted by gold" to raise a man from the dead, and Plato (Legg. iii. p. 408) copies him: this seems intended to afford some color for the subsequent punishment. "Mercede id captum (observes Boeckh. ad Pindar. *l. c.*) Æsculapium fecisse recentior est fictio; Pindari fortasse ipsius, quem tragici secuti sunt: haud dubie a medicorum avaris moribus profecta, qui Græcorum medicis nostrisque communes sunt." The rapacity of the physicians (granting it to be ever so well-founded, both then and now) appears to me less likely to have operated upon the mind of Pindar, than the disposition to extenuate the cruelty of Zeus, by imputing guilty and sordid views to Asklêpius. Compare the citation from Dikæarchus, *infrà*, p. 249, note 1.

[421] Pausan. ii. 26, where several distinct stories are mentioned, each springing up at some one or other of the sanctuaries of the god: quite enough to justify the idea of these Æsculapii (Cicero, N. D. iii. 22).

Homer, Hymn ad Æsculap. 2. The tale briefly alluded to in the Homeric Hymn. ad Apollin. 209. is evidently different: Ischys is there the companion of Apollo, and Korônis is an Arcadian damsel.

Aristidês, the fervent worshipper of Asklêpius, adopted the story of Korônis, and composed hymns on the γάμον Κορωνίδος καὶ γένεσιν τοῦ θεοῦ (Orat. 23. p. 463, Dind.).

[422] See Pindar, Pyth. iii. The Scholiast puts a construction upon Pindar's words which is at any rate farfetched, if indeed it be at all admissible: he supposes that Apollo knew the fact from his own omniscience, without any informant, and he praises Pindar for having thus transformed the old fable. But the words οὐδ᾽ ἔλαθε σκόπον seem certainly to imply some informant: to suppose that σκόπον means the god's own mind, is a strained interpretation.

[423] Iliad, ii. 730. The Messênians laid claim to the sons of Asklêpius as their heroes, and tried to justify the pretension by a forced construction of Homer (Pausan. iii. 4, 2).

[424] Arktinus, Epicc. Græc. Fragm. 2. p. 22, Düntzer. The Ilias Minor mentioned the death of Machaôn by Eurypylus, son of Têlephus (Fragm. 5. p. 19, Düntzer).

[425] Ἀσκληπιός γέ τοι καὶ Διόνυσος, εἴτ᾽ ἄνθρωποι πρότερον ἦστην εἴτε καὶ ἀρχῆθεν θεοί (Galen, Protreptic. 9. t. 1. p. 22, Kühn.). Pausanias considers him as θεὸς ἐξ ἀρχῆς (ii. 26, 7). In the important temple at Smyrna he was worshipped as Ζεὺς Ἀσκληπιός (Aristidês, Or. 6. p. 64; Or. 23. p. 456, Dind.).

[426] Apollodôr. ap. Clem. Alex. Strom. i. p. 381; see Heyne, Fragment. Apollodôr. p. 410. According to Apollodôrus, the apotheosis of Hêraklês and of Æsculapius took place at the same time, thirty-eight years after Hêraklês began to reign at Argos.

[427] About Hekatæus, Herodot. ii. 143; about Solôn, Diogen. Laërt. Vit. Platon. init.

A curious fragment, preserved from the lost works of Dikæarchus, tells us of the descendants of the Centaur Cheirôn at the town of Pêlion, or perhaps at the neighboring town of Dêmêtrias,—it is not quite certain which, perhaps at both (see Dikæarch. Fragment. ed. Fuhr, p. 408). Ταύτην δὲ τὴν δύναμιν ἓν τῶν πολιτῶν οἵδε γένος, ὁ δὴ λέγεται Χείρωνος ἀπόγονον εἶναι· παραδίδωσι δὲ καὶ δείκνυσι πατὴρ υἱῷ, καὶ οὕτως ἡ δύναμις φυλάσσεται, ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος οἵδε τῶν πολιτῶν· οὐχ ὅσιον δὲ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους τὰ φάρμακα μισθοῦ τοῖς καμνοῦσι βοηθεῖν, ἀλλὰ προῖκα.

Plato, de Republ. iii. 4 (p. 391). Ἀχιλλεὺς ὑπὸ τῷ σοφωτάτῳ Χείρωνι τεθραμμένος. Compare Xenophôn, De Venat. c. 1.

[428] See the genealogy at length in Le Clerc, Historie de la Médecine, lib. ii. c. 2. p. 78, also p. 287; also Littré, Introduction aux Œuvres Complètes d'Hippocrate, t. i. p. 35. Hippocratês was the seventeenth from Æsculapius.

Theopompus the historian went at considerable length into the pedigree of the Asklêpiads of Kôs and Knidus, tracing them up to Podaleirius and his first settlement at Syrnus in Karia (see Theopomp. Fragm. 111, Didot): Polyanthus of Kyrênê composed a special treatise περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν γενέσεως (Sextus Empiric. adv. Grammat. i. 12. p. 271); see Stephan. Byz. v. Κῶς, and especially Aristidês, Orat. vii. *Asclêpiadæ*. The Asklêpiads were even reckoned among the Ἀρχηγέται of Rhodes, jointly with the Hêrakleids (Aristidês, Or. 44, ad Rhod. p. 839, Dind.).

In the extensive sacred enclosure at Epidaurus stood the statues of Asklêpius and his wife Epionê (Pausan. ii. 29, 1): two daughters are coupled with him by Aristophanês, and he was considered especially εὔπαις (Plutus, 654); Jaso, Panakeia and Hygieia are named by Aristidês.

[429] Plato, Protagor. c. 6 (p. 311). Ἱπποκράτη τὸν Κῶον, τὸν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν; also Phædr. c. 121. (p. 270). About Ktêsias, Galen, Opp. t. v. p. 652, Basil.; and Bahrt, Fragm. Ktêsiæ, p. 20. Aristotle (see Stahr. Aristotelia, i. p. 32) and Xenophôn, the physician of the emperor Claudius, were both Asklêpiads (Tacit. Annal. xii. 61). Plato, de Republ. iii. 405, calls them τοὺς κομψοὺς Ἀσκληπιάδας.

Pausanias, a distinguished physician at Gela in Sicily, and contemporary of the philosopher Empedoklês, was also an Asklêpiad: see the verses of Empedoklês upon him, Diogen. Laërt. viii. 61.

[430] Strabo, viii. p. 374; Aristophan. Vesp. 122; Plutus, 635-750; where the visit to the temple of Æsculapius is described in great detail, though with a broad farcical coloring.

During the last illness of Alexander the Great, several of his principal officers slept in the temple of Serapis, in the hope that remedies would be suggested to them in their dreams (Arrian, vii. 26).

Pausanias, in describing the various temples of Asklêpius which he saw, announces as a fact quite notorious and well-understood, "Here cures are wrought by the god" (ii. 36, 1; iii. 26, 7; vii. 27, 4): see Suidas, v. Ἀρίσταρχος. The Orations of Aristidês, especially the 6th and 7th, *Asklêpius and the Asklêpiadæ*, are the most striking manifestations of faith and thanksgiving towards Æsculapius, as well as attestations of his extensive working throughout the Grecian world; also Orat. 23 and 25, Ἱερῶν Λόγος, 1 and 3; and Or. 45 (De Rhetoricâ, p. 22. Dind.), αἵ τ᾽ ἐν Ἀσκληπιοῦ τῶν ἀεὶ διατριβόντων ἀγελαὶ, etc.

[431] Pausan. ii. 27, 3; 36, 1. Ταύταις ἐγγεγραμμένα ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν ὀνόματα ἀκεσθέντων ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ, πρόσετι δὲ καὶ νόσημα, ὅ,τι ἕκαστος ἐνόσησε, καὶ ὅπως ἰάθη,—the cures are wrought by the god himself.

[432] "Apollodôrus ætatem Herculis pro cardine chronologiæ habuit" (Heyne, ad Apollodôr. Fragm. p. 410).

[433] Herodot. v. 81.

[434] Nem. iv. 22. Isthm. vii. 16.

[435] This tale, respecting the transformation of the ants into men, is as old as the Hesiodic Catalogue of Women. See Düntzer, Fragm. Epicc. 21. p. 34; evidently an etymological tale from the name Myrmidones. Pausanias throws aside both the etymology and the details of the miracle: he says that Zeus raised men from the earth, at the prayer of Æakus (ii. 29, 2): other authors retained the etymology of Myrmidons from μύρμηκες, but gave a different explanation (Kallimachus, Fragm. 114, Düntzer). Μυρμιδόνων ἐσσῆνα (Strabo, viii. p. 375). Ἐσσὴν, ὁ οἰκιστής (Hygin. fab. 52).

According to the Thessalian legend, Myrmidôn was the son of Zeus by Eurymedusa, daughter of Kletor; Zeus having assumed the disguise of an ant (Clemens Alex. Admon. ad Gent. p. 25. Sylb.).

[436] Apollod. iii. 12, 6. Isokrat. Evagor. Encom. vol. ii. p. 278, Auger. Pausan. i. 45, 13; ii. 29, 6. Schol. Aristoph. Equit. 1253.

So in the 106th Psalm, respecting the Israelites and Phinees, v. 29, "They provoked the Lord to anger by their inventions, and the plague was great among them;" "Then stood up Phinees and prayed, and so the plague ceased;" "And that was counted unto him for righteousness, among all posterities for evermore."

[437] Pindar, Olymp. viii. 41, with the Scholia. Didymus did not find this story in any other poet older than Pindar.

[438] Apollod. iii. 12, 6, who relates the tale somewhat differently; but the old epic poem Alkmæônis gave the details (ap. Schol. Eurip. Andromach. 685)—

Ἔνθα μὲν ἀντίθεος Τελαμὼν τροχοειδέϊ δίσκῳ

Πλῆξε κάρη· Πηλεὺς δὲ θοῶς ἀνὰ χεῖρα τανύσσας

Ἀξίνην ἐϋχαλκον ἐπεπλήγει μετὰ νῶτα.

[439] Pindar, Nem. v. 15, with Scholia, and Kallimach. Frag. 136. Apollônius Rhodius represents the fratricide as inadvertent and unintentional (i. 92); one instance amongst many of the tendency to soften down and moralize the ancient tales.

Pindar, however, seems to forget this incident when he speaks in other places of the general character of Pêleus (Olymp. ii. 75-86. Isthm. vii. 40).

[440] Apollod. iii. 12, 7. Euphoriôn, Fragm. 5, Düntzer, p. 43, Epicc. Græc. There may have been a tutelary serpent in the temple at Eleusis, as there was in that of Athênê Polias at Athens (Herodot viii. 41. Photius, v. Οἰκοῦρον ὄφιν. Aristophan. Lysistr. 759, with the Schol.).

[441] Apollod. iii. 12, 7. Hesiod. ap. Strab. ix. p. 393.

The libation and prayer of Hêraklês, prior to the birth of Ajax, and his fixing the name of the yet unborn child, from an eagle (αἰετὸς) which appeared in response to his words, was detailed in the Hesiodic Eoia, and is celebrated by Pindar (Isthm. v. 30-54). See also the Scholia.

[442] Apollodôr. iii. 13, 5. Homer, Iliad, xviii. 434; xxiv. 62. Pindar, Nem. iv. 50-68; Isthm. vii. 27-50. Herodot. vii. 192. Catullus, Carm. 64. Epithal. Pel. et Thetidos, with the prefatory remarks of Dœring.

The nuptials of Pêleus and Thetis were much celebrated in the Hesiodic Catalogue, or perhaps in the Eoiai (Düntzer, Epic. Græc. Frag. 36. p. 39), and Ægimius—see Schol. ad Apollôn. Rhod. iv. 869—where there is a curious attempt of Staphylus to rationalize the marriage of Pêleus and Thetis.

There was a town, seemingly near Pharsalus in Thessaly, called Thetideium. Thetis is said to have been carried by Pêleus to both these places: probably it grew up round a temple and sanctuary of this goddess (Pherekyd. Frag. 16, Didot; Hellank. ap. Steph. Byz. Θεστιδεῖον).

[443] See the arguments of the lost poems, the Cypria and the Æthiopis, as given by Proclus, in Düntzer, Fragm. Epic. Gr. p. 11-16; also Schol. ad Iliad. xvi. 140; and the extract from the lost Ψυχοστασία of Æschylus, ap. Plato. de Republic. ii. c. 21 (p. 382, St.).

[444] Eurip. Androm. 1242-1260; Pindar, Olymp. ii. 86.

[445] Herodot. vii. 198.

[446] Plutarch, Pyrrh. 1; Justin, xi. 3; Eurip. Androm. 1253; Arrian, Exp. Alexand. i. 11.

[447] Pherekydês and Hellanikus ap. Marcellin. Vit. Thucydid. init.; Pausan. ii. 29, 4; Plutarch, Solôn, 10. According to Apollodôrus, however, Pherekydês said that Telamôn was only the friend of Pêleus, not his brother,—not the son of Æakus (iii. 12, 7): this seems an inconsistency. There was however a warm dispute between the Athenians and the Megarians respecting the title to the hero Ajax, who was claimed by both (see Pausan. i. 42, 4; Plutarch, *l. c.*): the Megarians accused Peisistratus of having interpolated a line into the Catalogue in the Iliad (Strabo, ix. p. 394).

[448] Herodot. vii. 90; Isokrat. Enc. Evag. *ut sup.*; Sophokl. Ajax, 984-995; Vellei. Patercul. i. 1; Æschyl. Pers. 891, and Schol. The return from Troy of Teukrus, his banishment by Telamôn, and his settlement in Cyprus, formed the subject of the Τεῦκρος of Sophoklês, and of a tragedy under a similar title by Pacuvius (Cicero de Orat. i. 58; ii. 46); Sophokl. Ajax, 892; Pacuvii Fragm. Teucr. 15.—

"Te repudio, nec recipio, natum abdico,

Facesse."

The legend of Teukros was connected in Attic archæology with the peculiar functions and formalities of the judicature, ἐν Φρεαττοῖ (Pausan. i. 28, 12; ii. 29, 7).

[449] Hesiod, Fragm. Düntz. Eoiai, 55, y. 43.—

Ἀλκὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκεν Ὀλύμπιος Αἰακίδαισι,

Νοῦν δ᾽ Ἀμυθαονίδαις, πλοῦτον δ᾽ ἔπορ᾽ Ἀτρείδῃσι.

Polyb. v. 2.—

Αἰακίδας, πολέμῳ κεχαρηότας ἠϋτε δαιτί.

[450] See his Æginetica, p. 14, his earliest work.

[451] Pindar, Olymp. ix. 74. The hero Ajax, son of Oïleus, was especially worshipped at Opus; solemn festivals and games were celebrated in his honor.

[452] Iliad, ii. 546. Odyss. vii. 81.—

Οἳ δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ Ἀθήνας εἶχον …

Δῆμον Ἐρεχθῆος μεγαλήτορος, ὅν ποτ᾽ Ἀθήνη

Θρέψε, Διὸς θυγάτηρ, τέκε δὲ ζείδωρος Ἄρουρα,

Κὰδ δ᾽ ἐν Ἀθήνῃσ᾽ εἷσεν ἑῷ ἐνὶ πίονι νηῷ,

Ἐνθάδε μιν ταύροισι καὶ ἀρνειοῖς ἱλάονται

Κοῦροι Ἀθηναίων, περιτελλομένων ἐνιαυτῶν.

[453] See the Life of Lykurgus, in Plutarch's (I call it by that name, as it is always printed with his works) Lives of the Ten Orators, tom. iv. p. 382-384, Wytt. Κατῆγον δὲ τὸ γένος ἀπὸ τούτων καὶ Ἐρεχθέως τοῦ Γῆς καὶ Ἡφαίστου … καὶ ἐστὶν αὐτὴ ἡ καταγωγὴ τοῦ γένους τῶν ἱερασαμένων του Ποσειδῶνος, etc. Ὃς τὴν ἱερωσύνην Ποσειδῶνος Ἐρεχθέως εἶχε (pp. 382, 383). Erechtheus Πάρεδρος of Athênê—Aristidês, Panathenaic. p. 184, with the Scholia of Frommel.

Butês, the eponymus of the Butadæ, is the first priest of Poseidôn Erichthonius: Apollod. iii. 15, 1. So Kallias (Xenoph. Sympos. viii. 40), ἱερεὺς θεῶν τῶν ἀπ᾽ Ἐρεχθέως.

[454] Herodot. viii. 55.

[455] Harpokration, v. Αὐτοχθών. Ὁ δὲ Πίνδαρος καὶ ὁ τὴν Δαναΐδα πεποιηκὼς φασιν, Ἐριχθόνιον ἐξ Ἡφαίστου καὶ Γῆς φανῆναι. Euripidês, Ion. 21. Apollod. iii. 14, 6; 15, 1. Compare Plato, Timæus, c. 6.

[456] Schol. ad Iliad, ii. 546, where he cites also Kallimachus for the story of Erichthonius. Etymologicon Magn. Ἐρεχθεύς. Plato (Kritias, c. 4) employs vague and general language to describe the agency of Hêphæstos and Athênê, which the old fable in Apollodôrus (iii. 14, 6) details in coarser terms. See Ovid, Metam. ii. 757.

[457] Æthra, mother of Theseus, is also mentioned (Homer, Iliad, iii. 144).

[458] Hellanikus, Fragm. 62; Philochor. Fragm. 8, ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. x. 10. p. 489. Larcher (Chronologie d'Hérodote, ch. ix. s. 1. p. 278) treats both the historical personality and the date of Ogygês as perfectly well authenticated.

It is not probable that Philochorus should have given any calculation of time having reference to Olympiads; and hardly conceivable that Hellanikus should have done so. Justin Martyr quotes Hellanikus and Philochorus as having mentioned Moses,—ὡς σφόδρα ἀρχαίου καὶ παλαιοῦ τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἄρχοντος Μωϋσέως μέμνηνται—which is still more incredible even than the assertion of Eusebius about their having fixed the date of Ogygês by Olympiads (see Philochor. Fragm. 9).

[459] Apollod. iii. 14, 1; Herodot. viii. 55; Ovid. Metam. vi. 72. The story current among the Athenians represented Kekrops as the judge of this controversy (Xenoph. Memor. iii. 5, 10).

The impressions of the trident of Poseidôn were still shown upon the rock in the time of Pausanias (Pausan. i. 26, 4). For the sanctity of the ancient olive-tree, see the narrative of Herodotus (*l. c.*), relating what happened to it when Xerxes occupied the acropolis. As this tale seems to have attached itself specially to the local peculiarities of the Erechtheion, the part which Poseidôn plays in it is somewhat mean: that god appears to greater advantage in the neighborhood of the Ἱπποτὴς Κολωνὸς, as described in the beautiful Chorus of Sophoklês (Œdip. Colon. 690-712).

A curious rationalization of the monstrous form ascribed to Kekrops διφυὴς in Plutarch (Sera Num. Vindict. p. 551).

[460] Philochor. ap. Strabo. ix. p. 397.

[461] The Parian chronological marble designates Aktæus as an autochthonous person. Marmor Parium, Epoch. 3. Pausan. i. 2, 5. Philochorus treated Aktæus as a fictitious name (Fragm. 8, *ut sup.*).

[462] Pausan. viii. 2. 2. The three daughters of Kekrops were not unnoticed in the mythes (Ovid, Metam. ii. 739): the tale of Kephalus, son of Hersê by Hermês, who was stolen away by the goddess Eôs or Hêmera in consequence of his surpassing beauty, was told in more than one of the Hesiodic poems (Pausan. i. 3, 1; Hesiod. Theog. 986). See also Eurip. Ion. 269.

[463] Jul. Africanus also (ap. Euseb. x. 9. p. 486-488) calls Kekrops γηγενὴς and αὐτοχθών.

[464] Herod. viii. 44. Κραναοὶ Ἀθῆναι, Pindar.

[465] Apollod. iii. 14. Pausan. i. 26, 7.

[466] Virgil, Georgic iii. 114.

[467] The mythe of the visit of Dêmêtêr to Eleusis, on which occasion she vouchsafed to teach her holy rites to the leading Eleusinians, is more fully touched upon in a previous chapter (see *ante*, p. 50).

[468] Apollod. iii. 14, 8; Æsch. Supplic. 61; Soph. Elektr. 107; Ovid, Metamorph. vi. 425-670. Hyginus gives the fable with some additional circumstances, fab. 45. Antoninus Liberalis (Narr. 11), or Bœus, from whom he copies, has composed a new narrative by combining together the names of Pandareos and Aêdôn, as given in the Odyssey, xix. 523, and the adventures of the old Attic fable. The hoopoe still continued the habit of chasing the nightingale; it was to the Athenians a present fact. See Schol. Aristoph. Aves, 212.

[469] Thucyd. ii. 29. He makes express mention of the nightingale in connection with the story, though not of the metamorphosis. See below, chap. xvi. p. 544, note 2. So also does Pausanias mention and reason upon it

as a real incident: he founds upon it several moral reflections (i. 5, 4; x. 4, 5): the author of the Λόγος Ἐπιτάφιος, ascribed to Demosthenês, treats it in the same manner, as a fact ennobling the tribe Pandionis, of which Pandiôn was the eponymus. The same author, in touching upon Kekrops, the eponymus of the Kekropis tribe, cannot believe literally the story of his being half man and half serpent: he rationalizes it by saying that Kekrops was so called because in wisdom he was like a man, in strength like a serpent (Demosth. p. 1397, 1398, Reiske). Hesiod glances at the fable (Opp. Di. 566), ὀρθογόη Πανδιονὶς ὦρτο χελιδών; see also Ælian., V. H. xii. 20. The subject was handled by Sophoklês in his lost Têreus.

[470] Poseidôn is sometimes spoken of under the name of Erechtheus simply (Lycophrôn, 158). See Hesychius, v. Ἐρεχθεύς.

[471] Pherekydês, Fragm. 77, Didot; ap. Schol. ad Odyss. xi. 320; Hellanikus Fr. 82; ap. Schol. Eurip. Orest. 1648. Apollodôrus (iii. 15, 1) gives the story differently.

[472] Upon this story of Iôn is founded the tragedy of Euripidês which bears that name. I conceive many of the points of that tragedy to be of the invention of Euripidês himself: but to represent Iôn as son of Apollo, not of Xuthus, seems a genuine Attic legend. Respecting this drama, see O. Müller, Hist. of Dorians, ii. 2. 13-15. I doubt however the distinction which he draws between the Ionians and the other population of Attica.

[473] Apollodôr. iii. 15, 2; Plato, Phædr. c. 3; Sophok. Antig. 984; also the copious Scholion on Apollôn. Rhod. i. 212.

The tale of Phineus is told very differently in the Argonautic expedition as given by Apollônius Rhodius, ii. 180. From Sophoklês we learn that this was the Attic version.

The two winged sons of Boreas and their chase of the Harpies were noticed in the Hesiodic Catalogue (see Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. ii. 296). But whether the Attic legend of Oreithyia was recognized in the Hesiodic poems seems not certain.

Both Æschylus and Sophoklês composed dramas on the subject of Oreithyia (Longin. de Sublimit. c. 3). "Orithyia Atheniensis, filia Terrigenæ, et a Borea in Thraciam rapta." (Servius ad Virg. Æneid. xii. 83). Terrigenæ is the γηγενὴς Ἐρεχθεύς. Philochorus (Fragm. 30) rationalized the story, and said that it alluded to the effects of a violent wind.

[474] Herodot. vii. 189. Οἱ δ᾽ ὦν Ἀθηναῖοί σφι λέγουσι βοηθήσαντα τὸν Βορῆν πρότερον, καὶ τότε ἐκεῖνα κατεργάσασθαι· καὶ ἱρὸν ἀπελθόντες Βορέω ἱδρύσαντο παρὰ ποταμὸν Ἴλισσον.

[475] Herodot. *l. c.* Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν Βορῆν ἐκ θεοπροπίου ἐπεκαλέσαντο, ἐλθόντος σφι ἄλλου χρηστηρίου, τὸν γαμβρὸν ἐπίκουρον καλέσασθαι. Βορῆς δὲ, κατὰ τὸν Ἑλλήνων λόγον ἔχει γυναῖκα Ἀττικὴν, Ὠρειθυίην τὴν Ἐρεχθῆος. Κατὰ δὴ τὸ κῆδος τοῦτο, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, συμβαλλεόμενοί σφι τὸν Βορῆν γαμβρὸν εἶναι, etc.

[476] Suidas and Photius, v. Πάρθενοι: Protogeneia and Pandôra are given as the names of two of them. The sacrifice of Pandôra, in the Iambi of Hippônax (Hippônact. Fragm. xxi. Welck. ap. Athen. ix. p. 370), seems to allude to this daughter of Erechtheus.

[477] Apollodôr. iii. 15, 3; Thucyd. ii. 15; Isokratês (Panegyr. t. i. p. 206; Panathenaic. t. ii. p. 560, Auger), Lykurgus, cont. Leocrat. p. 201, Reiske, Pausan. i. 38, 3; Euripid. Erechth. Fragm. The Schol. ad. Soph. Œd. Col. 1048 gives valuable citations from Ister, Akestodôrus and Androtiôn: we see that the inquirers of antiquity found it difficult to explain how the Eumolpids could have acquired their ascendant privileges in the management of the Eleusinia, seeing that Eumolpus himself was a foreigner.—Ζητεῖται, τί δήποτε οἱ Εὐμολπίδαι τῶν τελετῶν ἐξάρχουσι, ξένοι ὄντες. Thucydidês does *not* call Eumolpus a Thracian: Strabo's language is very large and vague (vii. p. 321): Isokratês says that he assailed Athens in order to vindicate the rights of his father Poseidôn to the sovereign patronage of the city. Hyginus copies this (fab. 46).

[478] Pausan. i. 38. 3. Ἐλευσίνιοί τε ἀρχαῖοι, ἅτε οὐ προσόντων σφισι γενεαλόγων, ἄλλα τε πλάσασθαι δεδώκασι καὶ μάλιστα ἐς τὰ γένη τῶν ἡρώων. See Heyne ad Apollodôr. iii. 15, 4. "Eumolpi nomen modo communicatum pluribus, modo plurium hominum res et facta cumulata in unum. Is ad quem Hercules venisse dicitur, serior ætate fuit: antiquior est is de quo hoc loco agitur … antecessisse tamen hunc debet alius, qui cum Triptolemo vixit," etc. See the learned and valuable comments of Lobeck in his Aglaophamus, tom. i. p. 206-213: in regard to the discrepancies of this narrative he observes, I think, with great justice (p. 211), "quo uno exemplo ex innumerabilibus delecto, arguitur eorum temeritas, qui ex variis discordibusque poetarum et mythographorum narratiunculis, antiquæ famæ formam et quasi lineamenta recognosci posse sperant."

[479] Homer, Hymn, ad Cerer. 153-475.—

… Ἡ δὲ κίουσα θεμιστοπόλοις βασιλεῦσι
Δεῖξεν Τριπτολέμῳ τε, Διόκλεΐ τε πληξίππῳ,
Εὐμόλπου τε βίῃ, Κελεῷ θ᾽ ἡγήτορι λαῶν,
Δρησμοσύνην ἱερῶν.

Also v. 105.

Τὴν δὲ ἴδον Κελέοιο Ἐλευσινίδαο θύγατρες.

The hero Eleusis is mentioned in Pausanias, i. 38, 7: some said that he was the son of Hermês, others that he was the son of Ogygus. Compare Hygin. f. 147.

[480] Keleos and Metaneira were worshipped by the Athenians with divine honors (Athenagoras, Legat. p. 53, ed. Oxon.): perhaps he confounds divine and heroic honors, as the Christian controversialists against Paganism were disposed to do. Triptolemus had a temple at Eleusis (Pausan. i. 38, 6).

[481] Apollodôr. iii. 15, 4. Some said that Immaradus, son of Eumolpus, had been killed by Erechtheus (Pausan. i. 5, 2); others, that both Eumolpus and his son had experienced this fate (Schol. ad Eurip. Phœniss. 854). But we learn from Pausanias himself what the story in the interior of the Erechtheion was,—that Erechtheus killed Eumolpus (i. 27, 3).

[482] Cicero, Nat. Deor. iii. 19; Philochor. ap. Schol. Œdip. Col. 100. Three daughters of Erechtheus perished, and three daughters were worshipped (Apollodôr. iii. 15, 4; Hesychius, Ζεῦγος τριπάρθενον; Eurip. Erechtheus, Fragm. 3, Dindorf); but both Euripidês and Apollodôrus said that Erechtheus was only required to sacrifice, and only did sacrifice, *one*,—the other two slew themselves voluntarily, from affection for their sister. I cannot but think (in spite of the opinion of Welcker to the contrary, Griechisch. Tragöd. ii. p. 722) that the genuine legend represented Erechtheus as having sacrificed all three, as appears in the Iôn of Euripidês (276):—

Iôn. Πατὴρ Ἐρεχθεὺς σὰς ἔθυσε συγγόνους;
Creüsa. Ἔτλη πρὸ γαίας σφάγια παρθένους κτανεῖν.
Iôn. Σὺ δ᾽ ἐξεσώθης πῶς κασιγνήτων μόνη;
Creüsa. Βρέφος νέογνον μητρὸς ἦν ἐν ἀγκάλαις.

Compare with this passage, Demosthen. Λόγος Ἐπιταφ. p. 1397, Reisk. Just before, the death of the three daughters of Kekrops, for infringing the commands of Athênê, had been mentioned. Euripidês modified this in his Erechtheus, for he there introduced the mother Praxithea consenting to the immolation of one daughter, for the rescue of the country from a foreign invader: to propose to a mother the immolation of three daughters at once, would have been too revolting. In most instances we find the strongly marked features, the distinct and glaring incidents as well as the dark contrasts, belong to the Hesiodic or old Post-Homeric legend; the changes made afterwards go to soften, dilute, and to complicate, in proportion as the feelings of the public become milder and more humane; sometimes however the later poets add new horrors.

[483] See the striking evidence contained in the oration of Lykurgus against Leocratês (p. 201-204. Reiske; Demosthen. Λόγ. Ἐπιταφ. *l. c.*; and Xenophon, Memor. iii. 5, 9): from the two latter passages we see that the Athenian story represented the invasion under Eumolpus as a combined assault from the western continent.

[484] Apollodôr. iii. 15, 5; Eurip. Iôn, 282; Erechth. Fragm. 20, Dindorf.

[485] Eurip. Iôn. 1570-1595. The Kreüsa of Sophoklês, a lost tragedy, seems to have related to the same subject.

Pausanias (vii. 1, 2) tells us that Xuthus was chosen to arbitrate between the contending claims of the sons of Erechtheus.

[486] Philochor. ap. Harpocrat. v. Βοηδρόμια; Strabo, viii. p. 383.

[487] Philochor. ap. Harpocrat. v. Βοηδρόμια.

[488] Sophokl. ap. Strab. ix. p. 392; Herodot. i. 173; Strabo, xii. p. 573.

[489] Plutarch, Thêseus, c. 13. Αἰγεὺς θετὸς γενόμενος Πανδίονι, καὶ μηδὲν τοῖς Ἐρεχθείδαις προσήκων. Apollodôr. iii. 15, 6.

[490] Ægeus had by Mêdea (who took refuge at Athens after her flight from Corinth) a son named Mêdus, who passed into Asia, and was considered as the eponymus and progenitor of the Median people. Datis, the general who commanded the invading Persian army at the battle of Marathôn, sent a formal communication to the Athenians announcing himself as the descendant of Mêdus, and requiring to be admitted as king of Attica: such is the statement of Diodôrus (Exc. Vatic. vii.-x. 48: see also Schol. Aristophan. Pac. 289).

[491] Ovid, Metamorph. vii. 433.—

… "Te, maxime Theseu,
Mirata est Marathon Cretæi sanguine Tauri:
Quodque Suis securus arat Cromyona colonus,
Munus opusque tuum est. Tellus Epidauria per te
Clavigeram vidit Vulcani occumbere prolem:
Vidit et immanem Cephisias ora Procrustem.
Cercyonis letum vidit Cerealis Eleusin.
Occidit ille Sinis," etc.

Respecting the amours of Thêseus, Ister especially seems to have entered into great details; but some of them were noticed both in the Hesiodic poems and by Kekrops, not to mention Pherekydês (Athen. xiii. p. 557). Peirithous, the intimate friend and companion of Thêseus, is the eponymous hero of the Attic dême or gens Perithoidæ (Ephorus ap. Photium, v. Περιθοῖδαι).

[492] Thuc. ii. 15. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ Θησεὺς ἐβασίλευσε, γενόμενος μετὰ τοῦ ξυνετοῦ καὶ δυνατὸς, τά τε ἄλλα διεκόσμησε τὴν χώραν, καὶ κατάλυσας τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων τά τε βουλευτήρια καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς, ἐς τὴν νῦν πόλιν … ξυνῴκισε πάντας.

[493] Iliad, i. 265; Odyss. xi. 321. I do not notice the suspected line, Odyss. xi. 630.

[494] Diodôrus also, from his disposition to assimilate Thêseus to Hêraklês, has given us his chivalrous as well as his political attributes (iv. 61).

[495] Plutarch, Thêseus, i. Εἴη μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν, ἐκκαθαιρόμενον λόγῳ τὸ μυθῶδες ὑπακοῦσαι καὶ λαβεῖν ἱστορίας ὄψιν· ὅπου δ᾽ ἂν αὐθαδῶς τοῦ πιθανοῦ περιφρονῇ, καὶ μὴ δέχηται *τὴν πρὸς τὸ εἰκὸς μίξιν*, εὐγνωμόνων ἀκροατῶν δεησόμεθα, καὶ πρᾴως τὴν ἀρχαιολογίαν προσδεχομένων.

[496] See Isokratês, Panathenaic. (t. ii. p. 510-512, Auger); Xenoph. Memor. iii. 5, 10. In the Helenæ Encomium, Isokratês enlarges more upon the personal exploits of Thêseus in conjunction with his great political merits (t. ii. p. 342-350, Auger).

[497] Plutarch, Thêseus, 20.

[498] See the epigram of Krinagoras, Antholog. Pal. vol. ii. p. 144; ep. xv. ed. Brunck. and Kallimach. Frag. 40.

Ἀείδει δ᾽ (Kallimachus) Ἑκάλης τε φιλοξείνοιο καλιὴν,
Καὶ Θησεῖ Μαραθὼν οὓς ἐπέθηκε πόνους.

Some beautiful lines are preserved by Suidas, v. Ἐπαύλια, περὶ Ἑκάλης θανούσης (probably spoken by Thêseus himself, see Plutarch, Theseus, c. 14).

Ἴθι, πρηεῖα γυναικῶν,

Τὴν ὁδὸν, ἣν ἀνίαι θυμαλγέες οὐ περόωσιν·

Πόλλακι σεῖ, ὦ μαῖα, φιλοξείνοιο καλιῆς

Μνησόμεθα· ξυνὸν γὰρ ἐπαὐλιον ἔσκεν ἅπασι.

[499] Virgil, Æneid, vi. 617. "Sedet æternumque sedebit Infelix Thêseus."

[500] Pherekyd. Fragm. 25, Didot.

[501] Iliad, iii. 186; vi. 152.

[502] See Proclus's Argument of the lost Æthiopis (Fragm. Epicor. Græcor. ed. Düntzer, p. 16). We are reduced to the first book of Quintus Smyrnæus for some idea of the valor of Penthesileia; it is supposed to be copied more or less closely from the Æthiopis. See Tychsen's Dissertation prefixed to his edition of Quintus, sections 5 and 12. Compare Dio. Chrysostom. Or. xi. p. 350, Reiske. Philostratus (Heroica, c. 19, p. 751) gives a strange transformation of this old epical narrative into a descent of Amazons upon the island sacred to Achilles.

[503] Apollôn. Rhod. ii. 966, 1004; Apollod. ii. 5-9; Diodôr. ii. 46; iv. 16. The Amazons were supposed to speak the Thracian language (Schol. Apoll Rhod. ii. 953), though some authors asserted them to be natives of Libyia, others of Æthiopia (*ib.* 965).

Hellanikus (Frag. 33, ap. Schol. Pindar. Nem. iii. 65) said that all the Argonauts had assisted Hêraklês in this expedition: the fragment of the old epic poem (perhaps the Ἀμαζόνια) there quoted mentions Telamôn specially.

[504] The many diversities in the story respecting Thêseus and the Amazon Antiopê are well set forth in Bachet de Meziriac (Commentaires sur Ovide, t. i. p. 317).

Welcker (Der Epische Cyclus, p. 313) supposes that the ancient epic poem called by Suidas Ἀμαζόνια, related to the invasion of Attica by the Amazons, and that this poem is the same, under another title, as the Ἀτθὶς of Hegesinous cited by Pausanias: I cannot say that he establishes this conjecture satisfactorily, but the chapter is well worth consulting. The epic Thêsêis seems to have given a version of the Amazonian contest in many respects different from that which Plutarch has put together out of the logographers (see Plut. Thês. 28): it contained a narrative of many unconnected exploits belonging to Thêseus, and Aristotle censures it on that account as ill-constructed (Poetic. c. 17).

The Ἀμαζονὶς or Ἀμαζονικὰ of Onasus can hardly have been (as Heyne supposes, ad Apollod. ii. 5, 9) an epic poem: we may infer from the rationalizing tendency of the citation from it (Schol. ad Theocrit. xiii. 46, and Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. i. 1207) that it was a work in prose. There was an Ἀμαζονὶς by Possis of Magnêsia (Athenæus, vii. p. 296).

[505] Plutarch, Thêseus, 27. Pindar (Olymp. xiii. 84) represents the Amazons as having come from the extreme north, when Bellerophôn conquers them.

[506] Plutarch, Thêseus, 27-28; Pausan. i. 2, 4; Plato, Axiochus, c. 2; Harpocratiôn, v. Ἀμαζονεῖον; Aristophan. Lysistrat. 678, with the Scholia. Æschyl. (Eumenid. 685) says that the Amazons assaulted the citadel from the Areiopagus:—

> Πάγον τ᾽ Ἄρειον τόνδ᾽, Ἀμαζόνων ἕδραν
> Σκηνάς τ᾽, ὅτ᾽ ἦλθον Θησέως κατὰ φθόνον
> Στρατηλατοῦσαι, καὶ πόλιν νεόπτολιν
> Τήνδ᾽ ὑψίπυργον ἀντεπύργωσάν ποτε.

[507] Herodot. ix. 27, Lysias (Epitaph, c. 3) represents the Amazons as ἄρχουσαι πολλῶν ἐθνων: the whole race, according to him, was nearly extinguished in their unsuccessful and calamitous invasion of Attica. Isokratês (Panegyric. t. i. p. 206, Auger) says the same; also Panathênaic. t. iii. p. 560, Auger; Demosth. Epitaph, p. 1391. Reisk. Pausanias quotes Pindar's notice of the invasion, and with the fullest belief of its historical reality (vii. 2, 4) Plato mentions the invasion of Attica by the Amazons in the Menexenus (c. 9), but the passage in the treatise De Legg. c. ii. p. 804,—ἀκούων γὰρ δὴ μύθους παλαιοὺς πέπεισμαι, etc.—is even a stronger evidence of his own belief. And Xenophon in the Anabasis, when he compares the quiver and the hatchet of his barbarous enemies to "those which the Amazons carry," evidently believed himself to be speaking of real persons, though he could have seen only the costumes and armature of those painted by Mikôn and others (Anabas. iv. 4, 10; compare Æschyl. Supplic. 293, and Aristophan. Lysistr. 678; Lucian. Anachars, c. 34. v. iii. p. 318).

How copiously the tale was enlarged upon by the authors of the Atthides, we see in Plutarch, Thêseus, 27-28.

Hekatæus (ap. Steph. Byz. Ἀμαζονεῖον; also Fragm. 350, 351, 352, Didot) and Xanthus (ap. Hesychium, v. Βουλεψίη) both treated of the Amazons: the latter passage ought to be added to the collection of the Fragments of Xanthus by Didot.

[508] Clemens Alexandr. Stromat, i. p. 336; Marmor Parium, Epoch. 21.

[509] Plutarch, Thês. 27-28. Steph. Byz. v. Ἀμαζονεῖον. Pausan. ii. 32, 8; iii. 25, 2.

[510] Pherekydês ap. Schol. Apollôn. Rh. ii. 373-992; Justin, ii. 4; Strabo, xii. p. 547, Θεμίσκυραν, τὸ τῶν Ἀμαζόνων οἰκητήριον; Diodôr. ii. 45-46; Sallust ap. Serv. ad Virgil. Æneid. xi. 659; Pompon. Mela, i. 19; Plin. H. N. vi. 4. The geography of Quintus Curtius (vi. 4) and of Philostratus (Heroic c. 19) is on this point indefinite, and even inconsistent.

[511] Ephor. Fragm. 87, Didot. Strabo, xi. p. 505; xiii p. 573; xiii. p. 622. Pausan. iv. 31, 6; vii. 2. 4. Tacit. Ann. iii. 61. Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. ii. 965.

The derivation of the name Sinopê from an Amazon was given by Hekatæus (Fragm. 352). Themiskyra also had one of the Amazons for its eponymus (Appian, Bell. Mithridat. 78).

Some of the most venerated religious legends at Sinopê were attached to the expedition of Hêraklês against the Amazons: Autolykus, the oracle-giving hero, worshipped with great solemnity even at the time when the town was besieged by Lucullus, was the companion of Hêraclês (Appian, *ib.* c. 83). Even a small mountain village in the territory of Ephesus, called Latoreia, derived its name from one of the Amazons (Athenæ. i. p. 31).

[512] Herodot. iv. 108-117, where he gives the long tale, imagined by the Pontic Greeks, of the origin of the Sarmatian nation. Compare Hippokratês, De Aëre, Locis et Aquis, c. 17; Ephorus, Fragm. 103; Skymn. Chius, v. 102; Plato, Legg. vii. p. 804; Diodôr. ii. 34.

The testimony of Hippokrates certifies the practice of the Sarmatian women to check the growth of the right breast: Τὸν δέξιον δὲ μαζὸν οὐκ ἔχουσιν. Παιδίοισι γὰρ ἐοῦσιν ἔτι νηπίοισιν αἱ μητέρες χαλκεῖον τετεχνήμενον ἐπ᾽ αὐτέῳ τούτῳ διάπυρον ποιέουσαι, πρὸς τὸν μαζὸν τιθέασι τὸν δέξιον· καὶ ἐπικαίεται, ὥστε τὴν αὔξησιν φθείρεσθαι, ἐς δὲ τὸν δέξιον ὦμον καὶ βραχίονα πᾶσαν τὴν ἴσχυν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἐκδιδόναι.

Ktêsias also compares a warlike Sakian woman to the Amazons (Fragm. Persic. ii. pp. 221, 449, Bähr).

[513] Pausan. iv. 31, 6; vii. 2, 4. Dionys. Periêgêt. 828.

[514] Pausan. i. 15, 2.

[515] Arrian, Exped. Alex. vii. 13; compare iv. 15; Quint. Curt. vi. 4; Justin, xlii. 4. The note of Freinshemius on the above passage of Quintus Curtius is full of valuable references on the subject of the Amazons.

[516] Strabo, xi. p. 503-504; Appian, Bell. Mithridat. c. 103; Plutarch, Pompeius, c. 35. Plin. N. H. vi. 7. Plutarch still retains the old description of Amazons from the mountains near the Thermôdôn. Appian keeps clear of this geographical error, probably copying more exactly the language of Theophanês, who must have been well aware that when Lucullus besieged Themiskyra, he did not find it defended by the Amazons (see Appian, Bell. Mithridat. c. 78). Ptolemy (v. 9) places the Amazons in the imperfectly known regions of Asiatic Sarmatia, north of the Caspian and near the river Rha (Volga). "This fabulous community of women (observes Forbiger, Handbuch der alten Geographie, ii. 77, p. 457) was a phænomenon much too interesting for the geographers easily to relinquish."

[517] Strabo, xi. p. 505. Ἴδιον δέ τι συμβέβηκε τῷ λόγῳ τῷ περὶ τῶν Ἀμαζόνων. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι τὸ μυθῶδες καὶ τὸ ἱστορικὸν διωρίσμενον ἔχουσι· τὰ γὰρ παλαιὰ καὶ ψευδῆ καὶ τερατώδη, μῦθοι καλοῦνται· [*Note.* Strabo does not always speak of the μῦθοι in this disrespectful tone; he is sometimes much displeased with those who dispute the existence of an historical kernel in the inside, especially with regard to Homer.] ἡ δ᾽ ἱστορία βούλεται τἀληθὲς, ἄντε παλαιὸν, ἄντε νέον· καὶ τὸ τερατῶδες ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἢ σπάνιον. Περὶ δὲ τῶν Ἀμαζόνων τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεται καὶ νῦν καὶ παλαὶ, τερατώδη τ᾽ ὄντα, καὶ πίστεως πόρρω. Τίς γὰρ ἂν πιστεύσειεν, ὡς γυναικῶν στράτος, ἢ πόλις, ἢ ἔθνος, συσταίη ἂν πότε χωρὶς ἀνδρῶν; καὶ οὐ μόνον συσταίη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐφόδους ποιήσαιτο ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλλοτρίαν, καὶ κρατήσειεν οὐ τῶν ἐγγὺς μόνον, ὥστε καὶ μέχρι τῆς νῦν Ἰωνίας προελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διαπόντιον στείλαιτο στρατίαν μέχρι τῆς Ἀττικῆς; Ἀλλὰ μὴν ταῦτά γε αὐτὰ καὶ νῦν λέγεται περὶ αὐτῶν· *ἐπιτείνει δὲ τὴν ἰδιότητα καὶ τὸ πιστεύεσθαι τὰ παλαιὰ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ νῦν*. There are however, other passages in which he speaks of the Amazons as realities.

Justin (ii. 4) recognizes the great power and extensive conquests of the Amazons in very early times, but says that they gradually declined down to the reign of Alexander, in whose time there were *just a few remaining*; the queen with these few visited Alexander, but shortly afterwards the whole breed became extinct. This hypothesis has the merit of convenience, perhaps of ingenuity.

[518] Suetonius, Jul. Cæsar, c. 22. "In Syriâ quoque regnasse Semiramin (Julius Cæsar said this), magnamque Asiæ partem Amazonas tenuisse quondam."

In the splendid triumph of the emperor Aurelian at Rome after the defeat of Zenobia, a few Gothic women who had been taken in arms were exhibited among the prisoners; the official placard carried along with them announced them as *Amazons* (Vopiscus Aurel. in Histor. August. Scrip. p. 260, ed. Paris).

[519] Arrian, Expedit. Alexand. vii. 13.

[520] Ktêsias described as real animals, existing in wild and distant regions, the heterogeneous and fantastic combinations which he saw sculptured in the East (see this stated and illustrated in Bähr, Preface to the Fragm. of Ktêsias, pp. 58, 59).

[521] Heyne observes (Apollodôr. ii. 5, 9) with respect to the fable of the Amazons, "In his historiarum fidem aut vestigia nemo quæsiverit." Admitting the wisdom of this counsel (and I think it indisputable), why are we required to presume, in the absence of all proof, an historical basis for each of those *other* narratives, such as the Kalydônian boar-hunt, the Argonautic expedition, or the siege of Troy, which go to make up, along with the story of the Amazons, the aggregate matter of Grecian legendary faith? If the tale of the Amazons could gain currency without any such support, why not other portions of the ancient epic?

An author of easy belief, Dr. F. Nagel, vindicates the historical reality of the Amazons (Geschichte der Amazonen, Stutgart, 1838). I subjoin here a different explanation of the Amazonian tale, proceeding from another author who rejects the historical basis, and contained in a work of learning and value (Guhl, *Ephesiaca*, Berlin, 1843. p. 132):—

"Id tantum monendum videtur, Amazonas nequaquam historice accipiendas esse, sed e contrario totas ad mythologiam pertinere. Earum enim fabulas quum ex frequentium hierodularum gregibus in cultibus et sacris Asiaticis ortas esse ingeniose ostenderit Tolken, jam *inter omnes mythologiæ peritos constat*, Amazonibus nihil fere nisi peregrini cujusdam cultus notionem expressum esse, ejusque cum Græcorum religione certamen frequentibus istis pugnis designatum esse, quas cum Amazonibus tot Græcorum heroes habuisse credebantur, Hercules, Bellerophon, Theseus, Achilles, et vel ipse, quem Ephesi cultum fuisse supra ostendimus, Dionysus. Quæ Amazonum notio primaria, quum paulatim Euemeristicâ (ut ita dicam) ratione ita transformaretur, ut Amazones pro vero feminarum populo haberentur, necesse quoque erat, ut omnibus fere locis, ubi ejusmodi religionum certamina locum habuerunt, Amazones habitasse, vel eo usque processisse, crederentur. Quod cum nusquam manifestius fuerit, quam in Asiâ minore, et potissimum in eâ parte quæ Græciam versus vergit, haud mirandum est omnes fere ejus oræ urbes ab Amazonibus conditas putari."

I do not know the evidence upon which this conjectural interpretation rests, but the statement of it, though it boasts so many supporters among mythological critics, carries no appearance of probability to my mind. Priam fights against the Amazons as well as the Grecian heroes.

[522] Europê was worshipped with very peculiar solemnity in the island of Krête (see Dictys Cretensis, De Bello Trojano, i. c. 2).

The venerable plane-tree, under which Zeus and Europê had reposed, was still shown, hard by a fountain at Gortyn in Krête, in the time of Theophrastus: it was said to be the only plane-tree in the neighborhood which never cast its leaves (Theophrast. Hist. Plant. i. 9).

[523] Homer, Iliad, xiii. 249, 450; xiv. 321. Odyss. xi. 322-568; xix. 179; iv. 564-vii. 321.

The Homeric Minôs in the under-world is not a judge of the previous lives of the dead, so as to determine whether they deserve reward or punishment for their conduct on earth: such functions are not assigned to him earlier than the time of Plato. He administers justice *among* the dead, who are conceived as a sort of society, requiring some presiding judge: θεμιστεύοντα νεκύεσσι, with regard to Minôs, is said very much like (Odyss. xi. 484) νῦν αὖτε μέγα κρατέεις νεκύεσσι with regard to Achilles. See this matter partially illustrated in Heyne's Excursus xi. to the sixth book of the Æneid of Virgil.

[524] Apollodôr. iii. 1, 2. Καὶ αὐτῷ δίδωσι Ζεὺς ἐπὶ τρεῖς γενεὰς ζῆν. This circumstance is evidently imagined by the logographers to account for the appearance of Sarpêdôn in the Trojan war, fighting against Idomeneus, the grandson of Minôs. Nisus is the eponymus of Nisæa, the port of the town of Megara: his tomb was shown at Athens (Pausan. i. 19, 5). Minôs is the eponym of the island of Minoa (opposite the port of Nisæa), where it was affirmed that the fleet of Minôs was stationed (Pausan. i. 44, 5).

[525] Apollodôr iii. 1, 2.

[526] Apollodôr. iii. 15, 8. See the Ciris of Virgil, a juvenile poem on the subject of this fable; also Hyginus, f. 198; Schol. Eurip. Hippol. 1200. Propertius (iii. 19, 21) gives the features of the story with tolerable fidelity; Ovid takes considerable liberties with it (Metam. viii. 5-150).

[527] Apollodôr. iii. 15, 8.

[528] See, on the subject of Thêseus and the Minôtaur, Eckermann, Lehrbuch der Religions Geschichte und Mythologie, vol. ii. ch. xiii. p. 133. He maintains that the tribute of these human victims paid by Athens to Minôs is an historical fact. Upon what this belief is grounded, I confess I do not see.

[529] Plato, Phædon, c. 2, 3; Xenoph. Memor. iv. 8. 2. Plato especially noticed τοὺς δὶς ἕπτα ἐκείνους, the seven youths and the seven maidens whom Thêseus conveyed to Krête and brought back safely: this number seems an old and constant feature in the legend, maintained by Sappho and Bacchylidês as well as by Euripidês (Herc. Fur. 1318). See Servius ad Virgil Æneid. vi. 21.

[530] For the general narrative and its discrepancies, see Plutarch, Thês. c. 15-19; Diodôr. iv. 60-62; Pausan. i. 17, 3; Ovid, Epist. Ariadn. Thês. 104. In that other portion of the work of Diodôrus which relates more especially to Krête, and is borrowed from Kretan logographers and historians (v. 64-80), he mentions nothing at all respecting the war of Minôs with Athens.

In the drama of Euripidês called Thêseus, the genuine story of the youths and maidens about to be offered as food to the Minotaur was introduced (Schol. ad Aristoph. Vesp. 312).

Ariadnê figures in the Odyssey along with Thêseus: she is the daughter of Minôs, carried off by Thêseus from Krête, and killed by Artemis in the way home: there is no allusion to Minôtaur, or tribute, or self-devotion of Thêseus (Odyss. xi. 324). This is probably the oldest and simplest form of the legend—one of the many amorous (compare Theognis, 1232) adventures of Thêseus: the rest is added by post-Homeric poets.

The respect of Aristotle for Minôs induces him to adopt the hypothesis that the Athenian youths and maidens were not put to death in Krête, but grew old in servitude (Aristot. Fragm. Βοττιαίων Πολιτεία, p. 106. ed. Neumann. of the Fragments of the treatise Περὶ Πολιτειῶν, Plutarch, Quæst. Græc. p. 298).

[531] Apollodôr. iii. cap. 2-3.

[532] Pherekyd. Fragm. 105; Hellanik. Fragm. 82 (Didot); Pausan. vii. 4, 5.

[533] Diodôr. iv. 79; Ovid, Metamorph. viii. 181. Both Ephorus and Philistus mentioned the coming of Dædalus to Kokalus in Sicily (Ephor. Fr. 99; Philist. Fragm. 1, Didot): probably Antiochus noticed it also (Diodôr. xii. 71). Kokalus was the point of commencement for the Sicilian historians.

[534] Diodôr. iv. 80.

[535] Pausan. vii. 4, 5; Schol. Pindar. Nem. iv. 95; Hygin. fab. 44; Conon, Narr. 25; Ovid, Ibis, 291.—

"Vel tua maturet, sicut Minoia fata,

Per caput infusæ fervidus humor aquæ."

This story formed the subject of a lost drama of Sophoklês, Καμίκιοι or Μίνως; it was also told by Kallimachus, ἐν Αἰτίοις, as well as by Philostephanus (Schol. Iliad, ii. 145).

[536] This curious and very characteristic narrative is given by Herodot. vii. 169-171.

[537] Herodot. vii. 169. The answer ascribed to the Delphian oracle, on the question being put by the Krêtan envoys whether it would be better for them to aid the Greeks against Xerxês or not, is highly emphatic and poetical: Ὦ νήπιοι, ἐπιμέμφεσθε ὅσα ὑμῖν ἐκ τῶν Μενελέω τιμωρημάτων Μίνως ἔπεμψε μηνίων δακρύματα, ὅτι οἱ μὲν οὐ ξυνεξεπρήξαντο αὐτῷ τὸν ἐν Καμίκῳ θάνατον γενόμενον, ὑμεῖς δὲ κείνοισι τὴν ἐκ Σπάρτης ἁρπασθεῖσαν ὑπ᾽ ἀνδρὸς βαρβάρου γυναῖκα.

If such an answer was ever returned at all, I cannot but think that it must have been from some oracle in Krête itself, not from Delphi. The Delphian oracle could never have so far forgotten its obligations to the general cause of Greece, at that critical moment, which involved moreover the safety of all its own treasures, as to deter the Krêtans from giving assistance.

[538] Hesiod, Theogon. 949; Pausan. i. 1, 4.

[539] Kallimach. Hymn. ad Dian. 189. Strabo (x. p. 476) dwells also upon the strange contradiction of the legends concerning Minôs: I agree with Hoeckh (Kreta, ii. p. 93) that δασμόλογος in this passage refers to the tribute exacted from Athens for the Minôtaur.

[540] Thucyd. i. 4. Μίνως γὰρ, παλαίτατος ὧν ἀκοῇ ἴσμεν, ναυτικὸν ἐκτήσατο, καὶ τῆς νῦν Ἑλληνικῆς θαλάσσης ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐκράτησε, καὶ τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων ἦρξέ τε καὶ οἰκιστὴς αὐτὸς τῶν πλείστων ἐγένετο, Κᾶρας ἐξελάσας καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ παῖδας ἡγεμόνας ἐγκαταστήσας· τό τε λῃστικὸν, ὡς εἰκὸς, καθῄρει ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης, ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἠδύνατο, τοῦ τὰς προσόδους μᾶλλον ἰέναι αὐτῷ. See also c. 8.

Aristot. Polit. ii. 7, 2, Δοκεῖ δ᾽ ἡ νῆσος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν πεφυκέναι καὶ κεῖσθαι καλῶς … διὸ καὶ τὴν τῆς θαλάσσης ἀρχὴν κατέσχεν ὁ Μίνως, καὶ τὰς νήσους τὰς μὲν ἐχειρώσατο, τὰς δὲ ᾤκισε· τέλος δ᾽ ἐπιθέμενος τῇ Σικελίᾳ τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησεν ἐκεῖ περὶ Κάμικον.

Ephorus (ap. Skymn. Chi. 542) repeated the same statement: he mentioned also the autochthonous king Krês.

[541] It is curious that Herodotus expressly denies this, and in language which shows that he had made special inquiries about it: he says that the Karians or Leleges in the islands (who were, according to Thucydidês, expelled by Minôs) paid no tribute to Minôs, but manned his navy, *i. e.* they stood to Minôs much in the same relation as Chios and Lesbos stood to Athens (Herodot. i. 171). One may trace here the influence of those discussions which must have been prevalent at that time respecting the maritime empire of Athens.

[542] Herodot. vii. 170. Λέγεται γὰρ Μίνω κατὰ ζήτησιν Δαιδάλου ἀπικόμενον ἐς Σικανίην, τὴν νῦν Σικελίην καλουμένην, ἀποθανεῖν βιαίῳ θανάτῳ. Ἀνὰ δὲ χρόνον Κρῆτας, θεοῦ σφὶ ἐποτρύνοντος, etc.

[543] Aristot. Polit. ii. 7, 1; vii. 9, 2. Ephorus, Fragm. 63, 64, 65. He set aside altogether the Homeric genealogy of Minôs, which makes him brother of Rhadamanthus and born in Krête.

Strabo, in pointing out the many contradictions respecting Minôs, remarks, Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλος λόγος οὐχ ὁμολογούμενος, τῶν μὲν ξένον τῆς νήσου τὸν Μίνω λεγόντων, τῶν δὲ ἐπιχώριον.. By the former he doubtless means Ephorus, though he has not here specified him (x. p. 477).

[544] Herodot. iii. 122. Πολυκράτης γὰρ ἐστὶ πρῶτος τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν Ἑλλήνων, ὃς θαλασσοκρατέειν ἐπενοήθη, παρὲξ Μίνωός τε τοῦ Κνωσσίου, καὶ εἰ δή τις ἄλλος πρότερος τούτου ἦρξε τῆς θαλάττης· *τῆς δὲ ἀνθρωπηΐης λεγομένης γενεῆς* Πολυκράτης ἐστὶ πρῶτος ἐλπίδας πολλὰς ἔχων Ἰωνίης τε καὶ νήσων ἄρξειν.

The expression exactly corresponds to that of Pausanias, ix. 5, 1, ἐπὶ τῶν καλουμένων Ἡρώων, for the age preceding the ἀνθρωπηΐη γενέη; also viii. 2. 1, ἐς τὰ ἀνωτέρω τοῦ ἀνθρώπων γένους.

[545] Hoeckh, Kreta, vol. ii. pp. 56-67. K. O. Müller also (Dorier. ii. 2, 14) puts a religious interpretation upon these Kreto-Attic legends, but he explains them in a manner totally different from Hoeckh.

[546] Herodot. i. 173.

[547] Odyss. xii. 69.—

> Οἵη δὴ κείνη γε παρέπλει ποντόπορος νῆυς,
> Ἀργὼ πασιμέλουσα, παρ᾽ Αἰήταο πλέουσα·
> Καὶ νύ κε τὴν ἔνθ᾽ ὦκα βάλεν μεγάλας ποτὶ πέτρας,
> Ἀλλ᾽ Ἥρη παρέπεμψεν, ἐπεὶ φίλος ἦεν Ἰήσων.

See also Iliad, vii. 470.

[548] See Hesiod, Fragm. *Catalog.* Fr. 6. p. 33, Düntz.; *Eoiai*, Frag. 36. p. 39; Frag. 72. p. 47. Compare Schol. ad Apollôn. Rhod. i. 45; ii. 178-297, 1125; iv. 254-284. Other poetical sources—

The old epic poem *Ægimius*, Frag. 5. p. 57, Düntz.

Kinæthôn in the *Hêraklêia* touched upon the death of Hylas near Kius in Mysia (Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. i. 1357).

The epic poem *Naupactia*, Frag. 1 to 6, Düntz. p. 61.

Eumêlus, Frag. 2, 3, 5, p. 65, Düntz.

Epimenidês, the Krêtan prophet and poet, composed a poem in 6500 lines, Ἀργοῦς ναυπηγίαν τε, καὶ Ἰάσονος εἰς Κόλχους ἀποπλοῦν (Diogen. Laër. i. 10, 5), which is noticed more than once in the Scholia on Apollônius, on subjects connected with the poem (ii. 1125; iii. 42). See Mimnerm. Frag. 10, Schneidewin, p. 15.

Antimachus, in his poem *Lydê*, touched upon the Argonautic expedition, and has been partially copied by Apollônius Rhod. (Schol. Ap. Rh. i. 1290; ii. 296: iii. 410; iv. 1153).

The logographers Pherekydês and Hekatæus seem to have related the expedition at considerable length.

The Bibliothek der alten Literatur und Kunst (Göttingen, 1786, 2tes Stück, p. 61) contains an instructive Dissertation by Groddeck, Ueber die Argonautika, a summary of the various authorities respecting this expedition.

[549] Apollôn. Rhod. i. 525; iv. 580. Apollodôr. i. 9, 16. Valerius Flaccus (i. 300) softens down the speech of the ship Argô into a dream of Jasôn. Alexander Polyhistor explained what wood was used (Plin. H. N. xiii. 22).

[550] Apollônius Rhodius, Apollodôrus, Valerius Flaccus, the Orphic Argonautica, and Hyginus, have all given Catalogues of the Argonautic heroes (there was one also in the lost tragedy called Λήμνιαι of Sophoklês, see Welcker Gr. Trag. i. 327): the discrepancies among them are numerous and irreconcilable. Burmann, in the Catalogus Argonautarum, prefixed to his edition of Valerius Flaccus, has discussed them copiously. I transcribe one or two of the remarks of this conscientious and laborious critic, out of many of a similar tenor, on the impracticability of a fabulous chronology. Immediately before the first article, *Acastus*—"Neque enim in ætatibus Argonautarum ullam rationem temporum constare, neque in stirpe et stemmate deducenda ordinem ipsum naturæ congruere videbam. Nam et huic militiæ adscribi videbam Heroas, qui per naturæ leges et ordinem fati eo usque vitam extrahere non potuêre, ut aliis ab hac expeditione remotis Heroum militiis nomina dedisse narrari deberent a Poetis et Mythologis. In idem etiam tempus avos et Nepotes conjici, consanguineos ætate longe inferiores prioribus ut æquales adjungi, concoquere vix posse videtur."—Art. *Ancæus*: "Scio objici posse, si seriem illam majorem respiciamus, hunc Ancæum simul cum proavo suo Talao in eandem profectum fuisse expeditionem. Sed similia exempla in aliis occurrent, et in fabulis rationem temporum non semper accuratam licet deducere."—Art. *Jasôn*: "Herculi enim jam provectâ ætate adhæsit Theseus juvenis, et in Amazoniâ expeditione socius fuit, interfuit huic expeditioni, venatui apri Calydonii, et rapuit Helenam, quæ circa Trojanum bellum maxime floruit: quæ omnia si Theseus tot temporum intervallis distincta egit, secula duo vel tria vixisse debuit. Certe Jason Hypsipylem neptem Ariadnes, nec videre, nec Lemni cognoscere potuit."—Art. *Meleager*: "Unum est quod alicui longum ordinem majorum recensenti scrupulum movere possit: nimis longum intervallum inter Æolum et Meleagrum intercedere, ut potuerit interfuisse huic expeditioni: cum nonus fere numeretur ab Æolo, et plurimi ut Jason, Argus, et alii tertiâ tantum ab Æolo generatione distent. Sed sæpe jam notavimus, frustra temporum concordiam in fabulis quæri."

Read also the articles *Castôr and Pollux*, *Nestôr Pêleus*, *Staphylus*, etc.

We may stand excused for keeping clear of a chronology which is fertile only in difficulties, and ends in nothing but illusions.

[551] Apollodôr. i. 9, 17; Apollôn. Rhod. i. 609-915; Herodot. iv. 145. Theocritus (Idyll, xiii. 29) omits all mention of Lêmnos, and represents the Argô as arriving on the third day from Iôlkos at the Hellespont. Diodôrus (iv. 41) also leaves out Lêmnos.

[552] Apollôn. Rhod. 940-1020; Apollodôr. i. 9, 18.

[553] Apollodôr. i. 9, 19. This was the religious legend, explanatory of a ceremony performed for many centuries by the people of Prusa: they ran round the lake Askanias shouting and clamoring for Hylas—"ut littus Hyla, Hyla omne sonaret." (Virgil, Eclog.) … "in cujus memoriam adhuc solemni cursatione lacum populus circuit et Hylam voce clamat." Solinus, c. 42.

There is endless discrepancy as to the concern of Hêraklês with the Argonautic expedition. A story is alluded to in Aristotle (Politic, iii. 9) that the ship Argô herself refused to take him on board, because he was so much superior in stature and power to all the other heroes—οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλειν αὐτὸν ἄγειν τὴν Ἀργὼ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὡς

ὑπερβάλλοντα πολὺ τῶν πλωτήρων. This was the story of Pherekydês (Fr. 67, Didot) as well as of Antimachus (Schol. Apoll. Rhod. i. 1290): it is probably a very ancient portion of the legend, inasmuch as it ascribes to the ship sentient powers, in consonance with her other miraculous properties. The etymology of Aphetæ in Thessaly was connected with the tale of Hêraklês having there been put on shore from the Argô (Herodot. vii. 193): Ephorus said that he staid away voluntarily from fondness for Omphalê (Frag. 9, Didot). The old epic poet Kinæthôn said that Hêraklês had placed the Kian hostages at Trachin, and that the Kians ever afterwards maintained a respectful correspondence with that place (Schol. Ap. Rh. i. 1357). This is the explanatory legend connected with some existing custom, which we are unable further to unravel.

[554] See above, chap. viii. p. 169.

[555] Such was the old narrative of the Hesiodic Catalogue and Eoiai. See Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. ii. 181-296.

[556] This again was the old Hesiodic story (Schol. Apoll. Rhod. ii. 296),—

Ἐνθ᾽ οἵγ᾽ εὔχεσθον Αἰνῃΐῳ ὑψιμέδοντι.

Apollodôrus (i. 9, 21), Apollônius (178-300), and Valerius Flacc. (iv. 428-530) agree in most of the circumstances.

[557] Such was the fate of the harpies as given in the old Naupaktian Verses (See Fragm. Ep. Græc. Düntzer, Naupakt. Fr. 2. p. 61).

The adventure of the Argonauts with Phineus is given by Diodôrus in a manner totally different (Diodôr. iv. 44): he seems to follow Dionysius of Mitylênê (see Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. ii. 207).

[558] Apollodôr. i. 9, 22. Apollôn. Rhod. ii. 310-615.

[559] Apollodôr. i. 9, 23. Apollôn. Rhod. ii. 850-1257.

[560] Apollôn. Rhod. iii. 320-385.

[561] Apollôn. Rhod. iii. 410. Apollodôr. i. 9, 23.

[562] This was the story of the Naupaktian Verses (Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. iii. 515-525): Apollônius and others altered it. Idmôn, according to them, died in the voyage before the arrival at Kolchis.

[563] Apollôn. Rhod. iii. 50-200. Valer. Flacc. vi. 440-480. Hygin. fab. 22.

[564] Apollôn. Rhod. iii. 835. Apollodôr. i. 9, 23. Valer. Flacc vii. 356 Ovid, Epist. xii. 15.

"Isset anhelatos non præmedicatus in ignes

Immemor Æsonides, oraque adunca boum."

[565] Apollôn. Rhod. iii. 1230-1400.

[566] The Naupaktian Verses stated this (see the Fragm. 6, ed. Düntzer, p. 61, ap. Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. iv. 59-86).

[567] Such was the story of the Naupaktian Verses (See Fragm. 6. p 61 Düntzer ap. Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. iv. 59, 86, 87).

[568] Apollodôr. i. 9, 23. Apollôn. Rhod. iv. 220.

Pherekydês said that Jasôn killed the dragon (Fr. 74, Did.).

[569] This is the story of Apollodôrus (i. 9, 24), who seems to follow Pherekydês (Fr. 73, Didot). Apollônius (iv. 225-480) and Valerius Flaccus (viii. 262 *seq.*) give totally different circumstances respecting the death of Apsyrtus; but the narrative of Pherekydês seems the oldest: so revolting a story as that of the cutting up of the little boy cannot have been imagined in later times.

Sophoklês composed two tragedies on the adventures of Jasôn and Mêdea, both lost—the Κολχίδες and the Σκύθαι. In the former he represented the murder of the child Apsyrtus as having taken place in the house of

Æêtês: in the latter he introduced the mitigating circumstance, that Apsyrtus was the son of Æêtês by a different mother from Mêdea (Schol. Apollôn Rhod. iv. 223).

[570] Apollodôr. i. 9, 24, τὸν τόπον προσηγόρευσε Τόμους. Ovid. Trist. iii. 9. The story that Apsyrtus was cut in pieces, is the etymological legend explanatory of the name Tomi.

There was however a place called Apsarus, on the southern coast of the Euxine, west of Trapezus, where the tomb of Apsyrtus was shown, and where it was affirmed that he had been put to death. He was the eponymus of the town, which was said to have been once called Apsyrtus, and only corrupted by a barbarian pronunciation (Arrian. Periplus, Euxin. p. 6; Geogr. Min. v. 1). Compare Procop. Bell. Goth. iv. 2.

Strabo connects the death of Apsyrtus with the Apsyrtides, islands off the coast of Illyria, in the Adriatic (vii p. 315).

[571] The original narrative was, that the Argô returned by navigating the circumfluous ocean. This would be almost certain, even without positive testimony, from the early ideas entertained by the Greeks respecting geography; but we know further that it was the representation of the Hesiodic poems, as well as of Mimnermus, Hekatæus and Pindar, and even of Antimachus. Schol. Parisina Ap. Rhod. iv. 254. Ἑκαταῖος δὲ ὁ Μιλήσιος διὰ τοῦ Φάσιδος ἀνελθεῖν φησὶν αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸν Ὠκεανόν· διὰ δὲ τοῦ Ὠκεανοῦ κατελθεῖν εἰς τὸν Νεῖλον· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ Νείλου εἰς τὴν καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς θάλασσαν. Ἡσίοδος δὲ καὶ Πίνδαρος ἐν Πυθιονίκαις καὶ Ἀντίμαχος ἐν Λυδῇ διὰ τοῦ Ὠκεανοῦ φασὶν ἐλθεῖν αὐτοὺς εἰς Λιβύην· εἶτα βαστάσαντας τὴν Ἀργὼ εἰς τὸ ἡμέτερον ἀφικέσθαι πέλαγος. Compare the Schol. Edit. ad iv. 259.

[572] See the fourth Pythian Ode of Pindar, and Apollôn. Rhod. iv. 1551-1756.

The tripod of Jasôn was preserved by the Euesperitæ in Libya, Diod. iv. 56: but the legend, connecting the Argonauts with the lake Tritônis in Libya, is given with some considerable differences in Herodotus, iv. 179.

[573] Apollôn. Rhod. iv. 1153-1217. Timæus, Fr. 7-8, Didot. Τίμαιος ἐν Κερκύρᾳ λέγων γενέσθαι τοὺς γάμους, καὶ περὶ τῆς θυσίας ἱστορεῖ, ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγων ἄγεσθαι αὐτὴν κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν, Μηδείας πρῶτον θυσάσης ἐν τῷ τοῦ Απολλῶνος ἱερῷ. Καὶ Βωμοὺς δέ φησι μνημεῖα τῶν γάμων ἱδρύσασθαι συνεγγὺς μὲν τῆς θαλάσσης, οὐ μακρὰν δὲ τῆς πόλεως. Ὀνομάζουσι δὲ τὸν μὲν, Νυμφῶν· τὸν δὲ, Νηρηΐδων.

[574] Apollodôr. i. 9, 25. Apollôn. Rhod. iv. 1700-1725.

[575] Some called Talôs a remnant of the brazen race of men (Schol. Apoll. Rhod. iv. 1641).

[576] Apollodôr. i. 9, 26. Apollôn. Rhod. iv. 1638.

[577] Diodôr. iv. 53. Eratosth. Catasterism. c. 35.

[578] Strabo. xi. p. 526-531.

[579] Apollôn. Rhod. i. 955-960, and the Scholia.

There was in Kyzikus a temple of Apollo under different ἐπικλήσεις; some called it the temple of the Jasonian Apollo.

Another anchor however was preserved in the temple of Rhea on the banks of the Phasis, which was affirmed to be the anchor of the ship Argô. Arrian saw it there, but seems to have doubted its authenticity (Periplus, Euxin. Pont. p. 9. Geogr. Min. v. 1).

[580] Neanthês ap. Strabo. i. p. 45. Apollôn. Rhod. i. 1125, and Schol. Steph. Byz. v. Φρίξος.

Apollônius mentions the fountain called Jasoneæ, on the hill of Dindymon. Apollôn. Rhod. ii. 532, and the citations from Timosthenês and Herodôrus in the Scholia. See also Appian. Syriac. c. 63.

[581] See the historians of Hêrakleia, Nymphis and Promathidas, Fragm. Orelli, pp. 99, 100-104. Schol. ad Apollôn. Rhod. iv. 247. Strabo, xii. p. 546. Autolykus, whom he calls companion of Jasôn, was, according to another legend, comrade of Hêraklês in his expedition against the Amazons.

[582] Stephan. Byz. v. Παντικαπαῖον, Eustath. ad Dionys. Periêgêt. 311.

[583] Xenophôn, Anabas. vi. 2, 1; v. 7, 37.

[584] Strabo, xi. p. 499.

[585] Appian, Mithridatic. c. 101.

[586] Strabo, xi. p. 499, 503, 526, 531; i. p. 45-48. Justin, xlii. 3, whose statements illustrate the way in which men found a present home and application for the old fables,—"Jason, primus humanorum post Herculem et Liberum, qui reges Orientis fuisse traduntur, eam cœli plagam domuisse dicitur. Cum Albanis fœdus percussit, qui Herculem ex Italiâ ab Albano monte, cum, Geryone extincto, armenta ejus per Italiam duceret, secuti dicuntur; quique, memores Italicæ originis, exercitum Cn. Pompeii bello Mithridatico fratres consalutavêre. Itaque Jasoni totus fere Oriens, ut conditori, divinos honores templaque constituit; quæ Parmenio, dux Alexandri Magni, post multos annos dirui jussit, ne cujusquam nomen in Oriente venerabilius quam Alexandri esset."

The Thessalian companions of Alexander the Great, placed by his victories in possession of rich acquisitions in these regions, pleased themselves by vivifying and multiplying all these old fables, proving an ancient kindred between the Medes and Thessalians. See Strabo, xi. p. 530. The temples of Jasôn were τιμώμενα σφόδρα ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων (*ib.* p. 526).

The able and inquisitive geographer Eratosthenês was among those who fully believed that Jasôn had left his ships in the Phasis, and had undertaken a land expedition into the interior country, in which he had conquered Media and Armenia (Strabo, i. p. 48).

[587] Appian, Mithridatic. 103: τοὺς Κόλχους ἐπήει, καθ᾽ ἱστορίαν τῆς Ἀργοναυτῶν καὶ Διοσκούρων καὶ Ἡρακλέους ἐπιδημίας, καὶ μάλιστα τὸ πάθος ἰδεῖν ἐθέλων, ὃ Προμηθεῖ φασὶ γενέσθαι περὶ τὸ Καύκασον ὄρος. The lofty crag of Caucasus called Strobilus, to which Promêtheus had been attached, was pointed out to Arrian himself in his Periplus (p. 12. Geogr. Minor vol. i.).

[588] Strabo, i. pp. 21, 45, 46; v. 224-252. Pompon. Mel. ii. 3. Diodôr. iv. 56. Apollôn. Rhod. iv. 656. Lycophron, 1273.—

Τύρσιν μακεδνὰς ἀμφὶ Κιρκαίου νάπας

Ἀργοῦς τε κλεινὸν ὅρμον Αἰήτην μέγαν.

[589] Heyne, Observ. ad Apollodôr. i. 9, 16. p. 72. "Mirum in modum fallitur, qui in his commentis certum fundum historicum vel geographicum aut exquirere studet, aut se reperisse, atque historicam vel geographicam aliquam doctrinam, systema nos dicimus, inde procudi posse, putat," etc.

See also the observations interspersed in Burmann's Catalogus Argonautarum, prefixed to his edition of Valerius Flaccus.

The Persian antiquarians whom Herodotus cites at the beginning of his history (i. 2-4—it is much to be regretted that Herodotus did not inform us who they were, and whether they were the same as those who said that Perseus was an Assyrian by birth and had become a Greek, vi. 54), joined together the abductions of Iô and of Eurôpê, of Mêdea and of Helen, as pairs of connected proceedings, the second injury being a retaliation for the first,—they drew up a debtor and creditor account of abductions between Asia and Europe. The Kolchian king (they said) had sent a herald to Greece to ask for his satisfaction for the wrong done to him by Jasôn and to re-demand his daughter Mêdea; but he was told in reply that the Greeks had received no satisfaction for the previous rape of Iô.

There was some ingenuity in thus binding together the old fables, so as to represent the invasions of Greece by Darius and Xerxês as retaliations for the unexpiated destruction wrought by Agamemnôn.

[590] Sophokl. ap. Strabo. vii. p. 295.—

Ὑπέρ τε πόντον πάντ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἔσχατα χθονὸς,

Νυκτός τε πηγὰς οὐρανοῦ τ᾽ ἀναπτυχὰς,

Φοίβου τε παλαιὸν κῆπον.

[591] Odyss. iv. 562. The Islands of the Blessed, in Hesiod, are near the ocean (Opp. Di. 169).

[592] Hesiod, Theogon. 275-290. Homer, Iliad, i. 423. Odyss. i. 23; ix 86-206; x 4-83; xii. 135. Mimnerm. Fragm. 13, Schneidewin.

[593] Pindar, Pyth. x. 29.—

Ναυσὶ δ᾽ οὔτε πεζὸς ἰὼν ἂν εὕροις

Ἐς Ὑπερβορέων ἀγῶνα θαυματὰν ὁδόν.

Παρ᾽ οἷς ποτε Περσεὺς ἑδαίσατο λαγετὰς, etc.

Hesiod, and the old epic poem called the Epigoni, both mentioned the Hyperboreans (Herod. iv. 32-34).

[594] This idea is well stated and sustained by Völcker (Mythische Geographie der Griechen und Römer, cap. i. p. 11), and by Nitzsch in his Comments on the Odyssey—Introduct. Remarks to b. ix. p. xii.-xxxiii. The twelfth and thirteenth chapters of the History of Orchomenos, by O. Müller, are also full of good remarks on the geography of the Argonautic voyage (pp. 274-299).

The most striking evidence of this disposition of the Greeks is to be found in the legendary discoveries of Alexander and his companions, when they marched over the untrodden regions in the east of the Persian empire (see Arrian, Hist. Al. v. 3: compare Lucian. Dialog. Mortuor. xiv. vol. i. p. 212. Tauch) because these ideas were first broached at a time when geographical science was sufficiently advanced to canvass and criticize them. The early settlers in Italy, Sicily and the Euxine, indulged their fanciful vision without the fear of any such monitor: there was no such thing as a map before the days of Anaximander, the disciple of Thalês.

[595] See Mr. Payne Knight, Prolegg. ad Homer. c. 49. Compare Spohn—"de extremâ Odysseæ parte"—p. 97.

[596] Strabo. xvii. p. 834. An altar of Odysseus was shown upon this island, as well as some other evidences (σύμβολα) of his visit to the place.

Apollônius Rhodius copies the Odyssey in speaking of the island of Thrinakia and the cattle of Helios (iv. 965, with Schol.). He conceives Sicily as Thrinakia, a name afterwards exchanged for Trinakria. The Scholiast ad Apoll. (1. c.) speaks of Trinax king of Sicily. Compare iv. 291 with the Scholia.

[597] Thucyd. i. 25-vi. 2. These local legends appear in the eyes of Strabo convincing evidence (i. p. 23-26),—the tomb of the siren Parthenopê at Naples, the stories at Cumæ and Dikæarchia about the νεκυομαντεῖον of Avernus, and the existence of places named after Baius and Misênus, the companions of Odysseus, etc.

[598] Strabo, iii. p. 150-157. Οὐ γὰρ μόνον οἱ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ Σικελίαν τόποι καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν τοιούτων σημεῖα ὑπογράφουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰβηρίᾳ Ὀδύσσεια πόλις δείκνυται, καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς ἱερὸν, καὶ ἄλλα μύρια ἴχνη τῆς τε ἐκείνου πλάνης, καὶ ἄλλων τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Τρωϊκοῦ πολέμου περιγενομένων (I adopt Grosskurd's correction of the text from γενομένων to περιγενομένων, in the note to his German translation of Strabo).

Asklepiadês (of Myrlea in Bithynia, about 170 B. C.) resided some time in Turditania, the south-western region of Spain along the Guadalquivir, as a teacher of Greek literature (παιδεύσας τὰ γραμματικὰ), and composed a periegesis of the Iberian tribes, which unfortunately has not been preserved. He made various discoveries in archæology, and successfully connected his old legends with several portions of the territory before him. His discoveries were,—1. In the temple of Athênê, at this Iberian town of Odysseia, there were shields and beaks of ships affixed to the walls, monuments of the visit of Odysseus himself. 2. Among the Kallæki, in the northern part of Portugal, several of the companions of Teukros had settled and left descendants: there were in that region two Grecian cities, one called Hellenês, the other called Amphilochi; for Amphilochus also, the son of Amphiaraus, had died in Iberia, and many of his soldiers had taken up their permanent residence in the interior. 3. Many new inhabitants had come into Iberia with the expedition of Hêraklês; some also after the conquest of Messênê by the Lacedæmonians. 4. In Cantabria, on the north. coast of Spain, there was a town and region of Lacedæmonian colonists. 5. In the same portion of the country there was the town of Opsikella, founded by Opsikellas, one of the companions of Antenôr in his emigration from Troy (Strabo, iii. p. 157).

This is a specimen of the manner in which the seeds of Grecian mythus came to be distributed over so large a surface. To an ordinary Greek reader, these legendary discoveries of Asklepiadês would probably be more interesting than the positive facts which he communicated respecting the Iberian tribes; and his Turditanian audi-

tors would be delighted to hear—while he was reciting and explaining to them the animated passage of the Iliad, in which Agamemnôn extols the inestimable value of the bow of Teukros (viii. 281)—that the heroic archer and his companions had actually set foot in the Iberian peninsula.

[599] This was the opinion of Kratês of Mallus, one of the most distinguished of the critics on Homer: it was the subject of an animated controversy between him and Aristarchus (Aulus Gellius, N. A. xiv. 6; Strabo, iii. p. 157). See the instructive treatise of Lehrs, De Aristarchi Studiis, c. v. § 4. p. 251. Much controversy also took place among the critics respecting the ground which Menelaus went over in his wanderings (Odyss. iv.). Kratês affirmed that he had circumnavigated the southern extremity of Africa and gone to India: the critic Aristonikus, Strabo's contemporary, enumerated all the different opinions (Strabo, i. p. 38).

[600] Strabo, iii. p. 157.

[601] Strabo, i. p. 22-44; vii. p. 299.

[602] Stesichori Fragm. ed. Kleine; Geryonis, Fr. 5. p. 60; ap. Strabo. iii. p. 148; Herodot. iv. 8. It seems very doubtful whether Stesichorus meant to indicate any neighboring island as Erytheia, if we compare Fragm. 10. p. 67 of the Geryonis, and the passages of Athenæus and Eustathius there cited. He seems to have adhered to the old fable, placing Erytheia on the opposite side of the ocean-stream, for Hêraklês crosses the ocean to get to it.

Hekatæus, ap. Arrian. Histor. Alex. ii. 16. Skylax places Erytheia, "whither Geryôn is said to have come to feed his oxen," in the Kastid territory near the Greek city of Apollônia on the Ionic Gulf, northward of the Keraunian mountains. There were splendid cattle consecrated to Hêlios near Apollônia, watched by the citizens of the place with great care (Herodot. ix. 93; Skylax, c. 26).

About Erytheia, Cellerius observes (Geogr. Ant. ii. 1, 227), "Insula Erytheia, quam veteres adjungunt Gadibus, vel demersa est, vel in scopulis quærenda, vel pars est ipsarum Gadium, neque hodie ejus formæ aliqua, uti descripta est, fertur superesse." To make the disjunctive catalogue complete, he ought to have added, "or it never really existed,"—not the least probable supposition of all.

[603] Hesiod, Theogon. 956-992; Homer, Odyss. xii. 3-69.—

Νῆσον ἐς Αἰαίην, ὅθι τ᾽ Ἠοῦς ἠριγενείης
Οἴκια καὶ χόροι εἰσὶ, καὶ ἀντολαὶ ἠελίοιο.

[604] Mimnerm. Fragm. 10-11, Schneidewin; Athenæ. vii. p. 277.—

Οὐδέ κοτ᾽ ἂν μέγα κῶας ἀνήγαγεν αὐτὸς Ἰήσων
Ἐξ Αἴης τελέσας ἀλγινόεσσαν ὁδὸν,
Ὑβρίστῃ Πελίῃ τελέων χαλεπῆρες ἄεθλον,
Οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἐπ᾽ Ὠκεανοῦ καλὸν ἵκοντο ῥόον.
. . . . .
Αἰήταο πόλιν, τόθι τ᾽ ὠκέος Ἠελίοιο
Ἀκτῖνες χρυσέῳ κείαται ἐν θαλάμῳ,
Ὠκεανοῦ παρὰ χείλεσ᾽, ἵν᾽ ὤχετο θεῖος Ἰήσων.

[605] Strabo, i. p. 45-46. Δημήτριος ὁ Σκήψιος … πρὸς Νεάνθη τὸν Κυζικηνὸν *φιλοτιμοτέρως* ἀντιλέγων, εἰπόντα, ὅτι οἱ Ἀργοναῦται πλέοντες εἰς Φᾶσιν τὸν ὑφ᾽ Ὁμήρου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμολογούμενον πλοῦν, ἱδρύσαντο τὰ τῆς Ἰδαίας μητρὸς ἱερὰ ἐπὶ Κύζικον … *ἀρχὴν φησὶ μηδ᾽ εἰδέναι τὴν εἰς Φᾶσιν ἀποδημίαν τοῦ Ἰάσονος Ὅμηρον*. Again, p. 46, παραλαβὼν μάρτυρα Μίμνερμον, ὃς ἐν τῷ Ὠκεανῷ ποιήσας οἴκησιν Αἰήτου, etc.

The adverb φιλοτιμοτέρως reveals to us the municipal rivalry and contention between the small town Skêpsis and its powerful neighbor Kyzikus, respecting points of comparative archæology.

[606] Eumêlus, Fragm. Εὐρωπία 7, Κορινθιακὰ 2-5. pp. 63-68, Düntzer.

[607] Arrian, Periplus Pont. Euxin. p. 12; ap. Geogr. Minor. vol. i. He saw the Caucasus from Dioskurias.

[608] Herodot i. 2; vii. 193-197. Eurip. Mêd. 2. Valer. Flacc. v. 51.

[609] Strabo, i. p. 23. Völcker (Ueber Homerische Geographie, v. 66) is instructive upon this point, as upon the geography of the Greek poets generally. He recognizes the purely mythical character of Æa in Homer and Hesiod, but he tries to prove—unsuccessfully, in my judgment—that Homer places Æêtês in the east, while Circê is in the west, and that Homer refers the Argonautic voyage to the Euxine Sea.

[610] Strabo (or Polybius, whom he has just been citing) contends that Homer knew the existence of Æêtês in Kolchis, and of Circê at Circeium, as historical persons, as well as the voyage of Jasôn to Æa as an historical fact. Upon this he (Homer) built a superstructure of fiction (προσμύθευμα): he invented the brotherhood between them, and he placed both the one and the other in the exterior ocean (συγγενείας τε ἔπλασε τῶν οὕτω διῳκισμένων, καὶ ἐξωκεανισμὸν ἀμφοῖν, i. p. 20); perhaps also Jasôn might have wandered as far as Italy, as evidences (σημεῖά τινα) are shown that he did (*ib.*).

But the idea that Homer conceived Æêtês in the extreme east and Circê in the extreme west, is not reconcilable with the Odyssey. The supposition of Strabo is alike violent and unsatisfactory.

Circê was worshipped as a goddess at Circeii (Cicero, Nat. Deor. iii. 19). Hesiod, in the Theogony, represents the two sons of Circê by Odysseus as reigning over all the warlike Tyrrhenians (Theog. 1012), an undefined western sovereignty. The great Mamilian gens at Tusculum traced their descent to Odysseus and Circê (Dionys. Hal. iv. 45).

[611] See above, p. 239. There is an opinion cited from Hekatæus in Schol. Apoll. Rhod. iv. 284. contrary to this, which is given by the same scholiast on iv. 259. But, in spite of the remarks of Klausen (ad. Fragment. Hekatæi, 187. p. 98), I think that the Schol. ad. iv. 284 has made a mistake in citing Hekatæus; the more so as the scholiast, as printed from the Codex Parisinus, cites the same opinion without mentioning Hekatæus. According to the old Homeric idea, the ocean stream flowed all round the earth, and was the source of all the principal rivers which flowed into the great internal sea, or Mediterranean (see Hekatæus, Fr. 349; Klausen, ap. Arrian. ii. 16, where he speaks of the Mediterranean as the μεγάλη θάλασσα). Retaining this old idea of the ocean-stream, Hekatæus would naturally believe that the Phasis joined it: nor can I agree with Klausen (ad Fr. 187) that this implies a degree of ignorance too gross to impute to him.

[612] Apollôn. Rhod. iv. 287; Schol. ad iv. 284; Pindar, Pyth. iv. 447, with Schol.; Strabo, i. p. 46-57; Aristot. Mirabil. Auscult. c. 105. Altars were shown in the Adriatic, which had been erected both by Jasôn and by Mêdea (*ib.*).

Aristotle believed in the forked course of the Ister, with one embouchure in the Euxine and another in the Adriatic: he notices certain fishes called τριχιαι, who entered the river (like the Argonauts) from the Euxine, went up it as far as the point of bifurcation and descended into the Adriatic (Histor. Animal. viii. 15). Compare Ukert, Geographie der Griech. und Römer, vol. iii. p. 145-147, about the supposed course of the Ister.

[613] Diodôr. iv. 56; Timæus, Fragm. 53. Göller. Skymnus the geographer also adopted this opinion (Schol. Apoll. Rhod. 284-287). The pseudo-Orpheus in the poem called Argonautica seems to give a jumble of all the different stories.

[614] Diodôr. iv. 49. This was the tale both of Sophoklês and of Kallimachus (Schol. Apoll. Rhod. iv. 284).

See the Dissertation of Ukert, Beylage iv. vol. i. part 2, p. 320 of his Geographie der Griechen und Römer, which treats of the Argonautic voyage at some length; also J. H. Voss, Alte Weltkunde über die Gestalt der Erde, published in the second volume of the Kritische Blätter, pp. 162, 314-326; and Forbiger, Handbuch der Alten Geographie-Einleitung, p. 8.

[615] Strabo, i. p. 45. He speaks here of the voyage of Phryxus, as well as that of Jasôn, as having been a military undertaking (στρατεία): so again, iii. p. 149, he speaks of the military expedition of Odysseus—ἡ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως στρατία, and ἡ Ἡρακλέους στρατία (*ib.*). Again xi. p. 498. Οἱ μῦθοι, αἰνιττόμενοι τὴν Ἰάσονος

στρατείαν προελθόντος μέχρι καὶ Μηδίας· ἔτι δὲ πρότερον τὴν Φρίξου. Compare also Justin, xlii. 2-3; Tacit. Annal. vi. 34.

Strabo cannot speak of the old fables with literal fidelity: he unconsciously transforms them into quasi-historical incidents of his own imagination. Diodôrus gives a narrative of the same kind, with decent substitutes for the fabulous elements (iv. 40-47-56).

[616] Strabo, i. p. 48. The far-extending expeditions undertaken in the eastern regions by Dionysus and Hêraklês were constantly present to the mind of Alexander the Great as subjects of comparison with himself: he imposed upon his followers perilous and trying marches, from anxiety to equal or surpass the alleged exploits of Semiramis, Cyrus, Perseus, and Hêraklês. (Arrian, v. 2, 3; vi. 24, 3; vii. 10, 12. Strabo, iii. p. 171; xv. p. 686; xvii. p. 81).

[617] The eponym Bœôtus is son of Poseidôn and Arnê (Euphorion ap. Eustath. ad Iliad. ii. 507). It was from Arnê in Thessaly that the Bœôtians were said to have come, when they invaded and occupied Bœôtia. Euripidês made him son of Poseidôn and Melanippê. Another legend recited Bœôtus and Hellên as sons of Poseidôn and Antiopê (Hygin. f. 157-186).

The Tanagræan poetess Korinna (the rival of Pindar, whose compositions in the Bœôtian dialect are unfortunately lost) appears to have dwelt upon this native Bœôtian genealogy: she derived the Ogygian gates of Thêbes from Ogygus, son of Bœôtus (Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. iii. 1178), also the Fragments of Korinna in Schneidewin's edition, fr. 2. p. 432.

[618] Homer, Odyss. xi. 262, and Eustath. *ad loc.* Compare Schol. ad Iliad. xiii. 301.

[619] Iliad, xiv. 321. Ἰὼ is κερόεσσα προμάτωρ of the Thêbans. Eurip. Phœniss. 247-676.

[620] Apollodôr. ii. 1, 3; iii. 1, 8. In the Hesiodic poems (ap. Schol. Apoll. Rhod. ii. 178), Phœnix was recognized as son of Agenôr. Pherekydês also described both Phœnix and Kadmus as sons of Agenôr (Pherekyd. Fragm. 40, Didot). Compare Servius ad. Virgil. Æneid. 1. 338. Pherekydês expressly mentioned Kilix (Apollod. *ib.*). Besides the Εὐρώπεια of Stesichorus (see Stesichor. Fragm. xv. p. 73, ed. Kleine), there were several other ancient poems on the adventures of Europa; one in particular by Eumêlus (Schol. ad Iliad. vi. 138), which however can hardly be the same as the τὰ ἔπη τὰ εἰς Εὐρώπην alluded to by Pausanias (ix. 5, 4). See Wüllner de Cyclo Epico, p. 57 (Münster 1825).

[621] Conôn, Narrat. 37. Perhaps the most remarkable thing of all is the tone of unbounded self-confidence with which Conôn winds up this tissue of uncertified suppositions—περὶ μὲν Κάδμου καὶ Θηβῶν οἰκίσεως οὗτος ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος· τὸ δὲ ἄλλο μῦθος καὶ γοητεία ἀκοῆς.

[622] Stesichor. (Fragm. 16; Kleine) ap. Schol. Eurip. Phœniss. 680. The place where the heifer had lain down was still shown in the time of Pausanias (ix. 12, 1).

Lysimachus, a lost author who wrote Thebaïca, mentioned Eurôpa as having come with Kadmus to Thêbes, and told the story in many other respects very differently (Schol. Apoll. Rhod. iii. 1179).

[623] Apollodôr. iii. 4, 1-3. Pherekydês gave this account of the necklace, which seems to imply that Kadmus must have found his sister Eurôpa. The narrative here given is from Hellanikus; that of Pherekydês differed from it in some respects: compare Hellanik. Fragm. 8 and 9, and Pherekyd. Frag. 44. The resemblance of this story with that of Jasôn and Æêtês (see above, chap. xiii. p. 237) will strike everyone. It is curious to observe how the old logographer Pherekydês explained this analogy in his narrative; he said that Athênê had given half the dragon's teeth to Kadmus and half to Æêtês (see Schol. Pindar. Isthm. vi. 13).

[624] Hesiod, Theogon. 976. Leukothea, the sea-goddess, daughter of Kadmus, is mentioned in the Odyssey, v. 334; Diodôr. iv. 2.

[625] Eurip. Phœniss. 680, with the Scholia; Pherekydês, Fragm. 44; Androtiôn, ap. Schol. Pindar. Isthm. vi. 13. Dionysius (?) called the Sparti an ἔθνος Βοιωτίας (Schol. Phœniss. 1. c).

Even in the days of Plutarch, there were persons living who traced their descent to the Sparti of Thêbes (Plutarch, Ser. Num. Vindict. p. 563).

[626] Apollodôr. iii. 4, 2-9; Diodôr. iv. 2.

[627] See Apollodôr. iii. 4, 3; Stesichor. Fragm. xvii. Kleine; Pausan. ix. 2, 3; Eurip. Bacch. 337; Diodôr. iv. 81. The old logographer Akusilaus copied Stesichorus.

Upon this well-known story it is unnecessary to multiply references. I shall however briefly notice the remarks made upon it by Diodôrus and by Pausanias, as an illustration of the manner in which the literary Greeks of a later day dealt with their old national legends.

Both of them appear implicitly to believe the fact, that Aktæôn was devoured by his own dogs, but they differ materially in the explanation of it.

Diodôrus accepts and vindicates the miraculous interposition of the displeased goddess to punish Aktæôn, who, according to one story, had boasted of his superiority in the chase to Artemis,—according to another story, had presumed to solicit the goddess in marriage, emboldened by the great numbers of the feet of animals slain in the chase which he had hung up as offerings in her temple. "It is not improbable (observes Diodôrus) that the goddess was angry on both these accounts. For whether Aktæôn abused these hunting presents so far as to make them the means of gratifying his own desires towards one unapproachable in wedlock, or whether he presumed to call himself an abler hunter than her with whom the gods themselves will not compete in this department,—in either case the wrath of the goddess against him was just and legitimate (ὁμολογουμένην καὶ δικαίαν ὀργὴν ἔσχε πρὸς αὐτὸν ἡ θεός). With perfect propriety therefore (Καθόλου δὲ πιθανῶς) was he transformed into an animal such as those he had hunted, and torn to pieces by the very dogs who had killed them." (Didot. iv. 80.)

Pausanias, a man of exemplary piety, and generally less inclined to scepticism than Diodôrus, thinks the occasion unsuitable for a miracle or special interference. Having alluded to the two causes assigned for the displeasure of Artemis (they are the two first-mentioned in my text, and distinct from the two noticed by Diodôrus), he proceeds to say, "But I believe that the dogs of Aktæôn went mad, without the interference of the goddess: in this state of madness they would have torn in pieces without distinction any one whom they met (Paus. ix. 2, 3. ἐγὼ δὲ ἄνευ θεοῦ πείθομαι νόσον λύσσαν ἐπιβαλεῖν τοῦ Ἀκταίωνος τοὺς κύνας)." He retains the truth of the final catastrophe, but rationalizes it, excluding the special intervention of Artemis.

[628] Apollod. iii. 5, 3-4; Theocrit. Idyll. xxvi. Eurip. Bacch. *passim*. Such is the tragical plot of this memorable drama. It is a striking proof of the deep-seated reverence of the people of Athens for the sanctity of the Bacchic ceremonies, that they could have borne the spectacle of Agavê on the stage with her dead son's head, and the expressions of triumphant sympathy in her action on the part of the Chorus (1168), Μάκαιρ᾽ Ἀγαύη! This drama, written near the close of the life of Euripidês, and exhibited by his son after his death (Schol. Aristoph. Ran. 67,), contains passages strongly inculcating the necessity of implicit deference to ancestorial authority in matters of religion, and favorably contrasting the uninquiring faith of the vulgar with the dissenting and inquisitive tendencies of superior minds: see v. 196; compare vv. 389 and 422.—

Οὐδὲν σοφιζόμεσθα τοῖσι δαίμοσιν.

Πατρίους παραδοχὰς, ἅς θ᾽ ὁμήλικας χρόνῳ

Κεκτήμεθ᾽, οὐδεὶς αὐτὰ καταβαλεῖ λόγος,

Οὐδ᾽ ἢν δι᾽ ἄκρων τὸ σοφὸν εὕρηται φρένων.

Such reproofs "insanientis sapientiæ" certainly do not fall in with the plot of the drama itself, in which Pentheus appears as a Conservative, resisting the introduction of the new religious rites. Taken in conjunction with the emphatic and submissive piety which reigns through the drama, they countenance the supposition of Tyrwhitt, that Euripidês was anxious to repel the imputations, so often made against him, of commerce with the philosophers and participation in sundry heretical opinions.

Pacuvius in his Pentheus seems to have closely copied Euripidês; see Servius ad Virg. Æneid. iv. 469.

The old Thespis had composed a tragedy on the subject of Pentheus: Suidas, Θέσπις; also Æschylus; compare his Eumenidês, 25.

According to Apollodôrus (iii. 5, 5), Labdakus also perished in a similar way to Pentheus, and from the like impiety,—ἐκείνῳ φρονῶν παραπλήσια.

[629] Pausan. i. 38, 9.

[630] For the adventures of Antiopê and her sons, see Apollodôr. iii. 5; Pausan. ii. 6, 2; ix. 5, 2.

The narrative given respecting Epôpeus in the ancient Cyprian verses seems to have been very different from this, as far as we can judge from the brief notice in Proclus's Argument,—ὡς Ἐπωπεὺς φθείρας τὴν Λυκούργου (Λύκου) γυναῖκα ἐξεπορθήθη: it approaches more nearly to the story given in the seventh fable of Hyginus, and followed by Propertius (iii. 15); the eighth fable of Hyginus contains the tale of Antiopê as given by Euripidês and Ennius. The story of Pausanias differs from both.

The Scholiast ad Apollôn. Rhod. i. 735. says that there were two persons named Antiopê; one, daughter of Asôpus, the other, daughter of Nykteus. Pausanias is content with supposing one only, really the daughter of Nykteus, but there was a φήμη that she was daughter of Asôpus (ii. 6, 2). Asius made Antiopê daughter of Asôpus, and mother (both by Zeus and by Epôpeus: such a junction of divine and human paternity is of common occurrence in the Greek legends) of Zêthus and Amphiôn (ap. Paus. 1. c).

The contradictory versions of the story are brought together, though not very perfectly, in Sterk's Essay De Labdacidarum Historiâ, p. 38-43 (Leyden, 1829).

[631] This story about the lyre of Amphiôn is not noticed in Homer, but it was narrated in the ancient ἔπη ἐς Εὐρώπην which Pausanias had read: the wild beasts as well as the stones were obedient to his strains (Paus. ix. 5, 4). Pherekydês also recounted it (Pherekyd. Fragm. 102, Didot). The tablet of inscription (Ἀναγραφὴ) at Sikyôn recognized Amphiôn as the first composer of poetry and harp-music (Plutarch, de Musicâ, c. 3. p. 1132).

[632] The tale of the wife and son of Zêthus is as old as the Odyssey (xix. 525). Pausanias adds the statement that Zêthus died of grief (ix. 5, 5; Pherekydês, Fragm. 102, Did.). Pausanias, however, as well as Apollodôrus, tells us that Zêthus married Thêbê, from whom the name Thêbes was given to the city. To reconcile the conflicting pretensions of Zêthus and Amphiôn with those of Kadmus, as founders of Thêbes, Pausanias supposes that the latter was the original settler of the hill of the Kadmeia, while the two former extended the settlement to the lower city (ix. 5, 1-3).

[633] See Valckenaer. Diatribe in Eurip. Reliq. cap. 7, p. 58; Welcker, Griechisch. Tragöd. ii. p. 811. There is a striking resemblance between the Antiopê of Euripidês and the Tyrô of Sophoklês in many points.

Plato in his Gorgias has preserved a few fragments, and a tolerably clear general idea of the characters of Zêthus and Amphiôn (Gorg. 90-92); see also Horat. Epist. i. 18, 42.

Both Livius and Pacuvius had tragedies on the scheme of this of Euripidês, the former seemingly a translation.

[634] See the description of the locality in K. O. Müller (Orchomenos, c. i. p. 37).

The tombs of Laius and his attendant were still seen there in the days of Pausanias (x. 5, 2).

[635] Apollodôr. iii. 5, 8. An author named Lykus, in his work entitled *Thêbaïca*, ascribed this visitation to the anger of Dionysus (Schol. Hesiod, Theogon. 326). The Sphinx (or *Phix*, from the Bœôtian Mount Phikium) is as old as the Hesiodic Theogony,—Φῖκ᾽ ὀλόην τέκε, Καδμείοισιν ὄλεθρον (Theog. 326).

[636] Odyss. xi. 270. Odysseus, describing what he saw in the under-world, says,—

Μητέρα τ᾽ Οἰδιπόδαο ἴδον, καλὴν Ἐπικάστην,

Ἣ μέγα ἔργον ἔρεξεν αἰδρείῃσι νόοιο,

Γημαμένη ᾧ υἱεῖ· ὁ δ᾽ ὃν πατέρ᾽ ἐξεναρίξας

Γῆμεν· ἄφαρ δ᾽ ἀνάπυστα θεοὶ θέσαν ἀνθρώποισι.

Ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἐν Θήβῃ πολυηράτῳ ἄλγεα πάσχων,

Καδμείων ἤνασσε, θεῶν ὀλοὰς διὰ βουλάς·

Ἡ δ᾽ ἔβη εἰς Αἰδάο πυλάρταο κρατεροῖο

Ἀψαμένη βρόχον αἰπὺν ἀφ᾽ ὑψηλοιο μελάθρου,

Ἧ ἄχεϊ σχομένη· τῷ δ᾽ ἄλγεα κάλλιπ᾽ ὀπίσσω

Πολλὰ μάλ᾽, ὅσσα τε μητρὸς Ἐριννύες ἐκτελέουσιν.

[637] Iliad, xxiii. 680, with the scholiast who cites Hesiod. Proclus, Argum. ad Cypria, ap. Düntzer, Fragm. Epic. Græc. p. 10. Νέστωρ δὲ ἐν παρεκβάσει διηγεῖται … καὶ τὰ περὶ Οἰδίπουν, etc.

[638] Pausan. ix. 5, 5. Compare the narrative from Peisander in Schol. ad Eurip. Phœniss. 1773; where, however, the blindness of Œdipus seems to be unconsciously interpolated out of the tragedians. In the old narrative of the Cyclic Thêbaïs, Œdipus does not seem to be represented as blind (Leutsch, Thebaidis Cyclici Reliquiæ, Götting. 1830, p. 42).

Pherekydês (ap. Schol. Eurip. Phœniss. 52) tells us that Œdipus had three children by Jokasta, who were all killed by Erginus and the Minyæ (this must refer to incidents in the old poems which we cannot now recover); then the four celebrated children by Euryganeia; lastly, that he married a third wife, Astymedusa. Apollodôrus follows the narrative of the tragedians, but alludes to the different version about Euryganeia,—εἰσὶ δ᾽ οἵ φασιν, etc. (iii. 5, 8).

Hellanikus (ap. Schol. Eur. Phœniss. 59) mentioned the self-inflicted blindness of Œdipus; but it seems doubtful whether this circumstance was included in the narrative of Pherekydês.

[639] Pausan. ix. 9. 3. Ἐποιήθη δὲ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτον καὶ ἔπη, Θηβαΐς· τὰ δὲ ἔπη ταῦτα Καλλῖνος, ἀφικόμενος αὐτῶν ἐς μνήμην, ἔφησεν Ὅμηρον τὸν ποιήσαντα εἶναι. Καλλίνῳ δὲ πολλοί τε καὶ ἄξιοι λόγου κατὰ ταῦτα ἔγνωσαν· ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν ποίησιν ταύτην μετά γε Ἰλιάδα καὶ τὰ ἔπη τὰ ἐς Ὀδυσσέα ἐπαινῶ μάλιστα. The name in the text of Pausanias stands Καλαΐνος, an unknown person: most of the critics recognize the propriety of substituting Καλλῖνος, and Leutsch and Welcker have given very sufficient reasons for doing so.

The Ἀμφιάρεω ἐξελασία ἐς Θέβας, alluded to in the pseudo-Herodotean life of Homer, seems to be the description of a special passage in this Thêbaïs.

[640] Hesiod, ap. Schol. Iliad. xxiii. 680, which passage does not seem to me so much at variance with the incidents stated in other poets as Leutsch imagines.

[641] Ἄργος ἄειδε, θεὰ, πολυδίψιον, ἔνθεν ἄνακτες (see Leutsch, *ib.* c. 4. p. 29).

[642] Fragm. of the Thêbaïs, ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 465, ὅτι αὐτῷ παρέθηκαν ἐκπώματα ἃ ἀπηγορεύκει, λέγων οὕτως·

Αὐτὰρ ὁ διογένης ἥρως ξανθὸς Πολυνείκης
Πρῶτα μὲν Οἰδίποδι καλὴν παρέθηκε τράπεζαν
Ἀργυρέην Κάδμοιο θεόφρονος· αὐταρ ἔπειτα
Χρύσεον ἔμπλησεν καλὸν δέπας ἥδεος οἴνου·
Αὐτὰρ ὅγ᾽ ὡς φράσθη παρακείμενα πατρὸς ἑοῖο
Τιμήεντα γέρα, μέγα οἱ κακὸν ἔμπεσε θυμῷ.
Αἶψα δὲ παισὶν ἑοῖσι μετ᾽ ἀμφοτέροισιν ἐπαρὰς
Ἀργαλέας ἠρᾶτο· θεὸν δ᾽ οὐ λάνθαν᾽ Ἐριννύν·
Ὡς οὐ οἱ πατρῷα γ᾽ ἐνὶ φιλότητι δάσαιντο,
Εἶεν δ᾽ αμφοτέροις αἰεὶ πόλεμοί τε μάχαι τε.

See Leutsch, Thebaid. Cycl. Reliq. p. 38.

The other fragment from the same Thêbaïs is cited by the Schol. ad Soph. Œdip. Colon. 1378.—

Ἴσχιον ὡς ἐνόησε, χαμαὶ βάλεν, εἶπέ τε μῦθον·
Ὤ μοι ἐγὼ, παῖδές μοι ὀνειδείοντες ἔπεμψαν.
Εὐκτο Διῒ βασιλῆϊ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀθανάτοισι,
Χερσὶν ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων καταβήμεναι Ἄϊδος εἴσω.

Τὰ δὲ παραπλήσια τῷ ἐποποιῷ καὶ Αἴσχυλος ἐν τοῖς Ἑπτα ἐπι Θήβας. In spite of the protest of Schutz, in his note, I think that the scholiast has understood the words ἐπίκοτος τροφᾶς (Sept. ad Theb. 787) in their plain and just meaning.

[643] The curses of Œdipus are very frequently and emphatically dwelt upon both by Æschylus and Sophoklês (Sept. ad Theb. 70-586, 655-697, etc.; Œdip. Colon. 1293-1378). The former continues the same point of view as the Thêbaïs, when he mentions—

... Τὰς περιθύμους
Κατάρας βλαψίφρονος Οἰδιπόδα (727);

or, λόγου τ᾽ ἄνοια καὶ φρενῶν Ἐριννὺς (Soph. Antig. 584).

The Scholiast on Sophoklês (Œd. Col. 1378) treats the cause assigned by the ancient Thêbaïs for the curse vented by Œdipus as trivial and ludicrous.

The Ægeids at Sparta, who traced their descent to Kadmus, suffered from terrible maladies which destroyed the lives of their children; an oracle directed them to appease the Erinnyes of Laius and Œdipus by erecting a temple, upon which the maladies speedily ceased (Herodot. iv.).

[644] Hesiod. ap. Schol. Iliad. xxiii. 680.

[645] Apollodôr. iii. 5, 9; Hygin. f. 69; Æschyl. Sept. ad Theb. 573. Hyginus says that Polynikês came clothed in the skin of a lion, and Tydeus in that of a boar; perhaps after Antimachus, who said that Tydeus had been brought up by swineherds (Antimach. Fragm. 27, ed. Düntzer; ap. Schol. Iliad. iv. 400). Very probably, however, the old Thêbaïs compared Tydeus and Polynikês to a lion and a boar, on account of their courage and fierceness; a simile quite in the Homeric character. Mnaseas gave the words of the oracle (ap. Schol. Eurip. Phœniss. 411).

[646] See Pindar, Nem. ix. 30, with the instructive Scholium.

[647] Apollodôr. iii. 6, 2. The treachery of "the hateful Eriphylê" is noticed in the Odyssey, xi. 327: Odysseus sees her in the under-world along with the many wives and daughters of the heroes.

[648] Pausan. ii. 20, 4; ix. 9, 1. His testimony to this, as he had read and admired the Cyclic Thêbaïs, seems quite sufficient, in spite of the opinion of Welcker to the contrary (Æschylische Trilogie. p. 375).

[649] Iliad, iv. 376.

[650] There are differences in respect to the names of the seven: Æschylus (Sept. ad Theb. 461) leaves out Adrastus as one of the seven, and includes Eteoklus instead of him; others left out Tydeus and Polynikês, and inserted Eteoklus and Mekisteus (Apollodôr. iii. 6, 3). Antimachus, in his poetical *Thêbaïs*, called Parthenopæus an Argeian, not an Arcadian (Schol. ad Æschyl. Sept. ad. Theb. 532).

[651] Iliad, iv. 381-400, with the Schol. The first celebration of the Nemean games is connected with this march of the army of Adrastus against Thêbes; they were celebrated in honor of Archemorus, the infant son of Lykurgus, who had been killed by a serpent while his nurse Hypsipylê went to show the fountain to the thirsty Argeian chiefs (Apollod. iii. 6, 4; Schol. ad Pindar Nem. 1).

[652] The story recounted that the head of Melanippus was brought to Tydeus as he was about to expire of his wound, and that he gnawed it with his teeth, a story touched upon by Sophoklês (apud Herodian. in Rhetor. Græc. t. viii. p. 601, Walz.).

The lyric poet Bacchylidês (ap. Schol. Aristoph. Aves, 1535) seems to have handled the story even earlier than Sophoklês.

We find the same allegation embodied in charges against real historical men: the invective of Montanus against Aquilius Regulus, at the beginning of the reign of Vespasian, affirmed, "datam interfectori Pisonis pecuniam a Regulo, appetitumque morsu Pisonis caput" (Tacit. Hist. iv. 42).

[653] Apollodôr. iii. 6, 8. Pindar, Olymp. vi. 11; Nem. ix. 13-27. Pausan. ix. 8, 2; 18, 2-4.

Euripidês, in the Phœnissæ (1122 *seqq.*), describes the battle generally; see also Æsch. S. Th. 392. It appears by Pausanias that the Thêbans had poems or legends of their own, relative to this war: they dissented in various points from the Cyclic Thêbaïs (ix. 18, 4). The Thêbaïs said that Periklymenus had killed Parthenopæus; the Thêbans assigned this exploit to Asphodikus, a warrior not commemorated by any of the poets known to us.

The village of Harma, between Tanagra and Mykalêssus, was affirmed by some to have been the spot where Amphiaräus closed his life (Strabo, ix. p. 404): Sophoklês placed the scene at the Amphiaræium near Orôpus (ap Strabon. ix. p. 399).

[654] Pindar, Olymp. vi. 16. Ἕπτα δ᾽ ἔπειτα πυρᾶν νέκρων τελεσθέντων Ταλαϊονίδας Εἶπεν ἐν Θήβαισι τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπος· Ποθέω στρατιᾶς ὀφθαλμὸν ἐμᾶς Ἀμφότερον, μάντιν τ᾽ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δουρὶ μάχεσθαι.

The scholiast affirms that these last expressions are borrowed by Pindar from the Cyclic Thêbaïs.

The temple of Amphiaräus (Pausan. ii. 23, 2), his oracle, seems to have been inferior in estimation only to that of Delphi (Herodot. i. 52; Pausan. i. 34; Cicero, Divin. i. 40). Crœsus sent a rich present to Amphiaräus, πυθόμενος αὐτοῦ τήν τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν πάθην (Herod. l. c); a striking proof how these interesting legends were recounted and believed as genuine historical facts. Other adventures of Amphiaräus in the expedition against Thêbes were commemorated in the carvings on the Thronus at Amyklæ (Pausan. iii. 18, 4).

Æschylus (Sept. Theb. 611) seems to enter into the Thêban view, doubtless highly respectful towards Amphiaräus, when he places in the mouth of the Kadmeian king Eteoklês such high encomiums on Amphiaräus, and so marked a contrast with the other chiefs from Argos.

[655] Pausan. viii. 25, 5, from the Cyclic Thêbaïs, Εἵματα λυγρὰ φέρων σὺν Ἀρείονι κυανοχαίτῃ; also Apollodôr. iii. 6, 8.

The celebrity of the horse Areiôn was extolled in the Iliad (xxiii. 346), in the Cyclic Thêbaïs, and also in the Thêbaïs of Antimachus (Pausan. l. c.): by the Arcadians of Thelpusia he was said to be the offspring of Dêmêtêr by Poseidôn,—he, and a daughter whose name Pausanias will not communicate to the uninitiated (ᾗς τὸ ὄνομα ἐς ἀτελέστους λέγειν οὐ νομίζουσι, *l. c.*). A different story is in the Schol. Iliad, xxiii. 346; and in Antimachus,

who affirmed that "Gæa herself had produced him, as a wonder to mortal men" (see Antimach. Frag. 16. p. 102; Epic. Græc. Frag. ed. Düntzer).

[656] Sophokl. Antigon. 581. Νῦν γὰρ ἐσχάτας ὑπὲρ Ῥίζας ἐτέτατο φάος ἐν Οἰδίπου δόμοις, etc.

The pathetic tale here briefly recounted forms the subject of this beautiful tragedy of Sophoklês, the argument of which is supposed by Boeckh to have been borrowed in its primary rudiments from the Cyclic Thêbaïs or the Œdipodia (Boeckh, Dissertation appended to his translation of the Antigonê, c. x. p. 146); see Apollodôr. iii. 7, 1.

Æschylus also touches upon the heroism of Antigonê (Sep. Theb. 984).

[657] Apollodôr. iii. 7, 1; Eurip. Supp. *passim*; Herodot. ix. 27; Plato, Menexen. c. 9; Lysias, Epitaph. c. 4; Isokrat. Orat. Panegyr. p. 196, Auger.

[658] Pausan. i. 39, 2.

[659] Eurip. Supplic. 1004-1110.

[660] Homer, Iliad, iv. 406. Sthenelus, the companion of Diomêdês and one of the Epigoni, says to Agamemnôn,—

Ἠμεῖς τοι πατέρων μέγ᾽ ἀμείνονες εὐχόμεθ᾽ εἶναι·
Ἠμεῖς καὶ Θήβης ἕδος εἵλομεν ἑπταπύλοιο,
Παυρότερον λαὸν ἀγαγόνθ᾽ ὑπὸ τεῖχος Ἄρειον,
Πειθόμενοι τεράεσσι θεῶν καὶ Ζηνὸς ἀρωγῇ·
Αὐτοὶ δὲ σφετέρῃσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὄλοντο.

[661] Apollodôr. iii. 7, 4. Herodot. v. 57-61. Pausan. ix. 5, 7; 9, 2. Diodôr. iv. 65-66.

Pindar represents Adrastus as concerned in the second expedition against Thêbes (Pyth. viii. 40-58).

[662] Γλῶσσαν τ᾽ Ἀδρήστου μειλιχόγηρυν ἔχοι (Tyrtæus, Eleg. 9, 7, Schneidewin); compare Plato, Phædr. c. 118. "Adrasti pallentis imago" meets the eye of Æneas in the under-world (Æneid, vi. 480).

[663] About Melanippus, see Pindar, Nem. x. 36. His sepulchre was shown near the Prœtid gates of Thêbes (Pausan. ix. 18, 1).

[664] This very carious and illustrative story is contained in Herodot. v. 67. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ θεὸς τοῦτο οὐ παρεδίδου, ἀπελθὼν ὀπίσω (Kleisthenês, returning from Delphi) ἐφρόντιζε μηχανὴν τῇ *αὐτὸς ὁ Ἀδρήστος ἀπαλλάξεται*. Ὡς δὲ οἱ ἐξευρῆσθαι ἐδόκεε, πέμψας ἐς Θήβας τὰς Βοιωτίας, ἔφη θέλειν ἐπαγαγέσθαι Μελάνιππον τὸν Ἀστακοῦ· οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι ἔδοσαν. Ἐπηγάγετο δὲ τὸν Μελάνιππον ὁ Κλεισθένης, καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο δεῖ ἀπηγήσασθαι, ὡς ἔχθιστον ἐόντα Ἀδρήστῳ· ὃς τόν τε ἀδέλφεον Μηκιστέα ἀπεκτόνεε, καὶ τὸν γαμβρὸν Τυδέα.

The Sikyonians (Herodotus says) τά τε δὴ ἄλλα ἐτίμων τὸν Ἄδρηστον, καὶ πρὸς τὰ πάθεα αὐτοῦ τραγικοῖσι χόροισι ἐγέραιρον· τὸν μὲν Διόνυσον οὐ τιμέωντες, τὸν δὲ Ἄδρηστον.

Adrastus was worshipped as a hero at Megara as well as at Sikyôn: the Megarians affirmed that he had died there on his way back from Thêbes (Pausan. i. 43, 1; Dieuchidas, ap. Schol. ad Pindar. Nem. ix. 31). His house at Argos was still shown when Pausanias visited the town (ii. 23, 2).

[665] Pausan. ix. 18, 3. Τὰ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς δρώμενα οὐ θεασάμενος πιστὰ ὅμως ὑπείληφα εἶναι. Compare Hygin. f. 68.

"Et nova fraterno veniet concordia fumo,
Quem vetus accensâ separat ira pyrâ." (Ovid, Ibis, 35.)

The tale was copied by Ovid from Kallimachus (Trist. v. 5, 38.)

[666] Ἀνδροδάμαντ᾽ Ἐριφύλην (Pindar, Nem. ix. 16). A poem *Eryphilê* was included among the mythical compositions of Stesichorus: he mentioned in it that Asklêpius had restored Kapaneus to life, and that he was for that reason struck dead by thunder from Zeus (Stesichor. Fragm. Kleine, 18, p. 74). Two tragedies of Sophoklês once existed, *Epigoni* and *Alkmæôn* (Welcker, Griechisch. Tragöd. i. p. 269): a few fragments also remain of the Latin *Epigoni* and *Alphesibœa* of Attius: Ennius and Attius both composed or translated from the Greek a Latin *Alkmæôn* (Poet. Scenic. Latin. ed. Both. pp. 33, 164, 198).

[667] Hyginus gives the fable briefly (f. 73; see also Asclepiadês, ap. Schol. Odyss. xi. 326). In like manner, in the case of the matricide of Orestês, Apollo not only sanctions, but enjoins the deed; but his protection against the avenging Erinnyês is very tardy, not taking effect until after Orestês has been long persecuted and tormented by them (see Æschyl. Eumen. 76, 197 462).

In the *Alkmæôn* of the later tragic writer Thodektês, a distinction was drawn: the gods had decreed that Eriphylê should die, but not that Alkmæôn should kill her (Aristot. Rhetoric. ii. 24). Astydamas altered the story still more in his tragedy, and introduced Alkmæôn as killing his mother ignorantly and without being aware who she was (Aristot. Poetic. c. 27). The murder of Eriphylê by her son was one of the παρειλήμμενοι μῦθοι which could not be departed from; but interpretations and qualifications were resorted to, in order to prevent it from shocking the softened feelings of the spectators: see the criticism of Aristotle on the *Alkmæôn* of Euripidês (Ethic. Nicom. iii. 1, 8).

[668] Ephorus ap. Athenæ. vi. p. 232.

[669] Thucyd. ii. 68-102.

[670] Athenæ. *l. c.*

[671] Apollodôr. iii. 7, 5-6; Pausan. viii. 24, 4. These two authors have preserved the story of the Akarnanians and the old form of the legend, representing Alkmæôn as having found shelter at the abode of the person or king Achelôus, and married his daughter: Thucydidês omits the *personality* of Achelôus, and merely announces the wanderer as having settled on certain new islands deposited by the river.

I may remark that this is a singularly happy adaptation of a legend to an existing topographical fact. Generally speaking, before any such adaptation can be rendered plausible, the legend is of necessity much transformed; here it is taken exactly as it stands, and still fits on with great precision.

Ephorus recounted the whole sequence of events as so much political history, divesting it altogether of the legendary character. Alkmæôn and Diomêdês, after having taken Thêbes with the other Epigoni, jointly undertook an expedition into Ætôlia and Akarnania: they first punished the enemies of the old Œneus, grandfather of Diomêdês, and established the latter as king in Kalydôn: next they conquered Akarnania for Alkmæôn. Alkmæôn, though invited by Agamemnôn to join in the Trojan war, would not consent to do so (Ephor. ap. Strabo. vii. p. 326; x. p. 462).

[672] Apollodôr. iii. 7, 7; Pausan. viii. 24, 3-4. His remarks upon the mischievous longing of Kallirhoê for the necklace are curious: he ushers them in by saying, that "many men, and still more women, are given to fall into absurd desires," etc. He recounts it with all the *bonne foi* which belongs to the most assured matter of fact.

A short allusion is in Ovid's Metamorphoses (ix. 412).

[673] Thêbaïd, Cy. Reliqu. p. 70, Leutsch; Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. i. 408. The following lines cited in Athenæus (vii. p. 317) are supposed by Boeckh, with probable reason, to be taken from the Cyclic Thêbaïs; a portion of the advice of Amphiaräus to his sons at the time of setting out on his last expedition,—

Πουλύποδός μοι, τέκνον, ἔχων νόον, Ἀμφίλοχ᾽ ἥρως,

Τοῖσιν ἐφαρμόζου, τῶν ἂν κατὰ δῆμον ἵκηαι.

There were two tragedies composed by Euripidês, under the title of Ἀλκμαίων, ὁ διὰ Ψωφῖδος, and Ἀλκμαίων, ὁ διὰ Κορίνθου (Dindorf, Fragm. Eurip. p. 77).

[674] Apollodôr. iii. 7, 7; Thucyd. ii. 68.

[675] Iliad, xx. 215.

[676] Hellanik. Fragm. 129, Didot; Dionys. Hal. i. 50-61; Apollodôr. iii. 12, 1; Schol. Iliad. xviii. 486; Varro, ap. Servium ad Virgil. Æneid. iii. 167. Kephalôn. Gergithius ap. Steph. Byz. v. Ἀρίσβη.

[677] Iliad, v. 265; Hellanik. Fr. 146; Apollod. ii. 5, 9.

[678] Iliad, xx. 236.

[679] Iliad, vii. 451; xxi. 456. Hesiod. ap. Schol. Lycophr. 393.

[680] Iliad, xx. 145; Dionys. Hal. i. 52.

[681] Iliad, v. 640. Meneklês (ap. Schol. Venet. *ad loc.*) affirmed that this expedition of Hêraklês was a fiction; but Dikæarchus gave, besides, other exploits of the hero in the same neighborhood, at Thêbê Hypoplakiê (Schol. Iliad, vi. 396).

[682] Diodôr. iv. 32-49. Compare Venet. Schol. ad Iliad. viii. 284.

[683] Strabo, xiii. p. 596.

[684] As Dardanus, Trôs and Ilus are respectively eponyms of Dardania, Troy and Ilium, so Priam is eponym of the acropolis *Pergamum*. Πρίαμος is in the Æolic dialect Πέρραμος (Hesychius): upon which Ahrens remarks, "Cæterum ex hac Æolicâ nominis formâ apparet, Priamum non minus arcis Περγάμων eponymum esse, quam Ilum urbis, Troem populi: Πέργαμα enim a Περίαμα natum est, ι in γ mutato." (Ahrens, De Dialecto Æolicâ, 8, 7. p. 56: compare *ibid.* 28, 8. p. 150, περρ᾽ ἀπάλω).

[685] Iliad, vi. 245; xxiv. 495.

[686] Hectôr was affirmed, both by Stesichorus and Ibykus, to be the son of Apollo (Stesichorus, ap. Schol. Ven. ad Iliad. xxiv. 259; Ibyki Fragm. xiv. ed. Schneidewin): both Euphoriôn (Fr. 125, Meineke) and Alexander Ætôlus follow the same idea. Stesichorus further stated, that after the siege Apollo had carried Hekabê away into Lykia to rescue her from captivity (Pausanias, x. 27, 1): according to Euripidês, Apollo had promised that she should die in Troy (Troad. 427).

By Sapphô, Hectôr was given as a surname of Zeus, Ζεὺς Ἕκτωρ (Hesychius, v. Ἕκτορες); a prince belonging to the regal family of Chios, anterior to the Ionic settlement, as mentioned by the Chian poet Iôn (Pausan. vii. 3, 3), was so called.

[687] Iliad, iii. 45-55; Schol. Iliad. iii. 325; Hygin. fab. 91; Apollodôr. iii. 12, 5.

[688] This was the motive assigned to Zeus by the old epic poem, the Cyprian Verses (Frag. 1. Düntz. p. 12; ap. Schol. ad Iliad. i. 4):—

Ἡ δὲ ἱστορία παρὰ Στασίνῳ τῷ τὰ Κύπρια πεποιηκότι εἰπόντι οὕτως·

Ἦν ὅτε μύρια φῦλα κατὰ χθόνα πλαζόμενα …

… βαρυστέρνου πλάτος αἴης.

Ζεὺς δὲ ἰδὼν ἐλέησε, καὶ ἐν πυκιναῖς παπίδεσσι

Σύνθετο κουφίσαι ἀνθρώπων παμβώτορα γαῖαν,

Ῥιπίσας πολέμου μεγάλην ἔριν Ἰλιακοῖο,

Ὄφρα κενώσειεν θάνατῳ βάρος· οἱ δ᾽ ἐνὶ Τροίῃ

Ἥρωες κτείνοντο, Διὸς δ᾽ ἐτελείετο βουλή.

The same motive is touched upon by Eurip. Orest, 1635; Helen. 38; and seriously maintained, as it seems, by Chrysippus, ap. Plutarch. Stoic. Rep. p. 1049: but the poets do not commonly go back farther than the passion of Paris for Helen (Theognis, 1232; Simonid. Amorg. Fragm. 6, 118).

The judgment of Paris was one of the scenes represented on the ancient chest of Kypselus at Olympia (Pausan. v. 19, 1).

[689] Argument of the Ἔπη Κύπρια (ap. Düntzer, p. 10). These warnings of Kassandra form the subject of the obscure and affected poem of Lycophrôn.

[690] According to the Cyprian Verses, Helena was daughter of Zeus by Nemesis, who had in vain tried to evade the connection (Athenæ. viii. 334). Hesiod (Schol. Pindar. Nem. x. 150) represented her as daughter of Oceanus and Têthys, an oceanic nymph: Sapphô (Fragm. 17, Schneidewin), Pausanias (i. 33, 7), Apollodôrus (iii. 10, 7), and Isokratês (Encom. Helen. v. ii. p. 366, Auger) reconcile the pretensions of Lêda and Nemesis to a sort of joint maternity (see Heinrichsen, De Carminibus Cypriis, p. 45-46).

[691] Herodot. ii. 117. He gives distinctly the assertion of the Cyprian Verses, which contradicts the argument of the poem as it appears in Proclus (Fragm. 1, 1), according to which latter, Paris is driven out of his course by a storm and captures the city of Sidôn. Homer (Iliad, vi. 293) seems however to countenance the statement in the argument.

That Paris was guilty of robbery, as well as of the abduction of Helen, is several times mentioned in the Iliad (iii. 144; vii. 350-363), also in the argument of the Cyprian Verses (see Æschyl. Agam. 534).

[692] The ancient epic (Schol. ad Il. ii. 286-339) does not recognize the story of the numerous suitors of Helen, and the oath by which Tyndareus bound them all before he made the selection among them, that each should swear not only to acquiesce, but even to aid in maintaining undisturbed possession to the husband whom she should choose. This story seems to have been first told by Stesichorus (see Fragm. 20. ed. Kleine; Apollod. iii. 10, 8). Yet it was evidently one of the prominent features of the current legend in the time of Thucydidês (i. 9; Euripid. Iphig. Aul. 51-80; Soph. Ajax, 1100).

The exact spot in which Tyndareus exacted this oath from the suitors, near Sparta, was pointed out even in the time of Pausanias (iii. 20, 9).

[693] Iliad, iv. 27-55; xxiv. 765. Argument. Carm. Cypri. The point is emphatically touched upon by Dio Chrysostom (Orat. xi. p. 335-336) in his assault upon the old legend. Two years' preparation—in Dictys Cret. i. 16.

[694] The Spartan king Agesilaus, when about to start from Greece on his expedition into Asia Minor (396 B. C.) went to Aulis personally, in order that he too might sacrifice on the spot where Agamemnôn had sacrificed when he sailed for Troy (Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 4, 4).

Skylax (c. 60) notices the ἱερὸν at Aulis, and nothing else: it seems to have been like the adjoining Delium, a temple with a small village grown up around it.

Aulis is recognized as the port from which the expedition started, in the Hesiodic Works and Days (v. 650).

[695] Iliad, ii. 128. Uschold (Geschichte des Trojanischen Kriegs, p. 9, Stutgart 1836) makes the total 135,000 men.

[696] The Hesiodic Catalogue notices Oileus, or Ileus, with a singular etymology of his name (Fragm. 136, ed. Marktscheffel).

[697] Γουνεὺς is the Heros Eponymus of the town of Gonnus in Thessaly; the duplication of the consonant and shortening of the vowel belong to the Æolic dialect (Ahrens, De Dialect. Æolic. 50, 4. p. 220).

[698] See the Catalogue in the second book of the Iliad. There must probably have been a Catalogue of the Greeks also in the Cyprian Verses; for a Catalogue of the allies of Troy is specially noticed in the Argument of Proclus (p. 12. Düntzer).

Euripidês (Iphig. Aul. 165-300) devotes one of the songs of the Chorus to a partial Catalogue of the chief heroes.

According to Dictys Cretensis, all the principal heroes engaged in the expedition were kinsmen, all Pelopids (i. 14): they take an oath not to lay down their arms until Helen shall have been recovered, and they receive from Agamemnôn a large sum of gold.

[699] For the character of Odysseus, Iliad, iii. 202-220; x. 247. Odyss. xiii. 295.

The Philoktêtês of Sophoklês carries out very justly the character of the Homeric Odysseus (see v. 1035)—more exactly than the Ajax of the same poet depicts it.

[700] Sophokl. Philoktêt. 417, and Schol.—also Schol. ad Soph. Ajac. 190.

[701] Homer, Odyss. xxiv. 115; Æschyl. Agam. 841; Sophokl. Philoktêt. 1011, with the Schol. Argument of the Cypria in Heinrichsen, De Carmin. Cypr. p. 23 (the sentence is left out in Düntzer, p. 11).

A lost tragedy of Sophoklês, Ὀδυσσεὺς Μαινόμενος, handled this subject.

Other Greek chiefs were not less reluctant than Odysseus to take part in the expedition: see the tale of Pœmandrus, forming a part of the temple-legend of the Achilleium at Tanagra in Bœôtia (Plutarch, Quæstion. Græc. p. 299).

[702] Iliad, i. 352; ix. 411.

[703] Iliad, xi. 782.

[704] Telephus was the son of Augê, daughter of king Aleus of Tegea in Arcadia, by Hêraklês: respecting her romantic adventures, see the previous chapter on Arcadian legends—Strabo's faith in the story (xii. p. 572).

The spot called the Harbor of the Achæans, near Gryneium, was stated to be the place where Agamemnôn and the chiefs took counsel whether they should attack Telephus or not (Skylax, c. 97; compare Strabo, xiv. p. 622).

[705] Iliad, xi. 664; Argum. Cypr. p. 11, Düntzer; Diktys Cret. ii. 3-4.

[706] Euripid. Telephus, Frag. 26, Dindorf; Hygin. f. 101; Diktys, ii. 10. Euripidês had treated the adventure of Telephus in this lost tragedy: he gave the miraculous cure with the dust of the spear, πριστοῖσι λογχῆς θέλγεται ῥινήμασι. Diktys softens down the prodigy: "Achilles cum Machaone et Podalirio adhibeutes curam vulneri," etc. Pliny (xxxiv. 15) gives to the rust of brass or iron a place in the list of genuine remedies.

"Longe omnino a Tiberi ad Caicum: quo in loco etiam Agamemnôn errasset, nisi ducem Telephum invenisset" (Cicero, Pro L. Flacco, c. 29). The portions of the Trojan legend treated in the lost epics and the tragedians, seem to have been just as familiar to Cicero as those noticed in the Iliad.

Strabo pays comparatively little attention to any portion of the Trojan war except what appears in Homer. He even goes so far as to give a reason why the Amazons *did not* come to the aid of Priam: they were at enmity with him, because Priam had aided the Phrygians against them (Iliad, iii. 188: in Strabo, τοῖς Ἰῶσιν must be a mistake for τοῖς Φρυξίν). Strabo can hardly have read, and never alludes to, Arktinus; in whose poem the brave and beautiful Penthesileia, at the head of her Amazons, forms a marked epoch and incident of the war (Strabo, xii. 552).

[707] Nothing occurs in Homer respecting the sacrifice of Iphigeneia (see Schol. Ven. ad Il. ix. 145).

[708] No portion of the Homeric Catalogue gave more trouble to Dêmêtrius of Skêpsis and the other expositors than these Alizonians (Strabo, xii. p. 549; xiii. p. 603): a fictitious place called Alizonium, in the region of Ida, was got up to meet the difficulty (εἶτ᾽ Ἀλιζώνιον, τοῦτ᾽ ἤδη *πεπλασμένον* πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀλιζώνων ὑπόθεσιν, etc., Strabo, *l. c.*).

[709] See the Catalogue of the Trojans (Iliad, ii. 815-877).

[710] Cycnus was said by later writers to be king of Kolônæ in the Troad (Strabo, xiii. p. 589-603; Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii. 23). Æschylus introduced upon the Attic stage both Cycnus and Memnôn in terrific equipments (Aristophan. Ran. 957. Οὐδ᾽ ἐξέπληττον αὐτοὺς Κύκνους ἄγων καὶ Μέμνονας κωδωνοφαλαροπώλους). Compare Welcker, Æschyl. Trilogie, p. 433.

[711] Iliad, xxiv. 752; Argument of the Cypria, pp. 11, 12, Düntzer. These desultory exploits of Achilles furnished much interesting romance to the later Greek poets (see Parthênius, Narrat. 21). See the neat summary of the principal events of the war in Quintus Smyrn. xiv. 125-140; Dio Chrysost. Or. xi. p. 338-342.

Trôilus is only once named in the Iliad (xxiv. 253); he was mentioned also in the Cypria; but his youth, beauty, and untimely end made him an object of great interest with the subsequent poets. Sophoklês had a tragedy called *Trôilus* (Welcker, Griechisch. Tragöd. i. p. 124); Τὸν ἀνδρόπαιδα δεσπότην ἀπώλεσα, one of the Fragm. Even earlier than Sophoklês, his beauty was celebrated by the tragedian Phrynichus (Athenæ, xiii. p. 564; Virgil, Æneid, i. 474; Lycophrôn, 307).

[712] Argument. Cypr. p. 11, Düntz. Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα Ἀχιλλεὺς Ἑλένην ἐπιθυμεῖ θεάσασθαι, καὶ συνήγαγον αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ Ἀφροδίτη καὶ Θέτις. A scene which would have been highly interesting in the hands of Homer.

[713] Argum. Cypr. 1. 1.; Pausan. x. 31. The concluding portion of the Cypria seems to have passed under the title of Παλαμηδεία (see Fragm. 16 and 18. p. 15, Düntz.; Welcker, Der Episch. Cycl. p. 459; Eustath. ad Hom. Odyss. i. 107).

The allusion of Quintus Smyrnæus (v. 197) seems rather to point to the story in the Cypria, which Strabo (viii. p. 368) appears not to have read.

[714] Pindar, Nem. vii. 21; Aristidês, Orat. 46. p. 260.

[715] See the Fragments of the three tragedians, Παλαμήδης—Aristeidês, Or. xlvi. p. 260; Philostrat. Heroic. x.; Hygin. fab. 95-105. Discourses for and against Palamêdês, one by Alkidamas, and one under the name of Gorgias, are printed in Reiske's Orr. Græc. t. viii. pp. 64, 102; Virgil, Æneid, ii. 82, with the ample commentary of Servius—Polyæn. Proœ. p. 6.

Welcker (Griechisch. Tragöd. v. i. p. 130, vol. ii. p. 500) has evolved with ingenuity the remaining fragments of the lost tragedies.

According to Diktys, Odysseus and Diomêdês prevail upon Palamêdês to be let down into a deep well, and then cast stones upon him (ii. 15).

Xenophôn (De Venatione, c. 1) evidently recognizes the story in the Cypria, that Odysseus and Diomêdês caused the death of Palamêdês; but he *cannot* believe that two such exemplary men were really guilty of so iniquitous an act—κακοὶ δὲ ἔπραξαν τὸ ἔργον.

One of the eminences near Napoli still bears the name of *Palamidhi*.

[716] Plato, Apolog. Socr. c. 32; Xenoph. Apol. Socr. 26; Memor. iv. 2, 33; Liban. pro Socr. p. 242, ed. Morell.; Lucian, Dial. Mort 20.

[717] Herodot. vii. 170. Ten years is a proper mythical period for a great war to last: the war between the Olympic gods and the Titan gods lasts ten years (Hesiod, Theogon. 636). Compare δεκάτῳ ἐνιαυτῷ (Hom. Odyss. xvi. 17).

[718] Thucyd. i. 11.

[719] Homer, Iliad, i. 21.

[720] Tychsen, Commentat. de Quinto Smyrnæo, § iii. c. 5-7. The Ἰλίου Πέρσις was treated both by Arktinus and by Leschês: with the latter it formed a part of the Ilias Minor.

[721] Argument of the Æthiopis, p. 16, Düntzer; Quint. Smyrn. lib. i.; Diktys Cret. iv. 2-3.

In the Philoktêtês, of Sophoklês, Thersitês survives Achilles (Soph. Phil. 358-445).

[722] Odyss. xi. 522. Κεῖνον δὴ κάλλιστον ἴδον, μετὰ Μέμνονα δῖον: see also Odyss. iv. 187; Pindar, Pyth. vi. 31. Æschylus (ap. Strabo. xv. p. 728) conceives Memnôn as a Persian starting from Susa.

Ktêsias gave in his history full details respecting the expedition of Memnôn, sent by the king of Assyria to the relief of his dependent, Priam of Troy; all this was said to be recorded in the royal archives. The Egyptians affirmed that Memnôn had come from Egypt (Diodôr. ii. 22; compare iv. 77): the two stories are blended together in Pausanias, x. 31, 2. The Phrygians pointed out the road along which he had marched.

[723] Argum. Æth. *ut sup.*; Quint. Smyrn. ii. 396-550; Pausan. x. 31, 1. Pindar, in praising Achilles, dwells much on his triumphs over Hectôr, Têlephus, Memnôn, and Cycnus, but never notices Penthesileia (Olymp. ii. 90; Nem. iii. 60; vi. 52. Isthm. v. 43).

Æschylus, in the Ψυχοστασία, introduced Thetis and Eôs, each in an attitude of supplication for her son, and Zeus weighing in his golden scales the souls of Achilles and Memnôn (Schol. Ven. ad Iliad, viii. 70: Pollux, iv. 130; Plutarch, De Audiend. Poet. p. 17). In the combat between Achilles and Memnôn, represented on the chest of Kypselus at Olympia, Thetis and Eôs were given each as aiding her son (Pausan. v. 19, 1).

[724] Iliad, xxii. 360; Sophokl. Philokt. 334; Virgil, Æneid, vi. 56.

[725] Argum. Æthiop. *ut sup.*; Quint. Smyrn. 151-583; Homer, Odyss. v. 310; Ovid, Metam. xiii. 284; Eurip. Androm. 1262; Pausan. iii. 19, 13. According to Diktys (iv. 11), Paris and Deiphobus entrap Achilles by the promise of an interview with Polyxena and kill him.

A minute and curious description of the island Leukê, or Ἀχιλλέως νῆσος, is given in Arrian (Periplus, Pont. Euxin. p. 21; ap. Geogr. Min. t. 1).

The heroic or divine empire of Achilles in Scythia was recognized by Alkæus the poet (Alkæi Fragm. Schneidew. Fr. 46), Ἀχιλλεῦ, ὃς γᾶς Σκυθικᾶς μέδεις. Eustathius (ad Dionys. Periêgêt. 307) gives the story of his having followed Iphigeneia thither: compare Antonin. Liberal. 27.

Ibykus represented Achilles as having espoused Mêdea in the Elysian Field (Idyk. Fragm. 18. Schneidewin). Simonidês followed this story (ap. Schol. Apoll. Rhod. iv. 815).

[726] Argument of Æthiopis and Ilias Minor, and Fragm. 2 of the latter, pp. 17, 18, Düntz.; Quint. Smyrn. v. 120-482; Hom. Odyss. xi. 550; Pindar, Nem. vii. 26. The Ajax of Sophoklês, and the contending speeches between Ajax and Ulysses in the beginning of the thirteenth book of Ovid's Metamorphoses, are too well known to need special reference.

The suicide of Ajax seems to have been described in detail in the Æthiopis: compare Pindar. Isthm. iii. 51, and the Scholia *ad loc.*, which show the attention paid by Pindar to the minute circumstances of the old epic. See Fragm. 2 of the Ἰλίου Πέρσις of Arktinus, in Düntz. p. 22, which would seem more properly to belong to the Æthiopis. Diktys relates the suicide of Ajax, as a consequence of his unsuccessful competition with Odysseus, not about the arms of Achilles, but about the Palladium, after the taking of the city (v. 14).

There were, however, many different accounts of the manner in which Ajax had died, some of which are enumerated in the argument to the drama of Sophoklês. Ajax is never wounded in the Iliad: Æschylus made him

invulnerable except under the armpits (see Schol. ad Sophok. Ajac. 833); the Trojans pelted him with mud—εἴ πως βαρηθείῃ ὑπὸ τοῦ πήλου (Schol. Iliad. xiv. 404).

[727] Soph. Philokt. 604.

[728] Soph. Philokt. 703. Ὦ μελέα ψυχὰ, Ὃς μηδ᾽ οἰνοχύτου πόματος Ἥσθη δεκετῆ χρόνον, etc.

In the narrative of Diktys (ii. 47), Philoktêtês returns from Lemnus to Troy much earlier in the war before the death of Achilles, and without any assigned cause.

[729] According to Sophoklês, Hêraklês sends Asklêpius to Troy to heal Philoktêtês (Soph. Philokt. 1415).

The subject of Philoktêtês formed the subject of a tragedy both by Æschylus and by Euripidês (both lost) as well as by Sophoklês.

[730] Argument. Iliad. Minor. Düntz. *l. c.* Καὶ τὸν νεκρὸν ὑπὸ Μενελάου καταικισθέντα ἀνελόμενοι θάπτουσιν οἱ Τρῶες. See Quint. Smyrn. x. 240: he differs here in many respects from the arguments of the old poems as given by Proclus, both as to the incidents and as to their order in time (Diktys, iv. 20). The wounded Paris flees to Œnônê, whom he had deserted in order to follow Helen, and entreats her to cure him by her skill in simples: she refuses, and permits him to die; she is afterwards stung with remorse, and hangs herself (Quint. Smyrn. x. 285-331; Apollodôr. iii. 12, 6; Conôn. Narrat. 23; see Bachet de Meziriac, Comment. sur les Epîtres d'Ovide, t. i. p. 456). The story of Œnônê is as old as Hellanikus and Kephalôn of Gergis (see Hellan. Fragm. 126, Didot).

[731] To mark the way in which these legendary events pervaded and became embodied in the local worship, I may mention the received practice in the great temple of Asklêpius (father of Machaôn) at Pergamus, even in the time of Pausanias. Têlephus, father of Eurypylus, was the local hero and mythical king of Teuthrania, in which Pergamus was situated. In the hymns there sung, the poem and the invocation were addressed to Têlephus; but nothing was said in them about Eurypylus, nor was it permitted even to mention his name in the temple,—"they knew him to be the slayer of Machaôn:" ἄρχονται μὲν ἀπὸ Τηλέφου τῶν ὕμνων, προσᾴδουσι δὲ οὐδὲν ἐς τὸν Εὐρύπυλον, οὐδὲ ἀρχὴν ἐν τῷ ναῷ θέλουσιν ὀνομάζειν αὐτὸν, οἷα ἐπιστάμενοι φονέα ὄντα Μαχάονος (Pausan. iii. 26, 7).

The combination of these qualities in other Homeric chiefs is noted in a subsequent chapter of his work, ch. xx. vol. ii.

[732] Argument. Iliad. Minor. p. 17, Düntzer. Homer, Odyss. xi. 510-520. Pausan. iii. 26, 7. Quint. Smyrn. vii. 553; viii. 201.

[733] Argument. Iliad. Minor, p. 18, Düntz.; *Arktinus* ap. Dionys. Hal. i. 69; Homer, Odyss. iv. 246; Quint. Smyrn. x. 354: Virgil, Æneid, ii. 164, and the 9th Excursus of Heyne on that book.

Compare with this legend about the Palladium, the Roman legend respecting the Ancylia (Ovid, Fasti, III. 381).

[734] Odyss. iv. 275; Virgil, Æneid, ii. 14; Heyne, Excurs. 3. ad Æneid. ii. Stesichorus, in his Ἰλίου Πέρσις, gave the number of heroes in the wooden horse as one hundred (Stesichor. Fragm. 26, ed. Kleine; compare Athenæ. xiii. p. 610).

[735] Odyss. viii. 492; xi. 522. Argument of the Ἰλίου Πέρσις of Arktinus, p. 21. Düntz. Hydin. f. 108-135. Bacchylidês and Euphorion ap. Servium ad Virgil. Æneid. ii. 201.

Both Sinon and Laocoôn came originally from the old epic poem of Arktinus, though Virgil may perhaps have immediately borrowed both them, and other matters in his second book, from a poem passing under the name of Pisander (see Macrob. Satur. v. 2; Heyne, Excurs. 1. ad Æn. ii.; Welcker, Der Episch. Kyklus, v. 97). We cannot give credit either to Arktinus or Pisander for the masterly specimen of oratory which is put into the mouth of Sinon in the Æneid.

In Quintus Smyrnæus (xii. 366), the Trojans torture and mutilate Sinon to extort from him the truth: his endurance, sustained by the inspiration of Hêrê, is proof against the extremity of suffering, and he adheres to his false tale. This is probably an incident of the old epic, though the delicate taste of Virgil, and his sympathy with the Trojans, has induced him to omit it. Euphorion ascribed the proceedings of Sinon to Odysseus: he also gave a different cause for the death of Laocoôn (Fr. 33-36. p. 55, ed. Düntz., in the Fragments of Epic Poets after Alexander the Great). Sinon is ἑταῖρος Ὀδυσσέως in Pausan. x. 27, 1.

[736] Odyss. viii. 515; Argument of Arktinas, *ut sup.*; Euripid. Hecub. 903; Virg. Æn. vi. 497; Quint. Smyrn. xiii. 35-229; Leschês ap. Pausan. x. 27, 2; Diktys, v. 12. Ibykus and Simonidês also represented Deiphobus as the ἀντεράστης Ἑλένης (Schol. Hom. Iliad. xiii. 517).

The night-battle in the interior of Troy was described with all its fearful details both by Leschês and Arktinus: the Ἰλίου Πέρσις of the latter seems to have been a separate poem, that of the former constituted a portion of the Ilias Minor (see Welcker, Der Epische Kyklus, p. 215): the Ἰλίου Πέρσις by the lyric poets Sakadas and Stesichorus probably added many new incidents. Polygnôtus had painted a succession of the various calamitous scenes, drawn from the poem of Leschês, on the walls of the leschê at Delphi, with the name written over each figure (Pausan. x. 25-26).

Hellanikus fixed the precise day of the month on which the capture took place (Hellan. Fr. 143-144), the twelfth day of Thargeliôn.

[737] Æschyl. Agamemn. 527.—

Βωμοὶ δ᾽ ἄϊστοι καὶ θεῶν ἱδρύματα,

Καὶ σπέρμα πάσης ἐξαπόλλυται χθονός.

[738] This symbol of treachery also figured in the picture of Polygnôtus. A different story appears in Schol. Iliad. iii. 206.

[739] Euripid. Hecub. 38-114, and Troad. 716; Leschês ap. Pausan. x. 25, 9; Virgil, Æneid, iii. 322, and Servius *ad loc.*

A romantic tale is found in Diktys respecting the passion of Achilles for Polyxena (iii. 2).

[740] Odyss. xi. 422. Arktinus, Argum. p. 21, Düntz. Theognis, 1232. Pausan. i. 15, 2; x. 26, 3; 31, 1. As an expiation of this sin of their national hero, the Lokrians sent to Ilium periodically some of their maidens, to do menial service in the temple of Athênê (Plutarch. Ser. Numin. Vindict. p. 557, with the citation from Euphorion or Kallimachus, Düntzer, Epicc. Vet. p. 118).

[741] Leschês, Fr. 7, Düntz.; ap. Schol. Lycophr. 1263. Compare Schol. ad. 1232, for the respectful recollection of Andromachê, among the traditions of the Molossian kings, as their heroic mother, and Strabo, xiii. p. 594.

[742] Such is the story of the old epic (see Odyss. iv. 260, and the fourth book generally; Argument of Ilias Minor, p. 20. Düntz.). Polygnôtus, in the paintings above alluded to, followed the same tale (Pausan. x. 25, 3).

The anger of the Greeks against Helen, and the statement that Menelaus after the capture of Troy approached her with revengeful purposes, but was so mollified by her surpassing beauty as to cast away his uplifted sword, belongs to the age of the tragedians (Æschyl. Agamem. 685-1455: Eurip. Androm. 600-629; Helen. 75-120; Troad. 890-1057; compare also the fine lines in the Æneid, ii. 567-588).

[743] See the description in Herodot. vi. 61, of the prayers offered to her, and of the miracle which she wrought, to remove the repulsive ugliness of a little Spartan girl of high family. Compare also Pindar, Olymp. iii. 2, and the Scholia at the beginning of the ode; Eurip. Helen. 1662, and Orest. 1652-1706; Isokrat. Encom. Helen. ii. p. 368, Auger; Dio Chrysost. Or. xi. p. 311. θεὸς ἐνομίσθη παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι; Theodectês ap. Aristot. Pol. i. 2, 19. Θείων ἀπ᾽ ἀμφοῖν ἔκγονον ῥιζωμάτων.

[744] Euripid. Troad. 982 *seq.*; Lycophrôn ap. Steph. Byz. v. Αἰγύς; Stesichorus ap. Schol. Eurip. Orest. 239; Fragm. 9 and 10 of the Ἰλίου Πέρσις, Schneidewin:—

Οὕνεκα Τυνδάρεως ῥέζων ἁπᾶσι θεοῖς μιᾶς λαθετ᾽ ἠπιοδώρου

Κύπριδος· κεῖνα δὲ Τυνδάρεω κούραισι χολωσαμένα

Διγάμους τριγάμους τίθησι

Καὶ λιπεσάνορας …

Further

… Ἑλένη ἑκοῦσ᾽ ἄπηρε, etc.

He had probably contrasted her with other females carried away by force.

Stesichorus also affirmed that Iphigeneia was the daughter of Helen, by Thêseus, born at Argos before her marriage with Menelaus and made over to Klytæmnêstra: this tale was perpetuated by the temple of Eileithyia at Argos, which the Argeians affirmed to have been erected by Helen (Pausan. ii. 22, 7). The ages ascribed by Hellanikus and other logographers (Hellan. Fr. 74) to Thêseus and Helen—he fifty years of age and she a child of seven—when he carried her off to Aphidnæ, can never have been the original form of any poetical legend: these ages were probably imagined in order to make the mythical chronology run smoothly; for Thêseus belongs to the generation before the Trojan war. But we ought always to recollect that Helen never grows old (τὴν γὰρ φάτις ἔμμεν᾽ ἀγήρω—Quint. Smyrn. x. 312), and that her chronology consists only with an immortal being. Servius observes (ad Æneid. ii. 601)—"Helenam *immortalem* fuisse indicat tempus. Nam constat fratres ejus cum Argonautis fuisse. Argonautarum filii cum Thebanis (Thebano Eteoclis et Polynicis bello) dimicaverunt. Item illorum filii contra Trojam bella gesserunt. Ergo, si immortalis Helena non fuisset, tot sine dubio seculis durare non posset." So Xenophon, after enumerating many heroes of different ages, all pupils of Cheirôn, says that the life of Cheirôn suffices for all, he being brother of Zeus (De Venatione, c. 1).

The daughters of Tyndareus are Klytæmnêstra, Helen, and Timandra, all open to the charge advanced by Stesichorus: see about Timandra, wife of the Tegeate Echemus, the new fragment of the Hesiodic Catalogue, recently restored by Geel (Göttling, Pref. Hesiod. p. lxi.).

It is curious to read, in Bayle's article *Hélène*, his critical discussion of the adventures ascribed to her—as if they were genuine matter of history, more or less correctly reported.

[745] Plato, Republic. ix. p. 587. c. 10. ὥσπερ τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης εἴδωλον Στησίχορός φησι περιμάχητον γενέσθαι ἐν Τροίᾳ, ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

Isokrat. Encom. Helen. t. ii. p. 370, Auger; Plato, Phædr. c. 44. p. 243-244; Max. Tyr. Diss. xi. p. 320, Davis; Conôn, Narr. 18; Dio Chrysost. Or. xi. p. 323. Τὸν μὲν Στησίχορον ἐν τῇ ὕστερον ὠδῇ λέγειν, ὡς *τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ πλεύσειεν ἡ Ἑλένη οὐδάμοσε*. Horace, Od. i. 17, Epod. xvii. 42.—

"Infamis Helenæ Castor offensus vice,

Fraterque magni Castoris, victi prece,

Adempta vati reddidere lumina."

Pausan. iii. 19, 5. Virgil, surveying the war from the point of view of the Trojans, had no motive to look upon Helen with particular tenderness: Deiphobus imputes to her the basest treachery (Æneid, vi. 511. "*scelus exitiale Lacænæ*;" compare ii. 567).

[746] Herodot. ii. 120. οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὕτω γε φρενοβλαβὴς ἦν ὁ Πρίαμος, οὐδ᾽ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ προσήκοντες αὐτῷ, etc. The passage is too long to cite, but is highly curious: not the least remarkable part is the religious coloring which he gives to the new version of the story which he is adopting,—"the Trojans, though they had not got Helen, yet could not persuade the Greeks that this was the fact; for it was the divine will that they should be destroyed root and branch, in order to make it plain to mankind that upon great crimes the gods inflict great punishments."

Dio Chrysostom (Or. xi. p. 333) reasons in the same way as Herodotus against the credibility of the received narrative. On the other hand, Isokratês, in extolling Helen, dwells on the calamities of the Trojan war as a test of the peerless value of the prize (Encom. Hel. p. 360, Aug.): in the view of Pindar (Olymp. xiii. 56), as well as in that of Hesiod (Opp. Di. 165), Helen is the one prize contended for.

Euripidês, in his tragedy of Helen, recognizes the detention of Helen in Egypt and the presence of her εἴδωλον at Troy, but he follows Stesichorus in denying her elopement altogether,—Hermês had carried her to Egypt in a cloud (Helen. 35-45, 706): compare Von Hoff, De Mytho Helenæ Euripideæ, cap. 2. p. 35 (Leyden, 1843).

[747] Pausan. i. 23, 8; Payne Knight, Prolegg. ad Homer. c. 53. Euphorion construed the wooden horse into a Grecian ship called Ἵππος, "*The Horse*" (Euphorion, Fragm. 34. ap. Düntzer, Fragm. Epicc. Græc. p. 55).

See Thucyd. i. 12; vi. 2.

[748] Suidas, v. Νόστος. Wüllner, De Cyclo Epico, p. 93. Also a poem Ἀτρειδῶν κάθοδος (Athenæ. vii. p. 281).

[749] Upon this the turn of fortune in Grecian affairs depends (Æschyl. Agamemn. 338; Odyss. iii. 130; Eurip. Troad. 69-95).

[750] Odyss. iii. 130-161; Æschyl. Agamemn. 650-662.

[751] Odyss. iii. 188-196; iv. 5-87. The Egyptian city of Kanopus, at the mouth of the Nile, was believed to have taken its name from the pilot of Menelaus, who had died and was buried there (Strabo, xvii. p. 801; Tacit. Ann. ii. 60). Μενελάϊος νόμος, so called after Menelaus (Dio Chrysost. xi p. 361).

[752] Odyss. iv. 500. The epic Νόστοι of Hagias placed this adventure of Ajax on the rocks of Kaphareus, a southern promontory of Eubœa (Argum. Νόστοι, p. 23, Düntzer). Deceptive lights were kindled on the dangerous rocks by Nauplius, the father of Palamêdês, in revenge for the death of his son (Sophoklês, Ναύπιος Πυρκαεὺς, a lost tragedy; Hygin. f. 116; Senec. Agamemn. 567).

[753] Argument. Νόστοι *ut sup.* There were monuments of Kalchas near Sipontum in Italy also (Strabo, vi. p. 284), as well as at Selgê in Pisidia (Strabo, xii. p. 570).

[754] Strabo, v. p. 222; vi. p. 264. Vellei. Paterc. i. 1; Servius ad Æn. x. 179. He had built a temple to Athênê in the island of Keôs (Strabo, x. p. 487).

[755] Strabo, vi. pp. 254, 272; Virgil, Æn. iii. 401, and Servius *ad loc.*; Lycophrôn, 912.

Both the tomb of Philoktêtês and the arrows of Hêraklês which he had used against Troy, were for a long time shown at Thurium (Justin, xx. 1).

[756] Argument. Νόστοι, p. 23, Düntz.; Pindar, Nem. iv. 51. According to Pindar, however, Neoptolemus comes from Troy by sea, misses the island of Skyrus, and sails round to the Epeirotic Ephyra (Nem. vii. 37).

[757] Pindar, Nem. x. 7, with the Scholia. Strabo, iii. p. 150; v. p. 214-215; vi, p. 284. Stephan. Byz. Ἀργύριππα, Διομηδεία. Aristotle recognizes him as buried in the Diomedean islands in the Adriatic (Anthol. Gr. Brunck. i. p. 178).

The identical tripod which had been gained by Diomêdês, as victor in the chariot-race at the funeral games of Patroclus, was shown at Delphi in the time of Phanias, attested by an inscription, as well as the dagger which had been worn by Helikaôn, son of Antenôr (Athenæ. vi. p. 232).

[758] Virgil, Æneid, iii. 399.; xi. 265; and Servius, *ibid.* Ajax, the son of Oïleus, was worshipped there as a hero (Conôn, Narr. 18).

[759] Strabo, iii. p. 257; Isokratês, Evagor. Encom. p. 192; Justin, xliv. 3. Ajax, the son of Teukros, established a temple of Zeus, and an hereditary priesthood always held by his descendants (who mostly bore the name of Ajax or Teukros), at Olbê in Kilikia (Strabo, xiv. p. 672). Teukros carried with him his Trojan captives to Cyprus (Athenæ. vi. p. 256).

[760] Strabo, iii. p. 140-150; vi. p. 261; xiii. p. 622. See the epitaphs on Teukros and Agapenôr by Aristotle (Antholog. Gr. ed. Brunck. i. p. 179-180).

[761] Strabo, xiv. p. 683; Pausan. viii. 5, 2.

[762] Strabo, vi. p. 263; Justin, xx. 2; Aristot. Mirab. Ausc. c. 108. Also the epigram of the Rhodian Simmias called Πελεκύς (Antholog. Gr. Brunck. i. p. 210).

[763] Vellei. Patercul. i. 1. Stephan. Byz. v. Λάμπη. Strabo, xiii. p. 605; xiv p. 639. Theopompus (Fragm. III, Didot) recounted that Agamemnôn and his followers had possessed themselves of the larger portion of Cyprus.

[764] Thucydid. iv. 120.

[765] Herodot. vii. 91; Thucyd. ii. 68. According to the old elegiac poet Kallinos, Kalchas himself had died at Klarus near Kolophôn after his march from Troy, but Mopsus, his rival in the prophetic function, had conducted

his followers into Pamphylia and Kilikia (Strabo, xii. p. 570; xiv.p. 668). The oracle of Amphilochus at Mallus in Kilikia bore the highest character for exactness and truth-telling in the time of Pausanias, μαντεῖον ἀψευδέστατον τῶν ἐπ᾽ ἐμοῦ. (Paus. i. 34, 2). Another story recognized Leonteus and Polypætês as the founders of Aspendus in Kilikia (Eustath. ad Iliad. ii. 138).

[766] Strabo, ix. p. 416.

[767] Diodôr. iv. 79; Thucyd. vi. 2.

[768] Stephan, Byz. v. Σύρνα; Lycophrôn, 1047.

[769] Æschines, De Falsâ Legat. c. 14; Strabo, xiv. p. 683; Stephan. Byz. v. Σύνναδα.

[770] Lycophrôn, 877-902, with Scholia; Apollodôr. Fragm. p. 386, Heyne. There is also a long enumeration of these returning wanderers and founders of new settlements in Solinus (Polyhist. c. 2).

[771] Strabo, iii. p. 150.

[772] Aristot. Mirabil. Auscult. 79, 106, 107, 109, 111.

[773] Strabo, i. p. 48. After dwelling emphatically on the long voyages of Dionysus, Hêraklês, Jasôn, Odysseus, and Menelaus, he says, Αἰνείαν δὲ καὶ Ἀντήνορα καὶ Ἐνετοὺς, καὶ ἁπλῶς τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ Τρωϊκοῦ πολέμου πλανηθέντας εἰς *πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην*, ἄξιον μὴ τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνθρώπων νομίσαι; Συνέβη γὰρ δὴ τοῖς τότε Ἕλλησιν, ὁμοίως καὶ τοῖς βαρβάροις, διὰ τὸν τῆς στρατείας χρόνον, ἀποβαλεῖν τά τε ἐν οἴκῳ καὶ τῇ στρατείᾳ πορισθέντα· ὥστε μετὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἰλίου καταστροφὴν τούς τε νικήσαντας ἐπὶ λῄστειαν τραπέσθαι διὰ τὰς ἀπορίας, καὶ πολλῷ μᾶλλον τοὺς ἡττηθέντας καὶ περιγενομένους ἐκ τοῦ πολέμου. Καὶ δὴ καὶ πόλεις ὑπὸ *τούτων κτισθῆναι* λέγονται *κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ἔξω τῆς Ἑλλάδος παραλίαν*, ἔστι δ᾽ ὅπου καὶ τὴν μεσόγαιαν.

[774] The Telegonia, composed by Eugammôn of Kyrênê, is lost, but the Argument of it has been preserved by Proclus (p. 25, Düntzer; Dictys, vi. 15).

Pausanias quotes a statement from the poem called *Thesprôtis*, respecting a son of Odysseus and Penelopê, called Ptoliporthus, born after his return from Troy (viii. 12, 3). Nitzsch (Hist. Homer. p. 97) as well as Lobeck seem to imagine that this is the same poem as the Telegonia, under another title.

Aristotle notices an oracle of Odysseus among the Eurytanes, a branch of the Ætôlian nation: there were also places in Epirus which boasted of Odysseus as their founder (Schol. ad Lycophrôn. 800; Stephan. Byz. v. Βούνειμα; Etymolog. Mag. Ἀρκεῖσιος; Plutarch, Quæst. Gr. c. 14).

[775] Dionys. Hal. i. 46-48; Sophokl. ap. Strab. xiii. p. 608; Livy, i. 1; Xenophon, Venat. i. 15.

[776] Æn. ii. 433.

[777] Argument of Ἰλίου Πέρσις; Fragm. 7. of Leschês, in Düntzer's Collection, p. 19-21.

Hellanikus seems to have adopted this retirement of Æneas to the strongest parts of Mount Ida, but to have reconciled it with the stories of the migration of Æneas, by saying that he only remained in Ida a little time, and then quitted the country altogether by virtue of a convention concluded with the Greeks (Dionys. Hal. i. 47-48). Among the infinite variety of stories respecting this hero, one was, that after having effected his settlement in Italy, he had returned to Troy and resumed the sceptre, bequeathing it at his death to Ascanius (Dionys. Hal. i. 53): this was a comprehensive scheme for apparently reconciling *all* the legends.

[778] Iliad, xx. 300. Poseidôn speaks, respecting Æneas—

Ἀλλ᾽ ἄγεθ᾽ ἡμεῖς πέρ μιν ὑπ᾽ ἐκ θανάτου ἀγάγωμεν,

Μήπως καὶ Κρονίδης κεχολώσεται, αἴκεν Ἀχιλλεὺς

Τόνδε κατακτείνῃ· μόριμον δέ οἱ ἐστ᾽ ἀλέασθαι,

Ὄφρα μὴ ἄσπερμος γενεὴ καὶ ἄφαντος ὄληται

Δαρδάνου, ὃν Κρονίδης περὶ πάντων φίλατο παίδων,

Οἱ ἔθεν ἐξεγένοντο, γυναικῶν τε θνητάων.

Ἤδη γὰρ Πριάμου γενεὴν ἤχθηρε Κρονίων·

Νῦν δὲ δὴ Αἰνείαο βίη Τρώεσσιν ἀνάξει,

Καὶ παίδων παῖδες, τοί κεν μετόπισθε γένωνται.

Again, v. 339, Poseidôn tells Æneas that he has nothing to dread from any other Greek than Achilles.

[779] See O. Müller, on the causes of the mythe of Æneas and his voyage to Italy, in Classical Journal, vol. xxvi. p. 308; Klausen, Æneas und die Penaten, vol. i. p. 43-52.

Dêmêtrius Skêps. ab. Strab. xiii. p. 607; Nicolaus ap. Steph. Byz. v. Ἀσκανία. Dêmêtrius conjectured that Skêpsis had been the regal seat of Æneas: there was a village called Æneia near to it (Strabo, xiii. p. 603).

[780] Steph. Byz. v. Ἀρίσβη, Γεντῖνος. Ascanius is king of Ida after the departure of the Greeks (Conôn, Narr. 41; Mela, i. 18). *Ascanius portus* between Phokæ and Kymê.

[781] Strabo, xiii. p. 595; Lycophrôn, 1208, and Sch.; Athenagoras, Legat. 1. Inscription in Clarke's Travels, vol. ii. p. 86, Οἱ Ἰλιεῖς τὸν πάτριον θεὸν Αἰνείαν. Lucian, Deor. Concil. c. 12. i. 111. p. 534, Hemst.

[782] Menekrat. ap. Dionys. Hal. i. 48. Ἀχαιοὺς δὲ ἀνίη εἶχε (after the burial) καὶ ἐδόκεον τῆς στρατιῆς τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀπηράχθαι. Ὅμως δὲ τάφον αὐτῷ δαίσαντες, ἐπολέμεον γῇ πάσῃ, ἄχρις Ἴλιος ἐάλω Αἰνείεω ἐνδόντος. Αἰνείης γὰρ ἄτιτος ἐὼν ὑπὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου, καὶ ἀπὸ γερέων ἱερῶν ἐξειργόμενος, ἀνέτρεψε Πρίαμον, ἐργασάμενος δὲ ταῦτα, εἷς Ἀχαιῶν ἐγεγόνει.

Abas, in his *Troica*, gave a narrative different from any other preserved: "Quidam ab Abante, qui *Troica* scripsit, relatum ferunt, post discessum a Trojâ Græcorum Astyanacti ibi datum regnum, hunc ab Antenore expulsum sociatis sibi finitimis civitatibus, inter quas et Arisba fuit: Ænean hoc ægre tulisse, et pro Astyanacte arma cepisse ac prospere gestâ re Astyanact restituisse regnum" (Servius ad Virg. Æneid. ix. 264). According to Diktys, Antenôr remains king and Æneas goes away (Dikt. v. 17): Antenôr brings the Palladium to the Greeks (Dikt. v. 8). Syncellus, on the contrary, tells us that the sons of Hectôr recovered Ilium by the suggestions of Helenus, expelling the Atenorids (Syncell. p. 322, ed. Bonn).

[783] Dionys. Halic. A. R. i. 48-54; Heyne, Excurs. 1 ad Æneid. iii.; De Æneæ Erroribus, and Excurs. 1 ad Æn. v.; Conôn. Narr. 46; Livy, xl. 4; Stephan. Byz. Αἴνεια. The inhabitants of Æneia in the Thermaic Gulf worshipped him with great solemnity as their heroic founder (Pausan. iii. 22, 4; viii. 12, 4). The tomb of Anchisês was shown on the confines of the Arcadian Orchomenus and Mantineia (compare Steph. Byz. v. Κάφυαι), under the mountain called Anchisia, near a temple of Aphroditê: on the discrepancies respecting the death of Anchisês (Heyne. Excurs. 17 ad Æn. iii.): Segesta in Sicily founded by Æneas (Cicero, Verr. iv. 33).

[784] Τοῦ δὲ μηκέτι προσωτέρω τῆς Εὐρώπης πλεῦσαι τὸν Τρωϊκὸν στόλον, οἵ τε χρησμοὶ ἐγένοντο αἴτιοι, etc. (Dionys. Hal. i. 55).

[785] Dionys. Hal. i. 54. Among other places, his tomb was shown at Berecynthia, in Phrygia (Festus, v. *Romam*, p. 224, ed. Müller): a curious article, which contains an assemblage of the most contradictory statements respecting both Æneas and Latinus.

[786] Pindar, Pyth. v., and the citation from the Νόστοι of Lysimachus in the Scholia; given still more fully in the Scholia ad Lycophrôn. 875. There was a λόφος Ἀντηνορίδων at Kyrênê.

[787] Livy, i. 1. Servius ad Æneid. i. 242. Strabo, i. 48; v. 212. Ovid, Fasti, iv. 75.

[788] Strabo, iii. p. 157.

[789] These diversities are well set forth in the useful Dissertation of Fuchs De Varietate Fabularum Troicarum (Cologne, 1830).

Of the number of romantic statements put forth respecting Helen and Achilles especially, some idea may be formed from the fourth, fifth and sixth chapters of Ptolemy Hêphæstion (apud Westermann, Scriptt. Mythographi. p. 188, etc.).

[790] Dio Chrysost. Or. xi. p. 310-322.

[791] Herodot. v. 122. Pausan. v. 8, 3: viii. 12, 4. Αἰολεὺς ἐκ πόλεως Τρῳάδος, the title proclaimed at the Olympic games; like Αἰολεὺς ἀπὸ Μουρίνας, from Myrina in the more southerly region of Æolis, as we find in the list of visitors at the Charitêsia, at Orchomenos in Bœôtia (Corp. Inscrip. Boeckh. No. 1583).

[792] See Pausanias, i. 35, 3, for the legends current at Ilium respecting the vast size of the bones of Ajax in his tomb. The inhabitants affirmed that after the shipwreck of Odysseus, the arms of Achilles, which he was carrying away with him, were washed up by the sea against the tomb of Ajax. Pliny gives the distance at thirty stadia: modern travellers make it some thing more than Pliny, but considerably less than Strabo.

[793] Strabo, xiii. p. 596-598. Strabo distinguishes the Ἀχαιῶν Ναύσταθμον, which was near to Sigeium, from the Ἀχαιῶν λιμήν, which was more towards the middle of the bay between Sigeium and Rhœteium; but we gather from his language that this distinction was not universally recognized. Alexander landed at the Ἀχαιῶν λιμήν (Arrian, i. 11).

[794] Strabo, xiii. p. 593.

[795] Herodot. v. 95 (his account of the war between the Athenians and Mitylenæans about Sigeium and Achilleium); Strabo, xiii. p. 593. Τὴν δὲ τῶν Ἰλιέων πόλιν τὴν νῦν τέως μὲν κωμόπολιν εἶναί φασι, τὸ ἱερὸν ἔχουσαν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς μικρὸν καὶ εὐτελές. Ἀλέξανδρον δὲ ἀναβάντα μετὰ τὴν ἐπὶ Γρανίκῳ νίκην, ἀναθήμασι τε κοσμῆσαι τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ προσαγορεῦσαι πόλιν, etc.

Again, Καὶ τὸ Ἴλιον, ὃ νῦν ἐστὶ, κωμόπολίς τις ἦν ὅτε πρῶτον Ῥωμαῖοι τῆς Ἀσίας ἐπέβησαν.

[796] Besides Athênê, the Inscriptions authenticate Ζεὺς Πολιεὺς at Ilium (Corp. Inscrip. Bœckh. No. 3599).

[797] Strabo, xiii. p. 600. Λέγουσι δ᾽ οἱ νῦν Ἰλιεῖς καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς οὐδὲ τέλεως συνέβαινεν ἠφανίσθαι τὴν πόλιν κατὰ τὴν ἅλωσιν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, οὐδ᾽ ἐξηλείφθη οὐδέποτε.

The situation of Ilium (or as it is commonly, but erroneously, termed, *New Ilium*) appears to be pretty well ascertained, about two miles from the sea (Rennell, On the Topography of Troy, p. 41-71; Dr. Clarke's Travels, vol. ii. p. 102).

[798] Xerxês passing by Adramyttium, and leaving the range of Mount Ida on his left hand, ἤϊε ἐς τὴν Ἰλιάδα γῆν…. Ἀπικομένου δὲ τοῦ στρατοῦ ἐπὶ τὸν Σκάμανδρον … ἐς τὸ Πριάμου Πέργαμον ἀνέβη, ἵμερον ἔχων θεήσασθαι. Θεησάμενος δὲ, καὶ *πυθόμενος κείνων ἕκαστα*, τῇ Ἀθηναίῃ τῇ Ἰλιάδι ἔθυσε βοῦς χιλίας· χοὰς δὲ οἱ μάγοι τοῖσιν ἥρωσιν ἐχέαντο…. Ἅμα ἡμέρῃ δὲ ἐπορεύετο, ἐν ἀριστερῇ μὲν ἀπέργων Ῥοιτεῖον πόλιν καὶ Ὀφρυνεῖον καὶ Δάρδανον, ἥπερ δὴ Ἀβύδῳ ὅμουρος ἐστιν· ἐν δεξιῇ δὲ, Γέργιθας Τευκρούς (Herod. vii. 43).

Respecting Alexander (Arrian, i. 11), Ἀνελθόντα δὲ ἐς Ἴλιον, τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ θῦσαι τῇ Ἰλιάδι, καὶ τὴν πανοπλίαν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀναθεῖναι ἐς τὸν ναὸν, καὶ καθελεῖν ἀντὶ ταύτης τῶν ἱερῶν τινα ὅπλων ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ Τρωϊκοῦ ἔργου σωζόμενα· καὶ ταῦτα λέγουσιν ὅτι οἱ ὑπασπισταὶ ἔφερον πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐς τὰς μάχας. Θῦσαι δὲ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ἑρκείου λόγος κατέχει, μῆνιν Πριάμου παραιτούμενον τῷ Νεοπτολέμου γένει, ὃ δὴ ἐς αὐτὸν καθῆκε.

The inhabitants of Ilium also showed the lyre which had belonged to Paris (Plutarch, Alexand. c. 15).

Chandler, in his History of Ilium, chap. xxii. p. 89, seems to think that the place called by Herodotus the Pergamum of Priam is different from the historical Ilium. But the mention of the Iliean Athênê identifies them as the same.

[799] Strabo, xiii. p. 602. Ἑλλάνικος δὲ χαριζόμενος τοῖς Ἰλιεῦσιν, οἷος ὁ ἐκείνου μῦθος, συνηγορεῖ τῷ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι πόλιν τὴν νῦν τῇ τότε. Hellanikus had written a work called Τρωϊκά.

[800] Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 10. Skylax places Ilium twenty-five stadia, or about three miles, from the sea (c. 94). But I do not understand how he can call Skêpsis and Kebrên πόλεις ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ.

[801] See Xenoph. Hellen. iii. i. 16; and the description of the seizure of Ilium, along with Skêpsis and Kebrên, by the chief of mercenaries, Charidêmus, in Demosthen. cont. Aristocrat. c. 38. p. 671: compare Æneas Poliorcetic. c. 24, and Polyæn. iii. 14.

[802] Arrian, *l. c.* Dikæarchus composed a separate work respecting this sacrifice of Alexander, περὶ τῆς ἐν Ἰλίῳ θυσίας (Athenæ. xiii. p. 603; Dikæarch. Fragm. p. 114, ed. Fuhr).

Theophrastus, in noticing old and venerable trees, mentions the φηγοὶ (*Quercus æsculus*) on the tomb of Ilus at Ilium, without any doubt of the authenticity of the place (De Plant. iv. 14); and his contemporary, the harper Stratonikos, intimates the same feeling, in his jest on the visit of a bad sophist to Ilium during the festival of the Ilieia (Athenæ. viii. p. 351). The same may be said respecting the author of the tenth epistle ascribed to the orator Æschinês (p. 737), in which his visit of curiosity to Ilium is described—as well as about Apollônius of Tyana, or the writer who describes his life and his visit to the Trôad; it is evident that he did not distrust the ἀρχαιολογία of the Ilieans, who affirmed their town to be the real Troy (Philostrat. Vit. Apollôn. Tyan. iv. 11).

The goddess Athênê of Ilium was reported to have rendered valuable assistance to the inhabitants of Kyzikus, when they were besieged by Mithridatês, commemorated by inscriptions set up in Ilium (Plutarch, Lucull. 10).

[803] Strabo, xiii. p. 603-607.

[804] Livy, xxxv. 43; xxxvii. 9. Polyb. v. 78-111 (passages which prove that Ilium was fortified and defensible about B. C. 218). Strabo, xiii. p. 594. Καὶ τὸ Ἴλιον δ᾽, ὃ νῦν ἐστι, κωμόπολίς τις ἦν, ὅτε πρῶτον Ῥωμαῖοι τῆς Ἀσίας ἐπέβησαν καὶ ἐξέβαλον Ἀντίοχον τὸν μέγαν ἐκ τῆς ἐντὸς τοῦ Ταύρου. Φησὶ γοῦν Δημήτριος ὁ Σκήψιος, μειράκιον ἐπιδημήσας εἰς τὴν πόλιν κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς, οὕτως ὠλιγωρημένην ἰδεῖν τὴν κατοικίαν, ὥστε μηδὲ κεραμωτὰς ἔχειν τὰς στέγας. Ἠγησιάναξ δὲ, τοὺς Γαλάτας περαιωθέντας ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης, ἀναβῆναι μὲν εἰς τὴν πόλιν δεομένους ἐρύματος, παραχρῆμα δ᾽ ἐκλιπεῖν διὰ τὸ ἀτείχιστον· ὕστερον δ᾽ ἐπανόρθωσιν ἔσχε πολλήν. Εἶτ᾽ ἐκάκωσαν αὐτὴν πάλιν οἱ μετὰ Φιμβρίου, etc.

This is a very clear and precise statement, attested by an eye-witness. But it is thoroughly inconsistent with the statement made by Strabo in the previous chapter, a dozen lines before, as the text now stands; for he there informs us that Lysimachus, after the death of Alexander, paid great attention to Ilium, surrounded it with a wall of forty stadia in circumference, erected a temple, and aggregated to Ilium the ancient cities around, which were in a state of decay. We know from Livy that the aggregation of Gergis and Rhœteium to Ilium was effected, not by Lysimachus, but by the Romans (Livy, xxxviii. 37); so that the *first* statement of Strabo is not only inconsistent with his second, but is contradicted by an independent authority.

I cannot but think that this contradiction arises from a confusion of the text in Strabo's *first* passage, and that in that passage Strabo really meant to speak only of the improvements brought about by Lysimachus in *Alexandreia Trôas*; that he never meant to ascribe to Lysimachus any improvements in *Ilium*, but, on the contrary, to assign the remarkable attention paid by Lysimachus to *Alexandreia Trôas*, as the reason why he had neglected to fulfil the promises held out by Alexander to *Ilium*. The series of facts runs thus:—1. Ilium is nothing better than a κώμη; at the landing of Alexander; 2. Alexander promises great additions, but never returns from Persia to accomplish them; 3. Lysimachus is absorbed in Alexandreia Trôas, into which he aggregates several of the adjoining old towns, and which flourishes under his hands; 4. Hence Ilium remained a κώμη when the Romans entered Asia, as it had been when Alexander entered.

This alteration in the text of Strabo might be effected by the simple transposition of the words as they now stand, and by omitting ὅτε καὶ, ἤδη ἐπεμελήθη, without introducing a single new or conjectural word, so that the passage would read thus: Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου (Alexander's) τελευτὴν Λυσίμαχος μάλιστα τῆς Ἀλεξανδρείας ἐπεμελήθη, συνῳκισμένης μὲν ἤδη ὑπ᾽ Ἀντιγόνου, καὶ προσηγορευμένης Ἀντιγόνιας, μεταβαλούσης δὲ τοὔνομα· (ἔδοξε γὰρ εὐσεβὲς εἶναι τοὺς Ἀλεξάνδρον διαδεξαμένους ἐκείνου πρότερον κτίζειν ἐπωνύμους πόλεις, εἶθ᾽ ἑαυτῶν) καὶ νέων κατεσκεύασε καὶ τεῖχος περιεβάλετο ὅσον 40 σταδίων· συνῴκισε δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν τὰς κύκλῳ πόλεις ἀρχαίας, ἤδη κεκακωμένας. Καὶ δὴ καὶ συνέμεινε … πόλεων. If this reading be adopted, the words beginning that which stands in Tzschucke's edition as sect. 27, and which immediately follow the last word πόλεων, will read quite suitably and coherently,—Καὶ τὸ Ἴλιον δ᾽, ὃ νῦν ἐστὶ, κωμόπολίς τις ἦν, ὅτε πρῶτον Ῥωμαῖοι τῆς Ἀσίας ἐπέβησαν, etc., whereas with the present reading of the passage they show a contradiction, and the whole passage is entirely confused.

[805] Livy, xxxviii. 39; Strabo, xiii. p. 600. Κατέσκαπται δὲ καὶ τὸ Σίγειον ὑπὸ τῶν Ἰλιέων διὰ τὴν ἀπείθειαν· ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνοις γὰρ ἦν ὕστερον ἡ παραλία πᾶσα ἡ μέχρι Δαρδάνου, καὶ νῦν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνοις ἔστι.

[806] Strabo, xiii. 599. Παρατίθησι δὲ ὁ Δημήτριος καὶ τὴν Ἀλεξανδρίνην Ἑστίαιαν μάρτυρα, τὴν συγγράψασαν περὶ τῆς Ὁμήρου Ἰλιάδος, πυνθανομένην, εἰ περὶ τὴν νῦν πόλιν ὁ πόλεμος συνέστη, καὶ τὸ Τρωϊκὸν πεδίον ποῦ ἔστιν, ὃ μέταξυ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης ὁ ποιητὴς φράζει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρὸ τῆς νῦν πόλεως ὁρώμενον, πρόχωμα εἶναι τῶν ποταμῶν, ὕστερον γεγονός.

The words ποῦ ἔστιν are introduced conjecturally by Grosskurd, the excellent German translator of Strabo, but they seem to me necessary to make the sense complete.

Hesitæa is cited more than once in the Homeric Scholia (Schol. Venet. ad Iliad, iii. 64; Enstath. ad Iliad, ii. 538).

[807] Strabo, xiii. p. 599. Οὐδὲν δ᾽ ἴχνος σώζεται τῆς ἀρχαίας πόλεως—εἰκότως· ἅτε γὰρ ἐκπεπορθημένων τῶν κύκλῳ πόλεων, οὐ τελέως δὲ κατεσπασμένων, οἱ λίθοι πάντες εἰς τὴν ἐκείνων ἀνάληψιν μετηνέχθησαν.

[808] Appian, Mithridat. c. 53; Strabo, xiii. p. 594; Plutarch, Sertorius, c. 1; Velleius Paterc. ii. 23.

The inscriptions attest Panathenaic games celebrated at Ilium in honor of Athênê by the Ilieans conjointly with various other neighboring cities (see Corp. Inscr. Boeckh. No. 3601-3602, with Boeckh's observations). The valuable inscription No. 3595 attests the liberality of Antiochus Soter towards the Ilian Athênê as early as 278 B. C.

[809] Arrian, i. 11; Appian *ut sup.*; also Aristidês, Or. 43, Rhodiaca, p. 820 (Dindorf p. 369). The curious Oratio xi. of Dio Chrysostom, in which he writes his new version of the Trojan war, is addressed to the inhabitants of Ilium.

[810] The controversy, now half a century old, respecting Troy and the Trojan war—between Bryant and his various opponents, Morritt, Gilbert Wakefield, the British Critic, etc., seems now nearly forgotten, and I cannot think that the pamphlets on either side would be considered as displaying much ability, if published at the present day. The discussion was first raised by the publication of Le Chevalier's account of the plain of Troy, in which the author professed to have discovered the true site of Old Ilium (the supposed Homeric Troy), about twelve miles from the sea near Bounarbashi. Upon this account Bryant published some animadversions, followed up by a second treatise, in which he denied the historical reality of the Trojan war, and advanced the hypothesis that the tale was of Egyptian origin (Dissertation on the War of Troy, and the Expedition of the Grecians as described by Homer, showing that no such Expedition was ever undertaken, and that no such city of Phrygia existed, by Jacob Bryant; seemingly 1797, though there is no date in the title-page: Morritt's reply was published in 1798). A reply from Mr. Bryant and a rejoinder from Mr. Morritt, as well as a pamphlet from G. Wakefield, appeared in 1799 and 1800, besides an Expostulation by the former addressed to the British Critic.

Bryant, having dwelt both on the incredibilities and the inconsistencies of the Trojan war, as it is recounted in Grecian legend generally, nevertheless admitted that Homer had a groundwork for his story, and maintained that that groundwork was Egyptian. Homer (he thinks) was an Ithacan, descended from a family originally emigrant from Egypt: the war of Troy was originally an Egyptian war, which explains how Memnôn the Ethiopian came to take part in it: "upon this history, which was originally Egyptian, Homer founded the scheme of his two principal poems, adapting things to Greece and Phrygia by an ingenious transposition:" he derived information from priests of Memphis or Thêbes (Bryant, pp. 102, 108, 126). The Ἥρως Αἰγύπτιος, mentioned in the second book of the Odyssey (15), is the Egyptian hero, who affords, in his view, an evidence that the population of that island was in part derived from Egypt. No one since Mr. Bryant, I apprehend, has ever construed the passage in the same sense.

Bryant's Egyptian hypothesis is of no value; but the negative portion of his argument, summing up the particulars of the Trojan legend, and contending against its historical credibility, is not so easily put aside. Few persons will share in the zealous conviction by which Morritt tries to make it appear that the 1100 ships, the ten years of war, the large confederacy of princes from all parts of Greece, etc., have nothing but what is consonant with historical probability; difficulties being occasionally eliminated by the plea of our ignorance of the time and of the subject (Morritt, p. 7-21). Gilbert Wakefield, who maintains the historical reality of the siege with the utmost intensity, and even compares Bryant to Tom Paine (W. p. 17), is still more displeased with those who propound doubts, and tells us that "grave disputation in the midst of such darkness and uncertainty is a conflict with chimæras" (W. p. 14).

The most plausible line of argument taken by Morritt and Wakefield is, where they enforce the positions taken by Strabo and so many other authors, ancient as well as modern, that a superstructure of fiction is to be

distinguished from a basis of truth, and that the latter is to be maintained while the former is rejected (Morritt, p. 5; Wake. p. 7-8). To this Bryant replies, that "if we leave out every absurdity, we can make anything plausible; that a fable may be made consistent, and we have many romances that are very regular in the assortment of characters and circumstances: this may be seen in plays, memoirs, and novels. But this regularity and correspondence alone will not ascertain the truth" (Expostulation, pp. 8, 12, 13). "That there are a great many other fables besides that of Troy, regular and consistent among themselves, believed and chronologized by the Greeks, and even looked up to by them in a religious view (p. 13), which yet no one now thinks of admitting as history."

Morritt, having urged the universal belief of antiquity as evidence that the Trojan war was historically real, is met by Bryant, who reminds him that the same persons believed in centaurs, satyrs, nymphs, augury, aruspicy; Homer maintaining that horses could speak, etc. To which Morritt replies, "What has religious belief to do with historical facts? Is not the evidence on which our faith rests in matters of religion totally different in all its parts from that on which we ground our belief in history?" (Addit. Remarks, p. 47).

The separation between the grounds of religious and historical belief is by no means so complete as Mr. Morritt supposes, even in regard to modern times; and when we apply his position to the ancient Greeks, it will be found completely the reverse of the truth. The contemporaries of Herodotus and Thucydidês conceived their early history in the most intimate conjunction with their religion.

[811] For example, adopting his own line of argument (not to mention those battles in which the pursuit and the flight reaches from the city to the ships and back again), it might have been urged to him, that by supposing the Homeric Troy to be four miles farther off from the sea, he aggravated the difficulty of rolling the Trojan horse into the town: it was already sufficiently hard to propel this vast wooden animal full of heroes from the Greek Naustathmon to the town of Ilium.

The Trojan horse, with its accompaniments Sinon and Laocoôn, is one of the capital and indispensable events in the epic: Homer, Arktinus, Leschês, Virgil, and Quintus Smyrnæus, all dwell upon it emphatically as the proximate cause of the capture.

The difficulties and inconsistencies of the movements ascribed to Greeks and Trojans in the Iliad, when applied to real topography, are well set forth in Spohn, *De Agro Trojano*, Leipsic, 1814; and Mr. Maclaren has shown (Dissertation on the Topography of the Trojan War, Edinburgh, 1822) that these difficulties are nowise obviated by removing Ilium a few miles further from the sea.

[812] Major Rennell argues differently from the visit of Alexander, employing it to confute the hypothesis of Chevalier, who had placed the Homeric Troy at Bounarbashi, the site supposed to have been indicated by Dêmêtrius and Strabo:—

"Alexander is said to have been a passionate admirer of the Iliad, and he had an opportunity of deciding on the spot how far the topography was consistent with the narrative. Had he been shown the site of Bounarbashi for that of Troy, he would probably have questioned the fidelity either of the historical part of the poem or his guides. It is not within credibility, that a person of so correct a judgment as Alexander could have admired a poem, which contained a long history of military details, and other transactions that could not physically have had an existence. What pleasure could he receive, in contemplating as subjects of history, events which could not have happened? Yet he did admire the poem, and *therefore must have found the topography consistent*: that is, Bounarbashi, surely, was not shown to him for Troy." (Rennell, Observations on the Plain of Troy, p. 128).

Major Rennell here supposes in Alexander a spirit of topographical criticism quite foreign to his real character. We have no reason to believe that the site of Bounarbashi was shown to Alexander as the Homeric Troy, or that any site was shown to him *except Ilium*, or what Strabo calls New Ilium. Still less reason have we to believe that any scepticism crossed his mind, or that his deep-seated faith required to be confirmed by measurement of distances.

[813] Strabo, xiii. p. 599. Οὐδ᾽ ἡ τοῦ Ἕκτορος δὲ περιδρομὴ ἡ περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔχει τι εὔλογον· οὐ γάρ ἐστι περίδρομος ἡ νῦν, διὰ τὴν συνεχῆ ῥάχιν· ἡ δὲ παλαιὰ ἔχει περιδρομήν.

[814] Mannert (Geographie der Griechen und Römer, th. 6. heft 3. b. 8. cap. 8) is confused in his account of Old and New Ilium: he represents that Alexander raised up a new spot to the dignity of having been the Homeric Ilium, which is not the fact: Alexander adhered to the received local belief. Indeed, as far as our evidence goes, no one but Dêmêtrius, Hestiæa, and Strabo appears ever to have departed from it.

[815] There can hardly be a more singular example of this same confusion, than to find elaborate military criticisms from the Emperor Napoleon, upon the description of the taking of Troy in the second book of the Æneid. He shows that gross faults are committed in it, when looked at from the point of view of a general (see an interesting article by Mr. G. C. Lewis, in the Classical Museum, vol. i. p. 205, "Napoleon on the Capture of Troy").

Having cited this criticism from the highest authority on the art of war, we may find a suitable parallel in the works of distinguished publicists. The attack of Odysseus on the Ciconians (described in Homer, Odyss. ix. 39-61) is cited both by Grotius (De Jure Bell. et Pac. iii. 3, 10) and by Vattel (Droit des Gens, iii. 202) as a case in point in international law. Odysseus is considered to have sinned against the rules of international law by attacking them as allies of the Trojans, without a formal declaration of war.

[816] Compare Herodot. v. 24-122; Thucyd. i. 131. The Ἰλιὰς γῆ is a part of the Trôad.

[817] Herodot. vii. 43.

[818] Herodot. v. 122. εἶλε μὲν Αἰολέας πάντας, ὅσοι τὴν Ἰλιάδα γῆν νέμονται, εἶλε δὲ Γέργιθας, τοὺς ἀπολειφθέντας τῶν ἀρχαίων Τεύκρων.

For the migration of the Teukrians and Mysians into Europe, see Herodot. vii. 20; the Pæonians, on the Strymôn, called themselves their descendants.

[819] Herodot. ii. 118; v. 13.

[820] Strabo, xiii. p. 604; Apollodôr. iii. 12, 4.

Kephalôn of Gergis called Teukrus a Krêtan (Stephan. Byz. v. Ἀρίσβη).

[821] Clearchus ap. Athæne. vi. p. 256; Strabo, xiii. p. 589-616.

[822] Homer, Hymn. in Vener. 116.

[823] Iliad, ii. 863. Asius, the brother of Hecabê, lives in Phrygia on the banks of the Sangarius (Iliad, xvi. 717).

[824] See Hellanik. Fragm. 129, 130. ed. Didot; and Kephalôn Gergithius ap. Steph. Byz. v. Ἀρισβή.

[825] Skêpsis received some colonists from the Ionic Miletus (Anaximenês apud Strabo, xiv. p. 635); but the coins of the place prove that its dialect was Æolic. See Klausen, Æneas und die Penaten, tom. i. note 180.

Arisbê also, near Abydus, seems to have been settled from Mitylênê (Eustath. ad Iliad. xii. 97).

The extraordinary fertility and rich black mould of the plain around Ilium is noticed by modern travellers (see Franklin, Remarks and Observations on the Plain of Troy, London, 1800, p. 44): it is also easily worked: "a couple of buffaloes or oxen were sufficient to draw the plough, whereas near Constantinople it takes twelve or fourteen."

[826] Ephôrus ap. Harpocrat. v. Κεβρῆνα.

[827] Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 10; iii. 1, 10-15.

One of the great motives of Dio in setting aside the Homeric narrative of the Trojan war, is to vindicate Athênê from the charge of having unjustly destroyed her own city of Ilium (Orat. xi. p. 310: μάλιστα διὰ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν ὅπως μὴ δοκῇ ἀδίκως διαφθεῖραι τὴν ἑαυτῆς πόλιν).

[828] Strabo, x. p. 473; xiii. p. 604-605. Polemon. Fragm. 31. p. 63, ed. Preller.

Polemon was a native of Ilium, and had written a periegesis of the place (about 200 B. C., therefore earlier than Dêmêtrius of Skêpsis): he may have witnessed the improvement in its position effected by the Romans. He noticed the identical stone upon which Palamêdês had taught the Greeks to play at dice.

The Sminthian Apollo appears inscribed on the coins of Alexandreia Trôas; and the temple of the god was memorable even down to the time of the emperor Julian (Ammian. Marcellin. xxii. 8). Compare Menander (the Rhetor) περὶ Ἐπιδεικτικῶν, iv. 14; apud Walz. Collect. Rhetor. t. ix. p. 304; also περὶ Σμινθιακῶν, iv. 17.

Σμίνθος, both in the Krêtan and the Æolic dialect, meant a *field-mouse*: the region seems to have been greatly plagued by these little animals.

Polemon could not have accepted the theory of Dêmêtrius, that Ilium was not the genuine Troy: his Periegesis, describing the localities and relics of Ilium, implied the legitimacy of the place as a matter of course.

[829] Virgil, Æneid, vi. 42:—

Excisum Euboicæ latus ingens rupis in antrum,
Quo lati ducunt aditus centum, ostia centum;
Unde ruunt totidem voces, responsa Sibyllæ.

[830] Pausanias, x. 12, 8; Lactantius, i. 6, 12; Steph. Byz. v. Μέρμησσος; Schol. Plat. Phædr. p. 315, Bekker.

The date of this Gergithian Sibyll, or of the prophecies passing under her name, is stated by Hêrakleidês of Pontus, and there seems no reason for calling it in question.

Klausen (Æneas und die Penaten, book ii. p. 205) has worked out copiously the circulation and legendary import of the Sibylline prophecies.

[831] Herodot. v. 94. Σίγειον … τὸ εἶλε Πεισίστρατος αἰχμῇ παρὰ Μιτυληναίων … Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀποδεικνύντες λόγῳ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον Αἰολεῦσι μετεὸν τῆς Ἰλιάδος χώρης, ἢ οὐ καὶ σφι καὶ τοῖσι ἄλλοισι, ὅσοι Ἑλλήνων συνεξεπρήξαντο Μενέλεῳ τὰς Ἑλένης ἁρπαγάς. In Æschylus (Eumenid. 402) the goddess Athênê claims the land about the Skamander, as having been presented to the sons of Thêseus by the general vote of the Grecian chiefs:—

Ἀπὸ Σκαμάνδρου γῆν καταφθατουμένη,
Ἣν δὴ τ᾽ Ἀχαιῶν ἄκτορές τε καὶ πρόμοι
Τῶν αἰχμαλώτων χρημάτων λάχος μέγα,
Ἔνειμαν αὐτόπρεμνον εἰς τὸ πᾶν ἐμοὶ,
Ἐξαιρετὸν δώρημα Θησέως τόκοις.

In the days of Peisistratus, it seems Athens was not bold enough or powerful enough to advance this vast pretension.

[832] Charôn of Lampsacus ap. Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. ii. 2; Bernhardy ad Dionys. Periêgêt. 805. p. 747.

[833] Such at least is the statement of Strabo (xii. p. 590); though such an extent of Lydian role at that time seems not easy to reconcile with the proceedings of the subsequent Lydian kings.

[834] Homer, Iliad, i. 603; xx. 7. Hesiod, Theogon. 802.

[835] We read in the Iliad that Asteropæus was grandson of the beautiful river Axius, and Achilles, after having slain him, admits the dignity of this parentage, but boasts that his own descent from Zeus was much greater, since even the great river Achelôus and Oceanus himself is inferior to Zeus (xxi. 157-191). Skamander fights with Achilles, calling his brother Simoïs to his aid (213-308). Tyrô, the daughter of Salmôneus, falls in love with Enipeus, the most beautiful of rivers (Odyss. xi. 237). Achelôus appears as a suitor of Deianira (Sophokl. Trach. 9).

There cannot be a better illustration of this feeling than what is told of the New Zealanders at the present time. The chief Heu-Heu appeals to his ancestor, the great mountain Tonga Riro: "I am the Heu-Heu, and rule over you all, just as my ancestor Tonga Riro, the mountain of snow, stands above all this land." (E. J. Wakefield, Adventures in New Zealand, vol. i. ch. 17. p. 465). Heu-Heu refused permission to any one to ascend the mountain, on the ground that it was his *tipuna* or ancestor: "he constantly identified himself with the mountain and called it his sacred ancestor" (vol. ii. c. 4. p. 113). The mountains in New Zealand are accounted by the natives masculine and feminine: Tonga Riro, and Taranaki, two male mountains, quarrelled about the affections of a small volcanic female mountain in the neighborhood (*ibid.* ii. c. 4. p. 97).

The religious imagination of the Hindoos also (as described by Colonel Sleeman in his excellent work, Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official), affords a remarkable parallel to that of the early Greeks. Colonel Sleeman says,—

"I asked some of the Hindoos about us why they called the river Mother Nerbudda, if she was really never married. Her Majesty (said they with great respect) would really never consent to be married after the indignity she suffered from her affianced bridegroom the Sohun: and we call her *mother* because she blesses us all, and we are anxious to accost her by the name which we consider to be the most respectful and endearing.

"Any Englishman can easily conceive a poet in his highest calenture of the brain, addressing the Ocean as a steed that knows his rider, and patting the crested billow as his flowing mane. But he must come to India to understand how every individual of a *whole community of many millions can address a fine river as a living being—a sovereign princess who hears and understands all they say, and exercises a kind of local superintendence over their affairs*, without a single temple in which her image is worshipped, or a single priest to profit by the delusion. As in the case of the Ganges, *it is the river itself to whom they address themselves, and not to any deity residing in it, or presiding over it*—the stream itself is the deity which fills their imaginations, and receives their homage" (Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official, ch. iii. p. 20). Compare also the remarks in the same work on the sanctity of *Mother Nerbudda* (chapter xxvii. p. 261); also of the holy personality of the earth. "The land is considered as the MOTHER of the prince or chief who holds it, the great parent from whom he derives all that maintains him, his family, and his establishments. If well-treated, she yields this in abundance to her son; but if he presumes to look upon her with the eye of *desire*, she ceases to be fruitful; or the Deity sends down hail or blight to destroy all that she yields. The measuring the surface of the fields, and the frequently inspecting the crops by the chief himself or his immediate agents, were considered by the people in this light—either it should not be done at all, or the duty should be delegated to inferior agents, whose close inspection of the *great parent* could not be so displeasing to the Deity" (Ch. xxvii. p. 248).

See also about the gods who are believed to reside in trees—the Peepultree, the cotton-tree, etc. (ch. ix. p. 112), and the description of the annual marriage celebrated between the sacred pebble, or pebble-god, Saligram, and the sacred shrub Toolsea, celebrated at great expense and with a numerous procession (chap. xix. p. 158; xxiii. p. 185).

[836] See the song to the potters, in the Homeric Epigrams (14):—

Εἰ μὲν δώσετε μίσθον, ἀείσω, ὦ κεραμῆες·
Δεῦρ᾽ ἄγ᾽ Ἀθηναίη, καὶ ὑπείρεχε χεῖρα καμίνου.
Εὖ δὲ μελανθεῖεν κότυλοι, καὶ πάντα κάναστρα
Φρυχθῆναί τε καλῶς, καὶ τιμῆς ὦνον ἀρέσθαι.
… Ἢν δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀναιδείην τρεφθέντες ψευδῆ ἄρῃσθε,
Συγκαλέω δὴ ᾽πειτα καμίνῳ δηλητῆρας·
Σύντριβ᾽ ὅμως, Σμάραγόν τε, καὶ Ἄσβετον, ἠδὲ Σαβάκτην,
Ὠμόδαμόν θ᾽, ὃς τῇδε τέχνῃ κακὰ πολλὰ πορίζει, etc.

A certain kindred between men and serpents (συγγένειάν τινα πρὸς τοὺς ὄφεις) was recognized in the peculiar gens of the ὀφιογενεῖς near Parion, who possessed the gift of healing by their touches the bite of the serpent: the original hero of this gens was said to have been transformed from a serpent into a man (Strabo, xiii. p. 588).

[837] Odyss. ii. 388; viii. 270; xii. 4, 128, 416; xxiii. 362. Iliad, xiv. 344. The Homeric Hymn to Dêmêtêr expresses it neatly (63)—

Ἠέλιον δ᾽ ἵκοντο, θεῶν σκόπον ἠδὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν.

Also the remarkable story of Euênius of Apollônia, his neglect of the sacred cattle of Hêlios, and the awful consequences of it (Herodot. ix. 93: compare Theocr. Idyll, xxv. 130).

I know no passage in which this conception of the heavenly bodies as Persons is more strikingly set forth than in the words of the German chief Boiocalus, pleading the cause of himself and his tribe the Ansibarii before the Roman legate Avitus. This tribe, expelled by other tribes from its native possessions, had sat down upon some of that wide extent of lands on the Lower Rhine which the Roman government reserved for the use of its soldiers, but which remained desert, because the soldiers had neither the means nor the inclination to occupy them. The old chief, pleading his cause before Avitus, who had issued an order to him to evacuate the lands, first dwelt upon his fidelity of fifty years to the Roman cause, and next touched upon the enormity of retaining so large an area in a state of waste (Tacit. Ann. xiii. 55): "Quotam partem campi jacere, in quam pecora et armenta militum aliquando transmitterentur? Servarent sane receptos gregibus, inter hominum famam: modo ne vastitatem et solitudinem mallent, quam amicos populos Chamavorum quondam ea arva, mox Tubantum, et post Usipiorum fuisse. Sicuti cœlum Diis, ita terras generi mortalium datas: quæque vacuæ, eas publicas esse. *Solem* deinde respiciens, et *cœtera sidera vocans, quasi coram* interrogabat—*vellentne contueri inane solum? potius mare superfunderent adversus terrarum ereptores*. Commotus his Avitus," etc. The legate refused the request, but privately offered to Boiocalus lands for himself apart from the tribe, which that chief indignantly spurned. He tried to maintain himself in the lands, but was expelled by the Roman arms, and forced to seek a home among the other German tribes, all of whom refused it. After much wandering and privation, the whole tribe of the Ansibarii was annihilated: its warriors were all slain, its women and children sold as slaves.

I notice this afflicting sequel, in order to show that the brave old chief was pleading before Avitus a matter of life and death both to himself and his tribe, and that the occasion was one least of all suited for a mere rhetorical prosopopœia. His appeal is one sincere and heartfelt to the personal feelings and sympathies of Hêlios.

Tacitus, in reporting the speech, accompanies it with the gloss "quasi coram," to mark that the speaker here passes into a different order of ideas from that to which himself or his readers were accustomed. If Boiocalus could have heard, and reported to his tribe, an astronomical lecture, he would have introduced some explanation, in order to facilitate to his tribe the comprehension of Hêlios under a point of view so new to them. While Tacitus finds it necessary to illustrate by a comment the *personification of the sun*, Boiocalus would have had some trouble to make his tribe comprehend the *re-ification of the god Hêlios*.

[838] Physical astronomy was both new and accounted impious in the time of the Peloponnesian war: see Plutarch, in his reference to that eclipse which proved so fatal to the Athenian army at Syracuse, in consequence of the religious feelings of Nikias: οὐ γὰρ ἠνείχοντο τοὺς φυσικοὺς καὶ μετεωρολέσχας τότε καλουμένους ὡς, εἰς αἰτίας ἀλόγους καὶ δυνάμεις ἀπρονοήτους καὶ κατηναγκασμένα πάθη διατρίβοντας τὸ θεῖον (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23, and Periklês, c. 32; Diodôr. xii. 39; Dêmêtr. Phaler. ap. Diogen. Laërt, ix. 9, 1).

"You strange man, Melêtus," said Socratês, on his trial, to his accuser, "are you seriously affirming that I do not think Hêlios and Selênê to be gods, as the rest of mankind think?" "Certainly not, gentlemen of the Dikastery (*this is the reply of Melêtus*), Socratês says that the sun is a stone, and the moon earth." "Why, my dear Melêtus, you think you are preferring an accusation against Anaxagoras! You account these Dikasts so contemptibly ignorant, as not to know that the books of Anaxagoras are full of such doctrines! Is it from me that the youth acquire such teaching, when they may buy the books for a drachma in the theatre, and may thus laugh me to scorn if I pretended to announce such views as my own—*not to mention their extreme absurdity*?" (ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα, Plato, Apolog. Socrat. c. 14. p. 26).

The divinity of Hêlios and Selênê is emphatically set forth by Plato, Legg. x. p. 886-889. He permits physical astronomy only under great restrictions and to a limited extent. Compare Xenoph. Memor. iv. 7, 7; Diogen. Laërt. ii. 8; Plutarch, De Stoicor. Repugnant. c. 40. p. 1053; and Schaubach ad Anaxagoræ Fragmenta, p. 6.

[839] Hesiod, Catalog. Fragm. 76. p. 48, ed. Düntzer:—

Ξυναὶ γὰρ τότε δαῖτες ἔσαν ξυνοί τε θόωκει,

Ἀθανάτοις τε θοῖσι καταθνήτοις τ᾽ ἀνθρώποις.

Both the Theogonia and the Works and Days bear testimony to the same general feeling. Even the heroes of Homer suppose a preceding age, the inmates of which were in nearer contact with the gods than they them-

selves (Odyss. viii. 223; Iliad, v. 304; xii. 382). Compare Catullus, Carm. 64; Epithalam. Peleôs et Thetidos, v. 382-408.

Menander the Rhetor (following generally the steps of Dionys. Hal. Art Rhetor. cap. 1-8) suggests to his fellow-citizens at Alexandria Trôas, proper and complimentary forms to invite a great man to visit their festival of the Sminthia:—ὥσπερ γὰρ Ἀπόλλωνα πολλάκις ἐδέχετο ἡ πόλις τοῖς Σμινθίοις, *ἥνικα ἐξῆν θεοὺς προφανῶς ἐπιδημεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*, οὕτω καὶ σὲ ἡ πόλις νῦν προσδέχεται (περὶ Ἐπιδεικτικ. s. iv. c. 14. ap. Walz. Coll. Rhetor, t. ix. p. 304). Menander seems to have been a native of Alexandria Trôas, though Suidas calls him a Laodicean (see Walz. Præf. ad t. ix. p. xv.-xx.; and περὶ Σμινθιακῶν, sect. iv. c. 17). The festival of the Sminthia lasted down to his time, embracing the whole duration of paganism from Homer downwards.

[840] P. A. Müller observes justly, in his *Saga-Bibliothek*, in reference to the Icelandic mythes, "In dem Mythischen wird das Leben der Vorzeit dargestellt, wie es wirklich dem kindlichen Verstande, der jugendlichen Einbildungskraft, und dem vollen Herzen, erscheint."

(Lange's Untersuchungen über die Nordische und Deutsche Heldensage, translated from P. A. Müller, Introd. p. 1.)

[841] Titus visited the temple of the Paphian Venus in Cyprus, "spectatâ opulentiâ donisque regum, quæque *alia lætum* antiquitatibus Græcorum genus *incertæ vetustati adfingit*, de navigatione primum consuluit" (Tacit. Hist. ii. 4-5).

[842] Aristotel. Problem. xix. 48. Οἱ δὲ ἡγεμόνες τῶν ἀρχαίων μόνοι ἦσαν ἥρωες· οἱ δὲ λαοὶ ἄνθρωποι. Istros followed this opinion also: but the more common view seems to have considered all who combated at Troy as heroes (see Schol. Iliad, ii. 110; xv. 231), and so Hesiod treats them (Opp. Di. 158).

In reference to the Trojan war, Aristotle says—καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς *Ἡρωϊκοῖς* περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύεται (Ethic. Nicom. i. 9; compare vii. 1).

[843] Generation by a god is treated in the old poems as an act entirely human and physical (ἐμιγη—παρελέξατο); and this was the common opinion in the days of Plato (Plato, Apolog. Socrat. c. 15. p. 15); the hero Astrabakus is father of the Lacedæmonian king Demaratus (Herod. vi. 66). [Herodotus does not believe the story told him at Babylon respecting Belus (i. 182).] Euripidês sometimes expresses disapprobation of the idea (Ion. 350), but Plato passed among a large portion of his admirers for the actual son of Apollo, and his reputed father Aristo on marrying was admonished in a dream to respect the person of his wife Periktionê, then pregnant by Apollo, until after the birth of the child Plato (Plutarch, Quæst. Sympos. p. 717. viii. 1; Diogen. Laërt. iii. 2; Origen, cont. Cels. i. p. 29). Plutarch (in Life of Numa, c. 4; compare Life of Thêseus, 2) discusses the subject, and is inclined to disallow everything beyond mental sympathy and tenderness in a god: Pausanias deals timidly with it, and is not always consistent with himself; while the later rhetors spiritualize it altogether. Menander, περὶ Ἐπιδεικτικῶν, (towards the end of the third century B. C.) prescribes rules for praising a king: you are to praise him for the gens to which he belongs: perhaps you may be able to make out that he really is the son of some god; for many who seem to be from men, are really *sent down by God* and are *emanations from the Supreme Potency*—πολλοὶ τὸ μὲν δοκεῖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων εἰσὶ, τῇ δ᾽ ἀληθείᾳ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καταπέμπονται καὶ εἰσιν ἀπόῤῥοιαι ὄντως τοῦ κρείττονος· καὶ γὰρ Ἡρακλῆς ἐνομίζετο μὲν Ἀμφιτρύωνος, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ ἦν Διός. Οὕτω καὶ βασιλεὺς ὁ ἡμέτερος το μὲν δοκεῖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ τὴν καταβολὴν οὐράνοθεν ἔχει, etc. (Menander ap. Walz. Collect. Rhetor. t. ix. c. i. p. 218). Again—περὶ Σμινθιακῶν—Ζεὺς γένεσιν παιδῶν *δημιουργεῖν* ἐνενόησε—Ἀπόλλων τὴν Ἀσκληπιοῦ γένεσιν *ἐδημιούργησε*, p. 322-327; compare Hermogenês, about the story of Apollo and Daphnê, Progymnasm. c. 4; and Julian. Orat. vii. p. 220.

The contrast of the pagan phraseology of this age (Menander had himself composed a hymn of invocation to Apollo—περὶ Ἐγκωμίων, c. 3. t. ix. p. 136, Walz.) with that of Homer is very worthy of notice. In the Hesiodic Catalogue of Women much was said respecting the marriages and amours of the gods, so as to furnish many suggestions, like the love-songs of Sapphô, to the composers of Epithalamic Odes (Menand. *ib.* sect. iv. c. 6. p. 268).

Menander gives a specimen of a prose hymn fit to be addressed to the Sminthian Apollo (p. 320); the spiritual character of which hymn forms the most pointed contrast with the Homeric hymn to the same god.

We may remark an analogous case in which the Homeric hymn to Apollo is modified by Plutarch. To provide for the establishment of his temple at Delphi, Apollo was described as having himself, in the shape of a dolphin, swam before a Krêtan vessel and guided it to Krissa, where he directed the terrified crew to open the Delphian

temple. But Plutarch says that this old statement was not correct: the god had not himself appeared in the shape of a dolphin—he had sent a dolphin expressly to guide the vessel (Plutarch. de Solertiâ Animal. p. 983). See also a contrast between the Homeric Zeus, and the genuine Zeus, (ἀληθινὸς) brought out in Plutarch, Defect. Oracul. c 30. p. 426.

Illicit amours seem in these later times to be ascribed to the δαίμονες: see the singular controversy started among the fictitious pleadings of the ancient rhetors—Νόμου ὄντος, παρθένους καὶ καθαρὰς εἶναι τὰς ἱερείας, ἱερεία τις εὐρέθη ἀτόκιον φέρουσα, καὶ κρίνεται…. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐρεῖ, φασὶ, διὰ τὰς τῶν δαιμόνων ἐπιφοιτήσεις καὶ ἐπιβουλὰς περιτεθεῖσθαι. Καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἀνόητον κομιδῆ τὸ τοιοῦτον; ἔδει γὰρ πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀφαιρεθῆναι τὴν παρθενίαν φορεῖν τι ἀποτρόπαιον, οὐ μὴν πρὸς τὸ τεκεῖν (Anonymi Scholia ad Hermogen. Στάσεις, ap. Walz. Coll. Rh. t. vii. p. 162).

Apsinês of Gadara, a sophist of the time of Diocletian, pretended to be a son of Pan (see Suidas, v. Ἀψίνης). The anecdote respecting the rivers Skamander and Mæander, in the tenth epistle ascribed to the orator Æschines (p. 737), is curious, but we do not know the date of that epistle.

[844] The mental analogy between the early stages of human civilization and the childhood of the individual is forcibly and frequently set forth in the works of Vico. That eminently original thinker dwells upon the poetical and religious susceptibilities as the first to develop themselves in the human mind, and as furnishing not merely connecting threads for the explanation of sensible phænomena, but also aliment for the hopes and fears, and means of socializing influence to men of genius, at a time when reason was yet asleep. He points out the *personifying instinct* ("istinto d' animazione") as the spontaneous philosophy of man, "to make himself the rule of the universe," and to suppose everywhere a quasi-human agency as the determining cause. He remarks that in an age of fancy and feeling, the conceptions and language of poetry coincide with those of reality and common life, instead of standing apart as a separate vein. These views are repeated frequently (and with some variations of opinion as he grew older) in his Latin work *De Uno Universi Juris Principio*, as well as in the two successive *rédactions* of his great Italian work, *Scienza Nuova* (it must be added that Vico as an expositor is prolix, and does not do justice to his own powers of original thought): I select the following from the second edition of the latter treatise, published by himself in 1744, *Della Metafisica Poetica* (see vol. v. p. 189 of Ferrari's edition of his Works, Milan, 1836): "Adunque la sapienza poetica, che fu la prima sapienza della Gentilità, dovette incominciare da una Metafisica, non *ragionata ed astratta*, qual è questa or degli addottrinati, ma *sentita ed immaginata*, quale dovett' essere di tai primi uomini, siccome quelli ch' erano di niun raziocinio, e tutti robusti sensi e vigorosissime fantasie, come è stato nelle degnità (the *Axioms*) stabilito. Questa fu la loro propria poesia, la qual in essi fu una facultà loro connaturale, perchè erano di tali sensi e di si fatte fantasie naturalmente forniti, nata da *ignoranza di cagioni*—la qual fu loro madre di maraviglia di tutte le cose, che quelli ignoranti di tutte le cose fortemente ammiravano. Tal poesia incominciò in essi divina: perchè nello stesso tempo ch'essi immaginavano le cagioni delle cose, che sentivano ed ammiravano, essere Dei, come ora il confermiamo con gli Americani, i quali tutte le cose che superano la loro picciol capacità, dicono esser Dei … nello stesso tempo, diciamo, alle cose ammirate davano l'essere di sostanze dalla propria lor idea: ch'è appunto la natura dei fanciulli, che osserviamo prendere tra mani cose inanimate, e transtullarsi e favellarvi, come fussero quelle persone vive. In cotal guisa i primi uomini delle nazioni gentili, come fanciulli del nascente gener umano, dalla lor idea creavan essi le cose … per la loro robusta ignoranza, il facevano in forza d'una corpolentissima fantasia, e perch' era corpolentissima, il facevano con una maravigliosa sublimità, tal e tanta, che perturbava all'eccesso essi medesimi, che fingendo le si creavano…. Di questa natura di cose umane restò eterna proprietà spiegata con nobil espressione da Tacito, che vanamente gli uomini spaventati *fingunt simul creduntque*."

After describing the condition of rude men, terrified with thunder and other vast atmospheric phænomena, Vico proceeds (*ib.* p. 172)—"In tal caso la natura della mente umana porta ch'ella attribuisca all'effetto la sua natura: e la natura loro era in tale stato d'uomini tutti robuste forze di corpo, che urlando, brontolando, spiegavano le loro violentissime passioni, si finsero il cielo esser un gran corpo animato, che per tal aspetto chiamavano Giove, che col fischio dei fulmini e col fragore dei tuoni volesse lor dire qualche cosa…. E si fanno di tutta la natura un vasto corpo animato, che senta passioni ed affetti."

Now the contrast with modern habits of thought:—

"Ma siccome *ora* per la natura delle nostre umane menti troppo ritirata dai sensi nel medesimo volgo—con le tante astrazioni, di quante sono piene le lingue—con tanti vocaboli astratti—e di troppo assottigliata con l'arti dello scrivere, e quasi spiritualezzata con la practica dei numeri—*ci e naturalmente niegato di poter formare* la vasta imagine di cotal donna che dicono Natura simpatetica, che mentre con la bocca dicono, non hanno nulla in lor mente, perocchè la lor mente è dentro il falso, che è nulla; nè sono soccorsi dalla fantasia a poterne formare

una falsa vastissima imagine. Così *ora ci è naturalmente niegato di poter entrare nella vasta immaginativa di quei primi uomini*, le menti dei quali di nulla erano assottigliate, di nulla astratte, di nulla spiritualezzate…. Onde dicemmo sopra ch'*ora appena intender si può, affatto immaginar non sì può*, come pensassero i primi uomini che fondarono la umanità gentilesca."

In this citation (already almost too long for a note) I have omitted several sentences not essential to the general meaning. It places these early divine fables and theological poets (so Vico calls them) in their true point of view, and assigns to them their proper place in the ascending movement of human society: it refers the mythes to an early religious and poetical age, in which feeling and fancy composed the whole fund of the human mind, over and above the powers of sense: the great mental change which has since taken place has robbed us of the power, not merely of believing them as they were originally believed, but even of conceiving completely that which their first inventors intended to express.

The views here given from this distinguished Italian (the precursor of F. A. Wolf in regard to the Homeric poems, as well as of Niebuhr in regard to the Roman history) appear to me no less correct than profound; and the obvious inference from them is, that attempts to *explain* (as it is commonly called) the mythes (*i. e.* to translate them into some physical, moral or historical statements, suitable to our order of thought) are, even as guesses, essentially unpromising. Nevertheless Vico, inconsistently with his own general view, bestows great labor and ingenuity in attempting to discover internal meaning symbolized under many of the mythes; and even lays down the position, "che i primi uomini della Gentilità essendo stati semplicissimi, quanto i fanciulli, i quali per natura son veritieri: le prime favole non poterono finger nulla di falso: per lo che dovettero necessariamente essere *vere narrazioni*." (See vol. v. p. 194; compare also p. 99, Axiom xvi.) If this position be meant simply to exclude the idea of designed imposture, it may for the most part be admitted; but Vico evidently intends something more. He thinks that there lies hid under the fables a basis of matter of fact—not literal but symbolized—which he draws out and exhibits under the form of a civil history of the divine and heroic times: a confusion of doctrine the more remarkable, since he distinctly tells us (in perfect conformity with the long passage above transcribed from him) that the special matter of these early mythes is "impossibility accredited as truth,"—"che la di lei propria materia è *l'impossibile credibile*" (p. 176, and still more fully in the first *rédaction* of the *Scienza Nuova*, b. iii. c. 4; vol. iv. p. 187 of his Works).

When we read the *Canones Mythologici* of Vico (De Constantia Philologiæ, Pars Posterior, c. xxx.; vol. iii. p. 363), and his explanation of the legends of the Olympic gods, Hercules, Thêseus, Kadmus, etc., we see clearly that the meaning which he professes to bring out is one previously put in by himself.

There are some just remarks to the same purpose in Karl Ritter's *Vorhalle Europäischer Volkergeschichten*, Abschn. ii. p. 150 *seq.* (Berlin, 1820). He too points out how much the faith of the old world (der Glaube der Vorwelt) has become foreign to our minds, since the recent advances of "Politik und Kritik," and how impossible it is for us to elicit history from their conceptions by our analysis, in cases where they have not distinctly laid it out for us. The great length of this note prevents me from citing the passage: and he seems to me also (like Vico) to pursue his own particular investigations in forgetfulness of the principle laid down by himself.

[845] O. Müller, in his *Prolegomena zu einer wissenschaftlichen Mythologie* (cap. iv. p. 108), has pointed out the mistake of supposing that there existed originally some nucleus of pure reality as the starting-point of the mythes, and that upon this nucleus fiction was superinduced afterwards: he maintains that the real and the ideal were blended together in the primitive conception of the mythes. Respecting the general state of mind out of which the mythes grew, see especially pages 78 and 110 of that work, which is everywhere full of instruction on the subject of the Grecian mythes, and is eminently suggestive, even where the positions of the author are not completely made out.

The short *Heldensage der Griechen* by Nitzsch (Kiel, 1842, t. v.) contains more of just and original thought on the subject of the Grecian mythes than any work with which I am acquainted. I embrace completely the subjective point of view in which he regards them; and although I have profited much from reading his short tract, I may mention that before I ever saw it, I had enforced the same reasonings on the subject in an article in the Westminster Review, May 1843, on the *Heroen-Geschichten* of Niebuhr.

Jacob Grimm, in the preface to his *Deutsche Mythologie* (p. 1, 1st edit. Gött. 1835), pointedly insists on the distinction between "*Sage*" and history, as well as upon the fact that the former has its chief root in religious belief "Legend and history (he says) are powers each by itself, adjoining indeed on the confines, but having each its own separate and exclusive ground;" also p. xxvii. of the same introduction.

A view substantially similar is adopted by William Grimm, the other of the two distinguished brothers whose labors have so much elucidated Teutonic philology and antiquities. He examines the extent to which either historical matter of fact or historical names can be traced in the *Deutsche Heldensage*; and he comes to the conclusion that the former is next to nothing, the latter not considerable. He draws particular attention to the fact, that the audience for whom these poems were intended had not learned to distinguish history from poetry (W. Grimm, *Deutsche Heldensage*, pp. 8, 337, 342, 345, 399, Gött. 1829).

[846] Hesiod, Theogon. 32.—

> … ἐνέπνευσαν δέ (the Muses) μοι αὐδὴν
>
> Θείην, ὡς κλείοιμι τά τ᾽ ἐσσόμενα, πρό τ᾽ ἐόντα,
>
> Καί με κέλονθ᾽ ὑμνεῖν μακάρων γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων, etc.

Odyss. xxii. 347; viii. 63, 73, 481, 489. Δημόδοκ᾽ … ἢ σέ γε Μοῦσ᾽ ἐδίδαξε, Διὸς παῖς, ἢ σέγ᾽ Ἀπόλλων: that is, Demodocus has either been inspired as a poet by the Muse, or as a prophet by Apollo: for the Homeric Apollo is not the god of song. Kalchas the prophet receives his inspiration from Apollo, who confers upon him the same knowledge both of past and future as the Muses give to Hesiod (Iliad, i. 69):—

> Κάλχας Θεστορίδης, οἰωνοπόλων ὄχ᾽ ἄριστος
>
> Ὃς ᾔδη τά τ᾽ ἐόντα, τά τ᾽ ἐσσόμενα, πρό τ᾽ ἐόντα
>
> Ἦν διὰ μαντοσύνην, τὴν οἱ πόρε Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων.

Also Iliad, ii. 485.

Both the μάντις and the ἀοιδὸς are standing, recognized professions (Odyss. xvii. 383), like the physician and the carpenter, δημιόεργοι.

[847] Iliad, ii. 599.

[848] In this later sense it stands pointedly opposed to ἱστορία, *history*, which seems originally to have designated matter of fact, present and seen by the describer, or the result of his personal inquiries (see Herodot. i. 1; Verrius Flacc. ap. Aul. Gell. v. 18; Eusebius, Hist. Eccles. iii. 12; and the observations of Dr. Jortin, Remarks on Ecclesiastical History, vol. i. p. 59).

The original use of the word λόγος was the same as that of μῦθος—a current tale, true or false, as the case might be; and the term designating a person much conversant with the old legends (λόγιος) is derived from it (Herod. i. 1; ii. 3). Hekatæus and Herodotus both use λόγος in this sense. Herodotus calls both Æsop and Hekatæus λογοποιοί (ii. 134-143).

Aristotle (Metaphys. i. p. 8, ed. Brandis) seems to use μῦθος in this sense, where he says—διὸ καὶ φιλόμυθος ὁ φιλόσοφος πώς ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ μῦθος συγκεῖται ἐκ θαυμασίων, etc. In the same treatise (xi. p. 254), he uses it to signify fabulous amplification and transformation of a doctrine true in the main.

[849] M. Ampère, in his *Histoire Littéraire de la France* (ch. viii. v. i. p. 310) distinguishes the Saga (which corresponds as nearly as possible with the Greek μῦθος, λόγος, ἐπιχώριος λόγος), as a special product of the intellect, not capable of being correctly designated either as history, or as fiction, or as philosophy:—

"Il est un pays, la Scandinavie, où la tradition racontée s'est développée plus complètement qu'ailleurs, où ses produits ont été plus soigneusement recueillis et mieux conservés: dans ce pays, ils ont reçu un nom particulier, dont l'équivalent exact ne se trouve pas hors des langues Germaniques: c'est le mot *Saga, Sage, ce qu'on dit, ce qu'on raconte*,—la tradition orale. Si l'on prend ce mot non dans une acception restreinte, mais dans le sens général où le prenait Niebuhr quand il l'appliquoit, par exemple, aux traditions populaires qui ont pu fournir à Tite Live une portion de son histoire, la Saga doit être comptée parmi les produits spontanés de l'imagination humaine. La Saga a son existence propre comme la poësie, comme l'histoire, comme le roman. Elle n'est pas la poësie, parcequ'elle n'est pas chantée, mais parlée; elle n'est pas l'histoire, parcequ'elle est denuée de critique; elle n'est pas le roman, parcequ'elle est sincère, parcequ'elle a foi à ce qu'elle raconte. Elle n'invente pas, mais

répète: elle peut se tromper, mais elle ne ment jamais. Ce récit souvent merveilleux, que personne ne fabrique sciemment, et que tout le monde altère et falsifie sans le vouloir, qui se perpétue à la manière des chants primitifs et populaires,—ce récit, quand il se rapporte non à un héros, mais à un saint, s'appelle une légende."

[850] Herodot. ii. 53.

[851] See Plutarch, Perikl. capp. 5, 32, 38; Cicero, De Republ. i. 15-16, ed. Maii.

The phytologist Theophrastus, in his valuable collection of facts respecting vegetable organization, is often under the necessity of opposing his scientific interpretation of curious incidents in the vegetable world to the religious interpretation of them which he found current. Anomalous phænomena in the growth or decay of trees were construed as signs from the gods, and submitted to a prophet for explanation (see Histor. Plantar. ii. 3, iv. 16; v. 3).

We may remark, however, that the old faith had still a certain hold over his mind. In commenting on the story of the willow-tree at Philippi, and the venerable old plane-tree at Antandros (more than sixty feet high, and requiring four men to grasp it round in the girth), having been blown down by a high wind, and afterwards spontaneously resuming their erect posture, he offers some explanations how such a phænomenon might have happened, but he admits, at the end, that there may be something extra-natural in the case, Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως ἔξω φυσικῆς αἰτίας ἔστιν, etc. (De Caus. Plant. v. 4): see a similar miracle in reference to the cedar-tree of Vespasian (Tacit. Hist. ii. 78).

Euripidês, in his lost tragedy called Μελανίππη Σοφὴ, placed in the month of Melanippê a formal discussion and confutation of the whole doctrine of τέρατα, or supernatural indications (Dionys. Halicar. Ars Rhetoric. p. 300-356, Reisk). Compare the Fables of Phædrus, iii. 3; Plutarch, Sept. Sap. Conviv. ch. 3. p. 149; and the curious philosophical explanation by which the learned men of Alexandria tranquillized the alarms of the vulgar, on occasion of the serpent said to have been seen entwined round the head of the crucified Kleomenês (Plutarch, Kleomen. c. 39).

It is one part of the duty of an able physician, according to the Hippocratic treatise called Prognosticon (c. 1. t. ii. p. 112, ed. Littré), when he visits his patient, to examine whether there is anything divine in the malady, ἅμα δὲ καὶ εἴ τι θεῖον ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇσι νούσοισι: this, however, does not agree with the memorable doctrine laid down in the treatise, De Aëre, Locis et Aquis (c. 22. p. 78, ed. Littré), and cited hereafter, in this chapter. Nor does Galen seem to have regarded it as harmonizing with the general views of Hippocratês. In the excellent Prolegomena of M. Littré to his edition of Hippocratês (t. i. p. 76) will be found an inedited scholium, wherein the opinion of Baccheius and other physicians is given, that the affections of the plague were to be looked upon as divine, inasmuch as the disease came from God; and also the opinion of Xenophôn, the friend of Praxagoras, that the "genus of days of crisis" in fever was divine; "For (said Xenophôn) just as the Dioskuri, being gods, appear to the mariner in the storm and bring him salvation, so also do the days of crisis, when they arrive, in fever." Galen, in commenting upon this doctrine of Xenophôn, says that the author "has expressed his own individual feeling, but has no way set forth the opinion of Hippocratês:" Ὁ δὲ τῶν κρισίμων γένος ἡμερῶν εἰπὼν εἶναι θεῖον, ἑαυτοῦ τι πάθος ὡμολόγησεν· οὐ μὴν Ἱπποκράτους γε τὴν γνώμην ἔδειξεν (Galen, Opp. t. v. p. 120, ed. Basil).

The comparison of the Dioskuri appealed to by Xenophôn is a precise reproduction of their function as described in the Homeric Hymn (Hymn xxxiii. 10): his personification of the "days of crisis" introduces the old religious agency to fill up a gap in his medical science.

I annex an illustration from the Hindoo vein of thought:—"It is a rule with the Hindoos to bury, and not to burn, the bodies of those who die of the small pox: for (say they) the small pox is not only caused by the goddess Davey, but is, in fact, *Davey herself*; and to burn the body of a person affected with this disease, is, in reality, neither more nor less than *to burn the goddess*." (Sleeman, Rambles and Recollections, etc., vol. i. ch. xxv. p. 221.)

[852] Horat. de Art. Poet. 79:—

"Archilochum proprio rabies armavit Iambo," etc.

Compare Epist. i. 19, 23, and Epod. vi. 12; Aristot. Rhetor. iii. 8, 7, and Poetic. c. 4—also Synesius de Somniis—ὥσπερ Ἀλκαῖος καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος, οἳ δεδαπανήκασι τὴν εὐστομίαν εἰς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἑκάτερος (Alcæi Fragment.

Halle, 1810, p. 205). Quintilian speaks in striking language of the power of expression manifested by Archilochus (x. 1, 60).

[853] Simonidês of Amorgus touches briefly, but in a tone of contempt upon the Trojan war—*γυναικὸς οὕνεκ᾽* ἀμφιδηριωμένους (Simonid. Fragm. 8. p. 36. v. 118); he seems to think it absurd that so destructive a struggle should have taken place "*pro unâ mulierculâ*," to use the phrase of Mr. Payne Knight.

[854] See Quintilian, x. 1, 63. Horat. Od. i. 32; ii. 13. Aristot. Polit. iii. 10, 4. Dionys. Halic. observes (Vett. Scriptt. Censur. v. p. 421) respecting Alkæus—πολλαχοῦ γοῦν τὸ μέτρον εἴ τις περιέλοι, ῥητορικὴν ἂν εὕροι πολιτείαν; and Strabo (xiii. p. 617), τὰ στασιωτικὰ καλούμενα τοῦ Ἀλκαίου ποιήματα.

There was a large dash of sarcasm and homely banter aimed at neighbors and contemporaries in the poetry of Sapphô, apart from her impassioned love-songs—ἄλλως σκώπτει τὸν ἄγροικον νύμφιον καὶ τὸν θυρωρὸν τὸν ἐν τοῖς γάμοις, εὐτελέστατα καὶ ἐν πέζοις ὀνόμασι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν ποιητικοῖς. Ὥστε αὐτῆς μᾶλλόν ἐστι τὰ ποιήματα ταῦτα διαλέγεσθαι ἢ ἄδειν· οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἅρμοσαι πρὸς τὸν χόρον ἢ πρὸς τὴν λύραν, εἰ μή τις εἴη χόρος διαλεκτικός (Dêmêtr. Phaler, De Interpret. c. 167).

Compare also Herodot. ii. 135, who mentions the satirical talent of Sapphô, employed against her brother for an extravagance about the courtezan Rhodôpis.

[855] Solôn, Fragm. iv. 1, ed. Schneidewin:—

Αὐτὸς κήρυξ ἦλθον ἀφ᾽ ἱμερτῆς Σαλαμῖνος

Κόσμον ἐπέων ᾠδὴν ἀντ᾽ ἀγορῆς θέμενος, etc.

See *Brandis*, Handbuch der Griechischen Philosophie, sect. xxiv.-xxv. Plato states that Solôn, in his old age, engaged in the composition of an epic poem, which he left unfinished, on the subject of the supposed island of Atlantis and Attica (Plato, Timæus, p. 21, and Kritias, p. 113). Plutarch, Solôn, c. 31.

[856] Homer, Hymn. ad Apollin. 155; Thucydid. iii. 104.

[857] Herodot. i. 163.

[858] Herodot. iv. 36. γελῶ δὲ ὁρέων Γῆς περιόδους γράψαντας πολλοὺς ἤδη, καὶ οὐδένα νόον ἔχοντας ἐξηγησάμενον· οἳ Ὠκεάνόν τε ῥέοντα γράφουσι πέριξ τὴν γῆν, ἐοῦσαν κυκλοτερέα ὡς ἀπὸ τόρνου, etc., a remark probably directed against Hekatæus.

Respecting the map of Anaximander, Strabo, i. p. 7; Diogen. Laërt. ii. 1; Agathemer ap. Geograph. Minor. i. 1. πρῶτος ἐτόλμησε τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν πίνακι γράψαι.

Aristagoras of Milêtus, who visited Sparta to solicit aid for the revolted Ionians against Darius, brought with him a brazen tablet or map, by means of which he exhibited the relative position of places in the Persian empire (Herodot. v. 49).

[859] Xanthus ap. Strabo. i. p. 50; xii. p. 579. Compare Creuzer, Fragmenta Xanthi, p. 162.

[860] Xenophan. ap. Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathemat. ix. 193. Fragm. 1. Poet. Græc. ed. Schneidewin. Diogen. Laërt. ix. 18.

[861] Hesiod, Opp. Di. 122; Homer, Hymn. ad Vener. 260.

[862] A defence of the primitive faith, on this ground, is found in Plutarch, Quæstion. Sympos. vii. 4, 4, p. 703.

[863] Aristotel. Metaphys. i. 3.

[864] Plutarch, Placit. Philos. ii. 1; also Stobæus, Eclog. Physic. i. 22, where the difference between the Homeric expressions and those of the subsequent philosophers is seen. Damm, Lexic. Homeric. v. Φύσις; Alexander von Humboldt, *Kosmos*, p. 76, the note 9 on page 62 of that admirable work.

The title of the treatises of the early philosophers (Melissus, Dêmokritus, Parmenidês, Empedoclês, Alkmæôn, etc.) was frequently Περὶ Φύσεως (Galen. Opp. tom. i. p. 56, ed. Basil).

[865] Xenophan. ap. Sext. Empiric. vii. 50; viii. 326.—

Καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν, οὔτε τίς ἐστιν

Εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων·

Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπῶν,

Αὐτος ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε, δόκος δ᾽ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

Compare Aristotel. De Xenophane, Zenone, et Georgiâ, capp. 1-2.

[866] See the treatise of M. Auguste Comte (*Cours de Philosophie Positive*), and his doctrine of the three successive stages of the human mind in reference to scientific study—the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive;—a doctrine laid down generally in his first lecture (vol. i. p. 4-12), and largely applied and illustrated throughout his instructive work. It is also re-stated and elucidated by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, vol. ii. p. 610.

[867] "Human wisdom (ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία), as contrasted with the primitive theology (οἱ ἀρχαῖοι καὶ διατρίβοντες περὶ τὰς θεολογίας)," to take the words of Aristotle (Meteorolog. ii. 1. pp. 41-42, ed. Tauchnitz).

[868] Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 6-9. Τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα (Σωκράτης) συνεβούλευε καὶ πράττειν, ὡς ἐνόμιζεν ἄριστ᾽ ἂν πραχθῆναι· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδήλων ὅπως ἀποβήσοιτο, μαντευσομένους ἔπεμπεν, εἰ ποιητέα. Καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας οἴκους τε καὶ πόλεις καλῶς οἰκήσειν μαντικῆς ἔφη προσδεῖσθαι· τεκτονικὸν μὲν γὰρ ἢ χαλκευτικὸν ἢ γεωργικὸν ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχικὸν, ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἔργων ἐξεταστικὸν, ἢ λογιστικὸν, ἢ οἰκονομικὸν, ἢ στρατηγικὸν γενέσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, μαθήματα καὶ ἀνθρώπου γνώμῃ αἱρετέα, ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι· τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἔφη *τοὺς θεοὺς ἑαυτοῖς καταλείπεσθαι*, ὧν οὐδὲν δῆλον εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.... Τοὺς δὲ μηδὲν τῶν τοιούτων οἰομένους εἶναι δαιμόνιον, ἀλλὰ πάντα τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης γνώμης, δαιμονᾷν ἔφη· δαιμονᾷν δὲ καὶ τοὺς μαντευομένους ἃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ μαθοῦσι διακρίνειν.... Ἔφη δὲ δεῖν, ἃ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ, μανθάνειν· ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔστι, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι· τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ, οἷς ἂν ὦσιν ἵλεῳ, σημαίνειν. Compare also Memorab. iv. 7. 7; and Cyropæd. i. 6, 3, 23-46.

Physical and astronomical phænomena are classified by Socratês among the divine class, interdicted to human study (Memor. i. 1,13): τὰ θεῖα or δαιμόνια as supposed to τἀνθρώπεια. Plato (Phileb. c. 16; Legg. x. p. 886-889; xii. p. 967) held the sun and stars to be gods, each animated with its special soul: he allowed astronomical investigation to the extent necessary for avoiding blasphemy respecting these beings—μέχρι τοῦ μὴ βλασφημεῖν περὶ αὐτά (vii. 821).

[869] Hippocratês, De Aëre, Locis et Aquis, c. 22 (p. 78, ed. Littré, sect. 106 ed. Petersen): Ἔτι τε πρὸς τουτέοισι εὐνούχιαι γίγνονται οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐν Σκύθῃσι, καὶ γυναικῆια ἐργάζονται καὶ ὡς αἱ γυναῖκες διαλέγονταί τε ὁμοίως· καλεῦνταί τε οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἀνανδριεῖς. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπιχώριοι τὴν αἰτίην προστιθέασι θεῷ καὶ σέβονται τουτέους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ προσκυνέουσι, δεδοικότες περὶ ἑωϋτέων ἕκαστοι. Ἐμοὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτέῳ δοκέει ταῦτα τὰ πάθεα θεῖα εἶναι, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἑτέρου θειότερον οὐδὲ ἀνθρωπινώτερον, ἀλλὰ πάντα θεῖα· ἕκαστον δὲ ἔχει φύσιν τῶν τοιουτέων, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄνευ φύσιος γίγνεται. Καὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὥς μοι δοκέει γίγνεσθαι, φράσω, etc.

Again, sect. 112. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον ἔλεξα, θεῖα μὲν καὶ ταῦτά ἐστι ὁμοίως τοῖσι ἄλλοισι, γίγνεται δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἕκαστα.

Compare the remarkable treatise of Hippocratês, De Morbo Sacro, capp. 1 and 18, vol. vi. p. 352-394, ed. Littré. See this opinion of Hippocratês illustrated by the doctrines of some physical philosophers stated in Aristotle, Physic. ii. 8. ὥσπερ ὕει ὁ Ζεὺς, οὐχ ὅπως τὸν σῖτον αὐξήσῃ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, etc. Some valuable observations on the method of Hippocratês are also found in Plato, Phædr. p. 270.

[870] See the graphic picture in Plato, Phædon. p. 97-98 (cap. 46-47): compare Plato, Legg. xii. p. 967; Aristotel. Metaphysic. i. p. 13-14 (ed. Brandis); Plutarch, Defect. Oracul. p. 435.

Simplicius, Commentar. in Aristotel. Physic. p. 38. καὶ ὅπερ δὲ ὁ ἐν Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ Ἀναξαγόρᾳ, τὸ ἐν ταῖς τῶν κατὰ μέρος αἰτιολογίαις μὴ τῷ νῷ κεχρῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ ταῖς ὑλικαῖς ἀποδόσεσιν, οἰκεῖον ἦν τῇ φυσιολογίᾳ. Anaxagoras thought that the superior intelligence of men, as compared with other animals, arose from his possession of hands (Aristot. de Part. Animal. iv. 10. p. 687, ed. Bekk.).

[871] Xenophôn, Memorab. iv. 7. Socratês said, καὶ παραφρονῆσαι τὸν ταῦτα μεριμνῶντα οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ Ἀναξαγόρας παρεφρόνησεν, ὁ μέγιστον φρονήσας ἐπὶ τῷ τὰς τῶν θεῶν μηχανὰς ἐξηγεῖσθαι, etc. Compare Schaubach, Anaxagoræ Fragment. p. 50-141; Plutarch, Nikias, 23, and Periklês, 6-32; Diogen. Laërt. ii. 10-14.

The Ionic philosophy, from which Anaxagoras receded more in language than in spirit, seems to have been the least popular of all the schools, though some of the commentators treat it as conformable to vulgar opinion, because it confined itself for the most part to phænomenal explanations, and did not recognize the *noumena* of Plato, or the τὸ ἓν νοητὸν of Parmenidês,—"qualis fuit Ionicorum, quæ tum dominabatur, ratio, vulgari opinione et communi sensu comprobata" (Karsten, Parmenidis Fragment, De Parmenidis Philosophiâ, p. 154). This is a mistake: the Ionic philosophers, who constantly searched for and insisted upon physical laws, came more directly into conflict with the sentiment of the multitude than the Eleatic school.

The larger atmospheric phænomena were connected in the most intimate manner with Grecian religious feeling and uneasiness (see Demokritus ap. Sect. Empiric. ix. sect. 19-24. p. 552-554, Fabric.): the attempts of Anaxagoras and Demokritus to explain them were more displeasing to the public than the Platonic speculations (Demokritus ap. Aristot. Meteorol. ii. 7; Stobæus, Eclog. Physic. p. 594: compare Mullach, Democriti Fragmenta, lib. iv. p. 394).

[872] Xenophôn, Memorab. i. 1.

[873] It is curious to see that some of the most recondite doctrines of the Pythagorean philosophy were actually brought before the general Syracusan public in the comedies of Epicharmus: "In comœdiis suis personas sæpe ita colloqui fecit, ut sententias Pythagoricas et in universum sublimia vitæ præcepta immisceret" (Grysar, De Doriensium Comœdiâ, p. 111, Col. 1828). The fragments preserved in Diogen. Laërt. (iii. 9-17) present both criticisms upon the Hesiodic doctrine of a primæval chaos, and an exposition of the archetypal and immutable ideas (as opposed to the fluctuating phænomena of sense) which Plato afterwards adopted and systematized.

Epicharmus seems to have combined with this abstruse philosophy a strong vein of comic shrewdness and some turn to scepticism (Cicero, Epistol. ad Attic. i. 19): "ut crebro mihi vafer ille Siculus Epicharmus insusurret cantilenam suam." Clemens Alex. Strom. v. p. 258. Νῆφε καὶ μέμνασ᾽ ἀπιστεῖν· ἄρθρα ταῦτα τῶν φρενῶν. Ζῶμεν ἀριθμῷ καὶ λογισμῷ· ταῦτα γὰρ σώζει βροτοὺς. Also his contemptuous ridicule of the prophetesses of his time who cheated foolish women out of their money, pretending to universal knowledge, καὶ πάντα γιγνώσκοντι τῷ τηνᾶν λόγῳ (ap Polluc. ix. 81). See, about Epicharmus. O. Müller, Dorians, iv. 7, 4.

These dramas seem to have been exhibited at Syracuse between 480-460 B. C., anterior even to Chionidês and Magnês at Athens (Aristot. Poet. c. 3): he says *πολλῷ* πρότερος, which can hardly be literally exact. The critics of the Horatian age looked upon Epicharmus as the prototype of Plautus (Hor. Epistol. ii. 1. 58).

[874] The third book of the republic of Plato is particularly striking in reference to the use of the poets in education: see also his treatise De Legg. vii. p. 810-811. Some teachers made their pupils learn whole poets by heart (ὅλους ποιητὰς ἐκμανθάνων), others preferred extracts and selections.

[875] Pindar, Nem. vi. 1. Compare Simonidês, Fragm. 1 (Gaisford).

[876] Pindar, Olymp. i. 30-55; ix. 32-45.

[877] Pyth. iii. 25. See the allusions to Semelê, Alkmêna, and Danaê, Pyth. iii. 98; Nem. x. 10. Compare also *supra*, chap. ix. p. 245.

[878] Pindar, Nem. vii. 20-30; viii. 23-31. Isthm. iii. 50-60.

It seems to be sympathy for Ajax, in odes addressed to noble Æginetan victors, which induces him thus to depreciate Odysseus; for he eulogizes Sisyphus, specially on account of his cunning and resources (Olymp. xiii. 50) in the ode addressed to Xenophôn the Corinthian.

[879] Olymp. i. 28; Nem. viii. 20; Pyth. i. 93; Olymp. vii. 55; Nem. vi. 43. φάντι δ᾽ ἀνθρώπων παλαιαὶ ῥήσιες, etc.

[880] Pyth. x. 49. Compare Pyth. xii. 11-22.

[881] Pyth. i. 17; iii. 4-7; iv. 12; viii. 16. Nem. iv. 27-32; v. 89. Isthm. v. 31; vi. 44-48. Olymp. iii. 17; viii. 63; xiii. 61-87.

[882] Nem. iii. 39; v. 40. συγγενὴς εὐδοξία—πότμος συγγενής; v. 8. Olymp. ix. 103. Pindar seems to introduce φὺσ in cases where Homer would have mentioned the divine assistance.

[883] Nem. x. 37-51. Compare the family legend of the Athenian Dêmocrates, in Plato, Lysis, p. 295.

[884] Nem. v. 12-16.

[885] See above, chap. xiv. p. 368. on the Legend of the Siege of Thêbes.

[886] The curse of Œdipus is the determining force in the Sept. ad Thêb., Ἀρά τ᾽, Ἐριννὺς πατρὸς ἡ μεγασθενὴς (v. 70); it reappears several times in the course of the drama, with particular solemnity in the mouth of Eteoklês (695-709, 725, 785, etc.); he yields to it as an irresistible force, as carrying the family to ruin:—

Ἐπεὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα κάρτ᾽ ἐπισπέρχει θεὸς,

Ἴτω κατ᾽ οὖρον, κῦμα Κωκυτοῦ λαχὸν,

Φοίβῳ στυγηθὲν πᾶν τὸ Λαΐου γένος.

. . . . .

Φίλου γὰρ ἐχθρά μοι πατρὸς τέλει᾽ ἄρα

Ξηροῖς ἀκλαύστοις ὄμμασιν προσιζάνει, etc.

So again at the opening of the Agamemnôn, the μνάμων μῆνις τεκνόποινος (v. 155) and the sacrifice of Iphigeneia are dwelt upon as leaving behind them an avenging doom upon Agamemnôn, though he took precautions for gagging her mouth during the sacrifice and thus preventing her from giving utterance to imprecations—Φθόγγον ἀραῖον οἴκοις, βίᾳ χαλινῶν τ᾽ ἀναύδῳ μένει (κατασχεῖν), v. 346. The Erinnys awaits Agamemnôn even at the moment of his victorious consummation at Troy (467; compare 762-990, 1336-1433): she is most to be dreaded after great good fortune: she enforces the curse which ancestral crimes have brought upon the house of Atreus—πρώταρχος ἄτη—παλαιαὶ ἁμαρτίαι δόμων (1185-1197, Choëph. 692)—the curse imprecated by the outraged Thyestês (1601). In the Choëphoræ, Apollo menaces Orestês with the wrath of his deceased father, and all the direful visitations of the Erinnyes, unless he undertakes to revenge the murder (271-296). Αἶσα and Ἐριννὺς bring on blood for blood (647). But the moment that Orestês, placed between these conflicting obligations (925), has achieved it, he becomes himself the victim of the Erinnyes, who drive him mad even at the end of the Choëphoræ (ἕως δ᾽ ἔτ᾽ ἔμφρων εἰμὶ, 1026), and who make their appearance bodily, and pursue him throughout the third drama of this fearful trilogy. The Eidôlon of Klytæmnêstra impels them to vengeance (Eumenid. 96) and even spurs them on when they appear to relax. Apollo conveys Orestês to Athens, whither the Erinnyes pursue him, and prosecute him before the judgment-seat of the goddess Athênê, to whom they submit the award; Apollo appearing as his defender. The debate between "the daughters of Night" and the god, accusing and defending, is eminently curious (576-730): the Erinnyes are deeply mortified at the humiliation put upon them when Orestês is acquitted, but Athênê at length reconciles them, and a covenant is made whereby they become protectresses of Attica, accepting of a permanent abode and solemn worship (1006): Orestês returns to Argos, and promises that even in his tomb he will watch that none of his descendants shall ever injure the land of Attica (770). The solemn trial and acquittal of Orestês formed the consecrating legend of the Hill and Judicature of Areiopagus.

This is the only complete trilogy of Æschylus which we possess, and the avenging Erinnyes (416) are the movers throughout the whole—unseen in the first two dramas, visible and appalling in the third. And the appearance of Cassandra under the actual prophetic fever in the first, contributes still farther to impart to it a coloring different from common humanity.

The general view of the movement of the Oresteia given in Welcker (Æschyl. Trilogie, p. 445) appears to me more conformable to Hellenic ideas than that of Klausen (Theologumena Æschyli, pp. 157-169), whose valuable

collection and comparison of passages is too much affected, both here and elsewhere, by the desire to bring the agencies of the Greek mythical world into harmony with what a religious mind of the present day would approve. Moreover, he sinks the personality of Athênê too much in the supreme authority of Zeus (p. 158-168).

[887] Eumenidês, 150.—

Ἰὼ παῖ Διὸς, ἐπίκλοπος πέλει,

Νέος δὲ γραίας δαίμονας καθιππάσω, etc.

The same metaphor again, v. 731. Æschylus seems to delight in contrasting the young and the old gods: compare 70-162, 882.

The Erinnyes tell Apollo that he assumes functions which do not belong to him, and will thus desecrate those which do belong to him (715-754):—

Ἀλλ᾽ αἱματηρὰ πράγματ᾽, *οὐ λαχὼν*, σέβεις,

Μαντεῖα δ᾽ οὐκ ἔθ᾽ ἁγνὰ μαντεύσει μένων.

The refusal of the king Pelasgos, in the Supplices, to undertake what he feels to be the sacred duty of protecting the suppliant Danaïdes, without first submitting the matter to his people and obtaining their expressed consent, and the fear which he expresses of their blame (κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς γὰρ φιλαίτιος λέως), are more forcibly set forth than an old epic poet would probably have thought necessary (see Supplices, 369, 397, 485, 519). The solemn wish to exclude both anarchy and despotism from Athens bears still more the mark of political feeling of the time—μήτ᾽ ἄναρχον μήτε δεσποτουμένον (Eumenid. 527-696).

[888] Promêtheus, 35, 151, 170, 309, 524, 910, 940, 956.

[889] Plato, Republ. ii. 381-383; compare Æschyl. Fragment. 159, ed. Dindorf. He was charged also with having divulged in some of his plays secret matters of the mysteries of Dêmêtêr, but is said to have excused himself by alleging ignorance: he was not aware that what he had said was comprised in the mysteries (Aristot. Ethic. Nicom. iii. 2; Clemens Alex. Strom. ii. p. 387); the story is different again in Ælian, V. H. v. 19.

How little can be made out distinctly respecting this last accusation may be seen in Lobeck, Aglaopham. p. 81.

Cicero (Tusc. Dis. ii. 10) calls Æschylus "almost a Pythagorean:" upon what the epithet is founded we do not know.

There is no evidence to prove to us that the Promêtheus Vinctus was considered as impious by the public before whom it was represented; but its obvious meaning has been so regarded by modern critics, who resort to many different explanations of it, in order to prove that when properly construed it is not impious. But if we wish to ascertain what Æschylus really meant, we ought not to consult the religious ideas of modern times; we have no test except what we know of the poet's own time and that which had preceded him. The explanations given by the ablest critics seem generally to exhibit a predetermination to bring out Zeus as a just, wise, merciful, and all-powerful Being; and all, in one way or another, distort the figures, alter the perspective, and give far-fetched interpretations of the meaning, of this striking drama, which conveys an impression directly contrary (see Welcker, Trilogie, Æsch. p. 90-117, with the explanation of Dissen there given; Klausen, Theologum. Æsch. p. 140-154; Schömann, in his recent translation of the play, and the criticism on that Translation in the Wiener Jahrbücher, vol. cix. 1845, p. 245, by F. Ritter). On the other hand, Schutz (Excurs. ad Prom. Vinct. p. 149) thinks that Æschylus wished by means of this drama to enforce upon his countrymen the hatred of a despot. Though I do not agree in this interpretation, it appears to me less wide of the truth than the forcible methods employed by others to bring the poet into harmony with their own religious ideas.

Without presuming to determine whether Æschylus proposed to himself any special purpose, if we look at the Æschylean Promêtheus in reference only to ancient ideas, it will be found to borrow both its characters and all its main circumstances from the legend in the Hesiodic Theogony. Zeus acquires his supremacy only by overthrowing Kronos and the Titans; the Titan god Promêtheus is the pronounced champion of helpless man, and

negotiates with Zeus on their behalf: Zeus wishes to withhold from them the most essential blessings, which Promêtheus employs deceit and theft to procure for them, and ultimately with success; undergoing, however, severe punishment for so doing from the superior force of Zeus. These are the main features of the Æschylean Promêtheus, and they are all derived from the legend as it stands in the Theogony. As for the human race, they are depicted as abject and helpless in an extreme degree, in Æschylus even more than in Hesiod: they appear as a race of aboriginal savages, having the god Promêtheus for their protector.

Æschylus has worked up the old legend, homely and unimpressive as we read it in Hesiod, into a sublime ideal. We are not to forget that Promêtheus is not a man, but a god,—the equal of Zeus in race, though his inferior in power, and belonging to a family of gods who were once superior to Zeus: he has moreover deserted his own kindred, and lent all his aid and superior sagacity to Zeus, whereby chiefly the latter was able to acquire supremacy (this *last* circumstance is an addition by Æschylus himself to the Hesiodic legend). In spite of such essential service, Zeus had doomed him to cruel punishment, for no other reason than because he conferred upon helpless man the prime means of continuance and improvement, thus thwarting the intention of Zeus to extinguish the race.

Now Zeus, though superior to all the other gods and exercising general control, was never considered, either in Grecian legend or in Grecian religious belief, to be superior in so immeasurable a degree as to supersede all free action and sentiment on the part of gods less powerful. There were many old legends of dissension among the gods, and several of disobedience against Zeus: when a poet chose to dramatize one of these, he might so turn his composition as to sympathize either with Zeus or with the inferior god, without in either case shocking the general religious feeling of the country. And if there ever was an instance in which preference of the inferior god would be admissible, it is that of Promêtheus, whose proceedings are such as to call forth the maximum of human sympathy,—superior intelligence pitted against superior force, and resolutely encountering foreknown suffering, for the sole purpose of rendering inestimable and gratuitous service to mortals.

Of the Promêtheus Solutus, which formed a sequel to the Promêtheus Vinctus (the entire trilogy is not certainly known), the fragments preserved are very scanty, and the guesses of critics as to its plot have little base to proceed upon. They contend that, in one way or other, the apparent objections which the Promêth. Vinctus presents against the justice of Zeus were in the Promêth. Solutus removed. Hermann, in his *Dissertatio de Æschyli Prometheo Soluto* (Opuscula, vol. iv. p. 256), calls this position in question: I transcribe from his Dissertation one passage, because it contains an important remark in reference to the manner in which the Greek poets handled their religious legends: "while they recounted and believed many enormities respecting individual gods, they always described the Godhead in the abstract as holy and faultless." …

"Immo illud admirari oportet, quod quum de singulis Diis indignissima quæque crederent, tamen ubi sine certo nomine Deum dicebant, immunem ab omni vitio, summâque sanctitate præditum intelligebant. Illam igitur Jovis sævitiam ut excusent defensores Trilogiæ, et jure punitum volunt Prometheum—et in sequente fabulâ reconciliato Jove, restitutam arbitrantur divinam justitiam. Quo invento, vereor ne non optime dignitati consuluerint supremi Deorum, quem decuerat potius non sævire omnino, quam placari eâ lege, ut alius Promethei vice lueret."

[890] Æschyl. Fragment. 146, Dindorf; ap. Plato. Repub. iii. p. 391; compare Strabo, xii. p. 580.—

> … οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι
>
> Οἱ Ζηνὸς ἐγγὺς, οἷς ἐν Ἰδαίῳ πάγῳ
>
> Διὸς πατρῴου βωμός ἐστ᾽ ἐν αἰθέρι,
>
> Κοὔπω σφιν ἐξίτηλον αἷμα δαιμόνων.

There is one real exception to this statement—the Persæ—which is founded upon an event of recent occurrence; and one apparent exception—the Promêtheus Vinctus. But in that drama no individual mortal is made to appear; we can hardly consider Iô as an ἐφήμερος (253).

[891] For the characteristics of Æschylus see Aristophan. Ran. 755, *ad fin. passim*. The competition between Æschylus and Euripidês turns upon γνῶμαι ἀγαθαὶ, 1497; the weight and majesty of the words, 1362; πρῶτος τῶν Ἑλλήνων πυργώσας ῥήματα σεμνά, 1001, 921, 930 ("sublimis et gravis et grandiloquus sæpe usque ad vitium," Quintil. x. 1); the imposing appearance of his heroes, such as Memnôn and Cycnus, 961; their re-

serve in speech, 908; his dramas "full of Arês" and his lion-hearted chiefs, inspiring the auditors with fearless spirit in defence of their country,—1014, 1019, 1040; his contempt of feminine tenderness, 1042.—

Æsch. Οὐδ᾽ οἶδ᾽ οὐδεὶς ἥντιν᾽ ἐρῶσαν πώποτ᾽ ἐποίησα γυναῖκα.
Eurip. Μὰ Δι᾽, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης οὐδέν σοι.
Æsch. μηδέ γ᾽ ἐπείη·
Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ σοί τοι καὶ τοῖς σοῖσιν πολλὴ πολλοῦ ᾽πικάθοιτο.

To the same general purpose Nubes (1347-1356), composed so many years earlier. The weight and majesty of the Æschylean heroes (βάρος, τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς) is dwelt upon in the life of Æschylus, and Sophoklês is said to have derided it—Ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ Σοφοκλῆς ἔλεγε, τὸν Αἰσχύλου διαπεπαιχὼς *ὄγκον*, etc. (Plutarch, De Profect. in Virt. Sent. c. 7), unless we are to understand this as a mistake of Plutarch quoting Sophoklês instead of Euripidês, as he speaks in the Frogs of Aristophanês, which is the opinion both of Lessing in his Life of Sophoklês and of Welcker (Æschyl. Trilogie, p. 525).

[892] See above, Chapters xiv. and xv.

Æschylus seems to have been a greater innovator as to the matter of the mythes than either Sophoklês or Euripidês (Dionys. Halic. Judic. de Vett. Script. p. 422, Reisk.). For the close adherence of Sophoklês to the Homeric epic, see Athena, vii. p. 277; Diogen. Laërt. iv. 20; Suidas, v. Πολέμων. Æschylus puts into the mouth of the Eumenidês a serious argument derived from the behavior of Zeus in chaining his father Kronos (Eumen. 640).

[893] See Valckenaer, Diatribe in Euripid. Fragm. capp. 5 and 6.

The fourth and fifth lectures among the *Dramatische Vorlesungen* of August Wilhelm Schlegel depict both justly and eloquently the difference between Æschylus, Sophoklês and Euripidês, especially on this point of the gradual sinking of the mythical colossus into an ordinary man; about Euripidês especially in lecture 5, vol. i. p. 206, ed. Heidelberg 1809.

[894] Aristot. Poetic. c. 46. Οἷον καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη, αὐτὸς μὲν οἵους δεῖ ποιεῖν, Εὐριπίδης δὲ, οἷοί εἰσι.

The Ranæ and Acharneis of Aristophanês exhibit fully the reproaches urged against Euripidês: the language put into the mouth of Euripidês in the former play (vv. 935-977) illustrates specially the point here laid down. Plutarch (De Gloriâ Atheniens. c. 5) contrasts ἡ Εὐριπίδου σοφία καὶ ἡ Σοφοκλεοῦς λογιότης. Sophoklês either adhered to the old mythes or introduced alterations into them in a spirit comformable to their original character, while Euripidês refined upon them. The comment of Dêmêtrius Phalereus connects τὸ λόγιον expressly with the maintenance of the dignity of the tales. Ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ὅπερ νῦν *λόγιον* ὀνομάζουσιν (c. 38).

[895] Aristophan. Ran. 770, 887, 1066.

Euripidês says to Æschylus, in regard to the language employed by both of them,—

Ἦν οὖν σὺ λέγῃς Λυκαβήττους
Καὶ Παρνάσσων ἡμῖν μεγέθη, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ χρηστὰ διδάσκειν,
Ὃν χρὴ φράζειν ἀνθρωπείως;

Æschylus replies,—

Ἀλλ᾽, ὦ κακόδαιμον, ἀνάγκη
Μεγάλων γνωμῶν καὶ διανοιῶν ἴσα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα τίκτειν.
Κἄλλως εἰκὸς τοὺς *ἡμιθέους* τοῖς ῥήμασι μείζοσι χρῆσθαι·
Καὶ γὰρ τοῖς ἱματίοις ἡμῶν χρῶνται πολὺ σεμνοτέροισι.
Ἃ ᾽μοῦ χρηστῶς καταδείξαντος διελυμήνω σu.
Eurip. Τί δράσας;
Æsch. Πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς βασιλεύοντας ῥάκι᾽ ἀμπίσχων, ἵν᾽ ἐλεινοὶ
Τοῖς ἀνθρώποις φαίνοιντ᾽ εἶναι.

For the character of the language and measures of Euripidês, as represented by Æschylus, see also v. 1297, and Pac. 527. Philosophical discussion was introduced by Euripidês (Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhetor. viii. 10-ix. 11) about

the Melanippê, where the doctrine of prodigies (τέρας) appears to have been argued. Quintilian (x. 1) remarks that to young beginners in judicial pleading, the study of Euripidês was much more specially profitable than that of Sophoklês: compare Dio Chrysostom, Orat. xviii. vol. i. p. 477, Reisk.

In Euripidês the heroes themselves sometimes delivered moralizing discourses:—εἰσάγων τὸν Βελλεροφόντην γνωμολογοῦντα (Welcker, Griechisch. Tragöd. Eurip. Stheneb. p. 782). Compare the fragments of his Bellerophôn (15-25, Matthiæ), and of his Chrysippus (7, *ib.*). A striking story is found in Seneca, Epistol. 115; and Plutarch, de Audiend. Poetis, c. 4. t. i. p. 70, Wytt.

[896] Aristophan. Ran. 840.—

ὦ στωμυλιοσυλλεκτάδη

Καὶ πτωχοποιὲ καὶ ῥακιοσυῤῥαπτάδη·

See also Aristophan. Acharn. 385-422. For an unfavorable criticism upon such proceeding, see Aristot. Poet. 27.

[897] Aristophan. Ran. 1050.—

Eurip. Πότερον δ᾽ *οὐκ ὄντα λόγον* τοῦτον περὶ τῆς Φαίδρας ξυνέθηκα;
Æsch. Μὰ Δί᾽, ἀλλ᾽ ὄντ᾽· ἀλλ᾽ ἀποκρύπτειν χρὴ τὸ πονηρὸν τόν γε ποιητὴν,
Καὶ μὴ παράγειν μηδὲ διδάσκειν.

In the Hercules Furens, Euripidês puts in relief and even exaggerates the worst elements of the ancient mythes: the implacable hatred of Hêrê towards Hêraklês is pushed so far as to deprive him of his reason (by sending down Iris and the unwilling Λύσσα), and thus intentionally to drive him to slay his wife and children with his own hands.

[898] Aristoph. Ran. 849, 1041, 1080; Thesmophor. 547; Nubes, 1354. Grauert, De Mediâ Græcorum Comœdiâ in Rheinisch. Museum, 2nd Jahrs. 1 Heft, p. 51. It suited the plan of the drama of Æolus, as composed by Euripidês, to place in the mouth of Macareus a formal recommendation of incestuous marriages: probably this contributed much to offend the Athenian public. See Dionys. Hal. Rhetor. ix. p. 355.

About the liberty of intermarriage among relatives, indicated in Homer, parents and children being alone excepted, see Terpstra, Antiquitas Homerica, cap. xiii. p. 104.

Ovid, whose poetical tendencies led him chiefly to copy Euripidês, observes (Trist. ii. 1, 380)—

"Omne genus scripti gravitate Tragœdia vincit,
Hæc quoque materiam semper amoris habet.
Nam quid in Hippolyto nisi cæcæ flamma novercæ?
Nobilis est Canace fratris amore sui."

This is the reverse of the truth in regard to Æschylus and Sophoklês, and only very partially true in respect to Euripidês.

[899] Aristot. Ethic. Nicom. iii. 1, 8. καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγκάσαντα μητροκτονῆσαι (In the lost tragedy called Ἀλκμαίων ὁ διὰ Ψωφῖδος).

[900] Aristot. Poetic. 26-27. And in his Problemata also, in giving the reason why the Hypo-Dorian and Hypo-Phrygian musical modes were never assigned to the Chorus, he says—

Ταῦτα δὲ ἄμφω χόρῳ μὲν ἀναρμοστὰ, τοῖς δὲ ἀπὸ σκηνῆς οἰκειότερα. Ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ ἡρώων μίμηται· οἱ δὲ ἡγεμόνες τῶν ἀρχαίων μόνοι ἦσαν ἥρωες, οἱ δὲ λαοὶ ἄνθρωποι, ὧν ἐστὶν ὁ χόρος. Διὸ καὶ ἁρμόζει αὐτῷ τὸ γοερὸν καὶ ἡσύχιον ἦθος καὶ μέλος· ἀνθρωπικὰ γάρ.

[901] See Müller, Prolegom. zu einer wissenschaftlichen Mythologie, c. iii. p. 93.

[902] Hellanic. Fragment. 143, ed. Didot.

[903] Hekatæi Fragm. ed. Didot. 332, 346, 349; Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. 1. 256; Athenæ. ii. p. 133; Skylax, c. 26.

Perhaps Hekatæus was induced to look for Erytheia in Epirus by the brick-red color of the earth there in many places, noticed by Pouqueville and other travellers (Voyage dans la Grèce, vol. ii. 248: see Klausen, Æneas und die Penaten, vol. i. p. 222). Ἑκαταῖος ὁ Μιλήσιος—λόγον εὗρεν εἰκότα, Pausan. iii. 25, 4. He seems to have written expressly concerning the fabulous Hyperboreans, and to have upheld the common faith against doubts which had begun to rise in his time: the derisory notice of Hyperboreans in Herodotus is probably directed against Hekatæus, iv. 36; Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. ii. 675; Diodôr. ii. 47.

It is maintained by Mr. Clinton (Fast. Hell. ii. p. 480) and others (see not. ad Fragment. Hecatæi, p. 30, ed. Didot), that the work on the Hyperboreans was written by Hekatæus of Abdêra, a literary Greek of the age of Ptolemy Philadelphus—not by Hekatæus of Milêtus. I do not concur in this opinion. I think it much more probable that the earlier Hekatæus was the author spoken of.

The distinguished position held by Hekatæus at Milêtus is marked not only by the notice which Herodotus takes of his opinions on public matters, but also by his negotiation with the Persian satrap Artaphernes on behalf of his countrymen (Diodôr. Excerpt. xlvii. p. 41, ed. Dindorf).

[904] Herodot. ii. 143.

[905] Marcellin. Vit. Thucyd. init.

[906] Herodot. ii. 143.

[907] Herodot. ii. 3, 51, 61, 65, 170. He alludes briefly (c. 51) to an ἱρὸς λόγος which was communicated in the Samothracian mysteries, but he does not mention what it was: also about the Thesmophoria, or τελετὴ of Dêmêtêr (c. 171).

Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων τοσαῦτα ἡμῖν εἰποῦσι, καὶ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν καὶ ἡρώων εὐμένεια εἴη (c. 45).

Compare similar scruples on the part of Pausanias (viii. 25 and 37).

The passage of Herodotus (ii. 3) is equivocal, and has been understood in more ways than one (see Lobeck, Aglaopham. p. 1287).

The aversion of Dionysius of Halikarnassus to reveal the divine secrets is not less powerful (see A. R. i. 67, 68), and Pausanias *passim*.

[908] Herod. iii. 122.

[909] Herod. ii. 145.

[910] Herodot. ii. 43-145. Καὶ ταῦτα Αἰγύπτιοι ἀτρεκέως φασὶ ἐπίστασθαι, ἀεί τε λογιζόμενοι καὶ ἀεὶ ἀπογραφόμενοι τὰ ἔτεα.

[911] Herodot, ii. 53. μέχρι οὗ πρωήν τε καὶ χθὲς, ὡς εἰπεῖν λόγῳ. Ἡσίοδον γὰρ καὶ Ὅμηρον ἡλικίην τετρακοσίοισι ἔτεσι δοκέω μευ πρεσβυτέρους γενέσθαι, καὶ οὐ πλέοσι.

[912] Herodot. ii. 146.

[913] Herod. i. 56.

[914] Herod. v. 66.

[915] Herod. ix. 73.

[916] Herod. ii, 43-44, 91-98, 171-182 (the Egyptians admitted the truth of the Greek legend, that Perseus had come to Libya to fetch the Gorgon's head).

[917] Herod. ii. 113-120; iv. 145; vii. 134.

[918] Herod. i. 67-68; ii. 113. vii. 159.

[919] Herod. i. 1, 2, 4; v. 81, 65.

[920] Herod. i. 52; iv. 145; v. 67; vii. 193.

[921] Herod. vi. 52-53.

[922] Herod. iv. 147; v. 59-61.

[923] Herod. v. 61; ix. 27-28.

[924] Herod. i. 52; iv. 145; v. 67.

[925] Herod. i. 1-4; ii. 49, 113: iv. 147; v. 94.

[926] Herod. ii. 45. Λέγουσι δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα ἀνεπισκέπτως οἱ Ἕλληνες· εὐήθης δὲ αὐτέων καὶ ὅδε ὁ μῦθός ἐστι, τὸν περὶ τοῦ Ἡρακλέος λέγουσι…. Ἔτι δὲ ἕνα ἐόντα τὸν Ἡρακλέα, καὶ ἔτι ἄνθρωπον ὡς δή φασι, *κῶς φύσιν ἔχει* πολλὰς μυριάδας φονεῦσαι; Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων τοσαῦτα ἡμῖν εἰποῦσι, καὶ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡρώων εὐμένεια εἴη.

We may also notice the manner in which the historian criticizes the stratagem whereby Peisistratus established himself as despot at Athens—by dressing up the stately Athenian woman Phyê in the costume of the goddess Athênê, and passing off her injunctions as the commands of the goddess; the Athenians accepted her with unsuspecting faith, and received Peisistratus at her command. Herodotus treats the whole affair as a piece of extravagant silliness, πρᾶγμα εὐηθέστατον μακρῷ (i. 60).

[927] Herod. ii. 55. Δωδωναίων δὲ αἱ ἱρηΐαι … ἔλεγον ταῦτα, συνωμολόγεον δέ σφι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Δωδωναῖοι οἱ περὶ τὸ ἱρόν.

The miracle sometimes takes another form; the oak at Dôdôna was itself once endued with speech (Dionys. Hal. Ars. Rhetoric. i. 6; Strabo).

[928] Herod. ii. 54.

[929] Herod. ii. 57. Ἐπεὶ τέῳ ἂν τρόπῳ πελειάς γε ἀνθρωπηΐῃ φωνῇ φθέγξαιτο;

According to one statement, the word Πελειὰς in the Thessalian dialect meant both a dove and a prophetess (Scriptor. Rer. Mythicarum, ed. Bode, i. 96). Had there been any truth in this, Herodotus could hardly have failed to notice it, inasmuch as it would exactly have helped him out of the difficulty which he felt.

[930] Herod. ii. 49. Ἐγὼ μὲν νὺν φημι Μελάμποδα γενόμενον ἄνδρα σοφὸν, μαντικήν τε ἑωυτῷ συστῆσαι, καὶ πυθόμενον ἀπ᾽ Αἰγύπτου, ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἐσηγήσασθαι Ἕλλησι, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον, ὀλίγα αὐτῶν παραλλάξαντα.

[931] Herod. ii. 49. Ἀτρεκέως μὲν οὐ πάντα συλλαβὼν τὸν λόγον ἔφηνε· (Melampus) ἀλλ᾽ οἱ ἐπιγενόμενοι τούτῳ *σοφισταὶ* μεζόνως ἐξέφηναν.

[932] Compare Herod. iv. 95; ii. 81. Ἑλλήνων οὐ τῷ ἀσθενεστάτῳ *σοφιστῇ* Πυθαγόρᾳ.

[933] Homer, Odyss. xi. 290; xv. 225. Apollodôr. i. 9, 11-12. Hesiod, Eoiai, Fragm. 55, ed. Düntzer (p. 43)—

Ἀλκὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκεν Ὀλύμπιος Αἰακίδῃσι,

Νοῦν δ᾽ Ἀμυθαονίδαις, πλοῦτον δ᾽ ἔπορ᾽ Ἀτρεΐδῃσι.

also Frag. 34 (p. 38), and Frag. 65 (p. 45); Schol. Apoll. Rhod. i. 118.

Herodotus notices the celebrated mythical narrative of Melampus healing the deranged Argive women (ix. 34); according to the original legend, the daughters of Prœtus. In the Hesiodic Eoiai (Fr. 16, Düntz.; Apollod. ii. 2) the distemper of the Prœtid females was ascribed to their having repudiated the rites and worship of Dionysus (Akusilaus, indeed, assigned a different cause), which shows that the old fable recognized a connection between Melampus and these rites.

[934] Homer, Iliad, i. 72-87; xv. 412. Odyss. xv. 245-252; iv. 233. Some times the gods inspired prophecy for the special occasion, without conferring upon the party the permanent gift and *status* of a prophet (compare Odyss. i. 202; xvii. 383). Solôn, Fragm. xi. 48-53, Schneidewin:—

Ἄλλον μάντιν ἔθηκεν ἄναξ ἑκάεργος Ἀπολλὼν,

Ἔγνω δ᾽ ἀνδρὶ κακὸν τηλόθεν ἐρχόμενον,

Ὥι συνομαρτήσωσι θεοὶ….

Herodotus himself reproduces the old belief in the special gift of prophetic power by Zeus and Apollo, in the story of Euenius of Apollônia (ix. 94).

See the fine ode of Pindar, describing the birth and inspiration of Jamus, eponymous father of the great prophetic family in Elis called the Jamids (Herodot. ix. 33), Pindar, Olymp. vi. 40-75. About Teiresias, Sophoc. Œd. Tyr. 283-410. Neither Nestôr nor Odysseus possesses the gift of prophecy.

[935] More than one tale is found elsewhere, similar to this, about the defile of Tempê:—

"A tradition exists that this part of the country was once a lake, and that Solomon commanded two deeves, or genii, named Ard and Beel, to turn off the water into the Caspian, which they effected by cutting a passage through the mountains; and a city, erected in the newly-formed plain, was named after them Ard-u-beel." (Sketches on the Shores of the Caspian, by W. R. Holmes.)

Also about the plain of Santa Fe di Bogota, in South America, that it was once under water, until Bochica cleft the mountains and opened a channel of egress (Humboldt, Vues des Cordillères, p. 87-88); and about the plateau of Kashmir (Humboldt, Asie Centrale, vol. i. p. 102), drained in a like miraculous manner by the saint Kâsyapa. The manner in which conjectures, derived from local configuration or peculiarities, are often made to assume the form of *traditions*, is well remarked by the same illustrious traveller: "Ce qui se présente comme une tradition, n'est souvent que le reflet de l'impression que laisse l'aspect des lieux. Des bancs de coquilles à demi-fossiles, répandues dans les isthmes ou sur des plateaux, font naître même chez les hommes les moins avancés dans la culture intellectuelle, l'idée de grandes inondations, d'anciennes communications entre des bassins limitrophes. Des opinions, que l'on pourroit appeler systématiques, se trouvent dans les forêts de l'Orénoque comme dans les îles de la Mer du Sud. Dans l'une et dans l'autre de ces contrées, elles ont pris la forme des traditions." (A. von Humboldt, Asie Centrale, vol. ii. p. 147.) Compare a similar remark in the same work and volume, p. 286-294.

[936] Herodot. vii. 129. (Poseidôn was worshipped as Πετραῖος in Thessaly, in commemoration of this geological interference: Schol. Pindar. Pyth. iv. 245.) Τὸ δὲ παλαιὸν λέγεται, οὐκ ἐόντος κω τοῦ αὐλῶνος καὶ διεκρόου τούτου, τοὺς ποτάμους τούτους … ῥέοντας ποιεῖν τὴν Θεσσαλίην πᾶσαν πέλαγος. Αὐτοὶ μέν νυν Θέσσαλοι λέγουσι Ποσειδέωνα ποιῆσαι τὸν αὐλῶνα, δι᾽ οὗ ῥέει ὁ Πηνειὸς, οἰκότα λέγοντες. Ὅστις γὰρ νομίζει Ποσειδέωνα τὴν γῆν σείειν, καὶ τὰ διεστεῶτα ὑπὸ σεισμοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ τούτου ἔργα εἶναι, καὶ ἂν ἐκεῖνο ἰδὼν φαίη Ποσειδέωνα ποιῆσαι. Ἐστὶ γὰρ σεισμοῦ ἔργον, ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐφαίνετο εἶναι, ἡ διάστασις τῶν οὐρέων. In another case (viii. 129), Herodotus believes that Poseidôn produced a preternaturally high tide, in order to punish the Persians, who had insulted his temple near Potidæa: here was a special motive for the god to exert his power.

This remark of Herodotus illustrates the hostile ridicule cast by Aristophanês (in the Nubes) upon Socratês, on the score of alleged impiety, because he belonged to a school of philosophers (though in point of fact he discountenanced that line of study) who introduced physical laws and forces in place of the personal agency of the gods. The old man Strepsiades inquires from Socratês, *Who rains? Who thunders?* To which Socratês replies, "*Not Zeus*, but the Nephelæ, *i. e. the clouds*: you never saw rain without clouds." Strepsiades then proceeds to inquire—"But who is it that compels the clouds to move onward? is it not Zeus?" Socratês—"Not at all; it is æthereal rotation." Strepsiades—"Rotation? that had escaped me: Zeus then no longer exists, and Rotation reigns in his place."

Streps. Ὁ δ᾽ ἀναγκάζων ἐστὶ τίς αὐτὰς (Νεφέλας), οὐχ ὁ Ζεὺς, ὥστε φέρεσθαι;
Socrat. Ἥκιστ᾽, ἀλλ᾽ αἰθέριος δῖνος.
Streps. Δῖνος; τουτί μ᾽ ἐλελήθει—
Ὁ Ζεὺς οὐκ ὢν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀντ᾽ αὐτοῦ Δῖνος νυνὶ βασιλεύων.

To the same effect v. 1454, Δῖνος βασιλεύει τὸν Δι᾽ ἐξεληλακώς—"Rotation has driven out Zeus, and reigns in his place."

If Aristophanês had had as strong a wish to turn the public antipathies against Herodotus as against Socratês and Euripidês, the explanation here given would have afforded him a plausible show of truth for doing so; and it is highly probable that the Thessalians would have been sufficiently displeased with the view of Herodotus to sympathize in the poet's attack upon him. The point would have been made (waiving metrical considerations)—

Σεισμὸς βασιλεύει, τὸν *Ποσειδῶν'* ἐξελήλακώς.

The comment of Herodotus upon the Thessalian view seems almost as if it were intended to guard against this very inference.

Other accounts ascribed the cutting of the defile of Tempê to Hêraklês (Diodôr. iv. 18).

Respecting the ancient Grecian faith, which recognized the displeasure of Poseidôn as the cause of earthquakes, see Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 3, 2; Thucydid. i. 127; Strabo, xii. p. 579; Diodôr. xv. 48-49. It ceased to give universal satisfaction even so early as the time of Thalês and Anaximenês (see Aristot. Meteorolog. ii. 7-8; Plutarch, Placit. Philos. iii. 15; Seneca, Natural. Quæst. vi. 6-23); and that philosopher, as well as Anaxagoras, Democritus and others, suggested different physical explanations of the fact. Notwithstanding a dissentient minority, however, the old doctrine still continued to be generally received: and Diodôrus, in describing the terrible earthquake in 373 B. C., by which Helikê and Bura were destroyed, while he notices those philosophers (probably Kallisthenês, Senec. Nat. Quæst. vi. 23) who substituted physical causes and laws in place of the divine agency, rejects their views, and ranks himself with the religious public, who traced this formidable phænomenon to the wrath of Poseidôn (xv. 48-49).

The Romans recognized many different gods as producers of earthquakes; an unfortunate creed, since it exposed them to the danger of addressing their prayers to the wrong god: "Unde in ritualibus et pontificiis observatur, obtemperantibus sacerdotiis caute, ne alio Deo pro alio nominato, cum quis eorum terram concutiat, piacula committantur." (Ammian. Marcell. xvii. 7.)

[937] Herod. ii. 116. δοκέει δέ μοι καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν λόγον τοῦτον πυθέσθαι· ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως εὐπρεπὴς ἐς τὴν ἐποποιΐην ἦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ τῷ περ ἐχρήσατο· ἐς ὃ μετῆκε αὐτὸν, δηλώσας ὡς καὶ τοῦτον ἐπισταῖτο τὸν λόγον.

Herodotus then produces a passage from the Iliad, with a view to prove that Homer knew of the voyage of Paris and Helen to Egypt; but the passage proves nothing at all to the point.

Again (c. 120), his slender confidence in the epic poets breaks out—εἰ χρή τι τοῖσι ἐποποιοῖσι χρεώμενον λέγειν.

It is remarkable that Herodotus is disposed to identify Helen with the ξείνη Ἀφροδίτη whose temple he saw at Memphis (c. 112).

[938] "Ut conquirere fabulosa (says Tacitus, Hist. ii. 50, a worthy parallel of Thucydidês) et fictis oblectare legentium animos, procul gravitate cœpti operis crediderim, ita vulgatis traditisque demere fidem non ausim. Die, quo Bebriaci certabatur, avem inusitatâ specie, apud Regium Lepidum celebri vico consedisse, incolæ memorant; nec deinde cœtu hominum aut circumvolitantium alitum, territam pulsamque, donec Otho se ipse interficeret: tum ablatam ex oculis: et tempora reputantibus, initium finemque miraculi cum Othonis exitu competisse." Suetonius (Vesp. 5) recounts a different miracle, in which three eagles appear.

This passage of Tacitus occurs immediately after his magnificent description of the suicide of the emperor Otho, a deed which he contemplates with the most fervent admiration. His feelings were evidently so wrought up that he was content to relax the canons of historical credibility.

[939] Thucyd. i. 9-12.

[940] Thucyd. i. 25.

[941] Thucyd. ii. 29. Καὶ τὸ ἔργον τὸ περὶ τὸν Ἴτυν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐν τῇ γῇ ταύτῃ ἔπραξαν· πολλοῖς δὲ καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ἀηδόνος μνήμῃ Δαυλιὰς ἡ ὄρνις ἐπωνόμασται. Εἰκὸς τε καὶ τὸ κῆδος Πανδίονα ξυνάψασθαι τῆς θυγατρὸς διὰ τοσοῦτου, ἐπ᾽ ὠφελείᾳ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, μᾶλλον ἢ διὰ πολλῶν ἡμερῶν ἐς Ὀδρύσας ὁδοῦ. The first of these sentences would lead us to infer, if it came from any other pen than that of Thucydidês, that the writer believed the metamorphosis of Philomêla into a nightingale: see above, ch. xi. p. 270.

The observation respecting the convenience of neighborhood for the marriage is remarkable, and shows how completely Thucydidês regarded the event as historical. What would he have said respecting the marriage of Oreithyia, daughter of Erechtheus, with Boreas, and the prodigious distance which she is reported to have been carried by her husband? Ὑπέρ τε πόντον πάντ᾽, ἐπ᾽ ἔσχατα χθονὸς, etc. (Sophoklês ap. Strabo. vii. p. 295.)

From the way in which Thucydidês introduces the mention of this event, we see that he intended to correct the misapprehension of his countrymen, who having just made an alliance with the Odrysian *Têrês*, were led by that circumstance to think of the old mythical *Têreus*, and to regard him as the ancestor of *Têrês*.

[942] Thucyd. iv. 24.

[943] Thucyd. vi. 2.

[944] Thucyd. ii. 68-102; iv. 120; vi. 2. Antiochus of Syracuse, the contemporary of Thucydidês, also mentioned Italus as the eponymous king of Italy: he farther named Sikelus, who came to Morgos, son of Italus, after having been banished from Rome. He talks about Italus, just as Thucydidês talks about Thêseus, as a wise and powerful king, who first acquired a great dominion (Dionys. H. A. R. i. 12, 35, 73). Aristotle also mentioned Italus in the same general terms (Polit. vii. 9, 2).

[945] We may here notice some particulars respecting Isokratês. He manifests entire confidence in the authenticity of the mythical genealogies and chronology; but while he treats the mythical personages as historically real, he regards them at the same time not as human, but as half-gods, superior to humanity. About Helena, Thêseus, Sarpêdôn, Cycnus, Memnôn, Achilles, etc., see Encom. Helen. Or. x. pp. 282, 292, 295. Bek. Helena was worshipped in his time as a goddess at Therapnæ (*ib.* p. 295). He recites the settlements of Danaus, Kadmus, and Pelops in Greece, as undoubted historical facts (p. 297). In his discourse called *Busiris*, he accuses Polykratês, the sophist, of a gross anachronism, in having placed Busiris subsequent in point of date to Orpheus and Æolus (Or. xi. p. 301, Bek.), and he adds that the tale of Busiris having been slain by Hêraklês was chronologically impossible (p. 309). Of the long Athenian genealogy from Kekrops to Thêseus, he speaks with perfect historical confidence (Panathenaic. p. 349, Bek.); not less so of the adventures of Hêraklês and his mythical contemporaries, which he places in the mouth of Archidamus as a justification of the Spartan title to Messenia (Or. vi. *Archidamus*, p. 156, Bek.; compare Or. v. *Philippus*, pp. 114, 138), φάσιν, οἷς περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν πιστεύομεν, etc. He condemns the poets in strong language for the wicked and dissolute tales which they circulated respecting the gods: many of them (he says) had been punished for such blasphemies by blindness, poverty, exile, and other misfortunes (Or. xi. p. 309, Bek.).

In general, it may be said that Isokratês applies no principles of historical criticism to the mythes; he rejects such as appear to him discreditable or unworthy, and believes the rest.

[946] Thucyd. i. 21-22.

The first two volumes of this history have been noticed in an able article of the Quarterly Review, for October, 1846; as well as in the Heidelberger Jahrbücher der Literatur (1846. No. 41. pp. 641-655), by Professor Kortüm.

While expressing, on several points, approbation of my work, by which I feel much flattered—both my English and my German critic take partial objection to the views respecting Grecian legend. While the Quarterly Reviewer contends that the mythopœic faculty of the human mind, though essentially loose and untrustworthy, is never creative, but requires some basis of fact to work upon—Kortüm thinks that I have not done justice to Thucydidês, as regards his way of dealing with legend; that I do not allow sufficient weight to the authority of an historian so circumspect and so cold-blooded (den kalt-blüthigsten und besonnensten Historiker des Alterthums, p. 653) as a satisfactory voucher for the early facts of Grecian history in his preface (Herr G. fehlt also, wenn er das anerkannt kritische Procemium als Gewährsmann verschmäht, p. 654).

No man feels more powerfully than I do the merits of Thucydidês as an historian, or the value of the example which he set in multiplying critical inquiries respecting matters recent and verifiable. But the ablest judge or advocate, in investigating specific facts, can proceed no further than he finds witnesses having the means of knowledge, and willing more or less to tell truth. In reference to facts prior to 776 B. C., Thucydidês had nothing before him except the legendary poets, whose credibility is not at all enhanced by the circumstance that he accepted them as witnesses, applying himself only to cut down and modify their allegations. His credibility in regard to the specific facts of these early times depends altogether upon theirs. Now we in our day are in a better position for appreciating their credibility than he was in his, since the foundations of historical evidence are so

much more fully understood, and good or bad materials for history are open to comparison in such large extent and variety. Instead of wondering that he shared the general faith in such delusive guides—we ought rather to give him credit for the reserve with which he qualified that faith, and for the sound idea of historical possibility to which he held fast as the limit of his confidence. But it is impossible to consider Thucydidês as a *satisfactory guarantee* (Gewährsmann) for matters of fact which he derives only from such sources.

Professor Kortüm considers that I am inconsistent with myself in refusing to discriminate particular matters of historical fact among the legends—and yet in accepting these legends (in my chap. xx.) as giving a faithful mirror of the general state of early Grecian society (p. 653). It appears to me that this is no inconsistency, but a real and important distinction. Whether Hêraklês, Agamemnôn, Odysseus, etc. were real persons, and performed all, or a part, of the possible actions ascribed to them—I profess myself unable to determine. But even assuming both the persons and their exploits to be fictions, these very fictions will have been conceived and put together in conformity to the general social phænomena among which the describer and his hearers lived—and will thus serve as illustrations of the manners then prevalent. In fact, the real value of the Preface of Thucydidês, upon which Professor Kortüm bestows such just praise, consists, not in the particular facts which he brings out by altering the legends, but in the rational general views which he sets forth respecting early Grecian society, and respecting the steps as well as the causes whereby it attained its actual position as he saw it.

Professor Kortüm also affirms that the mythes contain "real matter of fact along with mere conceptions:" which affirmation is the same as that of the Quarterly Reviewer, when he says that the mythopœic faculty is not creative. Taking the mythes in the mass, I doubt not that this is true, nor have I anywhere denied it. Taking them one by one, I neither affirm nor deny it. My position is, that, whether there be matter of fact or not, we have no test whereby it can be singled out, identified, and severed from the accompanying fiction. And it lies upon those, who proclaim the practicability of such severance, to exhibit some means of verification better than any which has been yet pointed out. If Thucydidês has failed in doing this, it is certain that none of the many authors who have made the same attempt after him have been more successful.

It cannot surely be denied that the mythopœic faculty is *creative*, when we have before us so many divine legends, not merely in Greece, but in other countries also. To suppose that these religious legends are mere exaggerations, etc. of some basis of actual fact—that the gods of polytheism were merely divinized men, with qualities distorted or feigned—would be to embrace in substance the theory of Euêmerus.

[947] Diodôr. xv. 89. He was a contemporary of Alexander the Great.

[948] Diodôr. iv. 1. Strabo, ix. p. 422, ἐπιτιμήσας τοῖς φιλομυθοῦσιν ἐν τῇ τῆς ἱστωρίας γραφῇ.

[949] Ephorus recounted the principal adventures of Hêraklês (Fragm. 8, 9, ed. Marx.), the tales of Kadmus and Harmonia (Fragm. 12), the banishment of Ætôlus from Elis (Fragm. 15; Strabo, viii. p. 357); he drew inferences from the chronology of the Trojan and Theban wars (Fragm. 28); he related the coming of Dædalus to the Sikan king Kokalus, and the expedition of the Amazons (Fragm. 99-103).

He was particularly copious in his information about κτίσεις, ἀποικίαι and συγγενείαι (Polyb. ix. 1).

[950] Strabo, i. p. 74.

[951] Dionys. Halic. De Vett. Scriptt. Judic. p. 428, Reisk; Ælian, V. H. iii. 18, Θεόπομπος … δεινὸς μυθόλογος.

Theopompus affirmed, that the bodies of those who went into the forbidden precinct (τὸ ἄβατον) of Zeus, in Arcadia, gave no shadow (Polyb. xvi. 12). He recounted the story of Midas and Silênus (Fragm. 74, 75, 76, ed. Wichers); he said a good deal about the heroes of Troy; and he seems to have assigned the misfortunes of the Νόστοι to an historical cause—the rottenness of the Grecian ships, from the length of the siege, while the genuine epic ascribes it to the anger of Athênê (Fragm. 112, 113, 114; Schol. Homer. Iliad, ii. 135); he narrated an alleged expulsion of Kinyras from Cyprus by Agamemnôn (Fragm. 111); he gave the genealogy of the Macedonian queen Olympias up to Achilles and Æakus (Fragm. 232).

[952] Cicero, Epist. ad Familiar. v. 12; Xenophôn de Venation. c. 1.

[953] Philistus, Fragm. 1 (Göller), Dædalus, and Kokalus; about Liber and Juno (Fragm. 57); about the migration of the Sikels into Sicily, eighty years after the Trojan war (ap. Dionys. Hal. i. 3).

Timæus (Fragm. 50, 51, 52, 53, Göller) related many fables respecting Jasôn, Mêdea, and the Argonauts generally. The miscarriage of the Athenian armament under Nikias, before Syracuse, is imputed to the anger of

Hêraklês against the Athenians because they came to assist the Egestans, descendants of Troy (Plutarch, Nikias, 1),—a naked reproduction of genuine epical agencies by an historian; also about Diomêdês and the Daunians; Phaëthôn and the river Eridanus; the combats of the Gigantes in the Phlegræan plains (Fragm. 97, 99, 102).

[954] Strabo, ix. p. 422.

[955] Compare Diodôr. v. 44-46; and Lactantius, De Falsâ Relig. i. 11.

[956] Cicero, De Naturâ Deor. i. 42; Varro, De Re Rust. i. 48.

[957] Strabo, ii. p. 102. Οὐ πολὺ οὖν λείπεται ταῦτα τῶν Πύθεω καὶ Εὐημέρου καὶ Ἀντιφάνους ψευσμάτων; compare also i. p. 47, and ii. p. 104.

St. Augustin, on the contrary, tells us (Civitat. Dei, vi. 7), "Quid de ipse Jove senserunt, qui nutricem ejus in Capitolio posuerunt? Nonne attestati sunt omnes Euemero, qui non fabulosâ garrulitate, sed *historicâ diligentiâ*, homines fuisse mortalesque conscripsit?" And Minucius Felix (Octav. 20-21), "Euemerus exequitur Deorum natales: patrias, sepulcra dinumerat, et per provincias monstrat, Dictæi Jovis, et Apollinis Delphici, et Phariæ Isidis, et Cereris Eleusiniæ." Compare Augustin, Civit. Dei, xviii. 8-14; and Clemens Alexand. Cohort. ad Gent. pp. 15-18, Sylb.

Lactantius (De Falsâ Relig. c. 13, 14, 16) gives copious citations from Ennius's translation of the Historia Sacra of Euêmerus.

Εὐήμερος, ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς ἄθεος, Sextus Empiricus, adv. Physicos, ix. § 17-51. Compare Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 42; Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, c. 23. tom. ii. p. 475, ed. Wytt.

Nitzsch assumes (Helden Sage der Griechen, sect. 7. p. 84) that the voyage of Euêmerus to Panchaia was intended only as an amusing romance, and that Strabo, Polybius, Eratosthenês and Plutarch were mistaken in construing it as a serious recital. Böttiger, in his Kunst-Mythologie der Griechen (Absch. ii. s. 6. p. 190), takes the same view. But not the least reason is given for adopting this opinion, and it seems to me far-fetched and improbable; Lobeck (Aglaopham. p. 989), though Nitzsch alludes to him as holding it, manifests no such tendency, as far as I can observe.

[958] Diodôr. iv. 1-8. Ἔνιοι γὰρ τῶν ἀναγινωσκόντων, οὐ δικαίᾳ χρώμενοι κρίσει, τἀκριβὲς ἐπιζητοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαίαις μυθολογίαις, ἐπίσης τοῖς πραττομένοις ἐν τῷ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ, καὶ τὰ δισταζόμενα τῶν ἔργων διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, ἐκ τοῦ καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς βίου τεκμαιρόμενοι, τὴν Ἡρακλέους δύναμιν ἐκ τῆς ἀσθενείας τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων θεωροῦσιν, ὥστε διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἔργων ἀπιστεῖσθαι τὴν γραφήν. Καθόλου γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαίαις μυθολογίαις οὐκ ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου *πικρῶς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐξεταστέον*. Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις *πεπεισμένοι μήτε Κενταύρους* διφυεῖς ἐξ ἑτερογενῶν σωμάτων ὑπάρξαι, μήτε Γηρυόνην τρισώματον, *ὅμως προσδεχόμεθα τὰς τοιαύτας μυθολογίας*, καὶ *ταῖς ἐπισημασίαις συναύξομεν τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ τιμήν*. Καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον, Ἡρακλέα μὲν ἔτι κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπους ὄντα τοῖς ἰδίοις πόνοις ἐξημερῶσαι τὴν οἰκουμένην, τοὺς δ᾽ ἀνθρώπους, ἐπιλαθομένους τῆς κοινῆς εὐεργεσίας, *συκοφαντεῖν* τὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἔργοις ἔπαινον, etc.

This is a remarkable passage: first, inasmuch as it sets forth the total inapplicability of analogies drawn from the historical past as narratives about Hêraklês; next, inasmuch as it suspends the employment of critical and scientific tests, and invokes an acquiescence interwoven and identified with the feelings, as the proper mode of evincing pious reverence for the god Hêraklês. It aims at reproducing exactly that state of mind to which the mythes were addressed, and with which alone they could ever be in thorough harmony.

[959] Diodôr. iii. 45-60; v. 44-46.

[960] The work of Palæphatus, probably this original, is alluded to in the *Ciris* of Virgil (88):—

"Docta Palæphatiâ testatur voce papyrus."

The date of Palæphatus is unknown—indeed this passage of the *Ciris* seems the only ground that there is for inference respecting it. That which we now possess is probably an extract from a larger work—made by another person at some later time: see Vossius de Historicis Græcis, p. 478, ed. Westermann.

[961] Palæphat. init. ap. Script. Mythogr. ed. Westermann, p. 268. Τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν πείθονται πᾶσι τοῖς λεγομένοις, ὡς ἀνομίλητοι σοφίας καὶ ἐπιστήμης—οἱ δὲ πυκνότεροι τὴν φύσιν καὶ πολυπράγμονες ἀπιστοῦσι

τὸ παράπαν μηδὲν γενέσθαι τούτων. Ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ γενέσθαι πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα· … γενόμενα δέ τινα οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ λογογράφοι παρέτρεψαν εἰς τὸ ἀπιστότερον καὶ θαυμασιώτερον τοῦ θαυμάζειν ἕνεκα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. Ἐγὼ δὲ γινώσκω, ὅτι οὐ δύναται τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι οἷα καὶ λέγεται· τοῦτο δὲ καὶ διείληφα, ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἂν ἐλέγετο.

The main assumption of the semi-historical theory is here shortly and clearly stated.

One of the early Christian writers, Minucius Felix, is astonished at the easy belief of his pagan forefathers in miracles. If ever such things had been done in former times (he affirms), they would continue to be done now; as they cannot be done now, we may be sure that they never were *really* done formerly (Minucius Felix, Octav. c. 20): "Majoribus enim nostris tam facilis in mendaciis fides fuit, ut temerè crediderint etiam alia monstruosa mira miracula, Scyllam multiplicem, Chimæram multiformem, Hydram, et Centauros. Quid illas aniles fabulas—de hominibus aves, et feras homines, et de hominibus arbores atque flores? *Quæ, si essent facta, fierent; quia fieri non possunt, ideo nec facta sunt.*"

[962] Palæphat. Narrat. 1, 3, 6, 13, 20, 21, 29. Two short treatises on the same subject as this of Palæphatus, are printed along with it, both in the collection of Gale and of Westermann; the one, *Heracliti de Incredibilibus*, the other *Anonymi de Incredibilibus*. They both profess to interpret some of the extraordinary or miraculous mythes, and proceed in a track not unlike that of Palæphatus. Scylla was a beautiful courtezan, surrounded with abominable parasites: she ensnared and ruined the companions of Odysseus, though he himself was prudent enough to escape her (Heraclit. c. 2. p. 313, West.) Atlas was a great astronomer: Pasiphaê fell in love with a youth named Taurus; the monster called the Chimæra was in reality a ferocious queen, who had two brothers called Leo and Drako; the ram which carried Phryxus and Hellê across the Ægean was a boatman named Krias (Heraclit. c. 2, 6, 15, 24).

A great number of similar explanations are scattered throughout the Scholia on Homer and the Commentary of Eustathius, without specification of their authors.

Theôn considers such resolution of fable into plausible history as a proof of surpassing ingenuity (Progymnasmata, cap. 6, ap. Walz. Coll. Rhett. Græc. i. p. 219). Others among the Rhetors, too, exercised their talents sometimes in vindicating, sometimes in controverting, the probability of the ancient mythes. See the Progymnasmata of Nicolaus—Κατασκευὴ ὅτι εἰκότα τὰ κατὰ Νιόβην, Ἀνασκευὴ ὅτι οὐκ εἰκότα τὰ κατὰ Νιόβην (ap. Walz. Coll. Rhetor. i. p. 284-318), where there are many specimens of this fanciful mode of handling.

Plutarch, however, in one of his treatises, accepts Minotaurs, Sphinxes, Centaurs, etc. as realities; he treats them as products of the monstrous, incestuous, and ungovernable lusts of man, which he contrasts with the simple and moderate passions of animals (Plutarch, Gryllus, p. 990).

[963] The learned Mr. Jacob Bryant regards the explanations of Palæphatus as if they were founded upon real fact. He admits, for example, the city Nephelê alleged by that author in his exposition of the fable of the Centaurs. Moreover, he speaks with much commendation of Palæphatus generally: "He (Palæphatus) wrote early, and seems to have been a serious and sensible person; one who saw the absurdity of the fables upon which the theology of his country was founded." (Ancient Mythology, vol. i. p. 411-435.)

So also Sir Thomas Brown (Enquiry into Vulgar Errors, Book I. chap. vi. p. 221, ed. 1835) alludes to Palæphatus as having incontestably pointed out the real basis of the fables. "And surely the fabulous inclination of those days was greater than any since; which swarmed so with fables, and from such slender grounds took hints for fictions, poisoning the world ever after: wherein how far they succeeded, may be exemplified from Palæphatus, in his Book of Fabulous Narrations."

[964] Xenophan. ap. Sext. Empir. adv. Mathemat. ix. 193. He also disapproved of the rites, accompanied by mourning and wailing, with which the Eleatês worshipped Leukothea: he told them, εἰ μὲν θεὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, μὴ θρηνεῖν· εἰ δὲ ἄνθρωπον, μὴ θύειν (Aristotel. Rhet. ii. 23).

Xenophanês pronounced the battles of the Titans, Gigantes, and Centaurs to be "fictions of our predecessors," πλάσματα τῶν προτέρων (Xenophan. Fragm. 1. p. 42, ed. Schneidewin).

See a curious comparison of the Grecian and Roman theology in Dionys. Halicarn. Ant. Rom. ii. 20.

[965] Schol. Iliad. xx. 67: Tatian. adv. Græc. c. 48. Hêrakleitus indignantly repelled the impudent atheists who found fault with the divine mythes of the Iliad, ignorant of their true allegorical meaning: ἡ τῶν ἐπιφυομένων τῷ Ὁμήρῳ τόλμα τοὺς Ἥρας δεσμοὺς αἰτιᾶται, καὶ νομίζουσιν ὕλην τινα δαψιλῆ τῆς ἀθέου πρὸς

Ὅμηρον ἔχειν μανίας ταῦτα—Ἢ οὐ μέμνῃ ὅτι τ᾽ ἐκρέμω ὑψόθεν, etc. λέληθε δ᾽ αὐτοὺς ὅτι τούτοις τοῖς ἔπεσιν ἐκτεθεολόγηται ἡ τοῦ παντὸς γένεσις, καὶ τὰ συνεχῶς ᾀδόμενα τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα τούτων τῶν στίχων ἐστὶ τάξις (Schol. ad Hom. Iliad. xv. 18).

[966] Diogen. Laërt. ii. 11; Tatian. adv. Græc. c. 37; Hesychius, v. Ἀγαμέμνονα. See the ethical turn given to the stories of Circê, the Sirens, and Scylla, in Xenoph. Memorab. i. 3, 7; ii. 6, 11-31. Syncellus, Chronic. p. 149. Ἑρμηνεύουσι δὲ οἱ Ἀναξαγόρειοι τοὺς μυθώδεις θεοὺς, νοῦν μὲν τὸν Δία, τὴν δὲ Ἀθηνᾶν τέχνην, etc.

Uschold and other modern German authors seem to have adopted in its full extent the principle of interpretation proposed by Metrodorus—treating Odysseus and Penelopê as personifications of the Sun and Moon, etc. See Helbig, Die Sittlichen Zustände des Griechischen Helden Alters, Einleitung, p. xxix. (Leipzig, 1839.)

Corrections of the Homeric text were also resorted to, in order to escape the necessity of imputing falsehood to Zeus (Aristotel. De Sophist. Elench. c. 4).

[967] Sextus Empiric. ix. 18; Diogen. viii. 76; Plutarch, De Placit. Philosoph. i. 3-6; De Poesi Homericâ, 92-126; De Stoicor. Repugn. p. 1050, Menander, De Encomiis, c. 5.

Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 14, 15, 16, 41; ii. 24-25. "Physica ratio non inelegans inclusa in impias fabulas."

In the *Bacchæ* of Euripidês, Pentheus is made to deride the tale of the motherless infant Dionysus having been sewn into the thigh of Zeus. Teiresias, while reproving him for his impiety, explains the story away in a sort of allegory: the μηρὸς Διὸς (he says) was a mistaken statement in place of the αἰθὴρ χθόνα ἐγκυλούμενος (Bacch. 235-290).

Lucretius (iii. 995-1036) allegorizes the conspicuous sufferers in Hadês,—Tantalus, Sisyphus, Tityus, and the Danaïds, as well as the ministers of penal infliction, Cerberus and the Furies. The first four are emblematic descriptions of various defective or vicious characters in human nature,—the deisidæmonic, the ambitious, the amorous, or the insatiate and querulous man; the last two represent the mental terrors of the wicked.

[968] Οἱ νῦν περὶ Ὅμηρον δεινοὶ—so Plato calls these interpreters (Kratylus, p. 407); see also Xenoph. Sympos. iii. 6; Plato, Ion. p. 530; Plutarch, De Audiend. Poet. p. 19. ὑπόνοια was the original word, afterwards succeeded by ἀλληγορία.

Ἥρας δὲ δεσμοὺς καὶ Ἡφαίστου ῥίψεις ὑπὸ πατρὸς, μέλλοντος τῇ μητρὶ τυπτομένῃ ἀμυνεῖν, καὶ θεομαχίας ὅσας Ὅμηρος πεποίηκεν, οὐ παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, *οὔτ᾽ ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας, οὔτ᾽ ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν*. Ὁ γὰρ νέος οὐχ οἷός τε κρίνειν ὅ,τι τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὃ μὴ, ἀλλ᾽ ἃ ἂν τηλικοῦτος ὢν λάβῃ ἐν ταῖς δόξαις, δυσέκνιπτά τε καὶ ἀμετάστατα φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι (Plato, Republ. ii. 17. p. 378).

The idea of an interior sense and concealed purpose in the ancient poets occurs several times in Plato (Theætet. c. 93. p. 180): παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων, μετὰ ποιήσεως ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς πολλοὺς, etc.; also Protagor. c. 20. p. 316.

"Modo Stoicum Homerum faciunt,—modo Epicureum,—modo Peripateticum,—modo Academicum. Apparet nihil horum esse in illo, quia omnia sunt." (Seneca, Ep. 88.) Compare Plutarch, De Defectu Oracul. c. 11-12. t. ii. p. 702, Wytt., and Julian, Orat. vii. p. 216.

[969] Pausan. viii. 8, 2. To the same purpose (Strabo, x. p. 474), allegory is admitted to a certain extent in the fables by Dionys. Halic. Ant. Rom. ii. 20. The fragment of the lost treatise of Plutarch, on the Platæan festival of the Dædala, is very instructive respecting Grecian allegory (Fragm. ix. t. 5. p. 754-763, ed. Wyt.; ap. Euseb. Præpar. Evang. iii. 1).

[970] This doctrine is set forth in Macrobius (i. 2). He distinguishes between *fabula* and *fabulosa narratio*: the former is fiction pure, intended either to amuse or to instruct—the latter is founded upon truth, either respecting human or respecting divine agency. The gods did not like to be publicly talked of (according to his view) except under the respectful veil of a fable (the same feeling as that of Herodotus, which led him to refrain from inserting the ἱεροὶ λόγοι in his history). The supreme god, the τἀγαθὸν, the πρῶτον αἴτιον, could not be talked of in fables: but the other gods, the aërial or æthereal powers and the soul, might be, and ought to be, talked of in that manner alone. Only superior intellects ought to be admitted to a knowledge of the secret reality. "De Diis cæteris, et de animâ, non frustra se, nec ut oblectent, ad fabulosa convertunt; sed quia sciunt *inimicam esse naturæ apertam nudamque expositionem sui*: quæ sicut vulgaribus sensibus hominum intellectum sui, vario rerum tegmine operimentoque, subtraxit; ita à prudentibus arcana sua voluit per fabulosa tractari…. Adeo semper ita se et sciri et coli numina maluerunt, qualiter in vulgus antiquitus fabulata est…. Secundum hæc Pythago-

ras ipse atque Empedocles, Parmenides quoque et Heraclides, de Diis fabulati sunt: nec secus Timæus." Compare also Maximus Tyrius, Dissert. x. and xxxii. Arnobius exposes the allegorical interpretation as mere evasion, and holds the Pagans to literal historical fact (Adv. Gentes, v. p. 185, ed. Elm.).

Respecting the allegorical interpretation applied to the Greek fables, Böttiger (Die Kunst—Mythologie der Griechen, Abschn. ii. p. 176); Nitzsch (Heldensage der Griech. sect. 6. p. 78); Lobeck (Aglaopham. p. 133-155).

[971] According to the anonymous writer ap. Westermann (Script. Myth. p. 328), every personal or denominated god may be construed in three different ways: either πραγματικῶς (historically, as having been a king or a man)—or ψυχικῶς, in which theory Hêrê signifies the soul; Athênê, *prudence*; Aphroditê, *desire*; Zeus, *mind*, etc.—or στοιχειακῶς, in which system Apollo signifies the *sun*; Poseidôn, the *sea*; Hêrê, the upper stratum of the air, or *æther*; Athênê, the lower or denser stratum; Zeus, the upper hemisphere; Kronus, the lower, etc. This writer thinks that all the three principles of construction may be resorted to, each on its proper occasion, and that neither of them excludes the others. It will be seen that the first is pure Euêmerism; the two latter are modes of allegory.

The allegorical construction of the gods and of the divine mythes is copiously applied in the treatises, both of Phurnutus and Sallustius, in Gale's collection of mythological writers. Sallustius treats the mythes as of divine origin, and the chief poets as inspired (θεόληπτοι): the gods were propitious to those who recounted worthy and creditable mythes respecting them, and Sallustius prays that they will accept with favor his own remarks (cap. 3 and 4. pp. 245-251, Gale). He distributes mythes into five classes; theological, physical, spiritual, material, and mixed. He defends the practice of speaking of the gods under the veil of allegory, much in the same way as Macrobius (in the preceding note): he finds, moreover, a good excuse even for those mythes which imputed to the gods theft, adultery, outrages towards a father, and other enormities: such tales (he says) were eminently suitable, since the mind *must at once see* that the facts as told are *not* to be taken as being themselves the real truth, but simply as a veil, disguising some interior truth (p. 247).

Besides the Life of Homer ascribed to Plutarch (see Gale, p. 325-332), Hêraclidês (*not* Hêraclidês of Pontus) carries out the process of allegorizing the Homeric mythes most earnestly and most systematically. The application of the allegorizing theory is, in his view, the only way of rescuing Homer from the charge of scandalous impiety—πάντῃ γὰρ ἠσέβησεν, εἰ μηδὲν ἠλληγόρησεν (Hêrac. *in init.* p. 407, Gale). He proves at length, that the destructive arrows of Apollo, in the first book of the Iliad, mean nothing at the bottom except a contagious plague, caused by the heat of the summer sun in marshy ground (pp. 416-424). Athênê, who darts down from Olympus at the moment when Achilles is about to draw his sword on Agamemnôn, and seizes him by the hair, is a personification of repentant prudence (p. 435). The conspiracy against Zeus, which Homer (Iliad, i. 400) relates to have been formed by the Olympic gods, and defeated by the timely aid of Thetis and Briareus—the chains and suspension imposed upon Hêrê—the casting of Hêphæstos by Zeus out of Olympus, and his fall in Lêmnus—the destruction of the Grecian wall by Poseidôn, after the departure of the Greeks—the amorous scene between Zeus and Hêrê on Mount Gargarus—the distribution of the universe between Zeus, Poseidôn, and Hadês—all these he resolves into peculiar manifestations and conflicts of the elemental substances in nature. To the much-decried battle of the gods, he gives a turn partly physical, partly ethical (p. 481). In like manner, he transforms and vindicates the adventures of the gods in the Odyssey: the wanderings of Odysseus, together with the Lotophagi, the Cyclôps, Circê, the Sirens, Æolus, Scylla, etc., he resolves into a series of temptations, imposed as a trial upon a man of wisdom and virtue, and emblematic of human life (p. 496). The story of Arês, Aphroditê, and Hêphæstos, in the eighth book of the Odyssey, seems to perplex him more than any other: he offers two explanations, neither of which seems satisfactory even to himself (p. 494).

An anonymous writer in the collection of Westermann (pp. 329-344) has discussed the wanderings of Odysseus upon the same ethical scheme of interpretation as Hêraclidês: he entitles his treatise "A short essay on the Wanderings of Odysseus in Homer, worked out in conjunction with ethical reflections, and rectifying what is rotten in the story, as well as may be, for the benefit of readers." (τὸ μύθου σαθρὸν θεραπεύουσα.) The author resolves the adventures of Odysseus into narratives emblematic of different situations and trials of human life. Scylla and Charybdis, for example (c. 8. p. 338), represent, the one, the infirmities and temptations arising out of the body, the other, those springing from the mind, between which man is called upon to steer. The adventure of Odysseus with Æolus, shows how little good a virtuous man does himself by seeking, in case of distress, aid from conjurors and evil enchanters; the assistance of such allies, however it may at first promise well, ultimately deceives the person who accepts it, and renders him worse off than he was before (c. 3. p. 332). By such illustrations does the author sustain his general position, that there is a great body of valuable ethical teaching wrapped up in the poetry of Homer.

Proclus is full of similar allegorization, both of Homer and Hesiod: the third Excursus of Heyne ad Iliad. xxiii. (vol. viii. p. 563), De Allegoriâ Homericâ, contains a valuable summary of the general subject.

The treatise De Astrologiâ, printed among the works of Lucian, contains specimens of astrological explanations applied to many of the Grecian μῦθοι, which the author as a pious man cannot accept in their literal meaning. "How does it consist with holiness (he asks) to believe that Æneas was son of Aphroditê, Minôs of Zeus, or Askalaphus of Mars? No; these were men born under the favorable influences of the planets Venus, Jupiter, and Mars." He considers the principle of astrological explanation peculiarly fit to be applied to the mythes of Homer and Hesiod (Lucian, De Astrologiâ, c. 21-22).

[972] See Ritter, Geschichte der Philosophie, 2nd edit. part 3. book 11. chap. 4. p. 592; Varro ap. Augustin. Civitat. Dei, vi. 5, ix. 6; Cicero, Nat. Deor. ii. 24-28.

Chrysippus admitted the most important distinction between Zeus and the other gods (Plutarch. de Stoicor. Repugnant. p. 1052.)

[973] Plutarch. de Isid. et Osirid. c. 66. p. 377; c. 70. p. 379. Compare on this subject O. Müller, Prolegom. Mythol. p. 59 *seq.*, and Eckermann, Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte, vol. i. sect. ii. p. 46.

[974] Hesiod, Opp. et Di. 122: to the same effect Pythagoras and Thalês (Diogen. Laër. viii. 32; and Plutarch, Placit. Philos. i. 8).

The Hesiodic dæmons are all good: Athenagoras (Legat. Chr. p. 8) says that Thalês admitted a distinction between good and bad dæmons, which seems very doubtful.

[975] The distinction between Θεοὶ and Δαίμονες is especially set forth in the treatise of Plutarch, De Defectu Oraculorum, capp. 10, 12, 13, 15, etc. He seems to suppose it traceable to the doctrine of Zoroaster or the Orphic mysteries, and he represents it as relieving the philosopher from great perplexities: for it was difficult to know where to draw the line in admitting or rejecting divine Providence: errors were committed sometimes in affirming God to be the cause of everything, at other times in supposing him to be the cause of nothing. Ἐπεὶ τὸ διορίσαι πῶς χρηστέον καὶ μέχρι τίνων τῇ προνοίᾳ, χαλεπὸν, οἱ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἁπλῶς τὸν θεὸν, οἱ δὲ ὁμοῦ τι πάντων αἴτιον ποιοῦντες, ἀστοχοῦσι τοῦ μετρίου καὶ πρέποντος. Εὖ μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν καὶ οἱ λέγοντες, ὅτι Πλάτων τὸ ταῖς γεννωμέναις ποιότησιν ὑποκείμενον στοιχεῖον ἐξευρὼν, ὃ νῦν ὕλην καὶ φύσιν καλοῦσιν, πολλῶν ἀπήλλαξε καὶ μεγάλων ἀποριῶν τοὺς φιλοσόφους· ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσι πλείονας λῦσαι καὶ μείζονας ἀπορίας οἱ τὸ τῶν δαιμόνων γένος ἐν μέσῳ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τρόπον τινὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν ἡμῶν σύναγον εἰς ταὐτὸ καὶ σύναπτον, ἐξευρόντες (c. 10). Ἡ δαιμόνων φύσις ἔχουσα καὶ πάθος θνητοῦ καὶ θεοῦ δύναμιν (c. 13).

Εἰσὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἐν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ δαίμοσιν ἀρετῆς διάφοραὶ, καὶ τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ἀλόγου τοῖς μὲν ἀσθενὲς καὶ ἀμαυρὸν ἔτι λείψανον, ὥσπερ περίττωμα, τοῖς δὲ πολὺ καὶ δυσκατάσβεστον ἔνεστιν, ὧν ἴχνη καὶ σύμβολα πολλαχοῦ θύσιαι καὶ τελεταὶ καὶ μυθολογίαι σώζουσι καὶ διαφυλάττουσιν ἐνδιεσπαρμένα (*ib.*): compare Plutarch. de Isid. et Osir. 25. p. 360.

Καὶ μὴν ὅσας *ἔν τε μύθοις καὶ ὕμνοις λέγουσι καὶ ᾄδουσι*, τοῦτο μὲν ἁρπαγὰς, τοῦτο δὲ πλάνας θεῶν, κρύψεις τε καὶ φυγὰς καὶ λατρείας, οὐ θεῶν εἰσὶν ἀλλὰ δαιμόνων παθήματα, etc. (c. 15): also c. 23; also De Isid. et Osir. c. 25. p. 366.

Human sacrifices and other objectionable rites are excused, as necessary for the purpose of averting the anger of bad dæmons (c. 14-15).

Empedoklês is represented as the first author of the doctrine which imputed vicious and abominable dispositions to many of the dæmons (c. 15, 16, 17, 20), τοὺς εἰσαγομένους ὑπὸ Ἐμπεδοκλέους δαίμονας; expelled from heaven by the gods, θεήλατοι καὶ οὐρανοπετεῖς (Plutarch, De Vitand. Aër. Alien. p. 830); followed by Plato, Xenokratês, and Chrysippus, c. 17: compare Plato (Apolog. Socrat. p. 27; Politic. p. 271; Symposion, c. 28. p. 203), though he seems to treat the δαίμονες as defective and mutable beings, rather than actively maleficent. Xenokratês represents some of them both as wicked and powerful in a high degree:—Ξενοκράτης καὶ τῶν ἡμερῶν τὰς ἀποφράδας, καὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν ὅσαι πληγάς τινας ἢ κοπετοὺς, ἢ νηστείας, ἢ δυσφημίας, ἢ αἰσχρολογίαν ἔχουσιν, οὔτε θεῶν τιμαῖς οὔτε δαιμόνων οἴεται προσήκειν χρηστῶν, ἀλλ᾽ εἶναι φύσεις ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι μεγάλας μὲν καὶ ἰσχυρὰς, δυστρόπους δὲ καὶ σκυθρωπὰς, αἳ *χαίρουσι τοῖς τοιούτοις*, καὶ *τυγχάνουσαι πρὸς οὐθὲν ἄλλο χεῖρον τρέπονται* (Plutarch, De Isid. ut Osir. c. 26. p. 361; Quæstion. Rom. p. 283): compare Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. i. p. 62.

[976] Plutarch, De Defect. Orac. c. 15. p. 418. Chrysippus admitted, among the various conceivable causes to account for the existence of evil, the supposition of some negligent and reckless dæmons, δαιμόνια φαυλὰ ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι γίνονται καὶ ἐγκλητέαι ἀμέλειαι (Plutarch, De Stoicor. Repugnant. p. 1051). A distinction, which I do not fully understand, between θεοὶ and δαίμονες, was also adopted among the Locrians at Opus: δαίμων with them seems to have been equivalent to ἥρως (Plutarch, Quæstion. Græc. c. 6. p. 292): see the note above, pp. 350-351.

[977] Tatian. adv. Græcos, c. 20; Clemens Alexandrin. Admonit. ad Gentes, pp. 26-29, Sylb.; Minuc. Felix, Octav. c. 26. "Isti igitur impuri spiritus, ut ostensum a Magis, a philosophis, a Platone, sub statuis et imaginibus consecrati delitescunt, et afflatu suo quasi auctoritatem præsentis numinis consequuntur," etc. This, like so many other of the aggressive arguments of the Christians against paganism, was taken from the pagan philosophers themselves.

Lactantius, De Verâ Philosophiâ, iv. 28. "Ergo iidem sunt Dæmones, quos fatentur execrandos esse: iidem Dii, quibus supplicant. Si nobis credendum esse non putant, credant Homero; qui summum illum Jovem Dæmonibus aggregavit," etc.

[978] See above, Chapter II. p. 70, the remarks on the Hesiodic Theogony.

[979] A destructive inundation took place at Pheneus in Arcadia, seemingly in the time of Plutarch: the subterranean outlet (βάραθρον) of the river had become blocked up, and the inhabitants ascribed the stoppage to the anger of Apollo, who had been provoked by the stealing of the Pythian tripod by Hêraklês: the latter had carried the tripod to Pheneus and deposited it there. Ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐκ ἀτοπώτερος τούτων ὁ Ἀπόλλων, εἰ Φενεάτας ἀπόλλυσι τοὺς νῦν, ἐμφράξας τὸ βάραθρον, καὶ κατακλύσας τὴν χώραν ἅπασαν αὐτῶν, ὅτι πρὸ χιλίων ἐτῶν, ὡς φασιν, ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἀνασπάσας τὸν τρίποδα τὸν μαντικὸν εἰς Φενεὸν ἀπήνεγκε; (Plutarch. de Serâ Numin. Vindictâ, p. 577; compare Pausan. viii. 14, 1.) The expression of Plutarch, that the abstraction of the tripod by Hêraklês had taken place 1000 years before, is that of the critic, who thinks it needful to historicize and chronologize the genuine legend; which, to an inhabitant of Pheneus, at the time of the inundation, was doubtless as little questioned as if the theft of Hêraklês had been laid in the preceding generation.

Agathoclês of Syracuse committed depredations on the coasts of Ithaca and Korkyra: the excuse which he offered was, that Odysseus had come to Sicily and blinded Polyphêmus, and that on his return he had been kindly received by the Phæakians (Plutarch, *ib.*).

This is doubtless a jest, either made by Agathoclês, or more probably invented for him; but it is founded upon a popular belief.

[980] "Sanctiusque et reverentius visum, de actis Deorum credere quam scire." (Tacit. German. c. 34.)

Aristidês, however, represents the Homeric theology (whether he would have included the Hesiodic we do not know) as believed quite literally among the multitude in his time, the second century after Christianity (Aristid. Orat. iii. p. 25). Ἀπορῶ, ὅπη πότε χρή με διαθέσθαι μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν, πότερα ὡς τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ καὶ Ὁμήρῳ δὲ συνδοκεῖ, θεῶν παθήματα συμπεισθῆναι καὶ ἡμᾶς, οἷον Ἀρέος δέσμα καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος θητείας καὶ Ἡφαίστου ῥίψεις εἰς θάλασσαν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ Ἰνοῦς ἄχη καὶ φυγάς τινας. Compare Lucian, Ζεὺς Τραγῳδος, c. 20, and De Luctu, c. 2; Dionys. Halicar. A. R. ii. p. 90, Sylb.

Kallimachus (Hymn. ad Jov. 9) distinctly denied the statement of the Kretans that they possessed in Krête the tomb of Zeus, and treated it as an instance of Kretan mendacity; while Celsus did not deny it, but explained it in some figurative manner—αἰνιττόμενος τροπικὰς ὑπονοίας (Origen. cont. Celsum, iii. p. 137).

[981] There is here a change as compared with my first edition; I had inserted here some remarks on the allegorical theory of interpretation, as compared with the semi-historical. An able article on my work (in the Edinburgh Review, October 1846), pointed out that those remarks required modification, and that the idea of allegory in reference to the construction of the mythes was altogether inadmissible.

[982] Juvenal, Sat. x. 174:—

"Creditur olim

Velificatus Athos, et quantum Græcia mendax

Audet in historiâ," etc.

[983] Colonel Sleeman observes, respecting the Hindoo historical mind—"History to this people is all a fairy tale." (Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official, vol. i. ch. ix. p. 70.) And again, "The popular poem of the Ramaen describes the abduction of the heroine by the monster king of Ceylon, Rawun; and her recovery by means of the monkey general, Hunnooman. Every word of this poem, the people assured me was written, if not by the hand of the Deity himself, at least by his inspiration, which was the same thing—and it must consequently be true. Ninety-nine out of a hundred, among the Hindoos, implicitly believe, not only every word of the poem, but every word of every poem that has ever been written in Sanscrit. If you ask a man whether he really believes any very egregious absurdity quoted from these books, he replies, with the greatest *naïveté* in the world, Is it not written in the book; and how should it be there written, if not true? The Hindoo religion reposes upon an entire prostration of mind,—that continual and habitual surrender of the reasoning faculties, which we are accustomed to make occasionally, while engaged at the theatre, or in the perusal of works of fiction. We allow the scenes, characters, and incidents, to pass before our mind's eye, and move our feelings—without stopping a moment to ask whether they are real or true. There is only this difference—that with people of education among us, even in such short intervals of illusion or *abandon*, any extravagance in the acting, or flagrant improbability in the fiction, destroys the charm, breaks the spell by which we have been so mysteriously bound, and restores us to reason and the realities of ordinary life. With the Hindoos, on the contrary, the greater the improbability, the more monstrous and preposterous the fiction—the greater is the charm it has over their minds; and the greater their learning in the Sanscrit, the more are they under the influence of this charm. Believing all to be written by the Deity, or under his inspirations, and the men and things of former days to have been very different from men and things of the present day, and the heroes of these fables to have been demigods, or people endowed with powers far superior to those of the ordinary men of their own day—the analogies of nature are never for a moment considered; nor do questions of probability, or possibility, according to those analogies, ever obtrude to dispel the charm with which they are so pleasingly bound. They go on through life reading and talking of these monstrous fictions, which shock the taste and understanding of other nations, without ever questioning the truth of one single incident, or hearing it questioned. There was a time, and that not far distant, when it was the same in England, and in every other European nation; and there are, I am afraid, some parts of Europe where it is so still. But the Hindoo faith, so far as religious questions are concerned, is not more capacious or absurd than that of the Greeks or Romans in the days of Socrates or Cicero: the only difference is, that among the Hindoos a greater number of the questions which interest mankind are brought under the head of religion." (Sleeman, Rambles, etc., vol. i. ch. xxvi. p. 227: compare vol. ii. ch. v. p. 51; viii. p. 97.)

[984] Lord Lyttleton, in commenting on the tales of the Irish bards, in his History of Henry II., has the following just remarks (book iv. vol. iii. p. 13, quarto): "One may reasonably suppose that in MSS. written since the Irish received the Roman letters from St. Patrick, *some* traditional truths recorded before by the bards in their unwritten poems may have been preserved to our times. Yet these cannot be so separated from many fabulous stories derived from the same sources, as to obtain a firm credit; it not being sufficient to establish the authority of suspected traditions, that they can be shown not to be so improbable or absurd as others with which they are mixed—*since there may be specious as well as senseless fictions*. Nor can a poet or bard, who lived in the sixth or seventh century after Christ, if his poem is still extant, be any voucher for facts supposed to have happened before the incarnation; though his evidence (allowing for poetical license) may be received on such matters as come within his own time, or the remembrance of old men with whom he conversed. The most judicious historians pay no regard to the Welsh or British traditions delivered by Geoffrey of Monmouth, though it is not impossible but that some of these may be true."

One definition of a mythe given by Plutarch coincides exactly with a *specious fiction*: Ὁ μῦθος εἶναι βούλεται λόγος ψευδὴς ἐοικὼς ἀληθινῷ (Plutarch, Bellone an pace clariores fuerunt Athenienses, p. 348).

"Der Grund-Trieb des Mythus (Creuzer justly expresses it) das Gedachte in ein Geschehenes umzusetzen." (Symbolik der Alten Welt, sect. 43. p. 99.)

[985] In reference to the loose statements of the Highlanders, Dr. Johnson observes, "He that goes into the Highlands with a mind naturally acquiescent, and a credulity eager for wonders, may perhaps come back with an opinion very different from mine; for the inhabitants, knowing the ignorance of all strangers in their language and antiquities, are perhaps not very scrupulous adherents to truth; yet I do not say that they deliberately speak studied falsehood, or have a settled purpose to deceive. They have acquired and considered little, and do not always feel their own ignorance. They are not much accustomed to be interrogated by others, and seem never to have thought of interrogating themselves; *so that if they do not know what they tell to be true, they likewise do not distinctly perceive it to be false*. Mr. Boswell was very diligent in his inquiries, and the result of his investigations was, that the answer to the second question was commonly such as nullified the answer to the first." (Journey to the Western Islands, p. 272, 1st edit., 1775).

[986] I considered this position more at large in an article in the "Westminster Review" for May, 1843, on Niebuhr's Greek Legends, with which article much in the present chapter will be found to coincide.

[987] For this general character of the Grecian mysteries, with their concealed treasure of doctrine, see *Warburton*, Divine Legation of Moses, book ii. sect. 4.

Payne Knight, On the Symbolical Language of ancient Art and Mythology, sect. 6, 10, 11, 40, etc.

Saint Croix, Recherches sur les Mystères du Paganisme, sect. 3, p. 106; sect. 4, p. 404, etc.

Creuzer, Symbolik und Mythologie der Alten Völker, sect. 2, 3, 23, 39, 42, etc. Meiners and Heeren adopt generally the same view, though there are many divergences of opinion between these different authors, on a subject essentially obscure. Warburton maintained that the interior doctrine communicated in the mysteries was the existence of one Supreme Divinity, combined with the Euemeristic creed, that the pagan gods had been mere men.

See Clemens Alex. Strom. v. p. 582, Sylb.

The view taken by Hermann of the ancient Greek mythology is in many points similar to that of Creuzer, though with some considerable difference. He thinks that it is an aggregate of doctrine—philosophical, theological, physical, and moral—expressed under a scheme of systematic personifications, each person being called by a name significant of the function personified: this doctrine was imported from the East into Greece, where the poets, retaining or translating the names, but forgetting their meaning and connection, distorted the primitive stories, the sense of which came to be retained only in the ancient mysteries. That true sense, however, (he thinks,) may be recovered by a careful analysis of the significant names: and his two dissertations (De Mythologiâ Græcorum Antiquissimâ, in the Opuscula, vol. ii.) exhibit a specimen of this systematic expansion of etymology into narrative. The dissent from Creuzer is set forth in their published correspondence, especially in his concluding "Brief an Creuzer über das Wesen und die Behandlung der Mythologie," Leipzig, 1819. The following citation from his Latin dissertation sets forth his general doctrine:—

Hermann, De Mythologiâ Græcorum Antiquissimâ, p. 4 (Opuscula, vol. ii. p. 171): "Videmus rerum divinarum humanarumque scientiam ex Asiâ per Lyciam migrantem in Europam: videmus fabulosos poëtas peregrinam doctrinam, monstruoso tumore orientis sive exutam, sive nondum indutam, quasi de integro Græcâ specie procreantes; videmus poëtas, illos, quorum omnium vera nomina nominibus—ab arte, quâ clarebant, petitis—oblitterata sunt, diu in Thraciâ hærentes, raroque tandem etiam cum aliis Græciæ partibus commercio junctos: qualis Pamphus, non ipse Atheniensis, Atheniensibus hymnos Deorum fecit. Videmus denique retrusam paulatim in mysteriorum secretam illam sapientum doctrinam, vitiatam religionum perturbatione, corruptam inscitiâ interpretum, obscuratam levitate amœniora sectantium—adeo ut eam ne illi quidem intelligerent, qui hæreditariam a prioribus poësin colentes, quum ingenii præstantiâ omnes præstinguerent, tantâ illos oblivione merserunt, ut ipsi sint primi auctores omnis eruditionis habiti."

Hermann thinks, however, that by pursuing the suggestions of etymology, vestiges may still be discovered, and something like a history compiled, of Grecian belief as it stood anterior to Homer and Hesiod: "Est autem in hac omni ratione judicio maxime opus, quia non testibus res agitur, sed ad interpretandi solertiam omnia revocanda sunt" (p. 172). To the same general purpose the French work of M. Emérie David, Recherches sur le Dieu Jupiter—reviewed by O. Müller: see the Kleine Schriften of the latter, vol. ii. p. 82.

Mr. Bryant has also employed a profusion of learning, and numerous etymological conjectures, to resolve the Greek mythes into mistakes, perversions, and mutilations, of the exploits and doctrines of oriental tribes long-lost and by-gone,—Amonians, Cuthites, Arkites, etc. "It was Noah (he thinks) who was represented under the

different names of Thoth, Hermês, Menês, Osiris, Zeuth, Atlas, Phorôneus, Promêtheus, to which list a farther number of great extent might be added: the Noûς of Anaxagoras was in reality the patriarch Noah" (Ant. Mythol. vol. ii. pp. 253, 272). "The Cuthites or Amonians, descendants of Noah, settled in Greece from the east, celebrated for their skill in building and the arts" (*ib.* i. p. 502; ii. p. 187). "The greatest part of the Grecian theology arose from misconception and blunders, the stories concerning their gods and heroes were founded on terms misinterpreted or abused" (*ib.* i. p. 452). "The number of different actions ascribed to the various Grecian gods or heroes all relate to one people or family, and are at bottom one and the same history" (*ib.* ii. p. 57). "The fables of Promêtheus and Tityus were taken from ancient Amonian temples, from hieroglyphics misunderstood and badly explained" (i. p. 426): see especially vol. ii. p. 160.

[988] The Anti-Symbolik of Voss, and still more the Aglaophamus of Lobeck, are full of instruction on the subject of this supposed interior doctrine, and on the ancient mysteries in general: the latter treatise, especially, is not less distinguished for its judicious and circumspect criticism than for its copious learning.

Mr. Halhed (Preface to the Gentoo Code of Laws, pp. xiii.-xiv.) has good observations on the vanity of all attempts to allegorize the Hindu mythology: he observes, with perfect truth, "The vulgar and illiterate have always understood the mythology of their country in its literal sense; and there was a time to every nation, when the highest rank in it was equally vulgar and illiterate with the lowest…. A Hindu esteems the astonishing miracles attributed to a Brima, or a Kishen, as facts of the most indubitable authenticity, and the relation of them as most strictly historical."

Compare also Gibbon's remarks on the allegorizing tendencies of the later Platonists (Hist. Decl. and Fall, vol. iv. p. 71).

[989] Varro, ap. Augustin. De Civ. Dei, iv. 27; vi. 5-6. "Dicis fabulosos Deos accommodatos esse ad theatrum, naturales ad mundum, civiles ad urbem." "Varro, de religionibus loquens, multa esse vera dixit, quæ non modo vulgo scire non sit utile, sed etiam tametsi falsa sint, aliter existimare populum expediat: et ideo Græcos teletas et mysteria taciturnitate parietibusque clausisse" (*ibid.* iv. 31). See Villoison, De Triplici Theologiâ Commentatio, p. 8; and Lactantius, De Origin. Error. ii. 3. The doctrine of the Stoic Chrysippus, ap. Etymologicon Magn. v. Τελεταί—Χρύσιππος δέ φησι, τοὺς περὶ τῶν θείων λόγους εἰκότως καλεῖσθαι τελετάς, χρῆναι γὰρ τούτους τελευταίους καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσι διδάσκεσθαι, τῆς ψυχῆς ἐχούσης ἔρμα καὶ κεκρατημένης, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀμυήτους σιωπᾷν δυναμένης· μέγα γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἆθλον ὑπὲρ θεῶν ἀκοῦσαί τε ὀρθὰ, καὶ ἐγκρατεῖς γενέσθαι αὐτῶν.

The triple division of Varro is reproduced in Plutarch, Amatorius, p. 763. τὰ μὲν μύθῳ, τὰ δὲ νόμῳ, τὰ δὲ λόγῳ, πίστιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔσχηκε· τῆς δ᾽ οὖν περὶ θεῶν δόξης καὶ παντάπασιν ἡγεμόνες καὶ διδάσκαλοι γεγόνασιν ἡμῖν οἵ τε ποιηταὶ, καὶ οἱ νομοθέται, καὶ τρίτον, οἱ φιλόσοφοι.

[990] Plato, Phædr. c. 7. p. 229:—

Phædrus. Εἶπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σὺ τοῦτο τὸ μυθολόγημα πείθει ἀληθὲς εἶναι;

Socrates. Ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἀπιστοίην, ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοὶ, οὐκ ἂν ἄτοπος εἴην, εἶτα σοφιζόμενος φαίην αὐτὴν πνεῦμα Βορέου κατὰ τῶν πλησίον πετρῶν σὺν φαρμακείᾳ παίζουσαν ὦσαι, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τελευτήσασαν λεχθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ Βορέου ἀναρπαστὸν γεγονέναι…. Ἐγὼ δὲ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ἄλλως μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα χαρίεντα ἡγοῦμαι, λίαν δὲ δεινοῦ καὶ ἐπιπόνου καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐτυχοῦς ἀνδρὸς, κατ᾽ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν, ὅτι δ᾽ αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ τῶν Ἱπποκενταύρων εἶδος ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, καὶ αὖθις τὸ τῆς Χιμαίρας. Καὶ ἐπιῤῥεῖ δὲ ὄχλος τοιούτων Γοργόνων καὶ Πηγάσων, καὶ ἄλλων ἀμηχάνων πλήθη τε καὶ ἀτοπίαι τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων· αἷς εἴ τις ἀπιστῶν προσβιβᾷ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἕκαστον, ἄτε ἀγροίκῳ τινὶ σοφίᾳ χρώμενος, πολλῆς αὐτῷ σχολῆς δεήσει. Ἐμοὶ δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα οὐδαμῶς ἐστι σχολή…. Ὅθεν δὴ χαίρειν ἐάσας ταῦτα, πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομιζομένῳ περὶ αὐτῶν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, σκοπῶ οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλ᾽ ἐμαυτὸν, etc.

[991] Plato, Repub. iii. 5. p. 391. The perfect ignorance of all men respecting the gods, rendered the task of fiction easy (Plato, Kritias, p. 107).

[992] Plato, Repub. ii. 16. p. 377. Λόγων δὲ διττὸν εἶδος, τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς, ψεῦδος δ᾽ ἕτερον; Ναι. Παιδευτέον δ᾽ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις, πρότερον δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ψεύδεσιν· … Οὐ μανθάνεις, ὅτι πρῶτον τοῖς παιδίοις μύθους λέγομεν· τοῦτο δέ που ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν ψεῦδος, ἔνι δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆ…. Πρῶτον ἡμῖν ἐπιστατητέον τοῖς μυθοποιοῖς, καὶ ὃν μὲν ἂν καλὸν μῦθον ποιήσωσιν, ἐγκριτέον, ὃν δ᾽ ἂν μὴ, ἀποκριτέον … ὧν δὲ νῦν λέγουσι, τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκβλητέον … οὓς Ἡσίοδος καὶ Ὅμηρος ἡμῖν ἐλεγέτην, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί. Οὗτοι γάρ που μύθους τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ψευδεῖς συντιθέντες ἔλεγόν τε καὶ λέγουσι. Ποίους δὴ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, καὶ τί αὐτῶν μεμφόμενος λέγεις; Ὅπερ, ἦν δ᾽

ἐγὼ, χρὴ καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα μέμφεσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐάν τις μὴ καλῶς ψεύδηται. Τί τοῦτο; Ὅταν τις εἰκάζῃ κακῶς τῷ λόγῳ περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων, οἷοί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ γραφεὺς μηδὲν ἐοικότα γράφων οἷς ἂν ὅμοια βουληθῇ γράψαι.

The same train of thought, and the precepts founded upon it, are followed up through chaps. 17, 18, and 19; compare De Legg. xii. p. 941.

Instead of recognizing the popular or dramatic theology as something distinct from the civil (as Varro did), Plato suppresses the former as a separate department and merges it in the latter.

[993] Plato, Repub. ii. c. 21. p. 382. Τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος πότε καὶ τί χρήσιμον, ὥστε μὴ ἄξιον εἶναι μίσους; Ἆρ᾽ οὐ πρός τε τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τῶν καλουμένων φίλων, ὅταν διὰ μανίαν ἤ τινα ἄνοιαν κακόν τι ἐπιχειρῶσι πράττειν, τότε ἀποτροπῆς ἕνεκα ὡς φάρμακον χρήσιμον γίγνεται; *Καὶ ἐν αἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ταῖς μυθολογίαις, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι ὅπῃ τἀληθὲς ἔχει περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἀφομοιοῦντες τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος*, ὅτι μάλιστα, οὕτω χρήσιμον ποιοῦμεν;

[994] The censure which Xenophanês pronounced upon the Homeric legends has already been noticed: Herakleitus (Diogen. Laërt. ix. 1) and Metrodôrus, the companion and follower of Epicurus, were not less profuse in their invectives, ἐν γράμμασι τοσούτοις τῷ ποιητῇ λελοιδόρηται (Plutarch, Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, p. 1086). He even advised persons not to be ashamed to confess their utter ignorance of Homer, to the extent of not knowing whether Hectôr was a Greek or a Trojan (Plut. *ib.* p. 1094).

[995] Plato, Republic iii. 4-5. p. 391; De Legg. iii. 1. p. 677.

[996] For a description of similar tendencies in the Asiatic religions, see Mövers, Die Phönizier, ch. v. p. 153 (Bonn, 1841): he points out the same phænomena as in the Greek,—coalescence between the ideas of ancestry and worship,—confusion between gods and men in the past,—increasing tendency to Euêmerize (pp. 156-157).

[997] According to that which Aristotle seems to recognize (Histor. Animal. vii. 6), Hêraklês was father of seventy-two sons, but of only one daughter—he was essentially ἀῤῥενόγονος, illustrating one of the physical peculiarities noticed by Aristotle. Euripidês, however, mentions daughters of Hêraklês in the plural number (Euripid. Herakleid. 45).

[998] Hippocratês was twentieth in descent from Hêraklês, and nineteenth from Asklêpius (Vita Hippocr. by Soranus, ap. Westermann, Scriptor. Biographic. viii. 1); about Aristotle, see Diogen. Laërt. v. 1. Xenophôn, the physician of the emperor Claudius, was also an Asklêpiad (Tacit. Ann. xii. 61).

In Rhodes, the neighboring island to Kôs, was the gens Ἀλιάδαι, or sons of Hêlios, specially distinguished from the Ἁλιασταὶ of mere associated worshippers of Hêlios, τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἁλιαδῶν καὶ τῶν Ἁλιαστῶν (see the Inscription in Boeckh's Collection, No. 2525, with Boeckh's comment).

[999] Herodot. ii. 144. Ἑκαταίῳ δὲ γενεηλογήσαντι ἑωϋτὸν, καὶ ἀναδήσαντι ἐς ἑκκαιδέκατον θεὸν, ἀντεγενεηλόγησαν ἐπὶ τῇ ἀριθμήσει, οὐ δεκόμενοι παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ἀπὸ θεοῦ γένεσθαι ἄνθρωπον· ἀντεγενεηλόγησαν δὲ ὧδε, etc.

[1000] Herod. ii. 143-145. Καὶ ταῦτα Αἰγύπτιοι ἀτρεκέως φασὶν ἐπίστασθαι, αἰεί τε λογιζόμενοι καὶ αἰεὶ ἀπογραφόμενοι τὰ ἔτεα.

[1001] Herod. iv. 94-96. After having related the Euemeristic version given by the Hellespontic Greeks, he concludes with his characteristic frankness and simplicity—Ἐγὼ δὲ, περὶ μὲν τούτου καὶ τοῦ καταγαίου οἰκήματος, οὔτε ἀπιστέω, οὔτε ὦν πιστεύω τι λίην, δοκέω δὲ πολλοῖσι ἔτεσι πρότερον τὸν Ζάλμοξιν τοῦτον γενέσθαι Πυθαγόρεω. Εἴτε δὲ ἐγένετό τις Ζάλμοξις ἄνθρωπος, εἴτ᾽ ἐστὶ δαίμων τις Γέτῃσι οὗτος ἐπιχώριος, χαιρέτω. So Plutarch (Numa c. 19) will not undertake to determine whether Janus was a god or a king εἴτε δαίμων, εἴτε βασιλεὺς γενόμενος, etc.

Herakleitus the philosopher said that men were θεοὶ θνητοὶ, and the gods were ἄνθρωποι ἀθάνατοι (Lucian, Vitar. Auctio. c. 13. vol. i. p. 303, Tauch.: compare the same author, Dialog. Mortuor. iii. vol. i. p. 182, ed. Tauchn).

[1002] Iliad, v. 127:—

Ἀχλὺν δ᾽ αὖ τοι ἀπ᾽ ὀφθαλμῶν ἔλον, ἣ πρὶν ἐπῆεν,

Ὄφρ᾽ εὖ γιγνώσκῃς ἠμὲν θεὸν, ἠδὲ καὶ ἄνδρα.

Of this undistinguishable confusion between gods and men, striking illustrations are to be found both in the third book of Cicero de Naturâ Deorum (16-21), and in the long disquisition of Strabo (x. pp. 467-474) respecting the Kabeiri, the Korybantes, the Dactyls of Ida; the more so, as he cites the statements of Pherekydês, Akusilaus, Dêmêtrius of Skêpsis, and others. Under the Roman empire, the lands in Greece belonging to the immortal gods were exempted from tribute. The Roman tax-collectors refused to recognize as immortal gods any persons who had once been men; but this rule could not be clearly applied (Cicero, Nat. Deor. iii. 20). See the remarks of Pausanias (ii. 26, 7) about Asklêpius: Galen, too, is doubtful about Asklêpius and Dionysus—Ἀσκληπιός γέ τοι καὶ Διόνυσος, εἶτ᾽ ἄνθρωποι πρότερον ἦστην, εἴτε καὶ ἀρχῆθεν θεοί (Galen in Protreptic. 9. tom. i. p. 22, ed. Kühn). Xenophôn (De Venat. c. i.) considers Cheirôn as the brother of Zeus.

The ridicule of Lucian (Deorum Concilium, t. iii. p 527-538, Hems.) brings out still more forcibly the confusion here indicated.

[1003] Ovid, Fasti, vi. 6-20:—

"Fas mihi præcipue vultus vidisse Deorum,

Vel quia sum vates, vel quia sacra cano …

… Ecce Deas vidi….

Horrueram, tacitoque animum pallore fatebar:

Cum Dea, quos fecit, sustulit ipsa metus.

Namque ait—O vates, Romani conditor anni,

Ause per exiguos magna referre modos;

Jus tibi fecisti numen cœleste videndi,

Cum placuit numeris condere festa tuis."

[1004] The fourth Eclogue of Virgil, under the form of a prophecy, gives a faithful picture of the heroic and divine past, to which the legends of Troy and the Argonauts belonged:—

"Ille Deûm vitam accipiet, Divisque videbit

Permixtos heroas," etc.

"Alter erit tum Tiphys et altera quæ vehat Argo

Delectos heroas: erunt etiam altera bella,

Atque iterum ad Trojam magnus mittetur Achilles."

[1005] Lucian, Pseudol. c. 4. Παρακλητέος ἡμῖν τῶν Μενάνδρου προλόγων εἷς, ὁ Ἔλεγχος, φίλος ἀληθείᾳ καὶ παῤῥησίᾳ θεὸς, οὐχ ὁ ἀσημότατος τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν σκήνην ἀναβαινόντων. (See Meineke ad Menandr. p. 284.)

[1006] The following passage from Dr. Ferguson's Essay on Civil Society (part ii. sect. i. p. 126) bears well on the subject before us:—

"If conjectures and opinions formed at a distance have not a sufficient authority in the history of mankind, the domestic antiquities of every nation must for this very reason be received with caution. They are, for the most part, the mere conjectures or the fictions of subsequent ages; and even where at first they contained some resemblance of truth, they still vary with the imagination of those by whom they were transmitted, and in every generation receive a different form. They are made to bear the stamp of the times through which they

have passed in the form of tradition, not of the ages to which their pretended descriptions relate…. When traditionary fables are rehearsed by the vulgar, they bear the marks of a national character, and though mixed with absurdities, often raise the imagination and move the heart: when made the materials of poetry, and adorned by the skill and the eloquence of an ardent and superior mind, they instruct the understanding as well as engage the passions. It is only in the management of mere antiquaries, or stript of the ornaments which the laws of history forbid them to wear, that *they become unfit even to amuse the fancy or to serve any purpose whatever*.

"It were absurd to quote the fable of the Iliad or the Odyssey, the legend of Hercules, Theseus, and Œdipus, as authorities in matters of fact relating to the history of mankind; but they may, with great justice, be cited to ascertain what were the conceptions and sentiments of the age in which they were composed, or to characterize the genius of that people with whose imaginations they were blended, and by whom they were fondly rehearsed and admired. In this manner, fiction may be admitted to vouch for the genius of nations, while history has nothing to offer worthy of credit."

To the same purpose, M. Paulin Paris (in his Lettre à M. H. de Monmerqué, prefixed to the Roman de Berte aux Grans Piés, Paris, 1836), respecting the "romans" of the Middle Ages: "Pour bien connaître l'histoire du moyen âge, non pas celle des faits, mais celle des mœurs qui rendent les faits vraisemblables, il faut l'avoir étudiée dans les romans, et voilà pourquoi l'Histoire de France n'est pas encore faite." (p. xxi.)

[1007] A curious evidence of the undiminished popularity of the Grecian mythes to the exclusion even of recent history, is preserved by Vopiscus at the beginning of his Life of Aurelian.

The præfect of the city of Rome, Junius Tiberianus, took Vopiscus into his carriage on the festival-day of the Hilaria; he was connected by the ties of relationship with Aurelian, who had died about a generation before—and as the carriage passed by the splendid Temple of the Sun, which Aurelian had consecrated, he asked Vopiscus, what author had written the life of that emperor? To which Vopiscus replied, that he had read some Greek works which touched upon Aurelian, but nothing in Latin. Whereat the venerable præfect was profoundly grieved: "Dolorem gemitûs sui vir sanctus per hæc verba profudit: Ergo *Thersitem, Sinonem, cæteraque illa prodigia vetustatis, et nos bene scimus, et posteri frequentabunt*: divum Aurelianum, clarissimum principem, severissimum Imperatorem, per quem totus Romano nomini orbis est restitutus, posteri nescient? Deus avertat hanc amentiam! Et tamen, si bene memini, ephemeridas illius viri scriptas habemus," etc. (Historiæ August. Scriptt. p. 209, ed. Salmas.)

This impressive remonstrance produced the Life of Aurelian by Vopiscus. The materials seem to have been ample and authentic; it is to be regretted that they did not fall into the hands of an author qualified to turn them to better account.

[1008] Thucyd. vi. 56.

[1009] Pausan. i. 3, 3. Λέγεται μὲν δὴ καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ἀληθῆ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, οἷα ἱστορίας ἀνηκόοις οὖσι, καὶ ὅποσα ἤκουον εὐθὺς ἐκ παιδῶν ἔν τε χόροις καὶ τραγῳδίαις πιστὰ ἡγουμένοις, etc. The treatise of Lucian, De Saltatione, is a curious proof how much these mythes were in every one's memory, and how large the range of knowledge of them was which a good dancer possessed (see particularly c. 76-79. t. ii. p. 308-310, Hemst).

Antiphanês ap. Athenæ. vi. p. 223:—

Μακάριόν ἐστιν ἡ τραγῳδία
ποίημα κατὰ πάντ᾽, εἴ γε πρῶτον οἱ λόγοι
ὑπὸ τῶν θεατῶν εἰσιν ἐγνωρίσμενοι
πρὶν καί τιν᾽ εἰπεῖν· ὡς ὑπομνῆσαι μόνον
δεῖ τὸν ποιητήν. Οἰδίπουν γὰρ ἂν γε φῶ,
τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα πάντ᾽ ἴσασιν· ὁ πατὴρ Λάϊος,
μήτηρ Ἰοκάστη, θυγατέρες, παῖδες τίνες·
τί πείσεθ᾽ οὗτος, τί πεποίηκεν. Ἂν πάλιν
εἴπῃ τις Ἀλκμαίωνα, καὶ τὰ παιδία
πάντ᾽ εὐθὺς εἴρηχ᾽, ὅτι μανεὶς ἀπέκτονε
τὴν μήτερ᾽· ἀγανακτῶν δ᾽ Ἄδραστος εὐθέως
ἥξει, πάλιν δ᾽ ἄπεισιν, etc.

The first pages of the eleventh Oration of Dio Chrysostom contain some striking passages both as to the universal acquaintance with the mythes, and as to their extreme popularity (Or. xi. p. 307-312, Reisk). See also the commencement of Heraklidês, De Allegoriâ Homericâ (ap. Scriptt. Myth. ed. Gale, p. 408), about the familiarity with Homer.

The Lydê of the poet Antimachus was composed for his own consolation under sorrow, by enumerating the ἡρωϊκὰς συμφοράς (Plutarch, Consolat. ad Apollôn. c. 9. p. 106: compare Æschines cont. Ktesiph. c. 48): a sepulchral inscription in Thêra, on the untimely death of Admêtus, a youth of the heroic gens Ægidae, makes a touching allusion to his ancestors Pêleus and Pherês (Boeckh, C. I. t. ii. p. 1087).

A curious passage of Aristotle is preserved by Dêmêtrius Phalereus (Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας, c. 144),—Ὅσῳ γὰρ αὐτίτης καὶ μονώτης εἰμὶ, φιλομυθότερος γέγονα (compare the passage in the Nikomachean Ethics, i. 9, μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος). Stahr refers this to a letter of Aristotle written in his old age, the mythes being the consolation of his solitude (Aristotelia, i. p. 201).

For the employment of the mythical names and incidents as topics of pleasing and familiar comparison, see Menander, Περὶ Ἐπιδεικτῖκ. § iv. capp. 9 and 11, ap. Walz. Coll. Rhett. t. ix. pp. 283-294. The degree in which they passed into the ordinary songs of women is illustrated by a touching epigram contained among the Chian Inscriptions published in Boeckh's Collection (No. 2236):—

Βιττὼ καὶ Φαινὶς, φίλη ἡμέρη (?), αἱ συνέριθοι,
Αἱ πενιχραὶ, γραῖαι, τῆδ᾽ ἐκλίθημεν ὁμοῦ.
Ἀμφότεραι Κῶαι, πρῶται γένος—ὦ γλυκὺς ὄρθρος,
Πρὸς λύχνον ᾧ μύθους ᾔδομεν ἡμιθέων.

These two poor women were not afraid to boast of their family descent. They probably belonged to some noble gens which traced its origin to a god or a hero. About the songs of women, see also Agathias, i. 7. p. 29, ed. Bonn.

In the family of the wealthy Athenian Dêmocratês was a legend, that his primitive ancestor (son of Zeus by the daughter of the Archêgetês of the dême Aixônеis, to which he belonged) had received Hêraklês at his table: this legend was so rife that the old women sung it,—ἅπερ αἱ γραῖαι ᾄδουσι (Plato, Lysis, p. 205). Compare also a legend of the dême Ἀναγυροῦς, mentioned in Suidas *ad voc.*

"Who is this virgin?" asks Orestês from Pyladês in the Iphigeneia in Tauris of Euripidês (662), respecting his sister Iphigeneia, whom he does not know as priestess of Artemis in a foreign land:—

Τίς ἐστιν ἡ νεᾶνις; ὡς *Ἑλληνικῶς*

Ἀνήρεθ᾽ ἡμᾶς τούς τ᾽ ἐν Ἰλίῳ πόνους

Νόστον τ᾽ Ἀχαιῶν τόν τ᾽ ἐν οἰωνοῖς σοφὸν

Κάλχαντ᾽, Ἀχιλλέως τ᾽ οὔνομ᾽, etc.

… ἐστὶν ἡ ξένη γένος

Ἐκεῖθεν. Ἀργεία τις, etc.

[1010] Plato, Phædo, c. 2.

[1011] The Philopseudes of Lucian (t. iii. p. 31, Hemst. cap. 2, 3, 4) shows not only the pride which the general public of Athens and Thêbes took in their old mythes (Triptolemus, Boreas, and Oreithyia, the Sparti, etc.), but the way in which they treated every man who called the stories in question as a fool or as an atheist. He remarks, that if the guides who showed the antiquities had been restrained to tell nothing but what was true, they would have died of hunger; for the visiting strangers would not care to hear plain truth, even if they could have got it for nothing (μηδὲ ἀμισθὶ τῶν ξένων ἀληθὲς ἀκούειν ἐθελησάντων).

[1012] Herodot. viii. 134.

[1013] Herodot. v. 67.

[1014] Euripid. Hippolyt. 1424; Pausan. ii. 32, 1; Lucian, De Deâ Syriâ, c. 60. vol. iv. p. 287, Tauch.

It is curious to see in the account of Pausanias how all the petty peculiarities of the objects around became connected with explanatory details growing out of this affecting legend. Compare Pausan. i. 22, 2.

[1015] Pausan. ix. 40, 6.

[1016] Plutarch, Marcell. c. 20; Pausan. iii. 3, 6.

[1017] Pausan. viii. 46, 1; Diogen. Laër. viii. 5; Strabo, vi. p. 263; Appian, Bell. Mithridat. c. 77; Æschyl. Eumen. 380.

Wachsmuth has collected the numerous citations out of Pausanias on this subject (Hellenische Alterthumskunde, part ii. sect. 115. p. 111).

[1018] Herodot. ii. 182; Plutarch, Pyrrh. c. 32; Schol. Apoll. Rhod iv. 1217; Diodôr. iv. 56.

[1019] Ἡμιθέων ἀρεταῖς, the subjects of the works of Polygnotus at Athens (Melanthius ap. Plutarch. Cimôn. c. 4): compare Theocrit. xv. 138.

[1020] The Centauromachia and the Amazonomachia are constantly associated together in the ancient Grecian reliefs (see the Expedition Scientifique de Morée, t. ii. p. 16, in the explanation of the temple of Apollo Epikureius at Phigaleia).

[1021] Pausan. ii. 29, 6.

[1022] Ernst Curtius, Die Akropolis von Athen, Berlin, 1844, p. 18. Arnobius adv. Gentes, vi. p. 203, ed. Elmenhorst.

[1023] See the case of the Æginêtans lending the Æakids for a time to the Thebans (Herodot. v. 80), who soon, however, returned them: likewise sending the Æakids to the battle of Salamis (viii. 64-80). The Spartans, when they decreed that only one of their two kings should be out on military service, decreed at the same time that only one of the Tyndarids should go out with them (v. 75): they once lent the Tyndarids as aids to the envoys of Epizephyrian Locri, who prepared for them a couch on board their ship (Diodôr. Excerpt. xvi. p. 15, Dindorf). The Thebans grant their hero Melanippus to Kleisthenês of Sikyôn (v. 68). What was sent, must probably have been a consecrated copy of the genuine statue.

Respecting the solemnities practised towards the statues, see Plutarch, Alkibiad. 34; Kallimach. Hymn. ad Lavacr. Palladis, init. with the note of Spanheim; K. O. Müller, Archæologie der Kunst, § 69; compare Plutarch, Quæstion. Romaic. § 61. p. 279; and Tacit. Mor. Germ. c. 40; Diodôr. xvii. 49.

The manner in which the real presence of a hero was identified with his statue (τὸν δικαιον δεῖ θεὸν οἴκοι μένειν σώζοντα ροὺς ἱδρυμένους.—Menander, Fragm. Ἡνίοχος, p. 71, Meineke), consecrated ground, and oracle, is nowhere more powerfully attested than in the Heroïca of Philostratus (capp. 2-20. pp. 674-692; also De Vit Apollôn. Tyan. iv. 11), respecting Prôtesilaus at Elæus, Ajax at the Aianteium, and Hectôr at Ilium: Prôtesilaus appeared exactly in the equipment of his statue,—χλαμύδα ἐνῆπται, ξένε, τὸν Θετταλικὸν τρόπον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἄγαλμα τοῦτο (p. 674). The presence and sympathy of the hero Lykus is essential to the satisfaction of the Athenian dikasts (Aristophan. Vesp. 389-820): the fragment of Lucilius, quoted by Lactantius, De Falsâ Religione (i. 22), is curious.—Τοῖς ἥρωσι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν *ἱδρυμένοις* (Lycurgus cont. Leocrat. c. 1).

[1024] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 12; Strabo, vi. p. 264. Theophrastus treats the perspiration as a natural phænomenon in the statues made of cedar-wood (Histor. Plant. v. 10). Plutarch discusses the credibility of this sort of miracles in his Life of Coriolanus, c. 37-38.

[1025] Herodot. vii. 189. Compare the gratitude of the Megalopolitans to Boreas for having preserved them from the attack of the Lacedæmonian king Agis (Pausan. viii. 27, 4.—viii. 36, 4). When the Ten Thousand Greeks were on their retreat through the cold mountains of Armenia, Boreas blew in their faces, "parching and freezing intolerably." One of the prophets recommended that a sacrifice should be offered to him, which was done, "and the painful effect of the wind appeared to every one forthwith to cease in a marked manner;" (καὶ πᾶσι δὴ περιφανῶς ἔδοξε λῆξαι τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦ πνεύματος.—Xenoph. Anab. iv. 5, 3.)

[1026] Jornandes, De Reb. Geticis, capp. 4-6.

[1027] Tacit. Mor. German. c. 2. "Celebrant carminibus antiquis, quod unum apud eos memoriæ et annalium genus est, Tuistonem Deum terrâ editum, et filium Mannum, originem gentis conditoresque. Quidam licentiâ vetustatis, plures Deo ortos, pluresque gentis appellationes, Marsos, Gambrivios, Suevos, Vandaliosque affirmant: eaque vera et antiqua nomina."

[1028] On the hostile influence exercised by the change of religion on the old Scandinavian poetry, see an interesting article of Jacob Grimm in the Göttingen Gelehrte Anzeigen, Feb. 1830, pp. 268-273; a review of Olaf Tryggvson's Saga. The article *Helden*, in his Deutsche Mythologie, is also full of instruction on the same subject: see also the Einleitung to the book, p. 11, 2nd edition.

A similar observation has been made with respect to the old mythes of the pagan Russians by Eichhoff: "L'établissement du Christianisme, ce gage du bonheur des nations, fut vivement apprécié par les Russes, qui dans leur juste reconnaissance, le personnifièrent dans un héros. Vladimir le Grand, ami des arts, protecteur de la religion qu'il protégea, et dont les fruits firent oublier les fautes, devint l'Arthus et le Charlemagne de la Russie, et ses hauts faits furent un mythe national qui domina tous ceux du paganisme. Autour de lui se groupèrent ces guerriers aux formes athlétiques, au cœur généreux, dont la poésie aime à entourer le berceau mystérieux des peuples: et les exploits du vaillant Dobrinia, de Rogdai, d'Ilia, de Curilo, animèrent les ballades nationales, et vivent encore dans de naïfs récits." (Eichhoff, Histoire de la Langue et Littérature des Slaves, Paris, 1839, part iii. ch. 2. p. 190.)

[1029] This distinction is curiously brought to view by Saxo Grammaticus, where he says of an Englishman named Lucas, that he was "literis quidem tenuiter instructus, sed historiarum scientiâ apprime eruditus" (p. 330, apud Dahlmann's Historische Forschungen, vol. i. p. 176).

[1030] "Barbara et antiquissima carmina (says Eginhart, in his Life of Charlemagne), quibus veterum regum actus et bella canebantur, conscripsit."

Theganus says of Louis le Debonnaire, "Poetica carmina gentilia, quæ in juventute didicerat, respuit, nec legere, nec audire, nec docere, voluit." (De Gestis Ludovici Imperatoris ap. Pithœum, p. 304, c. xix.)

[1031] See Grimm's Deutsche Mythologie, art. *Helden*, p. 356, 2nd edit. Hengist and Horsa were fourth in descent from Odin (Venerable Bede, Hist. i. 15). Thiodolff, the Scald of Harold Haarfager king of Norway, traced the pedigree of his sovereign through thirty generations to Yngarfrey, the son of Niord, companion of Odin at Upsal; the kings of Upsal were called Ynglinger, and the song of Thiodolff, Ynglingatal (Dahlmann, Histor. Forschung. i. p. 379). Eyvind, another Scald, a century afterwards, deduced the pedigree of Jarl Hacon from Saming, son of Yngwifrey (p. 381). Are Frode, the Icelandic historian, carried up his own genealogy through thirty-six generations to Yngwe; a genealogy which Torfæus accepts as trustworthy, opposing it to the line of kings given by Saxo Grammaticus (p. 352). Torfæus makes Harold Haarfager a descendant from Odin through twenty-seven generations; Alfred of England through twenty-three generations; Offa of Mercia through fifteen (p. 362). See also the translation by Lange of P. A. Müller's Saga Bibliothek, Introd. p. xxviii. and the genealogical tables prefixed to Snorro Sturleson's Edda.

Mr. Sharon Turner conceives the human existence of Odin to be distinctly proved, seemingly upon the same evidence as Euêmerus believed in the human existence of Zeus (History of the Anglo-Saxons, Appendix to b. ii. ch. 3. p. 219, 5th edit.).

[1032] Dahlmann, Histor. Forschung. t. i. p. 220. There is a valuable article on this subject in the Zeitschrift für Geschichts Wissenschaft (Berlin, vol. i. pp. 237-282) by Stuhr, "Über einige Hauptfragen des Nordischen Alterthums," wherein the writer illustrates both the strong motive and the effective tendency, on the part of the

Christian clergy who had to deal with these newly-converted Teutonic pagans, to Euêmerize the old gods, and to represent a genealogy, which they were unable to efface from men's minds, as if it consisted only of mere men.

Mr. John Kemble (Über die Stammtafel der Westsachsen, ap. Stuhr, p. 254) remarks, that "nobilitas," among that people, consisted in descent from Odin and the other gods.

Colonel Sleeman also deals in the same manner with the religious legends of the Hindoos,—so natural is the proceeding of Euêmerus, towards any religion in which a critic does not believe:—

"They (the Hindoos) of course think that the incarnation of their three great divinities were beings infinitely superior to prophets, being in all their attributes and prerogatives equal to the divinities themselves. *But we are disposed to think that these incarnations were nothing more than great men whom their flatterers and poets have exalted into gods,—this was the way in which men made their gods in ancient Greece and Egypt.*—All that the poets have sung of the actions of these men is now received as revelation from heaven: though nothing can be more monstrous than the actions ascribed to the best incarnation, Krishna, of the best of the gods, Vishnoo." (Sleeman, Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official, vol. i. ch. viii. 61.)

[1033] See P. E. Müller, Über den Ursprung und Verfall der Isländischen Historiographie, p. 63.

In the Leitfaden zur Nordischen Alterthumskunde, pp. 4-5 (Copenhagen, 1837), is an instructive summary of the different schemes of interpretation applied to the northern mythes: 1, the historical; 2, the geographical; 3, the astronomical; 4, the physical; 5, the allegorical.

[1034] "Interea tamen homines Christiani in numina non credant ethnica, nec aliter fidem narrationibus hisce adstruere vel adhibere debent, quam in libri hujus procœmio monitum est de causis et occasionibus cur et quomodo genus humanum a verâ fide aberraverit." (Extract from the Prose Edda, p. 75, in the Lexicon Mythologicum ad calcem Eddæ Sæmund. vol. iii. p. 357, Copenhag. edit.)

A similar warning is to be found in another passage cited by P. E. Müller, Über den Ursprung und Verfall der Isländischen Historiographie, p. 138, Copenhagen, 1813; compare the Prologue to the Prose Edda, p. 6, and Mallet, Introduction à l'Histoire de Dannemarc, ch. vii. pp. 114-132.

Saxo Grammaticus represents Odin sometimes as a magician, sometimes as an evil dæmon, sometimes as a high priest or pontiff of heathenism, who imposed so powerfully upon the people around him as to receive divine honors. Thor also is treated as having been an evil dæmon. (See Lexicon Mythologic. ut supra, pp. 567, 915.)

Respecting the function of Snorro as logographer, see Præfat. ad Eddam, ut supra, p. xi. He is much more faithful, and less unfriendly to the old religion, than the other logographers of the ancient Scandinavian Sagas. (Leitfaden der Nordischen Alterthümer, p. 14, by the Antiquarian Society of Copenhagen, 1837.)

By a singular transformation, dependent upon the same tone of mind, the authors of the French Chansons de Geste, in the twelfth century, turned Apollo into an evil dæmon, patron of the Mussulmans (see the Roman of Garin le Loherain, par M. Paulin Paris, 1833, p. 31): "Car mieux vaut Dieux que ne fait Apollis." M. Paris observes, "Cet ancien Dieu des beaux arts est l'un des démons le plus souvent désignés dans nos poëmes, comme patron des Musulmans."

The prophet Mahomet, too, anathematized the old Persian epic anterior to his religion. "C'est à l'occasion de Naser Ibn al-Hareth, qui avait apporté de Perse l'Histoire de Rustem et d'Isfendiar, et la faisait réciter par des chanteuses dans les assemblées des Koreischites, que Mahomet prononça le vers suivant (of the Koran): Il y a des hommes qui achètent des contes frivoles, pour détourner par-là les hommes de la voie de Dieu, d'une manière insensée, et pour la livrer à la risée: mais leur punition les couvrira de honte." (Mohl, Préface au Livre des Rois de Ferdousi, p. xiii.)

[1035] The legends of the Saints have been touched upon by M. Guizot (Cours d'Histoire Moderne, leçon xvii.) and by M. Ampère (Histoire Littéraire de la France, t. ii. cap. 14, 15, 16); but a far more copious and elaborate account of them, coupled with much just criticism, is to be found in the valuable Essai sur les Légendes Pieuses du Moyen Age, par L. F. Alfred Maury, Paris, 1843.

M. Guizot scarcely adverts at all to the more or less of matter of fact contained in these biographies: he regards them altogether as they grew out of and answered to the predominant emotions and mental exigences of the age: "Au milieu d'un déluge de fables absurdes, la morale éclate avec un grand empire" (p. 159, ed. 1829). "Les légendes ont été pour les Chrétiens de ce temps (qu'on me permette cette comparaison purement lit-

téraire) ce que sont pour les Orientaux ces longs récits, ces histoires si brillantes et si variées, dont les Mille et une Nuits nous donnent un échantillon. C'était là que l'imagination populaire errait librement dans un monde inconnu, merveilleux, plein de mouvement et de poésie" (p. 175, *ibid.*).

M. Guizot takes his comparison with the tales of the Arabian Nights, as heard by an Oriental with uninquiring and unsuspicious credence. Viewed with reference to an instructed European, who reads these narratives as pleasing but recognized fiction, the comparison would not be just; for no one in that age dreamed of questioning the truth of the biographies. All the remarks of M. Guizot assume this implicit faith in them as literal histories: perhaps, in estimating the feelings to which they owed their extraordinary popularity, he allows too little predominance to the religious feeling, and too much influence to other mental exigences which then went along with it; more especially as he remarks, in the preceding lecture (p. 116), "Le caractère général de l'époque est la concentration du développement intellectuel dans la sphère religieuse."

How this absorbing religious sentiment operated in generating and accrediting new matter of narrative, is shown with great fulness of detail in the work of M. Maury: "Tous les écrits du moyen âge nous apportent la preuve de cette préoccupation exclusive des esprits vers l'Histoire Sainte et les prodiges qui avaient signalé l'avènement du Christianisme. Tous nous montrent la pensée de Dieu et du Ciel, dominant les moindres œuvres de cette époque de naïve et de crédule simplicité. D'ailleurs, n'était-ce pas le moine, le clerc, qui constituaient alors les seuls écrivains? Qu'y a-t-il d'étonnant que le sujet habituel de leurs méditations, de leurs études, se reflétât sans cesse dans leurs ouvrages? Partout reparaissait à l'imagination Jésus et ses Saints: cette image, l'esprit l'accueillait avec soumission et obéissance: il n'osait pas encore envisager ces célestes pensées avec l'œil de la critique, armé de défiance et de doute; au contraire, l'intelligence les acceptait toutes indistinctement et s'en nourrissait avec avidité. Ainsi s'accréditaient tous les jours de nouvelles fables. *Une foi vive veut sans cesse de nouveaux faits qu'elle puisse croire*, comme la charité veut de nouveaux bienfaits pour s'exercer" (p. 43). The remarks on the History of St. Christopher, whose personality was allegorized by Luther and Melancthon, are curious (p. 57).

[1036] "Dans les prodiges que l'on admettait avoir dû nécessairement s'opérer au tombeau du saint nouvellement canonisé, l'expression, 'Cæci visum, claudi gressum, muti loquelam, surdi auditum, paralytici debitum membrorum officium, recuperabant,' était devenue plûtot une formule d'usage que la rélation littérale du fait." (Maury, Essai sur les Légendes Pieuses du Moyen Age, p. 5.)

To the same purpose M. Ampère, ch. 14. p. 361: "Il y a un certain nombre de faits que l'agiographie reproduit constamment, quelque soit son héros: ordinairement ce personnage a eu dans sa jeunesse une vision qui lui a révélé son avenir: ou bien, une prophétie lui a annoncé ce qu'il serait un jour. Plus tard, il opère un certain nombre de miracles, toujours les mêmes; il exorcise des possédés, ressuscite des morts, il est averti de sa fin par un songe. Puis sur son tombeau s'accomplissent d'autres merveilles à-peu-près semblables."

[1037] A few words from M. Ampère to illustrate this: "C'est donc au sixième siècle que la légende se constitue: c'est alors qu'elle prend complètement le caractère naïf qui lui appartient: qu'elle est elle-même, qu'elle se sépare de toute influence étrangère. En même temps, l'ignorance devient de plus en plus grossière, et par suite la crédulité s'accroit: les calamités du temps sont plus lourdes, et l'on a un plus grand besoin de remède et de consolation…. Les récits miraculeux se substituent aux argumens de la théologie. Les miracles sont devenus la meilleure démonstration du Christianisme: c'est la seule que puissent comprendre les esprits grossiers des barbares" (c. 15. p. 373).

Again, c. 17. p. 401: "Un des caractères de la légende est de mêler constamment le puéril au grand: il faut l'avouer, elle défigure parfois un peu ces hommes d'une trempe si forte, en mettant sur leur compte des anecdotes dont le caractère n'est pas toujours sérieux; elle en a usé ainsi pour St. Columban, dont nous verrons tout à l'heure le rôle vis-à-vis de Brunehaut et des chefs Mérovingiens. La légende auroit pu se dispenser de nous apprendre, comment un jour, il se fit rapporter par un corbeau les gants qu'il avait perdus: comment, un autre jour, il empêcha la bière de couler d'un tonneau percé, et diverses merveilles, certainement indignes de sa mémoire."

The miracle by which St. Columban employed the raven to fetch back his lost gloves, is exactly in the character of the Homeric and Hesiodic age: the earnest faith, as well as the reverential sympathy, between the Homeric man and Zeus or Athênê, is indicated by the invocation of their aid for his own sufferings of detail, and in his own need and danger. The criticism of M. Ampère, on the other hand, is analogous to that of the later pagans, after the conception of a course of nature had become established in men's minds, so far as that exceptional in-

terference by the gods was understood to be, comparatively speaking, rare, and only supposable upon what were called great emergences.

In the old Hesiodic legend (see above, ch. ix. p. 245), Apollo is apprized by a raven of the infidelity of the nymph Korônis to him—τῷ μὲν ἄρ᾽ ἄγγελος ἦλθε κόραξ, etc. (the raven appears elsewhere as companion of Apollo, Plutarch, de Isid. et Os. p. 379, Herod. iv. 5.) Pindar, in his version of the legend, eliminated the raven, without specifying *how* Apollo got his knowledge of the circumstance. The Scholiasts praise Pindar much for having rejected the puerile version of the story—ἐπαινεῖ τὸν Πίνδαρον ὁ Ἀρτέμων ὅτι παρακρουσάμενος τὴν περὶ τὸν κόρακα ἱστορίαν, αὐτὸν δι᾽ ἑαυτοῦ ἐγνωκέναι φησὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω … χαίρειν οὖν ἐάσας τῷ τοιούτῳ μύθῳ *τέλεως ὄντι ληρώδει*, etc.—compare also the criticisms of the Schol. ad Soph. Œdip. Kol. 1378, on the old epic Thebaïs; and the remarks of Arrian (Exp. Al. iii. 4) on the divine interference by which Alexander and his army were enabled to find their way across the sand of the desert to the temple of Ammon.

In the eyes of M. Ampère, the recital of the biographer of St. Columban appears puerile (οὔπω ἴδον ὧδε θεοὺς ἀνάφανδρα φιλεῦντας, Odyss. iii. 221); in the eyes of that biographer, the criticism of M. Ampère would have appeared impious. When it is once conceded that phænomena are distributable under two denominations, the natural and the miraculous, it must be left to the feelings of each individual to determine what is and what is not, a suitable occasion for a miracle. Diodôrus and Pausanias differed in opinion (as stated in a previous chapter) about the death of Actæôn by his own hounds,—the former maintaining that the case was one fit for the special intervention of the goddess Artemis; the latter, that it was not so. The question is one determinable only by the religious feelings and conscience of the two dissentients: no common standard of judgment can be imposed upon them; for no reasonings derived from science or philosophy are available, inasmuch as in this case the very point in dispute is, whether the scientific point of view be admissible. Those who are disposed to adopt the supernatural belief, will find in every case the language open to them wherewith Dionysius of Halicarnassus (in recounting a miracle wrought by Vesta, in the early times of Roman history, for the purpose of rescuing an unjustly accused virgin) reproves the sceptics of his time: "It is well worth while (he observes) to recount the special manifestation (ἐπιφάνειαν) which the goddess showed to these unjustly accused virgins. For these circumstances, extraordinary as they are, have been held worthy of belief by the Romans, and historians have talked much about them. Those persons, indeed, who adopt the atheistical schemes of philosophy (if, indeed, we must call them *philosophy*), pulling in pieces as they do *all* the special manifestations (ἁπάσας διασύροντες τὰς ἐπιφανείας τῶν θεῶν) of the gods which have taken place among Greeks or barbarians, will of course turn *these* stories also into ridicule, ascribing them to the vain talk of men, as if none of the gods cared at all for mankind. But those who, having pushed their researches farther, believe the gods not to be indifferent to human affairs, but favorable to good men and hostile to bad—will not treat *these* special manifestations as *more* incredible than others." (Dionys. Halic. ii. 68-69.) Plutarch, after noticing the great number of miraculous statements in circulation, expresses his anxiety to draw a line between the true and the false, but cannot find where: "excess, both of credulity and of incredulity (he tells us) in such matters is dangerous; caution, and nothing too much, is the best course." (Camillus, c. 6.) Polybius is for granting permission to historians to recount a sufficient number of miracles to keep up a feeling of piety in the multitude, but not more: to measure out the proper quantity (he observes) is difficult, but not impossible (δυσπαράγραφός ἐστι ἡ ποσότης, οὐ μὴν ἀπαράγραφός γε, xvi. 12).

[1038] The great Bollandist collection of the Lives of the Saints, intended to comprise the whole year, did not extend beyond the nine months from January to October, which occupy fifty-three large volumes. The month of April fills three of those volumes, and exhibits the lives of 1472 saints. Had the collection run over the entire year, the total number of such biographies could hardly have been less than 25,000, and might have been even greater (see Guizot, Cours d'Histoire Moderne, leçon xvii. p. 157).

[1039] See Warton's History of English Poetry, vol. i. dissert. i. p. xvii. Again, in sect. iii. p. 140: "Vincent de Beauvais, who lived under Louis IX. of France (about 1260), and who, on account of his extraordinary erudition, was appointed preceptor to that king's sons, very gravely classes Archbishop Turpin's Charlemagne among the real histories, and places it on a level with Suetonius and Cæsar. He was himself an historian, and has left a large history of the world, fraught with a variety of reading, and of high repute in the Middle Ages; but edifying and entertaining as this work might have been to his contemporaries, at present it serves only to record their prejudices and to characterize their credulity." About the full belief in Arthur and the Tales of the Round Table during the fourteenth century, and about the strange historical mistakes of the poet Gower in the fifteenth, see the same work, sect. 7. vol. ii. p. 33; sect. 19. vol. ii. p. 239.

"L'auteur de la Chronique de Turpin (says M. Sismondi, Littérature du Midi, vol. i. ch. 7. p. 289) n'avait point l'intention de briller aux yeux du public par une invention heureuse, ni d'amuser les oisifs par des contes

merveilleux qu'ils reconnoitroient pour tels: il présentait aux Français tous ces faits étranges comme de l'histoire, et la lecture des légendes fabuleuses avait accoutumé à croire à de plus grandes merveilles encore; aussi plusieurs de ces fables furent-elles reproduites dans la Chronique de St. Denis."

Again, *ib.* p. 290: "Souvent les anciens romanciers, lorsqu'ils entreprennent un récit de la cour de Charlemagne, prennent un ton plus élevé: ce ne sont point des fables qu'ils vont conter, c'est de l'histoire nationale,—c'est la gloire de leurs ancêtres qu'ils veulent célébrer, et ils ont droit alors à demander qu'on les écoute avec respect."

The Chronicle of Turpin was inserted, even so late as the year 1566, in the collection printed by Scardius at Frankfort of early German historians (Ginguené, Histoire Littéraire d'Italie, vol. iv. part ii. ch. 3. p. 157).

To the same point—that these romances were listened to as real stories—see Sir Walter Scott's Preface to Sir Tristram, p. lxvii. The authors of the Legends of the Saints are not less explicit in their assertions that everything which they recount is true and well-attested (Ampère, c. 14. p. 358).

[1040] The series of articles by M. Fauriel, published in the Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. xiii. are full of instruction respecting the origin, tenor, and influence of the Romances of Chivalry. Though the name of Charlemagne appears, the romancers are really unable to distinguish him from Charles Martel or from Charles the Bald (pp. 537-539). They ascribe to him an expedition to the Holy Land, in which he conquered Jerusalem from the Saracens, obtained possession of the relics of the passion of Christ, the crown of thorns, etc. These precious relics he carried to Rome, from whence they were taken to Spain by a Saracen emir, named Balan, at the head of an army. The expedition of Charlemagne against the Saracens in Spain was undertaken for the purpose of recovering the relics: "Ces divers romans peuvent être regardés comme la suite, comme le développement, de la fiction de la conquête de Jérusalem par Charlemagne."

Respecting the Romance of Rinaldo of Montauban (describing the struggles of a feudal lord against the emperor) M. Fauriel observes, "Il n'y a, je crois, aucun fondement historique: c'est selon toute apparence, la pure expression poétique du fait général," etc. (p. 542.)

[1041] Among the "formules consacrées" (observes M. Fauriel) of the romancers of the Carlovingian epic, are asseverations of their own veracity, and of the accuracy of what they are about to relate—specification of witnesses whom they have consulted—appeals to pretended chronicles: "Que ces citations, ces indications, soient parfois sérieuses et sincères, cela peut être; mais c'est une exception et une exception rare. De telles allégations de la part des romanciers, sont en général un pur et simple mensonge, mais non toutefois un mensonge gratuit. C'est un mensonge qui a sa raison et sa convenance: il tient au désir et au besoin de satisfaire une opinion accoutumée à supposer et à chercher du vrai dans les fictions du genre de celles où l'on allègue ces prétendues autorités. La manière dont les auteurs de ces fictions les qualifient souvent eux-mêmes, est une conséquence naturelle de leur prétention d'y avoir suivi des documens vénérables. Ils les qualifient de chansons de *vieille histoire*, de *haute histoire*, de *bonne geste*, de *grande baronnie*: et ce n'est pas pour se vanter qu'ils parlent ainsi: la vanité d'auteur n'est rien chez eux, en comparaison du besoin qu'ils ont d'être crus, de passer pour de simples traducteurs, de simples répétiteurs de légendes ou d'histoire consacrée. Ces protestations de véracité, qui, plus ou moins expresses, sont de rigueur dans les romans Carlovingiens, y sont aussi fréquemment accompagnées de protestations accessoires contre les romanciers, qui, ayant déjà traité un sujet donné, sont accusés d'y avoir faussé la vérité." (Fauriel, Orig. de l'Epopée Chevaleresque, in the Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. xiii. p. 554.)

About the Cycle of the Round Table, see the same series of articles (Rev. D. M. t. xiv. pp. 170-184). The Chevaliers of the Saint Graal were a sort of *idéal* of the Knights Templars: "Une race de princes héroïques, originaires de l'Asie, fut prédestinée par le ciel même à la garde du Saint Graal. Perille fut le premier de cette race, qui s'étant converti au Christianisme, passa en Europe sous l'Empereur Vespasien," etc.; then follows a string of fabulous incidents: the epical agency is similar to that of Homer—Διὸς δ᾽ ἐτελείετο βουλή.

M. Paulin Paris, in his Prefaces to the Romans des Douze Pairs de France, has controverted many of the positions of M. Fauriel, and with success, so far as regards the Provençal origin of the Chansons de Geste, asserted by the latter. In regard to the Romances of the Round Table, he agrees substantially with M. Fauriel; but he tries to assign a greater historical value to the poems of the Carlovingian epic,—very unsuccessfully, in my opinion. But his own analysis of the old poem of Garin de Loherain bears out the very opinion which he is confuting: "Nous sommes au règne de Charles Martel, et nous reconnaissons sous d'autres noms les détails exacts de la fameuse défaite d'Attila dans les champs Catalauniques. Saint Loup et Saint Nicaise, glorieux prélats du qua-

trième siècle, reviennent figurer autour du père de Pépin le Bref: enfin pour compléter la confusion, Charles Martel meurt sur le champ de bataille, à la place du roi des Visigoths, Theodoric…. *Toutes les parties de la narration sont vraies*: seulement *toutes s'y trouvent déplacées*. En général, les peuples n'entendent rien à la chronologie: les evènemens restent: les individus, les lieux et les époques, ne laissent aucune trace: c'est pour ainsi dire, une décoration scénique que l'on applique indifféremment à des récits souvent contraires." (Preface to the Roman de Garin le Loherain, pp. xvi.-xx.: Paris, 1833.) Compare also his Lettre à M. Monmerqué, prefixed to the Roman de Berthe aux Grans Piés, Paris, 1836.

To say that *all* the parts of the narrative are true, is contrary to M. Paris's own showing: *some* parts may be true, separately taken, but these fragments of truth are melted down with a large mass of fiction, and cannot be discriminated unless we possess some independent test. The poet who picks out one incident from the fourth century, another from the fifth, and a few more from the eighth, and then blends them all into a continuous tale along with many additions of his own, shows that he takes the items of fact because they suit the purposes of his narrative, not because they happen to be attested by historical evidence. His hearers are not critical: they desire to have their imaginations and feelings affected, and they are content to accept without question whatever accomplishes this end.

[1042] Hesiod, Theogon. 100—κλέα προτέρων ἀνθρώπων. Puttenham talks of the remnant of bards existing in his time (1589): "Blind Harpers, or such like Taverne Minstrels, whose matters are for the most part *stories of old time*, as the Tale of Sir Topaze, the Reportes of Bevis of Southampton, Adam Bell, Clymme of the Clough, and such other old Romances or *Historical Rhymes*." (Arte of English Poesie, book ii. cap. 9.)

[1043] Respecting the Volsunga Saga and the Niebelungen Lied, the work of Lange—Untersuchungen über die Geschichte und das Verhältniss der Nordischen und Deutschen Heldensage—is a valuable translation from the Danish Saga-Bibliothek of P. E. Müller.

P. E. Müller maintains, indeed, the historical basis of the tales respecting the Volsungs (see pp. 102-107)—upon arguments very unsatisfactory; though the genuine Scandinavian origin of the tale is perfectly made out. The chapter added by Lange himself, at the close (see p. 432, etc.), contains juster views as to the character of the primitive mythology, though he too advances some positions respecting a something "reinsymbolisches" in the background, which I find it difficult to follow (see p. 477, etc.).—There are very ancient epical ballads still sung by the people in the Faro Islands, many of them relating to Sigurd and his adventures (p. 412).

Jacob Grimm, in his Deutsche Mythologie, maintains the purely mythical character, as opposed to the historical, of Siegfried and Dieterich (Art. *Helden*, pp. 344-346).

So, too, in the great Persian epic of Ferdousi, the principal characters are religious and mythical. M. Mohl observes,—"Les caractères des personnages principaux de l'ancienne histoire de Perse se retrouvent dans le livre des Rois (de Ferdousi) tels que les indiquent les parties des livres de Zoroaster que nous possédons encore. Kaioumors, Djemschid, Feridoun, Gushtasp, Isfendiar, etc. jouent dans le poème épique le même rôle que dans les Livres sacrés: à cela près, que dans les derniers ils nous apparaissent à travers une atmosphere mythologique qui grandit tous leurs traits: mais cette difference est précisément celle qu'on devait s'attendre à trouver entre la tradition religieuse et la tradition épique." (Mohl, Livre des Rois par Ferdousi, Preface, p. 1.)

The Persian historians subsequent to Ferdousi have all taken his poem as the basis of their histories, and have even copied him faithfully and literally (Mohl, p. 53). Many of his heroes became the subjects of long epical biographies, written and recited without any art or grace, often by writers whose names are unknown (*ib.* pp. 54-70). Mr. Morier tells us that "the Shah Nameh is still believed by the present Persians to contain their ancient history" (Adventures of Hadgi Baba, c. 32). As the Christian romancers transformed Apollo into the patron of Mussulmans, so Ferdousi makes Alexander the Great a Christian: "La critique historique (observes M. Mohl) était du temps de Ferdousi chose presqu'inconnue." (*ib.* p. xlviii.) About the absence not only of all historiography, but also of all idea of it, or taste for it among the early Indians, Persians, Arabians, etc., see the learned book of Nork, *Die Götter Syriens*, Preface, p. viii. *seqq.* (Stuttgart, 1842.)

[1044] Several of the heroes of the ancient world were indeed themselves popular subjects with the romancers of the middle ages, Thêseus, Jasôn, etc.; Alexander the Great, more so than any of them.

Dr. Warton observes, respecting the Argonautic expedition, "Few stories of antiquity have more the cast of one of the old romances than this of Jasôn. An expedition of a new kind is made into a strange and distant country, attended with infinite dangers and difficulties. The king's daughter of the new country is an enchantress; she falls in love with the young prince, who is the chief adventurer. The prize which he seeks is

guarded by brazen-footed bulls, who breathe fire, and by a hideous dragon, who never sleeps. The princess lends him the assistance of her charms and incantations to conquer these obstacles; she gives him possession of the prize, leaves her father's court, and follows him into his native country." (Warton, Observations on Spenser, vol. i. p. 178.)

To the same purpose M. Ginguené: "Le premier modèle des Fées n'est-il pas dans Circé, dans Calypso, dans Médée? Celui des géans, dans Polyphème, dans Cacus, et dans les géans, ou les Titans, cette race ennemie de Jupiter? Les serpens et les dragons des romans ne sont-ils pas des successeurs du dragon des Hesperides et de celui de la Toison d'or? Les Magiciens! la Thessalie en étoit pleine. Les armes enchantées impénétrables! elles sont de la même trempe, et l'on peut les croire forgées au même fourneau que celles d'Achille et d'Enée." (Ginguené, Histoire Littéraire d'Italie, vol. iv. part ii. ch. 3, p. 151.)

[1045] See Warton's History of English Poetry, sect. iii. p. 131, note. "No man before the sixteenth century presumed to doubt that the Francs derived their origin from Francus son of Hector; that the Spaniards were descended from Japhet, the Britons from Brutus, and the Scotch from Fergus." (*Ibid.* p. 140.)

According to the Prologue of the prose Edda, Odin was the supreme king of Troy in Asia, "in eâ terrâ quam nos Turciam appellamus…. Hinc omnes Borealis plagæ magnates vel primores genealogias suas referunt, atque principes illius urbis inter numina locant: sed in primis ipsum Priamum pro Odeno ponunt," etc. They also identified *Tros* with *Thor*. (See Lexicon Mythologicum ad calcem Eddæ Sæmund, p. 552. vol. iii.)

[1046] See above, ch. xv. p. 458; also Æschinês, De Falsâ Legatione, c. 14, Herodot. v. 94. The Herakleids pretended a right to the territory in Sicily near Mount Eryx, in consequence of the victory gained by their progenitor Hêraklês over Eryx, the eponymous hero of the place. (Herodot. v. 43.)

[1047] The remarks in Speed's Chronicle (book v. c. 3. sect. 11-12), and the preface to Howes's Continuation of Stow's Chronicle, published in 1631, are curious as illustrating this earnest feeling. The Chancellor Fortescue, in impressing upon his royal pupil, the son of Henry VI., the limited character of English monarchy, deduces it from Brute the Trojan: "Concerning the different powers which kings claim over their subjects, I am firmly of opinion that it arises solely from the different nature of their original institution. So the kingdom of England had its original from Brute and the Trojans, who attended him from Italy and Greece, and became a mixed kind of government, compounded of the regal and the political." (Hallam, Hist. Mid. Ages, ch. viii. P. 3, page 230.)

[1048] "Antiquitas enim recepit fabulas fictas etiam nonnunquam incondite: hæc ætas autem jam exculta, præsertim eludens omne quod fieri non potest, respuit," etc. (Cicero, De Republicâ, ii. 10, p. 147, ed. Maii.)

[1049] Dr. Zachary Grey has the following observations in his Notes on Shakspeare (London, 1754, vol. i. p. 112). In commenting on the passage in King Lear, *Nero is an angler in the lake of darkness*, he says, "This is one of Shakspeare's most remarkable *anachronisms*. King Lear succeeded his father Bladud anno mundi 3105; and Nero, anno mundi 4017, was sixteen years old, when he married Octavia, Cæsar's daughter. See Funcii Chronologia, p. 94."

Such a supposed chronological discrepancy would hardly be pointed out in any commentary now written.

The introduction prefixed by Mr. Giles, to his recent translation of Geoffrey of Monmouth (1842), gives a just view both of the use which our old poets made of his tales, and of the general credence so long and so unsuspectingly accorded to them. The list of old British kings given by Mr. Giles also deserves attention, as a parallel to the Grecian genealogies anterior to the Olympiads.

[1050] The following passage, from the Preface of Mr. Price to Warton's History of English Poetry, is alike just and forcibly characterized; the whole Preface is, indeed, full of philosophical reflection on popular fables generally. Mr. Price observes (p. 79):—

"The great evil with which this long-contested question appears to be threatened at the present day, is an extreme equally dangerous with the incredulity of Mr. Ritson,—a disposition to receive as authentic history, under a slightly fabulous coloring, every incident recorded in the British Chronicle. An allegorical interpretation is now inflicted upon all the marvellous circumstances; a forced construction imposed upon the less glaring deviations from probability; and the usual subterfuge of baffled research,—erroneous readings and etymological sophistry,—is made to reduce every stubborn and intractable text to something like the consistency required. It might have been expected that the notorious failures of Dionysius and Plutarch, in Roman history, would have prevented the repetition of an error, which neither learning nor ingenuity can render palatable; and that the havoc and deadly ruin effected by these ancient writers (in other respects so valuable) in one of the most beau-

tiful and interesting monuments of traditional story, would have acted as sufficient corrective on all future aspirants. The favorers of this system might at least have been instructed by the philosophic example of Livy,—if it be lawful to ascribe to philosophy a line of conduct which perhaps was prompted by a powerful sense of poetic beauty,—that traditional record can only gain in the hands of the future historian by one attractive aid,—the grandeur and lofty graces of that incomparable style in which the first decade is written; and that the best duty towards antiquity, and the most agreeable one towards posterity, is to transmit the narrative received as an unsophisticated tradition, in all the plenitude of its marvels and the awful dignity of its supernatural agency. For, however largely we may concede that real events have supplied the substance of any traditive story, yet the amount of absolute facts, and the manner of those facts, the period of their occurrence, the names of the agents, and the locality given to the scene, are all combined upon principles so wholly beyond our knowledge, that it becomes impossible to fix with certainty upon any single point better authenticated than its fellow. Probability in such decisions will often prove the most fallacious guide we can follow; for, independently of the acknowledged historical axiom, that 'le vrai n'est pas toujours le vraisemblable,' innumerable instances might be adduced, where tradition has had recourse to this very probability to confer a plausible sanction upon her most fictitious and romantic incidents. It will be a much more useful labor, wherever it can be effected, to trace the progress of this traditional story in the country where it has become located, by a reference to those natural or artificial monuments which are the unvarying sources of fictitious events; and, by a strict comparison of its details with the analogous memorials of other nations, to separate those elements which are obviously of a native growth, from the occurrences bearing the impress of a foreign origin. *We shall gain little, perhaps, by such a course for the history of human events*; but it will be an important accession to our stock of knowledge on the *history of the human mind*. It will infallibly display, as in the analysis of every similar record, the operations of that refining principle which is ever obliterating the monotonous deeds of violence that fill the chronicle of a nation's early career, and exhibit the brightest attribute in the catalogue of man's intellectual endowments,—a glowing and vigorous imagination,—bestowing upon all the impulses of the mind a splendor and virtuous dignity, which, however fallacious historically considered, are never without a powerfully redeeming good, the ethical tendency of all their lessons."

[1051] Varro ap. Censorin. de Die Natali; Varronis Fragm. p. 219, ed. Scaliger, 1623. "Varro tria discrimina temporum esse tradit. Primum ab hominum principio usque ad cataclysmum priorem, quod propter ignorantiam vocatur ἄδηλον. Secundum, a cataclysmo priore ad Olympiadem primam, quod quia in eo multa fabulosa referuntur, *Mythicon* nominatur. Tertium a primâ Olympiade ad nos; quod dicitur *Historicon*, quia res in eo gestæ veris historiis continentur."

To the same purpose Africanus, ap. Eusebium, Præp. Ev. xx. p. 487: Μέχρι μὲν Ὀλυμπιάδων, οὐδὲν ἀκριβὲς ἱστόρηται τοῖς Ἕλλησι, πάντων συγκεχυμένων, καὶ κατὰ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς τῶν πρὸ τοῦ συμφωνούντων, etc.



GEORGE GROTE.

HISTORY OF GREECE

I. Legendary Greece.

II. Grecian History to the Reign of Peisistratus at Athens.

BY
GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.

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SECTION I.—RETURN OF THE HERAKLEIDS INTO PELOPONNESUS.

In one of the preceding chapters, we have traced the descending series of the two most distinguished mythical families in Peloponnêsus,—the Perseids and the Pelopids: we have followed the former down to Hêraklês and his son Hyllus, and the latter down to Orestês son of Agamemnôn, who is left in possession of that ascendancy in the peninsula which had procured for his father the chief command in the Trojan war. The Herakleids, or sons of Hêraklês, on the other hand, are expelled fugitives, dependent upon foreign aid or protection: Hyllus had perished in single combat with Echemus of Tegea, (connected with the Pelopids by marriage with Timandra sister of Klytæmnêstra,[1]) and a solemn compact had been made, as the preliminary condition of this duel, that no similar attempt at an invasion of the peninsula should be undertaken by his family for the space of one hundred years. At the end of the stipulated period the attempt was renewed, and with complete success; but its success was owing, not so much to the valor of the invaders as to a powerful body of new allies. The Herakleids reappear as leaders and companions of the Dorians,—a northerly section of the Greek name, who now first come into importance,—poor, indeed, in mythical renown, since they are never noticed in the Iliad, and only once casually mentioned in the Odyssey, as a fraction among the many-tongued inhabitants of Krête,—but destined to form one of the grand and predominant elements throughout all the career of historical Hellas.

The son of Hyllus—Kleodæus—as well as his grandson Aristomachus, were now dead, and the lineage of Hêraklês was represented by the three sons of the latter,—Têmenus, Kresphontês, and Aristodêmus, and under their conduct the Dorians penetrated into the peninsula. The mythical account traced back this intimate union between the Herakleids and the Dorians to a prior war, in which Hêraklês himself had rendered inestimable aid to the Dorian king Ægimius, when the latter was hard pressed in a contest with the Lapithæ. Hêraklês defeated the Lapithæ, and slew their king Korônus; in return for which Ægimius assigned to his deliverer one third part of his whole territory, and adopted Hyllus as his son. Hêraklês desired that the territory thus made over might be held in reserve until a time should come when his descendants might stand in need of it; and that time did come, after the death of Hyllus, (see Chap. V.) Some of the Herakleids then found shelter at Trikorythus in Attica, but the remainder, turning their steps towards Ægimius, solicited from him the allotment

of land which had been promised to their valiant progenitor. Ægimius received them according to his engagement, and assigned to them the stipulated third portion of his territory:[2] and from this moment the Herakleids and Dorians became intimately united together into one social communion. Pamphylus and Dymas, sons of Ægimius, accompanied Têmenus and his two brothers in their invasion of Peloponnêsus.

Such is the mythical incident which professes to explain the origin of those three tribes into which all the Dorian communities were usually divided,—the Hyllêis, the Pamphyli, and the Dymanes,—the first of the three including certain particular families, such as that of the kings of Sparta, who bore the special name of Herakleids. Hyllus, Pamphylus, and Dymas are the eponymous heroes of the three Dorian tribes.

Têmenus and his two brothers resolved to attack Peloponnêsus, not by a land-march along the Isthmus, such as that in which Hyllus had been previously slain, but by sea, across the narrow inlet between the promontories of Rhium and Antirrhium, with which the Gulf of Corinth commences. According to one story, indeed,—which, however, does not seem to have been known to Herodotus,—they are said to have selected this line of march by the express direction of the Delphian god, who vouchsafed to expound to them an oracle which had been delivered to Hyllus in the ordinary equivocal phraseology. Both the Ozolian Lokrians, and the Ætolians, inhabitants of the northern coast of the Gulf of Corinth, were favorable to the enterprise, and the former granted to them a port for building their ships, from which memorable circumstance the port ever afterwards bore the name of Naupaktus. Aristodêmus was here struck with lightning and died, leaving twin sons, Eurysthenês and Proklês; but his remaining brothers continued to press the expedition with alacrity.

At this juncture, an Akarnanian prophet named Karnus presented himself in the camp[3] under the inspiration of Apollo, and uttered various predictions: he was, however, so much suspected of treacherous collusion with the Peloponnesians, that Hippotês, great-grandson of Hêraklês through Phylas and Antiochus, slew him. His death drew upon the army the wrath of Apollo, who destroyed their vessels and punished them with famine. Têmenus, in his distress, again applying to the Delphian god for succor and counsel, was made acquainted with the cause of so much suffering, and was directed to banish Hippotês for ten years, to offer expiatory sacrifice for the death of Karnus, and to seek as the guide of the army a man with three eyes.[4] On coming back to Naupaktus, he met the Ætolian Oxylus, son of Andræmôn, returning to his country, after a temporary exile in Elis, incurred for homicide: Oxylus had lost one eye, but as he was seated on a horse, the man and the horse together made up the three eyes required, and he was adopted as the guide prescribed by the oracle. [5] Conducted by him, they refitted their ships, landed on the opposite coast of Achaia, and marched to attack Tisamenus son of Orestês, then the great potentate of the peninsula. A decisive battle was fought, in which the latter was vanquished and slain, and in which Pamphylus and Dymas also perished. This battle made the Dorians so completely masters of the Peloponnêsus, that they proceeded to distrib-

ute the territory among themselves. The fertile land of Elis had been by previous stipulation reserved for Oxylus, as a recompense for his services as conductor: and it was agreed that the three Herakleids,—Têmenus, Kresphontês, and the infant sons of Aristodêmus,—should draw lots for Argos, Sparta, and Messênê. Argos fell to Têmenus, Sparta to the sons of Aristodêmus, and Messênê to Kresphontês; the latter having secured for himself this prize, the most fertile territory of the three, by the fraud of putting into the vessel out of which the lots were drawn, a lump of clay instead of a stone, whereby the lots of his brothers were drawn out while his own remained inside. Solemn sacrifices were offered by each upon this partition: but as they proceeded to the ceremony, a miraculous sign was seen upon the altar of each of the brothers,—a toad corresponding to Argos, a serpent to Sparta, and a fox to Messênê. The prophets, on being consulted, delivered the import of these mysterious indications: the toad, as an animal slow and stationary, was an evidence that the possessor of Argos would not succeed in enterprises beyond the limits of his own city; the serpent denoted the aggressive and formidable future reserved to Sparta; the fox prognosticated a career of wile and deceit to the Messenian.

Such is the brief account given by Apollodôrus of the Return of the Herakleids, at which point we pass, as if touched by the wand of a magician, from mythical to historical Greece. The story bears on the face of it the stamp, not of history, but of legend,—abridged from one or more of the genealogical poets,[6] and presenting such an account as they thought satisfactory, of the first formation of the great Dorian establishments in Peloponnêsus, as well as of the semi-Ætolian Elis. Its incidents are so conceived as to have an explanatory bearing on Dorian institutions,—upon the triple division of tribes, characteristic of the Dorians,—upon the origin of the great festival of the Karneia at Sparta, alleged to be celebrated in expiation of the murder of Karnus,—upon the different temper and character of the Dorian states among themselves,—upon the early alliance of the Dorians with Elis, which contributed to give ascendency and vogue to the Olympic games,—upon the reverential dependence of Dorians towards the Delphian oracle,—and, lastly, upon the etymology of the name Naupaktus. If we possessed the narrative more in detail, we should probably find many more examples of coloring of the legendary past suitable to the circumstances of the historical present.

Above all, this legend makes out in favor of the Dorians and their kings a mythical title to their Peloponnesian establishments; Argos, Sparta, and Messênê are presented as rightfully belonging, and restored by just retribution, to the children of Hêraklês. It was to them that Zeus had specially given the territory of Sparta; the Dorians came in as their subjects and auxiliaries.[7] Plato gives a very different version of the legend, but we find that he, too, turns the story in such a manner as to embody a claim of right on the part of the conquerors. According to him, the Achæans, who returned from the capture of Troy, found among their fellow-citizens at home—the race which had grown up during their absence—an aversion to readmit

them: after a fruitless endeavor to make good their rights, they were at last expelled, but not without much contest and bloodshed. A leader named Dorieus, collected all these exiles into one body, and from him they received the name of Dorians instead of Achæans; then marching back, under the conduct of the Herakleids into Peloponnêsus, they recovered by force the possessions from which they had been shut out, and constituted the three Dorian establishments under the separate Herakleid brothers, at Argos, Sparta, and Messênê. These three fraternal dynasties were founded upon a scheme of intimate union and sworn alliance one with the other, for the purpose of resisting any attack which might be made upon them from Asia,[8] either by the remaining Trojans or by their allies. Such is the story as Plato believed it; materially different in the incidents related, yet analogous in mythical feeling, and embodying alike the idea of a rightful reconquest. Moreover, the two accounts agree in representing both the entire conquest and the triple division of Dorian Peloponnêsus as begun and completed in one and the same enterprise,—so as to constitute one single event, which Plato would probably have called the Return of the Achæans, but which was commonly known as the Return of the Herakleids. Though this is both inadmissible and inconsistent with other statements which approach close to the historical times, yet it bears every mark of being the primitive view originally presented by the genealogical poets: the broad way in which the incidents are grouped together, was at once easy for the imagination to follow, and impressive to the feelings.

The existence of one legendary account must never be understood as excluding the probability of other accounts, current at the same time, but inconsistent with it: and many such there were as to the first establishment of the Peloponnesian Dorians. In the narrative which I have given from Apollodôrus, conceived apparently under the influence of Dorian feelings, Tisamenus is stated to have been slain in the invasion. But according to another narrative, which seems to have found favor with the historical Achæans on the north coast of Peloponnêsus, Tisamenus, though expelled by the invaders from his kingdom of Sparta or Argos, was not slain: he was allowed to retire under agreement, together with a certain portion of his subjects, and he directed his steps towards the coast of Peloponnêsus south of the Corinthian Gulf, then occupied by the Ionians. As there were relations, not only of friendship, but of kindred origin, between Ionians and Achæans, (the eponymous heroes Iôn and Achæus pass for brothers, both sons of Xuthus), Tisamenus solicited from the Ionians admission for himself and his fellow-fugitives into their territory. The leading Ionians declining this request, under the apprehension that Tisamenus might be chosen as sovereign over the whole, the latter accomplished his object by force. After a vehement struggle, the Ionians were vanquished and put to flight, and Tisamenus thus acquired possession of Helikê, as well as of the northern coast of the peninsula, westward from Sikyôn; which coast continued to be occupied by the Achæans, and received its name from them, throughout all the historical times. The Ionians retired to Attica, many of them taking part in what is called the Ionic emigration to the coast of

Asia Minor, which followed shortly after. Pausanias, indeed, tells us that Tisamenus, having gained a decisive victory over the Ionians, fell in the engagement,[9] and did not himself live to occupy the country of which his troops remained masters. But this story of the death of Tisamenus seems to arise from a desire, on the part of Pausanias, to blend together into one narrative two discrepant legends; at least the historical Achæans in later times continued to regard Tisamenus himself as having lived and reigned in their territory, and as having left a regal dynasty which lasted down to Ogygês,[10] after whom it was exchanged for a popular government.[11]

The conquest of Têmenus, the eldest of the three Herakleids, originally comprehended only Argos and its neighborhood; it was from thence that Trœzen, Epidaurus, Ægina, Sikyôn, and Phlius were successfully occupied by Dorians, the sons and son-in-law of Têmenus—Deiphontês, Phalkês, and Keisus—being the leaders under whom this was accomplished.[12] At Sparta, the success of the Dorians was furthered by the treason of a man named Philonomus, who received as recompense the neighboring town and territory of Amyklæ.[13] Messênia is said to have submitted without resistance to the dominion of the Herakleid Kresphontês, who established his residence at Stenyklêrus: the Pylian Melanthus, then ruler of the country, and representative of the great mythical lineage of Nêleus and Nestôr, withdrew with his household gods and with a portion of his subjects to Attica.[14]

The only Dorian establishment in the peninsula not directly connected with the triple partition is Corinth, which is said to have been Dorized somewhat later and under another leader, though still a Herakleid. Hippotês—descendant of Hêraklês in the fourth generation, but not through Hyllus,—had been guilty (as already mentioned) of the murder of Karnus the prophet at the camp of Naupaktus, for which he had been banished and remained in exile for ten years; his son deriving the name of Alêtês from the long wanderings endured by the father. At the head of a body of Dorians, Alêtês attacked Corinth: he pitched his camp on the Solygeian eminence near the city, and harassed the inhabitants with constant warfare until he compelled them to surrender. Even in the time of the Peloponnesian war, the Corinthians professed to identify the hill on which the camp of these assailants had been placed. The great mythical dynasty of the Sisyphids was expelled, and Alêtês became ruler and Œkist of the Dorian city; many of the inhabitants, however, Æolic or Ionic, departed.[15]

The settlement of Oxylus and his Ætolians in Elis is said by some to have been accomplished with very little opposition; the leader professing himself to be descended from Ætolus, who had been in a previous age banished from Elis into Ætôlia, and the two people, Epeians and Ætolians, acknowledging a kindred origin one with the other.[16] At first, indeed, according to Ephorus, the Epeians appeared in arms, determined to repel the intruders, but at length it was agreed on both sides to abide the issue of a single combat. Degmenus, the champion of the Epeians, confided in the long shot of his bow and arrow; but the Ætolian Pyræchmês came provided with his sling,—a weapon then unknown and recently invented by the Æto-

lians,—the range of which was yet longer than that of the bow of his enemy: he thus killed Degmenus, and secured the victory to Oxylus and his followers. According to one statement, the Epeians were expelled; according to another, they fraternized amicably with the new-comers: whatever may be the truth as to this matter, it is certain that their name is from this moment lost, and that they never reappear among the historical elements of Greece:[17] we hear from this time forward only of Eleians, said to be of Ætolian descent.[18]

One most important privilege was connected with the possession of the Eleian territory by Oxylus, coupled with his claim on the gratitude of the Dorian kings. The Eleians acquired the administration of the temple at Olympia, which the Achæans are said to have possessed before them; and in consideration of this sacred function, which subsequently ripened into the celebration of the great Olympic games, their territory was solemnly pronounced to be inviolable. Such was the statement of Ephorus:[19] we find, in this case as in so many others, that the Return of the Herakleids is made to supply a legendary basis for the historical state of things in Peloponnêsus.

It was the practice of the great Attic tragedians, with rare exceptions, to select the subjects of their composition from the heroic or legendary world, and Euripidês had composed three dramas, now lost, on the adventures of Têmenus with his daughter Hyrnethô and his son-in-law Dêiphontês,—on the family misfortunes of Kresphontês and Meropê,—and on the successful valor of Archelaus the son of Têmenus in Macedonia, where he was alleged to have first begun the dynasty of the Temenid kings. Of these subjects the first and second were eminently tragical, and the third, relating to Archelaus, appears to have been undertaken by Euripidês in compliment to his contemporary sovereign and patron, Archelaus king of Macedonia: we are even told that those exploits which the usual version of the legend ascribed to Têmenus, were reported in the drama of Euripidês to have been performed by Archelaus his son.[20] Of all the heroes, touched upon by the three Attic tragedians, these Dorian Herakleids stand lowest in the descending genealogical series,—one mark amongst others that we are approaching the ground of genuine history.

Though the name Achæans, as denoting a people, is henceforward confined to the North-Peloponnesian territory specially called Achaia, and to the inhabitants of Achæa, Phthiôtis, north of Mount Œta,—and though the great Peloponnesian states always seem to have prided themselves on the title of Dorians,—yet we find the kings of Sparta, even in the historical age, taking pains to appropriate to themselves the mythical glories of the Achæans, and to set themselves forth as the representatives of Agamemnôn and Orestês. The Spartan king Kleomenês even went so far as to disavow formally any Dorian parentage; for when the priestess at Athens refused to permit him to sacrifice in the temple of Athênê, on the plea that it was peremptorily closed to all Dorians, he replied: "I am no Dorian, but an Achæan."[21] Not only did the Spartan envoy, before Gelôn of Syracuse, connect the indefeasible title of his country to the supreme command of the Grecian military force, with the ancient

name and lofty prerogatives of Agamemnôn,[22]—but, in farther pursuance of the same feeling, the Spartans are said to have carried to Sparta both the bones of Orestês from Tegea, and those of Tisamenus from Helikê,[23] at the injunction of the Delphian oracle. There is also a story that Oxylus in Elis was directed by the same oracle to invite into his country an Achæan, as Œkist conjointly with himself; and that he called in Agorius, the great-grandson of Orestês, from Helikê, with a small number of Achæans who joined him.[24] The Dorians themselves, being singularly poor in native legends, endeavored, not unnaturally, to decorate themselves with those legendary ornaments which the Achæans possessed in abundance.

As a consequence of the Dorian establishments in Peloponnêsus, several migrations of the preëxisting inhabitants are represented as taking place. 1. The Epeians of Elis are either expelled, or merged in the new-comers under Oxylus, and lose their separate name. 2. The Pylians, together with the great heroic family of Nêleus and his son Nestôr, who preside over them, give place to the Dorian establishment of Messênia, and retire to Athens, where their leader, Melanthus, becomes king: a large portion of them take part in the subsequent Ionic emigration. 3. A portion of the Achæans, under Penthilus and other descendants of Orestês, leave Peloponnêsus, and form what is called the Æolic emigration, to Lesbos, the Trôad, and the Gulf of Adramyttium: the name *Æolians*, unknown to Homer, and seemingly never applied to any separate tribe at all, being introduced to designate a large section of the Hellenic name, partly in Greece Proper, and partly in Asia. 4. Another portion of Achæans expel the Ionians from Achaia, properly so called, in the north of Peloponnêsus; the Ionians retiring to Attica.

The Homeric poems describe Achæans, Pylians, and Epeians, in Peloponnêsus, but take no notice of Ionians in the northern district of Achaia: on the contrary, the Catalogue in the Iliad distinctly includes this territory under the dominions of Agamemnôn. Though the Catalogue of Homer is not to be regarded as an historical document, fit to be called as evidence for the actual state of Peloponnêsus at any prior time, it certainly seems a better authority than the statements advanced by Herodotus and others respecting the occupation of northern Peloponnêsus by the Ionians, and their expulsion from it by Tisamenus. In so far as the Catalogue is to be trusted, it negatives the idea of Ionians at Helikê, and countenances what seems in itself a more natural supposition,—that the historical Achæans in the north part of Peloponnêsus are a small undisturbed remnant of the powerful Achæan population once distributed throughout the peninsula, until it was broken up and partially expelled by the Dorians.

The Homeric legends, unquestionably the oldest which we possess, are adapted to a population of Achæans, Danaans, and Argeians, seemingly without any special and recognized names, either aggregate or divisional, other than the name of each separate tribe or kingdom. The post-Homeric legends are adapted to a population classified quite differently,—Hellens, distributed into Dorians, Ionians, and Æolians. If

we knew more of the time and circumstances in which these different legends grew up, we should probably be able to explain their discrepancy; but in our present ignorance we can only note the fact.

Whatever difficulty modern criticism may find in regard to the event called "The Return of the Herakleids," no doubt is expressed about it even by the best historians of antiquity. Thucydidês accepts it as a single and literal event, having its assignable date, and carrying at one blow the acquisition of Peloponnêsus. The date of it he fixes as eighty years after the capture of Troy. Whether he was the original determiner of this epoch, or copied it from some previous author, we do not know. It must have been fixed according to some computation of generations, for there were no other means accessible,—probably by means of the lineage of the Herakleids, which, as belonging to the kings of Sparta, constituted the most public and conspicuous thread of connection between the Grecian real and mythical world, and measured the interval between the Siege of Troy itself and the first recorded Olympiad. Hêraklês himself represents the generation before the siege, and his son Tlepolemus fights in the besieging army. If we suppose the first generation after Hêraklês to commence with the beginning of the siege, the fourth generation after him will coincide with the ninetieth year after the same epoch; and therefore, deducting ten years for the duration of the struggle, it will coincide with the eightieth year after the capture of the city;[25] thirty years being reckoned for a generation. The date assigned by Thucydidês will thus agree with the distance in which Têmenus, Kresphontês, and Aristodêmus, stand removed from Hêraklês. The interval of eighty years, between the capture of Troy and the Return of the Herakleids, appears to have been admitted by Apollodôrus and Eratosthenês, and some other professed chronologists of antiquity: but there were different reckonings which also found more or less of support.

SECTION II.—MIGRATION OF THESSALIANS AND BŒOTIANS.

In the same passage in which Thucydidês speaks of the Return of the Herakleids, he also marks out the date of another event a little antecedent, which is alleged to have powerfully affected the condition of Northern Greece. "Sixty years after the capture of Troy (he tells us) the Bœotians were driven by the Thessalians from Arnê, and migrated into the land then called Kadmêïs, but now Bœotia, wherein there had previously dwelt a section of their race, who had contributed the contingent to the Trojan war."

The expulsion here mentioned, of the Bœotians from Arnê "by the Thessalians," has been construed, with probability, to allude to the immigration of the Thessalians, properly so called, from the Thesprôtid in Epirus into Thessaly. That the Thessalians had migrated into Thessaly from the Thesprôtid territory, is stated by Herodotus,[26] though he says nothing about time or circumstances. Antiphus and Pheidippus appear in the Homeric Catalogue as commanders of the Grecian contingent from the islands of Kôs and Karpathus, on the south-east coast of Asia Minor: they are sons of Thessalus, who is himself the son of Hêraklês. A legend ran that these two chiefs, in the dispersion which ensued after the victory, had been driven by storms into the Ionian Gulf, and cast upon the coast of Epirus, where they landed and settled at Ephyrê in the Thesprôtid.[27] It was Thessalus, grandson of Pheidippus, who was reported to have conducted the Thesprotians across the passes of Pindus into Thessaly, to have conquered the fertile central plain of that country, and to have imposed upon it his own name instead of its previous denomination Æolis.[28]

Whatever we may think of this legend as it stands, the state of Thessaly during the historical ages renders it highly probable that the Thessalians, properly so called, were a body of immigrant conquerors. They appear always as a rude, warlike, violent, and uncivilized race, distinct from their neighbors the Achæans, the Magnetes, and the Perrhæbians, and holding all the three in tributary dependence: these three tribes stand to them in a relation analogous to that of the Lacedæmonian Periœki towards Sparta, while the Penestæ, who cultivated their lands, are almost an exact parallel of the Helots. Moreover, the low level of taste and intelligence among the Thessalians, as well as certain points of their costume, assimilates them more to Macedonians or Epirots than to Hellens.[29] Their position in Thessaly is in many respects analogous to that of the Spartan Dorians in Peloponnêsus, and there seems good reason for concluding that the former, as well as the latter, were originally victorious invaders, though we cannot pretend to determine the time at which the invasion took place. The great family of the Aleuads,[30] and probably other Thessalian families besides, were descendants of Hêraklês, like the kings of Sparta.

There are no similar historical grounds, in the case of the alleged migration of the Bœotians from Thessaly to Bœotia, to justify a belief in the main fact of the legend, nor were the different legendary stories in harmony one with the other. While the Homeric Epic recognizes the Bœotians in Bœotia, but not in Thessaly, Thucydidês records a statement which he had found of their migration from the latter into the former; but in order to escape the necessity of flatly contradicting Homer, he inserts the parenthesis that there had been previously an outlying fraction of Bœotians in Bœotia at the time of the Trojan war,[31] from whom the troops who served with Agamemnôn were drawn. Nevertheless, the discrepancy with the Iliad, though less strikingly obvious, is not removed, inasmuch as the Catalogue is unusually copious in enumerating the contingents from Thessaly, without once mentioning Bœotians. Homer distinguishes Orchomenus from Bœotia, and he does not specially notice Thêbes in the Catalogue: in other respects his enumeration of the towns coincides pretty well with the ground historically known afterwards under the name of Bœotia.

Pausanias gives us a short sketch of the events which he supposes to have intervened in this section of Greece between the Siege of Troy and the Return of the Herakleids. Peneleôs, the leader of the Bœotians at the siege, having been slain by Eurypylus the son of Telephus, Tisamenus, son of Thersander and grandson of Polynikês, acted as their commander, both during the remainder of the siege and after their return. Autesiôn, his son and successor, became subject to the wrath of the avenging Erinnyes of Laius and Œdipus: the oracle directed him to expatriate, and he joined the Dorians. In his place, Damasichthôn, son of Opheltas and grandson of Peneleôs, became king of the Bœotians: he was succeeded by Ptolemæus, who was himself followed by Xanthus. A war having broken out at that time between the Athenians and Bœotians, Xanthus engaged in single combat with Melanthus son of Andropompus, the champion of Attica, and perished by the cunning of his opponent. After the death of Xanthus, the Bœotians passed from kingship to popular government.[32] As Melanthus was of the lineage of the Neleids, and had migrated from Pylus to Athens in consequence of the successful establishment of the Dorians in Messênia, the duel with Xanthus must have been of course subsequent to the Return of the Herakleids.

Here, then, we have a summary of alleged Bœotian history between the Siege of Troy and the Return of the Herakleids, in which no mention is made of the immigration of the mass of Bœotians from Thessaly, and seemingly no possibility left of fitting in so great and capital an incident. The legends followed by Pausanias are at variance with those adopted by Thucydidês, but they harmonize much better with Homer.

So deservedly high is the authority of Thucydidês, that the migration here distinctly announced by him is commonly set down as an ascertained datum, historically as well as chronologically. But on this occasion it can be shown that he only followed

one amongst a variety of discrepant legends, none of which there were any means of verifying.

Pausanias recognized a migration of the Bœotians from Thessaly, in early times anterior to the Trojan war;[33] and the account of Ephorus, as given by Strabo, professed to record a series of changes in the occupants of the country: First, the non-Hellenic Aones and Temmikes, Leleges and Hyantes; next, the Kadmeians, who, after the second siege of Thêbes by the Epigoni, were expelled by the Thracians and Pelasgians, and retired into Thessaly, where they joined in communion with the inhabitants of Arnê,—the whole aggregate being called Bœotians. After the Trojan war, and about the time of the Æolic emigration, these Bœotians returned from Thessaly and reconquered Bœotia, driving out the Thracians and Pelasgians,—the former retiring to Parnassus, the latter to Attica. It was on this occasion (he says) that the Minyæ of Orchomenus were subdued, and forcibly incorporated with the Bœotians. Ephorus seems to have followed, in the main, the same narrative as Thucydidês, about the movement of the Bœotians out of Thessaly; coupling it, however, with several details current as explanatory of proverbs and customs.[34]

The only fact which we make out, independent of these legends, is, that there existed certain homonymies and certain affinities of religious worship, between parts of Bœotia and parts of Thessaly, which appear to indicate a kindred race. A town named Arne,[35] similar in name to the Thessalian, was enumerated in the Bœotian Catalogue of Homer, and antiquaries identified it sometimes with the historical town Chæroneia,[36] sometimes with Akræphium. Moreover, there was near the Bœotian Korôneia a river named Kuarius, or Koralius, and a venerable temple dedicated to the Itonian Athênê, in the sacred ground of which the Pambœotia, or public council of the Bœotian name, was held; there was also a temple and a river of similar denomination in Thessaly, near to a town called Iton, or Itônus.[37] We may from these circumstances presume a certain ancient kindred between the population of these regions, and such a circumstance is sufficient to explain the generation of legends describing migrations backward and forward, whether true or not in point of fact.

What is most important to remark is, that the stories of Thucydidês and Ephorus bring us out of the mythical into the historical Bœotia. Orchomenus is Bœotized, and we hear no more of the once-powerful Minyæ: there are no more Kadmeians at Thêbes, nor Bœotians in Thessaly. The Minyæ and the Kadmeians disappear in the Ionic emigration, which will be presently adverted to. Historical Bœotia is now constituted, apparently in its federative league, under the presidency of Thêbes, just as we find it in the time of the Persian and Peloponnesian wars.

SECTION III.—EMIGRATIONS FROM GREECE TO ASIA AND THE ISLANDS OF THE ÆGÆAN.

1. ÆOLIC.—2. IONIC.—3. DORIC.

To complete the transition of Greece from its mythical to its historical condition, the secession of the races belonging to the former must follow upon the introduction of those belonging to the latter. This is accomplished by means of the Æolic and Ionic migrations.

The presiding chiefs of the Æolic emigration are the representatives of the heroic lineage of the Pelopids: those of the Ionic emigration belong to the Neleids: and even in what is called the Doric emigration to Thêra, the Œkist Thêras is not a Dorian but a Kadmeian, the legitimate descendant of Œdipus and Kadmus.

The Æolic, Ionic, and Doric colonies were planted along the western coast of Asia Minor, from the coasts of the Propontis southward down to Lykia (I shall in a future chapter speak more exactly of their boundaries); the Æolic occupying the northern portion, together with the islands of Lesbos and Tenedos; the Doric occupying the southernmost, together with the neighboring islands of Rhodes and Kôs; and the Ionic being planted between them, comprehending Chios, Samos, and the Cycladês islands.

1. ÆOLIC EMIGRATION.

The Æolic emigration was conducted by the Pelopids: the original story seems to have been, that Orestês himself was at the head of the first batch of colonists, and this version of the event is still preserved by Pindar and by Hellanikus.[38] But the more current narratives represented the descendants of Orestês as chiefs of the expeditions to Æolis,—his illegitimate son Penthilus, by Erigonê daughter of Ægisthus, [39] together with Echelatus and Gras, the son and grandson of Penthilus, together with Kleuês and Malaus, descendants of Agamemnôn through another lineage. According to the account given by Strabo, Orestês began the emigration, but died on his route in Arcadia; his son Penthilus, taking the guidance of the emigrants, conducted them by the long land-journey through Bœotia and Thessaly to Thrace;[40] from whence Archelaus, son of Penthilus, led them across the Hellespont, and settled at Daskylium on the Propontis. Gras, son of Archelaus, crossed over to Lesbos and possessed himself of the island. Kleuês and Malaus, conducting another body of Achæans, were longer on their journey, and lingered a considerable time near Mount Phrikium, in the territory of Lokris; ultimately, however, they passed over by sea to Asia and took possession of Kymê, south of the Gulf of Adramyttium, the most considerable of all the Æolic cities on the continent.[41] From Lesbos and Kymê, the other less considerable Æolic towns, spreading over the region of Ida as well as the

Trôad, and comprehending the island of Tenedos, are said to have derived their origin.

Though there are many differences in the details, the accounts agree in representing these Æolic settlements as formed by the Achæans expatriated from Lacônia under the guidance of the dispossessed Pelopids.[42] We are told that in their journey through Bœotia they received considerable reinforcements, and Strabo adds that the emigrants started from Aulis, the port from whence Agamemnôn departed in the expedition against Troy.[43] He also informs us that they missed their course and experienced many losses from nautical ignorance, but we do not know to what particular incidents he alludes.[44]

2. IONIC EMIGRATION.

The Ionic emigration is described as emanating from and directed by the Athenians, and connects itself with the previous legendary history of Athens, which must therefore be here briefly recapitulated.

The great mythical hero Thêseus, of whose military prowess and errant exploits we have spoken in a previous chapter, was still more memorable in the eyes of the Athenians as an internal political reformer. He was supposed to have performed for them the inestimable service of transforming Attica out of many states into one. Each dême, or at least a great many out of the whole number, had before his time enjoyed political independence under its own magistrates and assemblies, acknowledging only a federal union with the rest under the presidency of Athens: by a mixture of conciliation and force, Thêseus succeeded in putting down all these separate governments, and bringing them to unite in one political system, centralized at Athens. He is said to have established a constitutional government, retaining for himself a defined power as king, or president, and distributing the people into three classes: Eupatridæ, a sort of sacerdotal noblesse; Geômori and Demiurgi, husbandmen and artisans.[45] Having brought these important changes into efficient working, he commemorated them for his posterity by introducing solemn and appropriate festivals. In confirmation of the dominion of Athens over the Megarid territory, he is said farther to have erected a pillar at the extremity of the latter towards the Isthmus, marking the boundary between Peloponnêsus and Iônia.

But a revolution so extensive was not consummated without creating much discontent; and Menestheus, the rival of Thêseus,—the first specimen, as we are told, of an artful demagogue,—took advantage of this feeling to assail and undermine him. Thêseus had quitted Attica, to accompany and assist his friend Peirithöus, in his journey down to the under-world, in order to carry off the goddess Persephonê,—or (as those who were critical in legendary story preferred recounting) in a journey to the residence of Aidôneus, king of the Molossians in Epirus, to carry off his daughter. In this enterprise, Peirithöus perished, while Thêseus was cast into prison, from whence he was only liberated by the intercession of Hêraklês. It was during his tem-

porary absence, that the Tyndarids Castôr and Pollux invaded Attica for the purpose of recovering their sister Helen, whom Thêseus had at a former period taken away from Sparta and deposited at Aphidnæ; and the partisans of Menestheus took advantage both of the absence of Thêseus and of the calamity which his licentiousness had brought upon the country, to ruin his popularity with the people. When he returned, he found them no longer disposed to endure his dominion, or to continue to him the honors which their previous feelings of gratitude had conferred. Having, therefore, placed his sons under the protection of Elephenôr, in Eubœa, he sought an asylum with Lykomêdês, prince of Scyros, from whom, however, he received nothing but an insidious welcome and a traitorous death.[46]

Menestheus, succeeding to the honors of the expatriated hero, commanded the Athenian troops at the Siege of Troy. But though he survived the capture, he never returned to Athens,—different stories being related of the place where he and his companions settled. During this interval, the feelings of the Athenians having changed, they restored the sons of Thêseus, who had served at Troy under Elephenôr, and had returned unhurt, to the station and functions of their father. The Theseids Demophoôn, Oxyntas, Apheidas, and Thymœtês had successively filled this post for the space of about sixty years,[47] when the Dorian invaders of Peloponnêsus (as has been before related) compelled Melanthus and the Neleid family to abandon their kingdom of Pylus. The refugees found shelter at Athens, where a fortunate adventure soon raised Melanthus to the throne. A war breaking out between the Athenians and Bœotians, respecting the boundary tract of Œnoê, the Bœotian king Xanthus challenged Thymœtês to single combat: the latter declining to accept it, Melanthus not only stood forward in his place, but practised a cunning stratagem with such success as to kill his adversary. He was forthwith chosen king, Thymœtês being constrained to resign.[48]

Melanthus and his son Kodrus reigned for nearly sixty years, during which time large bodies of fugitives, escaping from the recent invaders throughout Greece, were harbored by the Athenians: so that Attica became populous enough to excite the alarm and jealousy of the Peloponnesian Dorians. A powerful Dorian force, under the command of Alêtês from Corinth and Althæmenês from Argos, were accordingly despatched to invade the Athenian territory, in which the Delphian oracle promised them success, provided they abstained from injuring the person of Kodrus. Strict orders were given to the Dorian army that Kodrus should be preserved unhurt; but the oracle had become known among the Athenians,[49] and the generous prince determined to bring death upon himself as a means of salvation to his country. Assuming the disguise of a peasant, he intentionally provoked a quarrel with some of the Dorian troops, who slew him without suspecting his real character. No sooner was this event known, than the Dorian leaders, despairing of success, abandoned their enterprise and evacuated the country.[50] In retiring, however, they retained possession of Megara, where they established permanent settlers, and which became from this

moment Dorian,—seemingly at first a dependency of Corinth, though it afterwards acquired its freedom and became an autonomous community.[51] This memorable act of devoted patriotism, analogous to that of the daughters of Erechtheus at Athens, and of Menœkeus at Thêbes, entitled Kodrus to be ranked among the most splendid characters in Grecian legend.

Kodrus is numbered as the last king of Athens: his descendants were styled Archons, but they held that dignity for life,—a practice which prevailed during a long course of years afterwards. Medon and Neileus, his two sons, having quarrelled about the succession, the Delphian oracle decided in favor of the former; upon which the latter, affronted at the preference, resolved upon seeking a new home.[52] There were at this moment many dispossessed sections of Greeks, and an adventitious population accumulated in Attica, who were anxious for settlements beyond sea. The expeditions which now set forth to cross the Ægean, chiefly under the conduct of members of the Kodrid family, composed collectively the memorable Ionic Emigration, of which the Ionians, recently expelled from Peloponnêsus, formed a part, but, as it would seem, only a small part; for we hear of many quite distinct races, some renowned in legend, who withdraw from Greece amidst this assemblage of colonists. The Kadmeians, the Minyæ of Orchomenus, the Abantês of Eubœa, the Dryopes; the Molossi, the Phokians, the Bœotians, the Arcadian Pelasgians, and even the Dorians of Epidaurus,—are represented as furnishing each a proportion of the crews of these emigrant vessels.[53] Nor were the results unworthy of so mighty a confluence of different races. Not only the Cyclades islands in the Ægean, but the great islands of Samos and Chios, near the Asiatic coast, and ten different cities on the coast of Asia Minor, from Milêtus in the south to Phokæa in the north, were founded, and all adopted the Ionic name. Athens was the metropolis or mother city of all of them: Androklus and Neileus, the Œkists of Ephesus and Milêtus, and probably other Œkists also, started from the Prytaneium at Athens,[54] with those solemnities, religious and political, which usually marked the departure of a swarm of Grecian colonists.

Other mythical families, besides the heroic lineage of Nêleus and Nestôr, as represented by the sons of Kodrus, took a leading part in the expedition. Herodotus mentions Lykian chiefs, descendants from Glaukus son of Hippolochus, and Pausanias tells us of Philôtas descendant of Peneleôs, who went at the head of a body of Thebans: both Glaukus and Peneleôs are commemorated in the Iliad.[55] And it is a remarkable fact mentioned by Pausanias (though we do not know on what authority), that the inhabitants of Phokæa,—which was the northernmost city of Iônia on the borders of Æolis, and one of the last founded,—consisting mostly of Phokian colonists under the conduct of the Athenians Philogenês and Dæmôn, were not admitted into the Pan-Ionic Amphiktyony until they consented to choose for themselves chiefs of the Kodrid family.[56] Proklês, the chief who conducted the Ionic emigrants from Epidaurus to Samos, was said to be of the lineage of Iôn, son of Xuthus.[57]

Of the twelve Ionic states constituting the Pan-Ionic Amphiktyony—some of them among the greatest cities in Hellas—I shall say no more at present, as I have to treat of them again when I come upon historical ground.

3. DORIC EMIGRATIONS.

The Æolic and Ionic emigrations are thus both presented to us as direct consequences of the event called the Return of the Herakleids: and in like manner the formation of the Dorian Hexapolis in the south-western corner of Asia Minor: Kôs, Knidus, Halikarnassus, and Rhodes, with its three separate cities, as well as the Dorian establishments in Krête, Melos, and Thêra, are all traced more or less directly to the same great revolution.

Thêra, more especially, has its root in the legendary world. Its Œkist was Thêras, a descendant of the heroic lineage of Œdipus and Kadmus, and maternal uncle of the young kings of Sparta, Eurysthenês and Proklês, during whose minority he had exercised the regency. On their coming of age, his functions were at an end: but being unable to endure a private station, he determined to put himself at the head of a body of emigrants: many came forward to join him, and the expedition was farther reinforced by a body of interlopers, belonging to the Minyæ, of whom the Lacedæmonians were anxious to get rid. These Minyæ had arrived in Laconia, not long before, from the island of Lemnos, out of which they had been expelled by the Pelasgian fugitives from Attica. They landed without asking permission, took up their abode and began to "light their fires" on Mount Taygetus. When the Lacedæmonians sent to ask who they were, and wherefore they had come, the Minyæ replied that they were sons of the Argonauts who had landed at Lemnos, and that, being expelled from their own homes, they thought themselves entitled to solicit an asylum in the territory of their fathers: they asked, withal, to be admitted to share both the lands and the honors of the state. The Lacedæmonians granted the request, chiefly on the ground of a common ancestry,—their own great heroes, the Tyndarids, having been enrolled in the crew of the Argô: the Minyæ were then introduced as citizens into the tribes, received lots of land, and began to intermarry with the preëxisting families. It was not long, however, before they became insolent: they demanded a share in the kingdom (which was the venerated privilege of the Herakleids), and so grossly misconducted themselves in other ways, that the Lacedæmonians resolved to put them to death, and began by casting them into prison. While the Minyæ were thus confined, their wives, Spartans by birth, and many of them daughters of the principal men, solicited permission to go in and see them: leave being granted, they made use of the interview to change clothes with their husbands, who thus escaped and fled again to Mount Taygetus. The greater number of them quitted Laconia, and marched to Triphylia, in the western regions of Peloponnêsus, from whence they expelled the Paroreatæ and the Kaukones, and founded six towns of their own, of which Lepreum was the chief. A certain proportion, however, by permission of the Lacedæmonians, joined Thêras, and departed with him to the island of Kallistê, then

possessed by Phœnician inhabitants, who were descended from the kinsmen and companions of Kadmus, and who had been left there by that prince, when he came forth in search of Eurôpa, eight generations preceding. Arriving thus among men of kindred lineage with himself, Thêras met with a fraternal reception, and the island derived from him the name, under which it is historically known, of Thêra.[58]

Such is the foundation-legend of Thêra, believed both by the Lacedæmonians and by the Theræans, and interesting as it brings before us, characteristically as well as vividly, the persons and feelings of the mythical world,—the Argonauts, with the Tyndarids as their companions and Minyæ as their children. In Lepreum, as in the other towns of Triphylia, the descent from the Minyæ of old seems to have been believed in the historical times, and the mention of the river Minyëius in those regions by Homer tended to confirm it.[59] But people were not unanimous as to the legend by which that descent should be made out; while some adopted the story just cited from Herodotus, others imagined that Chlôris, who had come from the Minyeian town of Orchomenus as the wife of Nêleus to Pylus, had brought with her a body of her countrymen.[60]

These Minyæ from Lemnos and Imbros appear again as portions of another narrative respecting the settlement of the colony of Mêlos. It has already been mentioned, that when the Herakleids and the Dorians invaded Lacônia, Philonomus, an Achæan, treacherously betrayed to them the country, for which he received as his recompense the territory of Amyklæ. He is said to have peopled this territory by introducing detachments of Minyæ from Lemnos and Imbros, who, in the third generation after the return of the Herakleids, became so discontented and mutinous, that the Lacedæmonians resolved to send them out of the country as emigrants, under their chiefs Polis and Delphus. Taking the direction of Krête, they stopped in their way to land a portion of their colonists on the island of Mêlos, which remained throughout the historical times a faithful and attached colony of Lacedæmôn.[61] On arriving in Krête, they are said to have settled at the town of Gortyn. We find, moreover, that other Dorian establishments, either from Lacedæmôn or Argos, were formed in Krête; and Lyktos in particular, is noticed, not only as a colony of Sparta, but as distinguished for the analogy of its laws and customs.[62] It is even said that Krête, immediately after the Trojan war, had been visited by the wrath of the gods, and depopulated by famine and pestilence; and that, in the third generation afterwards, so great was the influx of emigrants, the entire population of the island was renewed, with the exception of the Eteokrêtes at Polichnæ and Præsus.[63]

There were Dorians in Krête in the time of the Odyssey: Homer mentions different languages and different races of men, Eteokrêtes, Kydônes, Dorians, Achæans, and Pelasgians, as all coexisting in the island, which he describes to be populous, and to contain ninety cities. A legend given by Andrôn, based seemingly upon the statement of Herodotus, that Dôrus the son of Hellen had settled in Histiæôtis, ascribed the first introduction of the three last races to Tektaphus son of Dôrus,—who

had led forth from that country a colony of Dorians, Achæans, and Pelasgians, and had landed in Krête during the reign of the indigenous king Krês.[64] This story of Andrôn so exactly fits on to the Homeric Catalogue of Kretan inhabitants, that we may reasonably presume it to have been designedly arranged with reference to that Catalogue, so as to afford some plausible account, consistently with the received legendary chronology, how there came to be Dorians in Krête before the Trojan war,—the Dorian colonies after the return of the Herakleids being of course long posterior in supposed order of time. To find a leader sufficiently early for his hypothesis, Andrôn ascends to the primitive Eponymus Dôrus, to whose son Tektaphus he ascribes the introduction of a mixed colony of Dorians, Achæans, and Pelasgians into Krête: these are the exact three races enumerated in the Odyssey, and the king Krês, whom Andrôn affirms to have been then reigning in the island, represents the Eteokrêtes and Kydônes in the list of Homer. The story seems to have found favor among native Kretan historians, as it doubtless serves to obviate what would otherwise be a contradiction in the legendary chronology.[65]

Another Dorian emigration from Peloponnêsus to Krête, which extended also to Rhodes and Kôs, is farther said to have been conducted by Althæmenês, who had been one of the chiefs in the expedition against Attica, in which Krodus perished. This prince, a Herakleid, and third in descent from Têmenus, was induced to expatriate by a family quarrel, and conducted a body of Dorian colonists from Argos first to Krête, where some of them remained; but the greater number accompanied him to Rhodes, in which island, after expelling the Karian possessors, he founded the three cities of Lindus, Ialysus, and Kameirus.[66]

It is proper here to add, that the legend of the Rhodian archæologists respecting their œkist Althæmenês, who was worshipped in the island with heroic honors, was something totally different from the preceding. Althæmenês was a Kretan, son of the king Katreus, and grandson of Minos. An oracle predicted to him that he would one day kill his father: eager to escape so terrible a destiny, he quitted Krête, and conducted a colony to Rhodes, where the famous temple of the Atabyrian Zeus, on the lofty summit of Mount Atabyrum, was ascribed to his foundation, built so as to command a view of Krête. He had been settled on the island for some time, when his father Katreus, anxious again to embrace his only son, followed him from Krête: he landed in Rhodes during the night without being known, and a casual collision took place between his attendants and the islanders. Althæmenês hastened to the shore to assist in repelling the supposed enemies, and in the fray had the misfortune to kill his aged father.[67]

Either the emigrants who accompanied Althæmenês, or some other Dorian colonists afterwards, are reported to have settled at Kôs, Knidus, Karpathus, and Halikarnassus. To the last mentioned city, however, Anthês of Trœzên is assigned as the œkist: the emigrants who accompanied him were said to have belonged to the Dymanian tribe, one of the three tribes always found in a Doric state: and the city

seems to have been characterized as a colony sometimes of Trœzên, sometimes of Argos.[68]

We thus have the Æolic, the Ionic, and the Doric colonial establishments in Asia, all springing out of the legendary age, and all set forth as consequences, direct or indirect, of what is called the Return of the Herakleids, or the Dorian conquest of Peloponnêsus. According to the received chronology, they are succeeded by a period, supposed to comprise nearly three centuries, which is almost an entire blank, before we reach authentic chronology and the first recorded Olympiad,—and they thus form the concluding events of the mythical world, out of which we now pass into historical Greece, such as it stands at the last-mentioned epoch. It is by these migrations that the parts of the Hellenic aggregate are distributed into the places which they occupy at the dawn of historical daylight,—Dorians, Arcadians, Ætolo-Eleians, and Achæans, sharing Peloponnêsus unequally among them,—Æolians, Ionians, and Dorians, settled both in the islands of the Ægean and the coast of Asia Minor. The Return of the Herakleids, as well as the three emigrations, Æolic, Ionic, and Doric, present the legendary explanation, suitable to the feelings and belief of the people, showing how Greece passed from the heroic races who besieged Troy and Thêbes, piloted the adventurous Argô, and slew the monstrous boar of Kalydôn, to the historical races, differently named and classified, who furnished victors to the Olympic and Pythian games.

A patient and learned French writer, M. Raoul Rochette,—who construes all the events of the heroic age, generally speaking, as so much real history, only making allowance for the mistakes and exaggerations of poets,—is greatly perplexed by the blank and interruption which this supposed continuous series of history presents, from the Return of the Herakleids down to the beginning of the Olympiads. He cannot explain to himself so long a period of absolute quiescence, after the important incidents and striking adventures of the heroic age; and if there happened nothing worthy of record during this long period,—as he presumes, from the fact that nothing has been transmitted,—he concludes that this must have arisen from the state of suffering and exhaustion in which previous wars and revolution had left the Greeks: a long interval of complete inaction being required to heal such wounds.[69]

Assuming M. Rochette's view of the heroic ages to be correct, and reasoning upon the supposition that the adventures ascribed to the Grecian heroes are matters of historical reality, transmitted by tradition from a period of time four centuries before the recorded Olympiads, and only embellished by describing poets,—the blank which he here dwells upon is, to say the least of it, embarrassing and unaccountable. It is strange that the stream of tradition, if it had once begun to flow, should (like several of the rivers in Greece) be submerged for two or three centuries and then reappear. But when we make what appears to me the proper distinction between legend and history, it will be seen that a period of blank time between the two is perfectly conformable to the conditions under which the former is generated. It is not

the immediate past, but a supposed remote past, which forms the suitable atmosphere of mythical narrative,—a past originally quite undetermined in respect to distance from the present, as we see in the Iliad and Odyssey. And even when we come down to the genealogical poets, who affect to give a certain measure of bygone time, and a succession of persons as well as of events, still, the names whom they most delight to honor and upon whose exploits they chiefly expatiate, are those of the ancestral gods and heroes of the tribe and their supposed contemporaries; ancestors separated by a long lineage from the present hearer. The gods and heroes were conceived as removed from him by several generations, and the legendary matter which was grouped around them appeared only the more imposing when exhibited at a respectful distance, beyond the days of father and grandfather, and of all known predecessors. The Odes of Pindar strikingly illustrate this tendency. We thus see how it happened that, between the times assigned to heroic adventure and those of historical record, there existed an intermediate blank, filled with inglorious names; and how, amongst the same society which cared not to remember proceedings of fathers and grandfathers, there circulated much popular and accredited narrative respecting real or supposed ancestors long past and gone The obscure and barren centuries which immediately precede the first recorded Olympiad, form the natural separation between the legendary return of the Herakleids and the historical wars of Sparta against Messênê,—between the province of legend, wherein matter of fact (if any there be) is so intimately combined with its accompaniments of fiction, as to be undistinguishable without the aid of extrinsic evidence,—and that of history where some matters of fact can be ascertained, and where a sagacious criticism may be usefully employed in trying to add to their number.

CHAPTER XIX.

APPLICATION OF CHRONOLOGY TO GRECIAN LEGEND.

I NEED not repeat, what has already been sufficiently set forth in the preceding pages, that the mass of Grecian incident anterior to 776 B. C. appears to me not reducible either to history or to chronology, and that any chronological system which may be applied to it must be essentially uncertified and illusory. It was, however, chronologized in ancient times, and has continued to be so in modern; and the various schemes employed for this purpose may be found stated and compared in the first volume (the last published) of Mr. Fynes Clinton's Fasti Hellenici. There were among the Greeks, and there still are among modern scholars, important differences as to the dates of the principal events:[70] Eratosthenês dissented both from Herodotus and from Phanias and Kallimachus, while Larcher and Raoul Rochette (who follow Herodotus) stand opposed to O. Müller and to Mr. Clinton. That the reader may have a general conception of the order in which these legendary events were disposed, I transcribe from the Fasti Hellenica a double chronological table, contained in p. 139, in which the dates are placed in series, from Phorôneus to the Olympiad of Corœbus in B. C. 776,—in the first column according to the system of Eratosthenês, in the second according to that of Kallimachus.

"The following Table (says Mr. Clinton) offers a summary view of the leading periods from Phorôneus to the Olympiad of Corœbus, and exhibits a double series of dates; the one proceeding from the date of Eratosthenês, the other from a date founded on the reduced calculations of Phanias and Kallimachus, which strike out fifty-six years from the amount of Eratosthenês. Phanias, as we have seen, omitted fifty-five years between the Return and the registered Olympiads; for so we may understand the account: Kallimachus, fifty-six years between the Olympiad of Iphitus and the Olympiad in which Corœbus won.[71]

"The first column of this Table exhibits the *current* years before and after the fall of Troy: in the second column of dates the *complete* intervals are expressed."

Years before the Fall of Troy.		Years intervening between the different events.	B. C. Eratosth.	B. C. Kallimach.
(570)[72]	*Phoroneus*, p. 19	287	(1753)	(1697)
(283)	*Daneus*, p. 73 *Pelasgus V.* p. 13, 88	33	(1466)	(1410)
(250)	*Deukalion*, p. 42	50	(1433)	(1377)
(200)	*Erechtheus* *Dardanus*, p. 88	50	(1383)	(1327)

(150)	*Azan*, *Aphida*, *Elatus*	20	(1333)	(1277)
130	*Kadmus*, p. 85	30	1313	1257
(100)	*Pelops*	22	(1283)	(1227)
78	Birth of *Hercules*	36	1261	1205
(42)	Argonauts	12	(1225)	(1169)
30	First Theban war, p. 51, h.	4	1213	1157
26	Death of *Hercules*	2	1209	1153
24	Death of *Eurystheus*, p. 106, x.	4	1207	1151
20	Death of *Hyllus*	2^{y} 9^{m}	1203	1147
18	Accession of *Agamemnon*	2	1200	1144
16	Second Theban war, p. 87, 1	6	1198	1142
10	Trojan expedition (9^{y} 1^{m})	9	1192	1136
Years after the Fall of Troy.				
	Troy taken	7	1183	1127
8	*Orestes* reigns at Argos in the 8th year	52	1176	1120
60	The *Thessali* occupy Thessaly The *Bœoti* return to Bœotia in the 60th yr. Æolic migration under *Penthilus*	20	1124	1068
80	Return of the *Heraclidæ* in the 80th year	29	1104	1048
109	*Aletes* reigns at Corinth, p. 130, m.	1	1075	1019
110	Migration of *Theras*	21	1074	1018
131	Lesbos occupied 130 years after the æra	8	1053	997
139	Death of *Codrus*	1	1045	989
140	Ionic migration 60 years after the Return	11	1044	988
151	Cymê founded 150 years after the æra	18	1033	977
169	Smyrna, 168 years after the æra, p. 105, t.	131	1015	959
		299		
300	Olympiad of *Iphitus*	108 52	884	828
408 352	Olympiad of *Corœbus*	..	776	776

Wherever chronology is possible, researches such as those of Mr. Clinton, which have conduced so much to the better understanding of the later times of Greece, deserve respectful attention. But the ablest chronologist can accomplish nothing, unless he is supplied with a certain basis of matters of fact, pure and distinguishable from fiction, and authenticated by witnesses both knowing the truth and willing to declare it. Possessing this preliminary stock, he may reason from it to refute distinct falsehoods and to correct partial mistakes: but if all the original statements submitted to him contain truth (at least wherever there is truth) in a sort of chemical combination with fiction, which he has no means of decomposing,—he is in the condition of one who tries to solve a problem without data: he is first obliged to construct his own data, and from them to extract his conclusions. The statements of the epic poets, our only original witnesses in this case, correspond to the description here given. Whether the proportion of truth contained in them be smaller or greater, it is at all

events unassignable,—and the constant and intimate admixture of fiction is both indisputable in itself, and, indeed, essential to the purpose and profession of those from whom the tales proceed. Of such a character are all the deposing witnesses, even where their tales agree; and it is out of a heap of such tales, not agreeing, but discrepant in a thousand ways, and without a morsel of pure authenticated truth,—that the critic is called upon to draw out a methodical series of historical events adorned with chronological dates.

If we could imagine a modern critical scholar transported into Greece at the time of the Persian war,—endued with his present habits of appreciating historical evidence, without sharing in the religious or patriotic feelings of the country,—and invited to prepare, out of the great body of Grecian epic which then existed, a History and Chronology of Greece anterior to 776 B. C., assigning reasons as well for what he admitted as for what he rejected,—I feel persuaded that he would have judged the undertaking to be little better than a process of guesswork. But the modern critic finds that not only Pherekydês and Hellanikus, but also Herodotus and Thucydidês, have either attempted the task or sanctioned the belief that it was practicable,—a matter not at all surprising, when we consider both their narrow experience of historical evidence and the powerful ascendency of religion and patriotism in predisposing them to antiquarian belief,—and he therefore accepts the problem as they have bequeathed it, adding his own efforts to bring it to a satisfactory solution. Nevertheless, he not only follows them with some degree of reserve and uneasiness, but even admits important distinctions quite foreign to their habits of thought. Thucydidês talks of the deeds of Hellên and his sons with as much confidence as we now speak of William the Conqueror: Mr. Clinton recognizes Hellên, with his sons Dôrus, Æolus, and Xuthus, as fictitious persons. Herodotus recites the great heroic genealogies down from Kadmus and Danaus, with a belief not less complete in the higher members of the series than in the lower: but Mr. Clinton admits a radical distinction in the evidence of events before and after the first recorded Olympiad, or 776 B. C.,—"the first date in Grecian chronology (he remarks, p. 123) which can be fixed upon *authentic evidence*,"—the highest point to which Grecian chronology, *reckoning upward*, can be carried. Of this important epoch in Grecian development,—the commencement of authentic chronological life,—Herodotus and Thucydidês had no knowledge or took no account: the later chronologists, from Timæus downwards, noted it, and made it serve as the basis of their chronological comparisons, so far as it went: but neither Eratosthenês nor Apollodôrus seem to have recognized (though Varro and Africanus did recognize) a marked difference in respect of certainty or authenticity between the period before and the period after.

In farther illustration of Mr. Clinton's opinion that the first recorded Olympiad is the earliest date which can be fixed upon authentic evidence, we have, in p. 138, the following just remarks in reference to the dissentient views of Eratosthenês, Phanias, and Kallimachus, about the date of the Trojan war: "The chronology of Eratosthenês

(he says), founded on a careful comparison of circumstances, and approved by those to whom the same stores of information were open, is entitled to our respect. But we must remember that a conjectural date can never rise to the authority of evidence; that what is accepted as a substitute for testimony is not an equivalent: witnesses only can prove a date, and in the want of these, the knowledge of it is plainly beyond our reach. If in the absence of a better light we seek for what is probable, we are not to forget the distinction between conjecture and proof; between what is probable and what is certain. The computation, then, of Eratosthenês for the war of Troy is open to inquiry; and if we find it adverse to the opinions of many preceding writers, who fixed a lower date, and adverse to the acknowledged length of generation in the most authentic dynasties, we are allowed to follow other guides, who give us a lower epoch."

Here Mr. Clinton again plainly acknowledges the want of evidence, and the irremediable uncertainty of Grecian chronology before the Olympiads; and the reasonable conclusion from his argument is, not simply, that "the computation of Eratosthenês was open to inquiry," (which few would be found to deny,) but that both Eratosthenês and Phanias had delivered positive opinions upon a point on which no sufficient evidence was accessible, and therefore that neither the one nor the other was a guide to be followed.[73] Mr. Clinton does, indeed, speak of authentic dynasties prior to the first recorded Olympiad, but if there be any such, reaching up from that period to a supposed point coeval with or anterior to the war of Troy,—I see no good reason for the marked distinction which he draws between chronology before and chronology after the Olympiad of Korœbus, or for the necessity which he feels of suspending his upward reckoning at the last-mentioned epoch, and beginning a different process, called "a downward reckoning," from the higher epoch (supposed to be somehow ascertained without any upward reckoning) of the first patriarch from whom such authentic dynasty emanates.[74] Herodotus and Thucydidês might well, upon this supposition, ask of Mr. Clinton, why he called upon them to alter their method of proceeding at the year 776 B. C., and why they might not be allowed to pursue their "upward chronological reckoning," without interruption, from Leonidas up to Danaus, or from Peisistratus up to Hellên and Deukalion, without any alteration in the point of view. Authentic dynasties from the Olympiads, up to an epoch above the Trojan war, would enable us to obtain chronological proof for the latter date, instead of being reduced (as Mr. Clinton affirms that we are) to "conjecture" instead of proof.

The whole question, as to the value of the reckoning from the Olympiads up to Phorôneus, does in truth turn upon this point: Are those genealogies, which profess to cover the space between the two, authentic and trustworthy, or not? Mr. Clinton appears to feel that they are not so, when he admits the essential difference in the character of the evidence and the necessity of altering the method of computation, before and after the first recorded Olympiad; yet, in his Preface, he labors to prove

that they possess historical worth and are in the main correctly set forth: moreover, that the fictitious persons, wherever any such are intermingled, may be detected and eliminated. The evidences upon which he relies, are: 1. Inscriptions; 2. The early poets.

1. An inscription, being nothing but a piece of writing on marble, carries evidentiary value under the same conditions as a published writing on paper. If the inscriber reports a contemporary fact which he had the means of knowing, and if there be no reason to suspect misrepresentation, we believe his assertion: if, on the other hand, he records facts belonging to a long period before his own time, his authority counts for little, except in so far as we can verify and appreciate his means of knowledge.

In estimating, therefore, the probative force of any inscription, the first and most indispensable point is to assure ourselves of its date. Amongst all the public registers and inscriptions alluded to by Mr. Clinton, there is not one which can be positively referred to a date anterior to 776 B. C. The quoit of Iphitus,—the public registers at Sparta, Corinth, and Elis,—the list of the priestesses of Juno at Argos,—are all of a date completely uncertified. O. Müller does, indeed, agree with Mr. Clinton (though in my opinion without any sufficient proof) in assigning the quoit of Iphitus to the age ascribed to that prince: and if we even grant thus much, we shall have an inscription as old (adopting Mr. Clinton's determination of the age of Iphitus) as 828 B. C. But when Mr. Clinton quotes O. Müller as admitting the registers of Sparta, Corinth, and Elis, it is right to add that the latter does not profess to guarantee the authenticity of these documents, or the age at which such registers began to be kept. It is not to be doubted that there were registers of the kings of Sparta carrying them up to Hêraklês, and of the kings of Elis from Oxylus to Iphitus; but the question is, at what time did these lists begin to be kept continuously? This is a point which we have no means of deciding, nor can we accept Mr. Clinton's unsupported conjecture, when he tells us: "*Perhaps* these were begun to be written as early as B. C. 1048, the probable time of the Dorian conquest." Again, he tells us: "At Argos, a register was preserved of the priestesses of Juno, which *might* be more ancient than the catalogues of the kings of Sparta or Corinth. That register, from which Hellanikus composed his work, contained the priestesses from the earliest times down to the age of Hellanikus himself…. But this catalogue *might have* been commenced as early as the Trojan war itself, and even at a still earlier date." (pp. x. xi.) Again, respecting the inscriptions quoted by Herodotus from the temple of the Ismenian Apollo at Thêbes, in which Amphitryo and Laodamas are named, Mr. Clinton says, "They were ancient in the time of Herodotus, which *may* perhaps carry them back 400 years before his time: and in that case they *might* approach within 300 years of Laodamas and within 400 years of the probable time of Kadmus himself."—"It is granted (he adds, in a note,) that these inscriptions were *not genuine*, that is, not of the date to which they were assigned by Herodotus himself. But that they were ancient, cannot be doubted," &c.

The time when Herodotus saw the temple of the Ismenian Apollo at Thêbes can hardly have been earlier than 450 B. C. reckoning upwards from hence to 776 B. C., we have an interval of 326 years: the inscriptions which Herodotus saw may well therefore have been *ancient*, without being earlier than the first recorded Olympiad. Mr. Clinton does, indeed, tell us that *ancient* "may perhaps" be construed as 400 years earlier than Herodotus. But no careful reader can permit himself to convert such bare possibility into a ground of inference, and to make it available, in conjunction with other similar possibilities before enumerated, for the purpose of showing that there really existed inscriptions in Greece of a date anterior to 776 B. C. Unless Mr. Clinton can make out this, he can derive no benefit from inscriptions, in his attempt to substantiate the reality of the mythical persons or of the mythical events.

The truth is, that the Herakleid pedigree of the Spartan kings (as has been observed in a former chapter) is only one out of the numerous divine and heroic genealogies with which the Hellenic world abounded,[75]—a class of documents which become historical evidence only so high in the ascending series as the names composing them are authenticated by contemporary, or nearly contemporary, enrolment. At what period this practice of enrolment began, we have no information. Two remarks, however, may be made, in reference to any approximative guess as to the time when actual registration commenced: First, that the number of names in the pedigree, or the length of past time which it professes to embrace, affords no presumption of any superior antiquity in the time of registration: Secondly, that, looking to the acknowledged paucity and rudeness of Grecian writing, even down to the 60th Olympiad (540 B. C.), and to the absence of the habit of writing, as well as the low estimate of its value, which such a state of things argues, the presumption is, that written enrolment of family genealogies, did not commence until a long time after 776 B. C., and the obligation of proof falls upon him who maintains that it commenced earlier. And this second remark is farther borne out, when we observe that there is no registered list, except that of the Olympic victors, which goes up even so high as 776 B. C. The next list which O. Müller and Mr. Clinton produce, is that of the Karneonicæ, or victors at the Karneian festival, which reaches only up to 676 B. C.

If Mr. Clinton then makes little out of inscriptions to sustain his view of Grecian history and chronology anterior to the recorded Olympiads, let us examine the inferences which he draws from his ether source of evidence,—the early poets. And here it will be found, First, that in order to maintain the credibility of these witnesses, he lays down positions respecting historical evidence both indefensible in themselves, and especially inapplicable to the early times of Greece: Secondly, that his reasoning is at the same time inconsistent,—inasmuch as it includes admissions, which, if properly understood and followed out, exhibit these very witnesses as habitually, indiscriminately, and unconsciously mingling truth and fiction; and therefore little fit to be believed upon their solitary and unsupported testimony.

To take the second point first, he says, Introduction, p. ii-iii: "The authority even of the genealogies has been called in question by many able and learned persons, who reject Danaus, Kadmus, Hercules, Thêseus, and many others, as fictitious persons. It is evident that any fact would come from the hands of the poets embellished with many fabulous additions: and fictitious genealogies were undoubtedly composed. Because, however, some genealogies were fictitious, we are not justified in concluding that all were fabulous…. In estimating, then, the historical value of the genealogies transmitted by the early poets, we may take a middle course; not rejecting them as wholly false, nor yet implicitly receiving all as true. The genealogies *contain many real persons*, but these are *incorporated with many fictitious names*. The fictions, however, will have a basis of truth: the genealogical expression may be false, but the connection which it describes is real. Even to those who reject the whole as fabulous, the exhibition of the early times which is presented in this volume may still be not unacceptable: because it is necessary to the right understanding of antiquity that the opinions of the Greeks concerning their own origin should be set before us, even if these are erroneous opinions, and that their story should be told as they have told it themselves. The names preserved by the ancient genealogies may be considered of three kinds; either they were the name of a race or clan converted into the name of an individual, or they were altogether fictitious, or lastly, they were real historical names. An attempt is made, in the four genealogical tables inserted below, to distinguish these three classes of names…. Of those who are left in the third class (*i. e.* the real) all are not entitled to remain there. But I have only placed in the third class those names concerning which there seemed to be little doubt. The rest are left to the judgment of the reader."

Pursuant to this principle of division, Mr. Clinton furnishes four genealogical tables,[76] in which the names of persons representing races are printed in capital letters, and those of purely fictitious persons in italics. And these tables exhibit a curious sample of the intimate commixture of fiction with that which he calls truth: real son and mythical father, real husband and mythical wife, or *vice versâ*.

Upon Mr. Clinton's tables we may remark:—

1. The names singled out as fictitious are distinguished by no common character, nor any mark either assignable or defensible, from those which are left as real. To take an example (p. 40), why is Itônus the first pointed out as a fiction, while Itônus the second, together with Physcus, Cynus, Salmôneus, Ormenus, etc., in the same page, are preserved as real, all of them being eponyms of towns just as much as Itônus?

2. If we are to discard Hellên, Dôrus, Æolus, Iôn, etc., as not being real individual persons, but expressions for personified races, why are we to retain Kadmus, Danaus, Hyllus, and several others, who are just as much eponyms of races and tribes as the four above mentioned? Hyllus, Pamphylus, and Dymas are the eponyms

of the three Dorian tribes,[77] just as Hoplês and the other three sons of Iôn were of the four Attic tribes: Kadmus and Danaus stand in the same relation to the Kadmeians and Danaans, as Argus and Achæus to the Argeians and Achæans. Besides, there are many other names really eponymous, which we cannot now recognize to be so, in consequence of our imperfect acquaintance with the subdivisions of the Hellenic population, each of which, speaking generally, had its god or hero, to whom the original of the name was referred. If, then, eponymous names are to be excluded from the category of reality, we shall find that the ranks of the real men will be thinned to a far greater extent than is indicated by Mr. Clinton's tables.

3. Though Mr. Clinton does not carry out consistently either of his disfranchising qualifications among the names and persons of the old mythes, he nevertheless presses them far enough to strike out a sensible proportion of the whole. By conceding thus much to modern scepticism, he has departed from the point of view of Hellanikus and Herodotus, and the ancient historians generally; and it is singular that the names, which he has been the most forward to sacrifice, are exactly those to which they were most attached, and which it would have been most painful to their faith to part with,—I mean the eponymous heroes. Neither Herodotus, nor Hellanikus, nor Eratosthenês, nor any one of the chronological reckoners of antiquity, would have admitted the distinction which Mr. Clinton draws between persons real and persons fictitious in the old mythical world, though they might perhaps occasionally, on special grounds, call in question the existence of some individual characters amongst the mythical ancestry of Greece; but they never dreamed of that general severance into real and fictitious persons, which forms the principle of Mr. Clinton's "middle course." Their chronological computations for Grecian antiquity assumed that the mythical characters, in their full and entire sequence, were all real persons. Setting up the entire list as real, they calculated so many generations to a century, and thus determined the number of centuries which separated themselves from the gods, the heroes, or the autochthonous men who formed in their view the historical starting point. But as soon as it is admitted that the personages in the mythical world are divisible into two classes, partly real and partly fictitious, the integrity of the series is broken up, and it can be no longer employed as a basis for chronological calculation. In the estimate of the ancient chronologers, three succeeding persons of the same lineage—grandfather, father, and son,—counted for a century; and this may pass in a rough way, so long as you are thoroughly satisfied that they are all real persons: but if, in the succession of persons A, B, C, you strike out B as a fiction, the continuity of data necessary for chronological computation disappears. Now Mr. Clinton is inconsistent with himself in this,—that, while he abandons the unsuspecting historical faith of the Grecian chronologers, he nevertheless continues his chronological computations upon the data of that ancient faith,—upon the assumed reality of all the persons constituting his ante-historical generations. What becomes, for example, of the Herakleid genealogy of the Spartan kings, when it is admitted that eponymous persons are to be cancelled as fictions; seeing that Hyllus, through whom those kings traced their

origin to Hêraklês comes in the most distinct manner under that category, as much so as Hoplês the son of Iôn? It will be found that, when we once cease to believe in the mythical world as an uninterrupted and unalloyed succession of real individuals, it becomes unfit to serve as a basis for chronological computations, and that Mr. Clinton, when he mutilated the data of the ancient chronologists, ought at the same time to have abandoned their problems as insoluble. Genealogies of real persons, such as Herodotus and Eratosthenês believed in, afford a tolerable basis for calculations of time, within certain limits of error: "genealogies containing many real persons, but incorporated with many fictitious names," (to use the language just cited from Mr. Clinton,) are essentially unavailable for such a purpose.

It is right here to add, that I agree in Mr. Clinton's view of these eponymous persons: I admit, with him, that "the genealogical expression may often be false, when the connection which it describes is real." Thus, for example, the adoption of Hyllus by Ægimius, the father of Pamphylus and Dymas, to the privileges of a son and to a third fraction of his territories, may reasonably be construed as a mythical expression of the fraternal union of the three Dorian tribes, Hyllêis, Pamphyli, and Dymanes: so about the relationship of Iôn and Achæus, of Dôrus and Æolus. But if we put this construction on the name of Hyllus, or Iôn, or Achæus, we cannot at the same time employ either of these persons as units in chronological reckoning: nor is it consistent to recognize them in the lump as members of a distinct class, and yet to enlist them as real individuals in measuring the duration of past time.

4. Mr. Clinton, while professing a wish to tell the story of the Greeks as they have told it themselves, seems unconscious how capitally his point of view differs from theirs. The distinction which he draws between real and fictitious persons would have appeared unreasonable, not to say offensive, to Herodotus or Eratosthenês. It is undoubtedly right that the early history (if so it is to be called) of the Greeks should be told as they have told it themselves, and with that view I have endeavored in the previous narrative, as far as I could, to present the primitive legends in their original color and character,—pointing out at the same time the manner in which they were transformed and distilled into history by passing through the retort of later annalists. It is the legend, as thus transformed, which Mr. Clinton seems to understand as the story told by the Greeks themselves,—which cannot be admitted to be true, unless the meaning of the expression be specially explained. In his general distinction, however, between the real and fictitious persons of the mythical world, he departs essentially from the point of view even of the later Greeks. And if he had consistently followed out that distinction in his particular criticisms, he would have found the ground slipping under his feet in his upward march even to Troy,—not to mention the series of eighteen generations farther up, to Phorôneus; but he does *not* consistently follow it out, and therefore, in practice, he deviates little from the footsteps of the ancients.

Enough has been said to show that the witnesses upon whom Mr. Clinton relies, blend truth and fiction habitually, indiscriminately, and unconsciously, even upon his own admission. Let us now consider the positions which he lays down respecting historical evidence. He says (Introduct. pp. vi-vii):—

"We may acknowledge as real persons all those whom there is no reason for rejecting. The presumption is in favor of the early tradition, if no argument can be brought to overthrow it. The persons may be considered real, when the description of them is consonant with the state of the country at that time: when no national prejudice or vanity could be concerned in inventing them: when the tradition is consistent and general: when rival or hostile tribes concur in the leading facts: when the acts ascribed to the person (divested of their poetical ornament) enter into the political system of the age, or form the basis of other transactions which fall within known historical times. Kadmus and Danaus appear to be real persons: for it is conformable to the state of mankind, and perfectly credible, that Phœnician and Egyptian adventurers, in the ages to which these persons are ascribed, should have found their way to the coasts of Greece: and the Greeks (as already observed) had no motive from any national vanity to feign these settlements. Hercules was a real person. His acts were recorded by those who were not friendly to the Dorians; by Achæans and Æolians, and Ionians, who had no vanity to gratify in celebrating the hero of a hostile and rival people. His descendants in many branches remained in many states down to the historical times. His son Tlepolemus, and his grandson and great-grandson Cleodæus and Aristomachus, are acknowledged (*i. e.* by O. Müller) to be real persons: and there is no reason that can be assigned for receiving these, which will not be equally valid for establishing the reality both of Hercules and Hyllus. Above all, Hercules is authenticated by the testimonies both of the Iliad and Odyssey."

These positions appear to me inconsistent with any sound views of the conditions of historical testimony. According to what is here laid down, we are bound to accept as real all the persons mentioned by Homer, Arktinus, Leschês, the Hesiodic poets, Eumêlus, Asius, etc., unless we can adduce some positive ground in each particular case to prove the contrary. If this position be a true one, the greater part of the history of England, from Brute the Trojan down to Julius Cæsar, ought at once to be admitted as valid and worthy of credence. What Mr. Clinton here calls the *early tradition*, is in point of fact, the narrative of these early poets. The word *tradition* is an equivocal word, and begs the whole question; for while in its obvious and literal meaning it implies only something handed down, whether truth or fiction,—it is tacitly understood to imply a tale descriptive of some real matter of fact, taking its rise at the time when that fact happened, and originally accurate, but corrupted by subsequent oral transmission. Understanding, therefore, by Mr. Clinton's words *early tradition*, the tales of the old poets, we shall find his position totally inadmissible,—that we are bound to admit the persons or statements of Homer and Hesiod as real unless where we can produce reasons to the contrary. To allow this, would be to put

them upon a par with good contemporary witnesses; for no greater privilege can be claimed in favor even of Thucydidês, than the title of his testimony to be believed unless where it can be contradicted on special grounds. The presumption in favor of an asserting witness is either strong or weak, or positively nothing, according to the compound ratio of his means of knowledge, his moral and intellectual habits, and his motive to speak the truth. Thus, for instance, when Hesiod tells us that his father quitted the Æolic Kymê, and came to Askra in Bœôtia, we may fully believe him; but when he describes to us the battles between the Olympic gods and the Titans, or between Hêraklês and Cycnus,—or when Homer depicts the efforts of Hectôr, aided by Apollo, for the defence of Troy, and the struggles of Achilles and Odysseus, with the assistance of Hêrê and Poseidôn, for the destruction of that city, events professedly long past and gone,—we cannot presume either of them to be in any way worthy of belief. It cannot be shown that they possessed any means of knowledge, while it is certain that they could have no motive to consider historical truth: their object was to satisfy an uncritical appetite for narrative, and to interest the emotions of their hearers. Mr. Clinton says, that "the persons may be considered real when the description of them is consistent with the state of the country at that time." But he has forgotten, first, that we know nothing of the state of the country except what these very poets tell us; next, that fictitious persons may be just as consonant to the state of the country as real persons. While, therefore, on the one hand, we have no independent evidence either to affirm or to deny that Achilles or Agamemnôn are consistent with the state of Greece or Asia Minor, at a certain supposed date 1183 B. C., so, on the other hand, even assuming such consistency to be made out, this of itself would not prove them to be real persons.

Mr. Clinton's reasoning altogether overlooks the existence of *plausible fiction*,—fictitious stories which harmonize perfectly well with the general course of facts, and which are distinguished from matters of fact not by any internal character, but by the circumstance that matter of fact has some competent and well-informed witness to authenticate it, either directly or through legitimate inference. Fiction may be, and often is, extravagant and incredible; but it may also be plausible and specious, and in that case there is nothing but the want of an attesting certificate to distinguish it from truth. Now all the tests, which Mr. Clinton proposes as guarantees of the reality of the Homeric persons, will be just as well satisfied by plausible fiction as by actual matter of fact: the plausibility of the fiction consists in its satisfying those and other similar conditions. In most cases, the tales of the poets *did* fall in with the existing current of feelings in their audience: "prejudice and vanity" are not the only feelings, but doubtless prejudice and vanity were often appealed to, and it was from such harmony of sentiment that they acquired their hold on men's belief. Without any doubt, the Iliad appealed most powerfully to the reverence for ancestral gods and heroes among the Asiatic colonists who first heard it: the temptation of putting forth an interesting tale is quite a sufficient stimulus to the invention of the poet, and the plausibility of the tale a sufficient passport to the belief of the hearers. Mr. Clinton talks of

"consistent and general tradition." But that the tale of a poet, when once told with effect and beauty, acquired general belief,—is no proof that it was founded on fact: otherwise, what are we to say to the divine legends, and to the large portion of the Homeric narrative which Mr. Clinton himself sets aside as untrue, under the designation of "poetical ornament?" When a mythical incident is recorded as "forming the basis" of some known historical fact or institution,—as, for instance, the successful stratagem by which Melanthus killed Xanthus, in the battle on the boundary, as recounted in my last chapter,—we may adopt one of two views; we may either treat the incident as real, and as having actually given occasion to what is described as its effect,—or we may treat the incident as a legend imagined in order to assign some plausible origin of the reality,—"Aut ex re nomen, aut ex vocabulo fabula."[78] In cases where the legendary incident is referred to a time long anterior to any records, —as it commonly is,—the second mode of proceeding appears to me far more consonant to reason and probability than the first. It is to be recollected that all the persons and facts, here defended as matter of real history, by Mr. Clinton, are referred to an age long preceding the first beginning of records.

I have already remarked that Mr. Clinton shrinks from his own rule in treating Kadmus and Danaus as real persons, since they are as much eponyms of tribes or races as Dôrus and Hellên. And if he can admit Hêraklês to be a real man, I cannot see upon what reason he can consistently disallow any one of the mythical personages, for there is not one whose exploits are more strikingly at variance with the standard of historical probability. Mr. Clinton reasons upon the supposition that "Herculês was a *Dorian* hero:" but he was Achæan and Kadmeian as well as Dorian, though the legends respecting him are different in all the three characters. Whether his son Tlepolemus and his grandson Cleodæus belong to the category of historical men, I will not take upon me to say, though O. Müller (in my opinion without any warranty) appears to admit it; but Hyllus certainly is not a real man, if the canon of Mr. Clinton himself respecting the eponyms is to be trusted. "The descendants of Herculês (observes Mr. Clinton) remained in many states down to the historical times." So did those of Zeus and Apollo, and of that god whom the historian Hekatæus recognized as his progenitor in the sixteenth generation; the titular kings of Ephesus, in the historical times, as well as Peisistratus, the despot of Athens, traced their origin up to Æolus and Hellên, yet Mr. Clinton does not hesitate to reject Æolus and Hellên as fictitious persons. I dispute the propriety of quoting the Iliad and Odyssey (as Mr. Clinton does) in evidence of the historic personality of Herculês. For, even with regard to the ordinary men who figure in those poems, we have no means of discriminating the real from the fictitious; while the Homeric Hêraklês is unquestionably more than an ordinary man,—he is the favorite son of Zeus, from his birth predestined to a life of labor and servitude, as preparation for a glorious immortality. Without doubt, the poet himself believed in the reality of Herculês, but it was a reality clothed with superhuman attributes.

Mr. Clinton observes (Introd. p. ii.), that "because some genealogies were fictitious, we are not justified in concluding that all were fabulous." It is no way necessary that we should maintain so extensive a position: it is sufficient that all are fabulous so far as concerns gods and heroes,—*some* fabulous throughout,—and none ascertainably true, for the period anterior to the recorded Olympiads. How much, or what particular portions, may be true, no one can pronounce. The gods and heroes are, from our point of view, essentially fictitious; but from the Grecian point of view they were the most real (if the expression may be permitted, *i. e.* clung to with the strongest faith) of all the members of the series. They not only formed parts of the genealogy as originally conceived, but were in themselves the grand reason why it was conceived,—as a golden chain to connect the living man with a divine ancestor. The genealogy, therefore, taken as a whole, (and its value consists in its being taken as a whole,) was from the beginning a fiction; but the names of the father and grandfather of the living man, in whose day it first came forth, were doubtless those of real men. Wherever, therefore, we can verify the date of a genealogy, as applied to some living person, we may reasonably presume the two lowest members of it to be also those of real persons: but this has no application to the time anterior to the Olympiads,—still less to the pretended times of the Trojan war, the Kalydônian boar-hunt, or the deluge of Deukalion. To reason (as Mr. Clinton does, Introd. p. vi.), —"Because Aristomachus was a real man, therefore his father Cleodæus, his grandfather Hyllus, and so farther upwards, etc., must have been real men,"—is an inadmissible conclusion. The historian Hekatæus was a real man, and doubtless his father Hegesander, also,—but it would be unsafe to march up his genealogical ladder fifteen steps, to the presence of the ancestorial god of whom he boasted: the upper steps of the ladder will be found broken and unreal. Not to mention that the inference, from real son to real father, is inconsistent with the admissions in Mr. Clinton's own genealogical tables; for he there inserts the names of several mythical fathers as having begotten real historical sons.

The general authority of Mr. Clinton's book, and the sincere respect which I entertain for his elucidations of the later chronology, have imposed upon me the duty of assigning those grounds on which I dissent from his conclusions prior to the first recorded Olympiad. The reader who desires to see the numerous and contradictory guesses (they deserve no better name) of the Greeks themselves in the attempt to chronologize their mythical narratives, will find them in the copious notes annexed to the first half of his first volume. As I consider all such researches not merely as fruitless, in regard to any trustworthy result, but as serving to divert attention from the genuine form and really illustrative character of Grecian legend, I have not thought it right to go over the same ground in the present work. Differing as I do, however, from Mr. Clinton's views on this subject, I concur with him in deprecating the application of etymology (Intr. pp. xi-xii.) as a general scheme of explanation to the characters and events of Greek legend. Amongst the many causes which operated as suggestives and stimulants to Greek fancy in the creation of these interesting tales,

doubtless etymology has had its share; but it cannot be applied (as Hermann, above all others, has sought to apply it) for the purpose of imparting supposed sense and system to the general body of mythical narrative. I have already remarked on this topic in a former chapter.

It would be curious to ascertain at what time, or by whom, the earliest continuous genealogies, connecting existing persons with the supposed antecedent age of legend, were formed and preserved. Neither Homer nor Hesiod mentioned any verifiable *present* persons or circumstances: had they done so, the age of one or other of them could have been determined upon good evidence, which we may fairly presume to have been impossible, from the endless controversies upon this topic among ancient writers. In the Hesiodic Works and Days, the heroes of Troy and Thêbes are even presented as an extinct race,[79] radically different from the poet's own contemporaries, who are a new race, far too depraved to be conceived as sprung from the loins of the heroes; so that we can hardly suppose Hesiod (though his father was a native of the Æolic Kymê) to have admitted the pedigree of the Æolic chiefs, as reputed descendants of Agamemnôn. Certain it is, that the earliest poets did not attempt to measure or bridge over the supposed interval, between their own age and the war of Troy, by any definite series of fathers and sons: whether Eumêlus or Asius made any such attempt, we cannot tell, but the earliest continuous backward genealogies which we find mentioned are those of Pherekydês, Hellanikus, and Herodotus. It is well known that Herodotus, in his manner of computing the upward genealogy of the Spartan kings, assigns the date of the Trojan war to a period 800 years earlier than himself, equivalent about to B. C. 1270-1250; while the subsequent Alexandrine chronologists, Eratosthenês and Apollodôrus, place that event in 1184 and 1183 B. C.; and the Parian marble refers it to an intermediate date, different from either,—1209 B. C. Ephorus, Phanias, Timæus, Kleitarchus, and Duris, had each his own conjectural date; but the computations of the Alexandrine chronologists was the most generally followed by those who succeeded them, and seems to have passed to modern times as the received date of this great legendary event,—though some distinguished inquirers have adopted the epoch of Herodotus, which Larcher has attempted to vindicate in an elaborate but feeble dissertation.[80] It is unnecessary to state that, in my view, the inquiry has no other value except to illustrate the ideas which guided the Greek mind, and to exhibit its progress from the days of Homer to those of Herodotus. For it argues a considerable mental progress when men begin to methodize the past, even though they do so on fictitious principles, being as yet unprovided with those records which alone could put them on a better course. The Homeric man was satisfied with feeling, imagining, and believing particular incidents of a supposed past, without any attempt to graduate the line of connection between them and himself: to introduce fictitious hypotheses and media of connection is the business of a succeeding age, when the stimulus of rational curiosity is first felt, without any authentic materials to supply it. We have, then, the form of history operating upon the matter of legend,—the transition-state between legend and history;

less interesting, indeed, than either separately, yet necessary as a step between the two.

CHAPTER XX.

STATE OF SOCIETY AND MANNERS AS EXHIBITED IN GRECIAN LEGEND.

THOUGH the particular persons and events, chronicled in the legendary poems of Greece, are not to be regarded as belonging to the province of real history, those poems are, nevertheless, full of instruction as pictures of life and manners; and the very same circumstances, which divest their composers of all credibility as historians, render them so much the more valuable as unconscious expositors of their own contemporary society. While professedly describing an uncertified past, their combinations are involuntarily borrowed from the surrounding present: for among communities, such as those of the primitive Greeks, without books, without means of extended travel, without acquaintance with foreign languages and habits, the imagination, even of highly gifted men, was naturally enslaved by the circumstances around them to a far greater degree than in the later days of Solôn or Herodotus; insomuch that the characters which they conceived and the scenes which they described would for that reason bear a stronger generic resemblance to the realities of their own time and locality. Nor was the poetry of that age addressed to lettered and critical authors, watchful to detect plagiarism, sated with simple imagery, and requiring something of novelty or peculiarity in every fresh production. To captivate their emotions, it was sufficient to depict, with genius and fervor, the more obvious manifestations of human adventure or suffering, and to idealize that type of society, both private and public, with which the hearers around were familiar. Even in describing the gods, where a great degree of latitude and deviation might have been expected,[81] we see that Homer introduces into Olympus the passions, the caprices, the love of power and patronage, the alternation of dignity and weakness, which animated the bosom of an ordinary Grecian chief; and this tendency, to reproduce in substance the social relations to which he had been accustomed, would operate still more powerfully when he had to describe simply human characters,—the chief and his people, the warrior and his comrades, the husband, wife, father, and son,—or the imperfect rudiments of judicial and administrative proceeding. That his narrative on all these points, even with fictitious characters and events, presents a close approximation to general reality, there can be no reason to doubt.[82] The necessity under which he lay of drawing from a store, then happily unexhausted, of personal experience and observation, is one of the causes of that freshness and vivacity of description for which he stands unrivalled, and which constituted the imperishable charm of the Iliad and Odyssey from the beginning to the end of Grecian literature.

While, therefore, we renounce the idea of chronologizing or historicizing the events of Grecian legend, we may turn them to profit as valuable memorials of that state of society, feeling, and intelligence, which must be to us the starting-point of

the history of the people. Of course, the legendary age, like all those which succeeded it, had its antecedent causes and determining conditions; but of these we know nothing, and we are compelled to assume it as a primary fact, for the purpose of following out its subsequent changes. To conceive absolute beginning or origin (as Niebuhr has justly remarked) is beyond the reach of our faculties: we can neither apprehend nor verify anything beyond progress, or development, or decay,[83]—change from one set of circumstances to another, operated by some definite combination of physical or moral laws. In the case of the Greeks, the legendary age, as the earliest in any way known to us, must be taken as the initial state from which this series of changes commences. We must depict its prominent characteristics as well as we can, and show,—partly how it serves to prepare, partly how it forms a contrast to set off, —the subsequent ages of Solôn, of Periklês, and of Demosthenês.

1. The political condition, which Grecian legend everywhere presents to us, is in its principal features strikingly different from that which had become universally prevalent among the Greeks in the time of the Peloponnêsian war. Historical oligarchy, as well as democracy, agreed in requiring a certain established system of government, comprising the three elements of specialized functions, temporary functionaries, and ultimate responsibility (under some forms or other) to the mass of qualified citizens—either a Senate or an Ecclesia, or both. There were, of course, many and capital distinctions between one government and another, in respect to the qualification of the citizen, the attributes and efficiency of the general assembly, the admissibility to power, etc.; and men might often be dissatisfied with the way in which these questions were determined in their own city. But in the mind of every man, some determining rule or system—something like what in modern times is called a *constitution*—was indispensable to any government entitled to be called legitimate, or capable of creating in the mind of a Greek a feeling of moral obligation to obey it. The functionaries who exercised authority under it might be more or less competent or popular; but his personal feelings towards them were commonly lost in his attachment or aversion to the general system. If any energetic man could by audacity or craft break down the constitution, and render himself permanent ruler according to his own will and pleasure,—even though he might govern well, he could never inspire the people with any sentiment of duty towards him. His sceptre was illegitimate from the beginning, and even the taking of his life, far from being interdicted by that moral feeling which condemned the shedding of blood in other cases, was considered meritorious. Nor could he be mentioned in the language except by a name[84] (τὐραννος, *despot*,) which branded him as an object of mingled fear and dislike.

If we carry our eyes back from historical to legendary Greece, we find a picture the reverse of what has been here sketched. We discern a government in which there is little or no scheme or system,—still less any idea of responsibility to the governed,—but in which the mainspring of obedience on the part of the people consists

in their personal feeling and reverence towards the chief. We remark, first and foremost, the king: next, a limited number of subordinate kings or chiefs; afterwards, the mass of armed freemen, husbandmen, artisans, freebooters, etc.; lowest of all, the free laborers for hire, and the bought slaves. The king is not distinguished by any broad or impassable boundary from the other chiefs, to each of whom the title *basileus* is applicable as well as to himself: his supremacy has been inherited from his ancestors, and passes by descent, as a general rule, to his eldest son, having been conferred upon the family as a privilege by the favor of Zeus.[85] In war, he is the leader, foremost in personal prowess, and directing all military movements; in peace, he is the general protector of the injured and oppressed; he farther offers up those public prayers and sacrifices which are intended to obtain for the whole people the favor of the gods. An ample domain is assigned to him as an appurtenance of his lofty position, while the produce of his fields and his cattle is consecrated in part to an abundant, though rude hospitality. Moreover, he receives frequent presents, to avert his enmity, to conciliate his favor,[86] or to buy off his exactions; and when plunder is taken from the enemy, a large previous share, comprising probably the most alluring female captive, is reserved for him, apart from the general distribution. [87]

Such is the position of the king, in the heroic times of Greece,—the only person (if we except the heralds and priests, each both special and subordinate,) who is then presented to us as clothed with any individual authority,—the person by whom all the executive functions, then few in number, which the society requires, are either performed or directed. His personal ascendency—derived from divine countenance, bestowed both upon himself individually and upon his race, and probably from accredited divine descent—is the salient feature in the picture. The people hearken to his voice, embrace his propositions, and obey his orders: not merely resistance, but even criticism upon his acts, is generally exhibited in an odious point of view, and is, indeed, never heard of except from some one or more of the subordinate princes. To keep alive and justify such feelings in the public mind, however, the king must himself possess various accomplishments, bodily and mental, and that too in a superior degree.[88] He must be brave in the field, wise in the council, and eloquent in the agora; he must be endued with bodily strength and activity above other men, and must be an adept, not only in the use of his arms, but also in those athletic exercises which the crowd delight to witness. Even the more homely varieties of manual acquirements are an addition to his character,—such as the craft of the carpenter or shipwright, the straight furrowing of the ploughman, or the indefatigable persistence of the mower without repose or refreshment throughout the longest day.[89] The conditions of voluntary obedience, during the Grecian heroic times, are family descent with personal force and superiority mental as well as bodily, in the chief, coupled with the favor of the gods: an old chief, such as Pêleus and Laërtes, cannot retain his position.[90] But, on the other hand, where these elements of force are present, a good deal of violence, caprice, and rapacity is tolerated: the ethical judg-

ment is not exact in scrutinizing the conduct of individuals so preëminently endowed. As in the case of the gods, the general epithets of *good*, *just*, etc., are applied to them as euphemisms arising from submission and fear, being not only not suggested, but often pointedly belied, by their particular acts. These words signify[91] the man of birth, wealth, influence, and daring, whose arm is strong to destroy or to protect, whatever may be the turn of his moral sentiments; while the opposite epithet, *bad*, designates the poor, lowly, and weak; from whose dispositions, be they ever so virtuous, society has little either to hope or to fear.

Aristotle, in his general theory of government,[92] lays down the position, that the earliest sources of obedience and authority among mankind are personal, exhibiting themselves most perfectly in the type of paternal supremacy; and that therefore the kingly government, as most conformable to this stage of social sentiment, became probably the first established everywhere. And in fact it still continued in his time to be generally prevalent among the non-Hellenic nations, immediately around; though the Phœnician cities and Carthage, the most civilized of all non-Hellenic states, were republics. Nevertheless, so completely were the feelings about kingship reversed among his contemporary Greeks, that he finds it difficult to enter into the voluntary obedience paid by his ancestors to their early heroic chiefs. He cannot explain to his own satisfaction how any one man should have been so much superior to the companions around him as to maintain such immense personal ascendency: he suspects that in such small communities great merit was very rare, so that the chief had few competitors.[93] Such remarks illustrate strongly the revolution which the Greek mind had undergone during the preceding centuries, in regard to the internal grounds of political submission. But the connecting link, between the Homeric and the republican schemes of government, is to be found in two adjuncts of the Homeric royalty, which are now to be mentioned,—the boulê, or council of chiefs, and the agora, or general assembly of freemen.

These two meetings, more or less frequently convoked, and interwoven with the earliest habits of the primitive Grecian communities, are exhibited in the monuments of the legendary age as opportunities for advising the king, and media for promulgating his intentions to the people, rather than as restraints upon his authority. Unquestionably, they must have conduced in practice to the latter result as well as to the former; but this is not the light in which the Homeric poems describe them. The chiefs, kings, princes, or gerontes—for the same word in Greek designates both an old man and a man of conspicuous rank and position—compose the council,[94] in which, according to the representations in the Iliad, the resolutions of Agamemnôn on the one side, and of Hectôr on the other, appear uniformly to prevail. The harshness and even contempt with which Hectôr treats respectful opposition from his ancient companion Polydamas,—the desponding tone and conscious inferiority of the latter, and the unanimous assent which the former obtains, even when quite in the wrong—all this is clearly set forth in the poem:[95] while in the Grecian camp we see

Nestôr tendering his advice in the most submissive and delicate manner to Agamemnôn, to be adopted or rejected, as "the king of men" might determine.[96] The council is a purely consultative body, assembled, not with any power of peremptorily arresting mischievous resolves of the king, but solely for his information and guidance. He himself is the presiding (boulephŏrus, or) member[97] of council; the rest, collectively as well as individually, are his subordinates.

We proceed from the council to the agora: according to what seems the received custom, the king, after having talked over his intentions with the former, proceeds to announce them to the people. The heralds make the crowd sit down in order,[98] and enforce silence: any one of the chiefs or councillors—but as it seems, no one else[99]—is allowed to address them: the king first promulgates his intentions, which are then open to be commented upon by others. But in the Homeric agora, no division of affirmative or negative voices ever takes place, nor is any formal resolution ever adopted. The nullity of positive function strikes us even more in the agora than in the council. It is an assembly for talk, communication, and discussion, to a certain extent, by the chiefs, in presence of the people as listeners and sympathizers,—often for eloquence, and sometimes for quarrel,—but here its ostensible purposes end.

The agora in Ithaka, in the second book of the Odyssey, is convened by the youthful Telemachus, at the instigation of Athênê, not for the purpose of submitting any proposition, but in order to give formal and public notice to the suitors to desist from their iniquitous intrusion and pillage of his substance, and to absolve himself farther, before gods and men, from all obligations towards them, if they refuse to comply. For the slaughter of the suitors, in all the security of the festive hall and banquet (which forms the catastrophe of the Odyssey), was a proceeding involving much that was shocking to Grecian feeling,[100] and therefore required to be preceded by such ample formalities, as would leave both the delinquents themselves without the shadow of excuse, and their surviving relatives without any claim to the customary satisfaction. For this special purpose, Telemachus directs the heralds to summon an agora: but what seems most of all surprising is, that none had ever been summoned or held since the departure of Odysseus himself,—an interval of twenty years. "No agora or session has taken place amongst us (says the gray-headed Ægyptius, who opens the proceedings) since Odysseus went on shipboard: and now, who is he that has called us together? what man, young or old, has felt such a strong necessity? Has he received intelligence from our absent warriors, or has he other public news to communicate? He is our good friend for doing this: whatever his projects may be, I pray Zeus to grant him success."[101] Telemachus, answering the appeal forthwith, proceeds to tell the assembled Ithakans that he has no public news to communicate, but that he has convoked them upon his own private necessities. Next, he sets forth, pathetically, the wickedness of the suitors, calls upon them personally to desist, and upon the people to restrain them, and concludes by solemnly warning them, that, being henceforward free from all obligation towards them, he

will invoke the avenging aid of Zeus, so "that they may be slain in the interior of his own house, without bringing upon him any subsequent penalty."[102]

We are not of course to construe the Homeric description as anything more than an *idéal*, approximating to actual reality. But, allowing all that can be required for such a limitation, it exhibits the agora more as a special medium of publicity and intercommunication,[103] from the king to the body of the people, than as including any idea of responsibility on the part of the former or restraining force on the part of the latter, however such consequences may indirectly grow out of it. The primitive Grecian government is essentially monarchical, reposing on personal feeling and divine right: the memorable dictum in the Iliad is borne out by all that we hear of the actual practice; "The ruler of many is not a good thing: let us have one ruler only,—one king,—him to whom Zeus has given the sceptre and the tutelary sanctions."[104]

The second book of the Iliad, full as it is of beauty and vivacity, not only confirms our idea of the passive, recipient, and listening character of the agora, but even presents a repulsive picture of the degradation of the mass of the people before the chiefs. Agamemnôn convokes the agora for the purpose of immediately arming the Grecian host, under a full impression that the gods have at last determined forthwith to crown his arms with complete victory. Such impression has been created by a special visit of Oneirus (the Dream-god), sent by Zeus during his sleep,—being, indeed, an intentional fraud on the part of Zeus, though Agamemnôn does not suspect its deceitful character. At this precise moment, when he may be conceived to be more than usually anxious to get his army into the field and snatch the prize, an unaccountable fancy seizes him, that, instead of inviting the troops to do what he really wishes, and encouraging their spirits for this one last effort, he will adopt a course directly contrary: he will try their courage by professing to believe that the siege had become desperate, and that there was no choice except to go on shipboard and flee. Announcing to Nestôr and Odysseus, in preliminary council, his intention to hold this strange language, he at the same time tells them that he relies upon them to oppose it and counterwork its effect upon the multitude.[105] The agora is presently assembled, and the king of men pours forth a speech full of dismay and despair, concluding by a distinct exhortation to all present to go aboard and return home at once. Immediately the whole army, chiefs as well as people, break up and proceed to execute his orders: every one rushes off to get his ship afloat, except Odysseus, who looks on in mournful silence and astonishment. The army would have been quickly on its voyage home, had not the goddesses Hêrê and Athênê stimulated Odysseus to an instantaneous interference. He hastens among the dispersing crowd and diverts them from their purpose of retreat: to the chiefs he addresses flattering words, trying to shame them by gentle expostulation: but the people he visits with harsh reprimand and blows from his sceptre,[106] thus driving them back to their seats in the agora.

Amidst the dissatisfied crowd thus unwillingly brought back, the voice of Thersitês is heard the longest and the loudest,—a man ugly, deformed, and unwarlike, but flu-

ent in speech, and especially severe and unsparing in his censure of the chiefs, Agamemnôn, Achilles, and Odysseus. Upon this occasion, he addresses to the people a speech denouncing Agamemnôn for selfish and greedy exaction generally, but particularly for his recent ill-treatment of Achilles,—and he endeavors, moreover, to induce them to persist in their scheme of departure. In reply, Odysseus not only rebukes Thersitês sharply for his impudence in abusing the commander-in-chief, but threatens that, if ever such behavior is repeated, he will strip him naked, and thrash him out of the assembly with disgraceful blows; as an earnest of which, he administers to him at once a smart stroke with the studded sceptre, imprinting its painful mark in a bloody weal across his back. Thersitês, terrified and subdued, sits down weeping; while the surrounding crowd deride him, and express the warmest approbation of Odysseus for having thus by force put the reviler to silence.[107]

Both Odysseus and Nestôr then address the agora, sympathizing with Agamemnôn for the shame which the retreat of the Greeks is about to inflict upon him, and urging emphatically upon every one present the obligation of persevering until the siege shall be successfully consummated. Neither of them animadverts at all upon Agamemnôn, either for his conduct towards Achilles, or for his childish freak of trying the temper of the army.[108]

There cannot be a clearer indication than this description—so graphic in the original poem—of the true character of the Homeric agora. The multitude who compose it are listening and acquiescent, not often hesitating, and never refractory[109] to the chief. The fate which awaits a presumptuous critic, even where his virulent reproaches are substantially well-founded, is plainly set forth in the treatment of Thersitês; while the unpopularity of such a character is attested even more by the excessive pains which Homer takes to heap upon him repulsive personal deformities, than by the chastisement of Odysseus;—he is lame, bald, crook-backed, of misshapen head, and squinting vision.

But we cease to wonder at the submissive character of the agora, when we read the proceedings of Odysseus towards the people themselves;—his fine words and flattery addressed to the chiefs, and his contemptuous reproof and manual violence towards the common men, at a moment when both were doing exactly the same thing,—fulfilling the express bidding of Agamemnôn, upon whom Odysseus does not offer a single comment. This scene, which excited a sentiment of strong displeasure among the democrats of historical Athens,[110] affords a proof that the feeling of personal dignity, of which philosophic observers in Greece—Herodotus, Xenophôn, Hippocratês, and Aristotle—boasted, as distinguishing the free Greek citizen from the slavish Asiatic, was yet undeveloped in the time of Homer.[111] The ancient epic is commonly so filled with the personal adventures of the chiefs, and the people are so constantly depicted as simple appendages attached to them, that we rarely obtain a glimpse of the treatment of the one apart from the other, such as this memorable Homeric agora affords.

There remains one other point of view in which we are to regard the agora of primitive Greece,—as the scene in which justice was administered. The king is spoken of as constituted by Zeus the great judge of society: he has received from Zeus the sceptre, and along with it the powers of command and sanction: the people obey these commands and enforce these sanctions, under him, enriching him at the same time with lucrative presents and payments.[112] Sometimes the king separately, sometimes the kings or chiefs or gerontes in the plural number, are named as deciding disputes and awarding satisfaction to complainants; always, however, in public, in the midst of the assembled agora.[113] In one of the compartments of the shield of Achilles, the details of a judicial scene are described. While the agora is full of an eager and excited crowd, two men are disputing about the fine of satisfaction for the death of a murdered man,—one averring, the other denying, that the fine had already been paid, and both demanding an inquest. The gerontes are ranged on stone seats,[114] in the holy circle, with two talents of gold lying before them, to be awarded to such of the litigants as shall make out his case to their satisfaction. The heralds with their sceptres, repressing the warm sympathies of the crowd in favor of one or other of the parties, secure an alternate hearing to both.[115] This interesting picture completely harmonizes with the brief allusion of Hesiod to the judicial trial—doubtless a real trial—between himself and his brother Persês. The two brothers disputed about their paternal inheritance, and the cause was carried to be tried by the chiefs in agora; but Persês bribed them, and obtained an unjust verdict for the whole.[116] So at least Hesiod affirms, in the bitterness of his heart; earnestly exhorting his brother not to waste a precious time, required for necessary labors, in the unprofitable occupation of witnessing and abetting litigants in the agora,—for which (he adds) no man has proper leisure, unless his subsistence for the year beforehand be safely treasured up in his garners.[117] He repeats, more than once, his complaints of the crooked and corrupt judgments of which the kings were habitually guilty; dwelling upon abuse of justice as the crying evil of his day, and predicting as well as invoking the vengeance of Zeus to repress it. And Homer ascribes the tremendous violence of the autumnal storms to the wrath of Zeus against those judges who disgrace the agora with their wicked verdicts.[118]

Though it is certain that, in every state of society, the feelings of men when assembled in multitude will command a certain measure of attention, yet we thus find the agora, in judicial matters still more than in political, serving merely the purpose of publicity. It is the king who is the grand personal mover of Grecian heroic society.[119] He is on earth, the equivalent of Zeus in the agora of the gods: the supreme god of Olympus is in the habit of carrying on his government with frequent publicity, of hearing some dissentient opinions, and of allowing himself occasionally to be wheedled by Aphroditê, or worried into compliance by Hêrê: but his determination is at last conclusive, subject only to the overruling interference of the Mœræ, or Fates.[120] Both the society of gods, and the various societies of men, are, according to the conceptions of Grecian legend, carried on by the personal rule of a legitimate sover-

eign, who does not derive his title from the special appointment of his subjects, though he governs with their full consent. In fact, Grecian legend presents to us hardly anything else, except these great individual personalities. The race, or nation, is as it were absorbed into the prince: eponymous persons, especially, are not merely princes, but fathers and representative unities, each the equivalent of that greater or less aggregate to which he gives name.

But though, in the primitive Grecian government, the king is the legitimate as well as the real sovereign, he is always conceived as acting through the council and agora. Both the one and the other are established and essential media through which his ascendency is brought to bear upon the society: the absence of such assemblies is the test and mark of savage men, as in the case of the Cyclôpes.[121] Accordingly, he must possess qualities fit to act with effect upon these two assemblies: wise reason for the council, unctuous eloquence for the agora.[122] Such is the *idéal* of the heroic government: a king, not merely full of valor and resource as a soldier, but also sufficiently superior to those around him to insure both the deliberate concurrence of the chiefs, and the hearty adhesion of the masses.[123] That this picture is not, in all individual cases, realized, is unquestionable; but the endowments so often predicated of good kings show it to have been the type present to the mind of the describer.[124] Xenophôn, in his Cyropædia, depicts Cyrus as an improved edition of the Homeric Agamemnôn,—"a good king and a powerful soldier," thus idealizing the perfection of personal government.

It is important to point out these fundamental conceptions of government, discernible even before the dawn of Grecian history, and identified with the social life of the people. It shows us that the Greeks, in their subsequent revolutions, and in the political experiments which their countless autonomous communities presented, worked upon preëxisting materials,—developing and exalting elements which had been at first subordinate, and suppressing, or remodelling on a totally new principle, that which had been originally predominant. When we approach historical Greece, we find that (with the exception of Sparta) the primitive hereditary, unresponsible monarch, uniting in himself all the functions of government, has ceased to reign,—while the feeling of legitimacy, which originally induced his people to obey him willingly, has been exchanged for one of aversion towards the character and title generally. The multifarious functions which he once exercised, have been parcelled out among temporary nominees. On the other hand, the council, or senate, and the agora, originally simple media through which the king acted, are elevated into standing and independent sources of authority, controlling and holding in responsibility the various special officers to whom executive duties of one kind or another are confided. The general principle here indicated is common both to the oligarchies and the democracies which grew up in historical Greece: much as these two governments differed from each other, and many as were the varieties even between one oligarchy or democracy and another, they all stood in equal contrast with the principle of the

heroic government. Even in Sparta, where the hereditary kingship lasted, it was preserved with lustre and influence exceedingly diminished,[125] and such timely diminution of its power seems to have been one of the essential conditions of its preservation.[126] Though the Spartan kings had the hereditary command of the military forces, yet, even in all foreign expeditions, they habitually acted in obedience to orders from home; while in affairs of the interior, the superior power of the ephors sensibly overshadowed them. So that, unless possessed of more than ordinary force of character, they seem to have exercised their chief influence as presiding members of the senate.

There is yet another point of view in which it behoves us to take notice of the council and the agora as integral portions of the legendary government of the Grecian communities. We are thus enabled to trace the employment of public speaking, as the standing engine of government and the proximate cause of obedience, to the social infancy of the nation. The power of speech in the direction of public affairs becomes more and more obvious, developed, and irresistible, as we advance towards the culminating period of Grecian history, the century preceding the battle of Chæroneia. That its development was greatest among the most enlightened sections of the Grecian name, and smallest among the more obtuse and stationary, is matter of notorious fact; nor is it less true, that the prevalence of this habit was one of the chief causes of the intellectual eminence of the nation generally. At a time when all the countries around were plunged comparatively in mental torpor, there was no motive sufficiently present and powerful to multiply so wonderfully the productive minds of Greece, except such as arose from the rewards of public speaking. The susceptibility of the multitude to this sort of guidance, their habit of requiring and enjoying the stimulus which it supplied, and the open discussion, combining regular forms with free opposition, of practical matters, political as well as judicial,—are the creative causes which formed such conspicuous adepts in the art of persuasion. Nor was it only professed orators who were thus produced; didactic aptitude was formed in the background, and the speculative tendencies were supplied with interesting phenomena for observation and combination, at a time when the truths of physical science were almost inaccessible. If the primary effect was to quicken the powers of expression, the secondary, but not less certain result, was to develop the habits of scientific thought. Not only the oratory of Demosthenês and Periklês, and the colloquial magic of Socratês, but also the philosophical speculations of Plato, and the systematic politics, rhetoric, and logic of Aristotle, are traceable to the same general tendencies in the minds of the Grecian people: and we find the germ of these expansive forces in the senate and agora of their legendary government. The poets, first epic and then lyric, were the precursors of the orators, in their power of moving the feelings of an assembled crowd; whilst the Homeric poems—the general training-book of educated Greeks—constituted a treasury of direct and animated expression, full of concrete forms, and rare in the use of abstractions, and thence better suited

to the workings of oratory. The subsequent critics had no difficulty in selecting from the Iliad and Odyssey, samples of eloquence in all its phases and varieties.

On the whole, then, the society depicted in the old Greek poems is loose and unsettled, presenting very little of legal restraint, and still less of legal protection,—but concentrating such political power as does exist in the hands of a legitimate hereditary king, whose ascendency over the other chiefs is more or less complete according to his personal force and character. Whether that ascendency be greater or less, however, the mass of the people is in either case politically passive and of little account. Though the Grecian freeman of the heroic age is above the degraded level of the Gallic *plebs*, as described by Cæsar,[127] he is far from rivalling the fierce independence and sense of dignity, combined with individual force, which characterize the Germanic tribes before their establishment in the Roman empire. Still less does his condition, or the society in which he moves, correspond to those pleasing dreams of spontaneous rectitude and innocence, in which Tacitus and Seneca indulge with regard to primitive man.[128]

2. The state of moral and social feeling, prevalent in legendary Greece, exhibits a scene in harmony with the rudimentary political fabrics just described. Throughout the long stream of legendary narrative on which the Greeks looked back as their past history, the larger social motives hardly ever come into play: either individual valor and cruelty, or the personal attachments and quarrels of relatives and war-companions, or the feuds of private enemies, are ever before us. There is no sense of obligation then existing, between man and man as such,—and very little between each man and the entire community of which he is a member; such sentiments are neither operative in the real world, nor present to the imaginations of the poets. Personal feelings, either towards the gods, the king, or some near and known individual, fill the whole of a man's bosom: out of them arise all the motives to beneficence, and all the internal restraints upon violence, antipathy, or rapacity: and special communion, as well as special solemnities, are essential to their existence. The ceremony of an oath, so imposing, so paramount, and so indispensable in those days, illustrates strikingly this principle. And even in the case of the stranger suppliant,—in which an apparently spontaneous sympathy manifests itself,—the succor and kindness shown to him arise mainly from his having gone through the consecrated formalities of supplication, such as that of sitting down in the ashes by the sacred hearth, thus obtaining a sort of privilege of sanctuary.[129] That ceremony exalts him into something more than a mere suffering man,—it places him in express fellowship with the master of the house, under the tutelary sanctions of Zeus Hiketêsios. There is great difference between one form of supplication and another; the suppliant, however, in any form, becomes more or less the object of a particular sympathy.

The sense of obligation towards the gods manifests itself separately in habitual acts of worship, sacrifice, and libations, or by votive presents, such as that of the hair of Achilles, which he has pledged to the river-god Spercheius,[130] and such as

the constant dedicated offerings which men who stand in urgent need of the divine aid first promise and afterwards fulfil. But the feeling towards the gods also appears, and that not less frequently, as mingling itself with and enforcing obligations towards some particular human person. The tie which binds a man to his father, his kinsman, his guest, or any special promisee towards whom he has taken the engagement of an oath, is conceived in conjunction with the idea of Zeus, as witness and guarantee; and the intimacy of the association is attested by some surname or special appellation of the god.[131] Such personal feelings composed all the moral influences of which a Greek of that day was susceptible,—a state of mind which we can best appreciate by contrasting it with that of the subsequent citizen of historical Athens. In the view of the latter, the great impersonal authority, called "The Laws," stood out separately, both as guide and sanction, distinct from religious duty or private sympathies: but of this discriminated conception of positive law and positive morality,[132] the germ only can be detected in the Homeric poems. The appropriate Greek word for human laws never occurs. Amidst a very wavering phraseology,[133] we can detect a gradual transition from the primitive idea of a personal goddess Themis, attached to Zeus, first to his sentences or orders called Themistes, and next by a still farther remove to various established customs, which those sentences were believed to sanctify,—the authority of religion and that of custom coalescing into one indivisible obligation.

The family relations, as we might expect, are set forth in our pictures of the legendary world as the grand sources of lasting union and devoted attachment. The paternal authority is highly reverenced: the son who lives to years of maturity, repays by affection to his parents the charge of his maintenance in infancy, which the language notes by a special word; whilst on the other hand, the Erinnys, whose avenging hand is put in motion by the curse of a father or mother, is an object of deep dread.[134]

In regard to marriage, we find the wife occupying a station of great dignity and influence, though it was the practice for the husband to purchase her by valuable presents to her parents,—a practice extensively prevalent among early communities, and treated by Aristotle as an evidence of barbarism. She even seems to live less secluded and to enjoy a wider sphere of action than was allotted to her in historical Greece.[135] Concubines are frequent with the chiefs, and occasionally the jealousy of the wife breaks out in reckless excess against her husband, as may be seen in the tragical history of Phœnix. The continence of Laërtês, from fear of displeasing his wife Antikleia, is especially noticed.[136] A large portion of the romantic interest which Grecian legend inspires is derived from the women: Penelopê, Andromachê, Helen, Klytæmnêstra, Eriphylê, Iokasta, Hekabê, etc., all stand in the foreground of the picture, either from their virtues, their beauty, their crimes, or their sufferings.

Not only brothers, but also cousins, and the more distant blood-relations and clansmen, appear connected together by a strong feeling of attachment, sharing

among them universally the obligation of mutual self-defence and revenge, in the event of injury to any individual of the race. The legitimate brothers divide between them by lot the paternal inheritance,—a bastard brother receiving only a small share; he is, however, commonly very well treated,[137] though the murder of Phokus, by Telamon and Pêleus, constitutes a flagrant exception. The furtive pregnancy of young women, often by a god, is one of the most frequently recurring incidents in the legendary narratives; and the severity with which such a fact, when discovered, is visited by the father, is generally extreme. As an extension of the family connection, we read of larger unions, called the phratry and the tribe, which are respectfully, but not frequently, mentioned.[138]

The generous readiness with which hospitality is afforded to the stranger who asks for it,[139] the facility with which he is allowed to contract the peculiar connection of guest with his host, and the permanence with which that connection, when created by partaking of the same food and exchanging presents, is maintained even through a long period of separation, and even transmitted from father to son—these are among the most captivating features of the heroic society. The Homeric chief welcomes the stranger who comes to ask shelter in his house, first gives him refreshment, and then inquires his name and the purpose of his voyage.[140] Though not inclined to invite strangers to his house, he cannot repel them when they spontaneously enter it craving a lodging.[141] The suppliant is also commonly a stranger, but a stranger under peculiar circumstances; who proclaims his own calamitous and abject condition, and seeks to place himself in a relation to the chief whom he solicits, something like that in which men stand to the gods. Onerous as such special tie may become to him, the chief cannot decline it, if solicited in the proper form: the ceremony of supplication has a binding effect, and the Erinnys punish the hardhearted person who disallows it. A conquered enemy may sometimes throw himself at the feet of his conqueror, and solicit mercy, but he cannot by doing so acquire the character and claims of a suppliant properly so called: the conqueror has free discretion either to kill him, or to spare him and accept a ransom.[142]

There are in the legendary narratives abundant examples of individuals who transgress in particular acts even the holiest of these personal ties, but the savage Cyclops is the only person described as professedly indifferent to them, and careless of that sanction of the gods which in Grecian belief accompanied them all.[143] In fact, the tragical horror which pervades the lineage of Athamas or Kadmus, and which attaches to many of the acts of Hêraklês, of Pêleus and Telamon, of Jasôn and Mêdea, of Atreus and Thyestês, etc., is founded upon a deep feeling and sympathy with those special obligations, which conspicuous individuals, under the temporary stimulus of the maddening Atê, are driven to violate. In such conflict of sentiments, between the obligation generally reverenced and the exceptional deviation in an individual otherwise admired, consists the pathos of the story.

These feelings—of mutual devotion between kinsmen and companions in arms—of generous hospitality to the stranger, and of helping protection to the suppliant,—constitute the bright spots in a dark age. We find them very generally prevalent amongst communities essentially rude and barbarous,—amongst the ancient Germans as described by Tacitus, the Druses in Lebanon,[144] the Arabian tribes in the desert, and even the North American Indians.

They are the instinctive manifestations of human sociality, standing at first alone, and for that reason appearing to possess a greater tutelary force than really belongs to them,—beneficent, indeed, in a high degree, with reference to their own appropriate period, but serving as a very imperfect compensation for the impotence of the magistrate, and for the absence of any all-pervading sympathy or sense of obligation between man and man. We best appreciate their importance when we compare the Homeric society with that of barbarians like the Thracians, who tattooed their bodies, as the mark of a generous lineage,—sold their children for export as slaves,—considered robbery, not merely as one admissible occupation among others, but as the only honorable mode of life; agriculture being held contemptible,—and above all, delighted in the shedding of blood as a luxury. Such were the Thracians in the days of Herodotus and Thucydidês: and the Homeric society forms a mean term between that which these two historians yet saw in Thrace, and that which they witnessed among their own civilized countrymen.[145]

When, however, among the Homeric men we pass beyond the influence of the private ties above enumerated, we find scarcely any other moralizing forces in operation. The acts and adventures commemorated imply a community wherein neither the protection nor the restraints of law are practically felt, and wherein ferocity, rapine, and the aggressive propensities generally, seem restrained by no internal counterbalancing scruples. Homicide, especially, is of frequent occurrence, sometimes by open violence, sometimes by fraud: expatriation for homicide is among the most constantly recurring acts of the Homeric poems: and savage brutalities are often ascribed, even to admired heroes, with apparent indifference. Achilles sacrifices twelve Trojan prisoners on the tomb of Patroklus, while his son Neoptolemus not only slaughters the aged Priam, but also seizes by the leg the child Astyanax (son of the slain Hector) and hurls him from one of the lofty towers of Troy.[146] Moreover, the celebrity of Autolykus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, in the career of wholesale robbery and perjury, and the wealth which it enabled him to acquire, are described with the same unaffected admiration as the wisdom of Nestôr or the strength of Ajax.[147] Achilles, Menelaus, Odysseus, pillage in person, wherever they can find an opportunity, employing both force and stratagem to surmount resistance.[148] The vocation of a pirate is recognized and honorable, so that a host, when he asks his guest what is the purpose of his voyage, enumerates enrichment by indiscriminate maritime plunder as among those projects which may naturally enter into his contemplation.[149] Abduction of cattle, and expeditions for unprovoked ravage as well

as for retaliation, between neighboring tribes, appear ordinary phenomena;[150] and the established inviolability of heralds seems the only evidence of any settled feeling of obligation between one community and another. While the house and property of Odysseus, during his long absence, enjoys no public protection,[151] those unprincipled chiefs, who consume his substance, find sympathy rather than disapprobation among the people of Ithaka. As a general rule, he who cannot protect himself finds no protection from society: his own kinsmen and immediate companions are the only parties to whom he can look with confidence for support. And in this respect, the representation given by Hesiod makes the picture even worse. In his emphatic denunciation of the fifth age, that poet deplores not only the absence of all social justice and sense of obligation among his contemporaries, but also the relaxation of the ties of family and hospitality.[152] There are marks of querulous exaggeration in the poem of the Works and Days; yet the author professes to describe the real state of things around him, and the features of his picture, soften them as we may, will still appear dark and calamitous. It is, however, to be remarked, that he contemplates a state of peace,—thus forming a contrast with the Homeric poems. His copious catalogue of social evils scarcely mentions liability to plunder by a foreign enemy, nor does he compute the chances of predatory aggression as a source of profit.

There are two special veins of estimable sentiment, on which it may be interesting to contrast heroic and historical Greece, and which exhibit the latter as an improvement on the former, not less in the affections than in the intellect.

The law of Athens was peculiarly watchful and provident with respect both to the persons and the property of orphan minors; but the description given in the Iliad of the utter and hopeless destitution of the orphan boy, despoiled of his paternal inheritance, and abandoned by all the friends of his father, whom he urgently supplicates, and who all harshly cast him off, is one of the most pathetic morsels in the whole poem.[153] In reference again to the treatment of the dead body of an enemy we find all the Greek chiefs who come near (not to mention the conduct of Achilles himself) piercing with their spears the corpse of the slain Hectôr, while some of them even pass disgusting taunts upon it. We may add, from the lost epics, the mutilation of the dead bodies of Paris and Deiphobus by the hand of Menelaus.[154] But at the time of the Persian invasion, it was regarded as unworthy of a right-minded Greek to maltreat in any way the dead body of an enemy, even where such a deed might seem to be justified on the plea of retaliation. After the battle of Platæa, a proposition was made to the Spartan king Pausanias, to retaliate upon the dead body of Mardonius the indignities which Xerxês had heaped upon that of Leonidas at Thermopylæ. He indignantly spurned the suggestion, not without a severe rebuke, or rather a half-suppressed menace, towards the proposer: and the feeling of Herodotus himself goes heartily along with him.[155]

The different manner of dealing with homicide presents a third test, perhaps more striking yet, of the change in Grecian feelings and manners during the three

centuries preceding the Persian invasion. That which the murderer in the Homeric times had to dread, was, not public prosecution and punishment, but the personal vengeance of the kinsmen and friends of the deceased, who were stimulated by the keenest impulses of honor and obligation to avenge the deed, and were considered by the public as specially privileged to do so.[156] To escape from this danger, he is obliged to flee the country, unless he can prevail upon the incensed kinsmen to accept of a valuable payment (we must not speak of coined money, in the days of Homer) as satisfaction for their slain comrade. They may, if they please, decline the offer, and persist in their right of revenge; but if they accept, they are bound to leave the offender unmolested, and he accordingly remains at home without farther consequences. The chiefs in agora do not seem to interfere, except to insure payment of the stipulated sum.

Here we recognize once more the characteristic attribute of the Grecian heroic age,—the omnipotence of private force, tempered and guided by family sympathies, and the practical nullity of that collective sovereign afterwards called *The City*,—who in historical Greece becomes the central and paramount source of obligation, but who appears yet only in the background, as a germ of promise for the future. And the manner in which, in the case of homicide, that germ was developed into a powerful reality, presents an interesting field of comparison with other nations.

For the practice, here designated, of leaving the party guilty of homicide to compromise by valuable payment with the relatives of the deceased, and also of allowing to the latter a free choice whether they would accept such compromise or enforce their right of personal revenge,—has been remarked in many rude communities, but is particularly memorable among the early German tribes.[157] Among the many separate Teutonic establishments which rose upon the ruins of the Western Empire of Rome, the right as well as duty of private revenge, for personal injury or insult offered to any member of a family,—and the endeavor to avert its effects by means of a pecuniary composition levied upon the offender, chiefly as satisfaction to the party injured, but partly also as perquisite to the king,—was adopted as the basis of their legislation. This fundamental idea was worked out in elaborate detail as to the valuation of the injury inflicted, wherein one main circumstance was the rank, condition, and power of the sufferer. The object of the legislator was to preserve the society from standing feuds, but at the same time to accord such full satisfaction as would induce the injured person to waive his acknowledged right of personal revenge,—the full luxury of which, as it presented itself to the mind of an Homeric Greek, may be read in more than one passage of the Iliad.[158] The German codes begin by trying to bring about the acceptance of a fixed pecuniary composition as a constant voluntary custom, and proceed ultimately to enforce it as a peremptory necessity: the idea of society is at first altogether subordinate, and its influence passes only by slow degrees from amicable arbitration into imperative control.

The Homeric society, in regard to this capital point in human progression, is on a level with that of the German tribes as described by Tacitus. But the subsequent course of Grecian legislation takes a direction completely different from that of the German codes: the primitive and acknowledged right of private revenge (unless where bought off by pecuniary payment), instead of being developed into practical working, is superseded by more comprehensive views of a public wrong requiring public intervention, or by religious fears respecting the posthumous wrath of the murdered person. In historical Athens, this right of private revenge was discountenanced and put out of sight, even so early as the Drakonian legislation,[159] and at last restricted to a few extreme and special cases; while the murderer came to be considered, first as having sinned against the gods, next as having deeply injured the society, and thus at once as requiring absolution and deserving punishment. On the first of these two grounds, he is interdicted from the agora and from all holy places, as well as from public functions, even while yet untried and simply a suspected person; for if this were not done, the wrath of the gods would manifest itself in bad crops and other national calamities. On the second ground, he is tried before the council of Areiopagus, and if found guilty, is condemned to death, or perhaps to disfranchisement and banishment.[160] The idea of a propitiatory payment to the relatives of the deceased has ceased altogether to be admitted: it is the protection of society which dictates, and the force of society which inflicts, a measure of punishment calculated to deter for the future.

3. The society of legendary Greece includes, besides the chiefs, the general mass of freemen (λαοὶ), among whom stand out by special names certain professional men, such as the carpenter, the smith, the leather-dresser, the leech, the prophet, the bard, and the fisherman.[161] We have no means of appreciating their condition. Though lots of arable land were assigned in special property to individuals, with boundaries both carefully marked and jealously watched,[162] yet the larger proportion of surface was devoted to pasture. Cattle formed both the chief item in the substance of a wealthy man, the chief means of making payments, and the common ground of quarrels,—bread and meat, in large quantities, being the constant food of every one.[163] The estates of the owners were tilled, and their cattle tended, mostly by bought slaves, but to a certain degree also by poor freemen called Thêtes, working for hire and for stated periods. The principal slaves, who were intrusted with the care of large herds of oxen, swine, or goats, were of necessity men worthy of confidence, their duties placing them away from their master's immediate eye.[164] They had other slaves subordinate to them, and appear to have been well-treated: the deep and unshaken attachment of Eumæus the swineherd and Philœtius the neatherd to the family and affairs of the absent Odysseus, is among the most interesting points in the ancient epic. Slavery was a calamity, which in that period of insecurity might befall any one: the chief who conducted a freebooting expedition, if he succeeded, brought back with him a numerous troop of slaves, as many as he could seize,[165]—if he failed, became very likely a slave himself: so that the slave was of-

ten by birth of equal dignity with his master: Eumæus was himself the son of a chief, conveyed away when a child by his nurse, and sold by Phœnician kidnappers to Laërtês. A slave of this character, if he conducted himself well, might often expect to be enfranchised by his master and placed in an independent holding.[166]

On the whole, the slavery of legendary Greece does not present itself as existing under a peculiarly harsh form, especially if we consider that all the classes of society were then very much upon a level in point of taste, sentiment, and instruction.[167] In the absence of legal security or an effective social sanction, it is probable that the condition of a slave under an average master, may have been as good as that of the free Thête. The class of slaves whose lot appears to have been the most pitiable were the females,—more numerous than the males, and performing the principal work in the interior of the house. Not only do they seem to have been more harshly treated than the males, but they were charged with the hardest and most exhausting labor which the establishment of a Greek chief required: they brought in water from the spring, and turned by hand the house-mills, which ground the large quantity of flour consumed in his family.[168] This oppressive task was performed generally by female slaves, in historical as well as legendary Greece.[169] Spinning and weaving was the constant occupation of women, whether free or slave, of every rank and station: all the garments worn both by men and women were fashioned at home, and Helen as well as Penelopê is expert and assiduous at the occupation.[170] The daughters of Keleos at Eleusis go to the well with their basins for water, and Nausikaa, daughter of Alkinous,[171] joins her female slaves in the business of washing her garments in the river. If we are obliged to point out the fierceness and insecurity of an early society, we may at the same time note with pleasure its characteristic simplicity of manners: Rebecca, Rachel, and the daughters of Jethro, in the early Mosaic narrative, as well as the wife of the native Macedonian chief (with whom the Temenid Perdiccas, ancestor of Philip and Alexander, first took service on retiring from Argos), baking her own cakes on the hearth,[172] exhibit a parallel in this respect to the Homeric pictures.

We obtain no particulars respecting either the common freemen generally, or the particular class of them called Thêtes. These latter, engaged for special jobs, or at the harvest and other busy seasons of field labor, seem to have given their labor in exchange for board and clothing: they are mentioned in the same line with the slaves,[173] and were (as has been just observed) probably on the whole little better off. The condition of a poor freeman in those days, without a lot of land of his own, going about from one temporary job to another, and having no powerful family and no social authority to look up to for protection, must have been sufficiently miserable. When Eumæus indulged his expectation of being manumitted by his masters, he thought at the same time that they would give him a wife, a house, and a lot of land near to themselves;[174] without which collateral advantages, simple manumission might perhaps have been no improvement in his condition. To be Thête in the

service of a very poor farmer is selected by Achilles as the maximum of human hardship: such a person could not give to his Thête the same ample food, and good shoes and clothing, as the wealthy chief Eurymachus, while he would exact more severe labor.[175] It was probably among such smaller occupants, who could not advance the price necessary to purchase slaves, and were glad to save the cost of keep when they did not need service, that the Thêtes found employment: though we may conclude that the brave and strong amongst these poor freemen found it preferable to accompany some freebooting chief and to live by the plunder acquired.[176] The exact Hesiod advises his farmer, whose work is chiefly performed by slaves, to employ and maintain the Thête during summer-time, but to dismiss him as soon as the harvest is completely got in, and then to take into his house for the winter a woman "without any child;" who would of course be more useful than the Thête for the indoor occupations of that season.[177]

In a state of society such as that which we have been describing, Grecian commerce was necessarily trifling and restricted. The Homeric poems mark either total ignorance or great vagueness of apprehension respecting all that lies beyond the coasts of Greece and Asia Minor, and the islands between or adjoining them. Libya and Egypt are supposed so distant as to be known only by name and hearsay: indeed, when the city of Kyrene was founded, a century and a half after the first Olympiad, it was difficult to find anywhere a Greek navigator who had ever visited the coast of Libya, or was fit to serve as guide to the colonists.[178] The mention of the Sikels in the Odyssey,[179] leads us to conclude that Korkyra, Italy, and Sicily were not wholly unknown to the poet: among seafaring Greeks, the knowledge of the latter implied the knowledge of the two former,—since the habitual track, even of a well-equipped Athenian trireme during the Peloponnesian war, from Peloponnêsus to Sicily, was by Korkyra and the Gulf of Tarentum. The Phokæans, long afterwards, were the first Greeks who explored either the Adriatic or Tyrrhenian sea.[180] Of the Euxine sea no knowledge is manifested in Homer, who, as a general rule, presents to us the names of distant regions only in connection with romantic or monstrous accompaniments. The Kretans, and still more the Taphians (who are supposed to have occupied the western islands off the coast of Acarnania), are mentioned as skilful mariners, and the Taphian Mentês professes to be conveying iron to Temesa to be there exchanged for copper;[181] but both Taphians and Kretans are more corsairs than traders.[182] The strong sense of the dangers of the sea, expressed by the poet Hesiod, and the imperfect structure of the early Grecian ship, attested by Thucydidês (who points out the more recent date of that improved ship-building which prevailed in his time), concur to demonstrate the then narrow range of nautical enterprise.[183]

Such was the state of the Greeks, as traders, at a time when Babylon combined a crowded and industrious population with extensive commerce, and when the Phœnician merchant-ships visited in one direction the southern coast of Arabia, perhaps even the island of Ceylon,—in another direction, the British islands.

The Phœnician, the kinsman of the ancient Jew, exhibits the type of character belonging to the latter,—with greater enterprise and ingenuity, and less of religious exclusiveness, yet still different from, and even antipathetic to, the character of the Greeks. In the Homeric poems, he appears somewhat like the Jew of the Middle Ages, a crafty trader, turning to profit the violence and rapacity of others,—bringing them ornaments, decorations, the finest and brightest products of the loom, gold, silver, electrum, ivory, tin, etc., in exchange for which he received landed produce, skins, wool, and slaves, the only commodities which even a wealthy Greek chief of those early times had to offer,—prepared at the same time for dishonest gain, in any manner which chance might throw in his way.[184] He is, however, really a trader, not undertaking expeditions with the deliberate purpose of surprise and plunder, and standing distinguished in this respect from the Tyrrhenian, Kretan, or Taphian pirate. Tin, ivory, and electrum, all of which are acknowledged in the Homeric poems, were the fruit of Phœnician trade with the West as well as with the East.[185]

Thucydidês tells us that the Phœnicians and Karians, in very early periods, occupied many of the islands of the Ægean, and we know, from the striking remnant of their mining works which Herodotus himself saw in Thasus, off the coast of Thrace, that they had once extracted gold from the mountains of that island,—at a period indeed very far back, since their occupation must have been abandoned prior to the settlement of the poet Archilochus.[186] Yet few of the islands in the Ægean were rich in such valuable products, nor was it in the usual course of Phœnician proceeding to occupy islands, except where there was an adjoining mainland with which trade could be carried on. The traffic of these active mariners required no permanent settlement, but as occasional visitors they were convenient, in enabling a Greek chief to turn his captives to account,—to get rid of slaves or friendless Thêtes who were troublesome,—and to supply himself with the metals, precious as well as useful.[187] The halls of Alkinous and Menelaus glitter with gold, copper, and electrum; while large stocks of yet unemployed metal—gold, copper, and iron—are stored up in the treasure-chamber of Odysseus and other chiefs.[188] Coined money is unknown to the Homeric age,—the trade carried on being one of barter. In reference also to the metals, it deserves to be remarked that the Homeric descriptions universally suppose copper, and not iron, to be employed for arms, both offensive and defensive. By what process the copper was tempered and hardened, so as to serve the purposes of the warrior, we do not know;[189] but the use of iron for these objects belongs to a later age, though the Works and Days of Hesiod suppose this change to have been already introduced.[190]

The mode of fighting among the Homeric heroes is not less different from the historical times, than the material of which their arms were composed. The Hoplites, or heavy-armed infantry of historical Greece, maintained a close order and well-dressed line, charging the enemy with their spears protended at even distance, and coming thus to close conflict without breaking their rank: there were special troops,

bowmen, slingers, etc. armed with missiles, but the hoplite had no weapon to employ in this manner. The heroes of the Iliad and Odyssey, on the contrary, habitually employ the spear as a missile, which they launch with tremendous force: each of them is mounted in his war-chariot, drawn by two horses, and calculated to contain the warrior and his charioteer; in which latter capacity a friend or comrade will sometimes consent to serve. Advancing in his chariot at full speed, in front of his own soldiers, he hurls his spear against the enemy: sometimes, indeed, he will fight on foot, and hand to hand, but the chariot is usually near to receive him if he chooses, or to insure his retreat. The mass of the Greeks and Trojans, coming forward to the charge, without any regular step or evenly-maintained line, make their attack in the same way by hurling their spears. Each chief wears habitually a long sword and a short dagger, besides his two spears to be launched forward,—the spear being also used, if occasion serves, as a weapon for thrust. Every man is protected by shield, helmet, breastplate, and greaves: but the armor of the chiefs is greatly superior to that of the common men, while they themselves are both stronger and more expert in the use of their weapons. There are a few bowmen, as rare exceptions, but the general equipment and proceeding is as here described.

Such loose array, immortalized as it is in the Iliad, is familiar to every one; and the contrast which it presents, with those inflexible ranks, and that irresistible simultaneous charge which bore down the Persian throng at Platæa and Kunaxa,[191] is such as to illustrate forcibly the general difference between heroic and historical Greece. While in the former, a few splendid figures stand forward, in prominent relief, the remainder being a mere unorganized and ineffective mass,—in the latter, these units have been combined into a system, in which every man, officer and soldier, has his assigned place and duty, and the victory, when gained, is the joint work of all. Preëminent individual prowess is indeed materially abridged, if not wholly excluded, —no man can do more than maintain his station in the line:[192] but on the other hand, the grand purposes, aggressive or defensive, for which alone arms are taken up, become more assured and easy, and long-sighted combinations of the general are rendered for the first time practicable, when he has a disciplined body of men to obey him. In tracing the picture of civil society, we have to remark a similar transition —we pass from Hêraklês, Thêseus, Jasôn, Achilles, to Solon, Pythagoras, and Periklês—from "the shepherd of his people," (to use the phrase in which Homer depicts the good side of the heroic king,) to the legislator who introduces, and the statesman who maintains, a preconcerted system by which willing citizens consent to bind themselves. If commanding individual talent is not always to be found, the whole community is so trained as to be able to maintain its course under inferior leaders; the rights as well as the duties of each citizen being predetermined in the social order, according to principles more or less wisely laid down. The contrast is similar, and the transition equally remarkable, in the civil as in the military picture. In fact, the military organization of the Grecian republics is an element of the greatest importance in respect to the conspicuous part which they have played in human affairs,—

their superiority over other contemporary nations in this respect being hardly less striking than it is in many others, as we shall have occasion to see in a subsequent stage of this history.

Even at the most advanced point of their tactics, the Greeks could effect little against a walled city, whilst the heroic weapons and array were still less available for such an undertaking as a siege. Fortifications are a feature of the age deserving considerable notice. There was a time, we are told, in which the primitive Greek towns or villages derived a precarious security, not from their walls, but merely from sites lofty and difficult of access. They were not built immediately upon the shore, or close upon any convenient landing-place, but at some distance inland, on a rock or elevation which could not be approached without notice or scaled without difficulty. It was thought sufficient at that time to guard against piratical or marauding surprise: but as the state of society became assured,—as the chance of sudden assault comparatively diminished and industry increased,—these uninviting abodes were exchanged for more convenient sites on the plain or declivity beneath; or a portion of the latter was inclosed within larger boundaries and joined on to the original foundation, which thus became the Acropolis of the new town. Thêbes, Athens, Argos, etc., belonged to the latter class of cities; but there were in many parts of Greece deserted sites on hilltops, still retaining, even in historical times, the traces of former habitation, and some of them still bearing the name of the old towns. Among the mountainous parts of Krête, in Ægina and Rhodes, in portions of Mount Ida and Parnassus, similar remnants might be perceived.[193]

Probably, in such primitive hill villages, a continuous circle of wall would hardly be required as an additional means of defence, and would often be rendered very difficult by the rugged nature of the ground. But Thucydidês represents the earliest Greeks—those whom he conceives anterior to the Trojan war—as living thus universally in unfortified villages, chiefly on account of their poverty, rudeness, and thorough carelessness for the morrow. Oppressed, and held apart from each other by perpetual fear, they had not yet contracted the sentiment of fixed abodes: they were unwilling even to plant fruit-trees because of the uncertainty of gathering the produce,—and were always ready to dislodge, because there was nothing to gain by staying, and a bare subsistence might be had any where. He compares them to the mountaineers of Ætolia and of the Ozolian Lokris in his own time, who dwelt in their unfortified hill villages with little or no intercommunication, always armed and fighting, and subsisting on the produce of their cattle and their woods,[194]—clothed in undressed hides, and eating raw meat.

The picture given by Thucydidês, of these very early and unrecorded times, can only be taken as conjectural,—the conjectures, indeed, of a statesman and a philosopher,—generalized too, in part, from the many particular instances of contention and expulsion of chiefs which he found in the old legendary poems. The Homeric poems, however, present to us a different picture. They recognize walled towns, fixed

abodes, strong local attachments, hereditary individual property in land, vineyards planted and carefully cultivated, established temples of the gods, and splendid palaces of the chiefs.[195] The description of Thucydidês belongs to a lower form of society, and bears more analogy to that which the poet himself conceives as antiquated and barbarous,—to the savage Cyclopes, who dwell on the tops of mountains, in hollow caves, without the plough, without vine or fruit culture, without arts or instruments,—or to the primitive settlement of Dardanus son of Zeus, on the higher ground of Ida, while it was reserved for his descendants and successors to found the holy Ilium on the plain.[196] Ilium or Troy represents the perfection of Homeric society. It is a consecrated spot, containing temples of the gods as well as the palace of Priam, and surrounded by walls which are the fabric of the gods; while the antecedent form of ruder society, which the poet briefly glances at, is the parallel of that which the theory of Thucydidês ascribes to his own early semi-barbarous ancestors.

Walled towns serve thus as one of the evidences, that a large part of the population of Greece had, even in the Homeric times, reached a level higher than that of the Ætolians and Lokrians of the days of Thucydidês. The remains of Mykênæ and Tiryns demonstrate the massy and Cyclopian style of architecture employed in those early days: but we may remark that, while modern observers seem inclined to treat the remains of the former as very imposing, and significant of a great princely family, Thucydidês, on the contrary, speaks of it as a small place, and labors to elude the inference, which might be deduced from its insignificant size, in disproof of the grandeur of Agamemnôn.[197] Such fortifications supplied a means of defence incomparably superior to those of attack. Indeed, even in historical Greece, and after the invention of battering engines, no city could be taken except by surprise or blockade, or by ruining the country around, and thus depriving the inhabitants of their means of subsistence. And in the two great sieges of the legendary time, Troy and Thêbes, the former is captured by the stratagem of the wooden horse, while the latter is evacuated by its citizens, under the warning of the gods, after their defeat in the field.

This decided superiority of the means of defence over those of attack, in rude ages, has been one of the grand promotive causes both of the growth of civic life and of the general march of human improvement. It has enabled the progressive portions of mankind not only to maintain their acquisitions against the predatory instincts of the ruder and poorer, and to surmount the difficulties of incipient organization,—but ultimately, when their organization has been matured, both to acquire predominance, and to uphold it until their own disciplined habits have in part passed to their enemies. The important truth here stated is illustrated not less by the history of ancient Greece, than by that of modern Europe during the Middle Ages. The Homeric chief, combining superior rank with superior force, and ready to rob at every convenient opportunity, greatly resembles the feudal baron of the Middle Ages, but circum-

stances absorb him more easily into a city life, and convert the independent potentate into the member of a governing aristocracy.[198] Traffic by sea continued to be beset with danger from pirates, long after it had become tolerably assured by land: the "wet ways" have always been the last resort of lawlessness and violence, and the Ægean, in particular, has in all times suffered more than other waters under this calamity.

Aggressions of the sort here described were of course most numerous in those earliest times when the Ægean was not yet an Hellenic sea, and when many of the Cyclades were occupied, not by Greeks, but by Karians,—perhaps by Phœnicians: the number of Karian sepulchres discovered in the sacred island of Delus seems to attest such occupation as an historical fact.[199] According to the legendary account, espoused both by Herodotus and by Thucydidês, it was the Kretan Minôs who subdued these islands and established his sons as rulers in them; either expelling the Karians, or reducing them to servitude and tribute.[200] Thucydidês presumes that he must of course have put down piracy, in order to enable his tribute to be remitted in safety, like the Athenians during the time of their hegemony.[201] Upon the legendary thalassocraty of Minôs, I have already remarked in another place:[202] it is sufficient here to repeat, that, in the Homeric poems (long subsequent to Minôs in the current chronology), we find piracy both frequent and held in honorable estimation, as Thucydidês himself emphatically tells us,—remarking, moreover, that the vessels of those early days were only half-decked, built and equipped after the piratical fashion, [203] in a manner upon which the nautical men of his time looked back with disdain. Improved and enlarged ship-building, and the trireme, or ship with three banks of oars, common for warlike purposes during the Persian invasion, began only with the growing skill, activity, and importance of the Corinthians, three quarters of a century after the first Olympiad.[204] Corinth, even in the Homeric poems, is distinguished by the epithet of wealthy, which it acquired principally from its remarkable situation on the Isthmus, and from its two harbors of Lechæum and Kenchreæ, the one on the Corinthian, the other on the Sarônic gulf. It thus supplied a convenient connection between Epirus and Italy on the one side, and the Ægean sea on the other, without imposing upon the unskilful and timid navigator of those days the necessity of circumnavigating Peloponnêsus.

The extension of Grecian traffic and shipping is manifested by a comparison of the Homeric with the Hesiodic poems; in respect to knowledge of places and countries,—the latter being probably referable to dates between B. C. 740 and B. C. 640. In Homer, acquaintance is shown (the accuracy of such acquaintance, however, being exaggerated by Strabo and other friendly critics) with continental Greece and its neighboring islands, with Krête and the principal islands of the Ægean, and with Thrace, the Troad, the Hellespont, and Asia Minor between Paphlagonia northward and Lykia southward. The Sikels are mentioned in the Odyssey, and Sikania in the last book of that poem, but nothing is said to evince a knowledge of Italy or the real-

ities of the western world. Libya, Egypt, and Phœnike, are known by name and by vague hearsay, but the Nile is only mentioned as "the river Egypt:" while the Euxine sea is not mentioned at all.[205] In the Hesiodic poems, on the other hand, the Nile, the Ister, the Phasis, and the Eridanus, are all specified by name;[206] Mount Ætna, and the island of Ortygia near to Syracuse, the Tyrrhenians and Ligurians in the west, and the Scythians in the north, were also noticed.[207] Indeed, within forty years after the first Olympiad, the cities of Korkyra and Syracuse were founded from Corinth, —the first of a numerous and powerful series of colonies, destined to impart a new character both to the south of Italy and to Sicily.

In reference to the astronomy and physics of the Homeric Greek, it has already been remarked that he connected together the sensible phenomena which form the subject matter of these sciences by threads of religious and personifying fancy, to which the real analogies among them were made subordinate; and that these analogies did not begin to be studied by themselves, apart from the religious element by which they had been at first overlaid, until the age of Thales,—coinciding as that period did with the increased opportunities for visiting Egypt and the interior of Asia. The Greeks obtained access in both of these countries to an enlarged stock of astronomical observations, to the use of the gnomon, or sundial,[208] and to a more exact determination of the length of the solar year,[209] than that which served as the basis of their various lunar periods. It is pretended that Thales was the first who predicted an eclipse of the sun,—not, indeed, accurately, but with large limits of error as to the time of its occurrence,—and that he also possessed so profound an acquaintance with meteorological phenomena and probabilities, as to be able to foretell an abundant crop of olives for the coming year, and to realize a large sum of money by an olive speculation.[210]

From Thales downward we trace a succession of astronomical and physical theories, more or less successful, into which I do not intend here to enter: it is sufficient at present to contrast the father of the Ionic philosophy with the times preceding him, and to mark the first commencement of scientific prediction among the Greeks, however imperfect at the outset, as distinguished from the inspired dicta of prophets or oracles, and from those special signs of the purposes of the gods, which formed the habitual reliance of the Homeric man.[211] We shall see these two modes of anticipating the future,—one based upon the philosophical, the other upon the religious appreciation of nature,—running simultaneously on throughout Grecian history, and sharing between them in unequal portions the empire of the Greek mind; the former acquiring both greater predominance and wider application among the intellectual men, and partially restricting, but never abolishing, the spontaneous employment of the latter among the vulgar.

Neither coined money, nor the art of writing,[212] nor painting, nor sculpture, nor imaginative architecture, belong to the Homeric and Hesiodic times. Such rudiments of arts, destined ultimately to acquire so great a development in Greece, as may

have existed in these early days, served only as a sort of nucleus to the fancy of the poet, to shape out for himself the fabulous creations ascribed to Hephæstus or Dædalus. No statues of the gods, not even of wood, are mentioned in the Homeric poems. All the many varieties, in Grecian music, poetry, and dancing,—the former chiefly borrowed from Lydia and Phrygia,—date from a period considerably later than the first Olympiad: Terpander, the earliest musician whose date is assigned, and the inventor of the harp with seven strings instead of that with four strings, does not come until the 26th Olympiad, or 676 B. C.: the poet Archilochus is nearly of the same date. The iambic and elegiac metres—the first deviations from the primitive epic strain and subject—do not reach up to the year 700 B. C.

It is this epic poetry which forms at once both the undoubted prerogative and the solitary jewel of the earliest era of Greece. Of the many epic poems which existed in Greece during the eight century before the Christian era, none have been preserved except the Iliad and Odyssey: the Æthiopis of Arktinus, the Ilias Minor of Lesches, the Cyprian Verses, the Capture of Œchalia, the Returns of the Heroes from Troy, the Thêbaïs and the Epigoni,—several of them passing in antiquity under the name of Homer,—have all been lost. But the two which remain are quite sufficient to demonstrate in the primitive Greeks, a mental organization unparalleled in any other people, and powers of invention and expression which prepared, as well as foreboded, the future eminence of the nation in all the various departments to which thought and language can be applied. Great as the power of thought afterwards became among the Greeks, their power of expression was still greater: in the former, other nations have built upon their foundations and surpassed them,—in the latter, they still remained unrivalled. It is not too much to say that this flexible, emphatic, and transparent character of the language as an instrument of communication,—its perfect aptitude for narrative and discussion, as well as for stirring all the veins of human emotion without ever forfeiting that character of simplicity which adapts it to all men and all times,—may be traced mainly to the existence and the wide-spread influence of the Iliad and Odyssey. To us, these compositions are interesting as beautiful poems, depicting life and manners, and unfolding certain types of character with the utmost vivacity and artlessness: to their original hearer, they possessed all these sources of attraction, together with others more powerful still, to which we are now strangers. Upon him, they bore with the full weight and solemnity of history and religion combined, while the charm of the poetry was only secondary and instrumental. The poet was then the teacher and preacher of the community, not simply the amuser of their leisure hours: they looked to him for revelations of the unknown past and for expositions of the attributes and dispensations of the gods, just as they consulted the prophet for his privileged insight into the future. The ancient epic comprised many different poets and poetical compositions, which fulfilled this purpose with more or less completeness: but it is the exclusive prerogative of the Iliad and Odyssey, that, after the minds of men had ceased to be in full harmony with their original design, they yet retained their empire by the mere force of secondary excel-

lences: while the remaining epics—though serving as food for the curious, and as storehouses for logographers, tragedians, and artists—never seem to have acquired very wide popularity even among intellectual Greeks.

I shall, in the succeeding chapter, give some account of the epic cycle, of its relation to the Homeric poems, and of the general evidences respecting the latter, both as to antiquity and authorship.

CHAPTER XXI.

GRECIAN EPIC.—HOMERIC POEMS.

At the head of the once abundant epical compositions of Greece, most of them unfortunately lost, stand the Iliad and Odyssey, with the immortal name of Homer attached to each of them, embracing separate portions of the comprehensive legend of Troy. They form the type of what may be called the heroic epic of the Greeks, as distinguished from the genealogical, in which latter species some of the Hesiodic poems —the Catalogue of Women, the Eoiai, and the Naupaktia—stood conspicuous. Poems of the Homeric character (if so it may be called, though the expression is very indefinite,)—being confined to one of the great events, or great personages of Grecian legendary antiquity, and comprising a limited number of characters, all contemporaneous, made some approach, more or less successful, to a certain poetical unity; while the Hesiodic poems, tamer in their spirit, and unconfined both as to time and as to persons, strung together distinct events without any obvious view to concentration of interest,—without legitimate beginning or end.[213] Between these two extremes there were many gradations: biographical poems, such as the Herakleia, or Theseïs, recounting all the principal exploits performed by one single hero, present a character intermediate between the two, but bordering more closely on the Hesiodic. Even the hymns to the gods, which pass under the name of Homer, are epical fragments, narrating particular exploits or adventures of the god commemorated.

Both the didactic and the mystico-religious poetry of Greece began in Hexameter verse,—the characteristic and consecrated measure of the epic:[214] but they belong to a different species, and burst out from a different vein in the Grecian mind. It seems to have been the more common belief among the historical Greeks, that such mystic effusions were more ancient than their narrative poems, and that Orpheus, Musæus, Linus, Olên, Pamphus, and even Hesiod, etc., etc., the reputed composers of the former, were of earlier date than Homer. But there is no evidence to sustain this opinion, and the presumptions are all against it. Those compositions, which in the sixth century before the Christian era passed under the name of Orpheus and Musæus, seem to have been unquestionably post-Homeric, nor can we even admit the modified conclusion of Hermann, Ulrici, and others, that the mystic poetry as a genus (putting aside the particular compositions falsely ascribed to Orpheus and others) preceded in order of time the narrative.[215]

Besides the Iliad and Odyssey, we make out the titles of about thirty lost epic poems, sometimes with a brief hint of their contents.

Concerning the legend of Troy there were five: the Cyprian Verses, the Æthiopis, and the Capture of Troy, both ascribed to Arktinus; the lesser Iliad, ascribed to

Leschês; the Returns (of the Heroes from Troy), to which the name of Hagias of Trœzên is attached; and the Telegonia, by Eugammôn, a continuation of the Odyssey. Two poems,—the Thebaïs and the Epigoni (perhaps two parts of one and the same poem) were devoted to the legend of Thebês,—the two sieges of that city by the Argeians. Another poem, called Œdipodia, had for its subject the tragical destiny of Œdipus and his family; and perhaps that which is cited as Eurôpia, or verses on Eurôpa, may have comprehended the tale of her brother Kadmus, the mythical founder of Thebês.[216]

The exploits of Hêraklês were celebrated in two compositions, each called Hêrakleia, by Kinæthôn and Pisander,—probably also in many others, of which the memory has not been preserved. The capture of Œchalia, by Hêraklês, formed the subject of a separate epic. Two other poems, the Ægimius and the Minyas, are supposed to have been founded on other achievements of this hero,—the effective aid which he lent to the Dorian king Ægimius against the Lapithæ, his descent to the under-world for the purpose of rescuing the imprisoned Thêseus, and his conquest of the city of the Minyæ, the powerful Orchomenus.[217]

Other epic poems—the Phorônis, the Danaïs, the Alkmæônis, the Atthis, the Amazonia—we know only by name, and can just guess obscurely at their contents so far as the name indicates.[218] The Titanomachia, the Gigantomachia, and the Corinthiaca, three compositions all ascribed to Eumêlus, afford by means of their titles an idea somewhat clearer of the matter which they comprised. The Theogony ascribed to Hesiod still exists, though partially corrupt and mutilated: but there seem to have been other poems, now lost, of the like import and title.

Of the poems composed in the Hesiodic style, diffusive and full of genealogical detail, the principal were, the Catalogue of Women and the Great Eoiai; the latter of which, indeed, seems to have been a continuation of the former. A large number of the celebrated women of heroic Greece were commemorated in these poems, one after the other, without any other than an arbitrary bond of connection. The Marriage of Kêyx,—the Melampodia,—and a string of fables called Astronomia, are farther ascribed to Hesiod: and the poem above mentioned, called Ægimius, is also sometimes connected with his name, sometimes with that of Kerkops. The Naupaktian Verses (so called, probably, from the birthplace of their author), and the genealogies of Kinæthôn and Asius, were compositions of the same rambling character, as far as we can judge from the scanty fragments remaining.[219] The Orchomenian epic poet Chersias, of whom two lines only are preserved to us by Pausanias, may reasonably be referred to the same category.[220]

The oldest of the epic poets, to whom any date, carrying with it the semblance of authority, is assigned, is Arktinus of Milêtus, who is placed by Eusebius in the first Olympiad, and by Suidas in the ninth. Eugammôn, the author of the Telegonia, and the latest of the catalogue, is placed in the fifty-third Olympiad, B. C. 566. Between

these two we find Asius and Leschês, about the thirtieth Olympiad,—a time when the vein of the ancient epic was drying up, and when other forms of poetry—elegiac, iambic, lyric, and choric—had either already arisen, or were on the point of arising, to compete with it.[221]

It has already been stated in a former chapter, that in the early commencements of prose-writing, Hekatæus, Pherekydês, and other logographers, made it their business to extract from the ancient fables something like a continuous narrative, chronologically arranged. It was upon a principle somewhat analogous that the Alexandrine literati, about the second century before the Christian era,[222] arranged the multitude of old epic poets into a series founded on the supposed order of time in the events narrated,—beginning with the intermarriage of Uranus and Gæa, and the Theogony,—and concluding with the death of Odysseus by the hands of his son Telegonus. This collection passed by the name of the Epic Cycle, and the poets, whose compositions were embodied in it, were termed Cyclic poets. Doubtless, the epical treasures of the Alexandrine library were larger than had ever before been brought together and submitted to men both of learning and leisure: so that multiplication of such compositions in the same museum rendered it advisable to establish some fixed order of perusal, and to copy them in one corrected and uniform edition. [223] It pleased the critics to determine precedence, neither by antiquity nor by excellence of the compositions themselves, but by the supposed sequence of narrative, so that the whole taken together constituted a readable aggregate of epical antiquity.

Much obscurity[224] exists, and many different opinions have been expressed, respecting this Epic Cycle: I view it, not as an exclusive canon, but simply as an all-comprehensive classification, with a new edition founded thereupon. It would include all the epic poems in the library older than the Telegonia, and apt for continuous narrative; it would exclude only two classes,—first, the recent epic poets, such as Panyasis and Antimachus; next, the genealogical and desultory poems, such as the Catalogue of Women, the Eoiai, and others, which could not be made to fit in to any chronological sequence of events.[225] Both the Iliad and the Odyssey were comprised in the Cycle, so that the denomination of cyclic poet did not originally or designedly carry with it any association of contempt. But as the great and capital poems were chiefly spoken of by themselves, or by the title of their own separate authors, so the general name of *poets of the Cycle* came gradually to be applied only to the worst, and thus to imply vulgarity or common-place; the more so, as many of the inferior compositions included in the collection seem to have been anonymous, and their authors in consequence describable only under some such common designation as that of the cyclic poets. It is in this manner that we are to explain the disparaging sentiment connected by Horace and others with the idea of a cyclic writer, though no such sentiment was implied in the original meaning of the Epic Cycle.

The poems of the Cycle were thus mentioned in contrast and antithesis with Homer,[226] though originally the Iliad and Odyssey had both been included among

them: and this alteration of the meaning of the word has given birth to a mistake as to the primary purpose of the classification, as if it had been designed especially to part off the inferior epic productions from Homer. But while some critics are disposed to distinguish the cyclic poets too pointedly from Homer, I conceive that Welcker goes too much into the other extreme, and identifies the Cycle too closely with that poet. He construes it as a classification deliberately framed to comprise all the various productions of the Homeric epic, with its unity of action and comparative paucity, both of persons and adventures,—as opposed to the Hesiodic epic, crowded with separate persons and pedigrees, and destitute of central action as well as of closing catastrophe. This opinion does, indeed, coincide to a great degree with the fact, inasmuch as few of the Hesiodic epics appear to have been included in the Cycle: to say that *none* were included, would be too much, for we cannot venture to set aside either the Theogony or the Ægimius; but we may account for their absence perfectly well without supposing any design to exclude them, for it is obvious that their rambling character (like that of the Metamorphoses of Ovid) forbade the possibility of interweaving them in any continuous series. Continuity in the series of narrated events, coupled with a certain degree of antiquity in the poems, being the principle on which the arrangement called the Epic Cycle was based, the Hesiodic poems generally were excluded, not from any preconceived intention, but because they could not be brought into harmony with such orderly reading.

What were the particular poems which it comprised, we cannot now determine with exactness. Welcker arranges them as follows: Titanomachia, Danaïs, Amazonia (or Atthis), Œdipodia, Thebaïs (or Expedition of Amphiaräus), Epigoni (or Alkmæônis), Minyas (or Phokaïs), Capture of Œchalia, Cyprian Verses, Iliad, Æthiopis, Lesser Iliad, Iliupersis or the Taking of Troy, Returns of the Heroes, Odyssey, and Telegonia. Wuellner, Lange, and Mr. Fynes Clinton enlarge the list of cyclic poems still farther. [227] But all such reconstructions of the Cycle are conjectural and destitute of authority: the only poems which we can affirm on positive grounds to have been comprehended in it, are, first, the series respecting the heroes of Troy, from the Cypria to the Telegonia, of which Proclus has preserved the arguments, and which includes the Iliad and Odyssey,—next, the old Thebaïs, which is expressly termed cyclic,[228] in order to distinguish it from the poem of the same name composed by Antimachus. In regard to other particular compositions, we have no evidence to guide us, either for admission or exclusion, except our general views as to the scheme upon which the Cycle was framed. If my idea of that scheme be correct, the Alexandrine critics arranged therein *all* their old epical treasures, down to the Telegonia,—the good as well as the bad; gold, silver, and iron,—provided only they could be pieced in with the narrative series. But I cannot venture to include, as Mr. Clinton does, the Eurôpia, the Phorônis, and other poems of which we know only the names, because it is uncertain whether their contents were such as to fulfil their primary condition: nor can I concur with him in thinking that, where there were two or more poems of the same title and subject, one of them must necessarily have been adopted into the Cycle to

the exclusion of the others. There may have been two Theogonies, or two Herakleias, both comprehended in the Cycle; the purpose being (as I before remarked), not to sift the better from the worse, but to determine some fixed order, convenient for reading and reference, amidst a multiplicity of scattered compositions, as the basis of a new, entire, and corrected edition.

Whatever may have been the principle on which the cyclic poems were originally strung together, they are all now lost, except those two unrivalled diamonds, whose brightness, dimming all the rest, has alone sufficed to confer imperishable glory even upon the earliest phase of Grecian life. It has been the natural privilege of the Iliad and Odyssey, from the rise of Grecian philology down to the present day, to provoke an intense curiosity, which, even in the historical and literary days of Greece, there were no assured facts to satisfy. These compositions are the monuments of an age essentially religious and poetical, but essentially also unphilosophical, unreflecting, and unrecording: the nature of the case forbids our having any authentic transmitted knowledge respecting such a period; and the lesson must be learned, hard and painful though it be, that no imaginable reach of critical acumen will of itself enable us to discriminate fancy from reality, in the absence of a tolerable stock of evidence. After the numberless comments and acrimonious controversies[229] to which the Homeric poems have given rise, it can hardly be said that any of the points originally doubtful have obtained a solution such as to command universal acquiescence. To glance at all these controversies, however briefly, would far transcend the limits of the present work; but the most abridged Grecian history would be incomplete without some inquiry respecting *the Poet* (so the Greek critics in their veneration denominated Homer), and the productions which pass now, or have heretofore passed, under his name.

Who or what was Homer? What date is to be assigned to him? What were his compositions?

A person, putting these questions to Greeks of different towns and ages, would have obtained answers widely discrepant and contradictory. Since the invaluable labors of Aristarchus and the other Alexandrine critics on the text of the Iliad and Odyssey, it has, indeed, been customary to regard those two (putting aside the Hymns, and a few other minor poems) as being the only genuine Homeric compositions: and the literary men called Chorizontes, or the Separators, at the head of whom were Xenôn and Hellanikus, endeavored still farther to reduce the number by disconnecting the Iliad and Odyssey, and pointing out that both could not be the work of the same author. Throughout the whole course of Grecian antiquity, the Iliad and the Odyssey, and the Hymns, have been received as Homeric: but if we go back to the time of Herodotus, or still earlier, we find that several other epics also were ascribed to Homer,—and there were not wanting[230] critics, earlier than the Alexandrine age, who regarded the whole Epic Cycle, together with the satirical poem called Margitês, the Batrachomyomachia, and other smaller pieces, as Homeric

works. The cyclic Thebaïs and the Epigoni (whether they be two separate poems, or the latter a second part of the former) were in early days currently ascribed to Homer: the same was the case with the Cyprian Verses: some even attributed to him several other poems,[231] the Capture of Œchalia, the Lesser Iliad, the Phokaïs, and the Amazonia. The title of the poem called Thebaïs to be styled Homeric, depends upon evidence more ancient than any which can be produced to authenticate the Iliad and Odyssey: for Kallinus, the ancient elegiac poet (B. C. 640), mentioned Homer as the author of it,—and his opinion was shared by many other competent judges. [232] From the remarkable description given by Herodotus, of the expulsion of the rhapsodes from Sikyôn, by the despot Kleisthenês, in the time of Solôn (about B. C. 580), we may form a probable judgment that the Thebaïs and the Epigoni were then rhapsodized at Sikyôn as Homeric productions.[233] And it is clear from the language of Herodotus, that in his time the general opinion ascribed to Homer both the Cyprian Verses and the Epigoni, though he himself dissents.[234] In spite of such dissent, however, that historian must have conceived the names of Homer and Hesiod to be nearly coextensive with the whole of the ancient epic; otherwise, he would hardly have delivered his memorable judgment, that they two were the framers of Grecian theogony.

The many different cities which laid claim to the birth of Homer (seven is rather below the truth, and Smyrna and Chios are the most prominent among them,) is well known, and most of them had legends to tell respecting his romantic parentage, his alleged blindness, and his life of an itinerant bard, acquainted with poverty and sorrow.[235] The discrepancies of statement respecting the date of his reputed existence are no less worthy of remark; for out of the eight different epochs assigned to him, the oldest differs from the most recent by a period of four hundred and sixty years.

Thus conflicting would have been the answers returned in different portions of the Grecian world to any questions respecting the person of Homer. But there were a poetical gens (fraternity or guild) in the Ionic island of Chios, who, if the question had been put to them, would have answered in another manner. To them, Homer was not a mere antecedent man, of kindred nature with themselves, but a divine or semi-divine eponymus and progenitor, whom they worshipped in their gentile sacrifices, and in whose ascendent name and glory the individuality of every member of the gens was merged. The compositions of each separate Homêrid, or the combined efforts of many of them in conjunction, were the works of Homer: the name of the individual bard perishes and his authorship is forgotten, but the common gentile father lives and grows in renown, from generation to generation, by the genius of his self-renewing sons.

Such was the conception entertained of Homer by the poetical gens called Homêridæ, or Homêrids; and in the general obscurity of the whole case, I lean towards it as the most plausible conception. Homer is not only the reputed author of the various compositions emanating from the gentile members, but also the recipient

of the many different legends and of the divine genealogy, which it pleases their imagination to confer upon him. Such manufacture of fictitious personality, and such perfect incorporation of the entities of religion and fancy with the real world, is a process familiar, and even habitual, in the retrospective vision of the Greeks.[236]

It is to be remarked, that the poetical gens here brought to view, the Homêrids, are of indisputable authenticity. Their existence and their considerations were maintained down to the historical times in the island of Chios.[237] If the Homêrids were still conspicuous, even in the days of Akusilaus, Pindar, Hellanikus, and Plato, when their productive invention had ceased, and when they had become only guardians and distributors, in common with others, of the treasures bequeathed by their predecessors,—far more exalted must their position have been three centuries before, while they were still the inspired creators of epic novelty, and when the absence of writing assured to them the undisputed monopoly of their own compositions.[238]

Homer, then, is no individual man, but the divine or heroic father (the ideas of worship and ancestry coalescing, as they constantly did in the Grecian mind) of the gentile Homêrids, and he is the author of the Thebaïs, the Epigoni, the Cyprian Verses, the Procems, or Hymns, and other poems, in the same sense in which he is the author of the Iliad and Odyssey,—assuming that these various compositions emanate, as perhaps they may, from different individuals numbered among the Homêrids. But this disallowance of the historical personality of Homer is quite distinct from the question, with which it has been often confounded, whether the Iliad and Odyssey are originally entire poems, and whether by one author or otherwise. To us, the name of Homer means these two poems, and little else: we desire to know as much as can be learned respecting their date, their original composition, their preservation, and their mode of communication to the public. All these questions are more or less complicated one with the other.

Concerning the date of the poems, we have no other information except the various affirmations respecting the age of Homer, which differ among themselves (as I have before observed) by an interval of four hundred and sixty years, and which for the most part determine the date of Homer by reference to some other event, itself fabulous and unauthenticated,—such as the Trojan war, the Return of the Hêrakleids, or the Ionic migration. Kratês placed Homer earlier than the Return of the Hêrakleids, and less than eighty years after the Trojan war: Eratosthenês put him one hundred years after the Trojan war: Aristotle, Aristarchus, and Castor made his birth contemporary with the Ionic migration, while Apollodôrus brings him down to one hundred years after that event, or two hundred and forty years after the taking of Troy. Thucydidês assigns to him a date much subsequent to the Trojan war.[239] On the other hand, Theopompus and Euphoriôn refer his age to the far more recent period of the Lydian king, Gyges, (Ol. 18-23, B. C. 708-688,) and put him five hundred years after the Trojan epoch.[240] What were the grounds of these various conjectures, we do not know; though in the statements of Kratês and Eratosthenês, we

may pretty well divine. But the oldest dictum preserved to us respecting the date of Homer,—meaning thereby the date of the Iliad and Odyssey,—appears to me at the same time the most credible, and the most consistent with the general history of the ancient epic. Herodotus places Homer four hundred years before himself; taking his departure, not from any fabulous event, but from a point of real and authentic time. [241] Four centuries anterior to Herodotus would be a period commencing with 880 B. C. so that the composition of the Homeric poems would thus fall in a space between 850 and 800 B. C. We may gather from the language of Herodotus that this was his own judgment, opposed to a current opinion, which assigned the poet to an earlier epoch.

To place the Iliad and Odyssey at some periods between 850 B. C. and 776 B. C., appears to me more probable than any other date, anterior or posterior,—more probable than the latter, because we are justified in believing these two poems to be older than Arktinus, who comes shortly after the first Olympiad;—more probable than the former, because, the farther we push the poems back, the more do we enhance the wonder of their preservation, already sufficiently great, down from such an age and society to the historical times.

The mode in which these poems, and indeed all poems, epic as well as lyric, down to the age (probably) of Peisistratus, were circulated and brought to bear upon the public, deserves particular attention. They were not read by individuals alone and apart, but sung or recited at festivals or to assembled companies. This seems to be one of the few undisputed facts with regard to the great poet: for even those who maintain that the Iliad and Odyssey were preserved by means of writing, seldom contend that they were read.

In appreciating the effect of the poems, we must always take account of this great difference between early Greece and our own times,—between the congregation mustered at a solemn festival, stimulated by community of sympathy, listening to a measured and musical recital from the lips of trained bards or rhapsodes, whose matter was supposed to have been inspired by the Muse,—and the solitary reader, with a manuscript before him; such manuscript being, down to a very late period in Greek literature, indifferently written, without division into parts, and without marks of punctuation. As in the case of dramatic performances, in all ages, so in that of the early Grecian epic,—a very large proportion of its impressive effect was derived from the talent of the reciter and the force of the general accompaniments, and would have disappeared altogether in solitary reading. Originally, the bard sung his own epical narrative, commencing with a proœmium or hymn to one of the gods:[242] his profession was separate and special, like that of the carpenter, the leech, or the prophet: his manner and enunciation must have required particular training no less than his imaginative faculty. His character presents itself in the Odyssey as one highly esteemed; and in the Iliad, even Achilles does not disdain to touch the lyre with his own hands, and to sing heroic deeds.[243] Not only did the Iliad and

Odyssey, and the poems embodied in the Epic Cycle, produce all their impression and gain all their renown by this process of oral delivery, but even the lyric and choric poets who succeeded them were known and felt in the same way by the general public, even after the full establishment of habits of reading among lettered men. While in the case of the epic, the recitation or singing had been extremely simple, and the measure comparatively little diversified, with no other accompaniment than that of the four-stringed harp,—all the variations superinduced upon the original hexameter, beginning with the pentameter and iambus, and proceeding step by step to the complicated strophês of Pindar and the tragic writers, still left the general effect of the poetry greatly dependent upon voice and accompaniments, and pointedly distinguished from mere solitary reading of the words. And in the dramatic poetry, the last in order of time, the declamation and gesture of the speaking actor alternated with the song and dance of the chorus, and with the instruments of musicians, the whole being set off by imposing visible decorations. Now both dramatic effect and song are familiar in modern times, so that every man knows the difference between reading the words and hearing them under the appropriate circumstances: but poetry, as such, is, and has now long been, so exclusively enjoyed by reading, that it requires an especial memento to bring us back to the time when the Iliad and Odyssey were addressed only to the ear and feelings of a promiscuous and sympathizing multitude. Readers there were none, at least until the century preceding Solôn and Peisistratus: from that time forward, they gradually increased both in number and influence; though doubtless small, even in the most literary period of Greece, as compared with modern European society. So far as the production of beautiful epic poetry was concerned, however, the select body of instructed readers, furnished a less potent stimulus than the unlettered and listening crowd of the earlier periods. The poems of Chœrilus and Antimachus, towards the close of the Peloponnesian war, though admired by erudite men, never acquired popularity; and the emperor Hadrian failed in his attempt to bring the latter poet into fashion at the expense of Homer.[244]

It will be seen by what has been here stated, that that class of men, who formed the medium of communication between the verse and the ear, were of the highest importance in the ancient world, and especially in the earlier periods of its career,—the bards and rhapsodes for the epic, the singers for the lyric, the actors and singers jointly with the dancers for the chorus and drama. The lyric and dramatic poets taught with their own lips the delivery of their compositions, and so prominently did this business of teaching present itself to the view of the public, that the name Didaskalia, by which the dramatic exhibition was commonly designated, derived from thence its origin.

Among the number of rhapsodes who frequented the festivals at a time when Grecian cities were multiplied and easy of access, for the recitation of the ancient epic, there must have been of course great differences of excellence; but that the

more considerable individuals of the class were elaborately trained and highly accomplished in the exercise of their profession, we may assume as certain. But it happens that Socrates, with his two pupils Plato and Xenophon, speak contemptuously of their merits; and many persons have been disposed, somewhat too readily, to admit this sentence of condemnation as conclusive, without taking account of the point of view from which it was delivered.[245] These philosophers considered Homer and other poets with a view to instruction, ethical doctrine, and virtuous practice: they analyzed the characters whom the poet described, sifted the value of the lessons conveyed, and often struggled to discover a hidden meaning, where they disapproved that which was apparent. When they found a man like the rhapsode, who professed to impress the Homeric narrative upon an audience, and yet either never meddled at all, or meddled unsuccessfully, with the business of exposition, they treated him with contempt; indeed, Socrates depreciates the poets themselves, much upon the same principle, as dealing with matters of which they could render no rational account.[246] It was also the habit of Plato and Xenophôn to disparage generally professional exertion of talent for the purpose of gaining a livelihood, contrasting it often in an indelicate manner with the gratuitous teaching and ostentatious poverty of their master. But we are not warranted in judging the rhapsodes by such a standard. Though they were not philosophers or moralists, it was their province—and it had been so, long before the philosophical point of view was opened—to bring their poet home to the bosoms and emotions of an assembled crowd, and to penetrate themselves with his meaning so far as was suitable for that purpose, adapting to it the appropriate graces of action and intonation. In this their genuine task they were valuable members of the Grecian community, and seem to have possessed all the qualities necessary for success.

These rhapsodes, the successors of the primitive aœdi, or bards, seem to have been distinguished from them by the discontinuance of all musical accompaniment. Originally, the bard sung, enlivening the song with occasional touches of the simple four-stringed harp: his successor, the rhapsode, recited, holding in his hand nothing but a branch of laurel and depending for effect upon voice and manner,—a species of musical and rhythmical declamation,[247] which gradually increased in vehement emphasis and gesticulation until it approached to that of the dramatic actor. At what time this change took place, or whether the two different modes of enunciating the ancient epic may for a certain period have gone on simultaneously, we have no means of determining. Hesiod receives from the Muse a branch of laurel, as a token of his ordination into their service, which marks him for a rhapsode; while the ancient bard with his harp is still recognized in the Homeric Hymn to the Delian Apollo, as efficient and popular at the Panionic festivals in the island of Delos.[248] Perhaps the improvements made in the harp, to which three strings, in addition to the original four, were attached by Terpander (B. C. 660), and the growing complication of instrumental music generally, may have contributed to discredit the primitive accompaniment, and thus to promote the practice of recital: the story, that Terpander himself

composed music, not only for hexameter poems of his own, but also for those of Homer, seems to indicate that the music which preceded him was ceasing to find favor.[249] By whatever steps the change from the bard to the rhapsode took place, certain it is that before the time of Solôn, the latter was the recognized and exclusive organ of the old Epic; sometimes in short fragments before private companies, by single rhapsodes,—sometimes several rhapsodes in continuous succession at a public festival.

Respecting the mode in which the Homeric poems were preserved, during the two centuries (or as some think, longer interval) between their original composition and the period shortly preceding Solôn,—and respecting their original composition and subsequent changes,—there are wide differences of opinion among able critics. Were they preserved with or without being written? Was the Iliad originally composed as one poem, and the Odyssey in like manner, or is each of them an aggregation of parts originally self-existent and unconnected? Was the authorship of each poem single-headed or many-headed?

Either tacitly or explicitly, these questions have been generally coupled together and discussed with reference to each other, by inquiries into the Homeric poems; though Mr. Payne Knight's Prolegomena have the merit of keeping them distinct. Half a century ago, the acute and valuable Prolegomena of F. A. Wolf, turning to account the Venetian Scholia which had then been recently published, first opened philosophical discussion as to the history of the Homeric text. A considerable part of that dissertation (though by no means the whole) is employed in vindicating the position, previously announced by Bentley, among others, that the separate constituent portions of the Iliad and Odyssey had not been cemented together into any compact body and unchangeable order until the days of Peisistratus, in the sixth century before Christ. As a step towards that conclusion, Wolf maintained that no written copies of either poem could be shown to have existed during the earlier times to which their composition is referred,—and that without writing, neither the perfect symmetry of so complicated a work could have been originally conceived by any poet, nor, if realized by him, transmitted with assurance to posterity. The absence of easy and convenient writing, such as must be indispensably supposed for long manuscripts, among the early Greeks, was thus one of the points in Wolf's case against the primitive integrity of the Iliad and Odyssey. By Nitzsch and other leading opponents of Wolf, the connection of the one with the other seems to have been accepted as he originally put it; and it has been considered incumbent on those, who defended the ancient aggregate character of the Iliad and Odyssey, to maintain that they were written poems from the beginning.

To me it appears that the architectonic functions ascribed by Wolf to Peisistratus and his associates, in reference to the Homeric poems, are nowise admissible. But much would undoubtedly be gained towards that view of the question, if it could be shown that, in order to controvert it, we were driven to the necessity of admitting

long written poems in the ninth century before the Christian era. Few things, in my opinion, can be more improbable: and Mr. Payne Knight, opposed as he is to the Wolfian hypothesis, admits this no less than Wolf himself.[250] The traces of writing in Greece, even in the seventh century before the Christian era, are exceedingly trifling. We have no remaining inscription earlier than the 40th Olympiad, and the early inscriptions are rude and unskilfully executed: nor can we even assure ourselves whether Archilochus, Simonidês of Amorgus, Kallinus, Tyrtæus, Xanthus, and the other early elegiac and lyric poets, committed their compositions to writing, or at what time the practice of doing so became familiar. The first positive ground, which authorizes us to presume the existence of a manuscript of Homer, is in the famous ordinance of Solôn with regard to the rhapsodes at the Panathenæa; but for what length of time, previously, manuscripts had existed, we are unable to say.

Those who maintain the Homeric poems to have been written from the beginning, rest their case, not upon positive proofs,—nor yet upon the existing habits of society with regard to poetry, for they admit generally that the Iliad and Odyssey were not read, but recited and heard,—but upon the supposed necessity that there must have been manuscripts,[251] to insure the preservation of the poems,—the unassisted memory of reciters being neither sufficient nor trustworthy. But here we only escape a smaller difficulty by running into a greater; for the existence of trained bards, gifted with extraordinary memory, is far less astonishing than that of long manuscripts in an age essentially non-reading and non-writing, and when even suitable instruments and materials for the process are not obvious. Moreover, there is a strong positive reason for believing that the bard was under no necessity for refreshing his memory by consulting a manuscript. For if such had been the fact, blindness would have been a disqualification for the profession, which we know that it was not; as well from the example of Demodokus in the Odyssey, as from that of the blind bard of Chios, in the hymn to the Delian Apollo, whom Thucydidês, as well as the general tenor of Grecian legend, identifies with Homer himself.[252] The author of that Hymn, be he who he may, could never have described a blind man as attaining the utmost perfection in his art, if he had been conscious that the memory of the bard was only maintained by constant reference to the manuscript in his chest.

Nor will it be found, after all, that the effort of memory required, either from bards or rhapsodes, even for the longest of these old Epic poems,—though doubtless great, was at all superhuman. Taking the case with reference to the entire Iliad and Odyssey, we know that there were educated gentlemen at Athens who could repeat both poems by heart:[253] but in the professional recitations, we are not to imagine that the same person did go through the whole: the recitation was essentially a joint undertaking, and the rhapsodes who visited a festival would naturally understand among themselves which part of the poem should devolve upon each particular individual. Under such circumstances, and with such means of preparation beforehand, the quantity of verse which a rhapsode could deliver would be measured, not so

much by the exhaustion of his memory, as by the physical sufficiency of his voice, having reference to the sonorous, emphatic, and rhythmical pronunciation required from him.[254]

But what guarantee have we for the exact transmission of the text for a space of two centuries by simply oral means? It may be replied, that oral transmission would hand down the text as exactly as in point of fact it was handed down. The great lines of each poem,—the order of parts,—the vein of Homeric feeling, and the general style of locution, and, for the most part, the true words,—would be maintained: for the professional training of the rhapsode, over and above the precision of his actual memory, would tend to Homerize his mind (if the expression may be permitted), and to restrain him within this magic circle. On the other hand, in respect to the details of the text, we should expect that there would be wide differences and numerous inaccuracies: and so there really were, as the records contained in the Scholia, together with the passages cited in ancient authors, but not found in our Homeric text, abundantly testify.[255]

Moreover, the state of the Iliad and Odyssey, in respect to the letter called the Digamma, affords a proof that they were recited for a considerable period before they were committed to writing, insomuch that the oral pronunciation underwent during the interval a sensible change.[256] At the time when these poems were composed, the Digamma was an effective consonant, and figured as such in the structure of the verse: at the time when they were committed to writing, it had ceased to be pronounced, and therefore never found a place in any of the manuscripts,—insomuch that the Alexandrine critics, though they knew of its existence in the much later poems of Alkæus and Sapphô, never recognized it in Homer. The hiatus, and the various perplexities of metre, occasioned by the loss of the Digamma, were corrected by different grammatical stratagems. But the whole history of this lost letter is very curious, and is rendered intelligible only by the supposition that the Iliad and Odyssey belonged for a wide space of time to the memory, the voice, and the ear, exclusively.

At what period these poems, or, indeed, any other Greek poems, first began to be written, must be matter of conjecture, though there is ground for assurance that it was before the time of Solôn. If, in the absence of evidence, we may venture upon naming any more determinate period, the question at once suggests itself, what were the purposes which, in that stage of society, a manuscript at its first commencement must have been intended to answer? For whom was a written Iliad necessary? Not for the rhapsodes; for with them it was not only planted in the memory, but also interwoven with the feelings, and conceived in conjunction with all those flexions and intonations of voice, pauses, and other oral artifices, which were required for emphatic delivery, and which the naked manuscript could never reproduce. Not for the general public,—*they* were accustomed to receive it with its rhapsodic delivery, and with its accompaniments of a solemn and crowded festival. The only per-

sons for whom the written Iliad would be suitable, would be a select few; studious and curious men,—a class of readers, capable of analyzing the complicated emotions which they had experienced as hearers in the crowd, and who would, on perusing the written words, realize in their imaginations a sensible portion of the impression communicated by the reciter.[257]

Incredible as the statement may seem in an age like the present, there is in all early societies, and there was in early Greece, a time when no such reading class existed. If we could discover at what time such a class first began to be formed, we should be able to make a guess at the time when the old Epic poems were first committed to writing. Now the period which may with the greatest probability be fixed upon as having first witnessed the formation even of the narrowest reading class in Greece, is the middle of the seventh century before the Christian era (B. C. 660 to B. C. 630),—the age of Terpander, Kallinus, Archilochus, Simonidês of Amorgus, etc. I ground this supposition on the change then operated in the character and tendencies of Grecian poetry and music,—the elegiac and iambic measures having been introduced as rivals to the primitive hexameter, and poetical compositions having been transferred from the epical past to the affairs of present and real life. Such a change was important at a time when poetry was the only known mode of publication (to use a modern phrase not altogether suitable, yet the nearest approaching to the sense). It argued a new way of looking at the old epical treasures of the people, as well as a thirst for new poetical effect; and the men who stood forward in it may well be considered as desirous to study, and competent to criticize, from their own individual point of view, the written words of the Homeric rhapsodes, just as we are told that Kallinus both noticed and eulogized the Thebaïs as the production of Homer. There seems, therefore, ground for conjecturing, that (for the use of this newly-formed and important, but very narrow class) manuscripts of the Homeric poems and other old epics—the Thebaïs and the Cypria as well as the Iliad and the Odyssey—began to be compiled towards the middle of the seventh century B. C.:[258] and the opening of Egypt to Grecian commerce, which took place about the same period, would furnish increased facilities for obtaining the requisite papyrus to write upon. A reading class, when once formed, would doubtless slowly increase, and the number of manuscripts along with it; so that before the time of Solôn, fifty years afterwards, both readers and manuscripts, though still comparatively few, might have attained a certain recognized authority, and formed a tribunal of reference, against the carelessness of individual rhapsodes.

We may, I think, consider the Iliad and Odyssey to have been preserved without the aid of writing, for a period near upon two centuries.[259] But is it true, as Wolf imagined, and as other able critics have imagined, also, that the separate portions of which these two poems are composed were originally distinct epical ballads, each constituting a separate whole and intended for separate recitation? Is it true, that they had not only no common author, but originally, neither common purpose nor

fixed order, and that their first permanent arrangement and integration was delayed for three centuries, and accomplished at last only by the taste of Peisistratus conjoined with various lettered friends?[260]

This hypothesis—to which the genius of Wolf first gave celebrity, but which has been since enforced more in detail by others, especially by William Müller and Lachmann—appears to me not only unsupported by any sufficient testimony, but also opposed to other testimony as well as to a strong force of internal probability. The authorities quoted by Wolf are Josephus, Cicero, and Pausanias:[261] Josephus mentions nothing about Peisistratus, but merely states (what we may accept as the probable fact) that the Homeric poems were originally unwritten, and preserved only in songs or recitations, from which they were at a subsequent period put into writing: hence many of the discrepancies in the text. On the other hand, Cicero and Pausanias go farther, and affirm that Peisistratus both collected, and arranged in the existing order, the rhapsodies of the Iliad and Odyssey, (implied as poems originally entire, and subsequently broken into pieces,) which he found partly confused and partly isolated from each other,—each part being then remembered only in its own portion of the Grecian world. Respecting Hipparchus the son of Peisistratus, too, we are told in the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue which bears his name, that he was the first to introduce into Attica, the poetry of Homer, and that he prescribed to the rhapsodes to recite the parts of the Panathenaic festival in regular sequence.[262]

Wolf and William Müller occasionally speak as if they admitted something like an Iliad and Odyssey as established aggregates prior to Peisistratus; but for the most part they represent him or his associates as having been the first to put together Homeric poems which were before distinct and self-existent compositions. And Lachmann, the recent expositor of the same theory, ascribes to Peisistratus still more unequivocally this original integration of parts in reference to the Iliad,—distributing the first twenty-two books of the poem into sixteen separate songs, and treating it as ridiculous to imagine that the fusion of these songs, into an order such as we now read, belongs to any date earlier than Peisistratus.[263]

Upon this theory we may remark, first, that it stands opposed to the testimony existing respecting the regulations of Solôn; who, before the time of Peisistratus, had enforced a fixed order of recitation on the rhapsodes of the Iliad at the Panathenaic festival; not only directing that they should go through the rhapsodies *seriatim*, and without omission or corruption, but also establishing a prompter or censorial authority to insure obedience,[264]—which implies the existence (at the same time that it proclaims the occasional infringement) of an orderly aggregate, as well as of manuscripts professedly complete. Next, the theory ascribes to Peisistratus a character not only materially different from what is indicated by Cicero and Pausanias,—who represent him, not as having put together atoms originally distinct, but as the renovator of an ancient order subsequently lost,—but also in itself unintelligible, and inconsistent with Grecian habit and feeling. That Peisistratus should take pains to re-

press the license, or make up for the unfaithful memory, of individual rhapsodes, and to ennoble the Panathenaic festival by the most correct recital of a great and venerable poem, according to the standard received among the best judges in Greece,—this is a task both suitable to his position, and requiring nothing more than an improved recension, together with exact adherence to it on the part of the rhapsodes. But what motive had he to string together several poems, previously known only as separate, into one new whole? What feeling could he gratify by introducing the extensive changes and transpositions surmised by Lachmann, for the purpose of binding together sixteen songs, which the rhapsodes are assumed to have been accustomed to recite, and the people to hear, each by itself apart? Peisistratus was not a poet, seeking to interest the public mind by new creations and combinations, but a ruler, desirous to impart solemnity to a great religious festival in his native city. Now such a purpose would be answered by selecting, amidst the divergences of rhapsodes in different parts of Greece, that order of text which intelligent men could approve as a return to the pure and pristine Iliad; but it would be defeated if he attempted large innovations of his own, and brought out for the first time a new Iliad by blending together, altering, and transposing, many old and well-known songs. A novelty so bold would have been more likely to offend than to please both the critics and the multitude. And if it were even enforced, by authority, at Athens, no probable reason can be given why all the other towns, and all the rhapsodes throughout Greece, should abnegate their previous habits in favor of it, since Athens at that time enjoyed no political ascendency such as she acquired during the following century. On the whole, it will appear that the character and position of Peisistratus himself go far to negative the function which Wolf and Lachmann put upon him. His interference presupposes a certain foreknown and ancient aggregate, the main lineaments of which were familiar to the Grecian public, although many of the rhapsodes in their practice may have deviated from it both by omission and interpolation. In correcting the Athenian recitations conformably with such understood general type, he might hope both to procure respect for Athens, and to constitute a fashion for the rest of Greece. But this step of "collecting the torn body of sacred Homer," is something generically different from the composition of a new Iliad out of preëxisting songs the former is as easy, suitable, and promising, as the latter is violent and gratuitous.[265]

To sustain the inference, that Peisistratus was the first architect of the Iliad and Odyssey, it ought at least to be shown that no other long and continuous poems existed during the earlier centuries. But the contrary of this is known to be the fact. The Æthiopis of Arktinus, which contained nine thousand one hundred verses, dates from a period more than two centuries earlier than Peisistratus: several other of the lost cyclic epics, some among them of considerable length, appear during the century succeeding Arktinus; and it is important to notice that three or four at least of these poems passed currently under the name of Homer.[266] There is no greater intrinsic difficulty in supposing long epics to have begun with the Iliad and Odyssey than with the Æthiopis: the ascendency of the name of Homer and the subordinate

position of Arktinus, in the history of early Grecian poetry, tend to prove the former in preference to the latter.

Moreover, we find particular portions of the Iliad, which expressly pronounce themselves, by their own internal evidence, as belonging to a large whole, and not as separate integers. We can hardly conceive the Catalogue in the second book, except as a fractional composition, and with reference to a series of approaching exploits; for, taken apart by itself, such a barren enumeration of names could have stimulated neither the fancy of the poet, nor the attention of the listeners. But the Homeric Catalogue had acquired a sort of canonical authority even in the time of Solôn, insomuch that he interpolated a line into it, or was accused of doing so, for the purpose of gaining a disputed point against the Megarians, who, on their side, set forth another version.[267] No such established reverence could have been felt for this document, unless there had existed for a long time prior to Peisistratus, the habit of regarding and listening to the Iliad as a continuous poem. And when the philosopher Xenophanês, contemporary with Peisistratus, noticed Homer as the universal teacher, and denounced him as an unworthy describer of the gods, he must have connected this great mental sway, not with a number of unconnected rhapsodies, but with an aggregate Iliad and Odyssey; probably with other poems, also, ascribed to the same author, such as the Cypria, Epigoni, and Thebaïs.

We find, it is true, references in various authors to portions of the Iliad, each by its own separate name, such as the Teichomachy, the Aristeia (preëminent exploits) of Diomedês, or Agamemnôn, the Doloneia, or Night-expedition (of Dolon as well as of Odysseus and Diomedês), etc., and hence, it has been concluded, that these portions originally existed as separate poems, before they were cemented together into an Iliad. But such references prove nothing to the point; for until the Iliad was divided by Aristarchus and his colleagues into a given number of books, or rhapsodies, designated by the series of letters in the alphabet, there was no method of calling attention to any particular portion of the poem except by special indication of its subject-matter.[268] Authors subsequent to Peisistratus, such as Herodotus and Plato, who unquestionably conceived the Iliad as a whole, cite the separate fractions of it by designations of this sort.

The foregoing remarks on the Wolfian hypothesis respecting the text of the Iliad, tend to separate two points which are by no means necessarily connected, though that hypothesis, as set forth by Wolf himself, by W. Müller, and by Lachmann, presents the two in conjunction. First, was the Iliad originally projected and composed by one author, and as one poem, or were the different parts composed separately and by unconnected authors, and subsequently strung together into an aggregate? Secondly, assuming that the internal evidences of the poem negative the former supposition, and drive us upon the latter, was the construction of the whole poem deferred, and did the parts exist only in their separate state, until a period so late as the reign of Peisistratus? It is obvious that these two questions are essentially

separate, and that a man may believe the Iliad to have been put together out of preëxisting songs, without recognizing the age of Peisistratus as the period of its first compilation. Now, whatever may be the steps through which the poem passed to its ultimate integrity, there is sufficient reason for believing that they had been accomplished long before that period: the friends of Peisistratus found an Iliad already existing and already ancient in their time, even granting that the poem had not been originally born in a state of unity. Moreover, the Alexandrine critics, whose remarks are preserved in the Scholia, do not even notice the Peisistratic recension among the many manuscripts which they had before them: and Mr. Payne Knight justly infers from their silence that either they did not possess it, or it was in their eyes of no great authority;[269] which could never have been the case if it had been the prime originator of Homeric unity.

The line of argument, by which the advocates of Wolf's hypothesis negative the primitive unity of the poem, consists in exposing gaps, incongruities, contradictions, etc., between the separate parts. Now, if in spite of all these incoherences, standing mementos of an antecedent state of separation, the component poems were made to coalesce so intimately as to appear as if they had been one from the beginning, we can better understand the complete success of the proceeding and the universal prevalence of the illusion, by supposing such coalescence to have taken place at a very early period, during the productive days of epical genius, and before the growth of reading and criticism. The longer the aggregation of the separate poems was deferred, the harder it would be to obliterate in men's minds the previous state of separation, and to make them accept the new aggregate as an original unity. The bards or rhapsodes might have found comparatively little difficulty in thus piecing together distinct songs, during the ninth or eighth century before Christ; but it we suppose the process to be deferred until the latter half of the sixth century,—if we imagine that Solôn, with all his contemporaries and predecessors, knew nothing about any aggregate Iliad, but was accustomed to read and hear only those sixteen distinct epical pieces into which Lachmann would dissect the Iliad, each of the sixteen bearing a separate name of its own,—no compilation then for the first time made by the friends of Peisistratus could have effaced the established habit, and planted itself in the general convictions of Greece as the primitive Homeric production. Had the sixteen pieces remained disunited and individualized down to the time of Peisistratus, they would in all probability have continued so ever afterwards; nor could the extensive changes and transpositions which (according to Lachmann's theory) were required to melt them down into our present Iliad, have obtained at that late period universal acceptance. Assuming it to be true that such changes and transpositions did really take place, they must at least be referred to a period greatly earlier than Peisistratus or Solôn.

The whole tenor of the poems themselves confirms what is here remarked. There is nothing either in the Iliad or Odyssey which savors of *modernism*, applying that

term to the age of Peisistratus; nothing which brings to our view the alterations, brought about by two centuries, in the Greek language, the coined money, the habits of writing and reading, the despotisms and republican governments, the close military array, the improved construction of ships, the Amphiktyonic convocations, the mutual frequentation of religious festivals, the Oriental and Egyptian veins of religion, etc., familiar to the latter epoch. These alterations Onomakritus and the other literary friends of Peisistratus, could hardly have failed to notice even without design, had they then for the first time undertaken the task of piecing together many self-existent epics into one large aggregate.[270] Everything in the two great Homeric poems, both in substance and in language, belongs to an age two or three centuries earlier than Peisistratus. Indeed, even the interpolations (or those passages which on the best grounds are pronounced to be such) betray no trace of the sixth century before Christ, and may well have been heard by Archilochus and Kallinus,—in some cases even by Arktinus and Hesiod,—as genuine Homeric matter. As far as the evidences on the case, as well internal as external, enable us to judge, we seem warranted in believing that the Iliad and Odyssey were recited substantially as they now stand, (always allowing for partial divergences of text, and interpolations,) in 776 B. C., our first trustworthy mark of Grecian time. And this ancient date,—let it be added,—as it is the best-authenticated fact, so it is also the most important attribute of the Homeric poems, considered in reference to Grecian history. For they thus afford us an insight into the ante-historical character of the Greeks,—enabling us to trace the subsequent forward march of the nation, and to seize instructive contrasts between their former and their later condition.

Rejecting, therefore, the idea of compilation by Peisistratus, and referring the present state of the Iliad and Odyssey to a period more than two centuries earlier, the question still remains, by what process, or through whose agency, they reached that state? Is each poem the work of one author, or of several? If the latter, do all the parts belong to the same age? What ground is there for believing, that any or all of these parts existed before, as separate poems, and have been accommodated to the place in which they now appear, by more or less systematic alteration?

The acute and valuable Prolegomena of Wolf, half a century ago, powerfully turned the attention of scholars to the necessity of considering the Iliad and Odyssey with reference to the age and society in which they arose, and to the material differences in this respect between Homer and more recent epic poets.[271] Since that time, an elaborate study has been bestowed upon the early manifestations of poetry (Sagen-poesie) among other nations; and the German critics especially, among whom this description of literatures has been most cultivated, have selected it as the only appropriate analogy for the Homeric poems. Such poetry, consisting for the most part of short, artless effusions, with little of deliberate or far-sighted combination, has been assumed by many critics as a fit standard to apply for measuring the capacities of the Homeric age; an age exclusively of speakers, singers, and hearers,

not of readers or writers. In place of the unbounded admiration which was felt for Homer, not merely as a poet of detail, but as constructor of a long epic, at the time when Wolf wrote his Prolegomena, the tone of criticism passed to the opposite extreme, and attention was fixed entirely upon the defects in the arrangement of the Iliad and Odyssey. Whatever was to be found in them of symmetry or pervading system, was pronounced to be decidedly post-Homeric. Under such preconceived anticipations, Homer seems to have been generally studied in Germany, during the generation succeeding Wolf, the negative portion of whose theory was usually admitted, though as to the positive substitute,—what explanation was to be given of the history and present constitution of the Homeric poems,—there was by no means the like agreement. During the last ten years, however, a contrary tendency has manifested itself; the Wolfian theory has been reëxamined and shaken by Nitzsch, who, as well as O. Müller, Welcker, and other scholars, have revived the idea of original Homeric unity, under certain modifications. The change in Goethe's opinion, coincident with this new direction, is recorded in one of his latest works.[272] On the other hand, the original opinion of Wolf has also been reproduced within the last five years, and fortified with several new observations on the text of the Iliad, by Lachmann.

The point is thus still under controversy among able scholars, and is probably destined to remain so. For, in truth, our means of knowledge are so limited, that no man can produce arguments sufficiently cogent to contend against opposing preconceptions; and it creates a painful sentiment of diffidence when we read the expressions of equal and absolute persuasion with which the two opposite conclusions have both been advanced.[273] We have nothing to teach us the history of these poems except the poems themselves. Not only do we possess no collateral information respecting them or their authors, but we have no one to describe to us the people or the age in which they originated; our knowledge respecting contemporary Homeric society, is collected exclusively from the Homeric compositions themselves. We are ignorant whether any other, or what other, poems preceded them, or divided with them the public favor; nor have we anything better than conjecture to determine either the circumstances under which they were brought before the hearers, or the conditions which a bard of that day was required to satisfy. On all these points, moreover, the age of Thucydidês[274] and Plato seems to have been no better informed than we are, except in so far as they could profit by the analogies of the cyclic and other epic poems, which would doubtless in many cases have afforded valuable aid.

Nevertheless, no classical scholar can be easy without *some* opinion respecting the authorship of these immortal poems. And the more defective the evidence we possess, the more essential is it that all that evidence should be marshalled in the clearest order, and its bearing upon the points in controversy distinctly understood

beforehand. Both these conditions seem to have been often neglected, throughout the long-continued Homeric discussion.

To illustrate the first point: Since two poems are comprehended in the problem to be solved, the natural process would be, first, to study the easier of the two, and then to apply the conclusions thence deduced as a means of explaining the other. Now, the Odyssey, looking at its aggregate character, is incomparably more easy to comprehend than the Iliad. Yet most Homeric critics apply the microscope at once, and in the first instance, to the Iliad.

To illustrate the second point: What evidence is sufficient to negative the supposition that the Iliad or the Odyssey is a poem originally and intentionally one? Not simply particular gaps and contradictions, though they be even gross and numerous; but the preponderance of these proofs of mere unprepared coalescence over the other proofs of designed adaptation scattered throughout the whole poem. For the poet (or the coöperating poets, if more than one) may have intended to compose an harmonious whole, but may have realized their intention incompletely, and left partial faults; or, perhaps, the contradictory lines may have crept in through a corrupt text. A survey of the whole poem is necessary to determine the question; and this necessity, too, has not always been attended to.

If it had happened that the Odyssey had been preserved to us alone, without the Iliad, I think the dispute respecting Homeric unity would never have been raised. For the former is, in my judgment, pervaded almost from beginning to end by marks of designed adaptation; and the special faults which Wolf, W. Müller, and B. Thiersch, [275] have singled out for the purpose of disproving such unity of intention, are so few, and of so little importance, that they would have been universally regarded as mere instances of haste or unskilfulness on the part of the poet, had they not been seconded by the far more powerful battery opened against the Iliad. These critics, having laid down their general presumptions against the antiquity of the long epopee, illustrate their principles by exposing the many flaws and fissures in the Iliad, and then think it sufficient if they can show a few similar defects in the Odyssey, —as if the breaking up of Homeric unity in the former naturally entailed a similar necessity with regard to the latter; and their method of proceeding, contrary to the rule above laid down, puts the more difficult problem in the foreground, as a means of solution for the easier. We can hardly wonder, however, that they have applied their observations in the first instance to the Iliad, because it is in every man's esteem the more marked, striking, and impressive poem of the two,—and the character of Homer is more intimately identified with it than with the Odyssey. This may serve as an explanation of the course pursued; but be the case as it may in respect to comparative poetical merit, it is not the less true, that, as an aggregate, the Odyssey is more simple and easily understood, and, therefore, ought to come first in the order of analysis.

Now, looking at the Odyssey by itself, the proofs of an unity of design seem unequivocal and everywhere to be found. A premeditated structure, and a concentration of interest upon one prime hero, under well-defined circumstances, may be traced from the first book to the twenty-third. Odysseus is always either directly or indirectly kept before the reader, as a warrior returning from the fulness of glory at Troy, exposed to manifold and protracted calamities during his return home, on which his whole soul is so bent that he refuses even the immortality offered by Calypsô;—a victim, moreover, even after his return, to mingled injury and insult from the suitors, who have long been plundering his property, and dishonoring his house; but at length obtaining, by valor and cunning united, a signal revenge, which restores him to all that he had lost. All the persons and all the events in the poem are subsidiary to this main plot: and the divine agency, necessary to satisfy the feeling of the Homeric man, is put forth by Poseidôn and Athênê, in both cases from dispositions directly bearing upon Odysseus. To appreciate the unity of the Odyssey, we have only to read the objections taken against that of the Iliad,—especially in regard to the long withdrawal of Achilles, not only from the scene, but from the memory,—together with the independent prominence of Ajax, Diomêdês, and other heroes. How far we are entitled from hence to infer the want of premeditated unity in the Iliad, will be presently considered; but it is certain that the constitution of the Odyssey, in this respect, everywhere demonstrates the presence of such unity. Whatever may be the interest attached to Penelopê, Telemachus, or Eumæus, we never disconnect them from their association with Odysseus. The present is not the place for collecting the many marks of artistical structure dispersed throughout this poem; but it may be worth while to remark, that the final catastrophe realized in the twenty-second book,—the slaughter of the suitors in the very house which they were profaning,—is distinctly and prominently marked out in the first and second books, promised by Teiresias in the eleventh, by Athênê in the thirteenth, and by Helen in the fifteenth, and gradually matured by a series of suitable preliminaries, throughout the eight books preceding its occurrence.[276] Indeed, what is principally evident, and what has been often noticed, in the Odyssey, is, the equable flow both of the narrative and the events; the absence of that rise and fall of interest which is sufficiently conspicuous in the Iliad.

To set against these evidences of unity, there ought, at least, to be some strong cases produced of occasional incoherence or contradiction. But it is remarkable how little of such counter-evidence is to be found, although the arguments of Wolf, W. Müller, and B. Thiersch stand so much in need of it. They have discovered only one instance of undeniable inconsistency in the parts,—the number of days occupied by the absence of Telemachus at Pylus and Sparta. That young prince, though represented as in great haste to depart, and refusing pressing invitations to prolong his stay, must, nevertheless, be supposed to have continued for thirty days the guest of Menelaus, in order to bring his proceedings into chronological harmony with those of Odysseus, and to explain the first meeting of father and son in the swine-fold of Eu-

mæus. Here is undoubtedly an inaccuracy, (so Nitzsch[277] treats it, and I think justly) on the part of the poet, who did not anticipate, and did not experience in ancient times, so strict a scrutiny; an inaccuracy certainly not at all wonderful; the matter of real wonder is, that it stands almost alone, and that there are no others in the poem.

Now, this is one of the main points on which W. Müller and B. Thiersch rest their theory,—explaining the chronological confusion by supposing that the journey of Telemachus to Pylus and Sparta, constituted the subject of an epic originally separate (comprising the first four books and a portion of the fifteenth), and incorporated at second-hand with the remaining poem. And they conceive this view to be farther confirmed by the double assembly of the gods, (at the beginning of the first book as well as of the fifth,) which they treat as an awkward repetition, such as could not have formed part of the primary scheme of any epic poet. But here they only escape a small difficulty by running into another and a greater. For it is impossible to comprehend how the first four books and part of the fifteenth can ever have constituted a distinct epic; since the adventures of Telemachus have no satisfactory termination, except at the point of confluence with those of his father, when the unexpected meeting and recognition takes place under the roof of Eumæus,—nor can any epic poem ever have described that meeting and recognition without giving some account how Odysseus came thither. Moreover, the first two books of the Odyssey distinctly lay the ground, and carry expectation forward, to the final catastrophe of the poem, —treating Telemachus as a subordinate person, and his expedition as merely provisional towards an ulterior result. Nor can I agree with W. Müller, that the real Odyssey might well be supposed to begin with the fifth book. On the contrary, the exhibition of the suitors and the Ithakesian agora, presented to us in the second book, is absolutely essential to the full comprehension of the books subsequent to the thirteenth. The suitors are far too important personages in the poem to allow of their being first introduced in so informal a manner as we read in the sixteenth book: indeed, the passing allusions of Athênê (xiii. 310, 375) and Eumæus (xiv. 41, 81) to the suitors, presuppose cognizance of them on the part of the hearer.

Lastly, the twofold discussion of the gods, at the beginning of the first and fifth books, and the double interference of Athênê, far from being a needless repetition, may be shown to suit perfectly both the genuine epical conditions and the unity of the poem.[278] For although the final consummation, and the organization of measures against the suitors, was to be accomplished by Odysseus and Telemachus jointly, yet the march and adventures of the two, until the moment of their meeting in the dwelling of Eumæus, were essentially distinct. But, according to the religious ideas of the old epic, the presiding direction of Athênê was necessary for the safety and success of both of them. Her first interference arouses and inspires the son, her second produces the liberation of the father,—constituting a point of union and common origination for two lines of adventures, in both of which she takes earnest inter-

est, but which are necessarily for a time kept apart in order to coincide at the proper moment.

It will thus appear that the twice-repeated agora of the gods in the Odyssey, bringing home, as it does to one and the same divine agent, that double start which is essential to the scheme of the poem, consists better with the supposition of premeditated unity than with that of distinct self-existent parts. And, assuredly, the manner in which Telemachus and Odysseus, both by different roads, are brought into meeting and conjunction at the dwelling of Eumæus, is something not only contrived, but very skilfully contrived. It is needless to advert to the highly interesting character of Eumæus, rendered available as a rallying-point, though in different ways, both to the father and the son, over and above the sympathy which he himself inspires.

If the Odyssey be not an original unity, of what self-existent parts can we imagine it to have consisted? To this question it is difficult to imagine a satisfactory reply: for the supposition that Telemachus and his adventures may once have formed the subject of a separate epos, apart from Odysseus, appears inconsistent with the whole character of that youth as it stands in the poem, and with the events in which he is made to take part. We could better imagine the distribution of the adventures of Odysseus himself into two parts,—one containing his wanderings and return, the other handling his ill-treatment by the suitors, and his final triumph. But though either of these two subjects might have been adequate to furnish out a separate poem, it is nevertheless certain that, as they are presented in the Odyssey, the former cannot be divorced from the latter. The simple return of Odysseus, as it now stands in the poem, could satisfy no one as a final close, so long as the suitors remain in possession of his house, and forbid his reunion with his wife. Any poem which treated his wanderings and return separately, must have represented his reunion with Penelopê and restoration to his house, as following naturally upon his arrival in Ithaka,—thus taking little or no notice of the suitors. But this would be a capital mutilation of the actual epical narrative, which considers the suitors at home as an essential portion of the destiny of the much-suffering hero, not less than his shipwrecks and trials at sea. His return (separately taken) is foredoomed, according to the curse of Polyphemus, executed by Poseidôn, to be long deferred, miserable, solitary, and ending with destruction in his house to greet him;[279] and the ground is thus laid, in the very recital of his wanderings, for a new series of events which are to happen to him after his arrival in Ithaka. There is no tenable halting-place between the departure of Odysseus from Troy, and the final restoration to his house and his wife. The distance between these two events may, indeed, be widened, by accumulating new distresses and impediments, but any separate portion of it cannot be otherwise treated than as a fraction of the whole. The beginning and the end are here the data in respect to epical genesis, though the intermediate events admit of being conceived as variables, more or less numerous: so that the conception of the

whole may be said without impropriety both to precede and to govern that of the constituent parts.

The general result of a study of the Odyssey may be set down as follows: 1. The poem, as it now stands, exhibits unequivocally adaptation of parts and continuity of structure, whether by one or by several consentient hands: it may, perhaps, be a secondary formation, out of a preëxisting Odyssey of smaller dimensions; but, if so, the parts of the smaller whole must have been so far recast as to make them suitable members of the larger, and are noway recognizable by us. 2. The subject-matter of the poem not only does not favor, but goes far to exclude, the possibility of the Wolfian hypothesis. Its events cannot be so arranged as to have composed several antecedent substantive epics, afterwards put together into the present aggregate. Its authors cannot have been mere compilers of preëxisting materials, such as Peisistratus and his friends: they must have been poets, competent to work such matter as they found, into a new and enlarged design of their own. Nor can the age in which this long poem, of so many thousand lines, was turned out as a continuous aggregate, be separated from the ancient, productive, inspired age of Grecian epic.

Arriving at such conclusions from the internal evidence of the Odyssey,[280] we can apply them by analogy to the Iliad. We learn something respecting the character and capacities of that early age which has left no other mementos except these two poems. Long continuous epics (it is observed by those who support the views of Wolf), with an artistical structure, are inconsistent with the capacities of a rude and non-writing age. Such epics (we may reply) are *not inconsistent* with the early age of the Greeks, and the Odyssey is a proof of it; for in that poem the integration of the whole, and the composition of the parts, must have been simultaneous. The analogy of the Odyssey enables us to rebut that preconception under which many ingenious critics sit down to the study of the Iliad, and which induces them to explain all the incoherences of the latter by breaking it up into smaller unities, as if short epics were the only manifestation of poetical power which the age admitted. There ought to be no reluctance in admitting a presiding scheme and premeditated unity of parts, in so far as the parts themselves point to such a conclusion.

That the Iliad is not so essentially one piece as the Odyssey, every man agrees. It includes a much greater multiplicity of events, and what is yet more important, a greater multiplicity of prominent personages: the very indefinite title which it bears, as contrasted with the speciality of the name, *Odyssey*, marks the difference at once. The parts stand out more conspicuously from the whole, and admit more readily of being felt and appreciated in detached recitation. We may also add, that it is of more unequal execution than the Odyssey,—often rising to a far higher pitch of grandeur, but also, occasionally, tamer: the story does not move on continuously; incidents occur without plausible motive, nor can we shut our eyes to evidences of incoherence and contradiction.

To a certain extent, the Iliad is open to all these remarks, though Wolf and William Müller, and above all Lachmann, exaggerate the case in degree. And from hence has been deduced the hypothesis which treats the parts in their original state as separate integers, independent of, and unconnected with, each other, and forced into unity only by the afterthought of a subsequent age; or sometimes, not even themselves as integers, but as aggregates grouped together out of fragments still smaller,—short epics formed by the coalescence of still shorter songs. Now there is some plausibility in these reasonings, so long as the discrepancies are looked upon as the whole of the case. But in point of fact they are not the whole of the case: for it is not less true, that there are large portions of the Iliad which present positive and undeniable evidences of coherence as antecedent and consequent, though we are occasionally perplexed by inconsistencies of detail. To deal with these latter, is a portion of the duties of the critic. But he is not to treat the Iliad as if inconsistency prevailed everywhere throughout its parts; for coherence of parts—symmetrical antecedence and consequence—is discernible throughout the larger half of the poem.

Now the Wolfian theory explains the gaps and contradictions throughout the narrative, but it explains nothing else. If (as Lachmann thinks) the Iliad originally consisted of sixteen songs, or little substantive epics, (Lachmann's sixteen songs cover the space only as far as the 22d book, or the death of Hector, and two more songs would have to be admitted for the 23d and 24th books),—not only composed by different authors, but by each[281] without any view to conjunction with the rest,—we have then no right to expect any intrinsic continuity between them; and all that continuity which we now find must be of extraneous origin. Where are we to look for the origin? Lachmann follows Wolf, in ascribing the whole constructive process to Peisistratus and his associates, at a period when the creative epical faculty is admitted to have died out. But upon this supposition, Peisistratus (or his associates) must have done much more than omit, transpose, and interpolate, here and there; he must have gone far to rewrite the whole poem. A great poet might have recast preëxisting separate songs into one comprehensive whole, but no mere arrangers or compilers would be competent to do so: and we are thus left without any means of accounting for that degree of continuity and consistence which runs through so large a portion of the Iliad, though not through the whole. The idea that the poem, as we read it, grew out of atoms not originally designed for the places which they now occupy, involves us in new and inextricable difficulties, when we seek to elucidate either the mode of coalescence or the degree of existing unity.[282]

Admitting then premeditated adaptation of parts to a certain extent as essential to the Iliad, we may yet inquire, whether it was produced all at once, or gradually enlarged,—whether by one author, or by several; and, if the parts be of different age, which is the primitive kernel, and which are the additions.

Welcker, Lange, and Nitzsch[283] treat the Homeric poems as representing a second step in advance, in the progress of popular poetry. First, comes the age of short

narrative songs; next, when these have become numerous, there arise constructive minds, who recast and blend together many of them into a larger aggregate, conceived upon some scheme of their own. The age of the epos is followed by that of the epopee,—short, spontaneous effusions preparing the way, and furnishing materials, for the architectonic genius of the poet. It is farther presumed by the above-mentioned authors, that the pre-Homeric epic included a great abundance of such smaller songs,—a fact which admits of no proof, but which seems countenanced by some passages in Homer, and is in itself no way improbable. But the transition from such songs, assuming them to be ever so numerous, to a combined and continuous poem, forms an epoch in the intellectual history of the nation, implying mental qualities of a higher order than those upon which the songs themselves depend. Nor is it to be imagined that the materials pass unaltered from their first state of isolation into their second state of combination. They must of necessity be recast, and undergo an adapting process, in which the genius of the organizing poet consists; nor can we hope, by simply knowing them as they exist in the second stage, ever to divine how they stood in the first. Such, in my judgment, is the right conception of the Homeric epoch,—an organizing poetical mind, still preserving that freshness of observation and vivacity of details which constitutes the charm of the ballad.

Nothing is gained by studying the Iliad as a congeries of fragments once independent of each other: no portion of the poem can be shown to have ever been so, and the supposition introduces difficulties greater than those which it removes. But it is not necessary to affirm that the whole poem as we now read it, belonged to the original and preconceived plan.[284] In this respect, the Iliad produces, upon my mind, an impression totally different from the Odyssey. In the latter poem, the characters and incidents are fewer, and the whole plot appears of one projection, from the beginning down to the death of the suitors: none of the parts look as if they had been composed separately, and inserted by way of addition into a preëxisting smaller poem. But the Iliad, on the contrary, presents the appearance of a house built upon a plan comparatively narrow, and subsequently enlarged by successive additions. The first book, together with the eighth, and the books from the eleventh to the twenty-second, inclusive, seem to form the primary organization of the poem, then properly an Achillêis: the twenty-third and twenty-fourth books are, perhaps, additions at the tail of this primitive poem, which still leave it nothing more than an enlarged Achillêis. But the books from the second to the seventh, inclusive, together with the tenth, are of a wider and more comprehensive character, and convert the poem from an Achillêis into an Iliad.[285] The primitive frontispiece, inscribed with the anger of Achilles, and its direct consequences, yet remains, after it has ceased to be coextensive with the poem. The parts added, however, are not necessarily inferior in merit to the original poem: so far is this from being the case, that amongst them are comprehended some of the noblest efforts of the Grecian epic. Nor are they more recent in date than the original; strictly speaking, they must be a little more recent, but they belong to the same generation and state of society as the primitive Achillêis.

These qualifications are necessary to keep apart different questions, which, in discussions of Homeric criticism, are but too often confounded.

If we take those portions of the poem which I imagine to have constituted the original Achillêis, it will be found that the sequence of events contained in them is more rapid, more unbroken, and more intimately knit together in the way of cause and effect, than in the other books. Heyne and Lachmann, indeed, with other objecting critics, complains of the action in them as being too much crowded and hurried, since one day lasts from the beginning of the eleventh book to the middle of the eighteenth, without any sensible halt in the march throughout so large a portion of the journey. Lachmann, likewise, admits that those separate songs, into which he imagines that the whole Iliad may be dissected, cannot be severed with the same sharpness, in the books subsequent to the eleventh, as in those before it.[286] There is only one real halting-place from the eleventh book to the twenty-second,—the death of Patroclus; and this can never be conceived as the end of a separate poem, [287] though it is a capital step in the development of the Achillêis, and brings about that entire revolution in the temper of Achilles which was essential for the purpose of the poet. It would be a mistake to imagine that there ever could have existed a separate poem called Patrocleia, though a part of the Iliad was designated by that name. For Patroclus has no substantive position: he is the attached friend and second of Achilles, but nothing else,—standing to the latter in a relation of dependence resembling that of Telemachus to Odysseus. And the way in which Patroclus is dealt with in the Iliad, is, (in my judgment,) the most dexterous and artistical contrivance in the poem,—that which approaches nearest to the neat tissue of the Odyssey.[288]

The great and capital misfortune which prostrates the strength of the Greeks, and renders them incapable of defending themselves without Achilles, is the disablement, by wounds, of Agamemnôn, Diomêdês, and Odysseus; so that the defence of the wall and of the ships is left only to heroes of the second magnitude (Ajax alone excepted), such as Idomeneus, Leonteus, Polypœtês, Merionês, Menelaus, etc. Now, it is remarkable that all these three first-rate chiefs are in full force at the beginning of the eleventh book: all three are wounded in the battle which that book describes, and at the commencement of which Agamemnôn is full of spirits and courage.

Nothing can be more striking than the manner in which Homer concentrates our attention in the first book upon Achilles as the hero, his quarrel with Agamemnôn, and the calamities to the Greeks which are held out as about to ensue from it, through the intercession of Thetis with Zeus. But the incidents dwelt upon from the beginning of the second book down to the combat between Hector and Ajax in the seventh, animated and interesting as they are, do nothing to realize this promise. They are a splendid picture of the Trojan war generally, and eminently suitable to that larger title under which the poem has been immortalized,—but the consequences of the anger of Achilles do not appear until the eighth book. The tenth book, or Doloneia, is also a portion of the Iliad, but not of the Achillêis: while the

ninth book appears to me a subsequent addition, nowise harmonizing with that main stream of the Achillêis which flows from the eleventh book to the twenty-second. The eighth book ought to be read in immediate connection with the eleventh, in order to see the structure of what seems the primitive Achillêis; for there are several passages in the eleventh and the following books, which prove that the poet who composed them could not have had present to his mind the main event of the ninth book,—the outpouring of profound humiliation by the Greeks, and from Agamemnôn, especially, before Achilles, coupled with formal offers to restore Brisêis, and pay the amplest compensation for past wrong.[289] The words of Achilles (not less than those of Patroclus and Nestor) in the eleventh and in the following books, plainly imply that the humiliation of the Greeks before him, for which he thirsts, is as yet future and contingent; that no plenary apology has yet been tendered, nor any offer made of restoring Brisêis; while both Nestor and Patroclus, with all their wish to induce him to take arms, never take notice of the offered atonement and restitution, but view him as one whose ground for quarrel stands still the same as it did at the beginning. Moreover, if we look at the first book,—the opening of the Achillêis,—we shall see that this prostration of Agamemnôn and the chief Grecian heroes before Achilles, would really be the termination of the whole poem; for Achilles asks nothing more from Thetis, nor Thetis anything more from Zeus, than that Agamemnôn and the Greeks may be brought to know the wrong they have done to their capital warrior, and humbled in the dust in expiation of it. We may add, that the abject terror in which Agamemnôn appears in the ninth book, when he sends the supplicatory message to Achilles, as it is not adequately accounted for by the degree of calamity which the Greeks have experienced in the preceding (eighth) book, so it is inconsistent with the gallantry and high spirit with which he shines at the beginning of the eleventh.[290] The situation of the Greeks only becomes desperate when the three great chiefs, Agamemnôn, Odysseus, and Diomêdês, are disabled by wounds;[291] this is the irreparable calamity which works upon Patroclus, and through him upon Achilles. The ninth book, as it now stands, seems to me an addition, by a different hand, to the original Achillêis, framed so as both to forestall and to spoil the nineteenth book, which is the real reconciliation of the two inimical heroes: I will venture to add, that it carries the pride and egotism of Achilles beyond even the largest exigences of insulted honor, and is shocking to that sentiment of Nemesis which was so deeply seated in the Grecian mind. We forgive any excess of fury against the Trojans and Hector, after the death of Patroclus; but that he should remain unmoved by restitution, by abject supplications, and by the richest atoning presents, tendered from the Greeks, indicates an implacability such as neither the first book, nor the books between the eleventh and seventeenth, convey.

It is with the Grecian agora, in the beginning of the second book, that the Iliad (as distinguished from the Achillêis) commences,—continued through the Catalogue, the muster of the two armies, the single combat between Menelaus and Paris, the renewed promiscuous battle caused by the arrow of Pandarus, the (Epipôlêsis, or)

personal circuit of Agamemnôn round the army, the Aristeia, or brilliant exploits of Diomêdês, the visit of Hector to Troy for the purposes of sacrifice, his interview with Andromachê, and his combat with Ajax,—down to the seventh book. All these are beautiful poetry, presenting to us the general Trojan war, and its conspicuous individuals under different points of view, but leaving no room in the reader's mind for the thought of Achilles. Now, the difficulty for an enlarging poet, was, to pass from the Achillêis in the first book, to the Iliad in the second, and it will accordingly be found that here is an awkwardness in the structure of the poem, which counsel on the poet's behalf (ancient or modern) do not satisfactorily explain.

In the first book, Zeus has promised Thetis, that he will punish the Greeks for the wrong done to Achilles: in the beginning of the second book, he deliberates how he shall fulfil the promise, and sends down for that purpose "mischievous Oneirus" (the Dream-god) to visit Agamemnôn in his sleep, to assure him that the gods have now with one accord consented to put Troy into his hands, and to exhort him forthwith to the assembling of his army for the attack. The ancient commentators were here perplexed by the circumstance that Zeus puts a falsehood into the mouth of Oneirus. But there seems no more difficulty in explaining this, than in the narrative of the book of 1 Kings (chap. xxii. 20), where Jehovah is mentioned to have put a lying spirit into the mouth of Ahab's prophets,—the real awkwardness is, that Oneirus and his falsehood produce no effect. For in the first place, Agamemnôn takes a step very different from that which his dream recommends,—and in the next place, when the Grecian army is at length armed and goes forth to battle, it does not experience defeat, (which would be the case if the exhortation of Oneirus really proved mischievous,) but carries on a successful day's battle, chiefly through the heroism of Diomêdês. Instead of arming the Greeks forthwith, Agamemnôn convokes first a council of chiefs, and next an agora of the host. And though himself in a temper of mind highly elate with the deceitful assurances of Oneirus, he deliberately assumes the language of despair in addressing the troops, having previously prepared Nestor and Odysseus for his doing so,—merely in order to try the courage of the men, and with formal instructions, given to these two other chiefs, that they are to speak in opposition to him. Now this intervention of Zeus and Oneirus, eminently unsatisfactory when coupled with the incidents which now follow it, and making Zeus appear, but only appear, to realize his promise of honoring Achilles as well as of hurting the Greeks,—forms exactly the point of junction between the Achillêis and the Iliad.[292]

The freak which Agamemnôn plays off upon the temper of his army, though in itself childish, serves a sufficient purpose, not only because it provides a special matter of interest to be submitted to the Greeks, but also because it calls forth the splendid description, so teeming with vivacious detail, of the sudden breaking up of the assembly after Agamemnôn's harangue, and of the decisive interference of Odysseus to bring the men back, as well as to put down Thersitês. This picture of the Greeks in agora, bringing out the two chief speaking and counselling heroes, was

so important a part of the general Trojan war, that the poet has permitted himself to introduce it by assuming an inexplicable folly on the part of Agamemnôn; just as he has ushered in another fine scene in the third book,—the Teichoskopy, or conversation, between Priam and Helen on the walls of Troy,—by admitting the supposition that the old king, in the tenth year of the war, did not know the persons of Agamemnôn and the other Grecian chiefs. This may serve as an explanation of the delusion practised by Agamemnôn towards his assembled host; but it does not at all explain the tame and empty intervention of Oneirus.[293]

If the initial incident of the second book, whereby we pass out of the Achillêis into the Iliad, is awkward, so also the final incident of the seventh book, immediately before we come back into the Achillêis, is not less unsatisfactory,—I mean, the construction of the wall and ditch round the Greek camp. As the poem now stands, no plausible reason is assigned why this should be done. Nestor proposes it without any constraining necessity: for the Greeks are in a career of victory, and the Trojans are making offers of compromise which imply conscious weakness,—while Diomêdês is so confident of the approaching ruin of Troy, that he dissuades his comrades from receiving even Helen herself, if the surrender should be tendered. "Many Greeks have been slain," it is true,[294] as Nestor observes; but an equal or greater number of Trojans have been slain, and all the Grecian heroes are yet in full force: the absence of Achilles is not even adverted to.

Now this account of the building of the fortification seems to be an after-thought, arising out of the enlargement of the poem beyond its original scheme. The original Achillêis, passing at once from the first to the eighth,[295] and from thence to the eleventh book, might well assume the fortification,—and talk of it as a thing existing, without adducing any special reason why it was erected. The hearer would naturally comprehend and follow the existence of a ditch and wall round the ships, as a matter of course, provided there was nothing in the previous narrative to make him believe that the Greeks had originally been without these bulwarks. And since the Achillêis, immediately after the promise of Zeus to Thetis, at the close of the first book, went on to describe the fulfilment of that promise and the ensuing disasters of the Greeks, there was nothing to surprise any one in hearing that their camp was fortified. But the case was altered when the first and the eighth books were parted asunder, in order to make room for descriptions of temporary success and glory on the part of the besieging army. The brilliant scenes sketched in the books, from the second to the seventh, mention no fortification, and even imply its nonexistence; yet, since notice of it occurs amidst the first description of Grecian disasters in the eighth book, the hearer, who had the earlier books present to his memory, might be surprised to find a fortification mentioned immediately afterwards, unless the construction of it were specially announced to have intervened. But it will at once appear, that there was some difficulty in finding a good reason why the Greeks should begin to fortify at this juncture, and that the poet who discovered the gap might not be enabled to fill it up

with success. As the Greeks have got on, up to this moment, without the wall, and as we have heard nothing but tales of their success, why should they now think farther laborious precautions for security necessary? We will not ask, why the Trojans should stand quietly by and permit a wall to be built, since the truce was concluded expressly for burying the dead.[296]

The tenth book, or Doloneia, was considered by some of the ancient scholiasts, [297] and has been confidently set forth by the modern Wolfian critics, as originally a separate poem, inserted by Peisistratus into the Iliad. How it can ever have been a separate poem, I do not understand. It is framed with great specialty for the antecedent circumstances under which it occurs, and would suit for no other place; though capable of being separately recited, inasmuch as it has a definite beginning and end, like the story of Nisus and Euryalus in the Æneid. But while distinctly presupposing and resting upon the incidents in the eighth book, and in line 88 of the ninth, (probably, the appointment of sentinels on the part of the Greeks, as well of the Trojans, formed the close of the battle described in the eighth book,) it has not the slightest bearing upon the events of the eleventh or the following books: it goes to make up the general picture of the Trojan war, but lies quite apart from the Achillêis. And this is one mark of a portion subsequently inserted,—that, though fitted on to the parts which precede, it has no influence on those which follow.

If the proceedings of the combatants on the plain of Troy, between the first and the eighth book, have no reference either to Achilles, or to an Achillêis, we find Zeus in Olympus still more completely putting that hero out of the question, at the beginning of the fourth book. He is in this last-mentioned passage the Zeus of the Iliad, not of the Achillêis. Forgetful of his promise to Thetis, in the first book, he discusses nothing but the question of continuance or termination of the war, and manifests anxiety only for the salvation of Troy, in opposition to the miso-Trojan goddesses, who prevent him from giving effect to the victory of Menelaus over Paris, and the stipulated restitution of Helen,—in which case, of course, the wrong offered to Achilles would remain unexpiated. An attentive comparison will render it evident that the poet who composed the discussion among the gods, at the beginning of the fourth book, has not been careful to put himself in harmony either with the Zeus of the first book, or with the Zeus of the eighth.

So soon as we enter upon the eleventh book, the march of the poem becomes quite different. We are then in a series of events, each paving the way for that which follows, and all conducing to the result promised in the first book,—the reappearance of Achilles, as the only means of saving the Greeks from ruin,—preceded by ample atonement,[298] and followed by the maximum both of glory and revenge. The intermediate career of Patroclus introduces new elements, which, however, are admirably woven into the scheme of the poem, as disclosed in the first book. I shall not deny that there are perplexities in the detail of events, as described in the battles at the Grecian wall, and before the ships, from the eleventh to the sixteenth books, but

they appear only cases of partial confusion, such as may be reasonably ascribed to imperfections of text: the main sequence remains coherent and intelligible. We find no considerable events which could be left out without breaking the thread, nor any incongruity between one considerable event and another. There is nothing between the eleventh and twenty-second books, which is at all comparable to the incongruity between the Zeus of the fourth book and the Zeus of the first and eighth. It may, perhaps, be true, that the shield of Achilles is a superadded amplification of that which was originally announced in general terms,—because the poet, from the eleventh to the twenty-second books, has observed such good economy of his materials, that he is hardly likely to have introduced one particular description of such disproportionate length, and having so little connection with the series of events. But I see no reason for believing that it is an addition materially later than the rest of the poem.

It must be confessed, that the supposition here advanced, in reference to the structure of the Iliad, is not altogether free from difficulties, because the parts constituting the original Achillêis[299] have been more or less altered or interpolated, to suit the additions made to it, particularly in the eighth book. But it presents fewer difficulties than any other supposition, and it is the only means, so far as I know, of explaining the difference between one part of the Iliad and another; both the continuity of structure, and the conformity to the opening promise, which are manifest when we read the books in the order i. viii. xi. to xxii, as contrasted with the absence of these two qualities in books ii. to vii. ix. and x. An entire organization, preconceived from the beginning, would not be likely to produce any such disparity, nor is any such visible in the Odyssey;[300] still less would the result be explained by supposing integers originally separate, and brought together without any designed organization. And it is between these three suppositions that our choice has to be made. A scheme, and a large scheme too, must unquestionably be admitted as the basis of any sufficient hypothesis. But the Achillêis would have been a long poem, half the length of the present Iliad, and probably not less compact in its structure than the Odyssey. Moreover, being parted off only by an imaginary line from the boundless range of the Trojan war, it would admit of enlargement more easily, and with greater relish to hearers, than the adventures of one single hero; while the expansion would naturally take place by adding new Grecian victory,—since the original poem arrived at the exaltation of Achilles only through a painful series of Grecian disasters. That the poem under these circumstances should have received additions, is no very violent hypothesis: in fact, when we recollect that the integrity both of the Achillêis and of the Odyssey was neither guarded by printing nor writing, we shall perhaps think it less wonderful that the former was enlarged,[301] than that the latter was not. Any relaxation of the laws of epical unity is a small price to pay for that splendid poetry, of which we find so much between the first and the eighth books of our Iliad.

The question respecting unity of authorship is different, and more difficult to determine, than that respecting consistency of parts, and sequence in the narrative. A poem conceived on a comparatively narrow scale may be enlarged afterwards by its original author, with greater or less coherence and success: the Faust of Goethe affords an example even in our own generation. On the other hand, a systematic poem may well have been conceived and executed by prearranged concert between several poets; among whom probably one will be the governing mind, though the rest may be effective, and perhaps equally effective, in respect to execution of the parts. And the age of the early Grecian epic was favorable to such fraternization of poets, of which the Gens called Homerids probably exhibited many specimens. In the recital or singing of a long unwritten poem, many bards must have conspired together, and in the earliest times the composer and the singer were one and the same person. [302] Now the individuals comprised in the Homerid Gens, though doubtless very different among themselves in respect of mental capacity, were yet homogeneous in respect of training, means of observation and instruction, social experience, religious feelings and theories, etc., to a degree much greater than individuals in modern times. Fallible as our inferences are on this point, where we have only internal evidence to guide us, without any contemporary points of comparison, or any species of collateral information respecting the age, the society, the poets, the hearers, or the language,—we must nevertheless, in the present case, take coherence of structure, together with consistency in the tone of thought, feeling, language, customs, etc., as presumptions of one author; and the contrary as presumptions of severalty; allowing, as well as we can, for that inequality of excellence which the same author may at different times present.

Now, the case made out against single-headed authorship of the Odyssey, appears to me very weak; and those who dispute it, are guided more by their *à priori* rejection of ancient epical unity, than by any positive evidence which the poem itself affords. It is otherwise with regard to the Iliad. Whatever presumptions a disjointed structure, several apparent inconsistencies of parts, and large excrescence of actual matter beyond the opening promise, can sanction,—may reasonably be indulged against the supposition that this poem all proceeds from a single author. There is a difference of opinion on the subject among the best critics, which is, probably, not destined to be adjusted, since so much depends partly upon critical feeling, partly upon the general reasonings, in respect to ancient epical unity, with which a man sits down to the study. For the champions of unity, such as Mr. Payne Knight, are very ready to strike out numerous and often considerable passages as interpolations, thus meeting the objections raised against unity of authorship, on the ground of special inconsistencies. Hermann and Boeckh, though not going the length of Lachmann in maintaining the original theory of Wolf, agree with the latter in recognizing diversity of authors in the poem, to an extent overpassing the limit of what can fairly be called interpolation. Payne Knight and Nitzsch are equally persuaded of the contrary. Here, then, is a decided contradiction among critics, all of whom have minutely studied the

poems since the Wolfian question was raised. And it is such critics alone who can be said to constitute authority; for the cursory reader, who dwells upon the parts simply long enough to relish their poetical beauty, is struck only by that general sameness of coloring which Wolf himself admits to pervade the poem.[303]

Having already intimated that, in my judgment, no theory of the structure of the poem is admissible which does not admit an original and preconcerted Achillêis,—a stream which begins at the first book and ends with the death of Hector, in the twenty-second, although the higher parts of it now remain only in the condition of two detached lakes, the first book and the eighth,—I reason upon the same basis with respect to the authorship. Assuming continuity of structure as a presumptive proof, the whole of this Achillêis must be treated as composed by one author. Wolf, indeed, affirmed, that he never read the poem continuously through without being painfully impressed with the inferiority[304] and altered style of the last six books,—and Lachmann carries this feeling farther back, so as to commence with the seventeenth book. If I could enter fully into this sentiment, I should then be compelled, not to deny the existence of a preconceived scheme, but to imagine that the books from the eighteenth to the twenty-second, though forming part of that scheme, or Achillêis, had yet been executed by another and an inferior poet. But it is to be remarked, first, that inferiority of poetical merit, to a certain extent, is quite reconcilable with unity of authorship; and, secondly, that the very circumstances upon which Wolf's unfavorable judgment is built, seem to arise out of increased difficulty in the poet's task, when he came to the crowning cantos of his designed Achillêis. For that which chiefly distinguishes these books, is, the direct, incessant, and manual intervention of the gods and goddesses, formerly permitted by Zeus,—and the repetition of vast and fantastic conceptions to which such superhuman agency gives occasion; not omitting the battle of Achilles against Skamander and Simois, and the burning up of these rivers by Hêphæstus. Now, looking at this vein of ideas with the eyes of a modern reader, or even with those of a Grecian critic of the literary ages, it is certain that the effect is unpleasing: the gods, sublime elements of poetry when kept in due proportion, are here somewhat vulgarized. But though the poet here has not succeeded, and probably success was impossible, in the task which he has prescribed to himself,—yet the mere fact of his undertaking it, and the manifest distinction between his employment of divine agency in these latter cantos as compared with the preceding, seems explicable only on the supposition that they *are* the latter cantos, and come in designed sequence, as the continuance of a previous plan. The poet wishes to surround the coming forth of Achilles with the maximum of glorious and terrific circumstance; no Trojan enemy can for a moment hold out against him:[305] the gods must descend to the plain of Troy and fight in person, while Zeus, who at the beginning of the eighth book, had forbidden them to take part, expressly encourages them to do so at the beginning of the twentieth. If, then, the nineteenth book (which contains the reconciliation between Achilles and Agamemnôn, a subject naturally somewhat tame) and the three following books (where we have before us only

the gods, Achilles, and the Trojans, without hope or courage) are inferior in execution and interest to the seven preceding books (which describe the long-disputed and often doubtful death-struggle between the Greeks and Trojans without Achilles), as Wolf and other critics affirm,—we may explain the difference without supposing a new poet as composer; for the conditions of the poem had become essentially more difficult, and the subject more unpromising. The necessity of keeping Achilles above the level, even of heroic prowess, restricted the poet's means of acting upon the sympathy of his hearers.[306]

The last two books of the Iliad may have formed part of the original Achillêis. But the probability rather is, that they are additions; for the death of Hector satisfies the exigencies of a coherent scheme, and we are not entitled to extend the oldest poem beyond the limit which such necessity prescribes. It has been argued on one side by Nitzsch and O. Müller, that the mind could not leave off with satisfaction at the moment in which Achilles sates his revenge, and while the bodies of Patroclus and Hector are lying unburied,—also, that the more merciful temper which he exhibits in the twenty-fourth book, must always have been an indispensable sequel, in order to create proper sympathy with his triumph. Other critics, on the contrary, have taken special grounds of exception against the last book, and have endeavored to set it aside as different from the other books, both in tone and language. To a certain extent, the peculiarities of the last book appear to me undeniable, though it is plainly a designed continuance, and not a substantive poem. Some weight also is due to the remark about the twenty-third book, that Odysseus and Diomêdês, who have been wounded and disabled during the fight, now reappear in perfect force, and contend in the games: here is no case of miraculous healing, and the inconsistency is more likely to have been admitted by a separate enlarging poet, than by the schemer of the Achillêis.

The splendid books from the second to v. 322 of the seventh,[307] are equal, in most parts, to any portion of the Achillêis, and are pointedly distinguished from the latter by the broad view which they exhibit of the general Trojan war, with all its principal personages, localities, and causes,—yet without advancing the result promised in the first book, or, indeed, any final purpose whatever. Even the desperate wound inflicted by Tlepolemus on Sarpêdon, is forgotten, when the latter hero is called forth in the subsequent Achillêis.[308] The arguments of Lachmann, who dissects these six books into three or four separate songs,[309] carry no conviction to my mind; and I see no reason why we should not consider all of them to be by the same author, bound together by the common purpose of giving a great collective picture which may properly be termed an Iliad. The tenth book, or Doloneia, though adapted specially to the place in which it stands, agrees with the books between the first and eighth in belonging only to the general picture of the war, without helping forward the march of the Achillêis; yet it seems conceived in a lower vein, in so far as we can trust our modern ethical sentiment. One is unwilling to believe that the author of the

fifth book, or Aristeia of Diomêdês, would condescend to employ the hero whom he there so brightly glorifies,—the victor even over Arês himself,—in slaughtering newly-arrived Thracian sleepers, without any large purpose or necessity.[310] The ninth book, of which I have already spoken at length, belongs to a different vein of conception, and seems to me more likely to have emanated from a separate composer.

While intimating these views respecting the authorship of the Iliad, as being in my judgment the most probable, I must repeat that, though the study of the poem carries to my mind a sufficient conviction respecting its structure, the question between unity and plurality of authors is essentially less determinable. The poem consists of a part original, and other parts superadded; yet it is certainly not impossible that the author of the former may himself have composed the latter; and such would be my belief if I regarded plurality of composers as an inadmissible idea. On this supposition, we must conclude that the poet, while anxious for the addition of new, and for the most part, highly interesting matter, has not thought fit to recast the parts and events in such manner as to impart to the whole a pervading thread of *consensus* and organization, such as we see in the Odyssey.

That the Odyssey is of later date than the Iliad, and by a different author, seems to be now the opinion of most critics, especially of Payne Knight[311] and Nitzsch; though O. Müller leans to a contrary conclusion, at the same time adding that he thinks the arguments either way not very decisive. There are considerable differences of statement in the two poems in regard to some of the gods: Iris is messenger of the gods in the Iliad, and Hermês in the Odyssey: Æolus, the dispenser of the winds in the Odyssey, is not noticed in the twenty-third book of the Iliad, but, on the contrary, Iris invites the winds, as independent gods, to come and kindle the funeral pile of Patroclus; and, unless we are to expunge the song of Demodokus in the eighth book of the Odyssey as spurious, Aphroditê there appears as the wife of Hêphæstus,—a relationship not known to the Iliad. There are also some other points of difference enumerated by Mr. Knight and others, which tend to justify the presumption that the author of the Odyssey is not identical either with the author of the Achillêis or his enlargers, which G. Hermann considers to be a point unquestionable.[312] Indeed, the difficulty of supposing a long coherent poem to have been conceived, composed, and retained, without any aid of writing, appears to many critics even now, insurmountable, though the evidences on the other side, are, in my view, sufficient to outweigh any negative presumption thus suggested. But it is improbable that the same person should have powers of memorial combination sufficient for composing two such poems, nor is there any proof to force upon us such a supposition.

Presuming a difference of authorship between the two poems, I feel less convinced about the supposed juniority of the Odyssey. The discrepancies in manners and language in the one and the other, are so little important, that two different persons, in the same age and society, might well be imagined to exhibit as great or even

greater. It is to be recollected that the subjects of the two are heterogeneous, so as to conduct the poet, even were he the same man, into totally different veins of imagination and illustration. The pictures of the Odyssey seem to delineate the same heroic life as the Iliad, though looked at from a distinct point of view: and the circumstances surrounding the residence of Odysseus, in Ithaka, are just such as we may suppose him to have left in order to attack Troy. If the scenes presented to us are for the most part pacific, as contrasted with the incessant fighting of the Iliad, this is not to be ascribed to any greater sociality or civilization in the real hearers of the Odyssey, but to the circumstances of the hero whom the poet undertakes to adorn: nor can we doubt that the poems of Arktinus and Leschês, of a later date than the Odyssey, would have given us as much combat and bloodshed as the Iliad. I am not struck by those proofs of improved civilization which some critics affirm the Odyssey to present: Mr. Knight, who is of this opinion, nevertheless admits that the mutilation of Melanthius, and the hanging up of the female slaves by Odysseus, in that poem, indicate greater barbarity than any incidents in the fights before Troy.[313] The more skilful and compact structure of the Odyssey, has been often considered as a proof of its juniority in age: and in the case of two poems by the same author, we might plausibly contend that practice would bring with it improvement in the combining faculty. But in reference to the poems before us, we must recollect, first, that in all probability the Iliad (with which the comparison is taken) is not a primitive but an enlarged poem, and that the primitive Achillêis might well have been quite as coherent as the Odyssey; secondly, that between different authors, superiority in structure is not a proof of subsequent composition, inasmuch as, on that hypothesis, we should be compelled to admit that the later poem of Arktinus would be an improvement upon the Odyssey; thirdly, that, even if it were so, we could only infer that the author of the Odyssey had *heard* the Achillêis or the Iliad; we could not infer that he lived one or two generations afterwards.[314]

On the whole, the balance of probabilities seems in favor of distinct authorship for the two poems, but the same age,—and that age a very early one, anterior to the first Olympiad. And they may thus be used as evidences, and contemporary evidences, for the phenomena of primitive Greek civilization; while they also show that the power of constructing long premeditated epics, without the aid of writing, is to be taken as a characteristic of the earliest known Greek mind. This was the point controverted by Wolf, which a full review of the case (in my judgment) decides against him: it is, moreover, a valuable result for the historian of the Greeks, inasmuch as it marks out to him the ground from which he is to start in appreciating their ulterior progress.[315]

Whatever there may be of truth in the different conjectures of critics respecting the authorship and structure of these unrivalled poems, we are not to imagine that it is the perfection of their epical symmetry which has given them their indissoluble hold upon the human mind, as well modern as ancient. There is some tendency in

critics, from Aristotle downwards,[316] to invert the order of attributes in respect to the Homeric poems, so as to dwell most on recondite excellences which escape the unaided reader, and which are even to a great degree disputable. But it is given to few minds (as Goethe has remarked[317]) to appreciate fully the mechanism of a long poem; and many feel the beauty of the separate parts, who have no sentiment for the aggregate perfection of the whole.

Nor were the Homeric poems originally addressed to minds of the rarer stamp. They are intended for those feelings which the critic has in common with the unlettered mass, not for that enlarged range of vision and peculiar standard which he has acquired to himself. They are of all poems the most absolutely and unreservedly popular: had they been otherwise, they could not have lived so long in the mouth of the rhapsodes, and the ear and memory of the people: and it was *then* that their influence was first acquired, never afterwards to be shaken. Their beauties belong to the parts taken separately, which revealed themselves spontaneously to the listening crowd at the festival,—far more than to the whole poem taken together, which could hardly be appreciated unless the parts were dwelt upon and suffered to expand in the mind. The most unlettered hearer of those times could readily seize, while the most instructed reader can still recognize, the characteristic excellence of Homeric narrative,—its straightforward, unconscious, unstudied simplicity,—its concrete forms of speech[318] and happy alternation of action with dialogue,—its vivid pictures of living agents, always clearly and sharply individualized, whether in the commanding proportions of Achilles and Odysseus, in the graceful presence of Helen and Penelope, or in the more humble contrast of Eumæus and Melanthius; and always, moreover, animated by the frankness with which his heroes give utterance to all their transient emotions and even all their infirmities,—its constant reference to those coarser veins of feeling and palpable motives which belong to all men in common,—its fulness of graphic details, freshly drawn from the visible and audible world, and though often homely, never tame, nor trenching upon that limit of satiety to which the Greek mind was so keenly alive,—lastly, its perpetual junction of gods and men in the same picture, and familiar appeal to ever-present divine agency, in harmony with the interpretation of nature at that time universal.

It is undoubtedly easier to feel than to describe the impressive influence of Homeric narrative: but the time and circumstances under which that influence was first, and most powerfully felt, preclude the possibility of explaining it by comprehensive and elaborate comparisons, such as are implied in Aristotle's remarks upon the structure of the poems. The critic who seeks the explanation in the right place will not depart widely from the point of view of those rude auditors to whom the poems were originally addressed, or from the susceptibilities and capacities common to the human bosom in every stage of progressive culture. And though the refinements and delicacies of the poems, as well as their general structure, are a subject of highly interesting criticism,—yet it is not to these that Homer owes his wide-spread and im-

perishable popularity. Still less is it true, as the well-known observations of Horace would lead us to believe, that Homer is a teacher of ethical wisdom akin and superior to Chrysippus or Crantor.[319] No didactic purpose is to be found in the Iliad and Odyssey; a philosopher may doubtless extract, from the incidents and strongly marked characters which it contains, much illustrative matter for his exhortations,—but the ethical doctrine which he applies must emanate from his own reflection. The Homeric hero manifests virtues or infirmities, fierceness or compassion, with the same straightforward and simple-minded vivacity, unconscious of any ideal standard by which his conduct is to be tried;[320] nor can we trace in the poet any ulterior function beyond that of the inspired organ of the Muse, and the nameless, but eloquent, herald of lost adventures out of the darkness of the past.

HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL GEOGRAPHY AND LIMITS OF GREECE.

Greece Proper lies between the 36th and 40th parallels of north latitude, and between the 21st and 26th degrees of east longitude. Its greatest length, from Mount Olympus to Cape Tænarus, may be stated at 250 English miles; its greatest breadth, from the western coast of Akarnania to Marathon in Attica, at 180 miles; and the distance eastward from Ambrakia across Pindus to the Magnesian mountain Homolê and the mouth of the Peneius is about 120 miles. Altogether, its area is somewhat less than that of Portugal.[321] In regard, however, to all attempts at determining the exact limits of Greece proper, we may remark, first, that these limits seem not to have been very precisely defined even among the Greeks themselves; and next, that so large a proportion of the Hellens were distributed among islands and colonies, and so much of their influence upon the world in general produced through their colonies, as to render the extent of their original domicile a matter of comparatively little moment to verify.

The chain called Olympus and the Cambunian mountains, ranging from east and west, and commencing with the Ægean sea or the gulf of Therma, near the 40th degree of north latitude, is prolonged under the name of Mount Lingon, until it touches the Adriatic at the Akrokeraunian promontory. The country south of this chain comprehended all that in ancient times was regarded as Greece, or Hellas proper, but it also comprehended something more. Hellas proper,[322] (or continuous Hellas, to use the language of Skylax and Dikæarchus) was understood to begin with the town and gulf of Ambrakia: from thence, northward to the Akrokeraunian promontory, lay the land called by the Greeks Epirus,—occupied by the Chaonians, Molossians, and Thesprotians, who were termed Epirots, and were not esteemed to belong to the Hellenic aggregate. This at least was the general understanding, though Ætolians and Akarnanians, in their more distant sections, seem to have been not less widely removed from the full type of Hellenism than the Epirots were; while Herodotus is inclined to treat even Molossians and Thesprotians as Hellens.[323]

At a point about midway between the Ægean and Ionian seas, Olympus and Lingon are traversed nearly at right angles by the still longer and vaster chain called Pindus, which stretches in a line rather west of north from the northern side of the range of Olympus: the system to which these mountains belong seems to begin with the lofty masses of greenstone comprised under the name of Mount Scardus, or Scordus, (Schardagh,)[324] which is divided only by the narrow cleft, containing the river Drin, from the limestone of the Albanian Alps. From the southern face of Olympus, Pindus strikes off nearly southward, forming the boundary between Thessaly and Epirus, and sending forth about the 39th degree of latitude the lateral chain of

Othrys,—which latter takes an easterly course, forming the southern boundary of Thessaly, and reaching the sea between Thessaly and the northern coast of Eubœa. Southward of Othrys, the chain of Pindus, under the name of Tymphrêstus, still continues, until another lateral chain, called Œta, projects from it again towards the east,—forming the lofty coast immediately south of the Maliac gulf, with the narrow road of Thermopylæ between the two,—and terminating at the Eubœan strait. At the point of junction with Œta, the chain of Pindus forks into two branches; one striking to the westward of south, and reaching across Ætolia, under the names of Arakynthus, Kurius, Korax, and Taphiassus, to the promontory called Antirrhion, situated on the northern side of the narrow entrance of the Corinthian gulf, over against the corresponding promontory of Rhion in Peloponnesus; the other tending south-east, and forming Parnassus, Helicon, and Kithærôn; indeed, Ægaleus and Hymettus, even down to the southernmost cape of Attica, Sunium, may be treated as a continuance of this chain. From the eastern extremity of Œta, also, a range of hills, inferior in height to the preceding, takes its departure in a south-easterly direction, under the various names of Knêmis, Ptôon, and Teumêssus. It is joined with Kithærôn by the lateral communication, ranging from west to east, called Parnês; while the celebrated Pentelikus, abundant in marble quarries, constitutes its connecting link, to the south of Parnês with the chain from Kithærôn to Sunium.

From the promontory of Antirrhion, the line of mountains crosses into Peloponnesus, and stretches in a southerly direction down to the extremity of the peninsula called Tænarus, now Cape Matapan. Forming the boundary between Elis with Messenia on one side, and Arcadia with Laconia on the other, it bears the successive names of Olenus, Panachaikus, Pholoê, Erymanthus, Lykæus, Parrhasius, and Taygetus. Another series of mountains strikes off from Kithærôn towards the south-west, constituting, under the names of Geraneia and Oneia, the rugged and lofty Isthmus of Corinth, and then spreading itself into Peloponnesus. On entering that peninsula, one of its branches tends westward along the north of Arkadia, comprising the Akrokorinthus, or citadel of Corinth, the high peak of Kyllênê, the mountains of Aroanii and Lampeia, and ultimately joining Erymanthus and Pholoê,—while the other branch strikes southward towards the south-eastern cape of Peloponnesus, the formidable Cape Malea, or St. Angelo,—and exhibits itself under the successive names of Apesas, Artemisium, Parthenium, Parnôn, Thornax, and Zarêx.

From the eastern extremity of Olympus, in a direction rather to the eastward of south, stretches the range of mountains first called Ossa, and afterwards Pelion, down to the south-eastern corner of Thessaly. The long, lofty, and naked back-bone of the island of Eubœa, may be viewed as a continuance both of this chain and of the chain of Othrys: the line is farther prolonged by a series of islands in the Archipelago, Andros, Tênos, Mykonos, and Naxos, belonging to the group called the Cyclades, or islands encircling the sacred centre of Delos. Of these Cyclades, others are in like manner a continuance of the chain which reaches to Cape Sunium,—Keôs,

Kythnos, Seriphos, and Siphnos join on to Attica, as Andros does to Eubœa. And we might even consider the great island of Krete as a prolongation of the system of mountains which breasts the winds and waves at Cape Malea, the island of Kythêra forming the intermediate link between them. Skiathus, Skopelus, and Skyrus, to the north-east of Eubœa, also mark themselves out as outlying peaks of the range comprehending Pelion and Eubœa.[325]

By this brief sketch, which the reader will naturally compare with one of the recent maps of the country, it will be seen that Greece proper is among the most mountainous territories in Europe. For although it is convenient, in giving a systematic view of the face of the country, to group the multiplicity of mountains into certain chains, or ranges, founded upon approximative uniformity of direction; yet, in point of fact, there are so many ramifications and dispersed peaks,—so vast a number of hills and crags of different magnitude and elevation,—that a comparatively small proportion of the surface is left for level ground. Not only few continuous plains, but even few continuous valleys, exist throughout all Greece proper. The largest spaces of level ground are seen in Thessaly, in Ætolia, in the western portion of Peloponnesus, and in Bœotia; but irregular mountains, valleys frequent but isolated, land-locked basins and declivities, which often occur, but seldom last long, form the character of the country.[326]

The islands of the Cyclades, Eubœa, Attica, and Laconia, consist for the most part of micaceous schist, combined with and often covered by crystalline granular limestone.[327] The centre and west of Peloponnesus, as well as the country north of the Corinthian gulf from the gulf of Ambrakia to the strait of Eubœa, present a calcareous formation, varying in different localities as to color, consistency, and hardness, but, generally, belonging or approximating to the chalk: it is often very compact, but is distinguished in a marked manner from the crystalline limestone above mentioned. The two loftiest summits in Greece[328] (both, however, lower than Olympus, estimated at nine thousand seven hundred feet) exhibit this formation,—Parnassus, which attains eight thousand feet, and the point of St. Elias in Taygetus, which is not less than seven thousand eight hundred feet. Clay-slate, and conglomerates of sand, lime, and clay, are found in many parts: a close and firm conglomerate of lime composes the Isthmus of Corinth: loose deposits of pebbles, and calcareous breccia, occupy also some portions of the territory. But the most important and essential elements of the Grecian soil, consist of the diluvial and alluvial formations, with which the troughs and basins are filled up, resulting from the decomposition of the older adjoining rocks. In these reside the productive powers of the country, and upon these the grain and vegetables for the subsistence of the people depend. The mountain regions are to a great degree barren, destitute at present of wood or any useful vegetation, though there is reason to believe that they were better wooded in antiquity: in many parts, however, and especially in Ætolia and Akarnania, they afford plenty of timber, and in all parts, pasture for the cattle during summer, at a time

when the plains are thoroughly burnt up.[329] For other articles of food, dependence must be had on the valleys, which are occasionally of singular fertility. The low ground of Thessaly, the valley of the Kephisus, and the borders of the lake Kopaïs, in Bœotia, the western portion of Elis, the plains of Stratus on the confines of Akarnania and Ætolia, and those near the river Pamisus in Messenia, both are now, and were in ancient times, remarkable for their abundant produce.

Besides the scarcity of wood for fuel, there is another serious inconvenience to which the low grounds of Greece are exposed,—the want of a supply of water at once adequate and regular.[330] Abundance of rain falls during the autumnal and winter months, little or none during the summer; while the naked limestone of the numerous hills, neither absorbs nor retains moisture, so that the rain runs off as rapidly as it falls, and springs are rare.[331] Most of the rivers of Greece are torrents in early spring, and dry before the end of the summer: the copious combinations of the ancient language, designated the winter torrent by a special and separate word.[332] The most considerable rivers in the country are, the Peneius, which carries off all the waters of Thessaly, finding an exit into the Ægean through the narrow defile which parts Ossa from Olympus,—and the Achelôus, which flows from Pindus in a south-westerly direction, separating Ætolia from Akarnania, and emptying itself into the Ionian sea: the Euênus also takes its rise at a more southerly part of the same mountain chain, and falls into the same sea more to the eastward. The rivers more to the southward are unequal and inferior. Kephisus and Asôpus, in Bœotia, Alpheius, in Elis and Arcadia, Pamisus in Messenia, maintain each a languid stream throughout the summer; while the Inachus near Argos, and the Kephisus and Ilissus near Athens, present a scanty reality which falls short still more of their great poetical celebrity. Of all those rivers which have been noticed, the Achelôus is by far the most important. The quantity of mud which its turbid stream brought down and deposited, occasioned a sensible increase of the land at its embouchure, within the observation of Thucydidês.[333]

But the disposition and properties of the Grecian territory, though not maintaining permanent rivers, are favorable to the multiplication of lakes and marshes. There are numerous hollows and inclosed basins, out of which the water can find no superficial escape, and where, unless it makes for itself a subterranean passage through rifts in the mountains, it remains either as a marsh or a lake according to the time of year. In Thessaly, we find the lakes Nessônis and Bœbêis; in Ætolia, between the Achelous and Eunêus, Strabo mentions the lake of Trichônis, besides several other lakes, which it is difficult to identify individually, though the quantity of ground covered by lake and marsh is, as a whole, very considerable. In Bœotia, are situated the lakes Kopaïs, Hylikê, and Harma; the first of the three formed chiefly by the river Kephisus, flowing from Parnassus on the north-west, and shaping for itself a sinuous course through the mountains of Phokis. On the north-east and east, the lake Kopaïs is bounded by the high land of Mount Ptôon, which intercepts its communication with

the strait of Eubœa. Through the limestone of this mountain, the water has either found or forced several subterraneous cavities, by which it obtains a partial egress on the other side of the rocky hill, and then flows into the strait. The Katabothra, as they were termed in antiquity, yet exist, but in an imperfect and half-obstructed condition. Even in antiquity, however, they never fully sufficed to carry off the surplus waters of the Kephisus; for the remains are still found of an artificial tunnel, pierced through the whole breadth of the rock, and with perpendicular apertures at proper intervals to let in the air from above. This tunnel—one of the most interesting remnants of antiquity, since it must date from the prosperous days of the old Orchomenus, anterior to its absorption into the Bœotian league, as well as to the preponderance of Thebes,—is now choked up and rendered useless. It may, perhaps, have been designedly obstructed by the hand of an enemy, and the scheme of Alexander the Great, who commissioned an engineer from Chalkis to reopen it, was defeated, first, by discontents in Bœotia, and ultimately by his early death.[334]

The Katabothra of the lake Kopaïs, are a specimen of the phenomenon so frequent in Greece,—lakes and rivers finding for themselves subterranean passages through the cavities in the limestone rocks, and even pursuing their unseen course for a considerable distance before they emerge to the light of day. In Arcadia, especially, several remarkable examples of subterranean water communication occur; this central region of Peloponnesus presents a cluster of such completely inclosed valleys, or basins.[335]

It will be seen from these circumstances, that Greece, considering its limited total extent, offers but little motive, and still less of convenient means, for internal communication among its various inhabitants.[336] Each village, or township, occupying its plain with the inclosing mountains,[337] supplied its own main wants whilst the transport of commodities by land was sufficiently difficult to discourage greatly any regular commerce with neighbors. In so far as the face of the interior country was concerned, it seemed as if nature had been disposed, from the beginning, to keep the population of Greece socially and politically disunited,—by providing so many hedges of separation, and so many boundaries, generally hard, sometimes impossible, to overleap. One special motive to intercourse, however, arose out of this very geographical constitution of the country, and its endless alternation of mountain and valley. The difference of climate and temperature between the high and low grounds is very great; the harvest is secured in one place before it is ripe in another, and the cattle find during the heat of summer shelter and pasture on the hills, at a time when the plains are burnt up.[338] The practice of transferring them from the mountains to the plain according to the change of season, which subsists still as it did in ancient times, is intimately connected with the structure of the country, and must from the earliest period have brought about communication among the otherwise disunited villages.[339]

Such difficulties, however, in the internal transit by land, were to a great extent counteracted by the large proportion of coast, and the accessibility of the country by sea. The prominences and indentations in the line of Grecian coast, are hardly less remarkable than the multiplicity of elevations and depressions which everywhere mark the surface.[340] The shape of Peloponnesus, with its three southern gulfs, (the Argolic, Laconian, and Messenian,) was compared by the ancient geographers to the leaf of a plane-tree: the Pagasæan gulf on the eastern side of Greece, and the Ambrakian gulf on the western, with their narrow entrances and considerable area, are equivalent to internal lakes: Xenophon boasts of the double sea which embraces so large a proportion of Attica, Ephorus of the triple sea, by which Bœotia was accessible from west, north, and south,—the Eubœan strait, opening a long line of country on both sides to coasting navigation.[341] But the most important of all Grecian gulfs are the Corinthian and the Saronic, washing the northern and north-eastern shores of Peloponnesus, and separated by the narrow barrier of the Isthmus of Corinth. The former, especially, lays open Ætolia, Phokis, and Bœotia, as well as the whole northern coast of Peloponnesus, to water approach. Corinth, in ancient times, served as an entrepôt for the trade between Italy and Asia Minor,—goods being unshipped at Lechæum, the port on the Corinthian gulf, and carried by land across to Cenchreæ, the port on the Saronic: indeed, even the merchant-vessels themselves, when not very large,[342] were conveyed across by the same route. It was accounted a prodigious advantage to escape the necessity of sailing round Cape Malea: and the violent winds and currents which modern experience attests to prevail around that formidable promontory, are quite sufficient to justify the apprehensions of the ancient Greek merchant, with his imperfect apparatus for navigation.[343]

It will thus appear that there was no part of Greece proper which could be considered as out of reach of the sea, while most parts of it were convenient and easy of access: in fact, the Arcadians were the only large section of the Hellenic name, (we may add the Doric, Tetrapolis, and the mountaineers along the chain of Pindus and Tymphrêstus,) who were altogether without a seaport.[344] But Greece proper constituted only a fraction of the entire Hellenic world, during the historical age: there were the numerous islands, and still more numerous continental colonies, all located as independent intruders on distinct points of the coast,[345] in the Euxine, the Ægean, the Mediterranean, and the Adriatic; and distant from each other by the space which separates Trebizond from Marseilles. All these various cities were comprised in the name Hellas, which implied no geographical continuity: all prided themselves on Hellenic blood, name, religion, and mythical ancestry. As the only communication between them was maritime, so the sea, important, even if we look to Greece proper exclusively, was the sole channel for transmitting ideas and improvements, as well as for maintaining sympathies—social, political, religious, and literary—throughout these outlying members of the Hellenic aggregate.

The ancient philosophers and legislators were deeply impressed with the contrast between an inland and a maritime city: in the former, simplicity and uniformity of life, tenacity of ancient habits, and dislike of what is new or foreign, great force of exclusive sympathy, and narrow range both of objects and ideas; in the latter, variety and novelty of sensations, expansive imagination, toleration, and occasional preference for extraneous customs, greater activity of the individual, and corresponding mutability of the state. This distinction stands prominent in the many comparisons instituted between the Athens of Periklês and the Athens of the earlier times down to Solôn. Both Plato and Aristotle dwell upon it emphatically,—and the former especially, whose genius conceived the comprehensive scheme of prescribing beforehand and insuring in practice the whole course of individual thought and feeling in his imaginary community, treats maritime communication, if pushed beyond the narrowest limits, as fatal to the success and permanence of any wise scheme of education. Certain it is, that a great difference of character existed between those Greeks who mingled much in maritime affairs, and those who did not. The Arcadian may stand as a type of the pure Grecian landsman, with his rustic and illiterate habits,[346]—his diet of sweet chestnuts, barley-cakes, and pork (as contrasted with the fish which formed the chief seasoning for the bread of an Athenian,)—his superior courage and endurance,—his reverence for Lacedaemonian headship as an old and customary influence,—his sterility of intellect and imagination, as well as his slackness in enterprise,—his unchangeable rudeness of relations with the gods, which led him to scourge and prick Pan, if he came back empty-handed from the chase; while the inhabitant of Phôkæa or Miletus exemplifies the Grecian mariner, eager in search of gain,—active, skilful, and daring at sea, but inferior in stedfast bravery on land,—more excitable in imagination as well as more mutable in character,—full of pomp and expense in religious manifestations towards the Ephesian Artemis or the Apollo of Branchidæ; with a mind more open to the varieties of Grecian energy and to the refining influences of Grecian civilization. The Peloponnesians generally, and the Lacedæmonians in particular, approached to the Arcadian type,—while the Athenians of the fifth century B. C. stood foremost in the other; superadding to it, however, a delicacy of taste, and a predominance of intellectual sympathy and enjoyments, which seem to have been peculiar to themselves.

The configuration of the Grecian territory, so like in many respects to that of Switzerland, produced two effects of great moment upon the character and history of the people. In the first place, it materially strengthened their powers of defence: it shut up the country against those invasions from the interior, which successively subjugated all their continental colonies; and it at the same time rendered each fraction more difficult to be attacked by the rest, so as to exercise a certain conservative influence in assuring the tenure of actual possessors: for the pass of Thermopylæ, between Thessaly and Phokis, that of Kythærôn, between Bœotia and Attica, or the mountainous range of Oneion and Geraneia along the Isthmus of Corinth, were positions which an inferior number of brave men could hold against a much greater force

of assailants. But, in the next place, while it tended to protect each section of Greeks from being conquered, it also kept them politically disunited, and perpetuated their separate autonomy. It fostered that powerful principle of repulsion, which disposed even the smallest township to constitute itself a political unit apart from the rest, and to resist all idea of coalescence with others, either amicable or compulsory. To a modern leader, accustomed to large political aggregations, and securities for good government through the representative system, it requires a certain mental effort to transport himself back to a time when even the smallest town clung so tenaciously to its right of self-legislation. Nevertheless, such was the general habit and feeling of the ancient world, throughout Italy, Sicily, Spain, and Gaul. Among the Hellenes, it stands out more conspicuously, for several reasons,—first, because they seem to have pushed the multiplication of autonomous units to an extreme point, seeing that even islands not larger than Peparêthos and Amorgos had two or three separate city communities;[347] secondly, because they produced, for the first time in the history of mankind, acute systematic thinkers on matters of government, amongst all of whom the idea of the autonomous city was accepted as the indispensable basis of political speculation; thirdly, because this incurable subdivision proved finally the cause of their ruin, in spite of pronounced intellectual superiority over their conquerors: and lastly, because incapacity of political coalescence did not preclude a powerful and extensive sympathy between the inhabitants of all the separate cities, with a constant tendency to fraternize for numerous purposes, social, religious, recreative, intellectual, and æsthetical. For these reasons, the indefinite multiplication of self-governing towns, though in truth a phenomenon common to ancient Europe, as contrasted with the large monarchies of Asia, appears more marked among the ancient Greeks than elsewhere: and there cannot be any doubt that they owe it, in a considerable degree, to the multitude of insulating boundaries which the configuration of their country presented.

Nor is it rash to suppose that the same causes may have tended to promote that unborrowed intellectual development for which they stand so conspicuous. General propositions respecting the working of climate and physical agencies upon character are, indeed, treacherous; for our knowledge of the globe is now sufficient to teach us that heat and cold, mountain and plain, sea and land, moist and dry atmosphere, are all consistent with the greatest diversities of resident men: moreover, the contrast between the population of Greece itself, for the seven centuries preceding the Christian era, and the Greeks of more modern times, is alone enough to inculcate reserve in such speculations. Nevertheless, we may venture to note certain improving influences, connected with their geographical position, at a time when they had no books to study, and no more advanced predecessors to imitate. We may remark, first, that their position made them at once mountaineers and mariners, thus supplying them with great variety of objects, sensations, and adventures; next, that each petty community, nestled apart amidst its own rocks,[348] was sufficiently severed from the rest to possess an individual life and attributes of its own, yet not so far as to subtract it

from the sympathies of the remainder; so that an observant Greek, commercing with a great diversity of half countrymen, whose language he understood, and whose idiosyncrasies he could appreciate, had access to a larger mass of social and political experience than any other man in so unadvanced an age could personally obtain. The Phœnician, superior to the Greek on shipboard, traversed wider distances, and saw a greater number of strangers, but had not the same means of intimate communion with a multiplicity of fellows in blood and language. His relations, confined to purchase and sale, did not comprise that mutuality of action and reaction which pervaded the crowd at a Grecian festival. The scene which here presented itself, was a mixture of uniformity and variety highly stimulating to the observant faculties of a man of genius,—who at the same time, if he sought to communicate his own impressions, or to act upon this mingled and diverse audience, was forced to shake off what was peculiar to his own town or community, and to put forth matter in harmony with the feelings of all. It is thus that we may explain, in part, that penetrating apprehension of human life and character, and that power of touching sympathies common to all ages and nations, which surprises us so much in the unlettered authors of the old epic. Such periodical intercommunion of brethren habitually isolated from each other, was the only means then open of procuring for the bard a diversified range of experience and a many-colored audience; and it was to a great degree the result of geographical causes. Perhaps among other nations such facilitating causes might have been found, yet without producing any result comparable to the Iliad and Odyssey. But Homer was, nevertheless, dependent upon the conditions of his age, and we can at least point out those peculiarities in early Grecian society, without which Homeric excellence would never have existed,—the geographical position is one, the language another.

In mineral and metallic wealth, Greece was not distinguished. Gold was obtained in considerable abundance in the island of Siphnos, which, throughout the sixth century B. C., was among the richest communities of Greece, and possessed a treasure-chamber at Delphi, distinguished for the richness of its votive offerings. At that time, gold was so rare in Greece, that the Lacedæmonians were obliged to send to the Lydian Crœsus, in order to provide enough of it for the gilding of a statue.[349] It appears to have been more abundant in Asia Minor, and the quantity of it in Greece was much multiplied by the opening of mines in Thrace, Macedonia, Epirus, and even some parts of Thessaly. In the island of Thasos, too, some mines were reopened with profitable result, which had been originally begun, and subsequently abandoned, by Phœnician settlers of an earlier century. From these same districts, also, was procured a considerable amount of silver; while, about the beginning of the fifth century B. C., the first effective commencement seems to have been made of turning to account the rich southern district of Attica, called Laureion. Copper was obtained in various parts of Greece, especially in Cyprus and Eubœa,—in which latter island was also found the earth called Cadmia, employed for the purification of the ore. Bronze was used among the Greeks for many purposes in which iron is now em-

ployed: and even the arms of the Homeric heroes (different in this respect from the later historical Greeks) are composed of copper, tempered in such a way as to impart to it an astonishing hardness. Iron was found in Eubœa, Bœôtia, and Melos,—but still more abundantly in the mountainous region of the Laconian Taygetus. There is, however no part of Greece where the remains of ancient metallurgy appear now so conspicuous, as the island of Seriphos. The excellence and varieties of marble, from Pentelikus, Hymettus, Paros, Karystus, etc., and other parts of the country,—so essential for the purposes of sculpture and architecture,—is well known.[350]

Situated under the same parallels of latitude as the coast of Asia Minor, and the southernmost regions of Italy and Spain, Greece produced wheat, barley, flax, wine, and oil, in the earliest times of which we have any knowledge;[351] though the currants, Indian corn, silk, and tobacco, which the country now exhibits, are an addition of more recent times. Theophrastus and other authors amply attest the observant and industrious agriculture prevalent among the ancient Greeks, as well as the care with which its various natural productions, comprehending a great diversity of plants, herbs, and trees, were turned to account. The cultivation of the vine and the olive,—the latter indispensable to ancient life, not merely for the purposes which it serves at present, but also from the constant habit then prevalent of anointing the body,—appears to have been particularly elaborate; and the many different accidents of soil, level, and exposure, which were to be found, not only in Hellas proper, but also among the scattered Greek settlements, afforded to observant planters materials for study and comparison. The barley-cake seems to have been more generally eaten than the wheaten loaf;[352] but one or other of them, together with vegetables and fish, (sometimes fresh, but more frequently salt,) was the common food of the population; the Arcadians fed much upon pork, and the Spartans also consumed animal food; but by the Greeks, generally, fresh meat seems to have been little eaten, except at festivals and sacrifices. The Athenians, the most commercial people in Greece proper, though their light, dry, and comparatively poor soil produced excellent barley, nevertheless, did not grow enough corn for their own consumption: they imported considerable supplies of corn from Sicily, from the coast of the Euxine, and the Tauric Chersonese, and salt-fish both from the Propontis and even from Gades:[353] the distance from whence these supplies came, when we take into consideration the extent of fine corn-land in Bœotia and Thessaly, proves how little internal trade existed between the various regions of Greece proper. The exports of Athens consisted in her figs and other fruit, olives, oil,—for all of which she was distinguished,—together with pottery, ornamental manufactures, and the silver from her mines at Laureion. Salt-fish, doubtless, found its way more or less throughout all Greece;[354] but the population of other states in Greece lived more exclusively upon their own produce than the Athenians, with less of purchase and sale,[355]—a mode of life assisted by the simple domestic economy universally prevalent, in which the women not only carded and spun all the wool, but also wove out of it the clothing and bedding employed in the family. Weaving was then considered as much a woman's business as

spinning, and the same feeling and habits still prevail to the present day in modern Greece, where the loom is constantly seen in the peasants' cottages, and always worked by women.[356]

The climate of Greece appears to be generally described by modern travellers in more favorable terms than it was by the ancients, which is easily explicable from the classical interest, picturesque beauties, and transparent atmosphere, so vividly appreciate by an English or a German eye. Herodotus,[357] Hippocrates, and Aristotle, treat the climate of Asia as far more genial and favorable both to animal and vegetable life, but at the same time more enervating than that of Greece: the latter, they speak of chiefly in reference to its changeful character and diversities of local temperature, which they consider as highly stimulant to the energies of the inhabitants. There is reason to conclude that ancient Greece was much more healthy than the same territory is at present, inasmuch as it was more industriously cultivated, and the towns both more carefully administered and better supplied with water. But the differences in respect of healthiness, between one portion of Greece and another, appear always to have been considerable, and this, as well as the diversities of climate, affected the local habits and the character of the particular sections. Not merely were there great differences between the mountaineers and the inhabitants of the plains, [358]—between Lokrains, Ætolians, Phokians, Dorians, Œtæans, and Arcadians, on one hand, and the inhabitants of Attica, Bœotia, and Elis, on the other,—but each of the various tribes which went to compose these categories, had its peculiarities; and the marked contrast between Athenians and Bœotians was supposed to be represented by the light and heavy atmosphere which they respectively breathed. Nor was this all: for, even among the Bœotian aggregate, every town had its own separate attributes, physical as well as moral and political:[359] Orôpus, Tanagra, Thespiæ, Thebes, Anthêdôn, Haliartus, Korôneia, Onchêstus, and Platæa, were known to Bœotians each by its own characteristic epithet: and Dikæarchus even notices a marked distinction between the inhabitants of the city of Athens and those in the country of Attica. Sparta, Argos, Corinth, and Sikyôn, though all called Doric, had each its own dialect and peculiarities. All these differences, depending in part upon climate, site, and other physical considerations, contributed to nourish antipathies, and to perpetuate that imperfect cohesion, which has already been noticed as an indelible feature in Hellas.

The Epirotic tribes, neighbors of the Ætolians and Akarnanians, filled the space between Pindus and the Ionian sea until they joined to the northward the territory inhabited by the powerful and barbarous Illyrians. Of these Illyrians, the native Macedonian tribes appear to have been an outlying section, dwelling northward of Thessaly and Mount Olympus, eastward of the chain by which Pindus is continued, and westward of the river Axius. The Epirots were comprehended under the various denominations of Chaonians, Molossians, Thesprotians, Kassopæans, Amphilochians, Athamānes, the Æthīkes, Tymphæi, Orestæ, Paroræi, and Atintānes,[360]—most of

the latter being small communities dispersed about the mountainous region of Pindus. There was, however, much confusion in the application of the comprehensive name *Epirot*, which was a title given altogether by the Greeks, and given purely upon geographical, not upon ethnical considerations. Epirus seems at first to have stood opposed to Peloponnesus, and to have signified the general region northward of the gulf of Corinth; and in this primitive sense it comprehended the Ætolians and Akarnanians, portions of whom spoke a dialect difficult to understand, and were not less widely removed than the Epirots from Hellenic habits.[361] The oracle of Dodona forms the point of ancient union between Greeks and Epirots, which was superseded by Delphi, as the civilization of Hellas developed itself. Nor is it less difficult to distinguish Epirots from Macedonians on the one hand, than from Hellenes on the other; the language, the dress, and the fashion of wearing the hair being often analogous, while the boundaries, amidst rude men and untravelled tracts, were very inaccurately understood.[362]

In describing the limits occupied by the Hellens in 776 B. C., we cannot yet take account of the important colonies of Leukas and Ambrakia, established by the Corinthians subsequently on the western coast of Epirus. The Greeks of that early time seem to comprise the islands of Kephallenia, Zakynthus, Ithaka, and Dulichium, but no settlement, either inland or insular, farther northward.

They include farther, confining ourselves to 776 B. C., the great mass of islands between the coast of Greece and that of Asia Minor, from Tenedos on the north, to Rhodes, Krete, and Kythêra southward; and the great islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and Eubœa, as well as the groups called the Sporades and the Cyclades. Respecting the four considerable islands nearer to the coasts of Macedonia and Thrace, —Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, and Thasos,—it may be doubted whether they were at that time Hellenized. The Catalogue of the Iliad includes, under Agamemnôn, contingents from Ægina, Eubœa, Krete, Karpathus, Kasus, Kôs, and Rhodes: in the oldest epical testimony which we possess, these islands thus appear inhabited by Greeks; but the others do not occur in the Catalogue, and are never mentioned in such manner as to enable us to draw any inference. Eubœa ought, perhaps, rather to be looked upon as a portion of Grecian mainland (from which it was only separated by a strait narrow enough to be bridged over) than as an island. But the last five islands named in the Catalogue are all either wholly or partially Doric: no Ionic or Æolic island appears in it: these latter, though it was among them that the poet sung, appear to be represented by their ancestral heroes, who came from Greece proper.

The last element to be included, as going to make up the Greece of 776 B. C., is the long string of Doric, Ionic, and Æolic settlements on the coast of Asia Minor,—occupying a space bounded on the north by the Troad and the region of Ida, and extending southward as far as the peninsula of Knidus. Twelve continental cities, over and above the islands of Lesbos and Tenedos, are reckoned by Herodotus as ancient

Æolic foundations,—Smyrna, Kymê, Larissa, Neon-Teichos, Têmnos, Killa, Notium, Ægirœssa, Pitana, Ægæ, Myrina, and Gryneia. Smyrna, having been at first Æolic, was afterwards acquired through a stratagem by Ionic inhabitants, and remained permanently Ionic. Phokæa, the northernmost of the Ionic settlements, bordered upon Æolis: Klazomenæ, Erythræ, Teôs, Lebedos, Kolophôn, Priênê, Myus, and Milêtus, continued the Ionic name to the southward. These, together with Samos and Chios, formed the Panionic federation.[363] To the south of Milêtus, after a considerable interval, lay the Doric establishments of Myndus, Halikarnassus, and Knidus: the two latter, together with the island of Kôs and the three townships in Rhodes, constituted the Doric Hexapolis, or communion of six cities, concerted primarily with a view to religious purposes, but producing a secondary effect analogous to political federation.

Such, then, is the extent of Hellas, as it stood at the commencement of the recorded Olympiads. To draw a picture even for this date, we possess no authentic materials, and are obliged to ante-date statements which belong to a later age: and this consideration might alone suffice to show how uncertified are all delineations of the Greece of 1183 B. C., the supposed epoch of the Trojan war, four centuries earlier.

CHAPTER II.

THE HELLENIC PEOPLE GENERALLY, IN THE EARLY HISTORICAL TIMES.

THE territory indicated in the last chapter—south of Mount Olympus, and south of the line which connects the city of Ambrakia with Mount Pindus,—was occupied during the historical period by the central stock of the Hellens, or Greeks, from which their numerous outlying colonies were planted out.

Both metropolitans and colonists styled themselves Hellens, and were recognized as such by each other; all glorying in the name as the prominent symbol of fraternity;—all describing non-Hellenic men, or cities, by a word which involved associations of repugnance. Our term *barbarian*, borrowed from this latter word, does not express the same idea; for the Greeks spoke thus indiscriminately of the extra-Hellenic world, with all its inhabitants;[364] whatever might be the gentleness of their character, and whatever might be their degree of civilization. The rulers and people of Egyptian Thebes, with their ancient and gigantic monuments, the wealthy Tyrians and Carthaginians, the phil-Hellene Arganthonius of Tartêssus, and the well-disciplined patricians of Rome (to the indignation of old Cato,[365]) were all comprised in it. At first, it seemed to have expressed more of repugnance than of contempt, and repugnance especially towards the sound of a foreign language.[366] Afterwards, a feeling of their own superior intelligence (in part well justified) arose among the Greeks, and their term *barbarian* was used so as to imply a low state of the temper and intelligence; in which sense it was retained by the semi-Hellenized Romans, as the proper antithesis to their state of civilization. The want of a suitable word, corresponding to *barbarian*, as the Greeks originally used it, is so inconvenient in the description of Grecian phenomena and sentiments, that I may be obliged occasionally to use the word in its primitive sense.

The Hellens were all of common blood and parentage,—were all descendants of the common patriarch Hellen. In treating of the historical Greeks, we have to accept this as a datum: it represents the sentiment under the influence of which they moved and acted. It is placed by Herodotus in the front rank, as the chief of those four ties which bound together the Hellenic aggregate: 1. Fellowship of blood; 2. Fellowship of language; 3. Fixed domiciles of gods, and sacrifices, common to all; 4. Like manners and dispositions.

These (say the Athenians, in their reply to the Spartan envoys, in the very crisis of the Persian invasion) "Athens will never disgrace herself by betraying." And Zeus Hellenius was recognized as the god watching over and enforcing the fraternity thus constituted.[367]

Hekatæus, Herodotus, and Thucydidês,[368] all believed that there had been an ante-Hellenic period, when different languages, mutually unintelligible, were spoken between Mount Olympus and Cape Malea. However this may be, during the historical times the Greek language was universal throughout these limits,—branching out, however, into a great variety of dialects, which were roughly classified by later literary men into Ionic, Doric, Æolic, and Attic. But the classification presents a semblance of regularity, which in point of fact does not seem to have been realized; each town, each smaller subdivision of the Hellenic name, having peculiarities of dialect belonging to itself. Now the lettered men who framed the quadruple division took notice chiefly, if not exclusively, of the written dialects,—those which had been ennobled by poets or other authors; the mere spoken idioms were for the most part neglected.[369] That there was no such thing as one Ionic dialect in the speech of the people called Ionic Greek, we know from the indisputable testimony of Herodotus, [370] who tells us that there were four capital varieties of speech among the twelve Asiatic towns especially known as Ionic. Of course, the varieties would have been much more numerous if he had given us the impressions of his ear in Eubœa, the Cyclades, Massalia, Rhegium, and Olbia,—all numbered as Greeks and as Ionians. The Ionic dialect of the grammarians was an extract from Homer, Hekatæus, Herodotus, Hippocrates, etc.; to what living speech it made the nearest approach, amidst those divergences which the historian has made known to us, we cannot tell. Sapphô and Alkæus in Lesbos, Myrtis and Korinna in Bœotia, were the great sources of reference for the Lesbian and Bœotian varieties of the Æolic dialect,—of which there was a third variety, untouched by the poets, in Thessaly.[371] The analogy between the different manifestations of Doric and Æolic, as well as that between the Doric generally and the Æolic generally, contrasted with the Attic, is only to be taken as rough and approximative.

But all these different dialects are nothing more than dialects, distinguished as modifications of one and the same language, and exhibiting evidence of certain laws and principles pervading them all. They seem capable of being traced back to a certain ideal mother-language, peculiar in itself and distinguishable from, though cognate with, the Latin; a substantive member of what has been called the Indo-European family of languages. This truth has been brought out, in recent times, by the comparative examination applied to the Sanscrit, Zend, Greek, Latin, German, and Lithuanian languages, as well as by the more accurate analysis of the Greek language itself to which such studies have given rise, in a manner much more clear than could have been imagined by the ancients themselves.[372] It is needless to dwell upon the importance of this uniformity of language in holding together the race, and in rendering the genius of its most favored members available to the civilization of all. Except in the rarest cases, the divergences of dialect were not such as to prevent every Greek from understanding, and being understood by, every other Greek,—a fact remarkable, when we consider how many of their outlying colonists, not having taken out women in their emigration, intermarried with non-Hellenic

wives. And the perfection and popularity of their early epic poems, was here of inestimable value for the diffusion of a common type of language, and for thus keeping together the sympathies of the Hellenic world.[373] The Homeric dialect became the standard followed by all Greek poets for the hexameter, as may be seen particularly from the example of Hesiod,—who adheres to it in the main, though his father was a native of the Æolic Kymê, and he himself resident at Askra, in the Æolic Bœotia,—and the early iambic and elegiac compositions are framed on the same model. Intellectual Greeks in all cities, even the most distant outcasts from the central hearth, became early accustomed to one type of literary speech, and possessors of a common stock of legends, maxims, and metaphors.

That community of religious sentiments, localities, and sacrifices, which Herodotus names as the third bond of union among the Greeks, was a phenomenon, not (like the race and the language) interwoven with their primitive constitution, but of gradual growth. In the time of Herodotus, and even a century earlier, it was at its full maturity: but there had been a period when no religious meetings common to the whole Hellenic body existed. What are called the Olympic, Pythian, Nemean, and Isthmian games, (the four most conspicuous amidst many others analogous,) were, in reality, great religious festivals,—for the gods then gave their special sanction, name, and presence, to recreative meetings,—the closest association then prevailed between the feelings of common worship and the sympathy in common amusement.[374] Though this association is now no longer recognized, it is, nevertheless, essential that we should keep it fully before us, if we desire to understand the life and proceedings of the Greeks. To Herodotus and his contemporaries, these great festivals, then frequented by crowds from every part of Greece, were of overwhelming importance and interest; yet they had once been purely local, attracting no visitors except from a very narrow neighborhood. In the Homeric poems, much is said about the common gods, and about special places consecrated to and occupied by several of them: the chiefs celebrate funeral games in honor of a deceased father, which are visited by competitors from different parts of Greece, but nothing appears to manifest public or town festivals open to Grecian visitors generally.[375] And, though the rocky Pytho, with its temple, stands out in the Iliad as a place both venerated and rich,—the Pythian games, under the superintendence of the Amphiktyons, with continuous enrolment of victors, and a Pan-Hellenic reputation, do not begin until after the Sacred War, in the 48th Olympiad, or 586 B. C.[376]

The Olympic games, more conspicuous than the Pythian, as well as considerably older, are also remarkable on another ground, inasmuch as they supplied historical computers with the oldest backward record of continuous time. It was in the year 776 B. C., that the Eleians inscribed the name of their countryman, Korœbus, as victor in the competition of runners, and that they began the practice of inscribing in like manner, in each Olympic, or fifth recurring year, the name of the runner who won the prize. Even for a long time after this, however, the Olympic games seem to have

remained a local festival; the prize being uniformly carried off, at the first twelve Olympiads, by some competitor either of Elis or its immediate neighborhood. The Nemean and Isthmian games did not become notorious or frequented until later even than the Pythian. Solôn,[377] in his legislation, proclaimed the large reward of five hundred drachms for every Athenian who gained an Olympic prize, and the lower sum of one hundred drachms for an Isthmiac prize. He counts the former, as Pan-Hellenic rank and renown, an ornament even to the city of which the victor was a member,—the latter, as partial, and confined to the neighborhood.

Of the beginnings of these great solemnities, we cannot presume to speak, except in mythical language: we know them only in their comparative maturity. But the habit of common sacrifice, on a small scale, and between near neighbors, is a part of the earliest habits of Greece. The sentiment of fraternity, between two tribes or villages, first manifested itself by sending a sacred legation, or Theôria,[378] to offer sacrifice at each other's festivals, and to partake in the recreations which followed; thus establishing a truce with solemn guarantee, and bringing themselves into direct connection each with the god of the other under his appropriate local surname. The pacific communion so fostered, and the increased assurance of intercourse, as Greece gradually emerged from the turbulence and pugnacity of the heroic age, operated especially in extending the range of this ancient habit: the village festivals became town festivals, largely frequented by the citizens of other towns, and sometimes with special invitations sent round to attract Theôrs from every Hellenic community,—and thus these once humble assemblages gradually swelled into the pomp and immense confluence of the Olympic and Pythian games. The city administering such holy ceremonies enjoyed inviolability of territory during the month of their occurrence, being itself under obligation at that time to refrain from all aggression, as well as to notify by heralds[379] the commencement of the truce to all other cities not in avowed hostility with it. Elis imposed heavy fines upon other towns—even on the powerful Lacedæmon—for violation of the Olympic truce, on pain of exclusion from the festival in case of non-payment.

Sometimes this tendency to religious fraternity took a form called an Amphiktyony, different from the common festival. A certain number of towns entered into an exclusive religious partnership, for the celebration of sacrifices periodically to the god of a particular temple, which was supposed to be the common property, and under the common protection of all, though one of the number was often named as permanent administrator; while all other Greeks were excluded. That there were many religious partnerships of this sort, which have never acquired a place in history, among the early Grecian villages, we may, perhaps, gather from the etymology of the word, (Amphiktyons[380] designates residents around, or neighbors, considered in the point of view of fellow-religionists,) as well as from the indications preserved to us in reference to various parts of the country. Thus there was an Amphiktyony[381] of seven cities at the holy island of Kalauria, close to the harbor of Trœzên. Hermionê, Epidau-

rus, Ægina, Athens, Prasiæ, Nauplia, and Orchomenus, jointly maintained the temple and sanctuary of Poseidôn in that island, (with which it would seem that the city of Trœzên, though close at hand, had no connection,) meeting there at stated periods, to offer formal sacrifices. These seven cities, indeed, were not immediate neighbors, but the speciality and exclusiveness of their interest in the temple is seen from the fact, that when the Argeians took Nauplia, they adopted and fulfilled these religious obligations on behalf of the prior inhabitants: so, also, did the Lacedæmonians, when they had captured Prasiæ. Again, in Triphylia,[382] situated between the Pisatid and Messenia, in the western part of Peloponnesus, there was a similar religious meeting and partnership of the Triphylians on Cape Samikon, at the temple of the Samian Poseidôn. Here, the inhabitants of Makiston were intrusted with the details of superintendence, as well as with the duty of notifying beforehand the exact time of meeting, (a precaution essential amidst the diversities and irregularities of the Greek calendar,) and also of proclaiming what was called the Samian truce,—a temporary abstinence from hostilities, which bound all Triphylians during the holy period. This latter custom discloses the salutary influence of such institutions in presenting to men's minds a common object of reverence, common duties, and common enjoyments; thus generating sympathies and feelings of mutual obligation amidst petty communities not less fierce than suspicious.[383] So, too, the twelve chief Ionic cities in and near Asia Minor, had their Pan-Ionic Amphiktyony peculiar to themselves: the six Doric cities, in and near the southern corner of that peninsula, combined for the like purpose at the temple of the Triopian Apollo; and the feeling of special partnership is here particularly illustrated by the fact, that Halikarnassus, one of the six, was formally extruded by the remaining five, in consequence of a violation of the rules.[384] There was also an Amphiktyonic union at Onchêstus in Bœotia, in the venerated grove and temple of Poseidôn:[385] of whom it consisted, we are not informed. These are some specimens of the sort of special religious conventions and assemblies which seem to have been frequent throughout Greece. Nor ought we to omit those religious meetings and sacrifices which were common to all the members of one Hellenic subdivision, such as the Pam-Bœotia to all the Bœotians, celebrated at the temple of the Itonian Athênê near Korôneia,[386]—the common observances, rendered to the temple of Apollo Pythaëus at Argos, by all those neighboring towns which had once been attached by this religious thread to the Argeians,—the similar periodical ceremonies, frequented by all who bore the Achæan or Ætolian name,—and the splendid and exhilarating festivals, so favorable to the diffusion of the early Grecian poetry, which brought all Ionians at stated intervals to the sacred island of Delos.[387] This latter class of festivals agreed with the Amphiktyony, in being of a special and exclusive character, not open to all Greeks.

But there was one amongst these many Amphiktyonies, which, though starting from the smallest beginnings, gradually expanded into so comprehensive a character, and acquired so marked a predominance over the rest, as to be called The Amphiktyonic Assembly, and even to have been mistaken by some authors for a sort of federal

Hellenic Diet. Twelve sub-races, out of the number which made up entire Hellas, belonged to this ancient Amphiktyony, the meetings of which were held twice in every year: in spring, at the temple of Apollo at Delphi; in autumn, at Thermopylæ, in the sacred precinct of Dêmêtêr Amphiktyonis. Sacred deputies, including a chief called the Hieromnêmôn, and subordinates called the Pylagoræ, attended at these meetings from each of the twelve races: a crowd of volunteers seem to have accompanied them, for purposes of sacrifice, trade, or enjoyment. Their special, and most important function, consisted in watching over the Delphian temple, in which all the twelve sub-races had a joint interest; and it was the immense wealth and national ascendency of this temple, which enhanced to so great a pitch the dignity of its acknowledged administrators.

The twelve constituent members were as follows: Thessalians, Bœotians, Dorians, Ionians, Perrhæbians, Magnêtes, Lokrians, Œtæans, Achæans, Phokians, Dolopes, and Malians.[388] All are counted as *races*, (if we treat the Hellenes as a race, we must call these *sub-races*,) no mention being made of cities:[389] all count equally in respect to voting, two votes being given by the deputies from each of the twelve: moreover, we are told that, in determining the deputies to be sent, or the manner in which the votes of each race should be given, the powerful Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, had no more influence than the humblest Ionian, Dorian, or Bœotian city. This latter fact is distinctly stated by Æschines, himself a pylagore sent to Delphi by Athens. And so, doubtless, the theory of the case stood: the votes of the Ionic races counted for neither more nor less than two, whether given by deputies from Athens, or from the small towns of Erythræ and Priênê; and, in like manner, the Dorian votes were as good in the division, when given by deputies from Bœon and Kytinion in the little territory of Doris, as if the men delivering them had been Spartans. But there can be as little question that, in practice, the little Ionic cities, and the little Doric cities, pretended to no share in the Amphyktionic deliberations. As the Ionic vote came to be substantially the vote of Athens, so, if Sparta was ever obstructed in the management of the Doric vote, it must have been by powerful Doric cities like Argos or Corinth, not by the insignificant towns of Doris. But the theory of Amphiktyonic suffrage, as laid down by Æschines, however little realized in practice during his day, is important, inasmuch as it shows in full evidence the primitive and original constitution. The first establishment of the Amphyktionic convocation dates from a time when all twelve members were on a footing of equal independence, and when there were no overwhelming cities (such as Sparta and Athens) to cast in the shade the humbler members,—when Sparta was only one Doric city, and Athens only one Ionic city, among various others of consideration, not much inferior.

There are also other proofs which show the high antiquity of this Amphiktyonic convocation. Æschines gives us an extract from the oath which had been taken by the sacred deputies, who attended on behalf of their respective races, ever since its first establishment, and which still apparently continued to be taken in his day. The

antique simplicity of this oath, and of the conditions to which the members bind themselves, betrays the early age in which it originated, as well as the humble resources of those towns to which it was applied.[390] "We will not destroy any Amphiktyonic town,—we will not cut off any Amphiktyonic town from running water,"—such are the two prominent obligations which Æschines specifies out of the old oath. The second of the two carries us back to the simplest state of society, and to towns of the smallest size, when the maidens went out with their basins to fetch water from the spring, like the daughters of Keleos at Eleusis, or those of Athens from the fountain of Kallirrhoê.[391] We may even conceive that the special mention of this detail, in the covenant between the twelve races, is borrowed literally from agreements still earlier, among the villages or little towns in which the members of each race were distributed. At any rate, it proves satisfactorily the very ancient date to which the commencement of the Amphiktyonic convocation must be referred. The belief of Æschines (perhaps, also, the belief general in his time) was, that it commenced simultaneously with the first foundation of the Delphian temple,—an event of which we have no historical knowledge; but there seems reason to suppose that its original establishment is connected with Thermopylæ and Dêmêtêr Amphiktyonis, rather than with Delphi and Apollo. The special surname by which Dêmêtêr and her temple at Thermopylæ was known,[392]—the temple of the hero Amphiktyon which stood at its side,—the word Pylæ, which obtained footing in the language to designate the half-yearly meeting of the deputies both at Thermopylæ and at Delphi,—these indications point to Thermopylæ (the real central point for all the twelve) as the primary place of meeting, and to the Delphian half-year as something secondary and superadded. On such a matter, however, we cannot go beyond a conjecture.

The hero Amphiktyon, whose temple stood at Thermopylæ, passed in mythical genealogy for the brother of Hellên. And it may be affirmed, with truth, that the habit of forming Amphiktyonic unions, and of frequenting each other's religious festivals was the great means of creating and fostering the primitive feeling of brotherhood among the children of Hellên, in those early times when rudeness, insecurity, and pugnacity did so much to isolate them. A certain number of salutary habits and sentiments, such as that which the Amphiktyonic oath embodies, in regard to abstinence from injury, as well as to mutual protection,[393] gradually found their way into men's minds: the obligations thus brought into play, acquired a substantive efficacy of their own, and the religious feeling which always remained connected with them, came afterwards to be only one out of many complex agencies by which the later historical Greek was moved. Athens and Sparta in the days of their might, and the inferior cities in relation to them, played each their own political game, in which religious considerations will be found to bear only a subordinate part.

The special function of the Amphiktyonic council, so far as we know it, consisted in watching over the safety, the interests, and the treasures of the Delphian temple. "If any one shall plunder the property of the god, or shall be cognizant thereof, or

shall take treacherous counsel against the things in the temple, we will punish him with foot, and hand, and voice, and by every means in our power." So ran the old Amphiktyonic oath, with an energetic imprecation attached to it.[394] And there are some examples in which the council[395] construes its functions so largely as to receive and adjudicate upon complaints against entire cities, for offences against the religious and patriotic sentiment of the Greeks generally. But for the most part its interference relates directly to the Delphian temple. The earliest case in which it is brought to our view, is the Sacred War against Kirrha, in the 46th Olympiad, or 595 B. C., conducted by Eurylochus, the Thessalian, and Kleisthenes of Sikyôn, and proposed by Solôn of Athens:[396] we find the Amphiktyons also, about half a century afterwards, undertaking the duty of collecting subscriptions throughout the Hellenic world, and making the contract with the Alkmæonids for rebuilding the temple after a conflagration.[397] But the influence of this council is essentially of a fluctuating and intermittent character. Sometimes it appears forward to decide, and its decisions command respect; but such occasions are rare, taking the general course of known Grecian history; while there are other occasions, and those too especially affecting the Delphian temple, on which we are surprised to find nothing said about it. In the long and perturbed period which Thucydidês describes, he never once mentioned the Amphiktyons, though the temple and the safety of its treasures form the repeated subject[398] as well of dispute as of express stipulation between Athens and Sparta: moreover, among the twelve constituent members of the council, we find three—the Perrhæbians, the Magnêtes, and the Achæans of Phthia—who were not even independent, but subject to the Thessalians, so that its meetings, when they were not matters of mere form, probably expressed only the feelings of the three or four leading members. When one or more of these great powers had a party purpose to accomplish against others,—when Philip of Macedon wished to extrude one of the members in order to procure admission for himself,—it became convenient to turn this ancient form into a serious reality, and we shall see the Athenian Æschines providing a pretext for Philip to meddle in favor of the minor Bœotian cities against Thebes, by alleging that these cities were under the protection of the old Amphiktyonic oath.[399]

It is thus that we have to consider the council as an element in Grecian affairs,—an ancient institution, one amongst many instances of the primitive habit of religious fraternization, but wider and more comprehensive than the rest,—at first, purely religious, then religious and political at once; lastly, more the latter than the former,—highly valuable in the infancy, but unsuited to the maturity of Greece, and called into real working only on rare occasions, when its efficiency happened to fall in with the views of Athens, Thebes, or the king of Macedon. In such special moments it shines with a transient light which affords a partial pretence for the imposing title bestowed on it by Cicero,—"commune Græciæ concilium:"[400] but we should completely misinterpret Grecian history if we regarded it as a federal council, habitually directing or habitually obeyed. Had there existed any such "commune concilium" of tolerable wis-

dom and patriotism, and had the tendencies of the Hellenic mind been capable of adapting themselves to it, the whole course of later Grecian history would probably have been altered; the Macedonian kings would have remained only as respectable neighbors, borrowing civilization from Greece, and expending their military energies upon Thracians and Illyrians; while united Hellas might even have maintained her own territory against the conquering legions of Rome.

The twelve constituent Amphiktyonic races remained unchanged until the Sacred War against the Phokians (B. C. 355), after which, though the number twelve was continued, the Phokians were disfranchised, and their votes transferred to Philip of Macedon. It has been already mentioned that these twelve did not exhaust the whole of Hellas. Arcadians, Eleans, Pisans, Minyæ, Dryopes, Ætolians, all genuine Hellens, are not comprehended in it; but all of them had a right to make use of the temple of Delphi, and to contend in the Pythian and Olympic games. The Pythian games, celebrated near Delphi, were under the superintendence of the Amphiktyons, [401] or of some acting magistrate chosen by and presumed to represent them: like the Olympic games, they came round every four years (the interval between one celebration and another being four complete years, which the Greeks called a Pentaetêris): the Isthmian and Nemean games recurred every two years. In its first humble form, of a competition among bards to sing a hymn in praise of Apollo, this festival was doubtless of immemorial antiquity;[402] but the first extension of it into Pan-Hellenic notoriety (as I have already remarked), the first multiplication of the subjects of competition, and the first introduction of a continuous record of the conquerors, date only from the time when it came under the presidency of the Amphiktyons, at the close of the Sacred War against Kirrha. What is called the first Pythian contest coincides with the third year of the 48th Olympiad, or 585 B. C. From that period forward, the games become crowded and celebrated: but the date just named, nearly two centuries after the first Olympiad, is a proof that the habit of periodical frequentation of festivals, by numbers and from distant parts, grew up but slowly in the Grecian world.

The foundation of the temple of Delphi itself reaches far beyond all historical knowledge, forming one of the aboriginal institutions of Hellas. It is a sanctified and wealthy place, even in the Iliad: the legislation of Lykurgus at Sparta is introduced under its auspices, and the earliest Grecian colonies, those of Sicily and Italy in the eighth century B. C., are established in consonance with its mandate. Delphi and Dodona appear, in the most ancient circumstances of Greece, as universally venerated oracles and sanctuaries: and Delphi not only receives honors and donations, but also answers questions, from Lydians, Phrygians, Etruscans, Romans, etc.: it is not exclusively Hellenic. One of the valuable services which a Greek looked for from this and other great religious establishments was, that it should resolve his doubts in cases of perplexity,—that it should advise him whether to begin a new, or to persist in an old project,—that it should foretell what would be his fate under given circum-

stances, and inform him, if suffering under distress, on what conditions the gods would grant him relief. The three priestesses of Dodona with their venerable oak, and the priestess of Delphi sitting on her tripod under the influence of a certain gas or vapor exhaling from the rock, were alike competent to determine these difficult points: and we shall have constant occasion to notice in this history, with what complete faith both the question was put and the answer treasured up,—what serious influence it often exercised both upon public and private proceeding.[403] The hexameter verses, in which the Pythian priestess delivered herself, were, indeed, often so equivocal or unintelligible, that the most serious believer, with all anxiety to interpret and obey them, often found himself ruined by the result; yet the general faith in the oracle was noway shaken by such painful experience. For as the unfortunate issue always admitted of being explained upon two hypotheses,—either that the god had spoken falsely, or that his meaning had not been correctly understood,—no man of genuine piety ever hesitated to adopt the latter. There were many other oracles throughout Greece besides Delphi and Dodona: Apollo was open to the inquiries of the faithful at Ptôon in Bœotia, at Abæ in Phokis, at Branchidæ near Miletus, at Patara in Lykia, and other places: in like manner, Zeus gave answers at Olympia, Poseidôn at Tænarus, Amphiaraus at Thebes, Amphilochus at Mallas, etc. And this habit of consulting the oracle formed part of the still more general tendency of the Greek mind to undertake no enterprise without having first ascertained how the gods viewed it, and what measures they were likely to take. Sacrifices were offered, and the interior of the victim carefully examined, with the same intent: omens, prodigies, unlooked-for coincidences, casual expressions, etc., were all construed as significant of the divine will. To sacrifice with a view to this or that undertaking, or to consult the oracle with the same view, are familiar expressions[404] embodied in the language. Nor could any man set about a scheme with comfort, until he had satisfied himself in some manner or other that the gods were favorable to it.

The disposition here adverted to is one of those mental analogies pervading the whole Hellenic nation, which Herodotus indicates. And the common habit among all Greeks, of respectfully listening to the oracle of Delphi, will be found on many occasions useful in maintaining unanimity among men not accustomed to obey the same political superior. In the numerous colonies especially, founded by mixed multitudes from distant parts of Greece, the minds of the emigrants were greatly determined towards cordial coöperation by their knowledge that the expedition had been directed, the œkist indicated, and the spot either chosen or approved, by Apollo of Delphi. Such in most cases was the fact: that god, according to the conception of the Greeks, "takes delight always in the foundation of new cities, and himself in person lays the first stone."[405]

These are the elements of union—over and above the common territory, described in the last chapter—with which the historical Hellens take their start: community of blood, language, religious point of view, legends, sacrifices, festivals,[406] and

also (with certain allowances) of manners and character. The analogy of manners and character between the rude inhabitants of the Arcadian Kynætha[407] and the polite Athens, was indeed accompanied with wide differences: yet if we compare the two with foreign contemporaries, we shall find certain negative characteristics, of much importance, common to both. In no city of historical Greece did there prevail either human sacrifices,[408]—or deliberate mutilation, such as cutting off the nose, ears, hands, feet, etc.,—or castration,—or selling of children into slavery,—or polygamy,—or the feeling of unlimited obedience towards one man: all customs which might be pointed out as existing among the contemporary Carthaginians, Egyptians, Persians, Thracians,[409] etc. The habit of running, wrestling, boxing, etc., in gymnastic contests, with the body perfectly naked,—was common to all Greeks, having been first adopted as a Lacedæmonian fashion in the fourteenth Olympiad: Thucydidês and Herodotus remark, that it was not only not practised, but even regarded as unseemly, among non-Hellens.[410] Of such customs, indeed, at once common to all the Greeks, and peculiar to them as distinguished from others, we cannot specify a great number; but we may see enough to convince ourselves that there did really exist, in spite of local differences, a general Hellenic sentiment and character, which counted among the cementing causes of an union apparently so little assured.

For we must recollect that, in respect to political sovereignty, complete disunion was among their most cherished principles. The only source of supreme authority to which a Greek felt respect and attachment, was to be sought within the walls of his own city. Authority seated in another city might operate upon his fears,—might procure for him increased security and advantages, as we shall have occasion hereafter to show with regard to Athens and her subject allies,—might even be mildly exercised, and inspire no special aversion: but, still, the principle of it was repugnant to the rooted sentiment of his mind, and he is always found gravitating towards the distinct sovereignty of his own boulê, or ekklêsia. This is a disposition common both to democracies and oligarchies, and operative even among the different towns belonging to the same subdivision of the Hellenic name,—Achæans, Phokians, Bœotians, etc. The twelve Achæan cities are harmonious allies, with a periodical festival which partakes of the character of a congress,—but equal and independent political communities: the Bœotian towns, under the presidency of Thebes, their reputed metropolis, recognize certain common obligations, and obey, on various particular matters, chosen officers named bœotarchs,—but we shall see, in this, as in other cases, the centrifugal tendencies constantly manifesting themselves, and resisted chiefly by the interests and power of Thebes. That great, successful, and fortunate revolution, which merged the several independent political communities of Attica into the single unity of Athens, took place before the time of authentic history: it is connected with the name of the hero Theseus, but we know not how it was effected, while its comparatively large size and extent, render it a signal exception to Hellenic tendencies generally.

Political disunion—sovereign authority within the city walls—thus formed a settled maxim in the Greek mind. The relation between one city and another was an international relation, not a relation subsisting between members of a common political aggregate. Within a few miles from his own city-walls, an Athenian found himself in the territory of another city, wherein he was nothing more than an alien,—where he could not acquire property in house or land, nor contract a legal marriage with any native woman, nor sue for legal protection against injury, except through the mediation of some friendly citizen. The right of intermarriage, and of acquiring landed property, was occasionally granted by a city to some individual non-freeman, as matter of special favor, and sometimes (though very rarely) reciprocated generally between two separate cities.[411] But the obligations between one city and another, or between the citizen of the one and the citizen of the other, are all matters of special covenant, agreed to by the sovereign authority in each. Such coexistence of entire political severance with so much fellowship in other ways, is perplexing in modern ideas, and modern language is not well furnished with expressions to describe Greek political phenomena. We may say that an Athenian citizen was an *alien* when he arrived as a visitor in Corinth, but we can hardly say that he was a *foreigner*; and though the relations between Corinth and Athens were in principle *international*, yet that word would be obviously unsuitable to the numerous petty autonomies of Hellas, besides that we require it for describing the relations of Hellenes generally with Persians or Carthaginians. We are compelled to use a word such as *interpolitical*, to describe the transactions between separate Greek cities, so numerous in the course of this history.

As, on the one hand, a Greek will not consent to look for sovereign authority beyond the limits of his own city, so, on the other hand, he must have a city to look to: scattered villages will not satisfy in his mind the exigencies of social order, security, and dignity. Though the coalescence of smaller towns into a larger is repugnant to his feelings, that of villages into a town appears to him a manifest advance in the scale of civilization. Such, at least, is the governing sentiment of Greece throughout the historical period; for there was always a certain portion of the Hellenic aggregate —the rudest and least advanced among them—who dwelt in unfortified villages, and upon whom the citizen of Athens, Corinth, or Thebes, looked down as inferiors. Such village residence was the character of the Epirots[412] universally, and prevailed throughout Hellas itself, in those very early and even ante-Homeric times upon which Thucydidês looked back as deplorably barbarous;—times of universal poverty and insecurity,—absence of pacific intercourse,—petty warfare and plunder, compelling every man to pass his life armed,—endless migration without any local attachments. Many of the considerable cities of Greece are mentioned as aggregations of preëxisting villages, some of them in times comparatively recent. Tegea and Mantineia in Arcadia, represent, in this way, the confluence of eight villages, and five villages respectively; Dymê in Achaia was brought together out of eight villages, and Elis in the same manner, at a period even later than the Persian invasion;[413] the like seems to

have happened with Megara and Tanagra. A large proportion of the Arcadians continued their village life down to the time of the battle of Leuktra, and it suited the purposes of Sparta to keep them thus disunited; a policy which we shall see hereafter illustrated by the dismemberment of Mantineia (into its primitive component villages), which Agesilaus carried into effect, but which was reversed as soon as the power of Sparta was no longer paramount,—as well as by the foundation of Megalopolis out of a large number of petty Arcadian towns and villages, one of the capital measures of Epameinondas.[414] As this measure was an elevation of Arcadian importance, so the reverse proceeding—the breaking up of a city into its elementary villages—was not only a sentence of privation and suffering, but also a complete extinction of Grecian rank and dignity.

The Ozolian Lokrians, the Ætolians, and the Akarnanians maintained their separate village residence down to a still later period, preserving along with it their primitive rudeness and disorderly pugnacity.[415] Their villages were unfortified, and defended only by comparative inaccessibility; in case of need, they fled for safety with their cattle into the woods and mountains. Amidst such inauspicious circumstances, there was no room for that expansion of the social and political feelings to which protected intramural residence and increased numbers gave birth; there was no consecrated acropolis or agora,—no ornamented temples and porticos, exhibiting the continued offerings of successive generations,[416]—no theatre for music or recitation, no gymnasium for athletic exercises,—none of those fixed arrangements, for transacting public business with regularity and decorum, which the Greek citizen, with his powerful sentiment of locality, deemed essential to a dignified existence. The village was nothing more than a fraction and a subordinate, appertaining as a limb to the organized body called the city. But the city and the state are in his mind, and in his language, one and the same. While no organization less than the city can satisfy the exigencies[417] of an intelligent freeman, the city is itself a perfect and self-sufficient whole, admitting no incorporation into any higher political unity. It deserves notice that Sparta, even in the days of her greatest power, was not (properly speaking) a city, but a mere agglutination of five adjacent villages, retaining unchanged its old-fashioned trim: for the extreme defensibility of its frontier and the military prowess of its inhabitants, supplied the absence of walls, while the discipline imposed upon the Spartan, exceeded in rigor and minuteness anything known in Greece. And thus Sparta, though less than a city in respect to external appearance, was more than a city in respect to perfection of drilling and fixity of political routine. The contrast between the humble appearance and the mighty reality, is pointed out by Thucydides.[418] The inhabitants of the small territory of Pisa, wherein Olympia is situated, had once enjoyed the honorable privilege of administering the Olympic festival. Having been robbed of it, and subjected by the more powerful Eleians, they took advantage of various movements and tendencies among the larger Grecian powers to try and regain it; and on one of these occasions, we find their claim repudiated because they

were villagers, and unworthy of so great a distinction.[419] There was nothing to be called a city in the Pisatid territory.

In going through historical Greece, we are compelled to accept the Hellenic aggregate with its constituent elements as a primary fact to start from, because the state of our information does not enable us to ascend any higher. By what circumstances, or out of what preëxisting elements, this aggregate was brought together and modified, we find no evidence entitled to credit. There are, indeed, various names which are affirmed to designate ante-Hellenic inhabitants of many parts of Greece,—the Pelasgi, the Leleges, the Kurêtes, the Kaukônes, the Aones, the Temmikes, the Hyantes, the Telchines, the Bœotian Thracians, the Teleboæ, the Ephyri, the Phlegyæ, etc. These are names belonging to legendary, not to historical Greece,—extracted out of a variety of conflicting legends, by the logographers and subsequent historians, who strung together out of them a supposed history of the past, at a time when the conditions of historical evidence were very little understood. That these names designated real nations, may be true, but here our knowledge ends. We have no well-informed witness to tell us their times, their limits of residence, their acts, or their character; nor do we know how far they are identical with or diverse from the historical Hellens,—whom we are warranted in calling, not, indeed, the first inhabitants of the country, but the first known to us upon any tolerable evidence. If any man is inclined to call the unknown ante-Hellenic period of Greece by the name of Pelasgic, it is open to him to do so; but this is a name carrying with it no assured predicates, noway enlarging our insight into real history, nor enabling us to explain—what would be the real historical problem—how or from whom the Hellens acquired that stock of dispositions, aptitudes, arts, etc., with which they begin their career. Whoever has examined the many conflicting systems respecting the Pelasgi,—from the literal belief of Clavier, Larcher, and Raoul Rochette, (which appears to me, at least, the most consistent way of proceeding,) to the interpretative and half-incredulous processes applied by abler men, such as Niebuhr, or O. Müller, or Dr. Thirlwall, [420]—will not be displeased with my resolution to decline so insoluble a problem. No attested facts are now present to us—none were present to Herodotus and Thucydidês, even in their age—on which to build trustworthy affirmations respecting the ante-Hellenic Pelasgians. And where such is the case, we may without impropriety apply the remark of Herodotus, respecting one of the theories which he had heard for explaining the inundation of the Nile by a supposed connection with the circumfluous Ocean,—that "the man who carries up his story into the invisible world, passes out of the range of criticism."[421]

As far as our knowledge extends, there were no towns or villages called Pelasgian, in Greece proper, since 776 B. C. But there still existed in two different places, even in the age of Herodotus, people whom he believed to be Pelasgians. One portion of these occupied the towns of Plakia and Skylakê near Kyzikus, on the Propontis; another dwelt in a town called Krêstôn, near the Thermaic gulf.[422] There were,

moreover, certain other Pelasgian townships which he does not specify,—it seems, indeed, from Thucydides, that there were some little Pelasgian townships on the peninsula of Athos.[423] Now, Herodotus acquaints us with the remarkable fact, that the people of Krêstôn, those of Plakia and Skylakê, and those of the other unnamed Pelasgian townships, all spoke the same language, and each of them respectively a different language from their neighbors around them. He informs us, moreover, that their language was a barbarous (*i. e.* a non-Hellenic) language; and this fact he quotes as an evidence to prove that the ancient Pelasgian language was a barbarous language, or distinct from the Hellenic. He at the same time states expressly that he has no positive knowledge what language the ancient Pelasgians spoke,—one proof, among others, that no memorials nor means of distinct information concerning that people, could have been open to him.

This is the one single fact, amidst so many conjectures concerning the Pelasgians, which we can be said to know upon the testimony of a competent and contemporary witness: the few townships—scattered and inconsiderable, but all that Herodotus in his day knew as Pelasgian—spoke a barbarous language. And upon such a point, he must be regarded as an excellent judge. If, then, (infers the historian,) all the early Pelasgians spoke the same language as those of Krêstôn and Plakia, they must have changed their language at the time when they passed into the Hellenic aggregate, or became Hellens. Now, Herodotus conceives that aggregate to have been gradually enlarged to its great actual size by incorporating with itself not only the Pelasgians, but several other nations once barbarians;[424] the Hellens having been originally an inconsiderable people. Among those other nations once barbarian, whom Herodotus supposes to have become Hellenized, we may probably number the Leleges; and with respect to them, as well as to the Pelasgians, we have contemporary testimony proving the existence of barbarian Leleges in later times. Philippus, the Karian historian, attested the present existence, and believed in the past existence, of Leleges in his country, as serfs or dependent cultivators under the Karians, analogous to the Helots in Laconia, or the Penestæ in Thessaly.[425] We may be very sure that there were no Hellens—no men speaking the Hellenic tongue—standing in such a relation to the Karians. Among those many barbaric-speaking nations whom Herodotus believed to have changed their language and passed into Hellens, we may, therefore, fairly consider the Leleges to have been included. For next to the Pelasgians and Pelasgus, the Leleges and Lelex figure most conspicuously in the legendary genealogies; and both together cover the larger portion of the Hellenic soil.

Confining myself to historical evidence, and believing that no assured results can be derived from the attempt to transform legend into history, I accept the statement of Herodotus with confidence, as to the barbaric language spoken by the Pelasgians of his day; and I believe the same with regard to the historical Leleges,—but without presuming to determine anything in regard to the legendary Pelasgians and Leleges, the supposed ante-Hellenic inhabitants of Greece. And I think this course more con-

sonant to the laws of historical inquiry than that which comes recommended by the high authority of Dr. Thirlwall, who softens and explains away the statement of Herodotus, until it is made to mean only that the Pelasgians of Plakia and Krêstôn spoke a very bad Greek. The affirmation of Herodotus is distinct, and twice repeated, that the Pelasgians of these towns, and of his own time, spoke a barbaric language; and that word appears to me to admit of but one interpretation.[426] To suppose that a man, who, like Herodotus, had heard almost every variety of Greek, in the course of his long travels, as well as Egyptian, Phœnician, Assyrian, Lydian, and other languages, did not know how to distinguish bad Hellenic from non-Hellenic, is, in my judgment, inadmissible; at any rate, the supposition is not to be adopted without more cogent evidence than any which is here found.

As I do not presume to determine what were the antecedent internal elements out of which the Hellenic aggregate was formed, so I confess myself equally uninformed with regard to its external constituents. Kadmus, Danaus, Kekrops,—the eponyms of the Kadmeians, of the Danaans, and of the Attic Kekropia,—present themselves to my vision as creatures of legend, and in that character I have already adverted to them. That there may have been very early settlements in continental Greece, from Phœnicia and Egypt, is nowise impossible; but I see neither positive proof, nor ground for probable inference, that there were any such, though traces of Phœnician settlements in some of the islands may doubtless be pointed out. And if we examine the character and aptitudes of Greeks, as compared either with Egyptians or Phœnicians, it will appear that there is not only no analogy, but an obvious and fundamental contrast: the Greek may occasionally be found as a borrower from these ultramarine contemporaries, but he cannot be looked upon as their offspring or derivative. Nor can I bring myself to accept an hypothesis which implies (unless we are to regard the supposed foreign emigrants as very few in number, in which case the question loses most of its importance) that the Hellenic language—the noblest among the many varieties of human speech, and possessing within itself a pervading symmetry and organization—is a mere confluence of two foreign barbaric languages (Phœnician and Egyptian) with two or more internal barbaric languages,—Pelasgian, Lelegian, etc. In the mode of investigation pursued by different historians into this question of early foreign colonies, there is great difference (as in the case of the Pelasgi) between the different authors,—from the acquiescent Euemerism of Raoul Rochette to the refined distillation of Dr. Thirlwall, in the third chapter of his History. It will be found that the amount of positive knowledge which Dr. Thirlwall guarantees to his readers in that chapter is extremely inconsiderable; for though he proceeds upon the general theory (different from that which I hold) that historical matter may be distinguished and elicited from the legends, yet when the question arises respecting any definite historical result, his canon of credibility is too just to permit him to overlook the absence of positive evidence, even when all intrinsic incredibility is removed. That which I note as Terra Incognita, is in his view a land which may be

known up to a certain point; but the map which he draws of it contains so few ascertained places as to differ very little from absolute vacuity.

The most ancient district called Hellas is affirmed by Aristotle to have been near Dôdôna and the river Achelôus,—a description which would have been unintelligible (since the river does not flow near Dôdôna), if it had not been qualified by the remark, that the river had often in former times changed its course. He states, moreover, that the deluge of Deukaliôn took place chiefly in this district, which was in those early days inhabited by the Selli, and by the people then called Græci, but now Hellenes.[427] The Selli (called by Pindar, Helli) are mentioned in the Iliad as the ministers of the Dodonæan Zeus,—"men who slept on the ground, and never washed their feet;" and Hesiod, in one of the lost poems (the Eoiai), speaks of the fat land and rich pastures of the land called Hellopia, wherein Dôdôna was situated.[428] On what authority Aristotle made his statement, we do not know; but the general feeling of the Greeks was different,—connecting Deukaliôn, Hellen, and the Hellenes, primarily and specially with the territory called Achaia Phthiôtis, between Mount Othrys and Œta. Nor can we either affirm or deny his assertion that the people in the neighborhood of Dôdôna were called Græci before they were called Hellenes. There is no ascertained instance of the mention of a people called Græci, in any author earlier than this Aristotelian treatise; for the allusions to Alkman and Sophoklês prove nothing to the point.[429] Nor can we explain how it came to pass that the Hellenes were known to the Romans only under the name of Græci, or Graii. But the name by which a people is known to foreigners is often completely different from its own domestic name, and we are not less at a loss to assign the reason, how the Rasena of Etruria came to be known to the Romans by the name of Tuscans, or Etruscans.

CHAPTER III.

MEMBERS OF THE HELLENIC AGGREGATE, SEPARATELY TAKEN.—GREEKS NORTH OF PELOPONNESUS.

HAVING in the preceding chapter touched upon the Greeks in their aggregate capacity, I now come to describe separately the portions of which this aggregate consisted, as they present themselves at the first discernible period of history.

It has already been mentioned that the twelve races or subdivisions, members of what is called the Amphiktyonic convocation, were as follows:—

North of the pass of Thermopylæ,—Thessalians, Perrhæbians, Magnêtes, Achæans, Melians, Ænianes, Dolopes.

South of the pass of Thermopylæ,—Dorians, Ionians, Bœotians, Lokrians, Phokians.

Other Hellenic races, not comprised among the Amphiktyons, were—

The Ætolians and Akarnanians, north of the gulf of Corinth.

The Arcadians, Eleians, Pisatans, and Triphylians, in the central and western portion of Peloponnêsus: I do not here name the Achæans, who occupied the southern or Peloponnesian coast of the Corinthian gulf, because they may be presumed to have been originally of the same race as the Phthiot Achæans, and therefore participant in the Amphiktyonic constituency, though their actual connection with it may have been disused.

The Dryopes, an inconsiderable, but seemingly peculiar subdivision, who occupied some scattered points on the sea-coast,—Hermionê on the Argolic peninsula; Styrus and Karystus in Eubœa; the island of Kythnus, etc.

Though it may be said, in a general way, that our historical discernment of the Hellenic aggregate, apart from the illusions of legend, commences with 776 B. C., yet, with regard to the larger number of its subdivisions just enumerated, we can hardly be said to possess any specific facts anterior to the invasion of Xerxes in 480 B. C. Until the year 560 B. C., (the epoch of Crœsus in Asia Minor, and of Peisistratus at Athens,) the history of the Greeks presents hardly anything of a collective character: the movements of each portion of the Hellenic world begin and end apart from the rest. The destruction of Kirrha by the Amphiktyons is the first historical incident which brings into play, in defence of the Delphian temple, a common Hellenic feeling of active obligation.

But about 560 B. C., two important changes are seen to come into operation, which alter the character of Grecian history,—extricating it out of its former chaos of detail, and centralizing its isolated phenomena: 1. The subjugation of the Asiatic Greeks by Lydia and by Persia, followed by their struggles for emancipation,—wherein the European Greeks became implicated, first as accessories, and afterwards as principals. 2. The combined action of the large mass of Greeks under Sparta, as their most powerful state and acknowledged chief, succeeded by the rapid and extraordinary growth of Athens, the complete development of Grecian maritime power, and the struggle between Athens and Sparta for the headship. These two causes, though distinct in themselves, must, nevertheless, be regarded as working together to a certain degree,—or rather, the second grew out of the first. For it was the Persian invasions of Greece which first gave birth to a wide-spread alarm and antipathy among the leading Greeks (we must not call it Pan-Hellenic, since more than half of the Amphiktyonic constituency gave earth and water to Xerxes) against the barbarians of the East, and impressed them with the necessity of joint active operations under a leader. The idea of a leadership or hegemony of collective Hellas, as a privilege necessarily vested in some one state for common security against the barbarians, thus became current,—an idea foreign to the mind of Solôn, or any one of the same age. Next, came the miraculous development of Athens, and the violent contest between her and Sparta, which should be the leader; the larger portion of Hellas taking side with one or the other, and the common quarrel against the Persian being for the time put out of sight. Athens is put down, Sparta acquires the undisputed hegemony, and again the anti-barbaric feeling manifests itself, though faintly, in the Asiatic expeditions of Agesilaus. But the Spartans, too incompetent either to deserve or maintain this exalted position, are overthrown by the Thebans,—themselves not less incompetent, with the single exception of Epameinondas. The death of that single man extinguishes the pretensions of Thebes to the hegemony, and Hellas is left, like the deserted Penelopê in the Odyssey, worried by the competition of several suitors, none of whom is strong enough to stretch the bow on which the prize depends.[430] Such a manifestation of force, as well as the trampling down of the competing suitors, is reserved, not for any legitimate Hellenic arm, but for a semi-Hellenized[431] Macedonian, "brought up at Pella," and making good his encroachments gradually from the north of Olympus. The hegemony of Greece thus passes forever out of Grecian hands; but the conqueror finds his interest in rekindling the old sentiment under the influence of which it had first sprung up. He binds to him the discordant Greeks, by the force of their ancient and common antipathy against the Great King, until the desolation and sacrilege once committed by Xerxes at Athens is avenged by annihilation of the Persian empire. And this victorious consummation of Pan-Hellenic antipathy,—the dream of Xenophon[432] and the Ten Thousand Greeks after the battle of Kunaxa,—the hope of Jason of Pheræ,—the exhortation of Isokratês,[433]—the project of Philip, and the achievement of Alexander,—while it manifests the irresistible might of Hellenic ideas and organization in the then existing state of the

world, is at the same time the closing scene of substantive Grecian life. The citizen-feelings of Greece become afterwards merely secondary forces, subordinate to the preponderance of Greek mercenaries under Macedonian order, and to the rudest of all native Hellens,—the Ætolian mountaineers. Some few individuals are indeed found, even in the third century B. C., worthy of the best times of Hellas, and the Achæan confederation of that century is an honorable attempt to contend against irresistible difficulties: but on the whole, that free, social, and political march, which gives so much interest to the earlier centuries, is irrevocably banished from Greece after the generation of Alexander the Great.

The foregoing brief sketch will show that, taking the period from Crœsus and Peisistratus down to the generation of Alexander (560-300 B. C.), the phenomena of Hellas generally, and her relations both foreign and interpolitical, admit of being grouped together in masses, with continued dependence on one or a few predominant circumstances. They may be said to constitute a sort of historical epopee, analogous to that which Herodotus has constructed out of the wars between Greeks and barbarians, from the legends of Iô and Eurôpa down to the repulse of Xerxes. But when we are called back to the period between 776 and 560 B. C., the phenomena brought to our knowledge are scanty in number,—exhibiting few common feelings or interests, and no tendency towards any one assignable purpose. To impart attraction to this first period, so obscure and unpromising, we shall be compelled to consider it in its relation with the second; partly as a preparation, partly as a contrast.

Of the extra-Peloponnesian Greeks north of Attica, during these two centuries, we know absolutely nothing; but it will be possible to furnish some information respecting the early condition and struggles of the great Dorian states in Peloponnesus, and respecting the rise of Sparta from the second to the first place in the comparative scale of Grecian powers. Athens becomes first known to us at the legislation of Drako and the attempt of Kylôn (620 B. C.) to make himself despot; and we gather some facts concerning the Ionic cities in Eubœa and Asia Minor, during the century of their chief prosperity, prior to the reign and conquests of Crœsus. In this way, we shall form to ourselves some idea of the growth of Sparta and Athens,—of the short-lived and energetic development of the Ionic Greeks,—and of the slow working of those causes which tended to bring about increased Hellenic intercommunication,—as contrasted with the enlarged range of ambition, the grand Pan-Hellenic ideas, the systematized party-antipathies, and the intensified action, both abroad and at home, which grew out of the contest with Persia.

There are also two or three remarkable manifestations which will require special notice during this first period of Grecian history: 1. The great multiplicity of colonies sent forth by individual cities, and the rise and progress of these several colonies; 2. The number of despots who arose in the various Grecian cities; 3. The lyric poetry; 4. The rudiments of that which afterwards ripened into moral philosophy, as manifested in gnomes, or aphorisms,—or the age of the Seven Wise Men.

But before I proceed to relate those earliest proceedings (unfortunately too few) of the Dorians and Ionians during the historical period, together with the other matters just alluded to, it will be convenient to go over the names and positions of those other Grecian states respecting which we have no information during these first two centuries. Some idea will thus be formed of the less important members of the Hellenic aggregate, previous to the time when they will be called into action. We begin by the territory north of the pass of Thermopylæ.

Of the different races who dwelt between this celebrated pass and the mouth of the river Peneius, by far the most powerful and important were the Thessalians. Sometimes, indeed, the whole of this area passes under the name of Thessaly,—since nominally, though not always really, the power of the Thessalians extended over the whole. We know that the Trachinian Herakleia, founded by the Lacedæmonians in the early years of the Peloponnesian war, close at the pass of Thermopylæ, was planted upon the territory of the Thessalians.[434] But there were also within these limits other races, inferior and dependent on the Thessalians, yet said to be of more ancient date, and certainly not less genuine subdivisions of the Hellenic name. The Perrhæbi[435] occupied the northern portion of the territory between the lower course of the river Peneius and Mount Olympus. The Magnêtes[436] dwelt along the eastern coast, between Mount Ossa and Pelion on one side and the Ægean on the other, comprising the south-eastern cape and the eastern coast of the gulf of Pagasæ as far as Iôlkos. The Achæans occupied the territory called Phthiôtis, extending from near Mount Pindus on the west to the gulf of Pagasæ on the east,[437]—along the mountain chain of Othrys with its lateral projections northerly into the Thessalian plain, and southerly even to its junction with Œta. The three tribes of the Malians dwelt between Achæa Phthiôtis and Thermopylæ, including both Trachin and Herakleia. Westward of Achæa Phthiôtis, the lofty region of Pindus or Tymphrêstus, with its declivities both westward and eastward, was occupied by the Dolopes.

All these five tribes, or subdivisions,—Perrhæbians, Magnetes, Achæans of Phthiôtis, Malians, and Dolopes, together with certain Epirotic and Macedonian tribes besides, beyond the boundaries of Pindus and Olympus,—were in a state of irregular dependence upon the Thessalians, who occupied the central plain or basin drained by the Peneius. That river receives the streams from Olympus, from Pindus, and from Othrys,—flowing through a region which was supposed by its inhabitants to have been once a lake, until Poseidôn cut open the defile of Tempê, through which the waters found an efflux. In travelling northward from Thermopylæ, the commencement of this fertile region—the amplest space of land continuously productive which Hellas presents—is strikingly marked by the steep rock and ancient fortress of Thaumaki;[438] from whence the traveller, passing over the mountains of Achæa Phthiôtis and Othrys, sees before him the plains and low declivities which reach northward across Thessaly to Olympus. A narrow strip of coast—in the interior of the gulf of Pagasæ, between the Magnêtes and the Achæans, and containing the towns of Am-

phanæum and Pagasæ[439]—belonged to this proper territory of Thessaly, but its great expansion was inland: within it were situated the cities of Pheræ, Pharsalus, Skotussa, Larissa, Krannôn, Atrax, Pharkadôn, Trikka, Metropolis, Pelinna, etc.

The abundance of corn and cattle from the neighboring plains sustained in these cities a numerous population, and above all a proud and disorderly noblesse, whose manners bore much resemblance to those of the heroic times. They were violent in their behavior, eager in armed feud, but unaccustomed to political discussion or compromise; faithless as to obligations, yet at the same time generous in their hospitalities, and much given to the enjoyments of the table.[440] Breeding the finest horses in Greece, they were distinguished for their excellence as cavalry; but their infantry is little noticed, nor do the Thessalian cities seem to have possessed that congregation of free and tolerably equal citizens, each master of his own arms, out of whom the ranks of hoplites were constituted,—the warlike nobles, such as the Aleuadæ at Larissa, or the Skopadæ at Krannon, despising everything but equestrian service for themselves, furnished, from their extensive herds on the plain, horses for the poorer soldiers. These Thessalian cities exhibit the extreme of turbulent oligarchy, occasionally trampled down by some one man of great vigor, but little tempered by that sense of political communion and reverence for established law, which was found among the better cities of Hellas. Both in Athens and Sparta, so different in many respects from each other, this feeling will be found, if not indeed constantly predominant, yet constantly present and operative. Both of them exhibit a contrast with Larissa or Pheræ not unlike that between Rome and Capua,—the former, with her endless civil disputes constitutionally conducted, admitting the joint action of parties against a common foe; the latter, with her abundant soil enriching a luxurious oligarchy, and impelled according to the feuds of her great proprietors, the Magii, Blossii, and Jubellii.[441]

The Thessalians are, indeed, in their character and capacity as much Epirotic or Macedonian as Hellenic, forming a sort of link between the two. For the Macedonians, though trained in aftertimes upon Grecian principles by the genius of Philip and Alexander, so as to constitute the celebrated heavy-armed phalanx, were originally (even in the Peloponnesian war) distinguished chiefly for the excellence of their cavalry, like the Thessalians;[442] while the broad-brimmed hat, or kausia, and the short spreading-mantle, or chlamys, were common to both.

We are told that the Thessalians were originally emigrants from Thesprotia in Epirus, and conquerors of the plain of the Peneius, which (according to Herodotus) was then called Æolis, and which they found occupied by the Pelasgi.[443] It may be doubted whether the great Thessalian families,—such as the Aleuadæ of Larissa, descendants from Hêraklês, and placed by Pindar on the same level as the Lacedæmonian kings[444]—would have admitted this Thesprotian origin; nor does it coincide with the tenor of those legends which make the eponym, Thessalus, son of Hêraklês. Moreover, it is to be remarked that the language of the Thessalians was Hellenic, a

variety of the Æolic dialect;[445] the same (so far as we can make out) as that of the people whom they must have found settled in the country at their first conquest. If then it be true that, at some period anterior to the commencement of authentic history, a body of Thesprotian warriors crossed the passes of Pindus, and established themselves as conquerors in Thessaly, we must suppose them to have been more warlike than numerous, and to have gradually dropped their primitive language.

In other respects, the condition of the population of Thessaly, such as we find it during the historical period, favors the supposition of an original mixture of conquerors and conquered: for it seems that there was among the Thessalians and their dependents a triple gradation, somewhat analogous to that of Laconia. First, a class of rich proprietors distributed throughout the principal cities, possessing most of the soil, and constituting separate oligarchies, loosely hanging together.[446] Next, the subject Achæans, Magnêtes, Perrhæbi, differing from the Laconian Periœki in this point, that they retained their ancient tribe-name and separate Amphiktyonic franchise. Thirdly, a class of serfs, or dependent cultivators, corresponding to the Laconian Helots, who, tilling the lands of the wealthy oligarchs, paid over a proportion of its produce, furnished the retainers by which these great families were surrounded, served as their followers in the cavalry, and were in a condition of villanage,—yet with the important reserve, that they could not be sold out of the country,[447] that they had a permanent tenure in the soil, and that they maintained among one another the relations of family and village. This last mentioned order of men, in Thessaly called the Penestæ, is assimilated by all ancient authors to the Helots of Laconia, and in both cases the danger attending such a social arrangement is noticed by Plato and Aristotle. For the Helots as well as the Penestæ had their own common language and mutual sympathies, a separate residence, arms, and courage; to a certain extent, also, they possessed the means of acquiring property, since we are told that some of the Penestæ were richer than their masters.[448] So many means of action, combined with a degraded social position, gave rise to frequent revolt and incessant apprehensions. As a general rule, indeed, the cultivation of the soil by slaves, or dependents, for the benefit of proprietors in the cities, prevailed throughout most parts of Greece. The rich men of Thebes, Argos, Athens, or Elis, must have derived their incomes in the same manner; but it seems that there was often, in other places, a larger intermixture of bought foreign slaves, and also that the number, fellow-feeling, and courage of the degraded village population was nowhere so great as in Thessaly and Laconia. Now the origin of the Penestæ, in Thessaly, is ascribed to the conquest of the territory by the Thesprotians, as that of the Helots in Laconia is traced to the Dorian conquest. The victors in both countries are said to have entered into a convention with the vanquished population, whereby the latter became serfs and tillers of the land for the benefit of the former, but were at the same time protected in their holdings, constituted subjects of the state, and secured against being sold away as slaves. Even in the Thessalian cities, though inhabited in common by Thessalian proprietors and their Penestæ, the quarters assigned to each were to a

great degree separated: what was called the Free Agora could not be trodden by any Penest, except when specially summoned.[449]

Who the people were, whom the conquest of Thessaly by the Thesprotians reduced to this predial villanage, we find differently stated. According to Theopompus, they were Perrhæbians and Magnêtes; according to others, Pelasgians; while Archemachus alleged them to have been Bœotians of the territory of Arnê,[450]—some emigrating, to escape the conquerors, others remaining and accepting the condition of serfs. But the conquest, assuming it as a fact, occurred at far too early a day to allow of our making out either the manner in which it came to pass, or the state of things which preceded it. The Pelasgians whom Herodotus saw at Krêstôn are affirmed by him to have been the descendants of those who quitted Thessaly to escape[451] the invading Thesprotians; though others held that the Bœotians, driven on this occasion from their habitations on the gulf of Pagasæ near the Achæans of Phthiôtis, precipitated themselves on Orchomenus and Bœotia, and settled in it, expelling the Minyæ and the Pelasgians.

Passing over the legends on this subject, and confining ourselves to historical time, we find an established quadruple division of Thessaly, said to have been introduced in the time of Aleuas, the ancestor (real or mythical) of the powerful Aleuadæ,—Thessaliôtis, Pelasgiôtis, Histiæôtis, Phthiôtis.[452] In Phthiôtis were comprehended the Achæans, whose chief towns were Melitæa, Itônus, Thebæ, Phthiôtides, Alos, Larissa, Kremastê, and Pteleon, on or near the western coast of the gulf of Pagasæ. Histiæôtis, to the north of the Peneius, comprised the Perrhæbians, with numerous towns strong in situation, but of no great size or importance; they occupied the passes of Olympus[453] and are sometimes considered as extending westward across Pindus. Pelasgiôtis included the Magnêtes, together with that which was called the Pelasgic plain, bordering on the western side of Pelion and Ossa.[454] Thessaliôtis comprised the central plain of Thessaly and the upper course of the river Peneius. This was the political classification of the Thessalian power, framed to suit a time when the separate cities were maintained in harmonious action by favorable circumstances, or by some energetic individual ascendency; for their union was in general interrupted and disorderly, and we find certain cities standing aloof while the rest went to war.[455] Though a certain political junction, and obligations of some kind towards a common authority, were recognized in theory by all, and a chief, or Tagus, [456] was nominated to enforce obedience,—yet it frequently happened that the disputes of the cities among themselves prevented the choice of a Tagus, or drove him out of the country; and left the alliance little more than nominal. Larissa, Pharsalus, [457] and Pheræ,—each with its cluster of dependent towns as adjuncts,—seem to have been nearly on a par in strength, and each torn by intestine faction, so that not only was the supremacy over common dependents relaxed, but even the means of repelling invaders greatly enfeebled. The dependence of the Perrhæbians, Magnetes, Achæans, and Malians, might, under these circumstances, be often loose and easy.

But the condition of the Penestæ—who occupied the villages belonging to these great cities, in the central plain of Pelasgiôtis and Thessaliôtis, and from whom the Aleuadæ and Skopadæ derived their exuberance of landed produce—was noway mitigated, if it was not even aggravated, by such constant factions. Nor were there wanting cases in which the discontent of this subject-class was employed by members of the native oligarchy,[458] or even by foreign states, for the purpose of bringing about political revolutions.

"When Thessaly is under her Tagus, all the neighboring people pay tribute to her; she can send into the field six thousand cavalry and ten thousand hoplites, or heavy-armed infantry,"[459] observed Jason, despot of Pheræ, to Polydamas of Pharsalus, in endeavoring to prevail on the latter to second his pretensions to that dignity. The impost due from the tributaries, seemingly considerable, was then realized with arrears, and the duties upon imports at the harbors of the Pagasæan gulf, imposed for the benefit of the confederacy, were then enforced with strictness; but the observation shows that, while unanimous Thessaly was very powerful, her periods of unanimity were only occasional.[460] Among the nations which thus paid tribute to the fulness of Thessalian power, we may number not merely the Perrhæbi, Magnêtes, and Achæans of Phthiôtis, but also the Malians and Dolopes, and various tribes of Epirots extending to the westward of Pindus.[461] We may remark that they were all (except the Malians) javelin-men, or light-armed troops, not serving in rank with the full panoply; a fact which, in Greece, counts as presumptive evidence of a lower civilization: the Magnêtes, too, had a peculiar close-fitting mode of dress, probably suited to movements in a mountainous country.[462] There was even a time when the Thessalian power threatened to extend southward of Thermopylæ, subjugating the Phokians, Dorians, and Lokrians. So much were the Phokians alarmed at this danger, that they had built a wall across the pass of Thermopylæ, for the purpose of more easily defending it against Thessalian invaders, who are reported to have penetrated more than once into the Phokian valleys, and to have sustained some severe defeats. [463] At what precise time these events happened, we find no information; but it must have been considerably earlier than the invasion of Xerxes, since the defensive wall which had been built at Thermopylæ, by the Phokians, was found by Leonidas in a state of ruin. But the Phokians, though they no longer felt the necessity of keeping up this wall, had not ceased to fear and hate the Thessalians,—an antipathy which will be found to manifest itself palpably in connection with the Persian invasion. On the whole, the resistance of the Phokians was successful, for the power of the Thessalians never reached southward of the pass.[464]

It will be recollected that these different ancient races, Perrhæbi, Magnêtes, Achæans, Malians, Dolopes,—though tributaries of the Thessalians, still retained their Amphiktyonic franchise, and were considered as legitimate Hellenes: all except the Malians are, indeed, mentioned in the Iliad. We shall rarely have occasion to speak much of them in the course of this history: they are found siding with Xerxes

(chiefly by constraint) in his attack of Greece, and almost indifferent in the struggle between Sparta and Athens. That the Achæans of Phthiôtis are a portion of the same race as the Achæans of Peloponnesus it seems reasonable to believe, though we trace no historical evidence to authenticate it. Achæa Phthiôtis is the seat of Hellên, the patriarch of the entire race,—of the primitive Hellas, by some treated as a town, by others as a district of some breadth,—and of the great national hero, Achilles. Its connection with the Peloponnesian Achæans is not unlike that of Doris with the Peloponnesian Dorians.[465] We have, also, to notice another ethnical kindred, the date and circumstances of which are given to us only in a mythical form, but which seems, nevertheless, to be in itself a reality,—that of the Magnêtes on Pelion and Ossa, with the two divisions of Asiatic Magnêtes, or Magnesia, on Mount Sipylus and Magnesia on the river Mæander. It is said that these two Asiatic homonymous towns were founded by migrations of the Thessalian Magnêtes, a body of whom became consecrated to the Delphian god, and chose a new abode under his directions. According to one story, these emigrants were warriors, returning from the Siege of Troy; according to another, they sought fresh seats, to escape from the Thesprotian conquerors of Thessaly. There was a third story, according to which the Thessalian Magnêtes themselves were represented as colonists[466] from Delphi. Though we can elicit no distinct matter of fact from these legends, we may, nevertheless, admit the connection of race between the Thessalian and the Asiatic Magnêtes, as well as the reverential dependence of both, manifested in this supposed filiation, on the temple of Delphi. Of the Magnêtes in Krete, noticed by Plato as long extinct in his time, we cannot absolutely verify even the existence.

Of the Malians, Thucydidês notices three tribes (γένη) as existing in his time,—the Paralii, the Hierês (priests), and the Trachinii, or men of Trachin:[467] it is possible that the second of the two may have been possessors of the sacred spot on which the Amphiktyonic meetings were held. The prevalence of the hoplites or heavy-armed infantry among the Malians, indicates that we are stepping from Thessalian to more southerly Hellenic habits: the Malians recognized every man as a qualified citizen, who either had served, or was serving, in the ranks with his full panoply.[468] Yet the panoply was probably not perfectly suitable to the mountainous regions by which they were surrounded; for, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the aggressive mountaineers of the neighboring region of Œta, had so harassed and overwhelmed them in war, that they were forced to throw themselves on the protection of Sparta; and the establishment of the Spartan colony of Herakleia, near Trachin, was the result of their urgent application. Of these mountaineers, described under the general name of Œtæans, the principal were the Ænianes, (or Eniênes, as they are termed in the Homeric Catalogue, as well as by Herodotus),—an ancient Hellenic[469] Amphiktyonic race, who are said to have passed through several successive migrations in Thessaly and Epirus, but who, in the historical times, had their settlement and their chief town, Hypata, in the upper valley of the Spercheius, on the northern declivity of Mount Œta. But other tribes were probably also included in the name, such as those

Ætolian tribes, the Bomians and Kallians, whose high and cold abodes approached near to the Maliac gulf. It is in this sense that we are to understand the name, as comprehending all the predatory tribes along this extensive mountain range, when we are told of the damage done by the Œtæans, both to the Malians on the east, and to the Dorians on the south: but there are some cases in which the name Œtæans seems to designate expressly the Ænianes, especially when they are mentioned as exercising the Amphiktyonic franchise.[470]

The fine soil, abundant moisture, and genial exposure of the southern declivities of Othrys,[471]—especially the valley of the Spercheius, through which river all these waters pass away, and which annually gives forth a fertilizing inundation,—present a marked contrast with the barren, craggy, and naked masses of Mount Œta, which forms one side of the pass of Thermopylæ. Southward of the pass, the Lokrians, Phokians, and Dorians, occupied the mountains and passes between Thessaly and Bœotia. The coast opposite to the western side of Eubœa, from the neighborhood of Thermopylæ, as far as the Bœotian frontier at Anthêdôn, was possessed by the Lokrians, whose northern frontier town, Alpêni, was conterminous with the Malians. There was, however, one narrow strip of Phokis—the town of Daphnus, where the Phokians also touched the Eubœan sea—which broke this continuity, and divided the Lokrians into two sections,—Lokrians of Mount Knêmis, or Epiknemidian Lokrians, and Lokrians of Opus, or Opuntian Lokrians. The mountain called Knêmis, running southward parallel to the coast from the end of Œta, divided the former section from the inland Phokians and the upper valley of the Kephisus: farther southward, joining continuously with Mount Ptôon by means of an intervening mountain which is now called Chlomo, it separated the Lokrians of Opus from the territories of Orchomenus, Thebes, and Anthêdôn, the north-eastern portions of Bœotia. Besides these two sections of the Lokrian name, there was also a third, completely separate, and said to have been colonized out from Opus,—the Lokrians surnamed Ozolæ,—who dwelt apart on the western side of Phokis, along the northern coast of the Corinthian gulf. They reached from Amphissa—which overhung the plain of Krissa, and stood within seven miles of Delphi—to Naupaktus. near the narrow entrance of the gulf; which latter town was taken from these Lokrians by the Athenians, a little before the Peloponnesian war. Opus prided itself on being the mother-city of the Lokrian name, and the legends of Deukaliôn and Pyrrha found a home there as well as in Phthiôtis. Alpeni, Nikæa, Thronium, and Skarpheia, were towns, ancient but unimportant, of the Epiknemidian Lokrians; but the whole length of this Lokrian coast is celebrated for its beauty and fertility, both by Ancient and modern observers.[472]

The Phokians were bounded on the north by the little territories called Doris and Dryopis, which separated them from the Malians,—on the north-east, east, and south-west, by the different branches of Lokrians,—and on the south-east, by the Bœotians. They touched the Eubœan sea, (as has been mentioned) at Daphnus, the point where it approaches nearest to their chief town, Elateia; their territory also

comprised most part of the lofty and bleak range of Parnassus, as far as its southerly termination, where a lower portion of it, called Kirphis, projects into the Corinthian gulf, between the two bays of Antikyra and Krissa; the latter, with its once fertile plain, lay immediately under the sacred rock of the Delphian Apollo. Both Delphi and Krissa originally belonged to the Phokian race, but the sanctity of the temple, together with Lacedæmonian aid, enabled the Delphians to set up for themselves, disavowing their connection with the Phokian brotherhood. Territorially speaking, the most valuable part of Phokis[473] consisted in the valley of the river Kephisus, which takes its rise from Parnassus, not far from the Phokian town of Lilæa, passes between Œta and Knêmis on one side, and Parnassus on the other, and enters Bœotia near Chæroneia, discharging itself into the lake Kôpaïs. It was on the projecting mountain ledges and rocks on each side of this river, that the numerous little Phokian towns were situated. Twenty-two of them were destroyed and broken up into villages by the Amphiktyonic order, after the second Sacred War; Abæ (one of the few, if not the only one, that was spared) being protected by the sanctity of its temple and oracle. Of these cities, the most important was Elateia, situated on the left bank of the Kephisus, and on the road from Lokris into Phokis, in the natural march of an army from Thermopylæ into Bœotia. The Phokian towns[474] were embodied in an ancient confederacy, which held its periodical meetings at a temple between Daulis and Delphi.

The little territory called Doris and Dryopis, occupied the southern declivity of Mount Œta, dividing Phokis on the north and north-west, from the Ætolians, Æni-anes, and Malians. That which was called Doris in the historical times, and which reached, in the time of Herodotus, nearly as far eastward as the Maliac gulf, is said to have formed a part of what had been once called Dryopis; a territory which had comprised the summit of Œta as far as the Spercheius, northward, and which had been inhabited by an old Hellenic tribe called Dryopes. The Dorians acquired their settlement in Dryopis by gift from Hêraklês, who, along with the Malians (so ran the legend), had expelled the Dryopes, and compelled them to find for themselves new seats at Hermionê, and Asinê, in the Argolic peninsula of Peloponnesus,—at Styra and Karystus in Eubœa,—and in the island of Kythnus;[475] it is only in these five last-mentioned places, that history recognizes them. The territory of Doris was distributed into four little townships,—Pindus, or Akyphas, Bœon, Kytinion, and Erineon,—each of which seems to have occupied a separate valley belonging to one of the feeders of the river Kephisus,—the only narrow spaces of cultivated ground which this "small and sad" region presented.[476] In itself, this tetrapolis is so insignificant, that we shall rarely find occasion to mention it; but it acquired a factitious consequence by being regarded as the metropolis of the great Dorian cities in Peloponnesus, and receiving on that ground special protection from Sparta. I do not here touch upon that string of ante-historical migrations—stated by Herodotus, and illustrated by the ingenuity as well as decorated by the fancy of O. Müller—through which the Dorians are affiliated with the patriarch of the Hellenic race,—moving origi-

nally out of Phthiôtis to Histiæôtis, then to Pindus, and lastly to Doris. The residence of Dorians in Doris, is a fact which meets us at the commencement of history, like that of the Phokians and Lokrians in their respective territories.

We next pass to the Ætolians, whose extreme tribes covered the bleak heights of Œta and Korax, reaching almost within sight of the Maliac gulf, where they bordered on the Dorians and Malians,—while their central and western tribes stretched along the frontier of the Ozolian Lokrians to the flat plain, abundant in marsh and lake, near the mouth of the Euênus. In the time of Herodotus and Thucydidês, they do not seem to have extended so far westward as the Achelôus; but in later times, this latter river, throughout the greater part of its lower course, divided them from the Akarnanians:[477] on the north, they touched upon the Dolopians, and upon a parallel of latitude nearly as far north as Ambrakia. There were three great divisions of the Ætolian name,—the Apodôti, Ophioneis, and Eurytanes,—each of which was subdivided into several different village tribes. The northern and eastern portion of the territory[478] consisted of very high mountain ranges, and even in the southern portion, the mountains Arakynthus, Kurion, Chalkis, Taphiassus, are found at no great distance from the sea; while the chief towns in Ætolia, Kalydôn, Pleurôn, Chalkis,—seem to have been situated eastward of the Euênus, between the last-mentioned mountains and the sea.[479] The first two towns have been greatly ennobled in legend, but are little named in history; while, on the contrary, Thermus, the chief town of the historical Ætolians, and the place where the aggregate meeting and festival of the Ætolian name, for the choice of a Pan-Ætolic general, was convoked, is not noticed by any one earlier than Ephorus.[480] It was partly legendary renown, partly ethnical kindred (publicly acknowledged on both sides) with the Eleians in Peloponnesus, which authenticated the title of the Ætolians to rank as Hellens. But the great mass of the Apodôti, Eurytanes, and Ophioneis in the inland mountains, were so rude in their manners, and so unintelligible[481] in their speech, (which, however, was not barbaric, but very bad Hellenic,) that this title might well seem disputable,—in point of fact it was disputed, in later times, when the Ætolian power and depredations had become obnoxious nearly to all Greece. And it is, probably, to this difference of manners between the Ætolians on the sea-coast and those in the interior, that we are to trace a geographical division mentioned by Strabo, into ancient Ætolia, and Ætolia Epiktêtus, or acquired. When or by whom this division was introduced, we do not know. It cannot be founded upon any conquest, for the inland Ætolians were the most unconquerable of mankind: and the affirmation which Ephorus applied to the whole Ætolian race,—that it had never been reduced to subjection by any one,—is, most of all, beyond dispute concerning the inland portion of it.[482]

Adjoining the Ætolians were the Akarnanians, the westernmost of extra-Peloponnesian Greeks. They extended to the Ionian sea, and seem, in the time of Thucydidês, to have occupied both banks of the river Achelôus, in the lower part of its course,—though the left bank appears afterwards as belonging to the Ætolians, so

that the river came to constitute the boundary, often disputed and decided by arms, between them. The principal Akarnanian towns, Stratus and Œniadæ, were both on the right bank; the latter on the marshy and overflowed land near its mouth. Near the Akarnanians, towards the gulf of Ambrakia, were found barbarian, or non-Hellenic nations,—the Agræans and the Amphilochians: in the midst of the latter, on the shores of the Ambrakian gulf, the Greek colony, called Argos Amphilochicum, was established.

Of the five Hellenic subdivisions now enumerated,—Lokrians, Phokians, Dorians (of Doris), Ætolians, and Akarnanians (of whom Lokrians, Phokians, and Ætolians are comprised in the Homeric catalogue),—we have to say the same as of those north of Thermopylæ: there is no information respecting them from the commencement of the historical period down to the Persian war. Even that important event brings into action only the Lokrians of the Eubœan sea, the Phokians, and the Dorians: we have to wait until near the Peloponnesian war, before we require information respecting the Ozolian Lokrians, the Ætolians, and the Akarnanians. These last three were unquestionably the most backward members of the Hellenic aggregate. Though not absolutely without a central town, they lived dispersed in villages, retiring, when attacked, to inaccessible heights, perpetually armed and in readiness for aggression and plunder wherever they found an opportunity.[483] Very different was the condition of the Lokrians opposite Eubœa, the Phokians, and the Dorians. These were all orderly town communities, small, indeed, and poor, but not less well administered than the average of Grecian townships, and perhaps exempt from those individual violences which so frequently troubled the Bœotian Thebes or the great cities of Thessaly. Timæus affirmed (contrary, as it seems, to the supposition of Aristotle) that, in early times, there were no slaves either among the Lokrians or Phokians, and that the work required to be done for proprietors was performed by poor freemen;[484] a habit which is alleged to have been continued until the temporary prosperity of the second Sacred War, when the plunder of the Delphian temple so greatly enriched the Phokian leaders. But this statement is too briefly given, and too imperfectly authenticated, to justify any inferences.

We find in the poet Alkman (about 610 B. C.), the Erysichæan, or Kalydonian shepherd, named as a type of rude rusticity,—the antithesis of Sardis, where the poet was born.[485] And among the suitors who are represented as coming forward to claim the daughter of the Sikyonian Kleisthenes in marriage, there appears both the Thessalian Diaktoridês from Krannôn, a member of the Skopad family,—and the Ætolian Malês, brother of that Titormus who in muscular strength surpassed all his contemporary Greeks, and who had seceded from mankind into the inmost recesses of Ætolia: this Ætolian seems to be set forth as a sort of antithesis to the delicate Smindyridês of Sybaris, the most luxurious of mankind. Herodotus introduces these characters into his dramatic picture of this memorable wedding.[486]

Between Phokis and Lokris on one side, and Attica (from which it is divided by the mountains Kithærôn and Parnês) on the other, we find the important territory called Bœotia, with its ten or twelve autonomous cities, forming a sort of confederacy under the presidency of Thebes, the most powerful among them. Even of this territory, destined during the second period of this history, to play a part so conspicuous and effective, we know nothing during the first two centuries after 776 B. C. We first acquire some insight into it, on occasion of the disputes between Thebes and Platæa, about the year 520 B. C. Orchomenus, on the north-west of the lake Kôpaïs, forms throughout the historical times one of the cities of the Bœotian league, seemingly the second after Thebes. But I have already stated that the Orchomenian legends, the Catalogue, and other allusions in Homer, and the traces of past power and importance yet visible in the historical age, attest the early political existence of Orchomenus and its neighborhood apart from Bœotia.[487] The Amphiktyony in which Orchomenus participated, at the holy island of Kalauria near the Argolic peninsula, seems to show that it must once have possessed a naval force and commerce, and that its territory must have touched the sea at Halæ and the lower town of Larymna, near the southern frontier of Lokris; this sea is separated by a very narrow space from the range of mountains which join Knêmis and Ptôon, and which inclose on the east both the basin of Orchomenus, Asplêdôn, and Kôpæ, and the lake Kôpaïs. The migration of the Bœotians out of Thessaly into Bœotia (which is represented as a consequence of the conquest of the former country by the Thesprotians) is commonly assigned as the compulsory force which Bœotized Orchomenus. By whatever cause, or at whatever time (whether before or after 776 B. C.) the transition may have been effected, we find Orchomenus completely Bœotian throughout the known historical age,—yet still retaining its local Minyeian legends, and subject to the jealous rivalry[488] of Thebes, as being the second city in the Bœotian league. The direct road from the passes of Phokis southward into Bœotia went through Chæroneia, leaving Lebadeia on the right, and Orchomenus on the left hand, and passed the south-western edge of the lake Kôpaïs near the towns of Koroneia, Alalkomenæ, and Haliartus,—all situated on the mountain Tilphôssion, an outlying ridge connected with Helicon by the intervention of Mount Leïbethrius. The Tilphossæon was an important military post, commanding that narrow pass between the mountain and the lake which lay in the great road from Phokis to Thebes.[489] The territory of this latter city occupied the greater part of central Bœotia, south of the lake Kôpaïs; it comprehended Akræphia and Mount Ptôon, and probably touched the Eubœan sea at the village of Salganeus south of Anthêdôn. South-west of Thebes, occupying the southern descent of lofty Helicon towards the inmost corner of the Corinthian gulf, and bordering on the south-eastern extremity of Phokis with the Phokian town of Bulis, stood the city of Thespiæ. Southward of the Asôpus, between that river and Mount Kithæron, were Platæa and Tanagra; in the south-eastern corner of Bœotia stood Orôpus, the frequent subject of contention between Thebes and Athens; and in the road between the Eubœan Chalkis and Thebes, the town of Mykalêssus.

From our first view of historical Bœotia downward, there appears a confederation which embraces the whole territory: and during the Peloponnesian war, the Thebans invoke "the ancient constitutional maxims of the Bœotians" as a justification of extreme rigor, as well as of treacherous breach of the peace, against the recusant Platæans.[490] Of this confederation, the greater cities were primary members, while the lesser were attached to one or other of them in a kind of dependent union. Neither the names nor the number of these primary members can be certainly known: there seem grounds for including Thebes, Orchomenus, Lebadeia, Korôneia, Haliartus, Kôpæ, Anthêdôn, Tanagra, Thespiæ, and Platæa before its secession.[491] Akræphia, with the neighboring Mount Ptôon and its oracle, Skôlus, Glisas, and other places, were dependencies of Thebes: Chæroneia, Asplêdôn, Holmônes, and Hyêttus, of Orchomenus: Siphæ, Leuktra, Kerêssus, and Thisbê, of Thespiæ.[492] Certain generals or magistrates, called Bœotarchs, were chosen annually to manage the common affairs of the confederation. At the time of the battle of Delium in the Peloponnesian war, they were eleven in number, two of them from Thebes; but whether this number was always maintained, or in what proportions the choice was made by the different cities, we find no distinct information. There were likewise, during the Peloponnesian war, four different senates, with whom the Bœotarchs consulted on matters of importance; a curious arrangement, of which we have no explanation. Lastly, there was the general concilium and religious festival,—the Pambœotia,—held periodically at Korôneia. Such were the forms, as far as we can make them out, of the Bœotian confederacy; each of the separate cities possessing its own senate and constitution, and having its political consciousness as an autonomous unit, yet with a certain habitual deference to the federal obligations. Substantially, the affairs of the confederation will be found in the hands of Thebes, managed in the interests of Theban ascendency, which appears to have been sustained by no other feeling except respect for superior force and bravery. The discontents of the minor Bœotian towns, harshly repressed and punished, form an uninviting chapter in Grecian history.

One piece of information we find, respecting Thebes singly and apart from the other Bœotian towns anterior to the year 700 B. C. Though brief, and incompletely recorded, it is yet highly valuable, as one of the first incidents of solid and positive Grecian history. Dioklês, the Corinthian, stands enrolled as Olympic victor in the 13th Olympiad, or 728 B. C., at a time when the oligarchy called Bacchiadæ possessed the government of Corinth. The beauty of his person attracted towards him the attachment of Philolaus, one of the members of this oligarchical body,—a sentiment which Grecian manners did not proscribe; but it also provoked an incestuous passion on the part of his own mother, Halcyonê, from which Dioklês shrunk with hatred and horror. He abandoned forever his native city and retired to Thebes, whither he was followed by Philolaus, and where both of them lived and died. Their tombs were yet shown in the time of Aristotle, close adjoining to each other, yet with an opposite frontage; that of Philolaus being so placed that the inmate could command a view of the lofty peak of his native city, while that of Dioklês was so disposed as to block out all

prospect of the hateful spot. That which preserves to us the memory of so remarkable an incident, is, the esteem entertained for Philolaus by the Thebans,—a feeling so profound, that they invited him to make laws for them. We shall have occasion to point out one or two similar cases, in which Grecian cities invoked the aid of an intelligent stranger; and the practice became common, among the Italian republics in the Middle Ages, to nominate a person not belonging to their city either as podesta or as arbitrator in civil dissensions. It would have been highly interesting to know, at length, what laws Philolaus made for the Thebans; but Aristotle, with his usual conciseness, merely alludes to his regulations respecting the adoption of children and respecting the multiplication of offspring in each separate family. His laws were framed with the view to maintain the original number of lots of land, without either subdivision or consolidation; but by what means the purpose was to be fulfilled we are not informed.[493] There existed a law at Thebes, which perhaps may have been part of the scheme of Philolaus, prohibiting exposure of children, and empowering a father, under the pressure of extreme poverty, to bring his new-born infant to the magistrates, who sold it for a price to any citizen-purchaser,—taking from him the obligation to bring it up, but allowing him in return, to consider the adult as his slave.[494] From these brief allusions, coming to us without accompanying illustration, we can draw no other inference, except that the great problem of population—the relation between the well-being of the citizens and their more or less rapid increase in numbers—had engaged the serious attention even of the earliest Grecian legislators. We may, however, observe that the old Corinthian legislator, Pheidôn, (whose precise date cannot be fixed) is stated by Aristotle,[495] to have contemplated much the same object as that which is ascribed to Philolaus at Thebes; an unchangeable number both of citizens and of lots of land, without any attempt to alter the unequal ratio of the lots, one to the other.

CHAPTER IV.

EARLIEST HISTORICAL VIEW OF PELOPONNESUS. DORIANS IN ARGOS AND THE NEIGHBORING CITIES.

We now pass from the northern members to the heart and head of Greece,—Peloponnesus and Attica, taking the former first in order, and giving as much as can be ascertained respecting its early historical phenomena.

The traveller who entered Peloponnesus from Bœotia during the youthful days of Herodotus and Thucydidês, found an array of powerful Doric cities conterminous to each other, and beginning at the isthmus of Corinth. First came Megara, stretching across the isthmus from sea to sea, and occupying the high and rugged mountain-ridge called Geraneia; next Corinth, with its strong and conspicuous acropolis, and its territory including Mount Oneion as well as the portion of the isthmus at once most level and narrowest, which divided its two harbors called Lechæum and Kenchreæ. Westward of Corinth, along the Corinthian gulf, stood Sikyôn, with a plain of uncommon fertility, between the two towns: southward of Sikyôn and Corinth were Phlius and Kleonæ, both conterminous, as well as Corinth, with Argos and the Argolic peninsula. The inmost bend of the Argolic gulf, including a considerable space of flat and marshy ground adjoining to the sea, was possessed by Argos; the Argolic peninsula was divided by Argos with the Doric cities of Epidaurus and Trœzen, and the Dryopian city of Hermionê, the latter possessing the south-western corner. Proceeding southward along the western coast of the gulf, and passing over the little river called Tanos, the traveller found himself in the dominion of Sparta, which comprised the entire southern region of the peninsula from its eastern to its western sea, where the river Neda flows into the latter. He first passed from Argos across the difficult mountain range called Parnôn (which bounds to the west the southern portion of Argolis), until he found himself in the valley of the river Œnus, which he followed until it joined the Eurotas. In the larger valley of the Eurotas, far removed from the sea, and accessible only through the most impracticable mountain roads, lay the five unwalled, unadorned, adjoining villages, which bore collectively the formidable name of Sparta. The whole valley of the Eurotas, from Skiritis and Beleminatis at the border of Arcadia, to the Laconian gulf,—expanding in several parts into fertile plain, especially near to its mouth, where the towns of Gythium and Helos were found,—belonged to Sparta; together with the cold and high mountain range to the eastward, which projects into the promontory of Malea,—and the still loftier chain of Taygetus to the westward, which ends in the promontory of Tænarus. On the other side of Taygetus, on the banks of the river Pamisus, which there flows into the Messenian gulf, lay the plain of Messênê, the richest land in the peninsula. This plain had once yielded its ample produce to the free Messenian Dorians, resident in the towns of

Stenyklêrus and Andania. But in the time of which we speak, the name of Messenians was borne only by a body of brave but homeless exiles, whose restoration to the land of their forefathers overpassed even the exile's proverbially sanguine hope. Their land was confounded with the western portion of Laconia, which reached in a south-westerly direction down to the extreme point of Cape Akritas, and northward as far as the river Neda.

Throughout his whole journey to the point last mentioned, from the borders of Bœotia and Megaris, the traveller would only step from one Dorian state into another. But on crossing from the south to the north bank of the river Neda, at a point near to its mouth, he would find himself out of Doric land altogether: first, in the territory called Triphylia,—next, in that of Pisa, or the Pisatid,—thirdly, in the more spacious and powerful state called Elis; these three comprising the coast-land of Peloponnesus from the mouth of the Neda to that of the Larissus. The Triphylians, distributed into a number of small townships, the largest of which was Lepreon,—and the Pisatans, equally destitute of any centralizing city,—had both, at the period of which we are now speaking, been conquered by their more powerful northern neighbors of Elis, who enjoyed the advantage of a spacious territory united under one government; the middle portion, called the Hollow Elis, being for the most part fertile, though the tracts near the sea were more sandy and barren. The Eleians were a section of Ætolian emigrants into Peloponnesus, but the Pisatans and Triphylians had both been originally independent inhabitants of the peninsula,—the latter being affirmed to belong to the same race as the Minyæ who had occupied the ante-Bœotian Orchomenos: both, too, bore the ascendency of Elis with perpetual murmur and occasional resistance.

Crossing the river Larissus, and pursuing the northern coast of Peloponnesus south of the Corinthian gulf, the traveller would pass into Achaia,—a name which designated the narrow strip of level land, and the projecting spurs and declivities, between that gulf and the northernmost mountains of the peninsula,—Skollis, Erymanthus, Aroania, Krathis, and the towering eminence called Kyllênê. Achæan cities, —twelve in number at least, if not more,—divided this long strip of land amongst them, from the mouth of the Larissus and the north-western Cape Araxus on one side, to the western boundary of the Sikyonian territory on the other. According to the accounts of the ancient legends and the belief of Herodotus, this territory had once been occupied by Ionian inhabitants whom the Achæans had expelled.

In making this journey, the traveller would have finished the circuit of Peloponnesus; but he would still have left untrodden the great central region, inclosed between the territories just enumerated,—approaching nearest to the sea on the borders of Triphylia, but never touching it anywhere. This region was Arcadia, possessed by inhabitants who are uniformly represented as all of one race, and all aboriginal. It was high and bleak, full of wild mountain, rock, and forest, and abounding, to a degree unusual even in Greece, with those land-locked basins from whence the water

finds only a subterraneous issue. It was distributed among a large number of distinct villages and cities. Many of the village tribes,—the Mænalii, Parrhasii, Azanes, etc., occupying the central and the western regions, were numbered among the rudest of the Greeks: but along its eastern frontier there were several Arcadian cities which ranked deservedly among the more civilized Peloponnesians. Tegea, Mantineia, Orchomenus, Stymphalus, Pheneus, possessed the whole eastern frontier of Arcadia from the borders of Laconia to those of Sikyôn and Pellênê in Achaia: Phigaleia at the south-western corner, near the borders of Triphylia, and Heræa, on the north bank of the Alpheius, near the place where that river quits Arcadia to enter the Pisatis, were also towns deserving of notice. Towards the north of this cold and thinly-peopled region, near Pheneos, was situated the small town of Nonakris, adjoining to which rose the hardly accessible crags where the rivulet of Styx[496] flowed down: a point of common feeling for all Arcadians, from the terrific sanction which this water was understood to impart to their oaths.

The distribution of Peloponnesus here sketched, suitable to the Persian invasion and the succeeding half century, may also be said (with some allowances) to be adapted to the whole interval between about B. C. 550-370; from the time of the conquest of Thyreatis by Sparta to the battle of Leuktra. But it is not the earliest distribution which history presents to us. Not presuming to criticize the Homeric map of Peloponnesus, and going back only to 776 B. C., we find this material difference,—that Sparta occupies only a very small fraction of the large territory above described as belonging to her. Westward of the summit of Mount Taygetus are found another section of Dorians, independent of Sparta: the Messenian Dorians, whose city is on the hill of Stenyklêrus, near the south-western boundary of Arcadia, and whose possessions cover the fertile plain of Messêne along the river Pamisus to its mouth in the Messenian gulf: it is to be noted that Messênê was then the name of the plain generally, and that no town so called existed until after the battle of Leuktra. Again, eastward of the valley of the Eurotas, the mountainous region and the western shores of the Argolic gulf down to Cape Malea are also independent of Sparta; belonging to Argos, or rather to Dorian towns in unison with Argos. All the great Dorian towns, from the borders of the Megarid to the eastern frontier of Arcadia, as above enumerated, appear to have existed in 776 B. C.: Achaia was in the same condition, so far as we are able to judge, as well as Arcadia, except in regard to its southern frontier, conterminous with Sparta, of which more will hereafter be said. In respect to the western portion of Peloponnesus, Elis (properly so called) appears to have embraced the same territory in 776 B. C. as in 550 B. C.: but the Pisatid had been recently conquered, and was yet imperfectly subjected by the Eleians; while Triphylia seems to have been quite independent of them. Respecting the south-western promontory of Peloponnesus down to Cape Akritas, we are altogether without information: reasons will hereafter be given for believing that it did not at that time form part of the territory of the Messenian Dorians.

Of the different races or people whom Herodotus knew in Peloponnesus, he believed three to be aboriginal,—the Arcadians, the Achæans, and the Kynurians. The Achæans, though belonging indigenously to the peninsula, had yet removed from the southern portion of it to the northern, expelling the previous Ionian tenants: this is a part of the legend respecting the Dorian conquest, or Return of the Herakleids, and we can neither verify nor contradict it. But neither the Arcadians nor the Kynurians had ever changed their abodes. Of the latter, I have not before spoken, because they were never (so far as history knows them) an independent population. They occupied the larger portion[497] of the territory of Argolis, from Orneæ, near the northern[498] or Phliasian border, to Thyrea and the Thyreatis, on the Laconian border: and though belonging originally (as Herodotus imagines rather than asserts) to the Ionic race—they had been so long subjects of Argos in his time, that almost all evidence of their ante-Dorian condition had vanished.

But the great Dorian states in Peloponnesus—the capital powers in the peninsula—were all originally emigrants, according to the belief not only of Herodotus, but of all the Grecian world: so also were the Ætolians of Elis, the Triphylians, and the Dryopes at Hermionê and Asinê. All these emigrations are so described as to give them a root in the Grecian legendary world: the Triphylians are traced back to Lemnos, as the offspring of the Argonautic heroes,[499] and we are too uninformed about them to venture upon any historical guesses. But respecting the Dorians, it may perhaps be possible, by examining the first historical situation in which they are presented to us, to offer some conjectures as to the probable circumstances under which they arrived. The legendary narrative of it has already been given in the first chapter of this volume,—that great mythical event called the Return of the Children of Hêraklês, by which the first establishment of the Dorians in the promised land of Peloponnesus was explained to the full satisfaction of Grecian faith. One single armament and expedition, acting by the special direction of the Delphian god, and conducted by three brothers, lineal descendants of the principal Achæo-Dorian heroes through Hyllus, (the eponymus of the principal tribe,)—the national heroes of the preëxisting population vanquished and expelled, and the greater part of the peninsula both acquired and partitioned at a stroke,—the circumstances of the partition adjusted to the historical relations of Laconia and Messenia,—the friendly power of Ætolian Elis, with its Olympic games as the bond of union in Peloponnesus, attached to this event as an appendage, in the person of Oxylus,—all these particulars compose a narrative well calculated to impress the retrospective imagination of a Greek. They exhibit an epical fitness and sufficiency which it would be unseasonable to impair by historical criticism.

The Alexandrine chronology sets down a period of 328 years from the Return of the Herakleids to the first Olympiad (1104 B. C.-776 B. C.),—a period measured by the lists of the kings of Sparta, on the trustworthiness of which some remarks have already been offered. Of these 328 years, the first 250, at the least, are altogether

barren of facts; and even if we admitted them to be historical, we should have nothing to recount except a succession of royal names. Being unable either to guarantee the entire list, or to discover any valid test for discriminating the historical and the non-historical items, I here enumerate the Lacedæmonian kings as they appear in Mr. Clinton's Fasti Hellenici. There were two joint kings at Sparta, throughout nearly all the historical time of independent Greece, deducing their descent from Hêraklês through Eurysthenês and Proklês, the twin sons of Aristodêmus; the latter being one of those three Herakleid brothers to whom the conquest of the peninsula is ascribed: —

Line of Eurysthenês.				*Line of Proklês.*			
Eurysthenês	reigned	42	years.	Proklês	reigned	51	years.
Agis	″	31	″	Söus	″	—	″
Echestratus	″	35	″	Eurypôn	″	—	″
Labôtas	″	37	″	Prytanis	″	49	″
Doryssus	″	29	″	Eunomus	″	45	″
Agesilaus	″	44	″	Charilaus	″	60	″
Archelaus	″	60	″	Nikander	″	38	″
Teleklus	″	40	″	Theopompus	″	10	″
Alkamenês	″	10	″				
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Both Theopompus and Alkamenês reigned considerably longer, but the chronologists affirm that the year 776 B. C. (or the first Olympiad) occurred in the tenth year of each of their reigns. It is necessary to add, with regard to this list, that there are some material discrepancies between different authors even as to the names of individual kings, and still more as to the duration of their reigns, as may be seen both in Mr. Clinton's chronology and in Müller's Appendix to the History of the Dorians.[500] The alleged sum total cannot be made to agree with the items without great license of conjecture. O. Müller observes,[501] in reference to this Alexandrine chronology, "that our materials only enable us to restore it to its original state, not to verify its correctness." In point of fact they are insufficient even for the former purpose, as the dissensions among learned critics attest.

We have a succession of names, still more barren of facts, in the case of the Dorian sovereigns of Corinth. This city had its own line of Herakleids, descended from Hêraklês, but not through Hyllus. Hippotês, the progenitor of the Corinthian Herakleids, was reported in the legend to have originally joined the Dorian invaders of the Peloponnesus, but to have quitted them in consequence of having slain the prophet Karnus.[502] The three brothers, when they became masters of the peninsula, sent for Alêtês, the son of Hippotês, and placed him in possession of Corinth, over which the chronologists make him begin to reign thirty years after the Herakleid conquest. His successors are thus given:—

Aletes	reigned	38	years,
Ixion	″	38	″

Agelas	″	37	″
Prymnis	″	35	″
Bacchis	″	35	″
Agelas	″	30	″
Eudêmus	″	25	″
Aristomêdês	″	35	″
Agêmôn	″	16	″
Alexander	″	25	″
Telestês	″	12	″
Automenês	″	1	″
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Such was the celebrity of Bacchis, we are told, that those who succeeded him took the name of Bacchiads in place of Aletiads or Herakleids. One year after the accession of Automenês, the family of the Bacchiads generally, amounting to 200 persons, determined to abolish royalty, to constitute themselves a standing oligarchy, and to elect out of their own number an annual Prytanis. Thus commenced the oligarchy of the Bacchiads, which lasted for ninety years, until it was subverted by Kypselus in 657 B. C.[503] Reckoning the thirty years previous to the beginning of the reign of Alêtês, the chronologists thus provide an interval of 447 years between the Return of the Herakleids and the accession of Kypselus, and 357 years between the same period and the commencement of the Bacchiad oligarchy. The Bacchiad oligarchy is unquestionably historical; the conquest of the Herakleids belongs to the legendary world; while the interval between the two is filled up, as in so many other cases, by a mere barren genealogy.

When we jump this vacant space, and place ourselves at the first opening of history, we find that, although ultimately Sparta came to hold the first place, not only in Peloponnesus, but in all Hellas, this was not the case at the earliest moment of which we have historical cognizance. Argos, and the neighboring towns connected with her by a bond of semi-religious, semi-political union,—Sikyôn, Phlius, Epidaurus, and Trœzên,—were at first of greater power and consideration than Sparta; a fact which the legend of the Herakleids seems to recognize by making Têmenus the eldest brother of the three. And Herodotus assures us that at one time all the eastern coast of Peloponnesus down to Cape Melea, including the island of Cythêra, all which came afterwards to constitute a material part of Laconia, had belonged to Argos.[504] Down to the time of the first Messenian war, the comparative importance of the Dorian establishments in Peloponnesus appears to have been in the order in which the legend placed them,—Argos first,[505] Sparta second, Messênê third. It will be seen hereafter that the Argeians never lost the recollection of this early preëminence, from which the growth of Sparta had extruded them; and the liberties of entire Hellas were more than once in danger from their disastrous jealousy of a more fortunate competitor.

At a short distance of about three miles from Argos, and at the exact point where that city approaches nearest to the sea,[506] was situated the isolated hillock called Temenion, noticed both by Strabo and Pausanias. It was a small village, deriving

both its name and its celebrity from the chapel and tomb of the hero Têmenus, who was there worshipped by the Dorians; and the statement which Pausanias heard was, that Têmenus, with his invading Dorians, had seized and fortified the spot, and employed it as an armed post to make war upon Tisamenus and the Achæans. What renders this report deserving of the greater attention, is, that the same thing is affirmed with regard to the eminence called Solygeius, near Corinth: this too was believed to be the place which the Dorian assailants had occupied and fortified against the preëxisting Corinthians in the city. Situated close upon the Sarônic gulf, it was the spot which invaders landing from that gulf would naturally seize upon, and which Nikias with his powerful Athenian fleet did actually seize and occupy against Corinth in the Peloponnesian war.[507] In early days, the only way of overpowering the inhabitants of a fortified town, generally also planted in a position itself very defensible, was,—that the invaders, entrenching themselves in the neighborhood, harassed the inhabitants and ruined their produce until they brought them to terms. Even during the Peloponnesian war, when the art of besieging had made some progress, we read of several instances in which this mode of aggressive warfare was adopted with efficient results.[508] We may readily believe that the Dorians obtained admittance both into Argos and Corinth in this manner. And it is remarkable that, except Sikyôn (which is affirmed to have been surprised by night), these were the only towns in the Argolic region which are said to have resisted them; the story being, that Phlius, Epidaurus, and Trœzên had admitted the Dorian intruders without opposition, although a certain portion of the previous inhabitants seceded. We shall hereafter see that the non-Dorian population of Sikyôn and Corinth still remained considerable.

The separate statements which we thus find, and the position of the Temenion and the Solygeius, lead to two conjectures,—first, that the acquisitions of the Dorians in Peloponnesus were also isolated and gradual, not at all conformable to the rapid strides of the old Herakleid legend; next, that the Dorian invaders of Argos and Corinth made their attack from the Argolic and the Saronic gulfs,—by sea and not by land. It is, indeed, difficult to see how they can have got to the Temenion in any other way than by sea; and a glance at the map will show that the eminence Solygeius presents itself,[509] with reference to Corinth, as the nearest and most convenient holding-ground for a maritime invader, conformably to the scheme of operations laid by Nikias. To illustrate the supposition of a Dorian attack by sea on Corinth, we may refer to a story quoted from Aristotle (which we find embodied in the explanation of an old adage), representing Hippotês the father of Alêtês as having crossed the Maliac gulf[510] (the sea immediately bordering on the ancient Maleans, Dryopians, and Dorians) in ships, for the purpose of colonizing. And if it be safe to trust the mention of Dorians in the Odyssey, as a part of the population of the island of Crete, we there have an example of Dorian settlements which must have been effected by sea, and that too at a very early period. "We must suppose (observes O. Müller,[511] in reference to these Kretan Dorians) that the Dorians, pressed by want or restless from inactivity, constructed piratical canoes, manned these frail and narrow barks

with soldiers who themselves worked at the oar, and thus being changed from mountaineers into seamen,—the Normans of Greece,—set sail for the distant island of Krête." In the same manner, we may conceive the expeditions of the Dorians against Argos and Corinth to have been effected; and whatever difficulties may attach to this hypothesis, certain it is that the difficulties of a long land-march, along such a territory as Greece, are still more serious.

The supposition of Dorian emigrations by sea, from the Maliac gulf to the north-eastern promontory of Peloponnesus, is farther borne out by the analogy of the Dryopes, or Dryopians. During the historical times, this people occupied several detached settlements in various parts of Greece, all maritime, and some insular;—they were found at Hermionê, Asinê, and Eiôn, in the Argolic peninsula (very near to the important Dorian towns constituting the Amphiktyony of Argos,[512])—at Styra and Karystus in the island of Eubœa,—in the island of Kythnus, and even at Cyprus. These dispersed colonies can only have been planted by expeditions over the sea. Now we are told that the original Dryopis, the native country of this people, comprehended both the territory near the river Spercheius, and north of Œta, afterwards occupied by the Malians, as well as the neighboring district south of Œta, which was afterwards called Doris. From hence the Dryopians were expelled,—according to one story, by the Dorians,—according to another, by Hêraklês and the Malians: however this may be, it was from the Maliac gulf that they started on shipboard in quest of new homes, which some of them found on the headlands of the Argolic peninsula. [513] And it was from this very country, according to Herodotus,[514] that the Dorians also set forth, in order to reach Peloponnesus. Nor does it seem unreasonable to imagine, that the same means of conveyance, which bore the Dryopians from the Maliac gulf to Hermionê and Asinê, also carried the Dorians from the same place to the Temenion, and the hill Solygeius.

The legend represents Sikyôn, Epidaurus, Trœzên, Phlius, and Kleônæ, as all occupied by Dorian colonists from Argos, under the different sons of Têmenus: the first three are on the sea, and fit places for the occupation of maritime invaders. Argos and the Dorian towns in and near the Argolic peninsula are to be regarded as a cluster of settlements by themselves, completely distinct from Sparta and the Messenian Stenyklêrus, which appear to have been formed under totally different conditions. First, both of them are very far inland,—Stenyklêrus not easy, Sparta very difficult of access from the sea; next, we know that the conquests of Sparta were gradually made down the valley of the Eurotas seaward. Both these acquisitions present the appearance of having been made from the land-side, and perhaps in the direction which the Herakleid legend describes,—by warriors entering Peloponnesus across the narrow mouth of the Corinthian gulf, through the aid or invitation of those Ætolian settlers who at the same time colonized Elis. The early and intimate connection (on which I shall touch presently) between Sparta and the Olympic games as adminis-

tered by the Eleians, as well as the leading part ascribed to Lykurgus in the constitution of the solemn Olympic truce, tend to strengthen such a persuasion.

In considering the early affairs of the Dorians in Peloponnesus, we are apt to have our minds biased, first, by the Herakleid legend, which imparts to them an impressive, but deceitful, epical unity; next, by the aspect of the later and better-known history, which presents the Spartan power as unquestionably preponderant, and Argos only as second by a long interval. But the first view (as I have already remarked) which opens to us, of real Grecian history, a little before 776 B. C., exhibits Argos with its alliance or confederacy of neighboring cities colonized from itself, as the great seat of Dorian power in the peninsula, and Sparta as an outlying state of inferior consequence. The recollection of this state of things lasted after it had ceased to be a reality, and kept alive pretensions on the part of Argos to the headship of the Greeks as a matter of right, which she became quite incapable of sustaining either by adequate power or by statesmanlike sagacity. The growth of Spartan power was a succession of encroachments upon Argos.[515]

How Sparta came constantly to gain upon Argos will be matter for future explanation: at present, it is sufficient to remark, that the ascendency of Argos was derived not exclusively from her own territory, but came in part from her position as metropolis of an alliance of autonomous neighboring cities, all Dorian and all colonized from herself,—and this was an element of power essentially fluctuating. What Thêbes was to the cities of Bœotia, of which she either was, or professed to have been, the founder,[516] the same was Argos in reference to Kleônæ, Phlius, Sikyôn, Epidaurus, Trœzên, and Ægina. These towns formed, in mythical language, "the lot of Têmenus,"[517]—in real matter of fact, the confederated allies or subordinates of Argos: the first four of them were said to have been *Dorized* by the sons or immediate relatives of Têmenus; and the kings of Argos, as acknowledged descendants of the latter, claimed and exercised a sort of *suzeraineté* over them. Hermionê, Asinê, and Nauplia seem also to have been under the supremacy of Argos, though not colonies. [518] But this supremacy was not claimed directly and nakedly: agreeably to the ideas of the time, the ostensible purposes of the Argeian confederacy or Amphiktyony were religious, though its secondary and not less real effects, were political. The great patron-god of the league was Apollo Pythaëus, in whose name the obligations incumbent on the members of the league were imposed. While in each of the confederated cities there was a temple to this god, his most holy and central sanctuary was on the Larissa or acropolis of Argos. At this central Argeian sanctuary, solemn sacrifices were offered by Epidaurus as well as by other members of the confederacy, and, as it should seem, accompanied by money-payments,[519]—which the Argeians, as chief administrators on behalf of the common god, took upon them to enforce against defaulters, and actually tried to enforce during the Peloponnesian war against Epidaurus. On another occasion, during the 66th Olympiad (B. C. 514), they imposed the large fine of 500 talents upon each of the two states Sikyôn and Ægina, for having

lent ships to the Spartan king Kleomenes, wherewith he invaded the Argeian territory. The Æginetans set the claim at defiance, but the Sikyonians acknowledged its justice, and only demurred to its amount, professing themselves ready to pay 100 talents.[520] There can be no doubt that, at this later period, the ascendency of Argos over the members of her primitive confederacy had become practically inoperative; but the tenor of the cases mentioned shows that her claims were revivals of bygone privileges, which had once been effective and valuable.

How valuable the privileges of Argos were, before the great rise of the Spartan power,—how important an ascendency they conferred, in the hands of an energetic man, and how easily they admitted of being used in furtherance of ambitious views, is shown by the remarkable case of Pheidôn, the Temenid. The few facts which we learn respecting this prince exhibit to us, for the first time, something like a real position of parties in the Peloponnesus, wherein the actual conflict of living historical men and cities, comes out in tolerable distinctness.

Pheidôn was designated by Ephorus as the tenth, and by Theopompus as the sixth, in lineal descent from Têmenus. Respecting the date of his existence, opinions the most discrepant and irreconcilable have been delivered; but there seems good reason for referring him to the period a little before and a little after the 8th Olympiad,—between 770 B. C. and 730 B. C.[521] Of the preceding kings of Argos we hear little: one of them, Eratus, is said to have expelled the Dryopian inhabitants of Asinê from their town on the Argolic peninsula, in consequence of their having coöperated with the Spartan king, Nikander, when he invaded the Argeian territory, seemingly during the generation preceding Pheidôn; there is another, Damokratidas, whose date cannot be positively determined, but he appears rather as subsequent than as anterior to Pheidôn.[522] We are informed, however, that these anterior kings, even beginning with Medôn, the grandson of Têmenus, had been forced to submit to great abridgment of their power and privileges, and that a form of government substantially popular, though nominally regal, had been established.[523] Pheidôn, breaking through the limits imposed, made himself despot of Argos. He then re-established the power of Argos over all the cities of her confederacy, which had before been so nearly dissolved as to leave all the members practically independent.[524] Next, he is said to have acquired dominion over Corinth, and to have endeavored to assure it, by treacherously entrapping a thousand of her warlike citizens; but his artifice was divulged and frustrated by Abrôn, one of his confidential friends.[525] He is farther reported to have aimed at extending his sway over the greater part of Peloponnesus,—laying claim, as the descendant of Hêraklês, through the eldest son of Hyllus, to all the cities which that restless and irresistible hero had ever taken.[526] According to Grecian ideas, this legendary title was always seriously construed, and often admitted as conclusive; though of course, where there were strong opposing interests, reasons would be found to elude it. Pheidôn would have the same ground of right as that which, two hundred and fifty years afterwards, determined the Her-

akleid Dôrieus, brother of Kleomenês king of Sparta, to acquire for himself the territory near Mount Eryx in Sicily, because his progenitor,[527] Hêraklês, had conquered it before him. So numerous, however, were the legends respecting the conquests of Hêraklês, that the claim of Pheidôn must have covered the greater part of Peloponnesus, except Sparta and the plain of Messêne, which were already in the hands of Herakleids.

Nor was the ambition of Pheidôn satisfied even with these large pretensions. He farther claimed the right of presiding at the celebration of those religious games, or Agônes, which had been instituted by Hêraklês,—and among these was numbered the Olympic Agôn, then, however, enjoying but a slender fraction of the lustre which afterwards came to attach to it. The presidency of any of the more celebrated festivals current throughout Greece, was a privilege immensely prized. It was at once dignified and lucrative, and the course of our history will present more than one example in which blood was shed to determine what state should enjoy it. Pheidôn marched to Olympia, at the epoch of the 8th recorded Olympiad, or 747 B. C.; on the occasion of which event we are made acquainted with the real state of parties in the peninsula.

The plain of Olympia,—now ennobled only by immortal recollections, but once crowded with all the decorations of religion and art, and forming for many centuries the brightest centre of attraction known in the ancient world,—was situated on the river Alpheius, in the territory called the Pisatid, hard by the borders of Arcadia. At what time its agonistic festival, recurring every fifth year, at the first full moon after the summer solstice, first began or first acquired its character of special sanctity, we have no means of determining. As with so many of the native waters of Greece,—we follow the stream upward to a certain point, but the fountain-head, and the earlier flow of history, is buried under mountains of unsearchable legend. The first celebration of the Olympic contests was ascribed by Grecian legendary faith to Hêraklês,—and the site of the place, in the middle of the Pisatid, with its eight small townships, is quite sufficient to prove that the inhabitants of that little territory were warranted in describing themselves as the original administrators of the ceremony.[528] But this state of things seems to have been altered by the Ætolian settlement in Elis, which is represented as having been conducted by Oxylus and identified with the Return of the Herakleids. The Ætolo-Eleians, bordering upon the Pisatid to the north, employed their superior power in subduing their weaker neighbors,[529] who thus lost their autonomy and became annexed to the territory of Elis. It was the general rule throughout Greece, that a victorious state undertook to perform[530] the current services of the conquered people towards the gods,—such services being conceived as attaching to the soil: hence, the celebration of the Olympic games became numbered among the incumbences of Elis, just in the same way as the worship of the Eleusinian Dêmêtêr, when Eleusis lost its autonomy, was included among the religious obligations of Athens. The Pisatans, however, never willingly acquiesced in this absorption

of what had once been their separate privilege; they long maintained their conviction, that the celebration of the games was their right, and strove on several occasions to regain it. On those occasions, the earliest, so far as we hear, was connected with the intervention of Pheidôn. It was at their invitation that the king of Argos went to Olympia, and celebrated the games himself, in conjunction with the Pisatans, as the lineal successor of Hêraklês; while the Eleians, being thus forcibly dispossessed, refused to include the 8th Olympiad in their register of the victorious runners. But their humiliation did not last long, for the Spartans took their part, and the contest ended in the defeat of Pheidôn. In the next Olympiad, the Eleian management and the regular enrolment appear as before, and the Spartans are even said to have confirmed Elis in her possession both of Pisatis and Triphylia.[531]

Unfortunately, these scanty particulars are all which we learn respecting the armed conflict at the 8th Olympiad, in which the religious and the political grounds of quarrel are so intimately blended,—as we shall find to be often the case in Grecian history. But there is one act of Pheidôn yet more memorable, of which also nothing beyond a meagre notice has come down to us. He first coined both copper and silver money in Ægina, and first established a scale of weights and measures,[532] which, through his influence, became adopted throughout Peloponnesus, and acquired, ultimately, footing both in all the Dorian states, and in Bœotia, Thessaly, northern Hellas generally, and Macedonia,—under the name of the Æginæan Scale. There arose subsequently another rival scale in Greece, called the Euboic, differing considerably from the Æginæan. We do not know at what time it was introduced, but it was employed both at Athens and in the Ionic cities generally, as well as in Eubœa,—being modified at Athens, so far as money was concerned, by Solon's debasement of the coinage.

The copious and valuable information contained in M. Boeckh's recent publication on Metrology, has thrown new light upon these monetary and statical scales.[533] He has shown that both the Æginæan and the Euboic scales—the former standing to the latter in the proportion of 6 : 5—had contemporaneous currency in different parts of the Persian empire; the divisions and denominations of the scale being the same in both, 100 drachmæ to a mina, and 60 minæ to a talent. The Babylonian talent, mina, and drachma are identical with the Æginæan: the word mina is of Asiatic origin; and it has now been rendered highly probable, that the scale circulated by Pheidôn was borrowed immediately from the Phœnicians, and by them originally from the Babylonians. The Babylonian, Hebraic, Phœnician, Egyptian,[534] and Grecian scales of weight (which were subsequently followed wherever coined money was introduced) are found to be so nearly conformable, as to warrant a belief that they are all deduced from one common origin; and that origin the Chaldæan priesthood of Babylon. It is to Pheidôn, and to his position as chief of the Argeian confederacy, that the Greeks owe the first introduction of the Babylonian scale of weight, and the first employment of coined and stamped money.

If we maturely weigh the few, but striking acts of Pheidôn which have been preserved to us, and which there is no reason to discredit, we shall find ourselves introduced to an early historical state of Peloponnesus very different from that to which another century will bring us. That Argos, with the federative cities attached to her, was at this early time decidedly the commanding power in that peninsula, is sufficiently shown by the establishment and reception of the Pheidonian weights, measures, and monetary system,—while the other incidents mentioned completely harmonize with the same idea. Against the oppressions of Elis, the Pisatans invoked Pheidon,—partly as exercising a primacy in Peloponnesus, just as the inhabitants of Lepreum in Triphylia,[535] three centuries afterwards, called in the aid of Sparta for the same object, at a time when Sparta possessed the headship,—and partly as the lineal representative of Hêraklês, who had founded those games from the management of which they had been unjustly extruded. On the other hand, Sparta appears as a second-rate power. The Æginæan scale of weight and measure was adopted there as elsewhere,[536]—the Messenian Dorians were still equal and independent,—and we find Sparta interfering to assist Elis by virtue of an obligation growing (so the legend represents it) out of the common Ætolo-Dorian emigration; not at all from any acknowledged primacy, such as we shall see her enjoying hereafter. The first coinage of copper and silver money is a capital event in Grecian history, and must be held to imply considerable commerce as well as those extensive views which belong only to a conspicuous and leading position. The ambition of Pheidôn to resume all the acquisitions made by his ancestor Hêraklês, suggests the same large estimate of his actual power. He is characterized as a despot, and even as the most insolent of all despots:[537] how far he deserved such a reputation, we have no means of judging. We may remark, however, that he lived before the age of despots or tyrants, properly so called, and before the Herakleid lineage had yet lost its primary, half-political, half-religious character. Moreover, the later historians have invested his actions with a color of exorbitant aggression, by applying them to a state of things which belonged to their time and not to his. Thus Ephorus represents him as having deprived the Lacedæmonians of the headship of Peloponnesus, which they never possessed until long after him,—and also as setting at naught the sworn inviolability of the territory of the Eleians, enjoyed by the latter as celebrators of the Olympic games; whereas the Agonothesia, or right of superintendence claimed by Elis, had not at that time acquired the sanction of prescription,—while the conquest of Pisa by the Eleians themselves had proved that this sacred function did not protect the territory of a weaker people.

How Pheidôn fell, and how the Argeians lost that supremacy which they once evidently possessed, we have no positive details to inform us: with respect to the latter point, however, we can discern a sufficient explanation. The Argeians stood predominant as an entire and unanimous confederacy, which required a vigorous and able hand to render its internal organization effective or its ascendency respected without. No such leader afterwards appeared at Argos, the whole history of which city is des-

titute of eminent individuals: her line of kings continued at least down to the Persian war,[538] but seemingly with only titular functions, for the government had long been decidedly popular. The statements, which represent the government as popular anterior to the time of Pheidôn, appear unworthy of trust. That prince is rather to be taken as wielding the old, undiminished prerogatives of the Herakleid kings, but wielding them with unusual effect,—enforcing relaxed privileges, and appealing to the old heroic sentiment in reference to Hêraklês, rather than revolutionizing the existing relations either of Argos or of Peloponnesus. It was in fact the great and steady growth of Sparta, for three centuries after the Lykurgean institutions, which operated as a cause of subversion to the previous order of command and obedience in Greece.

The assertion made by Herodotus,—that, in earlier times, the whole eastern coast of Laconia as far as Cape Malea, including the island of Kythêra and several other islands, had belonged to Argos,—is referred by O. Müller to about the 50th Olympiad, or 580 B. C. Perhaps it had ceased to be true at that period; but that it was true in the age of Pheidôn, there seem good grounds for believing. What is probably meant is, that the Dorian towns on this coast, Prasiæ, Zarêx, Epidaurus Limêra, and Bœæ, were once autonomous, and members of the Argeian confederacy,—a fact highly probable, on independent evidence, with respect to Epidaurus Limêra, inasmuch as that town was a settlement from Epidaurus in the Argolic peninsula: and Bœæ too had its own œkist and eponymus, the Herakleid Bœus,[539] noway connected with Sparta,—perhaps derived from the same source as the name of the town Bœon in Doris. The Argeian confederated towns would thus comprehend the whole coast of the Argolic and Saronic gulfs, from Kythêra as far as Ægina, besides other islands which we do not know: Ægina had received a colony of Dorians from Argos and Epidaurus, upon which latter town it continued for some time in a state of dependence.[540] It will at once be seen that this extent of coast implies a considerable degree of commerce and maritime activity. We have besides to consider the range of Doric colonies in the southern islands of the Ægean and in the south-western corner of Asia Minor,—Krête, Kôs, Rhodes (with its three distinct cities), Halikarnassus, Knidus, Myndus, Nisyrus, Symê, Karpathus, Kalydna, etc. Of the Doric establishments here named, several are connected (as has been before stated) with the great emigration of the Têmenid Althæmenês from Argos: but what we particularly observe is, that they are often referred as colonies promiscuously to Argos, Trœzên, Epidaurus[541]—more frequently however, as it seems, to Argos. All these settlements are doubtless older than Pheidôn, and we may conceive them as proceeding conjointly from the allied Dorian towns in the Argolic peninsula, at a time when they were more in the habit of united action than they afterwards became: a captain of emigrants selected from the line of Hêraklês and Têmenus was suitable to the feelings of all of them. We may thus look back to a period, at the very beginning of the Olympiads, when the maritime Dorians on the east of Peloponnesus maintained a considerable intercourse and commerce, not only among themselves, but also with their settlements

on the Asiatic coast and islands. That the Argolic peninsula formed an early centre for maritime rendezvous, we may farther infer from the very ancient Amphiktyony of the seven cities (Hermionê, Epidaurus, Ægina, Athens, Prasiæ, Nauplia, and the Minyeian Orchomenus), on the holy island of Kalauria, off the harbor of Trœzên.[542]

The view here given of the early ascendency of Argos, as the head of the Peloponnesian Dorians and the metropolis of the Asiatic Dorians, enables us to understand the capital innovation of Pheidôn,—the first coinage, and the first determinate scale of weight and measure, known in Greece. Of the value of such improvements, in the history of Grecian civilization, it is superfluous to speak, especially when we recollect that the Hellenic states, having no political unity, were only held together by the aggregate of spontaneous uniformities, in language, religion, sympathies, recreations, and general habits. We see both how Pheidôn came to contract the wish, and how he acquired the power, to introduce throughout so much of the Grecian world an uniform scale; we also see that the Asiatic Dorians form the link between him and Phœnicia, from whence the scale was derived, just as the Euboic scale came, in all probability, through the Ionic cities in Asia, from Lydia. It is asserted by Ephorus, and admitted even by the ablest modern critics, that Pheidôn first coined money "in Ægina:"[543] other authors (erroneously believing that his scale was the Euboic scale) alleged that his coinage had been carried on "in a place of Argos called Eubœa."[544] Now both these statements appear highly improbable, and both are traceable to the same mistake,—of supposing that the title, by which the scale had come to be commonly known, must necessarily be derived from the place in which the coinage had been struck. There is every reason to conclude, that what Pheidôn did was done in Argos, and nowhere else: his coinage and scale were the earliest known in Greece, and seem to have been known by his own name, "the Pheidonian measures," under which designation they were described by Aristotle, in his account of the constitution of Argos.[545] They probably did not come to bear the specific epithet of *Æginæan* until there was another scale in vogue, the *Euboic*, from which to distinguish them; and both the epithets were probably derived, not from the place where the scale first originated, but from the people whose commercial activity tended to make them most generally known,—in the one case, the Æginetans; in the other case, the inhabitants of Chalkis and Eretria. I think, therefore, that we are to look upon the Pheidonian measures as emanating from Argos, and as having no greater connection, originally, with Ægina, than with any other city dependent upon Argos.

There is, moreover, another point which deserves notice. What was known by the name of the Æginæan scale, as contrasted with and standing in a definite ratio (6 : 5) with the Euboic scale, related only to weight and money, so far as our knowledge extends:[546] we have no evidence to show that the same ratio extended either to measures of length or measures of capacity. But there seems ground for believing that the Pheidonian regulations, taken in their full comprehension, embraced measures of capacity as well as weights: Pheidôn, at the same time when he determined

the talent, mina, and drachm, seems also to have fixed the dry and liquid measures, —the medimnus and metrêtês, with their parts and multiples: and there existed[547] Pheidonian measures of capacity, though not of length, so far as we know. The Æginæan scale may thus have comprised only a portion of what was established by Pheidôn, namely, that which related to weight and money.

CHAPTER V.

ÆTOLO-DORIAN EMIGRATION INTO PELOPONNESUS.—ELIS, LACONIA, AND MESSENIA.

It has already been stated that the territory properly called Elis, apart from the enlargement which it acquired by conquest, included the westernmost land in Peloponnesus, south of Achaia, and west of Mount Pholoê and Olenus in Arcadia,—but not extending so far southward as the river Alpheius, the course of which lay along the southern portion of Pisatis and on the borders of Triphylia. This territory, which appears in the Odyssey as "the divine Elis, where the Epeians hold sway,"[548] is in the historical times occupied by a population of Ætolian origin. The connection of race between the historical Eleians and the historical Ætolians was recognized by both parties, nor is there any ground for disputing it.[549]

That Ætolian invaders, or emigrants, into Elis, would cross from Naupaktus, or some neighboring point in the Corinthian gulf, is in the natural course of things,—and such is the course which Oxylus, the conductor of the invasion, is represented by the Herakleid legend as taking. That legend (as has been already recounted) introduces Oxylus as the guide of the three Herakleid brothers,—Têmenus, Kresphontês, and Aristodêmus,—and as stipulating with them that, in the new distribution about to take place of Peloponnesus, he shall be allowed to possess the Eleian territory, coupled with many holy privileges as to the celebration of the Olympic games.

In the preceding chapter, I have endeavored to show that the settlements of the Dorians in and near the Argolic peninsula, so far as the probabilities of the case enable us to judge, were not accomplished by any inroad in this direction. But the localities occupied by the Dorians of Sparta, and by the Dorians of Stenyklêrus, in the territory called Messênê, lead us to a different conclusion. The easiest and most natural road through which emigrants could reach either of these two spots, is through the Eleian and the Pisatid country. Colonel Leake observes,[550] that the direct road from the Eleian territory to Sparta, ascending the valley of the Alpheius, near Olympia, to the sources of its branch, the Theius, and from thence descending the Eurotas, affords the only easy march towards that very inaccessible city: and both ancients and moderns have remarked the vicinity of the source of the Alpheius to that of the Eurotas. The situation of Stenyklêrus and Andania, the original settlements of the Messenian Dorians, adjoining closely the Arcadian Parrhasii, is only at a short distance from the course of the Alpheius; being thus reached most easily by the same route. Dismissing the idea of a great collective Dorian armament, powerful enough to grasp at once the entire peninsula,—we may conceive two moderate detachments of hardy mountaineers, from the cold regions in and near Doris, attaching themselves to the Ætolians, their neighbors, who were proceeding to the invasion of

Elis. After having aided the Ætolians, both to occupy Elis and to subdue the Pisatid, these Dorians advanced up the valley of the Alpheius in quest of settlements for themselves. One of these bodies ripens into the stately, stubborn, and victorious Spartans; the other, into the short-lived, trampled, and struggling Messenians.

Amidst the darkness which overclouds these original settlements, we seem to discern something like special causes to determine both of them. With respect to the Spartan Dorians, we are told that a person named Philonomus betrayed Sparta to them, persuading the sovereign in possession to retire with his people into the habitations of the Ionians, in the north of the peninsula,—and that he received as a recompense for this acceptable service Amyklæ, with the district around it. It is farther stated,—and this important fact there seems no reason to doubt,—that Amyklæ,—though only twenty stadia or two miles and a half distant from Sparta, retained both its independence and its Achæan inhabitants, long after the Dorian emigrants had acquired possession of the latter place, and was only taken by them under the reign of Têleklus, one generation before the first Olympiad.[551] Without presuming to fill up by conjecture incurable gaps in the statements of our authorities, we may from hence reasonably presume that the Dorians were induced to invade, and enabled to acquire, Sparta, by the invitation and assistance of a party in the interior of the country. Again, with respect to the Messenian Dorians, a different, but not less effectual temptation was presented by the alliance of the Arcadians, in the south-western portion of that central region of Peloponnesus. Kresphontês, the Herakleid leader, it is said, espoused the daughter[552] of the Arcadian king, Kypselus, which procured for him the support of a powerful section of Arcadia. His settlement at Stenyklêrus was a considerable distance from the sea, at the north-east corner of Messenia,[553] close to the Arcadian frontier; and it will be seen hereafter that this Arcadian alliance is a constant and material element in the disputes of the Messenian Dorians with Sparta.

We may thus trace a reasonable sequence of events, showing how two bodies of Dorians, having first assisted the Ætolo-Eleians to conquer the Pisatid, and thus finding themselves on the banks of the Alpheius, followed the upward course of that river, the one to settle at Sparta, the other at Stenyklêrus. The historian Ephorus, from whom our scanty fragments of information respecting these early settlements are derived,—it is important to note that he lived in the age immediately succeeding the first foundation of Messênê as a city, the restitution of the long-exiled Messenians, and the amputation of the fertile western half of Laconia, for their benefit, by Epameinondas,—imparts to these proceedings an immediate decisiveness of effect which does not properly belong to them: as if the Spartans had become at once possessed of all Laconia, and the Messenians of all Messenia: Pausanias, too, speaks as if the Arcadians collectively had assisted and allied themselves with Kresphontês. This is the general spirit which pervades his account, though the particular facts in so far as we find any such, do not always harmonize with it. Now we are ignorant of the preëxisting divisions of the country, either east or west of Mount Taygetus, at the

time when the Dorians invaded it. But to treat the one and the other as integral kingdoms, handed over at once to two Dorian leaders, is an illusion borrowed from the old legend, from the historicizing fancies of Ephorus, and from the fact that, in the well-known times, this whole territory came to be really united under the Spartan power.

At what date the Dorian settlements at Sparta and Stenyklêrus were effected, we have no means of determining. Yet, that there existed between them in the earliest times a degree of fraternity which did not prevail between Lacedæmon and Argos, we may fairly presume from the common temple, with joint religious sacrifices, of Artemis Limnatis, or Artemis on the Marsh, erected on the confines of Messenia and Laconia.[554] Our first view of the two, at all approaching to distinctness, seems to date from a period about half a century earlier than the first Olympiad (776 B. C.),—about the reign of king Têleklus of the Eurystheneid or Agid line, and the introduction of the Lykurgean discipline. Têleklus stands in the list as the eighth king dating from Eurysthenes. But how many of the seven kings before him are to be considered as real persons,—or how much, out of the brief warlike expeditions ascribed to them, is to be treated as authentic history,—I pretend not to define.

The earliest determinable event in the *internal* history of Sparta is the introduction of the Lykurgean discipline; the earliest *external* events are the conquest of Amyklæ, Pharis, and Geronthræ, effected by king Têleklus, and the first quarrel with the Messenians, in which that prince was slain. When we come to see how deplorably great was the confusion and ignorance which reigned with reference to a matter so preëminently important as Lykurgus and his legislation, we shall not be inclined to think that facts much less important, and belonging to an earlier epoch, can have been handed down upon any good authority. And in like manner, when we learn that Amyklæ, Pharis, and Geronthræ (all south of Sparta, and the first only two and a half miles distant from that city) were independent of the Spartans until the reign of Têleklus, we shall require some decisive testimony before we can believe that a community so small, and so hemmed in as Sparta must then have been, had in earlier times undertaken expeditions against Helos on the sea-coast, against Kleitor on the extreme northern side of Arcadia, against the Kynurians, or against the Argeians. If Helos and Kynuria were conquered by these early kings, it appears that they had to be conquered a second time by kings succeeding Têleklus. It would be more natural that we should hear when and how they conquered the places nearer to them,—Sellasia, or Belemina, the valley of the Œnus, or the upper valley of the Eurotas. But these seem to be assumed as matters of course; the proceedings ascribed to the early Spartan kings are such only as might beseem the palmy days when Sparta was undisputed mistress of all Laconia.

The succession of Messenian kings, beginning with Kresphontês, the Herakleid brother, and continuing from father to son,—Æpytus, Glaukus, Isthnius, Dotadas, Subotas, Phintas, the last being contemporary with Têleklus,—is still less marked by

incident than that of the early Spartan kings. It is said that the reign of Kresphontês was troubled, and himself ultimately slain by mutinies among his subjects: Æpytus, then a youth, having escaped into Arcadia, was afterwards restored to the throne by the Arcadians, Spartans, and Argeians.[555] From Æpytus, the Messenian line of kings are stated to have been denominated Æpytids in preference to Herakleids,—which affords another proof of their intimate connection with the Arcadians, since Æpytus was a very ancient name in Arcadian heroic antiquity.[556]

There is considerable resemblance between the alleged behavior of Kresphontês on first settling at Stenyklêrus, and that of Eurysthenês and Proklês at Sparta,—so far as we gather from statements alike meagre and uncertified, resting on the authority of Ephorus. Both are said to have tried to place the preëxisting inhabitants of the country on a level with their own Dorian bands; both provoked discontents and incurred obloquy, with their contemporaries as well as with posterity, by the attempt; nor did either permanently succeed. Kresphontês was forced to concentrate all his Dorians in Stenyklêrus, while after all, the discontents ended in his violent death. And Agis, the son of Eurysthenês, is said to have reversed all the liberal tentatives of his father, so as to bring the whole of Laconia into subjection and dependence on the Dorians at Sparta, with the single exception of Amyklæ. So odious to the Spartan Dorians was the conduct of Eurysthenês, that they refused to acknowledge him as their œkist, and conferred that honor upon Agis; the two lines of kings being called Agiads and Eurypontids, instead of Eurystheneids and Prokleids.[557] We see in these statements the same tone of mind as that which pervades the Panathenaic oration of Isokratês, the master of Ephorus,—the facts of an unknown period, so colored as to suit an *idéal* of haughty Dorian exclusiveness.

Again, as Eurysthenês and Proklês appear, in the picture of Ephorus, to carry their authority at once over the whole of Laconia, so too does Kresphontês over the whole of Messenia,—over the entire south-western region of Peloponnesus, westward of Mount Taygetus and Cape Tænarus, and southward of the river Neda. He sends an envoy to Pylus and Rhium, the western and southern portions of the south-western promontory of Peloponnesus, treating the entire territory as if it were one sovereignty, and inviting the inhabitants to submit under equal laws.[558] But it has already been observed, that this supposed oneness and indivisibility is not less uncertified in regard to Messenia than in regard to Laconia. How large a proportion of the former territory these kings of Stenyklêrus may have ruled, we have no means of determining, but there were certainly portions of it which they did not rule,—not merely during the reign of Têleklus at Sparta, but still later, during the first Messenian war. For not only are we informed that Têleklus established three townships, Poiêessa, Echeiæ,[559] and Tragium, near the Messenian gulf, and on the course of the river Nedon, but we read also a farther matter of evidence in the roll of Olympic victors. Every competitor for the prize at one of these great festivals was always entered as member of some autonomous Hellenic community, which constituted his ti-

tle to approach the lists; if successful, he was proclaimed with the name of the community to which he belonged. Now during the first ten Olympiads, seven winners are proclaimed as Messenians; in the 11th Olympiad, we find the name of Oxythemis Korônæus,—Oxythemis, not of Korôneia in Bœotia, but of Korônê in the western bend of the Messenian gulf,[560] some miles on the right bank of the Pamisus, and a considerable distance to the north of the modern Coron. Now if Korônê had then been comprehended in Messenia, Oxythemis would have been proclaimed as a Messenian, like the seven winners who preceded him; and the fact of his being proclaimed as a Korônæan, proves that Korônê was then an independent community, not under the dominion of the Dorians of Stenyklêrus. It seems clear, therefore, that the latter did not reign over the whole territory commonly known as Messenia, though we are unable to assign the proportion of it which they actually possessed.

The Olympic festival, in its origin doubtless a privilege of the neighboring Pisatans, seems to have derived its great and gradually expanding importance from the Ætolo-Eleian settlement in Peloponnesus, combined with the Dorians of Laconia and Messenia. Lykurgus of Sparta, and Iphitus of Elis, are alleged to have joined their efforts for the purpose of establishing both the sanctity of the Olympic truce and the inviolability of the Eleian territory. Hence, though this tale is not to be construed as matter of fact, we may see that the Lacedæmonians regarded the Olympic games as a portion of their own antiquities. Moreover, it is certain, both that the dignity of the festival increased simultaneously with their ascendency,[561] and that their peculiar fashions were very early introduced into the practice of the Olympic competitors. Probably, the three bands of coöperating invaders, Ætolians and Spartan and Messenian Dorians, may have adopted this festival as a periodical renovation of mutual union and fraternity; from which cause the games became an attractive centre for the western portion of Peloponnesus, before they were much frequented by people from the eastern, or still more from extra-Peloponnesian Hellas. For it cannot be altogether accidental, when we read the names of the first twelve proclaimed Olympic victors (occupying nearly half a century from 776 B. C. downwards), to find that seven of them are Messenians, three Eleians, one from Dymê, in Achaia, and one from Korônê; while after the 12th Olympiad, Corinthians and Megarians and Epidaurians begin to occur; later still, extra-Peloponnesian victors. We may reasonably infer from hence that the Olympic ceremonies were at this early period chiefly frequented by visitors and competitors from the western regions of Peloponnesus, and that the affluence to them, from the more distant parts of the Hellenic world, did not become considerable until the first Messenian war had closed.

Having thus set forth the conjectures, to which our very scanty knowledge points, respecting the first establishment of the Ætolian and Dorian settlements in Elis, Laconia, and Messenia, connected as they are with the steadily increasing dignity and frequentation of the Olympic festival, I proceed, in the next chapter, to that memorable

circumstance which both determined the character, and brought about the political ascendency, of the Spartans separately: I mean, the laws and discipline of Lykurgus.

Of the preëxisting inhabitants of Laconia and Messenia, whom we are accustomed to call Achæans and Pylians, so little is known, that we cannot at all measure the difference between them and their Dorian invaders, either in dialect, in habits, or in intelligence. There appear no traces of any difference of dialect among the various parts of the population of Laconia: the Messenian allies of Athens, in the Peloponnesian war, speak the same dialect as the Helots, and the same also as the Ambrakiotic colonists from Corinth: all Doric.[562] Nor are we to suppose that the Doric dialect was at all peculiar to the people called Dorians. As far as can be made out by the evidence of Inscriptions, it seems to have been the dialect of the Phokians, Delphians, Lokrians, Ætolians, and Achæans of Phthiôtis: with respect to the latter, the Inscriptions of Thaumaki, in Achæa Phthiôtis, afford a proof the more curious and the more cogent of native dialect, because the Phthiôts were both immediate neighbors and subjects of the Thessalians, who spoke a variety of the Æolic. So, too, within Peloponnesus, we find evidences of Doric dialect among the Achæans in the north of Peloponnesus,—the Dryopic inhabitants of Hermionê,[563]—and the Eleuthero-Lacones, or Laconian townships (compounded of Periœki and Helots), emancipated by the Romans in the second century B. C. Concerning the speech of that population whom the invading Dorians found in Laconia, we have no means of judging: the presumption would rather be that it did not differ materially from the Doric. Thucydidês designates the Corinthians, whom the invading Dorians attacked from the hill Solygeius, as being Æolians, and Strabo speaks both of the Achæans as an Æolic nation, and of the Æolic dialect as having been originally preponderant in Peloponnesus.[564] But we do not readily see what means of information either of these authors possessed respecting the speech of a time which must have been four centuries anterior even to Thucydidês.

Of that which is called the Æolic dialect there are three marked and distinguishable varieties,—the Lesbian, the Thessalian, and the Bœotian; the Thessalian forming a mean term between the other two. Ahrens has shown that the ancient grammatical critics are accustomed to affirm peculiarities, as belonging to the Æolic dialect generally, which in truth belong only to the Lesbian variety of it, or to the poems of Alkæus and Sappho, which these critics attentively studied. Lesbian Æolic, Thessalian Æolic, and Bœotian Æolic, are all different: and if, abstracting from these differences, we confine our attention to that which is common to all three, we shall find little to distinguish this abstract Æolic from the abstract Doric, or that which is common to the many varieties of the Doric dialect.[565] These two are sisters, presenting, both of them, more or less the Latin side of the Greek language, while the relationship of either of them to the Attic and Ionic is more distant. Now it seems that, putting aside Attica, the speech of all Greece,[566] from Perrhæbia and Mount Olympus to Cape Malea and Cape Akritas, consisted of different varieties, either of

the Doric or of the Æolic dialect; this being true (as far as we are able to judge) not less of the aboriginal Arcadians than of the rest. The Laconian dialect contained more specialties of its own, and approached nearer to the Æolic and to the Eleian, than any other variety of the Dorian: it stands at the extreme of what has been classified as the strict Dorian,—that is, the farthest removed from Ionic and Attic. The Kretan towns manifest also a strict Dorism; as well as the Lacedæmonian colony of Tarentum, and, seemingly, most of the Italiotic Greeks, though some of them are called Achæan colonies. Most of the other varieties of the Doric dialect (Phokian, Lokrian, Delphian, Achæan of Phthiôtis) exhibit a form departing less widely from the Ionic and Attic: Argos, and the towns in the Argolic peninsula, seem to form a stepping-stone between the two.

These positions represent the little which can be known respecting those varieties of Grecian speech which are not known to us by written works. The little presumption which can be raised upon them favors the belief that the Dorian invaders of Laconia and Messenia found there a dialect little different from that which they brought with them,—a conclusion which it is the more necessary to state distinctly, since the work of O. Müller has caused an exaggerated estimate to be formed of the distinctive peculiarities whereby Dorism was parted off from the rest of Hellas.

CHAPTER VI.

LAWS AND DISCIPLINE OF LYKURGUS AT SPARTA.

PLUTARCH begins his biography of Lykurgus with the following ominous words:—

"Concerning the lawgiver Lykurgus, we can assert absolutely nothing which is not controverted: there are different stories in respect to his birth, his travels, his death, and also his mode of proceeding, political as well as legislative: least of all is the time in which he lived agreed upon."

And this exordium is but too well borne out by the unsatisfactory nature of the accounts which we read, not only in Plutarch himself, but in those other authors out of whom we are obliged to make up our idea of the memorable Lykurgean system. If we examine the sources from which Plutarch's life of Lykurgus is deduced, it will appear that—excepting the poets Alkman, Tyrtæus, and Simonidês, from whom he has borrowed less than we could have wished—he has no authorities older than Xenophon and Plato: Aristotle is cited several times, and is unquestionably the best of his witnesses, but the greater number of them belong to the century subsequent to that philosopher. Neither Herodotus nor Ephorus are named, though the former furnishes some brief, but interesting particulars,—and the latter also (as far as we can judge from the fragments remaining) entered at large into the proceedings of the Spartan lawgiver.[567]

Lykurgus is described by Herodotus as uncle and guardian to king Labôtas, of the Eurystheneid or Agid line of Spartan kings; and this would place him, according to the received chronology, about 220 years before the first recorded Olympiad (about B. C. 996).[568] All the other accounts, on the contrary, seem to represent him as a younger brother, belonging to the other or Prokleid line of Spartan kings, though they do not perfectly agree respecting his parentage. While Simonidês stated him to be the son of Prytanis, Dieutychidas described him as grandson of Prytanis, son of Eunomus, brother of Polydektês, and uncle as well as guardian to Charilaus,—thus making him eleventh in descent from Hêraklês.[569] This latter account was adopted by Aristotle, coinciding, according to the received chronology, with the date of Iphitus the Eleian, and the first celebration of the Olympic games by Lykurgus and Iphitus conjointly,[570] which Aristotle accepted as a fact. Lykurgus, on the hypothesis here mentioned, would stand about B. C. 880, a century before the recorded Olympiads. Eratosthenês and Apollodorus placed him "not a few years earlier than the first Olympiad." If they meant hereby the epoch commonly assigned as the Olympiad of Iphitus, their date would coincide pretty nearly with that of Herodotus: if, on the other hand, they meant the first recorded Olympiad (B. C. 776), they would be found not much removed from the opinion of Aristotle. An unequivocal proof of

the inextricable confusion in ancient times respecting the epoch of the great Spartan lawgiver is indirectly afforded by Timæus, who supposed that there had existed two persons named Lykurgus, and that the acts of both had been ascribed to one. It is plain from hence that there was no certainty attainable, even in the third century before the Christian era, respecting the date or parentage of Lykurgus.

Thucydidês, without mentioning the name of Lykurgus, informs us that it was "400 years and somewhat more" anterior to the close of the Peloponnesian war,[571] when the Spartans emerged from their previous state of desperate internal disorder, and entered upon "their present polity." We may fairly presume that this alludes to the Lykurgean discipline and constitution, which Thucydides must thus have conceived as introduced about B. C. 830-820,—coinciding with something near the commencement of the reign of king Têleklus. In so far as it is possible to form an opinion, amidst evidence at once so scanty and so discordant, I incline to adopt the opinion of Thucydidês as to the time at which the Lykurgean constitution was introduced at Sparta. The state of "eunomy" and good order which that constitution brought about,—combined with the healing of great previous internal sedition, which had tended much to enfeeble them,—is represented (and with great plausibility) as the grand cause of the victorious career beginning with king Têleklus, the conqueror of Amyklæ, Pharis, and Geronthræ. Therefore it would seem, in the absence of better evidence, that a date, connecting the fresh stimulus of the new discipline with the reign of Têleklus, is more probable than any epoch either later or earlier.[572]

O. Müller,[573] after glancing at the strange and improbable circumstances handed down to us respecting Lykurgus, observes, "that we have absolutely no account of him as an individual person." This remark is perfectly just: but another remark, made by the same distinguished author, respecting the Lykurgean system of laws, appears to me erroneous,—and requires more especially to be noticed, inasmuch as the corollaries deduced from it pervade a large portion of his valuable History of the Dorians. He affirms that the laws of Sparta were considered the true Doric institutions, and that their origin was identical with that of the people: Sparta is, in his view, the full type of Dorian principles, tendencies, and sentiments,—and is so treated throughout his entire work.[574] But such an opinion is at once gratuitous (for the passage of Pindar cited in support of it is scarcely of any value) and contrary to the whole tenor of ancient evidence. The institutions of Sparta were not Dorian, but peculiar to herself;[575] distinguishing her not less from Argos, Corinth, Megara, Epidaurus, Sikyôn, Korkyra, or Knidus, than from Athens or Thebes. Krête was the only other portion of Greece in which there prevailed institutions in many respects analogous, yet still dissimilar in those two attributes which form the real mark and pinch of Spartan legislation, namely, the military discipline and the rigorous private training. There were doubtless Dorians in Krête, but we have no proof that these peculiar institutions belonged to them more than to the other inhabitants of the island. That the Spartans had an original organization, and tendencies common to them with the

other Dorians, we may readily concede; but the Lykurgean constitution impressed upon them a peculiar tendency, which took them out of the general march, and rendered them the least fit of all states to be cited as an example of the class-attributes of Dorism. One of the essential causes, which made the Spartan institutions work so impressively upon the Grecian mind, was their perfect singularity, combined with the conspicuous ascendency of the state in which they were manifested; while the Kretan communities, even admitting their partial resemblance (which was chiefly in the institution of the Syssitia, and was altogether more in form than in spirit) to Sparta, were too insignificant to attract notice except from speculative observers. It is therefore a mistake on the part of O. Müller, to treat Sparta as the type and representative of Dorians generally, and very many of the positions advanced in his History of the Dorians require to be modified when this mistake is pointed out.

The first capital fact to notice respecting the institutions ascribed to Lykurgus, is the very early period at which they had their commencement: it seems impossible to place this period later than 825 B. C. We do not find, nor have we a right to expect, trustworthy history in reference to events so early. If we have one foot on historical ground, inasmuch as the institutions themselves are real,—the other foot still floats in the unfaithful region of mythe, when we strive to comprehend the generating causes: the mist yet prevails which hinders us from distinguishing between the god and the man. The light in which Lykurgus appeared, to an intelligent Greek of the fifth century before the Christian era, is so clearly, yet briefly depicted, in the following passage of Herodotus, that I cannot do better than translate it:—

"In the very early times (Herodotus observes) the Spartans were among themselves the most lawless of all Greeks, and unapproachable by foreigners. Their transition to good legal order took place in the following manner. When Lycurgus, a Spartan of consideration, visited Delphi to consult the oracle, the instant that he entered the sanctuary, the Pythian priestess exclaimed,—

"Thou art come, Lycurgus, to my fat shrine, beloved by Zeus, and by all the Olympic gods. Is it as god or as man that I am to address thee in the spirit? I hesitate,—and yet, Lycurgus, I incline more to call thee a god."

So spake the Pythian priestess. "Moreover, in addition to these words, some affirm that the Pythia revealed to him the order of things now established among the Spartans. *But the Lacedæmonians themselves* say, that Lycurgus, when guardian of his nephew Labôtas, king of the Spartans, introduced these institutions out of Krete. No sooner had he obtained this guardianship, than he changed all the institutions into their present form, and took security against any transgression of it. Next, he constituted the military divisions, the Enômoties and the Triakads, as well as the Syssitia, or public mess: he also, farther, appointed the ephors and the senate. By this means the Spartans passed from bad to good order: to Lycurgus, after his death, they built a temple, and they still worship him reverentially. And as might naturally

be expected in a productive soil, and with no inconsiderable numbers of men, they immediately took a start forward, and flourished so much that they could not be content to remain tranquil within their own limits," etc.

Such is our oldest statement (coming from Herodotus) respecting Lykurgus, ascribing to him that entire order of things which the writer witnessed at Sparta. Thucydidês also, though not mentioning Lykurgus, agrees in stating that the system among the Lacedæmonians, as he saw it, had been adopted by them four centuries previously,—had rescued them from the most intolerable disorders, and had immediately conducted them to prosperity and success.[576] Hellanikus, whose writings a little preceded those of Herodotus, not only did not (any more than Thucydidês) make mention of Lykurgus, but can hardly be thought to have attached any importance to the name; since he attributed the constitution of Sparta to the first kings, Eurysthenes and Prokles.[577]

But those later writers, from whom Plutarch chiefly compiled his biography, profess to be far better informed on the subject of Lykurgus, and enter more into detail. His father, we are told, was assassinated during the preceding state of lawlessness; his elder brother Polydektês died early, leaving a pregnant widow, who made to Lykurgus propositions that he should marry her and become king. But Lykurgus, repudiating the offer with indignation, awaited the birth of his young nephew Charilaus, held up the child publicly in the agora, as the future king of Sparta, and immediately relinquished the authority which he had provisionally exercised. However, the widow and her brother Leonidas raised slanderous accusations against him, of designs menacing to the life of the infant king,—accusations which he deemed it proper to obviate, by a temporary absence. Accordingly, he left Sparta and went to Krête, where he studied the polity and customs of the different cities; next, he visited Ionia and Egypt, and (as some authors affirmed) Libya, Iberia, and even India. While in Ionia, he is reported to have obtained from the descendants of Kreophylus a copy of the Homeric poems, which had not up to that time become known in Peloponnesus: there were not wanting authors, indeed, who said that he had conversed with Homer himself.[578]

Meanwhile, the young king Charilaus grew up and assumed the sceptre, as representing the Prokleid or Eurypontid family. But the reins of government had become more relaxed, and the disorders worse than ever, when Lykurgus returned. Finding that the two kings as well as the people were weary of so disastrous a condition, he set himself to the task of applying a corrective, and with this view consulted the Delphian oracle; from which he received strong assurances of the divine encouragement, together with one or more special injunctions (the primitive Rhetræ of the constitution), which he brought with him to Sparta.[579] He then suddenly presented himself in the agora, with thirty of the most distinguished Spartans, all in arms, as his guards and partisans. King Charilaus, though at first terrified, when informed of the designs of his uncle, stood forward willingly to second them; while the bulk of

the Spartans respectfully submitted to the venerable Herakleid, who came as reformer and missionary from Delphi.[580] Such were the steps by which Lykurgus acquired his ascendency: we have now to see how he employed it.

His first proceeding, pursuant to the Rhetra or Compact brought from Delphi, was to constitute the Spartan senate, consisting of twenty-eight ancient men; making an aggregate of thirty in conjunction with the two kings, who sat and voted in it. With this were combined periodical assemblies of the Spartan people, in the open air, between the river Knakiôn and the bridge Babyka. Yet no discussion was permitted in these assemblies,—their functions were limited to the simple acceptance or rejection of that which had previously been determined in the senate.[581] Such was the Spartan political constitution as fixed by Lykurgus; but a century afterwards (so Plutarch's account runs), under the kings Polydôrus and Theopompus, two important alterations were made. A rider was then attached to the old Lykurgean Rhetra, by which it was provided that, "in case the people decided crookedly, the senate, with the kings, should reverse their decisions:"[582] while another change, perhaps intended as a sort of compensation for this bridle on the popular assembly, introduced into the constitution a new executive Directory of five men, called Ephors. This Board—annually chosen, by some capricious method, the result of which could not well be foreseen, and open to be filled by every Spartan citizen—either originally received, or gradually drew to itself, functions so extensive and commanding, in regard to internal administration and police, as to limit the authority of the kings to little more than the exclusive command of the military force. Herodotus was informed, at Sparta, that the ephors as well as the senate had been constituted by Lykurgus; but the authority of Aristotle, as well as the internal probability of the case, sanctions the belief that they were subsequently added.[583]

Taking the political constitution of Sparta ascribed to Lykurgus, it appears not to have differed materially from the rude organization exhibited in the Homeric poems, where we always find a council of chiefs or old men, and occasional meetings of a listening agora. It is hard to suppose that the Spartan kings can ever have governed without some formalities of this sort; so that the innovation (if innovation there really was) ascribed to Lykurgus, must have consisted in some new details respecting the senate and the agora,—in fixing the number[584] thirty, and the life-tenure of the former,—and the special place of meeting of the latter, as well as the extent of privilege which it was to exercise; consecrating the whole by the erection of the temples of Zeus Hellanius and Athênê Hellania. The view of the subject presented by Plutarch as well as by Plato,[585] as if the senate were an entire novelty, does not consist with the pictures of the old epic. Hence we may more naturally imagine that the Lykurgean political constitution, apart from the ephors who were afterwards tacked to it, presents only the old features of the heroic government of Greece, defined and regularized in a particular manner. The presence of two coexistent and coordinate kings, indeed, succeeding in hereditary descent, and both belonging to the gens of

Herakleids, is something peculiar to Sparta,—the origin of which receives no other explanation than a reference to the twin sons of Aristodêmus, Eurysthenês and Proklês. These two primitive ancestors are a type of the two lines of Spartan kings; for they are said to have passed their lives in perpetual dissensions, which was the habitual state of the two contemporaneous kings at Sparta. While the coexistence of the pair of kings, equal in power and constantly thwarting each other, had often a baneful effect upon the course of public measures, it was, nevertheless, a security to the state against successful violence,[586] ending in the establishment of a despotism, on the part of any ambitious individual among the regal line.

During five successive centuries of Spartan history, from Polydôrus and Theopompus downward, no such violence was attempted by any of the kings,[587] until the times of Agis the Third and Kleomenês the Third,—240 B. C. to 220 B. C. The importance of Greece had at this last-mentioned period irretrievably declined, and the independent political action which she once possessed had become subordinate to the more powerful force either of the Ætolian mountaineers (the rudest among her own sons) or to Epirotic, Macedonian, and Asiatic foreigners, preparatory to the final absorption by the Romans. But amongst all the Grecian states, Sparta had declined the most; her ascendency was totally gone, and her peculiar training and discipline (to which she had chiefly owed it) had degenerated in every way. Under these untoward circumstances, two young kings, Agis and Kleomenês,—the former a generous enthusiast, the latter more violent and ambitious,—conceived the design of restoring the Lykurgean constitution in its supposed pristine purity, with the hope of reviving both the spirit of the people and the ascendency of the state. But the Lykurgean constitution had been, even in the time of Xenophon,[588] in part, an *idéal* not fully realized in practice—much less was it a reality in the days of Kleomenês and Agis moreover, it was an *idéal* which admitted of being colored according to the fancy or feelings of those reformers who professed, and probably believed, that they were aiming at its genuine restoration. What the reforming kings found most in their way, was the uncontrolled authority, and the conservative dispositions, of the ephors,—which they naturally contrasted with the original fulness of the kingly power, when kings and senate stood alone. Among the various ways in which men's ideas of what the primitive constitution *had* been, were modified by the feelings of their own time (we shall presently see some other instances of this), is probably to be reckoned the assertion of Kleomenês respecting the first appointment of the ephors. Kleomenês affirmed that the ephors had originally been nothing more than subordinates and deputies of the kings, chosen by the latter to perform for a time their duties during the long absence of the Messenian war. Starting from this humble position, and profiting by the dissensions of the two kings,[589] they had in process of time, especially by the ambition of the ephor Asterôpus, found means first to constitute themselves an independent board, then to usurp to themselves more and more of the kingly authority, until they at last reduced the kings to a state of intolerable humiliation and impotence. As a proof of the primitive relation between the kings and the ephors, he alluded to that

which was the custom at Sparta in his own time. When the ephors sent for either of the kings, the latter had a right to refuse obedience to two successive summonses, but the third summons he was bound to obey.[590]

It is obvious that the fact here adduced by Kleomenês (a curious point in Spartan manners) contributes little to prove the conclusion which he deduced from it, of the original nomination of the ephors as mere deputies by the kings. That they were first appointed at the time of the Messenian war is probable, and coincides with the tale that king Theopompus was a consenting party to the measure,—that their functions were at first comparatively circumscribed, and extended by successive encroachments, is also probable; but they seem to have been from the beginning a board of specially popular origin, in contraposition to the kings and the senate. One proof of this is to be found in the ancient oath, which was every month interchanged between the kings and the ephors; the king swearing for himself, that he would exercise his regal functions according to the established laws,—the ephors swearing on behalf of the city, that his authority should on that condition remain unshaken.[591] This mutual compact, which probably formed a part of the ceremony during the monthly sacrifices offered by the king,[592] continued down to a time when it must have become a pure form, and when the kings had long been subordinate in power to the ephors. But it evidently began first as a reality,—when the king was predominant and effective chief of the state, and when the ephors, clothed with functions chiefly defensive, served as guarantees to the people against abuse of the regal authority. Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero,[593] all interpret the original institution of the ephors as designed to protect the people and restrain the kings: the latter assimilates them to the tribunes at Rome.

Such were the relations which had once subsisted between the kings and the ephors: though in later times these relations had been so completely reversed, that Polybius considers the former as essentially subordinate to the latter,—reckoning it as a point of duty in the kings to respect the ephors "as their fathers."[594] And such is decidedly the state of things throughout all the better-known period of history which we shall hereafter traverse. The ephors are the general directors of public affairs[595] and the supreme controlling board, holding in check every other authority in the state, without any assignable limit to their powers. The extraordinary ascendency of these magistrates is particularly manifested in the fact stated by Aristotle, that they exempted themselves from the public discipline, so that their self-indulgent year of office stood in marked contrast with the toilsome exercises and sober mess common to rich and poor alike. The kings are reduced to a certain number of special functions, combined with privileges partly religious, partly honorary: their most important political attribute is, that they are *ex officio* generals of the military force on foreign expeditions. But even here, we trace the sensible decline of their power. For whereas Herodotus was informed, and it probably had been the old privilege, that the king could levy war against whomsoever he chose, and that no Spartan could impede him

on pain of committing sacrilege,[596]—we shall see, throughout the best-known periods of this history, that it is usually the ephors (with or without the senate and public assembly) who determine upon war,—the king only takes the command when the army is put on the march. Aristotle seems to treat the Spartan king as a sort of hereditary general; but even in this privilege, shackles were put upon him,—for two, out of the five ephors, accompanied the army, and their power seems to have been not seldom invoked to insure obedience to his orders.[597]

The direct political powers of the kings were thus greatly curtailed; yet importance, in many ways, was still left to them. They possessed large royal domains, in many of the townships of the Periœki: they received frequent occasional presents, and when victims were offered to the gods, the skins and other portions belonged to them as perquisites:[598] they had their votes in the senate, which, if they were absent, were given on their behalf, by such of the other senators as were most nearly related to them: the adoption of children received its formal accomplishment in their presence,—and conflicting claims at law, for the hand of an unbequeathed orphan heiress, were adjudicated by them. But above all, their root was deep in the religious feelings of the people. Their preëminent lineage connected the entire state with a divine paternity. They, the chiefs of the Herakleids, were the special grantees of the soil of Sparta from the gods,—the occupation of the Dorians being only sanctified and blest by Zeus for the purpose of establishing the children of Hêraklês in the valley of the Eurotas.[599] They represented the state in its relations with the gods, being by right priests of Zeus Lacedæmon, (the ideas of the god and the country coalescing into one), and of Zeus Uranius, and offering the monthly sacrifices necessary to insure divine protection to the people. Though individual persons might sometimes be put aside, nothing short of a new divine revelation could induce the Spartans to step out of the genuine lineage of Eurysthenês and Proklês. Moreover, the remarkable mourning ceremony, which took place at the death of every king, seems to indicate that the two kingly families—which counted themselves Achæan,[600] not Dorian—were considered as the great common bond of union between the three component parts of the population of Laconia,—Spartans, Periœki, and Helots. Not merely was it required, on this occasion, that two members of every house in Sparta should appear in sackcloth and ashes,—but the death of the king was formally made known throughout every part of Laconia, and deputies from the townships of the Periœki, and the villages of the Helots, to the number of several thousand, were summoned to Sparta to take their share in the profuse and public demonstrations of sorrow,[601] which lasted for ten days, and which imparted to the funeral obsequies a superhuman solemnity. Nor ought we to forget, in enumerating the privileges of the Spartan king, that he (conjointly with two officers called Pythii, nominated by him,) carried on the communications between the state and the temple of Delphi, and had the custody of oracles and prophecies generally. In most of the Grecian states, such inspired declarations were treasured up, and consulted in cases of public emergency: but the intercourse of Sparta with the Delphian oracle was peculiarly frequent and intimate,

and the responses of the Pythian priestess met with more reverential attention from the Spartans than from any other Greeks.[602] So much the more important were the king's functions, as the medium of this intercourse: the oracle always upheld his dignity, and often even seconded his underhand personal schemes.[603]

Sustained by so great a force of traditional reverence, a Spartan king, of military talent and individual energy, like Agesilaus, exercised great ascendency; but such cases were very rare, and we shall find the king throughout the historical period only a secondary force, available on special occasions. For real political orders, in the greatest cases as well as the least, the Spartan looks to the council of ephors, to whom obedience is paid with a degree of precision which nothing short of the Spartan discipline could have brought about,—by the most powerful citizens not less than by the meanest.[604] Both the internal police and the foreign affairs of the state are in the hands of the ephors, who exercise an authority approaching to despotism, and altogether without accountability. They appoint and direct the body of three hundred young and active citizens, who performed the immediate police service of Laconia: they cashier at pleasure any subordinate functionary, and inflict fine or arrest at their own discretion: they assemble the military force, on occasion of foreign war, and determine its destination, though the king has the actual command of it: they imprison on suspicion even the regent or the king himself:[605] they sit as judges, sometimes individually and sometimes as a board, upon causes and complaints of great moment, and they judge without the restraint of written laws, the use of which was peremptorily forbidden by a special Rhetra,[606] erroneously connected with Lykurgus himself, but at any rate ancient. On certain occasions of peculiar moment, they take the sense of the senate and the public assembly,[607]—such seems to have been the habit on questions of war and peace. It appears, however, that persons charged with homicide, treason, or capital offences generally, were tried before the senate. We read of several instances in which the kings were tried and severely fined, and in which their houses were condemned to be razed to the ground, probably by the senate, on the proposition of the ephors: in one instance, it seems that the ephors inflicted by their own authority a fine even upon Agesilaus.[608]

War and peace appear to have been submitted, on most, if not on all occasions, to the senate and the public assembly; no matter could reach the latter until it had passed through the former. And we find some few occasions on which the decision of the public assembly was a real expression of opinion, and operative as to the result, —as, for example, the assembly which immediately preceded and resolved upon the Peloponnesian war. Here, in addition to the serious hazard of the case, and the general caution of a Spartan temperament, there was the great personal weight and experience of king Archidamus opposed to the war, though the ephors were favorable to it.[609] The public assembly, under such peculiar circumstances, really manifested an opinion and came to a division. But, for the most part, it seems to have been little better than an inoperative formality. The general rule permitted no open discussion,

nor could any private citizen speak except by special leave from the magistrates. Perhaps even the general liberty to discuss, if given, might have been of no avail, for not only was there no power of public speaking, but no habit of canvassing public measures, at Sparta; nothing was more characteristic of the government than the extreme secrecy of its proceedings.[610] The propositions brought forward by the magistrates were either accepted or rejected, without any license of amending. There could be no attraction to invite the citizen to be present at such an assembly: and we may gather from the language of Xenophon that, in his time, it consisted only of a certain number of notables specially summoned in addition to the senate, which latter body is itself called "the lesser Ekklesia.[611]" Indeed, the constant and formidable diminution in the number of qualified citizens was alone sufficient to thin the attendance of the assembly, as well as to break down any imposing force which it might once have possessed.

An assembly thus circumstanced,—though always retained as a formality, and though its consent on considerable matters and for the passing of laws (which, however, seems to have been a rare occurrence at Sparta) was indispensable,—could be very little of a practical check upon the administration of the ephors. The senate, a permanent body, with the kings included in it, was the only real check upon them, and must have been to a certain extent a concurrent body in the government,—though the large and imposing language in which its political supremacy is spoken of by Demosthenês and Isokratês exceeds greatly the reality of the case. Its most important function was that of a court of criminal justice, before whom every man put on trial for his life was arraigned.[612] But both in this and in their other duties, we find the senators as well as the kings and the ephors charged with corruption and venality.[613] As they were not appointed until sixty years of age, and then held their offices for life, we may readily believe that some of them continued to act after the period of extreme and disqualifying senility,—which, though the extraordinary respect of the Lacedæmonians for old age would doubtless tolerate it, could not fail to impair the influence of the body as a concurrent element of government.

The brief sketch here given of the Spartan government will show that, though Greek theorists found a difficulty in determining under what class they should arrange it,[614] it was in substance a close, unscrupulous, and well-obeyed oligarchy,—including within it, as subordinate, those portions which had once been dominant, the kings and the senate, and softening the odium, without abating the mischief, of the system, by its annual change of the ruling ephors. We must at the same time distinguish the government from the Lykurgean discipline and education, which doubtless tended much to equalize rich and poor, in respect to practical life, habits, and enjoyments. Herodotus (and seemingly, also, Xenophon) thought that the form just described was that which the government had originally received from the hand of Lykurgus. Now, though there is good reason for supposing otherwise, and for believing the ephors to be a subsequent addition,—yet, the mere fact that Herodotus

was so informed at Sparta, points our attention to one important attribute of the Spartan polity, which it is proper to bring into view. This attribute is, its unparalleled steadiness, for four or five successive centuries, in the midst of governments like the Grecian, all of which had undergone more or less of fluctuation. No considerable revolution—not even any palpable or formal change—occurred in it, from the days of the Messenian war, down to those of Agis the Third: in spite of the irreparable blow which the power and territory of the state sustained from Epameinondas and the Thebans, the form of government, nevertheless, remained unchanged. It was the only government in Greece which could trace an unbroken, peaceable descent from a high antiquity, and from its real or supposed founder. Now this was one of the main circumstances (among others which will hereafter be mentioned) of the astonishing ascendency which the Spartans acquired over the Hellenic mind, and which they will not be found at all to deserve by any superior ability in the conduct of affairs. The steadiness of their political sympathies,—exhibited at one time, by putting down the tyrants, or despots, at another, by overthrowing the democracies,—stood in the place of ability; and even the recognized failings of their government were often covered by the sentiment of respect for its early commencement and uninterrupted continuance. If such a feeling acted on the Greeks generally,[615] much more powerful was its action upon the Spartans themselves, in inflaming that haughty exclusiveness for which they stood distinguished. And it is to be observed that the Spartan mind continued to be cast on the old-fashioned scale, and unsusceptible of modernizing influences, longer than that of most other people of Greece. The ancient legendary faith, and devoted submission to the Delphian oracle, remained among them unabated, at a time when various influences had considerably undermined it among their fellow-Hellens and neighbors. But though the unchanged title and forms of the government thus contributed to its imposing effect, both at home and abroad, the causes of internal degeneracy were not the less really at work, in undermining its efficiency. It has been already stated, that the number of qualified citizens went on continually diminishing, and even of this diminished number a larger proportion than before were needy, since the landed property tended constantly to concentrate itself in fewer hands. There grew up in this way a body of discontent, which had not originally existed, both among the poorer citizens, and among those who had lost their franchise as citizens; thus aggravating the danger arising from Periœki and Helots, who will be presently noticed.

We pass from the political constitution of Sparta to the civil ranks and distribution, economical relations, and lastly, the peculiar system of habits, education, and discipline, said to have been established among the Lacedæmonians by Lykurgus. Here, again, we shall find ourselves imperfectly informed as to the existing institutions, and surrounded by confusion when we try to explain how those institutions arose.

It seems, however, ascertained that the Dorians, in all their settlements, were divided into three tribes,—the Hylleis, the Pamphyli, and the Dymanes: in all Dorian

cities, moreover, there were distinguished Herakleid families, from whom œkists were chosen when new colonies were formed. These three tribes can be traced at Argos, Sikyôn, Epidaurus, Trœzên, Megara, Korkyra, and seemingly, also, at Sparta.[616] The Hylleis recognized, as their eponym and progenitor, Hyllus, the son of Hêraklês, and were therefore, in their own belief, descended from Hêraklês himself: we may suppose the Herakleids, specially so called, comprising the two regal families, to have been the elder brethren of the tribe of Hylleis, the whole of whom are sometimes spoken of as Herakleids, or descendants of Hêraklês.[617] But there seem to have been also at Sparta, as in other Dorian towns, non-Dorian inhabitants, apart from these three tribes, and embodied in tribes of their own. One of these, the Ægeids, said to have come from Thebes as allies of the Dorian invaders, is named by Aristotle, Pindar, and Herodotus,[618]—while the Ægialeis at Sikyôn, the tribe Hyrnêthia at Argos and Epidaurus, and others, whose titles we do not know, at Corinth, represent, in like manner, the non-Dorian portions of their respective communities.[619] At Corinth, the total number of tribes is said to have been eight.[620] But at Sparta, though we seem to make out the existence of the three Dorian tribes, we do not know how many tribes there were in all: still less do we know what relation the Obæ, or Obes, another subordinate distribution of the people, bore to the tribes. In the ancient Rhetra of Lykurgus, the Tribes and Obês are directed to be maintained unaltered: but the statement of O. Müller and Boeckh[621]—that there were thirty Obês in all, ten to each tribe—rests upon no other evidence than a peculiar punctuation of this Rhetra, which various other critics reject; and seemingly, with good reason. We are thus left without any information respecting the Obê, though we know that it was an old, peculiar, and lasting division among the Spartan people, since it occurs in the oldest Rhetra of Lykurgus, as well as in late inscriptions of the date of the Roman empire. In similar inscriptions, and in the account of Pausanias, there is, however, recognized a classification of Spartans distinct from and independent of the three old Dorian tribes, and founded upon the different quarters of the city,—Limnæ, Mesoa, Pitanê, and Kynosura;[622] from one of these four was derived the usual description of a Spartan in the days of Herodotus. There is reason to suppose that the old Dorian tribes became antiquated at Sparta, (as the four old Ionian tribes did at Athens,) and that the topical classification derived from the quarters of the city superseded it,—these quarters having been originally the separate villages, of the aggregate of which Sparta was composed.[623] That the number of the old senators, thirty, was connected with the three Dorian tribes, deriving ten members from each, is probable enough, though there is no proof of it.

Of the population of Laconia, three main divisions are recognized,—Spartans, Periœki, and Helots. The first of the three were the full qualified citizens, who lived in Sparta itself, fulfilled all the exigences of the Lykurgean discipline, paid their quota to the Syssitia, or public mess, and were alone eligible to honors[624] or public offices. These men had neither time, nor taste even, for cultivation of the land, still less for trade or handicraft: such occupations were inconsistent with the prescribed training,

even if they had not been positively interdicted. They were maintained from the lands round the city, and from the large proportion of Laconia which belonged to them; the land being tilled for them by Helots, who seem to have paid over to them a fixed proportion of the produce; in some cases, at least, as much as one-half.[625] Each Spartan retained his qualification, and transmitted it to his children, on two conditions,—first, that of submitting to the prescribed discipline; next, that of paying, each, his stipulated quota to the public mess, which was only maintained by these individual contributions. The multiplication of children in the poorer families, after acquisitions of new territory ceased, continually augmented both the number and the proportion of citizens who were unable to fulfil the second of these conditions, and who therefore lost their franchise: so that there arose towards the close of the Peloponnesian war, a distinction, among the Spartans themselves, unknown to the earlier times,—the reduced number of fully qualified citizens being called The Equals, or Peers,—the disfranchised poor, The Inferiors. The latter, disfranchised as they were, nevertheless, did not become Periœki: it was probably still competent to them to resume their qualification, should any favorable accident enable them to make their contributions to the public mess.

The Periœkus was also a freeman and a citizen, not of Sparta, but of some one of the hundred townships of Laconia.[626] Both he and the community to which he belonged received their orders only from Sparta, having no political sphere of their own, and no share in determining the movements of the Spartan authorities. In the island of Kythêra,[627] which formed one of the Periœkic townships, a Spartan bailiff resided as administrator. But whether the same was the case with others, we cannot affirm: nor is it safe to reason from one of these townships to all,—there may have been considerable differences in the mode of dealing with one and another. For they were spread through the whole of Laconia, some near and some distant from Sparta: the free inhabitants of Amyklæ must have been Periœki, as well as those of Kythêra, Thuria, Ætheia, or Aulôn: nor can we presume that the feeling on the part of the Spartan authorities towards all of them was the same. Between the Spartans and their neighbors, the numerous Periœki of Amyklæ, there must have subsisted a degree of intercourse and mutual relation in which the more distant Periœki did not partake,—besides, that both the religious edifices and the festivals of Amyklæ were most reverentially adopted by the Spartans and exalted into a national dignity: and we seem to perceive, on some occasions, a degree of consideration manifested for the Amyklæan hoplites,[628] such as perhaps other Periœki might not have obtained. The class-name, Periœki,[629]—circumresidents, or dwellers around the city,—usually denoted native inhabitants of inferior political condition as contrasted with the full-privileged burghers who lived in the city, but it did not mark any precise or uniform degree of inferiority. It is sometimes so used by Aristotle as to imply a condition no better than that of the Helots, so that, in a large sense, all the inhabitants of Laconia (Helots as well as the rest) might have been included in it. But when used in reference to Laconia, it bears a technical sense, whereby it is placed in contraposition

with the Spartan on one side, and with the Helot on the other: it means, native freemen and proprietors, grouped in subordinate communities[630] with more or less power of local management, but (like the subject towns belonging to Bern, Zurich, and most of the old thirteen cantons of Switzerland) embodied in the Lacedæmonian aggregate, which was governed exclusively by the kings, senate, and citizens of Sparta.

When we come to describe the democracy of Athens after the revolution of Kleisthenes, we shall find the demes, or local townships and villages of Attica, incorporated as equal and constituent fractions of the integer called The Deme (or The City) of Athens, so that a demot of Acharnæ or Sphêttus is at the same time a full Athenian citizen. But the relation of the Periœkic townships to Sparta is one of inequality and obedience, though both belong to the same political aggregate, and make up together the free Lacedæmonian community. In like manner, Orneæ and other places were townships of men personally free, but politically dependent on Argos,—Akræphiæ on Thebes,—Chæroneia on Orchomenus,—and various Thessalian towns on Pharsalus and Larissa.[631] Such, moreover, was, in the main, the state into which Athens would have brought her allies, and Thebes the free Bœotian communities, [632] if the policy of either of these cities had permanently prospered. This condition carried with it a sentiment of degradation, and a painful negation of that autonomy for which every Grecian community thirsted; while being maintained through superior force, it had a natural tendency, perhaps without the deliberate wish of the reigning city, to degenerate into practical oppression. But in addition to this general tendency, the peculiar education of a Spartan, while it imparted force, fortitude, and regimental precision, was at the same time so rigorously peculiar, that it rendered him harsh, unaccommodating, and incapable of sympathizing with the ordinary march of Grecian feeling,—not to mention the rapacity and love of money, which is attested, by good evidence, as belonging to the Spartan character,[633] and which we should hardly have expected to find in the pupils of Lykurgus. As Harmosts out of their native city,[634] and in relations with inferiors, the Spartans seem to have been more unpopular than other Greeks, and we may presume that a similar haughty roughness pervaded their dealings with their own Periœki; who were bound to them certainly by no tie of affection, and who for the most part revolted after the battle of Leuktra, as soon as the invasion of Laconia by Epameinondas enabled them to do so with safety.

Isokratês, taking his point of departure from the old Herakleid legend, with its instantaneous conquest and triple partition of all Dorian Peloponnesus, among the three Herakleid brethren, deduces the first origin of the Periœkic townships from internal seditions among the conquerors of Sparta. According to him, the period immediately succeeding the conquest was one of fierce intestine warfare in newly-conquered Sparta, between the Few and the Many,—the oligarchy and the demus. The former being victorious, two important measures were the consequences of their vic-

tory. They banished the defeated Many from Sparta into Laconia, retaining the residence in Sparta exclusively for themselves; they assigned to them the smallest and least fertile half of Laconia, monopolizing the larger and better for themselves; and they disseminated them into many very small townships, or subordinate little communities, while they concentrated themselves entirely at Sparta. To these precautions for insuring dominion, they added another not less important. They established among their own Spartan citizens equality of legal privilege and democratical government, so as to take the greatest securities for internal harmony; which harmony, according to the judgment of Isokratês, had been but too effectually perpetuated, enabling the Spartans to achieve their dominion over oppressed Greece,—like the accord of pirates[635] for the spoliation of the peaceful. The Periœkic townships, he tells us, while deprived of all the privileges of freemen, were exposed to all the toils, as well as to an unfair share of the dangers, of war. The Spartan authorities put them in situations and upon enterprises which they deemed too dangerous for their own citizens; and, what was still worse, the ephors possessed the power of putting to death, without any form of preliminary trial, as many Periœki as they pleased.[636]

The statement here delivered by Isokratês, respecting the first origin of the distinction of Spartans and Periœki, is nothing better than a conjecture, nor is it even a probable conjecture, since it is based on the historical truth of the old Herakleid legend, and transports the disputes of his own time, between the oligarchy and the demus, into an early period, to which such disputes do not belong. Nor is there anything, so far as our knowledge of Grecian history extends, to bear out his assertion, that the Spartans took to themselves the least dangerous post in the field, and threw undue peril upon their Periœki. Such dastardly temper was not among the sins of Sparta; but it is undoubtedly true that, as the number of citizens continually diminished, so the Periœki came to constitute, in the later times, a larger and larger proportion of the Spartan force. Yet the power which Isokratês represents to have been vested in the ephors, of putting to death Periœki without preliminary trial, we may fully believe to be real, and to have been exercised as often as the occasion seemed to call for it. We shall notice, presently, the way in which these magistrates dealt with the Helots, and shall see ample reason from thence to draw the conclusion that, whenever the ephors believed any man to be dangerous to the public peace,—whether an inferior Spartan, a Periœkus, or a Helot,—the most summary mode of getting rid of him would be considered as the best. Towards Spartans of rank and consideration, they were doubtless careful and measured in their application of punishment, but the same necessity for circumspection did not exist with regard to the inferior classes: moreover, the feeling that the exigences of justice required a fair trial before punishment was inflicted, belongs to Athenian associations much more than to Spartan. How often any such summary executions may have taken place, we have no information.

We may remark that the account which Isokratês has here given of the origin of the Laconian Periœki is not essentially irreconcilable with that of Ephorus,[637] who recounted that Eurysthenês and Proklês, on first conquering Laconia, had granted to the preëxisting population equal rights with the Dorians,—but that Agis, son of Eurysthenês, had deprived them of this equal position, and degraded them into dependent subjects of the latter. At least, the two narratives both agree in presuming that the Periœki had once enjoyed a better position, from which they had been extruded by violence. And the policy which Isokratês ascribes to the victorious Spartan oligarchs,—of driving out the demus from concentrated residence in the city to disseminated residence in many separate and insignificant townships,—seems to be the expression of that proceeding which in his time was numbered among the most efficient precautions against refractory subjects,—the Diœkisis, or breaking up of a town-aggregate into villages. We cannot assign to the statement any historical authority.[638] Moreover, the division of Laconia into six districts, together with its distribution into townships (or the distribution of settlers into preëxisting townships), which Ephorus ascribed to the first Dorian kings, are all deductions from the primitive legendary account, which described the Dorian conquest as achieved by one stroke, and must all be dismissed, if we suppose it to have been achieved gradually. This gradual conquest is admitted by O. Müller, and by many of the ablest subsequent inquirers,—who, nevertheless, seem to have the contrary supposition involuntarily present to their minds when they criticize the early Spartan history, and always unconsciously imagine the Spartans as masters of all Laconia. We cannot even assert that Laconia was ever under one government before the consummation of the successive conquests of Sparta.

Of the assertion of O. Müller—repeated by Schömann[639]—"that the difference of races was strictly preserved, and that the Periœki were always considered as Achæans,"—I find no proof, and I believe it to be erroneous. Respecting Pharis, Geronthræ, and Amyklæ, three Periœkic towns, Pausanias gives us to understand that the preëxisting inhabitants either retired or were expelled on the Dorian conquest, and that a Dorian population replaced them.[640] Without placing great faith in this statement, for which Pausanias could hardly have any good authority, we may yet accept it as representing the probabilities of the case, and as counterbalancing the unsupported hypothesis of Müller. The Periœkic townships were probably composed either of Dorians entirely, or of Dorians incorporated in greater or less proportion with the preëxisting inhabitants. But whatever difference of race there may once have been, it was effaced before the historical times,[641] during which we find no proof of Achæans, known as such, in Laconia. The Herakleids, the Ægeids, and the Talthybiads, all of whom belong to Sparta, seem to be the only examples of separate races, partially distinguishable from Dorians, known after the beginning of authentic history. The Spartans and the Periœki constitute one political aggregate, and that too so completely melted together in the general opinion (speaking of the times before the battle of Leuktra), that the peace of Antalkidas, which guaranteed autonomy to

every separate Grecian city, was never so construed as to divorce the Periœkic towns from Sparta. Both are known as Laconians, or Lacedæmonians, and Sparta is regarded by Herodotus only as the first and bravest among the many and brave Lacedæmonian cities.[642] The victors at Olympia are proclaimed, not as Spartans, but as Laconians,—a title alike borne by the Periœki. And many of the numerous winners, whose names we read in the Olympic lists as Laconians, may probably have belonged to Amyklæ or other Periœkic towns.

The Periœkic hoplites constituted always a large—in later times a preponderant—numerical proportion of the Lacedæmonian army, and must undoubtedly have been trained, more or less perfectly, in the peculiar military tactics of Sparta; since they were called upon to obey the same orders as the Spartans in the field,[643] and to perform the same evolutions. Some cases appear, though rare, in which a Periœkus has high command in a foreign expedition. In the time of Aristotle, the larger proportion of Laconia (then meaning only the country eastward of Taygetus, since the foundation of Messênê by Epameinondas had been consummated) belonged to Spartan citizens,[644] but the remaining smaller half must have been the property of the Periœki, who must besides have carried on most of the commerce of export and import,—the metallurgic enterprise, and the distribution of internal produce,—which the territory exhibited; since no Spartan ever meddled in such occupations. And thus the peculiar training of Lykurgus, by throwing all these employments into the hands of the Periœki, opened to them a new source of importance, which the dependent townships of Argos, of Thebes, or of Orchomenus, would not enjoy.

The Helots of Laconia were Coloni, or serfs, bound to the soil, who tilled it for the benefit of the Spartan proprietors certainly,—probably, of Periœkic proprietors also. They were the rustic population of the country, who dwelt, not in towns, but either in small villages[645] or in detached farms, both in the district immediately surrounding Sparta, and round the Periœkic Laconian towns also. Of course, there were also Helots who lived in Sparta and other towns, and did the work of domestic slaves,—but such was not the general character of the class. We cannot doubt that the Dorian conquest from Sparta found this class in the condition of villagers and detached rustics; but whether they were dependent upon preëxisting Achæan proprietors, or independent, like much of the Arcadian village population, is a question which we cannot answer. In either case, however, it is easy to conceive that the village lands (with the cultivators upon them) were the most easy to appropriate for the benefit of masters resident at Sparta; while the towns, with the district immediately around them, furnished both dwelling and maintenance to the outgoing detachments of Dorians. If the Spartans had succeeded in their attempt to enlarge their territory by the conquest of Arcadia,[646] they might very probably have converted Tegea and Mantineia into Periœkic towns, with a diminished territory inhabited (either wholly or in part) by Dorian settlers,—while they would have made over to proprietors in Sparta much of the village lands of the Mænalii, Azanes, and Parrhasii, helotizing the inhabitants.

The distinction between a town and a village population seems the main ground of the different treatment of Helots and Periœki in Laconia. A considerable proportion of the Helots were of genuine Dorian race, being the Dorian Messenians west of Mount Taygetus, subsequently conquered and aggregated to this class of dependent cultivators, who, as a class, must have begun to exist from the very first establishment of the invading Dorians in the district round Sparta. From whence the name of Helots arose, we do not clearly make out: Ephorus deduced it from the town of Helus, on the southern coast, which the Spartans are said to have taken after a resistance so obstinate as to provoke them to deal very rigorously with the captives. There are many reasons for rejecting this story, and another etymology has been proposed, according to which Helot is synonymous with *captive*: this is more plausible, yet still not convincing.[647] The Helots lived in the rural villages, as *adscripti glebæ*, cultivating their lands and paying over their rent to the master at Sparta, but enjoying their homes, wives, families, and mutual neighborly feelings, apart from the master's view. They were never sold out of the country, and probably never sold at all; belonging, not so much to the master as to the state, which constantly called upon them for military service, and recompensed their bravery or activity with a grant of freedom. Meno, the Thessalian of Pharsalus, took out three hundred Penestæ of his own, to aid the Athenians against Amphipolis: these Thessalian Penestæ were in many points analogous to the Helots, but no individual Spartan possessed the like power over the latter. The Helots were thus a part of the state, having their domestic and social sympathies developed, a certain power of acquiring property,[648] and the consciousness of Grecian lineage and dialect,—points of marked superiority over the foreigners who formed the slave population of Athens or Chios. They seem to have been noway inferior to any village population of Greece; while the Grecian observer sympathized with them more strongly than with the bought slaves of other states,—not to mention that their homogeneous aspect, their numbers, and their employment in military service, rendered them more conspicuous to the eye.

The service in the Spartan house was all performed by members of the Helot class; for there seem to have been few, if any, other slaves in the country. The various anecdotes which are told respecting their treatment at Sparta, betoken less of cruelty than of ostentatious scorn,[649]—a sentiment which we are noway surprised to discover among the citizens at the mess-table. But the great mass of the Helots, who dwelt in the country, were objects of a very different sentiment on the part of the Spartan ephors, who knew their bravery, energy, and standing discontent, and yet were forced to employ them as an essential portion of the state army. The Helots commonly served as light-armed, in which capacity the Spartan hoplites could not dispense with their attendance. At the battle of Platæa, every Spartan hoplite had seven Helots,[650] and every Periœkic hoplite one Helot, to attend him:[651] but, even in camp, the Spartan arrangements were framed to guard against any sudden mutiny of these light-armed companions, while, at home, the citizen habitually kept his shield disjoined from its holding-ring, to prevent the possibility of its being snatched

for the like purpose. Sometimes, select Helots were clothed in heavy armor, and thus served in the ranks, receiving manumission from the state as the reward of distinguished bravery.[652]

But Sparta, even at the maximum of her power, was more than once endangered by the reality, and always beset with the apprehension, of Helotic revolt. To prevent or suppress it, the ephors submitted to insert express stipulations for aid in their treaties with Athens,—to invite Athenian troops into the heart of Laconia,—and to practice combinations of cunning and atrocity which even yet stand without parallel in the long list of precautions for fortifying unjust dominion. It was in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war, after the Helots had been called upon for signal military efforts in various ways, and when the Athenians and Messenians were in possession of Pylus, that the ephors felt especially apprehensive of an outbreak. Anxious to single out the most forward and daring Helots, as the men from whom they had most to dread, they issued proclamation that every member of that class who had rendered distinguished services should make his claims known at Sparta, promising liberty to the most deserving. A large number of Helots came forward to claim the boon: not less than two thousand of them were approved, formally manumitted, and led in solemn procession round the temples, with garlands on their heads, as an inauguration to their coming life of freedom. But the treacherous garland only marked them out as victims for the sacrifice: every man of them forthwith disappeared,—the manner of their death was an untold mystery.

For this dark and bloody deed, Thucydidês is our witness,[653] and Thucydidês describing a contemporary matter into which he had inquired. Upon any less evidence we should have hesitated to believe the statement; but standing as it thus does above all suspicion, it speaks volumes as to the inhuman character of the Lacedæmonian government, while it lays open to us at the same time the intensity of their fears from the Helots. In the assassination of this fated regiment of brave men, a large number of auxiliaries and instruments must have been concerned: yet Thucydidês, with all his inquiries, could not find out how any of them perished: he tells us, that no man knew. We see here a fact which demonstrates unequivocally the impenetrable mystery in which the proceedings of the Spartan government were wrapped,—the absence not only of public discussion, but of public curiosity,—and the perfection with which the ephors reigned over the will, the hands, and the tongues, of their Spartan subjects. The Venetian Council of Ten, with all the facilities for nocturnal drowning which their city presented, could hardly have accomplished so vast a *coup-d'état* with such invisible means. And we may judge from hence, even if we had no other evidence, how little the habits of a public assembly could have suited either the temper of mind or the march of government at Sparta.

Other proceedings, ascribed to the ephors against the Helots, are conceived in the same spirit as the incident just recounted from Thucydidês, though they do not carry with them the same certain attestation. It was a part of the institutions of

Lykurgus (according to a statement which Plutarch professes to have borrowed from Aristotle) that the ephors should every year declare war against the Helots, in order that the murder of them might be rendered innocent; and that active young Spartans should be armed with daggers and sent about Laconia, in order that they might, either in solitude or at night, assassinate such of the Helots as were considered formidable.[654] This last measure passes by the name of the Krypteia, yet we find some difficulty in determining to what extent it was ever realized. That the ephors, indeed, would not be restrained by any scruples of justice or humanity, is plainly shown by the murder of the two thousand Helots above noticed; but this latter incident really answered its purpose, while a standing practice, such as that of the Krypteia, and a formal notice of war given beforehand, would provoke the reaction of despair rather than enforce tranquillity. There seems, indeed, good evidence that the Krypteia was a real practice,[655]—that the ephors kept up a system of police or espionage throughout Laconia, by the employment of active young citizens, who lived a hard and solitary life, and suffered their motions to be as little detected as possible. The ephors might naturally enough take this method of keeping watch both over the Periœkic townships and the Helot villages, and the assassination of individual Helots by these police-men, or Krypts, would probably pass unnoticed. But it is impossible to believe in any standing murderous order, or deliberate annual assassination of Helots, for the purpose of intimidation, as Aristotle is alleged to have represented,—for we may well doubt whether he really did make such a representation, when we see that he takes no notice of this measure in his Politics, where he speaks at some length both of the Spartan constitution and of the Helots. The well-known hatred and fear, entertained by the Spartans towards their Helots, has probably colored Plutarch's description of the Krypteia, so as to exaggerate those unpunished murders which occasionally happened into a constant phenomenon with express design. A similar deduction is to be made from the statement of Myrôn of Priênê,[656] who alleged that they were beaten every year without any special fault, in order to put them in mind of their slavery,—and that those Helots, whose superior beauty or stature placed them above the visible stamp of their condition, were put to death; while such masters as neglected to keep down the spirit of their vigorous Helots were punished. That secrecy, for which the ephors were so remarkable, seems enough of itself to refute the assertion that they publicly proclaimed war against the Helots; though we may well believe that this unhappy class of men may have been noticed as objects for jealous observation in the annual ephoric oath of office. Whatever may have been the treatment of the Helots in later times, it is at all events hardly to be supposed that any regulation hostile to them can have emanated from Lykurgus. For the dangers arising from that source did not become serious until after the Messenian war,—nor, indeed, until after the gradual diminution of the number of Spartan citizens had made itself felt.

The manumitted Helots did not pass into the class of Periœki,—for this purpose a special grant, of the freedom of some Periœkic township, would probably be re-

quired,—but constituted a class apart, known at the time of the Peloponnesian war by the name of Neodamôdes. Being persons who had earned their liberty by signal bravery, they were of course regarded by the ephors with peculiar apprehension, and, if possible, employed on foreign service,[657] or planted on some foreign soil as settlers. In what manner these freedmen employed themselves, we find no distinct information; but we can hardly doubt that they quitted the Helot village and field, together with the rural costume (the leather cap and sheepskin) which the Helot commonly wore, and the change of which exposed him to suspicion, if not to punishment, from his jealous masters. Probably they, as well as the disfranchised Spartan citizens (called Hypomeiones, or Inferiors), became congregated at Sparta, and found employment either in various trades or in the service of the government.

It has been necessary to give this short sketch of the orders of men who inhabited Laconia, in order to enable us to understand the statements given about the legislation of Lykurgus. The arrangements ascribed to that lawgiver, in the way that Plutarch describes them, presuppose, and do not create, the three orders of Spartans, Periœki, and Helots. We are told by Plutarch that the disorders which Lykurgus found existing in the state arose in a great measure from the gross inequality of property, and from the luxurious indulgence and unprincipled rapacity of the rich,—who had drawn to themselves the greater proportion of the lands in the country, leaving a large body of poor, without any lot of land, in hopeless misery and degradation. To this inequality (according to Plutarch) the reforming legislator applied at once a stringent remedy. He redistributed the whole territory belonging to Sparta, as well as the remainder of Laconia; the former, in nine thousand equal lots, one to each Spartan citizen; the latter, in thirty thousand equal lots, one to each Periœkus: of this alleged distribution, I shall speak farther presently. Moreover, he banished the use of gold and silver money, tolerating nothing in the shape of circulating medium but pieces of iron, heavy and scarcely portable; and he forbade[658] to the Spartan citizen every species of industrious or money-seeking occupation, agriculture included. He farther constituted,—though not without strenuous opposition, during the course of which his eye is said to have been knocked out by a violent youth, named Alkander,—the Syssitia, or public mess. A certain number of joint tables were provided, and every citizen was required to belong to some one of them, and habitually to take his meals at it,[659]—no new member being admissible without an unanimous ballot in his favor by the previous occupants. Each provided from his lot of land a specified quota of barley-meal, wine, cheese, and figs, and a small contribution of money for condiments: game was obtained in addition by hunting in the public forests of the state, while every one who sacrificed to the gods,[660] sent to his mess-table a part of the victim killed. From boyhood to old age, every Spartan citizen took his sober meals at this public mess, where all shared alike; nor was distinction of any kind allowed, except on signal occasions of service rendered by an individual to the state.

These public Syssitia, under the management of the Polemarchs, were connected with the military distribution, the constant gymnastic training, and the rigorous discipline of detail, enforced by Lykurgus. From the early age of seven years, throughout his whole life, as youth and man no less than as boy, the Spartan citizen lived habitually in public, always either himself under drill, gymnastic and military, or a critic and spectator of others,—always under the fetters and observances of a rule partly military, partly monastic,—estranged from the independence of a separate home,—seeing his wife, during the first years after marriage, only by stealth, and maintaining little peculiar relation with his children. The supervision, not only of his fellow-citizens, but also of authorized censors, or captains nominated by the state, was perpetually acting upon him: his day was passed in public exercises and meals, his nights in the public barrack to which he belonged. Besides the particular military drill, whereby the complicated movements required from a body of Lacedæmonian hoplites in the field, were made familiar to him from his youth,—he also became subject to severe bodily discipline of other kinds, calculated to impart strength, activity, and endurance. To manifest a daring and pugnacious spirit,—to sustain the greatest bodily torture unmoved,—to endure hunger and thirst, heat, cold, and fatigue,—to tread the worst ground barefoot,—to wear the same garment winter and summer,—to suppress external manifestations of feeling, and to exhibit in public, when action was not called for, a bearing shy, silent, and motionless as a statue,—all these were the virtues of the accomplished Spartan youth.[661] Two squadrons were often matched against each other to contend (without arms) in the little insular circumscription called the Platanistûs, and these contests were carried on, under the eye of the authorities, with the utmost extremity of fury. Nor was the competition among them less obstinate, to bear without murmuring the cruel scourgings inflicted before the altar of Artemis Orthia, supposed to be highly acceptable to the goddess, though they sometimes terminated even in the death of the uncomplaining sufferer.[662] Besides the various descriptions of gymnastic contests, the youths were instructed in the choric dances employed in festivals of the gods, which contributed to impart to them methodized and harmonious movements. Hunting in the woods and mountains of Laconia was encouraged, as a means of inuring them to fatigue and privation. The nourishment supplied to the youthful Spartans was purposely kept insufficient, but they were allowed to make up the deficiency not only by hunting, but even by stealing whatever they could lay hands upon, provided they could do so without being detected in the fact; in which latter case they were severely chastised.[663] In reference simply to bodily results,[664] the training at Sparta was excellent, combining strength and agility with universal aptitude and endurance, and steering clear of that mistake by which Thebes and other cities impaired the effect of their gymnastics,—the attempt to create an athletic habit, suited for the games, but suited for nothing else.

Of all the attributes of this remarkable community, there is none more difficult to make out clearly than the condition and character of the Spartan women. Aristotle asserts that, in his time, they were imperious and unruly, without being really so

brave and useful in moments of danger as other Grecian females;[665] that they possessed great influence over the men, and even exercised much ascendency over the course of public affairs; and that nearly half the landed property of Laconia had come to belong to them. The exemption of the women from all control, formed, in his eye, a pointed contrast with the rigorous discipline imposed upon the men,—and a contrast hardly less pointed with the condition of women in other Grecian cities, where they were habitually confined to the interior of the house, and seldom appeared in public. While the Spartan husband went through the hard details of his ascetic life, and dined on the plainest fare at the Pheidition, or mess, the wife (it appears) maintained an ample and luxurious establishment at home; and the desire to provide for such outlay was one of the causes of that love of money which prevailed among men forbidden to enjoy it in the ordinary ways. To explain this antithesis between the treatment of the two sexes at Sparta, Aristotle was informed that Lykurgus had tried to bring the women no less than the men under a system of discipline, but that they made so obstinate a resistance as to compel him to desist.[666]

The view here given by the philosopher, and deserving of course careful attention, is not easy to reconcile with that of Xenophon and Plutarch, who look upon the Spartan women from a different side, and represent them as worthy and homogeneous companions to the men. The Lykurgean system (as these authors describe it) considering the women as a part of the state, and not as a part of the house, placed them under training hardly less than the men. Its grand purpose, the maintenance of a vigorous breed of citizens, determined both the treatment of the younger women, and the regulations as to the intercourse of the sexes. "Female slaves are good enough (Lykurgus thought) to sit at home spinning and weaving,—but who can expect a splendid offspring, the appropriate mission and duty of a free Spartan woman towards her country, from mothers brought up in such occupations?"[667] Pursuant to these views, the Spartan damsels underwent a bodily training analogous to that of the Spartan youth,—being formally exercised, and contending with each other in running, wrestling, and boxing, agreeably to the forms of the Grecian agônes. They seem to have worn a light tunic, cut open at the skirts, so as to leave the limbs both free and exposed to view,—hence Plutarch speaks of them as completely uncovered, while other critics, in different quarters of Greece, heaped similar reproach upon the practice, as if it had been perfect nakedness.[668] The presence of the Spartan youths, and even of the kings and the body of citizens, at these exercises, lent animation to the scene. In like manner, the young women marched in the religious processions, sung and danced at particular festivals, and witnessed as spectators the exercises and contentions of the youths; so that the two sexes were perpetually intermingled with each other in public, in a way foreign to the habits, as well as repugnant to the feelings, of other Grecian states. We may well conceive that such an education imparted to the women both a demonstrative character and an eager interest in masculine accomplishments, so that the expression of their praise was the strong-

est stimulus, and that of their reproach the bitterest humiliation, to the youthful troop who heard it.

The age of marriage (which in some of the unrestricted cities of Greece was so early as to deteriorate visibly the breed of citizens)[669] was deferred by the Spartan law, both in women and men, until the period supposed to be most consistent with the perfection of the offspring. And when we read the restriction which Spartan custom imposed upon the intercourse even between married persons, we shall conclude without hesitation that the public intermixture of the sexes, in the way just described, led to no such liberties, between persons not married, as might be likely to arise from it under other circumstances.[670] Marriage was almost universal among the citizens, enforced by general opinion at least, if not by law. The young Spartan carried away his bride by a simulated abduction, but she still seems, for some time at least, to have continued to reside with her family, visiting her husband in his barrack in the disguise of male attire, and on short and stolen occasions.[671] To some married couples, according to Plutarch, it happened, that they had been married long enough to have two or three children, while they had scarcely seen each other apart by daylight. Secret intrigue on the part of married women was unknown at Sparta; but to bring together the finest couples was regarded by the citizens as desirable, and by the lawgiver as a duty. No personal feeling or jealousy on the part of the husband found sympathy from any one,—and he permitted without difficulty, sometimes actively encouraged, compliances on the part of his wife, consistent with this generally acknowledged object. So far was such toleration carried, that there were some married women who were recognized mistresses of two houses,[672] and mothers of two distinct families,—a sort of bigamy strictly forbidden to the men, and never permitted, except in the remarkable case of king Anaxandrides, when the royal Herakleidan line of Eurysthenes was in danger of becoming extinct. The wife of Anaxandrides being childless, the ephors strongly urged him, on grounds of public necessity, to repudiate her and marry another. But he refused to dismiss a wife who had given him no cause of complaint; upon which, when they found him inexorable, they desired him to retain her, but to marry another wife besides, in order that at any rate there might be issue to the Eurystheneid line. "He thus (says Herodotus) married two wives, and inhabited two family-hearths, a proceeding unknown at Sparta;"[673] yet the same privilege which, according to Xenophon, some Spartan women enjoyed without reproach from any one, and with perfect harmony between the inmates of both their houses. O. Müller[674] remarks—and the evidence, as far as we know it, bears him out—that love-marriages and genuine affection towards a wife were more familiar to Sparta than to Athens; though in the former, marital jealousy was a sentiment neither indulged nor recognized,—while in the latter, it was intense and universal.[675]

To reconcile the careful gymnastic training, which Xenophon and Plutarch mention, with that uncontrolled luxury and relaxation which Aristotle condemns in the

Spartan women, we may perhaps suppose that, in the time of the latter, the women of high position and wealth had contrived to emancipate themselves from the general obligation, and that it is of such particular cases that he chiefly speaks. He dwells especially upon the increasing tendency to accumulate property in the hands of the women,[676] which seems to have been still more conspicuous a century afterwards, in the reign of Agis the Third. And we may readily imagine that one of the employments of wealth thus acquired would be to purchase exemption from laborious training,—an object more easy to accomplish in their case than in that of the men, whose services were required by the state as soldiers. By what steps so large a proportion as two-fifths of the landed property of the state came to be possessed by women, he partially explains to us. There were (he says) many sole heiresses,—the dowries given by fathers to their daughters were very large,—and the father had unlimited power of testamentary bequest, which he was disposed to use to the advantage of his daughter over his son. In conjunction with this last circumstance, we have to notice that peculiar sympathy and yielding disposition towards women in the Spartan mind, of which Aristotle also speaks,[677] and which he ascribes to the warlike temper both of the citizen and the state,—Arês bearing the yoke of Aphroditê. But, apart from such a consideration, if we suppose, on the part of a wealthy Spartan father, the simple disposition to treat sons and daughters alike as to bequest,—nearly one half of the inherited mass of property would naturally be found in the hands of the daughters, since on an average of families the number of the two sexes born is nearly equal. In most societies, it is the men who make new acquisitions: but this seldom or never happened with Spartan men, who disdained all money-getting occupations.

Xenophon, a warm panegyrist of Spartan manners, points with some pride to the tall and vigorous breed of citizens which the Lykurgic institutions had produced. The beauty of the Lacedæmonian women was notorious throughout Greece, and Lampitô, the Lacedæmonian woman introduced in the Lysistrata of Aristophanês, is made to receive from the Athenian women the loudest compliments upon her fine shape and masculine vigor.[678] We may remark that, on this as well as on the other points, Xenophon emphatically insists on the peculiarity of Spartan institutions, contradicting thus the views of those who regard them merely as something a little Hyper-Dorian. Indeed, such peculiarity seems never to have been questioned in antiquity, either by the enemies or by the admirers of Sparta. And those who censured the public masculine exercises of the Spartan maidens, as well as the liberty tolerated in married women, allowed at the same time that the feelings of both were actively identified with the state to a degree hardly known in Greece; that the patriotism of the men greatly depended upon the sympathy of the other sex, which manifested itself publicly, in a manner not compatible with the recluse life of Grecian women generally, to the exaltation of the brave as well as to the abasement of the recreant; and that the dignified bearing of the Spartan matrons under private family loss seriously assisted the state in the task of bearing up against public reverses.

"Return either with your shield or upon it," was their exhortation to their sons when departing for foreign service: and after the fatal day of Leuktra, those mothers who had to welcome home their surviving sons in dishonor and defeat, were the bitter sufferers; while those whose sons had perished, maintained a bearing comparatively cheerful.[679]

Such were the leading points of the memorable Spartan discipline, strengthened in its effect on the mind by the absence of communication with strangers. For no Spartan could go abroad without leave, nor were strangers permitted to stay at Sparta; they came thither, it seems, by a sort of sufferance, but the uncourteous process called xenêlasy[680] was always available to remove them, nor could there arise in Sparta that class of resident metics or aliens who constituted a large part of the population of Athens, and seem to have been found in most other Grecian towns. It is in this universal schooling, training, and drilling, imposed alike upon boys and men, youths and virgins, rich and poor, that the distinctive attribute of Sparta is to be sought,—not in her laws or political constitution.

Lykurgus (or the individual to whom this system is owing, whoever he was) is the founder of a warlike brotherhood rather than the lawgiver of a political community; his brethren live together like bees in a hive (to borrow a simile from Plutarch), with all their feelings implicated in the commonwealth, and divorced from house and home.[681] Far from contemplating the society as a whole, with its multifarious wants and liabilities, he interdicts beforehand, by one of the three primitive Rhetræ, all written laws, that is to say, all formal and premeditated enactments on any special subject. When disputes are to be settled or judicial interference is required, the magistrate is to decide from his own sense of equity; that the magistrate will not depart from the established customs and recognized purposes of the city, is presumed from the personal discipline which he and the select body to whom he belongs, have undergone. It is this select body, maintained by the labor of others, over whom Lykurgus exclusively watches, with the provident eye of a trainer, for the purpose of disciplining them into a state of regimental preparation,[682] single-minded obedience, and bodily efficiency and endurance, so that they may be always fit and ready for defence, for conquest and for dominion. The parallel of the Lykurgean institutions is to be found in the Republic of Plato, who approves the Spartan principle of select guardians carefully trained and administering the community at discretion; with this momentous difference, indeed, that the Spartan character[683] formed by Lykurgus is of a low type, rendered savage and fierce by exclusive and overdone bodily discipline,—destitute even of the elements of letters,—immersed in their own narrow specialities, and taught to despise all that lay beyond,—possessing all the qualities requisite to procure dominion, but none of those calculated to render dominion popular or salutary to the subject; while the habits and attributes of the guardians, as shadowed forth by Plato, are enlarged as well as philanthropic, qualifying them not simply to govern, but to govern for purposes protective, conciliatory, and exalted. Both Plato

and Aristotle conceive as the perfection of society something of the Spartan type,—a select body of equally privileged citizens, disengaged from industrious pursuits, and subjected to public and uniform training. Both admit (with Lykurgus) that the citizen belongs neither to himself nor to his family, but to his city; both at the same time note with regret, that the Spartan training was turned only to one portion of human virtue,—that which is called forth in a state of war;[684] the citizens being converted into a sort of garrison, always under drill, and always ready to be called forth either against Helots at home or against enemies abroad. Such exclusive tendency will appear less astonishing if we consider the very early and insecure period at which the Lykurgean institutions arose, when none of those guarantees which afterwards maintained the peace of the Hellenic world had as yet become effective,—no constant habits of intercourse, no custom of meeting in Amphiktyony from the distant parts of Greece, no common or largely frequented festivals, no multiplication of proxenies (or standing tickets of hospitality) between the important cities, no pacific or industrious habits anywhere. When we contemplate the general insecurity of Grecian life in the ninth or eighth century before the Christian era, and especially the precarious condition of a small band of Dorian conquerors in Sparta and its district, with subdued Helots on their own lands and Achæans unsubdued all around them,—we shall not be surprised that the language which Brasidas in the Peloponnesian war addresses to his army in reference to the original Spartan settlement, was still more powerfully present to the mind of Lykurgus four centuries earlier—"We are a few in the midst of many enemies; we can only maintain ourselves by fighting and conquering."[685]

Under such circumstances, the exclusive aim which Lykurgus proposed to himself is easily understood; but what is truly surprising, is the violence of his means and the success of the result. He realized his project of creating, in the eight thousand or nine thousand Spartan citizens, unrivalled habits of obedience, hardihood, self-denial, and military aptitude,—complete subjection on the part of each individual to the local public opinion, and preference of death to the abandonment of Spartan maxims, intense ambition on the part of every one to distinguish himself within the prescribed sphere of duties, with little ambition for anything else. In what manner so rigorous a system of individual training can have been first brought to bear upon any community, mastering the course of the thoughts and actions from boyhood to old age,—a work far more difficult than any political revolution,—we are not permitted to discover. Nor does the influence of an earnest and energetic Herakleidman,—seconded by the still more powerful working of the Delphian god behind, upon the strong pious susceptibilities of the Spartan mind,—sufficiently explain a phenomenon so remarkable in the history of mankind, unless we suppose them aided by some combination of coöperating circumstances which history has not transmitted to us,[686] and preceded by disorders so exaggerated as to render the citizens glad to escape from them at any price.

Respecting the ante-Lykurgean Sparta we possess no positive information whatever. But although this unfortunate gap cannot be filled up, we may yet master the negative probabilities of the case sufficiently to see that, in what Plutarch has told us (and from Plutarch the modern views have, until lately, been derived), there is indeed a basis of reality, but there is also a large superstructure of romance,—in not a few particulars essentially misleading. For example, Plutarch treats Lykurgus as introducing his reforms at a time when Sparta was mistress of Laconia, and distributing the whole of that territory among the Periœki. Now we know that Laconia was not then in possession of Sparta, and that the partition of Lykurgus (assuming it to be real) could only have been applied to the land in the immediate vicinity of the latter. For even Amyklæ, Pharis, and Geronthræ, were not conquered until the reign of Têleklus, posterior to any period which we can reasonably assign to Lykurgus: nor can any such distribution of Laconia have really occurred. Farther, we are told that Lykurgus banished from Sparta coined gold and silver, useless professions and frivolities, eager pursuit of gain, and ostentatious display. Without dwelling upon the improbability that any one of these anti-Spartan characteristics should have existed at so early a period as the ninth century before the Christian era, we may at least be certain that coined silver was not then to be found, since it was first introduced into Greece by Pheidon of Argos in the succeeding century, as has been stated in the preceding section.

But amongst all the points stated by Plutarch, the most suspicious by far, and the most misleading, because endless calculations have been built upon it, is the alleged redivision of landed property. He tells us that Lykurgus found fearful inequality in the landed possessions of the Spartans; nearly all the land in the hands of a few, and a great multitude without any land; that he rectified this evil by a redivision of the Spartan district into nine thousand equal lots, and the rest of Laconia into thirty thousand, giving to each citizen as much as would produce a given quota of barley, etc.; and that he wished, moreover, to have divided the movable property upon similar principles of equality, but was deterred by the difficulties of carrying his design into execution.

Now we shall find on consideration that this new and equal partition of lands by Lykurgus is still more at variance with fact and probability than the two former alleged proceedings. All the historical evidences exhibit decided inequalities of property among the Spartans,—inequalities which tended constantly to increase; moreover, the earlier authors do not conceive this evil as having grown up by way of abuse out of a primeval system of perfect equality, nor do they know anything of the original equal redivision by Lykurgus. Even as early as the poet Alkæus (B. C. 600-580) we find bitter complaints of the oppressive ascendency of wealth, and the degradation of the poor man, cited as having been pronounced by Aristodêmus at Sparta: "Wealth (said he) makes the man,—no poor person is either accounted good or honored."[687] Next, the historian Hellanikus certainly knew nothing of the Lykurgean re-

division,—for he ascribed the whole Spartan polity to Eurysthenês and Proklês, the original founders, and hardly noticed Lykurgus at all. Again, in the brief, but impressive description of the Spartan lawgiver by Herodotus, several other institutions are alluded to, but nothing is said about a redivision of the lands; and this latter point is in itself of such transcendent moment, and was so recognized among all Grecian thinkers, that the omission is almost a demonstration of ignorance. Thucydidês certainly could not have believed that equality of property was an original feature in the Lykurgean system; for he says that, at Lacedæmon, "the rich men assimilated themselves greatly in respect of clothing and general habits of life to the simplicity of the poor, and thus set an example which was partially followed in the rest of Greece:" a remark which both implies the existence of unequal property, and gives a just appreciation of the real working of Lykurgic institutions.[688] The like is the sentiment of Xenophon:[689] he observes that the rich at Sparta gained little by their wealth in point of superior comfort; but he never glances at any original measure carried into effect by Lykurgus for equalizing possessions. Plato too,[690] while he touches upon the great advantage possessed by the Dorians, immediately after their conquest of Peloponnesus, in being able to apportion land suitably to all,—never hints that this original distribution had degenerated into an abuse, and that an entire subsequent redivision had been resorted to by Lykurgus: moreover, he is himself deeply sensible of the hazards of that formidable proceeding. Lastly, Aristotle clearly did not believe that Lykurgus had redivided the soil. For he informs us first, that, "both in Lacedæmon and in Krete,[691] the legislator had rendered the enjoyment of property common through the establishment of the Syssitia, or public mess." Now this remark (if read in the chapter of which it forms a part, a refutation of the scheme of Communism for the select guardians in the Platonic Republic) will be seen to tell little for its point, if we assume that Lykurgus at the same time equalized all individual possessions. Had Aristotle known that fact, he could not have failed to notice it: nor could he have assimilated the legislators in Lacedæmon and Krete, seeing that in the latter no one pretends that any such equalization was ever brought about. Next, not only does Aristotle dwell upon the actual inequality of property at Sparta as a serious public evil, but he nowhere treats this as having grown out of a system of absolute equality once enacted by the lawgiver as a part of the primitive constitution: he expressly notices inequality of property so far back as the second Messenian war. Moreover, in that valuable chapter of his Politics, where the scheme of equality of possessions is discussed, Phaleas of Chalkedôn is expressly mentioned as the first author of it, thus indirectly excluding Lykurgus.[692] The mere silence of Aristotle is in this discussion a negative argument of the greatest weight. Isokratês,[693] too, speaks much about Sparta for good and for evil,—mentions Lykurgus as having established a political constitution much like that of the earliest days of Athens,—praises the gymnasia and the discipline, and compliments the Spartans upon the many centuries which they have gone through without violent sedition, extinction of debts, and redivision of the land,—those "monstrous evils," as he terms them. Had he conceived Lykurgus

as being himself the author of a complete redivision of land, he could hardly have avoided some allusion to it.

It appears, then, that none of the authors down to Aristotle ascribe to Lykurgus a redivision of the lands, either of Sparta or of Laconia. The statement to this effect in Plutarch, given in great detail and with precise specification of number and produce, must have been borrowed from some author later than Aristotle; and I think we may trace the source of it, when we study Plutarch's biography of Lykurgus in conjunction with that of Agis and Kleomenês. The statement is taken from authors of the century after Aristotle, either in, or shortly before, the age when both those kings tried extreme measures to renovate the sinking state: the former by a thorough change of system and property, yet proposed and accepted according to constitutional forms; the latter by projects substantially similar, with violence to enforce them. The accumulation of landed property in few hands, the multiplication of poor, and the decline in the number of citizens, which are depicted as grave mischiefs by Aristotle, had become greatly aggravated during the century between him and Agis. The number of citizens, reckoned by Herodotus in the time of the Persian invasion at eight thousand, had dwindled down in the time of Aristotle to one thousand, and in that of Agis to seven hundred, out of which latter number one hundred alone possessed most of the landed property of the state.[694] Now, by the ancient rule of Lykurgus, the qualification for citizenship was the ability to furnish the prescribed quota, incumbent on each individual, at the public mess: so soon as a citizen became too poor to answer to this requisition, he lost his franchise and his eligibility to offices.[695] The smaller lots of land, though it was held discreditable either to buy or sell them,[696] and though some have asserted (without ground, I think) that it was forbidden to divide them,—became insufficient for numerous families, and seem to have been alienated in some indirect manner to the rich; while every industrious occupation being both interdicted to a Spartan citizen and really inconsistent with his rigorous personal discipline, no other means of furnishing his quota, except the lot of land, was open to him. The difficulty felt with regard to these smaller lots of land may be judged of from the fact stated by Polybius,[697] that three or four Spartan brothers had often one and the same wife, the paternal land being just sufficient to furnish contributions for all to the public mess, and thus to keep alive the citizen-rights of all the sons. The tendency to diminution in the number of Spartan citizens seems to have gone on uninterruptedly from the time of the Persian war, and must have been aggravated by the foundation of Messênê, with its independent territory around, after the battle of Leuktra, an event which robbed the Spartans of a large portion of their property. Apart from these special causes, moreover, it has been observed often as a statistical fact, that a close corporation of citizens, or any small number of families, intermarrying habitually among one another, and not reinforced from without, have usually a tendency to diminish.

The present is not the occasion to enter at length into that combination of causes which partly sapped, partly overthrew, both the institutions of Lykurgus and the power of Sparta. But taking the condition of that city as it stood in the time of Agis the Third (say about 250 B. C.), we know that its citizens had become few in number, the bulk of them miserably poor, and all the land in a small number of hands. The old discipline and the public mess (as far as the rich were concerned) had degenerated into mere forms,—a numerous body of strangers or non-citizens (the old xenêlasy, or prohibition of resident strangers, being long discontinued) were domiciled in the town, forming a powerful moneyed interest; and lastly, the dignity and ascendency of the state amongst its neighbors were altogether ruined. It was insupportable to a young enthusiast like king Agis, as well as to many ardent spirits among his contemporaries, to contrast this degradation with the previous glories of their country: nor did they see any other way of reconstructing the old Sparta except by again admitting the disfranchised poor citizens, redividing the lands, cancelling all debts, and restoring the public mess and military training in all their strictness. Agis endeavored to carry through these subversive measures, (such as no demagogue in the extreme democracy of Athens would ever have ventured to glance at,) with the consent of the senate and public assembly, and the acquiescence of the rich. His sincerity is attested by the fact, that his own property, and that of his female relatives, among the largest in the state, was cast as the first sacrifice into the common stock. But he became the dupe of unprincipled coadjutors, and perished in the unavailing attempt to realize his scheme by persuasion. His successor, Kleomenês, afterwards accomplished by violence a change substantially similar, though the intervention of foreign arms speedily overthrew both himself and his institutions.

Now it was under the state of public feeling which gave birth to these projects of Agis and Kleomenês at Sparta, that the historic fancy, unknown to Aristotle and his predecessors, first gained ground, of the absolute equality of property as a primitive institution of Lykurgus. How much such a belief would favor the schemes of innovation is too obvious to require notice; and without supposing any deliberate imposture, we cannot be astonished that the predispositions of enthusiastic patriots interpreted, according to their own partialities, an old unrecorded legislation from which they were separated by more than five centuries. The Lykurgean discipline tended forcibly to suggest to men's minds the *idea* of equality among the citizens,—that is, the negation of all inequality not founded on some personal attribute,—inasmuch as it assimilated the habits, enjoyments, and capacities of the rich to those of the poor; and the equality thus existing in idea and tendency, which seemed to proclaim the wish of the founder, was strained by the later reformers into a positive institution which he had at first realized, but from which his degenerate followers had receded. It was thus that the fancies, longings, and indirect suggestions of the present assumed the character of recollections out of the early, obscure, and extinct historical past. Perhaps the philosopher Sphærus of Borysthenês (friend and companion of Kleomenês,[698] disciple of Zeno the Stoic, and author of works now lost, both on

Lykurgus and Socrates, and on the constitution of Sparta) may have been one of those who gave currency to such an hypothesis. And we shall readily believe that, if advanced, it would find easy and sincere credence, when we recollect how many similar delusions have obtained vogue in modern times, far more favorable to historical accuracy,—how much false coloring has been attached by the political feeling of recent days to matters of ancient history, such as the Saxon Witenagemote, the Great Charter, the rise and growth of the English House of Commons, or even the Poor Law of Elizabeth.

When we read the division of lands really proposed by king Agis, it is found to be a very close copy of the original division ascribed to Lykurgus. He parcels the lands bounded by the four limits of Pellênê, Sellasia, Malea, and Taygetus, into four thousand five hundred lots, one to every Spartan; and the lands beyond these limits into fifteen thousand lots, one to each Periœkus; and he proposes to constitute in Sparta fifteen pheiditia, or public mess-tables, some including four hundred individuals, others two hundred,—thus providing a place for each of his four thousand five hundred Spartans. With respect to the division originally ascribed to Lykurgus, different accounts were given. Some considered it to have set out nine thousand lots for the district of Sparta, and thirty thousand for the rest of Laconia;[699] others affirmed that six thousand lots had been given by Lykurgus, and three thousand added afterwards by king Polydorus; a third tale was, that Lykurgus had assigned four thousand five hundred lots, and king Polydorus as many more. This last scheme is much the same as what was really proposed by Agis.

In the preceding argument respecting the redivision of land ascribed to Lykurgus, I have taken that measure as it is described by Plutarch. But there has been a tendency, in some able modern writers, while admitting the general fact of such redivision, to reject the account given by Plutarch in some of its main circumstances. That, for instance, which is the capital feature in Plutarch's narrative, and which gives soul and meaning to his picture of the lawgiver—the equality of partition—is now rejected by many as incorrect, and it is supposed that Lykurgus made some new agrarian regulations tending towards a general equality of landed property, but not an entirely new partition; that he may have resumed from the wealthy men lands which they had unjustly taken from the conquered Achæans, and thus provided allotments both for the poorer citizens and for the subject Laconians. Such is the opinion of Dr. Thirlwall, who at the same time admits that the exact proportion of the Lykurgean distribution can hardly be ascertained.[700]

I cannot but take a different view of the statement made by Plutarch. The moment that we depart from that rule of equality, which stands so prominently marked in his biography of Lykurgus, we step into a boundless field of possibility, in which there is nothing to determine us to one point more than to another. The surmise started by Dr. Thirlwall, of lands unjustly taken from the conquered Achæans by wealthy Spartan proprietors, is altogether gratuitous; and granting it to be correct,

we have still to explain how it happened that this correction of a partial injustice came to be transformed into the comprehensive and systematic measure which Plutarch describes; and to explain, farther, from whence it arose that none of the authors earlier than Plutarch take any notice of Lykurgus as an agrarian equalizer. These two difficulties will still remain, even if we overlook the gratuitous nature of Dr. Thirlwall's supposition, or of any other supposition which can be proposed respecting the real Lykurgean measure which Plutarch is affirmed to have misrepresented.

It appears to me that these difficulties are best obviated by adopting a different canon of historical interpretation. We cannot accept as real the Lykurgean land division described in the life of the lawgiver; but treating this account as a fiction, two modes of proceeding are open to us. We may either consider the fiction, as it now stands, to be the exaggeration and distortion of some small fact, and then try to guess, without any assistance, what the small fact was. Or we may regard it as fiction from first to last, the expression of some large idea and sentiment so powerful in its action on men's minds at a given time, as to induce them to make a place for it among the realities of the past. Now the latter supposition, applied to the times of Agis the Third, best meets the case before us. The eighth chapter of the life of Lykurgus by Plutarch, in recounting the partition of land, describes the dream of king Agis, whose mind is full of two sentiments,—grief and shame for the actual condition of his country,—together with reverence for its past glories, as well as for the lawgiver from whose institutions those glories had emanated. Absorbed with this double feeling, the reveries of Agis go back to the old ante-Lykurgean Sparta, as it stood more than five centuries before. He sees, in the spirit, the same mischiefs and disorders as those which afflict his waking eye,—gross inequalities of property, with a few insolent and luxurious rich, a crowd of mutinous and suffering poor, and nothing but fierce antipathy reigning between the two. Into the midst of this froward, lawless, and distempered community, steps the venerable missionary from Delphi,—breathes into men's minds new impulses, and an impatience to shake off the old social and political Adam,—and persuades the rich, voluntarily abnegating their temporal advantages, to welcome with satisfaction a new system, wherein no distinction shall be recognized, except that of good or evil desert.[701] Having thus regenerated the national mind, he parcels out the territory of Laconia into equal lots, leaving no superiority to any one. Fraternal harmony becomes the reigning sentiment, while the coming harvests present the gratifying spectacle of a paternal inheritance recently distributed, with the brotherhood contented, modest, and docile. Such is the picture with which "mischievous Oneirus" cheats the fancy of the patriotic Agis, whispering the treacherous message that the gods have promised *him* success in a similar attempt, and thus seducing him into that fatal revolutionary course, which is destined to bring himself, his wife, and his aged mother, to the dungeon and the hangman's rope.[702]

That the golden dream just described was dreamed by some Spartan patriots is certain, because it stands recorded in Plutarch; that it was not dreamed by the authors of centuries preceding Agis, I have already endeavored to show; that the earnest feelings, of sickness of the present and yearning for a better future under the colors of a restored past, which filled the soul of this king and his brother-reformers,—combined with the levelling tendency between rich and poor which really was inherent in the Lykurgean discipline,—were amply sufficient to beget such a dream, and to procure for it a place among the great deeds of the old lawgiver, so much venerated and so little known,—this too I hold to be unquestionable. Had there been any evidence that Lykurgus had interfered with private property, to the limited extent which Dr. Thirlwall and other able critics imagine,—that he had resumed certain lands unjustly taken by the rich from the Achæans,—I should have been glad to record it; but, finding no such evidence, I cannot think it necessary to presume the fact, simply in order to account for the story in Plutarch.[703]

The various items in that story all hang together, and must be understood as forming parts of the same comprehensive fact, or comprehensive fancy. The fixed total of nine thousand Spartan, and thirty thousand Laconian lots,[704] the equality between them, and the rent accruing from each, represented by a given quantity of moist and dry produce,—all these particulars are alike true or alike uncertified. Upon the various numbers here given, many authors have raised calculations as to the population and produce of Laconia, which appear to me destitute of any trustworthy foundation. Those who accept the history, that Lykurgus constituted the above-mentioned numbers both of citizens and of lots of land, and that he contemplated the maintenance of both numbers in unchangeable proportion,—are perplexed to assign the means whereby this adjustment was kept undisturbed. Nor are they much assisted in the solution of this embarrassing problem by the statement of Plutarch, who tells us that the number remained fixed of itself, and that the succession ran on from father to son, without either consolidation or multiplication of parcels, down to the period when foreign wealth flowed into Sparta, as a consequence of the successful conclusion of the Peloponnesian war. Shortly after that period (he tells us) a citizen named Epitadeus became ephor,—a vindictive and malignant man, who, having had a quarrel with his son, and wishing to oust him from the succession, introduced and obtained sanction to a new Rhetra, whereby power was granted to every father of a family either to make over during life, or to bequeathe after death, his house and his estate to any one whom he chose.[705] But it is plain that this story (whatever be the truth about the family quarrel of Epitadeus) does not help us out of the difficulty. From the time of Lykurgus to that of this disinheriting ephor, more than four centuries must be reckoned: now, had there been real causes at work sufficient to maintain inviolate the identical number of lots and families during this long period, we see no reason why his new law, simply permissive and nothing more, should have overthrown it. We are not told by Plutarch what was the law of succession prior to Epitadeus. If the whole estate went by law to one son in the family, what became of the

other sons, to whom industrious acquisition in any shape was repulsive as well as interdicted? If, on the other hand, the estate was divided between the sons equally (as it was by the law of succession at Athens), how can we defend the maintenance of an unchanged aggregate number of parcels?

Dr. Thirlwall, after having admitted a modified interference with private property by Lykurgus, so as to exact from the wealthy a certain sacrifice in order to create lots for the poor, and to bring about something approaching to equi-producing lots for all, observes: "The average amount of the rent, paid by the cultivating Helots from each lot, seems to have been no more than was required for the frugal maintenance of a family with six persons. The right of transfer was as strictly confined as that of enjoyment; the patrimony was indivisible, inalienable, and descended to the eldest son; in default of a male heir, to the eldest daughter. The object seems to have been, after the number of the allotments became fixed, that each should be constantly represented by one head of a household. But the nature of the means employed for this end is one of the most obscure points of the Spartan system…. In the better times of the commonwealth, this seems to have been principally effected by adoptions and marriages with heiresses, which provided for the marriages of younger sons in families too numerous to be supported on their own hereditary property. It was then probably seldom necessary for the state to interfere, in order to direct the childless owner of an estate, or the father of a rich heiress, to a proper choice. But as all adoption required the sanction of the kings, and they had also the disposal of the hand of orphan heiresses, there can be little doubt that the magistrate had the power of interposing on such occasions, even in opposition to the wishes of individuals, to relieve poverty and check the accumulation of wealth." (Hist. Gr. ch. 8, vol. i. p. 367).

I cannot concur in the view which Dr. Thirlwall here takes of the state of property, or the arrangements respecting its transmission, in ancient Sparta. Neither the equal modesty of possession which he supposes, nor the precautions for perpetuating it, can be shown to have ever existed among the pupils of Lykurgus. Our earliest information intimates the existence of rich men at Sparta: the story of king Aristo and Agêtus, in Herodotus, exhibits to us the latter as a man who cannot be supposed to have had only just "enough to maintain six persons frugally,"—while his beautiful wife, whom Aristo coveted and entrapped from him, is expressly described as the daughter of opulent parents. Sperthiês and Bulis, the Talthybiads, are designated as belonging to a distinguished race, and among the wealthiest men in Sparta.[706] Demaratus was the only king of Sparta, in the days of Herodotus, who had ever gained a chariot-victory in the Olympic games; but we know by the case of Lichas, during the Peloponnesian war, Evagoras, and others, that private Spartans were equally successful;[707] and for one Spartan who won the prize, there must of course have been many who bred their horses and started their chariots unsuccessfully. It need hardly be remarked, that chariot-competition at Olympia was one of the most significant ev-

idences of a wealthy house: nor were there wanting Spartans who kept horses and dogs without any exclusive view to the games. We know from Xenophon that, at the time of the battle of Leuktra, "the very rich Spartans" provided the horses to be mounted for the state-cavalry.[708] These and other proofs, of the existence of rich men at Sparta, are inconsistent with the idea of a body of citizens each possessing what was about enough for the frugal maintenance of six persons, and no more.

As we do not find that such was in practice the state of property in the Spartan community, so neither can we discover that the lawgiver ever tried either to make or to keep it so. What he did was to impose a rigorous public discipline, with simple clothing and fare, incumbent alike upon the rich and the poor (this was his special present to Greece, according to Thucydidês,[709] and his great point of contact with democracy, according to Aristotle); but he took no pains either to restrain the enrichment of the former, or to prevent the impoverishment of the latter. He meddled little with the distribution of property, and such neglect is one of the capital deficiencies for which Aristotle censures him. That philosopher tells us, indeed, that the Spartan law had made it dishonorable (he does not say, peremptorily forbidden) to buy or sell landed property, but that there was the fullest liberty both of donation and bequest: and the same results, he justly observes, ensued from the practice tolerated as would have ensued from the practice discountenanced,—since it was easy to disguise a real sale under an ostensible donation. He notices pointedly the tendency of property at Sparta to concentrate itself in fewer hands, unopposed by any legal hindrances: the fathers married their daughters to whomsoever they chose, and gave dowries according to their own discretion, generally very large: the rich families, moreover, intermarried among one another habitually, and without restriction. Now all these are indicated by Aristotle as cases in which the law might have interfered, and ought to have interfered, but did not,—for the great purpose of disseminating the benefits of landed property as much as possible among the mass of the citizens. Again, he tells us that the law encouraged the multiplication of progeny, and granted exemptions to such citizens as had three or four children,—but took no thought how the numerous families of poorer citizens were to live, or to maintain their qualification at the public tables, most of the lands of the state being in the hands of the rich.[710] His notice, and condemnation, of that law, which made the franchise of the Spartan citizen dependent upon his continuing to furnish his quota to the public table,—has been already adverted to; as well as the potent love of money[711] which he notes in the Spartan character, and which must have tended continually to keep together the richer families among themselves: while amongst a community where industry was unknown, no poor citizen could ever become rich.

If we duly weigh these evidences, we shall see that equality of possessions neither existed in fact, nor ever entered into the scheme and tendencies of the lawgiver at Sparta. And the picture which Dr. Thirlwall[712] has drawn of a body of citizens each possessing a lot of land about adequate to the frugal maintenance of six per-

sons,—of adoptions and marriages of heiresses arranged with a deliberate view of providing for the younger children of numerous families,—of interference on the part of the kings to insure this object,—of a fixed number of lots of land, each represented by one head of a household,—this picture is one, of which the reality must not be sought on the banks of the Eurotas. The "better times of the commonwealth," to which he refers, may have existed in the glowing retrospect of Agis, but are not acknowledged in the sober appreciation of Aristotle. That the citizens were far more numerous in early times, the philosopher tells us, and that the community had in his day greatly declined in power, we also know: in this sense, the times of Sparta had doubtless once been better. We may even concede that during the three centuries succeeding Lykurgus, when they were continually acquiring new territory, and when Aristotle had been told that they had occasionally admitted new citizens, so that the aggregate number of citizens had once been ten thousand,—we may concede that in these previous centuries the distribution of land had been less unequal, so that the disproportion between the great size of the territory and the small number of citizens was not so marked as it had become at the period which the philosopher personally witnessed; for the causes tending to augmented inequality were constant and uninterrupted in their working. But this admission will still leave us far removed from the sketch drawn by Dr. Thirlwall, which depicts the Lykurgean Sparta as starting from a new agrarian scheme not far removed from equality of landed property,—the citizens as spontaneously disposed to uphold this equality, by giving to unprovided men the benefit of adoptions and heiress-marriages,—and the magistrate as interfering to enforce this latter purpose, even in cases where the citizens were themselves unwilling. All our evidence exhibits to us both decided inequality of possessions and inclinations on the part of rich men, the reverse of those which Dr. Thirlwall indicates; nor will the powers of interference which he ascribes to the magistrate be found sustained by the chapter of Herodotus on which he seems to rest them.[713]

To conceive correctly, then, the Lykurgean system, as far as obscurity and want of evidence will permit, it seems to me that there are two current misconceptions which it is essential to discard. One of these is, that the system included a repartition of landed property, upon principles of exact or approximative equality (distinct from that appropriation which belonged to the Dorian conquest and settlement), and provisions for perpetuating the number of distinct and equal lots. The other is, that it was first brought to bear when the Spartans were masters of all Laconia. The illusions created by the old legend,—which depicts Laconia as all one country, and all conquered at one stroke,—yet survive after the legend itself has been set aside as bad evidence: we cannot conceive Sparta as subsisting by itself without dominion over Laconia; nor Amyklæ, Pharis, and Geronthræ, as really and truly independent of Sparta. Yet, if these towns were independent in the time of Lykurgus, much more confidently may the same independence be affirmed of the portions of Laconia which lie lower than Amyklæ down the valley of the Eurotas, as well as of the eastern coast, which Herodotus expressly states to have been originally connected with Argos.

Discarding, then, these two suppositions, we have to consider the Lykurgean system as brought to bear upon Sparta and its immediate circumjacent district, apart from the rest of Laconia, and as not meddling systematically with the partition of property, whatever that may have been, which the Dorian conquerors established at their original settlement. Lykurgus does not try to make the poor rich, nor the rich poor; but he imposes upon both the same subjugating drill,[714]—the same habits of life, gentlemanlike idleness, and unlettered strength,—the same fare, clothing, labors, privations, endurance, punishments, and subordination. It is a lesson instructive at least, however unsatisfactory, to political students,—that, with all this equality of dealing, he ends in creating a community in whom not merely the love of preëminence, but even the love of money, stands powerfully and specially developed.[715]

How far the peculiar of the primitive Sparta extended we have no means of determining; but its limits down the valley of the Eurotas were certainly narrow, inasmuch as it did not reach so far as Amyklæ. Nor can we tell what principles the Dorian conquerors may have followed in the original allotment of lands within the limits of that peculiar. Equal apportionment is not probable, because all the individuals of a conquering band are seldom regarded as possessing equal claims; but whatever the original apportionment may have been, it remained without any general or avowed disturbance until the days of Agis the Third, and Kleomenês the Third. Here, then, we have the primitive Sparta, including Dorian warriors with their Helot subjects, but no Periœki. And it is upon these Spartans separately, perhaps after the period of aggravated disorder and lawlessness noticed by Herodotus and Thucydidês, that the painful but invigorating discipline, above sketched, must have been originally brought to bear.

The gradual conquest of Laconia, with the acquisition of additional lands and new Helots, and the formation of the order of Periœki, both of which were a consequence of it,—is to be considered as posterior to the introduction of the Lykurgean system at Sparta, and as resulting partly from the increased force which that system imparted. The career of conquest went on, beginning from Têleklus, for nearly three centuries, —with some interruptions, indeed, and in the case of the Messenian war, with a desperate and even precarious struggle,—so that in the time of Thucydidês, and for some time previously, the Spartans possessed two-fifths of Peloponnesus. And this series of new acquisitions and victories disguised the really weak point of the Spartan system, by rendering it possible either to plant the poorer citizens as Periœki in a conquered township, or to supply them with lots of land, of which they could receive the produce without leaving the city,—so that their numbers and their military strength were prevented from declining. It is even affirmed by Aristotle,[716] that during these early times they augmented the numbers of their citizens by fresh admissions, which of course implies the acquisition of additional lots of land. But successful war, to use an expression substantially borrowed from the same philosopher, was necessary to their salvation: the establishment of their ascendency, and of their max-

imum of territory, was followed, after no very long interval, by symptoms of decline.[717] It will hereafter be seen that, at the period of the conspiracy of Kinadôn (395 B. C.), the full citizens (called Homoioi, or Peers) were considerably inferior in number to the Hypomeiŏnes, or Spartans, who could no longer furnish their qualification, and had become disfranchised. And the loss thus sustained was very imperfectly repaired by the admitted practice, sometimes resorted to by rich men, of associating with their own children the children of poorer citizens, and paying the contribution for these latter to the public tables, so as to enable them to go through the prescribed course of education and discipline,—whereby they became (under the title or sobriquet of Mothăkes[718]) citizens, with a certain taint of inferiority, yet were sometimes appointed to honorable commands.

Laconia, the state and territory of the Lacedæmonians, was affirmed, at the time of its greatest extension, to have comprehended a hundred cities,[719]—this after the conquest of Messenia; so that it would include all the southern portion of Peloponnesus, from Thyrea, on the Argolic gulf, to the southern bank of the river Nedon, in its course into the Ionian sea. But Laconia, more strictly so called, was distinguished from Messenia, and was understood to designate the portion of the above-mentioned territory which lay to the east of Mount Taygetus. The conquest of Messenia by the Spartans we shall presently touch upon; but that of Laconia proper is very imperfectly narrated to us. Down to the reign of Têleklus, as has been before remarked, Amyklæ, Pharis, and Geronthræ, were still Achæan: in the reign of that prince they were first conquered, and the Achæans either expelled or subjugated. It cannot be doubted that Amyklæ had been previously a place of consequence: in point of heroic antiquity and memorials, this city, as well as Therapnæ, seems to have surpassed Sparta. And the war of the Spartans against it is represented as a struggle of some moment,—indeed, in those times, the capture of any walled city was tedious and difficult. Timomachus, an Ægeid from Thebes,[720] at the head of a body of his countrymen, is said to have rendered essential service to the Spartans in the conquest of the Achæans of Amyklæ; and the brave resistance of the latter was commemorated by a monument erected to Zeus Tropæus, at Sparta, which was still to be seen in the time of Pausanias.[721] The Achæans of Pharis and Geronthræ, alarmed by the fate of Amyklæ, are said to have surrendered their towns with little or no resistance: after which the inhabitants of all the three cities, either wholly or in part, went into exile beyond sea, giving place to colonists from Sparta.[722] From this time forward, according to Pausanias, Amyklæ continued as a village.[723] But as the Amyklæan hoplites constituted a valuable portion of the Spartan army, it must have been numbered among the cities of the Periœki, as one of the hundred;[724] the distinction between a dependent city and a village not being very strictly drawn. The festival of the Hyacinthia, celebrated at the great temple of the Amyklæan Apollo, was among the most solemn and venerated in the Spartan calendar.

It was in the time of Alkamenês, the son of Têleklus, that the Spartans conquered Helus, a maritime town on the left bank of the Eurotas, and reduced its inhabitants to bondage,—from whose name,[725] according to various authors, the general title *Helots*, belonging to all the serfs of Laconia, was derived. But of the conquest of the other towns of Laconia,—Gytheium, Akriæ, Therapnæ, etc.,—or of the eastern land on the coast of the Argolic gulf, including Brasiæ and Epidaurus Limêra, or the island of Kythêra, all which at one time belonged to the Argeian confederacy, we have no accounts.

Scanty as our information is, it just enables us to make out a progressive increase of force and dominion on the part of the Spartans, resulting from the organization of Lykurgus. Of this progress, a farther manifestation is found, besides the conquest of the Achæans in the south by Têleklus and Alkamenês, in their successful opposition to the great power of Pheidôn the Argeian, related in a previous chapter. We now approach the long and arduous efforts by which they accomplished the subjugation of their brethren the Messenian Dorians.

CHAPTER VII.

FIRST AND SECOND MESSENIAN WARS.

THAT there were two long contests between the Lacedæmonians and Messenians, and that in both the former were completely victorious, is a fact sufficiently attested. And if we could trust the statements in Pausanias,—our chief and almost only authority on the subject,—we should be in a situation to recount the history of both these wars in considerable detail. But unfortunately, the incidents narrated in that writer have been gathered from sources which are, even by his own admission, undeserving of credit,—from Rhianus, the poet of Bênê in Krete, who had composed an epic poem on Aristomenês and the second Messenian war, about B. C. 220,—and from Myrôn of Priênê, a prose author whose date is not exactly known, but belonging to the Alexandrine age, and not earlier than the third century before the Christian era. From Rhianus, we have no right to expect trustworthy information, while the accuracy of Myrôn is much depreciated by Pausanias himself,—on some points even too much, as will presently be shown. But apart from the mental habits either of the prose writer or the poet, it does not seem that any good means of knowledge were open to either of them, except the poems of Tyrtæus, which we are by no means sure that they ever consulted. The account of the two wars, extracted from these two authors by Pausanias, is a string of *tableaux*, several of them, indeed, highly poetical, but destitute of historical coherence or sufficiency: and O. Müller has justly observed, that "absolutely no reason is given in them for the subjection of Messenia."[726] They are accounts unworthy of being transcribed in detail into the pages of genuine history, nor can we pretend to do anything more than verify a few leading facts of the war.

The poet Tyrtæus was himself engaged on the side of the Spartans in the second war, and it is from him that we learn the few indisputable facts respecting both the first and the second. If the Messenians had never been reëstablished in Peloponnesus, we should probably never have heard any farther details respecting these early contests. That reëstablishment, together with the first foundation of the city called Messênê on Mount Ithomê, was among the capital wounds inflicted on Sparta by Epameinondas, in the year B. C. 369,—between three hundred and two hundred and fifty years after the conclusion of the second Messenian war. The descendants of the old Messenians, who had remained for so long a period without any fixed position in Greece, were incorporated in the new city, together with various Helots and miscellaneous settlers who had no claim to a similar genealogy. The gods and heroes of the Messenian race were reverentially invoked at this great ceremony, especially the great hero Aristomenês;[727] and the site of Mount Ithomê, the ardor of the newly established citizens, the hatred and apprehension of Sparta, operating as a

powerful stimulus to the creation and multiplication of what are called *traditions*, sufficed to expand the few facts known respecting the struggles of the old Messenians into a variety of details. In almost all these stories we discover a coloring unfavorable to Sparta, contrasting forcibly with the account given by Isokratês, in his Discourse called Archidamus, wherein we read the view which a Spartan might take of the ancient conquests of his forefathers. But a clear proof that these Messenian stories had no real basis of tradition, is shown in the contradictory statements respecting the principal Hero Aristomenês; for some place him in the first, others in the second, of the two wars. Diodôrus and Myrôn both placed him in the first; Rhianus, in the second. Though Pausanias gives it as his opinion that the account of the latter is preferable, and that Aristomenês really belongs to the second Messenian war, it appears to me that the one statement is as much worthy of belief as the other, and that there is no sufficient evidence for deciding between them,—a conclusion which is substantially the same with that of Wesseling, who thinks that there were two persons named Aristomenês, one in the first and one in the second war.[728] This inextricable confusion respecting the greatest name in Messenian antiquity, shows how little any genuine stream of tradition can here be recognized.

Pausanias states the first Messenian war as beginning in B. C. 743 and lasting till B. C. 724,—the second, as beginning in B. C. 685 and lasting till B. C. 668. Neither of these dates rest upon any assignable positive authority; but the time assigned to the first war seems probable, while that of the second is apparently too early. Tyrtæus authenticates both the duration of the first war, twenty years, and the eminent services rendered in it by the Spartan king Theopompus.[729] He says, moreover, speaking during the second war, "the fathers of our fathers conquered Messênê;" thus loosely indicating the relative dates of the two.

The Spartans (as we learn from Isokratês, whose words date from a time when the city of Messênê was only a recent foundation) professed to have seized the territory, partly in revenge for the impiety of the Messenians in killing their own king, the Herakleid Kresphontês, whose relative had appealed to Sparta for aid,—partly by sentence of the Delphian oracle. Such were the causes which had induced them first to invade the country, and they had conquered it after a struggle of twenty years. [730] The Lacedæmonian explanations, as given in Pausanias, seem for the most part to be counter-statements arranged after the time when the Messenian version, evidently the interesting and popular account, had become circulated.

It has already been stated that the Lacedæmonians and Messenians had a joint border temple and sacrifice in honor of Artemis Limnatis, dating from the earliest times of their establishment in Peloponnesus. The site of this temple, near the upper course of the river Nedon, in the mountainous territory north-east of Kalamata, but west of the highest ridge of Taygetus, has recently been exactly verified,—and it seems in these early days to have belonged to Sparta. That the quarrel began at one of these border sacrifices was the statement of both parties, Lacedæmonians and

Messenians. According to the latter, the Lacedæmonian king Têleklus laid a snare for the Messenians, by dressing up some youthful Spartans as virgins, and giving them daggers; whereupon a contest ensued, in which the Spartans were worsted and Têleklus slain. That Têleklus was slain at the temple by the Messenians, was also the account of the Spartans,—but they affirmed that he was slain in attempting to defend some young Lacedæmonian maidens, who were sacrificing at the temple, against outrageous violence from the Messenian youth.[731] In spite of the death of this king, however, the war did not actually break out until some little time after, when Alkamenês and Theopompus were kings at Sparta, and Antiochus and Androklês, sons of Phintas, kings of Messenia. The immediate cause of it was a private altercation between the Messenian Polycharês (victor at the fourth Olympiad, B. C. 764) and the Spartan Euæphnus. Polycharês, having been grossly injured by Euæphnus, and his claim for redress having been rejected at Sparta, took revenge by aggressions upon other Lacedæmonians; the Messenians refused to give him up, though one of the two kings, Androklês, strongly insisted upon doing so, and maintained his opinion so earnestly against the opposite sense of the majority and of his brother Antiochus, that a tumult arose, and he was slain. The Lacedæmonians, now resolving upon war, struck the first blow without any formal declaration, by surprising the border town of Ampheia, and putting its defenders to the sword. They farther overran the Messenian territory, and attacked some other towns, but without success. Euphaês, who had now succeeded his father Antiochus as king of Messenia, summoned the forces of the country and carried on the war against them with energy and boldness. For the first four years of the war, the Lacedæmonians made no progress, and even incurred the ridicule of the old men of their nation as faint-hearted warriors: in the fifth year, however, they undertook a more vigorous invasion, under their two kings, Theopompus and Polydôrus, who were met by Euphaês with the full force of the Messenians. A desperate battle ensued, in which it does not seem that either side gained much advantage: nevertheless, the Messenians found themselves so much enfeebled by it, that they were forced to take refuge on the fortified mountain of Ithômê, abandoning the rest of the country. In their distress, they sent to solicit counsel and protection from Delphi, but their messenger brought back the appalling answer that a virgin, of the royal race of Æpytus, must be sacrificed for their salvation: in the tragic scene which ensues, Aristodêmus puts to death his own daughter, yet without satisfying the exigencies of the oracle. The war still continued, and in the thirteenth year of it another hard-fought battle took place, in which the brave Euphaês was slain, but the result was again indecisive. Aristodêmus, being elected king in his place, prosecuted the war strenuously: the fifth year of his reign is signalized by a third general battle, wherein the Corinthians assist the Spartans, and the Arcadians and Sikyonians are on the side of Messenia; the victory is here decisive on the side of Aristodêmus, and the Lacedæmonians are driven, back into their own territory.[732] It was now their turn to send envoys and ask advice from the Delphian oracle; while the remaining events of the war exhibit a series, partly of stratagems to

fulfil the injunctions of the priestess,—partly of prodigies in which the divine wrath is manifested against the Messenians. The king Aristodêmus, agonized with the thought that he has slain his own daughter without saving his country, puts an end to his own life.[733] In the twentieth year of the war, the Messenians abandoned Ithômê, which the Lacedæmonians razed to the ground: the rest of the country being speedily conquered, such of the inhabitants as did not flee either to Arcadia or to Eleusis, were reduced to complete submission.

Such is the abridgment of what Pausanias[734] gives as the narrative of the first Messenian war. Most of his details bear the evident stamp of mere late romance; and it will easily be seen that the sequence of events presents no plausible explanation of that which is really indubitable,—the result. The twenty years' war, and the final abandonment of Ithômê, is attested by Tyrtæus beyond all doubt, as well as the harsh treatment of the conquered. "Like asses, worn down by heavy burdens,"[735] says the Spartan poet, "they were compelled to make over to their masters an entire half of the produce of their fields, and to come in the garb of woe to Sparta, themselves and their wives, as mourners at the decease of the kings and principal persons." The revolt of their descendants, against a yoke so oppressive, goes by the name of the second Messenian war.

Had we possessed the account of the first Messenian war as given by Myrôn and Diodorus, it would evidently have been very different from the above, because they included Aristomenês in it, and to him the leading parts would be assigned. As the narrative now stands in Pausanias, we are not introduced to that great Messenian hero,—the Achilles of the epic of Rhianus,[736]—until the second war, in which his gigantic proportions stand prominently forward. He is the great champion of his country in the three battles which are represented as taking place during this war: the first, with indecisive result, at Deræ; the second, a signal victory on the part of the Messenians, at the Boar's Grave; the third, an equally signal defeat, in consequence of the traitorous flight of Aristokratês, king of the Arcadian Orchomenus, who, ostensibly embracing the alliance of the Messenians, had received bribes from Sparta. Thrice did Aristomenês sacrifice to Zeus Ithomatês the sacrifice called Hekatomphonia,[737] reserved for those who had slain with their own hands a hundred enemies in battle. At the head of a chosen band, he carried his incursions more than once into the heart of the Lacedæmonian territory, surprised Amyklæ and Pharis, and even penetrated by night into the unfortified precinct of Sparta itself, where he suspended his shield, as a token of defiance, in the temple of Athênê Chalkiœkus. Thrice was he taken prisoner, but on two occasions marvellously escaped before he could be conveyed to Sparta: the third occasion was more fatal, and he was cast by order of the Spartans into the Keadas, a deep, rocky cavity in Mount Taygetus, into which it was their habit to precipitate criminals. But even in this emergency the divine aid[738] was not withheld from him. While the fifty Messenians who shared his punishment, were all killed by the shock, he alone was both supported by the gods so as to reach the

bottom unhurt, and enabled to find an unexpected means of escape. For when, abandoning all hope, he had wrapped himself up in his cloak to die, he perceived a fox creeping about among the dead bodies: waiting until the animal approached him, he grasped its tail, defending himself from its bites as well as he could by means of his cloak; and being thus enabled to find the aperture by which the fox had entered, enlarged it sufficiently for crawling out himself. To the surprise both of friends and enemies, he again appeared, alive and vigorous, at Eira. That fortified mountain on the banks of the river Nedon, and near the Ionian sea, had been occupied by the Messenians, after the battle in which they had been betrayed by Aristokratês, the Arcadian; it was there that they had concentrated their whole force, as in the former war at Ithômê, abandoning the rest of the country. Under the conduct of Aristomenês, assisted by the prophet Theoklus, they maintained this strong position for eleven years. At length, they were compelled to abandon it; but, as in the case of Ithômê, the final determining circumstances are represented to have been, not any superiority of bravery or organization on the part of the Lacedæmonians, but treacherous betrayal and stratagem, seconding the fatal decree of the gods. Unable to maintain Eira longer, Aristomenês, with his sons, and a body of his countrymen, forced his way through the assailants, and quitted the country,—some of them retiring to Arcadia and Elis, and finally migrating to Rhegium. He himself passed the remainder of his days in Rhodes, where he dwelt along with his son-in-law, Damagêtus, the ancestor of the noble Rhodian family, called the Diagorids, celebrated for its numerous Olympic victories.

Such are the main features of what Pausanias calls[739] the second Messenian war, or of what ought rather to be called the Aristomeneïs of the poet Rhianus. That after the foundation of Messênê, and the recall of the exiles by Epameinondas. favor and credence was found for many tales respecting the prowess of the ancient hero whom they invoked[740] in their libations,—tales well calculated to interest the fancy, to vivify the patriotism, and to inflame the anti-Spartan antipathies, of the new inhabitants,—there can be little doubt. And the Messenian maidens of that day may well have sung, in their public processional sacrifices,[741] how "Aristomenês pursued the flying Lacedæmonians down to the mid-plain of Stenyklêrus, and up to the very summit of the mountain." From such stories, *traditions* they ought not to be denominated, Rhianus may doubtless have borrowed; but if proof were wanting to show how completely he looked at his materials from the point of view of the poet, and not from that of the historian, we should find it in the remarkable fact noticed by Pausanias. Rhianus represented Leotychides as having been king of Sparta during the second Messenian war; now Leotychides, as Pausanias observes, did not reign until near a century and a half afterwards, during the Persian invasion.[742]

To the great champion of Messenia, during this war, we may oppose, on the side of Sparta, another remarkable person, less striking as a character of romance, but more interesting, in many ways, to the historian,—I mean, the poet Tyrtæus, a na-

tive of Aphidnæ in Attica, an inestimable ally of the Lacedæmonians during most part of this second struggle. According to a story,—which, however, has the air partly of a boast of the later Attic orators,—the Spartans, disheartened at the first successes of the Messenians, consulted the Delphian oracle, and were directed to ask for a leader from Athens. The Athenians complied by sending Tyrtæus, whom Pausanias and Justin represent as a lame man and a schoolmaster, despatched with a view of nominally obeying the oracle, and yet rendering no real assistance.[743] This seems to be a coloring put upon the story by later writers, but the intervention of the Athenians in the matter, in any way, deserves little credit.[744] It seems more probable that the legendary connection of the Dioskuri with Aphidnæ, celebrated at or near that time by the poet Alkman, brought about, through the Delphian oracle, the presence of the Aphidnæan poet at Sparta. Respecting the lameness of Tyrtæus, we can say nothing: but that he was a schoolmaster (if we are constrained to employ an unsuitable term) is highly probable,—for in that day, minstrels, who composed and sung poems, were the only persons from whom the youth received any mental training. Moreover, his sway over the youthful mind is particularly noted in the compliment paid to him, in after-days, by king Leonidas: "Tyrtæus was an adept in tickling the souls of youth."[745] We see enough to satisfy us that he was by birth a stranger, though he became a Spartan by the subsequent recompense of citizenship conferred upon him, —that he was sent through the Delphian oracle,—that he was an impressive and efficacious minstrel, and that he had, moreover, sagacity enough to employ his talents for present purposes and diverse needs; being able, not merely to reanimate the languishing courage of the baffled warrior, but also to soothe the discontents of the mutinous. That his strains, which long maintained undiminished popularity among the Spartans,[746] contributed much to determine the ultimate issue of this war, there is no reason to doubt; nor is his name the only one to attest the susceptibility of the Spartan mind in that day towards music and poetry. The first establishment of the Karneian festival, with its musical competition, at Sparta, falls during the period assigned by Pausanias to the second Messenian war: the Lesbian harper, Terpander, who gained the first recorded prize at this solemnity, is affirmed to have been sent for by the Spartans pursuant to a mandate from the Delphian oracle, and to have been the means of appeasing a sedition. In like manner, the Kretan Thalêtas was invited thither during a pestilence, which his art, as it is pretended, contributed to heal (about 620 B. C.); and Alkman, Xenokritus, Polymnastus, and Sakadas, all foreigners by birth, found favorable reception, and acquired popularity, by their music and poetry. With the exception of Sakadas, who is a little later, all these names fall in the same century as Tyrtæus, between 660 B. C.-610 B. C. The fashion which the Spartan music continued for a long time to maintain, is ascribed chiefly to the genius of Terpander.[747]

The training in which a Spartan passed his life consisted of exercises warlike, social, and religious, blended together. While the individual, strengthened by gymnastics, went through his painful lessons of fatigue, endurance, and aggression,—the cit-

izens collectively were kept in the constant habit of simultaneous and regulated movement in the warlike march, in the religious dance, and in the social procession. Music and song, being constantly employed to direct the measure and keep alive the spirit[748] of these multitudinous movements, became associated with the most powerful feelings which the habitual self-suppression of a Spartan permitted to arise, and especially with those sympathies which are communicated at once to an assembled crowd; indeed, the musician and the minstrel were the only persons who ever addressed themselves to the feelings of a Lacedæmonian assembly. Moreover, the simple music of that early day, though destitute of artistical merit, and superseded afterwards by more complicated combinations, had, nevertheless, a pronounced ethical character; it wrought much more powerfully on the impulses and resolutions of the hearers, though it tickled the ear less gratefully, than the scientific compositions of after-days. Farther, each particular style of music had its own appropriate mental effect,—the Phrygian mode imparted a wild and maddening stimulus; the Dorian mode created a settled and deliberate resolution, exempt alike from the desponding and from the impetuous sentiments.[749] What is called the Dorian mode, seems to be in reality the old native Greek mode, as contradistinguished from the Phrygian and Lydian,—these being the three primitive modes, subdivided and combined only in later times, with which the first Grecian musicians became conversant. It probably acquired its title of Dorian from the musical celebrity of Sparta and Argos, during the seventh and sixth centuries before the Christian era; but it belonged as much to the Arcadians and Achæans as to the Spartans and Argeians. And the marked ethical effects, produced both by the Dorian and the Phrygian modes in ancient times, are facts perfectly well-attested, however difficult they may be to explain upon any general theory of music.

That the impression produced by Tyrtæus at Sparta, therefore, with his martial music, and emphatic exhortations to bravery in the field, as well as union at home, should have been very considerable, is perfectly consistent with the character both of the age and of the people; especially, as he is represented to have appeared pursuant to the injunction of the Delphian oracle. From the scanty fragments remaining to us of his elegies and anapæsts, however, we can satisfy ourselves only of two facts: first, that the war was long, obstinately contested, and dangerous to Sparta as well as to the Messenians; next, that other parties in Peloponnesus took part on both sides, especially on the side of the Messenians. So frequent and harassing were the aggressions of the latter upon the Spartan territory, that a large portion of the border land was left uncultivated: scarcity ensued, and the proprietors of the deserted farms, driven to despair, pressed for a redivision of the landed property in the state. It was in appeasing these discontents that the poem of Tyrtæus, called Eunomia, "Legal order," was found signally beneficial.[750] It seems certain that a considerable portion of the Arcadians, together with the Pisatæ and the Triphylians, took part with the Messenians; there are also some statements numbering the Eleians among their allies, but this appears not probable. The state of the case rather seems to have

been, that the old quarrel between the Eleians and the Pisatæ, respecting the right to preside at the Olympic games, which had already burst forth during the preceding century, in the reign of the Argeian Pheidôn, still continued. Unwilling dependents of Elis, the Pisatæ and Triphylians took part with the subject Messenians, while the masters at Elis and Sparta made common cause, as they had before done against Pheidôn.[751] Pantaleôn, king of Pisa, revolting from Elis, acted as commander of his countrymen in coöperation with the Messenians; and he is farther noted for having, at the period of the 34th Olympiad (644 B. C.), marched a body of troops to Olympia, and thus dispossessed the Eleians, on that occasion, of the presidency: that particular festival,—as well as the 8th Olympiad, in which Pheidôn interfered,—and the 104th Olympiad, in which the Arcadians marched in,—were always marked on the Eleian register as non-Olympiads, or informal celebrations. We may reasonably connect this temporary triumph of the Pisatans with the Messenian war, inasmuch as they were no match for the Eleians single-handed, while the fraternity of Sparta with Elis is in perfect harmony with the scheme of Peloponnesian politics which we have observed as prevalent even before and during the days of Pheidôn.[752] The second Messenian war will thus stand as beginning somewhere about the 33d Olympiad, or 648 B. C., between seventy and eighty years after the close of the first, and lasting, according to Pausanias, seventeen years; according to Plutarch, more than twenty years.[753]

Many of the Messenians who abandoned their country after this second conquest are said to have found shelter and sympathy among the Arcadians, who admitted them to a new home and gave them their daughters in marriage; and who, moreover, punished severely the treason of Aristokratês, king of Orchomenus, in abandoning the Messenians at the battle of the Trench. That perfidious leader was put to death, and his race dethroned, while the crime as well as the punishment was farther commemorated by an inscription, which was to be seen near the altar of Zeus Lykæus, in Arcadia. The inscription doubtless existed in the days of Kallisthenês, in the generation after the restoration of Messênê. But whether it had any existence prior to that event, or what degree of truth there may be in the story of Aristokratês, we are unable to determine:[754] the son of Aristokratês, named Aristodêmus, is alleged in another authority to have reigned afterwards at Orchomenus.[755] That which stands strongly marked is, the sympathy of Arcadians and Messenians against Sparta,—a sentiment which was in its full vigor at the time of the restoration of Messênê.

The second Messenian war was thus terminated by the complete subjugation of the Messenians. Such of them as remained in the country were reduced to a servitude probably not less hard than that which Tyrtæus described them as having endured between the first war and the second. In aftertimes, the whole territory which figures on the map as Messenia,—south of the river Nedon, and westward of the summit of Taygetus,—appears as subject to Sparta, and as forming the western por-

tion of Laconia; distributed, in what proportion we know not, between Periœkic towns and Helot villages. By what steps, or after what degree of farther resistance, the Spartans conquered this country, we have no information; but we are told that they made over Asinê to the expelled Dryopes from the Argolic peninsula and Mothônê to the fugitives from Nauplia.[756] Nor do we hear of any serious revolt from Sparta in this territory until one hundred and fifty years afterwards,[757] subsequent to the Persian invasion,—a revolt which Sparta, after serious efforts, succeeded in crushing. So that the territory remained in her power until her defeat at Leuktra, which led to the foundation of Messênê by Epameinondas. The fertility of the plains,—especially of the central portion near the river Pamisus, so much extolled by observers, modern as well as ancient,—rendered it an acquisition highly valuable. At some time or other, it must of course have been formally partitioned among the Spartans, but it is probable that different and successive allotments were made, according as the various portions of territory, both to the east and to the west of Taygetus, were conquered. Of all this we have no information.[758]

Imperfectly as these two Messenian wars are known to us, we may see enough to warrant us in making two remarks. Both were tedious, protracted, and painful, showing how slowly the results of war were then gathered, and adding one additional illustration to prove how much the rapid and instantaneous conquest of Laconia and Messenia by the Dorians, which the Herakleid legend sets forth, is contradicted by historical analogy. Both were characterized by a similar defensive proceeding on the part of the Messenians,—the occupation of a mountain difficult of access, and the fortification of it for the special purpose and resistance,—Ithômê (which is said to have had already a small town upon it) in the first war, Eira in the second. It is reasonable to infer from hence, that neither their principal town Stenyklêrus, nor any other town in their country, was strongly fortified, so as to be calculated to stand a siege; that there were no walled towns among them analogous to Mykenæ and Tiryns on the eastern portion of Peloponnesus; and that, perhaps, what were called towns were, like Sparta itself, clusters of unfortified villages. The subsequent state of Helotism into which they were reduced is in consistency with this dispersed village residence during their period of freedom.

The relations of Pisa and Elis form a suitable counterpart and sequel to those of Messenia and Sparta. Unwilling subjects themselves, the Pisatans had lent their aid to the Messenians,—and their king, Pantaleôn, one of the leaders of this combined force, had gained so great a temporary success, as to dispossess the Eleians of the agonothesia or administration of the games for one Olympic ceremony, in the 34th Olympiad. Though again reduced to their condition of subjects, they manifested dispositions to renew their revolt at the 48th Olympiad, under Damophôn, the son of Pantaleôn, and the Eleians marched into their country to put them down, but were persuaded to retire by protestations of submission. At length, shortly afterwards, under Pyrrhus, the brother of Damophôn, a serious revolt broke out. The inhabitants of

Dyspentium, and the other villages in the Pisatid, assisted by those of Makistus, Skillus, and the other towns in Triphylia, took up arms to throw off the yoke of Elis; but their strength was inadequate to the undertaking. They were completely conquered; Dyspontium was dismantled, and the inhabitants of it obliged to flee the country, from whence most of them emigrated to the colonies of Epidamnus and Apollonia, in Epirus. The inhabitants of Makistus and Skillus were also chased from their abodes, while the territory became more thoroughly subject to Elis than it had been before. These incidents seem to have occurred about the 50th Olympiad, or B. C. 580; and the dominion of Elis over her Periœkic territory was thus as well assured as that of Sparta.[759] The separate denominations both of Pisa and Triphylia became more and more merged in the sovereign name of Elis: the town of Lepreum alone, in Triphylia, seems to have maintained a separate name and a sort of half-autonomy down to the time of the Peloponnesian war, not without perpetual struggles against the Eleians.[760] But towards the period of the Peloponnesian war, the political interests of Lacedæmon had become considerably changed, and it was to her advantage to maintain the independence of the subordinate states against the superior: accordingly, we find her at that time upholding the autonomy of Lepreum. From what cause the devastation of the Triphylian towns by Elis, which Herodotus mentions as having happened in his time, arose, we do not know; the fact seems to indicate a continual yearning for their original independence, which was still commemorated, down to a much later period, by the ancient Amphiktyony, at Samikum, in Triphylia, in honor of Poseidôn,—a common religious festival frequented by all the Triphylian towns and celebrated by the inhabitants of Makistus, who sent round proclamation of a formal truce for the holy period.[761] The Lacedæmonians, after the close of the Peloponnesian war, had left them undisputed heads of Greece, formally upheld the independence of the Triphylian towns against Elis, and seem to have countenanced their endeavors to attach themselves to the Arcadian aggregate, which, however, was never fully accomplished. Their dependence on Elis became loose and uncertain, but was never wholly shaken off.[762]

CHAPTER VIII.

CONQUESTS OF SPARTA TOWARDS ARCADIA AND ARGOLIS.

I HAVE described in the last two chapters, as far as our imperfect evidence permits, how Sparta came into possession both of the southern portion of Laconia along the coast of the Eurotas down to its mouth, and of the Messenian territory westward. Her progress towards Arcadia and Argolis is now to be sketched, so as to conduct her to that position which she occupied during the reign of Peisistratus at Athens, or about 560-540 B. C.,—a time when she had reached the maximum of her territorial possessions, and when she was confessedly the commanding state in Hellas.

The central region of Peloponnesus, called Arcadia, had never received any emigrants from without. Its indigenous inhabitants,—a strong and hardy race of mountaineers, the most numerous Hellenic tribe in the peninsula, and the constant hive for mercenary troops,[763]—were among the rudest and poorest of Greeks, retaining for the longest period their original subdivision into a number of petty hill-villages, each independent of the other; while the union of all who bore the Arcadian name,—though they had some common sacrifices, such as the festival of the Lykæan Zeus, of Despoina, daughter of Poseidôn and Dêmêtêr, and of Artemis Hymnia,[764]—was more loose and ineffective than that of Greeks generally, either in or out of Peloponnesus. The Arcadian villagers were usually denominated by the names of regions, coincident with certain ethnical subdivisions,—the Azānes, the Parrhasii, the Mænalii (adjoining Mount Mænalus), the Eutrêsii, the Ægytæ, the Skiritæ, etc.[765] Some considerable towns, however, there were,—aggregations of villages or demes which had been once autonomous. Of these, the principal were Tegea and Mantineia, bordering on Laconia and Argolis,—Orchomenus, Pheneus, and Stymphalus, towards the north-east, bordering on Achaia and Phlius,—Kleitôr and Heræa, westward, where the country is divided from Elis and Triphylia by the woody mountains of Pholoê and Erymanthus,—and Phigaleia, on the south-western border near to Messenia. The most powerful of all were Tegea and Mantineia,[766]—conterminous towns, nearly equal in force, dividing between them the cold and high plain of Tripolitza, and separated by one of those capricious torrents which only escapes through katabothra. To regulate the efflux of this water was a difficult task, requiring friendly coöperation of both the towns: and when their frequent jealousies brought on a quarrel, the more aggressive of the two inundated the territory of its neighbor as one means of annoyance. The power of Tegea, which had grown up out of nine constituent townships, originally separate,[767] appears to have been more ancient than that of its rival; as we may judge from its splendid heroic pretensions connected with the name of Echemus, and from the post conceded to its hoplites in joint Peloponnesian armaments, which was second in distinction only to that of the Lacedæmonians.[768] If it

be correct, as Strabo asserts,[769] that the incorporation of the town of Mantineia, out of its five separate demes, was brought about by the Argeians, we may conjecture that the latter adopted this proceeding as a means of providing some check upon their powerful neighbors of Tegea. The plain common to Tegea and Mantineia was bounded to the west by the wintry heights of Mænalus,[770] beyond which, as far as the boundaries of Laconia, Messenia, and Triphylia, there was nothing in Arcadia but small and unimportant townships, or villages,—without any considerable town, before the important step taken by Epameinondas in founding Megalopolis, a short time after the battle of Leuktra. The mountaineers of these regions, who joined Epameinondas before the battle of Mantineia, at a time when Mantineia and most of the towns of Arcadia were opposed to him, were so inferior to the other Greeks in equipment, that they still carried as their chief weapon, in place of the spear, nothing better than the ancient club.[771]

Both Tegea and Mantineia held several of these smaller Arcadian townships near them in a sort of dependence, and were anxious to extend this empire over others: during the Peloponnesian war, we find the Mantineians establishing and garrisoning a fortress at Kypsela among the Parrhasii, near the site in which Megalopolis was afterwards built.[772] But at this period, Sparta, as the political chief of Hellas,—having a strong interest in keeping all the Grecian towns, small and great, as much isolated from each other as possible, and in checking all schemes for the formation of local confederacies,—stood forward as the protectress of the autonomy of these smaller Arcadians, and drove back the Mantineians within their own limits.[773] At a somewhat later period, during the acmé of her power, a few years before the battle of Leuktra, she even proceeded to the extreme length of breaking up the unity of Mantineia itself, causing the walls to be razed, and the inhabitants to be again parcelled into their five original demes,—a violent arrangement, which the turn of political events very soon reversed.[774] It was not until after the battle of Leuktra and the depression of Sparta that any measures were taken for the formation of an Arcadian political confederacy;[775] and even then, the jealousies of the separate cites rendered it incomplete and short-lived. The great permanent change, the establishment of Megalopolis, was accomplished by the ascendency of Epameinondas. Forty petty Arcadian townships, among those situated to the west of Mount Mænalus, were aggregated into the new city: the jealousies of Tegea, Mantineia, and Kleitôr, were for a while suspended; and œkists came from all of them, as well as from the districts of the Mænalii and Parrhasii, in order to impart to the new establishment a genuine Pan-Arcadian character.[776] It was thus there arose for the first time a powerful city on the borders of Laconia and Messenia, rescuing the Arcadian townships from their dependence on Sparta, and imparting to them political interests of their own, which rendered them, both a check upon their former chief and a support to the reëstablished Messenians.

It has been necessary thus to bring the attention of the reader for one moment to events long posterior in the order of time (Megalopolis was founded in 370 B. C.), in order that he may understand, by contrast, the general course of those incidents of the earlier time, where direct accounts are wanting. The northern boundary of the Spartan territory was formed by some of the many small Arcadian townships or districts, several of which were successively conquered by the Spartans and incorporated with their dominion, though at what precise time we are unable to say. We are told that Charilaus, the reputed nephew and ward of Lykurgus, took Ægys, and that he also invaded the territory of Tegea, but with singular ill-success, for he was defeated and taken prisoner:[777] we also hear that the Spartans took Phigaleia by surprise in the 30th Olympiad, but were driven out again by the neighboring Arcadian Oresthasians.[778] During the second Messenian war, the Arcadians are represented as cordially seconding the Messenians: and it may seem perhaps singular that, while neither Mantineia nor Tegea are mentioned in this war, the more distant town of Orchomenus, with its king Aristokratês, takes the lead. But the facts of the contest come before us with so poetical a coloring, that we cannot venture to draw any positive inference as to the times to which they are referred.

Œnus[779] and Karystus seem to have belonged to the Spartans in the days of Alkman: moreover, the district called Skirītis bordering on the territory of Tegea,—as well as Belemina and Maleatis to the westward, and Karyæ to the eastward and south-eastward, of Skirītis,—forming altogether the entire northern frontier of Sparta, and all occupied by Arcadian inhabitants,—had been conquered and made part of the Spartan territory[780] before 600 B. C. And Herodotus tells us, that at this period the Spartan kings Leon and Hegesiklês contemplated nothing less than the conquest of entire Arcadia, and sent to ask from the Delphian oracle a blessing on their enterprise.[781] The priestess dismissed their wishes as extravagant, in reference to the whole of Arcadia, but encouraged them, though with the usual equivocations of language, to try their fortune against Tegea. Flushed with their course of previous success, not less than by the favorable construction which they put upon the words of the oracle, the Lacedæmonians marched against Tegea with such entire confidence of success, as to carry with them chains for the purpose of binding their expected prisoners. But the result was disappointment and defeat. They were repulsed with loss, and the prisoners whom they left behind, bound in the very chains which their own army had brought, were constrained to servile labor on the plain of Tegea,—the words of the oracle being thus literally fulfilled, though in a sense different from that in which the Lacedæmonians had first understood them.[782]

For one whole generation, we are told, they were constantly unsuccessful in their campaigns against the Tegeans, and this strenuous resistance probably prevented them from extending their conquests farther among the petty states of Arcadia.

At length, in the reign of Anaxandridês and Aristô, the successors of Leon and Hegesiklês (about 560 B. C.), the Delphian oracle, in reply to a question from the

Spartans,—which of the gods they ought to propitiate in order to become victorious,—enjoined them to find and carry to Sparta the bones of Orestês, son of Agamemnôn. After a vain search, since they did not know where the body of Orestês was to be found, they applied to the oracle for more specific directions, and were told that the son of Agamemnôn was buried at Tegea itself, in a place "where two blasts were blowing under powerful constraint,—where there was stroke and counter-stroke, and destruction upon destruction." These mysterious words were elucidated by a lucky accident. During a truce with Tegea, Lichas, one of the chiefs of the three hundred Spartan chosen youth, who acted as the movable police of the country under the ephors, visited the place, and entered the forge of a blacksmith,—who mentioned to him, in the course of conversation, that, in sinking a well in his outer court, he had recently discovered a coffin containing a body seven cubits long; astounded at the sight, he had left it there undisturbed. It struck Lichas that the gigantic relic of aforetime could be nothing else but the corpse of Orestês, and he felt assured of this, when he reflected how accurately the indications of the oracle were verified; for there were the "two blasts blowing by constraint," in the two bellows of the blacksmith: there was the "stroke and counter-stroke," in his hammer and anvil, as well as the "destruction upon destruction," in the murderous weapons which he was forging. Lichas said nothing, but returned to Sparta with his discovery, which he communicated to the authorities, who, by a concerted scheme, banished him under a pretended criminal accusation. He then returned again to Tegea, under the guise of an exile, prevailed upon the blacksmith to let to him the premises, and when he found himself in possession, dug up and carried off to Sparta the bones of the venerated hero.[783]

From and after this fortunate acquisition, the character of the contest was changed; the Spartans found themselves constantly victorious over the Tegeans. But it does not seem that these victories led to any positive result, though they might perhaps serve to enforce the practical conviction of Spartan superiority; for the territory of Tegea remained unimpaired, and its autonomy noway restrained. During the Persian invasion, Tegea appears as the willing ally of Lacedæmon, and as the second military power in the Peloponnesus;[784] and we may fairly presume that it was chiefly the strenuous resistance of the Tegeans which prevented the Lacedæmonians from extending their empire over the larger portion of the Arcadian communities. These latter always maintained their independence, though acknowledging Sparta as the presiding power in Peloponnesus, and obeying her orders implicitly as to the disposal of their military force. And the influence which Sparta thus possessed over all Arcadia was one main item in her power, never seriously shaken until the battle of Leuktra; which took away her previous means of insuring success and plunder to her minor followers.[785]

Having thus related the extension of the power of Sparta on her northern or Arcadian frontier, it remains to mention her acquisitions on the eastern and north-east-

ern side, towards Argos. Originally, as has been before stated, not merely the province of Kynuria and the Thyreātis but also the whole coast down to the promontory of Malea, had either been part of the territory of Argos or belonged to the Argeian confederacy. We learn from Herodotus,[786] that before the time when the embassy from Crœsus, king of Lydia, came to solicit aid in Greece (about 547 B. C.), the whole of this territory had fallen into the power of Sparta; but how long before, or at what precise epoch, we have no information. A considerable victory is said to have been gained by the Argeians over the Spartans in the 27th Olympiad or 669 B. C., at Hysiæ, on the road between Argos and Tegea.[787] At that time it does not seem probable that Kynuria could have been in the possession of the Spartans,—so that we must refer the acquisition to some period in the following century; though Pausanias places it much earlier, during the reign of Theopompus,[788]—and Eusebius connects it with the first establishment of the festival called Gymnopædia at Sparta, in 678 B. C.

About the year 547 B. C., the Argeians made an effort to reconquer Thyrea from Sparta, which led to a combat long memorable in the annals of Grecian heroism. It was agreed between the two powers that the possession of this territory should be determined by a combat of three hundred select champions on each side; the armies of both retiring, in order to leave the field clear. So undaunted and so equal was the valor of these two chosen companies, that the battle terminated by leaving only three of them alive,—Alkênôr and Chromius among the Argeians, Othryadês among the Spartans. The two Argeian warriors hastened home to report their victory, but Othryadês remained on the field, carried off the arms of the enemy's dead into the Spartan camp, and kept his position until he was joined by his countrymen the next morning. Both Argos and Sparta claimed the victory for their respective champions, and the dispute after all was decided by a general conflict, in which the Spartans were the conquerors, though not without much slaughter on both sides. The brave Othryadês, ashamed to return home as the single survivor of the three hundred, fell upon his own sword on the field of battle.[789]

This defeat decided the possession of Thyrea, which did not again pass, until a very late period of Grecian history, under the power of Argos. The preliminary duel of three hundred, with its uncertain issue, though well established as to the general fact, was represented by the Argeians in a manner totally different from the above story, which seems to have been current among the Lacedæmonians.[790] But the most remarkable circumstance is, that more than a century afterwards,—when the two powers were negotiating for a renewal of the then expiring truce, the Argeians, still hankering after this their ancient territory, desired the Lacedæmonians to submit the question to arbitration; which being refused, they next stipulated for the privilege of trying the point in dispute by a duel similar to the former, at any time except during the prevalence of war or of epidemic disease. The historian tells us that the Lacedæmonians acquiesced in this proposition, though they thought it absurd,[791] in consequence of their anxiety to keep their relations with Argos at that time smooth

and pacific. But there is no reason to imagine that the real duel, in which Othryadês contended, was considered as absurd at the time when it took place, or during the age immediately succeeding. It fell in with a sort of chivalrous pugnacity which is noticed among the attributes of the early Greeks,[792] and also with various legendary exploits, such as the single combat of Echemus and Hyllus, of Melanthus and Xanthus, of Menelaus and Paris, etc. Moreover, the heroism of Othryadês and his countrymen was a popular theme for poets, not only at the Spartan gymnopædia,[793] but also elsewhere, and appears to have been frequently celebrated. The absurdity attached to this proposition, then, during the Peloponnesian war,—in the minds even of the Spartans, the most old-fashioned and unchanging people in Greece,—is to be ascribed to a change in the Grecian political mind, at and after the Persian war. The habit of political calculation had made such decided progress among them, that the leading states especially had become familiarized with something like a statesmanlike view of their resources, their dangers, and their obligations. How lamentably deficient this sort of sagacity was during the Persian invasion, will appear when we come to describe that imminent crisis of Grecian independence: but the events of those days were well calculated to sharpen it for the future, and the Greeks of the Peloponnesian war had become far more refined political schemers than their forefathers. And thus it happened that the proposition to settle a territorial dispute by a duel of chosen champions, admissible and even becoming a century before, came afterwards to be derided as childish.

The inhabitants of Kynuria are stated by Herodotus to have been Ionians, but completely Dorized through their long subjection to Argos, by whom they were governed as Periœki. Pausanias gives a different account of their race, which he traces to the eponymous hero Kynūrus, son of Perseus: but he does not connect them with the Kynurians whom he mentions in another place as a portion of the inhabitants of Arcadia.[794] It is evident that, even in the time of Herodotus, the traces of their primitive descent were nearly effaced. He says they were "Orneates and Periœki" to Argos; and it appears that the inhabitants of Orneæ also, whom Argos had reduced to the same dependent condition, traced their eponymous hero to an Ionic stock,—Orneus was the son of the Attic Erechtheus.[795] Strabo seems to have conceived the Kynurians as occupying originally, not only the frontier district of Argolis and Laconia, wherein Thyrea is situated, but also the north-western portion of Argolis, under the ridge called Lyrkeium, which separates the latter from the Arcadian territory of Stimphalus.[796] This ridge was near the town of Orneæ, which lay on the border of Argolis near the confines of Phlius; so that Strabo thus helps to confirm the statement of Herodotus, that the Orneates were a portion of Kynurians, held by Argos along with the other Kynurians in the condition of dependent allies and Periœki, and very probably also of Ionian origin.

The conquest of Thyrea (a district valuable to the Lacedæmonians, as we may presume from the large booty which the Argeians got from it during the Pelopon-

nesian war)[797] was the last territorial acquisition made by Sparta. She was now possessed of a continuous dominion, comprising the whole southern portion of the Peloponnesus, from the southern bank of the river Nedon on the western coast, to the northern boundary of Thyreatis on the eastern coast. The area of her territory, including as it did both Laconia and Messenia, was equal to two-fifths of the entire peninsula, all governed from the single city, and for the exclusive purpose and benefit of the citizens of Sparta. Within all this wide area there was not a single community pretending to independent agency. The townships of the Periœki, and the villages of the Helots, were each individually unimportant; nor do we hear of any one of them presuming to treat with a foreign state: both consider themselves as nothing else but subjects of the Spartan ephors and their subordinate officers. They are indeed discontented subjects, hating as well as fearing their masters, and not to be trusted if a favorable opportunity for secure revolt presents itself. But no individual township or district is strong enough to stand up for itself, while combinations among them are prevented by the habitual watchfulness and unscrupulous precautions of the ephors, especially by that jealous secret police called the Krypteia, to which allusion has already been made.

Not only, therefore, was the Spartan territory larger and its population more numerous than that of any other state in Hellas, but its government was also more completely centralized and more strictly obeyed. Its source of weakness was the discontent of its Periœki and Helots, the latter of whom were not—like the slaves of other states—imported barbarians from different countries, and speaking a broken Greek, but genuine Hellens,—of one dialect and lineage, sympathizing with each other, and as much entitled to the protection of Zeus Hellanius as their masters,—from whom, indeed, they stood distinguished by no other line except the perfect training, individual and collective, which was peculiar to the Spartans. During the period on which we are at present dwelling, it does not seem that this discontent comes sensibly into operation; but we shall observe its manifestations very unequivocally after the Persian and during the Peloponnesian war.

To such auxiliary causes of Spartan predominance we must add another,—the excellent military position of Sparta, and the unassailable character of Laconia generally. On three sides that territory is washed by the sea,[798] with a coast remarkably dangerous and destitute of harbors; hence Sparta had nothing to apprehend from this quarter until the Persian invasion and its consequences,—one of the most remarkable of which was, the astonishing development of the Athenian naval force. The city of Sparta, far removed from the sea, was admirably defended by an almost impassable northern frontier, composed of those districts which we have observed above to have been conquered from Arcadia,—Karyātis, Skirītis, Maleātis, and Belminātis. The difficulty as well as danger of marching into Laconia by these mountain passes, noticed by Euripides, was keenly felt by every enemy of the Lacedæmonians, and has been powerfully stated by a first-rate modern observer, Colonel Leake.[799]

No site could be better chosen for holding the key of all the penetrable passes than that of Sparta. This well-protected frontier was a substitute more than sufficient for fortifications to Sparta itself, which always maintained, down to the times of the despot Nabis, its primitive aspect of a group of adjacent hill-villages rather than a regular city.

When, along with such territorial advantages, we contemplate the personal training peculiar to the Spartan citizens, as yet undiminished in their numbers,—combined with the effect of that training upon Grecian sentiment, in inspiring awe and admiration,—we shall not be surprised to find that, during the half-century which elapsed between the year 600 B. C. and the final conquest of Thyreātis from Argos, Sparta had acquired and begun to exercise a recognized ascendency over all the Grecian states. Her military force was at that time superior to that of any of the rest, in a degree much greater than it afterwards came to be; for other states had not yet attained their maximum, and Athens in particular was far short of the height which she afterwards reached. In respect to discipline as well as number, the Spartan military force had even at this early period reached a point which it did not subsequently surpass; while in Athens, Thebes, Argos, Arcadia, and even Elis (as will be hereafter shown), the military training in later days received greater attention, and improved considerably. The Spartans (observes Aristotle)[800] brought to perfection their gymnastic training and their military discipline, at a time when other Greeks neglected both the one and the other: their early superiority was that of the trained men over the untrained, and ceased in after-days, when other states came to subject their citizens to systematic exercises of analogous character or tendency. This fact,—the early period at which Sparta attained her maximum of discipline, power, and territory,—is important to bear in mind, when we are explaining the general acquiescence which her ascendency met with in Greece, and which her subsequent acts would certainly not have enabled her to earn. That acquiescence first began, and became a habit of the Grecian mind, at a time when Sparta had no rival to come near her,—when she had completely shot ahead of Argos,—and when the vigor of the Lykurgean discipline had been manifested in a long series of conquests, made during the stationary period of other states, and ending only, to use the somewhat exaggerated phrase of Herodotus, when she had subdued the greater part of Peloponnesus.[801]

Our accounts of the memorable military organization of Sparta are scanty, and insufficient to place the details of it clearly before us. The arms of the Spartans, as to all material points, were not different from those of other Greek hoplites. But one grand peculiarity is observable from the beginning, as an item in the Lykurgean institutions. That lawgiver established military divisions quite distinct from the civil divisions, whereas in the other states of Greece, until a period much later than that which we have now reached, the two were confounded,—the hoplites or horsemen of the same tribe or ward being marshalled together on the field of battle. Every Lacedæmonian was bound to military service from the age of twenty to sixty, and

the ephors, when they sent forth an expedition, called to arms all the men within some given limit of age. Herodotus tells us that Lykurgus established both the syssitia, or public mess, and the enômoties and triākads, or the military subdivisions peculiar to Sparta.[802] The triākads are not mentioned elsewhere, nor can we distinctly make out what they were; but the enômoty was the special characteristic of the system, and the pivot upon which all its arrangements turned. It was a small company of men, the number of whom was variable, being given differently at twenty-five, thirty-two, or thirty-six men,—drilled and practised together in military evolutions, and bound to each other by a common oath.[803] Each enômoty had a separate captain, or enomotarch, the strongest and ablest soldier of the company, who always occupied the front rank, and led the enômoty when it marched in single file, giving the order of march, as well as setting the example. If the enômoty was drawn up in three, or four, or six files, the enomotarch usually occupied the front post on the left, and care was taken that both the front-rank men and the rear-rank men, of each file, should be soldiers of particular merit.[804]

It was upon these small companies that the constant and severe Lacedæmonian drilling was brought to act. They were taught to march in concert, to change rapidly from line to file, to wheel right or left in such manner as that the enomotarch and the other protostates, or front-rank men, should always be the persons immediately opposed to the enemy.[805] Their step was regulated by the fife, which played in martial measures peculiar to Sparta, and was employed in actual battle as well as in military practice; and so perfectly were they habituated to the movements of the enômoty, that, if their order was deranged by any adverse accident, scattered soldiers could spontaneously form themselves into the same order, each man knowing perfectly the duties belonging to the place into which chance had thrown him.[806] Above the enômoty were several larger divisions,—the pentekostys, the lochus, and the mora,[807] of which latter there seem to have been *six* in all. Respecting the number of each division, and the proportion of the larger to the smaller, we find statements altogether different, yet each resting upon good authority,—so that we are driven to suppose that there was no peremptory standard, and that the enômoty comprised twenty-five, thirty-two, or thirty-six men; the pentekostys, two or four enômoties; the lochus, two or four pentekosties, and the mora, four hundred, five hundred, six hundred, or nine hundred men,—at different times, or according to the limits of age which the ephors might prescribe for the men whom they called into the field.[808]

What remains fixed in the system is, first, the small number, though varying within certain limits, of the elementary company called enômoty, trained to act together, and composed of men nearly of the same age,[809] in which every man knew his place; secondly, the scale of divisions and the hierarchy of officers, each rising above the other,—the enômotarch, the pentekontêr, the lochage, and the polemarch, or commander of the mora,—each having the charge of their respective divisions.

Orders were transmitted from the king, as commander-in-chief, through the polemarchs to the lochages,—from the lochages to the pentekonters, and then from the latter to the enômotarchs, each of whom caused them to be executed by his enômoty. As all these men had been previously trained to the duties of their respective stations, the Spartan infantry possessed the arrangements and aptitudes of a standing army. Originally, they seem to have had no cavalry at all,[810] and when cavalry was at length introduced into their system, it was of a very inferior character, no provision having been made for it in the Lykurgean training. But the military force of the other cities of Greece, even down to the close of the Peloponnesian war, enjoyed little or no special training, having neither any small company like the enômoty, consisting of particular men drilled to act together,—no fixed and disciplined officers,—nor triple scale of subordination and subdivision. Gymnastics, and the use of arms, made a part of education everywhere, and it is to be presumed that no Grecian hoplite was entirely without some practice of marching in line and military evolutions, inasmuch as the obligation to serve was universal and often enforced. But such practice was casual and unequal, nor had any individual of Argos or Athens a fixed military place and duty. The citizen took arms among his tribe, under a taxiarch, chosen from it for the occasion, and was placed in a rank or line wherein neither his place nor his immediate neighbors were predetermined. The tribe appears to have been the only military classification known to Athens,[811] and the taxiarch the only tribe officer for infantry, as the phylarch was for cavalry, under the general-in-chief. Moreover, orders from the general were proclaimed to the line collectively by a herald of loud voice, not communicated to the taxiarch so as to make him responsible for the proper execution of them by his division. With an arrangement thus perfunctory and unsystematized, we shall be surprised to find how well the military duties were often performed: but every Greek who contrasted it with the symmetrical structure of the Lacedæmonian armed force, and with the laborious preparation of every Spartan for his appropriate duty, felt an internal sentiment of inferiority, which made him willingly accept the headship of "these professional artists in the business of war,"[812] as they are often denominated.

It was through the concurrence of these various circumstances that the willing acknowledgment of Sparta as the leading state of Hellas became a part of Grecian habitual sentiment, during the interval between about 600 B. C. and 547 B. C. During this period too, chiefly, Greece and her colonies were ripening into a sort of recognized and active partnership. The common religious assemblies, which bound the parts together, not only acquired greater formality and more extended development, but also became more numerous and frequent,—while the Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean games were exalted into a national importance, approaching to that of the Olympic. The recognized superiority of Sparta thus formed part and parcel of the first historical aggregation of the Grecian states. It was about the year 547 B. C., that Crœsus of Lydia, when pressed by Cyrus and the Persians, solicited aid from Greece, addressing himself to the Spartans as confessed presidents of the whole Hellenic

body.[813] And the tendencies then at work, towards a certain degree of increased intercourse and coöperation among the dispersed members of the Hellenic name, were doubtless assisted by the existence of a state recognized by all as the first,—a state whose superiority was the more readily acquiesced in, because it was earned by a painful and laborious discipline, which all admired, but none chose to copy.[814]

Whether it be true, as O. Müller and other learned men conceive, that the Homeric mode of fighting was the general practice in Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece anterior to the invasion of the Dorians, and that the latter first introduced the habit of fighting with close ranks and protended spears, is a point which cannot be determined. Throughout all our historical knowledge of Greece, a close rank among the hoplites, charging with spears always in hand, is the prevailing practice; though there are cases of exception, in which the spear is hurled, when troops seem afraid of coming to close quarters.[815] Nor is it by any means certain, that the Homeric manner of fighting ever really prevailed in Peloponnesus, which is a country eminently inconvenient for the use of war-chariots. The descriptions of the bard may perhaps have been founded chiefly upon what he and his auditors witnessed on the coast of Asia Minor, where chariots were more employed, and where the country was much more favorable to them.[816] We have no historical knowledge of any military practice in Peloponnesus anterior to the hoplites with close ranks and protended spears.

One Peloponnesian state there was, and one alone, which disdained to acknowledge the superiority or headship of Lacedæmon. Argos never forgot that she had once been the chief power in the peninsula, and her feeling towards Sparta was that of a jealous, but impotent, competitor. By what steps the decline of her power had taken place, we are unable to make out, nor can we trace the succession of her kings subsequent to Pheidôn. It has been already stated that, about 669 B. C., the Argeians gained a victory over the Spartans at Hysiæ, and that they expelled from the port of Nauplia its preëxisting inhabitants, who found shelter, by favor of the Lacedæmonians, at the port of Mothônê, in Messenia:[817] Damokratidas was then king of Argos. Pausanias tells us that Meltas, the son of Lakidês, was the last descendant of Temenus who succeeded to this dignity; he being condemned and deposed by the people. Plutarch, however, states that the family of the Herakleids died out, and that another king, named Ægôn, was chosen by the people at the indication of the Delphian oracle.[818] Of this story, Pausanias appears to have known nothing. His language implies that the kingly dignity ceased with Meltas,—wherein he is undoubtedly mistaken, since the title existed, though probably with very limited functions, at the time of the Persian war. Moreover, there is some ground for presuming that the king of Argos was even at that time a Herakleid,—since the Spartans offered to him a third part of the command of the Hellenic force, conjointly with their own two kings.[819] The conquest of Thyreātis by the Spartans deprived the Argeians of a valuable portion of their Periœkis, or dependent territory; but Orneæ, and the remaining portion of Kynuria,[820] still continued to belong to them; the plain round their city was

very productive; and except Sparta, there was no other power in Peloponnesus superior to them. Mykenæ and Tiryns, nevertheless, seem both to have been independent states at the time of the Persian war, since both sent contingents to the battle of Platæa, at a time when Argos held aloof and rather favored the Persians. At what time Kleônæ became the ally, or dependent, of Argos, we cannot distinctly make out. During the Peloponnesian war, it is numbered in that character along with Orneæ; [821] but it seems not to have lost its autonomy about the year 470 B. C., at which period Pindar represents the Kleonæans as presiding and distributing prizes at the Nemean games.[822] The grove of Nemea was less than two miles from their town, and they were the original presidents of this great festival,—a function of which they were subsequently robbed by the Argeians, in the same manner as the Pisatans had been treated by the Eleians with reference to the Olympic Agôn. The extinction of the autonomy of Kleônæ and the acquisition of the presidency of the Nemean festival by Argos, were doubtless simultaneous, but we are unable to mark the exact time; for the statement of Eusebius, that the Argeians celebrated the Nemean festival as early as the 53d Olympiad, or 568 B. C., is contradicted by the more valuable evidence of Pindar.[823]

Of Corinth and Sikyôn it will be more convenient to speak when we survey what is called the Age of the Tyrants, or Despots; and of the inhabitants of Achaia (who occupied the southern coast of the Corinthian gulf, westward of Sikyôn, as far as Cape Araxus, the north-western point of Peloponnesus), a few words exhaust our whole knowledge, down to the time at which we are arrived. These Achæans are given to us as representing the ante-Dorian inhabitants of Laconia, whom the legend affirms to have retired under Tisamenus to the northern parts of Peloponnesus, from whence they expelled the preëxisting Ionians and occupied the country. The race of their kings is said to have lasted from Tisamenus down to Ogygus,[824]—how long, we do not know. After the death of the latter, the Achæan towns formed each a separate republic, but with periodical festivals and sacrifice at the temple of Zeus Homarius, affording opportunity of settling differences and arranging their common concerns. Of these towns, twelve are known from Herodotus and Strabo,—Pellênê, Ægira, Ægæ, Bura, Helikê, Ægium, Rhypes, Patræ, Pharæ, Olenus, Dymê, Tritæa. [825] But there must originally have been some other autonomous towns besides these twelve; for in the 23d Olympiad, Ikarus of Hyperêsia was proclaimed as victor, and there seems good reason to believe that Hyperêsia, an old town of the Homeric Catalogue, was in Achaia.[826] It is affirmed that, before the Achæan occupation of the country, the Ionians had dwelt in independent villages, several of which were subsequently aggregated into towns: thus Patræ was formed by a coalescence of seven villages, Dymê from eight (one of which was named Teuthea), and Ægium also from seven or eight. But all these towns were small, and some of them underwent a farther junction one with the other; thus Ægæ was joined with Ægeira, and Olenus with Dymê.[827] All the authors seem disposed to recognize twelve cities, and no more, in Achaia; for Polybius, still adhering to that number, substitutes Leontium and

Keryneia in place of Ægæ and Rhypes; Pausanias gives Keryneia in place of Patræ. [828] We hear of no facts respecting these Achæan towns until a short time before the Peloponnesian war, and even then their part was inconsiderable.

The greater portion of the territory comprised under the name of Achaia was mountain, forming the northern descent of those high ranges, passable only through very difficult gorges, which separate the country from Arcadia to the south, and which throw out various spurs approaching closely to the gulf of Corinth. A strip of flat land, with white clayey soil, often very fertile, between these mountains and the sea, formed *the plain* of each of the Achæan towns, which were situated for the most part upon steep outlying eminences overhanging it. From the mountains between Achaia and Arcadia, numerous streams flow into the Corinthian gulf, but few of them are perennial, and the whole length of coast is represented as harborless. [829]

FOOTNOTES

[1] Hesiod, Eoiai, Fragm. 58, p. 43, ed. Düntzer.

[2] Diodôr. iv. 37-60; Apollodôr. ii. 7, 7; Ephorus ap. Steph. Byz. Δυμᾶν, Fragm. 10, ed. Marx.

The Doric institutions are called by Pindar τεθμοὶ Αἰγιμίου Δωρικοὶ (Pyth. i. 124).

There existed an ancient epic poem, now lost, but cited on some few occasions by authors still preserved, under the title Αἰγίμιος; the authorship being sometimes ascribed to Hesiod, sometimes to Kerkops (Athenæ. xi. p. 503). The few fragments which remain do not enable us to make out the scheme of it, inasmuch as they embrace different mythical incidents lying very wide of each other,—Iô, the Argonauts, Pêleus, and Thetis, etc. But the name which it bears seems to imply that the war of Ægimius against the Lapithæ, and the aid given to him by Hêraklês, was one of its chief topics. Both O. Müller (History of the Dorians, vol. i. b. 1, c. 8) and Welcker (Der Epische Kyklus, p. 263) appear to me to go beyond the very scanty evidence which we possess, in their determination of this last poem; compare Marktscheffel, Præfat. Hesiod. Fragm. cap. 5, p. 159.

[3] Respecting this prophet, compare Œnomaus ap. Eusebium, Præparat. Evangel. v. p. 211. According to that statement, both Kleodæus (here called *Aridæus*) son of Hyllus, and Aristomachus son of Kleodæus, had made separate and successive attempts at the head of the Herakleids to penetrate into Peloponnêsus through the Isthmus: both had failed and perished, having misunderstood the admonition of the Delphian oracle. Œnomaus could have known nothing of the pledge given by Hyllus, as the condition of the single combat between Hyllus and Echemus (according to Herodotus), that the Herakleids should make no fresh trial for one hundred years; if it had been understood that they had given and then violated such a pledge, such violation would probably have been adduced to account for their failure.

[4] Apollodôr. ii. 8, 3; Pausan. iii. 13. 3.

[5] Apollodôr. ii. 8, 3. According to the account of Pausanias, the beast upon which Oxylus rode was a mule, and had lost one eye (Paus. v. 3, 5).

[6] Herodotus observes, in reference to the Lacedæmonian account of their first two kings in Peloponnêsus, (Eurysthenês and Proklês, the twin sons of Aristodêmus,) that the Lacedæmonians gave a *story not in harmony with any of the poets*,—Λακεδαιμόνιοι γὰρ, *ὁμολογέοντες οὐδενὶ ποιητῇ*, λέγουσιν αὐτὸν Ἀριστόδημον … βασιλεύοντα ἀγαγεῖν σφεας ἐς ταύτην τὴν χώρην τὴν νῦν ἐκτέαται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τοὺς Ἀριστοδήμου παῖδας (Herodot. vi. 52).

[7] Tyrtæus, Fragm.—

Αὐτος γαρ Κρονίων, καλλιστεφάνου πόσις Ἥρας,
Ζεὺς Ἡρακλείδαις τήνδε δέδωκε πόλιν·
Οἱσιν ἅμα, προλιπόντες Ἐρίνεον ἠνεμόεντα,
Εὐρεῖαν Πέλοπος νῆσον ἀφικόμεθα.

In a similar manner Pindar says that Apollo had planted the sons of Hêraklês, jointly with those of Ægimius, at Sparta, Argos, and Pylus (Pyth. v. 93).

Isokratês (Or. vi. *Archidamus*, p. 120) makes out a good title by a different line of mythical reasoning. There seem to have been also stories containing mythical reasons why the Herakleids did *not* acquire possession of Arcadia (Polyæn. i. 7).

[8] Plato, Legg. iii. 6-7, pp. 682-686.

[9] Pausan. vii. 1-3.

[10] Polyb. ii. 45; iv. 1; Strabo, viii. pp. 383-384. This Tisamenus derives his name from the memorable act of revenge ascribed to his father Orestês. So, in the legend of the Siege of Thêbes, Thersander, as one of the Epigoni, avenged his father Polynikês: the son of Thersander was also called *Tisamenus* (Herodot. iv. 149). Compare O. Müller, Dorians, i. p. 69, note 9, Eng. Trans.

[11] Diodôr. iv. 1. The historian Ephorus embodied in his work a narrative in considerable detail of this grand event of Grecian legend, the Return of the Herakleids,—with which he professed to commence his consecutive history: from what sources he borrowed we do not know.

[12] Strabo, viii. p. 389. Pausan. ii. 6, 2; 12, 1.

[13] Conôn, Nar. 36; Strabo, viii. p. 365.

[14] Strabo, viii. p. 359; Conôn, Narr. 39.

[15] Thucydid. iv. 42. Schol. Pindar. Olymp. xiii. 17; and Nem. vii. 155. Conôn, Narrat. 26. Ephor. ap. Strab. viii. p. 389.

Thucydidês calls the ante-Dorian inhabitants of Corinth Æolians; Conôn calls them Ionians.

[16] Ephorus ap. Strabo, x. p. 463.

[17] Strabo, viii. p. 358; Pausan. v. 4, 1. One of the six towns in Triphylia mentioned by Herodotus is called Ἔπειον (Herodot. iv. 149).

[18] Herodot. viii. 73; Pausan. v. 1, 2. Hekatæus affirmed that the Epeians were completely alien to the Eleians; Strabo does not seem to have been able to satisfy himself either of the affirmative or negative (Hekatæus, Fr. 348, ed. Didot; Strabo, viii. p. 341).

[19] Ephorus ap. Strabo. viii. p. 358. The tale of the inhabitants of Pisa, the territory more immediately bordering upon Olympia, was very different from this.

[20] Agatharchides ap. Photium, Sect. 250, p. 1332. Ὀυδ᾽ Εὐριπίδου κατηγορῶ, τῷ Ἀρχελάῳ περιτεθεικότος τὰς Τημένου πράξεις.

Compare the Fragments of the Τημένιδαι, Ἀρχέλαος, and Κρεσφόντης, in Dindorf's edition of Euripidês, with the illustrative remarks of Welcker, Griechische Tragödien, pp. 697, 708, 828.

The Prologue of the Archelaus seems to have gone through the whole series of the Herakleidan lineage, from Ægyptus and Danaus downwards.

[21] Herodot. v. 72.

[22] Herodot. vii. 159.

[23] Herodot. i. 68; Pausan. vii. 1, 3.

[24] Pausan. v. 4, 2.

[25] The date of Thucydidês is calculated, μετὰ Ἰλίου ἅλωσιν (i. 13).

[26] Herod. vii. 176.

[27] See the Epigram ascribed to Aristotle (Antholog. Græc. t. i. p. 181, ed. Reisk; Velleius Patercul. i. 1).

The Scholia on Lycophrôn (912) give a story somewhat different. Ephyrê is given as the old legendary name of the city of Krannon in Thessaly (Kineas, ap. Schol. Pindar. Pyth. x. 85), which creates the confusion with the Thesprotian Ephyrê.

[28] Herodot. vii. 176; Velleius Patercul. i. 2-3; Charax. ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Δώριον: Polyæn. viii. 44.

There were several different statements, however, about the parentage of Thessalus, as well as about the name of the country (Strabo, ix. p. 443 Stephan. Byz. v. Αἰμονία).

[29] See K. O. Müller, History of the Dorians, Introduction, sect. 4.

[30] Pindar, Pyth. x. 2.

[31] Thucyd. i. 12. ἦν δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ἀποδασμὸς πρότερον ἐν τῇ γῇ ταύτῃ ἀφ᾽ ὧν καὶ ἐς Ἴλιον ἐστράτευσαν.

[32] Pausan. ix. 5, 8.

[33] Pausan. x. 8, 3.

[34] Ephor. Fragm. 30, ed. Marx.; Strabo, ix. pp. 401-402. The story of the Bœotians at Arnê, in Polyænus (i. 12), probably comes from Ephorus.

Diodôrus (xix. 53) gives a summary of the legendary history of Thêbes from Deukalion downwards: he tells us that the Bœotians were expelled from their country, and obliged to return into Thessaly during the Trojan war, in consequence of the absence of so many of their brave warriors at Troy; they did not find their way back into Bœotia until the fourth generation.

[35] Stephen. Byz. v. Ἄρνη, makes the Thessalian Arnê an ἄποικος of the Bœotian.

[36] Homer, Iliad, ii.; Strabo, ix. p. 413; Pausan. ix. 40, 3. Some of the families at Chæroneia, even during the time of the Roman dominion in Greece, traced their origin to Peripoltas the prophet, who was said to have accompanied Opheltas in his invading march out of Thessaly (Plutarch, Cimôn, c. 1).

[37] Strabo, ix. 411-435; Homer, Iliad, ii. 696; Hekatæus, Fr. 338, Didot.

The fragment from Alkæus (cited by Strabo, but briefly, and with a mutilated text,) serves only to identify the river and the town.

Itônus was said to be son of Amphiktyôn, and Bœôtus son of Itônus (Pausan. ix. 1, 1. 34, 1: compare Steph. Byz. v. Βοιωτία) by Melanippê. By another legendary genealogy (probably arising after the name *Æolic* had obtained footing as the class-name for a large section of Greeks, but as old as the poet Asius, Olympiad 30), the eponymous hero Bœôtus was fastened on to the great lineage of Æolus, through the paternity of the god Poseidôn, either with Melanippê or with Arnê, daughter of Æolus (Asius, Fr. 8, ed. Düntzer; Strabo, vi. p. 265; Diodôr. v. 67; Hellanikus ap. Schol. Iliad. ii 494). Two lost plays of Euripidês were founded on the misfortunes of Melanippê, and her twin children by Poseidôn,—Bœôtus and Æolus (Hygin. Fab. 186; see the Fragments of Μελανίππη Σοφὴ and Μελανίππη Δεσμῶτις in Dindorf's edition, and the instructive comments of Welcker; Griech. Tragöd. vol. ii. pp. 840-860).

[38] Pindar, Nem. xi. 43; Hellanic. Fragm. 114, ed. Didot. Compare Stephan. Byz. v. Πέρινθος.

[39] Kinæthon ap. Pausan. ii. 18, 5. Penthilids existed in Lesbos during the historical times (Aristot. Polit. v. 10, 2).

[40] It has sometimes been supposed that the country called Thrace here means the residence of the Thracians near Parnassus; but the length of the journey, and the number of years which it took up, are so specially marked, that I think Thrace in its usual and obvious sense must be intended.

[41] Strabo, xiii. p. 582. Hellanikus seems to have treated of this delay near Mount Phrikium (see Steph. Byz. v. Φρίκιον). In another account (xiii. p. 621), probably copied from the Kymæan Ephorus, Strabo connects the establishments of this colony with the sequel of the Trojan war: the Pelasgians, the occupants of the territory, who had been the allies of Priam, were weakened by the defeat which they had sustained and unable to resist the emigrants.

[42] Velleius Patercul. i. 4: compare Antikleidês ap. Athenæ. xi. c. 3; Pausanias, iii. 2, 1.

[43] Strabo, ix. p. 401.

[44] Strabo, i. p. 10.

[45] Plutarch, Thêseus, c. 24, 25, 26.

[46] Plutarch, Thêseus, c. 34-35.

[47] Eusebius, Chronic. Can. pp. 228-229, ed. Scaliger; Pausan. ii. 18, 7.

[48] Ephorus ap. Harpocration. v. Ἀπατούρια: Ἔφορος ἐν δευτέρῳ, ὡς διὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὁρίων ἀπάτην γενομένην, ὅτι πολεμούντων Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Βοιωτοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Μελαινῶν χώρας, Μέλανθος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βασιλεὺς Ξάνθον τὸν Θηβαῖων μονομαχῶν ἀπέκτεινεν. Compare Strabo, ix. p. 393.

Ephorus derives the term Ἀπατούρια from the words signifying a trick with reference to the boundaries, and assumes the name of this great Ionic festival to have been derived from the stratagem of Melanthus, described

in Conôn (Narrat. 39) and Polyænus (i. 19). The whole derivation is fanciful and erroneous, and the story is a curious specimen of legend growing out of etymology.

[49] The orator Lykurgus, in his eulogium on Kodrus, mentions a Delphian citizen named Kleomantis, who secretly communicated the oracle to the Athenians, and was rewarded by them for doing so with σἰτησις ἐν Πρυτανεἰῳ (Lycurg. cont. Leocrat. c. 20).

[50] Pherekydês, Fragm. 110, ed. Didot; Vell. Paterc. i. 2; Conôn, Narr. 26; Polyæn. i. c. 18.

Hellanikus traced the genealogy of Kodrus, through ten generations, up to Deukaliôn (Fragment 10, ed. Didot.)

[51] Strabo, xiv. p. 653.

[52] Pausan. vii. 2, 1.

[53] Herodot. i. 146; Pausan. vii. 2, 3, 4. Isokratês extols his Athenian ancestors for having provided, by means of this emigration, settlements for so large a number of distressed and poor Greeks at the expense of Barbarians (Or. xii. Panathenaic. p. 241).

[54] Herodot. i. 146; vii. 95; viii 46. Vellei. Paterc. i. 4. Pherekydês Frag. 111, ed. Didot.

[55] Herodot. i. 147; Pausan. vi. 2, 7.

[56] Pausan. vii. 2, 2; vii. 3, 4.

[57] Pausan. vii. 4, 3.

[58] Herodot. iv. 145-149; Valer. Maxim. iv. c. 6; Polyæn. vii. 49, who, however, gives the narrative differently by mentioning "Tyrrhenians from Lemnos aiding Sparta during the Helotic war:" another narrative in his collection (viii. 71), though imperfectly preserved, seems to approach more closely to Herodotus.

[59] Homer, Iliad, xi. 721.

[60] Strabo, viii. p. 347. M. Raoul Rochette, who treats the legends for the most part as if they were so much authentic history, is much displeased with Strabo for admitting this diversity of stories (Histoire des Colonies Grecques, t. iii. ch. 7, p. 54): "Après des détails si clairs et si positifs, comment est-il possible que ce même Strabon, bouleversant toute la chronologie, fasse arriver les Minyens dans la Triphylie sous la conduite de Chloris, mère de Nestor?"

The story which M. Raoul Rochette thus puts aside, is quite equal in point of credibility to that which he accepts: in fact, no measure of credibility can be applied.

[61] Conôn, Narrat. 36. Compare Plutarch, Quæstion. Græc. c. 21, where Tyrrhenians from Lemnos are mentioned, as in the passage of Polyænus, referred to in a preceding note.

[62] Strabo, x. p. 481; Aristot. Polit. ii. 10.

[63] Herodot. vii. 171 (see above, Ch. xii. vol. i. p. 226). Diodôrus (v. 80), as well as Herodotus, mentions generally large emigrations into Krête from Lacedæmôn and Argos; but even the laborious research of M. Raoul Rochette (Histoire des Colonies Grecques, t. iii. c. 9, pp. 60-68) fails in collecting any distinct particulars of them.

[64] Steph. Byz. v. Δώριον.—Περὶ ὧν ἱστορεῖ Ἄνδρων, Κρητὸς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ βασιλεύοντος, Τέκταφον τὸν Δώρου τοῦ Ἕλληνος, ὁρμήσαντα ἐκ τῆς ἐν Θετταλἰᾳ τότε μὲν Δωρίδος, νῦν δὲ Ἰστιαιώτιδος καλουμένης, ἀφικέσθαι εἰς Κρήτην μετὰ Δωριέων τε καὶ Ἀχαιῶν καὶ Πελασγῶν, τῶν οὐκ ἀπαράντων εἰς Τυῤῥηνίαν. Compare Strabo, x. pp. 475-476, from which it is plain that the story was adduced by Andrôn with a special explanatory reference to the passage in the Odyssey (xv. 175.)

The age of Andrôn, one of the authors of Atthidês, is not precisely ascertainable, but he can hardly be put earlier than 300 B. C.; see the preliminary Dissertation of C. Müller to the Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum, ed. Didot, p. lxxxii; and the Prolusio de Atthidum Scriptoribus, prefixed to Lenz's edition of the Fragments of Phanodêmus and Dêmôn, p.xxviii. Lips. 1812.

[65] See Diodôr, iv. 60; v. 80. From Strabo, (*l. c.*) however, we see that others rejected the story of Andrôn.

O. Müller (History of the Dorians, b. i. c. 1, § 9) accepts the story as substantially true, putting aside the name Dôrus, and even regards it as certain that Minos of Knôssus was a Dorian; but the evidence with which he

supports this conclusion appears to me loose and fanciful.

[66] Conôn, Narrat. 47; Ephorus, Fragm. 62, ed. Marx.

[67] Diodôr. v. 59; Apollodôr. iii. 2, 2. In the Chapter next but one preceding this, Diodôrus had made express reference to native Rhodian mythologists,—to one in particular, named Zeno (c. 57).

Wesseling supposes two different settlers in Rhodes, both named Althæmenês: this is certainly necessary, if we are to treat the two narratives as historical.

[68] Strabo, xiv. p. 653; Pausan. ii. 39, 3; Kallimachus apud Stephan. Byz. v. Ἁλικάρνασσος.

Herodotus (vii. 99) calls Halikarnassus a colony of Trœzên; Pomponius Mela (i. 16,) of Argos. Vitruvius names both Argos and Trœzên (ii. 8, 12); but the two œkists whom he mentions, Melas and Arevanius, were not so well known as Anthês; the inhabitants of Halikarnassus being called *Antheadæ* (see Stephan. Byz. v. Ἀθῆναι; and a curious inscription in Boeckh's Corpus Inscriptionum, No. 2655).

[69] "La période qui me semble la plus obscure et la plus remplie de difficultés n'est pas celle que je viens de parcourir: c'est celle qui sépare l'époque des Héraclides de l'institution des Olympiades. La perte des ouvrages d'Ephore et de Théopompe est sans doute la cause en grande partie du vide immense que nous offre dans cet intervalle l'histoire de la Grèce. Mais si l'on en excepte l'établissement des colonies Eoliennes, Doriennes, et Ioniennes, de l'Asie Mineure, et quelques évènemens, très rapprochés de la première de ces époques, l'espace de plus de quatre siècles qui les sépare est couvert d'une obscurité presque impénétrable, et l'on aura toujours lieu de s'étonner que les ouvrages des anciens n'offrent aucun secours pour remplir une lacune aussi considérable. Une pareille absence doit aussi nous faire soupçonner qu'il se passa dans la Grèce peu de ces grands évènemens qui se gravent fortement dans la mémoire des hommes: puisque, si les traces ne s'en étaient point conservées dans les écrits des contemporains, au moins le souvenir s'en seroit il perpétué par des monumens: or les monumens et l'histoire se taisent également. Il faut donc croire que la Grèce, agitée depuis si long temps par des révolutions de toute espèce, épuisée par ses dernières émigrations, se tourna toute entière vers des occupations paisibles, et ne chercha, pendant ce long intervalle, qu'à guérir, au sein du repos et de l'abondance qui en est la suite, les plaies profondes que sa population avait souffertes. (Raoul Rochette, Histoire des Colonies Grecques, t. ii. c. 16. p. 455).

To the same purpose, Gillies (History of Greece, ch. iii. p. 67. quarto): "The obscure transactions of Greece, during the four following centuries ill correspond with the splendor of the Trojan, or even of the Argonautic expedition," etc.

[70] Larcher and Raoul Rochette, adopting the chronological date of Herodotus, fix the taking of Troy at 1270 B. C., and the Return of the Herakleids at 1190 B. C. According to the scheme of Eratosthenês, these two events stand at 1184 and 1104 B. C.

O. Müller, in his Chronological Tables (Appendix vi. to History of Dorians, vol ii. p. 441, Engl. transl.), gives no dates or computation of years anterior to the Capture of Troy and the Return of the Herakleids, which he places with Eratosthenês in 1184 and 1104 B. C.

C. Müller thinks (in his Annotatio ad Marmor Parium, appended to the Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum, ed. Didot, pp. 556, 568, 572; compare his Prefatory notice of the Fragments of Hellanikus, p. xxviii. of the same volume) that the ancient chronologists, in their arrangement of the mythical events as antecedent and consequent, were guided by certain numerical attachments, especially by a reverence for the cycle of 63 years, product of the sacred numbers 7 × 9 = 63. I cannot think that he makes out his hypothesis satisfactorily, as to the particular cycle followed, though it is not improbable that some preconceived numerical theories *did* guide these early calculators. He calls attention to the fact that the Alexandrine computation of dates was only one among a number of others discrepant, and that modern inquirers are too apt to treat it as if it stood alone, or carried some superior authority, (pp. 568-572; compare Clemen. Alex. Stromat. i. p. 145, Sylb.) For example, O. Müller observes, (Appendix to Hist. of Dorians, p. 442,) that "Larcher's criticism and rejection of the Alexandrine chronologists may perhaps be found as groundless as they are presumptuous,"—an observation, which, to say the least of it, ascribes to Eratosthenês a far higher authority than he is entitled to.

[71] The date of Kallimachus for *Iphitus* is approved by Clavier (Prem. Temps, tom. ii. p. 203), who considers it as not far from the truth.

[72] These dates, distinguished from the rest by braces, are proposed as mere conjectures, founded upon the probable length of generations.

[73] Karl Müller observes (in the Dissertation above referred to, appended to the Fragmenta Historicum Græcorum, p. 568): "Quod attinet æram Trojanam, tot obruimur et tam diversis veterum scriptorum computationibus, ut singulas enumerare negotium sit tædii plenum, eas vel probare vel improbare res vana nec vacua ab arrogantiâ. Nam nemo hodie nescit quænam fides his habenda sit omnibus."

[74] The distinction which Mr. Clinton draws between an upward and a downward chronology is one that I am unable to comprehend. His doctrine is, that upward chronology is trustworthy and practicable up to the first recorded Olympiad; downward chronology is trustworthy and practicable from Phorôneus down to the Ionic migration: what is uncertain is, the length of the intermediate line which joins the Ionic migration to the first recorded Olympiad,—the downward and the upward terminus. (See Fasti Hellenici, vol. i. Introduct. p. ix. second edit. and p. 123, ch. vi.)

All chronology must begin by reckoning upwards: when by this process we have arrived at a certain determined era in earlier time, we may from that date reckon downwards, if we please. We must be able to reckon upwards from the present time to the Christian era, before we can employ that event as a fixed point for chronological determinations generally. But if Eratosthenês could perform correctly the upward reckoning from his own time to the fall of Troy, so he could also perform the upward reckoning up to the nearer point of the Ionic migration. It is true that Eratosthenês gives all his statements of time from an older point to a newer (so far at least as we can judge from Clemens Alex. Strom. 1, p. 336); he says "From the capture of Troy to the return of the Herakleids is 80 years; from thence to the Ionic migration, 60 years; then, farther on, to the guardianship of Lykurgus, 159 years; then to the first year of the first Olympiad, 108 years; from which Olympiad to the invasion of Xerxês, 297 years; from whence to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, 48 years," etc. But here is no difference between upward reckoning as high as the first Olympiad, and then downward reckoning for the intervals of time above it. Eratosthenês first found or made some upward reckoning to the Trojan capture, either from his own time or from some time at a known distance from his own: he then assumes the capture of Troy as an era, and gives statements of intervals going downwards to the Peloponnesian war: amongst other statements, he assigns clearly that interval which Mr. Clinton pronounces to be undiscoverable, viz. the space of time between the Ionic emigration and the first Olympiad, interposing one epoch between them. I reject the computation of Eratosthenês, or any other computation, to determine the supposed date of the Trojan war; but, if I admitted it, I could have no hesitation in admitting also the space which he defines between the Ionic migration and the first Olympiad. Eusebius (Præp. Ev. x. 9, p. 485) reckons upwards from the birth of Christ, making various halts, but never breaking off, to the initial phenomena of Grecian antiquity,—the deluge of Deukalion and the conflagration of Phaëtôn.

[75] See the string of fabulous names placed at the head of the Halikarnassian Inscription, professing to enumerate the series of priests of Poseidôn from the foundation of the city (Inscript. No. 2655, Boeckh), with the commentary of the learned editor: compare, also, what he pronounces to be an inscription of a genealogy partially fabulous at Hierapytna in Krête (No. 2563).

The memorable Parian marble is itself an inscription, in which legend and history—gods, heroes, and men—are blended together in the various successive epochs without any consciousness of transition in the mind of the inscriber.

That the Catalogue of Priestesses of Hêrê at Argos went back to the extreme of fabulous times, we may discern by the Fragments of Hellanikus (Frag. 45-53). So also did the registers at Sikyôn: they professed to record Amphion, son of Zeus and Antiopê, as the inventor of harp-music (Plutarch, De Musicâ, c. 3, p. 1132).

I remarked in the preceding page, that Mr. Clinton erroneously cites K. O. Müller as a believer in the chronological *authenticity* of the lists of the early Spartan kings: he says (vol. iii. App. vi. p. 330), "Mr. Müller is of opinion that an *authentic* account of the years of each Lacedæmonian reign from the return of the Heraclidæ to the Olympiad of Korœbus had been preserved to the time of Eratosthenês and Apollodôrus." But this is a mistake; for Müller expressly disavows any belief in the *authenticity* of the lists (Dorians, i. p. 146): he says: "I do not contend that the chronological accounts in the Spartan lists form *an authentic document*, more than those in the catalogue of the priestesses of Hêrê and in the list of Halikarnassian priests. The chronological statements in the Spartan lists may have been formed from imperfect memorials: but the Alexandrine chronologists must have found such tables in existence," &c.

The discrepancies noticed in Herodotus (vi. 52) are alone sufficient to prove that continuous registers of the names of the Lacedæmonian kings did not begin to be kept until very long after the date here assigned by Mr. Clinton.

Xenophôn (Agesilaus, viii. 7) agrees with what Herodotus mentions to have been the native Lacedæmonian story,—that Aristodêmus (and not his sons) was the king who conducted the Dorian invaders to Sparta. What is farther remarkable is, that Xenophôn calls him—Ἀριστόδημος ὁ Ἡρακλέους. The reasonable inference here is, that Xenophôn believed Aristodêmus to be the *son* of Hêraklês, and that this was one of the various genealogical stories current. But here the critics interpose; "ὁ Ἡρακλέους (observes Schneider,) non παῖς, sed ἀπόγονος, ut ex Herodoto, viii. 131, admonuit Weiske." Surely, if Xenophôn had meant this, he would have said ὁ ἀφ᾽ Ἡρακλέους.

Perhaps particular exceptional cases might be quoted, wherein the very common phrase of ὁ, followed by a genitive, means *descendant*, and not *son*. But if any doubt be allowed upon this point, chronological computations, founded on genealogies, will be exposed to a serious additional suspicion. Why are we to assume that Xenophôn *must* give the same story as Herodotus, unless his words naturally tell us so?

[76] See Mr. Clinton's work, pp. 32, 40, 100.

[77] "From these three" (Hyllus, Pamphylus, and Dymas,) says Mr. Clinton, vol. i. ch. 5, p. 109, "the three Dorian tribes derived their names."

[78] Pomponius Mela, iii. 7.

[79] See the preceding volume of this History, Chap. ii. p. 66.

[80] Larcher, Chronologie d'Hérodote, chap. xiv. pp. 352-401.

From the capture of Troy down to the passage of Alexander with his invading army into Asia, the latter a known date of 334 B. C., the following different reckonings were made:—

Phanias	gave	715	years.
Ephorus	″	735	″
Eratosthenês	″	774	″
Timæus Kleitarchus	″	820	″
Duris	″	1000	″

(Clemens Alexand. Strom. i. p. 337.)

Democritus estimated a space of seven hundred and thirty years between his composition of the Μικρὸς Διάκοσμος and the capture of Troy (Diogen. Laërt. ix. 41). Isokratês believed the Lacedæmonians to have been established in Peloponnêsus seven hundred years, and he repeats this in three different passages (Archidam. p. 118; Panathen. p. 275; De Pace, p. 178). The dates of these three orations themselves differ by twenty-four years, the Archidamus being older than the Panathenaïc by that interval; yet he employs the same number of years for each in calculating backwards to the Trojan war, (see Clinton, vol. i. Introd. p. v.) In round numbers, his calculation coincides pretty nearly with the eight hundred years given by Herodotus in the preceding century.

The remarks of Boeckh on the Parian marble generally, in his Corpus Inscriptionum Græc. t. ii. pp. 322-336, are extremely valuable, but especially his criticism on the epoch of the Trojan war, which stands the twenty-fourth in the Marble. The ancient chronologists, from Damastês and Hellanikus downwards, professed to fix not only the exact year, but the exact month, day, and hour in which this celebrated capture took place. [Mr. Clinton pretends to no more than the possibility of determining the event within fifty years, Introduct. p. vi.] Boeckh illustrates the manner of their argumentation.

O. Müller observes (History of the Dorians, t. ii. p. 442, Eng. Tr.), "In reckoning from the migration of the Heraklidæ downward, we follow the Alexandrine chronology, of which it should be observed, that our materials only enable us to restore it to its original state, *not to examine its correctness*."

But I do not see upon what evidence even so much as this can be done. Mr. Clinton, admitting that Eratosthenês fixed his date by conjecture, supposes him to have chosen "a middle point between the longer and shorter computations of his predecessors." Boeckh thinks this explanation unsatisfactory (*l. c.* p. 328).

[81] Καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες φασὶ βασιλεύεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ, οἱ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον, ἐβασιλεύοντο. Ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἑαυτοῖς ἀφομοιοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν (Aristot. Politic. i. 1. 7).

[82] In the pictures of the Homeric Heroes, there is no material difference of character recognized between one race of Greeks and another,—or even between Greeks and Trojans. See Helbig, Die Sittlichen Zustände des Griechischen Heldenalters, part ii. p. 53.

[83] Niebuhr, Römische Geschichte, vol. i. p. 55, 2d edit. "Erkennt man aber, dass aller Ursprung jenseits unserer nur Entwickelung und Fortgang fassenden Begriffe liegt; und beschränkt sich von Stufe auf Stufe im Umfang der Geschichte zurückzugehen, so wird man Völker eines Stammes (das heisst, durch eigenthümliche Art und Sprache identisch) vielfach eben an sich entgegenliegenden Küstenländern antreffen … ohne dass irgend etwas die Voraussetzung erheischte, eine von diesen getrennten Landschaften sei die ursprüngliche Heimath gewesen von wo ein Theil nach der andern gewandert wäre…. Dies ist der Geographie der Thiergeschlechter und der Vegetation analog: deren grosse Bezirke durch Gebürge geschieden werden, and beschränkte Meere einschliessen."

"When we once recognize, however, that *all absolute beginning lies out of the reach of our mental conceptions, which comprehend nothing beyond development and progress*, and when we attempt nothing more than to go back from the later to the earlier stages in the compass of history, we shall often find, on opposite coasts of the same sea, people of one stock (that is, of the same peculiar customs and language,) without being warranted in supposing that either of these separate coasts was the primitive home from whence emigrants crossed over to the other. This is analogous to the geography of animals and plants, whose wide districts are severed by mountains and inclose internal seas."

[84] The Greek name τύραννος cannot be properly rendered *tyrant*; for many of the τύραννοι by no means deserved to be so called, nor is it consistent with the use of language to speak of a mild and well-intentioned tyrant. The word *despot* is the nearest approach which we can make to it, since it is understood to imply that a man has got more power than he ought to have, while it does not exclude a beneficent use of such power by some individuals. It is, however, very inadequate to express the full strength of Grecian feeling which the original word called forth.

[85] The Phæakian king Alkinous (Odyss. vii. 55-65): there are twelve other Phæakian Βασιλῆες, he is himself the thirteenth (viii. 391).

The chief men in the Iliad, and the suitors of Penelopê in the Odyssey, are called usually and indiscriminately both Βασιλῆες and Ἄνακτες; the latter word, however, designates them as men of property and masters of slaves, (analogous to the subsequent word δεσπότης, which word does not occur in Homer, though δέσποινα is found in the Odyssey,) while the former word marks them as persons of conspicuous station in the tribe (see Odyss. i. 393-401; xiv. 63). A chief could only be Βασιλεὺς of freemen; but he might be Ἄναξ either of freemen or of slaves.

Agamemnôn and Menelaus belong to the *most kingly* race (γένος βασιλεύτερον: compare Tyrtæus, Fragm. ix. v. 8, p. 9, ed. Schneidewin) of the Pelopids, to whom the sceptre originally made for Zeus has been given by Hermês (Iliad, ii. 101; ix. 160; x. 239); compare Odyss. xv. 539. The race of Dardanus are the favorite offspring of Zeus, βασιλεύτατον among the Trojans (Iliad, xx. 304). These races are the parallels of the kingly *prosapiæ* called Amali, Asdingi, Gungingi, and Lithingi, among the Goths, Vandals, and Lombards (Jornandes, De Rebus Geticis, c. 14-22; Paul Warnefrid, Gest. Langob. c. 14-21); and the ἀρχικὸν γένος among the Chaonian Epirots (Thucyd. ii. 80).

[86] Odyss. i. 392; xi. 184; xiii. 14; xix. 109.—

Οὐ μὲν γάρ τι κακὸν βασιλεύεμεν· αἶψά τέ οἱ δῶ

Ἄφνειον πέλεται, καὶ τιμηέστερος αὐτός.

Iliad, ix. 154-297 (when Agamemnôn is promising seven townships to Achilles, as a means of appeasing his wrath):—

Ἐν δ᾽ ἄνδρες ναίουσι πολυῤῥῆνες, πολυβοῦται,

Οἵ κέ σε δωτίνῃσι θεὸν ὣς, τιμήσουσι,

Καί σοι ὑπὸ σκήπτρῳ λιπαρὰς τελέουσι θέμιστας.

See Iliad, xii. 312; and the reproaches of Thersitês (ii. 226)—βασιλῆας δωροφάγους (Hesiod, Opp. Di. 38-264).

The Roman kings had a large τέμενος assigned to them,—"agri, arva, et arbusta et pascui læti atque uberes" (Cicero, De Republ. v. 2): the German kings received presents: "Mos est civitatibus (observes Tacitus, respecting the Germans whom he describes, M. G. 15) ultro ac viritim conferre principibus, vel armentorum vel frugum, quod pro honore acceptum etiam necessitatibus subvenit."

The revenue of the Persian kings before Darius consisted only of what were called δῶρα, or presents (Herod. iii. 89): Darius first introduced both the name of tribute and the determinate assessment. King Polydektês, in Seriphos, invites his friends to a festival, the condition of which is that each guest shall contribute to an ἔρανος for his benefit (Pherekydês, Fragm. 26, ed. Didot); a case to which the Thracian banquet prepared by Seuthês affords an exact parallel (Xenophôn, Anab. vii. 3, 16-32: compare Thucyd. ii. 97, and Welcker, Æschyl. Trilogie, p. 381). Such Aids, or Benevolences, even if originally voluntary, became in the end compulsory. In the European monarchies of the Middle Ages, what were called free gifts were more ancient than public taxes: "The feudal Aids (observes Mr. Hallam) are the beginning of taxation, of which they for a long time answered the purpose." (Middle Ages, ch. ii. part i. p. 189.) So about the Aides in the old French Monarchy, "La Cour des Aides avoit été instituée, et sa jurisdiction s'étoit formée, lorsque le domaine des Rois suffisoit à toutes les dépenses de l'Etat, les droits d'Aides étoient alors des supplémens peu considérables et toujours temporaires. Depuis, le domaine des Rois avoit été anéanti: les Aides, au contraire, étoient devenues permanentes et formoient presque la totalité des ressources du trésor." (Histoire de la Fronde, par M. de St. Aulaire, ch. iii. p. 124.)

[87] Ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρασι πατρικαὶ βασιλεῖαι, is the description which Thucydidês gives of these heroic governments (i. 13).

The language of Aristotle (Polit. iii. 10, 1) is much the same: Ἡ βασιλεία—ἡ περὶ τοὺς ἡρωικοὺς χρόνους—αὐτὴ δ᾽ ἦν ἑκόντων μὲν, ἐπί τισι δ᾽ ὡρισμένοις· στρατηγὸς δ᾽ ἦν καὶ δικαστὴς ὁ βασιλεὺς, καὶ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς κύριος.

It can hardly be said correctly, however, that the king's authority was *defined*: nothing can well be more indefinite.

Agamemnôn enjoyed or assumed the power of putting to death a disobedient soldier (Aristot. Polit. iii. 9, 2). The words which Aristotle read in the speech of Agamemnôn in the Iliad—Πὰρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος—are not in our present copies: the Alexandrine critics effaced many traces of the old manners.

[88] Striking phrases on this head are put into the mouth of Sarpêdôn (Iliad, xii. 310-322).

Kings are named and commissioned by Zeus,—Ἐκ δὲ Διὸς βασιλῆες (Hesiod, Theogon. 96; Callimach. Hymn. ad Jov. 79): κρατέρῳ θεράποντε Διὸς is a sort of paraphrase for the kingly dignity in the case of Pelias and Nêleus (Odyss. xi. 255; compare Iliad, ii. 204).

[89] Odysseus builds his own bed and bedchamber, and his own raft (Odyss. xxiii. 188; v. 246-255): he boasts of being an excellent mower and ploughman (xviii. 365-375): for his astonishing proficiency in the athletic contests, see viii. 180-230. Paris took a share in building his own house (Iliad, vi. 314).

[90] Odyss. xi. 496; xxiv. 136-248.

[91] See this prominent meaning of the words ἀγαθὸς, ἐσθλὸς, κακὸς, etc. copiously illustrated in Welcker's excellent Prolegomena to Theognis, sect. 9-16. Camerarius, in his notes on that poet (v. 19,), had already conceived clearly the sense in which these words are used. Iliad, xv. 323. Οἷά τε τοῖς ἀγαθοῖσι παραδρώωσι χέρηες. Compare Hesiod, Opp. Di. 216, and the line in Athenæus, v. p. 178, Αὐτόματοι δ᾽ ἀγαθοὶ δειλῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν.

"*Moralis* illarum vocum vis, et *civilis*—quarum hæc a lexicographis et commentatoribus plurimis fere neglecta est—probe discernendæ erunt. Quod quo facilius fieret, nescio an ubi posterior intellectus valet, majusculâ scribendum fuisset Ἀγαθοὶ et Κακοὶ."

If this advice of Welcker could have been followed, much misconception would have been obviated. The reference of these words to power and not to worth, is their primitive import in the Greek language, descending from the Iliad downward, and determining the habitual designation of parties during the period of active political dispute. The ethical meaning of the word hardly appears until the discussions raised by Socrates, and prosecuted by his disciples; but the primitive import still continued to maintain concurrent footing.

I shall have occasion to touch more largely on this subject, when I come to expound the Grecian political parties. At present, it is enough to remark that the epithets of *good men*, *best men*, habitually applied afterwards to the aristocratical parties, descend from the rudest period of Grecian society.

[92] Aristot. Polit. i. 1, 7.

[93] Καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἴσως ἐβασιλεύοντο πρότερον, ὅτι σπάνιον ἦν εὑρεῖν ἄνδρας διαφέροντας κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τότε μικρὰς οἰκοῦντας πόλεις (Polit. iii. 10, 7); also the same treatise, v. 8, 5, and v. 8, 22. Οὐ γίνονται δ᾽ ἔτι βασιλεῖαι νῦν, etc.

Aristotle handles monarchy far less copiously than either oligarchy or democracy: the tenth and eleventh chapters of his third book, in which he discusses it, are nevertheless very interesting to peruse.

In the conception of Plato, also, the kingly government, if it is to work well, implies a breed superior to humanity to hold the sceptre (Legg. iv. 6. p. 713).

The Athenian dramatic poets (especially Euripidês) often put into the mouths of their heroic characters popular sentiments adapted to the democratical atmosphere of Athens—very different from what we find in Homer.

[94] Βουλὴν δὲ πρῶτον μεγαθύμων ἶζε γερόντων (Iliad, ii. 53): compare x. 195-415. Ἴλου, παλαιοῦ *δημογέροντος* (xi. 371).

[95] Iliad, xviii. 313.—

Ἕκτορι μὲν γὰρ ἐπήνησαν κακὰ μητιόωντι,

Πουλυδάμαντι δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ οὔτις, ὃς ἐσθλὴν φράζετο βουλήν.

Also, xii. 213, where Polydamas says to Hectôr,—

… ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδὲ ἔοικε

Δῆμον ἐόντα παρὲξ ἀγορεύεμεν, οὔτ᾽ ἐνὶ βουλῇ,

Οὔτε ποτ᾽ ἐν πολέμῳ, σὸν δὲ κράτος αἰὲν ἀέξειν.

[96] Iliad, ix. 95-101.

[97] Iliad, vii. 126, Πηλεὺς—Ἐσθλὸς Μυρμιδόνων βουληφόρος ἠδ᾽ ἀγορήτης.

[98] Considerable stress seems to be laid on the necessity that the people in the agora should *sit* down (Iliad, ii. 96): a *standing* agora is a symptom of tumult or terror (Iliad, xviii, 246); an evening agora, to which men come elevated by wine, is also the forerunner of mischief (Odyss. iii. 138).

Such evidences of regular formalities observed in the agora are not without interest.

[99] Iliad, ii. 100.—

… εἴποτ᾽ ἀϋτῆς

Σχοίατ᾽, ἀκούσειαν δὲ διοτρεφέων βασιλήων.

Nitzsch (ad Odyss. ii. 14) controverts this restriction of individual manifestation to the chiefs: the view of O. Müller (Hist. Dorians, b. iii. c. 3) appears to me more correct: such was also the opinion of Aristotle—φησὶ

τοίνυν Ἀριστοτέλης ὅτι ὁ μὲν δῆμος μόνου τοῦ ἀκοῦσαι κύριος ἦν, οἱ δὲ ἡγεμόνες καὶ τοῦ πρᾶξαι (Schol. Iliad, ix. 17): compare the same statement in his Nikomachean Ethics, iii. 5.

[100] See Iliad, ix. 635; Odyss. xi. 419.

[101] Odyss. ii. 25-40.

[102] Odyss. ii. 43, 77, 145.—

Νήποινοί κεν ἔπειτα *δόμων ἔντοσθεν* ὄλοισθε.

[103] A similar character is given of the public assemblies of the early Franks and Lombards (Pfeffel, Histoire du Droit Public en Allemagne, t. i. p. 18; Sismondi, Histoire des Républiques Italiennes, t. i. c. 2, p. 71).

Dionysius of Halikarnassus (ii. 12) pays rather too high a compliment to the moderation of the Grecian heroic kings.

The kings at Rome, like the Grecian heroic kings, began with an ἀρχὴ ἀνυπεύθυνος: the words of Pomponius (De Origine Juris, i. 2,) would be perhaps more exactly applicable to the latter than to the former: "Initio civitatis nostræ Populus sine certâ lege, sine jure certo, primum agere instituit: omniaque manu a Regibus gubernabantur." Tacitus says (Ann. iii. 26), "Nobis Romulus, ut libitum, imperitaverat: dein Numa religionibus et divino jure populum devinxit, repertaque quædam a Tullo et Anco: sed præcipuus Servius Tullius sanctor legum fuit, quis etiam Reges obtemperarent." The appointment of a Dictator under the Republic was a reproduction, for a short and definite interval, of this old unbounded authority (Cicero, De Repub. ii. 32; Zonaras, Ann. vii. 13; Dionys. Hal. v. 75).

See Rubino, Untersuchungen über Römische Verfassung und Geschichte, Cassel, 1839, buch i. abschnitt 2, pp. 112-132; and Wachsmuth, Hellenische Alterthumskunde, i. sect. 18, pp. 81-91.

[104] Iliad, ii. 204. Agamemnôn promises to make over to Achilles seven well-peopled cities, with a body of wealthy inhabitants (Iliad, ix. 153); and Menelaus, if he could have induced Odysseus to quit Ithaka, and settle near him in Argos, would have depopulated one of his neighboring towns in order to make room for him (Odyss. iv. 176).

Manso (Sparta, i. 1, p. 34) and Nitzsch (ad Odyss. iv. 171) are inclined to exclude these passages as spurious,—a proceeding, in my opinion, inadmissible, without more direct grounds than they are able to produce.

[105] Iliad, ii. 74. Πρῶτα δ᾽ ἐγὼν ἔπεσιν πειρήσομαι, etc.

[106] Iliad, ii. 188-196.—

Ὄντινα μὲν βασιλῆα καὶ ἔξοχον ἄνδρα κιχείη,

Τόνδ᾽ ἀγανοῖς ἐπέεσσιν ἐρητύσασκε παραστάς….

Ὃν δ᾽ αὖ δήμου τ᾽ ἄνδρα ἴδοι, βοόωντά τ᾽ ἐφεύροι,

Τὸν σκήπτρῳ ἐλάσασκεν, ὁμοκλήσασκέ τε μύθῳ, etc.

[107] Iliad, ii. 213-277.

[108] Iliad, ii. 284-340. Nor does Thersitês, in his criminatory speech against Agamemnôn, touch in any way upon this anomalous point, though, in the circumstances under which his speech is made, it would seem to be of all others the most natural,—and the sharpest thrust against the commander-in-chief.

[109] See this illustrated in the language of Theseus, Eurip. Supplic. 349-352.

Δόξαι δὲ χρήζω καὶ πόλει πάσῃ τάδε·

Δόξει δ᾽, ἐμοῦ θέλοντος· ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου

Προσδοὺς, ἔχοιμ᾽ ἂν δῆμον εὐμενέστερον.

[110] Xenophôn, Memorab. i. 2, 9.

[111] Aristot. Polit. vii. 6, 1; Hippocrat. De Aëre, Loc. et Aq. v. 85-86; Herodot. vii. 135.

[112] The σκῆπτρον, θέμιστες, or θέμις, and ἀγορὴ, go together, under the presiding superintendence of the gods. The goddess Themis both convokes and dismisses the agora (see Iliad, xi. 806; Odyss. ii. 67; Iliad, xx. 4).

The θέμιστες, commandments and sanctions, belong properly to Zeus (Odyss. xvi. 403); from him they are given in charge to earthly kings along with the sceptre (Iliad, i. 238; ii. 206).

The commentators on Homer recognized θέμις, rather too strictly, as ἀγορᾶς καὶ βουλῆς λέξιν (see Eustath. ad Odyss. xvi. 403).

The presents and the λιπαραὶ θέμιστες (Iliad, ix. 156).

[113] Hesiod, Theogon. 85; the single person judging seems to be mentioned (Odyss. xii. 439).

It deserves to be noticed that, in Sparta, the senate decided accusations of homicide (Aristot. Polit. iii. 1, 7): in historical Athens, the senate of Areiopagus originally did the same, and retained, even when its powers were much abridged, the trial of accusations of intentional homicide and wounding.

Respecting the judicial functions of the early Roman kings, Dionys. Hal. A. R. x. 1. Τὸ μὲν ἀρχαῖον οἱ βασιλεῖς ἐφ᾽ αὐτῶν ἔταττον τοῖς δεομένοις τὰς δίκας, καὶ τὸ δικαιωθὲν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων, τοῦτο νόμος ἦν (compare iv. 25; and Cicero, Republic. v. 2; Rubino, Untersuchungen, i. 2, p. 122).

[114] Iliad, xviii. 504.—

Οἱ δὲ γέροντες

Εἵατ᾽ ἐπὶ ξεστοῖσι λίθοις, ἱερῷ ἐνὶ κύκλῳ.

Several of the old northern Sagas represent the old men, assembled for the purpose of judging, as sitting on great stones in a circle, called the Urtheilsring, or Gerichtsring (Leitfaden der Nördischen Alterthümer, p. 31, Copenhag. 1837).

[115] Homer, Iliad, xviii. 497-510.

[116] Hesiod, Opp. Di. 37.

[117] Hesiod, Opp. Di. 27-33.

[118] Hesiod, Opp. Di. 250-263; Homer, Iliad, xvi. 387.

[119] Tittmann (Darstellung der Griechischen Staatsverfassungen, book ii. p. 63) gives too lofty an idea, in my judgment, of the condition and functions of the Homeric agora.

[120] Iliad, i. 520-527; iv. 14-56; especially the agora of the gods (xx. 16).

[121] Odyss. ix. 114.—

Τοῖσιν δ᾽ (the Cyclôpes) οὔτ᾽ ἀγοραὶ βουληφόροι, οὔτε θέμιστες.

Ἀλλ᾽ οἵγ᾽ ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων ναίουσι κάρηνα

Ἐν σπέσσι γλαφυροῖσι· θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος

Παιδῶν ἠδ᾽ ἀλόχων· οὐδ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσι.

These lines illustrate the meaning of θέμις.

[122] See this point set forth in the prolix discourse of Aristeides, Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς (Or. xlv. vol. ii. p. 99): Ἡσίοδος … ταὐτὰ ἀντικρὺς Ὁμήρῳ λέγων … ὅτι τε ἡ ῥητορικὴ σύνεδρος τῆς βασιλικῆς, etc.

[123] *Pêleus*, king of the Myrmidons, is called (Iliad, vii. 126) Ἐσθλὸς Μυρμιδόνων βουληφόρος ἠδ᾽ ἀγορητὴς—*Diomedes*, ἀγορῇ δέ τ᾽ ἀμείνω (iv. 400)—*Nestôr*, λιγὺς Πυλίων ἀγορητὴς—*Sarpêdôn*, Λυκίων βουληφόρε (v. 633); and *Idomeneus*, Κρητῶν βουληφόρε (xiii. 219).

Hesiod (Theogon. 80-96) illustrates still more amply the *idéal* of the king governing by persuasion and inspired by the Muses.

[124] See the striking picture in Thucydidês (ii. 65). Xenophôn, in the Cyropædia, puts into the mouth of his hero the Homeric comparison between the good king and the good shepherd, implying as it does immense superiority of organization, morality, and intelligence (Cyropæd. viii. p. 450, Hutchinson).

Volney observes, respecting the emirs of the Druses in Syria: "Everything depends on circumstances: if the governor be a man of ability, he is absolute;—if weak, he is a cipher. This proceeds from the want of fixed laws; a want common to all Asia." (Travels in Egypt and Syria, vol. ii. p. 66.) Such was pretty much the condition of the king in primitive Greece.

[125] Nevertheless, the question put by Leotychides to the deposed Spartan king Demaratus,—ὅκοιόν τι εἴη τὸ ἄρχειν μετὰ τὸ βασιλεύειν (Herodot. vi. 65), and the poignant insult which those words conveyed, afford one among many other evidences of the lofty estimate current in Sparta respecting the regal dignity, of which Aristotle, in the Politica, seems hardly to take sufficient account.

[126] O. Müller (Hist. Dorians, book iii. i. 3) affirms that the fundamental features of the royalty were maintained in the Dorian states, and obliterated only in the Ionian and democratical. In this point, he has been followed by various other authors (see Helbig, Die Sittlich. Zustände des Heldenalters, p. 73), but his position appears to me substantially incorrect, even as regards Sparta; and strikingly incorrect, in regard to the other Dorian states.

[127] Cæsar, Bell. Gallic. vi. 12.

[128] Seneca, Epist. xc.; Tacitus. Annal. iii. 26. "Vetustissimi mortalium (says the latter), nullâ adhuc malâ libidine, sine probro, scelere, eoque sine pœnâ aut coërcitione, agebant: neque præmiis opus erat, cum honesta suopte ingenio peterentur; et ubi nihil contra morem cuperent, nihil per metum vetabantur. At postquam exui æqualitas, et pro modestiâ et pudore ambitio et vis incedebat, provenêre dominationes, multosque apud populos æternum mansere," etc. Compare Strabo, vii. p. 301.

These are the same fancies so eloquently set forth by Rousseau, in the last century. A far more sagacious criticism pervades the preface of Thucydidês.

[129] Seuthês, in the Anabasis of Xenophôn (vii. 2, 33), describes how, when an orphan youth, he formerly supplicated Mêdokos, the Thracian king, to grant him a troop of followers, in order that he might recover his lost dominions, ἐκαθεζόμην ἐνδίφριος αὐτῷ ἱκέτης δοῦναί μοι ἄνδρας.

Thucydidês gives an interesting description of the arrival of the exile Themistoklês, then warmly pursued by the Greeks on suspicion of treason, at the house of Admêtus, king of the Epirotic Molossians. The wife of Admêtus herself instructed the fugitive how to supplicate her husband in form: the child of Admêtus was placed in his arms, and he was directed to sit down in this guise close by the consecrated hearth, which was of the nature of an altar. While so seated, he addressed his urgent entreaties to Admêtus for protection: the latter raised him up from the ground and promised what was asked. "That (says the historian) was the most powerful form of supplication." Admêtus,—ἀκούσας ἀνίστησί τε αὐτὸν μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ υἱέος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔχων αὐτὸν ἐκαθέζετο, καὶ

μέγιστον ἱκέτευμα ἦν τοῦτο (Thuc. i. 136). So Têlephus, in the lost drama of Æschylus called Μυσοὶ, takes up the child Orestês. See Bothe's Fragm. 44; Schol. Aristoph. Ach. 305.

In the Odyssey, both Nausikaa and the goddess Athênê instruct Odysseus in the proper form of supplicating Alkinous: he first throws himself down at the feet of queen Arêtê, embracing her knees and addressing to her his prayer, and then, without waiting for a reply, sits down among the ashes on the hearth,—ὣς εἰπὼν, κατ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἕζετ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἐσχάρῃ ἐν κονίῃσι,—Alkinous is dining with a large company: for some time both he and the guests are silent: at length the ancient Echenêus remonstrates with him on his tardiness in raising the stranger up from the ashes. At his exhortation, the Phæakian king takes Odysseus by the hand, and, raising him up, places him on a chair beside him: he then directs the heralds to mix a bowl of wine, and to serve it to every one round, in order that all may make libations to Zeus Hiketêsios. This ceremony clothes the stranger with the full rights and character of a suppliant (Odyss. vi. 310; vii. 75, 141, 166): κατὰ νόμους ἀφικτόρων, Æschyl. Supplic. 242.

That the form counted for a great deal, we see evidently marked: but of course supplication is often addressed, and successfully addressed, in circumstances where this form cannot be gone through.

It is difficult to accept the doctrine of Eustathius (ad Odyss. xvi. 424), that ἱκέτης is a *vox media* (like ξεῖνος), applied as well to the ἱκετάδοχος as to the ἱκέτης, properly so called: but the word ἀλλήλοισιν, in the passage just cited, does seem to justify his observation: yet there is no direct authority for such use of the word in Homer.

The address of Theoclymenos, on first preferring his supplication to Telemachus, is characteristic of the practice (Odyss. xv. 260); compare also Iliad, xvi. 574, and Hesiod. Scut. Hercul. 12-85.

The idea of the ξεῖνος and the ἱκέτης run very much together. I can hardly persuade myself that the reading ἱκέτευσε (Odyss. xi. 520) is truly Homeric: implying as it does the idea of a pitiable sufferer, it is altogether out of place when predicated of the proud and impetuous Neoptolemus: we should rather have expected ἐκέλευσε. (See Odyss. x. 15.)

The constraining efficacy of special formalities of supplication, among the Scythians, is powerfully set forth in the Toxaris of Lucian: the suppliant sits upon an ox-hide, with his hands confined behind him (Lucian, Toxaris c. 48, vol. iii. p. 69, Tauchn.)—the μεγίστη ἱκετηρία among that people.

[130] Iliad, xxiii. 142.

[131] Odyss. xiv. 389.—

> Οὐ γὰρ τοὔνεκ᾽ ἐγώ σ᾽ αἰδέσσομαι, οὐδὲ φιλήσω,
>
> Ἀλλὰ Δία ξένιον δείσας, αὐτὸν δ᾽ ἐλεαίρων.

[132] Nägelsbach (Homerische Theologie, Abschn. v. s. 23) gives a just and well-sustained view of the Homeric ethics: "Es ist der charakteristische Standpunkt der Homerischen Ethik, dass die Sphären des Rechts, der Sittlichkeit, und Religiosität, bey dem Dichter, durchaus noch nicht auseinander fallen, so dass der Mensch z. B. δίκαιος seyn konnte ohne θεουδὴς zu seyn—sondern in unentwickelter Einheit beysammen sind."

[133] Νόμοι, *laws*, is not an Homeric word; νόμος, *law*, in the singular, occurs twice in the Hesiodic Works and Days (276, 388).

The employment of the words δίκη, δίκαι, θέμις, θέμιστες, in Homer, is curious as illustrating the early moral associations, but would require far more space than can be given to it in a note; we see that the sense of each of these words was essentially fluctuating. *Themis*, in Homer, is sometimes decidedly a *person*, who exercises the important function of opening and closing the agora, both of gods and men (Iliad, xx. 4: Odyss. ii. 68), and who, besides that, acts and speaks (Iliad, xiv. 87-93): always the associate and companion of Zeus, the highest god. In Hesiod, (Theog. 901,) she is the wife of Zeus: in Æschylus, (Prometh. 209,) she is the same as Γαῖα: even in Plato, (Legg. xi. p. 936,) witnesses swear (to want of knowledge of matters under inquest) by Zeus, Apollo, and Themis. Themis *as a person* is probably the oldest sense of the word: then we have the plural θέμιστες (connected with the verb τίθεμι, like θεσμὸς and τεθμὸς), which are (not persons, but) special appurtenances or emanations of the supreme god, or of a king acting under him, analogous to and joined with the sceptre. The sceptre, and the θέμιστες or the δίκαι constantly go together (Iliad, ii. 209; ix. 99): Zeus or the king is a judge, not a lawmaker; he issues decrees or special orders to settle particular disputes, or to restrain partic-

ular men; and, agreeable to the concrete forms of ancient language, the decrees are treated as if they were a collection of ready-made substantive things, actually in his possession, like the sceptre, and prepared for being delivered out when the proper occasion arose: δικασπόλοι, οἵτε θέμιστας Πρὸς Διὸς εἰρύαται (Il. i. 238), compared with the two passages last cited: Ἄφρονα τοῦτον ἀνέντας, ὃς οὔτινα οἶδε θέμιστα (Il. v. 761), Ἄγριον, οὔτε δίκας εὖ εἰδότα οὔτε θέμιστας (Odyss. ix. 215). The plural number δίκαι is more commonly used in Homer than the singular: δίκη is rarely used to denote Justice, an an abstract conception; it more often denotes a special claim of right on the part of some given man (Il. xviii. 508). It sometimes also denotes, simply, established custom, or the known lot,—δμώων δίκη, γερόντων, θείων βασιλήων, θεῶν (see Damm's Lexicon, *ad voc.*) θέμις is used in the same manner.

See, upon this matter, Platner, De Notione Juris ap. Homerum, p. 81, and O. Müller, Prolegg. Mythol. p. 121.

[134] Οὐδὲ τοκεῦσι Θρέπτρα φίλοις ἀπέδωκε (Il. iv. 477): θρέπτρα or θρεπτήρια (compare Il. ix. 454; Odyss. ii. 134; Hesiod, Opp. Di. 186).

[135] Aristot. Polit. ii. 5, 11. The ἕδνα, or present given by the suitor to the father, as an inducement to grant his daughter in marriage, are spoken of as very valuable,—ἀπερείσια ἕδνα (Il. xi. 244; xvi. 178; xxii. 472): to grant a daughter without ἕδνα was a high compliment to the intended son-in-law (Il. ix. 141: compare xiii. 366). Among the ancient Germans of Tacitus, the husband gave presents, not to his wife's father, but to herself (Tacit. Germ. c. 18): the customs of the early Jews were in this respect completely Homeric; see the case of Shechem and Dinah (Genesis, xxxiv. 12) and others, etc.; also Mr. Catlin's Letters on the North American Indians, vol. i. Lett. 26, p. 213.

The Greek ἕδνα correspond exactly to the *mundium* of the Lombard and Alemannic laws, which is thus explained by Mr. Price (Notes on the Laws of King Ethelbert, in the Ancient Laws and Institutes of England, translated and published by Mr. Thorpe, vol. i. p. 20): "The Longobardic law is the most copious of all the barbaric codes in its provisions respecting marriage, and particularly so on the subject of the Mund. From that law it appears that the Mundium was a sum paid over to the family of the bride, for transferring the tutelage which they possessed over her to the family of the husband: 'Si quis pro muliere liberâ aut puellâ mundium dederit et ei tradita fuerit ad uxorem,' etc. (ed. Rotharis, c. 183.) In the same sense in which the term occurs in these dooms, it is also to be met with in the Alemannic law: it was also common in Denmark and in Sweden, where the bride was called a mund-bought or a mund-given woman."

According to the 77th Law of King Ethelbert (p. 23), this *mund* was often paid in cattle: the Saxon daughters were πάρθενοι ἀλφεσίβοιαι (Iliad, xviii. 593).

[136] Odyss. i. 430: Iliad, ix. 450: see also Terpstra, Antiquitas Homerica, capp. 17 and 18.

Polygamy appears to be ascribed to Priam, but to no one else (Iliad, xxi. 88).

[137] Odyss. xiv. 202-215: compare Iliad, xi. 102. The primitive German law of succession divided the paternal inheritance among the sons of a deceased father, under the implied obligation to maintain and portion out their sisters (Eichhorn, *Deutsches Privat-Recht*. sect. 330).

[138] Iliad, ii. 362.—

> Ἀφρήτωρ, ἀθέμιστος, ἀνέστιός ἐστιν ἐκεῖνος,
>
> Ὃς πολέμου ἔραται, etc. (Il. ix. 63.)

These three epithets include the three different classes of personal sympathy and obligation: 1. The Phratry, in which a man is connected with father, mother, brothers, cousins, brothers-in-law, clansmen, etc.; 2. The θέμιστες, whereby he is connected with his fellow-men who visit the same agora; 3. His Hestia, or Hearth, whereby he becomes accessible to the ξεῖνος and the ἱκέτης:—

> Τῷ δ᾽ Ὀδυσεὺς ξίφος ὀξὺ καὶ ἄλκιμον ἔγχος ἔδωκεν,
>
> *Ἀρχὴν* ξεινοσύνης προσκηδέος· οὐδὲ τραπέζῃ
>
> Γνώτην ἀλλήλοιν. (Odyss. xxi. 34.)

[139] It must be mentioned, however, that when a chief received a stranger and made presents to him, he reimbursed to himself the value of the presents by collections among the people (Odyss. xiii. 14; xix. 197): ἀργαλέον γὰρ ἕνα προικὸς χαρίσασθαι, says Alkinous.

[140] Odyss. i. 123; iii. 70, etc.

[141] Odyss. xvii. 383.—

Τίς γὰρ δὴ ξεῖνον καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν

Ἄλλον γ᾽ εἰ μὴ τῶνδ᾽, οἳ δημιόεργοι ἔασιν, etc.;

which breathes the plain-spoken shrewdness of the Hesiodic Works and Days, v. 355.

[142] See the illustrative case of Lykaon, in vain craving mercy from Achilles. (Iliad, xxi. 64-97. Ἀντί τοι εἶμ᾽ ἱκέταο, etc.)

Menelaus is about to spare the life of the Trojan Adrastus, who clasps his knees and craves mercy, offering a large ransom,—when Agamemnôn repels the idea of quarter, and kills Adrastus with his own hand: his speech to Menelaus displays the extreme of violent enmity, yet the poet says,—

Ὣς εἰπὼν, παρέπεισεν ἀδελφείου φρένας ἥρως,

Αἴσιμα παρειπών, etc.

Adrastus is not called an ἱκέτης, nor is the expression used in respect to Dolon (Il. x. 456), nor in the equally striking case of Odysseus (Odyss. xiv. 279), when begging for his life.

[143] Odyss. ix. 112-275.

[144] Tacit. German. c. 21. "Quemeunque mortalium arcere tecto, nefas habetur: pro fortunâ quisque apparatis epulis excipit: cum defecêre qui modo hospes fuerat, monstratur hospitii et comes, proximam domum non invitati adeunt: nec interest—pari humanitate accipiuntur. Notum ignotumque, quantum ad jus hospitii, nemo discernit." Compare Cæsar, B. G. vi. 22.

See about the Druses and Arabians, Volney, Travels in Egypt and Syria, vol. ii. p. 76, Engl. Transl.; Niebuhr, Beschreibung von Arabien, Copenh. 1772, pp. 46-49.

Pomponius Mela describes the ancient Germans in language not inapplicable to the Homeric Greeks: "Jus in viribus habent, adeo ut ne latrocinii quidem pudeat: *tantum* hospitibus boni, mitesque supplicibus." (iii. 3.)

"The hospitality of the Indians is well known. It extends even to strangers who take refuge among them. They count it a most sacred duty, from which no one is exempted. Whoever refuses relief to any one, commits a grievous offence, and not only makes himself detested and abhorred by all, but liable to revenge from the offended person. In their conduct towards their enemies they are cruel and inexorable, and, when enraged, bent upon nothing but murder and bloodshed. They are, however, remarkable for concealing their passions, and waiting for a convenient opportunity of gratifying them. But then their fury knows no bounds. If they cannot satisfy their resentment, they will even call upon their friends and posterity to do it. The longest space of time cannot cool their wrath, nor the most distant place of refuge afford security to their enemy." (Loskiel, History of the Mission of the United Brethren among the North American Indians, Part I. ch. 2, p. 15.)

"Charlevoix observes, (says Dr. Ferguson, Essay on Civil Society, Part II. § 2, p. 145,) that the nations among whom he travelled in North America never mentioned acts of generosity or kindness under the notion of duty. They acted from affection, as they acted from appetite, without regard to its consequences. When they had done a kindness, they had gratified a desire: the business was finished, and it passed from the memory. The spirit with which they give or receive presents is the same as that which Tacitus remarks among the ancient Germans: 'Gaudent muneribus, sed nec data imputant, nec acceptis obligantur.' Such gifts are of little consequence, except when employed as the seal of a bargain or a treaty."

Respecting the Morlacchi (Illyrian Sclavonians), the Abbé Fortis says (Travels in Dalmatia, pp. 55-58):—

"The hospitality of the Morlachs is equally conspicuous among the poor as among the opulent. The rich prepares a roasted lamb or sheep, and the poor, with equal cordiality, gives his turkey, milk, honey,—whatever he has. Nor is their generosity confined to strangers, but generally extends to all who are in want…. Friendship is lasting among the Morlacchi. They have even made it a kind of religious point, and tie the sacred bond at the foot of the altar. The Sclavonian ritual contains a particular benediction, for the solemn union of two male or two female friends, in presence of the whole congregation. The male friends thus united are called Pobratimi, and the females Posestreme, which means half-brothers and half-sisters. The duties of the Pobratimi are, to assist each other in every case of need and danger, to revenge mutual wrongs, etc.: their enthusiasm is often carried so far as to risk, and even lose their life…. But as the friendships of the Morlacchi are strong and sacred, so their quarrels are commonly unextinguishable. They pass from father to son, and the mothers fail not to put their children in mind of their duty to revenge their father, if he has had the misfortune to be killed, and to show them often the bloody shirt of the deceased…. A Morlach is implacable, if injured or insulted. With him, revenge and justice have exactly the same meaning, and truly it is the primitive idea, and I have been told that in Albania the effects of revenge are still more atrocious and more lasting. There, a man of the mildest character is capable of the most barbarous revenge, believing it to be his positive duty…. A Morlach who has killed another of a powerful family is commonly obliged to save himself by flight, and keep out of the way for several years. If during that time he has been fortunate enough to escape the search of his pursuers, and has got a small sum of money, he endeavors to obtain pardon and peace…. It is the custom in some places for the offended party to threaten the criminal, holding all sorts of arms to his throat, and at last to consent to accept his ransom."

Concerning the influence of these two distinct tendencies—devoted personal friendship and implacable animosities—among the Illyrico-Sclavonian population, see Cyprien Robert, Les Slaves de la Turquie, ch. vii. pp. 42-46, and Dr. Joseph Müller, Albanien, Rumelien, und die Œsterreichisch-Montenegrenische Gränze, Prag. 1844, pp. 24-25.

"It is for the virtue of hospitality (observes Goguet, Origin of Laws, etc. vol. i. book vi. ch. iv.), that the primitive times are chiefly famed. But, in my opinion, hospitality was then exercised, not so much from generosity and greatness of soul, as from necessity. Common interest probably gave rise to that custom. In remote antiquity, there were few or no public inns: they entertained strangers, in order that they might render them the same service, if they happened to travel into their country. Hospitality was reciprocal. When they received strangers into their houses, they acquired a right of being received into theirs again. This right was regarded by the ancients as sacred and inviolable, and extended not only to those who had acquired it, but to their children and posterity. Besides, hospitality in these times could not be attended with much expense: men travelled but little. In a word, the modern Arabians prove that hospitality may consist with the greatest vices, and that this species of generosity is no decisive evidence of goodness of heart, or rectitude of manners."

The book of Genesis, amidst many other features of resemblance to the Homeric manners, presents that of ready and exuberant hospitality to the stranger.

[145] Respecting the Thracians, compare Herodot. v. 11; Thucydid. vii. 29-30. The expression of the latter historian is remarkable,—τὸ δὲ γένος τῶν Θρᾳκῶν, ὁμοῖα τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ βαρβαρικοῦ, *ἐν ᾧ ἂν θαρσήσῃ, φονικώτατόν ἐστι*.

Compare Herodot. viii. 116; the cruelty of the Thracian king of the Bisaltæ towards his own sons.

The story of Odysseus to Eumæus in the Odyssey (xiv. 210-226) furnishes a valuable comparison for this predatory disposition among the Thracians. Odysseus there treats the love of living by war and plunder as his own peculiar taste: he did not happen to like regular labor, but the latter is not treated in any way mean or unbecoming a freeman:—

ἔργον δέ μοι οὐ φίλον ἦεν

Οὐδ᾽ οἰκωφελίη, ἥ τε τρέφει ἀγλαὰ τέκνα, etc.

[146] Ilias Minor, Fragm. 7, p. 18, ed. Düntzer; Iliad, xxiii. 175. Odysseus is mentioned once as obtaining poison for his arrows (Odyss. i. 160), but no poisoned arrows are ever employed in either of the two poems.

The anecdotes recounted by the Scythian Toxaris in Lucian's work so entitled (vol. ii. c. 36, p. 544, *seqq.* ed. Hemst.) afford a vivid picture of this combination of intense and devoted friendship between individuals, with

the most revolting cruelty of manners. "You Greeks live in peace and tranquillity," observes the Scythian,—παρ᾽ ἡμῖν δὲ συνεχεῖς οἱ πόλεμοι, καὶ ἢ ἐπελαύνομεν ἄλλοις, ἢ ὑποχωροῦμεν ἐπιόντας, ἢ συμπεσόντες ὑπὲρ νομῆς ἢ λείας μαχόμεθα· *ἔνθα μάλιστα δεῖ φίλων ἀγαθῶν*, etc.

[147] Odyss. xxi. 397; Pherekydês, Fragm. 63, ed. Didot; Autolykus, πλεῖστα κλέπτων ἐθησαύριζεν. The Homeric Hymn to Hermês (the great patron-god of Autolykus) is a farther specimen of the admiration which might be made to attach to clever thieving.

The ἡμερόκοιτος ἀνὴρ, likely to rob the farm, is one great enemy against whom Hesiod advises precaution to be taken,—a sharp-toothed dog, well-fed, to serve as guard (Opp. Di. 604).

[148] Iliad, xi. 624; xx. 189. Odyss. iv. 81-90; ix. 40; xiv. 230; and the indirect revelation (Odyss. xix. 284), coupled with a compliment to the dexterity of Odysseus.

[149] Even in the century prior to Thucydidês, undistinguishing plunder at sea, committed by Greek ships against ships not Greek, seems not to have been held discreditable. The Phokæan Dionysius, after the ill-success of the Ionic revolt, goes with his three ships of war to Sicily, and from thence plunders Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians (Herod. vi. 17).—ληϊστὴς κατεστήκεε, Ἑλλήνων μὲν οὐδενὸς, Καρχηδονίων δὲ καὶ Τυρσηνῶν. Compare the conduct of the Phokæan settlers at Alalia in Corsica, after the conquest of Ionia by Harpagus (Herodot. i. 166).

In the treaty between the Romans and Carthaginians, made at some period subsequent to 509 B. C., it is stipulated,—Τοῦ Καλοῦ Ἀκρωτηρίου, Μαστίας, Ταρσηΐου, μὴ λῃΐζεσθαι ἐπέκεινα Ῥωμαίους μηδ᾽ ἐμπορεύεσθαι, μηδὲ πόλιν κτίζειν (Polyb. iii. 24, 4). Plunder, commerce, and colonization, are here assumed as the three objects which the Roman ships would pursue, unless they were under special obligation to abstain, in reference to foreigners. This morality approaches nearer to that of the Homeric age, than to the state of sentiment which Thucydides indicates as current in his day among the Greeks.

[150] See the interesting boastfulness of Nestôr, Iliad, xi. 670-700; also Odyss. xxi. 18; Odyss. iii. 71; Thucyd. i. 5.

[151] Odyss. iv. 165, among many other passages. Telemachus laments the misfortune of his race, in respect that himself, Odysseus, and Laërtês were all only sons of their fathers: there were no brothers to serve as mutual auxiliaries (Odyss. xvi. 118).

[152] Opp. Di. 182-199:—

Οὐδὲ πατὴρ παίδεσσιν ὁμοιΐος, οὐδέ τι παῖδες,

Οὐδὲ ξεῖνος ξεινοδόκῳ, καὶ ἑταῖρος ἑταίρῳ,

Οὐδὲ κασίγνητος φίλος ἔσσεται, ὡς τὸ πάρος περ,

Αἶψα δὲ γηράσκοντας ἀτιμήσουσι τοκῆας, etc.

[153] Iliad, xxii. 487-500. Hesiod dwells upon injury to orphan children, however, as a heinous offence (Opp. Di. 330).

[154] Iliad, xxii. 371. οὐδ᾽ ἄρα οἵ τις ἀνούτητί γε παρέστη. Argument of Iliad. Minor. ap. Düntzer, Epp. Fragm. p. 17; Virgil, Æneid, vi. 520.

Both Agamemnôn and the Oiliad Ajax cut off the heads of slain warriors, and send them rolling like a ball or like a mortar among the crowd of warriors (Iliad, xi. 147; xiii. 102).

The ethical maxim preached by Odysseus in the Odyssey, not to utter boastful shouts over a slain enemy (Οὐκ ὁσίη, κταμένοισιν ἐπ᾽ ἀνδράσιν εὐχετάασθαι, xxii. 412), is abundantly violated in the Iliad.

[155] Herodot. ix. 78-79. Contrast this strong expression from Pausanias, with the conduct of the Carthaginians towards the end of the Peloponnesian war, after their capture of Selinus in Sicily, where, after having put to death 16,000 persons, they mutilated the dead bodies,—κατὰ τὸ πάτριον ἔθος (Diodôr. xiii. 57-86).

[156] The Mosaic law recognizes this habit and duty on the part of the relatives of the murdered man, and provides cities of refuge for the purpose of sheltering the offender in certain cases (Deuteron. xxxv. 13-14;

Bauer, Handbuch der Hebraïschen Alterthümer, sect. 51-52).

The relative who inherited the property of a murdered man was specially obliged to avenge his death (H. Leo, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte des Jüdischen Staats.—Vorl. iii. p. 35).

[157] "Suscipere tam inimicitias, seu patris, seu propinqui, quam amicitias, necesse est. Nec implacabiles durant: luitur enim etiam homicidium certo pecorum armentorumque numero, recipitque satisfactionem universa domus." (Tacit. German. 21.) Niebuhr, Beschreibung von Arabien, p. 32.

"An Indian feast (says Loskiel, Mission of the United Brethren in North America,) is seldom concluded without bloodshed. For the murder of a man one hundred yards of wampum, and for that of a woman two hundred yards, must be paid by the murderer. If he is too poor, which is commonly the case, and his friends cannot or will not assist him, he must fly from the resentment of the relations."

Rogge (Gerichtswesen der Germanen, capp. 1, 2, 3), Grimm (Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer, book v. cap. 1-2), and Eichhorn (Deutsches Privat-Recht. sect. 48) have expounded this idea, and the consequences deduced from it among the ancient Germans.

Aristotle alludes, as an illustration of the extreme silliness of ancient Greek practices (εὐήθη πάμπαν), to a custom which he states to have still continued at the Æolic Kymê, in cases of murder. If the accuser produced in support of his charge a certain number of witnesses from his own kindred, the person was held peremptorily guilty,—οἷον ἐν Κύμῃ περὶ τὰ φονικὰ νόμος ἔστιν, ἂν πλῆθός τι παράσχηται μαρτύρων ὁ διώκων τὸν φόνον τῶν αὐτοῦ συγγενῶν, ἔνοχον εἶναι τῷ φόνῳ τὸν φεύγοντα (Polit. ii. 5, 12). This presents a curious parallel with the old German institution of the Eideshelfern, or conjurators, who, though most frequently required and produced in support of the party accused, were yet also brought by the party accusing. See Rogge, sect. 36, p. 186; Grimm, p. 862.

[158] The word ποινὴ indicates this *satisfaction by valuable payment* for wrong done, especially for homicide: that the Latin word *pœna* originally meant the same thing, may be inferred from the old phrases *dare pœnas, pendere pœnas*. The most illustrative passage in the Iliad is that in which Ajax, in the embassy undertaken to conciliate Achilles, censures by comparison the inexorable obstinacy of the latter in setting at naught the proffered presents of Agamemnôn (Il. ix. 627):—

Νηλής· καὶ μὲν τίς τε κασιγνήτοιο φόνοι
Ποινὴν, ἢ οὗ παιδὸς ἐδέξατο τεθνειῶτος·
Καί ῥ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἐν δήμῳ μένει αὐτοῦ, πολλ᾽ ἀποτίσας·
Τοῦ δέ τ᾽ ἐρητύεται κραδίη καὶ θύμος ἀγήνωρ,
Ποινὴν δεξαμένου….

The ποινὴ is, in its primitive sense, a genuine payment in valuable commodities serving as compensation (Iliad, iii. 290; v. 266; xiii. 659): but it comes by a natural metaphor to signify the death of one or more Trojans, as a satisfaction for that of a Greek warrior who had just fallen (or *vice versâ*, Iliad, xiv. 483; xvi. 398); sometimes even the notion of compensation generally (xvii. 207). In the representation on the shield of Achilles, the genuine proceeding about ποινὴ clearly appears: the question there tried is, whether the payment stipulated as satisfaction for a person slain, has really been made or not,—δύο δ᾽ ἄνδρες ἐνείκεον εἵνεκα ποινῆς Ἀνδρὸς ἀποφθιμένου, etc. (xviii. 498.)

The danger of an act of homicide is proportioned to the number and power of the surviving relatives of the slain; but even a small number is sufficient to necessitate flight (Odyss. xxiii. 120): on the other hand, a large body of relatives was the grand source of encouragement to an insolent criminal (Odyss. xviii. 141).

An old law of Tralles in Lydia, enjoining a nominal ποινὴ of a medimnus of beans to the relatives of a murdered person belonging to a contemptible class of citizens, is noticed by Plutarch, Quæst. Græc. c. 46, p. 302. Even in the century preceding Herodotus, too, the Delphians gave a ποινὴ as satisfaction for the murder of the fabulist Æsop; which ποινὴ was claimed and received by the grandson of Æsop's master (Herodot. ii. 134. Plutarch. Ser. Num. Vind. p. 556).

[159] See Lysias, De Cæde Eratosthen. Orat. i. p. 94; Plutarch. Solon, c. 23; Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. pp. 632-637.

Plato (De Legg. ix. pp. 871-874), in his copious penal suggestions to deal with homicide, both intentional and accidental, concurs in general with the old Attic law (see Matthiæ, Miscellanea Philologica, vol. i. p. 151): and as he states with sufficient distinctness the grounds of his propositions, we see how completely the idea of a right to private or family revenge is absent from his mind. In one particular case, he confers upon kinsmen the privilege of avenging their murdered relative (p. 871); but generally, he rather seeks to enforce upon them strictly the duty of bringing the suspected murderer to trial before the court. By the Attic law, it was only the kinsmen of the deceased who had the right of prosecuting for murder,—or the master, if the deceased was an οἰκέτης (Demosthen. cont. Euerg. et Mnesibul. c. 18); they might by forgiveness shorten the term of banishment for the unintentional murderer (Demosth. cont. Makart. p. 1069). They seem to have been regarded, generally speaking, as religiously obliged, but not legally compellable, to undertake this duty; compare Plato, Euthyphro, capp. 4 and 5.

[160] Lysias, cont. Agorat. Or. xiii. p. 137. Antiphon. Tetralog. i. 1, p. 629. Ἀσύμφορον δ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐστὶ τόνδε, μιαρὸν καὶ ἄναγνον ὄντα, εἰς τὰ τεμένη τῶν θεῶν εἰσιόντα μιαίνειν τὴν ἁγνειαν αὐτῶν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς αὐτὰς τραπέζας ἰόντα συγκαταπιμπλάναι τοὺς ἀναιτίους· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων αἵ τε ἀφορίαι γίνονται, δυστυχεῖς θ᾽ αἱ πράξεις καθίστανται.

The three Tetralogies of Antipho are all very instructive respecting the legal procedure in cases of alleged homicide: as also the Oration De Cæde Herodis (see capp. 1 and 2)—τοῦ νόμου κειμένου, τὸν ἀποκτείναντα ἀνταποθανεῖν, etc.

The case of the Spartan Drakontius, one of the Ten Thousand Greeks who served with Cyrus the younger, and permanently exiled from his country in consequence of an involuntary murder committed during his boyhood, presents a pretty exact parallel to the fatal quarrel of Patroklus at dice, when a boy, with the son of Amphidamas, in consequence of which he was forced to seek shelter under the roof of Pêleus (compare Iliad, xxiii. 85, with Xenoph. Anabas. iv. 8, 25).

[161] Odyss. xvii. 384; xix. 135. Iliad, iv. 187; vii. 221. I know nothing which better illustrates the idea of the Homeric δημιοεργοί,—the herald, the prophet, the carpenter, the leech, the bard, etc.,—than the following description of the structure of an East Indian village (Mill's History of British India, b. ii. c. 5, p. 266): "A village, politically considered, resembles a corporation or township. Its proper establishment of *officers and servants* consists of the following descriptions: the potail, or head inhabitant, who settles disputes and collects the revenue, etc.; the curnum, who keeps the accounts of cultivation, etc.; the tallier; the boundary-man; the superintendent of tanks and water-courses; the Brahman, who performs the village worship; the schoolmaster; the calendar Brahman, or astrologer, who proclaims the lucky or unpropitious periods for sowing or thrashing; the smith and carpenter; the potter; the washerman; the barber; the cowkeeper; the doctor; the dancing-girl, who attends at rejoicings; the musician, and the poet."

Each of these officers and servants (δημιοεργοί) is remunerated by a definite perquisite—so much landed produce—out of the general crop of the village (p. 264).

[162] Iliad, xii. 421; xxi. 405.

[163] Iliad, i. 155; ix. 154; xiv. 122.

[164] Odysseus and other chiefs of Ithaka had oxen, sheep, mules, etc., on the continent and in Peloponnêsus, under the care of herdsmen (Odyss. iv. 636; xiv. 100).

Leukanor, king of Bosporus, asks the Scythian Arsakomas—Πόσα δὲ βοσκήματα, ἢ πόσας ἁμάξας ἔχεις, ταῦτα γὰρ ὑμεῖς πλουτεῖτε; (Lucian, Toxaris, c. 45.) The enumeration of the property of Odysseus would have placed the βοσκήματα in the front line.

[165] Δμωαὶ δ᾽ ἂς Ἀχιλεὺς *ληΐσσατο* (Iliad, xviii. 28: compare also Odyss. i. 397; xxiii. 357; particularly xvii. 441).

[166] Odyss. xiv. 64; xv. 412; see also xix. 78: Eurykleia was also of dignified birth (i. 429). The questions put by Odysseus to Eumæus, to which the speech above referred to is an answer, indicate the proximate causes of slavery: "Was the city of your father sacked? or were you seized by pirates when alone with your sheep and oxen?" (Odyss. xv. 385.)

Eumæus had purchased a slave for himself (Odyss. xiv. 448).

[167] Tacitus, Mor. Germ. 21. "Dominum ac servum nullis educationis deliciis dignoscas: inter eadem pecora, in eâdem humo, degunt," etc. (Juvenal, Sat. xiv. 167.)

[168] Odyss. vii. 104; xx. 116; Iliad vi. 457; compare the Book of Genesis, ch. xi. 5. The expression of Telemachus, when he is proceeding to hang up the female slaves who had misbehaved, is bitterly contemptuous:—

Μὴ μὲν δὴ *καθαρῷ θανάτῳ* ἀπὸ θυμὸν ἑλοίμην

Τάων, etc. (Odyss. xxii. 464.)

The humble establishment of Hesiod's farmer does not possess a mill; he has nothing better than a wooden pestle and mortar for grinding or bruising the corn; both are constructed, and the wood cut from the trees, by his own hand (Opp. Di. 423), though it seems that a professional carpenter ("the servant of Athênê,") is required to put together the plough (v. 430). The Virgilian poem *Moretum*, (v. 24,) assigns a hand-mill even to the humblest rural establishment. The instructive article "Corn Mills," in Beckmann's Hist. of Inventions (vol. i. p. 227, Eng. transl.), collects all the information available about this subject.

[169] See Lysias, Or. 1, p. 93 (De Cæde Eratosthenis). Plutarch (Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 21, p. 1101),—*Παχυσκελὴς* ἀλετρὶς πρὸς μύλην κινουμένη,—and Kallimachus, (Hymn. ad Delum, 242,)—μηδ᾽ ὅθι δειλαὶ Δυστοκέες μογέουσιν ἀλετρίδες,—notice the overworked condition of these women.

The "grinding slaves" (ἀλετρίδες) are expressly named in one of the Laws of Ethelbert, king of Kent, and constitute the second class in point of value among the female slaves (Law xi. Thorpe's Ancient Laws and Institutes of England, vol. i. p. 7).

[170] Odyss. iv. 131; xix. 235.

[171] Odyss. vi. 96; Hymn, ad Dêmêtr. 105.

[172] Herodot. viii. 137.

[173] Odyss. iv. 643.

[174] Odyss. xiv. 64.

[175] Compare Odyss. xi. 490, with xviii. 358. Klytæmnêstra, in the *Agamemnôn* of Æschylus, preaches a something similar doctrine to Kassandra,—how much kinder the ἀρχαιόπλουτοι δεσποταὶ were towards their slaves, than masters who had risen by unexpected prosperity (Agamemn. 1042).

[176] Thucydid. i. 5, ἐτράποντο πρὸς λῃστειαν, ἡγουμένων ἀνδρῶν οὐ τῶν ἀδυνατωτάτων, κέρδους τοῦ σφετέρου αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενέσι τροφῆς.

[177] Hesiod, Opp. Di. 459—ἐφορμηθῆναι, ὁμῶς δμῶές τε καὶ αὐτὸς—and 603:—

… Αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν δὴ

Πάντα βίον κατάθηαι ἐπήρμενον ἔνδοθι οἴκου,

Θῆτά τ᾽ ἄοικον ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ ἄτεκνον ἔριθον

Δίζεσθαι κέλομαι· χαλεπὴ δ᾽ ὑπόπορτις ἔριθος.

The two words *ἄοικον ποιεῖσθαι* seem here to be taken together in the sense of "dismiss the Thête," or "make him houseless;" for when put out of his employer's house, he had no residence of his own. Göttling (*ad loc.*), Nitzsch (ad Odyss. iv. 643), and Lehrs (Quæst. Epic. p. 205) all construe ἄοικον with θῆτα, and represent Hesiod as advising that the houseless Thête should be at that moment *taken on*, just at the time when the summer's work was finished. Lehrs (and seemingly Göttling also), sensible that this can never have been the real meaning of the poet, would throw out the two lines as spurious. I may remark farther that the translation of θὴς

given by Göttling—*villicus*—is inappropriate: it includes the idea of superintendence over other laborers, which does not seem to have belonged to the Thête in any case.

There were a class of poor free women who made their living by taking in wool to spin and perhaps to weave: the exactness of their dealing, as well as the poor profit which they made, are attested by a touching Homeric simile (Iliad, xiii. 434). See Iliad, vi. 289; xxiii. 742. Odyss. xv. 414.

[178] Herodot. iv. 151. Compare Ukert, Geographie der Griechen und Römer, part i. pp. 16-19.

[179] Odyss. xx. 383; xxiv. 210. The identity of the Homeric Scheria with Korkyra, and that of the Homeric Thrinakia with Sicily, appear to me not at all made out. Both Welcker and Klausen treat the Phæakians as purely mythical persons (see W. C. Müller, De Corcyræorum Republicâ, Götting. 1835, p. 9).

[180] Herodot. i. 163.

[181] Nitzsch. ad Odyss. i. 181; Strabo, i. p. 6. The situation of Temesa, whether it is to be placed in Italy or in Cyprus, has been a disputed point among critics, both ancient and modern.

[182] Odyss. xv. 426. Τάφιοι, λῃΐστορες ἄνδρες; and xvi. 426. Hymn to Dêmêtêr, v. 123.

[183] Hesiod. Opp. Di. 615-684; Thucyd. i. 13.

[184] Odyss. xiv. 290; xv. 416.—

Φοίνιξ ἦλθεν ἀνὴρ, ἀπατήλια εἰδὼς,

Τρώκτης, ὃς δὴ πολλὰ κάκ᾽ ἀνθρώποισιν ἐώργει.

The interesting narrative given by Eumæus, of the manner in which he fell into slavery, is a vivid picture of Phœnician dealing (compare Herodot. i. 2-4. Iliad, vi. 290; xxiii. 743). Paris is reported to have visited Sidon, and brought from thence women eminent for skill at the loom. The Cyprian Verses (see the Argument. ap. Düntzer, p. 17) affirmed that Paris had landed at Sidon, and attacked and captured the city. Taphian corsairs kidnapped slaves at Sidon (Odyss. xv. 424).

The ornaments or trinkets (ἀθύρματα) which the Phœnician merchant carries with him, seem to be the same as the δαίδαλα πολλὰ, Πόρπας τε γναμπτάς θ᾽ ἕλικας, etc. which Hêphæstus was employed in fabricating (Iliad, xviii. 400) under the protection of Thetis.

"Fallacissimum esse genus Phœnicum omnia monumenta vetustatis atque omnes historiæ nobis prodiderunt." (Cicero, Orat. Trium. partes ineditæ, ed. Maii, 1815, p. 13.)

[185] Ivory is frequently mentioned in Homer, who uses the word ἐλέφας exclusively to mean that substance, not to signify the animal.

The art of dyeing, especially with the various shades of purple, was in after-ages one of the special excellences of the Phœnicians: yet Homer, where he alludes in a simile to dyeing or staining, introduces a Mæonian or Karian woman as the performer of the process, not a Phœnician (Iliad, iv. 141).

What the *electrum* named in the Homeric poems really is cannot be positively determined. The word in antiquity meant two different things: 1, amber; 2, an impure gold, containing as much as one-fifth or more of silver (Pliny, H. N. xxxiii. 4). The passages in which we read the word in the Odyssey do not positively exclude either of these meanings; but they present to us electrum so much in juxtaposition with gold and silver each separately, that perhaps the second meaning is more probable than the first. Herodotus understands it to mean *amber* (iii. 115): Sophoklês, on the contrary, employs it to designate a metal akin to gold (Antigone, 1033).

See the dissertation of Buttmann, appended to his collection of essays called *Mythologus*, vol. ii. p. 337; also, Beckmann, History of Inventions, vol. iv. p. 12, Engl. Transl. "The ancients (observes the latter) used as a peculiar metal a mixture of gold and silver, because they were not acquainted with the art of separating them, and gave it the name of *electrum*." Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. of Greece, vol. i. p. 241) thinks that the Homeric *electrum* is amber; on the contrary, Hüllmann thinks that it was a metallic substance (Handels, Geschichte der Griechen, pp. 63-81).

Beckmann doubts whether the oldest κασσίτερος of the Greeks was really *tin*: he rather thinks that it was "the *stannum* of the Romans, the *werk* of our smelting-houses,—that is, a mixture of lead, silver, and other accidental metals." (*Ibid.* p. 20). The Greeks of Massalia procured tin from Britain, through Gaul, by the Seine, the Saone, and the Rhone (Diodôr. v. 22).

[186] Herodot. ii. 44; vi. 47. Archiloch. Fragm. 21-22, ed. Gaisf. Œnomaus ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. vi. 7. Thucyd. i. 12.

The Greeks connected this Phœnician settlement in Thasus with the legend of Kadmus and his sister Eurôpa: Thasus, the eponymus of the island, was brother of Kadmus. (Herod. *ib.*)

[187] The angry Laomedôn threatens when Poseidôn and Apollo ask from him (at the expiration of their term of servitude) the stipulated wages of their labor, to cut off their ears and send them off to some distant islands (Iliad, xxi. 454). Compare xxiv. 752. Odyss. xx. 383: xviii. 83.

[188] Odyss. iv. 73; vii. 85; xxi. 61. Iliad, ii. 226; vi. 47.

[189] See Millin, Minéralogie Homerique, p. 74. That there are, however, modes of tempering copper, so as to impart to it the hardness of steel, has been proved by the experiments of the Comte de Caylus.

The Massagetæ employed only copper—no iron—for their weapons (Herodot. i. 215).

[190] Hesiod, Opp. Di. 150-420. The examination of the various matters of antiquity discoverable throughout the north of Europe, as published by the Antiquarian Society of Copenhagen, recognizes a distinction of three successive ages: 1. Implements and arms of stone, bone, wood, etc.: little or no use of metals at all; clothing made of skins. 2. Implements and arms of copper and gold, or rather bronze and gold; little or no silver or iron. Articles of gold and electrum are found belonging to this age, but none of silver, nor any evidences of writing. 3. The age which follows this has belonging to it arms of iron, articles of silver, and some Runic inscriptions: it is the last age of northern paganism, immediately preceding the introduction of Christianity (Leitfaden zur Nördischen Alterthumskunde, pp. 31, 57, 63, Copenhagen, 1837).

The Homeric age coincides with the second of these two periods. Silver is comparatively little mentioned in Homer, while both bronze and gold are familiar metals. Iron also is rare, and seems employed only for agricultural purposes—Χρυσόν τε, χαλκόν τε ἅλις, ἐσθῆτα θ᾽ ὑφαντήν (Iliad, vi. 48; Odyss. ii. 338; xiii. 136). The χρυσοχόος and the χαλκεὺς are both mentioned in Homer, but workers in silver and iron are not known by any special name (Odyss. iii. 425-436).

"The hatchet, wimble, plane, and level, are the tools mentioned by Homer, who appears to have been unacquainted with the saw, the square, and the compass." (Gillies, Hist. of Greece, chap. ii. p. 61.)

The Gauls, known to Polybius, seemingly the Cisalpine Gauls only, possessed all their property in cattle and gold,—θρέμματα καὶ χρυσὸς,—on account of the easy transportability of both (Polyb. ii. 17).

[191] Tyrtæus, in his military expressions, seems to conceive the Homeric mode of hurling the spear as still prevalent,—δόρυ δ᾽ εὐτόλμως *βάλλοντες* (Fragm. ix. Gaisford). Either he had his mind prepossessed with the Homeric array, or else the close order and conjunct spears of the hoplites had not yet been introduced during the second Messenian war.

Thiersch and Schneidewin would substitute πάλλοντες in place of βάλλοντες. Euripidês (Androm. 695) has a similar expression, yet it does not apply well to hoplites; for one of the virtues of the hoplite consisted in carrying his spear steadily: δοράτων κίνησις betokens a disorderly march, and the want of steady courage and self-possession. See the remarks of Brasidas upon the ranks of the Athenians under Kleon at Amphipolis (Thucyd. v. 6).

[192] Euripid. Andromach. 696.

[193] Ἡ παλαιὰ πόλις in Ægina (Herodot. vi. 88); Ἀστυπάλαια in Samus (Polyæn. i. 23. 2; Etymol. Magn. v. Ἀστυπάλαια): it became seemingly the acropolis of the subsequent city.

About the deserted sites in the lofty regions of Krête, see Theophrastus, De Ventis, v. 13, ed. Schneider, p. 762.

The site of Παλαίσκηψις in Mount Ida,—ἐπάνω Κέβρηνος κατὰ τὸ μετεωρότατον τῆς Ἴδης (Strabo, xiii. p. 607); ὕστερον δὲ κατωτέρω σταδίοις ἑξήκοντα εἰς τὴν νῦν Σκῆψιν μετῳκίσθησαν. Paphos in Cyprus was the

same distance below the ancient Palæ-Paphos (Strabo, xiv. p. 683).

Near Mantineia in Arcadia was situated ὄρος ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ, τὰ ἐρείπια ἔτι Μαντινείας ἔχον τῆς ἀρχαίας· καλεῖται δὲ τὸ χωρίον ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν Πτόλις (Pausan. viii. 12, 4). See a similar statement about the lofty sites of the ancient town of Orchomenus (in Arcadia) (Paus. viii. 13, 2), of Nonakris (viii. 17, 5,) of Lusi (viii. 18, 3), Lykoreia on Parnassus (Paus. x. 6, 2; Strabo, ix. p. 418).

Compare also Plato, Legg. iii. 2, pp. 678-679, who traces these lofty and craggy dwellings, general among the earliest Grecian townships, to the commencement of human society after an extensive deluge, which had covered all the lower grounds and left only a few survivors.

[194] Thucyd. i. 2. Φαίνεται γὰρ ἡ νῦν Ἑλλὰς καλουμένη, οὐ πάλαι βεβαίως οἰκουμένη, ἀλλὰ μεταναστάσεις τε οὖσαι τὰ πρότερα, καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἕκαστοι τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀπολείποντες, βιαζόμενοι ὑπὸ τινῶν ἀεὶ πλειόνων· τῆς γὰρ ἐμπορίας οὐκ οὔσης, οὐδ᾽ ἐπιμιγνύντες ἀδεῶς ἀλλήλοις, οὔτε κατὰ γῆν οὔτε διὰ θαλάσσης, νεμόμενοι δὲ τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστοι ὅσον ἀποζῆν, καὶ περιουσίαν χρημάτων οὐκ ἔχοντες οὐδὲ γῆν φυτεύοντες, ἄδηλον ὂν ὁπότε τις ἐπελθὼν, καὶ ἀτειχίστων ἅμα ὄντων, ἄλλος ἀφαιρήσεται, τῆς τε καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἀναγκαίου τροφῆς πανταχοῦ ἂν ἡγούμενοι ἐπικρατεῖν, οὐ χαλεπῶς ἀπανίσταντο, καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ οὔτε μεγέθει πόλεων ἴσχυον, οὔτε τῇ ἄλλῃ παρασκευῇ.

About the distant and unfortified villages and rude habits of the Ætolians and Lokrians, see Thucyd. iii. 94; Pausan. x. 38, 3: also of the Cisalpine Gauls, Polyb. ii. 17.

Both Thucydidês and Aristotle seem to have conceived the Homeric period as mainly analogous to the βάρβαροι of their own day—Λύει δ᾽ Ἀριστοτέλης λέγων, ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἀεὶ ποιεῖ Ὅμηρος οἷα ἦν τότε· ἦν δὲ τοιαῦτα τὰ παλαιὰ οἵἀπερ καὶ νῦν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις (Schol. Iliad. x. 151).

[195] Odyss. vi. 10; respecting Nausithous, past king of the Phæakians:

Ἀμφὶ δὲ τεῖχος ἔλασσε πόλει, καὶ ἐδείματο οἴκους,

Καὶ νηοὺς ποίησε θεῶν, καὶ ἐδάσσατ᾽ ἀρούρας.

The vineyard, olive-ground, and garden of Laërtes, is a model of careful cultivation (Odyss. xxiv. 245); see also the shield of Achilles (Iliad, xvii. 541-580), and the Kalydônian plain (Iliad, ix. 575).

[196] Odyss. x. 106-115; Iliad, xx. 216.

[197] Thucyd. i. 10. Καὶ ὅτι μὲν Μυκῆναι μικρὸν ἦν, ἢ εἴ τι τῶν τότε πόλισμα νῦν μὴ ἀξιόχρεων δοκεῖ εἶναι, etc.

[198] Nägelsbach, Homerische Theologie, Abschn. v. sect. 54. Hesiod strongly condemns robbery,—Δὼς ἀγαθὴ, ἅρπαξ δὲ κακὴ, θανάτοιο δότειρα (Opp. Di. 356, comp. 320); but the sentiment of the Grecian heroic poetry seems not to go against it,—it is looked upon as a natural employment of superior force,—Αὐτόματοι δ᾽ ἀγαθοὶ δειλῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν (Athenæ. v. p. 178; comp. Pindar, Fragm. 48, ed. Dissen.): the long spear, sword, and breastplate, of the Kretan Hybreas, constitute his wealth (Skolion 27, p. 877; Poet. Lyric. ed. Bergk), wherewith he ploughs and reaps,—while the unwarlike, who dare not or cannot wield these weapons, fall at his feet, and call him The Great King. The feeling is different in the later age of Demêtrius Poliorkêtês (about 310 B. C.): in the Ithyphallic Ode, addressed to him at his entrance into Athens, robbery is treated as worthy only of Ætolians:—

Αἰτωλικὸν γὰγ ἁρπάσαι τὰ τῶν πέλας,

Νυνὶ δὲ, καὶ τὰ πόῤῥω.—

(Poet. Lyr. xxv. p. 453, ed. Schneid.)

The robberies of powerful men, and even highway robbery generally found considerable approving sentiment in the Middle Ages. "All Europe (observes Mr. Hallam, Hist. Mid. Ag. ch. viii. part 3, p. 247) was a scene of intestine anarchy during the Middle Ages: and though England was far less exposed to the scourge of private war than most nations on the continent, we should find, could we recover the local annals of every country, such an

accumulation of petty rapine and tumult, as would almost alienate us from the liberty which served to engender it…. Highway robbery was from the earliest times a sort of national crime…. We know how long the outlaws of Sherwood lived in tradition; men who, like some of their betters, have been permitted to redeem, by a few acts of generosity, the just ignominy of extensive crimes. These, indeed, were the heroes of vulgar applause; but when such a judge as Sir John Fortescue could exult, that more Englishmen were hanged for robbery in one year than French in seven,—and that, *if an Englishman be poor, and see another having riches, which may be taken from him by might, he will not spare to do so*,—it may be perceived how thoroughly these sentiments had pervaded the public mind."

The robberies habitually committed by the noblesse of France and Germany during the Middle Ages, so much worse than anything in England,—and those of the highland chiefs even in later times,—are too well known to need any references: as to France, an ample catalogue is set forth in Dulaure's Histoire de la Noblesse (Paris, 1792). The confederations of the German cities chiefly originated in the necessity of keeping the roads and rivers open for the transit of men and goods against the nobles who infested the high roads. Scaliger might have found a parallel to the λῃσταὶ of the heroic ages in the noblesse of la Rouergue, as it stood even in the 16th century, which he thus describes: "In Comitatu Rodez pessimi sunt; nobilitas ibi latrocinatur: nec possunt reprimi." (ap. Dulaure, c. 9.)

[199] Thucyd. i. 4-8. τῆς νῦν Ἑλληνικῆς θαλάσσης.

[200] Herodot. i. 171; Thucyd. i. 4-8. Isokratês (Panathenaic. p. 241) takes credit to Athens for having finally expelled the Karians out of these islands at the time of the Ionic emigration.

[201] Thucyd. i. 4. τό τε λῃστικὸν, *ὡς εἰκὸς*, καθῄρει ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἠδύνατο, τοῦ τὰς προσόδους μᾶλλον ἰέναι αὐτῷ.

[202] See the preceding volume of this History, Chap. xii. p. 227.

[203] Thucyd. i. 10. τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ λῃστικώτερον παρεσκευασμένα.

[204] Thucyd. i. 13.

[205] See Voelcker, Homerische Geographie, ch. iii. sect. 55-63. He has brought to bear much learning and ingenuity to identify the places visited by Odysseus with real lands, but the attempt is not successful. Compare also Ukert, Hom. Geog. vol. i. p. 14, and the valuable treatises of J. H. Voss, *Alte Weltkunde*, annexed to the second volume of his Kritische Blätter (Stuttgart, 1828), pp. 245-413. Voss is the father of just views respecting Homeric geography.

[206] Hesiod. Theog. 338-340.

[207] Hesiod. Theogon. 1016; Hesiod. Fragm. 190-194, ed. Göttling; Strabo, i. p. 16; vii. p. 300. Compare Ukert, Geographie der Griechen und Römer, i. p. 37.

[208] The Greeks learned from the Babylonians, πόλον μὲν γὰρ καὶ γνώμονα καὶ τὰ δυωκαίδεκα μέρεα τῆς ἡμέρης (Herodot. ii. 109). In my first edition, I had interpreted the word πόλον in Herodotus erroneously. I now believe it to mean the same as *horologium*, the circular plate upon which the vertical gnomon projected its shadow, marked so as to indicate the hour of the day,—twelve hours between sunrise and sunset: see Ideler, Handbuch der Chronologie, vol. i. p. 233. Respecting the opinions of Thales, see the same work, part ii. pp. 18-57; Plutarch. de Placit. Philosophor. ii. c. 12; Aristot. de Cœlo, ii. 13. Costard, Rise and Progress of Astronomy among the Ancients, p. 99.

[209] We have very little information respecting the early Grecian mode of computing time, and we know that though all the different states computed by lunar periods, yet most, if not all, of them had different names of months as well as different days of beginning and ending their months. All their immediate computations, however, were made by months: the lunar period was their immediate standard of reference for determining their festivals, and for other purposes, the solar period being resorted to only as a corrective, to bring the same months constantly into the same seasons of the year. Their original month had thirty days, and was divided into three decades, as it continued to be during the times of historical Athens (Hesiod. Opp. Di. 766). In order to bring this lunar period more nearly into harmony with the sun, they intercalated every year an additional month: so that their years included alternately twelve months and thirteen months, each month of thirty days. This period was called a Dieteris,—sometimes a Trieteris. Solon is said to have first introduced the fashion of months differing in length, varying alternately from thirty to twenty-nine days. It appears, however, that Herodotus had present to his mind the Dieteric cycle, or years alternating between thirteen months and twelve months (each month of thirty days), and no other (Herodot. i. 32; compare ii. 104). As astronomical knowledge improved, longer and more elaborate periods were calculated, exhibiting a nearer correspondence between an integral number of lunations and an integral number of solar years. First, we find a period of four years; next, the Octaëteris, or period of eight years, or seventy-nine lunar months; lastly, the Metonic period of nineteen years, or 235 lunar months. How far any of these larger periods were ever legally authorized, or brought into civil usage, even at Athens, is matter of much doubt. See Ideler, Uber die Astronomischen Beobachtungen der Alten, pp. 175-195; Macrobius, Saturnal. i. 13.

[210] Herodot. i. 74; Aristot. Polit. i. 4, 5.

[211] Odyss. iii. 173.—

Ἠτέομεν δὲ θεὸν φαίνειν τέρας· αὐτὰρ ὅγ᾽ ἡμῖν

Δεῖξε, καὶ ἠνώγει πέλαγος μέσον εἰς Εὔβοιαν

Τέμνειν, etc.

Compare Odyss. xx. 100; Iliad, i. 62; Eurip. Suppl. 216-230.

[212] The σήματα λυγρὰ mentioned in the Iliad, vi. 168, if they prove anything, are rather an evidence against, than for, the existence of alphabetical writing at the times when the Iliad was composed.

[213] Aristot. Poet. c. 17-37. He points out and explains the superior structure of the Iliad and Odyssey, as compared with the semi Homeric and biographical poems: but he takes no notice of the Hesiodic, or genealogical.

[214] Aristot. Poetic. c. 41. He considers the Hexameter to be the *natural* measure of narrative poetry: any other would be unseemly.

[215] Ulrici, Geschichte des Griechischen Epos, 5te Vorlesung, pp. 96-108; G. Hermann, Ueber Homer und Sappho, in his Opuscula, tom. vi. p. 89.

The superior antiquity of Orpheus as compared with Homer passed as a received position to the classical Romans (Horat. Art. Poet. 392).

[216] Respecting these lost epics, see Düntzer, Collection of the Fragmenta Epicor. Græcorum; Wüllner, De Cyclo Epico, pp. 43-66; and Mr. Fynes Clinton's Chronology, vol. iii. pp. 349-359.

[217] Welcker, Der Epische Kyklus, pp. 256-266; Apollodôr. ii. 7, 7; Diodôr. iv. 37; O. Müller, Dorians, i. 28.

[218] Welcker (Der Epische Kyklus, p. 209) considers the Alkmæônis as the same with the Epigoni, and the Atthis of Hegesinous the same with the Amazonia: in Suidas (v. Ὅμηρος) the latter is among the poems ascribed to Homer.

Leutsch (Thebaidos Cyclicæ Reliquiæ, pp. 12-14) views the Thebaïs and the Epigoni as different parts of the same poem.

[219] See the Fragments of Hesiod, Eumêlus, Kinæthôn, and Asius, in the collections of Marktscheffel, Düntzer, Göttling, and Gaisford.

I have already, in going over the ground of Grecian legend, referred to all these lost poems, in their proper places.

[220] Pausan. ix. 38, 6; Plutarch, Sept. Sap. Conv. p. 156.

[221] See Mr. Clinton's Fasti Hellenici, about the date of Arktinus, vol i. p. 350.

[222] Perhaps Zenodotus, the superintendent of the Alexandrine library under Ptolemy Philadelphus, in the third century B. C.: there is a Scholion on Plautus, published not many years ago by Osann, and since more fully by Ritschl,—"Cæcius in commento Comœdiarum Aristophanis in Pluto,—Alexander Ætolus, et Lycophron Chalcidensis, et Zenodotus Ephesius, impulsu regis Ptolemæi, Philadelphi cognomento, artis poetices libros in unum collegerunt et in ordinem redegerunt. Alexander tragœdias, Lycophron comœdias, Zenodotus vero Homeri poemata et reliquorum illustrium poetarum." See Lange, Ueber die Kyklischen Dichter, p. 56 (Mainz. 1837); Welcker, Der Epische Kyklus, p. 8; Ritschl, Die Alexandrinischen Bibliotheken, p. 3 (Breslau, 1838).

Lange disputes the sufficiency of this passage as proof that Zenodotus was the framer of the Epic Cycle: his grounds are, however, unsatisfactory to me.

[223] That there existed a cyclic copy or edition of the Odyssey (ἡ κυκλικὴ) is proved by two passages in the Scholia (xvi. 195; xvii. 25), with Boeckh's remark in Buttmann's edition: this was the Odyssey copied or edited along with the other poems of the cycle.

Our word to *edit*—or *edition*—suggests ideas not exactly suited to the proceedings of the Alexandrine library, in which we cannot expect to find anything like what is now called *publication*. That magnificent establishment, possessing a large collection of epical manuscripts, and ample means of every kind at command, would naturally

desire to have these compositions put in order and corrected by skilful hands, and then carefully copied for the use of the library. Such copy constitutes the cyclic *edition*: they might perhaps cause or permit duplicates to be made, but the ἔκδοσις or edition was complete without them.

[224] Respecting the great confusion in which the Epic Cycle is involved, see the striking declaration of Buttmann, Addenda ad Scholia in Odysseum, p. 575: compare the opinions of the different critics, as enumerated at the end of Welcker's treatise, Episch. Kyk. pp. 420-453.

[225] Our information respecting the Epic Cycle is derived from Eutychius Proclus, a literary man of Sicca during the second century of the Christian era, and tutor of Marcus Antoninus (Jul. Capitolin. Vit. Marc. c. 2),—not from Proclus, called Diadochus, the new-Platonic philosopher of the fifth century, as Heyne, Mr. Clinton, and others have imagined. The fragments from his work called Chrestomathia, give arguments of several of the lost cyclic poems connected with the Siege of Troy, communicating the important fact that the Iliad and Odyssey were included in the cycle, and giving the following description of the principle upon which it was arranged: Διαλαμβάνει δὲ περὶ τοῦ λεγομένου ἐπικοῦ κύκλου, ὃς ἄρχεται μὲν ἐκ τῆς Οὐράνου καὶ Γῆς ὁμολογουμένης μίξεως … καὶ περατοῦται ὁ ἐπικὸς κύκλος, ἐκ διαφόρων ποιητῶν συμπληρούμενος, μέχρι τῆς ἀποβάσεως Ὀδυσσέως…. Λέγει δὲ ὡς τοῦ ἐπικοῦ κύκλου τὰ ποιήματα διασώζεται καὶ σπουδάζεται τοῖς πολλοῖς, οὐχ οὕτω διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν, ὡς διὰ τὴν *ἀκολουθίαν τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ πραγμάτων* (ap. Photium, cod. 239).

This much-commented passage, while it clearly marks out the cardinal principle of the Epic Cycle (ἀκολουθία πραγμάτων), neither affirms nor denies anything respecting the excellence of the constituent poems. Proclus speaks of the taste common in his own time (σπουδάζεται τοῖς πολλοῖς): there was not much relish in his time for these poems as such, but people were much interested in the sequence of epical events. The abstracts which he himself drew up in the form of arguments of several poems, show that he adapted himself to this taste. We cannot collect from his words that he intended to express any opinion of his own respecting the goodness or badness of the cyclic poems.

[226] The gradual growth of a contemptuous feeling towards the *scriptor cyclicus* (Horat. Ars. Poetic. 136), which was not originally implied in the name, is well set forth by Lange (Ueber die Kyklisch. Dicht. pp. 53-56).

Both Lange (pp. 36-41), however, and Ulrici (Geschichte des Griech. Epos, 9te Vorles. p. 418) adopt another opinion with respect to the cycle, which I think unsupported and inadmissible,—that the several constituent poems were not received into it entire (*i. e.* with only such changes as were requisite for a corrected text), but cut down and abridged in such manner as to produce an *exact* continuity of narrative. Lange even imagines that the cyclic Odyssey was thus dealt with. But there seems no evidence to countenance this theory, which would convert the Alexandrine literati from critics into logographers. That the cyclic Iliad and Odyssey were the same in the main (allowing for corrections of text) as the common Iliad and Odyssey, is shown by the fact, that Proclus merely names them in the series without giving any abstract of their contents: they were too well known to render such a process necessary. Nor does either the language of Proclus, or that of Cæcius as applied to Zenodotus, indicate any transformation applied to the poets whose works are described to have been brought together and put into a certain order.

The hypothesis of Lange is founded upon the idea that the (ἀκολουθία πραγμάτων) continuity of narrated events must necessarily have been exact and without break, as if the whole constituted one work. But this would not be possible, let the framers do what they might: moreover, in the attempt, the individuality of all the constituent poets must have been sacrificed, in such manner that it would be absurd to discuss their separate merits.

The continuity of narrative in the Epic Cycle could not have been more than approximate,—as complete as the poems composing it would admit: nevertheless, it would be correct to say that the poems were arranged in series upon this principle and upon no other. The librarians might have arranged in like manner the vast mass of tragedies in their possession (if they had chosen to do so) upon the principle of sequence in the subjects: had they done so, the series would have formed a *Tragic Cycle*.

[227] Welcker, Der Epische Kyklus, pp. 37-41; Wuellner, De Cyclo Epico, p. 43, *seq.*; Lange, Ueber die Kyklischen Dichter, p. 47; Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, vol. i. p. 349.

[228] Schol. Pindar. Olymp. vi. 26; Athenæ. xi. p. 465.

[229] It is a memorable illustration of that bitterness which has so much disgraced the controversies of literary men in *all* ages (I fear, we can make no exception), when we find Pausanias saying that he had examined

into the ages of Hesiod and Homer with the most laborious scrutiny, but that he knew too well the calumnious dispositions of contemporary critics and poets, to declare what conclusion he had come to (Paus. ix. 30, 2): Περὶ δὲ Ἡσιόδου τε ἡλικίας καὶ Ὁμήρου, πολυπραγμονήσαντι ἐς τὸ ἀκριβέστατον οὔ μοι γράφειν ἠδὺ ἦν, ἐπισταμένῳ τὸ φιλαίτιον ἄλλων τε καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα ὅσοι κατ᾽ ἐμὲ ἐπὶ ποιήσει τῶν ἐπῶν καθεστήκεσαν.

[230] See the extract of Proclus, in Photius Cod. 239.

[231] Suidas, v. Ὅμηρος; Eustath. ad Iliad. ii. p. 330.

[232] Pausan. ix. 9, 3. The name of Kallinus in that passage seems certainly correct: Τὰ δὲ ἔπη ταῦτα (the Thebaïs) Καλλῖνος, ἀφικόμενος αὐτῶν ἐς μνήμην, ἔφησεν Ὅμηρον τὸν ποιήσαντα εἶναι· Καλλίνῳ δὲ πολλοί τε καὶ ἄξιοι λόγου κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔγνωσαν. Ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν ποίησιν ταύτην μετά γε Ἰλιάδα καὶ Ὀδύσσειαν ἐπαινῶ μάλιστα.

To the same purpose the author of the Certamen of Hesiod and Homer, and the pseudo-Herodotus (Vit. Homer, c. 9). The Ἀμφιαρέω ἐξελασία, alluded to in Suidas as the production of Homer, may be reasonably identified with the Thebaïs (Suidas, v. Ὅμηρος).

The cyclographer Dionysius, who affirmed that Homer had lived both in the Theban and the Trojan wars, must have recognized that poet as author of the Thebaïs as well as of the Iliad (ap. Procl. ad Hesiod. p. 3).

[233] Herodot. v. 67. Κλεισθένης γὰρ Ἀργείοισι πολεμήσας—τοῦτο μὲν, ῥαψῳδοὺς ἔπαυσε ἐν Σικυῶνι ἀγωνίζεσθαι, τῶν Ὁμηρείων ἐπέων εἵνεκα, ὅτι Ἀργεῖοί τε καὶ Ἄργος τὰ πολλὰ πάντα ὑμνέαται—τοῦτο δὲ, ἡρῷον γὰρ ἦν καὶ ἔστι ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀγορᾷ τῶν Σικυωνίων Ἀδρήστου τοῦ Ταλαοῦ, τοῦτον ἐπεθύμησε ὁ Κλεισθένης, ἐόντα Ἀργεῖον, ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς χώρης. Herodotus then goes on to relate how Kleisthenês carried into effect his purpose of banishing the hero Adrastus: first, he applied to the Delphian Apollo, for permission to do so directly, and avowedly; next, on that permission being refused, he made application to the Thebans, to allow him to introduce into Sikyôn their hero Melanippus, the bitter enemy of Adrastus in the old Theban legend; by their consent, he consecrated a chapel to Melanippus in the most commanding part of the Sikyonian agora, and then transferred to the newly-imported hero the rites and festivals which had before been given to Adrastus.

Taking in conjunction all the points of this very curious tale, I venture to think that the rhapsodes incurred the displeasure of Kleisthenês by reciting, not the Homeric Iliad, but the *Homeric Thebaïs and Epigoni*. The former does not answer the conditions of the narrative: the latter fulfils them accurately.

1. It cannot be said, even by the utmost latitude of speech, that, in the Iliad, "Little else is sung except Argos and the Argeians,"—("in illis ubique fere nonnisi Argos et Argivi celebrantur,")—is the translation of Schweighäuser: Argos is rarely mentioned in it, and never exalted into any primary importance: the Argeians, as inhabitants of Argos separately, are never noticed at all: that name is applied in the Iliad, in common with the *Achæans* and *Danaans*, only to the general body of Greeks,—and even applied to them much less frequently than the name of *Achæans*.

2. Adrastus is twice, and only twice, mentioned in the Iliad, as master of the wonderful horse Areion, and as father-in-law of Tydeus; but he makes no figure in the poem, and attracts no interest.

Wherefore, though Kleisthenês might have been ever so much incensed against Argos and Adrastus, there seems no reason why he should have interdicted the rhapsodes from reciting the Iliad. On the other hand, the Thebaïs and Epigoni could not fail to provoke him especially. For,

1. Argos and its inhabitants were the grand subject of the poem, and the proclaimed assailants in the expedition against Thêbes. Though the poem itself is lost, the first line of it has been preserved (Leutsch, Theb. Cycl. Reliq. p. 5; compare Sophoclês, Œd. Col. 380 with Scholia),—

Ἄργος ἄειδε, θεὰ, πολυδίψιον, ἔνθεν ἄνακτες, etc.

2. Adrastus was king of Argos, and the chief of the expedition. It is therefore literally true, that Argos and the Argeians were "the burden of the song" in these two poems.

To this we may add—

1. The rhapsodes would have the strongest motive to recite the Thebaïs and Epigoni at Sikyôn, where Adrastus was worshipped and enjoyed so vast a popularity, and where he even attracted to himself the choric solemnities which in other towns were given to Dionysus.

2. The means which Kleisthenês took to get rid of Adrastus indicates a special reference to the Thebaïs: he invited from Thêbes the hero Melanippus, the *Hector* of Thêbes, in that very poem.

For these reasons, I think we may conclude that the Ὁμήρεια ἔπη, alluded to in this very illustrative story of Herodotus, are the Thebaïs and the Epigoni, not the Iliad.

[234] Herodot. ii. 117; iv. 32. The words in which Herodotus intimates his own dissent from the reigning opinion, are treated as spurious by F. A. Wolf, and vindicated by Schweighäuser: whether they be admitted or not, the general currency of the opinion adverted to is equally evident.

[235] The Life of Homer, which passes falsely under the name of Herodotus, contains a collection of these different stories: it is supposed to have been written about the second century after the Christian era, but the statements which it furnishes are probably several of them as old as Ephorus (compare also Proclus ap. Photium, c. 239).

The belief in the blindness of Homer is doubtless of far more ancient date, since the circumstance appears mentioned in the Homeric Hymn to the Delian Apollo where the bard of Chios, in some very touching lines, recommends himself and his strains to the favor of the Delian maidens employed in the worship of Apollo. This hymn is cited by Thucydidês as unquestionably authentic, and he doubtless accepted the lines as a description of the personal condition and relations of the author of the Iliad and Odyssey (Thucyd. iii. 104): Simonidês of Keôs also calls Homer a Chian (Frag. 69, Schneidewin).

There were also tales which represented Homer as the contemporary, the cousin, and the rival in recited composition, of Hesiod, who (it was pretended) had vanquished him. See the Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi, annexed to the works of the latter (p. 314, ed. Göttling; and Plutarch, Conviv. Sept. Sapient. c. 10), in which also various stories respecting the Life of Homer are scattered. The emperor Hadrian consulted the Delphian oracle to know who Homer was: the answer of the priestess reported him to be a native of Ithaca, the son of Telemachus and Epikastê, daughter of Nestôr (Certamen Hom. et Hes. p. 314). The author of this Certamen tells us that the authority of the Delphian oracle deserves implicit confidence.

Hellanikus, Damastes, and Pherekydês traced both Homer and Hesiod up to Orpheus, through a pedigree of ten generations (see Sturz, Fragment. Hellanic. fr. 75-144; compare also Lobeck's remarks—*Aglaophamus*, p. 322—on the subject of these genealogies). The computations of these authors earlier than Herodotus are of value, because they illustrate the habits of mind in which Grecian chronology began: the genealogy might be easily continued backward to any length in the past. To trace Homer up to Orpheus, however, would not have been consonant to the belief of the Homêrids.

The contentions of the different cities which disputed for the birth of Homer, and, indeed, all the legendary anecdotes circulated in antiquity respecting the poet, are copiously discussed in Welcker, Der Epische Kyklos (pp. 194-199).

[236] Even Aristotle ascribed to Homer a divine parentage: a damsel of the isle of Ios, pregnant by some god, was carried off by pirates to Smyrna, at the time of the Ionic emigration, and there gave birth to the poet (Aristotel. ap. Plutarch. Vit. Homer. p. 1059).

Plato seems to have considered Homer as having been an itinerant rhapsode, poor and almost friendless (Republ. p. 600).

[237] Pindar, Nem. ii. 1, and Scholia; Akusilaus, Fragm. 31, Didot; Harpokration, v. Ὁμήριδαι; Hellanic. Fr. 55, Didot; Strabo, xiv. p. 645.

It seems by a passage of Plato (Phædrus, p. 252), that the Homêridæ professed to possess unpublished verses of their ancestral poet—ἔπη ἀποθέτα. Compare Plato, Republic, p. 599, and Isocrat. Helen, p. 218.

[238] Nitzsch (De Historiâ Homeri, Fascic. 1, p. 128, Fascic. 2, p. 71), and Ulrici (Geschichte der Episch. Poesie, vol. i. pp. 240-381) question the antiquity of the Homêrid gens, and limit their functions to simple reciters, denying that they ever composed songs or poems of their own. Yet these *gentes*, such as the Euneidæ, the Lykomidæ, the Butadæ, the Talthybiadæ, the descendants of Cheirôn at Peliôn, etc., the Hesychidæ (Schol. Sophocl. Œdip. Col. 489), (the acknowledged parallels of the Homêridæ), may be surely all considered as belonging to the earliest known elements of Grecian history: rarely, at least, if ever, can such gens, with its tripartite character of civil, religious, and professional, be shown to have commenced at any recent period. And in the early times, composer and singer were one person: often at least, though probably not always, the bard com-

bined both functions. The Homeric ἀοιδὸς sings his own compositions; and it is reasonable to imagine that many of the early Homêrids did the same.

See Niebuhr, Römisch. Gesch. vol. i. p. 324; and the treatise, Ueber die Sikeler in der Odyssee,—in the Rheinisches Museum, 1828, p. 257; and Boeckh, in the Index of Contents to his Lectures of 1834.

"The sage Vyasa (observes Professor Wilson, System of Hindu Mythology, Int. p. lxii.) is represented, not as the author, but as the arranger and compiler of the Vedas and the Puránás. His name denotes his character, meaning *the arranger or distributor* (Welcker gives the same meaning to the name *Homer*); and the recurrence of many Vyasas,—many individuals who new-modelled the Hindu scriptures,—has nothing in it that is improbable, except the fabulous intervals by which their labors are separated." Individual authorship and the thirst of personal distinction, are in this case also buried under one great and common name, as in the case of Homer.

[239] Thucyd. i. 3.

[240] See the statements and citations respecting the age of Homer, collected in Mr. Clinton's Chronology, vol. i. p. 146. He prefers the view of Aristotle, and places the Iliad and Odyssey a century earlier than I am inclined to do,—940-927 B. C.

Kratês, probably placed the poet anterior to the Return of the Hêrakleids, because the Iliad makes no mention of Dorians in Peloponnêsus: Eratosthenês may be supposed to have grounded his date on the passage of the Iliad, which mentions the three generations descended from Æneas. We should have been glad to know the grounds of the very low date assigned by Theopompus and Euphoriôn.

The pseudo-Herodotus, in his life of Homer, puts the birth of the poet one hundred and sixty-eight years after the Trojan war.

[241] Herodot. ii. 53. Hêrakleides Ponticus affirmed that Lykurgus had brought into Peloponnêsus the Homeric poems, which had before been unknown out of Ionia. The supposed epoch of Lykurgus has sometimes been employed to sustain the date here assigned to the Homeric poems; but everything respecting Lykurgus is too doubtful to serve as evidence in other inquiries.

[242] The Homeric hymns are procems of this sort, some very short, consisting only of a few lines,—others of considerable length. The Hymn (or, rather, one of the two hymns) to Apollo is cited by Thucydidês as the Procem of Apollo.

The Hymns to Aphroditê, Apollo, Hermês, Dêmêtêr, and Dionysus, are genuine epical narratives. Hermann (Præf. ad Hymn. p. lxxxix.) pronounces the Hymn to Aphroditê to be the oldest and most genuine: portions of the Hymn to Apollo (Herm. p. xx.) are also very old, but both that hymn and the others are largely interpolated. His opinion respecting these interpolations, however, is disputed by Franke (Præfat. ad Hymn. Homeric. p. ix-xix.); and the distinction between what is genuine and what is spurious, depends upon criteria not very distinctly assignable. Compare Ulrici, Gesch. der Ep. Poes. pp. 385-391.

[243] Phemius, Demodokus, and the nameless bard who guarded the fidelity of Klytæmnêstra, bear out this position (Odyss. i. 155; iii. 267; viii. 490; xxi. 330; Achilles in Iliad, ix. 190).

A degree of inviolability seems attached to the person of the bard as well as to that of the herald (Odyss. xxii. 355-357).

[244] Spartian. Vit. Hadrian. p. 8; Dio Cass. lxix. 4: Plut. Tim. c. 36.

There are some good observations on this point in Näke's comments on Chœrilus, ch. viii. p. 59:—

"Habet hoc epica poesis, vera illa, cujus perfectissimam normam agnoscimus Homericam—habet hoc proprium, ut non in possessione virorum eruditorum, sed quasi viva sit et coram populo recitanda: ut cum populo crescat, et si populus Deorum et antiquorum heroum facinora, quod præcipium est epicæ poeseos argumentum, audire et secum repetere dedidicerit, obmutescat. Id vero tum factum est in Græciâ, quum populus eâ ætate, quam pueritiam dicere possis, peractâ, partim ad res serias tristesque, politicas maxime—easque multo, quam antea, impeditiores—abstrahebatur: partim epicæ poeseos pertæsus, ex aliis poeseos generibus, quæ tum nascebantur, novum et diversum oblectamenti genus primo præsagire, sibi, deinde haurire, cœpit."

Näke remarks, too, that the "splendidissima et propria Homericæ poeseos ætas, ea quæ sponte quasi suâ inter populum et quasi cum populo viveret," did not reach below Peisistratus. It did not, I think, reach even so low as that period.

[245] Xenoph. Memorab. iv. 2, 10; and Sympos. iii. 6. Οἶσθά τι οὖν ἔθνος ἠλιθιώτερον ῥαψῳδῶν; … Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὰς ὑπονοίας οὐκ ἐπίστανται. Σὺ δὲ Στησιμβρότῳ τε καὶ Ἀναξιμάνδρῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς πολὺ δέδωκας ἀργύριον, ὥστε οὐδέν σε τῶν πολλοῦ ἀξίων λέληθε.

These ὑπονοῖαι are the hidden meanings, or allegories, which a certain set of philosophers undertook to discover in Homer, and which the rhapsodes were no way called upon to study.

The Platonic dialogue, called Iôn, ascribes to Iôn the double function of a rhapsode, or impressive reciter, and a critical expositor of the poet (Isokratês also indicates the same double character, in the rhapsodes of his time,—Panathenaic, p. 240); but it conveys no solid grounds for a mean estimate of the class of rhapsodes, while it attests remarkably the striking effect produced by their recitation (c. 6, p. 535). That this class of men came to combine the habit of expository comment on the poet with their original profession of reciting, proves the tendencies of the age; probably, it also brought them into rivalry with the philosophers.

The grounds taken by Aristotle (Problem. xxx. 10; compare Aul. Gellius, xx. 14) against the actors, singers, musicians, etc. of his time, are more serious, and have more the air of truth.

If it be correct in Lehrs (de Studiis Aristarchi, Diss. ii. p. 46) to identify those early glossographers of Homer, whose explanations the Alexandrine critics so severely condemned, with the rhapsodes, this only proves that the rhapsodes had come to undertake a double duty, of which their predecessors before Solôn would never have dreamed.

[246] Plato, Apolog. Socrat. p. 22, c. 7.

[247] Aristotel. Poetic. c. 47; Welcker, Der Episch. Kyklos; Ueber den Vortrag der Homerischen Gedichte, pp. 340-406, which collects all the facts respecting the aœdi and the rhapsodes. Unfortunately, the ascertained points are very few.

The laurel branch in the hand of the singer or reciter (for the two expressions are often confounded) seems to have been peculiar to the recitation of Homer and Hesiod (Hesiod, Theog. 30: Schol. ad Aristophan. Nub. 1367. Pausan. x. 7, 2). "Poemata omne genus (says Apuleius, Florid. p. 122, Bipont.) apta *virgæ*, lyræ, socco, cothurno."

Not only Homer and Hesiod, but also Archilochus, were recited by rhapsodes (Athenæ, xii. 620; also Plato, Legg. ii. p. 658). Consult, besides, Nitzsch, De Historiâ Homeri, Fascic. 2, p. 114, *seq.*, respecting the rhapsodes; and O. Müller, History of the Literature of Ancient Greece, ch. iv. s. 3.

The ideas of singing and speech are, however, often confounded, in reference to any verse solemnly and emphatically delivered (Thucydid. ii. 53)—φάσκοντες οἱ πρεσβύτεροι πάλαι ᾄδεσθαι, Ἥξει Δωριακὸς πόλεμος καὶ λοιμὸς ἅμ᾽ αὐτῷ. And the rhapsodes are said to *sing* Homer (Plato, Eryxias, c. 13; Hesych. v. Βραυρωνίοις); Strabo (i. p. 18) has a good passage upon song and speech.

William Grimm (Deutsche Heldensage, p. 373) supposes the ancient German heroic romances to have been recited or declaimed in a similar manner with a simple accompaniment of the harp, as the Servian heroic lays are even at this time delivered.

Fauriel also tells us, respecting the French Carlovingian Epic (Romans de Chevalerie, Revue des Deux Mondes, xiii. p. 559): "The romances of the 12th and 13th centuries were really sung: the *jongleur* invited his audience to hear a *belle chanson d'histoire*,—'le mot chanter ne manque jamais dans la formule initiale,'—and it is to be understood literally: the music was simple and intermittent, more like a recitative; the jongleur carried a rebek, or violin with three strings, an Arabic instrument; when he wished to rest his voice, he played an air or ritournelle upon this; he went thus about from place to place, and the romances had no existence among the people, except through the aid and recitation of these jongleurs."

It appears that there had once been rhapsodic exhibitions at the festivals of Dionysus, but they were discontinued (Klearchus ap. Athenæ. vii. p. 275)—probably superseded by the dithyramb and the tragedy.

The etymology of ῥαψῳδὸς is a disputed point: Welcker traces it to ῥάβδος, most critics derive it from ῥάπτειν ἀοιδήν, which O. Müller explains "to denote the coupling together of verses without any considerable divisions or pauses,—the even, unbroken, continuous flow of the epic poem," as contrasted with the strophic or choric periods (*l. c.*).

[248] Homer, Hymn to Apoll. 170. The κίθαρις, ἀοιδὴ, ὀρχηθμὸς, are constantly put together in that hymn: evidently, the instrumental accompaniment was essential to the hymns at the Ionic festival. Compare also the Hymn to Hermês (430), where the function ascribed to the Muses can hardly be understood to include non-musical recitation. The Hymn to Hermês is more recent than Terpander, inasmuch as it mentions the seven strings of the lyre, v. 50.

[249] Terpander,—see Plutarch, de Musicâ, c. 3-4; the facts respecting him are collected in Plehn's Lesbiaca, pp. 140-160; but very little can be authenticated.

Stesander at the Pythian festivals sang the Homeric battles, with a harp accompaniment of his own composition (Athenæ. xiv. p. 638).

The principal testimonies respecting the rhapsodizing of the Homeric poems at Athens, chiefly at the Panathenaic festival, are Isokratês, Panegyric. p. 74; Lycurgus contra Leocrat. p. 161; Plato, Hipparch. p. 228; Diogen. Laërt. Vit. Solon. i. 57.

Inscriptions attest that rhapsodizing continued in great esteem, down to a late period of the historical age, both at Chios and Teôs, especially the former: it was the subject of competition by trained youth, and of prizes for the victor, at periodical religious solemnities: see Corp. Inscript. Boeckh, No. 2214-3088.

[250] Knight, Prolegom. Hom. c. xxxviii-xl. "Haud tamen ullum Homericorum carminum exemplar Pisistrati seculo antiquius extitisse, aut sexcentesimo prius anno ante C. N. scriptum fuisse, facile credam: rara enim et perdifficilis erat iis temporibus scriptura ob penuriam materiæ scribendo idoneæ, quum literas aut lapidibus exarare, aut tabulis ligneis aut laminis metalli alicujus insculpere oporteret…. Atque ideo memoriter retenta sunt, et hæc et alia veterum poetarum carmina, et per urbes et vicos et in principum virorum ædibus, decantata a rhapsodis. Neque mirandum est, ea per tot sæcula sic integra conservata esse, quoniam—per eos tradita erant, qui ab omnibus Græciæ et coloniarum regibus et civitatibus mercede satis amplâ conducti, omnia sua studia in iis ediscendis, retinendis, et rite recitandis, conferebant." Compare Wolf, Prolegom. xxiv-xxv.

The evidences of early writing among the Greeks, and of written poems even anterior to Homer, may be seen collected in Kreuser (Vorfragen ueber Homeros, pp. 127-159, Frankfort, 1828). His proofs appear to me altogether inconclusive. Nitzsch maintains the same opinion (Histor. Homeri, Fasc. i. sect. xi. xvii. xviii.),—in my opinion, not more successfully: nor does Franz (Epigraphicê Græc. Introd. s. iv.) produce any new arguments.

I do not quite subscribe to Mr. Knight's language, when he says that *there is nothing wonderful* in the long preservation of the Homeric poems *unwritten*. It is enough to maintain that the existence, and practical use of long manuscripts, by all the rhapsodes, under the condition and circumstances of the 8th and 9th centuries among the Greeks, would be a greater wonder.

[251] See this argument strongly put by Nitzsch, in the prefatory remarks at the beginning of his second volume of Commentaries on the Odyssey (pp. x-xxix). He takes great pains to discard all idea that the poems were written in order to be read. To the same purpose, Franz (Epigraphicê Græc. Introd. p. 32), who adopts Nitzsch's positions,—"Audituris enim, non lecturis, carmina parabant."

[252] Odyss. viii. 65; Hymn. ad Apoll. 172: Pseudo-Herodot. Vit. Homer. c. 3; Thucyd. iii. 104.

Various commentators on Homer imagined that, under the misfortune of Demodokus, the poet in reality described his own (Schol. ad Odyss. 1. 1; Maxim. Tyr. xxxviii. 1).

[253] Xenoph. Sympos. iii. 5. Compare, respecting the laborious discipline of the Gallic Druids, and the number of unwritten verses which they retained in their memories, Cæsar, B. G. vi. 14; Mela. iii. 2; also Wolf, Prolegg. s. xxiv. and Herod. ii. 77, about the prodigious memory of the Egyptian priests at Heliopolis.

I transcribe, from the interesting Discours of M. Fauriel (prefixed to his Chants Populaires de la Grèce Moderne, Paris 1824), a few particulars respecting the number, the mnemonic power, and the popularity of those itinerant singers or rhapsodes who frequent the festivals or *paneghyris* of modern Greece: it is curious to learn that this profession is habitually exercised by *blind* men (p. xc. *seq.*).

"Les aveugles exercent en Grèce une profession qui les rend non seulement agréables, mais nécessaires; le caractère, l'imagination, et la condition du peuple, étant ce qu'ils sont: c'est la profession de chanteurs ambulans…. Ils sont dans l'usage, tant sur le continent que dans les îles, de la Grèce, d'apprendre par cœur le plus grand nombre qu'ils peuvent de chansons populaires de tout genre et de toute époque. Quelques uns finissent par en savoir une quantité prodigieuse, et tous en savent beaucoup. Avec ce trésor dans leur mémoire, ils sont

toujours en marche, traversent la Grèce en tout sens; ils s'en vont de ville en ville, de village en village, chantant à l'auditoire qui se forme aussitôt autour d'eux, partout où ils se montrent, celles de leurs chansons qu'ils jugent convenir le mieux, soit à la localité, soit à la circonstance, et reçoivent une petite rétribution qui fait tout leur revenu. Ils ont l'air de chercher de préférence, en tout lieu, la partie la plus inculte de la population, qui en est toujours la plus curieuse, la plus avide d'impressions, et la moins difficile dans le choix de ceux qui leur sont offertes. Les Turcs seuls ne les écoutent pas. C'est aux réunions nombreuses, aux fêtes de village connues sous le nom de *Paneghyris*, que ces chanteurs ambulans accourent le plus volontiers. Ils chantent en s'accompagnant d'un instrument à cordes que l'on touche avec un archet, et qui est exactement l'ancienne lyre des Grecs, dont il a conservé le nom comme la forme.

"Cette lyre, pour être entière, doit avoir cinq cordes: mais souvent elle n'en a que deux ou trois, dont les sons, comme il est aisé de présumer, n'ont rien de bien harmonieux. Les chanteurs aveugles vont ordinairement isolés, et chacun d'eux chante à part des autres: mais quelquefois aussi ils se réunissent par groupes de deux ou de trois, pour dire ensemble les mêmes chansons…. Ces modernes rhapsodes doivent être divisés en deux classes. Les uns (et ce sont, selon toute apparence, les plus nombreux) se bornent à la function de recueillir, d'apprendre par cœur, et de mettre en circulation, des pièces qu'ils n'ont point composées. Les autres (et ce sont ceux qui forment l'ordre le plus distingué de leur corps), à cette fonction de répétiteurs et de colporteurs des poésies d'autrui, joignent celle de poëtes, et ajoutent à la masse des chansons apprises d'autres chants de leur façon…. Ces rhapsodes aveugles sont les nouvellistes et les historiens, en même temps que les poëtes du peuple, en cela parfaitement semblables aux rhapsodes anciens de la Grèce."

To pass to another country—Persia, once the great rival of Greece: "The Kurroglian rhapsodes are called *Kurroglou-Khans*, from *khaunden*, to sing. Their duty is, to know by heart all the *mejjlisses* (meetings) of Kurroglou, narrate them, or sing them with the accompaniment of the favorite instrument of Kurroglou, the chungur, or sitar, a three-stringed guitar. Ferdausi has also his *Shah-nama-Khans*, and the prophet Mohammed his *Koran Khans*. The memory of those singers is truly astonishing. At every request, they recite in one breath for some hours, without stammering, beginning the tale at the passage or verse pointed out by the hearers." (Specimens of the Popular Poetry of Persia, as found in the Adventures and Improvisations of Kurroglou, the Bandit Minstrel of Northern Persia, by Alexander Chodzko: London 1842, Introd. p. 13)

"One of the songs of the Calmuck national bards sometimes lasts a whole day." (*Ibid.* p. 372.)

[254] There are just remarks of Mr. Mitford on the possibility that the Homeric poems might have been preserved without writing (History of Greece, vol. i. pp. 135-137).

[255] Villoison, Prolegomen. pp. xxxiv-lvi; Wolf, Prolegomen. p. 37. Düntzer, in the Epicor. Græc. Fragm. pp. 27-29, gives a considerable list of the Homeric passages cited by ancient authors, but not found either in the Iliad or Odyssey. It is hardly to be doubted, however, that many of these passages belonged to other epic poems which passed under the name of Homer. Welcker (Der Episch. Kyklus, pp. 20-133) enforces this opinion very justly, and it harmonizes with his view of the name of Homer as coextensive with the whole Epic cycle.

[256] See this argument strongly maintained in Giese (Ueber den Æolischen Dialekt, sect. 14. p. 160, *seqq.*). He notices several other particulars in the Homeric language,—the plenitude and variety of interchangeable grammatical forms,—the numerous metrical licenses, set right by appropriate oral intonations,—which indicate a language as yet not constrained by the fixity of written authority.

The same line of argument is taken by O. Müller (History of the Literature of Ancient Greece, ch. iv. s. 5).

Giese has shown also, in the same chapter, that all the manuscripts of Homer mentioned in the Scholia, were written in the Ionic alphabet (with H and Ω as marks for the long vowels, and no special mark for the rough breathing), in so far as the special citations out of them enable us to verify.

[257] Nitzsch and Welcker argue, that because the Homeric poems were *heard* with great delight and interest, therefore the first rudiments of the art of writing, even while beset by a thousand mechanical difficulties, would be employed to record them. I cannot adopt this opinion, which appears to me to derive all its plausibility from our present familiarity with reading and writing. The first step from the recited to the written poem is really one of great violence, as well as useless for any want then actually felt. I much more agree with Wolf when he says: "Diu enim illorum hominum vita et simplicitas nihil admodum habuit, quod scripturâ dignum videretur: in aliis omnibus occupati agunt illi, quæ posteri scribunt, vel (ut de quibusdam populis accepimus) etiam monstratam operam hanc spernunt tanquam indecori otii: carmina autem quæ pangunt, longo usu sic ore fundere et

excipere consueverunt, ut cantu et recitatione cum maxime vigentia deducere ad mutas notas, ex illius ætatis sensu nihil aliud esset, quam perimere ea et vitali vi ac spiritu privare." (Prolegom. s. xv. p. 59.)

Some good remarks on this subject are to be found in William Humboldt's Introduction to his elaborate treatise *Ueber die Kawi-Sprache*, in reference to the oral tales current among the Basques. He, too, observes how great and repulsive a proceeding it is, to pass at first from verse sung, or recited, to verse written; implying that the words are conceived detached from the *Vortrag*, the accompanying music, and the surrounding and sympathizing assembly. The Basque tales have no charm for the people themselves, when put in Spanish words and read (Introduction, sect. xx. p. 258-259).

Unwritten prose tales, preserved in the memory, and said to be repeated nearly in the same words from age to age, are mentioned by Mariner, in the Tonga Islands (Mariner's Account, vol. ii. p. 377).

The Druidical poems were kept unwritten by design, after writing was in established use for other purposes (Cæsar, B. G. vi. 13).

[258] Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellenici, vol. i. pp. 368-373) treats it as a matter of *certainty* that Archilochus and Alkman *wrote* their poems. I am not aware of any evidence for announcing this as positively known,—except, indeed, an admission of Wolf, which is, doubtless, good as an *argumentum ad hominem*, but is not to be received as proof (Wolf, Proleg. p. 50). The evidences mentioned by Mr. Clinton (p. 368) certainly cannot be regarded as proving anything to the point.

Giese (Ueber den Æolischen Dialekt, p. 172) places the first writing of the separate rhapsodies composing the Iliad in the seventh century B. C.

[259] The songs of the Icelandic Skalds were preserved orally for a period longer than two centuries,—P. A. Müller thinks very much longer,—before they were collected, or embodied in written story by Snorro and Sæmund (Lange, Untersuchungen über die Gesch. der Nördischen Heldensage. p. 98; also, Introduct. pp. xx-xxviii). He confounds, however, often, the preservation of the songs from old time,—with the question, whether they have or have not an historical basis.

And there were, doubtless, many old bards and rhapsodes in ancient Greece, of whom the same might be said which Saxo Grammaticus affirms of an Englishman named Lucas, that he was "literis quidem tenuiter instructus, sed historiarum scientiâ apprime eruditus." (Dahlmann, Historische Forschungen, vol. ii. p. 176.)

[260] "Homer wrote a sequel of songs and rhapsodies, to be sung by himself for small earnings and good cheer, at festivals and other days of merriment; the Iliad he made for the men, the Odysseus for the other sex. These loose songs were not collected together into the form of an epic poem until 500 years after."

Such is the naked language in which Wolf's main hypothesis had been previously set forth by Bentley, in his "Remarks on a late Discourse of Freethinking, by Phileleutherus Lipsiensis," published in 1713: the passage remained unaltered in the seventh edition of that treatise published in 1737. See Wolf's Proleg. xxvii. p. 115.

The same hypothesis may be seen more amply developed, partly in the work of Wolfs pupil and admirer, William Müller, *Homerische Vorschule* (the second edition of which was published at Leipsic, 1836, with an excellent introduction and notes by Baumgarten-Crusius, adding greatly to the value of the original work by its dispassionate review of the whole controversy), partly in two valuable Dissertations of Lachmann, published in the Philological Transactions of the Berlin Academy for 1837 and 1841.

[261] Joseph, cont. Apion. i. 2; Cicero de Orator, iii. 34; Pausan. vii. 26, 6: compare the Scholion on Plautus in Ritschl, Die Alexandrin. Bibliothek, p. 4. Ælian (V. II. xiii. 14), who mentions both the introduction of the Homeric poems into Peloponnesus by Lykurgus, and the compilation by Peisistratus, can hardly be considered as adding to the value of the testimony: still less, Libanius and Suidas. What we learn is, that some literary and critical men of the Alexandrine age (more or fewer, as the case may be; but Wolf exaggerates when he talks of an *unanimous* conviction) spoke of Peisistratus as having first put together the fractional parts of the Iliad and Odyssey into entire poems.

[262] Plato, Hipparch. p. 228.

[263] "Doch ich komme mir bald lächerlich vor, wenn ich noch immer die Möglichkeit gelten lasse, dass unsere Ilias in dem gegenwärtigen Zusammenhange der bedeutenden Theile, und nicht blos der wenigen bedeutendsten, jemals vor der Arbeit des Pisistratus gedacht worden sey." (Lachmann, Fernere Betrachtungen über die Ilias, sect. xxviii. p. 32; Abhandlungen Berlin. Academ. 1841.) How far this admission—that for the *few most im-*

portant portions of the Iliad, there *did* exist an established order of succession prior to Peisistratus—is intended to reach, I do not know; but the language of Lachmann goes farther than either Wolf or William Müller. (See Wolf, Prolegomen. pp. cxli-cxlii, and W. Müller, Homerische Vorschule, Abschnitt vii. pp. 96, 98, 100, 102.) The latter admits that neither Peisistratus nor the Diaskeuasts could have made any considerable changes in the Iliad and Odyssey, either in the way of addition or of transposition; the poems as aggregates being too well known, and the Homeric vein of invention too completely extinct, to admit of such novelties.

I confess, I do not see how these last-mentioned admissions can be reconciled with the main doctrine of Wolf, in so far as regards Peisistratus.

[264] Diogen. Laërt. i. 57.—Τὰ τε Ὁμήρου *ἐξ ὑποβολῆς* γέγραφε (Σόλων) ῥαψῳδεῖσθαι, οἷον ὅπου ὁ πρῶτος ἔληξεν, ἔκειθεν ἄρχεσθαι τὸν ἀρχόμενον, ὥς φησι Διευχίδας ἐν τοῖς Μεγαρικοῖς.

Respecting Hipparchus, son of Peisistratus, the Pseudo-Plato tells us (in the dialogue so called, p. 228),—καὶ τὰ Ὁμήρου ἔπη πρῶτος ἐκόμισεν εἰς τὴν γῆν ταυτηνὶ, καὶ ἠνάγκασε τοὺς ῥαψῳδοὺς Παναθηναίοις *ἐξ ὑπολήψεως* ἐφεξῆς αὐτὰ διϊέναι, *ὥσπερ νῦν ἔτι* οἵδε ποιοῦσι.

These words have provoked multiplied criticisms from all the learned men who have touched upon the theory of the Homeric poems,—to determine what was the practice which Solon found existing, and what was the change which he introduced. Our information is too scanty to pretend to certainty, but I think the explanation of Hermann the most satisfactory ("Quid sit *ὑποβολή* et *ὑποβλήδεν*."—*Opuscula*, tom. v. p. 300, tom. vii. p. 162).

Ὑποβολεὺς is the technical term for the prompter at a theatrical representation (Plutarch, Præcept. gerend. Reip. p. 813); ὑποβολὴ and ὑποβάλλειν have corresponding meanings, of aiding the memory of a speaker and keeping him in accordance with a certain standard, in possession of the prompter: see the words ἐξ ὑποβολῆς, Xenophon. Cyropæd. iii. 3, 37. Ὑποβολὴ, therefore, has no necessary connection with a series of rhapsodes, but would apply just as much to one alone; although it happens in this case to be brought to bear upon several in succession. Ὑπόληψις, again, means "the taking up in succession of one rhapsode by another:" though the two words, therefore, have not the same meaning, yet the proceeding described in the two passages, in reference both to Solôn and Hipparchus, appears to be in substance the same,—*i. e.* to insure, by compulsory supervision, a correct and orderly recitation by the successive rhapsodes who went through the different parts of the poem.

There is good reason to conclude from this passage that the rhapsodes before Solôn were guilty both of negligence and of omission in their recital of Homer, but no reason to imagine either that they transposed the books, or that the legitimate order was not previously recognized.

The appointment of a systematic ὑποβολεὺς, or prompter, plainly indicates the existence of complete manuscripts.

The direction of Solôn, that Homer should be rhapsodized under the security of a prompter with his manuscript, appears just the same as that of the orator Lykurgus in reference to Æschylus, Sophoklês, and Euripidês (Pseudo-Plutarch. Vit. x. Rhetor. Lycurgi Vit.)—εἰσήνεγκε δὲ καὶ νόμους—ὡς χαλκᾶς εἰκόνας ἀναθεῖναι τῶν ποιητῶν Αἰσχύλου, Σοφοκλέους, Εὐριπίδου, καὶ τὰς τραγῳδίας αὐτῶν ἐν κοινῷ γραψαμένους φυλάττειν, καὶ τὸν τῆς πόλεως γραμματέα παραναγιγνώσκειν τοῖς ὑποκρινομένοις· οὐ γὰρ ἐξῆν αὐτὰς (ἄλλως) ὑποκρίνεσθαι. The word ἄλλως, which occurs last but one, is introduced by the conjecture of Grysar, who has cited and explained the above passage of the Pseudo-Plutarch in a valuable dissertation—*De Græcorum Tragœdiâ, qualis fuit circa tempora Demosthenis* (Cologne, 1830). All the critics admit the text as it now stands to be unintelligible, and various corrections have been proposed, among which that of Grysar seems the best. From his Dissertation, I transcribe the following passage, which illustrates the rhapsodizing of Homer ἐξ ὑποβολῆς:—

"Quum histriones fabulis interpolandis ægre abstinerent, Lycurgus legem supra indicatam eo tulit consilio, ut recitationes histrionum cum publico illo exemplo omnino congruas redderet. Quod ut assequeretur, constituit, ut dum fabulæ in scenâ recitarentur, scriba publicus simul exemplum civitatis inspiceret, juxta sive in theatro sive in postscenio sedens. Hæc enim verbi παραναγιγνώσκειν est significatio, posita præcipue in præpositione παρὰ, ut idem sit, quod *contra* sive *juxta* legere; id quod faciunt ii, *qui lecta ab altero vel recitata cum suis conferre cupiunt*." (Grysar, p. 7.)

[265] That the Iliad or Odyssey were ever recited with all the parts entire, at any time anterior to Solôn, is a point which Ritschl denies (Die Alexandrin. Bibliothek, pp. 67-70). He thinks that before Solôn, they were always recited in parts, and without any fixed order among the parts. Nor did Solôn determine (as he thinks) the order

of the parts: he only checked the license of the rhapsodes as to the recitation of the separate books: it was Pesistratus, who, with the help of Onomakritus and others, first settled the order of the parts and bound each poem into a whole, with some corrections and interpolations. Nevertheless, he admits that the parts were originally composed by the same poet, and adapted to form a whole amongst each other: but this primitive entireness (he asserts) was only maintained as a sort of traditional belief, never realized in recitation, and never reduced to an obvious, unequivocal, and permanent fact,—until the time of Peisistratus.

There is no sufficient ground, I think, for denying all entire recitation previous to Solôn, and we only interpose a new difficulty, both grave and gratuitous, by doing so.

[266] The Æthiopis of Arktinus contained nine thousand one hundred verses, as we learn from the Tabula Iliaca: yet Proklus assigns to it only four books. The Ilias Minor had *four* books, the Cyprian Verses *eleven*, though we do not know the number of lines in either.

Nitzsch states it as a certain matter of fact, that Arktinus recited his own poem *alone*, though it was too long to admit of his doing so without interruption. (See his Vorrede to the second vol. of the Odyssey, p. xxiv.) There is no evidence for this assertion, and it appears to me highly improbable.

In reference to the Romances of the Middle Ages, belonging to the Cycle of the Round Table, M. Fauriel tells us that the German *Perceval* has nearly twenty-five thousand verses (more than half as long again as the Iliad); the *Perceval* of Christian of Troyes, probably more; the German *Tristan*, of Godfrey of Strasburg, has more than twenty-three thousand; sometimes, the poem is begun by one author, and continued by another. (Fauriel, Romans de Chevalerie, Revue des Deux Mondes, t. xiii. pp. 695-697.)

The ancient unwritten poems of the Icelandic Skalds are as much lyric as epic: the longest of them does not exceed eight hundred lines, and they are for the most part much shorter (Untersuchungen über die Geschichte der Nördischen Heldensage, aus P. A. Müller's Sagabibliothek von G. Lange, Frankf. 1832, Introduct. p. xlii.).

[267] Plutarch, Solôn, 10.

[268] The Homeric Scholiast refers to Quintus Calaber ἐν τῇ Ἀμαζονομαχίᾳ, which was only one portion of his long poem (Schol. ad Iliad. ii. 220).

[269] Knight, Prolegg. Homer, xxxii. xxxvi. xxxvii. That Peisistratus caused a corrected MS. of the Iliad to be prepared, there seems good reason to believe, and the Scholion on Plautus edited by Ritschl (see Die Alexandrinische Bibliothek, p. 4) specifies the four persons (Onomakritus was one) employed on the task. Ritschl fancies that it served as a sort of Vulgate for the text of the Alexandrine critics, who named specially other MSS. (of Chios, Sinôpê, Massalia, etc.) only when they diverged from this Vulgate: he thinks, also, that it formed the original from whence those other MSS. were first drawn, which are called in the Homeric Scholia αἱ κοιναὶ, κοινότεραι (pp. 59-60).

Welcker supposes the Peisistratic MS. to have been either lost or carried away when Xerxês took Athens (Der Epische Kyklus, pp. 382-388).

Compare Nitzsch, Histor. Homer. Fasc. i. pp. 165-167; also his commentary on Odyss. xi. 604, the alleged interpolation of Onomakritus; and Ulrici, Geschichte der Hellen. Poes. Part i. s. vii. pp. 252-255.

The main facts respecting the Peisistratic recension are collected and discussed by Gräfenhan, Geschichte der Philologie, sect. 54-64, vol. i. pp. 266-311. Unfortunately, we cannot get beyond mere conjecture and possibility.

[270] Wolf allows both the uniformity of coloring, and the antiquity of coloring, which pervade the Homeric poems; also, the strong line by which they stand distinguished from the other Greek poets: "Immo congruunt in iis omnia ferme in idem ingenium, in eosdem mores, in eandem formam sentiendi et loquendi." (Prolegom. p. cclxv; compare p. cxxxviii.)

He thinks, indeed, that this harmony was *restored* by the ability and care of Aristarchus, ("mirificum illum concentum revocatum Aristarcho imprimis debemus.") This is a very exaggerated estimate of the interference of Aristarchus: but at any rate the *concentus* itself was ancient and original, and Aristarchus only *restored* it, when it had been spoiled by intervening accidents; at least, if we are to construe *revocatum* strictly, which, perhaps, is hardly consistent with Wolf's main theory.

[271] See Wolf, Prolegg. c. xii. p. xliii. "Nondum enim prorsus ejecta et explosa est eorum ratio, qui Homerum et Callimachum et Virgilium et Nonnum et Miltonum eodem animo legunt, nec quid uniuscujusque ætas

ferat, expendere legendo et computare laborant," etc.

A similar and earlier attempt to construe the Homeric poems with reference to their age, is to be seen in the treatise called *Il Vero Omero* of Vico,—marked with a good deal of original thought, but not strong in erudition (Opere di Vico, ed. Milan, vol. v. pp. 437-497).

[272] In the forty-sixth volume of his collected works, in the little treatise "*Homer, noch einmal*:" compare G. Lange, Ueber die Kyklischen Dichter (Mainz, 1837), Preface, p. vi.

[273] "Non esse totam Iliadem aut Odysseam unius poetæ opus, ita extra dubitationem positam puto, ut qui secus sentiat, eum non satis lectitasse illa carmina contendam." (Godf. Hermann, Præfat. ad Odysseam, Lips. 1825, p. iv.) See the language of the same eminent critic in his treatise "Ueber Homer und Sappho," Opuscula, vol. v. p. 74.

Lachmann, after having dissected the two thousand two hundred lines in the Iliad, between the beginning of the eleventh book, and line five hundred and ninety of the fifteenth, into four songs, "in the highest degree different in their spirit," ("ihrem Geiste nach höchst verschiedene Lieder,") tells us that whosoever thinks this difference of spirit inconsiderable,—whosoever does not feel it at once when pointed out,—whosoever can believe that the parts as they stand now belong to one artistically constructed Epos,—"will do well not to trouble himself any more either with my criticisms or with epic poetry, because he is too weak to understand anything about it," ("weil er zu schwach ist etwas darin zu verstehen:") Fernere Betrachtungen Ueber die Ilias: Abhandl. Berlin. Acad. 1841, p. 18, § xxiii.

On the contrary, Ulrici, after having shown (or tried to show) that the composition of Homer satisfies perfectly, in the main, all the exigencies of an artistic epic,—adds, that this will make itself at once evident to all those who have any sense of artistical symmetry; but that, for those to whom that sense is wanting, no conclusive demonstration can be given. He warns the latter, however, that they are not to deny the existence of that which their shortsighted vision cannot distinguish, for everything cannot be made clear to children, which the mature man sees through at a glance (Ulrici, Geschichte des Griechischen Epos, Part i. ch. vii. pp. 260-261). Read also Payne Knight, Proleg. c. xxvii, about the insanity of the Wolfian school, obvious even to the "homunculus e trivio."

I have the misfortune to dissent from both Lachmann and Ulrici; for it appears to me a mistake to put the Iliad and Odyssey on the same footing, as Ulrici does, and as is too frequently done by others.

[274] Plato, Aristotle, and their contemporaries generally, read the most suspicious portions of the Homeric poems as genuine (Nitzsch, Plan und Gang der Odyssee, in the Preface to his second vol. of Comments on the Odyssey, pp. lx-lxiv).

Thucydidês accepts the Hymn to Apollo as a composition by the author of the Iliad.

[275] Bernhard Thiersch, Ueber das Zeitalter und Vaterland des Homer (Halberstadt, 1832), Einleitung, pp. 4-18.

[276] Compare i, 295; ii. 145 (νήποινοί κεν ἔπειτα δόμων ἔντοσθεν ὅλοισθε); xi. 118; xiii. 395; xv. 178; also xiv. 162.

[277] Nitzsch, Plan und Gang der Odyssee, p. xliii, prefixed to the second vol. of his Commentary on the Odysseis.

"At carminum primi auditores non adeo curiosi erant (observes Mr. Payne Knight, Proleg. c. xxiii.), ut ejusmodi rerum rationes aut exquirerent aut expenderent; neque eorum fides e subtilioribus congruentiis omnino pendebat. Monendi enim sunt etiam atque etiam Homericorum studiosi, veteres illos ἀοιδοὺς non linguâ professoriâ inter viros criticos et grammaticos, aut alios quoscunque argutiarum captatores, carmina cantitasse, sed inter eos qui sensibus animorum libere, incaute, et effuse indulgerent," etc. Chap. xxii-xxvii. of Mr. Knight's Prolegomena, are valuable to the same purpose, showing the "homines rudes et agrestes," of that day, as excellent judges of what fell under their senses and observation, but careless, credulous, and unobservant of contradiction, in matters which came only under the mind's eye.

[278] W. Müller is not correct in saying that, in the first assembly of the gods, Zeus promises something which he does not perform: Zeus does not *promise* to send Hermes as messenger to Kalypsô, in the first book, though Athênê urges him to do so. Zeus, indeed, requires to be urged twice before he dictates to Kalypsô the

release of Odysseus, but he had already intimated, in the first book, that he felt great difficulty in protecting the hero, because of the wrath manifested against him by Poseidôn.

[279] Odyss. ix. 534.—

> Ὀψὲ κακῶς ἔλθοι, ὀλέσας ἀπὸ πάντας ἑταίρους,
>
> Νηὸς ἐπ᾽ ἀλλοτρίης, εὕροι δ᾽ ἐν πήματα οἴκῳ—
>
> Ὣς ἔφατ᾽ εὐχόμενος· (the Cyclops to Poseidôn) τοῦ δ᾽ ἔκλυε Κυανοχαίτης.

[280] Wolf admits, in most unequivocal language, the compact and artful structure of the Odyssey. Against this positive internal evidence, he sets the general presumption, that no such constructive art can possibly have belonged to a poet of the age of Homer: "De Odysseâ maxime, cujus admirabilis summa et compages pro præclarissimo monumento Græci ingenii habenda est…. Unde fit ut Odysseam nemo, cui omnino priscus vates placeat, nisi perlectam e manu deponere queat. At illa ars id ipsum est, quod *vix ac ne vix quidem cadere* videtur in vatem, singulas tantum rhapsodias decantantem," etc. (Prolegomen. pp. cxviii-cxx; compare cxii.)

[281] Lachmann seems to admit one case in which the composer of one song manifests cognizance of another song, and a disposition to give what will form a sequel to it. His fifteenth song (the Patrokleia) lasts from xv. 592 down to the end of the 17th book: the sixteenth song (including the four next books, from eighteen to twenty-two inclusive) is a continuation of the fifteenth, but by a different poet. (Fernere Betrachtungen über die Ilias, Abhandl. Berlin. Acad. 1841, sect. xxvi. xxviii. xxix. pp. 24, 34, 42.)

This admission of premeditated adaptation to a certain extent breaks up the integrity of the Wolfian hypothesis.

[282] The advocates of the Wolfian theory, appear to feel the difficulties which beset it; for their language is wavering in respect to these supposed primary constituent atoms. Sometimes Lachmann tells us, that the original pieces were much finer poetry than the Iliad as we now read it; at another time, that it cannot be now discovered what they originally were: nay, he farther admits, (as remarked in the preceding note,) that the poet of the sixteenth song had cognizance of the fifteenth.

But if it be granted that the original constituent songs were so composed, though by different poets, as that the more recent were adapted to the earlier with more or less dexterity and success, this brings us into totally different conditions of the problem. It is a virtual surrender of the Wolfian hypothesis, which, however, Lachmann both means to defend, and does defend with ability; though his vindication of it has, to my mind, only the effect of exposing its inherent weakness by carrying it out into something detailed and positive. I will add, in respect to his Dissertations, so instructive as a microscopic examination of the poem,—1. That I find myself constantly dissenting from that critical feeling, on the strength of which he cuts out parts as interpolations, and discovers traces of the hand of distinct poets; 2. That his objections against the continuity of the narrative are often founded upon lines which the ancient scholiasts and Mr. Payne Knight had already pronounced to be interpolations; 3. That such of his objections as are founded upon lines undisputed, admit in many cases of a complete and satisfactory reply.

[283] Lange, in his Letter to Goethe, Ueber die Einheit der Iliade, p. 33 (1826); Nitzsch, Historia Homeri, Fasciculus 2, Præfat. p. x.

[284] Even Aristotle, the great builder-up of the celebrity of Homer as to epical aggregation, found some occasions (it appears) on which he was obliged to be content with simply excusing, without admiring, the poet (Poet. 44 τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς ὁ ποιητὴς ἡδύνων ἀφανίζει τὸ ἄτοπον.)

And Hermann observes justly, in his acute treatise De Interpolationibus Homeri (Opuscula, tom. v. p. 53), —"Nisi admirabilis illa Homericorum carminum suavitas lectorum animos quasi incantationibus quibusdam captos teneret, non tam facile delitescerent, quæ accuratius considerata, et multo minus apte quam quis jure postulet composita esse apparere necesse est."

This treatise contains many criticisms on the structure of the Iliad, some of them very well founded, though there are many from which I dissent.

[285] In reference to the books from the second to the seventh, inclusive, I agree with the observations of William Müller, Homerische Vorschule, Abschnitt viii. pp. 116-118.

[286] Lachmann, Fernere Betrachtungen über die Ilias, Abhandlungen Berlin. Acad. 1841, p. 4.

After having pointed out certain discrepancies which he maintains to prove different composing hands, he adds: "Nevertheless, we must be careful not to regard the single constituent songs in this part of the poem as being distinct and separable in a degree equal to those in the first half; for they all with one accord harmonize in one particular circumstance, which, with reference to the story of the Iliad, is not less important even than the anger of Achilles, viz. that the three most distinguished heroes, Agamemnôn, Odysseus, and Diomêdês, all become disabled throughout the whole duration of the battles."

Important for the story of the *Achillêis*, I should say, not for that of the *Iliad*. This remark of Lachmann is highly illustrative for the distinction between the original and the enlarged poem.

[287] I confess my astonishment that a man of so much genius and power of thought as M. Benjamin Constant, should have imagined the original Iliad to have concluded with the death of Patroclus, on the ground that Achilles then becomes reconciled with Agamemnôn. See the review of B. Constant's work, De la Religion, etc., by O. Müller, in the Kleine Schriften of the latter, vol. ii. p. 74.

[288] He appears as the mediator between the insulted Achilles and the Greeks, manifesting kindly sympathies for the latter without renouncing his fidelity to the former. The wounded Machaon, an object of interest to the whole camp, being carried off the field by Nestor,—Achilles, looking on from his distant ship, sends Patroclus to inquire whether it be really Machaon; which enables Nestor to lay before Patroclus the deplorable state of the Grecian host, as a motive to induce him and Achilles again to take arms. The compassionate feelings of Patroclus being powerfully touched, he is hastening to enforce upon Achilles the urgent necessity of giving help, when he meets Eurypylus crawling out of the field, helpless with a severe wound, and imploring his succor. He supports the wounded warrior to his tent, and ministers to his suffering; but before this operation is fully completed, the Grecian host has been totally driven back, and the Trojans are on the point of setting fire to the ships: Patroclus then hurries to Achilles to proclaim the desperate peril which hangs over them all, and succeeds in obtaining his permission to take the field at the head of the Myrmidons. The way in which Patroclus is kept present to the hearer, as a prelude to his brilliant but short-lived display, when he comes forth in arms,—the contrast between his characteristic gentleness and the ferocity of Achilles,—and the natural train of circumstances whereby he is made the vehicle of reconciliation on the part of his offended friend, and rescue to his imperiled countrymen,—all these exhibit a degree of epical skill, in the author of the primitive Achillêis, to which nothing is found parallel in the added books of the Iliad.

[289] Observe, for example, the following passages:—

1. Achilles, standing on the prow of his ship, sees the general army of Greeks undergoing defeat by the Trojans, and also sees Nestor conveying in his chariot a wounded warrior from the field. He sends Patroclus to find out who the wounded man is: in calling forth Patroclus, he says (xi. 607),—

Δῖε Μενοιτιάδη τῷ ᾽μῷ κεχαρισμένε θυμῷ,

Νῦν οἵω περὶ γούνατ᾽ ἐμὰ στήσεσθαι Ἀχαιοὺς

Λισσομένους· χρείω γὰρ ἱκάνεται οὔκετ᾽ ἀνεκτός.

Heyne, in his comment, asks the question, not unnaturally, "Pœnituerat igitur asperitatis erga priorem legationem, an homo arrogans expectaverat alteram ad se missam iri?" I answer, neither one nor the other: the words imply that he had received *no embassy* at all. He is still the same Achilles who in the first book paced alone by the seashore, devouring his own soul under a sense of bitter affront, and praying to Thetis to aid his revenge: this revenge is now about to be realized, and he hails its approach with delight. But if we admit the embassy of the ninth book to intervene, the passage becomes a glaring inconsistency for that which Achilles anticipates as future, and even yet as contingent, *had actually occurred* on the previous evening; the Greeks *had* supplicated at his feet,—they *had proclaimed* their intolerable need,—and he had spurned them. The Scholiast, in his explanation of these lines, after giving the plain meaning, that "Achilles shows what he has long been desiring, to see the Greeks in a state of supplication to him,"—seems to recollect that this is in contradiction to the ninth book, and tries to remove the contradiction, by saying "that he had been previously mollified by conversa-

tion with Phœnix,"—ἤδη δὲ προμαλαχθεὶς ἦν ἐκ τῶν Φοίνικος λόγων,—a supposition neither countenanced by anything in the poet, nor sufficient to remove the difficulty.

2. The speech of Poseidôn (xiii. 115) to encourage the dispirited Grecian heroes, in which, after having admitted the injury done to Achilles by Agamemnôn, he recommends an effort to heal the sore, and intimates "that the minds of good men admit of this healing process," (Ἀλλ᾽ ἀκεώμεθα θᾶσσον· ἀκεσταί τε φρένες ἐσθλῶν,) is certainly not very consistent with the supposition that this attempt to heal *had been made* in the best possible way, and that Achilles had manifested a mind implacable in the extreme on the evening before,—while the mind of Agamemnôn was already brought to proclaimed humiliation, and needed no farther healing.

3. And what shall we say to the language of Achilles and Patroclus, at the beginning of the sixteenth book, just at the moment when the danger has reached its maximum, and when Achilles is about to send forth his friend?

Neither Nestor, when he invokes and instructs Patroclus as intercessor with Achilles (xi. 654-790), nor Patroclus himself, though in the extreme of anxiety to work upon the mind of Achilles, and reproaching him with hardness of heart,—ever bring to remembrance the ample atonement which had been tendered to him; while Achilles himself repeats the original ground of quarrel, the wrong offered to him in taking away Brisêis, continuing the language of the first book; then, without the least allusion to the atonement and restitution since tendered, he yields to his friend's proposition, just like a man whose wrong remained unredressed, but who was, nevertheless, forced to take arms by necessity (xvi. 60-63):—

Ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν προτετύχθαι ἐάσομεν, οὔδ᾽ ἄρα πως ἦν
Ἀσπερχὲς κεχολῶσθαι ἐνὶ φρεσίν· ἤτοι ἔφην γε
Οὐ πρὶν μηνιθμὸν καταπαύσεμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁπόταν δὴ
Νῆας ἐμὰς ἀφίκηται ἀϋτή τε πτόλεμός τε.

I agree with the Scholiast and Heyne in interpreting ἔφην γε as equivalent to διενοήθην,—not as referring to any express antecedent declaration.

Again, farther on in the same speech, "The Trojans (Achilles says) now press boldly forward upon the ships, for they no longer see the blaze of my helmet: but if Agamemnôn *were favorably disposed towards me*, they would presently run away and fill the ditches with their dead bodies" (71):—

… τάχα κεν φεύγοντες ἐναύλους
Πλήσειαν νεκύων, εἴ μοι κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων
Ἤπια εἰδείη· νῦν δὲ στράτον ἀμφιμάχονται.

Now here again, if we take our start from the first book, omitting the ninth, the sentiment is perfectly just. But assume the ninth book, and it becomes false and misplaced; for Agamemnôn is then a prostrate and repentant man, not merely "favorably disposed" towards Achilles, but offering to pay any price for the purpose of appeasing him.

4. Again, a few lines farther, in the same speech, Achilles permits Patroclus to go forth, in consideration of the extreme peril of the fleet, but restricts him simply to avert this peril and do nothing more: "Obey my words, so that you may procure *for me honor* and glory from *the body of Greeks*, and that they may send back to me the damsel, giving me ample presents besides: when you have driven the Trojans from the ships, come back again":—

Ὡς ἄν μοι τιμὴν μεγάλην καὶ κῦδος ἄροιο
Πρὸς πάντων Δαναῶν· ἀτὰρ οἳ περικαλλέα κούρην
Ἄψ ἀπονάσσωσι, προτὶ δ᾽ ἀγλαὰ δῶρα πόρωσιν·
Ἐκ νηῶν ἐλάσας, ἰέναι πάλιν (84-87).

How are we to reconcile this with the ninth book, where Achilles declares that he does not care for being honored by the Greeks, ix. 604? In the mouth of the affronted Achilles, of the first book, such words are apt enough: he will grant succor, but only to the extent necessary for the emergency, and in such a way as to insure redress for his own wrong,—which redress he has no reason as yet to conclude that Agamemnôn is willing to grant. But the ninth book *has actually* tendered to him everything which he here demands, and even more (the daughter of Agamemnôn in marriage, without the price usually paid for a bride, etc.): Brisêis, whom now he is so anxious to repossess, was then offered in restitution, and he disdained the offer. Mr. Knight, in fact, strikes out these lines as spurious; partly, because they contradict the ninth book, where Achilles has actually rejected what he here thirsts for ("Dona cum puellâ jam antea oblata aspernatus erat,")—partly because he thinks that they express a sentiment unworthy of Achilles; in which latter criticism I do not concur.

5. We proceed a little farther to the address of Patroclus to the Myrmidons, as he is conducting them forth to the battle: "Fight bravely, Myrmidons, that we may bring honor to Achilles; and that the wide-ruling Agamemnôn may know the mad folly which he committed, when he dishonored the bravest of the Greeks."

To impress this knowledge upon Agamemnôn was no longer necessary. The ninth book records his humiliating confession of it, accompanied by atonement and reparation. To teach him the lesson a second time, is to break the bruised reed,—to slay the slain. But leave out the ninth book, and the motive is the natural one,—both for Patroclus to offer, and for the Myrmidons to obey: Achilles still remains a dishonored man, and to humble the rival who has dishonored him is the first of all objects, as well with his friends as with himself.

6. Lastly, the time comes when Achilles, in deep anguish for the death of Patroclus, looks back with aversion and repentance to the past. To what point should we expect that his repentance would naturally turn? Not to his primary quarrel with Agamemnôn, in which he had been undeniably wronged,—but to the scene in the ninth book, where the maximum of atonement for the previous wrong is tendered to him and scornfully rejected. Yet when we turn to xviii. 108, and xix. 55, 68, 270, we find him reverting to the primitive quarrel in the first book, just as if it had been the last incident in his relations with Agamemnôn: moreover, Agamemnôn (xix. 86), in *his* speech of reconciliation, treats the past just in the same way,—deplores his original insanity in wronging Achilles.

7. When we look to the prayers of Achilles and Thetis, addressed to Zeus in the first book, we find that the consummation prayed for is,—honor to Achilles,—redress for the wrong offered to him,—victory to the Trojans until Agamemnôn and the Greeks shall be made bitterly sensible of the wrong which they have done to their bravest warrior (i. 409-509). Now this consummation is brought about in the ninth book. Achilles can get no more, nor does he ultimately get more, either in the way of redress to himself or remorseful humiliation of Agamemnôn, than what is here tendered. The defeat which the Greeks suffer in the battle of the eighth book (Κόλος Μάχη) has brought about the consummation. The subsequent and much more destructive defeats which they undergo are thus causeless: yet Zeus is represented as inflicting them reluctantly, and only because they are necessary to honor Achilles (xiii. 350; xv. 75, 235, 598; compare also viii. 372 and 475).

If we reflect upon the constitution of the poem, we shall see that the fundamental sequence of ideas in it is, a series of misfortunes to the Greeks, brought on by Zeus for the special purpose of procuring atonement to Achilles and bringing humiliation on Agamemnôn: the introduction of Patroclus superadds new motives of the utmost interest, but it is most harmoniously worked into the fundamental sequence. Now the intrusion of the ninth book breaks up the scheme of the poem by disuniting the sequence: Agamemnôn is on his knees before Achilles, entreating pardon and proffering reparation, yet the calamities of the Greeks become more and more dreadful. The atonement of the ninth book comes at the wrong time and in the wrong manner.

There are four passages (and only four, so far as I am aware) in which the embassy of the ninth book is alluded to in the subsequent books: one in xviii. 444-456, which was expunged as spurious by Aristarchus (see the Scholia and Knight's commentary, *ad loc.*); and three others in the following book, wherein the gifts previ-

ously tendered by Odysseus as the envoy of Agamemnôn are noticed as identical with the gifts actually given in the nineteenth book. I feel persuaded that these passages (vv. 140-141, 192-195, and 243) are specially inserted for the purpose of establishing a connection between the ninth book and the nineteenth. The four lines (192-195) are decidedly better away: the first two lines (140-141) are noway necessary; while the word χθιζὸς (which occurs in both passages) is only rendered admissible by being stretched to mean *nudius tertius* (Heyne, *ad loc.*).

I will only farther remark with respect to the ninth book, that the speech of Agamemnôn (17-28), the theme for the rebuke of Diomêdês and the obscure commonplace of Nestor, is taken verbatim from his speech in the second book, in which place the proposition, of leaving the place and flying, is made, not seriously, but as a stratagem (ii. 110, 118, 140).

The length of this note can only be excused by its direct bearing upon the structure of the Iliad. To show that the books from the eleventh downwards are composed by a poet who has no knowledge of the ninth book, is, in my judgment, a very important point of evidence in aiding us to understand what the original Achillêis was. The books from the second to the seventh inclusive are insertions into the Achillêis, and lie apart from its plot, but do not violently contradict it, except in regard to the agora of the gods at the beginning of the fourth book, and the almost mortal wound of Sarpêdon in his battle with Tlepolemus. But the ninth book overthrows the fundamental scheme of the poem.

[290] Helbig (Sittl. Zustände des Heldenalters, p. 30) says, "The consciousness in the bosom of Agamemnôn that he has offered atonement to Achilles strengthens his confidence and valor," &c. This is the idea of the critic, not of the poet. It does not occur in the Iliad, though the critic not unnaturally imagines that it *must* occur. Agamemnôn never says, "I was wrong in provoking Achilles, but you see I have done everything which man could do to beg his pardon." Assuming the ninth book to be a part of the original conception, this feeling is so natural, that we could hardly fail to find it, at the beginning of the eleventh book, numbered among the motives of Agamemnôn.

[291] Iliad, xi. 659; xiv. 128; xvi. 25.

[292] The intervention of Oneirus ought rather to come as an immediate preliminary to book viii. than to book ii. The first forty-seven lines of book ii would fit on and read consistently at the beginning of book viii, the events of which book form a proper sequel to the mission of Oneirus.

[293] O. Müller, (History of Greek Literature, ch. v. § 8,) doubts whether the beginning of the second book was written "by the ancient Homer, or by one of the later Homerids:" he thinks the speech of Agamemnôn, wherein he plays off the deceit upon his army, is "a copious parody (of the same words used in the ninth book) composed by a later Homerid, and inserted in the room of an originally shorter account of the arming of the Greeks." He treats the scene in the Grecian agora as "an entire mythical comedy, full of fine irony and with an amusing plot, in which the deceiving and deceived Agamemnôn is the chief character."

The comic or ironical character which is here ascribed to the second book appears to me fanciful and incorrect; but Müller evidently felt the awkwardness of the opening incident, though his way of accounting for it is not successful. The second book seems to my judgment just as serious as any part of the poem.

I think also that the words alluded to by O. Müller in the ninth book are a transcript of those in the second, instead of the reverse, as he believes,—because it seems probable that the ninth book is an addition made to the poem after the books between the first and the eighth had been already inserted,—it is certainly introduced after the account of the fortification, contained in the seventh book, had become a part of the poem: see ix. 349. The author of the Embassy to Achilles fancied that that hero had been too long out of sight, and out of mind,—a supposition for which there was no room in the original Achillêis, when the eighth and eleventh books followed in immediate succession to the first, but which offers itself naturally to any one on reading our present Iliad.

[294] Iliad, vii. 327.

[295] Heyne treats the eighth book as decidedly a separate song, or epic; a supposition which the language of Zeus and the agora of the gods at the beginning are alone sufficient to refute, in my judgment (Excursus 1, ad lib. xi. vol. vi. p. 269). This Excursus, in describing the sequence of events in the Iliad, passes at once and naturally from book eighth to book eleventh.

And Mr. Payne Knight, when he defends book eleventh against Heyne, says, "Quæ in undecimâ rhapsodiâ Iliadis narrata sunt, haud minus ex ante narratis pendent: neque rationem pugnæ commissæ, neque rerum in eâ gestarum nexum atque ordinem, quisquam intelligere posset, nisi *iram et secessum* Achillis, et *victoriam* quam Trojani inde consecuti erant, antea cognosset." (Prolegom. c. xxix.)

Perfectly true: to understand the eleventh book, we must have before us the first and the eighth (which are those that describe the anger and withdrawal of Achilles, and the defeat which the Greeks experience in consequence of it); we may dispense with the rest.

[296] O. Müller (Hist. Greek Literat. ch. v. § 6) says, about this wall: "Nor is it until the Greeks are *taught by the experience of the first day's fighting*, that the Trojans can resist them in open battle, that the Greeks build the wall round their ships…. This appeared to Thucydidês so little conformable to historical probability, that, without regard to the authority of Homer, he placed the building of these walls immediately after the landing."

It is to be lamented, I think, that Thucydidês took upon him to determine the point at all as a matter of history; but when he once undertook this, the account in the Iliad was not of a nature to give him much satisfaction, nor does the reason assigned by Müller make it better. It is implied in Müller's reason that, before the first day's battle, the Greeks did not believe that the Trojans *could* resist them in open battle: the Trojans (according to him) never had maintained the field, so long as Achilles was up and fighting on the Grecian side, and therefore the Greeks were quite astonished to find now, for the first time, that they *could* do so.

Now nothing can be more at variance with the tenor of the second and following books than this supposition. The Trojans come forth readily and fight gallantly; neither Agamemnôn, nor Nestor, nor Odysseus consider them as enemies who cannot hold front; and the circuit of exhortation by Agamemnôn (Epipôlêsis), so strikingly described in the fourth book, proves that *he* does not anticipate a very easy victory. Nor does Nestor, in proposing the construction of the wall, give the smallest hint that the power of the Trojans to resist in the open field was to the Greeks an unexpected discovery.

The reason assigned by Müller, then, is a fancy of his own, proceeding from the same source of mistake as others among his remarks; because he tries to find, in the books between the first and eighth, a governing reference to Achilles (the point of view of the Achillêis), which those books distinctly refuse. The Achillêis was a poem of Grecian disasters up to the time when Achilles sent forth Patroclus; and during those disasters, it might suit the poet to refer by contrast to the past time when Achilles was active, and to say that *then* the Trojans did not dare even to present themselves in battle-array in the field, whereas *now* they were assailing the ships. But the author of books ii. to vii. has no wish to glorify Achilles: he gives us a picture of the Trojan war generally, and describes the Trojans, not only as brave and equal enemies, but well known by the Greeks themselves to be so.

The building of the Grecian wall, as it now stands described, is an unexplained proceeding, which Müller's ingenuity does not render consistent.

[297] Schol. ad Iliad. x. 1.

[298] Agamemnôn, after deploring the misguiding influence of Atê, which induced him to do the original wrong to Achilles, says (xix. 88-137),—

Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ ἀασάμην καί μευ φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεὺς,

Ἄψ ἐθέλω ἀρέσαι, δόμεναί τ᾽ ἀπερείσι᾽ ἄποινα, etc.

[299] The supposition of a smaller original Iliad, enlarged by successive additions to the present dimensions, and more or less interpolated (we must distinguish *enlargement* from *interpolation*,—the insertion of a new rhapsody from that of a new line), seems to be a sort of intermediate compromise, towards which the opposing views of Wolf, J. H. Voss, Nitzsch, Hermann, and Boeckh, all converge. Baumgarten-Crusius calls this smaller poem an Achillêis.

Wolf, Preface to the Göschen edit. of the Iliad, pp. xii-xxiii; Voss, Anti-Symbolik, part ii. p. 234; Nitzsch, Histor. Homeri, Fasciculus i. p. 112; and Vorrede to the second volume of his Comments on the Odyssey, p. xxvi: "In the Iliad (he there says) many single portions may very easily be imagined as parts of another whole, or as

having been once separately sung." (See Baumgarten-Crusius, Preface to his edition of W. Müller's Homerische Vorschule, pp. xlv-xlix.)

Nitzsch distinguishes the Odyssey from the Iliad, and I think justly, in respect to this supposed enlargement. The reasons which warrant us in applying this theory to the Iliad have no bearing upon the Odyssey. If there ever was an Ur-Odyssee, we have no means of determining what it contained.

[300] The remarks of O. Müller on the Iliad (in his History of Greek Literature) are highly deserving of perusal: with much of them I agree, but there is also much which seems to me unfounded. The range of combination, and the far-fetched narrative stratagem which he ascribes to the primitive author, are in my view inadmissible (chap. v. § 5-11):—

"The internal connection of the Iliad (he observes, § 6) rests upon the union of certain parts; and neither the interesting introduction, describing the defeat of the Greeks up to the burning of the ship of Protesilaus, nor the turn of affairs brought about by the death of Patroclus, nor the final pacification of the anger of Achilles, could be spared from the Iliad, when the fruitful seed of such a poem had once been sown in the soul of Homer, and had begun to develop its growth. But the plan of the Iliad is certainly very much extended beyond what was actually necessary; and in particular, the preparatory part, consisting of the *attempts* on the part of *the other heroes to compensate for the absence of Achilles*, has, it must be owned, been drawn out to a disproportionate length, so that the suspicion that there were later insertions of importance applies with greater probability to the first than to the last books…. A design manifested itself at an early period to make this poem complete in itself, so that all the subjects, descriptions, and actions, which could alone give interest to a poem *on the entire war*, might find a place within the limits of its composition. For this purpose, it is not improbable that many lays of earlier bards, who had sung single adventures of the Trojan war, were laid under contribution, and the finest parts of them incorporated in the new poem."

These remarks of O. Müller intimate what is (in my judgment) the right view, inasmuch as they recognize an extension of the plan of the poem beyond its original limit, manifested by insertions in the first half; and it is to be observed that, in his enumeration of those parts, the union of which is necessary to the internal connection of the Iliad, nothing is mentioned except what is comprised in books i. viii. xi. to xxii. or xxiv. But his description of "*the preparatory part*," as "*the attempts of the other heroes to compensate for the absence of Achilles*," is noway borne out by the poet himself. From the second to the seventh book, Achilles is scarcely alluded to; moreover, the Greeks do perfectly well without him. This portion of the poem displays, not "the *insufficiency* of all the other heroes without Achilles," as Müller had observed in the preceding section, but the perfect *sufficiency* of the Greeks under Diomêdês, Agamemnôn, etc. to make head against Troy; it is only in the eighth book that their *insufficiency* begins to be manifested, and only in the eleventh book that it is consummated by the wounds of the three great heroes. Diomêdês is, in fact, exalted to a pitch of glory in regard to contests with the gods, which even Achilles himself never obtains afterwards, and Helenus the Trojan puts him above Achilles (vi. 99) in terrific prowess. Achilles is mentioned two or three times as absent, and Agamemnôn, in his speech to the Grecian agora, regrets the quarrel (ii. 377), but we never hear any such exhortation as, "Let us do our best to make up for the absence of Achilles,"—not even in the Epipôlêsis of Agamemnôn, where it would most naturally be found. "Attempts to compensate for the absence of Achilles" must, therefore, be treated as the idea of the critic, not of the poet.

Though O. Müller has glanced at the distinction between the two parts of the poem (an original part, having chief reference to *Achilles and the Greeks*; and a superinduced part, having reference to *the entire war*), he has not conceived it clearly, nor carried it out consistently. If we are to distinguish these two points of view at all, we ought to draw the lines at the end of the first book and at the beginning of the eighth, thus regarding the intermediate six books as belonging to the picture of *the entire war* (or the Iliad as distinguished from the Achillêis): the point of view of the Achillêis, dropped at the end of the first book, is resumed at the beginning of the eighth. The natural fitting together of these two parts is noticed in the comment of Heyne, ad viii. 1: "Cæterum *nunc* Jupiter aperte solvit Thetidi promissa, dum reddit causam Trojanorum bello superiorem, ut Achillis desiderium Achivos, et pœnitentia injuriæ ei illatæ Agamemnonem incessat (cf. i. 5). Nam quæ *adhuc* narrata sunt, partim continebantur in fortunâ belli utrinque tentatâ … partim valebant ad narrationem variandam," etc. The first and the eighth books belong to one and the same point of view, while *all* the intermediate books belong to the other. But O. Müller seeks to prove that a portion of these intermediate books belongs to one common point of view with the first and eighth, though he admits that they have been enlarged by insertions. Here I think he is mistaken. Strike out anything which can be reasonably allowed for enlargement in the books between the first and eighth, and the same difficulty will still remain in respect to the remainder; for *all* the incidents between those

two points are brought out in a spirit altogether indifferent to Achilles or his anger. The Zeus of the fourth book, as contrasted with Zeus in the first or eighth, marks the difference; and this description of Zeus is absolutely indispensable as the connecting link between book iii. on the one side and books iv. and v. on the other. Moreover, the attempt of O. Müller, to force upon the larger portion of what is between the first and eighth books the point of view of the Achillêis, is never successful: the poet does not exhibit in those books "insufficient efforts of other heroes to compensate for the absence of Achilles," but a general and highly interesting picture of the Trojan war, with prominent reference to the original ground of quarrel. In this picture, the duel between Paris and Menelaus forms naturally the foremost item,—but how far-fetched is the reasoning whereby O. Müller brings that striking recital within the scheme of the Achillêis! "The Greeks and Trojans are for the first time struck by an idea, which might have occurred in the previous nine years, if the Greeks, *when assisted by Achilles*, had not, from *confidence in their superior strength*, considered every compromise as unworthy of them,—namely, to decide the war by a single combat between the authors of it." Here the causality of Achilles is dragged in by main force, and unsupported either by any actual statement in the poem or by any reasonable presumption; for it is *the Trojans* who propose the single combat, and we are not told that they had ever proposed it before, though they would have had stronger reasons for proposing it during the presence of Achilles than during his absence.

O. Müller himself remarks (§ 7), "that from the second to the seventh book Zeus appears as it were to have forgotten his resolution and his promise to Thetis." In other words, the poet, during this part of the poem, drops the point of view of the Achillêis to take up that of the more comprehensive Iliad: the Achillêis reappears in book viii,—again disappears in book x,—and is resumed from book xi. to the end of the poem.

[301] This tendency to insert new homogeneous matter by new poets into poems already existing, is noticed by M. Fauriel, in reference to the *Romans* of the Middle Ages:—

"C'est un phénomène remarquable dans l'histoire de la poésie épique, que cette disposition, cette tendance constante du goût populaire à amalgamer, à lier en une seule et même composition le plus possible des compositions diverses,—cette disposition persiste chez un peuple, tant que la poésie conserve un reste de vie; tant qu'elle s'y transmet par la tradition et qu'elle y circule à l'aide du chant ou des récitations publiques. Elle cesse partout où la poésie est une fois fixée dans les livres, et n'agit plus que par la lecture,—cette dernière époque est pour ainsi dire, celle de la propriété poétique—celle où chaque poëte prétend à une existence, à une gloire, personnelles; et où la poésie cesse d'être une espèce de trésor commun dont le peuple jouit et dispose à sa manière, sans s'inquiéter des individus qui le lui ont fait." (Fauriel, Sur les Romans Chevaleresques, leçon 5^{me}, Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. xiii. p. 707.)

M. Fauriel thinks that the Shah Nameh of Ferdusi was an amalgamation of epic poems originally separate, and that probably the Mahabharat was so also (*ib.* 708).

[302] The remarks of Boeckh, upon the possibility of such coöperation of poets towards one and the same scheme are perfectly just:—

"Atqui quomodo componi a variis auctoribus successu temporum rhapsodiæ potuerint, quæ post prima initia directæ jam ad idem consilium et quam vocant unitatem carminis sint … missis istorum declamationibus qui populi universi opus Homerum esse jactant … tum potissimum intelligetur, ubi gentis civilis Homeridarum propriam et peculiarem Homericam poesin fuisse, veteribus ipsis si non testibus, at certe ducibus, concedetur…. Quæ quum ita sint, non erit adeo difficile ad intelligendum, quomodo, post prima initia ab egregio vate facta, in gente sacrorum et artis communione sociatâ, multæ rhapsodiæ ad unum potuerint consilium dirigi." (Index Lection. 1834, p. 12.)

I transcribe this passage from Giese (Ueber den Æolischen Dialekt, p. 157), not having been able to see the essay of which it forms a part.

[303] Wolf, Prolegom. p. cxxxviii. "Quippe *in universum* idem sonus est omnibus libris; idem habitus sententiarum, orationis, numerorum," etc.

[304] Wolf, Prolegomen. p. cxxxvii. "Equidem certe quoties in continenti lectione ad istas partes (*i. e.* the last six books) deveni, nunquam non in iis talia quædam sensi, quæ nisi illæ tam mature cum ceteris coaluissent, quovis pignore contendam, dudum ab eruditis detecta et animadversa fuisse, immo multa ejus generis, ut cum nunc Ὁμηρικώτατα habeantur, si tantummodo in Hymnis legerentur, ipsa sola eos suspicionibus νοθείας adspersura essent." Compare the sequel, p. cxxxviii, "ubi nervi deficiant et spiritus Homericus,—jejunum et frigidum in locis multis," etc.

[305] Iliad, xx. 25. Zeus addresses the agora of the gods,—

Ἀμφοτέροισι δ᾽ ἀρήγετ᾽, ὅπη νόος ἐστὶν ἑκάστου·
Εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς οἷος ἐπὶ Τρώεσσι μαχεῖται,
Οὐδὲ μίνυνθ᾽ ἕξουσι ποδώκεα Πηλείωνα.
Καὶ δέ τέ μιν καὶ πρόσθεν ὑποτρομέεσκον ὁρῶντες·
Νῦν δ᾽ ὅτε δὴ καὶ θυμὸν ἑταίρου χώεται αἰνῶς,
Δείδω μὴ καὶ τεῖχος ὑπὲρ μόρον ἐξαλαπάξῃ.

The formal restriction put upon the gods by Zeus at the beginning of the eighth book, and the removal of that restriction at the beginning of the twentieth, are evidently parts of one preconceived scheme.

It is difficult to determine whether the battle of the gods and goddesses in book xxi. (385-520) is to be expunged as spurious, or only to be blamed as of inferior merit ("improbanda tantum, non resecanda—hoc enim est illud, quo plerumque summa criseôs Homericæ redit," as Heyne observes in another place, Obss. Iliad. xviii. 444). The objections on the score of non-Homeric locution are not forcible (see P. Knight, *ad loc.*), and the scene belongs to that vein of conception which animates the poet in the closing act of his Achillêis.

[306] While admitting that these last books of the Iliad are not equal in interest with those between the eleventh and eighteenth, we may add that they exhibit many striking beauties, both of plan and execution, and one in particular may be noticed as an example of happy epical adaptation. The Trojans are on the point of ravishing from the Greeks the dead body of Patroclus, when Achilles (by the inspiration of Hêrê and Iris) shows himself unarmed on the Grecian mound, and by his mere figure and voice strikes such terror into the Trojans that they relinquish the dead body. As soon as night arrives, Polydamas proposes, in the Trojan agora, that the Trojans shall retire without farther delay from the ships to the town, and shelter themselves within the walls, without awaiting the assault of Achilles armed on the next morning. Hector repels this counsel of Polydamas with expressions,—not merely of overweening confidence in his own force, even against Achilles,—but also of extreme contempt and harshness towards the giver; whose wisdom, however, is proved by the utter discomfiture of the Trojans the next day. Now this angry deportment and mistake on the part of Hector is made to tell strikingly in the twenty-second book, just before his death. There yet remains a moment for him to retire within the walls, and thus obtain shelter against the near approach of his irresistible enemy, but he is struck with the recollection of that fatal moment when he repelled the counsel which would have saved his countrymen: "If I enter the town, Polydamas will be the first to reproach me, as having brought destruction upon Troy on that fatal night when Achilles came forth, and when I resisted his better counsel." (Compare xviii. 250-315; xxii. 100-110; and Aristot. Ethic. iii. 8.)

In a discussion respecting the structure of the Iliad, and in reference to arguments which deny all designed concatenation of parts, it is not out of place to notice this affecting touch of poetry, belonging to those books which are reproached as the feeblest.

[307] The latter portion of the seventh book is spoiled by the very unsatisfactory addition introduced to explain the construction of the wall and ditch: all the other incidents (the agora and embassy of the Trojans, the truce for burial, the arrival of wine-ships from Lemnos, etc.) suit perfectly with the scheme of the poet of these books, to depict the Trojan war generally.

[308] Unless, indeed, we are to imagine the combat between Tlepolemus and Sarpêdon, and that between Glaukus and Diomêdês, to be separate songs; and they are among the very few passages in the Iliad which are completely separable, implying no special antecedents.

[309] Compare also Heyne, Excursus ii. sect. ii. ad Iliad. xxiv. vol. viii. p. 783.

[310] Subsequent poets, seemingly thinking that the naked story, (of Diomêdês slaughtering Rhêsus and his companions in their sleep,) as it now stands in the Iliad, was too displeasing, adopted different ways of dressing it up. Thus, according to Pindar (ap. Schol. Iliad. x. 435), Rhêsus fought one day as the ally of Troy, and did such terrific damage, that the Greeks had no other means of averting total destruction from his hand on the next day, except by killing him during the night. And the Euripidean drama, called *Rhêsus*, though representing

the latter as a new-comer, yet puts into the mouth of Athênê the like overwhelming predictions of what he would do on the coming day, if suffered to live; so that to kill him in the night is the only way of saving the Greeks (Eurip. Rhês. 602): moreover, Rhêsus himself is there brought forward as talking with such overweening insolence, that the sympathies of man, and the envy of the gods, are turned against him (*ib.* 458).

But the story is best known in the form and with the addition (equally unknown to the Iliad) which Virgil has adopted. It was decreed by fate that, if the splendid horses of Rhêsus were permitted once either to taste the Trojan provender, or to drink of the river Xanthus, nothing could preserve the Greeks from ruin (Æneid, i. 468, with Servius, *ad loc.*):—

"Nec procul hinc Rhesi niveis tentoria velis
Agnoscit lacrymans: primo quæ prodita somno
Tydides multâ vastabat cæde cruentus:
Ardentesque avertit equos in castra, priusquam
Pabula gustassent Trojæ, Xanthumque bibissent."

All these versions are certainly improvements upon the story as it stands in the Iliad.

[311] Mr. Knight places the Iliad about two centuries, and the Odyssey one century, anterior to Hesiod: a century between the two poems (Prolegg. c. lxi.)

[312] Hermann, Præfat. ad Odyss. p. vii.

[313] Knight, Prolegg. 1, c. Odyss. xxii. 465-478.

[314] The arguments, upon the faith of which Payne Knight and other critics have maintained the Odyssey to be younger than the Iliad, are well stated and examined in Bernard Thiersch,—Quæstio de Diversâ Iliadis et Odysseæ Ætate,—in the Anhang (p. 306) to his work Ueber das Zeitalter und Vaterland des Homer.

He shows all such arguments to be very inconclusive; though the grounds upon which he himself maintains identity of age between the two appear to me not at all more satisfactory (p. 327): we can infer nothing to the point from the mention of Telemachus in the Iliad.

Welcker thinks that there is a great difference of age, and an evident difference of authorship, between the two poems (Der Episch. Cyclus, p. 295).

O. Müller admits the more recent date of the Odyssey, but considers it "difficult and hazardous to raise upon this foundation any definite conclusions as to the person and age of the poet." (History of the Literature of Ancient Greece, ch. v. s. 13.)

[315] Dr. Thirlwall has added to the second edition of his History of Greece a valuable Appendix, on the early history of the Homeric poems (vol. i. pp. 500-516); which contains copious information respecting the discrepant opinions of German critics, with a brief comparative examination of their reasons. I could have wished that so excellent a judge had superadded, to his enumeration of the views of others, an ampler exposition of his own. Dr. Thirlwall seems decidedly convinced upon that which appears to me the most important point in the Homeric controversy: "That before the appearance of the earliest of the poems of the Epic Cycle, the Iliad and Odyssey, even if they did not exist precisely in their present form, had at least reached their present compass, and were regarded each as a complete and well-defined whole, not as a fluctuating aggregate of fugitive pieces." (p. 509.)

This marks out the Homeric poems as ancient both in the items and in the total, and includes negation of the theory of Wolf and Lachmann, who contend that, as a total, they only date from the age of Peisistratus. It is then safe to treat the poems as unquestionable evidences of Grecian antiquity (meaning thereby 776 B. C.), which we could not do if we regarded all congruity of parts in the poems as brought about through alterations of Peisistratus and his friends.

There is also a very just admonition of Dr. Thirlwall (p. 516) as to the difficulty of measuring what degree of discrepancy or inaccuracy might or might not have escaped the poet's attention, in an age so imperfectly known to us.

[316] There are just remarks on this point in Heyne's Excursus, ii. sect. 2 and 4, ad Il. xxiv. vol. viii. pp. 771-800.

[317] "Wenig Deutsche, und vielleicht nur wenige Menschen aller *neuern* Nationen, haben Gefühl für ein æsthetisches Ganzes: sie loben und tadeln nur stellenweise, sie entzücken sich nur stellenweise." (Goethe, Wilhelm Meister: I transcribe this from Welcker's Æschyl. Trilogie, p. 306.)

What ground there is for restricting this proposition to *modern* as contrasted with *ancient* nations, I am unable to conceive.

[318] The κινούμενα ὀνόματα of Homer were extolled by Aristotle; see Schol. ad Iliad. i. 481; compare Dionys. Halicarn. De Compos. Verbor. c. 20. ὥστε μηδὲν ἡμῖν διαφέρειν γινόμενα τὰ πράγματα ἢ λεγόμενα ὁρᾶν. Respecting the undisguised bursts of feeling by the heroes, the Scholiast ad Iliad, i. 349 tells us,—ἕτοιμον τὸ ἠπωϊκον πρὸς δάκρυα,—compare Euripid. Helen. 959, and the severe censures of Plato, Republ. ii. p. 388.

The Homeric poems were the best understood, and the most widely popular of all Grecian composition, even among the least instructed persons, such (for example) as the semibarbarians who had acquired the Greek language in addition to their own mother tongue. (Dio Chrysost. Or. xviii. vol. i. p. 478; Or. liii. vol. ii. p. 277, Reisk.) Respecting the simplicity and perspicuity of the narrative style, implied in this extensive popularity, Porphyry made a singular remark: he said, that the sentences of Homer *really* presented much difficulty and obscurity, but that ordinary readers fancied they understood him, "because of the general clearness *which appeared* to run through the poems." (See the Prolegomena of Villoison's edition of the Iliad, p. xli.) This remark affords the key to a good deal of the Homeric criticism. There doubtless were real obscurities in the poems, arising from altered associations, customs, religion, language, etc., as well as from corrupt text; but while the critics did good service in elucidating these difficulties, they also introduced artificially many others, altogether of their own creating. Refusing to be satisfied with the plain and obvious meaning, they sought in Homer hidden purposes, elaborate innuendo, recondite motives even with regard to petty details, deep-laid rhetorical artifices (see a specimen in Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhetor. c. 15, p. 316, Reiske; nor is even Aristotle exempt from similar tendencies, Schol. ad Iliad. iii. 441, x. 198), or a substratum of philosophy allegorized. No wonder that passages, quite perspicuous to the vulgar reader, seemed difficult to them.

There could not be so sure a way of missing the real Homer as by searching for him in these devious recesses. He is essentially the poet of the broad highway and the market-place, touching the common sympathies and satisfying the mental appetencies of his countrymen with unrivalled effect; but exempt from ulterior views, either selfish or didactic, and immersed in the same medium of practical life and experience, religiously construed, as his auditors. No nation has ever yet had so perfect and touching an exposition of its early social mind as the Iliad and Odyssey exhibit.

In the verbal criticism of Homer, the Alexandrine literati seem to have made a very great advance, as compared with the glossographers who preceded them. (See Lehrs, De Studiis Aristarchi, Dissert. ii. p. 42.)

[319] Horat. Epist. i. 2, v. 1-26:—

> "Sirenum voces, et Circes pocula nosti:
>
> Quæ si cum sociis stultus cupidusque bibisset,
>
> Vixisset canis immundus, vel amica luto sus."

Horace contrasts the folly and greediness of the companions of Ulysses, in accepting the refreshments tendered to them by Circe, with the self-command of Ulysses himself in refusing them. But in the incident as described in the original poem, neither the praise nor the blame, here implied, finds any countenance. The companions of Ulysses follow the universal practice in accepting hospitality tendered to strangers, the fatal consequences of which, in their particular case, they could have no ground for suspecting; while Ulysses is preserved from a similar fate, not by any self-command of his own, but by a previous divine warning and a special antidote, which had not been vouchsafed to the rest (see Odyss. x. 285). And the incident of the Sirens, if it is to be taken as evidence of anything, indicates rather the absence, than the presence, of self-command on the part of Ulysses.

Of the violent mutations of text, whereby the *Grammatici* or critics tried to efface from Homer bad ethical tendencies (we must remember that many of these men were lecturers to youth), a remarkable specimen is af-

forded by Venet. Schol. ad Iliad. ix. 453; compare Plutarch, de Audiendis Poetis, p. 95. Phœnix describes the calamitous family tragedy in which he himself had been partly the agent, partly the victim. Now that an Homeric hero should confess guilty proceedings, and still more guilty designs, without any expression of shame or contrition, was insupportable to the feelings of the critics. One of them, Aristodemus, thrust two negative particles into one of the lines; and though he thereby ruined not only the sense but the metre, his emendation procured for him universal applause, because he had maintained the innocence of the hero (καὶ οὐ μόνον ηὐδοκίμησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐτιμήθη, ὡς εὐσεβῆ τηρήσας τὸν ἥρωα). And Aristarchus thought the case so alarming, that he struck out from the text four lines, which have only been preserved to us by Plutarch (Ὁ μὲν Ἀρίσταρχος ἔξειλε τὰ ἔπη ταῦτα, *φοβηθείς*). See the Fragment of Dioscorides (περὶ τῶν παρ᾽ Ὁμήρῳ Νόμων) in Didot's Fragmenta Historicor. Græcor. vol. ii. p. 193.

[320] "C'est un tableau idéal, à coup sûr, que celui de la société Grecque dans les chants qui portent le nom d'Homère: et pourtant cette société y est toute entière reproduite, avec la rusticité, la férocité de ses mœurs, ses bonnes et ses mauvaises passions, sans dessein de faire particulièrement ressortir, de célébrer tel ou tel de ses mérites, de ses avantages, ou de laisser dans l'ombre ses vices et ses maux. Ce mélange du bien et du mal, du fort et du faible,—cette simultanéité d'idées et de sentimens en apparence contraires,—cette variété, cette incohérence, ce développement inégal de la nature et de la destinée humaine,—c'est précisément là ce qu'il y a de plus poétique, car c'est le fond même des choses, c'est la vérité sur l'homme et le monde: et dans les peintures idéales qu'en veulent faire la poésie, le roman et même l'histoire, cet ensemble, si divers et pourtant si harmonieux, doit se retrouver: sans quoi l'idéal véritable y manque aussi bien que la réalité." (Guizot, Cours d'Histoire Moderne; Leçon 7me, vol. i. p. 285.)

[321] Compare Strong, Statistics of the Kingdom of Greece, p. 2; and Kruse, Hellas, vol. i. ch. 3, p. 196.

[322] Dikæarch, 31, p. 460, ed. Fuhr:—

Ἡ δ᾽ Ἑλλὰς ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀμβρακίας εἶναι δοκεῖ
Μάλιστα συνεχὴς τὸ πέρας· αὐτὴ δ᾽ ἔρχεται
Ἐπὶ τὸν πόταμον Πηνειὸν, ὡς Φιλέας γράφει,
Ὄρος τε Μαγνήτων Ὁμόλην κεκλημένον.

Skylax, c. 35.—Ἀμβρακία—ἐντεῦθεν ἄρχεται ἡ Ἑλλὰς συνεχὴς εἶναι μέχρι Πηνείου ποτάμου, καὶ Ὁμολίου Μαγνητικῆς πόλεως, ἥ ἔστι παρὰ τὸν πόταμον.

[323] Herod. i. 146: ii. 56. The Molossian Alkôn passes for a Hellen (Herod. vi. 127).

[324] The mountain systems in the ancient Macedonia and Illyricum, north of Olympus, have been yet but imperfectly examined: see Dr. Griesebach, Reise durch Rumelien und nach Brussa im Jahre 1839, vol. ii. ch. 13, p. 112, *seqq.* (Götting. 1841), which contains much instruction respecting the real relations of these mountains as compared with the different ideas and representations of them. The words of Strabo (lib. vii. Excerpt. 3, ed. Tzschucke), that Scardus, Orbêlus, Rhodopê, and Hæmus extend in a straight line from the Adriatic to the Euxine, are incorrect.

See Leake's Travels in Northern Greece, vol. i. p. 335: the pass of Tschangon, near Castoria (through which the river Devol passes from the eastward to fall into the Adriatic on the westward), is the only cleft in this long chain from the river Drin in the north down to the centre of Greece.

[325] For the general sketch of the mountain system of Hellas, see Kruse, Hellas, vol. i. ch. 4, pp. 280-290; Dr. Cramer, Geog. of An. Greece, vol. i. pp. 3-8.

Respecting the northern regions, Epirus, Illyria, and Macedonia, O. Müller, in his short but valuable treatise Ueber die Makedoner, p. 7 (Berlin, 1825), may be consulted with advantage. This treatise is annexed to the English translation of his History of the Dorians by Mr. G. C. Lewis.

[326] Out of the 47,600,000 stremas (= 12,000,000 English acres) included in the present kingdom of Greece, 26,500,000 go to mountains, rocks, rivers, lakes, and forests,—and 21,000,000 to arable land, vineyards, olive and currant grounds, etc. By arable land is meant, land fit for cultivation; for a comparatively small portion of it is actually cultivated at present (Strong, Statistics of Greece, p. 2, London, 1842).

The modern kingdom of Greece does not include Thessaly. The epithet κοιλὸς (hollow) is applied to several of the chief Grecian states,—κοιλὴ Ἦλις, κοιλὴ Λακεδαίμων, κοιλὸν Ἄργος, etc.

Κόρινθος ὀφρύᾳ τε καὶ κοιλαίνεται, Strabo, viii. p. 381.

The fertility of Bœotia is noticed in Strabo, ix. p. 400, and in the valuable fragment of Dikæarchus, Βίος Ἑλλάδος, p. 140, ed. Fuhr.

[327] For the geological and mineralogical character of Greece, see the survey undertaken by Dr. Fiedler, by orders of the present government of Greece, in 1834 and the following years (Reise durch alle Theile des Königreichs Griechenland in Auftrag der K. G. Regierung in den Jahren 1834 bis 1837, especially vol. ii. pp. 512-530).

Professor Ross remarks upon the character of the Greek limestone,—hard and intractable to the mason,—jagged and irregular in its fracture,—as having first determined in early times the polygonal style of architecture, which has been denominated (he observes) Cyclopian and Pelasgic, without the least reason for either denomination (Reise auf den Griech. Inseln, vol. i. p. 15).

[328] Griesebach, Reisen durch Rumelien, vol. ii. ch. 13, p. 124.

[329] In passing through the valley between Œta and Parnassus, going towards Elateia, Fiedler observes the striking change in the character of the country. "Romelia (*i. e.* Akarnania, Ætolia, Ozolian Lokris, etc.), woody, well-watered, and covered with a good soil, ceases at once and precipitously: while craggy limestone mountains, of a white-grey color, exhibit the cold character of Attica and the Morea." (Fiedler, Reise, i. p. 213.)

The Homeric Hymn to Apollo conceives even the πεδίον πυρήφορον of Thebes as having in its primitive state been covered with wood (v. 227).

The best timber used by the ancient Greeks came from Macedonia, the Euxine, and the Propontis: the timber of Mount Parnassus and of Eubœa was reckoned very bad; that of Arcadia better (Theophrast. v. 2, 1; iii. 9).

[330] See Fiedler, Reise, etc. vol. i. pp. 84, 219, 362, etc.

Both Fiedler and Strong (Statistics of Greece, p. 169) dwell with great reason upon the inestimable value of Artesian wells for the country.

[331] Ross, Reise auf den Griechischen Inseln, vol. i. letter 2, p. 12.

[332] The Greek language seems to stand singular in the expression χειμαῤῥοῦς,—the *Wadys* of Arabia manifest the like alternation, of extreme temporary fulness and violence, with absolute dryness (Kriegk, Schriften zur allgemeinen Erdkunde, p. 201, Leipzig, 1840).

[333] Thucydid. ii. 102.

[334] Strabo, ix. p. 407.

[335] Colonel Leake observes (Travels in Morea, vol. iii. pp. 45, 153-155), "The plain of Tripolitza (anciently that of Tegea and Mantineia) is by far the greatest of that cluster of valleys in the centre of Peloponnesus, each of which is so closely shut in by the intersecting mountains, that no outlet is afforded to the waters except through the mountains themselves," etc. Respecting the Arcadian Orchomenus, and its inclosed lake with Katabothra, see the same work, p. 103; and the mountain plains near Corinth, p. 263.

This temporary disappearance of the rivers was familiar to the ancient observers—οἱ καταπινόμενοι τῶν ποταμῶν. (Aristot. Meteorolog. i. 13. Diodor. xv. 49. Strabo, vi. p. 271; viii. p. 389, etc.)

Their familiarity with this phenomenon was in part the source of some geographical suppositions, which now appear to us extravagant, respecting the long subterranean and submarine course of certain rivers, and their reappearance at very distant points. Sophokles said that the Inachus of Akarnania joined the Inachus of Argolis: Ibykus the poet affirmed that the Asôpus, near Sikyon, had its source in Phrygia; the river Inôpus of the little island of Delos was alleged by others to be an effluent from the mighty Nile; and the rhetor Zôilus, in a panegyrical oration to the inhabitants of Tenedos, went the length of assuring them that the Alpheius in Elis had its source in their island (Strabo, vi. p. 271). Not only Pindar and other poets (Antigon. Caryst. c. 155), but also the historian Timæus (Timæi Frag. 127, ed. Göller), and Pausanias, also, with the greatest confidence (v. 7, 2), believed that the fountain Arethusa, at Syracuse, was nothing else but the reappearance of the river Alpheius from Peloponnesus: this was attested by the actual fact that a goblet or cup (φιάλη), thrown into the Alpheius, had come up at the Syracusan fountain, which Timæus professed to have verified,—but even the arguments by which Strabo justifies his disbelief of this tale, show how powerfully the phenomena of the Grecian rivers acted upon his mind. "If (says he, *l. c.*) the Alpheius, instead of flowing into the sea, fell into some chasm in the earth, there would be some plausibility in supposing that it continued its subterranean course as far as Sicily without mixing with the sea: but since its junction with the sea is matter of observation, and since there is no aperture visible near the shore to absorb the water of the river (στόμα τὸ καταῖνον τὸ ῥεῦμα τοῦ ποταμοῦ), so it is plain

that the water cannot maintain its separation and its sweetness, whereas the spring Arethusa is perfectly good to drink." I have translated here the sense rather than the words of Strabo; but the phenomena of "rivers falling into chasms and being drunk up," for a time, is exactly what happens in Greece. It did not appear to Strabo impossible that the Alpheius might traverse this great distance underground; nor do we wonder at this, when we learn that a more able geographer than he (Eratosthenês) supposed that the marshes of Rhinokolura, between the Mediterranean and the Red sea, were formed by the Euphrates and Tigris, which flowed underground for the length of 6000 stadia or furlongs (Strabo, xvi. p. 741: Seidel; Fragm. Eratosth. p. 194): compare the story about the Euphrates passing underground, and reappearing in Ethiopia as the river Nile (Pausan. ii. 5, 3). This disappearance and reappearance of rivers connected itself, in the minds of ancient physical philosophers, with the supposition of vast reservoirs of water in the interior of the earth, which were protruded upwards to the surface by some gaseous force (see Seneca, Nat. Quæst. vi. 8). Pomponius Mela mentions an idea of some writers, that the source of the Nile was to be found, not in our (οἰκουμένη) habitable section of the globe, but in the Antichthon, or southern continent, and that it flowed under the ocean to rise up in Ethiopia (Mela, i. 9, 55).

These views of the ancients, evidently based upon the analogy of Grecian rivers, are well set forth by M. Letronne, in a paper on the situation of the Terrestrial Paradise, as represented by the Fathers of the Church; cited in A. von Humboldt, Examen Critique de l'Histoire de la Géographie, etc., vol. iii. pp. 118-130.

[336] "Upon the arrival of the king and regency in 1833 (observes Mr. Strong), no carriage-roads existed in Greece; nor were they, indeed, much wanted previously, as down to that period not a carriage, waggon, or cart, or any other description of vehicles, was to be found in the whole country. The traffic in general was carried on by means of boats, to which the long indented line of the Grecian coast and its numerous islands afforded every facility. Between the seaports and the interior of the kingdom, the communication was effected by means of beasts of burden, such as mules, horses, and camels." (Statistics of Greece, p. 33.)

This exhibits a retrograde march to a point lower than the description of the Odyssey, where Telemachus and Peisistratus drive their chariot from Pylus to Sparta. The remains of the ancient roads are still seen in many parts of Greece (Strong, p. 34).

[337] Dr. Clarke's description deserves to be noticed, though his warm eulogies on the fertility of the soil, taken generally, are not borne out by later observers: "The physical phenomena of Greece, differing from those of any other country, present a series of beautiful plains, successively surrounded by mountains of limestone; resembling, although upon a larger scale, and rarely accompanied by volcanic products, the craters of the Phlegræan fields. Everywhere, their level surfaces seems to have been deposited by water, gradually retired or evaporated; they consist for the most part of the richest soil, and their produce is yet proverbially abundant. In this manner, stood the cities of Argos, Sikyon, Corinth, Megara, Eleusis, Athens, Thebes, Amphissa, Orchomenus, Chæronea, Lebadea, Larissa, Pella, and many others." (Dr. Clarke's Travels, vol. ii. ch. 4, p. 74.)

[338] Sir W. Gell found, in the month of March, summer in the low plains of Messenia, spring in Laconia, winter in Arcadia (Journey in Greece, pp. 355-359).

[339] The cold central region (or mountain plain,—ὀροπέδιον) of Tripolitza, differs in climate from the maritime regions of Peloponnesus, as much as the south of England from the south of France…. No appearance of spring on the trees near Tegea, though not more than twenty-four miles from Argos…. Cattle are sent from thence every winter to the maritime plains of Elos in Laconia (Leake, Trav. in Morea, vol. i. pp. 88, 98, 197). The pasture on Mount Olono (boundary of Elis, Arcadia, and Achaia) is not healthy until June (Leake, vol. ii. p. 119); compare p. 348, and Fiedler, Reise, i. p. 314.

See also the Instructive Inscription of Orchomenus, in Boeckh, Staatshaushaltung der Athener, t. ii. p. 380.

The transference of cattle, belonging to proprietors in one state, for temporary pasturage in another, is as old as the Odyssey, and is marked by various illustrative incidents: see the cause of the first Messenian war (Diodor. Fragm. viii. vol. iv. p. 23, ed. Wess; Pausan. iv. 4, 2).

[340] "Universa autem (Peloponnesus), velut pensante æquorum incursus naturâ, in montes 76 extollitur." (Plin. H. N. iv. 6.)

Strabo touches, in a striking passage (ii. pp. 121-122), on the influence of the sea in determining the shape and boundaries of the land: his observations upon the great superiority of Europe over Asia and Africa, in respect of intersection and interpenetration of land by the sea-water are remarkable: ἡ μὲν οὖν Εὐρώπη πολυσχημονεστάτη πασῶν ἐστι, etc. He does not especially name the coast of Greece, though his remarks have

a more exact bearing upon Greece than upon any other country. And we may copy a passage out of Tacitus (Agricol. c. 10), written in reference to Britain, which applies far more precisely to Greece: "nusquam latius dominari mare … nec litore tenus accrescere aut resorberi, sed influere penitus et ambire, *et jugis etiam atque montibus inseri velut in suo*."

[341] Xenophon, De Vectigal. c. 1; Ephor. Frag. 67, ed. Marx; Stephan. Byz. Βοιωτία.

[342] Pliny, H. N. iv. 5, about the Isthmus of Corinth: "Lechææ hinc, Cenchreæ illinc, angustiarum termini, longo et ancipiti navium ambitu (*i. e.* round Cape Malea), quas *magnitudo plaustris transvehi prohibet*: quam ob causam perfodere navigabili alveo angustias eas tentavere Demetrius rex, dictator Cæsar, Caius princeps, Domitius Nero,—infausto (ut omnium exitu patuit) incepto."

The διολκὸς, less than four miles across, where ships were drawn across, if their size permitted, stretched from Lechæum on the Corinthian gulf, to Schœnus, a little eastward of Cenchreæ, on the Saronic gulf (Strabo, viii. p. 330). Strabo (viii. p. 335) reckons the breadth of the διολκὸς at forty stadia (about 4¾ English miles); the reality, according to Leake, is 3½ English miles (Travels in Morea, vol. iii. ch. xxix. p. 297).

[343] The north wind, the Etesian wind of the ancients, blows strong in the Ægean nearly the whole summer, and with especially dangerous violence at three points,—under Karystos, the southern cape of Eubœa, near Cape Malea, and in the narrow strait between the islands of Tenos, Mykonos, and Dêlos (Ross, Reisen auf den Griechischen Inseln, vol. i. p. 20). See also Colonel Leake's account of the terror of the Greek boatman, from the gales and currents round Mount Athos: the canal cut by Xerxes through the isthmus was justified by sound reasons (Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii. c. 24, p. 145).

[344] The Periplus of Skylax enumerates every section of the Greek name, with the insignificant exceptions noticed in the text, as partaking of the line of coast; it even mentions Arcadia (c. 45), because at that time Lepreum had shaken off the supremacy of Elis, and was confederated with the Arcadians (about 360 B. C.): Lepreum possessed about twelve miles of coast, which therefore count as Arcadian.

[345] Cicero (De Republicâ, ii. 2-4, in the Fragments of that lost treatise, ed. Maii) notices emphatically both the general maritime accessibility of Grecian towns, and the effects of that circumstance on Grecian character: "Quod de Corintho dixi, id haud scio an liceat de cunctâ Græciâ verissime dicere. Nam et ipsa Peloponnesus fere tota in mari est: nec prætor Phliuntios ulli sunt, quorum agri non contingant mare: et extra Peloponnesum Æniianes et Dores et Dolopes soli absunt a mari. Quid dicam insulas Græciæ, quæ fluctibus cinctæ natant pæne ipsæ simul cum civitatium institutis et moribus? Atque hæc quidem, ut supra dixi, veteris sunt Græciæ. Coloniarum vero quæ est deducta a Graiis in Asiam, Thraciam, Italiam, Siciliam, Africam, præter unam Magnesiam, quam unda non alluat? Ita barbarorum agris quasi adtexta quædam videtur ora esse Græciæ."

Compare Cicero, Epistol. ad Attic. vi. 2, with the reference to Dikæarchus, who agreed to a great extent in Plato's objections against a maritime site (De Legg. iv. p. 705; also, Aristot. Politic. vii. 5-6). The sea (says Plato) is indeed a salt and bitter neighbor (μάλα γε μὴν ὄντως ἁλμυρὸν καὶ πικρὸν γειτόνημα), though convenient for purposes of daily use.

[346] Hekatæus, Fragm. Ἀρκαδικὸν δεῖπνον … μάζας καὶ ὕεια κρέα. Herodot. i. 66. Βαλανηφάγοι ἄνδρες. Theocrit. Id. vii. 106.—

> Κῆν μὲν ταῦθ᾽ ἑρδῇς, ὦ Πᾶν φίλε, μή τί τυ παῖδες
>
> Ἀρκαδικοὶ σκίλλαισιν ὑπὸ πλευράς τε καὶ ὤμους
>
> Τανίκα μαστίσδοιεν ὅτε κρέα τυτθὰ παρείη·
>
> Εἰ δ᾽ ἄλλως νεύσαις κατὰ μὲν χρόα πάντ᾽ ὀνύχεσσι
>
> Δακνόμενος κνάσαιο, etc.

The alteration of Χῖοι, which is obviously out of place, in the scholia on this passage, to ἔνιοι, appears unquestionable.

[347] Skylax, Peripl. 59.

[348] Cicero, de Orator. i. 44. "Ithacam illam in asperrimis saxulis, sicut nidulum, affixam."

[349] Herodot. i. 52; iii. 57; vi. 46-125. Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, b. i. ch. 3.

The gold and silver offerings sent to the Delphian temple, even from the Homeric times (Il. ix. 405) downwards, were numerous and valuable; especially those dedicated by Crœsus, who (Herodot. i. 17-52) seems to have surpassed all predecessors.

[350] Strabo, x. p. 447; xiv. pp. 680-684. Stephan. Byz. v. Αἴδηψος, Λακεδαίμων. Kruse, Hellas, ch. iv. vol. i. p. 328. Fiedler, Reisen in Griechenland, vol. ii. pp. 118-559.

[351] *Note to second edition.*—In my first edition, I had asserted that cotton grew in Greece in the time of Pausanias,—following, though with some doubt, the judgment of some critics, that βυσσὸς meant cotton. I now believe that this was a mistake, and have expunged the passage.

[352] At the repast provided at the public cost for those who dined in the Prytaneium of Athens, Solôn directed barley-cakes for ordinary days, wheaten bread for festivals (Athenæus, iv. p. 137).

The milk of ewes and goats was in ancient Greece preferred to that of cows (Aristot. Hist. Animal. iii. 15, 5-7); at present, also, cow's-milk and butter is considered unwholesome in Greece, and is seldom or never eaten (Kruse, Hellas, vol. i. ch. 4, p. 368).

[353] Theophrast. Caus. Pl. ix. 2; Demosthen. adv. Leptin. c. 9. That salt-fish from the Propontis and from Gades was sold in the markets of Athens during the Peloponnesian war, appears from a fragment of the Marikas of Eupolis (Fr. 23, ed. Meineke; Stephan. Byz. v. Γάδειρα):—

Πότερ᾽ ἦν τὸ τάριχος, Φρύγιον ἢ Γαδειρικόν;

The Phœnician merchants who brought the salt-fish from Gades took back with them Attic pottery for sale among the African tribes of the coast of Morocco (Skylax, Peripl. c. 109).

[354] Simonidês, Fragm. 109, Gaisford.—

Πρόσθε μὲν ἀμφ᾽ ὤμοισιν ἔχων τρηχεῖαν ἄσιλλαν

Ἰχθῦς ἐξ Ἄργους εἰς Τεγέαν ἔφερον, etc.

The Odyssey mentions certain inland people, who knew nothing either of the sea, or of ships, or the taste of salt: Pausanias looks for them in Epirus (Odyss. xi. 121; Pausan. i. 12, 3).

[355] Αὐτουργοί τε γάρ εἰσι Πελοποννήσιοι (says Perikles, in his speech to the Athenians, at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, Thucyd. i. 141) καὶ οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ χρήματά ἐστιν αὐτοῖς, etc.,—ἄνδρες γεωργοὶ καὶ οὐ θαλάσσιοι, etc. (ib. c. 142.)

[356] In Egypt, the men sat at home and wove, while the women did out-door business: both the one and the other excite the surprise of Herodotus and Sophoklês (Herod. ii. 35; Soph. Œd. Col. 340).

For the spinning and weaving of the modern Greek peasant women, see Leake, Trav. Morea, vol. i. pp. 13, 18, 223, etc.; Strong, Stat. p. 185.

[357] Herodot. i. 142; Hippocrat. De Aëre, Loc. et Aq. c. 12-13; Aristot. Polit. vii. 6, 1.

[358] The mountaineers of Ætolia are, at this time, unable to come down into the marshy plain of Wrachōri, without being taken ill after a few days (Fiedler, Reise in Griech. i. p. 184).

[359] Dikæarch. Fragm. p. 145, ed. Fuhr—Βίος Ἑλλάδος. Ἱστοροῦσι δ᾽ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ τὰ κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς ὑπάρχοντα ἴδια ἀκληρήματα λέγοντες ταῦτα—Τὴν μὲν αἰσχροκέρδειαν κατοικεῖν ἐν Ὠρώπῳ, τὸν δὲ φθόνον ἐν Τανάγρᾳ, τὴν φιλονεικίαν ἐν Θεσπίαις, τὴν ὕβριν ἐν Θήβαις, τὴν πλεονεξίαν ἐν Ἀνθήδονι, τὴν περιεργίαν ἐν Κορωνείᾳ, ἐν Πλαταιαῖς τὴν ἄλαζόνειαν, τὸν πυρετὸν ἐν Ὀγχήστῳ, τὴν ἀναισθησίαν ἐν Ἁλιάρτῳ.

About the distinction between Ἀθηναῖοι and Ἀττικοὶ, see the same work, p. 141.

[360] Strabo, vii. pp. 322, 324, 326; Thucydid. ii. 68. Theopompus (ap. Strab. *l. c.*) reckoned 14 Epirotic ἔθνη.

[361] Herodot. i. 140, ii. 56, vi. 127.

[362] Strabo, vii. p. 327.

Several of the Epirotic tribes were δίγλωσσοι,—spoke Greek in addition to their native tongue.

See, on all the inhabitants of these regions, the excellent dissertation of O. Müller above quoted, Ueber die Makedoner; appended to the first volume of the English translation of his History of the Dorians.

[363] Herodot. i. 143-150.

[364] See the protest of Eratosthenês against the continuance of the classification into Greek and Barbarian, after the latter word had come to imply rudeness (ap. Strabo. ii. p. 66; Eratosth. Fragm. Seidel. p. 85).

[365] Cato, Fragment. ed. Lion. p. 46; ap. Plin. H. N. xxii. 1. A remarkable extract from Cato's letter to his son, intimating his strong antipathy to the Greeks; he proscribes their medicine altogether, and admits only a slight taste of their literature: "Quod bonum sit eorum literas inspicere, non per discere…. Jurarunt inter se, Barbaros necare omnes medicinâ, sed hoc ipsum mercede faciunt, ut fides iis sit et facile disperdant. Nos quoque dictitant Barbaros et spurios, nosque magis quam alios, Opicos appellatione fœdant."

[366] Καρῶν ἠγήσατο βαρβαροφώνων, Homer, Iliad, ii. 867. Homer does not use the word βάρβαροι, or any words signifying either a Hellen generally or a non-Hellen generally (Thucyd. i. 3). Compare Strabo, viii. p. 370; and xiv. p. 662.

Ovid reproduces the primitive sense of the word βάρβαρος, when he speaks of himself as an exile at Tomi (Trist. v. 10-37):—

"Barbarus hic ego sum, quia non intelligor ulli."

The Egyptians had a word in their language, the exact equivalent of βάρβαρος in this sense (Herod. ii. 158).

[367] Herod. viii. 144. …τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐὸν ὅμαιμόν τε καὶ ὁμόγλωσσον, καὶ θεῶν ἱδρύματά τε κοινὰ καὶ θυσίαι, ἤθεα τε ὁμότροπα· τῶν προδότας γενέσθαι Ἀθηναίους οὐκ ἂν εὖ ἔχοι. (*Ib.* x. 7.) Ἡμεῖς δὲ, Δία τε Ἑλλήνιον αἰδεσθέντες, καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα δεινὸν ποιεύμενοι προδοῦναι, etc.

Compare Dikæarch. Fragm. p. 147, ed. Fuhr; and Thucyd. iii. 59,—τὰ κοινὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων νόμιμα… θεοὺς τοὺς ὁμοβωμίους καὶ κοινοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων: also, the provision about the κοινὰ ἱερὰ in the treaty between Sparta and Athens (Thuc. v. 18; Strabo, ix. p. 419).

It was a part of the proclamation solemnly made by the Eumolpidæ, prior to the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries, "All non-Hellens to keep away,"—εἴργεσθαι τῶν ἱερῶν (Isocrates, Orat. iv. Panegyr. p. 74).

[368] Hekatæ. Fragm. 356, ed. Klausen: compare Strabo, vii. p. 321; Herod. i. 57; Thucyd. i. 3,—κατὰ πόλεις τε, *ὅσοι ἀλλήλων συνίεσαν*, etc.

[369] "Antiqui grammatici eas tantum dialectos spectabant, quibus scriptores usi essent: ceteras, quæ non vigebant nisi in ore populi, non notabant." (Ahrens, De Dialecto Æolicâ, p. 2.) The same has been the case, to a great degree, even in the linguistic researches of modern times, though printing now affords such increased facility for the registration of popular dialects.

[370] Herod. i. 142.

[371] Respecting the three varieties of the Æolic dialect, differing considerably from each other, see the valuable work of Ahrens, De Dial. Æol. sect. 2, 32, 50.

[372] The work of Albert Giese, Ueber den Æolischen Dialekt (unhappily not finished, on account of the early death of the author,) presents an ingenious specimen of such analysis.

[373] See the interesting remarks of Dio Chrysostom on the attachment of the inhabitants of Olbia (or Borysthenes) to the Homeric poems: most of them, he says, could repeat the Iliad by heart, though their dialect was partially barbarized, and the city in a sad state of ruin (Dio Chrysost. Orat. xxxvi. p. 78, Reisk).

[374] Plato, Legg. ii. 1, p. 653; Kratylus, p. 406; and Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhetoric. c. 1-2, p. 226,—Θεὸς μὲν γέ που πάντως πάσης ἡστινοσοῦν πανηγύρεως ἡγεμὼν καὶ ἐπώνυμος· οἷον ὀλυμπίων μὲν, Ὀλύμπιος Ζεὺς· τοῦ δ᾽ ἐν

Πυθοῖ, Ἀπολλὼν.

Apollo, the Muses, and Dionysus are ξυνεορτασταὶ καὶ ξυγχορευταί (Homer, Hymn to Apoll. 146). The same view of the sacred games is given by Livy, in reference to the Romans and the Volsci (ii. 36-37): "Se, ut conscelleratos contaminatosque, ab *ludis, festis diebus, cœtu quodammodo hominum Deorumque*, abactos esse … ideo nos ab sede piorum, cœtu, concilioque abigi." It is curious to contrast this with the dislike and repugnance of Tertullian: "Idololatria omnium ludorum mater est,—quod enim spectaculum sine idolo, quis ludus sine sacrificio?" (De Spectaculis, p. 369.)

[375] Iliad, xxiii. 630-679. The games celebrated by Akastus, in honor of Pelias, were famed in the old epic (Pausan. v. 17, 4; Apollodôr. i. 9, 28).

[376] Strabo, ix. p. 421; Pausan. x. 7, 3. The first Pythian games celebrated by the Amphiktyons, after the Sacred War, carried with them a substantial reward to the victor (an ἀγὼν χρηματίτης); but in the next, or second Pythian games, nothing was given but an honorary reward, or wreath of laurel leaves (ἀγὼν στεφανίτης): the first coincide with Olympiad 48, 3; the second with Olympiad 49, 3.

Compare Schol. ad Pindar. Pyth. Argument.: Pausan. x. 37, 4-5; Krause, Die Pythien, Nemeen, und Isthmien, sect. 3, 4, 5.

The Homeric Hymn to Apollo is composed at a time earlier than the Sacred War, when Krissa is flourishing; earlier than the Pythian games, as celebrated by the Amphiktyons.

[377] Plutarch, Solôn, 23. The Isthmian Agon was to a certain extent a festival of old Athenian origin; for among the many legends respecting its first institution, one of the most notorious represented it as having been founded by Theseus after his victory over Sinis at the Isthmus (see Schol. ad Pindar. Isth. Argument.; Pausan. ii. 1, 4), or over Skeirôn (Plutarch, Theseus, c. 25). Plutarch says that they were first established by Theseus as funeral games for Skeirôn, and Pliny gives the same story (H. N. vii. 57). According to Hellanikus, the Athenian Theôrs at the Isthmian games had a privileged place, (Plutarch, *l. c.*).

There is, therefore, good reason why Solôn should single out the Isthmionikæ as persons to be specially rewarded, not mentioning the Pythionikæ and Nemeonikæ,—the Nemean and Pythian games not having then acquired Hellenic importance. Diogenes Laërt. (i. 55) says that Solôn provided rewards, not only for victories at the Olympic and Isthmian, but also ἀνάλογον ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, which Krause (Pythien, Nemeen und Isthmien, sect. 3, p. 13) supposes to be the truth: I think, very improbably. The sharp invective of Timokreon against Themistocles, charging him among other things with providing nothing but cold meat at the Isthmian games (Ἰσθμοῖ δ' ἐπανδόκευε γελοίως ψυχρὰ κρέα παρέχων, Plutarch. Themistoc. c. 21), seems to imply that the Athenian visitors, whom the Theôrs were called upon to take care of at those games, were numerous.

[378] In many Grecian states (as at Ægina, Mantineia, Trœzen, Thasos, etc.) these Theôrs formed a permanent college, and seem to have been invested with extensive functions in reference to religious ceremonies: at Athens, they were chosen for the special occasion (see Thucyd. v. 47; Aristotel. Polit. v. 8, 3; O. Müller, Æginetica, p. 135; Demosthen. de Fals. Leg. p. 380).

[379] About the sacred truce, Olympian, Isthmian, etc., formally announced by two heralds crowned with garlands sent from the administering city, and with respect to which many tricks were played, see Thucyd. v. 49; Xenophon, Hellen. iv. 7, 1-7; Plutarch, Lycurg. 23; Pindar, Isthm. ii. 35,—σπονδοφόροι—κάρυκες ὡρᾶν—Thucyd. viii. 9-10, is also peculiarly instructive in regard to the practice and the feeling.

[380] Pindar, Isthm. iii. 26 (iv. 14); Nem. vi. 40.

[381] Strabo, viii. p. 374.

[382] Strabo, viii. p. 343; Pausan v. 6, 1.

[383] At Iolkos, on the north coast of the Gulf of Pagasæ, and at the borders of the Magnêtes, Thessalians, and Achæans of Phthiôtis, was celebrated a periodical religious festival, or panegyris, the title of which we are prevented from making out by the imperfection of Strabo's text (Strabo, ix. 436). It stands in the text as printed in Tzschucke's edition, Ἐνταῦθα δὲ καὶ τὴν Πυλαϊκὴν πανήγυριν, συνετέλουν. The mention of Πυλαϊκὴ πανήγυρις, which conducts us only to the Amphiktyonic convocations of Thermopylæ and Delphi is here unsuitable; and the best or Parisian MS. of Strabo presents a gap (one among the many which embarrass the ninth book) in the place of the word Πυλαϊκὴν. Dutneil conjectures τὴν Πελϊακὴν πανήγυριν, deriving the name from the celebrated funeral games of the old epic celebrated by Akastus in honor of his father Pelias. Grosskurd (in his note on the

passage) approves the conjecture, but it seems to me not probable that a Grecian panegyris would be named after Pelias. Πηλϊακήν, in reference to the neighboring mountain and town of Pelion, might perhaps be less objectionable (see Dikæarch. Fragm. pp. 407-409, ed. Fuhr.), but we cannot determine with certainty.

[384] Herod, i.; Dionys. Hal. iv. 25.

[385] Strabo, ix. p. 412; Homer. Hymn. Apoll. 232.

[386] Strabo, ix. p. 411.

[387] Thucyd. iii. 104; v. 55. Pausan. vii. 7, 1; 24, 3. Polyb. v. 8; ii. 54. Homer. Hymn. Apoll. 146.

According to what seems to have been the ancient and sacred tradition, the whole of the month Karneius was a time of peace among the Dorians; though this was often neglected in practice at the time of the Peloponnesian war (Thuc. v. 54). But it may be doubted whether there was any festival of Karneia common to all the Dorians: the Karneia at Sparta seems to have been a Lacedæmonian festival.

[388] The list of the Amphiktyonic constituency is differently given by Æschines, by Harpokration, and by Pausanias. Tittmann (Ueber den Amphiktyonischen Bund, sect. 3, 4, 5) analyzes and compares their various statements, and elicits the catalogue given in the text.

[389] Æschines, De Fals. Legat. p. 280, c. 36.—Κατηριθμησάμην δὲ ἔθνη δώδεκα, τὰ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἱεροῦ … καὶ τούτων ἔδειξα ἕκαστον ἔθνος, ἰσόψηφον γενόμενον, τὸ μέγιστον τῷ ἐλάττονι, etc.

[390] Æschin. Fals. Legat. p. 279, c. 35: Ἅμα δ᾽ ἐξ ἀρχῆς διεξῆλθον τὴν κτίσιν τοῦ ἱεροῦ, καὶ τὴν πρώτην σύνοδον γενομένην τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων, καὶ τοὺς ὅρκους αὐτῶν ἀνέγνων, ἐν οἷς ἔνορκον ἦν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις μηδεμίαν πόλιν τῶν Ἀμφικτυονίδων ἀνάστατον ποιήσειν μηδ᾽ ὑδάτων ναματιαίων εἴρξειν, etc.

[391] Homer, Iliad, vi. 457. Homer, Hymn to Dêmêtêr, 100, 107, 170. Herodot. vi. 137. Thucyd. ii. 15.

[392] Herodot. vii. 200; Livy, xxxi. 32.

[393] The festival of the Amarynthia in Eubœa, held at the temple of Artemis of Amarynthus, was frequented by the Ionic Chalcis and Eretria as well as by the Dryopic Karystus. In a combat proclaimed between Chalcis and Eretria, to settle the question about the possession of the plain of Lelantum, it was stipulated that no missile weapons should be used by either party; this agreement was inscribed and recorded in the temple of Artemis (Strabo x. p. 448; Livy, xxxv. 38).

[394] Æschin. De Fals. Legat. c. 35, p. 279: compare adv. Ktesiphont. c. 36, p. 406.

[395] See the charge which Æschines alleges to have been brought by the Lokrians of Amphissa against Athens in the Amphiktyonic Council (adv. Ktesiphont. c. 38, p. 409). Demosthenes contradicts his rival as to the fact of the charge having been brought, saying that the Amphisseans had not given the notice, customary and required, of their intention to bring it: a reply which admits that the charge *might* be brought (Demosth. de Coronâ, c. 43, p. 277).

The Amphiktyons offer a reward for the life of Ephialtes, the betrayer of the Greeks at Thermopylæ; they also erect columns to the memory of the fallen Greeks in that memorable strait, the place of their half-yearly meeting (Herod. vii. 213-228).

[396] Æschin. adv. Ktesiph. 1, c. Plutarch, Solôn, c. xi, who refers to Aristotle ἐν τῇ τῶν Πυθιονικῶν ἀναγραφῇ—Pausan. x. 37, 4; Schol. ad Pindar, Nem. ix. 2. Τὰς Ἀμφικτυονικὰς δίκας, ὅσαι πόλεσι πρὸς πόλεις εἰσίν (Strabo, ix. p. 420). These Amphiktyonic arbitrations, however are of rare occurrence in history, and very commonly abused.

[397] Herodot. ii. 180, v. 62.

[398] Thucyd. i. 112, iv. 118, v. 18. The Phokians in the Sacred War (B. C. 354) pretended that they had an ancient and prescriptive right to the administration of the Delphian temple, under accountability to the general body of Greeks for the proper employment of its possessions,—thus setting aside the Amphiktyons altogether (Diodor. xvi. 27).

[399] Æschin. de Fals. Legat. p. 280, c. 36. The party intrigues which moved the council in regard to the Sacred War against the Phokians (B. C. 355) may be seen in Diodorus, xvi. 23-28, *seq.*

[400] Cicero, De Invention. ii. 23. The representation of Dionysius of Halikarnassus (Ant. Rom. iv. 25) overshoots the reality still more.

About the common festivals and Amphiktyones of the Hellenic world generally, see Wachsmuth, Hellenische Alterthumskunde, vol. i. sect. 22, 24, 25; also, C. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Griech. Staatsalterthümer, sect. 11-13.

[401] Plutarch, Sympos. vii. 5, 1.

[402] In this early phase of the Pythian festival, it is said to have been celebrated every eight years, marking what we should call an Octaetêris, and what the early Greeks called an Ennaetêris (Censorinus, De Die Natali, c. 18). This period is one of considerable importance in reference to the principle of the Grecian calendar, for ninety-nine lunar months coincide very nearly with eight solar years. The discovery of this coincidence is ascribed by Censorinus to Kleostratus of Tenedos, whose age is not directly known: he must be anterior to Meton, who discovered the cycle of nineteen solar years, but (I imagine) not much anterior. In spite of the authority of Ideler, it seems to me not proved, nor can I believe, that this octennial period with its solar and lunar coincidence was known to the Greeks in the earliest times of their mythical antiquity, or before the year 600 B. C. See Ideler, Handbuch der Chronologie, vol. i. p. 366; vol. ii. p. 607. The practice of the Eleians to celebrate the Olympic games alternately after forty-nine and fifty lunar months, though attested for a later time by the Scholiast on Pindar, is not proved to be old. The fact that there were ancient octennial recurring festivals, does not establish a knowledge of the properties of the octaeteric or ennaeteric period: nor does it seem to me that the details of the Bœotian δαφνηφορία, described in Proclus ap. Photium, sect. 239, are very ancient. See, on the old mythical Octaetêris, O. Müller, Orchomenos 218, *seqq.*, and Krause, Die Pythien, Nemeen, und Isthmien, sect. 4, p. 22.

[403] See the argument of Cicero in favor of divination, in the first book of his valuable treatise De Divinatione. Chrysippus, and the ablest of the stoic philosophers, both set forth a plausible theory demonstrating, *a priori*, the probability of prophetic warnings deduced from the existence and attributes of the gods: if you deny altogether the occurrence of such warnings, so essential to the welfare of man, you must deny either the existence, or the foreknowledge, or the beneficence, of the gods (c. 38). Then the veracity of the Delphian oracle had been demonstrated in innumerable instances, of which Chrysippus had made a large collection: and upon what other supposition could the immense credit of the oracle be explained (c. 19)? "Collegit innumerabilia oracula Chrysippus, et nullum sine locuplete teste et auctore: quæ quia nota tibi sunt, relinquo. Defendo unum hoc: nunquam illud oraculum Delphis tam celebre clarumque fuisset, neque tantis donis refertum omnium populorum et regum, nisi omnis ætas oraculorum illorum veritatem esset experta…. Maneat id, quod negari non potest, nisi omnem historiam perverterimus, multis sæculis verax fuisse id oraculum." Cicero admits that it had become less trustworthy in his time, and tries to explain this decline of prophetic power: compare Plutarch, De Defect. Oracul.

[404] Xenophon, Anabas. vii. 8, 20: Ὁ δὲ Ἀσιδάτης ἀκούσας, ὅτι πάλιν *ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν* τεθυμένος εἴη ὁ Ξενοφὼν, ἐξαυλίζεται, etc. Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 2, 22: μὴ χρηστηριάζεσθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐφ᾽ Ἑλλήνων πολέμῳ,—compare Iliad, vii. 450.

[405] Callimach. Hymn. Apoll. 55, with Spanheim's note; Cicero, De Divinat. i. 1.

[406] See this point strikingly illustrated by Plato, Repub. v. pp. 470-471 (c. 16), and Isocrates, Panegyr. p. 102.

[407] Respecting the Arcadian Kynætha, see the remarkable observations of Polybius iv. 17-23.

[408] See above, vol. i. ch. vi. p. 126 of this History.

[409] For examples and evidences of these practices, see Herodot. ii. 162; the amputation of the nose and cars of Patarbêmis, by Apries, king of Egypt (Xenophon, Anab. i. 9-13). There were a large number of men deprived of hands, feet, or eyesight, in the satrapy of Cyrus the younger, who had inflicted all these severe punishments for the prevention of crime,—he did not (says Xenophon) suffer criminals to scoff at him (εἴα καταγελᾶν). The ἐκτομὴ was carried on at Sardis (Herodot. iii. 49),—500 παῖδες ἐκτόμιαι formed a portion of the yearly tribute paid by the Babylonians to the court of Susa (Herod. iii. 92). Selling of children for exportation by the Thracians (Herod. v. 6); there is some trace of this at Athens, prior to the Solonian legislation (Plutarch, Solôn, 23), arising probably out of the cruel state of the law between debtor and creditor. For the sacrifice of children to Kronus by the Carthaginians, in troubled times, (according to the language of Ennius, "Pœni soliti suos sacrifi-

care puellos,") Diodor. xx. 14; xiii. 86. Porphyr. de Abstinent. ii. 56: the practice is abundantly illustrated in Möver's Die Religion der Phönizier, pp. 298-304.

Arrian blames Alexander for cutting off the nose and ears of the Satrap Bêssus, saying that it was an act altogether barbaric, (*i. e.* non-Hellenic,) (Exp. Al. iv. 7, 6.) About the σεβασμὸς θεοπρεπὴς περὶ τὸν βασιλέα in Asia, see Strabo, xi. p. 526.

[410] Thucyd. i. 6: Herodot. i. 10.

[411] Aristot. Polit. iii. 6, 12. It is unnecessary to refer to the many inscriptions which confer upon some individual non-freeman the right of ἐπιγαμία and ἔγκτησις.

[412] Skylax, Peripl. c. 28-33; Thucyd. ii. 80. See Dio Chrysostom, Or. xlvii. p. 225, vol. ii. ed. Reisk,—μᾶλλον ἠροῦντο διοικεσῖσθαι κατὰ κώμας, τοῖς βαρβάροις ὁμοίους, ἢ σχῆμα πόλεως καὶ ὄνομα ἔχειν.

[413] Strabo, viii. pp. 337, 342, 386; Pausan. viii. 45, 1; Plutarch, Quæst. Græc. c. 17-37.

[414] Pausan. viii. 27, 2-5; Diod. xv. 72: compare Arist. Polit. ii. 1, 5.

The description of the διοίκισις of Mantineia is in Xenophon, Hellen. v. 2, 6-8: it is a flagrant example of his philo-Laconian bias. We see by the case of the Phokians after the Sacred War, (Diodor. xvi. 60; Pausan. x. 3, 2,) how heavy a punishment this διοίκισις was. Compare, also, the instructive speech of the Akanthian envoy Kleigenês, at Sparta, when he invoked the Lacedæmonian interference for the purpose of crushing the incipient federation, or junction of towns into a common political aggregate, which was growing up round Olynthus (Xen. Hellen. v. 2, 11-2). The wise and admirable conduct of Olynthus, and the reluctance of the neighboring cities to merge themselves in this union, are forcibly set forth; also, the interest of Sparta in keeping all the Greek towns disunited. Compare the description of the treatment of Capua by the Romans (Livy, xxvi. 16).

[415] Thucyd. i. 5; iii. 94. Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 6, 5.

[416] Pausanias, x. 4, 1: his remarks on the Phokian πόλις Panopeus indicate what he included in the idea of a πόλις: εἴγε ὀνομάσαι τις πόλιν καὶ τούτους, οἷς γε οὐκ ἀρχεῖα, οὐ γυμνάσιόν ἐστιν· οὐ θέατρον, οὐκ ἀγορὰν ἔχουσιν, οὐχ ὕδωρ κατερχόμενον ἐς κρήνην· ἀλλὰ ἐν στέγαις κοίλαις κατὰ τὰς καλύβας μάλιστα τὰς ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσιν, ἐνταῦθα οἰκοῦσιν ἐπὶ χαράδρᾳ. ὅμως δὲ ὅροι γε τῆς χώρας εἰσὶν αὐτοῖς ἐς τοὺς ὁμόρους, καὶ ἐς τὸν σύλλογον συνέδρους καὶ οὗτοι πέμπουσι τὸν Φωκικόν.

The μικρὰ πολίσματα of the Pelasgians on the peninsula of Mount Athôs (Thucyd. iv. 109) seem to have been something between villages and cities. When the Phokians, after the Sacred War, were deprived of their cities and forced into villages by the Amphiktyons, the order was that no village should contain more than fifty houses, and that no village should be within the distance of a furlong of any other (Diodor. xvi. 60).

[417] Aristot. Polit. i. 1, 8. ἡ δ᾽ ἐκ πλείονων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις ἡ δὴ πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκείας. Compare also iii. 6, 14; and Plato, Legg. viii. p. 848.

[418] Thucyd. i. 10. οὔτε ξυνοικισθείσης πόλεως, οὔτε ἱεροῖς καὶ κατασκευαῖς πολυτελέσι χρησαμένης, κατὰ κώμας δὲ τῷ παλαιῷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τρόπῳ οἰκισθείσης, φαίνοιτ᾽ ἂν ὑποδεεστέρα.

[419] Xenophon, Hellen. iii. 2, 31.

[420] Larcher, Chronologie d'Hérodote, ch. viii. pp. 215, 274; Raoul Rochette, Histoire des Colonies Grecques, book i. ch. 5; Niebuhr, Römische Geschichte, vol. i. pp. 26-64, 2d ed. (the section entitled Die Oenotrer und Pelasger); O. Müller, Die Etrusker, vol. i. (Einleitung, ch. ii. pp. 75-100); Dr. Thirlwall, History of Greece, vol. i. ch. ii. pp. 36-64. The dissentient opinions of Kruse and Mannert may be found in Kruse, Hellas, vol. i. pp. 398-425; Mannert, Geographie der Griechen und Römer, part viii. Introduct. p. 4, *seqq.*

Niebuhr puts together all the mythical and genealogical traces, many of them in the highest degree vague and equivocal, of the existence of Pelasgi in various localities; and then, summing up their cumulative effect, asserts ("not as an hypothesis, but with full historical conviction," p. 54) "that there was a time when the Pelasgians, perhaps the most extended people in all Europe, were spread from the Po and the Arno to the Rhyndakus," (near Kyzikus,) with only an interruption in Thrace. What is perhaps the most remarkable of all, is the contrast between his feeling of disgust, despair, and aversion to the subject, when he begins the inquiry ("*the name Pelasgi*," he says, "*is odious to the historian, who hates the spurious philology out of which the pretences to knowledge on the subject of such extinct people arise*," p. 28), and the full confidence and satisfaction with which he concludes it.

[421] Herodot. ii. 23: Ὁ δὲ περὶ τοῦ Ὠκεάνου εἴπας, ἐς ἀφανὲς τὸν μῦθον ἀνενείκας, οὐκ ἔχει ἔλεγχον.

[422] That Krêstôn is the proper reading in Herodotus, there seems every reason to believe—not Krotôn, as Dionys. Hal. represents it (Ant. Rom. i. 26)—in spite of the authority of Niebuhr in favor of the latter.

[423] Thucyd. iv. 109. Compare the new Fragmenta of Strabo, lib. vii. edited from the Vatican MS. by Kramer, and since by Tafel (Tübingen, 1844), sect. 34, p. 26,—ᾤκησαν δὲ τὴν Χερρόνησον ταύτην τῶν ἐκ Λήμνου Πελασγῶν τινες, εἰς πέντε διῃρημένοι πολίσματα· Κλεωνὰς, Ὀλόφυχον, Ἀκροθώους, Δῖον, Θύσσον.

[424] Herod. i. 57. προσκεχωρηκότων αὐτῷ καὶ ἄλλων ἐθνέων βαρβάρων συχνῶν.

[425] Athenæ. vi. p. 271. Φίλιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ Καρῶν καὶ Λελέγων συγγράμματι, καταλέξας τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων Εἵλωτας καὶ τοὺς Θετταλικοὺς πενέστας, καὶ Κᾶράς φησι τοῖς Λέλεξιν ὡς οἰκέταις χρήσασθαι *πάλαι τε καὶ νῦν*.

[426] Herod, i. 57. Ἥντινα δὲ γλῶσσαν ἵεσαν οἱ Πελασγοὶ, οὐκ ἔχω ἀτρεκέως εἶπαι. εἰ δὲ χρεών ἐστι τεκμαιρόμενοις λέγειν τοῖσι νῦν ἔτι ἐοῦσι Πελασγῶν, τῶν ὑπὲρ Τυρσηνῶν Κρηστῶνα πόλιν οἰκεόντων … καὶ τὴν Πλακιήν τε καὶ Σκυλάκην Πελασγῶν οἰκισάντων ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ … καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα Πελασγικὰ ἐόντα πολίσματα τὸ οὔνομα μετέβαλε· εἰ τουτοῖσι δεῖ λέγειν, ἦσαν οἱ Πελασγοὶ βάρβαρον γλῶσσαν ἱέντες. Εἰ τοίνυν ἦν καὶ πᾶν τοιοῦτο τὸ Πελασγικὸν, τὸ Ἀττικὸν ἔθνος, ἐὸν Πελασγικὸν ἅμα τῇ μεταβολῇ τῇ ἐς Ἕλληνας καὶ τὴν γλῶσσαν μετέμαθε· καὶ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε οἱ Κρηστωνιῆται οὐδάμοισι τῶν νῦν σφέας περιοικεόντων εἰσὶ ὁμόγλωσσοι, οὔτε οἱ Πλακιηνοί· σφίσι δὲ, ὁμόγλωσσοι. δηλοῦσι δὲ, ὅτι τὸν ἠνείκαντο *γλώσσης χαρακτῆρα* μεταβαίνοντες ἐς ταῦτα τὰ χωρία, τοῦτον ἔχουσι ἐν φυλακῇ.

In the next chapter, Herodotus again calls the Pelasgian nation βάρβαρον.

Respecting this language, heard by Herodotus at Krêstôn and Plakia, Dr. Thirlwall observes (chap. ii. p. 60), "This language Herodotus describes as barbarous, and it is on this fact he grounds his general conclusion as to the ancient Pelasgian tongue. But he has not entered into any details that might have served to ascertain the manner or degree in which it differed from the Greek. Still, the expressions he uses would have appeared to imply that it was essentially foreign, had he not spoken quite as strongly in another passage, where it is impossible to ascribe a similar meaning to his words. When he is enumerating the dialects that prevailed among the Ionian Greeks, he observes that the Ionian cities in Lydia agree not at all in their tongue with those of Karia; and he applies the very same term to these dialects, which he had before used in speaking of the remains of the Pelasgian language. This passage affords a measure by which we may estimate the force of the word *barbarian* in the former. Nothing more can be safely inferred from it, than that the Pelasgian language which Herodotus heard on the Hellespont, and elsewhere, sounded to him a strange jargon: as did the dialect of Ephesus to a Milesian, and as the Bolognese does to a Florentine. This fact leaves its real nature and relation to the Greek quite uncertain; and we are the less justified in building on it, as the history of Pelasgian settlements is extremely obscure, and the traditions which Herodotus reports on that subject have by no means equal weight with statements made from his personal observation." (Thirlwall, History of Greece, ch. ii. p. 60, 2d edit.)

In the statement delivered by Herodotus (to which Dr. Thirlwall here refers) about the language spoken in the Ionic Greek cities, the historian had said (i. 142),—Γλῶσσαν δὲ οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν οὗτοι νενομίκασι, ἀλλὰ τρόπους τέσσερας παραγωγέων. Miletus, Myus, and Priêne,—ἐν τῇ Καρίῃ κατοίκηνται κατὰ ταὐτὰ διαλεγόμεναι σφι. Ephesus, Kolophon, etc.,—αὗται αἱ πόλιες τῇσι πρότερον λεχθείσῃσι ὁμολογέουσι κατὰ γλῶσσαν οὐδέν, σφὶ δὲ ὁμοφωνέουσι. The Chians and Erythræans,—κατὰ τώϋτὸ διαλέγονται, Σάμιοι δὲ ἐπ᾽ ἑωϋτῶν μοῦνοι. Οὗτοι χαρακτῆρες γλώσσης τέσσερες γίγνονται.

The words γλώσσης χαρακτὴρ ("distinctive mode of speech") are common to both these passages, but their meaning in the one and in the other is to be measured by reference to the subject-matter of which the author is speaking, as well as to the words which accompany them,—especially the word βάρβαρος in the first passage. Nor can I think (with Dr. Thirlwall) that the meaning of βάρβαρος is to be determined by reference to the other two words: the reverse is, in my judgment, correct. Βάρβαρος is a term definite and unequivocal, but γλώσσης χαρακτὴρ varies according to the comparison which you happen at the moment to be making, and its meaning is here determined by its conjunction with βάρβαρος.

When Herodotus was speaking of the twelve Ionic cities in Asia, he might properly point out the differences of speech among them as so many different χαρακτῆρες γλώσσης: the limits of difference were fixed by the knowledge which his hearers possessed of the persons about whom he was speaking; the Ionians being all notoriously Hellens. So an author, describing Italy, might say that Bolognese, Romans, Neapolitans, Genoese, etc.

had different χαρακτῆρες γλώσσης; it being understood that the difference was such as might subsist among persons all Italians.

But there is also a χαρακτῆρ γλώσσης of Greek generally (abstraction made of its various dialects and diversities), as contrasted with Persian, Phœnician, or Latin,—and of Italian generally, as contrasted with German or English. It is this comparison which Herodotus is taking, when he describes the language spoken by the people of Krêstôn and Plakia, and which he notes by the word βάρβαρον as opposed to Ἑλληνικόν: it is with reference to this comparison that χαρακτῆρ γλώσσης, in the fifty-seventh chapter, is to be construed. The word βάρβαρος is the usual and recognized antithesis of Ἕλλην, or Ἑλληνικός.

It is not the least remarkable part of the statement of Herodotus, that the language spoken at Krêstôn and at Plakia was the same, though the places were so far apart from each other. This identity of itself shows that he meant to speak of a substantive language, not of a "strange jargon."

I think it, therefore, certain that Herodotus pronounces the Pelasgians of his day to speak a substantive language different from Greek; but whether differing from it in a greater or less degree (*e. g.* in the degree of Latin or of Phœnician), we have no means of deciding.

[427] Aristotel. Meteorol. i. 14.

[428] Homer, Iliad, xvi. 234; Hesiod, Fragm. 149, ed. Marktscheffel; Sophokl. Trachin. 1174; Strabo, vii. p. 328.

[429] Stephan. Byz. v. Γραικὸς.—Γραῖκες δὲ παρὰ τῷ Ἀλκμᾶνι αἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων μητέρες, καὶ παρὰ Σοφοκλεῖ ἐν Ποίμεσιν. ἐστὶ δὲ μεταπλασμὸς, ἡ τῆς Γραὶξ εὐθείας κλίσις ἐστίν.

The word Γραῖκες, in Alkman, meaning "the mothers of the Hellenes," may well be only a dialectic variety of γρᾶες, analogous to κλᾲξ and ὄρνιξ, for κλεὶς, ὄρνις, etc. (Ahrens, De Dialecto Doricâ, sect. 11, p. 91; and sect. 31, p. 242), perhaps declined like γυναῖκες.

The term used by Sophoklês, if we may believe Photius, was not Γραικὸς, but Ῥαικὸς (Photius, p. 480, 15; Dindorf, Fragment. Soph. 933: compare 455). Eustathius (p. 890) seems undecided between the two.

[430] Xenophon, Hellen. vii. 5, 27; Demosthenes, De Coron. c. 7, p. 231—ἀλλά τις ἦν ἄκριτος καὶ παρὰ τούτοις καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν ἔρις καὶ ταπαχή.

[431] Demosthen. de Coron. c. 21, p. 247.

[432] Xenophon, Anabas. iii. 2, 25-26.

[433] Xenophon, Hellen. vi. 1, 12; Isocrates, Orat. ad Philipp., Orat. v. p. 107. This discourse of Isokratês is composed expressly for the purpose of calling on Philip to put himself at the head of united Greece against the Persians: the Oratio iv, called Panegyrica, recommends a combination of all Greeks for the same purpose, but under the hegemony of Athens, putting aside all intestine differences: see Orat. iv. pp. 45-68.

[434] Thucyd. iii. 93. Οἱ Θεσσαλοὶ ἐν δυνάμει ὄντες τῶν ταύτῃ χωρίων, καὶ ὧν ἐπὶ τῇ γῇ ἐκτίζετο (Heraklεia), etc.

[435] Herodot. vii. 173; Strabo, ix. pp. 440-441. Herodotus notices the pass over the chain of Olympus or the Cambunian mountains by which Xerxes and his army passed out of Macedonia into Perrhæbia; see the description of the pass and the neighboring country in Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, ch. xxviii. vol. iii. pp. 338-348; compare Livy, xlii. 53.

[436] Skylax, Periplus, c. 66; Herodot. vii. 183-188.

[437] Skylax, Peripl. c. 64; Strabo, ix. pp. 433-434. Sophoklês included the territory of Trachin in the limits of Phthiôtis (Strabo, *l. c.*). Herodotus considers Phthiôtis as terminating a little north of the river Spercheius (vii. 198).

[438] See the description of Thaumaki in Livy, xxxii. 4, and in Dr. Holland's Travels, ch. xvii. vol. ii. p. 112,—now Thomoko.

[439] Skylax, Peripl. c. 65. Hesychius (v. Παγασίτης Ἀπόλλων) seems to reckon Pagasæ as Achæan.

About the towns in Thessaly, and their various positions, see Mannert, Geograph. der Gr. und Römer, part vii. book iii. ch. 8 and 9.

There was an ancient religious ceremony, celebrated by the Delphians every ninth year (Ennaëtêris): a procession was sent from Delphi to the pass of Tempê, consisting of well-born youths under an archi-theôr, who represented the proceeding ascribed by an old legend to Apollo; that god was believed to have gone thither to receive expiation after the slaughter of the serpent Pytho: at least, this was one among several discrepant legends. The chief youth plucked and brought back a branch from the sacred laurel at Tempê, as a token that he had fulfilled his mission: he returned by "the sacred road," and broke his fast at a place called Δειπνιὰς, near Larissa. A solemn festival, frequented by a large concourse of people from the surrounding regions, was celebrated on this occasion at Tempê, in honor of Apollo Tempeitês (Ἀπλοῦνι Τεμπειτᾳ, in the Æolic dialect of Thessaly: see Inscript. in Boeckh, Corp. Ins. No. 1767). The procession was accompanied by a flute-player.

See Plutarch, Quæst. Græc. ch. xi. p. 292; De Musicâ, ch. xiv. p. 1136, Ælian, V. II. iii. 1: Stephan. Byz. v. Δειπνιάς.

It is important to notice these religious processions as establishing intercourse and sympathies between the distant members of Hellas: but the inferences which O. Müller (Dorians, b. ii. 1, p. 222) would build upon them, as to the original seat of the Dorians and the worship of Apollo, are not to be trusted.

[440] Plato, Krito, c. 15, p. 53. ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία (compare the beginning of the Menôn)—a remark the more striking, since he had just before described the Bœotian Thebes as a well-regulated city, though both Dikæarchus and Polybius represent it in their times as so much the contrary.

See also Demosthen. Olynth. i. c. 9, p. 16, cont. Aristokrat. c. 29, p. 657; Schol. Eurip. Phœniss. 1466; Theopomp. Fragment. 34-178, ed. Didot; Aristophanês, Plut. 521.

The march of political affairs in Thessaly is understood from Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1: compare Anabas. i. 1, 10, and Thucyd. iv. 78.

[441] See Cicero, Orat. in Pison. c. 11; De Leg. Agrar. cont. Rullum, c. 34-35.

[442] Compare the Thessalian cavalry as described by Polybius. iv. 8, with the Macedonian as described by Thucydidês, ii. 100.

[443] Herodot. vii. 176; Thucyd. i. 12.

[444] Pindar, Pyth. x. init. with the Scholia, and the valuable comment of Boeckh, in reference to the Aleuadæ; Schneider ad Aristot. Polit. v. 5, 9; and the Essay of Buttmann, Von dem Geschlecht der Aleuaden, art. xxii. vol. ii. p. 254, of the collection called "Mythologus."

[445] Ahrens, De Dialect. Æolicâ, c. 1, 2.

[446] See Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 3; Thucyd. ii. 99-100.

[447] The words ascribed by Xenophon (Hellen. vi. 1, 11) to Jason of Pheræ, as well as to Theocritus (xvi. 34), attest the numbers and vigor of the Thessalian Penestæ, and the great wealth of the Aleuadæ and Skopadæ. Both these families acquired celebrity from the verses of Simonides: he was patronized and his muse invoked by both of them; see Ælian, V. H. xii. 1; Ovid, Ibis, 512; Quintilian, xi. 2, 15. Pindar also boasts of his friendship with Thorax the Aleuad (Pyth. x. 99).

The Thessalian ἀνδραποδισταὶ, alluded to in Aristophanes (Plutus, 521), must have sold men out of the country for slaves,—either refractory Penestæ, or Perrhæbian, Magnetic, and Achæan freemen, seized by violence: the Athenian comic poet Mnêsimachus, in jesting on the voracity of the Pharsalians, exclaims, ap. Athenæ. x. p. 418—

ἆρά που

ὀπτὴν κατεσθίουσι πόλιν Ἀχαϊκήν.

Pagasæ was celebrated as a place of export for slaves (Hermippus ap. Athenæ, i. 49).

Menôn of Pharsalus assisted the Athenians against Amphipolis with 200, or 300 "Penestæ, on horseback, of his own"—(Πενέσταις ἰδίοις) Demosthen. περὶ Συνταξ. c. 9, p. 173, cont. Aristokrat. c. 51, p. 687.

[448] Archemachus ap. Athenæ. vi. p. 264; Plato, Legg. vi. p. 777; Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 3; vii. 9, 9; Dionys. Halic. A. R. ii. 84.

Both Plato and Aristotle insist on the extreme danger of having numerous slaves, fellow-countrymen and of one language—(ὁμόφυλοι, ὁμόφωνοι, πατρίωται ἀλλήλων).

[449] Aristot. Polit. vii. 11, 2.

[450] Theopompus and Archemachus ap. Athenæ. vi. pp. 264-266: compare Thucyd. ii. 12; Steph. Byz. v. Ἄρνη—the converse of this story in Strabo, ix. pp. 401-411, of the Thessalian Arnê being settled from Bœotia. That the villains or Penestæ were completely distinct from the circumjacent dependents,—Achæans, Magnêtes, Perrhæbians, we see by Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 3. They had their eponymous hero Penestês, whose descent was traced to Thessalus son of Hêraklês; they were thus connected with the mythical father of the nation (Schol. Aristoph. Vesp. 1271).

[451] Herodot. i. 57: compare vii. 176.

[452] Hellanikus, Fragm. 28, ed. Didot; Harpocration, v. Τετραρχία: the quadruple division was older than Hekatæus (Steph. Byz. v. Κράννων).

Hekatæus connected the Perrhæbians with the genealogy of Æolus through Tyrô, the daughter of Salmôneus: they passed as Αἰολεῖς (Hekatæus, Frag. 334, ed. Didot; Stephan. Byz. v. Φάλαννα and Γόννοι).

The territory of the city of Histiæa (in the north part of the island of Eubœa) was also called Histiæôtis. The double occurrence of this name (no uncommon thing in ancient Greece) seems to have given rise to the statement, that the Perrhæbi had subdued the northern parts of Eubœa, and carried over the inhabitants of the Eubœan Histiæa captive into the north-west of Thessaly (Strabo, ix. p. 437, x. p. 446).

[453] Pliny, H. N. iv. 1; Strabo, ix. p. 440.

[454] Strabo, ix. p. 443.

[455] Diodor. xviii. 11; Thucyd. ii. 22.

[456] The Inscription No. 1770 in Boeckh's Corpus Inscript. contains a letter of the Roman consul, Titus Quinctius Flamininus, addressed to the city of Kyretiæ (north of Atrax in Perrhæbia). The letter is addressed, Κυρετιέων τοῖς ταγοῖς καὶ τῇ πόλει,—the title of Tagi seems thus to have been given to the magistrates of separate Thessalian cities. The Inscriptions of Thaumaki (No. 1773-1774) have the title ἄρχοντες, not ταγοί. The title ταγὸς was peculiar to Thessaly (Pollux, i. 128).

[457] Xenophon, Hellen. vi. 1, 9; Diodor. xiv. 82; Thucyd. i. 3. Herod. vii. 6, calls the Aleuadæ Θεσσαλίης βασιλῆες.

[458] Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 24; Hellenic. ii. 3, 37. The loss of the comedy called Πόλεις of Eupolis (see Meineke, Fragm. Comicor. Græc. p. 513) probably prevents us from understanding the sarcasm of Aristophanes (Vesp. 1263) about the παραπρέσβεια of Amynias among the Penestæ of Pharsalus; but the incident there alluded to can have nothing to do with the proceedings of Kritias, touched upon by Xenophon.

[459] Xenophon, Hellen. vi. 1, 9-12.

[460] Demosthen. Olynth. i. c. 3, p. 15; ii. c. 5. p. 21. The orator had occasion to denounce Philip, as having got possession of the public authority of the Thessalian confederation, partly by intrigue, partly by force; and we thus hear of the λιμένες and the ἀγοραὶ, which formed the revenue of the confederacy.

[461] Xenophon (Hellen. vi. 1, 7) numbers the Μαρακοὶ among these tributaries along with the Dolopes: the Maraces are named by Pliny (H. N. iv. 3), also, along with the Dolopes, but we do not know where they dwelt.

[462] Xenophon, Hellen. vi. 1, 9; Pindar, Pyth. iv. 80.

[463] Herodot. vii. 176; viii. 27-28.

[464] The story of invading Thessalians at Kerêssus, near Leuktra in Bœotia, (Pausan. ix. 13, 1,) is not at all probable.

[465] One story was, that these Achæans of Phthia went into Peloponnesus with Pelops, and settled in Laconia (Strabo, viii. p. 365).

[466] Aristoteles ap. Athenæ iv. p. 173 Conon, Narrat. 29; Strabo. xiv. p. 647.

Hoeck (Kreta, b. iii. vol. ii. p. 409) attempts (unsuccessfully, in my judgment) to reduce these stories into the form of substantial history.

[467] Thucyd. iii. 92. The distinction made by Skylax (c. 61) and Diodorus (xviii. 11) between Μηλιεῖς and Μαλιεῖς—the latter adjoining the former on the north—appears inadmissible, though Letronne still defends it (Périple de Marcien d'Héraclée, etc., Paris, 1839, p. 212).

Instead of Μαλιεῖς, we ought to read Λαμιεῖς, as O. Müller observes (Dorians, i. 6, p. 48).

It is remarkable that the important town of Lamia (the modern Zeitun) is not noticed either by Herodotus, Thucydidês, or Xenophon; Skylax is the first who mentions it. The route of Xerxes towards Thermopylæ lay along the coast from Alos.

The Lamieis (assuming that to be the correct reading) occupied the northern coast of the Maliac gulf, from the north bank of the Spercheius to the town of Echinus: in which position Dr. Cramer places the Μηλιεῖς Παράλιοι—an error, I think (Geography of Greece, vol. i. p. 436).

It is not improbable that Lamia first acquired importance during the course of those events towards the close of the Peloponnesian war, when the Lacedæmonians, in defence of Herakleia, attacked the Achæans of Phthiôtis, and even expelled the Œtæans for a time from their seats (see Thucyd. viii. 3; Diodor. xiv. 38).

[468] Aristot. Polit. iv. 10, 10.

[469] Plutarch, Quæstion. Græc. p. 294.

[470] Thucyd. iii. 92-97; viii. 3. Xenoph. Hellen. i. 2, 18; in another passage Xenophon expressly distinguishes the Œtæi and the Ænianes (Hellen. iii. 5. 6). Diodor. xiv. 38. Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 44, p. 290.

[471] About the fertility as well as the beauty of this valley, see Dr. Holland's Travels, ch. xvii. vol. ii. p. 108, and Forchhammer (Hellenika, Griechenland, im Neuen das Alte, Berlin, 1837). I do not concur with the latter in his attempts to resolve the mythes of Hêraklês, Achilles, and others, into physical phenomena: but his descriptions of local scenery and attributes are most vivid and masterly.

[472] Strabo, ix. p. 425; Forchhammer, Hellenika, pp. 11-12. Kynus is sometimes spoken of as the harbor of Opus, but it was a city of itself as old as the Homeric Catalogue, and of some moment in the later wars of Greece, when military position came to be more valued than legendary celebrity (Livy, xxviii. 6; Pausan. x. 1, 1; Skylax. c. 61-62); the latter counts Thronium and Knêmis or Knêmides as being Phokian, not Lokrian; which they were for a short time, during the prosperity of the Phokians, at the beginning of the Sacred War, though not permanently (Æschin. Fals. Legat. c. 42, p. 46). This serves as one presumption about the age of the Periplus of Skylax (see the notes of Klausen ad Skyl. p. 269). These Lokrian towns lay along the important road from Thermopylæ to Elateia and Bœotia (Pausan. vii. 15, 2; Livy, xxxiii. 3).

[473] Pausan. x. 33, 4.

[474] Pausan. x. 5, 1; Demosth. Fals. Leg. c. 22-28; Diodor. xvi. 60, with the note of Wesseling.

The tenth book of Pausanias, though the larger half of it is devoted to Delphi, tells us all that we know respecting the less important towns of Phokis. Compare also Dr. Cramer's Geography of Greece, vol. ii. sect. 10; and Leake's Travels in Northern Greece, vol. ii. ch. 13.

Two funeral monuments of the Phokian hero Schedius (who commands the Phokian troops before Troy, and is slain in the Iliad) marked the two extremities of Phokis,—one at Daphnus on the Eubœan sea, the other at Antikyra on the Corinthian gulf (Strabo, ix. p. 425; Pausan. x. 36, 4).

[475] Herodot. viii. 31, 43, 46; Diodor. iv. 57; Aristot. ap. Strabo, viii. p. 373.

O. Müller (History of the Dorians, book i. ch. ii.) has given all that can be known about Doris and Dryopis, together with some matters which appear to me very inadequately authenticated.

[476] Πόλεις μικραὶ καὶ λυπρόχωροι, Strabo, ix. p. 427.

[477] Herod, vii. 126; Thucyd. ii. 102.

[478] See the difficult journey of Fiedler from Wrachori northward by Karpenitz, and then across the north-western portion of the mountains of the ancient Eurytanes (the southern continuation of Mount Tymphrêstus and Œta), into the upper valley of the Spercheius (Fiedler's Reise in Griechenland, vol. i. pp. 177-191), a part of the longer journey from Missolonghi to Zeitun.

Skylax (c. 35) reckons Ætolia as extending inland as far as the boundaries of the Ænianes on the Spercheius—which is quite correct—Ætolia Epiktêtus—μέχρι τῆς Οἰταίας, Strabo, x. p. 450.

[479] Strabo, x. pp. 459-460. There is, however, great uncertainty about the position of these ancient towns: compare Kruse, Hellas, vol. iii. ch. xi. pp. 233-255, and Brandstäter, Geschichte des Ætolischen Landes, pp. 121-134.

[480] Ephorus, Fragm. 29, Marx. ap. Strabo, p. 463. The situation of Thermus, "the acropolis as it were of all Ætolia," and placed on a spot almost unapproachable by an army, is to a certain extent, though not wholly, capable of being determined by the description which Polybius gives of the rapid march of Philip and the Macedonian army to surprise it. The maps, both of Kruse and Kiepert, place it too much on the north of the lake Trichônis: the map of Fiedler notes it, more correctly, to the east of that lake (Polyb. v. 7-8; compare Brandstäter, Geschichte des Ætol. Landes, p. 133).

[481] Thucyd. iii. 102.—ἀγνωστότατοι δὲ γλῶσσάν εἰσι, καὶ ὠμόφαγοι *ὡς λέγονται*. It seems that Thucydidês had not himself seen or conversed with them, but he does not call them βάρβαροι.

[482] Ephorus, Fragment. 29, ed. Marx.; Skymn. Chius, v. 471; Strabo, x. p. 450.

[483] Thucyd. i. 6; iii. 94. Aristotle, however, included, in his large collection of Πολιτεῖαι, an Ἀκαρνάνων Πολιτεία as well as an Αἰτωλῶν Πολιτεία (Aristotelis Rerum Publicarum Reliquiæ, ed. Neumann, p. 102; Strabo, vii. p. 321).

[484] Timæus, Fragm. xvii. ed. Göller; Polyb. xii. 6-7; Athenæus, vi. p. 264.

[485] This brief fragment of the Παρθενεῖα of Alkman is preserved by Stephan. Byz. (Ἐρυσίχη), and alluded to by Strabo, x. p. 460: see Welcker Alkm. Fragm. xi. and Bergk, Alk. Fr. xii.

[486] Herodot. vi. 127.

[487] See an admirable topographical description of the north part of Bœotia,—the lake Kôpaïs and its environs, in Forchhammer's Hellenika, pp. 159-186, with an explanatory map. The two long and laborious tunnels constructed by the old Orchomenians for the drainage of the lake, as an aid to the insufficiency of the natural Katabothra, are there very clearly laid down: one goes to the sea, the other into the neighboring lake Hylika, which is surrounded by high rocky banks and can take more water without overflowing. The lake Kôpaïs is an inclosed basin, receiving all the water from Doris and Phokis through the Kêphisus. A copy of Forchhammer's map will be found at the end of the present volume.

Forchhammer thinks that it was nothing but the similarity of the name Itônea (derived from ἰτέα, *a willow-tree*) which gave rise to the tale of an emigration of people from the Thessalian to the Bœotian Itônê (p. 148).

The Homeric Catalogue presents Kôpæ, on the north of the lake, as Bœotian, but not Orchomenus nor Asplêdôn (Iliad, ii. 502).

[488] See O. Müller, Orchomenos, cap. xx. p. 418, *seq.*

[489] See Demosthen. De Fals. Legat. c. 43-45. Another portion of this narrow road is probably meant by the pass of Korôneia—τὰ περὶ Κορώνειαν στενὰ (Diodor. xv. 52; Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 3, 15)—which Epameinondas occupied to prevent the invasion of Kleombrotus from Phokis.

[490] Thucyd. ii. 2—κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν: compare the speech of the Thebans to the Lacedæmonians after the capture of Platæa, iii. 61, 65, 66.

[491] Thucyd. iv. 91; C. F. Hermann, Griechische Staats Alterthümer, sect. 179; Herodot. v. 79; Boeckh, Commentat. ad. Inscript. Bœotic. ap. Corp. Ins. Gr. part v. p. 726.

[492] Herodot. viii. 135; ix. 15-43. Pausan ix. 13, 1; ix. 23, 3; ix. 24, 3; ix. 32, 1-4. Xenophon, Hellen. vi. 4, 3-4: compare O. Müller, Orchomenos, cap. xx. p. 403.

[493] Aristot. Polit. ii. 9, 6-7. Νομοθέτης δ᾽ αὐτοῖς (to the Thebans) ἐγένετο Φιλόλαος περὶ τ᾽ ἄλλων τινῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδοποιΐας, οὓς καλοῦσιν ἐκεῖνοι νόμους θετικούς· καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἰδίως ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου νενομοθετημένον, ὅπως ὁ ἀριθμὸς σῴζηται τῶν κλήρων. A perplexing passage follows within three lines of this, —Φιλολάου δὲ ἴδιον ἐστιν ἡ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀνομάλωσις,—which raises two questions: first, whether Philolaus can really be meant in the second passage, which talks of what is ἴδιον to Philolaus, while the first passage had already spoken of something ἰδίως νενομοθετημένον by the same person. Accordingly, Göttling and M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire follow one of the MSS. by writing Φαλέου in place of Φιλολάου. Next, what is the meaning of ἀνομάλωσις? O. Müller (Dorians, ch. x. 5, p. 209) considers it to mean a "fresh equalization, just as ἀναδασμὸς means a fresh division," adopting the translation of Victorius and Schlösser.

The point can hardly be decisively settled; but if this translation of ἀνομάλωσις be correct, there is good ground for preferring the word Φαλέου to Φιλολάου; since the proceeding described would harmonize better with the ideas of Phaleas (Aristot. Pol. ii. 4, 3).

[494] Ælian, V. H. ii. 7.

[495] Aristot. Polit. ii. 3, 7. This Pheidôn seems different from Pheidôn of Argos, as far as we are enabled to judge.

[496] Herodot. vi. 74; Pausan. viii. 18, 2. See the description and print of the river Styx, and the neighboring rocks, in Fiedler's Reise durch Griechenland, vol. i. p. 400.

He describes a scene amidst these rocks, in 1826, when the troops of Ibrahim Pasha were in the Morea, which realizes the fearful pictures of war after the manner of the ancient Gauls, or Thracians. A crowd of five thousand Greeks, of every age and sex, had found shelter in a grassy and bushy spot embosomed amidst these crags,—few of them armed. They were pursued by five thousand Egyptians and Arabians: a very small resistance, in such ground, would have kept the troops at bay, but the poor men either could not or would not offer it. They were forced to surrender: the youngest and most energetic cast themselves headlong from the rocks and perished: three thousand prisoners were carried away captive, and sold for slaves at Corinth, Patras, and Modon: all those who were unfit for sale were massacred on the spot by the Egyptian troops.

[497] This is the only way of reconciling Herodotus (viii. 73) with Thucydidês (iv. 56, and v. 41). The original extent of the Kynurian territory is a point on which neither of them had any means of very correct information, but there is no occasion to reject the one in favor of the other.

[498] Herod. viii. 73. Οἱ δὲ Κυνούριοι, αὐτόχθονες ἐόντες, δοκέουσι μοῦνοι εἶναι Ἴωνες· ἐκδεδωρίευνται δὲ, ὑπό τε Ἀργείων ἀρχόμενοι καὶ τοῦ χρόνου, ἐόντες Ὀρνεῆται καὶ περίοικοι.

[499] Herodot. iv. 145-146.

[500] Herodotus omits Söus between Proklês and Eurypôn, and inserts Polydektês between Prytanis and Eunomus: moreover, the accounts of the Lacedæmonians, as he states them, represented Lykurgus, the lawgiver, as uncle and guardian of Labôtas, of *the Eurysthenid house*,—while Simonidês made him son of Prytanis, and others made him son of Eunomus, of *the Proklid line*: compare Herod. i. 65; viii. 131. Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 2.

Some excellent remarks on this early series of Spartan kings will be found in Mr. G. C. Lewis's article in the Philological Museum, vol. ii. pp. 42-48, in a review of Dr. Arnold on the Spartan Constitution.

Compare also Larcher, Chronologie d'Hérodote, ch. 13, pp. 484-514. He lengthens many of the reigns considerably, in order to suit the earlier epoch which he assigns to the capture of Troy and the Return of the Herakleids.

[501] History of the Dorians, vol. ii. Append. p. 442.

[502] This story—that the heroic ancestor of the great Corinthian Bacchiadæ had slain the holy man Karnus, and had been punished for it by long banishment and privation—leads to the conjecture, that the Corinthians did not celebrate the festival of the Karneia, common to the Dorians generally.

Herodotus tells us, with regard to the Ionic cities, that all of them celebrated the festival of Apaturia, except Ephesus and Kolophon; and that these two cities did not celebrate it, "because of a certain reason of murder committed,"—οὗτοι γὰρ μοῦνοι Ἰώνων οὐκ ἄγουσιν Ἀπατούρια· καὶ οὗτοι κατὰ φόνου τινὰ σκῆψιν (Herod. i. 147).

The murder of Karnus by Hippotês was probably the φόνου σκῆψις which forbade the Corinthians from celebrating the Karneia; at least, this supposition gives to the legend a special pertinence which is otherwise wanting to it. Respecting the Karneia and Hyacinthia, see Schoell De Origine Græci Dramatis, pp. 70-78. Tübingen, 1828.

There were various singular customs connected with the Grecian festivals, which it was usual to account for by some legendary tale. Thus, no native of Elis ever entered himself as a competitor, or contended for the prize, at the Isthmian games. The legendary reason given for this was, that Hêraklês had waylaid and slain (at Kleônæ) the two Molionid brothers, when they were proceeding to the Isthmian games as Theôrs or sacred envoys from the Eleian king Augeas. Redress was in vain demanded for this outrage, and Molionê, mother of the slain envoys, imprecated a curse upon the Eleians generally if they should ever visit the Isthmian festival. This legend is the φόνου σκῆψις, explaining why no Eleian runner or wrestler was ever known to contend there (Pausan. ii. 15, 1; v. 2, 1-4. Ister, Fragment. 46, ed. Didot).

[503] Diodor. Fragm. lib. vii. p. 14, with the note of Wesseling. Strabo (viii. p. 378) states the Bacchiad oligarchy to have lasted nearly two hundred years.

[504] Herodot. i. 82. The historian adds, besides Cythêra, καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ τῶν νήσων. What other islands are meant, I do not distinctly understand.

[505] So Plato (Legg. iii. p. 692), whose mind is full of the old mythe and the tripartite distribution of Peloponnesus among the Herakleids,—ἡ δ᾽ αὖ, πρωτεύουσα ἐν τοῖς τότε χρόνοις τοῖς περὶ τὴν διανομὴν, ἡ περὶ τὸ Ἄργος, etc.

[506] Pausan. ii. 38, 1; Strabo, viii. p. 368. Professor Ross observes, respecting the line of coast near Argos, "The sea-side is thoroughly flat, and for the most part marshy; only at the single point where Argos comes nearest to the coast,—between the mouth, now choked by sand, of the united Inachus and Charadrus, and the efflux of the Erasinus, overgrown with weeds and bulrushes,—stands an eminence of some elevation and composed of firmer earth, upon which the ancient Temenion was placed." (Reisen im Peloponnes, vol. i. sect. 5, p. 149, Berlin, 1841.)

[507] Thucyd. iv. 42.

[508] Thucyd. i. 122; iii. 85, vii. 18-27; viii. 38-40.

[509] Thucyd. iv. 42.

[510] Aristot. ap. Prov. Vatican, iv. 4, Μηλιακὸν πλοῖον,—also Prov. Suidas, x. 2.

[511] Hist. of Dorians, ch. i. 9. Andrôn positively affirms that the Dorians came from Histiæôtis to Krête; but his affirmation does not seem to me to constitute any additional evidence of the fact: it is a conjecture adapted to the passage in the Odyssey (xix. 174), as the mention of Achæans and Pelasgians evidently shows.

Aristotle (ap. Strab. viii. p. 374) appears to have believed that the Herakleids returned to Argos out of the Attic Tetrapolis (where, according to the Athenian legend, they had obtained shelter when persecuted by Eurystheus), accompanying a body of Ionians who then settled at Epidaurus. He cannot, therefore, have connected the Dorian occupation of Argos with the expedition from Naupaktus.

[512] Herod. viii. 43-46; Diodor. iv. 37; Pausan. iv. 34, 6.

[513] Strabo, viii. p. 373; ix. p. 434. Herodot. viii. 43. Pherekydês, Fr. 23 and 38, ed. Didot. Steph. Byz. v. Δρυόπη. Apollodor. ii. 7, 7. Schol. Apollon. Rhod. i. 1213.

[514] Herodot. i. 56.—ἐνθεῦτεν δὲ αὖτις ἐς τὴν Δρυοπίδα μετέβη, καὶ ἐκ τῆς Δρυοπίδος οὕτω ἐς Πελοπόννησον ἐλθὸν, Δωρικὸν ἐκλήθη,—to the same purpose, viii. 31-43.

[515] See Herodot. vii. 148. The Argeians say to the Lacedæmonians, in reference to the chief command of the Greeks—καίτοι κατά γε τὸ δίκαιον γίνεσθαι τὴν ἡγεμονίην ἑωὐτων, etc. Schweighäuser and others explain the point by reference to the command of Agamemnôn; but this is at best only a part of the foundation of their claim: they had a more recent historical reality to plead also: compare Strabo, viii. p. 376.

[516] Ἡμῶν κτισάντων (so runs the accusation of the Theban orators against the captive Platæans, before their Lacedæmonian judges, Thucyd. iii. 61.) Πλάταιαν ὕστερον τῆς ἄλλης Βοιωτίας—οὐκ ἠξίουν αὐτοὶ, ὥσπερ ἐτάχθη τὸ πρῶτον, ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν, ἔξω δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Βοιωτῶν παραβαίνοντες τὰ πάτρια, ἐπειδὴ προσηναγκάζοντο, προσεχώρησαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτῶν πολλὰ ἡμᾶς ἔβλαπτον.

[517] Respecting Pheidôn, king of Argos, Ephorus said,—τὴν λῆξιν ὅλην ἀνέλαβε τὴν Τημένου διεσπασμένην εἰς πλείω μέρη (ap. Strabo. viii. p. 358).

[518] The worship of Apollo Pythaëus, adopted from Argos both at Hermionê and Asinê, shows the connection between them and Argos (Pausan. ii. 35, 2; ii. 36, 5): but Pausanias can hardly be justified in saying that the Argeians actually *Dorized* Hermionê: it was Dryopian in the time of Herodotus, and seemingly for a long time afterwards (Herodot. viii. 43). The Hermionian Inscription, No. 1193, in Boeckh's Collection, recognizes their old Dryopian connection with Asinê in Laconia: that town had once been neighbor of Hermionê, but was destroyed by the Argeians, and the inhabitants received a new home from the Spartans. The dialect of the Hermionians (probably that of the Dryopians generally) was Doric. See Ahrens, De Dialecto Doricâ, pp. 2-12.

[519] Thucyd. v. 53. *Κυριώτατοι* τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἦσαν οἱ Ἀργεῖοι. The word εἴσπραξις, which the historian uses in regard to the claim of Argos against Epidaurus, seems to imply a money-payment withheld: compare the offerings exacted by Athens from Epidaurus (Herod. v. 82).

The peculiar and intimate connection between the Argeians, and Apollo, with his surname of Pythaëus, was dwelt upon by the Argeian poetess Telesilla (Pausan. ii. 36, 2).

[520] Herodot. vi. 92. See O. Müller, History of the Dorians, ch. 7, 13.

[521] Ephor. Fragm. 15, ed. Marx; ap. Strabo, viii. p. 358; Theopompus, Fragm. 30, ed. Didot; ap. Diodor. Fragm. lib. iv.

The Parian Marble makes Pheidôn the eleventh from Hêraklês, and places him B. C. 895; Herodotus, on the contrary (in a passage which affords considerable grounds for discussion), places him at a period which cannot be much higher than 600 B. C. (vi. 127.) Some authors suspect the text of Herodotus to be incorrect: at any rate, the real epoch of Pheidôn is determined by the 8th Olympiad. Several critics suppose *two* Pheidôns, each king of Argos,—among others, O. Müller (Dorians, iii. 6, 10); but there is nothing to countenance this, except the impossibility of reconciling Herodotus with the other authorities. And Weissenborn, in a dissertation of some length, vindicates the emendation of Pausanias proposed by some former critics,—altering the 8th Olympiad, which now stands in the text of Pausanias, into the *twenty-eighth*, as the date of Pheidôn's usurpation at the Olympic games. Weissenborn endeavors to show that Pheidôn cannot have flourished earlier than 660 B. C.; but his arguments do not appear to me very forcible, and certainly not sufficient to justify so grave an alteration in the number of Pausanias (Beiträge zur Griechischen Alterthumskunde, p. 18, Jena, 1844). Mr. Clinton (Fasti Hellenici, vol. i. App. 1, p. 249) places Pheidôn between 783 and 744 B. C.; also, Boeckh. ad Corp. Inscript. No. 2374, p. 335, and Müller, Æginetica, p. 63.

[522] Pausan. ii. 36, 5; iv. 35, 2.

[523] Pausan. ii. 19, 1. Ἀργεῖοι δὲ, ἅτε ἰσηγορίαν καὶ τὸ αὐτόνομον ἀγαπῶντες ἐκ παλαιοτάτου, τὰ τῆς ἐξουσίας τῶν βασιλέων ἐς ἐλάχιστον προήγαγον, ὡς Μήδωνι τῷ Κείσου καὶ τοῖς ἀπογόνοις τὸ ὄνομα λειφθῆναι τοῦ βασιλέως μόνον. This passage has all the air of transferring back to the early government of Argos, feelings which were only true of the *later*. It is curious that, in this chapter, though devoted to the Argeian regal line and government, Pausanias takes no notice of Pheidôn: he mentions him only with reference to the disputed Olympic ceremony.

[524] Ephorus, *ut suprà*. Φείδωνα τὸν Ἀργεῖον, δέκατον ὄντα ἀπὸ Τημένου, δυνάμει δὲ ὑπερβεβλημένον τοὺς κατ᾽ αὐτὸν, ἀφ᾽ ἧς τήν τε λῆξιν ὅλην ἀνέλαβε τὴν Τημένου διεσπασμένην εἰς πλείω μέρη, etc. What is meant by *the lot of Têmenus* has been already explained.

[525] Plutarch, Narrat. Amator. p. 772; Schol. Apollon. Rhod. iv. 1212; compare Didymus, ap. Schol. Pindar. Olymp. xiii. 27.

I cannot, however, believe that Pheidôn, the ancient Corinthian law giver mentioned by Aristotle, is the same person as Pheidôn the king of Argos (Polit. ii. 6, 4).

[526] Ephor. *ut suprà*.Πρὸς τούτοις, ἐπιθέσθαι καὶ ταῖς ὑφ᾽ Ἡρακλέους αἱρεθείσαις πόλεσι, καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας ἀξιοῦν τιθέναι αὐτὸν, οὓς ἐκεῖνος ἔθηκε· τούτων δὲ εἶναι καὶ τὸν Ὀλυμπιακὸν, etc.

[527] Herodot. v. 43.

[528] Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 4, 28; Diodor. xv. 78.

[529] Strabo, viii. p. 354.

[530] Thucyd. iv. 98.

[531] Pausan. v. 22, 2; Strabo, viii. pp. 354-358; Herodot. vi. 127. The name of the victor (Antiklês the Messenian), however, belonging to the 8th Olympiad, appears duly in the lists; it must have been supplied afterwards.

[532] Herodot. vi. 127; Ephor. ap. Strab. viii. pp. 358-376.

[533] Metrologische Untersuchungen über Gewichte, Münzfusse, und Mässe des Alterthums in ihrem Zusammenhange dargestellt, von Aug. Boeckh; Berlin, 1838.

See chap. 7, 1-3. But I cannot agree with M. Boeckh, in thinking that Pheidôn, in celebrating the Olympic games, deduced from the Olympic stadium, and formally adopted, the measure of the *foot*, or that he at all settled measures of *length*. In general, I do not think that M. Boeckh's conclusions are well made out, in respect to the Grecian measures of *length* and *capacity*. In an examination of this eminently learned treatise (inserted in the Classical Museum, 1844, vol. i.), I endeavored to set forth both the new and interesting points established by the author, and the various others in which he appeared to me to have failed.

[534] I have modified this sentence as it stood in my first edition. It is not correct to speak of the Egyptian *money* scale: the Egyptians had no *coined money*. See a valuable article, in review of my History, in the Christian Reformer, by Mr. Kenrick, who pointed out this inaccuracy.

[535] Thucyd. v. 31.

[536] Plutarch, Apophthegm. Laconic. p. 226; Dikæarchus ap. Athenæ. iv. p. 141.

The Æginæan mina, drachma, and obolus were the denominations employed in stipulations among the Peloponnesian states (Thucyd. v. 47).

[537] Herodot. vi. 127. Φείδωνος τοῦ Ἀργείων τυράννου—τοῦ ὑβρίσαντος μέγιστα δὴ Ἑλλήνων ἁπάντων. Pausanias (vi. 22, 2) copies the expression.

Aristotle cites Pheidôn as a person who, being a βασιλεὺς, made himself a τύραννος (Politic. viii. 8, 5).

[538] Herodot. vii. 149.

[539] Pausan. iii. 22, 9; iii. 23, 4.

[540] Herodot. v. 83; Strabo, viii. p. 375.

[541] Rhodes, Kôs, Knidus, and Halikarnassus are all treated by Strabo (xiv. p. 653) as colonies of Argos: Rhodes is so described by Thucydidês (vii. 57), and Kôs by Tacitus (xii. 61). Kôs, Kalydna, and Nisyrus are described by Herodotus as colonies of Epidaurus (vii. 99): Halikarnassus passes sometimes for a colony of Trœzên, sometimes of Trœzên and Argos conjointly: "Cum Melas et Areuanius ab Argis et Trœzene coloniam communem eo loco induxerunt, barbaros Caras et Leleges ejecerunt (Vitruv. ii. 8, 12: Steph. Byz. v. Ἁλικάρνασσος)." Compare Strabo, x. p. 479; Conon, Narr. 47; Diodor. v. 80.

Raoul Rochette (Histoire des Colonies Grecques, t. iii. ch. 9) and O. Müller (History of the Dorians, ch. 6) have collected the facts about these Asiatic Dorians.

The little town of Bœæ had its counterpart of the same name in Krête (Steph. Byz. v. Βοῖον).

[542] Strabo, p. 374.

[543] Ephorus ap. Strabo, viii. p. 376; Boeckh, Metrologie, Abschn. 7, 1: see also the Marmor Parium, Epoch 30.

[544] Etymologicon Magn. Εὐβοϊκὸν νόμισμα.

[545] Pollux, Onomastic. x. 179. Εἴη δ᾽ ἂν καὶ Φείδων τι ἀγγεῖον ἐλαιηρὸν, ἀπὸ τῶν Φειδωνίων μέτρων ὠνομασμένον, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐν Ἀργείων πολιτείᾳ Ἀριστοτέλης λέγει.

Also Ephorus ap. Strab. viii. p. 358. καὶ μέτρα ἐξεῦρε τὰ Φειδώνεια καλούμενα καὶ σταθμοὺς, καὶ νόμισμα κεχαράγμενον, etc.

[546] This differs from Boeckh's opinion: see the note in page 315.

[547] Theophrast. Character. c. 13; Pollux, x. 179.

[548] Odyss. xv. 297.

[549] Strabo, x. p. 479.

[550] Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. iii. ch. 23, p. 29; compare Diodor. xv. 66.

The distance from Olympia to Sparta, as marked on a pillar which Pausanias saw at Olympia, was 660 stadia,—about 77 English miles (Pausan. vi. 16, 6).

[551] Strabo, viii. pp. 364, 365; Pausan. iii. 2, 5: compare the story of Krius, Pausan. iii. 13, 3.

[552] Pausan. iv. 3, 3; viii. 29, 4.

[553] Strabo (viii. p. 366) blames Euripidês for calling Messênê an inland country; but the poet seems to have been quite correct in doing so.

[554] Pausan. iv. 2, 2. μετεῖχον δὲ αὐτοῦ μόνοι Δωριέων οἵ τε Μεσσήνιοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι.

[555] Pausan. iv. 3, 5-6.

[556] Homer, Iliad, ii. 604.—

Οἳ δ᾽ ἔχον Ἀρκαδίην, ὑπὸ Κυλλήνης ὄρος αἰπὺ,

Αἰπύτιον παρὰ τύμβον.

Schol. *ad loc.* ὁ δ᾽ Αἴπυτος ἀρχαιότατος ἥρως, Ἀρκὰς τὸ γένος.

[557] Compare the two citations from Ephorus, Strabo, viii. pp. 361-365. Unfortunately, a portion of the latter citation is incurably mutilated in the text: O. Müller (History of the Dorians, book i. ch. v. 13) has proposed an ingenious conjecture, which, however, cannot be considered as trustworthy. Grosskurd, the German translator, usually skilful in these restorations, leaves the passage untouched.

For a new coloring of the death of Kresphontês, adjusted by Isokratês so as to suit the purpose of the address which he puts into the mouth of Archidamus king of Sparta, see the discourse in his works which passes under that name (Or. iv. pp. 120-122). Isokratês says that the Messenian Dorians slew Kresphontês, whose children fled as suppliants to Sparta, imploring revenge for the death of their father, and surrendering the territory to the Spartans. The Delphian god advised the latter to accept the tender, and they accordingly attacked the Messenians, avenged Kresphontês, and appropriated the territory.

Isokratês always starts from the basis of the old legend,—the triple Dorian conquest made all at once: compare Panathenaic. Or. xii. pp. 270-287.

[558] Ephorus ap. Strabo, viii. p. 361. Dr. Thirlwall observes (History of Greece, ch. vii. p. 300, 2d edit.), "The Messenian Pylus seems long to have retained its independence, and to have been occupied for several centuries by one branch of the family of Neleus; for descendants of Nestor are mentioned as allies of the Messenians in their struggle with Sparta in the latter half of the seventh century B. C."

For this assertion, Dr. Thirlwall cites Strabo (viii. p. 355). I agree with him as to the matter of fact: I see no proof that the Dorians of Stenyklêrus ever ruled over what is called the Messenian Pylus; for, of course, if they did not rule over it before the second Messenian war, they never acquired it at all. But on reference to the passage in Strabo, it will not be found to prove anything to the point; for Strabo is speaking, not of the Messenian Pylus, but of the *Triphylian Pylus*: he takes pains to show that Nestor had nothing to do with the *Messenian Pylus*,—Νέστορος ἀπόγονοι means the inhabitants of Triphylia, near Lepreum: compare p. 350.

[559] Strabo, viii. p. 360. Concerning the situation of Korônê, in the Messenian gulf, see Pausanias, iv. 34, 2; Strabo, viii. p. 361; and the observations of Colonel Leake, Travels in Morea, ch. x. vol. i. pp. 439-448. He places it near the modern Petalidhi, seemingly on good grounds.

[560] See Mr. Clinton's Chronological Tables for the year 732 B. C.; O. Müller (in the Chronological Table subjoined to his History of the Dorians) calls this victor, *Oxythemis of Korôneia*, in Bœotia. But this is inadmissible, on two grounds: 1. The occurrence of a Bœotian competitor in that early day at the Olympic games. The first eleven victors (I put aside Oxythemis, because he is the subject of the argument) are all from western and southern Peloponnesus; then come victors from Corinth, Megara, and Epidaurus; then from Athens; there is one

from Thebes in the 41st Olympiad. I infer from hence that the celebrity and frequentation of the Olympic games increased only by degrees, and had not got beyond Peloponnesus in the eighth century B. C. 2. The name Coronæus, Κορωναῖος, is the proper and formal title for a citizen of Korônê, not for a citizen of Korôneia: the latter styles himself Κορωνεὺς. The ethnical name Κορωνεὺς, as belonging to Korôneia in Bœotia, is placed beyond doubt by several inscriptions in Boeckh's collection; especially No. 1583, in which a citizen of that town is proclaimed as victorious at the festival of the Charitesia at Orchomenus: compare Nos. 1587-1593, in which the same ethnical name occurs. The Bœotian Inscriptions attest in like manner the prevalence of the same etymological law in forming ethnical names, for the towns near Korôneia: thus, *Chærôneia* makes Χαιρωνεὺς; *Lebadeia*, Λεβαδεὺς; *Elateia*, Ἐλατεὺς, or Ἐλατειεύς.

The Inscriptions afford evidence perfectly decisive as to the ethnical title under which a citizen of Korôneia in Bœotia would have caused himself to be entered and proclaimed at the Olympic games; better than the evidence of Herodotus and Thucydidês, who both call them Κορωναῖοι (Herodot. v. 79; Thucyd. iv. 93): Polybius agrees with the Inscription, and speaks of the Κορωνεῖς, Λεβαδεῖς, Χαιρωνεῖς (xxvii. 1). O. Müller himself admits, in another place (Orchomenos, p. 480), that the proper ethnical name is Κορωνεύς. The reading of Strabo (ix. p. 411) is not trustworthy: see Grosskurd, *ad loc.*; compare Steph. Byz. Κορώνεια and Κορώνη.

In regard to the formation of ethnical names, it seems the general rule, that a town ending in η or αι, preceded by a consonant, had its ethnical derivative in αιος; such as Σκιώνη, Τορώνη, Κύμη, Θῆβαι, Ἀθῆναι; while names ending in εια had their ethnicon in ευς, as Ἀλεξάνδρεια, Ἀμάσεια, Σελεύκεια, Λυσιμάχεια (the recent cities thus founded by the successors of Alexander are perhaps the best evidences that can be taken of the analogies of the language), Μελάμπεια, Μελίτεια, in addition to the Bœotian names of towns above quoted. There is, however, great irregularity in particular cases, and the number of towns called by the same name created an anxiety to vary the ethnicon for each: see Stephan. Byz. v. Ἡράκλεια.

[561] The entire nakedness of the competitors at Olympia was adopted from the Spartan practice, seemingly in the 14th Olympiad, as is testified by the epigram on Orsippus the Megarian. Previous to that period, the Olympic competitors had διαζώματα περὶ τὰ αἰδοῖα (Thucyd. i. 6).

[562] Thucyd. iii. 112: iv. 41: compare vii. 44, about the sameness of sound of the war-shout, or pæan, as delivered by all the different Dorians.

[563] Corpus Inscript. Boeckh, Nos. 1771, 1772, 1773; Ahrens, De Dialecto Doricâ, sect. i-ii. 48.

[564] Thucyd. iv. 42: Strabo, viii. p. 333.

[565] See the valuable work of Ahrens, De Dialecto Æolicâ. sect. 51. He observes, in reference to the Lesbian, Thessalian, and Bœotian dialects: "Tres illas dialectos, quæ optimo jure Æolicæ vocari videntur—quia, qui illis usi sunt, Æoles erant—comparantem mirum habere oportet, quod Asianorum Æolum et Bœotorum dialecti tantum inter se distant, quantum vix ab aliâ quâvis Græcæ linguæ dialecto." He then enumerates many points of difference: "Contra tot tantasque differentias pauca reperiuntur eaque fere levia, quæ utrique dialecto, neque simul Doricæ, communia sint…. Vides his comparatis tantum interesse inter utramque dialectum, ut dubitare liceat, an Æoles Bœoti non magis cum Æolibus Asianis conjuncti fuerint, quam qui hodie miro quodam casu Saxones vocantur cum antiquis Saxonibus. Nihilominus Thessalicâ dialecto in comparationem vocata, diversissima quæ videntur aliquo vinculo conjungere licet. Quamvis enim pauca de eâ comperta habeamus, hoc tamen certum est, alia Thessalis cum Lesbiis, alia cum solis Bœotis communia esse." (P. 222-223.)

[566] About the Æolic dialect of the Perrhæbians, see Stephanus Byz. v. Γόννος, and ap. Eustath. ad Iliad, p. 335.

The Attic judgment, in comparing these different varieties of Greek speech, is expressed in the story of a man being asked—Whether the Bœotians or the Thessalians were most of barbarians? He answered—The Eleians (Eustath. ad Iliad. p. 304).

[567] See Heeren, Dissertatio de Fontibus Plutarchi, pp. 19-25.

[568] Herodot. i. 65. Moreover, Herodotus gives this as the statement of the Lacedæmonians themselves.

[569] Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 1. According to Dionys. Halik. (Ant. Rom. ii. 49) Lykurgus was uncle, not son, of Eunomus.

Aristotle considers Lykurgus as guardian of Charilaus (Politic. ii. 7, 1): compare v. 10, 3. See O. Müller (Hist. of Dorians, i. 7, 3).

[570] Phlegôn also adds Kleosthenês of Pisa (De Olympiis ap. Meursii Opp. vii. p. 128). It appears that there existed a quoit at Olympia, upon which the formula of the Olympic truce was inscribed, together with the names of Iphitus and Lykurgus as the joint authors and proclaimers of it. Aristotle believed this to be genuine, and accepted it as an evidence of the fact which it professed to certify: and O. Müller is also disposed to admit it as genuine,—that is, as *contemporary* with the times to which it professes to relate. I come to a different conclusion: that the quoit existed, I do not doubt; but that the inscription upon it was actually set down in writing, in or near B. C. 880, would be at variance with the reasonable probabilities resulting from Grecian palæography. Had this ancient and memorable instrument existed at Olympia in the days of Herodotus, he could hardly have assigned to Lykurgus the epoch which we now read in his writings.

The assertions in Müller's History of the Dorians (i. 7, 7), about Lykurgus, Iphitus, and Kleosthenês "drawing up the fundamental law of the Olympic armistice," are unsupported by any sufficient evidence. In the later times of established majesty of the Olympic festival, the Eleians did undoubtedly exercise the power which he describes; but to connect this with any deliberate regulation of Iphitus and Lykurgus, is in my judgment incorrect. See the mention of a similar truce proclaimed throughout Triphylia by the Makistians as presidents of the common festival at the temple of the Samian Poseidon (Strabo, viii. p. 343).

[571] Thucyd. i. 18.

[572] Mr. Clinton fixes the legislation of Lykurgus, "in conformity with Thucydidês," at about 817 B. C., and his regency at 852 B. C., about thirty-five years previous (Fasti Hellen. v. i. c. 7, p. 141): he also places the Olympiad of Iphitus B. C. 828 (F. H. vol. ii. p. 410; App. c. 22).

In that chapter, Mr. Clinton collects and discusses the various statements respecting the date of Lykurgus: compare, also, Larcher ad Herodot. i. 67, and Chronologie, pp. 486-492.

The differences in these statements must, after all, be taken as they stand, for they cannot be reconciled except by the help of arbitrary suppositions, which only mislead us by producing a show of agreement where there is none in reality. I agree with Mr. Clinton, in thinking that the assertion of Thucydidês is here to be taken as the best authority. But I altogether dissent from the proceeding which he (in common with Larcher, Wesseling, Sir

John Marsham, and others) employs with regard to the passage of Herodotus, where that author calls Lykurgus the guardian and uncle of Labôtas (of the Eurystheneid line). Mr. Clinton says: "From the notoriety of the fact that Lycurgus was ascribed to the other house (the Prokleids), it is manifest that *the passage must be corrupted*" (p. 144); and he then goes on to correct the text of Herodotus, agreeably to the proposition of Sir J. Marsham.

This proceeding seems to me inadmissible. The text of Herodotus reads perfectly well, and is not contradicted by anything to be found elsewhere *in Herodotus himself*: moreover, we have here a positive guarantee of its accuracy, for Mr. Clinton himself admits that it stood in the days of Pausanias just as we now read it (Pausan. iii. 2, 3). By what right, then, do we alter it? or what do we gain by doing so? Our only right to do so, is, the assumption that there must have been uniformity of belief and means of satisfactory ascertainment, (respecting facts and persons of the ninth and tenth centuries before the Christian era,) existing among Greeks of the fifth and succeeding centuries; an assumption which I hold to be incorrect. And all we gain is, an illusory unanimity produced by gratuitously putting words into the mouth of one of our witnesses.

If we can prove Herodotus to have been erroneously informed, it is right to do so; but we have no ground for altering his deposition. It affords a clear proof that there were very different stories as to the mere question, to which of the two lines of Herakleids the Spartan lawgiver belonged,—and that there was an enormous difference as to the time in which he lived.

[573] History of the Dorians, i. 7, 6.

[574] History of the Dorians, iii. 1, 8. Alf. Kopstadt recognizes this as an error in Müller's work: see his recent valuable Dissertation "De Rerum Laconicarum Constitutionis Lycurgeæ Origine et Indole," Gryphiæ, 1849, sect. 3, p. 18.

[575] Among the many other evidences to this point, see Aristotle, Ethic. x. 9; Xenophon, Republ. Laced. 10, 8.

[576] Herodot. i. 65-66; Thucyd. i. 18.

[577] Strabo, viii. p. 363.

[578] Plutarch, Lykurg. 3, 4, 5.

[579] For an instructive review of the text as well as the meaning of this ancient Rhetra, see Urlichs, Ueber die Lycurgischen Rhetren, published since the first edition of this History. His refutation of the rash charges of Göttling seems to me complete: but his own conjectures are not all equally plausible; nor can I subscribe to his explanation of ἀφιστάσθαι.

[580] Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 5-6. Hermippus, the scholar of Aristotle, professed to give the names of twenty out of these thirty devoted partisans.

There was, however, a different story, which represented that Lykurgus, on his return from his travels, found Charilaus governing like a despot (Heraclid. Pontic. c. 2).

[581] The words of the old Rhetra—Διὸς Ἑλλανίου καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς Ἑλλανίας ἱερὸν ἱδρυσάμενον, φυλὰς φυλάξαντα, καὶ ὠβὰς ὠβάξαντα, τριάκοντα, γερουσίαν σὺν ἀρχαγέταις, καταστήσαντα, ὥρας ἐξ ὥρας ἀπελλάζειν μεταξὺ Βαβύκας καὶ Κνακίωνος, οὕτως εἰσφέρειν τε καὶ ἀφίστασθαι· δάμῳ δ᾽ ἀγορὰν εἶμεν καὶ κράτος. (Plutarch, *ib.*)

The reading ἀγορὰν (last word but three) is that of Coray's edition: other readings proposed are κυρίαν, ἀνωγὰν, ἀγορίαν, etc. The MSS., however, are incurably corrupt, and none of the conjectures can be pronounced certain.

The Rhetra contains various remarkable archaisms,—ἀπελλάζειν—ἀφίστασθαι,—the latter word in the sense of putting the question for decision, corresponding to the function of the Ἀφεστὴρ at Knidus, (Plutarch, Quæst. Græc. c. 4; see Schneider, Lexicon, *ad voc.*)

O. Müller connects τριάκοντα with ὠβὰς, and lays it down that there were thirty Obes at Sparta: I rather agree with those critics who place the comma after ὠβάξαντα, and refer the number thirty to the senate. Urlichs, in his Dissertation Ueber Die Lykurgisch. Rhetren (published in the Rheinisches Museum for 1847, p. 204), introduces the word πρεσβυγενέας after τριάκοντα; which seems a just conjecture, when we look to the

addition afterwards made by Theopompus. The statements of Müller about the Obes seem to me to rest on no authority.

The word Rhetra means a solemn compact, either originally emanating from, or subsequently sanctioned by, the gods, who are always parties to such agreements: see the old Treaty between the Eleians and Heræans,—Ἀ ϝράτρα, between the two,—commemorated in the valuable inscription still preserved,—as ancient, according to Boeckh, as Olymp. 40-60, (Boeckh, Corp. Inscript. No. 2, p. 26, part i.) The words of Tyrtæus imply such a compact between contracting parties: first the kings, then the senate, lastly the people—εὐθείαις ῥήτραις *ἀνταπαμειβομένους*—where the participle last occurring applies not to the people alone, but to all the three. The Rhetra of Lykurgus emanated from the Delphian god; but the kings, senate, and people all bound themselves, both to each other and to the gods, to obey it. The explanations given of the phrase by Nitzsch and Schömann (in Dr. Thirlwall's note, ch. viii. p. 334) seem to me less satisfactory than what appears in C. F. Hermann (Lehrbuch der Griech. Staatsalterthümer, s. 23).

Nitzsch (Histor. Homer. sect. xiv. pp. 50-55) does not take sufficient account of the distinction between the meaning of ῥήτρα in the early and in the later times. In the time of the Ephor Epitadeus, or of Agis the Third, he is right in saying that ῥήτρα is equivalent to *scitum*,—still, however, with an idea of greater solemnity and unchangeability than is implied in the word νόμος, analogous to what is understood by a fundamental or organic enactment in modern ideas. The old ideas, of a mandate from the Delphian god, and a compact between the kings and the citizens, which had once been connected with the word, gradually dropped away from it. There is no contradiction in Plutarch, therefore, such as that to which Nitzsch alludes (p. 54).

Kopstadt's Dissertation (pp. 22, 30) touches on the same subject. I agree with Kopstadt (Dissert. pp. 28-30), in thinking it probable that Plutarch copied the words of the old Lykurgean constitutional Rhetra, from the account given by Aristotle of the Spartan polity.

King Theopompus probably brought from the Delphian oracle the important rider which he tacked to the mandate as originally brought by Lykurgus—οἱ βασιλεῖς Θεόπομπος καὶ Πολύδωρος τάδε τῇ ῥήτρᾳ παρενέγραψαν. The authority of the oracle, together with their own influence, would enable them to get these words accepted by the people.

[582] Αἳ δὲ σκολιὰν ὁ δᾶμος ἔλοιτο, τοὺς πρεσβυγενέας καὶ ἀρχαγέτας ἀποστατῆρας εἶμεν. (Plutarch, *ib.*)

Plutarch tells us that the primitive Rhetra, anterior to this addition, specially enjoined the assembled citizens either to adopt or reject, without change, the Rhetra proposed by the kings and senate, and that the rider was introduced because the assembly had disobeyed this injunction, and adopted amendments of its own. It is this latter sense which he puts on the word σκολιὰν. Urlichs (Ueber Lyc. Rhetr. p. 232) and Nitzsch (Hist. Homer. p. 54) follow him, and the latter even construes the epithet Εὐθείαις ῥήτραις ἀνταπαμειβομένους of Tyrtæus in a corresponding sense: he says, "Populus iis (rhetris) εὐθείαις, i. e. *nihil inflexis*, suffragari jubetur: nam lex cujus Tyrtæus admonet, ita sanxerat—si populus rogationem *inflexam* (*i. e.* non nisi ad suum arbitrium immutatam) accipere voluerit, senatores et auctores abolento totam."

Now, in the first place, it seems highly improbable that the primitive Rhetra, with its antique simplicity, would contain any such preconceived speciality of restriction upon the competence of the assembly. That restriction received its formal commencement only from the rider annexed by king Theopompus, which evidently betokens a previous dispute and refractory behavior on the part of the assembly.

In the second place, the explanation which these authors give of the words σκολιὰν and εὐθείαις, is not conformable to the ancient Greek, as we find it in Homer and Hesiod: and these early analogies are the proper test, seeing that we are dealing with a very ancient document. In Hesiod, ἰθὺς and σκολιὸς are used in a sense which almost exactly corresponds to *right* and *wrong* (which words, indeed, in their primitive etymology, maybe traced back to the meaning of *straight* and *crooked*). See Hesiod. Opp. Di. 36, 192, 218, 221, 226, 230, 250, 262, 264; also Theogon. 97, and Fragm. 217, ed. Göttling; where the phrases are constantly repeated, ἰθεῖαι δίκαι, σκολιαὶ δίκαι, σκολιοὶ μῦθοι. There is also the remarkable expression, Opp. Di. 9. ῥεῖα δέ τ᾽ ἰθύνει σκολιὸν: compare v. 263. ἰθύνετε μύθους: also Homer, Iliad, xvi. 387. Οἳ βίῃ εἰν ἀγορῇ σκολιὰς κρίνωσι θέμιστας; and xxiii. 580. ἰθεῖα; xviii. 508. ὃς μετὰ τοῖσι δίκην ἰθύντατα εἴπῃ, etc.

If we judge by these analogies, we shall see that the words of Tyrtæus, εὐθείαις ῥήτραις, mean "*straightforward*, *honest*, statutes or conventions"—not *propositions adopted without change*, as Nitzsch supposes. And so the words σκολιὰν ἔλοιτο, mean, "adopt a *wrong or dishonest determination*,"—not a determination different from what was proposed to them.

These words gave to the kings and senate power to cancel any decision of the public assembly which they disapproved. It retained only the power of refusing assent to some substantive propositions of the authorities, first of the kings and senate, afterwards of the ephors. And this limited power it seems always to have preserved.

Kopstadt explains well the expression σκολιὰν, as the antithesis to the epithet of Tyrtæus, εὐθείαις ῥήτραις (Dissertat. sect. 15, p. 124).

[583] Herod. i. 65: compare Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 7; Aristot. Polit. v. 9, 1 (where he gives the answer of king Theopompus).

Aristotle tells us that the ephors were chosen, but not *how* they were chosen; only, that it was in some manner excessively puerile,—παιδαριώδης γὰρ ἐστι λίαν (ii. 6, 16).

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, in his note to the passage of Aristotle, presumes that they were of course chosen in the same manner as the senators; but there seems no sufficient ground in Aristotle to countenance this. Nor is it easy to reconcile the words of Aristotle respecting the election of the senators, where he assimilates it to an αἵρεσις δυναστευτικὴ (Polit. v. 5, 8; ii. 6, 18), with the description which Plutarch (Lycurg. 26) gives of that election.

[584] Kopstadt agrees in this supposition, that the number of the senate was probably not peremptorily fixed before the Lykurgean reform (Dissertat. ut sup. sect. 13, p. 109).

[585] Plato, Legg. iii. p. 691; Plato Epist. viii. p. 354, B.

[586] Plato, Legg. iii. p. 691; Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 20.

[587] The conspiracy of Pausanias, after the repulse of Xerxes, was against the liberty of combined Hellas, to constitute himself satrap of Hellas under the Persian monarch, rather than against the established Lacedæmonian government; though undoubtedly one portion of his project was to excite the Helots to revolt, and Aristotle treats him as specially aiming to put down the power of the ephors (Polit. v. 5, 6: compare Thucyd. i. 128-134; Herodot. v. 32).

[588] Xenophon, Republic. Laced, c. 14.

[589] Plutarch, Agis, c. 12. Τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ ἀρχεῖον (the ephors) ἰσχύειν ἐκ διαφορᾶς τῶν βασιλέων, etc.

[590] Plutarch, Kleomenês, c. 10. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου, *τὸ μέχρι νῦν*, μεταπεμπομένων τὸν βασιλέα τῶν Ἐφόρων, etc.

[591] Xenophon, Republic. Lacedæmon. c. 15. Καὶ ὅρκους μὲν ἀλλήλοις κατὰ μῆνα ποιοῦνται· Ἔφοροι μὲν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως, βασιλεὺς δ᾽ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ. Ὁ δὲ ὅρκος ἐστὶ, τῷ μὲν βασιλεῖ, κατὰ τοὺς τῆς πόλεως κειμένους νόμους βασιλεύσειν· τῇ δὲ πόλει, ἐμπεδορκοῦντος ἐκείνου, ἀστυφέλικτον τὴν βασιλείαν παρέξειν.

[592] Herodot. vi. 57.

[593] Plato, Legg. iii. p. 692; Aristot. Polit. v. 11, 1; Cicero de Republic. Fragm. ii. 33, ed. Maii—"Ut contra consulare imperium tribuni plebis, sic illi (ephori) contra vim regiam constituti;"—also, De Legg. iii. 7. and Valer. Max. iv. 1.

Compare Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 7: Tittmann, Griechisch. Staatsverfassung, p. 108, *seqq.*

[594] Polyb. xxiv. 8.

[595] Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 14-16; Ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ δίαιτα τῶν Ἐφόρων οὐχ ὁμολογουμένη τῷ βουλήματι τῆς πόλεως· αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἀνειμένη λίαν ἐστὶ· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ὑπερβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ σκληρὸν, etc.

[596] Herodot. vi. 56.

[597] Aristot. ii. 7, 4; Xenoph. Republ. Laced. c. 13. Παυσανίας, πείσας τῶν Ἐφόρων τρεῖς, ἐξάγει φρουράν, Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 29; φρουρὰν ἔφηναν οἱ Ἔφοροι, iii. 2, 23.

A special restriction was put on the functions of the king, as military commander-in-chief, in 417 B. C., after the ill-conducted expedition of Agis, son of Archidamus, against Argos. It was then provided that ten Spartan counsellors should always accompany the king in every expedition (Thucyd. v. 63).

[598] The hide-money (δερματικὸν) arising from the numerous victims offered at public sacrifices at Athens, is accounted for as a special item of the public revenue in the careful economy of that city: see Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, iii. 7, p. 333; Eng. Trans. Corpus Inscription. No. 157.

[599] Tyrtæus, Fragm. 1, ed. Bergk; Strabo, xviii. p. 362:—

Αὐτὸς γὰρ Κρονίων καλλιστεφάνου πόσις Ἥρης
Ζεὺς Ἡρακλείδαις τήνδε δέδωκε πόλιν·
Οἷσιν ἅμα προλιπόντες Ἐρίνεον ἠνεμόεντα
Εὐρεῖαν Πέλοπος νῆσον ἀφικόμεθα.

Compare Thucyd. v. 16; Herodot. v. 39; Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 3, 3; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 22.

[600] Herod, v. 72. See the account in Plutarch, of the abortive stratagem of Lysander, to make the kingly dignity elective, by putting forward a youth who passed for the son of Apollo (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 25-26).

[601] Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 3, 1. Ἄγις—ἔτυχε σεμνοτέρας ἢ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον ταφῆς.

[602] For the privileges of the Spartan kings, see Herodot. vi. 56-57; Xenophon, Republ. Laced. c. 15; Plato, Alcib. i. p. 123.

[603] Herodot. vi. 66, and Thucyd. v. 16, furnish examples of this.

[604] Xenophon, Republ. Laced. c. 8, 2, and Agesilaus, cap. 7, 2.

[605] Xenoph. Rep. Laced. 8, 4; Thucydid. i. 131; Aristot. Polit. ii. 6,14—ἀρχὴν λίαν μεγάλην καὶ ἰσοτύραννον. Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 13.—μὴ χρῆσθαι νόμοις ἐγγράφοις.

Plato, in his Republic, in like manner disapproves of any general enactments, tying up beforehand the discretion of perfectly educated men, like his guardians, who will always do what is best on each special occasion (Republic, iv. p. 425).

[606] Besides the primitive constitutional Rhetra mentioned above, page 345, various other Rhetræ are also attributed to Lykurgus: and Plutarch singles out three under the title of "The Three Rhetræ," as if they were either the only genuine Lykurgean Rhetræ, or at least stood distinguished by some peculiar sanctity from all others (Plutarch, Quæst. Roman. c. 87. Agesilaus, c. 26).

These three were (Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 13; comp. Apophth. Lacon. p. 227): 1. Not to resort to written laws. 2. Not to employ in house-building any other tools than the axe and the saw. 3. Not to undertake military expeditions often against the same enemies.

I agree with Nitzsch (Histor. Homer. pp. 61-65) that these Rhetræ, though doubtless not actually Lykurgean, are, nevertheless, ancient (that is, probably dating somewhere between 650-550 B. C.) and not the mere fictions of recent writers, as Schömann (Ant. Jur. Pub. iv. 1; xiv. p. 132) and Urlichs (p. 241) seem to believe. And though Plutarch specifies the number *three*, yet there seems to have been still more, as the language of Tyrtæus must be held to indicate: out of which, from causes which we do not now understand, the three which Plutarch distinguishes excited particular notice.

These maxims or precepts of state were probably preserved along with the dicta of the Delphian oracle, from which authority, doubtless, many of them may have emanated,—such as the famous ancient prophecy Ἀ φιλοχρηματία Σπάρταν ὀλεῖ, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδὲν (Krebs, Lectiones Diodoreæ, p. 140. Aristotel. Περὶ Πολιτειῶν, ap. Schol. ad Eurip. Andromach. 446. Schömann, Comm. ad Plutarch. Ag. et Cleomen. p. 123).

Nitzsch has good remarks in explanation of the prohibition against "using written laws." This prohibition was probably called forth by the circumstance that other Grecian states were employing lawgivers like Zaleukus, Drako, Charondas, or Solon,—to present them, at once, with a series of written enactments, or provisions. Some Spartans may have proposed that an analogous lawgiver should be nominated for Sparta: upon which proposition a negative was put in the most solemn manner possible, by a formal Rhetra, perhaps passed after advice from Delphi. There is no such contradiction, therefore, (when we thus conceive the event,) as some authors represent, in forbidding the use of written laws by a Rhetra itself, put into writing. To employ a phrase in greater

analogy with modern controversies—"The Spartans, on the direction of the oracle, resolve to retain their unwritten common law, and not to codify."

[607] Ἔδοξε τοῖς Ἐφόροις καὶ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ (Xen. Hellen. iii. 2, 23).

[608] The case of *Leotychides*, Herod. vi. 72; of *Pleistoanax*, Thucyd. ii. 21-v. 16; *Agis the Second*, Thucyd. v. 63; *Agis the Third*, Plutarch, Agis, c. 19: see Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 5.

Respecting the ephors generally, see Wachsmuth, Hellen. Alterthumskunde, v. 4, 42, vol. i. p. 223; Cragius, Rep. Lac. ii. 4, p. 121.

Aristotle distinctly marks the ephors as ἀνυπεύθυνοι: so that the story alluded to briefly in the Rhetoric (iii. 18) is not easy to be understood.

[609] Thucyd. i. 67, 80, 87. ξύλλογον σφῶν αὐτῶν τὸν εἰωθότα.

[610] Thucyd. iv. 68. τῆς πολιτείας τὸ κρυπτόν: compare iv. 74; also, his remarkable expression about so distinguished a man as Brasidas, ἦν δὲ οὐκ αδύνατος, ὡς Λακεδαιμόνιος, εἰπεῖν, and iv. 24, about the Lacedæmonian envoys to Athens. Compare Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Pub. Græc. iv. 1, 10, p. 122. Aristotel. Polit. ii. 8, 3.

[611] Τὴν μικρὰν καλουμένην ἐκκλησίαν (Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 3, 8), which means the γέροντες, or senate, and none besides, except the ephors, who convoked it. (See Lachmann, Spart. Verfass. sect. 12, p. 216.) What is still more to be noted, is the expression οἱ ἔκκλητοι as the equivalent of ἡ ἐκκλησία (compare Hellen. v. 2, 11; vi. 3, 3), evidently showing a special and limited number of persons convened: see, also, ii. 4, 38; iv. 6, 3; v. 2, 33; Thucyd. v. 77.

The expression οἱ ἔκκλητοι could never have got into use as an equivalent for the Athenian ecclesia.

[612] Xenoph. Republ. Laced. 10; Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 17; iii. 1, 7; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 23, p. 489; Isokratês, Or. xii. (Panathenaic.) p. 266. The language of Demosthenês seems particularly inaccurate.

Plutarch (Agesilaus, c. 32), on occasion of some suspected conspirators, who were put to death by Agesilaus and the ephors, when Sparta was in imminent danger from the attack of Epameinondas, asserts, that this was the first time that any Spartan had ever been put to death without trial.

[613] Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 18. Compare, also, Thucydid. i. 131, about the guilty Pausanias,—πιστεύων χρήμασι διαλύσειν τὴν διαβολήν; Herodot. v. 72; Thucyd. v. 16,—about the kings Leotychides and Pleistoanax; the brave and able Gylippus,—Plutarch, Lysand. c. 16.

[614] The ephors are sometimes considered as a democratical element, because every Spartan citizen had a chance of becoming ephor; sometimes as a despotical element, because in the exercise of their power they were subject to little restraint and no responsibility: see Plato, Legg. iv. p. 712; Aristot. Polit. ii. 3, 10; iv. 7, 4, 5.

[615] A specimen of the way in which this antiquity was lauded, may be seen in Isokratês, Or. xii. (Panathenaic.) p. 288.

[616] Herodot. v. 68; Stephan. Byz. Ὑλλέες and Δυμᾶν; O. Müller, Dorians, iii. 5, 2; Boeckh ad Corp. Inscrip. No. 1123.

Thucyd. i. 24, about Phalius, the Herakleid, at Corinth.

[617] See Tyrtæus, Fragm. 8, 1, ed. Schneidewin, and Pindar, Pyth. i. 61. v. 71, where the expressions "descendants of Hêraklês" plainly comprehend more than the two kingly families. Plutarch, Lysand. c. 22; Diodor. xi. 58.

[618] Herodot. iv. 149; Pindar, Pyth. v. 67; Aristot. Λακων. Πολιτ. p. 127, Fragm. ed. Neuman. The Talthybiadæ, or heralds, at Sparta, formed a family or caste apart (Herod. vii. 134).

O. Müller supposes, without any proof, that the Ægeids *must* have been adopted into one of the three Dorian tribes; this is one of the corollaries from his fundamental supposition, that Sparta is the type of pure Dorism (vol. ii. p. 78). Kopstadt thinks (Dissertat. p. 67) that I have done injustice to O. Müller, in not assenting to his proof: but, on studying the point over again, I can see no reason for modifying what is here stated in the text. The Section of Schömann's work (Antiq. Jur. Publ. Græc. iv. 1, 6, p. 115) on this subject asserts a great deal more than can be proved.

[619] Herod. v. 68-92; Boeckh, Corp. Inscrip. Nos. 1130, 1131; Stephan. Byz. v. Ὑρνίθιον; Pausan. ii. 28, 3.

[620] Photius Πάντα ὀκτώ; also. Proverb. Vatic. Suidas, xi. 64; compare Hesychius, v. Κυνόφαλοι.

[621] Müller, Dorians, iii. 5, 3-7; Boeckh ad Corp. Inscription. part iv. sect. 3, p. 609.

[622] Pausan. iii. 16, 6; Herodot. iii. 55; Boeckh, Corp. Inscript. Nos. 1241, 1338, 1347, 1425; Steph. Byz. v. Μεσόα; Strabo, viii. p. 364; Hesych. v. Πιτάνη.

There is much confusion and discrepancy of opinion about the Spartan tribes. Cragius admits six (De Republ. Lacon. i. 6); Meursius, eight (Rep. Lacon. i. 7): Barthélemy (Voyage du Jeune Anacharsis, iv. p. 185) makes them five. Manso has discussed the subject at large, but I think not very satisfactorily, in the eighth Beilage to the first book of his History of Sparta (vol. ii. p. 125); and Dr. Thirwall's second Appendix (vol. i. p. 517) both notices all the different modern opinions on this obscure topic, and adds several useful criticisms. Our scanty stock of original evidence leaves much room for divergent hypotheses, and little chance of any certain conclusion.

[623] Thucyd. i. 10.

[624] One or two Periœkic officers appear in military command towards the end of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. viii. 6, 22), but these seem rare exceptions, even as to foreign service by sea or land, while a Periœkus, as magistrate at Sparta, was unheard of.

[625] One half was paid by the enslaved Messenians (Tyrtæus, Frag. 4, Bergk): ἥμισυ πᾶν, ὅσσον κάρπον ἄρουσα φέρει.

[626] Strabo, viii. p. 362. Stephanus Byz. alludes to this total of one hundred townships in his notice of several different items among them,—Ἀνθάνα—πόλις Λακωνικὴ μία τῶν ἑκατον; also, v. Ἀφροδισιάς, Βοῖαι, Δυῤῥάχιον, etc: but he probably copied Strabo, and, therefore, cannot pass for a distinct authority. The total of one hundred townships belongs to the maximum of Spartan power, after the conquest and before the severance of Messenia; for Aulôn, Boiæ, and Methônê (the extreme places) are included among them.

Mr. Clinton (Fast. Hellen. ii. p. 401) has collected the names of above sixty out of the one hundred.

[627] Thucyd. iv. 53.

[628] Xenophon, Hellen. iv. 5, 11; Herod. ix. 7; Thucyd. v. 18-23. The Amyklæan festival of the Hyacinthia, and the Amyklæan temple of Apollo, seem to stand foremost in the mind of the Spartan authorities. Αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ ἐγγύτατα τῶν περιοἰκων (Thucyd. iv. 8), who are ready before the rest, and march against the Athenians at Pylus, probably include the Amyklæans.

Laconia generally is called by Thucydidês (iii. 16) as the περιοικὶς of Sparta.

[629] The word περἰοικοι is sometimes used to signify simply "surrounding neighbor states," in its natural geographical sense: see Thucyd. i. 17, and Aristot. Polit. ii. 7, 1.

But the more usual employment of it is, to mean, the unprivileged or less privileged members of the same political aggregate living without the city, in contrast with the full-privileged burghers who lived within it. Aristotle uses it to signify, in Krête, the class corresponding to the Lacedæmonian Helots (Pol. ii. 7, 3): there did not exist in Krête any class corresponding to the Lacedæmonian Periœki. In Krête, there were not two stages of inferiority,—there was only one, and that one is marked by the word περἰοικοι; while the Lacedæmonian Periœkus had the Helot below him. To an Athenian the word conveyed the idea of undefined degradation.

To understand better the *status* of the Periœkus, we may contrast him with the Metœkus, or Metic. The latter resides in the city, but he is an alien resident on sufferance, not a native: he pays a special tax, stands excluded from all political functions, and cannot even approach the magistrate except through a friendly citizen, or Prostatês (επὶ προστάτον οἰκεῖν—Lycurgus cont. Leocrat. c. 21-53): he bears arms for the defence of the state. The situation of a Metic was, however, very different in different cities of Greece. At Athens, that class were well-protected in person and property, numerous and domiciliated: at Sparta, there were at first none,—the Xenêlasy excluded them; but this must have been relaxed long before the days of Agis the Third.

The Periœkus differs from the Metic, in being a native of the soil, subject by birth to the city law.

M. Kopstadt (in his Dissertation above cited, on Lacedæmonian affairs, sect. 7, p. 60) expresses much surprise at that which I advance in this note respecting Krête and Lacedæmon,—that in Krête there was no class of men analogous to the Lacedæmonian Periœki, but only two classes,—*i. e.* free citizens and Helots. He thinks that this position is "prorsus falsum."

But I advance nothing more here than what is distinctly stated by Aristotle, as Kopstadt himself admits (pp. 60, 71). Aristotle calls the subject class in Krête by the name of Περίοικοι. And in this case, the general presumptions go far to sustain the authority of Aristotle. For Sparta was a dominant or capital city, including in its dependence not only a considerable territory, but a considerable number of inferior, distinct, organized townships. In Krête, on the contrary, each autonomous state included only a town with its circumjacent territory, but without any annexed townships. There was, therefore, no basis for the intermediate class called, in Laconia, Periœki: just as Kopstadt himself remarks (p. 78) about the Dorian city of Megara. There were only the two classes of free Krêtan citizens, and serf-cultivators in various modifications and subdivisions.

Kopstadt (following Hoeck, Krêta, b. iii. vol. iii. p. 23) says that the authority of Aristotle on this point is overborne by that of Dosiadas and Sosikratês,—authors who wrote specially on Krêtan affairs. Now if we were driven to make a choice, I confess that I should prefer the testimony of Aristotle,—considering that we know little or nothing respecting the other two. But in this case I do not think that we are driven to make a choice: Dosiadas (ap. Athenæ. xiv. p. 143) is not cited in terms, so that we cannot affirm him to contradict Aristotle: and Sosikratês (upon whom Hoeck and Kopstadt rely) says something which does not necessarily contradict him, but admits of being explained so as to place the two witnesses in harmony with each other.

Sosikratês says (ap. Athenæ. vi. p. 263), Τὴν μὲν κοινὴν δουλείαν οἱ Κρῆτες καλοῦσι μνοίαν, τὴν δὲ ἰδίαν ἀφαμίωτας, τοὺς δὲ περιοίκους ὑπηκόους. Now the word περιοίκους seems to be here used just as Aristotle would have used it, to comprehend the Krêtan serfs universally: it is not distinguished from μνώιται and ἀφαμιῶται, but comprehends both of them as different species under a generic term. The authority of Aristotle affords a reason for preferring to construe the passage in this manner, and the words appear to me to admit of it fairly.

[630] The πόλεις of the Lacedæmonian Periœki are often noticed: see Xenophon (Agesilaus, ii. 24; Laced. Repub. xv. 3; Hellenic. vi. 5, 21).

[631] Herod. viii. 73-135; Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 8; Thucyd. iv. 76-94.

[632] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 3, 5, 9, 19. Isokratês, writing in the days of Theban power, after the battle of Leuktra, characterizes the Bœotian towns as περίοικοι of Thebes (Or. viii. De Pace, p. 182); compare Orat. xiv. Plataic. pp. 299-303. Xenophon holds the same language, Hellen. v. 4, 46: compare Plutarch, Agesilaus, 28.

[633] Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 23.

[634] Thucyd. i. 77-95; vi. 105. Isokratês (Panathenaic. Or. xii. p. 283), Σπαρτιάτας δὲ ὑπεροπτικοὺς καὶ πολεμικοὺς καὶ πλεονέκτας, οἵους περ αὐτοὺς εἶναι πάντες ὑπειλήφασι. Compare his Oratio de Pace (Or. viii. pp. 180-181); Oratio Panegyr. (Or. iv. pp. 64-67).

[635] Isokratês, Panathenaic. Or. xii. p. 280. ὥστε οὐδεὶς ἂν αὐτοὺς διά γε τὴν ὁμόνοιαν δικαίως ἐπαινέσειεν, οὐδεν μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς καταποντιστὰς καὶ λῃστας καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀδικίας ὄντας· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὁμονοοῦντες τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπολλύουσι.

[636] Isokratês, Orat. xii. (Panathenaic.) pp. 270-271. The statement in the same oration (p. 246), that the Lacedæmonians "had put to death without trial more Greeks (πλείους τῶν Ἑλλήνων) than had ever been tried at Athens since Athens was a city," refers to their allies or dependents out of Laconia.

[637] Ephorus, Fragm. 18, ed. Marx; ap. Strabo, viii. p. 365.

[638] Dr. Arnold (in his Dissertation on the Spartan Constitution, appended to the first volume of his Thucydidês, p. 643) places greater confidence in the historical value of this narrative of Isokratês than I am inclined to do. On the other hand, Mr. G. C. Lewis, in his Review of Dr. Arnold's Dissertation (Philological Museum, vol. ii. p. 45), considers the "account of Isokratês as completely inconsistent with that of Ephorus;" which is saying rather more, perhaps, than the tenor of the two strictly warrants. In Mr. Lewis's excellent article, most of the difficult points respecting the Spartan constitution will be found raised and discussed in a manner highly instructive.

Another point in the statement of Isokratês is, that the Dorians, at the time of the original conquest of Laconia, were only two thousand in number (Or. xii. Panath. p. 286). Mr. Clinton rejects this estimate as too small, and observes, "I suspect that Isokratês, in describing the numbers of the Dorians at the original conquest, has adapted to the description the actual numbers of the Spartans in his own time." (Fast. Hellen. ii. p. 408.)

This seems to me a probable conjecture, and it illustrates as well the absence of data under which Isokratês or his informants labored, as the method which they took to supply the deficiency.

[639] Schömann, Antiq. Jurisp. Græcorum, iv. 1, 5, p. 112.

[640] Pausan. iii. 2, 6; iii. 22, 5. The statement of Müller is to be found (History of the Dorians, iii. 2, 1): he quotes a passage of Pausanias, which is noway to the point.

Mr. G. C. Lewis (Philolog. Mus. *ut. sup.* p. 41) is of the same opinion as Müller.

[641] M. Kopstadt (in the learned Dissertation which I have before alluded to, De Rerum Laconicarum Constitutionis Lycurgeæ Origine et Indole, cap. ii. p. 31) controverts this position respecting the Periœki. He appears to understand it in a sense which my words hardly present,—at least, a sense which I did not intend them to present: as if the majority of inhabitants in *each* of the hundred Periœkic towns were Dorians,—"ut per centum Laconiæ oppida distributi *ubique majorem* incolarum numerum efficerent," (p. 32.) I meant only to affirm that some of the Periœkic towns, such as Amyklæ, were wholly, or almost wholly, Dorian; many others of them partially Dorian. But what may have been the comparative numbers (probably different in each town) of Dorian and non-Dorian inhabitants,—there are no means of determining. M. Kopstadt (p. 35) admits that Amyklæ, Pharis, and Geronthræ, were Periœkic towns peopled by Dorians; and if this be true, it negatives the general maxim on the faith of which he contradicts what I affirm: his maxim is—"nunquam Dorienses à Doriensibus nisi bello victi erant, civitate æquoque jure privati sunt," (p. 31.) It is very unsafe to lay down such large positions respecting a supposed uniformity of Dorian rules and practice. The high authority of O. Müller has been extremely misleading in this respect.

It is plain that Herodotus (compare his expression, viii. 73 and i. 145) conceived all the free inhabitants of Laconia not as Achæans, but as Dorians. He believes in the story of the legend, that the Achæans, driven out of Laconia by the invading Dorians and Herakleidæ, occupied the territory in the north-west of Peloponnesus which was afterwards called Achæa,—expelling from it the Ionians. Whatever may be the truth about this legendary statement,—and whatever may have been the original proportions of Dorians and Achæans in Laconia,—these two races had (in the fifth century B. C.) become confounded in one undistinguishable ethnical and political aggregate called Laconian, or Lacedæmonian,—comprising both Spartans and Periœki, though with very unequal political franchises, and very material differences in individual training and habits. The case was different in Thessaly, where the Thessalians held in dependence Magnêtes, Perrhæbi, and Achæans: the separate nationality of these latter was never lost.

[642] Herod. vii. 234.

[643] Thucyd. viii. 6-22. They did not, however, partake in the Lykurgean discipline; but they seem to be named οἱ ἐκ τῆς χώρας παῖδες, as contrasted with οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἀγωγῆς (Sosibius ap. Athenæ. xv. p. 674).

[644] Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 23. διὰ γὰρ τὸ τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν εἶναι τὴν πλείστην γῆν, οὐκ ἐξετάζουσιν ἀλλήλων τὰς εἰσφοράς.

Mr. G. C. Lewis, in the article above alluded to (Philolog. Mus. ii. p. 54), says, about the Periœki: "They lived in the country or in small towns of the Laconian territory, and cultivated the land, which they did not hold of any individual citizen, but paid for it a tribute or rent to the state; being exactly in the same condition as the *possessores* of the Roman domain, or the Ryots, in Hindostan, before the introduction of the Permanent Settlement." It may be doubted, I think, whether the Periœki paid any such rent or tribute as that which Mr. Lewis here supposes. The passage just cited from Aristotle seems to show that they paid direct taxation individually, and just upon the same principle as the Spartan citizens, who are distinguished only by being larger landed-proprietors. But though the principle of taxation be the same, there was practical injustice (according to Aristotle) in the mode of assessing it. "The Spartan citizens (he observes) being the largest landed-proprietors, take care not to canvass strictly *each other's payment of property-tax*"—*i. e.* they wink mutually at each other's evasions. If the Spartans had been the *only* persons who paid εἰσφορὰ, or property-tax, this observation of Aristotle would have had no meaning. In principle, the tax was assessed, both on their larger properties and on the smaller properties of the Periœki: in practice, the Spartans helped each other to evade the due proportion.

[645] The village-character of the Helots is distinctly marked by Livy, xxxiv. 27, in describing the inflictions of the despot Nabis: "Ilotarum quidam (hi sunt jam inde antiquitus *castellani*, agreste genus) transfugere voluisse insimulati, per omnes *vicos* sub verberibus acti necantur."

[646] Herodot. i. 66. ἐχρηστηριάζοντο ἐν Δελφοισι ἐπὶ πάσῃ τῇ Ἀρκάδων χώρῃ.

[647] See O. Müller, Dorians, iii. 3, 1; Ephorus ap. Strabo, viii. p. 365: Harpocration, v. Εἵλωτες.

[648] Kleomenes the Third, offered manumission to every Helot, who could pay down five Attic minæ: he was in great immediate want of money, and he raised, by this means, five hundred talents. Six thousand Helots must thus have been in a condition to find five minæ each, which was a very considerable sum (Plutarch, Kleomenes, c. 23).

[649] Such is the statement, that Helots were compelled to appear in a state of drunkenness, in order to excite in the youths a sentiment of repugnance against intoxication (Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 28; also, Adversus Stoicos de Commun. Notit. c. 19, p. 1067).

[650] Herod. ix. 29. The Spartans, at Thermopylæ, seem to have been attended each by only one Helot (vii. 229).

O. Müller seems to consider that the light-armed, who attended the Periœkic hoplites at Platæa, were *not* Helots (Dor. iii. 3, 6). Herodotus does not distinctly say that they were so, but I see no reason for admitting two different classes of light-armed in the Spartan military force.

The calculation which Müller gives of the number of Periœki and Helots altogether, proceeds upon very untrustworthy data. Among them is to be noticed his supposition that πολιτικὴ χώρα means the district of Sparta as distinguished from Laconia, which is contrary to the passage in Polybius (vi. 45): πολιτικὴ χώρα, in Polybius, means the territory of the state generally.

[651] Xenophon, Rep. Lac. c. 12, 4; Kritias, De Lacedæm. Repub. ap. Libanium, Orat. de Servitute, t. ii. p. 85, Reisk. ὡς ἀπιστίας εἵνεκα τῆς πρὸς τοὺς Εἵλωτας ἐξαιρεῖ μὲν Σπαρτιατὴς οἵκοι τῆς ἄσπιδος τὴν πόρπακα, etc.

[652] Thucyd. i. 101; iv. 80; v. 14-23.

[653] Thucyd. iv. 80. οἱ δὲ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἠφάνισάν τε αὐτοὺς, καὶ οὐδεὶς ᾔσθετο ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἕκαστος διεφθάρη.

[654] Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 28; Heraclides Pontic. p. 504, ed. Crag.

[655] Plato, Legg. i. p. 633: the words of the Lacedæmonian Megillus designate an existing Spartan custom. Compare the same treatise, vi. p. 763, where Ast suspects, without reason, the genuineness of the word κρυπτοί.

[656] Myron, ap. Athenæ. xiv. p. 657. ἐπικόπτειν τοὺς ἀδρουμένους does not strictly mean "to put to death."

[657] Thucyd. v. 34.

[658] Xenophon, Rep. Lac. c. 7.

[659] Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 15; substantially confirmed by Xenophon, Rep. Lac. c. 1, 5.

[660] See the authors quoted in Athenæus, iv. p. 141.

[661] Xenoph. Rep. Lac. 2-3, 3-5, 4-6. The extreme pains taken to enforce καρτερία (fortitude and endurance) in the Spartan system is especially dwelt upon by Aristotle (Politica, ii. 6, 5-16); compare Plato, De Legibus, i. p. 633; Xenophon, De Laced. Repub. ii. 9, with the references in Schneider's note,—likewise Cragius, De Republica Laced. iii. 8, p. 325.

[662] It is remarkable that these violent contentions of the youth, wherein kicking, biting, gouging out each other's eyes, was resorted to,—as well as the διαμαστίγωσις, or scourging-match, before the altar of Artemis,—lasted down to the closing days of Sparta, and were actually seen by Cicero, Plutarch, and even Pausanias. Plutarch had seen several persons die under the suffering (Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 16, 18-30; and Instituta Laconica, p. 239; Pausan. iii. 14, 9, 16, 7; Cicero, Tuscul. Disp. ii. 15).

The voluntary tortures, undergone by the young men among the Mandan tribe of Indians, at their annual religious festival, in the presence of the elders of the tribe,—afford a striking illustration of the same principles and tendencies as this Spartan διαμαστίγωσις. They are endured partly under the influence of religious feelings, as an acceptable offering to the Great Spirit,—partly as a point of emulation and glory on the part of the young men, to show themselves worthy and unconquerable in the eyes of their seniors. The intensity of these tortures is, indeed, frightful to read, and far surpasses in that respect anything ever witnessed at Sparta. It would be incredible, were it not attested by a trustworthy eye-witness.

See Mr. Catlin's Letters on the North American Indians, Letter 22, vol. i. p. 157, *seq.*

"These religious ceremonies are held, in part, for the purpose of conducting all the young men of the tribe, as they annually arrive at manhood, through an ordeal of privation and torture; which, while it is supposed to harden their muscles and prepare them for extreme endurance,—enables the chiefs who are spectators of the scene, to decide upon their comparative bodily strength and ability, to endure the extreme privations and sufferings that often fall to the lot of Indian warriors; and that they may decide who is the most hardy and best able to lead a war-party in case of emergency."—Again, p. 173, etc.

The καρτερία or power of endurance (Aristot. Pol. ii. 6, 5-16) which formed one of the prominent objects of the Lycurgean training, dwindles into nothing compared to that of the Mandan Indians.

[663] Xenophon, Anab. iv. 6, 14; and De Repub. Lac. c. 2, 6; Isokratês, Or. xii. (Panath.) p. 277. It is these licensed expeditions for thieving, I presume, to which Isokratês alludes, when he speaks of τῆς παίδων αὐτονομίας at Sparta, which, in its natural sense, would be the reverse of the truth (p. 277).

[664] Aristot. Polit. viii. 3, 3,—the remark is curious,—νῦν μὲν οὖν αἱ μάλιστα δοκοῦσαι τῶν πόλεων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν παίδων αἱ μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἕξιν ἐμποιοῦσι, λωβώμεναι τὰ τ᾽ εἴδη καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν σωμάτων· οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὐχ ἥμαρτον τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, etc. Compare the remark in Plato, Protagor. p. 342.

[665] Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 5; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 31. Aristotle alludes to the conduct of the Spartan women on the occasion of the invasion of Laconia by the Thebans, as an evidence of his opinion respecting their want of courage. His judgment in this respect seems hard upon them, and he probably had formed to himself exaggerated notions of what their courage under such circumstances ought to have been, as the result of their peculiar training. We may add that their violent demonstrations on that trying occasion may well have arisen quite as much from the agony of wounded honor as from fear, when we consider what an event the appearance of a conquering army in Sparta was.

[666] Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 5, 8, 11.

[667] Xenoph. Rep. Lac. i. 3-4; Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 13-14.

[668] Eurip. Androm. 598; Cicero, Tuscul. Quæst. ii. 15. The epithet φαινομηρίδες, as old as the poet Ibykus, shows that the Spartan women were not uncovered (see Julius Pollux, vii. 55).

It is scarcely worth while to notice the poetical allusions of Ovid and Propertius.

How completely the practice of gymnastic and military training for young women, analogous to that of the other sex, was approved by Plato, may be seen from the injunctions in his Republic.

[669] Aristot. Polit. vii. 14, 4.

[670] "It is certain (observes Dr. Thirlwall, speaking of the Spartan unmarried women) that in this respect the Spartan morals were as pure as those of any ancient, perhaps of any modern, people." (History of Greece, ch. viii. vol. i. p. 371.)

[671] Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 15; Xenoph. Rep. Lac. i. 5. Xenophon does not make any allusion to the abduction as a general custom. There occurred cases in which it was real and violent: see Herod. v. 65. Demaratus carried off and married the betrothed bride of Leotychides.

[672] Xenoph. Rep. Lac. i. 9. Εἰ δέ τις αὖ γυναικὶ μὲν συνοικεῖν μὴ βούλοιτο, τέκνων δὲ ἀξιολόγων ἐπιθυμοίη, καὶ τούτῳ νόμον ἐποίησεν, ἤντινα ἂν εὔτεκνον καὶ γενναίαν ὁρῴη, πείσαντα τὸν ἔχοντα, ἐκ ταύτης τεκνοποιεῖσθαι. Καὶ πολλὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα συνεχώρει. *Αἵ τε γὰρ γυναῖκες δίττους οἴκους βούλονται κατέχειν*, οἵ τε ἄνδρες ἀδελφοὺς τοῖς παισὶ προσλαμβάνειν, οἳ τοῦ μὲν γένους καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως κοινωνοῦσι, τῶν δὲ χρημάτων οὐκ ἀντιποιοῦνται.

[673] Herodot. v. 39-40. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, γυναῖκας ἔχων δύο, διξὰς ἰστίας οἴκεε, ποιέων οὐδαμᾶ Σπαρτιητικά.

[674] Müller, Hist. of Dorians, iv. 4, 1. The stories recounted by Plutarch, (Agis, c. 20; Kleomenês, c. 37-38,) of the conduct of Agesistrata and Kratesikleia, the wives of Agis and Kleomenês, and of the wife of Panteus (whom he does not name) on occasion of the deaths of their respective husbands, illustrate powerfully the strong conjugal affection of a Spartan woman, and her devoted adherence and fortitude in sharing with her husband the last extremities of suffering.

[675] See the Oration of Lysias, De Cæde Eratosthenis, Orat. i. p. 94, *seq.*

[676] Plutarch, Agis, c. 4.

[677] Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 6; Plutarch, Agis, c. 4. τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους κατηκόους ὄντας ἀεὶ τῶν γυναικῶν, καὶ πλεῖον ἐκείναις τῶν δημοσίων, ἢ τῶν ἰδίων αὐτοῖς, πολυπραγμονεῖν διδοντας.

[678] Aristophan. Lysistr. 80.

[679] See the remarkable account in Xenophon, Hellen. iv. 16; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 29; one of the most striking incidents in Grecian history. Compare, also, the string of sayings ascribed to Lacedæmonian women, in Plutarch, Lac. Apophth. p. 241, *seq.*

[680] How offensive the Lacedæmonian xenêlasy or expulsion of strangers appeared in Greece, we may see from the speeches of Periklês in Thucydidês (i. 144; ii. 39). Compare Xenophon, Rep. Lac. xiv. 4; Plutarch, Agis, c. 10; Lykurgus, c. 27; Plato, Protagoras, p. 348.

No Spartan left the country without permission: Isokratês, Orat. xi. (Busiris), p. 225; Xenoph. *ut sup.*

Both these regulations became much relaxed after the close of the Peloponnesian war.

[681] Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 25.

[682] Plutarch observes justly about Sparta, under the discipline of Lykurgus, that it was "not the polity of a city, but the life of a trained and skilful man,"—οὐ πόλεως ἡ Σπάρτη πολίτειαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνδρὸς ἀσκητοῦ καὶ σοφοῦ βίον ἔχουσα (Plutarch, Lyk. c. 30).

About the perfect habit of obedience at Sparta, see Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 5, 9, 15-iv. 4, 15, the grand attributes of Sparta in the eyes of its admirers (Isokratês, Panathen. Or. xii. pp. 256-278), πειθαρχία—σωφροσύνη—τα γυμνάσια τάκει καθεστῶτα καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄσκησιν τῆς ἀνδρίας καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὁμόνοιαν καὶ συνόλως τὴν περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἐμπειρίαν.

[683] Aristot. Polit. viii. 3, 3. Οἱ Λάκωνες … θηριώδεις ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις.

That the Spartans were absolutely ignorant of letters, and could not read, is expressly stated by Isokratês (Panathen. Or. xii. p. 277). οὗτοι δὲ τοσοῦτον ἀπολελειμμένοι τῆς κοινῆς παιδείας καὶ φιλοσοφίας εἰσὶν, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ γράμματα μανθάνουσιν, etc.

The preference of rhetoric to accuracy, is so manifest in Isokratês, that we ought to understand his expressions with some reserve; but in this case it is evident that he means literally what he says, for in another part of the same discourse, there is an expression dropped, almost unconsciously, which confirms it. "The most rational Spartans (he says) will appreciate this discourse, if they *find any one to read it to them*,"—ἢν λάβωσι τὸν ἀναγνωσόμενον (p. 285).

[684] Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 22; vii. 13, 11; viii. 1, 3; viii. 3, 3. Plato, Legg. i. pp. 626-629. Plutarch, Solôn, c. 22.

[685] Thucyd. iv. 126. Οἵ γε μηδὲ ἀπὸ πολιτειῶν τοιούτων ἥκετε, ἐν αἷς οὐ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων ἄρχουσι, ἀλλὰ πλειόνων μᾶλλον ἐλάσσους· οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ κτησάμενοι τὴν δυναστείαν ἢ τῷ μαχόμενοι κρατεῖν.

The most remarkable circumstance is, that these words are addressed by Brasidas to an army composed, in large proportion, of manumitted Helots (Thucyd. iv. 81).

[686] Plato treats of the system of Lykurgus, as emanating from the Delphian Apollo and Lykurgus as his missionary (Legg. i. p. 632).

[687] Alcæi Fragment. 41, p. 279, ed. Schneidewin:—

> Ὡς γὰρ δήποτ᾽ Ἀριστόδαμον φαισ᾽ οὐκ ἀπάλαμνον ἐν *Σπάρτᾳ λόγον*
>
> Εἰπῆν—*Χρήματ᾽ ἀνηρ*· πενιχρὸς δ᾽ οὐδεὶς πέλετ᾽ ἐσθλὸς οὐδὲ τίμιος.

Compare the Schol. ad Pindar. Isthm. ii. 17, and Diogen. Laërt. i. 31.

[688] Thucydid. i. 6. μετρίᾳ δ᾽ αὖ ἐσθῆτι καὶ ἐς τὸν νῦν τρόπον πρῶτοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐχρήσαντο, καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ τὰ μείζω κεκτημένοι ἰσοδίαιτοι μάλιστα κατέστησαν. See, also, Plutarch, Apophthegm. Lacon. p. 210. A.-F.

[689] Xenoph. Republ. Laced. c. 7.

[690] Plato, Legg. iii. p. 684.

[691] Aristotel. Politic. ii. 2, 10. ὥσπερ τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἐν Λακεδαίμονι καὶ Κρήτῃ τοῖς συσσιτίοις ὁ νομοθέτης ἐκοίνωσε.

[692] Aristot. Politic. ii. 4, 1, about Phaleas; and about Sparta and Krete, generally, the whole sixth and seventh chapters of the second book; also, v. 6, 2-7.

Theophrastus (apud Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 10) makes a similar observation, that the public mess, and the general simplicity of habits, tended to render wealth of little service to the possessor: τὸν πλοῦτον ἄπλουτον ἀπεργάσασθαι τῇ κοινότητι τῶν δείπνων, καὶ τῇ περὶ τὴν δίαιταν εὐτελείᾳ. Compare Plutarch. Apophthegm. Lacon. p. 226 E. The wealth, therefore, was not formally done away with in the opinion of Theophrastus: there was no positive equality of possessions.

Both the Spartan kings dined at the public mess at the same pheidition (Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 30).

Herakleidês Ponticus mentions nothing, either about equality of Spartan lots or fresh partition of lands, by Lykurgus (ad calcem Cragii, De Spartanorum Repub. p. 504), though he speaks about the Spartan lots and law of succession as well as about Lykurgus.

[693] Isokratês, Panathen. Or. xii. pp. 266, 270, 278: οὐδὲ χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς οὐδὲ γῆς ἀναδασμὸν οὐδ᾽ ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνηκέστων κακῶν.

[694] Plutarch, Agis, c. iv.

[695] Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 21. Παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Λακῶσιν ἕκαστον δεῖ φέρειν, καὶ σφόδρα πενήτων ἐνίων ὄντων, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἀνάλωμα οὐ δυναμένων δαπανᾶν.... *Ὅρος δὲ τῆς πολιτείας οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ πάτριος, τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον τοῦτο τὸ τέλος φέρειν μὴ μετέχειν αὐτῆς.* So also Xenophon, Rep. Lac. c. vii. ἴσα μὲν φέρειν εἰς τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, ὁμοίως δὲ διαιτᾶσθαι τάξας.

The existence of this rate-paying qualification, is the capital fact in the history of the Spartan constitution; especially when we couple it with the other fact, that no Spartan acquired anything by any kind of industry.

[696] Herakleidês Ponticus, ad calcem Cragii De Repub. Laced. p. 504. Compare Cragius, iii. 2, p. 196.

Aristotle (ii. 6, 10) states that it was discreditable to buy or sell a lot of land, but that the lot might be either given or bequeathed at pleasure. He mentions nothing about the prohibition to divide, and even states what contradicts it,—that it was the practice to give a large dowry when a rich man's daughter married (ii. 6, 11). The sister of Agesilaus, Kyniska, was a person of large property, which apparently implies the division of his father's estate (Plutarch, Agesilaus, 30).

Whether there was ever any law prohibiting a father from dividing his lot among his children, may well be doubted. The Rhetra of the ephor Epitadeus (Plutarch, Agis, 5), granted unlimited power of testamentary disposition to the possessor, so that he might give away or bequeathe his land to a stranger if he chose. To this law great effects are ascribed: but it is evident that the tendency to accumulate property in few hands, and the tendency to diminution in the number of qualified citizens, were powerfully manifested before the time of Epitadeus, who came after Lysander. Plutarch, in another place, notices Hesiod, Xenokrates, and Lykurgus, as having concurred with Plato, in thinking that it was proper to leave only one single heir (ἕνα μόνον κληρόνομον καταλιπεῖν) (Ὑπομνήματα εἰς Ἡσίοδον, Fragm. vol. v. p. 777, Wyttenb.). But Hesiod does not lay down this as a necessity or as a universal rule; he only says, that a man is better off who has only one son (Opp. Di. 374). And if Plato had been able to cite Lykurgus as an authority for that system of an invariable number of separate κλῆροι, or lots, which he sets forth in his treatise De Legibus (p. 740), it is highly probable that he would have done so. Still less can Aristotle have supposed that Lykurgus or the Spartan system either insured, or intended to insure, the maintenance of an unalterable number of distinct proprietary lots; for he expressly notices that scheme as a peculiarity of Philolaus the Corinthian, in his laws for the Thebans (Polit. ii. 9, 7).

[697] Polybius, Fragm. ap. Maii. Collect. Vett. Scrip. vol. ii. p. 384.

Perhaps, as O. Müller remarks, this may mean only, that none except the eldest brother could afford to marry; but the feelings of the Spartans in respect to marriage were, in many other points, so different from ours, that we are hardly authorized to reject the literal statement (History of the Dorians, iii. 10, 2),—which, indeed, is both illustrated and rendered credible by the permission granted in the laws of Solôn to an ἐπίκληρος

who had been claimed in marriage by a relative in his old age,—ἂν ὁ κρατῶν καὶ κύριος γεγονὼς κατὰ τὸν νόμον αὐτὸς μὴ δυνατὸς ᾖ πλησιάζειν ὑπὸ τῶν ἔγγιστα τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ὀπυίεσθαι (Plutarch, Solôn, c. 20).

I may observe that of O. Müller's statements, respecting the lots of land at Sparta, several are unsupported and some incorrect.

[698] Plutarch, Kleomenês, cap. 2-11, with the note of Schömann, p. 175; also, Lycurg. cap. 8; Athenæ. iv. p. 141.

Phylarchus, also, described the proceedings of Kleomenês, seemingly with favor (Athenæ. ib.); compare Plutarch, Agis, c. 9.

Polybius believed, that Lykurgus had introduced equality of landed possession, both in the district of Sparta, and throughout Laconia: his opinion is, probably, borrowed from these same authors, of the third century before the Christian era. For he expresses his great surprise, how the best-informed ancient authors (οἱ λογιώτατοι τῶν ἀρχαίων συγγραφέων), Plato, Xenophon, Ephorus, Kallisthenês, can compare the Kretan polity to the old Lacedæmonian, the main features of the two being (as he says) so different,—equality of property at Sparta, great inequality of property in Krete, among other differences (Polyb. vi. 45-48).

This remark of Polybius, exhibits the difference of opinion of the earlier writers, as compared with those during the third century before the Christian era. The former compared Spartan and Kretan institutions, because they did not conceive equality of landed property as a feature in old Sparta.

[699] Respecting Sphærus, see Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 8; Kleomen. c. 2; Athenæ. v. p. 141; Diogen. Laërt. vii. sect. 137.

[700] Hist. of Greece, ch. viii. vol. i. pp. 344-347.

C. F. Hermann, on the contrary, considers the equal partition of Laconia into lots indivisible and inalienable, as "an essential condition" (eine wesentliche Bedingung) of the whole Lykurgean system (Lehrbuch der Griechischen Staatsalterthümer, sect. 28).

Tittmann (Griechische Staatsverfassungen, pp. 588-596) states and seems to admit the equal partition as a fact, without any commentary.

Wachsmuth (Hellenisch. Alterthumskunde, v. 4, 42, p. 217) supposes "that the best land was already parcelled, before the time of Lykurgus, into lots of equal magnitude, corresponding to the number of Spartans, which number afterwards increased to nine thousand." For this assertion, I know no evidence: it departs from Plutarch, without substituting anything better authenticated or more plausible. Wachsmuth notices the partition of Laconia among the Periœki in thirty thousand equal lots, without any comment, and seemingly as if there were no doubt of it (p. 218).

Manso, also, supposes that there had once been an equal division of land prior to Lykurgus,—that it had degenerated into abuse,—and that Lykurgus corrected it, restoring, not absolute equality, but something near to equality (Manso, Sparta, vol. i. pp. 110-121). This is the same gratuitous supposition as that of Wachsmuth.

O. Müller admits the division as stated by Plutarch, though he says that the whole number of nine thousand lots cannot have been set out before the Messenian war; and he adheres to the idea of equality as contained in Plutarch; but he says that the equality consisted in "equal estimate of average produce,"—not in equal acreable dimensions. He goes so far as to tell us that "the lots of the Spartans, which supported twice as many men as the lots of the Periœki, must, upon the whole, have been twice as extensive (*i. e.* in the aggregate): each lot must, therefore, have been seven times greater," (compare History of the Dorians, iii. 3, 6; iii. 10, 2.) He also supposes, that "similar partitions of land had been made from the time of the first occupation of Laconia by the Dorians." Whoever compares his various positions with the evidence brought to support them, will find a painful disproportion between the basis and the superstructure.

The views of Schömann, as far as I collect from expressions somewhat vague, seem to coincide with those of Dr. Thirlwall. He admits, however that the alleged Lykurgean equalization is at variance with the representations of Plato (Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Pub. iv. 1, 7, note 4, p. 116).

[701] Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 8. συνέπεισε τὴν χώραν ἅπασαν εἰς μέσον θέντας, ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀναδάσασθαι, καὶ ζῆν μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἅπαντας, ὁμαλεῖς καὶ ἰσοκλήρους τοῖς βίοις γενομένους, τὸ δὲ πρωτεῖον ἀρετῇ μετιόντας· ὡς ἄλλης

ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον οὐκ οὔσης διαφορᾶς, οὐδὲ ἀνισότητος, πλὴν ὅσην αἰσχρῶν ψόγος ὁρίζει καὶ καλῶν ἔπαινος. Ἐπάγων δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ἔργον, διέυειμε, etc.

[702] Plutarch, Agis, c. 19-20.

[703] I read with much satisfaction, in M. Kopstadt's Dissertation, that the general conclusion which I have endeavored to establish respecting the alleged Lykurgean redivision of property, appears to him successfully proved. (Dissert. De Rerum Laconic. Const. sect. 18, p. 138.)

He supposes, with perfect truth, that, at the time when the first edition of these volumes was published, I was ignorant of the fact, that Lachmann and Kortüm had both called in question the reality of the Lykurgean redivision. In regard to Professor Kortüm, the fact was first brought to my knowledge, by his notice of these two volumes, in the Heidelberger Jahrbücher, 1846, No. 41, p. 649.

Since the first edition, I have read the treatise of Lachmann (Die Spartanische Staats Verfassung in ihrer Entwicklung und ihrem Verfalle, sect. 10, p. 170) wherein the redivision ascribed to Lykurgus is canvassed. He, too, attributes the origin of the tale, as a portion of history, to the social and political feelings current in the days of Agis the Third, and Kleomenês the Third. He notices, also, that it is in contradiction with Plato and Isokratês. But a large proportion of the arguments which he brings to disprove it, are connected with ideas of his own respecting the social and political constitution of Sparta, which I think either untrue or uncertified. Moreover, he believes in the inalienability as well as the indivisibility of the separate lots of land,—which I believe to be just as little correct as their supposed equality.

Kopstadt (p. 139) thinks that I have gone too far in rejecting every middle opinion. He thinks that Lykurgus must have done something, though much less than what is affirmed, tending to realize equality of individual property.

I shall not say that this is impossible. If we had ampler evidence, perhaps such facts might appear. But as the evidence stands now, there is nothing whatever to show it. Nor are we entitled (in my judgment) to presume that it was so, in the absence of evidence, simply in order to make out that the Lykurgean mythe is only an exaggeration, and not entire fiction.

[704] Aristotle (Polit. ii. 6, 11) remarks that the territory of the Spartans would maintain fifteen hundred horsemen and thirty thousand hoplites, while the number of citizens was, in point of fact, less than one thousand. Dr. Thirlwall seems to prefer the reading of Göttling,—three thousand instead of thirty thousand; but the latter seems better supported by MSS, and most suitable.

[705] Plutarch, Agis, c. 5.

[706] Herod. vi. 61. οἷα ἀνθρώπων τε ὀλβίων θυγατέρα, etc; vii. 134.

[707] Herod. vi. 70-103; Thucyd. v. 50.

[708] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 11; Xenoph. de Rep. Lac. v. 3; Molpis ap. Athenæ. iv. p. 141; Aristot. Polit. ii. 2, 5.

[709] Thucyd. i. 6; Aristot. Polit. iv. 7, 4, 5; viii. 1, 3.

[710] Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 10-13; v. 6, 7.

[711] The panegyrist Xenophon acknowledges much the same respecting the Sparta which he witnessed; but he maintains that it had been better in former times (Repub. Lac. c. 14).

[712] The view of Dr. Thirlwall agrees, in the main, with that of Manso and O. Müller (Manso, Sparta, vol. i. pp. 118-128; and vol. ii. Beilage, 9, p. 129; and Müller, History of the Dorians, vol. ii. b. iii. c. 10, sect. 2, 3).

Both these authors maintain the proposition stated by Plutarch (Agis c. 5, in his reference to the ephor Epitadeus, and the new law carried by that ephor), that the number of Spartan lots, nearly equal and rigorously indivisible, remained with little or no change from the time of the original division, down to the return of Lysander, after his victorious close of the Peloponnesian war. Both acknowledge that they cannot understand by what regulations this long unalterability, so improbable in itself, was maintained: but both affirm the fact positively. The period will be more than four hundred years if the original division be referred to Lykurgus: more than three hundred years, if the nine thousand lots are understood to date from the Messenian war.

If this alleged fact be really a fact, it is something almost without a parallel in the history of mankind: and before we consent to believe it, we ought at least to be satisfied that there is considerable show of positive evidence in its favor, and not much against it. But on examining Manso and Müller, it will be seen that not only is there very slender evidence in its favor,—there is a decided balance of evidence against it.

The evidence produced to prove the indivisibility of the Spartan lot, is a passage of Herakleidês Ponticus, c. 2 (ad. calc. Cragii, p. 504), πωλεῖν δὲ γὴν Λακεδαιμονίοις αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται,—τῆς ἀρχαίας μοίρας ἀνανέμεσθαι (or νενεμῆσθαι) οὐδὲν ἔξεστι. The first portion of this assertion is confirmed by, and probably borrowed from, Aristotle, who says the same thing, nearly in the same words: the second portion of the sentence ought, according to all reasonable rules of construction, to be understood with reference to the first part; that is, to the *sale* of the original lot. "To sell land, is held disgraceful among the Lacedæmonians, nor is it permitted to sever off any portion of the original lot," i. e. *for sale*. Herakleidês is not here speaking of the law of *succession* to property at Lacedæmon, nor can we infer from his words that the whole lot was transmitted entire to one son. No evidence except this very irrelevant sentence is produced by Müller and Manso to justify their positive assertion, that the Spartan lot of land was indivisible in respect to inheritance.

Having thus determined the indivisible transmission of lots to one son of a family, Manso and Müller presume, without any proof, that that son must be the eldest: and Müller proceeds to state something equally unsupported by proof: "The extent of his rights, however, was perhaps no farther than that he was considered master of the house and property; while the other members of the family had an equal right to the enjoyment of it…. The master of the family was, therefore, obliged to contribute for all these to the syssitia, without which contribution no one was admitted."—pp. 199, 200.

All this is completely gratuitous, and will be found to produce as many difficulties in one way as it removes in another.

The next law as to the transmission of property, which Manso states to have prevailed, is, that all daughters were to marry without receiving any dowry,—the case of a sole daughter is here excepted. For this proposition he cites Plutarch, Apophtheg. Laconic. p. 227; Justin, iii. 3; Ælian. V. H. vi. 6. These authors do certainly affirm, that there was such a regulation, and both Plutarch and Justin assign reasons for it, real or supposed. "Lykurgus, being asked why he directed that maidens should be married without dowry, answered,—In order that maidens of poor families might not remain unmarried, and that character and virtue might be exclusively attended to in the choice of a wife." The same general reason is given by Justin. Now the *reason* here given for the prohibition of dowry, goes, indirectly, to prove that there existed no such law of general succession, as that which had been before stated, namely, the sacred indivisibility of the primitive lot. For had this latter been recognized, the reason would have been obvious why daughters could receive no dowry; the father's whole landed property (and a Spartan could have little of any other property, since he never acquired anything by industry) was under the strictest entail to his eldest son. Plutarch and Justin, therefore, while in their statement as to the matter of fact, they warrant Manso in affirming the prohibition of dowry (about this matter of fact, more presently), do, by the reason which they give, discountenance his former supposition as to the indivisibility of the primitive family lots.

Thirdly, Manso understands Aristotle (Polit. ii. 6, 11), by the use of the adverb νῦν, to affirm something respecting his own time specially, and to imply at the same time that the ancient custom had been the reverse. I cannot think that the adverb, as Aristotle uses it in that passage, bears out such a construction: νῦν δὲ, there, does not signify present time as opposed to past, but the antithesis between the actual custom and that which Aristotle pronounces to be expedient. Aristotle gives no indication of being aware that any material change had taken place in the laws of succession at Sparta: this is one circumstance, for which both Manso and Müller, who both believe in the extraordinary revolution caused by the permissive law of the ephor Epitadeus, censure him.

Three other positions are laid down by Manso about the laws of property at Sparta. 1. A man might give away or bequeathe his land to whomsoever he pleased. 2. But none except childless persons could do this. 3. They could only give or bequeathe it to citizens who had no land of their own. Of these three regulations, the first is distinctly affirmed by Aristotle, and may be relied upon: the second is a restriction not noticed by Aristotle, and supported by no proof except that which arises out of the story of the ephor Epitadeus, who is said to have been unable to disinherit his son without causing a new law to be passed: the third is a pure fancy.

So much for the positive evidence, on the faith of which Manso and Müller affirm the startling fact, that the lots of land in Sparta remained distinct, indivisible, and unchanged in number, down to the close of the Peloponnesian war. I venture to say that such positive evidence is far too weak to sustain an affirmation in itself so im-

probable, even if there were no evidence on the other side for contradiction. But in this case there is powerful contradictory evidence.

First, the assertions of these authors are distinctly in the teeth of Aristotle, whose authority they try to invalidate, by saying that he spoke altogether with reference to his own time at Sparta, and that he misconceived the primitive Lykurgean constitution. Now this might form a reasonable ground of presumption against the competency of Aristotle, if the witnesses produced on the other side were older than he. But it so happens, that *every one* of the witnesses produced by Manso and Müller, are *younger* than Aristotle: Herakleidês Ponticus, Plutarch, Justin, Ælian, etc. Nor is it shown that these authors copied from any source earlier than Aristotle,—for his testimony cannot be contradicted by any inferences drawn from Herodotus, Thucydidês, Xenophon, Plato, Isokratês, or Ephorus. None of these writers, anterior to, or contemporary with, Aristotle, countenance the fancy of equal, indivisible, perpetual lots, or prohibition of dowry.

The fact is, that Aristotle is not only our best witness, but also our oldest witness, respecting the laws of property in the Spartan commonwealth. I could have wished, indeed, that earlier testimonies had existed, and I admit that even the most sagacious observer of 340-330 B. C. is liable to mistake when he speaks of one or two centuries before. But if Aristotle is to be discredited on the ground of late date, what are we to say to Plutarch? To insist on the intellectual eminence of Aristotle would be superfluous: and on this subject he is a witness the more valuable, as he had made careful, laborious, and personal inquiries into the Grecian governments generally, and that of Sparta among them,—the great *point de mire* for ancient speculative politicians.

Now the statements of Aristotle, distinctly exclude the idea of equal, indivisible, inalienable, perpetual lots,—and prohibition of dowry. He particularly notices the habit of giving very large dowries, and the constant tendency of the lots of land to become consolidated in fewer and fewer hands. He tells us nothing upon the subject which is not perfectly consistent, intelligible, and uncontradicted by any known statements belonging to his own, or to earlier times. But the reason why men refuse to believe him, and either set aside or explain away his evidence, is, that they sit down to the study with their minds full of the division of landed property ascribed to Lykurgus by Plutarch. I willingly concede that, on this occasion, we have to choose between Plutarch and Aristotle. We cannot reconcile them except by arbitrary suppositions, every one of which breaks up the simplicity, beauty, and symmetry of Plutarch's agrarian idea,—and every one of which still leaves the perpetuity of the original lots unexplained. And I have no hesitation in preferring the authority of Aristotle (which is in perfect consonance with what we indirectly gather from other authors, his contemporaries and predecessors) as a better witness on every ground; rejecting the statement of Plutarch, and rejecting it altogether, with all its consequences.

But the authority of Aristotle is not the only argument which may be urged to refute this supposition that the distinct Spartan lots remained unaltered in number down to the time of Lysander. For if the number of distinct lots remained undiminished, the number of citizens cannot have greatly diminished. Now the conspiracy of Kinadôn falls during the life of Lysander, within the first ten years after the close of the Peloponnesian war: and in the account which Xenophon gives of that conspiracy, the paucity of the number of citizens is brought out in the clearest and most emphatic manner. And this must be before the time when the new law of Epitadeus is said to have passed, at least before that law can have had room to produce any sensible effects. If, then, the ancient nine thousand lots still remained all separate, without either consolidation or subdivision, how are we to account for the small number of citizens at the time of the conspiracy of Kinadôn?

This examination of the evidence, for the purpose of which I have been compelled to prolong the present note, shows—1. That the hypothesis of indivisible, inalienable lots, maintained for a long period in undiminished number at Sparta, is not only sustained by the very minimum of affirmative evidence, but is contradicted by very good negative evidence. 2. That the hypothesis which represents dowries to daughters as being prohibited by law, is, indeed, affirmed by Plutarch, Ælian, and Justin, but is contradicted by the better authority of Aristotle.

The recent edition of Herakleidês Ponticus, published by Schneidewin, in 1847, since my first edition, presents an amended text, which completely bears out my interpretation. His text, derived from a fuller comparison of existing MSS., as well as from better critical judgment (see his Prolegg. c. iii. p. liv.), stands—Πωλεῖν δὲ γὴν Λακεδαιμονίοις αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται· τῆς δὲ ἀρχαίας μοίρας οὐδὲ ἔξεστιν (p. 7). It is plain that all this passage relates to sale of land, and not to testation, or succession, or division. Thus much *negatively* is certain, and Schneidewin remarks in his note (p. 53) that it contradicts Müller, Hermann, and Schömann,—adding, that the distinction drawn is, between land inherited from the original family lots, and land otherwise acquired, by donation, bequest, etc. Sale of the former was absolutely illegal: sale of the latter was discreditable, yet not absolutely illegal. Aristotle in the Politics (ii. 6, 10) takes no notice of any such distinction, between land inherited from the primitive lots, and land otherwise acquired. Nor was there, perhaps, any well-defined line of distinction,

in a country of unwritten customs, like Sparta, between what was simply disgraceful and what was positively illegal. Schneidewin, in his note, however, assumes the original equality of the lots as certain in itself, and as being the cause of the prohibition: neither of which appears to me true.

I speak of this confused compilation still under the name of Herakleidês Ponticus, by which it is commonly known: though Schneidewin, in the second chapter of his Prolegomena, has shown sufficient reason for believing that there is no authority for connecting it with the name of Herakleidês. He tries to establish the work as consisting of Excerpta from the lost treatise of Aristotle's περὶ Πολιτειῶν: which is well made out with regard to some parts, but not enough to justify his inference as to the whole. The article, wherein Welcker vindicates the ascribing of the work to an Excerptor of Herakleidês, is unsatisfactory (Kleine Schriften, p. 451).

Beyond this irrelevant passage of Herakleidês Ponticus, no farther evidence is produced by Müller and Manso to justify their positive assertion, that the Spartan lot of land was indivisible in respect to inheritance.

[713] Herod. vi. 57, in enumerating the privileges and perquisites of the kings—δικάζειν δὲ μούνους τοὺς βασιλῆας τόσαδε μοῦνα· πατρούχου τε παρθένου πέρι, ἐς τὸν ἱκνέεται ἔχειν, ἢν μὴ περ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτὴν ἐγγυήσῃ· καὶ ὁδῶν δημοσιέων πέρι· καὶ ἤν τις θετὸν παῖδα ποιέεσθαι ἐθέλῃ, βασιλήων ἐνάντιον ποιέεσθαι.

It seems curious that πατρούχος πάρθενος should mean a damsel who has *no father* (literally, *lucus a non lucendo*): but I suppose that we must accept this upon the authority of Julius Pollux and Timæus. Proceeding on this interpretation, Valckenaer gives the meaning of the passage very justly: "Orbæ nuptias, necdum a patre desponsatæ, si plures sibi vindicarent, fieretque ἡ ἐπίκληρος, ut Athenis loquebantur, ἐπίδικος, Spartæ lis ista dirimebatur a regibus solis."

Now the judicial function here described, is something very different from the language of Dr. Thirlwall, that "the kings had the disposal of the hand of orphan heiresses in cases where the father had not signified his will." Such disposal would approach somewhat to that omnipotence which Aristophanês (Vesp. 585) makes old Philokleon claim for the Athenian dikasts (an exaggeration well calculated to serve the poet's purpose of making the dikasts appear monsters of caprice and injustice), and would be analogous to the power which English kings enjoyed three centuries ago as feudal guardians over wards. But the language of Herodotus is inconsistent with the idea that the kings *chose* a husband for the orphan heiress. She was claimed, as of right, by persons in certain degrees of relationship to her. Whether the law about ἀγχίστεια, affinity carrying legal rights, was the same as at Athens, we cannot tell; but the question submitted for adjudication at Sparta, to the kings, and at Athens to the dikasteries, was certainly the same, agreeably to the above note of Valckenaer,—namely, to whom, among the various claimants for the marriage, the best legal title really belonged. It is, indeed, probable enough, that the two royal descendants of Hêraklês might abuse their judicial function, as there are various instances known in which they take bribes; but they were not likely to abuse it in favor of an unprovided youth.

Next, as to adoption: Herodotus tells us that the ceremony of adoption was performed before the kings: probably enough, there was some fee paid with it. But this affords no ground for presuming that they had any hand in determining *whom* the childless father was to adopt. According to the Attic law about adoption, there were conditions to be fulfilled, consents to be obtained, the absence of disqualifying circumstances verified, etc; and some authority before which this was to be done was indispensable (see Meier und Schömann, Attisch. Prozess, b. iii. ch. ii. p. 436). At Sparta, such authority was vested by ancient custom in the king: but we are not told, nor is it probable, "that he could interpose, in opposition to the wishes of individuals, to relieve poverty," as Dr. Thirlwall supposes.

[714] Σπάρτα δαμασίμβροτος, Simonidês, apud Plutarch. Agesilaus, c. 1.

[715] Aristotel. Polit. ii. 6, 9, 19, 23. τὸ φιλότιμον—τὸ φιλοχρήματον.

[716] Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 12.

[717] Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 22. Τοιγαροῦν ἐσώζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλοντο δὲ ἄρξαντες, etc. Compare also vii. 13, 15.

[718] Plutarch, Kleomen. c. 8; Phylarch. ap. Athenæ. vi. p. 271.

The strangers called Τρόφιμοι, and the illegitimate sons of Spartans, whom Xenophon mentions with eulogy, as "having partaken in the honorable training of the city," must probably have been introduced in this same way, by private support from the rich (Xenoph. Hellen. v. 3, 9). The xenêlasy must have then become practically much relaxed, if not extinct.

[719] Strabo, viii. p. 362; Steph. Byz. Αἴθεια.

Construing the word πόλεις extensively, so as to include townships small as well as considerable, this estimate is probably inferior to the truth; since, even during the depressed times of modern Greece, a fraction of the ancient Laconia (including in that term Messenia) exhibited much more than one hundred *bourgs*.

In reference merely to the territory called La Magne, between Calamata in the Messenian gulf and Capo di Magna, the lower part of the peninsula of Tænarus, see a curious letter, addressed to the Duc de Nevers, in 1618, (on occasion of a projected movement to liberate the Morea from the Turks, and to insure to him the sovereignty of it, as descendant of the Palæologi,) by a confidential agent whom he despatched thither,—M. Chateaurenaud,—who sends to him "une sorte de tableau statistique du Magne, ou sont énumerés 125 bourgs ou villages renfermans 4,913 feux, et pouvans fournir 10,000 combattans, dont 4,000 armés, et 6,000 sans armes (between Calamata and Capo di Magna)." (Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions, tom. xv. 1842, p. 329. Mémoire de M. Berger Xivrey.)

This estimate is not far removed from that of Colonel Leake, towards the beginning of the present century, who considers that there were then in Mani (the same territory) one hundred and thirty towns and villages; and this too in a state of society exceedingly disturbed and insecure,—where private feuds and private towers, or pyrghi, for defence, were universal, and in parts of which, Colonel Leake says, "I see men preparing the ground for cotton, with a dagger and pistols at their girdles. This, it seems, is the ordinary armor of the cultivator when there is no particular suspicion of danger: the shepherd is almost always armed with a musket." … "The Maniotes reckon their population at thirty thousand, and their muskets at ten thousand." (Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. i. ch. vii. pp. 243, 263-266.)

Now, under the dominion of Sparta, all Laconia doubtless enjoyed complete internal security, so that the idea of the cultivator tilling his land in arms would be unheard of. Reasoning upon the basis of what has just been stated about the Maniote population and number of townships, one hundred πόλεις, for all Laconia, is a very moderate computation.

[720] Aristot. Λακων. Πολιτεία, ap. Schol. Pindar. Isthm. vii. 18.

I agree with M. Boeckh, that Pindar himself identifies this march of the Ægeids to Amyklæ with the original Herakleid conquest of Peloponnesus. (Notæ Criticæ ad Pindar. Pyth. v. 74, p. 479.)

[721] Pausan. iii. 2, 6; iii. 12, 7.

[722] Pausan. iii. 22, 5.

[723] Pausan. iii. 19, 5.

[724] Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 5, 11.

[725] Pausan. iii. 2, 7; iii. 20, 6. Strabo, viii. p. 363.

If it be true, as Pausanias states, that the Argeians aided Helus to resist, their assistance must probably have been given by sea; perhaps from Epidaurus Limêra, or Prasiæ, when they formed part of the Argeian federation.

[726] History of the Dorians, i. 7, 10 (note). It seems that Diodorus had given a history of the Messenian wars in considerable detail, if we may judge from a fragment of the last seventh book, containing the debate between Kleonnis and Aristomenês. Very probably it was taken from Ephorus,—though this we do not know.

For the statements of Pausanias respecting Myrôn and Rhianus, see iv. 6. Besides Myrôn and Rhianus, however, he seems to have received oral statements from contemporary Messenians and Lacedæmonians; at least on some occasions he states and contrasts the two contradictory stories (iv. 4, 4; iv. 5, 1).

[727] Pausan. iv. 27, 2-3: Diodor. xv. 77.

[728] See Diodor. Fragm. lib. viii. vol. iv. p. 30: in his brief summary of Messenian events (xv. 66), he represents it as a matter on which authors differed, whether Aristomenes belonged to the first or second war. Clemens Alexand. (Prot. p. 36) places him in the *first*, the same as Myrôn, by mentioning him as having killed Theopompus.

Wesseling observes (ad Diod. *l. c.*), "Duo fuerunt Aristomenes, uterque in Messeniorum contra Spartanos bello illustrissimus, alter posteriore, priore alter bello."

Unless this duplication of homonymous persons can be shown to be probable, by some collateral evidence, I consider it only as tantamount to a confession, that the difficulty is insoluble.

Pausanias is reserved in his manner of giving judgment,—ὁ μέντοι Ἀριστομένης *δόξῃ γε ἐμῇ* γέγονεν ἐπὶ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ ὑστέρου (iv. 6). Müller (Dorians, i. 7, 9) goes much too far when he affirms that the statement of Myrôn was "in the teeth of all tradition." Müller states incorrectly the citation from Plutarch, Agis, c. 21 (see his Note *h*). Plutarch there says nothing about *Tyrtæus*: he says that the Messenians affirmed that their hero Aristomenês had *killed* the Spartan king Theopompus, whereas the Lacedæmonians said, that he had only *wounded* the king. According to *both* accounts, then, it would appear that Aristomenês belonged to the *first* Messenian war, *not to the second*.

[729] Tyrtæus, Fragm. 6, Gaisford. But Tyrtæus ought not to be understood to affirm distinctly (as Pausanias, Mr. Clinton, and Müller, all think) that Theopompus survived and put a close to the war: his language might consist with the supposition that Theopompus had been slain in the war,—Ὃν διὰ (Theopompus), Μεσσήνην εἵλομεν εὐρύχορον.

For we surely might be authorized in saying—"It was through Epameinondas that the Spartans were conquered and humbled; or it was through Lord Nelson that the French fleet was destroyed in the last war," though both of them perished in the accomplishment.

Tyrtæus, therefore, does not contradict the assertion, that Theopompus was slain by Aristomenês, nor can he be cited as a witness to prove that Aristomenês did not live during the *first* Messenian war; which is the purpose for which Pausanias quotes him (iv. 6).

[730] Isokratês (Archidamus), Or. vi. pp. 121-122.

[731] Strabo (vi. p. 257) gives a similar account of the sacrilege and murderous conduct of the Messenian youth at the temple of Artemis Limnatis. His version, substantially agreeing with that of the Lacedæmonians, seems to be borrowed from Antiochus, the contemporary of Thucydidês, and is therefore earlier than the foundation of Messênê by Epameinondas, from which event the philo-Messenian statements take their rise. Antiochus, writing during the plenitude of Lacedæmonian power, would naturally look upon the Messenians as irretrievably prostrate, and the impiety here narrated would in his mind be the natural cause why the divine judgments overtook them. Ephorus gives a similar account (ap. Strabo. vi. p. 280).

Compare Herakleidês Ponticus (ad calcem Cragii De Rep. Laced. p. 528) and Justin, iii. 4.

The possession of this temple of Artemis Limnatis,—and of the Ager Dentheliates, the district in which it was situated,—was a subject of constant dispute between the Lacedæmonians and Messenians after the foundation of the city of Messênê, even down to the time of the Roman emperor Tiberius (Tacit. Annal. iv. 43). See Stephan. Byz. v. Δελθάνιοι; Pausan. iii. 2, 6; iv. 4, 2; iv. 31, 3. Strabo, viii. p. 362.

From the situation of the temple of Artemis Limnatis, and the description of the Ager Dentheliates, see Professor Ross, Reisen im Peloponnes, i. pp. 5-11. He discovered two boundary-stones with inscriptions, dating from the time of the early Roman emperors, marking the confines of Lacedæmon and Messênê; both on the line of the highest ridge of Taygetus, where the waters separate east and west, and considerably to the eastward of the temple of Artemis Limnatis, so that at that time the Ager Dentheliates was considered a part of Messenia.

I now find that Colonel Leake (Peloponnesiaca, p. 181) regards these Inscriptions, discovered by Professor Ross, as not proving that the temple of Artemis Limnatis was situated near the spot where they were found. His authority weighs much with me on such a point, though the arguments which he here employs do not seem to me conclusive.

[732] It is, perhaps, to this occasion that the story of the Epeunakti, in Theopompus, referred (ap. Athenæ. vi. p. 271),—Helots adopted into the sleeping-place of their masters, who had been slain in the war, and who were subsequently enfranchised.

The story of the Partheniæ, obscure and unintelligible as it is, belongs to the foundation of the colony of Taras, or Tarentum (Strabo, vi. p. 279).

[733] See Plutarch, De Superstitione, p. 168.

[734] See Pausan. iv. 6-14.

An elaborate discussion is to be seen in Manso's Sparta, on the authorities whom Pausanias has followed in his History of the Messenian Wars, 18te Beilage, tom. ii. p. 264.

"It would evidently be folly (he observes, p. 270), to suppose that in the history of the Messenian wars, as Pausanias lays them before us, we possess the *true* history of these events."

[735] Tyrtæus, Fragm. 5, 6 (Schneidewin).

C. F. Hermann conceives the treatment of the Messenians after the first war, as mild, in comparison with what it became after the second (Lehrbuch der Griech. Staatsalterthümer, sect. 31), a supposition which the emphatic words of Tyrtæus render inadmissible.

[736] This is the express comparison introduced by Pausanias, iv. 5, 2.

[737] Plutarch, Sept. Sapient. Convivium, p. 159.

[738] Pausan. iv. 18, 4. Ἀριστομένην δὲ ἔς τε τὰ ἄλλα θεῶν τις, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἐφύλασσεν.

Plutarch (De Herodot. Malignitat. p. 856) states that Herodotus had mentioned Aristomenês as having been made prisoner by the Lacedæmonians, but Plutarch must here have been deceived by his memory, for Herodotus does not mention Aristomenês.

[739] The narrative in Pausanias, iv. 15-24.

According to an incidental notice in Herodotus, the Samians affirmed that they had aided Lacedæmon in war against Messênê,—at what period we do not know (Herodot. iii. 56).

[740] Τοὺς δὲ Μεσσηνίους οἶδα αὐτὸς ἐπὶ ταῖς σπονδαῖς Ἀριστομένην Νικομηδους καλοῦντας (Pausan. ii. 14, 5). The practice still continued in his time.

Compare, also, Pausan. iv. 27, 3; iv. 32, 3-4.

[741] Pausanias heard the song himself (iv. 16, 4)—Ἐπέλεγον ᾄσμα τὸ καὶ ἐς ἡμᾶς ἔτι ᾀδόμενον:—

Ἔς τε μέσον πεδίον Στενυκλήριον ἔς τ᾽ ὄρος ἄκρον

Εἶπετ᾽ Ἀριστομένης τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις.

According to one story, the Lacedæmonians were said to have got possession of the person of Aristomenês, and killed him: they found in him a hairy heart (Steph. Byz. v. Ἀνδανία).

[742] Pausan. iv. 15, 1.

Perhaps Leotychides was king during the last revolt of the Helots, or Messenians, in 464 B. C., which is called the third Messenian war. He seems to have been then in exile, in consequence of his venality during the Thessalian expedition,—but not yet dead (Herodot. vi. 72). Of the reality of what Mr. Clinton calls the *third* Messenian war, in 490 B. C., I see no adequate proof (see Fast. Hell. vol. i. p. 257).

The poem of Rhianus was entitled Μεσσηνιακά. He also composed Θεσσαλικά, Ἠλιακά, Ἀχαϊκά. See the Fragments,—they are very few,—in Düntzer's Collection, pp. 67-77.

He seems to have mentioned Nikoteleia, the mother of Aristomenês (Fr. ii. p. 73): compare Pausan. iv. 14, 5.

I may remark, that Pausanias, throughout his account of the second Messenian war, names king Anaxander as leading the Lacedæmonian troops; but he has no authority for so doing, as we see by iv. 15, 1. It is a pure calculation of his own, from the πατέρων πατέρες of Tyrtæus.

[743] Pausan. iv. 15, 3; Justin. iii, 5, 4. Compare Plato, Legg. ii. p. 630, Diodor. xv. 66; Lycurg. cont. Leokrat. p. 162. Philochorus and Kallisthenês also represented him as a native of Aphidnæ in Attica, which Strabo controverts upon slender grounds (viii. p. 362); Philochor. Fr. 56 (Didot).

[744] Plutarch, Theseus, c. 33; Pausan. i. 41, 5; Welcker, Alkman. Fragm. p. 20.

[745] Plutarch, Kleomen. c. 2. Ἀγαθὸς νέων ψυχὰς αἰκάλλειν.

[746] Philochorus, Frag. 56, ed. Didot; Lycurgus cont. Leokrat. p. 163.

[747] See Plutarch, De Musicâ, pp. 1134, 1142, 1146.

[748] Thucyd. v. 69; Xenoph. Rep. Laced. c. 13.

[749] See the treatise of Plutarch, De Musicâ, passim, especially c. 17, p. 1136, etc.; 33, p. 1143. Plato, Republ. iii. p. 399; Aristot. Polit. viii. 6, 5-8.

The excellent treatise De Metris Pindari, prefixed by M. Boeckh to his edition of Pindar, is full of instruction upon this as well as upon all other points connected with the Grecian music (see lib. iii. c. 8, p. 238).

[750] Aristot. Polit. v. 7, 1; Pausan. iv. 18, 2.

[751] Pausan. vi. 12, 2; Strabo viii. p. 355, where the Νέστορος ἀπόγονοι mean the Pylians of Tryphylia.

[752] Respecting the position of the Eleians and Pisatæ during the second Messenian war, there is confusion in the different statements: as they cannot all be reconciled, we are compelled to make a choice.

That the Eleians were allies of Sparta, and the Pisatans of Messenia, and that the contests of Sparta and Messenia were mixed up with those of Elis and Pisa about the agonothesia of the Olympic games, is conformable to one distinct statement of Strabo (viii. pp. 355, 358), and to the passage in Phavorinus v. Αὐγείας, and is, moreover, indirectly sustained by the view given in Pausanias respecting the relations between Elis and Pisa (vi. 22, 2), whereby it clearly appears that the agonothesia was a matter of standing dispute between the two, until the Pisatans were finally crushed by the Eleians in the time of Pyrrhus, son of Pantaleôn. Farther, this same view is really conformable to another passage in Strabo, which, as now printed, appears to contradict it, but which is recognized by Müller and others as needing correction, though the correction which they propose seems to me not the best. The passage (viii. p. 362) stands thus: Πλεονάκις δ᾽ ἐπολέμησαν (Messenians and Lacedæmonians) διὰ τὰς ἀποστάσεις τῶν Μεσσηνίων. Τὴν μὲν οὖν πρώτην κατάκτησιν αὐτῶν φησὶ Τυρταῖος ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασι κατὰ τοὺς τῶν πατέρων πατέρας γενέσθαι· τὴν δὲ δευτέραν, καθ᾽ ἣν ἑλόμενοι συμμάχους *Ἠλείους* καὶ Ἀργείους καὶ Πισατὰς ἀπέστησαν, Ἀρκάδων μὲν Ἀριστοκράτην τὸν Ὀρχομένου βασιλὰα παρεχομένων στρατηγὸν, Πισατῶν δὲ Πανταλεόντα τὸν Ὀμφαλίωνος· ἡνίκα φησὶν αὐτὸς στρατηγῆσαι τὸν πόλεμον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, etc. Here it is obvious that, in the enumeration of allies, the Arcadians ought to have been included; accordingly, both O. Müller and Mr. Clinton (ad annum 672 B. C.) agree in altering the passage thus: they insert the words *καὶ Ἄρκαδας* after the word *Ἠλείους*, so that *both Eleians and Pisatans* appear as allies of Messenia at once. I submit that this is improbable in itself, and inconsistent with the passage of Strabo previously noticed: the proper way of altering the passage is, in my judgment, to substitute the word *Ἄρκαδας* in *place* of the word *Ἠλείους*, which makes the two passages of Strabo consistent with each other, and hardly does greater violence to the text.

As opposed to the view here adopted, there is, undoubtedly, the passage of Pausanias (iv. 15, 4) which numbers the Eleians among the allies of Messenia, and takes no notice of the Pisatæ. The affirmation of Julius Africanus (ap. Eusebium Chronic. i. p. 145, that the Pisatæ revolted from Elis in the 30th Olympiad, and celebrated the Olympic games themselves until Ol. 52, for twenty-two successive ceremonies) is in contradiction,—first, with Pausanias (vi. 22, 2), which appears to me a clear and valuable statement, from its particular reference to the *three* non-Olympiads,—secondly, with Pausanias (v. 9, 4), when the Eleians in the 50th Olympiad determine the number of Hellanodikæ. I agree with Corsini (Fasti Attici, t. iii. p. 47) in setting aside the passage of Julius Africanus: Mr. Clinton (F. H. p. 253) is displeased with Corsini for this suspicion, but he himself virtually does the same thing; for, in order to reconcile Jul. Africanus with Pansanias, he introduces a supposition quite different from what is asserted by either of them; *i. e.* a joint agonothesia by Eleians and Pisatans together. This hypothesis of Mr. Clinton appears to me gratuitous and inadmissible: Africanus himself meant to state something quite different, and I imagine him to have been misled by an erroneous authority. See Mr. Clinton, F. H. ad. ann. 660 B. C. to 580 B. C.

[753] Plutarch, De Serâ Num. Vind. p. 548; Pausan. iv. 15, 1; iv. 17, 3; iv. 23, 2.

The date of the second Messenian war, and the interval between the second and the first, are points respecting which also there is irreconcilable discrepancy of statement; we can only choose the most probable: see the passages collected and canvassed in O. Müller (Dorians, i. 7, 11, and in Mr. Clinton, Fast. Hellen. vol. i. Appendix 2, p. 257).

According to Pausanias, the second war lasted from B. C. 685-668, and there was an interval between the first and the second war of thirty-nine years. Justin (iii. 5) reckons an interval of eighty years; Eusebius, an inter-

val of ninety years. The main evidence is the passage of Tyrtæus, wherein that poet, speaking during the second war, says, "The fathers of our fathers conquered Messênê."

Mr. Clinton adheres very nearly to the view of Pausanias; he supposes that the real date is only six years lower (679-662). But I agree with Clavier (Histoire des Premiers Temps de la Grèce, t. ii. p. 233) and O. Müller (*l. c.*) in thinking that an interval of thirty-nine years is too short to suit the phrase of *fathers' fathers*. Speaking in the present year (1846), it would not be held proper to say, "The fathers of our fathers carried on the war between 1793 and the peace of Amiens:" we should rather say, "The fathers of our fathers carried on the American war and the Seven Years' war." An age is *marked* by its mature and even elderly members,—by those between thirty-five and fifty-five years of age.

Agreeing as I do here with O. Müller, against Mr. Clinton, I also agree with him in thinking that the best mark which we possess of the date of the second Messenian war is the statement respecting Pantaleôn: the 34th Olympiad, which Pantaleôn celebrated, probably fell within the time of the war; which would thus be brought down much later than the time assigned by Pausanias, yet not so far down as that named by Eusebius and Justin: the exact year of its commencement, however, we have no means of fixing.

Krebs, in his discussions on the Fragments of the lost Books of Diodorus, thinks that that historian placed the beginning of the second Messenian war in the 35th Olympiad (B. C. 640) (Krebs, Lectiones Diodoreæ, pp. 254-260).

[754] Diodor. xv. 66; Polyb. iv. 33, who quotes Kallisthenês; Paus. viii. 5, 8. Neither the Inscription, as cited by Polybius, nor the allusion in Plutarch (De Serâ Numin. Vindictâ, p. 548), appear to fit the narrative of Pausanias, for both of them imply secret and long-concealed treason, tardily brought to light by the interposition of the gods; whereas, Pausanias describes the treason of Aristokratês, at the battle of the Trench, as palpable and flagrant.

[755] Herakleid. Pontic. ap. Diog. Laërt. i. 94.

[756] Pausan. iv. 24, 2; iv. 34, 6; iv. 35, 2.

[757] Thucyd. i. 101.

[758] Pausanias says, τὴν μὲν ἄλλην Μεσσηνίαν, πλὴν τῆς Ἀσιναίων, αὐτοὶ διελάγχανον, etc. (iv. 24, 2.)

In an apophthegm ascribed to king Polydorus, leader of the Spartans during the first Messenian war, he is asked, whether he is really taking arms against his brethren, to which he replies, "No; I am only marching to the unallotted portion of the territory." (Plutarch, Apophthegm. Lakonic. p. 231.)—ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκλήρωτον χώραν.

[759] Pausan. vi. 22, 2; v. 6, 3; v. 10, 2; Strabo, viii. pp. 355-357.

The temple in honor of Zeus at Olympia, was first erected by the Eleians, out of the spoils of this expedition (Pausan. v. 10, 2).

[760] Thucyd. v. 31. Even Lepreum is characterized as Eleian, however (Aristoph. Aves, 149): compare also Steph. Byz. v. Τριφυλία, ἡ Ἦλις.

Even in the 6th Olympiad, an inhabitant of Dyspontium is proclaimed as victor at the stadium, under the denomination of "*an Eleian from Dyspontium*;" proclaimed by the Eleians of course,—the like in the 27th Olympiad: see Stephan. Byz. v. Δυσπόντιον which shows that the inhabitants of the Pisatid cannot have rendered themselves independent of Elis in the 26th Olympiad, as Strabo alleges (viii. p. 355).

[761] Herodot. iv. 149; Strabo, viii. p. 343.

[762] Diodor. xiv. 17; xv. 77; Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 2, 23, 26.

It was about this period, probably, that the idea of the local eponymous, Triphylus, son of Arkas, was first introduced (Polyb. iv. 77).

[763] Hermippus ap. Athenæ. i. p. 27. Ἀνδράποδ᾽ ἐκ Φρυγίας, απὸ δ᾽ Ἀρκαδίας ἐπικούρους. Also, Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 1, 23. πλεῖστον δὲ φῦλον τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν εἶη, etc.

[764] Pausan. viii. 6, 7; viii. 37, 6; viii. 38, 2. Xenias, one of the generals of Greek mercenaries in the service of Cyrus the younger, a native of the Parrhasian district in Arcadia, celebrates with great solemnity, during the march upward, the festival and games of the Lykæa (Xenoph. Anabas. i. 2 10; compare Pindar, Olymp. ix. 142).

Many of the forests in Arcadia contained not only wild boars, but bears, in the days of Pausanias (viii. 23, 4).

[765] Pausan. viii. 26, 5; Strabo, viii. p. 388.

Some geographers distributed the Arcadians into three subdivisions, Azanes, Parrhasii, and Trapezuntii. Azan passed for the son of Arcas, and his lot in the division of the paternal inheritance was said to have contained seventeen towns (ἃς ἔλαχεν Ἀζήν). Stephan. Byz. v. Ἀζανία—Παῤῥασία. Kleitôr seems the chief place in Azania, as far as we can infer from genealogy (Pausan. viii. 4, 2, 3). Pæus, or Päos, from whence the Azanian suitor of the daughter of Kleisthenês presented himself, was between Kleitôr and Psôphis (Herod. vi. 127; Paus. viii. 23, 6). A Delphian oracle, however, reckons the inhabitants of Phigaleia, in the south-western corner of Arcadia, among the Azanes (Paus. viii. 42, 3).

The burial-place of Areas was supposed to be on Mount Mænalus (Paus. viii. 9, 2).

[766] Thucyd. v. 65. Compare the description of the ground in Professor Ross (Reisen im Peloponnes. iv. 7).

[767] Strabo. viii. p. 337.

[768] Herodot. ix. 27.

[769] Strabo, 1. c. Mantineia is reckoned among the oldest cities of Arcadia (Polyb. ii. 54). Both Mantineia and Orchomenus had originally occupied very lofty hill-sites, and had been rebuilt on a larger scale, lower down, nearer to the plain (Pausan. viii. 8, 3; 12, 4; 13, 2).

In regard to the relations, during the early historical period, between Sparta, Argos, and Arcadia, there is a new fragment of Diodorus (among those recently published by Didot out of the Excerpta in the Escurial library, Fragment. Historic. Græcor. vol. ii. p. viii.). The Argeians had espoused the cause of the Arcadians against Sparta; and at the expense of considerable loss and suffering, had regained such portions of Arcadia as she had conquered. The king of Argos restored this recovered territory to the Arcadians: but the Argeians generally were angry that he did not retain it and distribute it among them as a reward for their losses in the contest. They rose in insurrection against the king, who was forced to flee, and take refuge at Tegea.

We have nothing to illustrate this fragment, nor do we know to what king, date, or events, it relates.

[770] Μαιναλίη δυσχείμερος (Delphian Oracle, ap. Paus. viii. 9, 2).

[771] Xenophon, in describing the ardor with which Epameinondas inspired his soldiers before this final battle, says (vii. 5, 20), προθύμως μὲν ἐλευκοῦντο οἱ ἱππεῖς τὰ κράνη, κελεύοντος ἐκείνου· *ἐπεγράφοντο* δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἀρκάδων ὁπλῖται, *ῥόπαλα ἔχοντες*, ὡς *Θηβαῖοι ὄντες* πάντες δὲ ἠκονῶντο καὶ λόγχας καὶ μαχαίρας, καὶ ἐλαμπρύνοντο τὰς ἀσπίδας.

It is hardly conceivable that these Arcadian clubmen should have possessed a shield and a full panoply. The language of Xenophon in calling them hoplites, and the term ἐπεγράφοντο, properly referring to the inscription on the shield, appear to be conceived in a spirit of contemptuous sneering, proceeding from Xenophon's miso-Theban tendencies: "The Arcadian hoplites, with their clubs, put themselves forward to be as good as the Thebans." That these tendencies of Xenophon show themselves in expressions very unbecoming to the dignity of history (though curious as evidences of the time), may be seen by vii. 5, 12, where he says of the Thebans,—ἐνταῦθα δὴ *οἱ πῦρ πνέοντες*, οἱ νενικηκότες τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, οἱ τῷ παντὶ πλέονες, etc.

[772] Thucyd. v. 33, 47, 81.

[773] Thucyd. 1. c. Compare the instructive speech of Kleigenês, the envoy from Akanthus, addressed to the Lacedæmonians, B. C. 382 (Xen. Hellen. v. 2, 15-16).

[774] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 2, 1-6; Diodor. xv. 19.

[775] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 5, 10-11; vii. 1, 23-25.

[776] Pausan. viii. 27, 5. No œkist is mentioned from Orchomenus, though three of the petty townships *contributing* (συντελοῦντα) to Orchomenus were embodied in the new city. The feud between the neighboring cities of Orchomenus and Mantineia was bitter (Xen. Hellen. vi. 5, 11-22). Orchomenus and Hêræa both opposed the political confederation of Arcadia.

The oration of Demosthenês, ὑπὲρ Μεγαλοπολιτῶν, strongly attests the importance of this city, especially c. 10,—ἐὰν μὲν ἀναιρεθῶσι καὶ διοικισθῶσιν, ἰσχυροῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις *εὐθύς* ἐστιν εἶναι, etc.

[777] Pausan. iii. 2, 6; iii. 7, 3; viii. 48, 3.

[778] Pausan. viii. 39, 2.

[779] Alkman, Fr. 15, Welcker; Strabo, x. p. 446.

[780] That the Skiritæ were Arcadians is well known (Thuc. v. 47; Steph. Byz. v. Σκίρος); the possession of Belemina was disputed with Sparta, in the days of her comparative humiliation, by the Arcadians: see Plutarch, Kleomenês, 4; Pausan. viii. 35, 4.

Respecting Karyæ (the border town of Sparta, where the διαβατήρια were sacrificed, Thuc. v. 55), see *Photius Καρυάτεια*—ἑορτὴ Ἀρτέμιδος· τὰς δὲ Καρύας Ἀρκάδων οὔσας ἀπετέμοντο Λακεδαιμόνιοι.

The readiness with which Karyæ and the Maleates revolted against Sparta after the battle of Leuktra, even before the invasion of Laconia by the Thebans, exhibits them apparently as conquered foreign dependencies of Sparta, without any kindred of race (Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 5, 24-26; vii. 1, 28). Leuktron, in the Maleatis, seems to have formed a part of the territory of Megalopolis in the days of Kleomenês the Third (Plutarch, Kleomenês, 6); in the Peloponnesian war it was the frontier town of Sparta towards Mount Lykæum (Thuc. v. 53).

[781] Herod. i. 66. καταφρονήσαντες Ἀρκάδων κρέσσονες εἶναι, ἐχρηστηριάζοντο ἐν Δέλφοισι *ἐπὶ πάσῃ τῇ Ἀρκάδων χωρῇ*.

[782] Herod. i. 67; Pausan. iii. 3, 5; vii. 45, 2.

Herodotus saw the identical chains suspended in the temple of Athênê Alea at Tegea.

[783] Herod. i. 69-70.

[784] Herod. ix. 26.

[785] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 2, 19. Ὥσπερ Ἀρκάδες, ὅταν μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν ἴωσι, τά τε αὐτῶν σώζουσι καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἁρπάζουσι, etc.

This was said to the Lacedæmonians about ten years before the battle of Leuktra.

[786] Herod. i. 82.

[787] Pausan. ii. 25, 1.

[788] Pausan. iii. 7, 5.

[789] Herod. i. 82; Strabo, viii. p. 376.

[790] The Argeians showed at Argos a statue of Perilaus, son of Alkênôr, killing Othryadês (Pausan. ii. 20, 6; ii. 38, 5: compare x. 9, 6, and the references in Larcher ad Herodot. i. 82). The narrative of Chrysermus, ἐν τρίτῳ Πελοποννησιακῶν (as given in Plutarch, Parallel. Hellenic. p. 306), is different in many respects.

Pausanias found the Thyreatis in possession of the Argeians (ii. 38, 5). They told him that they had recovered it by adjudication; when or by whom we do not know: it seems to have passed back to Argos before the close of the reign of Kleomenês the Third, at Sparta (220 B. C.), Polyb. iv. 36.

Strabo even reckons Prasiæ as Argeian, to the south of Kynuria (viii. p. 368), though in his other passage (p. 374) seemingly cited from Ephorus, it is treated as Lacedæmonian. Compare Manso, Sparta, vol. ii. Beilage i. p. 48.

Eusebius, placing this duel at a much earlier period (Ol. 27, 3, 678 B. C.), ascribes the first foundation of the Gymnopædia at Sparta to the desire of commemorating the event. Pausanias (iii. 7, 3) places it still farther back in the reign of Theopompus.

[791] Thucyd. v. 41. Τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐδόκει μωρία εἶναι ταῦτα, ἔπειτα (ἐπεθύμουν γὰρ πάντως τὸ Ἄργος φίλιον ἔχειν) ξυνεχώρησαν ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἠξίουν, καὶ ξυνεγράψαντο.

[792] Herodot. vii. 9. Compare the challenge which Herodotus alleges to have been proclaimed to the Spartans by Mardonius, through a herald, just before the battle of Platæa (ix. 48).

[793] Athenæ. xv. p. 678.

[794] Herod. viii. 73; Pausan. iii. 2, 2; viii. 27, 3.

[795] Pausan. ii. 25, 5. Mannert (Geographie der Griechen und Römer Griechenland, book ii. ch. xix. p. 618) connects the Kynurians of Arcadia and Argolis, though Herodotus tells us that the latter were Ionians: he gives to this name much greater importance and extension than the evidence bears out.

[796] Strabo, viii. p. 370—ὁ Ἴναχος ἔχων τὰς πηγὰς ἐκ Λυρκείου τοῦ κατὰ Κυνουρίαν ὄρους τῆς Ἀρκαδίας. Coray and Grosskurd gain nothing here by the conjectural reading of Ἀργείας in place of Ἀρκαδίας, for the ridge of Lyrkeium ran between the two, and might, therefore be connected with either without impropriety.

[797] Thucyd. vi. 95.

[798] Xenophon, Hellen. iv. 8, 7: φοβούμενος τὴν ἀλιμενότητα τῆς χώρας.

[799] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 5. 10; Eurip. ap. Strabo, viii. p. 366; Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. iii. c. xxii. p. 25.

"It is to the strength of the frontiers, and the comparatively large extent of country inclosed within them, that we must trace the primary cause of the Lacedæmonian power. These enabled the people, when strengthened by a rigid military discipline, and put in motion by an ambitious spirit, first to triumph over their weaker

neighbors of Messenia, by this additional strength to overawe the disunited republics of Arcadia, and at length for centuries to hold an acknowledged military superiority over every other state in Greece.

"It is remarkable that all the principal passes into Laconia lead to one point: this point is Sparta; a fact which shows at once how well the position of that city was chosen for the defence of the province, and how well it was adapted, especially as long as it continued to be unwalled, to maintain a perpetual vigilance and readiness for defence, which are the surest means of offensive success.

"The natural openings into the plain of Sparta are only two; one by the upper Eurotas, as the course of that river above Sparta may be termed; the other by its only large branch Œnus, now the Kelefina, which, as I have already stated, joins the Eurotas opposite to the north-eastern extremity of Sparta. All the natural approaches to Sparta from the northward lead to one or the other of these two valleys. On the side of Messenia, the northerly prolongation of Mount Taygetum, which joins Mount Lyceum at the pass of Andania, now the pass of Makryplái, furnishes a continued barrier of the loftiest kind, admitting only of routes easily defensible; and which,—whether from the Cromitis of Arcadia to the south-westward of the modern Londári, from the Stenykleric plain, from the plain of the Pamisus, or from Pheræ, now Kalamáta,—all descend into the valley of the upper Eurotas, and conduct to Sparta by Pellana. There was, indeed, a branch of the last-mentioned route, which descended into the Spartan plain at the modern Mistra, and which must have been a very frequent communication between Sparta and the lower part of Messenia; but, like the other direct passes over Taygetum, it was much more difficult and defensible than those which I have called the natural entrances of the province."

[800] Aristot. Polit. viii. 3, 4. Ἔτι δ᾽ αὐτοὺς τοὺς Λάκωνας ἴσμεν, ἕως μὲν αὐτοὶ προσήδρευον ταῖς φιλοπονίαις, ὑπερέχοντας τῶν ἄλλων· νῦν δὲ, καὶ τοῖς γυμνασίοις καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀγῶσι, λειπομένους ἑτέρων: οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοὺς νέους γυμνάζειν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον διέφερον, ἀλλὰ τῷ μόνον μὴ πρὸς ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖν…. Ἀνταγωνιστὰς γὰρ τῆς παιδείας νῦν ἔχουσι· πρότερον δὲ οὐκ εἶχον.

[801] Herodot. i. 68. ἤδη δέ σφι καὶ ἡ πολλὴ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἦν κατεστραμμένη.

[802] Herodot. i. 67; compare Larcher's note.

Concerning the obscure and difficult subject of the military arrangements of Sparta, see Cragius, Repub. Laced. iv. 4; Manso, Sparta, ii. Beilage 18, p. 224; O. Müller, Hist. Dorians, iii. 12; Dr. Arnold's note on Thucydidês, v. 68; and Dr. Thirlwall, History of Greece, vol. i. Appendix 3, p. 520.

[803] Pollux, i. 10, 129. Ἰδίως μέντοι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἐνωμοτία, καὶ μόρα: compare Suidas and Hesych. v. Ἐνωμοτία; Xenoph. Rep. Lacon. c. 11; Thucyd. v. 67-68; Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 12.

Suidas states the enômoty at twenty-five men: in the Lacedæmonian army which fought at the first battle of Mantineia (418 B. C.), it seems to have consisted of about thirty-two men (Thuc. *l. c.*): at the battle of Leuktra of thirty-six men (Xen. Hellen. *l. c.*). But the language of Xenophon and Thucydidês does not imply that the number of each enômoty was equal.

[804] O. Müller states that the enomotarch, after a παραγωγὴ, or deployment into phalanx, stood on the *right* hand, which is contrary to Xenoph. Rep. Lac. 11, 9.—Ὅτε δὲ ὁ ἄρχων *εὐώνυμος* γίγνεται, οὐδ᾽ ἐν τούτῳ μειονεκτεῖν ἡγοῦνται, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν,—the ἄρχων was the first enomotarch of the lochus, the πρωτοστάτης (as appears from 11, 5), when the enômoty marched in single file. To put the ἡγεμὼν on the right flank, was done *occasionally* for special reason,—ἢν δὲ *ποτε ἕνεκά τινος* δοκῇ ξυμφέρειν, τον ἡγεμόνα *δέξιον* κέρας ἔχειν, etc. I understand Xenophon's description of the παραγωγὴ, or deployment, differently from Müller,—it rather seems that the enômoties which stood first made a side-movement to the left, so that the first enomotarch still maintained his place on the left, at the same time that the opportunity was created for the enômoties in the rear to come up and form equal front, τῷ ἐνωμοτάρχῃ παρεγγυᾶται εἰς μέτωπον παρ᾽ ἀσπίδα καθίστασθαι,—the words *παρ᾽ ἀσπίδα* have reference, as I imagine, to the proceeding of the first enomotarch, who set the example of side-movement to the left-hand, as it is shown by the words which follow, —καὶ *διὰ παντὸς οὗτος* ἔστ᾽ ἂν ἡ φάλαγξ ἐναντία καταστῇ. The phalanx was constituted when all the *lochi* formed an equal and continuous front, whether the sixteen enômoties, of which each lochus was composed, might be each in one file, in three files, or in six files.

[805] See Xenoph. Anab. iv. 8, 10, upon the advantage of attacking the enemy with ὄρθιοι λόχοι, in which case the strongest and best soldiers all came first into conflict. It is to be recollected, however, that the practice of the Cyreian troops cannot be safely quoted as authority for the practice at Sparta. Xenophon and his colleagues established lochi, pentekosties, and enômoties in the Cyreian army: the lochus consisted of one hundred

men, but the numbers of the other two divisions are not stated (Anab. iii. 4, 21; iv. 3, 26: compare Arrian, Tactic. cap. 6).

[806] The words of Thucydides indicate the peculiar marshalling of the Lacedæmonians, as distinguished both from their enemies and from their allies at the battle of Mantineia,—καὶ εὐθὺς ὑπὸ σπουδῆς καθίσταντο ἐς *κόσμον τὸν ἑαυτῶν*, Ἄγιδος τοῦ βασιλέως ἕκαστα ἐξηγουμένου κατὰ νόμον: again, c. 68.

About the music of the flute or fife, Thucyd. v. 69; Xen. Rep. Lac. 13, 9; Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 22.

[807] Meursius, Dr. Arnold, and Rachetti (Della Milizia dei Grechi Antichi, Milan, 1807, p. 166) all think that lochus and mora were different names for the same division; but if this is to be reconciled with the statement of Xenophon in Repub. Lac. c. 11, we must suppose an actual change of nomenclature after the Peloponnesian war, which appears to be Dr. Arnold's opinion,—yet it is not easy to account for.

There is one point in Dr. Thirlwall's Appendix which is of some importance, and in which I cannot but dissent from his opinion. He says, after stating the nomenclature and classification of the Spartan military force as given by Xenophon, "Xenophon speaks only of Spartans, as appears by the epithet πολιτικῶν," p. 521: the words of Xenophon are, Ἑκάστη δὲ τῶν πολιτικῶν μορῶν ἔχει πολέμαρχον ἕνα, etc. (Rep. Lac. 11.)

It appears to me that Xenophon is here speaking of the aggregate Lacedæmonian heavy-armed force, including both Spartans and Periœki,—not of Spartans alone. The word πολιτικῶν does not mean Spartans as distinguished from Periœki, but Lacedæmonians as distinguished from allies. Thus, when Agesilaus returns home from the blockade of Phlius, Xenophon tells us that ταῦτα ποιήσας τοὺς μὲν συμμάχους ἀφῆκε, τὸ δὲ πολιτικὸν οἴκαδε ἀπήγαγε (Hellen. v. 3, 25).

O. Müller, also, thinks that the whole number of five thousand seven hundred and forty men, who fought at the first battle of Mantineia, in the thirteenth year of the Peloponnesian war, were furnished by the city of Sparta itself (Hist. of Dorians, iii. 12, 2): and to prove this, he refers to the very passage just cited from the Hellenica of Xenophon, which, as far as it proves anything, proves the contrary of his position. He gives no other evidence to support it, and I think it in the highest degree improbable. I have already remarked that he understands the expression πολιτικὴ χώρα (in Polybius, vi. 45) to mean the district of Sparta itself as contradistinguished from Laconia,—a construction which seems to me not warranted by the passage in Polybius.

[808] Aristotle, Λακώνων Πολιτεία, Fragm. 5-6, ed. Neumann: Photius v. Λόχος. Harpokration, Μόρα. Etymologic. Mag. Μόρα. The statement of Aristotle is transmitted so imperfectly that we cannot make out clearly what it was. Xenophon says that there were six moræ in all, comprehending all the citizens of military age (Rep. Lac. 11, 3). But Ephorus stated the mora at five hundred men, Kallisthenes at seven hundred, and Polybius at nine hundred (Plutarch, Pelopid. 17; Diodor. xv. 32). If all the citizens competent to bear arms were comprised in six moræ, the numbers of each mora must of course have varied. At the battle of Mantineia, there were seven Lacedæmonian lochi, each lochus containing four pentekosties, and each pentekosty containing four enômoties: Thucydidês seems, as I before remarked, to make each enômoty thirty-two men. But Xenophon tells us that each mora had four lochi, each lochus two pentekosties, and each pentekosty two enômoties (Rep. Lac. 11, 4). The names of these divisions remained the same, but the numbers varied.

[809] This is implied in the fact, that the men under thirty or under thirty-five years of age, were often detached in a battle to pursue the light troops of the enemy (Xen. Hellen. iv. 5, 15-16).

[810] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 12.

[811] Herodot. vi. 111; Thucyd. vi. 98; Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 2, 19.

The same marshalling of hoplites, according to the civil tribes to which they belonged, is seen in the inhabitants of Messênê in Sicily as well as of Syrakuse (Thucyd. iii. 90; vi. 100).

At Argos, there was a body of one thousand hoplites, who, during the Peloponnesian war, received training in military manœuvres at the cost of the city (Thucyd. v. 67), but there is reason to believe that this arrangement was not introduced until about the period of the peace of Nikias in the tenth or eleventh year of the Peloponnesian war, when the truce between Argos and Sparta was just expiring, and when the former began to entertain schemes of ambition. The Epariti in Arcadia began at a much later time, after the battle of Leuktra (Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 4, 33).

About the Athenian taxiarchs, one to each tribe, see Æschines de Fals. Leg. c. 53, p. 300 R.; Lysias, pro Mantitheo, Or. xvi. p. 147; Demosth. adv. Bœotum pro nomine, p. 999 R. Philippic, i. p. 47.

See the advice given by Xenophon (in his Treatise De Officio Magistri Equitum) for the remodelling of the Athenian cavalry, and for the introduction of small divisions, each with its special commander. The division into tribes is all that he finds recognized (Off. M. E. C. ii. 2-iv. 9); he strongly recommends giving orders,—διὰ παραγγέλσεως, and not ἀπὸ κήρυκος.

[812] Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 23. Πάντων ἄκροι τεχνῖται καὶ σοφισταὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν ὄντες οἱ Σπαρτιᾶται, etc. (Xenoph. Rep. Lac. c. 14) ἡγησαῖο ἂν, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους αὐτοσχεδιαστὰς εἶναι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ μόνους τῷ ὄντι τεχνίτας τῶν πολεμικῶν…. Ὥστε τῶν δεομένων γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲν ἀπορεῖται· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπρόσκεπτόν ἐστιν.

[813] Ὑμέας γὰρ πυνθάνομαι προεστάναι τῆς Ἑλλάδος (Herodot. i. 69): compare i. 152; v. 49; vi, 84, about Spartan hegemony.

[814] Xenoph. Repub. Lac. 10, 8. ἐπαινοῦσι μὲν πάντες τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπιτηδεύματα, μιμεῖσθαι δὲ αὐτὰ οὐδεμία πόλις ἐθέλει.

The magnificent funeral discourse, pronounced by Periklês in the early part of the Peloponnesian war over the deceased Athenian warriors, includes a remarkable contrast of the unconstrained patriotism and bravery of the Athenians, with the austere, repulsive, and ostentatious drilling to which the Spartans were subject from their earliest youth; at the same time, it attests the powerful effect which that drilling produced upon the mind of Greece (Thucyd. ii. 37-39). πιστεύοντες οὐ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς τὸ πλέον καὶ ἀπάταις, ἢ τῷ ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐς τὰ ἔργα εὐψύχῳ· καὶ ἐν ταῖς παιδείαις οἱ μὲν (the Spartans) ἐπιπόνῳ ἀσκήσει εὐθὺς νέοι ὄντες τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μετέρχονται, etc.

The impression of the light troops, when they first began to attack the Lacedæmonian hoplites in the island of Sphakteria, is strongly expressed by Thucydidês (iv. 34),—τῇ γνώμῃ *δεδουλωμένοι* ὡς ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, etc.

[815] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 4, 52: compare iii. 5, 20.

[816] Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 4, 19.

[817] Pausan. iv. 24, 2; iv. 35, 2.

[818] Pausan. ii. 19, 2; Plutarch (Cur Pythia nunc non reddat oracula, etc. c. 5, p. 396; De Fortunâ Alexandri, c. 8, p. 340). Lakidês, king of Argos, is also named by Plutarch as luxurious and effeminate (De capiendâ ab hostibus utilitate, c. 6, p. 89).

O. Müller (Hist. of Dorians, iii. 6, 10) identifies Lakidês, son of Meltas, named by Pausanias, with Leôkêdês son of Pheidôn, named by Herodotus as one of the suitors for the daughter of Kleisthenês the Sikyonian (vi. 127); and he thus infers that Meltas must have been deposed and succeeded by Ægon, about 560 B. C. This conjecture seems to me not much to be trusted.

[819] Herodot. vii. 149.

[820] Herodot. viii. 73.

Strabo distinguishes two places called Orneæ; one a village in the Argeian territory, the other a town between Corinth and Sikyôn: but I doubt whether there ever were two places so called: the town or village dependent on Argos seems the only place (Strabo. viii. p. 376).

[821] Thucyd. v. 67-vi. 95.

The Kleônæans are also said to have aided the Argeians in the destruction of Mykenæ, conjointly with the Tegeatans: from hence, however, we cannot infer anything as to their dependence at that time (Strabo, viii. p. 377).

[822] Pindar, Nem. x. 42. Κλεωναίων πρὸς ἀνδρῶν τετράκις (compare Nem. iv. 17). Κλεωναίου τ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἀγῶνος, etc.

[823] See Corsini Dissertation. Agonisticæ, iii. 2.

The tenth Nemean Ode of Pindar is on this point peculiarly good evidence, inasmuch as it is composed for, and supposed to be sung by Theiæus, a native of Argos. Had there been any jealousy then subsisting between

Argos and Kleônæ on the subject of the presidency of this festival, Pindar would never, on such an occasion, have mentioned expressly the Kleônæans as presidents.

The statements of the Scholia on Pindar, that the Corinthians at one time celebrated the Nemean games, or that they were of old celebrated at Sikyôn, seem unfounded (Schol. Pind. Arg. Nem., and Nem. x. 49).

[824] Polyb. ii. 41.

[825] Herodot. i. 145; Strabo, viii. p. 385.

[826] Pausan. iv. 15, 1; Strabo, viii. p. 383; Homer, Iliad, ii. 573. Pausanias seems to have forgotten this statement, when he tells us that the name of Hyperêsia was exchanged for that of Ægeira, during the time of the Ionian occupation of the country (vii. 26, 1; Steph. Byz. copies him, v. Αἴγειρα). It is doubtful whether the two names designate the same place, nor does Strabo conceive that they did.

[827] Strabo, viii. pp. 337, 342, 386.

[828] Polyb. ii. 41.

[829] See Leake's Travels in Morea, c. xxvii. and xxxi.



GEORGE GROTE.

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BY

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CHAPTER IX.

CORINTH, SIKYON, AND MEGARA. — AGE OF THE GRECIAN DESPOTS.

THE preceding volume brought down the history of Sparta to the period marked by the reign of Peisistratus at Athens; at which time she had attained her maximum of territory, was confessedly the most powerful state in Greece, and enjoyed a proportionate degree of deference from the rest. I now proceed to touch upon the three Dorian cities on and near to the Isthmus,—Corinth, Sikyôn, and Megara, as they existed at this same period.

Even amidst the scanty information which has reached us, we trace the marks of considerable maritime energy and commerce among the Corinthians, as far back as the eighth century B. C. The foundation of Korkyra and Syracuse, in the 11th Olympiad, or 734 B. C. (of which I shall speak farther in connection with Grecian colonization generally), by expeditions from Corinth, affords a good proof that they knew how to turn to account the excellent situation which connected them with the sea on both sides of Peloponnesus: and Thucydides,[1] while he notices them as the chief liberators of the sea, in early times, from pirates, also tells us that the first great improvement in ship-building,—the construction of the trireme, or ship of war, with a full deck and triple banks for the rowers,—was the fruit of Corinthian ingenuity. It was in the year 703 B. C., that the Corinthian Ameinoklês built four triremes for the Samians, the first which those islanders had ever possessed: the notice of this fact attests as well the importance attached to the new invention, as the humble scale on which the naval force in those early days was equipped. And it is a fact of not less moment, in proof of the maritime vigor of Corinth in the seventh century B. C., that the earliest naval battle known to Thucydides was one which took place between the Corinthians and the Korkyræans, B. C. 664.[2]

It has already been stated, in the preceding volume, that the line of Herakleid kings in Corinth subsides gradually, through a series of empty names, into the oligarchy denominated Bacchiadæ, or Bacchiads, under whom our first historical knowledge of the city begins. The persons so named were all accounted descendants of Hêraklês, and formed the governing caste in the city; intermarrying usually among themselves, and choosing from their own number an annual prytanis, or president, for the administration of affairs. Of their internal government we have no accounts, except the tale respecting Archias the founder of Syracuse,[3] one of their number, who had made himself so detested by an act of brutal violence terminating in the death of the beautiful youth Aktæôn, as to be forced to expatriate. That such a man should have been placed in the distinguished post of œkist of the colony of Syracuse, gives us no favorable idea of the Bacchiad oligarchy: we do not, however, know upon what original authority the story depends, nor can we be sure that it is accurately re-

counted. But Corinth, under their government, was already a powerful commercial and maritime city, as has already been stated.

Megara, the last Dorian state in this direction eastward, and conterminous with Attica at the point where the mountains called Kerāta descend to Eleusis and the Thracian plain, is affirmed to have been originally settled by the Dorians of Corinth, and to have remained for some time a dependency of that city. It is farther said to have been at first merely one of five separate villages,—Megara, Heræa, Peiræa, Kynosura, Tripodiskus,—inhabited by a kindred population, and generally on friendly terms, yet sometimes distracted by quarrels, and on those occasions carrying on war with a degree of lenity and chivalrous confidence which reverses the proverbial affirmation respecting the sanguinary character of enmities between kindred. Both these two statements are transmitted to us (we know not from what primitive source) as explanatory of certain current phrases:[4] the author of the latter cannot have agreed with the author of the former in considering the Corinthians as masters of the Megarid, because he represents them as fomenting wars among these five villages for the purpose of acquiring that territory. Whatever may be the truth respecting this alleged early subjection of Megara, we know it[5] in the historical age, and that too as early as the 14th Olympiad, only as an independent Dorian city, maintaining the integrity of its territory under its leader Orsippus, the famous Olympic runner, against some powerful enemies, probably the Corinthians. It was of no mean consideration, possessing a territory which extended across Mount Geraneia to the Corinthian gulf, on which the fortified town and port of Pêgæ, belonging to the Megarians, was situated; it was mother of early and distant colonies,—and competent, during the time of Solon, to carry on a protracted contest with the Athenians, for the possession of Salamis, wherein, although the latter were at last victorious, it was not without an intermediate period of ill-success and despair.

Of the early history of Sikyôn, from the period when it became Dorian down to the seventh century B. C., we know nothing. Our first information respecting it, concerns the establishment of the despotism of Orthagoras, about 680-670 B. C. And it is a point deserving of notice, that all the three above-mentioned towns,—Corinth, Sikyôn, and Megara,—underwent during the course of this same century a similar change of government. In each of them a despot established himself; Orthagoras in Sikyôn; Kypselus in Corinth; Theagenês in Megara.

Unfortunately, we have too little evidence as to the state of things by which this change of government was preceded and brought about, to be able to appreciate fully its bearing. But what draws our attention to it more particularly is, that the like phenomenon seems to have occurred contemporaneously throughout a large number of cities, continental, insular, and colonial, in many different parts of the Grecian world. The period between 650 and 500 B. C., witnessed the rise and downfall of many despots and despotic dynasties, each in its own separate city. During the succeeding interval between 500 and 350 B. C., new despots, though occasionally spring-

ing up, become more rare; political dispute takes another turn, and the question is raised directly and ostensibly between the many and the few,—the people and the oligarchy. But in the still later times which follow the battle of Chæroneia, in proportion as Greece, declining in civic not less than in military spirit, is driven to the constant employment of mercenary troops, and humbled by the overruling interference of foreigners,—the despot with his standing foreign body-guard becomes again a characteristic of the time; a tendency partially counteracted, but never wholly subdued, by Aratus, and the Achæan league of the third century B. C.

It would have been instructive if we had possessed a faithful record of these changes of government in some of the more considerable of the Grecian towns; but in the absence of such evidence we can do little more than collect the brief sentences of Aristotle and others respecting the causes which produced them. For as the like change of government was common, near about the same time, to cities very different in locality, in race of inhabitants, in tastes and habits, and in wealth, it must partly have depended upon certain general causes which admit of being assigned and explained.

In the preceding volume, I tried to elucidate the heroic government of Greece, so far as it could be known from the epic poems,—a government founded (if we may employ modern phraseology) upon divine right as opposed to the sovereignty of the people, but requiring, as an essential condition, that the king shall possess force, both of body and mind, not unworthy of the exalted breed to which he belongs.[6] In this government, the authority which pervades the whole society, all resides in the king; but on important occasions it is exercised through the forms of publicity; he consults, and even discusses, with the council of chiefs or elders,—he communicates after such consultation with the assembled agora,—who hear and approve, perhaps hear and murmur, but are not understood to exercise an option or to reject. In giving an account of the Lykurgean system, I remarked that the old primitive Rhetræ, or charters of compact, indicated the existence of these same elements; a king of superhuman lineage (in this particular case two coördinate kings),—a senate of twenty-eight old men, besides the kings who sat in it,—and an ekklesia, or public assembly of citizens, convened for the purpose of approving or rejecting propositions submitted to them, with little or no liberty of discussion. The elements of the heroic government of Greece are thus found to be substantially the same as those existing in the primitive Lykurgean constitution: in both cases the predominant force residing in the kings,—and the functions of the senate, still more those of the public assembly, being comparatively narrow and restricted; in both cases the regal authority being upheld by a certain religious sentiment, which tended to exclude rivalry and to insure submission in the people up to a certain point, in spite of misconduct or deficiency in the reigning individual. Among the principal Epirotic tribes, this government subsisted down to the third century B. C.[7], though some of them had passed out of it, and were in the habit of electing annually a president out of the gens to which the king

belonged. Starting from these points, common to the Grecian heroic government, and to the original Lykurgean system, we find that in the Grecian cities generally, the king is replaced by an oligarchy, consisting of a limited number of families,—while at Sparta, the kingly authority, though greatly curtailed, is never abolished. And the different turn of events at Sparta admits of being partially explained. It so happened that, for five centuries, neither of the two coördinate lines of Spartan kings was ever without some male representatives, so that the sentiment of divine right, upon which their preëminence was founded, always proceeded in an undeviating channel. That sentiment never wholly died out in the tenacious mind of Sparta, but it became sufficiently enfeebled to occasion a demand for guarantees against abuse. If the senate had been a more numerous body, composed of a few principal families, and comprising men of all ages, it might, perhaps, have extended its powers so much as to absorb those of the king: but a council of twenty-eight very old men, chosen indiscriminately from all Spartan families, was essentially an adjunct and secondary force. It was insufficient even as a restraint upon the king,—still less was it competent to become his rival; and it served indirectly even as a support to him, by preventing the formation of any other privileged order powerful enough to be an overmatch for his authority. This insufficiency on the part of the senate was one of the causes which occasioned the formation of the annually-renewed Council of Five, called the Ephors; originally a defensive board, like the Roman Tribunes, intended as a restraint upon abuse of power in the kings, but afterwards expanding into a paramount and unresponsible Executive Directory. Assisted by endless dissensions between the two coördinate kings, the ephors encroached upon their power on every side, limited them to certain special functions, and even rendered them accountable and liable to punishment, but never aspired to abolish the dignity. That which the regal authority lost in extent (to borrow the just remark of king Theopompus)[8] it gained in durability: the descendants of the twins Eurysthenês and Proklês continued in possession of their double sceptre from the earliest historical times down to the revolutions of Agis the Third, and Kleomenês the Third,—generals of the military force, growing richer and richer, and reverenced as well as influential in the state, though the directory of ephors were their superiors. And the ephors became, in time, quite as despotic, in reference to internal affairs, as the kings could ever have been before them; for the Spartan mind, deeply possessed with the feelings of command and obedience, remained comparatively insensible to the ideas of control and responsibility, and even averse to that open discussion and censure of public measures, or officers, which such ideas imply. We must recollect that the Spartan political constitution was both simplified in its character, and aided in its working, by the comprehensive range of the Lykurgean discipline, with its rigorous equal pressure upon rich and poor, which averted many of the causes elsewhere productive of sedition,—habituating the proudest and most refractory citizen to a life of undeviating obedience,—satisfying such demand as existed for system and regularity,—rendering Spartan personal habits of life much more equal than even democratical Athens could parallel; but

contributing, at the same time, to engender a contempt for talkers, and a dislike of methodical and prolonged speech, which of itself sufficed to exclude all regular interference of the collective citizens, either in political or judicial affairs.

Such were the facts at Sparta; but in the rest of Greece the primitive heroic government was modified in a very different manner: the people outgrew, much more decidedly, that feeling of divine right and personal reverence which originally gave authority to the king. Willing submission ceased on the part of the people, and still more on the part of the inferior chiefs, and with it ceased the heroic royalty. Something like a system or constitution came to be demanded.

Of this discontinuance of kingship, so universal in the political march of Hellas, the prime cause is, doubtless, to be sought in the smallness and concentrated residence of each distinct Hellenic society. A single chief, perpetual and unresponsible, was noway essential for the maintenance of union. In modern Europe, for the most part, the different political societies which grew up out of the extinction of the Roman empire embraced each a considerable population and a wide extent of territory and the monarchical form presented itself as the only known means of union between the parts, the only visible and imposing symbol of a national identity. Both the military character of the Teutonic invaders, as well as the traditions of the Roman empire which they dismembered, tended towards the establishment of a monarchical chief, the abolition of whose dignity would have been looked upon as equivalent, and would really have been equivalent, to the breaking up of the nation, since the maintenance of a collective union by means of general assemblies was so burdensome, that the kings themselves vainly tried to exact it by force, and representative government was then unknown.

The history of the Middle Ages, though exhibiting constant resistance on the part of powerful subjects, frequent deposition of individual kings, and occasional changes of dynasty, contains few instances of any attempt to maintain a large political aggregate united without a king, either hereditary or elective. Even towards the close of the last century, at the period when the federal constitution of the United States of America was first formed, many reasoners regarded[9] as an impossibility the application of any other system than the monarchical to a territory of large size and population, so as to combine union of the whole with equal privileges and securities to each of the parts. And it might, perhaps, be a real impossibility among any rude people, with strong local peculiarities, difficult means of communication, and habits of representative government not yet acquired. Hence, throughout all the larger nations of mediæval and modern Europe, with few exceptions, the prevailing sentiment has been favorable to monarchy; but wherever any single city, or district, or cluster of villages, whether in the plains of Lombardy, or in the mountains of Switzerland, has acquired independence,—wherever any small fraction has severed itself from the aggregate,—the opposite sentiment has been found, and the natural tendency has been towards some modification of republican government;[10] out of which, indeed,

as in Greece, a despot has often been engendered, but always through some unnatural mixture of force and fraud. The feudal system, evolved out of the disordered state of Europe between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, always presumed a permanent suzerain, vested with large rights of a mixed personal and proprietary character over his vassals, though subject, also, to certain obligations towards them the immediate vassals of the king had subordinate vassals of their own, to whom they stood in the same relation: and in this hierarchy[11] of power, property, and territory blended together, the rights of the chief, whether king, duke, or baron, were always conceived as constituting a status apart, and neither conferred originally by the grant, nor revocable at the pleasure, of those over whom they were exercised. This view of the essential nature of political authority was a point in which the three great elements of modern European society,—the Teutonic, the Roman, and the Christian,—all concurred, though each in a different way and with different modifications; and the result was, a variety of attempts on the part of subjects to compromise with their chief, without any idea of substituting a delegated executive in his place. On particular points of these feudal monarchies there grew up, gradually, towns with a concentrated population, among whom was seen the remarkable combination of a republican feeling, demanding collective and responsible management in their own local affairs, with a necessity of union and subordination towards the great monarchical whole; and hence again arose a new force tending both to maintain the form, and to predetermine the march, of kingly government.[12] And it has been found in practice possible to attain this latter object,—to combine regal government with fixity of administration, equal law impartially executed, security to person and property, and freedom of discussion under representative forms,—in a degree which the wisest ancient Greek would have deemed hopeless.[13] Such an improvement in the practical working of this species of government, speaking always comparatively with the kings of ancient times in Syria, Egypt, Judæa, the Grecian cities, and Rome,—coupled with the increased force of all established routine, and the greater durability of all institutions and creeds which have once obtained footing throughout any wide extent of territory and people, has caused the monarchical sentiment to remain predominant in the European mind, though not without vigorous occasional dissent, throughout the increased knowledge and the enlarged political experience of the last two centuries.

It is important to show that the monarchical institutions and monarchical tendencies prevalent throughout mediæval and modern Europe have been both generated and perpetuated by causes peculiar to those societies, whilst in Hellenic societies such causes had no place,—in order that we may approach Hellenic phenomena in the proper spirit, and with an impartial estimate of the feeling universal among Greeks towards the idea of a king. The primitive sentiment entertained towards the heroic king died out, passing first into indifference, next,—after experience of the despots,—into determined antipathy.

To an historian like Mr. Mitford, full of English ideas respecting government, this anti-monarchical feeling appears of the nature of insanity, and the Grecian communities like madmen without a keeper: while the greatest of all benefactors is the hereditary king, who conquers them from without,—the second-best is the home-despot, who seizes the acropolis and puts his fellow-citizens under coercion. There cannot be a more certain way of misinterpreting and distorting Grecian phenomena than to read them in this spirit, which reverses the maxims both of prudence and morality current in the ancient world. The hatred of kings as it stood among the Greeks, whatever may be thought about a similar feeling now, was a prëeminent virtue, flowing directly from the noblest and wisest part of their nature: it was a consequence of their deep conviction of the necessity of universal legal restraint—it was a direct expression of that regulated sociality which required the control of individual passion from every one without exception, and most of all from him to whom power was confided. The conception which the Greeks formed of an unresponsible One, or of a king who could do no wrong, may be expressed in the pregnant words of Herodotus: [14] "He subverts the customs of the country: he violates women: he puts men to death without trial." No other conception of the probable tendencies of kingship was justified either by a general knowledge of human nature, or by political experience as it stood from Solon downward: no other feeling than abhorrence could be entertained for the character so conceived: no other than a man of unprincipled ambition would ever seek to invest himself with it.

Our larger political experience has taught us to modify this opinion by showing that, under the conditions of monarchy in the best governments of modern Europe, the enormities described by Herodotus do not take place,—and that it is possible, by means of representative constitutions acting under a certain force of manners, customs, and historical recollection, to obviate many of the mischiefs likely to flow from proclaiming the duty of peremptory obedience to an hereditary and unresponsible king, who cannot be changed without extra-constitutional force. But such larger observation was not open to Aristotle, the wisest as well as the most cautious of ancient theorists; nor if it had been open, could he have applied with assurance its lessons to the governments of the single cities of Greece. The theory of a constitutional king, especially as it exists in England, would have appeared to him impracticable: to establish a king who will reign without governing,—in whose name all government is carried on, yet whose personal will is in practice of little or no effect,—exempt from all responsibility, without making use of the exemption,—receiving from every one unmeasured demonstrations of homage, which are never translated into act except within the bounds of a known law,—surrounded with all the paraphernalia of power, yet acting as a passive instrument in the hands of ministers marked out for his choice by indications which he is not at liberty to resist. This remarkable combination of the fiction of superhuman grandeur and license with the reality of an invisible strait-waistcoat, is what an Englishman has in his mind when he speaks of a constitutional king: the events of our history have brought it to pass in England, amidst

an aristocracy the most powerful that the world has yet seen,—but we have still to learn whether it can be made to exist elsewhere, or whether the occurrence of a single king, at once able, aggressive, and resolute, may not suffice to break it up. To Aristotle, certainly, it could not have appeared otherwise than unintelligible and impracticable: not likely even in a single case,—but altogether inconceivable as a permanent system and with all the diversities of temper inherent in the successive members of an hereditary dynasty. When the Greeks thought of a man exempt from legal responsibility, they conceived him as really and truly such, in deed as well as in name, with a defenceless community exposed to his oppressions;[15] and their fear and hatred of him was measured by their reverence for a government of equal law and free speech, with the ascendency of which their whole hopes of security were associated,—in the democracy of Athens more perhaps than in any other portion of Greece. And this feeling, as it was one of the best in the Greek mind, so it was also one of the most widely spread,—a point of unanimity highly valuable amidst so many points of dissension. We cannot construe or criticize it by reference to the feelings of modern Europe, still less to the very peculiar feelings of England, respecting kingship: and it is the application, sometimes explicit and sometimes tacit, of this unsuitable standard, which renders Mr. Mitford's appreciation of Greek politics so often incorrect and unfair.

When we try to explain the course of Grecian affairs, not from the circumstances of other societies, but from those of the Greeks themselves, we shall see good reason for the discontinuance as well as for the dislike of kingship. Had the Greek mind been as stationary and unimproving as that of the Orientals, the discontent with individual kings might have led to no other change than the deposition of a bad king in favor of one who promised to be better, without ever extending the views of the people to any higher conception than that of a personal government. But the Greek mind was of a progressive character, capable of conceiving and gradually of realizing amended social combinations. Moreover, it is in the nature of things that any government,—regal, oligarchical, or democratical,—which comprises only a single city, is far less stable than if it embraced a wider surface and a larger population: and when that semi-religious and mechanical submission, which made up for the personal deficiencies of the heroic king, became too feeble to serve as a working principle, the petty prince was in too close contact with his people, and too humbly furnished out in every way, to get up a prestige or delusion of any other kind: he had no means of overawing their imaginations by that combination of pomp, seclusion, and mystery, which Herodotus and Xenophon so well appreciate among the artifices of kingcraft.[16] As there was no new feeling upon which a perpetual chief could rest his power, so there was nothing in the circumstances of the community which rendered the maintenance of such a dignity necessary for visible and effective union:[17] in a single city, and a small circumjacent community, collective deliberation and general rules, with temporary and responsible magistrates, were practicable without difficulty.

To maintain an unresponsible king, and then to contrive accompaniments which shall extract from him the benefits of responsible government, is in reality a highly complicated system, though, as has been remarked, we have become familiar with it in modern Europe: the more simple and obvious change is, to substitute one or more temporary and responsible magistrates in place of the king himself. Such was the course which affairs took in Greece. The inferior chiefs, who had originally served as council to the king, found it possible to supersede him, and to alternate the functions of administration among themselves; retaining probably the occasional convocation of the general assembly, as it had existed before, and with as little practical efficacy. Such was in substance the character of that mutation which occurred generally throughout the Grecian states, with the exception of Sparta: kingship was abolished, and an oligarchy took its place,—a council deliberating collectively, deciding general matters by the majority of voices, and selecting some individuals of their own body as temporary and accountable administrators. It was always an oligarchy which arose on the defeasance of the heroic kingdom: the age of democratical movement was yet far distant, and the condition of the people—the general body of freemen—was not immediately altered, either for better or worse, by the revolution; the small number of privileged persons, among whom the kingly attributes were distributed and put in rotation, being those nearest in rank to the king himself, perhaps members of the same large gens with him, and pretending to a common divine or heroic descent. As far as we can make out, this change seems to have taken place in the natural course of events and without violence. Sometimes the kingly lineage died out and was not replaced; sometimes, on the death of a king, his son and successor was acknowledged[18] only as archon, or perhaps set aside altogether to make room for a prytanis, or president, out of the men of rank around.

At Athens, we are told that Kodrus was the last king, and that his descendants were recognized only as archons for life; after some years, the archons for life were replaced by archons for ten years, taken from the body of Eupatridæ, or nobles; subsequently, the duration of the archonship was farther shortened to one year. At Corinth, the ancient kings are said to have passed in like manner into the oligarchy of the Bacchiadæ, out of whom an annual prytanis was chosen. We are only able to make out the general fact of such a change, without knowing how it was brought about,—our first historical acquaintance with the Grecian cities beginning with these oligarchies.

Such oligarchical governments, varying in their details but analogous in general features, were common throughout the cities of Greece proper as well as of the colonies, throughout the seventh century B. C. Though they had little immediate tendency to benefit the mass of the freemen, yet when we compare them with the antecedent heroic government, they indicate an important advance,—the first adoption of a deliberate and preconceived system in the management of public affairs.[19] They exhibit the first evidences of new and important political ideas in the Greek

mind,—the separation of legislative and executive powers; the former vested in a collective body, not merely deliberating but also finally deciding,—while the latter is confided to temporary individual magistrates, responsible to that body at the end of their period of office. We are first introduced to a community of citizens, according to the definition of Aristotle,—men qualified, and thinking themselves qualified, to take turns in command and obedience: the collective sovereign, called The City, is thus constituted. It is true that this first community of citizens comprised only a small proportion of the men personally free, but the ideas upon which it was founded began gradually to dawn upon the minds of all. Political power had lost its heaven-appointed character, and had become an attribute legally communicable as well as determined to certain definite ends; and the ground was thus laid for those thousand questions which agitated so many of the Grecian cities during the ensuing three centuries, partly respecting its apportionment, partly respecting its employment,—questions sometimes raised among the members of the privileged oligarchy itself, sometimes between that order as a whole and the non-privileged Many. The seeds of those popular movements, which called forth so much profound emotion, so much bitter antipathy, so much energy and talent, throughout the Grecian world, with different modifications in each particular city, may thus be traced back to that early revolution which erected the primitive oligarchy upon the ruins of the heroic kingdom.

How these first oligarchies were administered we have no direct information; but the narrow and anti-popular interests naturally belonging to a privileged few, together with the general violence of private manners and passions, leave us no ground for presuming favorably respecting either their prudence or their good feeling; and the facts which we learn respecting the condition of Attica prior to the Solonian legislation (to be recounted in the next chapter) raise inferences all of an unfavorable character.

The first shock which they received, and by which so many of them were subverted, arose from the usurpers called Despots, who employed the prevalent discontents both as pretexts and as aids for their own personal ambition, while their very frequent success seems to imply that such discontents were wide-spread as well as serious. These despots arose out of the bosom of the oligarchies, but not all in the same manner.[20] Sometimes the executive magistrate, upon whom the oligarchy themselves had devolved important administrative powers for a certain temporary period, became unfaithful to his choosers, and acquired sufficient ascendency to retain his dignity permanently in spite of them,—perhaps even to transmit it to his son. In other places, and seemingly more often, there arose that noted character called the Demagogue, of whom historians both ancient and modern commonly draw so repulsive a picture:[21] a man of energy and ambition, sometimes even a member of the oligarchy itself, who stood forward as champion of the grievances and sufferings of the non-privileged Many, acquired their favor, and employed their strength so effectively as to put down the oligarchy by force, and constitute himself despot. A third

form of despot, some presumptuous wealthy man, like Kylôn at Athens, without even the pretence of popularity, was occasionally emboldened by the success of similar adventures in other places to hire a troop of retainers and seize the acropolis; and there were examples, though rare, of a fourth variety,—the lineal descendant of the ancient kings,—who, instead of suffering himself to be restricted or placed under control by the oligarchy, found means to subjugate them, and to extort by force an ascendency as great as that which his forefathers had enjoyed by consent. To these must be added, in several Grecian states, the Æsymnête, or Dictator, a citizen formally invested with supreme and unresponsible power, placed in command of the military force, and armed with a standing body-guard, but only for a time named, and in order to deal with some urgent peril or ruinous internal dissension.[22] The person thus exalted, always enjoying a large measure of confidence, and generally a man of ability, was sometimes so successful, or made himself so essential to the community, that the term of his office was prolonged, and he became practically despot for life; or, even if the community were not disposed to concede to him this permanent ascendency, he was often strong enough to keep it against their will.

Such were the different modes in which the numerous Greek despots of the seventh and sixth centuries B. C. acquired their power. Though we know thus much in general terms from the brief statements of Aristotle, yet, unhappily, we have no contemporary picture of any one of these communities, so as to give us the means of appreciating the change in detail. Of those persons who, possessing inherited kingly dignity, stretched their paternal power so far as to become despots, Aristotle gives us Pheidôn of Argos as an example, whose reign has been already narrated in the preceding volume: of those who made themselves despots by means of official power previously held under an oligarchy, he names Phalaris, at Agrigentum, and the despots at Miletus and other cities of the Ionic Greeks: of those who raised themselves by becoming demagogues, he specifies Panætius in the Sicilian town of Leontini, Kypselus at Corinth, and Peisistratus at Athens;[23] of Æsymnêtes, or chosen despots, Pittakus of Mitylênê is the prominent instance. The military and aggressive demagogue, subverting an oligarchy which had degraded and ill-used him, governing as a cruel despot for several years, and at last dethroned and slain, is farther depicted by Dionysius of Halikarnassus, in the history of Aristodêmus of the Italian Cumæ.[24]

From the general statement of Thucydides as well as of Aristotle, we learn that the seventh and sixth centuries B. C. were centuries of progress for the Greek cities generally, in wealth, in power, and in population; and the numerous colonies founded during this period, of which I shall speak in a future chapter, will furnish farther illustration of such progressive tendencies. Now the changes just mentioned in the Grecian governments, imperfectly as we know them, are on the whole decided evidences of advancing citizenship. For the heroic government, with which Grecian communities begin, is the rudest and most infantine of all governments; destitute even of

the pretence of system or security, incapable of being in any way foreknown, and depending only upon the accidental variations in the character of the reigning individual, who, in most cases, far from serving as a protection to the poor against the rich and great, was likely to indulge his passions in the same unrestrained way as the latter, and with still greater impunity.

The despots, who in so many towns succeeded and supplanted this oligarchical government, though they governed on principles usually narrow and selfish, and often oppressively cruel, "taking no thought—to use the emphatic words of Thucydides—except for their own body and their own family,"—yet since they were not strong enough to crush the Greek mind, imprinted upon it a painful but improving political lesson, and contributed much to enlarge the range of experience as well as to determine the subsequent cast of feeling.[25] They partly broke down the wall of distinction between the people—properly so called, the general mass of freemen—and the oligarchy; indeed, the demagogue-despots are interesting, as the first evidence of the growing importance of the people in political affairs. The demagogue stood forward as representing the feelings and interests of the people against the governing few, probably availing himself of some special cases of ill-usage, and taking pains to be conciliatory and generous in his own personal behavior; and when the people, by their armed aid, had enabled him to overthrow the existing rulers, they had thus the satisfaction of seeing their own chief in possession of the supreme power, but they acquired no political rights and no increased securities for themselves. What measure of positive advantage they may have reaped, beyond that of seeing their previous oppressors humiliated, we know too little to determine;[26] but even the worst of despots was more formidable to the rich than to the poor, and the latter may perhaps have gained by the change, in comparative importance, notwithstanding their share in the rigors and exactions of a government which had no other permanent foundation than naked fear.

A remark made by Aristotle deserves especial notice here, as illustrating the political advance and education of the Grecian communities. He draws a marked distinction between the early demagogue of the seventh and sixth centuries, and the later demagogue, such as he himself and the generations immediately preceding had witnessed: the former was a military chief, daring and full of resource, who took arms at the head of a body of popular insurgents, put down the government by force, and made himself the master both of those whom he deposed and of those by whose aid he deposed them; while the latter was a speaker, possessed of all the talents necessary for moving an audience, but neither inclined to, nor qualified for, armed attack,—accomplishing all his purposes by pacific and constitutional methods. This valuable change,—substituting discussion and the vote of an assembly in place of an appeal to arms, and procuring for the pronounced decision of the assembly such an influence over men's minds as to render it final and respected even by dissentients,—arose from the continued practical working of democratical institutions. I shall have

occasion, at a later period of this history, to estimate the value of that unmeasured obloquy which has been heaped on the Athenian demagogues of the Peloponnesian war,—Kleôn and Hyperbolus; but, assuming the whole to be well-founded, it will not be the less true that these men were a material improvement on the earlier demagogues, such as Kypselus and Peisistratus, who employed the armed agency of the people for the purpose of subverting the established government and acquiring despotic authority for themselves. The demagogue was essentially a leader of opposition, who gained his influence by denouncing the men in real ascendency, and in actual executive functions. Now, under the early oligarchies, his opposition could be shown only by armed insurrection, and it conducted him either to personal sovereignty or to destruction; but the growth of democratical institutions insured both to him and to his political opponents full liberty of speech, and a paramount assembly to determine between them; whilst it both limited the range of his ambition, and set aside the appeal to armed force. The railing demagogue of Athens, at the time of the Peloponnesian war (even if we accept literally the representations of his worst enemies), was thus a far less mischievous and dangerous person than the fighting demagogue of the earlier centuries; and the "growth of habits of public speaking,"[27] to use Aristotle's expression, was the cause of the difference: the opposition of the tongue was a beneficial substitute for the opposition of the sword.

The rise of these despots on the ruins of the previous oligarchies was, in appearance, a return to the principles of the heroic age,—the restoration of a government of personal will in place of that systematic arrangement known as the City. But the Greek mind had so far outgrown those early principles, that no new government founded thereupon could meet with willing acquiescence, except under some temporary excitement. At first, doubtless, the popularity of the usurper,—combined with the fervor of his partizans and the expulsion or intimidation of opponents, and farther enhanced by the punishment of rich oppressors,—was sufficient to procure for him obedience; and prudence on his part might prolong this undisputed rule for a considerable period, perhaps even throughout his whole life. But Aristotle intimates that these governments, even when they began well, had a constant tendency to become worse and worse: discontent manifested itself, and was aggravated rather than repressed by the violence employed against it, until at length the despot became a prey to mistrustful and malevolent anxiety, losing any measure of equity or benevolent sympathy which might once have animated him. If he was fortunate enough to bequeathe his authority to his son, the latter, educated in a corrupt atmosphere and surrounded by parasites, contracted dispositions yet more noxious and unsocial: his youthful appetites were more ungovernable, while he was deficient in the prudence and vigor which had been indispensable to the self-accomplished rise of his father.[28] For such a position, mercenary guards and a fortified acropolis were the only stay,—guards fed at the expense of the citizens, and thus requiring constant exactions on behalf of that which was nothing better than a hostile garrison. It was essential to the security of the despot that he should keep down the spirit of the free people

whom he governed; that he should isolate them from each other, and prevent those meetings and mutual communications which Grecian cities habitually presented in the school, the leschê, or the palæstra; that he should strike off the overtopping ears of corn in the field (to use the Greek locution) or crush the exalted and enterprising minds.[29] Nay, he had even to a certain extent an interest in degrading and impoverishing them, or at least in debarring them from the acquisition either of wealth or leisure: and the extensive constructions undertaken by Polykratês at Samos, as well as the rich donations of Periander to the temple at Olympia, are considered by Aristotle to have been extorted by these despots with the express view of engrossing the time and exhausting the means of their subjects.

It is not to be imagined that all were alike cruel or unprincipled; but the perpetual supremacy of one man and one family had become so offensive to the jealousy of those who felt themselves to be his equals, and to the general feeling of the people, that repression and severity were inevitable, whether originally intended or not. And even if an usurper, having once entered upon this career of violence, grew sick and averse to its continuance, abdication only left him in imminent peril, exposed to the vengeance[30] of those whom he had injured,—unless, indeed, he could clothe himself with the mantle of religion, and stipulate with the people to become priest of some temple and deity; in which case his new function protected him, just as the tonsure and the monastery sheltered a dethroned prince in the Middle Ages.[31] Several of the despots were patrons of music and poetry, and courted the good-will of contemporary intellectual men by invitation as well as by reward; and there were some cases, such as that of Peisistratus and his sons at Athens, in which an attempt was made (analogous to that of Augustus at Rome) to reconcile the reality of personal omnipotence with a certain respect for preëxisting forms.[32] In such instances the administration, though not unstained by guilt, never otherwise than unpopular, and carried on by means of foreign mercenaries, was doubtless practically milder. But cases of this character were rare, and the maxims usual with Grecian despots were personified in Periander, the Kypselid of Corinth,—a harsh and brutal person, but not destitute either of vigor or intelligence.

The position of a Grecian despot, as depicted by Plato, by Xenophon and by Aristotle,[33] and farther sustained by the indications in Herodotus, Thucydides, and Isokrates, though always coveted by ambitious men, reveals clearly enough "those wounds and lacerations of mind," whereby the internal Erinnys avenged the community upon the usurper who trampled them down. Far from considering success in usurpation as a justification of the attempt (according to the theories now prevalent respecting Cromwell and Bonaparte, who are often blamed because they kept out a legitimate king, but never because they seized an unauthorized power over the people), these philosophers regard the despot as among the greatest of criminals: the man who assassinated him was an object of public honor and reward, and a virtuous Greek would seldom have scrupled to carry his sword concealed in myrtle branches,

like Harmodius and Aristogeiton, for the execution of the deed.[34] A station which overtopped the restraints and obligations involved in citizenship, was understood at the same time to forfeit all title to the common sympathy and protection,[35] so that it was unsafe for the despot to visit in person those great Pan-Hellenic games in which his own chariot might perhaps have gained the prize, and in which the theors, or sacred envoys, whom he sent as representatives of his Hellenic city, appeared with ostentatious pomp. A government carried on under these unpropitious circumstances could never be otherwise than short-lived. Though the individual daring enough to seize it, often found means to preserve it for the term of his own life, yet the sight of a despot living to old age was rare, and the transmission of his power to his son still more so.[36]

Amidst the numerous points of contention in Grecian political morality, this rooted antipathy to a permanent hereditary ruler stood apart as a sentiment almost unanimous, in which the thirst for preëminence felt by the wealthy few, and the love of equal freedom in the bosoms of the many, alike concurred. It first began among the oligarchies of the seventh and sixth centuries B. C., a complete reversal of that pronounced monarchical sentiment which we now read in the Iliad; and it was transmitted by them to the democracies, which did not arise until a later period. The conflict between oligarchy and despotism preceded that between oligarchy and democracy, the Lacedæmonians standing forward actively on both occasions to uphold the oligarchical principle: a mingled sentiment of fear and repugnance led them to put down despotism in several cities of Greece during the sixth century B. C., just as, during their contest with Athens in the following century, they assisted the oligarchical party, where-ever they could, to overthrow democracy. And it was thus that the demagogue-despot of these earlier times, bringing out the name of the people as a pretext, and the arms of the people as a means of accomplishment, for his own ambitious designs, served as a preface to the reality of democracy, which manifested itself at Athens a short time before the Persian war, as a development of the seed planted by Solon.

As far as our imperfect information enables us to trace, the early oligarchies of the Grecian states, against which the first usurping despots contended, contained in themselves far more repulsive elements of inequality, and more mischievous barriers between the component parts of the population, than the oligarchies of later days. What was true of Hellas as an aggregate, was true, though in a less degree, of each separate community which went to compose that aggregate: each included a variety of clans, orders, religious brotherhoods, and local or professional sections, which were very imperfectly cemented together: and the oligarchy was not, like the government so denominated in subsequent times, the government of a rich few over the less rich and the poor, but that of a peculiar order, sometimes a patrician order, over all the remaining society. In such a case, the subject Many might number opulent and substantial proprietors as well as the governing Few; but these subject Many

would themselves be broken into different heterogeneous fractions, not heartily sympathizing with each other, perhaps not intermarrying together, nor partaking of the same religious rites. The country-population, or villagers, who tilled the land, seem in these early times to have been held to a painful dependence on the proprietors who lived in the fortified town, and to have been distinguished by a dress and habits of their own, which often drew upon them an unfriendly nickname. These town proprietors seem to have often composed the governing class in early Grecian states, while their subjects consisted,—1. Of the dependent cultivators living in the district around, by whom their lands were tilled. 2. Of a certain number of small self-working proprietors (αὐτουργοὶ), whose possessions were too scanty to maintain more than themselves by the labor of their own hands on their own plot of ground—residing either in the country or the town, as the case might be. 3. Of those who lived in the town, having no land but exercising handicraft, arts, or commerce.

The governing proprietors went by the name of the Gamori, or Geomori, according as the Doric or Ionic dialect might be used in describing them, since they were found in states belonging to one race as well as to the other. They appear to have constituted a close order, transmitting their privileges to their children, but admitting no new members to a participation,—for the principle called by Greek thinkers a timocracy, the appointment of political rights and privileges according to comparative property, appears to have been little, if at all, applied in the earlier times, and we know no example of it earlier than Solon. So that, by the natural multiplication of families and mutation of property, there would come to be many individual gamori possessing no land at all, and perhaps worse off than those small freeholders who did not belong to the order; while some of these latter freeholders, and some of the artisans and traders in the towns, might at the same time be rising in wealth and importance. Under a political classification such as this, of which the repulsive inequality was aggravated by a rude state of manners, and which had no flexibility to meet the changes in relative position amongst individual inhabitants, discontent and outbreaks were unavoidable, and the earliest despot, usually a wealthy man of the disfranchised class, became champion and leader of the malcontents.[37] However oppressive his rule might be, at least it was an oppression which bore with indiscriminate severity upon all the fractions of the population; and when the hour of reaction against him or against his successor arrived, so that the common enemy was expelled by the united efforts of all, it was hardly possible to revive the preëxisting system of exclusion and inequality without some considerable abatements.

As a general rule, every Greek city-community included in its population, independent of bought slaves, the three elements above noticed,—considerable land proprietors with rustic dependents, small self-working proprietors, and town-artisans,—the three elements being found everywhere in different proportions. But the progress of events in Greece, from the seventh century B. C. downwards, tended continually to elevate the comparative importance of the two latter, while in those early days the as-

cendency of the former was at its maximum, and altered only to decline. The military force of most of the cities was at first in the hands of the great proprietors, and formed by them; it consisted of cavalry, themselves and their retainers, with horses fed upon their lands. Such was the primitive oligarchical militia, as it was constituted in the seventh and sixth centuries B. C.,[38] at Chalkis and Eretria in Eubœa, as well as at Kolophôn and other cities in Ionia, and as it continued in Thessaly down to the fourth century B. C.; but the gradual rise of the small proprietors and town-artisans was marked by the substitution of heavy-armed infantry in place of cavalry; and a farther change not less important took place when the resistance to Persia led to the great multiplication of Grecian ships of war, manned by a host of seamen who dwelt congregated in the maritime towns. All the changes which we are able to trace in the Grecian communities tended to break up the close and exclusive oligarchies with which our first historical knowledge commences, and to conduct them either to oligarchies rather more open, embracing all men of a certain amount of property, or else to democracies. But the transition in both cases was usually attained through the interlude of the despot.

In enumerating the distinct and unharmonious elements of which the population of these early Grecian communities was made up, we must not forget one farther element which was to be found in the Dorian states generally,—men of Dorian, as contrasted with men of non-Dorian race. The Dorians were in all cases emigrants and conquerors, establishing themselves along with and at the expense of the prior inhabitants. Upon what terms the cohabitation was established, and in what proportions invaders and invaded came together, we are without information; and important as this circumstance is in the history of these Dorian communities, we know it only as a general fact, and are unable to follow its results in detail. But we see enough to satisfy ourselves that in those revolutions which overthrew the oligarchies both at Corinth and Sikyon,—perhaps also at Megara,—the Dorian and non-Dorian elements of the community came into conflict more or less direct.

The despots of Sikyon are the earliest of whom we have any distinct mention: their dynasty lasted one hundred years, a longer period than any other Grecian despots known to Aristotle; they are said,[39] moreover, to have governed with mildness and with much practical respect to the preëxisting laws. Orthagoras,[40] the beginner of the dynasty, raised himself to the position of despot about 676 B. C., subverting the preëxisting Dorian oligarchy; but the cause and circumstances of this revolution are not preserved. He is said to have been originally a cook. In his line of successors we find mention of Andreas, Myrôn, Aristônymus, and Kleisthenês; but we know nothing of any of them until the last, except that Myrôn gained a chariot victory at Olympia in the 33d Olympiad (648 B. C.), and built, at the same holy place, a thesaurus containing two ornamented alcoves of copper for the reception of commemorative offerings from himself and his family.[41] Respecting Kleisthenês (whose age must be placed between 600-560 B. C., but can hardly be determined accurately,)

some facts are reported to us highly curious, but of a nature not altogether easy to follow or verify.

We learn from the narrative of Herodotus that the tribe to which Kleisthenês[42] himself (and of course his progenitors Orthagoras and the other Orthagoridæ also) belonged, was distinct from the three Dorian tribes, who have been already named in my previous chapter respecting the Lykurgean constitution at Sparta,—the Hylleis, Pamphyli, and Dymanes. We also learn that these tribes were common to the Sikyonians and the Argeians; and Kleisthenês, being in a state of bitter hostility with Argos, tried in several ways to abolish the points of community between the two. Sikyôn, originally Dorized by settlers from Argos, was included in the "lot of Temenus," or among the towns of the Argeian confederacy: the coherence of this confederacy had become weaker and weaker, partly without doubt through the influence of the predecessors of Kleisthenês; but the Argeians may perhaps have tried to revive it, thus placing themselves in a state of war with the latter, and inducing him to disconnect, palpably and violently, Sikyôn from Argos. There were two anchors by which the connection held,—first, legendary and religious sympathy; next, the civil rites and denominations current among the Sikyonian Dorians: both of them were torn up by Kleisthenês. He changed the names both of the three Dorian tribes, and of that non-Dorian tribe to which he himself belonged: the last he called by the complimentary title of archelai (commanders of the people); the first three he styled by the insulting names of hyatæ, oneatæ, and chœreatæ, from the three Greek words signifying a boar, an ass, and a little pig. The extreme bitterness of this insult can only be appreciated when we fancy to ourselves the reverence with which the tribes in a Grecian city regarded the hero from whom their name was borrowed. That these new denominations, given by Kleisthenês, involved an intentional degradation of the Dorian tribes as well as an assumption of superiority for his own, is affirmed by Herodotus, and seems well-deserving of credit.

But the violence of which Kleisthenês was capable in his anti-Argeian antipathy, is manifested still more plainly in his proceedings with respect to the hero Adrastus and to the legendary sentiment of the people. Something has already been said, in my former volume,[43] about this remarkable incident, which must, however, be here again briefly noticed. The hero Adrastus, whose chapel Herodotus himself saw in the Sikyonian agora, was common both to Argos and to Sikyôn, and was the object of special reverence at both: he figures in the legend as king of Argos, and as the grandson and heir of Polybus, king of Sikyôn. He was the unhappy leader of the two sieges of Thebes, so famous in the ancient epic,—and the Sikyonians listened with delight both to the exploits of the Argeians against Thebes, as celebrated in the recitations of the epical rhapsodes, and to the mournful tale of Adrastus and his family misfortunes, as sung in the tragic chorus. Kleisthenês not only forbade the rhapsodes to come to Sikyôn, but farther resolved to expel Adrastus himself from the country,—such is the literal Greek expression,[44] the hero himself being believed to

be actually present and domiciled among the people. He first applied to the Delphian oracle for permission to carry this banishment into direct effect, but the Pythian priestess returned an answer of indignant refusal,—"Adrastus is king of the Sikyonians, but thou art a ruffian." Thus baffled, he put in practice a stratagem calculated to induce Adrastus to depart of his own accord.[45] He sent to Thebes to beg that he might be allowed to introduce into Sikyôn the hero Melanippus, and the permission was granted. Now Melanippus was celebrated in the legend as the puissant champion of Thebes against Adrastus and the Argeian besiegers, and as having slain both Mêkisteus the brother, and Tydeus the son-in-law, of Adrastus; and he was therefore preëminently odious to the latter. Kleisthenês brought this anti-national hero into Sikyôn, assigning to him consecrated ground in the prytaneium, or government-house, and even in that part which was most strongly fortified[46] (for it seems that Adrastus was conceived as likely to assail and do battle with the intruder);—moreover, he took away both the tragic choruses and the sacrifice from Adrastus, assigning the former to the god Dionysus, and the latter to Melanippus.

The religious manifestations of Sikyôn being thus transferred from Adrastus to his mortal foe, and from the cause of the Argeians in the siege of Thebes to that of the Thebans, Adrastus was presumed to have voluntarily retired from the place, and the purpose which Kleisthenês contemplated, of breaking the community of feeling between Sikyôn and Argos, was in part accomplished.

A ruler who could do such violence to the religious and legendary sentiment of his community may well be supposed capable of inflicting that deliberate insult upon the Dorian tribes which is implied in their new appellations. As we are uninformed, however, of the state of things which preceded, we know not how far it might have been a retaliation for previous insult in the opposite direction. It is plain that the Dorians of Sikyôn maintained themselves and their ancient tribes quite apart from the remaining community, though what the other constituent portions of the population were, or in what relation they stood to these Dorians, we are not enabled to make out. We hear, indeed, of a dependent rural population in the territory of Sikyôn, as well as in that of Argos and Epidaurus, analogous to the Helots in Laconia. In Sikyôn, this class was termed the Korynêphori (club men), or the Katônakophori, from the thick woollen mantle which they wore, with a sheepskin sewn on to the skirt: in Argos, they were called Gymnêsii, from their not possessing the military panoply or the use of regular arms: in Epidaurus, Konipodes, or the dusty-footed.[47] We may conclude that a similar class existed in Corinth, in Megara, and in each of the Dorian towns of the Argolic Aktê. But besides the Dorian tribes and these rustics, there must probably have existed non-Dorian proprietors and town residents, and upon them we may suppose that the power of the Orthagoridæ and of Kleisthenês was founded, perhaps more friendly and indulgent to the rustic serfs than that of the Dorians had been previously. The moderation, which Aristotle ascribes to the Orthagoridæ generally, is belied by the proceedings of Kleisthenês: but we may probably believe that

his predecessors, content with maintaining the real predominance of the non-Dorian over the Dorian population, meddled very little with the separate position and civil habits of the latter,—while Kleisthenês, provoked or alarmed by some attempt on their part to strengthen alliance with the Argeians, resorted both to repressive measures and to that offensive nomenclature which has been above cited. The preservation of the power of Kleisthenês was due to his military energy (according to Aristotle) even more than to his moderation and popular conduct; it was aided, probably, by his magnificent displays at the public games, for he was victor in the chariot-race at the Pythian games 582 B. C., as well as at the Olympic games besides. Moreover, he was in fact the last of the race, nor did he transmit his power to any successor.[48]

The reigns of the early Orthagoridæ, then, may be considered as marking a predominance, newly acquired but quietly exercised, of the non-Dorians over the Dorians in Sikyôn: the reign of Kleisthenês, as displaying a strong explosion of antipathy from the former towards the latter; and though this antipathy, and the application of those opprobrious tribe-names in which it was conveyed, stand ascribed to Kleisthenês personally, we may see that the non-Dorians in Sikyôn shared it generally, because these same tribe-names continued to be applied not only during the reign of that despot, but also for sixty years longer, after his death. Of course, it is needless to remark that such denominations could never have been acknowledged or employed among the Dorians themselves. After the lapse of sixty years from the death of Kleisthenês, the Sikyonians came to an amicable adjustment of the feud, and placed the tribe-names on a footing satisfactory to all parties; the old Dorian denominations (Hylleis, Pamphyli, and Dymanes) were reëstablished, and the name of the fourth tribe, or non-Dorians, was changed from Archelai to Ægialeis,—Ægialeus son of Adrastus being constituted their eponymus.[49] This choice of the son of Adrastus for an eponymus, seems to show that the worship of Adrastus himself was then revived in Sikyôn, since it existed in the time of Herodotus.

Of the war which Kleisthenês helped to conduct against Kirrha, for the protection of the Delphian temple, I shall speak in another place. His death and the cessation of his dynasty seem to have occurred about 650 B. C., as far as the chronology can be made out.[50] That he was put down by the Spartans, as K. F. Hermann, O. Müller, and Dr. Thirlwall suppose,[51] can be hardly admitted consistently with the narrative of Herodotus, who mentions the continuance of the insulting names imposed by him upon the Dorian tribes for many years after his death. Now, had the Spartans forcibly interfered for the suppression of his dynasty, we may reasonably presume that, even if they did not restore the decided preponderance of the Dorians in Sikyôn, they would at least have rescued the Dorian tribes from this obvious ignominy. But it seems doubtful whether Kleisthenês had any son: and the extraordinary importance attached to the marriage of his daughter, Agaristê, whom he bestowed upon the Athenian Megaklês of the great family of Alkmæônidæ, seems rather to evince that she was an heiress,—not to his power, but to his wealth. There can be no doubt as

to the fact of that marriage, from which was born the Athenian leader Kleisthenês, afterwards the author of the great democratical revolution at Athens after the expulsion of the Peisistratidæ; but the lively and amusing details with which Herodotus has surrounded it, bear much more the stamp of romance than of reality. Dressed up, apparently, by some ingenious Athenian, as a compliment to the Alkmæonid lineage of his city, which comprised both Kleisthenês and Periklês, the narrative commemorates a marriage-rivalry between that lineage and another noble Athenian house, and at the same time gives a mythical explanation of a phrase seemingly proverbial at Athens—"*Hippokleides don't care.*"[52]

Plutarch numbers Æschinês of Sikyôn[53] among the despots put down by Sparta: at what period this took place, or how it is to be connected with the history of Kleisthenês as given in Herodotus, we are unable to say.

Contemporaneous with the Orthagoridæ at Sikyôn,—but beginning a little later and closing somewhat earlier,—we find the despots Kypselus and Periander at Corinth. The former appears as the subverter of the oligarchy called the Bacchiadæ. Of the manner in which he accomplished his object we find no information: and this historical blank is inadequately filled up by various religious prognostics and oracles, foreshadowing the rise, the harsh rule, and the dethronement, after two generations, of these powerful despots.

According to an idea deeply seated in the Greek mind, the destruction of a great prince or of a great power is usually signified to him by the gods beforehand, though either through hardness of heart or inadvertence, no heed is taken of the warning. In reference to Kypselus and the Bacchiadæ, we are informed that Melas, the ancestor of the former, was one of the original settlers at Corinth who accompanied the first Dorian chief Alêtês, and that Alêtês was in vain warned by an oracle not to admit him;[54] again, too, immediately before Kypselus was born, the Bacchiadæ received notice that his mother was about to give birth to one who would prove their ruin: the dangerous infant escaped destruction only by a hair's breadth, being preserved from the intent of his destroyers by lucky concealment in a chest. Labba, the mother of Kypselus, was daughter of Amphion, who belonged to the gens, or sept, of the Bacchiadæ; but she was lame, and none of the gens would consent to marry her with that deformity. Eetion, son of Echekratês, who became her husband, belonged to a different, yet hardly less distinguished heroic genealogy: he was of the Lapithæ, descended from Kæneus, and dwelling in the Corinthian deme called Petra. We see thus that Kypselus was not only a high-born man in the city, but a Bacchiad by half-birth; both of these circumstances were likely to make exclusion from the government intolerable to him. He rendered himself highly popular with the people, and by their aid overthrew and expelled the Bacchiadæ, continuing as despot at Corinth for thirty years until his death (B. C. 655-625). According to Aristotle, he maintained throughout life the same conciliatory behavior by which his power had first been acquired; and his popularity was so effectually sustained that he had never any occa-

sion for a body-guard. But the Corinthian oligarchy of the century of Herodotus,—whose tale that historian has embodied in the oration of the Corinthian envoy Sosiklês[55] to the Spartans,—gave a very different description, and depicted Kypselus as a cruel ruler, who banished, robbed, and murdered by wholesale.

His son and successor Periander, though energetic as a warrior, distinguished as an encourager of poetry and music, and even numbered by some among the seven wise men of Greece,—is, nevertheless, uniformly represented as oppressive and inhuman in his treatment of subjects. The revolting stories which are told respecting his private life, and his relations with his mother and his wife, may for the most part be regarded as calumnies suggested by odious associations with his memory; but there seems good reason for imputing to him tyranny of the worst character, and the sanguinary maxims of precaution so often acted upon by Grecian despots were traced back in ordinary belief to Periander,[56] and his contemporary Thrasybulus, despot of Milêtus. He maintained a powerful body-guard, shed much blood, and was exorbitant in his exactions, a part of which was employed in votive offerings at Olympia; and this munificence to the gods was considered by Aristotle and others as part of a deliberate system, with the view of keeping his subjects both hard at work and poor. On one occasion, we are told that he invited the women of Corinth to assemble for the celebration of a religious festival, and then stripped them of their rich attire and ornaments. By some later writers, he is painted as the stern foe of everything like luxury and dissolute habits,—enforcing industry, compelling every man to render account of his means of livelihood, and causing the procuresses of Corinth to be thrown into the sea.[57] Though the general features of his character, his cruel tyranny no less than his vigor and ability, may be sufficiently relied on, yet the particular incidents connected with his name are all extremely dubious: the most credible of all seems to be the tale of his inexpiable quarrel with his son, and his brutal treatment of many noble Korkyræan youths, as related in Herodotus. Periander is said to have put to death his wife, Melissa, daughter of Proklês, despot of Epidaurus; and his son Lykophrôn, informed of this deed, contracted an incurable antipathy against him. After vainly trying, both by rigor and by conciliation, to conquer this feeling on the part of his son, Periander sent him to reside at Korkyra, then dependent upon his rule; but when he found himself growing old and disabled, he recalled him to Corinth, in order to insure the continuance of the dynasty. Lykophrôn still obstinately declined all personal communication with his father, upon which the latter desired him to come to Corinth, and engaged himself to go over to Korkyra. So terrified were the Korkyræans at the idea of a visit from this formidable old man, that they put Lykophrôn to death,—a deed which Periander avenged by seizing three hundred youths of their noblest families, and sending them over to the Lydian king, Alyattês at Sardis, in order that they might be castrated and made to serve as eunuchs. The Corinthian vessels in which the youths were dispatched fortunately touched at Samos in the way; where the Samians and Knidians, shocked at a proceeding which outraged all Hellenic sentiment, contrived to rescue the youths from the miserable fate

intended for them, and, after the death of Periander, sent them back to their native island.[58]

While we turn with displeasure from the political life of this man, we are at the same time made acquainted with the great extent of his power,—greater than that which was ever possessed by Corinth after the extinction of his dynasty. Korkyra, Ambrakia, Leukas, and Anaktorium, all Corinthian colonies, but in the next century independent states, appear in his time dependencies of Corinth. Ambrakia is said to have been under the rule of another despot named Periander, probably also a Kypselid by birth. It seems, indeed, that the towns of Anaktorium, Leukas, and Apollonia in the Ionian gulf, were either founded by the Kypselids, or received reinforcements of Corinthian colonists, during their dynasty, though Korkyra was established considerably earlier.[59]

The reign of Periander lasted for forty years (B. C. 625-585): Psammetichus son of Gordius, who succeeded him, reigned three years, and the Kypselid dynasty is then said to have closed, after having continued for seventy-three years.[60] In respect of power, magnificent display, and wide-spread connections both in Asia and in Italy, they evidently stood high among the Greeks of their time. Their offerings consecrated at Olympia excited great admiration, especially the gilt colossal statue of Zeus, and the large chest of cedar-wood dedicated in the temple of Hêrê, overlaid with various figures in gold and ivory: the figures were borrowed from mythical and legendary story, and the chest was a commemoration both of the name of Kypselus and of the tale of his marvellous preservation in infancy.[61] If Plutarch is correct, this powerful dynasty is to be numbered among the despots put down by Sparta;[62] yet such intervention of the Spartans, granting it to have been matter of fact, can hardly have been known to Herodotus.

Coincident in point of time with the commencement of Periander's reign at Corinth, we find Theagenês despot at Megara, who is also said to have acquired his power by demagogic arts, as well as by violent aggressions against the rich proprietors, whose cattle he destroyed in their pastures by the side of the river. We are not told by what previous conduct on the part of the rich this hatred of the people had been earned, but Theagenês carried the popular feeling completely along with him, obtained by public vote a body of guards ostensibly for his personal safety, and employed them to overthrow the oligarchy.[63] But he did not maintain his power, even for his own life: a second revolution dethroned and expelled him; on which occasion, after a short interval of temperate government, the people are said to have renewed in a still more marked way their antipathies against the rich; banishing some of them with confiscation of property, intruding into the houses of others with demands for forced hospitality, and even passing a formal palintokia, or decree, to require from the rich who had lent money on interest, the refunding of all past interest paid to them by their debtors.[64] To appreciate correctly such a demand, we must recollect that the practice of taking interest for money lent was regarded by a large proportion

of early ancient society with feelings of unqualified reprobation; and it will be seen, when we come to the legislation of Solon, how much such violent reactionary feeling against the creditor was provoked by the antecedent working of the harsh law determining his rights.

We hear in general terms of more than one revolution in the government of Megara,—a disorderly democracy, subverted by returning oligarchical exiles, and these again unable long to maintain themselves;[65] but we are alike uninformed as to dates and details. And in respect to one of these struggles, we are admitted to the outpourings of a contemporary and a sufferer,—the Megarian poet Theognis. Unfortunately, his elegiac verses, as we possess them, are in a state so broken, incoherent, and interpolated, that we make out no distinct conception of the events which call them forth,—still less, can we discover in the verses of Theognis that strength and peculiarity of pure Dorian feeling, which, since the publication of O. Müller's History of the Dorians, it has been the fashion to look for so extensively. But we see that the poet was connected with an oligarchy, of birth and not of wealth, which had recently been subverted by the breaking in of the rustic population previously subject and degraded,—that these subjects were contented to submit to a single-headed despot, in order to escape from their former rulers,—and that Theognis had himself been betrayed by his own friends and companions, stripped of his property, and exiled, through the wrong doing "of enemies whose blood he hopes one day to be permitted to drink."[66] The condition of the subject cultivators previous to this revolution he depicts in sad colors;—they "dwelt without the city, clad in goatskins, and ignorant of judicial sanctions or laws:"[67] after it, they had become citizens, and their importance had been immensely enhanced. And thus, according to his impression, the vile breed has trodden down the noble,—the bad have become masters, and the good are no longer of any account. The bitterness and humiliation which attend upon poverty, and the undue ascendency which wealth confers even upon the most worthless of mankind,[68] are among the prominent subjects of his complaint, and his keen personal feeling on this point would be alone sufficient to show that the recent revolution had no way overthrown the influence of property; in contradiction to the opinion of Welcker, who infers without ground, from a passage of uncertain meaning, that the land of the state had been formally redivided.[69] The Megarian revolution, so far as we apprehend it from Theognis, appears to have improved materially the condition of the cultivators around the town, and to have strengthened a certain class whom he considers "the bad rich,"—while it extinguished the privileges of that governing order, to which he himself belonged, denominated in his language "the good and the virtuous," with ruinous effect upon his own individual fortunes. How far this governing order was exclusively Dorian, we have no means of determining. The political change by which Theognis suffered, and the new despot whom he indicates as either actually installed or nearly impending, must have come considerably after the despotism of Theagenês; for the life of the poet seems to fall between 570-490 B. C., while Theagenês must have ruled about 630-600 B. C. From the unfavorable pic-

ture, therefore, which the poet gives as his own early experience of the condition of the rural cultivators, it is evident that the despot Theagenês had neither conferred upon them any permanent benefit, nor given them access to the judicial protection of the city.

It is thus that the despots of Corinth, Sikyôn, and Megara serve as samples of those revolutionary influences, which towards the beginning of the sixth century B. C., seem to have shaken or overturned the oligarchical governments in very many cities throughout the Grecian world. There existed a certain sympathy and alliance between the despots of Corinth and Sikyôn:[70] how far such feeling was farther extended to Megara, we do not know. The latter city seems evidently to have been more populous and powerful during the seventh and sixth centuries B. C., than we shall afterwards find her throughout the two brilliant centuries of Grecian history: her colonies, found as far distant as Bithynia and the Thracian Bosphorus on one side, and as Sicily on the other, argue an extent of trade as well as naval force once not inferior to Athens: so that we shall be the less surprised when we approach the life of Solon, to find her in possession of the island of Salamis, and long maintaining it, at one time with every promise of triumph, against the entire force of the Athenians.

CHAPTER X.

IONIC PORTION OF HELLAS. — ATHENS BEFORE SOLON.

HAVING traced in the preceding chapters the scanty stream of Peloponnesian history, from the first commencement of an authentic chronology in 776 B. C. to the maximum of Spartan territorial acquisition, and the general acknowledgment of Spartan primacy, prior to 547 B. C., I proceed to state as much as can be made out respecting the Ionic portion of Hellas during the same period. This portion comprehends Athens and Eubœa,—the Cyclades Islands,—and the Ionic cities on the coast of Asia Minor, with their different colonies.

In the case of Peloponnesus, we have been enabled to discern something like an order of real facts in the period alluded to,—Sparta makes great strides, while Argos falls. In the case of Athens, unfortunately, our materials are less instructive. The number of historical facts, anterior to the Solonian legislation, is very few indeed;—the interval between 776 B. C. and 624 B. C., the epoch of Drako's legislation a short time prior to Kylôn's attempted usurpation, gives us merely a list of archons, denuded of all incident.

In compliment to the heroism of Kodrus, who had sacrificed his life for the safety of his country, we are told that no person after him was permitted to bear the title of king:[71] his son Medôn, and twelve successors,—Akastus, Archippus, Thersippus, Phorbas, Megaklês, Diognêtus, Phereklês, Ariphrôn, Thespieus, Agamestôr, Æschylus, and Alkmæôn,—were all archons for life. In the second year of Alkmæôn (752 B. C.), the dignity of archon was restricted to a duration of ten years: and seven of these decennial archons are numbered,—Charops, Æsimidês, Kleidikus, Hippomenês, Leokratês, Apsandrus, Eryxias. With Kreôn, who succeeded Eryxias, the archonship was not only made annual, but put into commission and distributed among nine persons and these nine archons, annually changed, continue throughout all the historical period, interrupted only by the few intervals of political disturbance and foreign compression. Down to Kleidikus and Hippomenês (714 B. C.), the dignity of archon had continued to belong exclusively to the Medontidæ or descendants of Medôn and Kodrus:[72] at that period it was thrown open to all the Eupatrids, or order of nobility in the state.

Such is the series of names by which we step down from the level of legend to that of history. All our historical knowledge of Athens is confined to the period of the annual archons; which series of eponymous archons, from Kreôn downwards, is perfectly trustworthy.[73] Above 683 B. C., the Attic antiquaries have provided us with a string of names, which we must take as we find them, without being able either to warrant the whole or to separate the false from the true. There is no reason to doubt

the general fact, that Athens, like so many other communities of Greece, was in its primitive times governed by an hereditary line of kings, and that it passed from that form of government into a commonwealth, first oligarchical, afterwards democratical.

We are in no condition to determine the civil classification and political constitution of Attica, even at the period of the archonship of Kreôn, 683 B. C., when authentic Athenian chronology first commences,—much less can we pretend to any knowledge of the anterior centuries. Great political changes were introduced first by Solon (about 594 B. C.), next by Kleisthenês (509 B. C.), afterwards by Aristeidês, Periklês, and Ephialtês, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars: so that the old ante-Solonian,—nay, even the real Solonian,—polity was thus put more and more out of date and out of knowledge. But all the information which we possess respecting that old polity, is derived from authors who lived after all or most of these great changes,—and who, finding no records, nor anything better than current legends, explained the foretime as well as they could by guesses more or less ingenious, generally attached to the dominant legendary names. They were sometimes able to found their conclusions upon religious usages, periodical ceremonies, or common sacrifices, still subsisting in their own time; and these were doubtless the best evidences to be found respecting Athenian antiquity, since such practices often continued unaltered throughout all the political changes. It is in this way alone that we arrive at some partial knowledge of the ante-Solonian condition of Attica, though as a whole it still remains dark and unintelligible, even after the many illustrations of modern commentators.

Philochorus, writing in the third century before the Christian era, stated that Kekrops had originally distributed Attica into twelve districts,—Kekropia, Tetrapolis, Epakria, Dekeleia, Eleusis, Aphidnæ, Thorikus, Braurôn, Kythêrus, Sphêttus, Kêphisia, Phalêrus,—and that these twelve were consolidated into one political society by Theseus.[74] This partition does not comprise the Megarid, which, according to other statements, is represented as united with Attica, and as having formed part of the distribution made by king Pandiôn among his four sons, Nisus, Ægeus, Pallas, and Lykus,—a story as old as Sophoklês, at least.[75] In other accounts, again, a quadruple division is applied to the tribes, which are stated to have been four in number, beginning from Kekrops,—called in his time Kekrŏpis, Autochthon, Aktæa, and Paralia. Under king Kranaus, these tribes, we are told, received the names of Kranaïs, Atthis, Mesogæa, and Diakria,[76]—under Erichthonius, those of Dias, Athenaïs, Poseidonias, Hephæstias: at last, shortly after Erechtheus, they were denominated after the four sons of Iôn (son of Kreusa, daughter of Erechtheus, by Apollo), Geleontes, Hoplêtes, Ægikoreis, Argadeis. The four Attic or Ionic tribes, under these last-mentioned names, continued to form the classification of the citizens until the revolution of Kleisthenês in 509 B. C. by which the ten tribes were introduced, as we find them down to the period of Macedonian ascendency. It is affirmed, and with some etymological plausibility, that the denominations of these four tribes must origi-

nally have had reference to the occupations of those who bore them,—the Hoplêtes being the *warrior-class*, the Ægikoreis *goatherds*, the Argadeis *artisans*, and the Geleontes (Teleontes, or Gedeontes) *cultivators*: and hence some authors have ascribed to the ancient inhabitants of Attica[77] an actual primitive distribution into hereditary professions, or castes, similar to that which prevailed in India and Egypt. If we should even grant that such a division into castes might originally have prevailed, it must have grown obsolete long before the time of Solon: but there seem no sufficient grounds for believing that it ever did prevail. The names of the tribes may have been originally borrowed from certain professions, but it does not necessarily follow that the reality corresponded to this derivation, or that every individual who belonged to any tribe was a member of the profession from whence the name had originally been derived. From the etymology of the names, be it ever so clear, we cannot safely assume the historical reality of a classification according to professions. And this objection (which would be weighty, even if the etymology had been clear) becomes irresistible, when we add that even the etymology is not beyond dispute; [78] that the names themselves are written with a diversity which cannot be reconciled: and that the four professions named by Strabo omit the goatherds and include the priests; while those specified by Plutarch leave out the latter and include the former.[79]

All that seems certain is, that these were the four ancient Ionic tribes—analogous to the Hylleis, Pamphyli, and Dymanes among the Dorians—which prevailed not only at Athens, but among several of the Ionic cities derived from Athens. The Geleontes are mentioned in inscriptions now remaining belonging to Teôs in Ionia, and all the four are named in those of Kyzikus in the Propontis, which was a foundation from the Ionic Miletus.[80] The four tribes, and the four names (allowing for some variations of reading), are therefore historically verified; but neither the time of their introduction nor their primitive import are ascertainable matters, nor can any faith be put in the various constructions of the legends of Iôn, Erechtheus, and Kekrops, by modern commentators.

These four tribes may be looked at either as religious and social aggregates, in which capacity each of them comprised three phratries and ninety gentes; or as political aggregates, in which point of view each included three trittyes and twelve naukraries. Each phratry contained thirty gentes; each trittys comprised four naukraries: the total numbers were thus three hundred and sixty gentes and forty-eight naukraries. Moreover, each gens is said to have contained thirty heads of families, of whom therefore there would be a total of ten thousand eight hundred.

Comparing these two distributions one with the other, we may remark that they are distinct in their nature and proceed in opposite directions. The trittys and the naukrary are essentially fractional subdivisions of the tribe, and resting upon the tribe as their higher unity; the naukrary is a local circumscription, composed of the naukrars, or principal householders (so the etymology seems to indicate), who levy

in each respective district the quota of public contributions which belongs to it, and superintend the disbursement,—provide the military force incumbent upon the district, being for each naukrary two horsemen and one ship,—and furnish the chief district-officers, the prytanes of the naukrari.[81] A certain number of foot soldiers, varying according to the demand, must probably be understood as accompanying these horsemen, but the quota is not specified, as it was perhaps thought unnecessary to limit precisely the obligations of any except the wealthier men who served on horseback,—at a period when oligarchical ascendency was paramount, and when the bulk of the people was in a state of comparative subjection. The forty-eight naukraries are thus a systematic subdivision of the four tribes, embracing altogether the whole territory, population, contributions, and military force of Attica,—a subdivision framed exclusively for purposes connected with the entire state.

But the phratries and gentes are a distribution completely different from this. They seem aggregations of small primitive unities into larger; they are independent of, and do not presuppose, the tribe; they arise separately and spontaneously, without preconcerted uniformity, and without reference to a common political purpose; the legislator finds them preëxisting, and adapts or modifies them to answer some national scheme. We must distinguish the general fact of the classification, and the successive subordination in the scale, of the families to the gens, of the gentes to the phratry, and of the phratries to the tribe,—from the precise numerical symmetry with which this subordination is invested, as we read it,—thirty families to a gens, thirty gentes to a phratry, three phratries to each tribe. If such nice equality of numbers could ever have been procured, by legislative constraint[82] operating upon preëxistent natural elements, the proportions could not have been permanently maintained. But we may reasonably doubt whether it did ever so exist: it appears more like the fancy of an author who pleased himself by supposing an original systematic creation in times anterior to records, by multiplying together the number of days in the month and of months in the year. That every phratry contained an equal number of gentes, and every gens an equal number of families, is a supposition hardly admissible without better evidence than we possess. But apart from this questionable precision of numerical scale, the phratries and gentes themselves were real, ancient, and durable associations among the Athenian people, highly important to be understood.[83] The basis of the whole was the house, hearth, or family,—a number of which, greater or less, composed the gens, or genos. This gens was therefore a clan, sept, or enlarged, and partly factitious, brotherhood, bound together by,—1. Common religious ceremonies, and exclusive privilege of priesthood, in honor of the same god, supposed to be the primitive ancestor, and characterized by a special surname. 2. By a common burial-place. 3. By mutual rights of succession to property. 4. By reciprocal obligations of help, defence, and redress of injuries. 5. By mutual right and obligation to intermarry in certain determinate cases, especially where there was an orphan daughter or heiress. 6. By possession, in some cases at least, of common property, an archon and a treasurer of their own. Such were the rights and obliga-

tions characterizing the gentile union:[84] the phratric union, binding together several gentes, was less intimate, but still included some mutual rights and obligations of an analogous character, and especially a communion of particular sacred rites and mutual privileges of prosecution in the event of a phrator being slain. Each phratry was considered as belonging to one of the four tribes, and all the phratries of the same tribe enjoyed a certain periodical communion of sacred rites, under the presidency of a magistrate called the phylo-basileus, or tribe-king, selected from the Eupatrids; Zeus Geleôn was in this manner the patron-god of the tribe Geleontes. Lastly, all the four tribes were linked together by the common worship of Apollo Patrôus, as their divine father and guardian; for Apollo was the father of Iôn, and the eponyms of all the four tribes were reputed sons of Iôn.

Such was the primitive religious and social union of the population of Attica in its gradually ascending scale,—as distinguished from the political union, probably of later introduction, represented at first by the trittyes and naukraries, and in after times by the ten Kleisthenean tribes, subdivided into trittyes and demes. The religious and family bond of aggregation is the earlier of the two: but the political bond, though beginning later, will be found to acquire constantly increasing influence throughout the greater part of this history. In the former, personal relation is the essential and predominant characteristic,[85]—local relation being subordinate: in the latter, property and residence become the chief considerations, and the personal element counts only as measured by these accompaniments. All these phratric and gentile associations, the larger as well as the smaller, were founded upon the same principles and tendencies of the Grecian mind,[86]—a coalescence of the idea of worship with that of ancestry, or of communion in certain special religious rites with communion of blood, real or supposed. The god, or hero, to whom the assembled members offered their sacrifices, was conceived as the primitive ancestor, to whom they owed their origin; often through a long list of intermediate names, as in the case of the Milesian Hekatæus, so often before adverted to.[87] Each family had its own sacred rites and funereal commemoration of ancestors, celebrated by the master of the house, to which none but members of the family were admissible: the extinction of a family, carrying with it the suspension of these religious rites, was held by the Greeks to be a misfortune, not merely from the loss of the citizens composing it, but also because the family gods and the manes of deceased citizens were thus deprived of their honors,[88] and might visit the country with displeasure. The larger associations, called gens, phratry, tribe, were formed by an extension of the same principle,—of the family considered as a religious brotherhood, worshipping some common god or hero with an appropriate surname, and recognizing him as their joint ancestor; and the festivals Theoenia and Apaturia[89]—the first Attic, the second common to all the Ionic race,—annually brought together the members of these phratries and gentes for worship, festivity, and maintenance of special sympathies; thus strengthening the larger ties without effacing the smaller.

Such were the manifestations of Grecian sociality, as we read them in the early constitution, not merely of Attica, but of other Grecian states besides. To Aristotle and Dikæarchus, it was an interesting inquiry to trace back all political society into certain assumed elementary atoms, and to show by what motives and means the original families, each having its separate meal-bin and fireplace,[90] had been brought together into larger aggregates. But the historian must accept as an ultimate fact the earliest state of things which his witnesses make known to him; and in the case now before us, the gentile and phratric unions are matters into the beginning of which we cannot pretend to penetrate.

Pollux—probably from Aristotle's lost work on the Constitutions of Greece—informs us, distinctly, that the members of the same gens at Athens were not commonly related by blood,—and even without any express testimony we might have concluded such to be fact: to what extent the gens, at the unknown epoch of its first formation, was based upon actual relationship, we have no means of determining, either with regard to the Athenian or the Roman gentes, which were in all main points analogous. Gentilism is a tie by itself; distinct from the family ties, but presupposing their existence and extending them by an artificial analogy, partly founded on religious belief and partly on positive compact, so as to comprehend strangers in blood. All the members of one gens, or even of one phratry, believed themselves to be sprung, not, indeed, from the same grandfather or greatgrandfather, but from the same divine or heroic ancestor: all the contemporary members of the phratry of Hekatæus had a common god for their ancestor in the sixteenth degree; and this fundamental belief, into which the Greek mind passed with so much facility, was adopted and converted by positive compact into the gentile and phratric principle of union. It is because such a transfusion, not recognized by Christianity, is at variance with modern habits of thought, and because we do not readily understand how such a legal and religious fiction can have sunk deep into the Greek feelings, that the phratries and gentes appear to us mysterious: but they are in harmony with all the legendary genealogies which have been set forth in the preceding volume. Doubtless Niebuhr, in his valuable discussion of the ancient Roman gentes, is right in supposing that they were not real families, procreated from any common historical ancestor: but it is not the less true, though he seems to suppose otherwise, that the idea of the gens involved *the belief* in a common first father, divine or heroic,—a genealogy which we may properly call fabulous, but which was consecrated and accredited among the members of the gens itself, and served as one important bond of union between them.[91] And though an analytical mind like Aristotle might discern the difference between the gens and the family, so as to distinguish the former as the offspring of some special compact, still, this is no fair test of the feelings usual among early Greeks; nor is it certain that Aristotle himself, son of the physician Nikomachus, who belonged to the gens of the Asklepiads,[92] would have consented to disallow the procreative origin of *all* these religious families without any exception. The natural families of course changed from generation to generation, some extending them-

selves while others diminished or died out; but the gens received no alterations, except through the procreation, extinction, or subdivision of these component families; accordingly, the relations of the families with the gens were in perpetual course of fluctuation, and the gentile ancestorial genealogy, adapted as it doubtless was to the early condition of the gens, became in process of time partially obsolete and unsuitable. We hear of this genealogy but rarely, because it is only brought before the public in certain cases preëminent and venerable. But the humbler gentes had their common rites, and common superhuman ancestor and genealogy, as well as the more celebrated: the scheme and ideal basis was the same in all.

Analogies, borrowed from very different people and parts of the world, prove how readily these enlarged and factitious family unions assort with the ideas of an early stage of society. The Highland clan, the Irish sept,[93] the ancient legally constituted families in Friesland and Dithmarsch, the phis, or phara, among the Albanians, are examples of a similar practice:[94] and the adoption of prisoners by the North American Indians, as well as the universal prevalence and efficacy of the ceremony of adoption in the Grecian and Roman world, exhibit to us a solemn formality under certain circumstances, originating an union and affections similar to those of kindred. Of this same nature were the phratries and gentes at Athens, the curiæ and gentes at Rome, but they were peculiarly modified by the religious imagination of the ancient world, which always traced back the past time to gods and heroes: and religion thus supplied both the common genealogy as their basis, and the privileged communion of special sacred rites as means of commemoration and perpetuity. The gentes, both at Athens and in other parts of Greece, bore a patronymic name, the stamp of their believed common paternity: we find the Asklepiadæ in many parts of Greece,—the Aleuadæ in Thessaly,—the Midylidæ, Psalychidæ, Blepsiadæ, Euxenidæ, at Ægina,—the Branchidæ at Miletus,—the Nebridæ at Kôs,—the Iamidæ and Klytiadæ at Olympia,—the Akestoridæ at Argos,—the Kinyradæ in Cyprus,—the Penthilidæ at Mitylene,[95]—the Talthybiadæ at Sparta,—not less than the Kodridæ, Eumolpidæ, Phytalidæ, Lykomêdæ, Butadæ, Euneidæ, Hesychidæ, Brytiadæ, &c., in Attica.[96] To each of these corresponded a mythical ancestor more or less known, and passing for the first father as well as the eponymous hero of the gens,—Kodrus, Eumolpus, Butes, Phytalus, Hesychus, &c.

The revolution of Kleisthenês in 509 B. C. abolished the old tribes for civil purposes, and created ten new tribes,—leaving the phratries and gentes unaltered, but introducing the local distribution according to demes, or cantons, as the foundation of his new political tribes. A certain number of demes belonged to each of the ten Kleisthenean tribes (the demes in the same tribes were not usually contiguous, so that the tribe was not coincident with a definite circumscription), and the deme, in which every individual was then registered, continued to be that in which his descendants were also registered. But the gentes had no connection, as such, with these new tribes, and the members of the same gens might belong to different demes.[97]

It deserves to be remarked, however, that to a certain extent, in the old arrangement of Attica, the division into gentes coincided with the division into demes; that is, it happened not unfrequently that the gennêtes or members of the same gens lived in the same canton, so that the name of the gens and the name of the deme was the same: moreover, it seems that Kleisthenês recognized a certain number of new demes, to which he gave names derived from some important gens resident near the spot. It is thus that we are to explain the large number of the Kleisthenean demes which bear patronymic names.[98]

There is one remarkable difference between the Roman and the Grecian gens, arising from the different practice in regard to naming. A Roman patrician bore habitually three names,—the gentile name, with one name following it to denote his family, and another preceding it peculiar to himself in that family. But in Athens, at least after the revolution of Kleisthenês, the gentile name was not employed: a man was described by his own single name, followed first by the name of his father, and next by that of the deme to which he belonged,—as *Æschinês, son of Atromêtus, a Kothôkid*. Such a difference in the habitual system of naming, tended to make the gentile tie more present to every one's mind at Rome than in the Greek cities.

Before the pecuniary classification of the Atticans introduced by Solon, the phratries and gentes, and the trittyes and naukraries, were the only recognized bonds among them, and the only basis of legal rights and obligations, over and above the natural family. The gens constituted a close incorporation, both as to property and as to persons. Until the time of Solon, no man had any power of testamentary disposition: if he died without children, his gennêtes succeeded to his property,[99] and so they continued to do even after Solon, if he died intestate. An orphan girl might be claimed in marriage of right by any member of the gens, the nearest agnates being preferred;[100] if she was poor, and he did not choose to marry her himself, the law of Solon compelled him to provide her with a dowry proportional to his enrolled scale of property, and to give her out in marriage to another; and the magnitude of the dowry required to be given,—large, even as fixed by Solon, and afterwards doubled, —seems a proof that the lawgiver intended indirectly to enforce actual marriage.[101] If a man was murdered, first his near relations, next his gennêtes and phrators, were both allowed and required to prosecute the crime at law;[102] his fellow demots, or inhabitants of the same deme, did not possess the like right of prosecuting. All that we hear of the most ancient Athenian laws is based upon the gentile and phratric divisions, which are treated throughout as extensions of the family. It is to be observed that this division is completely independent of any property qualification,—rich men as well as poor being comprehended in the same gens.[103] Moreover, the different gentes were very unequal in dignity, arising chiefly from the religious ceremonies of which each possessed the hereditary and exclusive administration, and which, being in some cases considered as of preëminent sanctity in reference to the whole city, were therefore nationalized. Thus the Eumolpidæ and Kêrȳkes, who supplied the Hi-

erophant, and superintended the mysteries of the Eleusinian Dêmêtêr,—and the Butadæ, who furnished the priestess of Athênê Polias as well as the priest of Poseidôn Erechtheus in the acropolis,—seem to have been reverenced above all the other gentes.[104] When the name Butadæ was adopted in the Kleisthenean arrangement as the name of a deme, the holy gens so called adopted the distinctive denomination of Eteobutadæ, or "The True Butadæ."[105]

A great many of the ancient gentes of Attica are known to us by name; but there is only one phratry (the Achniadæ) whose title has come down to us.[106] These phratries and gentes probably never at any time included the whole population of the country,—and the proportion not included in them tended to become larger and larger, in the times anterior to Kleisthenês,[107] as well as afterwards. They remained, under his constitution, and throughout the subsequent history, as religious quasi-families, or corporations, conferring rights and imposing liabilities which were enforced in the regular dikasteries, but not directly connected with the citizenship or with political functions: a man might be a citizen without being enrolled in any gens. The forty-eight naukraries ceased to exist, for any important purposes, under his constitution: the deme, instead of the naukrary, became the elementary political division, for military and financial objects, and the demarch became the working local president, in place of the chief of the naukrars. The deme, however, was not coincident with a naukrary, nor the demarch with the previous chief of the naukrary, though they were analogous and constituted for the like purpose.[108] While the naukraries had been only forty-eight in number, the demes formed smaller subdivisions, and, in later times at least, amounted to a hundred and seventy-four.[109]

But though this early quadruple division into tribes is tolerably intelligible in itself, there is much difficulty in reconciling it with that severalty of government which we learn to have originally prevailed among the inhabitants of Attica. From Kekrops down to Theseus, says Thucydidês, there were many different cities in Attica, each of them autonomous and self-governing, with its own prytaneium and its own archons; and it was only on occasions of some common danger that these distinct communities took counsel together under the authority of the Athenian kings, whose city at that time comprised merely the holy rock of Athênê on the plain,[110]—afterwards so conspicuous as the acropolis of the enlarged Athens,—together with a narrow area under it on the southern side. It was Theseus, he states, who effected that great revolution whereby the whole of Attica was consolidated into one government, all the local magistracies and councils being made to centre in the prytaneium and senate of Athens: his combined sagacity and power enforced upon all the inhabitants of Attica the necessity of recognizing Athens as the one city in the country, and of occupying their own abodes simply as constituent portions of Athenian territory. This important move, which naturally produced a great extension of the central city, was commemorated throughout the historical times by the Athenians in the periodical festival called Synœkia, in honor of the goddess Athênê.[111]

Such is the account which Thucydidês gives of the original severalty and subsequent consolidation of the different portions of Attica. Of the general fact there is no reason to doubt, though the operative cause assigned by the historian,—the power and sagacity of Theseus,—belongs to legend and not to history. Nor can we pretend to determine either the real steps by which such a change was brought about, or its date, or the number of portions which went to constitute the full-grown Athens,—farther enlarged at some early period, though we do not know when, by voluntary junction of the Bœotian, or semi-Bœotian, town Eleutheræ, situated among the valleys of Kithærôn between Eleusis and Platæa. It was the standing habit of the population of Attica, even down to the Peloponnesian war,[112] to reside in their several cantons, where their ancient festivals and temples yet continued as relics of a state of previous autonomy: their visits to the city were made only at special times, for purposes religious or political, and they yet looked upon the country residence as their real home. How deep-seated this cantonal feeling was among them, we may see by the fact that it survived the temporary exile forced upon them by the Persian invasion, and was resumed when the expulsion of that destroying host enabled them to rebuild their ruined dwellings in Attica.[113]

How many of the demes recognized by Kleisthenês had originally separate governments, or in what local aggregates they stood combined, we cannot now make out; it will be recollected that the city of Athens itself contained several demes, and Peiræeus also formed a deme apart. Some of the twelve divisions, which Philochorus ascribes to Kekrops, present probable marks of an ancient substantive existence,—Kekropia, or the region surrounding and including the city and acropolis; the tetrapolis, composed of Œnoê, Trikorythus, Probalinthus, and Marathon;[114] Eleusis; Aphidnæ and Dekeleia,[115] both distinguished by their peculiar mythical connection with Sparta and the Dioskuri. But it is difficult to imagine that Phalêrum, which is one of the separate divisions named by Philochorus, can ever have enjoyed an autonomy apart from Athens. Moreover, we find among some of the demes which Philochorus does not notice, evidences of standing antipathies, and prohibitions of intermarriage, which might seem to indicate that these had once been separate little states.[116] Though in most cases we can infer little from the legends and religious ceremonies which nearly every deme[117] had peculiar to itself, yet those of Eleusis are so remarkable, as to establish the probable autonomy of that township down to a comparatively late period. The Homeric Hymn to Dêmêtêr, recounting the visit of that goddess to Eleusis after the abduction of her daughter, and the first establishment of the Eleusinian ceremonies, specifies the eponymous prince Eleusis, and the various chiefs of the place,—Keleos, Triptolemus, Dioklês, and Eumolpus; it also notices the Rharian plain in the neighborhood of Eleusis, but not the least allusion is made to Athens or to any concern of the Athenians in the presence or worship of the goddess. There is reason to believe that at the time when this Hymn was composed, Eleusis was an independent town: what that time was we have no means of settling, though Voss puts it as low as the 30th Olympiad.[118] And the proof hence derived is

so much the more valuable, because the Hymn to Dêmêtêr presents a coloring strictly special and local; moreover, the story told by Solon to Crœsus, respecting Tellus the Athenian, who perished in battle against the neighboring townsmen of Eleusis,[119] assumes, in like manner, the independence of the latter in earlier times. Nor is it unimportant to notice that, even so low as 300 B. C., the observant visitor Dikæarchus professes to detect a difference between the native Athenians and the Atticans, as well in physiognomy as in character and taste.[120]

In the history set forth to us of the proceedings of Theseus, no mention is made of these four Ionic tribes; but another and a totally different distribution of the people into eupatridæ, geômori, and demiurgi, which he is said to have first introduced, is brought to our notice; Dionysius of Halikarnassus gives only a double division,—eupatridæ and dependent cultivators; corresponding to his idea of the patricians and clients in early Rome.[121] As far as we can understand this triple distinction, it seems to be disparate and unconnected with the four tribes above mentioned. The eupatridæ are the wealthy and powerful men, belonging to the most distinguished families in all the various gentes, and principally living in the city of Athens, after the consolidation of Attica: from them are distinguished the middling and lower people, roughly classified into husbandmen and artisans. To the eupatridæ, is ascribed a religious as well as a political and social ascendency; they are represented as the source of all authority on matters both sacred and profane;[122] they doubtless comprised those gentes, such as the Butadæ, whose sacred ceremonies were looked upon with the greatest reverence by the people: and we may conceive Eumolpus, Keleos, Dioklês, etc., as they are described in the Homeric Hymn to Dêmêtêr, in the character of eupatridæ of Eleusis. The humbler gentes, and the humbler members of each gens, would appear in this classification confounded with that portion of the people who belonged to no gens at all.

From these eupatridæ exclusively, and doubtless by their selection, the nine annual archons—probably also the prytanes of the naukrari—were taken. That the senate of areopagus was formed of members of the same order, we may naturally presume: the nine archons all passed into it at the expiration of their year of office, subject only to the condition of having duly passed the test of accountability; and they remained members for life. These are the only political authorities of whom we hear in the earliest imperfectly known period of the Athenian government, after the discontinuance of the king, and the adoption of the annual change of archons. The senate of areopagus seems to represent the Homeric council of old men;[123] and there were doubtless, on particular occasions, general assemblies of the people, with the same formal and passive character as the Homeric agora,—at least, we shall observe traces of such assemblies anterior to the Solonian legislation. Some of the writers of antiquity ascribed the first establishment of the senate of areopagus to Solon, just as there were also some who considered Lykurgus as having first brought together the Spartan gerusia. But there can be little doubt that this is a mistake, and that the sen-

ate of areopagus is a primordial institution, of immemorial antiquity, though its constitution as well as its functions underwent many changes. It stood at first alone as a permanent and collegiate authority, originally by the side of the kings and afterwards by the side of the archons: it would then of course be known by the title of *The* Boulê,—*The* Senate, or council; its distinctive title, "Senate of Areopagus," borrowed from the place where its sittings were held, would not be bestowed until the formation by Solon of the second senate, or council, from which there was need to discriminate it.

This seems to explain the reason why it was never mentioned in the ordinances of Drako, whose silence supplied one argument in favor of the opinion that it did not exist in his time, and that it was first constituted by Solon.[124] We hear of the senate of areopagus chiefly as a judicial tribunal, because it acted in this character constantly throughout Athenian history, and because the orators have most frequent occasion to allude to its decisions on matters of trial. But its functions were originally of the widest senatorial character, directive generally as well as judicial. And although the gradual increase of democracy at Athens, as will be hereafter explained, both abridged its powers and contributed still farther comparatively to lower it, by enlarging the direct working of the people in assembly and judicature, as well as that of the senate of Five Hundred, which was a permanent adjunct and adminicle of the public assembly,—yet it seems to have been, even down to the time of Periklês, the most important body in the state. And after it had been cast into the background by the political reforms of that great man, we still find it on particular occasions stepping forward to reassert its ancient powers, and to assume for the moment that undefined interference which it had enjoyed without dispute in antiquity. The attachment of the Athenians to their ancient institutions gave to the senate of areopagus a constant and powerful hold on their minds, and this feeling was rather strengthened than weakened when it ceased to be an object of popular jealousy,—when it could no longer be employed as an auxiliary of oligarchical pretensions.

Of the nine archons, whose number continued unaltered from 638 B. C. to the end of the free democracy, three bore special titles,—the archon eponymus, from whose name the designation of the year was derived, and who was spoken of as *The Archon*; the archon basileus (king), or more frequently, the basileus; and the polemarch. The remaining six passed by the general title of Thesmothetæ. Of the first three, each possessed exclusive judicial competence in regard to certain special matters: the thesmothetæ were in this respect all on a par, acting sometimes as a board, sometimes individually. The archon eponymus determined all disputes relative to the family, the gentile, and the phratric relations: he was the legal protector of orphans and widows.[125] The archon basileus, or king archon, enjoyed competence in complaints respecting offences against the religious sentiment and respecting homicide. The polemarch, speaking of times anterior to Kleisthenês, was the leader of the military force and judge in disputes between citizens and non-citizens. Moreover, each of

these three archons had particular religious festivals assigned to him, which it was his duty to superintend and conduct. The six thesmothetæ seem to have been judges in disputes and complaints, generally, against citizens, saving the special matters reserved for the cognizance of the first two archons. According to the proper sense of the word thesmothetæ, all the nine archons were entitled to be so called, [126] though the first three had especial designations of their own: the word thesmoi, analogous to the themistes[127] of Homer, includes in its meaning both general laws and particular sentences,—the two ideas not being yet discriminated, and the general law being conceived only in its application to some particular case. Drako was the first thesmothet who was called upon to set down his thesmoi in writing, and thus to invest them essentially with a character of more or less generality.

In the later and better-known times of Athenian law, we find these archons deprived in great measure of their powers of judging and deciding, and restricted to the task of first hearing the parties and collecting the evidence, next, of introducing the matter for trial into the appropriate dikastery, over which they presided. Originally, there was no separation of powers: the archons both judged and administered, sharing among themselves those privileges which had once been united in the hands of the king, and probably accountable at the end of their year of office to the senate of areopagus. It is probable also, that the functions of that senate, and those of the prytanes of the naukrars, were of the same double and confused nature. All of these functionaries belonged to the eupatrids, and all of them doubtless acted more or less in the narrow interest of their order: moreover, there was ample room for favoritism, in the way of connivance as well as antipathy, on the part of the archons. That such was decidedly the case, and that discontent began to be serious, we may infer from the duty imposed on the thesmothet Drako, B. C. 624, to put in writing the thesmoi, or ordinances, so that they might be "shown publicly," and known beforehand.[128] He did not meddle with the political constitution, and in his ordinances Aristotle finds little worthy of remark except the extreme severity[129] of the punishments awarded: petty thefts, or even proved idleness of life, being visited with death or disfranchisement.

But we are not to construe this remark as demonstrating any special inhumanity in the character of Drako, who was not invested with the large power which Solon afterwards enjoyed, and cannot be imagined to have imposed upon the community severe laws of his own invention. Himself of course an eupatrid, he set forth in writing such ordinances as the eupatrid archons had before been accustomed to enforce without writing, in the particular cases which came before them; and the general spirit of penal legislation had become so much milder, during the two centuries which followed, that these old ordinances appeared to Aristotle intolerably rigorous. Probably neither Drako, nor the Lokrian Zaleukus, who somewhat preceded him in date, were more rigorous than the sentiment of the age: indeed, the few fragments of the Drakonian tables which have reached us, far from exhibiting indiscriminate cruelty,

introduce, for the first time, into the Athenian law, mitigating distinctions in respect to homicide;[130] founded on the variety of concomitant circumstances. He is said to have constituted the judges called Ephetæ, fifty-one elders belonging to some respected gens or possessing an exalted position, who held their sittings for trial of homicide in three different spots, according to the difference of the cases submitted to them. If the accused party, admitting the fact, denied any culpable intention and pleaded accident, the case was tried at the place called the palladium; when found guilty of accidental homicide, he was condemned to a temporary exile, unless he could appease the relatives of the deceased, but his property was left untouched. If, again, admitting the fact, he defended himself by some valid ground of justification, such as self-defence, or flagrant adultery with his wife on the part of the deceased, the trial took place on ground consecrated to Apollo and Artemis, called the Delphinium. A particular spot called the Phreattys, close to the sea-shore, was also named for the trial of a person, who, while under sentence of exile for an unintentional homicide, might be charged with a second homicide, committed of course without the limits of the territory: being considered as impure from the effects of the former sentence, he was not permitted to set foot on the soil, but stood his trial on a boat hauled close in shore. At the prytaneium, or government-house itself, sittings were held by the four phylo-basileis, or tribe-kings, to try any inanimate object (a piece of wood or stone, etc.) which had caused death to any one, without the proved intervention of a human hand: the wood or stone, when the fact was verified, was formally cast beyond the border.[131] All these distinctions of course imply the preliminary investigation of the case, called anakrisis, by the king-archon, in order that it might be known what was the issue, and where the sittings of the ephetæ were to be held.

So intimately was the mode of dealing with homicide connected with the religious feelings of the Athenians, that these old regulations were never formally abrogated throughout the historical times, and were read engraved on their column by the contemporaries of Dêmosthenês.[132] The areopagus continued in judicial operation, and the ephetæ are spoken of as if they were so, even through the age of Dêmosthenês; though their functions were tacitly usurped or narrowed, and their dignity impaired, [133] by the more popular dikasteries afterwards created. It is in this way that they have become known to us, while the other Drakonian institutions have perished: but there is much obscurity respecting them, particularly in regard to the relation between the ephetæ and the areopagites. Indeed, so little was known on the subject, even by the historical inquirers of Athens, that most of them supposed the council of areopagus to have received its first origin from Solon: and even Aristotle, though he contradicts this view, expresses himself in no very positive language.[134] That judges sat at the areopagus for the trial of homicide, previous to Drako, seems implied in the arrangements of that lawgiver respecting the ephetæ, inasmuch as he makes no new provision for trying the direct issue of intentional homicide, which, according to all accounts, fell within the cognizance of the areopagus: but whether the ephetæ

and the areopagites were the same persons, wholly or partially, our information is not sufficient to discover. Before Drako, there existed no tribunal for trying homicide, except the senate, sitting at the areopagus, and we may conjecture that there was something connected with that spot,—legends, ceremonies, or religious feelings,—which compelled judges there sitting to condemn every man proved guilty of homicide, and forbade them to take account of extenuating or justifying circumstances. [135] Drako appointed the ephetæ to sit at different places; and these places are so pointedly marked, and were so unalterably maintained, that we may see in how peculiar a manner those special issues, of homicide under particular circumstances, which he assigned to each, were adapted, in Athenian belief, to the new sacred localities chosen,[136] each having its own distinct ceremonial and procedure appointed by the gods themselves. That the religious feelings of the Greeks were associated in the most intimate manner with particular localities, has already been often remarked; and Drako proceeded agreeably to them in his arrangements for mitigating the indiscriminate condemnation of every man found guilty of homicide, which was unavoidable so long as the areopagus remained the only place of trial. The man who either confessed, or was proved to have shed the blood of another, could not be acquitted, or condemned to less than the full penalty (of death or perpetual exile, with confiscation of property) by the judges on the hill of Arês, whatever excuse he might have to offer: but the judges at the palladium and delphinium might hear him, and even admit his plea, without contracting the taint of irreligion. Drako did not directly meddle with, nor indeed ever mention, the judges sitting in areopagus.

In respect to homicide, then, the Drakonian ordinances were partly a reform of the narrowness, partly a mitigation of the rigor, of the old procedure; and these are all that have come down to us, having been preserved unchanged from the religious respect of the Athenians for antiquity on this peculiar matter. The rest of his ordinances are said to have been repealed by Solon, on account of their intolerable severity. So they doubtless appeared, to the Athenians of a later day, who had come to measure offences by a different scale; and even to Solon, who had to calm the wrath of a suffering people in actual mutiny.

That under this eupatrid oligarchy and severe legislation the people of Attica were sufficiently miserable, we shall presently see, when I recount the proceedings of Solon: but the age of democracy had not yet begun, and the government received its first shock from the hands of an ambitious eupatrid who aspired to the despotism. Such was the phase, as has been remarked in the preceding chapter, through which, during the century now under consideration, a large proportion of the Grecian governments passed.

Kylôn, an Athenian patrician, who superadded to a great family position the personal celebrity of a victory at Olympia, as runner in the double stadium, conceived the design of seizing the acropolis and constituting himself despot. Whether any special event had occurred at home to stimulate this project, we do not know: but he

obtained both encouragement and valuable aid from his father-in-law Theagenês of Megara, who, by means of his popularity with the people, had already subverted the Megarian oligarchy, and become despot of his native city. Previous to so hazardous an attempt, however, Kylôn consulted the Delphian oracle, and was advised by the god in reply, to take the opportunity of "the greatest festival of Zeus" for seizing the acropolis. Such expressions, in the natural interpretation put upon them by every Greek, designated the Olympic games in Peloponnesus,—to Kylôn, moreover himself an Olympic victor, that interpretation came recommended by an apparent peculiar propriety. But Thucydidês, not indifferent to the credit of the oracle, reminds his readers that no question was asked nor any express direction given, *where* the intended "greatest festival of Zeus" was to be sought,—whether in Attica or elsewhere,—and that the public festival of the Diasia, celebrated periodically and solemnly in the neighborhood of Athens, was also denominated the "greatest festival of Zeus Meilichius." Probably no such exegetical scruples presented themselves to any one, until after the miserable failure of the conspiracy; least of all to Kylôn himself, who, at the recurrence of the next ensuing Olympic games, put himself at the head of a force, partly furnished by Theagenês, partly composed of his friends at home, and took sudden possession of the sacred rock of Athens. But the attempt excited general indignation among the Athenian people, who crowded in from the country to assist the archons and the prytanes of the naukrari in putting it down. Kylôn and his companions were blockaded in the acropolis, where they soon found themselves in straits for want of water and provisions; and though many of the Athenians went back to their homes, a sufficient besieging force was left to reduce the conspirators to the last extremity. After Kylôn himself had escaped by stealth, and several of his companions had died of hunger, the remainder, renouncing all hope of defence, sat down as suppliants at the altar. The archon Megaklês, on regaining the citadel, found these suppliants on the point of expiring with hunger on the sacred ground, and to prevent such a pollution, engaged them to quit the spot by a promise of sparing their lives. No sooner, however, had they been removed into profane ground, than the promise was violated and they were put to death: some even, who, seeing the fate with which they were menaced, contrived to throw themselves upon the altar of the venerable goddesses, or eumenides, near the areopagus, received their death-wounds in spite of that inviolable protection.[137]

Though the conspiracy was thus put down, and the government upheld, these deplorable incidents left behind them a long train of calamity,—profound religious remorse mingled with exasperated political antipathies. There still remained, if not a considerable Kylonian party, at least a large body of persons who resented the way in which the Kylonians had been put to death, and who became in consequence bitter enemies of Megaklês the archon, and of the great family of the Alkmæônidæ, to which he belonged. Not only Megaklês himself and his personal assistants were denounced as smitten with a curse, but the taint was supposed to be transmitted to his descendants, and we shall hereafter find the wound reopened, not only in the sec-

ond and third generation, but also two centuries after the original event.[138] When we see that the impression left by the proceeding was so very serious, even after the length of time which had elapsed, we may well believe that it was sufficient, immediately afterwards, to poison altogether the tranquillity of the state. The Alkmæônids and their partisans long defied their opponents, resisting any public trial,—and the dissensions continued without hope of termination, until Solon, then enjoying a lofty reputation for sagacity and patriotism, as well as for bravery, persuaded them to submit to judicial cognizance,—at a moment so far distant from the event, that several of the actors were dead. They were accordingly tried before a special judicature of three hundred eupatrids, Myrôn, of the deme Phlyeis, being their accuser. In defending themselves against the charge that they had sinned against the reverence due to the gods and the consecrated right of asylum, they alleged that the Kylonian suppliants, when persuaded to quit the holy ground, had tied a cord round the statue of the goddess and clung to it for protection in their march; but on approaching the altar of the eumenides, the cord accidentally broke,—and this critical event, so the accused persons argued, proved that the goddess had herself withdrawn from them her protecting hand and abandoned them to their fate.[139] Their argument, remarkable as an illustration of the feelings of the time, was not, however, accepted as an excuse: they were found guilty, and while such of them as were alive retired into banishment, those who had already died were disinterred and cast beyond the borders. Yet their exile, continuing as it did only for a time, was not held sufficient to expiate the impiety for which they had been condemned. The Alkmæônids, one of the most powerful families in Attica, long continued to be looked upon as a tainted race, [140] and in cases of public calamity were liable to be singled out as having by their sacrilege drawn down the judgment of the gods upon their countrymen.[141]

Nor was the banishment of the guilty parties adequate in other respects to restore tranquillity. Not only did pestilential disorders prevail, but the religious susceptibilities and apprehensions of the Athenian community also remained deplorably excited: they were oppressed with sorrow and despondency, saw phantoms and heard supernatural menaces, and felt the curse of the gods upon them without abatement. [142] In particular, it appears that the minds of the women—whose religious impulses were recognized generally by the ancient legislators as requiring watchful control—were thus disturbed and frantic. The sacrifices offered at Athens did not succeed in dissipating the epidemic, nor could the prophets at home, though they recognized that special purifications were required, discover what were the new ceremonies capable of appeasing the divine wrath. The Delphian oracle directed them to invite a higher spiritual influence from abroad, and this produced the memorable visit of the Kretan prophet and sage Epimenidês to Athens.

The century between 620 and 500 B. C. appears to have been remarkable for the first diffusion and potent influence of distinct religious brotherhoods, mystic rites, and expiatory ceremonies, none of which, as I have remarked in a former chapter,

find any recognition in the Homeric epic. To this age belong Thalêtas, Aristeas, Abaris, Pythagoras, Onomakritus, and the earliest provable agency of the Orphic sect.[143] Of the class of men here noticed, Epimenidês, a native of Phæstus or Knossus in Krete,[144] was one of the most celebrated,—and the old legendary connection between Athens and Krete, which shows itself in the tales of Theseus and Minos, is here again manifested in the recourse which the Athenians had to this island to supply their spiritual need. Epimenidês seems to have been connected with the worship of the Kretan Zeus, in whose favor he stood so high as to receive the denomination of the new Kurête[145]—the Kurêtes having been the primitive ministers and organizers of that worship. He was said to be the son of the nymph Baltê; to be supplied by the nymphs with constant food, since he was never seen to eat; to have fallen asleep in his youth in a cave, and to have continued in this state without interruption for fifty-seven years; though some asserted that he remained all this time a wanderer in the mountains, collecting and studying medicinal botany in the vocation of an Iatromantis, or leech and prophet combined. Such narratives mark the idea entertained by antiquity of Epimenidês, the Purifier,[146] who was now called in to heal both the epidemic and the mental affliction prevalent among the Athenian people, in the same manner as his countryman and contemporary Thalêtas had been, a few years before, invited to Sparta to appease a pestilence by the effect of his music and religious hymns.[147] The favor of Epimenidês with the gods, his knowledge of propitiatory ceremonies, and his power of working upon the religious feeling, was completely successful in restoring both health and mental tranquillity at Athens. He is said to have turned out some black and white sheep on the areopagus, directing attendants to follow and watch them, and to erect new altars to the appropriate local deities on the spots where the animals lay down.[148] He founded new chapels and established various lustral ceremonies; and more especially, he regulated the worship paid by the women, in such a manner as to calm the violent impulses which had before agitated them. We know hardly anything of the details of his proceeding, but the general fact of his visit, and the salutary effects produced in removing the religious despondency which oppressed the Athenians, are well attested: consoling assurances and new ritual precepts, from the lips of a person supposed to stand high in the favor of Zeus, were the remedy which this unhappy disorder required. Moreover, Epimenidês had the prudence to associate himself with Solon, and while he thus doubtless obtained much valuable advice, he assisted indirectly in exalting the reputation of Solon himself, whose career of constitutional reform was now fast approaching. He remained long enough at Athens to restore completely a more comfortable tone of religious feeling, and then departed, carrying with him universal gratitude and admiration, but refusing all other reward, except a branch from the sacred olive-tree in the acropolis.[149] His life is said to have been prolonged to the unusual period of one hundred and fifty-four years, according to a statement which was current during the time of his younger contemporary Xenophanês of Kolophon;[150] and the Kretans even ventured to affirm that he lived three hundred years. They extolled him not merely as a sage

and a spiritual purifier, but also as a poet,—very long compositions on religious and mythical subjects being ascribed to him; according to some accounts, they even worshipped him as a god. Both Plato and Cicero considered Epimenidês in the same light in which he was regarded by his contemporaries, as a prophet divinely inspired, and foretelling the future under fits of temporary ecstasy: but according to Aristotle, Epimenidês himself professed to have received from the gods no higher gift than that of divining the unknown phenomena of the past.[151]

The religious mission of Epimenidês to Athens, and its efficacious as well as healing influence on the public mind, deserve notice as characteristics of the age in which they occurred.[152] If we transport ourselves two centuries forward, to the Peloponnesian war, when rational influences and positive habits of thought had acquired a durable hold upon the superior minds, and when practical discussions on political and judicial matters were familiar to every Athenian citizen, no such uncontrollable religious misery could well have subdued the entire public; and if it had, no living man could have drawn to himself such universal veneration as to be capable of effecting a cure. Plato,[153] admitting the real healing influence of rites and ceremonies, fully believed in Epimenidês as an inspired prophet during the past; but towards those who preferred claims to supernatural power in his own day, he was not so easy of faith. He, as well as Euripides and Theophrastus, treated with indifference, and even with contempt, the orpheotelestæ of the later times, who advertised themselves as possessing the same patent knowledge of ceremonial rites, and the same means of guiding the will of the gods, as Epimenidês had wielded before them. These orpheotelestæ unquestionably numbered a considerable tribe of believers, and speculated with great effect, as well as with profit to themselves, upon the timorous consciences of rich men:[154] but they enjoyed no respect with the general public, or with those to whose authority the public habitually looked up. Degenerate as they were, however, they were the legitimate representatives of the prophet and purifier from Knossus, to whose presence the Athenians had been so much indebted two centuries before: and their altered position was owing less to any falling off in themselves, than to an improvement in the mass upon whom they sought to operate. Had Epimenidês himself come to Athens in those days, his visit would probably have been as much inoperative to all public purposes as a repetition of the stratagem of Phyê, clothed and equipped as the goddess Athênê, which had succeeded so completely in the days of Peisistratus,—a stratagem which even Herodotus treats as incredibly absurd, although, a century before his time, both the city of Athens and the demes of Attica had obeyed, as a divine mandate, the orders of this magnificent and stately woman, to restore Peisistratus.[155]

CHAPTER XI.

SOLONIAN LAWS AND CONSTITUTION.

We now approach a new era in Grecian history,—the first known example of a genuine and disinterested constitutional reform, and the first foundation-stone of that great fabric, which afterwards became the type of democracy in Greece. The archonship of the eupatrid Solon dates in 594 B. C., thirty years after that of Drako, and about eighteen years after the conspiracy of Kylôn, assuming the latter event to be correctly placed B. C. 612.

The life of Solon by Plutarch and by Diogenês, especially the former, are our principal sources of information respecting this remarkable man; and while we thank them for what they have told us, it is impossible to avoid expressing disappointment that they have not told us more. For Plutarch certainly had before him both the original poems, and the original laws, of Solon, and the few transcripts which he gives from one or the other form the principal charm of his biography: but such valuable materials ought to have been made available to a more instructive result than that which he has brought out. There is hardly anything more to be deplored, amidst the lost treasures of the Grecian mind, than the poems of Solon; for we see by the remaining fragments, that they contained notices of the public and social phenomena before him, which he was compelled attentively to study,—blended with the touching expression of his own personal feelings, in the post, alike honorable and difficult, to which the confidence of his countrymen had exalted him.

Solon, son of Exekestidês, was a eupatrid of middling fortune,[156] but of the purest heroic blood, belonging to the gens or family of the Kodrids and Neleids, and tracing his origin to the god Poseidôn. His father is said to have diminished his substance by prodigality, which compelled Solon in his earlier years to have recourse to trade, and in this pursuit he visited many parts of Greece and Asia. He was thus enabled to enlarge the sphere of his observation, and to provide material for thought as well as for composition: and his poetical talents displayed themselves at a very early age, first on light, afterwards on serious subjects. It will be recollected that there was at that time no Greek prose writing, and that the acquisitions as well as the effusions of an intellectual man, even in their simplest form, adjusted themselves not to the limitations of the period and the semicolon, but to those of the hexameter and pentameter: nor in point of fact do the verses of Solon aspire to any higher effect than we are accustomed to associate with an earnest, touching, and admonitory prose composition. The advice and appeals which he frequently addressed to his countrymen[157] were delivered in this easy metre, doubtless far less difficult than the elaborate prose of subsequent writers or speakers, such as Thucydidês, Isokratês, or Demosthenês. His poetry and his reputation became known throughout

many parts of Greece, and he was classed along with Thalês of Milêtus, Bias of Priênê, Pittakus of Mytilênê, Periander of Corinth, Kleobulus of Lindus, Cheilôn of Lacedæmon,—altogether forming the constellation afterwards renowned as the Seven wise men.

The first particular event in respect to which Solon appears as an active politician, is the possession of the island of Salamis, then disputed between Megara and Athens. Megara was at that time able to contest with Athens, and for sometime to contest with success, the occupation of this important island,—a remarkable fact, which perhaps may be explained by supposing that the inhabitants of Athens and its neighborhood carried on the struggle with only partial aid from the rest of Attica. However this may be, it appears that the Megarians had actually established themselves in Salamis, at the time when Solon began his political career, and that the Athenians had experienced so much loss in the struggle, as to have formally prohibited any citizen from ever submitting a proposition for its reconquest. Stung with this dishonorable abnegation, Solon counterfeited a state of ecstatic excitement, rushed into the agora, and there, on the stone usually occupied by the official herald, pronounced to the crowd around a short elegiac poem,[158] which he had previously composed on the subject of Salamis. He enforced upon them the disgrace of abandoning the island, and wrought so powerfully upon their feelings, that they rescinded the prohibitory law: "Rather (he exclaimed) would I forfeit my native city, and become a citizen of Pholegandrus, than be still named an Athenian, branded with the shame of surrendered Salamis!" The Athenians again entered into the war, and conferred upon him the command of it,—partly, as we are told, at the instigation of Peisistratus, though the latter must have been at this time (600-594 B. C.) a very young man, or rather a boy.[159]

The stories in Plutarch, as to the way in which Salamis was recovered, are contradictory as well as apocryphal, ascribing to Solon various stratagems to deceive the Megarian occupiers; unfortunately, no authority is given for any of them. According to that which seems the most plausible, he was directed by the Delphian god, first to propitiate the local heroes of the island; and he accordingly crossed over to it by night, for the purpose of sacrificing to the heroes Periphêmus and Kychreus, on the Salaminian shore. Five hundred Athenian volunteers were then levied for the attack of the island, under the stipulation that if they were victorious they should hold it in property and citizenship.[160] They were safely landed on an outlying promontory, while Solon, having been fortunate enough to seize a ship which the Megarians had sent to watch the proceedings, manned it with Athenians, and sailed straight towards the city of Salamis, to which the five hundred Athenians who had landed also directed their march. The Megarians marched out from the city to repel the latter, and during the heat of the engagement, Solon, with his Megarian ship, and Athenian crew, sailed directly to the city: the Megarians, interpreting this as the return of their own crew, permitted the ship to approach without resistance, and the city was thus

taken by surprise. Permission having been given to the Megarians to quit the island, Solon took possession of it for the Athenians, erecting a temple to Enyalius, the god of war, on Cape Skiradium, near the city of Salamis.[161]

The citizens of Megara, however, made various efforts for the recovery of so valuable a possession, so that a war ensued long as well as disastrous to both parties. At last, it was agreed between them to refer the dispute to the arbitration of Sparta, and five Spartans were appointed to decide it,—Kritolaidas, Amompharetus, Hypsêchidas, Anaxilas, and Kleomenês. The verdict in favor of Athens was founded on evidence which it is somewhat curious to trace. Both parties attempted to show that the dead bodies buried in the island conformed to their own peculiar mode of interment, and both parties are said to have cited verses from the catalogue of the Iliad, [162]—each accusing the other of error or interpolation. But the Athenians had the advantage on two points; first, there were oracles from Delphi, wherein Salamis was mentioned with the epithet Ionian; next, Philæus and Eurysakês, sons of the Telamonian Ajax, the great hero of the island, had accepted the citizenship of Athens, made over Salamis to the Athenians, and transferred their own residences to Braurôn and Melitê in Attica, where the deme or gens Philaidæ still worshipped Philæus as its eponymous ancestor. Such a title was held sufficient, and Salamis was adjudged by the five Spartans to Attica,[163] with which it ever afterwards remained incorporated until the days of Macedonian supremacy. Two centuries and a half later, when the orator Æschinês argued the Athenian right to Amphipolis against Philip of Macedon, the legendary elements of the title were indeed put forward, but more in the way of preface or introduction to the substantial political grounds.[164] But in the year 600 B. C., the authority of the legend was more deep-seated and operative, and adequate by itself to determine a favorable verdict.

In addition to the conquest of Salamis, Solon increased his reputation by espousing the cause of the Delphian temple against the extortionate proceedings of the inhabitants of Kirrha, of which more will be said in a coming chapter; and the favor of the oracle was probably not without its effect in procuring for him that encouraging prophecy with which his legislative career opened.

It is on the occasion of Solon's legislation, that we obtain our first glimpse—unfortunately, but a glimpse—of the actual state of Attica and its inhabitants. It is a sad and repulsive picture, presenting to us political discord and private suffering combined.

Violent dissensions prevailed among the inhabitants of Attica, who were separated into three factions,—the pedieis, or men of the plain, comprising Athens, Eleusis, and the neighboring territory, among whom the greatest number of rich families were included; the mountaineers in the east and north of Attica, called diakrii, who were on the whole the poorest party; and the paralii in the southern portion of Attica, from sea to sea, whose means and social position were intermediate between

the two.[165] Upon what particular points these intestine disputes turned we are not distinctly informed; they were not, however, peculiar to the period immediately preceding the archontate of Solon; they had prevailed before, and they reappear afterwards prior to the despotism of Peisistratus, the latter standing forward as the leader of the diakrii, and as champion, real or pretended, of the poorer population.

But in the time of Solon these intestine quarrels were aggravated by something much more difficult to deal with,—a general mutiny of the poorer population against the rich, resulting from misery combined with oppression. The thêtes, whose condition we have already contemplated in the poems of Homer and Hesiod, are now presented to us as forming the bulk of the population of Attica,—the cultivating tenants, metayers, and small proprietors of the country. They are exhibited as weighed down by debts and dependence, and driven in large numbers out of a state of freedom into slavery,—the whole mass of them, we are told, being in debt to the rich, who are proprietors of the greater part of the soil.[166] They had either borrowed money for their own necessities, or they tilled the lands of the rich as dependent tenants, paying a stipulated portion of the produce, and in this capacity they were largely in arrear.

All the calamitous effects were here seen of the old harsh law of debtor and creditor,—once prevalent in Greece, Italy, Asia, and a large portion of the world,—combined with the recognition of slavery as a legitimate status, and of the right of one man to sell himself as well as that of another man to buy him. Every debtor unable to fulfil his contract was liable to be adjudged as the slave of his creditor, until he could find means either of paying it or working it out; and not only he himself, but his minor sons and unmarried daughters and sisters also, whom the law gave him the power of selling.[167] The poor man thus borrowed upon the security of his body, to translate literally the Greek phrase, and upon that of the persons of his family; and so severely had these oppressive contracts been enforced, that many debtors had been reduced from freedom to slavery in Attica itself,—many others had been sold for exportation,—and some had only hitherto preserved their own freedom by selling their children. Moreover, a great number of the smaller properties in Attica were under mortgage, signified,—according to the formality usual in the Attic law, and continued down throughout the historical times,—by a stone pillar erected on the land, inscribed with the name of the lender and the amount of the loan. The proprietors of these mortgaged lands, in case of an unfavorable turn of events, had no other prospect except that of irremediable slavery for themselves and their families, either in their own native country, robbed of all its delights, or in some barbarian region where the Attic accent would never meet their ears. Some had fled the country to escape legal adjudication of their persons, and earned a miserable subsistence in foreign parts by degrading occupations: upon several, too, this deplorable lot had fallen by unjust condemnation and corrupt judges; the conduct of the rich, in regard

to money sacred and profane, in regard to matters public as well as private, being thoroughly unprincipled and rapacious.

The manifold and long-continued suffering of the poor under this system, plunged into a state of debasement not more tolerable than that of the Gallic plebs, —and the injustices of the rich, in whom all political power was then vested, are facts well attested by the poems of Solon himself, even in the short fragments preserved to us:[168] and it appears that immediately preceding the time of his archonship, the evils had ripened to such a point,—and the determination of the mass of sufferers, to extort for themselves some mode of relief, had become so pronounced, —that the existing laws could no longer be enforced. According to the profound remark of Aristotle,—that seditions are generated by great causes but out of small incidents,[169]—we may conceive that some recent events had occurred as immediate stimulants to the outbreak of the debtors,—like those which lend so striking an interest to the early Roman annals, as the inflaming sparks of violent popular movements for which the train had long before been laid. Condemnations by the archons, of insolvent debtors, may have been unusually numerous, or the maltreatment of some particular debtor, once a respected freeman, in his condition of slavery, may have been brought to act vividly upon the public sympathies,—like the case of the old plebeian centurion at Rome,[170]—first impoverished by the plunder of the enemy, then reduced to borrow, and lastly adjudged to his creditor as an insolvent,—who claimed the protection of the people in the forum, rousing their feelings to the highest pitch by the marks of the slave-whip visible on his person. Some such incidents had probably happened, though we have no historians to recount them; moreover, it is not unreasonable to imagine, that that public mental affliction which the purifier Epimenidês had been invoked to appease, as it sprung in part from pestilence, so it had its cause partly in years of sterility, which must of course have aggravated the distress of the small cultivators. However this may be, such was the condition of things in 594 B. C., through mutiny of the poor freemen and thêtes, and uneasiness of the middling citizens, that the governing oligarchy, unable either to enforce their private debts or to maintain their political power, were obliged to invoke the well-known wisdom and integrity of Solon. Though his vigorous protest—which doubtless rendered him acceptable to the mass of the people—against the iniquity of the existing system had already been proclaimed in his poems, they still hoped that he would serve as an auxiliary, to help them over their difficulties, and they therefore chose him, nominally, as archon along with Philombrotus, but with power in substance dictatorial.

It had happened in several Grecian states, that the governing oligarchies, either by quarrels among their own members or by the general bad condition of the people under their government, were deprived of that hold upon the public mind which was essential to their power; and sometimes, as in the case of Pittakus of Mitylênê, anterior to the archonship of Solon, and often in the factions of the Italian republics in the Middle Ages, the collision of opposing forces had rendered society intolerable,

and driven all parties to acquiesce in the choice of some reforming dictator. Usually, however, in the early Greek oligarchies, this ultimate crisis was anticipated by some ambitious individual, who availed himself of the public discontent, to overthrow the oligarchy, and usurp the powers of a despot; and so, probably, it might have happened in Athens, had not the recent failure of Kylôn, with all its miserable consequences, operated as a deterring motive. It is curious to read, in the words of Solon himself, the temper in which his appointment was construed by a large portion of the community, but most especially by his own friends: and we are to bear in mind that at this early day, so far as our knowledge goes, democratical government was a thing unknown in Greece,—all Grecian governments were either oligarchical or despotic, the mass of the freemen having not yet tasted of constitutional privilege. His own friends and supporters were the first to urge him, while redressing the prevalent discontents, to multiply partisans for himself personally, and seize the supreme power: they even "chid him as a madman, for declining to haul up the net when the fish were already enmeshed."[171] The mass of the people, in despair with their lot, would gladly have seconded him in such an attempt, and many even among the oligarchy might have acquiesced in his personal government, from the mere apprehension of something worse, if they resisted it. That Solon might easily have made himself despot, admits of little doubt; and though the position of a Greek despot was always perilous, he would have had greater facility for maintaining himself in it than Peisistratus possessed after him; so that nothing but the combination of prudence and virtue which marks his lofty character, restricted him within the trust specially confided to him. To the surprise of every one,—to the dissatisfaction of his own friends, —under the complaints alike, as he says, of various extreme and dissentient parties, who required him to adopt measures fatal to the peace of society,[172]—he set himself honestly to solve the very difficult and critical problem submitted to him.

Of all grievances, the most urgent was the condition of the poorer class of debtors; and to their relief Solon's first measure, the memorable seisachtheia, or shaking off of burdens, was directed. The relief which it afforded was complete and immediate. It cancelled at once all those contracts in which the debtor had borrowed on the security of either his person or of his land: it forbade all future loans or contracts in which the person of the debtor was pledged as security: it deprived the creditor in future of all power to imprison, or enslave, or extort work from his debtor, and confined him to an effective judgment at law, authorizing the seizure of the property of the latter. It swept off all the numerous mortgage pillars from the landed properties in Attica, and left the land free from all past claims. It liberated, and restored to their full rights, all those debtors who were actually in slavery under previous legal adjudication; and it even provided the means—we do not know how—of repurchasing in foreign lands, and bringing back to a renewed life of liberty in Attica, many insolvents who had been sold for exportation.[173] And while Solon forbade every Athenian to pledge or sell his own person into slavery, he took a step farther in the same direction, by forbidding him to pledge or sell his son, his daughter, or an

unmarried sister under his tutelage,—excepting only the case in which either of the latter might be detected in unchastity.[174] Whether this last ordinance was contemporaneous with the seisachtheia, or followed as one of his subsequent reforms, seems doubtful.

By this extensive measure the poor debtors,—the thêtes, small tenants, and proprietors,—together with their families, were rescued from suffering and peril. But these were not the only debtors in the state: the creditors and landlords of the exonerated thêtes were doubtless in their turn debtors to others, and were less able to discharge their obligations in consequence of the loss inflicted upon them by the seisachtheia. It was to assist these wealthier debtors, whose bodies were in no danger,—yet without exonerating them entirely,—that Solon resorted to the additional expedient of debasing the money standard; he lowered the standard of the drachma in a proportion something more than twenty-five per cent., so that one hundred drachmas of the new standard contained no more silver than seventy-three of the old, or one hundred of the old were equivalent to one hundred and thirty-eight of the new. By this change, the creditors of these more substantial debtors were obliged to submit to a loss, while the debtors acquired an exemption, to the extent of about twenty-seven per cent.[175]

Lastly, Solon decreed that all those who had been condemned by the archons to atīmy (civil disfranchisement) should be restored to their full privileges of citizens,—excepting, however, from this indulgence those who had been condemned by the ephetæ, or by the areopagus, or by the phylo-basileis (the four kings of the tribes), after trial in the prytaneium, on charges either of murder or treason.[176] So wholesale a measure of amnesty affords strong grounds for believing that the previous judgments of the archons had been intolerably harsh; and it is to be recollected that the Drakonian ordinances were then in force.

Such were the measures of relief with which Solon met the dangerous discontent then prevalent. That the wealthy men and leaders of the people, whose insolence and iniquity he has himself so sharply denounced in his poems, and whose views in nominating him he had greatly disappointed,[177] should have detested propositions which robbed them without compensation of so many of their legal rites, it is easy to imagine. But the statement of Plutarch, that the poor emancipated debtors were also dissatisfied, from having expected that Solon would not only remit their debts, but also redivide the soil of Attica, seems utterly incredible; nor is it confirmed by any passage now remaining of the Solonian poems.[178] Plutarch conceives the poor debtors as having in their minds the comparison with Lykurgus, and the equality of property at Sparta, which, as I have already endeavored to show,[179] is a fiction; and even had it been true, as matter of history long past and antiquated, would not have been likely to work upon the minds of the multitude of Attica in the forcible way that the biographer supposes. The seisachtheia must have exasperated the feelings and diminished the fortunes of many persons; but it gave to the large body of thêtes

and small proprietors all that they could possibly have hoped. And we are told that after a short interval it became eminently acceptable in the general public mind, and procured for Solon a great increase of popularity,—all ranks concurring in a common sacrifice of thanksgiving and harmony.[180] One incident there was which occasioned an outcry of indignation. Three rich friends of Solon, all men of great family in the state, and bearing names which will hereafter reappear in this history as borne by their descendants,—Konôn, Kleinias, and Hipponikus,—having obtained from Solon some previous hint of his designs, profited by it, first, to borrow money, and next, to make purchases of lands; and this selfish breach of confidence would have disgraced Solon himself, had it not been found that he was personally a great loser, having lent money to the extent of five talents. We should have been glad to learn what authority Plutarch had for this anecdote, which could hardly have been recorded in Solon's own poems.[181]

In regard to the whole measure of the seisachtheia, indeed, though the poems of Solon were open to every one, ancient authors gave different statements, both of its purport and of its extent. Most of them construed it as having cancelled indiscriminately all money contracts; while Androtion, and others, thought that it did nothing more than lower the rate of interest and depreciate the currency to the extent of twenty-seven per cent., leaving the letter of the contracts unchanged. How Androtion came to maintain such an opinion we cannot easily understand, for the fragments now remaining from Solon seem distinctly to refute it, though, on the other hand, they do not go so far as to substantiate the full extent of the opposite view entertained by many writers,—that all money contracts indiscriminately were rescinded: [182] against which there is also a farther reason, that, if the fact had been so, Solon could have had no motive to debase the money standard. Such debasement supposes that there must have been *some* debtors, at least, whose contracts remained valid, and whom, nevertheless, he desired partially to assist. His poems distinctly mention three things: 1. The removal of the mortgage pillars. 2. The enfranchisement of the land. 3. The protection, liberation, and restoration of the persons of endangered or enslaved debtors. All these expressions point distinctly to the thêtes and small proprietors, whose sufferings and peril were the most urgent, and whose case required a remedy immediate as well as complete: we find that his repudiation of debts was carried far enough to exonerate them, but no farther.

It seems to have been the respect entertained for the character of Solon which partly occasioned these various misconceptions of his ordinances for the relief of debtors: Androtion in ancient, and some eminent critics in modern times, are anxious to make out that he gave relief without loss or injustice to any one. But this opinion is altogether inadmissible: the loss to creditors, by the wholesale abrogation of numerous prëexisting contracts, and by the partial depreciation of the coin, is a fact not to be disguised. The seisachtheia of Solon, unjust so far as it rescinded previous agreements, but highly salutary in its consequences, is to be vindicated by showing

that in no other way could the bonds of government have been held together, or the misery of the multitude alleviated. We are to consider, first, the great personal cruelty of these preëxisting contracts, which condemned the body of the free debtor and his family to slavery; next, the profound detestation created by such a system in the large mass of the poor, against both the judges and the creditors by whom it had been enforced, which rendered their feelings unmanageable, so soon as they came together under the sentiment of a common danger, and with the determination to insure to each other mutual protection. Moreover, the law which vests a creditor with power over the person of his debtor, so as to convert him into a slave, is likely to give rise to a class of loans, which inspire nothing but abhorrence,—money lent with the foreknowledge that the borrower will be unable to repay it, but also in the conviction that the value of his person as a slave will make good the loss; thus reducing him to a condition of extreme misery, for the purpose sometimes of aggrandizing, sometimes of enriching, the lender. Now the foundation on which the respect for contracts rests, under a good law of debtor and creditor, is the very reverse of this; it rests on the firm conviction that such contracts are advantageous to both parties as a class, and that to break up the confidence essential to their existence would produce extensive mischief throughout all society. The man whose reverence for the obligation of a contract is now the most profound, would have entertained a very different sentiment if he had witnessed the dealings of lender and borrower at Athens, under the old ante-Solonian law. The oligarchy had tried their best to enforce this law of debtor and creditor, with its disastrous series of contracts, and the only reason why they consented to invoke the aid of Solon, was because they had lost the power of enforcing it any longer, in consequence of the newly awakened courage and combination of the people. That which they could not do for themselves, Solon could not have done for them, even had he been willing; nor had he in his possession the means either of exempting or compensating those creditors, who, separately taken, were open to no reproach; indeed, in following his proceedings, we see plainly that he thought compensation due, not to the creditors, but to the past sufferings of the enslaved debtors, since he redeemed several of them from foreign captivity, and brought them back to their home. It is certain that no measure, simply and exclusively prospective, would have sufficed for the emergency: there was an absolute necessity for overruling all that class of preëxisting rights which had produced so violent a social fever. While therefore, to this extent, the seisachtheia cannot be acquitted of injustice, we may confidently affirm that the injustice inflicted was an indispensable price, paid for the maintenance of the peace of society, and for the final abrogation of a disastrous system as regarded insolvents.[183] And the feeling as well as the legislation universal in the modern European world, by interdicting beforehand all contracts for selling a man's person or that of his children into slavery, goes far to sanction practically the Solonian repudiation.

One thing is never to be forgotten in regard to this measure, combined with the concurrent amendments introduced by Solon in the law,—it settled finally the ques-

tion to which it referred. Never again do we hear of the law of debtor and creditor as disturbing Athenian tranquillity. The general sentiment which grew up at Athens, under the Solonian money-law, and under the democratical government, was one of high respect for the sanctity of contracts. Not only was there never any demand in the Athenian democracy for new tables or a depreciation of the money standard, but a formal abnegation of any such projects was inserted in the solemn oath taken annually by the numerous diakasts, who formed the popular judicial body, called hêliæa, or the hêliastic jurors,—the same oath which pledged them to uphold the democratical constitution, also bound them to repudiate all proposals either for an abrogation of debts or for a redivision of the lands.[184] There can be little doubt that under the Solonian law, which enabled the creditor to seize the property of his debtor, but gave him no power over the person, the system of money-lending assumed a more beneficial character: the old noxious contracts, mere snares for the liberty of a poor freeman and his children, disappeared, and loans of money took their place, founded on the property and prospective earnings of the debtor, which were in the main useful to both parties, and therefore maintained their place in the moral sentiment of the public. And though Solon had found himself compelled to rescind all the mortgages on land subsisting in his time, we see money freely lent upon this same security, throughout the historical times of Athens, and the evidentiary mortgage pillars remaining ever after undisturbed.

In the sentiment of an early society, as in the old Roman law, a distinction is commonly made between the principal and the interest of a loan, though the creditors have sought to blend them indissolubly together. If the borrower cannot fulfil his promise to repay the principal, the public will regard him as having committed a wrong which he must make good by his person; but there is not the same unanimity as to his promise to pay interest: on the contrary, the very exaction of interest will be regarded by many in the same light in which the English law considers usurious interest, as tainting the whole transaction. But in the modern mind, principal, and interest within a limited rate, have so grown together, that we hardly understand how it can ever have been pronounced unworthy of an honorable citizen to lend money on interest; yet such is the declared opinion of Aristotle, and other superior men of antiquity; while the Roman Cato, the censor, went so far as to denounce the practice as a heinous crime.[185] It was comprehended by them among the worst of the tricks of trade,—and they held that all trade, or profit derived from interchange, was unnatural, as being made by one man at the expense of another: such pursuits, therefore, could not be commended, though they might be tolerated to a certain extent as matter of necessity, but they belonged essentially to an inferior order of citizens.[186] What is remarkable in Greece is, that the antipathy of a very early state of society against traders and money-lenders lasted longer among the philosophers than among the mass of the people,—it harmonized more with the social *idéal* of the former, than with the practical instincts of the latter.

In a rude condition, such as that of the ancient Germans described by Tacitus, loans on interest are unknown: habitually careless of the future, the Germans were gratified both in giving and receiving presents, but without any idea that they thereby either imposed or contracted an obligation.[187] To a people in this state of feeling, a loan on interest presents the repulsive idea of making profit out of the distress of the borrower; moreover, it is worthy of remark, that the first borrowers must have been for the most part men driven to this necessity by the pressure of want, and contracting debt as a desperate resource, without any fair prospect of ability to repay: debt and famine run together, in the mind of the poet Hesiod.[188] The borrower is, in this unhappy state, rather a distressed man soliciting aid, than a solvent man capable of making and fulfilling a contract; and if he cannot find a friend to make him a free gift in the former character, he will not, under the latter character, obtain a loan from a stranger, except by the promise of exorbitant interest,[189] and by the fullest eventual power over his person which he is in a condition to grant. In process of time a new class of borrowers rise up, who demand money for temporary convenience or profit, but with full prospect of repayment,—a relation of lender and borrower quite different from that of the earlier period, when it presented itself in the repulsive form of misery on the one side, set against the prospect of very large profit on the other. If the Germans of the time of Tacitus had looked to the condition of the poor debtors in Gaul, reduced to servitude under a rich creditor, and swelling by hundreds the crowd of his attendants, they would not have been disposed to regret their own ignorance of the practice of money-lending.[190] How much the interest of money was then regarded as an undue profit extorted from distress, is powerfully illustrated by the old Jewish law; the Jew being permitted to take interest from foreigners (whom the lawgiver did not think himself obliged to protect), but not from his own countrymen.[191] The Koran follows out this point of view consistently, and prohibits the taking of interest altogether. In most other nations, laws have been made to limit the rate of interest, and at Rome, especially, the legal rate was successively lowered,—though it seems, as might have been expected, that the restrictive ordinances were constantly eluded. All such restrictions have been intended for the protection of debtors; an effect which large experience proves them never to produce, unless it be called protection to render the obtaining of money on loan impracticable for the most distressed borrowers. But there was another effect which they *did* tend to produce,—they softened down the primitive antipathy against the practice generally, and confined the odious name of usury to loans lent above the fixed legal rate.

In this way alone could they operate beneficially, and their tendency to counterwork the previous feeling was at that time not unimportant, coinciding as it did with other tendencies arising out of the industrial progress of society, which gradually exhibited the relation of lender and borrower in a light more reciprocally beneficial, and less repugnant to the sympathies of the bystander.[192]

At Athens, the more favorable point of view prevailed throughout all the historical times,—the march of industry and commerce, under the mitigated law which prevailed subsequently to Solon, had been sufficient to bring it about at a very early period, and to suppress all public antipathy against lenders at interest.[193] We may remark, too, that this more equitable tone of opinion grew up spontaneously, without any legal restriction on the rate of interest,—no such restriction having ever been imposed, and the rate being expressly declared free by a law ascribed to Solon himself.[194] The same may probably be said of the communities of Greece generally,—at least there is no information to make us suppose the contrary. But the feeling against lending money at interest remained in the bosoms of the philosophical men long after it had ceased to form a part of the practical morality of the citizens, and long after it had ceased to be justified by the appearances of the case as at first it really had been. Plato, Aristotle, Cicero,[195] and Plutarch, treat the practice as a branch of that commercial and money-getting spirit which they are anxious to discourage; and one consequence of this was, that they were less disposed to contend strenuously for the inviolability of existing money-contracts. The conservative feeling on this point was stronger among the mass than among the philosophers. Plato even complains of it as inconveniently preponderant,[196] and as arresting the legislator in all comprehensive projects of reform. For the most part, indeed, schemes of cancelling debts and redividing lands were never thought of except by men of desperate and selfish ambition, who made them stepping-stones to despotic power. Such men were denounced alike by the practical sense of the community and by the speculative thinkers; but when we turn to the case of the Spartan king Agis the Third, who proposed a complete extinction of debts and an equal redivision of the landed property of the state, not with any selfish or personal views, but upon pure ideas of patriotism, well or ill understood, and for the purpose of renovating the lost ascendency of Sparta,—we find Plutarch[197] expressing the most unqualified admiration of this young king and his projects, and treating the opposition made to him as originating in no better feelings than meanness and cupidity. The philosophical thinkers on politics conceived—and to a great degree justly, as I shall show hereafter—that the conditions of security, in the ancient world, imposed upon the citizens generally the absolute necessity of keeping up a military spirit and willingness to brave at all times personal hardship and discomfort; so that increase of wealth, on account of the habits of self-indulgence which it commonly introduces, was regarded by them with more or less of disfavor. If in their estimation any Grecian community had become corrupt, they were willing to sanction great interference with preëxisting rights for the purpose of bringing it back nearer to their ideal standard: and the real security for the maintenance of these rights lay in the conservative feelings of the citizens generally, much more than in the opinions which superior minds imbibe from the philosophers.

Those conservative feelings were in the subsequent Athenian democracy peculiarly deep-rooted: the mass of the Athenian people identified inseparably the main-

tenance of property, in all its various shapes, with that of their laws and constitution. And it is a remarkable fact, that though the admiration entertained at Athens for Solon, was universal, the principle of his seisachtheia, and of his money-depreciation, was not only never imitated, but found the strongest tacit reprobation; whereas at Rome, as well as in most of the kingdoms of modern Europe, we know that one debasement of the coin succeeded another,—the temptation, of thus partially eluding the pressure of financial embarrassments, proved, after one successful trial, too strong to be resisted, and brought down the coin by successive depreciations from the full pound of twelve ounces to the standard of half an ounce. It is of some importance to take notice of this fact, when we reflect how much "Grecian faith" has been degraded by the Roman writers into a byword for duplicity in pecuniary dealings.[198] The democracy of Athens,—and, indeed, the cities of Greece generally, both oligarchies and democracies,—stands far above the senate of Rome, and far above the modern kingdoms of France and England, until comparatively recent times, in respect of honest dealing with the coinage:[199] moreover, while there occurred at Rome several political changes which brought about new tables,[200] or at least a partial depreciation of contracts, no phenomenon of the same kind ever happened at Athens, during the three centuries between Solon and the end of the free working of the democracy. Doubtless there were fraudulent debtors at Athens, and the administration of private law, though it did not in any way connive at their proceedings, was far too imperfect to repress them as effectually as might have been wished. But the public sentiment on the point was just and decided, and it may be asserted with confidence, that a loan of money at Athens was quite as secure as it ever was at any time or place of the ancient world,—in spite of the great and important superiority of Rome with respect to the accumulation of a body of authoritative legal precedent, the source of what was ultimately shaped into the Roman jurisprudence. Among the various causes of sedition or mischief in the Grecian communities, [201] we hear little of the pressure of private debt.

By the measures of relief above described,[202] Solon had accomplished results surpassing his own best hopes. He had healed the prevailing discontents; and such was the confidence and gratitude which he had inspired, that he was now called upon to draw up a constitution and laws for the better working of the government in future. His constitutional changes were great and valuable: respecting his laws, what we hear is rather curious than important.

It has been already stated that, down to the time of Solon, the classification received in Attica was that of the four Ionic tribes, comprising in one scale the phratries and gentes, and in another scale the three trittyes and forty-eight naukraries,—while the eupatridæ, seemingly a few specially respected gentes, and perhaps a few distinguished families in all the gentes, had in their hands all the powers of government. Solon introduced a new principle of classification, called, in Greek, the timocratic principle. He distributed all the citizens of the tribes, without any reference to

their gentes or phratries, into four classes, according to the amount of their property, which he caused to be assessed and entered in a public schedule. Those whose annual income was equal to five hundred medimni of corn (about seven hundred imperial bushels) and upwards,—one medimnus being considered equivalent to one drachma in money,—he placed in the highest class; those who received between three hundred and five hundred medimni, or drachms, formed the second class; and those between two hundred and three hundred, the third.[203] The fourth and most numerous class comprised all those who did not possess land yielding a produce equal to two hundred medimni. The first class, called pentakosiomedimni, were alone eligible to the archonship and to all commands: the second were called the knights or horsemen of the state, as possessing enough to enable them to keep a horse and perform military service in that capacity: the third class, called the zeugitæ, formed the heavy-armed infantry, and were bound to serve, each with his full panoply. Each of these three classes was entered in the public schedule as possessed of a taxable capital, calculated with a certain reference to his annual income, but in a proportion diminishing according to the scale of that income,—and a man paid taxes to the state according to the sum for which he stood rated in the schedule; so that this direct taxation acted really like a graduated income-tax. The ratable property of the citizens belonging to the richest class, the pentakosiomedimnus, was calculated and entered on the state-schedule at a sum of capital equal to twelve times his annual income: that of the hippeus, or knight, at a sum equal to ten times his annual income: that of the zeugite, at a sum equal to five times his annual income. Thus a pentakosiomedimnus, whose income was exactly five hundred drachms, the minimum qualification of his class, stood rated in the schedule for a taxable property of six thousand drachms, or one talent, being twelve times his income,—if his annual income were one thousand drachms, he would stand rated for twelve thousand drachms, or two talents, being the same proportion of income to ratable capital. But when we pass to the second class, or knights, the proportion of the two is changed,—the knight possessing an income of just three hundred drachms, or three hundred medimni, would stand rated for three thousand drachms, or ten times his real income, and so in the same proportion for any income above three hundred and below five hundred. Again, in the third class. or below three hundred, the proportion is a second time altered,—the zeugite possessing exactly two hundred drachms of income, was rated upon a still lower calculation, at one thousand drachms, or a sum equal to five times his income; and all incomes of this class, between two hundred and three hundred drachms, would in like manner be multiplied by five in order to obtain the amount of ratable capital. Upon these respective sums of scheduled capital, all direct taxation was levied: if the state required one per cent, of direct tax, the poorest pentakosiomedimnus would pay (upon six thousand drachms) sixty drachms; the poorest hippeus would pay (upon three thousand drachms) thirty; the poorest zeugite would pay (upon one thousand drachms) ten drachms. And thus this mode of assessment would operate like a *graduated* income-tax, looking at it in reference to the three dif-

ferent classes,—but as an *equal* income-tax, looking at it in reference to the different individuals comprised in one and the same class.[204]

All persons in the state whose annual income amounted to less than two hundred medimni, or drachms, were placed in the fourth class, and they must have constituted the large majority of the community. They were not liable to any direct taxation, and, perhaps, were not at first even entered upon the taxable schedule, more especially as we do not know that any taxes were actually levied upon this schedule during the Solonian times. It is said that they were all called thêtes, but this appellation is not well sustained, and cannot be admitted: the fourth compartment in the descending scale was indeed termed the thetic census, because it contained all the thêtes, and because most of its members were of that humble description; but it is not conceivable that a proprietor whose land yielded to him a clear annual return of one hundred, one hundred and twenty, one hundred and forty, or one hundred and eighty drachms, could ever have been designated by that name.[205]

Such were the divisions in the political scale established by Solon, called by Aristotle a timocracy, in which the rights, honors, functions, and liabilities of the citizens were measured out according to the assessed property of each. Though the scale is stated as if nothing but landed property were measured by it, yet we may rather presume that property of other kinds was intended to be included, since it served as the basis of every man's liability to taxation. The highest honors of the state,—that is, the places of the nine archons annually chosen, as well as those in the senate of areopagus, into which the past archons always entered,—perhaps also the posts of prytanes of the naukrari,—were reserved for the first class: the poor eupatrids became ineligible; while rich men, not eupatrids, were admitted. Other posts of inferior distinction were filled by the second and third classes, who were, moreover, bound to military service, the one on horseback, the other as heavy-armed soldiers on foot. Moreover, the liturgies of the state, as they were called,—unpaid functions, such as the trierarchy, chorêgy, gymnasiarchy, etc., which entailed expense and trouble on the holder of them,—were distributed in some way or other between the members of the three classes, though we do not know how the distribution was made in these early times. On the other hand, the members of the fourth or lowest class were disqualified from holding any individual office of dignity,—performed no liturgies, served in case of war only as light-armed, or with a panoply provided by the state, and paid nothing to the direct property-tax, or eisphora. It would be incorrect to say that they paid *no* taxes; for indirect taxes, such as duties on imports, fell upon them in common with the rest; and we must recollect that these latter were, throughout a long period of Athenian history, in steady operation, while the direct taxes were only levied on rare occasions.

But though this fourth class, constituting the great numerical majority of the free people, were shut out from individual office, their collective importance was in another way greatly increased. They were invested with the right of choosing the an-

nual archons, out of the class of pentakosiomedimni; and what was of more importance still, the archons and the magistrates generally, after their year of office, instead of being accountable to the senate of areopagus, were made formally accountable to the public assembly sitting in judgment upon their past conduct. They might be impeached and called upon to defend themselves, punished in case of misbehavior, and debarred from the usual honor of a seat in the senate of areopagus.

Had the public assembly been called upon to act alone, without aid or guidance, this accountability would have proved only nominal. But Solon converted it into a reality by another new institution, which will hereafter be found of great moment in the working out of the Athenian democracy. He created the pro-bouleutic or pre-considering senate, with intimate and especial reference to the public assembly,—to prepare matters for its discussion, to convoke and superintend its meetings, and to insure the execution of its decrees. This senate, as first constituted by Solon, comprised four hundred members, taken in equal proportions from the four tribes,—not chosen by lot, as they will be found to be in the more advanced stage of the democracy, but elected by the people, in the same way as the archons then were,—persons of the fourth or poorest class of the census, though contributing to elect, not being themselves eligible.

But while Solon thus created the new pre-considering senate, identified with and subsidiary to the popular assembly, he manifested no jealousy of the preëxisting areopagitic senate: on the contrary, he enlarged its powers, gave to it an ample supervision over the execution of the laws generally, and imposed upon it the censorial duty of inspecting the lives and occupations of the citizens, as well as of punishing men of idle and dissolute habits. He was himself, as past archon, a member of this ancient senate, and he is said to have contemplated that, by means of the two senates, the state would be held fast, as it were with a double anchor, against all shocks and storms.[206]

Such are the only new political institutions, apart from the laws to be noticed presently, which there are grounds for ascribing to Solon, when we take proper care to discriminate what really belongs to Solon and his age, from the Athenian constitution as afterwards remodelled. It has been a practice common with many able expositors of Grecian affairs, and followed partly, even by Dr. Thirlwall,[207] to connect the name of Solon with the whole political and judicial state of Athens as it stood between the age of Periklês and that of Dêmosthenês,—the regulations of the senate of five hundred, the numerous public dikasts or jurors taken by lot from the people, as well as the body annually selected for law-revision, and called nomothets, and the prosecution, called the graphê paranomôn, open to be instituted against the proposer of any measure illegal, unconstitutional, or dangerous. There is, indeed, some countenance for this confusion between Solonian and post-Solonian Athens, in the usage of the orators themselves; for Dêmosthenês and Æschinês employ the name of Solon in a very loose manner, and treat him as the author of institutions belonging

evidently to a later age for example, the striking and characteristic oath of the heliastic jurors, which Demosthenês[208] ascribes to Solon, proclaims itself in many ways as belonging to the age after Kleisthenês, especially by the mention of the senate of five hundred, and not of four hundred. Among the citizens who served as jurors or dikasts, Solon was venerated generally as the author of the Athenian laws; and the orator, therefore, might well employ his name for the purpose of emphasis, without provoking any critical inquiry whether the particular institution, which he happened to be then impressing upon his audience, belonged really to Solon himself or to the subsequent periods. Many of those institutions, which Dr. Thirlwall mentions in conjunction with the name of Solon, are among the last refinements and elaborations of the democratical mind of Athens,—gradually prepared, doubtless, during the interval between Kleisthenês and Periklês, but not brought into full operation until the period of the latter (460-429 B. C.); for it is hardly possible to conceive these numerous dikasteries and assemblies in regular, frequent, and long-standing operation, without an assured payment to the dikasts who composed them. Now such payment first began to be made about the time of Periklês, if not by his actual proposition;[209] and Dêmosthenês had good reason for contending that, if it were suspended, the judicial as well as the administrative system of Athens would at once fall to pieces.[210] And it would be a marvel, such as nothing short of strong direct evidence would justify us in believing, that in an age when even partial democracy was yet untried, Solon should conceive the idea of such institutions: it would be a marvel still greater, that the half-emancipated thêtes and small proprietors, for whom he legislated,—yet trembling under the rod of the eupatrid archons, and utterly inexperienced in collective business,—should have been found suddenly competent to fulfil these ascendent functions, such as the citizens of conquering Athens in the days of Periklês,—full of the sentiment of force and actively identifying themselves with the dignity of their community,—became gradually competent, and not more than competent, to exercise with effect. To suppose that Solon contemplated and provided for the periodical revision of his laws by establishing a nomothetic jury, or dikastery, such as that which we find in operation during the time of Dêmosthenês, would be at variance, in my judgment, with any reasonable estimate either of the man or of the age. Herodotus says that Solon, having exacted from the Athenians solemn oaths that *they* would not rescind any of his laws for ten years, quitted Athens for that period, in order that he might not be compelled to rescind them himself: Plutarch informs us that he gave to his laws force for a century absolute.[211] Solon himself, and Drako before him, had been lawgivers, evoked and empowered by the special emergency of the times; the idea of a frequent revision of laws, by a body of lot-selected dikasts, belongs to a far more advanced age, and could not well have been present to the minds of either. The wooden rollers of Solon, like the tables of the Roman decemvirs,[212] were doubtless intended as a permanent "fons omnis publici privatique juris."

If we examine the facts of the case, we shall see that nothing more than the bare foundation of the democracy of Athens as it stood in the time of Periklês, can reasonably be ascribed to Solon. "I gave to the people," Solon says, in one of his short remaining fragments,[213] "as much strength as sufficed for their needs, without either enlarging or diminishing their dignity: for those too who possessed power and were noted for wealth, I took care that no unworthy treatment should be reserved. I stood with the strong shield cast over both parties, so as not to allow an unjust triumph to either." Again, Aristotle tells us that Solon bestowed upon the people no greater measure of power than was barely necessary,[214]—to elect their magistrates and to hold them to accountability: if the people had had less than this, they could not have been expected to remain tranquil,—they would have been in slavery and hostile to the constitution. Not less distinctly does Herodotus speak, when he describes the revolution subsequently operated by Kleisthenês—the latter, he tells us, found "the Athenian people excluded from everything."[215] These passages seem positively to contradict the supposition, in itself sufficiently improbable, that Solon is the author of the peculiar democratical institutions of Athens, such as the constant and numerous dikasts for judicial trials and revision of laws. The genuine and forward democratical movement of Athens begins only with Kleisthenês, from the moment when that distinguished Alkmæônid, either spontaneously, or from finding himself worsted in his party strife with Isagoras, purchased by large popular concessions the hearty coöperation of the multitude under very dangerous circumstances. While Solon, in his own statement as well as in that of Aristotle, gave to the people as much power as was strictly needful, but no more,—Kleisthenês (to use the significant phrase of Herodotus), "being vanquished in the party contest with his rival, *took the people into partnership*."[216] It was thus to the interests of the weaker section, in a strife of contending nobles, that the Athenian people owed their first admission to political ascendency,—in part, at least, to this cause, though the proceedings of Kleisthenês indicate a hearty and spontaneous popular sentiment. But such constitutional admission of the people would not have been so astonishingly fruitful in positive results, if the course of public events for the half-century after Kleisthenês had not been such as to stimulate most powerfully their energy, their self-reliance, their mutual sympathies, and their ambition. I shall recount in a future chapter those historical causes, which, acting upon the Athenian character, gave such efficiency and expansion to the great democratical impulse communicated by Kleisthenês: at present, it is enough to remark that that impulse commences properly with Kleisthenês, and not with Solon.

But the Solonian constitution, though only the foundation, was yet the indispensable foundation, of the subsequent democracy; and if the discontents of the miserable Athenian population, instead of experiencing his disinterested and healing management, had fallen at once into the hands of selfish power-seekers, like Kylôn or Peisistratus, the memorable expansion of the Athenian mind during the ensuing century would never have taken place, and the whole subsequent history of Greece

would probably have taken a different course. Solon left the essential powers of the state still in the hands of the oligarchy, and the party combats—to be recounted hereafter—between Peisistratus, Lykurgus, and Megaklês, thirty years after his legislation, which ended in the despotism of Peisistratus, will appear to be of the same purely oligarchical character as they had been before he was appointed archon. But the oligarchy which he established was very different from the unmitigated oligarchy which he found, so teeming with oppression and so destitute of redress, as his own poems testify.

It was he who first gave both to the citizens of middling property and to the general mass, a *locus standi* against the eupatrids; he enabled the people partially to protect themselves, and familiarized them with the idea of protecting themselves, by the peaceful exercise of a constitutional franchise. The new force, through which this protection was carried into effect, was the public assembly called heliæa,[217] regularized and armed with enlarged prerogatives, and farther strengthened by its indispensable ally,—the pro-bouleutic or pre-considering senate. Under the Solonian constitution, this force was merely secondary and defensive, but after the renovation of Kleisthenês, it became paramount and sovereign; it branched out gradually into those numerous popular dikasteries which so powerfully modified both public and private Athenian life, drew to itself the undivided reverence and submission of the people, and by degrees rendered the single magistracies essentially subordinate functions. The popular assembly as constituted by Solon, appearing in modified efficiency, and trained to the office of reviewing and judging the general conduct of a past magistrate,—forms the intermediate stage between the passive Homeric agora, and those omnipotent assemblies and dikasteries which listened to Periklês or Dêmosthenês. Compared with these last, it has in it but a faint streak of democracy,—and so it naturally appeared to Aristotle, who wrote with a practical experience of Athens in the time of the orators; but compared with the first, or with the ante-Solonian constitution of Attica, it must doubtless have appeared a concession eminently democratical. To impose upon the eupatrid archon the necessity of being elected, or put upon his trial of after-accountability, by the *rabble* of freemen (such would be the phrase in eupatrid society), would be a bitter humiliation to those among whom it was first introduced; for we must recollect that this was the most extensive scheme of constitutional reform yet propounded in Greece, and that despots and oligarchies shared between them at that time the whole Grecian world. As it appears that Solon, while constituting the popular assembly with its pro-bouleutic senate, had no jealousy of the senate of areopagus, and indeed even enlarged its powers,—we may infer that his grand object was, not to weaken the oligarchy generally, but to improve the administration and to repress the misconduct and irregularities of the individual archons; and that too, not by diminishing their powers, but by making some degree of popularity the condition both of their entry into office, and of their safety or honor after it.

It is, in my judgment, a mistake to suppose that Solon transferred the judicial power of the archons to a popular dikastery; these magistrates still continued self-acting judges, deciding and condemning without appeal,—not mere presidents of an assembled jury, as they afterwards came to be during the next century.[218] For the general exercise of such power they were accountable after their year of office; and this accountability was the security against abuse,—a very insufficient security, yet not wholly inoperative. It will be seen, however, presently, that these archons, though strong to coerce, and perhaps to oppress, small and poor men,—had no means of keeping down rebellious nobles of their own rank, such as Peisistratus, Lykurgus, and Megaklês, each with his armed followers. When we compare the drawn swords of these ambitious competitors, ending in the despotism of one of them, with the vehement parliamentary strife between Themistoklês and Aristeidês afterwards, peaceably decided by the vote of the sovereign people, and never disturbing the public tranquillity,—we shall see that the democracy of the ensuing century fulfilled the conditions of order, as well as of progress, better than the Solonian constitution.

To distinguish this Solonian constitution from the democracy which followed it, is essential to a due comprehension of the progress of the Greek mind, and especially of Athenian affairs. That democracy was achieved by gradual steps, which will be hereafter described: Dêmosthenês and Æschinês lived under it as a system consummated and in full activity, when the stages of its previous growth were no longer matter of exact memory; and the dikasts then assembled in judgment were pleased to hear the constitution to which they were attached identified with the names either of Solon, or of Theseus, to which they were no less partial. Their inquisitive contemporary Aristotle was not thus misled: but even the most common-place Athenians of the century preceding would have escaped the same delusion. For during the whole course of the democratical movement from the Persian invasion down to the Peloponnesian war, and especially during the changes proposed by Periklês and Ephialtês, there was always a strenuous party of resistance, who would not suffer the people to forget that they had already forsaken, and were on the point of forsaking still more, the orbit marked out by Solon. The illustrious Periklês underwent innumerable attacks both from the orators in the assembly and from the comic writers in the theatre; and among these sarcasms on the political tendencies of the day, we are probably to number the complaint breathed by the poet Kratinus, of the desuetude into which both Solon and Drako had fallen. "I swear,[219] said he, in a fragment of one of his comedies, by Solon and Drako, whose wooden tablets (of laws) are now employed by people to roast their barley." The laws of Solon respecting penal offences, respecting inheritance and adoption, respecting the private relations generally, etc., remained for the most part in force; his quadripartite census also continued, at least for financial purposes until the archonship of Nausinikus in 377 B. C.; so that Cicero and others might be warranted in affirming that his laws still prevailed at Athens: but his political and judicial arrangements had undergone a revolution[220]

not less complete and memorable than the character and spirit of the Athenian people generally. The choice, by way of lot, of archons and other magistrates, and the distribution by lot of the general body of dikasts or jurors into pannels for judicial business, may be decidedly considered as not belonging to Solon, but adopted after the revolution of Kleisthenês;[221] probably, the choice of senators by lot also. The lot was a symptom of pronounced democratical spirit, such as we must not seek in the Solonian institutions.

It is not easy to make out distinctly what was the political position of the ancient gentes and phratries, as Solon left them. The four tribes consisted altogether of gentes and phratries, insomuch that no one could be included in any one of the tribes who was not also a member of some gens and phratry. Now the new probouleutic or pre-considerate senate consisted of four hundred members,—one hundred from each of the tribes: persons not included in any gens or phratry could therefore have had no access to it. The conditions of eligibility were similar, according to ancient custom, for the nine archons,—of course, also, for the senate of areopagus. So that there remained only the public assembly, in which an Athenian not a member of these tribes could take part: yet he was a citizen, since he could give his vote for archons and senators, and could take part in the annual decision of their accountability, besides being entitled to claim redress for wrong from the archons in his own person,—while the alien could only do so through the intervention of an avouching citizen, or prostatês. It seems, therefore, that all persons not included in the four tribes, whatever their grade of fortune might be, were on the same level in respect to political privilege as the fourth and poorest class of the Solonian census. It has already been remarked that, even before the time of Solon, the number of Athenians not included in the gentes or phratries was probably considerable: it tended to become greater and greater, since these bodies were close and unexpansive, while the policy of the new lawgiver tended to invite industrious settlers from other parts of Greece to Athens. Such great and increasing inequality of political privilege helps to explain the weakness of the government in repelling the aggressions of Peisistratus, and exhibits the importance of the revolution afterwards wrought by Kleisthenês, when he abolished (for all political purposes) the four old tribes, and created ten new comprehensive tribes in place of them.

In regard to the regulations of the senate and the assembly of the people, as constituted by Solon, we are altogether without information: nor is it safe to transfer to the Solonian constitution the information, comparatively ample, which we possess respecting these bodies under the later democracy.

The laws of Solon were inscribed on wooden rollers and triangular tablets, in the species of writing called boustrophêdon (lines alternating first from left to right, and next from right to left, like the course of the ploughman), and preserved first in the acropolis, subsequently in the prytaneium. On the tablets, called kyrbeis, were chiefly commemorated the laws respecting sacred rites and sacrifices:[222] on the pillars, or

rollers, of which there were at least sixteen, were placed the regulations respecting matters profane. So small are the fragments which have come down to us, and so much has been ascribed to Solon by the orators, which belongs really to the subsequent times, that it is hardly possible to form any critical judgment respecting the legislation as a whole, or to discover by what general principles or purposes he was guided.

He left unchanged all the previous laws and practices respecting the crime of homicide, connected as they were intimately with the religious feelings of the people. The laws of Drako on this subject therefore remained, but on other subjects, according to Plutarch, they were altogether abrogated:[223] there is, however, room for supposing, that the repeal cannot have been so sweeping as this biographer represents.

The Solonian laws seem to have borne more or less upon all the great departments of human interest and duty. We find regulations political and religious, public and private, civil and criminal, commercial, agricultural, sumptuary, and disciplinarian. Solon provides punishment for crimes, restricts the profession and status of the citizen, prescribes detailed rules for marriage as well as for burial, for the common use of springs and wells, and for the mutual interest of conterminous farmers in planting or hedging their properties. As far as we can judge, from the imperfect manner in which his laws come before us, there does not seem to have been any attempt at a systematic order or classification. Some of them are mere general and vague directions, while others again run into the extreme of speciality.

By far the most important of all was the amendment of the law of debtor and creditor which has already been adverted to, and the abolition of the power of fathers and brothers to sell their daughters and sisters into slavery. The prohibition of all contracts on the security of the body, was itself sufficient to produce a vast improvement in the character and condition of the poorer population,—a result which seems to have been so sensibly obtained from the legislation of Solon, that Boeckh and some other eminent authors suppose him to have abolished villenage and conferred upon the poor tenants a property in their lands, annulling the seignorial rights of the landlord. But this opinion rests upon no positive evidence, nor are we warranted in ascribing to him any stronger measure in reference to the land, than the annulment of the previous mortgages.[224]

The first pillar of his laws contained a regulation respecting exportable produce. He forbade the exportation of all produce of the Attic soil, except olive-oil alone, and the sanction employed to enforce observance of this law deserves notice, as an illustration of the ideas of the time;—the archon was bound, on pain of forfeiting one hundred drachms, to pronounce solemn curses against every offender.[225] We are probably to take this prohibition in conjunction with other objects said to have been contemplated by Solon, especially the encouragement of artisans and manufacturers at Athens. Observing, we are told, that many new emigrants were just then flocking

into Attica to seek an establishment, in consequence of its greater security, he was anxious to turn them rather to manufacturing industry than to the cultivation of a soil naturally poor.[226] He forbade the granting of citizenship to any emigrants, except such as had quitted irrevocably their former abodes, and come to Athens for the purpose of carrying on some industrious profession; and in order to prevent idleness, he directed the senate of areopagus to keep watch over the lives of the citizens generally, and punish every one who had no course of regular labor to support him. If a father had not taught his son some art or profession, Solon relieved the son from all obligation to maintain him in his old age. And it was to encourage the multiplication of these artisans, that he insured, or sought to insure, to the residents in Attica a monopoly of all its landed produce except olive-oil, which was raised in abundance more than sufficient for their wants. It was his wish that the trade with foreigners should be carried on by exporting the produce of artisan labor, instead of the produce of land.[227]

This commercial prohibition is founded on principles substantially similar to those which were acted upon in the early history of England, with reference both to corn and to wool, and in other European countries also. In so far as it was at all operative, it tended to lessen the total quantity of produce raised upon the soil of Attica, and thus to keep the price of it from rising,—a purpose less objectionable—if we assume that the legislator is to interfere at all—than that of our late Corn Laws, which were destined to prevent the price of grain from falling. But the law of Solon must have been altogether inoperative, in reference to the great articles of human subsistence; for Attica imported, both largely and constantly, grain and salt provisions,—probably, also, wool and flax for the spinning and weaving of the women, and certainly timber for building. Whether the law was ever enforced with reference to figs and honey, may well be doubted; at least these productions of Attica were in after-times generally consumed and celebrated throughout Greece. Probably also, in the time of Solon, the silver-mines of Laureium had hardly begun to be worked: these afterwards became highly productive, and furnished to Athens a commodity for foreign payments not less convenient than lucrative.[228]

It is interesting to notice the anxiety, both of Solon and of Drako, to enforce among their fellow-citizens industrious and self-maintaining habits;[229] and we shall find the same sentiment proclaimed by Periklês, at the time when Athenian power was at its maximum. Nor ought we to pass over this early manifestation in Attica, of an opinion equitable and tolerant towards sedentary industry, which in most other parts of Greece was regarded as comparatively dishonorable. The general tone of Grecian sentiment recognized no occupations as perfectly worthy of a free citizen except arms, agriculture, and athletic and musical exercises; and the proceedings of the Spartans, who kept aloof even from agriculture, and left it to their Helots, were admired, though they could not be copied throughout most part of the Hellenic world. Even minds like Plato, Aristotle, and Xenophon concurred to a considerable

extent in this feeling, which they justified on the ground that the sedentary life and unceasing house-work of the artisan was inconsistent with military aptitude: the town-occupations are usually described by a word which carries with it contemptuous ideas, and though recognized as indispensable to the existence of the city, are held suitable only for an inferior and semi-privileged order of citizens. This, the received sentiment among Greeks, as well as foreigners, found a strong and growing opposition at Athens, as I have already said,—corroborated also by a similar feeling at Corinth.[230] The trade of Corinth, as well as of Chalkis in Eubœa, was extensive, at a time when that of Athens had scarce any existence. But while the despotism of Periander can hardly have failed to operate as a discouragement to industry at Corinth, the contemporaneous legislation of Solon provided for traders and artisans a new home at Athens, giving the first encouragement to that numerous town-population both in the city and in the Peiræeus, which we find actually residing there in the succeeding century. The multiplication of such town-residents, both citizens and metics, or non-freemen, was a capital fact in the onward march of Athens, since it determined not merely the extension of her trade, but also the preëminence of her naval force,—and thus, as a farther consequence, lent extraordinary vigor to her democratical government. It seems, moreover, to have been a departure from the primitive temper of Atticism, which tended both to cantonal residence and rural occupation. We have, therefore, the greater interest in noting the first mention of it as a consequence of the Solonian legislation.

To Solon is first owing the admission of a power of testamentary bequest at Athens, in all cases in which a man had no legitimate children. According to the preëxisting custom, we may rather presume that if a deceased person left neither children nor blood relations, his property descended, as at Rome, to his gens and phratry.[231] Throughout most rude states of society, the power of willing is unknown, as among the ancient Germans,—among the Romans prior to the twelve tables,—in the old laws of the Hindus,[232] etc. Society limits a man's interest or power of enjoyment to his life, and considers his relatives as having joint reversionary claims to his property, which take effect, in certain determinate proportions, after his death; and this view was the more likely to prevail at Athens, inasmuch as the perpetuity of the family sacred rites, in which the children and near relatives partook of right, was considered by the Athenians as a matter of public as well as of private concern. Solon gave permission to every man dying without children to bequeathe his property by will as he should think fit, and the testament was maintained, unless it could be shown to have been procured by some compulsion or improper seduction. Speaking generally, this continued to be the law throughout the historical times of Athens. Sons, wherever there were sons, succeeded to the property of their father in equal shares, with the obligation of giving out their sisters in marriage along with a certain dowry. If there were no sons, then the daughters succeeded, though the father might by will, within certain limits, determine the person to whom they should be married, with their rights of succession attached to them; or might, with the consent

of his daughters, make by will certain other arrangements about his property. A person who had no children, or direct lineal descendants, might bequeathe his property at pleasure: if he died without a will, first his father, then his brother or brother's children, next his sister or sister's children succeeded: if none such existed, then the cousins by the father's side, next the cousins by the mother's side,—the male line of descent having preference over the female. Such was the principle of the Solonian laws of succession, though the particulars are in several ways obscure and doubtful. [233] Solon, it appears, was the first who gave power of superseding by testament the rights of agnates and gentiles to succession,—a proceeding in consonance with his plan of encouraging both industrious occupation and the consequent multiplication of individual acquisitions.[234]

It has been already mentioned that Solon forbade the sale of daughters or sisters into slavery, by fathers or brothers,—a prohibition which shows how much females had before been looked upon as articles of property. And it would seem that before his time the violation of a free woman must have been punished at the discretion of the magistrates; for we are told that he was the first who enacted a penalty of one hundred drachms against the offender, and twenty drachms against the seducer of a free woman.[235] Moreover, it is said that he forbade a bride when given in marriage to carry with her any personal ornaments and appurtenances, except to the extent of three robes and certain matters of furniture not very valuable.[236] Solon farther imposed upon women several restraints in regard to proceedings at the obsequies of deceased relatives: he forbade profuse demonstrations of sorrow, singing of composed dirges, and costly sacrifices and contributions; he limited strictly the quantity of meat and drink admissible for the funeral banquet, and prohibited nocturnal exit, except in a car and with a light. It appears that both in Greece and Rome, the feelings of duty and affection on the part of surviving relatives prompted them to ruinous expense in a funeral, as well as to unmeasured effusions both of grief and conviviality; and the general necessity experienced for interference of the law is attested by the remark of Plutarch, that similar prohibitions to those enacted by Solon were likewise in force at his native town of Chæroneia.[237]

Other penal enactments of Solon are yet to be mentioned. He forbade absolutely evil-speaking with respect to the dead: he forbade it likewise with respect to the living, either in a temple or before judges or archons, or at any public festival,—on pain of a forfeit of three drachms to the person aggrieved, and two more to the public treasury. How mild the general character of his punishments was, may be judged by this law against foul language, not less than by the law before mentioned against rape: both the one and the other of these offences were much more severely dealt with under the subsequent law of democratical Athens. The peremptory edict against speaking ill of a deceased person, though doubtless springing in a great degree from disinterested repugnance, is traceable also in part to that fear of the wrath of the departed which strongly possessed the early Greek mind.

It seems generally that Solon determined by law the outlay for the public sacrifices, though we do not know what were his particular directions: we are told that he reckoned a sheep and a medimnus (of wheat or barley?) as equivalent, either of them, to a drachm, and that he also prescribed the prices to be paid for first-rate oxen intended for solemn occasions. But it astonishes us to see the large recompense which he awarded out of the public treasury to a victor at the Olympic or Isthmian games: to the former five hundred drachms, equal to one year's income of the highest of the four classes on the census; to the latter one hundred drachms. The magnitude of these rewards strikes us the more when we compare them with the fines on rape and evil speaking; and we cannot be surprised that the philosopher Xenophanês noticed, with some degree of severity, the extravagant estimate of this species of excellence, current among the Grecian cities.[238] At the same time, we must remember both that these Pan-Hellenic sacred games presented the chief visible evidence of peace and sympathy among the numerous communities of Greece, and that in the time of Solon, factitious reward was still needful to encourage them. In respect to land and agriculture, Solon proclaimed a public reward of five drachms for every wolf brought in, and one drachm for every wolf's cub: the extent of wild land has at all times been considerable in Attica. He also provided rules respecting the use of wells between neighbors, and respecting the planting in conterminous olive-grounds. Whether any of these regulations continued in operation during the better-known period of Athenian history cannot be safely affirmed.[239]

In respect to theft, we find it stated that Solon repealed the punishment of death which Drako had annexed to that crime, and enacted as a penalty, compensation to an amount double the value of the property stolen. The simplicity of this law perhaps affords ground for presuming that it really does belong to Solon, but the law which prevailed during the time of the orators respecting theft[240] must have been introduced at some later period, since it enters into distinctions and mentions both places and forms of procedure, which we cannot reasonably refer to the 46th Olympiad. The public dinners at the prytaneium, of which the archons and a select few partook in common, were also either first established, or perhaps only more strictly regulated, by Solon: he ordered barley cakes for their ordinary meals, and wheaten loaves for festival days, prescribing how often each person should dine at the table. [241] The honor of dining at the table of the prytaneium was maintained throughout as a valuable reward at the disposal of the government.

Among the various laws of Solon, there are few which have attracted more notice than that which pronounces the man, who in a sedition stood aloof and took part with neither side, to be dishonored and disfranchised.[242] Strictly speaking, this seems more in the nature of an emphatic moral denunciation, or a religious curse, than a legal sanction capable of being formally applied in an individual case and after judicial trial,—though the sentence of atīmy, under the more elaborated Attic procedure, was both definite in its penal consequences and also judicially delivered. We

may, however, follow the course of ideas under which Solon was induced to write this sentence on his tables, and we may trace the influence of similar ideas in later Attic institutions. It is obvious that his denunciation is confined to that special case in which a sedition has already broken out: we must suppose that Kylôn has seized the acropolis, or that Peisistratus, Megaklês, and Lykurgus are in arms at the head of their partisans. Assuming these leaders to be wealthy and powerful men, which would in all probability be the fact, the constituted authority—such as Solon saw before him in Attica, even after his own organic amendments—was not strong enough to maintain the peace; it became, in fact, itself one of the contending parties. Under such given circumstances, the sooner every citizen publicly declared his adherence to some one of them, the earlier this suspension of legal authority was likely to terminate. Nothing was so mischievous as the indifference of the mass, or their disposition to let the combatants fight out the matter among themselves, and then to submit to the victor:[243] nothing was so likely to encourage aggression on the part of an ambitious malcontent, as the conviction that, if he could once overpower the small amount of physical force which surrounded the archons and exhibit himself in armed possession of the prytaneium or the acropolis, he might immediately count upon passive submission on the part of all the freemen without. Under the state of feeling which Solon inculcates, the insurgent leader would have to calculate that every man who was not actively in his favor would be actively against him, and this would render his enterprise much more dangerous; indeed, he could then never hope to succeed except on the double supposition of extraordinary popularity in his own person, and universal detestation of the existing government. He would thus be placed under the influence of powerful deterring motives, and mere ambition would be far less likely to seduce him into a course which threatened nothing but ruin, unless under such encouragements from the preëxisting public opinion as to make his success a result desirable for the community. Among the small political societies of Greece,—and especially in the age of Solon, when the number of despots in other parts of Greece seems to have been at its maximum,—every government, whatever might be its form, was sufficiently weak to make its overthrow a matter of comparative facility. Unless upon the supposition of a band of foreign mercenaries,—which would render it a government of naked force, and which the Athenian lawgiver would of course never contemplate,—there was no other stay for it except a positive and pronounced feeling of attachment on the part of the mass of citizens: indifference on their part would render them a prey to every daring man of wealth who chose to become a conspirator. That they should be ready to come forward not only with voice but with arms,—and that they should be known beforehand to be so,—was essential to the maintenance of every good Grecian government. It was salutary in preventing mere personal attempts at revolution, and pacific in its tendency, even where the revolution had actually broken out,—because, in the greater number of cases, the proportion of partisans would probably be very unequal, and the inferior party would be compelled to renounce their hopes.

It will be observed that in this enactment of Solon, the existing government is ranked merely as one of the contending parties. The virtuous citizen is enjoined not to come forward in its support, but to come forward at all events, either for it or against it: positive and early action is all that is prescribed to him as matter of duty. In the age of Solon, there was no political idea or system yet current which could be assumed as an unquestionable datum,—no conspicuous standard to which the citizens could be pledged under all circumstances to attach themselves. The option lay only between a mitigated oligarchy in possession and a despot in possibility; a contest wherein the affections of the people could rarely be counted upon in favor of the established government. But this neutrality in respect to the constitution was at an end after the revolution of Kleisthenês, when the idea of the sovereign people and the democratical institutions became both familiar and precious to every individual citizen. We shall hereafter find the Athenians binding themselves by the most sincere and solemn oaths to uphold their democracy against all attempts to subvert it; we shall discover in them a sentiment not less positive and uncompromising in its direction, than energetic in its inspirations. But while we notice this very important change in their character, we shall at the same time perceive that the wise precautionary recommendation of Solon, to obviate sedition by an early declaration of the impartial public between two contending leaders, was not lost upon them. Such, in point of fact, was the purpose of that salutary and protective institution which is called Ostracism. When two party-leaders, in the early stages of the Athenian democracy, each powerful in adherents and influence, had become passionately embarked in bitter and prolonged opposition to each other, such opposition was likely to conduct one or other to violent measures. Over and above the hopes of party triumph, each might well fear that if he himself continued within the bounds of legality, he might fall a victim to aggressive proceedings on the part of his antagonists. To ward off this formidable danger, a public vote was called for to determine which of the two should go into temporary banishment, retaining his property and unvisited by any disgrace. A number of citizens, not less than six thousand, voting secretly and therefore independently, were required to take part, pronouncing upon one or other of these eminent rivals a sentence of exile for ten years: the one who remained became of course more powerful, yet less in a situation to be driven into anti-constitutional courses, than he was before. I shall in a future chapter speak again of this wise precaution, and vindicate it against some erroneous interpretations to which it has given rise; at present, I merely notice its analogy with the previous Solonian law, and its tendency to accomplish the same purpose of terminating a fierce party-feud by artificially calling in the votes of the mass of impartial citizens against one or other of the leaders,—with this important difference, that while Solon assumed the hostile parties to be actually in arms, the ostracism averted that grave public calamity by applying its remedy to the premonitory symptoms.

I have already considered, in a previous chapter, the directions given by Solon for the more orderly recital of the Homeric poems; and it is curious to contrast his rever-

ence for the old epic with the unqualified repugnance which he manifested towards Thespis and the drama,—then just nascent, and holding out little promise of its subsequent excellence. Tragedy and comedy were now beginning to be grafted on the lyric and choric song. First, one actor was provided to relieve the chorus,—subsequently, two actors were introduced to sustain fictitious characters and carry on a dialogue, in such manner that the songs of the chorus and the interlocution of the actors formed a continuous piece. Solon, after having heard Thespis acting (as all the early composers did, both tragic and comic) in his own comedy, asked him afterwards if he was not ashamed to pronounce such falsehoods before so large an audience. And when Thespis answered that there was no harm in saying and doing such things merely for amusement, Solon indignantly exclaimed, striking the ground with his stick,[244] "If once we come to praise and esteem such amusement as this, we shall quickly find the effects of it in our daily transactions." For the authenticity of this anecdote it would be rash to vouch, but we may at least treat it as the protest of some early philosopher against the deceptions of the drama; and it is interesting, as marking the incipient struggles of that literature in which Athens afterwards attained such unrivalled excellence.

It would appear that all the laws of Solon were proclaimed, inscribed, and accepted without either discussion or resistance. He is said to have described them, not as the best laws which he could himself have imagined, but as the best which he could have induced the people to accept; he gave them validity for the space of ten years, for which period[245] both the senate collectively and the archons individually swore to observe them with fidelity, under penalty, in case of non-observance, of a golden statue, as large as life, to be erected at Delphi. But though the acceptance of the laws was accomplished without difficulty, it was not found so easy either for the people to understand and obey, or for the framer to explain them. Every day, persons came to Solon either with praise, or criticism, or suggestions of various improvements, or questions as to the construction of particular enactments; until at last he became tired of this endless process of reply and vindication, which was seldom successful either in removing obscurity or in satisfying complainants. Foreseeing that, if he remained, he would be compelled to make changes, he obtained leave of absence from his countrymen for ten years, trusting that before the expiration of that period they would have become accustomed to his laws. He quitted his native city, in the full certainty that his laws would remain unrepealed until his return; for, says Herodotus, "the Athenians *could not* repeal them, since they were bound by solemn oaths to observe them for ten years." The unqualified manner in which the historian here speaks of an oath, as if it created a sort of physical necessity, and shut out all possibility of a contrary result, deserves notice as illustrating Grecian sentiment.[246]

On departing from Athens, Solon first visited Egypt, where he communicated largely with Psenôphis of Heliopolis and Sonchis of Saïs, Egyptian priests, who had much to tell respecting their ancient history, and from whom he learned matters, real

or pretended, far transcending in alleged antiquity the oldest Grecian genealogies,—especially the history of the vast submerged island of Atlantis, and the war which the ancestors of the Athenians had successfully carried on against it, nine thousand years before. Solon is said to have commenced an epic poem upon this subject, but he did not live to finish it, and nothing of it now remains. From Egypt he went to Cyprus, where he visited the small town of Æreia, said to have been originally founded by Demophôn, son of Theseus; it was then under the dominion of the prince Philokyprus,—each town in Cyprus having its own petty prince. It was situated near the river Klarius, in a position precipitous and secure, but inconvenient and ill-supplied; and Solon persuaded Philokyprus to quit the old site, and establish a new town down in the fertile plain beneath. He himself stayed and became œkist of the new establishment, making all the regulations requisite for its safe and prosperous march, which was indeed so decisively manifested that many new settlers flocked into the new plantation, called by Philokyprus *Soli*, in honor of Solon. To our deep regret, we are not permitted to know what these regulations were; but the general fact is attested by the poems of Solon himself, and the lines, in which he bade farewell to Philokyprus on quitting the island, are yet before us. On the dispositions of this prince, his poem bestowed unqualified commendation.[247]

Besides his visit to Egypt and Cyprus, a story was also current of his having conversed with the Lydian king Crœsus, at Sardis; and the communication said to have taken place between them, has been woven by Herodotus into a sort of moral tale, which forms one of the most beautiful episodes in his whole history. Though this tale has been told and retold as if it were genuine history, yet, as it now stands, it is irreconcilable with chronology,—although, very possibly, Solon may at some time or other have visited Sardis, and seen Crœsus as hereditary prince.[248]

But even if no chronological objections existed, the moral purpose of the tale is so prominent, and pervades it so systematically, from beginning to end, that these internal grounds are of themselves sufficiently strong to impeach its credibility as a matter of fact, unless such doubts happen to be outweighed—which in this case they are not—by good contemporary testimony. The narrative of Solon and Crœsus can be taken for nothing else but an illustrative fiction, borrowed by Herodotus from some philosopher, and clothed in his own peculiar beauty of expression, which on this occasion is more decidedly poetical than is habitual with him. I cannot transcribe, and I hardly dare to abridge it. The vainglorious Crœsus, at the summit of his conquests and his riches, endeavors to win from his visitor Solon an opinion that he is the happiest of mankind. The latter, after having twice preferred to him modest and meritorious Grecian citizens, at length reminds him that his vast wealth and power are of a tenure too precarious to serve as an evidence of happiness,—that the gods are jealous and meddlesome, and often make the show of happiness a mere prelude to extreme disaster,—and that no man's life can be called happy until the whole of it has been played out, so that it may be seen to be out of the reach of reverses. Crœsus

treats this opinion as absurd, but "a great judgment from God fell upon him, after Solon was departed,—probably (observes Herodotus) because he fancied himself the happiest of all men." First, he lost his favorite son Atys, a brave and intelligent youth, —his only other son being dumb. For the Mysians of Olympus, being ruined by a destructive and formidable wild boar which they were unable to subdue, applied for aid to Crœsus, who sent to the spot a chosen hunting force, and permitted, though with great reluctance, in consequence of an alarming dream,—that his favorite son should accompany them. The young prince was unintentionally slain by the Phrygian exile Adrastus, whom Crœsus had sheltered and protected;[249] and he had hardly recovered from the anguish of this misfortune, when the rapid growth of Cyrus and the Persian power induced him to go to war with them, against the advice of his wisest counsellors. After a struggle of about three years he was completely defeated, his capital Sardis taken by storm, and himself made prisoner. Cyrus ordered a large pile to be prepared, and placed upon it Crœsus in fetters, together with fourteen young Lydians, in the intention of burning them alive, either as a religious offering, or in fulfilment of a vow, "or perhaps (says Herodotus) to see whether some of the gods would not interfere to rescue a man so preëminently pious as the king of Lydia."[250] In this sad extremity, Crœsus bethought him of the warning which he had before despised, and thrice pronounced, with a deep groan, the name of Solon. Cyrus desired the interpreters to inquire whom he was invoking, and learned in reply the anecdote of the Athenian lawgiver, together with the solemn memento which he had offered to Crœsus during more prosperous days, attesting the frail tenure of all human greatness. The remark sunk deep into the Persian monarch, as a token of what might happen to himself: he repented of his purpose, and directed that the pile, which had already been kindled, should be immediately extinguished. But the orders came too late; in spite of the most zealous efforts of the bystanders, the flame was found unquenchable, and Crœsus would still have been burned, had he not implored with prayers and tears the succor of Apollo, to whose Delphian and Theban temples he had given such munificent presents. His prayers were heard, the fair sky was immediately overcast, and a profuse rain descended, sufficient to extinguish the flames. [251] The life of Crœsus was thus saved, and he became afterwards the confidential friend and adviser of his conqueror.

Such is the brief outline of a narrative which Herodotus has given with full development and with impressive effect. It would have served as a show-lecture to the youth of Athens, not less admirably than the well-known fable of the Choice of Hêraklês, which the philosopher Prodikus,[252] a junior contemporary of Herodotus, delivered with so much popularity. It illustrates forcibly the religious and ethical ideas of antiquity; the deep sense of the jealousy of the gods, who would not endure pride in any one except themselves;[253] the impossibility, for any man, of realizing to himself more than a very moderate share of happiness; the danger from reactionary nemesis, if at any time he had overpassed such limit; and the necessity of calculations taking in the whole of life, as a basis for rational comparison of different indi-

viduals; and as a practical consequence from these feelings, a constant protest on the part of the moralists against vehement impulses and unrestrained aspirations. The more valuable this narrative appears, in its illustrative character, the less can we presume to treat it as a history.

It is much to be regretted that we have no information respecting events in Attica immediately after the Solonian laws and constitution, which were promulgated in 594 B. C., so as to understand better the practical effect of these changes. What we next hear respecting Solon in Attica refers to a period immediately preceding the first usurpation of Peisistratus in 560 B. C., and after the return of Solon from his long absence. We are here again introduced to the same oligarchical dissensions as are reported to have prevailed before the Solonian legislation: the pedieis, or opulent proprietors of the plain round Athens, under Lykurgus; the parali of the south of Attica, under Megaklês: and the diakrii, or mountaineers of the eastern cantons, the poorest of the three classes, under Peisistratus, are in a state of violent intestine dispute. The account of Plutarch represents Solon as returning to Athens during the height of this sedition. He was treated with respect by all parties, but his recommendations were no longer obeyed, and he was disqualified by age from acting with effect in public. He employed his best efforts to mitigate party animosities, and applied himself particularly to restrain the ambition of Peisistratus, whose ulterior projects he quickly detected.

The future greatness of Peisistratus is said to have been first portended by a miracle which happened, even before his birth, to his father Hippokratês at the Olympic games. It was realized, partly by his bravery and conduct, which had been displayed in the capture of Nisæa from the Megarians,[254]—partly by his popularity of speech and manners, his championship of the poor,[255] and his ostentatious disavowal of all selfish pretensions,—partly by an artful mixture of stratagem and force. Solon, after having addressed fruitless remonstrances to Peisistratus himself, publicly denounced his designs in verses addressed to the people. The deception, whereby Peisistratus finally accomplished his design, is memorable in Grecian tradition.[256] He appeared one day in the agora of Athens in his chariot with a pair of mules: he had intentionally wounded both his person and the mules, and in this condition he threw himself upon the compassion and defence of the people, pretending that his political enemies had violently attacked him. He implored the people to grant him a guard, and at the moment when their sympathies were freshly aroused both in his favor and against his supposed assassins, Aristo proposed formally to the ekklesia,—the probouleutic senate, being composed of friends of Peisistratus, had previously authorized the proposition,[257]—that a company of fifty club-men should be assigned as a permanent body-guard for the defence of Peisistratus. To this motion Solon opposed a strenuous resistance,[258] but found himself overborne, and even treated as if he had lost his senses. The poor were earnest in favor of it, while the rich were afraid to express their dissent; and he could only comfort himself, after the fatal vote had

been passed, by exclaiming that he was wiser than the former and more determined than the latter. Such was one of the first known instances in which this memorable stratagem was played off against the liberty of a Grecian community.

The unbounded popular favor which had procured the passing of this grant, was still farther manifested by the absence of all precautions to prevent the limits of the grant from being exceeded. The number of the body-guard was not long confined to fifty, and probably their clubs were soon exchanged for sharper weapons. Peisistratus thus found himself strong enough to throw off the mask and seize the acropolis. His leading opponents, Megaklês and the Alkmæônids, immediately fled the city, and it was left to the venerable age and undaunted patriotism of Solon to stand forward almost alone in a vain attempt to resist the usurpation. He publicly presented himself in the market-place, employing encouragement, remonstrance, and reproach, in order to rouse the spirit of the people. To prevent this despotism from coming, he told them would have been easy; to shake it off now was more difficult, yet at the same time more glorious.[259] But he spoke in vain; for all who were not actually favorable to Peisistratus listened only to their fears, and remained passive; nor did any one join Solon, when, as a last appeal, he put on his armor and planted himself in military posture before the door of his house. "I have done my duty, he exclaimed at length; I have sustained to the best of my power my country and the laws:" and he then renounced all farther hope of opposition,—though resisting the instances of his friends that he should flee, and returning for answer, when they asked him on what he relied for protection, "On my old age." Nor did he even think it necessary to repress the inspirations of his Muse: some verses yet remain, composed seemingly at a moment when the strong hand of the new despot had begun to make itself sorely felt, in which he tells his countrymen: "If ye have endured sorrow from your own baseness of soul, impute not the fault of this to the gods. Ye have yourselves put force and dominion into the hands of these men, and have thus drawn upon yourselves wretched slavery."

It is gratifying to learn that Peisistratus, whose conduct throughout his despotism was comparatively mild, left Solon untouched. How long this distinguished man survived the practical subversion of his own constitution, we cannot certainly determine; but according to the most probable statement he died the very next year, at the advanced age of eighty.

We have only to regret that we are deprived of the means of following more in detail his noble and exemplary character. He represents the best tendencies of his age, combined with much that is personally excellent; the improved ethical sensibility; the thirst for enlarged knowledge and observation, not less potent in old age than in youth; the conception of regularized popular institutions, departing sensibly from the type and spirit of the governments around him, and calculated to found a new character in the Athenian people; a genuine and reflecting sympathy with the mass of the poor, anxious not merely to rescue them from the oppressions of the

rich, but also to create in them habits of self-relying industry; lastly, during his temporary possession of a power altogether arbitrary, not merely an absence of all selfish ambition, but a rare discretion in seizing the mean between conflicting exigencies. In reading his poems we must always recollect that what now appears common-place was once new, so that to his comparatively unlettered age, the social pictures which he draws were still fresh, and his exhortations calculated to live in the memory. The poems composed on moral subjects, generally inculcate a spirit of gentleness towards others and moderation in personal objects; they represent the gods as irresistible, retributive, favoring the good and punishing the bad, though sometimes very tardily. But his compositions on special and present occasions are usually conceived in a more vigorous spirit; denouncing the oppressions of the rich at one time, and the timid submission to Peisistratus at another,—and expressing, in emphatic language, his own proud consciousness of having stood forward as champion of the mass of the people. Of his early poems hardly anything is preserved; the few lines which remain seem to manifest a jovial temperament, which we may well conceive to have been overlaid by the political difficulties against which he had to contend,—difficulties arising successively out of the Megarian war, the Kylonian sacrilege, the public despondency healed by Epimenidês, and the task of arbiter between a rapacious oligarchy and a suffering people. In one of his elegies, addressed to Mimnermus, he marked out the sixtieth year as the longest desirable period of life, in preference to the eightieth year, which that poet had expressed a wish to attain;[260] but his own life, as far as we can judge, seems to have reached the longer of the two periods, and not the least honorable part of it—the resistance to Peisistratus—occurs immediately before his death.

There prevailed a story, that his ashes were collected and scattered around the island of Salamis, which Plutarch treats as absurd,—though he tells us at the same time that it was believed both by Aristotle, and by many other considerable men: it is at least as ancient as the poet Kratinus, who alluded to it in one of his comedies, and I do not feel inclined to reject it.[261] The inscription on the statue of Solon at Athens described him as a Salaminian: he had been the great means of acquiring the island for his country,—and it seems highly probable that among the new Athenian citizens who went to settle there, he may have received a lot of land and become enrolled among the Salaminian demots. The dispersion of his ashes in various parts of the island connects him with it as in some sort the œkist; and we may construe that incident, if not as the expression of a public vote, at least as a piece of affectionate vanity on the part of his surviving friends.[262]

We have now reached the period of the usurpation of Peisistratus (B. C. 560), whose dynasty governed Athens—with two temporary interruptions during the life of Peisistratus himself—for fifty years. The history of this despotism, milder than Grecian despotism generally, and productive of important consequences to Athens, will be reserved for a succeeding chapter.

APPENDIX.

The explanation which M. von Savigny gives of the Nexi and Addicti under the old Roman law of debtor and creditor (after he has refuted the elucidation of Niebuhr on the same subject), while it throws great light on the historical changes in Roman legislation on that important subject, sets forth at the same time the marked difference made in the procedure of Rome, between the demand of the creditor for repayment of *principal*, and the demand for payment of *interest*.

The primitive Roman law distinguished a debt arising from money lent (*pecunia certa credita*) from debts arising out of contract, delict, sale, etc., or any other source: the creditor on the former ground had a quick and easy process, by which he acquired the fullest power over the person and property of his debtor. After the debt on loan was either confessed or proved before the magistrate, thirty days were allowed to the debtor for payment: if payment was not made within that time, the creditor laid hold of him (*manûs injectio*) and carried him before the magistrate again. The debtor was now again required either to pay or to find a surety (*vindex*); if neither of these demands were complied with, the creditor took possession of him and carried him home, where he kept him in chains for two months; during which interval he brought him before the prætor publicly on three successive nundinæ. If the debt was not paid within these two months, the sentence of addiction was pronounced, and the creditor became empowered either to put his debtor to death, or to sell him for a slave (p. 81), or to keep him at forced work, without any restriction as to the degree of ill usage which might be inflicted upon him. The judgment of the magistrate authorized him, besides, to seize the property of his debtor wherever he could find any, within the limits sufficient for payment: this was one of the points which Niebuhr had denied.

Such was the old law of Rome, with respect to the consequences of an action for money had and received, for more than a century after the Twelve Tables. But the law did not apply this stringent personal execution to any debt except that arising from loan,—and even in that debt only to the principal money, not to the interest,—which latter had to be claimed by a process both more gentle and less efficient, applying to the property only and not to the person of the debtor. Accordingly, it was to the advantage of the creditor to devise some means for bringing his claim of interest under the same stringent process as his claim for the principal; it was also to his advantage, if his claim arose, not out of money lent, but out of sale, compensation for injury, or any other source, to give it *the form* of an action for money lent. Now the nexum, or nexi obligatio, was an artifice—a fictitious loan—whereby this purpose was accomplished. The severe process which legally belonged only to the recovery of the principal money, was extended by the nexum so as to comprehend the interest; and so as to comprehend, also, claims for money arising from all other sources (as well as from loan), wherein the law gave no direct recourse except against the property of a debtor. The debitor nexus was made liable by this legal artifice to pass into the condition of an addictus, either without having borrowed money at all, or for the interest as well as for the principal of that which he had borrowed.

The Lex Pœtelia, passed about B. C. 325, liberated all the nexi then under liability, and interdicted the nexi obligatio forever afterwards (Cicero, De Republ. ii, 34; Livy, viii, 28). Here, as in the seisachtheia of Solon, the existing contracts were cancelled, at the same time that the whole class of similar contracts were forbidden for the future.

But though the nexi obligatio was thus abolished, the old stringent remedy still continued against the debtor on loan, *as far as the principal sum borrowed*, apart from interest. Some mitigations were introduced: by a Lex Julia, the still more important provision was added, that the debtor by means of a cessio bonorum might save his person from seizure. But this cessio bonorum was coupled with conditions which could not always be fulfilled, nor was the debtor admitted to the benefit of it, if he had been guilty of carelessness or dishonesty. Accordingly, the old stringent process, and the addiction in which it ended, though it became less frequent, still continued throughout the course of Imperial Rome, and even down to the time of Justinian. The private prison, with adjudicated debtors working in it, was still the appendage to a Roman money-lender's house, even in the third and fourth centuries after the Christian era, though the practice seems to have become rarer and rarer. The status of the *addictus debitor*, with its peculiar rights and obligations, is discussed by Quintilian (vii, 3); and Aulus Gellius observes: "Addici namque *nunc* et vinciri multos *videmus*, quia vinculorum pœnam deterrimi homines contemnunt," (xx, 1.)

If the *addictus debitor* was adjudged to several creditors, they were allowed by the Twelve Tables to divide his body among them. No example was known of this power having been ever carried into effect, but the law was understood to give the power distinctly.

It is useful to have before us the old Roman law of debtor and creditor, partly as a point of comparison with the ante-Solonian practice in Attica, partly to illustrate the difference drawn in an early state of society between the claim for the principal and the claim for the interest.

See the Abhandlung of Von Savigny in the Transactions of the Berlin Academy for 1833, pp. 70-103; the subject is also treated by the same admirable expositor, in his System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, vol. v, sect. 219, and in Beilage xiv, 10-11 of that volume.

The same peculiar stringent process, which was available in the case of an action for *pecunia certa credita*, was also specially extended to the surety, who had paid down money to liquidate another man's debt; the debtor, if solvent, became his addictus,—this was the *actio depensi*. I have already remarked in a former note, that in the Attic law, a case analogous to this was the only one in which the original remedy against the person of the debtor was always maintained. When a man had paid money to redeem a citizen from captivity, the latter, if he did not repay it, became the slave of the party who had advanced the money.

Walter (Geschichte des Römischen Rechts, sects. 583-715, 2d ed.) calls in question the above explanation of Von Savigny, on grounds which do not appear to me sufficient.

How long the feeling continued, that it was immoral and irreligious to receive any interest at all for money lent, may be seen from the following notice respecting the state of the law in France even down to 1789:—

"Avant la Révolution Française (de 1789) le prêt à intérêt n'était pas également admis dans les diverses parties du royaume. Dans les pays de droit écrit, il était permis de stipuler l'intérêt des déniers prêtés: mais la jurisprudence des parlemens resistait souvent à cet usage. Suivant le droit commun des pays coutumiers, on ne pouvait stipuler aucun intérêt pour le prêt appelé en droit *mutuum*. On tenait pour maxime que l'argent ne produisant rien par lui-même, un tel prêt devait être gratuit: que la perception d'intérêts était une usure: à cet égard, on admettait assez généralement les principes du droit canonique. Du reste, la législation et la jurisprudence variaient suivant les localités et suivant la nature des contrâts et des obligations." (Carette, Lois Annotées, ou Lois, Décrets, Ordonnances, Paris 1843; Note sur le Décret de l'Assemblée Nationale concernant le Prêt et Intérêt. Août 11, 1789.)

The National Assembly declared the legality of all loans on interest, "suivant le taux déterminé par la loi," but did not then fix any special rate. "Le décret du 11 Avril, 1793, défendit la vente et l'achat du numéraire." "La loi du 6 floréal, an III, déclara que l'or et l'argent sont marchandises; mais elle fut rapportée par le décret du 2 prairial suivant. Les articles 1905 et 1907 du Code Civil permettent le prêt à intérêt, mais au taux fixé ou autorisé par la loi. La loi du 3 Sept. 1807 a fixé le taux d'intérêt à 5 per cent. en matière civile et à 6 per cent. en matière commerciale."

The article on Lending-houses, in Beckmann's History of Inventions (vol. iii, pp. 9-50), is highly interesting and instructive on the same subject. It traces the gradual calling in question, mitigation, and disappearance, of the ancient antipathy against taking interest for money, an antipathy long sanctioned by the ecclesiastics as well as by the jurists. Lending-houses, or Monts de Piété, were first commenced in Italy about the middle of the fifteenth century, by some Franciscan monks, for the purpose of rescuing poor borrowers from the exorbitant exactions of the Jews: Pope Pius the Second (Æneas Silvius, one of the ablest of the popes, about 1458-1464), was the first who approved of one of them at Perugia, but even the papal sanction was long combated by a large proportion of ecclesiastics. At first, it was to be purely charitable; not only neither giving interest to those who contributed money, nor taking interest from the borrowers,—but not even providing fixed pay to the administrators: interest was tacitly taken, but the popes were a long time before they would formally approve of such a practice. "At Vicenza, in order to avoid the reproach of usury, the artifice was employed of not demanding any interest, but admonishing the borrowers that they should give a remuneration according to their piety and ability," (p. 31.) The Dominicans, partisans of the old doctrine, called these establishments Montes *Impietatis*. A Franciscan monk Bernardinus, one of the most active promoters of the Monts de Piété, did not venture to defend, but only to excuse as an unavoidable evil, the payment of wages to the clerks and administrators: "Speciosius et religiosius fatebatur Bernardinus fore, si absque ullo penitus obolo et pretio mutuum daretur et commodaretur libere pecunia, sed pium opus et pauperum subsidium exiguo sic duraturum tempore. Non enim (inquit) tantus est ardor hominum, ut gubernatores et officiales, Montium ministerio necessarii, velint laborem hunc omnem gratis subire: quod si remunerandi sint ex sorte principali, vel ipso deposito, seu exili Montium ærario, brevi exhaurietur, et commodum opportunumque istud pauperum refugium ubique peribit." (p. 33.)

The Council of Trent, during the following century, pronounced in favor of the legality and usefulness of these lending-houses, and this has since been understood to be the sentiment of the Catholic church generally.

To trace this gradual change of moral feeling is highly instructive,—the more so, as that general basis of sentiment, of which the antipathy against lending money on interest is only a particular case, still prevails largely in society and directs the current of moral approbation and disapprobation. In some nations, as among the ancient Persians before Cyrus, this sentiment has been carried so far as to repudiate and despise all buying and selling (Herodot. i, 153). With many, the principle of reciprocity in human dealings appears, when conceived in theory, odious and contemptible, and goes by some bad name, such as egoism, selfishness, calculation, political economy, etc: the only sentiment which they will admit in theory, is, that the man who has, ought to be ready at all times to give away what he has to him who has not; while the latter is encouraged to expect and require such gratuitous donation.

CHAPTER XII.

EUBŒA. — CYCLADES.

AMONG the Ionic portion of Hellas are to be reckoned (besides Athens) Eubœa, and the numerous group of islands included between the southernmost Eubœan promontory, the eastern coast of Peloponnesus, and the north-western coast of Krête. Of these islands some are to be considered as outlying prolongations, in a south-easterly direction, of the mountain-system of Attica; others, of that of Eubœa; while a certain number of them lie apart from either system, and seem referable to a volcanic origin.[263] To the first class belong Keôs, Kythnus, Serīphus, Pholegandrus, Sikinus, Gyarus, Syra, Paros, and Antiparos; to the second class, Andros, Tênos, Mykonos, Dêlos, Naxos, Amorgos; to the third class, Kimôlus, Mêlos, Thêra. These islands passed amongst the ancients by the general name of the Cyclades and the Sporades; the former denomination being commonly understood to comprise those which immediately surrounded the sacred island of Dêlos,—the latter being given to those which lay more scattered and apart. But the names are not applied with uniformity or steadiness even in ancient times: at present, the whole group are usually known by the title of Cyclades.

The population of these islands was called Ionic,—with the exception of Styra and Karystus in the southern part of Eubœa, and the island of Kythnus, which were peopled by dryopes,[264] the same tribe as those who have been already remarked in the Argolic peninsula; and with the exception also of Mêlos and Thêra, which were colonies from Sparta.

The island of Eubœa, long and narrow like Krête, and exhibiting a continuous backbone of lofty mountains from north-west to south-east, is separated from Bœotia at one point by a strait so narrow (celebrated in antiquity under the name of the Eurīpus), that the two were connected by a bridge for a large portion of the historical period of Greece, erected during the later times of the Peloponnesian war by the inhabitants of Chalkis.[265] Its general want of breadth leaves little room for plains: the area of the island consists principally of mountain, rock, dell, and ravine, suited in many parts for pasture, but rarely convenient for grain-culture or town habitations. Some plains there were, however, of great fertility, especially that of Lelantum,[266] bordering on the sea near Chalkis, and continuing from that city in a southerly direction towards Eretria. Chalkis and Eretria, both situated on the western coast, and both occupying parts of this fertile plain, were the two principal places in the island: the domain of each seems to have extended across the island from sea to sea.[267] Towards the northern end of the island were situated Histiæa, afterwards called Oreus,—as well as Kêrinthus and Dium, Athênæ Diades, Ædêpsus, Ægæ, and Orobiæ, are also mentioned on the north-western coast, over against Lokris. Dystus,

Styra, and Karystus are made known to us in the portion of the island south of Eretria,—the two latter opposite to the Attic demes Halæ, Araphênides, and Prasiæ.[268] The large extent of the island of Eubœa was thus distributed between six or seven cities, the larger and central portion belonging to Chalkis and Eretria. But the extensive mountain lands, applicable only for pastures in the summer,—for the most part public lands, let out for pasture to such proprietors as had the means of providing winter sustenance elsewhere for their cattle,—were never visited by any one except the shepherds; and were hardly better known to the citizens resident in Chalkis and Eretria than if they had been situated on the other side of the Ægean.[269]

The towns above enumerated in Eubœa, excepting Athenæ Diades, all find a place in the Iliad. Of their history we know no particulars until considerably after 776 B. C., and they are first introduced to us as Ionic, though in Homer the population are called Abantes. The Greek authors are never at a loss to give us the etymology of a name. While Aristotle tells us that the Abantes were Thracians who had passed over into the island from Abæ in Phokis, Hesiod deduces the name of Eubœa from the cow Iô.[270] Hellopia, a district near Histiæa, was said to have been founded by Hellops, son of Ion: according to others, Æklus and Kothus, two Athenians,[271] were the founders, the former of Eretria, the latter of Chalkis and Kêrinthus: and we are told, that among the demes of Attica, there were two named Histiæa and Eretria, from whence some contended that the appellations of the two Eubœan towns were derived. Though Herodotus represents the population of Styra as Dryopian, there were others who contended that it had originally been peopled from Marathon and the tetrapolis of Attica, partly from the deme called Steireïs. The principal writers whom Strabo consulted seem to trace the population of Eubœa, by one means or other, to an Attic origin, though there were peculiarities in the Eretrian dialect which gave rise to the supposition that they had been joined by settlers from Elis, or from the Triphylian Makistus.

Our earliest historical intimations represent Chalkis and Eretria as the wealthiest, most powerful, and most enterprising Ionic cities in European Greece,—apparently surpassing Athens, and not inferior to Samos or Miletus. Besides the fertility of the plain Lelantum, Chalkis possessed the advantage of copper and iron ore, obtained in immediate proximity both to the city and to the sea,—which her citizens smelted and converted into arms and other implements, with a very profitable result: the Chalkidic sword acquired a distinctive renown.[272] In this mineral source of wealth several of the other islands shared: iron ore is found in Keôs, Kythnus, and Seriphus, and traces are still evident in the latter island of extensive smelting formerly practised.[273] Moreover, in Siphnus, there were in early times veins of silver and gold, by which the inhabitants were greatly enriched; though their large acquisitions, attested by the magnitude of the tithe[274] which they offered at the Delphian temple, were only of temporary duration, and belong particularly to the seventh and sixth centuries before the Christian era. The island of Naxos too, was at an early day wealthy

and populous. Andros, Tênos, Keôs, and several other islands, were at one time reduced to dependence upon Eretria:[275] other islands seem to have been in like manner dependent upon Naxos, which at the time immediately preceding the Ionic revolt possessed a considerable maritime force, and could muster eight thousand heavy-armed citizens,[276]—a very large force for any single Grecian city. Nor was the military force of Eretria much inferior; for in the temple of the Amarynthian Artemis, nearly a mile from the city, to which the Eretrians were in the habit of marching in solemn procession to celebrate the festival of the goddess, there stood an ancient column setting forth that the procession had been performed by no less than three thousand hoplites, six hundred horsemen, and sixty chariots.[277] The date of this inscription cannot be known, but it can hardly be earlier than the 45th Olympiad, or 600 B. C.,—near about the time of the Solonian legislation. Chalkis was still more powerful than Eretria; both were in early times governed by an oligarchy, which among the Chalkidians was called hippobotæ, or horse-feeders,—proprietors probably of most part of the plain called Lelantum, and employing the adjoining mountains as summer pasture for their herds. The extent of their property is attested by the large number of four thousand kleruchs, or out-freemen, whom Athens quartered upon their lands, after the victory gained over them when they assisted the expelled Hippias in his efforts to regain the Athenian sceptre.[278]

Confining our attention, as we now do, to the first two centuries of Grecian history, or the interval between 776 B. C. and 560 B. C., there are scarce any facts which we can produce to ascertain the condition of these Ionic islands. Two or three circumstances, however, may be named, which go to confirm our idea of their early wealth and importance.

1. The Homeric Hymn to Apollo presents to us the island of Dêlos as the centre of a great periodical festival in honor of Apollo, celebrated by all the cities, insular and continental, of the Ionic name. What the date of this hymn is, we have no means of determining: Thucydidês quotes it, without hesitation, as the production of Homer, and, doubtless, it was in his time universally accepted as such,—though modern critics concur in regarding both that and the other hymns as much later than the Iliad and Odyssey: it cannot probably be later than 600 B. C. The description of the Ionic visitors presented to us in this hymn is splendid and imposing: the number of their ships, the display of their finery, the beauty of their women, the athletic exhibitions as well as the matches of song and dance,—all these are represented as making an ineffaceable impression on the spectator:[279] "the assembled Ionians look as if they were beyond the reach of old age or death." Such was the magnificence of which Dêlos was the periodical theatre, and which called forth the voices and poetical genius not merely of itinerant bards, but also of the Delian maidens in the temple of Apollo, during the century preceding 560 B. C. At that time it was the great central festival of the Ionians in Asia and Europe; frequented by the twelve Ionic cities, in and near Asia Minor, as well as by Athens and Chalkis in Europe: it had not yet been super-

seded by the Ephesia as the exclusive festival of the former, nor had the Panathenæa of Athens reached the importance which afterwards came to belong to them during the plenitude of the Athenian power.

We find both Polykratês of Samos, and Peisistratus of Athens, taking a warm interest in the sanctity of Dêlos and the celebrity of this festival.[280] But it was partly the rise of these two great Ionian despots, partly the conquests of the Persians in Asia Minor, which broke up the independence of the numerous petty Ionian cities, during the last half of the sixth century before the Christian era; hence the great festival at Dêlos gradually declined in importance. Though never wholly intermitted, it was shorn of much of its previous ornaments, and especially of that which constituted the first of all ornaments,—the crowds of joyous visitors. And Thucydidês, when he notices the attempt made by the Athenians during the Peloponnesian war, in the height of their naval supremacy, to revive the Delian festival, quotes the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, as a certificate of its foregone and long-forgotten splendor. We perceive that even *he* could find no better evidence than this hymn, for Grecian transactions of a century anterior to Peisistratus,—and we may, therefore, judge how imperfectly the history of this period was known to the men who took part in the Peloponnesian war. The hymn is exceedingly precious as an historical document, because it attests to us a transitory glory and extensive association of the Ionic Greeks on both sides of the Ægean sea, which the conquests of the Lydians first, and of the Persians afterwards, overthrew,—a time when the hair of the wealthy Athenian was decorated with golden ornaments, and his tunic made of linen,[281] like that of the Milesians and Ephesians, instead of the more sober costume and woollen clothing which he subsequently copied from Sparta and Peloponnesus,—a time too when the Ionic name had not yet contracted that stain of effeminacy and cowardice, which stood imprinted upon it in the time of Herodotus and Thucydidês, and which grew partly out of the subjugation of the Asiatic Ionians by Persia, partly out of the antipathy of the Peloponnesian Dorians to Athens. The author of the Homeric Hymn, in describing the proud Ionians who thronged, in his day, to the Delian festival, could hardly have anticipated a time to come, when the name *Ionian* would become a reproach, such as the European Greeks, to whom it really belonged, were desirous of disclaiming.[282]

2. Another illustrative fact, in reference both to the Ionians generally, and to Chalkis and Eretria in particular, during the century anterior to Peisistratus, is to be found in the war between these two cities respecting the fertile plain Lelantum, which lay between them. In general, it appears, these two important towns maintained harmonious relations; but there were some occasions of dispute, and one in particular, wherein a formidable war ensued between them. Several allies joined with each, and it is remarkable that this was the only war known to Thucydidês, anterior to the Persian conquest, which had risen above the dignity of a mere quarrel between neighbors; and in which so many different states manifested a disposition to

interfere, as to impart to it a semi-Hellenic character.[283] Of the allies of each party on this occasion we know only that the Milesians lent assistance to Eretria, and the Samians, as well as the Thessalians and the Chalkidic colonies in Thrace, to Chalkis. A column, still visible during the time of Strabo, in the temple of the Amarynthian Artemis near Eretria, recorded the covenant entered into mutually by the two belligerents, to abstain from missiles, and to employ nothing but hand-weapons. The Eretrians are said to have been superior in horse, but they were vanquished in the battle; the tomb of Kleomachus of Pharsalus, a distinguished warrior who had perished in the cause of the Chalkidians, was erected in the agora of Chalkis. We know nothing of the date, the duration, or the particulars of this war;[284] but it seems that the Eretrians were worsted, though their city always maintained its dignity as the second state in the island. Chalkis was decidedly the first, and continued to be flourishing, populous, and commercial, long after it had lost its political importance, throughout all the period of Grecian independent history.[285]

3. Of the importance of Chalkis and Eretria, during the seventh and part of the eighth century before the Christian era, we gather other evidences,—partly in the numerous colonies founded by them, which I shall advert to in a subsequent chapter,—partly in the prevalence throughout a large portion of Greece, of the Euboic scale of weight and money. What the quantities and proportions of this scale were, has been first shown by M. Boeckh in his "Metrologie." It was of Eastern origin, and the gold collected by Dareius in tribute throughout the vast Persian empire, was ordered to be delivered in Euboic talents. Its divisions,—the talent equal to sixty minæ, the mina equal to one hundred drachms, the drachm equal to six obols,—were the same as those of the scale called Æginæan, introduced by Pheidôn of Argos; but the six obols of the Euboic drachm contained a weight of silver equal only to five Æginæan obols, so that the Euboic denominations,—drachm, mina, and talent,—were equal only to five-sixths of the same denominations in the Æginæan scale. It was the Euboic scale which prevailed at Athens before the debasement introduced by Solon; which debasement,—amounting to about twenty-seven per cent., as has been mentioned in a previous chapter,—created a third scale, called the Attic, distinct both from the Æginæan and Euboic,—standing to the former in the ratio of 3 : 5, and to the latter, in the ratio of 18 : 25. It seems plain that the Euboic scale was adopted by the Ionians through their intercourse with the Lydians,[286] and other Asiatics, and that it became naturalized among their cities under the name of the Euboic, because Chalkis and Eretria were the most actively commercial states in the Ægean,—just as the superior commerce of Ægina among the Dorian states, had given to the scale introduced by Pheidôn of Argos, the name of Æginæan. The fact of its being so called indicates a time when these two Eubœan cities surpassed Athens in maritime power and extended commercial relations, and when they stood among the foremost of the Ionic cities throughout Greece. The Euboic scale, after having been debased by Solon, in reference to coinage and money, still continued in use at Athens for merchandise: the Attic mercantile mina retained its primitive Euboic weight.[287]

CHAPTER XIII.

ASIATIC IONIANS.

THERE existed at the commencement of historical Greece, in 776 B. C., besides the Ionians in Attica and the Cyclades, twelve Ionian cities of note on or near the coast of Asia Minor, besides a few others less important. Enumerated from south to north, they stand,—Milêtus, Myûs, Priênê, Samos, Ephesus, Kolophôn, Lebedus, Teôs, Erythræ, Chios, Klazomenæ, Phôkæa.

That these cities, the great ornament of the Ionic name, were founded by emigrants from European Greece, there is no reason to doubt. How, or when, they were founded, we have no history to tell us; the legend, which has already been set forth in a preceding chapter, gives us a great event called the Ionic migration, referred by chronologists to one special year, one hundred and forty years after the Trojan war. This massive grouping belongs to the character of legend,—the Æolic and Ionic emigrations, as well as the Dorian conquest of Peloponnesus, are each invested with unity, and imprinted upon the imagination as the results of a single great impulse. But such is not the character of the historical colonies: when we come to relate the Italian and Sicilian emigrations, it will appear that each colony has its own separate nativity and causes of existence. In the case of the Ionic emigration, this large scale of legendary conception is more than usually conspicuous, since to that event is ascribed the foundation or repeopling both of the Cyclades and of the Asiatic Ionian cities.

Euripidês treats Ion,[288] the son of Kreusa by Apollo, as the planter of these latter cities: but the more current form of the legend assigns that honor to the sons of Kodrus, two of whom are especially named, corresponding to the two greatest of the ten continental Ionic cities: Androklus, as founder of Ephesus, Neileus of Milêtus. These two towns are both described as founded directly from Athens. The others seem rather to be separate settlements, neither consisting of Athenians, nor emanating from Athens, but adopting the characteristic Ionic festival of the Apaturia, and, in part at least, the Ionic tribes,—and receiving princes from the Kodrid families at Ephesus or Milêtus, as a condition of being admitted into the Pan-Ionic confederate festival. The poet Mimnermus ascribed the foundation of his native city Kolophôn to emigrants from Pylus, in Peloponnesus, under Andræmôn: Teôs was settled by Minyæ of Orchomenus, under Athamas: Klazomenæ by settlers from Kleônæ and Phlius, Phôkæa, by Phocians, Priênê in large portion by Kadmeians from Thebes. And with regard to the powerful islands of Chios and Samos, it does not appear that their native authors,—the Chian poet Ion, or the Samaian poet Asius,—ascribed to them a population emanating from Athens: Pausanias could not make out from the poems of Ion how it happened that Chios came to form a part of the Ionic federation.[289]

Herodotus, especially, dwells upon the number of Grecian tribes and races, who contributed to supply the population of the twelve Ionic cities,—Minyæ, from Orchomenus, Kadmeians, Dryopians, Phocians, Molossians, Arkadian Pelasgians, Dorians from Epidaurus, and "several other sections" of Greeks. Moreover, he particularly singles out the Milesians, as claiming for themselves the truest Ionic blood, and as having started from the prytaneium, at Athens; thus plainly implying his belief that the majority, at least, of the remaining settlers did not take their departure from the same hearth.[290]

But the most striking information which Herodotus conveys to us is, the difference of language, or dialect, which marked these twelve cities. Milêtus, Myûs, and Priênê, all situated on the soil of the Karians, had one dialect: Ephesus, Kolophôn, Lebedus, Teôs, Klazomenæ, and Phôkæa, had a dialect common to all, but distinct from that of the three preceding: Chios and Erythræ exhibited a third dialect, and Samos, by itself, a fourth. Nor does the historian content himself with simply noting such quadruple variety of speech; he employs very strong terms to express the degree of dissimilarity.[291] The testimony of Herodotus as to these dialects is, of course, indisputable.

Instead of one great Ionic emigration, then, the statements above cited conduct us rather to the supposition of many separate and successive settlements, formed by the Greeks of different sections, mingling with and modified by preëxisting Lydians and Karians, and subsequently allying themselves with Milêtus and Ephesus into the so-called Ionic amphiktyony. As a condition of this union, they are induced to adopt among their chiefs princes of the Kodrid gens or family; who are called sons of Kodrus, but who are not for that reason to be supposed necessarily contemporary with Androklus or Neileus.

The chiefs selected by some of the cities are said to have been Lykians,[292] of the heroic family of Glaukus and Bellerophon: in some causes, the Kodrids and the Glaukids were chiefs conjointly. Respecting the dates of these separate settlements, we cannot give any account, for they lie beyond the commencement of authentic history: there is ground for believing that most of them existed for some time previous to 776 B. C., but at what date the federative solemnity uniting the twelve cities was commenced, we do not know.

The account of Herodotus shows us that these colonies were composed of mixed sections of Greeks,—an important circumstance in estimating their character. Such was usually the case more or less in respect to all emigrations, and hence the establishments thus planted contracted at once, generally speaking, both more activity and more instability than was seen among those Greeks who remained at home, and among whom the old habitual routine had not been counterworked by any marked change of place or of social relations. For in a new colony it became necessary to adopt fresh classifications of the citizens, to range them together in fresh military

and civil divisions, and to adopt new characteristic sacrifices and religious ceremonies as bonds of union among all the citizens conjointly. At the first outset of a colony, moreover, there were inevitable difficulties to be surmounted, which imposed upon its leading men the necessity of energy and forethought,—more especially in regard to maritime affairs, on which not only their connection with the countrymen whom they had left behind, but also their means of establishing advantageous relations with the population of the interior, depended. At the same time, the new arrangements indispensable among the colonists were far from working always harmoniously: dissension and partial secessions were not unfrequent occurrences. And what has been called the mobility of the Ionic race, as compared with the Doric, is to be ascribed in a great measure to this mixture of races and external stimulus arising out of expatriation: for there is no trace of it in Attica anterior to Solon; and on the other hand, the Doric colonies of Korkyra and Syracuse exhibit a population not less excitable than the Ionic towns generally,[293] and much more so than the Ionic colony of Massalia. The remarkable commercial enterprise, which will be seen to characterize Milêtus, Samos, and Phokæa, belongs but little to anything connected with the Ionic temperament.

All the Ionic towns, except Klazomenæ and Phokæa, are represented to have been founded on some preëxisting settlements of Karians, Lelegians, Kretans, Lydians, or Pelasgians.[294] In some cases these previous inhabitants were overcome, slain, or expelled; in others they were accepted as fellow-residents, and the Grecian cities thus established acquired a considerable tinge of Asiatic customs and feelings. What is related by Herodotus respecting the first establishment of Neileus and his emigrants at Milêtus is in this point of view remarkable. They took out with them no women from Athens (the historian says), but found wives in the Karian women of the place, whose husbands and fathers they overcame and put to death; and the women, thus violently seized, manifested their repugnance by taking a solemn oath among themselves that they would never eat with their new husbands, nor ever call them by their personal names. This same pledge they imposed upon their daughters; but how long the practice lasted, we are not informed: it rather seems from the language of the historian that traces of it were visible even in his day in the family customs of the Milesians. The population of this greatest of the Ionic towns must thus have been half of Karian breed. It is to be presumed that what is true of Neileus and his companions would be found true, also, respecting most of the maritime colonies of Greece, and that the vessels which took them out would be scantily provided with women. But on this point, unfortunately, we are left without information.

The worship of Apollo Didymæus, at Branchidæ, near Milêtus,—that of Artemis, near Ephesus,—and that of the Apollo Klarius, near Kolophôn,—seems to have existed among the native Asiatic population before the establishment of either of these three cities. To maintain these preëxisting local rites was not less congenial to the feelings, than beneficial to the interests, of the Greeks: all the three establishments

acquired increased celebrity under Ionic administration, and contributed in their turn to the prosperity of the towns to which they were attached. Milêtus, Myûs, and Priênê were situated on or near the productive plain of the river Mæander; while Ephesus was, in like manner, planted near the mouth of the Kaïster, thus immediately communicating with the productive breadth of land separating Mount Tmôlus on the north from Mount Messôgis on the south, through which that river runs: Kolophôn is only a very few miles north of the same river. Possessing the best means of communication with the interior, these three towns seem to have thriven with greater rapidity than the rest; and they, together with the neighboring island of Samos, constituted in early times the strength of the Pan-Ionic amphiktyony. The situation of the sacred precinct of Poseidôn (where this festival was celebrated), on the north side of the promontory of Mykalê, near Priênê, and between Ephesus and Milêtus, seems to show that these towns formed the primitive centre to which the other Ionian settlements became gradually aggregated. For it was by no means a centrical site with reference to all the twelve; so that Thalês of Milêtus,—who at a subsequent period recommended a more intimate political union between the twelve Ionic towns, and the establishment of a common government to manage their collective affairs,—indicated Teôs,[295] and not Priênê, as the suitable place for it. Moreover, it seems that the Pan-Ionic festival,[296] though still formally continued, had lost its importance before the time of Thucydidês, and had become practically superseded by the more splendid festival of the Ephesia, near Ephesus, where the cities of Ionia found a more attractive place of meeting.

An island close adjoining to the coast, or an outlying tongue of land connected with the continent by a narrow isthmus, and presenting some hill sufficient for an acropolis, seems to have been considered as the most favorable situation for Grecian colonial settlement. To one or other of these descriptions most of the Ionic cities, conform.[297] The city of Milêtus at the height of its power had four separate harbors, formed probably by the aid of the island of Ladê and one or two islets which lay close off against it: the Karian or Kretan establishment, which the Ionic colonists found on their arrival and conquered, was situated on an eminence overhanging the sea, and became afterwards known by the name of Old Milêtus, at a time when the new Ionic town had been extended down to the water-side and rendered maritime.[298] The territory of this important city seems to have comprehended both the southern promontory called Poseidium and the greater part of the northern promontory of Mykalê,[299] reaching on both sides of the river Mæander: the inconsiderable town of Myûs[300] on the southern bank of the Mæander, an offset seemingly formed by the secession of some Milesian malcontents under a member of the Neleid gens named Kydrêlus, maintained for along time its autonomy, but was at length absorbed into the larger unity of Milêtus; its swampy territory having been rendered uninhabitable by a plague of gnats. Priênê acquired an importance greater than naturally belonged to it, by its immediate vicinity to the holy Pan-Ionic temple and its function of administering the sacred rites,[301]—a dignity which it probably was only permitted to

enjoy in consequence of the jealousies of its greater neighbors Milêtus, Ephesus, and Samos.[302] The territories of these Grecian cities seem to have been interspersed with Karian villages, probably in the condition of subjects.

It is rare to find a genuine Greek colony established at any distance from the sea; but the two Asiatic towns called Magnêsia form exceptions to this position,—one situated on the south side of the Mæander, or rather on the river Lethæus, which runs into the Mæander; the other more northerly, adjoining to the Æolic Greeks, on the northern declivity of Mount Sipylus, and near to the plain of the river Harmus. The settlement of both these towns dates before the period of history: the tale[303] which we read affirms them to be settlements from the Magnêtes in Thessaly, formed by emigrants who had first passed into Krête, under the orders of the Delphian oracle, and next into Asia, where they are said to have extricated the Ionic and Æolic colonists, then recently arrived, from a position of danger and calamity. By the side of this story, which can neither be verified nor contradicted, it is proper to mention the opinion of Niebuhr, that both these towns of Magnêsia are remnants of a primitive Pelasgic population, akin to, but not emigrants from, the Magnêtes of Thessaly, —Pelasgians whom he supposes to have occupied both the valley of the Hermus and that of the Kaïster, anterior to the Æolic and Ionic migrations. In support of this opinion, it may be stated that there were towns bearing the Pelasgic name of Larissa, both near the Hermus and near the Mæander: Menekratês of Elæa considered the Pelasgians as having once occupied most part of that coast; and O. Müller even conceives the Tyrrhenians to have been Pelasgians from Tyrrha, a town in the interior of Lydia south of Tmôlus. The point is one upon which we have not sufficient evidence to advance beyond conjecture.[304]

Of the Ionic towns, with which our real knowledge of Asia Minor begins, Milêtus[305] was the most powerful; and its celebrity was derived not merely from its own wealth and population, but also from the extraordinary number of its colonies, established principally in the Propontis and Euxine, and amounting, as we are told by some authors, to not less than seventy-five or eighty. Respecting these colonies I shall speak presently, in treating of the general colonial expansion of Greece during the eighth and seventh centuries B. C.: at present, it is sufficient to notice that the islands of Ikarus and Lerus,[306] not far from Samos and the Ionic coast generally, were among the places planted with Milesian settlers.

The colonization of Ephesus by Androklus appears to be connected with the Ionic occupation of Samos, so far as the confused statements which we find enable us to discern. Androklus is said to have lingered upon that island for a long time, until the oracle vouchsafed to indicate to him what particular spot to occupy on the continent; at length the indication was given, and he planted his colonists at the fountain of Hypelæon and on a portion of the hill of Korêssus, within a short distance of the temple and sanctuary of Artemis; whose immediate inhabitants he respected and received as brethren, while he drove away for the most part the surrounding Lelegians and

Lydians. The population of the new town of Ephesus was divided into three tribes,—the pre-existing inhabitants, or Ephesians proper, the Bennians, and the Euônymeis, so named (we are told) from the deme Euonymus in Attica.[307] So much did the power of Androklus increase, that he was enabled to conquer Samos, and to expel from it the prince Leôgorus: of the retiring Samians, a part are said to have gone to Samothrace and there established themselves, while another portion acquired possession of Marathêsium near Ephesus, on the adjoining continent of Asia Minor, from whence, after a short time, they recovered their island, compelling Androklus to return to Ephesus. It seems, however, that in the compromise and treaty which ensued, they yielded possession of Marathêsium to Androklus,[308] and confined themselves to Anæa, a more southerly district farther removed from the Ephesian settlement, and immediately opposite to the island of Samos. Androklus is said to have perished in a battle fought for the defence of Priênê, which town he had come to aid against an attack of the Karians. His dead body was brought from the field and buried near the gates of Ephesus, where the tomb was yet shown during the days of Pausanias; but a sedition broke out against his sons after him, and the malcontents strengthened their party by inviting reinforcements from Teôs and Karina. The struggle which ensued terminated in the discontinuance of the kingly race and the establishment of a republican government,—the descendants of Androklus being allowed to retain both considerable honorary privileges and the hereditary priesthood of the Eleusinian Dêmêtêr. The newly-received inhabitants were enrolled in two new tribes, making in all five tribes, which appear to have existed throughout the historical times at Ephesus.[309] It appears too that a certain number of fugitive proprietors from Samos found admission among the Ephesians and received the freedom of the city; and the part of the city in which they resided acquired the name of Samorna, or Smyrna, by which name it was still known in the time of the satirical poet Hippônax, about 530 B. C.[310]

Such are the stories which we find respecting the infancy of the Ionic Ephesus. The fact of its increase and of its considerable acquisitions of territory, at the expense of the neighboring Lydians,[311] is at least indisputable. It does not appear to have been ever very powerful or enterprising at sea, and few maritime colonies owed their origin to its citizens; but its situation near the mouth and the fertile plain of the Kaïster was favorable both to the multiplication of its inland dependencies and to its trade with the interior. A despot named Pythagoras is said to have subverted by stratagem the previous government of the town, at some period before Cyrus, and to have exercised power for a certain time with great cruelty.[312] It is worthy of remark, that we find no trace of the existence of the four Ionic tribes at Ephesus; and this, when coupled with the fact that neither Ephesus nor Kolophôn solemnized the peculiar Ionic festival of the Apaturia, is one among other indications that the Ephesian population had little community of race with Athens, though the œkist may have been of heroic Athenian family. Guhl attempts to show, on mistaken grounds, that the Greek settlers at Ephesus were mostly of Arkadian origin.[313]

Kolophôn, about fifteen miles north of Ephesus, and divided from the territory of the latter by the precipitous mountain range called Gallêsium, though a member of the Pan-Ionic amphiktyony, seems to have had no Ionic origin: it recognized neither an Athenian œkist nor Athenian inhabitants. The Kolophonian poet Mimnermus tells us that the œkist of the place was the Pylian Andræmôn, and that the settlers were Pylians from Peloponnesus. "We quitted (he says) Pylus, the city of Neleus, and passed in our vessels to the much-desired Asia. There with the insolence of superior force, and employing from the beginning cruel violence, we planted ourselves in the tempting Kolophôn."[314] This description of the primitive Kolophonian settlers, given with Homeric simplicity, forcibly illustrates the account given by Herodotus of the proceedings of Neileus at Milêtus. The establishment of Andræmôn must have been effected by force, and by the dispossession of previous inhabitants, leaving probably their wives and daughters as a prey to the victors. The city of Kolophôn seems to have been situated about two miles inland, but it had a fortified port called Notium, not joined to it by long walls as the Peiræeus was to Athens, but completely distinct. There were times in which this port served the Kolophonians as a refuge, when their upper town was assailed by Persians from the interior; but the inhabitants of Notium occasionally manifested inclinations to act as a separate community, and dissensions thus occurred between them and the people in Kolophôn,[315]—so difficult was it in the Greek mind to keep up a permanent feeling of political amalgamation beyond the circle of the town walls.

It is much to be regretted that nothing beyond a few lines of Mimnermus, and nothing at all of the long poem of Xenophanês (composed seemingly near a century after Mimnermus) on the foundation of Kolophôn, has reached us. The short statements of Pausanias omit all notice of that violence which the native Kolophonian poet so emphatically signalizes in his ancestors: they are derived more from the temple legends of the adjoining Klarian Apollo and from morsels of epic poetry referring to that holy place, which connected itself with the worship of Apollo in Krête, at Delphi, and at Thebes. The old Homeric poem, called Thebaïs, reported that Mantô, daughter of the Theban prophet Teiresias, had been presented to Apollo at Delphi as a votive offering by the victorious epigoni: the god directed her to migrate to Asia, and she thus arrived at Klarus, where she married the Kretan Rhakius. The offspring of this marriage was the celebrated prophet Mopsus, whom the Hesiodic epic described as having gained a victory in prophetic skill over Kalchas; the latter having come to Klarus after the Trojan war in company with Amphilochus son of Amphiaraus.[316] Such tales evince the early importance of the temple and oracle of Apollo at Klarus, which appears to have been in some sort an emanation from the great sanctuary of Branchidæ near Milêtus; for we are told that the high priest of Klarus was named by the Milesians.[317] Pausanias states that Mopsus expelled the indigenous Karians, and established the city of Kolophôn; and that the Ionic settlers under Promêthus and Damasichthôn, sons of Kodrus, were admitted amicably as additional inhabitants:[318] a story probably emanating from the temple, and very different from that of the

Kolophonian townsmen in the time of Mimnermus. It seems evident that not only the Apollinic sanctuary at Klarus, but also the analogous establishments on the south of Asia Minor at Phasêlis, Mallus, etc., had their own foundation legends (apart from those of the various bands of emigrant settlers), in which they connected themselves by the best thread which they could devise with the epic glories of Greece.[319]

Passing along the Ionian coast in a north-westerly direction from Kolophôn, we come first to the small but independent Ionic settlement of Lebedus—next, to Teôs, which occupies the southern face of a narrow isthmus, Klazomenæ being placed on the northern: this isthmus, a low narrow valley of about six miles across, forms the eastern boundary of a very considerable peninsula, containing the mountainous and woody regions called Mimas and Kôrykus. Teôs is said to have been first founded by Orchomenian Minyæ under Athamas, and to have received afterwards by consent various swarms of settlers, Orchomenians and others, under the Kodrid leaders Apœkus, Nauklus, and Damasus.[320] The valuable Teian inscriptions published in the large collection of Boeckh, while they mention certain names and titles of honor which connect themselves with this Orchomenian origin, reveal to us at the same time some particulars respecting the internal distribution of the Teian citizens. The territory of the town was distributed amongst a certain number of towers, to each of which corresponded a symmory or section of the citizens, having its common altar and sacred rites, and often its heroic eponymus. How many in number the tribes of Teôs were, we do not know: the name of the Geleontes, one of the four old Ionic tribes, is preserved in an inscription; but the rest, both as to names and number, are unknown. The symmories or tower-fellowships of Teôs seem to be analogous to the phratries of ancient Athens,—forming each a factitious kindred, recognizing a common mythical ancestor, and bound together by a communion at once religious and political. The individual name attached to each tower is in some cases Asiatic rather than Hellenic, indicating in Teôs the mixture not merely of Ionic and Æolic, but also of Karian or Lydian inhabitants, of which Pausanias speaks.[321] Gerrhæidæ, or Cherræidæ, the port on the west side of the town of Teôs, had for its eponymous hero Gerês the Bœotian, who was said to have accompanied the Kodrids in their settlement.

The worship of Athênê Polias at Erythræ may probably be traceable to Athens, and that of the Tyrian Hêraklês (of which Pausanias recounts a singular legend) would seem to indicate an intermixture of Phœnician inhabitants. But the close neighborhood of Erythræ to the island of Chios, and the marked analogy of dialect which Herodotus[322] attests between them, show that the elements of the population must have been much the same in both. The Chian poet Iôn mentioned the establishment of Abantes from Eubœa in his native island, under Amphiklus, intermixed with the preëxisting Karians: Hektor, the fourth descendant from Amphiklus, was said to have incorporated this island in the Pan-Ionic amphiktyony. It is to Pherekydês that we owe the mention of the name of Egertius, as having conducted a miscella-

neous colony into Chios; and it is through Egertius (though Iôn, the native poet, does not appear to have noticed him) that this logographer made out the connection between the Chians and the other group of Kodrid settlements.[323] In Erythræ, Knôpus or Kleopus is noted as the Kodrid œkist, and as having procured for himself, partly by force, partly by consent, the sovereignty of the preëxisting settlement of mixed inhabitants. The Erythræan historian Hippias recounted how Knôpus had been treacherously put to death on ship-board, by Ortygês and some other false adherents; who, obtaining some auxiliaries from the Chian king Amphiklus, made themselves masters of Erythræ and established in it an oppressive oligarchy. They maintained the government, with a temper at once licentious and cruel, for some time, admitting none but a chosen few of the population within the walls of the town; until at length Hippotês the brother of Knôpus, arriving from without at the head of some troops, found sufficient support from the discontents of the Erythræans to enable him to overthrow the tyranny. Overpowered in the midst of a public festival, Ortygês and his companions were put to death with cruel tortures and the same tortures were inflicted upon their innocent wives and children,[324]—a degree of cruelty which would at no time have found place amidst a community of European Greeks: even in the murderous party dissensions of Korkyra during the Peloponnesian war, death was not aggravated by preliminary tortures. Aristotle[325] mentions the oligarchy of the Basilids as having existed in Erythræ, and as having been overthrown by a democratical revolution, although prudently managed: to what period this is to be referred we do not know.

Klazomenæ is said to have been founded by a wandering party, either of Ionians or of inhabitants from Kleonæ and Phlius, under Parphorus or Paralus: and Phôkæa by a band of Phokians under Philogenês and Damon. This last-mentioned town was built at the end of a peninsula which formed part of the territory of the Æolic Kymê: the Kymæans were induced to cede it amicably, and to permit the building of the new town. The Phokians asked and obtained permission to enrol themselves in the Pan-Ionic amphiktyony; but the permission is said to have been granted only on condition that they should adopt members of the Kodrid family as their œkists; and they accordingly invited from Erythræ and Teôs three chiefs belonging to that family or gens,—Deœtês, Periklus, and Abartus.[326]

Smyrna, originally an Æolic colony, established from Kymê fell subsequently into the hands of the Ionians of Kolophôn. A party of exiles from the latter city, expelled during an intestine dispute, were admitted by the Smyrnæans into their city,—a favor which they repaid by shutting the gates and seizing the place for themselves, at a moment when the Smyrnæans had gone forth in a body to celebrate a religious festival. The other Æolic towns sent auxiliaries for the purpose of reëstablishing their dispossessed brethren; but they were compelled to submit to an accommodation, whereby the Ionians retained possession of the town, restoring to the prior inhabi-

tants all their movables. These exiles were distributed as citizens among the other Æolic cities.[327]

Smyrna after this became wholly Ionian; and the inhabitants in later times, if we may judge by Aristeidês the rhetor, appear to have forgotten the Æolic origin of their town, though the fact is attested both by Herodotus and by Mimnermus.[328] At what time the change took place, we do not know; but Smyrna appears to have become Ionian before the celebration of the 23d Olympiad, when Onomastus the Smyrnæan gained the prize.[329] Nor have we information as to the period at which the city was received as a member into the Pan-Ionic amphiktyony, for the assertion of Vitruvius is obviously inadmissible, that it was admitted at the instance of Attalus, king of Pergamus, in place of a previous town called Melitê, excluded by the rest for misbehavior.[330] As little can we credit the statement of Strabo, that the city of Smyrna was destroyed by the Lydian kings, and that the inhabitants were compelled to live in dispersed villages until its restoration by Antigonus. A fragment of Pindar, which speaks of "the elegant city of the Smyrnæans," indicates that it must have existed in his time.[331] The town of Eræ, near Lebedus, though seemingly autonomous,[332] was not among the contributors to the Pan-Ionian: Myonnêsus seems to have been a dependency of Teôs, as Pygela and Marathêsium were of Ephesus. Notium, after its recolonization by the Athenians during the Peloponnesian war, seems to have remained separate from and independent of Kolophôn: at least the two are noticed by Skylax as distinct towns.[333]

CHAPTER XIV.

ÆOLIC GREEKS IN ASIA.

On the coast of Asia Minor to the north of the twelve Ionic confederated cities, were situated the twelve Æolic cities, apparently united in a similar manner. Besides Smyrna, the fate of which has already been described, the eleven others were,—Têmnos, Larissa, Neon-Teichos, Kymê, Ægæ, Myrina, Gryneium, Killa, Notium, Ægiroëssa, Pitanê. These twelve are especially noted by Herodotus as the twelve ancient continental Æolic cities, and distinguished on the one hand from the insular Æolic Greeks, in Lesbos, Tenedos, and Hekatonnesoi,—and on the other hand from the Æolic establishments in and about Mount Ida, which seem to have been subsequently formed and derived from Lesbos and Kymê.[334]

Of these twelve Æolic towns, eleven were situated very near together, clustered round the Elæitic gulf: their territories, all of moderate extent, seem also to have been conterminous with each other. Smyrna, the twelfth, was situated to the south of Mount Sipylus, and at a greater distance from the remainder,—one reason why it was so soon lost to its primitive inhabitants. These towns occupied chiefly a narrow but fertile strip of territory lying between the base of the woody mountain-range called Sardênê and the sea.[335] Gryneium, like Kolophôn and Milêtus, possessed a venerated sanctuary of Apollo, of older date than the Æolic emigration. Larissa, Têmnos, and Ægæ were at some little distance from the sea: the first at a short distance north of the Hermus, by which its territory was watered and occasionally inundated, so as to render embankments necessary;[336] the last two upon rocky mountain-sites, so inaccessible to attack that the inhabitants were enabled, even during the height of the Persian power, to maintain constantly a substantial independence.[337] Elæa, situated at the mouth of the river Kaïkus, became in later times the port of the strong and flourishing city of Pergamus; while Pitana, the northernmost of the twelve, was placed between the mouth of the Kaïkus and the lofty promontory of Kanê, which closes in the Elæitic gulf to the northward. A small town Kanæ, close to that promontory is said to have once existed.[338]

It has already been stated that the legend ascribes the origin of these colonies to a certain special event called the Æolic emigration, of which chronologers profess to know the precise date, telling us how many years it happened after the Trojan war, considerably before the Ionic emigration.[339] That the Æolic as well as Ionic inhabitants of Asia were emigrants from Greece, we may reasonably believe, but as to the time or circumstances of their emigration we can pretend to no certain knowledge. The name of the town Larissa, and perhaps that of Magnêsia on Mount Sipylus (according to what has been observed in the preceding passage), has given rise to the supposition that the anterior inhabitants were Pelasgians, who, having once occupied

the fertile banks of the Hermus, as well as those of the Kaïster near Ephesus, employed their industry in the work of embankment.[340] Kymê was the earliest as well as the most powerful of the twelve Æolic towns, Neon-Teichos having been originally established by the Kymæans as a fortress for the purpose of capturing the Pelasgic Larissa. Both Kymê and Larissa were designated by the epithet of Phrikônis: by some this was traced to the mountain Phrikium in Lokris, from whence it was alleged that the Æolic emigrants had started to cross the Ægean; by others it seems to have been connected with an eponymous hero Phrikôn.[341]

It was probably from Kymê and its sister cities on the Elæitic gulf that Hellenic inhabitants penetrated into the smaller towns in the inland plain of the Kaïkus,—Pergamus, Halisarna, Gambreion, etc.[342] In the more southerly plain of the Hermus, on the northern declivity of Mount Sipylus, was situated the city of Magnêsia, called Magnêsia ad Sipylum, in order to distinguish it from Magnêsia on the river Mæander. Both these towns called Magnêsia were inland,—the one bordering upon the Ionic Greeks, the other upon the Æolic, but seemingly not included in any amphiktyony either with the one or the other. Each is referred to a separate and early emigration either from the Magnêtes in Thessaly or from Krête. Like many other of the early towns, Magnêsia ad Sipylum appears to have been originally established higher up on the mountain,—in a situation nearer to Smyrna, from which it was separated by the Sipylene range,—and to have been subsequently brought down nearer to the plain on the north side as well as to the river Hermus. The original site, Palæ-Magnêsia,[343] was still occupied as a dependent township, even during the times of the Attalid and Seleukid kings. A like transfer of situation, from a height difficult of access to some lower and more convenient position, took place with other towns in and near this region; such as Gambreion and Skêpsis, which had their Palæ-Gambreion and Palæ-Skêpsis not far distant.

Of these twelve Æolic towns, it appears that all except Kymê were small and unimportant. Thucydidês, in recapitulating the dependent allies of Athens at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, does not account them worthy of being enumerated.[344] Nor are we authorized to conclude, because they bear the general name of Æolians, that the inhabitants were all of kindred race, though a large proportion of them are said to have been Bœotians, and the feeling of fraternity between Bœotians and Lesbians was maintained throughout the historical times; one etymology of the name is, indeed, founded upon the supposition that they were of miscellaneous origin.[345] We do not hear, moreover, of any considerable poets produced by the Æolic continental towns; in this respect Lesbos stood alone,—an island said to have been the earliest of all the Æolic settlements, anterior even to Kymê. Six towns were originally established in Lesbos,—Mitylêne, Mêthymna, Eresus, Pyrrha, Antissa, and Arisbê: the last-mentioned town was subsequently enslaved and destroyed by the Methymnæans, so that there remained only five towns in all.[346] According to the political subdivision usual in Greece, the island had thus, first six, af-

terwards five, independent governments, of which, however, Mitylênê, situated in the south-eastern quarter and facing the promontory of Kanê, was by far the first, while Mêthymna, on the north of the island over against Cape Lekton, was the second. Like so many other Grecian colonies, the original city of Mitylênê was founded upon an islet divided from Lesbos by a narrow strait; it was subsequently extended on to Lesbos itself, so that the harbor presented two distinct entrances.[347]

It appears that the native poets and fabulists who professed to deliver the archæology of Lesbos, dwelt less upon the Æolic settlers than upon the various heroes and tribes who were alleged to have had possession of the island anterior to that settlement, from the deluge of Deukalion downwards,—just as the Chian and Samian poets seem to have dwelt principally upon the ante-Ionic antiquities of their respective islands. After the Pelasgian Xanthus son of Triopas, comes Makar son of Krinakus, the great native hero of the island, supposed by Plehn to be the eponym of an occupying race called the Makares: the Homeric Hymn to Apollo brings Makar into connection with the Æolic inhabitants by calling him son of Æolus, and the native historian Myrsilus also seems to have treated him as an Æolian.[348] To dwell upon such narratives suited the disposition of the Greeks; but when we come to inquire for the history of Lesbos, we find ourselves destitute of any genuine materials, not only for the period prior to the Æolic occupation, but also for a long time after it: nor can we pretend to determine at what date that occupation took place. We may reasonably believe it to have occurred before 776 B. C., and it therefore becomes a part of the earliest manifestations of real Grecian history: both Kymê, with its eleven sister towns on the continent, and the islands Lesbos and Tenedos, were then Æolic; and I have already remarked that the migration of the father of Hesiod the poet, from the Æolic Kymê to Askra in Bœotia, is the earliest authentic fact known to us on contemporary testimony,—seemingly between 776 and 700 B. C.

But besides these islands, and the strip of the continent between Kymê and Pitanê (which constituted the territory properly called Æolis), there were many other Æolic establishments in the region near Mount Ida, the Troad, and the Hellespont, and even in European Thrace. All these establishments seem to have emanated from Lesbos, Kymê, and Tenedos, but at what time they were formed we have no information. Thirty different towns are said to have been established by these cities,[349] and nearly all the region of Mount Ida (meaning by that term the territory west of a line drawn from the town of Adramyttion northward to Priapos on the Propontis) came to be Æolized. A new Æolis[350] was thus formed, quite distinct from the Æolis near the Elæitic gulf, and severed from it partly by the territory of Atarneus, partly by the portion of Mysia and Lydia, between Atarneus and Adramyttium, including the fertile plain of Thêbê: a portion of the lands on this coast seem indeed to have been occupied by Lesbos, but the far larger part of it was never Æolic. Nor was Ephorus accurate when he talked of the whole territory between Kymê and Abydos as known under the name of Æolis.[351]

The inhabitants of Tenedos possessed themselves of the strip of the Troad opposite to their island, northward of Cape Lekton,—those of Lesbos founded Assus, Gargara, Lampônia, Antandrus,[352] etc., between Lekton and the north-eastern corner of the Adramyttian gulf,—while the Kymæans seem to have established themselves at Kebrên and other places in the inland Idæan district.[353] As far as we can make out, this north-western corner (west of a line drawn from Smyrna to the eastern corner of the Propontis) seems to have been occupied, anterior to the Hellenic settlements, by Mysians and Teukrians,—who are mentioned together, in such manner as to show that there was no great ethnical difference between them.[354] The elegiac poet Kallinus, in the middle of the seventh century B. C., was the first who mentioned the Teukrians: he treated them as emigrants from Krête, though other authors represented them as indigenous, or as having come from Attica: however the fact may stand as to their origin, we may gather that, in the time of Kallinus, they were still the great occupants of the Troad.[355] Gradually, the south and west coasts, as well as the interior of this region, became penetrated by successive colonies of Æolic Greeks, to whom the iron and ship timber of Mount Ida were valuable acquisitions; and thus the small Teukrian townships (for there were no considerable cities) became Æolized; while on the coast northward of Ida, along the Hellespont and Propontis, Ionic establishments were formed from Milêtus and Phôkæa, and Milesian colonists were received into the inland town of Skêpsis.[356] In the time of Kallinus, the Teukrians seem to have been in possession of Hamaxitus and Kolônæ, with the worship of the Sminthian Apollo, in the south-western region of the Troad: a century and a half afterwards, at the time of the Ionic revolt, Herodotus notices the inhabitants of Gergis, occupying a portion of the northern region of Ida in the line eastward from Dardanus and Ophrynion, as "the remnant of the ancient Teukrians."[357] We also find the Mityleneans and Athenians contending by arms about 600-580 B. C., for the possession of Sigeium at the entrance of the Hellespont:[358] probably the Lesbian settlements on the southern coast of the Troad, lying as they do so much nearer to the island, as well as the Tenedian settlements on the western coast opposite Tenedos, had been formed at some time prior to this epoch. We farther read of Æolic inhabitants as possessing Sestos on the European side of the Hellespont.[359] The name Teukrians gradually vanished out of present use, and came to belong only to the legends of the past; preserved either in connection with the worship of the Sminthian Apollo, or by writers such as Hellanikus and Kephalôn of Gergis, from whence it passed to the later poets and to the Latin epic. It appears that the native place of Kephalôn was a town called Gergis or Gergithes near Kymê: there was also another place called Gergêtha on the river Kaïkus, near its sources, and therefore higher up in Mysia. It was from Gergithes near Kymê (according to Strabo), that the place called Gergis in Mount Ida was settled:[360] probably the non-Hellenic inhabitants, both near Kymê and in the region of Ida, were of kindred race, but the settlers who went from Kymê to Gergis in Ida were doubtless Greeks, and contributed in this manner to the conversion of that place from a Teukrian to an Hellenic settlement. In

one of those violent dislocations of inhabitants, which were so frequent afterwards among the successors of Alexander in Asia Minor, the Teukro-Hellenic population of the Idæan Gergis is said to have been carried away by Attalus of Pergamus, in order to people the village of Gergêtha near the river Kaïkus.

We are to regard the Æolic Greeks as occupying not only their twelve cities on the continent round the Elæitic gulf, and the neighboring islands, of which the chief were Lesbos and Tenedos,—but also as gradually penetrating and Hellenizing the Idæan region and the Troad. This last process belongs probably to a period subsequent to 776 B. C., but Kymê and Lesbos doubtless count as Æolic from an earlier period.

Of Mitylênê, the chief city of Lesbos, we hear some facts between the 40th and 50th Olympiad (620-580 B. C.), which unfortunately reach us only in a faint echo. That city then numbered as its own the distinguished names of Pittakus, Sappho, and Alkæus: like many other Grecian communities of that time, it suffered much from intestine commotion, and experienced more than one violent revolution. The old oligarchy called the Penthilids (seemingly a gens with heroic origin), rendered themselves intolerably obnoxious by misrule of the most reckless character; their brutal use of the bludgeon in the public streets was avenged by Megaklês and his friends, who slew them and put down their government.[361] About the 42d Olympiad (612 B. C.) we hear of Melanchrus, as despot of Mitylênê, who was slain by the conspiracy of Pittakus, Kikis, and Antimenidês,—the last two being brothers of Alkæus the poet. Other despots, Myrsilus, Megalagyrus, and the Kleanaktidæ, whom we know only by name, and who appear to have been immortalized chiefly by the bitter stanzas of Alkæus, acquired afterwards the sovereignty of Mitylênê. Among all the citizens of the town, however, the most fortunate, and the most deserving, was Pittakus the son of Hyrrhadus,—a champion trusted by his countrymen alike in foreign war and in intestine broils.[362]

The foreign war in which the Mityleneans were engaged, and in which Pittakus commanded them, was against the Athenians on the continental coast opposite to Lesbos, in the Troad, near Sigeium. The Mityleneans had already established various settlements along the Troad, the northernmost of which was Achilleium: they laid claim to the possession of this line of coast, and when Athens (about the 43d Olympiad, as it is said[363]) attempted to plant a settlement at Sigeium, they resisted the establishment by force. At the head of the Mitylenean troops, Pittakus engaged in single combat with the Athenian commander Phrynôn, and had the good fortune to kill him. The general struggle was, however, carried on with no very decisive result. On one memorable occasion the Mityleneans fled, and Alkæus the poet, serving as an hoplite in their ranks, commemorated in one of his odes both his flight and the humiliating loss of his shield, which the victorious Athenians suspended as a trophy in the temple of Athênê at Sigeium. His predecessor Archilochus, and his imitator Horace, have both been frank enough to confess a similar misfortune, which Tyrtæus

perhaps would not have endured to survive.[364] It was at length agreed by Mitylênê and Athens to refer the dispute to Periander of Corinth. While the Mityleneans laid claim to the whole line of coast, the Athenians alleged that inasmuch as a contingent from Athens had served in the host of Agamemnôn against Troy, their descendants had as good a right as any other Greeks to share in the conquered ground. It appears that Periander felt unwilling to decide this delicate question of legendary law. He directed that each party should retain what they possessed, and his verdict[365] was still remembered and appealed to even in the time of Aristotle, by the inhabitants of Tenedos against those of Sigeium.

Though Pittakus and Alkæus were both found in the same line of hoplites against the Athenians at Sigeium, yet in the domestic politics of their native city, their bearing was that of bitter enemies. Alkæus and Antimenidas his brother were worsted in this party-feud, and banished: but even as exiles they were strong enough seriously to alarm and afflict their fellow-citizens, while their party at home, and the general dissension within the walls, reduced Mitylênê to despair. In this calamitous condition, the Mityleneans had recourse to Pittakus, who with his great rank in the state (his wife belonged to the old gens of the Penthilids), courage in the field, and reputation for wisdom, inspired greater confidence than any other citizen of his time. He was by universal consent named Æsymnete or dictator for ten years, with unlimited powers: [366] and the appointment proved eminently successful. How effectually he repelled the exiles, and maintained domestic tranquillity, is best shown by the angry effusions of Alkæus, whose songs (unfortunately lost) gave vent to the political hostility of the time, in the same manner as the speeches of the Athenian orators two centuries afterwards, and who in his vigorous invectives against Pittakus did not spare even the coarsest nicknames, founded on alleged personal deformities.[367] Respecting the proceedings of this eminent dictator, the contemporary and reported friend of Solon, we know only in a general way, that he succeeded in reëstablishing security and peace, and that at the end of his term he voluntarily laid down his authority,[368]—an evidence not only of probity superior to the lures of ambition, but also of that conscious moderation during the period of his dictatorship which left him without fear as a private citizen afterwards. He enacted various laws for Mitylênê, one of which was sufficiently curious to cause it to be preserved and commented on,—for it prescribed double penalties against offences committed by men in a state of intoxication.[369] But he did not (like Solon at Athens) introduce any constitutional changes, nor provide any new formal securities for public liberty and good government:[370] which illustrates the remark previously made, that Solon in doing this was beyond his age, and struck out new lights for his successors,—since on the score of personal disinterestedness Pittakus and he are equally unimpeachable. What was the condition of Mitylênê afterwards, we have no authorities to tell us. Pittakus is said, if the chronological computers of a later age can be trusted, to have died in the 52d Olympiad (B. C. 572-568). Both he and Solon are numbered among the Seven Wise Men of Greece, respecting whom something will be said in a future chapter. The various

anecdotes current about him are little better than uncertified exemplifications of a spirit of equal and generous civism: but his songs and his elegiac compositions were familiar to literary Greeks in the age of Plato.

CHAPTER XV.

ASIATIC DORIANS.

THE islands of Rhodes, Kôs, Symê, Nisyros, Kasus, and Karpathus, are represented in the Homeric Catalogue as furnishing troops to the Grecian armament before Troy. Historical Rhodes, and historical Kôs, are occupied by Dorians, the former with its three separate cities of Lindus, Jalysus, and Kameirus. Two other Dorian cities, both on the adjacent continent, are joined with these four so as to constitute an amphiktyony on the Triopian promontory or south-western corner of Asia Minor,—thus constituting an hexapolis, including Halikarnassus, Knidus, Kôs, Lindus, Jalysus, and Kameirus. Knidus was situated on the Triopian promontory itself; Halikarnassus more to the northward, on the northern coast of the Keramic gulf: neither of the two are named in Homer.

The legendary account of the origin of these Asiatic Dorians has already been given, and we are compelled to accept their hexapolis as a portion of the earliest Grecian history, of which no previous account can be rendered. The circumstance of Rhodes and Kôs being included in the Catalogue of the Iliad leads us to suppose that they were Greek at an earlier period than the Ionic or Æolic settlements. It may be remarked that both the brothers Antiphus and Pheidippus from Kôs, and Tlêpolemus from Rhodes, are Herakleids,—the only Herakleids who figure in the Iliad: and the deadly combat between Tlêpolemus and Sarpêdôn may perhaps be an heroic copy drawn from real contests, which doubtless often took place between the Rhodians and their neighbors the Lykians. That Rhodes and Kôs were already Dorian at the period of the Homeric Catalogue, I see no reason for doubting. They are not called Dorian in that Catalogue, but we may well suppose that the name Dorian had not at that early period come to be employed as a great distinctive class-name, as it was afterwards used in contrast with Ionian and Æolian. In relating the history of Pheidôn of Argos, I have mentioned various reasons for suspecting that the trade of the Dorians on the eastern coast of the Peloponnesus was considerable at an early period, and there may well have been Doric migrations by sea to Krête and Rhodes, anterior to the time of the Iliad.

Herodotus tells us that the six Dorian towns, which had established their amphiktyony on the Triopian promontory, were careful to admit none of the neighboring Dorians to partake of it. Of these neighboring Dorians, we make out the islands of Astypalæ, and Kalymnæ,[371] Nisyrus, Karpathus, Symê, Têlus, Kasus, and Chalkia,—on the continental coast, Myndus, situated on the same peninsula with Halikarnassus,—Phasêlis, on the eastern coast of Lykia towards Pamphylia. The strong coast-rock of Iasus, midway between Milêtus and Halikarnassus, is said to have been originally founded by Argeians, but was compelled in consequence of destructive wars with the

Karians to admit fresh settlers and a Neleid œkist from Milêtus.[372] Bargylia and Karyanda seem to have been Karian settlements more or less Hellenized. There probably were other Dorian towns, not specially known to us, upon whom this exclusion from the Triopian solemnities was brought to operate. The six amphiktyonized cities were in course of time reduced to five, by the exclusion of Halikarnassus: the reason for which (as we are told) was, that a citizen of Halikarnassus, who had gained a tripod as prize, violated the regulation which required that the tripod should always be consecrated as an offering in the Triopian temple, in order that he might carry it off to decorate his own house.[373] The Dorian amphiktyony was thus contracted into a pentapolis: at what time this incident took place, we do not know, nor is it perhaps unreasonable to conjecture that the increasing predominance of the Karian element at Halikarnassus had some effect in producing the exclusion, as well as the individual misbehavior of the victor Agasiklês.

CHAPTER XVI.

NATIVES OF ASIA MINOR WITH WHOM THE GREEKS BECAME CONNECTED.

FROM the Grecian settlements on the coast of Asia Minor, and on the adjacent islands, our attention must now be turned to those non-Hellenic kingdoms and people with whom they there came in contact.

Our information with respect to all of them is unhappily very scanty. Nor shall we improve our narrative by taking the catalogue, presented in the Iliad, of allies of Troy, and construing it as if it were a chapter of geography: if any proof were wanting of the unpromising results of such a proceeding, we may find it in the confusion which darkens so much of the work of Strabo,—who perpetually turns aside from the actual and ascertainable condition of the countries which he is describing, to conjectures on Homeric antiquity, often announced as if they were unquestionable facts. Where the Homeric geography is confirmed by other evidence, we note the fact with satisfaction; where it stands unsupported or difficult to reconcile with other statements, we cannot venture to reason upon it as in itself a substantial testimony. The author of the Iliad, as he has congregated together a vast body of the different sections of Greeks for the attack of the consecrated hill of Ilium, so he has also summoned all the various inhabitants of Asia Minor to coöperate in its defence, and he has planted portions of the Kilikians and Lykians, whose historical existence is on the southern coast, in the immediate vicinity of the Troad. Those only will complain of this who have accustomed themselves to regard him as an historian or geographer: if we are content to read him only as the first of poets, we shall no more quarrel with him for a geographical misplacement, than with his successor Arktinus for bringing on the battle-field of Ilium the Amazons or the Æthiopians.

The geography of Asia Minor is even now very imperfectly known,[374] and the matters ascertained respecting its ancient divisions and boundaries relate almost entirely either to the later periods of the Persian empire, or to times after the Macedonian and even after the Roman conquest. To state them as they stood in the time of Crœsus king of Lydia, before the arrival of the conquering Cyrus, is a task in which we find little evidence to sustain us. The great mountain chain of Taurus, which begins from the Chelidonian promontory on the southern coast of Lykia, and strikes north-eastward as far as Armenia, formed the most noted boundary-line during the Roman times,—but Herodotus does not once mention it; the river Halys is in his view the most important geographical limit. Northward of Taurus, on the upper portions of the rivers Halys and Sangarius, was situated the spacious and lofty central plain of Asia Minor. To the north, west, and south of this central plain, the region is chiefly mountainous, as it approaches all the three seas, the Euxine, the Ægean, and the

Pamphylian,—most mountainous in the case of the latter, permitting no rivers of long course. The mountains Kadmus, Messôgis, Tmôlus, stretch westward towards the Ægean sea, but leaving extensive spaces of plain and long valleys, so that the course of the Mæander, the Kaïster, and the Hermus is of considerable length. The north-western part includes the mountainous regions of Ida, Têmnus, and the Mysian Olympus, yet with much admixture of fertile and productive ground. The elevated tracts near the Euxine appear to have been the most wooded,—especially Kytôrus: the Parthenius, the Sangarius, the Halys, and the Iris, are all considerable streams flowing northward towards that sea. Nevertheless, the plain land interspersed through these numerous elevations was often of the greatest fertility; and as a whole, the peninsula of Asia Minor was considered as highly productive by the ancients, in grain, wine, fruit, cattle, and in many parts, oil; though the cold central plain did not carry the olive.[375]

Along the western shores of this peninsula, where the various bands of Greek emigrants settled, we hear of Pelasgians, Teukrians, Mysians, Bithynians, Phrygians, Lydians or Mæonians, Karians, Lelegians. Farther eastward are Lykians, Pisidians, Kilikians, Phrygians, Kapadokians, Paphlagonians, Mariandynians, etc. Speaking generally, we may say that the Phrygians, Teukrians, and Mysians appear in the north-western portion, between the river Hermus and the Propontis,—the Karians and Lelegians south of the river Mæander,—and the Lydians in the central region between the two. Pelasgians are found here and there, seemingly both in the valley of the Hermus and in that of the Kaïster: even in the time of Herodotus, there were Pelasgian settlements at Plakia and Skylakê on the Propontis, westward of Kyzikus: and O. Müller would even trace the Tyrrhenian Pelasgians to Tyrrha, an inland town of Lydia, from whence he imagines, though without much probability, the name Tyrrhenian to be derived.

One important fact to remark, in respect to the native population of Asia Minor at the first opening of this history, is, that they were not aggregated into great kingdoms or confederations, nor even into any large or populous cities,—but distributed into many inconsiderable tribes, so as to present no overwhelming resistance, and threaten no formidable danger, to the successive bodies of Greek emigrants. The only exception to this is, the Lydian monarchy of Sardis, the real strength of which begins with Gygês and the dynasty of the Mermnadæ, about 700 B. C. Though the increasing force of this kingdom ultimately extinguished the independence of the Greeks in Asia, it seems to have noway impeded their development, as it stood when they first arrived, and for a long time afterwards. Nor were either Karians or Mysians united under any one king, so as to possess facilities for aggression or conquest.

As far as can be made out from our scanty data, it appears that all the nations of Asia Minor west of the river Halys, were, in a large sense, of kindred race with each other, as well as with the Thracians on the European side of the Bosphorus and Hellespont. East of the Halys dwelt the people of Syro-Arabian or Semitic race,—As-

syrians, Syrians, and Kappadokians,—as well as Kilikians, Pamphylians, and Solymi, along its upper course and farther southward to the Pamphylian sea. Westward of the Halys, the languages were not Semitic, but belonging to a totally different family, [376]—cognate, yet distinct one from another, perhaps not mutually intelligible. The Karians, Lydians, and Mysians recognized a certain degree of brotherhood with each other, attested by common religious sacrifices in the temple of Zeus Karios, at Mylasa.[377] But it is by no means certain that each of these nations mutually comprehended each other's speech; and Herodotus, from whom we derive the knowledge of these common sacrifices, acquaints us at the same time that the Kaunians in the south-western corner of the peninsula had no share in them, though speaking the same language as the Karians; he does not, however, seem to consider identity or difference of language as a test of national affinity.

Along the coast of the Euxine, from the Thracian Bosphorus eastward to the river Halys, dwelt Bithynians or Thynians, Mariandynians and Paphlagonians,—all recognized branches of the widely-extended Thracian race. The Bithynians especially, in the north-western portion of this territory, and reaching from the Euxine to the Propontis, are often spoken of as Asiatic Thracians,—while on the other hand various tribes among the Thracians of Europe, are denominated Thyni, or Thynians,[378]—so little difference was there in the population on the two sides of the Bosphorus, alike brave, predatory, and sanguinary. The Bithynians of Asia are also sometimes called Bebrykians, under which denomination they extend as far southward as the gulf of Kios in the Propontis.[379] They here come in contact with Mygdonians, Mysians, and Phrygians. Along the southern coast of the Propontis, between the rivers Rhyndakus and Æsêpus, in immediate neighborhood with the powerful Greek colony of Kyzikus, appear the Doliones; next, Pelasgians at Plakia and Skylakê; then again, along the coast of the Hellespont near Abydus and Lampsakus, and occupying a portion of the Troad, we find mention made of other Bebrykians.[380] In the interior of the Troad, or the region of Ida, are Teukrians and Mysians: the latter seem to extend southward down to Pergamus and the region of Mount Sipylus, and eastward to the mountainous region called the Mysian Olympus, south of the lake Askanius, near which they join with the Phrygians.[381]

As far as any positive opinion can be formed respecting nations of whom we know so little, it would appear that the Mysians and Phrygians are a sort of connecting link between Lydians and Karians on one side, and Thracians (European as well as Asiatic) on the other,—a remote ethnical affinity pervading the whole. Ancient migrations are spoken of in both directions across the Hellespont and the Thracian Bosphorus. It was the opinion of some that Phrygians, Mysians, and Thracians had emigrated into Asia from Europe, and the Lydian historian Xanthus referred the arrival of the Phrygians to an epoch subsequent to the Trojan war.[382] On the other hand, Herodotus speaks of a vast body of Teukrians and Mysians, who, before the Trojan war, had crossed the strait from Asia into Europe, expelled many of the Euro-

pean Thracians from their seats, crossed the Strymôn and the Macedonian rivers, and penetrated as far southward as the river Peneus in Thessaly,—as far westward as the Ionic gulf. This Teukro-Mysian migration, he tells us, brought about two consequences: first, the establishment near the river Strymôn of the Pæonians, who called themselves Teukrian colonists;[383] next, the crossing into Asia of many of the dispossessed Thracian tribes from the neighborhood of the Strymôn, into the north-western region of Asia Minor, by which the Bithynian or Asiatic Thracian people was formed. The Phrygians also are supposed by some to have originally occupied an European soil on the borders of Macedonia, near the snow-clad Mount Bermion, at which time they were called Briges,—an appellative name in the Lydian language equivalent to freemen, or Franks:[384] while the Mysians are said to have come from the north-eastern portions of European Thrace south of the Danube, known under the Roman empire by the name of Mœsia.[385] But with respect to the Mysians there was also another story, according to which they were described as colonists emanating from the Lydians; put forth according to that system of devoting by solemn vow a tenth of the inhabitants, chosen by lot, to seek settlements elsewhere, which recurs not unfrequently among the stories of early emigrations, as the consequence of distress and famine. And this last opinion was supported by the character of the Mysian language, half Lydian and half Phrygian, of which both the Lydian historian Xanthus, and Menekratês of Elæa,[386]—by whom the opinion was announced,—must have been very competent judges.

From such tales of early migration both ways across the Hellespont and the Bosphorus, all that we can with any certainty infer is, a certain measure of affinity among the population of Thrace and Asia Minor,—especially visible in the case of the Phrygians and Mysians. The name and legends of the Phrygian hero Midas are connected with different towns throughout the extensive region of Asiatic Phrygia,—Kelænæ, Pessinûs, Ankyra,[387] Gordium,—as well as with the neighborhood of Mount Bermion in Macedonia: the adventure whereby Midas got possession of Silenus, mixing wine with the spring of which he drank, was localized at the latter place as well as at the town of Thymbrion, nearly at the eastern extremity of Asiatic Phrygia.[388] The name Mygdonia, and the eponymous hero Mygdôn, belong not less to the European territory near the river Axius,—afterwards a part of Macedonia,—than to the Asiatic coast of the eastern Propontis, between Kios and the river Rhyndakus.[389] Otreus and Mygdôn are the commanders of the Phrygians in the Iliad; and the river Odrysês, which flowed through the territory of the Asiatic Mygdonians, into the Rhyndakus, affords another example of homonymy with the Odrysian Thracians[390] in Europe. And as these coincidences of names and legends conduct us to the idea of analogy and affinity between Thracians and Phrygians, so we find Archilochus, the earliest poet remaining to us who mentions them as contemporaries, coupling the two in the same simile.[391] To this early Parian Iambist, the population on the two sides of the Hellespont appears to have presented similarity of feature and customs.

To settle with any accuracy the extent and condition of these Asiatic nations during the early days of Grecian settlement among them is impracticable; the problem was not to be solved even by the ancient geographers, with their superior means of knowledge. The early indigenous distribution of the Phrygian population is unknown to us, and the division into the Greater and Lesser Phrygia belongs to a period at least subsequent to the Persian conquest, like most of the recognized divisions of Asia Minor; it cannot, therefore, be applied with reference to the period earlier than Crœsus. It appears that the name Phrygians, like that of Thracians, was a generic designation, and comprehended tribes or separate communities who had also specific names of their own. We trace Phrygians at wide distances: on the western bank of the river Halys,—at Kelænæ, in the interior of Asia Minor, towards the rise of the river Mæander,—and on the coast of the Propontis near Kios;—in both of these latter localities there is a salt lake called Askanius, which is the name both of the leader of the Phrygian allies of Troy, and of the country from whence they are said to come, in the Iliad.[392] They thus occupy a territory bounded on the south by the Pisidian mountains, on the west by the Lydians (indicated by a terminal pillar set up by Crœsus at Kydrara),[393]—on the east by the river Halys, on the other side of which were Kappadokians or Syrians, on the north by Paphlagonians and Mariandynians. But it seems, besides this, that they must have extended farther to the west, so as to occupy a great portion of the region of Mount Ida and the Troad. For Apollodôrus considered that both the Doliones and the Bebrykians were included in the great Phrygian name;[394] and even in the ancient poem called "Phorônis," which can hardly be placed later than 600 B. C., the Daktyls of Mount Ida, the great discoverers of metallurgy, are expressly named Phrygian.[395] The custom of the Attic tragic poets to call the inhabitants of the Troad Phrygians, does not necessarily imply any translation of inhabitants, but an employment of the general name, as better known to the audience whom they addressed, in preference to the less notorious specific name,—just as the inhabitants of Bithynia might be described either as Bithynians or as Asiatic Thracians.

If, as the language of Herodotus and Ephorus[396] would seem to imply, we suppose the Phrygians to be at a considerable distance from the coast and dwelling only in the interior, it will be difficult to explain to ourselves how or where the early Greek colonists came to be so much influenced by them; whereas the supposition that the tribes occupying the Troad and the region of Ida were Phrygians elucidates this point. And the fact is incontestable, that both Phrygians and Lydians did not only modify the religious manifestations of the Asiatic Greeks, and through them of the Grecian world generally,—but also rendered important aid towards the first creation of the Grecian musical scale. Of this the denominations of the scale afford a proof.

Three primitive musical modes were employed by the Greek poets, in the earliest times of which later authors could find any account,—the Lydian, which was the most acute,—the Dorian, which was the most grave,—and the Phrygian, intermediate be-

tween the two; the highest note of the Lydian being one tone higher, that of the Dorian one tone lower, than the highest note of the Phrygian scale.[397] Such were the three modes or scales, each including only a tetrachord, upon which the earliest Greek masters worked: many other scales, both higher and lower, were subsequently added. It thus appears that the earliest Greek music was, in large proportion, borrowed from Phrygia and Lydia: and when we consider that, in the eighth and seventh centuries before the Christian era, music and poetry conjoined—often also with dancing or rhythmical gesticulation—was the only intellectual manifestation known among the Greeks,—and moreover that, in the belief of all the ancient writers, every musical mode had its own peculiar emotional influences, powerfully modified the temper of hearers, and was intimately connected with the national worship,—we shall see that this transmission of the musical modes implies much both of communication and interchange between the Asiatic Greeks and the indigenous population of the continent. Now the fact of communication between the Ionic and Æolic Greeks, and their eastern neighbors, the Lydians, is easy to comprehend generally, though we have no details as to the way in which it took place; but we do not distinctly see where it was that the Greeks came so much into contact with the Phrygians except in the region of Ida, the Troad, and the southern coast of the Propontis. To this region belonged those early Phrygian musicians (under the heroic names of Olympus, Hyagnis, Marsyas), from whom the Greeks borrowed.[398] And we may remark that the analogy between Thracians and Phrygians seems partially to hold in respect both to music and religion, since the old mythe in the Iliad, wherein the Thracian bard Thamyris, rashly contending in song with the Muses, is conquered, blinded, and stripped of his art, seems to be the prototype of the very similar story respecting the contention of Apollo with the Phrygian Marsyas,[399]—the cithara against the flute; while the Phrygian Midas is farther characterized as the religious disciple of Thracian Orpheus.

In my previous chapter relating to the legend of Troy,[400] mention has been already made of the early fusion of the Æolic Greeks with the indigenous population of the Troad; and it is from hence probably that the Phrygian music with the flute as its instrument,—employed in the orgiastic rites and worship of the Great Mother in Mount Ida, in the Mysian Olympus, and other mountain regions of the country, and even in the Greek city of Lampsakus,[401]—passed to the Greek composers. Its introduction is coeval with the earliest facts respecting Grecian music, and must have taken place during the first century of the recorded Olympiads. In the Homeric poems we find no allusion to it, but it may probably have contributed to stimulate that development of lyric and elegiac composition which grew up among the post-Homeric Æolians and Ionians, to the gradual displacement of the old epic. Another instance of the fusion of Phrygians with Greeks is to be found in the religious ceremonies of Kyzikus, Kius, and Prusa, on the southern and south-eastern coasts of the Propontis; at the first of the three places, the worship of the Great Mother of the gods was celebrated with much solemnity on the hill of Dindymon, bearing the same

name as that mountain in the interior, near Pessinus, from whence Cybelê derived her principal surname of Dindymênê.[402] The analogy between the Kretan and Phrygian religious practices has been often noticed, and confusion occurs not unfrequently between Mount Ida in Krête and the mountain of the same name in the Troad; while the Teukrians of Gergis in the Troad,—who were not yet Hellenized even at the time of the Persian invasion, and who were affirmed by the elegiac poet Kallinus to have emigrated from Krêtê,—if they were not really Phrygians,—differed so little from them as to be called such by the poets.

The Phrygians are celebrated by Herodotus for the abundance both of their flocks and their agricultural produce:[403] the excellent wool for which Milêtus was always renowned came in part from the upper valley of the river Mæander, which they inhabited. He contrasts them in this respect with the Lydians, among whom the attributes and capacities of persons dwelling in cities are chiefly brought to our view: much gold and silver, retail trade, indigenous games, unchastity of young women, yet combined with thrift and industry.[404] Phrygian cheese and salt-provisions, Lydian unguents,[405] carpets and colored shoes, acquired notoriety. Both Phrygians and Lydians are noticed by Greek authors subsequent to the establishment of the Persian empire as a people timid, submissive, industrious, and useful as slaves,—an attribute not ascribed to the Mysians,[406] who are usually described as brave and hardy mountaineers, difficult to hold in subjection: nor even true respecting the Lydians, during the earlier times anterior to the complete overthrow of Crœsus by Cyrus; for they were then esteemed for their warlike prowess. Nor was the different character of these two Asiatic people yet effaced even in the second century after the Christian era. For the same Mysians, who in the time of Herodotus and Xenophon gave so much trouble to the Persian satraps, are described by the rhetor Aristeidês as seizing and plundering his property at Laneion near Hadriani,—while on the contrary he mentions the Phrygians as habitually coming from the interior towards the coast-regions to do the work of the olive-gathering.[407] During the times of Grecian autonomy and ascendency, in the fifth century B. C., the conception of a Phrygian or a Lydian was associated in the Greek mind with ideas of contempt and servitude,[408] to which unquestionably these Asiatics became fashioned, since it was habitual with them under the Roman empire to sell their own children into slavery,[409]—a practice certainly very rare among the Greeks, even when they too had become confounded among the mass of subjects of imperial Rome. But we may fairly assume that this association of contempt with the name of a Phrygian or a Lydian did not prevail during the early period of Grecian Asiatic settlement, or even in the time of Alkman, Mimnermus, or Sappho, down to 600 B. C. We first trace evidence of it in a fragment of Hippônax, and it began with the subjection of Asia Minor generally, first under Crœsus[410] and then under Cyrus, and with the sentiment of comparative pride which grew up afterwards in the minds of European Greeks. The native Phrygian tribes along the Propontis, with whom the Greek colonists came in contact,—Bebrykians, Doliones, Mygdonians, etc,—seem to have been agricultural, cattle-breed-

ing and horse-breeding, yet more vehement and warlike than the Phrygians of the interior, as far at least as can be made out by their legends. The brutal but gigantic Amykus son of Poseidôn, chief of the Bebrykians, with whom Pollux contends in boxing, and his brother Mygdôn to whom Hêraklês is opposed, are samples of a people whom the Greek poets considered ferocious, and not submissive;[411] while the celebrity of the horses of Erichthonius, Laomedôn, and Asius of Arisbê, in the Iliad, shows that horse-breeding was a distinguishing attribute of the region of Ida, not less in the mind of Homer than in that of Virgil.[412]

According to the legend of the Phrygian town of Gordium on the river Sangarius, the primitive Phrygian king Gordius was originally a poor husbandman, upon the yoke of whose team, as he one day tilled his field, an eagle perched and posted himself. Astonished at this portent, he consulted the Telmissean augurs to know what it meant, and a maiden of the prophetic breed acquainted him that the kingdom was destined to his family. He espoused her, and the offspring of the marriage was Midas. Seditions afterwards breaking out among the Phrygians, they were directed by an oracle, as the only means of tranquillity, to choose for themselves as king the man whom they should first see approaching in a wagon. Gordius and Midas happened to be then coming into the town in their wagon, and the crown was conferred upon them: their wagon was consecrated in the citadel of Gordium to Zeus Basileus, and became celebrated from the insoluble knot whereby the yoke was attached, and the severance of it afterwards by the sword of Alexander the Great. Whosoever could untie the knot, to him the kingdom of Asia was portended, and Alexander was the first whose sword both fulfilled the condition and realized the prophecy.[413]

Of these legendary Phrygian names and anecdotes we can make no use for historical purposes. We know nothing of any Phrygian kings, during the historical times, —but Herodotus tells us of a certain Midas son of Gordius, king of Phrygia, who was the first foreign sovereign that ever sent offerings to the Delphian temple, anterior to Gygês of Lydia. This Midas dedicated to the Delphian god the throne on which he was in the habit of sitting to administer justice. Chronologers have referred the incident to a Phrygian king Midas placed by Eusebius in the 10th Olympiad,—a supposition which there are no means of verifying.[414] There may have been a real Midas king of Gordium; but that there was ever any great united Phrygian monarchy, we have not the least ground for supposing. The name Gordius son of Midas again appears in the legend of Crœsus and Solon told by Herodotus, as part of the genealogy of the ill-fated prince Adrastus: here too it seems to represent a legendary rather than a real person.[415]

Of the Lydians, I shall speak in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XVII.

LYDIANS. — MEDES. — CIMMERIANS. — SCYTHIANS.

THE early relations between the Lydians and the Asiatic Greeks, anterior to the reign of Gygês, are not better known to us than those of the Phrygians. Their native music became partly incorporated with the Greek, as the Phrygian music was; to which it was very analogous, both in instruments and in character, though the Lydian mode was considered by the ancients as more effeminate and enervating. The flute was used alike by Phrygians and Lydians, passing from both of them to the Greeks; but the magadis or pectis (a harp with sometimes as many as twenty strings, sounded two together in octave) is said to have been borrowed by the Lesbian Terpander from the Lydian banquets.[416] The flute-players who acquired esteem among the early Asiatic Greeks were often Phrygian or Lydian slaves; and even the poet Alkman, who gained for himself permanent renown among the Greek lyric poets, though not a slave born at Sardis, as is sometimes said, was probably of Lydian extraction.

It has been already mentioned that Homer knows nothing of Lydia or Lydians. He names Mæonians in juxtaposition with Karians, and we are told by Herodotus that the people once called Mæonian received the new appellation of Lydian from Lydus son of Atys. Sardis, whose almost inexpugnable citadel was situated on a precipitous rock on the northern side of the ridge of Tmôlus, overhanging the plain of the river Hermus, was the capital of the Lydian kings: it is not named by Homer, though he mentions both Tmôlus and the neighboring Gygæan lake: the fortification of it was ascribed to an old Lydian king named Mêlês, and strange legends were told concerning it.[417] Its possessors were enriched by the neighborhood of the river Paktôlus, which flowed down from Mount Tmôlus towards the Hermus, and brought with it considerable quantities of gold in its sands. To this cause historians often ascribe the abundant treasure belonging to Crœsus and his predecessors; but Crœsus possessed, besides, other mines near Pergamus;[418] and another cause of wealth is also to be found in the general industry of the Lydian people, which the circumstances mentioned respecting them seem to attest. They were the first people, according to Herodotus, who ever carried on retail trade; and the first to coin money of gold and silver.[419]

The archæologists of Sardis in the time of Herodotus, a century after the Persian conquest, carried very far back the antiquity of the Lydian monarchy, by means of a series of names which are in great part, if not altogether, divine and heroic. Herodotus gives us first, Manês, Atys, and Lydus,—next, a line of kings beginning with Hêraklês, twenty-two in number, succeeding each other from father to son and lasting for 505 years. The first of this line of Herakleid kings was Agrôn, descended

from Hêraklês in the fourth generation,—Hêraklês, Alkæus, Ninus, Bêlus, and Agrôn. The twenty-second prince of this Herakleid family, after an uninterrupted succession of father and son during 505 years, was Kandaulês, called by the Greeks Myrsilus the son of Myrsus: with him the dynasty ended, and ended by one of those curious incidents which Herodotus has narrated with his usual dramatic, yet unaffected, emphasis. It was the divine will that Kandaulês should be destroyed, and he lost his rational judgment: having a wife the most beautiful woman in Lydia, his vanity could not be satisfied without exhibiting her naked person to Gygês son of Daskylus, his principal confidant and the commander of his guards. In spite of the vehement repugnance of Gygês, this resolution was executed; but the wife became aware of the inexpiable affront, and took her measures to avenge it. Surrounded by her most faithful domestics, she sent for Gygês, and addressed him: "Two ways are now open to thee, Gygês: take which thou wilt. Either kill Kandaulês, wed me, and acquire the kingdom of Lydia,—or else thou must at once perish. For thou hast seen forbidden things, and either thou, or the man who contrived it for thee must die." Gygês in vain entreated to be spared so terrible an alternative: he was driven to the option, and he chose that which promised safety to himself.[420] The queen planted him in ambush behind the bed-chamber door, in the very spot where Kandaulês had placed him as a spectator, and armed him with a dagger, which he plunged into the heart of the sleeping king.

Thus ended the dynasty of the Herakleids; but there was a large party in Lydia who indignantly resented the death of Kandaulês, and took arms against Gygês. A civil war ensued, which both parties at length consented to terminate by reference to the Delphian oracle. The decision of that holy referee was given in favor of Gygês, and the kingdom of Lydia thus passed to his dynasty, called the Mermnadæ. But the oracle accompanied its verdict with an intimation, that in the person of the fifth descendant of Gygês, the murder of Kandaulês would be avenged,—a warning of which, Herodotus innocently remarks, no one took any notice, until it was actually fulfilled in the person of Crœsus.[421]

In this curious legend, which marks the commencement of the dynasty called Mermnadæ, the historical kings of Lydia,—we cannot determine how much, or whether any part, is historical. Gygês was probably a real man, contemporary with the youth of the poet Archilochus; but the name Gygês is also an heroic name in Lydian archæology. He is the eponymus of the Gygæan lake near Sardis; and of the many legends told respecting him, Plato has preserved one, according to which Gygês is a mere herdsman of the king of Lydia: after a terrible storm and earthquake, he sees near him a chasm in the earth, into which he descends and finds a vast horse of brass, hollow and partly open, wherein there lies a gigantic corpse with a golden ring. This ring he carries away, and discovers unexpectedly that it possesses the miraculous property of rendering him invisible at pleasure. Being sent on a message to the king, he makes the magic ring available to his ambition: he first pos-

sesses himself of the person of the queen, then with her aid assassinates the king, and finally seizes the sceptre.[422]

The legend thus recounted by Plato, different in almost all points from the Herodotean, has this one circumstance in common, that the adventurer Gygês, through the favor and help of the queen, destroys the king and becomes his successor. Feminine preference and patronage is the cause of his prosperity. Klausen has shown[423] that this "aphrodisiac influence" runs in a peculiar manner through many of the Asiatic legends, both divine and heroic. The Phrygian Midas, or Gordius, as before recounted, acquires the throne by marriage with a divinely privileged maiden: the favor shown by Aphroditê to Anchisês, confers upon the Æneadæ sovereignty in the Troad: moreover, the great Phrygian and Lydian goddess Rhea or Cybelê has always her favored and self-devoting youth Atys, who is worshipped along with her, and who serves as a sort of mediator between her and mankind. The feminine element appears predominant in Asiatic mythes: Midas, Sardanapalus, Sandôn, and even Hêraklês,[424] are described as clothed in women's attire and working at the loom; while on the other hand the Amazons and Semiramis achieve great conquests.

Admitting therefore the historical character of the Lydian kings called Mermnadæ, beginning with Gygês about 715-690 B. C., and ending with Crœsus, we find nothing but legend to explain to us the circumstances which led to their accession. Still less can we make out anything respecting the preceding kings, or determine whether Lydia was ever in former times connected with or dependent upon the kingdom of Assyria, as Ktêsias affirmed.[425] Nor can we certify the reality or dates of the old Lydian kings named by the native historian Xanthus,—Alkimus, Kamblês, Adramytês.[426] One piece of valuable information, however, we acquire from Xanthus,—the distribution of Lydia into two parts, Lydia proper and Torrhêbia, which he traces to the two sons of Atys,—Lydus and Torrhêbus; he states that the dialect of the Lydians and Torrhebians differed much in the same degree as that of Doric and Ionic Greeks.[427] Torrhêbia appears to have included the valley of the Kaïster, south of Tmôlus, and near to the frontiers of Karia.

With Gygês, the Mermnad king, commences the series of aggressions from Sardis upon the Asiatic Greeks, which ultimately ended in their subjection. Gygês invaded the territories of Milêtus and Smyrna, and even took the city, probably not the citadel, of Kolophôn. Though he thus, however, made war upon the Asiatic Greeks, he was munificent in his donations to the Grecian god of Delphi, and his numerous as well as costly offerings were seen in the temple by Herodotus. Elegiac compositions of the poet Mimnermus celebrated the valor of the Smyrnæans in their battle with Gygês.[428] We hear also, in a story which bears the impress of Lydian more than of Grecian fancy, of a beautiful youth of Smyrna named Magnês, to whom Gygês was attached, and who incurred the displeasure of his countrymen for having composed verses in celebration of the victories of the Lydians over the Amazons. To avenge the ill-treatment received by this youth, Gygês attacked the territory of Mag-

nêsia (probably Magnêsia on Sipylus) and after a considerable struggle took the city.[429]

How far the Lydian kingdom of Sardis extended during the reign of Gygês, we have no means of ascertaining. Strabo alleges that the whole Troad[430] belonged to him, and that the Greek settlement of Abydus on the Hellespont was established by the Milesians only under his auspices. On what authority this statement is made, we are not told, and it appears doubtful, especially as so many legendary anecdotes are connected with the name of Gygês. This prince reigned (according to Herodotus) thirty-eight years, and was succeeded by his son Ardys, who reigned forty-nine years (about B. C. 678-629). We learn that he attacked the Milesians, and took the Ionic city of Priênê, but this possession cannot have been maintained, for the city appears afterwards as autonomous.[431] His long reign, however, was signalized by two events, both of considerable moment to the Asiatic Greeks; the invasion of the Cimmerians, —and the first approach to collision, at least the first of which we have any historical knowledge, between the inhabitants of Lydia and those of Upper Asia under the Median kings.

It is affirmed by all authors that the Medes were originally numbered among the subjects of the great Assyrian empire, of which Nineveh—or Ninos, as the Greeks call it—was the chief town, and Babylon one of the principal portions. That the population and power of these two great cities, as well as of several others which the Ten Thousand Greeks in their march found ruined and deserted in those same regions, is of high antiquity,[432] there is no room for doubting; but it is noway incumbent upon a historian of Greece to entangle himself in the mazes of Assyrian chronology, or to weigh the degree of credit to which the conflicting statements of Herodotus, Ktêsias, Berosus, Abydênus, etc. are entitled. With the Assyrian empire,[433]—which lasted, according to Herodotus, five hundred and twenty years, according to Ktêsias, thirteen hundred and sixty years,—the Greeks have no ascertainable connection: the city of Nineveh appears to have been taken by the Medes a little before the year 600 B. C. (in so far as the chronology can be made out), and exercised no influence upon Grecian affairs. Those inhabitants of Upper Asia, with whom the early Greeks had relation, were the Medes, and the Assyrians or Chaldæans of Babylon,—both originally subject to the Assyrians of Nineveh,—both afterwards acquiring independence,—and both ultimately embodied in the Persian empire. At what time either of them became first independent, we do not know:[434] the astronomical canon which gives a list of kings of Babylon, beginning with what is called the era of Nabonassar, or 747 B. C., does not prove at what epoch these Babylonian chiefs became independent of Nineveh: and the catalogue of Median kings, which Herodotus begins with Dêïokês, about 709-711 B. C., is commenced by Ktêsias more than a century earlier,—moreover, the names in the two lists are different almost from first to last.

For the historian of Greece, the Medes first begin to acquire importance about 656 B. C., under a king whom Herodotus calls Phraortês, son of Dêïokês. Respecting

Dêïokês himself, Herodotus recounts to us how he came to be first chosen king.[435] The seven tribes of Medes dwelt dispersed in separate villages, without any common authority, and the mischiefs of anarchy were painfully felt among them: Dêïokês having acquired great reputation in his own village as a just man, was invoked gradually by all the adjoining villages to settle their disputes. As soon as his efficiency in this vocation, and the improvement which he brought about, had become felt throughout all the tribes, he artfully threw up his post and retired again into privacy,—upon which the evils of anarchy revived in a manner more intolerable than before. The Medes had now no choice except to elect a king,—the friends of Dêïokês expatiated warmly upon his virtues, and he was the person chosen.[436] The first step of the new king was to exact from the people a body of guards selected by himself; next, he commanded them to build the city of Ekbatana, upon a hill surrounded with seven concentric circles of walls, his own palace being at the top and in the innermost. He farther organized the scheme of Median despotism; the king, though his person was constantly secluded in his fortified palace, inviting written communications from all aggrieved persons, and administering to each the decision or the redress which it required,—informing himself, moreover, of passing events by means of ubiquitous spies and officials, who seized all wrong-doers and brought them to the palace for condign punishment. Dêïokês farther constrained the Medes to abandon their separate abodes and concentrate themselves in Ekbatana, from whence all the powers of government branched out; and the seven distinct fortified circles in the town, coinciding as they do with the number of the Median tribes, were probably conceived by Herodotus as intended each for one distinct tribe,—the tribe of Dêïokês occupying the innermost along with himself.[437]

Except the successive steps of this well-laid political plan, we hear of no other acts ascribed to Dêïokês: he is said to have held the government for fifty-three years, and then dying, was succeeded by his son Phraortês. Of the real history of Dêïokês, we cannot be said to know anything. For the interesting narrative of Herodotus, of which the above is an abridgment, presents to us in all its points Grecian society and ideas, not Oriental: it is like the discussion which the historian ascribes to the seven Persian conspirators, previous to the accession of Darius,—whether they shall adopt an oligarchical, a democratical, or a monarchical form of government;[438] or it may be compared, perhaps more aptly still, to the Cyropædia of Xenophon, who beautifully and elaborately works out an ideal which Herodotus exhibits in brief outline. The story of Dêïokês describes what may be called the despot's progress, first as candidate, and afterwards as fully established. Amidst the active political discussion carried on by intelligent Greeks in the days of Herodotus, there were doubtless many stories of the successful arts of ambitious despots, and much remark as to the probable means conducive to their success, of a nature similar to those in the Politics of Aristotle: one of these tales Herodotus has employed to decorate the birth and infancy of the Median monarchy. His Dêïokês begins like a clever Greek among other Greeks, equal, free, and disorderly. He is athirst for despotism from the beginning,

and is forward in manifesting his rectitude and justice, "as beseems a candidate for command;"[439] he passes into a despot by the public vote, and receives what to the Greeks was the great symbol and instrument of such transition, a personal body-guard; he ends by organizing both the machinery and the etiquette of a despotism in the Oriental fashion, like the Cyrus of Xenophon,[440] only that both these authors maintain the superiority of their Grecian ideal over Oriental reality by ascribing both to Dêïokês and Cyrus a just, systematic, and laborious administration, such as their own experience did not present to them in Asia. Probably Herodotus had visited Ekbatana (which he describes and measures like an eye-witness, comparing its circuit to that of Athens), and there heard that Dêïokês was the builder of the city, the earliest known Median king, and the first author of those public customs which struck him as peculiar, after the revolt from Assyria: the interval might then be easily filled up, between Median autonomy and Median despotism, by intermediate incidents, such as would have accompanied that transition in the longitude of Greece. The features of these inhabitants of Upper Asia, for a thousand years forward from the time at which we are now arrived,—under the descendants of Dêïokês, of Cyrus, of Arsakês, and of Ardshir,—are so unvarying,[441] that we are much assisted in detecting those occasions in which Herodotus or others infuse into their history indigenous Grecian ideas.

Phraortês (658-636 B. C.), having extended the dominion of the Medes over a large portion of Upper Asia, and conquered both the Persians and several other nations, was ultimately defeated and slain in a war against the Assyrians of Nineveh: who, though deprived of their external dependencies, were yet brave and powerful by themselves. His son Kyaxarês (636-595 B. C.) followed up with still greater energy the same plans of conquest, and is said to have been the first who introduced any organization into the military force;—before his time, archers, spearmen, and cavalry had been confounded together indiscriminately, until this monarch established separate divisions for each. He extended the Median dominion to the eastern bank of the Halys, which river afterwards, by the conquests of the Lydian king Crœsus, became the boundary between the Lydian and Median empires; and he carried on war for six years with Alyattês king of Lydia, in consequence of the refusal of the latter to give up a band of Scythian nomads, who, having quitted the territory of Kyaxarês in order to escape severities with which they were menaced, had sought refuge as suppliants in Lydia.[442] The war, indecisive as respects success, was brought to its close by a remarkable incident: in the midst of a battle between the Median and Lydian armies, there happened a total eclipse of the sun, which occasioned equal alarm to both parties, and induced them immediately to cease hostilities.[443] The Kilikian prince Syennesis, and the Babylonian prince Labynêtus, interposed their mediation, and effected a reconciliation between Kyaxarês and Alyattês, one of the conditions of which was, that Alyattês gave his daughter Aryênis in marriage to Astyagês son of Kyaxarês. In this manner began the connection between the Lydian and Median kings which afterwards proved so ruinous to Crœsus. It is affirmed that the Greek philosopher Thalês

foretold this eclipse; but we may reasonably consider the supposed prediction as not less apocryphal than some others ascribed to him, and doubt whether at that time any living Greek possessed either knowledge or scientific capacity sufficient for such a calculation.[444] The eclipse itself, and its terrific working upon the minds of the combatants, are facts not to be called in question; though the diversity of opinion among chronologists, respecting the date of it, is astonishing.[445]

It was after this peace with Alyattês, as far as we can make out the series of events in Herodotus, that Kyaxarês collected all his forces and laid siege to Nineveh, but was obliged to desist by the unexpected inroad of the Scythians. Nearly at the same time that Upper Asia was desolated by these formidable nomads, Asia Minor too was overrun by other nomads,—the Cimmerians,—Ardys being then king of Lydia; and the two invasions, both spreading extreme disaster, are presented to us as indirectly connected together in the way of cause and effect.

The name Cimmerians appears in the Odyssey,—the fable describes them as dwelling beyond the ocean-stream, immersed in darkness and unblessed by the rays of Helios. Of this people as existent we can render no account, for they had passed away, or lost their identity and become subject, previous to the commencement of trustworthy authorities: but they seem to have been the chief occupants of the Tauric Chersonesus (Crimea) and of the territory between that peninsula and the river Tyras (Dniester), at the time when the Greeks first commenced their permanent settlements on those coasts in the seventh century B. C. The numerous localities which bore their name, even in the time of Herodotus,[446] after they had ceased to exist as a nation,—as well as the tombs of the Cimmerian kings then shown near the Tyras,—sufficiently attest this fact; and there is reason to believe that they were—like their conquerors and successors the Scythians—a nomadic people, mare-milkers, moving about with their tents and herds, suitably to the nature of those unbroken steppes which their territory presented, and which offered little except herbage in profusion. Strabo tells us[447]—on what authority we do not know—that they, as well as the Trêres and other Thracians, had desolated Asia Minor more than once before the time of Ardys, and even earlier than Homer.

The Cimmerians thus belong partly to legend partly to history; but the Scythians formed for several centuries an important section of the Grecian contemporary world. Their name, unnoticed by Homer, occurs for the first time in the Hesiodic poems. When the Homeric Zeus in the Iliad turns his eye away from Troy towards Thrace, he sees, besides the Thracians and Mysians, other tribes, whose names cannot be made out, but whom the poet knows as milk-eaters and mare-milkers;[448] and the same characteristic attributes, coupled with that of "having wagons for their dwelling-houses," appear in Hesiod connected with the name of the Scythians.[449] The navigation of the Greeks into the Euxine, gradually became more and more frequent, and during the last half of the seventh century B. C. their first settlements on its coasts were established. The foundation of Byzantium, as well as of the Pontic Herakleia, at

a short distance to the east of the Thracian Bosphorus, by the Megarians, is assigned to the 30th Olympiad, or 658 B. C.;[450] and the succession of colonies founded by the enterprise of Milesian citizens on the western coast of the Euxine, seem to fall not very long after this date,—at least within the following century. Istria, Tyras, and Olbia, or Borysthenes, were planted respectively near the mouths of the three great rivers Danube, Dniester, and Bog: Kruni, Odêssus, Tomi, Kallatis, and Apollonia, were also planted on the south-western or Thracian coast, northward of the dangerous land of Salmydessus, so frequent in wrecks, but south of the Danube.[451] According to the turn of Grecian religious faith, the colonists took out with them the worship of the hero Achilles (from whom, perhaps, the œkist and some of the expatriating chiefs professed to be descended), which they established with great solemnity both in the various towns and on the small adjoining islands: and the earliest proof which we find of Scythia, as a territory familiar to Grecian ideas and feeling, is found in a fragment of the poet Alkæus (about B. C. 600), wherein he addresses Achilles[452] as "sovereign of Scythia." There were, besides, several other Milesian foundations on or near the Tauric Chersonese (Crimea) which brought the Greeks into conjunction with the Scythians,—Herakleia, Chersonêsus, and Theodosia, on the southern coast and south-western corner of the peninsula,—Pantikapæum and the Teian colony of Phanagoria (these two on the European and Asiatic sides of the Cimmerian Bosphorus respectively), and Kêpi, Hermônassa, etc. not far from Phanagoria, on the Asiatic coast of the Euxine: last of all, there was, even at the extremity of the Palus Mæotis (Sea of Azof), the Grecian settlement of Tanais.[453] All or most of these seem to have been founded during the course of the sixth century B. C., though the precise dates of most of them cannot be named; probably several of them anterior to the time of the mystic poet Aristeas of Prokonnêsus, about 540 B. C. His long voyage from the Palus Mæotis (Sea of Azof) into the interior of Asia as far as the country of the Issêdones (described in a poem, now lost, called the Arimaspian verses), implies an habitual intercourse between Scythians and Greeks which could not well have existed without Grecian establishments on the Cimmerian Bosphorus.

Hekatæus of Milêtus,[454] appears to have given much geographical information respecting the Scythian tribes; but Herodotus, who personally visited the town of Olbia, together with the inland regions adjoining to it, and probably other Grecian settlements in the Euxine (at a time which we may presume to have been about 450-440 B. C.),—and who conversed with both Scythians and Greeks competent to give him information,—has left us far more valuable statements respecting the Scythian people, dominion, and manners, as they stood in his day. His conception of the Scythians, as well as that of Hippokratês, is precise and well-defined,—very different from that of the later authors, who use the word almost indiscriminately to denote all barbarous nomads. His territory, called Scythia, is a square area, twenty days' journey or four thousand stadia (somewhat less than five hundred English miles) in each direction,—bounded by the Danube (the course of which river he conceives in a direction from N. W. to S. E.), the Euxine, and the Palus Mæotis with the river Tanais,

on three sides respectively,—and on the fourth or north side by the nations called Agathyrsi, Neuri, Androphagi, and Melanchlæni.[455] However imperfect his idea of the figure of this territory may be found, if we compare it with a good modern map, the limits which he gives us are beyond dispute: from the lower Danube and the mountains eastward of Transylvania to the lower Tanais, the whole area was either occupied by or subject to the Scythians. And this name comprised tribes differing materially in habits and civilization. The great mass of the people who bore it, strictly nomadic in their habits,—neither sowing nor planting, but living only on food derived from animals, especially mare's milk and cheese,—moved from place to place, carrying their families in wagons covered with wicker and leather, themselves always on horseback with their flocks and herds, between the Borysthenês and the Palus Mæotis; they hardly even reached so far westward as the Borysthenês, since a river (not easily identified) which Herodotus calls Pantikapês, flowing into the Borysthenês from the eastward, formed their boundary. These nomads were the genuine Scythians, possessing the marked attributes of the race, and including among their number the regal Scythians,[456]—hordes so much more populous and more effective in war than the rest, as to maintain undisputed ascendency, and to account all other Scythians no better than their slaves. It was to these that the Scythian kings belonged, by whom the religious and political unity of the name was maintained,—each horde having its separate chief, and to a certain extent separate worship and customs. But besides these nomads, there were also agricultural Scythians, with fixed abodes, living more or less upon bread, and raising corn for exportation, along the banks of the Borysthenês and the Hypanis.[457] And such had been the influence of the Grecian settlement of Olbia at the mouth of the latter river in creating new tastes and habits, that two tribes on its western banks, the Kallippidæ and the Alazônes, had become completely accustomed both to tillage and to vegetable food, and had in other respects so much departed from their Scythian rudeness as to be called Hellenic-Scythians, many Greeks being seemingly domiciled among them. Northward of the Alazônes, lay those called the agricultural Scythians, who sowed corn, not for food but for sale.[458]

Such stationary cultivators were doubtless regarded by the predominant mass of the Scythians as degenerate brethren; and some historians maintain that they belonged to a foreign race, standing to the Scythians merely in the relation of subjects, [459]—an hypothesis contradicted implicitly, if not directly, by the words of Herodotus, and no way necessary in the present case. It is not from them, however, that Herodotus draws his vivid picture of the people, with their inhuman rites and repulsive personal features. It is the purely nomadic Scythians whom he depicts, the earliest specimens of the Mongolian race (so it seems probable)[460] known to history, and prototypes of the Huns and Bulgarians of later centuries. The sword, in the literal sense of the word, was their chief god,[461]—an iron scymetar solemnly elevated upon a wide and lofty platform, which was supported on masses of fagots piled underneath,—to whom sheep, horses, and a portion of their prisoners taken in war,

were offered up in sacrifice: Herodotus treats this sword as the image of the god Arês, thus putting an Hellenic interpretation upon that which he describes literally as a barbaric rite. The scalps and the skins of slain enemies, and sometimes the skull formed into a drinking-cup, constituted the decoration of a Scythian warrior: whoever had not slain an enemy, was excluded from participation in the annual festival and bowl of wine prepared by the chief of each separate horde. The ceremonies which took place during the sickness and funeral obsequies of the Scythian kings (who were buried at Gerrhi, at the extreme point to which navigation extended up the Borysthenês), partook of the same sanguinary disposition. It was the Scythian practice to put out the eyes of all their slaves; and the awkwardness of the Scythian frame, often overloaded with fat, together with extreme dirt of body, and the absence of all discriminating feature between one man and another, complete the brutish portrait.[462] Mare's milk (with cheese made from it) seems to have been their chief luxury, and probably served the same purpose of procuring the intoxicating drink called *kumiss*, as at present among the Bashkirs and the Kalmucks.[463]

If the habits of the Scythians were such as to create in the near observer no other feeling than repugnance, their force at least inspired terror. They appeared in the eyes of Thucydidês so numerous and so formidable, that he pronounces them irresistible, if they could but unite, by any other nation within his knowledge. Herodotus, too, conceived the same idea of a race among whom every man was a warrior and a practised horse-bowman, and who were placed by their mode of life out of all reach of an enemy's attack.[464] Moreover, Herodotus does not speak meanly of their intelligence, contrasting them in favorable terms with the general stupidity of the other nations bordering on the Euxine. In this respect Thucydidês seems to differ from him.

On the east, the Scythians of the time of Herodotus were separated only by the river Tanais from the Sarmatians, who occupied the territory for several days' journey north-east of the Palus Mæôtis: on the south, they were divided by the Danube from the section of Thracians called Getæ. Both these nations were nomadic, analogous to the Scythians in habits, military efficiency, and fierceness: indeed, Herodotus and Hippokratês distinctly intimate that the Sarmatians were nothing but a branch of Scythians,[465] speaking a Scythian dialect, and distinguished from their neighbors on the other side of the Tanais, chiefly by this peculiarity,—that the women among them were warriors hardly less daring and expert than the men. This attribute of Sarmatian women, as a matter of fact, is well attested,—though Herodotus has thrown over it an air of suspicion not properly belonging to it, by his explanatory genealogical mythe, deducing the Sarmatians from a mixed breed between the Scythians and the Amazons.

The wide extent of steppe eastward and north-eastward of the Tanais, between the Ural mountains and the Caspian, and beyond the possessions of the Sarmatians, was traversed by Grecian traders, even to a good distance in the direction of the Al-

tai mountains,—the rich produce of gold, both in Altai and Ural, being the great temptation. First, according to Herodotus, came the indigenous nomadic nation called Budini, who dwelt to the northward of the Sarmatians,[466] and among whom were established a colony of Pontic Greeks, intermixed with natives, and called Gelôni; these latter inhabited a spacious town built entirely of wood. Beyond the Budini eastward dwelt the Thyssagetæ and the Jurkæ, tribes of hunters, and even a body of Scythians who had migrated from the territories of the regal Scythians. The Issêdones were the easternmost people respecting whom any definite information reached the Greeks; beyond them we find nothing but fable,[467]—the one-eyed Arimaspians, the gold-guarding Grypes, or Griffins, and the bald-headed Argippæi. It is impossible to fix with precision the geography of these different tribes, or to do more than comprehend approximatively their local bearings and relations to each other.

But the best known of all is the situation of the Tauri (perhaps a remnant of the expelled Cimmerians), who dwelt in the southern portion of the Tauric Chersonesus (or Crimea), and who immolated human sacrifices to their native virgin goddess,—identified by the Greeks with Artemis, and serving as a basis for the affecting legend of Iphigeneia. The Tauri are distinguished by Herodotus from Scythians,[468] but their manners and state of civilization seem to have been very analogous. It appears also that the powerful and numerous Massagetæ, who dwelt in Asia on the plains eastward of the Caspian and southward of the Issêdones, were so analogous to the Scythians as to be reckoned as members of the same race by many of the contemporaries of Herodotus.[469]

This short enumeration of the various tribes near the Euxine and the Caspian, as well as we can make them out, from the seventh to the fifth century B. C., is necessary for the comprehension of that double invasion of Scythians and Cimmerians which laid waste Asia between 630 and 610 B. C. We are not to expect from Herodotus, born a century and a half afterwards, any very clear explanations of this event, nor were all his informants unanimous respecting the causes which brought it about. But it is a fact perfectly within the range of historical analogy, that accidental aggregations of number, development of aggressive spirit, or failure in the means of subsistence, among the nomadic tribes of the Asiatic plains, have brought on the civilized nations of southern Europe calamitous invasions, of which the prime moving cause was remote and unknown. Sometimes a weaker tribe, flying before a stronger, has been in this manner precipitated upon the territory of a richer and less military population, so that an impulse originating in the distant plains of Central Tartary has been propagated until it reached the southern extremity of Europe, through successive intermediate tribes, a phenomenon especially exhibited during the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian era, in the declining years of the Roman empire. A pressure so transmitted onward is said to have brought down the Cimmerians and Scythians upon the more southerly regions of Asia. The most ancient story in explanation of this incident seems to have been contained in the epic poem (now lost)

called *Arimaspia*, of the mystic Aristeas of Prokonnêsus, composed apparently about 540 B. C. This poet, under the inspiration of Apollo,[470] undertook a pilgrimage to visit the sacred Hyperboreans (especial votaries of that god) in their elysium beyond the Rhipæan mountains; but he did not reach farther than the Issêdones. According to him, the movement, whereby the Cimmerians had been expelled from their possessions on the Euxine sea, began with the Grypes or Griffins in the extreme north,—the sacred character of the Hyperboreans beyond was incompatible with aggression or bloodshed. The Grypes invaded the Arimaspians, who on their part assailed their neighbors the Issêdones;[471] these latter moved southward or westward and drove the Scythians across the Tanais, while the Scythians, carried forward by this onset, expelled the Cimmerians from their territories along the Palus Mæotis and the Euxine.

We see thus that Aristeas referred the attack of the Scythians upon the Cimmerians to a distant impulse proceeding in the first instance from the Grypes or Griffins; but Herodotus had heard it explained in another way, which he seems to think more correct,—the Scythians, originally occupants of Asia, or the regions east of the Caspian, had been driven across the Araxês, in consequence of an unsuccessful war with the Massagetæ, and precipitated upon the Cimmerians in Europe.[472]

When the Scythian host approached, the Cimmerians were not agreed among themselves whether to resist or retire: the majority of the people were dismayed and wished to evacuate the territory, while the kings of the different tribes resolved to fight and perish at home. Those who were animated with this fierce despair, divided themselves along with the kings into two equal bodies and perished by each other's hands near the river Tyras, where the sepulchres of the kings were yet shown in the time of Herodotus.[473] The mass of the Cimmerians fled and abandoned their country to the Scythians; who, however, not content with possession of the country, followed the fugitives across the Cimmerian Bosphorus from west to east, under the command of their prince Madyês son of Protothyês. The Cimmerians, coasting along the east of the Euxine sea and passing to the west of Mount Caucasus, made their way first into Kolchis, and next into Asia Minor, where they established themselves on the peninsula on the northern coast, near the site of the subsequent Grecian city of Sinôpê. But the Scythian pursuers, mistaking the course taken by the fugitives, followed the more circuitous route east of Mount Caucasus near to the Caspian sea; [474] which brought them, not into Asia Minor, but into Media. Both Asia Minor and Media became thus exposed nearly at the same time to the ravages of northern nomades.

These two stories, representing the belief of Herodotus and Aristeas, involve the assumption that the Scythians were comparatively recent emigrants into the territory between the Ister and the Palus Mæotis. But the legends of the Scythians themselves, as well as those of the Pontic Greeks, imply the contrary of this assumption; and describe the Scythians as primitive and indigenous inhabitants of the country.

Both legends are so framed as to explain a triple division, which probably may have prevailed, of the Scythian aggregate nationality, traced up to three heroic brothers: both also agree in awarding the predominance to the youngest brother of the three, [475] though in other respects, the names and incidents of the two are altogether different, The Scythians call themselves Skoloti.

Such material differences, in the various accounts given to Herodotus of the Scythian and Cimmerian invasions of Asia, are by no means wonderful, seeing that nearly two centuries had elapsed between that event and his visit to the Pontus. That the Cimmerians—perhaps the northernmost portion of the great Thracian name, and conterminous with the Getæ on the Danube—were the previous tenants of much of the territory between the Ister and the Palus Mæotis, and that they were expelled in the seventh century B. C., by the Scythians, we may follow Herodotus in believing; but Niebuhr has shown that there is great intrinsic improbability in his narrative of the march of the Cimmerians into Asia Minor, and in the pursuit of these fugitives by the Scythians. That the latter would pursue at all, when an extensive territory was abandoned to them without resistance, is hardly supposable: that they should pursue and mistake their way, is still more difficult to believe: nor can we overlook the great difficulties of the road and the Caucasian passes, in the route ascribed to the Cimmerians.[476] Niebuhr supposes the latter to have marched into Asia Minor by the western side of the Euxine, and across the Thracian Bosphorus, after having been defeated in a decisive battle by the Scythians near the river Tyras, where their last kings fell and were interred.[477] Though this is both an easier route, and more in accordance with the analogy of other occupants expelled from the same territory, we must, in the absence of positive evidence, treat the point as unauthenticated.

The inroad of the Cimmerians into Asia Minor was doubtless connected with their expulsion from the northern coast of the Euxine by the Scythians, but we may well doubt whether it was at all connected, as Herodotus had been told that it was, with the invasion of Media by the Scythians, except as happening near about the same time. The same great evolution of Scythian power, or propulsion by other tribes behind, may have occasioned both events,—brought about by different bodies of Scythians, but nearly contemporaneous.

Herodotus tells us two facts respecting the Cimmerian emigrants into Asia Minor. They committed destructive, though transient, ravages in many parts of Paphlagonia, Phrygia, Lydia, and Ionia,—and they occupied permanently the northern peninsula, [478] whereon the Greek city of Sinôpê was afterwards planted. Had the elegies of the contemporary Ephesian poet Kallinus been preserved, we should have known better how to appreciate these trying times: he strove to keep alive the energy of his countrymen against the formidable invaders.[479] From later authors, who probably, had these poems before them, we learn that the Cimmerian host, having occupied the Lydian chief town Sardis (its inaccessible acropolis defied them), poured with their wagons into the fertile valley of the Kaïster, took and sacked Magnêsia on the

Mæander, and even threatened the temple of Artemis at Ephesus. But the goddess so well protected her own town and sanctuary,[480] that Lygdamis the leader of the Cimmerians, whose name marks him for a Greek, after a season of prosperous depredation in Lydia and Ionia, conducting his host into the mountainous regions of Kilikia, was there overwhelmed and slain. But though these marauders perished, the Cimmerian settlers in the territory near Sinôpê remained; and Ambrôn, the first Milesian œkist who tried to colonize that spot, was slain by them, if we may believe Skymnus. They are not mentioned afterwards, but it seems not unreasonable to believe that they appear under the name of the Chalybes, whom Herodotus mentions along that coast between the Mariandynians and Paphlagonians, and whom Mela notices as adjacent to Sinôpê and Amisus.[481] Other authors place the Chalybes on several different points, more to the east, though along the same parallel of latitude, —between the Mosynœki and Tibarêni,—near the river Thermôdôn,—and on the northern boundary of Armenia, near the sources of the Araxês; but it is only Herodotus and Mela who recognize Chalybes westward of the river Halys and the Paphlagonians, near to Sinôpê. These Chalybes were brave mountaineers, though savage in manners; distinguished as producers and workers of the iron which their mountains afforded. In the conceptions of the Greeks, as manifested in a variety of fabulous notices, they are plainly connected with Scythians or Cimmerians; whence it seems probable that this connection was present to the mind of Herodotus in regard to the inland population near Sinôpê.[482]

Herodotus seems to have conceived only one invasion of Asia by the Cimmerians, during the reign of Ardys in Lydia. Ardys was succeeded by his son Sadyattês, who reigned twelve years; and it was Alyattês, son and successor of Sadyattês, according to Herodotus, who expelled the Cimmerians from Asia.[483] But Strabo seems to speak of several invasions, in which the Trêres, a Thracian tribe, were concerned, and which are not clearly discriminated; while Kallisthenês affirmed that Sardis had been taken by the Trêres and Lykians.[484] We see only that a large and fair portion of Asia Minor was for much of this seventh century B. C. in possession of these destroying nomads, who, while on the one hand they afflicted the Ionic Greeks, on the other hand indirectly befriended them by retarding the growth of the Lydian monarchy.

The invasion of Upper Asia by the Scythians appears to have been nearly simultaneous with that of Asia Minor by the Cimmerians, but more ruinous and longer protracted. The Median king Kyaxarês, called away from the siege of Nineveh to oppose them, was totally defeated; and the Scythians became full masters of the country. They spread themselves over the whole of Upper Asia, as far as Palestine and the borders of Egypt, where Psammetichus the Egyptian king met them, and only redeemed his kingdom from invasion by prayers and costly presents. In their return, a detachment of them sacked the temple of Aphroditê at Askalon; an act of sacrilege which the goddess avenged both upon the plunderers and their descendants, to the

third and fourth generation. Twenty-eight years did their dominion in Upper Asia continue,[485] with intolerable cruelty and oppression; until, at length, Kyaxarês and the Medes found means to entrap the chiefs into a banquet, and slew them in the hour of intoxication. The Scythian host once expelled, the Medes resumed their empire. Herodotus tells us that these Scythians returned to the Tauric Chersonese, where they found that, during their long absence, their wives had intermarried with the slaves, while the new offspring which had grown up refused to readmit them. A deep trench had been drawn across a line[486] over which their march lay, and the new-grown youth defended it with bravery, until at length,—so the story runs,—the returning masters took up their whips instead of arms, and scourged the rebellious slaves into submission.

Little as we know about the particulars of these Cimmerian and Scythian inroads, they deserve notice as the first—at least the first historically known—among the numerous invasions of cultivated Asia and Europe by the nomads of Tartary. Huns, Avars, Bulgarians, Magyars, Turks, Mongols, Tartars, etc., are found in subsequent centuries repeating the same infliction, and establishing a dominion both more durable, and not less destructive, than the transient scourge of the Scythians during the reign of Kyaxarês.

After the expulsion of the Scythians from Asia, the full extent and power of the Median empire was reëstablished; and Kyaxarês was enabled again to besiege Nineveh. He took that great city, and reduced under his dominion all the Assyrians except those who formed the kingdom of Babylon. This conquest was achieved towards the close of his reign, and he bequeathed the Median empire, at the maximum of its grandeur, to his son Astyagês, in 595 B. C.[487]

As the dominion of the Scythians in Upper Asia lasted twenty eight years before they were expelled by Kyaxarês, so also the inroads of the Cimmerians through Asia Minor, which had begun during the reign of the Lydian king Ardys, continued through the twelve years of the reign of his son Sadyattês (629-617 B. C.), and were finally terminated by Alyattês, son of the latter.[488] Notwithstanding the Cimmerians, however, Sadyattês was in a condition to prosecute a war against the Grecian city of Milêtus, which continued during the last seven years of his reign, and which he bequeathed to his son and successor. Alyattês continued the war for five years longer. So feeble was the sentiment of union among the various Grecian towns on the Asiatic coast, that none of them would lend any aid to Milêtus except the Chians, who were under special obligations to Milêtus for previous aid in a contest against Erythræ: and the Milesians unassisted were no match for the Lydian army in the field, though their great naval strength placed them out of all danger of a blockade; and we must presume that the erection of those mounds of earth against the walls, whereby the Persian Harpagus vanquished the Ionian cities half a century afterwards, was then unknown to the Lydians. For twelve successive years the Milesian territory was annually overrun and ravaged, previous to the gathering in of the crop.

The inhabitants, after having been defeated in two ruinous battles, gave up all hope of resisting the devastation, so that the task of the invaders became easy, and the Lydian army pursued their destructive march to the sound of flutes and harps. They ruined the crops and the fruit-trees, but Alyattês would not allow the farm-buildings or country-houses to be burnt, in order that the means of production might still be preserved, to be again destroyed during the following season. By such unremitting devastation the Milesians were reduced to distress and famine, in spite of their command of the sea; and the fate which afterwards overtook them during the reign of Crœsus, of becoming tributary subjects to the throne of Sardis, would have begun half a century earlier, had not Alyattês unintentionally committed a profanation against the goddess Athênê. Her temple at Assêssus accidentally took fire, and was consumed, when his soldiers on a windy day were burning the Milesian standing corn. Though no one took notice of this incident at the time, yet Alyattês on his return to Sardis was smitten with prolonged sickness. Unable to obtain relief, he despatched envoys to seek humble advice from the god at Delphi; but the Pythian priestess refused to furnish any healing suggestions until he should have rebuilt the burnt temple of Athênê,—and Periander, at that time despot of Corinth, having learned the tenor of this reply, transmitted private information of it to Thrasybulus, despot of Milêtus, with whom he was intimately allied. Presently there arrived at Milêtus a herald on the part of Alyattês, proposing a truce for the special purpose of enabling him to rebuild the destroyed temple,—the Lydian monarch believing the Milesians to be so poorly furnished with subsistence that they would gladly embrace this temporary relief. But the herald on his arrival found abundance of corn heaped up in the agora, and the citizens engaged in feasting and enjoyment: for Thrasybulus had caused all the provision in the town, both public and private, to be brought out, in order that the herald might see the Milesians in a condition of apparent plenty, and carry the news of it to his master. The stratagem succeeded. Alyattês, under the persuasion that his repeated devastations inflicted upon the Milesians no sensible privations, abandoned his hostile designs, and concluded with them a treaty of amity and alliance. It was his first proceeding to build two temples to Athênê, in place of the one which had been destroyed, and he then, forthwith, recovered from his protracted malady. His gratitude for the cure was testified by the transmission of a large silver bowl, with an iron footstand welded together by the Chian artist Glaukus,—the inventor of the art of thus joining together pieces of iron.[489]

Alyattês is said to have carried on other operations against some of the Ionic Greeks: he took Smyrna, but was defeated in an inroad on the territory of Klazomenæ.[490] But on the whole, his long reign of fifty-seven years was one of tranquillity to the Grecian cities on the coast, though we hear of an expedition which he undertook against Karia.[491] He is reported to have been during youth of overweening insolence, but to have acquired afterwards a just and improved character. By an Ionian wife he became father of Crœsus, whom, even during his lifetime, he appointed satrap of the town of Adramyttium, and the neighboring plain of Thêbê. But

he had also other wives and other sons, and one of the latter, Adramytus, is reported as the founder of Adramyttium.[492] How far his dominion in the interior of Asia Minor extended, we do not know, but very probably his long and comparatively inactive reign may have favored the accumulation of those treasures which afterwards rendered the wealth of Crœsus so proverbial. His monument, an enormous pyramidal mound upon a stone base, erected near Sardis, by the joint efforts of the whole Sardian population, was the most memorable curiosity in Lydia during the time of Herodotus; it was inferior only to the gigantic edifices of Egypt and Babylon.[493]

Crœsus obtained the throne, at the death of his father, by appointment from the latter. But there was a party among the Lydians who had favored the pretensions of his brother Pantaleon; one of the richest chiefs of which party was put to death afterwards by the new king, under the cruel torture of a spiked carding-machine,—his property confiscated.[494] The aggressive reign of Crœsus, lasting fourteen years (559-545 B. C.), formed a marked contrast to the long quiescence of his father during a reign of fifty-seven years.

Pretences being easily found for war against the Asiatic Greeks, Crœsus attacked them one after the other. Unfortunately, we know neither the particulars of these successive aggressions, nor the previous history of the Ionic cities, so as to be able to explain how it was that the fifth of the Mermnad kings of Sardis met with such unqualified success, in an enterprise which his predecessors had attempted in vain. Milêtus alone, with the aid of Chios, had resisted Alyattês and Sadyattês for eleven years,—and Crœsus possessed no naval force, any more than his father and grandfather. But on this occasion, not one of the towns can have displayed the like individual energy. In regard to the Milesians, we may perhaps suspect that the period now under consideration was comprised in that long duration of intestine conflict which Herodotus represents (though without defining exactly when) to have crippled the forces of the city for two generations, and which was at length appeased by a memorable decision of some arbitrators invited from Paros. These latter, called in by mutual consent of the exhausted antagonist parties at Milêtus, found both the city and her territory in a state of general neglect and ruin. But on surveying the lands, they discovered some which still appeared to be tilled with undiminished diligence and skill; to the proprietors of these lands they consigned the government of the town, in the belief that they would manage the public affairs with as much success as their own.[495] Such a state of intestine weakness would partly explain the easy subjugation of the Milesians by Crœsus; while there was little in the habits of the Ionic cities to present the chance of united efforts against a common enemy. These cities, far from keeping up any effective political confederation, were in a state of habitual jealousy of each other, and not unfrequently in actual war.[496] The common religious festivals,—the Deliac festival as well as the Pan-Ionia, and afterwards the Ephesia in place of the Delia,—seem to have been regularly frequented by all the cities throughout the worst of times. But these assemblies had no direct political function, nor

were they permitted to control that sentiment of separate city-autonomy which was paramount in the Greek mind,—though their influence was extremely precious in calling forth social sympathies. Apart from the periodical festival, meetings for special emergencies were held at the Pan-Ionic temple; but from such meetings any city, not directly implicated, kept aloof.[497] As in this case, so in others not less critical throughout the historical period, the incapacity of large political combination was the source of constant danger, and ultimately proved the cause of ruin, to the independence of all the Grecian states. Herodotus warmly commends the advice given by Thalês to his Ionic countrymen,—and given, to use his remarkable expression, "before the ruin of Ionia,"[498]—that a common senate, invested with authority over all the twelve cities, should be formed within the walls of Teôs, as the most central in position; and that all the other cities should account themselves mere demes of this aggregate commonwealth, or polis. Nor can we doubt that such was the unavailing aspiration of many a patriot of Milêtus or Ephesus, even before the final operations of Crœsus were opened against them.

That prince attacked the Greek cities successively, finding or making different pretences for hostility against each. He began with Ephesus, which is said to have been then governed by a despot of harsh and oppressive character, named Pindarus, whose father Melas had married a daughter of Alyattês, and who was, therefore, himself nephew of Crœsus.[499] The latter, having in vain invited Pindarus and the Ephesians to surrender the town, brought up his forces and attacked the walls: one of the towers being overthrown, the Ephesians abandoned all hope of defending their town, and sought safety by placing it under the guardianship of Artemis, to whose temple they carried a rope from the walls,—a distance not less than seven furlongs. They at the same time sent a message of supplication to Crœsus, who is said to have granted them the preservation of their liberties, out of reverence to the protection of Artemis; exacting at the same time that Pindarus should quit the place. Such is the tale of which we find a confused mention in Ælian and Polyænus; but Herodotus, while he notices the fact of the long rope whereby the Ephesians sought to place themselves in contact with their divine protectress, does not indicate that Crœsus was induced to treat them more favorably. Ephesus, like all the other Grecian towns on the coast, was brought under subjection and tribute to him.[500] How he dealt with them, and what degree of coercive precaution he employed either to insure subjection or collect tribute, the brevity of the historian does not acquaint us. But they were required partially at least, if not entirely, to raze their fortifications; for on occasion of the danger which supervened a few years afterwards from Cyrus, they are found practically unfortified.[501]

Thus completely successful in his aggressions on the continental Asiatic Greeks, Crœsus conceived the idea of assembling a fleet, for the purpose of attacking the islanders of Chios and Samos, but was convinced,—as some said, by the sarcastic remark of one of the seven Greek sages, Bias or Pittakus—of the impracticability of the

project. He carried his arms, however, with full success, over other parts of the continent of Asia Minor, until he had subdued the whole territory within the river Halys, excepting only the Kilikians and the Lykians. The Lydian empire thus reached the maximum of its power, comprehending, besides the Æolic, Ionic, and Doric Greeks on the coast of Asia Minor, the Phrygians, Mysians, Mariandynians, Chalybes, Paphlagonians, Thynian and Bithynian Thracians, Karians, and Pamphylians. And the treasures amassed by Crœsus at Sardis, derived partly from this great number of tributaries, partly from mines in various places as well as the auriferous sands of the Paktôlus, exceeded anything which the Greeks had ever before known.

We learn, from the brief but valuable observations of Herodotus, to appreciate the great importance of these conquests of Crœsus, with reference not merely to the Grecian cities actually subjected, but also indirectly to the whole Grecian world.

"Before the reign of Crœsus, observes the historian, all the Greeks were free; it was by him first that Greeks were subdued into tribute." And he treats this event as the initial phenomenon of the series, out of which grew the hostile relations between the Greeks on one side, and Asia as represented by the Persians on the other, which were uppermost in the minds of himself and his contemporaries.

It was in the case of Crœsus that the Greeks were first called upon to deal with a tolerably large barbaric aggregate under a warlike and enterprising prince, and the result was such as to manifest the inherent weakness of their political system, from its incapacity of large combination. The separated autonomous cities could only maintain their independence either through similar disunion on the part of barbaric adversaries, or by superiority on their own side of military organization as well as of geographical position. The situation of Greece proper and of the islands was favorable to the maintenance of such a system,—not so the shores of Asia with a wide interior country behind. The Ionic Greeks were at this time different from what they became during the ensuing century, little inferior in energy to Athens or to the general body of European Greeks, and could doubtless have maintained their independence, had they cordially combined. But it will be seen hereafter that the Greek colonies,—planted as isolated settlements, and indisposed to political union, even when neighbors,—all of them fell into dependence so soon as attack from the interior came to be powerfully organized; especially if that organization was conducted by leaders partially improved through contact with the Greeks themselves. Small autonomous cities maintain themselves so long as they have only enemies of the like strength to deal with: but to resist larger aggregates requires such a concurrence of favorable circumstances as can hardly remain long without interruption. And the ultimate subjection of entire Greece, under the kings of Macedon, was only an exemplification on the widest scale of this same principle.

The Lydian monarchy under Crœsus, the largest with which the Greeks had come into contact down to that moment, was very soon absorbed into a still larger,—the

Persian; of which the Ionic Greeks, after unavailing resistance, became the subjects. The partial sympathy and aid which they obtained from the independent or European Greeks, their western neighbors, followed by the fruitless attempt on the part of the Persian king to add these latter to his empire, gave an entirely new turn to Grecian history and proceedings. First, it necessitated a degree of central action against the Persians which was foreign to Greek political instinct; next it opened to the noblest and most enterprising section of the Hellenic name,—the Athenians,—an opportunity of placing themselves at the head of this centralizing tendency: while a concurrence of circumstances, foreign and domestic, imparted to them at the same time that extraordinary and many-sided impulse, combining action with organization, which gave such brilliancy to the period of Herodotus and Thucydidês. It is thus that most of the splendid phenomena of Grecian history grew, directly or indirectly, out of the reluctant dependence in which the Asiatic Greeks were held by the inland barbaric powers, beginning with Crœsus.

These few observations will suffice to intimate that a new phase of Grecian history is now on the point of opening. Down to the time of Crœsus, almost everything which is done or suffered by the Grecian cities bears only upon one or other of them separately: the instinct of the Greeks repudiates even the modified forms of political centralization, and there are no circumstances in operation to force it upon them. Relation of power and subjection exist, between a strong and a weak state, but no tendency to standing political coördination. From this time forward, we shall see partial causes at work, tending in this direction, and not without considerable influence; though always at war with the indestructible instinct of the nation, and frequently counteracted by selfishness and misconduct on the part of the leading cities.

CHAPTER XVIII.

PHENICIANS.

Of the Phenicians, Assyrians, and Egyptians, it is necessary for me to speak so far as they acted upon the condition, or occupied the thoughts, of the early Greeks, without undertaking to investigate thoroughly their previous history. Like the Lydians, all three became absorbed into the vast mass of the Persian empire, retaining, however, to a great degree, their social character and peculiarities after having been robbed of their political independence.

The Persians and Medes,—portions of the Arian race, and members of what has been classified, in respect of language, as the great Indo-European family,—occupied a part of the vast space comprehended between the Indus on the east, and the line of Mount Zagros (running eastward of the Tigris and nearly parallel with that river) on the west. The Phenicians as well as the Assyrians belonged to the Semitic, Aramæan, or Syro-Arabian family; comprising, besides, the Syrians, Jews, Arabians, and in part the Abyssinians. To what established family of the human race the swarthy and curly-haired Egyptians are to be assigned, has been much disputed; we cannot reckon them as members of either of the two preceding, and the most careful inquiries render it probable that their physical type was something purely African, approximating in many points to that of the negro.[502]

It has already been remarked that the Phenician merchant and trading vessel figures in the Homeric poems as a well-known visitor, and that the variegated robes and golden ornaments fabricated at Sidon are prized among the valuable ornaments belonging to the chiefs.[503] We have reason to conclude generally, that in these early times, the Phenicians traversed the Ægean sea habitually, and even formed settlements for trading and mining purposes upon some of its islands: on Thasos, especially, near the coast of Thrace, traces of their abandoned gold-mines were visible even in the days of Herodotus, indicating both persevering labor and considerable length of occupation. But at the time when the historical era opens, they seem to have been in course of gradual retirement from these regions,[504] and their commerce had taken a different direction. Of this change we can furnish no particulars; but we may easily understand that the increase of the Grecian marine, both warlike and commercial, would render it inconvenient for the Phenicians to encounter such enterprising rivals,—piracy (or private war at sea) being then an habitual proceeding, especially with regard to foreigners.

The Phenician towns occupied a narrow strip of the coast of Syria and Palestine, about one hundred and twenty miles in length, never more, and generally much less, than twenty miles in breadth,—between Mount Libanus and the sea. Aradus—on an

islet, with Antaradus and Marathus over against it on the main land—was the northernmost, and Tyre the southernmost (also upon a little island, with Palæ-Tyrus and a fertile adjacent plain over against it). Between the two were situated Sidon, Berytus, Tripolis, and Byblus, besides some smaller towns[505] attached to one or other of these last mentioned, and several islands close to the coast occupied in like manner; while the colony of Myriandrus lay farther north, near the borders of Kilikia. Whether Sidon or Tyre was the most ancient, seems not determinable: if it be true as some authorities affirmed, that Tyre was originally planted from Sidon, the colony must have grown so rapidly as to surpass its metropolis in power and consideration, for it became the chief of all the Phenician towns.[506] Aradus, the next in importance after these two, was founded by exiles from Sidon, and all the rest either by Tyrian or Sidonian settlers. Within this confined territory was concentrated a greater degree of commercial wealth and enterprise, and manufacturing ingenuity, than could be found in any other portion of the contemporary world. Each town was an independent community, having its own surrounding territory and political constitution and its own hereditary prince,[507] though the annals of Tyre display many instances of princes assassinated by men who succeeded them on the throne. Tyre appears to have enjoyed a certain presiding, perhaps a controlling authority, over all of them, which was not always willingly submitted to; and examples occur in which the inferior towns, when Tyre was pressed by a foreign enemy,[508] took the opportunity of revolting, or at least stood aloof. The same difficulty of managing satisfactorily the relations between a presiding town and its confederates, which Grecian history manifests, is found also to prevail in Phenicia, and will be hereafter remarked in regard to Carthage; while the same effects are also perceived, of the autonomous city polity, in keeping alive the individual energies and regulated aspirations of the inhabitants. The predominant sentiment of jealous town-isolation is forcibly illustrated by the circumstances of Tripolis, established jointly by Tyre, Sidon, and Aradus. It consisted of three distinct towns, each one furlong apart from the other two, and each with its own separate walls; though probably constituting to a certain extent one political community, and serving as a place of common meeting and deliberation for the entire Phenician name.[509] The outlying promontories of Libanus and Anti-Libanus touched the sea along the Phenician coast, and those mountainous ranges, while they rendered a large portion of the very confined area unfit for cultivation of corn, furnished what was perhaps yet more indispensable,—abundant supplies of timber for ship-building: the entire want of all wood in Babylonia, except the date-palm, restricted the Assyrians of that territory from maritime traffic on the Persian gulf. It appears, however, that the mountains of Lebanon also afforded shelter to tribes of predatory Arabs, who continually infested both the Phenician territory and the rich neighboring plain of Cœle-Syria.[510]

The splendid temple of that great Phenician god (Melkarth) whom the Greeks called Hêraklês,[511] was situated in Tyre, and the Tyrians affirmed that its establishment had been coeval with the first foundation of the city, two thousand three hun-

dred years before the time of Herodotus. This god is the companion and protector of their colonial settlements, and the ancestor of the Phœnico-Libyan kings: we find him especially at Carthage, Gadês, and Thasos.[512] Some supposed that they had migrated to their site on the Mediterranean coast, from previous abodes near the mouth of the Euphrates,[513] or on islands (named Tylus and Aradus) of the Persian gulf, while others treated the Mediterranean Phenicians as original, and the others as colonists. Whether such be the fact or not, history knows them in no other portion of Asia earlier than in Phenicia proper.

Though the invincible industry and enterprise of the Phenicians maintained them as a people of importance down to the period of the Roman empire, yet the period of their widest range and greatest efficiency is to be sought much earlier,—anterior to 700 B. C. In these remote times they and their colonists were the exclusive navigators of the Mediterranean: the rise of the Greek maritime settlements banished their commerce to a great degree from the Ægean sea, and embarrassed it even in the more westerly waters. Their colonial establishments were formed in Africa, Sicily, Sardinia, the Balearic Isles, and Spain: the greatness as well as the antiquity of Carthage, Utica, and Gadês, attest the long-sighted plans of Phenician traders, even in days anterior to the 1st Olympiad. We trace the wealth and industry of Tyre, and the distant navigation of her vessels through the Red sea and along the coast of Arabia, back to the days of David and Solomon. And as neither Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, nor Indians, addressed themselves to a seafaring life, so it seems that both the importation and the distribution of the products of India and Arabia into Western Asia and Europe, was performed by the Idumæan Arabs, between Petra and the Red sea,—by the Arabs of Gerrha on the Persian gulf, joined as they were in later times by a body of Chaldæan exiles from Babylonia,—and by the more enterprising Phenicians of Tyre and Sidon in these two seas as well as in the Mediterranean.[514]

The most ancient Phenician colonies were Utica, nearly on the northernmost point of the coast of Africa, and in the same gulf, (now known as the gulf of Tunis) as Carthage, over against cape Lilybæum in Sicily,—and Gadês, or Gadeira, on the south-western coast of Spain; a town which, founded perhaps near one thousand years before the Christian era,[515] has maintained a continuous prosperity, and a name (Cadiz) substantially unaltered, longer than any town in Europe. How well the site of Utica was suited to the circumstances of Phenician colonists may be inferred from the fact that Carthage was afterwards established in the same gulf and near to the same spot, and that both the two cities reached a high pitch of prosperity. The distance of Gadês from Tyre seems surprising, and if we calculate by time instead of by space, the Tyrians were separated from their Tartêssian colonists by an interval greater than that which now divides an Englishman from Bombay; for the ancient navigator always coasted along the land, and Skylax reckons seventy-five days[516] of voyage from the Kanôpic (westernmost) mouth of the Nile to the Pillars of Hêraklês (strait of Gibraltar); to which some more days must be added to represent the full

distance between Tyre and Gadês. But the enterprise of these early mariners surmounted all difficulties consistent with the principle of never losing sight of the coast. Proceeding along the northern coast of Libya, at a time when the mouths of the Nile were still closed by Egyptian jealousy against all foreign ships, they appear to have found little temptation to colonize[517] on the dangerous coast near to the two gulfs called the great and little Syrtis,—in a territory for the most part destitute of water, and occupied by rude Libyan nomades, who were thinly spread over the wide space between the western Nile[518] and cape Hermæa, now called cape Bona. The subsequent Grecian towns of Kyrênê and Barka, whose well-chosen site formed an exception to the general character of the region, were not planted with any view to commerce,[519] and the Phenician town of Leptis, near the gulf called the great Syrtis, was founded by exiles from Sidon, and not by deliberate colonization. The site of Utica and Carthage, in the gulf immediately westward of cape Bona, was convenient for commerce with Sicily, Italy, and Sardinia; and the other Phenician colonies, Adrumêtum, Neapolis, Hippo (two towns so called), the lesser Leptis, etc., were settled on the coast not far distant from the eastern or western promontories which included the gulf of Tunis, common to Carthage and Utica.

These early Phenician settlements were planted thus in the territory now known as the kingdom of Tunis and the western portion of the French province of Constantine. From thence to the Pillars of Hêraklês (strait of Gibraltar), we do not hear of any others; but the colony of Gadês, outside of the strait, formed the centre of a flourishing and extensive commerce, which reached on one side far to the south, not less than thirty days' sail along the western coast of Africa,[520]—and on the other side to Britain and the Scilly Islands. There were numerous Phenician factories and small trading-towns along the western coast of what is now the empire of Morocco; and the island of Kernê, twelve days' sail along the coast from the strait of Gibraltar, formed an established dépôt for Phenician merchandise in trading with the interior. There were, moreover, towns not far distant from the coast, of Libyans or Ethiopians, to which the inhabitants of the central regions resorted, and where they brought their leopard skins and elephants' teeth, to be exchanged against the unguents of Tyre and the pottery of Athens.[521] So distant a trade, with the limited navigation of that day, could not be made to embrace very bulky goods.

But this trade, though seemingly a valuable one, constituted only a small part of the sources of wealth open to the Phenicians of Gadês. The Turditanians and Turduli, who occupied the south-western portion of Spain, between the Anas river (Guadiana) and the Mediterranean, seem to have been the most civilized and improvable section of the Iberian tribes, well suited for commercial relations with the settlers who occupied the isle of Leon, and who established the temple, afterwards so rich and frequented, of the Tyrian Hêraklês. And the extreme productiveness of the southern region of Spain, in corn, fish, cattle, and wine, as well as in silver and iron, is a topic upon which we find but one language among ancient writers. The territory

round Gadês, Carteia, and the other Phenician settlements in this district, was known to the Greeks in the sixth century B. C. by the name of Tartêssus, and regarded by them somewhat in the same light as Mexico and Peru appeared to the Spaniards of the sixteenth century. For three or four centuries the Phenicians had possessed the entire monopoly of this Tartêssian trade, without any rivalry on the part of the Greeks; probably, the metals there procured were in those days their most precious acquisition, and the tribes who occupied the mining regions of the interior found a new market and valuable demand, for produce then obtained with a degree of facility exaggerated into fable.[522] It was from Gadês as a centre that these enterprising traders, pushing their coasting voyage yet farther, established relations with the tin-mines of Cornwall, perhaps also with amber-gatherers from the coasts of the Baltic. It requires some effort to carry back our imaginations to the time when, along all this vast length of country, from Tyre and Sidon to the coast of Cornwall, there was no merchant-ship to buy or sell goods except these Phenicians. The rudest tribes find advantage in such visitors; and we cannot doubt, that the men, whose resolute love of gain braved so many hazards and difficulties, must have been rewarded with profits on the largest scale of monopoly.

The Phenician settlers on the coast of Spain became gradually more and more numerous, and appear to have been distributed, either in separate townships or intermingled with the native population, between the mouth of the Anas (Guadiana) and the town of Malaka (Malaga) on the Mediterranean. Unfortunately, we are very little informed about their precise localities and details, but we find no information of Phenician settlements on the Mediterranean coast of Spain northward of Malaka; for Carthagena, or New Carthage, was a Carthaginian settlement, founded only in the third century B. C., after the first Punic war.[523] The Greek word Phenicians being used to signify as well the inhabitants of Carthage as those of Tyre and Sidon, it is not easy to distinguish what belongs to each of them; nevertheless, we can discern a great and important difference in the character of their establishments, especially in Iberia. The Carthaginians combined with their commercial projects large schemes of conquest and empire: it is thus that the independent Phenician establishments in and near the gulf of Tunis, in Africa, were reduced to dependence upon them,—while many new small townships, direct from Carthage itself, were planted on the Mediterranean coast of Africa, and the whole of that coast from the great Syrtis westward to the Pillars of Hêraklês (strait of Gibraltar) is described as their territory in the Periplus of Skylax (B. C. 360). In Iberia, during the third century B. C., they maintained large armies,[524] constrained the inland tribes to subjection, and acquired a dominion which nothing but the superior force of Rome prevented from being durable: in Sicily, also, the resistance of the Greeks prevented a similar consummation. But the foreign settlements of Tyre and Sidon were formed with views purely commercial. In the region of Tartêssus as well as in the western coast of Africa outside of the strait of Gibraltar, we hear only of pacific interchange and metallurgy; and the number of Phenicians who acquired gradually settlements in the interior was so great, that

Strabo describes these towns—not less than two hundred in number—as altogether Phenicized.[525] In his time, the circumstances favorable to new Phenician emigrations had been long past and gone, and there can be little hesitation in ascribing the preponderance, which this foreign element had then acquired, to a period several centuries earlier, beginning at a time when Tyre and Sidon enjoyed both undisputed autonomy at home, and the entire monopoly of Iberian commerce, without interference from the Greeks.

The earliest Grecian colony founded in Sicily was that of Naxos, planted by the Chalkidians in 735 B. C.: Syracuse followed in the next year, and during the succeeding century many flourishing Greek cities took root on the island. These Greeks found the Phenicians already in possession of many outlying islets and promontories all around the island, which served them in their trade with the Sikels and Sikans who occupied the interior. The safety and facilities of this established trade were to so great a degree broken up by the new-comers, that the Phenicians, relinquishing their numerous petty settlements round the island, concentrated themselves in three considerable towns at the south-western angle near Lilybæum,[526]—Motyê, Soloeis, and Panormus,—and in the island of Malta, where they were least widely separated from Utica and Carthage. The Tyrians of that day were hard-pressed by the Assyrians under Salmaneser, and the power of Carthage had not yet reached its height; otherwise probably this retreat of the Sicilian Phenicians before the Greeks would not have taken place without a struggle. But the early Phenicians, superior to the Greeks in mercantile activity, and not disposed to contend, except under circumstances of very superior force, with warlike adventurers bent on permanent settlement, took the prudent course of circumscribing their sphere of operations. A similar change appears to have taken place in Cyprus, the other island in which Greeks and Phenicians came into close contact. If we may trust the Tyrian annals consulted by the historian Menander, Cyprus was subject to the Tyrians even in the time of Solomon.[527] We do not know the dates of the establishment of Paphos, Salamis, Kitium, and the other Grecian cities there planted,—but there can be no doubt that they were posterior to this period, and that a considerable portion of the soil and trade of Cyprus thus passed from Phenicians to Greeks; who on their part partially embraced and diffused the rites, sometimes cruel, sometimes voluptuous, embodied in the Phenician religion.[528] In Cilicia, too, especially at Tarsus, the intrusion of Greek settlers appears to have gradually Hellenized a town originally Phenician and Assyrian; contributing, along with the other Grecian settlements—Phasêlis, Aspendus, and Sidê—on the southern coast of Asia Minor, to narrow the Phenician range of adventure in that direction.[529]

Such was the manner in which the Phenicians found themselves affected by the spread of Greek settlements; and if the Ionians of Asia Minor, when first conquered by Harpagus and the Persians, had followed the advice of the Prienean Bias to emigrate in a body, and found one great Pan-Ionic colony in the island of Sardinia, these

early merchants would have experienced the like hindrance[530] carried still farther westward,—perhaps, indeed, the whole subsequent history of Carthage might have been sensibly modified. But Iberia, and the golden region of Tartêssus, remained comparatively little visited, and still less colonized, by the Greeks; nor did it even become known to them until more than a century after their first settlements had been formed in Sicily. Easy as the voyage from Corinth to Cadiz may now appear to us, to a Greek of the seventh or sixth centuries B. C. it was a formidable undertaking. He was under the necessity of first coasting along Akarnania and Epirus, then crossing, first to the island of Korkyra, and next to the gulf of Tarentum; he then doubled the southernmost cape of Italy and followed the sinuosities of the Mediterranean coast, by Tyrrhenia, Liguria, southern Gaul, and eastern Iberia, to the Pillars of Hêraklês or strait of Gibraltar: or if he did not do this, he had the alternative of crossing the open sea from Krête or Peloponnesus to Libya, and then coasting westward along the perilous coast of the Syrtes until he arrived at the same point. Both voyages presented difficulties hard to be encountered; but the most serious hazard of all, was the direct transit across the open sea from Krête to Libya. It was about the year 630 B. C. that the inhabitants of the island of Thêra, starved out by a seven years' drought, were enjoined by the Delphian god to found a colony in Libya. Nothing short of the divine command would have induced them to obey so terrific a sentence of banishment; for not only was the region named quite unknown to them, but they could not discover, by the most careful inquiries among practised Greek navigators, a single man who had ever intentionally made the voyage to Libya.[531] One Kretan only could they find,—a fisherman named Korôbius,—who had been driven thither accidentally by violent gales, and he served them as guide.

At this juncture, Egypt had only been recently opened to Greek commerce,—Psammetichus having been the first king who partially relaxed the jealous exclusion of ships from the entrance of the Nile, enforced by all his predecessors; and the incitement of so profitable a traffic emboldened some Ionian traders to make the direct voyage from Krête to the mouth of that river. It was in the prosecution of one of these voyages, and in connection with the foundation of Kyrênê (to be recounted in a future chapter), that we are made acquainted with the memorable adventure of the Samian merchant Kôlæus. While bound for Egypt, he had been driven out of his course by contrary winds, and had found shelter on an uninhabited islet called Platea, off the coast of Libya,—the spot where the emigrants intended for Kyrênê first established themselves, not long afterwards. From hence he again started to proceed to Egypt, but again without success; violent and continuous east winds drove him continually to the westward, until he at length passed the Pillars of Hêraklês, and found himself, under the providential guidance of the gods,[532] an unexpected visitor among the Phenicians and Iberians of Tartêssus. What the cargo was which he was transporting to Egypt, we are not told; but it sold in this yet virgin market for the most exorbitant prices: he and his crew (says Herodotus)[533] "realized a profit larger than ever fell to the lot of any known Greek except Sostratus the

Æginetan, with whom no one else can compete." The magnitude of their profits may be gathered from the votive offering which they erected on their return, in the sacred precinct of Hêrê at Samos, in gratitude for the protection of that goddess during their voyage,—a large bronze vase, ornamented with projecting griffins' heads, and supported by three bronze kneeling figures of colossal stature: it cost six talents, and represented the tithe of their gains. The aggregate of sixty talents[534] (about sixteen thousand pounds, speaking roughly), corresponding to this tithe, was a sum which not many even of the rich men of Athens in her richest time, could boast of possessing.

To the lucky accident of this enormous vase and the inscription doubtless attached to it, which Herodotus saw in the Hêræon at Samos, and to the impression which such miraculous enrichment made upon his imagination,—we are indebted for our knowledge of the precise period at which the secret of Phenician commerce at Tartêssus first became known to the Greeks. The voyage of Kôlæus opened to the Greeks of that day a new world hardly less important—regard being had to their previous aggregate of knowledge—than the discovery of America to the Europeans of the last half of the fifteenth century. But Kôlæus did little more than make known the existence of this distant and lucrative region: he cannot be said to have shown the way to it: nor do we find, in spite of the foundation of Kyrênê and Barka, which made the Greeks so much more familiar with the coast of Libya than they had been before, that the route by which he had been carried against his own will was ever deliberately pursued by Greek traders.

Probably the Carthaginians, altogether unscrupulous in proceedings against commercial rivals,[535] would have aggravated its natural maritime difficulties by false information and hostile proceedings. The simple report of such gains, however, was well calculated to act as a stimulus to other enterprising navigators; and the Phôkæans, during the course of the next half-century, pushing their exploring voyages both along the Adriatic and along the Tyrrhenian coast, and founding Massalia in the year 600 B. C., at length reached the Pillars of Hêraklês and Tartêssus along the eastern coast of Spain. These men were the most adventurous mariners[536] that Greece had yet produced, creating a jealous uneasiness even among their Ionian neighbors:[537] their voyages were made, not with round and bulky merchant-ships, calculated only for the maximum of cargo, but with armed pentekonters,—and they were thus enabled to defy the privateers of the Tyrrhenian cities on the Mediterranean, which had long deterred the Greek trader from any habitual traffic near the strait of Messina.[538] There can be little doubt that the progress of the Phôkæans was very slow, and the foundation of Massalia (Marseilles), one of the most remote of all Greek colonies, may for a time have absorbed their attention: moreover, they had to pick up information as they went on, and the voyage was one of discovery in the strict sense of the word. The time at which they reached Tartêssus may seemingly be placed between 570-560 B. C. They made themselves so acceptable to Ar-

ganthônius,—king of Tartêssus, or at least king of part of that region,—that he urged them to relinquish their city of Phôkæa and establish themselves in his territory, offering to them any site which they chose to occupy. Though they declined this tempting offer, yet he still continued anxious to aid them against dangers at home, and gave them a large donation of money,—whereby they were enabled at a critical moment to complete their fortifications. Arganthônius died shortly afterwards, having lived, we are told, to the extraordinary age of one hundred and twenty years, of which he had reigned eighty. The Phôkæans had probably reason to repent of their refusal, since in no very long time their town was taken by the Persians, half their citizens became exiles, and were obliged to seek a precarious abode in Corsica, in place of the advantageous settlement which old Arganthônius had offered to them in Tartêssus.[539]

By such steps did the Greeks gradually track out the lines of Phenician commerce in the Mediterranean, and accomplish that vast improvement in their geographical knowledge,—the circumnavigation of what Eratosthenes and Strabo termed "our sea," as distinguished from the external ocean.[540] Little practical advantage, however, was derived from the discovery, which was only made during the last years of Ionian independence. The Ionian cities became subjects of Persia, and Phôkæa especially, was crippled and half-depopulated in the struggle. Had the period of Ionian enterprise been prolonged, we should probably have heard of other Greek settlements in Iberia and Tartêssus, over and above Emporia and Rhodus, formed by the Massaliots between the Pyrenees and the Ebro,—as well as of increasing Grecian traffic with those regions. The misfortunes of Phôkæa and the other Ionic towns saved the Phenicians of Tartêssus from Grecian interference and competition, such as that which their fellow-countrymen in Sicily had been experiencing for a century and a half.

But though the Ephesian Artemis, the divine protectress of Phôkæan emigration, was thus prevented from becoming consecrated in Tartêssus along with the Tyrian Hêraklês, an impulse not the less powerful was given to the imaginations of philosophers like Thalês and poets like Stesichorus,—whose lives cover the interval between the supernatural transport of Kôlæus on the wings of the wind, and the persevering, well-planned exploration which emanated from Phôkæa. While, on the one hand, the Tyrian Hêraklês with his venerated temple at Gadês furnished a new locality and details for mythes respecting the Grecian Hêraklês,—on the other hand, intelligent Greeks learned for the first time that the waters surrounding their islands and the Peloponnesus formed part of a sea circumscribed by assignable boundaries; continuous navigation of the Phôkæans round the coasts, first of the Adriatic, next of the gulf of Lyons to the Pillars of Hêraklês and Tartêssus, first brought to light this important fact. The hearers of Archilochus, Simonidês of Amorgus, and Kallinus, living before or contemporary with the voyage of Kôlæus, had known no sea-limit either north of Korkyra or west of Sicily: those of Anakreon and Hippônax, a century after-

wards, found the Euxine, the Palus Mæotis, the Adriatic, the western Mediterranean, and the Libyan Syrtes, all so far surveyed as to present to the mind a definite conception, and to admit of being visibly represented by Anaximander on a map. However familiar such knowledge has now become to us, at the time now under discussion it was a prodigious advance. The Pillars of Hêraklês, especially, remained deeply fixed in the Greek mind, as a terminus of human adventure and aspiration: of the ocean beyond, men were for the most part content to remain ignorant.

It has already been stated, that the Phenicians, as coast explorers, were even more enterprising than the Phôkæans; but their jealous commercial spirit induced them to conceal their track,—to give information designedly false,[541] respecting dangers and difficulties,—and even to drown any commercial rivals when they could do so with safety.[542] One remarkable Phenician achievement, however, contemporary with the period of Phôkæan exploration, must not be passed over. It was somewhere about 600 B. C. that they circumnavigated Africa; starting from the Red sea, by direction of the Egyptian king Nekôs, son of Psammetichus,—going round the cape of Good Hope to Gadês,—and from thence returning to the Nile.

It appears that Nekôs, anxious to procure a water communication between the Red sea and the Mediterranean, began digging a canal from the former to the Nile, but desisted from the undertaking after having made considerable progress. In prosecution of the same object, he despatched these Phenicians on an experimental voyage round Libya, which was successfully accomplished, though in a time not less than three years; for during each autumn, the mariners landed and remained on shore a sufficient time to sow their seed and raise a crop of corn. They reached Egypt again, through the strait of Gibraltar, in the course of the third year, and recounted a tale,—"which (says Herodotus) others may believe if they choose, but I cannot believe,"—that, in sailing round Libya, they had the sun on their right hand, *i. e.* to the north.[543]

The reality of this circumnavigation was confirmed to Herodotus by various Carthaginian informants,[544] and he himself fully believes it. There seems good reason for sharing in his belief, though several able critics reject the tale as incredible. The Phenicians were expert and daring masters of coast navigation, and in going round Africa they had no occasion ever to lose sight of land: we may presume that their vessels were amply stored, so that they could take their own time, and lie by in bad weather; we may also take for granted that the reward consequent upon success was considerable. For any other mariners then existing, indeed, the undertaking might have been too hard, but it was not so for them, and that was the reason why Nekôs chose them. To such reasons, which show the story to present no intrinsic incredibility (that, indeed, is hardly alleged even by Mannert and others who disbelieve it), we may add one other, which goes far to prove it positively true. They stated that, in the course of their circuit, they had the sun on their right hand (*i. e.* to the northward); and this phenomenon, observable according to the season even when

they were within the tropics, could not fail to force itself on their attention as constant, after they had reached the southern temperate zone. But Herodotus at once pronounces this part of the story to be incredible, and so it would probably appear to every Greek[545], Phenician, or Egyptian, not only of the age of Nekôs, but even of the time of Herodotus, who heard it; since none of them possessed either actual experience of the phenomenon of a southern latitude, or a sufficiently correct theory of the relation between sun and earth, to understand the varying direction of the shadows; and few men would consent to set aside the received ideas with reference to the solar motions, from pure confidence in the veracity of these Phenician narrators. Now that under such circumstances the latter should invent the tale, is highly improbable; and if they were not inventors, they must have experienced the phenomenon during the southern portion of their transit.

Some critics disbelieve this circumnavigation, from supposing that if so remarkable an achievement had really taken place once, it must have been repeated, and practical application must have been made of it. But though such a suspicion is not unnatural, with those who recollect how great a revolution was operated when the passage was rediscovered during the fifteenth century,—yet the reasoning will not be found applicable to the sixth century before the Christian era.

Pure scientific curiosity, in that age, counted for nothing: the motive of Nekôs for directing this enterprise was the same as that which had prompted him to dig his canal,—in order that he might procure the best communication between the Mediterranean and the Red sea. But, as it has been with the north-west passage in our time, so it was with the circumnavigation of Africa in his,—the proof of its practicability at the same time showed that it was not available for purposes of traffic or communication, looking to the resources then at the command of navigators,—a fact, however, which could not be known until the experiment was made. To pass from the Mediterranean to the Red sea by means of the Nile still continued to be the easiest way; either by aid of the land-journey, which in the times of the Ptolemies was usually made from Koptos on the Nile to Berenikê on the Red sea,—or by means of the canal of Nekôs, which Darius afterwards finished, though it seems to have been neglected during the Persian rule in Egypt, and was subsequently repaired and put to service under the Ptolemies. Without any doubt the successful Phenician mariners underwent both severe hardship and great real perils, besides those still greater supposed perils, the apprehension of which so constantly unnerved the minds even of experienced and resolute men in the unknown ocean. Such was the force of these terrors and difficulties, to which there was no known termination, upon the mind of the Achæmenid Sataspês (upon whom the circumnavigation of Africa was imposed as a penalty "worse than death" by Xerxes, in commutation of a capital sentence), that he returned without having finished the circuit, though by so doing he forfeited his life. He affirmed that he had sailed "until his vessel stuck fast, and could move on no farther,"—a persuasion not uncommon in ancient times, and even down to Columbus,

that there was a point, beyond which the ocean,—either from mud, sands, shallows, fogs, or accumulations of sea-weed,—was no longer navigable.[546]

Now we learn from hence that the enterprise, even by those who believed the narrative of Nekôs's captains, was regarded as at once desperate and unprofitable; but doubtless many persons treated it as a mere "Phenician lie,"[547] (to use an expression proverbial in ancient times). The circumnavigation of Libya is said to have been one of the projects conceived by Alexander the Great,[548] and we may readily believe that if he had lived longer, it would have been confided to Nearchus, or some other officer of the like competence: nor can there be any reason why it should not have succeeded, especially since it would have been undertaken from the eastward, to the great profit of geographical knowledge among the ancients, but with little advantage to their commerce. There is then adequate reason for admitting that these Phenicians rounded the cape of Good Hope from the East about 600 B. C., more than two thousand years earlier than Vasco de Gama did the same thing from the West: though the discovery was in the first instance of no avail, either for commerce or for geographical science.

Besides the maritime range of Tyre and Sidon, their trade by land in the interior of Asia was of great value and importance. They were the speculative merchants who directed the march of the caravans laden with Assyrian and Egyptian products across the deserts which separated them from inner Asia,[549]—an operation which presented hardly less difficulties, considering the Arabian depredators whom they were obliged to conciliate and even to employ as carriers, than the longest coast-voyage. They seem to have stood alone in antiquity in their willingness to brave, and their ability to surmount, the perils of a distant land-traffic;[550] and their descendants at Carthage and Utica were not less active in pushing caravans far into the interior of Africa.

CHAPTER XIX.

ASSYRIANS. — BABYLON.

THE name of the Assyrians, who formed one wing of this early system of intercourse and commerce, rests chiefly upon the great cities of Nineveh and Babylon. To the Assyrians of Nineveh (as has been already mentioned) is ascribed in early times a very extensive empire, covering much of Upper Asia, as well as Mesopotamia or the country between the Euphrates and the Tigris. Respecting this empire,—its commencement, its extent, or even the mode in which it was put down,—nothing certain can be affirmed; but it seems unquestionable that many great and flourishing cities, —and a population inferior in enterprise, but not in industry, to the Phenicians,— were to be found on the Euphrates and Tigris, in times anterior to the first Olympiad. Of these cities, Nineveh on the Tigris and Babylon on the Euphrates were the chief; [551] the latter being in some sort of dependence, probably, on the sovereigns of Nineveh, yet governed by kings or chiefs of its own, and comprehending an hereditary order of priests named Chaldæans, masters of all the science and literature as well as of the religious ceremonies current among the people, and devoted, from very early times, to that habit of astronomical observation which their brilliant sky so much favored.

The people called Assyrians or Syrians—for among the Greek authors no constant distinction is maintained between the two[552]— were distributed over the wide territory bounded on the east by Mount Zagros and its north-westerly continuation toward Mount Ararat, by which they were separated from the Medes,—and extending from thence westward and southward to the Euxine sea, the river Halys, the Mediterranean sea, and the Persian gulf,—thus covering the whole course of the Tigris and Euphrates south of Armenia, as well as Syria and Syria-Palæstine, and the territory eastward of the Halys called Kappadokia. But the Chaldæan order of priests appear to have been peculiar to Babylon and other towns in its territory, especially between that city and the Persian gulf. The vast, rich, and lofty temple of Bêlus in that city, served them at once as a place of worship and an astronomical observatory; and it was the paramount ascendency of this order which seems to have caused the Babylonian people generally to be spoken of as Chaldæans,—though some writers have supposed, without any good proof, a conquest of Assyrian Babylon by barbarians called Chaldæans from the mountains near the Euxine.[553]

There were exaggerated statements respecting the antiquity of their astronomical observations, which cannot be traced as of definite and recorded date higher than the era of Nabonassar[554] (747 B. C.), as well as respecting the extent of their acquired knowledge, so largely blended with astrological fancies and occult influences of the heavenly bodies on human affairs. But however incomplete their knowledge

may appear when judged by the standard of after-times, there can be no doubt, that compared with any of their contemporaries of the sixth century B. C.—either Egyptians, Greeks, or Asiatics—they stood preëminent, and had much to teach, not only to Thalês and Pythagoras, but even to later inquirers, such as Eudoxus and Aristotle. The conception of the revolving celestial sphere, the gnomon, and the division of the day into twelve parts, are affirmed by Herodotus[555] to have been first taught to the Greeks by the Babylonians; and the continuous observation of the heavens both by the Egyptian and Chaldæan priests, had determined with considerable exactness both the duration of the solar year and other longer periods of astronomical recurrence; thus impressing upon intelligent Greeks the imperfection of their own calendars, and furnishing them with a basis not only for enlarged observations of their own, but also for the discovery and application of those mathematical theories whereby astronomy first became a science.

Nor was it only the astronomical acquisitions of the priestly caste which distinguished the early Babylonians. The social condition, the fertility of the country, the dense population, and the persevering industry of the inhabitants, were not less remarkable. Respecting Nineveh,[556] once the greatest of the Assyrian cities, we have no good information, nor can we safely reason from the analogy of Babylon, inasmuch as the peculiarities of the latter were altogether determined by the Euphrates, while Nineveh was seated considerably farther north, and on the east bank of the Tigris: but Herodotus gives us valuable particulars respecting Babylon as an eye-witness, and we may judge by his account respecting its condition after much suffering from the Persian conquest, what it had been a century earlier in the days of its full splendor.

The neighboring territory receiving but little rain,[557] owed its fertility altogether to the annual overflowing of the Euphrates, on which the labor bestowed, for the purpose of limiting, regularizing, and diffusing its supply of water, was stupendous. Embankments along the river,—artificial reservoirs in connection with it, to receive an excessive increase,—new curvilinear channels, dug for the water in places where the stream was too straight and rapid,—broad and deep canals crossing the whole space between the Euphrates and the Tigris, and feeding numerous rivulets[558] or ditches which enabled the whole breadth of land to be irrigated,—all these toilsome applications were requisite to insure due moisture for the Babylonian soil; but they were rewarded with an exuberance of produce, in the various descriptions of grain, such as Herodotus hardly dares to particularize. The country produced no trees except the date-palm, which was turned to account in many different ways, and from the fruit of which, both copious and of extraordinary size, wine as well as bread were made.[559] Moreover, Babylonia was still more barren of stone than of wood, so that buildings as well as walls were constructed almost entirely of brick, for which the earth was well adapted; while a flow of mineral bitumen, found near the town and river of Is, higher up the Euphrates, served for cement. Such persevering and systematic labor, applied

for the purpose of irrigation, excites our astonishment; yet the description of what was done for defence is still more imposing. Babylon, traversed in the middle by the Euphrates, was surrounded by walls three hundred feet in height, seventy-five feet in thickness, and composing a square of which each side was one hundred and twenty stadia (or nearly fifteen English miles) in length: around the outside of the walls was a broad and deep moat from whence the material for the bricks composing them had been excavated; while one hundred brazen gates served for ingress and egress. Besides, there was an interior wall less thick, but still very strong; and as a still farther obstruction to invaders from the north and north-east, another high and thick wall was built at some miles from the city, across much of the space between the Euphrates and the Tigris,—called the wall of Media, seemingly a little to the north of that point where the two rivers most nearly approach to each other, and joining the Tigris on its west bank. Of the houses many were three or four stories high, and the broad and straight streets, unknown in a Greek town until the distribution of the peiræeus by Hippodamus, near the time of the Peloponnesian war, were well calculated to heighten the astonishment raised by the whole spectacle in a visitor like Herodotus. The royal palace, with its memorable terraces or hanging gardens, formed the central and commanding edifice in one half of the city,—the temple of Bêlus in the other half.

That celebrated temple, standing upon a basis of one square stadium, and inclosed in a precinct of two square stadia in dimension, was composed of eight solid towers, built one above the other, and is alleged by Strabo to have been as much as a stadium or furlong high (the height is not specified by Herodotus):[560] it was full of costly decorations, and possessed an extensive landed property. Along the banks of the river, in its passage through the city, were built spacious quays, and a bridge on stone piles, for the placing of which—as Herodotus was told—Semiramis had caused the river Euphrates to be drained off into the large side reservoir and lake constructed higher up its course.[561]

Besides this great town of Babylon itself, there were throughout the neighborhood, between the canals which united the Euphrates and the Tigris, many rich and populous villages, while Borsippa and other considerable towns were situated lower down on the Euphrates itself. And the industry, agricultural as well as manufacturing, of the collective population, was not less persevering than productive: their linen, cotton, and woollen fabrics, and their richly ornamented carpets, were celebrated throughout all the Eastern regions. Their cotton was brought in part from islands in the Persian gulf, while the flocks of sheep tended by the Arabian nomads supplied them with wool finer even than that of Milêtus or Tarentum. Besides the Chaldæan order of priests, there seem to have been among them certain other tribes with peculiar hereditary customs: thus there were three tribes, probably near the mouth of the river, who restricted themselves to the eating of fish alone; but we have no evidences of a military caste (like that in Egypt) nor any other hereditary profession.

In order to present any conception of what Assyria was, in the early days of Grecian history, and during the two centuries preceding the conquest of Babylon by Cyrus in 536 B. C., we unfortunately have no witness earlier than Herodotus, who did not see Babylon until near a century after that event,—about seventy years after its still more disastrous revolt and second subjugation by Darius, Babylonia had become one of the twenty satrapies of the Persian empire, and besides paying a larger regular tribute than any of the other nineteen, supplied from its exuberant soil provision for the Great King and his countless host of attendants during one-third part of the year.[562] Yet it was then in a state of comparative degradation, having had its immense walls breached by Darius, and having afterwards undergone the ill usage of Xerxês, who, since he stripped its temples, and especially the venerated temple of Bêlus, of some of their richest ornaments, would probably be still more reckless in his mode of dealing with the civil edifices.[563] If in spite of such inflictions, and in spite of that manifest evidence of poverty and suffering in the people which Herodotus expressly notices, it continued to be what he describes, still counted as almost the chief city of the Persian empire, both in the time of the younger Cyrus and in that of Alexander,[564]—we may judge what it must once have been, without either foreign satrap or foreign tribute,[565] under its Assyrian kings and Chaldæan priests, during the last of the two centuries which intervened between the era of Nabonassar and the capture of the city by Cyrus the Great. Though several of the kings, during the first of these two centuries, had contributed much to the great works of Babylon, yet it was during the second century of the two, after the capture of Nineveh by the Medes, and under Nebuchadnezzar and Nitôkris, that the kings attained the maximum of their power, and the city its greatest enlargement. It was Nebuchadnezzar who constructed the seaport Terêdon, at the mouth of the Euphrates, and who probably excavated the long ship canal of near four hundred miles, which joined it,—which was perhaps formed partly from a natural western branch of the Euphrates. [566] The brother of the poet Alkæus,—Antimenidas, who served in the Babylonian army, and distinguished himself by his personal valor (600-580 B. C.),—would have seen it in its full glory:[567] he is the earliest Greek of whom we hear individually in connection with the Babylonians. It marks[568] strikingly the contrast between the Persian kings and the Babylonian kings, on whose ruin they rose, that while the latter incurred immense expense to facilitate the communication between Babylon and the sea, the former artificially impeded the lower course of the Tigris, in order that their residence at Susa might be out of the reach of assailants.

That which strikes us most, and which must have struck the first Grecian visitors much more, both in Assyria and Egypt, is the unbounded command of naked human strength possessed by these early kings, and the effect of mere mass and indefatigable perseverance, unaided either by theory or by artifice, in the accomplishment of gigantic results.[569] In Assyria, the results were in great part exaggerations of enterprises in themselves useful to the people for irrigation and defence: religious worship was ministered to in the like manner, as well as the personal fancies and pomp of

their kings: while in Egypt the latter class predominates more over the former. We scarcely trace in either of them the higher sentiment of art, which owes its first marked development to Grecian susceptibility and genius. But the human mind is in every stage of its progress, and most of all in its rude and unreflecting period, strongly impressed by visible and tangible magnitude, and awe-struck by the evidences of great power. To this feeling, for what exceeded the demands of practical convenience and security, the wonders both in Egypt and Assyria chiefly appealed; while the execution of such colossal works demonstrates habits of regular industry, a concentrated population under one government, and above all, an implicit submission to the regal and priestly sway,—contrasting forcibly with the small autonomous communities of Greece and western Europe, wherein the will of the individual citizen was so much more energetic and uncontrolled. The acquisition of habits of regular industry, so foreign to the natural temper of man, was brought about in Egypt and Assyria, in China and Hindostan, before it had acquired any footing in Europe; but it was purchased either by prostrate obedience to a despotic rule, or by imprisonment within the chain of a consecrated institution of caste. Even during the Homeric period of Greece, these countries had attained a certain civilization in mass, without the acquisition of any high mental qualities or the development of any individual genius: the religious and political sanction, sometimes combined and sometimes separate, determined for every one his mode of life, his creed, his duties, and his place in society, without leaving any scope for the will or reason of the agent himself. Now the Phenicians and Carthaginians manifest a degree of individual impulse and energy which puts them greatly above this type of civilization, though in their tastes, social feelings, and religion, they are still Asiatic. And even the Babylonian community, though their Chaldæan priests are the parallel of the Egyptian priests, with a less measure of ascendency, combine with their industrial aptitude and constancy of purpose something of that strenuous ferocity of character which marks so many people of the Semitic race,—Jews, Phenicians, and Carthaginians. These Semitic people stand distinguished as well from the Egyptian life,—enslaved by childish caprices and antipathies, and by endless frivolities of ceremonial detail,—as from the flexible, many-sided, and self-organizing Greek; not only capable of opening both for himself and for the human race the highest walks of intellect, and the full creative agency of art, but also gentler by far in his private sympathies and dealings than his contemporaries on the Euphrates, the Jordan, or the Nile,—for we are not of course to compare him with the exigencies of western Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Both in Babylonia and in Egypt, the vast monuments, embankments, and canals, executed by collective industry, appeared the more remarkable to an ancient traveller by contrast with the desert regions and predatory tribes immediately surrounding them. West of the Euphrates, the sands of Arabia extended northward, with little interruption, to the latitude of the gulf of Issus; they even covered the greater part of Mesopotamia,[570] or the country between the Euphrates and the Tigris, beginning a

few days' journey northward of the wall called the wall of Media above mentioned, which—extending westward from the Tigris to one of the canals joining the Euphrates—had been erected to protect Babylon, against the incursion of the Medes. [571] Eastward of the Tigris again, along the range of Mount Zagros, but at no great distance from the river, were found the Elymæi, Kossæi, Uxii, Parætakêni, etc.,—tribes which, to use the expression of Strabo,[572] "as inhabiting a poor country, were under the necessity of living by the plunder of their neighbors." Such rude bands of depredators on the one side, and such wide tracts of sand on the two others, without vegetation or water, contrasted powerfully with the industry and productiveness of Babylonia. Babylon itself is to be considered, not as one continuous city, but as a city together with its surrounding district inclosed within immense walls, the height and thickness of which were in themselves a sufficient defence, so that the place was assailable only at its gates. In case of need, it would serve as shelter for the persons and property of the village inhabitants in Babylonia; and we shall see hereafter how useful under trying circumstances such a resource was, when we come to review the invasions of Attica by the Peloponnesians, and the mischiefs occasioned by a temporary crowd pouring in from the country, so as to overcharge the intra-mural accommodations of Athens. Spacious as Babylon was, however, it is affirmed by Strabo that Ninus or Nineveh was considerably larger.

APPENDIX.

Since the first edition of these volumes, the interesting work of Mr. Layard,—"Nineveh and its Remains," together with his illustrative Drawings,—"The Monuments of Nineveh,"—have been published. And through his unremitting valuable exertions in surmounting all the difficulties connected with excavations on the spot, the British Museum has been enriched with a valuable collection of real Assyrian sculptures and other monuments. A number of similar relics of Assyrian antiquity, obtained by M. Botta and others, have also been deposited in the museum of the Louvre at Paris.

In respect to Assyrian art, indeed to the history of art in general, a new world has thus been opened, which promises to be fruitful of instruction especially when we consider that the ground out of which the recent acquisitions have been obtained, has been yet most imperfectly examined, and may be expected to yield a much ampler harvest hereafter, assuming circumstances tolerably favorable to investigation. The sculptures to which we are now introduced, with all their remarkable peculiarities of style and idea, must undoubtedly date from the eighth or seventh century B. C., at the latest,—and may be much earlier. The style which they display forms a parallel and subject of comparison, though in many points extremely different, to that of early Egypt,—at a time when the ideal combinations of the Greeks were, as far as we know, embodied only in epic and lyric poetry.

But in respect to early Assyrian history, we have yet to find out whether much new information can be safely deduced from these interesting monuments. The cuneiform inscriptions now brought to light are indeed very numerous: and if they can be deciphered, on rational and trustworthy principles, we can hardly fail to acquire more or less of positive knowledge respecting a period now plunged in total darkness. But from the monuments of art alone, it would be unsafe to draw historical inferences. For example, when we find sculptures representing a king taking a city by assault, or receiving captives brought to him, etc., we are not to conclude that this commemorates any real and positive conquest recently made by the Assyrians. Our knowledge of the subjects of Greek sculpture on temples is quite sufficient to make us disallow any such inference, unless there be some corroborative proof. Some means must first be discovered, of discriminating historical from mythical subjects: a distinction which I here notice, the rather, because Mr. Layard shows occasional tendency to overlook it in his interesting remarks and explanations: see, especially, vol. ii, ch. vi, p. 409.

From the rich and abundant discoveries made at Nimroud, combined with those at Kouyunjik and Khorsabad, Mr. Layard is inclined to comprehend all these three within the circuit of ancient Nineveh; admitting for that circuit the prodigious space alleged by Diodorus out of Ktêsias, four hundred and eighty stadia or near sixty English miles. (See Nineveh and its Remains, vol. ii, ch. ii, pp. 242-253.) Mr. Layard considers that the north-west portion of Nimroud exhibits monuments more ancient, and at the same time better in style and execution, than the south-west portion,—or than Kouyunjik and Khorsabad (vol. ii, ch. i, p. 204; ch. iii, p. 305). If this hypothesis, as to the ground covered by Nineveh, be correct, probably future excavations will confirm it—or, if incorrect, refute it. But I do not at all reject the supposition on the simple ground of excessive magnitude: on the contrary, I should at once believe the statement, if it were reported by Herodotus after a visit to the spot, like the magnitude of Babylon. The testimony of Ktêsias is, indeed, very inferior in value to that of Herodotus: yet it ought hardly to be outweighed by the supposed improbability of so great a walled space, when we consider how little we know where to set bounds to the power of the Assyrian kings in respect to command of human labor for any process merely simple and toilsome, with materials both near and inexhaustible. Not to mention the great wall of China, we have only to look at the Picts Wall, and other walls built by the Romans in Britain, to satisfy ourselves that a great length of fortification, under circumstances much less favorable than the position of the ancient Assyrian kings, is noway incredible in itself. Though the walls of Nineveh and Babylon were much *larger* than those of Paris as it now stands, yet when we compare the two not merely in size, but in respect of costliness, elaboration, and contrivance, the latter will be found to represent an infinitely greater *amount of work*.

Larissa and Mespila, those deserted towns and walls which Xenophon saw in the retreat of the Ten Thousand (Anabas. iii, 4, 6-10), coincide in point of distance and situation with Nimroud and Kouyunjik, according to Mr. Layard's remark. Nor is his supposition improbable, that both of them were formed by the Medes out of the ruins of the conquered city of Nineveh. Neither of them singly seems at all adequate to the reputation of that ancient city, or rather walled circuit. According to the account of Herodotus, Phraortes the second Median king had attacked Nineveh, but had been himself slain in the attempt, and lost nearly all his army. It was partly to revenge this disgrace that Kyaxarês, son of Phraortes assailed Nineveh (Herod. i, 102-103): we may thus see a special reason, in addition to his own violence of temper (i, 73), why he destroyed the city after having taken it (Νίνου ἀναστάτου γενομένης, i, 178). It is easy to conceive that this vast walled space may have been broken up and converted into

two Median towns, both on the Tigris. In the subsequent change from Median to Persian dominion, these towns also became depopulated, as far as the strange tales which Xenophon heard in his retreat can be trusted. The interposition of these two Median towns doubtless contributed, for the time, to put out of sight the traditions respecting the old Ninus which had before stood upon their site. But these traditions were never extinct, and a new town bearing the old name of Ninus must have subsequently arisen on the spot. This second Ninus is recognized by Tacitus, Ptolemy, and Ammianus, not only as existing, but as pretending to uninterrupted continuity of succession from the ancient "caput Assyriæ."

Mr. Layard remarks on the facility with which edifices, such as those in Assyria, built of sunburnt bricks, perish when neglected, and crumble away into earth, leaving little or no trace.

CHAPTER XX.

EGYPTIANS.

If, on one side, the Phenicians were separated from the productive Babylonia by the Arabian desert; on the other side, the western portion of the same desert divided them from the no less productive valley of the Nile. In those early times which preceded the rise of Greek civilization, their land trade embraced both regions, and they served as the sole agents of international traffic between the two. Conveniently as their towns were situated for maritime commerce with the Nile, Egyptian jealousy had excluded Phenician vessels not less than those of the Greeks from the mouths of that river, until the reign of Psammetichus (672-618 B. C.); and thus even the merchants of Tyre could then reach Memphis only by means of caravans, employing as their instruments, as I have already observed, the Arabian tribes,[573] alternately plunderers and carriers. Respecting Egypt, as respecting Assyria, since the works of Hekatæus are unfortunately lost, our earliest information is derived from Herodotus, who visited Egypt about two centuries after the reign of Psammetichus, when it formed part of one of the twenty Persian satrapies. The Egyptian marvels and peculiarities which he recounts, are more numerous, as well as more diversified, than the Assyrian, and had the vestiges been effaced as completely in the former as in the latter, his narrative would probably have met with an equal degree of suspicion. But the hard stone, combined with the dry climate of Upper Egypt (where a shower of rain counted as a prodigy), have given such permanence to the monuments in the valley of the Nile, that enough has remained to bear out the father of Grecian history, and to show that, in describing what he professes to have seen, he is a guide perfectly trustworthy. For that which he heard, he appears only in the character of a reporter, and often an incredulous reporter; but though this distinction between his hearsay and his ocular evidence is not only obvious, but of the most capital moment,[574]—it has been too often neglected by those who depreciate him as a witness.

The mysterious river Nile, a god[575] in the eyes of ancient Egyptians, and still preserving both its volume and its usefulness undiminished amidst the general degradation of the country, reached the sea in the time of Herodotus by five natural mouths, besides two others artificially dug;—the Pelusiac branch formed the eastern boundary of Egypt, the Kanôpic branch—one hundred and seventy miles distant—the western; while the Sebennytic branch was a continuation of the straight line of the upper river: from this latter branched off the Saitic and the Mendesian arms.[576] Its overflowings are far more fertilizing than those of the Euphrates in Assyria,—partly from their more uniform recurrence both in time and quantity, partly from the rich silt which it brings down and deposits, whereas the Euphrates served only as a moisture. The patience of the Egyptians had excavated, in middle Egypt, the vast reservoir—

partly, it seems, natural and preëxisting—called the lake of Mœris: and in the Delta, a network of numerous canals; yet on the whole the hand of man had been less tasked than in Babylonia; whilst the soil annually enriched, yielded its abundant produce without either plough or spade to assist the seed cast in by the husbandman. [577] That under these circumstances a dense and regularly organized population should have been concentrated in fixed abodes along the valley occupied by this remarkable river, is no matter of wonder; the marked peculiarities of the locality seem to have brought about such a result, in the earliest periods to which human society can be traced. Along the five hundred and fifty miles of its undivided course from Syênê to Memphis, where for the most part the mountains leave only a comparatively narrow strip on each bank, as well as in the broad expanse between Memphis and the Mediterranean, there prevailed a peculiar form of theocratic civilization, from a date which even in the time of Herodotus was immemorially ancient. But when we seek for some measure of this antiquity (earlier than the time when Greeks were first admitted into Egypt in the reign of Psammetichus), we find only the computations of the priests, reaching back for many thousand years, first, of government by immediate and present gods, next, of human kings. Such computations have been transmitted to us by Herodotus, Manetho, and Diodorus,[578]—agreeing in their essential conception of the foretime, with gods in the first part of the series, and men in the second, but differing materially in events, names, and epochs: probably, if we possessed lists from other Egyptian temples, besides those which Manetho drew up at Heliopolis, or which Herodotus learned at Memphis, we should find discrepancies from both these two. To compare these lists, and to reconcile them as far as they admit of being reconciled, is interesting, as enabling us to understand the Egyptian mind, but conducts to no trustworthy chronological results, and forms no part of the task of an historian of Greece.

To the Greeks, Egypt was a closed world before the reign of Psammetichus, though after that time it gradually became an important part of their field both of observation and action. The astonishment which the country created in the mind of the earliest Grecian visitors may be learned even from the narrative of Herodotus, who doubtless knew it by report long before he went there. Both the physical and moral features of Egypt stood in strong contrast with Grecian experience: "not only (says Herodotus) does the climate differ from all other climates, and the river from all other rivers, but Egyptian laws and customs are opposed on almost all points to those of other men."[579] The delta was at that time full of large and populous cities, [580] built on artificial elevations of ground, and seemingly not much inferior to Memphis itself, which was situated on the left bank of the Nile (opposite to the site of the modern Cairo), a little higher up than the spot where the delta begins. From the time when the Greeks first became cognizant of Egypt, to the building of Alexandria and the reign of the Ptolemies, Memphis was the first city in Egypt, but it seems not to have been always so,—there had been an earlier period when Thebes was the seat of Egyptian power, and upper Egypt of far more consequence than middle Egypt.

Vicinity to the delta, which must always have contained the largest number of cities and the widest surface of productive territory, probably enabled Memphis to usurp this honor from Thebes, and the predominance of lower Egypt was still farther confirmed when Psammetichus introduced Ionian and Karian troops as his auxiliaries in the government of the country. But the stupendous magnitude of the temples and palaces, the profusion of ornamental sculpture and painting, the immeasurable range of sculptures hewn in the rocks still remaining as attestations of the grandeur of Thebes,—not to mention Ombi, Edfu, and Elephantinê,—show that upper Egypt was once the place to which the land-tax from the productive delta was paid, and where the kings and priests who employed it resided. It has been even contended that Thebes itself was originally settled by emigrants from still higher regions of the river, and the remains yet found along the Nile in Nubia are analogous, both in style and in grandeur, to those in Thebais.[581] What is remarkable is, that both the one and the other are strikingly distinguished from the Pyramids, which alone remain to illustrate the site of the ancient Memphis. There are no pyramids either in upper Egypt or in Nubia; but on the Nile, above Nubia, near the Ethiopian Meroê, pyramids in great number, though of inferior dimensions, are again found. From whence, or in what manner, Egyptian institutions first took their rise, we have no means of determining: but there seems little to bear out the supposition of Heeren,[582] and other eminent authors, that they were transmitted down the Nile by Ethiopian colonists from Meroê. Herodotus certainly conceived Egyptians and Ethiopians (who in his time jointly occupied the border island of Elephantinê, which he had himself visited) as completely distinct from each other, in race and customs not less than in language,—the latter being generally of the rudest habits, of great stature, and still greater physical strength,—the chief part of them subsisting on meat and milk, and blest with unusual longevity. He knew of Meroê, as the Ethiopian metropolis and a considerable city, fifty-two days' journey higher up the river than Elephantinê, but his informants had given him no idea of analogy between its institutions and those of Egypt;[583] it was the migration of a large number of the Egyptian military caste, during the reign of Psammetichus, into Ethiopia, which first communicated civilized customs, in his judgment, to these southern barbarians. If there be really any connection between the social phenomena of Egypt and those of Meroê, it seems more reasonable to treat the latter as derivative from the former.[584]

The population of Egypt was classified into certain castes or hereditary professions, of which the number was not exactly defined, and is represented differently by different authors. The priests stand clearly marked out, as the order richest, most powerful, and most venerated,—distributed all over the country, and possessing exclusively the means of reading and writing,[585] besides a vast amount of narrative matter treasured up in the memory, the whole stock of medical and physical knowledge then attainable, and those rudiments of geometry, or rather land-measuring, which were so often called into use in a country annually inundated. To each god, and to each temple, throughout Egypt, lands and other properties belonged,

whereby the numerous band of priests attached to him were maintained: it seems, too, that a farther portion of the lands of the kingdom was set apart for them in individual property, though on this point no certainty is attainable. Their ascendency, both direct and indirect, over the minds of the people, was immense; they prescribed that minute ritual under which the life of every Egyptian, not excepting the king himself,[586] was passed, and which was for themselves more full of harassing particularities than for any one else.[587] Every day in the year belonged to some particular god, and the priests alone knew to which. There were different gods in every nome, though Isis and Osiris were common to all,—and the priests of each god constituted a society apart, more or less important, according to the comparative celebrity of the temple: the high priests of Hephæstos, whose dignity was said to have been transmitted from father to son through a series of three hundred and forty-one generations[588] (commemorated by the like number of colossal statues, which Herodotus himself saw), were second in importance only to the king. The property of each temple included troops of dependents and slaves, who were stamped with "holy marks,"[589] and who must have been numerous in order to suffice for the large buildings and their constant visitors.

Next in importance to the sacerdotal caste were the military caste or order, whose native name[590] indicated that they stood on the left hand of the king, while the priests occupied the right. They were classified into Kalasiries and Hermotybii, who occupied lands in eighteen particular nomes or provinces, principally in lower Egypt. The kalasiries had once amounted to one hundred and sixty thousand men, the hermotybii to two hundred and fifty thousand, when at the maximum of their population; but the highest point had long been past in the time of Herodotus. To each man of this soldier caste was assigned a portion of land equal to about six and a half English acres, free from any tax; what measures were taken to keep the lots of land in suitable harmony with a fluctuating number of holders, we know not. The statement of Herodotus relates to a time long past and gone, and describes what was believed, by the priests with whom he talked, to have been the primitive constitution of their country anterior to the Persian conquest: the like is still more true respecting the statement of Diodorus.[591] The latter says that the territory of Egypt was divided into three parts,—one part belonging to the king, another to the priests, and the remainder to the soldiers;[592] his language seems to intimate that every nome was so divided, and even that the three portions were equal, though he does not expressly say so. The result of these statements, combined with the history of Joseph in the book of Genesis, seems to be, that the lands of the priests and the soldiers were regarded as privileged property and exempt from all burdens, while the remaining soil was considered as the property of the king, who, however, received from it a fixed proportion, one-fifth of the total produce, leaving the rest in the hands of the cultivators.[593] We are told that Sethos, priest of the god Phtha (or Hephæstos) at Memphis, and afterwards named king, oppressed the military caste and deprived them of their lands, in revenge for which they withheld from him their aid when Egypt was

invaded by Sennacherib,—and also that, in the reign of Psammetichus, a large number (two hundred and forty thousand) of these soldiers migrated into Ethiopia from a feeling of discontent, leaving their wives and children behind them.[594] It was Psammetichus who first introduced Ionian and Karian mercenaries into the country, and began innovations on the ancient Egyptian constitution; so that the disaffection towards him, on the part of the native soldiers, no longer permitted to serve as exclusive guards to the king, is not difficult to explain. The kalasiries and hermotybii were interdicted from every description of art or trade. There can be little doubt that under the Persians their lands were made subject to the tribute, and this may partly explain the frequent revolts which they maintained, with very considerable bravery, against the Persian kings.

Herodotus enumerates five other *races* (so he calls them), or castes, besides priests and soldiers,[595]—herdsmen, swineherds, tradesmen, interpreters, and pilots; an enumeration which perplexes us, inasmuch as it takes no account of the husbandmen, who must always have constituted the majority of the population. It is, perhaps, for this very reason that they are not comprised in the list,—not standing out specially marked or congregated together, like the five above named, and therefore not seeming to constitute a race apart. The distribution of Diodorus, who specifies (over and above priests and soldiers) husbandmen, herdsmen, and artificers, embraces much more completely the whole population.[596] It seems more the statement of a reflecting man, pushing out the principle of hereditary occupations to its consequences; (and the comments which the historian so abundantly interweaves with his narrative show that such was the character of the authorities which he followed);—while the list given by Herodotus comprises that which struck his observation. It seems that a certain proportion of the soil of the delta consisted of marsh land, including pieces of habitable ground, but impenetrable to an invading enemy, and favorable only to the growth of papyrus and other aquatic plants: other portions of the delta, as well as the upper valley, in parts where it widened to the eastward, were too wet for the culture of grain, though producing the richest herbage, and eminently suitable to the race of Egyptian herdsmen, who thus divided the soil with the husbandmen.[597] Herdsmen generally were held reputable, but the race of swineherds were hated and despised, from the extreme antipathy of all other Egyptians to the pig,—which animal yet could not be altogether proscribed, because there were certain peculiar occasions on which it was imperative to offer him in sacrifice to Selênê or Dionysus. Herodotus acquaints us that the swineherds were interdicted from all the temples, and that they always intermarried among themselves, other Egyptians disdaining such an alliance,—a statement which indirectly intimates that there was no standing objection against intermarriage of the remaining castes with each other. The caste or race of interpreters began only with the reign of Psammetichus, from the admission of Greek settlers, then for the first time tolerated in the country. Though they were half Greeks, the historian does not note them as of inferior account, except as compared with the two ascendant castes of soldiers and

priests; moreover, the creation of a new caste shows that there was no consecrated or unchangeable total number.

Those whom Herodotus denominates tradesmen (καπήλοι) are doubtless identical with the artisans (τεχνῖται) specified by Diodorus,—the town population generally as distinguished from that of the country. During the three months of the year when Egypt was covered with water, festival days were numerous,—the people thronging by hundreds of thousands, in vast barges, to one or other of the many holy places, combining worship and enjoyment.[598] In Egypt, weaving was a trade, whereas in Greece it was the domestic occupation of females; and Herodotus treats it as one of those reversals of the order of nature which were seen only in Egypt,[599] that the weaver stayed at home plying his web while his wife went to market. The process of embalming bodies was elaborate and universal, giving employment to a large special class of men: the profusion of edifices, obelisks, sculpture and painting, all executed by native workmen, required a large body of trained sculptors,[600] who in the mechanical branch of their business attained a high excellence. Most of the animals in Egypt were objects of religious reverence, and many of them were identified in the closest manner with particular gods. The order of priests included a large number of hereditary feeders and tenders of these sacred animals.[601] Among the sacerdotal order were also found the computers of genealogies, the infinitely subdivided practitioners in the art of healing, etc.,[602] who enjoyed good reputation, and were sent for as surgeons to Cyrus and Darius. The Egyptian city population was thus exceedingly numerous, so that king Sethon, when called upon to resist an invasion without the aid of the military caste, might well be supposed to have formed an army out of "the tradesmen, the artisans, and the market-people:"[603] and Alexandria, at the commencement of the dynasty of the Ptolemies, acquired its numerous and active inhabitants at the expense of Memphis and the ancient towns of lower Egypt.

The mechanical obedience and fixed habits of the mass of the Egyptian population (not priests or soldiers) was a point which made much impression upon Grecian observers; so that Solon is said to have introduced at Athens a custom prevalent in Egypt, whereby the nomarch or chief of each nome was required to investigate every man's means of living, and to punish with death those who did not furnish evidence of some recognized occupation.[604] It does not seem that the institution of caste in Egypt, though insuring unapproachable ascendency to the priests and much consideration to the soldiers, was attended with any such profound debasement to the rest as that which falls upon the lowest caste or sudras in India,—no such gulf between them as that between the twice-born and the once-born in the religion of Brahma. Yet those stupendous works, which form the permanent memorials of the country, remain at the same time as proofs of the oppressive exactions of the kings, and of the reckless caprice with which the lives as well as the contributions of the people were lavished. One hundred and twenty thousand Egyptians were said to have perished in the digging of the canal, which king Nekôs began but did not finish, between

the Pelusian arm of the Nile and the Red sea;[605] while the construction of the two great pyramids, attributed to the kings Cheops and Chephrên, was described to Herodotus by the priests as a period of exhausting labor and extreme suffering to the whole Egyptian people,—and yet the great Labyrinth,[606] said to have been built by the dodekarchs, appeared to him a more stupendous work than the Pyramids, so that the toil employed upon it cannot have been less destructive. The moving of such vast masses of stone as were seen in the ancient edifices both of upper and lower Egypt, with the imperfect mechanical resources then existing, must have tasked the efforts of the people yet more severely than the excavation of the half-finished canal of Nekôs. Indeed, the associations with which the Pyramids were connected, in the minds of those with whom Herodotus conversed, were of the most odious character. Such vast works, Aristotle observes, are suitable to princes who desire to consume the strength and break the spirit of their people. With Greek despots, perhaps, such an intention may have been sometimes deliberately conceived; but the Egyptian kings may be presumed to have followed chiefly caprice, or love of pomp,—sometimes views of a permanent benefit to be achieved,—as in the canal of Nekôs and the vast reservoir of Mœris,[607] with its channel joining the river,—when they thus expended the physical strength and even the lives of their subjects.

Sanctity of animal life generally, veneration for particular animals in particular nomes, and abstinence on religious grounds from certain vegetables, were among the marked features of Egyptian life, and served preëminently to impress upon the country that air of singularity which foreigners like Herodotus remarked in it. The two specially marked bulls, called apis at Memphis, and mnevis at Heliopolis, seem to have enjoyed a sort of national worship:[608] the ibis, the cat, and the dog were throughout most of the nomes venerated during life, embalmed like men after death, and if killed, avenged by the severest punishment of the offending party: but the veneration of the crocodile was confined to the neighborhood of Thebes and the lake of Mœris. Such veins of religious sentiment, which distinguished Egypt from Phenicia and Assyria, not less than from Greece, were explained by the native priests after their manner to Herodotus, though he declines from pious scruples to communicate what was told to him.[609] They seem remnants continued from a very early stage of Fetichism,—and the attempts of different persons, noticed in Diodorus and Plutarch, to account for their origin, partly by legends, partly by theory, will give little satisfaction to any one.[610]

Though Thebes first, and Memphis afterwards, were undoubtedly the principal cities of Egypt, yet if the dynasties of Manetho are at all trustworthy, even in their general outline, the Egyptian kings were not taken uniformly either from one or the other. Manetho enumerates on the whole twenty-six different dynasties or families of kings, anterior to the conquest of the country by Kambysês,—the Persian kings between Kambysês and the revolt of the Egyptian Amyrtæus, in 405 B. C. constituting his twenty-seventh dynasty. Of these twenty-six dynasties, beginning with the year

5702 B. C., the first two are Thinites,—the third and fourth, Memphites,—the fifth, from the island of Elephantinê,—the sixth, seventh, and eighth, again Memphites,—the ninth and tenth, Herakleopolites,—the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth, Diospolites or Thebans,—the fourteenth, Choïtes,—the fifteenth and sixteenth, Hyksos, or shepherd kings,—the seventeenth, shepherd kings, overthrown and succeeded by Diospolites,—the eighteenth (B. C. 1655-1327, in which is included Rameses, the great Egyptian conqueror, identified by many authors with Sesostris, 1411 B. C.), nineteenth, and twentieth, Diospolites,—the twenty-first, Tanites,—the twenty-second, Bubastites,—the twenty-third, again Tanites,—the twenty-fourth, Saïtes,—the twenty-fifth, Ethiopians, beginning with Sabakôn, whom Herodotus also mentions,—the twenty-sixth, Saïtes, including Psammetichus, Nekôs, Apries or Uaphris, and Amasis or Amosis. We see by these lists, that, according to the manner in which Manetho construed the antiquities of his country, several other cities of Egypt, besides Thebes and Memphis, furnished kings to the whole territory; but we cannot trace any correspondence between the nomes which furnished kings, and those which Herodotus mentions to have been exclusively occupied by the military caste. Many of the separate nomes were of considerable substantive importance, and had a marked local character each to itself, religious as well as political; though the whole of Egypt, from Elephantinê to Pelasium and Kanôpus, is said to have always constituted one kingdom, from the earliest times which the native priests could conceive.

We are to consider this kingdom as engaged, long before the time when Greeks were admitted into it,[611] in a standing caravan-commerce with Phenicia, Palestine, Arabia, and Assyria. Ancient Egypt having neither vines nor olives, imported both wine and oil,[612] while it also needed especially the frankincense and aromatic products peculiar to Arabia, for its elaborate religious ceremonies. Towards the last quarter of the eighth century B. C. (a little before the time when the dynasty of the Mermnadæ in Lydia was commencing in the person of Gygês), we trace events tending to alter the relation which previously subsisted between these countries, by continued aggressions on the part of the Assyrian monarchs of Nineveh,—Salmaneser and Sennacherib. The former having conquered and led into captivity the ten tribes of Israel, also attacked the Phenician towns on the adjoining coast: Sidon, Palæ-Tyrus, and Akê yielded to him, but Tyre itself resisted, and having endured for five years the hardships of a blockade with partial obstruction of its continental aqueducts, was enabled by means of its insular position to maintain independence. It was just at this period that the Grecian establishments in Sicily were forming, and I have already remarked that the pressure of the Assyrians upon Phenicia, probably had some effect in determining that contraction of the Phenician occupations in Sicily, which really took place (B. C. 730-720). Respecting Sennacherib, we are informed by the Old Testament, that he invaded Judæa, and by Herodotus (who calls him king of the Assyrians and Arabians), that he assailed the pious king Sethos in Egypt: in both cases his army experienced a miraculous repulse and destruction. After this, the Assyrians of Nineveh, either torn by intestine dissension, or shaken by the attacks of

the Medes, appear no longer active; but about the year 630 B. C. the Assyrians or Chaldæans of Babylon manifest a formidable and increasing power. It is, moreover, during this century that the old routine of the Egyptian kings was broken through, and a new policy displayed towards foreigners by Psammetichus,—which, while it rendered Egypt more formidable to Judæa and Phenicia, opened to Grecian ships and settlers the hitherto inaccessible Nile.

Herodotus draws a marked distinction between the history of Egypt before Psammetichus and the following period: the former he gives as the narration of the priests, without professing to guarantee it,—the latter he evidently believes to be well ascertained.[613] And we find that, from Psammetichus downward, Herodotus and Manetho are in tolerable harmony, whereas even for the sovereigns occupying the last fifty years before Psammetichus, there are many and irreconcilable discrepancies between them;[614] but they both agree in stating that Psammetichus reigned fifty-four years. So important an event as the first admission of the Greeks into Egypt, was made, by the informants of Herodotus, to turn upon two prophecies. After the death of Sethos, king and priest of Hephæstos, who left no son, Egypt became divided among twelve kings, of whom Psammetichus was one: it was under this dodekarchy, according to Herodotus, that the marvellous labyrinth near the lake of Mœris was constructed. The twelve lived and reigned for some time in perfect harmony, but a prophecy had been made known to them, that the one who should make libations in the temple of Hephæstos out of a brazen goblet would reign over all Egypt. Now it happened that one day, when they all appeared armed in that temple to offer sacrifice, the high priest brought out by mistake only eleven golden goblets instead of twelve, and Psammetichus, left without a goblet, made use of his brass helmet as a substitute. Being thus considered, though unintentionally, to have fulfilled the condition of the prophecy, by making libations in a brazen goblet, he became an object of terror to his eleven colleagues, who united to despoil him of his dignity, and drove him into the inaccessible marshes. In this extremity, he sent to seek counsel from the oracle of Lêtô at Butô, and received for answer an assurance, that "vengeance would come to him by the hands of brazen men showing themselves from the seaward." His faith was for the moment shaken by so startling a conception as that of brazen men for his allies: but the prophetic veracity of the priest at Butô was speedily shown, when an astonished attendant came to acquaint him, in his lurking-place, that brazen men were ravaging the sea-coast of the delta. It was a body of Ionian and Karian soldiers, who had landed for pillage, and the messenger who came to inform Psammetichus had never before seen men in an entire suit of brazen armor. That prince, satisfied that these were the allies whom the oracle had marked out for him, immediately entered into negotiation with the Ionians and Karians, enlisted them in his service, and by their aid in conjunction with his other partisans overpowered the other eleven kings,—thus making himself the one ruler of Egypt.[615]

Such was the tale by which the original alliance of an Egyptian king with Grecian mercenaries, and the first introduction of Greeks into Egypt, was accounted for and dignified. What followed is more authentic and more important. Psammetichus provided a settlement and lands for his new allies, on the Pelusiac or eastern branch of the Nile, a little below Bubastis. The Ionians were planted on one side of the river, the Karians on the other; and the place was made to serve as a military position, not only for the defence of the eastern border, but also for the support of the king himself against malcontents at home: it was called the Stratopĕda, or the Camps.[616] He took pains, moreover, to facilitate the intercourse between them and the neighboring inhabitants, by causing a number of Egyptian children to be domiciled with them, in order to learn the Greek language; and hence sprung the interpreters; who, in the time of Herodotus, constituted a permanent hereditary caste or breed.

Though the chief purpose of this first foreign settlement in Egypt, between Pelusium and Bubastis, was to create an independent military force, and with it a fleet for the king, yet it was of course an opening both for communication and traffic to all Greeks and to all Phenicians, such as had never before been available. And it was speedily followed by the throwing open of the Kanôpic or westernmost branch of the river for the purposes of trade specially. According to a statement of Strabo, it was in the reign of Psammetichus that the Milesians with a fleet of thirty ships made a descent on that part of the coast, first built a fort in the immediate neighborhood, and then presently founded the town of Naukratis, on the right bank of the Kanôpic Nile. There is much that is perplexing in this affirmation of Strabo; but on the whole I am inclined to think that the establishment of the Greek factories and merchants at Naukratis may be considered as dating in the reign of Psammetichus,[617]—Naukratis being a city of Egyptian origin, in which these foreigners were permitted to take up their abode,—not a Greek colony, as Strabo would have us believe. The language of Herodotus seems rather to imply that it was king Amasis—between whom and the death of Psammetichus there intervened nearly half a century—who first allowed Greeks to settle at Naukratis; but on comparing what the historian tells us respecting the courtezan Rhodôpis and the brother of Sapphô the Poetess, it is evident that there must have been both Greek trade and Greek establishments in that town long before Amasis came to the throne. We may consider, then, that both the eastern and western mouths of the Nile became open to the Greeks in the days of Psammetichus; the former as leading to the head-quarters of the mercenary Greek troops in Egyptian pay,—the latter for purposes of trade.

While this event afforded to the Greeks a valuable enlargement both of their traffic and of their field of observation, it seems to have occasioned an internal revolution in Egypt. The nome of Bubastis, in which the new military settlement of foreigners was planted, is numbered among those occupied by the Egyptian military caste: [618] whether their lands were in part taken away from them, we do not know; but the mere introduction of such foreigners must have appeared an abomination, to the

strong conservative feeling of ancient Egypt. And Psammetichus treated the native soldiers in a manner which showed of how much less account they had become since the "brazen helmets" had got footing in the land. It had hitherto been the practice to distribute such portions of the military as were on actual service in three different posts: at Daphnê, near Pelusium, on the north-eastern frontier,—at Marea, on the north-western frontier, near the spot where Alexandria was afterwards built,—and at Elephantinê, on the southern or Ethiopian boundary. Psammetichus, having no longer occasion for their services on the eastern frontier, since the formation of the mercenary camp, accumulated them in greater number and detained them for an unusual time at the two other stations, especially at Elephantinê. Here, as Herodotus tells us, they remained for three years unrelieved, and Diodorus adds that Psammetichus assigned to those native troops who fought conjointly with the mercenaries, the least honorable post in the line; until at length discontent impelled them to emigrate in a body of two hundred and forty thousand men into Ethiopia, leaving their wives and children behind in Egypt,—nor could they be induced by any instances on the part of Psammetichus to return. This memorable incident,[619] which is said to have given rise to a settlement in the southernmost regions of Ethiopia, called by the Greeks the Automoli (though the emigrant soldiers still called themselves by their old Egyptian name), attests the effect produced by the introduction of the foreign mercenaries in lowering the position of the native military. The number of the emigrants, however, is a point noway to be relied upon: we shall presently see that there were enough of them left behind to renew effectively the struggle for their lost dignity.

It was probably with his Ionian and Karian troops that Psammetichus carried on those warlike operations in Syria which filled so large a proportion of his long and prosperous reign of fifty-four years.[620] He besieged the city of Azôtus in Syria for twenty-nine years, until he took it,—the longest blockade which the historian had ever heard of: moreover, he was in that country when the destroying Scythian nomads, who had defeated the Median king Kyaxarês and possessed themselves of Upper Asia, advanced to invade Egypt,—an undertaking which Psammetichus, by large presents, induced them to abandon.[621]

There were, however, more powerful enemies than the Scythians, against whom he and his son Nekôs—who succeeded him, seemingly about 604 B. C.[622]—had to contend in Syria and the lands adjoining. It is just at this period, during the reigns of Nabopolassar and his son Nebuchadnezzar (B. C. 625-561) that the Chaldæans or Assyrians of Babylon appear at the maximum of their power and aggressive disposition, while the Assyrians of Ninus or Nineveh lose their substantive position through the taking of that town by Kyaxarês (about B. C. 600),—the greatest height which the Median power ever reached. Between the Egyptian Nekôs and his grandson Apriês—Pharaoh Necho and Pharaoh Hophra of the Old Testament—on the one side, and the Babylonian Nebuchadnezzar on the other, Judæa and Phenicia form the intermediate subject of quarrel: and the political independence of the Phenician towns is extin-

guished never again to be recovered. At the commencement of his reign, it appears, Nekôs was chiefly anxious to extend the Egyptian commerce, for which purpose he undertook two measures, both of astonishing boldness for that age,—a canal between the lower part of the eastern or Pelusiac Nile, and the inmost corner of the Red sea,—and the circumnavigation of Africa; his great object being to procure a water-communication between the Mediterranean and the Red sea. He began the canal —much about the same time as Nebuchadnezzar executed his canal from Babylon to Terêdon—with such reckless determination, that one hundred and twenty thousand Egyptians are said to have perished in the work; but either from this disastrous proof of the difficulty, or, as Herodotus represents, from the terrors of a menacing prophecy which reached him, he was compelled to desist. Next, he accomplished the circumnavigation of Africa, already above alluded to; but in this way too he found it impracticable to procure any available communication such as he wished.[623] It is plain that in both these enterprises he was acting under Phenician and Greek instigation; and we may remark that the point of the Nile from whence the canal took its departure, was close upon the mercenary camps or stratopeda. Being unable to connect the two seas together, he built and equipped an armed naval force both upon the one and the other, and entered upon aggressive enterprises, naval as well as military. His army, on marching into Syria, was met at Megiddo—Herodotus says Magdolum—by Josiah king of Judah, who was himself slain and so completely worsted, that Jerusalem fell into the power of the conqueror, and became tributary to Egypt. It deserves to be noted that Nekôs sent the raiment which he had worn on the day of his victory, as an offering to the holy temple of Apollo at Branchidæ near Milêtus, [624]—the first recorded instance of a donation from an Egyptian king to a Grecian temple, and a proof that Hellenic affinities were beginning to take effect upon him: probably we may conclude that a large proportion of his troops were Milesians.

But the victorious career of Nekôs was completely checked by the defeat which he experienced at Carchemisch, or Circesium, on the Euphrates, from Nebuchadnezzar and the Babylonians, who not only drove him out of Judæa and Syria, but also took Jerusalem, and carried away the king and the principal Jews into captivity.[625] Nebuchadnezzar farther attacked the Phenician cities, and the siege of Tyre alone cost him severe toil for thirteen years. After this long and gallant resistance, the Tyrians were forced to submit, and underwent the same fate as the Jews: their princes and chiefs were dragged captive into the Babylonian territory, and the Phenician cities became numbered among the tributaries of Nebuchadnezzar. So they seemed to have remained, until the overthrow of Babylon by Cyrus: for we find among those extracts, unhappily, very brief, which Josephus has preserved out of the Tyrian annals, that during this interval there were disputes and irregularities in the government of Tyre,[626]—judges being for a time substituted in the place of kings; while Merbal and Hirom, two princes of the regal Tyrian line, detained captive in Babylonia, were successively sent down on the special petition of the Tyrians, and reigned at Tyre; the former four years, the latter twenty years, until the conquest of Babylon by

Cyrus. The Egyptian king Apriês, indeed, the son of Psammis, and grandson of Nekôs, attacked Sidon and Tyre both by land and sea, but seemingly without any result.[627] To the Persian empire, as soon as Cyrus had conquered Babylon, they cheerfully and spontaneously submitted,[628] whereby the restoration of the captive Tyrians to their home was probably conceded to them, like that of the captive Jews.

Nekôs in Egypt was succeeded by his son Psammis, and he again, after a reign of six years, by his son Apriês; of whose power and prosperity Herodotus speaks in very high general terms, though the few particulars which he recounts are of a contrary tenor. It was not till after a reign of twenty-five years, that Apriês undertook that expedition against the Greek colonies in Libya,—Kyrênê and Barka,—which proved his ruin. The native Libyan tribes near those cities, having sent to surrender themselves to him, and entreat his aid against the Greek settlers, Apriês despatched to them a large force composed of native Egyptians; who, as has been before mentioned, were stationed on the north-western frontier of Egypt, and were, therefore, most available for the march against Kyrênê. The Kyrenean citizens advanced to oppose them, and a battle ensued in which the Egyptians were completely routed with severe loss. It is affirmed that they were thrown into disorder from want of practical knowledge of Grecian warfare,[629]—a remarkable proof of the entire isolation of the Grecian mercenaries (who had now been long in the service of Psammetichus and his successors) from the native Egyptians.

This disastrous reverse provoked a mutiny in Egypt against Apriês, the soldiers contending that he had despatched them on the enterprise with a deliberate view to their destruction, in order to assure his rule over the remaining Egyptians. The malcontents found so much sympathy among the general population, that Amasis, a Saïtic Egyptian of low birth, but of considerable intelligence, whom Apriês had sent to conciliate them, was either persuaded or constrained to become their leader, and prepared to march immediately against the king at Saïs. Unbounded and reverential submission to the royal authority was a habit so deeply rooted in the Egyptian mind, that Apriês could not believe the resistance to be serious. He sent an officer of consideration named Patarbêmis to bring Amasis before him, and when the former returned, bringing back from the rebel nothing better than a contemptuous refusal to appear except at the head of an army, the exasperated king ordered his nose and ears to be cut off. This act of atrocity caused such indignation among the Egyptians round him, that most of them deserted and joined the revolters, who thus became irresistibly formidable in point of numbers. There yet remained to Apriês the foreign mercenaries,—thirty thousand Ionians and Karians,—whom he summoned from their stratopeda on the Pelusiac Nile to his residence at Saïs; and this force, the creation of his ancestor Psammetichus, and the main reliance of his family, still inspired him with such unabated confidence, that he marched to attack the far superior numbers under Amasis at Momemphis. Though his troops behaved with bravery, the disparity of numbers, combined with the excited feeling of the insurgents, overpowered him:

he was defeated and carried prisoner to Saïs, where at first Amasis not only spared his life, but treated him with generosity.[630] Such, however, was the antipathy of the Egyptians, that they forced Amasis to surrender his prisoner into their hands, and immediately strangled him.

It is not difficult to trace in these proceedings the outbreak of a long-suppressed hatred on the part of the Egyptian soldier-caste towards the dynasty of Psammetichus, to whom they owed their comparative degradation, and by whom that stream of Hellenism had been let in upon Egypt, which doubtless was not witnessed without great repugnance. It might seem, also, that this dynasty had too little of pure Egyptianism in them to find favor with the priests. At least Herodotus does not mention any religious edifices erected either by Nekôs or Psammis or Apriês, though he describes much of such outlay on the part of Psammetichus,—who built magnificent propylæa to the temple of Hephæstos at Memphis,[631] and a splendid new chamber or stable for the sacred bull Apis,—and more still on the part of Amasis.

Nevertheless, Amasis, though he had acquired the crown by this explosion of native antipathy, found the foreign adjuncts both already existing and eminently advantageous. He not only countenanced, but extended them; and Egypt enjoyed under him a degree of power and consideration such as it neither before possessed, nor afterwards retained,—for his long reign of forty-four years (570-526 B. C.) closed just six months before the Persian conquest of the country. He was eminently phil-Hellenic, and the Greek merchants at Naukratis,—the permanent settlers, as well as the occasional visitors,—obtained from him valuable enlargement of their privileges. Besides granting permission to various Grecian towns, to erect religious establishments for such of their citizens as visited the place, he also sanctioned the constitution of a formal and organized emporium or factory, invested with commercial privileges, and armed with authority exercised by presiding officers regularly chosen. This factory was connected with, and probably grew out of, a large religious edifice and precinct, built at the joint cost of nine Grecian cities: four of them Ionic,—Chios, Teôs, Phôkæa, and Klazomenæ; four Doric,—Rhodes, Knidus, Halikarnassus, and Phasêlis; and one Æolic,—Mitylênê. By these nine cities the joint temple and factory was kept up and its presiding magistrates chosen; but its destination, for the convenience of Grecian commerce generally, seems revealed by the imposing title of *The Hellênion*. Samos, Milêtus, and Ægina had each founded a separate temple at Naukratis, for the worship of such of their citizens as went there; probably connected—as the Hellênion was—with protection and facilities for commercial purposes. But though these three powerful cities had thus constituted each a factory for itself, as guarantee to the merchandise, and as responsible for the conduct, of its own citizens separately,—the corporation of the Hellênion served both as protection and control to all other Greek merchants. And such was the usefulness, the celebrity, and probably the pecuniary profit, of the corporation, that other Grecian cities set up claims to a share in it, and falsely pretended to have contributed to the original foundation.[632]

Naukratis was for a long time the privileged port for Grecian commerce with Egypt. No Greek merchant was permitted to deliver goods in any other part, or to enter any other of the mouths of the Nile except the Kanôpic. If forced into any of them by stress of weather, he was compelled to make oath that his arrival was a matter of necessity, and to convey his goods round by sea into the Kanôpic branch to Naukratis; and if the weather still forbade such a proceeding, the merchandise was put into barges and conveyed round to Naukratis by the internal canals of the delta. Such a monopoly, which made Naukratis in Egypt, something like Canton in China, or Nangasaki in Japan, no longer subsisted in the time of Herodotus.[633] But the factory of the Hellênion was in full operation and dignity, and very probably he himself, as a native of one of the contributing cities, Halikarnassus, may have profited by its advantages. At what precise time Naukratis first became licensed for Grecian trade, we cannot directly make out; but there seems reason to believe that it was the port to which the Greek merchants first went, so soon as the general liberty of trading with the country was conceded to them; and this would put it at least as far back as the foundation of Kyrênê, and the voyage of the fortunate Kôlæus, who was on his way with a cargo to Egypt, when the storms overtook him,—about 630 B. C., during the reign of Psammetichus. And in the time of the poetess Sapphô, and her brother Charaxus, it seems evident that Greeks had been some time established at Naukratis.[634] But Amasis, though his predecessors had permitted such establishment, may doubtless be regarded as having given organization to the factories, and as having placed the Greeks on a more comfortable footing of security than they had ever enjoyed before.

This Egyptian king manifested several other evidences of his phil-Hellenic disposition, by donations to Delphi and other Grecian temples, and he even married a Grecian wife from the city of Kyrênê.[635] Moreover, he was in intimate alliance and relations of hospitality both with Polykratês despot of Samos, and with Crœsus king of Lydia.[636] He conquered the island of Cyprus, and rendered it tributary to the Egyptian throne: his fleet and army were maintained in good condition, and the foreign mercenaries, the great strength of the dynasty which he had supplanted, were not only preserved, but even removed from their camp near Pelusium to the chief town Memphis, where they served as the special guards of Amasis.[637] Egypt enjoyed under him a degree of power abroad, and prosperity at home—the river having been abundant in its overflowing—which was the more tenaciously remembered on account of the period of disaster and subjugation immediately following his death. And his contributions, in architecture and sculpture, to the temples of Saïs[638] and Memphis, were on a scale of vastness surpassing everything before known in lower Egypt.

APPENDIX.

The archæology of Egypt, as given in the first book of Diodorus, is so much blended with Grecian mythes, and so much colored over with Grecian motive, philosophy, and sentiment, as to serve little purpose in illustrating the native Egyptian turn of thought. Even in Herodotus, though his stories are in the main genuine Egyptian, we find a certain infusion of Hellenism which the priests themselves had in his day acquired, and which probably would not have been found in their communications with Solon, or with the poet Alkæus, a century and a half earlier. Still, his stories (for the tenor of which Diodorus unduly censures him, i, 69) are really illustrative of the national mind; but the narratives coined by Grecian fancy out of Egyptian materials, and idealizing Egyptian kings and priests so as to form a pleasing picture for the Grecian reader, are mere romance, which has rarely even the merit of amusing. Most of the intellectual Greeks had some tendency thus to dress up Egyptian history, and Plato manifests it considerably; but the Greeks who crowded into Egypt under the Ptolemies carried it still further. Hekatæus of Abdêra, from whom Diodorus greatly copied (i, 46), is to be numbered among them, and from him, perhaps, come the eponymous kings Ægyptus (i, 51) and Neileus (i, 63), the latter of whom was said to have given to the river its name of *Nile*, whereas it had before been called *Ægyptus* (this to save the credit of Homer, who calls it Αἴγυπτος ποταμὸς, Odyss. xiv, 258): also Macedon, Prometheus, Triptolemus, etc., largely blended with Egyptian antiquities, in Diodorus, (i, 18, 19, etc.). It appears that the name of king Neilos occurred in the list of Egyptian kings in Dikæarchus (ap. Schol. Apoll. Rhod. iv, 272; Dikæarch. Fragment, p. 100, ed. Fuhr).

That the ἀναγραφαὶ in the temples of Egypt reached to a vast antiquity and contained a list of names, human, semi-divine, and divine, very long indeed,—there is no reason to doubt. Herodotus, in giving the number of years between Dionysus and Amasis as 1500, expressly says that "the priests told him they knew this accurately, since they always kept an account, and always wrote down the number of years,"—καὶ ταῦτα Αἰγύπτιοι ἀτρεκέως φασὶν ἐπίστασθαι, αἰεί τε λογιζόμενοι καὶ αἰεὶ ἀπογραφόμενοι τὰ ἔτεα (ii. 145): compare Diodor. i, 44. He tells us that the priests read to him out of a manuscript of papyrus (ἔκ βύβλου, ii, 100) the names of the 330 successive kings from father to son, between Mên or Menês and Mœris; and the 341 colossal statues of chief priests, each succeeding his father, down to Sethos priest of Hephæstos and king (ii, 142), which were shown to him in the temple of Hephæstos at Memphis, afford a sort of monumental evidence analogous in its nature to a written list. So also the long period of 23,000 years given by Diodorus, from the rule of Hêlios down to the expedition of Alexander against Asia, 18,000 of which were occupied by the government of gods and demigods (i, 26, 24, 44,—his numbers do not all agree with one another), may probably be drawn from an ἀναγραφή. Many temples in Egypt probably had such tablets or inscriptions, some differing from others. But this only shows us that such ἀναγραφαὶ or other temple monuments do not of themselves carry any authority, unless in cases where there is fair reason to presume them nearly contemporary with the facts or persons which they are produced to avouch. It is plain that the temple inscriptions represent the ideas of Egyptian priests (of some unknown date anterior to Herodotus) respecting the entire range of Egyptian past history and chronology.

What the proportion of historical items may be, included in this aggregate, we have no means of testing, nor are the monuments in Egyptian temples in themselves a proof of the reality of the persons or events which they are placed to commemorate, any more than the Centauromachia or Amazonomachia on the frieze of a Grecian temple proves that there really existed Centaurs or Amazons. But it is interesting to penetrate, so far as we are enabled, into the scheme upon which the Egyptians themselves conceived and constructed their own past history, of which the gods form quite as essential an element as the human kings; for we depart from the Egyptian point of view when we treat the gods as belonging to Egyptian religion and the human kings to Egyptian history,—both are parts of the same series.

It is difficult to trace the information which Herodotus received from the Egyptian priests to any intelligible scheme of chronology; but this may be done in regard to Manetho with much plausibility, as the recent valuable and elaborate analysis of Boeckh (Manetho und die Hundssternperiode, Berlin, 1845) has shown. He gives good reason for believing that the dynasties of Manetho have been so arranged as to fill up an exact number of Sothiac cycles (or periods of the star Sirius, each comprehending 1460 Julian years = 1461 Egyptian years). The Egyptian calender recognized a year of 365 days exactly, taking no note of the six hours additional which go to make up the solar year: they had twelve months of thirty days, with five epagomens or additional days, and their year always began with the first of the month Thoth (Soth, Sothis). Their year being thus six hours shorter (or one day for every four years) than the Julian year with its recurrent leap-year, the first of the Egyptian month Thoth fell back every four years one day in the Julian calender, and in the course of 1460 years it fell successively on every day of the Julian year, coming back again to the same day from which it had started. This period of 1460 years

was called a Sothiac period, and was reckoned from the year in which the first of the Egyptian month Thoth coincided with the heliacal rising of Sirius in Egypt; that is, (for an interval from 2700 B. C. down to the Christian era) on the 20th July of the Julian year. We know from Censorinus that the particular revolution of the Sothiac period, in which both Herodotus and Manetho were included, ended in the year 139 after the Christian era, in which year the first of the Egyptian month Thoth fell on the 20th July, or coincided with the heliacal rising of Sirius in Egypt: knowing in what year this period ended, we also know that it must have begun in 1322 B. C., and that the period immediately preceding it must have begun in 2782 B. C. (Censorinus, De Die Natali, c. 21; Ideler, Handbuch der Chronologie, vol. i, Abschn. 1, pp. 125-138.) The name Sothis, or Thoth, was the Egyptian name for Sirius or the Dog-star, the heliacal rising of which was an important phenomenon in that country, as coinciding nearly with the commencement of the overflowing of the Nile.

Boeckh has analyzed, with great care and ability, the fragmentary, partial, and in many particulars conflicting, versions of the dynasties of Manetho which have come down to us: after all, we know them very imperfectly, and it is clear that they have been much falsified and interpolated. He prefers, for the most part, the version reported as that of Africanus. The number of years included in the Egyptian chronology has been always a difficulty with critics, some of whom have eluded it by the supposition that the dynasties mentioned as successive were really simultaneous,—while others have supposed that the years enumerated were not full years, but years of one month or three months; nor have there been wanting other efforts of ingenuity to reconcile Manetho with the biblical chronology.

Manetho constructs his history of the past upon views purely Egyptian, applying to past time the measure of the Sothiac period or 1460 Julian years (= 1461 Egyptian years), and beginning both the divine history of Egypt, and the human history which succeeds it, each at the beginning of one of these Sothiac periods. Knowing as we do from Censorinus that a Sothiac period ended in 139 A. D., and, of course, began in 1322 B. C.—we also know that the third preceding Sothiac period must have begun in 5702 B. C. (1322 + 1460 + 1460 + 1460 = 5702). Now the year 5702 B. C. coincides with that in which Manetho places Menês, the first human king of Egypt; for his thirty-one dynasties end with the first year of Alexander the Great, 332 B. C., and include 5366 years in the aggregate, giving for the beginning of the series of dynasties, or accession of Menês, the date 5702 B. C. Prior to Menês he gives a long series of years as the time of the government of gods and demigods; this long time comprehends 24,837 years, or seventeen Sothiac periods of 1461 Egyptian years each. We see, therefore, that Manetho (or perhaps the sacerdotal ἀναγραφαὶ which he followed) constructed a system of Egyptian history and chronology out of twenty full Sothiac periods, in addition to that fraction of the twenty-first which had elapsed down to the time of Alexander,—about three-quarters of a century anterior to Manetho himself, if we suppose him to have lived during the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus, which, though not certain, is yet probable (Boeckh, p. 11). These results have not been brought out without some corrections of Manetho's figures,—corrections which are, for the most part, justified on reasonable grounds, and, where not so justified, are unimportant in amount; so that the approximation is quite sufficient to give a high degree of plausibility to Boeckh's hypothesis: see pp. 142-145.

Though there is no doubt that in the time of Manetho the Sothiac period was familiar to the Egyptian priests, yet as to the time at which it first became known we have no certain information: we do not know the time at which they first began to take notice of the fact that their year of 365 days was six hours too short. According to the statement of Herodotus (ii, 4), the priests of Heliopolis represented the year of 365 days (which they said that the Egyptians had first discovered) as if it were an exact recurrence of the seasons, without any reference to the remaining six hours. This passage of Herodotus, our oldest informant, is perplexing. Geminus (Isagogê in Arati Phænomena, c. 6) says that the Egyptians intentionally refrained from putting in the six hours by any intercalation, because they preferred that their months, and the religious ceremonies connected with them, should from time to time come round at different seasons,—which has much more the air of an ingenious after-thought, than of a determining reason.

Respecting the principle on which the Egyptian chronology of Herodotus is put together, see the remarks of M. Bunsen, Ægyptens Stellung in der Welt-geschichte, vol. i, p. 145.

CHAPTER XXI.

DECLINE OF THE PHENICIANS. — GROWTH OF CARTHAGE.

THE preceding sketch of that important system of foreign nations,—Phenicians, Assyrians, and Egyptians,—who occupied the south-eastern portion of the (οἰκουμένη) inhabited world of an early Greek, brings them down nearly to the time at which they were all absorbed into the mighty Persian empire. In tracing the series of events which intervened between 700 B. C., and 530 B. C., we observe a material increase of power both in the Chaldæans and Egyptians, and an immense extension of Grecian maritime activity and commerce,—but we at the same time notice the decline of Tyre and Sidon, both in power and traffic. The arms of Nebuchadnezzar reduced the Phenician cities to the same state of dependence as that which the Ionian cities underwent half a century later from Crœsus and Cyrus, while the ships of Milêtus, Phôkæa, and Samos gradually spread over all those waters of the Levant which had once been exclusively Phenician. In the year 704 B. C., the Samians did not yet possess a single trireme,[639] down to the year 630 B. C. not a single Greek vessel had yet visited Libya; but when we reach 550 B. C., we find the Ionic ships predominant in the Ægean, and those of Corinth and Korkyra in force to the west of Peloponnesus,—we see the flourishing cities of Kyrênê and Barka already rooted in Libya, and the port of Naukratis a busy emporium of Grecian commerce with Egypt. The trade by land, which is all that Egypt had enjoyed prior to Psammetichus, and which was exclusively conducted by Phenicians, is exchanged for a trade by sea, of which the Phenicians have only a share, and seemingly a smaller share than the Greeks; and the conquest by Amasis of the island of Cyprus, half-filled with Phenician settlements and once the tributary dependence of Tyre, affords one mark of the comparative decline of that great city. In her commerce with the Red sea and the Persian gulf she still remained without a competitor, the schemes of the Egyptian king Nekôs having proved abortive; and even in the time of Herodotus, the spices and frankincense of Arabia were still brought and distributed only by the Phenician merchant.[640] But on the whole, both her political and industrial development are now cramped by impediments, and kept down by rivals, not before in operation; and the part which she will be found to play in the Mediterranean, throughout the whole course of this history, is one subordinate and of reduced importance.

The course of Grecian history is not directly affected by these countries, yet their effect upon the Greek mind was very considerable, and the opening of the Nile by Psammetichus constitutes an epoch in Hellenic thought. It supplied their observation with a large and diversified field of present reality, while it was at the same time one great source of those mysticizing tendencies which corrupted so many of their speculative minds. But to Phenicia and Assyria, the Greeks owe two acquisitions well de-

serving special mention,—the alphabet, and the first standard and scale of weight, as well as coined money. Of neither of these acquisitions can we trace the precise date. That the Greek alphabet is derived from the Phenician, the analogy of the two proves beyond dispute, though we know not how or where the inestimable present was handed over, of which no traces are to be found in the Homeric poems.[641] The Latin alphabet, which is nearly identical with the most ancient Doric variety of the Greek, was derived from the same source,—also the Etruscan alphabet, though—if O. Müller is correct in his conjecture—only at second-hand, through the intervention of the Greek.[642] If we cannot make out at what time the Phenicians made this valuable communication to the Greeks, much less can we determine when or how they acquired it themselves,—whether it be of Semitic invention, or derived from improvement upon the phonetic hieroglyphics of the Egyptians.[643]

Besides the letters of the alphabet, the scale of weight and that of coined money passed from Phenicia and Assyria into Greece. It has been shown by Boeckh, in his "Metrologie," that the Æginæan scale,[644]—with its divisions, talent, mna, and obolus,—is identical with the Babylonian and Phenician: and that the word *mna*, which forms the central point of the scale, is of Chaldæan origin. On this I have already touched in a former chapter, while relating the history of Pheidôn of Argos, by whom what is called the Æginæan scale was first promulgated.

In tracing, therefore, the effect upon the Greek mind of early intercourse with the various Asiatic nations, we find that, as the Greeks made up their musical scale, so important an element of their early mental culture, in part by borrowing from Lydians and Phrygians,—so also their monetary and statical system, their alphabetical writing, and their duodecimal division of the day, measured by the gnomon and the shadow, were all derived from Assyrians and Phenicians. The early industry and commerce of these countries was thus in many ways available to Grecian advance, and would probably have become more so, if the great and rapid rise of the more barbarous Persians had not reduced them all to servitude. The Phenicians, though unkind rivals, were at the same time examples and stimulants to Greek maritime aspiration; and the Phenician worship of that goddess whom the Greeks knew under the name of Aphroditê, became communicated to the latter in Cyprus, in Kythêra, in Sicily,—perhaps also in Corinth.

The sixth century B. C., though a period of decline for Tyre and Sidon, was a period of growth for their African colony Carthage, which appears during this century in considerable traffic with the Tyrrhenian towns on the southern coast of Italy, and as thrusting out the Phôkæan settlers from Alalia in Corsica. The wars of the Carthaginians with the Grecian colonies in Sicily, so far as they are known to us, commence shortly after 500 B. C., and continue at intervals, with fluctuating success, for two centuries and a half.

The foundation of Carthage by the Tyrians is placed at different dates, the lowest of which, however, is 819 B. C.: other authorities place it in 878 B. C., and we have no means of deciding between them. I have already remarked that it is by no means the oldest of the Tyrian colonies; but though Utica and Gadês may have been more ancient than Carthage,[645] the latter greatly outstripped them in wealth and power, and acquired a sort of federal preëminence over all the Phenician colonies on the coast of Africa. In those later times when the dominion of the Carthaginians had reached its maximum, it comprised the towns of Utica, Hippo, Adrumêtum, and Leptis,—all original Phenician foundations, and enjoying probably, even as dependents of Carthage, a certain qualified autonomy,—besides a great number of smaller towns planted by themselves, and inhabited by a mixed population called Liby-Phenicians. Three hundred such towns,—a dependent territory covering half the space between the lesser and the greater Syrtis, and in many parts remarkably fertile,—a city said to contain seven hundred thousand inhabitants, active, wealthy, and seemingly homogeneous,—and foreign dependencies in Sicily, Sardinia, the Balearic isles, and Spain,—all this aggregate of power, under one political management, was sufficient to render the contest of Carthage even with Rome for some time doubtful.

But by what steps the Carthaginians raised themselves to such a pitch of greatness we have no information, and we are even left to guess how much of it had already been acquired in the sixth century B. C. As in the case of so many other cities, we have a foundation-legend, decorating the moment of birth, and then nothing farther. The Tyrian princess Dido or Elisa, daughter of Belus, sister of Pygmalion king of Tyre, and wife of the wealthy Sichæus priest of Hêraklês in that city,—is said to have been left a widow in consequence of the murder of Sichæus by Pygmalion, who seized the treasures belonging to his victim. But Dido found means to disappoint him of his booty, possessed herself of the gold which had tempted Pygmalion, and secretly emigrated, carrying with her the sacred insignia of Hêraklês: a considerable body of Tyrians followed her. She settled at Carthage on a small hilly peninsula joined by a narrow tongue of land to the continent, purchasing from the natives as much land as could be surrounded by an ox's hide, which she caused to be cut into the thinnest strip, and thus made it sufficient for the site of her first citadel, Byrsa, which afterwards grew up into the great city of Carthage. As soon as her new settlement had acquired footing, she was solicited in marriage by several princes of the native tribes, especially by the Gætulian Jarbas, who threatened war if he were refused. Thus pressed by the clamors of her own people, who desired to come into alliance with the natives, yet irrevocably determined to maintain exclusive fidelity to her first husband, she escaped the conflict by putting an end to her life. She pretended to acquiesce in the proposition of a second marriage, requiring only delay sufficient to offer an expiatory sacrifice to the manes of Sichæus: a vast funeral pile was erected, and many victims slain upon it, in the midst of which Dido pierced her own bosom with a sword, and perished in the flames. Such is the legend to which Virgil has given a new color by interweaving the adventures of Æneas, and thus connecting the

foundation legends of Carthage and Rome, careless of his deviation from the received mythical chronology. Dido was worshipped as a goddess at Carthage until the destruction of the city:[646] and it has been imagined with some probability that she is identical with Astartê, the divine patroness under whose auspices the colony was originally established, as Gadês and Tarsus were founded under those of Hêraklês,—the tale of the funeral pile and self-burning appearing in the religious ceremonies of other Cilician and Syrian towns.[647] Phenician religion and worship was diffused along with the Phenician colonies throughout the larger portion of the Mediterranean.

The Phôkæans of Ionia, who amidst their adventurous voyages westward established the colony of Massalia, (as early as 600 B. C.) were only enabled to accomplish this by a naval victory over the Carthaginians,—the earliest example of Greek and Carthaginian collision which has been preserved to us. The Carthaginians were jealous of commercial rivalry, and their traffic with the Tuscans and Latins in Italy, as well as their lucrative mine-working in Spain, dates from a period when Greek commerce in those regions was hardly known. In Greek authors, the denomination Phenicians is often used to designate the Carthaginians, as well as the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon, so that we cannot always distinguish which of the two is meant; but it is remarkable that the distant establishment of Gadês, and the numerous settlements planted for commercial purposes along the western coast of Africa, and without the strait of Gibraltar, are expressly ascribed to the Tyrians.[648] Many of the other Phenician establishments on the southern coast of Spain seemed to have owed their origin to Carthage rather than to Tyre. But the relations between the two, so far as we know them, were constantly amicable, and Carthage, even at the period of her highest glory, sent Theôri with a tribute of religious recognition to the Tyrian Hêraklês: the visit of these envoys coincided with the siege of the town by Alexander the Great. On that critical occasion, the wives and children of the Tyrians were sent to find shelter at Carthage: two centuries before, when the Persian empire was in its age of growth and expansion, the Tyrians had refused to aid Kambysês with their fleet in his plans for conquering Carthage, and thus probably preserved their colony from subjugation.[649]

CHAPTER XXII.

WESTERN COLONIES OF GREECE — IN EPIRUS, ITALY, SICILY, AND GAUL.

THE stream of Grecian colonization to the westward, as far as we can be said to know it authentically, with names and dates, begins from the 11th Olympiad. But it is reasonable to believe that there were other attempts earlier than this, though we must content ourselves with recognizing them as generally probable. There were doubtless detached bands of volunteer emigrants or marauders, who, fixing themselves in some situation favorable to commerce or piracy, either became mingled with the native tribes, or grew up by successive reinforcements into an acknowledged town. Not being able to boast of any filiation from the prytaneium of a known Grecian city, these adventurers were often disposed to fasten upon the inexhaustible legend of the Trojan war, and ascribe their origin to one of the victorious heroes in the host of Agamemnôn, alike distinguished for their valor and for their ubiquitous dispersion after the siege. Of such alleged settlements by fugitive Grecian or Trojan heroes, there were a great number, on various points throughout the shores of the Mediterranean; and the same honorable origin was claimed even by many non-Hellenic towns.

In the eighth century B. C., when this westerly stream of Grecian colonization begins to assume an authentic shape (735 B. C.), the population of Sicily—as far as our scanty information permits us to determine it—consisted of two races completely distinct from each other—Sikels and Sikans—besides the Elymi, a mixed race apparently distinct from both, and occupying Eryx and Egesta, near the westernmost corner of the island,—and the Phenician colonies and coast establishments formed for purposes of trade. According to the belief both of Thucydidês and Philistus, these Sikans, though they gave themselves out as indigenous, were yet of Iberian origin[650] and emigrants of earlier date than the Sikels,—by whom they had been invaded and restricted to the smaller western half of the island, and who were said to have crossed over originally from the south-western corner of the Calabrian peninsula, where a portion of the nation still dwelt in the time of Thucydidês. The territory known to Greek writers of the fifth century B. C. by the names of Œnotria on the coast of the Mediterranean, and Italia on that of the gulfs of Tarentum and Squillace, included all that lies south of a line drawn across the breadth of the country, from the gulf of Poseidônia (Pæstum) and the river Silarus on the Mediterranean sea, to the north-west corner of the gulf of Tarentum; it was also bounded northwards by the Iapygians and Messapians, who occupied the Salentine peninsula, and the country immediately adjoining to Tarentum, and by the Peuketians on the Ionic gulf. According to the logographers Pherekydês and Hellanikus,[651] Œnotrus and Peuketius were sons of Lykaôn, grandsons of Pelasgus, and emigrants in very early times from

Arcadia to this territory. An important statement in Stephanus Byzantinus[652] acquaints us that the serf-population, whom the great Hellenic cities in this portion of Italy employed in the cultivation of their lands, were called Pelasgi, seemingly even in the historical times: it is upon this name, probably, that the mythical genealogy of Pherekydês is constructed. This Œnotrian or Pelasgian race were the population whom the Greek colonists found there on their arrival. They were known apparently under other names, such as the Sikels,—mentioned even in the Odyssey, though their exact locality in that poem cannot be ascertained—the Italians, or Itali, properly so called,—the Morgêtes,—and the Chaones,— all of them names of tribes either cognate or subdivisional.[653] The Chaones or Chaonians are also found, not only in Italy, but in Epirus, as one of the most considerable of the Epirotic tribes,—while Pandosia, the ancient residence of the Œnotrian kings in the southern corner of Italy, [654] was also the name of a township or locality in Epirus, with a neighboring river Acheron in both: from hence, and from some other similarities of name, it has been imagined that Epirots, Œnotrians, Sikels, etc., were all names of cognate people, and all entitled to be comprehended under the generic appellation of Pelasgi. That they belonged to the same ethnical kindred, there seems fair reason to presume, and also that in point of language, manners, and character, they were not very widely separated from the ruder branches of the Hellenic race.

It would appear too, as far as any judgment can be formed on a point essentially obscure, that the Œnotrians were ethnically akin to the primitive population of Rome and Latium on one side,[655] as they were to the Epirots on the other; and that tribes of this race, comprising Sikels, and Itali properly so called, as sections, had at one time occupied most of the territory from the left bank of the river Tiber southward between the Apennines and the Mediterranean. Both Herodotus and his junior contemporary, the Syracusan Antiochus, extend Œnotria as far northward as the river Silarus,[656] and Sophoklês includes the whole coast of the Mediterranean, from the strait of Messina to the gulf of Genoa, under the three successive names of Œnotria, the Tyrrhenian gulf, and Liguria.[657] Before or during the fifth century B. C., however, a different population, called Opicians, Oscans, or Ausonians, had descended from their original seats on or north of the Apennines,[658] and had conquered the territory between Latium and the Silarus, expelling or subjugating the Œnotrian inhabitants, and planting outlying settlements even down to the strait of Messina and the Liparæan isles. Hence the more precise Thucydidês designates the Campanian territory, in which Cumæ stood, as the country of the Opici; a denomination which Aristotle extends to the river Tiber, so as to comprehend within it Rome and Latium.[659] Not merely Campania, but in earlier times even Latium, originally occupied by a Sikel or Œnotrian population, appears to have been partially overrun and subdued by fiercer tribes from the Apennines, and had thus received a certain intermixture of Oscan race. But in the regions south of Latium, these Oscan conquests were still more overwhelming; and to this cause (in the belief of inquiring Greeks of the fifth century

B. C.)[660] were owing the first migrations of the Œnotrian race out of southern Italy, which wrested the larger portion of Sicily from the preëxisting Sikanians.

This imperfect account, representing the ideas of Greeks of the fifth century B. C. as to the early population of southern Italy, is borne out by the fullest comparison which can be made between the Greek, Latin, and Oscan language,—the first two certainly, and the third probably, sisters of the same Indo-European family of languages. While the analogy, structural and radical, between Greek and Latin, establishes completely such community of family—and while comparative philology proves that on many points the Latin departs less from the supposed common type and mother-language than the Greek—there exists also in the former a non-Grecian element, and non-Grecian classes of words, which appear to imply a confluence of two or more different people with distinct tongues; and the same non-Grecian element, thus traceable in the Latin, seems to present itself still more largely developed in the scanty remains of the Oscan.[661] Moreover, the Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily caught several peculiar words from their association with the Sikels, which words approach in most cases very nearly to the Latin,—so that a resemblance thus appears between the language of Latium on the one side, and that of Œnotrians and Sikels (in southern Italy and Sicily) on the other, prior to the establishments of the Greeks. These are the two extremities of the Sikel population; between them appear, in the intermediate country, the Oscan or Ausonian tribes and language; and these latter seem to have been in a great measure conquerors and intruders from the central mountains. Such analogies of language countenance the supposition of Thucydidês and Antiochus, that these Sikels had once been spread over a still larger portion of southern Italy, and had migrated from thence into Sicily in consequence of Oscan invasions. The element of affinity existing between Latins, Œnotrians, and Sikels—to a certain degree also between all of them together and the Greeks, but not extending to the Opicians or Oscans, or to the Iapygians—may be called Pelasgic, for want of a better name; but, by whatever name it be called, the recognition of its existence connects and explains many isolated circumstances in the early history of Rome as well as in that of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks.

The earliest Grecian colony in Italy or Sicily, of which we know the precise date, is placed about 735 B. C., eighteen years subsequent to the Varronian era of Rome; so that the causes, tending to subject and Hellenize the Sikel population in the southern region, begin their operation nearly at the same time as those which tended gradually to exalt and aggrandize the modified variety of it which existed in Latium. At that time, according to the information given to Thucydidês, the Sikels had been established for three centuries in Sicily: Hellanikus and Philistus—who both recognized a similar migration into that island out of Italy, though they give different names, both to the emigrants and to those who expelled them—assign to the migration a date three generations before the Trojan war.[662] Earlier than 735 B. C., however, though we do not know the precise era of its commencement, there existed one solitary Gre-

cian establishment in the Tyrrhenian sea,—the Campanian Cumæ, near cape Misenum; which the more common opinion of chronologists supposed to have been founded in 1050 B. C., and which has even been carried back by some authors to 1139 B. C.[663] Without reposing any faith in this early chronology, we may at least feel certain that it is the most ancient Grecian establishment in any part of Italy, and that a considerable time elapsed before any other Greek colonists were bold enough to cut themselves off from the Hellenic world by occupying seats on the other side of the strait of Messina,[664] with all the hazards of Tyrrhenian piracy as well as of Scylla and Charybdis. The Campanian Cumæ—known almost entirely by this its Latin designation—received its name and a portion of its inhabitants from the Æolic Kymê in Asia Minor. A joint band of settlers, partly from this latter town, partly from Chalkis in Eubœa,—the former under the Kymæan Hippoklês, the latter under the Chalkidian Megasthenês,—having combined to form the new town, it was settled by agreement that Kymê should bestow the name, and that Chalkis should enjoy the title and honors of the mother-city.[665]

Cumæ, situated on the neck of the peninsula which terminates in cape Misenum, occupied a lofty and rocky hill overhanging the sea,[666] and difficult of access on the land side. The unexampled fertility of the Phlegræan plains in the immediate vicinity of the city, the copious supply of fish in the Lucrine lake,[667] and the gold mines in the neighboring island of Pithekusæ,—both subsisted and enriched the colonists. They were joined by fresh settlers from Chalkis, from Eretria, and even from Samos; and became numerous enough to form distinct towns at Dikæarchia and Neapolis, thus spreading over a large portion of the bay of Naples. In the hollow rock under the very walls of the town was situated the cavern of the prophetic Sibyl,—a parallel and reproduction of the Gergithian Sibyl, near Kymê in Æolis: in the immediate neighborhood, too, stood the wild woods and dark lake of Avernus, consecrated to the subterranean gods, and offering an establishment of priests, with ceremonies evoking the dead, for purposes of prophecy or for solving doubts and mysteries. It was here that Grecian imagination localized the Cimmerians and the fable of Odysseus; and the Cumæans derived gains from the numerous visitors to this holy spot,[668] perhaps hardly less than those of the inhabitants of Krissa from the vicinity of Delphi. Of the relations of these Cumæans with the Hellenic world generally, we unfortunately know nothing; but they seem to have been in intimate connection with Rome during the time of the kings, and especially during that of the last king Tarquin,[669]—forming the intermediate link between the Greek and Latin world, whereby the feelings of the Teukrians and Gergithians near the Æolic Kymê, and the legendary stories of Trojan as well as Grecian heroes—Æneas and Odysseus—passed into the antiquarian imagination of Rome and Latium.[670] The writers of the Augustan age knew Cumæ only in its decline, and wondered at the vast extent of its ancient walls, yet remaining in their time. But during the two centuries prior to 500 B. C., these walls inclosed a full and thriving population, in the plenitude of prosperity, —with a surrounding territory extensive as well as fertile,[671] resorted to by pur-

chasers of corn from Rome in years of scarcity, and unassailed as yet by formidable neighbors,—and with a coast and harbors well suited to maritime commerce. At that period, the town of Capua, if indeed it existed at all, was of very inferior importance, and the chief part of the rich plain around it was included in the possessions of Cumæ[672]—not unworthy probably, in the sixth century B. C., to be numbered with Sybaris and Krotôn.

The decline of Cumæ begins in the first half of the fifth century B. C. (500-450 B. C.), first, from the growth of hostile powers in the interior,—the Tuscans and Samnites,—next, from violent intestine dissensions and a destructive despotism. The town was assailed by a formidable host of invaders from the interior, Tuscans reinforced by Umbrian and Daunian allies; which Dionysius refers to the 64th Olympiad (524-520 B. C.), though upon what chronological authority we do not know, and though this same time is marked by Eusebius as the date of the foundation of Dikæarchia from Cumæ. The invaders, in spite of great disparity of number, were bravely repelled by the Cumæans, chiefly through the heroic example of a citizen then first known and distinguished,—Aristodêmus Malakus. The government of the city was oligarchical, and the oligarchy from that day became jealous of Aristodêmus; who, on his part, acquired extraordinary popularity and influence among the people. Twenty years afterwards, the Latin city of Aricia, an ancient ally of Cumæ was attacked by a Tuscan host, and intreated succor from the Cumæans. The oligarchy of the latter thought this a good opportunity to rid themselves of Aristodêmus, whom they despatched by sea to Aricia, with rotten vessels and an insufficient body of troops. But their stratagem failed and proved their ruin; for the skill and intrepidity of Aristodêmus sufficed for the rescue of Aricia, and he brought back his troops victorious and devoted to himself personally. Partly by force, partly by stratagem, he subverted the oligarchy, put to death the principal rulers, and constituted himself despot: by a jealous energy, by disarming the people, and by a body of mercenaries, he maintained himself in this authority for twenty years, running his career of lust and iniquity until old age. At length a conspiracy of the oppressed population proved successful against him; he was slain, with all his family and many of his chief partisans, and the former government was restored.[673]

The despotism of Aristodêmus falls during the exile of the expelled Tarquin[674] (to whom he gave shelter) from Rome, and during the government of Gelôn at Syracuse; and this calamitous period of dissension and misrule was one of the great causes of the decline of Cumæ. Nearly at the same time, the Tuscan power, both by land and sea, appears at its maximum, and the Tuscan establishment at Capua begins, if we adopt the era of the town as given by Cato.[675] There was thus created at the expense of Cumæ a powerful city, which was still farther aggrandized afterwards when conquered and occupied by the Samnites; whose invading tribes, under their own name or that of Lucanians, extended themselves during the fifth and fourth centuries B. C., even to the shores of the gulf of Tarentum.[676] Cumæ was also

exposed to formidable dangers from the sea-side: a fleet, either of Tuscans alone, or of Tuscans and Carthaginians united, assailed it in 474 B. C., and it was only rescued by the active interposition of Hiero, despot of Syracuse; by whose naval force the invaders were repelled with slaughter.[677] These incidents go partly to indicate, partly to explain, the decline of the most ancient Hellenic settlement in Italy,—a decline from which it never recovered.

After briefly sketching the history of Cumæ, we pass naturally to that series of powerful colonies which were established in Sicily and Italy, beginning with 735 B. C. —enterprises in which Chalkis, Corinth, Megara, Sparta, the Achæans in Peloponnesus, and the Lokrians out of Peloponnesus, were all concerned. Chalkis, the metropolis of Cumæ, became also the metropolis of Naxos, the most ancient Grecian colony in Sicily, on the eastern coast of the island, between the strait of Messina and Mount Ætna.

The great number of Grecian settlements, from different colonizing towns, which appear to have taken effect within a few years upon the eastern coast of Italy and Sicily—from the Iapygian cape to cape Pachynus—leads us to suppose that the extraordinary capacities of the country for receiving new settlers had become known only suddenly. The colonies follow so close upon each other, that the example of the first cannot have been the single determining motive to those which followed. I shall have occasion to point out, even a century later (on the occasion of the settlement of Kyrênê), the narrow range of Grecian navigation; so that the previous supposed ignorance would not be at all incredible, were it not for the fact of the preëxisting colony of Cumæ. According to the practice universal with Grecian ships—which rarely permitted themselves to lose sight of the coast except in cases of absolute necessity —every man, who navigated from Greece to Italy or Sicily, first coasted along the shores of Akarnania and Epirus until he reached the latitude of Korkyra; he then struck across first to that island, next to the Iapygian promontory, from whence he proceeded along the eastern coast of Italy (the gulfs of Tarentum and Squillace) to the southern promontory of Calabria and the Sicilian strait; he would then sail, still coastwise, either to Syracuse or to Cumæ, according to his destination. So different are nautical habits now, that this fact requires special notice; we must recollect, moreover, that in 735 B. C., there were yet no Grecian settlements either in Epirus or in Korkyra: outside of the gulf of Corinth, the world was non-Hellenic, with the single exception of the remote Cumæ. A little before the last-mentioned period, Theoklês (an Athenian or a Chalkidian—probably the latter) was cast by storms on the coast of Sicily, and became acquainted with the tempting character of the soil, as well as the dispersed and half-organized condition of the petty Sikel communities who occupied it.[678] The oligarchy of Chalkis, acting upon the information which he brought back, sent out under his guidance settlers,[679] Chalkidian and Naxian, who founded the Sicilian Naxos. Theoklês and his companions on landing first occupied the eminence of Taurus, immediately overhanging the sea (whereon was established four centuries

afterwards the town of Tauromenium, after Naxos had been destroyed by the Syracusan despot Dionysius); for they had to make good their position against the Sikels, who were in occupation of the neighborhood, and whom it was requisite either to dispossess or to subjugate. After they had acquired secure possession of the territory, the site of the city was transferred to a convenient spot adjoining; but the hill first occupied remained ever memorable, both to Greeks and to Sikels. On it was erected the altar of Apollo Archêgetês, the divine patron who (through his oracle at Delphi) had sanctioned and determined Hellenic colonization in the island. The altar remained permanently as a sanctuary common to all the Sicilian Greeks, and the Theôrs or sacred envoys from their various cities, when they visited the Olympic and other festivals of Greece, were always in the habit of offering sacrifice upon it immediately before their departure. To the autonomous Sikels, on the other hand, the hill was an object of durable but odious recollection, as the spot in which Grecian conquest and intrusion had first begun; and at the distance of three centuries and a half from the event, we find them still animated by this sentiment in obstructing the foundation of Tauromenium.[680]

At the time when Theoklês landed, the Sikels were in possession of the larger half of the island, lying chiefly to the east of the Heræan mountains,[681]—a chain of hills stretching in a southerly direction from that principal chain, called the Neurode or Nebrode mountains, which runs from east to west for the most part parallel with the northern shore. West of the Heræan hills were situated the Sikans; and west of these latter, Eryx and Egesta, the possessions of the Elymi: along the western portion of the northern coast, also, were placed Motyê, Soloêis, and Panormus (now Palermo), the Phenician or Carthaginian seaports. The formation, or at least the extension, of these three last-mentioned ports, however, was a consequence of the multiplied Grecian colonies; for the Phenicians down to this time had not founded any territorial or permanent establishments, but had contented themselves with occupying in a temporary way various capes or circumjacent islets, for the purpose of trade with the interior. The arrival of formidable Greek settlers, maritime like themselves, induced them to abandon these outlying factories, and to concentrate their strength in the three considerable towns above named, all near to that corner of the island which approached most closely to Carthage. The east side of Sicily, and most part of the south, were left open to the Greeks, with no other opposition than that of the indigenous Sikels and Sikans, who were gradually expelled from all contact with the seashore, except on part of the north side of the island,—and who were indeed, so unpractised at sea as well as destitute of shipping, that in the tale of their old migration out of Italy into Sicily, the Sikels were affirmed to have crossed the narrow strait upon rafts at a moment of favorable wind.[682]

In the very next year[683] to the foundation of Naxos, Corinth began her part in the colonization of the island. A body of settlers, under the œkist Archias, landed in the islet Ortygia, farther southward on the eastern coast, expelled the Sikel occu-

pants, and laid the first stone of the mighty Syracuse. Ortygia, two English miles in circumference, was separated from the main island only by a narrow channel, which was bridged over when the city was occupied and enlarged by Gelôn in the 72d Olympiad, if not earlier. It formed only a small part, though the most secure and best-fortified part, of the vast space which the city afterwards occupied; but it sufficed alone for the inhabitants during a considerable time, and the present city in its modern decline has again reverted to the same modest limits. Moreover, Ortygia offered another advantage of not less value; it lay across the entrance of a spacious harbor, approached by a narrow mouth, and its fountain of Arethusa was memorable in antiquity both for the abundance and goodness of its water. We should have been glad to learn something respecting the numbers, character, position, nativity, etc. of these primitive emigrants, the founders of a city which we shall hereafter find comprising a vast walled circuit, which Strabo reckons at one hundred and eighty stadia, but which the modern observations of Colonel Leake announce as fourteen English miles,[684] or about one hundred and twenty-two stadia. We are told only that many of them came from the Corinthian village of Tenea, and that one of them sold to a comrade on the voyage his lot of land in prospective, for the price of a honey-cake: the little which we hear about the determining motives[685] of the colony refers to the personal character of the œkist. Archias son of Euagêtus, one of the governing gens of the Bacchiadæ at Corinth, in the violent prosecution of unbridled lust, had caused, though unintentionally, the death of a free youth named Aktæon, whose father Melissus, after having vainly endeavored to procure redress, slew himself at the Isthmian games, invoking the vengeance of Poseidôn against the aggressor.[686] Such were the destructive effects of this paternal curse, that Archias was compelled to expatriate, and the Bacchiadæ placed him at the head of the emigrants to Ortygia, in 734 B. C.: at that time, probably, this was a sentence of banishment to which no man of commanding station would submit except under the pressure of necessity.

There yet remained room for new settlements between Naxos and Syracuse: and Theoklês, the œkist of Naxos, found himself in a situation to occupy part of this space only five years after the foundation of Syracuse: perhaps he may have been joined by fresh settlers. He attacked and expelled the Sikels[687] from the fertile spot called Leontini, seemingly about half-way down on the eastern coast between Mount Ætna and Syracuse; and also from Katana, immediately adjoining to Mount Ætna, which still retains both its name and its importance. Two new Chalkidic colonies were thus founded,—Theoklês himself becoming œkist of Leontini, and Euarchus chosen by the Katanæan settlers themselves, of Katana.

The city of Megara was not behind Corinth and Chalkis in furnishing emigrants to Sicily. Lamis the Megarian, having now arrived with a body of colonists, took possession first of a new spot called Trotilus, but afterwards joined the recent Chalkidian settlement at Leontini. The two bodies of settlers, however, could not live in harmony, and Lamis, with his companions, was soon expelled; he then occupied Thap-

sus,[688] at a little distance to the northward of Ortygia or Syracuse, and shortly afterwards died. His followers made an alliance with Hyblôn, king of a neighboring tribe of Sikels, who invited them to settle in his territory; they accepted the proposition, relinquished Thapsus, and founded, in conjunction with Hyblôn, the city called the Hyblæan Megara, between Leontini and Syracuse. This incident is the more worthy of notice, because it is one of the instances which we find of a Grecian colony beginning by amicable fusion with the preëxisting residents: Thucydidês seems to conceive the prince Hyblôn as betraying his people against their wishes to the Greeks.[689]

It was thus that, during the space of five years, several distinct bodies of Greek emigrants had rapidly succeeded each other in Sicily: for the next forty years, we do not hear of any fresh arrivals, which is the more easy to understand as there were during that interval several considerable foundations on the coast of Italy, which probably took off the disposable Greek settlers. At length, forty-five years after the foundation of Syracuse, a fresh body of settlers arrived, partly from Rhodes under Antiphêmus, partly from Krête under Entimus, and founded the city of Gela on the south-western front of the island, between cape Pachynus and Lilybæum (B. C. 690)—still on the territory of the Sikels, though extending ultimately to a portion of that of the Sikans.[690] The name of the city was given from that of the neighboring river Gela.

One other fresh migration from Greece to Sicily remains to be mentioned, though we cannot assign the exact date of it. The town of Zanklê (now Messina), on the strait between Italy and Sicily, was at first occupied by certain privateers or pirates from Cumæ,—the situation being eminently convenient for their operations. But the success of the other Chalkidic settlements imparted to this nest of pirates a more enlarged and honorable character: a body of new settlers joined them from Chalkis and other towns of Eubœa, the land was regularly divided, and two joint œkists were provided to qualify the town as a member of the Hellenic communion—Periêrês from Chalkis, and Kratæmenês from Cumæ. The name Zanklê had been given by the primitive Sikel occupants of the place, meaning in their language *a sickle*; but it was afterwards changed to Messênê by Anaxilas, despot of Rhegium, who, when he conquered the town, introduced new inhabitants, in a manner hereafter to be noticed.[691]

Besides these emigrations direct from Greece, the Hellenic colonies in Sicily became themselves the founders of sub-colonies. Thus the Syracusans, seventy years after their own settlement (B. C. 664), founded Akræ—Kasmenæ, twenty years afterwards (B. C. 644), and Kamarina forty-five years after Kasmenæ (B. C. 599): Daskôn and Menekôlus were the œkists of the latter, which became in process of time an independent and considerable town, while Akræ and Kasmenæ seem to have remained subject to Syracuse. Kamarina was on the south-western side of the island, forming

the boundary of the Syracusan territory towards Gela. Kallipolis was established from Naxos, and Eubœa (a town so called) from Leontini.[692]

Hitherto, the Greeks had colonized altogether on the territory of the Sikels; the three towns which remain to be mentioned were all founded in that of the Sikans, [693]—Agrigentum or Akragas, Selinûs, and Himera. The two former were both on the south-western coast,—Agrigentum bordering upon Gela on the one side, and upon Selinûs on the other. Himera was situated on the westerly portion of the northern coast,—the single Hellenic establishment in the time of Thucydidês which that long line of coast presented. The inhabitants of the Hyblæan Megara were founders of Selinûs, about 630 B. C., a century after their own establishment: the œkist Pamillus, according to the usual Hellenic practice, was invited from their metropolis Megara in Greece proper, but we are not told how many fresh settlers came with him: the language of Thucydidês leads us to suppose that the new town was peopled chiefly from the Hyblæan Megarians themselves. The town of Akragas, or Agrigentum, called after the neighboring river of the former name, was founded from Gela in B. C. 582. Its œkists were Aristonous and Pystilus, and it received the statutes and religious characteristics of Gela. Himera, on the other hand, was founded from Zanklê, under three œkists, Eukleidês, Simus, and Sakôn. The chief part of its inhabitants were of Chalkidic race, and its legal and religious characteristics were Chalkidic; but a portion of the settlers were Syracusan exiles, called Mylêtidæ, who had been expelled from home by a sedition, so that the Himeræan dialect was a mixture of Doric and Chalkidic. Himera was situated not far from the towns of the Elymi,—Eyrx and Egesta.

Such were the chief establishments founded by the Greeks in Sicily during the two centuries after their first settlement in 735 B. C. The few particulars just stated respecting them are worthy of all confidence,—for they come to us from Thucydidês,—but they are unfortunately too few to afford the least satisfaction to our curiosity. It cannot be doubted that these first two centuries were periods of steady increase and prosperity among the Sicilian Greeks, undisturbed by those distractions and calamities which supervened afterwards, and which led indeed to the extraordinary aggrandizement of some of their communities, but also to the ruin of several others: moreover, it seems that the Carthaginians in Sicily gave them no trouble until the time of Gelôn. Their position will indeed seem singularly advantageous, if we consider the extraordinary fertility of the soil in this fine island, especially near the sea,—its capacity for corn, wine, and oil, the species of cultivation to which the Greek husbandman had been accustomed under less favorable circumstances,—its abundant fisheries on the coast, so important in Grecian diet, and continuing undiminished even at the present day, together with sheep, cattle, hides, wool, and timber from the native population in the interior. These natives seem to have been of rude pastoral habits, dispersed either among petty hill-villages, or in caverns hewn out of the rock, like the primitive inhabitants of the Balearic islands and Sardinia; so that Sicily, like New Zea-

land in our century, was now for the first time approached by organized industry and tillage.[694] Their progress, though very great, during this most prosperous interval (between the foundation of Naxos, in 735 B. C. to the reign of Gelôn at Syracuse in 485 B. C.), is not to be compared to that of the English colonies in America; but it was nevertheless very great, and appears greater from being concentrated as it was in and around a few cities. Individual spreading and separation of residence were rare, nor did they consist either with the security or the social feelings of a Grecian colonist. The city to which he belonged was the central point of his existence, where the produce which he raised was brought home to be stored or sold, and where alone his active life, political, domestic, religious, recreative, etc., was carried on. There were dispersed throughout the territory of the city small fortified places and garrisons,[695] serving as temporary protection to the cultivators in case of sudden inroad; but there was no permanent residence for the free citizen except the town itself. This was, perhaps, even more the case in a colonial settlement, where everything began and spread from one central point, than in Attica, where the separate villages had once nourished a population politically independent. It was in the town, therefore, that the aggregate increase of the colony palpably concentrated itself,—property as well as population,—private comfort and luxury not less than public force and grandeur. Such growth and improvement was of course sustained by the cultivation of the territory, but the evidences of it were manifested in the town; and the large population which we shall have occasion to notice as belonging to Agrigentum, Sybaris, and other cities, will illustrate this position.

There is another point of some importance to mention in regard to the Sicilian and Italian cities. The population of the town itself may have been principally, though not wholly, Greek; but the population of the territory belonging to the town, or of the dependent villages which covered it, must have been in a great measure Sikel or Sikan. The proof of this is found in a circumstance common to all the Sicilian and Italian Greeks,—the peculiarity of their weights, measures, monetary system, and language. The pound and ounce are divisions and denominations belonging altogether to Italy and Sicily, and unknown originally to the Greeks, whose scale consisted of the obolus, the drachma, the mina, and the talent: among the Greeks, too, the metal first and most commonly employed for money was silver, while in Italy and Sicily copper was the primitive metal made use of. Now among all the Italian and Sicilian Greeks, a scale of weight and money arose quite different from that of the Greeks at home, and formed by a combination and adjustment of the one of these systems to the other; it is in many points complex and difficult to understand, but in the final result the native system seems to be predominant, and the Grecian system subordinate.[696] Such a consequence as this could not have ensued, if the Greek settlers in Italy and Sicily had kept themselves apart as communities, and had merely carried on commerce and barter with communities of Sikels: it implies a fusion of the two races in the same community, though doubtless in the relation of superior and subject, and not in that of equals. The Greeks on arriving in the country expelled the

natives from the town, perhaps also from the lands immediately round the town; but when they gradually extended their territory, this was probably accomplished, not by the expulsion, but by the subjugation of those Sikel tribes and villages, much subdivided and each individually petty, whom their aggressions successively touched.

At the time when Theoklês landed on the hill near Naxos, and Archias in the islet of Ortygia, and when each of them expelled the Sikels from that particular spot, there were Sikel villages or little communities spread through all the neighboring country. By the gradual encroachments of the colony, some of these might be dispossessed and driven out of the plains near the coast into the more mountainous regions of the interior, but many of them doubtless found it convenient to submit, to surrender a portion of their lands, and to hold the rest as subordinate villagers of an Hellenic city-community:[697] and we find even at the time of the Athenian invasion (414 B. C.) villages existing in distinct identity as Sikels, yet subject and tributary to Syracuse. Moreover, the influence which the Greeks exercised, though in the first instance essentially compulsory, became also in part self-operating,—the ascendency of a higher over a lower civilization. It was the working of concentrated townsmen, safe among one another by their walls and by mutual confidence, and surrounded by more or less of ornament, public as well as private,—upon dispersed, unprotected, artless villagers, who could not be insensible to the charm of that superior intellect, imagination, and organization, which wrought so powerfully upon the whole contemporaneous world. To understand the action of these superior emigrants upon the native but inferior Sikels, during those three earliest centuries (730-430 B. C.) which followed the arrival of Archias and Theoklês, we have only to study the continuance of the same action during the three succeeding centuries which preceded the age of Cicero. At the period when Athens undertook the siege of Syracuse (B. C. 415), the interior of the island was occupied by Sikel and Sikan communities, autonomous, and retaining their native customs and language;[698] but in the time of Verres and Cicero (three centuries and a half afterwards) the interior of the island, as well as the maritime regions had become Hellenized: the towns in the interior were then hardly less Greek than those on the coast. Cicero contrasts favorably the character of the Sicilians with that of the Greeks generally (*i. e.* the Greeks out of Sicily), but he nowhere distinguishes Greeks in Sicily from native Sikels;[699] nor Enna and Centuripi from Katana and Agrigentum. The little Sikel villages became gradually semi-Hellenized and merged into subjects of a Grecian town during the first three centuries, this change took place in the regions of the coast,—during the following three centuries, in the regions of the interior; and probably with greater rapidity and effect in the earlier period, not only because the action of the Grecian communities was then closer, more concentrated, and more compulsory, but because also the obstinate tribes could then retire into the interior.

The Greeks in Sicily are thus not to be considered as purely Greeks, but as modified by a mixture of Sikel and Sikan language, customs, and character. Each town in-

cluded in its non-privileged population a number of semi-Hellenized Sikels (or Sikans, as the case might be), who, though in a state of dependence, contributed to mix the breed and influence the entire mass. We have no reason to suppose that the Sikel or Œnotrian language ever became written, like Latin, Oscan, or Umbrian:[700] the inscriptions of Segesta and Halesus are all in Doric Greek, which supplanted the native tongue for public purposes as a separate language, but not without becoming itself modified in the confluence. In following the ever-renewed succession of violent political changes, the inferior capacity of regulated and pacific popular government, and the more unrestrained and voluptuous license, which the Sicilian and Italian Greeks[701] exhibit as compared with Athens and the cities of Greece proper,—we must call to mind that we are not dealing with pure Hellenism; and that the native element, though not unfavorable to activity or increase of wealth, prevented the Grecian colonist from partaking fully in that improved organization which we so distinctly trace in Athens from Solon downwards. How much the taste, habits, ideas, religion, and local mythes, of the native Sikels passed into the minds of the Sikeliots or Sicilian Greeks, is shown by the character of their literature and poetry. Sicily was the native country of that rustic mirth and village buffoonery which gave birth to the primitive comedy,—politicized and altered at Athens so as to suit men of the market-place, the ekklesia, and the dikastery,—blending, in the comedies of the Syracusan Epicharmus, copious details about the indulgences of the table (for which the ancient Sicilians were renowned) with Pythagorean philosophy and moral maxims,—but given with all the naked simplicity of common life, in a sort of rhythmical prose, without even the restraint of a fixed metre, by the Syracusan Sophrôn in his lost Mimes, and afterwards polished as well as idealized in the Bucolic poetry of Theokritus.[702] That which is commonly termed the Doric comedy was in great part at least, the Sikel comedy taken up by Dorian composers,—the Doric race and dialect being decidedly predominant in Sicily: the manners thus dramatized belonged to that coarser vein of humor which the Doric Greeks of the town had in common with the semi-Hellenized Sikels of the circumjacent villages. Moreover, it seems probable that this rustic population enabled the despots of the Greco-Sicilian towns to form easily and cheaply those bodies of mercenary troops, by whom their power was sustained,[703] and whose presence rendered the continuance of popular government, even supposing it begun, all but impossible.

It was the destiny of most of the Grecian colonial establishments to perish by the growth and aggression of those inland powers upon whose coast they were planted,—powers which gradually acquired, from the vicinity of the Greeks, a military and political organization, and a power of concentrated action, such as they had not originally possessed. But in Sicily, the Sikels were not numerous enough even to maintain permanently their own nationality, and were ultimately penetrated on all sides by Hellenic ascendency and manners. We shall, nevertheless, come to one remarkable attempt, made by a native Sikel prince in the 82d Olympiad (455 B. C.),—the enterprising Duketius,—to group many petty Sikel villages into one considerable town, and

thus to raise his countrymen into the Grecian stage of polity and organization. Had there been any Sikel prince endowed with these superior ideas at the time when the Greeks first settled in Sicily, the subsequent history of the island would probably have been very different; but Duketius had derived his projects from the spectacle of the Grecian towns around him, and these latter had acquired much too great power to permit him to succeed. The description of his abortive attempt, however, which we find in Diodorus,[704] meagre as it is, forms an interesting point in the history of the island.

Grecian colonization in Italy began nearly at the same time as in Sicily, and was marked by the same general circumstances. Placing ourselves at Rhegium (now Reggio) on the Sicilian strait, we trace Greek cities gradually planted on various points of the coast as far as Cumæ on the one sea, and Tarentum (Taranto) on the other. Between the two seas runs the lofty chain of the Apennines, calcareous in the upper part of its course, throughout middle Italy,—granitic and schistose in the lower part, where it traverses the territories now called the hither and the farther Calabria. The plains and valleys on each side of the Calabrian Apennines exhibit a luxuriance of vegetation extolled by all observers, and surpassing even that of Sicily;[705] and great as the productive powers of this territory are now, there is full reason for believing that they must have been far greater in ancient times. For it has been visited by repeated earthquakes, each of which has left calamitous marks of devastation: those of 1638 and 1783—especially the latter, whose destructive effects were on a terrific scale, both as to life and property[706]—are of a date sufficiently recent to admit of recording and measuring the damage done by each; and that damage, in many parts of the south-western coast, was great and irreparable. Animated as the epithets are, therefore, with which the modern traveller paints the present fertility of Calabria, we are warranted in enlarging their meaning when we conceive the country as it stood between 720-320 B. C., the period of Grecian occupation and independence; while the unhealthy air, which now desolates the plains generally, seems then to have been felt only to a limited extent, and over particular localities. The founders of Tarentum, Sybaris, Krotôn, Lokri, and Rhegium, planted themselves in situations of unexampled promise to the industrious cultivator, which the previous inhabitants had turned to little account: since the subjugation of the Grecian cities, these once rich possessions have sunk into poverty and depopulation, especially during the last three centuries, from insalubrity, indolence, bad administration, and fear of the Barbary corsairs.

The Œnotrians, Sikels, or Italians, who were in possession of these territories in 720 B. C., seem to have been rude petty communities,—procuring for themselves safety by residence on lofty eminences,—more pastoral than agricultural, and some of them consuming the produce of their fields in common mess, on a principle analogous to the syssitia of Sparta or Krête. King Italus was said to have introduced this peculiarity[707] among the southernmost portion of the Œnotrian population, and at the same time to have bestowed upon them the name of Italians, though they were

also known by the name of Sikels. Throughout the centre of Calabria between sea and sea, the high chain of the Apennines afforded protection to a certain extent both to their independence and to their pastoral habits. But these heights are made to be enjoyed in conjunction with the plains beneath, so as to alternate winter and summer pasture for the cattle: it is in this manner that the richness of the country is rendered available, since a large portion of the mountain range is buried in snow during the winter months. Such remarkable diversity of soil and climate rendered Calabria a land of promise for Grecian settlement: the plains and lower eminences being as productive of corn, wine, oil, and flax, as the mountains in summer-pasture and timber, —and abundance of rain falling upon the higher ground, which requires only industry and care to be made to impart the maximum of fertility to the lower: moreover, a long line of sea-coast,—though not well furnished with harbors,—and an abundant supply of fish, came in aid of the advantages of the soil. While the poorer freemen of the Grecian cities were enabled to obtain small lots of fertile land in the neighborhood, to be cultivated by their own hands, and to provide for the most part their own food and clothing, the richer proprietors made profitable use of the more distant portions of the territory by means of their cattle, sheep, and slaves.

Of the Grecian towns on this favored coast, the earliest as well as the most prosperous were Sybaris and Krotôn: both in the gulf of Tarentum,—both of Achæan origin, and conterminous with each other in respect of territory. Krotôn was placed not far to the west of the south-eastern extremity of the gulf, called in ancient times the Lakinian cape, and ennobled by the temple of the Lakinian Hêrê, which became alike venerated and adorned by the Greek resident as well as by the passing navigator: one solitary column of the temple, the humble remnant of its past magnificence, yet marks the extremity of this once celebrated promontory. Sybaris seems to have been planted in the year 720 B. C., Krotôn in 710 B. C.: Iselikeus was œkist of the former, [708] Myskellus of the latter. This large Achæan emigration seems to have been connected with the previous expulsion of the Achæan population from the more southerly region of Peloponnesus by the Dorians, though in what precise manner we are not enabled to see: the Achæan towns in Peloponnesus appear in later times too inconsiderable to furnish emigrants, but probably in the eighth century B. C. their population may have been larger. The town of Sybaris was planted between two rivers, the Sybaris and the Krathis,[709] the name of the latter borrowed from a river of Achaia,—the town of Krotôn about twenty-five miles distant, on the river Æsarus. The primitive settlers of Sybaris consisted in part of Trœzenians, who were, however, subsequently expelled by the more numerous Achæans,—a deed of violence which was construed by the religious sentiment of Antiochus and some other Grecian historians, as having drawn down upon them the anger of the gods in the ultimate destruction of the city by the Krotoniates.[710]

The fatal contest between these two cities, which ended in the ruin of Sybaris, took place in 510 B. C., after the latter had subsisted in her prosperity for two hun-

dred and ten years. And the astonishing prosperity to which both of them attained is a sufficient proof that during the most of this period they had remained in peace at least, if not in alliance and common Achæan brotherhood. Unfortunately, the general fact of their great size, wealth, and power, is all that we are permitted to know. The walls of Sybaris embraced a circuit of fifty stadia, or more than six miles, while those of Krotôn were even larger, and comprised not less than twelve miles:[711] a large walled circuit was advantageous for sheltering the movable property in the territory around, which was carried in on the arrival of an invading enemy. Both cities possessed an extensive dominion across the Calabrian peninsula from sea to sea; but the territorial range of Sybaris seems to have been greater and her colonies wider and more distant,—a fact which may, perhaps, explain the smaller circuit of the city.

The Sybarites were founders of Laus and Skidrus, on the Mediterranean sea in the gulf of Policastro, and even of the more distant Poseidonia,—now known by its Latin name of Pæstum, as well as by the temples which still remain to decorate its deserted site. They possessed twenty-five dependent towns, and ruled over four distinct native tribes or nations. What these nations were we are not told,[712] but they were probably different sections of the Œnotrian name. The Krotoniates also reached across to the Mediterranean sea, and founded (upon the gulf now called St. Euphemia) the town of Terina, and seemingly also that of Lametini.[713] The inhabitants of the Epizephyrian Lokri, which was situated in a more southern part of Calabria Ultra, near the modern town of Gerace, extended themselves in like manner across the peninsula, and founded upon the Mediterranean coast the towns of Hippônium, Medma, and Mataurum,[714] as well as Melæ and Itoneia, in localities not now exactly ascertained.

Myskellus of Rhypes in Achaia, the founder of Krotôn under the express indication of the Delphian oracle, is said to have thought the site of Sybaris preferable, and to have solicited permission from the oracle to plant his colony there, but he was admonished to obey strictly the directions first given.[715] It is farther affirmed that the foundation of Krotôn was aided by Archias, then passing along the coast with his settlers for Syracuse, who is also brought into conjunction in a similar manner with the foundation of Lokri: but neither of these statements appears chronologically admissible. The Italian Lokri (called Epizephyrian, from the neighborhood of cape Zephyrium) was founded in the year 683 B. C. by settlers from the Lokrians,—either the Ozolian Lokrians in the Krissæan gulf, or those of Opus on the Eubœan strait. This point was disputed even in antiquity, and perhaps both the one and the other may have contributed: Euanthus was the œkist of the place.[716] The first years of the Epizephyrian Lokri are said to have been years of sedition and discord. And the vile character which we hear ascribed to the primitive colonists, as well as their perfidious dealing with the natives, are the more to be noted, as the Lokrians, of the times both of Aristotle and of Polybius, fully believed these statements in regard to their own ancestors.

The original emigrants to Lokri were, according to Aristotle, a body of runaway slaves, men-stealers, and adulterers, whose only legitimate connection with an honorable Hellenic root arose from a certain number of well-born Lokrian women who accompanied them. These women belonged to those select families called the Hundred Houses, who constituted what may be called the nobility of the Lokrians in Greece proper, and their descendants continued to enjoy a certain rank and preëminence in the colony, even in the time of Polybius. The emigration is said to have been occasioned by disorderly intercourse between these noble Lokrian women and their slaves,—perhaps by intermarriage with persons of inferior station, where there had existed no recognized *connubium*;[717] a fact referred, by the informants of Aristotle, to the long duration of the first Messenian war,—the Lokrian warriors having for the most part continued in the Messenian territory as auxiliaries of the Spartans during the twenty years of that war,[718] permitting themselves only rare and short visits to their homes. This is a story resembling that which we shall find in explanation of the colony of Tarentum. It comes to us too imperfectly to admit of criticism or verification; but the unamiable character of the first emigrants is a statement deserving credit, and very unlikely to have been invented. Their first proceedings on settling in Italy display a perfidy in accordance with the character ascribed to them. They found the territory in this southern portion of the Calabrian peninsula possessed by native Sikels, who, alarmed at their force, and afraid to try the hazard of resistance, agreed to admit them to a participation and joint residence. The covenant was concluded and sworn to by both parties in the following terms: "There shall be friendship between us, and we will enjoy the land in common, so long as we stand upon this earth and have heads upon our shoulders." At the time when the oath was taken, the Lokrians had put earth into their shoes and concealed heads of garlic upon their shoulders; so that, when they had divested themselves of these appendages, the oath was considered as no longer binding. Availing themselves of the first convenient opportunity, they attacked the Sikels by surprise and drove them out of the territory, of which they thus acquired the exclusive possession.[719] Their first establishment was formed upon the headland itself, cape Zephyrium (now Bruzzano); but after three or four years the site of the town was moved to an eminence in the neighboring plain, in which the Syracusans are said to have aided them.[720]

In describing the Grecian settlers in Sicily, I have already stated that they are to be considered as Greeks with a considerable infusion of blood, of habits, and of manners, from the native Sikels: the case is the same with the Italiots, or Italian Greeks, and in respect to these Epizephyrian Lokrians, especially, we find it expressly noticed by Polybius. Composed as their band was of ignoble and worthless men, not bound together by strong tribe-feelings or traditional customs, they were the more ready to adopt new practices, as well religious as civil,[721] from the Sikels. One in particular is noticed by the historian,—the religious dignity called the Phialêphorus, or censer-bearer, enjoyed among the native Sikels by a youth of noble birth, who performed the duties belonging to it in their sacrifices; but the Lokrians, while they identified

themselves with the religious ceremony, and adopted both the name and the dignity, altered the sex, and conferred it upon one of those women of noble blood who constituted the ornament of their settlement. Even down to the days of Polybius, some maiden descended from one of these select Hundred Houses, still continued to bear the title and to perform the ceremonial duties of Phialêphorus. We learn from these statements how large a portion of Sikels must have become incorporated as dependents in the colony of the Epizephyrian Lokri, and how strongly marked was the intermixture of their habits with those of the Greek settlers; while the tracing back among them of all eminence of descent to a few emigrant women of noble birth, is a peculiarity belonging exclusively to their city.

That a body of colonists, formed of such unpromising materials, should have fallen into much lawlessness and disorder, is noway surprising; but these mischiefs appear to have become so utterly intolerable in the early years of the colony, as to force upon every one the necessity of some remedy. Hence arose a phenomenon new in the march of Grecian society,—the first promulgation of written laws. The Epizephyrian Lokrians, having applied to the Delphian oracle for some healing suggestion under their distress, were directed to make laws for themselves;[722] and received the ordinances of a shepherd named Zaleukus, which he professed to have learned from the goddess Athênê in a dream. His laws are said to have been put in writing and promulgated in 664 B. C., forty years earlier than those of Drako at Athens.

That these first of all Grecian written laws were few and simple, we may be sufficiently assured. The only fact certain respecting them is their extraordinary rigor:[723] they seem to have enjoined the application of the *lex talionis* as a punishment for personal injuries. In this general character of his laws, Zaleukus was the counterpart of Drako. But so little was certainly known, and so much falsely asserted, respecting him, that Timæus the historian went so far as to call in question his real existence, [724]—against the authority not only of Ephorus, but also of Aristotle and Theophrastus. The laws must have remained, however, for a long time, formally unchanged; for so great was the aversion of the Lokrians, we are told, to any new law, that the man who ventured to propose one appeared in public with a rope round his neck, which was at once tightened if he failed to convince the assembly of the necessity of his proposition.[725] Of the government of the Epizephyrian Lokri we know only, that in later times it included a great council of one thousand members, and a chief executive magistrate called Kosmopolis: it is spoken of also as strictly and carefully administered.

The date of Rhegium (Reggio), separated from the territory of the Epizephyrian Lokri by the river Halex, must have been not only earlier than Lokri, but even earlier than Sybaris,—if the statement of Antiochus be correct, that the colonists were joined by those Messenians, who, prior to the first Messenian war, were anxious to make reparation to the Spartans for the outrage offered to the Spartan maidens at

the temple of Artemis Limnatis, but were overborne by their countrymen and forced into exile. A different version, however, is given by Pausanias of this migration of Messenians to Rhegium, yet still admitting the fact of such migration at the close of the first Messenian war, which would place the foundation of the city earlier than 720 B. C. Though Rhegium was a Chalkidic colony, yet a portion of its inhabitants seem to have been undoubtedly of Messenian origin, and amongst them Anaxilas, despot of the town between 500-470 B. C., who traced his descent through two centuries to a Messenian emigrant named Alkidamidas.[726] The celebrity and power of Anaxilas, just at the time when the ancient history of the Greek towns was beginning to be set forth in prose, and with some degree of system, caused the Messenian element in the population of Rhegium to be noticed prominently; but the town was essentially Chalkidic, connected by colonial sisterhood with the Chalkidic settlements in Sicily,—Zanklê, Naxos, Katana, and Leontini. The original emigrants departed from Chalkis, as a tenth of the citizens consecrated by vow to Apollo in consequence of famine; and the directions of the god, as well as the invitation of the Zanklæans, guided their course to Rhegium. The town was flourishing, and acquired a considerable number of dependent villages around,[727] inhabited doubtless by cultivators of the indigenous population. But it seems to have been often at variance with the conterminous Lokrians, and received one severe defeat, in conjunction with the Tarentines, which will be hereafter recounted.

Between Lokri and the Lakinian cape were situated the Achæan colony of Kaulônia, and Skyllêtium; the latter seemingly included in the domain of Krotôn, though pretending to have been originally founded by Menestheus, the leader of the Athenians at the siege of Troy: Petilia, also, a hill-fortress north-west of the Lakinian cape, as well as Makalla, both comprised in the territory of Krotôn, were affirmed to have been founded by Philoktêtês. Along all this coast of the gulf of Tarentum, there were various establishments ascribed to the heroes of the Trojan war,[728]—Epeius, Philoktêtês, Nestor,—or to their returning troops. Of these establishments, probably the occupants had been small, miscellaneous, unacknowledged bands of Grecian adventurers,[729] who assumed to themselves the most honorable origin which they could imagine, and who became afterwards absorbed into the larger colonial establishments which followed; the latter adopting and taking upon themselves the heroic worship of Philoktêtês or other warriors from Troy, which the prior emigrants had begun.

During the flourishing times of Sybaris and Krotôn, it seems that these two great cities divided the whole length of the coast of the Tarentine gulf, from the spot now called Rocca Imperiale down to the south of the Lakinian cape. Between the point where the dominion of Sybaris terminated on the Tarentine side, and Tarentum itself, there were two considerable Grecian settlements,—Siris, afterwards called Herakleia, and Metapontium. The fertility and attraction of the territory of Siris, with its two rivers, Akiris and Siris, were well known even to the poet Archilochus[730] (660 B. C.),

but we do not know the date at which it passed from the indigenous Chônians or Chaonians into the hands of Greek settlers. A citizen of Siris is mentioned among the suitors for the daughter of the Sikyonian Kleisthenês, (580-560 B. C.) We are told that some Kolophonian fugitives, emigrating to escape the dominion of the Lydian kings, attacked and possessed themselves of the spot, giving to it the name Polieion. The Chônians of Siris ascribed to themselves a Trojan origin, exhibiting a wooden image of the Ilian Athênê, which they affirmed to have been brought away by their fugitive ancestors after the capture of Troy. When the town was stormed by the Ionians, many of the inhabitants clung to this relic for protection, but were dragged away and slain by the victors,[731] whose sacrilege was supposed to have been the cause that their settlement was not durable. At the time of the invasion of Greece by Xerxês, the fertile territory of Siritis was considered as still open to be colonized; for the Athenians when their affairs appeared desperate, had this scheme of emigration in reserve as a possible resource;[732] and there were inspired declarations from some of the contemporary prophets, which encouraged them to undertake it. At length, after the town of Thurii had been founded by Athens, in the vicinity of the dismantled Sybaris, the Thurians tried to possess themselves of the Siritid territoiy, but were opposed by the Tarentines.[733] According to the compromise concluded between them, Tarentum was recognized as the metropolis of the colony, but joint possession was allowed both to Tarentines and Thurians. The former transferred the site of the city, under the new name Herakleia, to a spot three miles from the sea, leaving Siris as the place of maritime access to it.[734]

About twenty-five miles eastward of Siris, on the coast of the Tarentine gulf, was situated Metapontium, a Greek town which was affirmed by some to draw its origin from the Pylian companions of Nestor,—by others, from the Phocian warriors of Epeius, on their return from Troy. The proofs of the former were exhibited in the worship of the Neleid heroes,—the proofs of the latter in the preservation of the reputed identical tools with which Epeius had constructed the Trojan horse.[735] Metapontium was planted on the territory of the Chônians or Œnotrians, but the first colony is said to have been destroyed by an attack of the Samnites,[736] at what period we do not know. It had been founded by some Achæan settlers,—under the direction of the œkist Daulius, despot of the Phocian Krissa, and invited by the inhabitants of Sybaris, who feared that the place might be appropriated by the neighboring Tarentines, colonists from Sparta and hereditary enemies in Peloponnesus of the Achæan race. Before the new settlers arrived, however, the place seems to have been already appropriated by the Tarentines; for the Achæan Leukippus only obtained their permission to land by a fraudulent promise, and, after all, had to sustain a forcible struggle both with them and with the neighboring Œnotrians, which was compromised by a division of territory. The fertility of the Metapontine territory was hardly less celebrated than that of the Siritid.[737]

Farther eastward of Metapontium, again at the distance of about twenty-five miles, was situated the great city of Taras, or Tarentum, a colony from Sparta founded after the first Messenian war, seemingly about 707 B. C. The œkist Phalanthus, said to have been an Herakleid, was placed at the head of a body of Spartan emigrants,—consisting principally of some citizens called Epeunaktæ, and of the youth called Partheniæ, who had been disgraced by their countrymen on account of their origin, and were on the point of breaking out into rebellion. It was out of the Messenian war that this emigration is stated to have arisen, in a manner analogous to that which has been stated respecting the Epizephyrian Lokrians. The Lacedæmonians, before entering Messenia to carry on the war, had made a vow not to return until they should have completed the conquest; a vow in which it appears that some of them declined to take part, standing altogether aloof from the expedition. When the absent soldiers returned after many years of absence consumed in the war, they found a numerous progeny which had been born to their wives and daughters during the interval, from intercourse with those (Epeunaktæ) who had stayed at home. The Epeunaktæ were punished by being degraded to the rank and servitude of Helots; the children thus born, called Partheniæ,[738] were also cut off from all the rights of citizenship, and held in dishonor. But the parties punished were numerous enough to make themselves formidable, and a conspiracy was planned among them, intended to break out at the great religious festival of the Hyacinthia, in the temple of the Amyklæan Apollo. Phalanthus was the secret chief of the conspirators, who agreed to commence their attack upon the authorities at the moment when he should put on his helmet. The leader, however, never intending that the scheme should be executed, betrayed it beforehand, stipulating for the safety of all those implicated in it. At the commencement of the festival, when the multitude were already assembled, a herald was directed to proclaim aloud, that Phalanthus would not on that day put on his helmet,—a proclamation which at once revealed to the conspirators that they were betrayed. Some of them sought safety in flight, others assumed the posture of suppliants; but they were merely detained in confinement, with assurance of safety, while Phalanthus was sent to the Delphian oracle to ask advice respecting emigration. He is said to have inquired whether he might be permitted to appropriate the fertile plain of Sikyon, but the Pythian priestess emphatically dissuaded him, and enjoined him to conduct his emigrants to Satyrium and Tarentum, where he would be "a mischief to the Iapygians." Phalanthus obeyed, and conducted the detected conspirators as emigrants to the Tarentine gulf,[739] which he reached a few years after the foundation of Sybaris and Krotôn by the Achæans. According to Ephorus, he found these prior emigrants at war with the natives, aided them in the contest, and received in return their aid to accomplish his own settlement. But this can hardly have consisted with the narrative of Antiochus, who represented the Achæans of Sybaris as retaining, even in their colonies, the hatred against the Dorian name which they had contracted in Peloponnesus.[740] Antiochus stated that Phalanthus

and his colonists were received in a friendly manner by the indigenous inhabitants, and allowed to establish their new town in tranquillity.

If such was really the fact, it proves that the native inhabitants of the soil must have been of purely inland habits, making no use of the sea either for commerce or for fishery, otherwise they would hardly have relinquished such a site as that of Tarentum,—which, while favorable and productive, even in regard to the adjoining land, was with respect to sea-advantages without a parallel in Grecian Italy.[741] It was the only spot in the gulf which possessed a perfectly safe and convenient harbor,—a spacious inlet of the sea is there formed, sheltered by an isthmus and an outlying peninsula, so as to leave only a narrow entrance. This inlet, still known as the Mare Piccolo, though its shores and the adjoining tongue of land appear to have undergone much change, affords at the present day a constant, inexhaustible, and varied supply of fish, especially of shell-fish; which furnish both nourishment and employment to a large proportion among the inhabitants of the contracted modern Taranto, just as they once served the same purpose to the numerous, lively, and jovial population of the mighty Tarentum. The concentrated population of fishermen formed a predominant element in the character of the Tarentine democracy.[742] Tarentum was just on the borders of the country originally known as Italy, within which Herodotus includes it, while Antiochus considers it in Iapygia, and regards Metapontium as the last Greek town in Italy.

Its immediate neighbors were the Iapygians, who, under various subdivisions of name and dialect, seem to have occupied the greater part of south-eastern Italy, including the peninsula denominated after them,—yet sometimes also called the Salentine,—between the Adriatic and the Tarentine gulf,—and who are even stated at one time to have occupied some territory on the south east of that gulf, near the site of Krotôn. The Iapygian name appears to have comprehended Messapians, Salentines, and Kalabrians; according to some, even Peuketians and Daunians, as far along the Adriatic as Mount Garganus, or Drion; Skylax notices in his time (about 360 B. C.) five different tongues in the country which he calls Iapygia.[743] The Messapians and Salentines are spoken of as emigrants from Krête, akin to the Minoian or primitive Kretans; and we find a national genealogy which recognizes Iapyx son of Dædalus, an emigrant from Sicily. But the story told to Herodotus was, that the Kretan soldiers who had accompanied Minos in his expedition to recover Dædalus from Kamikus in Sicily, were on their return home cast away on the shores of Iapygia, and became the founders of Hyria and other Messapian towns in the interior of the country.[744] Brundusium also, or Brentesion, as the Greeks called it,[745] inconsiderable in the days of Herodotus, but famous in the Roman times afterwards, as the most frequented seaport for voyaging to Epirus, was a Messapian town. The native language spoken by the Iapygian Messapians was a variety of the Oscan: the Latin poet Ennius, a native of Rudiæ in the Iapygian peninsula, spoke Greek, Latin, and Oscan,

and even deduced his pedigree from the ancient national prince or hero Messapus. [746]

We are told that during the lifetime of Phalanthus, the Tarentine settlers gained victories over the Messapians and Peuketians, which they commemorated afterwards by votive offerings at Delphi,—and that they even made acquisitions at the expense of the inhabitants of Brundusium,[747]—a statement difficult to believe, if we look to the distance of the latter place, and to the circumstance that Herodotus, even in his time, names it only as a harbor. Phalanthus too, driven into exile, is said to have found a hospitable reception at Brundusium, and to have died there. Of the history of Tarentum, however, during the first two hundred and thirty years of its existence, we possess no details; we have reason to believe that it partook in the general prosperity of the Italian Greeks during those two centuries, though it remained inferior both to Sybaris and to Krotôn. About the year 510 B. C., these two latter republics went to war, and Sybaris was nearly destroyed; while in the subsequent half-century, the Krotoniates suffered the terrible defeat of Sagra from the Lokrians, and the Tarentines experienced an equally ruinous defeat from the Iapygian Messapians. From these reverses, however, the Tarentines appear to have recovered more completely than the Krotoniates; for the former stand first among the Italiots, or Italian Greeks, from the year 400 B. C. down to the supremacy of the Romans, and made better head against the growth of the Lucanians and Bruttians of the interior.

Such were the chief cities of the Italian Greeks from Tarentum on the upper sea to Poseidonia on the lower; and if we take them during the period preceding the ruin of Sybaris (in 510 B. C.), they will appear to have enjoyed a degree of prosperity even surpassing that of the Sicilian Greeks. The dominion of Sybaris, Krotôn, and Lokri extended across the peninsula from sea to sea, and the mountainous regions of the interior of Calabria were held in amicable connection with the cities and cultivators in the plain and valley near the sea,—to the reciprocal advantage of both. The petty native tribes of Œnotrians, Sikels, or Italians, properly so called, were partially Hellenized, and brought into the condition of village cultivators and shepherds, dependent upon Sybaris and its fellow cities; a portion of them dwelling in the town, probably, as domestic slaves of the rich men, but most of them remaining in the country as serfs, penestæ, or coloni, intermingled with Greek settlers, and paying over parts of their produce to Greek proprietors.

But this dependence, though accomplished in the first instance by force, was yet not upheld exclusively by force,—it was to a great degree the result of an organized march of life, and of more productive cultivation brought within their reach,—of new wants, both created and supplied,—of temples, festivals, ships, walls, chariots, etc., which imposed upon the imagination of the rude landsman and shepherd. Against mere force the natives could have found shelter in the unconquerable forests and ravines of the Calabrian Apennines, and in that vast mountain region of the Sila, lying immediately behind the plains of Sybaris, where even the French army, with its

excellent organization, in 1807, found so much difficulty in reaching the bandit villagers.[748] It was not by arms alone, but by arms and arts combined,—a mingled influence, such as enabled imperial Rome to subdue the fierceness of the rude Germans and Britons,—that the Sybarites and Krotoniates acquired and maintained their ascendency over the natives of the interior. The shepherd of the banks of the river Sybaris or Krathis not only found a new exchangeable value for his cattle and other produce, becoming familiar with better diet and clothing, and improved cultivation of the olive and the vine,—but he was also enabled to display his prowess, if strong and brave, in the public games at the festival of the Lakinian Hêrê, or even at the Olympic games in Peloponnesus.[749] It is thus that we have to explain the extensive dominion, the great population and the wealth and luxury of the Sybarites and Krotoniates,—a population of which the incidental reports as given in figures are not trustworthy, but which we may well believe to have been very numerous. The native Œnotrians, while unable to combine in resisting Greek force, were at the same time less widely distinguished from the Greeks, in race and language, than the Oscans of middle Italy, and therefore more accessible to Greek pacific influences; while the Oscan race seem to have been both fiercer in repelling the assaults of the Greeks, and more intractable as to their seductions. Nor were the Iapygians modified by the neighborhood of Tarentum, in the same degree as the tribes adjoining to Sybaris and Krotôn were by their contact with those cities. The dialect of Tarentum,[750] as well as of Herakleia, though a marked Doric, admitted many local peculiarities, and the farces of the Tarentine poet Rhinthon, like the Syracusan Sophron, seem to have blended the Hellenic with the Italic in language as well as in character.

About the year 560 B. C., the time of the accession of Peisistratus at Athens, the close of what may properly be called the first period of Grecian history, Sybaris and Krotôn were at the maximum of their power, which each maintained for half a century afterwards, until the fatal dissension between them. We are told that the Sybarites, in that final contest, marched against Krotôn with an army of three hundred thousand men: fabulous as this number doubtless is, we cannot doubt that, for an irruption of this kind into an adjoining territory, their large body of semi-Hellenized native subjects might be mustered in prodigious force. The few statements which have reached us respecting them touch, unfortunately, upon little more than their luxury, fantastic self-indulgence, and extravagant indolence, for which qualities they have become proverbial in modern times as well as in ancient. Anecdotes illustrating these qualities were current, and served more than one purpose, in antiquity. The philosopher recounted them, in order to discredit and denounce the character which they exemplified,—while among gay companies, "Sybaritic tales," or tales respecting sayings and doing of ancient Sybarites, formed a separate and special class of excellent stories, to be told simply for amusement,[751]—with which view witty romancers multiplied them indefinitely. It is probable that the Pythagorean philosophers (who belonged originally to Krotôn, but maintained themselves permanently as a philosophical sect in Italy and Sicily, with a strong tinge of ostentatious asceticism

and mysticism), in their exhortations to temperance and in their denunciations of luxurious habits, might select by preference examples from Sybaris, the ancient enemy of the Krotonians, to point their moral,—and that the exaggerated reputation of the city thus first became the subject of common talk throughout the Grecian world; for little could be actually known of Sybaris in detail, since its humiliation dates from the first commencement of Grecian contemporaneous history. Hekatæus of Milêtus may perhaps have visited it in its full splendor, but even Herodotus knew it only by past report, and the principal anecdotes respecting it are cited from authors considerably later than him, who follow the tone of thought so common in antiquity, in ascribing the ruin of the Sybarites to their overweening corruption and luxury.[752]

Making allowance, however, for exaggeration on all these accounts, there can be no reason to doubt that Sybaris, in 560 B. C., was one of the most wealthy, populous, and powerful cities of the Hellenic name; and that it also presented both comfortable abundance among the mass of the citizens, arising from the easy attainment of fresh lots of fertile land, and excessive indulgences among the rich,—to a degree forming marked contrast with Hellas proper, of which Herodotus characterized poverty as the foster-sister.[753] The extraordinary productiveness of the neighboring territory,—alleged by Varro, in his time, when the culture must have been much worse than it had been under the old Sybaris, to yield an ordinary crop of a hundred-fold,[754] and extolled by modern travellers, even in its present yet more neglected culture,—has been already touched upon. The river Krathis,—still the most considerable river of that region,—at a time when there was an industrious population to keep its watercourse in order, would enable the extensive fields of Sybaris to supply abundant nourishment for a population larger perhaps than any other Grecian city could parallel. But though nature was thus bountiful, industry, good management, and well-ordered government were required to turn her bounty to account: where these are wanting, later experience of the same territory shows that its inexhaustible capacities may exist in vain. That luxury, which Grecian moralists denounced in the leading Sybarites, between 560 and 510 B. C., was the result of acquisitions vigorously and industriously pushed, and kept together by an orderly central force, during a century and a half that the colony had existed. Though the Trœzenian settlers who formed a portion of the original emigrants had been expelled when the Achæans became more numerous, yet we are told that, on the whole, Sybaris was liberal in the reception of new emigrants to the citizenship,[755] and that this was one of the causes of its remarkable advance. Of these additional comers, we may presume that many went to form its colonies on the Mediterranean sea, and some to settle both among its four dependent inland nations, and its twenty-five subject towns. Five thousand horsemen, we are told, clothed in showy attire, formed the processional march in certain Sybaritic festivals,—a number which is best appreciated by comparison with the fact, that the knights or horsemen of Athens, in her best days, did not exceed twelve hundred. The Sybaritic horses, if we are to believe a story purporting to come from Aristotle, were taught to move at the sound of the flute; and the garments of these

wealthy citizens were composed of the finest wool from Milêtus in Ionia,[756]—the Tarentine wool not having then acquired the distinguished renown which it possessed five centuries afterwards towards the close of the Roman republic. Next to the great abundance of home produce,—corn, wine, oil, flax, cattle, fish, timber, etc.,—the fact next in importance which we hear respecting Sybaris is, the great traffic carried on with Milêtus: these two cities were more intimately and affectionately connected together than any two Hellenic cities within the knowledge of Herodotus.[757] The tie between Tarentum and Knidus was also of a very intimate character,[758] so that the great intercourse, personal as well as commercial, between the Asiatic and the Italic Greeks, appears as a marked fact in the history of the sixth century before the Christian era.

In this respect, as well as in several others, the Hellenic world wears a very different aspect in 560 B. C. from that which it assumed a century afterwards, and in which it is best known to modern readers. At the former period, the Ionic and Italic Greeks are the great ornaments of the Hellenic name, and carried on a more lucrative trade with each other, than either of them maintained with Greece proper; which both of them recognized as their mother-country, though without admitting anything in the nature of established headship. The military power of Sparta is indeed at this time great and preponderant in Peloponnesus, but she has no navy, and she is only just essaying her strength, not without reluctance, in ultramarine interference. After the lapse of a century, these circumstances change materially. The independence of the Asiatic Greeks is destroyed, and the power of the Italic Greeks is greatly broken; while Sparta and Athens not only become the prominent and leading Hellenic states, but constitute themselves centres of action for the lesser cities, to a degree previously unknown.

It was during the height of their prosperity, seemingly, in the sixth century B. C., that the Italian Greeks either acquired for, or bestowed upon, their territory the appellation of Magna Græcia, which at that time it well deserved; for not only were Sybaris and Krotôn then the greatest Grecian cities situated near together, but the whole peninsula of Calabria may be considered as attached to the Grecian cities on the coast. The native Œnotrians and Sikels occupying the interior had become Hellenized, or semi-Hellenized, with a mixture of Greeks among them,—common subjects of these great cities; so that the whole extent of the Calabrian peninsula, within the line which joins Sybaris with Poseidonia, might then be fairly considered as Hellenic territory. Sybaris maintained much traffic with the Tuscan towns in the Mediterranean, and the communication between Greece and Rome, across the Calabrian isthmus,[759] may perhaps have been easier during the time of the Roman kings—whose expulsion was nearly contemporaneous with the ruin of Sybaris—than it became during the first two centuries of the Roman republic. But all these relations underwent a complete change after the breaking up of the power of Sybaris in 510 B. C., and the gradual march of the Oscan population from middle Italy towards the south.

Cumæ was overwhelmed by the Samnites, Poseidonia by the Lucanians; who became possessed not only of these maritime cities, but also of the whole inland territory—now called the Basilicata, with part of the hither Calabria—across from Poseidonia to the neighborhood of the gulf of Tarentum: while the Bruttians,—a mixture of outlying Lucanians with the Greco-Œnotrian population once subject to Sybaris, speaking both Greek and Oscan,[760]—became masters of the inland mountains in the farther Calabria, from Consentia nearly to the Sicilian strait. It was thus that the ruin of Sybaris, combined with the spread of the Lucanians and Bruttians, deprived the Italian Greeks of that inland territory which they had enjoyed in the sixth century B. C., and restricted them to the neighborhood of the coast. To understand the extraordinary power and prosperity of Sybaris and Krotôn, in the sixth century B. C., when the whole of this inland territory was subject to them, and before the rise of the Lucanians, and Bruttians, and when the name Magna Græcia was first given, it is necessary to glance by contrast at these latter periods; more especially since the name still continued to be applied by the Romans to Italian Greece after the contraction of territory had rendered it less appropriate.

Of Krotôn at this early period of its power and prosperity we know even less than of Sybaris. It stood distinguished both for the number of its citizens who received prizes at the Olympic games, and for the excellence of its surgeons or physicians. And what may seem more surprising, if we consider the extreme present insalubrity of the site upon which it stood, it was in ancient times proverbially healthy,[761] which was not so much the case with the more fertile Sybaris. Respecting all these cities of Italian Greeks, the same remark is applicable as was before made in reference to the Sicilian Greeks,—that the intermixture of the native population sensibly affected both their character and habits. We have no information respecting their government during this early period of prosperity, except that we find mention at Krotôn, as at the Epizephyrian Lokri, of a senate of one thousand members, yet not excluding occasionally the ekklesia, or general assembly.[762] Probably, the steady increase of their dominion in the interior, and the facility of providing maintenance for new population, tended much to make their political systems, whatever they may have been, work in a satisfactory manner. The attempt of Pythagoras and his followers to constitute themselves a ruling faction as well as a philosophical sect, will be recounted in a subsequent chapter. The proceedings connected with that attempt will show that there was considerable analogy and sympathy between the various cities of Italian Greece, so as to render them liable to be acted on by the same causes. But though the festivals of the Lakinian Hêrê, administered by the Krotoniates, formed from early times a common point of religious assemblage to all,[763]—yet the attempts to institute periodical meetings of deputies, for the express purpose of maintaining political harmony, did not begin until after the destruction of Sybaris, nor were they ever more than partially successful.

One other city, the most distant colony founded by Greeks in the western regions, yet remains to be mentioned; and we can do no more than mention it, since we have no facts to make up its history. Massalia, the modern Marseilles, was founded by the Ionic Phokæans in the 45th Olympiad, about 597 B. C.,[764] at the time when Sybaris and Krotôn were near the maximum of their power,—when the peninsula of Calabria was all Hellenic, and when Cumæ also had not yet been visited by those calamities which brought about its decline. So much Hellenism in the south of Italy doubtless facilitated the western progress of the adventurous Phokæan mariner. It would appear that Massalia was founded by amicable fusion of Phokæan colonists with the indigenous Gauls, if we may judge by the romantic legend of the Protiadæ, a Massaliotic family or gens existing in the time of Aristotle. Euxenus, a Phokæan merchant, had contracted friendly relations with Nanus, a native chief in the south of Gaul, and was invited to the festival in which the latter was about to celebrate the marriage of his daughter Petta. According to the custom of the country, the maiden was to choose for herself a husband among the guests, by presenting him with a cup: through accident, or by preference, Petta presented it to Euxenus, and became his wife. Prôtis of Massalia, the offspring of this marriage, was the primitive ancestor and eponym of the Protiadæ. According to another story respecting the origin of the same gens, Protis was himself the Phokæan leader who married Gyptis, daughter of Nannus king of the Segobrigian Gauls.[765]

Of the history of Massalia we know nothing, nor does it appear to have been connected with the general movement of the Grecian world. We learn generally that the Massaliots administered their affairs with discretion as well as with unanimity, and exhibited in their private habits an exemplary modesty,—that although preserving alliance with the people of the interior, they were scrupulously vigilant in guarding their city against surprise, permitting no armed strangers to enter,—that they introduced the culture of vines and olives, and gradually extended the Greek alphabet, language, and civilization among the neighboring Gauls,—that they possessed and fortified many positions along the coast of the gulf of Lyons, and founded five colonies along the eastern coast of Spain,—that their government was oligarchical, consisting of a perpetual senate of six hundred persons, yet admitting occasionally new members from without, and a small council of fifteen members,—that the Delphinian Apollo and the Ephesian Artemis were their chief deities, planted as guardians of their outlying posts, and transmitted to their colonies.[766] Although it is common to represent a deliberate march and steady supremacy of the governing few, with contented obedience on the part of the many, as the characteristic of Dorian states, and mutability not less than disturbance as the prevalent tendency in Ionia,—yet there is no Grecian community to whom the former attributes are more pointedly ascribed than the Ionic Massalia. The commerce of the Massaliots appears to have been extensive, and their armed maritime force sufficiently powerful to defend it against the aggressions of Carthage,—their principal enemy in the western Mediterranean.

CHAPTER XXIII.

GRECIAN COLONIES IN AND NEAR EPIRUS.

On the eastern side of the Ionian sea were situated the Grecian colonies of Korkyra, Leukas, Anaktorium, Ambrakia, Apollonia, and Epidamnus.

Among these, by far the most distinguished, for situation, for wealth, and for power, was Korkyra,—now known as Corfu, the same name belonging, as in antiquity, both to the town and the island, which is separated from the coast of Epirus by a strait varying from two to seven miles in breadth. Korkyra was founded by the Corinthians, at the same time, we are told, as Syracuse. Chersikratês, a Bacchiad, is said to have accompanied Archias on his voyage from Corinth to Syracuse, and to have been left with a company of emigrants on the island of Korkyra, where he founded a settlement.[767] What inhabitants he found there, or how they were dealt with, we cannot clearly make out. The island was generally conceived in antiquity as the residence of the Homeric Phæakians, and it is to this fact that Thucydidês ascribes in part the eminence of the Korkyræan marine.[768] According to another story, some Eretrians from Eubœa had settled there, and were compelled to retire. A third statement represents the Liburnians[769] as the prior inhabitants,—and this perhaps is the most probable, since the Liburnians were an enterprising, maritime, piratical race, who long continued to occupy the more northerly islands in the Adriatic along the Illyrian and Dalmatian coast. That maritime activity, and number of ships, both warlike and commercial, which we find at an early date among the Korkyræans, and in which they stand distinguished from the Italian and Sicilian Greeks, may be plausibly attributed to their partial fusion with preëxisting Liburnians; for the ante-Hellenic natives of Magna Græcia and Sicily, as has been already noticed, were as unpractised at sea as the Liburnians were expert.

At the time when the Corinthians were about to colonize Sicily, it was natural that they should also wish to plant a settlement at Korkyra, which was a post of great importance for facilitating the voyage from Peloponnesus to Italy, and was farther convenient for traffic with Epirus, at that period altogether non-Hellenic. Their choice of a site was fully justified by the prosperity and power of the colony, which, however, though sometimes in combination with the mother-city, was more frequently alienated from her and hostile, and continued so from an early period throughout most part of the three centuries from 700-400 B. C.[770] Perhaps also Molykreia and Chalkis,[771] on the south-western coast of Ætolia, not far from the mouth of the Corinthian gulf, may have been founded by Corinth at a date hardly less early than Korkyra.

It was at Corinth that the earliest improvements in Greek ship-building, and the first construction of the trireme or warship with a triple bank of oars, was introduced,

and it was probably from Corinth that this improvement passed to Korkyra, as it did to Samos. In early times, the Korkyræan navy was in a condition to cope with the Corinthian, and the most ancient naval battle known to Thucydidês[772] was one between these two states, in 664 B. C. As far as we can make out, it appears that Korkyra maintained her independence, not only during the government of the Bacchiads at Corinth, but also throughout the long reign of the despot Kypselus, and a part of the reign of his son Periander. But towards the close of this latter reign, we find Korkyra subject to Corinth; and the barbarous treatment inflicted by Periander, in revenge for the death of his son, upon three hundred Korkyræan youths, has already been recounted in a former chapter.[773] After the death of Periander, the island seems to have regained its independence, but we are left without any particulars respecting it, from about 585 B. C. down to the period shortly preceding the invasion of Greece by Xerxes,—nearly a century. At this later epoch the Korkyræans possessed a naval force hardly inferior to any state in Greece. The expulsion of Kypselids from Corinth, and the reëstablishment of the previous oligarchy, or something like it, does not seem to have reconciled the Korkyræans to their mother-city; for it was immediately previous to the Peloponnesian war that the Corinthians preferred the bitterest complaints against them,[774] of setting at nought those obligations which a colony was generally understood to be obliged to render. No place of honor was reserved at the public festivals of Korkyra for Corinthian visitors, nor was it the practice to offer to the latter the first taste of the victims sacrificed,—observances which were doubtless respectfully fulfilled at Ambrakia and Leukas. Nevertheless, the Korkyræans had taken part conjointly with the Corinthians in favor of Syracuse, when that city was in imminent danger of being conquered and enslaved by Hippokratês[775] despot of Gela (about 492 B. C.),—an incident which shows that they were not destitute of generous sympathy with sister states, and leads us to imagine that their alienation from Corinth was as much the fault of the mother-city as their own.

The grounds of the quarrel were, probably, jealousies of trade,—especially trade with the Epirotic and Illyrian tribes, wherein both were to a great degree rivals. Safe at home, and industrious in the culture of their fertile island, the Korkyræans were able to furnish wine and oil to the Epirots on the main-land in exchange for the cattle, sheep, hides, and wool of the latter,—more easily and cheaply than the Corinthian merchant. And for the purposes of this trade, they had possessed themselves of a peræa or strip of the main-land immediately on the other side of the intervening strait, where they fortified various posts for the protection of their property.[776] The Corinthians were personally more popular among the Epirots than the Korkyræans;[777] but it was not until long after the foundation of Korkyra that they established their first settlement on the main-land,—Ambrakia, on the north side of the Ambrakiotic gulf, and near the mouth of the river Arachthus. It was during the reign of Kypselus, and under the guidance of his son Gorgus, that this settlement was planted, which afterwards became populous and considerable. We know nothing respecting its growth, and we hear only of a despot named Periander as ruling in it,

probably related to the despot of the same name at Corinth.[778] Periander of Ambrakia was overthrown by a private conspiracy, provoked by his own brutality, and warmly seconded by the citizens, who lived constantly afterwards under a popular government.[779]

Notwithstanding the long-continued dissensions between Korkyra and Corinth, it appears that four considerable settlements on this same line of coast were formed by the joint enterprise of both,—Leukas and Anaktorium, to the south of the mouth of the Ambrakiotic gulf,—and Apollonia and Epidamnus, both in the territory of the Illyrians, at some distance to the north of the Akrokeraunian promontory. In the settlement of the two latter, the Korkyræans seem to have been the principals,—in that of the two former, they were only auxiliaries; and it probably did not suit their policy to favor the establishment of any new colony on the intermediate coast opposite to their own island, between the promontory and the gulf above mentioned. Leukas, Anaktorium, and Ambrakia are all referred to the agency of Kypselus the Corinthian, and the tranquillity which Aristotle ascribes to his reign may be in part ascribed to the new homes thus provided for poor or discontented Corinthian citizens. Leukas was situated near the modern Santa Maura: the present island was originally a peninsula, and continued to be so until the time of Thucydidês; but in the succeeding half-century, the Leukadians cut through the isthmus, and erected a bridge across the narrow strait connecting them with the main-land. It had been once an Akarnanian settlement, named Epileukadii, the inhabitants of which falling into civil dissension, invited one thousand Corinthian settlers to join them. The new-comers choosing their opportunity for attack, slew or expelled those who had invited them, made themselves masters of the place with its lands, and converted it from an Akarnanian village into a Grecian town.[780] Anaktorium was situated a short distance within the mouth of the Ambrakian gulf,—founded, like Leukas, upon Akarnanian soil, and with a mixture of Akarnanian inhabitants, by colonists under the auspices of Kypselus or Periander. In both these establishments Korkyræan settlers participated;[781] in both, also, the usual religious feelings connected with Grecian emigration were displayed by the neighborhood of a venerated temple of Apollo overlooking the sea,—Apollo Aktius near Anaktorium, and Apollo Leukatas near Leukas.[782]

Between these three settlements,—Ambrakia, Anaktorium, and Leukas,—and the Akarnanian population of the interior, there were standing feelings of hostility; perhaps arising out of the violence which had marked the first foundation of Leukas. The Corinthians, though popular with the Epirots, had been indifferent or unsuccessful in conciliating the Akarnanians. It rather seems, indeed, that the Akarnanians were averse to the presence or neighborhood of any powerful seaport; for in spite of their hatred towards the Ambrakiots, they were more apprehensive of seeing Ambrakia in the hands of the Athenians than in that of its own native citizens.[783]

The two colonies, north of the Akrokeraunian promontory, and on the coast-land of the Illyrian tribes,—Apollonia and Epidamnus,—were formed chiefly by the Ko-

rkyræans, yet with some aid and a portion of the settlers from Corinth, as well as from other Doric towns. Especially it is to be noticed, that the œkist was a Corinthian and a Herakleid, Phalius the son of Eratokleidês,—for, according to the usual practice of Greece, whenever a city, itself a colony, founded a sub-colony, the œkist of the latter was borrowed from the mother-city of the former.[784] Hence the Corinthians acquired a partial right of control and interference in the affairs of Epidamnus, which we shall find hereafter leading to important practical consequences. Epidamnus,—better known under its subsequent name Dyrrhachium,—was situated on an isthmus on or near the territory of the Illyrian tribe called Taulantii, and is said to have been settled about 627 B. C. Apollonia, of which the god Apollo himself seems to have been recognized as œkist,[785] was founded under similar circumstances, during the reign of Periander of Corinth, on a maritime plain both extensive and fertile, near the river Aôus, two days' journey south of Epidamnus.

Both the one and the other of these two cities seem to have flourished, and to have received accession of inhabitants from Triphylia in Peloponnesus, when that country was subdued by the Eleians. Respecting Epidamnus, especially, we are told that it acquired great wealth and population during the century preceding the Peloponnesian war.[786] A few allusions which we find in Aristotle, too brief to afford much instruction, lead us to suppose that the governments of both began by being close oligarchies, under the management of the primitive leaders of the colony,—that in Epidamnus, the artisans and tradesmen in the town were considered in the light of slaves belonging to the public,—but that in process of time, seemingly somewhat before the Peloponnesian war, intestine dissensions broke up this oligarchy,[787] substituted a periodical senate, with occasional public assemblies, in place of the permanent phylarchs, or chiefs of tribes, and thus introduced a form more or less democratical, yet still retaining the original single-headed archon. The Epidamnian government was liberal in the admission of metics, or resident aliens,—a fact which renders it probable that the alleged public slavery of artisans in that town was a status carrying with it none of the hardships of actual slavery. It was through an authorized selling agent, or polêtês, that all traffic between Epidamnus and the neighboring Illyrians was carried on,—individual dealing with them being interdicted.[788] Apollonia was in one respect pointedly distinguished from Epidamnus, since she excluded metics, or resident strangers, with a degree of rigor hardly inferior to Sparta. These few facts are all that we are permitted to hear respecting colonies both important in themselves and interesting as they brought the Greeks into connection with distant people and regions.

The six colonies just named,—Korkyra, Ambrakia, Anaktorium, Leukas, Apollonia, and Epidamnus,—form an aggregate lying apart from the rest of the Hellenic name, and connected with each other, though not always maintained in harmony, by analogy of race and position, as well as by their common original from Corinth. That the commerce which the Corinthian merchants carried on with them, and through them

with the tribes in the interior, was lucrative, we can have no doubt; and Leukas and Ambrakia continued for a long time to be not merely faithful allies, but servile imitators, of their mother-city. The commerce of Korkyra is also represented as very extensive, and carried even to the northern extremity of the Ionic gulf. It would seem that they were the first Greeks to open a trade and to establish various settlements on the Illyrian and Dalmatian coasts, as the Phokæans were the first to carry their traffic along the Adriatic coast of Italy: the jars and pottery of Korkyra enjoyed great reputation throughout all parts of the gulf.[789] The general trade of the island, and the encouragement for its shipping, must probably have been greater during the sixth century B. C., while the cities of Magna Græcia were at the maximum of their prosperity, than in the ensuing century, when they had comparatively declined. Nor can we doubt that the visitors and presents to the oracle of Dodona in Epirus, which was distant two days' journey on landing from Korkyra, and the importance of which was most sensible during the earlier periods of Grecian history, contributed to swell the traffic of the Korkyræans.

It is worthy of notice that the monetary system established at Korkyra was thoroughly Grecian and Corinthian, graduated on the usual scale of obols, drachms, minæ, and talents, without including any of those native Italian or Sicilian elements which were adopted by the cities in Magna Græcia and Sicily. The type of the Corinthian coins seems also to have passed to those of Leukas and Ambrakia.[790]

Of the islands of Zakynthus and Kephallenia, Zante and Cephalonia, we hear very little: of Ithaka, so interesting from the story of the Odyssey, we have no historical information at all. The inhabitants of Zakynthus were Achæans from Peloponnesus: Kephallenia was distributed among four separate city governments.[791] Neither of these islands play any part in Grecian history until the time of the maritime empire of Athens, after the Persian war.

CHAPTER XXIV.

AKARNANIANS. — EPIROTS.

Some notice must be taken of those barbarous or non-Hellenic nations who formed the immediate neighbors of Hellas, west of the range of Pindus, and north of that range which connects Pindus with Olympus,—as well as of those other tribes, who, though lying more remote from Hellas proper, were yet brought into relations of traffic or hostility with the Hellenic colonies.

Between the Greeks and these foreign neighbors, the Akarnanians, of whom I have already spoken briefly in my preceding volume, form the proper link of transition. They occupied the territory between the river Achelôus, the Ionian sea, and the Ambrakian gulf: they were Greeks, and admitted as such to contend at the Pan-Hellenic games,[792] yet they were also closely connected with the Amphilochi and Agræi, who were not Greeks. In manners, sentiments, and intelligence, they were half-Hellenic and half-Epirotic,—like the Ætolians and the Ozolian Lokrians. Even down to the time of Thucydidês, these nations were subdivided into numerous petty communities, lived in unfortified villages, were frequently in the habit of plundering each other, and never permitted themselves to be unarmed: in case of attack, they withdrew their families and their scanty stock, chiefly cattle, to the shelter of difficult mountains or marshes. They were for the most part light-armed, few among them being trained to the panoply of the Grecian hoplite; but they were both brave and skilful in their own mode of warfare, and the sling, in the hands of the Akarnanian, was a weapon of formidable efficiency.[793]

Notwithstanding this state of disunion and insecurity, however, the Akarnanians maintained a loose political league among themselves, and a hill near the Amphilochian Argos, on the shores of the Ambrakian gulf, had been fortified to serve as a judgment-seat, or place of meeting, for the settlement of disputes. And it seems that Stratus and Œniadæ had both become fortified in some measure towards the commencement of the Peloponnesian war. The former, the most considerable township in Akarnania, was situated on the Achelôus, rather high up its course,—the latter was at the mouth of the river, and was rendered difficult of approach by its inundations.[794] Astakus, Solium, Palærus, and Alyzia, lay on or near the coast of the Ionian sea, between Œniadæ and Leukas: Phytia, Koronta, Medeôn, Limnæa, and Thyrium, were between the southern shore of the Ambrakian gulf and the river Achelôus.

The Akarnanians appear to have produced many prophets. They traced up their mythical ancestry, as well as that of their neighbors the Amphilochians, to the most renowned prophetic family among the Grecian heroes,—Amphiaraus, with his sons

Alkmæôn and Amphilochus: Akarnan, the eponymous hero of the nation, and other eponymous heroes of the separate towns, were supposed to be the sons of Alkmæôn.[795] They are spoken of, together with the Ætolians, as mere rude shepherds, by the lyric poet Alkman, and so they seem to have continued with little alteration until the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when we hear of them, for the first time, as allies of Athens and as bitter enemies of the Corinthian colonies on their coast. The contact of those colonies, however, and the large spread of Akarnanian accessible coast, could not fail to produce some effect in socializing and improving the people. And it is probable that this effect would have been more sensibly felt, had not the Akarnanians been kept back by the fatal neighborhood of the Ætolians, with whom they were in perpetual feud,—a people the most unprincipled and unimprovable of all who bore the Hellenic name, and whose habitual faithlessness stood in marked contrast with the rectitude and steadfastness of the Akarnanian character.[796] It was in order to strengthen the Akarnanians against these rapacious neighbors, that the Macedonian Kassander urged them to consolidate their numerous small townships into a few considerable cities. Partially, at least, the recommendation was carried into effect, so as to aggrandize Stratus and one or two other towns; but in the succeeding century, the town of Leukas seems to lose its original position as a separate Corinthian colony, and to pass into that of chief city of Akarnania,[797] which is lost only by the sentence of the Roman conquerors.

Passing over the borders of Akarnania, we find small nations or tribes not considered as Greeks, but known, from the fourth century B. C. downwards, under the common name of Epirots. This word signifies properly, inhabitants of a continent, as opposed to those of an island or a peninsula, and came only gradually to be applied by the Greeks as their comprehensive denomination to designate all those diverse tribes, between the Ambrakian gulf on the south and west, Pindus on the east, and the Illyrians and Macedonians to the north and north-east. Of these Epirots, the principal were,—the Chaonians, Thesprotians, Kassôpians, and Molossians,[798] who occupied the country inland as well as maritime along the Ionian sea, from the Akrokeraunian mountains to the borders of Ambrakia in the interior of the Ambrakian gulf. The Agræans and Amphilochians dwelt eastward of the last-mentioned gulf, bordering upon Akarnania: the Athamânes, the Tymphæans, and the Talares, lived along the western skirts and high range of Pindus. Among these various tribes it is difficult to discriminate the semi-Hellenic from the non-Hellenic; for Herodotus considers both Molossians and Thesprotians as Hellenic,—and the oracle of Dôdôna, as well as the Nekyomanteion, or holy cavern for evoking the dead, of Acheron, were both in the territory of the Thesprotians, and both, in the time of the historian, Hellenic. Thucydidês, on the other hand, treats both Molossians and Thesprotians as barbaric, and Strabo says the same respecting the Athamânes, whom Plato numbers as Hellenic.[799] As the Epirots were confounded with the Hellenic communities towards the south, so they become blended with the Macedonian and Illyrian tribes towards the north. The Macedonian Orestæ, north of the Cambunian mountains and

east of Pindus, are called by Hekatæus a Molossian tribe; and Strabo even extends the designation Epirots to the Illyrian Paroræia and Atintânes, west of Pindus, nearly on the same parallel of latitude with the Orestæ.[800] It must be remembered, as observed above, that while the designations Illyrians and Macedonians are properly ethnical, given to denote analogies of language, habits, feeling, and supposed origin, and probably acknowledged by the people themselves,—the name Epirots belongs to the Greek language, is given by Greeks alone, and marks nothing except residence on a particular portion of the continent. Theopompus (about 340 B. C.) reckoned fourteen distinct Epirotic nations, among whom the Molossians and Chaonians were the principal. It is possible that some of these may have been semi-Illyrian, others semi-Macedonian, though all were comprised by him under the common name Epirots.[801]

Of these various tribes, who dwelt between the Akrokeraunian promontory and the Ambrakian gulf, some, at least, appear to have been of ethnical kindred with portions of the inhabitants of southern Italy. There were Chaonians on the gulf of Tarentum, before the arrival of the Greek settlers, as well as in Epirus; we do not find the name Thesprotians in Italy, but we find there a town named Pandosia, and a river named Acheron, the same as among the Epirotic Thesprotians: the ubiquitous name Pelasgian is connected both with one and with the other. This ethnical affinity, remote or near, between Œnotrians and Epirots, which we must accept as a fact without being able to follow it into detail, consists at the same time with the circumstance,—that both seem to have been susceptible of Hellenic influences to an unusual degree, and to have been moulded, with comparatively little difficulty, into an imperfect Hellenism, like that of the Ætolians and Akarnanians. The Thesprotian conquerors of Thessaly passed in this manner into Thessalian Greeks, and the Amphilochians who inhabited Argos on the Ambrakian gulf, were Hellenized by the reception of Greeks from Ambrakia, though the Amphilochians situated without the city, still remained barbarous in the time of Thucydidês:[802] a century afterwards, probably, they would be Hellenized, like the rest, by a longer continuance of the same influences,—as happened with the Sikels in Sicily.

To assign the names and exact boundaries of the different tribes inhabiting Epirus, as they stood in the seventh and sixth centuries B. C., at the time when the western stream of Grecian colonization was going on, and when the newly established Ambrakiots must have been engaged in subjugating or expelling the prior occupants of their valuable site,—is out of our power. We have no information prior to Herodotus and Thucydidês, and that which they tell us cannot be safely applied to a time either much earlier or much later than their own. That there was great analogy between the inland Macedonians and the Epirots, from Mount Bermius across the continent to the coast opposite Korkyra, in military equipment, in the fashion of cutting the hair, and in speech, we are apprized by a valuable passage of Strabo; who farther tells us, that many of the tribes spoke two different languages,[803]—a fact which at least, proves very close intercommunion, if not a double origin and incorpo-

ration. Wars, or voluntary secessions and new alliances, would alter the boundaries and relative situation of the various tribes. And this would be the more easily effected, as all Epirus, even in the fourth century B. C., was parcelled out among an aggregate of villages, without any great central cities; so that the severance of a village from the Molossian union, and its junction with the Thesprotian (abstracting from the feelings with which it might be connected), would make little practical difference in its condition or proceedings. The gradual increase of Hellenic influence tended partially to centralize this political dispersion, enlarging some of the villages into small towns by the incorporation of some of their neighbors; and in this way, probably, were formed the seventy Epirotic cities which were destroyed and given up to plunder on the same day, by Paulus Emilius and the Roman senate. The Thesprotian Ephyrê is called a city, even by Thucydidês.[804] Nevertheless, the situation was unfavorable to the formation of considerable cities, either on the coast or in the interior, since the physical character of the territory is an exaggeration of that of Greece,—almost throughout, wild, rugged, and mountainous. The valleys and low grounds, though frequent, are never extensive,—while the soil is rarely suited, in any continuous spaces, for the cultivation of corn: insomuch that the flour for the consumption of Janina, at the present day, is transported from Thessaly over the lofty ridge of Pindus, by means of asses and mules;[805] while the fruits and vegetables are brought from Arta, the territory of Ambrakia. Epirus is essentially a pastoral country: its cattle as well as its shepherds and shepherd's dogs were celebrated throughout all antiquity; and its population then, as now, found divided village residence the most suitable to their means and occupations. In spite of this natural tendency, however, Hellenic influences were to a certain extent efficacious, and it is to them that we are to ascribe the formation of towns like Phœnikê,—an inland city a few miles removed from the sea, in a latitude somewhat north of the northernmost point of Korkyra, which Polybius notices as the most flourishing[806] of the Epirotic cities at the time when it was plundered by the Illyrians in 230 B. C. Passarôn, the ancient spot where the Molossian kings were accustomed on their accession to take their coronation-oath, had grown into a considerable town, in this last century before the Roman conquest; while Tekmôn, Phylakê, and Horreum also became known to us at the same period.[807] But the most important step which those kings made towards aggrandizement, was the acquisition of the Greek city of Ambrakia, which became the capital of the kingdom of Pyrrhus, and thus gave to him the only site suitable for a concentrated population which the country afforded.

If we follow the coast of Epirus from the entrance of the Ambrakian gulf northward to the Akrokeraunian promontory, we shall find it discouraging to Grecian colonization. There are none of those extensive maritime plains which the gulf of Tarentum exhibits on its coast, and which sustained the grandeur of Sybaris and Krotôn. Throughout the whole extent, the mountain-region, abrupt and affording little cultivable soil, approaches near to the sea,[808] and the level ground, wherever it exists, must be commanded and possessed, as it is now, by villagers on hill-sites, always

difficult of attack and often inexpugnable. From hence, and from the neighborhood of Korkyra,—herself well situated for traffic with Epirus, and jealous of neighboring rivals,—we may understand why the Grecian emigrants omitted this unprofitable tract, and passed on either northward to the maritime plains of Illyria, or westward to Italy. In the time of Herodotus and Thucydidês, there seems to have been no Hellenic settlement between Ambrakia and Apollonia. The harbor called Glykys Limên, and the neighboring valley and plain, the most considerable in Epirus, next to that of Ambrakia, near the junction of the lake and river of Acheron with the sea, were possessed by the Thesprotian town of Ephyrê, situated on a neighboring eminence; perhaps also, in part, by the ancient Thesprotian town of Pandosia, so pointedly connected, both in Italy and Epirus, with the river Acheron.[809] Amidst the almost inexpugnable mountains and gorges which mark the course of that Thesprotian river, was situated the memorable recent community of Suli, which held in dependence many surrounding villages in the lower grounds and in the plain,—the counterpart of primitive Epirotic rulers in situation, in fierceness, and in indolence, but far superior to them in energetic bravery and endurance. It appears that after the time of Thucydidês, certain Greek settlers must have found admission into the Epirotic towns in this region. For Dêmosthenês[810] mentions Pandosia, Buchetia, and Elæa, as settlements from Elis, which Philip of Macedon conquered and handed over to his brother-in-law the king of the Molossian Epirots; and Strabo tells us that the name of Ephyrê had been changed to Kichyrus, which appears to imply an accession of new inhabitants.

Both the Chaonians and Thesprotians appear, in the time of Thucydidês, as having no kings: there was a privileged kingly race, but the presiding chief was changed from year to year. The Molossians, however, had a line of kings, succeeding from father to son, which professed to trace its descent through fifteen generations downward, from Achilles and Neoptolemus to Tharypas about the year 400 B. C.; they were thus a scion of the great Æakid race. Admêtus, the Molossian king to whom Themistoklês presented himself as a suppliant, appears to have lived in the simplicity of an inland village chief. But Arrybas, his son or grandson, is said to have been educated at Athens, and to have introduced improved social regularity into his native country: while the subsequent kings both imitated the ambition and received the aid of Philip of Macedon, extending their dominion[811] over a large portion of the other Epirots: even in the time of Skylax, they covered a large inland territory, though their portion of sea-coast was confined. From the narrative of Thucydidês, we gather that all the Epirots, though held together by no political union, were yet willing enough to combine for purposes of aggression and plunder. The Chaonians enjoyed a higher military reputation than the rest,—but the account which Thucydidês gives of their expedition against Akarnania exhibits a blind, reckless, boastful impetuosity, which contrasts strikingly with the methodical and orderly march of their Greek allies and companions.[812] We may here notice, that the Kassopæans, whom Skylax places in the south-western portion of Epirus between the Acheron and the Ambrakian gulf, are

not noticed either by Herodotus or Thucydidês: the former, indeed, conceives the river Acheron and the Thesprotians as conterminous with the Ambrakiotic territory.

To collect the few particulars known respecting these ruder communities adjacent to Greece, is a task indispensable for the just comprehension of the Grecian world, and for the appreciation of the Greeks themselves, by comparison or contrast with their contemporaries. Indispensable as it is, however, it can hardly be rendered in itself interesting to the reader, whose patience I have to bespeak by assuring him that the facts hereafter to be recounted of Grecian history would be only half understood without this preliminary survey of the lands around.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Thucyd. i, 13.

[2] Thucyd. i, 13.

[3] Plutarch, Amator. Narrat. c. 2, p. 772; Diodor. Fragm. lib. viii, p. 26. Alexander, Ætolus (Fragm. i, 5, ed. Schneidewin), and the Scholiast ad Apollon. Rhod. iv, 1212, seem to connect this act of outrage with the expulsion of the Bacchiadæ from Corinth, which did not take place until long afterwards.

[4] The first account seems referred to Dêmôn (an author of about 280 B. C., and a collector of Attic archæology, or what is called Ἀτθιδόγραφος. See Phanodêmi, Dêmônis, Clitodêmi, atque Istri, Ἀτθίδων, Fragmenta, ed. Siebelis, Præfatio, pp. viii-xi), and is given as the explanation of the locution—ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος. See Schol. ad Pindar. Nem. vii, ad finem; Schol. Aristophan. Ran. 440: the Corinthians seem to have represented their eponymous hero as son of Zeus, though other Greeks did not believe them (Pausan. ii, 1, 1). That the Megarians were compelled to come to Corinth for demonstration of mourning on occasion of the decease of any of the members of the Bacchiad oligarchy, is, perhaps, a story copied from the regulation at Sparta regarding the Periœki and Helots (Herod. vi, 57; Pausan. iv, 14, 3; Tyrtæus, Fragm.). Pausanias conceives the victory of the Megarians over the Corinthians, which he saw commemorated in the Megarian θησαυρὸς at Olympia, as having taken place before the 1st Olympiad, when Phorbas was life-archon at Athens: Phorbas is placed by chronologers fifth in the series from Medon, son of Codrus (Pausan. i, 39, 4; vi, 19, 9). The early enmity between Corinth and Megara is alluded to in Plutarch, De Malignitate Herodoti, p. 868, c. 35.

The second story noticed in the text is given by Plutarch, Quæstion. Græc. c. 17, p. 295, in illustration of the meaning of the word Δορύξενος.

[5] Pausanias, i, 44, 1, and the epigram upon Orsippus in Boeckh, Corpus Inscript. Gr. No. 1050, with Boeckh's commentary.

[6] See a striking passage in Plutarch. Præcept. Reipubl. Gerend. c. 5, p. 801.

[7] Plutarch, Pyrrh. c. 5. Aristot. Polit. v, 9, 1.

[8] Aristot. Polit. v, 9, 1.

[9] See this subject discussed in the admirable collection of letters, called the Federalist, written in 1787, during the time when the federal constitution of the United States of America was under discussion.—Letters 9, 10, 14, by Mr. Madison.

"Il est de la nature d'une république (says Montesquieu, Esprit des Loix, viii, 16) de n'avoir qu'un petit territoire: sans cela, elle ne peut guère subsister."

[10] David Hume, in his Essay xii (vol. i, p. 159, ed. 1760), after remarking "that all kinds of government, free and despotic, seem to have undergone in modern times (*i. e.* as compared with ancient) a great change for the better, with regard both to foreign and domestic management," proceeds to say:—

"But though all kinds of government be improved in modern times, yet monarchical government seems to have made the greatest advances towards perfection. It may now be affirmed of civilized monarchies, what was formerly said in praise of republics alone, that they are a government of laws, not of men. They are found susceptible of order, method, and constancy to a surprising degree. Property is there secure; industry encouraged; the arts flourish; and the prince lives secure among his subjects, like a father among his children. There are, perhaps, and have been for two centuries, near two hundred absolute princes, great and small, in Europe; and allowing twenty years to each reign, we may suppose that there have been in the whole two thousand monarchs, or tyrants, as the Greeks would have called them; yet of these there has not been one, not even Philip the Second of Spain, so bad as Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, Domitian, who were four in twelve amongst the Roman emperors. It must, however, be confessed, that though monarchical governments have approached nearer to popular ones in gentleness and stability, they are still much inferior. Our modern education and customs instil

more humanity and moderation than the ancient, but have not as yet been able to overcome entirely the disadvantages of that form of government."

[11] See the Lectures of M. Guizot, Cours d'Histoire Moderne, Leçon 30, vol. iii, p. 187, edit. 1829.

[12] M. Augustin Thierry observes, Lettres sur l'Histoire de France, Lettre xvi, p. 235:—

"Sans aucun souvenir de l'histoire Grecque ou Romaine, les bourgeois des onzième et douzième siècles, soit que leur ville fut sous la seigneurie d'un roi, d'un comte, d'un duc, d'un évêque ou d'une abbaye, allaient droit à la république: mais la réaction du pouvoir établi les rejetait souvent en arrière. Du balancement de ces deux forces opposées résultait pour la ville une sort de gouvernement mixte, et c'est ce qui arriva, en général, dans le nord de la France, comme le prouvent les chartes de commune."

Even among the Italian cities, which became practically self-governing, and produced despots as many in number and as unprincipled in character as the Grecian (I shall touch upon this comparison more largely hereafter), Mr. Hallam observes, that "the sovereignty of the emperors, though not very effective, was in theory always admitted: their name was used in public acts and appeared upon the coin."—View of the Middle Ages, part i, ch. 3, p. 346, sixth edit.

See also M. Raynouard, Histoire du Droit Municipal en France, book iii, ch. 12, vol. ii. p. 156: "Cette séparation essentielle et fondamentale entre les actes, les agens du gouvernement—et les actes, les agens de l'administration locale pour les affaires locales—cette démarcation politique, dont l'empire Romain avoit donné l'exemple, et qui concilioit le gouvernement monarchique avec une administration populaire—continua plus ou moins expressément sous les trois dynasties."

M. Raynouard presses too far his theory of the continuous preservation of the municipal powers in towns from the Roman empire down to the third French dynasty; but into this question it is not necessary for my purpose to enter.

[13] In reference to the Italian republics of the Middle Ages, M. Sismondi observes, speaking of Philip della Torre, denominated *signor* by the people of Como, Vercelli, and Bergamo, "Dans ces villes, non plus que dans celles que son frère s'était auparavant assujetties, le peuple ne croyoit point renoncer à sa liberté: il n'avoit point voulu choisir un maître, mais seulement un protecteur contre les nobles, un capitaine des gens de guerre, et un chef de la justice. L'expérience lui apprit trop tard, que ces prérogatives réunies constituoient un souverain."—Républiques Italiennes, vol. iii, ch. 20, p. 273.

[14] Herod. iii, 80. Νόμαιά τε κινεῖ πάτρια, καὶ βιᾶται γυναῖκας, κτείνει τε ἀκρίτους.

[15] Euripides (Supplices, 429) states plainly the idea of a τύραννος, as received in Greece the antithesis to laws:—

Οὐδὲν τυράννου δυσμενέστερον πόλει·
Ὅπου, τὸ μὲν πρώτιστον, οὔκ εἰσιν νόμοι
Κοινοὶ, κρατεῖ δ᾽ εἷς, τὸν νόμον κεκτημένος
Αὑτὸς παρ᾽ αὑτῷ.

Compare Soph. Antigon. 737. See, also, the discussion in Aristot. Polit. iii, sect. 10 and 11, in which the rule of the king is discussed in comparison with the government of laws; compare also iv, 8, 2-3. The person called "a king according to law" is, in his judgment, no king at all: Ὁ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον λεγόμενος βασιλεὺς οὔκ ἐστιν εἶδος καθάπερ εἴπομεν βασιλείας (iii, 11, 1).

Respecting ἰσονομίη, ἰσηγορίη, παῤῥησία,—equal laws and equal speech,—as opposed to monarchy, see Herodot. iii, 142, v. 78-92; Thucyd. iii, 62; Demosthen. ad Leptin. c. 6, p. 461; Eurip. Ion. 671.

Of Timoleon it was stated, as a part of the grateful vote passed after his death by the Syracusan assembly,—ὅτι τοὺς τυράννους καταλύσας,—ἀπέδωκε τοὺς νόμους τοῖς Σικελιώταις (Plutarch. Timoleon. c. 39).

See Karl Fried. Hermann, Griech. Staatsalterthümer, sect. 61-65.

[16] See the account of Deiokês, the first Median king, in Herodotus, i, 98, evidently an outline drawn by Grecian imagination: also, the Cyropædia of Xenophon, viii, 1, 40; viii, 3, 1-14; vii, 5, 37 … οὐ τούτῳ μόνῳ ἐνόμιζε (Κῦρος) χρῆναι τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων διαφέρειν τῷ βελτίονας αὐτῶν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ καταγοητεύειν ᾧετο χρῆναι αὐτοὺς, etc.

[17] David Hume, Essay xvii, On the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences, p. 198, ed. 1760. The effects of the greater or less extent of territory, upon the nature of the government, are also well discussed in Destutt Tracy, Commentaire sur l'Esprit des Loix de Montesquieu, ch. viii.

[18] Aristot. Polit. iii, 9, 7; iii, 10, 7-8.

M. Augustin Thierry remarks, in a similar spirit, that the great political change, common to so large a portion of mediæval Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, whereby the many different *communes* or city constitutions were formed, was accomplished under great varieties of manner and circumstance; sometimes by violence, sometimes by harmonious accord.

"C'est une controverse qui doit finir, que celle des franchises municipales obtenues par l'insurrection et des franchises municipales accordées. Quelque face du problême qu'on envisage, il reste bien entendu que les constitutions urbaines du xii et du xiii siècle, comme toute espèce d'institutions politiques dans tous les temps, ont pu s'établir à force ouverte, s'octroyer de guerre lasse ou de plein gré, être arrachées ou sollicitées, vendues ou données gratuitement: les grandes révolutions sociales s'accomplissent par tous ces moyens à la fois."—(Aug. Thierry, Récits des Temps Mérovingiens, Préface, p. 19, 2de édit.)

[19] Aristot. Polit. iii, 10, 7. Ἐπεὶ δὲ (*i. e.* after the early kings had had their day) συνέβαινε γίγνεσθαι πολλοὺς ὁμοίους πρὸς ἀρετὴν, οὔκετι ὑπέμενον (τὴν Βασίλειαν), ἀλλ' ἐζήτουν κοινόν τι, καὶ πολίτειαν καθίστασαν.

Κοινόν τι, *a commune*, the great object for which the European towns in the Middle Ages, in the twelfth century, struggled with so much energy, and ultimately obtained: a charter of incorporation, and a qualified privilege of internal self-government.

[20] The definition of a despot is given in Cornelius Nepos, Vit. Miltiadis, c. 8: "Omnes habentur et dicuntur tyranni, qui potestate sunt perpetuâ in eâ civitate, quæ libertate usa est:" compare Cicero de Republicâ, ii, 26, 27; iii, 14.

The word τύραννος was said by Hippias the sophist to have first found its way into the Greek language about the time of Archilochus (B. C. 660): Boeckh thinks that it came from the Lydians or Phyrgians (Comment. ad Corp. Inscrip. No. 3439).

[21] Aristot. Polit. v, 8, 2, 3, 4. Τύραννος—ἐκ προστατικῆς ῥίζης καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἐκβλαστάνει (Plato, Repub. viii, c. 17, p. 565). Οὐδενὶ γὰρ δὴ ἄδηλον, ὅτι πᾶς τύραννος ἐκ δημοκόλακος φύεται (Dionys. Halic. vi, 60): a proposition decidedly too general.

[22] Aristot. iii, 9, 5; iii, 10, 1-10; iv, 8, 2. Αἰσυμνῆται—αὐτοκράτορες μόναρχοι ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Ἕλλησι—αἱρετὴ τυραννίς: compare Theophrastus, fragment. περὶ Βασιλείας, and Dionys. Hal. A. R. v, 73-74; Strabo, xiii, p. 617; and Aristot. Fragment. Rerum Publicarum, ed. Neumann, p. 122, Κυμαίων Πολιτεία.

[23] Aristot. Polit. v, 8, 2, 3, 4; v, 4, 5. Aristotle refers to one of the songs of Alkæus as his evidence respecting the elevation of Pittakus: a very sufficient proof doubtless,—but we may see that he had no other informants, except the poets, about these early times.

[24] Dionys. Hal. A. R. vii, 2, 12. The reign of Aristodemus falls about 510 B. C.

[25] Thucyd. i, 17. Τύραννοι δὲ ὅσοι ἦσαν ἐν ταῖς Ἑλληνικαῖς πόλεσι, τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν μόνον προορώμενοι ἔς τε τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἐς τὸ τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον αὔξειν δι' ἀσφαλείας ὅσον ἐδύναντο μάλιστα, τὰς πόλεις ᾤκουν.

[26] Wachsmuth (Hellenische Alterthumskunde, sect. 49-51) and Tittmann (Griechisch. Staatsverfassungen, pp. 527-533) both make too much of the supposed friendly connection and mutual good-will between the despot and the poorer freemen. Community of antipathy against the old oligarchy was a bond essentially temporary, dissolved as soon as that oligarchy was put down.

[27] Aristot. Polit. v, 4, 4; 7, 3. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχαίων, ὅτε γένοιτο ὁ αὐτὸς δημαγωγὸς καὶ στρατηγὸς, εἰς τυραννίδα μετέβαλλον· σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀρχαίων τυράννων ἐκ δημαγωγῶν γεγόνασι. Αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ τότε μὲν γενέσθαι, νῦν δὲ μὴ, ὅτι τότε μὲν, οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἦσαν ἐκ τῶν στρατηγούντων· οὐ γάρ πω δεινοὶ ἦσαν

λέγειν· νῦν δὲ, τῆς ῥητορικῆς ηὐξημένης, οἱ δυνάμενοι λέγειν δημαγωγοῦσι μὲν, δι' ἀπειρίαν δὲ τῶν πολεμικῶν οὐκ ἐπιτίθενται, πλὴν εἴ που βραχύ τι γέγονε τοιοῦτον.

[28] Aristot. Polit. v, 8, 20. The whole tenor of this eighth chapter (of the fifth book) shows how unrestrained were the personal passions,—the lust as well as the anger,—of a Grecian τύραννος.

Τὸν τοι τύραννον εὐσεβεῖν οὐ ῥᾴδιον (Sophokles ap. Schol. Aristides, vol. iii, p. 291, ed. Dindorf).

[29] Aristot. Polit. iii, 8, 3; v, 8, 7. Herodot. v, 92. Herodotus gives the story as if Thrasybulus had been the person to suggest this hint by conducting the messenger of Periander into a cornfield and there striking off the tallest ears with his stick: Aristotle reverses the two, and makes Periander the adviser: Livy (i, 54) transfers the scene to Gabii and Rome, with Sextus Tarquinius as the person sending for counsel to his father at Rome. Compare Plato, Republ. viii, c. 17, p. 565; Eurip. Supplic. 444-455.

The discussion which Herodotus ascribes to the Persian conspirators, after the assassination of the Magian king, whether they should constitute the Persian government as a monarchy, an oligarchy, or a democracy, exhibits a vein of ideas purely Grecian, and altogether foreign to the Oriental conception of government: but it sets forth,—briefly, yet with great perspicuity and penetration,—the advantages and disadvantages of all the three. The case made out against monarchy is by far the strongest, while the counsel on behalf of monarchy assumes as a part of his case that the individual monarch is to be the best man in the state. The anti-monarchical champion Otanes concludes a long string of criminations against the despot, with these words above-noticed: "He subverts the customs of the country: he violates women: he puts men to death untried." (Herod. iii, 80-82.)

[30] Thucyd. ii, 63. Compare again the speech of Kleon, iii, 37-40,—ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἔχετε αὐτὴν, ἣν λαβεῖν μὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφεῖναι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον.

The bitter sentiment against despots seems to be as old as Alkæus, and we find traces of it in Solon and Theognis (Theognis, 38-50; Solon, Fragm. vii, p. 32, ed. Schneidewin). Phanias of Eresus had collected in a book the "Assassinations of Despots from revenge." (Τυράννων ἀναιρέσεις ἐκ τιμωρίας,—Athenæus, iii, p. 90; x, p. 438.)

[31] See the story of Mæandrius, minister and successor of Polykratês of Samos, in Herodotus, iii, 142, 143.

[32] Thucyd. vi, 54. The epitaph of Archedikê, the daughter of Hippias (which was inscribed at Lampsakus, where she died), though written by a great friend of Hippias, conveys the sharpest implied invective against the usual proceedings of the despots:—

Ἡ πατρός τε καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀδελφῶν τ' οὖσα τυράννων

Παιδῶν τ', οὐχ ᾗρθη νοῦν ἐς ἀτασθαλίην (Thuc. vi, 59).

The position of Augustus at Rome, and of Peisistratus at Athens, may be illustrated by a passage in Sismondi, Républiques Italiennes, vol. iv, ch. 26, p. 208:—

"Les petits monarques de chaque ville s'opposaient eux-mêmes à ce que leur pouvoir fût attribué à un droit héréditaire, parce que l'hérédité aurait presque toujours été retorquée contre eux. Ceux qui avaient succédé à une république, avaient abaissé des nobles plus anciens et plus illustres qu'eux: ceux qui avaient succédé à d'autres seigneurs n'avaient tenu aucun compte du droit de leurs prédécesseurs, et se sentaient intéressés à le nier. Ils se disaient donc mandataires du peuple: ils ne prenaient jamais le commandement d'une ville, lors même qu'ils l'avaient soumise par les armes, sans se faire attribuer par les anciens ou par l'assemblée du peuple, selon que les uns ou les autres se montraient plus dociles, le titre et les pouvoirs de seigneur général, pour un an, pour cinq ans, ou pour toute leur vie, avec une paie fixée, qui devoit être prise sur les deniers de la communauté."

[33] Consult, especially, the treatise of Xenophon, called Hiero, or Τυραννικὸς, in which the interior life and feelings of the Grecian despot are strikingly set forth, in a supposed dialogue with the poet Simonides. The tenor of Plato's remarks in the eighth and ninth books of the Republic, and those of Aristotle in the fifth book (ch. 8 and 9) of the Politics, display the same picture, though not with such fulness of detail. The speech of one of the assassins of Euphrôn (despot of Sikyon) is remarkable, as a specimen of Grecian feeling (Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 3, 7-12). The expressions both of Plato and Tacitus, in regard to the mental wretchedness of the despot, are the strongest which the language affords: Καὶ πένης τῇ ἀληθείᾳ φαίνεται, ἐάν τις ὅλην ψυχὴν ἐπίστηται θεάσασθαι,

καὶ φόβου γέμων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, σφαδασμῶν τε καὶ ὀδυνῶν πλήρης … Ἀνάγκη καὶ εἶναι, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον γίγνεσθαι αὐτῷ ἢ πρότερον διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν, φθονερῷ, ἀπίστῳ, ἀδίκῳ, ἀφίλῳ, ἀνοσίῳ, καὶ πάσης κακίας πανδοκεῖ τε καὶ τροφεῖ, καὶ ἐξ ἁπάντων τούτων μάλιστα μὲν αὐτῷ δυστυχεῖ εἶναι, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοὺς πλησίον αὐτῷ τοιούτους ἀπεργάζεσθαι (Republic, ix, p. 580).

And Tacitus, in the well-known passage (Annal. vi, 6): "Neque frustra præstantissimus sapientiæ firmare solitus est, si recludantur tyrannorum mentes, posse aspici laniatus et ictus: quando ut corpora verberibus, ita sævitiâ, libidine, malis consultis, animus dilaceretur. Quippe Tiberium non fortuna, non solitudines, protegebant, quin tormenta pectoris suasque ipse pœnas fateretur."

It is not easy to imagine power more completely surrounded with all circumstances calculated to render it repulsive to a man of ordinary benevolence: the Grecian despot had large means of doing harm,—scarcely any means of doing good. Yet the acquisition of power over others, under any conditions, is a motive so all-absorbing, that even this precarious and anti-social sceptre was always intensely coveted,—Τυραννὶς, χρῆμα σφαλερὸν, πολλοὶ δὲ αὐτῆς ἐρασταὶ εἰσι (Herod. iii, 53). See the striking lines of Solon (Fragment, vii, ed. Schneidewin), and the saying of Jason of Pheræ, who used to declare that he felt incessant hunger until he became despot,—πεινῆν, ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ· ὡς οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος ἰδιώτης εἶναι (Aristot. Polit. iii, 2, 6).

[34] See the beautiful Skolion of Kallistratus, so popular at Athens, xxvii, p. 456, apud Schneidewin, Poet. Græc.—Ἐν μύρτου κλαδὶ τὸ ξίφος φορήσω, etc.

Xenophon, Hiero, ii, 8. Οἱ τύραννοι πάντες πανταχῆ ὡς διὰ πολεμίας πορεύονται. Compare Isokrates, Or. viii (De Pace), p. 182; Polyb. ii, 59; Cicero, Orat. pro Milone, c. 29.

Aristot. Polit. ii, 4, 8. Επεὶ ἀδικοῦσί γε τὰ μέγιστα διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς, ᾽αλλ᾽ οὐ διὰ τἀναγκαῖα· οἷον τυραννοῦσιν, οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ῥιγῶσι· διὸ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ μεγάλαι, ἂν ἀποκτείνῃ τις, οὐ κλέπτην, ἀλλὰ τύραννον.

There cannot be a more striking manifestation of the sentiment entertained towards a despot in the ancient world, than the remarks of Plutarch on Timoleon, for his conduct in assisting to put to death his brother, the despot Timophanês (Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4-7, and Comp. of Timoleon with Paulus Æmilius, c. 2). See also Plutarch, Comparison of Dion and Brutus, c. 3, and Plutarch, Præcepta Reipublicæ Gerendæ, c. 11, p. 805; c. 17, p. 813; c. 32, p. 824,—he speaks of the putting down of a despot (τυραννίδων κατάλυσις) as among the most splendid of human exploits,—and the account given by Xenophon of the assassination of Jason of Pheræ, Hellenic. vi, 4, 32.

[35] Livy, xxxviii, 50. "Qui jus æquum pati non possit, in eum vim haud injustam esse."

[36] Plutarch, Sept. Sapient. Conviv. c. 2, p. 147,—ὡς ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ Μολπαγόρου τοῦ Ἴωνος, τί παραδοξότατον εἴης ἑωρακὼς, ἀποκρίναιο, τύραννον γέροντα.—Compare the answer of Thales, in the same treatise, c. 7, p. 152.

The orator Lysias, present at the Olympic games, and seeing the theors of the Syracusan despot Dionysius also present, in tents with gilding and purple, addressed an harangue, inciting the assembled Greeks to demolish the tents (Lysiæ Λόγος Ὀλυμπιακὸς, Fragm. p. 911, ed. Reisk.; Dionys. Halicar. De Lysiâ Judicium, c. 29-30). Theophrastus ascribed to Themistokles a similar recommendation, in reference to the theôrs and the prize-chariots of the Syracusan despot Hiero (Plutarch, Themistokles, c. 25).

The common-places of the rhetors afford the best proof how unanimous was the sentiment in the Greek mind to rank the despot among the most odious criminals, and the man who put him to death among the benefactors of humanity. The rhetor Theon, treating upon *common-places*, says: Τόπος ἐστὶ λόγος αὐξητικὸς ὁμολογουμένου πράγματος, ἤτοι ἁμαρτήματος, ἢ ἀνδραγαθήματος. Ἐστὶ γὰρ διττὸς ὁ τόπος· ὁ μέν τις, κατὰ τῶν πεπονηρευμένων, οἷον κατὰ τυράννου, προδότου, ἀνδροφόνου, ἀσώτου· ὁ δέ τις, ὑπὲρ τῶν χρηστόν τι διαπεπραγμένων· οἷον ὑπὲρ τυραννοκτόνου, ἀριστέως, νομοθέτου. (Theon, Progymnasmata, c. vii, ap. Walz. Coll. Rhett. vol. i, p. 222. Compare Aphthonius, Progymn. c. vii, p. 82 of the same volume, and Dionysius Halikarn. Ars Rhetorica, x, 15, p. 390, ed. Reiske.)

[37] Thucyd. i, 13.

[38] Aristot. Polit. iv, 3, 2; 11, 10. Aristot. Rerum Public. Fragm. ed. Neumann. Fragm. v. Εὐβοέων πολιτεῖαι, p. 112; Strabo, x, p. 447.

[39] Aristot. Polit. v, 9, 21. An oracle is said to have predicted to the Sikyonians that they would be subjected for the period of a century to the hand of the scourger (Diodor. Fragm. lib. vii-x; Fragm. xiv, ed. Maii).

[40] Herodot. vi, 126; Pausan. ii, 8, 1. There is some confusion about the names of Orthagoras and Andreas; the latter is called a *cook* in Diodorus (Fragment. Excerpt. Vatic. lib. vii-x, Fragm. xiv). Compare Libanius in Sever. vol. iii, p. 251, Reisk. It has been supposed, with some probability, that the same person is designated under both names: the two names do not seem to occur in the same author. See Plutarch, Ser. Numin. Vind. c. 7, p. 553.

Aristotle (Polit. v, 10, 3) seems to have conceived the dominion as having passed direct from Myrôn to Kleisthenês, omitting Aristônymus.

[41] Pausan. vi, 19, 2. The Eleians informed Pausanias that the brass in these alcoves came from Tartessus (the south-western coast of Spain from the Strait of Gibraltar to the territory beyond Cadiz): he declines to guarantee the statement. But O. Müller treats it as a certainty: "Two apartments inlaid with Tartessian brass, and adorned with Doric and Ionic columns. Both the architectural orders employed in this building, and the Tartessian brass, which the Phocæans had then brought to Greece in large quantities from the hospitable king Arganthonius, attest the intercourse of Myrôn with the Asiatics." (Dorians, i, 8, 2.) So also Dr. Thirlwall states the fact: "Copper of Tartessus, which had not long been introduced into Greece." (Hist. Gr. ch. x, p. 483, 2d ed.) Yet, if we examine the chronology of the case, we shall see that the 33d Olympiad (648 B. C.) must have been earlier even than the first discovery of Tartessus by the Greeks,—before the accidental voyage of the Samian merchant Kôlaeus first made the region known to them, and more than half a century (at least) earlier than the commerce of the Phocæans with Arganthonius. Compare Herod. iv. 152; i, 163, 167.

[42] Herodot. v. 67.

[43] See above, vol. ii, p. 129, part i, ch. 21.

[44] Herod. v, 67. Τοῦτον ἐπεθύμησε ὁ Κλεισθένης, ἐόντα Ἀργεῖον, ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς χώρης.

[45] Herod. v, 67. Ἐφρόντιζε μηχανὴν τῇ αὐτὸς ὁ Ἄδρηστος ἀπαλλάξεται.

[46] Ἐπαγαγόμενος δὲ ὁ Κλεισθένης τὸν Μελάνιππον, τέμενος οἱ ἀπέδεξε ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ πρυτανηΐῳ, καὶ μιν ἐνθαῦτα ἵδρυσε ἐν τῷ ἰσχυροτάτῳ. (Herod. *ib.*)

[47] Julius Pollux, iii, 83; Plutarch, Quæst. Græc. c. 1, p. 291; Theopompus ap. Athenæum, vi, p. 271; Welcker, Prolegomen. ad Theognid. c. 19, p. xxxiv.

As an analogy to this name of Konipodes, we may notice the ancient courts of justice called Courts of *Piepowder* in England, *Pieds Poudrés*.

[48] Aristot. Polit. v, 9, 21; Pausan. x, 7, 3.

[49] Herod, v, 68. Τούτοισι τοῖσι οὐνόμασι τῶν φυλέων ἐχρέωντο οἱ Σικυώνιοι, καὶ ἐπὶ Κλεισθένεος ἄρχοντος, καὶ ἐκείνου τεθνεῶτος ἔτι ἐπ᾽ ἔτεα ἑξήκοντα· μετέπειτα μέντοι λόγον σφισι δόντες, μετέβαλον ἐς τοὺς Ὑλλέας καὶ Παμφύλους καὶ Δυμανάτας· τετάρτους δὲ αὐτοῖσι προσέθεντο ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἀδρήστου παιδὸς Αἰγιαλέος τὴν ἐπωνυμίην ποιεύμενοι κεκλῆσθαι Αἰγιαλέας.

[50] The chronology of Orthagoras and his dynasty is perplexing. The commemorative offering of Myron at Olympia is marked for 648 B. C., and this must throw back the beginning of Orthagoras to a period between 680-670. Then we are told by Aristotle that the entire dynasty lasted one hundred years; but it must have lasted, probably, somewhat longer, for the death of Kleisthenês can hardly be placed earlier than 560 B. C. The war against Kirrha (595 B. C.) and the Pythian victory (582 B. C.) fall within his reign: but the marriage of his daughter Agaristê with Megaklês can hardly be put earlier than 570 B. C., if so high; for Kleisthenês the Athenian, the son of that marriage, effected the democratical revolution at Athens in 509 or 508 B. C.: whether the daughter, whom Megaklês gave in marriage to Peisistratus about 554 B. C., was also the offspring of that marriage, as Larcher contends, we do not know.

Megaklês was the son of that Alkmæon who had assisted the deputies sent by Crœsus of Lydia into Greece to consult the different oracles, and whom Crœsus rewarded so liberally as to make his fortune (compare Herod. i, 46; vi, 125): and the marriage of Megaklês was in the next generation after this enrichment of Alkmæon,—μετὰ δὲ, γενεῇ δευτέρῃ ὕστερον (Herod. vi, 126). Now the reign of Crœsus extended from 560-546 B. C. and his deputation to the oracles in Greece appears to have taken place about 556 B. C.; and if this chronology be admitted, the marriage of Megaklês with the daughter of the Sikyonian Kleisthenês cannot have taken place until considerably after 556 B. C. See the long, but not very satisfactory, note of Larcher, ad Herodot. v, 66.

But I shall show grounds for believing, when I recount the interview between Solon and Crœsus, that Herodotus in his conception of events misdates very considerably the reign and proceedings of Crœsus as well as of Peisistratus: this is a conjecture of Niebuhr which I think very just, and which is rendered still more probable by what we find here stated about the succession of the Alkmæonidæ. For it is evident that Herodotus here conceives the adventure between Alkmæon and Crœsus as having occurred one generation (about twenty-five or thirty years) anterior to the marriage between Megaklês and the daughter of Kleisthenês. That adventure will thus stand about 590-585 B. C., which would be about the time of the supposed interview (if real) between Solon and Crœsus, describing the maximum of the power and prosperity of the latter.

[51] Müller, Dorians, book i, 8, 2; Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, vol. i, ch. x, p. 486, 2d ed.

[52] Herod. vi, 127-131. The locution explained is,—Οὐ φροντὶς Ἱππoκλείδῃ: compare the allusions to it in the Parœmiographi, Zenob. v, 31; Diogenian. vii, 21; Suidas, xi, 45, ed. Schott.

The convocation of the suitors at the invitation of Kleisthenês from all parts of Greece, and the distinctive mark and character of each, is prettily told, as well as the drunken freak whereby Hippokleidês forfeits both the favor of Kleisthenês, and the hand of Agaristê, which he was on the point of obtaining. It seems to be a story framed upon the model of various incidents in the old epic, especially the suitors of Helen.

On one point, however, the author of the story seems to have overlooked both the exigencies of chronology and the historical position and feelings of his hero Kleisthenês. For among the suitors who present themselves at Sikyôn in conformity with the invitation of the latter, one is Leôkêdês, son of Pheidôn the despot of Argos. Now the hostility and vehement antipathy towards Argos, which Herodotus ascribes in another place to the Sikyonian Kleisthenês, renders it all but impossible that the son of any king of Argos could have become a candidate for the hand of Agaristê. I have already recounted the violence which Kleisthenês did to the legendary sentiment of his native town, and the insulting names which he put upon the Sikyonian Dorians,—all under the influence of a strong anti-Argeian feeling. Next, as to chronology: Pheidôn king of Argos lived some time between 760-730; and his son can never have been a candidate for the daughter of Kleisthenês, whose reign falls 600-500 B. C. Chronologers resort here to the usual resource in cases of difficulty: they recognize a second and later Pheidôn, whom they affirm that Herodotus has confounded with the first: or they alter the text of Herodotus, and in place of "son of Pheidôn," read "descendant of Pheidôn." But neither of these conjectures rests upon any basis: the text of Herodotus is smooth and clear, and the second Pheidôn is nowhere else authenticated. See Larcher and Wesseling, *ad loc.*; compare also vol. ii, p. 419, part ii, ch. 4, of this History.

[53] Plutarch, De Herod. Malign. c. 21, p. 859.

[54] Pausan. ii, 4, 9.

[55] Aristot. Polit. v, 9, 22; Herodot. v, 92. The tale respecting Kypselus, and his wholesale exaction from the people, contained in the spurious second book of the Œconomica of Aristotle, coincides with the general view of Herodotus (Aristot. Œconom. ii, 2); but I do not trust the statements of this treatise for facts of the sixth or seventh centuries B. C.

[56] Aristot. Polit. v, 9, 2-22; iii, 8, 3; Herodot. v, 92.

[57] Ephorus, Frag. 106, ed. Marx.; Herakleidês Ponticus, Frag. v, ed. Köhler; Nicolaus Damasc. p. 50, ed. Orell.; Diogen. Laërt. i, 96-98; Suidas, v. Κυψελίδων ἀνάθημα.

[58] Herodot. iii, 47-54. He details at some length this tragical story. Compare Plutarch, De Herodoti Malignitat. c. 22, p. 860.

[59] Aristot. Polit. v, 3, 6; 8, 9. Plutarch, Amatorius, c. 23, p. 768, and De Serâ Numinis Vindictâ, c. 7, p. 553. Strabo, vii, p. 325; x, p. 452. Scymnus Chius, v, 454, and Antoninus Liberalis, c. iv, who quotes the lost work called Ἀμβρακικὰ of Athanadas.

[60] See Mr. Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, ad ann. 625-585 B. C.

[61] Pausan. v, 2, 4; 17, 2. Strabo, viii, p. 353. Compare Schneider, Epimetrum ad Xenophon. Anabas. p. 570. The chest was seen at Olympia, both by Pausanias and by Dio Chrysostom (Or. xi, p. 325, Reiske).

[62] Plutarch, De Herodot. Malign. c. 21, p. 859. If Herodotus had known or believed that the dynasty of the Kypselids at Corinth was put down by Sparta, he could not have failed to make allusion to the fact, in the

long harangue which he ascribes to the Corinthian Sosiklês (v, 92). Whoever reads that speech, will perceive that the inference from silence to ignorance is in this case almost irresistible.

O. Müller ascribes to Periander a policy intentionally anti-Dorian,—"prompted by the wish of utterly eradicating the peculiarities of the Doric race. For this reason he abolished the public tables, and prohibited the ancient education." (O. Müller, Dorians, iii, 8, 3.)

But it cannot be shown that any *public tables* (συσσίτια), or any peculiar education, analogous to those of Sparta, ever existed at Corinth. If nothing more be meant by these συσσίτια than public banquets on particular festive occasions (see Welcker, Prolegom. ad Theognid. c. 20, p. xxxvii), these are noway peculiar to Dorian cities. Nor does Theognis, v, 270, bear out Welcker in affirming "syssitiorum vetus institutum" at Megara.

[63] Aristot. Polit. v, 4, 5; Rhetor. i, 2, 7.

[64] Plutarch, Quæst. Græc. c. 18, p. 295.

[65] Aristot. Polit. iv, 12, 10; v, 2, 6; 4, 3.

[66] Theognis, vv. 682, 715, 720, 750, 816, 914, Welcker's edition:—

Τῶν εἴη μέλαν αἷμα πιεῖν, etc.

[67] Theognis, v, 20.—

Κύρνε, πόλις μὲν ἔθ᾽ ἥδε πόλις, λαοὶ δὲ δὴ ἄλλοι,
Οἳ πρόσθ᾽ οὔτε δίκας ᾔδεσαν οὔτε νόμους,
Ἀλλ᾽ ἀμφὶ πλευρῇσι δορὰς αἰγῶν κατέτριβον,
Ἔξω δ᾽ ὥστ᾽ ἔλαφοι τῆσδ᾽ ἐνέμοντο πόλεος.

[68] See, especially, the lines from 500-560, 816-830, in Welcker's edition.

[69] Consult the Prolegomena to Welcker's edition of Theognis; also, those of Schneidewin (Delectus Elegiac. Poetar. pp. 46-55)

The Prolegomena of Welcker are particularly valuable and full of instruction. He illustrates at great length the tendency common to Theognis, with other early Greek poets, to apply the words *good* and *bad*, not with reference to any ethical standard, but to wealth as contrasted with poverty,—nobility with low birth,—strength with weakness,—conservative and oligarchical politics as opposed to innovation (sect. 10-18). The ethical meaning of these words is not absolutely unknown, yet rare, in Theognis: it gradually grew up at Athens, and became popularized by the Socratic school of philosophers as well as by the orators. But the early or political meaning always remained, and the fluctuation between the two has been productive of frequent misunderstanding. Constant attention is necessary when we read the expressions οἱ ἀγαθοὶ, ἐσθλοὶ, βέλτιστοι, καλοκἀγαθοὶ, χρηστοὶ, etc., or on the other hand, οἱ κακοὶ, δειλοὶ, etc., to examine whether the context is such as to give to them the ethical or the political meaning. Welcker seems to go a step too far, when he says that the latter sense "fell into desuetude, through the influence of the Socratic philosophy." (Proleg. sect. 11, p. xxv.) The two meanings both remained extant at the same time, as we see by Aristotle (Polit. iv, 8, 2),—σχεδὸν γὰρ παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις οἱ εὔποροι, τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν δοκοῦσι κατέχειν χώραν. A careful distinction is sometimes found in Plato and Thucydides, who talk of the oligarchs as "the persons called super-excellent,"—τοὺς καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ὀνομαζομένους (Thucyd. viii, 48),—ὑπὸ τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν λεγομένων ἐν τῇ πόλει (Plato, Rep. viii, p. 569).

The same double sense is to be found equally prevalent in the Latin language: "*Boni*que et *mali* cives appellati, non ob merita in rempublicam, omnibus pariter corruptis: sed uti quisque locupletissimus, et injuriâ validior, quia præsentia defendebat, pro bono habebatur." (Sallust, Hist. Fragment. lib. i, p. 935, Cort.) And again, Cicero (De Republ. i, 34): "Hoc errore vulgi cum rempublicam opes paucorum, non virtutes, tenere cœperunt, nomen illi principes *optimatium* mordicus tenent, re autem carent eo nomine." In Cicero's Oration pro Sextio (c. 45) the two meanings are intentionally confounded together, when he gives his definition of *optimus quisque*. Welcker

(Proleg. s. 12) produces several other examples of the like equivocal meaning. Nor are there wanting instances of the same use of language in the laws and customs of the early Germans,—boni homines, probi homines, Rachinburgi, Gudemänner. See Savigny, Geschichte des Römisch. Rechts im Mittelalter, vol. i, p. 184; vol. ii, p. xxii.

[70] Herod. vi. 128.

[71] Justin. ii, 7.

[72] Pausan. i, 3, 2; Suidas, Ἱππομένης; Diogenian. Centur. Proverb. iii, 1. Ἀσεβέστερον Ἱππομένους.

[73] See Boeckh on the Parian Marble, in Corp. Inscrip. Græc. part 12, sect. 6, pp. 307, 310, 332.

From the beginning of the reign of Medôn son of Kodrus, to the first annual archon Kreôn, the Parian Marble computes 407 years, Eusebius 387.

[74] Philochorus ap. Strabo, ix, p. 396. See Schömann, Antiq. J. P. Græc. b. v, sect. 2-5.

[75] Strabo, ix, p. 392. Philochorus and Andrôn extended the kingdom of Nisus from the isthmus of Corinth as far as the Pythium (near Œnoê) and Eleusis (Str. *ib.*); but there were many different tales.

[76] Pollux, viii, c. 9, 109-111.

[77] Iôn, the father of the four heroes after whom these tribes were named, was affirmed by one story to be the primitive civilizing legislator of Attica, like Lykurgus, Numa, or Deukaliôn (Plutarch. adv. Kolôten, c. 31, p. 1125).

[78] Thus Euripides derives the Αἰγικορεῖς, not from αἴξ, a goat, but from Αἰγὶς, the Ægis of Athênê (Ion. 1581): he also gives *Teleontes*, derived from an eponymous *Teleôn*, son of Iôn, while the inscriptions at Kyzikus concur with Herodotus and others in giving Geleontes. Plutarch (Solon, 25) gives Gedeontes. In an Athenian inscription recently published by Professor Ross (dating, seemingly, in the first century after the Christian era), the worship of Zeus Geleôn at Athens has been for the first time verified,—Διὸς Γελέοντος ἱεροκήρυξ (Ross, *Die Attischen Demen*, pp. vii-ix. Halle 1846).

[79] Plutarch (Solon, c. 25); Strabo, viii, p. 383. Compare Plato, Kritias, p. 110.

[80] Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. Nos. 3078, 3079, 3665. The elaborate commentary on this last-mentioned inscription, in which Boeckh vindicates the early historical reality of the classification by professions, is noway satisfactory to my mind.

K. F. Hermann (Lehrbuch der Griechischen Staats Alterthümer, sect. 91-96) gives a summary of all that can be known respecting these old Athenian tribes. Compare Ilgen, De Tribubus Atticis, p. 9, *seq.*; Tittmann, Griechische Staats Verfassungen, pp. 570-582; Wachsmuth, Hellenische Alterthumskunde, sect. 43, 44.

[81] About the naukraries, see Aristot. Fragment. Rerum Public., p. 89, ed. Neumann; Harpokration, vv. Δήμαρχος, Ναυκραρικὰ; Photius, v. Ναυκραρία; Pollux, viii, 108; Schol. ad Aristoph. Nubes, 37.

Οἱ πρυτάνεις τῶν Ναυκράρων, Herodot. v, 71: they conducted the military proceedings in resistance to the usurpation of Kylôn.

The statement that each naukrary was obliged to furnish one ship can hardly be true of the time before Solon: as Pollux states it, we should be led to conceive that he only infers it from the name ναύκραρος (Pollux, viii, 108), though the real etymology seems rather to be from ναίω (Wachsmuth, Hellen. Alt. sect. 44, p. 240). There may be some ground for believing that the old meaning, also, of the word ναύτης connected it with ναίω; such a supposition would smooth the difficulty in regard to the functions of the ναυτόδικαι as judges in cases of illicit admission into the phratores. See Hesychius and Harpokration, v. Ναυτόδικαι; and Baumstark, De Curatoribus Emporii, Friburg, 1828, p. 67, *seq.*: compare, also, the fragment of the Solonian law, ἢ ἱερῶν ὀργίων ἢ ναῦται, which Niebuhr conjecturally corrects. Rom. Gesch. v. i, p. 323, 2d ed.; Hesychius, Ναυστῆρες—οἱ οἰκέται. See Pollux, Ναῦλον, and Lobeck, Ῥηματικὸν, sect. 3, p. 7; Ἀειναῦται παρὰ Μιλησίοις? Plutarch, Quæst. Græc. c. 32, p. 298.

[82] Meier, De Gentilitate Atticâ, pp. 22-24, conceives that this numerical completeness was enacted by Solon; but of this there is no proof, nor is it in harmony with the general tendencies of Solon's legislation.

[83] So in reference to the Anglo-Saxon *Tythings* and *Hundreds*, and to the still more widely-spread division of the *Hundred*, which seems to pervade the whole of Teutonic and Scandinavian antiquity, much more extensively than the *tything*;—there is no ground for believing that these precise numerical proportions were in general practice realized: the systematic nomenclature served its purpose by marking the idea of graduation and the type to which a certain approach was actually made. Mr. Thorpe observes, respecting the Hundred, in his Glossary to the "Ancient Laws and Institutes of England," v. *Hundred*, *Tything*, *Frid-Borg*, etc. "In the Dialogus de Scaccario, it is said that a Hundred 'ex hydarum aliquot centenariis, sed non determinatis, constat: quidam enim ex pluribus, quidam ex paucioribus constat.' Some accounts make it consist of precisely a hundred hydes, others of a hundred tythings, others of a hundred free families. Certain it is, that whatever may have been its original organization, the Hundred, at the time when it becomes known to us, differed greatly in extent in various parts of England."

[84] See the instructive inscription in Professor Ross's work (Über die Demen von Attika, p. 26) of the γένος Ἀμυνανδριδῶν, commemorating the archon of that gens, the priest of Kekrops, the Ταμίας, or treasurer, and the names of the members, with the deme and tribe of each individual. Compare Bossler, De Gent. Atticis, p. 53. About the peculiar religious rites of the gens called Gephyræi, see Herodot. v, 61.

[85] Φυλαὶ γενικαὶ, opposed to φυλαὶ τοπικαί.—Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. iv, 14.

[86] Plato, Euthydem. p. 302; Aristot. ap. Schol. in Platon. Axioch. p. 465, ed. Bek. Ἀριστοτέλης φησί· τοῦ ὅλου πλήθους διηρημένου Ἀθήνησιν εἵς τε τοὺς γεωργοὺς καὶ τοὺς δημιουργοὺς, φυλὰς αὐτῶν εἶναι τέσσαρας, τῶν δὲ φυλῶν ἑκάστις μοιρὰς εἶναι τρεῖς, ἃς τριττύας τε καλοῦσι καὶ φρατρίας· ἑκάστης δὲ τούτων τριάκοντα εἶναι γένη, τὸ δὲ γένος ἐκ τριάκοντα ἀνδρῶν συνιστάναι· τούτους δὴ τοὺς εἰς τα γένη τεταγμένοις γεννήτας καλοῦσι. Pollux, viii, 3. Οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ γένους, γεννῆται καὶ ὁμογάλακτες· γένει μὲν οὐ προσήκοντες, ἐκ δὲ τῆς συνόδου οὕτω προσαγορευόμενοι: compare also iii, 52; Mœris. Atticist. p. 108.

Harpokrat. v. Ἀπόλλων Πατρῷος, Θεοίνιον, Γεννῆται, Ὀργεῶνες, etc. Etymol. Magn. v. Γεννῆται; Suidas, v. Ὀργεῶνες; Pollux, viii, 85; Demosthen. cont. Eubulid. p. 1319, εἶτα φράτορες, εἶτα Ἀπόλλωνος πατρῴου καὶ Διὸς ἑκρίου γεννῆται; and cont. Neæram, p. 1365. Isæus uses ὀργεῶνες as synonymous with γεννῆται (see Orat. ii, pp. 19, 20-28, ed. Bek.). Schömann (Antiq. J. P. Græc. § xxvi) considers the two as essentially distinct. Φρήτρη and φῦλον both occur in the Iliad, ii, 362. See the Dissertation of Buttmann Über den Begriff von φρατρία (Mythologus, c. 24, p. 305); and that of Meier, De Gentilitate Atticâ, where the points of knowledge attainable respecting the gentes are well put together and discussed.

In the Theræan Inscription (No. 2448 ap. Boeckh. Corp. Inscr., see his comment, page 310) containing the testament of Epiktêta, whereby a bequest is made to οἱ συγγενεῖς—ὁ ἀνδρεῖος τῶν συγγενῶν,—this latter word does not mean kindred or blood relations, but a variety of the gentile union—"thiasus," or "sodalitium." Boeckh.

[87] Herodot. ii, 143. Ἑκαταίῳ—γενεηλογήσαντί τε ἑωυτὸν καὶ ἀναδήσαντι τὴν πατριὴν ἐς ἑκκαιδέκατον θεόν. Again, γενεηλογήσαντι ἑωυτὸν, καὶ ἀναδήσαντι ἐς ἑκκαιδέκατον θεόν. The Attic expression,—ἀγχίστεια ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων,—illustrates the intimate association between family relationship and common religious privileges.—Isæus, Orat. vi, p. 89, ed. Bek.

[88] Isæus, Or. vi, p. 61; ii, p. 38; Demosth. adv. Makartatum, pp. 1053-1075; adv. Leochar. p. 1093. Respecting this perpetuation of the family sacred rites, the feeling prevalent among the Athenians is much the same as what is now seen in China.

Mr. Davis observes: "Sons are considered in this country, where the power over them is so absolute through life, as a sure support, as well as a probable source of wealth and dignities, should they succeed in learning. But the grand object is, the perpetuation of the race, to sacrifice at the family tombs. Without sons, a man lives without honor or satisfaction, and dies unhappy; and as the only remedy, he is permitted to adopt the sons of his younger brothers.

"It is not during life only, that a man looks for the service of his sons. It is his consolation in declining years, to think that they will continue the performance of the prescribed rites in the hall of ancestors, and at the family tombs, when he is no more: and it is the absence of this prospect which makes the childless doubly miserable. The superstition derives influence from the importance attached by the government to this species of posthumous duty: a neglect of which is punishable, as we have seen, by the laws. Indeed, of all the subjects of their care, there are none which the Chinese so religiously attend to as the tombs of their ancestors, conceiving that any neglect is sure to be followed by worldly misfortune."—(The Chinese, by John Francis Davis, chap. ix, pp. 131-134. ed. Knight, 1840.)

Mr. Mill notices the same state of feeling among the Hindoos.—(History of British India, book ii, chap. vii. p. 381, ed. 8vo.)

[89] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 8; Herodot. i, 147; Suidas, Ἀπατουρία—Ζεὺς Φράτριος—Ἀθηναία φρατρία, the presiding god of the phratric union.—Plato, Euthydem. c. 28, p. 302; Demosth. adv. Makart. p. 1054. See Meier, De Gentilitate Atticâ, pp. 11-14.

The πάτριαι at Byzantium, which were different from θίασοι, and which possessed corporate property (τά τε θιασωτικὰ καὶ τὰ πατριωτικὰ, Aristot. Œconomic. ii, 4), are doubtless the parallel of the Athenian phratries.

[90] Dikæarchus ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Πατρὰ; Aristot. Polit. i, 1, 6: Ὁμοσιπύος and ὁμοκάπνους are the old words cited by the latter from Charondas and Epimenidês.

[91] Niebuhr, Römische Geschichte, vol. i, pp. 317-337. Varro's language on that point is clear: "Ut in hominibus quædam sunt cognationes et gentilitates, sic in verbis. Ut enim ab Æmilio homines orti Æmilii et gentiles, sic ab Æmilii nomine declinatæ voces in gentilitate nominali." Paul. Diacon. p. 94. "Gentilis dicitur ex eodem genere ortus, et is qui simili nomine appellatur," etc. See Becker, Handbuch der Römischen Alterthümer, part 2, abth. 2, p. 36.

The last part of the definition ought to be struck out for the Grecian gentes. The passage of Varro does not prove the historical reality of the primitive father, or genarch, Æmilius, but it proves that the members of the gens believed in him.

Dr. Wilda, in his learned work, "Das Deutsche Strafrecht," (Halle, 1842,) dissents from Niebuhr in the opposite direction, and seems to maintain that the Grecian and Roman gentes were really distant blood relations (p. 123). How this can be proved, I do not know: and it is inconsistent with the opinion which he advances in the preceding page (p. 122), very justly,—that these quasi families are primordial facts in early human society, beyond which we cannot carry our researches. "The farther we go back in history, the more does the community exhibit the form of a family, though in reality it is not a mere family. This is the limit of historical research, which no man can transgress with impunity," (p. 122).

[92] Diogen. Laërt. v, 1.

[93] See Colonel Leake's Travels in Northern Greece, ch. 2, p. 85 (the Greek word φράτριαι seems to be adopted in Albania); Boué, La Turquie en Europe, vol. ii, ch. 1, pp. 15-17; chap. 4, p. 530; Spenser's View of the State of Ireland (vol. vi, pp. 1542-1543, of Tonson's edition of Spenser's Works, 1715); Cyprien Robert, Die Slaven in Turkey, b. 1, chs. 1 and 2.

So, too, in the laws of king Alfred in England, on the subject of murder, the guild-brethren, or members of the same guild, are made to rank in the position of distant relatives, if there happen to be no blood relatives:—

"If a man, kinless of paternal relatives, fight and slay a man, then, if he have maternal relatives, let them pay a third of the wēr: his guild-brethren a third part: for a third let him flee. If he have no maternal relatives, let his guild-brethren pay half: for half let him flee…. If a man kill a man thus circumstanced, if he have no relatives, let half be paid to the king, half to his guild-brethren." (Thorpe, Ancient Laws and Institutes of England, vol. i, pp. 79-81.) Again, in the same work, Leges Henrici Primi, vol. i, p. 596, the ideas of the kindred and the guild run together in the most intimate manner: "Si quis hominem occidat,—Si eum tunc *cognatio sua* deserat, et pro eo *gildare* nolit," etc. In the Salic law, the members of a *contubernium* were invested with the same rights and obligations one towards the other (Rogge, Gerichtswesen der Germanen, ch. iii, p. 62). Compare Wilda, Deutsches Strafrecht, p. 389, and the valuable special treatise of the same author (Das Gildenwesen im Mittelalter. Berlin, 1831), where the origin and progress of the guilds from the primitive times of German heathenism is unfolded. He shows that these associations have their basis in the earliest feelings and habits of the Teutonic race,—the family was, as it were, a natural guild,—the guild, a factitious family. Common religious sacrifices and festivals,—mutual defence and help, as well as mutual responsibility,—were the recognized bonds among the *congildones*: they were *sororitates* as well as *fraternitates*, comprehending both men and women (deren Genosser wie die Glieder einer Familie enge unter einander verbunden waren, p. 145). Wilda explains how this primitive social and religious *phratry* (sometimes this very expression *fratria* is used, see p. 109) passed into something like the more political tribe, or *phylê* (see pp. 43, 57, 60, 116, 126, 129, 344). The sworn *commune*, which spread so much throughout Europe in the beginning of the twelfth century, partakes both of the one and of the other,—*conjuratio,—amicitia jurata* (pp. 148, 169).

The members of an Albanian *phara* are all jointly bound to exact, and each severally exposed to suffer, the vengeance of blood, in the event of homicide committed upon, or by, any one of them (Boué, *ut supra*).

[94] See the valuable chapter of Niebuhr, Röm. Gesch. vol. i, pp. 317, 350, 2d edit.

The *Alberghi* of Genoa in the Middle Ages were enlarged families created by voluntary compact: "De tout temps (observes Sismondi) les familles puissantes avaient été dans l'usage, à Gênes, d'augmenter encore leur puissance en adoptant d'autres familles moins riches, moins illustres, ou moins nombreuses,—auxquelles elles communiquoient leur nom et leurs armes, qu'elles prenoient ainsi l'engagement de protéger,—et qui en retour s'associoient à toutes leurs quérelles. Les maisons dans lesquelles on entroit ainsi par adoption, étoient nommées des alberghi (auberges), et il y avoit peu de maisons illustres qui ne se fussent ainsi récrutées a l'aide de quelque famille étrangère." (Républiques Italiennes, t. xv, ch. 120, p. 366.)

Eichhorn (Deutsche Staats und Rechts-Geschichte, sect. 18, vol. i, p. 84, 5th edit.) remarks in regard to the ancient Germans, that the German "familiæ et propinquitates," mentioned by Tacitus (Germ. c. 7), and the "gentibus cognationibusque hominum" of Cæsar (B. G. vi. 22), bore more analogy to the Roman gens than to relationship of blood or wedlock. According to the idea of some of the German tribes, even blood-relationship might be formally renounced and broken off, with all its connected rights and obligations, at the pleasure of the individual: he might declare himself ἐκποιητὸς, to use the Greek expression. See the Titul. 63 of the Salic law, as quoted by Eichhorn, *l. c.*

Professor Koutorga of St. Petersburg (in his Essai sur l'Organisation de la Tribu dans l'Antiquité, translated from Russian into French by M. Chopin, Paris, 1839) has traced out and illustrated the fundamental analogy between the social classification, in early times, of Greeks, Romans, Germans, and Russians (see especially, pp. 47, 213). Respecting the early history of Attica, however, many of his positions are advanced upon very untrustworthy evidence (see p. 123, *seq.*).

[95] Pindar, Pyth. viii, 53; Isthm. vi, 92; Nem. vii, 103; Strabo, ix, p. 421; Stephan. Byz. v. Κῶς; Herodot. v, 44; vii, 134; ix, 37; Pausan. x, 1, 4; Kallimachus, Lavacr. Pallad. 33; Schol. Pindar. Pyth. ii. 27; Aristot. Pol. v, 8, 13: Ἀλευάδων τοὺς πρώτους, Plato, Menon. 1, which marks them as a numerous gens. See Buttmann, Dissert. on the Aleuadæ in the Mythologus, vol. ii, p. 246. Bacchiadæ at Corinth, ἐδίδοσαν καὶ ἤγοντο ἐξ ἀλλήλων (Herod. v, 92).

[96] Harpokration, v. Ἐτεοβουτάδαι, Βουτάδαι; Thucyd. viii, 53; Plutarch, Theseus, 12; Themistoklês, 1; Demosth. cont. Neær. p. 1365: Polemo ap. Schol. ad Soph. Œdip. Kol. 489; Plutarch, Vit. x, Orator. pp. 841-844. See the Dissertation of O. Müller, De Minervâ Poliade, c. 2.

[97] Demosth. cont. Neær. p. 1365. Tittmann (Griechische Staatsverfass, p. 277) thinks that every citizen, after the Kleisthenean revolution, was of necessity a member of some phratry, as well as of some deme: but the evidence which he produces is, in my judgment, insufficient. The ideas of the phratry and the tribe are often confounded together; thus the Ægeidæ of Sparta, whom Herodotus (iv, 149) calls a tribe, are by Aristotle called a phratry of Thebans (ap. Schol. ad Pindar. Isthm. vii, 18). Compare Wachsmuth, Hellenische Alterthumskunde, sect. 83, p. 17.

A great many of the demes seem to have derived their names from the shrubs or plants which grew in their neighborhood (Schol. ad Aristophan. Plutus, 586, Μυρρινοῦς, Ῥαμνοῦς, etc.).

[98] For example, Æthalidæ, Butadæ, Kothôkidæ, Dædalidæ, Eiresidæ, Epieikidæ, Erœadæ, Eupyridæ, Echelidæ, Keiriadæ, Kydantidæ, Lakiadæ, Pambôtadæ, Peritheidæ, Persidæ, Semachidæ, Skambônidæ, Sybridæ, Titakidæ, Thyrgonidæ, Hybadæ, Thymœtadæ, Pæonidæ, Philaidæ, Chollidæ: all these names of demes, bearing the patronymic form, are found in Harpokration and Stephanus Byz. alone.

We do not know that the Κεραμεῖς ever constituted a γένος, but the name of the deme Κεραμεῖς is evidently given, upon the same principle, to a place chiefly occupied by potters. The gens Κοιρώνιδαι are said to have been called Φιλιεῖς (? Φλυεῖς) and Περιθοῖδαι as well as Κοιρώνιδαι: the names of gentes and those of demes seem not always distinguishable.

The Butadæ, though a highly venerable gens, also ranked as a deme (see the Psephism about Lykurgus in Plutarch, Vit. x. Orator, p. 852): yet we do not know that there was any locality called Butadæ. Perhaps some of the names above noticed may be simply names of gentes, enrolled as demes, but without meaning to imply any community of abode among the members.

The members of the Roman gens occupied adjoining residences, on some occasions,—to what extent we do not know (Heiberg, De Familiari Patriciorum Nexu, ch. 24, 25. Sleswic, 1829).

We find the same patronymic names of demes and villages elsewhere: in Kôs and Rhodes (Ross, Inscr. Gr. ined., Nos. 15-26. Halle, 1846); *Lêstadæ* in Naxos (Aristotle ap. Athenæ. viii, p. 348); *Botachidæ* at Tegea (Steph. Byz. in v); *Branchidæ*, near Miletus, etc.; and an interesting illustration is afforded, in other times and other places, by the frequency of the ending ikon in villages near Zurich in Switzerland,—Mezikon, Nennikon, Wezikon, etc. Blüntschli, in his history of Zurich, shows that these terminations are abridgments of *inghoven*, including an original patronymic element,—indicating the primary settlement of members of a family, or of a band bearing the name of its captain, on the same spot (Blüntschli, Staats und Rechts Geschichte der Stadt Zurich, vol. i, p. 26).

In other Inscriptions from the island of Kôs, published by Professor Ross, we have a deme mentioned (without name), composed of three coalescing gentes, "In hoc et sequente titulo alium jam deprehendimus *demum Coum*, e tribus gentibus appellatione patronymicâ conflatum, Antimachidarum, Ægiliensium, Archidarum." (Ross, Inscript. Græc. Ined. Fascic. iii, No. 307, p. 44. Berlin, 1845.) This is a specimen of the process systematically introduced by Kleisthenês in Attica.

[99] Plutarch, Solon. 21. We find a common cemetery exclusively belonging to the gens, and tenaciously preserved (Demosth. cont. Eubulid. p. 1307; Cicero, Legg. ii, 26).

[100] Demosth. cont. Makartat. p. 1068. See the singular additional proviso in Plutarch, Solon, c. 20.

[101] See Meursius, Themis Attica, i, 13.

[102] That this was the primitive custom, and that the limitation μέχρις ἀνεψιαδῶν (Meier, De Bonis Damnat. p. 23, cites ἀνεψιαδῶν καὶ φρατόρων) was subsequently introduced (Demosth. cont. Euerg. et Mnesib. p. 1161), we may gather from the law as it stands in Demosth. cont. Makartat. p. 1069, which includes the phrators, and therefore, *à fortiori*, the gennêtes, or gentiles.

The same word γένος is used to designate both the circle of nameable relatives, brothers, first cousins (ἀγχιστεῖς, Demosth. cont. Makartat. c. 9, p. 1058), etc., going beyond the οἶκος,—and the quasi-family, or gens. As the gentile tie tended to become weaker, so the former sense of the word became more and more current, to the extinction of the latter. Οἱ ἐν γένει, or οἱ προσήκοντες, would have borne a wider sense in the days of Drako than in those of Demosthenes: Συγγενὴς usually belongs to γένος in the narrower sense, γεννήτης to γένος in the wider sense; but Isæus sometimes uses the former word as an exact equivalent of the latter (Orat. vii, pp. 95, 99, 102, 103, Bekker). Τριακὰς appears to be noted in Pollux as the equivalent of γένος, or gens (viii, 111), but the word does not occur in the Attic orators, and we cannot make out its meaning with certainty: the Inscription of the Deme of Peiræeus given in Boeckh (Corp. Insc. No. 101, p. 140,) rather adds to the confusion by revealing the existence of a τριακὰς constituting the fractional part of a deme, and not connected with a gens: compare Boeckh's Comment. *ad loc.* and his Addenda and Corrigenda, p. 900.

Dr. Thirlwall translates γένος, *house*; which I cannot but think inconvenient, because that word is the natural equivalent of οἶκος,—a very important word in reference to Attic feelings, and quite different from γένος (Hist. of Greece, vol. ii, p. 14, ch. 11). It will be found impossible to translate it by any known English word which does not at the same time suggest erroneous ideas: which I trust will be accepted as my excuse for adopting it untranslated into this History.

[103] Demosthen. cont. Makartat *l. c.*

[104] See Æschines de Falsâ Legat. p. 292, c. 46; Lysias cont. Andokid. p. 108; Andokid. de Mysteriis, p. 63, Reiske; Deinarchus and Hellanikus ap. Harpokration. v. Ἱεροφάντης.

In case of crimes of impiety, particularly in offences against the sanctity of the Mysteries, the Eumolpidæ had a peculiar tribunal of their own number, before which offenders were brought by the king archon. Whether it was often used, seems doubtful; they had also certain unwritten customs of great antiquity, according to which they pronounced (Demosthen. cont. Androtion. p. 601; Schol. ad Demosth. vol. ii, p. 137, Reiske: compare Meier and Schömann, Der Attische Prozess, p. 117). The Butadæ, also, had certain old unwritten maxims (Androtion ap. Athenæ. ix, p. 374).

Compare Bossler, De Gentibus et Familiis Atticæ, p. 20, and Ostermann, De Præconibus Græcor. sect. 2 and 3 (Marburg, 1845).

[105] Lykurgus the orator is described as τὸν δῆμον Βουτάδης, γένους τοῦ τῶν Ἐτεοβουταδῶν (Plutarch, Vit. x. Orator. p. 841).

[106] In an inscription (apud Boeckh. Corpus Inscrip. No. 465).

Four names of the phratries at the Greek city of Neapolis, and six names out of the thirty Roman curiæ, have been preserved (Becker, Handbuch der Römischen Alterthümer, p. 32; Boeckh, Corp. Inscript. ii, p. 650).

Each Attic phratry seems to have had its own separate laws and customs, distinct from the rest, τοῖς φράτορσι, κατὰ τοὺς ἐκείνων νόμους (Isæus, Or. viii, p. 115, ed. Bek.; vii, p. 99; iii, p. 49).

Bossler (De Gentibus et Familiis Atticæ, Darmstadt, 1833), and Meier (De Gentilitate Atticâ, pp. 41-54) have given the names of those Attic gentes that are known: the list of Meier comprises seventy-nine in number (see Koutorga, Organis. Trib. p. 122).

[107] Tittmann (Griech. Staats Alterthümer, p. 271) is of opinion that Kleisthenês augmented the number of phratries, but the passage of Aristotle brought to support this opinion is insufficient proof (Polit. vi, 2, 11). Still less can we agree with Platner (Beyträge zur Kenntniss des Attischen Rechts, pp. 74-77), that three new phratries were assigned to each of the new Kleisthenean tribes.

Allusion is made in Hesychius, Ἀτριάκαστοι, Ἔξω τριακάδος, to persons not included in any gens, but this can hardly be understood to refer to times anterior to Kleisthenês, as Wachsmuth would argue (p. 238).

[108] The language of Photius on this matter (v. Ναυκραρία μὲν ὁποῖόν τι ἡ συμμορία καὶ ὁ δῆμος· ναύκραρος δὲ ὁποῖόν τι ὁ δήμαρχος) is more exact than that of Harpokration, who identifies the two completely,—v. Δήμαρχος. If it be true that the naukraries were continued under the Kleisthenean constitution, with the alteration that they were augmented to fifty in number, five to every Kleisthenean tribe, they must probably have been continued in name alone without any real efficiency or function. Kleidêmus makes this statement, and Boeckh follows it (Public Economy of Athens, l. ii, ch. 21, p. 256): yet I cannot but doubt its correctness. For the τριττὺς (one-third of a Kleisthenean tribe) was certainly retained and was a working and available division (see Dêmosthenês de Symmoriis, c. 7, p. 184), and it seems hardly probable that there should be two coexistent divisions, one representing the third part, the other the fifth part, of the same tribes.

[109] Strabo, ix, p. 396.

[110] Strabo, ix, p. 396, πετρὰ ἐν πεδίῳ περιοικουμένη κύκλῳ. Euripid. Ion, 1578, σκόπελον οἳ ναίουσ᾽ ἐμόν (Athênê).

[111] Thucyd. ii, 15; Theophrast. Charact. 29, 4. Plutarch (Theseus, 24) gives the proceedings of Theseus in greater detail, and with a stronger tinge of democracy.

[112] Pausan. i, 2, 4; 38, 2; Diodor. Sicul. iv, 2; Schol. ad Aristophan. Acharn. 242.

The Athenians transferred from Eleutheræ to Athens both a venerable statue of Dionysus and a religious ceremony in honor of that god. The junction of the town with Athens is stated by Pausanias to have taken place in consequence of the hatred of its citizens for Thebes, and must have occurred before 509 B. C., about which period we find Hysiæ to be the frontier deme of Attica (Herodot. v, 72; vi, 108).

[113] Thucyd. ii, 15, 16. οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πόλιν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀπολείπων ἕκαστος,—respecting the Athenians from the country who were driven into Athens at the first invasion during the Peloponnesian war.

[114] Etymologicon Magn. v. Ἐπακρία χωρά; Strabo, viii, p. 383; Stephan. Byz. v. Τετράπολις.

The τετράκωμοι comprised the four demes, Πειραῖεις, Φαληρεῖς, Ξυπετεῶνες, Θυμοίταδαι (Pollux, iv, 105): whether this is an old division, however, has been doubted (see Ilgen, De Tribubus Atticis, p. 51).

The Ἐπακρέων τριττὺς is mentioned in an inscription apud Ross (Die Demen von Attika, p. vi). Compare Boeckh ad Corp. Inscr. No. 82: among other demes, it comprised the deme Plôtheia. Mesogæa also (or rather the Mesogei, οἱ Μεσόγειοι) appears as a communion for sacrifice and religious purposes, and as containing the deme Batê. See Inscriptiones Atticæ nuper repertæ duodecim, by Ern. Curtius; Berlin, 1843; Inscript. i, p. 3. The exact site of the deme Batê in Attica is unknown (Ross, Die Demen von Attica, p. 64); and respecting the question, what portion of Attica was called Mesogæa, very different conjectures have been started, which there appears to be no means of testing. Compare Schömann de Comitiis, p. 343, and Wordsworth, Athens and Attica, p. 229, 2d edit.

[115] Dikæarchus, Fragm. p. 109, ed. Fuhr; Plutarch, Theseus, c. 33.

[116] Such as that between the Pallenæans and Agnusians (Plutarch, Theseus, 12).

Acharnæ was the largest and most populous deme in Attica (see Ross, Die Demen von Attika, p. 62; Thucyd. ii, 21); yet Philochorus does not mention it as having ever constituted a substantive πόλις.

Several of the demes seem to have stood in repute for peculiar qualities, good or bad: see Aristophan. Acharn. 177, with Elmsley's note.

[117] Strabo, ix, p. 396; Plutarch, Theseus, 14. Polemo had written a book expressly on the eponymous heroes of the Attic demes and tribes (Preller. Polemonis Fragm. p. 42): the Atthidographers were all rich on the same subject: see the Fragments of the Atthis of Hellanikus (p. 24, ed. Preller), also those of Istrus, Philochorus, etc.

[118] J. H. Voss, Erlaüterungen, p. 1: see the Hymn, 96-106, 451-475: compare Hermesianax ap. Athen. xiii, p. 597.

[119] Herodot. i, 30.

[120] Dikæarch. Vita Græciæ, p. 141, Fragm. ed. Fuhr.

[121] Plutarch, Theseus, c. 25: Dionys. Hal. ii, 8.

[122] Etymologic. Magn. Εὐπατρίδαι—οἱ αὐτὸ τὸ ἄστυ οἰκοῦντες, καὶ μετέχοντες τοῦ βασιλικοῦ γένους, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἱερῶν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενοι. The βασιλικὸν γένος includes not only the Kodrids, but also the Erechtheids, Pandionids, Pallantids, etc. See also Plutarch, Theseus, c. 24; Hesychius, Ἀγροιῶται.

Yet Isokratês seems to speak of the great family of the Alkmæonidæ as *not* included among the eupatridæ. (Orat. xvi, De Bigis, p. 351, p. 506, Bek.)

[123] Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Prozess. Einleitung, p. 10.

[124] Plutarch, Solon, c. 19; Aristotle, Polit. ii. 9, 2; Cicero, De Offic. i. 22. Pollux seems to follow the opinion that Solon first instituted the senate of areopagus (viii, 125).

[125] Pollux, viii, 89-91.

[126] We read the θεσμοθέτων ἀνάκρισις in Demosthen. cont. Eubulidem, c. 17, p. 1319, and Pollux, viii, 85; a series of questions which it was necessary for them to answer before they were admitted to occupy their office. Similar questions must have been put to the archon, the basileus, and the polemarch: so that the words θεσμοθέτων ἀνάκρισις may reasonably be understood to apply to all the nine archons, as, indeed, we find the words τοὺς ἐννέα ἄρχοντας ἀνακρίνετε shortly afterwards, p. 1320.

[127] Respecting the word θέμιστες in the Homeric sense, see above, vol. ii, ch. xx.

Both Aristotle (Polit. ii, 9, 9) and Dêmosthenês (contr. Euerg. et Mnêsibul. c. 18, p. 1161) call the ordinances of Drako νόμοι, not θεσμοί. Andokidês distinguishes the θεσμοὶ of Drako and the νόμοι of Solon (De Mysteriis, p. 11). This is the adoption of a phrase comparatively modern; Solon called his own laws θεσμοί. The oath of the περίπολοι ἔφηβοι (the youth who formed the armed police of Attica during the first two years of their military age), as given in Pollux (viii, 106), seems to contain at least many ancient phrases: this phrase,—καὶ τοῖς θεσμοῖς τοῖς ἱδρυμένοις πείσομαι,—is remarkable, as it indicates the ancient association of religious sanction which adhered to the word θεσμοί; for ἱδρύεσθαι is the word employed in reference to the establishment and domiciliation of the gods who protected the country,—θέσθαι νόμους is the later expression for making laws. Compare Stobæus De Republic. xliii, 48, ed. Gaisford, and Dêmosthen. cont. Makartat. c. 13, p. 1069.

[128] Ὅτε θεσμὸς ἐφάνη ὅδε,—such is the exact expression of Solon's law (Plutarch, Solon, c. 19); the word θεσμὸς is found in Solon's own poems, θεσμοὺς δ᾽ ὁμοίους τῷ κακῷ τε κἀγαθῷ.

[129] Aristot. Polit. ii, 9, 9; Rhetoric. ii. 25, 1; Aulus Gell. N. A. xi, 18; Pausanias, ix, 36, 4; Plutarch, Solon, c. 19; though Pollux (viii, 42) does not agree with him. Taylor, Lectt. Lysiacæ, ch. 10.

Respecting the θεσμοὶ of Drako, see Kuhn. ad Ælian. V. II. viii, 10. The preliminary sentence which Porphyry (De Abstinentiâ, iv, 22) ascribes to Drako can hardly be genuine.

[130] Pausanias, ix, 36, 4. Δράκοντος Ἀθηναίοις θεσμοθετήσαντος ἐκ τῶν ἐκείνου κατέστη νόμων οὓς ἔγραφεν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἄλλων τε ὁπόσων ἄδειαν εἶναι χρή, καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμωρίας μοιχοῦ: compare Dêmosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 637; Lysias de Cæde Eratosthen. p. 31.

[131] Harpokration, vv. Ἐφέται, Ἐπὶ Δελφινίῳ, Ἐπὶ Παλλαδίῳ, Ἐν Φρεαττοῖ; Pollux, viii, 119, 124, 125; Photius, v. Ἐφέται; Hesychius, ἐς Φρέατου; Dêmosthen. cont. Aristokrat. c. 15-18, pp. 642-645; cont. Makartat. c. 13, p. 1068. When Pollux speaks of the five courts in which the ephetæ judged, he probably includes the areopagus (see Dêmosth. cont. Aristokrat. c. 14, p. 641).

About the judges ἐν Φρεαττοῖ, see Aristot. Polit. iv, 13, 2. On the general subject of this ancient and obscure criminal procedure, see Matthiæ, De Judiciis Atheniensium (in Miscellan. Philologie, vol. i, p. 143, *seq.*); also Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Pub. Att. sect. 61, p. 288; Platner, Prozess und Klagen bey den Attikern, b. i, ch. 1; and E. W. Weber, Comment. ad Dêmosthen. cont. Aristokrat. pp. 627, 641; Meier und Schömann, Attisch. Prozess, pp. 14-19.

I cannot consider the ephetæ as judges in appeal, and I agree with those (Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Pub. Gr. p. 171; Meier und Schömann, Attisch. Prozess, p. 16; Platner, Prozess und Klagen, t. i, p. 18) who distrust the etymology which connects this word with ἐφέσιμος. The active sense of the word, akin to ἐφίεμαι (Æsch. Prom. 4) and ἐφετμὴ, meets the case better: see O. Müller, Prolegg. ad Mythol. p. 424 (though there is no reason for believing the ephetæ to be older than Drako): compare, however, K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Griechischen Staats Alterthümer, sects. 103, 104, who thinks differently.

The trial, condemnation, and banishment of inanimate objects which had been the cause of death, was founded on feelings widely diffused throughout the Grecian world (see Pausan. vi, 11, 2; and Theokritus, Idyll, xxiii, 60): analogous in principle to the English law respecting deodand, and to the spirit pervading the ancient Germanic codes generally (see Dr. C. Trümmer, Die Lehre von der Zurechnung, c. 28-38. Hamburg, 1845).

The Germanic codes do not content themselves with imposing a general obligation to appease the relatives and gentiles of the slain party, but determine beforehand the sum which shall be sufficient to the purpose, which, in the case of involuntary homicide, is paid to the surviving relatives as a compensation; for the difference between culpable homicide, justifiable homicide, and accidental homicide, see the elaborate treatise of Wilda, Das Deutsche Strafrecht, ch. viii, pp. 544-559, whose doctrine, however, is disputed by Dr. Trümmer, in the treatise above noticed.

At Rome, according to the Twelve Tables, and earlier, involuntary homicide was to be expiated by the sacrifice of a ram (Walter, Geschichte des Römisch. Rechts, sect. 768).

[132] Dêmosthen. cont. Euerg. et Mnêsib. p. 1161.

[133] Dêmosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 647. τοσούτοις δικαστηρίοις, ἃ θεοὶ κατέδειξαν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἄνθρωποι χρῶνται πάντα τὸν χρόνον, p. 643.—οἱ ταῦτ᾽ ἐξαρχῆς τὰ νόμισμα διαθέντες, οἵτινές ποθ᾽ ἦσαν, εἴθ᾽ ἥρωες, εἴτε θεοί. See also the Oration cont. Makartat. p. 1069; Æschin. cont. Ktesiphon. p. 636; Antiph. De Cæde Herodis, c. 14.

The popular dikastery, in the age of Isokratês and Dêmosthenês, held sittings ἐπὶ Παλλαδίῳ for the trial of charges of unintentional homicide,—a striking evidence of the special holiness of the place for that purpose (see Isokrat. cont. Kallimachum, Or. xviii, p. 381; Dêmosth. cont. Neær. p. 1348).

The statement of Pollux (viii, 125), that the ephetæ became despised, is not confirmed by the language of Dêmosthenês.

[134] Plutarch, Solon, c. 19; Aristot. Polit. ii, 9, 2.

[135] Read on this subject the maxims laid down by Plato (Legg. xii, p. 941). Nevertheless, Plato copies, to a great degree, the arrangements of the ephetic tribunals in his provisions for homicide (Legg. ix. pp. 865-873).

[136] I know no place in which the special aptitude of particular localities consecrated each to its own purpose, is so powerfully set forth, as in the speech of Camillus against the transfer of Rome to Veii (Livy, v, 52).

[137] The narrative is given in Thucyd. i, 126; Herod. v, 71; Plutarch, Solon, 12.

[138] Aristophan. Equit. 445, and the Scholia; Herodot. v, 70.

[139] Plutarch, Solon, c. 12. If the story of the breaking of the cord had been true, Thucydidês could hardly have failed to notice it; but there is no reason to doubt that it was the real defence urged by the Alkmæônids.

When Ephesus was besieged by Crœsus, the inhabitants sought protection to their town by dedicating it to Artemis: they carried a cord from the walls of the town to the shrine of the goddess, which was situated without the walls (Herod. i, 26). The Samian despot Polykratês, when he consecrated to the Delian Apollo the neighboring island of Rhêneia, connected it with the island of Delos by means of a chain (Thucyd. iii, 104).

These analogies illustrate the powerful effect of visible or material continuity on the Grecian imagination.

[140] Herodot. i, 61.

[141] See Thucyd. v, 16, and his language respecting Pleistoanax of Sparta.

[142] Plutarch, Solon, c. 12. Καὶ φόβοι τινὲς ἐκ δεισιδαιμονίας ἅμα καὶ φάσματα κατεῖχε τὴν πόλιν, etc.

[143] Lobeck, Aglaophamus, ii, p. 313; Hoeckh, Kreta, iii, 2, p. 252.

[144] The statements respecting Epimenidês are collected and discussed in the treatise of Heinrich, Epimenides aus Kreta. Leipsic, 1801.

[145] Diogen. Laërt. i, 114, 115.

[146] Plutarch, Solon, c. 12; Diogen. Laërt. i, 109-115; Pliny, H. N. vii, 52. θεοφιλὴς καὶ σοφὸς περὶ τὰ θεῖα τὴν ἐνθουσιαστικὴν καὶ τελεστικὴν σοφίαν, etc. Maxim. Tyrius, xxxviii, 3, δεινὸς τὰ θεῖα, οὐ μαθὼν ἀλλ᾽ ὕπνον αὐτῷ διηγεῖτο μακρὸν καὶ ὄνειρον διδάσκαλον.

Ἰατρόμαντις, Æschyl. Supplic. 277; Καθαρτὴς, Iamblichus, Vit. Pythagor. c. 28.

Plutarch (Sept. Sapient. Conviv. p. 157) treats Epimenidês simply as having lived up to the precepts of the Orphic life, or vegetable diet: to this circumstance, I presume, Plato (Legg. iii, p. 677) must be understood to refer, though it is not very clear. See the Fragment of the lost *Krêtes* of Euripides, p. 98, ed. Dindorf.

Karmanor of Tarrha in Krete had purified Apollo himself for the slaughter of Pytho (Pausan. ii, 30, 3).

[147] Plutarch, De Musicâ, pp. 1134-1146; Pausanias, i, 14, 3.

[148] Cicero (Legg. ii, 11) states that Epimenidês directed a temple to be erected at Athens to Ὕβρις and Ἀναίδεια (Violence and Impudence): Clemens said that he had erected *altars* to the same two goddesses (Protrepticon, p. 22): Theophrastus said that there were *altars* at Athens (without mentioning Epimenidês) to these same (ap. Zenobium, Proverb. Cent. iv, 36). Ister spoke of a ἱερὸν Ἀναιδείας at Athens (Istri Fragm. ed. Siebelis, p. 62). I question whether this story has any other foundation than the fact stated by Pausanias, that the stones which were placed before the tribunal of areopagus, for the accuser and the accused to stand upon, were called by these names,—Ὕβρεως, that of the accused; Ἀναιδείας, that of the accuser (i, 28, 5). The confusion between stones and altars is not difficult to be understood. The other story, told by Neanthês of Kyzikus, respecting Epimenidês, that he had offered two young men as human sacrifices, was distinctly pronounced to be untrue by Polemo: and it reads completely like a romance (Athenæus, xiii, p. 602).

[149] Plutarch. Præcept. Reipubl. Gerend. c. 27, p. 820.

[150] Diogen. Laërt. *l. c.*

[151] Plato, Legg. i, p. 642; Cicero, De Divinat. i, 18; Aristot. Rhet. iii, 17.

Plato places Epimenidês ten years before the Persian invasion of Greece, whereas his real date is near upon 600 B. C.; a remarkable example of carelessness as to chronology.

[152] Respecting the characteristics of this age, see the second chapter of the treatise of Heinrich, above alluded to, Kreta und Griechenland in Hinsicht auf Wunderglauben.

[153] Plato, Kratylus, p. 405; Phædr. p. 244.

[154] Eurip. Hippolyt. 957; Plato, Republ. ii, p. 364; Theophrast. Charact. c. 16.

[155] Herodot. i, 60.

[156] Plutarch, Solon, i; Diogen. Laërt. iii, 1; Aristot. Polit. iv, 9, 10.

[157] Plutarch, Solon, v.

[158] Plutarch, Solon, viii. It was a poem of one hundred lines, χαριέντως πάνυ πεποιημένων.

Diogenês tells us, that "Solon read the verses to the people through the medium of the herald,"—a statement not less deficient in taste than in accuracy, and which spoils the whole effect of the vigorous exordium, Ἀυτὸς κήρυξ ἦλθον ἀφ᾽ ἱμερτῆς Σαλαμῖνος, etc.

[159] Plutarch, *l. c.*; Diogen. Laërt. i, 47. Both Herodotus (i, 59) and some authors read by Plutarch ascribed to Peisistratus an active part in the war against the Megarians, and even the capture of Nisæa, the port of Megara. Now the first usurpation of Peisistratus was in 560 B. C., and we can hardly believe that he can have been prominent and renowned in a war no less than forty years before.

It will be seen hereafter—see the note on the interview between Solon and Krœsus, towards the end of this chapter—that Herodotus, and perhaps other authors also, conceived the Solonian legislation to date at a period later than it really does; instead of 594 B. C., they placed it nearer to the usurpation of Peisistratus.

[160] Plutarch, Solon, κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ πολιτεύματος. The strict meaning of these words refers only to the *government* of the island; but it seems almost certainly implied that they would be established in it as klêruchs, or proprietors of land, not meaning necessarily that *all* the preëxisting proprietors would be expelled.

[161] Plutarch, Solon, 8, 9, 10. Daïmachus of Platæa, however, denied to Solon any personal share in the Salaminian war (Plutarch, comp. Solon and Public. c. 4).

Polyænus (i, 20) ascribes a different stratagem to Solon: compare Ælian, V. H. vii, 19. It is hardly necessary to say that the account which the Megarians gave of the way in which they lost the island was totally different: they imputed it to the treachery of some exiles (Pausan. i, 40, 4): compare Justin, ii, 7.

[162] Aristot. Rhet. i, 16, 3.

[163] Plutarch, Solon, 10: compare Aristot. Rhet. i, 16. Alkibiadês traced up his γένος to Eurysakês (Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 1); Miltiadês traced up his to Philæus (Herodot. vi, 35).

According to the statement of Hêreas the Megarian, both his countrymen and the Athenians had the same way of interment: both interred the dead with their faces towards the west. This statement, therefore, affords no proof of any peculiarity of Athenian custom in burial.

The Eurysakeium, or precinct sacred to the hero Eurysakês, stood in the deme of Melitê (Harpokrat. ad v), which formed a portion of the city of Athens.

[164] Æschin. Fals. Legat. p. 250, c. 14.

[165] Plutarch, Solon, c. 13. The language of Plutarch, in which he talks of the pedieis as representing the oligarchical tendency, and the diakrii as representing the democratical, is not quite accurate when applied to the days of Solon. Democratical pretensions, as such, can hardly be said to have then existed.

[166] Plutarch, Solon, 13. Ἅπας μὲν γὰρ ὁ δῆμος ἦν ὑπόχρεως τῶν πλουσίων· ἢ γὰρ ἐγεώργουν ἐκείνοις ἕκτα τῶν γινομένων τελοῦντες, ἑκτημόριοι προσαγορευόμενοι καὶ θῆτες· ἢ χρέα λαμβάνοντες ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀγώγιμοι τοῖς δανείζουσιν ἦσαν· οἱ μὲν αὐτοῦ δουλεύοντες, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ ξένῃ πιπρασκόμενοι. Πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ παῖδας ἰδίους ἠναγκάζοντο πωλεῖν, καὶ τὴν πόλιν φεύγειν διὰ τὴν χαλεπότητα τῶν δανειστῶν. Οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι καὶ ῥωμαλεώτατοι συνίσταντο καὶ παρεκάλουν ἀλλήλους μὴ περιορᾷν, etc.

Respecting these hektêmori, "tenants paying one-sixth portion," we find little or no information: they are just noticed in Hesychius (v. Ἑκτήμοροι, Ἐπίμορτος) and in Pollux, vii, 151; from whom we learn that ἐπίμορτος γῆ was an expression which occurred in one of the Solonian laws. Whether they paid to the landlord one-sixth, or retained for themselves only one-sixth, has been doubted (see Photius, Πελάται).

Dionysius Hal. (A. R. ii, 9) compares the thêtes in Attica to the Roman clients: that both agreed in being relations of personal and proprietary dependence is certain; but we can hardly carry the comparison farther, nor is there any evidence in Attica of that sanctity of obligation which is said to have bound the Roman patron to his client.

[167] So the Frisii, when unable to pay the tribute imposed by the Roman empire, "primo boves ipsos, mox agros, postremo corpora conjugum et liberorum, servitio tradebant." (Tacit. Annal. iv, 72.) About the selling of

children by parents, to pay the taxes, in the later times of the Roman empire see Zosimus, ii, 38; Libanius, t. ii, p. 427, ed. Paris, 1627.

[168] See the Fragment περὶ τῆς Ἀθηναίων πολιτείας, No. 2, Schneidewin.

Δήμου θ᾽ ἡγεμόνων ἄδικος νόος, οἷσιν ἔτοιμος
Ὕβριος ἐκ μεγάλης ἄλγεα πολλὰ παθεῖν.
… Οὔθ᾽ ἱερῶν κτεάνων οὔτε τι δημοσίων
Φειδόμενοι, κλέπτουσιν ἐφ᾽ ἁρπαγῇ ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος,
Οὐδὲ φυλάσσονται σεμνὰ δίκης θέμεθλα.
… Ταῦτα μὲν ἐν δήμῳ στρέφεται κακά· τῶν δὲ πενιχρῶν
Ἰκνεῦνται πολλοὶ γαῖαν ἐς ἀλλοδαπὴν
Πραθέντες, δεσμοῖσι τ᾽ ἀεικελίοισι δεθέντες.

[169] Aristot. Polit. γίγνονται δὲ αἱ στάσεις οὐ περὶ μικρῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ μικρῶν.

[170] Livy, ii, 23; Dionys. Hal. A. R. vi, 26: compare Livy, vi, 34-36.

"An placeret, fœnore circumventam plebem, potius quam sorte creditum solvat, corpus in nervum ac supplicia dare? et gregatim quotidie de foro addictos duci, et repleri vinctis nobiles domos? et ubicumque patricius habitet, ibi carcerem privatum esse?"

The exposition of Niebuhr, respecting the old Roman law of debtor and creditor (Röm. Gesch. i, p. 602, *seq.*; Arnold's Roman Hist., ch. viii, vol. i, p. 135), and the explanation which he there gives of the nexi, as distinguished from the addicti, have been shown to be incorrect by M. von Savigny, in an excellent Dissertation Über das Altrömische Schuldrecht (Abhandlungen Berlin Academ. 1833, pp. 70-73), an abstract of which will be found in an Appendix, at the close of this chapter.

[171] See Plutarch, Solon, 14; and above all the Trochaic tetrameters of Solon himself, addressed to Phôkus, Fr. 24-26, Schneidewin:—

Οὐκ ἔφυ Σόλων βαθύφρων, οὐδὲ βουλήεις ἀνήρ,
Ἐσθλὰ γὰρ θεοῦ δίδοντος, αὐτὸς οὐκ ἐδέξατο.
Περιβαλὼν δ᾽ ἄγραν, ἀγασθεὶς οὐκ ἀνέσπασεν μέγα
Δίκτυον, θυμοῦ θ᾽ ἁμαρτῇ καὶ φρενῶν ἀποσφαλείς.

[172] Aristides, Περὶ τοῦ Παραφθέγματος, ii, p. 397; and Fragm. 29, Schn. of the Iambics of Solon:—

… εἰ γὰρ ἤθελον
Ἃ τοῖς ἐναντίοισιν ἤνδανεν τότε,
Αὖθις δ᾽ ἃ τοῖσιν ἀτέροις δρᾶσαι …
Πολλῶν ἂν ἀνδρῶν ἥδ᾽ ἐχηρώθη πόλις.

[173] See the valuable fragment of his Iambics, preserved by Plutarch and Aristidês, the expression of which is rendered more emphatic by the appeal to the *personal Earth*, as having passed by his measures from slavery into freedom (compare Plato, Legg. v, pp. 740-741):—

Συμμαρτυροίη ταῦτ᾽ ἂν ἐν δίκῃ Χρόνου
Μήτηρ, μεγίστη δαιμόνων Ὀλυμπίων,
Ἄριστα, Γῆ μέλαινα, τῆς ἐγὼ ποτε
Ὅρους ἀνεῖλον πολλαχῇ πεπηγότας,
Πρόσθεν δὲ δουλεύουσα, νῦν ἐλευθέρα.
Πολλοὺς δ᾽ Ἀθήνας, πατρίδ᾽ εἰς θεόκτιτον
Ἀνήγαγον πραθέντας, ἄλλον ἐκδίκως,
Ἄλλον δικαίως· τοὺς δ᾽ ἀναγκαίης ὕπο
Χρειοῦς φυγόντας, γλῶσσαν οὐκετ᾽ Ἀττικὴν
Ἰέντας, ὡς ἂν πολλαχῇ πλανωμένους·
Τοὺς δ᾽ ἐνθάδ᾽ αὐτοῦ δουλίην ἀεικέα
Ἔχοντας, ἤδη δεσπότας τρομευμένους,
Ἐλευθέρους ἔθηκα.

also Plutarch, Solon, c. 15.

[174] Plutarch, Solon, c. 23: compare c. 13. The statement in Sextus Empiricus (Pyrrhon. Hypot. iii, 24, 211), that Solon enacted a law permitting fathers to kill (φονεύειν) their children, cannot be true, and must be copied from some untrustworthy authority: compare Dionys. Hal. A. R. ii, 26, where he contrasts the prodigious extent of the *patria potestas* among the early Romans, with the restrictions which all the Greek legislators alike,—Solon, Pittakus, Charondas,—either found or introduced: he says, however, that the Athenian father was permitted to disinherit legitimate male children, which does not seem to be correct.

Meier (Der Attische Prozess, iii, 2, p. 427) rejects the above-mentioned statement of Sextus Empiricus, and farther contends that the exposure of new-born infants was not only rare, but discountenanced as well by law as by opinion; the evidence in the Latin comedies to the contrary, he considers as manifestations of Roman, and not of Athenian, manners. In this latter opinion I do not think that he is borne out, and I agree in the statement of Schömann (Ant. J. P. Græc. sect. 82), that the practice and feeling of Athens as well as of Greece generally, left it to the discretion of the father whether he would consent, or refuse, to bring up a new-born child.

[175] Plutarch, Solon, c. 15. See the full exposition given of this debasement of the coinage, in Boeckh's Metrologie, ch. ix, p. 115.

M. Boeckh thinks (ch. xv, s. 2) that Solon not only debased the coin, but also altered the weights and measures. I dissent from his opinion on this latter point, and have given my reasons for so doing, in a review of his valuable treatise in the Classical Museum, No. 1.

[176] Plutarch, Solon, c. 19. In the general restoration of exiles throughout the Greek cities, proclaimed first by order of Alexander the Great, afterwards by Polysperchon, exception is made of men exiled for sacrilege or homicide (Diodor. xvii, 109; xviii, 8-46).

[177] Plutarch, Solon, c. 15. οὐδὲ μαλακῶς, οὐδ᾽ ὑπείκων τοῖς δυναμένοις, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἡδονὴν τῶν ἑλομένων, ἔθετο τοὺς νόμους, etc.

[178] Plutarch, Solon, c. 16.

[179] See above, vol. ii, part ii, ch. vi.

[180] Plutarch, *l. c.* ἔθυσάν τε κοινῇ, Σεισάχθειαν τὴν θυσίαν ὀνομάζοντες, etc.

[181] The anecdote is again noticed, but without specification of the names of the friends, in Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. Præcep. p. 807.

[182] Plutarch, Solon, c. 15. The statement of Dionysius of Hal., in regard to the bearing of the seisachtheia, is in the main accurate,—χρεῶν ἄφεσιν ψηφισαμένην τοῖς ἀπόροις (v, 65),—to the debtors who were liable on the security of their bodies and their lands, and who were chiefly poor,—not to *all* debtors.

Herakleidês Pontic. (Πολιτ. c. 1) and Dio Chrysostom (Or. xxxi, p. 331) express themselves loosely.

Both Wachsmuth (Hell. Alterth. v. i, p. 249) and K. F. Hermann (Gr. Staats Alter. c. s. 106) quote the heliastic oath, and its energetic protest against repudiation, as evidence of the bearing of the Solonian seisachtheia. But that oath is referable only to a later period; it cannot be produced in proof of any matter applicable to the time of Solon; the mere mention of the senate of Five Hundred in it, shows that it belongs to times subsequent to the Kleisthenean revolution. Nor does the passage from Plato (Legg. iii, p. 684) apply to the case.

Both Wachsmuth and Hermann appear to me to narrow too much the extent of Solon's measure in reference to the clearing of debtors. But on the other hand, they enlarge the effect of his measures in another way, without any sufficient evidence,—they think that he raised *the villein tenants* into *free proprietors*. Of this I see no proof, and think it improbable. A large proportion of the small debtors whom Solon exonerated were probably free proprietors before; the existence of the ὅροι, or mortgage pillars, upon their land proves this.

[183] That which Solon did for the Athenian people in regard to debts, is less than what was *promised* to the Roman plebs (at the time of its secession to the Mons Sacer in 491 B. C.) by Menenius Agrippa, the envoy of the senate, to appease them, but which does not seem to have been ever *realized* (Dionys. Hal. vi, 83). He promised an abrogation of all the debts of debtors unable to pay, without exception,—if the language of Dionysius is to be trusted, which probably it cannot be.

Dr. Thirlwall justly observes respecting Solon, "He must be considered as an arbitrator, to whom all the parties interested submitted their claims, with the avowed intent that they should be decided by him, not upon the footing of legal right, but according to his own view of the public interest. It was in this light that he himself regarded his office, and he appears to have discharged it faithfully and discreetly." (History of Greece, ch. xi. vol. ii, p. 42.)

[184] Dêmosthen. cont. Timokrat. p. 746. οὐδὲ τῶν χρεῶν τῶν ἰδίων ἀποκοπὰς, οὐδὲ γῆς ἀναδασμὸν τῆς Ἀθηναίων, οὐδ᾽ οἰκιῶν (ψηφιοῦμαι): compare Dio Chrysostom, Orat. xxxi, p. 332, who also dwells upon the anxiety of various Grecian cities to fix a curse upon all propositions for χρεῶν ἀποκοπὴ and γῆς ἀναδασμός. What is not less remarkable is, that Dio seems not to be aware of any one well-authenticated case in Grecian history, in which a redivision of lands had ever actually taken place—ὃ μηδ᾽ ὅλως ἴσμεν εἴ ποτε συνέβη. (*l. c.*)

For the law of debtor and creditor, as it stood during the times of the Orators at Athens, see Heraldus, Animadv. ad Salmasium, pp. 174-286; Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Prozess, b. iii, c. 2, p. 497, *seqq.* (though I doubt the distinction which they there draw between χρέος and δανεῖον); Platner, Prozess und Klagen, b. ii, absch. 11, pp. 349, 361.

There was one exceptional case, in which the Attic law always continued to the creditor that power over the person of the insolvent debtor which all creditors had possessed originally,—it was when the creditor had lent money for the express purpose of ransoming the debtor from captivity (Dêmosthen. cont. Nikostr. p. 1249),—analogous to the actio depensi in the old Roman law.

Any citizen who owed money to the public treasury, and whose debt became overdue, was deprived for the time of all civil rights until he had cleared it off.

Diodorus (i, 79) gives us an alleged law of the Egyptian king Bocchoris, releasing the persons of debtors and rendering their properties only liable, which is affirmed to have served as an example for Solon to copy. If we can trust this historian, lawgivers in other parts of Greece still retained the old severe law enslaving the debtor's person: compare a passage in Isokratês (Orat. xiv, Plataicus, p. 305; p. 414, Bek.)

[185] Aristot. Polit. i, 4, 23; Cato ap. Cicero. de Offic. ii, 25. Plato, in his Treatise de Legg. (v, p. 742) forbids all lending on interest: indeed, he forbids any private citizen to possess either gold or silver.

To illustrate the marked difference made in the early Roman law, between the claim for the principal and that for the interest, I insert in an Appendix, at the end of this chapter, the explanation given by M. von Savigny, of the treatment of the nexi and addicti,—connected as it is by analogy with the Solonian seisachtheia.

[186] Aristot. Polit. i, 4, 23. Τὴς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς ψεγομένης διακίως (οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἔστιν), εὐλογώτατα μισεῖται ἡ ὀβολοστατική, etc. Compare Ethic. Nikom. iv, 1.

Plutarch borrows from Aristotle the quibble derived from the word τόκος (the Greek expression for interest), which has given birth to the well-known dictum of Aristotle,—that money being naturally *barren*, to extract *offspring* from it must necessarily be *contrary to nature* (see Plutarch, De Vit. Ær. Al. p. 829).

[187] Tacit. Germ. 26. "Fœnus agitare et in usuras extendere, ignotum: ideoque magis servatur quam si vetitum esset," (c. 21.) "Gaudent muneribus: sed nec data imputant, nec acceptis obligantur."

[188] Hesiod, Opp. Di. 647, 404. Βούληαι χρέα τε προφυγεῖν, καὶ λιμὸν ἀτερπῆ. Some good observations on this subject are to be found in the excellent treatise of M. Turgot, written in 1763, "Mémoire sur les Prêts d'Argent:"—

"Les causes qui avoient autrefois rendu odieux le prêt à intérêt, ont cessé d'agir avec tant de force…. De toutes ces circonstances réunies, il est résulté que les emprunts faits par le pauvre pour subsister ne sont plus qu'un objet à peine sensible dans la somme totale d'emprunts: que la plus grande partie des prêts se font à l'homme riche, ou du moins à l'homme industrieux, qui espère se procurer de grands profits par l'emploi de l'argent qu'il emprunte…. Les prêteurs sur gage à gros intérêt, les seuls qui prêtent véritablement au pauvre pour ses besoins journaliers et non pour le mettre en état de gagner, ne font point le même mal que les anciens usuriers qui conduisoient par degrés à la misère et à l'esclavage les pauvres citoyens auxquels ils avoient procuré des secours funestes…. Le créancier qui pouvait réduire son débiteur en esclavage y trouvait un profit: c'étoit un esclave qu'il acquérait: mais aujourd'hui le créancier sait qu'en privant son débiteur de la liberté, il n'y gagnera autre chose que d'être obligé de le nourrir en prison: aussi ne s'avise-t-on pas de faire contracter à un homme qui n'a rien, et qui est réduit à emprunter pour vivre, des engagemens qui emportent la contrainte par corps. La seule sûreté vraiment solide contre l'homme pauvre est le gage: et l'homme pauvre s'estime heureux de trouver un secours pour le moment sans autre danger que de perdre ce gage. Aussi le peuple a-t-il plutôt de la reconnoissance pour ces petits usuriers qui le secourent dans son besoin, quoiqu'ils lui vendent assez cher ce secours." (Mémoire sur les Prêts d'Argent, in the collection of Œuvres de Turgot, by Dupont de Nemours, vol. v, sects. xxx, xxxi, pp. 326, 327, 329, written in 1763.)

[189] "In Bengal (observes Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, b. i, ch. 9, p. 143, ed. 1812) money is frequently lent to the farmers at 40, 50, and 60 per cent., and the succeeding crop is mortgaged for the payment."

Respecting this commerce at Florence in the Middle Ages, M. Depping observes: "Il semblait que l'esprit commercial fût inné chez les Florentins: déjà aux 12me et 13me siècles, on les voit tenir des banques et prêter de l'argent aux princes. Ils ouvrirent partout des maisons de prêt, marchèrent de pair avec les Lombards, et, il faut le dire, ils furent souvent maudits, comme ceux-ci, par leurs débiteurs, à cause de leur rapacité. Vingt pour cent par an était le taux ordinaire des prêteurs Florentins: et il n'était pas rare qu'ils en prissent trente et quarante." Depping, Histoire du Commerce entre le Levant et l'Europe, vol. i, p. 235.

Boeckh (Public Economy of Athens, book i, ch. 22) gives from 12 to 18 per cent. per annum as the common rate of interest at Athens in the time of the orators.

The valuable Inscription (No. 1845, in his Corpus Inser. Pars viii, p. 23, sect. 3) proves, that at Korkyra a rate of 2 per cent. per month, or 24 per cent. per annum, might be obtained from perfectly solvent and responsible borrowers. For this is a decree of the Korkyræan government, prescribing what shall be done with a sum of money given to the state for the Dionysiac festivals,—placing that money under the care of certain men of property and character, and directing them to lend it out exactly at 2 per cent. per month, *neither more nor less*, until a given sum shall be accumulated. This Inscription dates about the third or second century B. C., according to Boeckh's conjecture.

The Orchomenian Inscription, No. 1569, to which Boeckh refers in the passage above alluded to, is unfortunately defective in the words determining the rate of interest payable to Eubulus: but there is another, the Theræan Inscription (No. 2446), containing the Testament of Epiktêta, wherein the annual sum payable in lieu of a principal sum bequeathed, is calculated at 7 per cent.; a rate which Boeckh justly regards as moderate considered in reference to ancient Greece.

[190] Cæsar, B. G. i, 4, respecting the Gallic chiefs and plebs: "Die constitutâ causæ dictionis, Orgetorix ad judicium omnem suam familiam, ad hominum millia decem, undique coëgit: et omnes clientes, *obœratos*que suos, quorum magnum numerum habebat, eodem conduxit: per eos, ne caussam diceret, se eripuit." Ibid. vi, 13: "Plerique, cum aut *ære alieno*, aut magnitudine tributorum, aut injuriâ potentiorum, premuntur, sese in servitutem dicant nobilibus. In hos eadem omnia sunt jura, quæ dominis in servos." The wealthy Romans culti-

vated their large possessions partly by the hands of adjudged debtors, in the time of Columella (i, 3, 14): "More præpotentium, qui possident fines gentium, quos … aut occupatos nexu civium, aut ergastulis, tenent."

According to the Teutonic codes also, drawn up several centuries subsequently to Tacitus, it seems that the insolvent debtor falls under the power of his creditor and is subject to personal fetters and chastisement (Grimm, Deutsche Rechts Alterthümer, pp. 612-615): both he and Von Savigny assimilate it to the terrible process of personal execution and addiction in the old law of Rome, against the insolvent debtor on loan. King Alfred exhorts the creditor to lenity (Laws of King Alfred, Thorpe, Ancient Laws of England, vol. i, p. 53, law 35).

A striking evidence of the alteration of the character and circumstances of debtors, between the age of Solon and that of Plutarch, is afforded by the treatise of the latter, "De Vitando Ære Alieno," wherein he sets forth in the most vehement manner the miserable consequences of getting into debt. "*The poor*" he says, "*do not get into debt, for no one will lend them money* (τοῖς γὰρ ἀπόροις οὐ δανείζουσιν, ἀλλὰ βουλομένοις εὐπορίαν τινα ἑαυτοῖς κτᾶσθαι καὶ μάρτυρα δίδωσι καὶ βεβαιώτην ἄξιον, ὅτι ἔχει πιστεύεσθαι): the borrowers are men who have still some property and some security to offer, but who wish to keep up a rate of expenditure beyond what they can afford, and become utterly ruined by contracting debts." (Plut. pp. 827, 830.) This shows how intimately the multiplication of poor debtors was connected with the liability of their persons to enslavement. Compare Plutarch, De Cupidine Divitiarum, c. 2, p. 523.

[191] Levitic. 25: 35-36; Deuteron. 23: 20. This enactment seems sufficiently intelligible; yet M. Salvador (Histoire des Institutions de Moïse, liv. iii, ch. 6) puzzles himself much to assign to it some far-sighted commercial purpose. "Unto thy brother thou shalt not lend upon *usury*, but unto a stranger thou mayst lend upon *usury*:"—it is of more importance to remark that the word here translated *usury* really means *any interest* for money, great or small;—see the opinion of the Sanhedrim of seventy Jewish doctors, assembled at Paris in 1807, cited in M. Salvador's work, *l. c.*

The Mosaic law, therefore, (as between Jew and Jew, or even as between Jew and the μέτοικος, or *resident stranger*, distinguished from the *foreigner*,) went as far as the Koran in prohibiting all taking of interest. That its enactments were not much observed, any more than those of the Koran, we have one proof at least in the proceeding of Nehemiah at the building of the second temple,—which presents so curious a parallel in many respects to the Solonian seisachtheia, that I transcribe the account of it from Prideaux, Connection of Sacred and Profane History, part i, b. 6, p. 290:—

"The burden which the people underwent in the earning on of this work, and the incessant labor which they were enforced to undergo to bring it to so speedy a conclusion, being very great, … care was taken to relieve them from a much greater burden, the oppression of usurers; which they then in great misery lay under, and had much greater reason to complain of. For the rich, taking advantage of the necessities of the meaner sort, had exacted heavy usury of them, making them pay the centesima for all moneys lent them; that is, 1 per cent. for every month, which amounted to 12 per cent. for the whole year; so that they were forced to mortgage their lands, and sell their children into servitude, to have wherewith to buy bread for the support of themselves and their families; which being a manifest breach of the law of God, given them by Moses (for that forbids all the race of Israel to take usury of any of their brethren), Nehemiah, on his hearing hereof, resolved forthwith to remove so great an iniquity; in order whereto he called a general assembly of all the people, where having set forth unto them the nature of the offence, how great a breach it was of the divine law, and how heavy an oppression upon their brethren, and how much it might provoke the wrath of God against them, he caused it to be enacted by the general suffrage of that whole assembly, that all should return to their brethren whatsoever had been exacted of them upon usury, and also *release all the lands, vineyards, olive-yards, and houses*, which had been taken of them upon *mortgage* on the account hereof."

The measure of Nehemiah appears thus to have been not merely a seisachtheia such as that of Solon, but also a παλιντοκία, or refunding of interest paid by the debtor in past time,—analogous to the proceeding of the Megarians on emancipating themselves from their oligarchy, as recounted above, chapter ix, p. 44.

[192] In every law to limit the rate of interest, it is of course implied that the law not only ought to fix, but can fix, the maximum rate at which money is to be lent. The tribunes at Rome followed out this proposition with perfect consistency: they passed successive laws for the reduction of the rate of interest, until at length they made it illegal to take any interest at all: "Gemecium, tribunum plebis, tulisse ad populum, ne fœnerari liceret." (Liv. vii, 42.) History shows that the law, though passed, was not carried into execution.

[193] Boeckh (Public Econ. of Athens, b. i, ch. 22, p. 128) thinks differently,—in my judgment, contrary to the evidence: the passages to which he refers, especially that of Theophrastus, are not sufficient to sustain his opinion, and there are other passages which go far to contradict it.

[194] Lysias cont. Theomnêst. A. c. 5, p. 360.

[195] Cicero, De Officiis, i, 42.

[196] Plato, Legg. iii, p. 684. ὡς ἐπιχειροῦντι δὴ νομοθέτῃ κινεῖν τῶν τοιούτων τι πᾶς ἀπαντᾷ, λέγων, μὴ κινεῖν τὰ ἀκίνητα, καὶ ἐπαρᾶται γῆς τε ἀναδασμοὺς εἰσηγούμενον καὶ χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς, ὥστ᾽ εἰς ἀπορίαν καθίστασθαι πάντα ἄνδρα, etc.: compare also v, pp. 736-737, where similar feelings are intimated not less emphatically.

Cicero lays down very good principles about the mischief of destroying faith in contracts; but his admonitions to this effect seem to be accompanied with an impracticable condition: the lawgiver is to take care that debts shall not be contracted to an extent hurtful to the state: "Quamobrem ne sit æs alienum, quod reipublicæ noceat, providendum est (quod *multis rationibus* caveri potest): non, si fuerit, ut locupletes suum perdant, debitores lucrentur alienum," etc. What the *multæ rationes* were, which Cicero had in his mind, I do not know: compare his opinion about *fœneratores*, Offic. i, 42 ii, 25.

[197] See Plutarch's Life of Agis, especially ch. 13, about the bonfire in which the κλάρια, or mortgage-deeds, of the creditors were all burnt, in the agora of Sparta: compare also the comparison of Agis with Gracchus, c. 2.

[198] "Græcâ fide mercari." Polybius puts the Greeks greatly below the Romans in point of veracity and good faith (vi, 56); in another passage, he speaks not quite so confidently (xviii, 17). Even the testimony of the Roman writers is sometimes given in favor of Attic good faith, not against it—"ut semper et in omni re, quicquid sincerâ fide gereretur, id Romani, *Atticâ fieri*, prædicarent." (Velleius Paterc. ii, 23.)

The language of Heffter (Athenäische Gerichts Verfassung, p. 466), especially, degrades very undeservedly the state of good faith and credit at Athens.

The whole tone and argument of the Oration of Dêmosthenês against Leptinês is a remarkable proof of the respect of the Athenian dikastery for vested interests, even under less obvious forms than that of pecuniary possession. We may add a striking passage of Dêmosthenês cont. Timokrat. wherein he denounces the rescinding of past transactions (τὰ πεπραγμένα λῦσαι, contrasted with prospective legislation) as an injustice peculiar to an oligarchy, and repugnant to the feelings of a democracy (cont. Timokrat. c. 20, p. 724; c. 36, 747).

[199] A similar credit, in respect to monetary probity, may be claimed for the republic of Florence. M. Sismondi says, "Au milieu des révolutions monétaires de tous les pays voisins et tandis que la mauvaise foi des gouvernemens altéroit le numéraire d'une extrémité à l'autre de l'Europe, le florin ou séquin de Florence est toujours resté le même: il est du même poids, du même titre: il porte la même empreinte que celui qui fut battu en 1252." (Républiques Italiennes, vol. iii, ch. 18, p. 176.)

M. Boeckh (Public Econ. of Athens, i, 6; iv, 19), while affirming, justly and decidedly, that the Athenian republic always set a high value on maintaining the integrity of their silver money,—yet thinks that the gold pieces which were coined in Olymp. 93, 2, (408 B. C.) under the archonship of Antigenês (out of the golden ornaments in the acropolis, and at a time of public embarrassments) were debased and made to pass for more than their value. The only evidence in support of this position appears to be the passage in Aristophanês (Ran. 719-737) with the Scholia; but this very passage seems to me rather to prove the contrary. "The Athenian people (says Aristophanês) deal with their public servants as they do with their coins: they prefer the new and bad to the old and good." If the people were so exceedingly, and even extravagantly, desirous of obtaining the new coins, this is a strong proof that they were *not* depreciated, and that no loss was incurred by giving the old coins in exchange for them.

[200] "Sane vetus Urbi fœnebre malum (says Tacitus, Ann. vi, 16) et seditionum discordiarumque creberrima causa," etc: compare Appian, Bell. Civil. Præfat.; and Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois, l. xxii, c. 22.

The constant hopes and intrigues of debtors at Rome, to get rid of their debts by some political movement, are nowhere more forcibly brought out than in the second Catilinarian Oration of Cicero, c. 8-9: read also the striking harangue of Catiline to his fellow-conspirators (Sallust, B. Catilin. c. 20-21).

[201] The insolvent debtor, in some of the Bœotian towns, was condemned to sit publicly in the agora with a basket on his head, and then disfranchised (Nikolaus Damaskenus, Frag. p. 152, ed. Orelli).

According to Diodorus, the old severe law against the body of a debtor, long after it had been abrogated by Solon at Athens, still continued in other parts of Greece (i, 79).

[202] Solon, Frag. 27, ed. Schneid.—

> Ἃ μὲν ἄελπτα σὺν θεοῖσιν ἤνυσ᾽, ἄλλα δ᾽ οὐ μάτην
>
> Ἔρδον.

[203] Plutarch, Solon, 18-23; Pollux, viii. 130; Aristot. Polit. ii, 9, 4; Aristot. Fragm. περὶ Πολιτείων, Fr. 51, ed. Neumann; Harpokration and Photius, v. Ἱππάς; Etymolog. Mag. Ζευγίσιον, Θητικόν; the Etym. Mag. Ζευγίσιον, and the Schol. Aristoph. Equit. 627, recognize only three classes.

He took a medimnus (of wheat or barley?) as equivalent to a drachm, and a sheep at the same value (*ib.* c. 23).

The medimnus seems equal to about 1 2/5 (1·4) English imperial bushel: consequently 500 medimni = 700 English imperial bushels, or 87 1/2 quarters.

[204] The excellent explanation of the Solonian (τίμημα) property-schedule and graduated qualification, first given by Boeckh, in his Staatshaushaltung der Athener (b. iii, c. 5), has elucidated a subject which was, before him, nothing but darkness and mystery. The statement of Pollux (viii, 130), given in very loose language, had been, before Boeckh, erroneously apprehended; ἀνήλισκον εἰς τὸ δημόσιον, does not mean the sums which the pentakosiomedimnus, the hippeus, or the zeugite, *actually paid* to the state, but the sums for which each was rated, or which each was *liable* to pay, if called upon: of course, the state does not call for *the whole* of a man's rated property, but exacts an equal proportion of it from each.

On one point I cannot concur with Boeckh. He fixes the pecuniary qualification of the third class, or zeugites, at one hundred and fifty drachms, not at two hundred. All the positive testimonies (as he himself allows, p. 31) agree in fixing two hundred, and not one hundred and fifty; and the inference drawn from the old law, quoted in Dêmosthenês (cont. Makartat. p. 1067) is too uncertain to outweigh this concurrence of authorities.

Moreover, the whole Solonian schedule becomes clearer and more symmetrical if we adhere to the statement of two hundred drachms, and not one hundred and fifty, as the lowest scale of zeugite income; for the scheduled capital is then, in all the three scales, a definite and exact multiple of the income returned,—in the richest class it is twelve times,—in the middle class, ten times,—in the poorest, five times the income. But this correspondence ceases, if we adopt the supposition of Boeckh, that the lowest zeugite income was one hundred and fifty drachms; for the sum of one thousand drachms (at which the lowest zeugite was rated in the schedule) is no exact multiple of one hundred and fifty drachms. In order to evade this difficulty, Boeckh supposes that the adjustment of income to scheduled capital was effected in a way both roundabout and including nice fractions: he thinks that the income of each was converted into capital by multiplying by twelve, and that, in the case of the richest class, or pentakosiomedimni, the *whole* sum so obtained was entered in the schedule,—in the case of the second class, or hippeis, five-sixths of the sum,—and in the case of the third class, or zeugites, five-ninths of the sum. Now this process seems to me rather complicated, and the employment of a fraction such as five-ninths (both difficult and not much above the simple fraction of one-half) very improbable: moreover, Boeckh's own table, p. 41, gives fractional sums in the third class, when none appear in the first or second.

Such objections, of course, would not be admissible, if there were any positive evidence to prove the point. But in this case they are in harmony with all the positive evidence, and are amply sufficient, in my judgment, to countervail the presumption arising from the old law on which Boeckh relies.

[205] See Boeckh, Staatshaushaltung der Athener, *ut suprà*. Pollux gives an Inscription describing Anthemion son of Diphilus,—Θητικοῦ ἀντὶ τέλους ἱππάδ᾽ ἀμειψάμενος. The word τελεῖν does not necessarily mean *actual* payment, but "the being included in a class with a certain aggregate of duties and liabilities,"—equivalent to *censeri* (Boeckh, p. 36).

Plato, in his treatise De Legibus, admits a quadripartite census of citizens, according to more or less of property (Legg. v, p. 744; vi, p. 756). Compare Tittmann, Griechische Staats Verfassungen pp. 648, 653; K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Gr. Staats Alt. § 108.

[206] Plutarch, Solon, 18, 19, 23; Philochorus, Frag. 60, ed. Didot. Athenæus, iv, p. 168; Valer. Maxim. ii, 6.

[207] Meursius, Solon, *passim*; Sigonius, De Republ. Athen. i, p. 39 (though in some passages he makes a marked distinction between the time before and after Kleisthenês, p. 28). See Wachsmuth, Hellenische Alterthumskunde, vol. i, sects. 46, 47; Tittmann, Griechische Staatsverfassungen, p. 146; Platner, Der Attische Prozess, book ii, ch. 5, pp 28-38; Dr. Thirlwall, History of Greece, vol. ii, ch. xi, pp. 46-57.

Niebuhr, in his brief allusions to the legislation of Solon, keeps duly in view the material difference between Athens as constituted by Solon, and Athens as it came to be after Kleisthenês; but he presumes a closer analogy between the Roman patricians and the Athenian eupatridæ than we are entitled to count upon.

[208] Dêmosthen. cont. Timokrat. p. 746. Æschinês ascribes this oath to ὁ νομοθέτης (c. Ktesiphon. p. 389).

Dr. Thirlwall notices the oath as prescribed by Solon (History of Greece, vol. ii, ch. xi, p. 47).

So again Dêmosthenês and Æschinês, in the orations against Leptinês (c. 21, p. 486) and against Timokrat. pp. 706-707,—compare Æschin. c. Ktesiph. p. 429,—in commenting upon the formalities enjoined for repealing

an existing law and enacting a new one, while ascribing the whole to Solon,—say, among other things, that Solon directed the proposer "to post up his project of law before the eponymi," (ἐκθεῖναι πρόσθεν τῶν Ἐπωνύμων): now the eponymi were (the statues of) the heroes from whom the ten Kleisthenean tribes drew their names, and the law making mention of these statues, proclaims itself as of a date subsequent to Kleisthenês. Even the law defining the treatment of the condemned murderer who returned from exile, which both Dêmosthenês and Doxopater (ap. Walz. Collect. Rhetor. vol. ii, p. 223) call a law of Drako, is really later than Solon, as may be seen by its mention of the ἄξων (Dêmosth. cont. Aristok. p. 629).

Andokidês is not less liberal in his employment of the name of Solon (see Orat. i, De Mysteriis, p. 13), where he cites as a law of Solon, an enactment which contains the mention of the tribe Æantis and the senate of five hundred (obviously, therefore, subsequent to the revolution of Kleisthenês), besides other matters which prove it to have been passed even subsequent to the oligarchical revolution of the four hundred, towards the close of the Peloponnesian war. The prytanes, the proëdri, and the division of the year into ten portions of time, each called by the name of *a prytany*,—so interwoven with all the public proceedings of Athens,—do not belong to the Solonian Athens, but to Athens as it stood after the ten tribes of Kleisthenês.

Schömann maintains emphatically, that the sworn nomothetæ, as they stood in the days of Dêmosthenês, were instituted by Solon; but he admits at the same time that all the allusions of the orators to this institution include both words and matters essentially post-Solonian, so that modifications subsequent to Solon must have been introduced. This admission seems to me fatal to the cogency of his proof: see Schömann, De Comitiis, ch. vii, pp. 266-268; and the same author, Antiq. J. P. Att. sect. xxxii. His opinion is shared by K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Griech. Staats Alterth. sect. 131; and Platner, Attischer Prozess, vol. ii, p. 38.

Meier, De Bonis Damnatorum, p. 2, remarks upon the laxity with which the orators use the name of Solon: "Oratores Solonis nomine sæpe utuntur, ubi omnino legislatorem quemquam significare volunt, etiamsi a Solone ipso lex lata non est." Herman Schelling, in his Dissertation De Solonis Legibus ap. Oratt. Attic. (Berlin, 1842), has collected and discussed the references to Solon and to his laws in the orators. He controverts the opinion just cited from Meier, but upon arguments no way satisfactory to me (pp. 6-8); the more so, as he himself admits that the dialect in which the Solonian laws appear in the citation of the orators can never have been the original dialect of Solon himself (pp. 3-5), and makes also substantially the same admission at Schömann, in regard to the presence of post-Solonian matters in the supposed Solonian laws (pp. 23-27).

[209] See Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, book ii, c. 15.

[210] Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 26, p. 731: compare Aristophanês Ekklesiazus. 302.

[211] Herodot. i, 29; Plutarch, Solon, c. 25. Aulus Gellius affirms that the Athenians swore, under strong religious penalties, to observe them forever (ii, 12).

[212] Livy iii, 34.

[213] Solon, Fragm. ii, 3, ed. Schneidewin:—

Δήμῳ μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα τόσον κράτος, ὅσσον ἐπαρκεῖ,
Τιμῆς οὔτ᾽ ἀφελών, οὔτ᾽ ἐπορεξάμενος·
Οἳ δ᾽ εἶχον δύναμιν καὶ χρήμασιν ἦσαν ἀγητοὶ,
Καὶ τοῖς ἐφρασάμην μηδὲν ἀεικὲς ἔχειν.
Ἕστην δ᾽ ἀμφιβαλὼν κρατερὸν σάκος ἀμφοτέροισι,
Νικᾶν δ᾽ οὐκ εἴασ᾽ οὐδετέρους ἀδίκως.

The reading ἐπαρκεῖ in the first line is not universally approved: Brunck adopts ἐπαρκεῖν, which Niebuhr approves. The latter construes it to mean, "I gave to the people only so much power as could not be withheld from them." (Röm. Geschicht. t. ii, p. 346, 2d ed.) Taking the first two lines together, I think Niebuhr's meaning is substantially correct, though I give a more literal translation myself. Solon seems to be vindicating himself against the reproach of having been too democratical, which was, doubtless, addressed to him in every variety of language.

[214] Aristot. Polit. ii, 9, 4. Ἐπεὶ Σόλων γ᾽ ἔοικε τὴν ἀναγκαιοτάτην ἀποδιδόναι τῷ δημῳ δύναμιν, τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν· μηδὲ γὰρ τούτου κύριος ὢν ὁ δῆμος, δοῦλος ἂν εἴη καὶ πολέμιος.

In this passage respecting Solon (containing sections 2, 3, 4 of the edition of M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire), Aristotle first gives the opinion of certain critics who praised Solon, with the reasons upon which it is founded; next, the opinion of certain critics who blamed him, with *their* reasons; thirdly, his own judgment. The first of these three contains sect. 2 (from Σόλωνα δ᾽ ἔνιοι, down to τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων). The second contains the greater part of sect. 3 (from Διὸ καὶ μέμφονταί τινες αὐτῷ, down to τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν). The remainder is his own judgment. I notice this, because sections 2 and 3 are not to be taken as the opinion of Aristotle himself, but of those upon whom he was commenting, who considered Solon as the author of the dikasteries selected by lot.

[215] Herodot. v, 69. τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον, πρότερον ἀπωσμένον πάντων, etc.

[216] Herodot. v, 66-69. Οὗτοι οἱ ἄνδρες (Kleisthenês and Isagoras) ἐστασίασαν περὶ δυνάμεως· ἐσσούμενος δὲ ὁ Κλεισθένης τὸν δῆμον προσεταιρίζεται …

… Ὡς γὰρ δὴ τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον, πρότερον ἀπωσμένον πάντων, τότε πρὸς τὴν ἑωϋτοῦ μοίρην προσεθήκατο, (Kleisthenês) τὰς φυλὰς μετωνόμασε … ἦν δὲ, τὸν δῆμον προσθέμενος πολλῷ κατύπερθε τῶν ἀντιστασιώτεων.

As to the marked democratical tendency of the proceedings of Kleisthenês, see Aristot. Polit. vi, 2, 11; iii, 1, 10.

[217] Lysias cont. Theomnest. A. c. 5, p. 357, who gives ἐὰν μὴ προστιμήσῃ ἡ Ἡλίαια as a Solonian phrase; though we are led to doubt whether Solon can ever have employed it, when we find Pollux (vii, 5, 22) distinctly stating that Solon used the word ἐπαίτια to signify what the orators called προστιμήματα.

The original and proper meaning of the word Ἡλίαια is, the public assembly (see Tittmann, Griech. Staatsverfass. pp. 215-216); in subsequent times we find it signifying at Athens—1. The aggregate of six thousand dikasts chosen by lot annually and sworn, or the assembled people considered as exercising judicial functions; 2. Each of the separate fractions into which this aggregate body was in practice subdivided for actual judicial business. Ἐκκλησία became the term for the public deliberative assembly properly so called, which could never be held on the same day that the dikasteries sat (Dêmosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 21, p. 726): every dikastery is in fact always addressed as if it were the assembled people engaged in a specific duty.

I imagine the term Ἡλίαια in the time of Solon to have been used in its original meaning,—the public assembly, perhaps with a connotation of employment in judicial proceeding. The fixed number of six thousand does not date before the time of Kleisthenês, because it is essentially connected with the ten tribes; while the subdivision of this body of six thousand into various bodies of jurors for different courts and purposes did not commence, probably, until after the first reforms of Kleisthenês. I shall revert to this point when I touch upon the latter, and his times.

[218] The statement of Plutarch, that Solon gave an appeal from the decision of the archon to the judgment of the popular dikastery (Plutarch, Solon, 18), is distrusted by most of the expositors, though Dr. Thirlwall seems to admit it, justifying it by the analogy of the ephetæ, or judges of appeal, constituted by Drako (Hist. of Greece, vol. ii, ch. xi, p. 46).

To me it appears that the Drakonian ephetæ were not really judges in *appeal*: but be that as it may, the supposition of an appeal from the judgment of the archon is inconsistent with the known course of Attic procedure, and has apparently arisen in Plutarch's mind from confusion with the Roman *provocatio*, which really was an appeal from the judgment of the consul to that of the people. Plutarch's comparison of Solon with Publicola leads to this suspicion,—Καὶ τοῖς φεύγουσι δίκη, ἐπικαλεῖσθαι τὸν δῆμον, ὥσπερ ὁ Σόλων τοὺς δικαστὰς, ἔδωκε (Publicola). The Athenian archon was first a judge without appeal; and afterwards, ceasing to be a judge, he became president of a dikastery, performing only those preparatory steps which brought the case to an issue fit for decision: but he does not seem ever to have been a judge subject to appeal.

It is hardly just to Plutarch to make him responsible for the absurd remark that Solon rendered his laws intentionally obscure, in order that the dikasts might have more to do and greater power: he gives the remark, himself, only with the saving expression λέγεται, "it is said;" and we may well doubt whether it was ever seriously intended even by its author, whoever he may have been.

[219] Kratinus ap. Plutarch. Solon. 25.—

Πρὸς τοῦ Σόλωνος καὶ Δράκοντος, οἵσι νῦν

Φρύγουσιν ἤδη τὰς κάχρυς τοῖς κύρβεσιν.

Isokratês praises the moderate democracy in early Athens, as compared with that under which he lived; but in the Orat. vii (Areopagitic.) he connects the former with the names of Solon and Kleisthenês, while in the Orat. xii (Panathenaic.), he considers the former to have lasted from the days of Theseus to those of Solon and Peisistratus. In this latter oration he describes pretty exactly the power which the people possessed under the Solonian constitution,—τοῦ τὰς ἀρχὰς καταστῆσαι καὶ λαβεῖν δίκην παρὰ τῶν ἐξαμαρτανόντων, which coincides with the phrase of Aristotle—τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν,—supposing ἀρχόντων to be understood as the substantive of ἐξαμαρτανόντων.

Compare Isokratês, Or. vii, p. 143 (p. 192 Bek.) and p. 150 (202 Bek.) and Orat. xii, pp. 260-264 (351-356 Bek.).

[220] Cicero, Orat. pro Sext. Roscio, c. 25; Ælian, V. H. viii, 10.

[221] This seems to be the opinion of Dr. Thirlwall, against Wachsmuth though he speaks with doubt. (History of Greece, vol. ii, ch. 11, p. 48, 2d ed.)

[222] Plutarch, Solon, 23-25. He particularly mentions the sixteenth ἄξων: we learn, also, that the thirteenth ἄξων contained the eighth law (c. 19): the twenty-first law is alluded to in Harpokration, v. Ὅτι οἱ ποιητοί.

Some remnants of these wooden rollers existed in the days of Plutarch, in the Athenian prytaneium. See Harpokration and Photius, v. Κύρβεις; Aristot. περὶ Πολιτειῶν, Frag. 35, ed. Neumann; Euphorion ap. Harpokrat. Ὁ κάτωθεν νόμος. Bekker, Anecdota, p. 413.

What we read respecting the ἄξονες and the κύρβεις does not convey a clear idea of them. Besides Aristotle, both Seleukus and Didymus are named as having written commentaries expressly about them (Plutarch, Solon, i; Suidas, v. Ὀργεῶνες; compare also Meursius, Solon, c. 24; Vit. Aristotelis ap. Westermann. Vitarum Scriptt. Græc. p. 404), and the collection in Stephan. Thesaur. p. 1095.

[223] Plutarch, Solon, c. 17; Cyrill. cont. Julian, v, p. 169, ed. Spanheim. The enumeration of the different admitted justifications for homicide, which we find in Dêmosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 637, seems rather too copious and systematic for the age of Drako; it may have been amended by Solon, or, perhaps, in an age subsequent to Solon.

[224] See Boeckh, Public Economy of the Athenians, book iii, sect. 5. Tittmann (Griechisch. Staatsverfass. p. 651) and others have supposed (from Aristot. Polit. ii, 4, 4) that Solon enacted a law to limit the quantity of land which any individual citizen might acquire. But the passage does not seem to me to bear out such an opinion.

[225] Plutarch, Solon, 24. The *first law*, however, is said to have related to the insuring of a maintenance to wives and orphans (Harpokration, v. Σῖτος).

By a law of Athens (which marks itself out as belonging to the century after Solon, by the fulness of its provisions, and by the number of steps and official persons named in it), the rooting up of an olive-tree in Attica was forbidden, under a penalty of two hundred drachms for each tree so destroyed,—except for sacred purposes, or to the extent of two trees per annum for the convenience of the proprietor (Dêmosthen. cont. Makartat c. 16, p. 1074).

[226] Plutarch, Solon, 22. ταῖς τέχναις ἀξίωμα περιέθηκε.

[227] Plutarch, Solon, 22-24. According to Herodotus, Solon had enacted that the authorities should punish every man with death who could not show a regular mode of industrious life (Herod. ii, 177; Diodor. i, 77).

So severe a punishment is not credible; nor is it likely that Solon borrowed his idea from Egypt.

According to Pollux (viii, 6) idleness was punished by atimy (civil disfranchisement) under Drako: under Solon, this punishment only took effect against the person who had been convicted of it on three successive occasions. See Meursius, Solon, c. 17; and the "Areopagus" of the same author, c. 8 and 9; and Taylor, Lectt. Lysiac. cap. 10.

[228] Xenophon, De Vectigalibus, iii, 2.

[229] Thucyd. ii, 40 (the funeral oration delivered by Periklês),—καὶ τὸ πένεσθαι οὐχ ὁμολογεῖν τινι αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλὰ μὴ διαφεύγειν ἔργῳ αἴσχιον.

[230] Herodot. ii, 167-177: compare Xenophon, Œconomic. iv, 3.

The unbounded derision, however, which Aristophanes heaps upon Kleôn as a tanner, and upon Hyperbolus as a lamp-maker, proves that, if any manufacturer engaged in politics, his party opponents found enough of the old sentiment remaining to turn it to good account against him.

[231] This seems the just meaning of the words, ἐν τῷ γένει τοῦ τεθνηκότος ἔδει τὰ χρήματα καὶ τὸν οἶκον καταμένειν, for that early day (Plutarch, Solon, 21): compare Meier, De Gentilitate Atticâ, p. 33.

[232] Tacitus, German, c. 20; Halhed, Preface to Gentoo Code, p. i, iii; Mill's History of British India, b. ii, ch. iv, p. 214.

[233] See the Dissertation of Bunsen, De Jure Hereditario Atheniensium. pp. 28, 29; and Hermann Schelling. De Solonis Legibus ap. Oratt. Atticos, ch. xvii.

The adopted son was not allowed to bequeathe by will that property of which adoption had made him the possessor: if he left no legitimate children, the heirs at law of the adopter claimed it as of right (Dêmosthen. cont. Leochar p. 1100; cont. Stephan. B. p. 1133; Bunsen, *ut sup.* pp. 55-58).

[234] Plutarch, Solon, 21. τὰ χρήματα, κτήματα τῶν ἐχόντων ἐποίησεν.

[235] According to Æschinês (cont. Timarch. pp. 16-78), the punishment enacted by Solon against the προαγωγὸς, or procurer, in such cases of seduction, was death.

[236] Plutarch, Solon, 20. These φερναὶ were independent of the dowry of the bride, for which the husband, when he received it, commonly gave security, and repaid it in the event of his wife's death: see Bunsen, De Jure Hered. Ath. p. 43.

[237] Plutarch, *l. c.* The Solonian restrictions on the subject of funerals were to a great degree copied in the twelve tables at Rome: see Cicero, De Legg. ii, 23, 24. He esteems it a right thing to put the rich and the poor on a level in respect to funeral ceremonies. Plato follows an opposite idea, and limits the expense of funerals upon a graduated scale, according to the census of the deceased (Legg. xii, p. 959).

Dêmosthenês (cont. Makartat. p 1071) gives what he calls the Solonian law on funerals, different from Plutarch on several points.

Ungovernable excesses of grief among the female sex are sometimes mentioned in Grecian towns: see the μανικὸν πένθος among the Milesian women (Polyæn. viii, 63): the Milesian women, however, had a tinge of Karian feeling.

Compare an instructive inscription, recording a law of the Greek city of Gambreion in Æolic Asia Minor, wherein the dress, the proceedings, and the time of allowed mourning, for men, women, and children who had lost their relatives, are strictly prescribed under severe penalties (Franz, Fünf Inschriften und fünf Städte in Kleinasien, Berlin, 1840, p. 17). Expensive ceremonies in the celebration of marriage are forbidden by some of the old Scandinavian laws (Wilda, Das Gildenwesen im Mittelalter, p. 18).

[238] Plutarch, Solon, 23. Xenophanês, Frag. 2, ed. Schneidewin. If Diogenês is to be trusted, the rewards were even larger anterior to Solon: he reduced them (Diog. l. i, 55).

[239] Plutarch, Solon, c. 23. See Suidas, v. Φεισόμεθα.

[240] See the laws in Dêmosthen. cont. Timokrat. pp. 733-736. Notwithstanding the opinion both of Heraldus (Animadversion. in Salmas. iv, 8) and of Meier (Attischer Prozess, p. 356), I cannot imagine anything more than the basis of these laws to be Solonian,—they indicate a state of Attic procedure too much elaborated for that day (Lysias c. Theomn. p. 356). The word ποδοκάκκη belongs to Solon, and probably the penalty of five days' confinement in the stocks, for the thief who had not restored what he had stolen.

Aulus Gell. (xi, 18) mentions the simple *pœna dupli*: in the authors from whom he copied, it is evident that Solon was stated to have enacted this law generally for *all* thefts: we cannot tell from whom he copied, but in another part of his work, he copies a Solonian law from the wooden ἄξονες on the authority of Aristotle (ii, 12).

Plato, in his Laws, prescribes the *pœna dupli* in all cases of theft, without distinction of circumstances (Legg. ix, p. 857; xii, p. 941); it was also the primitive law of Rome: "Posuerunt furem duplo condemnari, fœneratorem quadruplo." (Cato, De Re Rusticâ, Procemium),—that is to say, in cases of *furtum nec manifestum* (Walter, Geschichte des Römisch. Rechts. sect. 757).

[241] Plutarch, Solon, 24; Athenæ. iv, p. 137; Diogen. Laërt. i, 58: καὶ πρῶτος τὴν συναγωγὴν τῶν ἐννέα ἀρχόντων ἐποίησεν, εἰς τὸ συνειπεῖν,—where perhaps, συνδειπνεῖν is the proper reading.

[242] Plutarch, Solon, 20, and De Serâ Numinis Vindictâ, p. 550; Aulus Gell. ii, 12.

[243] See a case of such indifference manifested by the people of Argos, in Plutarch's Life of Aratus, c. 27.

[244] Plutarch, Solon, 29; Diogen. Laërt. i, 59.

[245] Plutarch, Solon, 15.

[246] Herodot. i, 29. Σόλων, ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναῖος, ὃς Ἀθηναίοισι νόμους κελεύσασι ποιήσας, ἀπεδήμησε ἔτεα δέκα, ἵνα δὴ μή τινα τῶν νόμων ἀναγκάσθῃ λῦσαι τῶν ἔθετο· αὐτοὶ γὰρ οὐκ οἷοί τε ἦσαν αὐτὸ ποιῆσαι Ἀθηναῖοι· ὁρκίοισι γὰρ μεγάλοισι κατείχοντο, δέκα ἔτεα χρήσεσθαι νόμοισι τοὺς ἄν σφι Σόλων θῆται.

One hundred years is the term stated by Plutarch (Solon, 25).

[247] Plutarch, Solon, 26; Herodot. v, 113. The statements of Diogenês that Solon founded Soli in Kilikia, and that he died in Cyprus, are not worthy of credit (Diog. Laërt. i, 51-62).

[248] Plutarch tells us that several authors rejected the reality of this interview as being chronologically impossible. It is to be recollected that the question all turns upon the interview *as described by Herodotus* and its alleged sequel; for that there may have been an interview between Solon and Crœsus at Sardis, at some period between B. C. 594 and 560, is possible, though not shown.

It is evident that Solon made no mention of any interview with Crœsus in his poems; otherwise, the dispute would have been settled at once. Now this, in a man like Solon, amounts to negative evidence of some value for he noticed in his poems both Egypt and the prince Philokyprus in Cyprus, and had there been any conversation so impressive as that which Herodotus relates, between him and Crœsus, he could hardly have failed to mention it.

Wesseling, Larcher, Volney, and Mr. Clinton, all try to obviate the chronological difficulties, and to save the historical character of this interview, but in my judgment unsuccessfully. See Mr. Clinton's F. H. ad ann. 546 B. C., and Appendix, c. 17, p. 298. The chronological data are these,—Crœsus was born in 595 B. C., one year before the legislation of Solon: he succeeded to his father at the age of thirty-five, in 560 B. C.: he was overthrown, and Sardis captured, in 546 B. C., by Cyrus.

Mr. Clinton, after Wesseling and the others, supposes that Crœsus was king jointly with his father Halyattês, during the lifetime of the latter, and that Solon visited Lydia and conversed with Crœsus during this joint reign in 570 B. C. "We may suppose that Solon left Athens in B. C. 575, about twenty years after his archonship, and returned thither in B. C. 565, about five years before the usurpation of Peisistratus." (p. 300.) Upon which hypothesis we may remark:—

1. The arguments whereby Wesseling and Mr. Clinton endeavor to show that Crœsus was king jointly with his father, do not sustain the conclusion. The passage of Nikolaus Damaskenus, which is produced to show that it was Halyattês (and not Crœsus) who conquered Karia, only attests that Halyattês *marched* with an armed force into Karia (ἐπὶ Καρίαν στρατεύων): this same author states, that Crœsus was deputed by Halyattês to govern *Adramyttium and the plain of Thêbê* (ἄρχειν ἀποδεδειγμένος), but Mr. Clinton stretches this testimony to an inadmissible extent when he makes it tantamount to a conquest of *Æolis* by Halyattês, ("*so that Æolis is already conquered*.") Nothing at all is said about Æolis, or the cities of the Æolic Greeks, in this passage of Nikolaus, which represents Crœsus as governing a sort of satrapy under his father Halyattês, just as Cyrus the younger did in after-times under Artaxerxês. And the expression of Herodotus, ἐπεί τε, δόντος τοῦ πατρὸς, ἐκράτησε τῆς ἀρχῆς ὁ Κροῖσος, appears to me, when taken along with the context, to indicate a bequest or nomination of successor, and not a donation during life.

2. The hypothesis, therefore, that Crœsus was king 570 B. C., during the lifetime of his father, is one purely gratuitous, resorted to on account of the chronological difficulties connected with the account of Herodotus. But

it is quite insufficient for such a purpose; it does not save us from the necessity of contradicting Herodotus in most of his particulars; there may, perhaps, have been an *interview* between Solon and Crœsus in B. C. 570, but it cannot be *the interview* described by Herodotus. That interview takes place within ten years after the promulgation of Solon's laws,—at the maximum of the power of Crœsus, and after numerous conquests effected by himself as king,—at a time when Crœsus had a son old enough to be married and to command armies (Herod, i, 35),—at a time, moreover, immediately preceding the turn of his fortunes from prosperity to adversity, first in the death of his son, succeeded by two years of mourning, which were put an end to (πένθεος ἀπέπαυσε, Herod. i, 46) by the stimulus of war with the Persians. That war, if we read the events of it as described in Herodotus, cannot have lasted more than three or four years,—so that the interview between Solon and Crœsus, *as Herodotus conceived it*, may be fairly stated to have occurred within seven years before the capture of Sardis.

If we put together all these conditions, it will appear that the interview recounted by Herodotus is a chronological impossibility: and Niebuhr (Rom. Gesch. vol. i, p. 579) is right in saying that the historian has fallen into a mistake of ten olympiads, or forty years; his recital would consist with chronology, if we suppose that the Solonian legislation were referable to 554 B. C., and not 594.

In my judgment, this is an illustrative tale, in which certain real characters,—Crœsus and Solon; and certain real facts,—the great power and succeeding ruin of the former by the victorious arm of Cyrus,—together with certain facts probably altogether fictitious, such as the two sons of Crœsus, the Phyrgian Adrastus and his history, the hunting of the mischievous wild boar on Mount Olympus, the ultimate preservation of Crœsus, etc., are put together so as to convey an impressive moral lesson. The whole adventure of Adrastus and the son of Crœsus is depicted in language eminently beautiful and poetical.

Plutarch treats the impressiveness and suitableness of this narrative as the best proof of its historical truth, and puts aside the chronological tables as unworthy of trust. Upon which reasoning Mr. Clinton has the following very just remarks: "Plutarch must have had a very imperfect idea of the nature of historical evidence, if he could imagine that the suitableness of a story to the character of Solon was a better argument for its authenticity than the number of witnesses by whom it is attested. Those who invented the scene (assuming it to be a fiction) would surely have had the skill to adapt the discourse to the character of the actors." (p. 300.)

To make this remark quite complete, it would be necessary to add the words "*trustworthiness and means of knowledge*," in addition to the "*number,*" of attesting witnesses. And it is a remark the more worthy of notice, inasmuch as Mr. Clinton here pointedly adverts to the existence of *plausible fiction*, as being completely distinct from attested matter of fact,—a distinction of which he took no account in his vindication of the historical credibility of the early Greek legends.

[249] Herod, i, 32. Ὦ Κροῖσε, ἐπιστάμενόν με τὸ θεῖον, πᾶν ἐὸν φθονερόν τε καὶ ταραχώδες, ἐπειρωτᾷς με ἀνθρωπηΐων πρηγμάτων πέρι. i, 34. Μετὰ δὲ Σόλωνα οἰχόμενον, ἔλαβεν ἐκ θεοῦ νέμεσις μεγάλη Κροῖσον, ὡς εἰκάσαι ὅτι ἐνόμισε ἑωϋτὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων ὀλβιώτατον.

The hunting-match, and the terrible wild boar with whom the Mysians cannot cope, appear to be borrowed from the legend of Kalydôn. The whole scene of Adrastus, returning after the accident in a state of desperate remorse, praying for death with outstretched hands, spared by Crœsus, and then killing himself on the tomb of the young prince, is deeply tragic (Herod. i, 44-45).

[250] Herodot. i, 85.

[251] Herodot. i, 86, 87: compare Plutarch, Solon, 27-28. See a similar story about Gygês king of Lydia (Valerius Maxim. vii, 1, 2).

[252] Xenoph. Memorab. ii, 1, 21. Πρόδικος ὁ σοφὸς ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι τῷ περὶ Ἡρακλέους, ὅπερ δὴ καὶ πλείστοις ἐπιδείκνυται, etc.

[253] Herodot. vii, 10. φιλέει γὰρ ὁ θεὸς τὰ ὑπερέχοντα πάντα κολούειν…. οὐ γὰρ ἐᾷ φρονέειν μέγα ὁ θεὸς ἄλλον ἢ ἑωϋτόν.

[254] Herodot. i, 59. I record this allusion to Nisæa and the Megarian war, because I find it distinctly stated in Herodotus; and because it *may* possibly refer to some other *later* war between Athens and Megara than that which is mentioned in Plutarch's Life of Solon as having taken place before the Solonian legislation (that is, before 594 B. C.), and therefore nearly forty years before this movement of Peisistratus to acquire the despotism. Peisistratus must then have been so young that he could not with any propriety be said to have "captured

Nisæa" (Νισαιάν τε ἑλών): moreover, the public reputation, which was found useful to the ambition of Peisistratus in 560 B. C., must have rested upon something more recent than his bravery displayed about 597 B. C.; just as the celebrity which enabled Napoleon to play the game of successful ambition on the 18th Brumaire (Nov. 1799) was obtained by victories gained within the preceding five years, and could not have been represented by any historian as resting upon victories gained in the Seven Years' war, between 1756-1763.

At the same time, my belief is that the words of Herodotus respecting Peisistratus do really refer to the Megarian war mentioned in Plutarch's Life of Solon, and that Herodotus supposed that Megarian war to have been much more near to the despotism of Peisistratus than it really was. In the conception of Herodotus, and by what (after Niebuhr) I venture to call a mistake in his chronology, the interval between 600-560 B. C. shrinks from forty years to little or nothing. Such mistake appears, not only on the present occasion, but also upon two others: first, in regard to the alleged dialogue between Solon and Crœsus, described and commented upon a few pages above; next, in regard to the poet Alkæus and his inglorious retreat before the Athenian troops at Sigeium and Achilleium, where he lost his shield, when the Mityleneans were defeated. The reality of this incident is indisputable, since it was mentioned by Alkæus himself in one of his songs; but Herodotus represents it to have occurred in an Athenian expedition *directed by Peisistratus*. Now the war in which Alkæus incurred this misfortune, and which was brought to a close by the mediation of Periander of Corinth, must have taken place earlier than 584 B. C., and probably took place before the legislation of Solon; long before the time when Peisistratus had the direction of Athenian affairs,—though the latter may have carried on, and probably did carry on, *another and a later war* against the Mityleneans in those regions, which led to the introduction of his illegitimate son, Hegesistratus, as despot of Sigeium (Herod. v. 94-95).

If we follow the representation given by Herodotus of these three different strings of events, we shall see that the same chronological mistake pervades all of them,—he jumps over nearly ten olympiads, or forty years. Alkæus is the contemporary of Pittakus and Solon.

I have already remarked, in the previous chapter respecting the despots of Sikyôn (ch. ix.), another instance of confused chronology in Herodotus respecting the events of this period,—respecting Crœsus, Megaklês, Alkmæôn and Kleisthenês of Sikyôn.

[255] Aristot. Politic. v, 4, 5; Plutarch, Solon, 29.

[256] Plato, Republic, viii, p. 565. τὸ τυραννικὸν αἴτημα τὸ πολυθρυλλητὸν … αἰτεῖν τὸν δῆμον φύλακάς τινας τοῦ σώματος, ἵνα σῶς αὐτοῖς ᾖ ὁ τοῦ δήμου βοηθός.

[257] Diog. Laërt. i, 49. ἡ βουλὴ, Πεισιστατίδαι ὄντες, etc.

[258] Plutarch, Solon, 29-30; Diog. Laërt. i, 50-51.

[259] Plutarch, Solon, 30; Diogen. Laërt. i, 49; Diodor. Excerpta., lib. vii-x, ed. Maii. Fr. xix-xxiv.

[260] Solon, Fragment 22, ed. Bergk. Isokratês affirms that Solon was the first person to whom the appellation Sophist—in later times carrying with it so much obloquy—was applied, (Isokratês, Or. xv, De Permutatione, p. 344; p. 496, Bek.)

[261] Plutarch, Solon, 32; Kratinus ap. Diogen. Laërt. i, 62.

[262] Aristidês, in noticing this story of the spreading of the ashes of Solon in Salamis, treats him as Ἀρχηγέτης of the island (Orat. xlvi, Ὑπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων, p. 172; p. 230, Dindorf). The inscription on his statue, which describes him as born in Salamis, can hardly have been literally true: for when he was born, Salamis was not incorporated in Attica; but it may have been true by a sort of adoption (see Diogen. Laërt. i, 62). The statue seems to have been erected by the Salaminians themselves, a long time after Solon: see Menage ad Diogen. Laërt. *l. c.*

[263] See Fiedler, Reisen durch Griechenland, vol. ii, p. 87.

[264] Herodot. viii, 46; Thucyd. vii, 57.

[265] Diodor. xiii, 47.

[266] Kallimachus, Hymn. ad Delum, 289, with Spanheim's note; Theognis, v, 888; Theophrast. Hist. Plant. 8, 5.

See Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. ii, ch. 14, p. 254, *seq.* The passage of Theognis leads to the belief that Kêrinthus formed a part of the territory of Chalkis.

[267] Skylax (c. 59) treats the island of Skyrus as opposite to Eretria, the territory of which must, therefore, have included a portion of the eastern coast of Eubœa, as well as the western. He recognizes only four cities in the island,—Karystus, Eretria, Chalkis, and Hestiæa.

[268] Mannert, Geograph. Gr. Röm. part viii, book i, c. 16, p. 248; Strabo, x, pp. 445-449.

[269] The seventh Oration of Dio Chrysostom, which describes his shipwreck near Cape Kaphareus, on the island of Eubœa, and the shelter and kindness which he experienced from a poor mountain huntsman, presents one of the most interesting pictures remaining, of this purely rustic portion of the Greek population (Or. vii, p. 221, *seq.*),—men who never entered the city, and were strangers to the habits, manners, and dress there prevailing,—men who drank milk and were clothed in skins (γαλακτοπότας ἀνὴρ, οὐρειβάτας, Eurip. Elektr. 169), yet nevertheless (as it seems) possessing right of citizenship (p. 238) which they never exercised. The industry of the poor men visited by Dion had brought into cultivation a little garden and field in a desert spot near Kaphareus.

Two-thirds of the territory of this Euboic city consisted of barren mountain (p. 232); it must probably have been Karystus.

The high lands of Eubœa were both uninhabited and difficult of approach, even at the time of the battle of Marathon, when Chalkis and Eretria had not greatly declined from the maximum of their power: the inhabitants of Eretria looked to τὰ ἄρκα τῆς Εὐβοίης as a refuge against the Persian force under Datis (Herod. vi, 100).

[270] Strabo, x, p. 445.

[271] Plutarch, Quæst. Græc. p. 296; Strab. x, p. 446 (whose statements are very perplexed); Velleius Patercul. i, 4.

According to Skymnus the Chian (v. 572), Chalkis was founded by Pandôrus son of Erechtheus, and Kêrinthus by Kothôn, from Athens.

[272] Strabo, x, p. 446,—Πὰρ δὲ Χαλκιδικαὶ σπάθαι (Alkæus, Fragm. 7, Schneidewin),—Χαλκιδικὸν ποτήριον (Aristophan. Equit. 237),—certainly belongs to the Euboic Chalkis, not to the Thrakian Chalkidikê. Boeckh, Staatshaushalt. der Athener, vol. ii, p. 284, App. xi, cites Χαλκιδικὰ ποτηρία in an inscription: compare Steph. Byz. Χαλκὶς.—Ναυσικλείτης Εὐβοίης, Homer, Hymn. Apoll. 219.

[273] See the mineralogical account of the islands in Fiedler (Reisen, vol. ii, pp. 88, 118, 562).

The copper and iron ore near Chalkis had ceased to be worked even in the time of Strabo: Fiedler indicates the probable site (vol. i, p. 443).

[274] Herodot. iii. 57. The Siphnians, however, in an evil hour, committed the wrong of withholding this tithe: the sea soon rushed in and rendered the mines ever afterwards unworkable (Pausan. x, 11, 2).

[275] Strabo, x, p. 448.

[276] Herodot. v, 31. Compare the accounts of these various islands in the recent voyages of Professor Ross, Reisen auf den Griechischen Inseln, vol. i, letter 2; vol. ii, letter 15.

The population of Naxos is now about eleven thousand souls; that of Andros fifteen thousand (Ross, vol. i, p. 28; vol. ii, p. 22).

But the extent and fertility of the Naxian plain perfectly suffice for that aggregate population of one hundred thousand souls, which seems implied in the account of Herodotus.

[277] Strabo, *l. c.*

[278] Herodot. v, 77; Aristoteles, Fragment. περὶ Πολιτειῶν, ed. Neumann, pp. 111-112: compare Aristot. Polit. iv, 3, 2.

[279] Hom. Hymn. Apoll. Del. 146-176; Thucyd. iii, 104:—

Φαίη κ᾽ ἀθανάτους καὶ ἀγήρως ἔμμεναι αἰεὶ,

Ὥς τότ᾽ ἐπαντιάσει᾽, ὅτ᾽ Ἰάονες ἄθροοι εἶεν·

Πάντων γάρ κεν ἴδοιτο χάριν, τέρψαιτο δὲ θυμὸν,

Ἄνδρας τ᾽ εἰσορόων καλλιζώνους τε γυναῖκας,

Νῆάς τ᾽ ὠκείας ἠδ᾽ αὐτῶν κρήματα πολλά.

[280] Thucyd. iii, 104.

[281] Thucyd. i, 6. διὰ τὸ ἀβροδίαιτον, etc.

[282] Herodot. i, 143. Οἱ μὲν νυν ἄλλοι Ἴωνες καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔφυγον τὸ οὔνομα, οὐ βουλόμενοι Ἴωνες κεκλῆσθαι,—an assertion quite unquestionable with reference to the times immediately preceding Herodotus, but not equally admissible in regard to the earlier times. Compare Thucyd. i, 124 (with the Scholium), and also v, 9; viii, 25.

[283] Thucyd. i, 15. The second Messenian war cannot have appeared to Thucydidês as having enlisted so many allies on each side as Pausanias represents.

[284] Strabo, viii, p. 448; Herodot. v, 99; Plutarch, Amator, p. 760,—valuable by the reference to Aristotle.

Hesiod passed over from Askra to Chalkis, on the occasion of the funeral games celebrated by the sons of Amphidamas in honor of their deceased father, and gained a tripod as prize by his song or recital (Opp. Di. 656). According to the Scholia, Amphidamas was king of Chalkis, who perished in the war against Eretria respecting Lelantum. But it appears that Plutarch threw out the lines as spurious, though he acknowledges Amphidamas as a vigorous champion of Chalkis in this war. See Septem Sapient. Conviv. c. 10, p. 153.

This visit of Hesiod to Chalkis was represented as the scene of his poetical competition with and victory over Homer. (See the Certamen Hom. et Hes. p. 315, ed. Göttl.)

[285] See the striking description of Chalkis given by Dikæarchus in the Βίος Ἑλλάδος (Fragment. p. 146, ed. Fuhr).

[286] Herodot. i, 94.

[287] See Boeckh's Metrologie, c. 8 and 9.

[288] Euripid. Ion, 1546. κτίστορ᾽ Ἀσίαδος χθονός.

[289] Pausan. vii, 4, 6. Τοσαῦτα εἰρηκότα ἐς Χίους Ἴωνα εὑρίσκω· οὐ μέντοι ἐκεῖνός γε εἴρηκε, καθ᾽ ἥντινα αἰτίαν Χῖοι τελοῦσιν ἐς Ἰῶνας.

Respecting Samos, and its primitive Karian inhabitants, displaced by Patroklês, and Tembriôn at the head of Grecian emigrants, see Etymol. Mag. v. Ἀστυπάλαια.

[290] Herod. i, 146. ἐπεὶ, ὥς γε ἔτι μᾶλλον οὗτοι (*i. e.* the inhabitants of the Pan-Ionic Dodekapolis) Ἴωνές εἰσι τῶν ἄλλων Ἰώνων ἢ κάλλιόν τι γεγόνασι, μωρίη πολλὴ λέγειν· τῶν Ἄβαντες ἐξ Εὐβοίες εἰσὶν οὐκ ἐλαχίστη μοῖρα, τοῖσι Ἰωνίης μέτα οὐδὲ τοῦ οὐνόματος οὐδέν· Μίνυαι δὲ Ὀρχομένιοι ἀναμεμίχαται, καὶ Καδμεῖοι, καὶ Δρύοπες, καὶ Φωκέες ἀποδάσμιοι, καὶ Μολοσσοὶ, καὶ Ἀρκάδες Πελασγοὶ, καὶ Δωριέες Ἐπιδαύριοι, ἄλλα τε ἔθνεα πολλὰ ἀναμεμίχαται. Οἱ δὲ αὐτέων ἀπὸ τοῦ Πρυτανηίου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων ὁρμηθέντες, καὶ νομίζοντες γενναιότατοι εἶναι Ἰώνων, οὗτοι δὲ οὐ γυναῖκας ἤγαγον εἰς τὴν ἀποικίην, ἀλλὰ Καείρας ἔσχον, τῶν ἐφόνευσαν τοὺς γονέας … Ταῦτα δὲ ἦν γινόμενα ἐν Μιλήτῳ.

The polemical tone in which this remark of Herodotus is delivered is explained by Dahlmann on the supposition that it was destined to confute certain boastful pretensions of the Milesian Hekatæus (see Bähr, *ad loc.*, and Klausen ad Hekatæi Frag. 225).

The test of *Ionism*, according to the statement of Herodotus, is, that a city should derive its origin from Athens, and that it should celebrate the solemnity of the Apaturia (i. 147). But we must construe both these tests with indulgence. Ephesus and Kolophôn were Ionic, though neither of them celebrated the Apaturia. And

the colony might be formed under the auspices of Athens, though the settlers were neither natives, nor even of kindred race with the natives, of Attica.

[291] Herod. i, 142. Ephesus, Kolophôn, Lebedus, Teôs, Klazomenæ, Phokæa—αὗται αἱ πόλιες τῇσι πρότερον λεχθείσῃσι ὁμολογέουσι κατὰ γλῶσσαν οὐδὲν, σφὶ δὲ ὁμοφωνέουσι.

[292] Herodot. i, 146.

[293] Thucyd. vi, 17, about the Sicilian Greeks—ὄχλοις τε γὰρ ξυμμικτοῖς πολυανδροῦσιν αἱ πόλεις, καὶ ῥᾳδίας ἔχουσι τῶν πολιτειῶν τὰς μεταβολὰς καὶ ἐπιδοχάς.

[294] See Raoul Rochette, Histoire des Colonies Grecques, b. iv, c. 10, p. 93.

[295] Herodot. i, 170.

[296] Both Diodorus (xv, 49) and Dionysius of Halikarnassus (A. R. iv, 25) speak as if the convocation or festival had been formally transferred to Ephesus, in consequence of the insecurity of the meetings near Mykalê: Strabo on the contrary speaks of the Pan-Ionia as if they still in his time celebrated in the original spot (xiv, pp. 636-638), under the care of the Priêneans. The formal transfer is not probable: Thucydidês (iii, 104) proves that in his time the festival of Ephesia was practically the Pan-Ionic rendezvous, though Herodotus does not seem to have conceived it as such. See Guhl, Ephesiaca, part iii, p. 117; and K. F. Hermann, Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen, c. 66, p. 343.

[297] The site of Milêtus is best indicated by Arrian, i, 19-20; see that of Phôkæa, Erythræ, Myonnêsus, Klazomenæ, Kolophôn, Teôs (Strabo, xiv, pp. 644-645; Pausan. vii, 3, 2; Livy, xxxvii, 27-31; Thucyd. viii, 31).

[298] Strabo. xiv, p. 635.

[299] Strabo, xiv, p. 633; Herod. ix, 97-99. Τὸ Ποσείδιον τῶν Μιλησίων. Strabo, xiv, p. 651.

[300] Strabo, xiv, p. 636; Vitruvius, iv, 1; Polyæn. viii, 35.

[301] Strabo, xiv, pp. 636-638.

[302] Thucyd. i, 116.

[303] Conon, Narrat. 29; Strabo, xiv, pp. 636-647.

The story in Parthenius about Leukippus, leader τῶν δεκατευθέντων ἐκ Φέρης ὑπ᾽ Ἀδμήτου, who came to the Ephesian territory and acquired possession of the place called Kretinæon, by the treachery of Leukophryê, daughter of Mandrolytos, whether truth or romance, is one of the notices of Thessalian migration into those parts (Parthen. Narrat. 6).

[304] Strabo, xiii, p. 621. See Niebuhr, Kleine Historische Schriften, p. 371, O. Müller, Etrusker, Einleitung ii, 5, p. 80. The evidence on which Müller's conjecture is built seems, however, unusually slender, and the identity of Tyrrhênos and Torrhêbos, or the supposed confusion of the one with the other, is in no way made out. Pelasgians are spoken of in Trallês and Aphrodisias as well as in Ninoê (Steph. Byz. v. Νινόη), but this name seems destined to present nothing but problems and delusions.

Respecting Magnêsia on the Mæander, consult Aristot. ap. Athen. iv, p. 173, who calls the town a colony from Delphi. But the intermediate settlement of these colonists in Krête, or even the reality of any town called Magnêsia in Krête, appears very questionable: Plato's statement (Legg. iv, 702; xi, 919) can hardly be taken as any evidence. Compare O. Müller, History of the Dorians, book ii, ch. 3; Hoeckh, Kreta, book iii, vol. ii, p. 413. Müller gives these "*Sagen*" too much in the style of real facts: the worship of Apollo at Magnêsia on the Mæander (Paus. x, 32, 4) cannot be thought to prove much, considering how extensively that god was worshipped along the Asiatic coast, from Lykia to Troas.

The great antiquity of this Grecian establishment was recognized in the time of the Roman emperors; see Inscript. No. 2910 in Boeckh, Corp. Ins.

[305] Ἰωνίης πρόσχημα (Herodot. v, 28).

[306] Strabo, xiv, p. 635. Ikarus, or Ikaria, however, appears in later times as belonging to Samos, and used only for pasture (Strabo, p. 639; x, p. 488).

[307] Kreophylus ap. Athen. viii, p. 361; Ephor. Fragm. 32, ed Marx; Stephan. Byz. v. Βέννα: see Guhl, Ephesiaca, p. 29.

[308] Pausan. vii, 4, 3.

[309] The account of Ephorus ap. Steph. Byz. v. Βέννα, attests at least the existence of the five tribes at Ephesus, whether his account of their origin and primitive history be well founded or not. See also Strabo, xiv, p. 633; Steph. Byz. v. Εὐωνυμία. Karênê or Karinê is in Æolis, near Pitana and Gryneium (Herod. vii, 42; Steph. Byz. Καρήνη).

[310] Stephan. Byz. v. Σάμορνα; Heysch. Σαμονία; Athenæus, vi, p. 267; Hippônax, Fragm. 32, Schneid.; Strabo, xiv, p. 633. Some, however, said that the *vicus* of Ephesus, called Smyrna, derived its name from an Amazon.

[311] Strabo, xiv, p. 620.

[312] Bato ap. Suidas, v. Πυθαγόρας. In this article of Suidas, however, it is stated that "the Ephesian Pythagoras put down, by means of a crafty plot, the government of those who were called the *Basilidæ*." Now Aristotle talks (Polit. v, 5, 4) of the oligarchy of the Basilidæ at Erythræ. It is hardly likely that there should have been an oligarchy called by that same name both at Erythræ and Ephesus; there is here some confusion between Erythræ and Ephesus which we are unable to clear up. Bato of Sinôpê wrote a book περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἐφέσῳ τυράννων (Athenæus, vii, p. 289).

[313] Guhl, Ephesiaca, cap. ii, s. 2, p. 28. The passage which he cites in Aristeidês (Or. xlii, p. 523) refers, not to Ephesus, but to Pergamus, and to the mythe of Augê and Têlephus: compare *ibid.* p. 251.

[314] Mimnerm. Fragm. 9, Schneid. ap. Strab. xiv, p. 634:—

Ἡμεῖς δ᾽ αἰπὺ Πύλον Νηλήϊον ἄστυ λιπόντες
Ἰμερτὴν Ἀσίην νησὶν ἀφικόμεθα·
Ἐς δ᾽ ἐρατὴν Κολοφῶνα, βίην ὑπέροπλον ἔχοντες,
Ἐζόμεθ᾽ ἀργαλέης ὕβριος ἡγεμόνες.

Mimnermus, in his poem called Nanno, named Andræmôn as founder (Strabo, p. 633). Compare this behavior with the narrative of Odysseus in Homer (Odyss. ix. 40):—

Ἰλιόθεν με φέρων ἄνεμος Κικόνεσσι πέλασσεν
Ἰσμάρῳ· ἔνθα δ᾽ ἐγὼ πόλιν ἔπραθον, ὤλεσα δ᾽ αὐτούς·
Ἐκ πόλιος δ᾽ ἀλόχους καὶ κτήματα πολλὰ λαβόντες
Δάσσαμεθ᾽, etc.

Mimnermus comes in point of time a little before Solon, B. C. 620-600.

[315] Aristot. Polit. v, 2, 12; Thucyd. iii, 34.

[316] Hesiod. ap. Strab. xiv, p. 643; Conon, Narrat. 6; Argument of the poem called Νόστοι (apud Düntzer), Epicc. Græc. Frag. p. 23; Pausan. ix, 33, 1.

[317] Tacit. Annal. ii, 54.

[318] Pausan. vii, 3, 1.

[319] See Welcker, Epischer Kyklus, p. 285.

[320] Steph Byz. v. Τέως; Pausan. vii, 3, 3; Strabo, xiv, p. 633. Anakreon called the town Ἀθαμαντίδα Τέω. (Strab. *l. c.*)

[321] Pausan. vii, 3, 3. See the Inscrip. No. 3064 in Boeckh's Corp. Ins., which enumerates twenty-eight separate πύργοι: it is a list of archons, with the name and civil designation of each: I do not observe that the name of the same πύργος ever occurs twice.—Ἀρτέμων, τοῦ Φιλαίου πύργου, Φιλαΐδης, etc: there are two πύργοι, the names of which are effaced on the inscription. In two other inscriptions (Nos. 3065, 3066) there occur Ἐχίνου συμμορία—Ἐχιναδαι—as the title of a civil division without any specification of an Ἐχίνου πύργος; but it is reasonable to presume that the πύργος and the συμμορία are coincident divisions. The Φιλαίου πύργος occurs also in another Insc. No. 3081. Philæus is the Athenian hero, son of Ajax, and eponym of the deme or gens Philaidæ in Attica, who existed, as we here see, in Teôs also. In Inscription, No. 3082, a citizen is complimented as νέον Ἀθάμαντα, after the name of the old Minyan hero. In No. 3078, the Ionic tribe of the Γελέοντες is named as existing at Teôs.

Among the titles of the towers we find the following,—τοῦ Κίδυος πύργου, τοῦ Κιναβάλου πύργου, τοῦ Ἰέρυος πύργου, τοῦ Δάδδου πύργου, τοῦ Σίντυος πύργου: these names seem to be rather foreign than Hellenic. Κίδυς, Ἰέρυς, Σίντυς, Δάδδος, are Asiatic, perhaps Karian or Lydian: respecting the name Δάδδος, compare Steph. Byz. v. Τρέμισσος where Δάδας appears as a Karian name: Boeckh (p. 651) expresses his opinion that Δάδδος is Karian or Lydian. Then Κινάβαλος seems plainly not Hellenic: it is rather Phœnician (Anni*bal*, Asdru*bal*, etc.), though Boeckh (in his Introductory Comment to the Sarmatian Inscriptions, part xi, p. 109) tells us that βαλος is also Thracian or Getic,—"βαλος haud dubie Thracica aut Getica est radix finalis, quam tenes in Dacico nomine Decebalus, et in nomine populi Triballorum." The name τοῦ Κόθου πύργου, Κοθίδης, is Ionic: Æklus and Kothus are represented as Ionic œkists in Eubœa. Another name—Πάρμις, τοῦ Σθενέλου πύργου, Χαλκιδεῖος—affords an instance in which the local or gentile epithet is not derived from the tower; for Χαλκιδεῖς, or Χαλκιδεύς was the denomination of a village in the Teian territory. In regard to some persons, the gentile epithet is derived from the tower,—τοῦ Φιλαίου πύργου, Φιλαΐδης—τοῦ Γαλαίσου πύργου, Γαλαισίδης—τοῦ Δάδδου πύργου, Δαδδεῖος—τοῦ πύργου τοῦ Κιζῶνος, Κίζων: in other cases not—τοῦ Ἑκαδίου πύργου, Σκηβηΐδης—τοῦ Μηράδους πύργου, Βρυσκίδης—τοῦ Ἰσθμίου πύργου, Λεωνίδης, etc. In the Inscrip. 3065, 3066, there is a formal vote of the Ἐχίνου συμμορία or Ἐχιναδαι (both names occur): mention is also made of the βῶμος τῆς συμμορίας; also the annual solemnity called Leukathea, seemingly a gentile solemnity of the Echinadæ, which connects itself with the mythical family of Athamas. As an analogy to these Teian towers, we may compare the πύργοι in the Greek settlement of Olbia in the Euxine (Boeckh, Inscr. 2058), πύργος Πόσιος, πύργος Ἐπιδαύρου,—they were portions of the fortifications. See also Dio Chrysostom, Orat. xxxvi, pp. 76-77. A large tower, belonging to a private individual named Aglomachus is mentioned in Kyrênê (Herod. iv, 164).

[322] Herod. i, 142: compare Thucyd. viii, 5.

[323] Strabo, xiv, p. 633.

[324] Hippias ap. Athen. vi, p. 259; Polyæn. viii, 44, gives another story about Knôpus. Erythræ, called Κνωπούπολις. (Steph. Byz. v.)

The story told by Polyænus about the dictum of the oracle, and the consequent stratagem, whereby Knôpus made himself master of Erythræ, represents that town as powerful anterior to the Ionic occupation (Polyæn. viii, 43).

[325] Aristot. Polit. v, 5, 4.

[326] Pausan. vii, 3, 3. In Pausanias the name stands *Abartus*; but it probably ought to be *Abarnus*, the eponymus of Cape Abarnis in the Phôkæan territory: see Stephan. Byz. v. Ἄβαρνις. Raoul Rochette puts Abarnus without making any remark (Histoire des Colonies Grecques, b. iv, c. 13, p. 95).

[327] Herod. i, 150; Mimnermus, Fragm.—

Θεῶν βουλῇ Σμύρνην εἵλομεν Αἰολίδα.

[328] See Raoul Rochette, Histoire des Colonies Grecques, b. iv, ch. 5, p. 43; Aristeidês, Orat. xx-xxi, pp. 260, 267.

[329] Pausan. v, 8, 3.

[330] Vitruvius, iv, 1.

[331] Strabo, xiv, p. 646; Pindar, Frag. 155, Dissen.

[332] Thucydid. viii, 19.

[333] Skylax, c. 97; Thucyd. iii. 34.

[334] Herodot. i, 149. Herodotus does not name Elæa, at the month of the Kaïkus: on the other hand, no other author mentions Ægiroëssa (see Mannert, Geogr. der Gr. und Römer, b. viii, p. 396).

[335] Herod. *ut sup.*; Pseudo-Herodot. Vit. Homeri, c. 9. Σαρδήνης πόδα νειατον ὑψικόμοιο.

[336] Strabo, xiii, p. 621.

[337] Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 5. The rhetor Aristeidês (Orat. Sacr. xxvii, p. 347, p. 535 D.) describes in detail his journey from Smyrna to Pergamus, crossing the Hermus, and passing through Larissa, Kymê, Myrina, Gryneium, Elæa. He seems not to have passed through Têmnos, at least he does not name it: moreover, we know from Pausanias (v, 13, 3) that Têmnos was on the north bank of the Hermus. In the best maps of this district it is placed, erroneously, both on the south bank, and as if it were on the high road from Smyrna to Kymê. We may infer from another passage of Aristeidês (Or. xlviii, p. 351, p. 468 D.) that Larissa was nearer to the mouth of the Hermus than the maps appear to place it. According to Strabo (xiii, p. 622), it would seem that Larissa was on the south bank of the Hermus; but the better testimony of Aristeidês proves the contrary; Skylax (c. 94) does not name Têmnos, which seems to indicate that its territory was at some distance from the sea.

The investigations of modern travellers have, as yet, thrown little light upon the situation of Têmnos or of the other Æolic towns: see Arundel, Discoveries in Asia Minor, vol. ii, pp. 292-298.

[338] Pliny, H. N. v, 30.

[339] Strabo, xiii, pp. 582-621, compared with Pseudo-Herodotus, Vit. Homer, c. 1-38, who says that Lesbos was occupied by the Æolians one hundred and thirty years after the Trojan war: Kymê, twenty years after Lesbos; Smyrna, eighteen years after Kymê.

The chronological statements of different writers are collected in Mr. Clinton's Fast. Hellen. c. 5, pp. 104, 105.

[340] Strabo, xiii, p. 621.

[341] Strabo, xiii, 621; Pseudo-Herodot. c. 14. Λαοὶ Φρίκωονος, compared with c. 38.

Φρίκων appears, in later times, as an Ætolian proper name; Φρίκος as a Lokrian. See Anecdota Delphica, by E. Curtius, Inscript. 40, p. 75 (Berlin, 1843).

[342] Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 1, 6; Anabas. vii, 8, 24.

[343] There is a valuable inscription in Boeckh's collection, No. 3137, containing the convention between the inhabitants of Smyrna and Magnêsia. Palæ-Magnêsia seems to have been a strong and important post.

"Magnêtes a Sipylo," Tacit. Annal. ii, 47; Pliny, H. N. v, 29; Pausan. iii, 24, 2. πρὸς βόῤῥαν τοῦ Σιπύλου.

Stephan. Byzantinus notices only Magnêsia ad Mæandrum, not Magnêsia ad Sipylum.

[344] Thucyd. ii, 9.

[345] Strabo, ix, p. 402; Thucyd. viii, 100; Pseudo-Herodot. Vit. Homer, i. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ πάλαι Αἰολιῶτις Κύμη ἐκτίζετο, συνῆλθοι ἐν ταύτῳ παντοδαπὰ ἔθνεα Ἑλληνικὰ, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐκ Μαγνησίας, etc. Etymolog. Magn. v, Αἰολεῖς.

[346] Herodot. i, 151; Strabo, xiii, p. 590.

[347] Diodor. xiii, 79; Strabo, xiii, p. 617; Thucyd. iii, 6.

[348] Hymn. ad Apollin. v, 37. Λέσβος τ᾽ ἠγαθέη, Μάκαρος ἔδος Αἰολίωνος. Myrsilus ap. Clemen. Alexandr. Protreptic. p. 19; Diodor. v, 57-82; Dionys. Halik. A. R. i, 18; Stephan. Byz. v. Μυτιλήνη.

Plehn (Lesbiaca, c. 2, pp. 25-37) has collected all the principal fables respecting this Lesbian archæology: compare also Raoul Rochette (Histoire des Colonies Grecques, t. i, c. 5, p. 182 etc.)

[349] Strabo, xiii, pp. 621, 622. Μέγιστον δὲ ἐστι τῶν Αἰολικῶν καὶ ἀρίστη Κύμη, καὶ σχεδὸν μητρόπολις αὐτή τε καὶ ἡ Λέσβος τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων τριάκοντά που τὸν ἀριθμὸν, etc.

[350] Xenophon, Hellen. iii, 1, 10. μέχρι τῆς Φαρναβάζου Αἰολίδος—ἡ Αἰολὶς αὕτη ἦν μὲν Φαρναβάζου.

Xenophon includes the whole of the Troad under the denomination of Æolis. Skylax distinguishes the Troad from Æolis: he designates as the Troad the coast towns from Dardanus seemingly down to Lekton: under Æolis he includes Kebrên, Skêpsis, Neandreia, and Pityeia, though how these four towns are to be called ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ it is not easy to see (Skylax, 94-95). Nor does Skylax notice either the Peræa of Tenedos, or Assos and Gargara.

[351] Strabo, xiii, p. 583.

[352] Thucyd. iv, 52; viii, 108; Strabo, xiii, p. 610; Stephan. Byz. Ἄσσος; Pausan. vi, 4, 5.

[353] Pseudo-Herod. Vit. Hom. c. 20:—

Ἴδης ἐν κορυφῇσι πολυπτύχου ἠνεμόεσσης,
Ἔνθα σίδηρος Ἄρηος ἐπιχθονίοισι βρότοισι
Ἔσσεται, εὖτ᾽ ἄν μιν Κεβρήνιοι ἄνδρες ἔχωσι.

Τὰ δὲ Κεβρήνια τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον κτίζειν παρεσκευάζοντο οἱ Κυμαῖοι πρὸς τῇ Ἴδῃ, καὶ γίνεται αὐτόθι σίδηρος.

[354] Herodot. vii, 20.

[355] Kallinus ap. Strabo, xiii, p. 604: compare p. 613, οὓς πρῶτος παρέδωκε Καλλῖνος, etc.

[356] Strabo, xiii, pp. 607-635.

[357] Herodot. v, 122, εἶλε μὲν Αἰολέας πάντας, ὅσοι τὴν Ἰλιάδα νέμονται, εἶλε δὲ Γέργιθας, τοὺς ὑπολειφθέντας τῶν ἀρχαίων Τευκρῶν, etc.

The Teukrians, in the conception of Herodotus, were the Trojans described in the Iliad,—the Τευκρὶς γῆ seems the same as Ἰλιὰς γῆ (ii, 118).

[358] Herodot. v, 94.

[359] Herodot. ix, 115.

[360] Strabo, xiii, 589-616.

[361] Aristot. Polit. v, 8, 13.

[362] Diogen. Laërt. i, 74; Suidas, v. Κίκις, Πίττακος; Strabo, xiii, p. 617. Two lines of Alkæus are preserved, exulting in the death of Myrsilus (Alkæus, Fragm. 12, ed. Schneidewin). Melanchrus also is named (Fragm. 13), and Pittakus, in a third fragment (73, ed. Schneid.), is brought into connection with Myrsilus.

[363] In regard to the chronology of this war, see a note near the end of my previous chapter on the Solonian legislation. I have there noticed what I believe to be a chronological mistake of Herodotus in regard to the period between 600-560 B. C. Herodotus considers this war between the Mityleneans and Athenians, in which Pittakus and Alkæus were concerned, to have been directed by Peisistratus, whose government did not commence until 560 B. C. (Herod. v, 94, 95).

My suspicion is, that there were two Athenian expeditions to these regions—one in the time of Alkæus and Pittakus; a second, much afterwards, undertaken by order of Peisistratus, whose illegitimate son Hegesistratus became, in consequence, despot of Sigeium. Herodotus appears to me to have merged the two into one.

[364] See the difficult fragment of Alkæus (Fr. 24, ed. Schneidewin), preserved in Strabo, xiii, p. 600; Herodot. v, 94, 95; Archilochus, Eleg. Fr. i, 5, ed. Schneidewin; Horat. Carm. ii, 7, 9; perhaps also Anakreon, but not certainly (see Fr. 81, ed. Schneidewin), is to be regarded as having thrown away his shield.

[365] Aristot. Rhetoric. i, 16, 2, where ἔναγχος marks the date.

[366] Aristot. Polit. iii, 9, 5, 6; Dionys. Halik. Ant. Rom. v, 73: Plehn, Lesbiaca, pp. 46-50.

[367] Diogen. Laërt. i, 81.

[368] Strabo, xiii, p. 617; Diogen. Laërt. i, 75; Valer. Maxim. vi, 5, 1.

[369] Aristot. Polit. ii, 9, 9; Rhetoric ii, 27, 2.

A ditty is said to have been sung by the female grinding-slaves in Lesbos, when the mill went heavily: Ἄλει, μύλα, ἄλει· καὶ γὰρ Πιττακὸς ἀλεῖ, Τᾶς μεγάλας Μιτυλάνας βασιλεύων,—"Grind, mill, grind; for Pittakus also *grinds*, the master of great Mitylênê." This has the air of a genuine composition of the time, set forth by the enemies of Pittakus, and imputing to him (through a very intelligible metaphor) tyrannical conduct; though both Plutarch (Sept. Sap. Conv. c. 14, p. 157) and Diogenes Laërt. (i, 81) construe it literally, as if Pittakus had been accustomed to take bodily exercise at the hand-mill.

[370] Aristot. Polit. ii, 9, 9. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Πιττακὸς νόμων δημιουργὸς, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πολιτείας.

[371] See the Inscriptions in Boeckh's collection, 2483-2671: the latter is an Iasian Inscription, reciting a Doric decree by the inhabitants of Kalymnæ; also Ahrens, De Dialecto Doricâ, pp. 15, 553; Diodor. v, 53-54.

[372] Polyb. xvi, 5.

[373] Herodot. i, 144.

[374] For the general geography of Asia Minor, see Albert Forbiger, Handbuch der Alt. Geogr. part ii, sect. 61, and an instructive little treatise, Fünf Inschriften und fünf Städte in Klein Asien, by Franz and Kiepert, Berlin, 1840, with a map of Phrygia annexed. The latter is particularly valuable as showing us how much yet remains to be made out: it is too often the practice with the compilers of geographical manuals to make a show of full knowledge, and to disguise the imperfection of their data. Nor do they always keep in view the necessity of distinguishing between the territorial names and divisions of one age and those of another.

[375] Cicero, Pro Lege Manilîâ, c. 6; Strabo, xii, p. 572; Herodot. v, 32. See the instructive account of the spread and cultivation of the olive-tree, in Ritter, Erdkunde, West-Asien, b. iii, Abtheilung iii; Abschn. i, s. 50, pp. 522-537.

[376] Herodot. i, 72; Heeren, Ideen über den Verkehr der Alten Welt, part i, abth. i, pp. 142-145. It may be remarked, however, that the Armenians, eastward of the Halys, are treated by Herodotus as colonists from the Phrygians (vii, 73): Stephanus Byz. says the same, v. Ἀρμενία, adding also, καὶ τῇ φωνῇ πολλὰ φρυγίζουσι. The more careful researches of modern linguists after much groundless assertion on the part of those who preceded them, have shown that the Armenian language belongs in its structure to the Indo-Germanic family, and is essentially distinct from the Semitic: see Ritter, Erdkunde, West-Asien, b. iii, abth. iii; Abschn. i, 5, 36, pp. 577-582. Herodotus rarely takes notice of the language spoken, nor does he on this occasion, when speaking of the river Halys as a boundary.

[377] Herodot. i, 170-171.

[378] Strabo, vii, pp. 295-303; xii, pp. 542, 564, 565, 572; Herodot. i, 28; vii, 74-75; Xenophon. Hellenic. i, 3, 2; Anabasis, vii, 2, 22-32. Mannert, Geographie der Gr. und Römer, b. viii, ch. ii, p. 403.

[379] Dionys. Periegêt. 805: Apollodôrus, i, 9, 20. Theokritus puts the Bebrykians on the coast of the Euxine—Id. xxii, 29; Syncell. p. 340, Bonn. The story in Appian, Bell. Mithridat. init. is a singular specimen of Grecian fancy, and anxiety to connect the antiquities of a nation with the Trojan war: the Greeks whom he followed assigned the origin of the Bithynians to Thracian followers of Rhêsus, who fled from Troy after the latter had been killed by Diomêdes: Dolonkus, eponym of the Thracians in the Chersonesus, is called brother of Bithynus (Steph. Byz. Δόλογκος—Βιθυνία).

The name Μαριαν-δυνοὶ, like Βι-θυνοὶ, may probably be an extension or compound of the primitive Θυνοὶ; perhaps, also, Βέβρυκες stands in the same relation to Βριγὲς, or Φρυγές. Hellanikus wrote Θύμβριον, Δύμβριον (Steph. Byz. in v.).

Kios is Mysian in Herodotus, v, 122: according to Skylax, the coast from the gulf of Astakus to that of Kios is Mysia (c. 93).

[380] Charon of Lampsakus, Fr. 7, ed. Didot. Χάρων δὲ φησὶ καὶ τὴν Λαμψακηνῶν χώραν προτέραν Βεβρυκίαν καλεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κατοικησάντων αὐτὴν Βεβρύκων· τὸ δὲ γένος αὐτῶν ἠφάνισται διὰ τοὺς γενομένους πολέμους. Strabo, xiii, p. 556; Conon, Narr. 12; Dionys. Hal. i, 54.

[381] Hekatæus, Frag. 204, ed. Didot; Apollodôr. i, 9, 18; Strabo, xii, pp. 564-575.

[382] Xanth. Fragm. 5, ed. Didot.

[383] Herodot. vii, 20-75.

[384] Strabo, vii, p. 295; xii, p. 550; Herodot. vii, 73; Hesych. v. Βρίγα.

[385] Strabo, vii, p. 295; xii, pp. 542, 564, 571, where he cites the geographer Artemidôrus. In the passage of the Iliad (xiii, 5), the Μυσοὶ ἀγχέμαχοι appear to be conceived by the poet in European Thrace; but Apollodôrus does not seem to have so construed the passage. Niebuhr (Kleine Schriften, p. 370) expresses himself more confidently than the evidence warrants.

[386] Strabo, xii, p. 572; Herodot. vii, 74.

[387] Diodor. iii, 59; Arrian, ii, 3, 1; Quint. Curt. iii, 1, 12; Athenæ. x, p. 415. We may also notice the town of Κοτυάειον near Μιδάειον in Phrygia, as connected with the name of the Thracian goddess *Kotys* (Strabo, x, p. 470; xii, p. 576).

[388] Herodot. viii, 138; Theopompus, Frag. 74, 75, 76, Didot (he introduced a long dialogue between Midas and Silenus,—Dionys. Halik. Vett. Script. Censur. p. 70: Theon. Progymnas. c. 2); Strabo, xiv, p. 680; Xenophon, Anabas. i, 2, 13.

[389] Strabo, xii, pp. 575-576; Steph. Byz. Μυγδονία; Thucyd. ii, 99. The territory Mygdonia and the Mygdonians, in the distant region of Mesopotamia, eastward of the river Chaboras (Plutarch, Lucullus, 32; Polyb. v, 51; Xenophon, Anab. iv, 3, 4), is difficult to understand, since it is surprising to find a branch of these more westerly Asiatics in the midst of the Syro-Arabian population. Strabo (xv, p. 747) supposes it to date only from the times of the Macedonian conquest of Asia, which is disproved by the mention of the name in Xenophon; though this reading in the text of Xenophon is by some called in question. See Forbiger, Handbuch der Alten Geographie, part ii, sect. 98, p. 628.

[390] Iliad, iii, 188; Strabo, xii, p. 551. The town of Otrœa, of which Otreus seems to be the eponymus, was situated in Phrygia, just on the borders of Bithynia (Strabo, xii, p. 566).

[391] Archiloch. Fragm. 28 Schneid., 26 Gaisf.—

… ὥσπερ αὐλῷ βρῦτον ἡ Θρῆϊξ ἀνὴρ

Ἠ Φρὺξ ἔβρυζε, etc.

The passage is too corrupt to support any inference, except the near approximation in the poet's mind of Thracians and Phrygians.

[392] Iliad, ii, 873; xiii, 792; Arrian, i, 29; Herodot. vii, 30. The boundary of the Phrygians southward towards the Pisidians, and westward as well as north-westward towards the Lydians and Mysians, could never be distinctly traced (Strabo. xii, pp. 564, 576, 628): the volcanic region called Katakekaumenê is referred in Xenophon's time to Mysia (Anabas. i, 2, 10): compare the remarks of Kiepert in the treatise above referred to, Fünf Inschriften und fünf Städte, p. 27.

[393] Herodot. i, 72; vii, 30.

[394] Strabo, xiv, p. 678: compare xiii, p. 586. The legend makes Doliôn son of Silênus, who is so much connected with the Phrygian Midas (Alexand. Ætolus ap. Strabo, xiv, p. 681).

[395] Phorônis, Fragm. 5, ed. Düntzer, p. 57—

… ἔνθα γόητες

Ἰδαῖοι Φρυγὲς ἄνδρες, ὀρέστεροι, οἵκαδ᾽ ἔναιον, etc.

[396] Ephorus ap. Strabo, xiv, 678; Herodot. v, 49.

[397] See the learned and valuable Dissertation of Boeckh, De Metris Pindari, iii, 8, pp. 235-239.

[398] Plutarch, De Musicâ, c. 5, 7, p. 1132; Aristoxenus ap. Athenæ. xiv, p. 624; Alkman, Frag. 104, ed. Bergk.

Aristoxenus seems to have considered the Phrygian Olympus as the great inventive genius who gave the start to Grecian music (Plutarch, *ib.* pp. 1135-1141): his music was employed almost entirely for hymns to the gods, religious worship, the Mêtrôa, or ceremonies, in honor of the Great Mother (p. 1140). Compare Clemen. Alexand. Strom. i, p. 306.

Μαρσύας may perhaps have its etymology in the Karian or Lydian language. Σούας was in Karian equivalent to τάφος (see Steph. Byz. v. Σουαγέλα): Mã was one of the various names of Rhea (Steph. Byz. v. Μάσταυρα). The word would have been written Μαρσούας by an Æolic Greek.

Marsyas is represented by Telestês the dithyrambist as a satyr, son of a nymph,—νυμφαγενεῖ χειροκτύπῳ φηρὶ Μαρσύᾳ κλέος (Telestês ap. Athenæ xiv. p 617).

[399] Xenoph. Anab. i, 2, 8; Homer, Iliad, ii, 595; Strabo, xii, p. 578: the latter connects Olympus with Kelænæ as well as Marsyas. Justin, xi, 7: "Mida, qui ab Orpheo sacrorum solemnibus initiatus, Phrygiam religionibus implevit."

The coins of Midaeion, Kadi, and Prymnêssus, in the more northerly portion of Phrygia, bear the impress of the Phrygian hero Midas (Eckhel, Doctrina Nummorum Vet. iii, pp. 143-168).

[400] Part i, ch. xv, p. 453.

[401] The fragment of Hippônax mentioning an eunuch of Lampsakus, rich and well-fed, reveals to us the Asiatic worship in that place (Fragm. 26, ed. Bergk):—

Θύνναν τε καὶ μυττωτὸν ἡμέρας πάσας

Δαινύμενος, ὥσπερ Λαμψακηνὸς εὐνοῦχος, etc.

[402] Strabo, xii, pp. 564-575; Herodot. iv, 76.

[403] Herodot. v, 49. πολυπροβατώτατοι καὶ πολυκαρπότατοι.

[404] Herodot. i, 93-94.

[405] Τάριχος Φρύγιον (Eupolis, Marik. Fr. 23, p. 506, Meineke),—τυρὸς, Athenæ. xii, 516,—ἰσχάδες, Alexis ap. Athenæ. iii, 75: *some* Phrygians, however, had never seen a fig-tree (Cicero pro Flacco, c. 17).

Carpets of Sardis (Athenæ. v, 197); φοινικίδες Σαρδιανικαὶ (Plato, Comicus ap. Athenæ. ii, 48); Ἀεὶ φιλόμυρον πᾶν τὸ Σάρδεων γένος (Alexis ap. Athenæ. xv, p. 691, and again *ib.* p. 690); Πόδας δὲ Ποικίλος μάσθλης ἐκάλυπτε Λύδιον καλὸν ἔργον (Sappho, Fragm. 54, ed. Schneidewin; Schol. Aristoph. Pac. 1174).

[406] Xenophon, Anabas. i, 6, 7; iii, 2, 23; Memorab. iii, 5, 26. ἀκοντισταὶ Μυσοὶ; Æschyl. Pers. 40. ἁβροδίαιτοι Λύδοι.

[407] Aristeid. Orat. xxvi, p. 346. The λόφος Ἄτυος was very near to this place Laneion, which shows the identity of the religious names throughout Lydia and Mysia (Or. xxv, p. 318). About the Phrygians, Aristeidês, Orat. xlvi, p. 308, Τῶν δὲ πλουσίων ἕνεκα εἰς τὴν ὑπεροριαν ἀπαίρουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Φρυγὲς τῶν ἐλαῶν ἕνεκα τῆς συλλογῆς.

The declamatory prolixities of Aristeidês offer little reward to the reader, except these occasional valuable evidences of existing custom.

[408] Hermippus ap. Athenæ. i, p. 27. Ἀνδράποδ᾽ ἐκ Φρυγίας, etc., the saying ascribed to Sokratês in Ælian, V. H. x, 14; Euripid. Alcest. 691; Strabo, vii, p. 304; Polyb. iv. 38. The Thracians sold their children into slavery,—(Herod. v, 6) as the Circassians do at present (Clarke's Travels, vol. i, p. 378).

Δειλότερος λάγω Φρυγὸς was a Greek proverb (Strabo, i, p. 36: compare Cicero pro Flacco, c. 27).

[409] Philostrat. Vit. Apollon. viii, 7, 12, p. 346. The slave-merchants seem to have visited Thessaly, and to have bought slaves at Pagasæ; these were either Penests sold by their masters out of the country, or perhaps non-Greeks procured from the borderers in the interior (Aristoph. Plutus, 521; Hermippus ap. Athenæ. i, p. 27. Αἱ Παγασαὶ δούλους καὶ στιγματίας παρέχουσι).

[410] Phrygian slaves seem to have been numerous at Milêtus in the time of Hippônax, Frag. 36, ed. Bergk:—

Καὶ τοὺς σολοίκους, ἢν λάβωτι, περνᾶσιν,
Φρυγὰς μὲν ἐς Μίλητον ἀλφιτεύσοντας.

[411] Theocrit. Idyll. xxii, 47-133; Apollon. Rhod. i, 937-954; ii, 5-140; Valer. Flacc. iv, 100; Apollodôr. ii, 5, 9.

[412] Iliad, ii, 138; xii, 97; xx, 219: Virgil, Georgic, iii, 270:—

"Illas ducit amor (equas) trans Gargara, transque sonantem
Ascanium," etc.

Klausen (Æneas und die Penaten, vol. i, pp. 52-56, 102-107) has put together with great erudition all the legendary indications respecting these regions.

[413] Arrian, ii, 3; Justin, xi, 7.

According to another tale, Midas was son of the Great Mother herself (Plutarch, Cæsar, 9; Hygin. fab. 191).

[414] Herodot. i, 14, with Wesseling's note.

[415] Herodot. i, 34.

[416] Pindar. ap. Athenæ. xiv, p. 635: compare Telestês ap. Athenæ. xiv, p. 626; Pausan. ix, 5, 4.

[417] Herodot. i, 84.

[418] Aristot. Mirabil. Auscultat. 52.

[419] Herodot. i, 94.

[420] Herodot. i, 11. αἱρέεται αὐτὸς περιεῖναι,—a phrase to which Gibbon has ascribed an intended irony, which it is difficult to discover in Herodotus.

[421] Herodot. i, 13. τούτου τοῦ ἔπεος … λόγον οὐδένα ἐποιεῦντο, πρὶν δὴ ἐπετελέσθη.

[422] Plato, Republ. ii, p. 360; Cicero, Offic. iii, 9. Plato (x, p. 612) compares very suitably the ring of Gygês to the helmet of Hadês.

[423] See Klausen, Æneas und die Penaten, pp. 34, 110, etc: compare Menke, Lydiaca, ch. 8, 9.

[424] See the article of O. Müller in the Rheinisch. Museum für Philologie Jahrgang, iii, pp. 22-38; also Movers, Die Phönizier, ch. xii, pp. 452-470.

[425] Diodor. ii, 2. Niebuhr also conceives that Lydia was in early days a portion of the Assyrian empire (Kleine Schriften, p. 371).

[426] Xanthi Fragment. 10, 12, 19, ed. Didot; Athenæ. x, p. 415; Nikolaus Damasc. p. 36, Orelli.

[427] Xanthi Fragm. 1, 2; Dionys. Halik. A. R. i, 28; Stephan. Byz. v. Τόῤῥηβος. The whole genealogy given by Dionysius is probably borrowed from Xanthus,—Zeus, Manês, Kotys, Asiês and Atys, Lydus and Torrhêbus.

[428] Herod, i, 14; Pausan. ix, 29, 2.

[429] Nikolaus Damasc. p. 52, ed. Orelli.

[430] Strabo, xiii, p. 590.

[431] Herodot. i, 15.

[432] Xenophon, Anabas. iii, 4, 7; 10, 11.

[433] Herodot. i, 95; Ktêsias, Fragm. Assyr. xiii, p. 419, ed. Bahr; Diodor. ii, 21. Ktêsias gives thirty generations of Assyrian kings from Ninyas to Sardanapalus: Velleius, 33; Eusebius, 35; Syncellus, 40; Castor, 27; Cephalion, 23. See Bahr ad Ctesiam, p. 428. The Babylonian chronology of Berosus (a priest of Belus, about 280 B. C.) gave 86 kings and 34,000 years from the Deluge to the Median occupation of Babylon; then 1,453 years down to the reign of Phul king of Assyria (Berosi Fragmenta, p. 8, ed. Richter).

Mr. Clinton sets forth the chief statements and discrepancies respecting Assyrian chronology in his Appendix, c. 4. But the suppositions to which he resorts, in order to bring them into harmony, appear to me uncertified and gratuitous.

Compare the different, but not more successful, track followed by Larcher (Chronologie, c. 3, pp. 145-157).

[434] Here again both Larcher and Mr. Clinton represent the time, at which the Medes made themselves independent of Assyria, as perfectly ascertained, though Larcher places it in 748 B. C., and Mr. Clinton in 711 B. C. "L'époque ne me paroit pas douteuse," (Chronologie, c. iv, p. 157,) says Larcher. Mr. Clinton treats the epoch of 711 B. C. for the same event, as fixed upon "*the authority of Scripture*" and reasons upon it in more than one place as a fact altogether indisputable (Appendix, c. iii, p. 259): "We may collect from Scripture that the Medes did not become independent till after the death of Sennacherib; and accordingly Josephus (Ant. x, 2), having related the death of this king, and the miraculous recovery of Hezekiah from sickness, adds—ἐν τοὐτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ συνέβη τὴν τῶν Ἀσσυρίων ἀρχὴν ὑπὸ Μήδων καταλυθῆναι. But the death of Sennacherib, as will be shown hereafter, is determined to the beginning of 711 B. C. The Median revolt, then, did not occur before B. C. 711; which refutes Conringius, who raises it to B. C. 715, and Valckenaer, who raises it to B. C. 741. Herodotus, indeed, implies an interval of some space between the revolt of the Medes and the election of Dêïokês to be king. But these anni ἀβασίλευτοι could not have been prior to the fifty-three years of Dêïokês, since the revolt is *limited by Scripture* to B. C. 711." Again, p. 261, he says, respecting the four Median kings mentioned by Eusebius before Dêïokês: "If they existed at all, they governed Media during the empire of the Assyrians, as we *know from Scripture*." And again, p. 280: "The precise date of the termination (of the Assyrian empire) in B. C. 711 is *given by Scripture*, with which Herodotus agrees," etc.

Mr. Clinton here treats, more than once, the revolt of the Medes as fixed to the year 711 B. C. *by Scripture*; but he produces no passage of Scripture to justify his allegation: and the passage which he cites from Josephus alludes, not to the Median revolt, but to the destruction of the Assyrian empire by the Medes. Herodotus represents the Medes as revolting from the Assyrian empire, and maintaining their independence for some time (undefined in extent) before the election of Dêïokês as king; but he gives us no means of determining the date of the *Median revolt*; and when Mr. Clinton says (p. 280, Note O.): "I suppose Herodotus to place the revolt of the Medes in Olymp. 17, 2, since he places the accession of Dêïokês in Olymp. 17, 3,"—this is a conjecture of his own: and the narrative of Herodotus seems plainly to imply that he conceived an interval far greater than one year between these two events. Diodorus gives the same interval as lasting "for many generations." (Diod. ii, 32.)

We know—both from Scripture and from the Phœnician annals, as cited by Josephus—that the Assyrians of Nineveh were powerful conquerors in Syria, Judæa, and Phœnicia, during the reigns of Salmaneser and Sennacherib: the statement of Josephus farther implies that Media was subject to Salmaneser, who took the Israelites from their country into Media and Persis, and brought the Cuthæans out of Media and Persis into the lands of the Israelites (Joseph. ix, 14, 1; x, 9, 7). We know farther, that after Sennacherib, the Assyrians of Nineveh are no more mentioned as invaders or disturbers of Syria or Judæa; the Chaldæans or Babylonians become then the enemies whom those countries have to dread. Josephus tells us, that at this epoch the Assyrian empire was destroyed by the Medes,—or, as he says in another place, by the Medes and Babylonians (x, 2, 2; x, 5, 1). This is good evidence for believing that the Assyrian empire of Nineveh sustained at this time a great shock and diminution of power; but as to the nature of this diminution, and the way in which it was brought about, it appears to me that there is a discrepancy of authorities which we have no means of reconciling,—Josephus follows the same view as Ktêsias, of the destruction of the empire of Nineveh by the Medes and Babylonians united, while Herodotus conceives successive revolts of the territories dependent upon Nineveh, beginning with that of the Medes, and still leaving Nineveh flourishing and powerful in its own territory: he farther conceives Nineveh as taken by Kyaxarês the Mede, about the year 600 B. C., without any mention of Babylonians,—on the contrary, in his representation, Nitokris the queen of Babylon is afraid of the Medes (i, 185), partly from the general increase of their power, but especially from their having taken Nineveh (though Mr. Clinton tells us, p. 275, that "Nineveh was destroyed B. C. 606, as we have seen from the united testimonies of the Scripture and Herodotus, *by the Medes and Babylonians*.")

Construing fairly the text of Herodotus, it will appear that he conceived the relations of these Oriental kingdoms between 800 and 560 B. C. differently on many material points from Ktêsias, or Berosus, or Josephus: and he himself expressly tells us, that he heard "four different tales" even respecting Cyrus (i, 95); much more, respecting events anterior to Cyrus by more than a century.

The chronology of the Medes, Babylonians, Lydians, and Greeks in Asia, when we come to the seventh century B. C., acquires some fixed points which give us assurance of correctness within certain limits; but above the year 700 B. C. no such fixed points can be detected. We cannot discriminate the historical from the mythical in our authorities,—we cannot reconcile them with each other, except by violent changes and conjectures,—nor can we determine which of them ought to be set aside in favor of the other. The names and dates of the Babylonian kings down from Nabonassar, in the Canon of Ptolemy, are doubtless authentic, but they are names and dates only: when we come to apply them to illustrate real or supposed matters of fact, drawn from other sources, they only create a new embarrassment, for even the *names* of the kings as reported by different authors do not agree and Mr. Clinton informs us (p. 277): "In tracing the identity of Eastern kings, the times and the transactions are better guides than the names; for these, from many well-known causes (as the changes which they undergo in passing through the Greek language, and the substitution of a title or an epithet for the name), are variously reported, so that *the same king frequently appears under many different appellations*." Here, then, is a new problem: we are to employ "the times and transactions" to identify the kings: but unfortunately the *times* are marked only by the succession of kings, and the *transactions* are known only by statements always scanty and often irreconcilable with each other. So that our means of identifying the kings are altogether insufficient, and whoever will examine the process of identification as it appears in Mr. Clinton's chapters, will see that it is in a high degree arbitrary; more arbitrary still are the processes which he employs for bringing about a forced harmony between discrepant authorities. Nor is Volney (Chronologie d'Hérodote, vol. i, pp. 383-429) more satisfactory in his chronological results.

[435] Herodot. i, 96-100.

[436] Herodot. i, 97. ὡς δ᾽ ἐγὼ δοκέω, μάλιστα ἔλεγον οἱ τοῦ Δηϊόκεω φίλοι, etc.

[437] Herodot. i, 98, 99, 100. Οἰκοδομηθέντων δὲ πάντων, κόσμον τόνδε Δηϊόκης πρῶτός ἐστιν ὁ καταστησάμενος· μήτε ἐσιέναι παρὰ βασιλέα μηδένα, δι᾽ ἀγγέλων δὲ πάντα χρέεσθαι, ὁρᾶσθαι δὲ βασιλέα ὑπὸ μηδενός· πρὸς δὲ τούτοισι ἔτι γελᾷν τε καὶ πτύειν ἄντιον, καὶ ἄπασι εἶναι τοῦτό γε αἰσχρόν, etc. and … οἱ κατάσκοποί τε καὶ κατήκοοι ἦσαν ἀνὰ πᾶσαν τὴν χώρην τῆς ἦρχε.

[438] Herodot. iii, 80-82. Herodotus, while he positively asserts the genuineness of these deliberations, lets drop the intimation that many of his contemporaries regarded them as of Grecian coinage.

[439] Herodot. i, 96. Ἐόντων δὲ αὐτονόμων πάντων ἀνὰ τὴν ἤπειρον, ὧδε αὖτις ἐς τυραννίδας περιῆλθον. Ἀνὴρ ἐν τοῖσι Μήδοισι ἐγένετο σοφὸς, τῷ οὔνομα ἦν Δηϊόκης…. Οὗτος ὁ Δηϊόκης, ἐρασθεὶς τυραννίδος, ἐποίεε τοιάδε, etc…. Ὁ δὲ δὴ, οἷα μνεώμενος ἀρχὴν, ἰθύς τε καὶ δίκαιος ἦν.

[440] Compare the chapters above referred to in Herodotus with the eighth book of the Cyropædia, wherein Xenophon describes the manner in which the Median despotism was put in effective order and turned to useful account by Cyrus, especially the arrangements for imposing on the imagination of his subjects (καταγοητεύειν, viii, 1, 40)—(it is a small thing, but marks the cognate plan of Herodotus and Xenophon). Dêïokês forbids his subjects to laugh or spit in his presence. Cyrus also directs that no one shall spit, or wipe his nose, or turn round to look at anything, when the king is present (Herodot. i, 99; Xen. Cyrop. viii, 1, 42). Again, viii, 3, 1, about the pompous procession of Cyrus when he rides out,—καὶ γὰρ αὐτῆς τῆς ἐξελάσεως ἡ σεμνότης ἡμῖν δοκεῖ μία τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι τῶν μεμηχανημένων, τὴν ἀρχὴν μὴ εὐκαταφρόνητον εἶναι—analogous to the Median Dêïokês in Herodotus—Ταῦτα δὲ περὶ ἑωυτὸν ἐσέμνυνε τῶνδε εἵνεκεν, etc. *Cyrus*—ἐμφανίζων δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὅτι περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιεῖτο, μηδένα μήτε φίλον ἀδικεῖν μήτε σύμμαχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἰσχυρῶς ὁρῶν (Cyrop. viii, 1, 26). *Dêïokês*—ἦν τὸ δίκαιον φυλάσσων χαλεπός (Herodot. i, 100). *Cyrus* provides numerous persons who serve to him as eyes and ears throughout the country (Cyrop. viii, 2, 12), *Dêïokês* has many κατάσκοποι and κατήκοοι (Herodot. *ib.*).

[441] When the Roman emperor Claudius sends the young Parthian prince Meherdatês, who had been an hostage at Rome, to occupy the kingdom which the Parthian envoys tendered to him, he gives him some good advice, conceived in the school of Greek and Roman politics: "Addidit præcepta, ut non dominationem ac servos, sed rectorem et cives, cogitaret: clementiamque ac justitiam quanto ignara barbaris, tanto toleratiora, capesseret." (Tacit, Annal. xii, 11.)

[442] The passage of such nomadic hordes from one government in the East to another, has been always, and is even down to the present day, a frequent cause of dispute between the different governments: they are valuable both as tributaries and as soldiers. The Turcoman Ilats—so these nomadic tribes are now called—in the north-east of Persia frequently pass backwards and forwards, as their convenience suits, from the Persian territory to the Usbeks of Khiva and Bokhara: wars between Persia and Russia have been in like manner occasioned by the transit of the Ilats across the frontier from Persia into Georgia: so also the Kurd tribes near Mount Zagros have caused by their movements quarrels between the Persians and the Turks.

See Morier, Account of the Iliyats, or Wandering Tribes of Persia, in the Journal of the Geographical Society of London, 1837, vol. vii, p. 240, and Carl Ritter, Erdkunde von Asien, West-Asien, Band ii, Abtheilung ii, Abschnitt ii, sect. 8, p. 387.

[443] Herodot. i, 74-103.

[444] Compare the analogous case of the prediction of the coming olive crop ascribed to Thalês (Aristot. Polit. i, 4, 5; Cicero, De Divinat. i, 3). Anaxagoras is asserted to have predicted the fall of an aërolithe (Aristot. Meteorol. i, 7; Pliny, H. N. ii, 58; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 5).

Thalês is said by Herodotus to have predicted that the eclipse would take place "in the year in which it actually did occur,"—a statement so vague that it strengthens the grounds of doubt.

The fondness of the Ionians for exhibiting the wisdom of their eminent philosopher Thalês, in conjunction with the history of the Lydian kings, may be seen farther in the story of Thalês and Crœsus at the river Halys (Herod. i, 75),—a story which Herodotus himself disbelieves.

[445] Consult, for the chronological views of these events, Larcher ad Herodot. i, 74; Volney, Recherches sur l'Histoire Ancienne, vol. i, pp. 330-355; Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, vol. i, p. 418 (Note ad B. C. 617, 2); Des Vignoles, Chronologie de l'Histoire Sainte, vol. ii, p. 245; Ideler, Handbuch der Chronologie, vol. i, p. 209.

No less than eight different dates have been assigned by different chronologists for this eclipse,—the most ancient 625 B. C., the most recent 583 B. C. Volney is for 625 B. C.; Larcher for 597 B. C.; Des Vignoles for 585 B. C.; Mr. Clinton for 603 B. C. Volney observes, with justice, that the eclipse on this occasion "n'est pas l'accessoire, la broderie du fait, mais le *fait principal* lui-même," (p. 347:) the astronomical calculations concerning the eclipse are, therefore, by far the most important items in the chronological reckoning of this event. Now in regard to the eclipse of 625 B. C., Volney is obliged to admit that it does not suit the case; for it would be visible only at half-past five in the morning on February 3, and the sun would hardly be risen at that hour in the latitude of Media and Lydia (p. 343). He seeks to escape from this difficulty by saying that the data for the calculation, according to the astronomer Pingré, are not quite accurate for these early eclipses; but after all, if there be error, it may just as well be in one direction as in another, *i. e.* the true hour at which the eclipse would be visible for those latitudes is as likely to have been *earlier* than half-past five A. M. as to have been later, which would put this eclipse still more out of the question.

The chronology of that period presents difficulties which our means of knowledge hardly enable us to clear up. Volney remarks, and the language of Herodotus is with him, that not merely the war between Kyaxarês and Alyattês (which lasted five years, and was terminated by the eclipse), but also the conquest made by Kyaxarês of the territory up to the river Halys, took place anterior (Herodot. i, 103: compare i, 16) to the *first siege* of Nineveh by Kyaxarês,—that siege which he was forced to raise by the inroad of the Scythians. This constitutes a strong presumption in favor of Volney's date for the eclipse (625 B. C.) if astronomical considerations would admit of it, which they will not. Mr. Clinton, on the other hand, puts the first siege of Nineveh in the very first year of the reign of Kyaxarês, which is not to be reconciled with the language of Herodotus. In placing the eclipse, therefore, in 603 B. C., we depart from the relative arrangement of events which Herodotus conceived, in deference to astronomical reasons: and Herodotus is our only authority in regard to the general chronology.

According to Ideler, however (and his authority upon such a point is conclusive, in my judgment), astronomical considerations decisively fix this eclipse for the 30th September 610 B. C., and exclude all those other eclipses which have been named. Recent and more trustworthy calculations made by Oltmanns, from the newest astronomical tables, have shown that the eclipse of 610 B. C. fulfils the conditions required, and that the other eclipses named do not. For a place situated in 40° N. lat. and 36° E. long. this eclipse was nearly total, only one-eightieth of the sun's disc remaining luminous: the darkness thus occasioned would be sufficient to cause great terror. (Ideler, Handbuch, *l. c.*)

Since the publication of my first edition, I have been apprized that the late Mr. Francis Baily had already settled the date of this eclipse to the 30th of September 610 B. C., in his first contribution to the Transactions of the Royal Society as long ago as 1811,—much before the date of the publication of Ideler's Handbuch der Chronologie. Sir John Herschel (in his Memoir of Mr. Francis Baily, in the Transactions of the Royal Astronomical Society, vol. xv, p. 311), after completely approving Mr. Baily's calculations, and stating that he had been the first to solve the disputed question, expresses his surprise that various French and German astronomers, writing on the same subject afterwards, have taken no notice of "that remarkable paper." Though a fellow-countryman of Mr. Baily, I am sorry that I have to plead guilty to a similar ignorance, until the point was specially brought to my notice by a friend. Had I been aware of the paper and the Memoir, it would have been unnecessary to cite any other authority than that of Mr. Baily and Sir John Herschel.

[446] Herodot. iv, 11-12. Hekatæus also spoke of a town Κιμμερίς (Strabo, vii, p. 294).

Respecting the Cimmerians, consult Ukert, Skythien, p. 360, *seqq.*

[447] Strabo, i, pp. 6, 59, 61.

[448] Homer, Iliad, xiii, 4.—

… Αὐτὸς δὲ πάλιν τρέπεν ὅσσε φαεινὼ,

Νόσφιν ἐφ᾽ ἱπποπόλων Θρῃκῶν καθορώμενος αἶαν

Μυσῶν τ᾽ ἀγχεμάχων, καὶ ἀγαυῶν Ἱππημολγῶν,

Γλακτοφάγων, Ἀβίων τε, δικαιοτάτων ἀνθρώπων.

Compare Strabo, xii, p. 553.

[449] Hesiod, Fragm. 63-64, Marktscheffel:—

Γλακτοφάγων εἰς αἶαν, ἀπήναις οἴκι᾽ ἐχόντων …

Αἰθίοπας, Δίγυάς τε, ἰδὲ Σκύθας ἱππημολγούς.

Strabo, vii, pp. 300-302.

[450] Raoul Rochette, Histoire des Colonies Grecques, tom. iii, ch. xiv, p. 297. The dates of these Grecian settlements near the Danube are very vague and untrustworthy.

[451] Skymnus Chius, v, 730, Fragm. 2-25.

[452] Alkæus, Fragm. 49, Bergk; Eustath. ad Dionys. Perieg. 306.—

Ἀχιλλεῦ, ὃ τᾶς (γᾶς, Schneid.) Σκυθικᾶς μέδεις.

Alkman, somewhat earlier, made mention of the Issêdones (Alkm. Frag. 129, Bergk; Steph. Byz. v. Ἰσσήδονες,—he called them Assêdones) and of the Rhipæan mountains (Fr. 80).

In the old epic of Arktinus, the deceased Achilles is transported to an elysium in the λευκὴ νῆσος (see the argument of the Æthiopis in Düntzer's Collection of Epicc. Poet. Græc. p. 15), but it may well be doubted whether λευκὴ νῆσος in his poem was anything but a fancy,—not yet localized upon the little island off the mouth of the Danube.

For the early allusions to the Pontus Euxinus and its neighboring inhabitants, found in the Greek poets, see Ukert, Skythien, pp. 15-18, 78; though he puts the Ionian colonies in the Pontus nearly a century too early, in my judgment.

[453] Compare Dr. Clarke's description of the present commerce between Taganrock—not far from the ancient Greek settlement of Tanais—and the Archipelago: besides exporting salt-fish, corn, leather, etc. in exchange for wines, fruit, etc. it is the great deposit of Siberian productions: from Orenburg it receives tallow, furs, iron, etc; this is, doubtless, as old as Herodotus (Clarke's Travels in Russia, ch. xv, p. 330).

[454] Hekatæi Fragment. Fr. 153, 168, ed. Klausen. Hekatæus mentioned the Issêdones (Fr. 168; Steph. Byz. v. Ἰσσήδονες); both he and Damastês seem to have been familiar with the poem of Aristeas: see Klausen, *ad loc.*; Steph. Byz. v. Ὑπερβόρειοι. Compare also Æschyl. Prometh. 409, 710, 805.

Hellanikus, also, seems to have spoken about Scythia in a manner generally conformable to Herodotus (Strabo, xii, p. 550). It does little credit to the discernment of Strabo that he treats with disdain the valuable Scythian chapter of Herodotus,—ἅπερ Ἑλλάνικος καὶ Ἡρόδοτος καὶ Εὔδοξος κατεφλυάρησαν ἡμῶν (*ib.*).

[455] Herodot. iv, 100-101. See, respecting the Scythia of Herodotus, the excellent dissertation of Niebuhr, contained in his Kleine Historische Schriften, "Ueber die Geschichte der Skythen, Geten, und Sarmaten," p. 360, alike instructive both as to the geography and the history. Also the two chapters in Völcker's Mythische Geographie, ch. vii-viii, sects. 23-26, respecting the geographical conceptions present to Herodotus in his description of Scythia.

Herodotus has much in his Scythian geography, however, which no comment can enable us to understand. Compared with his predecessors, his geographical conceptions evince very great improvement; but we shall

have occasion, in the course of this history, to notice memorable examples of extreme misapprehension in regard to distance and bearings in these remote regions, common to him not only with his contemporaries, but also with his successors.

[456] Herodot. iv, 17-21, 46-56; Hippokratês, De Aëre, Locis et Aquis, c. vi; Æschyl. Prometh. 709; Justin, ii, 2.

It is unnecessary to multiply citations respecting nomadic life, the same under such wide differences both of time and of latitude,—the same with the "armentarius Afer" of Virgil (Georgic, iii, 343) and the "campestres Scythæ" of Horace (Ode iii, 24, 12), and the Tartars of the present day; see Dr. Clarke's Travels in Russia, ch. xiv, p. 310.

The fourth book of Herodotus, the Tristia and Epistolæ ex Ponto of Ovid, the Toxaris of Lucian (see c. 36, vol. i, p. 544 Hemst.), and the Inscription of Olbia (No. 2058 in Boeckh's Collection), convey a genuine picture of Scythian manners as seen by the near observer and resident, very different from the pleasing fancies of the distant poet respecting the innocence of pastoral life. The poisoned arrows, which Ovid so much complains of in the Sarmatians and Getæ (Trist. iii, 10, 60, among other passages, and Lucan, iii, 270), are not noticed by Herodotus in the Scythians.

The dominant Golden Horde among the Tartars, in the time of Zinghis Khan, has been often spoken of; and among the different Arab tribes now in Algeria, some are noble, others enslaved; the latter habitually, and by inheritance, servants of the former, following wherever ordered (Tableau de la Situation des Établissemens Français en Algérie, p. 393, Paris, Mar. 1846).

[457] Ephorus placed the Karpidæ immediately north of the Danube (Fragm. 78, Marx; Skymn. Chius, 102). I agree with Niebuhr that this is probably an inaccurate reproduction of the Kallippidæ of Herodotus, though Boeckh is of a different opinion (Introduct. ad Inscriptt. Sarmatic. Corpus Inscript. part xi, p. 81). The vague and dreamy statements of Ephorus, so far as we know them from the fragments, contrast unfavorably with the comparative precision of Herodotus. The latter expressly separates the Androphagi from the Scythians,—ἔθνος ἐὸν ἴδιον καὶ οὐδαμῶς Σκυθικόν (iv, 18), whereas when we compare Strabo vii. p. 302 and Skymn. Chi. 105-115, we see that Ephorus talked of the Androphagi as a variety of Scythians,—ἔθνος ἀνδροφάγων Σκυθῶν.

The valuable inscription from Olbia (No. 2058 Boeckh) recognizes Μιξέλληνες near that town.

[458] Herod. iv, 17. We may illustrate this statement of Herodotus by an extract from Heber's journal as cited in Dr. Clarke's Travels, ch. xv, p. 337: "The Nagay Tartars begin to the west of Marinopol: they cultivate a good deal of corn, yet they dislike bread as an article of food."

[459] Niebuhr (Dissertat. *ut sup.* p. 360), Boeckh (Introd. Inscrip. *ut sup.* p. 110), and Ritter (Vorhalle der Geschichte, p. 316) advance this opinion. But we ought not on this occasion to depart from the authority of Herodotus, whose information respecting the people of Scythia, collected by himself on the spot, is one of the most instructive and precious portions of his whole work. He is very careful to distinguish what is Scythian from what is not: and these tribes, which Niebuhr (contrary to the sentiment of Herodotus) imagines *not* to be Scythian, were the tribes nearest and best known to him; probably he had personally visited them, since we know that he went up the river Hypanis (Bog) as high as the Exampæus, four days' journey from the sea (iv, 52-81).

That some portions of the same ἔθνος should be ἀροτῆρες, and other portions νόμαδες, is far from being without parallel; such was the case with the Persians, for example (Herodot. i, 126), and with the Iberians between the Euxine and the Caspian (Strabo, xi, p. 500).

The Pontic Greeks confounded Agathyrsus, Gelônus, and Scythês in the same genealogy, as being three brethren, sons of Hêraklês by the μιξοπάρθενος Ἔχιδνα of the Hylæa (iv, 7-10). Herodotus is more precise: he distinguishes both the Agathyrsi and Gelôni from Scythians.

[460] Both Niebuhr and Boeckh account the ancient Scythians to be of Mongolian race (Niebuhr in the Dissertation above mentioned, Untersuchungen über die Geschichte der Skythen, Geten, und Sarmaten, among the Kleine Historische Schriften, p. 362; Boeckh, Corpus Inscriptt. Græcarum, Introductio ad Inscriptt. Sarmatic. part xi, p. 81). Paul Joseph Schafarik, in his elaborate examination of the ethnography of the ancient people described as inhabiting northern Europe and Asia, arrives at the same result (Slavische Alterthümer, Prag. 1843, vol. i, xiii, 6, p. 279).

A striking illustration of this analogy of race is noticed by Alexander von Humboldt, in speaking of the burial-place and the funeral obsequies of the Tartar Tchinghiz Khan:—

"Les cruautés lors de la pompe funèbre des grands-khans ressemblent entièrement à celles que nous trouvons décrites par Hérodote (iv, 71) environ 1700 ans avant la mort de Tchinghiz, et 65° de longitude plus à l'ouest, chez les Scythes du Gerrhus et du Borysthène." (Humboldt, Asie Centrale, vol. i, p. 244.)

Nevertheless, M. Humboldt dissents from the opinion of Niebuhr and Boeckh, and considers the Scythians of Herodotus to be of Indo-Germanic, not of Mongolian race: Klaproth seems to adopt the same view (see Humboldt, Asie Centrale, vol. i, p. 401, and his valuable work, Kosmos, p. 491, note 383). He assumes it as a certain fact, upon what evidence I do not distinctly see, that no tribe of Turk or Mongol race migrated westward out of Central Asia until considerably later than the time of Herodotus. To make out such a negative, seems to me impossible: and the marks of ethnographical analogy, so far as they go, decidedly favor the opinion of Niebuhr. Ukert also (Skythien, pp. 266-280) controverts the opinion of Niebuhr.

At the same time it must be granted that these marks are not very conclusive, and that many nomadic hordes, whom no one would refer to the same race, may yet have exhibited an analogy of manners and characteristics equal to that between the Scythians and Mongols.

The principle upon which the Indo-European family of the human race is defined and parted off, appears to me inapplicable to any particular case wherein the *language* of the people is unknown to us. The nations constituting that family have no other point of affinity except in the roots and structure of their language; on every other point there is the widest difference. To enable us to affirm that the Massagetæ, or the Scythians, or the Alani, belonged to the Indo-European family, it would be requisite that we should know something of their language. But the Scythian language may be said to be wholly unknown; and the very few words which are brought to our knowledge do not tend to aid the Indo-European hypothesis.

[461] See the story of the accidental discovery of this Scythian sword when lost, by Attila, the chief of the Huns (Priscus ap. Jornandem de Rebus Geticis, c. 35, and in Eclog. Legation. p. 50).

Lucian in the Toxaris (c. 38, vol. ii, p. 546, Hemst.) notices the worship of the akinakes, or scymetar, by the Scythians in plain terms without interposing the idea of the god Arês: compare Clemen. Alexand. Protrept. p. 25, Syl. Ammianus Marcellinus, in speaking of the Alani (xxxi, 2), as well as Pomponius Mela (ii, 1) and Solinus (c. 20), copy Herodotus. Ammianus is more literal in his description of the Sarmatian sword-worship (xvii, 12). "Eductisque mucronibus, quos pro numinibus colunt," etc.

[462] Herodot. iv, 3-62, 71-75; Sophoklês, Œnomaus,—ap. Athenæ. ix, p. 410; Hippokratês, De Aëre, Locis et Aquis, ch. vi, s. 91-99, etc.

It is seldom that we obtain, in reference to the modes of life of an ancient population, two such excellent witnesses as Herodotus and Hippokratês about the Scythians.

Hippokratês was accustomed to see the naked figure in its highest perfection at the Grecian games: hence, perhaps, he is led to dwell more emphatically on the corporeal defects of the Scythians.

[463] See Pallas, Reise durch Russland, and Dr. Clarke, Travels in Russia, ch. xii, p. 238.

[464] Thucyd. ii, 95; Herodot. ii, 46-47: his idea of the formidable power of the Scythians seems also to be implied in his expression (c. 81), καὶ ὀλίγους, ὡς Σκύθας εἶναι.

Herodotus holds the same language about the Thracians, however, as Thucydidês about the Scythians,—irresistible, if they could but act with union (v, 3).

[465] The testimony of Herodotus to this effect (iv, 110-117) seems clear and positive, especially as to the language. Hippokratês also calls the Sauromatæ ἔθνος Σκυθικόν (De Aëre, Locis et Aquis, c. vi, sect. 89, Petersen).

I cannot think that there is any sufficient ground for the marked ethnical distinction which several authors draw (contrary to Herodotus) between the Scythians and the Sarmatians. Boeckh considers the latter to be of Median or Persian origin, but to be, also, the progenitors of the modern Sclavonian family: "Sarmatæ, Slavorum haud dubie parentes," (Introduct. ad Inscr. Sarmatic. Corp. Inscr. part xi, p. 83.) Many other authors have shared this opinion, which identifies the Sarmatians with the Slavi; but Paul Joseph Schafarik (Slavische Alterthümer, vol. i, c. 16) has shown powerful reasons against it.

Nevertheless, Schafarik admits the Sarmatians to be of Median origin, and radically distinct from the Scythians. But the passages which are quoted to prove this point from Diodorus (ii, 43), from Mela (i, 19), and from Pliny (H. N. vi. 7), appear to me of much less authority than the assertion of Herodotus. In none of these authors is there any trace of inquiries made in or near the actual spot from neighbors and competent informants, such as we find in Herodotus. And the chapter in Diodorus, on which both Boeckh and Schafarik lay especial stress, appears to me one of the most untrustworthy in the whole book. To believe in the existence of Scythian kings who reigned over all Asia from the eastern ocean to the Caspian, and sent out large colonies of Medians and Assyrians, is surely impossible; and Wesseling speaks much within the truth when he says, "Verum hæc dubia admodum atque incerta." It is remarkable to see Boeckh treating this passage as conclusive against Herodotus and Hippokratês. M. Boeckh has also given a copious analysis of the names found in the Greek inscriptions from Scythian, Sarmatian, and Mæotic localities (*ut sup.* pp. 107-117), and he endeavors to establish an analogy between the two latter classes and Median names. But the analogy holds just as much with regard to the Scythian names.

[466] The locality which Herodotus assigns to the Budini creates difficulty. According to his own statement, it would seem that they ought to be near to the Neuri (iv, 105), and so in fact Ptolemy places them (v, 9) near about Volhynia and the sources of the Dniester.

Mannert (Geographie der Griech. und Römer, Der Norden der Erde, v, iv, p. 138) conceives the Budini to be a Teutonic tribe; but Paul Joseph Schafarik (Slavische Alterthümer, i, 10, pp. 185-195) has shown more plausible grounds for believing both them and the Neuri to be of Slavic family. It seems that the names Budini and Neuri are traceable to Slavic roots; that the wooden town described by Herodotus in the midst of the Budini is an exact parallel of the primitive Slavic towns, down even to the twelfth century; and that the description of the country around, with its woods and marshes containing beavers, otters, etc. harmonizes better with southern Poland and Russia than with the neighborhood of the Ural mountains. From the color ascribed to the Budini, no certain inference can be drawn: γλαυκόν τε πᾶν ἰσχυρῶς ἐστὶ καὶ πυῤῥόν (iv, 108). Mannert construes it in favor of Teutonic family, Schafarik in favor of Slavic; and it is to be remarked, that Hippokratês talks of the Scythians generally as extremely πυῤῥοὶ (De Aëre, Locis et Aquis, c. vi: compare Aristot. Prob. xxxviii, 2).

These reasonings are plausible; yet we can hardly venture to alter the position of the Budini as Herodotus describes it, eastward of the Tanais. For he states in the most explicit manner that the route as far as the Argippæi *is thoroughly known*, traversed both by Scythian and by Grecian traders, and all the nations in the way to it known (iv, 24): μέχρι μὲν τούτων πολλὴ περιφάνεια τῆς χώρης ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἐθνέων· καὶ γὰρ Σκυθέων τινες ἀπικνέονται ἐς αὐτοὺς, τῶν οὐ χαλεπόν ἐστὶ πυθέσθαι, καὶ Ἑλλήνων τῶν ἐκ Βορυσθένεός τε ἐμπορίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ποντικῶν ἐμπορίων. These Greek and Scythian traders, in their journey from the Pontic seaports into the interior, employed seven different languages and as many interpreters.

Völcker thinks that Herodotus or his informants confounded the Don with the Volga (Mythische Geographie, sect. 24, p. 190), supposing that the higher parts of the latter belonged to the former; a mistake not unnatural, since the two rivers approach pretty near to each other at one particular point, and since the lower parts of the Volga, together with the northern shore of the Caspian, where its embouchure is situated, appear to have been little visited and almost unknown in antiquity. There cannot be a more striking evidence how unknown these regions were, than the persuasion, so general in antiquity, that the Caspian sea was a gulf of the ocean, to which Herodotus, Aristotle, and Ptolemy are almost the only exceptions. Alexander von Humboldt has some valuable remarks on the tract laid down by Herodotus from the Tanais to the Argippæi (Asie Centrale, vol. i, pp. 390-400).

[467] Herodot. iv, 80.

[468] Herodot. iv, 99-101. Dionysius Periêgêtês seems to identify Cimmerians and Tauri (v, 168: compare v, 680, where the Cimmerians are placed on the Asiatic side of the Cimmerian Bosphorus, adjacent to the Sindi).

[469] Herodot. i, 202. Strabo compares the inroads of the Sakæ, which was the name applied by the Persians to the Scythians, to those of the Cimmerians and the Trêres (xi, pp. 511-512).

[470] Herodot. iv, 13. φοιβολαμπτὸς γενομένος.

[471] Herodot. iv, 13.

[472] Herodot. iv, 11. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλος λόγος, ἔχων ὧδε, τῷ μάλιστα λεγομένῳ αὐτὸς προσκεῖμαι.

[473] Herodot. iv, 11.

[474] Herodot. iv, 1-12.

[475] Herodot. iv, 5-9. At this day, the three great tribes of the nomadic Turcomans, on the north-eastern border of Persia near the Oxus,—the Yamud, the Gokla, and the Tuka,—assert for themselves a legendary genealogy deduced from three brothers (Frazer, Narrative of a Journey in Khorasan, p. 258).

[476] Read the description of the difficult escape of Mithridates Eupator, with a mere handful of men, from Pontus to Bosphorus by this route, between the western edge of Caucasus and the Euxine (Strabo, xi, pp. 495-496),—ἡ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ Ζυγῶν καὶ Ἡνιόχων παραλία,—all piratical and barbarous tribes,—τῇ παραλίᾳ χαλεπῶς ᾔει, τὰ πολλὰ ἐμβαίνων ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν: compare Plutarch, Pompeius, c. 34. Pompey thought the route unfit for his march.

To suppose the Cimmerian tribes with their wagons passing along such a track would require strong positive evidence. According to Ptolemy, however, there were two passes over the range of Caucasus,—the Caucasian or Albanian gates, near Derbend and the Caspian, and the Sarmatian gates, considerably more to the westward (Ptolemy, Geogr. v, 9; Forbiger, Handbuch der Alten Geographie, vol. ii, sect. 56, p. 55). It is not impossible that the Cimmerians may have followed the westernmost, and the Scythians the easternmost, of these two passes; but the whole story is certainly very improbable.

[477] See Niebuhr's Dissertation above referred to, pp. 366-367. A reason for supposing that the Cimmerians came into Asia Minor from the west and not from the east, is, that we find them so much confounded with the Thracian Trêres indicating seemingly a joint invasion.

[478] Herodot. i, 6-15; iv, 12. φαίνονται δὲ οἱ Κιμμέριοι, φεύγοντες ἐς τὴν Ἀσίην τοὺς Σκύθας, καὶ τὴν Χερσόνησον κτίσαντες, ἐν τῇ νῦν Σινώπη πόλις Ἑλληνὶς οἴκισται.

[479] Kallinus, Fragment. 2, 3, ed. Bergk. Νῦν δ᾽ ἐπὶ Κιμμερίων στρατὸς ἔρχεται ὀβριμοεργῶν (Strabo, xiii, p. 627; xiv, 633-647). O. Müller (History of the Literature of Ancient Greece, ch. x, s. 4) and Mr. Clinton (Fasti Hellenici, B. C. 716-635) may be consulted about the obscure chronology of these events. The Scythico-Cimmerian invasion of Asia, to which *Herodotus* alludes, appears fixed for some date in the reign of Ardys the Lydian, 640-629 B. C., and may stand for 635 B. C. as Mr. Clinton puts it; and I agree with O. Müller that the fragment of the poet Kallinus above cited alludes to *this* invasion; for the supposition of Mr. Clinton, that Kallinus here alludes to an invasion past and not present, appears to be excluded by the word νῦν. Mr. Clinton places both Kallinus and Archilochus (in my judgment) half a century too high; for I agree with O. Müller in disbelieving the story told by Pliny of the picture sold by Bularchus to Kandaulês. O. Müller follows Strabo (i, p. 61) in calling Madys a Cimmerian prince, who drove the Trêres out of Asia Minor; whereas Herodotus mentions him as the *Scythian* prince, who drove the Cimmerians *out* of their own territory *into* Asia Minor (i, 103).

The chronology of Herodotus is intelligible and consistent with itself: that of Strabo we cannot settle, when he speaks of many different invasions. Nor does his language give us the smallest reason to suppose that he was in possession of any means of determining dates for these early times,—nothing at all calculated to justify the positive chronology which Mr. Clinton deduces from him: compare his Fasti Hellenici, B. C. 635, 629, 617. Strabo says, after affirming that Homer knew both the name and the reality of the Cimmerians (i, p. 6; iii, p. 149),—καὶ γὰρ καθ᾽ Ὅμηρον, ἢ πρὸ αὐτοῦ μικρὸν, λέγουσι τὴν τῶν Κιμμερίων ἔφοδον γενέσθαι τὴν μέχρι τῆς Αἰολίδος καὶ τῆς Ἰωνίας,—"which places the first appearance of the Cimmerians in Asia Minor a century *at least* before the Olympiad of Corœbus," (says Mr. Clinton.) But what means could Strabo have had to chronologize events as happening *at or a little before* the time of Homer? No date in the Grecian world was so contested, or so indeterminable, as the time of Homer: nor will it do to reason, as Mr. Clinton does, *i. e.* to take the latest date fixed for Homer among many, and then to say that the invasion of the Cimmerians *must* be *at least* B. C. 876: thus assuming it as a certainty that, whether the date of Homer be a century earlier or later, the invasion of the Cimmerians must be made to fit it. When Strabo employs such untrustworthy chronological standards, he only shows us—what everything else confirms—that there existed no tests of any value for events of that early date in the Grecian world.

Mr. Clinton announces this ante-Homeric calculation as a chronological certainty: "The Cimmerians first appeared in Asia Minor about a century before B. C. 776. An irruption is *recorded* in B. C. 782. Their last inroad was in B. C. 635. The settlement of Ambrôn (the Milesian, at Sinôpê) may be placed at about B. C. 782, twenty-six years before the era assigned to (the Milesian or Sinôpic settlement of) Trapezus."

On what authority does Mr. Clinton assert that a Cimmerian irruption was *recorded* in B. C. 782? Simply on the following passage of Orosius, which he cites at B. C. 635: "Anno ante urbem conditam tricesimo,—Tunc

etiam *Amazonum gentis et Cimmeriorum* in Asiam repentinus incursus plurimum diu lateque vastationem et stragem intulit." If this authority of Orosius is to be trusted, we ought to say that the invasion of the Amazons was a *recorded* fact. To treat a fact mentioned in Orosius, an author of the fourth century after Christ, and referred to B. C. 782, as a *recorded* fact, confounds the most important boundary-lines in regard to the appreciation of historical evidence.

In fixing the Cimmerian invasion of Asia at 782 B. C., Mr. Clinton has the statement of Orosius, whatever it may be worth, to rest upon; but in fixing the settlement of Ambrôn the Milesian (at Sinôpê) at 782 B. C., I know not that he had any authority at all. Eusebius does, indeed, place the foundation of Trapezus in 756 B. C., and Trapezus is said to have been a colony from Sinôpê; and Mr. Clinton, therefore, is anxious to find some date for the foundation of Sinôpê anterior to 756 B. C.; but there is nothing to warrant him in selecting 782 B. C., rather than any other year.

In my judgment, the establishment of *any* Milesian colony in the Euxine at so early a date as 756 B. C. is highly improbable: and when we find that the same Eusebius fixes the foundation of Sinôpê (the metropolis of Trapezus) as low down as 629 B. C., this is an argument with me for believing that the date which he assigns to Trapezus is by far too early. Mr. Clinton treats the date which Eusebius assigns to Trapezus as certain, and infers from it, that the date which the same author assigns to *Sinôpê* is one hundred and thirty years *later* than the reality: I reverse the inference, considering the date which he assigns to *Sinôpê* as the more trustworthy of the two, and deducing the conclusion, that the date which he gives for *Trapezus* is one hundred and thirty years at least *earlier* than the reality.

On all grounds, the authority of the chronologists is greater with regard to the later of the two periods than to the earlier, and there is, besides, the additional probability arising out of what is a suitable date for Milesian settlement. To which I will add, that Herodotus places the settlement of the Cimmerians near "that spot where Sinôpê is *now* settled," in the reign of Ardys, soon after 635 B. C. Sinôpê was, therefore, *not* founded at the time when the Cimmerians went there, in the belief of Herodotus.

[480] Strabo i, p. 61; Kallimachus, Hymn. ad Dianam, 251-260—

> … ἠλαίνων ἀλαπάζεμεν ἠπείλησε (Ἔφεσον)
> Λύγδαμις ὑβριστὴς, ἐπὶ δὲ στρατὸν ἱππημόλγων
> Ἦγαγε Κιμμερίων, ψαμάθῳ ἴσον, οἳ ῥα παρ᾽ αὐτὸν
> Κεκλίμενοι ναίουσι βοὸς πόρον Ἰναχιώνης.
> Ἂ δειλὸς βασιλέων ὅσον ἤλιτεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔμελλε
> Οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς Σκυθίηνδε παλίμπετες, οὔτε τις ἄλλος
> Ὅσσων ἐν λειμῶνι Καϋστρίῳ ἦσαν ἅμαξαι,
> Ἆψ ἀπονοστήσειν….

In the explanation of the proverb Σκυθῶν ἐρημία, allusion is made to a sudden panic and flight of *Scythians* from Ephesus (Hesychius, v. Σκυθῶν ἐρημία),—probably this must refer to some story of interference on the part of Artemis to protect the town against these Cimmerians. The confusion between Cimmerians and Scythians is very frequent.

[481] Herodot. i, 28; Mela, i, 19, 9; Skymn. Chi. Fragm. 207.

[482] The ten thousand Greeks in their homeward march passed through a people called Chalybes between Armenia and the town of Trapezus, and also again after eight days' march westerly from Trapezus, between the Tibarêni and Mosynœki: compare Xenophon, Anabas. iv, 7, 15; v, 5, 1; probably different sections of the same people. The last-mentioned Chalybes seem to have been the best known, from their iron works, and their greater vicinity to the Greek ports: Ephorus recognized them (see Ephori Fragm. 80-82, ed. Marx); whether he knew of the more easterly Chalybes, north of Armenia, is less certain: so also Dionysius Periêgêtês, v, 768: compare Eustathius, *ad loc.*

The idea which prevailed among ancient writers, of a connection between the Chalybes in these regions and the Scythians or Cimmerians (Χάλυβος Σκυθῶν ἄποικος, Æschyl. Sept. ad Thebas, 729; and Hesiod. ap. Clemen. Alex. Str. i, p. 132), and of which the supposed residence of the Amazons on the river Thermôdôn seems to be one of the manifestations, is discussed in Hoeckh, Kreta, book i, pp. 294-305; and Mannert, Geographie der Griechen und Römer, vi, 2, pp. 408-416: compare Stephan. Byz. v. Χάλυβες. Mannert believes in an early Scythian emigration into these regions. The ten thousand Greeks passed through the territory of a people called Skythini, immediately bordering on the Chalybes to the north; which region some identify with the Sakasênê of Strabo (xi, 511) occupied, according to that geographer, by invaders from Eastern Scythia.

It seems that Sinôpê was one of the most considerable places for the export of the iron used in Greece: the Sinopic as well as the Chalybdic (or Chalybic) iron had a special reputation (Stephan. Byz. v. Λακεδαίμων).

About the Chalybes, compare Ukert, Skythien, pp. 521-523.

[483] Herodot. i, 15-16.

[484] Strabo, xi, p. 511; xii, p. 552; xiii, p. 627.

The poet Kallinus mentioned both Cimmerians and Trêres (Fr. 2, 3, ed. Bergk; Strabo. xiv, pp. 633-647).

[485] Herodot. i, 105. The account given by Herodotus of the punishment inflicted by the offended Aphroditê on the Scythian plunderers, and on their children's children down to his time, becomes especially interesting when we combine it with the statement of Hippokratês respecting the peculiar incapacities which were so apt to affect the Scythians, and the religious interpretation put upon them by the sufferers (De Aëre, Locis, et Aquis, c. vi, s. 106-109).

[486] See, in reference to the direction of this ditch, Völcker, in the work above referred to on the Scythia of Herodotus (Mythische Geographie, ch. vii, p. 177).

That the ditch existed, there can be no reasonable doubt; though the tale given by Herodotus is highly improbable.

[487] Herodot. i. 106. Mr. Clinton fixes the date of the capture of Nineveh at 606 B. C. (F. H. vol. i. p. 269), upon grounds which do not appear to me conclusive: the utmost which can be made out is, that it was taken during the last ten years of the reign of Kyaxarês.

[488] From whom Polyænus borrowed his statement, that Alyattês employed with effect savage dogs against the Cimmerians, I do not know (Polyæn. vii, 2, 1).

[489] Herodot. i, 20-23.

[490] Herodot. i, 18. Polyænus (vii, 2, 2) mentions a proceeding of Alyattês against the Kolophonians.

[491] Nikolaus Damasken. p. 54, ed. Orelli; Xanthi Fragment. p. 243, Creuzer.

Mr Clinton states Alyattês to have *conquered* Karia, and also Æolis, for neither of which do I find sufficient authority (Fasti Hellen. ch. xvii, p. 298).

[492] Aristoteles ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Ἀδραμυττεῖον.

[493] Herodot. i, 92-93.

[494] Herodot. i, 92.

[495] Herodot. v, 28. κατὑπερθε δὲ τουτέων, ἐπὶ δύο γενέας ἀνδρῶν νοσήσασα τὰ μάλιστα στάσει.

Alyattês reigned fifty-seven years, and the vigorous resistance which the Milesians offered to him took place in the first six years of his reign. The "two generations of intestine dissension" may well have succeeded after the reign of Thrasybulus. This, indeed, is a mere conjecture, yet it may be observed that Herodotus, speaking of the time of the Ionic revolt (500 B. C.), and intimating that Milêtus, though then peaceable, had been for two generations at an earlier period torn by intestine dissension, could hardly have meant these "two generations" to apply to a time earlier than 617 B. C.

[496] Herodot. i, 17; v, 99; Athenæ. vi, p. 267. Compare K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Griech. Staats Alterthümer, sect. 77, note 28.

[497] See the remarkable case of Milêtus sending no deputies to a Pan-Ionic meeting, being safe herself from danger (Herodot. i, 141).

[498] Herodot. i, 141-170. χρηστὴ δὲ καὶ πρὶν ἢ διαφθαρῆναι Ἰωνίην, Θάλεω ἀνδρὸς Μιλησίου γνώμη ἐγένετο, etc.

About the Pan-Ionia and the Ephesia, see Thucyd. iii, 104; Dionys. Halik. iv, 25; Herodot. i, 143-148. Compare also Whitte, De Rebus Chiorum Publicis, sect. vii, pp. 22-26.

[499] If we may believe the narrative of Nikolaus Damaskenus, Crœsus had been in relations with Ephesus and with the Ephesians during the time when he was hereditary prince, and in the lifetime of Alyattês. He had borrowed a large sum of money from a rich Ephesian named Pamphaês, which was essential to enable him to perform a military duty imposed upon him by his father. The story is given in some detail by Nikolaus, Fragm. p. 54, ed. Orell.,—I know not upon what authority.

[500] Herodot. i, 26; Ælian, V. H. iii, 26; Polyæn. vi, 50. The story contained in Ælian and Polyænus seems to come from Batôn of Sinôpê; see Guhl, Ephesiaca. ii, 3, p. 26, and iv, 5, p. 150.

The article in Suidas, v. Ἀρίσταρχος, is far too vague to be interwoven as a positive fact into Ephesian history, as Guhl interweaves it, immediately consequent on the retirement of Pindarus.

In reference to the rope reaching from the city to the Artemision, we may quote an analogous case of the Kylonian suppliants at Athens, who sought to maintain their contact with the altar by means of a continuous cord,—unfortunately, the cord broke (Plutarch, Solon, c. 12).

[501] Herodot. i, 141. Ἴωνες δὲ, ὡς ἤκουσαν—τείχεά τε περιεβάλλοντο ἕκαστοι, etc.: compare also the statement respecting Phôkæa, c. 168.

[502] See the discussion in Dr. Prichard, Natural History of Man, sect. xvii, p. 152.

Μελαγχρόες καὶ οὐλότριχες (Herodot. ii, 104: compare Ammian. Marcell. xxii, 16, "subfusculi, atrati," etc.) are certain attributes of the ancient Egyptians, depending upon the evidence of an eye-witness.

"In their complexion, and in many of their physical peculiarities (observes Dr. Prichard, p. 138), the Egyptians were an African race. In the eastern, and even in the central parts of Africa, we shall trace the existence of various tribes in physical characters nearly resembling the Egyptians; and it would not be difficult to observe among many nations of that continent a gradual deviation from the physical type of the Egyptian to the strongly-marked character of the negro, and that without any very decided break or interruption. The Egyptian language, also, in the great leading principles of its grammatical construction, bears much greater analogy to the idioms of Africa than to those prevalent among the people of other regions."

[503] Homer, Iliad, vi, 290: xxiii, 740; Odyss. xv, 116:—

… πέπλοι παμποίκιλοι, ἔργα γυναικῶν

Σιδονίων.

Tyre is not named either in the Iliad or Odyssey, though a passage in Probus (ad Virg. Georg. ii, 115) seems to show that it was mentioned in one of the epics which passed under the name of Homer: "Tyrum Sarram appellatam esse, Homerus docet: quem etiam Ennius sequitur cum dicit, Pœnos Sarrâ oriundos."

The Hesiodic catalogue seems to have noticed both Byblus and Sidon: see Hesiodi Fragment. xxx, ed. Marktscheffel, and Etymolog. Magnum, v. Βύβλος.

[504] The name Adramyttion or Atramyttion—very like the Africo-Phenician name *Adrumêtum*—is said to be of Phenician origin (Olshausen, De Origine Alphabeti, p. 7, in Kieler Philologische Studien, 1841). There were valuable mines afterwards worked for the account of Crœsus near Pergamus, and these mines may have tempted Phenician settlers to those regions (Aristotel. Mirab. Auscult. c. 52).

The African Inscriptions, in the Monumenta Phœnic. of Gesenius, recognize Makar as a cognomen of Baal: and Movers imagines that the hero Makar, who figures conspicuously in the mythology of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Kôs, Rhodes, etc., is traceable to this Phenician god and Phenician early settlements in those islands (Movers, Die Religion der Phönizier, p. 420).

[505] Strabo, xiv, pp. 754-758; Skylax, Peripl. c. 104; Justin, xviii, 3; Arrian, Exp. Al. ii, 16-19; Xenophon, Anab. i, 4, 6.

Unfortunately, the text of Skylax is here extremely defective, and Strabo's account is in many points perplexed, from his not having travelled in person through Phenicia, Cœle-Syria, or Judæa: see Groskurd's note on p. 755 and the Einleitung to his Translation of Strabo, sect. 6.

Respecting the original relation between Palæ-Tyrus and Tyre, there is some difficulty in reconciling all the information, little as it is, which we possess. The name Palæ-Tyrus (it has been assumed as a matter of course: compare Justin, xi, 10) marks that town as the original foundation from which the Tyrians subsequently moved into the island: there was, also, on the main land a place named Palæ-Byblos (Plin. H. N. v, 20; Ptolem. v, 15) which was in like manner construed as the original seat from whence the town properly called Byblus was derived. Yet the account of Herodotus plainly represents the insular Tyrus, with its temple of Hêraklês, as the original foundation (ii, 44), and the Tyrians are described as living in an island even in the time of their king Hiram, the contemporary of Solomon (Joseph. Ant. Jud. viii, 2, 7). Arrian treats the temple of Hêraklês in the island-Tyre as the most ancient temple within the memory of man (Exp. Al. ii, 16). The Tyrians also lived on their island during the invasion of Salmaneser king of Nineveh, and their position enabled them to hold out against him, while Palæ-Tyrus on the terra firma was obliged to yield itself (Joseph. *ib.* ix, 14, 2). The town taken (or reduced to capitulate), after a long siege, by Nebuchadnezzar, was the insular Tyrus, not the continental or Palæ-Tyrus, which had surrendered without resistance to Salmaneser. It is not correct, therefore, to say—with Volney (Recherches sur l'Hist. Anc. ch. xiv, p. 249), Heeren (Ideen über den Verkehr der Alten Welt, part i, abth. 2, p. 11), and others—that the insular Tyre was called new Tyre, and that the site of Tyre was changed from continental to insular, in consequence of the taking of the continental Tyre by Nebuchadnezzar: the site remained unaltered, and the insular Tyrians became subject to him and his successors until the destruction of the Chaldæan monarchy by Cyrus. Hengstenberg's Dissertation, De Rebus Tyriorum (Berlin, 1832), is instructive on many of these points: he shows sufficiently that Tyre was, from the earliest times traceable, an insular city; but he wishes at the same time to show, that it was also, from the beginning, joined on to the main land by an isthmus (pp. 10-25),—which is both inconsistent with the former position and unsupported by any solid proofs. It remained an island strictly so called, until the siege by Alexander: the mole, by which that conqueror had stormed it, continued after his day, perhaps enlarged, so as to form a permanent connection from that time forward between the island and the main land (Plin. H. N. v, 19; Strabo, xvi, p. 757), and to render the insular Tyrus capable of being included by Pliny in one computation of circumference jointly with Palæ-Tyrus, the main-land town.

It may be doubted whether we know the true meaning of the word which the Greeks called Παλαι-Τύρος. It is plain that the Tyrians themselves did not call it by that name: perhaps the Phenician name which this continental adjacent town bore, may have been something resembling Palæ-Tyrus in sound, but not coincident in meaning.

The strength of Tyre lay in its insular situation; for the adjacent main-land, whereon Palæ-Tyrus was placed, was a fertile plain, thus described by William of Tyre during the time of the Crusaders:—

"Erat prædicta civitas non solum munitissima, sed etiam fertilitate præcipuâ et amœnitate quasi singularis: nam licet in medio mari sita est, et in modum insulæ tota fluctibus cincta; habet tamen pro foribus latifundium per omnia commendabile, et planitiem sibi continuam divitis glebæ et opimi soli, multas civibus ministrans commoditates. Quæ licet modica videatur respectu aliarum regionum, exiguitatem suam multâ redimit ubertate, et infinita jugera multiplici fœcunditate compensat. Nec tamen tantis arctatur angustiis. Protenditur enim in Austrum versus Ptolemaidem usque ad eum locum, qui hodie vulgo dicitur districtum Scandarionis, milliaribus quatuor aut quinque: e regione in Septentrionem versus Sareptam et Sidonem iterum porrigitur totidem milliaribus. In latitudinem vero ubi minimum ad duo, ubi plurimum ad tria, habens milliaria." (Apud Hengstenberg, *ut sup.* p. 5.) Compare Maundrell, Journey from Aleppo to Jerusalem, p. 50, ed. 1749; and Volney, Travels in Egypt and Syria, vol. ii, pp. 210-226.

[506] Justin (xviii, 3) states that Sidon was the metropolis of Tyre, but the series of events which he recounts is confused and unintelligible. Strabo also, in one place, calls Sidon the μητρόπολις τῶν Φοινίκων (i, p. 40); in another place he states it as a point disputed between the two cities, which of them was the μητρόπολις τῶν Φοινίκων (xvi, p. 756).

Quintus Curtius affirms both Tyre and Sidon to have been founded by Agênôr (iv, 4, 15).

[507] See the interesting citations of Josephus from Dius and Menander, who had access to the Tyrian ἀναγραφαὶ, or chronicles (Josephus cont. Apion. i, c. 17, 18, 21; Antiq. J. x, 11, 1).

[508] Joseph. Antiq. J. ix, 14, 2.

[509] Diodor. xvi, 41; Skylax, c. 104.

[510] Strabo, xvi, p. 756.

[511] A Maltese inscription identifies the Tyrian Melkarth with Ἡρακλῆς (Gesenius, Monument. Phœnic. tab. vi).

[512] Herodot. ii, 44; Sallust, Bell. Jug. c. 18; Pausan. x, 12, 2; Arrian, Exp. Al. ii, 16; Justin, xliv, 5; Appian, vi, 2.

[513] Herodot. i, 2; Ephorus, Fragm. 40, ed. Marx; Strabo, xvi, pp. 766-784; Justin, xviii, 3. In the animated discussion carried on among the Homeric critics and the great geographers of antiquity, to ascertain where it was that Menelaus actually went during his eight years' wandering (Odyss. iv, 85)—

> … ἦ γὰρ πολλὰ παθὼν καὶ πόλλ᾽ ἐπαληθεὶς
> Ἠγαγόμην ἐν νηυσὶ, καὶ ὀγδοάτῳ ἔτει ἦλθον,
> Κύπρον, Φοινίκην τε, καὶ Αἰγυπτίους ἐπαληθεὶς,
> Αἰθίοπάς θ᾽ ἱκόμην, καὶ Σιδονίους, καὶ Ἐρεμβοὺς,
> καὶ Λιβύην, etc.

one idea started was, that he had visited these Sidonians in the Persian gulf, or in the Erythræan sea (Strabo, i, p. 42). The various opinions which Strabo quotes, including those of Eratosthenês and Kratês, as well as his own comments, are very curious. Kratês supposed that Menelaus had passed the straits of Gibraltar and circumnavigated Libya to Æthiopia and India, which voyage would suffice, he thought, to fill up the eight years. Others supposed that Menelaus had sailed first up the Nile, and then into the Red sea, by means of the canal (διωρὺξ) which existed in the time of the Alexandrine critics between the Nile and that sea; to which Strabo replies that this canal was not made until after the Trojan war. Eratosthenês started a still more remarkable idea: he thought that in the time of Homer the strait of Gibraltar had not yet been burst open, so that the Mediterranean was on that side a closed sea; but, on the other hand, its level was then so much higher that it covered the isthmus of Suez, and joined the Red sea. It was, he thought, the disruption of the strait of Gibraltar which first lowered the level of the water, and left the isthmus of Suez dry; though Menelaus, in *his* time, had sailed from the Mediterranean into the Red sea without difficulty. This opinion Eratosthenês had imbibed from Stratôn of Lampsakus, the successor of Theophrastus: Hipparchus controverted it, together with many other of the opinions of Eratosthenês (see Strabo, i, pp. 38, 49, 56; Seidel, Fragmenta Eratosthenis, p. 39).

In reference to the view of Kratês,—that Menelaus had sailed round Africa,—it is to be remarked that all the geographers of that day formed to themselves a very insufficient idea of the extent of that continent, believing that it did not even reach so far southward as the equator.

Strabo himself adopts neither of these three opinions, but construes the Homeric words describing the wanderings of Menelaus as applying only to the coasts of Egypt, Libya, Phenicia, etc; he suggests various reasons, more curious than convincing, to prove that Menelaus may easily have spent eight years in these visits of mixed friendship and piracy.

[514] See Ritter, Erdkunde von Asien, West-Asien, Buch iii, Abtheilung iii, Abschnitt i, s. 29, p. 50.

[515] Strabo speaks of the earliest settlements of the Phenicians in Africa and Iberia as μικρὸν τῶν Τρωϊκῶν ὕστερον (i, p. 48). Utica is affirmed to have been two hundred and eighty-seven years earlier than Carthage (Aristot. Mirab. Auscult. c. 134): compare Velleius Paterc. i, 2.

Archaleus, son of Phœnix, was stated as the founder of Gadês in the Phenician history of Claudius Julius, now lost (Etymolog. Magn. v. Γαδεῖρα). Archaleus is a version of the name Hercules, in the opinion of Movers.

[516] Skylax, Periplus, c. 110. "Carteia, ut quidam putant, aliquando Tartessus; et quam transvecti ex Africâ Phœnices habitant, atque unde nos sumus, Tingentera." (Mela, ii, 6, 75.) The expression, *transvecti ex Africâ* applies as much to the Phenicians as to the Carthaginians: "*uterque Pœnus*" (Horat. Od. ii, 11) means the Carthaginians, and the Phenicians of Gadês.

[517] Strabo, xvii, p. 836.

[518] Cape Soloeis, considered by Herodotus as the westernmost headland of Libya, coincides in name with the Phenician town Soloeis in western Sicily, also, seemingly, with the Phenician settlement *Suel* (Mela, ii, 6, 65) in southern Iberia or Tartêssus. Cape Hermæa was the name of the north-eastern headland of the gulf of Tunis, and also the name of a cape in Libya, two days' sail westward of the Pillars of Hêraklês (Skylax, c. 111).

Probably, all the remarkable headlands in these seas received their names from the Phenicians. Both Mannert (Geogr. d. Gr. und Röm. x, 2, p. 495) and Forbiger (Alte Geogr. sect. 111, p. 867) identify cape Soloeis with what is now called cape Cantin; Heeren considers it to be the same as cape Blanco; Bougainville as cape Boyador.

[519] Sallust, Bell. Jug. c. 78. It was termed Leptis Magna, to distinguish it from another Leptis, more to the westward and nearer to Carthage, called Leptis Parva; but this latter seems to have been generally known by the name Leptis (Forbiger, Alte Geogr. sect. 109, p. 844). In Leptis Magna, the proportion of Phenician colonists was so inconsiderable that the Phenician language had been lost, and that of the natives, whom Sallust calls Numidians, spoken: but these people had embraced Sidonian institutions and civilization. (Sall. *ib.*)

[520] Strabo, xvii, pp. 825-826. He found it stated by some authors that there had once been three hundred trading establishments along this coast, reaching thirty days' voyage southward from Tingis or Lixus (Tangier); but that they had been chiefly ruined by the tribes of the interior,—the Pharusians and Nigritæ. He suspects the statement of being exaggerated, but there seems nothing at all incredible in it. From Strabo's language we gather that Eratosthenês set forth the statement as in his judgment a true one.

[521] Compare Skylax, c. 111, and the Periplus of Hanno, ap. Hudson, Geogr. Græc. Min. vol. i, pp. 1-6. I have already observed that the τάριχος (salt provisions) from Gadeira was currently sold in the markets of Athens, from the Peloponnesian war downward.—Eupolis, Fragm. 23; Μαρικᾶς, p. 506, ed. Meineke, Comic. Græc.

Πότερ᾽ ἦν τὸ τάριχος; Φρύγιον ἢ Γαδειρικόν;

Compare the citations from the other comic writers, Antiphanês and Nikostratus ap. Athenæ. iii, p. 118. The Phenician merchants bought in exchange Attic pottery for their African trade.

[522] About the productiveness of the Spanish mines, Polybius (xxxiv, 9, 8) ap. Strabo, iii, p. 147; Aristot. Mirab. Ausc. c. 135.

[523] Strabo, iii, pp. 156, 158, 161; Polybius, iii, 10, 3-10.

[524] Polyb. i, 10; ii, 1.

[525] Strabo, iii, pp. 141-150. Οὗτοι γὰρ Φοίνιξιν οὕτως ἐγένοντο ὑποχείριοι, ὥστε τὰς πλείους τῶν ἐν τῇ Τουρδιτανίᾳ πολέων καὶ τῶν πλήσιον τόπων ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων νῦν οἰκεῖσθαι.

[526] Thucyd. vi, 3; Diodor. v, 12.

[527] See the reference in Joseph. Antiq. Jud. viii, 5, 3, and Joseph. cont. Apion. i, 18; an allusion is to be found in Virgil, Æneid, i, 642, in the mouth of Dido.—

"Genitor tum Belus opimam

Vastabat Cyprum, et late ditione tenebat." (t. v.)

[528] Respecting the worship at Salamis (in Cyprus) and Paphos, see Lactant. i, 21; Strabo, xiv, p. 683.

[529] Tarsus is mentioned by Dio Chrysostom as a colony from the Phenician Aradus (Orat. Tarsens. ii, p. 20, ed. Reisk.), and Herodotus makes Kilix brother of Phœnix and son of Agênôr (vii, 92).

Phenician coins of the city of Tarsus are found, of a date towards the end of the Persian empire: see Movers, Die Phönizier, i, p. 13.

[530] Herodot. i, 170.

[531] Herodot. iv, 151.

[532] Herodot. iv, 152. Θείῃ πομπῇ χρεώμενος.

[533] Herodot. iv, 152. Τὸ δὲ ἐμπόριον τοῦτο (Tartêssus) ἦν ἀκήρατον τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον· ὥστε ἀπονοστήσαντες οὗτοι ὀπίσω μέγιστα δὴ Ἑλλήνων πάντων, τῶν ἡμεῖς ἀτρεκέως ἴδμεν, ἐκ φορτίων ἐκέρδησαν, μετά γε Σώστρατον τὸν Λαοδάμαντος, Αἰγινήτην· τούτῳ γὰρ οὐκ οἷά τε ἐρίσαι ἄλλον.

Allusions to the prodigious wealth of Tartêssus in Anakreon, Fragm. 8, ed. Bergk; Stephan. Byz. Ταρτησσός; Eustath. ad Dionys. Periêgêt. 332, Ταρτησσὸς, ἣν καὶ ὁ Ἀνακρέων φησὶ πανευδαίμονα; Himerius ap. Photium, Cod. 243, p. 599,—Ταρτεσσοῦ βίον, Ἀμαλθείας κέρας, πᾶν ὅσον εὐδαιμονίας κεφαλαῖον.

[534] These talents cannot have been Attic talents; for the Attic talent first arose from the debasement of the Athenian money-standard by Solon, which did not occur until a generation after the voyage of Kôlæus. They may have been either Euboic or Æginæan talents; probably the former, seeing that the case belongs to the island of Samos. Sixty Euboic talents would be about equivalent to the sum stated in the text. For the proportion of the various Greek monetary scales, see above, vol. ii, part 2, ch. iv, p. 425 and ch. xii, p. 171 in the present volume.

[535] Strabo, xvii, p. 802; Aristot. Mirab. Ausc. c. 84-132.

[536] Herodot. i, 163. Οἱ δὲ Φωκαιέες οὗτοι ναυτιλίῃσι μακρῇσι πρῶτοι Ἑλλήνων ἐχρήσαντο, καὶ τὸν Ἀδρίην καὶ τὴν Τυρσηνίην καὶ τὴν Ἰβηρίην καὶ τὸν Ταρτησσὸν οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ καταδείξαντες· ἐναυτίλλοντο δὲ οὐ στρογγύλῃσι νηυσὶν, ἀλλὰ πεντηκοντέροισιν,—the expressions are remarkable.

[537] Herodot. i, 164-165, gives an example of the jealousy of the Chians in respect to the islands called Œnussæ.

[538] Ephorus, Fragm. 52, ed. Marx; Strabo, vi, p. 267.

[539] Herodot. i, 165.

[540] Ἡ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς θάλασσα (Strabo); τῆσδε τῆς θαλάττης (Herod. iv, 41).

[541] The geographer Ptolemy, with genuine scientific zeal, complains bitterly of the reserve and frauds common with the old traders, respecting the countries which they visited (Ptolem. Geogr. i, 11).

[542] Strabo, iii, pp. 175-176; xvii, p. 802.

[543] Herodot. iv, 42. Καὶ ἔλεγον, ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ πιστὰ, ἄλλῳ δὲ δή τεῳ, ὡς περιπλώοντες τὴν Λιβύην, τὸν ἠέλιον ἔσχον ἐς τὰ δεξιά.

[544] Herodot. Οὕτω μὲν αὐτὴ ἐγνώσθη τοπρῶτον· (*i. e.* ἡ Λιβύη ἐγνώσθη ἐοῦσα περίῤῥυτος·) μετὰ δὲ, Καρχηδόνιοί εἰσιν οἱ λέγοντες. These Carthaginians, to whom Herodotus here alludes, told him that Libya was circumnavigable; but it does not seem that they knew of any other actual circumnavigation except that of the Phenicians sent by Nekôs; otherwise, Herodotus would have made some allusion to it, instead of proceeding, as he does immediately, to tell the story of the Persian Sataspês, who tried and failed.

The testimony of the Carthaginians is so far valuable, as it declares their persuasion of the truth of the statement made by those Phenicians.

Some critics have construed the words, in which Herodotus alludes to the Carthaginians as his informants, as if what they told him was the story of the fruitless attempt made by Sataspês. But this is evidently not the meaning of the historian: he brings forward the opinion of the Carthaginians as confirmatory of the statement made by the Phenicians employed by Nekôs.

[545] Diodorus (iii, 40) talks correct language about the direction of the shadows southward of the tropic of Cancer (compare Pliny, H. N. vi, 29),—one mark of the extension of geographical and astronomical observations during the four intervening centuries between him and Herodotus.

[546] Skylax, after following the line of coast from the Mediterranean outside of the strait of Gibraltar, and then south-westward along Africa as far as the island of Kernê, goes on to say, that "beyond Kernê the sea is no longer navigable from shallows, and mud, and sea-weed:" Τῆς δὲ Κέρνης νήσου τὰ ἐπέκεινα οὐκέτι ἐστὶ πλωτὰ διὰ βραχύτητα θαλάττης καὶ πηλὸν καὶ φῦκος. Ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ φῦκος τῆς δοχμῆς τὸ πλάτος καὶ ἄνωθεν ὀξὺ, ὥστε κεντεῖν (Skylax, c. 109). Nearchus, on undertaking his voyage down the Indus, and from thence into the Persian gulf, is not certain whether the external sea will be found navigable—εἰ δὴ πλωτός γέ ἐστιν ὁ ταύτῃ πόντος (Nearchi Periplus, p. 2: compare p. 40, ap. Geogr. Minor. vol. i, ed. Hudson). Pytheas described the neighborhood of Thulê as a sort of chaos—a medley of earth, sea, and air, in which you could neither walk nor sail: οὔτε γῇ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ὕπηρχεν ἔτι οὔτε θάλασσα οὔτε ἀὴρ, ἀλλὰ σύγκριμά τι ἐκ τούτων πλεύμονι θαλασσίῳ ἐοικὸς, ἐν ᾧ φησὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν αἰωρεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ σύμπαντα, καὶ τοῦτον ὡς ἂν δεσμὸν εἶναι τῶν ὅλων, μήτε πορευτὸν μήτε πλωτὸν ὑπάρχοντα· τὸ μὲν οὖν τῷ πλεύμονι ἐοικὸς αὐτὸς (Pytheas) ἑωρακέναι, τἄλλα δὲ λέγειν ἐξ ἀκοῆς. (Strabo, ii, p. 104). Again, the priests of Memphis told Herodotus that their conquering hero Sesostris had equipped a fleet in the Arabian gulf, and made a voyage into the Erythræan sea, subjugating people everywhere, "until he came to a sea no longer navigable from shallows,"—οὐκέτι πλωτὴν ὑπὸ βραχέων (Herod. ii, 109). Plato represents the sea without the Pillars of Hêraklês as impenetrable and unfit for navigation, in consequence of the large admixture of earth, mud, or vegetable covering, which had arisen in it from the disruption of the great island or continent Atlantis (Timæus, p. 25; and Kritias, p. 108); which passages are well illustrated by the Scholiast, who seems to have read geographical descriptions of the character of this outer sea: τοῦτο καὶ οἱ τοὺς ἐκείνῃ τόπους ἱστοροῦντες λέγουσιν, ὡς πάντα τεναγώδη τὸν ἐκεῖ εἶναι χῶρον· τέναγος δὲ ἐστὶν ἰλύς τις, ἐπιπολάζοντος ὕδατος οὐ πολλοῦ, καὶ βοτάνης ἐπιφαινομένης τούτῳ. See also Plutarch's fancy of the dense, earthy, and viscous Kronian sea (some days to the westward of Britain), in which a ship could with difficulty advance, and only by means of severe pulling with the oars (Plutarch, De Facie in Orbe Lunæ, c. 26, p. 941). So again in the two geographical productions in verse by Rufus Festus Avienus (Hudson, Geogr. Minor. vol. iv, Descriptio Orbis Terræ, v, 57, and Ora Maritima, v, 406-415): in the first of these two, the density of the water of the western ocean is ascribed to its being saturated with salt,—in the second, we have shallows, large quantities of sea-weed, and wild beasts swimming about, which the Carthaginian Himilco affirmed himself to have seen:—

"Plerumque porro tenue tenditur salum,
Ut vix arenas subjacentes occulat;
Exsuperat autem gurgitem fucus frequens
Atque impeditur æstus ex uligine:
Vis vel ferarum pelagus omne internatat,
Mutusque terror ex feris habitat freta.
Hæc olim Himilco Pœnus Oceano super
Spectasse semet et probasse rettulit:
Hæc nos, ab imis Punicorum annalibus
Prolata longo tempore, edidimus tibi."

Compare also v, 115-130 of the same poem, where the author again quotes from a voyage of Himilco, who had been four months in the ocean outside of the Pillars of Hercules:—

"Sic nulla late flabra propellunt ratem,
Sic segnis humor æquoris pigri stupet.
Adjicit et illud, plurimum inter gurgites
Extare fucum, et sæpe virgulti vice
Retinere puppim," etc.

The dead calm, mud, and shallows of the external ocean are touched upon by Aristot. Meteorolog. ii, 1, 14, and seem to have been a favorite subject of declamation with the rhetors of the Augustan age. See Seneca, Suasoriar. i, 1.

Even the companions and contemporaries of Columbus, when navigation had made such comparative progress, still retained much of these fears respecting the dangers and difficulties of the unknown ocean: "Le tableau exagéré (observes A. von Humboldt, Examen Critique de l'Histoire de la Géographie, t. iii, p. 95) que la ruse des Phéniciens avait tracé des difficultés qu'opposaient à la navigation au delà des Colonnes d'Hercule, de Cerné, et de l'Ile Sacrée (Ierné), le fucus, le limon, le manque de fond, et le calme perpétuel de la mer, ressemble d'une manière frappante aux récits animés des premiers compagnons de Colomb."

Columbus was the first man who traversed the sea of Sargasso, or area of the Atlantic ocean south of the Azores, where it is covered by an immense mass of sea-weed for a space six or seven times as large as France: the alarm of his crew at this unexpected spectacle was considerable. The sea-weed is sometimes so thickly accumulated, that it requires a considerable wind to impel the vessel through it. The remarks and comparisons of M. von Humboldt, in reference to ancient and modern navigation, are highly interesting. (Examen, *ut sup.* pp. 69, 88, 91, etc.)

J. M. Gesner (Dissertat. de Navigationibus extra Columnas Herculis, sects. 6 and 7) has a good defence of the story told by Herodotus. Major Rennell also adopts the same view, and shows by many arguments how much easier the circumnavigation was from the East than from the West (Geograph. System of Herodotus, p. 680); compare Ukert, Geograph. der Griechen und Römer. vol. i, p. 61; Mannert, Geog. d. G. und Römer, vol. i, pp. 19-26. Gossellin (Recherches sur la Géogr. des Anc. i, p. 149) and Mannert both reject the story as not worthy of belief: Heeren defends it (Ideen über den Verkehr der Alten Welt, i, 2, pp. 86-95).

Agatharchides, in the second century B. C., pronounces the eastern coast of Africa, southward of the Red sea, to be as yet unexamined: he treats it as a matter of certainty, however, that the sea to the south-westward is continuous with the Western ocean (De Rubro Mari, Geog. Minores, ed. Huds. v, i, p. 11).

[547] Strabo, iii, p. 170. Sataspês (the unsuccessful Persian circumnavigator of Libya, mentioned just above) had violated the daughter of another Persian nobleman, Zopyrus son of Megabyzus, and Xerxês had given orders that he should be crucified for this act; his mother begged him off by suggesting that he should be condemned to something "*worse than death*"—the circumnavigation of Libya (Herod. iv, 43). Two things are to be remarked in respect to his voyage: 1. He took with him a ship and seamen from Egypt; we are not told that they were Phenician: probably no other mariners than Phenicians were competent to such a voyage,—and even if the crew of Sataspês had been Phenicians, he could not offer rewards for success equal to those at the disposal of Nekôs. 2. He began his enterprise from the strait of Gibraltar instead of from the Red sea; now it seems that the current between Madagascar and the eastern coast of Africa sets very strongly towards the cape of Good Hope, so that while it greatly assists the southerly voyage, on the other hand, it makes return by the same way very difficult. (See Humboldt, Examen Critique de l'Histoire de la Géographie, t. i, p. 343.) Strabo, however, affirms that all those who had tried to circumnavigate Africa, both from the Red sea and from the strait of Gibraltar, had been forced to return without success (i, p. 32), so that most people believed that there was a continuous isthmus which rendered it impracticable to go by sea from the one point to the other: he is himself, however, persuaded that the Atlantic is σὺῤῥους on both sides of Africa, and therefore that circumnavigation is possible. He as well as Poseidonius (ii, pp. 98-100) disbelieved the tale of the Phenicians sent by Nekôs. He must have derived his complete conviction, that Libya might be circumnavigated, from geographical theory, which led him to contract the dimensions of that continent southward,—inasmuch as the thing in his belief never had been done, though often attempted. Mannert (Geog. d. G. und Röm. i, p. 24) erroneously says that Strabo and others founded their belief on the narrative of Herodotus.

It is worth while remarking that Strabo cannot have read the story in Herodotus with much attention, since he mentions Darius as the king who sent the Phenicians round Africa, not Nekôs; nor does he take notice of the remarkable statement of these navigators respecting the position of the sun. There were doubtless many apocryphal narratives current in his time respecting attempts, successful and unsuccessful, to circumnavigate Africa, as we may see by the tale of Eudoxus (Strabo, ii, 98; Cornel. Nep. ap. Plin. H. N. ii, 67, who gives the story very differently; and Pomp. Mela, iii, 9).

[548] Arrian, Exp. Al. vii, 1, 2.

[549] Herodot. i, 1. Φοίνικας—ἀπαγινέοντας φορτία Ἀσσύριά τε καὶ Αἰγύπτια.

[550] See the valuable chapter in Heeren (Ueber den Verkehr der Alten Welt i, 2, Abschn. 4, p. 96) about the land trade of the Phenicians.

The twenty-seventh chapter of the prophet Ezekiel presents a striking picture of the general commerce of Tyre.

[551] Herodot. i, 178. Τῆς δὲ Ἀσσυρίης ἐστὶ μέν κου καὶ ἄλλα πολίσματα μεγάλα πολλά· τὸ δὲ ὀνομαστότατον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον, καὶ ἔνθα σφι, τῆς Νίνου ἀναστάτου γενομένης, τὰ βασιλήϊα κατεστήκεε, ἦν Βαβυλών.

The existence of these and several other great cities is an important item to be taken in, in our conception of the old Assyria: Opis on the Tigris, and Sittakê on one of the canals very near the Tigris, can be identified (Xenoph. Anab. ii, 4, 13-25): compare Diodor. ii, 11.

[552] Herodot. i, 72; iii, 90-91; vii, 63; Strabo, xvi, p. 736, also ii, p. 84, in which he takes exception to the distribution of the οἰκουμένη (inhabited portion of the globe) made by Eratosthenês, because it did not include in the same compartment (σφραγὶς) Syria proper and Mesopotamia: he calls Ninus and Semiramis, Syrians. Herodotus considers the Armenians as colonists from the Phrygians (vii, 73).

The Homeric names Ἀρίμοι, Ἐρεμβοὶ (the first in the Iliad, ii, 783, the second in the Odyssey, iv, 84) coincide with the Oriental name of this race *Aram*; it seems more ancient, in the Greek habits of speech, than *Syrians* (see Strabo, xvi, p. 785).

The Hesiodic Catalogue too, as well as Stêsichorus, recognized *Arabus* as the son of Hermês, by Throniê, daughter of Bêlus (Hesiod, Fragm. 29, ed. Marktscheffel; Strabo, i, p. 42).

[553] Heeren, in his account of the Babylonians (Ideen über den Verkehr der Alten Welt, part i, Abtheilung 2, p. 168), speaks of this conquest of Babylon by Chaldæan barbarians from the northern mountains as a certain fact, explaining the great development of the Babylonian empire under Nabopolasar and Nebuchadnezzar from 630-580 B. C.; it was, he thinks, the new Chaldæan conquerors who thus extended their dominion over Judæa and Phenicia.

I agree with Volney (Chronologie des Babyloniens, ch. x, p. 215) in thinking this statement both unsupported and improbable. Mannert seems to suppose the Chaldæans of Arabian origin (Geogr. der Gr. und Röm., part v, s. 2, ch. xii, p. 419). The passages of Strabo (xvi, p. 739) are more favorable to this opinion than to that of Heeren; but we make out nothing distinct respecting the Chaldæans except that they were the priestly order among the Assyrians of Babylon, as they are expressly termed by Herodotus—ὡς λέγουσι οἱ Χαλδαῖοι, ἐόντες ἱρέες τούτου τοῦ θεοῦ (of Zeus Bêlus) (Herodot. i, 181).

The Chalybes and Chaldæi of the northern mountains seem to be known only through Xenophon (Anab. iv, 3, 4; v, 5, 17; Cyrop. iii, 2, 1); they are rude barbarians, and of their exploits or history no particulars reach us.

[554] The earliest Chaldæan astronomical observation, known to the astronomer Ptolemy, both precise and of ascertained date to a degree sufficient for scientific use, was a lunar eclipse of the 19th March 721 B. C.—the 27th year of the era of Nabonassar (Ideler, Ueber die Astronomischen Beobachtungen der Alten, p. 19, Berlin, 1806). Had Ptolemy known any older observations conforming to these conditions, he would not have omitted to notice them: his own words in the Almagest testify how much he valued the knowledge and comparison of observations taken at distant intervals (Almagest, b. 3, p. 62, ap. Ideler, *l. c.* p. 1), and at the same time imply that he had none more ancient than the era of Nabonassar (Alm. iii, p. 77, ap. Idel. p. 169).

That the Chaldæans had been, long before this period, in the habit of observing the heavens, there is no reason to doubt; and the exactness of those observations cited by Ptolemy implies (according to the judgment of Ideler *ib.* p. 167) long previous practice. The period of two hundred and twenty-three lunations, after which the moon reverts nearly to the same positions in reference to the apsides and nodes, and after which eclipses return nearly in the same order and magnitude, appears to have been discovered by the Chaldæans ("Defectus ducentis viginti tribus mensibus redire in suos orbes certum est," Pliny, H. N. ii, 13), and they deduced from hence the mean daily motions of the moon with a degree of accuracy which differs only by four seconds from modern lunar tables (Geminus, Isagoge in Arati Phænomena, c. 15; Ideler, *l. c.* pp. 153, 154, and in his Handbuch der Chronologie, vol. i, Absch. ii, p. 207).

There seem to have been Chaldæan observations, both made and recorded, of much greater antiquity than the era of Nabonassar; though we cannot lay much stress on the date of 1903 years anterior to Alexander the

Great, which is mentioned by Simplicius (ad Aristot. de Cœlo, p. 123) as being the earliest period of the Chaldæan observations sent from Babylon by Kallisthenês to Aristotle. Ideler thinks that the Chaldæan observations anterior to the era of Nabonassar were useless to astronomers from the want of some fixed era, or definite cycle, to identify the date of each of them. The common civil year of the Chaldæans had been from the beginning (like that of the Greeks) a lunar year, kept in a certain degree of harmony with the sun by cycles of lunar years and intercalation. Down to the era of Nabonassar, the calender was in confusion, and there was nothing to verify either the time of accession of the kings, or that of astronomical phenomena observed, except the days and months of this lunar year. In the reign of Nabonassar, the astronomers at Babylon introduced (not into civil use, but for their own purposes and records) the Egyptian solar year,—of three hundred and sixty-five days, or twelve months of thirty days each, with five added days, beginning with the first of the month Thoth, the commencement of the Egyptian year,—and they thus first obtained a continuous and accurate mode of marking the date of events. It is not meant that the Chaldæans then for the first time obtained from the Egyptians the *knowledge* of the solar year of three hundred and sixty-five days, but that they then for the first time adopted it in their notation of time for astronomical purposes, fixing the precise moment at which they began. Nor is there the least reason to suppose that the era of Nabonassar coincided with any political revolution or change of dynasty. Ideler discusses this point (pp. 146-173, and Handbuch der Chronol. pp. 215-220). Syncellus might correctly say—Ἀπὸ Ναβονασάρου τοὺς χρόνους τῆς τῶν ἄστρων παρατηρησέως Χαλδαῖοι ἠκρίβωσαν (Chronogr. p. 207).

We need not dwell upon the back reckonings of the Chaldæans for periods of 720,000, 490,000, 470,000 years, mentioned by Cicero, Diodorus, and Pliny (Cicero, De Divin. ii, 46; Diod. ii, 31; Pliny, H. N. vii, 57), and seemingly presented by Berosus and others as the preface of Babylonian history.

It is to be noted that Ptolemy always cited the Chaldæan observations as made by "*the Chaldæans*," never naming any individual; though in all the other observations to which he alludes, he is very scrupulous in particularizing the name of the observer. Doubtless he found the Chaldæan observations registered just in this manner; a point which illustrates what is said in the text respecting the collective character of their civilization, and the want of individual development or prominent genius.

The superiority of the Chaldæan priests to the Egyptian, as astronomical observers, is shown by the fact that Ptolemy, though living at Alexandria, never mentions the latter as astronomers, and cites no Egyptian observations while he cites thirteen Chaldæan observations in the years B. C. 721, 720, 523, 502, 491, 383, 382, 245, 237, 229: the first ten being observations of lunar eclipses; the last three, of conjunctions of planets and fixed stars (Ideler, Handbuch der Chronologie, vol. i, Ab. ii, pp. 195-199).

[555] Herodot. ii, 109.

[556] The ancient Ninus or Nineveh was situated on the eastern bank of the Tigris, nearly opposite the modern town of Mousul or Mosul. Herodotus (i, 193) and Strabo (xvi, p. 737) both speak of it as being destroyed; but Tacitus (Ann. xii, 13) and Ammian. Marcell. (xviii, 7) mention it as subsisting. Its ruins had been long remarked (see Thevenot, Voyages, lib. i, ch. xi, p. 176, and Niebuhr, Reisen, vol. ii, p. 360), but have never been examined carefully until recently by Rich, Ainsworth, and others: see Ritter, West-Asien, b. iii, Abtheil. iii, Abschn. i, s. 45, pp. 171-221.

Ktêsias, according to Diodorus (ii, 3), placed Ninus or Nineveh on the Euphrates, which we must presume to be an inadvertence,—probably of Diodorus himself, for Ktêsias would be less likely than he to confound the Euphrates and the Tigris. Compare Wesseling ad Diodor. ii, 3, and Bähr ad Ktesiæ Fragm. ii, Assyr. p. 392.

Mannert (Geographie der Gr. und Röm. part v, c. 14, pp. 439-448) disputes the identity of these ruins with the ancient city of Ninus or Nineveh, because, if this had been the fact, Xenophon and the Ten Thousand Greeks must have passed directly over them in the retreat along the eastern bank of the Tigris upward: and Xenophon, who particularly notices the deserted cities of Larissa and Mespila, says nothing of the great ruin of this once flourishing Assyrian capital. This argument once appeared to me so forcible, that I came to the same negative conclusion as Mannert, though his conjectures, as to the real site of the city, never appeared to me satisfactory. But Ritter has removed the difficulty, by showing that the ruins opposite Mosul exactly correspond to the situation of that deserted city which Xenophon calls Mespila: the difference of name in this case is not of very great importance (Ritter, *ut sup.* p. 175). Consult also Forbiger, Handbuch der alten Geographie, sect. 96, p. 612.

The situation of Nineveh here pointed out is exactly what we should expect in reference to the conquests of the Median kings: it lies in that part of Assyria bordering on Media, and in the course of the conquests which the

king Kyaxarês afterwards extended farther on to the Halys. (See Appendix at the end of this chapter.)

[557] Herodot. i, 193. Ἡ γῆ τῶν Ἀσσυρίων ὕεται μὲν ὀλίγῳ—while he speaks of rain falling at Thebes in Egypt as a prodigy, which never happened except just at the moment when the country was conquered by Cambysês,—οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὕεται τὰ ἄνω τῆς Αἰγύπτου τὸ παράπαν (iii, 10). It is not unimportant to notice this distinction between the *little* rain of Babylonia, and the *no* rain of Upper Egypt,—as a mark of measured assertion in the historian from whom so much of our knowledge of Grecian history is derived.

It chanced to rain hard during the four days which the traveller Niebuhr spent in going from the ruins of Babylon to Bagdad, at the end of November 1763 (Reisen, vol. ii, p. 292).

[558] Herodot. i, 193; Xenophon, Anab. i, 7, 15; ii, 4, 13-22.

[559] About the date-palms (φοίνικες) in the ancient Babylonia, see Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. ii, 6, 2-6; Xenoph. Cyrop. vii, 5, 12; Anab. ii, 3, 15; Diodor. ii, 53: there were some which bore no fruit, but which afforded good wood for house-purposes and furniture.

Theophrastus gives the same general idea of the fertility and produce of the soil in Babylonia as Herodotus, though the two hundred-fold, and sometimes three hundred-fold, which was stated to the latter as the produce of the land in grain, appears in his statement cut down to fifty-fold, or one hundred-fold (Hist. Plant. viii, 7, 4).

Respecting the numerous useful purposes for which the date-palm was made to serve (a Persian song enumerated three hundred and sixty), see Strabo, xiv, p. 742; Ammian. Marcell. xxiv, 3.

[560] Herodot. i, 178, Strabo, xiv, p. 738; Arrian, E. A. vii, 17, 7. Strabo does not say that it was a stadium in *perpendicular* height: we may suppose that the stadium represents the entire distance in upward march from the bottom to the top. He as well as Arrian say that Xerxês destroyed both the temple of Bêlus and all the other temples at Babylon (καθεῖλεν, κατέσκαψεν, iii, 16, 6; vii, 17, 4); he talks of the intention of Alexander to rebuild it, and of his directions given to level new foundations, carrying away the loose earth and ruins. This cannot be reconciled with the narrative of Herodotus, nor with the statement of Pliny (vi, 30), nor do I believe it to be true. Xerxês plundered the temple of much of its wealth and ornaments, but that he knocked down the vast building and the other Babylonian temples, is incredible. Babylon always continued one of the chief cities of the Persian empire.

[561] What is stated in the text respecting Babylon, is taken almost entirely from Herodotus: I have given briefly the most prominent points in his interesting narrative (i, 178-193), which well deserves to be read at length.

Herodotus is in fact our only original witness, speaking from his own observation and going into details, respecting the marvels of Babylon. Ktêsias, if his work had remained, would have been another original witness; but we have only a few extracts from him by Diodorus. Strabo seems not to have visited Babylon, nor can it be affirmed that Kleitarchus did so. Arrian had Aristobulus to copy, and is valuable as far as he goes; but he does not enter into many particulars respecting the magnitude of the city or its appurtenances. Berosus also, if we possessed his book, would have been an eye-witness of the state of Babylon more than a century and a half later than Herodotus, but the few fragments remaining are hardly at all descriptive (see Berosi Fragm. pp. 64-67, ed. Richter).

The magnitude of the works described by Herodotus naturally provokes suspicions of exaggeration; but there are good grounds for trusting him, in my judgment, on all points which fell under his own vision and means of verification, as distinguished from past facts, on which he could do no more than give what he heard. He had bestowed much attention on Assyria and its phenomena, as is evident from the fact that he had written (or prepared to write, if the suspicion be admissible that the work was never completed,—Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. ii, 20, 5) a special Assyrian history, which has not reached us (Ἀσσυρίοισι λόγοισι, i, 106-184). He is very precise in the measures of which he speaks; thus having described the dimensions of the walls in "royal cubits," he goes on immediately to tell us how much that measure differs from an ordinary cubit. He designedly suppresses a part of what he had heard respecting the produce of the Babylonian soil, from the mere apprehension of not being believed.

To these reasons for placing faith in Herodotus we may add another, not less deserving of attention. That which seems incredible in the constructions which he describes, arises simply from their enormous bulk, and the frightful quantity of human labor which must have been employed to execute them. He does not tell us, like Berosus (Fragm. p. 66), that these wonderful fortifications were completed in fifteen days,—nor like Quintus

Curtius, that the length of one stadium was completed on each successive day of the year (v, 1, 26). To bring to pass all that Herodotus has described, is a mere question of time, patience, number of laborers, and cost of maintaining them,—for the materials were both close at hand and inexhaustible.

Now what would be the limit imposed upon the power and will of the old kings of Babylonia on these points? We can hardly assign that limit with so much confidence as to venture to pronounce a statement of Herodotus incredible, when he tells us something which he has seen, or verified from eye-witnesses. The Pyramids and other works in Egypt are quite sufficient to make us mistrustful of our own means of appreciation; and the great wall of China (extending for twelve hundred English miles along what was once the whole northern frontier of the Chinese empire,—from twenty to twenty-five feet high,—wide enough for six horses to run abreast, and furnished with a suitable number of gates and bastions) *contains more material than all the buildings of the British empire put together*, according to Barrow's estimate (Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. i, p. 7, *t. v.*; and Ideler, Ueber die Zeitrechnung der Chinesen, in the Abhandlungen of the Berlin Academy for 1837, ch. 3, p. 291).

Ktêsias gave the circuit of the walls of Babylon as three hundred and sixty stadia; Kleitarchus, three hundred and sixty-five stadia; Quintus Curtius, three hundred and sixty-eight stadia; and Strabo, three hundred and eighty-five stadia; all different from Herodotus, who gives four hundred and eighty stadia, a square of one hundred and twenty stadia each side. Grosskurd (ad Strabon. xvi, p. 738), Letronne, and Heeren, all presume that the smaller number must be the truth, and that Herodotus must have been misinformed; and Grosskurd further urges, that Herodotus cannot have *seen* the walls, inasmuch as he himself tells us that Darius caused them to be razed after the second siege and reconquest (Herodot. iii, 159). But upon this we may observe: First, the expression (τὸ τεῖχος περιεῖλε) does not imply that the wall was so thoroughly and entirely razed by Darius as to leave no part standing,—still less, that the great and broad moat was in all its circuit filled up and levelled. This would have been a most laborious operation in reference to such high and bulky masses, and withal not necessary for the purpose of rendering the town defenceless; for which purpose the destruction of certain portions of the wall is sufficient. Next, Herodotus speaks distinctly of the walls and ditch as existing in his time, when he saw the place, which does not exclude the possibility that numerous breaches may have been designedly made in them, or mere openings left in the walls without any actual gates, for the purpose of obviating all idea of revolt. But, however this latter fact may be, certain it is that the great walls were either continuous, or discontinuous only to the extent of these designed breaches, when Herodotus saw them. He describes the town and its phenomena in the present tense: κέεται ἐν πεδίῳ μεγάλῳ, μέγαθος ἐοῦσα μέτωπον ἕκαστον 120 σταδίων, ἐούσης τετραγώνου· οὗτοι στάδιοι τῆς περιόδου τῆς πόλιος γίνονται συνάπαντες 480. Τὸ μὲν νῦν μέγαθος τοσοῦτόν ἐστι τοῦ ἄστεος τοῦ Βαβυλωνίου. Ἐκεκόσμητο δὲ ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο πόλισμα τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν· ταφρὸς μὲν πρῶτά μιν βαθέα τε καὶ εὐρεα καὶ πλέη ὕδατος περιθέει· μετὰ δὲ, τεῖχος πεντήκοντα μὲν πηχέων βασιληΐων ἐὸν τὸ εὖρος, ὕψος δὲ, διηκοσίων πηχέων. Ὁ δὲ βασιληΐος πηχὺς τοῦ μετρίου ἐστὶ πήχεος μέζων τρισὶ δακτυλίοισι (c. 178). Again (c. 181),—Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τὸ τεῖχος θώρηξ ἐστὶ· ἕτερον δὲ ἔσωθεν τεῖχος περιθεῖ, οὐ πολλῷ τέῳ ἀσθενέστερον τοῦ ἑτέρου τείχους, στεινότερον δέ. Then he describes the temple of Zeus Bêlus, with its vast dimensions,—καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ τοῦτο ἔτι ἐὸν, δύο σταδίων πάντη, ἐὸν τετράγωνον,—in the language of one who had himself gone up to the top of it. After having mentioned the striking present phenomena of the temple, he specifies a statue of solid gold, twelve cubits high, which the Chaldæans told him had once been there, but which he did not see, and he carefully marks the distinction in his language,—ἦν δὲ ἐν τῷ τεμένεϊ τούτῳ ἔτι τὸν χρόνον ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἀνδριὰς δυώδεκα πήχεων, χρύσεος στέρεος. Ἐγὼ μέν μιν οὐκ εἶδον· τὰ δὲ λέγεται ὑπὸ Χαλδαίων, ταῦτα λέγω (c. 183).

The argument, therefore, by which Grosskurd justifies the rejection of the statement of Herodotus is not to be reconciled with the language of the historian: Herodotus certainly saw both the walls and the ditch. Ktêsias saw them too, and his statement of the circuit, as three hundred and sixty stadia, stands opposed to that of four hundred and eighty stadia, which appears in Herodotus. But the authority of Herodotus is, in my judgment, so much superior to that of Ktêsias, that I accept the larger figure as more worthy of credit than the smaller. Sixty English miles of circuit is, doubtless, a wonder, but forty-five miles in circuit is a wonder also: granting means and will to execute the lesser of these two, the Babylonian kings can hardly be supposed inadequate to the greater.

To me the height of these artificial mountains, called *walls*, appears even more astonishing than their length or breadth. Yet it is curious that on this point the two eye-witnesses, Herodotus and Ktêsias, both agree, with only the difference between royal cubits and common cubits. Herodotus states the height at two hundred royal cubits: Ktêsias, at fifty fathoms, which are equal to two hundred common cubits (Diod. ii, 7),—τὸ δὲ ὕψος, ὡς μὲν Κτησίας φησὶ, πεντήκοντα ὀργυιῶν, ὡς δὲ ἔνιοι τῶν νεωτώρων ἔγραψαν, πηχῶν πεντήκοντα. Olearius (ad

Philostratum Vit. Apollon. Tyan. i, 25) shows plausible reason for believing that the more recent writers (νεώτεροι) cut down the dimensions stated by Ktêsias simply because they thought such a vast height incredible. The difference between the royal cubit and the common cubit, as Herodotus on this occasion informs us, was three digits in favor of the former; his two hundred royal cubits are thus equal to three hundred and thirty-seven feet eight inches: Ktêsias has not attended to the difference between royal cubits and common cubits, and his estimate, therefore, is lower than that of Herodotus by thirty-seven feet eight inches.

On the whole, I cannot think that we are justified, either by the authority of such counter-testimony as can be produced, or by the intrinsic wonder of the case, in rejecting the dimensions of the walls of Babylon as given by Herodotus.

Quintus Curtius states that a large proportion of the inclosed space was not occupied by dwellings, but sown and planted (v, 1, 26: compare Diodor. ii, 9).

[562] Herodot. i, 196.

[563] Arrian, Exp. Al. iii, 16, 6; vii, 17, 3; Quint. Curtius, iii, 3, 16.

[564] Xenoph. Anab. i, 4, 11; Arrian. Exp. Al. iii. 16, 3. καὶ ἅμα τοῦ πολέμου τὸ ἆθλον ἡ Βαβυλῶν καὶ τὰ Σοῦσα ἐφαίνετο.

[565] See the statement of the large receipts of the satrap Tritantæchmes and his immense establishment of horses and Indian dogs (Herodot. i 192).

[566] There is a valuable examination of the lower course of the Euphrates, with the changes which it has undergone, in Ritter, West-Asien, b. iii. Abtheil. iii, Abschnitt i, sect. 29, pp. 45-49, and the passage from Abydenus in the latter page.

For the distance between Terêdon or Diridôtis, at the mouth of the Euphrates (which remained separate from that of the Tigris until the first century of the Christian era), to Babylon, see Strabo, ii, p. 80; xvi, p. 739.

It is important to keep in mind the warning given by Ritter, that none of the maps of the course of the river Euphrates, prepared previously to the publication of Colonel Chesney's expedition in 1836, are to be trusted. That expedition gave the first complete and accurate survey of the course of the river, and led to the detection of many mistakes previously committed by Mannert, Reichard, and other able geographers and chartographers. To the immense mass of information contained in Ritter's comprehensive and laborious work, is to be added the farther merit, that he is always careful in pointing out where the geographical data are insufficient and fall short of certainty. See West-Asien, B. iii, Abtheilung iii, Abschnitt i, sect. 41, p 959.

[567] Strabo, xiii, p. 617, with the mutilated fragment of Alkæus, which O Müller has so ingeniously corrected (Rhenisch. Museum, i, 4, p. 287).

[568] Strabo, xvi, p. 740.

[569] Diodor. (i. 31) states this point justly with regard to the ancient kings of Egypt—ἔργα μεγάλα καὶ θαυμαστὰ διὰ τὰς πολυχειρίας κατασκευάσαντας, ἀθάνατα τῆς ἑαυτῶν δόξες καταλιπεῖν ὑπομνήματα.

[570] See the description of this desert in Xenoph. Anab. i, 5, 1-8.

[571] The Ten Thousand Greeks passed from the outside to the inside of the wall of Media: it was one hundred feet high, twenty feet wide, and was reported to them as extending twenty parasangs or six hundred stadia (= seventy miles) in length (Xenoph. Anab. ii, 4, 12). Eratosthenês called it τὸ Σεμιράμιδος διατείχισμα (Strabo, ii, p. 80): it was seemingly about twenty-five miles north of Bagdad.

There is some confusion about the wall of Media: Mannert (Geogr. der G. und R. v. 2, p. 280) and Forbiger also (Alte Geogr. sect. 97, p. 616, note 94) appear to have confounded the ditch dug by special order of Artaxerxês to oppose the march of the younger Cyrus, with the Nahar-Malcha or Royal canal between the Tigris and the Euphrates: see Xenoph. Anab. i, 7, 15.

It is singular that Herodotus makes no mention of the wall of Media, though his subject (i, 185) naturally conducts him to it: he seems to have sailed down the Euphrates to Babylon, and must, therefore, have seen it, if it had really extended to the Euphrates, as some authors have imagined. Probably, however, it was not kept up with any care, even in his time, seeing that its original usefulness was at an end, after the whole of Asia, from the Euxine to the Persian gulf, became subject to the Persians.

[572] Strabo, xvi, p. 744.

[573] Strabo, xvi, pp. 766, 776, 778; Pliny, H. N. vi, 32. "Arabes, mirum dictu, ex innumeris populis pars æqua in commerciis aut latrociniis degunt: in universum gentes ditissimæ, ut apud quas maximæ opes Romanorum Parthorumque subsistant,—vendentibus quæ a mari aut sylvis capiunt, nihil invicem redimentibus."

The latter part of this passage of Pliny presents an enunciation sufficiently distinct, though by implication only, of what has been called the *mercantile theory* in political economy.

[574] To give one example: Herodotus mentions an opinion given to him by the γραμματιστὴς (comptroller) of the property of Athênê at Sais, to the effect that the sources of the Nile were at an immeasurable depth in the interior of the earth, between Syênê and Elephantinê, and that Psammetichus had vainly tried to sound them with a rope many thousand fathoms in length (ii, 28). In mentioning this tale (perfectly deserving of being *recounted* at least, because it came from a person of considerable station in the country), Herodotus expressly says: "This comptroller seemed to me to be only bantering, though he professed to know accurately,"—οὗτος δ᾽ ἐμοίγε παίζειν ἐδόκεε, φάμενος εἰδέναι ἀτρεκέως. Now Strabo (xvii, p. 819), in alluding to this story, introduces it just as if Herodotus had told it for a fact,—Πολλὰ δ᾽ Ἡρόδοτός τε καὶ ἄλλοι φλυαροῦσιν, οἷον, etc.

Many other instances might be cited, both from ancient and modern writers, of similar carelessness or injustice towards this admirable author.

[575] Οἱ ἱρέες τοῦ Νείλου, Herod. ii, 90.

[576] The seven mouths of the Nile, so notorious in antiquity, are not conformable to the modern geography of the country: see Mannert, Geogr. der Gr. und Röm. x, 1, p. 539.

The breadth of the base of the Delta, between Pelusium and Kanôpus, is overstated by Herodotus (ii, 6-9) at three thousand six hundred stadia; Diodorus (i, 34) and Strabo, at thirteen hundred stadia, which is near the truth, though the text of Strabo in various passages is not uniform on this matter, and requires correction. See Grosskurd's note on Strabo, ii, p. 64 (note 3, p. 101), and xvii, p. 186 (note 9, p. 332). Pliny gives the distance at one hundred and seventy miles (H. N. v, 9).

[577] Herod, i, 193. Παραγίνεται ὁ σῖτος (in Babylonia) οὐ, κατάπερ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἀναβαίνοντος ἐς τὰς ἀρούρας, ἀλλὰ χερσί τε καὶ κηλωνηΐοισι ἀρδόμενος· ἡ γὰρ Βαβυλωνίη χώρη πᾶσα, κατάπερ ἡ Αἰγυπτίη, κατατέτμηται ἐς διώρυχας, etc.

Herodotus was informed that the canals in Egypt had been dug by the labor of that host of prisoners whom the victorious Sesostris brought home from his conquests (ii, 108). The canals in Egypt served the purpose partly of communication between the different cities, partly of a constant supply of water to those towns which were not immediately on the Nile: "that vast river, so constantly at work," (to use the language of Herodotus—ὑπὸ τοσούτου τε ποτάμου καὶ οὕτως ἐργατικοῦ, ii, 11), spared the Egyptians all the toil of irrigation which the Assyrian cultivator underwent (ii, 14).

Lower Egypt, as Herodotus saw it, though a continued flat, was unfit either for horse or car, from the number of intersecting canals,—ἄνιππος καὶ ἀναμάξευτος (ii, 108). But lower Egypt, as Volney saw it, was among the countries in the world best suited to the action of cavalry, so that he pronounces the native population of the country to have no chance of contending against the Mamelukes (Volney, Travels in Egypt and Syria, vol. i, ch. 12, sect. 2, p. 199). The country has reverted to the state in which it was (ἱππασίμη καὶ ἀμαξευομένη πᾶσα) before the canals were made,—one of the many striking illustrations of the difference between the Egypt which a modern traveller visits, and that which Herodotus and even Strabo saw,—ὅλην πλωτὴν διωρύγων ἐπὶ διώρυξι τμηθεισῶν (Strabo, xvii, p. 788).

Considering the early age of Herodotus, his remarks on the geological character of Egypt as a deposit of the accumulated mud by the Nile, appear to me most remarkable (ii, 8-14). Having no fixed number of years included in his religious belief as measuring the past existence of the earth, he carries his mind back without difficulty to what may have been effected by this river in ten or twenty thousand years, or "in the whole space of time elapsed before I was born," (ii, 11).

About the lake of Mœris, see a note a little farther on.

[578] See note in Appendix to this chapter.

[579] Herodot. ii, 35. Αἰγύπτιοι ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ τῷ κατὰ σφέας ἐόντι ἑτεροίῳ, καὶ τῷ ποταμῷ φύσιν ἀλλοίην παρεχομένῳ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι πόταμοι, τὰ πολλὰ πάντα ἔμπαλιν τοῖσι ἄλλοισι ἀνθρώποισι ἐστήσαντο ἤθεα καὶ νόμους.

[580] Theokritus (Idyll, xvii, 83) celebrates Ptolemy Philadelphus king of Egypt as ruling over thirty-three thousand three hundred and thirty-three cities: the manner in which he strings these figures into three hexameter verses is somewhat ingenious. The priests, in describing to Herodotus the unrivalled prosperity which they affirmed Egypt to have enjoyed under Amasis, the last king before the Persian conquest, said that there were then twenty thousand cities in the country (ii, 177). Diodorus tells us that eighteen thousand different cities and considerable villages were registered in the Egyptian ἀναγραφαὶ (i, 31) for the ancient times, but that thirty thousand were numbered under the Ptolemies.

[581] Respecting the monuments of ancient Egyptian art, see the summary of O. Müller, Archäologie der Kunst, sects. 215-233, and a still better account and appreciation of them in Carl Schnaase, Geschichte der bildenden Künste bei den Alten, Düsseldorf, 1843, vol. i, book ii, chs. 1 and 2.

In regard to the credibility and value of Egyptian history anterior to Psammetichus, there are many excellent remarks by Mr. Kenrick, in the preface to his work, "The Egypt of Herodotus," (the second book of Herodotus, with notes.) About the recent discoveries derived from the hieroglyphics, he says: "We know that it was the custom of the Egyptian kings to inscribe the temples and obelisks which they raised with their own names or with distinguishing hieroglyphics; but in no one instance do these names, as read by the modern decipherers of hieroglyphics on monuments said to have been raised by kings before Psammetichus, correspond with the names given by Herodotus." (Preface, p. xliv.) He farther adds in a note, "A name which has been read phonetically *Mena*, has been found at Thebes, and Mr. Wilkinson supposes it to be Menes. It is remarkable, however, that the names which follow are not phonetically written, so that it is probable that this is not to be read *Mena*. Besides, the cartouche, which immediately follows, is that of a king of the eighteenth dynasty; so that, at all events, it cannot have been engraved till many centuries after the supposed age of Menes; and the occurrence of the name no more decides the question of historical existence than that of Cecrops in the Parian Chronicle."

[582] Heeren, Ideen über den Verkehr der Alten Welt, part ii, 1, p. 403. The opinion given by Parthey, however (De Philis Insulâ, p. 100, Berlin, 1830), may perhaps be just: "Antiquissimâ ætate eundem populum, dicamus Ægyptiacum, Nili ripas inde a Meroë insulâ usque ad Ægyptum inferiorem occupâsse, e monumentorum congruentiâ apparet: posteriore tempore, tabulis et annalibus nostris longe superiore, alia stirps Æthiopica interiora terræ usque ad cataractam Syenensem obtinuit. Ex quâ ætate certa rerum notitia ad nos pervenit, Ægyptiorum et Æthiopum segregatio jam facta est. Herodotus cæterique scriptores Græci populos acute discernunt."

At this moment, Syênê and its cataract mark the boundary of two people and two languages,—Egyptians and Arabic language to the north, Nubians and Berber language to the south. (Parthey, *ibid.*)

[583] Compare Herodot. ii, 30-32; iii, 19-25; Strabo, xvi, p. 818. Herodotus gives the description of their armor and appearance as part of the army of Xerxês (vii, 69); they painted their bodies: compare Plin. H. N. xxxiii, 36. How little Ethiopia was visited in his time, may be gathered from the tenor of his statements: according to Diodorus (i, 37), no Greeks visited it earlier than the expedition of Ptolemy Philadelphus,—οὕτως ἄξενα ἦν τὰ περὶ τοὺς τόπους τούτους, καὶ παντελῶς ἐπικίνδυνα. Diodorus, however, is incorrect in saying that no Greek had ever gone as far southward as the frontier of Egypt: Herodotus certainly visited Elephantinê, probably other Greeks also.

The statements respecting the theocratical state of Meroê and its superior civilization come from Diodorus (iii, 2, 5, 7), Strabo (xvii, p. 822), and Pliny (H. N. vi, 29-33), much later than Herodotus. Diodorus seems to have had no older informants before him, about Ethiopia, than Agatharchidês and Artemidôrus, both in the second century B. C. (Diod. iii, 10.)

[584] Wesseling ad Diodor. iii, 3.

[585] Herodot. ii, 37. Θεοσεβέες δὲ περισσῶς ἐόντες μάλιστα πάντων ἀνθρώπων, etc. He is astonished at the retentiveness of their memory; some of them had more stories to tell than any one whom he had ever seen (ii, 77-109; Diodor. i, 73).

The word *priest* conveys to a modern reader an idea very different from that of the Egyptian ἱερεῖς, who were not a profession, but an order comprising many occupations and professions,—Josephus the Jew was in like manner an ἱερεὺς κατὰ γένος (cont. Apion. c. 3).

[586] Diodorus (i, 70-73) gives an elaborate description of the monastic strictness with which the daily duties of the Egyptian king were measured out by the priests: compare Plutarch, De Isid. et Osirid. p. 353, who refers to Hekatæus (probably Hekatæus of Abdêra) and Eudoxus. The priests represented that Psammetichus was the first Egyptian king who broke through the priestly canon limiting the royal allowance of wine: compare Strabo, xvii, p, 790.

The Ethiopian kings at Meroê are said to have been kept in the like pupillage by the priestly order, until a king named Ergamenês, during the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus in Egypt, emancipated himself and put the chief priests to death (Diodor. iii, 6).

[587] Herodot. ii, 82-83.

[588] Herodot. ii, 143.

[589] Herodot. ii, 113; στἰγματα ἱρά.

[590] Herodot. ii, 30.

[591] Herodot. i, 165-166; Diodor. i, 73.

[592] Diodor. i, 73.

[593] Besides this general rent or land-tax received by the Egyptian kings, there seem, also, to have been special crown-lands. Strabo mentions an island in the Nile (in the Thebaid) celebrated for the extraordinary excellence of its date-palms; the whole of this island belonged to the kings, without any other proprietor: it yielded a large revenue, and passed into the hands of the Roman government in Strabo's time (xvii, p. 818).

[594] Herodot. ii, 30-141.

[595] Herodot. ii, 164.

[596] Diodor. i, 74. About the Egyptian castes generally, see Heeren, Ideen über den Verkehr der Alten Welt, part ii, 2, pp. 572-595.

[597] See the citation from Maillet's Travels in Egypt, in Heeren, Ideen, p. 590; also Volney's Travels, vol. i, ch. 6, p. 77.

The expression of Herodotus—οἱ περὶ τὴν σπειρομένην Αἴγυπτον οἰκέουσι—indicates that the portion of the soil used as pasture was not inconsiderable.

The inhabitants of the marsh land were the most warlike part of the population (Thucyd. i, 110).

[598] Herodot. ii, 59-60.

[599] Herodot. ii, 35; Sophokl. Œdip. Colon. 332: where the passage cited by the Scholiast out of Nymphodôrus is a remarkable example of the habit of ingenious Greeks to represent all customs which they thought worthy of notice, as having emanated from the design of some great sovereign: here Nymphodôrus introduces Sesostris as the author of the custom in question, in order that the Egyptians might be rendered effeminate.

[600] The process of embalming is minutely described (Herod. ii, 85-90); the word which he uses for it is the same as that for salting meat and fish,—ταριχευσις: compare Strabo, xvi, p. 764.

Perfect exactness of execution, mastery of the hardest stone, and undeviating obedience to certain rules of proportion, are general characteristics of Egyptian sculpture. There are yet seen in their quarries obelisks not severed from the rock, but having three of their sides already adorned with hieroglyphics; so certain were they of cutting off the fourth side with precision (Schnaase, Gesch. der Bild. Künste, i, p. 428).

All the nomes of Egypt, however, were not harmonious in their feelings respecting animals: particular animals were worshipped in some nomes which in other nomes were objects even of antipathy, especially the crocodile (Herod. ii, 69; Strabo, xvii, p. 817: see particularly the fifteenth Satire of Juvenal).

[601] Herodot. ii, 65-72; Diodor. i, 83-90; Plutarch, Isid. et Osir. p. 380.

Hasselquist identified all the birds carved on the obelisk near Matarea (Heliopolis), (Travels in Egypt, p. 99.)

[602] Herodot. ii, 82-83; iii, 1, 129. It is one of the points of distinction between Egyptians and Babylonians, that the latter had no surgeons or ἰατροί: they brought out the sick into the market-place, to profit by the sympathy and advice of the passers-by (Herodot. i, 197).

[603] Herodot. ii, 141.

[604] Herodot. iii, 177.

[605] Herodot. ii, 158. Read the account of the foundation of Petersburg by Peter the Great: "Au milieu de ces réformes, grandes et petites, qui faisaient les amusemens du czar, et de la guerre terrible qui l'occupoit contre Charles XII, il jeta les fondemens de l'importante ville et du port de Pétersbourg, en 1714, dans un marais où il n'y avait pas une cabane. Pierre travailla de ses mains à la première maison: rien ne le rebuta: des ouvriers furent forcés de venir sur ce bord de la mer Baltique, des frontières d'Astrachan, des bords de la Mer Noire et de la Mer Caspienne. Il périt plus de cent mille hommes dans les travaux qu'il fallut faire, et dans les fatigues et la disette qu'on essuya: mais enfin la ville existe." (Voltaire, Anecdotes sur Pierre le Grand, en Œuvres Complètes, ed. Paris, 1825, tom. xxxi, p. 491.)

[606] Herodot. ii, 124-129. τὸν λέων τετρυμένον ἐς τὸ ἔσχατον κακοῦ. (Diodor. i, 63-64.)

Περὶ τῶν Πυραμίδων (Diodorus observes) οὐδὲν ὅλως οὐδὲ παρὰ τοῖς ἐγχωρίοις, οὐδὲ παρὰ τοῖς συγγραφεῦσιν, συμφωνεῖται. He then alludes to some of the discrepant stories about the date of the Pyramids, and the names of their constructors. This confession, of the complete want of trustworthy information respecting the most remarkable edifices of lower Egypt, forms a striking contrast with the statement which Diodorus had given (c. 44), that the priests possessed records, "continually handed down from reign to reign respecting four hundred and seventy Egyptian kings."

[607] It appears that the lake of Mœris is, at least in great part, a natural reservoir, though improved by art for the purposes wanted, and connected with the river by an artificial canal, sluices, etc. (Kenrick ad Herodot. ii, 149.)

"The lake still exists, of diminished magnitude, being about sixty miles in circumference, but the communication with the Nile has ceased." Herodotus gives the circumference as three thousand six hundred stadia, = between four hundred and four hundred and fifty miles.

I incline to believe that there was more of the hand of man in it than Mr. Kenrick supposes, though doubtless the receptacle was natural.

[608] Herodot. ii, 38-46, 65-72; iii, 27-30: Diodor. i, 83-90.

It is surprising to find Pindar introducing into one of his odes a plain mention of the monstrous circumstances connected with the worship of the goat in the Mendesian nome (Pindar, Fragm. Inc. 179, ed. Bergk). Pindar had also dwelt, in one of his Prosodia, upon the mythe of the gods having disguised themselves as animals, when seeking to escape Typhon; which was one of the tales told as an explanation of the consecration of animals in Egypt: see Pindar, Fragm. Inc. p. 61, ed. Bergk; Porphyr. de Abstinent. iii, p. 251, ed. Rhoer.

[609] Herodot. ii, 65. Diodorus does not feel the same reluctance to mention these ἀπόῤῥητα (i, 86).

[610] Diodor. i, 86-87; Plutarch, De Isid. et Osirid. p. 377, *seq.*

[611] On this early trade between Egypt, Phenicia, and Palestine, anterior to any acquaintance with the Greeks, see Josephus cont. Apion. i, 12.

[612] Herodotus notices the large importation of wine into Egypt in his day, from all Greece as well as from Phenicia, as well as the employment of the earthen vessels in which it was brought for the transport of water, in the journeys across the desert (iii, 6).

In later times, Alexandria was supplied with wine chiefly from Laodikeia, in Syria, near the mouth of the Orontes (Strabo, xvi, p. 751).

[613] Herodot. ii, 147-154. ἀπὸ Ψαμμητίχου,—πάντα καὶ τὰ ὕστερον ἐπιστάμεθα ἀτρεκέως.

[614] See these differences stated and considered in Boeckh, Manetho und die Hundssternperiode. pp. 326—336, of which some account is given in the Appendix to this chapter.

[615] Herodot. ii, 149-152. This narrative of Herodotus, however little satisfactory in an historical point of view, bears evident marks of being the genuine tale which he heard from the priests of Hephæstos. Diodorus gives an account more historically plausible, but he could not well have had any positive authorities for that period, and he gives us seemingly the ideas of Greek authors of the days of the Ptolemies. Psammetichus (he tells us), as one of the twelve kings, ruled at Saïs and in the neighboring part of the delta: he opened a trade, previously unknown in Egypt, with Greeks and Phenicians, so profitable that his eleven colleagues became jealous of his riches and combined to attack him. He raised an army of foreign mercenaries and defeated them (Diodor. i, 66-67). Polyænus gives a different story about Psammetichus and the Karian mercenaries (vii 3).

[616] Herodot. ii, 154.

[617] Strabo, xvii, p. 801. καὶ τὸ Μιλησίων τεῖχος· πλεύσαντες γὰρ ἐπὶ Ψαμμητίχου τριάκοντα ναυσὶν Μιλήσιοι κατὰ Κυαξάρη (οὗτος δὲ τῶν Μήδων) κάτεσχον εἰς τὸ στόμα τὸ Βολβίτινον· εἶτ᾽ ἐκβάντες ἐτείχισαν τὸ λεχθὲν κτίσμα· χρόνῳ δ᾽ ἀναπλεύσαντες εἰς τὸν Σαϊτικὸν νομὸν, καταναυμαχήσαντες Ἴναρον, πόλιν ἔκτισαν Ναύκρατιν οὐ πολὺ τῆς Σχεδίας ὕπερθεν.

What is meant by the allusion to Kyaxarês, or to Inarus, in this passage, I do not understand. We know nothing of any relations either between Kyaxarês and Psammetichus, or between Kyaxarês and the Milesians. moreover, if by κατὰ Κυαξάρη be meant *in the time of Kyaxarês*, as the translators render it, we have in immediate succession ἐπὶ Ψαμμητίχου—κατὰ Κυαξάρη, with the same meaning, which is, to say the least of it, a very awkward sentence. The words οὗτος δὲ τῶν Μήδων look not unlike a comment added by some early reader of Strabo, who could not understand why Kyaxarês should be here mentioned, and who noted his difficulty in words which have subsequently found their way into the text. Then again, *Inarus* belongs to the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars: at least we know no other person of that name than the chief of the Egyptian revolt against Persia (Thucyd. i, 114) who is spoken of as a "Libyan, the son of Psammetichus." The mention of Kyaxarês, therefore, here appears unmeaning, while that of Inarus is an anachronism: possibly, the

story that the Milesians founded Naukratis "after having worsted Inarus in a sea-flight," may have grown out of the etymology of the name Naukratis, in the mind of one who found Inarus the son of Psammetichus mentioned two centuries afterwards, and identified the two Psammetichuses with each other.

The statement of Strabo has been copied by Steph. Byz. v. Ναύκρατις. Eusebius also announces (Chron. i, p. 168) the Milesians as the founders of Naukratis, but puts the event at 753 B. C., during what he calls the Milesian thalassokraty: see Mr. Fynes Clinton ad ann. 732 B. C. in the Fasti Hellenici.

[618] Herodot. ii, 166

[619] Herodot. ii, 30: Diodor. i, 67.

[620] Ἀπρίης—ὃς μετὰ Ψαμμήτιχον τὸν ἑωϋτοῦ προπάτορα ἐγένετο εὐδαιμονέστατος τῶν πρότερον βασιλέων (Herodot. ii, 161).

[621] Herodot. i, 105; ii, 157.

[622] The chronology of the Egyptian kings from Psammetichus to Amasis is given in some points differently by Herodotus and by Manetho:—

According to Herodotus,				According to Manetho ap. African.			
Psammetichus	reigned	54	years.	Psammetichus	reigned	54	years.
Nekôs	„	16	„	Nechao II	„	6	„
Psammis	„	6	„	Psammathis	„	6	„
Apriês	„	25	„	Uaphris	„	19	„
Amasis	„	44	„	Amosis	„	44	„

Diodorus gives 22 years for Apriês and 55 years for Amasis (i, 68).

Now the end of the reign of Amasis stands fixed for 526 B. C., and, therefore, the beginning of his reign (according to both Herodotus and Manetho) to 570 B. C. or 569 B. C. According to the chronology of the Old Testament, the battles of Megiddo and Carchemisch, fought by Nekôs, fall from 609-605 B. C., and this coincides with the reign of Nekôs as dated by Herodotus, but not as dated by Manetho. On the other hand, it appears from the evidence of certain Egyptian inscriptions recently discovered, that the real interval from the beginning of Nechao to the end of Uaphris is only forty years, and not forty-seven years, as the dates of Herodotus would make it (Boeckh, Manetho und die Hundsternperiode, pp. 341-348), which would place the accession of Nekôs in 610 or 609 B. C. Boeckh discusses at some length this discrepancy of dates, and inclines to the supposition that Nekôs reigned nine or ten years jointly with his father, and that Herodotus has counted these nine or ten years twice, once in the reign of Psammetichus, once in that of Nekôs. Certainly, Psammetichus can hardly have been very young when his reign began, and if he reigned fifty-four years, he must have reached an extreme old age, and may have been prominently aided by his son. Adopting the suppositions, therefore, that the last ten years of the reign of Psammetichus may be reckoned both for him and for Nekôs,—that for Nekôs separately only six years are to be reckoned,—and that the number of years from the beginning of Nekôs's separate reign to the end of Uaphris is forty,—Boeckh places the beginning of Psammetichus in 654 B. C., and not in 670 B. C., as the data of Herodotus would make it (*ib.* pp. 342-350).

Mr. Clinton, Fast. Hellen. B. C. 616, follows Herodotus.

[623] Herodot. ii, 158. Respecting the canal of Nekôs, see the explanation of Mr. Kenrick on this chapter of Herodotus. From Bubastis to Suez the length would be about ninety miles.

[624] Herodot. ii, 159. Diodorus makes no mention of Nekôs.

The account of Herodotus coincides in the main with the history of the Old Testament about Pharaoh Necho and Josiah. The great city of Syria which he calls Κάδυτις seems to be Jerusalem, though Wesseling (ad Herodot. iii, 5) and other able critics dispute the identity. See Volney, Recherches sur l'Hist. Anc. vol. ii, ch. 13, p. 239: "Les Arabes ont conservé l'habitude d'appeler Jerusalem la Sainte par excellence, *el Qods*. Sans doute les Chaldéens et les Syriens lui donnèrent le même nom, qui dans leur dialecte est *Qadouta*, dont Hérodote rend bien l'orthographie quand il écrit Κάδυτις."

[625] Jeremiah, xlvi, 2; 2d book of Kings, xxiii and xxiv; Josephus, Ant. J. x, 5, 1; x, 6, 1.

About Nebuchadnezzar, see the Fragment of Berosus ap. Joseph. cont. Apion. i, 19-20, and Antiqq. J. x, 11, 1, and Berosi Fragment. ed. Ritcher pp. 65-67.

[626] Menander ap. Joseph. Antiq. J. ix, 14, 2. Ἐπὶ Εἰθωβάλου τοῦ βασιλέως ἐπολιόρκησε Ναβουχοδονόσορος τὴν Τύρον ἐπ᾽ ἔτε δεκάτρια. That this siege of thirteen years ended in the storming, capitulation, or submission (we know not which, and Volney goes beyond the evidence when he says, "Les Tyriens furent emportés *d'assaut* par le roi de Babylone," Recherches sur l'Histoire Ancienne, vol. ii, ch. 14, p. 250) of Tyre to the Chaldæan king, is quite certain from the mention which afterwards follows of the Tyrian princes being detained captive in Babylonia. Hengstenberg (De Rebus Tyriorum, pp. 34-77) heaps up a mass of arguments, most of them very inconclusive, to prove this point, about which the passage cited by Josephus from Menander leaves no doubt. What is *not* true, is, that Tyre was destroyed and laid desolate by Nebuchadnezzar: still less can it be believed that that king conquered Egypt and Libya, as Megasthenes, and even Berosus, so far as Egypt is concerned, would have us believe,—the argument of Larcher ad Herodot. ii, 168, is anything but satisfactory. The defeat of the Egyptian king at Carchemisch, and the stripping him of his foreign possessions in Judæa and Syria, have been exaggerated into a conquest of Egypt itself.

[627] Herodot. ii, 161. He simply mentions what I have stated in the text; while Diodorus tells us (i, 68) that the Egyptian king took Sidon by assault, terrified the other Phenician towns into submission, and defeated the Phenicians and Cyprians in a great naval battle, acquiring a vast spoil.

What authority Diodorus here followed, I do not know; but the measured statement of Herodotus is far the most worthy of credit.

[628] Herodot. iii, 19.

[629] Herodot. ii, 161; iv, 159.

[630] Herodot. ii, 162-169; Diodor. i, 68.

[631] Herodot. ii, 153.

[632] Herodot. ii, 178. The few words of the historian about these Greek establishments at Naukratis are highly valuable, and we can only wish that he had told us more: he speaks of them in the present tense, from personal knowledge—τὸ μὲν νῦν μέγιστον αὐτέων τέμενος καὶ οὐνομαστότατον ἐὸν καὶ χρησιμώτατον, καλεύμενον δὲ Ἑλλήνιον, αἵδε πόλις εἰσὶν αἱ ἱδρυμέναι—Τουτέων μέν ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ τέμενος, καὶ προστάτας τοῦ ἐμπορίου αὗται αἱ πόλις εἰσὶν αἱ παρέχουσαι. Ὅσαι δὲ ἄλλαι πόλις μεταποιεῦνται, οὐδέν σφι μετεὸν μεταποιεῦνται.

We are here let into a vein of commercial jealousy between the Greek cities about which we should have been glad to be farther informed.

[633] Herodot. ii, 179. Ἦν δὲ τοπαλαιὸν μούνη ἡ Ναύκρατις ἐμπόριον, καὶ ἄλλο οὐδὲν Αἰγύπτου…. Οὕτω δὴ Ναύκρατις ἐτετίμητο.

[634] The beautiful Thracian courtezan, Rhodôpis, was purchased by a Samian merchant named Xanthês, and conveyed to Naukratis, in order that he might make money by her (κατ᾽ ἐργασίην). The speculation proved a successful one, for Charaxus, brother of Sappho, going to Naukratis with a cargo of wine, became so captivated with Rhodôpis, that he purchased her for a very large sum of money, and gave her her freedom. She then carried on her profession at Naukratis on her own account, realized a handsome fortune, the tithe of which she employed in a votive offering at Delphi, and acquired so much renown, that the Egyptian Greeks ascribed to her the building of one of the pyramids,—a supposition, on the absurdity of which Herodotus makes proper comments, but which proves the great celebrity of the name of Rhodôpis (Herodot. ii, 134). Athenæus calls her Dôrichê, and distinguishes her from Rhodôpis (xiii. p. 596, compare Suidas, v. Ῥοδωπίδος ἀνάθημα). When Charaxus returned to Mitylênê, his sister Sappho composed a song, in which she greatly derided him for this proceeding,—a song which doubtless Herodotus knew, and which gives to the whole anecdote a complete authenticity.

Now we can hardly put the age of Sappho lower than 600-580 B. C. (see Mr. Clinton, Fasti Hellen ad ann. 595 B. C., and Ulrici, Geschichte der Griech. Lyrik, ch. xxiii, p. 360): Alkæus, too, her contemporary, had himself visited Egypt. (Alcæi Fragm. 103, ed. Bergk; Strabo, i, p. 63). The Greek settlement at Naukratis, therefore, must be decidedly older than Amasis, who began to reign in 570 B. C., and the residence of Rhodôpis in that town must have begun earlier than Amasis, though Herodotus calls her κατ᾽ Ἄμασιν ἀκμάζουσα (ii, 134). Nor

can we construe the language of Herodotus strictly, when he says that it was Amasis who *permitted* the residence of Greeks at Naukratis (ii, 173).

[635] Herodot. ii, 181.

[636] Herodot. i, 77; iii, 39.

[637] Herodot. ii, 182, 154. κατοίκισε ἐς Μέμφιν, φυλακὴν ἑωϋτοῦ ποιεύμενος πρὸς Αἰγυπτίων.

[638] Herodot. ii, 175-177.

[639] Thucyd. i, 13.

[640] Herodot. iii, 107.

[641] The various statements or conjectures to be found in Greek authors (all comparatively recent) respecting the origin of the Greek alphabet, are collected by Franz, Epigraphicê Græca, s. iii, pp. 12-20: "Omnino Græci alphabeti ut certa primordia sunt in origine Phœniciâ, ita certus terminus in litteraturâ Ionicâ seu Simonideâ. Quæ inter utrumque a veteribus ponuntur, incerta omnia et fabulosa…. Non commoramur in iis quæ de litterarum origine et propagatione ex fabulosâ Pelasgorum historiâ (cf. Knight, pp. 119-123; Raoul Rochette, pp. 67-87) neque in iis quæ de Cadmo narrantur quem unquam fuisse hodie jam nemo crediderit…. Alphabeti Phœnicii omnes 22 literas cum antiquis Græcis congruere, hodie nemo est qui ignoret." (pp. 14-15.) Franz gives valuable information respecting the changes gradually introduced into the Greek alphabet, and the erroneous statements of the Grammatici as to what letters were original, and what were subsequently added.

Kruse also, in his "Hellas," (vol. i, p. 13, and in the first Beylage, annexed to that volume,) presents an instructive comparison of the Greek, Latin, and Phenician alphabets.

The Greek authors, as might be expected, were generally much more fond of referring the origin of letters to native heroes or gods, such as Palamêdês, Promêtheus, Musæus, Orpheus, Linus, etc., than to the Phenicians. The oldest known statement (that of Stêsichorus, Schol. ap. Bekker. Anecdot. ii, p. 786) ascribes them to Palamêdês.

Both Franz and Kruse contend strenuously for the existence and habit of writing among the Greeks in times long anterior to Homer: in which I dissent from them.

[642] See O. Müller, Die Etrusker (iv, 6), where there is much instruction on the Tuscan alphabet.

[643] This question is raised and discussed by Justus Olshausen, Ueber den Ursprung des Alphabetes (pp. 1-10), in the Kieler Philologische Studien, 1841.

[644] See Boeckh, Metrologie, chs. iv, v, vi; also the preceding volume of this History.

[645] Utica is said to have been founded 287 years earlier than Carthage; the author who states this, professing to draw his information from Phenician histories (Aristot. Mirab. Auscult. c. 134). Velleius Paterculus states Gadês to be older than Utica, and places the foundation of Carthage B. C. 819 (i, 2, 6). He seems to follow in the main the same authority as the composer of the Aristotelic compilation above cited. Other statements place the foundation of Carthage in 878 B. C. (Heeren, Ideen über den Verkehr, etc., part ii, b. i, p. 29). Appian states the date of the foundation as fifty years before the Trojan war (De Reb. Punic. c. 1); Philistus, as twenty-one years before the same event (Philist. Fragm. 50, ed. Göller); Timæus, as thirty-eight years earlier than the 1st Olympiad (Timæi Fragm. 21, ed. Didot); Justin, seventy-two years earlier than the foundation of Rome (xviii, 6).

The citation which Josephus gives from Menander's work, extracted from Tyrian ἀναγραφαὶ, placed the foundation of Carthage 143 years after the building of the temple of Jerusalem (Joseph. cont. Apion. i, c. 17-18). Apion said that Carthage was founded in the first year of Olympiad 7 (B. C. 748), (Joseph. c. Apion. ii, 2.)

[646] "Quamdiu Carthago invicta fuit, pro Deâ culta est." (Justin. xviii, 6; Virgil, Æneid, i, 340-370.) We trace this legend about Dido up to Timæus (Timæi Frag. 23, ed. Didot): Philistus seems to have followed a different story;—he said that Carthage had been founded by Azor and Karchêdôn (Philist. Fr. 50). Appian notices both stories (De Reb. Pun. 1): that of Dido was current both among the Romans and Carthaginians: of Zôrus (or Ezôrus) and Karchêdôn, the second is evidently of Greek coinage, the first seems genuine Phenician: see Josephus cont. Apion. i, c. 18-21.

[647] See Movers, Die Phönizier, pp. 609-616.

[648] Strabo, xvii, p. 826.

[649] Herodot. iii, 19.

[650] Thucyd. vi, 2; Philistus, Fragm. 3, ed. Göller, ap. Diodor. v, 6. Timæus adopted the opposite opinion (Diodor. *l. c.*), also Ephorus, if we may judge by an indistinct passage of Strabo (vi, p. 270). Dionysius of Halikarnassus follows Thucydidês (A. R. i, 22).

The opinion of Philistus is of much value on this point, since he was, or might have been, personally cognizant of Iberian mercenaries in the service of the elder Dionysius.

[651] Pherekyd. Fragm. 85, ed. Didot; Hellanik. Fr. 53, ed. Didot; Dionys. Halik. A. R. i, 11, 13, 22; Skymnus Chius, v. 362; Pausan. viii, 3, 5.

[652] Stephan. Byz. v. Χῖοι.

[653] Aristot. Polit. vii, 9, 3. Ὤκουν δὲ τὸ πρὸς τὴν Ἰαπυγίαν καὶ τὸν Ἰόνιον Χῶνες (or Χάονες) τὴν καλουμένην Σίριν· ἦσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χῶνες Οἰνωτροὶ τὸ γένος.

Antiochus Fr. 3, 4, 6, 7, ed. Didot; Strabo, vi, p. 254; Hesych. v. Χώνην, Dionys. Hal. A. R. i, 12.

[654] Livy, viii, 24.

[655] For the early habitation of Sikels or Siculi in Latium and Campania, see Dionys. Hal. A. R. i, 1-21: it is curious that Siculi and Sicani, whether the same or different, the primitive ante-Hellenic population of Sicily, are also numbered as the ante-Roman population of Rome: see Virgil, Æneid, viii, 328, and Servius ad Æneid. xi, 317.

The alleged ancient emigration of Evander from Arcadia to Latium forms a parallel to the emigration of Œnotrus from Arcadia to southern Italy as recounted by Pherekydês: it seems to have been mentioned even as early as in one of the Hesiodic poems (Servius ad Virg. Æn. viii, 138): compare Steph. Byz. v. Παλλάντιον. The earliest Latin authors appear all to have recognized Evander and his Arcadian emigrants: see Dionys. Hal. i, 31-32, ii, 9, and his references to Fabius Pictor and Ælius Tubero, i, 79-80; also Cato ap. Solinum, c. 2. If the old reading Ἀρκάδων, in Thucyd. vi, 2 (which Bekker has now altered into Σικελῶν), be retained, Thucydidês would also stand as witness for a migration from Arcadia into Italy. A third emigration of Pelasgi, from Peloponnesus to the river Sarnus in southern Italy (near Pompeii), was mentioned by Conon (ap. Servium ap. Virg. Æn. vii, 730).

[656] Herodotus (i, 24-167) includes Elea (or Velia) in Œnotria,—and Tarentum in Italia; while Antiochus considers Tarentum as in Iapygia, and the southern boundary of the Tarentine territory as the northern boundary of Italia: Dionysius of Halikarnassus (A. R. ii, 1) seems to copy from Antiochus when he extends the Œnotrians along the whole south-western corner of Italy, within the line drawn from Tarentum to Poseidonia, or Pæstum. Hence the appellation Οἰνωτρίδες νῆσοι to the two islands opposite Elea (Strabo, vi, p. 253). Skymnus Chius (v. 247) recognizes the same boundaries.

Twelve Œnotrian cities are cited by name (in Stephanus Byzantinus) from the Εὐρώπη of Hekatæus (Frag. 30-39, ed. Didot): Skylax in his Periplus does not name Œnotrians; he enumerates Campanians, Samnites, and Lucanians (cap. 9-13). The intimate connection between Milêtus and Sybaris would enable Hekatæus to inform himself about the interior Œnotrian country.

Œnotria and Italia together, as conceived by Antiochus and Herodotus, comprised what was known a century afterwards as Lucania and Bruttium: see Mannert, Geographie der Griech. und Römer, part ix, b. 9, ch. i, p. 86. Livy, speaking with reference to 317 B. C., when the Lucanian nation as well as the Bruttians were in full vigor, describes only the sea-coast of the lower sea as Grecian,—"cum omni orâ Græcorum inferi maris a Thuriis Neapolim et Cumas," (ix, 19.) Verrius Flaccus considered the Sikels as *Græci* (Festus, v, Major Græcia, with Müller's note).

[657] Sophoklês, Triptolem. Fr. 527, ed. Dindorf. He places the lake Avernus, which was close to the Campanian Cumæ, in Tyrrhenia: see Lexicon Sophocleum, ad calc. ed. Brunck, v. Ἄορνος. Euripidês (Medea, 1310-1326) seems to extend Tyrrhenia to the strait of Messina.

[658] Aristot. Polit. vii, 9, 3. ᾤκουν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὴν Τυῤῥηνίαν Ὀπικοὶ, καὶ πρότερον καὶ νῦν καλούμενοι τὴν ἐπίκλησιν Αὔσονες. Festus: "*Ausoniam* appellavit Auson, Ulyssis et Calypsûs filius, eam primam partem Italiæ in quâ sunt urbes Beneventum et Cales: deinde paulatim tota quoque Italia quæ Apennino finitur, dicta est Ausonia," etc. The original Ausonia would thus coincide nearly with the territory called Samnium, after the

Sabine emigrants had conquered it: see Livy, viii, 16; Strabo, v, p. 250; Virg. Æn. vii, 727, with Servius. Skymnus Chius (v, 227) has copied from the same source as Festus. For the extension of Ausonians along various parts of the more southern coast of Italy, even to Rhegium, as well as to the Liparæan isles, see Diodor. v, 7-8; Cato, Origg. Fr. lib. iii, ap. Probum ad Virg. Bucol. v, 2. The Pythian priestess, in directing the Chalkidic emigrants to Rhegium, says to them,—Ἔνθα πόλιν οἴκιζε, διδοῖ δέ σοι Αὔσονα χώραν (Diodor. Fragm. xiii, p. 11, ap Scriptt. Vatic. ed. Maii). Temesa is Ausonian in Strabo, vi, p. 255.

[659] Thucyd. vi. 3; Aristot. ap. Dionys. Hal. A. R. i, 72. Ἀχαιῶν τινας τῶν ἀπὸ Τροίης ἀνακομιζομένων,—ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὸν τόπον τοῦτον τῆς Ὁπικῆς, ὃς καλεῖται Λάτιον.

Even in the time of Cato the elder, the Greeks comprehended the Romans under the general, and with them contemptuous, designation of Opici (Cato ap. Plin. H. N. xxii, 1: see Antiochus ap. Strab. v, p. 242).

[660] Thucyd. vi, 2. Σικελοὶ δὲ ἐξ Ἰταλίας φεύγοντες Ὁπικοὺς διέβησαν ἐς Σικελίαν (see a Fragment of the geographer Menippus of Pergamus, in Hudson's Geogr. Minor. i, p. 76). Antiochus stated that the Sikels were driven out of Italy into Sicily by the Opicians and Œnotrians; but the Sikels themselves, according to him, were also Œnotrians (Dionys. H. i, 12-22). It is remarkable that Antiochus (who wrote at a time when the name of Rome had not begun to exercise that fascination over men's minds which the Roman power afterwards occasioned), in setting forth the mythical antiquity of the Sikels and Œnotrians, represents the eponymous Sikelus as an exile from Rome, who came into the south of Italy to the king Morgês, successor of Italus,—Ἐπεὶ δὲ Ἰταλὸς κατεγήρα, Μόργης ἐβασίλευσεν. Ἐπὶ τούτου δὲ ἀνὴρ ἀφίκετο ἐκ Ῥώμης φυγὰς, Σικελὸς ὄνομα αὐτῷ (Antiochus ap. Dionys. H. i, 73: compare c. 12).

Philistus considered Sikelus to be a son of Italus: both he and Hellanikus believed in early migrations from Italy into Sicily, but described the emigrants differently (Philistus, Frag. 2, ed. Didot).

[661] See the learned observations upon the early languages of Italy and Sicily, which Müller has prefixed to his work on the Etruscans (Einleitung, i, 12). I transcribe the following summary of his views respecting the early Italian dialects and races: "The notions which we thus obtain respecting the early languages of Italy are as follows: the *Sikel*, a sister language, nearly allied to the Greek or Pelasgic; the *Latin*, compounded from the Sikel and from the rougher dialect of the men called *Aborigines*; the *Oscan*, akin to the Latin in both its two elements; the language spoken by the Sabine emigrants in their various conquered territories, *Oscan*; the *Sabine proper*, a distinct and peculiar language, yet nearly connected with the non-Grecian element in Latin and Oscan, as well as with the language of the oldest Ausonians and Aborigines."

[N. B. This last statement, respecting the original Sabine language, is very imperfectly made out: it seems equally probable that the Sabellians may have differed from the Oscans no more than the Dorians from the Ionians: see Niebuhr, Röm. Gesch. tom. i, p. 69.]

"Such a comparison of languages presents to us a certain view, which I shall here briefly unfold, of the earliest history of the Italian races. At a period anterior to all records, a single people, akin to the Greeks, dwelling extended from the south of Tuscany down to the straits of Messina, occupies in the upper part of its territory only the valley of the Tiber,—lower down, occupies the mountainous districts also, and in the south, stretches across from sea to sea,—called Sikels, Œnotrians, or Peucetians. Other mountain tribes, powerful, though not widely extended, live in the northern Abruzzo and its neighborhood: in the east, the Sabines, southward from them the cognate Marsi, more to the west the Aborigines, and among them probably the old Ausonians or Oscans. About 1000 years prior to the Christian era, there arises among these tribes—from whom almost all the popular migrations in ancient Italy have proceeded—a movement whereby the Aborigines more northward, the Sikels more southward, are precipitated upon the Sikels of the plains beneath. Many thousands of the great Sikel nation withdraw to their brethren the Œnotrians, and by degrees still farther across the strait to the island of Sicily. Others of them remain stationary in their residences, and form, in conjunction with the Aborigines, the Latin nation,—in conjunction with the Ausonians, the Oscan nation: the latter extends itself over what was afterwards called Samnium and Campania. Still, the population and power of these mountain tribes, especially that of the Sabines, goes on perpetually on the increase: as they pressed onward towards the Tiber, at the period when Rome was only a single town, so they also advanced southwards, and conquered,—first, the mountainous Opica; next, some centuries later, the Opician plain, Campania; lastly, the ancient country of the Œnotrians, afterwards denominated Lucania."

Compare Niebuhr, Römisch. Geschicht. vol. i, p. 80, 2d edit., and the first chapter of Mr. Donaldson's Varronianus.

[662] Thucyd. vi, 2; Philistus, Frag. 2, ed. Didot.

[663] Strabo, v, p. 243; Velleius Patercul. i, 5; Eusebius, p 121. M. Raoul Rochette, assuming a different computation of the date of the Trojan war, pushes the date of Cumæ still farther back to 1139 B. C. (Histoire des Colonies Grecques, book iv, c. 12, p. 100.)

The mythes of Cumæ extended to a period preceding the Chalkidic settlement. See the stories of Aristæus and Dædalus ap. Sallust. Fragment. Incert. p. 204, ed. Delphin.; and Servius ad Virgil. Æneid. vi, 17. The fabulous Thespiadæ, or primitive Greek settlers in Sardinia, were supposed in early ages to have left that island and retired to Cumæ (Diodor. v, 15).

[664] Ephorus, Frag. 52, ed. Didot.

[665] Strabo, v, p. 243; Velleius Paterc. i, 5.

[666] See the site of Cumæ as described by Agathias (on occasion of the siege of the place by Narses, in 552 A. D.), Histor. i, 8-10; also by Strabo, v, p. 244.

[667] Diodor. iv, 21, v, 71; Polyb. iii, 91; Pliny, H. N. iii, 5; Livy, viii, 22. "In Baiano sinu Campaniæ contra Puteolanam civitatem lacus sunt duo, Avernus et Lucrinus: qui olim propter piscium copiam vectigalia magna præstabant," (Servius ad Virg. Georgic. ii, 161.)

[668] Strabo, v, p. 243. Καὶ εἰσέπλεόν γε οἱ προθυσόμενοι καὶ ἱλασόμενοι τοὺς καταχθονίους δαίμονας, ὄντων τῶν ὑφηγουμένων τὰ τοιάδε ἱερέων, ἠργολαβηκότων τὸν τόπον.

[669] Dionys. H. iv, 61-62, vi, 21; Livy, ii, 34.

[670] See, respecting the transmission of ideas and fables from the Æolic Kymê to Cumæ in Campania, the first volume of this History, chap. xv, p. 457.

The father of Hesiod was a native of the Æolic Kymê: we find in the Hesiodic Theogony (*ad fin.*) mention of Latinus as the son of Odysseus and Circê: Servius cites the same from the Ἀσπιδοποιΐα of Hesiod (Servius ad Virg. Æn. xii, 162; compare Cato, Fragment. p. 33, ed. Lion). The great family of the Mamilii at Tusculum, also derived their origin from Odysseus and Circê (Livy, i, 49).

The tomb of Elpênôr, the lost companion of Odysseus, was shown at Circeii in the days of Theophrastus (Hist. Plant. v, 8, 3) and Skylax (c. 10).

Hesiod notices the promontory of Pelôrus. the strait of Messina, and the islet of Ortygia near Syracuse (Diodor. iv, 85; Strabo, i, p. 23).

[671] Livy, ii. 9.

[672] Niebuhr, Römisch. Geschicht. vol. i. p. 76, 2d edit.

[673] The history of Aristodêmus Malakus is given at some length by Dionysius of Halikarnassus (viii, 3-10).

[674] Livy, ii, 21.

[675] Velleius Patercul. i, 5.

[676] Compare Strabo, v, p. 250; vi. p. 264. "Cumanos Osca mutavit vicinia," says Velleius, *l. c.*

[677] Diodor. xi, 51; Pindar, Pyth. i, 71.

[678] Thucyd. vi, 3; Strabo, vi, p. 267.

[679] The admixture of Naxian colonists may be admitted, as well upon the presumption arising from the name, as from the statement of Hellanikus, ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Χαλκίς.

Ephorus put together into one the Chalkidian and the Megarian migrations, which Thucydidês represents as distinct (Ephorus ap. Strabo, vi, p. 267).

[680] Thucyd. vi, 3; Diodor. xiv, 59-88.

[681] Mannert places the boundary of Sikels and Sikans at these mountains: Otto Siefert (Akragas und sein Gebiet, Hamburg, 1845, p. 53) places it at the Gemelli Colles, rather more to the westward,—thus contracting the domain of the Sikans: compare Diodor. iv, 82-83.

[682] Thucyd. vi, 2.

[683] Mr. Fynes Clinton discusses the era of Syracuse, Fasti Hellenici, ad B. C. 734, and the same work, vol. ii. Appendix xi, p. 264.

[684] See Colonel Leake, notes on the Topography of Syracuse, p. 41.

[685] Athenæ. iv, 167; Strabo, ix, p. 380.

[686] Diodor. Frag. Lit. viii, p. 24; Plutarch, Narrat. Amator. p. 772; Schol. Apollon. Rhod. iv, 1212.

[687] Polyænus (v. 5. 1) describes the stratagem of Theoklês on this occasion.

[688] Polyænus details a treacherous stratagem whereby this expulsion is said to have been accomplished (v, 5. 2).

[689] Thucydid. vi, 3. Ὕβλωνος τοῦ βασιλέως προδόντος τὴν χώραν καὶ καθηγησαμένου.

[690] Thucydid. vi, 4; Diodor. Excerpt. Vatican. ed. Maii, Fragm. xiii, p. 13; Pausanias, viii, 46, 2.

[691] Thucydid. vi, 4.

[692] Strabo, vi, p. 272.

[693] Stephanus Byz. Σικανία, ἡ περίχωρος Ἀκραγαντινῶν. Herodot. vii, 170; Diodor. iv, 78.

Vessa, the most considerable among the Sikanian townships or villages, with its prince Teutus, is said to have been conquered by Phalaris despot of Agrigentum, through a mixture of craft and force (Polyæn. v, 1, 4).

[694] Of these Sikel or Sikan caverns many traces yet remain: see Otto Siefert, Akragas und sein Gebiet, pp. 39, 45, 49, 55, and the work of Captain W. H. Smyth,—Sicily and its Islands, London, 1824, p. 190.

"These cryptæ (observes the latter) appear to have been the earliest effort of a primitive and pastoral people towards a town, and are generally without regularity as to shape and magnitude: in after-ages they perhaps served as a retreat in time of danger, and as a place of security in case of extraordinary alarm, for women, children, and valuables. In this light, I was particularly struck with the resemblance these rude habitations bore to the caves I had seen in Owhyhee, for similar uses. The Troglodyte villages of Northern Africa, of which I saw several, are also precisely the same."

About the early cave-residences in Sardinia and the Balearic islands, consult Diodor. v, 15-17.

[695] Thucydid. vi, 45. τὰ περιπόλια τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ (of Syracuse).

[696] Respecting the statical and monetary system, prevalent among the Italian and Sicilian Greeks, see Aristot. Fragment. περὶ Πολιτειῶν, ed. Neumann, p. 102; Pollux, iv, 174, ix, 80-87; and above all, Boeckh, Metrologie, ch. xviii, p. 292, and the abstract and review of that work in the Classical Museum, No. 1; also, O. Müller, Die Etrusker, vol. i, p. 309.

The Sicilian Greeks reckoned by talents, each consisting of 120 litræ or libræ: the Æginæan obolus was the equivalent of the litra, having been the value in silver of a pound-weight of copper, at the time when the valuation was taken.

The common denominations of money and weight—with the exception of the talent, the meaning of which was altered while the word was retained—seem to have been all borrowed by the Italian and Sicilian Greeks from the Sikel or Italic scale, not from the Grecian,—νούμμος, λίτρα, δεκάλιτρον, πεντεκοντάλιτρον, πεντούγκιον, ἑξᾶς, τετρᾶς, τριᾶς, ἥμινα, ἡμιλίτριον (see Fragments of Epicharmus and Sophron, ap. Ahrens de Dialecto Doricâ, Appendix, pp 435, 471, 472, and Athenæ. xi, p. 479).

[697] Thucyd. vi, 88.

[698] Thucyd. vi, 62-87; vii, 13.

[699] Cicero in Verrem, Act. ii, lib. iv, c. 26-51; Diodor. v. 6.

Contrast the manner in which Cicero speaks of Agyrium, Centuripi, and Enna, with the description of these places as inhabited by autonomous Sikels, B. C. 396, in the wars of the elder Dionysius (Diodor. xiv, 55, 58, 78). Both Sikans and Sikels were at that time completely distinguished from the Greeks, in the centre of the island.

O. Müller states that "Syracuse, seventy years after its foundation, colonized Akræ, also Enna, situated in the centre of the island," (Hist. of Dorians, i, 6, 7). Enna is mentioned by Stephanus Byz. as a Syracusan foundation, but without notice of the date of its foundation, which must have been much later than Müller here affirms. Serra di Falco (Antichità di Sicilia, Introd. t. i, p. 9) gives Enna as having been founded later than Akræ, but earlier than Kasmenæ: for which date I find no authority. Talaria (see Steph. Byz. *ad voc.*) is also mentioned as another Syracusan city, of which we do not know either the date or the particulars of foundation.

[700] Ahrens, De Dialecto Doricâ, sect. 1, p. 3.

[701] Plato, Epistol. vii, p. 326; Plautus, Rudens, Act i, Sc. 1, 56; Act ii. Sc. 6, 58.

[702] Timokreon, Fragment. 5 ap. Ahrens, De Dialecto Doricâ, p. 478,—Σικελὸς κομψὸς ἀνὴρ Ποτὶ τὰν ματέρ᾽ ἔφα.

Bernhardy, Grundriss der Geschichte der Griech. Litteratur, vol. ii, ch. 120, sects. 2-5; Grysar, De Doriensium Comœdia, Cologne, 1828, ch. i, pp. 41, 55, 57, 210; Boeckh, De Græcæ Tragœd. Princip. p. 52; Aristot. ap. Athenæ. xi, 505. The κότταβος seems to have been a native Sikel fashion, borrowed by the Greeks (Athenæus, xv, pp. 666-668).

The Sicilian βουκολιασμὸς was a fashion among the Sicilian herdsmen earlier than Epicharmus, who noticed the alleged inventor of it, Diomus, the βούκολος Σικελιώτης (Athenæ. xiv, p. 619). The rustic manners and speech represented in the Sicilian comedy are contrasted with the town manners and speech of the Attic comedy, by Plautus, Persæ. Act. iii. Sc. 1, v, 31:—

"Librorum eccillum habeo plenum soracum.

Dabuntur dotis tibi inde sexcenti logi,

Atque Attici omnes, nullum Siculum acceperis."

Compare the beginning of the prologue to the Menæchmi of Plautus.

The comic μῦθος began at Syracuse with Epicharmus and Phormis (Aristot. Poet, v, 5).

[703] Zenobius, Proverb. v, 84.—Σικελὸς στρατιώτης.

[704] Diodor. xi, 90-91; xii, 9.

[705] See Dolomieu, Dissertation on the Earthquakes of Calabria Ultra, in 1783, in Pinkerton, Collection of Voyages and Travels, vol. v, p. 280.

"It is impossible (he observes) to form an adequate idea of the fertility of Calabria Ultra, particularly of that part called the Plain (south-west of the Apennines, below the gulf of St. Eufemia). The fields, productive of olive-trees of larger growth than any seen elsewhere, are yet productive of grain. Vines load with their branches the trees on which they grow, yet lessen not their crops. All things grow there, and nature seems to anticipate the wishes of the husbandman. There is never a sufficiency of hands to gather the whole of the olives, which finally fall and rot at the bottom of the trees that bore them, in the months of February and March. Crowds of foreigners, principally Sicilians, come there to help to gather them, and share the produce with the grower. Oil is their chief article of exportation: in every quarter their wines are good and precious." Compare pp. 278-282.

[706] Mr. Keppel Craven observes (Tour through the Southern Provinces of Naples, ch. xiii, p. 254), "The earthquake of 1783 may be said to have altered the face of the whole of Calabria Ultra, and extended its ravages as far northward as Cosenza."

[707] Aristot. Polit. vii, 9, 3.

[708] Strabo, vi, p. 263. Kramer, in his new edition of Strabo follows Koray in suspecting the correctness of the name Ἰσελικεὺς, which certainly departs from the usual analogy of Grecian names. Assuming it to be incorrect, however, there are no means of rectifying it: Kramer prints,—οἰκιστὴς δὲ αὐτῆς ὁ Ἰσ…Ἑλικεὺς: thus making Ἑλικεὺς the ethnicon of the Achæan town Helikê.

There were also legends which connected the foundation of Krotôn with Hêraklês, who was affirmed to have been hospitably sheltered by the eponymous hero Krotôn. Hêraklês was οἰκεῖος at Krotôn: see Ovid, Metamorph.

xv, 1-60; Jamblichus, Vit. Pythagor. c. 8, p. 30, c. 9, p. 37, ed Kuster.

[709] Herodot. i, 145.

[710] Strabo, vi, p. 262; Livy, xxiv, 3.

[711] Aristot. Polit. v, 2, 10

[712] Strabo, vi, p. 263, v, p. 251; Skymn. Chi. v, 244; Herodot. vi, 21.

[713] Stephan. Byz. v. Τέρινα—Λαμητῖνοι; Skymn. Chi. 305.

[714] Thucydid. v, 5; Strabo, vi, p. 256; Skymn. Chi. 307. Steph. Byz. calls Mataurum πόλις Σικελίας.

[715] Herodot. viii, 47. Κροτωνιῆται, γένος εἰσὶν Ἀχαιοί: the date of the foundation is given by Dionysius of Halikarnassus (A. R. ii, 59).

The oracular commands delivered to Myskellus are found at length in the Fragments of Diodorus, published by Maii (Scriptt. Vet. Fragm. x, p. 8): compare Zenob. Proverb. Centur. iii, 42.

Though Myskellus is thus given as the œkist of Krotôn, yet we find a Krotoniatic coin with the inscription Ἡρακλῆς Οἰκίστας (Eckhel, Doctrin. Numm. Vet. vol. i, p. 172): the worship of Hêraklês at Krotôn under this title is analogous to that of Ἀπολλὼν Οἰκίστης καὶ Δωματίτης at Ægina (Pythænêtus ap. Schol. Pindar. Nem. v, 81). There were various legends respecting Hêraklês, the Eponymus Krotôn, and Lakinius. Herakleidês Ponticus, Fragm. 30, ed. Köller; Diodor. iv, 24; Ovid, Metamorph. xv, 1-53.

[716] Strabo, vi, p. 259. Euantheia, Hyantheia, or Œantheia, was one of the towns of the Ozolian Lokrians on the north side of the Krissæan gulf, from which, perhaps, the emigrants may have departed, carrying with them the name and patronage of its eponymous œkist (Plutarch, Quæst. Græc. c. 15; Skylax, p. 14).

[717] Polyb. xii, 5, 8, 9; Dionys. Perieget. v, 365.

[718] This fact may connect the foundation of the colony of Lokri with Sparta; but the statement of Pausanias (iii, 3, 1), that the Spartans in the reign of king Polydorus founded both Lokri and Krotôn, seems to belong to a different historical conception.

[719] Polyb. xii, 5-12.

[720] Strabo, vi, p. 259. We find that, in the accounts given of the foundation of Korkyra, Krotôn, and Lokri, reference is made to the Syracusan settlers, either as contemporary in the way of companionship, or as auxiliaries: perhaps the accounts all come from the Syracusan historian Antiochus, who exaggerated the intervention of his own ancestors.

[721] "Nil patrium, nisi nomen, habet Romanus alumnus," observes Propertius (iv, 37) respecting the Romans: repeated with still greater bitterness in the epistle in Sallust from Mithridatês to Arsacês, (p. 191, Delph. ed.) The remark is well-applicable to Lokri.

[722] Aristot. ap. Schol. Pindar. Olymp. x, 17.

[723] Proverb. Zenob. Centur. iv, 20. Ζαλεύκου νόμος, ἐπὶ τῶν ἀποτόμων.

[724] Strabo, vi, p. 259; Skymnus Chius, v, 313; Cicero de Legg. ii, 6, and Epist. ad Atticum, vi, 1.

Heyne, Opuscula, vol. ii, Epimetrum ii, pp. 60-68; Göller ad Timæi Fragment, pp. 220-259. Bentley (on the Epistles of Phalaris, ch. xii, p 274) seems to countenance, without adequate reason, the doubt of Timæus about the existence of Zaleukus. But the statement of Ephorus, that Zaleukus had collected his ordinances from the Kretan, Laconian, and Areiopagitic customs, when contrasted with the simple and far more credible statement above cited from Aristotle, shows how loose were the affirmations respecting the Lokrian lawgiver (ap. Strabo, vi, p. 260). Other statements, also, concerning him, alluded to by Aristotle (Politic. ii, 9, 3), were distinctly at variance with chronology.

Charondas, the lawgiver of the Chalkidic towns in Italy and Sicily, as far as we can judge amidst much confusion of testimony, seems to belong to an age much later than Zaleukus: I shall speak of him hereafter.

[725] Dêmosthen. cont. Timokrat. p. 744; Polyb. xii, 10.

[726] Strabo, vi, p. 257; Pausan. iv, 23, 2.

[727] Strabo, vi, p. 258. ἴσχυσε δὲ μάλιστα ἡ τῶν Ῥηγινῶν πόλις, καὶ περιοικίδας ἔσχε συχνὰς, etc.

[728] Strabo, vi. p. 263; Aristot. Mirab. Ausc. c. 106; Athenæ. xii, p. 523. It is to these reputed Rhodian companions of Tlêpolemus before Troy, that the allusion in Strabo refers, to Rhodian occupants near Sybaris (xiv, p. 655).

[729] See Mannert, Geographie, part ix, b. 9, ch. 11, p. 234.

[730] Archiloch. Fragm. 17, ed. Schneidewin.

[731] Herodot. vi, 127; Strabo, vi, p. 263. The name Polieion seems to be read Πλεῖον in Aristot. Mirab. Auscult. 106.

Niebuhr assigns this Kolophonian settlement of Siris to the reign of Gygês in Lydia; for which I know no other evidence except the statement that Gygês took τῶν Κολοφωνίων τὸ ἄστυ (Herodot. i, 14); but this is no proof that the inhabitants then emigrated; for Kolophôn was a very flourishing and prosperous city afterwards.

Justin (xx, 2) gives a case of sacrilegious massacre committed near the statue of Athênê at Siris, which appears to be totally different from the tale respecting the Kolophonians.

[732] Herodot. viii, 62.

[733] Strabo, vi, p. 264.

[734] Strabo, vi, p. 264.

[735] Strabo, *l. c.*; Justin, xx, 2; Velleius Paterc. i, 1; Aristot. Mirab. Auscult. c. 108. This story respecting the presence and implements of Epeius may have arisen through the Phocian settlers from Krissa.

[736] The words of Strabo—ἠφανίσθη δ᾽ ὑπὸ Σαυνιτῶν (vi, p. 264) can hardly be connected with the immediately following narrative, which he gives out of Antiochus, respecting the revival of the place by new Achæan settlers, invited by the Achæans of Sybaris. For the latter place was reduced to impotence in 510 B. C.: invitations by the Achæans of Sybaris must, therefore, be anterior to that date. If Daulius despot of Krissa is to be admitted as the œkist of Metapontium, the plantation of it must be placed early in the first half of the sixth century B. C.; but there is great difficulty in admitting the extension of Samnite conquests to the gulf of Tarentum at so early a period as this. I therefore construe the words of Antiochus as referring to the original settlement of Metapontium by the Greeks, not to the revival of the town after its destruction by the Samnites.

[737] Strabo, *l. c.*; Stephanus Byz. (v. Μεταπόντιον) identifies Metapontium and Siris in a perplexing manner.

Livy (xxv, 15) recognizes Metapontium as Achæan: compare Heyne Opuscula, vol. ii, Prolus. xii, p. 207.

[738] Partheniæ, *i. e. children of virgins*: the description given by Varro of the Illyrian *virgines* illustrates this phrase: "Quas *virgines* ibi appellant, nonnunquam annorum xx, quibus mos eorum non denegavit, ante nuptias ut succumberent quibus vellent, et incomitatis ut vagari liceret, et *liberos habere*." (Varro, De Re Rusticâ, ii, 10, 9.)

[739] For this story respecting the foundation of Tarentum, see Strabo, vi, pp. 278-280 (who gives the versions both of Antiochus and Ephorus); Justin, iii, 4; Diodorus, xv, 66; Excerpta Vatican. lib. vii-x, ed. Maii, Fr. 12; Servius ad Virgil. Æneid. iii, 551.

There are several points of difference between Antiochus, Ephorus, and Servius; the story given in the text follows the former.

The statement of Hesychius (v. Παρθενεῖαι) seems on the whole some what more intelligible than that given by Strabo,—Οἱ κατὰ τὸν Μεσσηνιακὸν πόλεμον αὐτοῖς γενόμενοι ἐκ τῶν θεραπαίνων· καὶ οἱ ἐξ ἀνεκδότου λάθρα γεννώμενοι παῖδες. Justin translates Partheniæ, *Spurii*.

The local eponymous heroes Taras and Satyrus (from Satyrium) were celebrated and worshipped among the Tarentines. See Cicero, Verr. iv, 60, 13; Servius ad Virg. Georg. ii, 197; Zumpt. ap. Orelli, Onomasticon Tullian. ii, p. 570.

[740] Compare Strabo, vi, p. 264 and p. 280.

[741] Strabo, vi, p. 278; Polyb. x, 1.

[742] Juvenal, Sat. vi, 297. "Atque coronatum et petulans madidumque Tarentum:" compare Plato, Legg. i, p. 637; and Horat. Satir. ii, 4, 34. Aristot. Polit. iv, 4, 1. οἱ ἁλιεῖς ἐν Τἀραντι καὶ Βυζαντίῳ. "Tarentina ostrea," Varro, Fragm. p. 301, ed. Bipont.

To illustrate this remark of Aristotle on the fishermen of Tarentum, as the predominant class in the democracy, I transcribe a passage from Mr. Keppel Craven's Tour in the Southern Provinces of Naples, ch. x, p. 182. "Swinburne gives a list of ninety-three different sorts of shell-fish which are found in the gulf of Taranto; but more especially in the Mare Piccolo. Among these, in ancient times, the murex and purpura ranked foremost in value; in our degenerate days, the mussel and oyster seem to have usurped a preëminence as acknowledged but less dignified; but there are numerous other tribes held in proportionate estimation for their exquisite flavor, and as greedily sought for during their respective seasons. The appetite for shell-fish of all sorts, which seems peculiar to the natives of these regions, is such as to appear exaggerated to a foreigner, accustomed to consider only a few of them as eatable. This taste exists at Taranto, if possible, in a stronger degree than in any other part of the kingdom, and accounts for the comparatively large revenue which government draws from this particular branch of commerce. The Mare Piccolo is divided into several portions, which are let to different societies, who thereby become the only privileged fishermen; the lower classes are almost all employed by these corporations, as every revolving season of the year affords occupation for them, so that Nature herself seems to have afforded the exclusive trade most suited to the inhabitants of Taranto. Both seas abound with varieties of testacea, but the inner gulf (the Mare Piccolo) is esteemed most favorable to their growth and flavor; the sandy bed is literally blackened by the mussels that cover it; the boats that glide over its surface are laden with them; they emboss the rocks that border the strand, and appear equally abundant on the shore, piled up in heaps." Mr. Craven goes on to illustrate still farther the wonderful abundance of this fishery; but that which has been already transcribed, while it illustrates the above-noticed remark of Aristotle, will at the same time help to explain the prosperity and physical abundance of the ancient Tarentum.

For an elaborate account of the state of cultivation, especially of the olive, near the degenerate modern Taranto, see the Travels of M. De Salis Marschlins in the Kingdom of Naples (translated by Aufrere, London, 1795), sect. 5, pp. 82-107, 163-178.

[743] Skylax does not mention at all the name of Italy; he gives to the whole coast, from Rhegium to Poseidonia on the Mediterranean, and from the same point to the limit between Thurii and Herakleia on the gulf of Tarentum, the name of Lucania (c. 12-13). From this point he extends Iapygia to the Mount Drion, or Garganus, so that he includes not only Metapontium, but also Herakleia in Iapygia.

Antiochus draws the line between Italy and Iapygia at the extremity of the Metapontine territory; comprehending Metapontium in Italy, and Tarentum in Iapygia (Antiochus, Frag. 6, ed. Didot; ap. Strabo, vi, p. 254).

Herodotus, however, speaks not only of Metapontium but also of Tarentum, as being in Italy (i, 24; iii, 136; iv, 15).

I notice this discrepancy of geographical speech, between the two contemporaries Herodotus and Antiochus, the more especially, because Niebuhr has fallen into a mistake by exclusively following Antiochus, and by saying that *no writer*, even of the days of Plato, would have spoken of Tarentum as being *in Italy*, or of the Tarentines as Italiots. This is perfectly true respecting Antiochus, but is certainly not true with respect to Herodotus; nor can it be shown to be true with respect to Thucydidês,—for the passage of the latter, which Niebuhr produces, does not sustain his inference. (Niebuhr, Römische Geschichte, vol. i. pp. 16-18, 2d edit.)

[744] Herodot. vii, 170: Pliny, H. N. iii, 16; Athenæ. xii, p. 523; Servius ad Virgil. Æneid. viii, 9.

[745] Herodot. iv. 99.

[746] Servius ad Virgil. Æneid. vii, 691. Polybius distinguishes Iapygians from Messapians (ii, 24).

[747] Pausanias, x, 10, 3; x, 13, 5; Strabo, vi, p. 282: Justin, iii, 4.

[748] See a description of the French military operations in these almost inaccessible regions, contained in a valuable publication by a French general officer, on service in that country for three years, "Calabria during a Military Residence of three years," London, 1832, Letter xx, p. 201.

The whole picture of Calabria contained in this volume is both interesting and instructive: military operations had never before been carried on, probably, in the mountains of the Sila.

[749] See Theokritus, Idyll, iv, 6-35, which illustrates the point here stated.

[750] Suidas, v. Ῥινθων; Stephan. Byz. v. Τάρας: compare Bernhardy, Grundriss der Römischen Litteratur, Abschnitt ii, pt. 2, pp. 185-186, about the analogy of these φλύακες of Rhinthon with the native Italic Mimes.

The dialect of the other cities of Italic Greece is very little known: the ancient Inscription of Petilia is Doric: see Ahrens, De Dialecto Doricâ, sect. 49, p. 418.

[751] Aristophan. Vesp. 1260. Αἰσωπικὸν γελοῖον, ἢ Συβαριτικόν. What is meant by Συβαριτικὸν γελοῖον is badly explained by the Scholiast, but is perfectly well illustrated by Aristophanês himself, in subsequent verses of the same play (1427-1436), where Philokleon tells two good stories respecting "a Sybaritan man," and a "woman in Sybaris:" Ἀνὴρ Συβαρίτης ἐξέπεσεν ἐξ ἅρματος, etc.—ἐν Συβάρει γυνή ποτε Κατέαξ᾽ ἐχῖνον, etc.

These Συβάρια ἐπιφθέγματα are as old as Epicharmus, whose mind was much imbued with the Pythagorean philosophy. See Etymolog. Magn. Συβαρίζειν. Ælian amused himself also with the ἱστόριαι Συβαριτικαὶ (V. H. xiv, 20): compare Hesychius, Συβαριτικοὶ λόγοι, and Suidas, Συβαριτικαῖς.

[752] Thus Herodotus (vi, 127) informs us that, at the time when Kleisthenês of Sikyon invited from all Greece suitors of proper dignity for the hand of his daughter, Smindyridês of Sybaris came among the number, "the most delicate and luxurious man ever known," (ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὴ χλιδῆς εἷς ἀνὴρ ἀφίκετο—Herodot. vi, 127), and Sybaris was at that time (B. C. 580-560) in its greatest prosperity. In Chamæleon, Timæus, and other writers subsequent to Aristotle, greater details were given. Smindyridês was said to have taken with him to the marriage one thousand domestic servants, fishermen, bird-catchers, and cooks (Athenæ. vi, 271; xii, 541). The details of Sybaritic luxury, given in Athenæus, are chiefly borrowed from writers of this post-Aristotelian age,—Herakleidês of Pontus, Phylarchus, Klearchus, Timæus (Athenæ. xii, 519-522). The best-authenticated of all the examples of Sybaritic wealth, is the splendid figured garment, fifteen cubits in length, which Alkimenês the Sybarite dedicated as a votive offering in the temple of the Lakinian Hêrê. Dionysius of Syracuse plundered that temple, got possession of the garment, and is said to have sold it to the Carthaginians for the price of one hundred and twenty talents: Polemon, the Periegetes, seems to have seen it at Carthage (Aristot. Mirab. Ausc. 96; Athenæ. xii, 541). Whether the price be correctly stated, we are not in a situation to determine.

[753] Herodot. vii, 102. τῇ Ἑλλάδι πενίη μὲν αἰεί κοτε σύντροφός ἐστι.

[754] Varro, De Re Rusticâ, i, 44. "In Sybaritano dicunt etiam cum centesimo redire solitum." The land of the Italian Greeks stands first for wheaten bread and beef; that of Syracuse for pork and cheese (Hermippus ap. Athenæ. i, p. 27): about the excellent wheat of Italy, compare Sophoklês, Triptolem. Fragm. 529, ed. Dindorf.

Theophrastus dwells upon the excellence of the land near Mylæ, in the territory of the Sicilian Messênê, which produced, according to him, thirty-fold. (Hist. Plant. ix, 2, 8, p. 259, ed. Schneid.) This affords some measure of comparison, both for the real excellence of the ancient Sybaritan territory, and for the estimation in which it was held; its estimated produce being more than three times that of Mylæ.

See in Mr. Keppel Craven's Tour in the Southern Provinces of Naples (chapters xi, xii, pp. 212-218), the description of the rich and productive plain of the Krathis (in the midst of which stood the ancient Sybaris), extending about sixteen miles from Cassano to Corigliano, and about twelve miles from the former town to the sea. Compare, also, the picture of the same country, in the work by a French officer, referred to in a previous note, "Calabria during a Military Residence of three years," London, 1832, Letter xxii, pp. 219-226.

Hekatæus (c. 39, ed. Klausen) calls Cosa,—Κόσσα, πόλις Οἰνωτρῶν ἐν μεσογαίᾳ. Cosa is considered to be identical, seemingly on good grounds, with the modern Cassano (Cæsar, Bell. Civ. iii, 22): assuming this to be correct, there must have been an Œnotrian dependent town within eight miles of the ancient city of Sybaris.

[755] Diodor xii, 9.

[756] Athenæus, xii, p. 519.

[757] Herodot. vi, 21. Respecting the great abundance of ship-timber in the territory of the Italiots (Italian Greeks), see Thucyd. vi, 90; vii, 25.

The pitch from the pine forests in the Sila was also abundant and celebrated (Strabo, vi, p. 261).

[758] Herodot. iii, 138.

[759] Athenæus, xii, p. 519.

[760] Festus, v. bilingues Brutates.

[761] Strabo, vi, p. 262.

[762] Jamblichus, Vit. Pythagor. c. 9, p. 33; c. 35, p. 210.

[763] Athenæus, xii, 541.

[764] This date depends upon Timæus (as quoted by Skymnus Chius, 210) and Solinus; there seems no reason for distrusting it, though Thucydidês (i, 13) and Isokratês (Archidamus, p. 316) seem to conceive Massalia as founded by the Phokæans about 60 years later, when Ionia was conquered by Harpagus (see Bruckner, Historia Reip. Massiliensium, sect. 2, p. 9, Raoul Rochette, Histoire des Colonies Grecques, vol. iii, pp. 405-413, who, however, puts the arrival of the Phokæans, in these regions and at Tartêssus much too early).

[765] Aristotle, Μασσαλιώτων πολιτεῖα, ap. Athenæum, xiii, p. 576; Justin, xliii, 3. Plutarch (Solon, c. 2) seems to follow the same story as Justin.

[766] Strabo, iv, pp. 179-182: Justin, xliii, 4-5; Cicero, Pro Flacco. 26. It rather appears from Aristotle (Polit. v, 5, 2; vi, 4-5), that the senate was originally a body completely close, which gave rise to discontent on the part of wealthy men not included in it: a mitigation took place by admitting into it, occasionally, men selected from the latter.

Some authors seem to have accused the Massaliots of luxurious and effeminate habits (see Athenæus, xii, p. 523).

[767] Strabo, vi, p. 269: compare Timæus, Fragm. 49, ed. Göller; Fr. 53, ed Didot.

[768] Thucyd. i, 25.

[769] Strabo, *l. c.*; Plutarch, Quæst. Græc. c. 11; a different fable in Conon. Narrat. 3, ap. Photium Cod. 86.

[770] Herodot. iii, 49.

[771] Thucyd. i, 108; iii, 102.

[772] Thucyd. i, 13.

[773] Herodot. iii, 49-51: see above, chap. ix, p. 42 of this volume.

[774] Thucyd. i, 25-37.

[775] Herodot. vii. 155.

[776] Thucyd. iii, 85. These fortifications are probably alluded to also i, 45-54. ἢ ἐς τῶν ἐκείνων χωρίων.

[777] Thucyd. i, 47.

[778] Strabo, vii, p. 325, x. p. 452; Skymn. Chi. 453, Raoul Rochette, Hist. des Colon. Grecq. vol. iii, p. 294.

[779] Aristot. Polit. v, 3, 5; v, 8, 9.

[780] About Leukas, see Strabo, x, p. 452; Skylax, p. 34; Steph. Byz. v. Ἐπιλευκάδιοι.

Strabo seems to ascribe the cutting through of the isthmus to the original colonists. But Thucydidês speaks of this isthmus in the plainest manner (iii, 81), and of the Corinthian ships of war as being transported across it. The Dioryktos, or intervening factitious canal, was always shallow, only deep enough for boats, so that ships of war had still to be carried across by hand or machinery (Polyb. v, 5): both Plutarch (De Serâ Num. Vind. p. 552) and Pliny treat Leukadia as having again become a peninsula, from the accumulation of sand (H. N. iv, 1): compare Livy, xxxiii, 17.

Mannert (Geograph. der Gr. und Röm. part viii, b. 1, p. 72) accepts the statement of Strabo, and thinks that the Dioryktos had already been dug before the time of Thucydidês. But it seems more reasonable to suppose that Strabo was misinformed as to the date, and that the cut took place at some time between the age of Thucydidês and that of Skylax.

Boeckh (ad Corp. Inscriptt. Gr. t. i, p. 58) and W. C. Müller (De Corcyræor Republicâ, Götting. 1835, p. 18) agree with Mannert.

[781] Skymn. Chius, 458; Thucyd. i, 55; Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 24.

[782] Thucyd. i, 46; Strabo, x, p. 452. Before 220 B. C., the temple of Apollo Aktius, which in the time of Thucydidês belonged to Anaktorium, had come to belong to the Akarnanians; it seems, also, that the town itself had been merged in the Akarnanian league, for Polybius does not mention it separately (Polyb. iv, 63).

[783] Thucyd. iii, 94, 95, 115.

[784] Thucyd. i, 24-26.

[785] The rhetor Aristeidês pays a similar compliment to Kyzikus, in his Panegyrical Address at that city,—the god Apollo had founded it personally and directly himself, not through any human œkist, as was the case with other colonies (Aristeidês, Λόγος περὶ Κυζίκου, Or. xvi, p. 414; vol. i, p, 384, Dindorf).

[786] Thucyd. i, 24. ἐγένετο μεγάλη καὶ πολυάνθρωπος; Strabo, vii, p. 316, viii, p. 357; Steph. Byz. v. Ἀπολλωνία; Plutarch, De Serâ Numin. Vind. p. 553; Pausan. v, 22, 2.

Respecting the plain near the site of the ancient Apollonia, Colonel Leake observes: "The cultivation of this noble plain, capable of supplying grain to all Illyria and Epirus, with an abundance of other productions, is confined to a few patches of maize near the villages," (Travels in Northern Greece, vol. i, ch. vii, p. 367.) Compare c. ii, p. 70.

The country surrounding Durazzo (the ancient Epidamnus) is described by another excellent observer as highly attractive, though now unhealthy. See the valuable topographical work, "Albanien, Rumelien, und die Oesterreichisch-montenegrinische Gränze," von Dr. Joseph Müller (Prag. 1844), p. 62.

[787] Thucyd. i, 25; Aristot. Polit. ii, 4, 13; iii, 11, 1; iv, 3, 8; v, 1, 6; v, 3, 4.

The allusions of the philosopher are so brief, as to convey little or no knowledge: see O. Müller, Dorians, b. iii, 9, 6; Tittmann, Griech. Staatsverfass. p. 491.

[788] Plutarch, Quæst. Græc. p. 297, c. 29; Ælian, V. H. xiii, 16.

[789] W. C. Müller. De Corcyræor. Repub. ch. 3, pp. 60-63: Aristot. Mirab. Ausc. c. 104;. Hesychius, v. Κερκυραῖοι ἀμφορεῖς; Herodot. i, 145.

The story given in the above passage of the Pseudo-Aristotle is to be taken in connection with the succeeding chapter of the same work (105), wherein the statement, largely credited in antiquity, is given that the river Danube forked at a certain point of its course into two streams, one flowing into the Adriatic, the other into the Euxine.

[790] See the Inscriptions No. 1838 and No. 1845, in the collection of Boeckh, and Boeckh's Metrologie, vii, 8, p. 97. Respecting the Corinthian coinage our information is confused and imperfect.

[791] Thucyd. ii, 30-66.

[792] See Aristot. Fragm. περὶ Πολιτειῶν, ed. Neumann: Fragm. 2, Ἀκαρνάνων πολιτεία.

[793] Pollux, i, 150; Thucyd. ii. 81.

[794] Thucyd. ii, 102; iii, 105.

[795] Thucyd. ii, 68-102; Stephan. Byz. v. Φοίτιαι. See the discussion in Strabo (x, p. 462), whether the Akarnanians did, or did not, take part in the expedition against Troy; Ephorus maintaining the negative, and stringing together a plausible narrative to explain *why* they did not. The time came when the Akarnanians gained credit with Rome for this supposed absence of their ancestors.

[796] Polyb. iv, 30: compare also ix, 40.

[797] Diodor. xix, 67; Livy, xxxiii, 16-17; xlv, 31.

[798] Skylax. c. 28-32.

[799] Herodot. ii, 56, v, 92, vi, 127; Thucyd. ii, 80; Plato, Minos, p. 315. The Chaonians and Thesprotians were separated by the river Thyamis (now Kalamas),—Thucyd. i, 46; Stephanus Byz. v. Τροία.

[800] Hekatæus, Fr. 77, ed. Klausen; Strabo, vii, p. 326; Appian, Illyric. c. 7. In the time of Thucydidês, the Molossi and the Atintânes were under the same king (ii, 80). The name Ἠπειρῶται, with Thucydidês, means only

inhabitants of a continent,—οἱ ταὐτῃ ἠπειρῶται (i, 47; ii, 80) includes Ætolians and Akarnanians (iii, 94-95), and is applied to inhabitants of Thrace (iv, 105).

Epirus is used in its special sense to designate the territory west of Pindus by Xenophon, Hellen. vi, 1, 7.

Compare Mannert. Geographie der Griech. und Römer, part vii, book 2 p. 283.

[801] Strabo, vii, p. 324.

[802] Thucyd. ii, 68.

[803] Strabo, vii, p. 324. In these same regions, under the Turkish government of the present day, such is the mixture and intercourse of Greeks, Albanians, Bulgaric Sclavonians, Wallachians, and Turks, that most of the natives find themselves under the necessity of acquiring two, sometimes three, languages: see Dr. Grisebach, Reise durch Rumelien und nach Brussa, ch. xii, vol. ii, p. 68.

[804] Livy, xlv, 34; Thucyd. i, 47. Phanotê, in the more northerly part of Epirus, is called only a *castellum*, though it was an important military post (Livy, xliii, 21).

[805] Leake's Travels in Northern Greece, ch. xxxviii, vol. iv, pp. 207, 210, 233; ch. ix. vol. i, p. 411; Cyprien Robert, Les Slaves de Turquie, book iv, ch. 2.

Βουβόται πρῶνες ἐξόχοι—Pindar, Nem. iv, 81; Cæsar, Bell. Civil. iii, 47.

[806] Polybius, ii, 5, 8.

[807] Plutarch, Pyrrh. c. i; Livy, xlv, 26.

[808] See the description of the geographical features of Epirus in Boué, La Turquie en Europe, Géographie Générale, vol. i, p. 57.

[809] See the account of this territory in Colonel Leake's Travels in Northern Greece, vol. i. ch. v; his journey from Janina, through the district of Suli and the course of the Acheron, to the plain of Glyky and the Acherusian lake and marshes near the sea. Compare, also, vol. iv, ch. xxxv, p. 73.

"To the ancient sites (observes Colonel Leake) which are so numerous in the great valleys watered by the lower Acheron, the lower Thyamis, and their tributaries, it is a mortifying disappointment to the geographer not to be able to apply a single name with absolute certainty."

The number of these sites affords one among many presumptions that each must have been individually inconsiderable.

[810] Dêmosthenês, De Haloneso, ch. 7, p. 84 R; Strabo, vii, p. 324.

[811] Skylax, c. 32; Pausanias, i, 11; Justin, xvii, 6.

That the *Arrhybas* of Justin is the same as the *Tharypas* of Pausanias,—perhaps, also, the same as *Tharyps* in Thucydidês, who was a minor at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war,—seems probable.

[812] Thucyd. ii, 81.



GEORGE GROTE.

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BY

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CHAPTER XXV.

ILLYRIANS, MACEDONIANS, PÆONIANS.

NORTHWARD of the tribes called Epirotic lay those more numerous and widely extended tribes who bore the general name of Illyrians; bounded on the west by the Adriatic, on the east by the mountain-range of Skardus, the northern continuation of Pindus,—and thus covering what is now called Middle and Upper Albania, together with the more northerly mountains of Montenegro, Herzegovina, and Bosnia. Their limits to the north and north-east cannot be assigned, but the Dardani and Autariatæ must have reached to the north-east of Skardus and even east of the Servian plain of Kossovo; while along the Adriatic coast, Skylax extends the race so far northward as to include Dalmatia, treating the Liburnians and Istrians beyond them as not Illyrian: yet Appian and others consider the Liburnians and Istrians as Illyrian, and Herodotus even includes under that name the Eneti, or Veneti, at the extremity of the Adriatic gulf.[1] The Bulini, according to Skylax, were the northernmost Illyrian tribe: the Amantini, immediately northward of the Epirotic Chaonians, were the southernmost. Among the southern Illyrian tribes are to be numbered the Taulantii,—originally the possessors, afterwards the immediate neighbors, of the territory on which Epidamnus was founded. The ancient geographer Hekatæus[2] (about 500 B. C.), is sufficiently well acquainted with them to specify their town Sesarêthus: he also named the Chelidonii as their northern, the Encheleis as their southern neighbors; and the Abri also as a tribe nearly adjoining. We hear of the Illyrian Parthini, nearly in the same regions,—of the Dassaretii,[3] near Lake Lychnidus,—of the Penestæ, with a fortified town Uscana, north of the Dassaretii,—of the Ardiæans, the Autariatæ, and the Dardanians, throughout Upper Albania eastward as far as Upper Mœsia, including the range of Skardus itself; so that there were some Illyrian tribes conterminous on the east with Macedonians, and on the south with Macedonians as well as with Pæonians. Strabo even extends some of the Illyrian tribes much farther northward, nearly to the Julian Alps.[4]

With the exception of some portions of what is now called Middle Albania, the territory of these tribes consisted principally of mountain pastures with a certain proportion of fertile valley, but rarely expanding into a plain. The Autariatæ had the reputation of being unwarlike, but the Illyrians generally were poor, rapacious, fierce, and formidable in battle. They shared with the remote Thracian tribes the custom of tattooing[5] their bodies and of offering human sacrifices: moreover, they were always ready to sell their military service for hire, like the modern Albanian Schkipetars, in whom probably their blood yet flows, though with considerable admixture from subsequent emigrations. Of the Illyrian kingdom on the Adriatic coast, with Skodra (Scutari) for its capital city, which became formidable by its reckless piracies in the third century B. C., we hear nothing in the flourishing period of Grecian his-

tory. The description of Skylax notices in his day, all along the northern Adriatic, a considerable and standing traffic between the coast and the interior, carried on by Liburnians, Istrians, and the small Grecian insular settlements of Pharus and Issa. But he does not name Skodra, and probably this strong post—together with the Greek town Lissus, founded by Dionysius of Syracuse—was occupied after his time by conquerors from the interior,[6] the predecessors of Agrôn and Gentius,—just as the coast-land of the Thermaic gulf was conquered by inland Macedonians.

Once during the Peloponnesian war, a detachment of hired Illyrians, marching into Macedonia Lynkêstis (seemingly over the pass of Skardus a little east of Lychnidus, or Ochrida), tried the valor of the Spartan Brasidas; and on that occasion—as in the expedition above alluded to of the Epirots against Akarnania—we shall notice the marked superiority of the Grecian character, even in the case of an armament chiefly composed of helots newly enfranchised, over both Macedonians and Illyrians,—we shall see the contrast between brave men acting in concert and obedience to a common authority, and an assailing host of warriors, not less brave individually, but in which every man is his own master,[7] and fights as he pleases. The rapid and impetuous rush of the Illyrians, if the first shock failed of its effect, was succeeded by an equally rapid retreat or flight. We hear nothing afterwards respecting these barbarians until the time of Philip of Macedon, whose vigor and military energy first repressed their incursions, and afterwards partially conquered them. It seems to have been about this period (400-350 B. C.) that the great movement of the Gauls from west to east took place, which brought the Gallic Skordiski and other tribes into the regions between the Danube and the Adriatic sea, and which probably dislodged some of the northern Illyrians so as to drive them upon new enterprises and fresh abodes.

What is now called Middle Albania, the Illyrian territory immediately north of Epirus, is much superior to the latter in productiveness.[8] Though mountainous, it possesses more both of low hill and valley, and ampler as well as more fertile cultivable spaces. Epidamnus and Apollonia formed the seaports of this territory, and the commerce with the southern Illyrians, less barbarous than the northern, was one of the sources[9] of their great prosperity during the first century of their existence,—a prosperity interrupted in the case of the Epidamnians by internal dissensions, which impaired their ascendency over their Illyrian neighbors, and ultimately placed them at variance with their mother-city Korkyra. The commerce between these Greek seaports and the interior tribes, when once the former became strong enough to render violent attack from the latter hopeless, was reciprocally beneficial to both of them. Grecian oil and wine were introduced among these barbarians, whose chiefs at the same time learned to appreciate the woven fabrics,[10] the polished and carved metallic work, the tempered weapons, and the pottery, which issued from Grecian artisans. Moreover, the importation sometimes of salt-fish, and always that of salt itself, was of the greatest importance to these inland residents, especially for such localities

as possessed lakes abounding in fish, like that of Lychnidus. We hear of wars between the Autariatæ and the Ardiæi, respecting salt-springs near their boundaries, and also of other tribes whom the privation of salt reduced to the necessity of submitting to the Romans.[11] On the other hand, these tribes possessed two articles of exchange so precious in the eyes of the Greeks, that Polybius reckons them as absolutely indispensable,[12]—cattle and slaves; which latter were doubtless procured from Illyria, often in exchange for salt, as they were from Thrace and from the Euxine and from Aquileia in the Adriatic, through the internal wars of one tribe with another. Silver-mines were worked at Damastium in Illyria. Wax and honey were probably also articles of export, and it is a proof that the natural products of Illyria were carefully sought out, when we find a species of iris peculiar to the country collected and sent to Corinth, where its root was employed to give the special flavor to a celebrated kind of aromatic unguent.[13]

Nor was the intercourse between the Hellenic ports and Illyrians inland exclusively commercial. Grecian exiles also found their way into Illyria, and Grecian mythes became localized there, as may be seen by the tale of Kadmus and Harmonia, from whom the chiefs of the Illyrian Encheleis professed to trace their descent. [14]

The Macedonians of the fourth century B. C. acquired, from the ability and enterprise of two successive kings, a great perfection in Greek military organization without any of the loftier Hellenic qualities. Their career in Greece is purely destructive, extinguishing the free movement of the separate cities, and disarming the citizen-soldier to make room for the foreign mercenary, whose sword was unhallowed by any feelings of patriotism,—yet totally incompetent to substitute any good system of central or pacific administration. But the Macedonians of the seventh and sixth centuries B. C. are an aggregate only of rude inland tribes, subdivided into distinct petty principalities, and separated from the Greeks by a wider ethnical difference even than the Epirots; since Herodotus, who considers the Epirotic Molossians and Thesprotians as children of Hellen, decidedly thinks the contrary respecting the Macedonians.[15] In the main, however, they seem at this early period analogous to the Epirots in character and civilization. They had some few towns, but were chiefly village residents, extremely brave and pugnacious. The customs of some of their tribes enjoined that the man who had not yet slain an enemy should be distinguished on some occasions by a badge of discredit.[16]

The original seats of the Macedonians were in the regions east of the chain of Skardus (the northerly continuation of Pindus)—north of the chain called the Cambunian mountains, which connects Olympus with Pindus, and which forms the northwestern boundary of Thessaly. But they did not reach so far eastward as the Thermaic gulf; apparently not farther eastward than Mount Bermius, or about the longitude of Edessa and Berrhoia. They thus covered the upper portions of the course of the rivers Haliakmôn and Erigôn, before the junction of the latter with the Axius;

while the upper course of the Axius, higher than this point of junction, appears to have belonged to Pæonia,—though the boundaries of Macedonia and Pæonia cannot be distinctly marked out at any time.

The large space of country included between the above-mentioned boundaries is in great part mountainous, occupied by lateral ridges, or elevations, which connect themselves with the main line of Skardus. But it also comprises three wide alluvial basins, or plains, which are of great extent and well-adapted to cultivation,—the plain of Tettovo, or Kalkandele (northernmost of the three), which contains the sources and early course of the Axius, or Vardar,—that of Bitolia, coinciding to a great degree with the ancient Pelagonia, wherein the Erigon flows towards the Axius,—and the larger and more undulating basin of Greveno and Anaselitzas, containing the upper Haliakmôn with its confluent streams. This latter region is separated from the basin of Thessaly by a mountainous line of considerable length, but presenting numerous easy passes.[17] Reckoning the basin of Thessaly as a fourth, here are four distinct inclosed plains on the east side of this long range of Skardus and Pindus,—each generally bounded by mountains which rise precipitously to an alpine height, and each leaving only one cleft for drainage by a single river,—the Axius, the Erigôn, the Haliakmôn, and the Peneius respectively. All four, moreover, though of high level above the sea, are yet for the most part of distinguished fertility, especially the plains of Tettovo, of Bitolia, and Thessaly. The fat, rich land to the east of Pindus and Skardus is described as forming a marked contrast with the light calcareous soil of the Albanian plains and valleys on the western side. The basins of Bitolia and of the Haliakmôn, with the mountains around and adjoining, were possessed by the original Macedonians; that of Tettovo, on the north, by a portion of the Pæonians. Among the four, Thessaly is the most spacious; yet the two comprised in the primitive seats of the Macedonians, both of them very considerable in magnitude, formed a territory better calculated to nourish and to generate a considerable population, than the less favored home, and smaller breadth of valley and plain, occupied by Epirots or Illyrians. Abundance of corn easily raised, of pasture for cattle, and of new fertile land open to cultivation, would suffice to increase the numbers of hardy villagers, indifferent to luxury as well as to accumulation, and exempt from that oppressive extortion of rulers which now harasses the same fine regions.[18]

The inhabitants of this primitive Macedonia doubtless differed much in ancient times, as they do now, according as they dwelt on mountain or plain, and in soil and climate more or less kind; but all acknowledged a common ethnical name and nationality, and the tribes were in many cases distinguished from each other, not by having substantive names of their own, but merely by local epithets of Grecian origin. Thus we find Elymiotæ Macedonians, or Macedonians of Elymeia,—Lynkestæ Macedonians, or Macedonians of Lynkus, etc. Orestæ is doubtless an adjunct name of the same character. The inhabitants of the more northerly tracts, called Pelagonia and Deuriopis, were also portions of the Macedonian aggregate, though neighbors of

the Pæonians, to whom they bore much affinity: whether the Eordi and Almopians were of Macedonian race, it is more difficult to say. The Macedonian language was different from Illyrian,[19] from Thracian, and seemingly also from Pæonian. It was also different from Greek, yet apparently not more widely distinct than that of the Epirots,—so that the acquisition of Greek was comparatively easy to the chiefs and people, though there were always some Greek letters which they were incapable of pronouncing. And when we follow their history, we shall find in them more of the regular warrior, conquering in order to maintain dominion and tribute, and less of the armed plunderer,—than in the Illyrians, Thracians, or Epirots, by whom it was their misfortune to be surrounded. They approach nearer to the Thessalians,[20] and to the other ungifted members of the Hellenic family.

The large and comparatively productive region covered by the various sections of Macedonians, helps to explain that increase of ascendency which they successively acquired over all their neighbors. It was not, however, until a late period that they became united under one government. At first each section, how many we do not know, had its own prince, or chief. The Elymiots, or inhabitants of Elymeia, the southernmost portion of Macedonia, were thus originally distinct and independent; also the Orestæ, in mountain-seats somewhat north-west of the Elymiots,—the Lynkêstæ and Eordi, who occupied portions of territory on the track of the subsequent Egnatian way, between Lychnidus (Ochrida) and Edessa,—the Pelagonians,[21] with a town of the same name, in the fertile plain of Bitolia,—and the more northerly Deuriopians. And the early political union was usually so loose, that each of these denominations probably includes many petty independencies, small towns, and villages. That section of the Macedonian name who afterwards swallowed up all the rest and became known as *The Macedonians*, had their original centre at Ægæ, or Edessa,—the lofty, commanding, and picturesque site of the modern Vodhena. And though the residence of the kings was in later times transferred to the marshy Pella, in the maritime plain beneath, yet Edessa was always retained as the regal burial-place, and as the hearth to which the religious continuity of the nation, so much reverenced in ancient times, was attached. This ancient town, which lay on the Roman Egnatian way from Lychnidus to Pella and Thessalonika, formed the pass over the mountain-ridge called Bermius, or that prolongation to the northward of Mount Olympus, through which the Haliakmôn makes its way out into the maritime plain at Verria, by a cleft more precipitous and impracticable than that of the Peneius in the defile of Tempê.

This mountain-chain called Bermius, extending from Olympus considerably to the north of Edessa, formed the original eastern boundary of the Macedonian tribes; who seem at first not to have reached the valley of the Axius in any part of its course, and who certainly did not reach at first to the Thermaic gulf. Between the last-mentioned gulf and the eastern counterforts of Olympus and Bermius there exists a narrow strip of plain land or low hill, which reaches from the mouth of the Peneius to

the head of the Thermaic gulf. It there widens into the spacious and fertile plain of Salonichi, comprising the mouths of the Haliakmôn, the Axius, and the Echeidôrus: the river Ludias, which flows from Edessa into the marshes surrounding Pella, and which in antiquity joined the Haliakmôn near its mouth, has now altered its course so as to join the Axius. This narrow strip, between the mouths of the Peneius and the Haliakmôn, was the original abode of the Pierian Thracians, who dwelt close to the foot of Olympus, and among whom the worship of the Muses seems to have been a primitive characteristic; Grecian poetry teems with local allusions and epithets which appear traceable to this early fact, though we are unable to follow it in detail. North of the Pierians, from the mouth of the Haliakmôn to that of the Axius, dwelt the Bottiæans.[22] Beyond the river Axius, at the lower part of its course, began the tribes of the great Thracian race,—Mygdonians, Krestônians, Edônians, Bisaltæ, Sithonians: the Mygdonians seem to have been originally the most powerful, since the country still continued to be called by their name, Mygdonia, even after the Macedonian conquest. These, and various other Thracian tribes, originally occupied most part of the country between the mouth of the Axius and that of the Strymon; together with that memorable three-pronged peninsula which derived from the Grecian colonies its name of Chalkidikê. It will thus appear, if we consider the Bottiæans as well as the Pierians to be Thracians, that the Thracian race extended originally southward as far as the mouth of the Peneius: the Bottiæans professed, indeed, a Kretan origin, but this pretension is not noticed by either Herodotus or Thucydidês. In the time of Skylax,[23] seemingly during the early reign of Philip the son of Amyntas, Macedonia and Thrace were separated by the Strymon.

We have yet to notice the Pæonians, a numerous and much-divided race,—seemingly neither Thracian nor Macedonian nor Illyrian, but professing to be descended from the Teukri of Troy,—who occupied both banks of the Strymon, from the neighborhood of Mount Skomius, in which that river rises, down to the lake near its mouth. Some of their tribes possessed the fertile plain of Siris (now Seres),—the land immediately north of Mount Pangæus,—and even a portion of the space through which Xerxês marched on his route from Akanthus to Therma. Besides this, it appears that the upper parts of the valley of the Axius were also occupied by Pæonian tribes; how far down the river they extended, we are unable to say. We are not to suppose that the whole territory between Axius and Strymon was continuously peopled by them. Continuous population is not the character of the ancient world, and it seems, moreover, that while the land immediately bordering on both rivers is in very many places of the richest quality, the spaces between the two are either mountain or barren low hill,—forming a marked contrast with the rich alluvial basin of the Macedonian river Erigon.[24] The Pæonians, in their north-western tribes, thus bordered upon the Macedonian Pelagonia,—in their northern tribes, upon the Illyrian Dardani and Autariatæ,—in their eastern, southern, and south-eastern tribes, upon the Thracians and Pierians;[25] that is, upon the second seats occupied by the expelled Pierians under Mount Pangæus.

Such was, as far as we can make it out, the position of the Macedonians and their immediate neighbors, in the seventh century B. C. It was first altered by the enterprise and ability of a family of exiled Greeks, who conducted a section of the Macedonian people to those conquests which their descendants, Philip and Alexander the Great, afterwards so marvellously multiplied.

Respecting the primitive ancestry of these two princes, there were different stories, but all concurred in tracing the origin of the family to the Herakleid or Temenid race of Argos. According to one story (which apparently cannot be traced higher than Theopompus), Karanus, brother of the despot Pheidon, had migrated from Argos to Macedonia, and established himself as conqueror at Edessa; according to another tale, which we find in Herodotus, there were three exiles of the Temenid race, Gauanês, Aëropus, and Perdikkas, who fled from Argos to Illyria, from whence they passed into Upper Macedonia, in such poverty as to be compelled to serve the petty king of the town Lebæa in the capacity of shepherds. A remarkable prodigy happening to Perdikkas foreshadows the future eminence of his family, and leads to his dismissal by the king of Lebæa,—from whom he makes his escape with difficulty, by the sudden rise of a river immediately after he had crossed it, so as to become impassable by the horsemen who pursued him. To this river, as to the saviour of the family, solemn sacrifices were still offered by the kings of Macedonia in the time of Herodotus. Perdikkas with his two brothers having thus escaped, established himself near the spot called the Garden of Midas on Mount Bermius, and from the loins of this hardy young shepherd sprang the dynasty of Edessa.[26] This tale bears much more the marks of a genuine local tradition than that of Theopompus. And the origin of the Macedonian family, or Argeadæ, from Argos, appears to have been universally recognized by Grecian inquirers,[27]—so that Alexander the son of Amyntas, the contemporary of the Persian invasion, was admitted by the Hellanodikæ to contend at the Olympic games as a genuine Greek, though his competitors sought to exclude him as a Macedonian.

The talent for command was so much more the attribute of the Greek mind than of any of the neighboring barbarians, that we easily conceive a courageous Argeian adventurer acquiring to himself great ascendency in the local disputes of the Macedonian tribes, and transmitting the chieftainship of one of those tribes to his offspring. The influence acquired by Miltiadês among the Thracians of the Chersonese, and by Phormion among the Akarnanians (who specially requested that, after his death, his son, or some one of his kindred, might be sent from Athens to command them),[28] was very much of this character: we may add the case of Sertorius among the native Iberians. In like manner, the kings of the Macedonian Lynkêstæ professed to be descended from the Bacchiadæ[29] of Corinth; and the neighborhood of Epidamnus and Apollonia, in both of which doubtless members of that great gens were domiciliated, renders this tale even more plausible than that of an emigration from Argos. The kings of the Epirotic Molossi pretended also to a descent from the heroic

Æakid race of Greece. In fact, our means of knowledge do not enable us to discriminate the cases in which these reigning families were originally Greeks, from those in which they were Hellenized natives pretending to Grecian blood.

After the foundation-legend of the Macedonian kingdom, we have nothing but a long blank until the reign of king Amyntas (about 520-500 B. C.), and his son Alexander, (about 480 B. C.) Herodotus gives us five successive kings between the founder Perdikkas and Amyntas,—Perdikkas, Argæus, Philippus, Aëropus, Alketas, Amyntas, and Alexander,—the contemporary and to a certain extent the ally of Xerxês.[30] Though we have no means of establishing any dates in this early series, either of names or of facts, yet we see that the Temenid kings, beginning from a humble origin, extended their dominions successively on all sides. They conquered the Briges, [31]—originally their neighbors on Mount Bermius,—the Eordi, bordering on Edessa to the westward, who were either destroyed or expelled from the country, leaving a small remnant still existing in the time of Thucydidês at Physka between Strymon and Axius,—the Almopians, an inland tribe of unknown site,—and many of the interior Macedonian tribes who had been at first autonomous. Besides these inland conquests, they had made the still more important acquisition of Pieria, the territory which lay between Mount Bermius and the sea, from whence they expelled the original Pierians, who found new seats on the eastern bank of the Strymon between Mount Pangæus and the sea. Amyntas king of Macedon was thus master of a very considerable territory, comprising the coast of the Thermaic gulf as far north as the mouth of the Haliakmôn, and also some other territory on the same gulf from which the Bottiæans had been expelled; but not comprising the coast between the mouths of the Axius and the Haliakmôn, nor even Pella, the subsequent capital, which were still in the hands of the Bottiæans at the period when Xerxês passed through.[32] He possessed also Anthemus, a town and territory in the peninsula of Chalkidikê, and some parts of Mygdonia, the territory east of the mouth of the Axius; but how much, we do not know. We shall find the Macedonians hereafter extending their dominion still farther, during the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian war.

We hear of king Amyntas in friendly connection with the Peisistratid princes at Athens, whose dominion was in part sustained by mercenaries from the Strymon, and this amicable sentiment was continued between his son Alexander and the emancipated Athenians.[33] It is only in the reigns of these two princes that Macedonia begins to be implicated in Grecian affairs: the regal dynasty had become so completely Macedonized, and had so far renounced its Hellenic brotherhood, that the claim of Alexander to run at the Olympic games was contested by his competitors, and he was called upon to prove his lineage before the Hellanodikæ.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THRACIANS AND GREEK COLONIES IN THRACE.

THAT vast space comprised between the rivers Strymon and Danube, and bounded to the west by the easternmost Illyrian tribes, northward of the Strymon, was occupied by the innumerable subdivisions of the race called Thracians, or Threïcians. They were the most numerous and most terrible race known to Herodotus: could they by possibility act in unison or under one dominion (he says), they would be irresistible. A conjunction thus formidable once seemed impending, during the first years of the Peloponnesian war, under the reign of Sitalkês king of the Odrysæ, who reigned from Abdêra at the mouth of the Nestus to the Euxine, and compressed under his sceptre a large proportion of these ferocious but warlike plunderers; so that the Greeks even down to Thermopylæ trembled at his expected approach. But the abilities of that prince were not found adequate to bring the whole force of Thrace into effective coöperation and aggression against others.

Numerous as the tribes of Thracians were, their customs and character (according to Herodotus) were marked by great uniformity: of the Getæ, the Trausi, and others, he tells us a few particularities. And the large tract over which the race were spread, comprising as it did the whole chain of Mount Hæmus and the still loftier chain of Rhodopê, together with a portion of the mountains Orbêlus and Skomius, was yet partly occupied by level and fertile surface,—such as the great plain of Adrianople, and the land towards the lower course of the rivers Nestus and Hebrus. The Thracians of the plain, though not less warlike, were at least more home-keeping, and less greedy of foreign plunder, than those of the mountains. But the general character of the race presents an aggregate of repulsive features unredeemed by the presence of even the commonest domestic affections.[34] The Thracian chief deduced his pedigree from a god called by the Greeks Hermês, to whom he offered up worship apart from the rest of his tribe, sometimes with the acceptable present of a human victim. He tattooed his body,[35] and that of the women belonging to him, as a privilege of honorable descent: he bought his wives from their parents, and sold his children for exportation to the foreign merchant: he held it disgraceful to cultivate the earth, and felt honored only by the acquisitions of war and robbery. The Thracian tribes worshipped deities whom the Greeks assimilate to Arês, Dionysus, and Artemis: the great sanctuary and oracle of their god Dionysus was in one of the loftiest summits of Rhodopê, amidst dense and foggy thickets,—the residence of the fierce and unassailable Satræ. To illustrate the Thracian character, we may turn to a deed perpetrated by the king of the Bisaltæ,—perhaps one out of several chiefs of that extensive Thracian tribe,—whose territory, between Strymon and Axius, lay in the direct march of Xerxês into Greece, and who fled to the desolate heights of

Rhodopê, to escape the ignominy of being dragged along amidst the compulsory auxiliaries of the Persian invasion, forbidding his six sons to take any part in it. From recklessness, or curiosity, the sons disobeyed his commands, and accompanied Xerxês into Greece; they returned unhurt by the Greek spear; but the incensed father, when they again came into his presence, caused the eyes of all of them to be put out. Exultation of success manifested itself in the Thracians by increased alacrity in shedding blood; but as warriors, the only occupation which they esteemed, they were not less brave than patient of hardship, and maintained a good front, under their own peculiar array, against forces much superior in all military efficacy.[36] It appears that the Thynians and Bithynians,[37] on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, perhaps also the Mysians, were members of this great Thracian race, which was more remotely connected, also, with the Phrygians. And the whole race may be said to present a character more Asiatic than European, especially in those ecstatic and maddening religious rites, which prevailed not less among the Edonian Thracians than in the mountains of Ida and Dindymon of Asia, though with some important differences. The Thracians served to furnish the Greeks with mercenary troops and slaves, and the number of Grecian colonies planted on the coast had the effect of partially softening the tribes in the immediate vicinity, between whose chiefs and the Greek leaders intermarriages were not unfrequent. But the tribes in the interior seem to have retained their savage habits with little mitigation, so that the language in which Tacitus[38] describes them is an apt continuation to that of Herodotus, though coming more than five centuries after.

To note the situation of each one among these many different tribes, in the huge territory of Thrace, which is even now so imperfectly known and badly mapped, would be unnecessary, and, indeed, impracticable. I shall proceed to mention the principal Grecian colonies which were formed in the country, noticing occasionally the particular Thracian tribes with which they came in contact.

The Grecian colonies established on the Thermaic gulf, as well as in the peninsula of Chalkidikê, emanating principally from Chalkis and Eretria, though we do not know their precise epoch, appear to have been of early date, and probably preceded the time when the Macedonians of Edessa extended their conquests to the sea. At that early period, they would find the Pierians still between the Peneius and Haliakmôn,—also a number of petty Thracian tribes throughout the broad part of the Chalkidic peninsula; they would find Pydna a Pierian town, and Therma, Anthemus, Chalastra, etc. Mygdonian.

The most ancient Grecian colony in these regions seems to have been Methônê, founded by the Eretrians in Pieria; nearly at the same time (if we may trust a statement of rather suspicious character, though the date itself is noway improbable) as Korkyra was settled by the Corinthians (about 730-720 B. C.).[39] It was a little to the north of the Pierian town of Pydna, and separated by about ten miles from the Bottiæan town of Alôrus, which lay north of the Haliakmôn.[40] We know very little about

Methônê, except that it preserved its autonomy and its Hellenism until the time of Philip of Macedon, who took and destroyed it. But though, when once established, it was strong enough to maintain itself in spite of conquests made all around by the Macedonians of Edessa, we may fairly presume that it could not have been originally planted on Macedonian territory. Nor in point of fact was the situation peculiarly advantageous for Grecian colonists, inasmuch as there were other maritime towns, not Grecian, in its neighborhood,—Pydna, Alôrus, Therma, Chalastra; whereas the point of advantage for a Grecian colony was, to become the exclusive seaport for inland indigenous people.

The colonies, founded by Chalkis and Eretria on all the three projections of the Chalkidic peninsula, were numerous, though for a long time inconsiderable. We do not know how far these projecting headlands were occupied before the arrival of the settlers from Eubœa,—an event which we may probably place at some period earlier than 600 B. C.; for after that period Chalkis and Eretria seem rather on the decline,—and it appears too, that the Chalkidian colonists in Thrace aided their mother-city Chalkis in her war against Eretria, which cannot be much later than 600 B. C., though it may be considerably earlier.

The range of mountains which crosses from the Thermaic to the Strymonic gulf, and forms the northern limit of the Chalkidic peninsula, slopes down towards the southern extremity, so as to leave a considerable tract of fertile land between the Torônaic and the Thermaic gulfs, including the fertile headland called Pallênê,—the westernmost of those three prongs of Chalkidikê which run out into the Ægean. Of the other two prongs, or projections, the easternmost is terminated by the sublime Mount Athos, which rises out of the sea as a precipitous rock six thousand four hundred feet in height, connected with the mainland by a ridge not more than half the height of the mountain itself, yet still high, rugged, and woody from sea to sea, leaving only little occasional spaces fit to be occupied or cultivated. The intermediate or Sithonian headland is also hilly and woody, though in a less degree,—both less inviting and less productive than Pallênê.[41]

Æneia, near that cape which marks the entrance of the inner Thermaic gulf,—and Potidæa, at the narrow isthmus of Pallênê,—were both founded by Corinth. Between these two towns lay the fertile territory called Krusis, or Krossæa, forming in aftertimes a part of the domain of Olynthus, but in the sixth century B. C. occupied by petty Thracian townships.[42] Within Pallênê were the towns of Mendê, a colony from Eretria,—Skiônê, which, having no legitimate mother-city traced its origin to Pellenian warriors returning from Troy,—Aphytis, Neapolis, Ægê, Therambôs, and Sanê,[43] either wholly or partly colonies from Eretria. In the Sithonian peninsula were Assa, Pilôrus, Singus, Sartê, Torônê, Galêpsus, Sermylê, and Mekyberna; all or most of these seem to have been of Chalkidic origin. But at the head of the Torônaic gulf (which lies between Sithonia and Pallênê) was placed Olynthus, surrounded by an extensive and fertile plain. Originally a Bottiæan town, Olynthus will be seen at the

time of the Persian invasion to pass into the hands of the Chalkidian Greeks,[44] and gradually to incorporate with itself several of the petty neighboring establishments belonging to that race; whereby the Chalkidians acquired that marked preponderance in the peninsula which they retained, even against the efforts of Athens, until the days of Philip of Macedon.

On the scanty spaces, admitted by the mountainous promontory, or ridge, ending in Athos, were planted some Thracian and some Pelasgic settlements of the same inhabitants as those who occupied Lemnos and Imbros; a few Chalkidic citizens being domiciliated with them, and the people speaking both Pelasgic and Hellenic. But near the narrow isthmus which joins this promontory to Thrace, and along the north-western coast of the Strymonic gulf, were Grecian towns of considerable importance,—Sanê, Akanthus, Stageira, and Argilus, all colonies from Andros, which had itself been colonized from Eretria.[45] Akanthus and Stageira are said to have been founded in 654 B. C.

Following the southern coast of Thrace, from the mouth of the river Strymôn towards the east, we may doubt whether, in the year 560 B. C., any considerable independent colonies of Greeks had yet been formed upon it. The Ionic colony of Abdêra, eastward of the mouth of the river Nestus, formed from Teôs in Ionia, is of more recent date, though the Klazomenians[46] had begun an unsuccessful settlement there as early as the year 651 B. C.; while Dikæa—the Chian settlement of Marôneia—and the Lesbian settlement of Ænus at the mouth of the Hebrus, are of unknown date. [47] The important and valuable territory near the mouth of the Strymôn, where, after many ruinous failures,[48] the Athenian colony of Amphipolis afterwards maintained itself, was at the date here mentioned possessed by Edonian Thracians and Pierians: the various Thracian tribes,—Satræ, Edonians, Dersæans, Sapæans, Bistones, Kikones, Pætians, etc.—were in force on the principal part of the tract between Strymôn and Hebrus, even to the sea-coast. It is to be remarked, however, that the island of Thasus, and that of Samothrace, each possessed what in Greek was called a Peræa,[49]—a strip of the adjoining mainland cultivated and defended by means of fortified posts, or small towns: probably, these occupations are of very ancient date, since they seem almost indispensable as a means of support to the islands. For the barren Thasus, especially, merits even at this day the uninviting description applied to it by the poet Archilochus, in the seventh century B. C.,—"an ass's backbone, overspread with wild wood:"[50] so wholly is it composed of mountain, naked or wooded, and so scanty are the patches of cultivable soil left in it, nearly all close to the sea-shore. This island was originally occupied by the Phenicians, who worked the gold mines in its mountains with a degree of industry which, even in its remains, excited the admiration of Herodotus. How and when it was evacuated by them, we do not know; but the poet Archilochus[51] formed one of a body of Parian colonists who planted themselves on it in the seventh century B. C., and carried on war, not always successful, against the Thracian tribe called Saians: on one occasion,

Archilochus found himself compelled to throw away his shield. By their mines and their possessions on the mainland (which contained even richer mines, at Skaptê Hylê, and elsewhere, than those in the island), the Thasian Greeks rose to considerable power and population. And as they seem to have been the only Greeks, until the settlement of the Milesian Histiæus on the Strymôn about 510 B. C., who actively concerned themselves in the mining districts of Thrace opposite to their island, we cannot be surprised to hear that their clear surplus revenue before the Persian conquest, about 493 B. C., after defraying the charges of their government without any taxation, amounted to the large sum of two hundred talents, sometimes even to three hundred talents, in each year (from forty-six thousand to sixty-six thousand pounds).

On the long peninsula called the Thracian Chersonese there may probably have been small Grecian settlements at an early date, though we do not know at what time either the Milesian settlement of Kardia, on the western side of the isthmus of that peninsula, near the Ægean sea,—or the Æolic colony of Sestus on the Hellespont,—were founded; while the Athenian ascendency in the peninsula begins only with the migration of the first Miltiadês, during the reign of Peisistratus at Athens. The Samian colony of Perinthus, on the northern coast of the Propontis,[52] is spoken of as ancient in date, and the Megarian colonies, Selymbria and Byzantium, belong to the seventh century B. C.: the latter of these two is assigned to the 30th Olympiad (657 B. C.), and its neighbor Chalkêdôn, on the opposite coast, was a few years earlier. The site of Byzantium in the narrow strait of the Bosphorus, with its abundant thunny-fishery,[53] which both employed and nourished a large proportion of the poorer freemen, was alike convenient either for maritime traffic, or for levying contributions on the numerous corn ships which passed from the Euxine into the Ægean; and we are even told that it held a considerable number of the neighboring Bithynian Thracians as tributary Periœki. Such dominion, though probably maintained during the more vigorous period of Grecian city life, became in later times impracticable, and we even find the Byzantines not always competent to the defence of their own small surrounding territory. The place, however, will be found to possess considerable importance during all the period of this history.[54]

The Grecian settlements on the inhospitable south-western coast of the Euxine, south of the Danube, appear never to have attained any consideration: the principal traffic of Greek ships in that sea tended to more northerly ports, on the banks of the Borysthenês and in the Tauric Chersonese. Istria was founded by the Milesians near the southern embouchure of the Danube,—Apollonia and Odêssus on the same coast, more to the south,—all probably between 600-560 B. C. The Megarian or Byzantine colony of Mesambria, seems to have been later than the Ionic revolt; of Kallatis the age is not known. Tomi, north of Kallatis and south of Istria, is renowned as the place of Ovid's banishment.[55] The picture which he gives of that uninviting

spot, which enjoyed but little truce from the neighborhood of the murderous Getæ, explains to us sufficiently why these towns acquired little or no importance.

The islands of Lemnos and Imbros, in the Ægean, were at this early period occupied by Tyrrhenian Pelasgi, were conquered by the Persians about 508 B. C., and seem to have passed into the power of the Athenians at the time when Ionia revolted from the Persians. If the mythical or poetical stories respecting these Tyrrhenian Pelasgi contain any basis of truth, they must have been a race of buccaneers not less rapacious than cruel. At one time, these Pelasgi seem also to have possessed Samothrace, but how or when they were supplanted by Greeks, we find no trustworthy account; the population of Samothrace at the time of the Persian war was Ionic.[56]

CHAPTER XXVII.

KYRENE AND BARKA. — HESPERIDES.

It has been already mentioned, in a former chapter, that Psammetichus king of Egypt, about the middle of the seventh century B. C., first removed those prohibitions which had excluded Grecian commerce from his country. In his reign, Grecian mercenaries were first established in Egypt, and Grecian traders admitted, under certain regulations, into the Nile. The opening of this new market emboldened them to traverse the direct sea which separates Krête from Egypt,—a dangerous voyage with vessels which rarely ventured to lose sight of land,—and seems to have first made them acquainted with the neighboring coast of Libya, between the Nile and the gulf called the Great Syrtis. Hence arose the foundation of the important colony called Kyrênê.

As in the case of most other Grecian colonies, so in that of Kyrênê, both the foundation and the early history are very imperfectly known. The date of the event, as far as can be made out amidst much contradiction of statement, was about 630 B. C.:[57] Thêra was the mother-city, herself a colony from Lacedæmon; and the settlements formed in Libya became no inconsiderable ornaments to the Dorian name in Hellas.

According to the account of a lost historian, Meneklês,[58]—political dissension among the inhabitants of Thêra led to that emigration which founded Kyrênê; and the more ample legendary details which Herodotus collected, partly from Theræan, partly from Kyrenæan informants, are not positively inconsistent with this statement, though they indicate more particularly bad seasons, distress, and over-population. Both of them dwell emphatically on the Delphian oracle as the instigator as well as the director of the first emigrants, whose apprehensions of a dangerous voyage and an unknown country were very difficult to overcome. Both of them affirmed that the original œkist Battus was selected and consecrated to the work by the divine command: both called Battus the son of Polymnêstus, of the mythical breed called Minyæ. But on other points there was complete divergence between the two stories, and the Kyrenæans themselves, whose town was partly peopled by emigrants from Krête, described the mother of Battus as daughter of Etearchus, prince of the Kretan town of Axus.[59] Battus had an impediment in his speech, and it was on his intreating from the Delphian oracle a cure for this infirmity that he received directions to go as "a cattle-breeding œkist to Libya." The suffering Theræans were directed to assist him, but neither he nor they knew where Libya was, nor could they find any resident in Krête who had ever visited it. Such was the limited reach of Grecian navigation to the south of the Ægean sea, even a century after the foundation of Syracuse. At length, by prolonged inquiry, they discovered a man employed in catching the purple shellfish, named Korôbius,—who said that he had been once forced by stress of

weather to the island of Platea, close to the shores of Libya, and on the side not far removed from the western limit of Egypt. Some Theræans being sent along with Korôbius to inspect this island, left him there with a stock of provisions, and returned to Thêra to conduct the emigrants. From the seven districts into which Thêra was divided, emigrants were drafted for the colony, one brother being singled out by lot from the different numerous families. But so long was their return to Platea deferred, that the provisions of Korôbius were exhausted, and he was only saved from starvation by the accidental arrival of a Samian ship, driven by contrary winds out of her course on the voyage to Egypt. Kôlæus, the master of this ship (whose immense profits made by the first voyage to Tartêssus have been noticed in a former chapter), supplied him with provisions for a year,—an act of kindness, which is said to have laid the first foundation of the alliance and good feeling afterwards prevalent between Thêra, Kyrênê, and Samos. At length the expected emigrants reached the island, having found the voyage so perilous and difficult, that they once returned in despair to Thêra, where they were only prevented by force from relanding. The band which accompanied Battus was all conveyed in two pentekonters,—armed ships, with fifty rowers each. Thus humble was the start of the mighty Kyrênê, which, in the days of Herodotus, covered a city-area equal to the entire island of Platea.[60]

That island, however, though near to Libya, and supposed by the colonists to be Libya, was not so in reality: the commands of the oracle had not been literally fulfilled. Accordingly, the settlement carried with it nothing but hardship for the space of two years, and Battus returned with his companions to Delphi, to complain that the promised land had proved a bitter disappointment. The god, through his priestess, returned for answer, "If you, who have never visited the cattle-breeding Libya, know it better than I, who *have*, I greatly admire your cleverness." Again the inexorable mandate forced them to return; and this time they planted themselves on the actual continent of Libya, nearly over against the island of Platea, in a district called Aziris, surrounded on both sides by fine woods, and with a running stream adjoining. After six years of residence in this spot, they were persuaded by some of the indigenous Libyans to abandon it, under the promise that they should be conducted to a better situation: and their guides now brought them to the actual site of Kyrênê, saying, "Here, men of Hellas, is the place for you to dwell, for here the sky is perforated."[61] The road through which they passed had led through the tempting region of Irasa with its fountain Thestê, and their guides took the precaution to carry them through it by night, in order that they might remain ignorant of its beauties.

Such were the preliminary steps, divine and human, which brought Battus and his colonists to Kyrênê. In the time of Herodotus, Irasa was an outlying portion of the eastern territory of this powerful city. But we trace in the story just related an opinion prevalent among his Kyrenæan informants, that Irasa with its fountain Thestê was a more inviting position than Kyrênê with its fountain of Apollo, and ought in prudence to have been originally chosen; out of which opinion, according to the gen-

eral habit of the Greek mind, an anecdote is engendered and accredited, explaining how the supposed mistake was committed. What may have been the recommendations of Irasa, we are not permitted to know: but descriptions of modern travellers, no less than the subsequent history of Kyrênê, go far to justify the choice actually made. The city was placed at the distance of about ten miles from the sea, having a sheltered port called Apollonia, itself afterwards a considerable town,—it was about twenty miles from the promontory Phykus, which forms the northernmost projection of the African coast, nearly in the longitude of the Peloponnesian Cape Tænarus (Matapan). Kyrênê was situated about eighteen hundred feet above the level of the Mediterranean, of which it commanded a fine view, and from which it was conspicuously visible, on the edge of a range of hills which slope by successive terraces down to the port. The soil immediately around, partly calcareous, partly sandy, is described by Captain Beechey to present a vigorous vegetation and remarkable fertility, though the ancients considered it inferior in this respect both to Barka[62] and Hesperides, and still more inferior to the more westerly region near Kinyps. But the abundant periodical rains, attracted by the lofty heights around, and justifying the expression of the "perforated sky," were even of greater importance, under an African sun, than extraordinary richness of soil.[63] The maritime regions near Kyrênê and Barka, and Hesperides, produced oil and wine as well as corn, while the extensive district between these towns, composed of alternate mountain, wood, and plain, was eminently suited for pasture and cattle-breeding; and the ports were secure, presenting conveniences for the intercourse of the Greek trader with Northern Africa, such as were not to be found along all the coasts of the Great Syrtis westward of Hesperides. Abundance of applicable land,—great diversity both of climate and of productive season, between the sea-side, the low hill, and the upper mountain, within a small space, so that harvest was continually going on, and fresh produce coming in from the earth, during eight months of the year,—together with the monopoly of the valuable plant called the Silphium, which grew nowhere except in the Kyrenaic region, and the juice of which was extensively demanded throughout Greece and Italy,—led to the rapid growth of Kyrênê, in spite of serious and renewed political troubles. And even now, the immense remains which still mark its desolate site, the evidences of past labor and solicitude at the Fountain of Apollo, and elsewhere, together with the profusion of excavated and ornamented tombs,—attest sufficiently what the grandeur of the place must have been in the days of Herodotus and Pindar. So much did the Kyrenæans pride themselves on the Silphium, found wild in their back country, from the island of Platea on the east to the inner recess of the Great Syrtis westward,—the leaves of which were highly salubrious for cattle, and the stalk for man, while the root furnished the peculiar juice for export,—that they maintained it to have first appeared seven years prior to the arrival of the first Grecian colonists in their city.[64]

But it was not only the properties of the soil which promoted the prosperity of Kyrênê. Isokratês[65] praises the well-chosen site of that colony because it was

planted in the midst of indigenous natives apt for subjection, and far distant from any formidable enemies. That the native Libyan tribes were made conducive in an eminent degree to the growth of the Greco-Libyan cities, admits of no doubt; and in reviewing the history of these cities, we must bear in mind that their population was not pure Greek, but more or less mixed, like that of the colonies in Italy, Sicily, or Ionia. Though our information is very imperfect, we see enough to prove that the small force brought over by Battus the Stammerer was enabled first to fraternize with the indigenous Libyans,—next, reinforced by additional colonists and availing themselves of the power of native chiefs, to overawe and subjugate them. Kyrênê—combined with Barka and Hesperides, both of them sprung from her root[66]—exercised over the Libyan tribes between the borders of Egypt and the inner recess of the Great Syrtis, for a space of three degrees of longitude, an ascendency similar to that which Carthage possessed over the more westerly Libyans near the Lesser Syrtis. Within these Kyrenæan limits, and further westward along the shores of the Great Syrtis, the Libyan tribes were of pastoral habits; westward, beyond the Lake Tritônis and the Lesser Syrtis,[67] they began to be agricultural. Immediately westward of Egypt were the Adyrmachidæ, bordering upon Apis and Marea, the Egyptian frontier towns;[68] they were subject to the Egyptians, and had adopted some of the minute ritual and religious observances which characterized the region of the Nile. Proceeding westward from the Adyrmachidæ were found the Giligammæ, the Asbystæ, the Auschisæ, the Kabales, and the Nasamônes,—the latter of whom occupied the south-eastern corner of the Great Syrtis;—next, the Makæ, Gindânes, Lotophagi, Machlyes, as far as a certain river and lake called Tritôn and Tritônis, which seems to have been near the Lesser Syrtis. These last-mentioned tribes were not dependent either on Kyrênê or on Carthage, at the time of Herodotus, nor probably during the proper period of free Grecian history, (600-300 B. C.) In the third century B. C., the Ptolemaic governors of Kyrênê extended their dominion westward, while Carthage pushed her colonies and castles eastward, so that the two powers embraced between them the whole line of coast between the Greater and Lesser Syrtis, meeting at the spot called the Altars of the Brothers Philæni,—so celebrated for its commemorative legend.[69] But even in the sixth century B. C., Carthage was jealous of the extension of Grecian colonies along this coast, and aided the Libyan Makæ (about 510 B. C.) to expel the Spartan prince Dorieus from his settlement near the river Kinyps. Near that spot was afterwards planted, by Phenician or Carthaginian exiles, the town of Leptis Magna[70] (now Lebida), which does not seem to have existed in the time of Herodotus. Nor does the latter historian notice the Marmaridæ, who appear as the principal Libyan tribe near the west of Egypt, between the age of Skylax and the third century of the Christian era. Some migration or revolution subsequent to the time of Herodotus must have brought this name into predominance.[71]

The interior country, stretching westward from Egypt along the thirtieth and thirty-first parallel of latitude, to the Great Syrtis, and then along the southern shore of that gulf, is to a great degree low and sandy, and quite destitute of trees; yet af-

fording in many parts water, herbage, and a fertile soil.[72] But the maritime region north of this, constituting the projecting bosom of the African coast from the island of Platea (Gulf of Bomba) on the east to Hesperides (Bengazi) on the west, is of a totally different character; covered with mountains of considerable elevation, which reach their highest point near Kyrênê, interspersed with productive plain and valley, broken by frequent ravines which carry off the winter torrents into the sea, and never at any time of the year destitute of water. It is this latter advantage that causes them to be now visited every summer by the Bedouin Arabs, who flock to the inexhaustible Fountain of Apollo and to other parts of the mountainous region from Kyrênê to Hesperides, when their supply of water and herbage fails in the interior:[73] and the same circumstance must have operated in ancient times to hold the nomadic Libyans in a sort of dependence on Kyrênê and Barka. Kyrênê appropriated the maritime portion of the territory of the Libyan Asbystæ;[74] the Auschisæ occupied the region south of Barka, touching the sea near Hesperides,—the Kabales near Teucheira in the territory of Barka. Over the interior spaces these Libyan Nomads, with their cattle and twisted tents, wandered unrestrained, amply fed upon meat and milk,[75] clothed in goatskins, and enjoying better health than any people known to Herodotus. Their breed of horses was excellent, and their chariots or wagons with four horses could perform feats admired even by Greeks: it was to these horses that the princes[76] and magnates of Kyrênê and Barka often owed the success of their chariots in the games of Greece. The Libyan Nasamônes, leaving their cattle near the sea, were in the habit of making an annual journey up the country to the Oasis of Augila, for the purpose of gathering the date-harvest,[77] or of purchasing dates,—a journey which the Bedouin Arabs from Bengazi still make annually, carrying up their wheat and barley, for the same purpose. Each of the Libyan tribes was distinguished by a distinct mode of cutting the hair, and by some peculiarities of religious worship, though generally all worshipped the Sun and the Moon.[78] But in the neighborhood of the Lake Tritônis (seemingly the western extremity of Grecian coasting trade in the time of Herodotus, who knows little beyond, and begins to appeal to Carthaginian authorities), the Grecian deities Poseidôn and Athênê, together with the legend of Jason and the Argonauts, had been localized. There were, moreover, current prophecies announcing that one hundred Hellenic cities were destined one day to be founded round the lake,—and that one city in the island Phla, surrounded by the lake, was to be planted by the Lacedæmonians.[79] These, indeed, were among the many unfulfilled prophecies which from every side cheated the Grecian ear,—proceeding in this case probably from Kyrenæan or Theræan traders, who thought the spot advantageous for settlement, and circulated their own hopes under the form of divine assurances. It was about the year 510 B. C.[80] that some of these Theræans conducted the Spartan prince Dorieus to found a colony in the fertile region of Kinyps, belonging to the Libyan Makæ. But Carthage, interested in preventing the extension of Greek settlements westward, aided the Libyans in driving him out.

The Libyans in the immediate neighborhood of Kyrênê were materially changed by the establishment of that town, and constituted a large part—at first, probably, far the largest part—of its constituent population. Not possessing that fierce tenacity of habits which the Mohammedan religion has impressed upon the Arabs of the present day, they were open to the mingled influence of constraint and seduction applied by Grecian settlers; so that in the time of Herodotus, the Kabales and the Asbystæ of the interior had come to copy Kyrenæan tastes and customs.[81] The Theræan colonists, having obtained not merely the consent but even the guidance of the natives to their occupation of Kyrênê, constituted themselves like privileged Spartan citizens in the midst of Libyan Perioeki.[82] They seem to have married Libyan wives, whence Herodotus describes the women of Kyrênê and Barka as following, even in his time, religious observances indigenous and not Hellenic.[83] Even the descendants of the primitive œkist Battus were semi-Libyan. For Herodotus gives us the curious information that Battus was the Libyan word for a king, deducing from it the just inference, that the name Battus was not originally personal to the œkist, but acquired in Libya first as a title,[84]—and that it afterwards passed to his descendants as a proper name. For eight generations the reigning princes were called Battus and Arkesilaus, the Libyan denomination alternating with the Greek, until the family was finally deprived of its power. Moreover, we find the chief of Barka, kinsman of Arkesilaus of Kyrênê bearing the name of Alazir; a name certainly not Hellenic, and probably Libyan.[85] We are, therefore, to conceive the first Theræan colonists as established in their lofty fortified post Kyrênê, in the centre of Libyan Perioeki, till then strangers to walls, to arts, and perhaps even to cultivated land. Probably these Perioeki were always subject and tributary, in a greater or less degree, though they continued for half a century to retain their own king.

To these rude men the Theræans communicated the elements of Hellenism and civilization, not without receiving themselves much that was non-Hellenic in return; and perhaps the reactionary influence of the Libyan element against the Hellenic might have proved the stronger of the two, had they not been reinforced by new-comers from Greece. After forty years of Battus the œkist (about 630-590 B. C.), and sixteen years of his son Arkesilaus (about 590-574 B. C.), a second Battus[86] succeeded, called Battus the Prosperous, to mark the extraordinary increase of Kyrênê during his presidency. The Kyrenæans under him took pains to invite new settlers from all parts of Greece without distinction,—a circumstance deserving notice in Grecian colonization, which usually manifested a preference for certain races, if it did not positively exclude the rest. To every new-comer was promised a lot of land, and the Delphian priestess strenuously seconded the wishes of the Kyrenæans, proclaiming that "whosoever should reach the place too late for the land-division, would have reason to repent it." Such promise of new land, as well as the sanction of the oracle, were doubtless made public at all the games and meetings of Greeks, and a large number of new colonists embarked for Kyrênê. The exact number is not mentioned, but we must conceive it to have been very great, when we are told that during the

succeeding generation, not less than seven thousand Grecian hoplites of Kyrênê perished by the hands of the revolted Libyans,—yet leaving both the city itself and its neighbor Barka still powerful. The loss of so great a number as seven thousand Grecian hoplites has very few parallels throughout the whole history of Greece. In fact, this second migration, during the government of Battus the Prosperous, which must have taken place between 574-554 B. C., ought to be looked upon as the moment of real and effective colonization for Kyrênê. It was on this occasion, probably, that the port of Apollonia, which afterwards came to equal the city itself in importance, was first occupied and fortified,—for this second swarm of emigrants came by sea direct, while the original colonists had reached Kyrênê by land from the island of Platea through Irasa. The fresh emigrants came from Peloponnesus, Krete, and some other islands of the Ægean.

To furnish so many new lots of land, it was either necessary, or it was deemed expedient, to dispossess many of the Libyan Perioeki, who found their situation in other respects also greatly changed for the worse. The Libyan king Adikran, himself among the sufferers, implored aid from Apriês king of Egypt, then in the height of his power; sending to declare himself and his people Egyptian subjects, like their neighbors the Adyrmachidæ. The Egyptian prince, accepting the offer, despatched a large military force of the native soldier-caste, who were constantly in station at the western frontier-town Marea, by the route along shore to attack Kyrênê. They were met at Irasa by the Greeks of Kyrênê, and, being totally ignorant of Grecian arms and tactics, experienced a defeat so complete that few of them reached home.[87] The consequences of this disaster in Egypt, where it caused the transfer of the throne from Apriês to Amasis, have been noticed in a former chapter.

Of course the Libyan Perioeki were put down, and the redivision of lands near Kyrênê among the Greek settlers accomplished, to the great increase of the power of the city. And the reign of Battus the Prosperous marks a flourishing era in the town, and a large acquisition of land-dominion, antecedent to years of dissension and distress. The Kyrenæans came into intimate alliance with Amasis king of Egypt, who encouraged Grecian connection in every way, and who even took to wife Ladikê, a woman of the Battiad family at Kyrênê, so that the Libyan Perioeki lost all chance of Egyptian aid against the Greeks.[88]

New prospects, however, were opened to them during the reign of Arkesilaus the Second, son of Battus the Prosperous, (about 554-544 B. C.). The behavior of this prince incensed and alienated his own brothers, who raised a revolt against him, seceded with a portion of the citizens, and induced a number of the Libyan Perioeki to take part with them. They founded the Greco-Libyan city of Barka, in the territory of the Libyan Auschisæ, about twelve miles from the coast, distant from Kyrênê by sea about seventy miles to the westward. The space between the two, and even beyond Barka, as far as the more westerly Grecian colony called Hesperides, was in the days of Skylax provided with commodious ports for refuge or landing:[89] at what time

Hesperides was founded we do not know, but it existed about 510 B. C.[90] Whether Arkesilaus obstructed the foundation of Barka is not certain; but he marched the Kyrenæan forces against those revolted Libyans who had joined it. Unable to resist, the latter fled for refuge to their more easterly brethren near the borders of Egypt, and Arkesilaus pursued them. At length, in a district called Leukôn, the fugitives found an opportunity of attacking him at such prodigious advantage, that they almost destroyed the Kyrenæan army, seven thousand hoplites (as has been before intimated) being left dead on the field. Arkesilaus did not long survive this disaster. He was strangled during sickness by his brother Learchus, who aspired to the throne; but Eryxô, widow of the deceased prince,[91] avenged the crime, by causing Learchus to be assassinated.

That the credit of the Battiad princes was impaired by such a series of disasters and enormities, we can readily believe. But it received a still greater shock from the circumstance, that Battus the Third, son and successor of Arkesilaus, was lame and deformed in his feet. To be governed by a man thus personally disabled, was in the minds of the Kyrenæans an indignity not to be borne, as well as an excuse for preëxisting discontents; and the resolution was taken to send to the Delphian oracle for advice. They were directed by the priestess to invite from Mantineia, a moderator, empowered to close discussions and provide a scheme of government,—the Mantineans selecting Demônax, one of the wisest of their citizens, to solve the same problem which had been committed to Solon at Athens. By his arrangement, the regal prerogative of the Battiad line was terminated, and a republican government established seemingly about 543 B. C.; the dispossessed prince retaining both the landed domains[92] and the various sacerdotal functions which had belonged to his predecessors.

Respecting the government, as newly framed, however, Herodotus unfortunately gives us hardly any particulars. Demônax classified the inhabitants of Kyrênê into three tribes; composed of: 1. Theræans with their Libyan Periœki; 2. Greeks who had come from Peloponnesus and Krete; 3. Such Greeks as had come from all other islands in the Ægean. It appears, too, that a senate was constituted, taken doubtless from these three tribes, and we may presume, in equal proportion. It seems probable that there had been before no constitutional classification, nor political privilege, except what was vested in the Theræans,—that these latter, the descendants of the original colonists were the only persons hitherto *known to the constitution*,—and that the remaining Greeks, though free landed proprietors and hoplites, were not permitted to act as an integral part of the body politic, nor distributed in tribes at all.[93] The whole powers of government,—up to this time vested in the Battiad princes, subject only to such check, how effective we know not, which the citizens of Theræan origin might be able to interpose,—were now transferred from the prince to the people; that is, to certain individuals or assemblies chosen somehow from among all the citizens. There existed at Kyrênê, as at Thêra and Sparta, a board of Ephors,

and a band of three hundred armed police,[94] analogous to those who were called the Hippeis, or Horsemen, at Sparta: whether these were instituted by Demônax, we do not know, nor does the identity of titular office, in different states, afford safe ground for inferring identity of power. This is particularly to be remarked with regard to the Periœki at Kyrênê, who were perhaps more analogous to the Helots than to the Periœki of Sparta. The fact that the Periœki were considered in the new constitution as belonging specially to the Theræan branch of citizens, shows that these latter still continued a privileged order, like the Patricians with their Clients at Rome in relation to the Plebs.

That the rearrangement introduced by Demônax was wise, consonant to the general current of Greek feeling, and calculated to work well, there is good reason to believe: and no discontent within would have subverted it without the aid of extraneous force. Battus the Lame acquiesced in it peaceably during his life; but his widow and his son, Pheretimê and Arkesilaus, raised a revolt after his death, and tried to regain by force the kingly privileges of the family. They were worsted and obliged to flee,—the mother to Cyprus, the son to Samos,—where both employed themselves in procuring foreign arms to invade and conquer Kyrênê. Though Pheretimê could obtain no effective aid from Euelthôn prince of Salamis in Cyprus, her son was more successful in Samos, by inviting new Greek settlers to Kyrênê, under promise of a redistribution of the land. A large body of emigrants joined him on this promise; the period seemingly being favorable to it, since the Ionian cities had not long before become subject to Persia, and were discontented with the yoke. But before he conducted this numerous band against his native city, he thought proper to ask the advice of the Delphian oracle. Success in the undertaking was promised to him, but moderation and mercy after success was emphatically enjoined, on pain of losing his life; and the Battiad race was declared by the god to be destined to rule at Kyrênê for eight generations, but no longer,—as far as four princes named Battus and four named Arkesilaus.[95] "More than such eight generations (said the Pythia), Apollo forbids the Battiads even to aim at." This oracle was doubtless told to Herodotus by Kyrenæan informants when he visited their city after the final deposition of the Battiad princes, which took place in the person of the fourth Arkesilaus, between 460-450 B. C.; the invasion of Kyrênê by Arkesilaus the Third, sixth prince of the Battiad race, to which the oracle professed to refer, having occurred about 530 B. C. The words placed in the mouth of the priestess doubtless date from the later of these two periods, and afford a specimen of the way in which pretended prophecies are not only made up by antedating after-knowledge, but are also so contrived as to serve a present purpose. For the distinct prohibition of the god, "not even to aim at a longer lineage than eight Battiad princes," seems plainly intended to deter the partisans of the dethroned family from endeavoring to reinstate them.

Arkesilaus the Third, to whom this prophecy purports to have been addressed, returned with his mother Pheretimê and his army of new colonists to Kyrênê. He was

strong enough to carry all before him,—to expel some of his chief opponents and seize upon others, whom he sent to Cyprus to be destroyed; though the vessels were driven out of their course by storms to the peninsula of Knidus, where the inhabitants rescued the prisoners and sent them to Thêra. Other Kyrenæans, opposed to the Battiads, took refuge in a lofty private tower, the property of Aglômachus, wherein Arkesilaus caused them all to be burned, heaping wood around and setting it on fire. But after this career of triumph and revenge, he became conscious that he had departed from the mildness enjoined to him by the oracle, and sought to avoid the punishment which it had threatened by retiring from Kyrênê. At any rate, he departed from Kyrênê to Barka, to the residence of the Barkæan prince, his kinsman Alazir, whose daughter he had married. But he found in Barka some of the unfortunate men who had fled from Kyrênê to escape him: these exiles, aided by a few Barkæans, watched for a suitable moment to assail him in the market-place, and slew him, together with his kinsman the prince Alazir.[96]

The victory of Arkesilaus at Kyrênê, and his assassination at Barka, are doubtless real facts; but they seem to have been compressed together and incorrectly colored, in order to give to the death of the Kyrenæan prince the appearance of a divine judgment. For the reign of Arkesilaus cannot have been very short, since events of the utmost importance occurred within it. The Persians under Kambysês conquered Egypt, and both the Kyrenæan and the Barkæan prince sent to Memphis to make their submission to the conqueror,—offering presents and imposing upon themselves an annual tribute. The presents of the Kyrenæans, five hundred minæ of silver, were considered by Kambysês so contemptibly small, that he took hold of them at once and threw them among his soldiers. And at the moment when Arkesilaus died, Aryandes, the Persian satrap after the death of Kambysês, is found established in Egypt.[97]

During the absence of Arkesilaus at Barka, his mother Pheretimê had acted as regent, taking her place at the discussions in the senate; but when his death took place, and the feeling against the Battiads manifested itself strongly at Barka, she did not feel powerful enough to put it down, and went to Egypt to solicit aid from Aryandes. The satrap, being made to believe that Arkesilaus had met his death in consequence of steady devotion to the Persians, sent a herald to Barka to demand the men who had slain him. The Barkæans assumed the collective responsibility of the act, saying that he had done them injuries both numerous and severe,—a farther proof that his reign cannot have been very short. On receiving this reply, the satrap immediately despatched a powerful Persian armament, land-force as well as sea-force, in fulfilment of the designs of Pheretimê against Barka. They besieged the town for nine months, trying to storm, to batter, and to undermine the walls;[98] but their efforts were vain, and it was taken at last only by an act of the grossest perfidy. Pretending to relinquish the attempt in despair, the Persian general concluded a treaty with the Barkæans, wherein it was stipulated that the latter should continue to

pay tribute to the Great King, but that the army should retire without farther hostilities: "I swear it (said the Persian general), and my oath shall hold good, as long as this earth shall keep its place." But the spot on which the oaths were exchanged had been fraudulently prepared: a ditch had been excavated and covered with hurdles, upon which again a surface of earth had been laid. The Barkæans, confiding in the oath, and overjoyed at their liberation, immediately opened their gates and relaxed their guard; while the Persians, breaking down the hurdles and letting fall the superimposed earth, so that they might comply with the letter of their oath, assaulted the city and took it without difficulty.

Miserable was the fate which Pheretimê had in reserve for these entrapped prisoners. She crucified the chief opponents of herself and her late son around the walls, on which were also affixed the breasts of their wives: then, with the exception of such of the inhabitants as were Battiads, and noway concerned in the death of Arkesilaus, she consigned the rest to slavery in Persia. They were carried away captive into the Persian empire, where Darius assigned to them a village in Baktria as their place of abode, which still bore the name of Barka, even in the days of Herodotus.

During the course of this expedition, it appears, the Persian army advanced as far as Hesperides, and reduced many of the Libyan tribes to subjection: these, together with Kyrênê and Barka, figure among the tributaries and auxiliaries of Xerxês in his expedition against Greece. And when the army returned to Egypt, by order of Aryandês, they were half inclined to seize Kyrênê itself in their way, though the opportunity was missed and the purpose left unaccomplished.[99]

Pheretimê accompanied the retreating army to Egypt, where she died shortly of a loathsome disease, consumed by worms; thus showing, says Herodotus,[100] that "excessive cruelty in revenge brings down upon men the displeasure of the gods." It will be recollected that in the veins of this savage woman the Libyan blood was intermixed with the Grecian. Political enmity in Greece proper kills, but seldom if ever mutilates or sheds the blood, of women.

We thus leave Kyrênê and Barka again subject to Battiad princes, at the same time that they are tributaries of Persia. Another Battus and another Arkesilaus have to intervene before the glass of this worthless dynasty is run out, between 460-450 B. C. I shall not at present carry the reader's attention to this last Arkesilaus, who stands honored by two chariot victories in Greece, and two fine odes of Pindar.

The victory of the third Arkesilaus, and the restoration of the Battiads, broke up the equitable constitution established by Demônax. His triple classification into tribes must have been completely remodelled, though we do not know how. For the number of new colonists whom Arkesilaus introduced must have necessitated a fresh distribution of land, and it is extremely doubtful whether the relation of the Theræan class of citizens with their Perioeki, as established by Demônax, still continued to subsist. It is necessary to notice this fact, because the arrangements of Demônax are

spoken of by some authors as if they formed the permanent constitution of Kyrênê; whereas they cannot have outlived the restoration of the Battiads, nor can they even have been revived after that dynasty was finally expelled, since the number of new citizens and the large change of property, introduced by Arkesilaus the Third, would render them inapplicable to the subsequent city.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

PAN-HELLENIC FESTIVALS — OLYMPIC, PYTHIAN, NEMEAN, AND ISTHMIAN.

IN THE preceding chapters I have been under the necessity of presenting to the reader a picture altogether incoherent and destitute of central effect,—to specify briefly each of the two or three hundred towns which agreed in bearing the Hellenic name, and to recount its birth and early life, as far as our evidence goes,—but without being able to point out any action and reaction, exploits or sufferings, prosperity or misfortune, glory or disgrace, common to all. To a great degree, this is a characteristic inseparable from the history of Greece from its beginning to its end, for the only political unity which it ever receives is the melancholy unity of subjection under all-conquering Rome. Nothing short of force will efface in the mind of a free Greek the idea of his city as an autonomous and separate organization; the village is a fraction, but the city is an unit,—and the highest of all political units, not admitting of being consolidated with others into a ten or a hundred, to the sacrifice of its own separate and individual mark. Such is the character of the race, both in their primitive country and in their colonial settlements,—in their early as well as in their late history,—splitting by natural fracture into a multitude of self-administering, indivisible cities. But that which marks the early historical period before Peisistratus, and which impresses upon it an incoherence at once so fatiguing and so irremediable, is, that as yet no causes have arisen to counteract this political isolation. Each city, whether progressive or stationary, prudent or adventurous, turbulent or tranquil, follows out its own thread of existence, having no partnership or common purposes with the rest, and not yet constrained into any active partnership with them by extraneous forces. In like manner, the races which on every side surround the Hellenic world appear distinct and unconnected, not yet taken up into any coöperating mass or system.

Contemporaneously with the accession of Peisistratus, this state of things becomes altered both in and out of Hellas,—the former as a consequence of the latter: for at that time begins the formation of the great Persian empire, which absorbs into itself not only Upper Asia and Asia Minor, but also Phenicia, Egypt, Thrace, Macedonia, and a considerable number of the Grecian cities themselves; and the common danger, threatening the greater states of Greece proper from this vast aggregate, drives them, in spite of great reluctance and jealousy, into active union. Hence arises a new impulse, counterworking the natural tendency to political isolation in the Hellenic cities, and centralizing their proceedings to a certain extent for the two centuries succeeding 560 B. C.; Athens and Sparta both availing themselves of the centralizing tendencies which had grown out of the Persian war. But during the interval

between 776-560 B. C., no such tendency can be traced even in commencement, nor any constraining force calculated to bring it about. Even Thucydidês, as we may see by his excellent preface, knew of nothing during these two centuries except separate city-politics and occasional wars between neighbors: the only event, according to him, in which any considerable number of Grecian cities were jointly concerned, was the war between Chalkis and Eretria, the date of which we do not know. In this war, several cities took part as allies; Samos, among others, with Eretria,—Milêtus with Chalkis:[101] how far the alliances of either may have extended, we have no evidence to inform us, but the presumption is that no great number of Grecian cities was comprehended in them. Such as it was, however, this war between Chalkis and Eretria was the nearest approach, and the only approach, to a Pan-Hellenic proceeding which Thucydidês indicates between the Trojan and the Persian wars. Both he and Herodotus present this early period only by way of preface and contrast to that which follows,—when the Pan-Hellenic spirit and tendencies, though never at any time predominant, yet counted for a powerful element in history, and sensibly modified the universal instinct of city-isolation. They tell us little about it, either because they could find no trustworthy informants, or because there was nothing in it to captivate the imagination in the same manner as the Persian or the Peloponnesian wars. From whatever cause their silence arises, it is deeply to be regretted, since the phenomena of the two centuries from 776-560 B. C., though not susceptible of any central grouping, must have presented the most instructive matter for study, had they been preserved. In no period of history have there ever been formed a greater number of new political communities, under such variety of circumstances, personal as well as local. And a few chronicles, however destitute of philosophy, reporting the exact march of some of these colonies from their commencement,—amidst all the difficulties attendant on amalgamation with strange natives, as well as on a fresh distribution of land,—would have added greatly to our knowledge both of Greek character and Greek social existence.

Taking the two centuries now under review, then, it will appear that there is not only no growing political unity among the Grecian states, but a tendency even to the contrary,—to dissemination and mutual estrangement. Not so, however, in regard to the other feelings of unity capable of subsisting between men who acknowledge no common political authority,—sympathies founded on common religion, language, belief of race, legends, tastes and customs, intellectual appetencies, sense of proportion and artistic excellence, recreative enjoyments, etc. On all these points the manifestations of Hellenic unity become more and more pronounced and comprehensive, in spite of increased political dissemination, throughout the same period. The breadth of common sentiment and sympathy between Greek and Greek, together with the conception of multitudinous periodical meetings as an indispensable portion of existence, appears decidedly greater in 560 B. C. than it had been a century before. It was fostered by the increased conviction of the superiority of Greeks as compared with foreigners,—a conviction gradually more and more justified as Grecian art and

intellect improved, and as the survey of foreign countries became extended,—as well as by the many new efforts of men of genius in the field of music, poetry, statuary, and architecture, each of whom touched chords of feeling belonging to other Greeks hardly less than to his own peculiar city. At the same time, the life of each peculiar city continues distinct, and even gathers to itself a greater abundance of facts and internal interests. So that during the two centuries now under review there was in the mind of every Greek an increase both of the city-feeling and of the Pan-Hellenic feeling, but on the other hand a decline of the old sentiment of separate race,—Doric, Ionic, Æolic.

I have already, in my former volume, touched upon the many-sided character of the Grecian religion, entering as it did into all the enjoyments and sufferings, the hopes and fears, the affections and antipathies, of the people,—not simply imposing restraints and obligations, but protecting, multiplying, and diversifying all the social pleasures and all the decorations of existence. Each city and even each village had its peculiar religious festivals, wherein the sacrifices to the gods were usually followed by public recreations of one kind or other,—by feasting on the victims, processional marches, singing and dancing, or competition in strong and active exercises. The festival was originally local, but friendship or communion of race was shown by inviting others, non-residents, to partake in its attractions. In the case of a colony and its metropolis, it was a frequent practice that citizens of the metropolis were honored with a privileged seat at the festivals of the colony, or that one of their number was presented with the first taste of the sacrificial victim.[102] Reciprocal frequentation of religious festivals was thus the standing evidence of friendship and fraternity among cities not politically united. That it must have existed to a certain degree from the earliest days, there can be no reasonable doubt; though in Homer and Hesiod we find only the celebration of funeral games, by a chief at his own private expense, in honor of his deceased father or friend,—with all the accompanying recreations, however, of a public festival, and with strangers not only present, but also contending for valuable prizes.[103] Passing to historical Greece during the seventh century B. C., we find evidence of two festivals, even then very considerable, and frequented by Greeks from many different cities and districts,—the festival at Delos, in honor of Apollo, the great place of meeting for Ionians throughout the Ægean,—and the Olympic games. The Homeric Hymn to the Delian Apollo, which must be placed earlier than 600 B. C., dwells with emphasis on the splendor of the Delian festival,—unrivalled throughout Greece, as it would appear, during all the first period of this history, for wealth, finery of attire, and variety of exhibitions as well in poetical genius as in bodily activity,[104]—equalling probably at that time, if not surpassing, the Olympic games. The complete and undiminished grandeur of this Delian Pan-Ionic festival is one of our chief marks of the first period of Grecian history, before the comparative prostration of the Ionic Greeks through the rise of Persia: it was celebrated periodically in every fourth year, to the honor of Apollo and Artemis. It was distinguished from the Olympic games by two circumstances both deserving of no-

tice,—first, by including solemn matches not only of gymnastic, but also of musical and poetical excellence, whereas the latter had no place at Olympia; secondly, by the admission of men, women, and children indiscriminately as spectators, whereas women were formally excluded from the Olympic ceremony.[105] Such exclusion may have depended in part on the inland situation of Olympia, less easily approachable by females than the island of Delos; but even making allowance for this circumstance, both the one distinction and the other mark the rougher character of the Ætolo-Dorians in Peloponnesus. The Delian festival, which greatly dwindled away during the subjection of the Asiatic and insular Greeks to Persia, was revived afterwards by Athens during the period of her empire, when she was seeking in every way to strengthen her central ascendency in the Ægean. But though it continued to be ostentatiously celebrated under her management, it never regained that commanding sanctity and crowded frequentation which we find attested in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo for its earlier period.

Very different was the fate of the Olympic festival,—on the banks of the Alpheius[106] in Peloponnesus, near the old oracular temple of the Olympian Zeus,—which not only grew up uninterruptedly from small beginnings to the maximum of Pan-Hellenic importance, but even preserved its crowds of visitors and its celebrity for many centuries after the extinction of Greek freedom, and only received its final abolition, after more than eleven hundred years of continuance, from the decree of the Christian emperor Theodosius in 394 A. D. I have already recounted, in the preceding volume of this history, the attempt made by Pheidon, despot of Argos, to restore to the Pisatans, or to acquire for himself, the administration of this festival,—an event which proves the importance of the festival in Peloponnesus, even so early as 740 B. C. At that time, and for some years afterwards, it seems to have been frequented chiefly, if not exclusively, by the neighboring inhabitants of central and western Peloponnesus,—Spartans, Messenians, Arkadians, Triphylians, Pisatans, Eleians, and Achæans,[107]—and it forms an important link connecting the Etolo-Eleians, and their privileges as Agonothets to solemnize and preside over it, with Sparta. From the year 720 B. C., we trace positive evidences of the gradual presence of more distant Greeks,—Corinthians, Megarians, Bœotians, Athenians, and even Smyrnæans from Asia.

We observe also another proof of growing importance, in the increased number and variety of matches exhibited to the spectators, and in the substitution of the simple crown of olive, an honorary reward, in place of the more substantial present which the Olympic festival and all other Grecian festivals began by conferring upon the victor. The humble constitution of the Olympic games presented originally nothing more than a match of runners in the measured course called the Stadium: a continuous series of the victorious runners was formally inscribed and preserved by the Eleians, beginning with Korœbus in 776 B. C., and was made to serve by chronological inquirers from the third century B. C. downwards, as a means of measuring the

chronological sequence of Grecian events. It was on the occasion of the 7th Olympiad after Korœbus, that Daiklês the Messenian first received for his victory in the stadium no farther recompense than a wreath from the sacred olive-tree near Olympia:[108] the honor of being proclaimed victor was found sufficient, without any pecuniary addition. But until the 14th Olympiad, there was no other match for the spectators to witness beside that of simple runners in the stadium. On that occasion a second race was first introduced, of runners in the double stadium, or up and down the course; in the next, or 15th Olympiad (720 B. C.), a third match, the long course for runners, or several times up and down the stadium. There were thus three races,—the simple stadium, the double stadium, or diaulos, and the long course, or dolichos, all for runners,—which continued without addition until the 18th Olympiad, when the wrestling-match and the complicated pentathlon—including jumping, running, the quoit, the javelin, and wrestling—were both added. A farther novelty appears in the 23rd Olympiad (688 B. C.), the boxing-match; and another, still more important, in the 25th (680 B. C.), the chariot with four full-grown horses. This last-mentioned addition is deserving of special notice, not merely as it diversified the scene by the introduction of horses, but also as it brought in a totally new class of competitors,—rich men and women, who possessed the finest horses and could hire the most skilful drivers, without any personal superiority, or power of bodily display, in themselves.[109] The prodigious exhibition of wealth in which the chariot proprietors indulged, is not only an evidence of growing importance in the Olympic games, but also served materially to increase that importance, and to heighten the interest of spectators. Two farther matches were added in the 33rd Olympiad (648 B. C.),—the pankration, or boxing and wrestling conjoined,[110] with the hand unarmed or divested of that hard leather cestus[111] worn by the pugilist, which rendered the blow of the latter more terrible, but at the same time prevented him from grasping or keeping hold of his adversary,—and the single race-horse. Many other novelties were introduced one after the other, which it is unnecessary fully to enumerate,—the race between men clothed in full panoply, and bearing each his shield,—the different matches between boys, analogous to those between full-grown men, and between colts, of the same nature as between full-grown horses. At the maximum of its attraction the Olympic solemnity occupied five days, but until the 77th Olympiad, all the various matches had been compressed into one,—beginning at daybreak and not always closing before dark.[112] The 77th Olympiad follows immediately after the successful expulsion of the Persian invaders from Greece, when the Pan-Hellenic feeling had been keenly stimulated by resistance to a common enemy; and we may easily conceive that this was a suitable moment for imparting additional dignity to the chief national festival.

We are thus enabled partially to trace the steps by which, during the two centuries succeeding 776 B. C., the festival of the Olympic Zeus in the Pisatid gradually passed from a local to a national character, and acquired an attractive force capable of bringing together into temporary union the dispersed fragments of Hellas, from

Marseilles to Trebizond. In this important function it did not long stand alone. During the sixth century B. C., three other festivals, at first local, became successively nationalized,—the Pythia near Delphi, the Isthmia, near Corinth, the Nemea near Kleônæ, between Sikyôn and Argos.

In regard to the Pythian festival, we find a short notice of the particular incidents and individuals by whom its reconstitution and enlargement were brought about,—a notice the more interesting, inasmuch as these very incidents are themselves a manifestation of something like Pan-Hellenic patriotism, standing almost alone in an age which presents little else in operation except distinct city-interests. At the time when the Homeric Hymn to the Delphinian Apollo was composed (probably in the seventh century B. C.), the Pythian festival had as yet acquired little eminence. The rich and holy temple of Apollo was then purely oracular, established for the purpose of communicating to pious inquirers "the counsels of the immortals." Multitudes of visitors came to consult it, as well as to sacrifice victims and to deposit costly offerings; but while the god delighted in the sound of the harp as an accompaniment to the singing of pæans, he was by no means anxious to encourage horse-races and chariot-races in the neighborhood,—nay, this psalmist considers that the noise of horses would be "a nuisance," the drinking of mules a desecration to the sacred fountains, and the ostentation of fine-built chariots objectionable,[113] as tending to divert the attention of spectators away from the great temple and its wealth.

From such inconveniences the god was protected by placing his sanctuary "in the rocky Pytho,"—a rugged and uneven recess, of no great dimensions, embosomed in the southern declivity of Parnassus, and about two thousand feet above the level of the sea, while the topmost Parnassian summits reach a height of near eight thousand feet. The situation was extremely imposing, but unsuited by nature for the congregation of any considerable number of spectators,—altogether impracticable for chariot-races,—and only rendered practicable by later art and outlay for the theatre as well as for the stadium; the original stadium, when first established, was placed in the plain beneath. It furnished little means of subsistence, but the sacrifices and presents of visitors enabled the ministers of the temple to live in abundance,[114] and gathered together by degrees a village around it. Near the sanctuary of Pytho, and about the same altitude, was situated the ancient Phocian town of Krissa, on a projecting spur of Parnassus,—overhung above by the line of rocky precipice called the Phædriades, and itself overhanging below the deep ravine through which flows the river Pleistus. On the other side of this river rises the steep mountain Kirphis, which projects southward into the Corinthian gulf,—the river reaching that gulf through the broad Krissæan or Kirrhæan plain, which stretches westward nearly to the Lokrian town of Amphissa; a plain for the most part fertile and productive, though least so in its eastern part immediately under the Kirphis, where the seaport Kirrha was placed. [115] The temple, the oracle, and the wealth of Pytho, belong to the very earliest periods of Grecian antiquity; but the octennial solemnity in honor of the god included at

first no other competition except that of bards, who sang each a pæan with the harp. It has been already mentioned, in my preceding volume, that the Amphiktyonic assembly held one of its half-yearly meetings near the temple of Pytho, the other at Thermopylæ.

In those early times when the Homeric Hymn to Apollo was composed, the town of Krissa appears to have been great and powerful, possessing all the broad plain between Parnassus, Kirphis, and the gulf, to which latter it gave its name,—and possessing also, what was a property not less valuable, the adjoining sanctuary of Pytho itself, which the Hymn identifies with Krissa, not indicating Delphi as a separate place. The Krissæans, doubtless, derived great profits from the number of visitors who came to visit Delphi, both by land and by sea, and Kirrha was originally only the name for their seaport. Gradually, however, the port appears to have grown in importance at the expense of the town, just as Apollonia and Ptolemais came to equal Kyrênê and Barka, and as Plymouth Dock has swelled into Devonport; while at the same time, the sanctuary of Pytho with its administrators expanded into the town of Delphi, and came to claim an independent existence of its own. The original relations between Krissa, Kirrha, and Delphi, were in this manner at length subverted, the first declining and the two latter rising. The Krissæans found themselves dispossessed of the management of the temple, which passed to the Delphians, as well as of the profits arising from the visitors, whose disbursements went to enrich the inhabitants of Kirrha. Krissa was a primitive city of the Phocian name, and could boast of a place as such in the Homeric Catalogue, so that her loss of importance was not likely to be quietly endured. Moreover, in addition to the above facts, already sufficient in themselves as seeds of quarrel, we are told that the Kirrhæans abused their position as masters of the avenue to the temple by sea, and levied exorbitant tolls on the visitors who landed there,—a number constantly increasing from the multiplication of the transmarine colonies, and from the prosperity of those in Italy and Sicily. Besides such offence against the general Grecian public, they had also incurred the enmity of their Phocian neighbors by outrages upon women, Phocian as well as Argeian, who were returning from the temple.[116]

Thus stood the case, apparently, about 595 B. C., when the Amphiktyonic meeting interfered—either prompted by the Phocians, or perhaps on their own spontaneous impulse, out of regard to the temple—to punish the Kirrhæans. After a war of ten years, the first Sacred War in Greece, this object was completely accomplished, by a joint force of Thessalians under Eurylochus, Sikyonians under Kleisthenês, and Athenians under Alkmæon; the Athenian Solon being the person who originated and enforced, in the Amphiktyonic council, the proposition of interference. Kirrha appears to have made a strenuous resistance until its supplies from the sea were intercepted by the naval force of the Sikyonian Kleisthenês; and even after the town was taken, its inhabitants defended themselves for some time on the heights of Kirphis.[117] At length, however, they were thoroughly subdued. Their town was destroyed, or left to

subsist merely as a landing-place; and the whole adjoining plain was consecrated to the Delphian god, whose domains thus touched the sea. Under this sentence, pronounced by the religious feeling of Greece, and sanctified by a solemn oath publicly sworn and inscribed at Delphi, the land was condemned to remain untilled and unplanted, without any species of human care, and serving only for the pasturage of cattle. The latter circumstance was convenient to the temple, inasmuch as it furnished abundance of victims for the pilgrims who landed and came to sacrifice,—for without preliminary sacrifice no man could consult the oracle;[118] while the entire prohibition of tillage was the only means of obviating the growth of another troublesome neighbor on the sea-board. The fate of Kirrha in this war is ascertained: that of Krissa is not so clear, nor do we know whether it was destroyed, or left subsisting in a position of inferiority with regard to Delphi. From this time forward, however, the Delphian community appears as substantive and autonomous, exercising in their own right the management of the temple; though we shall find, on more than one occasion, that the Phocians contest this right, and lay claim to the management of it for themselves,[119]—a remnant of that early period when the oracle stood in the domain of the Phocian Krissa. There seems, moreover, to have been a standing antipathy between the Delphians and the Phocians.

The Sacred War just mentioned, emanating from a solemn Amphiktyonic decree, carried on jointly by troops of different states whom we do not know to have ever before coöperated, and directed exclusively towards an object of common interest, is in itself a fact of high importance as manifesting a decided growth of Pan-Hellenic feeling. Sparta is not named as interfering,—a circumstance which seems remarkable when we consider both her power, even as it then stood, and her intimate connection with the Delphian oracle,—while the Athenians appear as the prime movers, through the greatest and best of their citizens: the credit of a large-minded patriotism rests prominently upon them.

But if this Sacred War itself is a proof that the Pan-Hellenic spirit was growing stronger, the positive result in which it ended reinforced that spirit still farther. The spoils of Kirrha were employed by the victorious allies in founding the Pythian games. The octennial festival hitherto celebrated at Delphi in honor of the god, including no other competition except in the harp and the pæan, was expanded into comprehensive games on the model of the Olympic, with matches not only of music, but also of gymnastics and chariots,—celebrated, not at Delphi itself, but on the maritime plain near the ruined Kirrha,—and under the direct superintendence of the Amphiktyons themselves. I have already mentioned that Solon provided large rewards for such Athenians as gained victories in the Olympic and Isthmian games, thereby indicating his sense of the great value of the national games as a means of promoting Hellenic intercommunion. It was the same feeling which instigated the foundation of the new games on the Kirrhæan plain, in commemoration of the vindicated honor of Apollo, and in the territory newly made over to him. They were celebrated in the

latter half of summer, or first half of every third Olympic year,—the Amphiktyons being the ostensible agonothets, or administrators, and appointing persons to discharge the duty in their names.[120] At the first Pythian ceremony (in 586 B. C.), valuable rewards were given to the different victors; at the second (582 B. C.), nothing was conferred but wreaths of laurel,—the rapidly attained celebrity of the games being such as to render any farther reward superfluous. The Sikyonian despot Kleisthenês himself, one of the leaders in the conquest of Kirrha, gained the prize at the chariot-race of the second Pythia. We find other great personages in Greece frequently mentioned as competitors, and the games long maintained a dignity second only to the Olympic, over which, indeed, they had some advantages; first, that they were not abused for the purpose of promoting petty jealousies and antipathies of any administering state, as the Olympic games were perverted by the Eleians, on more than one occasion; next, that they comprised music and poetry as well as bodily display. From the circumstances attending their foundation, the Pythian games deserved, even more than the Olympic, the title bestowed on them by Demosthenês, —"The common Agôn of the Greeks."[121]

The Olympic and Pythian games continued always to be the most venerated solemnities in Greece: yet the Nemea and Isthmia acquired a celebrity not much inferior; the Olympic prize counting for the highest of all.[122] Both the Nemea and the Isthmia were distinguished from the other two festivals by occurring, not once in four years, but once in two years; the former in the second and fourth years of each Olympiad, the latter in the first and third years. To both is assigned, according to Greek custom, an origin connected with the interesting persons and circumstances of Grecian antiquity: but our historical knowledge of both begins with the sixth century B. C. The first historical Nemead is presented as belonging to Olympiad 52 or 53 (572-568 B. C.), a few years subsequent to the Sacred War above mentioned and to the origin of the Pythia. The festival was celebrated in honor of the Nemean Zeus, in the valley of Nemea, between Phlius and Kleônæ,—and originally by the Kleônæans themselves, until, at some period after 460 B. C., the Argeians deprived them of that honor and assumed the honors of administration to themselves.[123] The Nemean games had their Hellanodikæ[124] to superintend, to keep order, and to distribute the prizes, as well as the Olympic. Respecting the Isthmian festival, our first historical information is a little earlier, for it has already been stated that Solon conferred a premium upon every Athenian citizen who gained a prize at that festival as well as at the Olympian,—in or after 594 B. C. It was celebrated by the Corinthians at their isthmus, in honor of Poseidôn; and if we may draw any inference from the legends respecting its foundation, which is ascribed sometimes to Theseus, the Athenians appear to have identified it with the antiquities of their own state.[125]

We thus perceive that the interval between 600-560 B. C. exhibits the first historical manifestation of the Pythia, Isthmia, and Nemea,—the first expansion of all the three from local into Pan-Hellenic festivals. To the Olympic games, for some time the

only great centre of union among all the widely dispersed Greeks, are now added three other sacred agônes of the like public, open, national character; constituting visible marks, as well as tutelary bonds, of collective Hellenism, and insuring to every Greek who went to compete in the matches, a safe and inviolate transit even through hostile Hellenic states.[126] These four, all in or near Peloponnesus, and one of which occurred in each year, formed the period, or cycle, of sacred games, and those who had gained prizes at all the four received the enviable designation of periodonikes:[127] the honors paid to Olympic victors on their return to their native city were prodigious, even in the sixth century B. C., and became even more extravagant afterwards. We may remark that in the Olympic games alone, the oldest as well as the most illustrious of the four, the musical and intellectual element was wanting: all the three more recent agônes included crowns for exercises of music and poetry, along with gymnastics, chariots, and horses.

Nor was it only in the distinguishing national stamp set upon these four great festivals that the gradual increase of Hellenic family-feeling exhibited itself, during the course of this earliest period of our history. Pursuant to the same tendencies, religious festivals in all the considerable towns gradually became more and more open and accessible, and attracted guests as well as competitors from beyond the border; the dignity of the state, as well as the honor rendered to the presiding god, being measured by numbers, admiration, and envy, in the frequenting visitors.[128] There is no positive evidence, indeed, of such expansion in the Attic festivals earlier than the reign of Peisistratus, who first added the quadrennial or greater Panathenæa to the ancient annual or lesser Panathenæa; nor can we trace the steps of progress in regard to Thebes, Orchomenus, Thespiæ, Megara, Sikyôn, Pellênê, Ægina, Argos, etc., but we find full reason for believing that such was the general reality. Of the Olympic or Isthmian victors whom Pindar and Simonidês celebrated, many derived a portion of their renown from previous victories acquired at several of these local contests, [129]—victories sometimes so numerous, as to prove how wide-spread the habit of mutual frequentation had become;[130] though we find, even in the third century B. C., treaties of alliance between different cities, in which it is thought necessary to confer this mutual right by express stipulation. Temptation was offered, to the distinguished gymnastic or musical competitors, by prizes of great value; and Timæus even asserted, as a proof of the overweening pride of Kroton and Sybaris, that these cities tried to supplant the preëminence of the Olympic games, by instituting games of their own with the richest prizes, to be celebrated at the same time,[131]—a statement in itself not worthy of credit, but nevertheless illustrating the animated rivalry known to prevail among the Grecian cities in procuring for themselves splendid and crowded games. At the time when the Homeric Hymn to Dêmêtêr was composed, the worship of that goddess seems to have been purely local at Eleusis; but before the Persian war, the festival celebrated by the Athenians every year, in honor of the Eleusinian Dêmêtêr, admitted Greeks of all cities to be initiated, and was attended by vast crowds of them.[132]

It was thus that the simplicity and strict local application of the primitive religious festival, among the greater states in Greece, gradually expanded, on certain great occasions periodically recurring, into an elaborate and regulated series of exhibitions, —not merely admitting, but soliciting the fraternal presence of all Hellenic spectators. In this respect Sparta seems to have formed an exception to the remaining states: her festivals were for herself alone, and her general rudeness towards other Greeks was not materially softened even at the Karneia,[133] or Hyakinthia, or Gymnopædiæ. On the other hand, the Attic Dionysia were gradually exalted, from their original rude spontaneous outburst of village feeling in thankfulness to the god, followed by song, dance, and revelry of various kinds,—into costly and diversified performances, first, by a trained chorus, next, by actors superadded to it;[134] and the dramatic compositions thus produced, as they embodied the perfection of Grecian art, so they were eminently calculated to invite a Pan-Hellenic audience and to encourage the sentiment of Hellenic unity. The dramatic literature of Athens, however, belongs properly to a later period; previous to the year 560 B. C., we see only those commencements of innovation which drew upon Thespis[135] the rebuke of Solon, who himself contributed to impart to the Panathenaic festival a more solemn and attractive character, by checking the license of the rhapsodes, and insuring to those present a full, orderly recital of the Iliad.

The sacred games and festivals, here alluded to as a class, took hold of the Greek mind by so great a variety of feelings,[136] as to counterbalance in a high degree the political disseverance, and to keep alive among their wide-spread cities, in the midst of constant jealousy and frequent quarrel, a feeling of brotherhood and congenial sentiment such as must otherwise have died away. The Theôrs, or sacred envoys, who came to Olympia or Delphi from so many different points, all sacrificed to the same god and at the same altar, witnessed the same sports, and contributed by their donatives to enrich or adorn one respected scene. Nor must we forget that the festival afforded opportunity for a sort of fair, including much traffic amid so large a mass of spectators,[137] and besides the exhibitions of the games themselves, there were recitations and lectures in a spacious council-room for those who chose to listen to them, by poets, rhapsodes, philosophers, and historians,—among which last, the history of Herodotus is said to have been publicly read by its author.[138] Of the wealthy and great men in the various cities, many contended simply for the chariot victories and horse victories. But there were others whose ambition was of a character more strictly personal, and who stripped naked as runners, wrestlers, boxers, or pankratiasts, having gone through the extreme fatigue of a complete previous training. Kylon, whose unfortunate attempt to usurp the sceptre at Athens has been recounted, had gained the prize in the Olympic stadium: Alexander son of Amyntas, the prince of Macedon, had run for it.[139] The great family of the Diagoridæ at Rhodes, who furnished magistrates and generals to their native city, supplied a still greater number of successful boxers and pankratiasts at Olympia, while other instances also occur of generals named by various cities from the lists of successful Olympic gym-

nasts; and the odes of Pindar, always dearly purchased, attest how many of the great and wealthy were found in that list.[140] The perfect popularity and equality of persons at these great games, is a feature not less remarkable than the exact adherence to predetermined rule, and the self-imposed submission of the immense crowd to a handful of servants armed with sticks,[141] who executed the orders of the Eleian Hellanodikæ. The ground upon which the ceremony took place, and even the territory of the administering state, was protected by a "Truce of God," during the month of the festival, the commencement of which was formally announced by heralds sent round to the different states. Treaties of peace between different cities were often formally commemorated by pillars there erected, and the general impression of the scene suggested nothing but ideas of peace and brotherhood among Greeks.[142] And I may remark that the impression of the games as belonging to all Greeks, and to none but Greeks, was stronger and clearer during the interval between 600-300 B. C., than it came to be afterwards. For the Macedonian conquests had the effect of diluting and corrupting Hellenism, by spreading an exterior varnish of Hellenic tastes and manners over a wide area of incongruous foreigners, who were incapable of the real elevation of the Hellenic character; so that although in later times the games continued undiminished, both in attraction and in number of visitors, the spirit of Pan-Hellenic communion, which had once animated the scene, was gone forever.

CHAPTER XXIX.

LYRIC POETRY. — THE SEVEN WISE MEN.

THE interval between 776-560 B. C. presents to us a remarkable expansion of Grecian genius in the creation of their elegiac, iambic, lyric, choric, and gnomic poetry, which was diversified in a great many ways and improved by many separate masters. The creators of all these different styles—from Kallinus and Archilochus down to Stesichorus—fall within the two centuries here included; though Pindar and Simonidês, "the proud and high-crested bards,"[143] who carried lyric and choric poetry to the maximum of elaboration consistent with full poetical effect, lived in the succeeding century, and were contemporary with the tragedian Æschylus. The Grecian drama, comic as well as tragic, of the fifth century B. C., combined the lyric and choric song with the living action of iambic dialogue,—thus constituting the last ascending movement in the poetical genius of the race. Reserving this for a future time, and for the history of Athens, to which it more particularly belongs, I now propose to speak only of the poetical movement of the two earlier centuries, wherein Athens had little or no part. So scanty are the remnants, unfortunately, of these earlier poets, that we can offer little except criticisms borrowed at second-hand, and a few general considerations on their workings and tendency.[144]

Archilochus and Kallinus both appear to fall about the middle of the seventh century B. C., and it is with them that the innovations in Grecian poetry commence. Before them, we are told, there existed nothing but the epos, or daktylic hexameter poetry, of which much has been said in my former volume,—being legendary stories or adventures narrated, together with addresses or hymns to the gods. We must recollect, too, that this was not only the whole poetry, but the whole literature of the age: prose composition was altogether unknown, and writing, if beginning to be employed as an aid to a few superior men, was at any rate generally unused, and found no reading public. The voice was the only communicant, and the ear the only recipient, of all those ideas and feelings which productive minds in the community found themselves impelled to pour out; both voice and ear being accustomed to a musical recitation, or chant, apparently something between song and speech, with simple rhythm and a still simpler occasional accompaniment from the primitive four-stringed harp. Such habits and requirements of the voice and ear were, at that time, inseparably associated with the success and popularity of the poet, and contributed doubtless to restrict the range of subjects with which he could deal. The type was to a certain extent consecrated, like the primitive statues of the gods, from which men only ventured to deviate by gradual and almost unconscious innovations. Moreover, in the first half of the seventh century B. C., that genius which had once created an Iliad and an Odyssey was no longer to be found, and the work of hexameter narrative had

come to be prosecuted by less gifted persons,—by those Cyclic poets of whom I have spoken in the preceding volumes.

Such, as far as we can make it out amidst very uncertain evidence, was the state of the Greek mind immediately before elegiac and lyric poets appeared; while at the same time its experience was enlarging by the formation of new colonies, and the communion among its various states tended to increase by the freer reciprocity of religious games and festivals. There arose a demand for turning the literature of the age—I use this word as synonymous with the poetry—to new feelings and purposes, and for applying the rich, plastic, and musical language of the old epic, to present passion and circumstance, social as well as individual. Such a tendency had become obvious in Hesiod, even within the range of hexameter verse; but the same causes which led to an enlargement of the subjects of poetry inclined men also to vary the metre.

In regard to this latter point, there is reason to believe that the expansion of Greek music was the immediate determining cause; for it has been already stated that the musical scale and instruments of the Greeks, originally very narrow, were materially enlarged by borrowing from Phrygia and Lydia, and these acquisitions seem to have been first realized about the beginning of the seventh century B. C., through the Lesbian harper Terpander,—the Phrygian (or Greco-Phrygian) flute-player Olympus,—and the Arkadian or Bœotian flute-player Klonas. Terpander made the important advance of exchanging the original four-stringed harp for one of seven strings, embracing the compass of one octave or two Greek tetrachords, and Olympus as well as Klonas taught many new nomes, or tunes, on the flute, to which the Greeks had before been strangers,—probably also the use of a flute of more varied musical compass. Terpander is said to have gained the prize at the first recorded celebration of the Lacedæmonian festival of the Karneia, in 676 B. C.: this is one of the best-ascertained points among the obscure chronology of the seventh century; and there seem grounds for assigning Olympus and Klonas to nearly the same period, a little before Archilochus and Kallinus.[145] To Terpander, Olympus, and Klonas, are ascribed the formation of the earliest musical nomes known to the inquiring Greeks of later times: to the first, nomes on the harp; to the two latter, on the flute,—every nome being the general scheme, or basis, of which the airs actually performed constituted so many variations, within certain defined limits.[146] Terpander employed his enlarged instrumental power as a new accompaniment to the Homeric poems, as well as to certain epic proœmia or hymns to the gods of his own composition. But he does not seem to have departed from the hexameter verse and the daktylic rhythm, to which the new accompaniment was probably not quite suitable; and the idea may thus have been suggested of combining the words also according to new rhythmical and metrical laws.

It is certain, at least, that the age (670-600) immediately succeeding Terpander,—comprising Archilochus, Kallinus, Tyrtæus, and Alkman, whose relations of time one

to another we have no certain means of determining,[147] though Alkman seems to have been the latest,—presents a remarkable variety both of new metres and of new rhythms, superinduced upon the previous daktylic hexameter. The first departure from this latter is found in the elegiac verse, employed seemingly more or less by all the four above-mentioned poets, but chiefly by the first two, and even ascribed by some to the invention of Kallinus. Tyrtæus in his military march-songs employed the anapæstic metre, but in Archilochus as well as in Alkman we find traces of a much larger range of metrical variety,—iambic, trochaic, anapæstic, ionic, etc.,—sometimes even asynartetic or compound metres, anapæstic or daktylic, blended with trochaic or iambic. What we have remaining from Mimnermus, who comes about the close of the preceding four, is elegiac; his contemporaries Alkæus and Sappho, besides employing most of those metres which they found existing, invented each a peculiar stanza of their own, which is familiarly known under a name derived from each. In Solon, the younger contemporary of Mimnermus, we have the elegiac, iambic, and trochaic: in Theognis, yet later, the elegiac only. But both Arion and Stesichorus appear to have been innovators in this department, the former by his improvement in the dithyrambic chorus or circular song and dance in honor of Dionysus,—the latter by his more elaborate choric compositions, containing not only a strophê and antistrophê, but also a third division or epode succeeding them, pronounced by the chorus standing still. Both Anakreon and Ibykus likewise added to the stock of existing metrical varieties. And we thus see that, within the century and a half succeeding Terpander, Greek poetry (or Greek literature, which was then the same thing) became greatly enriched in matter as well as diversified in form.

To a certain extent there seems to have been a real connection between the two: new forms were essential for the expression of new wants and feelings,—though the assertion that elegiac metre is especially adapted for one set of feelings,[148] trochaic for a second, and iambic for a third, if true at all, can only be admitted with great latitude of exception, when we find so many of them employed by the poets for very different subjects,—gay or melancholy, bitter or complaining, earnest or sprightly,—seemingly with little discrimination.

But the adoption of some new metre, different from the perpetual series of hexameters, was required when the poet desired to do something more than recount a long story or fragment of heroic legend,—when he sought to bring himself, his friends, his enemies, his city, his hopes and fears with regard to matters recent or impending, all before the notice of the hearer, and that, too, at once with brevity and animation. The Greek hexameter, like our blank verse, has all its limiting conditions bearing upon each separate line, and presents to the hearer no predetermined resting-place or natural pause beyond.[149] In reference to any long composition, either epic or dramatic, such unrestrained license is found convenient, and the case was similar for Greek epos and drama,—the single-lined iambic trimeter being generally used for the dialogue of tragedy and comedy, just as the daktylic hexameter had

been used for the epic. The metrical changes introduced by Archilochus and his contemporaries may be compared to a change from our blank verse to the rhymed couplet and quatrain: the verse was thrown into little systems of two, three, or four lines, with a pause at the end of each; and the halt thus assured to, as well as expected and relished by, the ear, was generally coincident with a close, entire or partial, in the sense, which thus came to be distributed with greater point and effect. The elegiac verse, or common hexameter and pentameter (this second line being an hexameter with the third and sixth thesis,[150] or the last half of the third and sixth foot, suppressed, and a pause left in place of it), as well as the epode (or iambic trimeter followed by an iambic dimeter) and some other binary combinations of verse which we trace among the fragments of Archilochus, are conceived with a view to such increase of effect both on the ear and the mind, not less than to the direct pleasures of novelty and variety.

The iambic metre, built upon the primitive iambus, or coarse and licentious jesting,[151] which formed a part of some Grecian festivals (especially of the festivals of Dêmêtêr as well in Attica as in Paros, the native country of the poet), is only one amongst many new paths struck out by his inventive genius; whose exuberance astonishes us, when we consider that he takes his start from little more than the simple hexameter,[152] in which, too, he was a distinguished composer,—for even of the elegiac verse he is as likely to have been the inventor as Kallinus, just as he was the earliest popular and successful composer of table-songs, or Skolia, though Terpander may have originated some such before him. The entire loss of his poems, excepting some few fragments, enables us to recognize little more than one characteristic,—the intense personality which pervaded them, as well as that coarse, direct, and out-spoken license, which afterwards lent such terrible effect to the old comedy at Athens. His lampoons are said to have driven Lykambês, the father of Neobulê, to hang himself: the latter had been promised to Archilochus in marriage, but that promise was broken, and the poet assailed both father and daughter with every species of calumny.[153] In addition to this disappointment, he was poor, the son of a slave-mother, and an exile from his country, Paros, to the unpromising colony of Thasos. The desultory notices respecting him betray a state of suffering combined with loose conduct which vented itself sometimes in complaint, sometimes in libellous assault; and he was at last slain by some whom his muse had thus exasperated. His extraordinary poetical genius finds but one voice of encomium throughout antiquity. His triumphal song to Hêraklês was still popularly sung by the victors at Olympia, near two centuries after his death, in the days of Pindar; but that majestic and complimentary poet at once denounces the malignity, and attests the retributive suffering, of the great Parian iambist.[154]

Amidst the multifarious veins in which Archilochus displayed his genius, moralizing or gnomic poetry is not wanting, while his contemporary Simonides, of Amorgos, devotes the iambic metre especially to this destination, afterwards followed out by

Solon and Theognis. But Kallinus, the earliest celebrated elegiac poet, so far as we can judge from his few fragments, employed the elegiac metre for exhortations of warlike patriotism; and the more ample remains which we possess of Tyrtæus are sermons in the same strain, preaching to the Spartans bravery against the foe, and unanimity as well as obedience to the law at home. They are patriotic effusions, called forth by the circumstances of the time, and sung by single voice, with accompaniment of the flute,[155] to those in whose bosoms the flame of courage was to be kindled. For though what we peruse is in verse, we are still in the tide of real and present life, and we must suppose ourselves rather listening to an orator addressing the citizens when danger or dissension is actually impending. It is only in the hands of Mimnermus that elegiac verse comes to be devoted to soft and amatory subjects. His few fragments present a vein of passive and tender sentiment, illustrated by appropriate matter of legend, such as would be cast into poetry in all ages, and quite different from the rhetoric of Kallinus and Tyrtæus.

The poetical career of Alkman is again distinct from that of any of his above-mentioned contemporaries. Their compositions, besides hymns to the gods, were principally expressions of feeling intended to be sung by individuals, though sometimes also suited for the kômus, or band of festive volunteers, assembled on some occasion of common interest: those of Alkman were principally choric, intended for the song and accompanying dance of the chorus. He was a native of Sardis in Lydia, or at least his family were so; and he appears to have come in early life to Sparta, though his genius and mastery of the Greek language discountenance the story that he was brought over to Sparta as a slave. The most ancient arrangement of music at Sparta, generally ascribed to Terpander,[156] underwent considerable alteration, not only through the elegiac and anapæstic measures of Tyrtæus, but also through the Kretan Thalêtas and the Lydian Alkman. The harp, the instrument of Terpander, was rivalled and in part superseded by the flute or pipe, which had been recently rendered more effective in the hands of Olympus, Klonas, and Polymnêstus, and which gradually became, for compositions intended to raise strong emotion, the favorite instrument of the two,—being employed as accompaniment both to the elegies of Tyrtæus, and to the hyporchemata (songs, or hymns, combined with dancing) of Thalêtas; also, as the stimulus and regulator to the Spartan military march.[157]

These elegies (as has been just remarked) were sung by one person, in the midst of an assembly of listeners, and there were doubtless other compositions intended for the individual voice. But in general such was not the character of music and poetry at Sparta; everything done there, both serious and recreative, was public and collective, so that the chorus and its performances received extraordinary development. It has been already stated, that the chorus usually, with song and dance combined, constituted an important part of divine service throughout all Greece, and was originally a public manifestation of the citizens generally,—a large proportion of them being actively engaged in it,[158] and receiving some training for the purpose as an

ordinary branch of education. Neither the song nor the dance, under such conditions, could be otherwise than extremely simple. But in process of time, the performance at the chief festivals tended to become more elaborate, and to fall into the hands of persons expressly and professionally trained,—the mass of the citizens gradually ceasing to take active part, and being present merely as spectators. Such was the practice which grew up in most parts of Greece, and especially at Athens, where the dramatic chorus acquired its highest perfection. But the drama never found admission at Sparta, and the peculiarity of Spartan life tended much to keep up the popular chorus on its ancient footing. It formed, in fact, one element in that never-ceasing drill to which the Spartans were subject from their boyhood, and it served a purpose analogous to their military training, in accustoming them to simultaneous and regulated movement,—insomuch that the comparison between the chorus, especially in its Pyrrhic, or war-dances, and the military enomoty, seems to have been often dwelt upon.[159] In the singing of the solemn pæan in honor of Apollo, at the festival of the Hyakinthia, king Agesilaus was under the orders of the chorus-master, and sang in the place allotted to him;[160] while the whole body of Spartans without exception,—the old, the middle-aged, and the youth, the matrons, and the virgins,—were distributed in various choric companies,[161] and trained to harmony both of voice and motion, which was publicly exhibited at the solemnities of the Gymnopædiæ. The word *dancing* must be understood in a larger sense than that in which it is now employed, and as comprising every variety of rhythmical, accentuated, conspiring movements, or gesticulations, or postures of the body, from the slowest to the quickest;[162] cheironomy, or the decorous and expressive movement of the hands, being especially practised.

We see thus that both at Sparta and in Krête (which approached in respect to publicity of individual life most nearly to Sparta), the choric aptitudes and manifestations occupied a larger space than in any other Grecian city. And as a certain degree of musical and rhythmical variety was essential to meet this want,[163] while music was never taught to Spartan citizens individually,—we farther understand how strangers like Terpander, Polymnêstus, Thalêtas, Tyrtæus, Alkman, etc., were not only received, but acquired great influence at Sparta, in spite of the preponderant spirit of jealous seclusion in the Spartan character. All these masters appear to have been effective in their own special vocation,—the training of the chorus,—to which they imparted new rhythmical action, and for which they composed new music. But Alkman did this, and something more; he possessed the genius of a poet, and his compositions were read afterwards with pleasure by those who could not hear them sung or see them danced. In the little of his poems which remains, we recognize that variety of rhythm and metre for which he was celebrated. In this respect he (together with the Kretan Thalêtas, who is said to have introduced a more vehement style both of music and dance, with the Kretic and Pæonic rhythm, into Sparta[164]) surpassed Archilochus, and prepared the way for the complicated choric movements of Stesichorus and Pindar: some of the fragments, too, manifest that fresh outpour-

ing of individual sentiment and emotion which constitutes so much of the charm of popular poetry. Besides his touching address in old age to the Spartan virgins, over whose song and dance he had been accustomed to preside.—he is not afraid to speak of his hearty appetite, satisfied with simple food and relishing a bowl of warm broth at the winter tropic.[165] And he has attached to the spring an epithet, which comes home to the real feelings of a poor country more than those captivating pictures which abound in verse, ancient as well as modern: he calls it "the season of short fare,"—the crop of the previous year being then nearly consumed, the husbandman is compelled to pinch himself until his new harvest comes in.[166] Those who recollect that in earlier periods of our history, and in all countries where there is little accumulated stock, an exorbitant difference is often experienced in the price of corn before and after the harvest, will feel the justice of Alkman's description.

Judging from these and from a few other fragments of this poet, Alkman appears to have combined the life and exciting vigor of Archilochus in the song properly so called, sung by himself individually,—with a larger knowledge of musical and rhythmical effect in regard to the choric performance. He composed in the Laconian dialect,—a variety of the Doric with some intermixture of Æolisms. And it was from him, jointly with those other composers who figured at Sparta during the century after Terpander, as well as from the simultaneous development of the choric muse[167] in Argos, Sikyôn, Arcadia, and other parts of Peloponnesus, that the Doric dialect acquired permanent footing in Greece, as the only proper dialect for choric compositions. Continued by Stesichorus and Pindar, this habit passed even to the Attic dramatists, whose choric songs are thus in a great measure Doric, while their dialogue is Attic. At Sparta, as well as in other parts of Peloponnesus,[168] the musical and rhythmical style appears to have been fixed by Alkman and his contemporaries, and to have been tenaciously maintained, for two or three centuries, with little or no innovation; the more so, as the flute-players at Sparta formed an hereditary profession, who followed the routine of their fathers.[169]

Alkman was the last poet who addressed himself to the popular chorus. Both Arion and Stesichorus composed for a body of trained men, with a degree of variety and involution such as could not be attained by a mere fraction of the people. The primitive dithyrambus was a round choric dance and song in honor of Dionysus,[170] common to Naxos, Thebes, and seemingly to many other places, at the Dionysiac festival,—a spontaneous effusion of drunken men in the hour of revelry, wherein the poet Archilochus, "with the thunder of wine full upon his mind," had often taken the chief part.[171] Its exciting character approached to the worship of the Great Mother in Asia, and stood in contrast with the solemn and stately pæan addressed to Apollo. Arion introduced into it an alteration such as Archilochus had himself brought about in the scurrilous iambus. He converted it into an elaborate composition in honor of the god, sung and danced by a chorus of fifty persons, not only sober, but trained with great strictness; though its rhythm and movements, and its equipment in the

character of satyrs, presented more or less an imitation of the primitive license. Born at Methymna in Lesbos, Arion appears as a harper, singer, and composer, much favored by Periander at Corinth, in which city he first "composed, denominated, and taught the dithyramb," earlier than any one known to Herodotus.[172] He did not, however, remain permanently there, but travelled from city to city, exhibiting at the festivals for money,—especially to Sicilian and Italian Greece, where he acquired large gains. We may here again remark how the poets as well as the festivals served to promote a sentiment of unity among the dispersed Greeks. Such transfer of the dithyramb, from the field of spontaneous nature into the garden of art,[173] constitutes the first stage in the refinement of Dionysiac worship; which will hereafter be found still farther exalted in the form of the Attic drama.

The date of Arion seems about 600 B. C., shortly after Alkman: that of Stesichorus is a few years later. To the latter the Greek chorus owed a high degree of improvement, and in particular the last finished distribution of its performance into the strophê, the antistrophê, and the epôdus: the turn, the return, and the rest,—the rhythm and metre of the song during each strophê corresponded with that during the antistrophê, but was varied during the epôdus, and again varied during the following strophês. Until this time the song had been monostrophic, consisting of nothing more than one uniform stanza, repeated from the beginning to the end of the composition;[174] so that we may easily see how vast was the new complication and difficulty introduced by Stesichorus,—not less for the performers than for the composer, himself at that time the teacher and trainer of performers. Both this poet and his contemporary the flute-player Sakadas of Argos,—who gained the prize at the first three Pythian games founded after the Sacred War,—seem to have surpassed their predecessors in the breadth of subject which they embraced, borrowing from the inexhaustible province of ancient legend, and expanding the choric song into a well-sustained epical narrative.[175] Indeed, these Pythian games opened a new career to musical composers just at the time when Sparta began to be closed against musical novelties.

Alkæus and Sappho, both natives of Lesbos, appear about contemporaries with Arion, B. C. 610-580. Of their once celebrated lyric compositions, scarcely anything remains. But the criticisms which are preserved on both of them place them in strong contrast with Alkman, who lived and composed under the more restrictive atmosphere of Sparta,—and in considerable analogy with the turbulent vehemence of Archilochus,[176] though without his intense private malignity. Both composed for their own local audience, and in their own Lesbian Æolic dialect; not because there was any peculiar fitness in that dialect to express their vein of sentiment, but because it was more familiar to their hearers. Sappho herself boasts of the preëminence of the Lesbian bards;[177] and the celebrity of Terpander, Perikleitas, and Arion, permits us to suppose that there may have been before her many popular bards in the island who did not attain to Hellenic celebrity. Alkæus included in his songs the

fiercest bursts of political feeling, the stirring alternations of war and exile, and all the ardent relish of a susceptible man for wine and love.[178] The love-song seems to have formed the principal theme of Sappho, who, however, also composed odes or songs[179] on a great variety of other subjects, serious as well as satirical, and is said farther to have first employed the Mixolydian mode in music. It displays the tendency of the age to metrical and rhythmical novelty, that Alkæus and Sappho are said to have each invented the peculiar stanza, well-known under their respective names,—combinations of the dactyl, trochee, and iambus, analogous to the asynartetic verses of Archilochus; they by no means confined themselves, however, to Alkaic and Sapphic metre. Both the one and the other composed hymns to the gods; indeed, this is a theme common to all the lyric and choric poets, whatever may be their peculiarities in other ways. Most of their compositions were songs for the single voice, not for the chorus. The poetry of Alkæus is the more worthy of note, as it is the earliest instance of the employment of the Muse in actual political warfare, and shows the increased hold which that motive was acquiring on the Grecian mind.

The gnomic poets, or moralists in verse, approach by the tone of their sentiments more to the nature of prose. They begin with Simonidês of Amorgos or of Samos, the contemporary of Archilochus: indeed, the latter himself devoted some compositions to the illustrative fable, which had not been unknown even to Hesiod. In the remains of Simonidês of Amorgos we trace nothing relative to the man personally, though he too, like Archilochus, is said to have had an individual enemy, Orodœkidês, whose character was aspersed by his muse.[180] His only considerable poem extant is devoted to a survey of the characters of women, in iambic verse, and by way of comparison with various animals,—the mare, the ass, the bee, etc. It follows out the Hesiodic vein respecting the social and economical mischief usually caused by women, with some few honorable exceptions; but the poet shows a much larger range of observation and illustration, if we compare him with his predecessor Hesiod; moreover, his illustrations come fresh from life and reality. We find in this early iambist the same sympathy with industry and its due rewards which are observable in Hesiod, together with a still more melancholy sense of the uncertainty of human events.

Of Solon and Theognis I have spoken in former chapters. They reproduce in part the moralizing vein of Simonidês, though with a strong admixture of personal feeling and a direct application to passing events. The mixture of political with social morality, which we find in both, marks their more advanced age: Solon bears in this respect the same relation to Simonidês, as his contemporary Alkæus bears to Archilochus. His poems, as far as we can judge by the fragments remaining, appear to have been short occasional effusions,—with the exception of the epic poem respecting the submerged island of Atlantis; which he began towards the close of his life, but never finished. They are elegiac, trimeter iambic, and trochaic tetrameter: in his hands certainly neither of these metres can be said to have any special or sepa-

rate character. If the poems of Solon are short, those of Theognis are much shorter, and are indeed so much broken (as they stand in our present collection), as to read like separate epigrams or bursts of feeling, which the poet had not taken the trouble to incorporate in any definite scheme or series. They form a singular mixture of maxim and passion,—of general precept with personal affection towards the youth Kyrnus,—which surprises us if tried by the standard of literary composition, but which seems a very genuine manifestation of an impoverished exile's complaints and restlessness. What remains to us of Phokylidês, another of the gnomic poets nearly contemporary with Solon, is nothing more than a few maxims in verse,—couplets, with the name of the author in several cases embodied in them.

Amidst all the variety of rhythmical and metrical innovations which have been enumerated, the ancient epic continued to be recited by the rhapsodes as before, and some new epical compositions were added to the existing stock: Eugammon of Kyrênê, about the 50th Olympiad, (580 B. C.) appears to be the last of the series. At Athens, especially, both Solon and Peisistratus manifested great solicitude as well for the recitation as for the correct preservation of the Iliad. Perhaps its popularity may have been diminished by the competition of so much lyric and choric poetry, more showy and striking in its accompaniments, as well as more changeful in its rhythmical character. Whatever secondary effect, however, this newer species of poetry may have derived from such helps, its primary effect was produced by real intellectual or poetical excellence,—by the thoughts, sentiment, and expression, not by the accompaniment. For a long time the musical composer and the poet continued generally to be one and the same person; and besides those who have acquired sufficient distinction to reach posterity, we cannot doubt that there were many known only to their own contemporaries. But with all of them the instrument and the melody constituted only the inferior part of that which was known by the name of music,—altogether subordinate to the "thoughts that breathe and words that burn."[181] Exactness and variety of rhythmical pronunciation gave to the latter their full effect upon a delicate ear; but such pleasure of the ear was ancillary to the emotion of mind arising out of the sense conveyed. Complaints are made by the poets, even so early as 500 B. C., that the accompaniment was becoming too prominent. But it was not until the age of the comic poet Aristophanês, towards the end of the fifth century B. C., that the primitive relation between the instrumental accompaniment and the words was really reversed,—and loud were the complaints to which it gave rise;[182] the performance of the flute or harp then became more elaborate, showy, and overpowering, while the words were so put together as to show off the player's execution. I notice briefly this subsequent revolution for the purpose of setting forth, by contrast, the truly intellectual character of the original lyric and choric poetry of Greece; and of showing how much the vague sentiment arising from mere musical sound was lost in the more definite emotion, and in the more lasting and reproductive combinations, generated by poetical meaning.

The name and poetry of Solon, and the short maxims, or sayings, of Phokylidês, conduct us to the mention of the Seven Wise Men of Greece. Solon was himself one of the seven, and most if not all of them were poets, or composers in verse.[183] To most of them is ascribed also an abundance of pithy repartees, together with one short saying, or maxim, peculiar to each, serving as a sort of distinctive motto;[184] indeed, the test of an accomplished man about this time was his talent for singing or reciting poetry, and for making smart and ready answers. Respecting this constellation of wise men,—who in the next century of Grecian history, when philosophy came to be a matter of discussion and argumentation, were spoken of with great eulogy,—all the statements are confused, in part even contradictory. Neither the number, nor the names, are given by all authors alike. Dikæarchus numbered ten, Hermippus seventeen: the names of Solon the Athenian, Thalês the Milesian, Pittakus the Mitylenean, and Bias the Prienean, were comprised in all the lists,—and the remaining names as given by Plato[185] were, Kleobulus of Lindus in Rhodes, Myson of Chênæ, and Cheilon of Sparta. By others, however, the names are differently stated: nor can we certainly distribute among them the sayings, or mottoes, upon which in later days the Amphiktyons conferred the honor of inscription in the Delphian temple: Know thyself,—Nothing too much,—Know thy opportunity,—Suretyship is the precursor of ruin. Bias is praised as an excellent judge, and Myson was declared by the Delphian oracle to be the most discreet man among the Greeks, according to the testimony of the satirical poet Hippônax. This is the oldest testimony (540 B. C.) which can be produced in favor of any of the seven; but Kleobulus of Lindus, far from being universally extolled, is pronounced by the poet Simonidês to be a fool.[186] Dikæarchus, however, justly observed, that these seven or ten persons were not wise men, or philosophers, in the sense which those words bore in his day, but persons of practical discernment in reference to man and society,[187]—of the same turn of mind as their contemporary the fabulist Æsop, though not employing the same mode of illustration. Their appearance forms an epoch in Grecian history, inasmuch as they are the first persons who ever acquired an Hellenic reputation grounded on mental competency apart from poetical genius or effect,—a proof that political and social prudence was beginning to be appreciated and admired on its own account. Solon, Pittakus, Bias, and Thalês, were all men of influence—the first two even men of ascendency, [188]—in their respective cities. Kleobulus was despot of Lindus, and Periander (by some numbered among the seven) of Corinth. Thalês stands distinguished as the earliest name in physical philosophy, with which the other contemporary wise men are not said to have meddled; their celebrity rests upon moral, social, and political wisdom exclusively, which came into greater honor as the ethical feeling of the Greeks improved and as their experience became enlarged.

In these celebrated names we have social philosophy in its early and infantine state,—in the shape of homely sayings or admonitions, either supposed to be self-evident, or to rest upon some great authority divine or human, but neither accompanied by reasons nor recognizing any appeal to inquiry and discussion as the proper

test of their rectitude. From such unsuspecting acquiescence, the sentiment to which these admonitions owe their force, we are partially liberated even in the poet Simonidês of Keôs, who (as before alluded to) severely criticizes the song of Kleobulus as well as its author. The half-century which followed the age of Simonidês (the interval between about 480-430 B. C.) broke down that sentiment more and more, by familiarizing the public with argumentative controversy in the public assembly, the popular judicature, and even on the dramatic stage. And the increased self-working of the Grecian mind, thus created, manifested itself in Sokratês, who laid open all ethical and social doctrines to the scrutiny of reason, and who first awakened among his countrymen that love of dialectics which never left them,—an analytical interest in the mental process of inquiring out, verifying, proving, and expounding truth. To this capital item of human progress, secured through the Greeks—and through them only—to mankind generally, our attention will be called at a later period of the history; at present, it is only mentioned in contrast with the naked, dogmatical laconism of the Seven Wise Men, and with the simple enforcement of the early poets: a state in which morality has a certain place in the feelings,—but no root, even among the superior minds, in the conscious exercise of reason.

The interval between Archilochus and Solon (660-580 B. C.) seems, as has been remarked in my former volume, to be the period in which writing first came to be applied to Greek poems,—to the Homeric poems among the number; and shortly after the end of that period, commences the era of compositions without metre or prose. The philosopher Pherekydês of Syros, about 550 B. C., is called by some the earliest prose-writer; but no prose-writer for a considerable time afterwards acquired any celebrity,—seemingly none earlier than Hekatæus of Milêtus,[189] about 510-490 B. C., —prose being a subordinate and ineffective species of composition, not always even perspicuous, but requiring no small practice before the power was acquired of rendering it interesting.[190] Down to the generation preceding Sokratês, the poets continued to be the grand leaders of the Greek mind: until then, nothing was taught to youth except to read, to remember, to recite musically and rhythmically, and to comprehend poetical composition. The comments of preceptors, addressed to their pupils, may probably have become fuller and more instructive, but the text still continued to be epic or lyric poetry. We must recollect also that these poets, so enunciated, were the best masters for acquiring a full command of the complicated accent and rhythm of the Greek language,—essential to an educated man in ancient times, and sure to be detected if not properly acquired. Not to mention the Choliambist Hippônax, who seems to have been possessed with the devil of Archilochus, and in part also with his genius,—Anakreon, Ibykus, Pindar, Bacchylidês, Simonidês, and the dramatists of Athens, continue the line of eminent poets without intermission. After the Persian war, the requirements of public speaking created a class of rhetorical teachers, while the gradual spread of physical philosophy widened the range of instruction: so that prose composition, for speech or for writing, occupied a larger and larger share of the attention of men, and was gradually wrought up to high perfec-

tion, such as we see for the first time in Herodotus. But before it became thus improved, and acquired that style which was the condition of wide-spread popularity, we may be sure that it had been silently used as a means of recording information; and that neither the large mass of geographical matter contained in the Periegêsis of Hekatæus, nor the map first prepared by his contemporary, Anaximander, could have been presented to the world, without the previous labors of unpretending prose writers, who set down the mere results of their own experience. The acquisition of prose-writing, commencing as it does about the age of Peisistratus, is not less remarkable as an evidence of past, than as a means of future, progress.

Of that splendid genius in sculpture and architecture, which shone forth in Greece after the Persian invasion, the first lineaments only are discoverable between 600-560 B. C., in Corinth, Ægina, Samos, Chios, Ephesus, etc.,—enough, however, to give evidence of improvement and progress. Glaukus of Chios is said to have discovered the art of welding iron, and Rhœkus, or his son Theodôrus of Samos, the art of casting copper or brass in a mould: both these discoveries, as far as can be made out, appear to date a little before 600 B. C.[191] The primitive memorial, erected in honor of a god, did not even pretend to be an image, but was often nothing more than a pillar, a board, a shapeless stone, a post, etc., fixed so as to mark and consecrate the locality, and receiving from the neighborhood respectful care and decoration, as well as worship. Sometimes there was a real statue, though of the rudest character, carved in wood; and the families of carvers,—who, from father to son, exercised this profession, represented in Attica by the name of Dædalus, and in the Ægina by the name of Smilis,—adhered long, with strict exactness, to the consecrated type of each particular god. Gradually, the wish grew up to change the material, as well as to correct the rudeness, of such primitive idols; sometimes the original wood was retained as the material, but covered in part with ivory or gold,—in other cases, marble or metal was substituted. Dipœnos and Skyllis of Krête acquired renown as workers in marble, about the 50th Olympiad (580 B. C.), and from them downwards a series of names may be traced, more or less distinguished; moreover, it seems about the same period that the earliest temple-offerings, in works of art, properly so called, commence,—the golden statue of Zeus, and the large carved chest, dedicated by the Kypselids of Corinth at Olympia.[192] The pious associations, however, connected with the old type were so strong, that the hand of the artist was greatly restrained in dealing with statues of the gods. It was in statues of men, especially in those of the victors at Olympia and other sacred games, that genuine ideas of beauty were first aimed at and in part attained, from whence they passed afterwards to the statues of the gods. Such statues of the athletes seem to commence somewhere between Olympiad 53-58, (568-548 B. C.).

Nor is it until the same interval of time (between 600-550 B. C.) that we find any traces of these architectural monuments, by which the more important cities in Greece afterwards attracted to themselves so much renown. The two greatest tem-

ples in Greece known to Herodotus were, the Artemision at Ephesus, and the Heræon at Samos: the former of these seems to have been commenced, by the Samian Theodorus, about 600 B. C.,—the latter, begun by the Samian Rhœkus, can hardly be traced to any higher antiquity. The first attempts to decorate Athens by such additions proceeded from Peisistratus and his sons, near the same time. As far as we can judge, too, in the absence of all direct evidence, the temples of Pæstum in Italy and Selinus in Sicily seem to fall in this same century. Of painting, during these early centuries, nothing can be affirmed; it never at any time reached the same perfection as sculpture, and we may presume that its years of infancy were at least equally rude.

The immense development of Grecian art subsequently, and the great perfection of Grecian artists, are facts of great importance in the history of the human race. And in regard to the Greeks themselves, they not only acted powerfully on the taste of the people, but were also valuable indirectly as the common boast of Hellenism, and as supplying one bond of fraternal sympathy as well as of mutual pride, among its widely-dispersed sections. It is the paucity and weakness of these bonds which renders the history of Greece, prior to 560 B. C., little better than a series of parallel, but isolated threads, each attached to a separate city; and that increased range of joint Hellenic feeling and action, upon which we shall presently enter, though arising doubtless in great measure from new and common dangers threatening many cities at once,—also springs in part from those other causes which have been enumerated in this chapter as acting on the Grecian mind. It proceeds from the stimulus applied to all the common feelings in religion, art, and recreation,—from the gradual formation of national festivals, appealing in various ways to tastes and sentiments which animated every Hellenic bosom,—from the inspirations of men of genius, poets, musicians, sculptors, architects, who supplied more or less in every Grecian city, education for the youth, training for the chorus, and ornament for the locality,—from the gradual expansion of science, philosophy, and rhetoric, during the coming period of this history, which rendered one city the intellectual capital of Greece, and brought to Isokratês and Plato pupils from the most distant parts of the Grecian world. It was this fund of common tastes, tendencies, and aptitudes, which caused the social atoms of Hellas to gravitate towards each other, and which enabled the Greeks to become something better and greater than an aggregate of petty disunited communities like the Thracians or Phrygians. And the creation of such common, extra-political Hellenism, is the most interesting phenomenon which the historian has to point out in the early period now under our notice. He is called upon to dwell upon it the more forcibly, because the modern reader has generally no idea of national union without political union,—an association foreign to the Greek mind. Strange as it may seem to find a song-writer put forward as an active instrument of union among his fellow-Hellens, it is not the less true, that those poets, whom we have briefly passed in review, by enriching the common language, and by circulating from town to town either in person or in their compositions, contributed to fan the flame of Pan-Hellenic

patriotism at a time when there were few circumstances to coöperate with them, and when the causes tending to perpetuate isolation seemed in the ascendant.

CHAPTER XXX.

GRECIAN AFFAIRS DURING THE GOVERNMENT OF PEISISTRATUS AND HIS SONS AT ATHENS.

WE NOW arrive at what may be called the second period of Grecian history, beginning with the rule of Peisistratus at Athens and of Crœsus in Lydia.

It has been already stated that Peisistratus made himself despot of Athens in 560 B. C.: he died in 527 B. C., and was succeeded by his son Hippias, who was deposed and expelled in 510 B. C., thus making an entire space of fifty years between the first exaltation of the father and the final expulsion of the son. These chronological points are settled on good evidence: but the thirty-three years covered by the reign of Peisistratus are interrupted by two periods of exile,—one of them lasting not less than ten years,—the other, five years. And the exact place of the years of exile, being nowhere laid down upon authority, has been differently determined by the conjectures of chronologers.[193] Partly from this half-known chronology, partly from a very scanty collection of facts, the history of the half-century now before us can only be given very imperfectly: nor can we wonder at our ignorance, when we find that even among the Athenians themselves, only a century afterwards, statements the most incorrect and contradictory respecting the Peisistratids were in circulation, as Thucydidês distinctly, and somewhat reproachfully, acquaints us.

More than thirty years had now elapsed since the promulgation of the Solonian constitution, whereby the annual senate of Four Hundred had been created, and the public assembly (preceded in its action as well as aided and regulated by this senate) invested with a power of exacting responsibility from the magistrates after their year of office. The seeds of the subsequent democracy had thus been sown, and no doubt the administration of the archons had been practically softened by it; but nothing in the nature of a democratical sentiment had yet been created. A hundred years hence, we shall find that sentiment unanimous and potent among the enterprising masses of Athens and Peiræeus, and shall be called upon to listen to loud complaints of the difficulty of dealing with "that angry, waspish, intractable little old man, Dêmus of Pnyx,"—so Aristophanes[194] calls the Athenian people to their faces, with a freedom which shows that *he* at least counted on their good temper. But between 560-510 B. C. the people are as passive in respect to political rights and securities as the most strenuous enemy of democracy could desire, and the government is transferred from hand to hand by bargains and cross-changes between two or three powerful men,[195] at the head of partisans who echo their voices, espouse their personal quarrels, and draw the sword at their command. It was this ancient constitution—Athens as it stood before the Athenian democracy—which the Macedonian Antipater

professed to restore in 322 B. C., when he caused the majority of the poorer citizens to be excluded altogether from the political franchise.[196]

By the stratagem recounted in a former chapter,[197] Peisistratus had obtained from the public assembly a guard which he had employed to acquire forcible possession of the acropolis. He thus became master of the administration; but he employed his power honorably and well, not disturbing the existing forms farther than was necessary to insure to himself full mastery. Nevertheless, we may see by the verses of Solon[198] (the only contemporary evidence which we possess), that the prevalent sentiment was by no means favorable to his recent proceeding, and that there was in many minds a strong feeling both of terror and aversion, which presently manifested itself in the armed coalition of his two rivals,—Megaklês at the head of the Parali, or inhabitants of the sea-board, and Lykurgus at the head of those in the neighboring plain. As the conjunction of the two formed a force too powerful for Peisistratus to withstand, he was driven into exile, after no long possession of his despotism.

But the time came, how soon we cannot tell, when the two rivals who had expelled him quarrelled, and Megaklês made propositions to Peisistratus, inviting him to resume the sovereignty, promising his own aid, and stipulating that Peisistratus should marry his daughter. The conditions being accepted, a plan was laid between the two new allies for carrying them into effect, by a novel stratagem,—since the simulated wounds and pretence of personal danger were not likely to be played off a second time with success. The two conspirators clothed a stately woman, six feet high, named Phyê, in the panoply and costume of Athênê,—surrounded her with the processional accompaniments belonging to the goddess,—and placed her in a chariot with Peisistratus by her side. In this guise the exiled despot and his adherents approached the city and drove up to the acropolis, preceded by heralds, who cried aloud to the people: "Athenians, receive ye cordially Peisistratus, whom Athênê has honored above all other men, and is now bringing back into her own acropolis." The people in the city received the reputed goddess with implicit belief and demonstrations of worship, while among the country cantons the report quickly spread that Athênê had appeared in person to restore Peisistratus, who thus found himself, without even a show of resistance, in possession of the acropolis and of the government. His own party, united with that of Megaklês, were powerful enough to maintain him, when he had once acquired possession; and probably all, except the leaders, sincerely believed in the epiphany of the goddess, which came to be divulged as having been a deception, only after Peisistratus and Megaklês had quarrelled.[199]

The daughter of Megaklês, according to agreement, quickly became the wife of Peisistratus, but she bore him no children; and it became known that her husband, having already adult sons by a former marriage, and considering that the Kylonian curse rested upon all the Alkmæônid family, did not intend that she should become a mother.[200] Megaklês was so incensed at this behavior, that he not only renounced his alliance with Peisistratus, but even made his peace with the third party, the ad-

herents of Lykurgus,—and assumed so menacing an attitude, that the despot was obliged to evacuate Attica. He retired to Eretria in Eubœa, where he remained no less than ten years; but a considerable portion of that time was employed in making preparations for a forcible return, and he seems to have exercised, even while in exile, a degree of influence much exceeding that of a private man. He lent valuable aid to Lygdamis of Naxos,[201] in constituting himself despot of that island, and he possessed, we know not how, the means of rendering valuable service to different cities, Thebes in particular. They repaid him by large contributions of money to aid in his reëstablishment: mercenaries were hired from Argos, and the Naxian Lygdamis came himself, both with money and with troops. Thus equipped and aided, Peisistratus landed at Marathon in Attica. How the Athenian government had been conducted during his ten years' absence, we do not know; but the leaders of it permitted him to remain undisturbed at Marathon, and to assemble his partisans both from the city and from the country: nor was it until he broke up from Marathon and had reached Pallênê on his way to Athens, that they took the field against him. Moreover, their conduct, even when the two armies were near together, must have been either extremely negligent or corrupt; for Peisistratus found means to attack them unprepared, routing their forces almost without resistance. In fact, the proceedings have altogether the air of a concerted betrayal: for the defeated troops, though unpursued, are said to have dispersed and returned to their homes forthwith, in obedience to the proclamation of Peisistratus, who marched on to Athens, and found himself a third time ruler.[202]

On this third successful entry, he took vigorous precautions for rendering his seat permanent. The Alkmæônidæ and their immediate partisans retired into exile; but he seized the children of those who remained, and whose sentiments he suspected, as hostages for the behavior of their parents, and placed them in Naxos, under the care of Lygdamis. Moreover, he provided himself with a powerful body of Thracian mercenaries, paid by taxes levied upon the people:[203] nor did he omit to conciliate the favor of the gods by a purification of the sacred island of Delos: all the dead bodies which had been buried within sight of the temple of Apollo were exhumed and reinterred farther off. At this time the Delian festival,—attended by the Asiatic Ionians and the islanders, and with which Athens was of course peculiarly connected,—must have been beginning to decline from its pristine magnificence; for the subjugation of the continental Ionic cities by Cyrus had been already achieved, and the power of Samos, though increased under the despot Polykratês, seems to have increased at the expense and to the ruin of the smaller Ionic islands. From the same feelings, in part, which led to the purification of Delos,—partly as an act of party revenue,—Peisistratus caused the houses of the Alkmæônids to be levelled with the ground, and the bodies of the deceased members of that family to be disinterred and cast out of the country.[204]

This third and last period of the rule of Peisistratus lasted several years, until his death in 527 B. C.: it is said to have been so mild in its character, that he once even suffered himself to be cited for trial before the Senate of Areopagus; yet as we know that he had to maintain a large body of Thracian mercenaries out of the funds of the people, we shall be inclined to construe this eulogium comparatively rather than positively. Thucydidês affirms that both he and his sons governed in a wise and virtuous spirit, levying from the people only an income-tax of five per cent.[205] This is high praise coming from such an authority, though it seems that we ought to make some allowance for the circumstance of Thucydidês being connected by descent with the Peisistratid family.[206] The judgment of Herodotus is also very favorable respecting Peisistratus; that of Aristotle favorable, yet qualified,—since he includes these despots among the list of those who undertook public and sacred works with the deliberate view of impoverishing as well as of occupying their subjects. This supposition is countenanced by the prodigious scale upon which the temple of Zeus Olympius at Athens was begun by Peisistratus,—a scale much exceeding either the Parthenôn or the temple of Athênê Polias, both of which were erected in later times, when the means of Athens were decidedly larger,[207] and her disposition to demonstrative piety certainly no way diminished. It was left by him unfinished, nor was it ever completed until the Roman emperor Hadrian undertook the task. Moreover, Peisistratus introduced the greater Panathenaic festival, solemnized every four years, in the third Olympic year: the annual Panathenaic festival, henceforward called the Lesser, was still continued.

I have already noticed, at considerable length, the care which he bestowed in procuring full and correct copies of the Homeric poems, as well as in improving the recitation of them at the Panathenaic festival,—a proceeding for which we owe him much gratitude, but which has been shown to be erroneously interpreted by various critics. He probably also collected the works of other poets,—called by Aulus Gellius, [208] in language not well suited to the sixth century B. C., a library thrown open to the public; and the service which he thus rendered must have been highly valuable at a time when writing and reading were not widely extended. His son Hipparchus followed up the same taste, taking pleasure in the society of the most eminent poets of the day,[209]—Simonidês, Anakreon, and Lasus; not to mention the Athenian mystic Onomakritus, who, though not pretending to the gift of prophecy himself, passed for the proprietor and editor of the various prophecies ascribed to the ancient name of Musæus. The Peisistratids were well versed in these prophecies, and set great value upon them; but Onomakritus, being detected on one occasion in the act of interpolating the prophecies of Musæus, was banished by Hipparchus in consequence. [210] The statues of Hermês, erected by this prince or by his personal friends in various parts of Attica,[211] and inscribed with short moral sentences, are extolled by the author of the Platonic dialogue called Hipparchus, with an exaggeration which approaches to irony; but it is certain that both the sons of Peisistratus, as well as himself, were exact in fulfilling the religious obligations of the state, and ornamented the

city in several ways, especially the public fountain Kallirrhoê. They are said to have maintained the preëxisting forms of law and justice, merely taking care always to keep themselves and their adherents in the effective offices of state, and in the full reality of power. They were, moreover, modest and popular in their personal demeanor, and charitable to the poor; yet one striking example occurs of unscrupulous enmity, in their murder of Kimôn, by night, through the agency of hired assassins. [212] There is good reason, however, for believing that the government both of Peisistratus and of his sons was in practice generally mild until after the death of Hipparchus by the hands of Harmodius and Aristogeitôn, after which event the surviving Hippias became alarmed, cruel, and oppressive during his last four years. And the harshness of this concluding period left upon the Athenian mind[213] that profound and imperishable hatred, against the dynasty generally, which Thucydidês attests,—though he labors to show that it was not deserved by Peisistratus, nor at first by Hippias.

Peisistratus left three legitimate sons,—Hippias, Hipparchus, and Thessalus: the general belief at Athens among the contemporaries of Thucydidês was, that Hipparchus was the eldest of the three and had succeeded him; but the historian emphatically pronounces this to be a mistake, and certifies, upon his own responsibility, that Hippias was both eldest son and successor. Such an assurance from him, fortified by certain reasons in themselves not very conclusive, is sufficient ground for our belief,—the more so as Herodotus countenances the same version. But we are surprised at such a degree of historical carelessness in the Athenian public, and seemingly even in Plato,[214] about a matter both interesting and comparatively recent. In order to abate this surprise, and to explain how the name of Hipparchus came to supplant that of Hippias in the popular talk, Thucydidês recounts the memorable story of Harmodius and Aristogeitôn.

Of these two Athenian citizens,[215] both belonging to the ancient gens called Gephyræi, the former was a beautiful youth, attached to the latter by a mutual friendship and devoted intimacy, which Grecian manners did not condemn. Hipparchus made repeated propositions to Harmodius, which were repelled, but which, on becoming known to Aristogeitôn, excited both his jealousy and his fears lest the disappointed suitor should employ force,—fears justified by the proceedings not unusual with Grecian despots,[216] and by the absence of all legal protection against outrage from such a quarter. Under these feelings, he began to look about, in the best way that he could, for some means of putting down the despotism. Meanwhile Hipparchus, though not entertaining any designs of violence, was so incensed at the refusal of Harmodius, that he could not be satisfied without doing something to insult or humiliate him. In order to conceal the motive from which the insult really proceeded, he offered it, not directly to Harmodius, but to his sister. He caused this young maiden to be one day summoned to take her station in a religious procession as one of the kanêphoræ, or basket carriers, according to the practice usual at

Athens; but when she arrived at the place where her fellow-maidens were assembled, she was dismissed with scorn as unworthy of so respectable a function, and the summons addressed to her was disavowed.[217] An insult thus publicly offered filled Harmodius with indignation, and still farther exasperated the feelings of Aristogeitôn: both of them, resolving at all hazards to put an end to the despotism, concerted means for aggression with a few select associates. They awaited the festival of the Great Panathenæa, wherein the body of the citizens were accustomed to march up in armed procession, with spear and shield, to the acropolis; this being the only day on which an armed body could come together without suspicion. The conspirators appeared armed like the rest of the citizens, but carrying concealed daggers besides. Harmodius and Aristogeitôn undertook with their own hands to kill the two Peisistratids, while the rest promised to stand forward immediately for their protection against the foreign mercenaries; and though the whole number of persons engaged was small, they counted upon the spontaneous sympathies of the armed bystanders in an effort to regain their liberties, so soon as the blow should once be struck. The day of the festival having arrived, Hippias, with his foreign body-guard around him, was marshalling the armed citizens for procession, in the Kerameikus without the gates, when Harmodius and Aristogeitôn approached with concealed daggers to execute their purpose. On coming near, they were thunderstruck to behold one of their own fellow-conspirators talking familiarly with Hippias, who was of easy access to every man, and they immediately concluded that the plot was betrayed. Expecting to be seized, and wrought up to a state of desperation, they resolved at least not to die without having revenged themselves on Hipparchus, whom they found within the city gates near the chapel called the Leôkorion, and immediately slew him. His attendant guards killed Harmodius on the spot; while Aristogeitôn, rescued for the moment by the surrounding crowd, was afterwards taken, and perished in the tortures applied to make him disclose his accomplices.[218]

The news flew quickly to Hippias in the Kerameikus, who heard it earlier than the armed citizens near him, awaiting his order for the commencement of the procession. With extraordinary self-command, he took advantage of this precious instant of foreknowledge, and advanced towards them,—commanding them to drop their arms for a short time, and assemble on an adjoining ground. They unsuspectingly obeyed, and he immediately directed his guards to take possession of the vacant arms. He was now undisputed master, and enabled to seize the persons of all those citizens whom he mistrusted,—especially all those who had daggers about them, which it was not the practice to carry in the Panathenaic procession.

Such is the memorable narrative of Harmodius and Aristogeitôn, peculiarly valuable inasmuch as it all comes from Thucydidês.[219] To possess great power,—to be above legal restraint,—to inspire extraordinary fear,—is a privilege so much coveted by the giants among mankind, that we may well take notice of those cases in which it brings misfortune even upon themselves. The fear inspired by Hipparchus,—of de-

signs which he did not really entertain, but was likely to entertain, and competent to execute without hindrance,—was here the grand cause of his destruction.

The conspiracy here detailed happened in 514 B. C., during the thirteenth year of the reign of Hippias,—which lasted four years longer, until 510 B. C. And these last four years, in the belief of the Athenian public, counted for his whole reign; nay, many of them made the still greater historical mistake of eliding these last four years altogether, and of supposing that the conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogeitôn had deposed the Peisistratid government and liberated Athens. Both poets and philosophers shared this faith, which is distinctly put forth in the beautiful and popular Skolion or song on the subject: the two friends are there celebrated as the authors of liberty at Athens,—"they slew the despot and gave to Athens equal laws."[220] So inestimable a present was alone sufficient to enshrine in the minds of the subsequent democracy those who had sold their lives to purchase it: and we must farther recollect that the intimate connection between the two, so repugnant to the modern reader, was regarded at Athens with sympathy,—so that the story took hold of the Athenian mind by the vein of romance conjointly with that of patriotism. Harmodius and Aristogeitôn were afterwards commemorated both as the winners and as the protomartyrs of Athenian liberty. Statues were erected in their honor shortly after the final expulsion of the Peisistratids; immunity from taxes and public burdens was granted to the descendants of their families; and the speaker who proposed the abolition of such immunities, at a time when the number had been abusively multiplied, made his only special exception in favor of this respected lineage.[221] And since the name of Hipparchus was universally notorious as the person slain, we discover how it was that he came to be considered by an uncritical public as the predominant member of the Peisistratid family,—the eldest son and successor of Peisistratus,—the reigning despot,—to the comparative neglect of Hippias. The same public probably cherished many other anecdotes,[222] not the less eagerly believed because they could not be authenticated, respecting this eventful period.

Whatever may have been the moderation of Hippias before, indignation at the death of his brother, and fear for his own safety,[223] now induced him to drop it altogether. It is attested both by Thucydidês and Herodotus, and admits of no doubt, that his power was now employed harshly and cruelly,—that he put to death a considerable number of citizens. We find also a statement, noway improbable in itself, and affirmed both in Pausanias and in Plutarch,—inferior authorities, yet still in this case sufficiently credible,—that he caused Leæna, the mistress of Aristogeitôn, to be tortured to death, in order to extort from her a knowledge of the secrets and accomplices of the latter.[224] But as he could not but be sensible that this system of terrorism was full of peril to himself, so he looked out for shelter and support in case of being expelled from Athens; and with this view he sought to connect himself with Darius king of Persia,—a connection full of consequences to be hereafter developed. Æantidês, son of Hippoklus the despot of Lampsakus on the Hellespont, stood high

at this time in the favor of the Persian monarch, which induced Hippias to give him his daughter Archedikê in marriage; no small honor to the Lampsakene, in the estimation of Thucydidês.[225] To explain how Hippias came to fix upon this town, however, it is necessary to say a few words on the foreign policy of the Peisistratids.

It has already been mentioned that the Athenians, even so far back as the days of the poet Alkæus, had occupied Sigeium in the Troad, and had there carried on war with the Mityleneans; so that their acquisitions in these regions date much before the time of Peisistratus. Owing probably to this circumstance, an application was made to them in the early part of his reign from the Dolonkian Thracians, inhabitants of the Chersonese on the opposite side of the Hellespont, for aid against their powerful neighbors the Absinthian tribe of Thracians; and opportunity was thus offered for sending out a colony to acquire this valuable peninsula for Athens. Peisistratus willingly entered into the scheme, and Miltiadês son of Kypselus, a noble Athenian, living impatiently under his despotism, was no less pleased to take the lead in executing it: his departure and that of other malcontents as founders of a colony suited the purpose of all parties. According to the narrative of Herodotus,—alike pious and picturesque,—and doubtless circulating as authentic at the annual games which the Chersonesites, even in his time, celebrated to the honor of their œkist,—it is the Delphian god who directs the scheme and singles out the individual. The chiefs of the distressed Dolonkians went to Delphi to crave assistance towards procuring Grecian colonists, and were directed to choose for their œkist the individual who should first show them hospitality on their quitting the temple. They departed and marched all along what was called the Sacred Road, through Phocis and Bœotia to Athens, without receiving a single hospitable invitation; at length they entered Athens, and passed by the house of Miltiadês, while he himself was sitting in front of it. Seeing men whose costume and arms marked them out as strangers, he invited them into his house and treated them kindly: they then apprized him that he was the man fixed upon by the oracle, and abjured him not to refuse his concurrence. After asking for himself personally the opinion of the oracle, and receiving an affirmative answer, he consented; sailing as œkist, at the head of a body of Athenian emigrants, to the Chersonese.[226]

Having reached this peninsula, and having been constituted despot of the mixed Thracian and Athenian population, he lost no time in fortifying the narrow isthmus by a wall reaching all across from Kardia to Paktya, a distance of about four miles and a half; so that the Absinthian invaders were for the time effectually shut out,[227] though the protection was not permanently kept up. He also entered into a war with Lampsakus, on the Asiatic side of the strait, but was unfortunate enough to fall into an ambuscade and become a prisoner. Nothing preserved his life except the immediate interference of Crœsus king of Lydia, coupled with strenuous menaces addressed to the Lampsakenes, who found themselves compelled to release their prisoner; Miltiadês having acquired much favor with this prince, in what manner we are not told.

He died childless some time afterwards, while his nephew Stesagoras, who succeeded him, perished by assassination, some time subsequent to the death of Peisistratus at Athens.[228]

The expedition of Miltiadês to the Chersonese must have occurred early after the first usurpation of Peisistratus, since even his imprisonment by the Lampsakenes happened before the ruin of Crœsus, (546 B. C.). But it was not till much later,—probably during the third and most powerful period of Peisistratus,—that the latter undertook his expedition against Sigeium in the Troad. This place appears to have fallen into the hands of the Mityleneans: Peisistratus retook it,[229] and placed there his illegitimate son Hegesistratus as despot. The Mityleneans may have been enfeebled at this time (somewhere between 537-527 B. C.) not only by the strides of Persian conquest on the mainland, but also by the ruinous defeat which they suffered from Polykratês and the Samians.[230] Hegesistratus maintained the place against various hostile attempts, throughout all the reign of Hippias, so that the Athenian possessions in those regions comprehended at this period both the Chersonese and Sigeium.[231] To the former of the two, Hippias sent out Miltiadês, nephew of the first œkist, as governor, after the death of his brother Stesagoras. The new governor found much discontent in the peninsula, but succeeded in subduing it by entrapping and imprisoning the principal men in each town. He farther took into his pay a regiment of five hundred mercenaries, and married Hegesipylê, daughter of the Thracian king Olorus.[232] It appears to have been about 515 B. C. that this second Miltiadês went out to the Chersonese.[233] He seems to have been obliged to quit it for a time, after the Scythian expedition of Darius, in consequence of having incurred the hostility of the Persians; but he was there from the beginning of the Ionic revolt until about 493 B. C., or two or three years before the battle of Marathon, on which occasion we shall find him acting commander of the Athenian army.

Both the Chersonese and Sigeium, though Athenian possessions, were however now tributary and dependent on Persia. And it was to this quarter that Hippias, during his last years of alarm, looked for support in the event of being expelled from Athens: he calculated upon Sigeium as a shelter, and upon Æantidês, as well as Darius, as an ally. Neither the one nor the other failed him.

The same circumstances which alarmed Hippias, and rendered his dominion in Attica at once more oppressive and more odious, tended of course to raise the hopes of his enemies, the Athenian exiles, with the powerful Alkmæônids at their head. Believing the favorable moment to be come, they even ventured upon an invasion of Attica, and occupied a post called Leipsydrion in the mountain range of Parnês, which separates Attica from Bœotia.[234] But their schemes altogether failed: Hippias defeated and drove them out of the country. His dominion now seemed confirmed, for the Lacedæmonians were on terms of intimate friendship with him; and Amyntas king of Macedon, as well as the Thessalians, were his allies. Yet the exiles whom he

had beaten in the open field succeeded in an unexpected manœuvre, which, favored by circumstances, proved his ruin.

By an accident which had occurred in the year 548 B. C.,[235] the Delphian temple was set on fire and burnt. To repair this grave loss was an object of solicitude to all Greece; but the outlay required was exceedingly heavy, and it appears to have been long before the money could be collected. The Amphiktyons decreed that one-fourth of the cost should be borne by the Delphians themselves, who found themselves so heavily taxed by this assessment, that they sent envoys throughout all Greece to collect subscriptions in aid, and received, among other donations, from the Greek settlers in Egypt twenty minæ, besides a large present of alum from the Egyptian king Amasis: their munificent benefactor Crœsus fell a victim to the Persians in 546 B. C., so that his treasure was no longer open to them. The total sum required was three hundred talents (equal probably to about one hundred and fifteen thousand pounds sterling),[236]—a prodigious amount to be collected from the dispersed Grecian cities, who acknowledged no common sovereign authority, and among whom the proportion reasonable to ask from each was so difficult to determine with satisfaction to all parties. At length, however, the money was collected, and the Amphiktyons were in a situation to make a contract for the building of the temple. The Alkmæônids, who had been in exile ever since the third and final acquisition of power by Peisistratus, took the contract; and in executing it, they not only performed the work in the best manner, but even went much beyond the terms stipulated; employing Parian marble for the frontage, where the material prescribed to them was coarse stone.[237] As was before remarked in the case of Peisistratus when he was in banishment, we are surprised to find exiles whose property had been confiscated so amply furnished with money,—unless we are to suppose that Kleisthenês the Alkmæônid, grandson of the Sikyonian Kleisthenês,[238] inherited through his mother wealth independent of Attica, and deposited it in the temple of the Samian Hêrê. But the fact is unquestionable, and they gained signal reputation throughout the Hellenic world for their liberal performance of so important an enterprise. That the erection took considerable time, we cannot doubt. It seems to have been finished, as far as we can conjecture, about a year or two after the death of Hipparchus,—512 B. C.,—more than thirty years after the conflagration.

To the Delphians, especially, the rebuilding of their temple on so superior a scale was the most essential of all services, and their gratitude towards the Alkmæônids was proportionally great. Partly through such a feeling, partly through pecuniary presents, Kleisthenês was thus enabled to work the oracle for political purposes, and to call forth the powerful arm of Sparta against Hippias. Whenever any Spartan presented himself to consult the oracle, either on private or public business, the answer of the priestess was always in one strain, "Athens must be liberated." The constant repetition of this mandate at length extorted from the piety of the Lacedæmonians a reluctant compliance. Reverence for the god overcame their strong feeling of friend-

ship towards the Peisistratids, and Anchimolius son of Aster was despatched by sea to Athens, at the head of a Spartan force to expel them. On landing at Phalêrum, however, he found them already forewarned and prepared, as well as farther strengthened by one thousand horse specially demanded from their allies in Thessaly. Upon the plain of Phalêrum, this latter force was found peculiarly effective, so that the division of Anchimolius was driven back to their ships with great loss and he himself slain.[239] The defeated armament had probably been small, and its repulse only provoked the Lacedæmonians to send a larger, under the command of their king Kleomenês in person, who on this occasion marched into Attica by land. On reaching the plain of Athens, he was assailed by the Thessalian horse, but repelled them in so gallant a style, that they at once rode off and returned to their native country; abandoning their allies with a faithlessness not unfrequent in the Thessalian character. Kleomenês marched on to Athens without farther resistance, and found himself, together with the Alkmæônids and the malcontent Athenians generally, in possession of the town. At that time there was no fortification except around the acropolis, into which Hippias retired with his mercenaries and the citizens most faithful to him; having taken care to provision it well beforehand, so that it was not less secure against famine than against assault. He might have defied the besieging force, which was noway prepared for a long blockade; but, not altogether confiding in his position, he tried to send his children by stealth out of the country; and in this proceeding the children were taken prisoners. To procure their restoration, Hippias consented to all that was demanded of him, and withdrew from Attica to Sigeium in the Troad within the space of five days.

Thus fell the Peisistratid dynasty in 510 B. C., fifty years after the first usurpation of its founder.[240] It was put down through the aid of foreigners,[241] and those foreigners, too, wishing well to it in their hearts, though hostile from a mistaken feeling of divine injunction. Yet both the circumstances of its fall, and the course of events which followed, conspire to show that it possessed few attached friends in the country, and that the expulsion of Hippias was welcomed unanimously by the vast majority of Athenians. His family and chief partisans would accompany him into exile,—probably as a matter of course, without requiring any formal sentence of condemnation; and an altar was erected in the acropolis, with a column hard by, commemorating both the past iniquity of the dethroned dynasty, and the names of all its members.[242]

CHAPTER XXXI.

GRECIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXPULSION OF THE PEISISTRATIDS. — REVOLUTION OF KLEISTHENES AND ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRACY AT ATHENS.

With Hippias disappeared the mercenary Thracian garrison, upon which he and his father before him had leaned for defence as well as for enforcement of authority; and Kleomenês with his Lacedæmonian forces retired also, after staying only long enough to establish a personal friendship, productive subsequently of important consequences, between the Spartan king and the Athenian Isagoras. The Athenians were thus left to themselves, without any foreign interference to constrain them in their political arrangements.

It has been mentioned in the preceding chapter, that the Peisistratids had for the most part respected the forms of the Solonian constitution: the nine archons, and the probouleutic or preconsidering Senate of Four Hundred (both annually changed), still continued to subsist, together with occasional meetings of the people,—or rather of such portion of the people as was comprised in the gentes, phratries, and four Ionic tribes. The timocratic classification of Solon (or quadruple scale of income and admeasurement of political franchises according to it) also continued to subsist,—but all within the tether and subservient to the purposes of the ruling family, who always kept one of their number as real master, among the chief administrators, and always retained possession of the acropolis as well as of the mercenary force.

That overawing pressure being now removed by the expulsion of Hippias, the enslaved forms became at once endued with freedom and reality. There appeared again, what Attica had not known for thirty years, declared political parties, and pronounced opposition between two men as leaders,—on one side, Isagoras son of Tisander, a person of illustrious descent,—on the other, Kleisthenês the Alkmæônid, not less illustrious, and possessing at this moment a claim on the gratitude of his countrymen as the most persevering as well as the most effective foe of the dethroned despots. In what manner such opposition was carried on we are not told. It would seem to have been not altogether pacific; but at any rate, Kleisthenês had the worst of it, and in consequence of this defeat, says the historian, "he took into partnership the people, who had been before excluded from everything."[243] His partnership with the people gave birth to the Athenian democracy: it was a real and important revolution.

The political franchise, or the character of an Athenian citizen, both before and since Solon, had been confined to the primitive four Ionic tribes, each of which was an aggregate of so many close corporations or quasi-families,—the gentes and the

phratries. None of the residents in Attica, therefore, except those included in some gens or phratry, had any part in the political franchise. Such non-privileged residents were probably at all times numerous, and became more and more so by means of fresh settlers: moreover, they tended most to multiply in Athens and Peiræus, where emigrants would commonly establish themselves. Kleisthenês broke down the existing wall of privilege, and imparted the political franchise to the excluded mass. But this could not be done by enrolling them in new gentes or phratries, created in addition to the old; for the gentile tie was founded upon old faith and feeling, which, in the existing state of the Greek mind, could not be suddenly conjured up as a bond of union for comparative strangers: it could only be done by disconnecting the franchise altogether from the Ionic tribes as well as from the gentes which constituted them, and by redistributing the population into new tribes with a character and purpose exclusively political. Accordingly, Kleisthenês abolished the four Ionic tribes, and created in their place ten new tribes founded upon a different principle, independent of the gentes and phratries. Each of his new tribes comprised a certain number of demes or cantons, with the enrolled proprietors and residents in each of them. The demes taken altogether included the entire surface of Attica, so that the Kleisthenean constitution admitted to the political franchise all the free native Athenians; and not merely these, but also many Metics, and even some of the superior order of slaves.[244] Putting out of sight the general body of slaves, and regarding only the free inhabitants, it was in point of fact a scheme approaching to universal suffrage, both political and judicial.

The slight and cursory manner in which Herodotus announces this memorable revolution tends to make us overlook its real importance. He dwells chiefly on the alteration in the number and names of the tribes: Kleisthenês, he says, despised the Ionians so much, that he would not tolerate the continuance in Attica of the four tribes which prevailed in the Ionic cities,[245] deriving their names from the four sons of Ion,—just as his grandfather, the Sikyonian Kleisthenês, hating the Dorians, had degraded and nicknamed the three Dorian tribes at Sikyôn. Such is the representation of Herodotus, who seems himself to have entertained some contempt for the Ionians,[246] and therefore to have suspected a similar feeling where it had no real existence. But the scope of Kleisthenês was something far more extensive: he abolished the four ancient tribes, not because they were Ionic, but because they had become incommensurate with the existing condition of the Attic people, and because such abolition procured both for himself and for his political scheme new as well as hearty allies. And indeed, if we study the circumstances of the case, we shall see very obvious reasons to suggest the proceeding. For more than thirty years—an entire generation—the old constitution had been a mere empty formality, working only in subservience to the reigning dynasty, and stripped of all real controlling power. We may be very sure, therefore, that both the Senate of Four Hundred and the popular assembly, divested of that free speech which imparted to them not only all their value but all their charm, had come to be of little public estimation, and were proba-

bly attended only by a few partisans; and thus the difference between qualified citizens and men not so qualified,—between members of the four old tribes, and men not members,—became during this period practically effaced. This, in fact, was the only species of good which a Grecian despotism ever seems to have done: it confounded the privileged and the non-privileged under one coercive authority common to both, so that the distinction between the two was not easy to revive when the despotism passed away. As soon as Hippias was expelled, the senate and the public assembly regained their efficiency. But had they been continued on the old footing, including none except members of the four tribes, these tribes would have been reinvested with a privilege which in reality they had so long lost, that its revival would have seemed an odious novelty, and the remaining population would probably not have submitted to it. If, in addition, we consider the political excitement of the moment,—the restoration of one body of men from exile, and the departure of another body into exile,—the outpouring of long-suppressed hatred, partly against these very forms, by the corruption of which the despot had reigned,—we shall see that prudence as well as patriotism dictated the adoption of an enlarged scheme of government. Kleisthenês had learned some wisdom during his long exile; and as he probably continued, for some time after the introduction of his new constitution, to be the chief adviser of his countrymen, we may consider their extraordinary success as a testimony to his prudence and skill not less than to their courage and unanimity.

Nor does it seem unreasonable to give him credit for a more generous forward movement than what is implied in the literal account of Herodotus. Instead of being forced against his will to purchase popular support by proposing this new constitution, Kleisthenês may have proposed it before, during the discussions which immediately followed the retirement of Hippias; so that the rejection of it formed the ground of quarrel—and no other ground is mentioned—between him and Isagoras. The latter doubtless found sufficient support, in the existing senate and public assembly, to prevent it from being carried without an actual appeal to the people, and his opposition to it is not difficult to understand. For, necessary as the change had become, it was not the less a shock to ancient Attic ideas. It radically altered the very idea of a tribe, which now became an aggregation of demes, not of gentes,—of fellow-demots, not of fellow-gentiles; and it thus broke up those associations, religious, social, and political, between the whole and the parts of the old system, which operated powerfully on the mind of every old-fashioned Athenian. The patricians at Rome, who composed the gentes and curiæ,—and the plebs, who had no part in these corporations,—formed for a long time two separate and opposing fractions in the same city, each with its own separate organization. It was only by slow degrees that the plebs gained ground, and the political value of the patrician gens was long maintained alongside of and apart from the plebeian tribe. So too in the Italian and German cities of the Middle Ages, the patrician families refused to part with their own separate political identity, when the guilds grew up by the side of them; even though forced to renounce a portion of their power, they continued to be a separate frater-

nity, and would not submit to be regimented anew, under an altered category and denomination, along with the traders who had grown into wealth and importance. [247] But the reform of Kleisthenês effected this change all at once, both as to the name and as to the reality. In some cases, indeed, that which had been the name of a gens was retained as the name of a deme, but even then the old gentiles were ranked indiscriminately among the remaining demots; and the Athenian people, politically considered, thus became one homogeneous whole, distributed for convenience into parts, numerical, local, and politically equal. It is, however, to be remembered, that while the four Ionic tribes were abolished, the gentes and phratries which composed them were left untouched, and continued to subsist as family and religious associations, though carrying with them no political privilege.

The ten newly-created tribes, arranged in an established order of precedence, were called,—Erechthêis, Ægêis, Pandiŏnis, Leontis, Akamantis, Œnêis, Kekrŏpis, Hippothoöntis, Æantis, Antiochis; names borrowed chiefly from the respected heroes of Attic legend.[248] This number remained unaltered until the year 305 B. C., when it was increased to twelve by the addition of two new tribes, Antigonias and Demetrias, afterwards designated anew by the names of Ptolemais and Attalis. The mere names of these last two, borrowed from living kings, and not from legendary heroes, betray the change from freedom to subservience at Athens. Each tribe comprised a certain number of demes,—cantons, parishes, or townships,—in Attica. But the total number of these demes is not distinctly ascertained; for though we know that, in the time of Polemô (the third century B. C.), it was one hundred and seventy-four, we cannot be sure that it had always remained the same; and several critics construe the words of Herodotus to imply that Kleisthenês at first recognized exactly one hundred demes, distributed in equal proportion among his ten tribes.[249] But such construction of the words is more than doubtful, while the fact itself is improbable; partly because if the change of number had been so considerable as the difference between one hundred and one hundred and seventy-four, some positive evidence of it would probably be found,—partly because Kleisthenês would, indeed, have a motive to render the amount of citizen population nearly equal, but no motive to render the number of demes equal, in each of the ten tribes. It is well known how great is the force of local habits, and how unalterable are parochial or cantonal boundaries. In the absence of proof to the contrary, therefore, we may reasonably suppose the number and circumscription of the demes, as found or modified by Kleisthenês, to have subsisted afterwards with little alteration, at least until the increase in the number of the tribes.

There is another point, however, which is at once more certain, and more important to notice. The demes which Kleisthenês assigned to each tribe were in no case all adjacent to each other; and therefore the tribe, as a whole, did not correspond with any continuous portion of the territory, nor could it have any peculiar local interest, separate from the entire community. Such systematic avoidance of the factions arising out of neighborhood will appear to have been more especially necessary,

when we recollect that the quarrels of the Parali, the Diakrii, the Pediaki, during the preceding century, had all been generated from local feud, though doubtless artfully fomented by individual ambition. Moreover, it was only by this same precaution that the local predominance of the city, and the formation of a city-interest distinct from that of the country, was obviated; which could hardly have failed to arise had the city by itself constituted either one deme or one tribe. Kleisthenês distributed the city (or found it already distributed) into several demes, and those demes among several tribes; while Peiræus and Phalêrum, each constituting a separate deme, were also assigned to different tribes; so that there were no local advantages either to bestow predominance, or to create a struggle for predominance, of one tribe over the rest. [250] Each deme had its own local interests to watch over; but the tribe was a mere aggregate of demes for political, military, and religious purposes, with no separate hopes or fears, apart from the whole state. Each tribe had a chapel, sacred rites and festivals, and a common fund for such meetings, in honor of its eponymous hero, administered by members of its own choice;[251] and the statues of all the ten eponymous heroes, fraternal patrons of the democracy, were planted in the most conspicuous part of the agora of Athens. In the future working of the Athenian government, we shall trace no symptom of disquieting local factions,—a capital amendment, compared with the disputes of the preceding century, and traceable, in part, to the absence of border-relations between demes of the same tribe.

The deme now became the primitive constituent element of the commonwealth, both as to persons and as to property. It had its own demarch, its register of enrolled citizens, its collective property, its public meetings and religious ceremonies, its taxes levied and administered by itself. The register of qualified citizens[252] was kept by the demarch, and the inscription of new citizens took place at the assembly of the demots, whose legitimate sons were enrolled on attaining the age of eighteen, and their adopted sons at any time when presented and sworn to by the adopting citizen. The citizenship could only be granted by a public vote of the people, but wealthy non-freemen were enabled sometimes to evade this law and purchase admission upon the register of some poor deme, probably by means of a fictitious adoption. At the meetings of the demots, the register was called over, and it sometimes happened that some names were expunged,—in which case the party thus disfranchised had an appeal to the popular judicature.[253] So great was the local administrative power, however, of these demes, that they are described as the substitute,[254] under the Kleisthenean system, for the naukraries under the Solonian and ante-Solonian. The trittyes and naukraries, though nominally preserved, and the latter (as some affirm) augmented in number from forty-eight to fifty, appear henceforward as of little public importance.

Kleisthenês preserved, but at the same time modified and expanded, all the main features of Solon's political constitution; the public assembly, or ekklesia,—the preconsidering senate, composed of members from all the tribes,—and the habit of an-

nual election, as well as annual responsibility of magistrates, by and to the ekklesia. The full value must now have been felt of possessing such preëxisting institutions to build upon, at a moment of perplexity and dissension. But the Kleisthenean ekklesia acquired new strength, and almost a new character, from the great increase of the number of citizens qualified to attend it; while the annually-changed senate, instead of being composed of four hundred members taken in equal proportion from each of the old four tribes, was enlarged to five hundred, taken equally from each of the new ten tribes. It now comes before us, under the name of Senate of Five Hundred, as an active and indispensable body throughout the whole Athenian democracy: and the practice now seems to have begun (though the period of commencement cannot be decisively proved), of determining the names of the senators by lot. Both the senate thus constituted, and the public assembly, were far more popular and vigorous than they had been under the original arrangement of Solon.

The new constitution of the tribes, as it led to a change in the annual senate, so it transformed, no less directly, the military arrangements of the state, both as to soldiers and as to officers. The citizens called upon to serve in arms were now marshalled according to tribes,—each tribe having its own taxiarchs as officers for the hoplites, and its own phylarch at the head of the horsemen. Moreover, there were now created for the first time ten strategi, or generals, one from each tribe; and two hipparchs, for the supreme command of the horsemen. Under the prior Athenian constitution it appears that the command of the military force had been vested in the third archon, or polemarch, no strategi then existing; and even after the latter had been created, under the Kleisthenean constitution, the polemarch still retained a joint right of command along with them,—as we are told at the battle of Marathon, where Kallimachus the polemarch not only enjoyed an equal vote in the council of war along with the ten strategi, but even occupied the post of honor on the right wing.[255] The ten generals, annually changed, are thus (like the ten tribes) a fruit of the Kleisthenean constitution, which was at the same time powerfully strengthened and protected by such remodelling of the military force. The functions of the generals becoming more extensive as the democracy advanced, they seem to have acquired gradually not merely the direction of military and naval affairs, but also that of the foreign relations of the city generally,—while the nine archons, including the polemarch, were by degrees lowered down from that full executive and judicial competence which they had once enjoyed, to the simple ministry of police and preparatory justice. Encroached upon by the strategi on one side, they were also restricted in efficiency by the rise of the popular dikasteries or numerous jury-courts, on the other. We may be very sure that these popular dikasteries had not been permitted to meet or to act under the despotism of the Peisistratids, and that the judicial business of the city must then have been conducted partly by the Senate of Areopagus, partly by the archons; perhaps with a nominal responsibility of the latter at the end of their year of office to an acquiescent ekklesia. And if we even assume it to be true, as some writers contend, that the habit of direct popular judicature, over and above this

annual trial of responsibility, had been partially introduced by Solon, it must have been discontinued during the long coercion exercised by the supervening dynasty. But the outburst of popular spirit, which lent force to Kleisthenês, doubtless carried the people into direct action as jurors in the aggregate Heliæa, not less than as voters in the ekklesia,—and the change was thus begun which contributed to degrade the archons from their primitive character as judges, into the lower function of preliminary examiners and presidents of a jury. Such convocation of numerous juries, beginning first with the aggregate body of sworn citizens above thirty years of age, and subsequently dividing them into separate bodies or pannels, for trying particular causes, became gradually more frequent and more systematized: until at length, in the time of Periklês, it was made to carry a small pay, and stood out as one of the most prominent features of Athenian life. We cannot particularize the different steps whereby such final development was attained, and the judicial competence of the archon cut down to the mere power of inflicting a small fine; but the first steps of it are found in the revolution of Kleisthenês, and it seems to have been consummated by the reforms of Periklês. Of the function exercised by the nine archons as well as by many other magistrates and official persons at Athens, in convoking a dikastery, or jury-court, bringing on causes for trial,—and presiding over the trial,—a function constituting one of the marks of superior magistracy, and called the Hegemony, or presidency of a dikastery,—I shall speak more at length hereafter. At present, I wish merely to bring to view the increased and increasing sphere of action on which the people entered at the memorable turn of affairs now before us.

The financial affairs of the city underwent at this epoch as complete a change as the military: in fact, the appointment of magistrates and officers by tens, one from each tribe, seems to have become the ordinary practice. A board of ten, called Apodektæ, were invested with the supreme management of the exchequer, dealing with the contractors as to those portions of the revenue which were farmed, receiving all the taxes from the collectors, and disbursing them under competent authority. The first nomination of this board is expressly ascribed to Kleisthenês,[256] as a substitute for certain persons called Kôlakretæ, who had performed the same function before, and who were now retained only for subordinate services. The duties of the apodektæ were afterwards limited to receiving the public income, and paying it over to the ten treasurers of the goddess Athênê, by whom it was kept in the inner chamber of the Parthenon, and disbursed as needed; but this more complicated arrangement cannot be referred to Kleisthenês. From his time forward too, the Senate of Five Hundred steps far beyond its original duty of preparing matters for the discussion of the ekklesia: it embraces, besides, a large circle of administrative and general superintendence, which hardly admits of any definition. Its sittings become constant, with the exception of special holidays, and the year is distributed into ten portions called Prytanies,—the fifty senators of each tribe taking by turns the duty of constant attendance during one prytany, and receiving during that time the title of The Prytanes: the order of precedence among the tribes in these duties was annually deter-

mined by lot. In the ordinary Attic year of twelve lunar months, or three hundred and fifty-four days, six of the prytanies contained thirty-five days, four of them contained thirty-six: in the intercalated years of thirteen months, the number of days was thirty-eight and thirty-nine respectively. Moreover, a farther subdivision of the prytany into five periods of seven days each, and of the fifty tribe-senators into five bodies of ten each, was recognized: each body of ten presided in the senate for one period of seven days, drawing lots every day among their number for a new chairman, called Epistatês, to whom during his day of office were confided the keys of the acropolis and the treasury, together with the city seal. The remaining senators, not belonging to the prytanizing tribe, might of course attend if they chose; but the attendance of nine among them, one from each of the remaining nine tribes, was imperatively necessary to constitute a valid meeting, and to insure a constant representation of the collective people.

During those later times known to us through the great orators, the ekklesia, or formal assembly of the citizens, was convoked four times regularly during each prytany, or oftener if necessity required,—usually by the senate, though the stratêgi had also the power of convoking it by their own authority. It was presided over by the prytanes, and questions were put to the vote by their epistatês, or chairman; but the nine representatives of the non-prytanizing tribes were always present as a matter of course, and seem, indeed, in the days of the orators, to have acquired to themselves the direction of it, together with the right of putting questions for the vote,[257]—setting aside wholly or partially the fifty prytanes. When we carry our attention back, however, to the state of the ekklesia, as first organized by Kleisthenês (I have already remarked that expositors of the Athenian constitution are too apt to neglect the distinction of times, and to suppose that what was the practice between 400-330 B. C. had been always the practice), it will appear probable that he provided one regular meeting in each prytany, and no more; giving to the senate and the stratêgi power of convening special meetings if needful, but establishing one ekklesia during each prytany, or ten in the year, as a regular necessity of state. How often the ancient ekklesia had been convoked during the interval between Solon and Peisistratus, we cannot exactly say,—probably but seldom during the year. But under the Peisistratids, its convocation had dwindled down into an inoperative formality; and the reëstablishment of it by Kleisthenês, not merely with plenary determining powers, but also under full notice and preparation of matters beforehand, together with the best securities for orderly procedure, was in itself a revolution impressive to the mind of every Athenian citizen. To render the ekklesia efficient, it was indispensable that its meetings should be both frequent and free. Men thus became trained to the duty both of speakers and hearers, and each man, while he felt that he exercised his share of influence on the decision, identified his own safety and happiness with the vote of the majority, and became familiarized with the notion of a sovereign authority which he neither could nor ought to resist. This is an idea new to the Athenian bosom; and with it came the feelings sanctifying free speech and equal law,—words

which no Athenian citizen ever afterwards heard unmoved: together with that sentiment of the entire commonwealth as one and indivisible, which always overruled, though it did not supplant, the local and cantonal special ties. It is not too much to say that these patriotic and ennobling impulses were a new product in the Athenian mind, to which nothing analogous occurs even in the time of Solon. They were kindled in part doubtless by the strong reaction against the Peisistratids, but still more by the fact that the opposing leader, Kleisthenês, turned that transitory feeling to the best possible account, and gave to it a vigorous perpetuity, as well as a well-defined positive object, by the popular elements conspicuous in his constitution. His name makes less figure in history than we should expect, because he passed for the mere renovator of Solon's scheme of government after it had been overthrown by Peisistratus. Probably he himself professed this object, since it would facilitate the success of his propositions: and if we confine ourselves to the letter of the case, the fact is in a great measure true, since the annual senate and the ekklesia are both Solonian,—but both of them under his reform were clothed in totally new circumstances, and swelled into gigantic proportions. How vigorous was the burst of Athenian enthusiasm, altering instantaneously the position of Athens among the powers of Greece, we shall hear presently from the lips of Herodotus, and shall find still more unequivocally marked in the facts of his history.

But it was not only the people formally installed in their ekklesia, who received from Kleisthenês the real attributes of sovereignty,—it was by him also that the people were first called into direct action as dikasts, or jurors. I have already remarked, that this custom may be said, in a certain limited sense, to have begun in the time of Solon, since that lawgiver invested the popular assembly with the power of pronouncing the judgment of accountability upon the archons after their year of office. Here, again, the building, afterwards so spacious and stately, was erected on a Solonian foundation, though it was not itself Solonian. That the popular dikasteries, in the elaborate form in which they existed from Periklês downward, were introduced all at once by Kleisthenês, it is impossible to believe; yet the steps by which they were gradually wrought out are not distinctly discoverable. It would rather seem, that at first only the aggregate body of citizens above thirty years of age exercised judicial functions, being specially convoked and sworn to try persons accused of public crimes, and when so employed bearing the name of the heliæa, or heliasts; private offences and disputes between man and man being still determined by individual magistrates in the city, and a considerable judicial power still residing in the Senate of Areopagus. There is reason to believe that this was the state of things established by Kleisthenês, and which afterwards came to be altered by the greater extent of judicial duty gradually accruing to the heliasts, so that it was necessary to subdivide the collective heliæa. According to the subdivision, as practised in the times best known, six thousand citizens above thirty years of age were annually selected by lot out of the whole number, six hundred from each of the ten tribes: five thousand of these citizens were arranged in ten pannels or decuries of five hundred each, the re-

maining one thousand being reserved to fill up vacancies in case of death or absence among the former. The whole six thousand took a prescribed oath, couched in very striking words, and every man received a ticket inscribed with his own name as well as with a letter designating his decury. When there were causes or crimes ripe for trial, the thesmothets, or six inferior archons, determined by lot, first, which decuries should sit, according to the number wanted,—next, in which court, or under the presidency of what magistrate, the decury B or E should sit, so that it could not be known beforehand in what cause each would be judge. In the number of persons who actually attended and sat, however, there seems to have been much variety, and sometimes two decuries sat together.[258] The arrangement here described, we must recollect, is given to us as belonging to those times when the dikasts received a regular pay, after every day's sitting; and it can hardly have long continued without that condition, which was not realized before the time of Periklês. Each of these decuries sitting in judicature was called *The Heliæa*,—a name which belongs properly to the collective assembly of the people; this collective assembly having been itself the original judicature. I conceive that the practice of distributing this collective assembly, or heliæa, into sections of jurors for judicial duty, may have begun under one form or another soon after the reform of Kleisthenês, since the direct interference of the people in public affairs tended more and more to increase. But it could only have been matured by degrees into that constant and systematic service which the pay of Periklês called forth at last in completeness. Under the last-mentioned system the judicial competence of the archons was annulled, and the third archon, or polemarch, withdrawn from all military functions. Still, this had not been yet done at the time of the battle of Marathon, in which Kallimachus the polemarch not only commanded along with the stratêgi, but enjoyed a sort of preëminence over them: nor had it been done during the year after the battle of Marathon, in which Aristeidês was archon,—for the magisterial decisions of Aristeidês formed one of the principal foundations of his honorable surname, the Just.[259]

With this question, as to the comparative extent of judicial power vested by Kleisthenês in the popular dikastery and the archons, are in reality connected two others in Athenian constitutional law; relating, first, to the admissibility of all citizens for the post of archon,—next, to the choosing of archons by lot. It is well known that, in the time of Periklês, the archons, and various other individual functionaries, had come to be chosen by lot,—moreover, all citizens were legally admissible, and might give in their names to be drawn for by lot, subject to what was called the dokimasy, or legal examination into their status of citizen, and into various moral and religious qualifications, before they took office; while at the same time the function of the archon had become nothing higher than preliminary examination of parties and witnesses for the dikastery, and presidence over it when afterwards assembled, together with the power of imposing by authority a fine of small amount upon inferior offenders.

Now all these three political arrangements hang essentially together. The great value of the lot, according to Grecian democratical ideas, was that it equalized the chance of office between rich and poor. But so long as the poor citizens were legally inadmissible, choice by lot could have no recommendation either to the rich or to the poor; in fact, it would be less democratical than election by the general mass of citizens, because the poor citizen would under the latter system enjoy an important right of interference by means of his suffrage, though he could not be elected himself.[260] Again, choice by lot could never under any circumstances be applied to those posts where special competence, and a certain measure of attributes possessed only by a few, could not be dispensed with without obvious peril,—nor was it ever applied, throughout the whole history of democratical Athens, to the stratêgi, or generals, who were always elected by show of hands of the assembled citizens. Accordingly, we may regard it as certain that, at the time when the archons first came to be chosen by lot, the superior and responsible duties once attached to that office had been, or were in course of being, detached from it, and transferred either to the popular dikasts or to the ten elected stratêgi: so that there remained to these archons only a routine of police and administration, important indeed to the state, yet such as could be executed by any citizen of average probity, diligence, and capacity. At least there was no obvious absurdity in thinking so; and the dokimasy excluded from the office men of notoriously discreditable life, even after they might have drawn the successful lot. Periklês,[261] though chosen stratêgus, year after year successively, was never archon; and it may even be doubted whether men of first-rate talents and ambition often gave in their names for the office. To those of smaller aspirations[262] it was doubtless a source of importance, but it imposed troublesome labor, gave no pay, and entailed a certain degree of peril upon any archon who might have given offence to powerful men, when he came to pass through the trial of accountability which followed immediately upon his year of office. There was little to make the office acceptable either to very poor men, or to very rich and ambitious men; and between the middling persons who gave in their names, any one might be taken without great practical mischief, always assuming the two guarantees of the dokimasy before, and accountability after, office. This was the conclusion—in my opinion a mistaken conclusion, and such as would find no favor at present—to which the democrats of Athens were conducted by their strenuous desire to equalize the chances of office for rich and poor. But their sentiment seems to have been satisfied by a partial enforcement of the lot to the choice of some offices,—especially the archons, as the primitive chief magistrates of the state,—without applying it to all, or to the most responsible and difficult. Nor would they have applied it to the archons, if it had been indispensably necessary that these magistrates should retain their original very serious duty of judging disputes and condemning offenders.

I think, therefore, that these three points: 1. The opening of the post of archon to all citizens indiscriminately; 2. The choice of archons by lot; 3. The diminished range of the archon's duties and responsibilities, through the extension of those be-

longing to the popular courts of justice on the one hand and to the stratêgi on the other—are all connected together, and must have been simultaneous, or nearly simultaneous, in the time of introduction: the enactment of universal admissibility to office certainly not coming after the other two, and probably coming a little before them.

Now in regard to the eligibility of all Athenians indiscriminately to the office of archon, we find a clear and positive testimony as to the time when it was first introduced. Plutarch tells us[263] that the oligarchical,[264] but high-principled Aristeidês, was himself the proposer of this constitutional change,—shortly after the battle of Platæa, with the consequent expulsion of the Persians from Greece, and the return of the refugee Athenians to their ruined city. Seldom has it happened in the history of mankind, that rich and poor have been so completely equalized as among the population of Athens in that memorable expatriation and heroic struggle. Nor are we at all surprised to hear that the mass of the citizens, coming back with freshly-kindled patriotism as well as with the consciousness that their country had only been recovered by the equal efforts of all, would no longer submit to be legally disqualified from any office of state. It was on this occasion that the constitution was first made really "common" to all, and that the archons, stratêgi, and all functionaries, first began to be chosen from all Athenians without any difference of legal eligibility.[265] No mention is made of the lot, in this important statement of Plutarch, which appears to me every way worthy of credit, and which teaches us that, down to the invasion of Xerxês, not only had the exclusive principle of the Solonian law of qualification continued in force (whereby the first three classes on the census were alone admitted to all individual offices, and the fourth or Thêtic class excluded), but also the archons had hitherto been elected by the citizens,—not taken by lot.

Now for financial purposes, the quadruple census of Solon was retained long after this period, even beyond the Peloponnesian war and the oligarchy of Thirty. But we thus learn that Kleisthenês in his constitution retained it for political purposes also, in part at least: he recognized the exclusion of the great mass of the citizens from all individual offices,—such as the archon, the stratêgus, etc. In his time, probably, no complaints were raised on the subject. His constitution gave to the collective bodies —senate, ekklesia, and heliæa, or dikastery—a degree of power and importance such as they had never before known or imagined: and we may well suppose that the Athenian people of that day had no objection even to the proclaimed system and theory of being exclusively governed by men of wealth and station as individual magistrates,—especially since many of the newly-enfranchised citizens had been previously metics and slaves. Indeed, it is to be added that, even under the full democracy of later Athens, though the people had then become passionately attached to the theory of equal admissibility of all citizens to office, yet, in practice, poor men seldom obtained offices which were elected by the general vote, as will appear more fully in the course of this history.[266]

The choice of the stratêgi remained ever afterwards upon the footing on which Aristeidês thus placed it. But the lot for the choice of archon must have been introduced shortly after his proposition of universal eligibility, and in consequence too of the same tide of democratical feeling,—introduced as a farther corrective, because the poor citizen, though he had become eligible, was nevertheless not elected. And at the same time, I imagine, that elaborate distribution of the Heliæa, or aggregate body of dikasts, or jurors, into separate pannels, or dikasteries, for the decision of judicial matters, was first regularized. It was this change that stole away from the archons so important a part of their previous jurisdiction: it was this change that Periklês more fully consummated by insuring pay to the dikasts. But the present is not the time to enter into the modifications which Athens underwent during the generation after the battle of Platæa. They have been here briefly noticed for the purpose of reasoning back, in the absence of direct evidence, to Athens as it stood in the generation before that memorable battle, after the reform of Kleisthenês. His reform, though highly democratical, stopped short of the mature democracy which prevailed from Periklês to Demosthenês, in three ways especially, among various others; and it is therefore sometimes considered by the later writers as an aristocratical constitution:[267] 1. It still recognized the archons as judges to a considerable extent, and the third archon, or polemarch, as joint military commander along with the stratêgi. 2. It retained them as elected annually by the body of citizens, not as chosen by lot.[268] 3. It still excluded the fourth class of the Solonian census from all individual office, the archonship among the rest. The Solonian law of exclusion, however, though retained in principle, was mitigated in practice thus far,—that whereas Solon had rendered none but members of the highest class on the census (the Pentakosiomedimni) eligible to the archonship, Kleisthenês opened that dignity to all the first three classes, shutting out only the fourth. That he did this may be inferred from the fact that Aristeidês, assuredly not a rich man, became archon.

I am also inclined to believe that the Senate of Five Hundred, as constituted by Kleisthenês, was taken, not by election, but by lot, from the ten tribes,—and that every citizen became eligible to it. Election for this purpose—that is, the privilege of annually electing a batch of fifty senators, all at once, by each tribe—would probably be thought more troublesome than valuable; nor do we hear of separate meetings of each tribe for purposes of election. Moreover, the office of senator was a collective, not an individual office; the shock, therefore, to the feelings of semi-democratized Athens, from the unpleasant idea of a poor man sitting among the fifty prytanes, would be less than if they conceived him as polemarch at the head of the right wing of the army, or as an archon administering justice.

A farther difference between the constitution of Solon and that of Kleisthenês is to be found in the position of the Senate of Areopagus. Under the former, that senate had been the principal body in the state, and he had even enlarged its powers; under the latter, it must have been treated at first as an enemy, and kept down. For

as it was composed only of all the past archons, and as, during the preceding thirty years, every archon had been a creature of the Peisistratids, the Areopagites collectively must have been both hostile and odious to Kleisthenês and his partisans,—perhaps a fraction of its members might even retire into exile with Hippias. Its influence must have been sensibly lessened by the change of party, until it came to be gradually filled by fresh archons springing from the bosom of the Kleisthenean constitution. But during this important interval, the new-modelled Senate of Five Hundred, and the popular assembly, stepped into that ascendency which they never afterwards lost. From the time of Kleisthenês forward, the Areopagites cease to be the chief and prominent power in the state: yet they are still considerable; and when the second fill of the democratical tide took place, after the battle of Platæa, they became the focus of that which was then considered as the party of oligarchical resistance. I have already remarked that the archons, during the intermediate time (about 509-477 B. C.), were all elected by the ekklesia, not chosen by lot,—and that the fourth (or poorest and most numerous) class on the census were by law then ineligible; while election at Athens, even when every citizen without exception was an elector and eligible, had a natural tendency to fall upon men of wealth and station. We thus see how it happened that the past archons, when united in the Senate of Areopagus, infused into that body the sympathies, prejudices, and interests of the richer classes. It was this which brought them into conflict with the more democratical party headed by Periklês and Ephialtês, in times when portions of the Kleisthenean constitution had come to be discredited as too much imbued with oligarchy.

One other remarkable institution, distinctly ascribed to Kleisthenês, yet remains to be noticed,—the Ostracism; upon which I have already made some remarks,[269] in touching upon the memorable Solonian proclamation against neutrality in a sedition. It is hardly too much to say that, without this protective process, none of the other institutions would have reached maturity.

By the ostracism, a citizen was banished without special accusation, trial, or defence, for a term of ten years,—subsequently diminished to five. His property was not taken away, nor his reputation tainted; so that the penalty consisted solely in the banishment from his native city to some other Greek city. As to reputation, the ostracism was a compliment rather than otherwise;[270] and so it was vividly felt to be, when, about ninety years after Kleisthenês, the conspiracy between Nikias and Alkibiadês fixed it upon Hyperbolus. The two former had both recommended the taking of an ostracizing vote, each hoping to cause the banishment of the other; but before the day arrived, they accommodated the difference. To fire off the safety-gun of the republic against a person so little dangerous as Hyperbolus, was denounced as the prostitution of a great political ceremony: "it was not against such men as him (said the comic writer, Plato),[271] that the oyster-shell (or potsherd) was intended to be used." The process of ostracism was carried into effect by writing upon a shell, or potsherd, the name of the person whom a citizen thought it prudent for a time to

banish; which shell, when deposited in the proper vessel, counted for a vote towards the sentence.

I have already observed that all the governments of the Grecian cities, when we compare them with that idea which a modern reader is apt to conceive of the measure of force belonging to a government, were essentially weak, the good as well as the bad,—the democratical, the oligarchical, and the despotic. The force in the hands of any government, to cope with conspirators or mutineers, was extremely small, with the single exception of a despot surrounded by his mercenary troop; so that no tolerably sustained conspiracy or usurper could be put down except by the direct aid of the people in support of the government; which amounted to a dissolution, for the time, of constitutional authority, and was pregnant with reactionary consequences such as no man could foresee. To prevent powerful men from attempting usurpation was, therefore, of the greatest possible moment; and a despot or an oligarchy might exercise preventive means at pleasure,[272] much sharper than the ostracism, such as the assassination of Kimon, mentioned in my last chapter, as directed by the Peisistratids. At the very least, they might send away any one, from whom they apprehended attack or danger, without incurring even so much as the imputation of severity. But in a democracy, where arbitrary action of the magistrate was the thing of all others most dreaded, and where fixed laws, with trial and defence as preliminaries to punishment, were conceived by the ordinary citizen as the guarantees of his personal security and as the pride of his social condition,—the creation of such an exceptional power presented serious difficulty. If we transport ourselves to the times of Kleisthenês, immediately after the expulsion of the Peisistratids, when the working of the democratical machinery was as yet untried, we shall find this difficulty at its maximum; but we shall also find the necessity of vesting such a power somewhere absolutely imperative. For the great Athenian nobles had yet to learn the lesson of respect for any constitution; their past history had exhibited continual struggles between the armed factions of Megaklês, Lykurgus, and Peisistratus, put down after a time by the superior force and alliances of the latter. And though Kleisthenês, the son of Megaklês, might be firmly disposed to renounce the example of his father, and to act as the faithful citizen of a fixed constitution,—he would know but too well that the sons of his father's companions and rivals would follow out ambitious purposes without any regard to the limits imposed by law, if ever they acquired sufficient partisans to present a fair prospect of success. Moreover, when any two candidates for power, with such reckless dispositions, came into a bitter personal rivalry, the motives to each of them, arising as well out of fear as out of ambition, to put down his opponent at any cost to the constitution, might well become irresistible, unless some impartial and discerning interference could arrest the strife in time. "If the Athenians were wise (Aristeidês is reported to have said,[273] in the height and peril of his parliamentary struggle with Themistoklês), they would cast both Themistoklês and me into the barathrum."[274] And whoever reads the sad narrative of the Korkyræan sedition, in the third book of Thucydidês, together with the reflections of the historian

upon it,[275] will trace the gradual exasperation of these party feuds, beginning even under democratical forms, until at length they break down the barriers of public as well as of private morality.

Against this chance of internal assailants Kleisthenês had to protect the democratical constitution,—first, by throwing impediments in their way and rendering it difficult for them to procure the requisite support; next, by eliminating them before any violent projects were ripe for execution. To do either the one or the other, it was necessary to provide such a constitution as would not only conciliate the good-will, but kindle the passionate attachment, of the mass of citizens, insomuch that not even any considerable minority should be deliberately inclined to alter it by force. It was necessary to create in the multitude, and through them to force upon the leading ambitious men, that rare and difficult sentiment which we may term a constitutional morality; a paramount reverence for the forms of the constitution, enforcing obedience to the authorities acting under and within those forms, yet combined with the habit of open speech, of action subject only to definite legal control, and unrestrained censure of those very authorities as to all their public acts,—combined too with a perfect confidence in the bosom of every citizen, amidst the bitterness of party contest, that the forms of the constitution will be not less sacred in the eyes of his opponents than in his own. This coexistence of freedom and self-imposed restraint,—of obedience to authority with unmeasured censure of the persons exercising it,—may be found in the aristocracy of England (since about 1688) as well as in the democracy of the American United States: and because we are familiar with it, we are apt to suppose it a natural sentiment; though there seem to be few sentiments more difficult to establish and diffuse among a community, judging by the experience of history. We may see how imperfectly it exists at this day in the Swiss cantons; and the many violences of the first French revolution illustrate, among various other lessons, the fatal effects arising from its absence, even among a people high in the scale of intelligence. Yet the diffusion of such constitutional morality, not merely among the majority of any community, but throughout the whole, is the indispensable condition of a government at once free and peaceable; since even any powerful and obstinate minority may render the working of free institutions impracticable, without being strong enough to conquer ascendency for themselves. Nothing less than unanimity, or so overwhelming a majority as to be tantamount to unanimity, on the cardinal point of respecting constitutional forms, even by those who do not wholly approve of them, can render the excitement of political passion bloodless, and yet expose all the authorities in the state to the full license of pacific criticism.

At the epoch of Kleisthenês, which by a remarkable coincidence is the same as that of the regifuge at Rome, such constitutional morality, if it existed anywhere else, had certainly no place at Athens; and the first creation of it in any particular society must be esteemed an interesting historical fact. By the spirit of his reforms,—equal, popular, and comprehensive, far beyond the previous experience of Athenians,—he

secured the hearty attachment of the body of citizens; but from the first generation of leading men, under the nascent democracy, and with such precedents as they had to look back upon, no self-imposed limits to ambition could be expected: and the problem required was to eliminate beforehand any one about to transgress these limits, so as to escape the necessity of putting him down afterwards, with all that bloodshed and reaction, in the midst of which the free working of the constitution would be suspended at least, if not irrevocably extinguished. To acquire such influence as would render him dangerous under democratical forms, a man must stand in evidence before the public, so as to afford some reasonable means of judging of his character and purposes; and the security which Kleisthenês provided, was, to call in the positive judgment of the citizens respecting his future promise purely and simply, so that they might not remain too long neutral between two formidable political rivals,—pursuant in a certain way to the Solonian proclamation against neutrality in a sedition, as I have already remarked in a former chapter. He incorporated in the constitution itself the principle of *privilegium* (to employ the Roman phrase, which signifies, not a peculiar favor granted to any one, but a peculiar inconvenience imposed), yet only under circumstances solemn and well defined, with full notice and discussion beforehand, and by the positive secret vote of a large proportion of the citizens. "No law shall be made against any single citizen, without the same being made against *all* Athenian citizens; unless it shall so seem good to six thousand citizens voting secretly."[276] Such was that general principle of the constitution, under which the ostracism was a particular case. Before the vote of ostracism could be taken, a case was to be made out in the senate and the public assembly to justify it. In the sixth prytany of the year, these two bodies debated and determined whether the state of the republic was menacing enough to call for such an exceptional measure.[277] If they decided in the affirmative, a day was named, the agora was railed round, with ten entrances left for the citizens of each tribe, and ten separate casks or vessels for depositing the suffrages, which consisted of a shell, or a potsherd, with the name of the person written on it whom each citizen designed to banish. At the end of the day, the number of votes was summed up, and if six thousand votes were found to have been given against any one person, that person was ostracized; if not, the ceremony ended in nothing.[278] Ten days were allowed to him for settling his affairs, after which he was required to depart from Attica for ten years, but retained his property, and suffered no other penalty.

It was not the maxim at Athens to escape the errors of the people, by calling in the different errors, and the sinister interest besides, of an extra-popular or privileged few; nor was any third course open, since the principles of representative government were not understood, nor indeed conveniently applicable to very small communities. Beyond the judgment of the people—so the Athenians felt—there was no appeal; and their grand study was to surround the delivery of that judgment with the best securities for rectitude and the best preservatives against haste, passion, or private corruption. Whatever measure of good government could not be obtained in

that way, could not, in their opinion, be obtained at all. I shall illustrate the Athenian proceedings on this head more fully when I come to speak of the working of their mature democracy: meanwhile, in respect to this grand protection of the nascent democracy,—the vote of ostracism,—it will be found that the securities devised by Kleisthenês, for making the sentence effectual against the really dangerous man, and against no one else, display not less foresight than patriotism. The main object was, to render the voting an expression of deliberate public feeling, as distinguished from mere factious antipathy: the large minimum of votes required, one-fourth of the entire citizen population, went far to insure this effect,—the more so, since each vote, taken as it was in a secret manner, counted unequivocally for the expression of a genuine and independent sentiment, and could neither be coerced nor bought. Then again, Kleisthenês did not permit the process of ostracizing to be opened against any one citizen exclusively. If opened at all, every one without exception was exposed to the sentence; so that the friends of Themistoklês could not invoke it against Aristeidês,[279] nor those of the latter against the former, without exposing their own leader to the same chance of exile. It was not likely to be invoked at all, therefore, until exasperation had proceeded so far as to render both parties insensible to this chance, —the precise index of that growing internecive hostility, which the ostracism prevented from coming to a head. Nor could it even then be ratified, unless a case was shown to convince the more neutral portion of the senate and the ekklesia: moreover, after all, the ekklesia did not itself ostracize, but a future day was named, and the whole body of the citizens were solemnly invited to vote. It was in this way that security was taken not only for making the ostracism effectual in protecting the constitution, but to hinder it from being employed for any other purpose. And we must recollect that it exercised its tutelary influence, not merely on those occasions when it was actually employed, but by the mere knowledge that it might be employed, and by the restraining effect which that knowledge produced on the conduct of the great men. Again, the ostracism, though essentially of an exceptional nature, was yet an exception sanctified and limited by the constitution itself; so that the citizen, in giving his ostracizing vote, did not in any way depart from the constitution or lose his reverence for it. The issue placed before him—"Is there any man whom you think vitally dangerous to the state? if so, whom?"—though vague, was yet raised directly and legally. Had there been no ostracism, it might probably have been raised both indirectly and illegally, on the occasion of some special imputed crime of a suspected political leader, when accused before a court of justice, —a perversion, involving all the mischief of the ostracism, without its protective benefits.

Care was taken to divest the ostracism of all painful consequence except what was inseparable from exile; and this is not one of the least proofs of the wisdom with which it was devised. Most certainly, it never deprived the public of candidates for political influence: and when we consider the small amount of individual evil which it inflicted,—evil too diminished, in the cases of Kimon and Aristeidês, by a reactionary sentiment which augmented their subsequent popularity after return,—two remarks

will be quite sufficient to offer in the way of justification. First, it completely produced its intended effect; for the democracy grew up from infancy to manhood without a single attempt to overthrow it by force,[280]—a result, upon which no reflecting contemporary of Kleisthenês could have ventured to calculate. Next, through such tranquil working of the democratical forms, a constitutional morality quite sufficiently complete was produced among the leading Athenians, to enable the people after a certain time to dispense with that exceptional security which the ostracism offered. [281] To the nascent democracy, it was absolutely indispensable; to the growing yet militant democracy, it was salutary; but the full-grown democracy both could and did stand without it. The ostracism passed upon Hyperbolus, about ninety years after Kleisthenês, was the last occasion of its employment. And even this can hardly be considered as a serious instance: it was a trick concerted between two distinguished Athenians (Nikias and Alkibiadês), to turn to their own political account a process already coming to be antiquated. Nor would such a manœuvre have been possible, if the contemporary Athenian citizens had been penetrated with the same, serious feeling of the value of ostracism as a safeguard of democracy, as had been once entertained by their fathers and grandfathers. Between Kleisthenês and Hyperbolus, we hear of about ten different persons as having been banished by ostracism. First of all, Hipparchus of the deme Cholargus, the son of Charmus, a relative of the recently-expelled Peisistratid despots;[282] then Aristeidês, Themistoklês, Kimon, and Thucydidês son of Melêsias, all of them renowned political leaders; also Alkibiadês and Megaklês (the paternal and maternal grandfathers of the distinguished Alkibiadês), and Kallias, belonging to another eminent family at Athens;[283] lastly, Damôn, the preceptor of Periklês in poetry and music, and eminent for his acquisitions in philosophy.[284] In this last case comes out the vulgar side of humanity, aristocratical as well as democratical; for with both, the process of philosophy and the persons of philosophers are wont to be alike unpopular. Even Kleisthenês himself is said to have been ostracized under his own law, and Xanthippus; but both upon authority too weak to trust.[285] Miltiadês was not ostracized at all, but tried and punished for misconduct in his command.

I should hardly have said so much about this memorable and peculiar institution of Kleisthenês, if the erroneous accusations against the Athenian democracy,—of envy, injustice, and ill-treatment of their superior men, had not been greatly founded upon it, and if such criticisms had not passed from ancient times to modern with little examination. In monarchical governments, a pretender to the throne, numbering a certain amount of supporters, is, as a matter of course, excluded from the country. The duke of Bordeaux cannot now reside in France,—nor could Napoleon after 1815,—nor Charles Edward in England during the last century. No man treats this as any extravagant injustice, yet it is the parallel of the ostracism,—with a stronger case in favor of the latter, inasmuch as the change from one regal dynasty to another does not of necessity overthrow all the collateral institutions and securities of the country. Plutarch has affirmed that the ostracism arose from the envy and jealousy inherent

in a democracy,[286] and not from justifiable fears,—an observation often repeated, yet not the less demonstrably untrue. Not merely because ostracism so worked as often to increase the influence of that political leader whose rival it removed,—but still more, because, if the fact had been as Plutarch says, this institution would have continued as long as the democracy; whereas it finished with the banishment of Hyperbolus, at a period when the government was more decisively democratical than it had been in the time of Kleisthenês. It was, in truth, a product altogether of fear and insecurity,[287] on the part both of the democracy and its best friends,—fear perfectly well-grounded, and only appearing needless because the precautions taken prevented attack. So soon as the diffusion of a constitutional morality had placed the mass of the citizens above all serious fear of an aggressive usurper the ostracism was discontinued. And doubtless the feeling, that it might safely be dispensed with, must have been strengthened by the long ascendency of Periklês,—by the spectacle of the greatest statesman whom Athens ever produced, acting steadily within the limits of the constitution; as well as by the ill-success of his two opponents, Kimon and Thucydidês,—aided by numerous partisans and by the great comic writers, at a period when comedy was a power in the state such as it has never been before or since,—in their attempts to get him ostracized. They succeeded in fanning up the ordinary antipathy of the citizens towards philosophers, so far as to procure the ostracism of his friend and teacher Damôn: but Periklês himself, to repeat the complaint of his bitter enemy, the comic poet Kratinus,[288] "was out of the reach of the oyster-shell." If Periklês was not conceived to be dangerous to the constitution, none of his successors were at all likely to be so regarded. Damôn and Hyperbolus were the two last persons ostracized: both of them were cases, and the only cases, of an unequivocal abuse of the institution, because, whatever the grounds of displeasure against them may have been, it is impossible to conceive either of them as menacing to the state,—whereas all the other known sufferers were men of such position and power, that the six or eight thousand citizens who inscribed each name on the shell, or at least a large proportion of them, may well have done so under the most conscientious belief that they were guarding the constitution against real danger. Such a change, in the character of the persons ostracized, plainly evinces that the ostracism had become dissevered from that genuine patriotic prudence which originally rendered it both legitimate and popular. It had served for two generations an inestimable tutelary purpose,—it lived to be twice dishonored,—and then passed, by universal acquiescence, into matter of history.

A process analogous to the ostracism subsisted at Argos,[289] at Syracuse, and in some other Grecian democracies. Aristotle states that it was abused for factious purposes: and at Syracuse, where it was introduced after the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty, Diodorus affirms that it was so unjustly and profusely applied, as to deter persons of wealth and station from taking any part in public affairs; for which reason it was speedily discontinued. We have no particulars to enable us to appreciate this general statement. But we cannot safely infer that because the ostracism worked on

the whole well at Athens, it must necessarily have worked well in other states,—the more so, as we do not know whether it was surrounded with the same precautionary formalities, nor whether it even required the same large minimum of votes to make it effective. This latter guarantee, so valuable in regard to an institution essentially easy to abuse, is not noticed by Diodorus in his brief account of the Petalism,—so the process was denominated at Syracuse.[290]

Such was the first Athenian democracy, engendered as well by the reaction against Hippias and his dynasty as by the memorable partnership, whether spontaneous or compulsory, between Kleisthenês and the unfranchised multitude. It is to be distinguished, both from the mitigated oligarchy established by Solon before, and from the full-grown and symmetrical democracy which prevailed afterwards from the beginning of the Peloponnesian war towards the close of the career of Periklês. It was, indeed, a striking revolution, impressed upon the citizen not less by the sentiments to which it appealed than by the visible change which it made in political and social life. He saw himself marshalled in the ranks of hoplites, alongside of new companions in arms,—he was enrolled in a new register, and his property in a new schedule, in his deme and by his demarch, an officer before unknown,—he found the year distributed afresh, for all legal purposes, into ten parts bearing the name of prytanies, each marked by a solemn and free-spoken ekklesia, at which he had a right to be present,—that ekklesia was convoked and presided by senators called prytanes, members of a senate novel both as to number and distribution,—his political duties were now performed as member of a tribe, designated by a name not before pronounced in common Attic life, connected with one of ten heroes whose statues he now for the first time saw in the agora, and associating him with fellow-tribemen from all parts of Attica. All these and many others were sensible novelties, felt in the daily proceedings of the citizen. But the great novelty of all was, the authentic recognition of the ten new tribes as a sovereign dêmos, or people, apart from all specialties of phratric or gentile origin, with free speech and equal law; retaining no distinction except the four classes of the Solonian property-schedule with their gradations of eligibility. To a considerable proportion of citizens this great novelty was still farther endeared by the fact that it had raised them out of the degraded position of metics and slaves; and to the large majority of all the citizens, it furnished a splendid political idea, profoundly impressive to the Greek mind,—capable of calling forth the most ardent attachment as well as the most devoted sense of active obligation and obedience. We have now to see how their newly-created patriotism manifested itself.

Kleisthenês and his new constitution carried with them so completely the popular favor, that Isagoras had no other way of opposing it except by calling in the interference of Kleomenês and the Lacedæmonians. Kleomenês listened the more readily to this call, as he was reported to have been on an intimate footing with the wife of Isagoras. He prepared to come to Athens; but his first aim was to deprive the democracy of its great leader Kleisthenês, who, as belonging to the Alkmæônid family, was

supposed to be tainted with the inherited sin of his great-grandfather Megaklês, the destroyer of the usurper Kylôn. Kleomenês sent a herald to Athens, demanding the expulsion "of the accursed,"—so this family were called by their enemies, and so they continued to be called eighty years afterwards, when the same manœuvre was practised by the Lacedæmonians of that day against Periklês. This requisition had been recommended by Isagoras, and was so well-timed that Kleisthenês, not venturing to disobey it, retired voluntarily, so that Kleomenês, though arriving at Athens only with a small force, found himself master of the city. At the instigation of Isagoras, he sent into exile seven hundred families, selected from the chief partisans of Kleisthenês: his next attempt was to dissolve the new Senate of Five Hundred and place the whole government in the hands of three hundred adherents of the chief whose cause he espoused. But now was seen the spirit infused into the people by their new constitution. At the time of the first usurpation of Peisistratus, the Senate of that day had not only not resisted, but even lent themselves to the scheme. But the new Senate of Kleisthenês resolutely refused to submit to dissolution, and the citizens manifested themselves in a way at once so hostile and so determined, that Kleomenês and Isagoras were altogether baffled. They were compelled to retire into the acropolis and stand upon the defensive; and this symptom of weakness was the signal for a general rising of the Athenians, who besieged the Spartan king on the holy rock. He had evidently come without any expectation of finding, or any means of overpowering, resistance; for at the end of two days his provisions were exhausted, and he was forced to capitulate. He and his Lacedæmonians, as well as Isagoras, were allowed to retire to Sparta; but the Athenians of the party captured along with him were imprisoned, condemned,[291] and executed by the people.

Kleisthenês, with the seven hundred exiled families, was immediately recalled, and his new constitution materially strengthened by this first success. Yet the prospect of renewed Spartan attack was sufficiently serious to induce him to send envoys to Artaphernês, the Persian satrap at Sardis, soliciting the admission of Athens into the Persian alliance: he probably feared the intrigues of the expelled Hippias in the same quarter. Artaphernês, having first informed himself who the Athenians were, and where they dwelt,—replied that, if they chose to send earth and water to the king of Persia, they might be received as allies, but upon no other condition. Such were the feelings of alarm under which the envoys had quitted Athens, that they went the length of promising this unqualified token of submission. But their countrymen, on their return, disavowed them with scorn and indignation.[292]

It was at this time that the first connection began between Athens and the little Bœotian town of Platæa, situated on the northern slope of the range of Kithæron, between that mountain and the river Asôpus,—on the road from Athens to Thebes; and it is upon this first occasion that we become acquainted with the Bœotians and their polities. In one of my preceding volumes,[293] the Bœotian federation has already been briefly described, as composed of some twelve or thirteen autonomous

towns under the headship of Thebes, which was, or professed to have been, their mother-city. Platæa had been, so the Thebans affirmed, their latest foundation;[294] it was ill-used by them, and discontented with the alliance. Accordingly, as Kleomenês was on his way back from Athens, the Platæans took the opportunity of addressing themselves to him, craved the protection of Sparta against Thebes, and surrendered their town and territory without reserve. The Spartan king, having no motive to undertake a trust which promised nothing but trouble, advised them to solicit the protection of Athens, as nearer and more accessible for them in case of need. He foresaw that this would embroil the Athenians with Bœotia; and such anticipation was in fact his chief motive for giving the advice, which the Platæans followed. Selecting an occasion of public sacrifice at Athens, they dispatched thither envoys, who sat down as suppliants at the altar, surrendered their town to Athens, and implored protection against Thebes. Such an appeal was not to be resisted, and protection was promised; it was soon needed, for the Thebans invaded the Platæan territory, and an Athenian force marched to defend it. Battle was about to be joined, when the Corinthians interposed with their mediation, which was accepted by both parties. They decided altogether in favor of Platæa, pronouncing that the Thebans had no right to employ force against any seceding member of the Bœotian federation.[295] But the Thebans, finding the decision against them, refused to abide by it, and, attacking the Athenians on their return, sustained a complete defeat: the latter avenged this breach of faith by joining to Platæa the portion of Theban territory south of the Asôpus, and making that river the limit between the two. By such success, however, the Athenians gained nothing, except the enmity of Bœotia,—as Kleomenês had foreseen. Their alliance with Platæa, long continued, and presenting in the course of this history several incidents touching to our sympathies, will be found, if we except one splendid occasion,[296] productive only of burden to the one party, yet insufficient as a protection to the other.

Meanwhile Kleomenês had returned to Sparta full of resentment against the Athenians, and resolved on punishing them, as well as on establishing his friend Isagoras as despot over them. Having been taught, however, by humiliating experience, that this was no easy achievement, he would not make the attempt, without having assembled a considerable force; he summoned allies from all the various states of Peloponnesus, yet without venturing to inform them what he was about to undertake. He at the same time concerted measures with the Bœotians, and with the Chalkidians of Eubœa, for a simultaneous invasion of Attica on all sides. It appears that he had greater confidence in their hostile dispositions towards Athens than in those of the Peloponnesians, for he was not afraid to acquaint them with his design,—and probably the Bœotians were incensed with the recent interference of Athens in the affair of Platæa. As soon as these preparations were completed, the two kings of Sparta, Kleomenês and Demaratus, put themselves at the head of the united Peloponnesian force, marched into Attica, and advanced as far as Eleusis on the way to Athens. But when the allies came to know the purpose for which they were to be employed, a

spirit of dissatisfaction manifested itself among them. They had no unfriendly sentiment towards Athens; and the Corinthians especially, favorably disposed rather than otherwise towards that city, resolved to proceed no farther, withdrew their contingent from the camp, and returned home. At the same time, king Demaratus, either sharing in the general dissatisfaction, or moved by some grudge against his colleague which had not before manifested itself, renounced the undertaking also. And these two examples, operating upon the preëxisting sentiment of the allies generally, caused the whole camp to break up and return home without striking a blow.[297]

We may here remark that this is the first instance known in which Sparta appears in act as recognized head of an obligatory Peloponnesian alliance,[298] summoning contingents from the cities to be placed under the command of her king. Her headship, previously recognized in theory, passes now into act, but in an unsatisfactory manner, so as to prove the necessity of precaution and concert beforehand,—which will be found not long wanting.

Pursuant to the scheme concerted, the Bœotians and Chalkidians attacked Attica at the same time that Kleomenês entered it. The former seized Œnoê and Hysiæ, the frontier demes of Attica on the side towards Platæa, while the latter assailed the north-eastern frontier, which faces Eubœa. Invaded on three sides, the Athenians were in serious danger, and were compelled to concentrate all their forces at Eleusis against Kleomenês, leaving the Bœotians and Chalkidians unopposed. But the unexpected breaking up of the invading army from Peloponnesus proved their rescue, and enabled them to turn the whole of their attention to the other frontier. They marched into Bœotia to the strait called Euripus, which separates it from Eubœa, intending to prevent the junction of the Bœotians and Chalkidians, and to attack the latter first apart. But the arrival of the Bœotians caused an alteration in their scheme; they attacked the Bœotians first, and gained a victory of the most complete character,—killing a large number, and capturing seven hundred prisoners. On the very same day they crossed over to Eubœa, attacked the Chalkidians, and gained another victory so decisive that it at once terminated the war. Many Chalkidians were taken, as well as Bœotians, and conveyed in chains to Athens, where after a certain detention they were at last ransomed for two minæ per man; and the tenth of the sum thus raised was employed in the fabrication of a chariot and four horses in bronze, which was placed in the acropolis to commemorate the victory. Herodotus saw this trophy when he was at Athens. He saw too, what was a still more speaking trophy, the actual chains in which the prisoners had been fettered, exhibiting in their appearance the damage undergone when the acropolis was burnt by Xerxês: an inscription of four lines described the offerings and recorded the victory out of which they had sprung. [299]

Another consequence of some moment arose out of this victory. The Athenians planted a body of four thousand of their citizens as klêruchs (lot-holders) or settlers upon the lands of the wealthy Chalkidian oligarchy called the Hippobotæ,—propri-

etors probably in the fertile plain of Lêlantum, between Chalkis and Eretria. This is a system which we shall find hereafter extensively followed out by the Athenians in the days of their power; partly with the view of providing for their poorer citizens,—partly to serve as garrison among a population either hostile or of doubtful fidelity. These Attic klêruchs (I can find no other name by which to speak of them) did not lose their birthright as Athenian citizens: they were not colonists in the Grecian sense, and they are known by a totally different name,—but they corresponded very nearly to the colonies formally planted out on the conquered lands by Rome. The increase of the poorer population was always more or less painfully felt in every Grecian city. For though the aggregate population never seems to have increased very fast, yet the multiplication of children in poor families caused the subdivision of the smaller lots of land, until at last they became insufficient for a maintenance; and the persons thus impoverished found it difficult to obtain subsistence in other ways, more especially as the labor for the richer classes was so much performed by imported slaves. Doubtless some families possessed of landed property became extinct; but this did not at all benefit the smaller and poorer proprietors; for the lands thus rendered vacant passed, not to them, but by inheritance, or bequest, or intermarriage, to other proprietors, for the most part in easy circumstances,—since one opulent family usually intermarried with another. I shall enter more fully at a future opportunity into this question,—the great and serious problem of population, as it affected the Greek communities generally, and as it was dealt with in theory by the powerful minds of Plato and Aristotle. At present it is sufficient to notice that the numerous klêruchies sent out by Athens, of which this to Eubœa was the first, arose in a great measure out of the multiplication of the poorer population, which her extended power was employed in providing for. Her subsequent proceedings with a view to the same object will not be always found so justifiable as this now before us, which grew naturally, according to the ideas of the time, out of her success against the Chalkidians.

The war between Athens, however, and Thebes with her Bœotian allies, still continued, to the great and repeated disadvantage of the latter, until at length the Thebans in despair sent to ask advice of the Delphian oracle, and were directed to "solicit aid from those nearest to them."[300] "How (they replied) are we to obey? Our nearest neighbors, of Tanagra, Korôneia, and Thespiæ, are now, and have been from the beginning, lending us all the aid in their power." An ingenious Theban, however, coming to the relief of his perplexed fellow-citizens, dived into the depths of legend and brought up a happy meaning. "Those nearest to us (he said) are the inhabitants of Ægina: for Thêbê (the eponym of Thebes) and Ægina (the eponym of that island) were both sisters, daughters of Asôpus: let us send to crave assistance from the Æginetans." If his subtle interpretation (founded upon their descent from the same legendary progenitors) did not at once convince all who heard it, at least no one had any better to suggest; and envoys were at once sent to the Æginetans,—who, in reply to a petition founded on legendary claims, sent to the help of the Thebans a rein-

forcement of legendary, but venerated, auxiliaries,—the Æakid heroes. We are left to suppose that their effigies are here meant. It was in vain, however, that the glory and the supposed presence of the Æakids Telamôn and Pêleus were introduced into the Theban camp. Victory still continued on the side of Athens; and the discouraged Thebans again sent to Ægina, restoring the heroes,[301] and praying for aid of a character more human and positive. Their request was granted, and the Æginetans commenced war against Athens without even the decent preliminary of a herald and declaration.[302]

This remarkable embassy first brings us into acquaintance with the Dorians of Ægina,—oligarchical, wealthy, commercial, and powerful at sea, even in the earliest days; more analogous to Corinth than to any of the other cities called Dorian. The hostility which they now began without provocation against Athens,—repressed by Sparta at the critical moment of the battle of Marathon,—then again breaking out,—and hushed for a while by the common dangers of the Persian invasion under Xerxês, was appeased only with the conquest of the island about twenty years after that event, and with the expulsion and destruction of its inhabitants some years later. There had been indeed, according to Herodotus,[303] a feud of great antiquity between Athens and Ægina,—of which he gives the account in a singular narrative, blending together religion, politics, exposition of ancient customs, etc.; but at the time when the Thebans solicited aid from Ægina, the latter was at peace with Athens. The Æginetans employed their fleet, powerful for that day, in ravaging Phalêrum and the maritime demes of Attica; nor had the Athenians as yet any fleet to resist them.[304] It is probable that the desired effect was produced, of diverting a portion of the Athenian force from the war against Bœotia, and thus partially relieving Thebes. But the war of Athens against both of them continued for a considerable time, though we have no information respecting its details.

Meanwhile the attention of Athens was called off from these combined enemies by a more menacing cloud, which threatened to burst upon her from the side of Sparta. Kleomenês and his countrymen, full of resentment at the late inglorious desertion of Eleusis, were yet more incensed by the discovery, which appears to have been then recently made, that the injunctions of the Delphian priestess for the expulsion of Hippias from Athens had been fraudulently procured.[305] Moreover, Kleomenês, when shut up in the acropolis of Athens with Isagoras, had found there various prophecies previously treasured up by the Peisistratids, many of which foreshadowed events highly disastrous to Sparta. And while the recent brilliant manifestations of courage, and repeated victories, on the part of Athens, seemed to indicate that such prophecies might perhaps be realized,—Sparta had to reproach herself, that, from the foolish and mischievous conduct of Kleomenês, she had undone the effect of her previous aid against the Peisistratids, and thus lost that return of gratitude which the Athenians would otherwise have testified. Under such impressions, the Spartan authorities took the remarkable step of sending for Hippias from his resi-

dence at Sigeium to Peloponnesus, and of summoning deputies from all their allies to meet him at Sparta.

The convocation thus summoned deserves notice as the commencement of a new era in Grecian politics. The previous expedition of Kleomenês against Attica presents to us the first known example of Spartan headship passing from theory into act: that expedition miscarried because the allies, though willing to follow, would not follow blindly, nor be made the instruments of executing purposes repugnant to their feelings. Sparta had now learned the necessity, in order to insure their hearty concurrence, of letting them know what she contemplated, so as to ascertain at least that she had no decided opposition to apprehend. Here, then, is the third stage in the spontaneous movement of Greece towards a systematic conjunction, however imperfect, of its many autonomous units. First we have Spartan headship suggested in theory, from a concourse of circumstances which attract to her the admiration of all Greece,—power, unrivalled training, undisturbed antiquity, etc.: next, the theory passes into act, yet rude and shapeless: lastly, the act becomes clothed with formalities, and preceded by discussion and determination. The first convocation of the allies at Sparta, for the purpose of having a common object submitted to their consideration, may well be regarded as an important event in Grecian political history. The proceedings at the convocation are no less important, as an indication of the way in which the Greeks of that day felt and acted, and must be borne in mind as a contrast with times hereafter to be described.

Hippias having been presented to the assembled allies, the Spartans expressed their sorrow for having dethroned him,—their resentment and alarm at the new-born insolence of Athens,[306] already tasted by her immediate neighbors, and menacing to every state represented in the convocation,—and their anxiety to restore Hippias, not less as a reparation for past wrong, than as a means, through his rule, of keeping Athens low and dependent. But the proposition, though emanating from Sparta, was listened to by the allies with one common sentiment of repugnance. They had no sympathy for Hippias,—no dislike, still less any fear, of Athens,—and a profound detestation of the character of a despot. The spirit which had animated the armed contingents at Eleusis now reappeared among the deputies at Sparta, and the Corinthians again took the initiative. Their deputy Sosiklês protested against the project in the fiercest and most indignant strain: no language can be stronger than that of the long harangue which Herodotus puts into his mouth, wherein the bitter recollections prevalent at Corinth respecting Kypselus and Periander are poured forth. "Surely, heaven and earth are about to change places,—the fish are coming to dwell on dry land, and mankind going to inhabit the sea,—when you, Spartans, propose to subvert the popular governments, and to set up in the cities that wicked and bloody thing called a Despot.[307] First try what it is, for yourselves at Sparta, and then force it upon others if you can: you have not tasted its calamities as we have, and you take very good care to keep it away from yourselves. We adjure you, by the

common gods of Hellas,—plant not despots in her cities: if you persist in a scheme so wicked, know that the Corinthians will not second you."

This animated appeal was received with a shout of approbation and sympathy on the part of the allies. All with one accord united with Sosiklês in adjuring the Lacedæmonians[308] "not to revolutionize any Hellenic city." No one listened to Hippias when he replied, warning the Corinthians that the time would come, when they, more than any one else, would dread and abhor the Athenian democracy, and wish the Peisistratidæ back again. He knew well, says Herodotus, that this would be, for he was better acquainted with the prophecies than any man. But no one then believed him, and he was forced to take his departure back to Sigeium: the Spartans not venturing to espouse his cause against the determined sentiment of the allies. [309]

That determined sentiment deserves notice, because it marks the present period of the Hellenic mind: fifty years later it will be found materially altered. Aversion to single-headed rule, and bitter recollection of men like Kypselus and Periander, are now the chords which thrill in an assembly of Grecian deputies: the idea of a revolution, implying thereby a great and comprehensive change, of which the party using the word disapproves, consists in substituting a permanent One in place of those periodical magistrates and assemblies which were the common attribute of oligarchy and democracy: the antithesis between these last two is as yet in the background, nor does there prevail either fear of Athens or hatred of the Athenian democracy. But when we turn to the period immediately before the Peloponnesian war, we find the order of precedence between these two sentiments reversed. The anti-monarchical feeling has not perished, but has been overlaid by other and more recent political antipathies,—the antithesis between democracy and oligarchy having become, not indeed the only sentiment, but the uppermost sentiment, in the minds of Grecian politicians generally, and the soul of active party-movement. Moreover, a hatred of the most deadly character has grown up against Athens and her democracy, especially in the grandsons of those very Corinthians who now stand forward as her sympathizing friends. The remarkable change of feeling here mentioned is nowhere so strikingly exhibited as when we contrast the address of the Corinthian Sosiklês, just narrated, with the speech of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta, immediately antecedent to the Peloponnesian war, as given to us in Thucydidês.[310] It will hereafter be fully explained by the intermediate events, by the growth of Athenian power, and by the still more miraculous development of Athenian energy.

Such development, the fruit of the fresh-planted democracy as well as the seed for its sustentation and aggrandizement, continued progressive during the whole period just adverted to. But the first unexpected burst of it, under the Kleisthenean constitution, and after the expulsion of Hippias, is described by Herodotus in terms too emphatic to be omitted. After narrating the successive victories of the Athenians over both Bœotians and Chalkidians, that historian proceeds: "Thus did the Atheni-

ans grow in strength. And we may find proof, not merely in this instance but everywhere else, how valuable a thing freedom is: since even the Athenians, while under a despot, were not superior in war to any of their surrounding neighbors, but, so soon as they got rid of their despots, became by far the first of all. These things show that while kept down by one man, they were slack and timid, like men working for a master; but when they were liberated, every single man became eager in exertions for his own benefit." The same comparison reappears a short time afterwards, where he tells us, that "the Athenians when free, felt themselves a match for Sparta; but while kept down by any man under a despotism, were feeble and apt for submission."[311]

Stronger expressions cannot be found to depict the rapid improvement wrought in the Athenian people by their new democracy. Of course this did not arise merely from suspension of previous cruelties, or better laws, or better administration. These, indeed, were essential conditions, but the active transforming cause here was, the principle and system of which such amendments formed the detail: the grand and new idea of the sovereign People, composed of free and equal citizens,—or liberty and equality, to use words which so profoundly moved the French nation half a century ago. It was this comprehensive political idea which acted with electric effect upon the Athenians, creating within them a host of sentiments, motives, sympathies, and capacities, to which they had before been strangers. Democracy in Grecian antiquity possessed the privilege, not only of kindling an earnest and unanimous attachment to the constitution in the bosoms of the citizens, but also of creating an energy of public and private action, such as could never be obtained under an oligarchy, where the utmost that could be hoped for was a passive acquiescence and obedience. Mr. Burke has remarked that the mass of the people are generally very indifferent about theories of government; but such indifference—although improvements in the practical working of all governments tend to foster it—is hardly to be expected among any people who exhibit decided mental activity and spirit on other matters; and the reverse was unquestionably true, in the year 500 B. C., among the communities of ancient Greece. Theories of government were there anything but a dead letter: they were connected with emotions of the strongest as well as of the most opposite character. The theory of a permanent ruling One, for example, was universally odious: that of a ruling Few, though acquiesced in, was never positively attractive, unless either where it was associated with the maintenance of peculiar education and habits, as at Sparta, or where it presented itself as the only antithesis to democracy, the latter having by peculiar circumstances become an object of terror. But the theory of democracy was preëminently seductive; creating in the mass of the citizens an intense positive attachment, and disposing them to voluntary action and suffering on its behalf, such as no coercion on the part of other governments could extort. Herodotus,[312] in his comparison of the three sorts of government, puts in the front rank of the advantages of democracy, "its most splendid name and promise,"—its power of enlisting the hearts of the citizens in support of their constitution,

and of providing for all a common bond of union and fraternity. This is what even democracy did not always do: but it was what no other government in Greece *could* do: a reason alone sufficient to stamp it as the best government, and presenting the greatest chance of beneficent results, for a Grecian community. Among the Athenian citizens, certainly, it produced a strength and unanimity of positive political sentiment, such as has rarely been seen in the history of mankind, which excites our surprise and admiration the more when we compare it with the apathy which had preceded,—and which is even implied as the natural state of the public mind in Solon's famous proclamation against neutrality in a sedition.[313] Because democracy happens to be unpalatable to most modern readers, they have been accustomed to look upon the sentiment here described only in its least honorable manifestations,—in the caricatures of Aristophanês, or in the empty common-places of rhetorical declaimers. But it is not in this way that the force, the earnestness, or the binding value, of democratical sentiment at Athens is to be measured. We must listen to it as it comes from the lips of Periklês,[314] while he is strenuously enforcing upon the people those active duties for which it both implanted the stimulus and supplied the courage; or from the oligarchical Nikias in the harbor of Syracuse, when he is endeavoring to revive the courage of his despairing troops for one last death-struggle, and when he appeals to their democratical patriotism as to the only flame yet alive and burning even in that moment of agony.[315] From the time of Kleisthenês downward, the creation of this new mighty impulse makes an entire revolution in the Athenian character. And if the change still stood out in so prominent a manner before the eyes of Herodotus, much more must it have been felt by the contemporaries among whom it occurred.

The attachment of an Athenian citizen to his democratical constitution comprised two distinct veins of sentiment: first, his rights, protection, and advantages derived from it,—next, his obligations of exertion and sacrifice towards it and with reference to it. Neither of these two veins of sentiment was ever wholly absent; but according as the one or the other was present at different times in varying proportions, the patriotism of the citizen was a very different feeling. That which Herodotus remarks is, the extraordinary efforts of heart and hand which the Athenians suddenly displayed, —the efficacy of the active sentiment throughout the bulk of the citizens; and we shall observe even more memorable evidences of the same phenomenon in tracing down the history from Kleisthenês to the end of the Peloponnesian war: we shall trace a series of events and motives eminently calculated to stimulate that self-imposed labor and discipline which the early democracy had first called forth. But when we advance farther down, from the restoration of the democracy after the Thirty Tyrants to the time of Demosthenês,—I venture upon this brief anticipation, in the conviction that one period of Grecian history can only be thoroughly understood by contrasting it with another,—we shall find a sensible change in Athenian patriotism. The active sentiment of obligation is comparatively inoperative,—the citizen, it is true, has a keen sense of the value of the democracy as protecting him and insuring

to him valuable rights, and he is, moreover, willing to perform his ordinary sphere of legal duties towards it; but he looks upon it as a thing established, and capable of maintaining itself in a due measure of foreign ascendency, without any such personal efforts as those which his forefathers cheerfully imposed upon themselves. The orations of Demosthenês contain melancholy proofs of such altered tone of patriotism,—of that languor, paralysis, and waiting for others to act, which preceded the catastrophe of Chæroneia, notwithstanding an unabated attachment to the democracy as a source of protection and good government.[316] That same preternatural activity which the allies of Sparta, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, both denounced and admired in the Athenians, is noted by the orator as now belonging to their enemy Philip.

Such variations in the scale of national energy pervade history, modern as well as ancient, but in regard to Grecian history, especially, they can never be overlooked. For a certain measure, not only of positive political attachment, but also of active self-devotion, military readiness, and personal effort, was the indispensable condition of maintaining Hellenic autonomy, either in Athens or elsewhere; and became so more than ever when the Macedonians were once organized under an enterprising and semi-Hellenized prince. The democracy was the first creative cause of that astonishing personal and many-sided energy which marked the Athenian character, for a century downward from Kleisthenês. That the same ultra-Hellenic activity did not longer continue, is referable to other causes, which will be hereafter in part explained. No system of government, even supposing it to be very much better and more faultless than the Athenian democracy, can ever pretend to accomplish its legitimate end apart from the personal character of the people, or to supersede the necessity of individual virtue and vigor. During the half-century immediately preceding the battle of Chæroneia, the Athenians had lost that remarkable energy which distinguished them during the first century of their democracy, and had fallen much more nearly to a level with the other Greeks, in common with whom they were obliged to yield to the pressure of a foreign enemy. I here briefly notice their last period of languor, in contrast with the first burst of democratical fervor under Kleisthenês, now opening,—a feeling which will be found, as we proceed, to continue for a longer period than could have been reasonably anticipated, but which was too high-strung to become a perpetual and inherent attribute of any community.

CHAPTER XXXII.

RISE OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE. — CYRUS.

In the preceding chapter, I have followed the history of Central Greece very nearly down to the point at which the history of the Asiatic Greeks becomes blended with it, and after which the two streams begin to flow to a great degree in the same channel. I now revert to the affairs of the Asiatic Greeks, and of the Asiatic kings as connected with them, at the point in which they were left in my seventeenth chapter.

The concluding facts recounted in that chapter were of sad and serious moment to the Hellenic world. The Ionic and Æolic Greeks on the Asiatic coast had been conquered and made tributary by the Lydian king Crœsus: "down to that time (says Herodotus) all Greeks had been free." Their conqueror Crœsus, who ascended the throne in 560 B. C., appeared to be at the summit of human prosperity and power in his unassailable capital, and with his countless treasures at Sardis. His dominions comprised nearly the whole of Asia Minor, as far as the river Halys to the east; on the other side of that river began the Median monarchy under his brother-in-law Astyagês, extending eastward to some boundary which we cannot define, but comprising in a south-eastern direction Persis proper, or Farsistan, and separated from the Kissians and Assyrians on the west by the line of Mount Zagros—the present boundary-line between Persia and Turkey. Babylonia, with its wondrous city, between the Euphrates and the Tigris, was occupied by the Assyrians, or Chaldæans, under their king Labynêtus: a territory populous and fertile, partly by nature, partly by prodigies of labor, to a degree which makes us mistrust even an honest eye-witness who describes it afterwards in its decline,—but which was then in its most flourishing condition. The Chaldæan dominion under Labynêtus reached to the borders of Egypt, including, as dependent territories, both Judæa and Phenicia. In Egypt reigned the native king Amasis, powerful and affluent, sustained in his throne by a large body of Grecian mercenaries, and himself favorably disposed to Grecian commerce and settlement. Both with Labynêtus and with Amasis, Crœsus was on terms of alliance; and as Astyagês was his brother-in-law, the four kings might well be deemed out of the reach of calamity. Yet within the space of thirty years or a little more, the whole of their territories had become embodied in one vast empire, under the son of an adventurer as yet not known even by name.

The rise and fall of Oriental dynasties has been in all times distinguished by the same general features. A brave and adventurous prince, at the head of a population at once poor, warlike, and greedy, acquires dominion,—while his successors, abandoning themselves to sensuality and sloth, probably also to oppressive and irascible dispositions, become in process of time victims to those same qualities in a stranger which had enabled their own father to seize the throne. Cyrus, the great founder of

the Persian empire, first the subject and afterwards the dethroner of the Median Astyagês, corresponds to this general description, as far at least as we can pretend to know his history. For in truth, even the conquests of Cyrus, after he became ruler of Media, are very imperfectly known, whilst the facts which preceded his rise up to that sovereignty cannot be said to be known at all: we have to choose between different accounts at variance with each other, and of which the most complete and detailed is stamped with all the character of romance. The Cyropædia of Xenophon is memorable and interesting, considered with reference to the Greek mind, and as a philosophical novel:[317] that it should have been quoted so largely as authority on matters of history, is only one proof among many how easily authors have been satisfied as to the essentials of historical evidence. The narrative given by Herodotus of the relations between Cyrus and Astyagês, agreeing with Xenophon in little more than the fact that it makes Cyrus son of Kambysês and Mandanê, and grandson of Astyagês, goes even beyond the story of Romulus and Remus in respect to tragical incident and contrast. Astyagês, alarmed by a dream, condemns the new-born infant of his daughter Mandanê to be exposed: Harpagus, to whom the order is given, delivers the child to one of the royal herdsmen, who exposes it in the mountains, where it is miraculously suckled by a bitch.[318] Thus preserved, and afterwards brought up as the herdsman's child, Cyrus manifests great superiority both physical and mental, is chosen king in play by the boys of the village, and in this capacity severely chastises the son of one of the courtiers; for which offence he is carried before Astyagês, who recognizes him for his grandson, but is assured by the Magi that his dream is out, and that he has no farther danger to apprehend from the boy,—and therefore permits him to live. With Harpagus, however, Astyagês is extremely incensed, for not having executed his orders: he causes the son of Harpagus to be slain, and served up to be eaten by his unconscious father at a regal banquet. The father, apprized afterwards of the fact, dissembles his feelings, but conceives a deadly vengeance against Astyagês for this Thyestean meal. He persuades Cyrus, who has been sent back to his father and mother in Persia, to head a revolt of the Persians against the Medes; whilst Astyagês—to fill up the Grecian conception of madness as a precursor to ruin—sends an army against the revolters, commanded by Harpagus himself. Of course the army is defeated,—Astyagês, after a vain resistance, is dethroned,—Cyrus becomes king in his place,—and Harpagus repays the outrage which he has undergone by the bitterest insults.

Such are the heads of a beautiful narrative which is given at some length in Herodotus. It will probably appear to the reader sufficiently romantic, though the historian intimates that he had heard three other narratives different from it, and that all were more full of marvels, as well as in wider circulation, than his own, which he had borrowed from some unusually sober-minded Persian informants.[319] In what points the other three stories departed from it, we do not hear.

To the historian of Halikarnassus, we have to oppose the physician of the neighboring town Knidus,—Ktêsias, who contradicted Herodotus, not without strong terms of censure, on many points, and especially upon that which is the very foundation of the early narrative respecting Cyrus; for he affirmed that Cyrus was noway related to Astyagês.[320] However indignant we may be with Ktêsias, for the disparaging epithets which he presumed to apply to an historian whose work is to us inestimable,—we must nevertheless admit that as surgeon, in actual attendance on king Artaxerxês Mnêmon, and healer of the wound inflicted on that prince at Kunaxa by his brother Cyrus the younger,[321] he had better opportunities even than Herodotus of conversing with sober-minded Persians; and that the discrepancies between the two statements are to be taken as a proof of the prevalence of discordant, yet equally accredited, stories. Herodotus himself was in fact compelled to choose one out of four. So rare and late a plant is historical authenticity.

That Cyrus was the first Persian conqueror, and that the space which he overran covered no less than fifty degrees of longitude, from the coast of Asia Minor to the Oxus and the Indus, are facts quite indisputable; but of the steps by which this was achieved, we know very little. The native Persians, whom he conducted to an empire so immense, were an aggregate of seven agricultural and four nomadic tribes,—all of them rude, hardy, and brave,[322]—dwelling in a mountainous region, clothed in skins, ignorant of wine or fruit, or any of the commonest luxuries of life, and despising the very idea of purchase or sale. Their tribes were very unequal in point of dignity, probably also in respect to numbers and powers, among one another: first in estimation among them stood the Pasargadæ; and the first phratry, or clan, among the Pasargadæ were the Achæmenidæ, to whom Cyrus himself belonged. Whether his relationship to the Median king whom he dethroned was a matter of fact, or a politic fiction, we cannot well determine. But Xenophon, in noticing the spacious deserted cities, Larissa and Mespila,[323] which he saw in his march with the Ten Thousand Greeks on the eastern side of the Tigris, gives us to understand that the conquest of Media by the Persians was reported to him as having been an obstinate and protracted struggle. However this may be, the preponderance of the Persians was at last complete: though the Medes always continued to be the second nation in the empire, after the Persians, properly so called; and by early Greek writers the great enemy in the East is often called "the Mede,[324]" as well as "the Persian." Ekbatana always continued to be one of the capital cities, and the usual summer residence, of the kings of Persia; Susa on the Choaspês, on the Kissian plain farther southward, and east of the Tigris, being their winter abode.

The vast space of country comprised between the Indus on the east, the Oxus and Caspian sea to the north, the Persian gulf and Indian ocean to the south, and the line of Mount Zagros to the west, appears to have been occupied in these times by a great variety of different tribes and people, but all or most of them belonging to the religion of Zoroaster, and speaking dialects of the Zend language.[325] It was

known amongst its inhabitants by the common name of Iran, or Aria: it is, in its central parts at least, a high, cold plateau, totally destitute of wood and scantily supplied with water; much of it, indeed, is a salt and sandy desert, unsusceptible of culture. Parts of it are eminently fertile, where water can be procured and irrigation applied; and scattered masses of tolerably dense population thus grew up. But continuity of cultivation is not practicable, and in ancient times, as at present, a large proportion of the population of Iran seems to have consisted of wandering or nomadic tribes, with their tents and cattle. The rich pastures, and the freshness of the summer climate, in the region of mountain and valley near Ekbatana, are extolled by modern travellers, just as they attracted the Great King in ancient times, during the hot months. The more southerly province called Persis proper (Farsistan) consists also in part of mountain land interspersed with valley and plain, abundantly watered, and ample in pasture, sloping gradually down to low grounds on the sea-coast which are hot and dry. The care bestowed, both by Medes and Persians, on the breeding of their horses, was remarkable.[326] There were doubtless material differences between different parts of the population of this vast plateau of Iran. Yet it seems that, along with their common language and religion, they had also something of a common character, which contrasted with the Indian population east of the Indus, the Assyrians west of Mount Zagros, and the Massagetæ and other Nomads of the Caspian and the sea of Aral,—less brutish, restless, and bloodthirsty, than the latter, —more fierce, contemptuous, and extortionate, and less capable of sustained industry, than the two former. There can be little doubt, at the time of which we are now speaking, when the wealth and cultivation of Assyria were at their maximum, that Iran also was far better peopled than ever it has been since European observers have been able to survey it; especially the north-eastern portion, Baktria and Sogdiana: so that the invasions of the nomads from Turkestan and Tartary, which have been so destructive at various intervals since the Mohammedan conquest, were before that period successfully kept back.

The general analogy among the population of Iran probably enabled the Persian conqueror with comparative ease to extend his empire to the east, after the conquest of Ekbatana, and to become the full heir of the Median kings. And if we may believe Ktêsias, even the distant province of Baktria had been before subject to those kings: it at first resisted Cyrus, but finding that he had become son-in-law of Astyagês as well as master of his person, it speedily acknowledged his authority.[327]

According to the representation of Herodotus, the war between Cyrus and Crœsus of Lydia began shortly after the capture of Astyagês, and before the conquest of Baktria.[328] Crœsus was the assailant, wishing to avenge his brother-in-law, to arrest the growth of the Persian conqueror, and to increase his own dominions: his more prudent councillors in vain represented to him that he had little to gain, and much to lose, by war with a nation alike hardy and poor. He is represented, as just at that time recovering from the affliction arising out of the death of his son. To ask advice

of the oracle, before he took any final decision, was a step which no pious king would omit; but in the present perilous question, Crœsus did more,—he took a precaution so extreme, that, if his piety had not been placed beyond all doubt by his extraordinary munificence to the temples, he might have drawn upon himself the suspicion of a guilty skepticism.[329] Before he would send to ask advice respecting the project itself, he resolved to test the credit of some of the chief surrounding oracles,—Delphi, Dôdôna, Branchidæ near Milêtus, Amphiaraus at Thebes, Trophônius at Lebadeia, and Ammôn in Libya. His envoys started from Sardis on the same day, and were all directed on the hundredth day afterwards to ask at the respective oracles how Crœsus was at that precise moment employed. This was a severe trial: of the manner in which it was met by four out of the six oracles consulted, we have no information, and it rather appears that their answers were unsatisfactory. But Amphiaraus maintained his credit undiminished, and Apollo at Delphi, more omniscient than Apollo at Branchidæ, solved the question with such unerring precision, as to afford a strong additional argument against persons who might be disposed to scoff at divination. No sooner had the envoys put the question to the Delphian priestess, on the day named, "What is Crœsus now doing?" than she exclaimed, in the accustomed hexameter verse,[330] "I know the number of grains of sand, and the measures of the sea; I understand the dumb, and I hear the man who speaks not. The smell reaches me of a hard-skinned tortoise boiled in a copper with lamb's flesh,—copper above and copper below." Crœsus was awestruck on receiving this reply. It described with the utmost detail that which he had been really doing, insomuch that he accounted the Delphian oracle and that of Amphiaraus the only trustworthy oracles on earth,—following up these feelings with a holocaust of the most munificent character, in order to win the favor of the Delphian god. Three thousand cattle were offered up, and upon a vast sacrificial pile were placed the most splendid purple robes and tunics, together with couches and censers of gold and silver: besides which he sent to Delphi itself the richest presents in gold and silver,—ingots, statues, bowls, jugs, etc., the size and weight of which we read with astonishment; the more so as Herodotus himself saw them a century afterwards at Delphi.[331] Nor was Crœsus altogether unmindful of Amphiaraus, whose answer had been creditable, though less triumphant than that of the Pythian priestess. He sent to Amphiaraus a spear and shield of pure gold, which were afterwards seen at Thebes by Herodotus: this large donative may help the reader to conceive the immensity of those which he sent to Delphi.

The envoys who conveyed these gifts were instructed to ask, at the same time, whether Crœsus should undertake an expedition against the Persians,—and, if so, whether he should prevail on any allies to assist him. In regard to the second question, the answer both of Apollo and Amphiaraus was decisive, recommending him to invite the alliance of the most powerful Greeks. In regard to the first and most momentous question, their answer was as remarkable for circumspection as it had been before for detective sagacity: they told Crœsus that, if he invaded the Persians, he would subvert a mighty monarchy. The blindness of Crœsus interpreted this declara-

tion into an unqualified promise of success. He sent farther presents to the oracle, and again inquired whether his kingdom would be durable. "When a mule shall become king of the Medes (replied the priestess), then must thou run away,—be not ashamed."[332]

More assured than ever by such an answer, Crœsus sent to Sparta, under the kings Anaxandridês and Aristo, to tender presents and solicit their alliance.[333] His propositions were favorably entertained,—the more so, as he had before gratuitously furnished some gold to the Lacedæmonians, for a statue to Apollo. The alliance now formed was altogether general,—no express effort being as yet demanded from them, though it soon came to be. But the incident is to be noted, as marking the first plunge of the leading Grecian state into Asiatic politics; and that too without any of the generous Hellenic sympathy which afterwards induced Athens to send her citizens across the Ægean. Crœsus was the master and tribute-exactor of the Asiatic Greeks, and their contingents seem to have formed part of his army for the expedition now contemplated; which army consisted principally, not of native Lydians, but of foreigners.

The river Halys formed the boundary at this time between the Median and Lydian empires: and Crœsus, marching across that river into the territory of the Syrians or Assyrians of Kappadokia, took the city of Pteria and many of its surrounding dependencies, inflicting damage and destruction upon these distant subjects of Ekbatana. Cyrus lost no time in bringing an army to their defence considerably larger than that of Crœsus, and at the same time tried, though unsuccessfully, to prevail on the Ionians to revolt from him. A bloody battle took place between the two armies, but with indecisive result: and Crœsus, seeing that he could not hope to accomplish more with his forces as they stood, thought it wise to return to his capital, in order to collect a larger army for the next campaign. Immediately on reaching Sardis, he despatched envoys to Labynêtus king of Babylon; to Amasis king of Egypt; to the Lacedæmonians, and to other allies; calling upon all of them to send auxiliaries to Sardis during the course of the fifth coming month. In the mean time, he dismissed all the foreign troops who had followed him into Kappadokia.[334]

Had these allies appeared, the war might perhaps have been prosecuted with success; and on the part of the Lacedæmonians at least, there was no tardiness; for their ships were ready and their troops almost on board, when the unexpected news reached them that Crœsus was already ruined.[335] Cyrus had foreseen and forestalled the defensive plan of his enemy. He pushed on with his army to Sardis without delay, compelling the Lydian prince to give battle with his own unassisted subjects. The open and spacious plain before that town was highly favorable to the Lydian cavalry, which at that time, Herodotus tells us, was superior to the Persian. But Cyrus devised a stratagem whereby this cavalry was rendered unavailable,—placing in front of his line the baggage camels, which the Lydian horses could not endure either to smell or to behold.[336] The horsemen of Crœsus were thus obliged to dis-

mount; nevertheless, they fought bravely on foot, and were not driven into the town till after a sanguinary combat.

Though confined within the walls of his capital, Crœsus had still good reason for hoping to hold out until the arrival of his allies, to whom he sent pressing envoys of acceleration: for Sardis was considered impregnable,—one assault had already been repulsed, and the Persians would have been reduced to the slow process of blockade. But on the fourteenth day of the siege, accident did for the besiegers that which they could not have accomplished either by skill or force. Sardis was situated on an outlying peak of the northern side of Tmôlus; it was well-fortified everywhere except towards the mountain; and on that side, the rock, was so precipitous and inaccessible, that fortifications were thought unnecessary, nor did the inhabitants believe assault to be possible. But Hyrœades, a Persian soldier, having accidentally seen one of the garrison descending this precipitous rock to pick up his helmet, which had rolled down, watched his opportunity, tried to climb up, and found it not impracticable. Others followed his example, the strong-hold was thus seized first, and the whole city was speedily taken by storm.[337]

Cyrus had given especial orders to spare the life of Crœsus, who was accordingly made prisoner. But preparations were made for a solemn and terrible spectacle. The captive king was destined to be burnt in chains, together with fourteen Lydian youths, on a vast pile of wood: and we are even told that the pile was already kindled and the victim beyond the reach of human aid, when Apollo sent a miraculous rain to preserve him. As to the general fact of supernatural interposition, in one way or another, Herodotus and Ktêsias both agree, though they describe differently the particular miracles wrought.[338] It is certain that Crœsus, after some time, was released and well treated by his conqueror, and lived to become the confidential adviser of the latter as well as of his son Kambysês:[339] Ktêsias also acquaints us that a considerable town and territory near Ekbatana, called Barênê, was assigned to him, according to a practice which we shall find not unfrequent with the Persian kings.

The prudent counsel and remarks as to the relations between Persians and Lydians, whereby Crœsus is said by Herodotus to have first earned this favorable treatment, are hardly worth repeating; but the indignant remonstrance sent by Crœsus to the Delphian god is too characteristic to be passed over. He obtained permission from Cyrus to lay upon the holy pavement of the Delphian temple the chains with which he had at first been bound. The Lydian envoys were instructed, after exhibiting to the god these humiliating memorials, to ask whether it was his custom to deceive his benefactors, and whether he was not ashamed to have encouraged the king of Lydia in an enterprise so disastrous? The god, condescending to justify himself by the lips of the priestess, replied: "Not even a god can escape his destiny. Crœsus has suffered for the sin of his fifth ancestor (Gygês), who, conspiring with a woman, slew his master and wrongfully seized the sceptre. Apollo employed all his influence with the Mœræ (Fates) to obtain that this sin might be expiated by the chil-

dren of Crœsus, and not by Crœsus himself; but the Mœræ would grant nothing more than a postponement of the judgment for three years. Let Crœsus know that Apollo has thus procured for him a reign three years longer than his original destiny, [340] after having tried in vain to rescue him altogether. Moreover, he sent that rain which at the critical moment extinguished the burning pile. Nor has Crœsus any right to complain of the prophecy by which he was encouraged to enter on the war; for when the god told him, that he would subvert *a great empire*, it was his duty to have again inquired which empire the god meant; and if he neither understood the meaning, nor chose to ask for information, he has himself to blame for the result. Besides, Crœsus neglected the warning given to him, about the acquisition of the Median kingdom by a mule: Cyrus was that mule,—son of a Median mother of royal breed, by a Persian father, at once of different race and of lower position."

This triumphant justification extorted even from Crœsus himself a full confession, that the sin lay with him, and not with the god.[341] It certainly illustrates, in a remarkable manner, the theological ideas of the time; and it shows us how much, in the mind of Herodotus, the facts of the centuries preceding his own, unrecorded as they were by any contemporary authority, tended to cast themselves into a sort of religious drama; the threads of the historical web being in part put together, in part originally spun, for the purpose of setting forth the religious sentiment and doctrine woven in as a pattern. The Pythian priestess predicts to Gygês that the crime which he had committed in assassinating his master would be expiated by his fifth descendant, though, as Herodotus tells us, no one took any notice of this prophecy until it was at last fulfilled:[342] we see thus that the history of the first Mermnad king is made up after the catastrophe of the last. There was something in the main facts of the history of Crœsus profoundly striking to the Greek mind: a king at the summit of wealth and power,—pious in the extreme, and munificent towards the gods,—the first destroyer of Hellenic liberty in Asia,—then precipitated, at once and on a sudden, into the abyss of ruin. The sin of the first parent helped much towards the solution of this perplexing problem, as well as to exalt the credit of the oracle, when made to assume the shape of an unnoticed prophecy. In the affecting story (discussed in a former chapter[343]) of Solon and Crœsus, the Lydian king is punished with an acute domestic affliction, because he thought himself the happiest of mankind,—the gods not suffering anyone to be arrogant except themselves;[344] and the warning of Solon is made to recur to Crœsus after he has become the prisoner of Cyrus, in the narrative of Herodotus. To the same vein of thought belongs the story, just recounted, of the relations of Crœsus with the Delphian oracle. An account is provided, satisfactory to the religious feelings of the Greeks, how and why he was ruined,—but nothing less than the overruling and omnipotent Mœræ could be invoked to explain so stupendous a result.

It is rarely that these supreme goddesses, or hyper-goddesses—since the gods themselves must submit to them—are brought into such distinct light and action.

Usually, they are kept in the dark, or are left to be understood as the unseen stumbling-block in cases of extreme incomprehensibility; and it is difficult clearly to determine (as in the case of some complicated political constitutions) where the Greeks conceived sovereign power to reside, in respect to the government of the world. But here the sovereignty of the Mœræ, and the subordinate agency of the gods, are unequivocally set forth.[345] Yet the gods are still extremely powerful, because the Mœræ comply with their requests up to a certain point, not thinking it proper to be wholly inexorable; but their compliance is carried no farther than they themselves choose. Nor would they, even in deference to Apollo,[346] alter the original sentence of punishment for the sin of Gygês in the person of his fifth descendant,—a sentence, moreover, which Apollo himself had formally prophesied shortly after the sin was committed; so that, if the Mœræ had listened to his intercession on behalf of Crœsus, his own prophetic credit would have been endangered. Their unalterable resolution has predetermined the ruin of Crœsus, and the grandeur of the event is manifested by the circumstance, that even Apollo himself cannot prevail upon them to alter it, or to grant more than a three years' respite. The religious element must here be viewed as giving the form—the historical element as giving the matter only, and not the whole matter—of the story; and these two elements will be found conjoined more or less throughout most of the history of Herodotus, though, as we descend to later times, we shall find the historical element in constantly increasing proportion. His conception of history is extremely different from that of Thucydidês, who lays down to himself the true scheme and purpose of the historian, common to him with the philosopher,—to recount and interpret the past, as a rational aid towards the prevision of the future.[347]

The destruction of the Lydian monarchy, and the establishment of the Persians at Sardis—an event pregnant with consequences to Hellas generally—took place in 546 B. C.[348] Sorely did the Ionic Greeks now repent that they had rejected the propositions made to them by Cyrus for revolting from Crœsus,—though at the time when these propositions were made, it would have been highly imprudent to listen to them, since the Lydian power might reasonably be looked upon as the stronger. As soon as Sardis had fallen, they sent envoys to the conqueror, entreating that they might be enrolled as his tributaries, on the footing which they had occupied under Crœsus. The reply was a stern and angry refusal, with the exception of the Milesians, to whom the terms which they asked were granted:[349] why this favorable exception was extended to them, we do not know. The other continental Ionians and Æolians (exclusive of Milêtus, and exclusive also of the insular cities which the Persians had no means of attacking), seized with alarm, began to put themselves in a condition of defence: it seems that the Lydian king had caused their fortifications to be wholly or partially dismantled, for we are told that they now began to erect walls; and the Phôkæans especially devoted to that purpose a present which they had received from the Iberian Arganthônius, king of Tartêssus. Besides thus strengthening their own cities, they thought it advisable to send a joint embassy entreating aid from

Sparta; they doubtless were not unapprized that the Spartans had actually equipped an army for the support of Crœsus. Their deputies went to Sparta, where the Phôkæan Pythermus, appointed by the rest to be spokesman, clothing himself in a purple robe,[350] in order to attract the largest audience possible, set forth their pressing need of succor against the impending danger. The Lacedæmonians refused the prayer; nevertheless, they despatched to Phôkæa some commissioners to investigate the state of affairs,—who perhaps, persuaded by the Phôkæans, sent Lakrinês, one of their number, to the conqueror at Sardis, to warn him that he should not lay hands on any city of Hellas,—for the Lacedæmonians would not permit it. "Who are these Lacedæmonians? (inquired Cyrus from some Greeks who stood near him)—how many are there of them, that they venture to send me such a notice?" Having received the answer, wherein it was stated that the Lacedæmonians had a city and a regular market at Sparta, he exclaimed: "I have never yet been afraid of men like these, who have a set place in the middle of their city, where they meet to cheat one another and forswear themselves. If I live, they shall have troubles of their own to talk about, apart from the Ionians." To buy or sell, appeared to the Persians a contemptible practice; for they carried out consistently, one step farther, the principle upon which even many able Greeks condemned the lending of money on interest; and the speech of Cyrus was intended as a covert reproach of Grecian habits generally.[351]

This blank menace of Lakrinês, an insulting provocation to the enemy rather than a real support to the distressed, was the only benefit which the Ionic Greeks derived from Sparta. They were left to defend themselves as best they could against the conqueror; who presently, however, quitted Sardis to prosecute in person his conquests in the East, leaving the Persian Tabalus with a garrison in the citadel, but consigning both the large treasure captured, and the authority over the Lydian population, to the Lydian Paktyas. As he carried away Crœsus along with him, he probably considered himself sure of the fidelity of those Lydians whom the deposed monarch recommended. But he had not yet arrived at his own capital, when he received the intelligence that Paktyas had revolted, arming the Lydian population, and employing the treasure in his charge to hire fresh troops. On hearing this news, Cyrus addressed himself to Crœsus, according to Herodotus, in terms of much wrath against the Lydians, and even intimated that he should be compelled to sell them all as slaves. Upon which Crœsus, full of alarm for his people, contended strenuously that Paktyas alone was in fault, and deserving of punishment; but he at the same time advised Cyrus to disarm the Lydian population, and to enforce upon them effeminate attire, together with habits of playing on the harp and shopkeeping. "By this process (he said) you will soon see them become women instead of men."[352] This suggestion is said to have been accepted by Cyrus, and executed by his general Mazarês. The conversation here reported, and the deliberate plan for enervating the Lydian character supposed to be pursued by Cyrus, is evidently an hypothesis imagined by some of the contemporaries or predecessors of Herodotus,—to explain the contrast between the

Lydians whom they saw before them, after two or three generations of slavery, and the old irresistible horsemen of whom they heard in fame, at the time when Crœsus was lord from the Halys to the Ægean sea.

To return to Paktyas,—he had commenced his revolt, come down to the sea-coast, and employed the treasures of Sardis in levying a Grecian mercenary force, with which he invested the place and blocked up the governor Tabalus. But he manifested no courage worthy of so dangerous an enterprise; for no sooner had he heard that the Median general Mazarês was approaching at the head of an army dispatched by Cyrus against him, than he disbanded his force and fled to Kymê for protection as a suppliant. Presently, arrived a menacing summons from Mazarês, demanding that he should be given up forthwith, which plunged the Kymæans into profound dismay; for the idea of giving up a suppliant to destruction was shocking to Grecian sentiment. They sent to solicit advice from the holy temple of Apollo, at Branchidæ near Milêtus; and the reply directed, that Paktyas should be surrendered. Nevertheless, so ignominious did such a surrender appear, that Aristodikus and some other Kymæan citizens denounced the messengers as liars, and required that a more trustworthy deputation should be sent to consult the god. Aristodikus himself, forming one of the second body, stated the perplexity to the oracle, and received a repetition of the same answer; whereupon he proceeded to rob the birds'-nests which existed in abundance in and about the temple. A voice from the inner oracular chamber speedily arrested him, exclaiming: "Most impious of men, how darest thou to do such things? Wilt thou snatch my suppliants from the temple itself?" Unabashed by the rebuke, Aristodikus replied: "Master, thus dost *thou* help suppliants thyself: and dost thou command the Kymæans to give up a suppliant?" "Yes, I do command it[353] (rejoined the god forthwith), in order that the crime may bring destruction upon you the sooner, and that you may not in future come to consult the oracle upon the surrender of suppliants."

The ingenuity of Aristodikus completely nullified the oracular response, and left the Kymæans in their original perplexity. Not choosing to surrender Paktyas, nor daring to protect him against a besieging army, they sent him away to Mitylênê, whither the envoys of Mazarês followed and demanded him; offering a reward so considerable, that the Kymæans became fearful of trusting them, and again conveyed away the suppliant to Chios, where he took refuge in the temple of Athênê Poliuchus. But here again the pursuers followed, and the Chians were persuaded to drag him from the temple and surrender him, on consideration of receiving the territory of Atarneus (a district on the continent over against the island of Lesbos) as purchase-money. Paktyas was thus seized and sent prisoner to Cyrus, who had given the most express orders for this capture: hence the unusual intensity of the pursuit. But it appears that the territory of Atarneus was considered as having been ignominiously acquired by the Chians; none even of their own citizens would employ any article of its produce for holy or sacrificial purposes.[354]

Mazarês next proceeded to the attack and conquest of the Greeks on the coast; an enterprise which, since he soon died of illness, was completed by his successor Harpagus. The towns assailed successively made a gallant but ineffectual resistance: the Persian general by his numbers drove the defenders within their walls, against which he piled up mounds of earth, so as either to carry the place by storm or to compel surrender. All of them were reduced, one after the other: with all, the terms of subjection were doubtless harder than those which had been imposed upon them by Crœsus, because Cyrus had already refused to grant these terms to them, with the single exception of Milêtus, and because they had since given additional offence by aiding the revolt of Paktyas. The inhabitants of Priênê were sold into slavery: they were the first assailed by Mazarês, and had perhaps been especially forward in the attack made by Paktyas on Sardis.[355]

Among these unfortunate towns, thus changing their master and passing out into a harsher subjection, two deserve especial notice,—Teôs and Phôkæa. The citizens of the former, so soon as the mound around their walls had rendered farther resistance impossible, embarked and emigrated, some to Thrace, where they founded Abdêra, —others to the Cimmerian Bosphorus, where they planted Phanagoria; a portion of them, however, must have remained to take the chances of subjection, since the town appears in after-times still peopled and still Hellenic.[356]

The fate of Phôkæa, similar in the main, is given to us with more striking circumstances of detail, and becomes the more interesting, since the enterprising mariners who inhabited it had been the torch-bearers of Grecian geographical discovery in the west. I have already described their adventurous exploring voyages of former days into the interior of the Adriatic, and along the whole northern and western coasts of the Mediterranean as far as Tartêssus (the region around and adjoining to Cadiz),—together with the favorable reception given to them by old Arganthônius, king of the country, who invited them to emigrate in a body to his kingdom, offering them the choice of any site which they might desire. His invitation was declined, though probably the Phôkæans may have subsequently regretted the refusal; and he then manifested his good-will towards them by a large present to defray the expense of constructing fortifications round their town.[357] The walls, erected in part, by this aid, were both extensive and well built; yet they could not hinder Harpagus from raising his mounds of earth up against them, while he was politic enough at the same time to tempt them with offers of a moderate capitulation; requiring only that they should breach their walls in one place by pulling down one of the towers, and consecrate one building in the interior of the town as a token of subjection. To accept these terms, was to submit themselves to the discretion of the besieger, for there could be no security that they would be observed; and the Phôkæans, while they asked for one day to deliberate upon their reply, entreated that, during that day, Harpagus should withdraw his troops altogether from the walls. With this demand the latter complied, intimating, at the same time, that he saw clearly through the meaning of

it. The Phôkæans had determined that the inevitable servitude impending over their town should not be shared by its inhabitants, and they employed their day of grace in preparation for collective exile, putting on ship-board their wives and children as well as their furniture and the movable decorations of their temples. They then set sail for Chios, leaving to the conqueror a deserted town for the occupation of a Persian garrison.[358]

It appears that the fugitives were not very kindly received at Chios; at least, when they made a proposition for purchasing from the Chians the neighboring islands of Œnussæ as a permanent abode, the latter were induced to refuse by apprehensions of commercial rivalry. It was necessary to look farther for a settlement: and Arganthônius their protector, being now dead, Tartêssus was no longer inviting. Twenty years before, however, the colony of Alalia in the island of Corsica had been founded from Phôkæa by the direction of the oracle, and thither the general body of Phôkæans now resolved to repair. Having prepared their ships for this distant voyage, they first sailed back to Phôkæa, surprised the Persian garrison whom Harpagus had left in the town, and slew them: they then sunk in the harbor a great lump of iron, and bound themselves by a solemn and unanimous oath never again to see Phôkæa until that iron should come up to the surface. Nevertheless, in spite of the oath, the voyage of exile had been scarcely begun when more than half of them repented of having so bound themselves,—and became homesick.[359] They broke their vow and returned to Phôkæa. But as Herodotus does not mention any divine judgment as having been consequent on the perjury, we may, perhaps, suspect that some gray-headed citizen, to whom transportation to Corsica might be little less than a sentence of death, both persuaded himself, and certified to his companions, that he had seen the sunken lump of iron raised up and floating for a while buoyant upon the waves. Harpagus must have been induced to pardon the previous slaughter of his Persian garrison, or at least to believe that it had been done by those Phôkæans who still persisted in exile. He wanted tribute-paying subjects, not an empty military post, and the repentant home-seekers were allowed to number themselves among the slaves of the Great King.

Meanwhile the smaller but more resolute half of the Phôkæans executed their voyage to Alalia in Corsica, with their wives and children, in sixty pentekontêrs, or armed ships, and established themselves along with the previous settlers. They remained there for five years,[360] during which time their indiscriminate piracies had become so intolerable (even at that time, piracy committed against a foreign vessel seems to have been both frequent and practised without much disrepute), that both the Tyrrhenian seaports along the Mediterranean coast of Italy, and the Carthaginians, united to put them down. There subsisted particular treaties between these two, for the regulation of the commercial intercourse between Africa and Italy, of which the ancient treaty preserved by Polybius between Rome and Carthage (made in 509 B. C.) may be considered as a specimen.[361] Sixty Carthaginian and as many Tuscan

ships attacked the sixty Phôkæan ships near Alalia, and destroyed forty of them, yet not without such severe loss to themselves that the victory was said to be on the side of the latter; who, however, in spite of this Kadmeian victory (so a battle was denominated in which the victors lost more than the vanquished), were compelled to carry back their remaining twenty vessels to Alalia, and to retire with their wives and families, in so far as room could be found for them, to Rhegium. At last, these unhappy exiles found a permanent home by establishing the new settlement of Elea, or Velia, in the gulf of Policastro, on the Italian coast (then called Œnôtrian) southward from Poseidônia, or Pæstum. It is probable that they were here joined by other exiles from Ionia, in particular by the Kolophonian philosopher and poet Xenophanês, from whom what was afterwards called the Eleatic school of philosophy, distinguished both for bold consistency and dialectic acuteness, took its rise. The Phôkæan captives, taken prisoners in the naval combat by Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians, were stoned to death; but a divine judgment overtook the Tyrrhenian town of Agylla, in consequence of this cruelty; and even in the time of Herodotus, a century afterwards, the Agyllæans were still expiating the sin by a periodical solemnity and agon, pursuant to the penalty which the Delphian oracle had imposed upon them.[362]

Such was the fate of the Phôkæan exiles, while their brethren at home remained as subjects of Harpagus, in common with all the other Ionic and Æolic Greeks except Milêtus. For even the insular inhabitants of Lesbos and Chios, though not assailable by sea, since the Persians had no fleet, thought it better to renounce their independence and enrol themselves as Persian subjects,—both of them possessing strips of the mainland which they were unable to protect otherwise. Samos, on the other hand, maintained its independence, and even reached, shortly after this period, under the despotism of Polykratês, a higher degree of power than ever. Perhaps the humiliation of the other maritime Greeks around may have rather favored the ambition of this unscrupulous prince, to whom I shall revert presently. But we may readily conceive that the public solemnities in which the Ionic Greeks intermingled, in place of those gay and richly-decked crowds which the Homeric hymn describes in the preceding century as assembled at Delos, presented scenes of marked despondency: one of their wisest men, indeed, Bias of Priênê, went so far as to propose, at the Pan-Ionic festival, a collective emigration of the entire population of the Ionic towns to the island of Sardinia. Nothing like freedom, he urged, was now open to them in Asia; but in Sardinia, one great Pan-Ionic city might be formed, which would not only be free herself, but mistress of her neighbors. The proposition found no favor; the reason of which is sufficiently evident from the narrative just given respecting the unconquerable local attachment on the part of the Phôkæan majority. But Herodotus bestows upon it the most unqualified commendation, and regrets that it was not acted upon.[363] Had such been the case, the subsequent history of Carthage, Sicily, and even Rome, might have been sensibly altered.

Thus subdued by Harpagus, the Ionic and Æolic Greeks were employed as auxiliaries to him in the conquest of the south-western inhabitants of Asia Minor,—Karians, Kaunians, Lykians, and Doric Greeks of Knidus and Halikarnassus. Of the fate of the latter town, Herodotus tells us nothing, though it was his native place. The inhabitants of Knidus, a place situated on a long outlying tongue of land, at first tried to cut through the narrow isthmus which joined them to the continent, but abandoned the attempt with a facility which Herodotus explains by referring it to a prohibition of the oracle:[364] nor did either the Karians or the Kaunians offer any serious resistance. The Lykians only, in their chief town Xanthus, made a desperate defence. Having in vain tried to repel the assailants in the open field, and finding themselves blocked up in their city, they set fire to it with their own hands; consuming in the flames their women, children, and servants, while the armed citizens marched out and perished to a man in combat with the enemy.[365] Such an act of brave and even ferocious despair is not in the Grecian character. In recounting, however, the languid defence and easy submission of the Greeks of Knidus, it may surprise us to call to mind that they were Dorians and colonists from Sparta. So that the want of steadfast courage, often imputed to Ionic Greeks as compared to Dorian, ought properly to be charged on Asiatic Greeks as compared with European; or rather upon that mixture of indigenous with Hellenic population, which all the Asiatic colonies, in common with most of the other colonies, presented, and which in Halikarnassus was particularly remarkable; for it seems to have been half Karian, half Dorian, and was even governed by a line of Karian despots.

Harpagus and the Persians thus mastered, without any considerable resistance, the western and southern portions of Asia Minor; probably, also, though we have no direct account of it, the entire territory within the Halys which had before been ruled by Crœsus. The tributes of the conquered Greeks were transmitted to Ekbatana instead of to Sardis. While Harpagus was thus employed, Cyrus himself had been making still more extensive conquests in Upper Asia and Assyria, of which I shall speak in the coming chapter.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

GROWTH OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE.

In the preceding chapter an account has been given, the best which we can pick out from Herodotus, of the steps by which the Asiatic Greeks became subject to Persia. And if his narrative is meagre, on a matter which vitally concerned not only so many of his brother Greeks, but even his own native city, we can hardly expect that he should tell us much respecting the other conquests of Cyrus. He seems to withhold intentionally various details which had come to his knowledge, and merely intimates in general terms that while Harpagus was engaged on the coast of the Ægean, Cyrus himself assailed and subdued all the nations of Upper Asia, "not omitting any one of them."[366] He alludes to the Baktrians and the Sakæ,[367] who are also named by Ktêsias as having become subject partly by force, partly by capitulation; but he deems only two of the exploits of Cyrus worthy of special notice,—the conquest of Babylon, and the final expedition against the Massagetæ. In the short abstract which we now possess of the lost work of Ktêsias, no mention appears of the important conquest of Babylon; but his narrative, as far as the abstract enables us to follow it, diverges materially from that of Herodotus, and must have been founded on data altogether different.

"I shall mention (says Herodotus)[368] those conquests which gave Cyrus most trouble, and are most memorable: after he had subdued all the rest of the continent, he attacked the Assyrians." Those who recollect the description of Babylon and its surrounding territory, as given in a former chapter, will not be surprised to learn that the capture of it gave the Persian aggressor much trouble: their only surprise will be, how it could ever have been taken at all,—or, indeed, how a hostile army could have even reached it. Herodotus informs us that the Babylonian queen Nitôkris—mother of that very Labynêtus who was king when Cyrus attacked the place—had been apprehensive of invasion from the Medes after their capture of Nineveh, and had executed many laborious works near the Euphratês for the purpose of obstructing their approach. Moreover, there existed what was called the wall of Media (probably built by her, but certainly built prior to the Persian conquest), one hundred feet high and twenty feet thick,[369] across the entire space of seventy-five miles which joined the Tigris with one of the canals of the Euphratês. And the canals themselves, as we may see by the march of the Ten Thousand Greeks after the battle of Kunaxa, presented means of defence altogether insuperable by a rude army such as that of the Persians. On the east, the territory of Babylonia was defended by the Tigris, which cannot be forded lower than the ancient Nineveh or the modern Mosul.[370] In addition to these ramparts, natural as well as artificial, to protect the territory,—populous, cultivated, productive, and offering every motive to its inhabitants to resist even

the entrance of an enemy,—we are told that the Babylonians were so thoroughly prepared for the inroad of Cyrus that they had accumulated a store of provisions within the city walls for many years.

Strange as it may seem, we must suppose that the king of Babylon, after all the cost and labor spent in providing defences for the territory, voluntarily neglected to avail himself of them, suffered the invader to tread down the fertile Babylonia without resistance, and merely drew out the citizens to oppose him when he arrived under the walls of the city,—if the statement of Herodotus is correct.[371] And we may illustrate this unaccountable omission by that which we know to have happened in the march of the younger Cyrus to Kunaxa against his brother Artaxerxês Mnêmon. The latter had caused to be dug, expressly in preparation for this invasion, a broad and deep ditch, thirty feet wide and eight feet deep, from the wall of Media to the river Euphratês, a distance of twelve parasangs, or forty-live English miles, leaving only a passage of twenty feet broad close alongside of the river. Yet when the invading army arrived at this important pass, they found not a man there to defend it, and all of them marched without resistance through the narrow inlet. Cyrus the younger, who had up to that moment felt assured that his brother would fight, now supposed that he had given up the idea of defending Babylon:[372] instead of which, two days afterwards, Artaxerxês attacked him on an open plain of ground, where there was no advantage of position on either side; though the invaders were taken rather unawares in consequence of their extreme confidence, arising from recent unopposed entrance within the artificial ditch.

This anecdote is the more valuable as an illustration, because all its circumstances are transmitted to us by a discerning eye-witness. And both the two incidents here brought into comparison demonstrate the recklessness, changefulness, and incapacity of calculation, belonging to the Asiatic mind of that day,—as well as the great command of hands possessed by these kings, and their prodigal waste of human labor.[373] We shall see, as we advance in this history, farther evidences of the same attributes, which it is essential to bear in mind, for the purpose of appreciating both Grecian dealing with Asiatics, and the comparative absence of such defects in the Grecian character. Vast walls and deep ditches are an inestimable aid to a brave and well commanded garrison; but they cannot be made entirely to supply the want of bravery and intelligence.

In whatever manner the difficulties of approaching Babylon may have been overcome, the fact that they were overcome by Cyrus is certain. On first setting out for this conquest, he was about to cross the river Gyndês (one of the affluents from the East which joins the Tigris near the modern Bagdad, and along which lay the high road crossing the pass of Mount Zagros from Babylon to Ekbatana), when one of the sacred white horses, which accompanied him, insulted the river[374] so far as to march in and try to cross it by himself. The Gyndês resented this insult, and the horse was drowned: upon which Cyrus swore in his wrath that he would so break the

strength of the river as that women in future should pass it without wetting their knees. Accordingly, he employed his entire army, during the whole summer season, in digging three hundred and sixty artificial channels to disseminate the unity of the stream. Such, according to Herodotus, was the incident which postponed for one year the fall of the great Babylon; but in the next spring Cyrus and his army were before the walls, after having defeated and driven in the population who came out to fight. But the walls were artificial mountains (three hundred feet high, seventy-five feet thick, and forming a square of fifteen miles to each side), within which the besieged defied attack, and even blockade, having previously stored up several years' provision. Through the midst of these walls, however, flowed the Euphratês; and this river, which had been so laboriously trained to serve for protection, trade, and sustenance to the Babylonians, was now made the avenue of their ruin. Having left a detachment of his army at the two points where the Euphratês enters and quits the city, Cyrus retired with the remainder to the higher part of its course, where an ancient Babylonian queen had prepared one of the great lateral reservoirs for carrying off in case of need the superfluity of its water. Near this point Cyrus caused another reservoir and another canal of communication to be dug, by means of which he drew off the water of the Euphrates to such a decree that it became not above the height of a man's thigh. The period chosen was that of a great Babylonian festival, when the whole population were engaged in amusement and revelry; and the Persian troops left near the town, watching their opportunity, entered from both sides along the bed of the river, and took it by surprise with scarcely any resistance. At no other time, except during a festival, could they have done this, says Herodotus, had the river been ever so low; for both banks throughout the whole length of the town were provided with quays, with continuous walls, and with gates at the end of every street which led down to the river at right angles: so that if the population had not been disqualified by the influences of the moment, they would have caught the assailants in the bed of the river "as a trap," and overwhelmed them from the walls alongside. Within a square of fifteen miles to each side, we are not surprised to hear that both the extremities were already in the power of the besiegers before the central population heard of it, and while they were yet absorbed in unconscious festivity.[375]

Such is the account given by Herodotus of the circumstances which placed Babylon—the greatest city of western Asia—in the power of the Persians. To what extent the information communicated to him was incorrect, or exaggerated, we cannot now decide; but the way in which the city was treated would lead us to suppose that its acquisition cannot have cost the conqueror either much time or much loss. Cyrus comes into the list as king of Babylon, and the inhabitants with their whole territory become tributary to the Persians, forming the richest satrapy in the empire; but we do not hear that the people were otherwise ill-used, and it is certain that the vast walls and gates were left untouched. This was very different from the way in which the Medes had treated Nineveh, which seems to have been ruined and for a long time absolutely uninhabited, though reoccupied on a reduced scale under the

Parthian empire; and very different also from the way in which Babylon itself was treated twenty years afterwards by Darius, when reconquered after a revolt.

The importance of Babylon, marking as it does one of the peculiar forms of civilization belonging to the ancient world in a state of full development, gives an interest even to the half-authenticated stories respecting its capture; but the other exploits ascribed to Cyrus,—his invasion of India, across the desert of Arachosia,[376]—and his attack upon the Massagetæ, nomads ruled by queen Tomyris, and greatly resembling the Scythians, across the mysterious river which Herodotus calls Araxês,—are too little known to be at all dwelt upon. In the latter he is said to have perished, his army being defeated in a bloody battle.[377] He was buried at Pasargadæ, in his native province of Persis proper, where his tomb was honored and watched until the breaking up of the empire,[378] while his memory was held in profound veneration among the Persians.

Of his real exploits, we know little except their results; but in what we read respecting him there seems, though amidst constant fighting, very little cruelty. Xenophon has selected his life as the subject of a moral romance, which for a long time was cited as authentic history, and which even now serves as an authority, expressed or implied, for disputable and even incorrect conclusions. His extraordinary activity and conquests admit of no doubt. He left the Persian empire[379] extending from Sogdiana and the rivers Jaxartês and Indus eastward, to the Hellespont and the Syrian coast westward, and his successors made no permanent addition to it except that of Egypt. Phenicia and Judæa were dependencies of Babylon, at the time when he conquered it, with their princes and grandees in Babylonian captivity. They seem to have yielded to him, and become his tributaries,[380] without difficulty; and the restoration of their captives was conceded to them. It was from Cyrus that the habits of the Persian kings took commencement, to dwell at Susa in the winter, and Ekbatana during the summer; the primitive territory of Persis, with its two towns of Persepolis and Pasargadæ, being reserved for the burial-place of the kings and the religious sanctuary of the empire. How or when the conquest of Susiana was made, we are not informed; it lay eastward of the Tigris, between Babylonia and Persis proper, and its people, the Kissians, as far as we can discern, were of Assyrian and not of Arian race. The river Choaspês, near Susa, was supposed to furnish the only water fit for the palate of the Great King, and is said to have been carried about with him wherever he went.[381]

While the conquests of Cyrus contributed to assimilate the distinct types of civilization in western Asia,—not by elevating the worse, but by degrading the better,—upon the native Persians themselves they operated as an extraordinary stimulus, provoking alike their pride, ambition, cupidity, and warlike propensities. Not only did the territory of Persis proper pay no tribute to Susa or Ekbatana,—being the only district so exempted between the Jaxartês and the Mediterranean,—but the vast tributes received from the remaining empire were distributed to a great degree among its in-

habitants. Empire to them meant,—for the great men, lucrative satrapies, or pachalics, with powers altogether unlimited, pomp inferior only to that of the Great King, and standing armies which they employed at their own discretion, sometimes against each other,[382]—for the common soldiers, drawn from their fields or flocks, constant plunder, abundant maintenance, and an unrestrained license, either in the suite of one of the satraps, or in the large permanent troop which moved from Susa to Ekbatana with the Great King. And if the entire population of Persis proper did not migrate from their abodes to occupy some of those more inviting spots which the immensity of the imperial dominion furnished,—a dominion extending (to use the language of Cyrus the younger, before the battle of Kunaxa)[383] from the region of insupportable heat to that of insupportable cold,—this was only because the early kings discouraged such a movement, in order that the nation might maintain its military hardihood,[384] and be in a situation to furnish undiminished supplies of soldiers.

The self-esteem and arrogance of the Persians was no less remarkable than their avidity for sensual enjoyment. They were fond of wine to excess; their wives and their concubines were both numerous; and they adopted eagerly from foreign nations new fashions of luxury as well as of ornament. Even to novelties in religion, they were not strongly averse; for though they were disciples of Zoroaster, with magi as their priests, and as indispensable companions of their sacrifices, worshipping Sun, Moon, Earth, Fire, etc., and recognizing neither image, temple, nor altar,—yet they had adopted the voluptuous worship of the goddess Mylitta from the Assyrians and Arabians. A numerous male offspring was the Persian's boast, and his warlike character and consciousness of force were displayed in the education of these youths, who were taught, from five years old to twenty, only three things,—to ride, to shoot with the bow, and to speak the truth.[385] To owe money, or even to buy and sell, was accounted among the Persians disgraceful,—a sentiment which they defended by saying, that both the one and the other imposed the necessity of telling falsehood. To exact tribute from subjects, to receive pay or presents from the king, and to give away without forethought whatever was not immediately wanted, was their mode of dealing with money. Industrious pursuits were left to the conquered, who were fortunate if by paying a fixed contribution, and sending a military contingent when required, they could purchase undisturbed immunity for their remaining concerns.[386] They could not thus purchase safety for the family hearth, since we find instances of noble Grecian maidens torn from their parents for the harem of the satrap.[387]

To a people of this character, whose conceptions of political society went no farther than personal obedience to a chief, a conqueror like Cyrus would communicate the strongest excitement and enthusiasm of which they were capable. He had found them slaves, and made them masters; he was the first and greatest of national benefactors,[388] as well as the most forward of leaders in the field; they followed him from one conquest to another, during the thirty years of his reign, their love of

empire growing with the empire itself. And this impulse of aggrandizement continued unabated during the reigns of his three next successors,—Kambysês, Darius, and Xerxês,—until it was at length violently stifled by the humiliating defeats of Platæa and Salamis; after which the Persians became content with defending themselves at home, and playing a secondary game. But at the time when Kambysês son of Cyrus succeeded to his father's sceptre, Persian spirit was at its highest point, and he was not long in fixing upon a prey both richer and less hazardous than the Massagetæ, at the opposite extremity of the empire. Phenicia and Judæa being already subject to him, he resolved to invade Egypt, then highly flourishing under the long and prosperous reign of Amasis. Not much pretence was needed to color the aggression, and the various stories which Herodotus mentions as causes of the war, are only interesting inasmuch as they imply a vein of Egyptian party feeling,—affirming that the invasion was brought upon Amasis by a daughter of Apriês, and was thus a judgment upon him for having deposed the latter. As to the manner in which she had produced this effect, indeed, the most contradictory stories were circulated.[389]

Kambysês summoned the forces of his empire for this new enterprise, and among them both the Phenicians and the Asiatic Greeks, Æolic as well as Ionic,[390] insular as well as continental,—nearly all the maritime force and skill of the Ægean sea. He was apprized by a Greek deserter from the mercenaries in Egypt, named Phanês, of the difficulties of the march, and the best method of surmounting them; especially the three days of sandy desert, altogether without water, which lay between Egypt and Judæa. By the aid of the neighboring Arabians,—with whom he concluded a treaty, and who were requited for this service with the title of equal allies, free from all tribute,—he was enabled to surmount this serious difficulty, and to reach Pelusium at the eastern mouth of the Nile, where the Ionian and Karian troops in the Egyptian service, as well as the Egyptian military, were assembled to oppose him.[391]

Fortunately for himself, the Egyptian king Amasis had died during the interval of the Persian preparations, a few months before the expedition took place,—after forty-four years of unabated prosperity. His death, at this critical moment, was probably the main cause of the easy conquest which followed; his son Psammenitus succeeding to his crown, but neither to his abilities nor his influence. The result of the invasion was foreshadowed, as usual, by a menacing prodigy,—rain falling at Thebes in Upper Egypt; and was brought about by a single victory, though bravely disputed, at Pelusium,—followed by the capture of Memphis, with the person of king Psammenitus, after a siege of some duration. Kambysês had sent forward a Mitylenæan ship to Memphis, with heralds to summon the city; but the Egyptians, in a paroxysm of fury, rushed out of the walls, destroyed the vessel, and tore the crew into pieces,—a savage proceeding, which drew upon them severe retribution after the capture. Psammenitus, after being at first treated with harshness and insult, was at length released, and even allowed to retain his regal dignity as a dependent of Persia. But be-

ing soon detected, or at least believed to be concerned, in raising revolt against the conquerors, he was put to death, and Egypt was placed under a satrap.[392]

There yet lay beyond Egypt territories for Kambysês to conquer,—though Kyrênê and Barka, the Greek colonies near the coast of Libya, placed themselves at once out of the reach of danger by sending to him tribute and submission at Memphis. He projected three new enterprises: one against Carthage, by sea; the other two, by land, against the Ethiopians, far to the southward up the course of the Nile, and against the oracle and oasis of Zeus Ammon, amidst the deserts of Libya. Towards Ethiopia he himself conducted his troops, but was compelled to bring them back without reaching it, since they were on the point of perishing with famine; while the division which he sent against the temple of Ammon is said to have been overwhelmed by a sand-storm in the desert. The expedition against Carthage was given up, for a reason which well deserves to be commemorated. The Phenicians, who formed the most efficient part of his navy, refused to serve against their kinsmen and colonists, pleading the sanctity of mutual oaths as well as the ties both of relationship and traffic.[393] Even the frantic Kambysês was compelled to accept, and perhaps to respect, this honorable refusal, which was not imitated by the Ionic Greeks when Darius and Xerxês demanded the aid of their ships against Athens,—we must add, however, that they were then in a situation much more exposed and helpless than that in which the Phenicians stood before Kambysês.

Among the sacred animals so numerous and so different throughout the various nomes of Egypt, the most venerated of all was the bull Apis. Yet such peculiar conditions were required by the Egyptian religion as to the birth, the age, and the marks of this animal, that, when he died, it was difficult to find a new calf properly qualified to succeed him. Much time was sometimes spent in the search, and when an unexceptionable successor was at last found, the demonstrations of joy in Memphis were extravagant and universal. At the moment when Kambysês returned to Memphis from his Ethiopian expedition, full of humiliation for the result, it so happened that a new Apis was just discovered; and as the population of the city gave vent to their usual festival pomp and delight, he construed it into an intentional insult towards his own recent misfortunes. In vain did the priests and magistrates explain to him the real cause of these popular manifestations; he persisted in his belief, punished some of them with death and others with stripes, and commanded every man seen in holiday attire to be slain. Furthermore,—to carry his outrage against Egyptian feeling to the uttermost pitch,—he sent for the newly-discovered Apis, and plunged his dagger into the side of the animal, who shortly afterwards died of the wound.[394]

After this brutal deed,—calculated to efface in the minds of the Egyptian priests the enormities of Cheops and Chephrên, and doubtless unparalleled in all the twenty-four thousand years of their anterior history,—Kambysês lost every spark of reason which yet remained to him, and the Egyptians found in this visitation a new proof of the avenging interference of their gods. Not only did he commit every variety of

studied outrage against the conquered people among whom he was tarrying, as well as their temples and their sepulchres,—but he also dealt his blows against his Persian friends and even his nearest blood-relations. Among these revolting atrocities, one of the greatest deserves peculiar notice, because the fate of the empire was afterwards materially affected by it. His younger brother Smerdis had accompanied him into Egypt, but had been sent back to Susa, because the king became jealous of the admiration which his personal strength and qualities called forth.[395] That jealousy was aggravated into alarm and hatred by a dream, portending dominion and conquest to Smerdis; so that the frantic Kambysês sent to Susa secretly a confidential Persian, Prexaspês, with express orders to get rid of his brother. Prexaspês fulfilled his commission effectively, burying the slain prince with his own hands,[396] and keeping the deed concealed from all except a few of the chiefs at the regal residence.

Among these few chiefs, however, there was one, the Median Patizeithês, belonging to the order of the Magi, who saw in it a convenient stepping-stone for his own personal ambition, and made use of it as a means of covertly supplanting the dynasty of the great Cyrus. Enjoying the full confidence of Kambysês, he had been left by that prince, on departing for Egypt, in the entire management of the palace and treasures, with extensive authority.[397] Moreover, he happened to have a brother extremely resembling in person the deceased Smerdis; and as the open and dangerous madness of Kambysês contributed to alienate from him the minds of the Persians, he resolved to proclaim this brother king in his room, as if it were the younger son of Cyrus succeeding to the disqualified elder. On one important point, the false Smerdis differed from the true. He had lost his ears, which Cyrus himself had caused to be cut off for an offence; but the personal resemblance, after all, was of little importance, since he was seldom or never allowed to show himself to the people.[398] Kambysês, having heard of this revolt in Syria on his return from Egypt, was mounting his horse in haste for the purpose of going to suppress it, when an accident from his sword put an end to his life. Herodotus tells us that, before his death, he summoned the Persians around him, confessed that he had been guilty of putting his brother to death, and apprized them that the reigning Smerdis was only a Median pretender,—conjuring them at the same time not to submit to the disgrace of being ruled by any other than a Persian and an Achæmenid. But if it be true that he ever made known the facts, no one believed him. For Prexaspês, on his part, was compelled by regard to his own safety, to deny that he had imbrued his hands in the blood of a son of Cyrus;[399] and thus the opportune death of Kambysês placed the false Smerdis without opposition at the head of the Persians, who all, or for the most part, believed themselves to be ruled by a genuine son of Cyrus. Kambysês had reigned for seven years and five months.

For seven months did Smerdis reign without opposition, seconded by his brother Patizeithês; and if he manifested his distrust of the haughty Persians around him, by

neither inviting them into his palace nor showing himself out of it, he at the same time studiously conciliated the favor of the subject provinces, by remission of tribute and of military service for three years.[400] Such a departure from the Persian principle of government was in itself sufficient to disgust the warlike and rapacious Achæmenids at Susa. But it seems that their suspicions as to his genuine character had never been entirely set at rest, and in the eighth month those suspicions were converted into certainty. According to what seems to have been the Persian usage, he had taken to himself the entire harem of his predecessor, among whose wives was numbered Phædymê, daughter of a distinguished Persian, named Otanês. At the instance of her father, Phædymê undertook the dangerous task of feeling the head of Smerdis while he slept, and thus detected the absence of ears.[401] Otanês, possessed of the decisive information, lost no time in concerting, with five other noble Achæmenids, means for ridding themselves of a king who was at once a Mede, a Magian, and a man without ears;[402] Darius, son of Hystaspês, the satrap of Persis proper, arriving just in time to join the conspiracy as the seventh. How these seven noblemen slew Smerdis in his palace at Susa,—how they subsequently debated among themselves whether they should establish in Persia a monarchy, an oligarchy, or a democracy,—how, after the first of the three had been resolved upon, it was determined that the future king, whichever he might be, should be bound to take his wives only from the families of the seven conspirators,—how Darius became king, from the circumstance of his horse being the first to neigh among those of the conspirators at a given spot, by the stratagem of the groom Œbarês,—how Otanês, standing aside beforehand from this lottery for the throne, reserved for himself as well as for his descendants perfect freedom and exemption from the rule of the future king, whichsoever might draw the prize,—all these incidents may be found recounted by Herodotus with his usual vivacity, but with no small addition of Hellenic ideas as well as of dramatic ornament.

It was thus that the upright tiara, the privileged head-dress of the Persian kings, [403] passed away from the lineage of Cyrus, yet without departing from the great phratry of the Achæmenidæ,—to which Darius and his father Hystaspês, as well as Cyrus, belonged. That important fact is unquestionable, and probably the acts ascribed to the seven conspirators are in the main true, apart from their discussions and intentions. But on this as well as on other occasions, we must guard ourselves against an illusion which the historical manner of Herodotus is apt to create. He presents to us with so much descriptive force the personal narrative,—individual action and speech, with all its accompanying hopes, fears, doubts, and passions,—that our attention is distracted from the political bearing of what is going on; which we are compelled often to gather up from hints in the speeches of performers, or from consequences afterwards indirectly noticed. When we put together all the incidental notices which he lets drop, it will be found that the change of sceptre from Smerdis to Darius was a far larger political event than his direct narrative would seem to announce. Smerdis represents preponderance to the Medes over the Persians, and

comparative degradation to the latter; who, by the installation of Darius, are again placed in the ascendent. The Medes and the Magians are in this case identical; for the Magians, though indispensable in the capacity of priests to the Persians, were essentially one of the seven Median tribes.[404] It thus appears that though Smerdis ruled as a son of the great Cyrus, yet he ruled by means of Medes and Magians, depriving the Persians of that supreme privilege and predominance to which they had become accustomed.[405] We see this by what followed immediately after the assassination of Smerdis and his brother in the palace. The seven conspirators, exhibiting the bloody heads of both these victims as an evidence of their deed, instigated the Persians in Susa to a general massacre of the Magians, many of whom were actually slain, and the rest only escaped by flight, concealment, or the hour of night. And the anniversary of this day was celebrated afterwards among the Persians by a solemnity and festival, called the Magophonia; no Magian being ever allowed on that day to appear in public.[406] The descendants of the Seven maintained a privileged name and rank,[407] even down to the extinction of the monarchy by Alexander the Great.

Furthermore, it appears that the authority of Darius was not readily acknowledged throughout the empire, and that an interval of confusion ensued before it became so.[408] The Medes actually revolted, and tried to maintain themselves by force against Darius, who however found means to subdue them: though, when he convoked his troops from the various provinces, he did not receive from the satraps universal obedience. The powerful Orœtês, especially, who had been appointed by Cyrus satrap of Lydia and Ionia, not only sent no troops to the aid of Darius against the Medes,[409] but even took advantage of the disturbed state of the government to put to death his private enemy Mitrobatês satrap of Phrygia, and appropriate that satrapy in addition to his own. Aryandês also, the satrap nominated by Kambysês in Egypt, comported himself as the equal of Darius rather than as his subject.[410] The subject provinces generally, to whom Smerdis had granted remission of tribute and military service for the space of three years, were grateful and attached to his memory, and noway pleased with the new dynasty; moreover, the revolt of the Babylonians, conceived a year or two before it was executed, took its rise from the feelings of this time.[411] But the renewal of the old conflict between the two principal sections of the empire, Medes and Persians, is doubtless the most important feature in this political revolution. The false Smerdis with his brother, both of them Medes and Magians, had revived the Median nationality to a state of supremacy over the Persian, recalling the memory of what it had been under Astyagês; while Darius,—a pure Persian, and not (like the mule Cyrus) half Mede and half Persian,—replaced the Persian nationality in its ascendent condition, though not without the necessity of suppressing by force a rebellion of the Medes.[412]

It has already been observed that the subjugation of the recusant Medes was not the only embarrassment of the first years of Darius. Orœtês, satrap of Phrygia, Lydia, and Ionia, ruling seemingly the entire western coast of Asia Minor,—possessing a

large military force and revenue, and surrounded by a body-guard of one thousand native Persians,—maintained a haughty independence. He secretly made away with couriers sent to summon him to Susa, and even wreaked his vengeance upon some of the principal Persians who had privately offended him. Darius, not thinking it prudent to attack him by open force, proposed to the chief Persians at Susa, the dangerous problem of destroying him by stratagem. Thirty among them volunteered to undertake it, and Bagæus, son of Artontês, to whom on drawing lots the task devolved, accomplished it by a manœuvre which might serve as a lesson to the Ottoman government, in its embarrassments with contumacious Pashas. Having proceeded to Sardis, furnished with many different royal ordinances, formally set forth and bearing the seal of Darius,—he was presented to Orœtês in audience, with the public secretary of the satrapy close at hand, and the Persian guards standing around. He presented his ordinances to be read aloud by the secretary, choosing first those which related to matters of no great importance; but when he saw that the guards listened with profound reverence, and that the king's name and seal imposed upon them irresistibly, he ventured upon the real purport of his perilous mission. An ordinance was handed to the secretary, and read by him aloud, as follows: "Persians, king Darius forbids you to serve any longer as guards to Orœtês." The obedient guards at once delivered up their spears, when Bagæus caused the final warrant to be read to them: "King Darius commands the Persians in Sardis to kill Orœtês." The guards drew their swords and killed him on the spot: his large treasure was conveyed to Susa: Darius became undisputed master, and probably Bagæus satrap.[413]

Another devoted adherent, and another yet more memorable piece of cunning, laid prostrate before Darius the mighty walls and gates of the revolted Babylon. The inhabitants of that city had employed themselves assiduously,—both during the lax provincial superintendence of the false Smerdis, and during the period of confusion and conflict which elapsed before Darius became firmly established and obeyed,—in making every preparation both for declaring and sustaining their independence. Having accumulated a large store of provisions and other requisites for a long siege, without previous detection, they at length proclaimed their independence openly. And such was the intensity of their resolution to maintain it, that they had recourse to a proceeding, which, if correctly reported by Herodotus, forms one of the most frightful enormities recorded in his history. To make their provisions last out longer, they strangled all the women in the city, reserving only their mothers, and one woman to each family for the purpose of baking.[414] We cannot but suppose that this has been magnified from a partial into an universal destruction. Yet taking it even with such allowance, it illustrates that ferocious force of will,—and that predominance of strong nationality, combined with antipathy to foreigners, over all the gentler sympathies,—which seems to mark the Semitic nations, and which may be traced so much in the Jewish history of Josephus.

Darius, assembling all the forces in his power, laid siege to the revolted city, but could make no impression upon it, either by force or by stratagem. He tried to repeat the proceeding by which Cyrus had taken it at first; but the besieged were found this time on their guard. The siege had lasted twenty months without the smallest progress, and the Babylonians derided the besiegers from the height of their impregnable walls, when a distinguished Persian nobleman Zopyrus,—son of Megabyzus, who had been one of the seven conspirators against Smerdis,—presented himself one day before Darius in a state of frightful mutilation: his nose and ears were cut off, and his body misused in every way. He had designedly so maimed himself, "thinking it intolerable that Assyrians should thus laugh the Persians to scorn,"[415] in the intention which he presently intimated to Darius, of passing into the town as a deserter, with a view of betraying it,—for which purpose measures were concerted. The Babylonians, seeing a Persian of the highest rank in so calamitous a condition, readily believed his assurance, that he had been thus punished by the king's order, and that he came over to them as the only means of procuring for himself single vengeance. They intrusted him with the command of a detachment, with which he gained several advantages in different sallies, according to previous concert with Darius, until at length, the confidence of the Babylonians becoming unbounded, they placed in his hands the care of the principal gates. At the critical moment these gates were thrown open, and the Persians became masters of the city.[416]

Thus was the impregnable Babylon a second time reduced,[417] and Darius took precautions on this occasion to put it out of condition for resisting a third time. He caused the walls and gates to be demolished, and three thousand of the principal citizens to be crucified: the remaining inhabitants were left in the dismantled city, fifty thousand women being levied by assessment upon the neighboring provinces, to supply the place of the women strangled when it first revolted.[418] Zopyrus was appointed satrap of the territory for life, with enjoyment of its entire revenues, receiving besides every additional reward which it was in the power of Darius to bestow, and generous assurances from the latter that he would rather have Zopyrus without wounds than the possession of Babylon. I have already intimated in a former chapter that the demolition of the walls here mentioned is not to be regarded as complete and continuous, nor was there any necessity that it should be so. Partial demolition would be quite sufficient to leave the city without defence; and the description given by Herodotus of the state of things as they stood at the time of his visit, proves that portions of the walls yet subsisted. One circumstance is yet to be added in reference to the subsequent condition of Babylon under the Persian empire. The city with the territory belonging to it constituted a satrapy, which not only paid a larger tribute (one thousand Euboic talents of silver) and contributed a much larger amount of provisions in kind for the maintenance of the Persian court, than any other among the twenty satrapies of the empire, but furnished besides an annual supply of five hundred eunuch youths.[419] We may presume that this was intended

in part as a punishment for the past revolt, since the like obligation was not imposed upon any other satrapy.

Thus firmly established on the throne, Darius occupied it for thirty-six years, and his reign was one of organization, different from that of his two predecessors; a difference which the Persians well understood and noted, calling Cyrus the father, Kambysês the master, and Darius the retail-trader, or huckster.[420] In the mouth of the Persians this latter epithet must be construed as no insignificant compliment, since it intimates that he was the first to introduce some methodical order into the imperial administration and finances. Under the two former kings there was no definite amount of tribute levied upon the subject provinces: which furnished what were called presents, subject to no fixed limit except such as might be satisfactory to the satrap in each district. But Darius—succeeding as he did to Smerdis, who had rendered himself popular with the provinces by large financial exemptions, and having farther to encounter jealousy and dissatisfaction from Persians, his former equals in rank—probably felt it expedient to relieve the provinces from the burden of undefined exactions. He distributed the whole empire into twenty departments, imposing upon each a fixed annual tax, and a fixed contribution for the maintenance of the court. This must doubtless have been a great improvement, though the limitation of the sum which the Great King at Susa would require, did not at all prevent the satrap in his own province from indefinite requisitions beyond it. The latter was a little king, who acted nearly as he pleased in the internal administration of his province,—subject only to the necessity of sending up the imperial tribute, of keeping off foreign enemies, and of furnishing an adequate military contingent for the foreign enterprises of the Great King. To every satrap was attached a royal secretary, or comptroller, of the revenue,[421] who probably managed the imperial finances in the province, and to whom the court of Susa might perhaps look as a watch upon the satrap himself. It is not to be supposed that the Persian authorities in any province meddled with the details of taxation, or contribution, as they bore upon individuals. The court having fixed the entire sum payable by the satrapy in the aggregate, the satrap or the secretary apportioned it among the various component districts, towns, or provinces, leaving to the local authorities in each of these latter the task of assessing it upon individual inhabitants. From necessity, therefore, as well as from indolence of temper and political incompetence, the Persians were compelled to respect authorities which they found standing both in town and country, and to leave in their hands a large measure of genuine influence; frequently overruled, indeed, by oppressive interference on the part of the satrap, whenever any of his passions prompted,—but never entirely superseded. In the important towns and stations, Persian garrisons were usually kept, and against the excesses of the military there was probably little or no protection to the subject people. Yet still, the provincial governments were allowed to continue, and often even the petty kings who had governed separate districts during their state of independence prior to the Persian conquest, retained their title and dignity as tributaries to the court of Susa.[422] The empire of the Great King

was thus an aggregate of heterogeneous elements, connected together by no tie except that of common fear and subjection,—noway coherent nor self-supporting, nor pervaded by any common system or spirit of nationality. It resembled, in its main political features, the Turkish and Persian empires of the present day,[423] though distinguished materially by the many differences arising out of Mohammedanism and Christianity, and apparently not reaching the same extreme of rapacity, corruption, and cruelty in detail.

Darius distributed the Persian empire into twenty satrapies, each including a certain continuous territory, and one or more nations inhabiting it, the names of which Herodotus sets forth. The amount of tribute payable by each satrapy was determined: payable in gold, according to the Euboic talent, by the Indians in the easternmost satrapy,—in silver, according to the Babylonian, or larger talent, by the remaining nineteen. Herodotus computes the ratio of gold to silver as 13 : 1. From the nineteen satrapies which paid in silver, there was levied annually the sum of seven thousand seven hundred and forty Babylonian talents, equal to something about two million nine hundred and sixty-four thousand pounds sterling: from the Indians, who alone paid in gold, there was received a sum equal (at the rate of 1 : 13) to four thousand six hundred and eighty Euboic talents of silver, or to about one million two hundred and ninety thousand pounds sterling.[424]

To explain how it happened that this one satrapy was charged with a sum equal to two-fifths of the aggregate charge on the other nineteen, Herodotus dwells upon the vast population, the extensive territory, and the abundant produce in gold, among those whom he calls Indians,—the easternmost inhabitants of the earth, since beyond them there was nothing but uninhabitable sand,—reaching, as far as we can make it out, from Baktria southward along the Indus to its mouth, but how far eastward we cannot determine. Darius is said to have undertaken an expedition against them and subdued them: moreover, he is affirmed to have constructed and despatched vessels down the Indus, from the city of Kaspatyri and the territory of the Paktyes, in its upper regions, all the way down to its mouth: then into the Indian ocean, round the peninsula of Arabia, and up the Red Sea to Egypt. The ships were commanded by Skylax,—a Greek of Karyanda on the south-western coast of Asia Minor;[425] who, if this statement be correct, executed a scheme of nautical enterprise not only one hundred and seventy years earlier, but also far more extensive, than the famous voyage of Nearchus, admiral of Alexander the Great,—since the latter only went from the Indus to the Persian gulf. The eastern portions of the Persian empire remained so unknown and unvisited until the Macedonian invasion, that we are unable to criticize these isolated statements of Herodotus. None of the Persian kings subsequent to Darius appear to have visited them, and whether the prodigious sum demandable from them according to the Persian rent-roll was ever regularly levied, may reasonably be doubted. At the same time, we may reasonably believe that the mountains in the northern parts of Persian India—Cabul and Little Thibet—were at

that time extremely productive in gold, and that quantities of that metal, such as now appear almost fabulous, may have been often obtained. It appears that the produce of gold in all parts of the earth, as far as hitherto known, is obtained exclusively near the surface; so that a country once rich in that metal may well have been exhausted of its whole supply, and left at a later period without any gold at all.

Of the nineteen silver-paying satrapies, the most heavily imposed was Babylonia, which paid one thousand talents: the next in amount of charge was Egypt, paying seven hundred talents, besides the produce of the fish from the lake of Mœris. The remaining satrapies varied in amount, down as low as one hundred and seventy talents, which was the sum charged on the seventh satrapy (in the enumeration of Herodotus), comprising the Sattagydæ, the Gandarii, the Dodikæ, and the Aparytæ. The Ionians, Æolians, Magnesians on the Mæander, and on Mount Sipylus, Karians, Lykians, Milyans, and Pamphylians,—including the coast of Asia Minor, southward of Kanê, and from thence round the southern promontory to Phasêlis,—were rated as one division, paying four hundred talents. But we may be sure that much more than this was really taken from the people, when we read that Magnesia alone afterwards paid to Themistoklês a revenue of fifty talents annually.[426] The Mysians and Lydians were included, with some others, in another division, and the Hellespontine Greeks in a third, with Phrygians, Bithynians, Paphlagonians, Mariandynians, and Syrians, paying three hundred and sixty talents,—nearly the same as was paid by Syria proper, Phenicia, and Judæa, with the island of Cyprus. Independent of this regular tribute, and the undefined sums extorted over and above it,[427] there were some dependent nations, which, though exempt from tribute, furnished occasional sums called presents; and farther contributions were exacted for the maintenance of the vast suite who always personally attended the king. One entire third of this last burden was borne by Babylonia alone in consequence of its exuberant fertility.[428] It was paid in produce, as indeed the peculiar productions of every part of the empire seem to have been sent up for the regal consumption.

However imperfectly we are now able to follow the geographical distribution of the subject nations as given by Herodotus, it is extremely valuable as the only professed statistics remaining, of the entire Persian empire. The arrangement of satrapies, which he describes, underwent modification in subsequent times; at least it does not harmonize with various statements in the Anabasis of Xenophon, and in other authors who recount Persian affairs belonging to the fourth century B. C. But we find in no other author except Herodotus any entire survey and distribution of the empire. It is, indeed, a new tendency which now manifests itself in the Persian Darius, compared with his predecessors: not simply to conquer, to extort, and to give away,—but to do all this with something like method and system,[429] and to define the obligations of the satraps towards Susa. Another remarkable example of the same tendency is to be found in the fact, that Darius was the first Persian king who coined money: his coin, both in gold and silver, the Daric, was the earliest produce of

a Persian mint.[430] The revenue, as brought to Susa in metallic money of various descriptions, was melted down separately, and poured in a fluid state into jars or earthenware vessels; when the metal had cooled and hardened, the jar was broken, leaving a standing solid mass, from which portions were cut off as the occasion required. [431] And in addition to these administrative, financial, and monetary arrangements, of which Darius was the first originator, we may probably ascribe to him the first introduction of that system of roads, resting-places, and permanent relays of couriers, which connected both Susa and Ekbatana with the distant portions of the empire. Herodotus describes in considerable detail the imperial road from Sardis to Susa, a journey of ninety days, crossing the Halys, the Euphratês, the Tigris, the Greater and Lesser Zab, the Gyndês, and the Choaspês. And we may see by this account that in his time it was kept in excellent order, with convenience for travellers.[432]

It was Darius also who first completed the conquest of the Ionic Greeks by the acquisition of the important island of Samos. That island had maintained its independence, at the time when the Persian general Harpagus effected the conquest of Ionia. It did not yield voluntarily when Chios and Lesbos submitted, and the Persians had no fleet to attack it; nor had the Phenicians yet been taught to round the Triopian cape. Indeed, the depression which overtook the other cities of Ionia, tended rather to the aggrandizement of Samos, under the energetic and unscrupulous despotism of Polykratês. That ambitious Samian, about ten years after the conquest of Sardis by Cyrus (seemingly between 536-532 B. C.), contrived to seize by force or fraud the government of his native island, with the aid of his brothers Pantagnôtus and Sylosôn, and a small band of conspirators.[433] At first, the three brothers shared the supreme power; but presently Polykratês put to death Pantagnôtus, banished Sylosôn, and made himself despot alone. In this station, his ambition, his perfidy, and his good fortune, were alike remarkable. He conquered several of the neighboring islands, and even some towns on the mainland; he carried on successful war against Milêtus; and signally defeated the Lesbian ships which came to assist Milêtus; he got together a force of one hundred armed ships called pentekonters, and one thousand mercenary bowmen,—aspiring to nothing less than the dominion of Ionia, with the islands in the Ægean. Alike terrible to friend and foe by his indiscriminate spirit of aggression, he acquired a naval power which seems at that time to have been the greatest in the Grecian world.[434] He had been in intimate alliance with Amasis, king of Egypt, who, however, ultimately broke with him. Considering his behavior towards allies, such rupture is not at all surprising; but Herodotus ascribes it to the alarm which Amasis conceived at the uninterrupted and superhuman good fortune of Polykratês,—a degree of good fortune sure to draw down ultimately corresponding intensity of suffering from the hands of the envious gods. Indeed, Herodotus,—deeply penetrated with this belief in an ever-present nemesis, which allows no man to be very happy, or long happy, with impunity,—throws it into the form of an epistolary warning from Amasis to Polykratês, advising him to inflict upon himself some seasonable mischief or suffering; in order, if possible, to avert the ultimate judgment,

—to let blood in time, so that the plethora of happiness might not end in apoplexy.[435] Pursuant to such counsel, Polykratês threw into the sea a favorite ring, of matchless price and beauty; but unfortunately, in a few days, the ring reappeared in the belly of a fine fish, which a fisherman had sent to him as a present. Amasis now foresaw that the final apoplexy was inevitable, and broke off the alliance with Polykratês without delay,—a well-known story, interesting as evidence of ancient belief, and not less to be noted as showing the power of that belief to beget fictitious details out of real characters, such as I have already touched upon in the history of Solon and Crœsus, and elsewhere.

The facts mentioned by Herodotus rather lead us to believe that it was Polykratês, who, with characteristic faithlessness, broke off his friendship with Amasis;[436] finding it suitable to his policy to cultivate the alliance of Kambysês, when that prince was preparing for his invasion of Egypt. In that invasion, the Ionic subjects of Persia were called upon to serve, and Polykratês, deeming it a good opportunity to rid himself of some Samian malcontents, sent to the Persian king to tender auxiliaries from himself. Kambysês, having eagerly caught at the prospect of aid from the first naval potentate in the Ægean, forty Samian triremes were sent to the Nile, having on board the suspected persons, as well as conveying a secret request to the Persian king that they might never be suffered to return. Either they never went to Egypt, however, or they found means to escape; very contradictory stories had reached Herodotus. But they certainly returned to Samos, attacked Polykratês at home, and were driven off by his superior force without making any impression. Whereupon they repaired to Sparta to entreat assistance.[437]

We may here notice the gradually increasing tendency in the Grecian world to recognize Sparta as something like a head, protector, or referee, in cases either of foreign danger or internal dispute. The earliest authentic instance known to us, of application to Sparta in this character, is that of Crœsus against Cyrus: next, that of the Ionic Greeks against the latter: the instance of the Samians now before us, is the third. The important events connected with, and consequent upon, the expulsion of the Peisistratidæ from Athens, manifesting yet more formally the headship of Sparta, occur fifteen years after the present event; they have been already recounted in a previous chapter, and serve as a farther proof of progress in the same direction. To watch the growth of these new political habits, is essential to a right understanding of Grecian history.

On reaching Sparta, the Samian exiles, borne down with despondency and suffering, entered at large into the particulars of their case. Their long speaking annoyed instead of moving the Spartans, who said, or are made to say: "We have forgotten the first part of the speech, and the last part is unintelligible to us." Upon which the Samians appeared the next day, simply with an empty wallet, saving: "Our wallet has no meal in it." "Your wallet is superfluous," (said the Spartans;) *i. e.* the words would have been sufficient without it.[438] The aid which they implored was granted.

We are told that both the Lacedæmonians and the Corinthians,—who joined them in the expedition now contemplated,—had separate grounds of quarrel with the Samians,[439] which operated as a more powerful motive than the simple desire to aid the suffering exiles. But it rather seems that the subsequent Greeks generally construed the Lacedæmonian interference against Polykratês as an example of standing Spartan hatred against despots. Indeed, the only facts which we know, to sustain this anti-despotic sentiment for which the Lacedæmonians had credit, are, their proceedings against Polykratês and Hippias; there may have been other analogous cases, but we cannot specify them with certainty. However this may be, a joint Lacedæmonian and Corinthian force accompanied the exiles back to Samos, and assailed Polykratês in the city. They did their best to capture it, for forty days, and were at one time on the point of succeeding, but were finally obliged to retire without any success. "The city would have been taken," says Herodotus, "if all the Lacedæmonians had acted like Archias and Lykôpas,"—who, pressing closely upon the retreating Samians, were shut within the town-gates, and perished. The historian had heard this exploit in personal conversation with Archias, grandson of the person above mentioned, in the deme Pitana at Sparta,—whose father had been named Samius, and who respected the Samians above any other Greeks, because they had bestowed upon the two brave warriors, slain within their town, an honorable and public funeral.[440] It is rarely that Herodotus thus specifies his informants: had he done so more frequently the value as well as the interest of his history would have been materially increased.

On the retirement of the Lacedæmonian force, the Samian exiles were left destitute; and looking out for some community to plunder, weak as well as rich, they pitched upon the island of Siphnos. The Siphnians of that day were the wealthiest islanders in the Ægean, from the productiveness of their gold and silver mines,—the produce of which was annually distributed among the citizens, reserving a tithe for the Delphian temple.[441] Their treasure-chamber was among the most richly furnished of which that holy place could boast, and they themselves, probably, in these times of early prosperity, were numbered among the most brilliant of the Ionic visitors at the Delian festival. The Samians landing at Siphnos, demanded a contribution, under the name of a loan, of ten talents: which being refused, they proceeded to ravage the island, inflicting upon the inhabitants a severe defeat, and ultimately extorting from them one hundred talents. They next purchased from the inhabitants of Hermionê, in the Argolic peninsula, the neighboring island of Hydrea, famous in modern Greek warfare. But it appears that their plans must have been subsequently changed, for, instead of occupying it, they placed it under the care of the Trœzenians, and repaired themselves to Krete, for the purpose of expelling the Zakynthian settlers at Kydônia. In this they succeeded, and were induced to establish themselves in that place. But after they had remained there five years, the Kretans obtained naval aid from Ægina, whereby the place was recovered, and the Samian intruders finally sold into slavery.[442]

Such was the melancholy end of the enemies of Polykratês: meanwhile, that despot himself was more powerful and prosperous than ever. Samos, under him, was "the first of all cities, Hellenic or barbaric:[443]" and the great works admired by Herodotus in the island,[444]—an aqueduct for the city, tunnelled through a mountain for the length of seven furlongs,—a mole to protect the harbor, two furlongs long and twenty fathoms deep, and the vast temple of Hêrê, may probably have been enlarged and completed, if not begun, by him. Aristotle quotes the public works of Polykratês as instances of the profound policy of despots, to occupy as well as to impoverish their subjects.[445] The earliest of all Grecian thalassokrats, or sea-kings,—master of the greatest naval force in the Ægean, as well as of many among its islands,—he displayed his love of letters by friendship to Anakreon, and his piety by consecrating to the Delian Apollo[446] the neighboring island of Rhêneia. But while thus outshining all his contemporaries, victorious over Sparta and Corinth, and projecting farther aggrandizement, he was precipitated on a sudden into the abyss of ruin;[447] and that too, as if to demonstrate unequivocally the agency of the envious gods, not from the revenge of any of his numerous victims, but from the gratuitous malice of a stranger whom he had never wronged and never even seen. The Persian satrap Orœtês, on the neighboring mainland, conceived an implacable hatred against him: no one could tell why,—for he had no design of attacking the island; and the trifling reasons conjecturally assigned, only prove that the real reason, whatever it might be, was unknown. Availing himself of the notorious ambition and cupidity of Polykratês, Orœtês sent to Samos a messenger, pretending that his life was menaced by Kambysês, and that he was anxious to make his escape with his abundant treasures. He proposed to Polykratês a share in this treasure, sufficient to make him master of all Greece, as far as that object could be achieved by money, provided the Samian prince would come over to convey him away. Mæandrius, secretary of Polykratês, was sent over to Magnêsia on the Mæander, to make inquiries; he there saw the satrap with eight large coffers full of gold,—or rather apparently so, being in reality full of stones, with a layer of gold at the top,[448]—tied up ready for departure. The cupidity of Polykratês was not proof against so rich a bait: he crossed over to Magnêsia with a considerable suite, and thus came into the power of Orœtês, in spite of the warnings of his prophets and the agony of his terrified daughter, to whom his approaching fate had been revealed in a dream. The satrap slew him and crucified his body; releasing all the Samians who accompanied him, with an intimation that they ought to thank him for procuring them a free government,—but retaining both the foreigners and the slaves as prisoners.[449] The death of Orœtês himself, which ensued shortly afterwards, has already been described. It is considered by Herodotus as a judgment for his flagitious deed in the case of Polykratês.[450]

At the departure of the latter from Samos, in anticipation of a speedy return, Mæandrius had been left as his lieutenant at Samos; and the unexpected catastrophe of Polykratês filled him with surprise and consternation. Though possessed of the fortresses, the soldiers, and the treasures, which had constituted the machinery

of his powerful master, he knew the risk of trying to employ them on his own account. Partly from this apprehension, partly from the genuine political morality which prevailed with more or less force in every Grecian bosom, he resolved to lay down his authority and enfranchise the island. "He wished (says the historian, in a remarkable phrase)[451] to act like the justest of men; but he was not allowed to do so." His first proceeding was to erect in the suburbs an altar in honor of Zeus Eleutherius, and to inclose a piece of ground as a precinct, which still existed in the time of Herodotus: he next convened an assembly of the Samians. "You know (says he) that the whole power of Polykratês is now in my hands, nor is there anything to hinder me from continuing to rule over you. Nevertheless, what I condemn in another I will not do myself,—and I have always disapproved of Polykratês, and others like him, for seeking to rule over men as good as themselves. Now that Polykratês has come to the end of his destiny, I at once lay down the command, and proclaim among you equal law; reserving to myself as privileges, first, six talents out of the treasures of Polykratês,—next, the hereditary priesthood of Zeus Eleutherius for myself and my descendants forever. To him I have just set apart a sacred precinct, as the God of that freedom which I now hand over to you."

This reasonable and generous proposition fully justifies the epithet of Herodotus. But very differently was it received by the Samian hearers. One of the chief men among them, Telesarchus, exclaimed, with the applause of the rest, "*You* rule us, low-born and scoundrel as you are! you are not worthy to rule: don't think of that, but give us some account of the money which you have been handling."[452]

Such an unexpected reply caused a total revolution in the mind of Mæandrius. It left him no choice but to maintain dominion at all hazards,—which he accordingly resolved to do. Retiring into the acropolis, under pretence of preparing his money-accounts for examination, he sent for Telesarchus and his chief political enemies, one by one,—intimating that they were open to inspection. As fast as they arrived they were put in chains, while Mæandrius remained in the acropolis, with his soldiers and his treasures, as the avowed successor of Polykratês. And thus the Samians, after a short hour of insane boastfulness, found themselves again enslaved. "It seemed (says Herodotus) that they were not willing to be free."[453]

We cannot but contrast their conduct on this occasion with that of the Athenians about twelve years afterwards, on the expulsion of Hippias, which has been recounted in a previous chapter. The position of the Samians was far the more favorable of the two, for the quiet and successful working of a free government; for they had the advantage of a voluntary as well as a sincere resignation from the actual despot. Yet the thirst for reactionary investigation prevented them even from taking a reasonable estimate of their own power of enforcing it: they passed at once from extreme subjection to overbearing and ruinous rashness. Whereas the Athenians, under circumstances far less promising, avoided the fatal mistake of sacrificing the prospects of the future to recollections of the past; showed themselves both anxious

to acquire the rights, and willing to perform the obligations, of a free community; listened to wise counsels, maintained unanimous action, and overcame, by heroic efforts, forces very greatly superior. If we compare the reflections of Herodotus on the one case and on the other,[454] we shall be struck with the difference which those reflections imply between the Athenians and the Samians,—a difference partly referable, doubtless, to the pure Hellenism of the former, contrasted with the half-Asiatized Hellenism of the latter,—but also traceable in a great degree to the preliminary lessons of the Solonian constitution, overlaid, but not extinguished, during the despotism of the Peisistratids which followed.

The events which succeeded in Samos are little better than a series of crimes and calamities. The prisoners, whom Mæandrius had detained in the acropolis, were slain during his dangerous illness, by his brother Lykarêtus, under the idea that this would enable him more easily to seize the sceptre. But Mæandrius recovered, and must have continued as despot for a year or two: it was, however, a weak despotism, contested more or less in the island, and very different from the iron hand of Polykratês. In this untoward condition, the Samians were surprised by the arrival of a new claimant for their sceptre and acropolis,—and, what was much more formidable, a Persian army to back him.

Sylosôn, the brother of Polykratês, having taken part originally in his brother's conspiracy and usurpation, had been at first allowed to share the fruits of it, but quickly found himself banished. In this exile he remained during the whole life of Polykratês, and until the accession of Darius to the Persian throne, which followed about a year after the death of Polykratês. He happened to be at Memphis, in Egypt, during the time when Kambysês was there with his conquering army, and when Darius, then a Persian of little note, was serving among his guards. Sylosôn was walking in the agora of Memphis, wearing a scarlet cloak, to which Darius took a great fancy, and proposed to buy it. A divine inspiration prompted Sylosôn to reply,[455] "I cannot for any price sell it; but I give it you for nothing, if it must be yours." Darius thanked him, and accepted the cloak; and for some years the donor accused himself of a silly piece of good-nature.[456] But as events came round, Sylosôn at length heard with surprise that the unknown Persian, whom he had presented with the cloak at Memphis, was installed as king in the palace at Susa. He went thither, proclaimed himself as a Greek, as well as benefactor of the new king, and was admitted to the regal presence. Darius had forgotten his person, but perfectly remembered the adventure of the cloak, when it was brought to his mind,—and showed himself forward to requite, on the scale becoming the Great King, former favors, though small, rendered to the simple soldier at Memphis. Gold and silver were tendered to Sylosôn in profusion, but he rejected them,—requesting that the island of Samos might be conquered and handed over to him, without slaughter or enslavement of inhabitants. His request was complied with. Otanês, the originator of the conspiracy against Smerdis,

was sent down to the coast of Ionia with an army, carried Sylosôn over to Samos, and landed him unexpectedly on the island.[457]

Mæandrius was in no condition to resist the invasion, nor were the Samians generally disposed to sustain him. He accordingly concluded a convention with Otanês, whereby he agreed to make way for Sylosôn, to evacuate the island, and to admit the Persians at once into the city; retaining possession, however—for such time as might be necessary to embark his property and treasures—of the acropolis, which had a separate landing-place, and even a subterranean passage and secret portal for embarkation,—probably one of the precautionary provisions of Polykratês. Otanês willingly granted these conditions, and himself with his principal officers entered the town, the army being quartered around; while Sylosôn seemed on the point of ascending the seat of his deceased brother without violence or bloodshed. But the Samians were destined to a fate more calamitous. Mæandrius had a brother named Charilaus, violent in his temper, and half a madman, whom he was obliged to keep in confinement. This man looking out of his chamber-window, saw the Persian officers seated peaceably throughout the town and even under the gates of the acropolis, unguarded, and relying upon the convention: it seems that these were the chief officers, whose rank gave them the privilege of being carried about on their seats.[458] The sight inflamed both his wrath and his insane ambition; he clamored for liberty and admission to his brother, whom he reviled as a coward no less than a tyrant. "Here are you, worthless man, keeping me, your own brother, in a dungeon, though I have done no wrong worthy of bonds; while you do not dare to take your revenge on the Persians, who are casting you out as a houseless exile, and whom it would be so easy to put down. If you are afraid of them, give me your guards; I will make the Persians repent of their coming here, and I will send you safely out of the island forthwith."[459]

Mæandrius, on the point of quitting Samos forever, had little personal motive to care what became of the population. He had probably never forgiven them for disappointing his honorable intentions after the death of Polykratês, nor was he displeased to hand over to Sylosôn an odious and blood-stained sceptre, which he foresaw would be the only consequence of his brother's mad project. He therefore sailed away with his treasures, leaving the acropolis to his brother Charilaus; who immediately armed the guards, sallied forth from his fortress, and attacked the unsuspecting Persians. Many of the great officers were slain without resistance before the army could be got together; but at length Otanês collected his troops and drove the assailants back into the acropolis. While he immediately began the siege of that fortress, he also resolved, as Mæandrius had foreseen, to take a signal revenge for the treacherous slaughter of so many of his friends and companions. His army, no less incensed than himself, were directed to fall upon the Samian people and massacre them without discrimination,—man and boy, on ground sacred as well as profane. The bloody order was too faithfully executed, and Samos was handed over to

Sylosôn, stripped of its male inhabitants.[460] Of Charilaus and the acropolis we hear no farther, perhaps he and his guards may have escaped by sea. Lykarêtus,[461] the other brother of Mæandrius, must have remained either in the service of Sylosôn or in that of the Persians; for we find him some years afterwards intrusted by the latter with an important command.

Sylosôn was thus finally installed as despot of an island peopled chiefly, if not wholly, with women and children: we may, however, presume, that the deed of blood has been described by the historian as more sweeping than it really was. It seems, nevertheless, to have sat heavily on the conscience of Otanês, who was induced sometime afterwards, by a dream and by a painful disease, to take measures for repeopling the island.[462] From whence the new population came, we are not told: but wholesale translations of inhabitants from one place to another were familiar to the mind of a Persian king or satrap.

Mæandrius, following the example of the previous Samian exiles under Polykratês, went to Sparta and sought aid for the purpose of reëstablishing himself at Samos. But the Lacedæmonians had no disposition to repeat an attempt which had before turned out so unsuccessfully, nor could he seduce king Kleomenês by the display of his treasures and finely-wrought gold plate. The king, however, not without fear that such seductions might win over some of the Spartan leading men, prevailed with the ephors to send Mæandrius away.[463]

Sylosôn seems to have remained undisturbed at Samos, as a tributary of Persia, like the Ionic cities on the continent: some years afterwards we find his son Æakês reigning in the island.[464] Strabo states that it was the harsh rule of Sylosôn which caused the depopulation of the island. But the cause just recounted out of Herodotus is both very different and sufficiently plausible in itself; and as Strabo seems in the main to have derived his account from Herodotus, we may suppose that on this point he has incorrectly remembered his authority.[465]

CHAPTER XXXIV.

DEMOKEDES. — DARIUS INVADES SCYTHIA.

Darius had now acquired full authority throughout the Persian empire, having put down the refractory satrap Orœtês, as well as the revolted Medes and Babylonians. He had, moreover, completed the conquest of Ionia, by the important addition of Samos; and his dominion thus comprised all Asia Minor, with its neighboring islands. But this was not sufficient for the ambition of a Persian king, next but one in succession to the great Cyrus. The conquering impulse was yet unabated among the Persians, who thought it incumbent upon their king, and whose king thought it incumbent upon himself, to extend the limits of the empire. Though not of the lineage of Cyrus, Darius had taken pains to connect himself with it by marriage; he had married Atossa and Artystonê, daughters of Cyrus,—and Parmys, daughter of Smerdis, the younger son of Cyrus. Atossa had been first the wife of her brother Kambysês; next, of the Magian Smerdis, his successor; and thirdly of Darius, to whom she bore four children.[466] Of those children the eldest was Xerxês, respecting whom more will be said hereafter.

Atossa, mother of the only Persian king who ever set foot in Greece, the Sultana Validi of Persia during the reign of Xerxês, was a person of commanding influence in the reign of her last husband,[467] as well as in that of her son, and filled no inconsiderable space even in Grecian imagination, as we may see both by Æschylus and Herodotus. Had her influence prevailed, the first conquering appetites of Darius would have been directed, not against the steppes of Scythia, but against Attica and Peloponnesus; at least, so Herodotus assures us. The grand object of the latter in his history is to set forth the contentions of Hellas with the barbarians or non-Hellenic world; and with an art truly epical, which manifests itself everywhere to the careful reader of his nine books, he preludes to the real dangers which were averted at Marathon and Platæa, by recounting the first conception of an invasion of Greece by the Persians,—how it originated, and how it was abandoned. For this purpose,—according to his historical style, wherein general facts are set forth as subordinate and explanatory accompaniments to the adventures of particular persons,—he give us the interesting, but romantic, history of the Krotoniate surgeon Dêmokêdês.

Dêmokêdês, son of a citizen of Krotôn named Kalliphôn, had turned his attention in early youth to the study and practice of medicine and surgery (for that age, we can make no difference between the two), and had made considerable progress in it. His youth coincides nearly with the arrival of Pythagoras at Krotôn, (550-520,) where the science of the surgeon, as well as the art of the gymnastic trainer, seem to have been then prosecuted more actively than in any part of Greece. His father Kalliphôn, however, was a man of such severe temper, that the son ran away from him, and re-

solved to maintain himself by his talents elsewhere. He went to Ægina, and began to practice in his profession; and so rapid was his success, even in his first year,—though very imperfectly equipped with instruments and apparatus,[468]—that the citizens of the island made a contract with him to remain there for one year, at a salary of one talent (about three hundred and eighty-three pounds sterling, an Æginæan talent). The year afterwards he was invited to come to Athens, then under the Peisistratids, at a salary of one hundred minæ, or one and two-thirds of a talent; and in the following year, Polykratês of Samos tempted him by the offer of two talents. With that despot he remained, and accompanied him in his last calamitous visit to the satrap Orœtês: on the murder of Polykratês, being seized among the slaves and foreign attendants, he was left to languish with the rest in imprisonment and neglect. When again, soon after, Orœtês himself was slain, Dêmokêdês was numbered among his slaves and chattels and sent up to Susa.

He had not been long at that capital, when Darius, leaping from his horse in the chase, sprained his foot badly, and was carried home in violent pain. The Egyptian surgeons, supposed to be the first men in their profession,[469] whom he habitually employed, did him no good, but only aggravated his torture; for seven days and nights he had no sleep, and he as well as those around him began to despair. At length, some one who had been at Sardis, accidentally recollected that he had heard of a Greek surgeon among the slaves of Orœtês: search was immediately made, and the miserable slave was brought, in chains as well as in rags,[470] into the presence of the royal sufferer. Being asked whether he understood surgery, he affected ignorance; but Darius, suspecting this to be a mere artifice, ordered out the scourge and the pricking instrument, to overcome it. Dêmokêdês now saw that there was no resource, admitted that he had acquired some little skill, and was called upon to do his utmost in the case before him. He was fortunate enough to succeed perfectly, in alleviating the pain, in procuring sleep for the exhausted patient, and ultimately in restoring the foot to a sound state. Darius, who had abandoned all hopes of such a cure, knew no bounds to his gratitude. As a first reward, he presented him with two sets of chains in solid gold,—a commemoration of the state in which Dêmokêdês had first come before him,—he next sent him into the harem to visit his wives. The conducting eunuchs introduced him as the man who had restored the king to life, and the grateful sultanas each gave to him a saucer full of golden coins called staters; [471] in all so numerous, that the slave Skitôn, who followed him, was enriched by merely picking up the pieces which dropped on the floor. Nor was this all. Darius gave him a splendid house and furniture, made him the companion of his table, and showed him every description of favor. He was about to crucify the Egyptian surgeons who had been so unsuccessful in their attempts to cure him; but Dêmokêdês had the happiness of preserving their lives, as well as of rescuing an unfortunate companion of his imprisonment,—an Eleian prophet, who had followed the fortunes of Polykratês.

But there was one favor which Darius would on no account grant; yet upon this one Dêmokêdês had set his heart,—the liberty of returning to Greece. At length accident, combined with his own surgical skill, enabled him to escape from the splendor of his second detention, as it had before extricated him from the misery of the first. A tumor formed upon the breast of Atossa; at first, she said nothing to any one, but as it became too bad for concealment, she was forced to consult Dêmokêdês. He promised to cure her, but required from her a solemn oath that she would afterwards do for him anything which he should ask,—pledging himself at the same time to ask nothing indecent.[472] The cure was successful, and Atossa was required to repay it by procuring his liberty. He knew that the favor would be refused, even to her, if directly solicited, but he taught her a stratagem for obtaining under false pretences the consent of Darius. She took an early opportunity, Herodotus tells us,[473] in bed, of reminding Darius that the Persians expected from him some positive addition to the power and splendor of the empire; and when Darius, in answer, acquainted her that he contemplated a speedy expedition against the Scythians, she entreated him to postpone it, and to turn his forces first against Greece: "I have heard (she said) about the maidens of Sparta, Athens, Argos, and Corinth, and I want to have some of them as slaves to serve me—(we may conceive the smile of triumph with which the sons of those who had conquered at Platæa and Salamis would hear this part of the history read by Herodotus);—you have near you the best person possible to give information about Greece,—that Greek who cured your foot." Darius was induced by this request to send some confidential Persians into Greece to procure information, along with Dêmokêdês. Selecting fifteen of them, he ordered them to survey the coasts and cities of Greece, under guidance of Dêmokêdês, but with peremptory orders upon no account to let him escape or to return without him. He next sent for Dêmokêdês himself, explained to him what he wanted, and enjoined him imperatively to return as soon as the business had been completed; he farther desired him to carry away with him all the ample donations which he had already received, as presents to his father and brothers, promising that on his return fresh donations of equal value should make up the loss: lastly, he directed that a storeship, "filled with all manner of good things," should accompany the voyage. Dêmokêdês undertook the mission with every appearance of sincerity. The better to play his part, he declined to take away what he already possessed at Susa,—saying, that he should like to find his property and furniture again on coming back, and that the storeship alone, with its contents, would be sufficient both for the voyage and for all necessary presents.

Accordingly, he and the fifteen Persian envoys went down to Sidon in Phenicia, where two armed triremes were equipped, with a large storeship in company; and the voyage of survey into Greece was commenced. They visited and examined all the principal places in Greece,—probably beginning with the Asiatic and insular Greeks, crossing to Eubœa, circumnavigating Attica and Peloponnesus, then passing to Korkyra and Italy. They surveyed the coasts and cities, taking memoranda[474] of every-

thing worthy of note which they saw: this Periplûs, if it had been preserved, would have been inestimable, as an account of the actual state of the Grecian world about 518 B. C. As soon as they arrived at Tarentum, Dêmokêdês—now within a short distance of his own home, Krotôn—found an opportunity of executing what he had meditated from the beginning. At his request Aristophilidês, the king of Tarentum, seized the fifteen Persians, and detained them as spies, at the same time taking the rudders from off their ships,—while Dêmokêdês himself made his escape to Krotôn. As soon as he had arrived there, Aristophilidês released the Persians, and suffered them to pursue their voyage: they went on to Krotôn, found Dêmokêdês in the market-place, and laid hands upon him. But his fellow-citizens released him, not without opposition from some who were afraid of provoking the Great King, and in spite of remonstrances, energetic and menacing, from the Persians themselves: indeed, the Krotôniates not only protected the restored exile, but even robbed the Persians of their storeship. The latter, disabled from proceeding farther, as well by this loss as by the secession of Dêmokêdês, commenced their voyage homeward, but unfortunately suffered shipwreck near the Iapygian cape, and became slaves in that neighborhood. A Tarentine exile, named Gillus, ransomed them and carried them up to Susa,—a service for which Darius promised him any recompense that he chose. Restoration to his native city was all that Gillus asked; and that too, not by force, but by the mediation of the Asiatic Greeks of Knidus, who were on terms of intimate alliance with the Tarentines. This generous citizen,—an honorable contrast to Dêmokêdês, who had not scrupled to impel the stream of Persian conquest against his country, in order to procure his own release,—was unfortunately disappointed of his anticipated recompense. For though the Knidians, at the injunction of Darius, employed all their influence at Tarentum to procure a revocation of the sentence of exile, they were unable to succeed, and force was out of the question.[475] The last words addressed by Dêmokêdês at parting to his Persian companions, exhorted them to acquaint Darius that he (Dêmokêdês) was about to marry the daughter of the Krotoniate Milo,—one of the first men in Krotôn, as well as the greatest wrestler of his time. The reputation of Milo was very great with Darius,—probably from the talk of Dêmokêdês himself: moreover, gigantic muscular force could be appreciated by men who had no relish either for Homer or Solon. And thus did this clever and vainglorious Greek, sending back his fifteen Persian companions to disgrace, and perhaps to death, deposit in their parting ears a braggart message, calculated to create for himself a factitious name at Susa. He paid a large sum to Milo as the price of his daughter, for this very purpose.[476]

Thus finishes the history of Dêmokêdês, and of the "first Persians (to use the phrase of Herodotus) who ever came over from Asia into Greece."[477] It is a history well deserving of attention, even looking only to the liveliness of the incidents, introducing us as they do into the full movement of the ancient world,—incidents which I see no reason for doubting, with a reasonable allowance for the dramatic amplification of the historian. Even at that early date, Greek medical intelligence stands out in

a surpassing manner, and Dêmokêdês is the first of those many able Greek surgeons who were seized, carried up to Susa,[478] and there detained for the Great King, his court, and harem.

But his history suggests, in another point of view, far more serious reflections. Like the Milesian Histiæus (of whom I shall speak hereafter,) he cared not what amount of risk he brought upon his country in order to procure his own escape from a splendid detention at Susa. And the influence which he originated and brought to bear was on the point of precipitating upon Greece the whole force of the Persian empire, at a time when Greece was in no condition to resist it. Had the first aggressive expedition of Darius, with his own personal command and fresh appetite for conquest, been directed against Greece instead of against Scythia (between 516-514 B. C.), Grecian independence would have perished almost infallibly. For Athens was then still governed by the Peisistratids; what she was, under them, we have had occasion to notice in a former chapter. She had then no courage for energetic self-defence, and probably Hippias himself, far from offering resistance, would have found it advantageous to accept Persian dominion as a means of strengthening his own rule, like the Ionian despots: moreover, Grecian habit of coöperation was then only just commencing. But fortunately, the Persian invader did not touch the shore of Greece until more than twenty years afterwards, in 490 B. C.; and during that precious interval, the Athenian character had undergone the memorable revolution which has been before described. Their energy and their organization had been alike improved, and their force of resistance had become decupled; moreover, their conduct had so provoked the Persian that resistance was then a matter of necessity with them, and submission on tolerable terms an impossibility. When we come to the grand Persian invasion of Greece, we shall see that Athens was the life and soul of all the opposition offered. We shall see farther, that with all the efforts of Athens, the success of the defence was more than once doubtful; and would have been converted into a very different result, if Xerxês had listened to the best of his own counsellors. But had Darius, at the head of the very same force which he conducted into Scythia, or even an inferior force, landed at Marathon in 514 B. C., instead of sending Datis in 490 B. C.,—he would have found no men like the victors of Marathon to meet him. As far as we can appreciate the probabilities, he would have met with little resistance except from the Spartans singly, who would have maintained their own very defensible territory against all his efforts,—like the Mysians and Pisidians in Asia Minor, or like the Mainots of Laconia in later days; but Hellas generally would have become a Persian satrapy. Fortunately, Darius, while bent on invading some country, had set his mind on the attack of Scythia, alike perilous and unprofitable. His personal ardor was wasted on those unconquerable regions, where he narrowly escaped the disastrous fate of Cyrus,—nor did he ever pay a second visit to the coasts of the Ægean. Yet the amorous influences of Atossa, set at work by Dêmokêdês might well have been sufficiently powerful to induce Darius to assail Greece instead of Scythia,—a choice in favor of which all other recommendations concurred; and the history of free Greece

would then probably have stopped at this point, without unrolling any of the glories which followed. So incalculably great has been the influence of Grecian development, during the two centuries between 500-300 B. C., on the destinies of mankind, that we cannot pass without notice a contingency which threatened to arrest that development in the bud. Indeed, it may be remarked that the history of any nation, considered as a sequence of causes and effects, affording applicable knowledge, requires us to study not merely real events, but also imminent contingencies,—events which were on the point of occurring, but yet did not occur. When we read the wailings of Atossa in the Persæ of Æschylus, for the humiliation which her son Xerxês had just undergone in his flight from Greece,[479] we do not easily persuade ourselves to reverse the picture, and to conceive the same Atossa twenty years earlier, numbering as her slaves at Susa the noblest Hêrakleid and Alkmæônid maidens from Greece. Yet the picture would really have been thus reversed,—the wish of Atossa would have been fulfilled, and the wailings would have been heard from enslaved Greek maidens in Persia,—if the mind of Darius had not happened to be preoccupied with a project not less insane even than those of Kambysês against Ethiopia and the Libyan desert. Such at least is the moral of the story of Dêmokêdês.

That insane expedition across the Danube into Scythia comes now to be recounted. It was undertaken by Darius for the purpose of avenging the inroad and devastation of the Scythians in Media and Upper Asia, about a century before. The lust of conquest imparted unusual force to this sentiment of wounded dignity, which in the case of the Scythians could hardly be connected with any expectation of plunder or profit. In spite of the dissuading admonition of his brother Artabanus,[480] Darius summoned the whole force of his empire, army and navy, to the Thracian Bosphorus,—a force not less than seven hundred thousand horse and foot, and six hundred ships, according to Herodotus. On these prodigious numbers we can lay no stress. But it appears that the names of all the various nations composing the host were inscribed on two pillars, erected by order of Darius on the European side of the Bosphorus, and afterwards seen by Herodotus himself in the city of Byzantium,—the inscriptions were bilingual, in Assyrian characters as well as Greek. The Samian architect Mandroklês had been directed to throw a bridge of boats across the Bosphorus, about half-way between Byzantium and the mouth of the Euxine. So peremptory were the Persian kings that their orders for military service should be punctually obeyed, and so impatient were they of the idea of exemptions, that when a Persian father named Œobazus entreated that one of his three sons, all included in the conscription, might be left at home, Darius replied that all three of them should be left at home,—an answer which the unsuspecting father heard with delight. They were indeed all left at home,—for they were all put to death.[481] A proceeding similar to this is ascribed afterwards to Xerxês;[482] whether true or not as matters of fact, both tales illustrate the wrathful displeasure with which the Persian kings were known to receive such petitions for exemption.

The naval force of Darius seems to have consisted entirely of subject Greeks, Asiatic and insular; for the Phenician fleet was not brought into the Ægean until the subsequent Ionic revolt. At this time all or most of the Asiatic Greek cities were under despots, who leaned on the Persian government for support, and who appeared with their respective contingents to take part in the Scythian expedition.[483] Of Ionic Greeks were seen,—Strattis, despot of Chios; Æakês son of Sylosôn, despot of Samos; Laodamas, of Phôkæa; and Histiæus, of Milêtus. From the Æolic towns, Aristagoras of Kymê; from the Hellespontine Greeks, Daphnis of Abydus, Hippoklus of Lampsakus, Hêrophantus of Parium, Metrodôrus of Prokonnêsus, Aristagoras of Kyzikus, and Miltiadês of the Thracian Chersonese. All these are mentioned, and there were probably more. This large fleet, assembled at the Bosphorus, was sent forward into the Euxine to the mouth of the Danube,—with orders to sail up the river two days' journey, above the point where its channel begins to divide, and to throw a bridge of boats over it; while Darius, having liberally recompensed the architect Mandroklês, crossed the bridge over the Bosphorus, and began his march through Thrace, receiving the submission of various Thracian tribes in his way, and subduing others,—especially the Getæ north of Mount Hæmus, who were compelled to increase still farther the numbers of his vast army.[484] On arriving at the Danube, he found the bridge finished and prepared for his passage by the Ionians: we may remark here, as on so many other occasions, that all operations requiring intelligence are performed for the Persians either by Greeks or by Phenicians,—more usually by the former. He crossed this greatest of all earthly rivers,[485]—for so the Danube was imagined to be in the fifth century B. C.,—and directed his march into Scythia.

As far as the point now attained, our narrative runs smoothly and intelligibly: we know that Darius marched his army into Scythia, and that he came back with ignominy and severe loss. But as to all which happened between his crossing and recrossing the Danube, we find nothing approaching to authentic statement,—nothing even which we can set forth as the probable basis of truth on which exaggerating fancy has been at work. All is inexplicable mystery. Ktêsias indeed says that Darius marched for fifteen days into the Scythian territory,—that he then exchanged bows with the king of Scythia, and discovered the Scythian bow to be the largest,—and that, being intimidated by such discovery, he fled back to the bridge by which he had crossed the Danube, and recrossed the river with the loss of one-tenth part of his army,[486] being compelled to break down the bridge before all had passed. The length of march is here the only thing distinctly stated; about the direction nothing is said. But the narrative of Ktêsias, defective as it is, is much less perplexing than that of Herodotus, who conducts the immense host of Darius as it were through fairyland,—heedless of distance, large intervening rivers, want of all cultivation or supplies, destruction of the country—in so far as it could be destroyed—by the retreating Scythians, etc. He tells us that the Persian army consisted chiefly of foot,—that there were no roads nor agriculture; yet his narrative carries it over about twelve degrees of longitude from the Danube to the country east of the Tanais, across the rivers

Tyras (Dniester), Hypanis (Bog), Borysthenês (Dnieper), Hypakyris. Gerrhos, and Tanais.[487] How these rivers could have been passed in the face of enemies by so vast a host, we are left to conjecture, since it was not winter time, to convert them into ice: nor does the historian even allude to them as having been crossed either in the advance or in the retreat. What is not less remarkable is, that in respect to the Greek settlement of Olbia, or Borysthenês, and the agricultural Scythians and Mix-hellenes between the Hypanis and the Borysthenês, across whose country it would seem that this march of Darius must have carried him,—Herodotus does not say anything; though we should have expected that he would have had better means of informing himself about this part of the march than about any other, and though the Persians could hardly have failed to plunder or put in requisition this, the only productive portion of Scythia.

The narrative of Herodotus in regard to the Persian march north of the Ister seems indeed destitute of all the conditions of reality. It is rather an imaginative description, illustrating the desperate and impracticable character of Scythian warfare, and grouping in the same picture, according to that large sweep of the imagination which is admissible in epical treatment, the Scythians, with all their barbarous neighbors from the Carpathian mountains to the river Wolga. The Agathyrsi, the Neuri, the Androphagi, the Melanchlæni, the Budini, the Gelôni, the Sarmatians, and the Tauri, —all of them bordering on that vast quadrangular area of four thousand stadia for each side, called Scythia, as Herodotus conceives it,[488]—are brought into deliberation and action in consequence of the Persian approach. And Herodotus takes that opportunity of communicating valuable particulars respecting the habits and manners of each. The kings of these nations discuss whether Darius is justified in his invasion, and whether it be prudent in them to aid the Scythians. The latter question is decided in the affirmative by the Sarmatians, the Budini, and the Gelôni, all eastward of the Tanais,[489]—in the negative by the rest. The Scythians, removing their wagons with their wives and children out of the way northward, retreat and draw Darius after them from the Danube all across Scythia and Sarmatia to the north-eastern extremity of the territory of the Budini,[490] several days' journey eastward of the Tanais. Moreover, they destroy the wells and ruin the herbage as much as they can, so that during all this long march, says Herodotus, the Persians "found nothing to damage, inasmuch as the country was barren;" it is therefore not easy to see what they could find to live upon. It is in the territory of the Budini, at this easternmost terminus on the borders of the desert, that the Persians perform the only positive acts which are ascribed to them throughout the whole expedition. They burn the wooden wall before occupied, but now deserted, by the Gelôni, and they build, or begin to build, eight large fortresses near the river Oarus. For what purpose these fortresses could have been intended, Herodotus gives no intimation; but he says that the unfinished work was yet to be seen even in his day.[491]

Having thus been carried all across Scythia and the other territories above mentioned in a north-easterly direction, Darius and his army are next marched back a prodigious distance in a north-westerly direction, through the territories of the Melanchlæni, the Androphagi, and the Neuri, all of whom flee affrighted into the northern desert, having been thus compelled against their will to share in the consequences of the war. The Agathyrsi peremptorily require the Scythians to abstain from drawing the Persians into *their* territory, on pain of being themselves treated as enemies:[492] the Scythians in consequence respect the boundaries of the Agathyrsi, and direct their retreat in such a manner as to draw the Persians again southward into Scythia. During all this long march backwards and forwards, there are partial skirmishes and combats of horse, but the Scythians steadily refuse any general engagement. And though Darius challenges them formally, by means of a herald, with taunts of cowardice, the Scythian king Idanthyrsus not only refuses battle, but explains and defends his policy, and defies the Persian to come and destroy the tombs of their fathers,—it will then, he adds, be seen whether the Scythians are cowards or not.[493] The difficulties of Darius have by this time become serious, when Idanthyrsus sends to him the menacing presents of a bird, a mouse, a frog, and five arrows: the Persians are obliged to commence a rapid retreat towards the Danube, leaving, in order to check and slacken the Scythian pursuit, the least effective and the sick part of their army encamped, together with the asses which had been brought with them,—animals unknown to the Scythians, and causing great alarm by their braying. [494] However, notwithstanding some delay thus caused, as well as the anxious haste of Darius to reach the Danube, the Scythians, far more rapid in their movements, arrive at the river before him, and open a negotiation with the Ionians left in guard of the bridge, urging them to break it down and leave the Persian king to his fate,—inevitable destruction with his whole army.[495]

Here we reënter the world of reality, at the north bank of the Danube, the place where we before quitted it. All that is reported to have passed in the interval, if tried by the tests of historical matter of fact, can be received as nothing better than a perplexing dream. It only acquires value when we consider it as an illustrative fiction, including, doubtless, some unknown matter of fact, but framed chiefly to exhibit in action those unattackable Nomads, who formed the north-eastern barbarous world of a Greek, and with whose manners Herodotus was profoundly struck. "The Scythians[496] (says he) in regard to one of the greatest of human matters, have struck out a plan cleverer than any that I know. In other respects I do not admire them; but they have contrived this great object, that no invader of their country shall ever escape out of it, or shall ever be able to find out and overtake them, unless they themselves choose. For when men have neither walls nor established cities, but are all house-carriers and horse-bowmen,—living, not from the plough, but from cattle, and having their dwellings on wagons,—how can they be otherwise than unattackable and impracticable to meddle with?" The protracted and unavailing chase ascribed to Darius,—who can neither overtake his game nor use his arms, and who hardly even

escapes in safety,—embodies in detail this formidable attribute of the Scythian Nomads. That Darius actually marched into the country, there can be no doubt. Nothing else is certain, except his ignominious retreat out of it to the Danube; for of the many different guesses,[497] by which critics have attempted to cut down the gigantic sketch of Herodotus into a march with definite limits and direction, not one rests upon any positive grounds, or carries the least conviction. We can trace the pervading idea in the mind of the historian, but cannot find out what were his substantive data.

The adventures which took place at the passage of that river, both on the outmarch and the home-march, wherein the Ionians are concerned, are far more within the limits of history. Here Herodotus possessed better means of information, and had less of a dominant idea to illustrate. That which passed between Darius and the Ionians on his first crossing is very curious: I have reserved it until the present moment, because it is particularly connected with the incidents which happened on his return.

On reaching the Danube from Thrace, he found the bridge of boats ready, and when the whole army had passed over, he ordered the Ionians to break it down, as well as to follow him in his land-march into Scythia;[498] the ships being left with nothing but the rowers and seamen essential to navigate them homeward. His order was on the point of being executed, when, fortunately for him, the Mitylenæan general Kôês ventured to call in question the prudence of it, having first asked whether it was the pleasure of the Persian king to listen to advice. He urged that the march on which they were proceeding might prove perilous, and retreat possibly unavoidable; because the Scythians, though certain to be defeated if brought to action, might perhaps not suffer themselves to be approached or even discovered. As a precaution against all contingencies, it was prudent to leave the bridge standing and watched by those who had constructed it. Far from being offended at the advice, Darius felt grateful for it, and desired that Kôês would ask him after his return for a suitable reward,—which we shall hereafter find granted. He then altered his resolution, took a cord, and tied sixty knots in it. "Take this cord (said he to the Ionians), untie one of the knots in it each day after my advance from the Danube into Scythia. Remain here and guard the bridge until you shall have untied all the knots; but if by that time I shall not have returned, then depart and sail home."[499] After such orders he began his march into the interior.

This anecdote is interesting, not only as it discloses the simple expedients for numeration and counting of time then practised, but also as it illustrates the geographical ideas prevalent. Darius did not intend to come back over the Danube, but to march round the Mæotis, and to return into Persia on the eastern side of the Euxine. No other explanation can be given of his orders. At first, confident of success, he orders the bridge to be destroyed forthwith: he will beat the Scythians, march through their country, and reënter Media from the eastern side of the Euxine. When he is reminded that possibly he may not be able to find the Scythians, and may be obliged

to retreat, he still continues persuaded that this must happen within sixty days, if it happens at all; and that, should he remain absent more than sixty days, such delay will be a convincing proof that he will take the other road of return instead of repassing the Danube. The reader who looks at a map of the Euxine and its surrounding territories may be startled at so extravagant a conception. But he should recollect that there was no map of the same or nearly the same accuracy before Herodotus, much less before the contemporaries of Darius. The idea of entering Media by the north from Scythia and Sarmatia over the Caucasus, is familiar to Herodotus in his sketch of the early marches of the Scythians and Cimmerians: moreover, he tells us that after the expedition of Darius, there came some Scythian envoys to Sparta, proposing an offensive alliance against Persia, and offering on their part to march across the Phasis into Media from the north,[500] while the Spartans were invited to land on the shores of Asia Minor, and advance across the country to meet them from the west. When we recollect that the Macedonians and their leader, Alexander the Great, having arrived at the river Jaxartês, on the north of Sogdiana, and on the east of the sea of Aral, supposed that they had reached the Tanais, and called the river by that name,[501]—we shall not be astonished at the erroneous estimation of distance implied in the plan conceived by Darius.

The Ionians had already remained in guard of the bridge beyond the sixty days commanded, without hearing anything of the Persian army, when they were surprised by the appearance, not of that army, but of a body of Scythians, who acquainted them that Darius was in full retreat and in the greatest distress, and that his safety with the whole army depended upon that bridge. They endeavored to prevail upon the Ionians, since the sixty days included in their order to remain had now elapsed, to break the bridge and retire; assuring them that, if this were done, the destruction of the Persians was inevitable,—of course, the Ionians themselves would then be free. At first, the latter were favorably disposed towards the proposition, which was warmly espoused by the Athenian Miltiadês, despot, or governor, of the Thracian Chersonese.[502] Had he prevailed, the victor of Marathon—for such we shall hereafter find him—would have thus inflicted a much more vital blow on Persia than even that celebrated action, and would have brought upon Darius the disastrous fate of his predecessor Cyrus. But the Ionian princes, though leaning at first towards his suggestion, were speedily converted by the representations of Histiæus of Milêtus, who reminded them that the maintenance of his own ascendency over the Milesians, and that of each despot in his respective city, was assured by means of Persian support alone,—the feeling of the population being everywhere against them: consequently, the ruin of Darius would be their ruin also. This argument proved conclusive. It was resolved to stay and maintain the bridge, but to pretend compliance with the Scythians, and prevail upon them to depart, by affecting to destroy it. The northern portion of the bridge was accordingly destroyed, for the length of a bow-shot, and the Scythians departed under the persuasion that they had succeeded in depriving their enemies of the means of crossing the river.[503] It appears

that they missed the track of the retreating host, which was thus enabled, after the severest privation and suffering, to reach the Danube in safety. Arriving during the darkness of the night, Darius was at first terrified to find the bridge no longer joining the northern bank: an Egyptian herald, of stentorian powers of voice, was ordered to call as loudly as possible the name of Histiæus the Milesian. Answer being speedily made, the bridge was reëstablished, and the Persian army passed over before the Scythians returned to the spot.[504]

There can be no doubt that the Ionians here lost an opportunity eminently favorable, such as never again returned, for emancipating themselves from the Persian dominion. Their despots, by whom the determination was made, especially the Milesian Histiæus, were not induced to preserve the bridge by any honorable reluctance to betray the trust reposed in them, but simply by selfish regard to the maintenance of their own unpopular dominion. And we may remark that the real character of this impelling motive, as well as the deliberation accompanying it, may be assumed as resting upon very good evidence, since we are now arrived within the personal knowledge of the Milesian historian Hekatæus, who took an active part in the Ionic revolt a few years afterwards, and who may, perhaps, have been personally engaged in this expedition. He will be found reviewing with prudence and sobriety the chances of that unfortunate revolt, and distrusting its success from the beginning; while Histiæus of Milêtus will appear on the same occasion as the fomenter of it, in order to procure his release from an honorable detention at Susa, near the person of Darius. The selfishness of this despot having deprived his countrymen of that real and favorable chance of emancipation which the destruction of the bridge would have opened to them, threw them into perilous revolt a few years afterwards against the entire and unembarrassed force of the Persian king and empire.

Extricated from the perils of Scythian warfare, Darius marched southward from the Danube through Thrace to the Hellespont, where he crossed from Sestus into Asia. He left, however, a considerable army in Europe, under the command of Megabazus, to accomplish the conquest of Thrace. Perinthus on the Propontis made a brave resistance,[505] but was at length subdued, and it appears that all the Thracian tribes, and all the Grecian colonies between the Hellespont and the Strymon, were forced to submit, giving earth and water, and becoming subject to tribute.[506] Near the lower Strymon, was the Edonian town of Myrkinus, which Darius ordered to be made over to Histiæus of Milêtus; for both this Milesian, and Kôês of Mitylênê, had been desired by the Persian king to name their own reward for their fidelity to him on the passage over the Danube.[507] Kôês requested that he might be constituted despot of Mitylênê, which was accomplished by Persian authority; but Histiæus solicited that the territory near Myrkinus might be given to him for the foundation of a colony. As soon as the Persian conquests extended thus far, the site in question was presented to Histiæus, who entered actively upon his new scheme. We shall find the territory near Myrkinus eminent hereafter as the site of Amphipolis. It offered

great temptation to settlers, as fertile, well wooded, convenient for maritime commerce, and near to auriferous and argentiferous mountains.[508] It seems, however, that the Persian dominion in Thrace was disturbed by an invasion of the Scythians, who, in revenge for the aggression of Darius, overran the country as far as the Thracian Chersonese, and are even said to have sent envoys to Sparta proposing a simultaneous invasion of Persia from different sides, by Spartans and Scythians. The Athenian Miltiadês, who was despot, or governor, of the Chersonese, was forced to quit it for some time, and Herodotus ascribes his retirement to the incursion of these Nomads. But we may be permitted to suspect that the historian has misconceived the real cause of such retirement. Miltiadês could not remain in the Chersonese after he had incurred the deadly enmity of Darius by exhorting the Ionians to destroy the bridge over the Danube.[509]

Nor did the conquests of Megabazus stop at the western bank of the Strymon. He carried his arms across that river, conquering the Pæonians, and reducing the Macedonians under Amyntas to tribute. A considerable number of the Pæonians were transported across into Asia, by express order of Darius; whose fancy had been struck by seeing at Sardis a beautiful Pæonian woman carrying a vessel on her head, leading a horse to water, and spinning flax, all at the same time. This woman had been brought over, we are told, by her two brothers, Pigrês and Mantyês, for the express purpose of arresting the attention of the Great King. They hoped by this means to be constituted despots of their countrymen, and we may presume that their scheme succeeded, for such part of the Pæonians as Megabazus could subdue were conveyed across to Asia and planted in some villages in Phrygia. Such violent transportations of inhabitants were in the genius of the Persian government.[510]

From the Pæonian lake Prasias, seven eminent Persians were sent as envoys into Macedonia, to whom Amyntas readily gave the required token of submission, inviting them to a splendid banquet. When exhilarated with wine, they demanded to see the women of the regal family, who, being accordingly introduced, were rudely dealt with by the strangers. At length, the son of Amyntas, Alexander, resented the insult, and exacted for it a signal vengeance. Dismissing the women, under pretence that they should return after a bath, he brought back in their place youths in female attire, armed with daggers: the Persians, proceeding to repeat their caresses, were all put to death. Their retinue and splendid carriages and equipment which they had brought with them disappeared at the same time, without any tidings reaching the Persian army. And when Bubarês, another eminent Persian, was sent into Macedonia to institute researches, Alexander contrived to hush up the proceeding by large bribes, and by giving him his sister Gygæa in marriage.[511]

Meanwhile Megabazus crossed over into Asia, carrying with him the Pæonians from the river Strymon. Having been in those regions, he had become alarmed at the progress of Histiæus with his new city of Myrkinus, and communicated his apprehensions to Darius; who was prevailed upon to send for Histiæus, retaining him about

his person, and carrying him to Susa as counsellor and friend, with every mark of honor, but with the secret intention of never letting him revisit Asia Minor. The fears of the Persian general were probably not unreasonable; but this detention of Histiæus at Susa, became in the sequel an important event.[512]

On departing for his capital, Darius nominated his brother Artaphernês satrap of Sardis, and Otanês, general of the forces on the coast, in place of Megabazus. The new general dealt very severely with various towns near the Propontis, on the ground that they had evaded their duty in the late Scythian expedition, and had even harassed the army of Darius in its retreat. He took Byzantium and Chalkêdon, as well as Antandrus in the Troad, and Lampônium; and with the aid of a fleet from Lesbos, he achieved a new conquest,—the islands of Lemnos and Imbros, at that time occupied by a Pelasgic population, seemingly without any Greek inhabitants at all.

These Pelasgi were of cruel and piratical character, if we may judge by the tenor of the legends respecting them; Lemnian misdeeds being cited as a proverbial expression for atrocities.[513] They were distinguished also for ancient worship of Hêphæstus, together with mystic rites in honor of the Kabeiri, and even human sacrifices to their Great Goddess. In their two cities,—Hephæstias on the east of the island, and Myrina on the west,—they held out bravely against Otanês, nor did they submit until they had undergone long and severe hardship. Lykarêtus, brother of that Mæandrius whom we have already noticed as despot of Samos, was named governor of Lemnos; but he soon after died.[514] It is probable that the Pelasgic population of the islands was greatly enfeebled during this struggle, and we even hear that their king Hermon voluntarily emigrated, from fear of Darius.[515]

Lemnos and Imbros thus became Persian possessions, held by a subordinate prince as tributary. A few years afterwards their lot was again changed,—they passed into the hands of Athens, the Pelasgic inhabitants were expelled, and fresh Athenian settlers introduced. They were conquered by Miltiadês from the Thracian Chersonese; from Elæus at the south of that peninsula to Lemnos being within less than one day's sail with a north wind. The Hephæstieans abandoned their city and evacuated the island with little resistance; but the inhabitants of Myrina stood a siege,[516] and were not expelled without difficulty: both of them found abodes in Thrace, on and near the peninsula of Mount Athos. Both these islands, together with that of Skyros (which was not taken until after the invasion of Xerxês), remained connected with Athens in a manner peculiarly intimate. At the peace of Antalkidas (387 B. C.),—which guaranteed universal autonomy to every Grecian city, great and small,—they were specially reserved, and considered as united with Athens.[517] The property in their soil was held by men who, without losing their Athenian citizenship, became Lemnian kleruchs, and as such were classified apart among the military force of the state; while absence in Lemnos or Imbros seems to have been accepted as an excuse for delay before the courts of justice, so as to escape the penalties of contumacy, or departure from the country.[518] It is probable that a considerable number of poor Athe-

nian citizens were provided with lots of land in these islands, though we have no direct information of the fact, and are even obliged to guess the precise time at which Miltiadês made the conquest. Herodotus, according to his usual manner, connects the conquest with an ancient oracle, and represents it as the retribution for ancient legendary crime committed by certain Pelasgi, who, many centuries before, had been expelled by the Athenians from Attica, and had retired to Lemnos. Full of this legend, he tells us nothing about the proximate causes or circumstances of the conquest, which must probably have been accomplished by the efforts of Athens, jointly with Miltiadês from the Chersonese, daring the period that the Persians were occupied in quelling the Ionic revolt, between 502-494 B. C.,—since it is hardly to be supposed that Miltiadês would have ventured thus to attack a Persian possession during the time that the satraps had their hands free. The acquisition was probably facilitated by the fact, that the Pelasgic population of the islands had been weakened, as well by their former resistance to the Persian Otanês, as by some years passed under the deputy of a Persian satrap.

In mentioning the conquest of Lemnos by the Athenians and Miltiadês, I have anticipated a little on the course of events, because that conquest,—though coinciding in point of time with the Ionic revolt (which will be recounted in the following chapter), and indirectly caused by it, in so far as it occupied the attention of the Persians,—lies entirely apart from the operations of the revolted Ionians. When Miltiadês was driven out of the Chersonese by the Persians, on the suppression of the Ionic revolt, his fame, derived from having subdued Lemnos,[519] contributed both to neutralize the enmity which he had incurred as governor of the Chersonese, and to procure his election as one of the ten generals for the year of the Marathonian combat.

CHAPTER XXXV.

IONIC REVOLT.

HITHERTO, the history of the Asiatic Greeks has flowed in a stream distinct from that of the European Greeks. The present chapter will mark the period of confluence between the two.

At the time when Darius quitted Sardis on his return to Susa, carrying with him the Milesian Histiæus, he left Artaphernês, his brother, as satrap of Sardis, invested with the supreme command of Western Asia Minor. The Grecian cities on the coast, comprehended under his satrapy, appear to have been chiefly governed by native despots in each; and Milêtus especially, in the absence of Histiæus, was ruled by his son-in-law Aristagoras. That city was now in the height of power and prosperity,—in every respect the leading city of Ionia. The return of Darius to Susa may be placed seemingly about 512 B. C., from which time forward the state of things above described continued, without disturbance, for eight or ten years,—"a respite from suffering," to use the significant phrase of the historian.[520]

It was about the year 506 B. C., that the exiled Athenian despot Hippias, after having been repelled from Sparta by the unanimous refusal of the Lacedæmonian allies to take part in his cause, presented himself from Sigeium as a petitioner to Artaphernês at Sardis. He now, doubtless, found the benefit of the alliance which he had formed for his daughter with the despot Æantidês of Lampsakus, whose favor with Darius would stand him in good stead. He made pressing representations to the satrap, with a view of procuring restoration to Athens, on condition of holding it under Persian dominion; and Artaphernês was prepared, if an opportunity offered, to aid him in his design. So thoroughly had he resolved on espousing actively the cause of Hippias, that when the Athenians despatched envoys to Sardis, to set forth the case of the city against its exiled pretender, he returned to them an answer not merely of denial, but of menace,—bidding them receive Hippias back again, if they looked for safety.[521] Such a reply was equivalent to a declaration of war, and so it was construed at Athens. It leads us to infer that he was even then revolving in his mind an expedition against Attica, in conjunction with Hippias; but, fortunately for the Athenians, other projects and necessities intervened to postpone for several years the execution of the scheme.

Of these new projects, the first was that of conquering the island of Naxos. Here, too, as in the case of Hippias, the instigation arose from Naxian exiles,—a rich oligarchy which had been expelled by a rising of the people. This island, like all the rest of the Cyclades, was as yet independent of the Persians.[522] It was wealthy, prosperous, possessing a large population both of freemen and slaves, and defended as well

by armed ships as by a force of eight thousand heavy-armed infantry. The exiles applied for aid to Aristagoras, who saw that he could turn them into instruments of dominion for himself in the island, provided he could induce Artaphernês to embark in the project along with him,—his own force not being adequate by itself. Accordingly, he went to Sardis, and laid his project before the satrap, intimating that as soon as the exiles should land with a powerful support, Naxos would be reduced with little trouble: that the neighboring islands of Paros, Andros, Tênos, and the other Cyclades, could not long hold out after the conquest of Naxos, nor even the large and valuable island of Eubœa. He himself engaged, if a fleet of one hundred ships were granted to him, to accomplish all these conquests for the Great King, and to bear the expenses of the armament besides. Artaphernês warmly entered into the scheme, loaded him with praise, and promised him in the ensuing spring two hundred ships instead of one hundred. A messenger despatched to Susa, having brought back the ready consent of Darius, a large armament was forthwith equipped, under the command of the Persian Megabatês, to be placed at the disposal of Aristagoras,—composed both of Persians and of all the tributaries near the coast.[523]

With this force Aristagoras and the Naxian exiles set sail from Milêtus, giving out that they were going to the Hellespont. On reaching Chios, they waited in its western harbor of Kaukasa for a fair wind to carry them straight across to Naxos. No suspicion was entertained in that island of its real purpose, nor was any preparation made for resistance, and the success of Aristagoras would have been complete, had it not been defeated by an untoward incident ending in dispute. Megabatês, with a solicitude which we are surprised to discern in a Persian general, personally made the tour of his fleet, to see that every ship was under proper watch, and discovered a ship from Myndus (an Asiatic Dorian city near Halikarnassus), left without a single man on board. Incensed at this neglect, he called before him Skylax, the commander of the ship, and ordered him to be put in chains, with his head projecting outwards through one of the apertures for oars in the ship's side. Skylax was a guest and friend of Aristagoras, who, on hearing of this punishment, interceded with Megabatês for his release; but finding the request refused, took upon him to release the prisoner himself. He even went so far as to treat the remonstrance of Megabatês with disdain, reminding him that, according to the instructions of Artaphernês, he was only second and himself (Aristagoras) first. The pride of Megabatês could not endure such treatment: as soon as night arrived, he sent a private intimation to Naxos of the coming of the fleet, warning the islanders to be on their guard. The warning thus fortunately received was turned by the Naxians to the best account. They carried in their property, laid up stores, and made every preparation for a siege, so that when the fleet, probably delayed by the dispute between its leaders, at length arrived, it was met by a stout resistance, remained on the shore of the island for four months in prosecution of an unavailing siege, and was obliged to retire without accomplishing anything beyond the erection of a fort, as lodgment for the Naxian exiles. After a

large cost incurred, not only by the Persians, but also by Aristagoras himself, the unsuccessful armament was brought back to the coast of Ionia.[524]

The failure of this expedition threatened Aristagoras with entire ruin. He had incensed Megabatês, deceived Artaphernês, and incurred an obligation, which he knew not how to discharge, of indemnifying the latter for the costs of the fleet. He began to revolve in his mind the scheme of revolting from Persia, when it so happened that there arrived nearly at the same moment a messenger from his father-in-law, Histiæus, who was detained at the court of Susa, secretly instigating him to this very resolution. Not knowing whom to trust with this dangerous message, Histiæus had caused the head of a faithful slave to be shaved,—branded upon it the words necessary,—and then despatched him, so soon as his hair had grown, to Milêtus, with a verbal intimation to Aristagoras that his head was to be again shaved and examined. [525] Histiæus sought to provoke this perilous rising, simply as a means of procuring his own release from Susa, and in the calculation that Darius would send him down to the coast to reëstablish order. His message, arriving at so critical a moment, determined the faltering resolution of Aristagoras, who convened his principal partisans at Milêtus, and laid before them the formidable project of revolt. All of them approved it, with one remarkable exception,—the historian Hekatæus of Milêtus; who opposed it as altogether ruinous, and contended that the power of Darius was too vast to leave them any prospect of success. When he found direct opposition fruitless, he next insisted upon the necessity of at once seizing the large treasures in the neighboring temple of Apollo, at Branchidæ, for the purpose of carrying on the revolt. By this means alone, he said, could the Milesians, too feeble to carry on the contest with their own force alone, hope to become masters at sea,—while, if *they* did not take these treasures, the victorious enemy surely would. Neither of these recommendations, both of them indicating sagacity and foresight in the proposer, were listened to. Probably the seizure of the treasures,—though highly useful for the impending struggle, and though in the end they fell into the hands of the enemy, as Hekatæus anticipated,—would have been insupportable to the pious feelings of the people, and would thus have proved more injurious than beneficial:[526] perhaps, indeed, Hekatæus himself may have urged it with the indirect view of stifling the whole project. We may remark that he seems to have urged the question as if Milêtus were to stand alone in the revolt; not anticipating, as indeed no prudent man could then anticipate, that the Ionic cities generally would follow the example.

Aristagoras and his friends resolved forthwith to revolt, and their first step was to conciliate popular favor throughout Asiatic Greece by putting down the despots in all the various cities,—the instruments not less than the supports of Persian ascendency, as Histiæus had well urged at the bridge of the Danube. The opportunity was favorable for striking this blow at once on a considerable scale. The fleet, recently employed at Naxos, had not yet dispersed, but was still assembled at Myus, with many of the despots present at the head of their ships. Iatragoras was despatched from

Milêtus, at once to seize as many of them as he could, and to stir up the soldiers to revolt. This decisive proceeding was the first manifesto against Darius. Iatragoras was successful: the fleet went along with him, and many of the despots fell into his hands,—among them Histiæus (a second person so named) of Termera, Oliatus of Mylasa (both Karians),[527] Kôês of Mitylênê, and Aristagoras (also a second person so named) of Kymê. At the same time the Milesian Aristagoras himself, while he formally proclaimed revolt against Darius, and invited the Milesians to follow him, laid down his own authority, and affected to place the government in the hands of the people. Throughout most of the towns of Asiatic Greece, insular and continental, a similar revolution was brought about; the despots were expelled, and the feelings of the citizens were thus warmly interested in the revolt. Such of these despots as fell into the hands of Aristagoras were surrendered into the hands of their former subjects, by whom they were for the most part quietly dismissed, and we shall find them hereafter active auxiliaries to the Persians. To this treatment the only exception mentioned is Kôês, who was stoned to death by the Mitylenæans.[528]

By these first successful steps the Ionic revolt was made to assume an extensive and formidable character; much more so, probably, than the prudent Hekatæus had anticipated as practicable. The naval force of the Persians in the Ægean was at once taken away from them, and passed to their opponents, who were thus completely masters of the sea; and would in fact have remained so, if a second naval force had not been brought up against them from Phenicia,—a proceeding never before resorted to, and perhaps at that time not looked for.

Having exhorted all the revolted towns to name their generals, and to put themselves in a state of defence, Aristagoras crossed the Ægean to obtain assistance from Sparta, then under the government of king Kleomenês; to whom he addressed himself, "holding in his hand a brazen tablet, wherein was engraved the circuit of the entire earth, with the whole sea and all the rivers." Probably this was the first map or plan which had ever been seen at Sparta, and so profound was the impression which it made, that it was remembered there even in the time of Herodotus.[529] Having emphatically entreated the Spartans to step forth in aid of their Ionic brethren, now engaged in a desperate struggle for freedom,—he proceeded to describe the wealth and abundance (gold, silver, brass, vestments, cattle, and slaves), together with the ineffective weapons and warfare of the Asiatics. The latter, he said, could be at once put down, and the former appropriated, by military training such as that of the Spartans,—whose long spear, brazen helmet and breastplate, and ample shield, enabled them to despise the bow, the short javelin, the light wicker target, the turban and trowsers, of a Persian.[530] He then traced out on his brazen plan the road from Ephesus to Susa, indicating the intervening nations, all of them affording a booty more or less rich; but he magnified especially the vast treasures at Susa: "Instead of fighting your neighbors, he concluded, Argeians, Arcadians, and Messenians, from whom you get hard blows and small reward, why do you not make yourself ruler of all Asia,

[531] a prize not less easy than lucrative?" Kleomenês replied to these seductive instigations by desiring him to come for an answer on the third day. When that day arrived, he put to him the simple question, how far it was from Susa to the sea? To which Aristagoras answered, with more frankness than dexterity, that it was a three months' journey; and he was proceeding to enlarge upon the facilities of the road when Kleomenês interrupted him: "Quit Sparta before sunset, Milesian stranger; you are no friend to the Lacedæmonians, if you want to carry them a three months' journey from the sea." In spite of this peremptory mandate, Aristagoras tried a last resource: he took in his hand the bough of supplication, and again went to the house of Kleomenês, who was sitting with his daughter Gorgô, a girl of eight years old. He requested Kleomenês to send away the child, but this was refused, and he was desired to proceed; upon which he began to offer to the Spartan king a bribe for compliance, bidding continually higher and higher from ten talents up to fifty. At length, the little girl suddenly exclaimed, "Father, the stranger will corrupt you, if you do not at once go away." The exclamation so struck Kleomenês, that he broke up the interview, and Aristagoras forthwith quitted Sparta.[532]

Doubtless Herodotus heard the account of this interview from Lacedæmonian informants. But we may be permitted to doubt, whether any such suggestions were really made, or any such hopes held out, as those which he places in the mouth of Aristagoras,—suggestions and hopes which might well be conceived in 450-440 B. C., after a generation of victories over the Persians, but which have no pertinence in the year 502 B. C. Down even to the battle of Marathon, the name of the Medes was a terror to the Greeks, and the Athenians are highly and justly extolled as the first who dared to look them in the face.[533] To talk about an easy march up to the treasures of Susa and the empire of all Asia, at the time of the Ionic revolt, would have been considered as a proof of insanity. Aristagoras may very probably have represented, that the Spartans were more than a match for Persians in the field; but even thus much would have been considered, in 502 B. C., rather as the sanguine hope of a petitioner than as the estimate of a sober looker-on.

The Milesian chief had made application to Sparta, as the presiding power of Hellas,—a character which we thus find more and more recognized and passing into the habitual feeling of the Greeks. Fifty years previously to this, the Spartans had been flattered by the circumstance, that Crœsus singled them out from all other Greeks to invite as allies: now they accepted such priority as a matter of course.[534]

Rejected at Sparta, Aristagoras proceeded to Athens, now decidedly the second power in Greece. And here he found an easier task, not only as it was the metropolis, or mother-city, of Asiatic Ionia, but also as it had already incurred the pronounced hostility of the Persian satrap, and might look to be attacked as soon as the project came to suit his convenience, under the instigation of Hippias: whereas the Spartans had not only no kindred with Ionia, beyond that of common Hellenism, but were in no hostile relations with Persia, and would have been provoking a new enemy by

meddling in the Asiatic war. The promises and representations of Aristagoras were accordingly received with great favor by the Athenians: who, over and above the claims of sympathy, had a powerful interest in sustaining the Ionic revolt as an indirect protection to themselves,—and to whom the abstraction of the Ionic fleet from the Persians afforded a conspicuous and important relief. The Athenians at once resolved to send a fleet of twenty ships, under Melanthius, as an aid to the revolted Ionians,—ships which are styled by Herodotus, "the beginning of the mischiefs between Greeks and barbarians,"—as the ships in which Paris crossed the Ægean had before been called in the Iliad of Homer. Herodotus farther remarks that it seems easier to deceive many men together than one,—since Aristagoras, after having failed with Kleomenês, thus imposed upon the thirty thousand citizens of Athens.[535] But on this remark two comments suggest themselves. First, the circumstances of Athens and Sparta were not the same in regard to the Ionic quarrel,—an observation which Herodotus himself had made a little while before: the Athenians had a material interest in the quarrel, political as well as sympathetic, while the Spartans had none. Secondly, the ultimate result of their interference, as it stood in the time of Herodotus, though purchased by severe intermediate hardship, was one eminently gainful and glorifying, not less to Athens than to Greece.[536]

When Aristagoras returned, he seems to have found the Persians engaged in the siege of Milêtus. The twenty Athenian ships soon crossed the Ægean, and found there five Eretrian ships which had also come to the succor of the Ionians; the Eretrians generously taking this opportunity to repay assistance formerly rendered to them by the Milesians in their ancient war with Chalkis. On the arrival of these allies, Aristagoras organized an expedition from Ephesus up to Sardis, under the command of his brother Charopinus, with others. The ships were left at Korêssus,[537] a mountain and seaport five miles from Ephesus, while the troops marched up under Ephesian guides, first, along the river Kayster, next, across the mountain range of Tmôlus to Sardis. Artaphernês had not troops enough to do more than hold the strong citadel, so that the assailants possessed themselves of the town without opposition. But he immediately recalled his force near Miletus,[538] and summoned Persians and Lydians from all the neighboring districts, thus becoming more than a match for Charopinus; who found himself, moreover, obliged to evacuate Sardis, owing to an accidental conflagration. Most of the houses in that city were built in great part with reeds or straw, and all of them had thatched roofs; hence it happened that a spark touching one of them set the whole city in flame. Obliged to abandon their dwellings by this accident, the population of the town congregated in the marketplace,—and as reinforcements were hourly crowding in, the position of the Ionians and Athenians became precarious: they evacuated the town, took up a position on Mount Tmôlus, and, when night came, made the best of their way to the sea-coast. The troops of Artaphernês pursued, overtook them near Ephesus, and defeated them completely. Eualkidês, the Eretrian general, a man of eminence and a celebrated victor at the solemn games, perished in the action, together with a considerable num-

ber of troops. After this unsuccessful commencement, the Athenians betook themselves to their vessels and sailed home, in spite of pressing instances on the part of Aristagoras to induce them to stay. They took no farther part in the struggle;[539] a retirement at once so sudden and so complete, that they must probably have experienced some glaring desertion on the part of their Asiatic allies, similar to that which brought so much danger upon the Spartan general Derkyllidas, in 396 B. C. Unless such was the case, they seem open to censure rather for having too soon withdrawn their aid, than for having originally lent it.[540]

The burning of a place so important as Sardis, however, including the temples of the local goddess Kybêbê, which perished with the remaining buildings, produced a powerful effect on both sides,—encouraging the revolters, as well as incensing the Persians. Aristagoras despatched ships along the coast, northward as far as Byzantium, and southward as far as Cyprus. The Greek cities near the Hellespont and the Propontis were induced, either by force or by inclination, to take part with him: the Karians embraced his cause warmly; even the Kaunians, who had not declared themselves before, joined him as soon as they heard of the capture of Sardis; while the Greeks in Cyprus, with the single exception of the town of Amathûs, at once renounced the authority of Darius, and prepared for a strenuous contest. Onesilus of Salamis, the most considerable city in the island,—finding the population willing, but his brother, the despot Gorgus, reluctant,—shut the latter out of the gates, took the command of the united forces of Salamis and other revolting cities, and laid siege to Amathûs. These towns of Cyprus were then, and seem always afterwards to have continued, under the government of despots; who, however, unlike the despots in Ionia generally, took part along with their subjects in the revolt against Persia.[541]

The rebellion had now assumed a character more serious than ever, and the Persians were compelled to put forth their strongest efforts to subdue it. From the number of different nations comprised in their empire, they were enabled to make use of the antipathies of one against the other; and the old adverse feeling of Phenicians against Greeks was now found extremely serviceable. After a year spent in getting together forces,[542] the Phenician fleet was employed to transport into Cyprus the Persian general Artybius with a Kilikian and Egyptian army,[543]—while the force under Artaphernês at Sardis was so strengthened as to enable him to act at once against all the coast of Asia Minor, from the Propontis to the Triopian promontory. On the other side, the common danger had for the moment brought the Ionians into a state of union foreign to their usual habit, and we hear now, for the first and the last time, of a tolerably efficient Pan-Ionic authority.[544]

Apprized of the coming of Artybius with the Phenician fleet, Onesilus and his Cyprian supporters solicited the aid of the Ionic fleet, which arrived shortly after the disembarkation of the Persian force in the island. Onesilus offered to the Ionians their choice, whether they would fight the Phenicians at sea or the Persians on land. Their natural determination was in favor of the seafight, and they engaged with a

degree of courage and unanimity which procured for them a brilliant victory; the Samians being especially distinguished.[545] But the combat on land, carried on at the same time, took a different turn. Onesilus and the Salaminians brought into the field, after the fashion of Orientals rather than of Greeks, a number of scythed chariots, destined to break the enemy's ranks; while on the other hand the Persian general Artybius was mounted on a horse, trained to rise on his hind legs and strike out with his fore legs against an opponent on foot. In the thick of the fight, Onesilus and his Karian shield-bearer came into personal conflict with this general and his horse; and by previous concert, when the horse so reared as to get his fore legs over the shield of Onesilus, the Karian with a scythe severed the legs from his body, while Onesilus with his own hand slew Artybius. But the personal bravery of the Cypriots was rendered useless by treachery in their own ranks. Stêsênor, despot of Kurium, deserted in the midst of the battle, and even the scythed chariots of Salamis followed his example. The brave Onesilus, thus weakened, perished in the total rout of his army, along with Aristokyprus despot of Soli, on the north coast of the island: this latter being son of that Philokyprus who had been immortalized more than sixty years before, in the poems of Solon. No farther hopes now remained for the revolters, and the victorious Ionian fleet returned home. Salamis relapsed under the sway of its former despot Gorgus, while the remaining cities in Cyprus were successively besieged and taken: not without a resolute defence, however, since Soli alone held out five months.[546]

Meanwhile the principal force of Darius having been assembled at Sardis,—Daurisês, Hymeas, and other generals who had married daughters of the Great King, distributed their efforts against different parts of the western coast. Daurisês attacked the towns near the Hellespont,[547]—Abydus, Perkôtê, Lampsakus, and Pæsus,—which made little resistance. He was then ordered southward into Karia, while Hymeas, who, with another division, had taken Kios on the Propontis, marched down to the Hellespont and completed the conquest of the Troad as well as of the Æolic Greeks in the region of Ida. Artaphernês and Otanês attacked the Ionic and Æolic towns on the coast,—the former taking Klazomenæ,[548] the latter Kymê. There remained Karia, which, with Milêtus in its neighborhood, offered a determined resistance to Daurisês. Forewarned of his approach, the Karians assembled at a spot called the White Pillars, near the confluence of the rivers Mæander and Marsyas. Pixodarus, one of their chiefs, recommended the desperate expedient of fighting with the river at their back, so that all chance of flight might be cut off; but most of the chiefs decided in favor of a contrary policy,[549]—to let the Persians pass the river, in hopes of driving them back into it and thus rendering their defeat total. Victory, however, after a sharp contest, declared in favor of Daurisês, chiefly in consequence of his superior numbers: two thousand Persians, and not less than ten thousand Karians, are said to have perished in the battle. The Karian fugitives, reunited after the flight, in the grove of noble plane-trees consecrated to Zeus Stratius, near Labranda, [550] were deliberating whether they should now submit to the Persians or emigrate

forever, when the appearance of a Milesian reinforcement restored their courage. A second battle was fought, and a second time they were defeated, the loss on this occasion falling chiefly on the Milesians.[551] The victorious Persians now proceeded to assault Karian cities, but Herakleidês of Mylasa laid an ambuscade for them with so much skill and good fortune, that their army was nearly destroyed, and Daurisês with other Persian generals perished. This successful effort, following upon two severe defeats, does honor to the constancy of the Karians, upon whom Greek proverbs generally fasten a mean reputation. It saved for the time the Karian towns, which the Persians did not succeed in reducing until after the capture of Milêtus.[552]

On land, the revolters were thus everywhere worsted, though at sea the Ionians still remained masters. But the unwarlike Aristagoras began to despair of success, and to meditate a mean desertion of the companions and countrymen whom he had himself betrayed into danger. Assembling his chief advisers, he represented to them the unpromising state of affairs, and the necessity of securing some place of refuge, in case they were expelled from Milêtus. He then put the question to them, whether the island of Sardinia, or Myrkinus in Thrace, near the Strymon (which Histiæus had begun some time before to fortify, as I have mentioned in the preceding chapter), appeared to them best adapted to the purpose. Among the persons consulted was Hekatæus the historian, who approved neither the one nor the other scheme, but suggested the erection of a fortified post in the neighboring island of Leros; a Milesian colony, wherein a temporary retirement might be sought, should it prove impossible to hold Milêtus, but which permitted an easy return to that city, so soon as opportunity offered.[553] Such an opinion must doubtless have been founded on the assumption, that they would be able to maintain superiority at sea. And it is important to note such confident reliance upon this superiority in the mind of a sagacious man, not given to sanguine hopes, like Hekatæus,—even under circumstances very unprosperous on land. Emigration to Myrkinus, as proposed by Aristagoras, presented no hope of refuge at all; since the Persians, if they regained their authority in Asia Minor, would not fail again to extend it to the Strymon. Nevertheless, the consultation ended by adopting this scheme, since, probably, no Ionians could endure the immeasurable distance of Sardinia as a new home. Aristagoras set sail for Myrkinus, taking with him all who chose to bear him company; but he perished not long after landing, together with nearly all his company, in the siege of a neighboring Thracian town.[554] Though making profession to lay down his supreme authority at the commencement of the revolt, he had still contrived to retain it in great measure; and on departing for Myrkinus, he devolved it on Pythagoras, a citizen in high esteem. It appears however that the Milesians, glad to get rid of a leader who had brought them nothing but mischief,[555] paid little obedience to his successor, and made their government from this period popular in reality as well as in profession. The desertion of Aristagoras, with the citizens whom he carried away, must have seriously damped the spirits of those who remained: nevertheless, it seems that the cause of the Ionic revolters was quite as well conducted without him.

Not long after his departure, another despot—Histiæus of Milêtus, his father-in-law, and jointly with him the fomenter of the revolt—presented himself at the gates of Milêtus for admission. The outbreak of the revolt had enabled him, as he had calculated, to procure leave of departure from Darius. That prince had been thrown into violent indignation by the attack and burning of Sardis, and by the general revolt of Ionia, headed (so the news reached him) by the Milesian Aristagoras, but carried into effect by the active coöperation of the Athenians. "The Athenians (exclaimed Darius), who are *they*?" On receiving the answer, he asked for his bow, placed an arrow on the string, and shot as high as he could towards the heavens, saying: "Grant me, Zeus, to revenge myself on the Athenians." He at the same time desired an attendant to remind him thrice every day at dinner: "Master, remember the Athenians;" for as to the Ionians, he felt assured that their hour of retribution would come speedily and easily enough.[556]

This Homeric incident deserves notice as illustrating the epical handling of Herodotus. His theme is, the invasions of Greece by Persia: he has now arrived at the first eruption, in the bosom of Darius, of that passion which impelled the Persian forces towards Marathon and Salamis,—and he marks the beginning of the new phase by act and word both alike significant. It may be compared to the libation and prayer addressed by Achilles in the Iliad to Zeus, at the moment when he is sending forth Patroklus and the Myrmidons to the rescue of the despairing Greeks.

At first, Darius had been inclined to ascribe the movement in Ionia to the secret instigation of Histiæus, whom he called into his presence and questioned. But the latter found means to satisfy him, and even to make out that no such mischief would have occurred, if he, Histiæus, had been at Milêtus instead of being detained at Susa. "Send me down to the spot, he asseverated, and I engage not merely to quell the revolt, and put into your hands the traitor who heads it, but also, not to take off this tunic from my body, before I shall have added to your empire the great island of Sardinia." An expedition to Sardinia, though never realized, appears to have been among the favorite fancies of the Ionic Greeks of that day.[557] By such boasts and assurances he obtained his liberty, and went down to Sardis, promising to return as soon as he should have accomplished them.[558]

But on reaching Sardis he found the satrap Artaphernês better informed than the Great King at Susa. Though Histiæus, when questioned as to the causes which had brought on the outbreak, affected nothing but ignorance and astonishment, Artaphernês detected his evasions, and said: "I will tell you how the facts stand, Histiæus: it is you that have stitched this shoe, and Aristagoras has put it on."[559] Such a declaration promised little security to the suspected Milesian who heard it; and accordingly, as soon as night arrived, he took to flight, went down to the coast, and from thence passed over to Chios. Here he found himself seized on the opposite count, as the confidant of Darius and the enemy of Ionia: he was released, however, on proclaiming himself not merely a fugitive escaping from Persian custody, but also

as the prime author of the Ionic revolt. And he farther added, in order to increase his popularity, that Darius had contemplated the translation of the Ionian population to Phenicia, as well as that of the Phenician population to Ionia,—to prevent which translation he, Histiæus, had instigated the revolt. This allegation, though nothing better than a pure fabrication, obtained for him the good-will of the Chians, who carried him back to Milêtus. But before he departed, he avenged himself on Artaphernês by despatching to Sardis some false letters, implicating many distinguished Persians in a conspiracy jointly with himself: these letters were so managed as to fall into the hands of the satrap himself, who became full of suspicion, and put to death several of the parties, to the great uneasiness of all around him.[560]

On arriving at Milêtus, Histiæus found Aristagoras no longer present, and the citizens altogether adverse to the return of their old despot. Nevertheless, he tried to force his way by night into the town, but was repulsed and even wounded in the thigh. He returned to Chios, but the Chians refused him the aid of any of their ships: he next passed to Lesbos, from the inhabitants of which island he obtained eight triremes, and employed them to occupy Byzantium, pillaging and detaining the Ionian merchant-ships as they passed into or out of the Euxine.[561] The few remaining piracies of this worthless traitor, mischievous to his countrymen down to the day of his death, hardly deserve our notice, amidst the last struggles and sufferings of the subjugated Ionians, to which we are now hastening.

A vast Persian force, both military and naval, was gradually concentrating itself near Milêtus, against which city Artaphernês had determined to direct his principal efforts. Not only the whole army of Asia Minor, but also the Kilikian and Egyptian troops fresh from the conquest of Cyprus, and even the conquered Cypriots themselves, were brought up as reinforcements; while the entire Phenician fleet, no less than six hundred ships strong, coöperated on the coast.[562] To meet such a land-force in the field, being far beyond the strength of the Ionians, the joint Pan-Ionic council resolved that the Milesians should be left to defend their own fortifications, while the entire force of the confederate cities should be mustered on board the ships. At sea they had as yet no reason to despair, having been victorious over the Phenicians near Cyprus, and having sustained no defeat. The combined Ionic fleet, including the Æolic Lesbians, amounting in all to the number of three hundred and fifty-three ships, was accordingly mustered at Ladê,—then a little island near Milêtus, but now joined on to the coast, by the gradual accumulation of land in the bay at the mouth of the Mæander. Eighty Milesian ships formed the right wing, one hundred Chian ships the centre, and sixty Samian ships the left wing; while the space between the Milesians and the Chians was occupied by twelve ships from Priênê, three from Myus, and seventeen from Teôs,—the space between the Chians and Samians was filled by eight ships from Erythræ, three from Phôkæa, and seventy from Lesbos.[563]

The total armament thus made up was hardly inferior in number to that which, fifteen years afterwards, gained the battle of Salamis against a far larger Persian fleet than the present. Moreover, the courage of the Ionians, on ship-board, was equal to that of their contemporaries on the other side of the Ægean; while in respect of disagreement among the allies, we shall hereafter find the circumstances preceding the battle of Salamis still more menacing than those before the coming battle of Ladê. The chances of success, therefore, were at least equal between the two; and indeed the anticipations of the Persians and Phenicians on the present occasion were full of doubt, so that they thought it necessary to set on foot express means for disuniting the Ionians,—it was fortunate for the Greeks that Xerxês at Salamis could not be made to conceive the prudence of aiming at the same object. There were now in the Persian camp all those various despots whom Aristagoras, at the beginning of the revolt, had driven out of their respective cities. At the instigation of Artaphernês, each of these men despatched secret communications to their citizens in the allied fleet, endeavoring to detach them severally from the general body, by promises of gentle treatment in the event of compliance, and by threats of extreme infliction from the Persians if they persisted in armed efforts. Though these communications were sent to each without the knowledge of the rest, yet the answer from all was one unanimous negative.[564] And the confederates at Ladê seemed more one, in heart and spirit, than the Athenians, Spartans, and Corinthians will hereafter prove to be at Salamis.

But there was one grand difference which turned the scale,—the superior energy and ability of the Athenian leaders at Salamis, coupled with the fact that they *were* Athenians,—that is, in command of the largest and most important contingent throughout the fleet.

At Ladê, unfortunately, this was quite otherwise: each separate contingent had its own commander, but we hear of no joint commander at all. Nor were the chiefs who came from the larger cities—Milesian, Chian, Samian, or Lesbian—men like Themistoklês, competent and willing to stand forward as self-created leaders, and to usurp for the moment, with the general consent and for the general benefit, a privilege not intended for them. The only man of sufficient energy and forwardness to do this, was the Phôkæan Dionysius,—unfortunately, the captain of the smallest contingent of the fleet, and therefore enjoying the least respect. For Phôkæa, once the daring explorer of the western waters, had so dwindled down since the Persian conquest of Ionia, that she could now furnish no more than three ships; and her ancient maritime spirit survived only in the bosom of her captain. When Dionysius saw the Ionians assembled at Ladê, willing, eager, full of talk and mutual encouragement, but untrained and taking no thought of discipline, or nautical practice, or coöperation in the hour of battle,—he saw the risk which they ran for want of these precautions, and strenuously remonstrated with them: "Our fate hangs on the razor's edge, men of Ionia: either to be freemen or slaves,—and slaves too, caught after running away.

Set yourself at once to work and duty,—you will then have trouble indeed at first, with certain victory and freedom afterwards. But if you persist in this carelessness and disorder, there is no hope for you to escape the king's revenge for your revolt. Be persuaded and commit yourself to me; and I pledge myself, if the gods only hold an equal balance, that your enemies either will not fight, or will be severely beaten."[565]

The wisdom of this advice was so apparent, that the Ionians, quitting their comfortable tents on the shore of Ladê and going on board their ships, submitted themselves to the continuous nautical labors and manœuvres imposed upon them by Dionysius. The rowers, and the hoplites on the deck, were exercised in their separate functions, and even when they were not so employed, the ships were kept at anchor, and the crews on board, instead of on shore; so that the work lasted all day long, under a hot summer's sun. Such labor, new to the Ionian crews, was endured for seven successive days, after which they broke out with one accord into resolute mutiny and refusal: "Which of the gods have we offended, to bring upon ourselves such a retribution as this? madmen as we are, to put ourselves into the hands of this Phôkæan braggart, who has furnished only three ships![566] He has now got us, and is ruining us without remedy: many of us are already sick, many others are sickening; we had better make up our minds to Persian slavery, or any other mischiefs, rather than go on with these present sufferings. Come, we will not obey this man any longer." And they forthwith refused to execute his orders, resuming their tents on shore, with the enjoyments of shade, rest, and inactive talk, as before.

I have not chosen to divest this instructive scene of the dramatic liveliness with which it is given in Herodotus,—the more so as it has all the air of reality, and as Hekatæus, the historian, was probably present in the island of Ladê, and may have described what he actually saw and heard. When we see the intolerable hardship which these nautical manœuvres and labors imposed upon the Ionians, though men not unaccustomed to ordinary ship-work,—and when we witness their perfect incapacity to submit themselves to such a discipline, even with extreme danger staring them in the face,—we shall be able to appreciate the severe and unremitting toil whereby the Athenian seaman afterwards purchased that perfection of nautical discipline which characterized him at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. It will appear, as we proceed with this history, that the full development of the Athenian democracy worked a revolution in Grecian military marine, chiefly by enforcing upon the citizen seaman a strict continuous training, such as was only surpassed by the Lacedæmonian drill on land,—and by thus rendering practicable a species of nautical manœuvring which was unknown even at the time of the battle of Salamis. I shall show this more fully hereafter: at present, I contrast it briefly with the incapacity of the Ionians at Ladê, in order that it may be understood how painful such training really was. The reader of Grecian history is usually taught to associate only ideas of turbulence and anarchy with the Athenian democracy; but the Athenian navy, the

child and champion of that democracy, will be found to display an indefatigable labor and obedience nowhere else witnessed in Greece, and of which even the first lessons, as in the case now before us, prove to others so irksome as to outweigh the prospect of extreme and imminent peril. The same impatience of steady toil and discipline, which the Ionians displayed to their own ruin before the battle of Ladê, will be found to characterize them fifty years afterwards as allies of Athens, as I shall have occasion to show when I come to describe the Athenian empire.

Ending in this abrupt and mutinous manner, the judicious suggestions of the Phôkæan leader did more harm than good. Perhaps his manner of dealing may have been unadvisedly rude, but we are surprised to see that no one among the leaders of the larger contingents had the good sense to avail himself of the first readiness of the Ionians, and to employ his superior influence in securing the continuance of a good practice once begun. Not one such superior man did this Ionic revolt throw up. From the day on which the Ionians discarded Dionysius, their camp became a scene of disunion and mistrust. Some of them grew so reckless and unmanageable, that the better portion despaired of maintaining any orderly battle; and the Samians in particular now repented that they had declined the secret offers made to them by their expelled despot,[567]—Æakês, son of Sylosôn. They sent privately to renew the negotiation, received a fresh promise of the same indulgence, and agreed to desert when the occasion arrived. On the day of battle, when the two fleets were on the point of coming to action, the sixty Samian ships all sailed off, except eleven, whose captains disdained such treachery. Other Ionians followed their example; yet amidst the reciprocal crimination which Herodotus had heard, he finds it difficult to determine who was most to blame, though he names the Lesbians as among the earliest deserters.[568] The hundred ships from Chios, constituting the centre of the fleet—each ship carrying forty chosen soldiers fully armed—formed a brilliant exception to the rest; they fought with the greatest fidelity and resolution, inflicting upon the enemy, and themselves sustaining, heavy loss. Dionysius, the Phôkæan, also behaved in a manner worthy of his previous language,—capturing with his three ships the like number of Phenicians. But these examples of bravery did not compensate the treachery or cowardice of the rest, and the defeat of the Ionians at Ladê was complete as well as irrecoverable. To the faithful Chians, the loss was terrible, both in the battle and after it. For though some of their vessels escaped from the defeat safely to Chios, others were so damaged as to be obliged to run ashore close at hand on the promontory of Mykalê, where the crews quitted them, with the intention of marching northward, through the Ephesian territory, to the continent opposite their own island. We hear with astonishment that, at that critical moment, the Ephesian women were engaged in solemnizing the Thesmophoria,—a festival celebrated at night, in the open air, in some uninhabited portion of the territory, and without the presence of any male person. As the Chian fugitives entered the Ephesian territory by night, their coming being neither known nor anticipated,—it was believed that they were thieves or pirates coming to seize the women, and under this error they were attacked by

the Ephesians and slain.[569] It would seem from this incident that the Ephesians had taken no part in the Ionic revolt, nor are they mentioned amidst the various contingents. Nor is anything said either of Kolophon, or Lebedus, or Eræ.[570]

The Phôkæan Dionysius, perceiving that the defeat of Ladê was the ruin of the Ionic cause, and that his native city was again doomed to Persian subjection, did not think it prudent even to return home. Immediately after the battle he set sail, not for Phôkæa, but for the Phenician coast, at this moment stripped of its protecting cruisers. He seized several Phenician merchantmen, out of which considerable profit was obtained: then setting sail for Sicily, he undertook the occupation of a privateer against the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians, abstaining from injury towards Greeks.[571] Such an employment seems then to have been perfectly admissible. A considerable body of Samians also migrated to Sicily, indignant at the treachery of their admirals in the battle, and yet more indignant at the approaching restoration of their despot Æakês. How these Samian emigrants became established in the Sicilian town of Zanklê,[572] I shall mention as a part of the course of Sicilian events, which will come hereafter.

The victory of Ladê enabled the Persians to attack Milêtus by sea as well as by land; they prosecuted the siege with the utmost vigor, by undermining the walls, and by various engines of attack: in which department their resources seem to have been enlarged since the days of Harpagus. In no long time the city was taken by storm, and miserable was the fate reserved to it. The adult male population was chiefly slain; while such of them as were preserved, together with the women and children, were sent in a body to Susa, to await the orders of Darius,—who assigned to them a residence at Ampê, not far from the mouth of the Tigris. The temple at Branchidæ was burned and pillaged, as Hekatæus had predicted at the beginning of the revolt: the large treasures therein contained must have gone far to defray the costs of the Persian army. The Milesian territory is said to have been altogether denuded of its former inhabitants,—the Persians retaining for themselves the city with the plain adjoining to it, and making over the mountainous portions to the Karians of Pedasa. Some few of the Milesians found a place among the Samian emigrants to Sicily.[573] It is certain, however, that new Grecian inhabitants must have been subsequently admitted into Milêtus; for it appears ever afterwards as a Grecian town, though with diminished power and importance.

The capture of Milêtus, in the sixth year from the commencement of the revolt,[574] carried with it the rapid submission of the neighboring towns in Karia.[575] During the next summer,—the Phenician fleet having wintered at Milêtus,—the Persian forces by sea and land reconquered all the Asiatic Greeks, insular as well as continental. Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos,—the towns in the Chersonese,—Selymbria and Perinthus in Thrace,—Prokonnêsus and Artakê in the Propontis,—all these towns were taken or sacked by the Persian and Phenician fleet.[576] The inhabitants of Byzantium and Chalkêdôn fled for the most part, without even awaiting its arrival, to

Mesembria, and the Athenian Miltiadês only escaped Persian captivity by a rapid flight from his abode in the Chersonese to Athens. His pursuers were indeed so close upon him, that one of his ships, with his son Metiochus on board, fell into their hands. As Miltiadês had been strenuous in urging the destruction of the bridge over the Danube, on the occasion of the Scythian expedition, the Phenicians were particularly anxious to get possession of his person, as the most acceptable of all Greek prisoners to the Persian king; who, however, when Metiochus the son of Miltiadês was brought to Susa, not only did him no harm, but treated him with great kindness, and gave him a Persian wife with a comfortable maintenance.[577]

Far otherwise did the Persian generals deal with the reconquered cities on and near the coast. The threats which had been held out before the battle of Ladê were realized to the full. The most beautiful Greek youths and virgins were picked out, to be distributed among the Persian grandees as eunuchs, or inmates of the harems; the cities with their edifices, sacred as well as profane, were made a prey to the flames; and in the case of the islands, Herodotus even tells us, that a line of Persians was formed from shore to shore, which swept each territory from north to south, and drove the inhabitants out of it.[578] That much of this hard treatment is well founded, there can be no doubt. But it must be exaggerated as to extent of depopulation and destruction, for these islands and cities appear ever afterwards as occupied by a Grecian population, and even as in a tolerable, though reduced, condition. Samos was made an exception to the rest, and completely spared by the Persians, as a reward to its captains for setting the example of desertion at the battle of Ladê; at the same time, Æakês the despot of that island was reinstated in his government.[579] It appears that several other despots were also replaced in their respective cities, though we are not told which.

Amidst the sufferings endured by so many innocent persons, of every age and of both sexes, the fate of Histiæus excites but little sympathy. Having learned, while carrying on his piracies at Byzantium, the surrender of Milêtus, he thought it expedient to sail with his Lesbian vessels to Chios, where admittance was refused to him. But the Chians, weakened as they had been by the late battle, were in little condition to resist, so that he defeated their troops and despoiled the island. During the present break-up of the Asiatic Greeks, there were doubtless many who, like the Phôkæan Dionysius, did not choose to return home to an enslaved city, yet had no fixed plan for a new abode: of these exiles, a considerable number put themselves under the temporary command of Histiæus, and accompanied him to the plunder of Thasos.[580] While besieging that town, he learned the news that the Phenician fleet had quitted Milêtus to attack the remaining Ionic towns; and he left his designs on Thasos unfinished, in order to go and defend Lesbos. But in this latter island the dearth of provisions was such, that he was forced to cross over to the continent to reap the standing corn around Atarneus and in the fertile plain of Mysia near the river Kaïkus. Here he fell in with a considerable Persian force under Harpagus,—was

beaten, compelled to flee, and taken prisoner. On his being carried to Sardis, Artaphernês the satrap caused him to be at once crucified: partly, no doubt, from genuine hatred, but partly also under the persuasion that, if he were sent up as a prisoner to Susa, he might again become dangerous,—since Darius would even now spare his life, under an indelible sentiment of gratitude for the maintenance of the bridge over the Danube. The head of Histiæus was embalmed and sent up to Susa, where Darius caused it to be honorably buried, condemning this precipitate execution of a man who had once been his preserver.[581]

We need not wonder that the capture of Milêtus excited the strongest feeling, of mixed sympathy and consternation, among the Athenians. In the succeeding year (so at least we are led to think, though the date cannot be positively determined), it was selected as the subject of a tragedy,—The Capture of Milêtus,—by the dramatic poet Phrynichus; which, when performed, so painfully wrung the feelings of the Athenian audience, that they burst into tears in the theatre, and the poet was condemned to pay a fine of one thousand drachmæ, as "having recalled to them their own misfortunes."[582] The piece was forbidden to be afterwards acted, and has not come down to us. Some critics have supposed that Herodotus has not correctly assigned the real motive which determined the Athenians to impose this fine.[583] For it is certain that the subjects usually selected for tragedy were portions of heroic legend, and not matters of recent history; so that the Athenians might complain of Phrynichus on the double ground,—for having violated an established canon of propriety, as well as for touching their sensibilities too deeply. Still, I see no reason for doubting that the cause assigned by Herodotus is substantially the true one; but it is very possible that Phrynichus, at an age when tragic poetry had not yet reached its full development, might touch this very tender subject with a rough and offensive hand, before a people who had fair reason to dread the like cruel fate for themselves. Æschylus, in his Persæ, would naturally carry with him the full tide of Athenian sympathy, while dwelling on the victories of Salamis and Platæa. But to interest the audience in Persian success and Grecian suffering, was a task in which much greater poets than Phrynichus would have failed,—and which no judicious poet would have undertaken. The sack of Magdeburg, by Count Tilly, in the Thirty Years' war, was not likely to be endured as the subject of dramatic representation in any Protestant town of Germany.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

FROM THE IONIC REVOLT TO THE BATTLE OF MARATHON.

In the preceding chapter, I indicated the point of confluence between the European and Asiatic streams of Grecian history,—the commencement of a decided Persian intention to conquer Attica; manifested first in the form of a threat by Artaphernês the satrap, when he enjoined the Athenians to take back Hippias as the only condition of safety, and afterwards converted into a passion in the bosom of Darius in consequence of the burning of Sardis. From this time forward, therefore, the affairs of Greece and Persia came to be in direct relation one with the other, and capable of being embodied, much more than before, into one continuous narrative.

The reconquest of Ionia being thoroughly completed, Artaphernês proceeded to organize the future government of it, with a degree of prudence and forethought not often visible in Persian proceedings. Convoking deputies from all the different cities, he compelled them to enter into a permanent convention, for the amicable settlement of disputes, so as to prevent all employment of force by any one against the others. Moreover, he caused the territory of each city to be measured by parasangs (each parasang was equal to thirty stadia, or about three miles and a half), and arranged the assessments of tribute according to this measurement, without any material departure, however, from the sums which had been paid before the revolt.[584]

Unfortunately, Herodotus is unusually brief in his allusion to this proceeding, which it would have been highly interesting to be able to comprehend perfectly. We may, however, assume it as certain, that both the population and the territory of many among the Ionic cities, if not of all, were materially altered in consequence of the preceding revolt, and still more in consequence of the cruelties with which the suppression of the revolt had been accompanied. In regard to Milêtus, Herodotus tells us that the Persians retained for themselves the city with its circumjacent plain, but gave the mountain portion of the Milesian territory to the Karians of Pêdasa.[585] Such a proceeding would naturally call for a fresh measurement and assessment of tribute; and there may have been similar transfers of land elsewhere. I have already observed that the statements which we find in Herodotus, of utter depopulation and destruction falling upon the cities, cannot be credited in their full extent; for these cities are all peopled, and all Hellenic, afterwards. But there can be no doubt that they are partially true, and that the miseries of those days, as stated in the work of Hekatæus, as well as by contemporary informants with whom Herodotus had probably conversed, must have been extreme. New inhabitants would probably be admitted in many of them, to supply the loss sustained; and such infusion of fresh blood would strengthen the necessity for the organization introduced by Artaphernês, in order to determine clearly the obligations due from the cities both to the Persian gov-

ernment and towards each other. Herodotus considers that the arrangement was extremely beneficial to the Ionians, and so it must unquestionably have appeared, coming as it did immediately after so much previous suffering. He farther adds, that the tribute then fixed remained unaltered until his own day,—a statement requiring some comment, which I reserve until the time arrives for describing the condition of the Asiatic Greeks after the repulse of Xerxês from Greece proper.

Meanwhile, the intentions of Darius for the conquest of Greece were now effectively manifested: Mardonius, invested with the supreme command, and at the head of a large force, was sent down in the ensuing spring for the purpose. Having reached Kilikia in the course of the march, he himself got on ship-board and went by sea to Ionia, while his army marched across Asia Minor to the Hellespont. His proceeding in Ionia surprises us, and seems to have appeared surprising as well to Herodotus himself as to his readers. Mardonius deposed the despots throughout the various Greek cities,[586] and left the people of each to govern themselves, subject to the Persian dominion and tribute. This was a complete reversal of the former policy of Persia, and must be ascribed to a new conviction, doubtless wise and well founded, which had recently grown up among the Persian leaders, that on the whole their unpopularity was aggravated, more than their strength was increased, by employing these despots as instruments. The phenomena of the late Ionic revolt were well calculated to teach such a lesson; but we shall not often find the Persians profiting by experience, throughout the course of this history.

Mardonius did not remain long in Ionia, but passed on with his fleet to the Hellespont, where the land-force had already arrived. He transported it across into Europe, and began his march through Thrace; all of which had already been reduced by Megabazus, and does not seem to have participated in the Ionic revolt. The island of Thasus surrendered to the fleet without any resistance, and the land-force was conveyed across the Strymon to the Greek city of Akanthus, on the western coast of the Strymonic gulf. From hence his land-force marched into Macedonia, and subdued a considerable portion of its inhabitants, perhaps some of those not comprised in the dominion of Amyntas, since that prince had before submitted to Megabazus. Meanwhile, he sent his fleet to double the promontory of Mount Athos, and to join the land-force again at the gulf of Therma, with a view of conquering as much of Greece as he could, and even of prosecuting the march as far as Athens and Eretria;[587] so that the expedition afterwards accomplished by Xerxês would have been tried at least by Mardonius, twelve or thirteen years earlier, had not a terrible storm completely disabled the fleet. The sea near Athos was then, and is now, full of peril to navigators. One of the hurricanes, so frequent in its neighborhood, overtook the Persian fleet, destroyed three hundred ships, and drowned or cast ashore not less than twenty thousand men: of those who reached the shore, many died of cold, or were devoured by the wild beasts on that inhospitable tongue of land. This disaster checked altogether the farther progress of Mardonius, who also sustained consider-

able loss with his land-army, and was himself wounded, in a night attack made upon him by the tribe of Thracians called Brygi. Though strong enough to repel and avenge this attack, and to subdue the Brygi, he was yet in no condition to advance farther. Both the land-force and the fleet were conveyed back to the Hellespont, and from thence across to Asia, with all the shame of failure. Nor was Mardonius again employed by Darius, though we cannot make out that the fault was imputable to him.[588] We shall hear of him again under Xerxês.

The ill-success of Mardonius seems to have inspired the Thasians, so recently subdued, with the idea of revolting. At least, they provoked the suspicion of Darius by making active preparations for defence, building war-ships, and strengthening their fortifications. The Thasians were at this time in great opulence, chiefly from their gold and silver mines, both in their island and in their mainland territory opposite. Their mines at Skaptê Hylê, in Thrace, yielded to them an annual income of eighty talents; and altogether their surplus revenue—after defraying all the expenses of government, so that the inhabitants were entirely untaxed—was two hundred talents (forty-six thousand pounds, if Attic talents; more, if either Euboic or Æginæan). With these large means, they were enabled soon to make preparations which excited notice among their neighbors, many of whom were doubtless jealous of their prosperity, and perhaps inclined to dispute with them possession of the profitable mines of Skaptê Hylê. As in other cases, so in this: the jealousies among subject neighbors often procured revelations to the superior power: the proceedings of the Thasians were made known, and they were forced to raze their fortifications as well as to surrender all their ships to the Persians at Abdêra.[589]

Though dissatisfied with Mardonius, Darius was only the more eagerly bent on his project of conquering Greece, and Hippias was at his side to keep alive his wrath against the Athenians.[590] Orders were despatched to the maritime cities of his empire to equip both ships of war and horse-transports for a renewed attempt. His intentions were probably known in Greece itself by this time, from the recent march of his army to Macedonia; but he thought it advisable to send heralds round to most of the Grecian cities, in order to require from each the formal token of submission,—earth and water; and thus to ascertain what extent of resistance his intended expedition was likely to experience. The answers received were to a high degree favorable. Many of the continental Greeks sent their submission, as well as all those islanders to whom application was made. Among the former, we are probably to reckon the Thebans and Thessalians, though Herodotus does not particularize them. Among the latter, Naxos, Eubœa, and some of the smaller islands, are not included; but Ægina, at that time the first maritime power of Greece, is expressly included.[591]

Nothing marks so clearly the imminent peril in which the liberties of Greece were now placed, and the terror inspired by the Persians after their reconquest of Ionia, as this abasement on the part of the Æginetans, whose commerce with the Asiatic islands and continent doubtless impressed them strongly with the melancholy conse-

quences of unsuccessful resistance to the Great King. But on the present occasion, their conduct was dictated as much by antipathy to Athens as by fear, so that Greece was thus threatened with the intrusion of the Persian arm as ally and arbiter in her internal contests: a contingency which, if it had occurred now in the dispute between Ægina and Athens, would have led to the certain enslavement of Greece,—though when it did occur nearly a century afterwards, towards the close of the Peloponnesian war, and in consequence of the prolonged struggle between Lacedæmon and Athens, Greece had become strong enough in her own force to endure it without the loss of substantial independence. The war between Thebes and Ægina on one side, and Athens on the other,—begun several years before, and growing out of the connection between Athens and Platæa,—had never yet been terminated. The Æginetans had taken part in that war from gratuitous feeling, either of friendship for Thebes, or of enmity to Athens, without any direct ground of quarrel,[592] and they had begun the war even without the formality of notice. Though a period apparently not less than fourteen years (from about 506-492 B. C.) had elapsed since it began, the state of hostility still continued; and we may well conceive that Hippias, the great instigator of Persian attack upon Greece, would not fail to enforce upon all the enemies of Athens the prudence of seconding, or at least of not opposing, the efforts of the Persian to reinstate him in that city. It was partly under this feeling, combined with genuine alarm, that both Thebes and Ægina manifested submissive dispositions towards the heralds of Darius.

Among these heralds, some had gone both to Athens and to Sparta, for the same purpose of demanding earth and water. The reception given to them at both places was angry in the extreme. The Athenians cast the herald into the pit called the barathrum,[593] into which they sometimes precipitated public criminals: the Spartans threw the herald who came to them into a well, desiring the unfortunate messenger to take earth and water from thence to the king. The inviolability of heralds was so ancient and undisputed in Greece, from the Homeric times downward, that nothing short of the fiercest excitement could have instigated any Grecian community to such an outrage. But to the Lacedæmonians, now accustomed to regard themselves as the first of all Grecian states, and to be addressed always in the character of superiors, the demand appeared so gross an insult as to banish from their minds for the time all recollection of established obligations. They came subsequently, however, to repent of the act as highly criminal, and to look upon it as the cause of misfortunes which overtook them thirty or forty years afterwards: how they tried at that time to expiate it, I shall hereafter recount.[594]

But if, on the one hand, the wounded dignity of the Spartans hurried them into the commission of this wrong, it was on the other hand of signal use to the general liberties of Greece, by rousing them out of their apathy as to the coming invader, and placing them with regard to him in the same state of inexpiable hostility as Athens and Eretria. We see at once the bonds drawn closer between Athens and Sparta. The

Athenians, for the first time, prefer a complaint at Sparta against the Æginetans for having given earth and water to Darius,—accusing them of having done this with views of enmity to Athens, and in order to invade Attica conjointly with the Persian. This they represented "as treason to Hellas," calling upon Sparta as head of Greece to interfere. And in consequence of their appeal, Kleomenês king of Sparta went over to Ægina, to take measures against the authors of the late proceeding, "for the general benefit of Hellas."[595]

The proceeding now before us is of very great importance in the progress of Grecian history. It is the first direct and positive historical manifestation of Hellas as an aggregate body, with Sparta as its chief, and obligations of a certain sort on the part of its members, the neglect or violation of which constitutes a species of treason. I have already pointed out several earlier incidents, showing how the Greek political mind, beginning from entire severance of states, became gradually prepared for this idea of a permanent league with mutual obligations and power of enforcement vested in a permanent chief,—an idea never fully carried into practice, but now distinctly manifest and partially operative. First, the great acquired power and territory of Sparta, her military training, her undisturbed political traditions, create an unconscious deference towards her, such as was not felt towards any other state: next, she is seen in the proceedings against Athens, after the expulsion of Hippias, as summoning and conducting to war a cluster of self-obliged Peloponnesian allies, with certain formalities which gave to the alliance an imposing permanence and solemnity: thirdly, her position becomes recognized as first power or president of Greece, both by foreigners who invite alliance (Crœsus), or by Greeks who seek help, such as the Platæans against Thebes, or the Ionians against Persia. But Sparta has not been hitherto found willing to take on herself the performance of this duty of protector-general. She refused the Ionians and the Samian Mæandrius, as well as the Platæans, in spite of their entreaties founded on common Hellenic lineage: the expedition which she undertook against Polykratês of Samos, was founded upon private motives of displeasure, even in the estimation of the Lacedæmonians themselves: moreover, even if all these requests had been granted, she might have seemed to be rather obeying a generous sympathy than performing a duty incumbent upon her as superior. But in the case now before us, of Athens against Ægina, the latter consideration stands distinctly prominent. Athens is not a member of the cluster of Spartan allies, nor does she claim the compassion of Sparta, as defenceless against an overpowering Grecian neighbor. She complains of a Pan-Hellenic obligation as having been contravened by the Æginetans to her detriment and danger, and calls upon Sparta to enforce upon the delinquents respect to these obligations. For the first time in Grecian history, such a call is made; for the first time in Grecian history, it is effectively answered. We may reasonably doubt, whether it would have been thus answered,—considering the tardy, unimpressible, and home-keeping character of the Spartans, with their general insensibility to distant dangers,[596]—if the adventure of the Persian herald had not occurred to gall their pride beyond endurance; to drive

them into unpardonable hostility with the Great King; and to cast them into the same boat with Athens for keeping off an enemy who threatened the common liberties of Hellas.

From this time, then, we may consider that there exists a recognized political union of Greece against the Persians,[597]—or at least something as near to a political union as Grecian temper will permit,—with Sparta as its head for the present. To such a preëminence of Sparta, Grecian history had been gradually tending; but the final event which placed it beyond dispute, and which humbled for the time her ancient and only rival—Argos—is now to be noticed.

It was about three or four years before the arrival of these Persian heralds in Greece, and nearly at the time when Milêtus was besieged by the Persian generals, that a war broke out between Sparta and Argos,[598]—on what grounds Herodotus does not inform us. Kleomenês, encouraged by a promise of the oracle that he should take Argos, led the Lacedæmonian troops to the banks of the Erasinus, the border river of the Argeian territory. But the sacrifices, without which no river could be crossed, were so unfavorable, that he altered his course, extorted some vessels from Ægina and Sikyon,[599] and carried his troops by sea to Nauplia, the seaport belonging to Argos, and to the territory of Tiryns. The Argeians having marched their forces down to resist him, the two armies joined battle at Sêpeia, near Tiryns: Kleomenês, by a piece of simplicity on the part of his enemies, which we find it difficult to credit in Herodotus, was enabled to attack them unprepared, and obtained a decisive victory. For the Argeians, it is stated, were so afraid of being overreached by stratagem, in the post which their army occupied over against the enemy, that they listened for the commands proclaimed aloud by the Lacedæmonian herald, and performed with their own army the same order which they thus heard given. This came to the knowledge of Kleomenês, who communicated private notice to his soldiers, that when the herald proclaimed orders to go to dinner, they should not obey, but immediately stand to their arms. We are to presume that the Argeian camp was sufficiently near to that of the Lacedæmonians to enable them to hear the voice of the herald, yet not within sight, from the nature of the ground. Accordingly, so soon as the Argeians heard the herald in the enemy's camp proclaim the word to go to dinner,[600] they went to dinner themselves; and in this disorderly condition they were easily overthrown by the Spartans. Many of them perished in the field, while the fugitives took refuge in a thick grove consecrated to their eponymous hero Argus. Kleomenês pursued and inclosed them therein; but thinking it safer to employ deceit rather than force, he ascertained from deserters the names of the chief Argeians thus shut up, and then invited them out successively by means of a herald,—pretending that he had received their ransom, and that they were released. As fast as each man came out, he was put to death; the fate of these unhappy sufferers being concealed from their comrades within the grove by the thickness of the foliage, until some one climbing to the top of a tree detected and proclaimed the destruction go-

ing on,—after about fifty of the victims had perished. Unable to entice any more of the Argeians from their consecrated refuge, which they still vainly hoped would protect them, Kleomenês set fire to the grove, and burnt it to the ground, insomuch that the persons within it appear to have been destroyed, either by fire or by sword.[601] After the conflagration had begun, he inquired for the first time to whom the grove belonged, and learnt that it belonged to the hero Argus.

Not less than six thousand citizens, the flower and strength of Argos, perished in this disastrous battle and retreat. And so completely was the city prostrated, that Kleomenês might easily have taken it, had he chosen to march thither forthwith and attack it with vigor. If we are to believe later historians whom Pausanias, Polyænus, and Plutarch have copied, he did march thither and attack it, but was repulsed by the valor of the Argeian women; who, in the dearth of warriors occasioned by the recent defeat, took arms along with the slaves, headed by the poetess Telesilla, and gallantly defended the walls.[602] This is probably a mythe, generated by a desire to embody in detail the dictum of the oracle a little before, about "the female conquering the male."[603] Without meaning to deny that the Argeian women might have been capable of achieving so patriotic a deed, if Kleomenês had actually marched to the attack of their city, we are compelled, by the distinct statement of Herodotus, to affirm that he never did attack it. Immediately after the burning of the sacred grove of Argos, he dismissed the bulk of his army to Sparta, retaining only one thousand choice troops,—with whom he marched up to the Hêræum, or great temple of Hêrê, between Argos and Mykênæ, to offer sacrifice. The priest in attendance forbade him to enter, saying that no stranger was allowed to offer sacrifice in the temple. But Kleomenês had once already forced his way into the sanctuary of Athênê, on the Athenian acropolis, in spite of the priestess and her interdict,—and he now acted still more brutally towards the Argeian priest, for he directed his helots to drag him from the altar and scourge him. Having offered sacrifice, Kleomenês returned with his remaining force to Sparta.[604]

But the army whom he had sent home returned with a full persuasion that Argos might easily have been taken,—that the king alone was to blame for having missed the opportunity. As soon as he himself returned, his enemies—perhaps his colleague Demaratus—brought him to trial before the ephors, on a charge of having been bribed, against which he defended himself as follows: He had invaded the hostile territory on the faith of an assurance from the oracle that he should take Argos; but so soon as he had burnt down the sacred grove of the hero Argus,—without knowing to whom it belonged,—he became at once sensible that this was all that the god meant by *taking Argos*, and therefore that the divine promise had been fully realized. Accordingly, he did not think himself at liberty to commence any fresh attack, until he had ascertained whether the gods would approve it and would grant him success. It was with this view that he sacrificed in the Hêræum. But though his sacrifice was favorable, he observed that the flame kindled on the altar flashed back from the bo-

som of the statue of Hêrê, and not from her head. If the flame had flashed from her head, he would have known at once that the gods intended him to take the city by storm;[605] but the flash from her bosom plainly indicated that the topmost success was out of his reach, and that he had already reaped all the glories which they intended for him. We may see that Herodotus, though he refrains from criticizing this story, suspects it to be a fabrication. Not so the Spartan ephors: to them it appeared not less true as a story than triumphant as a defence, insuring to Kleomenês an honorable acquittal.[606]

Though this Spartan king lost the opportunity of taking Argos, his victories already gained had inflicted upon her a blow such as she did not recover for a generation, and put her for a time out of all condition to dispute the primacy of Greece with Lacedæmon. I have already mentioned that both in legend and in earliest history, Argos stands forth as the first power in Greece, with legendary claims to headship, and decidedly above Lacedæmon; who gradually usurps from her, first the reality of superior power, next the recognition of preëminence,—and is now, at the period which we have reached, taking upon herself both the rights and the duties of a presiding state over a body of allies who are bound both to her and to each other. Her title to this honor, however, was never admitted at Argos, and it is very probable that the war just described grew in some way or other out of the increasing presidential power which circumstances were tending to throw into her hands. And the complete temporary prostration of Argos was an essential condition to the quiet acquisition of this power by Sparta. Occurring as it did two or three years before the above-recounted adventure of the heralds, it removed the only rival at that time both willing and able to compete with Sparta,—a rival who might well have prevented any effective union under another chief, though she could no longer have secured any Pan-Hellenic ascendency for herself,—a rival who would have seconded Ægina in her submission to the Persians, and would thus have lamed incurably the defensive force of Greece. The ships which Kleomenês had obtained from the Æginetans as well as from the Sikyonians, against their own will, for landing his troops at Nauplia, brought upon both these cities the enmity of Argos, which the Sikyonians compromised by paying a sum of money, while the Æginetans refused to do so.[607] And thus the circumstances of the Kleomenic war had the effect not only of enfeebling Argos, but of alienating her from natural allies and supporters, and clearing the ground for undisputed Spartan primacy.

Returning now to the complaint preferred by Athens to the Spartans against the traitorous submission of Ægina to Darius, we find that king Kleomenês passed immediately over to that island for the purpose of inquiry and punishment. He was proceeding to seize and carry away as prisoners several of the leading Æginetans, when Krius and some others among them opposed to him a menacing resistance, telling him that he came without any regular warrant from Sparta and under the influence of Athenian bribes,—that, in order to carry authority, both the Spartan kings ought to

come together. It was not of their own accord that the Æginetans ventured to adopt so dangerous a course. Demaratus, the colleague of Kleomenês in the junior or Prokleid line of kings, had suggested to them the step and promised to carry them through it safely.[608] Dissension between the two coördinate kings was no new phenomenon at Sparta; but in the case of Demaratus and Kleomenês, it had broken out some years previously on the occasion of the march against Attica; and Demaratus, hating his colleague more than ever, entered into the present intrigue with the Æginetans with the deliberate purpose of frustrating his intervention. He succeeded, and Kleomenês was compelled to return to Sparta; not without unequivocal menace against Krius and the other Æginetans who had repelled him,[609] and not without a thorough determination to depose Demaratus.

It appears that suspicions had always attached to the legitimacy of Demaratus's birth. His reputed father Aristo had had no offspring by two successive wives: at last, he became enamored of the wife of his friend Agêtus,—a woman of surpassing beauty,—and entrapped him into an agreement, whereby each solemnly bound himself to surrender anything belonging to him which the other might ask for. That which Agêtus asked from Aristo was at once given: in return, the latter demanded to have the wife of Agêtus, who was thunderstruck at the request, and indignantly complained of having been cheated into a sacrifice of all others the most painful: nevertheless, the oath was peremptory, and he was forced to comply. The birth of Demaratus took place so soon after this change of husbands, that when it was first made known to Aristo, as he sat upon a bench along with the ephors, he counted on his fingers the number of months since his marriage, and exclaimed with an oath, "The child cannot be mine." He soon, however, retracted his opinion, and acknowledged the child, who grew up without any question being publicly raised as to his birth, and succeeded his father on the throne. But the original words of Aristo had never been forgotten, and private suspicions were still cherished that Demaratus was really the son of his mother's first husband.[610]

Of these suspicions, Kleomenês now resolved to avail himself, exciting Leotychidês, the next heir in the Prokleid line of kings, to impugn publicly the legitimacy of Demaratus; engaging to second him with all his influence as next in order for the crown, and exacting in return a promise that he would support the intervention against Ægina. Leotychidês was animated not merely by ambition, but also by private enmity against Demaratus, who had disappointed him of his intended bride: he warmly entered into the scheme, arraigned Demaratus as no true Herakleid, and produced evidence to prove the original doubts expressed by Aristo. A serious dispute was thus raised at Sparta, and Kleomenês, espousing the pretensions of Leotychidês, recommended that the question as to the legitimacy of Demaratus should be decided by reference to the Delphian oracle. Through the influence of Kobôn, a powerful native of Delphi, he procured from the Pythian priestess an answer pronouncing that Demaratus was not the son of Aristo.[611] Leotychidês thus became king of the

Prokleid line, while Demaratus descended into a private station, and was elected at the ensuing solemnity of the Gymnopædia to an official function. The new king, unable to repress a burst of triumphant spite, sent an attendant to ask him, in the public theatre, how he felt as an officer after having once been a king. Stung with this insult, Demaratus replied that he himself had tried them both, and that Leotychidês might in time come to try them both also: the question, he added, shall bear its fruit, —great evil, or great good, to Sparta. So saying, he covered his face and retired home from the theatre,—offered a solemn farewell sacrifice at the altar of Zeus Herkeios, and solemnly adjured his mother to declare to him who his real father was, —then at once quitted Sparta for Elis, under pretence of going to consult the Delphian oracle.[612]

Demaratus was well known to be a high-spirited and ambitious man,—noted, among other things, as the only Lacedæmonian king down to the time of Herodotus who had ever gained a chariot victory at Olympia; and Kleomenês and Leotychidês became alarmed at the mischief which he might do them in exile. By the law of Sparta, no Herakleid was allowed to establish his residence out of the country, on pain of death: this marks the sentiment of the Lacedæmonians, and Demaratus was not the less likely to give trouble because they had pronounced him illegitimate.[613] Accordingly they sent in pursuit of him, and seized him in the island of Zakynthus. But the Zakynthians would not consent to surrender him, so that he passed unobstructed into Asia, where he presented himself to Darius, and was received with abundant favors and presents.[614] We shall hereafter find him the companion of Xerxês, giving to that monarch advice such as, if it had been acted upon, would have proved the ruin of Grecian independence; to which, however, he would have been even more dangerous, if he had remained at home as king of Sparta.

Meanwhile Kleomenês, having obtained a consentient colleague in Leotychidês, went with him over to Ægina, eager to revenge himself for the affront which had been put upon him. To the requisition and presence of the two kings jointly, the Æginetans did not dare to oppose any resistance. Kleomenês made choice of ten citizens, eminent for wealth, station, and influence, among whom were Krius and another person named Kasambus, the two most powerful men in the island. Conveying them away to Athens, he deposited them as hostages in the hands of the Athenians. [615]

It was in this state that the affairs of Athens and of Greece generally were found by the Persian armament which landed at Marathon, the progress of which we are now about to follow. And the events just recounted were of material importance, considered in their indirect bearing upon the success of that armament. Sparta had now, on the invitation of Athens, assumed to herself for the first time a formal Pan-Hellenic primacy, her ancient rival Argos being too much broken to contest it,—her two kings, at this juncture unanimous, employ their presiding interference in coercing Ægina, and placing Æginetan hostages in the hands of Athens. The Æginetans

would not have been unwilling to purchase victory over a neighbor and rival at the cost of submission to Persia, and it was the Spartan interference only which restrained them from assailing Athens conjointly with the Persian invaders; thus leaving the hands of the latter free, and her courage undiminished, for the coming trial.

Meanwhile, a vast Persian force, brought together in consequence of the preparation made during the last two years in every part of the empire, had assembled in the Aleïan plain of Kilikia, near the sea. A fleet of six hundred armed triremes, together with many transports, both of men and horses, was brought hither for their embarkation: the troops were put on board, and sailed along the coast to Samos in Ionia. The Ionic and Æolic Greeks constituted an important part of this armament, and the Athenian exile Hippias was on board as guide and auxiliary in the attack of Attica. The generals were Datis, a Median,[616]—and Artaphernês, son of the satrap of Sardis, so named, and nephew of Darius. We may remark that Datis is the first person of Median lineage who is mentioned as appointed to high command after the accession of Darius, which had been preceded and marked, as I have noticed in a former chapter, by an outbreak of hostile nationality between the Medes and Persians. Their instructions were, generally, to reduce to subjection and tribute all such Greeks as had not already given earth and water. But Darius directed them most particularly to conquer Eretria and Athens, and to bring the inhabitants as slaves into his presence.[617] These orders were literally meant, and probably neither the generals nor the soldiers of this vast armament doubted that they would be literally executed; and that before the end of the year, the wives, or rather the widows, of men like Themistoklês and Aristeidês would be seen among a mournful train of Athenian prisoners, on the road from Sardis to Susa, thus accomplishing the wish expressed by queen Atossa at the instance of Dêmokêdês.

The recent terrific storm near Mount Athos deterred the Persians from following the example of Mardonius, and taking their course by the Hellespont and Thrace. It was resolved to strike straight across the Ægean[618] (the mode of attack which intelligent Greeks like Themistoklês most feared, even after the repulse of Xerxês), from Samos to Eubœa, attacking the intermediate islands in the way. Among those islands was Naxos, which ten years before had stood a long siege, and gallantly repelled the Persian Megabatês with the Milesian Aristagoras. It was one of the main objects of Datis to efface this stain on the Persian arms, and to take a signal revenge on the Naxians.[619] Crossing from Samos to Naxos, he landed his army on the island, which was found an easier prize than he had expected. The terrified citizens, abandoning their town, fled with their families to the highest summits of their mountains; while the Persians, seizing as slaves a few who had been dilatory in flight, burnt the undefended town with its edifices sacred and profane.

Immense, indeed, was the difference in Grecian sentiment towards the Persians, created by the terror-striking reconquest of Ionia, and by the exhibition of a large Phenician fleet in the Ægean. The strength of Naxos was the same now as it had

been before the Ionic revolt, and the successful resistance then made might have been supposed likely to nerve the courage of its inhabitants. Yet such is the fear now inspired by a Persian armament, that the eight thousand Naxian hoplites abandon their town and their gods without striking a blow,[620] and think of nothing but personal safety for themselves and their families. A sad augury for Athens and Eretria!

From Naxos, Datis despatched his fleet round the other Cyclades islands, requiring from each, hostages for fidelity and a contingent to increase his army. With the sacred island of Delos, however, he dealt tenderly and respectfully. The Delians had fled before his approach to Tênos, but Datis sent a herald to invite them back again, promised to preserve their persons and property inviolate, and proclaimed that he had received express orders from the Great King to reverence the island in which Apollo and Artemis were born. His acts corresponded with this language; for the fleet was not allowed to touch the island, and he himself, landing with only a few attendants, offered a magnificent sacrifice at the altar. A large portion of his armament consisted of Ionic Greeks, and this pronounced respect to the island of Delos may probably be ascribed to the desire of satisfying their religious feelings; for in their days of early freedom, this island had been the scene of their solemn periodical festivals, as I have already more than once remarked.

Pursuing his course without resistance along the islands, and demanding reinforcements as well as hostages from each, Datis at length touched the southernmost portion of Eubœa,—the town of Karystus and its territory.[621] The Karystians, though at first refusing either to give hostages or to furnish any reinforcements against their friends and neighbors, were speedily compelled to submission by the aggressive devastation of the invaders. This was the first taste of resistance which Datis had yet experienced; and the facility with which it was overcome gave him a promising omen as to his success against Eretria, whither he soon arrived.

The destination of the armament was no secret to the inhabitants of this fated city, among whom consternation, aggravated by intestine differences, was the reigning sentiment. They made application to Athens for aid, which was readily and conveniently afforded to them by means of those four thousand kleruchs, or out-citizens, whom the Athenians had planted sixteen years before in the neighboring territory of Chalkis. Notwithstanding this reinforcement, however, many of them despaired of defending the city, and thought only of seeking shelter on the unassailable summits of the island, as the more numerous and powerful Naxians had already done before them; while another party, treacherously seeking their own profit out of the public calamity, lay in wait for an opportunity of betraying the city to the Persians.[622] Though a public resolution was taken to defend the city, yet so manifest was the absence of that stoutness of heart which could alone avail to save it, that a leading Eretrian named Æschinês was not ashamed to forewarn the four thousand Athenian allies of the coming treason, and urge them to save themselves before it was too late. They followed his advice and passed over to Attica by way of Orôpus; while the Per-

sians disembarked their troops, and even their horses, in expectation that the Eretrians would come out and fight, at Tamynæ and other places in the territory. As the Eretrians did not come out, they proceeded to lay siege to the city, and for some days met with a brave resistance, so that the loss on both sides was considerable. At length two of the leading citizens, Euphorbus and Philagrus, with others, betrayed Eretria to the besiegers; its temples were burnt, and its inhabitants dragged into slavery.[623] It is impossible to credit the exaggerated statement of Plato, which is applied by him to the Persians at Eretria, as it had been before applied by Herodotus to the Persians at Chios and Samos,—that they swept the territory clean of inhabitants by joining hands and forming a line across its whole breadth.[624] Evidently, this is an idea illustrating the possible effects of numbers and ruinous conquest, which has been woven into the tissue of historical statements, like so many other illustrative ideas in the writings of Greek authors. That a large proportion of the inhabitants were carried away as prisoners, there can be no doubt. But the traitors who betrayed the town were spared and rewarded by the Persians,[625] and we see plainly that either some of the inhabitants must have been left or new settlers introduced, when we find the Eretrians reckoned ten years afterwards among the opponents of Xerxês.

Datis had thus accomplished with little or no resistance one of the two express objects commanded by Darius, and his army was elated with the confident hope of soon completing the other. Alter halting a few days at Eretria, and depositing in the neighboring islet of Ægilia the prisoners recently captured, he reëmbarked his army to cross over to Attica, and landed in the memorable bay of Marathon on the eastern coast,—the spot indicated by the despot Hippias, who now landed along with the Persians, twenty years after his expulsion from the government. Forty-seven years had elapsed since he had made as a young man this same passage, from Eretria to Marathon, in conjunction with his father Peisistratus, on the occasion of the second restoration of the latter. On that previous occasion, the force accompanying the father had been immeasurably inferior to that which now seconded the son; yet it had been found amply sufficient to carry him in triumph to Athens, with feeble opposition from citizens alike irresolute and disunited. And the march of Hippias from Marathon to Athens would now have been equally easy, as it was doubtless conceived to be by himself, both in his waking hopes and in the dream which Herodotus mentions,—had not the Athenians whom he found been men radically different from those whom he had left.

To that great renewal of the Athenian character, under the democratical institutions which had subsisted since the dispossession of Hippias, I have already pointed attention in a former chapter. The modifications introduced by Kleisthenês in the constitution had now existed eighteen or nineteen years, without any attempt to overthrow them by violence. The Ten Tribes, each with its constituent demes, had become a part of the established habits of the country, and the citizens had become accustomed to exercise a genuine and self-determined decision in their assemblies, po-

litical as well as judicial; while even the senate of Areopagus, renovated by the nine annual archons successively chosen who passed into it after their year of office, had also become identified in feeling with the constitution of Kleisthenês. Individual citizens, doubtless, remained partisans in secret, and perhaps correspondents of Hippias; but the mass of citizens, in every scale of life, could look upon his return with nothing but terror and aversion. With what degree of newly-acquired energy the democratical Athenians could act in defence of their country and institutions, has already been related in a former chapter; though unfortunately we possess few particulars of Athenian history during the decade preceding 490 B. C., nor can we follow in detail the working of the government. The new form, however, which Athenian politics had assumed becomes partially manifest, when we observe the three leaders who stand prominent at this important epoch,—Miltiadês, Themistoklês, and Aristeidês.

The first of the three had returned to Athens, three or four years before the approach of Datis, after six or seven years' absence in the Chersonesus of Thrace, whither he had been originally sent by Hippias about the year 517-516 B. C., to inherit the property as well as the supremacy of his uncle the œkist Miltiadês. As despot of the Chersonese, and as one of the subjects of Persia, he had been among the Ionians who accompanied Darius to the Danube in his Scythian expedition, and he had been the author of that memorable recommendation which Histiæus and the other despots did not think it their interest to follow,—of destroying the bridge and leaving the Persian king to perish. Subsequently, he had been unable to remain permanently in the Chersonese, for reasons which have before been noticed; yet he seems to have occupied it during the period of the Ionic revolt.[626] What part he took in that revolt we do not know. But he availed himself of the period while the Persian satraps were employed in suppressing it, and deprived of the mastery of the sea, to expel, in conjunction with forces from Athens, both the Persian garrison and Pelasgic inhabitants from the islands of Lemnos and Imbros. The extinction of the Ionic revolt threatened him with ruin; so that when the Phenician fleet, in the summer following the capture of Milêtus, made its conquering appearance in the Hellespont, he was forced to escape rapidly to Athens with his immediate friends and property, and with a small squadron of five ships. One of these ships, commanded by his son Metiochus, was actually captured between the Chersonese and Imbros; and the Phenicians were most eager to capture himself,[627]—inasmuch as he was personally odious to Darius from his strenuous recommendation to destroy the bridge over the Danube. On arriving at Athens, after his escape from the Phenician fleet, he was brought to trial before the judicial popular assembly for alleged misgovernment in the Chersonese, or for what Herodotus calls "his despotism" there exercised.[628] Nor is it improbable, that the Athenian citizens settled in that peninsula may have had good reason to complain of him,—the more so as he had carried out with him the maxims of government prevalent at Athens under the Peisistratids, and had in his pay a body of Thracian mercenaries. However, the people at Athens honorably ac-

quitted him, probably in part from the reputation which he had obtained as conqueror of Lemnos;[629] and he was one of the ten annually-elected generals of the republic, during the year of this Persian expedition,—chosen at the beginning of the Attic year, shortly after the summer solstice, at a time when Datis and Hippias had actually sailed, and were known to be approaching.

The character of Miltiadês is one of great bravery and decision,—qualities preëminently useful to his country on the present crisis, and the more useful as he was under the strongest motive to put them forth, from the personal hostility of Darius towards him; but he does not peculiarly belong to the democracy of Kleisthenês, like his younger contemporaries Themistoklês and Aristeidês. The two latter are specimens of a class of men new at Athens since the expulsion of Hippias, and contrasting forcibly with Peisistratus, Lykurgus, and Megaklês, the political leaders of the preceding generation. Themistoklês and Aristeidês, different as they were in disposition, agree in being politicians of the democratical stamp, exercising ascendency by and through the people,—devoting their time to the discharge of public duties, and to the frequent discussions in the political and judicial meetings of the people,—manifesting those combined powers of action, comprehension, and persuasive speech, which gradually accustomed the citizens to look to them as advisers as well as leaders,—but always subject to criticism and accusation from unfriendly rivals, and exercising such rivalry towards each other with an asperity constantly increasing. Instead of Attica, disunited and torn into armed factions, as it had been forty years before,—the Diakrii under one man, and the Parali and Pedieis under others,—we have now Attica one and indivisible; regimented into a body of orderly hearers in the Pnyx, appointing and holding to accountability the magistrates, and open to be addressed by Themistoklês, Aristeidês, or any other citizen who can engage their attention.

Neither Themistoklês nor Aristeidês could boast of a lineage of gods and heroes, like the Æakid Miltiadês:[630] both were of middling station and circumstances. Aristeidês, son of Lysimachus, was on both sides of pure Athenian blood. But the wife of Neoklês, father of Themistoklês, was a foreign woman of Thrace or of Karia: and such an alliance is the less surprising, since Themistoklês must have been born during the dynasty of the Peisistratids, when the status of an Athenian citizen had not yet acquired its political value. There was a marked contrast between these two eminent men,—those points which stood most conspicuous in the one, being comparatively deficient in the other. In the description of Themistoklês, which we have the advantage of finding briefly sketched by Thucydidês, the circumstance most emphatically brought out is, his immense force of spontaneous invention and apprehension, without any previous aid either from teaching or gradual practice. The might of unassisted nature[631] was never so strikingly exhibited as in him: he conceived the complications of a present embarrassment, and divined the chances of a mysterious future, with equal sagacity and equal quickness: the right expedient seemed to flash upon his mind extempore, even in the most perplexing contingencies, without the

least necessity for premeditation. Nor was he less distinguished for daring and resource in action. When engaged on any joint affairs, his superior competence marked him out as the leader for others to follow, and no business, however foreign to his experience, ever took him by surprise, or came wholly amiss to him. Such is the remarkable picture which Thucydidês draws of a countryman whose death nearly coincided in time with his own birth: the untutored readiness and universality of Themistoklês probably formed in his mind a contrast to the more elaborate discipline, and careful preliminary study, with which the statesmen of his own day—and Periklês especially, the greatest of them—approached the consideration and discussion of public affairs. Themistoklês had received no teaching from philosophers, sophists, and rhetors, who were the instructors of well-born youth in the days of Thucydidês, and whom Aristophanês, the contemporary of the latter, so unmercifully derides,—treating such instruction as worse than nothing, and extolling, in comparison with it, the unlettered courage, with mere gymnastic accomplishments, of the victors at Marathon.[632] There is no evidence in the mind of Thucydidês of any such undue contempt towards his own age. Though the same terms of contrast are tacitly present to his mind, he seems to treat the great capacity of Themistoklês as the more a matter of wonder, since it sprung up without that preliminary cultivation which had gone to the making of Periklês.

The general character given of Plutarch,[633] though many of his anecdotes are both trifling and apocryphal, is quite consistent with the brief sketch just cited from Thucydidês. Themistoklês had an unbounded passion,—not merely for glory, insomuch that the laurels of Miltiadês acquired at Marathon deprived him of rest,—but also for display of every kind. He was eager to vie with men richer than himself in showy exhibition,—one great source, though not the only source, of popularity at Athens,—nor was he at all scrupulous in procuring the means of doing so. Besides being assiduous in attendance at the ekklesia and the dikastery, he knew most of the citizens by name, and was always ready with advice to them in their private affairs. Moreover, he possessed all the tactics of an expert party-man in conciliating political friends and in defeating political enemies; and though he was in the early part of his life sincerely bent upon the upholding and aggrandizement of his country, and was on some most critical occasions of unspeakable value to it,—yet on the whole his morality was as reckless as his intelligence was eminent. He will be found grossly corrupt in the exercise of power, and employing tortuous means, sometimes indeed for ends in themselves honorable and patriotic, but sometimes also merely for enriching himself. He ended a glorious life by years of deep disgrace, with the forfeiture of all Hellenic esteem and brotherhood,—a rich man, an exile, a traitor, and a pensioner of the Great King, pledged to undo his own previous work of liberation accomplished at the victory of Salamis.

Of Aristeidês we possess unfortunately no description from the hand of Thucydidês; yet his character is so simple and consistent, that we may safely accept the

brief but unqualified encomium of Herodotus and Plato, expanded as it is in the biography of Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos,[634] however little the details of the latter can be trusted. Aristeidês was inferior to Themistoklês in resource, quickness, flexibility, and power of coping with difficulties; but incomparably superior to him, as well as to other rivals and contemporaries, in integrity, public as well as private; inaccessible to pecuniary temptations, as well as to other seductive influences, and deserving as well as enjoying the highest measure of personal confidence. He is described as the peculiar friend of Kleisthenês, the first founder of the democracy,[635]—as pursuing a straight and single-handed course in political life, with no solicitude for party ties, and with little care either to conciliate friends or to offend enemies,—as unflinching in the exposure of corrupt practices, by whomsoever committed or upheld,—as earning for himself the lofty surname of the Just, not less by his judicial decisions in the capacity of archon, than by his equity in private arbitrations, and even his candor in political dispute,—and as manifesting throughout a long public life, full of tempting opportunities, an uprightness without flaw and beyond all suspicion, recognized equally by his bitter contemporary the poet Timokreon,[636] and by the allies of Athens, upon whom he first assessed the tribute. Few of the leading men in any part of Greece were without some taint on their reputation, deserved or undeserved, in regard to pecuniary probity; but whoever became notoriously recognized as possessing this vital quality, acquired by means of it a firmer hold on the public esteem than even eminent talents could confer. Thucydidês ranks conspicuous probity among the first of the many ascendent qualities possessed by Periklês;[637] and Nikias, equal to him in this respect, though immeasurably inferior in every other, owed to it a still larger proportion of that exaggerated confidence which the Athenian people continued so long to repose in him. The abilities of Aristeidês, though apparently adequate to every occasion on which he was engaged, and only inferior when we compare him with so remarkable a man as Themistoklês, were put in the shade by this incorruptible probity, which procured for him, however, along with the general esteem, no inconsiderable amount of private enmity from jobbers whom he exposed, and even some jealousy from persons who heard it proclaimed with offensive ostentation.

We are told that a rustic and unlettered citizen gave his ostracizing vote, and expressed his dislike against Aristeidês,[638] on the simple ground that he was tired of hearing him always called the Just. Now the purity of the most honorable man will not bear to be so boastfully talked of as if he were the only honorable man in the country: the less it is obtruded, the more deeply and cordially will it be felt: and the story just alluded to, whether true or false, illustrates that natural reaction of feeling, produced by absurd encomiasts, or perhaps by insidious enemies under the mask of encomiasts, who trumpeted forth Aristeidês as *The* Just man at Attica, so as to wound the legitimate dignity of every one else. Neither indiscreet friends nor artful enemies, however, could rob him of the lasting esteem of his countrymen; which he enjoyed, with intervals of their displeasure, to the end of his life. Though he was os-

tracized during a part of the period between the battle of Marathon and Salamis,—at a time when the rivalry between him and Themistoklês was so violent that both could not remain at Athens without peril,—yet the dangers of Athens during the invasion of Xerxês brought him back before the ten years of exile were expired. His fortune, originally very moderate, was still farther diminished during the course of his life, so that he died very poor, and the state was obliged to lend aid to his children.

Such were the characters of Themistoklês and Aristeidês, the two earliest leaders thrown up by the Athenian democracy. Half a century before, Themistoklês would have been an active partisan in the faction of the Parali or the Pedieis, while Aristeidês would probably have remained an unnoticed citizen. At the present period of Athenian history, the characters of the soldier, the magistrate, and the orator, were intimately blended together in a citizen who stood forward for eminence, though they tended more and more to divide themselves during the ensuing century and a half. Aristeidês and Miltiadês were both elected among the ten generals, each for his respective tribe, in the year of the expedition of Datis across the Ægean, and probably even after that expedition was known to be on its voyage. Moreover, we are led to suspect from a passage in Plutarch, that Themistoklês also was general of his tribe on the same occasion,[639] though this is doubtful; but it is certain that he fought at Marathon. The ten generals had jointly the command of the army, each of them taking his turn to exercise it for a day: in addition to the ten, moreover, the third archon, or polemarch, was considered as eleventh in the military council. The polemarch of this year was Kallimachus of Aphidnæ.[640] Such were the chiefs of the military force, and to a great degree the administrators of foreign affairs, at the time when the four thousand Athenian kleruchs, or settlers planted in Eubœa,—escaping from Eretria, now invested by the Persians,—brought word to their countrymen at home that the fall of that city was impending. It was obvious that the Persian host would proceed from Eretria forthwith against Athens, and a few days afterwards Hippias disembarked them at Marathon, whither the Athenian army marched to meet them.

Of the feeling which now prevailed at Athens we have no details, but doubtless the alarm was hardly inferior to that which had been felt at Eretria: dissenting opinions were heard as to the proper steps to be taken, nor were suspicions of treason wanting. Pheidippidês the courier was sent to Sparta immediately to solicit assistance; and such was his prodigious activity, that he performed this journey of one hundred and fifty miles, on foot, in forty-eight hours.[641] He revealed to the ephors that Eretria was already enslaved, and entreated their assistance to avert the same fate from Athens, the most ancient city in Greece. The Spartan authorities readily promised their aid, but unfortunately it was now the ninth day of the moon: ancient law or custom forbade them to march, in this month at least, during the last quarter before the full moon; but after the full they engaged to march without delay. Five days' delay at this critical moment might prove the utter ruin of the endangered city;

yet the reason assigned seems to have been no pretence on the part of the Spartans. It was mere blind tenacity of ancient habit, which we shall find to abate, though never to disappear, as we advance in their history.[642] Indeed, their delay in marching to rescue Attica from Mardonius, eleven years afterwards, at the imminent hazard of alienating Athens and ruining the Hellenic cause, marks the same selfish dulness. But the reason now given certainly looked very like a pretence, so that the Athenians could indulge no certain assurance that the Spartan troops would start even when the full moon arrived.

In this respect the answer brought by Pheidippidês was mischievous, as it tended to increase that uncertainty and indecision which already prevailed among the ten generals, as to the proper steps for meeting the invaders. Partly, perhaps, in reliance on this expected Spartan help, five out of the ten generals were decidedly averse to an immediate engagement with the Persians; while Miltiadês with the remaining four strenuously urged that not a moment should be lost in bringing the enemy to action, without leaving time to the timid and the treacherous to establish correspondence with Hippias, and to take some active step for paralyzing all united action on the part of the citizens. This most momentous debate, upon which the fate of Athens hung, is represented by Herodotus to have occurred at Marathon, after the army had marched out and taken post there within sight of the Persians; while Cornelius Nepos describes it as having been raised before the army quitted the city,—upon the question, whether it was prudent to meet the enemy at all in the field, or to confine the defence to the city and the sacred rock. Inaccurate as this latter author generally is, his statement seems more probable here than that of Herodotus. For the ten generals would scarcely march out of Athens to Marathon without having previously resolved to fight: moreover, the question between fighting in the field or resisting behind the walls, which had already been raised at Eretria, seems the natural point on which the five mistrustful generals would take their stand. And probably indeed Miltiadês himself, if debarred from immediate action, would have preferred to hold possession of Athens, and prevent any treacherous movement from breaking out there, —rather than to remain inactive on the hills, watching the Persians at Marathon, with the chance of a detachment from their numerous fleet sailing round to Phalêrum, and thus distracting, by a double attack, both the city and the camp.

However this may be, the equal division of opinion among the ten generals, whether manifested at Marathon or at Athens, is certain,—so that Miltiadês had to await the casting-vote of the polemarch Kallimachus. To him he represented emphatically the danger of delay, and the chance of some traitorous intrigue occurring to excite disunion and aggravate the alarms of the citizens. Nothing could prevent such treason from breaking out, with all its terrific consequences of enslavement to the Persians and to Hippias, except a bold, decisive, and immediate attack,—the success of which he (Miltiadês) was prepared to guarantee. Fortunately for Athens, the polemarch embraced the opinion of Miltiadês, and the seditious movements which were

preparing did not show themselves until after the battle had been gained. Aristeidês and Themistoklês are both recorded to have seconded Miltiadês warmly in this proposal,—while all the other generals agreed in surrendering to Miltiadês their days of command, so as to make him, as much as they could, the sole leader of the army. It is said that the latter awaited the day of his own regular turn before he fought the battle.[643] Yet considering the eagerness which he displayed to bring on an immediate and decisive action, we cannot suppose that he would have admitted any serious postponement upon such a punctilio.

While the army were mustered on the ground sacred to Heraklês near Marathon, with the Persians and their fleet occupying the plain and shore beneath, and in preparation for immediate action, they were joined by the whole force of the little town of Platæa, consisting of about one thousand hoplites, who had marched directly from their own city to the spot, along the southern range of Kithærôn and passing through Dekeleia. We are not told that they had been invited, and very probably the Athenians had never thought of summoning aid from this unimportant neighbor, in whose behalf they had taken upon themselves a lasting feud with Thebes and the Bœotian league.[644] Their coming on this important occasion seems to have been a spontaneous effort of gratitude which ought not to be the less commended because their interests were really wrapped up in those of Athens,—since if the latter had been conquered, nothing could have saved Platæa from being subdued by the Thebans,—yet many a Grecian town would have disregarded both generous impulse and rational calculation, in the fear of provoking a new and terrific enemy. If we summon up to our imaginations all the circumstances of the case,—which it requires some effort to do, because our authorities come from the subsequent generations, after Greece had ceased to fear the Persians,—we shall be sensible that this volunteer march of the whole Platæan force to Marathon is one of the most affecting incidents of all Grecian history. Upon Athens generally it produced an indelible impression, commemorated ever afterwards in the public prayers of the Athenian herald,[645] and repaid by a grant to the Platæans of the full civil rights—seemingly without the political rights—of Athenian citizens. Upon the Athenians then marshalled at Marathon its effect must have been unspeakably powerful and encouraging, as a proof that they were not altogether isolated from Greece, and as an unexpected countervailing stimulus under circumstances so full of hazard.

Of the two opposing armies at Marathon, we are told that the Athenians were ten thousand hoplites, either including or besides the one thousand who came from Platæa.[646] Nor is this statement in itself improbable, though it does not come from Herodotus, who is our only really valuable authority on the case, and who mentions no numerical total. Indeed, the number named seems smaller than we should have expected, considering that no less than four thousand kleruchs, or out-settled citizens, had just come over from Eubœa. A sufficient force of citizens must of course have been left behind to defend the city. The numbers of the Persians we cannot be

said to know at all, nor is there anything certain except that they were greatly superior to the Greeks. We hear from Herodotus that their armament originally consisted of six hundred ships of war, but we are not told how many separate transports there were; and, moreover, reinforcements had been procured as they came across the Ægean from the islands successively conquered. The aggregate crews on board of all their ships must have been between one hundred and fifty thousand and two hundred thousand men; but what proportion of these were fighting men, or how many actually did fight at Marathon, we have no means of determining.[647] There were a certain proportion of cavalry, and some transports expressly prepared for the conveyance of horses: moreover, Herodotus tells us that Hippias selected the plain of Marathon for a landing place, because it was the most convenient spot in Attica for cavalry movements,—though it is singular, that in the battle the cavalry are not mentioned.

Marathon, situated near to a bay on the eastern coast of Attica, and in a direction E.N.E. from Athens, is divided by the high ridge of Mount Pentelikus from the city, with which it communicated by two roads, one to the north, another to the south of that mountain. Of these two roads, the northern, at once the shortest and the most difficult, is twenty-two miles in length: the southern—longer but more easy, and the only one practicable for chariots—is twenty-six miles in length, or about six and a half hours of computed march. It passed between mounts Pentelikus and Hymettus, through the ancient demes of Gargêttus and Pallênê, and was the road by which Peisistratus and Hippias, when they landed at Marathon forty-seven years before, had marched to Athens. The bay of Marathon, sheltered by a projecting cape from the northward, affords both deep water and a shore convenient for landing; while "its plain (says a careful modern observer[648]) extends in a perfect level along this fine bay, and is in length about six miles, in breadth never less than about one mile and a half. Two marshes bound the extremities of the plain: the southern is not very large, and is almost dry at the conclusion of the great heats; but the northern, which generally covers considerably more than a square mile, offers several parts which are at all seasons impassable. Both, however, leave a broad, firm, sandy beach between them and the sea. The uninterrupted flatness of the plain is hardly relieved by a single tree; and an amphitheatre of rocky hills and rugged mountains separates it from the rest of Attica, over the lower ridges of which some steep and difficult paths communicate with the districts of the interior."

The position occupied by Miltiadês before the battle, identified as it was to all subsequent Athenians by the sacred grove of Hêraklês near Marathon, was probably on some portion of the high ground above this plain, and Cornelius Nepos tells us that he protected it from the attacks of the Persian cavalry by felled trees obstructing the approach. The Persians occupied a position on the plain; while their fleet was ranged along the beach, and Hippias himself marshalled them for the battle.[649] The native Persians and Sakæ, the best troops in the whole army, were placed in the

centre, which they considered as the post of honor,[650] and which was occupied by the Persian king himself, when present at a battle. The right wing was so regarded by the Greeks, and the polemarch Kallimachus had the command of it; the hoplites being arranged in the order of their respective tribes from right to left, and at the extreme left stood the Platæans. It was necessary for Miltiadês to present a front equal, or nearly equal, to that of the more numerous Persian host, in order to guard himself from being taken in flank: and with this view he drew up the central tribes, including the Leontis and Antiochis, in shallow files, and occupying a large breadth of ground; while each of the wings was in stronger and deeper order, so as to make his attack efficient on both sides. His whole army consisted of hoplites, with some slaves as unarmed or light-armed attendants, but without either bowmen or cavalry. Nor could the Persians have been very strong in this latter force, seeing that their horses had to be transported across the Ægean. But the elevated position of Miltiadês enabled them to take some measure of the numbers under his command, and the entire absence of cavalry among their enemies could not but confirm the confidence with which a long career of uninterrupted victory had impressed their generals.

At length the sacrifices in the Greek camp were favorable for battle, and Miltiadês, who had everything to gain by coming immediately to close quarters, ordered his army to advance at a running step over the interval of one mile which separated the two armies. This rapid forward movement, accompanied by the war-cry, or pæan, which always animated the charge of the Greek soldier, astounded the Persian army; who construed it as an act of desperate courage, little short of insanity, in a body not only small but destitute of cavalry or archers,—but who, at the same time, felt their conscious superiority sink within them. It seems to have been long remembered also among the Greeks as the peculiar characteristic of the battle of Marathon, and Herodotus tells us that the Athenians were the first Greeks who ever charged at a run.[651] It doubtless operated beneficially in rendering the Persian cavalry and archers comparatively innocuous, but we may reasonably suppose that it also disordered the Athenian ranks, and that when they reached the Persian front, they were both out of breath and unsteady in that line of presented spears and shields which constituted their force. On the two wings, where the files were deep, this disorder produced no mischievous effect: the Persians, after a certain resistance, were overborne and driven back. But in the centre, where the files were shallow, and where, moreover, the native Persians and other choice troops of the army were posted, the breathless and disordered Athenian hoplites found themselves in far greater difficulties. The tribes Leontis and Antiochis, with Themistoklês and Aristeidês among them, were actually defeated, broken, driven back, and pursued by the Persians and Sakæ.[652] Miltiadês seems to have foreseen the possibility of such a check, when he found himself compelled to diminish so materially the depth of his centre: for his wings, having routed the enemies opposed to them, were stayed from pursuit until the centre was extricated, and the Persians and Sakæ put to flight along with the rest. The pursuit then became general, and the Persians were chased to their ships ranged in

line along the shore: some of them became involved in the impassable marsh and there perished.[653] The Athenians tried to set the ships on fire, but the defence here was both vigorous and successful,—several of the forward warriors of Athens were slain,—and only seven ships out of the numerous fleet destroyed.[654] This part of the battle terminated to the advantage of the Persians. They repulsed the Athenians from the sea-shore, and secured a safe reëmbarkation; leaving few or no prisoners, but a rich spoil of tents and equipments which had been disembarked and could not be carried away.

Herodotus estimates the number of those who fell on the Persian side in this memorable action at six thousand four hundred men: the number of Athenian dead is accurately known, since all were collected for the last solemn obsequies,—they were one hundred and ninety-two. How many were wounded, we do not hear. The brave Kallimachus the polemarch, and Stesilaus, one of the ten generals, were among the slain; together with Kynegeirus son of Euphorion, who, in laying hold on the poop-staff of one of the vessels, had his hand cut off by an axe,[655] and died of the wound. He was brother of the poet Æschylus, himself present at the fight; to whose imagination this battle at the ships must have emphatically recalled the fifteenth book of the Iliad. Both these Athenian generals are said to have perished in the assault of the ships, apparently the hottest part of the combat. The statement of the Persian loss as given by Herodotus appears moderate and reasonable,[656] but he does not specify any distinguished individuals as having fallen.

But the Persians, though thus defeated and compelled to abandon the position of Marathon, were not yet disposed to relinquish altogether their chances against Attica. Their fleet was observed to take the direction of Cape Sunium,—a portion being sent to take up the Eretrian prisoners and the stores which had been left in the island of Ægilia. At the same time a shield, discernible from its polished surface afar off, was seen held aloft upon some high point of Attica,[657]—perhaps on the summit of Mount Pentelikus, as Colonel Leake supposes with much plausibility. The Athenians doubtless saw it as well as the Persians; and Miltiadês did not fail to put the right interpretation upon it, taken in conjunction with the course of the departing fleet. The shield was a signal put up by partisans in the country, to invite the Persians round to Athens by sea, while the Marathonian army was absent. Miltiadês saw through the plot, and lost not a moment in returning to Athens. On the very day of the battle, the Athenian army marched back with the utmost speed from the precinct of Hêraklês at Marathon to the precinct of the same god at Kynosarges, close to Athens, which they reached before the arrival of the Persian fleet.[658] Datis soon came off the port of Phalêrum, but the partisans of Hippias had been dismayed by the rapid return of the Marathonian army, and he did not therefore find those aids and facilities which he had anticipated for a fresh disembarkation in the immediate neighborhood of Athens. Though too late, however, it seems that he was not much too late: the Marathonian army had only just completed their forced return-march. A little less quickness on the

part of Miltiadês in deciphering the treasonable signal and giving the instant order of march,—a little less energy on the part of the Athenian citizens in superadding a fatiguing march to a no less fatiguing combat,—and the Persians, with the partisans of Hippias, might have been found in possession of Athens. As the facts turned out, Datis, finding at Phalêrum no friendly movement to encourage him, but, on the contrary, the unexpected presence of the soldiers who had already vanquished him at Marathon,—made no attempt again to disembark in Attica, and sailed away, after a short delay, to the Cyclades.

Thus was Athens rescued, for this time at least, from a danger not less terrible than imminent. Nothing could have rescued her except that decisive and instantaneous attack which Miltiadês so emphatically urged. The running step on the field of Marathon might cause some disorder in the ranks of the hoplites; but extreme haste in bringing on the combat was the only means of preventing disunion and distraction in the minds of the citizens. Imperfect as the account is which Herodotus gives of this most interesting crisis, we see plainly that the partisans of Hippias had actually organized a conspiracy, and that it only failed by coming a little too late. The bright shield uplifted on Mount Pentelikus, apprizing the Persians that matters were prepared for them at Athens, was intended to have come to their view before any action had taken place at Marathon, and while the Athenian army were yet detained there; so that Datis might have sent a portion of his fleet round to Phalêrum, retaining the rest for combat with the enemy before him. If it had once become known to the Marathonian army that a Persian detachment had landed at Phalêrum,[659]—where there was a good plain for cavalry to act in, prior to the building of the Phalêric wall, as had been seen in the defeat of the Spartan Anchimolius by the Thessalian cavalry, in 510 B. C.,—that it had been joined by timid or treacherous Athenians, and had perhaps even got possession of the city,—their minds would have been so distracted by the double danger, and by fears for their absent wives and children, that they would have been disqualified for any unanimous execution of military orders, and generals as well as soldiers would have become incurably divided in opinion,—perhaps even mistrustful of each other. The citizen-soldier of Greece generally, and especially of Athens, possessed in a high degree both personal bravery and attachment to order and discipline; but his bravery was not of that equal, imperturbable, uninquiring character, which belonged to the battalions of Wellington or Napoleon,—it was fitful, exalted or depressed by casual occurrences, and often more sensitive to dangers absent and unseen, than to enemies immediately in his front. Hence the advantage, so unspeakable in the case before us, and so well appreciated by Miltiadês, of having one undivided Athenian army,—with one hostile army, and only one, to meet in the field. When we come to the battle of Salamis, ten years later, it will be seen that the Greeks of that day enjoyed the same advantage: though the wisest advisers of Xerxês impressed upon him the prudence of dividing his large force, and of sending detachments to assail separate Greek states—which would infallibly produce the effect of breaking up the combined Grecian host, and leaving no central or coöperating

force for the defence of Greece generally. Fortunately for the Greeks, the childish insolence of Xerxês led him to despise all such advice, as implying conscious weakness. Not so Datis and Hippias. Sensible of the prudence of distracting the attention of the Athenians by a double attack, they laid a scheme, while the main army was at Marathon, for rallying the partisans of Hippias, with a force to assist them, in the neighborhood of Athens,—and the signal was upheld by these partisans as soon as their measures were taken. But the rapidity of Miltiadês so precipitated the battle, that this signal came too late, and was only given, "when the Persians were already in their ships,"[660] after the Marathonian defeat. Even then it might have proved dangerous, had not the movements of Miltiadês been as rapid after the victory as before it: but if time had been allowed for the Persian movement on Athens before the battle of Marathon had been fought, the triumph of the Athenians might well have been exchanged for a calamitous servitude. To Miltiadês belongs the credit of having comprehended the emergency from the beginning, and overruled the irresolution of his colleagues by his own single-hearted energy. The chances all turned out in his favor,—for the unexpected junction of the Platæans in the very encampment of Marathon must have wrought up the courage of his army to the highest pitch: and not only did he thus escape all the depressing and distracting accidents, but he was fortunate enough to find this extraneous encouragement immediately preceding the battle, from a source on which he could not have calculated.

I have already observed that the phase of Grecian history best known to us, amidst which the great authors from whom we draw our information lived, was one of contempt for the Persians in the field. And it requires some effort of imagination to call back previous feelings after the circumstances have been altogether reversed: perhaps even Æschylus the poet, at the time when he composed his tragedy of the Persæ, to celebrate the disgraceful flight of the invader Xerxês, may have forgotten the emotions with which he and his brother Kynegeirus must have marched out from Athens fifteen years before, on the eve of the battle of Marathon. It must therefore be again mentioned that, down to the time when Datis landed in the bay of Marathon, the tide of Persian success had never yet been interrupted,—and that especially during the ten years immediately preceding, the high-handed and cruel extinction of the Ionic revolt had aggravated to the highest pitch the alarm of the Greeks. To this must be added the successes of Datis himself, and the calamities of Eretria, coming with all the freshness of novelty as an apparent sentence of death to Athens. The extreme effort of courage required in the Athenians, to encounter such invaders, is attested by the division of opinion among the ten generals. Putting all the circumstances together, it is without a parallel in Grecian history, surpassing even the combat of Thermopylæ, as will appear when I come to describe that memorable event. And the admirable conduct of the five dissentient generals, when outvoted by the decision of the polemarch against them, in coöperating heartily for the success of a policy which they deprecated,—proves how much the feelings of a constitutional democracy, and that entire acceptance of the pronounced decision of the majority on

which it rests, had worked themselves into the Athenian mind. The combat of Marathon was by no means a very decisive defeat, but it was a defeat,—and the first which the Persians had ever received from Greeks in the field. If the battle of Salamis, ten years afterwards, could be treated by Themistoklês as a hair-breadth escape for Greece, much more is this true of the battle of Marathon;[661] which first afforded reasonable proof, even to discerning and resolute Greeks, that the Persians might be effectually repelled, and the independence of European Greece maintained against them,—a conviction of incalculable value in reference to the formidable trials destined to follow. Upon the Athenians themselves, the first to face in the field successfully the terrific look of a Persian army, the effect of the victory was yet more stirring and profound.[662] It supplied them with resolution for the far greater actual sacrifices which they cheerfully underwent ten years afterwards, at the invasion of Xerxês, without faltering in their Pan-Hellenic fidelity; and it strengthened them at home by swelling the tide of common sentiment and patriotic fraternity in the bosom of every individual citizen. It was the exploit of Athenians alone, but of all Athenians without dissent or exception,—the boast of orators, repeated until it almost degenerated into common-place, though the people seem never to have become weary of allusions to their single-handed victory over a host of forty-six nations.[663] It had been purchased without a drop of intestine bloodshed,—for even the unknown traitors who raised the signal-shield on Mount Pentelikus, took care not to betray themselves by want of apparent sympathy with the triumph: lastly, it was the final guarantee of their democracy, barring all chance of restoration of Hippias for the future. Themistoklês[664] is said to have been robbed of his sleep by the trophies of Miltiadês, and this is cited in proof of his ambitious temperament; but without supposing either jealousy or personal love of glory, the rapid transit from extreme danger to unparalleled triumph might well deprive of rest even the most sober-minded Athenian.

Who it was that raised the treacherous signal-shield to attract the Persians to Athens was never ascertained: very probably, in the full exultation of success, no investigation was made. Of course, however, the public belief would not be satisfied without singling out some persons as the authors of such a treason; and the information received by Herodotus (probably about 450-440 B. C., forty or fifty years after the Marathonian victory) ascribed the deed to the Alkmæônids; nor does he notice any other reported authors, though he rejects the allegation against them upon very sufficient grounds. They were a race religiously tainted, ever since the Kylonian sacrilege, and were therefore convenient persons to brand with the odium of an anonymous crime; while party feud, if it did not originally invent, would at least be active in spreading and certifying such rumors. At the time when Herodotus knew Athens, the political enmity between Periklês son of Xanthippus, and Kimon son of Miltiadês, was at its height: Periklês belonged by his mother's side to the Alkmæônid race, and we know that such lineage was made subservient to political manœuvres against him by his enemies.[665] Moreover, the enmity between Kimon and Periklês had been inherited by both from their fathers; for we shall find Xanthippus, not long after the

battle of Marathon, the prominent accuser of Miltiadês. Though Xanthippus was not an Alkmæônid, his marriage with Agaristê connected himself indirectly, and his son Periklês directly, with that race. And we may trace in this standing political feud a probable origin for the false reports as to the treason of the Alkmæônids, on that great occasion which founded the glory of Miltiadês; for that the reports were false, the intrinsic probabilities of the case, supported by the judgment of Herodotus, afford ample ground for believing.

When the Athenian army made its sudden return-march from Marathon to Athens, Aristeidês with his tribe was left to guard the field and the spoil; but the speedy retirement of Datis from Attica left the Athenians at full liberty to revisit the scene and discharge the last duties to the dead. A tumulus was erected on the spot[666]—such distinction was never conferred by Athens except in this case only—to the one hundred and ninety-two Athenian citizens who had been slain. Their names were inscribed on ten pillars erected at the spot, one for each tribe: there was also a second tumulus for the slain Platæans, a third for the slaves, and a separate funeral monument to Miltiadês himself. Six hundred years after the battle, Pausanias saw the tumulus, and could still read on the pillars the names of the immortalized warriors; [667] and even now a conspicuous tumulus exists about half a mile from the seashore, which Colonel Leake believes to be the same.[668] The inhabitants of the deme of Marathon worshipped these slain warriors as heroes, along with their own eponymus, and with Hêraklês.

So splendid a victory had not been achieved, in the belief of the Athenians, without marked supernatural aid. The god Pan had met the courier Pheidippidês on his hasty route from Athens to Sparta, and had told him that he was much hurt that the Athenians had as yet neglected to worship him;[669] in spite of which neglect, however, he promised them effective aid at Marathon. The promise was faithfully executed, and the Athenians repaid it by a temple with annual worship and sacrifice. Moreover, the hero Theseus was seen strenuously assisting in the battle; and an unknown warrior, in rustic garb and armed only with a ploughshare, dealt destruction among the Persian ranks: after the battle he could not be found; and the Athenians, on asking at Delphi who he was, were directed to worship the hero Echetlus.[670] Even in the time of Pausanias, this memorable battle-field was heard to resound every night with the noise of combatants and the snorting of horses. "It is dangerous (observes that pious author) to go to the spot with the express purpose of seeing what is passing; but if a man finds himself there by accident, without having heard anything about the matter, the gods will not be angry with him." The gods, it seems, could not pardon the inquisitive mortal who deliberately pried into their secrets. Amidst the ornaments with which Athens was decorated during the free working of her democracy, the glories of Marathon of course occupied a conspicuous place. The battle was painted on one of the compartments of the portico called Pœkilê, wherein, amidst several figures of gods and heroes,—Athênê, Hêraklês, Theseus, Echetlus,

and the local patron of Marathon,—were seen honored and prominent the polemarch Kallimachus and the general Miltiadês, while the Platæans were distinguished by their Bœotian leather casques.[671] And the sixth of the month Boëdromion, the anniversary of the battle, was commemorated by an annual ceremony, even down to the time of Plutarch.[672]

Two thousand Spartans, starting from their city, immediately after the full moon, reached the frontier of Attica, on the third day of their march,—a surprising effort, when we consider that the total distance from Sparta to Athens was about one hundred and fifty miles. They did not arrive, however, until the battle had been fought, and the Persians departed; but curiosity led them to the field of Marathon to behold the dead bodies of the Persians, after which they returned home, bestowing well-merited praise on the victors.

Datis and Artaphernês returned across the Ægean with their Eretrian prisoners to Asia; stopping for a short time at the island of Mykonos, where discovery was made of a gilt image of Apollo carried off as booty in a Phenician ship. Datis went himself to restore it to Dêlos, requesting the Delians to carry it back to the Delium, or temple of Apollo, on the eastern coast of Bœotia: the Delians, however, chose to keep the statue until it was reclaimed from them twenty years afterwards by the Thebans. On reaching Asia, the Persian generals conducted their prisoners up to the court of Susa, and into the presence of Darius. Though he had been vehemently incensed against them, yet when he saw them in his power, his wrath abated, and he manifested no desire to kill or harm them. They were planted at a spot called Arderikka, in the Kissian territory, one of the resting-places on the road from Sardis to Susa, and about twenty-six miles distant from the latter place: Herodotus seems himself to have seen their descendants there on his journey between the two capitals, and to have had the satisfaction of talking to them in Greek,—which we may well conceive to have made some impression upon him, at a spot distant by nearly three months' journey from the coast of Ionia.[673]

Happy would it have been for Miltiadês if he had shared the honorable death of the polemarch Kallimachus,—"animam exhalasset opimam,"—in seeking to fire the ships of the defeated Persians at Marathon. The short sequel of his history will be found in melancholy contrast with the Marathonian heroism.

His reputation had been great before the battle, and after it the admiration and confidence of his countrymen knew no bounds: it appears, indeed, to have reached such a pitch that his head was turned, and he lost both his patriotism and his prudence. He proposed to his countrymen to incur the cost of equipping an armament of seventy ships, with an adequate armed force, and to place it altogether at his discretion; giving them no intimation whither he intended to go, but merely assuring them that, if they would follow him, he would conduct them to a land where gold was abundant, and thus enrich them. Such a promise, from the lips of the recent vic-

tor of Marathon, was sufficient, and the armament was granted, no man except Miltiadês knowing what was its destination. He sailed immediately to the island of Paros, laid siege to the town, and sent in a herald to require from the inhabitants a contribution of one hundred talents, on pain of entire destruction. His pretence for this attack was, that the Parians had furnished a trireme to Datis for the Persian fleet at Marathon; but his real motive, so Herodotus assures us,[674] was vindictive animosity against a Parian citizen named Lysagoras, who had exasperated the Persian general Hydarnês against him. The Parians amused him at first with evasions, until they had procured a little delay to repair the defective portions of their wall, after which they set him at defiance; and Miltiadês in vain prosecuted hostilities against them for the space of twenty-six days: he ravaged the island, but his attacks made no impression upon the town.[675] Beginning to despair of success in his military operations, he entered into some negotiation—such at least was the tale of the Parians themselves—with a Parian woman named Timô, priestess or attendant in the temple of Dêmêtêr, near the town-gates. This woman, promising to reveal to him a secret which would place Paros in his power, induced him to visit by night a temple to which no male person was admissible. He leaped the exterior fence, and approached the sanctuary; but on coming near, was seized with a panic terror and ran away, almost out of his senses: on leaping the same fence to get back, he strained or bruised his thigh badly, and became utterly disabled. In this melancholy state he was placed on shipboard; the siege being raised, and the whole armament returning to Athens.

Vehement was the indignation both of the armament and of the remaining Athenians against Miltiadês on his return;[676] and Xanthippus, father of the great Periklês, became the spokesman of this feeling. He impeached Miltiadês before the popular judicature as having been guilty of deceiving the people, and as having deserved the penalty of death. The accused himself, disabled by his injured thigh, which even began to show symptoms of gangrene, was unable to stand, or to say a word in his own defence: he lay on his couch before the assembled judges, while his friends made the best case they could in his behalf. Defence, it appears, there was none; all they could do, was to appeal to his previous services: they reminded the people largely and emphatically of the inestimable exploit of Marathon, coming in addition to his previous conquest of Lemnos. The assembled dikasts, or jurors, showed their sense of these powerful appeals by rejecting the proposition of his accuser to condemn him to death; but they imposed on him the penalty of fifty talents "for his iniquity."

Cornelius Nepos affirms that these fifty talents represented the expenses incurred by the state in fitting out the armament; but we may more probably believe, looking to the practice of the Athenian dikastery in criminal cases, that fifty talents was the minor penalty actually proposed by the defenders of Miltiadês themselves, as a substitute for the punishment of death. In those penal cases at Athens, where the punishment was not fixed beforehand by the terms of the law, if the person accused was

found guilty, it was customary to submit to the jurors, subsequently and separately, the question as to amount of punishment: first, the accuser named the penalty which he thought suitable; next, the accused person was called upon to name an amount of penalty for himself, and the jurors were constrained to take their choice between these two,—no third gradation of penalty being admissible for consideration.[677] Of course, under such circumstances, it was the interest of the accused party to name, even in his own case, some real and serious penalty,—something which the jurors might be likely to deem not wholly inadequate to his crime just proved; for if he proposed some penalty only trifling, he drove them to prefer the heavier sentence recommended by his opponent. Accordingly, in the case of Miltiadês, his friends, desirous of inducing the jurors to refuse their assent to the punishment of death, proposed a fine of fifty talents as the self-assessed penalty of the defendant; and perhaps they may have stated, as an argument in the case, that such a sum would suffice to defray the costs of the expedition. The fine was imposed, but Miltiadês did not live to pay it; his injured limb mortified, and he died, leaving the fine to be paid by his son Kimon.

According to Cornelius Nepos, Diodorus, and Plutarch, he was put in prison, after having been fined, and there died.[678] But Herodotus does not mention this imprisonment, and the fact appears to me improbable: he would hardly have omitted to notice it, had it come to his knowledge. Immediate imprisonment of a person fined by the dikastery, until his fine was paid, was not the natural and ordinary course of Athenian procedure, though there were particular cases in which such aggravation was added. Usually, a certain time was allowed for payment,[679] before absolute execution was resorted to, but the person under sentence became disfranchised and excluded from all political rights, from the very instant of his condemnation as a public debtor, until the fine was paid. Now in the instance of Miltiadês, the lamentable condition of his wounded thigh rendered escape impossible,—so that there would be no special motive for departing from the usual practice, and imprisoning him forthwith: moreover, if he was not imprisoned forthwith, he would not be imprisoned at all, since he cannot have lived many days after his trial.[680] To carry away the suffering general in his couch, incapable of raising himself even to plead for his own life, from the presence of the dikasts to a prison, would not only have been a needless severity, but could hardly have failed to imprint itself on the sympathies and the memory of all the beholders; so that Herodotus would have been likely to hear and mention it, if it had really occurred. I incline to believe therefore that Miltiadês died at home: all accounts concur in stating that he died of the mortal bodily hurt which already disabled him even at the moment of his trial, and that his son Kimon paid the fifty talents after his death. If *he* could pay them, probably his father could have paid them also. And this is an additional reason for believing that there was no imprisonment,—for nothing but non-payment could have sent him to prison; and to rescue the suffering Miltiadês from being sent thither, would have been the first and strongest desire of all sympathizing friends.

Thus closed the life of the conqueror of Marathon. The last act of it produces an impression so mournful, and even shocking,—his descent from the pinnacle of glory to defeat, mean tampering with a temple-servant, mortal bodily hurt, undefended ignominy, and death under a sentence of heavy fine, is so abrupt and unprepared,—that readers, ancient and modern, have not been satisfied without finding some one to blame for it: we must except Herodotus, our original authority, who recounts the transaction without dropping a single hint of blame against any one. To speak ill of the people, as Machiavel has long ago observed,[681] is a strain in which every one at all times, even under a democratical government, indulges with impunity and without provoking any opponent to reply; and in this instance, the hard fate of Miltiadês has been imputed to the vices of the Athenians and their democracy,—it has been cited in proof, partly of their fickleness, partly of their ingratitude. But however such blame may serve to lighten the mental sadness arising from a series of painful facts, it will not be found justified if we apply to those facts a reasonable criticism.

What is called the fickleness of the Athenians on this occasion is nothing more than a rapid and decisive change in their estimation of Miltiadês; unbounded admiration passing at once into extreme wrath. To censure them for fickleness is here an abuse of terms; such a change in their opinion was the unavoidable result of his conduct. His behavior in the expedition of Paros was as reprehensible as at Marathon it had been meritorious, and the one succeeded immediately after the other: what else could ensue except an entire revolution in the Athenian feelings? He had employed his prodigious ascendency over their minds to induce them to follow him without knowing whither, in the confidence of an unknown booty: he had exposed their lives and wasted their substance in wreaking a private grudge: in addition to the shame of an unprincipled project, comes the constructive shame of not having succeeded in it. Without doubt, such behavior, coming from a man whom they admired to excess, must have produced a violent and painful revulsion in the feelings of his countrymen. The idea of having lavished praise and confidence upon a person who forthwith turns it to an unworthy purpose, is one of the greatest torments of the human bosom; and we may well understand that the intensity of the subsequent displeasure would be aggravated by this reactionary sentiment, without accusing the Athenians of fickleness. If an officer, whose conduct has been such as to merit the highest encomiums, comes on a sudden to betray his trust, and manifests cowardice or treachery in a new and important undertaking confided to him, are we to treat the general in command as fickle, because his opinion as well as his conduct undergoes an instantaneous revolution,—which will be all the more vehement in proportion to his previous esteem? The question to be determined is, whether there be sufficient ground for such a change; and in the case of Miltiadês, that question must be answered in the affirmative.

In regard to the charge of ingratitude against the Athenians, this last-mentioned point—sufficiency of reason—stands tacitly admitted. It is conceded that Miltiadês

deserved punishment for his conduct in reference to the Parian expedition, but it is nevertheless maintained that gratitude for his previous services at Marathon ought to have exempted him from punishment. But the sentiment upon which, after all, this exculpation rests, will not bear to be drawn out and stated in the form of a cogent or justifying reason. For will any one really contend, that a man who has rendered great services to the public, is to receive in return a license of unpunished misconduct for the future? Is the general, who has earned applause by eminent skill and important victories, to be recompensed by being allowed the liberty of betraying his trust afterwards, and exposing his country to peril, without censure or penalty? This is what no one intends to vindicate deliberately; yet a man must be prepared to vindicate it, when he blames the Athenians for ingratitude towards Miltiadês. For if all that be meant is, that gratitude for previous services ought to pass, not as a receipt in full for subsequent crime, but as an extenuating circumstance in the measurement of the penalty, the answer is, that it was so reckoned in the Athenian treatment of Miltiadês.[682] His friends had nothing whatever to urge, against the extreme penalty proposed by his accuser, except these previous services,—which influenced the dikasts sufficiently to induce them to inflict the lighter punishment instead of the heavier. Now the whole amount of punishment inflicted consisted in a fine which certainly was not beyond his reasonable means of paying, or of prevailing upon friends to pay for him, since his son Kimon actually did pay it. And those who blame the Athenians for ingratitude,—unless they are prepared to maintain the doctrine that previous services are to pass as full acquittal for future crime,—have no other ground left except to say that the fine was too high; that instead of being fifty talents, it ought to have been no more than forty, thirty, twenty, or ten talents. Whether they are right in this, I will not take upon me to pronounce. If the amount was named on behalf of the accused party, the dikastery had no legal power of diminishing it; but it is within such narrow limits that the question actually lies, when transferred from the province of sentiment to that of reason. It will be recollected that the death of Miltiadês arose neither from his trial nor his fine, but from the hurt in his thigh.

The charge of ingratitude against the Athenian popular juries really amounts to this,—that, in trying a person accused of present crime or fault, they were apt to confine themselves too strictly and exclusively to the particular matter of charge, either forgetting, or making too little account of, past services which he might have rendered. Whoever imagines that such was the habit of Athenian dikasts, must have studied the orators to very little purpose. Their real defect was the very opposite: they were too much disposed to wander from the special issue before them, and to be affected by appeals to previous services and conduct.[683] That which an accused person at Athens usually strives to produce is, an impression in the minds of the dikasts favorable to his general character and behavior. Of course, he meets the particular allegation of his accuser as well as he can, but he never fails also to remind them emphatically, how well he has performed his general duties of a citizen,—how many times he has served in military expeditions,—how many trierarchies and litur-

gies he has performed, and performed with splendid efficiency. In fact, the claim of an accused person to acquittal is made to rest too much on his prior services, and too little upon innocence or justifying matter as to the particular indictment. When we come down to the time of the orators, I shall be prepared to show that such indisposition to confine themselves to a special issue was one of the most serious defects of the assembled dikasts at Athens. It is one which we should naturally expect from a body of private, non-professional citizens assembled for the occasion, and which belongs more or less to the system of jury-trial everywhere; but it is the direct reverse of that ingratitude, or habitual insensibility to prior services, for which they have been so often denounced.

The fate of Miltiadês, then, so far from illustrating either the fickleness or the ingratitude of his countrymen, attests their just appreciation of deserts. It also illustrates another moral, of no small importance to the right comprehension of Grecian affairs; it teaches us the painful lesson, how perfectly maddening were the effects of a copious draught of glory on the temperament of an enterprising and ambitious Greek. There can be no doubt, that the rapid transition, in the course of about one week, from Athenian terror before the battle to Athenian exultation after it, must have produced demonstrations towards Miltiadês such as were never paid towards any other man in the whole history of the commonwealth. Such unmeasured admiration unseated his rational judgment, so that his mind became abandoned to the reckless impulses of insolence, and antipathy, and rapacity;—that distempered state, for which (according to Grecian morality) the retributive Nemesis was ever on the watch, and which, in his case, she visited with a judgment startling in its rapidity, as well as terrible in its amount. Had Miltiadês been the same man before the battle of Marathon as he became after it, the battle might probably have turned out a defeat instead of a victory. Dêmosthenês, indeed,[684] in speaking of the wealth and luxury of political leaders in his own time, and the profuse rewards bestowed upon them by the people, pointed in contrast to the house of Miltiadês as being noway more splendid than that of a private man. But though Miltiadês might continue to live in a modest establishment, he received from his countrymen marks of admiration and deference such as were never paid to any citizen before or after him; and, after all, admiration and deference constitute the precious essence of popular reward. No man except Miltiadês ever dared to raise his voice in the Athenian assembly, and say: "Give me a fleet of ships: do not ask what I am going to do with them, but only follow me, and I will enrich you." Herein we may read the unmeasured confidence which the Athenians placed in their victorious general, and the utter incapacity of a leading Greek to bear it without mental depravation; while we learn from it to draw the melancholy inference, that one result of success was to make the successful leader one of the most dangerous men in the community. We shall presently be called upon to observe the same tendency in the case of the Spartan Pausanias, and even in that of the Athenian Themistoklês. It is, indeed, fortunate that the reckless aspirations of Miltiadês did not take a turn more noxious to Athens than the comparatively unim-

portant enterprise against Paros. For had he sought to acquire dominion and gratify antipathies against enemies at home, instead of directing his blow against a Parian enemy, the peace and security of his country might have been seriously endangered.

Of the despots who gained power in Greece, a considerable proportion began by popular conduct, and by rendering good service to their fellow-citizens: having first earned public gratitude, they abused it for purposes of their own ambition. There was far greater danger, in a Grecian community, of dangerous excess of gratitude towards a victorious soldier, than of deficiency in that sentiment: hence the person thus exalted acquired a position such that the community found it difficult afterwards to shake him off. Now there is a disposition almost universal among writers and readers to side with an individual, especially an eminent individual, against the multitude; and accordingly those who under such circumstances suspect the probable abuse of an exalted position, are denounced as if they harbored an unworthy jealousy of superior abilities. But the truth is, that the largest analogies of the Grecian character justified that suspicion, and required the community to take precautions against the corrupting effects of their own enthusiasm. There is no feature which more largely pervades the impressible Grecian character, than a liability to be intoxicated and demoralized by success: there was no fault from which so few eminent Greeks were free: there was hardly any danger, against which it was at once so necessary and so difficult for the Grecian governments to take security,—especially the democracies, where the manifestations of enthusiasm were always the loudest. Such is the real explanation of those charges which have been urged against the Grecian democracies, that they came to hate and ill-treat previous benefactors; and the history of Miltiadês illustrates it in a manner no less pointed than painful.

I have already remarked that the fickleness, which has been so largely imputed to the Athenian democracy in their dealings with him, is nothing more than a reasonable change of opinion on the best grounds. Nor can it be said that fickleness was in any case an attribute of the Athenian democracy. It is a well-known fact, that feelings, or opinions, or modes of judging, which have once obtained footing among a large number of people, are more lasting and unchangeable than those which belong only to one or a few; insomuch that the judgments and actions of the many admit of being more clearly understood as to the past, and more certainly predicted as to the future. If we are to predicate any attribute of the multitude, it will rather be that of undue tenacity than undue fickleness; and there will occur nothing in the course of this history to prove that the Athenian people changed their opinions on insufficient grounds more frequently than an unresponsible one or few would have changed.

But there were two circumstances in the working of the Athenian democracy which imparted to it an appearance of greater fickleness, without the reality: First, that the manifestations and changes of opinion were all open, undisguised, and noisy: the people gave utterance to their present impression, whatever it was, with perfect frankness; if their opinions were really changed, they had no shame or scru-

ple in avowing it. Secondly,—and this is a point of capital importance in the working of democracy generally,—the *present* impression, whatever it might be, was not merely undisguised in its manifestations, but also had a tendency to be exaggerated in its intensity. This arose from their habit of treating public affairs in multitudinous assemblages, the well-known effect of which is, to inflame sentiment in every man's bosom by mere contact with a sympathizing circle of neighbors. Whatever the sentiment might be,—fear, ambition, cupidity, wrath, compassion, piety, patriotic devotion, etc,[685]—and whether well-founded or ill-founded, it was constantly influenced more or less by such intensifying cause. This is a defect which of course belongs in a certain degree to all exercise of power by numerous bodies, even though they be representative bodies,—especially when the character of the people, instead of being comparatively sedate and slow to move, like the English, is quick, impressible, and fiery, like Greeks or Italians; but it operated far more powerfully on the self-acting Dêmos assembled in the Pnyx. It was in fact the constitutional malady of the democracy, of which the people were themselves perfectly sensible,—as I shall show hereafter from the securities which they tried to provide against it,—but which no securities could ever wholly eradicate. Frequency of public assemblies, far from aggravating the evil, had a tendency to lighten it. The people thus became accustomed to hear and balance many different views as a preliminary to ultimate judgment; they contracted personal interest and esteem for a numerous class of dissentient speakers; and they even acquired a certain practical consciousness of their own liability to error. Moreover, the diffusion of habits of public speaking, by means of the sophists and the rhetors, whom it has been so much the custom to disparage, tended in the same direction,—to break the unity of sentiment among the listening crowd, to multiply separate judgments, and to neutralize the contagion of mere sympathizing impulse. These were important deductions, still farther assisted by the superior taste and intelligence of the Athenian people: but still, the inherent malady remained,—excessive and misleading intensity of present sentiment. It was this which gave such inestimable value to the ascendency of Periklês, as depicted by Thucydidês: his hold on the people was so firm, that he could always speak with effect against excess of the reigning tone of feeling. "When Periklês (says the historian) saw the people in a state of unseasonable and insolent confidence, he spoke so as to cow them into alarm; when again they were in groundless terror, he combated it, and brought them back to confidence."[686] We shall find Dêmosthenês, with far inferior ascendency, employed in the same honorable task: the Athenian people often stood in need of such correction, but unfortunately did not always find statesmen, at once friendly and commanding, to administer it.

These two attributes, then, belonged to the Athenian democracy; first, their sentiments of every kind were manifested loudly and openly; next, their sentiments tended to a pitch of great present intensity. Of course, therefore, when they changed, the change of sentiment stood prominent, and forced itself upon every one's notice,—being a transition from one strong sentiment past to another strong

sentiment present.[687] And it was because such alterations, when they did take place, stood out so palpably to remark, that the Athenian people have drawn upon themselves the imputation of fickleness: for it is not at all true, I repeat, that changes of sentiment were more frequently produced in them by frivolous or insufficient causes, than changes of sentiment in other governments.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

IONIC PHILOSOPHERS. — PYTHAGORAS. — KROTON AND SYBARIS.

THE history of the powerful Grecian cities in Italy and Sicily, between the accession of Peisistratus and the battle of Marathon, is for the most part unknown to us. Phalaris, despot of Agrigentum in Sicily, made for himself an unenviable name during this obscure interval. His reign seems to coincide in time with the earlier part of the rule of Peisistratus (about 560-540 B. C.), and the few and vague statements which we find respecting it,[688] merely show us that it was a period of extortion and cruelty, even beyond the ordinary licence of Grecian despots. The reality of the hollow bull of brass, which Phalaris was accustomed to heat in order to shut up his victims in it and burn them, appears to be better authenticated than the nature of the story would lead us to presume: for it is not only noticed by Pindar, but even the actual instrument of this torture, the brazen bull itself,[689]—which had been taken away from Agrigentum as a trophy by the Carthaginians when they captured the town, was restored by the Romans, on the subjugation of Carthage, to its original domicile. Phalaris is said to have acquired the supreme command, by undertaking the task of building a great temple[690] to Zeus Polieus on the citadel rock; a pretence whereby he was enabled to assemble and arm a number of workmen and devoted partisans, whom he employed, at the festival of the Thesmophoria, to put down the authorities. He afterwards disarmed the citizens by a stratagem, and committed cruelties which rendered him so abhorred, that a sudden rising of the people, headed by Têlemachus (ancestor of the subsequent despot, Thêro), overthrew and slew him. A severe revenge was taken on his partisans after his fall.[691]

During the interval between 540-500 B. C., events of much importance occurred among the Italian Greeks,—especially at Kroton and Sybaris,—events, unhappily, very imperfectly handed down. Between these two periods fall both the war between Sybaris and Kroton, and the career and ascendency of Pythagoras. In connection with this latter name, it will be requisite to say a few words respecting the other Grecian philosophers of the sixth century B. C.

I have, in a former chapter, noticed and characterized those distinguished persons called the Seven Wise Men of Greece, whose celebrity falls in the first half of this century,—men not so much marked by scientific genius as by practical sagacity and foresight in the appreciation of worldly affairs, and enjoying a high degree of political respect from their fellow-citizens. One of them, however, the Milesian Thalês, claims our notice, not only on this ground, but also as the earliest known name in the long line of Greek scientific investigators. His life, nearly contemporary with that of Solon, belongs seemingly to the interval about 640-550 B. C.: the stories mentioned in Herodotus—perhaps borrowed in part from the Milesian Hekatæus—are sufficient to

show that his reputation for wisdom, as well as for science, continued to be very great, even a century after his death, among his fellow-citizens. And he marks an important epoch in the progress of the Greek mind, as having been the first man to depart both in letter and spirit from the Hesiodic Theogony, introducing the conception of substances with their transformations and sequences, in place of that string of persons and quasi-human attributes which had animated the old legendary world. He is the father of what is called the Ionic philosophy, which is considered as lasting from his time down to that of Sokratês; and writers, ancient as well as modern, have professed to trace a succession of philosophers, each one the pupil of the preceding, between these two extreme epochs. But the appellation is, in truth, undefined, and even incorrect, since nothing entitled to the name of a school, or sect, or succession, —like that of the Pythagoreans, to be noticed presently,—can be made out. There is, indeed, a certain general analogy in the philosophical vein of Thalês, Hippo, Anaximenês, and Diogenês of Apollonia, whereby they all stand distinguished from Xenophanês of Elea, and his successors, the Eleatic dialecticians, Parmenidês and Zeno; but there are also material differences between their respective doctrines,—no two of them holding the same. And if we look to Anaximander, the person next in order of time to Thalês, as well as to Herakleitus, we find them departing, in a great degree, even from that character which all the rest have in common, though both the one and the other are usually enrolled in the list of Ionic philosophers.

Of the old legendary and polytheistic conception of nature, which Thalês partially discarded, we may remark that it is a state of the human mind in which the problems suggesting themselves to be solved, and the machinery for solving them, bear a fair proportion one to the other. If the problems be vast, indeterminate, confused, and derived rather from the hopes, fears, love, hatred, astonishment, etc., of men, than from any genuine desire of knowledge,—so also does the received belief supply invisible agents in unlimited number, and with every variety of power and inclination. The means of explanation are thus multiplied and diversified as readily as the phenomena to be explained. And though no future events or states can be predicted on trustworthy grounds, in such manner as to stand the scrutiny of subsequent verification,—yet there is little difficulty in rendering a specious and plausible account of matters past, of any and all things alike; especially as, at such a period, matters of fact requiring explanation are neither collated nor preserved with care. And though no event or state, which has not yet occurred, can be predicted, there is little difficulty in rendering a plausible account of everything which has occurred in the past. Cosmogony, and the prior ages of the world, were conceived as a sort of personal history, with intermarriages, filiation, quarrels, and other adventures, of these invisible agents; among whom some one or more were assumed as unbegotten and self-existent,—the latter assumption being a difficulty common to all systems of cosmogony, and from which even this flexible and expansive hypothesis is not exempt.

Now when Thalês disengaged Grecian philosophy from the old mode of explanation, he did not at the same time disengage it from the old problems and matters propounded for inquiry. These he retained, and transmitted to his successors, as vague and vast as they were at first conceived; and so they remained, though with some transformations and modifications, together with many new questions equally insoluble, substantially present to the Greeks throughout their whole history, as the legitimate problems for philosophical investigation. But these problems, adapted only to the old elastic system of polytheistic explanation and omnipresent personal agency, became utterly disproportioned to any impersonal hypotheses such as those of Thalês and the philosophers after him,—whether assumed physical laws, or plausible moral and metaphysical dogmas, open to argumentative attack, and of course requiring the like defence. To treat the visible world as a whole, and inquire when and how it began, as well as into all its past changes,—to discuss the first origin of men, animals, plants, the sun, the stars, etc.,—to assign some comprehensive reason why motion or change in general took place in the universe,—to investigate the destinies of the human race, and to lay down some systematic relation between them and the gods,—all these were topics admitting of being conceived in many different ways, and set forth with eloquent plausibility, but not reducible to any solution either resting on scientific evidence, or commanding steady adherence under a free scrutiny. [692]

At the time when the power of scientific investigation was scanty and helpless, the problems proposed were thus such as to lie out of the reach of science in its largest compass. Gradually, indeed, subjects more special and limited, and upon which experience, or deductions from experience, could be brought to bear, were added to the list of *quæsita*, and examined with great profit and instruction: but the old problems, with new ones, alike unfathomable, were never eliminated, and always occupied a prominent place in the philosophical world. Now it was this disproportion, between questions to be solved and means of solution, which gave rise to that conspicuous characteristic of Grecian philosophy,—the antagonist force of suspensive skepticism, passing in some minds into a broad negation of the attainability of general truth,—which it nourished from its beginning to its end; commencing as early as Xenophanês, continuing to manifest itself seven centuries afterwards in Ænesidêmus and Sextus Empiricus, and including in the interval between these two extremes some of the most powerful intellects in Greece. The present is not the time for considering these Skeptics, who bear an unpopular name, and have not often been fairly appreciated; the more so, as it often suited the purpose of men, themselves essentially skeptical, like Sokratês and Plato, to denounce professed skepticism with indignation. But it is essential to bring them into notice at the first spring of Grecian philosophy under Thalês, because the circumstances were then laid which so soon afterwards developed them.

Though the celebrity of Thalês in antiquity was great and universal, scarcely any distinct facts were known respecting him: it is certain that he left nothing in writing. Extensive travels in Egypt and Asia are ascribed to him, and as a general fact these travels are doubtless true, since no other means of acquiring knowledge were then open. At a time when the brother of the Lesbian Alkæus was serving in the Babylonian army, we may easily conceive that an inquisitive Milesian would make his way to that wonderful city wherein stood the temple-observatory of the Chaldæan priesthood; nor is it impossible that he may have seen the still greater city of Ninus, or Nineveh, before its capture and destruction by the Medes. How great his reputation was in his lifetime, the admiration expressed by his younger contemporary, Xenophanês, assures us; and Herakleitus, in the next generation, a severe judge of all other philosophers, spoke of him with similar esteem. To him were traced, by the Grecian inquirers of the fourth century B. C., the first beginnings of geometry, astronomy, and physiology in its large and really appropriate sense, the scientific study of nature: for the Greek word denoting nature (φὐσις), first comes into comprehensive use about this time (as I have remarked in an earlier chapter),[693] with its derivatives *physics* and *physiology*, as distinguished from the *theology* of the old poets. Little stress can be laid on those elementary propositions in geometry which are specified as discovered, or as first demonstrated, by Thalês,—still less upon the solar eclipse respecting which, according to Herodotus, he determined beforehand the year of occurrence.[694] But the main doctrine of his physiology,—using that word in its larger Greek sense,—is distinctly attested. He stripped Oceanus and Tethys, primeval parents of the gods in the Homeric theogony, of their personality,—and laid down water, or fluid substance, as the single original element from which everything came, and into which everything returned.[695] The doctrine of one eternal element, remaining always the same in its essence, but indefinitely variable in its manifestations to sense, was thus first introduced to the discussion of the Grecian public. We have no means of knowing the reasons by which Thalês supported this opinion, nor could even Aristotle do more than conjecture what they might have been; but one of the statements urged on behalf of it,—that the earth itself rested on water,[696]—we may safely refer to the Milesian himself, for it would hardly have been advanced at a later age. Moreover, Thalês is reported to have held, that everything was living and full of gods; and that the magnet, especially, was a living thing. Thus the gods, as far as we can pretend to follow opinions so very faintly transmitted, are conceived as active powers, and causes of changeful manifestation, attached to the primeval substance:[697] the universe being assimilated to an organized body or system.

Respecting Hippo,—who reproduced the theory of Thalês under a more generalized form of expression, substituting, in place of water, moisture, or something common to air and water,[698]—we do not know whether he belonged to the sixth or the fifth century B. C. But Anaximander, Xenophanês, and Pherekydês belong to the latter half of the sixth century. Anaximander, the son of Praxiadês, was a native of Milêtus, —Xenophanês, a native of Kolophon; the former, among the earliest expositors of

doctrine in prose,[699] while the latter committed his opinions to the old medium of verse. Anaximander seems to have taken up the philosophical problem, while he materially altered the hypothesis of his predecessor Thalês. Instead of the primeval fluid of the latter, he supposed a primeval principle, without any actual determining qualities whatever, but including all qualities potentially, and manifesting them in an infinite variety from its continually self-changing nature,—a principle, which was nothing in itself, yet had the capacity of producing any and all manifestations, however contrary to each other,[700]—a primeval something, whose essence it was to be eternally productive of different phenomena,—a sort of mathematical point, which counts for nothing in itself, but is vigorous in generating lines to any extent that may be desired. In this manner, Anaximander professed to give a comprehensive explanation of change in general, or generation, or destruction,—how it happened that one sensible thing began and another ceased to exist,—according to the vague problems which these early inquirers were in the habit of setting to themselves.[701] He avoided that which the first philosophers especially dreaded, the affirmation that generation could take place out of Nothing; yet the primeval Something, which he supposed was only distinguished from nothing by possessing this very power of generation.

In his theory, he passed from the province of physics into that of metaphysics. He first introduced into Grecian philosophy that important word which signifies a beginning or a principle,[702] and first opened that metaphysical discussion, which was carried on in various ways throughout the whole period of Grecian philosophy, as to the one and the many—the continuous and the variable—that which exists eternally, as distinguished from that which comes and passes away in ever-changing manifestations. His physiology, or explanation of nature, thus conducted the mind into a different route from that suggested by the hypothesis of Thalês, which was built upon physical considerations, and was therefore calculated to suggest and stimulate observations of physical phenomena for the purpose of verifying or confuting it,—while the hypothesis of Anaximander admitted only of being discussed dialectically, or by reasonings expressed in general language; reasonings sometimes, indeed, referring to experience for the purpose of illustration, but seldom resting on it, and never looking out for it as a necessary support. The physical explanation of nature, however, once introduced by Thalês, although deserted by Anaximander, was taken up by Anaximenês and others afterwards, and reproduced with many divergences of doctrine,—yet always more or less entangled and perplexed with metaphysical additions, since the two departments were never clearly parted throughout all Grecian philosophy. Of these subsequent physical philosophers I shall speak hereafter: at present, I confine myself to the thinkers of the sixth century B. C., among whom Anaximander stands prominent, not as the follower of Thalês, but as the author of an hypothesis both new and tending in a different direction.

It was not merely as the author of this hypothesis, however, that Anaximander enlarged the Greek mind and roused the powers of thought: we find him also men-

tioned as distinguished in astronomy and geometry. He is said to have been the first to establish a sun-dial in Greece, to construct a sphere, and to explain the obliquity of the ecliptic;[703] how far such alleged authorship really belongs to him, we cannot be certain,—but there is one step of immense importance which he is clearly affirmed to have made. He was the first to compose a treatise on the geography of the land and sea within his cognizance, and to construct a chart or map founded thereupon,—seemingly a tablet of brass. Such a novelty, wondrous even to the rude and ignorant, was calculated to stimulate powerfully inquisitive minds, and from it may be dated the commencement of Grecian rational geography,—not the least valuable among the contributions of this people to the stock of human knowledge.

Xenophanês of Kolophon, somewhat younger than Anaximander, and nearly contemporary with Pythagoras (seemingly from about 570-480 B. C.), migrated from Kolophon[704] to Zanklê and Katana in Sicily and Elea in Italy, soon after the time when Ionia became subject to the Persians, (540-530 B. C.) He was the founder of what is called the Eleatic school of philosophers,—a real school, since it appears that Parmenidês, Zeno, and Melissus, pursued and developed, in a great degree, the train of speculation which had been begun by Xenophanês,—doubtless with additions and variations of their own, but especially with a dialectic power which belongs to the age of Periklês, and is unknown in the sixth century B. C. He was the author of more than one poem of considerable length, one on the foundation of Kolophon and another on that of Elea; besides his poem on Nature, wherein his philosophical doctrines were set forth.[705] His manner appears to have been controversial and full of asperity towards antagonists; but what is most remarkable is the plain-spoken manner in which he declared himself against the popular religion, and in which he denounced as abominable the descriptions of the gods given by Homer and Hesiod.[706]

He is said to have controverted the doctrines both of Thalês and Pythagoras: this is probable enough; but he seems to have taken his start from the philosophy of Anaximander,—not, however, to adopt it, but to reverse it,—and to set forth an opinion which we may call its contrary. Nature, in the conception of Anaximander, consisted of a Something having no other attribute except the unlimited power of generating and cancelling phenomenal changes: in this doctrine, the something or substratum existed only in and for those changes, and could not be said to exist at all in any other sense: the permanent was thus merged and lost in the variable,—the one in the many. Xenophanês laid down the exact opposite: he conceived Nature as one unchangeable and indivisible whole, spherical, animated, endued with reason, and penetrated by or indeed identical with God: he denied the objective reality of all change, or generation, or destruction, which he seems to have considered as only changes or modifications in the percipient, and perhaps different in one percipient and another. That which exists, he maintained, could not have been generated, nor could it ever be destroyed: there was neither real generation nor real destruction of anything; but that which men took for such, was the change in their own feelings and ideas. He

thus recognized the permanent without the variable,[707]—the one without the many. And his treatment of the received religious creed was in harmony with such physical or metaphysical hypothesis; for while he held the whole of Nature to be God, without parts or change, he at the same time pronounced the popular gods to be entities of subjective fancy, imagined by men after their own model: if oxen or lions were to become religious, he added, they would in like manner provide for themselves gods after their respective shapes and characters.[708] This hypothesis, which seemed to set aside altogether the study of the sensible world as a source of knowledge, was expounded briefly, and as it should seem, obscurely and rudely, by Xenophanês; at least we may infer thus much from the slighting epithet applied to him by Aristotle. [709] But his successors, Parmenidês and Zeno, in the succeeding century, expanded it considerably, supported it with extraordinary acuteness of dialectics, and even superadded a second part, in which the phenomena of sense—though considered only as appearances, not partaking in the reality of the one Ens—were yet explained by a new physical hypothesis; so that they will be found to exercise great influence over the speculations both of Plato and Aristotle. We discover in Xenophanês, moreover, a vein of skepticism, and a mournful despair as to the attainability of certain knowledge,[710] which the nature of his philosophy was well calculated to suggest, and in which the sillograph Timon of the third century B. C., who seems to have spoken of Xenophanês better than of most of the other philosophers, powerfully sympathized.

The cosmogony of Pherekydês of Syrus, contemporary of Anaximander and among the teachers of Pythagoras, seems, according to the fragments preserved, a combination of the old legendary fancies with Orphic mysticism,[711] and probably exercised little influence over the subsequent course of Grecian philosophy. By what has been said of Thalês, Anaximander, and Xenophanês, it will be seen that the sixth century B. C. witnessed the opening of several of those roads of intellectual speculation which the later philosophers pursued farther, or at least from which they branched off. Before the year 500 B. C. many interesting questions were thus brought into discussion, which Solon, who died about 558 B. C., had never heard of,—just as he may probably never have seen the map of Anaximander. But neither of these two distinguished men—Anaximander or Xenophanês—was anything more than a speculative inquirer. The third eminent name of this century, of whom I am now about to speak,—Pythagoras, combined in his character disparate elements which require rather a longer development.

Pythagoras was founder of a brotherhood, originally brought together by a religious influence, and with observances approaching to monastic peculiarity,—working in a direction at once religious, political, and scientific, and exercising for some time a real political ascendency,—but afterwards banished from government and state affairs into a sectarian privacy with scientific pursuits, not without, however, still producing some statesmen individually distinguished. Amidst the multitude of false and apocryphal statements which circulated in antiquity respecting this celebrated man,

we find a few important facts reasonably attested and deserving credence. He was a native of Samos,[712] son of an opulent merchant named Mnêsarchus,—or, according to some of his later and more fervent admirers, of Apollo; born, as far as we can make out, about the 50th Olympiad, or 580 B. C. On the many marvels recounted respecting his youth, it is unnecessary to dwell. Among them may be numbered his wide-reaching travels, said to have been prolonged for nearly thirty years, to visit the Arabians, the Syrians, the Phenicians, the Chaldæans, the Indians, and the Gallic Druids. But there is reason to believe that he really visited Egypt[713]—perhaps also Phenicia—and Babylon, then Chaldæan and independent. At the time when he saw Egypt, between 560-540 B. C., about one century earlier than Herodotus, it was under Amasis, the last of its own kings, with its peculiar native character yet unimpaired by foreign conquest, and only slightly modified by the admission during the preceding century of Grecian mercenary troops and traders. The spectacle of Egyptian habits, the conversation of the priests, and the initiation into various mysteries or secret rites and stories not accessible to the general public, may very naturally have impressed the mind of Pythagoras, and given him that turn for mystic observance, asceticism, and peculiarity of diet and clothing,—which manifested itself from the same cause among several of his contemporaries, but which was not a common phenomenon in the primitive Greek religion. Besides visiting Egypt, Pythagoras is also said to have profited by the teaching of Thalês, of Anaximander, and of Pherekydês of Syros. [714] Amidst the towns of Ionia, he would, moreover, have an opportunity of conversing with many Greek navigators who had visited foreign countries, especially Italy and Sicily. His mind seems to have been acted upon and impelled by this combined stimulus,—partly towards an imaginative and religious vein of speculation, with a life of mystic observance,—partly towards that active exercise, both of mind and body, which the genius of an Hellenic community so naturally tended to suggest.

Of the personal doctrines or opinions of Pythagoras, whom we must distinguish from Philolaus and the subsequent Pythagoreans, we have little certain knowledge, though doubtless the first germ of their geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, etc. must have proceeded from him. But that he believed in the metempsychosis or transmigration of the souls of deceased men into other men, as well as into animals, we know, not only by other evidence, but also by the testimony of his contemporary, the philosopher Xenophanês of Elea. Pythagoras, seeing a dog beaten, and hearing him howl, desired the striker to desist, saying: "It is the soul of a friend of mine, whom I recognized by his voice." This—together with the general testimony of Hêrakleitus, that Pythagoras was a man of extensive research and acquired instruction, but artful for mischief and destitute of sound judgment—is all that we know about him from contemporaries. Herodotus, two generations afterwards, while he conceives the Pythagoreans as a peculiar religious order, intimates that both Orpheus and Pythagoras had derived the doctrine of the metempsychosis from Egypt, but had pretended to it as their own without acknowledgment.[715]

Pythagoras combines the character of a sophist (a man of large observation, and clever, ascendent, inventive mind,—the original sense of the word Sophist, prior to the polemics of the Platonic school, and the only sense known to Herodotus[716]) with that of an inspired teacher, prophet, and worker of miracles,—approaching to and sometimes even confounded with the gods,—and employing all these gifts to found a new special order of brethren, bound together by religious rites and observances peculiar to themselves. In his prominent vocation, analogous to that of Epimenidês, Orpheus, or Melampus, he appears as the revealer of a mode of life calculated to raise his disciples above the level of mankind, and to recommend them to the favor of the gods; the Pythagorean life, like the Orphic life,[717] being intended as the exclusive prerogative of the brotherhood,—approached only by probation and initiatory ceremonies which were adapted to select enthusiasts rather than to an indiscriminate crowd,—and exacting entire mental devotion to the master.[718] In these lofty pretensions the Agrigentine Empedoklês seems to have greatly copied him, though with some varieties, about half a century afterwards.[719] While Aristotle tells us that the Krotoniates identified Pythagoras with the Hyperborean Apollo, the satirical Timon pronounced him to have been "a juggler of solemn speech, engaged in fishing for men."[720] This is the same character, looked at from the different points of view of the believer and the unbeliever. There is, however, no reason for regarding Pythagoras as an impostor, because experience seems to show, that while in certain ages it is not difficult for a man to persuade others that he is inspired, it is still less difficult for him to contract the same belief himself.

Looking at the general type of Pythagoras, as conceived by witnesses in and nearest to his own age,—Xenophanês, Hêrakleitus, Herodotus, Plato, Aristotle, Isokratês,[721]—we find in him chiefly the religious missionary and schoolmaster, with little of the politician. His efficiency in the latter character, originally subordinate, first becomes prominent in those glowing fancies which the later Pythagoreans communicated to Aristoxenus and Dikæarchus. The primitive Pythagoras inspired by the gods to reveal a new mode of life,[722]—the Pythagorean life,—and to promise divine favor to a select and docile few, as the recompense of strict ritual obedience, of austere self-control, and of laborious training, bodily as well as mental. To speak with confidence of the details of his training, ethical or scientific, and of the doctrines which he promulgated, is impossible; for neither he himself nor any of his disciples anterior to Philolaus—who was separated from him by about one intervening generation—left any memorials in writing.[723] Numbers and lines, studied partly in their own mutual relations, partly under various symbolizing fancies, presented themselves to him as the primary constituent elements of the universe, and as a sort of magical key to phenomena, physical as well as moral. And these mathematical tendencies in his teaching, expanded by Pythagoreans, his successors, and coinciding partly also, as has been before stated, with the studies of Anaximander and Thalês, acquired more and more development, so as to become one of the most glorious and profitable manifestations of Grecian intellect. Living as Pythagoras did at a time when the stock

of experience was scanty, the license of hypothesis unbounded, and the process of deduction without rule or verifying test,—he was thus fortunate enough to strike into that track of geometry and arithmetic, in which, from data of experience few, simple, and obvious, an immense field of deductive and verifiable investigation may be travelled over. We must at the same time remark, however, that in his mind this track, which now seems so straightforward and well defined, was clouded by strange fancies which it is not easy to understand, and from which it was but partially cleared by his successors. Of his spiritual training much is said, though not upon very good authority. We hear of his memorial discipline, his monastic self-scrutiny, his employment of music to soothe disorderly passions,[724] his long novitiate of silence, his knowledge of physiognomy, which enabled him to detect even without trial unworthy subjects, his peculiar diet, and his rigid care for sobriety as well as for bodily vigor. He is also said to have inculcated abstinence from animal food, and this feeling is so naturally connected with the doctrine of the metempsychosis, that we may well believe him to have entertained it, as Empedoklês also did after him.[725] It is certain that there were peculiar observances, and probably a certain measure of self-denial embodied in the Pythagorean life; but on the other hand, it seems equally certain that the members of the order cannot have been all subjected to the same diet, or training, or studies. For Milo the Krotoniate was among them,[726] the strongest man and the unparalleled wrestler of his age,—who cannot possibly have dispensed with animal food and ample diet (even setting aside the tales about his voracious appetite), and is not likely to have bent his attention on speculative study. Probably Pythagoras did not enforce the same bodily or mental discipline on all, or at least knew when to grant dispensations. The order, as it first stood under him, consisted of men different both in temperament and aptitude, but bound together by common religious observances and hopes, common reverence for the master, and mutual attachment as well as pride in each other's success; and it must thus be distinguished from the Pythagoreans of the fourth century B. C., who had no communion with wrestlers, and comprised only ascetic, studious men, generally recluse, though in some cases rising to political distinction.

The succession of these Pythagoreans, never very numerous, seems to have continued until about 300 B. C., and then nearly died out; being superseded by other schemes of philosophy more suited to cultivated Greeks of the age after Sokratês. But during the time of Cicero, two centuries afterwards, the orientalizing tendency—then beginning to spread over the Grecian and Roman world, and becoming gradually stronger and stronger—caused the Pythagorean philosophy to be again revived. It was revived too, with little or none of its scientific tendencies, but with more than its primitive religious and imaginative fanaticism,—Apollonius of Tyana constituting himself a living copy of Pythagoras. And thus, while the scientific elements developed by the disciples of Pythagoras had become disjoined from all peculiarity of sect, and passed into the general studious world,—the original vein of mystic and ascetic fancy belonging to the master, without any of that practical efficiency of body and mind

which had marked his first followers, was taken up anew into the pagan world, along with the disfigured doctrines of Plato. Neo-Pythagorism, passing gradually into Neo-Platonism, outlasted the other more positive and masculine systems of pagan philosophy, as the contemporary and rival of Christianity. A large proportion of the false statements concerning Pythagoras come from these Neo-Pythagoreans, who were not deterred by the want of memorials from illustrating, with ample latitude of fancy, the ideal character of the master.

That an inquisitive man like Pythagoras, at a time when there were hardly any books to study, would visit foreign countries, and converse with all the Grecian philosophical inquirers within his reach, is a matter which we should presume, even if no one attested it; and our witnesses carry us very little beyond this general presumption. What doctrines he borrowed, or from whom, we are unable to discover. But, in fact, his whole life and proceedings bear the stamp of an original mind, and not of a borrower,—a mind impressed both with Hellenic and with non-Hellenic habits and religion, yet capable of combining the two in a manner peculiar to himself; and above all, endued with those talents for religion and personal ascendency over others, which told for much more than the intrinsic merit of his ideas. We are informed that after extensive travels and inquiries he returned to Samos, at the age of about forty: he then found his native island under the despotism of Polykratês, which rendered it an unsuitable place either for free sentiments or for marked individuals. Unable to attract hearers, or found any school or brotherhood, in his native island, he determined to expatriate. And we may presume that at this period (about 535-530 B. C.) the recent subjugation of Ionia by the Persians was not without influence on his determination. The trade between the Asiatic and the Italian Greeks,—and even the intimacy between Milêtus and Knidus on the one side, and Sybaris and Tarentum on the other,—had been great and of long standing, so that there was more than one motive to determine him to the coast of Italy; in which direction also his contemporary Xenophanês, the founder of the Eleatic school of philosophy, emigrated, seemingly, about the same time,—from Kolophon to Zanklê, Katana, and Elea.[727]

Kroton and Sybaris were at this time in their fullest prosperity,—among the first and most prosperous cities of the Hellenic name. To the former of the two Pythagoras directed his course. A council of one thousand persons, taken from among the heirs and representatives of the principal proprietors at its first foundation, was here invested with the supreme authority: in what manner the executive offices were filled, we have no information. Besides a great extent of power, and a numerous population, the large mass of whom had no share in the political franchise, Kroton stood at this time distinguished for two things,—the general excellence of the bodily habit of the citizens, attested, in part, by the number of conquerors furnished to the Olympic games,—and the superiority of its physicians, or surgeons.[728] These two points were, in fact, greatly connected with each other. For the therapeutics of the day consisted not so much of active remedies as of careful diet and regimen; while

the trainer, who dictated the life of an athlete during his long and fatiguing preparation for an Olympic contest, and the professional superintendent of the youths who frequented the public gymnasia, followed out the same general views, and acted upon the same basis of knowledge, as the physician who prescribed for a state of positive bad health.[729] Of medical education properly so called, especially of anatomy, there was then little or nothing. The physician acquired his knowledge from observation of men sick as well as healthy, and from a careful notice of the way in which the human body was acted upon by surrounding agents and circumstances: and this same knowledge was not less necessary for the trainer; so that the same place which contained the best men in the latter class was also likely to be distinguished in the former. It is not improbable that this celebrity of Kroton may have been one of the reasons which determined Pythagoras to go thither; for among the precepts ascribed to him, precise rules as to diet and bodily regulation occupy a prominent place. The medical or surgical celebrity of Dêmokêdês (son-in-law of the Pythagorean Milo), to whom allusion has been made in a former chapter, is contemporaneous with the presence of Pythagoras at Kroton; and the medical men of Magna Græcia maintained themselves in credit, as rivals of the schools of the Asklepiads at Kôs and Knidus, throughout all the fifth and fourth centuries B. C.

The biographers of Pythagoras tell us that his arrival there, his preaching, and his conduct, produced an effect almost electric upon the minds of the people, with an extensive reform, public as well as private. Political discontent was repressed, incontinence disappeared, luxury became discredited, and the women, hastened to exchange their golden ornaments for the simplest attire. No less than two thousand persons were converted at his first preaching; and so effective were his discourses to the youth, that the Supreme Council of One Thousand invited him into their assembly, solicited his advice, and even offered to constitute him their prytanis, or president, while his wife and daughter were placed at the head of the religious processions of females.[730] Nor was his influence confined to Kroton. Other towns in Italy and Sicily,—Sybaris, Metapontum, Rhêgium, Katana, Himera, etc., all felt the benefit of his exhortations, which extricated some of them even from slavery. Such are the tales of which the biographers of Pythagoras are full.[731] And we see that even the disciples of Aristotle, about the year 300 B. C.,—Aristoxenus, Dikæarchus, Herakleidês of Pontus, etc., are hardly less charged with them than the Neo-Pythagoreans of three or four centuries later: they doubtless heard them from their contemporary Pythagoreans,[732] the last members of a declining sect, among whom the attributes of the primitive founder passed for godlike, but who had no memorials, no historical judgment, and no means of forming a true conception of Kroton as it stood in 530 B. C.[733]

To trace these tales to a true foundation is impossible: but we may entertain reasonable belief that the success of Pythagoras, as a person favored by the gods and patentee of divine secrets, was very great,—that he procured to himself both the

reverence of the multitude and the peculiar attachment and obedience of many devoted adherents, chiefly belonging to the wealthy and powerful classes,—that a select body of these adherents, three hundred in number, bound themselves by a sort of vow both to Pythagoras and to each other, and adopted a peculiar diet, ritual, and observances, as a token of union,—though without anything like community of property, which some have ascribed to them. Such a band of men, standing high in the city for wealth and station, and bound together by this intimate tie, came by almost unconscious tendency to mingle political ambition with religious and scientific pursuits. Political clubs with sworn members, under one form or another, were a constant phenomenon in the Grecian cities,[734] and the Pythagorean order at its first formation was the most efficient of all clubs; since it presented an intimacy of attachment among its members, as well as a feeling of haughty exclusiveness against the public without, such as no other fraternity could parallel.[735] The devoted attachment of Pythagoreans towards each other is not less emphatically set forth than their contempt for every one else. In fact, these two attributes of the order seem the best ascertained, as well as the most permanent of all: moreover, we may be sure that the peculiar observances of the order passed for exemplary virtues in the eyes of its members, and exalted ambition into a duty, by making them sincerely believe that they were the only persons fit to govern. It is no matter of surprise, then, to learn that the Pythagoreans gradually drew to themselves great ascendency in the government of Kroton. And as similar clubs, not less influential, were formed at Metapontum and other places, so the Pythagorean order spread its net and dictated the course of affairs over a large portion of Magna Græcia. Such ascendency of the Pythagoreans must have procured for the master himself some real, and still more supposed, influence over the march of government at Kroton and elsewhere, of a nature not then possessed by any of his contemporaries throughout Greece.[736] But his influence was probably exercised in the background, through the medium of the brotherhood who reverenced him: for it is hardly conformable to Greek manners that a stranger of his character should guide personally and avowedly the political affairs of any Grecian city.

Nor are we to believe that Pythagoras came originally to Kroton with the express design of creating for himself an ascendent political position,—still less that he came for the purpose of realizing a great preconceived political idea, and transforming Kroton into a model-city of pure Dorism, as has been supposed by some eminent modern authors. Such schemes might indeed be ascribed to him by Pythagoreans of the Platonic age, when large ideas of political amelioration were rife in the minds of speculative men,—by men disposed to forego the authorship of their own opinions, and preferring to accredit them as traditions handed down from a founder who had left no memorials; but it requires better evidence than theirs to make us believe that any real Greek born in 580 B. C. actually conceived such plans. We cannot construe the scheme of Pythagoras as going farther than the formation of a private, select order of brethren, embracing his religious fancies, ethical tone, and germs of scientific

idea,—and manifesting adhesion by those observances which Herodotus and Plato call the Pythagorean orgies and mode of life. And his private order became politically powerful, because he was skilful or fortunate enough to enlist a sufficient number of wealthy Krotoniates, possessing individual influence which they strengthened immensely by thus regimenting themselves in intimate union. The Pythagorean orgies or religious ceremonies were not inconsistent with public activity, bodily as well as mental: probably the rich men of the order may have been rendered even more active, by being fortified against the temptations of a life of indulgence. The character of the order as it first stood, different from that to which it was afterwards reduced, was indeed religious and exclusive, but also active and domineering; not despising any of those bodily accomplishments which increased the efficiency of the Grecian citizen, and which so particularly harmonized with the preëxisting tendencies of Kroton.[737] Niebuhr and O. Müller have even supposed that the select Three Hundred Pythagoreans constituted a sort of smaller senate at that city,[738]—an hypothesis no way probable; we may rather conceive them as a powerful private club, exercising ascendency in the interior of the senate, and governing through the medium of the constituted authorities. Nor can we receive without great allowance the assertion of Varro,[739] who, assimilating Pythagoras to Plato, tells us that he confined his instructions on matters of government to chosen disciples, who had gone through a complete training, and had reached the perfection of wisdom and virtue. It seems more probable that the political Pythagoreans were those who were most qualified for action, and least for speculation. And we may reasonably suppose in the general of the order that skill in turning to account the aptitudes of individuals, which two centuries ago was so conspicuous in the Jesuits; to whom, in various ways, the Pythagoreans bear considerable resemblance. All that we can be said to know about their political principles is, that they were exclusive and aristocratical, adverse to the control and interference of the people; a circumstance no way disadvantageous to them, since they coincided in this respect with the existing government of the city,—had not their own conduct brought additional odium on the old aristocracy, and raised up an aggravated democratical opposition, carried to the most deplorable lengths of violence.

All the information which we possess, apocryphal as it is, respecting this memorable club, is derived from its warm admirers; yet even their statements are enough to explain how it came to provoke deadly and extensive enmity. A stranger coming to teach new religious dogmas and observances, with a tincture of science and some new ethical ideas and phrases, though he would obtain some zealous votaries, would also bring upon himself a certain measure of antipathy. Extreme strictness of observances, combined with the art of touching skilfully the springs of religious terror in others, would indeed do much both to fortify and to exalt him. But when it was discovered that science, philosophy, and even the mystic revelations of religion, whatever they were, remained confined to the private talk and practice of the disciples, and were thus thrown into the background, while all that was seen and felt without, was the political predominance of an ambitious fraternity,—we need not wonder that

Pythagorism in all its parts became odious to a large portion of the community. Moreover, we find the order represented not merely as constituting a devoted and exclusive political party, but also as manifesting an ostentatious self-conceit throughout their personal demeanor,[740]—refusing the hand of fellowship to all except the brethren, and disgusting especially their own familiar friends and kinsmen. So far as we know Grecian philosophy, this is the only instance in which it was distinctly abused for political and party objects: the early days of the Pythagorean order stand distinguished for such perversion, which, fortunately for the progress of philosophy, never presented itself afterwards in Greece.[741] Even at Athens, however, we shall hereafter see that Sokratês, though standing really aloof from all party intrigue, incurred much of his unpopularity from supposed political conjunction with Kritias and Alkibiadês,[742] to which, indeed, the orator Æschinês distinctly ascribes his condemnation, speaking about sixty years after the event. Had Sokratês been known as the founder of a band holding together intimately for ambitious purposes, the result would have been eminently pernicious to philosophy, and probably much sooner pernicious to himself.

It was this cause which brought about the complete and violent destruction of the Pythagorean order. Their ascendency had provoked such wide-spread discontent, that their enemies became emboldened to employ extreme force against them. Kylon and Ninon—the former of whom is said to have sought admittance into the order, but to have been rejected on account of his bad character—took the lead in pronounced opposition to the Pythagoreans; and the odium which the latter had incurred extended itself farther to the Senate of One Thousand, through the medium of which their ascendency had been exercised. Propositions were made for rendering the government more democratical, and for constituting a new senate, taken by lot from all the people, before which the magistrates should go through their trial of accountability after office; an opportunity being chosen in which the Senate of One Thousand had given signal offence by refusing to divide among the people the recently conquered territory of Sybaris.[743] In spite of the opposition of the Pythagoreans, this change of government was carried through. Ninon and Kylon, their principal enemies, made use of it to exasperate the people still farther against the order, until they provoked actual popular violence against it. The Pythagoreans were attacked when assembled in their meeting-house near the temple of Apollo, or, as some said, in the house of Milo: the building was set on fire, and many of the members perished;[744] none but the younger and more vigorous escaping. Similar disturbances, and the like violent suppression of the order, with destruction of several among the leading citizens, are said to have taken place in other cities of Magna Græcia,—Tarentum, Metapontum, Kaulonia. And we are told that these cities remained for some time in a state of great disquietude and commotion from which they were only rescued by the friendly mediation of the Peloponnesian Achæans, the original founders of Sybaris and Kroton,—assisted, indeed, by mediators from other parts of Greece. The cities were at length pacified, and induced to adopt an amicable congress, with

common religious festivals at a temple founded expressly for the purpose, and dedicated to Zeus Homarius.[745]

Thus perished the original Pythagorean order. Respecting Pythagoras himself, there were conflicting accounts; some representing that he was burnt in the temple with his disciples;[746] others, that he had died a short time previously; others again affirmed that he was alive at the time, but absent, and that he died not long afterwards in exile, after forty days of voluntary abstinence from food. His tomb was still shown at Metapontum in the days of Cicero.[747] As an active brotherhood, the Pythagoreans never revived; but the dispersed members came together as a sect, for common religious observances and common pursuit of science. They were readmitted, after some interval, into the cities of Magna Græcia,[748] from which they had been originally expelled, but to which the sect is always considered as particularly belonging,—though individual members of it are found besides at Thebes and other cities of Greece. Indeed, some of these later Pythagoreans sometimes even acquired great political influence, as we see in the case of the Tarentine Archytas, the contemporary of Plato.

It has already been stated that the period when Pythagoras arrived at Kroton may be fixed somewhere between B. C. 540-530; and his arrival is said to have occurred at a time of great depression in the minds of the Krotoniates. They had recently been defeated by the united Lokrians and Rhegians, vastly inferior to themselves in number, at the river Sagra; and the humiliation thus brought upon them is said to have rendered them docile to the training of the Samian missionary.[749] As the birth of the Pythagorean order is thus connected with the defeat of the Krotoniates at the Sagra, so its extinction is also connected with their victory over the Sybarites at the river Traeis, or Trionto, about twenty years afterwards.

Of the history of these two great Achæan cities we unfortunately know very little. Though both were powerful, yet down to the period of 510 B. C., Sybaris seems to have been decidedly the greatest: of its dominion as well as of its much-denounced luxury I have spoken in a former chapter.[750] It was at that time that the war broke out between them which ended in the destruction of Sybaris. It is certain that the Sybaritans were aggressors in the war; but by what causes it had been preceded in their own town, or what provocation they had received, we make out very indistinctly. There had been a political revolution at Sybaris, we are told, not long before, in which a popular leader named Têlys had headed a rising against the oligarchical government, and induced the people to banish five hundred of the leading rich men, as well as to confiscate their properties. He had acquired the sovereignty and become despot of Sybaris;[751] and it appears that he, or his rule at Sybaris, was much abhorred at Kroton,—since the Krotoniate Philippus, a man of splendid muscular form and an Olympic victor, was exiled for having engaged himself to marry the daughter of Têlys.[752] According to the narrative given by the later Pythagoreans, those exiles, whom Têlys had driven from Sybaris, took refuge at Kroton, and cast

themselves as suppliants on the altars for protection. It may well be, indeed, that they were in part Pythagoreans of Sybaris. A body of powerful exiles, harbored in a town so close at hand, naturally inspired alarm, and Têlys demanded that they should be delivered up, threatening war in case of refusal. This demand excited consternation at Kroton, since the military strength of Sybaris was decidedly superior. The surrender of the exiles was much debated, and almost decreed, by the Krotoniates, until at length the persuasion of Pythagoras himself is said to have determined them to risk any hazard sooner than incur the dishonor of betraying suppliants.

On the demand of the Sybarites being refused, Têlys marched against Kroton, at the head of a force which is reckoned at three hundred thousand men.[753] He marched, too, in defiance of the strongest religious warnings against the enterprise,—for the sacrifices, offered on his behalf by the Iamid prophet Kallias of Elis, were decisively unfavorable, and the prophet himself fled in terror to Kroton.[754] Near the river Traeis, or Trionto, he was met by the forces of Kroton, consisting, we are informed, of one hundred thousand men, and commanded by the great athlete and Pythagorean Milo; who was clothed, we are told, in the costume and armed with the club of Hêraklês. They were farther reinforced, however, by a valuable ally, the Spartan Dorieus, younger brother of king Kleomenês, then coasting along the gulf of Tarentum with a body of colonists, intending to found a settlement in Sicily. A bloody battle was fought, in which the Sybarites were totally worsted, with prodigious slaughter; while the victors, fiercely provoked and giving no quarter, followed up the pursuit so warmly that they took the city, dispersed its inhabitants, and crushed its whole power[755] in the short space of seventy days. The Sybarites fled in great part to Laos and Skidros,[756] their settlements planted on the Mediterranean coast, across the Calabrian peninsula. And so eager were the Krotoniates to render the site of Sybaris untenable, that they turned the course of the river Krathis so as to overwhelm and destroy it: the dry bed in which the river had originally flowed was still visible in the time of Herodotus,[757] who was among the settlers in the town of Thurii, afterwards founded, nearly adjoining.

It appears, however, that the Krotoniates for a long time kept the site of Sybaris deserted, refusing even to allot the territory among the body of their own citizens: from which circumstances, as has been before noticed, the commotion against the Pythagorean order is said to have arisen. They may perhaps have been afraid of the name and recollections of the city; wherein no large or permanent establishment was ever formed, until Thurii was established by Athens about sixty-five years afterwards. Nevertheless, the name of the Sybarites did not perish. Having maintained themselves at Laos, Skidros, and elsewhere, they afterwards formed the privileged Old-citizens among the colonists of Thurii; but misbehaved themselves in that capacity, and were mostly either slain or expelled. Even after that, however, the name of Sybaris still remained on a reduced scale in some portion of the territory. Herodotus

recounts what he was told by the Sybarites, and we find subsequent indications of them even as late as Theokritus.

The conquest and destruction of the original Sybaris—perhaps in 510 B. C. the greatest of all Grecian cities—appears to have excited a strong sympathy in the Hellenic world. In Milêtus, especially, with which it had maintained intimate union, the grief was so vehement, that all the Milesians shaved their heads in token of mourning.[758] The event happened just at the time of the expulsion of Hippias from Athens, and must have made a sensible revolution in the relations of the Greek cities on the Italian coast with the rustic population of the interior. The Krotoniates might destroy Sybaris, and disperse its inhabitants, but they could not succeed to its wide dominion over dependent territory; and the extinction of this great aggregate power, stretching across the peninsula from sea to sea, lessened the means of resistance against the Oscan movements from the inland. From this time forward, the cities of Magna Græcia, as well as those of Ionia, tend to decline in consequence, while Athens, on the other hand, becomes both more conspicuous and more powerful. At the invasion of Greece by Xerxês, thirty years after this conquest of Sybaris, Sparta and Athens send to ask for aid both from Sicily and Korkyra,—but not from Magna Græcia.

It is much to be regretted that we do not possess fuller information respecting these important changes among the Greco-Italian cities, but we may remark that even Herodotus,—himself a citizen of Thurii, and dwelling on the spot not more than eighty years after the capture of Sybaris,—evidently found no written memorials to consult; and could obtain from verbal conversation nothing better than statements both meagre and contradictory. The material circumstance, for example, of the aid rendered by the Spartan Dorieus and his colonists, though positively asserted by the Sybarites, was as positively denied by the Krotoniates, who alleged that they had accomplished the conquest by themselves, and with their own unaided forces. There can be little hesitation in crediting the affirmative assertion of the Sybarites, who showed to Herodotus a temple and precinct erected by the Spartan prince in testimony of his share in the victory, on the banks of the dry, deserted channel, out of which the Krathis had been turned, and in honor of the Krathian Athênê.[759] This of itself forms a proof, coupled with the positive assertion of the Sybarites, sufficient for the case. But they produced another indirect argument to confirm it, which deserves notice. Dorieus had attacked Sybaris while he was passing along the coast of Italy to go and found a colony in Sicily, under the express mandate and encouragement of the oracle; and after tarrying awhile at Sybaris, he pursued his journey to the south-western portion of Sicily, where he and nearly all his companions perished in a battle with the Carthaginians and Egestæans,—though the oracle had promised him that he should acquire and occupy permanently the neighboring territory near Mount Eryx. Now the Sybarites deduced from this fatal disaster of Dorieus and his expedition, combined with the favorable promise of the oracle beforehand, a confident proof of

the correctness of their own statement that he had fought at Sybaris. For if he had gone straight to the territory marked out by the oracle, they argued, without turning aside for any other object, the prophecy on which his hopes were founded would have been unquestionably realized, and he would have succeeded; but the ruinous disappointment which actually overtook him was at once explained, and the truth of prophecy vindicated, when it was recollected that he had turned aside to help the Krotoniates against Sybaris, and thus set at nought the conditions prescribed to him. Upon this argument, Herodotus tells us, the Sybarites of his day especially insisted. [760] And while we note their pious and literal faith in the communications of an inspired prophet, we must at the same time observe how perfectly that faith supplied the place of historical premises,—how scanty their stock was of such legitimate evidence,—and how little they had yet learned to appreciate its value.

It is to be remarked, that Herodotus, in his brief mention of the fatal war between Sybaris and Kroton, does not make the least allusion to Pythagoras or his brotherhood. The least which we can infer from such silence is, that the part which they played in reference to the war, and their general ascendency in Magna Græcia, was in reality less conspicuous and overruling than the Pythagorean historians set forth. Even making such allowance, however, the absence of all allusion in Herodotus, to the commotions which accompanied the subversion of the Pythagoreans, is a surprising circumstance. Nor can I pass over a perplexing statement in Polybius, which seems to show that he too must have conceived the history of Sybaris in a way different from that in which it is commonly represented. He tells us that after much suffering in Magna Græcia, from the troubles which followed the expulsion of the Pythagoreans, the cities were induced by Achæan mediation to come to an accommodation, and even to establish something like a permanent league, with a common temple and sacrifices. Now the three cities which he specifies as having been the first to do this, are Kroton, Sybaris, and Kaulonia.[761] But according to the sequence of events and the fatal war, just described, between Kroton and Sybaris, the latter city must have been at that time in ruins; little, if at all, inhabited. I cannot but infer from this statement of Polybius, that he followed different authorities respecting the early history of Magna Græcia in the beginning of the fifth century B. C.

Indeed, the early history of these cities gives us little more than a few isolated facts and names. With regard to their legislators, Zaleukus and Charondas, nothing is made out except their existence,—and even that fact some ancient critics contested. Of Zaleukus, whom chronologists place in 664 B. C., I have already spoken; the date of Charondas cannot be assigned, but we may perhaps presume that it was at some time between 600-500 B. C. He was a citizen of middling station, born in the Chalkidic colony of Katana in Sicily,[762] and he framed laws not only for his own city, but for the other Chalkidic cities in Sicily and Italy,—Leontini, Naxos, Zanklê, and Rhêgium. The laws and the solemn preamble ascribed to him by Diodorus and Stobæus, belong to a later day,[763] and we are obliged to content ourselves with collecting the

brief hints of Aristotle, who tells us that the laws of Charondas descended to great minuteness of distinction and specification, especially in graduating the fine for offences according to the property of the guilty person fined,[764]—but that there was nothing in his laws strictly original and peculiar, except that he was the first to introduce the solemn indictment against perjured witnesses before justice. The perjured witness, in Grecian ideas, was looked upon as having committed a crime half religious, half civil; and the indictment raised against him, known by a peculiar name, partook of both characters, approaching in some respects to the procedure against a murderer. Such distinct form of indictment against perjured testimony—with its appropriate name,[765] which we shall find maintained at Athens throughout the best-known days of Attic law—was first enacted by Charondas.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Herodot. i, 196; Skylax, c. 19-27; Appian. Illyric. c. 2, 4, 8.

The geography of the countries occupied in ancient times by the Illyrians, Macedonians, Pæonians, Thracians, etc., and now possessed by a great diversity of races, among whom the Turks and Albanians retain the primitive barbarism without mitigation, is still very imperfectly understood; though the researches of Colonel Leake, of Boué, of Grisebach, and others (especially the valuable travels of the latter), have of late thrown much light upon it. How much our knowledge is extended in this direction, may be seen by comparing the map prefixed to Mannert's Geographie, or to O. Müller's Dissertation on the Macedonians, with that in Boué's Travels, but the extreme deficiency of the maps, even as they now stand, is emphatically noticed by Boué himself (see his Critique des Cartes de la Turquie in the fourth volume of his Voyage),—by Paul Joseph Schaffarik, the learned historian of the Sclavonic race, in the preface attached by him to Dr. Joseph Müller's Topographical Account of Albania,—and by Grisebach, who in his surveys, taken from the summits of the mountains Peristeri and Ljubatrin, found the map differing at every step from the bearings which presented themselves to his eye. It is only since Boué and Grisebach that the idea has been completely dismissed, derived originally from Strabo, of a straight line of mountains (εὐθεῖα γραμμὴ, Strabo, lib. vii, Fragm. 3) running across from the Adriatic to the Euxine, and sending forth other lateral chains in a direction nearly southerly. The mountains of Turkey in Europe, when examined with the stock of geological science which M. Viquesnel (the companion of Boué) and Dr. Grisebach bring to the task, are found to belong to systems very different, and to present evidences of conditions of formation often quite independent of each other.

The thirteenth chapter of Grisebach's Travels presents the best account which has yet been given of the chain of Skardus and Pindus: he has been the first to prove clearly, that the Ljubatrin, which immediately overhangs the plain of Kossovo at the southern border of Servia and Bosnia, is the north-eastern extremity of a chain of mountains reaching southward to the frontiers of Ætolia, in a direction not very wide of N-S.,—with the single interruption (first brought to view by Colonel Leake) of the Klissoura of Devol,—a complete gap, where the river Devol, rising on the eastern side, crosses the chain and joins the Apsus, or Beratino, on the western,—(it is remarkable that both in the map of Boué and in that annexed to Dr. Joseph Müller's Topographical Description of Albania, the river Devol is made to join the Genussus, or Skoumi, considerably north of the Apsus, though Colonel Leake's map gives the correct course.) In Grisebach's nomenclature Skardus is made to reach from the Ljubatrin as its north-eastern extremity, south-westward and southward as far as the Klissoura of Devol: south of that point Pindus commences, in a continuation, however, of the same axis.

In reference to the seats of the ancient Illyrians and Macedonians Grisebach has made another observation of great importance (vol. ii, p. 121). Between the north-eastern extremity, Mount Ljubatrin, and the Klissoura of Devol, there are in the mighty and continuous chain of Skardus (above seven thousand feet high) only two passes fit for an army to cross: one near the northern extremity of the chain, over which Grisebach himself crossed, from Kalkandele to Prisdren, a very high *col*, not less than five thousand feet above the level of the sea; the other, considerably to the southward, and lower as well as easier, nearly in the latitude of Lychnidus, or Ochrida. It was over this last pass that the Roman Via Egnatia travelled, and that the modern road from Scutari and Durazzo to Bitolia now travels. With the exception of these two partial depressions, the long mountain-ridge maintains itself undiminished in height, admitting, indeed, paths by which a small company either of travellers or of Albanian robbers from the Dibren, may cross (there is a path of this kind which connects Struga with Ueskioub, mentioned by Dr. Joseph Müller, p. 70, and some others by Boué, vol. iv, p. 546), but nowhere admitting the passage of an army.

To attack the Macedonians, therefore, an Illyrian army would have to go through one or other of these passes, or else to go round the north-eastern pass of Katschanik, beyond the extremity of Ljubatrin. And we shall find that, in point of fact, the military operations recorded between the two nations carry us usually in one or other of these directions. The military proceedings of Brasidas (Thucyd. iv, 124),—of Philip the son of Amyntas king of Macedon (Diodor. xvi, 8),—of Alexander the Great in the first year of his reign (Arrian, i, 5), all bring us to the pass near Lychnidus (compare Livy, xxxii, 9; Plutarch, Flaminin. c. 4); while the Illyrian Dardani and Autariatæ border upon Pæonia, to the north of Pelagonia, and threaten Macedonia from the north-east of the

mountain-chain of Skardus. The Autariatæ are not far removed from the Pæonian Agrianes, who dwelt near the sources of the Strymon, and both Autariatæ and Dardani threatened the return march of Alexander from the Danube into Macedonia, after his successful campaign against the Getæ, low down in the course of that great river (Arrian, i, 5). Without being able to determine the precise line of Alexander's march on this occasion, we may see that these two Illyrian tribes must have come down to attack him from Upper Mœsia, and on the eastern side of the Axius. This, and the fact that the Dardani were the immediate neighbors of the Pæonians, shows us that their seats could not have been far removed from Upper Mœsia (Livy, xlv, 29): the fauces Pelagoniæ (Livy, xxxi, 34) are the pass by which they entered Macedonia from the north. Ptolemy even places the Dardani at Skopiæ (Ueskioub) (iii, 9); his information about these countries seems better than that of Strabo.

[2] Hekatæi Fragm. ed. Klausen, Fr. 66-70; Thucyd. i, 26.

Skylax places the Encheleis north of Epidamnus and of the Taulantii. It may be remarked that Hekatæus seems to have communicated much information respecting the Adriatic: he noticed the city of Adria at the extremity of the Gulf, and the fertility and abundance of the territory around it (Fr. 58: compare Skymnus Chius, 384).

[3] Livy, xliii, 9-18. Mannert (Geograph. der Griech. und Römer, part vii, ch. 9, p. 386, *seq.*) collects the points and shows how little can be ascertained respecting the localities of these Illyrian tribes.

[4] Strabo, iv, p. 206.

[5] Strabo, vii, p. 315; Arrian, i, 5, 4-11. So impracticable is the territory, and so narrow the means of the inhabitants, in the region called Upper Albania, that most of its resident tribes even now are considered as free, and pay no tribute to the Turkish government: the Pachas cannot extort it without greater expense and difficulty than the sum gained would repay. The same was the case in Epirus, or Lower Albania, previous to the time of Ali Pacha: in Middle Albania, the country does not present the like difficulties, and no such exemptions are allowed (Boué, Voyage en Turquie, vol. iii, p. 192). These free Albanian tribes are in the same condition with regard to the Sultan as the Mysians and Pisidians in Asia Minor with regard to the king of Persia in ancient times (Xenophon, Anab. iii, 2, 23).

[6] Diodor. xv, 13: Polyb. ii, 4.

[7] See the description in Thucydidês (iv, 124-128); especially the exhortation which he puts into the mouth of Brasidas,—αὐτοκράτωρ μάχη, contrasted with the orderly array of Greeks.

"Illyriorum velocitas ad excursiones et impetus subitos."

(Livy, xxxi, 35.)

[8] See Pouqueville, Voyage en Grèce, vol. i, chs. 23 and 24; Grisebach, Reise durch Rumelien und nach Brussa, vol. ii, pp. 138-139; Boué, La Turquie en Europe, Géographie Générale, vol. i, pp. 60-65.

[9] Skymnus Chius, v, 418-425.

[10] Thucydidês mentions the ὑφαντὰ τε καὶ λεῖα, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κατασκευή, which the Greek settlements on the Thracian coast sent up to king Seuthês (ii, 98): similar to the ὑφασμαθ᾽ ἱερὰ, and to the χερισῶν τεκτόνων δαίδαλα, offered as presents to the Delphian god (Eurip. Ion. 1141; Pindar, Pyth. v, 46).

[11] Strabo, vii, p. 317; Appian, Illyric. 17; Aristot. Mirab. Ausc. c. 138. For the extreme importance of the trade in salt, as a bond of connection, see the regulations of the Romans when they divided Macedonia into four provinces, with the distinct view of cutting off all connection between one and the other. All *commercium* and *connubium* were forbidden between them: the fourth region, whose capital was Pelagonia (and which included all the primitive or Upper Macedonia, east of the range of Pindus and Skardus), was altogether inland, and it was expressly forbidden to draw its salt from the third region, or the country between the Axius and the Peneius; while on the other hand the Illyrian Dardani, situated northward of Upper Macedonia, received express permission to draw *their* salt from this third or maritime region of Macedonia: the salt was to be conveyed from the Thermaic gulf along the road of the Axius to Stobi in Pæonia, and was there to be sold at a fixed price.

The inner or fourth region of Macedonia, which included the modern Bitoglia and Lake Castoria, could easily obtain its salt from the Adriatic, by the communication afterwards so well known as the Roman Egnatian way;

but the communication of the Dardani with the Adriatic led through a country of the greatest possible difficulty, and it was probably a great convenience to them to receive their supply from the gulf of Therma by the road along the Vardar (Axius) (Livy, xlv, 29). Compare the route of Grisebach from Salonichi to Scutari, in his Reise durch Rumelien, vol. ii.

[12] About the cattle in Illyria, Aristotle, De Mirab. Ausc. c. 128. There is a remarkable passage in Polybius, wherein he treats the importation of slaves as a matter of necessity to Greece (iv, 37). The purchasing of the Thracian slaves in exchange for salt is noticed by Menander.—Θρᾷξ εὐγενὴς εἶ, πρὸς ἅλας ἠγορασμένος: see Proverb. Zenob. ii, 12, and Diogenian, i, 100.

The same trade was carried on in antiquity with the nations on and near Caucasus, from the seaport of Dioskurias at the eastern extremity of the Euxine (Strabo, xi, p. 506). So little have those tribes changed, that the Circassians now carry on much the same trade. Dr. Clarke's statement carries us back to the ancient world: "The Circassians frequently sell their children to strangers, particularly to the Persians and Turks, and their princes supply the Turkish seraglios with the most beautiful of the prisoners of both sexes whom they take in war. In their commerce with the Tchernomorski Cossacks (north of the river Kuban), the Circassians bring considerable quantities of wood, and the delicious honey of the mountains, sewed up in goats' hides, with the hair on the outside. These articles they exchange for salt, a commodity found in the neighboring lakes, of a very excellent quality. Salt is more precious than any other kind of wealth to the Circassians, and it constitutes the most acceptable present which can be offered to them. They weave mats of very great beauty, which find a ready market both in Turkey and Russia. They are also ingenious in the art of working silver and other metals, and in the fabrication of guns, pistols, and sabres. Some, which they offered us for sale, we suspected had been procured in Turkey in exchange for slaves. Their bows and arrows are made with inimitable skill, and the arrows being tipped with iron, and otherwise exquisitely wrought, are considered by the Cossacks and Russians as inflicting incurable wounds." (Clarke's Travels, vol. i, ch. xvi, p. 378.)

[13] Theophrast. Hist. Plant. iv, 5, 2; ix, 7, 4: Pliny. H. N. xiii, 2; xxi, 19: Strabo, vii, p. 326. Coins of Epidamnus and Apollonia are found not only in Macedonia, but in Thrace and in Italy: the trade of these two cities probably extended across from sea to sea, even before the construction of the Egnatian way; and the Inscription 2056 in the Corpus of Boeckh proclaims the gratitude of Odêssus (Varna) in the Euxine sea towards a citizen of Epidamnus (Barth, Corinthiorum Mercatur. Hist. p. 49; Aristot. Mirab. Auscult. c. 104).

[14] Herodot. v, 61; viii, 137: Strabo, vii, p. 326. Skylax places the λίθοι of Kadmus and Harmonia among the Illyrian Manii, north of the Encheleis (Diodor. xix, 53; Pausan. ix, 5, 3).

[15] Herodot. v, 22.

[16] Aristot. Polit. vii, 2, 6. That the Macedonians were chiefly village residents, appears from Thucyd. ii, 100, iv, 124, though this does not exclude *some* towns.

[17] Boué, Voyage en Turquie, vol. i, p. 199: "Un bon nombre de cols dirigés du nord au sud, comme pour inviter les habitans de passer d'une de ces provinces dans l'autre."

[18] For the general physical character of the region, both east and west of Skardus, continued by Pindus, see the valuable charter of Grisebach's Travels above referred to (Reisen, vol. ii. ch. xiii, pp. 125-130; c. xiv, p. 175; c. xvi, pp. 214-216; c. xvii, pp. 244-245).

Respecting the plains comprised in the ancient Pelagonia, see also the Journal of the younger Pouqueville, in his progress from Travnik in Bosnia to Janina. He remarks, in the two days' march from Prelepe (Prilip) through Bitolia to Florina, "Dans cette route on parcourt des plaines luxuriantes couvertes de moissons, de vastes prairies remplies de trèfle, des plateaux abondans en pâturages inépuisables, où paissent d'innombrables troupeaux de bœufs, de chèvres, et de menu bétail…. Le blé, le maïs, et les autres grains sont toujours à très bas prix, à cause de la difficulté des débouchés, d'où l'on exporte une grande quantité de laines, de cotons, de peaux d'agneaux, de buffles, et de chevaux, qui passent par le moyen des caravanes en Hongrie." (Pouqueville, Voyage dans la Grèce, tom. ii, ch. 62, p. 495.)

Again, M. Boué remarks upon this same plain, in his Critique des Cartes de la Turquie, Voyage, vol. iv, p. 483, "La plaine immense de Prilip, de Bitolia, et de Florina, n'est pas représentée (sur les cartes) de manière à ce qu'on ait une idée de son étendue, et surtout de sa largeur…. La plaine de Sarigoul est changée en vallée," etc. The basin of the Haliakmôn he remarks to be represented equally imperfectly on the maps: compare also his Voyage, i, pp. 211, 299, 300.

I notice the more particularly the large proportion of fertile plain and valley in the ancient Macedonia, because it is often represented (and even by O. Müller, in his Dissertation on the ancient Macedonians, attached to his History of the Dorians) as a cold and rugged land, pursuant to the statement of Livy (xlv, 29), who says, respecting the fourth region of Macedonia as distributed by the Romans, "Frigida hæc omnis, duraque cultu, et aspera plaga est: cultorum quoque ingenia terræ similia habet: ferociores eos et accolæ barbari faciunt, nunc bello exercentes, nunc in pace miscentes ritus suos."

This is probably true of the mountaineers included in the region, but it is too much generalized.

[19] Polyb. xxviii, 8, 9. This is the most distinct testimony which we possess, and it appears to me to contradict the opinion both of Mannert (Geogr. der Gr. und Röm. vol. vii, p. 492) and of O. Müller (On the Macedonians, sects. 28-36), that the native Macedonians were of Illyrian descent.

[20] The Macedonian military array seems to have been very like that of the Thessalians,—horsemen well-mounted and armed, and maintaining good order (Thucyd. ii, 101): of their infantry, before the time of Philip son of Amyntas, we do not hear much.

"Macedoniam, quæ tantis barbarorum gentibus attingitur, ut semper Macedonicis imperatoribus iidem fines imperii fuerint qui gladiorum atque pilorum." (Cicero, in Pison. c. xvi.)

[21] Strabo, lib. vii, Fragm. 20, ed. Tafel.

[22] I have followed Herodotus in stating the original series of occupants on the Thermaic gulf, anterior to the Macedonian conquests. Thucydidês introduces the Pæonians between Bottiæans and Mygdonians: he says that the Pæonians possessed "a narrow strip of land on the side of the Axius, down to Pella and the sea," (ii, 96.) If this were true, it would leave hardly any room for the Bottiæans, whom, nevertheless, Thucydidês recognizes on the coast; for the whole space between the mouths of the two rivers, Axius and Haliakmôn, is inconsiderable; moreover, I cannot but suspect that Thucydidês has been led to believe, by finding in the Iliad that the Pæonian allies of Troy came from the Axius, that there *must have been* old Pæonian settlements at the mouth of that river, and that he has advanced the inference as if it were a certified fact. The case is analogous to what he says about the Bœotians in his preface (upon which O. Müller has already commented); he stated the emigration of the Bœotians into Bœotia as having taken place after the Trojan war, but saves the historical credit of the Homeric catalogue by adding that there had been a *fraction* of them in Bœotia *before*, from whom the contingent which went to Troy was furnished (ἀποδασμός, Thucyd. i, 12).

On this occasion, therefore, having to choose between Herodotus and Thucydidês, I prefer the former. O. Müller (On the Macedonians, sect. 11) would strike out just so much of the assertion of Thucydidês as positively contradicts Herodotus, and retain the rest; he thinks that the Pæonians came down *very near* to the mouth of the river, but *not quite*. I confess that this does not satisfy me; the more so as the passage from Livy by which he would support his view will appear, on examination, to refer to Pæonia high up the Axius,—not to a supposed portion of Pæonia near the mouth (Livy, xlv, 29).

Again, I would remark that the original residence of the Pierians between the Peneius and the Haliakmôn rests chiefly upon the authority of Thucydidês: Herodotus knows the Pierians in their seats between Mount Pangæus and the sea, but he gives no intimation that they had before dwelt south of the Haliakmôn; the tract between the Haliakmôn and the Peneius is by him conceived as Lower Macedonia, or Macedonis, reaching to the borders of Thessaly (vii, 127-173). I make this remark in reference to sects. 7-17 of O. Müller's Dissertation, wherein the conception of Herodotus appears incorrectly apprehended, and some erroneous inferences founded upon it. That this tract was the original Pieria, there is sufficient reason for believing (compare Strabo, vii, Frag. 22, with Tafel's note, and ix, p. 410; Livy, xliv, 9); but Herodotus notices it only as Macedonia.

[23] Skylax, c. 67. The conquests of Philip extended the boundary beyond the Strymon to the Nestus (Strabo, lib. vii, Fragm. 33, ed. Tafel).

[24] See this contrast noticed in Grisebach, especially in reference to the wide but barren region called the plain of Mustapha, no great distance from the left bank of the Axius (Grisebach, Reisen, v, ii, p. 225; Boué, Voyage, vol. i, p. 168).

For the description of the banks of the Axius (Vardar) and the Strymon, see Boué, Voyage en Turquie, vol. i, pp. 196-199. "La plaine ovale de Seres est un des diamans de la couronne de Byzance," etc. He remarks how incorrectly the course of the Strymon is depicted on the maps (vol. iv, p. 482).

[25] The expression of Strabo or his Epitomator—τὴν Παιονίαν μέχρι Πελαγονίας καὶ Πιερίας ἐκτετάσθαι,—seems quite exact, though Tafel finds a difficulty in it. See his Note on the Vatican Fragments of the seventh book of Strabo, Fr. 37. The Fragment 40 is expressed much more loosely. Compare Herodot. v, 13-16, vii, 124; Thucyd. ii, 96; Diodor. xx, 19.

[26] Herodot. viii, 137-138.

[27] Herodot. v, 22. Argeadæ, Strabo, lib. vii, Fragm. 20, ed. Tafel, which may probably have been erroneously changed into Ægeadæ (Justin, vii, 1).

[28] Thucyd. iii, 7; Herodot. vi, 34-37: compare the story of Zalmoxis among the Thracians (iv, 94).

[29] Strabo, vii, p. 326.

[30] Herodot. viii, 139. Thucydidês agrees in the number of kings, but does not give the names (ii, 100).

For the divergent lists of the early Macedonian kings, see Mr. Clinton's Fasti Hellenici, vol. ii, p. 221.

[31] This may be gathered, I think, from Herodot. vii, 73 and viii, 138. The alleged migration of the Briges into Asia, and the change of their name to Phryges, is a statement which I do not venture to repeat as credible.

[32] Herodot. vii, 123. Herodotus recognizes both Bottiæans between the Axius and the Haliakmôn,—and Bottiæans at Olynthus, whom the Macedonians had expelled from the Thermaic gulf,—at the time when Xerxês passed (viii, 127). These two statements seem to me compatible, and both admissible: the former Bottiæans were expelled by the Macedonians subsequently, anterior to the Peloponnesian war.

My view of these facts, therefore, differs somewhat from that of O. Müller (Macedonians, sect. 16).

[33] Herodot. i, 59, v, 94; viii, 136.

[34] Mannert assimilates the civilization of the Thracians to that of the Gauls when Julius Cæsar invaded them,—a great injustice to the latter, in my judgment (Geograph. Gr. und Röm. vol. vii, p. 23).

[35] Cicero, De Officiis, ii, 7. "Barbarum compunctum notis Threiciis." Plutarch (De Serâ Numin. Vindict. c. 13, p. 558) speaks as if the women only were tattooed, in Thrace: he puts a singular interpretation upon it, as a continuous punishment on the sex for having slain Orpheus.

[36] For the Thracians generally, see Herodot. v, 3-9, vii, 110, viii, 116, ix, 119; Thucyd. ii, 100, vii, 29-30; Xenophon, Anabas. vii, 2, 38, and the seventh book of the Anabasis generally, which describes the relations of Xenophon and the Ten Thousand Greeks with Seuthês the Thracian prince.

[37] Xenoph. Anab. vi, 2, 17; Herodot. vii, 75.

[38] Tacit. Annal. ii, 66; iv, 46.

[39] Plutarch, Quæst. Græc. p. 293.

[40] Skylax, c. 67.

[41] For the description of Chalkidikê, see Grisebach's Reisen, vol. ii, ch. 10, pp. 6-16, and Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii, ch. 24, p. 152.

If we read attentively the description of Chalkidikê as given by Skylax (c. 67), we shall see that he did not conceive it as three-pronged, but as terminating only in the peninsula of Pallênê, with Potidæa at its isthmus.

[42] Herodot. vii, 123; Skymnus Chius, v, 627.

[43] Strabo, x, p. 447; Thucyd. iv, 120-123; Pompon. Mela, ii, 2; Herodot. vii, 123.

[44] Herodot. vii, 122; viii, 127. Stephanus Byz. (v. Παλλήνη) gives us some idea of the mythes of the lost Greek writers, Hegesippus and Theagenês about Pallênê.

[45] Thucyd. iv, 84, 103, 109. See Mr. Clinton's Fasti Hellenici, ad ann. 654 B. C.

[46] Solinus, x, 10.

[47] Herodot. i, 168; vii, 58-59, 109; Skymnus Chius, v, 675.

[48] Thucyd. i, 100, iv, 102; Herodot. v, 11. Large quantities of corn are now exported from this territory to Constantinople (Leake, North. Gr. vol. iii, ch. 25, p. 172).

[49] Herodot. vii, 108-109; Thucyd. i, 101.

[50]

… ἥδε δ᾽ ὥστ᾽ ὄνου ῥαχις

Ἔστηκεν, ὕλης ἀγρίας ἐπιστεφής.

Archiloch. Fragm. 17-18, ed. Schneidewin.

The striking propriety of this description, even after the lapse of two thousand five hundred years, may be seen in the Travels of Grisebach, vol. i. ch. 7, pp. 210-218, and in Prokesch, Denkwürdigkeiten des Orients, Th. 3, p. 612. The view of Thasus from the sea justifies the title Ἠερίη (Œnomaus ap. Euseb. Præpar. Evang. vii, p. 256; Steph. Byz. Θάσσος).

Thasus (now Tasso) contains at present a population of about six thousand Greeks, dispersed in twelve small villages; it exports some good ship-timber, principally fir, of which there is abundance on the island, together with some olive oil and wax; but it cannot grow corn enough even for this small population. No mines either are now, or have been for a long time, in work.

[51] Archiloch. Fragm. 5, ed. Schneidewin; Aristophan. Pac. 1298, with the Scholia; Strabo, x, p. 487, xii, p. 549; Thucyd. iv, 104.

[52] Skymnus Chius, 699-715; Plutarch, Quæst. Græc. c. 57. See M. Raoul Rochette, Histoire des Colonies Grecques chs. xi-xiv, vol. iii, pp. 273-298.

[53] Aristot. Polit. iv, 4, l.

[54] Polyb. iv, 39, Phylarch. Fragm. 10, ed. Didot.

[55] Skymnus Chius, 720-740; Herodot. ii, 33, vi, 33; Strabo, vii, p. 319; Skylax, c. 68; Mannert, Geograph. Gr. Röm. vol. vii, ch. 8, pp. 126-140.

An inscription in Boeckh's Collection proves the existence of a pentapolis, or union, of five Grecian cities on this coast. Tomi, Kallatis, Mesambria, and Apollônia, are presumed by Blaramberg to have belonged to this union. See Inscript. No. 2056 c.

Syncellus, however (p. 213), places the foundation of Istria considerably earlier, in 651 B. C.

[56] Herodot. viii, 90.

[57] See the discussion of the era of Kyrênê in Thrige, Historia Cyrênês, chs. 22, 23, 24, where the different statements are noticed and compared.

[58] Schol. ad Pindar. Pyth. iv.

[59] Herodot. iv, 150-154.

[60] Herodot. iv, 155.

[61] Herodot. iv, 158. ἐνθαῦτα γὰρ ὁ οὐρανὸς τέτρηται. Compare the jest ascribed to the Byzantian envoys, on occasion of the vaunts of Lysimachus (Plutarch, De Fortunâ Alexandr. Magn. c. 3, p. 338).

[62] Herodot. iv, 198.

[63] See, about the productive powers of Kyrênê and its surrounding region, Herodot. iv, 199; Kallimachus (himself a Kyrenæan), Hymn. ad Apoll. 65, with the note of Spanheim; Pindar, Pyth. iv, with the Scholia *passim*; Diodor. iii, 49; Arrian, Indica, xliii, 13. Strabo (xvii, p. 837) saw Kyrênê from the sea in sailing by, and was struck with the view: he does not appear to have landed.

The results of modern observation in that country are given in the Viaggio of Della Cella and in the exploring expedition of Captain Beechey; see an interesting summary in the History of the Barbary States, by Dr. Russell (Edinburgh, 1835), ch. v, pp. 160-171. The chapter on this subject (c. 6) in Thrige's Historia Cyrênês is defec-

tive, as the author seems never to have seen the careful and valuable observations of Captain Beechey, and proceeds chiefly on the statements of Della Cella.

I refer briefly to a few among the many interesting notices of Captain Beechey. For the site of the ancient Hesperides (Bengazi), and the "beautiful fertile plain near it, extending to the foot of a long chain of mountains about fourteen miles distant to the south-eastward,"—see Beechey, Expedition, ch. xi, pp. 287-315; "a great many datepalm-trees in the neighborhood," (ch. xii, pp. 340-345.)

The distance between Bengazi (Hesperides) and Ptolemeta (Ptolemais, the port of Barka) is fifty-seven geographical miles, along a fertile and beautiful plain, stretching from the mountains to the sea. Between these two was situated the ancient Teucheira (*ib.* ch. xii, p. 347), about thirty-eight miles from Hesperides (p. 349), in a country highly productive wherever it is cultivated (pp. 350-355). Exuberant vegetation exists near the deserted Ptolemeta, or Ptolemais, after the winter rains (p. 364). The circuit of Ptolemais, as measured by the ruins of its walls, was about three and a half English miles (p. 380).

The road from Barka to Kyrênê presents continued marks of ancient chariot-wheels (ch. xiv, p. 406); after passing the plain of Mergê, it becomes hilly and woody, "but on approaching Grenna (Kyrênê) it becomes more clear of wood; the valleys produce fine crops of barley, and the hills excellent pasturage for cattle," (p. 409.) Luxuriant vegetation after the winter rains in the vicinity of Kyrênê (ch. xv, p. 465).

[64] Theophrast. Hist. Pl. vi, 3, 3; ix, 1, 7; Skylax, c. 107.

[65] Isokratês, Or. v, ad Philipp. p. 84, (p. 107, ed. Bek.) Thêra being a colony of Lacedæmon, and Kyrênê of Thêra, Isokratês speaks of Kyrênê as a colony of Lacedæmon.

[66] Pindar, Pyth. iv, 26. Κυρήνην—ἀστέων ῥἰζαν. In the time of Herodotus these three cities may possibly have been spoken of as a Tripolis; but no one before Alexander the Great would have understood the expression Pentapolis, used under the Romans to denote Kyrênê, Apollonia, Ptolemais, Teucheira, and Berenikê, or Hesperides.

Ptolemais, originally the port of Barka, had become autonomous, and of greater importance than the latter.

[67] The accounts respecting the lake called in ancient times Tritônis are, however, very uncertain: see Dr. Shaw's Travels in Barbary, p. 127. Strabo mentions a lake so called near Hesperides (xvii, p. 836); Pherekydês talks of it as near Irasa (Pherekyd. Fragm. 33 *d.* ed. Didot).

[68] Eratosthenês, born at Kyrênê and resident at Alexandria, estimated the land-journey between the two at five hundred and twenty-five Roman miles (Pliny, H. N. v, 6).

[69] Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. c. 75; Valerius Maximus, v, 6. Thrige (Histor. Cyr. c. 49) places this division of the Syrtis between Kyrênê and Carthage at some period between 400-330 B. C., anterior to the loss of the independence of Kyrênê; but I cannot think that it was earlier than the Ptolemies: compare Strabo, xvii, p. 836.

[70] The Carthaginian establishment Neapolis is mentioned by Skylax (c. 109), and Strabo states that Leptis was another name for the same place (xvii, p. 835).

[71] Skylax, c. 107; Vopiscus, Vit. Prob. c. 9; Strabo, xvii, p. 838; Pliny, H. N. v, 5. From the Libyan tribe Marmaridæ was derived the name Marmarika, applied to that region.

[72] ταπεινή τε καὶ ψαμμώδης (Herodot. iv, 191); Sallust, Bell. Jugurthin. c. 17.

Captain Beechey points out the mistaken conceptions which have been entertained of this region:—

"It is not only in the works of early writers that we find the nature of the Syrtis misunderstood; for the whole of the space between Mesurata (*i. e.* the cape which forms the western extremity of the Great Syrtis) and Alexandria is described by Leo Africanus, under the title of Barka, as a wild and desert country, where there is neither water nor land capable of cultivation. He tells us that the most powerful among the Mohammedan invaders possessed themselves of the fertile parts of the coast, leaving the others only the desert for their abode, exposed to all the miseries and privations attendant upon it; for this desert (he continues) is far removed from any habitations, and nothing is produced there whatever. So that if these poor people would have a supply of grain, or of any other articles necessary to their existence, they are obliged to pledge their children to the Sicilians who visit the coast; who, on providing them with these things, carry off the children they have received….

"It appears to be chiefly from Leo Africanus that modern historians have derived their idea of what they term the district and desert of Barka. Yet the whole of the Cyrenaica is comprehended within the limits which they assign to it; and the authority of Herodotus, without citing any other, would be amply sufficient to prove that this tract of country not only was no desert, but was at all times remarkable for its fertility…. The impression left upon our minds, after reading the account of Herodotus, would be much more consistent with the appearance and peculiarities of both, in their actual state, than that which would result from the description of any succeeding writer…. The district of Barka, including all the country between Mesurata and Alexandria, neither is, nor ever was, so destitute and barren as has been represented: the part of it which constitutes the Cyrenaica is capable of the highest degree of cultivation, and many parts of the Syrtis afford excellent pasturage, while some of it is not only adapted to cultivation, but does actually produce good crops of barley and dhurra." (Captain Beechey, Expedition to Northern Coast of Africa, ch. x, pp. 263, 265, 267, 269: comp. ch. xi, p. 321.)

[73] Justin, xiii, 7. "Amœnitatem loci et fontium ubertatem." Captain Beechey notices this annual migration of the Bedouin Arabs:—

"Teucheira (on the coast between Hesperides and Barka) abounds in wells of excellent water, which are reserved by the Arabs for their summer consumption, and only resorted to when the more inland supplies are exhausted: at other times it is uninhabited. Many of the excavated tombs are occupied as dwelling-houses by the Arabs during their summer visits to that part of the coast." (Beechey, Exp. to North. Afric. ch. xii, p. 354.)

And about the wide mountain plain, or table-land of Mergê, the site of the ancient Barka, "The water from the mountains inclosing the plain settles in pools and lakes in different parts of this spacious valley; and affords a constant supply during the summer months, to the Arabs who frequent it." (ch. xiii, p. 390.) The red earth which Captain Beechey observed in this plain is noticed by Herodotus in regard to Libya (ii, 12). Stephan. Byz. notices also the bricks used in building (v. Βάρκη). Derna, too, to the eastward of Cyrene on the sea-coast, is amply provided with water (ch. xvi, p. 471).

About Kyrênê itself, Captain Beechey states: "During the time, about a fortnight, of our absence from Kyrene, the changes which had taken place in the appearance of the country about it were remarkable. We found the hills on our return covered with Arabs, their camels, flocks, and herds; the scarcity of water in the interior at this time having driven the Bedouins to the mountains, and particularly to Kyrene, where the springs afford at all times an abundant supply. The corn was all cut, and the high grass and luxuriant vegetation, which we had found it so difficult to wade through on former occasions, had been eaten down to the roots by the cattle." (ch. xviii, pp. 517-520.)

The winter rains are also abundant, between January and March, at Bengazi (the ancient Hesperides): sweet springs of water near the town (ch. xi, pp. 282, 315, 327). About Ptolemeta, or Ptolemais, the port of the ancient Barka, *ib.* ch. xii, p. 363.

[74] Herodot. iv, 170-171. παραλία σφόδρα εὐδαίμων. Strabo, ii, p. 131. πολυμήλου καὶ πολυκαρποτάτας χθονὸς, Pindar. Pyth. ix, 7.

[75] Herodot. iv, 186, 187, 189, 190. Νομάδες κρεοφάγοι καὶ γαλακτοπόται. Pindar, Pyth. ix, 127, ἱππευταὶ Νομάδες. Pompon. Mela, i, 8.

[76] See the fourth, fifth, and ninth Pythian Odes of Pindar. In the description given by Sophoklês (Electra, 695) of the Pythian contests, in which pretence is made that Orestês has perished, ten contending chariots are supposed, of which two are Libyan, from Barka: of the remaining eight, one only comes from each place named.

[77] Herodot. iv, 172-182. Compare Hornemann's Travels in Africa, p. 48, and Heeren, Verkehr und Handel der Alten Welt, Th. ii, Abth. 1, Abschnitt vi, p. 226.

[78] Herodot. iv, 175-188.

[79] Herodot. iv, 178, 179, 195, 196.

[80] Herodot. iv, 42.

[81] Herodot. iv, 170. νόμους δὲ τοὺς πλείστους μιμέεσθαι ἐπιτηδεύουσι τοὺς Κυρηναίων.

[82] Herodot. iv, 161. Θηραίων καὶ τῶν περιοίκων, etc.

[83] Herodot. iv, 186-189. Compare, also, the story in Pindar. Pyth. ix, 109-126, about Alexidamus, the ancestor of Telesikratês the Kyrenæan; how the former won, by his swiftness in running, a Libyan maiden, daugh-

ter of Antæus of Irasa,—and Kallimachus, Hymn. Apoll. 86.

[84] Herodot. iv, 155.

[85] Herodot. iv, 164.

[86] Respecting the chronology of the Battiad princes, see Boeckh, ad Pindar. Pyth. iv, p. 265, and Thirge, Histor. Cyrenes, p. 127, *seq.*

[87] Herodot. iv, 159.

[88] Herodot. ii, 180-181.

[89] Herodot. iv, 160; Skylax, c. 107; Hekatæus, Fragm. 300, ed. Klausen.

[90] Herodot. iv, 204.

[91] Herodot. iv, 160. Plutarch (De Virtutibus Mulier. p. 261) and Polyænus (viii, 41) give various details of this stratagem on the part of Eryxô; Learchus being in love with her. Plutarch also states that Learchus maintained himself as despot for some time by the aid of Egyptian troops from Amasis, and committed great cruelties. His story has too much the air of a romance to be transcribed into the text, nor do I know from what authority it is taken.

[92] Herodot. iv, 161. Τῷ βασιλέϊ Βάττῳ τεμένεα ἐξελὼν καὶ ἱρωσύνας, τὰ ἄλλα πάντα τὰ πρότερον εἶχον οἱ βασιλεῖς ἐς μέσον τῷ δήμῳ ἔθηκε.

I construe the word τεμένεα as meaning all the domains, doubtless large, which had belonged to the Battiad princes; contrary to Thrige (Historia Cyrênês, ch. 38, p. 150), who restricts the expression to revenues derived from sacred property. The reference of Wesseling to Hesych.—Βάττου σίλφιον—is of no avail for illustrating this passage.

The supposition of O. Müller, that the preceding king had made himself despotic by means of Egyptian soldiers, appears to me neither probable in itself, nor admissible upon the simple authority of Plutarch's romantic story, when we take into consideration the silence of Herodotus. Nor is Müller correct in affirming that Demônax "restored the supremacy of the community:" that legislator superseded the old kingly political privileges, and framed a new constitution (see O. Müller, History of Dorians, b. iii, ch. 9. s. 13.)

[93] Both O. Müller (Dor. b. iii, 4, 5), and Thrige (Hist. Cyren. c. 38, p. 148), speak of Demônax as having abolished the old tribes and created new ones. I do not conceive the change in this manner. Demônax did not *abolish* any tribes, but distributed for the first time the inhabitants into tribes. It is possible indeed that, before his time, the Theræans of Kyrênê may have been divided among themselves into distinct tribes; but the other inhabitants, having emigrated from a great number of different places, had never before been thrown into tribes at all. Some formal enactment or regulation was necessary for this purpose, to define and sanction that religious, social, and political communion, which went to make up the idea of the Tribe. It is not to be assumed, as a matter of course, that there must necessarily have been tribes anterior to Demônax, among a population so miscellaneous in its origin.

[94] Hesychius, Τριακάτιοι; Eustath. ad Hom. Odyss. p. 303; Herakleidês Pontic. De Polit. c. 4.

[95] Herodot. iv, 163. Ἐπὶ μὲν τέσσερας Βάττους, καὶ Ἀρκεσιλέως τέσσερας, διδοῖ ὑμῖν Λοξίης βασιλεύειν Κυρήνης· πλέον μέντοι τούτου οὐδὲ πειρᾶσθαι παραινέει.

[96] Herodot. iv, 163-164.

[97] Herodot. iii, 13; iv, 165-166.

[98] Polyænus (Strateg. vii, 28) gives a narrative in many respects different from this of Herodotus.

[99] Herodot. iv, 203-204.

[100] Herodot. iv, 205.

[101] Thucyd. i, 15.

[102] Thucyd. i, 26. See the tale in Pausanias (v, 25, 1) of the ancient chorus sent annually from Messênê in Sicily across the strait to Rhegium, to a local festival of the Rhegians,—thirty-five boys with a chorus-master and a flute-player: on one unfortunate occasion, all of them perished in crossing. For the Theôry (or solemn reli-

gious deputation) periodically sent by the Athenians to Delos, see Plutarch, Nicias, c. 3; Plato, Phædon, c. 1, p. 58. Compare also Strabo, ix, p. 419, on the general subject.

[103] Homer, Iliad, xi, 879, xxiii, 679; Hesiod, Opp. Di. 651.

[104] Homer, Hymn. Apoll. 150; Thucyd. iii, 104.

[105] Pausan. v, 6, 5; Ælian, N. H. x, 1; Thucyd. iii, 104. When Ephesus, and the festival called Ephesia, had become the great place of Ionic meeting, the presence of women was still continued (Dionys. Hal. A. R. iv, 25).

[106] Strabo, viii, p. 353; Pindar, Olymp. viii, 2; Xenophon, Hellen. iv, 7, 2; iii, 2, 22.

[107] See K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Griechischen Staats-Alterthümer, sect. 10.

[108] Dionys. Halikarn. Ant. Rom. i, 71; Phlegon. De Olympiad. p. 140. For an illustration of the stress laid by the Greeks on the purely honorary rewards of Olympia, and on the credit which they took to themselves as competitors, not for money, but for glory, see Herodot. viii, 26. Compare the Scholia on Pindar, Nem. and Isthm. Argument, pp. 425-514, ed. Boeckh.

[109] See the sentiment of Agesilaus, somewhat contemptuous, respecting the chariot-race, as described by Xenophon (Agesilaus, ix, 6); the general feeling of Greece, however, is more in conformity with what Thucydidês (vi, 16) puts into the mouth of Alkibiadês, and Xenophon into that of Simonidês (Xenophon, Hiero, xi, 5). The great respect attached to a family which had gained chariot victories is amply attested: see Herodot. vi, 35, 36, 103, 126,—οἰκίη τεθριπποτρόφος,—and vi, 70, about Demaratus king of Sparta.

[110] Antholog. Palatin. ix, 588; vol. ii. p. 299, Jacobs.

[111] The original Greek word for this covering (which surrounded the middle hand and upper portion of the fingers, leaving both the ends of the fingers and the thumb exposed) was ἱμὰς, the word for a thong, strap, or whip, of leather: the special word μύρμηξ seems to have been afterwards introduced (Hesychius, v. Ἱμάς): see Homer, Iliad, xxiii, 686. Cestus, or Cæstus, is the Latin word (Virg. Æn. v, 404), the Greek word κεστός is an adjective annexed to ἱμὰς—κεστὸν ἱμάντα—πολύκεστος ἱμὰς (Iliad, xiv, 214; iii, 371). See Pausan. viii, 40, 3, for the description of the incident which caused an alteration in this hand-covering at the Nemean games: ultimately, it was still farther hardened by the addition of iron.

[112] Ἀέθλων πεμπαμέρους ἁμίλλαις,—Pindar, Olymp. v, 6: compare Schol. ad Pindar. Olymp. iii, 33.

See the facts respecting the Olympic Agôn collected by Corsini (Dissertationes Agonisticæ, Dissert. i, sects. 8, 9, 10), and still more amply set forth with a valuable commentary, by Krause (Olympia, oder Darstellung der grossen Olympischen Spiele, Wien, 1838, sects. 8-11 especially).

[113] Hom. Hymn. Apoll. 262.

Πημανέει σ᾽ αἰεὶ κτυπὸς ἵππων ὠκειάων,

Ἀρδόμενοί τ᾽ οὐρῆες ἐμῶν ἱερῶν ἀπὸ πηγέων·

Ἔνθα τις ἀνθρώπων βουλήσεται εἰσοράασθαι

Ἅρματά τ᾽ εὐποίητα καὶ ὠκυπόδων κτυπὸν ἵππων,

Ἢ νηόν τε μέγαν καὶ κτήματα πόλλ᾽ ἐνεόντα.

Also v. 288-394. γυάλων ὑπὸ Παρνήσοιο—484. ὑπὸ πτυχὶ Παρνήσοιο—Pindar, Pyth. viii, 90. Πυθῶνος ἐν γυάλοις—Strabo, ix, p. 418. πετρωδὲς χώριον καὶ θεατροειδὲς—Heliodorus, Æthiop. ii, 26: compare Will. Götte, Das Delphische Orakel (Leipzig, 1839), pp. 39-42.

[114] Βωμοί μ᾽ ἔφερβον, οὔπιών τ᾽ ἀεὶ ξένος, says Ion (in Euripidês, Ion. 334) the slave of Apollo, and the verger of his Delphian temple, who waters it from the Kastalian spring, sweeps it with laurel boughs, and keeps off with his bow and arrows the obtrusive birds (Ion, 105, 143, 154). Whoever reads the description of Professor Ulrichs (Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland, ch. 7, p. 110) will see that the birds—eagles, vultures, and crows—are quite numerous enough to have been exceedingly troublesome. The whole play of Ion conveys a lively idea of the Delphian temple and its scenery, with which Euripidês was doubtless familiar.

[115] There is considerable perplexity respecting Krissa and Kirrha, and it still remains a question among scholars whether the two names denote the same place or different places; the former is the opinion of O. Müller (Orchomenos, p. 495). Strabo distinguishes the two. Pausanias identifies them, conceiving no other town to have ever existed except the seaport (x, 37, 4). Mannert (Geogr. Gr. Röm. viii, p. 148) follows Strabo, and represents them as different.

I consider the latter to be the correct opinion, upon the grounds, and partly, also, on the careful topographical examination of Professor Ulrichs, which affords an excellent account of the whole scenery of Delphi (Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland, Bremen, 1840, chapters 1, 2, 3). The ruins described by him on the high ground near Kastri, called the Forty Saints, may fairly be considered as the ruins of Krissa; the ruins of Kirrha are on the sea-shore near the mouth of the Pleistus. The plain beneath might without impropriety be called either the Krissæan or the Kirrhæan plain (Herodot. viii, 32; Strabo, ix, p. 419). Though Strabo was right in distinguishing Krissa from Kirrha, and right also in the position of the latter under Kirphis, he conceived incorrectly the situation of Krissa; and his representation that there were two wars,—in the first of which, Kirrha was destroyed by the Krissæans, while in the second, Krissa itself was conquered by the Amphiktyons,—is not confirmed by any other authority.

The mere circumstance that Pindar gives us in three separate passages, Κρίσᾳ, Κρισαῖον, Κρισαίοις (Isth. ii, 26; Pyth. v, 49, vi, 18), and in five other passages, Κἰῤῥᾳ, Κἰῤῥας, Κἰῤῥαθεν (Pyth. iii, 33, vii, 14, viii, 26, x, 24, xi, 20), renders it almost certain that the two names belong to different places, and are not merely two different names for the same place; the poet could not in this case have any metrical reason for varying the denomination, as the metre of the two words is similar.

[116] Athenæus, xiii, p. 560; Æschinês cont. Ktesiphont. c. 36, p. 406; Strabo, ix, p. 418. Of the Akragallidæ, or Kraugallidæ, whom Æschinês mentions along with the Kirrhæans as another impious race who dwelt in the neighborhood of the god,—and who were overthrown along with the Kirrhæans,—we have no farther information. O. Müller's conjecture would identify them with the Dryopes (Dorians, i, 2, 5, and his Orchomenos, p. 496); Harpokration, v. Κραυγαλλίδαι.

[117] Schol. ad Pindar, Pyth. Introduct.: Schol. ad Pindar, Nem. ix, 2; Plutarch, Solon, c. 11; Pausan. ii, 9, 6. Pausanias (x, 37, 4) and Polyænus (Strateg. iii, 6) relate a stratagem of Solon, or of Eurylochus, to poison the water of the Kirrhæans with hellebore.

[118] Eurip. Ion, 230.

[119] Thucyd. i, 112.

[120] Mr. Clinton thinks that the Pythian games were celebrated in the autumn: M. Boeckh refers the celebration to the spring: Krause agrees with Boeckh. (Clinton, Fast. Hell. vol. ii, p. 200, Appendix; Boeckh, ad Corp. Inscr. No. 1688, p. 813; Krause, Die Pythien, Nemeen und Isthmien, vol. ii, pp. 29-35.)

Mr. Clinton's opinion appears to me nearly the truth; the real time, as I conceive it, being about the beginning of August, or end of July. Boeckh admits that, with the exception of Thucydidês (v, 1-19), the other authorities go to sustain it; but he relies on Thucydidês to outweigh them. Now the passage of Thucydidês, properly understood, seems to me as much against Boeckh's view as the rest.

I may remark, as a certain additional reason in the case, that the Isthmia appear to have been celebrated in the third year of each Olympiad, and in the spring (Krause, p. 187). It seems improbable that these two great festivals should have come one immediately after the other, which, nevertheless, must be supposed, if we adopt the opinion of Boeckh and Krause.

The Pythian games would be sometimes a little earlier, sometimes a little later, in consequence of the time of full moon: notice being always sent round by the administrators beforehand of the commencement of the sacred month. See the references in K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der gottesdienstl. Alterth. der Griechen, ch. 49, not. 12.—This note has been somewhat modified since my first edition,—see the note vol. vi, ch. liv.

[121] Demosthen. Philipp. iii, p. 119.

[122] Pindar, Nem. x, 28-33.

[123] Strabo, viii, p. 377; Plutarch, Arat. c. 28; Mannert. Geogr. Gr. Röm. pt. viii, p. 650. Compare the second chapter in Krause, Die Pythien, Nemeen und Isthmien, vol. ii. p. 108, *seq.*

That the Kleônæans continued without interruption to administer the Nemean festival down to Olympiad 80 (460 B. C.), or thereabouts, is the rational inference from Pindar, Nem. x, 42: compare Nem. iv, 17. Eusebius, indeed, states that the Argeians seized the administration for themselves in Olympiad 53, and in order to reconcile this statement with the above passage in Pindar, critics have concluded that the Argeians lost it again, and that the Kleônæans resumed it a little before Olympiad 80. I take a different view, and am disposed to reject the statement of Eusebius altogether; the more so as Pindar's tenth Nemean ode is addressed to an Argeian citizen named Theiæus. If there had been at that time a standing dispute between Argos and Kleônæ on the subject of the administration of the Nemea, the poet would hardly have introduced the mention of the Nemean prizes gained by the ancestors of Theiæus, under the untoward designation of "prizes received from Kleônæan men."

[124] See Boeckh, Corp. Inscript. No. 1126.

[125] K. F. Hermann, in his Lehrbuch der Griechischen Staatsalterthümer (ch. 32, not. 7. and ch. 65, not. 3), and again in his more recent work (Lehrbuch der gottesdienstlichen Alterthümer der Griechen, part iii, ch. 49, also not. 6), both highly valuable publications, maintains,—1. That the exaltation of the Isthmian and Nemean games into Pan-Hellenic importance arose directly after and out of the fall of the despots of Corinth and Sikyon. 2. That it was brought about by the paramount influence of the Dorians, especially by Sparta. 3. That the Spartans put down the despots of both these two cities.

The last of these three propositions appears to me untrue in respect to Sikyon,—improbable in respect to Corinth: my reasons for thinking so have been given in a former chapter. And if this be so, the reason for presuming Spartan intervention as to the Isthmian and Nemean games falls to the ground; for there is no other proof of it, nor does Sparta appear to have interested herself in any of the four national festivals except the Olympic, with which she was from an early period peculiarly connected.

Nor can I think that the first of Hermann's three propositions is at all tenable. No connection whatever can be shown between Sikyon and the Nemean games; and it is the more improbable in this case that the Sikyonians should have been active, inasmuch as they had under Kleisthenês a little before contributed to nationalize the Pythian games: a second interference for a similar purpose ought not to be presumed without some evidence. To prove his point about the Isthmia, Hermann cites only a passage of Solinus (vii, 14), "Hoc spectaculum, per Cypselum tyrannum intermissum, Corinthii Olymp. 49 solemnitati pristinæ reddiderunt." To render this passage at all credible, we must read *Cypselidas* instead of *Cypselum*, which deducts from the value of a witness whose testimony can never under any circumstances be rated high. But granting the alteration, there are two reasons against the assertion of Solinus. One, a positive reason, that Solon offered a large reward to Athenian victors at the Isthmian games: his legislation falls in 594 B. C., ten years before the time when the Isthmia are said by Solinus to have been renewed after a long intermission. The other reason (negative, though to my mind also powerful) is the silence of Herodotus in that long invective which he puts into the mouth of Sosiklês against the Kypselids (v, 92). If Kypselus had really been guilty of so great an insult to the feelings of the people as to suppress their most solemn festival, the fact would hardly have been omitted in the indictment which Sosiklês is made to urge against him. Aristotle, indeed, representing Kypselus as a mild and popular despot, introduces a contrary view of his character, which, if we admitted it, would of itself suffice to negative the supposition that he had suppressed the Isthmia.

[126] Plutarch, Arat. c. 28. καὶ συνεχύθη τότε πρῶτον (by order of Aratus) ἡ δεδομένη τοῖς ἀγωνισταῖς ἀσυλία καὶ ἀσφάλεια, a deadly stain on the character of Aratus.

[127] Festus, v, Perihodos, p. 217, ed. Müller. See the animated protest of the philosopher Xenophanês against the great rewards given to Olympic victors (540-520 B. C.), Xenophan. Fragment. 2, p 357, ed. Bergk.

[128] Thucyd. vi, 16. Alkibiadês says, καὶ ὅσα αὖ ἐν τῇ πόλει χορηγίαις ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ λαμπρύνομαι, τοῖς μὲν ἀστοῖς φθονεῖται φύσει, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ξένους καὶ αὐτὴ ἰσχὺς φαίνεται.

The greater Panathenæa are ascribed to Peisistratus by the Scholiast on Aristeidês, vol. iii, p. 323, ed. Dindorf: judging by what immediately precedes, the statement seems to come from Aristotle.

[129] Simonidês, Fragm. 154-158, ed. Bergk; Pindar, Nem. x, 45; Olymp. xiii, 107.

The distinguished athlete Theagenês is affirmed to have gained twelve hundred prizes in these various agônes: according to some, fourteen hundred prizes (Pausan. vi, 11, 2; Plutarch, Præcept. Reip. Ger. c. 15, p. 811).

An athlete named Apollonius arrived too late for the Olympic games, having stayed away too long, from his anxiety to get money at various agônes in Ionia (Pausan. v, 21, 5).

[130] See, particularly, the treaty between the inhabitants of Latus and those of Olûs in Krête, in Boeckh's Corp. Inscr. No. 2554, wherein this reciprocity is expressly stipulated. Boeckh places this Inscription in the third century B. C.

[131] Timæus, Fragm. 82, ed. Didot. The Krotoniates furnished a great number of victors both to the Olympic and to the Pythian games (Herodot. viii, 47; Pausan. x, 5, 5–x, 7, 3; Krause, Gymnastik und Agonistik der Hellenen, vol. ii, sect. 29, p. 752).

[132] Herodot. viii, 65. καὶ αὐτῶν ὁ βουλόμενος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων μυεῖται.

The exclusion of all competitors, natives of Lampsakus, from the games celebrated in the Chersonesus to the honor of the œkist Miltiadês, is mentioned by Herodotus as something special (Herodot. vi, 38).

[133] See the remarks, upon the Lacedæmonian discouragement of stranger-visitors at their public festivals, put by Thucydidês into the mouth of Periklês (Thucyd. ii, 39).

Lichas the Spartan gained great renown by treating hospitably the strangers who came to the Gymnopædiæ at Sparta (Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 61; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 10),—a story which proves that *some* strangers came to the Spartan festivals, but which also proves that they were not many in number, and that to show them hospitality was a striking distinction from the general character of Spartans.

[134] Aristot. Poetic, c. 3 and 4; Maximus Tyrius. Diss. xxi. p. 215; Plutarch. De Cupidine Divitiarum. c. 8. p. 527: compare the treatise, "Quod non potest suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum." c. 16. p. 1098. The old oracles quoted by Demosthenês, cont. Meidiam (c. 15. p. 531. and cont. Makartat. p. 1072: see also Buttmann's note on the former passage), convey the idea of the ancient simple Athenian festival.

[135] Plutarch. Solon, c. 29: see above, chap. xi. vol. iii. p. 195.

[136] The orator Lysias, in a fragment of his lost Panegyrical Oration preserved by Dionysius of Halikarnassus (vol. v. p. 520 R.), describes the influence of the games with great force and simplicity. Hêraklês, the founder of them, ἀγῶνα μὲν σωμάτων ἐποίησε, φιλοτιμίαν δὲ πλούτῳ, γνώμης δ᾽ ἐπίδειξιν ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος· ἵνα τούτων ἁπάντων ἕνεκα ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔλθωμεν, τὰ μὲν ὀψόμενοι, τὰ δὲ ἀκουσόμενοι. Ἡγήσατο γὰρ τὸν ἐνθάδε σύλλογον ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι τοῖς Ἕλλησι τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλίας.

[137] Cicero, Tusc. Quæst. v, 3. "*Mercatum* eum, qui haberetur maximo ludorum apparatu totius Græciæ celebritate: nam ut illic alii corporibus exercitatis gloriam et nobilitatem coronæ peterent, alii emendi aut vendendi quæstu et lucro ducerentur," etc.

Both Velleius Paterculus also (i, 8) and Justin (xiii, 5), call the Olympic festival by the name *mercatus*.

There were booths all round the Altis, or sacred precinct of Zeus (Schol. Pindar. Olymp. xi, 55), during the time of the games.

Strabo observes with justice, respecting the multitudinous festivals generally—Ἡ πανήγυρις, ἐμπορικόν τι πρᾶγμα (x, p. 486), especially in reference to Delos: see Cicero pro Lege Maniliâ, c. 18: compare Pausanias, x, 32, 9, about the Panegyris and fair at Tithorea in Phokis, and Becker, Chariklês, vol. i, p. 283.

At the Attic festival of the Herakleia, celebrated by the communion called Mesogei, or a certain number of the demes constituting Mesogæa, a regular market-due, or ἀγοραστικὸν, was levied upon those who brought goods to sell (Inscriptiones Atticæ nuper repertæ 12, by E. Curtius, pp. 3-7).

[138] Pausan. vi, 23, 5; Diodor. xiv, 109, xv, 7; Lucian, Quomodo Historia sit conscribenda, c. 42. See Krause, Olympia, sect. 29. pp. 183-186.

[139] Thucyd. i, 120; Herodot. v, 22-71. Eurybatês of Argos (Herodot. vi, 92); Philippus and Phayllus of Kroton (v, 47; viii, 47); Eualkidês of Eretria (v, 102); Hermolykus of Athens (ix, 105).

Pindar (Nem. iv and vi) gives the numerous victories of the Bassidæ and Theandridræ at Ægina: also Melissus the pankratiast and his ancestors the Kleonymidæ of Thebes—τιμάεντες ἀρχᾶθεν πρόξενοί τ᾽ ἐπιχωρίων (Isthm. iii, 25).

Respecting the extreme celebrity of Diagoras and his sons, of the Rhodian gens Eratidæ, Damagêtus, Akusilaus, and Dorieus, see Pindar, Olymp. vii, 16-145, with the Scholia; Thucyd. iii, 11; Pausan. vi, 7, 1-2; Xenophon, Hellenic. i, 5, 19: compare Strabo. xiv, p. 655.

[140] The Latin writers remark it as a peculiarity of Grecian feeling, as distinguished from Roman, that men of great station accounted it an honor to contend in the games: see, as a specimen, Tacitus, Dialogus de Orator. c. 9. "Ac si in Græciâ natus esses, ubi ludicras quoque artes exercere honestum est, ac tibi Nicostrati robur Dii dedissent, non paterer immanes illos et ad pugnam natos lacertos levitate jaculi vanescere." Again, Cicero, pro Flacco, c. 13, in his sarcastic style: "Quid si etiam occisus est a piratis Adramyttenus, homo nobilis, cujus est fere nobis omnibus nomen auditum, Atinas pugil, Olympionices? hoc est apud Græcos (quoniam de corum *gravitate* dicimus) prope majus et gloriosius, quam Romæ triumphasse."

[141] Lichas, one of the chief men of Sparta, and moreover a chariot-victor, received actual chastisement on the ground, from these staff-bearers, for an infringement of the regulations (Thucyd. v, 50).

[142] Thucyd. v, 18-47. and the curious ancient Inscription in Boeckh's Corpus Inscr. No. 11. p. 28. recording the convention between the Eleians and the inhabitants of the Arcadian town of Heræa.

The comparison of various passages referring to the Olympia, Isthmia, and Nemea (Thucydidês iii, 11; viii, 9-10; v, 49-51; and Xenophon, Hellenic. iv, 7, 2; v, 1, 29) shows that various political business was often discussed at these Games,—that diplomatists made use of the intercourse for the purpose of detecting the secret designs of states whom they suspected, and that the administering state often practised manœuvres in respect to the obligations of truce for the Hieromenia, or Holy Month.

[143] Himerius, Orat. iii, p. 426, Wernsdorf—ἀγέρωχοι καὶ ὑψαυχένες.

[144] For the whole subject of this chapter, the eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth chapters of O. Müller's History of the Literature of Ancient Greece, wherein the lyric poets are handled with greater length than consists with the limits of this work, will be found highly valuable,—chapters abounding in erudition and ingenuity, but not always within the limits of the evidence.

The learned work of Ulrici (Geschichte der Griechischen Poesie—*Lyrik*) is still more open to the same remark.

[145] These early innovators in Grecian music, rhythm, metre, and poetry, belonging to the seventh century B. C., were very imperfectly known, even to those contemporaries of Plato and Aristotle who tried to get together facts for a consecutive history of music. The treatise of Plutarch, De Musicâ, shows what very contradictory statements he found. He quotes from four different authors,—Herakleidês, Glaukus, Alexander, and Aristoxenus, who by no means agreed in their series of names and facts. The first three of them blend together mythe and history; while even the Anagraphê or inscription at Sikyon, which professed to give a continuous list of such poets and musicians as had contended at the Sikyonian games, began with a large stock of mythical names,—Amphion, Linus, Pierius, etc. (Plutarch, Music. p. 1132.) Some authors, according to Plutarch (p. 1133), made the great chronological mistake of placing Terpander as contemporary with Hippônax; a proof how little of chronological evidence was then accessible.

That Terpander was victor at the Spartan festival of the Karneia, in 676 B. C., may well have been derived by Hellanikus from the Spartan registers: the name of the Lesbian harper Perikleitas, as having gained the same prize at some subsequent period (Plutarch, De Mus. p. 1133), probably rests on the same authority. That Archilochus was rather later than Terpander, and Thalêtas rather later than Archilochus, was the statement of Glaukus (Plutarch, De Mus. p. 1134). Klonas and Polymnêstus are placed later than Terpander; Archilochus later than Klonas: Alkman is said to have mentioned Polymnêstus in one of his songs (pp. 1133-1135). It can hardly be true that Terpander gained *four* Pythian prizes, if the festival was octennial prior to its reconstitution by the Amphiktyons (p. 1132). Sakadas gained three Pythian prizes *after* that period, when the festival was quadrennial (p. 1134).

Compare the confused indications in Pollux, iv, 65-66, 78-79. The abstract given by Photius of certain parts of the Chrestomathia of Proclus (published in Gaisford's edition of Hephæstion, pp. 375-389), is also extremely valuable, in spite of its brevity and obscurity, about the lyric and choric poetry of Greece.

[146] The difference between Νόμος and Μέλος appears in Plutarch, De Musicâ, p. 1132—Καὶ τὸν Τέρπανδρον, κιθαρῳδικῶν ποιητὴν ὄντα νόμων, κατὰ νόμον ἕκαστον τοῖς ἔπεσι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τοῖς Ὁμήρου μέλη περιτιθέντα, ᾄδειν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι· ἀποφῆναι δὲ τοῦτον λέγει ὀνόματα πρῶτον τοῖς κιθαρῳδικοῖς νόμοις.

The nomes were not many in number; they went by special names; and there was a disagreement of opinion as to the persons who had composed them (Plutarch, Music. p. 1133). They were monodic, not choric,—intended to be sung by one person (Aristot. Problem. xix, 15). Herodot. i, 23, about Arion and the Nomus Orthius.

[147] Mr. Clinton (Fasti Hellen. ad ann. 671, 665, 644) appears to me noway satisfactory in his chronological arrangements of the poets of this century. I agree with O. Müller (Hist. of Literat. of Ancient Greece, ch. xii, 9) in thinking that he makes Terpander too recent, and Thalêtas too ancient; I also believe both Kallinus and Alkman to have been more recent than the place which Mr. Clinton assigns to them; the epoch of Tyrtæus will depend upon the date which we assign to the second Messenian war.

How very imperfectly the chronology of the poetical names even of the sixth century B. C.—Sappho, Anakreon, Hippônax—was known even to writers of the beginning of the Ptolemaic age (or shortly after 300 B. C.), we may see by the mistakes noted in Athenæus, xiii, p. 599. Hermesianax of Kolophon, the elegiac poet, represented Anakreon as the lover of Sappho; this might perhaps be not absolutely impossible, if we supposed in Sappho an old age like that of Ninon de l'Enclos; but others (even earlier than Hermesianax, since they are quoted by Chamæleon) represented Anakreon, when in old age, as addressing verses to Sappho, still young. Again, the comic writer Diphilus introduced both Archilochus and Hippônax as the lovers of Sappho.

[148] The Latin poets and the Alexandrine critics seem to have both insisted on the natural mournfulness of the elegiac metre (Ovid, Heroid. xv, 7; Horat. Art. Poet. 75): see also the fanciful explanation given by Didymus in the Etymologicon Magnum, v. Ἔλεγος.

We learn from Hephæstion (c. viii, p. 45, Gaisf.) that the anapæstic march-metre of Tyrtæus was employed by the comic writers also, for a totally different vein of feeling. See the Dissertation of Franck, Callinus, pp. 37-48 (Leips. 1816).

Of the remarks made by O. Müller respecting the metres of these early poets (History of the Literature of Ancient Greece, ch. xi, s. 8-12, etc.; ch. xii, s. 1-2, etc.), many appear to be uncertified and disputable.

For some good remarks on the fallibility of men's impressions respecting the natural and inherent ἦθος of particular metres, see Adam Smith (Theory of Moral Sentiment, part v, ch. i, p. 329), in the edition of his works by Dugald Stewart.

[149] See the observations in Aristotle (Rhetor. iii, 9) on the λέξις εἰρομένη as compared with λέξις κατεστραμμένη·—λέξις εἰρομένη, ἣ οὐδὲν ἔχει τέλος αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτήν, ἂν μὴ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ λεγόμενον τελειώθη·—κατεστραμμένη δὲ, ἡ ἐν περιόδοις· λέγω δὲ περίοδον, λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον.

[150] I employ, however unwillingly, the word *thesis* here (arsis and thesis) in the sense in which it is used by G. Hermann ("Illud tempus, in quo ictus est, *arsin*; ea tempora, quæ carent ictu, *thesin* vocamus," Element. Doctr. Metr. sect. 15), and followed by Boeckh, in his Dissertation on the Metres of Pindar (i, 4), though I agree with Dr. Barham (in the valuable Preface to his edition of Hephæstion, Cambridge, 1843, pp. 5-8) that the opposite sense of the words would be the preferable one, just as it was the original sense in which they were used by the best Greek musical writers: Dr. Barham's Preface is very instructive on the difficult subject of ancient rhythm generally.

[151] Homer, Hymn. ad Cererem. 202; Hesychius, v. Γεφυρὶς; Herodot. v, 83; Diodor. v, 4. There were various gods at whose festivals scurrility (τωθασμὸς) was a consecrated practice, seemingly different festivals in different places (Aristot. Politic. vii, 15, 8).

The reader will understand better what this consecrated scurrility means by comparing the description of a modern traveller in the kingdom of Naples (Tour through the Southern Provinces of the Kingdom of Naples, by Mr. Keppel Craven, London, 1821, ch. xv, p. 287):—

"I returned to Gerace (the site of the ancient Epizephyrian Lokri) by one of those moonlights which are known only in these latitudes, and which no pen or pencil can portray. My path lay along some cornfields, in which the natives were employed in the last labors of the harvest, and I was not a little surprised to find myself saluted with a volley of opprobrious epithets and abusive language, uttered in the most threatening voice, and accompanied with the most insulting gestures. This extraordinary custom is of the most remote antiquity, and is observed towards all strangers during the harvest and vintage seasons; those who are apprized of it will keep their temper as well as their presence of mind, as the loss of either would only serve as a signal for still louder invectives, and prolong a contest in which success would be as hopeless as undesirable."

[152] The chief evidence for the rhythmical and metrical changes introduced by Archilochus is to be found in the 28th chapter of Plutarch, De Musicâ, pp. 1140-1141, in words very difficult to understand completely. See Ulrici, Geschichte der Hellenisch. Poesie, vol. ii, p. 381.

The epigram ascribed to Theokritus (No. 18 in Gaisford's Poetæ Minores) shows that the poet had before him hexameter compositions of Archilochus, as well as lyric:—

ὡς ἐμμελὴς τ᾽ ἔγεντο κἀπιδέξιος

ἐπεά τε ποιεῖν, πρὸς λύραν τ᾽ ἀείδειν

See the article on Archilochus in Welcker's Kleine Schriften, pp. 71-82, which has the merit of showing that iambic bitterness is far from being the only marked feature in his character and genius.

[153] See Meleager, Epigram. cxix, 3; Horat. Epist. 19, 23, and Epod. vi, 13 with the Scholiast; Ælian. V. H. x, 13.

[154] Pindar, Pyth. ii, 55; Olymp. ix, 1, with the Scholia; Euripid. Hercul. Furens, 583-683. The eighteenth epigram of Theokritus (above alluded to) conveys a striking tribute of admiration to Archilochus: compare Quintilian, x, 1, and Liebel. ad Archilochi Fragmenta, sects. 5, 6, 7.

[155] Athenæus, xiv, p. 630.

[156] Plutarch, De Musicâ, pp. 1134, 1135; Aristotle, De Lacedæmon. Republicâ, Fragm. xi, p. 132, ed. Neumann; Plutarch, De Serâ Numin. Vindict. c. 13, p. 558.

[157] Thucyd. v, 69-70, with the Scholia,—μετὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν νόμων … Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ βραδέως καὶ ὑπὸ αὐλητῶν πολλῶν νόμῳ ἐγκαθεστώτων, οὐ τοῦ θείου χάριν, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα ὁμαλῶς μετὰ ῥυθμοῦ βαίνοιεν, καὶ μὴ διασπασθείη αὐτοῖς ἡ τάξις.

Cicero, Tuscul. Qu. ii, 16. "Spartiatarum quorum procedit Mora ad tibiam, neque adhibetur ulla sine anapæstis pedibus hortatio."

The flute was also the instrument appropriated to Kômus, or the excited movement of half-intoxicated revellers (Hesiod. Scut. Hercul. 280; Athenæ. xiv, pp. 617-618).

[158] Plato, Legg. vii, p. 803. θύοντα καὶ ᾄδοντα καὶ ὀρχούμενον, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἱλέως αὑτῷ παρασκευάζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι, etc.: compare p. 799; Maximus Tyr. Diss. xxxvii, 4: Aristophan. Ran. 950-975; Athenæus, xiv, p. 626; Polyb. iv, 30; Lucian, De Saltatione, c. 10, 11, 16, 31.

Compare Aristotle (Problem xix, 15) about the primitive character and subsequent change of the chorus; and the last chapter of the eighth book of his Politica: also, a striking passage in Plutarch (De Cupidine Divitiarum, c. 8, p. 527) about the transformation of the Dionysiac festival at Chæroneia from simplicity to costliness.

[159] Athenæus, xiv, p. 628; Suidas, vol. iii, p. 715, ed. Kuster; Plutarch, Instituta Laconica, c. 32,—κωμῳδίας καὶ τραγῳδίας οὐκ ἠκρόωντο, ὅπως μήτε ἐν σπουδῇ, μήτε ἐν παιδιᾷ, ἀκούωσι τῶν ἀντιλεγόντων τοῖς νόμοις,—which exactly corresponds with the ethical view implied in the alleged conversation between Solon and Thespis (Plutarch, Solon, c. 29: see above, ch. xi, vol. ii, p. 195), and with Plato, Legg. vii, p. 817.

[160] Xenophon, Agesilaus ii, 17. οἴκαδε ἀπελθὼν εἰς τὰ Ὑακίνθια, ὅπου ἐτάχθη ὑπὸ τοῦ χοροποιοῦ, τὸν παιᾶνα τῷ θεῷ συνεπετέλει.

[161] Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 14, 16, 21: Athenæus, xiv, pp. 631-632, xv, p. 678; Xenophon, Hellen. vi, 4, 15; De Republic. Lacedæm. ix, 5; Pindar, Hyporchemata, Fragm. 78, ed. Bergk.

Λάκαινα μὲν παρθένων ἀγέλα.

Also, Alkman, Fragm. 13, ed. Bergk; Antigon. Caryst. Hist. Mirab. c. 27.

[162] How extensively pantomimic the ancient orchêsis was, may be seen by the example in Xenophon, Symposion, vii, 5, ix, 3-6, and Plutarch, Symposion, ix, 15, 2: see K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der gottesdienstlichen Alterthümer der Griechen, ch. 29.

"Sane ut in religionibus saltaretur, hæc ratio est: quod nullam majores nostri partem corporis esse voluerunt, quæ non sentiret religionem: nam cantus ad animum, saltatio ad mobilitatem corporis pertinet." (Servius ad Virgil. Eclog. v, 73.)

[163] Aristot. Politic. viii, 4, 6. Οἱ Λάκωνες—οὐ μανθάνοντες ὅμως δύνανται κρίνειν ὀρθῶς, ὥς φασι, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῶν μέλων.

[164] Homer. Hymn. Apoll. 340. Οἵοί τε Κρητῶν παιήονες, etc.: see Boeckh. De Metris Pindari, ii, 7, p. 143; Ephorus ap. Strabo, x, p. 480: Plutarch, De Musicâ, p. 1142.

Respecting Thalêtas, and the gradual alterations in the character of music at Sparta. Hoeckh has given much instructive matter (Kreta. vol. iii, pp. 340-377). Respecting Nymphæus of Kydonia, whom Ælian (V. II. xii, 50) puts in juxtaposition with Thalêtas and Terpander, nothing is known.

After what is called the second fashion of music (κατάστασις) had thus been introduced by Thalêtas and his contemporaries.—the first fashion being that of Terpander,—no farther innovations were allowed. The ephors employed violent means to prohibit the intended innovations of Phrynis and Timotheus, after the Persian war: see Plutarch Agis, c. 10.

[165] Alkman. Fragm. 13-17. ed. Bergk, ὁ πάμφαγος Ἀλκμάν: compare Fr. 63. Aristides calls him ὁ τῶν παρθένων ἐπαινέτης καὶ σύμβουλος (Or. xlv, vol. ii, p. 40. Dindorf).

Of the Partneneia of Alkman (songs, hymns, and dances, composed for a chorus of maidens) there were at least two books (Stephanus Byzant. v. Ἐρυσίχη). He was the earliest poet who acquired renown in this species of composition, afterwards much pursued by Pindar, Bacchylidês, and Simonidês of Keôs: see Welcker, Alkman. Fragment. p. 10.

[166] Alkman, Frag. 64, ed. Bergk.

Ὥρας δ᾽ ἐσῆκε τρεῖς, θέρος
Καὶ χεῖμα κ᾽ ὠπώραν τρίταν·
Καὶ τέτρατον τὸ ἦρ, ὅκα
Σάλλει μὲν, ἐσθίειν δ᾽ ἄδαν
Οὐκ ἐστί.

[167] Plutarch, De Musicâ, c. 9, p. 1134. About the dialect of Alkman, see Ahrens, De Dialecto Æolicâ, sects. 2, 4; about his different metres, Welcker, Alkman. Fragm. pp. 10-12.

[168] Plutarch, De Musicâ, c. 32, p. 1142, c. 37, p. 1144; Athenæus, xiv, p. 632. In Krête, also, the popularity of the primitive musical composers was maintained, though along with the innovator Timotheus: see Inscription No. 3053, ap. Boeckh, Corp. Ins.

[169] Herodot. vi, 60. They were probably a γένος with an heroic progenitor, like the heralds, to whom the historian compares them.

[170] Pindar, Fragm. 44, ed. Bergk: Schol. ad Pindar. Olymp. xiii, 25; Proclus, Chrestomathia, c. 12-14. ad calc. Hephæst. Gaisf. p. 382: compare W. M. Schmidt, In Dithyrambum Poetarumque Dithyrambicorum Reliquias, pp. 171-183 (Berlin, 1845).

[171] Archiloch. Fragm. 72, ed. Bergk.

Ὡς Διωνύσου ἄνακτος καλὸν ἐξάρξαι μέλος
Οἶδα διθύραμβον, οἴνῳ ξυγκεραυνωθεὶς φρένας.

The old oracle quoted in Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, about the Dionysia at Athens, enjoins—Διονύσῳ δημοτελῆ ἱερὰ τελεῖν, καὶ κρατῆρα κεράσαι, καὶ χοροὺς ἱστάναι.

[172] Herodot. i, 23; Suidas, v. Ἀρίων; Pindar, Olymp. xiii, 25.

[173] Aristot. Poetic. c. 6, ἐγέννησαν τὴν ποίησιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων; again, to the same effect, *ibid.* c. 9.

[174] Alkman slightly departed from this rule: in one of his compositions of fourteen strophês, the last seven were in a different metre from the first seven (Hephæstion, c. xv, p. 134, Gaisf.; Hermann, Elementa Doctrin. Metricæ, c. xvii, sect. 595). Ἀλκμανικὴ καινοτομία καὶ Στησιχόρειος (Plutarch, De Musicâ, p. 1135).

[175] Pausanias, vi, 14, 4; x, 7, 3. Sakadas, as well as Stesichorus, composed an Ἰλίου πέρσις (Athenæus, xiii, p. 609).

"Stesichorum (observes Quintilian, x, 1) quam sit ingenio validus, materiæ quoque ostendunt, maxima bella et clarissimos canentem duces, et epici carminis onera lyrâ sustinentem. Reddit enim personis in agendo simul loquendoque debitam dignitatem: ac si tenuisset modum, videtur æmulari proximus Homerum potuisse: sed redundat, atque effunditur: quod, ut est reprehendendum, ita copiæ vitium est."

Simonidês of Keôs (Frag. 19. ed. Bergk) puts Homer and Stesichorus together: see the epigram of Antipater in the Anthologia, t. i, p. 328, ed. Jacobs, and Dio Chrysostom. Or. 55, vol. ii, p. 284, Reisk. Compare Kleine, Stesichori Fragment. pp. 30-34 (Berlin 1828), and O. Müller, History of the Literature of Ancient Greece, ch. xiv, sect. 5.

The musical composers of Argos are affirmed by Herodotus to have been the most renowned in Greece, half a century after Sakadas (Her. iii, 131).

[176] Horat. Epistol. i, 19, 23.

[177] Sappho, Fragm. 93, ed. Bergk. See also Plehn, Lesbiaca, pp. 145-165. Respecting the poetesses, two or three of whom were noted, contemporary with Sappho, see Ulrici, Gesch. der Hellen. Poesie, vol. ii, p. 370.

[178] Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. v, 82; Horat. Od. i, 32, ii, 13; Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i, 28; the striking passage in Plutarch, Symposion iii, 1, 3, ap. Bergk. Fragm. 42. In the view of Dionysius, the Æolic dialect of Alkæus and Sappho diminished the value of their compositions: the Æolic accent, analogous to the Latin, and acknowledging scarcely any oxyton words, must have rendered them much less agreeable in recitation or song.

[179] See Plutarch, De Music. p. 1136; Dionys. Hal. de Comp. Verb. c. 23, p. 173, Reisk, and some striking passages of Himerius, in respect to Sappho (i, 4, 16, 19; Maximus Tyrius, Dissert. xxiv, 7-9), and the encomium of the critical Dionysius (De Compos. Verborum, c. 23, p. 173).

The author of the Parian marble adopts, as one of his chronological epochs (Epoch 37), the flight of Sappho, or exile, from Mitylênê to Sicily somewhere between 604-596 B. C. There probably was something remarkable which induced him to single out this event; but we do not know what, nor can we trust the hints suggested by Ovid (Heroid. xv, 51).

Nine books of Sappho's songs were collected by the later literary Greeks, arranged chiefly according to the metres (C. F. Neue, Sapphonis Fragm. p. 11, Berlin 1827). There were ten books of the songs of Alkæus (Athenæus, xi, p. 481), and both Aristophanês (Grammaticus) and Aristarchus published editions of them. (Hephæstion, c. xv, p. 134, Gaisf.) Dikæarchus wrote a commentary upon his songs (Athenæus, xi, p. 461).

[180] Welcker, Simonidis Amorgini Iambi qui supersunt, p. 9.

[181] Aristophan. Nubes, 536.

Ἀλλ᾽ αὐτῇ καὶ τοῖς ἔπεσιν πιστεύουσ᾽ ἐλήλυθεν.

[182] See Pratinas ap. Athenæum, xiv, p. 617, also p. 636, and the striking fragment of the lost comic poet Pherekratês, in Plutarch, De Musicâ, p. 1141, containing the bitter remonstrance of *Music* (Μουσικὴ) against the wrong which she had suffered from the dithyrambist Melanippidês: compare also Aristophanês, Nubes, 951-972; Athenæus, xiv, p. 617; Horat. Art. Poetic. 205; and W. M. Schmidt, Diatribê in Dithyrambum, ch. viii, pp. 250-265.

Τὸ σοβαρὸν καὶ περιττὸν—the character of the newer music (Plutarch, Agis, c. 10)—as contrasted with τὸ σεμνὸν καὶ ἀπερίεργον of the old music (Plutarch, De Musicâ, *ut sup.*): ostentation and affected display, against seriousness and simplicity. It is by no means certain that these reproaches against the more recent music of the

Greeks were well founded; we may well be rendered mistrustful of their accuracy when we hear similar remarks and contrasts advanced with regard to the music of our last three centuries. The character of Greek poetry certainly tended to degenerate after Euripidês.

[183] Bias of Priênê composed a poem of two thousand verses, on the condition of Ionia (Diogen. Laërt. i, 85), from which, perhaps, Herodotus may have derived, either directly or indirectly, the judicious advice which he ascribes to that philosopher on the occasion of the first Persian conquest of Ionia (Herod. i, 170).

Not merely Xenophanês the philosopher (Diogen. Laërt. viii, 36, ix, 20), but long after him Parmenidês and Empedoklês, composed in verse.

[184] See the account given by Herodotus (vi, 128-129) of the way in which Kleisthenês of Sikyon tested the comparative education (παίδευσις) of the various suitors who came to woo his daughter,—οἱ δὲ μνήστηρες ἔριν εἶχον ἀμφί τε μουσικῇ καὶ τῷ λεγομένῳ ἐς τὸ μέσον.

[185] Plato, Protagoras, c. 28, p. 343.

[186] Hippônax, Fragm. 77, 34, ed. Bergk—καὶ δικάσσασθαι Βίαντος τοῦ Πριηνέος κρείττων.

… Καὶ Μύσων, ὃν ὡς πολλὼν

Ἀνεῖπεν ἀνδρῶν σωφρονέστατον πάντων.

Simonidês. Fr. 6, ed. Bergk—μωροῦ φωτὸς ἅδε βουλά. Diogen. Laërt. i, 6, 2.

Simonidês treats Pittakus with more respect, though questioning an opinion delivered by him (Fragm. 8, ed. Bergk; Plato, Protagoras, c. 26, p. 339).

[187] Dikæarchus ap. Diogen. Laërt. i. 40. συνετοὺς καὶ νομοθετικοὺς δεινότητα πολιτικὴν καὶ δραστήριον σύνεσιν. Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 2.

About the story of the tripod, which is said to have gone the round of these Seven Wise Men, see Menage ad Diogen. Laërt. i, 28, p. 17.

[188] Cicero, De Republ. i, 7; Plutarch, in Delph. p. 385; Bernhardy, Grundriss der Griechischen Litteratur, vol. i, sect. 66, not. 3.

[189] Pliny, H. N. vii, 57. Suidas v. Ἑκαταῖος.

[190] H. Ritter (Geschichte der Philosophie, ch. vi, p. 243) has some good remarks on the difficulty and obscurity of the early Greek prose-writers, in reference to the darkness of expression and meaning universally charged upon the philosopher Herakleitus.

[191] See O. Müller, Archäologie der Kunst, sect. 61; Sillig. Catalogus Artificium,—under Theodôrus and Teleklês.

Thiersch (Epochen der Bildenden Kunst, pp. 182-190, 2nd edit.) places Rhœkus near the beginning of the recorded Olympiads; and supposes two artists named Theodôrus, one the grandson of the other; but this seems to me not sustained by any adequate authority (for the loose chronology of Pliny about the Samian school of artists is not more trustworthy than about the Chian school,—compare xxxv, 12, and xxxvi, 3), and, moreover, intrinsically improbable. Herodotus (i, 51) speaks of "*the* Samian Theodôrus," and seems to have known only one person so called: Diodôrus (i, 98) and Pausanias (x, 38, 3) give different accounts of Theodôrus, but the positive evidence does not enable us to verify the genealogies either of Thiersch or O. Müller. Herodotus (iv, 152) mentions the Ἡραῖον at Samos in connection with events near Olymp. 37; but this does not prove that the great temple which he himself saw, a century and a half later, had been begun before Olymp. 37, as Thiersch would infer. The statement of O. Müller, that this temple was begun in Olymp. 35, is not authenticated (Arch. der Kunst. sect. 53).

[192] Pausanias tells us distinctly that this chest was dedicated at Olympia by the Kypselids, descendants of Kypselus; and this seems credible enough. But he also tells us that this was the identical chest in which the infant Kypselus had been concealed, believing the story as told in Herodotus (v, 92). In this latter belief I cannot go along with him, nor do I think that there is any evidence for believing the chest to have been of more ancient date than the persons who dedicated it,—in spite of the opinions of O. Müller and Thiersch to the contrary (O.

Müller, Archäol. der Kunst, sect. 57; Thiersch, Epochen der Griechischen Kunst, p. 169, 2nd edit.: Pausan. v, 17, 2).

[193] Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. vol. ii, Appendix, c. 2, p. 201) has stated and discussed the different opinions on the chronology of Peisistratus and his sons.

[194]

Ἀγροῖκος ὀργὴν, κυαμοτρὼξ, ἀκράχολος

Δῆμος Πνυκίτης, δύσκολον γερόντιον.

Aristoph. Equit. 41.

I need hardly mention that the Pnyx was the place in which the Athenian public assemblies were held.

[195] Plutarch (De Herodot. Malign. c. 15, p. 858) is angry with Herodotus for imparting so petty and personal a character to the dissensions between the Alkmæônids and Peisistratus; his severe remarks in that treatise, however, tend almost always to strengthen rather than to weaken the credibility of the historian.

[196] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 27, ἀπεκρίνατο φιλίαν ἔσεσθαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ ξυμμαχίαν, ἐκδοῦσι μὲν τοὺς περὶ Δημοσθένην καὶ Ὑπερείδην, πολιτευομένοις δὲ τὴν πάτριον ἀπὸ τιμήματος πολιτείαν, δεξαμένοις δὲ φρουρὰν εἰς τὴν Μουνυχίαν, ἔτι δὲ χρήματα τοῦ πολέμου καὶ ζημίαν προσεκτίσασιν. Compare Diodor. xviii, 18.

Twelve thousand of the poorer citizens were disfranchised by this change (Plutarch, Phokion, c. 28).

[197] See the preceding volume, ch. xi, p. 155.

[198] Solon. Fragm. 10, ed. Bergk.—

Εἰ δὲ πεπόνθατε λυγρὰ δι᾽ ὑμετέρην κακότητα,

Μήτι θεοῖς τούτων μοῖραν ἐπαμφέρετε, etc.

[199] Herodot. i, 60, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄστεϊ πειθόμενοι τὴν γυναῖκα εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν θεὸν, προσεύχοντό τε τὴν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἐδέκοντο τὸν Πεισίστρατον. A later statement (Athenæus, xiii, p. 609) represents Phyê to have become afterwards the wife of Hipparchus.

Of this remarkable story, not the least remarkable part is the criticism with which Herodotus himself accompanies it. He treats it as a proceeding infinitely silly (πρῆγμα εὐηθέστατον, ὡς ἐγὼ εὑρίσκω, μακρῷ); he cannot conceive, how Greeks, so much superior to barbarians,—and even Athenians, the cleverest of all the Greeks,—could have fallen into such a trap. To him the story was told as a deception from the beginning, and he did not perhaps take pains to put himself into the state of feeling of those original spectators who saw the chariot approach, without any warning or preconceived suspicion. But even allowing for this, his criticism brings to our view the alteration and enlargement which had taken place in the Greek mind during the century between Peisistratus and Periklês. Doubtless, neither the latter nor any of his contemporaries could have succeeded in a similar trick.

The fact, and the criticism upon it, now before us are remarkably illustrated by an analogous case recounted in a previous chapter, (vol. ii, p. 421, chap. viii.) Nearly at the same period as this stratagem of Peisistratus, the Lacedæmonians and the Argeians agreed to decide, by a combat of three hundred select champions, the dispute between them as to the territory of Kynuria. The combat actually took place, and the heroism of Othryades, sole Spartan survivor, has been already recounted. In the eleventh year of the Peloponnesian war, shortly after or near upon the period when we may conceive the history of Herodotus to have been finished, the Argeians concluded a treaty with Lacedæmon, and introduced as a clause into it the liberty of reviving their pretensions to Kynuria, and of again deciding the dispute by a combat of select champions. To the Lacedæmonians of that time this appeared extreme folly,—the very proceeding which had been actually resorted to a century before. Here is another case, in which the change in the point of view, and the increased positive tendencies in the Greek mind, are brought to our notice not less forcibly than by the criticism of Herodotus upon Phyê-Athênê.

Istrus (one of the Atthido-graphers of the third century B. C.) and Antiklês published books respecting the personal manifestations or epiphanies of the gods,—Ἀπόλλωνος ἐπιφανεῖαι: see Istri Fragment. 33-37, ed. Didot. If Peisistratus and Megaklês had never quarrelled, their joint stratagem might have continued to pass for a genuine epiphany, and might have been included as such in the work of Istrus. I will add, that the real presence of the gods, at the festivals celebrated in their honor, was an idea continually brought before the minds of the Greeks.

The Athenians fully believed the epiphany of the god Pan to Pheidippidês the courier, on his march to Sparta, a little before the battle of Marathôn (Herodot. vi, 105, καὶ ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι πιστεύσαντες εἶναι ἀληθέα), and even Herodotus himself does not controvert it, though he relaxes the positive character of history so far as to add —"as Pheidippidês himself said and recounted publicly to the Athenians." His informants in this case were doubtless sincere believers; whereas, in the case of Phyê, the story was told to him at first as a fabrication.

At Gela in Sicily, seemingly not long before this restoration of Peisistratus, Têlinês (ancestor of the despot Gelon) had brought back some exiles to Gela, "without any armed force, but merely through the sacred ceremonies and appurtenances of the subterranean goddesses,"—ἔχων οὐδεμίην ἀνδρῶν δύναμιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἱρὰ τουτέων τῶν θεῶν—τούτοισι δ᾽ ὧν πίσυνος ἐὼν, κατήγαγε (Herodot. vii, 153). Herodotus does not tell us the details which he had heard of the manner in which this restoration at Gela was brought about; but his general language intimates, that they were remarkable details, and they might have illustrated the story of Phyê Athênê.

[200] Herodot. i, 61. Peisistratus—ἐμίχθη οἱ οὐ κατὰ νόμον.

[201] About Lygdamis, see Athenæus, viii, p. 348, and his citation from the lost work of Aristotle on the Grecian Πολιτεῖαι; also, Aristot. Politic. v, 5, 1.

[202] Herodot. i, 63.

[203] Herodot. i, 64. ἐπικούροισί τε πολλοῖσι, καὶ χρημάτων συνόδοισι, τῶν μὲν αὐτόθεν, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ Στρύμονος ποτάμου προσιόντων.

[204] Isokratês, Or. xvi, De Bigis, c. 351.

[205] For the statement of Boeckh, Dr. Arnold, and Dr. Thirlwall, that Peisistratus had levied a tythe or tax of ten per cent., and that his sons reduced it to the half, I find no sufficient warrant: certainly, the spurious letter of Peisistratus to Solon in Diogenes Laërtius (i, 53) ought not to be considered as proving anything. Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, B. iii, c. 6 (i, 351 German); Dr. Arnold ad Thucyd. vi, 34; Dr. Thirlwall Hist. of Gr. ch. xi, pp. 72-74. Idomeneus (ap. Athenæ. xii, p. 533) considers the sons of Peisistratus to have indulged in pleasures to an extent more costly and oppressive to the people than their father. Nor do I think that there is sufficient authority to sustain the statement of Dr. Thirlwall (p. 68), "He (Peisistratus) possessed lands on the Strymon in Thrace, which yielded a large revenue." Herodotus (i, 64) tells us that Peisistratus brought mercenary soldiers from the Strymon, but that he levied the money to pay them in Attica—ἐῤῥίζωσε τὴν τυραννίδα ἐπικούροισί τε πολλοῖσι, καὶ χρημάτων συνόδοισι, τῶν μὲν αὐτόθεν, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ Στρύμονος ποταμοῦ συνιόντων. It is, indeed, possible to construe this passage so as to refer both τῶν μὲν and τῶν δὲ to χρημάτων, which would signify that Peisistratus obtained his funds partly from the river Strymon, and thus serve as basis to the statement of Dr. Thirlwall. But it seems to me that the better way of construing the words is to refer τῶν μὲν to χρημάτων συνόδοισι, and τῶν δὲ to ἐπικούροισι,—treating both of them as genitives absolute. It is highly improbable that he should derive money from the Strymon: it is highly probable that his mercenaries came from thence.

[206] Hermippus (ap. Marcellin. Vit. Thucyd. p. ix,) and the Scholiast on Thucyd. i, 20, affirm that Thucydidês was connected by relationship with the Peisistratidæ. His manner of speaking of them certainly lends countenance to the assertion; not merely as he twice notices their history, once briefly (i, 20) and again at considerable length (vi, 54-59), though it does not lie within the direct compass of his period,—but also as he so emphatically announces his own personal knowledge of their family relations,—Ὅτι δὲ πρεσβύτατος ὢν Ἱππίας ἦρξεν, εἰδὼς μὲν καὶ ἀκοῇ ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλων ἰσχυρίζομαι (vi, 55).

Aristotle (Politic. v, 9, 21) mentions it as a report (φασι) that Peisistratus obeyed the summons to appear before the Areopagus; Plutarch adds that the person who had summoned him did not appear to bring the cause to trial (Vit. Solon, 31), which is not at all surprising: compare Thucyd. vi, 56, 57.

[207] Aristot. Politic, v, 9, 4; Dikæarchus, Vita Græciæ, pp. 140-166, ed. Fuhr; Pausan. i, 18, 8.

[208] Aul. Gell. N. A. vi, 17.

[209] Herodot. vii, 6; Pseudo-Plato, Hipparchus, p. 229.

[210] Herodot. v, 93, VI, 6. Ὀνομάκριτον, χρησμολόγον καὶ διαθέτην τῶν χρησμῶν τῶν Μουσαίου. See Pausan. i, 22, 7. Compare, about the literary tendencies of the Peisistratids, Nitzsch, De Historiâ Homeri, ch. 30, p. 168.

[211] Philochor. Frag. 69, ed. Didot; Plato, Hipparch. p. 230.

[212] Herodot. vi, 38-103; Theopomp. ap. Athenæ. xii, p. 533.

[213] Thucyd. vi, 53; Pseudo-Plato, Hipparch. p. 230; Pausan. i, 23, 1.

[214] Thucyd. i, 20, about the general belief of the Athenian public in his time—Ἀθηναίων γοῦν τὸ πλῆθος οἴονται ὑφ᾽ Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος Ἵππαρχον τύραννον ὄντα ἀποθανεῖν, καὶ οὐκ ἴσασιν ὅτι Ἱππίας μὲν πρεσβύτατος ὢν ἦρχε τῶν Πεισιστράτου παιδῶν, etc.

The Pseudo-Plato in the dialogue called Hipparchus adopts this belief, and the real Plato in his Symposion (c. 9, p. 182) seems to countenance it.

[215] Herodot. v, 55-58. Harmodius is affirmed by Plutarch to have been of the deme Aphidnæ (Plutarch, Symposiacon, i, 10, p. 628).

It is to be recollected that he died before the introduction of the Ten Tribes, and before the recognition of the demes as political elements in the commonwealth.

[216] For the terrible effects produced by this fear of ὕβρις εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, see Plutarch, Kimon, 1; Aristot. Polit. v, 9, 17.

[217] Thucyd. vi, 56. Τὸν δ᾽ οὖν Ἁρμόδιον ἀπαρνηθέντα τὴν πείρασιν, ὥσπερ διενοεῖτο, προυπηλάκισεν· ἀδελφὴν γὰρ αὐτοῦ, κόρην, ἐπαγγείλαντες ἥκειν κανοῦν οἴσουσαν ἐν πομπῇ τινι, ἀπήλασαν, λέγοντες οὐδὲ ἐπαγγεῖλαι ἀρχὴν, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀξίαν εἶναι.

Dr. Arnold, in his note, supposes that this exclusion of the sister of Harmodius by the Peisistratids may have been founded on the circumstance that she belonged to the gens Gephyræi (Herodot. v, 57); her foreign blood, and her being in certain respects ἄτιμος, disqualified her (he thinks) from ministering to the worship of the gods of Athens.

There is no positive reason to support the conjecture of Dr. Arnold, which seems, moreover, virtually discountenanced by the narrative of Thucydidês, who plainly describes the treatment of this young woman as a deliberate, preconcerted insult. Had there existed any assignable ground of exclusion, such as that which Dr. Arnold supposes, leading to the inference that the Peisistratids could not admit her without violating religious custom, Thucydidês would hardly have neglected to allude to it, for it would have lightened the insult; and indeed, on that supposition, the sending of the original summons might have been made to appear as an accidental mistake. I will add, that Thucydidês, though no way forfeiting his obligations to historical truth, is evidently not disposed to omit anything which can be truly said in favor of the Peisistratids.

[218] Thucyd. vi, 58, οὐ ῥᾳδίως διετέθη: compare Polyæn. i, 22; Diodorus, Fragm. lib. x, p. 62, vol. iv, ed. Wess.; Justin, ii, 9. See, also, a good note of Dr. Thirlwall on the passage, Hist. of Gr. vol. ii, ch. xi, p. 77, 2nd ed. I agree with him, that we may fairly construe the indistinct phrase of Thucydidês by the more precise statements of later authors, who mention the torture.

[219] Thucyd. i, 20, vi, 54-59; Herodot. v, 55, 56, vi, 123; Aristot. Polit. v, 8, 9.

[220] See the words of the song:—

Ὅτι τὸν τύραννον κτανέτην

Ἰσονόμους τ᾽ Αθήνας ἐποιησάτην—

ap. Athenæum, xv, p. 691.

The epigram of the Keian Simonidês, (Fragm. 132, ed. Bergk—ap. Hephæstion. c. 14, p. 26, ed. Gaisf.) implies a similar belief: also, the passages in Plato, Symposion, p. 182, in Aristot. Polit. v, 8, 21, and Arrian, Exped. Alex. iv, 10, 3.

[221] Herodot. vi, 109; Demosthen. adv. Leptin. c. 27, p. 495; cont. Meidiam, c. 47, p. 569; and the oath prescribed in the Psephism of Demophantus, Andokidês, De Mysteriis, p. 13; Pliny, H. N. xxxiv, 4-8; Pausan. i, 8, 5; Plutarch, Aristeidês, 27.

The statues were carried away from Athens by Xerxês, and restored to the Athenians by Alexander after his conquest of Persia (Arrian, Ex. Al. iii, 14, 16; Pliny, H. N. xxxiv, 4-8).

[222] One of these stories may be seen in Justin, ii, 9,—who gives the name of Dioklês to Hipparchus,—"Diocles, alter ex filiis, per vim stupratâ virgine, a fratre puellæ interficitur."

[223] Ἡ γὰρ δειλία φονικώτατόν ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς τυραννίσιν—observes Plutarch, (Artaxerxês, c. 25).

[224] Pausan. i, 23, 2: Plutarch, De Garrulitate, p. 897; Polyæn. viii, 45; Athenæus, xiii. p. 596.

[225] We can hardly be mistaken in putting this interpretation on the words of Thucydidês—Ἀθηναῖος ὢν, Λαμψακηνῷ ἔδωκε (vi, 59).

Some financial tricks and frauds are ascribed to Hippias by the author of the Pseudo-Aristotelian second book of the Œconomica (ii, 4). I place little reliance on the statements in this treatise respecting persons of early date, such as Kypselus or Hippias; in respect to facts of the subsequent period of Greece, between 450-300 B. C., the author's means of information will doubtless render him a better witness.

[226] Herodot. vi, 36-37.

[227] Thus the Scythians broke into the Chersonese even during the government of Miltiadês son of Kimôn, nephew of Miltiadês the œkist, about forty years after the wall had been erected (Herodot. vi, 40). Again, Periklês reëstablished the cross-wall, on sending to the Chersonese a fresh band of one thousand Athenian settlers (Plutarch, Periklês, c. 19): lastly, Derkyllidas the Lacedæmonian built it anew, in consequence of loud complaints raised by the inhabitants of their defenceless condition,—about 397 B. C. (Xenophon. Hellen. iii, 2, 8-10). So imperfect, however, did the protection prove, that about half a century afterwards, during the first years of the conquests of Philip of Macedon, an idea was entertained of digging through the isthmus, and converting the peninsula into an island (Demosthenês, Philippic ii, 6, p. 92, and De Haloneso, c. 10, p. 86); an idea, however, never carried into effect.

[228] Herodot. vi, 38, 39.

[229] Herodot. v, 94. I have already said that I conceive this as a different war from that in which the poet Alkæus was engaged.

[230] Herodot. iii, 39.

[231] Herodot. vi, 104, 139, 140.

[232] Herodot. vi, 39-103. Cornelius Nepos, in his Life of Miltiadês, confounds in one biography the adventures of two persons,—Miltiadês son of Kypselus, the œkist,—and Miltiadês son of Kimôn, the victor of Marathon,—the uncle and the nephew.

[233] There is nothing that I know to mark the date except that it was earlier than the death of Hipparchus in 514 B. C., and also earlier than the expedition of Darius against the Scythians, about 516 B. C., in which expedition Miltiadês was engaged: see Mr. Clinton's Fasti Hellenici, and J. M. Schultz, Beitrag zu genaueren Zeitbestimmungen der Hellen. Geschichten von der 63sten bis zur 72sten Olympiade, p. 165, in the Kieler Philologische Studien 1841.

[234] Herodot. v, 62. The unfortunate struggle at Leipsydrion became afterwards the theme of a popular song (Athenæus, xv, p. 695): see Hesychius, v. Λειψύδριον, and Aristotle, Fragm. Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία, 37, ed. Neumann.

If it be true that Alkibiadês, grandfather of the celebrated Alkibiadês, took part with Kleisthenês and the Alkmæonid exiles in this struggle (see Isokratês, De Bigis, Or. xvi, p. 351), he must have been a mere youth.

[235] Pausan. x, 5, 5.

[236] Herodot. i, 50, ii, 180. I have taken the three hundred talents of Herodotus as being Æginæan talents, which are to Attic talents in the ratio of 5 : 3. The Inscriptions prove that the accounts of the temple were kept by the Amphiktyons on the Æginæan scale of money: see Corpus Inscrip. Boeckh, No. 1688, and Boeckh, Metrologie, vii, 4.

[237] Herodot. vi, 62. The words of the historian would seem to imply that they only began to think of this scheme of building the temple after the defeat of Leipsydrion, and a year or two before the expulsion of Hippias; a supposition quite inadmissible, since the temple must have taken some years in building.

The loose and prejudiced statement in Philochorus, affirming that the Peisistratids caused the Delphian temple to be burnt, and also that they were at last deposed by the victorious arm of the Alkmæônids (Philochori Fragment. 70, ed. Didot) makes us feel the value of Herodotus and Thucydidês as authorities.

[238] Herodot. vi, 128; Cicero, De Legg. ii, 16. The deposit here mentioned by Cicero, which may very probably have been recorded in an inscription in the temple, must have been made before the time of the Persian conquest of Samos,—indeed, before the death of Polykratês in 522 B. C., after which period the island fell at once into a precarious situation, and very soon afterwards into the greatest calamities.

[239] Herodot. v, 62, 63.

[240] Herodot. v, 64, 65.

[241] Thucyd. vi, 56, 57.

[242] Thucyd. vi, 55. ὡς ὅ τε βωμὸς σημαίνει, καὶ ἡ στήλη περὶ τῆς τῶν τυράννων ἀδικίας, ἡ ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀκροπόλει σταθεῖσα.

Dr. Thirlwall, after mentioning the departure of Hippias, proceeds as follows: "After his departure many severe measures were taken against his adherents, who appear to have been for a long time afterwards a formidable party. They were punished or repressed, some by death, others by exile or by the loss of their political privileges. The family of the tyrants was condemned to perpetual banishment, and appears to have been excepted from the most comprehensive decrees of amnesty passed in later times." (Hist. of Gr. ch. xi, vol. ii, p. 81.)

I cannot but think that Dr. Thirlwall has here been misled by insufficient authority. He refers to the oration of Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 106 and 78 (sect. 106 coincides in part with ch. 18, in the ed. of Dobree). An attentive reading of it will show that it is utterly unworthy of credit in regard to matters anterior to the speaker by one generation or more. The orators often permit themselves great license in speaking of past facts, but Andokidês in this chapter passes the bounds even of rhetorical license. First, he states something not bearing the least analogy to the narrative of Herodotus as to the circumstances preceding the expulsion of the Peisistratids, and indeed tacitly setting aside that narrative; next, he actually jumbles together the two capital and distinct exploits of Athens,—the battle of Marathon and the repulse of Xerxês ten years after it. I state this latter charge in the words of Sluiter and Valckenaer, before I consider the former charge: "Verissime ad hæc verba notat Valckenaerius—Confundere videtur Andocidês diversissima; Persica sub Miltiade et Dario et victoriam Marathoniam (v, 14)—quæque evenere sub Themistocle, Xerxis gesta. Hic urbem incendio delevit, non ille (v, 20). Nihil magis manifestum est, quam diversa ab oratore confundi." (Sluiter, Lection. Andocideæ, p. 147.)

The criticism of these commentators is perfectly borne out by the words of the orator, which are too long to find a place here. But immediately prior to those words he expresses himself as follows, and this is the passage which serves as Dr. Thirlwall's authority: Οἱ γὰρ πατέρες οἱ ὑμέτεροι, γενομένων τῇ πόλει κακῶν μεγάλων, ὅτε οἱ τύραννοι εἶχον τὴν πόλιν, ὁ δὲ δῆμος ἔφυγε, νικήσαντες μαχόμενοι τοὺς τυράννους ἐπὶ Παλληνίῳ, στρατηγοῦντος Λεωγόρου τοῦ προπάππου τοῦ ἐμοῦ, καὶ Χαρίου οὗ ἐκεῖνος τὴν θυγατέρα εἶχεν ἐξ ἧς ὁ ἡμέτερος ἦν πάππος, κατελθόντες εἰς τὴν πατρίδα τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναν, τῶν δὲ φυγὴν κατέγνωσαν, τοὺς δὲ μένειν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐάσαντες ἠτίμωσαν.

Both Sluiter (Lect. And. p. 8) and Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. p. 80) refer this alleged victory of Leogoras and the Athenian demus to the action described by Herodotus (v, 64) as having been fought by Kleomenês of Sparta against the Thessalian cavalry. But the two events have not a single circumstance in common, except that each is a victory over the Peisistratidæ or their allies: nor could they well be the same event, described in different terms, seeing that Kleomenês, marching from Sparta to Athens, could not have fought the Thessalians at Pallênê, which lay on the road from *Marathon* to Athens. Pallênê was the place where Peisistratus, advancing from Marathon to Athens, on occasion of his second restoration, gained his complete victory over the opposing party, and marched on afterwards to Athens without farther resistance (Herodot. i, 63).

If, then, we compare the statement given by Andokidês of the preceding circumstances, whereby the dynasty of the Peisistratids was put down, with that given by Herodotus, we shall see that the two are radically different; we cannot blend them together, but must make our election between them. Not less different are the representations of the two as to the circumstances which immediately ensued on the fall of Hippias: they would scarcely appear to relate to the same event. That "the adherents of the Peisistratidæ were punished or repressed, some by death, others by exile, or by the loss of their political privileges," which is the assertion of An-

dokidês and Dr. Thirlwall, is not only not stated by Herodotus, but is highly improbable, if we accept the facts which he does state; for he tells us that Hippias capitulated and agreed to retire while possessing ample means of resistance,—simply from regard to the safety of his children. It is not to be supposed that he would leave his intimate partisans exposed to danger; such of them as felt themselves obnoxious would naturally retire along with him; and if this be what is meant by "many persons condemned to exile," here is no reason to call it in question. But there is little probability that any one was put to death, and still less probability that any were punished by the loss of their political privileges. Within a year afterwards came the comprehensive constitution of Kleisthenês, to be described in the following chapter, and I consider it eminently unlikely that there were a considerable class of residents in Attica left out of this constitution, under the category of partisans of Peisistratus: indeed, the fact cannot be so, if it be true that the very first person banished under the Kleisthenean ostracism was a person named Hipparchus, a kinsman of Peisistratus (Androtion, Fr. 5, ed. Didot; Harpokration, v. Ἵππαρχος); and this latter circumstance depends upon evidence better than that of Andokidês. That there were a party in Attica attached to the Peisistratids, I do not doubt; but that they were "a powerful party," (as Dr. Thirlwall imagines,) I see nothing to show; and the extraordinary vigor and unanimity of the Athenian people under the Kleisthenean constitution will go far to prove that such could not have been the case.

I will add another reason to evince how completely Andokidês misconceives the history of Athens between 510-480 B. C. He says that when the Peisistratids were put down, many of their partisans were banished, many others allowed to stay at home with the loss of their political privileges; but that afterwards, when the overwhelming dangers of the Persian invasion supervened, the people passed a vote to restore the exiles and to remove the existing disfranchisements at home. He would thus have us believe that the exiled partisans of the Peisistratids were all restored, and the disfranchised partisans of the Peisistratids all enfranchised, just at the moment of the Persian invasion, and with the view of enabling Athens better to repel that grave danger. This is nothing less than a glaring mistake; for the first Persian invasion was undertaken with the express view of restoring Hippias, and with the presence of Hippias himself at Marathon; while the second Persian invasion was also brought on in part by the instigation of his family. Persons who had remained in exile or in a state of disfranchisement down to that time, in consequence of their attachment to the Peisistratids, could not in common prudence be called into action at the moment of peril, to help in repelling Hippias himself. It is very true that the exiles and the disfranchised were readmitted, shortly before the invasion of Xerxês, and under the then pressing calamities of the state. But these persons were not philo-Peisistratids; they were a number gradually accumulated from the sentences of exile and (atimy or) disfranchisement every year passed at Athens,—for these were punishments applied by the Athenian law to various crimes and public omissions,—the persons so sentenced were not politically disaffected, and their aid would then be of use in defending the state against a foreign enemy.

In regard to "the exception of the family of Peisistratus from the most comprehensive decrees of amnesty passed in later times," I will also remark that, in the decree of amnesty, there is no mention of them by name, nor any special exception made against them: among a list of various categories excepted, those are named "who have been condemned to death or exile either as murderers or as despots," (ἢ σφαγεῦσιν ἢ τυράννοις, Andokid. c. 13.) It is by no means certain that the *descendants* of Peisistratus would be comprised in this exception, which mentions only the person himself condemned; but even if this were otherwise, the exception is a mere continuance of similar words of exception in the old Solonian law, anterior to Peisistratus; and, therefore, affords no indication of particular feeling against the Peisistratids.

Andokidês is a useful authority for the politics of Athens in his own time (between 420-390 B. C.), but in regard to the previous history of Athens between 510-480 B. C., his assertions are so loose, confused, and unscrupulous, that he is a witness of no value. The mere circumstance noted by Valckenaer, that he has confounded together Marathon and Salamis, would be sufficient to show this; but when we add to such genuine ignorance his mention of his two great-grandfathers in prominent and victorious leadership, which it is hardly credible that they could ever have occupied,—when we recollect that the facts which he alleges to have preceded and accompanied the expulsion of the Peisistratids are not only at variance with those stated by Herodotus, but so contrived as to found a factitious analogy for the cause which he is himself pleading,—we shall hardly be able to acquit him of something worse than ignorance in his deposition.

[243] Herodot. v, 66-69 ἐσσούμενος δὲ ὁ Κλεισθένης τὸν δῆμον προσεταιρίζεται—ὡς γὰρ δὴ τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον, πρότερον ἀπωσμένον πάντων, τότε πρὸς τὴν ἑωϋτοῦ μοίρην προσεθήκατο, etc.

[244] Aristot. Polit. iii, 1, 10; vi, 2, 11. Κλεισθένης,—πολλοῖς ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους.

Several able critics, and Dr. Thirlwall among the number, consider this passage as affording no sense, and assume some conjectural emendation to be indispensable; though there is no particular emendation which suggests itself as preëminently plausible. Under these circumstances, I rather prefer to make the best of the words as they stand; which, though unusual, seem to me not absolutely inadmissible. The expression ξένος μέτοικος (which is a perfectly good one, as we find in Aristoph. Equit. 347,—εἶπου δικιδίον εἶπας εὖ κατὰ ξένου μετοίκου) may be considered as the correlative to δούλους μετοίκους,—the last word being construed both with δούλους and with ξένους. I apprehend that there always must have been in Attica a certain number of intelligent slaves living apart from their masters (χωρὶς οἰκοῦντες), in a state between slavery and freedom, working partly on condition of a fixed payment to him, partly for themselves, and perhaps continuing to pass nominally as slaves after they had bought their liberty by instalments. Such men would be δοῦλοι μέτοικοι: indeed, there are cases in which δοῦλοι signifies *freedmen* (Meier, De Gentilitate Atticâ, p. 6): they must have been industrious and pushing men, valuable partisans to a political revolution. See K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Griech. Staats Alterth. ch. 111, not. 15.

[245] Herodot. v, 69. Κλεισθένης,—ὑπεριδὼν Ἴωνας, ἵνα μὴ σφισι αἱ αὐταὶ ἔωσι φυλαὶ καὶ Ἴωσι.

[246] Such a disposition seems evident in Herodot. i, 143.

[247] In illustration of what is here stated, see the account of the modifications of the constitution of Zurich, in Blüntschli, Staats und Rechts Geschichte der Stadt Zurich, book iii. ch. 2, p. 322; also, Kortüm, Entstehungs Geschichte der Freistädtischen Bünde im Mittelalter, ch. 5, pp. 74-75.

[248] Respecting these Eponymous Heroes of the Ten Tribes, and the legends connected with them, see chapter viii of the Ἐπιτάφιος Λόγος, erroneously ascribed to Demosthenês.

[249] Herodot. v, 69. δέκα δὲ καὶ τοὺς δήμους κατένεμε ἐς τὰς φυλάς.

Schömann contends that Kleisthenês established exactly one hundred demes to the ten tribes (De Comitiis Atheniensium, Præf. p. xv and p. 363, and Antiquitat. Jur. Pub. Græc. ch. xxii, p. 260), and K. F. Hermann (Lehrbuch der Griech. Staats Alt. ch. 111) thinks that this is what Herodotus meant to affirm, though he does not believe the fact to have really stood so.

I incline, as the least difficulty in the case, to construe δέκα with φυλὰς and not with δήμους, as Wachsmuth (i, 1, p. 271) and Dieterich (De Clisthene, a treatise cited by K. F. Hermann, but which I have not seen) construe it.

[250] The deme *Melitê* belonged to the tribe Kekropis; *Kollytus*, to the tribe Ægêis; *Kydathenæon*, to the tribe Pandionis; *Kerameis* or *Kerameikus*, to the Akamantis; *Skambônidæ*, to the Leontis.

All these five were demes within the city of Athens, and all belonged to different tribes.

Peiræus belonged to the Hippothoöntis; *Phalêrum*, to the Æantis; *Xypetê*, to the Kekropis; *Thymætadæ*, to the Hippothoöntis. These four demes, adjoining to each other, formed a sort of quadruple local union, for festivals and other purposes, among themselves; though three of them belonged to different tribes.

See the list of the Attic demes, with a careful statement of their localities in so far as ascertained, in Professor Ross, Die Demen von Attika. Halle, 1846. The distribution of the city-demes, and of Peiræus and Phalêrum, among different tribes, appears to me a clear proof of the intention of the original distributors. It shows that they wished from the beginning to make the demes constituting each tribe discontinuous, and that they desired to prevent both the growth of separate tribe-interests and ascendency of one tribe over the rest. It contradicts the belief of those who suppose that the tribe was at first composed of continuous demes, and that the breach of continuity arose from subsequent changes.

Of course there were many cases in which adjoining demes belonged to the same tribe; but not one of the ten tribes was made up altogether of adjoining demes.

[251] See Boeckh, Corp. Inscriptt. Nos. 85, 128, 213, etc.: compare Demosthen. cont. Theokrin. c. 4. p. 1326 R.

[252] We may remark that this register was called by a special name, the Lexiarchic register; while the primitive register of phrators and gentiles always retained, even in the time of the orators, its original name of the common register—Harpokration, v. Κοινὸν γραμματεῖον καὶ ληξιαρχικόν.

[253] See Schömann, Antiq. Jur. P. Græc. ch. xxiv. The oration of Demosthenês against Eubulidês is instructive about these proceedings of the assembled demots: compare Harpokration, v. Διαψήφισις, and Meier, De Bonis Damnatorum, ch. xii, p. 78, etc.

[254] Aristot. Fragment. de Republ., ed. Neumann.—Ἀθην. πολιτ. Fr. 40, p. 88; Schol. ad Aristophan. Ran. 37; Harpokration, v. Δήμαρχος—Ναυκραρικά; Photius, v. Ναυκραρία.

[255] Herodot. vi, 109-111.

[256] Harpokration, v. Ἀποδέκται.

[257] See the valuable treatise of Schömann, De Comitiis, *passim*; also his Antiq. Jur. Publ. Gr. ch. xxxi; Harpokration, v. Κυρία Ἐκκλησία; Pollux, viii, 95.

[258] See in particular on this subject the treatise of Schömann, De Sortitione Judicum (Gripswald, 1820), and the work of the same author, Antiq. Jur. Publ. Græc. ch. 49-55, p. 264, *seqq.*; also Heffter, Die Athenäische Gerichtsverfassung, part ii, ch. 2, p. 51, *seqq.*; Meier and Schömann, Der Attische Prozess, pp. 127-135.

The views of Schömann respecting the sortition of the Athenian jurors have been bitterly attacked, but in no way refuted, by F. V. Fritzsche (De Sortitione Judicum apud Athenienses Conmentatio, Leipsic, 1835).

Two or three of these dikastic tickets, marking the name and the deme of the citizen, and the letter of the decury to which during that particular year he belonged, have been recently dug up near Athens:—

Δ. Διόδωρος Φρεαῤῥιος

Ε. Δεινίας Ἀλαιεύς.

(Boeckh, Corp. Inscrip. Nos. 207-208.)

Fritzsche (p. 73) considers these to be tickets of senators, not of dikasts, contrary to all probability.

For the Heliastic oath, and its remarkable particulars, see Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. p. 746. See also Aristophanês, Plutus, 277 (with the valuable Scholia, though from different hands and not all of equal correctness) and 972; Ekklesiazusæ, 678, *seqq.*

[259] Plutarch, Arist. 7; Herodot. vi, 109-111.

[260] Aristotle puts these two together; election of magistrates by the mass of the citizens, but only out of persons possessing a high pecuniary qualification; this he ranks as the least democratical democracy, if one may use the phrase (Politic. iii, 6-11), or a mean between democracy and oligarchy,—an ἀριστοκρατία, or πολιτεῖα, in his sense of the word (iv, 7, 3). He puts the employment of the lot as a symptom of decisive and extreme democracy, such as would never tolerate a pecuniary qualification of eligibility.

So again Plato (Legg. iii, p. 692), after remarking that the legislator of Sparta first provided the senate, next the ephors, as a bridle upon the kings, says of the ephors that they were "something nearly approaching to an authority emanating from the lot,"—οἷον ψάλιον ἐνέβαλεν αὐτῇ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων δύναμιν, ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς ἀγαγὼν δυνάμεως.

Upon which passage there are some good remarks in Schömann's edition of Plutarch's Lives of Agis and Kleomenês (Comment. ad Ag. c. 8, p. 119). It is to be recollected that the actual mode in which the Spartan ephors were chosen, as I have already stated in my first volume, cannot be clearly made out, and has been much debated by critics:—

"Mihi hæc verba, quum illud quidem manifestum faciant, quod etiam aliunde constat, sorte captos ephoros non esse, tum hoc alterum, quod Hermannus statuit, creationem sortitioni non absimilem fuisse, nequaquam demonstrare videntur. Nimirum nihil aliud nisi prope accedere ephororum magistratus ad cos dicitur, qui sortito capiantur. *Sortitis autem magistratibus hoc maxime proprium est, ut promiscue—non ex genere, censu, dignitate—a quolibet capi possint*: quamobrem quum ephori quoque fere promiscue fierent ex omni multitudine civium, poterat haud dubie magistratus eorum ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς δυνάμεως esse dici, etiamsi αἱρετοὶ essent—h. e. suffragiis creati. Et video Lachmannum quoque, p. 165, not. 1, de Platonis loco similiter judicare."

The employment of the lot, as Schömann remarks, implies universal admissibility of all citizens to office: though the converse does not hold good,—the latter does not of necessity imply the former. Now, as we know that universal admissibility did not become the law of Athens until after the battle of Platæa, so we may con-

clude that the employment of the lot had no place before that epoch,—*i. e.* had no place under the constitution of Kleisthenês.

[261] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 9-16.

[262] See a passage about such characters in Plato, Republic, v, p. 475 B.

[263] Plutarch, Arist. 22.

[264] So at least the supporters of the constitution of Kleisthenês were called by the contemporaries of Periklês.

[265] Plutarch, Arist. *ut sup.* γράφει ψήφισμα, κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐξ Ἀθηναίων πάντων αἱρεῖσθαι.

[266] So in the Italian republics of the twelfth and thirteenth century, the nobles long continued to possess the exclusive right of being elected to the consulate and the great offices of state, even after those offices had come to be elected by the people: the habitual misrule and oppression of the nobles gradually put an end to this right, and even created in many towns a resolution positively to exclude them. At Milan, towards the end of the twelfth century, the twelve consuls, with the Podestat, possessed all the powers of government: these consuls were nominated by one hundred electors chosen by and among the people. Sismondi observes: "Cependant le peuple imposa lui-même a ces électeurs, la règle fondamentale de choisir tous les magistrats dans le corps de la noblesse. Ce n'étoit point encore la possession des magistratures que l'on contestoit aux gentilshommes: on demandoit seulement qu'ils fussent les mandataires immédiats de la nation. Mais plus d'une fois, en dépit du droit incontestable des citoyens, les consuls regnant s'attribuèrent l'élection de leurs successeurs." (Sismondi, Histoire des Républiques Italiennes, chap. xii, vol. ii, p. 240.)

[267] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 15. τὴν ἐπὶ Κλεισθένους ἐγείρειν ἀριστοκρατίαν πειρωμένου: compare Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 2, and Isokratês, Areopagiticus, Or. vii, p. 143, p. 192, ed. Bek.

[268] Herodotus speaks of Kallimachus the Polemarch, at Marathon, as ὁ τῷ κυάμῳ λαχὼν Πολέμαρχος (vi, 110).

I cannot but think that in this case he transfers to the year 490 B. C. the practice of his own time. The polemarch, at the time of the battle of Marathon, was in a certain sense the first stratêgus; and the stratêgi were never taken by lot, but always chosen by show of hands, even to the end of the democracy. It seems impossible to believe that the stratêgi were elected, and that the polemarch, at the time when his functions were the same as theirs, was chosen by lot.

Herodotus seems to have conceived the choice of magistrates by lot as being of the essence of a democracy (Herodot. iii, 80).

Plutarch also (Periklês, c. 9) seems to have conceived the choice of archons by lot as a very ancient institution of Athens: nevertheless, it results from the first chapter of his life of Aristeidês,—an obscure chapter, in which conflicting authorities are mentioned without being well discriminated,—that Aristeidês was *chosen archon by the people*,—not drawn by lot: an additional reason for believing this is, that he was archon in the year following the battle of Marathon, at which, he had been one of the ten generals. Idomeneus distinctly affirmed this to be the fact.—οὐ κυαμευτὸν, ἀλλ᾽ ἑλομένων Ἀθηναίων (Plutarch, Arist. c. 1).

Isokratês also (Areopagit. Or. vii, p. 144, p. 195, ed. Bekker) conceived the constitution of Kleisthenês as including all the three points noticed in the text: 1. A high pecuniary qualification of eligibility for individual offices. 2. Election to these offices by all the citizens, and accountability to the same after office. 3. No employment of the lot.—He even contends that this election is more truly democratical than sortition; since the latter process might admit men attached to oligarchy, which would not happen under the former,—ἔπειτα καὶ δημοτικωτέραν ἐνόμιζον ταύτην τὴν κατάστασιν ἢ τὴν διὰ τοῦ λαγχάνειν γιγνομένην· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῇ κληρώσει τὴν τύχην βραβεύσειν, καὶ πολλάκις λήψεσθαι τὰς ἀρχὰς τοὺς τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπιθυμοῦντας, etc. This would be a good argument if there were no pecuniary qualification for eligibility,—such pecuniary qualification is a provision which he lays down, but which he does not find it convenient to insist upon emphatically.

I do not here advert to the γραφὴ παρανόμων, the νομοφύλακες, and the sworn νομόθεται,—all of them institutions belonging to the time of Periklês at the earliest; not to that of Kleisthenês.

[269] See above, chap. xi. vol. iii. p. 145.

[270] Aristeidês Rhetor. Orat. xlvi. vol ii. p. 317, ed. Dindorf.

[271] Plutarch (Nikias, c. 11; Alkibiad. c. 13; Aristeid. c. 7): Thucyd. viii, 73. Plato Comicus said, respecting Hyperbolus—

Οὐ γὰρ τοιούτων οὕνεκ᾽ ὄστραχ᾽ ηὑρέθη.

Theophrastus had stated that Phæax, and not Nikias, was the rival of Alkibiadês on this occasion, when Hyperbolus was ostracized; but most authors, says Plutarch, represent Nikias as the person. It is curious that there should be any difference of statement about a fact so notorious, and in the best-known time of Athenian history.

Taylor thinks that the oration which now passes as that of Andokidês against Alkibiadês, is really by Phæax, and was read by Plutarch as the oration of Phæax in an actual contest of ostracism between Phæax, Nikias, and Alkibiadês. He is opposed by Ruhnken and Valckenaer (see Sluiter's preface to that oration, c. 1, and Ruhnken, Hist. Critic. Oratt. Græcor. p. 135). I cannot agree with either: I cannot think with him, that it is a real oration of Phæax; nor with them, that it is a real oration in any genuine cause of ostracism whatever. It appears to me to have been composed after the ostracism had fallen into desuetude, and when the Athenians had not only become somewhat ashamed of it, but had lost the familiar conception of what it really was. For how otherwise can we explain the fact, that the author of that oration complains that he is about to be ostracized without any secret voting, in which the very essence of the ostracism consisted, and from which its name was borrowed (οὔτε διαψηφισαμένων κρυβδὴν, c. 2)? His oration is framed as if the audience whom he was addressing were about to ostracize one out of the three, by show of hands. But the process of ostracizing included no meeting and haranguing,—nothing but simple deposit of the shells in a cask; as may be seen by the description of the special railing-in of the agora, and by the story (true or false) of the unlettered country-citizen coming into the city to give his vote, and asking Aristeidês, without even knowing his person, to write the name for him on the shell (Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 7). There was, indeed, previous discussion in the senate as well as in the ekklesia, whether a vote of ostracism should be entered upon at all; but the author of the oration to which I allude does not address himself to *that* question; he assumes that the vote is actually about to be taken, and that one of the three —himself, Nikias, or Alkibiadês—must be ostracized (c. 1). Now, doubtless, in practice, the decision commonly lay between two formidable rivals; but it was not publicly or formally put so before the people: every citizen might write upon the shell such name as he chose. Farther, the open denunciation of the injustice of ostracism as a system (c. 2), proves an age later than the banishment of Hyperbolus. Moreover, the author having begun by remarking that he stands in contest with Nikias as well as with Alkibiadês, says nothing more about Nikias to the end of the speech.

[272] See the discussion of the ostracism in Aristot. Politic. iii, 8, where he recognizes the problem as one common to all governments.

Compare, also, a good Dissertation—J. A. Paradys, De Ostracismo Atheniensium, Lugduni Batavor. 1793; K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Griechischen Staatsalterthümer, ch. 130; and Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Pub. Græc. ch. xxxv, p. 233.

[273] Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 3.

[274] The barathrum was a deep pit, said to have had iron spikes at the bottom, into which criminals condemned to death were sometimes cast. Though probably an ancient Athenian punishment, it seems to have become at the very least extremely rare, if not entirely disused, during the times of Athens historically known to us; but the phrase continued in speech after the practice had become obsolete. The iron spikes depend on the evidence of the Schol. Aristophan. Plutus, 431,—a very doubtful authority, when we read the legend which he blends with his statement.

[275] Thucyd. iii, 70, 81, 82.

[276] Andokidês, De Mysteriis, p. 12, c. 13. Μηδὲ νόμον ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ ἐξεῖναι θεῖναι, ἐὰν μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις· ἐὰν μὴ ἑξακισχιλίοις δόξῃ, κρυβδὴν ψηφιζομένοις. According to the usual looseness in dealing with the name of Solon, this has been called a law of Solon (see Petit. Leg. Att. p. 188), though it certainly cannot be older than Kleisthenês.

"Privilegia ne irroganto," said the law of the Twelve Tables at Rome (Cicero, Legg. iii, 4-19).

[277] Aristotle and Philochorus, ap. Photium, App. p. 672 and 675, ed. Porson.

It would rather appear by that passage that the ostracism was never formally abrogated; and that even in the later times, to which the description of Aristotle refers, the form was still preserved of putting the question whether the public safety called for an ostracizing vote, long after it had passed both out of use and out of mind.

[278] Philochorus, *ut supra*; Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 7; Schol. ad Aristophan. Equit. 851; Pollux, viii, 19.

There is a difference of opinion among the authorities, as well as among the expositors, whether the minimum of six thousand applies to the votes given in all, or to the votes given against any one name. I embrace the latter opinion, which is supported by Philochorus, Pollux, and the Schol. on Aristophanês, though Plutarch countenances the former. Boeckh, in his Public Economy of Athens, and Wachsmuth, (i, 1, p. 272) are in favor of Plutarch and the former opinion; Paradys (Dissertat. De Ostr. p. 25), Platner, and Hermann (see K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Gr. Staatsalt. ch. 130, not. 6) support the other, which appears to me the right one.

For the purpose, so unequivocally pronounced, of the general law determining the absolute minimum necessary for a *privilegium*, would by no means be obtained, if the simple majority of votes, among six thousand voters in all, had been allowed to take effect. A person might then be ostracized with a very small number of votes against him, and without creating any reasonable presumption that he was dangerous to the constitution; which was by no means either the purpose of Kleisthenês, or the well-understood operation of the ostracism, so long as it continued to be a reality.

[279] The practical working of the ostracism presents it as a struggle between two contending leaders, accompanied with chance of banishment to both—Periklês πρὸς τὸν Θουκυδίδην εἰς ἀγῶνα περὶ τοῦ ὀστράκου καταστὰς, καὶ διακινδυνεύσας, ἐκεῖνον μὲν ἐξέβαλε, κατέλυσε δὲ τὴν ἀντιτεταγμένην ἑταιρείαν (Plutarch, Periklês, c. 14; compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11).

[280] It is not necessary in this remark to take notice, either of the oligarchy of Four Hundred, or that of Thirty, called the Thirty Tyrants, established during the closing years of the Peloponnesian war, and after the ostracism had been discontinued. Neither of these changes were brought about by the excessive ascendency of any one or few men: both of them grew out of the embarrassments and dangers of Athens in the latter period of her great foreign war.

[281] Aristotle (Polit. iii, 8, 6) seems to recognize the political necessity of the ostracism, as applied even to obvious superiority of wealth, connection, etc. (which he distinguishes pointedly from superiority of merit and character), and upon principles of symmetry only, even apart from dangerous designs on the part of the superior mind. No painter, he observes, will permit a foot, in his picture of a man, to be of disproportionate size with the entire body, though separately taken it may be finely painted; nor will the chorus-master allow any one voice, however beautiful, to predominate beyond a certain proportion over the rest.

His final conclusion is, however, that the legislator ought, if possible, so to construct his constitution, as to have no need of such exceptional remedy; but, if this cannot be done, then the second-best step is to apply the ostracism. Compare also v, 2, 5.

The last century of the free Athenian democracy realized the first of these alternatives.

[282] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11: Harpokration. v. Ἵππαρχος.

[283] Lysias cont. Alkibiad. A. c. 11, p. 143: Harpokration. v. Ἀλκιβιάδης; Andokidês cont. Alkibiad. c. 11-12, pp. 129, 130: this last oration may afford evidence as to the facts mentioned in it, though I cannot imagine it to be either genuine, or belonging to the time to which it professes to refer, as has been observed in a previous note.

[284] Plutarch, Periklês. c. 4; Plutarch. Aristeid. c. 1.

[285] Ælian, V. H. xiii, 24; Herakleidês, περὶ Πολιτειῶν, c. 1, ed. Köhler.

[286] Plutarch, Themistoklês, 22; Plutarch, Aristeidês, 7, παραμυθία φθόνου καὶ κουφισμός. See the same opinions repeated by Wachsmuth, Hellenische Alterthumskunde, ch. 48, vol. i, p. 272, and by Platner, Prozess and Klagen bey den Attikern, vol. i, p. 386.

[287] Thucyd. viii, 73, διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀξιώματος φόβον.

[288] Kratinus ap. Plutarch, Periklês, 13.

Ὁ σχινοκέφαλος Ζεὺς ὁδὶ προσέρχεται
Περικλέης, τῳδεῖον ἐπὶ τοῦ κρανίου
Ἔχων, ἐπειδὴ τοὔστρακον παροίχεται.

For the attacks of the comic writers upon Damôn, see Plutarch, Periklês, c. 4.

[289] Aristot. Polit. iii, 8, 4; v, 2, 5.

[290] Diodor. xi, 55-87. This author describes very imperfectly the Athenian ostracism, transferring to it apparently the circumstances of the Syracusan Petalism.

[291] Herodot. v, 70-72; compare Schol. ad Aristophan. Lysistr. 274.

[292] Herodot. v, 73.

[293] See vol. ii, p. 295, part ii, ch. 3.

[294] Thucyd. iii, 61.

[295] Herodot. vi, 108. ἐᾷν Θηβαίους Βοιωτῶν τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους ἐς Βοιωτοὺς τελέειν. This is an important circumstance in regard to Grecian political feeling: I shall advert to it hereafter.

[296] Herodot. vi, 108. Thucydidês (iii, 58), when recounting the capture of Platæa by the Lacedæmonians in the third year of the Peloponnesian war, states that the alliance between Platæa and Athens was then in its 93rd year of date; according to which reckoning it would begin in the year 519 B. C., where Mr. Clinton and other chronologers place it.

I venture to think that the immediate circumstances, as recounted in the text from Herodotus (whether Thucydidês conceived them in the same way, cannot be determined), which brought about the junction of Platæa with Athens, cannot have taken place in 519 B. C., but must have happened *after* the expulsion of Hippias from Athens in 510 B. C.,—for the following reasons:—

1. No mention is made of Hippias, who yet, if the event had happened in 519 B. C., must have been the person to determine whether the Athenians should assist Platæa or not. The Platæan envoys present themselves at a public sacrifice in the attitude of suppliants, so as to touch the feelings of the Athenian citizens generally: had Hippias been then despot, *he* would have been the person to be propitiated and to determine for or against assistance.

2. We know no cause which should have brought Kleomenês with a Lacedæmonian force near to Platæa in the year 519 B. C.: we know from the statement of Herodotus (v, 76) that no Lacedæmonian expedition against Attica took place at that time. But in the year to which I have referred the event, Kleomenês is on his march near the spot upon a known and assignable object. From the very tenor of the narrative, it is plain that Kleomenês and his army were not designedly in Bœotia, nor meddling with Bœotian affairs, at the time when the Platæans solicited his aid; he declines to interpose in the matter, pleading the great distance between Sparta and Platæa as a reason.

3. Again, Kleomenês, in advising the Platæans to solicit Athens, does not give the advice through good-will towards them, but through a desire to harass and perplex the Athenians, by entangling them in a quarrel with the Bœotians. At the point of time to which I have referred the incident, this was a very natural desire: he was angry, and perhaps alarmed, at the recent events which had brought about his expulsion from Athens. But what was there to make him conceive such a feeling against Athens during the reign of Hippias? That despot was on terms of the closest intimacy with Sparta: the Peisistratids were (ξείνους—ξεινίους ταμάλιστα—Herod. v, 63, 90, 91) "the particular guests" of the Spartans, who were only induced to take part against Hippias from a reluctant obedience to the oracles procured, one after another, by Kleisthenês. The motive, therefore, assigned by Herodotus, for the advice given by Kleomenês to the Platæans, can have no application to the time when Hippias was still despot.

4. That Herodotus did not conceive the victory gained by the Athenians over Thebes as having taken place *before* the expulsion of Hippias, is evident from his emphatic contrast between their warlike spirit and success

when liberated from the despots, and their timidity or backwardness while under Hippias (Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννευόμενοι μὲν, οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφέας περιοικεόντων ἔσαν τὰ πολέμια ἀμείνους, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων, μακρῷ πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο· δηλοῖ ὧν ταῦτα, ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν, ἐθελοκάκεον, etc. v, 78). The man who wrote thus cannot have believed that, in the year 519 B. C., while Hippias was in full sway, the Athenians gained an important victory over the Thebans, cut off a considerable portion of the Theban territory for the purpose of joining it to that of the Platæans, and showed from that time forward their constant superiority over Thebes by protecting her inferior neighbor against her.

These different reasons, taking them altogether, appear to me to show that the first alliance between Athens and Platæa, as Herodotus conceives and describes it, cannot have taken place before the expulsion of Hippias, in 510 B. C.; and induce me to believe, either that Thucydidês was mistaken in the date of that event, or that Herodotus has not correctly described the facts. Not seeing any reason to suspect the description given by the latter, I have departed, though unwillingly, from the date of Thucydidês.

The application of the Platæans to Kleomenês, and his advice grounded thereupon, may be connected more suitably with his first expedition to Athens, after the expulsion of Hippias, than with his second.

[297] Herodot. v, 75.

[298] Compare Kortüm, Zur Geschichte Hellenischer Staats-Verfassungen, p. 35 (Heidelberg, 1821).

I doubt, however, his interpretation of the words in Herodotus (v, 63)—εἴτε ἰδίῳ στόλῳ, εἴτε δημοσίῳ χρησόμενοι.

[299] Herodot. v, 77; Ælian, V. H. vi, 1; Pausan. i, 28, 2.

[300] Herodot. v, 80.

[301] In the expression of Herodotus, the Æakid heroes are *really* sent from Ægina, and *really* sent back by the Thebans (v, 80-81)—Οἱ δὲ σφι αἰτέουσι ἐπικουρίην τοὺς Αἰακίδας συμπέμπειν ἔφασαν, αὖτις οἱ Θηβαῖοι πέμψαντες, τοὺς μὲν Αἰακίδας σφι ἀπεδίδοσαν, τῶν δὲ ἀνδρῶν ἐδέοντο. Compare again v, 75; viii, 64; and Polyb. vii, 9, 2. θεῶν τῶν συστρατευομένων.

Justin gives a narrative of an analogous application from the Epizephyrian Lokrians to Sparta (xx, 3): "Territi Locrenses ad Spartanos decurrunt: auxilium supplices deprecantur: illi longinquâ militiâ gravati, auxilium a Castore et Polluce petere eos jubent. Neque legati responsum sociæ urbis spreverunt; profectique in proximum templum, facto sacrificio, auxilium deorum implorant. Litatis hostiis, *obtentoque, ut rebantur, quod petebant—haud secus læti quam si deos ipsos secum avecturi essent*—pulvinaria iis in navi componunt, faustisque profecti ominibus, *solatia suis pro auxiliis* deportant." In comparing the expressions of Herodotus with those of Justin, we see that the former believes the direct literal presence and action of the Æakid heroes ("the Thebans sent back the heroes, and asked for men"), while the latter explains away the divine intervention into a mere fancy and feeling on the part of those to whom it is supposed to be accorded. This was the tone of those later authors whom Justin followed: compare also Pausan. iii, 19, 2.

[302] Herodot. v, 81-82.

[303] Herodot. v, 83-88.

[304] Herodot. v, 81-89. μεγάλως Ἀθηναίους ἐσινέοντο.

[305] Herodot. v, 90.

[306] Herodot. v, 90, 91.

[307] Herodot. v, 92. … τυραννίδας ἐς τὰς πόλις κατάγειν παρασκευάζεσθε, τοῦ οὔτε ἀδικώτερον ἐστὶ οὐδὲν κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπους οὔτε μιαιφονώτερον.

[308] Herodot. v, 93. μὴ ποιέειν μηδὲν νεώτερον περὶ πόλιν Ἑλλάδα.

[309] Herodot. v, 93-94.

[310] Thucydid. i, 68-71, 120-124.

[311] Herodot. v, 78-91. Ἀθηναῖοι μέν νυν ηὔξηντο· δηλοῖ δὲ οὐ κατ᾽ ἓν μόνον ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ, ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὡς ἔστι χρῆμα σπουδαῖον, εἰ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννευόμενοι μὲν, οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφέας περιοικεόντων ἔσαν τὰ πολέμια

ἀμείνους, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων, μακρῷ πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο· δηλοῖ ὧν ταῦτα, ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν, ἐθελοκάκεον, ὡς δεσπότῃ ἐργαζόμενοι, ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ, αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἑωϋτῷ προθυμέετο κατεργάζεσθαι.

(c. 91.) Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι—νόῳ λαβόντες, ὡς ἐλεύθερον μὲν ἐὸν τὸ γένος τὸ Ἀττικὸν, ἰσόῤῥοπον τῷ ἑωϋτῶν ἂν γένοιτο, κατεχόμενον δὲ ὑπό του τυραννίδι, ἀσθενὲς καὶ πειθαρχέεσθαι ἑτοῖμον.

[312] Herodot. iii, 80. Πλῆθος δὲ ἄρχον, πρῶτα μὲν, οὔνομα πάντων κάλλιστον ἔχει, ἰσονομίην· δεύτερα δὲ, τούτων τῶν ὁ μόναρχος, ποιέει οὐδέν· πάλῳ μὲν ἀρχὰς ἄρχει, ὑπεύθυνον δὲ ἀρχὴν ἔχει, βουλεύματα δὲ πάντα ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ἀναφέρει.

The democratical speaker at Syracuse, Athenagoras, also puts this name and promise in the first rank of advantages—(Thucyd. vi, 39)—ἐγὼ δέ φημι, πρῶτα μὲν, δῆμον ξύμπαν ὠνόμασθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ, μέρος, etc.

[313] See the preceding chapter xi, of this History, vol. iii, p. 145, respecting the Solonian declaration here adverted to.

[314] See the two speeches of Periklês in Thucyd. ii, 35-46, and ii, 60-64. Compare the reflections of Thucydidês upon the two democracies of Athens and Syracuse, vi, 69 and vii, 21-55.

[315] Thucyd. vii, 69. Πατρίδος τε τῆς ἐλευθερωτάτης ὑπομιμνήσκων καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ ἀνεπιτακτοῦ πᾶσιν ἐς τὴν δίαιταν ἐξουσίας, etc.

[316] Compare the remarkable speech of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta (Thucyd. i, 68-71), with the φιλοπραγμοσύνη which Demosthenês so emphatically notices in Philip (Olynthiac. i, 6, p. 13): also Philippic. i, 2, and the Philippics and Olynthiacs generally.

[317] Among the lost productions of Antisthenês the contemporary of Xenophon and Plato, and emanating like them from the tuition of Sokratês, was one Κῦρος, ἢ περὶ Βασιλείας (Diogenes Laërt. vi, 15).

[318] That this was the real story—a close parallel of Romulus and Remus—we may see by Herodotus, i, 122. Some rationalizing Greeks or Persians transformed it into a more plausible tale,—that the herdsman's wife who suckled the boy Cyrus was named Κυνὼ (Κυὼν is a dog, male or female); contending that this latter was the real basis of fact, and that the intervention of the bitch was an exaggeration built upon the name of the woman, in order that the divine protection shown to Cyrus might be still more manifest,—οἱ δὲ τοκέες παραλαβόντες τὸ οὔνομα τοῦτ (ἵνα θειοτέρως δοκέῃ τοῖσι Πέρσῃσι περιεῖναί σφι ὁ παῖς), κατέβαλον φάτιν ὡς ἐκκείμενον Κῦρον κύων ἐξέθρεψε· ἐνθεῦτεν μὲν ἡ φάτις αὐτὴ κεχωρήκεε.

In the first volume of this History, I have noticed various transformations operated by Palæphatus and others upon the Greek mythes,—the ram which carried Phryxus and Hellê across the Hellespont is represented to us as having been in *reality* a man *named Krius*, who aided their flight,—the winged horse which carried Bellerophon was a ship *named* Pegasus, etc.

This same operation has here been performed upon the story of the suckling of Cyrus; for we shall run little risk in affirming that the miraculous story is the older of the two. The feelings which welcome a miraculous story are early and primitive; those which break down the miracle into a common-place fact are of subsequent growth.

[319] Herodot. i, 95. Ὡς ὧν Περσέων μετεξέτεροι λέγουσιν, οἱ μὴ βουλόμενοι σεμνοῦν τὰ περὶ Κῦρον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐόντα λέγειν λόγον, κατὰ ταῦτα γράψω· ἐπιστάμενος περὶ Κύρου καὶ τριφασίας ἄλλας λόγων ὁδοὺς φῆναι. His informants were thus select persons, who differed from the Persians generally.

The long narrative respecting the infancy and growth of Cyrus is contained in Herodot. i, 107-129.

[320] See the Extracts from the lost Persian History of Ktêsias, in Photius Cod. lxxii, also appended to Schweighaüser's edition of Herodotus, vol. iv, p. 345. Φησὶ δὲ (Ktêsias) αὐτὸν τῶν πλειόνων ἃ ἱστορεῖ αὐτόπτην γενόμενον, ἢ παρ᾽ αὐτῶν Περσῶν (ἔνθα τὸ ὁρᾷν μὴ ἐνεχώρει) αὐτήκοον καταστάντα, οὕτως τὴν ἱστορίαν συγγράψαι.

To the discrepancies between Xenophon, Herodotus, and Ktêsias, on the subject of Cyrus, is to be added the statement of Æschylus (Persæ, 747), the oldest authority of them all, and that of the Armenian historians: see Bähr ad Ktesiam, p. 85: comp. Bähr's comments on the discrepancies, p. 87.

[321] Xenophon, Anabas. i, 8, 26.

[322] Herodot. i, 71-153; Arrian, v, 4; Strabo, xv, p. 727; Plato, Legg. iii, p. 695.

[323] Xenophon, Anabas. iii, 3, 6; iii, 4, 7-12. Strabo had read accounts which represented the last battle between Astyagês and Cyrus to have been fought near Pasargadæ (xv, p. 730).

It has been rendered probable by Ritter, however, that the ruined city which Xenophon called Mespila was the ancient Assyrian Nineveh, and the other deserted city which Xenophon calls Larissa, situated as it was on the Tigris, must have been originally Assyrian, and not Median. See about Nineveh, above,—the Chapter on the Babylonians, vol. iii, ch. xix, p. 305, note.

The land east of the Tigris, in which Nineveh and Arbêla were situated, seems to have been called Aturia,—a dialectic variation of Assyria (Strabo, xvi, p. 737; Dio Cass. lxviii, 28).

[324] Xenophanês, Fragm. p. 39, ap. Schneidewin, Delectus Poett. Elegiac. Græc.—

Πήλικος ἦσθ᾽ ὅθ᾽ ὁ Μῆδος ἀφίκετο;

compare Theognis, v, 775, and Herodot. i, 163.

[325] Strabo, xv, p. 724. ὁμόγλωττοι παρὰ μικρόν. See Heeren, Ueber den Verkehr der Alten Welt, part i, book i, pp. 320-340, and Ritter, Erdkunde, West-Asien, b. iii, Abtheil. ii, sects. 1 and 2, pp. 17-84.

[326] About the province of Persis, see Strabo, xv, p. 727; Diodor. xix, 21; Quintus Curtius, v, 13, 14, pp. 432-434, with the valuable explanatory notes of Mützell (Berlin, 1841). Compare, also, Morier's Second Journey in Persia, pp. 49-120, and Ritter, Erdkunde, West Asien, pp. 712-738.

[327] Ktêsias, Persica, c. 2.

[328] Herodot. i, 153.

[329] That this point of view should not be noticed in Herodotus, may appear singular, when we read his story (vi, 86) about the Milesian Glaukus, and the judgment that overtook him for having tested the oracle; but it is put forward by Xenophon as constituting part of the guilt of Crœsus (Cyropæd. vii, 2, 17).

[330] Herodot. i, 47-50.

[331] Herodot. i, 52-54.

[332] Herodot. i, 55.

[333] Herodot. i, 67-70.

[334] Herodot. i, 77.

[335] Herodot. i, 83.

[336] The story about the successful employment of the camels appears also in Xenophon, Cyropæd. vii, 1, 47.

[337] Herodot. i, 84.

[338] Compare Herodot. i, 84-87, and Ktêsias, Persica, c. 4; which latter seems to have been copied by Polyænus, vii, 6, 10.

It is remarkable that among the miracles enumerated by Ktêsias, no mention is made of fire or of the pile of wood kindled: we have the chains of Crœsus miraculously struck off, in the midst of thunder and lightning, but no *fire* mentioned. This is deserving of notice, as illustrating the fact that Ktêsias derived his information from *Persian* narrators, who would not be likely to impute to Cyrus the use of fire for such a purpose. The Persians worshipped fire as a god, and considered it impious to burn a dead body (Herodot. iii, 16). Now Herodotus seems to have heard the story, about the burning, from Lydian informants (λέγεται ὑπὸ Λυδῶν, Herodot. i, 87): whether the Lydians regarded fire in the same point of view as the Persians, we do not know; but even if they did, they would not be indisposed to impute to Cyrus an act of gross impiety, just as the Egyptians imputed another act equally gross to Kambysês, which Herodotus himself treats as a falsehood (iii, 16).

The long narrative given by Nikolaus Damaskênus of the treatment of Crœsus by Cyrus, has been supposed by some to have been borrowed from the Lydian historian Xanthus, elder contemporary of Herodotus. But it seems to me a mere compilation, not well put together, from Xenophon's Cyropædia, and from the narrative of

Herodotus, perhaps including some particular incidents out of Xanthus (see Nikol. Damas. Fragm. ed. Orell. pp. 57-70, and the Fragments of Xanthus in Didot's Historic. Græcor. Fragm. p. 40).

[339] Justin (i, 7) seems to copy Ktêsias, about the treatment of Crœsus.

[340] Herodot. i, 91. Προθυμεομένου δὲ Λοξίεω ὅκως ἂν κατὰ τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς Κροίσου γένοιτο τὸ Σαρδίων πάθος, καὶ μὴ κατ᾽ αὐτὸν Κροῖσον, οὐκ οἷόν τε ἐγένετο παραγαγεῖν Μοίρας· ὅσον δὲ ἐνέδωκαν αὗται, ἠνύσατο, καὶ ἐχαρίσατό οἱ· τρία γὰρ ἔτεα ἐπανεβάλετο τὴν Σαρδίων ἅλωσιν. Καὶ τοῦτο ἐπιστάσθω Κροῖσος, ὡς ὕστερον τοῖσι ἔτεσι τούτοισι ἁλοὺς τῆς πεπρωμένης.

[341] Herodot. i, 91. Ὁ δὲ ἀκούσας συνέγνω ἑωϋτοῦ εἶναι τὴν ἁμαρτάδα, καὶ οὐ τοῦ θεοῦ.

Xenophon also, in the Cyropædia (vii, 2, 16-25), brings Crœsus to the same result of confession and humiliation, though by steps somewhat different.

[342] Herodot. i, 13.

[343] See above, chap, xi, vol. iii, pp. 149-153.

[344] Herodot. vii, 10. οὐ γὰρ ἐᾷ φρονέειν ἄλλον μέγα ὁ θεὸς ἢ ἑωϋτόν.

[345] In the oracle reported in Herodot. vii, 141, as delivered by the Pythian priestess to Athens on occasion of the approach of Xerxês, Zeus is represented in the same supreme position as the present oracle assigns to the Mœræ, or Fates: Pallas in vain attempts to propitiate him in favor of Athens, just as, in this case, Apollo tries to mitigate the Mœræ in respect to Crœsus—

Οὐ δύναται Παλλὰς Δι᾽ Ὀλύμπιον ἐξιλάσασθαι,

Λισσομένη πολλοῖσι λόγοις καὶ μήτιδι πυκνῇ, etc.

Compare also viii, 109, and ix, 16.

O. Müller (Dissertation on the Eumenides of Æschylus, p. 222, Eng. Transl.) says: "On no occasion does Zeus Soter exert his influence directly, like Apollo, Minerva, and the Erinnyes; but whereas Apollo is prophet and exegetes by virtue of wisdom derived from him, and Minerva is indebted to him for her sway over states and assemblies,—nay, the very Erinnyes exercise their functions in his name,—this Zeus stands always in the background, and has in reality only to settle a conflict existing within himself. For with Æschylus, as with all men of profound feeling among the Greeks from the earliest times, Jupiter is the only real god, in the higher sense of the word. Although he is, in the spirit of ancient theology, a generated god, arisen out of an imperfect state of things, and not produced till the third stage of a development of nature,—still he is, at the time we are speaking of, the spirit that pervades and governs the universe."

To the same purpose Klausen expresses himself (Theologumena Æschyli, pp. 6-69).

It is perfectly true that many passages may be produced from Greek authors which ascribe to Zeus the supreme power here noted. But it is equally true that this conception is not uniformly adhered to, and that sometimes the Fates, or Mœræ are represented as supreme; occasionally represented as the stronger and Zeus as the weaker (Promêtheus, 515). The whole tenor of that tragedy, in fact, brings out the conception of a Zeus τύραννος,—whose power is not supreme, even for the time; and is not destined to continue permanently, even at its existing height. The explanations given by Klausen of this drama appear to me incorrect; nor do I understand how it is to be reconciled with the above passage quoted from O. Müller.

The two oracles here cited from Herodotus exhibit plainly the fluctuation of Greek opinion on this subject: in the one, the supreme determination, and the inexorability which accompanies it, are ascribed to Zeus,—in the other, to the Mœræ. This double point of view adapted itself to different occasions, and served as a help for the interpretation of different events. Zeus was supposed to have certain sympathies for human beings; misfortunes happened to various men which he not only did not wish to bring on, but would have been disposed to avert; here the Mœræ, who had no sympathies, were introduced as an explanatory cause, tacitly implied as overruling Zeus. "Cum Furiis Æschylus Parcas tantum non ubique conjungit," says Klausen (Theol. Æsch. p. 39); and this entire absence of human sympathies constitutes the common point of both,—that in which the Mœræ and the Erinnyes differ from all the other gods,—πέφρικα τὰν ὠλεσίοικον θεὰν, οὐ θεοῖς ὁμοίαν (Æschyl. Sept. ad Theb. 720): compare Eumenid. 169, 172, and, indeed, the general strain of that fearful tragedy.

In Æschylus, as in Herodotus, Apollo is represented as exercising persuasive powers over the Mœræ (Eumenid. 724),—Μοίρας ἔπεισας ἀφθίτους θεῖναι βροτούς.

[346] The language of Herodotus deserves attention. Apollo tells Crœsus: "I applied to the Mœræ to get the execution of the judgment postponed from your time to that of your children,—but I could not prevail upon them; but as much as they would yield *of their own accord*, I procured for you." (ὅσον δὲ ἐνέδωκαν αὗται, ἐχαρίσατό οἱ—i, 91.)

[347] Thucyd. i, 22.

[348] This important date depends upon the evidence of Solinus (Polyhistor, i, 112) and Sosikratês (ap. Diog. Laërt. i, 95): see Mr. Clinton's Fasti Hellen. ad ann. 546, and his Appendix, ch. 17, upon the Lydian kings.

Mr. Clinton and most of the chronologists accept the date without hesitation, but Volney (Recherches sur l'Histoire Ancienne, vol. i, pp. 306-308; Chronologie des Rois Lydiens) rejects it altogether; considering the capture of Sardis to have occurred in 557 B. C., and the reign of Crœsus to have begun in 571 B. C. He treats very contemptuously the authority of Solinus and Sosikratês, and has an elaborate argumentation to prove that the date which he adopts is borne out by Herodotus. This latter does not appear to me at all satisfactory: I adopt the date of Solinus and Sosikratês, though agreeing with Volney that such positive authority is not very considerable, because there is nothing to contradict them, and because the date which they give seems in consonance with the stream of the history.

Volney's arguments suppose in the mind of Herodotus a degree of chronological precision altogether unreasonable, in reference to events anterior to contemporary records. He, like other chronologists, exhausts his ingenuity to find a proper point of historical time for the supposed conversation between Solon and Crœsus (p. 320).

[349] Herodot. i, 141.

[350] Herodot. i, 152. The purple garment, so attractive a spectacle amid the plain clothing universal at Sparta, marks the contrast between Asiatic and European Greece.

[351] Herodot. i, 153. ταῦτα ἐς τοὺς πάντας Ἕλληνας ἀπέῤῥιψε ὁ Κῦρος τὰ ἔπεα, etc.

[352] Herodot. i, 155.

[353] Herodot. i, 159.

[354] Herodot. i, 160. The short fragment from Charôn of Lampsakus, which Plutarch (De Malignitat. Herod. p. 859) cites here, in support of one among his many unjust censures on Herodotus, is noway inconsistent with the statement of the latter, but rather tends to confirm it.

In writing this treatise on the alleged ill-temper of Herodotus, we see that Plutarch had before him the history of Charôn of Lampsakus, more ancient by one generation than the historian whom he was assailing, and also belonging to Asiatic Greece. Of course, it suited the purpose of his work to produce all the contradictions to Herodotus which he could find in Charôn: the fact that he has produced none of any moment, tends to strengthen our faith in the historian of Halikarnassus, and to show that in the main his narrative was in accordance with that of Charôn.

[355] Herodot. i, 161-169.

[356] Herodot. i, 168; Skymnus Chius, Fragm. v, 153; Dionys. Perieg. v, 553.

[357] Herodot. i, 163. Ὁ δὲ πυθόμενος παρ᾽ αὐτῶν τὸν Μῆδον ὡς αὔξοιτο, ἐδίδου σφι χρήματα τείχος περιβαλέσθαι τὴν πόλιν.

I do not understand why the commentators debate what or who is meant by τὸν Μῆδον: it plainly means the Median or Persian power generally: but the chronological difficulty is a real one, if we are to suppose that there was time between the first alarm conceived of the Median power of the Ionians, and the siege of Phôkæa by Harpagus, to inform Arganthônius of the circumstances, and to procure from him this large aid as well as to build the fortifications. The Ionic Greeks neither actually did conceive, nor had reason to conceive, any alarm respecting Persian power, until the arrival of Cyrus before Sardis; and within a month from that time Sardis was in his possession. If we are to suppose communication with Arganthônius, grounded upon this circumstance, at the distance of Tartêssus, and under the circumstances of ancient navigation, we must necessarily imagine, also, that the attack made by Harpagus upon Phôkæa—which city he assailed before any of the rest—was postponed

for at least two or three years. Such postponement is not wholly impossible, yet it is not in the spirit of the Herodotean narrative, nor do I think it likely. It is much more probable that the informants of Herodotus made a slip in chronology, and ascribed the donations of Arganthônius to a motive which did not really dictate them.

As to the fortifications (which Phôkæa and the other Ionic cities are reported to have erected after the conquest of Sardis by the Persians), the case may stand thus. While these cities were all independent, before they were first conquered by Crœsus, they must undoubtedly have had fortifications. When Crœsus conquered them, he directed the demolition of the fortifications; but demolition does not necessarily mean pulling down the entire walls: when one or a few breaches are made, the city is laid open, and the purpose of Crœsus would thus be answered. Such may well have been the state of the Ionian cities at the time when they first thought it necessary to provide defences against the Persians at Sardis: they repaired and perfected the breached fortifications.

The conjecture of Larcher (see the Notes both of Larcher and Wesseling),—τὸν Λυδὸν instead of τὸν Μῆδον,—is not an unreasonable one, if it had any authority: the donation of Arganthônius would then be transferred to the period anterior to the Lydian conquest: it would get rid of the chronological difficulty above adverted to, but it would introduce some new awkwardness into the narrative.

[358] Herodot. i, 164.

[359] Herodot. i, 165. ὑπερημίσεας τῶν ἀστῶν ἔλαβε πόθος τε καὶ οἶκτος τῆς πόλιος καὶ τῶν ἠθέων τῆς χώρης· ψευδόρκιοί τε γενόμενοι, etc. The colloquial term which I have ventured to place in the text expresses exactly, as well as briefly, the meaning of the historian. A public oath, taken by most of the Greek cities with similar ceremony of lumps of iron thrown into the sea, is mentioned in Plutarch, Aristid. c. 25.

[360] Herodot. i, 166.

[361] Aristot. Polit. iii, 5, 11; Polyb. iii, 22.

[362] Herodot. i, 167.

[363] Herodot. i, 170. Πυνθάνομαι γνώμην Βίαντα ἄνδρα Πριηνέα ἀποδέξασθαι Ἴωσι χρησιμωτάτην, τῇ εἰ ἐπείθοντο, παρεῖχε ἂν σφι εὐδαιμονέειν Ἑλλήνων μάλιστα.

[364] Herodot. i, 174.

[365] Herodot. i, 176. The whole population of Xanthus perished, except eighty families accidentally absent: the subsequent occupants of the town were recruited from strangers. Nearly five centuries afterwards, their descendants in the same city slew themselves in the like desperate and tragical manner, to avoid surrendering to the Roman army under Marcus Brutus (Plutarch, Brutus, c. 31).

[366] Herodot. i, 177.

[367] Herodot. i, 153.

[368] Herodot. i, 177. τὰ δὲ οἱ πάρεσχε πόνον τε πλεῖστον, καὶ ἀξιαπηγητότατά ἐστι, τούτων ἐπιμνήσομαι.

[369] See Xenophon, Anabas. i, 7, 15; ii, 4, 12. For the inextricable difficulties in which the Ten Thousand Greeks were involved, after the battle of Kunaxa, and the insurmountable obstacles which impeded their march, assuming any resisting force whatever, see Xenoph. Anab. ii, 1, 11; ii, 2, 3; ii, 3, 10; ii, 4, 12-13. These obstacles, doubtless, served as a protection to them against attack, not less than as an impediment to their advance; and the well-supplied villages enabled them to obtain plenty of provisions: hence the anxiety of the Great King to help them across the Tigris out of Babylonia. But it is not easy to see how, in the face of such difficulties, any invading army could reach Babylon.

Ritter represents the wall of Media as having reached across from the Euphratês to the Tigris at the point where they come nearest together, about two hundred stadia or twenty-five miles across. But it is nowhere stated, so far as I can find, that this wall reached to the Euphratês,—still less that its length was two hundred stadia, for the passages of Strabo cited by Ritter do not prove either point (ii, 80; xi, 529). And Xenophon (ii, 4, 12) gives the length of the wall as I have stated it in the text, = 20 parasangs = 600 stadia = 75 miles.

The passage of the Anabasis (i, 7, 15) seems to connect the Median wall with the canals, and not with the river Euphratês. The narrative of Herodotus, as I have remarked in a former chapter, leads us to suppose that he descended that river to Babylon; and if we suppose that the wall did not reach the Euphratês, this would afford

some reason why he makes no mention of it. See Ritter, West Asien, b. iii, Abtheilung iii, Abschn. i, sect. 29, pp. 19-22.

[370] Ὁ Τίγρης μέγας τε καὶ οὐδαμοῦ διαβατὸς ἕς τε ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκβολὴν (Arrian, vii, 7, 7). By which he means, that it is not fordable below the ancient Nineveh, or Mosul; for a little above that spot, Alexander himself forded it with his army, a few days before the battle of Arbêla—not without very great difficulty (Arrian, iii, 7, 8; Diodor. xvii, 55).

[371] Herodot. i, 190. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένετο ἐλαύνων ἀγχοῦ τῆς πόλιος, συνέβαλόν τε οἱ Βαβυλώνιοι, καὶ ἐσσωθέντες τῇ μάχῃ, κατειλήθησαν ἐς τὸ ἄστυ.

Just as if Babylon was as easy to be approached as Sardis,—οἷά τε ἐπιστάμενοι ἔτι πρότερον τὸν Κῦρον οὐκ ἀτρεμίζοντα, ἀλλ᾽ ὀρέοντες αὐτὸν παντὶ ὁμοίως ἔθνεϊ ἐπιχειρέοντα, προεσάξαντο σίτια ἐτέων κάρτα πολλῶν.

[372] Xenophon, Anabas. i, 7, 14-20; Diodor. xiv, 22; Plutarch, Artaxerxês, c. 7. I follow Xenophon without hesitation, where he differs from these two latter.

[373] Xenophon, Cyropæd. iii, 3, 26, about the πολυχειρία of the barbaric kings.

[374] Herodot. i, 189-202. ἐνθαῦτά οἱ τῶν τις ἱρῶν ἵππων τῶν λευκῶν ὑπὸ ὕβριος ἐσβὰς ἐς τὸν ποταμὸν, διαβαίνειν ἐπειρᾶτο…. Κάρτα τε δὴ ἐχαλέπαινε τῷ ποταμῷ ὁ Κῦρος τοῦτο ὑβρίσαντι, etc.

[375] Herodot. i, 191. This latter portion of the story, if we may judge from the expression of Herodotus, seems to excite more doubt in his mind than all the rest, for he thinks it necessary to add, "as the residents at Babylon say," ὡς λέγεται ὑπὸ τῶν ταὐτῃ οἰκημένων. Yet if we assume the size of the place to be what he has affirmed, there seems nothing remarkable in the fact that the people in the centre did not at once hear of the capture; for the first business of the assailants would be to possess themselves of the walls and gates. It is a lively illustration of prodigious magnitude, and as such it is given by Aristotle (Polit. iii, 1, 12); who, however, exaggerates it by giving as a report that the inhabitants in the centre did not hear of the capture until the third day. No such exaggeration as this appears in Herodotus.

Xenophon, in the Cyropædia (vii, 5, 7-18), following the story that Cyrus drained off the Euphratês, represents it as effected in a manner differing from Herodotus. According to him, Cyrus dug two vast and deep ditches, one on each side round the town, from the river above the town to the river below it: watching the opportunity of a festival day in Babylon, he let the water into both of these side ditches, which fell into the main stream again below the town: hence the main stream in its passage through the town became nearly dry. The narrative of Xenophon, however, betrays itself, as not having been written from information received on the spot, like that of Herodotus; for he talks of αἱ ἄκραι of Babylon, just as he speaks of the ἄκραι of the hill-towns of Karia (compare Cyropædia, vii, 4, 1, 7, with vii, 5, 34). There were no ἄκραι on the dead flat of Babylon.

[376] Arrian, vi, 24, 4.

[377] Herodot. i, 205-214; Arrian, v, 4, 14; Justin, i, 8; Strabo, xi, p. 512.

According to Ktêsias, Cyrus was slain in an expedition against the Derbikes, a people in the Caucasian regions,—though his army afterwards prove victorious and conquer the country (Ktesiæ Persica, c. 8-9),—see the comment of Bähr on the passage, in his edition of Ktêsias.

[378] Strabo, xv, pp. 730, 731; Arrian, vi, 29.

[379] The town Kyra, or Kyropolis, on the river Sihon, or Jaxartês, was said to have been founded by Cyrus,—it was destroyed by Alexander (Strabo, xi, pp. 517, 518; Arrian, iv, 2, 2; Curtius, vii, 6, 16).

[380] Herodot. iii, 19.

[381] Herodot. i, 188; Plutarch, Artaxerxês, c. 3; Diodor. xvii, 71.

[382] Xenophon, Anabas. i, 1, 8.

[383] Xenophon, Anabas. i, 7, 6; Cyropæd. viii, 6, 19.

[384] Herodot. ix, 122.

[385] The modern Persians at this day exhibit almost matchless skill in shooting with the firelock, as well as with the bow, on horseback. See Sir John Malcolm, Sketches of Persia, ch. xvii, p. 201; see also Kinneir, Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire, p. 32.

[386] About the attributes of the Persian character, see Herodot. i, 131-140: compare i, 153.

He expresses himself very strongly as to the facility with which the Persians imbibed foreign customs, and especially foreign luxuries (i, 135),—ξεινικὰ δὲ νόμαια Πέρσαι προσίενται ἀνδρῶν μάλιστα,—καὶ εὐπαθείας τε παντοδαπὰς πυνθανόμενοι ἐπιτηδεύουσι.

That rigid tenacity of customs and exclusiveness of tastes, which mark the modern Orientals, appear to be of the growth of Mohammedanism, and to distinguish them greatly from the old Zoroastrian Persians.

[387] Herodot. ix, 76; Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 26.

[388] Herodot. i, 210; iii, 159.

[389] Herodot. iii, 1-4.

[390] Herodot. iii, 1, 19, 44.

[391] The narrative of Ktêsias is, in respect both to the Egyptian expedition and to the other incidents of Persian history, quite different in its details from that of Herodotus, agreeing only in the main events (Ktêsias, Persica, c. 7). To blend the two together is impossible.

Tacitus (Histor. i, 11) notes the difficulty of approach for an invading army to Egypt: "Egyptum, provinciam aditu difficilem, annonæ fecundam, superstitione ac lasciviâ discordem et mobilem," etc.

[392] Herodot. iii, 10-16. About the Arabians, between Judæa and Egypt, see iii, c. 5, 88-91.

[393] Herodot. iii, 19.

[394] Herodot. iii, 29.

[395] Ktêsias calls the brother Tanyoxarkês, and says that Cyrus had left him satrap, without tribute, of Baktria and the neighboring regions (Persica, c. 8). Xenophon, in the Cyropædia, also calls him Tanyoxarkês, but gives him a different satrapy (Cyropæd. viii, 7, 11).

[396] Herodot. iii, 30-62.

[397] Herodot. iii, 61-63.

[398] Herodot. iii, 68-69.—"Auribus decisis vivere jubet," says Tacitus, about a case under the Parthian government (Annal. xii, 14),—nor have the Turkish authorities given up the infliction of it at the present moment, or at least down to a very recent period.

[399] Herodot. iii, 64-66.

[400] Herodot. iii, 67.

[401] Herodot. iii, 68-69.

[402] Herodot. iii, 69-73. ἀρχόμεθα μὲν ἐόντες Πέρσαι, ὑπὸ Μήδου ἀνδρὸς μάγου, καὶ τούτου ὦτα οὐκ ἔχοντος.

Compare the description of the insupportable repugnance of the Greeks of Kyrênê to be governed by the *lame* Battus (Herodot. iv, 161).

[403] Compare Aristophan. Aves, 487, with the Scholia, and Herodot. vii, 61; Arrian, iv, 6, 29. The cap of the Persians generally was loose, low, clinging about the head in folds; that of the king was high and erect above the head. See the notes of Wesseling and Schweighaüser, upon πῖλοι ἀπαγὲες in Herodot. *l. c.*

[404] Herodot. i, 101-120.

[405] In the speech which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Kambysês on his deathbed, addressed to the Persians around him in a strain of prophetic adjuration (iii, 65), he says: Καὶ δὴ ὑμῖν τάδε ἐπισκήπτω, θεοὺς τοὺς βασιληΐους ἐπικαλέων, καὶ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν καὶ μάλιστα Ἀχαιμενιδέων τοῖσι παρεοῦσι, μὴ περιϊδεῖν τὴν ἡγεμονίην αὖτις ἐς Μήδους περιελθοῦσαν· ἀλλ᾽ εἴτε δόλῳ ἔχουσι αὐτὴν κτησάμενοι (the personification of the deceased son of Cyrus), δόλῳ ἀπαιρεθῆναι ὑπὸ ὑμέων· εἴτε καὶ σθένεϊ τεῷ κατεργασάμενοι, σθένεϊ κατὰ τὸ κάρτερον ἀνασώσασθαι (the forcible opposition of the Medes to Darius, which he put down by superior force on the Persian side): compare the speech of Gobryas, one of the seven Persian conspirators (iii, 73), and that of Prexaspês (iii, 75); also Plato, Legg. iii, 12, p. 695.

Heeren has taken a correct view of the reign of Smerdis the Magian, and its political character (Ideen über den Verkehr, etc., der Alten Welt, part i, abth. i, p. 431).

[406] Herodot. iii, 79. Σπασάμενοι δὲ τὰ ἐγχειρίδια, ἔκτεινον ὅκου τινὰ μάγον εὕρισκον· εἰ δὲ μὴ νὺξ ἐπελθοῦσα ἔσχε, ἔλιπον ἂν οὐδένα μάγον. Ταύτην τὴν ἡμέρην θεραπεύουσι Πέρσαι κοινῇ μάλιστα τῶν ἡμερέων· καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ὁρτὴν μεγάλην ἀνάγουσι, ἣ κέκληται ὑπὸ Περσέων Μαγοφόνια.

The periodical celebration of the Magophonia is attested by Ktêsias,—one of the few points of complete agreement with Herodotus. He farther agrees in saying that a Magian usurped the throne, through likeness of person to the deceased son of Cyrus, whom Kambysês had slain,—but all his other statements differ from Herodotus (Ktêsias, 10-14).

[407] Even at the battle of Arbela,—"Summæ Orsines præerat, a septem Persis oriundus, ad Cyrum quoque, nobilissimum regem, originem sui referens." (Quintus Curtius, iv, 12, 7, or iv, 45, 7, Zumpt.): compare Strabo, xi, p. 531; Florus, iii, 5, 1.

[408] Herodot. iii, 127. Δαρεῖος—ἅτε οἰδεόντων οἱ ἔτι τῶν πρηγμάτων, etc.,—mention of the ταραχή (iii, 126, 150).

[409] Herodot. iii, 126. Μετὰ γὰρ τὸν Καμβύσεω θάνατον, καὶ τῶν Μάγων τὴν βασιληΐην, μένων ἐν τῇσι Σάρδισι Ὀροίτης, ὠφέλει μὲν οὐδὲν Πέρσας, ὑπὸ Μήδων ἀπαραιρημένους τὴν ἀρχήν· ὁ δὲ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ταραχῇ κατὰ μὲν ἔκτεινε Μιτροβάτεα … ἄλλα τε ἐξύβρισε παντοῖα, etc.

[410] Herodot. iv, 166. Ὁ δὲ Ἀρυάνδης ἦν οὗτος τῆς Αἰγύπτου ὕπαρχος ὑπὸ Καμβύσεω κατεστεώς· ὃς ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ παρισεύμενος Δαρείῳ διεφθάρη.

[411] Herodot. iii, 67-150.

[412] Herodot. i, 130. Ἀστυάγης μέν νυν βασιλεύσας ἐπ᾽ ἔτεα πέντε καὶ τριήκοντα, οὕτω τῆς ἀρχῆς κατεπαύσθη. Μῆδοι δὲ ὑπέκυψαν Πέρσῃσι διὰ τὴν τούτου πικρότητα…. Ὑστέρῳ μέντοι χρόνῳ μετεμέλησέ τέ σφι ταῦτα ποιήσασι, καὶ ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ Δαρείου· ἀποστάντες δὲ, ὀπίσω κατεστράφθησαν, μάχῃ νικηθέντες· τότε δὲ, ἐπὶ Ἀστυάγεος, οἱ Πέρσαι τε καὶ ὁ Κῦρος ἐπαναστάντες τοῖσι Μήδοισι, ἦρχον τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου τῆς Ἀσίης.

This passage—asserting that the Medes, some time after the deposition of Astyagês and the acquisition of Persian supremacy by Cyrus, repented of having suffered their discontent against Astyagês to place this supremacy in the hands of the Persians, revolted from Darius, and were reconquered after a contest—appears to me to have been misunderstood by chronologists. Dodwell, Larcher, and Mr. Fynes Clinton (indeed, most, if not all, of the chronologists) explain it as alluding to a revolt of the Medes against the Persian king Darius Nothus, mentioned in the Hellenica of Xenophon (i, 2, 12), and belonging to the year 408 B. C. See Larcher ad Herodot. i, 130, and his Vie d'Hérodote, prefixed to his translation (p. lxxxix); also Mr. Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, ad ann. 408 and 455, and his Appendix, c, 18, p. 316.

The revolt of the Medes alluded to by Herodotus is, in my judgment, completely distinct from the revolt mentioned by Xenophon: to identify the two, as these eminent chronologists do, is an hypothesis not only having nothing to recommend it, but open to grave objection. The revolt mentioned by Herodotus was against Darius son of Hystaspês, not against Darius Nothus; and I have set forth with peculiar care the circumstances connected with the conspiracy and accession of the former, for the purpose of showing that they all decidedly imply that conflict between Median and Persian supremacy, which Herodotus directly announces in the passage now before us.

1. When Herodotus speaks of Darius, without any adjective designation, why should we imagine that he means any other than Darius the son of Hystaspês, on whom he dwells so copiously in his narrative? Once only in the course of his history (ix, 108) another Darius (the young prince, son of Xerxês the First) is mentioned; but with this exception, Darius son of Hystaspês is uniformly, throughout the work, spoken of under his simple name: Darius Nothus is never alluded to at all.

2. The deposition of Astyagês took place in 559 B. C.; the beginning of the reign of Darius occurred in 520 B. C.; now repentance on the part of the Medes, for what they had done at the former of those two epochs, might naturally prompt them to try to repair it in the latter. But between the deposition of Astyagês in 559 B. C., and the revolt mentioned by Xenophon against Darius Nothus in 408 B. C., the interval is more than one hundred and fifty years. To ascribe a revolt which took place in 408 B. C., to repentance for something which had occurred one hundred and fifty years before, is unnatural and far-fetched, if not positively inadmissible.

The preceding arguments go to show that the natural construction of the passage in Herodotus points to Darius son of Hystaspês, and not to Darius Nothus; but this is not all. There are yet stronger reasons why the reference to Darius Nothus should be discarded.

The supposed mention, in Herodotus, of a fact so late as 408 B. C., perplexes the whole chronology of his life and authorship. According to the usual statement of his biography, which every one admits, and which there is no reason to call in question, he was born in 484 B. C. Here, then, is an event alluded to in his history, which occurred when the historian was seventy-six years old, and the allusion to which he must be presumed to have written when about eighty years old, if not more; for his mention of the fact by no means implies that it was particularly recent. Those who adopt this view, do not imagine that he wrote his whole history at that age; but they maintain that he made later additions, of which they contend that this is one. I do not say that this is impossible: we know that Isokratês composed his Panathenaic oration at the age of ninety-four; but it must be admitted to be highly improbable,—a supposition which ought not to be advanced without some cogent proof to support it. But here no proof whatever is produced. Herodotus mentions a revolt of the Medes against Darius,—Xenophon also mentions a revolt of the Medes against Darius; hence, chronologists have taken it as a matter of course, that both authors must allude to the same event; though the supposition is unnatural as regards the text, and still more unnatural as regards the biography, of Herodotus.

In respect to that biography, Mr. Clinton appears to me to have adopted another erroneous opinion; in which, however, both Larcher and Wesseling are against him, though Dahlmann and Heyse agree with him. He maintains that the passage in Herodotus (iii, 15), wherein it is stated that Pausiris succeeded his father Amyrtæus by consent of the Persians in the government of Egypt, is to be referred to a fact which happened subsequent to the year 414 B. C., or the tenth year of Darius Nothus; since it was in that year that Amyrtæus acquired the government of Egypt. But this opinion rests altogether upon the assumption that a certain Amyrtæus, whose name and date occur in Manetho (see Eusebius, Chronicon), is the same person as the Amyrtæus mentioned in Herodotus; which identity is not only not proved, but is extremely improbable, since Mr. Clinton himself admits (F. H. Appendix, p. 317), while maintaining the identity: "He (Amyrtæus) had conducted a war against the Persian government *more than fifty years before*." This, though not impossible, is surely very improbable; it is at least equally probable that the Amyrtæus of Manetho was a different person from (perhaps even the *grandson* of) that Amyrtæus in Herodotus, who had carried on war against the Persians more than fifty wars before; it appears to me, indeed, that this is the more reasonable hypothesis of the two.

I have permitted myself to prolong this note to an unusual length, because the supposed mention of such recent events in the history of Herodotus, as those in the reign of Darius Nothus, has introduced very gratuitous assumptions as to the time and manner in which that history was composed. It cannot be shown that there is a single event of precise and ascertained date, alluded to in his history, later than the capture of the Lacedæmonian heralds in the year 430 B. C. (Herodot. vii, 137: see Larcher, Vie d'Hérodote, p. lxxxix); and this renders the composition of his history as an entire work much more smooth and intelligible.

It may be worth while to add, that whoever reads attentively Herodotus, vi, 98,—and reflects at the same time that the destruction of the Athenian armament at Syracuse (the greatest of all Hellenic disasters, hardly inferior, for its time, to the Russian campaign of Napoleon, and especially impressive to one living at Thurii, as may be seen by the life of Lysias, Plutarch, Vit. x, Oratt. p. 835) happened during the reign of Darius Nothus in 413 B. C.,—will not readily admit the hypothesis of additions made to the history during the reign of the latter, or so late as 408 B. C. Herodotus would hardly have dwelt so expressly and emphatically upon mischief done by Greeks to each other in the reigns of Darius son of Hystaspês, Xerxês, and Artaxerxês, if he had lived to witness the greater mischiefs so inflicted during the reign of Darius Nothus, and had kept his history before him for the purpose of inserting new events. The destruction of the Athenians before Syracuse would have been a thousand times more striking to his imagination than the revolt of the Medes against Darius Nothus, and would have impelled him with much greater force to alter or enlarge the chapter vi, 98.

The sentiment too which Herodotus places in the mouth of Demaratus respecting the Spartans (vii, 104) appears to have been written *before* the capture of the Spartans in Sphakteria, in 425 B. C., rather than *after* it: compare Thucyd. iv, 40.

Dahlmann (Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte, vol. ii, pp. 41-47) and Heyse (Quæstiones Herodoteæ, pp. 74-77, Berlin, 1827) both profess to point out six passages in Herodotus which mark events of later date than 430 B. C. But none of the chronological indications which they adduce appear to me trustworthy.

[413] Herodot. iii, 127, 128.

[414] Herodot. iii, 150.

[415] Herodot. iii, 155. δεινόν τι ποιεύμενος, Ἀσσυρίους Πέρσῃσι καταγελᾷν. Compare the speech of Mardonius, vii, 9.

The horror of Darius, at the first sight of Zopyrus in this condition, is strongly dramatized by Herodotus.

[416] Herodot. iii, 154-158.

[417] Ktêsias represents the revolt and recapture of Babylon to have taken place, not under Darius, but under his son and successor Xerxês. He says that the Babylonians, revolting, slew their satrap Zopyrus; that they were besieged by Xerxês, and that Megabyzus son of Zopyrus caused the city to be taken by practising that very stratagem which Herodotus ascribes to Zopyrus himself (Persica, c. 20-22).

This seems inconsistent with the fact, that Megabyzus was general of the Persian army in Egypt in the war with the Athenians, about 460 B. C. (Diodor. Sic. xi, 75-77): he would hardly have been sent on active service had he been so fearfully mutilated; moreover, the whole story of Ktêsias appears to me far less probable than that of Herodotus; for on this, as on other occasions, to blend the two together is impossible.

[418] Herodot. iii, 159, 160. "From the women thus introduced (says Herodotus) the present Babylonians are sprung."

To crucify subdued revolters by thousands is, fortunately, so little in harmony with modern European manners, that it may not be amiss to strengthen the confidence of the reader in the accuracy of Herodotus, by producing an analogous narrative of incidents far more recent. Voltaire gives, from the MS. of General Lefort, one of the principal and confidential officers of Peter the Great, the following account of the suppression of the revolted Strelitzes at Moscow, in 1698: these Strelitzes were the old native militia, or Janissaries, of the Russian Czars, opposed to all the reforms of Peter.

"Pour étouffer ces troubles, le czar part secrètement de Vienne, arrive enfin à Moscou, et surprend tout le monde par sa présence: il récompense les troupes qui ont vaincu les Strélitz: les prisons étaient pleines de ces malheureux. Si leur crime était grand, le châtiment le fut aussi. Leurs chefs, plusieurs officiers, et quelques prêtres, furent condamnés à la mort: quelques-uns furent roués, deux femmes enterrées vives. On pendit autour des murailles de la ville et on fit périr dans d'autres supplices deux mille Strélitz; leurs corps restèrent deux jours exposés sur les grands chemins, et surtout autour du monastère où résidaient les princesses Sophie et Eudoxe. On érigea des colonnes de pierre où le crime et le châtiment furent gravés. Un très-grand nombre qui avaient leurs femmes et leurs enfans furent dispersés avec leurs familles dans la Sibérie, dans le royaume d'Astrakhan, dans le pays d'Azof: par là du moins leur punition fut utile à l'état: ils servirent à défricher des terres qui manquaient d'habitans et de culture." (Voltaire, Histoire de Russie, part i, ch. x, tom. 31, of the Œuvres Complètes de Voltaire, p. 148, ed. Paris, 1825.)

[419] Herodot. iii, 92.

[420] Herodot. iii, 89. What the Persian denomination was, which Herodotus or his informants translated κάπηλος, we do not know; but this latter word was used often by Greeks to signify a cheat, or deceiver generally: see Etymologic. Magn. p. 490, 11, and Suidas, v. Κάπελος. Ὁ δ' Αἴσχυλος τὰ δόλια πάντα καλεῖ κάπηλα —"Κάπηλα προσφέρων τεχνήματα." (Æschylus, Fragment. 328, ed. Dindorf: compare Euripid. Hippolyt. 953.)

[421] Herodot. iii, 128. This division of power, and double appointment by the Great King, appears to have been retained until the close of the Persian empire: see Quintus Curtius, v, l, 17-20 (v, 3, 19-21, Zumpt). The present Turkish government nominates a Defterdar as finance administrator in each province, with authority derived directly from itself, and professedly independent of the Pacha.

[422] Herodot. iii, 15.

[423] Respecting the administration of the modern Persian empire, see Kinneir, Geograph. Memoir of Persia, pp. 29, 43, 47.

[424] Herodot. iii, 95. The text of Herodotus contains an erroneous summing up of items, which critics have no means of correcting with certainty. Nor is it possible to trust the huge sum which he alleges to have been levied from the Indians, though all the other items, included in the nineteen silver-paying divisions, seem within the probable truth; and indeed both Rennell and Robertson think the total too small: the charges on some of the satrapies are decidedly smaller than the reality.

The vast sum of fifty thousand talents is said to have been found by Alexander the Great, laid up by successive kings at Susa alone, besides the treasures at Persepolis, Pasargadæ, and elsewhere (Arrian, iii, 16, 12; Plutarch, Alexand. 37). Presuming these talents to be Babylonian or Æginæan talents (in the proportion 5 : 3 to Attic talents), fifty thousand talents would be equal to nineteen million pounds sterling; if they were Attic talents, it would be equal to eleven million six hundred thousand pounds sterling. The statements of Diodorus give even much larger sums (xvii, 66-71: compare Curtius, v, 2, 8; v, 6, 9; Strabo, xv, p. 730). It is plain that the numerical affirmations were different in different authors, and one cannot pretend to pronounce on the trustworthiness of such large figures without knowing more of the original returns on which they were founded. That there were prodigious sums of gold and silver, is quite unquestionable. Respecting the statement of the Persian revenue given by Herodotus, see Boeckh, Metrologie, ch. v, 1-2.

Amedée Jaubert, in 1806, estimated the population of the modern Persian empire at about seven million souls; of which about six million were settled population, the rest nomadic: he also estimated the Schah's revenue at about two million nine hundred thousand tomans, or one million five hundred thousand pounds sterling. Others calculated the population higher, at nearer twelve million souls. Kinneir gives the revenue at something more than three million pounds sterling: he thinks that the whole territory between the Euphratês and the Indus does not contain above eighteen millions of souls (Geogr. Memoir of Persia, pp. 44-47: compare Ritter, West Asien, Abtheil. ii, Abschn. iv, pp. 879-889).

The modern Persian empire contains not so much as the eastern half of the ancient, which covered all Asiatic Turkey and Egypt besides.

[425] Herodot. iii, 102; iv, 44. See the two Excursus of Bähr on these two chapters, vol. ii, pp. 648-671 of his edit. of Herodotus.

It certainly is singular that neither Nearchus, nor Ptolemy, nor Aristobulus, nor Arrian, take any notice of this remarkable voyage distinctly asserted by Herodotus to have been accomplished. Such silence, however, affords no sufficient reason for calling the narrative in question. The attention of the Persian kings, successors to Darius, came to be far more occupied with the western than with the eastern portions of their empire.

[426] Thucyd. i, 138.

[427] Herodot. iii, 117.

[428] Herodot. i, 192. Compare the description of the dinner and supper of the Great King, in Polyænus, iv, 3, 32; also Ktêsias and Deinôn ap Athenæum, ii, p. 67.

[429] Plato, Legg. iii, 12, p. 695.

[430] Herodot. iv, 166; Plutarch, Kimon, 10.

The gold Daric, of the weight of two Attic drachmæ; (Stater Daricus), equivalent to twenty Attic silver drachmæ (Xenoph. Anab. i, 7, 18), would be about 16*s.* 3*d.* English. But it seems doubtful whether that ratio between gold and silver (10 : 1) can be reckoned upon as the ordinary ratio in the fifth and fourth centuries B. C. Mr. Hussey calculates the golden Daric as equal to £1, 1*s.* 3*d.* English (Hussey, Essay on the Ancient Weights and Money, Oxford, 1836, ch. iv, s. 8, p. 68; ch. vii, s. 3, p. 103).

I cannot think, with Mr. Hussey, that there is any reason for believing either the name or the coin *Daric* to be older than Darius son of Hystaspês. Compare Boeckh, Metrologie, ix, 5, p. 129.

Particular statements respecting the value of gold and silver, as exchanged one against the other, are to be received with some reserve as the basis of any general estimate, since we have not the means of comparing a great many such statements together. For the process of coinage was imperfectly performed, and the different pieces, both of gold and silver, in circulation, differed materially in weight one with the other. Herodotus gives the ratio of gold to silver as 13 : 1.

[431] Herodot. iii, 96.

[432] Herodot. v, 52-53; viii, 98. "It appears to be a favorite idea with all barbarous princes, that the badness of the roads adds considerably to the natural strength of their dominions. The Turks and Persians are undoubtedly of this opinion: the public highways are, therefore, neglected, and particularly so towards the frontiers." (Kinneir, Geog. Mem. of Pers. p. 43.)

The description of Herodotus contrasts favorably with the picture here given by Mr. Kinneir.

[433] Herodot. iii, 120.

[434] Herodot. iii, 39; Thucyd. i, 13.

[435] Herodot. iii, 40-42. … ἦν δὲ μὴ ἐναλλὰξ ἤδη τὠπὸ τούτου αἱ εὐτυχίαι τοι τοιαύταισι πάθαισι προσπίπτωσι, τρόπῳ τῷ ἐξ ἐμεῦ ὑποκειμένῳ ἀ κ έ ο: compare vii, 203, and i, 32.

[436] Herodot. iii, 44.

[437] Herodot. iii, 44.

[438] Herodot. iii, 46. τῷ θυλάκῳ περιείργασθαι.

[439] Herodot. iii, 47, 48, 52.

[440] Herodot. iii, 54-56.

[441] Herodot. iii, 57. νησιωτέων μάλιστα ἐπλούτεον.

[442] Herodot. iii, 58, 59.

[443] Herodot. iii, 139. πολίων πασέων πρώτην Ἑλληνίδων καὶ βαρβάρων.

[444] Herodot. iii, 60.

[445] Aristot. Polit. v, 9, 4. τῶν περὶ Σάμον ἔργα Πολυκράτεια· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα δύναται ταὐτὸν, ἀσχολίαν καὶ πενίαν τῶν ἀρχομένων.

[446] Thucyd. i, 14; iii, 104.

[447] Herodot. iii, 120.

[448] Compare the trick of Hannibal at Gortyn in Krete,—Cornelius Nepos (Hannibal, c. 9).

[449] Herodot. iii, 124, 125.

[450] Herodot. iii, 126. Ὀροίτεα Πολυκράτεος τίσιες μετῆλθον.

[451] Herodot. iii, 142. τῷ δικαιοτάτῳ ἀνδρῶν βουλομένῳ γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἐξεγένετο. Compare his remark on Kadmus, who voluntarily resigned the despotism at Kôs (vii, 164).

[452] Herodot. iii, 142. Ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἄξιος εἶ σὺ γε ἡμέων ἄρχειν, γεγονώς τε κακὸς, καὶ ἐὼν ὄλεθρος· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅκως λόγον δώσεις τῶν ἐνεχείρισας χρημάτων.

[453] Herodot. iii, 143. οὐ γὰρ δὴ, ὡς οἴκασι, ἐβουλέατο εἶναι ἐλεύθεροι.

[454] Herodot. v, 78, and iii, 142, 143.

[455] Herodot. iii, 139. Ὁ δὲ Συλοσῶν, ὁρέων τὸν Δαρεῖον μεγάλως ἐπιθυμέοντα τῆς χλάνιδος, θείῃ τύχῃ χρεώμενος, λέγει, etc.

[456] Herodot. iii, 140. ἠπίστατό οἱ τοῦτο ἀπολωλέναι δι᾽ εὐηθίην.

[457] Herodot. iii, 141-144.

[458] Herodot. iii, 146. τῶν Περσέων τοὺς διφροφορευμένους καὶ λόγου πλείστου ἀξίους.

[459] Herodot. iii, 145. Ἐμὲ μὲν, ὦ κάκιστε ἀνδρῶν, ἐόντα σεωϋτοῦ ἀδελφεὸν, καὶ ἀδικήσαντα οὐδὲν ἄξιον δεσμοῦ, δήσας γοργύρης ἠξίωσας· ὁρέων δὲ τοὺς Πέρσας ἐκβάλλοντάς τέ σε καὶ ἄνοικον ποιεῦντας, οὐ τολμᾷς τίσασθαι, οὕτω δή τι ἐόντας εὐπετέας χειρωθῆναι.

The highly dramatic manner of Herodotus cannot be melted down into smooth historical recital.

[460] Herodot. iii, 149. ἔρημον ἐοῦσαν ἀνδρῶν.

[461] Herodot. v, 27.

[462] Herodot. iii, 148.

[463] Herodot. iii, 149.

[464] Herodot. vi, 13.

[465] Strabo, xiv, p. 638. He gives a proverbial phrase about the depopulation of the island—

Ἔκητι Συλοσῶντος εὐρυχορίη,

which is perfectly consistent with the narrative of Herodotus.

[466] Herodot. iii, 88; vii, 2.

[467] Herodot. vii, 3. ἡ γὰρ Ἄτοσσα εἶχε τὸ πᾶν κράτος. Compare the description given of the ascendency of the savage Sultana Parysatis over her son Artaxerxês Mnêmon (Plutarch, Artaxerxês, c. 16, 19, 23).

[468] Herodot. iii, 131. ἀσκευὴς περ ἐὼν, καὶ ἔχων οὐδὲν τῶν ὅσα περὶ τὴν τέχνην ἔστιν ἐργαλήϊα,—the description refers to surgical rather than to medical practice.

That curious assemblage of the cases of particular patients with remarks, known in the works of Hippokratês, under the title Ἐπιδήμιαι (Notes of visits to different cities), is very illustrative of what Herodotus here mentions about Dêmokêdês. Consult, also, the valuable Prolegomena of M. Littré, in his edition of Hippokratês now in course of publication, as to the character, means of action, and itinerant habits of the Grecian ἰατροὶ: see particularly the preface to vol. v, p. 12, where he enumerates the various places visited and noted by Hippokratês. The greater number of the Hippokratic observations refer to various parts of Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly; but there are some, also, which refer to patients in the islands of Syros and Delos, at Athens, Salamis, Elis, Corinth, and Œniadæ in Akarnania. "On voit par là combien étoit juste le nom de Periodeutes ou voyageurs donnés à ces anciens médecins."

Again, M. Littré, in the same preface, p. 25, illustrates the proceedings and residence of the ancient ἰατρός: "On se tromperoit si on se représentoit la demeure d'un médecin d'alors comme celle d'un médecin d'aujourd'hui. La maison du médecin de l'antiquité, du moins au temps d'Hippocrate et aux époques voisines, renfermoit un local destiné à la pratique d'un grand nombre d'opérations, contenant les machines et les instrumens nécessaires, et de plus étant aussi une boutique de pharmacie. Ce local se nommait ἰατρεῖον." See Plato, Legg. i, p. 646, iv, p. 720. Timæus accused Aristotle of having begun as a surgeon, practising to great profit in surgery, or ἰατρεῖον, and having quitted this occupation late in life, to devote himself to the study of science,—σοφιστὴν ὀψιμαθῆ καὶ μισητὸν ὑπάρχοντα, καὶ τὸ πολυτίμητον ἰατρεῖον ἀρτίως ἀποκεκλεικότα (Polyb. xii, 9).

See, also, the Remarques Retrospectives attached by M. Littré to volume iv, of the same work (pp. 654-658), where he dwells upon the intimate union of surgical and medical practice in antiquity. At the same time, it must be remarked that a passage in the remarkable medical oath, published in the collection of Hippokratic treatises, recognizes in the plainest manner the distinction between the physician and the operator,—the former binds himself by this oath not to perform the operation "even of lithotomy, but to leave it to the operators, or workmen:" Οὐ τεμέω δὲ οὐδὲ μὴν λιθιῶντας, ἐκχωρήσω δὲ ἐργάστῃσιν ἀνδράσι πρήξιος τῆσδε (Œuvres d'Hippocrate, vol. iv, p. 630, ed. Littré). M. Littré (p. 617) contests this explanation, remarking that the various Hippokratic treatises represent the ἰατρός as performing all sorts of operations, even such as require violent and mechanical dealing. But the words of the oath are so explicit, that it seems more reasonable to assign to the oath itself a later date than the treatises, when the habits of practitioners may have changed.

[469] About the Persian habit of sending to Egypt for surgeons, compare Herodot. iii, 1.

[470] Herodot iii, 129. τὸν δὲ ὡς ἐξεῦρον ἐν τοῖσι Ὀροίτεω ἀνδραπόδοισι ὄκου δὴ ἀπημελημένον, παρῆγον ἐς μέσον, πέδας τε ἕλκοντα καὶ ῥάκεσιν ἐσθημένον.

[471] Herodot. iii, 130. The golden stater was equal to about 1*l.* 1*s.* 3*d.* English money (Hussey, Ancient Weights, vii, 3, p. 103).

The ladies in a Persian harem appear to have been less unapproachable and invisible than those in modern Turkey; in spite of the observation of Plutarch, Artaxerxês, c. 27.

[472] Herodot. iii, 133. δεήσεσθαι δὲ οὐδενὸς τῶν ὅσα αἰσχύνην ἐστὶ φέροντα. Another Greek physician at the court of Susa, about seventy years afterwards,—Apollonidês of Kôs,—in attendance on a Persian princess, did not impose upon himself the same restraint: his intrigue was divulged, and he was put to death miserably (Ktêsias, Persica, c. 42).

[473] Herodot. iii, 134.

[474] Herodot. iii, 136. προσίσχοντες δὲ αὐτῆς τὰ παραθαλάσσια ἐθήσαντο καὶ ἀπεγράφοντο.

[475] Herodot. iii, 137, 138.

[476] Herodot. iii, 137. κατὰ δὴ τοῦτό μοι σπεῦσαι δοκέει τὸν γάμον τοῦτον τελέσας χρήματα μεγάλα Δημοκήδης, ἵνα φανῇ πρὸς Δαρείου ἐὼν καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑωϋτοῦ δόκιμος.

[477] Herodot. iii, 138.

[478] Xenophon, Memorab. iv, 2, 33. Ἄλλους δὲ πόσους οἴει (says Sokratês) διὰ σοφίαν ἀναρπάστους πρὸς βασιλέα γεγονέναι, καὶ ἐκεῖ δουλεύειν;

We shall run little risk in conjecturing that, among the intelligent and able men thus carried off, surgeons and physicians would be selected as the first and most essential.

Apollônidês of Kôs—whose calamitous end has been alluded to in a previous note—was resident as surgeon, or physician, with Artaxerxês Longimanus (Ktêsias, Persica, c. 30), and Polykritus of Mendê, as well as Ktêsias himself, with Artaxerxês Mnêmon (Plutarch, Artaxerxês, c. 31).

[479] Æschyl. Pers. 435-845, etc.

[480] Herodot. iv, 1, 83. There is nothing to mark the precise year of the Scythian expedition; but as the accession of Darius is fixed to 521 B. C., and as the expedition is connected with the early part of his reign, we may conceive him to have entered upon it as soon as his hands were free; that is, as soon as he had put down the revolted satraps and provinces, Orœtês, the Medes, Babylonians, etc. Five years seems a reasonable time to allow for these necessities of the empire, which would bring the Scythian expedition to 516-515 B. C. There is reason for supposing it to have been before 514 B. C., for in that year Hipparchus was slain at Athens, and Hippias the surviving brother, looking out for securities and alliances abroad, gave his daughter in marriage to Æantidês son of Hippoklus, despot of Lampsakus, "perceiving that Hippoklus and his son had great influence with Darius," (Thucyd. vi, 59.) Now Hippoklus could not well have acquired this influence *before* the Scythian expedition; for Darius came down then for the first time to the western sea; Hippoklus served upon that expedition (Herodot. iv, 138), and it was probably then that his favor was acquired, and farther confirmed during the time that Darius stayed at Sardis after his return from Scythia.

Professor Schultz (Beiträge zu genaueren Zeitbestimmungen der Hellen. Geschicht. von der 63n bis zur 72n Olympiade, p. 168, in the Kieler Philolog. Studien) places the expedition in 513 B. C.; but I think a year or two earlier is more probable. Larcher, Wesseling, and Bähr (ad Herodot. iv, 145) place it in 508 B. C., which is later than the truth; indeed, Larcher himself places the reduction of Lemnos and Imbros by Otanês in 511 B. C., though that event decidedly came after the Scythian expedition (Herodot. v, 27; Larcher, Table Chronologique, Trad. d'Hérodot. t. vii, pp. 633-635).

[481] Herodot. iv, 84.

[482] Herodot. vii, 39.

[483] Herodot. iv, 97, 137, 138.

[484] Herodot. iv, 89-93.

[485] Herod. iv, 48-50. Ἴστρος—μέγιστος ποταμῶν πάντων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν, etc.

[486] Ktêsias, Persica. c. 17. Justin (ii, 5—compare also xxxviii, 7) seems to follow the narrative of Ktêsias.

Æschylus (Persæ. 864), who presents the deceased Darius as a glorious contrast with the living Xerxês, talks of the splendid conquests which he made by means of others,—"without crossing the Halys himself, nor leaving his home." We are led to suppose, by the language which Æschylus puts into the mouth of the Eidôlon of Darius (v, 720-745), that he had forgotten, or had never heard of, the bridge thrown across the Bosphorus by order of Darius; for the latter is made to condemn severely the impious insolence of Xerxês in bridging over the Hellespont.

[487] Herodot. iv, 136. ἅτε δὲ τοῦ Περσικοῦ πολλοῦ ἐόντος πεζοῦ στρατοῦ, καὶ τὰς ὁδοὺς οὐκ ἐπισταμένου, ὥστε οὐ τετμημένων τῶν ὁδῶν, τοῦ δὲ Σκυθικοῦ, ἱππότεω, καὶ τὰ σύντομα τῆς ὁδοῦ ἐπισταμένου, etc. Compare c. 128.

The number and size of the rivers are mentioned by Herodotus as the principal wonder of Scythia, c. 82—Θωϋμάσια δὲ ἡ χώρη αὐτὴ οὐκ ἔχει, χωρὶς ἢ ὅτι ποτάμους τε πολλῷ μεγίστους καὶ ἀριθμὸν πλείστους, etc. He ranks the Borysthenês as the largest of all rivers except the Nile and the Danube (c. 53). The Hypanis also (Bog) is ποταμὸς ἐν ὀλίγοισι μέγας (c. 52).

But he appears to forget the existence of these rivers when he is describing the Persian march.

[488] Herodot. iv, 101.

[489] Herodot. iv, 118, 119.

[490] Herodot. iv, 120-122.

[491] Herodot. iv, 123. Ὅσον μὲν δὴ χρόνον οἱ Πέρσαι ἦϊσαν διὰ τῆς Σκυθικῆς καὶ τῆς Σαυρομάτιδος χώρης, οἳ δὲ εἶχον οὐδὲν σίνεσθαι, ἅτε τῆς χώρης ἐούσης χέρσου· ἐπεὶ δὲ τε ἐς τὴν τῶν Βουδίνων χώρην ἐσέβαλον, etc. See Rennell, Geograph. System of Herodotus, p. 114, about the Oarus.

The erections, whatever they were, which were supposed to mark the extreme point of the march of Darius, may be compared to those evidences of the extreme advance of Dionysus, which the Macedonian army saw on the north of the Jaxartês—"Liberi patris terminos." Quintus Curtius, vii, 9, 15, (vii, 37, 16, Zumpt.)

[492] Herodot. iv, 125. Hekatæus ranks the Melanchlæni as a Scythian ἔθνος (Hekat. Fragment. 154, ed. Klausen): he also mentions several other subdivisions of Scythians, who cannot be farther authenticated (Fragm. 155-160).

[493] Herodot. iv, 126, 127.

[494] Herodot. iv, 128-132. The bird, the mouse, the frog, and the arrows, are explained to mean: Unless you take to the air like a bird, to the earth like a mouse, or to the water like a frog, you will become the victim of the Scythian arrows.

[495] Herodot. iv, 133.

[496] Herodot. iv. 46. Τῷ δὲ Σκυθικῷ γένεϊ ἓν μὲν τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπηΐων πρηγμάτων σοφώτατα πάντων ἐξεύρηται, τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν· τὰ μέντοι ἄλλα οὐκ ἄγαμαι. Τὸ δὲ μέγιστον οὕτω σφι ἀνεύρηται, ὥστε ἀποφυγέειν τε μηδένα ἐπελθόντα ἐπὶ σφέας, μὴ βουλομένους τε ἐξευρεθῆναι, καταλαβεῖν μὴ οἷόν τε εἶναι. Τοῖσι γὰρ μήτε ἄστεα μήτε τείχεα ᾖ ἐκτισμένα, ἀλλὰ φερέοικοι ἐόντες πάντες, ἅτε ἱπποτοξόται, ζῶντες μὴ ἀπ᾽ ἀρότου, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ κτηνέων, οἰκήματα δέ σφι ᾖ ἐπὶ ζευγέων, κῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴησαν οὗτοι ἄμαχοί τε καὶ ἄποροι προσμίσγειν;

Ἐξεύρηται δέ σφι ταῦτα, τῆς τε γῆς ἐούσης ἐπιτηδέης, καὶ τῶν ποταμῶν ἐόντων σφι συμμάχων, etc.

Compare this with the oration of the Scythian envoys to Alexander the Great, as it stands in Quintus Curtius, vii, 8, 22 (vii, 35, 22, Zumpt).

[497] The statement of Strabo (vii, p. 305), which restricts the march of Darius to the country between the Danube and the Tyras (Dniester) is justly pronounced by Niebuhr (Kleine Schriften, p. 372) to be a mere supposition suggested by the probabilities of the case, because it could not be understood how his large army should cross even the Dniester: it is not to be treated as an affirmation resting upon any authority. "As Herodotus tells us what is impossible (adds Niebuhr), we know nothing at all historically respecting the expedition."

So again the conjecture of Palmerius (Exercitationes ad Auctores Græcos, p. 21) carries on the march somewhat farther than the Dniester,—to the Hypanis, or *perhaps* to the Borysthenês. Rennell, Klaproth, and Reichard, are not afraid to extend the march on to the Wolga. Dr. Thirlwall stops within the Tanais, admitting, however, that no correct historical account can be given of it. Eichwald supposes a long march up the Dniester into Volhynia and Lithuania.

Compare Ukert, Skythien, p. 26; Dahlmann, Historische Forschungen, ii, pp. 159-164; Schaffarik, Slavische Alterthümer, i, 10, 3, i, 13, 4-5; and Mr. Kenrick, Remarks on the Life and Writings of Herodotus, prefixed to his Notes on the Second Book of Herodotus, p. xxi. The latter is among those who cannot swim the Dniester: he says: "Probably the Dniester (Tyras) was the real limit of the expedition, and Bessarabia, Moldavia, and the Bukovina, the scene of it."

[498] Herodot. iv, 97. Δαρεῖος ἐκέλευσε τοὺς Ἴωνας τὴν σχεδίην λύσαντας ἕπεσθαι κατ᾽ ἤπειρον ἑωϋτῷ, καὶ τὸν ἐκ τῶν νέων στρατόν.

[499] Herodot. iv, 98. ἢν δὲ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ μὴ παρέω, ἀλλὰ διέλθωσι ὑμῖν αἱ ἡμέραι τῶν ἀμμάτων, ἀποπλέετε ἐς τὴν ὑμετέρην αὐτέων· μέχρι δὲ τούτου, ἐπεί τε οὕτω μετέδοξε, φυλάσσετε τὴν σχεδίην.

[500] Herodot. vi, 84. Compare his account of the marches of the Cimmerians and of the Scythians into Asia Minor and Media respectively (Herodot. i, 103, 104, iv, 12).

[501] Arrian, Exp. Al. iii, 6, 15; Plutarch, Alexand. c. 45; Quint. Curt. vii, 7, 4, vii, 8, 30 (vii, 29, 5, vii, 36, 7, Zumpt).

[502] Herodot. iv, 133, 136, 137.

[503] Herodot. iv, 137-139.

[504] Herodot. iv, 140, 141.

[505] Herodot. iv, 143, 144, v, 1, 2.

[506] Herodot. v, 2.

[507] Herodot. v, 11.

[508] Herodot. v, 23.

[509] Herodot. vi, 40-84. That Miltiadês could have remained in the Chersonese undisturbed, during the interval between the Scythian expedition of Darius and the Ionic revolt,—when the Persians were complete masters of those regions, and when Otanês was punishing other towns in the neighborhood for evasion of service under Darius, after he had declared so pointedly against the Persians on a matter of life and death to the king and army,—appears to me, as it does to Dr. Thirlwall (History of Gr. vol. ii, App. ii, p. 486, ch. xiv, pp. 226-249), eminently improbable. So forcibly does Dr. Thirlwall feel the difficulty, that he suspects the reported conduct and exhortations of Miltiadês at the bridge over the Danube to have been a falsehood, fabricated by Miltiadês himself, twenty years afterwards, for the purpose of acquiring popularity at Athens during the time immediately preceding the battle of Marathon.

I cannot think this hypothesis admissible. It directly contradicts Herodotus on a matter of fact very conspicuous, and upon which good means of information seem to have been within his reach. I have already observed that the historian Hekatæus must have possessed personal knowledge of all the relations between the Ionians and Darius, and that he very probably may have been even present at the bridge: all the information given by Hekatæus upon these points would be open to the inquiries of Herodotus. The unbounded gratitude of Darius towards Histiæus shows that some one or more of the Ionic despots present at the bridge must have powerfully enforced the expediency of breaking it down. That the name of the despot who stood forward as prime mover of this resolution should have been forgotten and not mentioned at the time, is highly improbable; yet such must have been the case if a fabrication by Miltiadês twenty years afterwards could successfully fill up the blank with his own name. The two most prominent matters talked of, after the retreat of Darius, in reference to the bridge, would probably be the name of the leader who urged its destruction, and the name of Histiæus, who preserved it. Indeed, the mere fact of the mischievous influence exercised by the latter afterwards would be pretty sure to keep these points of the case in full view.

There are means of escaping from the difficulty of the case, I think, without contradicting Herodotus on any matter of fact important and conspicuous, or indeed on any matter of fact whatever. We see by vi, 40, that Miltiadês *did quit the Chersonese* between the close of the Scythian expedition of Darius and the Ionic revolt; Herodotus, indeed, tells us that he quitted it in consequence of an incursion of the Scythians: but without denying the fact of such an incursion, we may reasonably suppose the historian to have been mistaken in assigning it as the cause of the flight of Miltiadês. The latter was prevented from living in the Chersonese continuously, during the interval between the Persian invasion of Scythia and the Ionic revolt, by fear of Persian enmity. It is not necessary for us to believe that he was never there at all, but his residence there must have been interrupted and insecure. The chronological data in Herodot. vi, 40, are exceedingly obscure and perplexing; but it seems to me that the supposition which I suggest introduces a plausible coherence into the series of historical facts, with the slightest possible contradiction to our capital witness.

The only achievement of Miltiadês, between the affair on the Danube and his return to Athens shortly before the battle of Marathon, is the conquest of Lemnos; and *that* must have taken place evidently while the Persians were occupied by the Ionic revolt, (between 502-494 B. C.) There is nothing in his recorded deeds inconsistent with the belief, therefore, that between 515-502 B. C. he may not have resided in the Chersonese at all, or at least not for very long together: and the statement of Cornelius Nepos, that he quitted it immediately after the return from Scythia, from fear of the Persians, may be substantially true. Dr. Thirlwall observes (p. 487)—"As little would it appear that when the Scythians invaded the Chersonese, Miltiadês was conscious of having endeavored to render them an important service. He flies before them, though he had been so secure while the Persian arms were in his neighborhood." He has here put his finger on what I believe to be the error of Herodotus,—the supposition that Miltiadês fled from the Chersonese to avoid the Scythians, whereas he really left it to avoid the Persians.

The story of Strabo (xiii, p. 591), that Darius caused the Greek cities on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont to be burnt down, in order to hinder them from affording means of transport to the Scythians into Asia, seems to me highly improbable. These towns appear in their ordinary condition, Abydus among them, at the time of the Ionic revolt a few years afterwards (Herodot. v, 117).

[510] Herodot. v, 13-16. Nikolaus Damaskênus (Fragm. p. 36, ed. Orell.) tells a similar story about the means by which a Mysian woman attracted the notice of the Lydian king Alyattês. Such repetition of a striking story, in reference to different people and times, has many parallels in ancient history.

[511] Herodot. v, 20, 21.

[512] Herodot. v, 23, 24.

[513] Herodot. vi, 138. Æschyl. Choêphor. 632; Stephan. Byz. v. Λῆμνος.

The mystic rites in honor of the Kabeiri at Lemnos and Imbros are particularly noticed by Pherekydês (ap. Strabo, x, p. 472): compare Photius, v. Κάβειροι, and the remarkable description of the periodical Lemnian solemnity in Philostratus (Heroi. p. 740).

The volcanic mountain Mosychlus, in the north-eastern portion of the island, was still burning in the fourth century B. C. (Antimach. Fragment. xviii, p. 103, Düntzer Epicc. Græc. Fragm.)

Welcker's Dissertation (Die Æschylische Trilogie, p. 248, *seqq.*) enlarges much upon the Lemnian and Samothracian worship.

[514] Herodot. v, 26, 27. The twenty-seventh chapter is extremely perplexing. As the text reads at present, we ought to make Lykarêtus the subject of certain predications which yet seem properly referable to Otanês. We must consider the words from Οἱ μὲν δὴ Λήμνιοι—down to τελευτᾷ—as parenthetical, which is awkward; but it seems the least difficulty in the case, and the commentators are driven to adopt it.

[515] Zenob. Proverb. iii, 85.

[516] Herodot. vi, 140. Charax ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Ἡφαιστία.

[517] Xenophon, Hellen. v, 1, 31. Compare Plato, Menexenus, c. 17, p. 245, where the words ἡμετέραι ἀποίκιαι doubtless mean Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros.

[518] Thucyd. iv, 23, v, 8, vii, 57; Phylarchus ap. Athenæum, vi, p. 255; Dêmosthen. Philippic. 1, c. 12, p. 17, R.: compare the Inscription, No. 1686, in the collection of Boeckh, with his remarks, p. 297.

About the stratagems resorted to before the Athenian dikastery, to procure delay by pretended absence in Lemnos or Skyros, see Isæus, Or. vi, p. 58 (p. 80, Bek.); Pollux, viii, 7, 81; Hesych. v. Ἴμβριος; Suidas, v. Λημνία δίκη: compare also Carl Rhode, Res Lemnicæ, p. 50 (Wratislaw 1829).

It seems as if εἰς Λῆμνον πλεῖν had come to be a proverbial expression at Athens for getting out of the way, —evading the performance of duty: this seems to be the sense of Dêmosthenês, Philipp. i, c. 9, p. 14. ἀλλ᾽ εἰς μὲν Λῆμνον τὸν παρ᾽ ὑμῶν ἵππαρχον δεῖ πλεῖν, τῶν δ᾽ ὑπὲρ τῶν τῆς πόλεως κτημάτων ἀγωνιζομένων Μενέλαον ἱππαρχεῖν.

From the passage of Isæus above alluded to, which Rhode seems to me to construe incorrectly, it appears that there was a legal *connubium* between Athenian citizens and Lemnian women.

[519] Herodot. vi, 136.

[520] Herodot. v, 28. Μετὰ δὲ οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον, ἄνεως κακῶν ἦν—or ἄνεσις κακῶν—if the conjecture of some critics be adopted. Mr. Clinton, with Larcher and others (see Fasti Hellen. App. 18, p. 314), construe this passage as if the comma were to be placed after μετὰ δὲ, so that the historian would be made to affirm that the period of repose lasted only a short time. It appears to me that the comma ought rather to be placed after χρόνον, and that the "short time" refers to those evils which the historian had been describing before. There must have been an interval of eight years at least, if not of ten years, between the events which the historian had been describing—the evils inflicted by the attacks of Otanês—and the breaking out of the Ionic revolt; which latter event no one places earlier than 504 B. C., though some prefer 502 B. C., others even 500 B. C.

If, indeed, we admitted with Wesseling (ad Herodot. vi, 40; and Mr. Clinton seems inclined towards the same opinion, see p. 314, *ut sup.*) that the Scythian expedition is to be placed in 508-507 B. C., then indeed the inter-

val between the campaign of Otanês and the Ionic revolt would be contracted into one or two years. But I have already observed that I cannot think 508 B. C. a correct date for the Scythian expedition: it seems to me to belong to about 515 B. C. Nor do I know what reason there is for determining the date as Wesseling does, except this very phrase οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον, which is on every supposition exceedingly vague, and which he appears to me not to have construed in the best way.

[521] Herodot. v, 96. Ὁ δὲ Ἀρταφέρνης ἐκέλευέ σφεας εἰ βουλοίατο σόοι εἶναι, καταδέκεσθαι ὀπίσω τὸν Ἱππίην.

[522] Herodot. v, 31. Plutarch says that Lygdamis, established as despot at Naxos by Peisistratus (Herodot. i, 64), was expelled from this post by the Lacedæmonians (De Herodot. Malignitat. c. 21, p. 859). I confess that I do not place much confidence in the statements of that treatise, as to the many despots expelled by Sparta: we neither know the source from whence Plutarch borrowed them, nor any of the circumstances connected with them.

[523] Herodot. v, 30, 31.

[524] Herodot. v, 34, 35.

[525] Herodot. v, 35: compare Polyæn. i, 24, and Aulus Gellius, N. A. xvii, 9.

[526] Herodot. v, 36.

[527] Compare Herodotus, v, 121, and vii, 98. Oliatus was son of Ibanôlis, as was also the Mylasian Herakleidês mentioned in v, 121.

[528] Herodot. v, 36, 37; vi, 9.

[529] Herodot. v, 49. Τῷ δὴ (Κλεομένεϊ) ἐς λόγους ἦϊε, ὡς Λακεδαιμόνιοι λέγουσι, ἔχων χάλκεον πίνακα, ἐν τῷ γῆς ἁπάσης περίοδος ἐνετέτμητο, καὶ θάλασσά τε πᾶσα καὶ ποταμοὶ πάντες.

The earliest map of which mention is made was prepared by Anaximander in Ionia, apparently not long before this period: see Strabo, i, p. 7; Agathemerus, 1, c. 1; Diogen. Laërt. ii, 1.

Grosskurd, in his note on the above passage of Strabo, as well as Larcher and other critics, appear to think, that though this tablet or chart of Anaximander was the earliest which embraced the whole known earth, there were among the Greeks others still earlier, which described particular countries. There is no proof of this, nor can I think it probable: the passage of Apollonius Rhodius (iv, 279) with the Scholia to it, which is cited as evidence, appears to me unworthy of attention.

Among the Roman Agrimensores, it was the ancient practice to engrave their plans, of land surveyed, upon tablets of brass, which were deposited in the public archives, and of which copies were made for private use, though the original was referred to in case of legal dispute (Siculus Flaccus ap. Rei Agrariæ Scriptores, p. 16, ed. Goes: compare Giraud, Recherches sur le Droit de Propriété, p. 116, Aix, 1838).

[530] Herodot. v, 49. δεικνὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἔλεγε ἐς τὴν τῆς γῆς περίοδον, τὴν ἐφέρετο ἐν τῷ πίνακι ἐντετμημένην.

[531] Herodot. v, 49. πάρεχον δὲ τῆς Ἀσίης πάσης ἄρχειν εὐπετέως, ἄλλο τι αἱρήσεσθε;

[532] Herodot. v, 49, 50, 51. Compare Plutarch, Apophthegm. Laconic. p. 240.

We may remark, both in this instance and throughout all the life and time of Kleomenês, that the Spartan king has the active management and direction of foreign affairs,—subject, however, to trial and punishment by the ephors in case of misbehavior (Herodot. vi, 82). We shall hereafter find the ephors gradually taking into their own hands, more and more, the actual management.

[533] Herodot. vi, 112. πρῶτοί τε ἀνέσχοντο ἐσθῆτά τε Μηδικὴν ὁρέοντες, καὶ ἄνδρας ταύτην ἐσθημένους· τέως δὲ ἦν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι καὶ τὸ οὔνομα τὸ Μήδων φόβος ἀκοῦσαι.

[534] Aristagoras says to the Spartans (v, 49)—τὰ κατήκοντα γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα· Ἰώνων παῖδας δούλους εἶναι ἀντ᾽ ἐλευθέρων, ὄνειδος καὶ ἄλγος μέγιστον μὲν αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑμῖν, ὅσῳ προεστέατε τῆς Ἑλλάδος (Herodotus, v, 49). In reference to the earlier incident (Herodot. i, 70)—Τουτέων τε ὦν εἵνεκεν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὴν συμμαχίην ἐδέξαντο, καὶ ὅτι ἐκ πάντων σφέας προκρίνας Ἑλλήνων, αἱρέετο φίλους (Crœsus).

An interval of rather more than forty years separates the two events, during which both the feelings of the Spartans, and the feelings of others towards them, had undergone a material change.

[535] Herodot. v, 97. πολλοὺς γὰρ οἶκε εἶναι εὐπετέστερον διαβάλλειν ἢ ἕνα, εἰ Κλεομένεα μὲν τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον μοῦνον οὐκ οἷός τε ἐγένετο διαβαλέειν, τρεῖς δὲ μυριάδας Ἀθηναίων ἐποίησε τοῦτο.

[536] Herodot. v, 98; Homer, Iliad, v, 62. The criticism of Plutarch (De Malignitat. Herodot. p. 861) on this passage, is rather more pertinent than the criticisms in that ill-tempered composition generally are.

[537] About Korêssus, see Diodor. xiv, 99, and Xenophon, Hellen. i, 2, 7.

[538] Charôn of Lampsakus, and Lysanias in his history of Eretria, seem to have mentioned this first siege of Milêtus, and the fact of its being raised in consequence of the expedition to Sardis; see Plutarch, de Herodot. Malignit. p. 861,—though the citation is given there confusedly, so that we cannot make much out of it.

[539] Herodot. v, 102, 103. It is a curious fact that Charôn of Lampsakus made no mention of this defeat of the united Athenian and Ionian force: see Plutarch, de Herodot. Malign. *ut sup.*

[540] About Derkyllidas, see Xenophon, Hellen. iii, 2, 17-19.

[541] Herodot. v, 103, 104, 108. Compare the proceedings in Cyprus against Artaxerxês Mnêmon, under the energetic Evagoras of Salamis (Diodor. xiv, 98, xv, 2), about 386 B. C.: most of the petty princes of the island became for the time his subjects, but in 351 B. C. there were nine of them independent (Diodor. xvi, 42), and seemingly quite as many at the time when Alexander besieged Tyre (Arrian, ii, 20, 8).

[542] Herodot. v, 116. Κύπριοι μὲν δὴ, ἑνιαυτὸν ἐλεύθεροι γενόμενοι, αὖτις ἐκ νέης κατεδεδούλωντο.

[543] Herodot. vi, 6. Κίλικες καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι.

[544] Herodot. v, 109. Ἡμέας δὲ ἀπέπεμψε τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἰώνων φυλάξοντας τὴν θάλασσαν, etc.: compare vi, 7.

[545] Herodot. v, 112.

[546] Herodot. v, 112-115. It is not uninteresting to compare, with this reconquest of Cyprus by the Persians, the conquest of the same island by the Turks in 1570, when they expelled from it the Venetians. See the narrative of that conquest (effected in the reign of Selim the Second by the Seraskier Mustapha-Pasha), in Von Hammer, Geschichte des Osmannischen Reichs, book xxxvi, vol. iii, pp. 578-589. Of the two principal towns, Nikosia in the centre of the island, and Famagusta on the north-eastern coast, the first, after a long siege, was taken by storm, and the inhabitants of every sex and age either put to death or carried into slavery; while the second, after a most gallant defence, was allowed to capitulate. But the terms of the capitulation were violated in the most flagitious manner by the Seraskier, who treated the brave Venetian governor, Bragadino, with frightful cruelty, cutting off his nose and ears, exposing him to all sorts of insults, and ultimately causing him to be flayed alive. The skin of this unfortunate general was conveyed to Constantinople as a trophy, but in after-times found its way to Venice.

We read of nothing like this treatment of Bragadino in the Persian reconquest of Cyprus, though it was a subjugation after revolt; indeed, nothing like it in all Persian warfare.

Von Hammer gives a short sketch (not always very accurate as to ancient times) of the condition of Cyprus under its successive masters,—Persians, Græco-Egyptians, Romans, Arabians, the dynasty of Lusignan, Venetians, and Turks,—the last seems decidedly the worst of all.

In reference to the above-mentioned piece of cruelty, I may mention that the Persian king Kambysês caused one of the royal judges (according to Herodotus v, 25), who had taken a bribe to render an iniquitous judgment, to be flayed alive, and his skin to be stretched upon the seat on which his son was placed to succeed him; as a lesson of justice to the latter. A similar story is told respecting the Persian king Artaxerxês Mnêmon; and what is still more remarkable, the same story is also recounted in the Turkish history, as an act of Mohammed the Second (Von Hammer, Geschichte des Osmannisch. Reichs, book xvii, vol. ii, p. 209; Diodorus, xv, 10). Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiii, 6) had good reason to treat the reality of the fact as problematical.

[547] Herodot. v, 117.

[548] Herodot. v, 122-124.

[549] Herodot. v, 118. On the topography of this spot, as described in Herodotus, see a good note in Weissenborn, Beyträge zur genaueren Erforschung der alt. Griechischen Geschichte, p. 116, Jena, 1844.

He thinks, with much reason, that the river Marsyas here mentioned cannot be that which flows through Kelænæ, but another of the same name which flows into the Mæander from the southwest.

[550] About the village of Labranda and the temple of Zeus Stratius, see Strabo, xiv, p. 659. Labranda was a village in the territory of, and seven miles distant from, the inland town of Mylasa; it was Karian at the time of the Ionic revolt, but partially Hellenized before the year 350 B. C. About this latter epoch, three rural tribes of Mylasa—constituting along with the citizens of the town, the Mylasene community—were, Ταρκόνδαρα, Ὀτώρκονδα, Λάβρανδα,—see the Inscription in Boeckh's Collection, No. 2695, and in Franz, Epigraphicê Græca, No. 73, p. 191. In the Lydian language, λάβρυς is said to have signified a hatchet (Plutarch, Quæst. Gr. c. 45, p. 314).

[551] Herodot. v, 118, 119.

[552] Herodot. v, 120, 121; vi, 25.

[553] Herodot. v, 125; Strabo, xiv, p. 635.

[554] Herodot. v, 126.

[555] Herodot. vi, 5. Οἱ δὲ Μιλήσιοι, ἄσμενοι ἀπαλλαχθέντες καὶ Ἀρισταγόρεω, οὐδαμῶς ἔτοιμοι ἔσαν ἄλλον τύραννον δέκεσθαι ἐς τὴν χώρην, οἵά τε ἐλευθερίης γευσάμενοι.

[556] Herodot. v, 105. Ὦ Ζεῦ, ἐκγενέσθαί μοι Ἀθηναίους τίσασθαι. Compare the Thracian practice of communicating with the gods by shooting arrows high up into the air (Herodot. iv, 94).

[557] Herodot. v, 107, vi, 2. Compare the advice of Bias of Priênê to the Ionians, when the Persian conqueror Cyrus was approaching, to found a Pan-Ionic colony in Sardinia (Herodot. i, 170): the idea started by Aristagoras has been alluded to just above (Herodot. v, 124).

Pausanias (iv, 23, 2) puts into the mouth of Mantiklus, son of Aristomenês, a recommendation to the Messenians, when conquered a second time by the Spartans, to migrate to Sardinia.

[558] Herodot. v, 106, 107.

[559] Herodot. vi, 1. Οὕτω τοι, Ἰστίαιε, ἔχει κατὰ ταῦτα τὰ πρήγματα· τοῦτο τὸ ὑπόδημα ἔρραψας μὲν σὺ, ὑπεδήσατο δὲ Ἀρισταγόρης.

[560] Herodot. vi, 2-5.

[561] Herodot. vi, 5-26.

[562] Herodot. vi, 6-9.

[563] Herodot. vi, 8.

[564] Herodot. vi, 9-10.

[565] Herodot. vi, 11. Ἐπὶ ξυροῦ γὰρ ἀκμῆς ἔχεται ἡμῖν τὰ πρήγματα, ἄνδρες Ἴωνες, ἢ εἶναι ἐλευθέροισι ἢ δούλοισι, καὶ τούτοισι ὡς δρηπέτῃσι· νῦν ὦν ὑμέες, ἢν μὲν βούλησθε ταλαιπωρίας ἐνδέκεσθαι, τὸ παραχρῆμα μὲν πόνος ὑμῖν ἔσται, οἷοί τε δὲ ἔσεσθε, ὑπερβαλλόμενοι τοὺς ἐναντίους, εἶναι ἐλεύθεροι, etc.

[566] Herodot. vi, 12. Οἱ Ἴωνες, οἷα ἀπαθέες ἐόντες πόνων τοιούτων, τετρυμένοι τε ταλαιπωρίῃσί τε καὶ ἠελίῳ, ἔλεξαν πρὸς ἑωϋτοὺς τάδε—Τίνα δαιμόνων παραβάντες, τάδε ἀναπίμπλαμεν, οἵτινες παραφρονήσαντες, καὶ ἐκπλώσαντες ἐκ τοῦ νόου, ἀνδρὶ Φωκαέει ἀλαζόνι, παρεχομένῳ νέας τρεῖς, ἐπιτρέψαντες ἡμέας αὐτοὺς ἔχομεν, etc.

[567] Herodot. vi, 13.

[568] Herodot. vi, 14, 15.

[569] Herodot. vi, 16.

[570] Thucyd. viii, 14.

[571] Herodot. vi, 17. λῃϊστὴς κατεστήκεε Ἑλλήνων μὲν οὐδενὸς, Καρχηδονίων δὲ καὶ Τυρσηνῶν.

[572] Herodot. vi, 22-25.

[573] Herodot. vi, 18, 19, 20, 22.

Μίλητος μέν νυν Μιλησίων ἠρήμωτο.

[574] Herodot. vi, 18, αἱρέουσι κατ᾽ ἄκρης, ἐν τῷ ἑκτῷ ἔτεϊ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀποστάσιος τῆς Ἀρισταγόρεω. This is almost the only distinct chronological statement which we find in Herodotus respecting the Ionic revolt. The other evidences of time in his chapters are more or less equivocal: nor is there sufficient testimony before us to enable us to arrange the events, between the commencement of the Ionic revolt, and the battle of Marathon, into the precise years to which they belong. The battle of Marathon stands fixed for August or September, 490 B. C.: the siege of Milêtus may probably have been finished in 496-495 B. C., and the Ionic revolt may have begun in 502-501 B. C. Such are the dates which, on the whole, appear to me most probable, though I am far from considering them as certain.

Chronological critics differ considerably in their arrangement of the events here alluded to among particular years. See Appendix, No. 5, p. 244, in Mr. Clinton's Fasti Hellenici; Professor Schultz, Beyträge zu genaueren Zeitbestimmungen von der 63n zur 72n Olympiade, pp. 177-183, in the Kieler Philologische Studien; and Weissenborn, Beyträge zur genaueren Erforschung der alten Griechischen Geschichte, Jena, 1844, p. 87, *seqq.*: not to mention Reiz and Larcher. Mr. Clinton reckons only ten years from the beginning of the Ionic revolt to the battle of Marathon; which appears to me too short; though, on the other hand, the fourteen years reckoned by Larcher—much more the sixteen years reckoned by Reiz—are too long. Mr. Clinton compresses inconveniently the latter portion of the interval,—that portion which elapsed between the siege of Milêtus and the battle of Marathon. And the very improbable supposition to which he is obliged to resort,—of a confusion in the language of Herodotus between Attic and Olympic years,—indicates that he is pressing the text of the historian too closely, when he states, "that Herodotus specifies a term of three years between the capture of Milêtus, and the expedition of Datis:" see F. H. ad ann. 499. He places the capture of Milêtus in 494 B. C.; which I am inclined to believe a year later—if not two years later—than the reality. Indeed, as Mr. Clinton places the expedition of Aristagoras against Naxos (which was *immediately before* the breaking out of the revolt, since Aristagoras seized the Ionic despots while that fleet yet remained congregated immediately at the close of the expedition) in 501 B. C., and as Herodotus expressly says that Milêtus was taken in the sixth year after the revolt, it would follow that this capture ought to belong to 495, and not to 494 B. C. I incline to place it either in 496, or in 495; and the Naxian expedition in 502 or 501, leaning towards the earlier of the two dates: Schultz agrees with Larcher in placing the Naxian expedition in 504 B. C., yet he assigns the capture of Milêtus to 496 B. C.,—whereas, Herodotus states that the last of these two events was in the sixth year after the revolt, which revolt immediately succeeded on the first of the two, within the same summer. Weissenborn places the capture of Milêtus in 496 B. C., and the expedition to Naxos in 499,—suspecting that the text in Herodotus—ἑκτῷ ἔτεϊ—is incorrect, and that it ought to be τετάρτῳ ἔτεϊ, the fourth year (p. 125: compare the chronological table in his work, p. 222). He attempts to show that the particular incidents composing the Ionic revolt, as Herodotus recounts it, cannot be made to occupy more than four years; but his reasoning is, in my judgment, unsatisfactory, and the conjecture inadmissible. The distinct affirmation of the historian, as to the entire interval between the two events, is of much more evidentiary value than our conjectural summing up of the details.

It is vain, I think, to try to arrange these details according to precise years: this can only be done very loosely.

[575] Herodot. vi, 25.

[576] Herodot. vi, 31-33. It may perhaps be to this burning and sacking of the cities in the Propontis, and on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, that Strabo (xiii, p. 591) makes allusion; though he ascribes the proceeding to a different cause,—to the fear of Darius that the Scythians would cross into Asia to avenge themselves upon him for attacking them, and that the towns on the coast would furnish them with vessels for the passage.

[577] Herodot. vi, 41.

[578] Herodot. vi, 31, 32, 33.

[579] Herodot. vi, 25.

[580] Herodot. vi, 26-28. ἄγων Ἰώνων καὶ Αἰολέων συχνούς.

[581] Herodot. vi, 28, 29, 30.

[582] Herodot. vi, 21, ὡς ἀναμνήσαντα οἰκηΐα κακὰ: compare vii, 152; also, Kallisthenês ap. Strabo, xiv, p. 635, and Plutarch, Præcept. Reipubl. Gerend. p. 814.

[583] See Welcker Griechische Tragödien, vol. i, p. 25.

[584] Herodot. vi, 42.

[585] Herodot. vi, 20.

[586] Herodot. vi, 43. In recounting this deposition of the despots by Mardonius, Herodotus reasons from it as an analogy for the purpose of vindicating the correctness of another of his statements, which, he acquaints us, many persons disputed; namely, the discussion which he reports to have taken place among the seven conspirators, after the death of the Magian Smerdis, whether they should establish a monarchy, an oligarchy, or a democracy,—ἐνθαῦτα μέγιστον θώϋμα ἐρέω τοῖσι μὴ ἀποδεκομένοισι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, Περσέων τοῖσι ἕπτα Ὀτάνεα γνώμην ἀποδέξασθαι, ὡς χρέων εἴη δημοκρατέεσθαι Πέρσας· τοὺς γὰρ τυράννους τῶν Ἰώνων καταπαύσας πάντας ὁ Μαρδόνιος, δημοκρατίας κατίστα ἐς τὰς πόλιας. Such passages as this let us into the controversies of the time, and prove that Herodotus found many objectors to his story about the discussion on theories of government among the seven Persian conspirators (iii, 80-82).

[587] Herodot. vi, 43, 44, ἐπορεύοντο δὲ ἐπὶ τε Ἐρετρίαν καὶ Ἀθήνας.

[588] Herodot. vi, 44-94. Charon of Lampsakus had noticed the storm near Mount Athos, and the destruction of the fleet of Mardonius (Charonis Fragment. 3, ed. Didot; Athenæ. ix, p. 394).

[589] Herodot. vi, 46-48. See a similar case of disclosure arising from jealousy between Tenedos and Lesbos (Thucyd. iii, 2).

[590] Herodot. vi, 94.

[591] Herodot. vi, 48-49; viii, 46.

[592] Herodot. v, 81-89. See above, chapter xxxi. The legendary story there given as the provocation of Ægina to the war is evidently not to be treated as a real and historical cause of war: a state of quarrel causes all such stories to be raked up, and some probably to be invented. It is like the old alleged quarrel between the Athenians and the Pelasgi of Lemnos (vi, 137-140).

[593] It is to this treatment of the herald that the story in Plutarch's Life of Themistoklês must allude, if that story indeed be true; for the Persian king was not likely to send a second herald, after such treatment of the first. An interpreter accompanied the herald, speaking Greek as well as his own native language. Themistoklês proposed and carried a vote that he should be put to death, for having employed the Greek language as medium for barbaric dictation (Plutarch, Themist. c. 6). We should be glad to know from whom Plutarch copied this story.

Pausanias states that it was Miltiadês who proposed the putting to death of the heralds at Athens (iii, 12, 6); and that the divine judgment fell upon his family in consequence of it. From whom Pausanias copied this statement I do not know: certainly not from Herodotus, who does not mention Miltiadês in the case, and expressly says that he does not know in what manner the divine judgment overtook the Athenians for the crime, "except (says he) that their city and country was afterwards laid waste by Xerxês; but I do not think that this happened on account of the outrage on the heralds." (Herodot. vii, 133.)

The belief that there must have been a divine judgment of some sort or other, presented a strong stimulus to invent or twist some historical fact to correspond with it. Herodotus has sufficient regard for truth to resist this stimulus and to confess his ignorance; a circumstance which goes, along with others, to strengthen our confidence in his general authority. His silence weakens the credibility, but does not refute the allegation of Pausanias with regard to Miltiadês,—which is certainly not intrinsically improbable.

[594] Herodot. vii, 133.

[595] Herodot. vi, 49. Ποιήσασι δέ σφι (Αἰγιμήταις) ταῦτα, ἰθέως Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπεκέατο, δοκέοντες ἐπὶ σφίσι ἔχοντας τοὺς Αἰγινήτας δεδωκέναι (γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ), ὡς ἅμα τῷ Πέρσῃ ἐπὶ σφέας στρατεύωνται. Καὶ ἅσμενοι προφάσιος ἐπελάβοντο· φοιτεόντές τε ἐς τὴν Σπάρτην, κατηγόρεον τῶν Αἰγινητέων τὰ

πεποιήκοιεν, προδόντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα. Compare viii, 144, ix, 7. τὴν Ἑλλάδα δεινὸν ποιούμενοι προδοῦναι—a new and very important phrase.

vi, 61. Τότε δὲ τὸν Κλεομένεα, ἐόντα ἐν τῇ Αἰγίνῃ, καὶ κοινὰ τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀγαθὰ προεργαζόμενον, etc.

[596] Thucyd. i, 70-118. ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς (*i. e.* the Spartans) μελλητὰς καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους.

[597] Herodot. vii, 145-148. Οἱ συνωμόται Ἑλλήνων ἐπὶ τῷ Πέρσῃ.

[598] That which marks the siege of Milêtus, and the defeat of the Argeians by Kleomenês, as contemporaneous, or nearly so, is, the common oracular dictum delivered in reference to both: in the same prophecy of the Pythia, one half alludes to the sufferings of Milêtus, the other half to those of Argos (Herodot. vi, 19-77).

Χρεωμένοισι γὰρ Ἀργείοισι ἐν Δελφοῖσι περὶ σωτηρίης τῆς πόλιος τῆς σφετέρης, τὸ μὲν ἐς αὐτοὺς τοὺς Ἀργείους φέρον, τὴν δὲ παρενθήκην ἔχρησε ἐς Μιλησίους.

I consider this evidence of date to be better than the statement of Pausanias. That author places the enterprise against Argos immediately (αὖτικα—Paus. iii, 4, 1) after the accession of Kleomenês, who, as he was king when Mæandrius came from Samos (Herodot. iii, 148), must have come to the throne not later than 518 or 517 B. C. This would be thirty-seven years prior to 480 B. C.; a date much too early for the war between Kleomenês and the Argeians, as we may see by Herodotus (vii, 149).

[599] Herodot. vi, 92.

[600] Herodot. vi, 78; compare Xenophon, Rep. Laced. xii, 6. Orders for evolutions in the field, in the Lacedæmonian military service, were not proclaimed by the herald, but transmitted through the various gradations of officers (Thucyd. v, 66).

[601] Herodot. vi, 79, 80.

[602] Pausan. ii, 20, 7; Polyæn. viii, 33; Plutarch, De Virtut. Mulier, p. 245; Suidas, v. Τελέσιλλα.

Plutarch cites the historian Sokratês of Argos for this story about Telesilla; an historian, or perhaps composer of a περιήγησις Ἄργους, of unknown date: compare Diogen. Laërt. ii, 5, 47, and Plutarch, Quæstion. Romaic. pp. 270-277. According to his representation, Kleomenês and Demaratus jointly assaulted the town of Argos, and Demaratus, after having penetrated into the town and become master of the Pamphyliakon, was driven out again by the women. Now Herodotus informs us that Kleomenês and Demaratus were never employed upon the same expedition, after the disagreement in their march to Attica (v, 75; vi, 64).

[603] Herodot. vi, 77.

Ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ἡ θηλείᾱ τὸν ἄρσενα νικήσασα

Ἐξελάσῃ, καὶ κῦδος ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἄρηται, etc.

If this prophecy can be said to have any distinct meaning, it probably refers to Hêrê, as protectress of Argos, repulsing the Spartans.

Pausanias (ii, 20, 7) might well doubt whether Herodotus understood this oracle in the same sense as he did: it is plain that Herodotus could not have so understood it.

[604] Herodot. vi, 80, 81: compare v, 72.

[605] Herodot. vi, 82. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς τοῦ ἀγάλματος ἐξέλαμψε, αἱρέειν ἂν κατ᾽ ἀκρῆς τὴν πόλιν· ἐκ τῶν στηθέων δὲ λάμψαντος, πᾶν οἱ πεποιῆσθαι ὅσον ὁ θεὸς ἤθελε.

For the expression αἱρέειν κατ᾽ ἀκρῆς, compare Herodot. vi, 21, and Damm. Lex. Homer. v. ἀκρός. In this expression, as generally used, the last words κατ᾽ ἀκρῆς have lost their primitive and special sense, and do little more than intensify the simple αἱρέειν,—equivalent to something like "de fond en comble:" for Kleomenês is accused by his enemies,—φάμενοί μιν δωροδοκήσαντα, οὐκ ἐλέειν τὸ Ἄργος, παρέον εὐπετέως μιν ἑλεῖν. But in the story recounted by Kleomenês, the words κατ᾽ ἀκρῆς come back to their primitive meaning, and serve as the

foundation for his religious inference, from type to thing typified: if the light had shone from the head or *top* of the statue, this would have intimated that the gods meant him to take the city "*from top to bottom*."

In regard to this very illustrative story,—which there seems no reason for mistrusting,—the contrast between the point of view of Herodotus and that of the Spartan ephors deserves notice. The former, while he affirms distinctly that it was the real story told by Kleomenês, suspects its truth, and utters as much of skepticism as his pious fear will permit him; the latter find it in complete harmony, both with their canon of belief and with their religious feeling,—Κλεομένης δὲ σφι ἔλεξε, οὔτε εἰ ψευδόμενος οὔτε εἰ ἀληθέα λέγων, ἔχω σαφηνέως εἶπαι· ἔλεξε δ᾽ ὦν…. Ταῦτα δὲ λέγων, πιστά τε καὶ οἴκοτα ἐδόκεε Σπαρτιήτῃσι λέγειν, καὶ ἀπέφυγε πολλὸν τοὺς διώκοντας.

[606] Compare Pausanias, ii, 20, 8.

[607] Herodot. vi, 92.

[608] Herodot. vi, 50. Κρῖος—ἔλεγε δὲ ταῦτα ἐξ ἐπιστολῆς τῆς Δημαρήτου. Compare Pausan. iii, 4, 3.

[609] Herodot. vi, 50-61, 64. Δημάρητος—φθόνῳ καὶ ἄγῃ χρεώμενος.

[610] Herodot. vi, 61, 62, 63.

[611] Herodot. vi, 65, 66. In an analogous case afterwards, where the succession was disputed between Agesilaus the brother, and Leotychidês the reputed son of the deceased king Agis, the Lacedæmonians appear to have taken upon themselves to pronounce Leotychidês illegitimate; or rather to assume tacitly such illegitimacy by choosing Agesilaus in preference, without the aid of the oracle (Xenophon, Hellen. iii, 3, 1-4; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 3). The previous oracle from Delphi, however, φυλάξασθαι τὴν χωλὴν βασιλείαν, was cited on the occasion, and the question was, in what manner it should be interpreted.

[612] Herodot. vi, 68, 69. The answer made by the mother to this appeal—informing Demaratus that he is the son either of king Aristo, or of the hero Astrabakus—is extremely interesting as an evidence of Grecian manners and feeling.

[613] Plutarch, Agis, c. 11. κατὰ δή τινα νόμον παλαιὸν, ὃς οὐκ ἐᾷ τὸν Ἡρακλείδην ἐκ γυναικὸς ἀλλοδαπῆς τεκνοῦσθαι, τὸν δ᾽ ἀπελθόντα τῆς Σπάρτης ἐπὶ μετοικισμῷ πρὸς ἑτέρους ἀποθνήσκειν κελεύει.

[614] Herodot. vi, 70.

[615] Herodot. vi, 78.

[616] Herodot. vi, 94. Δᾶτίν τε, ἐόντα Μῆδον γένος, etc.

Cornelius Nepos (Life of Pausanias, c. 1) calls Mardonius a Mede; which cannot be true, since he was the son of Gobryas, one of the seven Persian conspirators (Herodot. vi, 43).

[617] Herodot. vi, 94. ἐντειλάμενος δὲ ἀπέπεμπε, ἐξανδραποδίσαντας Ἐρετρίαν καὶ Ἀθήνας, ἄγειν ἑωϋτῷ ἐς ὄψιν τὰ ἀνδράποδα.

According to the Menexenus of Plato (c. 17, p. 245), Darius ordered Datis to fulfil this order on peril of his own head; no such harshness appears in Herodotus.

[618] Thucyd. i, 93.

[619] Herodot. vi, 95, 96. ἐπὶ ταύτην (Naxos) γὰρ δὴ πρώτην ἐπεῖχον στρατεύεσθαι οἱ Πέρσαι, μεμνημένοι τῶν πρότερον.

[620] The historians of Naxos affirmed that Datis had been repulsed from the island. We find this statement in Plutarch, De Malign. Herodot. c. 36, p. 869, among his violent and unfounded contradictions of Herodotus.

[621] Herodot. vi, 99.

[622] Herodot. vi, 100. Τῶν δὲ Ἐρετριέων ἦν ἄρα οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς βούλευμα, οἳ μετεπέμποντο μὲν Ἀθηναίους, ἐφρόνεον δὲ διφασίας ἰδέας· οἳ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐβουλεύοντο ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἐς τὰ ἄκρα τῆς Εὐβοίης, ἄλλοι δὲ αὐτῶν ἴδια κέρδεα προσδεκόμενοι παρὰ τοῦ Πέρσεω οἴσεσθαι προδοσίην ἐσκευάζοντο.

Allusion to this treason among the Eretrians is to be found in a saying of Themistoklês (Plutarch, Themist. c. 11).

The story told by Hêrakleidês Ponticus (ap. Athenæ. xii, p. 536), of an earlier Persian armament which had assailed Eretria and failed, cannot be at all understood; it rather looks like a mythe to explain the origin of the great wealth possessed by the family of Kallias at Athens,—the Λακκόπλουτος. There is another story, having the same explanatory object, in Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 5.

[623] Herodot. vi, 101, 102.

[624] Plato, Legg. iii, p. 698, and Menexen. c. 10, p. 240; Diogen. Laërt. iii, 33; Herodot. vi, 31: compare Strabo, x, p. 446, who ascribes to Herodotus the statement of Plato about the σαγήνευσις of Eretria. Plato says nothing about the betrayal of the city.

It is to be remarked that, in the passage of the Treatise de Legibus, Plato mentions this story (about the Persians having swept the territory of Eretria clean of its inhabitants) with some doubt as to its truth, and as if it were a rumor intentionally circulated by Datis with a view to frighten the Athenians. But in the Menexenus, the story is given as if it were an authentic historical fact.

[625] Plutarch, De Garrulitate, c. 15, p. 510. The descendants of Gongylus the Eretrian, who passed over to the Persians on this occasion, are found nearly a century afterwards in possession of a town and district in Mysia, which the Persian king had bestowed upon their ancestor. Herodotus does not mention Gongylus (Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 1, 6).

This surrender to the Persians drew upon the Eretrians bitter remarks at the time of the battle of Salamis (Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 11).

[626] The chapter of Herodotus (vi, 40) relating to the adventures of Miltiadês is extremely perplexing, as I have already remarked in a former note: and Wesseling considers that it involves chronological difficulties which our present MSS. do not enable us to clear up. Neither Schweighäuser, nor the explanation cited in Bähr's note, is satisfactory.

[627] Herodot. vi, 43-104.

[628] Herodot. vi, 39-104.

[629] Herodot. vi, 132. Μιλτιάδης, καὶ πρότερον εὐδοκιμέων—*i. e.* before the battle of Marathon. How much his reputation had been heightened by the conquest of Lemnos, see Herodot. vi, 136.

[630] Herodot. vi, 35.

[631] Thucyd. i, 138. ἦν γὰρ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς βεβαιότατα δὴ φύσεως ἰσχὺν δηλώσας καὶ διαφερόντως τι ἐς αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἑτέρων ἄξιος θαυμάσαι· οἰκείᾳ γὰρ συνέσει καὶ οὔτε προμαθὼν ἐς αὐτὴν οὐδὲν οὔτ᾽ ἐπιμαθὼν, τῶν τε παραχρῆμα δι᾽ ἐλαχίστης βουλῆς κράτιστος γνώμων, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπὶ πλεῖστον τοῦ γενησομένου ἄριστος εἰκαστής. Καὶ ἃ μὲν μετὰ χεῖρας ἔχοι, καὶ ἐξηγήσασθαι οἷός τε· ὧν δὲ ἄπειρος εἴη, κρῖναι ἱκανῶς οὐκ ἀπήλλακτο. Τό τε ἄμεινον ἢ χεῖρον ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ ἔτι προεώρα μάλιστα· καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν, φύσεως μὲν δυνάμει, μελέτης δὲ βραχύτητι, κράτιστος δὴ οὗτος αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τὰ δέοντα ἐγένετο.

[632] See the contrast of the old and new education, as set forth in Aristophanês, Nubes, 957-1003; also Ranæ, 1067.

About the training of Themistoklês, compared with that of the contemporaries of Periklês, see also Plutarch, Themistokl. c. 2.

[633] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 3, 4, 5; Cornelius Nepos, Themist. c. 1.

[634] Herodot. viii, 79; Plato, Gorgias, c. 172. ἄριστον ἄνδρα ἐν Ἀθήνῃσι καὶ δικαιότατον.

[635] Plutarch (Aristeidês, c. 1-4; Themistoklês, c. 3; An Seni sit gerenda respublica, c. 12, p. 790; Præcepta Reip. Gerend. c. ii, p. 805).

[636] Timokreon ap. Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 21.

[637] Thucyd. ii, 65.

[638] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 7.

[639] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 5.

[640] Herodot. vi, 109, 110.

[641] Mr. Kinneir remarks that the Persian Cassids, or foot-messengers, will travel for several days successively at the rate of sixty or seventy miles a day (Geographical Memoir of Persia, p. 44).

[642] Herodot. ix, 7-10.

[643] Herodot. vi, 110.

[644] Herodot. vi, 108-112.

[645] Thucyd. iii, 55.

[646] Justin states ten thousand Athenians, besides one thousand Platæans. Cornelius Nepos, Pausanias, and Plutarch give ten thousand as the sum total of both. Justin, ii, 9; Corn. Nep. Miltiad. c. 4; Pausan. iv, 25, 5; x, 20, 2: compare also Suidas, v. Ἱππίας.

Heeren (De Fontibus Trogi Pompeii, Dissertat. ii, 7) affirms that Trogus, or Justin, follows Herodotus in matters concerning the Persian invasions of Greece. He cannot have compared the two very attentively; for Justin not only states several matters which are not to be found in Herodotus, but is at variance with the latter on some particulars not unimportant.

[647] Justin (ii, 9) says that the total of the Persian army was six hundred thousand, and that two hundred thousand perished. Plato (Menexen. p. 240) and Lysias (Orat. Funebr. c. 7) speak of the Persian total as five hundred thousand men. Valerius Maximus (v, 3), Pausanias (iv, 25), and Plutarch (Parallel. Græc. ad init.), give three hundred thousand men. Cornelius Nepos (Miltiadês, c. 5) gives the more moderate total of one hundred and ten thousand men.

See the observations on the battle of Marathon, made both by Colonel Leake and by Mr. Finlay, who have examined and described the locality; Leake, on the Demi of Attica, in Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature, vol. ii, p. 160, *seq.*; and Finlay, on the Battle of Marathon, in the same Transactions, vol. iii, pp. 360-380, etc.

Both have given remarks on the probable numbers of the armies assembled; but there are really no materials, even for a probable guess, in respect to the Persians. The silence of Herodotus (whom we shall find hereafter very circumstantial as to the numbers of the army under Xerxês) seems to show that he had no information which he could trust. His account of the battle of Marathon presents him in honorable contrast with the loose and boastful assertors who followed him; for though he does not tell us much, and falls lamentably short of what we should like to know, yet all that he does say is reasonable and probable as to the proceedings of both armies and the little which he states becomes more trustworthy on that very account,—because it *is* so little,—showing that he keeps strictly within his authorities.

There is nothing in the account of Herodotus to make us believe that he had ever visited the ground of Marathon.

[648] See Mr. Finlay on the Battle of Marathon, Transactions, etc., vol. iii, pp. 364, 368, 383, *ut suprà*: compare Hobhouse, Journey in Albania, i, p. 432.

Colonel Leake thinks that the ancient town of Marathon was not on the exact site of the modern Marathon, but at a place called Vraná, a little to the south of Marathon (Leake, on the Demi of Attica, in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature, 1829, vol. ii, p. 166).

"Below these two points," he observes, "(the tumuli of Vraná and the hill of Kotróni,) the plain of Marathon expands to the shore of the bay, which is near two miles distant from the opening of the valley of Vraná. It is moderately well cultivated with corn, and is one of the most fertile spots in Attica, though rather inconveniently subject to inundations from the two torrents which cross it, particularly that of Marathóna. From Lucian (in Icaro-Menippo) it appears that the parts about Œnoê were noted for their fertility, and an Egyptian poet of the fifth century has celebrated the vines and olives of Marathon. It is natural to suppose that the vineyards occupied the rising grounds: and it is probable that the olive-trees were chiefly situated in the two valleys, where some are still growing: for as to the plain itself, the circumstances of the battle incline one to believe that it was anciently as destitute of trees as it is at the present day." (Leake, on the Demi of Attica, Trans. of Roy. Soc. of Literature, vol. ii, p. 162.)

Colonel Leake farther says, respecting the fitness of the Marathonian ground for cavalry movements: "As I rode across the plain of Marathon with a peasant of Vraná, he remarked to me that it was a fine place for cavalry to fight in. None of the modern Marathonii were above the rank of laborers: they have heard that a great battle was once fought there, but that is all they know." (Leake, *ut sup.* ii, p. 175.)

[649] Herodot. vi, 107.

[650] Plutarch, Symposiac. i, 3, p. 619; Xenophon, Anabas. i, 8, 21; Arrian, ii, 8, 18; iii, 11, 16.

We may compare, with this established battle-array of the Persian armies, that of the Turkish armies, adopted and constantly followed ever since the victorious battle of Ikonium, in 1386, gained by Amurath the First over the Karamanians. The European troops, or those of Rum, occupy the left wing: the Asiatic troops, or those of Anatoli, the right wing: the Janissaries are in the centre. The Sultan, or the Grand Vizir, surrounded by the national cavalry, or Spahis, is in the central point of all (Von Hammer, Geschichte des Osmannischen Reichs, book v, vol. i, p. 199).

About the honor of occupying the right wing in a Grecian army, see in particular the animated dispute between the Athenians and the Tegeates before the battle of Platæa (Herodot. ix, 27): it is the post assigned to the heroic kings of legendary warfare (Eurip. Supplices, 657).

[651] Herodot. vi, 112. Πρῶτοι μὲν γὰρ Ἑλλήνων πάντων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν, δρόμῳ ἐς πολεμίους ἐχρήσαντο.

The running pace of the charge was obviously one of the most remarkable events connected with the battle. Colonel Leake and Mr. Finlay seem disposed to reduce the run to a quick march; partly on the ground that the troops must have been disordered and out of breath by running a mile. The probability is, that they really were so, and that such was the great reason of the defeat of the centre. It is very probable that a part of the mile run over consisted of declivity. I accept the account of Herodotus literally, though whether the distance be exactly stated, we cannot certainly say: indeed the fact is, that it required some steadiness of discipline to prevent the step of hoplites, when charging, from becoming accelerated into a run. See the narrative of the battle of Kunaxa in Xenoph. Anabas. i, 8, 18; Diodor. xiv, 23: compare Polyæn. ii, 2, 3. The passage of Diodorus here referred to contrasts the advantages with the disadvantages of the running charge.

Both Colonel Leake and Mr. Finlay try to point out the exact ground occupied by the two armies: they differ in the spot chosen, and I cannot think that there is sufficient evidence to be had in favor of any spot. Leake thinks that the Persian commanders were encamped in the plain of Tricorythos, separated from that of Marathon by the great marsh, and communicating with it only by means of a causeway (Leake, Transact. ii, p. 170).

[652] Herodot. vi, 113. Κατὰ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ, ἐνίκων οἱ βάρβαροι, καὶ ῥήξαντες ἐδίωκον ἐς τὴν μεσόγαιαν.

Herodotus here tells us the whole truth without disguise: Plutarch (Aristeidês, c. 3) only says that the Persian centre made a longer resistance, and gave the tribes in the Grecian centre more trouble to overthrow.

[653] Pausan. i, 32, 6.

[654] Herodot. vi, 113-115.

[655] Herodot. vi, 114. This is the statement of Herodotus respecting Kynegeirus. How creditably does his character as an historian contrast with that of the subsequent romancers! Justin tells us that Kynegeirus first seized the vessel with his right hand: that was cut off, and he held the vessel with his left: when he had lost that also, he seized the ship with his teeth, "like a wild beast," (Justin, ii, 9)—Justin seems to have found this statement in many different authors: "Cynegiri militis virtus, multis scriptorum laudibus celebrata."

[656] For the exaggerated stories of the numbers of Persians slain, see Xenophon, Anabas. iii, 2, 12; Plutarch, De Malign. Herodot. c. 26, p. 862; Justin, ii, 9; and Suidas, v. Ποικίλη.

In the account of Ktêsias, Datis was represented as having been killed in the battle, and it was farther said that the Athenians refused to give up his body for interment; which was one of the grounds whereupon Xerxês afterwards invaded Greece. It is evident that in the authorities which Ktêsias followed, the alleged death of Datis at Marathon was rather emphatically dwelt upon. See Ktêsias, Persica, c. 18-21, with the note of Bähr, who is inclined to defend the statement, against Herodotus.

[657] Herodot. vi, 124. Ἀνεδέχθη μὲν γὰρ ἄσπις, καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι ἄλλως εἰπεῖν· ἐγένετο γάρ· ὃς μέντοι ἦν ὁ ἀναδέξας οὐκ ἔχω προσωτέρω εἰπεῖν τουτέων.

[658] Herodot. vi, 116. Οὗτοι μὲν δὴ περιέπλωον Σούνιον. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ, ὡς ποδῶν εἶχον, τάχιστα ἐβοήθεον ἐς τὸ ἄστυ· καὶ ἔφθησάν τε ἀπικόμενοι, πρὶν ἢ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἥκειν, καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο ἀπιγμένοι ἐξ Ἡρακληΐου τοῦ ἐν Μαραθῶνι ἐς ἄλλο Ἡρακληΐον το ἐν Κυνοσάργει.

Plutarch (Bellone an Pace clariores fuerint Athenienses, c. 8, p. 350) represents Miltiadês as returning to Athens on the *day after* the battle: it must have been on the same afternoon, according to the account of Herodotus.

[659] Herodot. v, 62, 63.

[660] Herodot. vi, 115. Τοῖσι Πέρσῃσι ἀναδέξαι ἀσπίδα, ἐοῦσι ἤδη ἐν τῇσι νηυσί.

[661] Herodot. viii, 109. ἡμεῖς δὲ, εὕρημα γὰρ εὑρήκαμεν ἡμέας τε καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, νέφος τοσοῦτον ἀνθρώπων ἀνωσάμενοι.

[662] Pausanias, i, 14, 4; Thucyd. i, 73. φαμὲν γὰρ Μαραθῶνί τε μόνοι προκινδυνεῦσαι τῷ βαρβάρῳ, etc.

Herodot. vi, 112. πρῶτοι τε ἀνέσχοντο ἐσθῆτά τε Μηδικὴν ὁρέοντες, καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ταύτην ἐσθημένους· τέως δὲ ἦν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι καὶ τὸ οὔνομα τὸ Μήδων φόβος ἀκοῦσαι.

It is not unworthy of remark, that the memorable oath in the oration of Demosthenês, de Coronâ, wherein he adjures the warriors of Marathon, copies the phrase of Thucydidês,—οὐ μὰ τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων, etc. (Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 60.)

[663] So the computation stands in the language of Athenian orators (Herodot. ix, 27.) It would be unfair to examine it critically.

[664] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 3. According to Cicero (Epist. ad Attic. ix, 10) and Justin (ii, 9) Hippias was killed at Marathon. Suidas (v. Ἱππίας) says that he died afterwards at Lemnos. Neither of these statements seems probable. Hippias would hardly go to Lemnos, which was an Athenian possession; and had he been slain in the battle, Herodotus would have been likely to mention it.

[665] Thucyd. i, 126.

[666] Thucyd. ii, 34.

[667] Pausan. i, 32, 3. Compare the elegy of Kritias ap. Athenæ. i, p. 28.

[668] The tumulus now existing is about thirty feet high, and two hundred yards in circumference. (Leake, on the Demi of Attica; Transactions of Royal Soc. of Literat. ii, p. 171.)

[669] Herodot. vi, 105; Pausan. i, 28, 4.

[670] Plutarch, Theseus, c. 24; Pausan. i, 32, 4.

[671] Pausan. i, 15, 4; Dêmosthen. cont. Neær. c. 25.

[672] Herodot. vi, 120; Plutarch, Camill. c. 19; De Malignit. Herodoti, c. 26, p. 862; and De Gloriâ Atheniensium, c. 7.

Boëdromion was the third month of the Attic year, which year began near about the summer solstice. The first three Attic months, Hekatombæon, Metageitnion, Boëdromion, approach (speaking in a loose manner) nearly to our July, August, September; probably the month Hekatombæon began usually at some day in the latter half of June.

From the fact that the courier Pheidippidês reached Sparta on the ninth day of the moon, and that the two thousand Spartans arrived in Attica on the third day after the full moon, during which interval the battle took place, we see that the sixth day of Boëdromion could not be the sixth day of the moon. The Attic months, though professedly lunar months, did not at this time therefore accurately correspond with the course of the moon. See Mr. Clinton, Fast. Hellen. ad an. 490 B. C. Plutarch (in the Treatise De Malign. Herodoti, above referred to) appears to have no conception of this discrepancy between the Attic month and the course of the moon. A portion of the censure which he casts on Herodotus is grounded on the assumption that the two must coincide.

M. Boeckh, following Fréret and Larcher, contests the statement of Plutarch, that the battle was fought on the sixth of the month Boëdromion, but upon reasons which appear to me insufficient. His chief argument rests upon another statement of Plutarch (derived from some lost verses of Æschylus), that the tribe Æantis had the right wing or post of honor at the battle; and that the public vote, pursuant to which the army was led out of Athens, was passed during the prytany of the tribe Æantis. He assumes, that the reason why this tribe was posted on the right wing, must have been, that it had drawn by lot the first prytany in that particular year: if this be granted, then the vote for drawing out the army must have been passed in the first prytany, or within the first thirty-five or thirty-six days of the Attic year, during the space between the first of Hekatombæon and the fifth or sixth of Metageitnion. But it is certain that the interval, which took place between the army leaving the city and the battle, was much less than one month,—we may even say less than one week. The battle, therefore, must have been fought between the sixth and tenth of Metageitnion. (Plutarch, Symposiac. i, 10, 3, and Ideler, Handbuch der Chronologie, vol. i, p. 291.) Herodotus (vi, 111) says that the tribes were arranged in line ὡς ἠριθμέοντο,—"as they were numbered,"—which is contended to mean necessarily the arrangement between them, determined by lot for the prytanies of that particular year. "In acie instruendâ (says Boeckh, Comment. ad Corp. Inscript. p. 299) Athenienses non constantem, sed variabilem secundum prytanias, ordinem secatos esse, ita ut tribus ex hoc ordine inde a dextro cornu disponerentur, docui in Commentatione de pugnâ Marathoniâ." Procemia Lect. Univ. Berolin. æstiv. a. 1816.

The Procemia here referred to I have not been able to consult, and they may therefore contain additional reasons to prove the point advanced, viz., that the order of the ten tribes in line of battle, beginning from the right wing, was conformable to their order in prytanizing, as drawn by lot for the year; but I think the passages of Herodotus and Plutarch now before us insufficient to establish this point. From the fact that the tribe Æantis had the right wing at the battle of Marathon, we are by no means warranted in inferring that that tribe had drawn by lot the earliest prytany in the year. Other reasons, in my judgment equally probable, may be assigned in explanation of the circumstance: one reason, I think, decidedly *more* probable. This reason is, that the battle was fought during the prytany of the tribe Æantis, which may be concluded from the statement of Plutarch, that the vote for marching out the army from Athens was passed during the prytany of that tribe; for the interval, between the march of the army out of the city and the battle, must have been only a very few days. Moreover, the deme Marathon belonged to the tribe Æantis (see Boeckh, ad Inscript. No. 172, p. 309): the battle being fought in their deme, the Marathonians may perhaps have claimed on this express ground the post of honor for their tribe; just as we see that at the first battle of Mantineia against the Lacedæmonians, the Mantineians were allowed to occupy the right wing or post of honor, "because the battle was fought in their territory," (Thucyd. v, 67.) Lastly, the deme Aphidnæ also belonged to the tribe Æantis (see Boeckh, *l. c.*): now the polemarch Kallimachus was an Aphidnæan (Herodot. vi, 109), and Herodotus expressly tells us, "the law or custom *then* stood among the Athenians, that the polemarch should have the right wing,"—ὁ γὰρ νόμος τότε εἶχε οὕτω τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι, τὸν πολέμαρχον ἔχειν κέρας τὸ δέξιον (vi, 111). Where the polemarch stood, there his tribe would be likely to stand: and the language of Herodotus indeed seems directly to imply that he identifies the tribe of the polemarch with the polemarch himself,—ἡγεομένου δὲ τούτου, ἐξεδέκοντο ὡς ἀριθμέοντο αἱ φυλαὶ, ἐχόμεναι ἀλλήλων,—meaning that the order of tribes began by that of the polemarch being in the leading position, and was then "taken up" by the rest "in numerical sequence,"—*i. e.* in the order of their prytanizing sequence for the year.

Here are a concurrence of reasons to explain why the tribe Æantis had the right wing at the battle of Marathon, even though it may not have been first in the order of prytanizing tribes for the year. Boeckh, therefore, is not warranted in inferring the second of these two facts from the first.

The concurrence of these three reasons, all in favor of the same conclusion, and all independent of the reason supposed by Boeckh, appears to me to have great weight; but I regard the first of the three, even singly taken, as more probable than his reason. If my view of the case be correct, the sixth day of Boëdromion, the day of battle as given by Plutarch, is not to be called in question. That day comes in the second prytany of the year, which begins about the sixth of Metageitnion, and ends about the twelfth of Boëdromion, and which must in this year have fallen to the lot of the tribe Æantis. On the first or second day of Boëdromion, the vote for marching out the army may have passed; on the sixth the battle was fought; both during the prytany of this tribe.

I am not prepared to carry these reasons farther than the particular case of the battle of Marathon, and the vindication of the day of that battle as stated by Plutarch; nor would I apply them to later periods, such as the Peloponnesian war. It is certain that the army regulations of Athens were considerably modified between the battle of Marathon and the Peloponnesian war, as well in other matters as in what regards the polemarch; and

we have not sufficient information to enable us to determine whether in that later period the Athenians followed any known or perpetual rule in the battle-order of the tribes. Military considerations, connected with the state of the particular army serving, must have prevented the constant observance of any rule: thus we can hardly imagine that Nikias, commanding the army before Syracuse, could have been tied down to any invariable order of battle among the tribes to which his hoplites belonged. Moreover, the expedition against Syracuse lasted more than one Attic year: can it be believed that Nikias, on receiving information from Athens of the sequence in which the prytanies of the tribes had been drawn by lot during the second year of his expedition, would be compelled to marshal his army in a new battle-order conformably to it? As the military operations of the Athenians became more extensive, they would find it necessary to leave such dispositions more and more to the general serving in every particular campaign. It may well be doubted whether during the Peloponnesian war *any* established rule was observed in marshalling the tribes for battle.

One great motive which induces critics to maintain that the battle was fought in the Athenian month Metageitnion, is, that that month coincides with the Spartan month Karneius, so that the refusal of the Spartans to march before the full moon, is construed to apply only to the peculiar sanctity of this last-mentioned month, instead of being a constant rule for the whole year. I perfectly agree with these critics, that the answer, given by the Spartans to the courier Pheidippidês, cannot be held to prove a regular, invariable Spartan maxim, applicable throughout the whole year, not to begin a march in the second quarter of the moon: very possibly, as Boeckh remarks, there may have been some festival impending during the particular month in question, upon which the Spartan refusal to march was founded. But no inference can be deduced from hence to disprove the sixth of Boëdromion as the day of the battle of Marathon: for though the months of every Grecian city were professedly lunar, yet they never coincided with each other exactly or long together, because the systems of intercalation adopted in different cities were different: there was great irregularity and confusion (Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 19; Aristoxenus, Harmon. ii, p. 30: compare also K. F. Hermann, Ueber die Griechische Monatskunde, p. 26, 27. Göttingen, 1844; and Boeckh, ad Corp. Inscript. t. i, p. 734).

Granting, therefore, that the answer given by the Spartans to Pheidippidês is to be construed, not as a general rule applicable to the whole year, but as referring to the particular month in which it was given,—no inference can be drawn from hence as to the day of the battle of Marathon, because either one of the two following suppositions is possible: 1. The Spartans may have had solemnities on the day of the full moon, or on the day before it, in *other months* besides Karneius; 2. Or the full moon of the Spartan Karneius may actually have fallen, in the year 490 B. C., on the fifth or sixth of the Attic month Boëdromion.

Dr. Thirlwall appears to adopt the view of Boeckh, but does not add anything material to the reasons in its favor (Hist. of Gr. vol. ii, Append. iii, p. 488).

[673] Herodot. vi, 119. Darius—σφέας τῆς Κισσίης χώρης κατοίκισε ἐν σταθμῷ ἑωϋτοῦ τῷ οὔνομα ἐστὶ Ἀρδέρικκα—ἐνθαῦτα τοὺς Ἐρετριέας κατοίκισε Δαρεῖος, οἳ καὶ μέχρι ἐμέο εἶχον τὴν χώρην ταύτην, φυλάσοντες τὴν ἀρχαίην γλῶσσαν. The meaning of the word σταθμὸς is explained by Herodot. v, 52. σταθμὸς ἑωϋτοῦ is the same as σταθμὸς βασιλήϊος: the particulars which Herodotus recounts about Arderikka, and its remarkable well, or pit of bitumen, salt, and oil, give every reason to believe that he had himself stopped there.

Strabo places the captive Eretrians in Gordyênê, which would be considerably higher up the Tigris; upon whose authority, we do not know (Strabo, xv, p. 747).

The many particulars which are given respecting the descendants of these Eretrians in Kissia, by Philostratus, in his Life of Apollonius of Tyana, as they are alleged to have stood even in the first century of the Christian era, cannot be safely quoted. With all the fiction there contained, some truth may perhaps be mingled; but we cannot discriminate it (Philostratus, Vit. Apollon. i, c. 24-30).

[674] Herodot. vi, 133. ἔπλεε ἐπὶ Πάρον, πρόφασιν ἔχων ὡς οἱ Πάριοι ὕπηρξαν πρότεροι στρατευόμενοι τριήρεϊ ἐς Μαραθῶνα ἅμα τῷ Πέρσῃ. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ πρόσχημα τοῦ λόγου ἦν· ἀτάρ τινα καὶ ἔγκοτον εἶχε τοῖσι Παρίοισι διὰ Λυσαγόρεα τὸν Τισίεω, ἐόντα γένος Πάριον, διαβαλόντα μιν πρὸς Ὑδάρνεα τὸν Πέρσην.

[675] Ephorus (Fragm. 107, ed. Didot; ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Πάρος) gave an account of this expedition in several points different from Herodotus, which latter I here follow. The authority of Herodotus is preferable in every respect; the more so, since Ephorus gives his narrative as a sort of explanation of the peculiar phrase ἀναπαριάζειν. Explanatory narratives of that sort are usually little worthy of attention.

[676] Herodot. vi, 136. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἐκ Πάρου Μιλτιάδεα ἀπονοστήσαντα ἔσχον ἐν στόμασι, οἵ τε ἄλλοι, καὶ μάλιστα Ξάνθιππος ὁ Ἀρίφρονος· ὃς θανάτου ὑπαγαγὼν ὑπὸ τὸν δῆμον Μιλτιάδεα, ἐδίωκε τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἀπάτης

εἵνεκεν. Μιλτιάδης δὲ, αὐτὸς μὲν παρεὼν, οὐκ ἀπελογέετο· ἦν γὰρ ἀδύνατος, ὥστε σηπομένου τοῦ μηροῦ. Προκειμένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐν κλίνῃ, ὑπεραπελογέοντο οἱ φίλοι, τῆς μάχης τε τῆς ἐν Μαραθῶνι γενομένης πολλὰ ἐπιμεμνημένοι, καὶ τὴν Λήμνου αἵρεσιν· ὡς ἑλὼν Λῆμνόν τε καὶ τισάμενος τοὺς Πελασγοὺς, παρέδωκε Ἀθηναίοισι. Προσγενομένου δὲ τοῦ δήμου αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τοῦ θανάτου, ζημιώσαντος δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀδικίην πεντήκοντα ταλάντοισι, Μιλτιάδης μὲν μετὰ ταῦτα, σφακελίσαντός τε τοῦ μηροῦ καὶ σαπέντος, τελευτᾷ· τὰ δὲ πεντήκοντα τάλαντα ἐξέτισεν ὁ πάϊς αὐτοῦ Κίμων.

Plato (Gorgias, c. 153, p. 516) says that the Athenians passed a vote to cast Miltiadês into the barathrum (ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο), and that he would have been actually thrown in, if it had not been for the prytanis, *i. e.* the president, by turn for that day, of the prytanizing senators and of the ekklesia. The prytanis may perhaps have been among those who spoke to the dikastery on behalf of Miltiadês, deprecating the proposition made by Xanthippus; but that he should have caused a vote once passed to be actually rescinded, is incredible. The Scholiast on Aristeidês (cited by Valckenaer ad Herodot. vi, 136) reduces the exaggeration of Plato to something more reasonable—Ὅτε γὰρ ἐκρίνετο Μιλτιάδης ἐπὶ τῇ Πάρῳ, ἠθέλσαν αὐτὸν κατακρημνίσαι· ὁ δὲ πρύτανις εἰσελθὼν ἐξητήσατο αὐτὸν.

[677] That this was the habitual course of Attic procedure in respect to public indictments, wherever a positive amount of penalty was not previously determined, appears certain. See Platner, Prozess und Klagen bei den Attikern, Abschn. vi, vol. i, p. 201; Heffter, Die Athenäische Gerichtsverfassung, p. 334. Meier and Schömann (Der Attische Prozess, b. iv, p. 725) maintain that any one of the dikasts might propose a third measure of penalty, distinct from that proposed by the accuser as well as the accused. In respect to public indictments, this opinion appears decidedly incorrect; but where the sentence to be pronounced involved a compensation for private wrong and an estimate of damages, we cannot so clearly determine whether there was not sometimes a greater latitude in originating propositions for the dikasts to vote upon. It is to be recollected that these dikasts were several hundred, sometimes even more, in number,—that there was no discussion or deliberation among them,—and that it was absolutely necessary for some distinct proposition to be laid before them to take a vote upon. In regard to some offences, the law expressly permitted what was called a προστίμημα; that is, after the dikasts had pronounced the full penalty demanded by the accuser, any other citizen who thought the penalty so imposed insufficient, might call for a certain limited amount of additional penalty, and require the dikasts to vote upon it,—ay or no. The votes of the dikasts were given, by depositing pebbles in two casks, under certain arrangements of detail.

The ἀγὼν τιμητὸς, δίκη τιμητὸς, or trial including this separate admeasurement of penalty,—as distinguished from the δίκη ἀτίμητος, or trial where the penalty was predetermined, and where was no τίμησις, or vote of admeasurement of penalty,—is an important line of distinction in the subject-matter of Attic procedure; and the practice of calling on the accused party, after having been pronounced guilty, to impose upon himself a *counter-penalty* or *under-penalty* (ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι or ὑποτιμᾶθαι) in contrast with that named by the accuser, was a convenient expedient for bringing the question to a substantive vote of the dikasts. Sometimes accused persons found it convenient to name very large penalties on themselves, in order to escape a capital sentence invoked by the accuser (see Dêmosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 34, p. 743, R). Nor was there any fear, as Platner imagines, that in the generality of cases the dikasts would be left under the necessity of choosing between an extravagant penalty and something merely nominal; for the interest of the accused party himself would prevent this from happening. Sometimes we see him endeavoring by entreaties to prevail upon the accuser voluntarily to abate something of the penalty which he had at first named; and the accuser might probably do this, if he saw that the dikasts were not likely to go along with that first proposition.

In one particular case, of immortal memory, that which Platner contemplates actually did happen; and the death of Sokratês was the effect of it. Sokratês, having been found guilty, only by a small majority of votes among the dikasts, was called upon to name a penalty upon himself, in opposition to that of death, urged by Melêtus. He was in vain entreated by his friends to name a fine of some tolerable amount, which they would at once have paid in his behalf; but he would hardly be prevailed upon to name any penalty at all, affirming that he had deserved honor rather than punishment: at last, he named a fine so small in amount, as to be really tantamount to an acquittal. Indeed, Xenophon states that he would not name any counter-penalty at all; and in the speech ascribed to him, he contended that he had even merited the signal honor of a public maintenance in the prytaneium (Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 27; Xenoph. Apol. Sok. 23; Diogen. Laërt. ii, 41). Plato and Xenophon do not agree; but taking the two together, it would seem that he must have named a very small fine. There can be little doubt that this circumstance, together with the tenor of his defence, caused the dikasts to vote for the proposition of Melêtus.

[678] Cornelius Nepos, Miltiadês, c. 7; and Kimon, c. 1; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 4; Diodorus, Fragment. lib. x. All these authors probably drew from the same original fountain; perhaps Ephorus (see Marx, ad Ephori Fragmenta, p. 212); but we have no means of determining. Respecting the alleged imprisonment of Kimon, however, they must have copied from different authorities, for their statements are all different. Diodorus states, that Kimon put himself voluntarily into prison after his father had died there, because he was not permitted on any other condition to obtain the body of his deceased father for burial. Cornelius Nepos affirms that he was imprisoned, as being legally liable to the state for the unpaid fine of his father. Lastly, Plutarch does not represent him as having been put into prison at all. Many of the Latin writers follow the statement of Diodorus: see the citations in Bos's note on the above passage of Cornelius Nepos.

There can be no hesitation in adopting the account of Plutarch as the true one. Kimon neither was, nor could be, in prison, by the Attic law, for an unpaid fine of his father; but after his father's death, he became liable for the fine, in this sense,—that he remained disfranchised (ἄτιμος) and excluded from his rights as a citizen, until the fine was paid: see Dêmosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 46, p. 762, R.

[679] See Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, b. iii, ch. 13, p. 390, Engl. Transl. (vol. i, p. 420, Germ.); Meier und Schömann, Attisch. Prozess, p. 744. Dr. Thirlwall takes a different view of this point, with which I cannot concur (Hist. Gr. vol. iii, Append. ii, p. 488); though his general remarks on the trial of Miltiadês are just and appropriate (ch. xiv, p. 273).

Cornelius Nepos (Miltiadês, c. 8; Kimon, c. 3) says that the misconduct connected with Paros was only a pretence with the Athenians for punishing Miltiadês; their real motive, he affirms, was envy and fear, the same feelings which dictated the ostracism of Kimon. How little there is to justify this fancy, may be seen even from the nature of the punishment inflicted. Fear would have prompted them to send away or put to death Miltiadês, not to fine him. The ostracism, which was dictated by fear, was a temporary banishment.

[680] The interval between his trial and his decease is expressed in Herodotus (vi, 136) by the difference between the present participle σηπομένου and the past participle σαπέντος τοῦ μηροῦ.

[681] Machiavel, Discorsi sopra Tito Livio, cap. 58. "L' opinione contro ai popoli nasce, perchè dei popoli ciascun dice male senza paura, e liberamente ancora mentre che regnano: dei principi si parla sempre con mille timori e mille rispetti."

[682] Machiavel will not even admit so much as *this*, in the clear and forcible statement which he gives of the question here alluded to: he contends that the man who has rendered services ought to be recompensed for them, but that he ought to be punished for subsequent crime just as if the previous services had not been rendered. He lays down this position in discussing the conduct of the Romans towards the victorious survivor of the three Horatii, after the battle with the Curiatii: "Erano stati i meriti di Orazio grandissimi, avendo con la sua virtù vinti i Curiazi. Era stato il fallo suo atroce, avendo morto la sorella. Nondimeno dispiacque tanto tale omicidio ai Romani, che lo condussero a disputare della vita, non ostante che gli meriti suoi fussero tanto grandi e si freschi. La qual cosa, a chi superficialmente la considerasse, parrebbe uno esempio d' ingratitudine popolare. Nondimeno chi lo esaminerà meglio, e con migliore considerazione ricercherà quali debbono essere gli' ordini delle republiche, biasimearà quel popolo piuttosto per averlo assoluto, che per averlo voluto condannare: e la ragione è questa, che nessuna republica bene ordinata, non mai cancellò i demeriti con gli meriti dei suoi cittadini: ma avendo ordinati i premi ad una buona opera, e le pene ad una cattiva, ed avendo premiato uno per aver bene operato, se quel medesimo opera dipoi male, lo gastiga senza avere riguardo alcuno alle sue buone opere. E quando questi ordini sono bene osservati, una città vive libera molto tempo: altrimenti sempre rovinera presto. *Perchè se, ad un cittadino che abbia fatto qualche egregia opere per la città, si aggiunge oltre alla riputazione, che quella cosa gli arreca, una audacia e confidenza di potere senza temer pena, far qualche opera non buona, diventerà in breve tempo tanto insolente, che si risolverà ogni civiltà.*"—Machiavel, Discorsi sop. Tit. Livio, ch. 24.

[683] Machiavel, in the twenty-ninth chapter of his Discorsi sopra T. Livio, examines the question, "Which of the two is more open to the charge of being ungrateful,—a popular government, or a king?" He thinks that the latter is more open to it. Compare chapter fifty-nine of the same work, where he again supports a similar opinion.

M. Sismondi also observes, in speaking of the long attachment of the city of Pisa to the cause of the emperors and to the Ghibelin party: "Pise montra dans plus d'une occasion, par sa constance à supporter la cause des empereurs au milieu des revers, combien la reconnoissance lie un peuple libre d'une manière plus puissante et plus durable qu'elle ne sauroit lier le peuple gouverné par un seul homme." (Histoire des Républ. Italiennes, ch. xiii, tom. ii, p. 302.)

[684] Dêmosthenês, Olynth. iii, c. 9, p. 35, R.

[685] This is the general truth, which ancient authors often state, both partially, and in exaggerated terms as to degree: "Hæc est natura multitudinis (says Livy); aut humiliter servit aut superbe dominatur." Again, Tacitus: "Nihil in vulgo modicum; terrere, ni paveant; ubi pertimuerint, impune contemni." (Annal. i, 29.) Herodotus, iii, 81. ὠθέει δὲ (ὁ δῆμος) ἐμπεσὼν τὰ πρήγματα ἄνευ νοῦ, χειμάῤῥῳ ποταμῷ ἴκελος.

It is remarkable that Aristotle, in his Politica, takes little or no notice of this attribute belonging to every numerous assembly. He seems rather to reason as if the aggregate intelligence of the multitude was represented by the sum total of each man's separate intelligence in all the individuals composing it (Polit. iii, 6, 4, 10, 12); just as the property of the multitude, taken collectively, would be greater than that of the few rich. He takes no notice of the difference between a number of individuals judging jointly and judging separately: I do not, in-

deed, observe that such omission leads him into any positive mistake, but it occurs in some cases calculated to surprise us, and where the difference here adverted to is important to notice: see Politic. iii, 10, 5, 6.

[686] Thucyd. ii, 65. Ὅποτε γοῦν αἴσθοιτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησσεν πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι· καὶ δεδιότας αὖ ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν.

[687] Such swing of the mind, from one intense feeling to another, is always deprecated by the Greek moralists, from the earliest to the latest: even Demokritus, in the fifth century B. C., admonishes against it,—Αἱ ἐκ μεγάλων διαστημάτων κινεόμεναι τῶν ψυχῶν οὔτε εὐσταθέες εἰσὶν, οὔτε εὔθυμοι. (Democriti Fragmenta, lib. iii, p. 168, ed. Mullach ap. Stobæum, Florileg. i, 40.)

[688] The letters of Bentley against Boyle, discussing the pretended Epistles of Phalaris,—full of acuteness and learning, though beyond measure excursive,—are quite sufficient to teach us that little can be safely asserted about Phalaris. His date is very imperfectly ascertained. Compare Bentley, pp. 82, 83, and Seyfert, Akragas und sein Gebiet, p. 60: the latter assigns the reign of Phalaris to the years 570-554 B. C. It is surprising to see Seyfert citing the letters of the pseudo-Phalaris as an authority, after the exposure of Bentley.

[689] Pindar. Pyth. 1 *ad fin*, with the Scholia, p. 310, ed. Boeckh; Polyb. xii, 25; Diodor. xiii, 99; Cicero cont. Verr. iv, 33. The contradiction of Timæus is noway sufficient to make us doubt the authenticity of the story. Ebert (Σικελίων, part ii, pp. 41-84, Königsberg, 1829) collects all the authorities about the bull of Phalaris. He believes the matter of fact substantially. Aristotle (Rhetoric, ii, 20) tells a story of the fable, whereby Stêsichorus the poet dissuaded the inhabitants of Himera from granting a guard to Phalaris: Conon (Narrat. 42 ap. Photium) recounts the same story with the name of Hiero substituted for that of Phalaris. But it is not likely that either the one or the other could ever have been in such relations with the citizens of *Himera*. Compare Polybius, vii, 7, 2.

[690] Polyæn. v, 1, 1; Cicero de Officiis, ii, 7.

[691] Plutarch, Philosophand. cum Principibus, c. 3, p. 778.

[692] The less these problems are adapted for rational solution, the more nobly do they present themselves in the language of a great poem; see as a specimen, Euripidês, Fragment. 101, ed. Dindorf.

Ὄλβιος ὅστις τῆς ἱστορίας
Ἔσχε μάθησιν, μήτε πολιτῶν
Ἐπὶ πημοσύνῃ, μήτ᾽ εἰς ἀδίκους
Πράξεις ὁρμῶν·
Ἀλλ᾽ ἀθανάτου καθορῶν φύσεως
Κόσμον ἀγήρω, πῇ τε συνέστη
Καὶ ὅπη καὶ ὅπως.
Τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις οὐδέποτ᾽ αἰσχρῶν
Ἔργων μελέτημα προσίζει.

[693] Vol. i, ch. xvi.

[694] Diogen. Laërt. i, 23; Herodot. i, 75; Apuleius, Florid. iv, p. 144, Bip.

Proclus, in his Commentary on Euclid, specifies several propositions said to have been discovered by Thalês (Brandis, Handbuch der Gr. Philos. ch. xxviii, p. 110).

[695] Aristotel. Metaphys. i, 3; Plutarch, Placit. Philos. i, 3, p. 875. ὃς ἐξ ὕδατος φησὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ εἰς ὕδωρ πάντα ἀναλύεσθαι.

[696] Aristotel. *ut supra*, and De Cœlo, ii, 13.

[697] Aristotel. De Animâ, i, 2-5; Cicero, De Legg. ii, 11; Diogen. Laërt. i, 24.

[698] Aristotel. De Animâ, i, 2; Alexander Aphrodis. in Aristotel. Metaphys. 1, 3.

[699] Apollodorus, in the second century B. C., had before him some brief expository treatises of Anaximander (Diogen. Laërt. ii, 2): Περὶ Φύσεως, Γῆς Περίοδον, Περὶ τῶν Ἀπλανῶν καὶ Σφαῖραν καὶ ἄλλα τινά. Suidas, v. Ἀναξίμανδρος. Themistius. Orat. xxv, p. 317: ἐθάῤῥησε πρῶτος ὧν ἴσμεν Ἑλλήνων λόγον ἐξενεγκεῖν περὶ Φύσεως συγγεγραμμένον.

[700] Irenæus, ii, 19, (14) ap. Brandis, Handbuch der Geschichte der Griech. Röm. Philos. ch. xxxv, p. 133: "Anaximander hoc quod immensum est, omnium initium subjecit, seminaliter habens in semetipso omnium genesin, ex quo immensos mundos constare ait." Aristotel. Physic. Auscult. iii, 4, p. 203, Bek. οὔτε γὰρ μάτην αὐτὸ οἷόν τε εἶναι (τὸ ἄπειρον), οὔτε ἄλλην ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δύναμιν, πλὴν ὡς ἀρχήν. Aristotle subjects this ἄπειρον to an elaborate discussion, in which he says very little more about Anaximander, who appears to have assumed it without anticipating discussion or objections. Whether Anaximander called his ἄπειρον divine, or god, as Tennemann (Gesch. Philos. i, 2, p. 67) and Panzerbieter affirm (ad Diogenis Apolloniat. Fragment. c. 13, p. 16,) I think doubtful: this is rather an inference which Aristotle elicits from his language. Yet in another passage, which is difficult to reconcile, Aristotle ascribes to Anaximander the water-doctrine of Thalês, (Aristotel. de Xenophane, p. 975. Bek.)

Anaximander seems to have followed speculations analogous to those of Thalês, in explaining the first production of the human race (Plutarch Placit. Philos. v, 19, p. 908), and in other matters (ibid. iii, 16, p. 896).

[701] Aristotel. De Generat. et Destruct. c. 3, p. 317, Bek. ὃ μάλιστα φοβούμενοι διετέλεσαν οἱ πρῶτοι φιλοσοφήσαντες, τὸ ἐκ μηδενὸς γίνεσθαι προϋπάρχοντος· compare Physic. Auscultat. i, 4, p. 187, Bek.

[702] Simplicius in Aristotel. Physic. fol. 6, 32. πρῶτος αὐτὸς Ἀρχὴν ὀνομάσας τὸ ὑποκείμενον.

[703] Diogen. Laërt. ii, 81, 2. He agreed with Thalês in maintaining that the earth was stationary, (Aristotel. de Cœlo, ii, 13, p. 295, ed. Bekk.)

[704] Diogen. Laërt. ix, 18.

[705] Diogen. Laërt. ix, 22; Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. i, p. 294.

[706] Sextus Empiricus, adv. Mathem. ix, 193.

[707] Aristot. Metaphys. i, 5, p. 986, Bek. Ξενοφάνης δὲ πρῶτος τούτων ἐνίσας, οὐθὲν διεσαφήνισεν, οὐδὲ τῆς φύσεως τούτων (τοῦ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην) οὐδετέρας ἔοικε θιγεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας τὸ ἓν εἶναί φησι τὸν θεόν.

Plutarch. ap. Eusebium Præparat. Evangel. i, 8. Ξενοφάνης δὲ ὁ Κολοφώνιος ἰδίαν μέν τινα ὁδὸν πεπορευμένος καὶ παρηλλαχυῖαν πάντας τοὺς προειρημένους, οὔτε γένεσιν οὔτε φθορὰν ἀπολείπει, ἀλλ᾽ εἶναι λέγει τὸ πᾶν ἀεὶ ὅμοιον. Compare Timon ap. Sext. Empiric. Pyrrh. Hypotyp. i, 224, 225. ἐδογμάτιζε δὲ ὁ Ξενοφάνης παρὰ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων προλήψεις, ἓν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τὸν θεὸν συμφυῆ τοῖς πᾶσιν· εἶναι δὲ σφαιροειδὴ καὶ ἀπαθῆ καὶ ἀμετάβλητον καὶ λογικόν, (Airstot. de Xenoph. c. 3, p. 977, Bek.). Ἀδύνατόν φησιν (ὁ Ξενοφάνης) εἶναι, εἴ τι ἐστὶν, γενέσθαι, etc.

One may reasonably doubt whether all the arguments ascribed to Xenophanês, in the short but obscure treatise last quoted, really belong to him.

[708] Clemens Alexand. Stromat. v, p. 601, vii, p. 711.

[709] Aristot. Metaphysic. i, 5, p. 986, Bek. μικρὸν ἀγροικότερος.

[710] Xenophanês, Fr. xiv, ed. Mullach; Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathematicos, vii, 49-110; and Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. i, 224; Plutarch adv. Colôtên, p. 1114; compare Karsten ad Parmenidis Fragmenta, p. 146.

[711] See Brandis, Handbuch der Griech. Röm. Philosophie, ch. xxii.

[712] Herodot. iv, 95. The place of his nativity is certain from Herodotus, but even this fact was differently stated by other authors, who called him a Tyrrhenian of Lemnos or Imbros (Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. c. 1-10), a Syrian, a Phliasian, etc.

Cicero (De Repub. ii, 15: compare Livy, i, 18) censures the chronological blunder of those who made Pythagoras the preceptor of Numa; which certainly is a remarkable illustration how much confusion prevailed among literary men of antiquity about the dates of events even of the sixth century B. C. Ovid follows this story without hesitation: see Metamorph. xv, 60, with Burmann's note.

[713] Cicero de Fin. v, 29; Diogen. Laërt. viii, 3; Strabo, xiv, p. 638; Alexander Polyhistor ap. Cyrill. cont. Julian. iv, p. 128, ed. Spanh. For the vast reach of his supposed travels, see Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. 11; Jamblic 14, *seqq.*

The same extensive journeys are ascribed to Demokritus, Diogen. Laërt. ix, 35.

[714] The connection of Pythagoras with Pherekydês is noticed by Aristoxenus ap. Diogen. Laërt. i, 118, viii, 2; Cicero de Divinat. i, 13.

[715] Xenophanês, Fragm. 7, ed. Schneidewin; Diogen. Laërt. viii, 36: compare Aulus Gellius, iv, 11 (we must remark that this or a like doctrine is not peculiar to Pythagoreans, but believed by the poet Pindar, Olymp. ii, 68, and Fragment, Thren. x, as well as by the philosopher Pherekydês, Porphyrius de Antro Nympharum, c. 31).

Καί ποτέ μιν στυφελιζομένου σκύλακος παριόντα

Φασὶν ἐποικτεῖραι, καὶ τόδε φάσθαι ἔπος—

Παῦσαι, μηδὲ ῥάπιζ᾽· ἐπεὶη φίλου ἄνερός ἐστι

Ψυχὴ, τὴν ἔγνων φθεγξαμένης ἀΐων.

Consult also Sextus Empiricus, viii, 286, as to the κοινωνία between gods, men and animals, believed both by Pythagoras and Empedoklês. That Herodotus (ii, 123) alludes to Orpheus and Pythagoras, though refraining designedly from mentioning names, there can hardly be any doubt: compare ii, 81; also Aristotle, De Animâ, i, 3, 23.

The testimony of Hêrakleitus is contained in Diogenes Laërtius, viii, 6; ix, 1. Ἡρακλεῖτος γοῦν ὁ φυσικὸς μονονουχὶ κέκραγε καὶ φησι· Πυθαγόρης Μνησάρχου ἱστορίην ἤσκησεν ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πάντων, καὶ ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγραφὰς, ἐποιήσατο ἑαυτοῦ σοφίην, πολυμαθείην, κακοτεχνίην. Again, Πολυμαθὶη νόον οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην, αὖθις δὲ Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἑκαταῖον.

Dr. Thirlwall conceives Xenophanês as having intended in the passage above cited to treat the doctrine of the metempsychosis "with deserved ridicule." (Hist. of Greece, ch. xii, vol. ii, p. 162.) Religious opinions are so apt to appear ridiculous to those who do not believe them, that such a suspicion is not unnatural; yet I think, if Xenophanês had been so disposed, he would have found more ridiculous examples among the many which this doctrine might suggest. Indeed, it seems hardly possible to present the metempsychosis in a more touching or respectable point of view than that which the lines of his poem set forth. The particular animal selected is that one between whom and man the sympathy is most marked and reciprocal, while the doctrine is made to enforce a practical lesson against cruelty.

[716] Herodot. i, 29; ii, 49; iv, 95. Ἑλλήνων οὐ τῷ ἀσθενεστάτῳ σοφιστῇ Πυθαγόρῃ. Hippokratês distinguishes the σοφιστὴς from the ἰητρὸς, though both of them had handled the subject of medicine,—the general from the special habits of investigation. (Hippokratês, Περὶ ἀρχαίης ἰητρικῆς, c. 20, vol. i, p. 620, Littré.)

[717] See Lobeck's learned and valuable treatise, Aglaophamus, Orphica, lib. ii, pp. 247, 698, 900; also Plato, Legg. vi, 782, and Euripid. Hippol. 946.

[718] Plato's conception of Pythagoras (Republ. x, p. 600) depicts him as something not unlike St. Benedict, or St. Francis, (or St. Elias, as some Carmelites have tried to make out: see Kuster ad Jamblich. c. 3)—Ἀλλὰ δὴ, εἰ μὴ δημοσίᾳ, ἰδίᾳ τισὶν ἡγεμὼν παιδείας αὐτὸς ζῶν λέγεται Ὅμηρος γενέσθαι, οἱ ἐκεῖνον ἠγάπων ἐπὶ συνουσίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ὑστέροις ὁδόν τινα βίου παρέδοσαν Ὁμηρικὴν· ὥσπερ Πυθαγόρας αὐτός τε διαφερόντως ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἠγαπήθη, καὶ οἱ ὕστερον ἔτι καὶ νῦν Πυθαγορεῖον τροπὸν ἐπονομάζοντες τοῦ βίου διαφανεῖς πῃ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.

The description of Melampus, given in Herodot. ii, 49, very much fills up the idea of Pythagoras, as derived from ii, 81-123, and iv, 95. Pythagoras, as well as Melampus, was said to have pretended to divination and prophecy (Cicero, Divinat. i, 3, 46; Porphyr. Vit. Pyth. c. 29: compare Krische, De Societate a Pythagorâ in urbe Crotoniatarum conditâ Commentatio, ch. v, p. 72, Göttingen, 1831).

[719] Brandis, Handbuch der Geschichte der Griechisch. Rom. Philosophie, part i, sect. xlvii, p. 191.

[720] Ælian. V. H. ii, 26; Jamblichus, Vit. Pyth. c. 31, 140; Porphyry, Vit. Pyth. c. 20; Diodorus, Fragm. lib. x, vol. iv, p. 56, Wess.: Timon ap. Diogen. Laërt. viii, 36; and Plutarch, Numa, c. 8.

Πυθαγόρην τε γόητος ἀποκλίναντ᾽ ἐπὶ δόξαν

Θήρῃ ἐπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων, σεμνηγορίης ὀαριστὴν.

[721] Isokratês, Busiris, p. 402, ed. Auger. Πυθαγόρας ὁ Σάμιος, ἀφικόμενος εἰς Αἴγυπτον, καὶ μαθητὴς τῶν ἱερέων γενόμενος, τήν τε ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτος εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐκόμισε, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τὰς ἁγιστείας ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἐπιφανέστερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐσπούδασε.

Compare Aristotel. Magn. Moralia, i, 1, about Pythagoras as an ethical teacher. Dêmokritus, born about 460 B. C., wrote a treatise (now lost) respecting Pythagoras, whom he greatly admired: as far as we can judge, it would seem that he too must have considered Pythagoras as an ethical teacher (Diogen. Laërt. xi, 38; Mullach, Democriti Fragmenta, lib. ii, p. 113; Cicero de Orator. iii, 15).

[722] Jamblichus, Vit. Pyth. c. 64, 115, 151, 199: see also the idea ascribed to Pythagoras, of divine inspirations coming on men (ἐπίπνοια παρὰ τοῦ δαιμονίου). Aristoxenus apud Stobæum, Eclog. Physic. p. 206; Diogen. Laërt. viii, 32.

Meiners establishes it as probable that the stories respecting the miraculous powers and properties of Pythagoras got into circulation either during his lifetime, or at least not long after his death (Geschichte der Wissenschaften, b. iii, vol. i, pp. 504, 505).

[723] Respecting Philolaus, see the valuable collection of his fragments, and commentary on them, by Boeckh (Philolaus des Pythagoreers Leben, Berlin, 1819). That Philolaus was the first who composed a work on Pythagorean science, and thus made it known beyond the limits of the brotherhood—among others to Plato—appears well established (Boeckh, Philolaus, p. 22; Diogen. Laërt. viii, 15-55; Jamblichus, c. 119). Simmias and Kebês, fellow-disciples of Plato under Sokratês, had held intercourse with Philolaus at Thebes (Plato, Phædon, p. 61), perhaps about 420 B. C. The Pythagorean brotherhood had then been dispersed in various parts of Greece, though the attachment of its members to each other seems to have continued long afterwards.

[724] Plutarch, De Isid. et Osirid. p. 384, ad fin. Quintilian, Instit. Oratt. ix, 4.

[725] Empedoklês, ap. Aristot. Rhetoric. i, 14, 2; Sextus Empiric. ix, 127; Plutarch, De Esu Carnium, pp. 993, 996, 997; where he puts Pythagoras and Empedoklês together, as having both held the doctrine of the metempsychosis, and both prohibited the eating of animal food. Empedoklês supposed that plants had souls, and that the souls of human beings passed after death into plants as well as into animals. "I have been myself heretofore (said he) a boy, a girl, a shrub, a bird, and a fish of the sea."

ἤδη γάρ ποτ᾽ ἐγὼ γενόμην κοῦρός τε κόρη τε,

θάμνος τ᾽, οἰωνός τε καὶ ἐξ ἁλὸς ἔμπυρος ἰχθύς.

(Diogen. L. viii, 77; Sturz. ad Empedokl. Frag. p. 466.) Pythagoras is said to have affirmed that he had been not only Euphorbus in the Grecian army before Troy, but also a tradesman, a courtezan, etc., and various other human characters, before his actual existence; he did not, however, extend the same intercommunion to plants, in any case.

The abstinence from animal food was an Orphic precept as well as a Pythagorean (Aristophan. Ran. 1032).

[726] Strabo, vi, p. 263; Diogen. L. viii, 40.

[727] Diogen. Laërt. ix, 18.

[728] Herodot. iii, 131; Strabo, vi, p. 261: Menander de Encomiis, p. 96, ed. Heeren. Ἀθηναίους ἐπὶ ἀγαλματοποιΐα τε καὶ ζωγραφικῇ, καὶ Κροτωνιάτας ἐπὶ ἰατρικῇ, μέγα φρονῆσαι, etc.

The Krotoniate Alkmæon, a younger contemporary of Pythagoras (Aristotel. Metaph. i, 5), is among the earliest names mentioned as philosophizing upon physical and medical subjects. See Brandis, Handbuch der Geschicht. der Philos. sect. lxxxiii, p. 508, and Aristotel. De Generat. Animal. iii, 2, p. 752, Bekker.

The medical art in Egypt, at the time when Pythagoras visited that country, was sufficiently far advanced to excite the attention of an inquisitive traveller,—the branches of it minutely subdivided and strict rules laid down for practice (Herodot. ii, 84; Aristotel. Politic, iii, 10, 4).

[729] See the analogy of the two strikingly brought out in the treatise of Hippokratês Περὶ ἀρχαίης ἰητρικῆς, c. 3, 4, 7, vol. i, p. 580-584, ed. Littré.

Ἔτι γοῦν καὶ νῦν οἱ τῶν γυμνασίων τε καὶ ἀσκησίων ἐπιμελόμενοι αἰεί τι προσεξευρίσκουσι, καὶ τὴν αὐτέην ὁδὸν ζητέοντες ὅ,τι ἔδων καὶ πίνων ἐπικρατήσει τε αὐτέων μάλιστα, καὶ ἰσχυρότερος αὐτὸς ἑωϋτοῦ ἔσται (p. 580); again, p. 584: Τί οὖν φαίνεται ἑτεροῖον διανοηθεὶς ὁ καλεύμενος ἰητρὸς καὶ ὁμολογεομένως χειροτέχνης, ὃς ἐξεῦρε τὴν ἀμφὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας δίαιτάν καὶ τροφὴν, ἢ κεῖνος ὁ ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς τοῖσι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποισι τροφὴν, ἣ νῦν χρεόμεθα, ἐξ ἐκείνης τῆς ἀγρίης τε καὶ θηριώδεος εὑρών τε καὶ παρασκευάσας διαίτης: compare another passage, not less illustrative, in the treatise of Hippokratês Περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων, c. 3, vol. ii, p. 245, ed. Littré.

Following the same general idea, that the theory and practice of the physician is a farther development and variety of that of the gymnastic trainer, I transcribe some observations from the excellent Remarques Rétrospectives of M. Littré, at the end of the fourth volume of his edition of Hippokratês (p. 662).

After having observed (p. 659) that physiology may be considered as divided into two parts,—one relating to the mechanism of the functions; the other, to the effects produced upon the human body by the different influences which act upon it and the media by which it is surrounded; and after having observed that on the first of these two branches the ancients could never make progress from their ignorance of anatomy,—he goes on to state, that respecting the second branch they acquired a large amount of knowledge:—

"Sur la physiologie des influences extérieures, la Grèce du temps d'Hippocrate et après lui fut le théâtre d'expériences en grand, les plus importantes et les plus instructives. Toute la population (la population libre, s'entend) étoit soumise à un système régulier d'éducation physique (N. B. this is a little too strongly stated): dans quelques cités, à Lacédémone par exemple, les femmes n'en étoient pas exemptées. Ce système se composoit d'exercices et d'une alimentation, que combinèrent l'empirisme d'abord, puis une théorie plus savante: il concernoit (comme dit Hippocrate lui-même, en ne parlant, il est vrai, que de la partie alimentaire), il concernoit et les malades pour leur rétablissement, et les gens bien portans pour la conservation de leur santé, et les personnes livrées aux exercices gymnastiques pour l'accroissement de leurs forces. On savoit au juste ce qu'il falloit pour conserver seulement le corps en bon état ou pour traiter un malade—pour former un militaire ou pour faire un athlète—et en particulier, un lutteur, un coureur, un sauteur, un pugiliste. Une classe d'hommes, les maîtres des gymnases, étoient exclusivement adonnés à la culture de cet art, auquel les médecins participoient dans les limites de leur profession, et Hippocrate, qui dans les Aphorismes, invoque l'exemple des athlètes, nous parle dans le Traité des Articulations des personnes maigres, qui n'ayant pas été amaigris par un procédé régulier de l'art, ont les chairs muqueuses. Les anciens médecins savoient, comme on le voit, procurer l'amaigrissement conformément à l'art, et reconnoitre à ses effets un amaigrissement irrégulier: toutes choses auxquelles nos médecins sont étrangers, et dont on ne retrouve l'analogue que parmi les *entraineurs* Anglois. Au reste cet ensemble de connoissances empiriques et théoriques doit être mis au rang des pertes fâcheuses qui ont accompagné la longue et turbulente transition du monde ancien an monde moderne. Les admirables institutions destinées dans l'antiquité à développer et affermir le corps, ont disparu: l'hygiène publique est déstituée à cet égard de toute direction scientifique et générale, et demeure abandonnée complètement au hasard."

See also the remarks of Plato respecting Herodikus, De Republicâ, iii, p. 406; Aristotel. Politic. iii, 11, 6; iv, 1, 1; viii, 4, 1.

[730] Valerius Maxim. viii, 15, xv, 1; Jamblichus, Vit. Pyth. c. 45; Timæus, Fragm. 78, ed. Didot.

[731] Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. c. 21-54; Jamblich. 33-35, 166.

[732] The compilations of Porphyry and Jamblichus on the life of Pythagoras, copied from a great variety of authors, will doubtless contain some truth amidst their confused heap of statements, many incredible, and nearly all unauthenticated. But it is very difficult to single out what these portions of truth really are. Even Aristoxenus and Dikæarchus, the best authors from whom these biographers quote, lived near two centuries after the death of Pythagoras, and do not appear to have had any early memorials to consult, nor any better informants than the contemporary Pythagoreans,—the last of an expiring sect, and probably among the least eminent for intellect, since the philosophers of the Sokratic school in its various branches carried off the acute and aspiring young men of that time.

Meiners, in his Geschichte der Wissenschaften (vol. i, b. iii, p. 191, *seq.*), has given a careful analysis of the various authors from whom the two biographers have borrowed, and a comparative estimate of their trustworthiness. It is an excellent piece of historical criticism, though the author exaggerates both the merits and the influence of the first Pythagoreans: Kiessling, in the notes to his edition of Jamblichus, has given some extracts from it, but by no means enough to dispense with the perusal of the original. I think Meiners allows too much credit, on the whole, to Aristoxenus (see p. 214), and makes too little deduction for the various stories, difficult to be believed, of which Aristoxenus is given as the source: of course the latter could not furnish better matter than he heard from his own witnesses. Where Meiners's judgment is more severe, it is also better borne out, especially respecting Porphyry himself, and his scholar Jamblichus. These later Pythagorean philosophers seem to have set up as a formal canon of credibility, that which many religious men of antiquity acted upon from a mere unconscious sentiment and fear of giving offence to the gods,—That it was *not right to disbelieve any story* recounted respecting the gods, and wherein the divine agency was introduced: no one could tell but what it *might be true*: to deny its truth, was to set bounds to the divine omnipotence. Accordingly, they made no difficulty in believing what was recounted about Aristæus, Abaris, and other eminent subjects of mythes (Jamblichus, Vit. Pyth. c. 138-148)—καὶ τοῦτό γε πάντες οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ὅμως ἔχουσι πιστευτικῶς, οἷον περὶ Ἀρισταίου καὶ Ἀβάριδος τὰ μυθολογούμενα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα λέγεται … τῶν τοιούτων δὲ τῶν δοκούντων μυθικῶν ἀπομνημονεύουσιν, ὡς οὐδὲν ἀπιστοῦντες ὅτι ἂν εἰς τὸ θεῖον ἀναγηται. Also, not less formally laid down in Jamblichus, Adhortatio ad Philosophiam, as the fourth Symbolum, p. 324, ed. Kiessling. Περὶ θεῶν μηδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἀπιστεῖ, μηδὲ περὶ θείων δογμάτων. Reasoning from their principles, this was a consistent corollary to lay down; but it helps us to estimate their value as selectors and discriminators of accounts respecting Pythagoras. The extravagant compliments paid by the emperor Julian in his letters to Jamblichus will not suffice to establish the authority of the latter as a critic and witness: see the Epistolæ 34, 40, 41, in Heyler's edit. of Julian's letters.

[733] Aulus Gell. N. A. iv, 11. Apollonius (ap. Jamblich. c. 262) alludes to τὰ ὑπομνήματα τῶν Κροτωνιατῶν: what the date of these may be, we do not know, but there is no reason to believe them anterior to Aristoxenus.

[734] Thucyd. viii, 54. τὰς ξυνωμοσίας, αἵπερ ἐτύγχανον πρότερον οὖσαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς, ἁπάσας ἐπελθὼν, etc.

On this important passage, in which Thucydidês notes the political clubs of Athens as sworn societies,—numerous, notorious, and efficient,—I shall speak farther in a future stage of the history. Dr. Arnold has a good note on the passage.

[735] Justin, xx, 4. "Sed trecenti ex juvenibus cum sodalitii juris sacramento quodam nexi, separatam a ceteris civibus vitam exercerent, quasi cœtum clandestinæ conjurationis haberent, civitatem in se converterunt."

Compare Diogen. Laërt. viii, 3; Apollonius ap. Jamblich. c. 254; Porphyry, Vit. Pyth. c. 33.

The story of the devoted attachments of the two Pythagoreans Damon and Phintias appears to be very well attested: Aristoxenus heard it from the lips of the younger Dionysius the despot, whose sentence had elicited such manifestation of friendship (Porphyry, Vit. Pyth. c. 59-62, Cicero, De Officiis, iii, 10; and Davis ad Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v, 22).

[736] Plutarch, Philosoph. cum Principib. c. i, p. 777. ἂν δ᾽ ἄρχοντος ἀνδρὸς καὶ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πρακτικοῦ καθάψηται (ὁ φιλόσοφος) καὶ τοῦτον ἀναπλήσῃ καλοκἀγαθίας, πολλοὺς δι᾽ ἑνὸς ὠφέλησεν, ὡς Πυθαγόρας τοῖς πρωτεύουσι τῶν Ἰταλιωτῶν συγγενόμενος.

[737] I transcribe here the summary given by Krische, at the close of his Dissertation on the Pythagorean order, p. 101: "Societatis scopus fuit mere politicus, ut lapsam optimatium potestatem non modo in pristinum restitueret, sed firmaret amplificaretque: cum summo hoc scopo duo conjuncti fuerunt; moralis alter, alter ad literas spectans. Discipulos suos bonos probosque homines reddere voluit Pythagoras, et ut civitatem moderantes potestate suâ non abuterentur ad plebem opprimendam; et ut plebs, intelligens suis commodis consuli, conditione suâ contenta esset. Quoniam vero bonum sapiensque moderamen nisi a prudente literisque exculto viro exspectari (non) licet, philosophiæ studium necessarium duxit Samius iis, qui ad civitatis clavum tenendum se accingerent."

This is the general view (coinciding substantially with that of O. Müller,—Dorians, iii, 9, 16) given by an author who has gone through the evidences with care and learning. It differs on some important points from the idea which I conceive of the primitive master and his contemporary brethren. It leaves out the religious ascendency, which I imagine to have stood first among the means as well as among the premeditated purposes of

Pythagoras, and sets forth a reformatory political scheme as directly contemplated by him, of which there is no proof. Though the political ascendency of the early Pythagoreans is the most prominent feature in their early history, it is not to be considered as the manifestation of any peculiar or settled political idea,—it is rather a result of their position and means of union. Ritter observes, in my opinion more justly: "We must not believe that the mysteries of the Pythagorean order were of a simply political character: the most probable accounts warrant us in considering that its central point was a mystic religious teaching," (Geschicht. der Philosophie, b. iv, ch. i, vol. i, pp. 365-368:) compare Hoeck. Kreta, vol. iii, p. 223.

Krische (p. 32) as well as Boeckh (Philolaus, pp. 39-42) and O. Müller assimilate the Pythagorean life to the Dorian or Spartan habits, and call the Pythagorean philosophy the expression of Grecian Dorism, as opposed to the Ionians and the Ionic philosophy. I confess that I perceive no analogy between the two, either in action or speculation. The Spartans stand completely distinct from other Dorians; and even the Spartan habits of life, though they present some points of resemblance with the bodily training of the Pythagoreans, exhibit still more important points of difference, in respect to religious peculiarity and mysticism, as well as to scientific element embodied with it. The Pythagorean philosophy, and the Eleatic philosophy, were both equally opposed to the Ionic; yet neither of them is in any way connected with Dorian tendencies. Neither Elea nor Kroton were Doric cities; moreover, Xenophanês as well as Pythagoras were both Ionians.

The general assertions respecting Ionic mobility and inconstancy, contrasted with Doric constancy and steadiness, will not be found borne out by a study of facts. The Dorism of Pythagoras appears to me a complete fancy. O. Müller even turns Kroton into a Dorian city, contrary to all evidence.

[738] Niebuhr, Römisch. Gesch. i, p. 165, 2nd edit.; O. Müller, Hist of Dorians, iii, 9, 16: Krische is opposed to this idea, sect. v, p. 84.

[739] Varro ap. Augustin. de Ordine, ii, 30; Krische, p. 77.

[740] Apollonius ap. Jamblichum, V. P. c. 254, 255, 256, 257. ἡγεμόνες δὲ ἐγένοντο τῆς διαφορᾶς οἱ ταῖς συγγενείαις καὶ ταῖς οἰκειότησιν ἐγγύτατα καθεστηκότες τῶν Πυθαγορείων. Αἴτιον δ᾽ ἦν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν πολλὰ αὐτοὺς ἐλύπει τῶν πραττομένων, etc.: compare also the lines descriptive of Pythagoras, c. 259. Τοὺς μὲν ἑταίρους ἦγεν ἴσους μακάρεσσι θεοῖσι. Τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους ἡγεῖτ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἐν λόγῳ, ἐν ἀριθμῷ.

That this Apollonius, cited both by Jamblichus and by Porphyry, is Apollonius of Tyana, has been rendered probable by Meiners (Gesch. der Wissensch. v. i, pp. 239-245): compare Welcker, Prolegomena ad Theognid. pp. xlv, xlvi.

When we read the life of Apollonius by Philostratus, we see that the former was himself extremely communicative: he might be the rather disposed therefore to think that the seclusion and reserve of Pythagoras was a defect, and to ascribe to it much of the mischief which afterwards overtook the order.

[741] Schleiermacher observes, that "Philosophy among the Pythagoreans was connected with political objects, and their school with a practical brotherly partnership, such as was never on any other occasion seen in Greece." (Introduction to his Translation of Plato, p. 12.) See also Theopompus, Fr. 68, ed. Didot, apud Athenæum, v, p. 213, and Euripidês, Mêdêa, 294.

[742] Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 12; Æschines, cont. Timarch. c. 34. ὑμεῖς, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, Σωκράτην μὲν τὸν σοφιστὴν ἀπεκτείνατε, ὅτι Κριτίαν ἐφάνη πεπαιδευκὼς, ἕνα τῶν τριάκοντα.

[743] This is stated in Jamblichus, c. 255; yet it is difficult to believe; for if the fact had been so, the destruction of the Pythagoreans would naturally have produced an allotment and permanent occupation of the Sybaritan territory,—which certainly did not take place, for Sybaris remained without resident possessors until the foundation of Thurii.

[744] Jamblichus, c, 255-259; Porphyry, c. 54-57; Diogen. Laërt. viii, 39; Diodor. x, Fragm. vol. iv, p. 56, Wess.

[745] Polyb. ii, 39; Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, c. 13, p. 583; Aristoxenus, ap. Jamblich. c. 250. That the enemies of the order attacked it by setting fire to the house in which the members were assembled, is the circumstance in which all accounts agree. On all other points there is great discrepancy, especially respecting the names and dates of the Pythagoreans who escaped: Boeckh (Philolaus, p. 9, *seq.*) and Brandis (Handbuch der Gesch. Philos. ch. lxxiii, p. 432) try to reconcile these discrepancies.

Aristophanês introduces Strepsiadês, at the close of the Nubes, as setting fire to the meeting-house (φροντιστήριον) of Sokratês and his disciples possibly the Pythagorean conflagration may have suggested this.

[746] "Pythagoras Samius suspicione dominatûs injustâ vivus in fano concrematus est." (Arnobius adv. Gentes, lib. i, p. 23, ed. Elmenhorst.)

[747] Cicero, De Finib. v, 2 (who seems to have copied from Dikæarchus: see Fuhr. ad Dikæarchi Fragment. p. 55); Justin, xx, 4; Diogen. Laërt. viii, 40; Jamblichus, V. P. c. 249.

O. Müller says (Dorians, iii, 9, 16), that "the influence of the Pythagorean league upon the administration of the Italian states was of the most beneficial kind, which continued for many generations after the dissolution of the league itself."

The first of these two assertions cannot be made out, and depends only on the statements of later encomiasts, who even supply materials to contradict their own general view. The judgment of Welcker respecting the influence of the Pythagoreans, much less favorable, is at the same time more probable. (Præfat. ad Theognid. p. xlv.)

The second of the two assertions appears to me quite incorrect; the influence of the Pythagorean order on the government of Magna Græcia ceased altogether, as far as we are able to judge. An individual Pythagorean like Archytas might obtain influence, but this is not the influence of the order. Nor ought O. Müller to talk about the Italian Greeks giving up the Doric customs and adopting an Achæan government. There is nothing to prove that Kroton ever had Doric customs.

[748] Aristotel. de Cœlo, ii, 13. οἱ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, καλούμενοι δὲ Πυθαγορεῖοι. "Italici philosophi quondam nominati." (Cicero, De Senect. c. 21.)

[749] Heyne places the date of the battle of Sagra about 560 B. C.; but this is very uncertain. See his Opuscula, vol. ii, Prolus. ii, pp. 53, and Prolus. x, p. 184. See also Justin, xx, 3, and Strabo, vi, pp. 261-263. It will be seen that the latter conceives the battle of the Sagra as having happened after the destruction of Sybaris by the Krotoniates; for he states twice that the Krotoniates lost so many citizens at the Sagra, that the city did not long survive so terrible a blow: he cannot, therefore, have supposed that the complete triumph of the Krotoniates over the great Sybaris was gained afterwards.

[750] See above, vol. iii, chap. xxii.

[751] Diodor. xii, 9. Herodotus calls Têlys in one place βασιλῆα, in another τύραννον of Sybaris (v, 44): this is not at variance with the story of Diodorus.

The story given by Athenæus, out of Herakleidês Ponticus, respecting the subversion of the dominion of Têlys, cannot be reconciled either with Herodotus or Diodorus (Athenæus, xii, p. 522). Dr. Thirlwall supposes the deposition of Têlys to have occurred between the defeat at the Traeis and the capture of Sybaris; but this is inconsistent with the statement of Herakleidês, and not countenanced by any other evidence.

[752] Herodot. v, 47.

[753] Diodor. xii, 9; Strabo, vi, p. 263; Jamblichus, Vit. Pythag. c. 260; Skymn. Chi. v, 340.

[754] Herodot. v, 44.

[755] Diodor. xii, 9, 10; Strabo, vi, p. 263.

[756] Herodot. vi, 21; Strabo, vi, p. 253.

[757] Herodot. v, 45; Diodor. xii, 9, 10; Strabo, vi, p. 263. Strabo mentions expressly the turning of the river for the purpose of overwhelming the city,—ἐλόντες γὰρ τὴν πόλιν ἐπήγαγον τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ κατέκλυσαν. It is to this change in the channel of the river that I refer the expression in Herodotus,—τέμενός τε καὶ νηὸν ἐόντα παρὰ τὸν ξηρὸν Κρᾶθιν. It was natural that the old deserted bed of the river should be called "*the dry Krathis*:" whereas, if we suppose that there was only one channel, the expression has no appropriate meaning. For I do not think that any one can be well satisfied with the explanation of Bähr "Vocatur Crathis hoc loco ξηρὸς *siccus*, ut qui hieme fluit, æstatis vero tempore exsiccatus est: quod adhuc in multis Italiæ inferioris fluviis observant." I doubt whether this be true, as a matter of fact, respecting the river Krathis (see my preceding volume, ch. xxii), but even if the fact were true, the epithet in Bähr's sense has no especial significance for the purpose contemplated by Herodotus, who merely wishes to describe the site of the temple erected by Dorieus.

"Near the Krathis," or "near the dry Krathis," would be equivalent expressions, if we adopted Bähr's construction; whereas to say, "near the deserted channel of the Krathis," would be a good local designation.

[758] Herodot. vi, 21.

[759] Herodot. v, 45.

[760] Herodot. v, 45. Τοῦτο δὲ, αὐτοῦ Δωριέος τὸν θάνατον μαρτύριον μέγιστον ποιεῦνται (Συβαρῖται), ὅτι παρὰ τὰ μεμαντευμένα ποιέων διεφθάρη. Εἰ γὰρ δὴ μὴ παρέπρηξε μηδὲν, ἐπ᾽ ᾧ δὲ ἐστάλη ἐποίεε, εἶλε ἂν τὴν Ἐρυκίνην χώρην καὶ ἐλὼν κάτεσχε, οὐδ᾽ ἂν αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ στρατιὴ διεφθάρη.

[761] Polyb. ii, 39. Heyne thinks that the agreement here mentioned by Polybius took place Olymp. 80, 3; or, indeed, after the repopulation of the Sybaritan territory by the foundation of Thurii (Opuscula, vol. ii; Prolus. x, p. 189). But there seems great difficulty in imagining that the state of violent commotion—which, according to Polybius, was only appeased by this agreement—can possibly have lasted so long as half a century; the received date of the overthrow of the Pythagoreans being about 504 B. C.

[762] Aristot. Politic. ii, 9, 6; iv, 9, 10. Heyne puts Charondas much earlier than the foundation of Thurii, in which, I think, he is undoubtedly right: but without determining the date more exactly (Opuscul. vol. ii; Prolus. ix, p. 160), Charondas must certainly have been earlier than Anaxilas of Rhêgium and the great Sicilian despots; which will place him higher than 500 B. C.: but I do not know that any more precise mark of time can be found.

[763] Diodorus, xii, 35; Stobæus, Serm. xliv, 20-40; Cicero de Legg. ii, 6. See K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Griech. Staatsalterthümer, ch. 89; Heyne, Opuscul. vol. ii, pp. 72-164. Brandis (Geschichte der Röm. Philosophie, ch. xxvi, p. 102) seems to conceive these prologues as genuine.

The mistakes and confusion made by ancient writers respecting these lawgivers—even by writers earlier than Aristotle (Politic. ii, 9, 5)—are such as we have no means of clearing up.

Seneca (Epist. 90) calls both Zaleukus and Charondas disciples of Pythagoras. That the former was so, is not to be believed; but it is not wholly impossible that the latter may have been so,—or at least that he may have been a companion of the earliest Pythagoreans.

[764] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 9, 8. Χαρώνδου δ᾽ ἴδιον μὲν οὐδέν ἐστι πλὴν αἱ δίκαι τῶν ψευδομαρτύρων· πρῶτος γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν ἐπίσκηψιν· τῇ δ᾽ ἀκριβείᾳ τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ γλαφυρώτερος καὶ τῶν νῦν νομοθετῶν. To the fulness and precision predicated respecting Charondas in the latter part of this passage, I refer the other passage in Politic. iv, 10, 6, which is not to be construed as if it meant that Charondas had graduated fines on the rich and poor with a distinct view to that political trick (of indirectly eliminating the poor from public duties) which Aristotle had been just adverting to,—but merely means that Charondas had been nice and minute in graduating pecuniary penalties generally, having reference to the wealth or poverty of the person sentenced.

[765] Πρῶτος γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν ἐπίσκηψιν (Aristot. Politic. ii, 9, 8). See Harpokration, v. Ἐπεσκήψατο, and Pollux, viii, 33; Demosthenês cont. Stephanum, ii, c. 5; cont. Euerg. et Mnêsibul. c. 1. The word ἐπίσκηψις carries with it the solemnity of meaning adverted to it in the text, and seems to have been used specially with reference to an action or indictment against perjured witnesses: which indictment was permitted to be brought with a less degree of risk or cost to the accuser than most others in the Attic dikasteries, (Dêmosth. cont. Euerg. et Mn. *l. c.*)



GEORGE GROTE.

HISTORY OF GREECE.

BY

GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.

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PREFACE TO VOL. V.

VOLUMES V AND VI.

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE PEACE OF NIKIAS.

B. C. 490-421.

I HAD reckoned upon carrying my readers in these two volumes down to the commencement of the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse.

But the narration of events, now that we are under the positive guidance of Thucydidês,—coupled with the exposition of some points on which I differ from the views generally taken by my predecessors,— have occupied greater space than I had foreseen: and I have been obliged to enlarge my Sixth Volume beyond the usual size, in order to arrive even at the Peace of Nikias.

The interval of disturbance and partial hostility, which ensued between that peace and the Athenian expedition, will therefore be reserved for the beginning of my Seventh Volume, the publication of which will not be long delayed.

G. G.

DEC. 1848.

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CHAPTER XXXVIII.

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE MARCH OF XERXES AGAINST GREECE.

Resolutions of Darius to invade Greece a second time. His death. — Succeeded by his son Xerxes. — Revolt and reconquest of Egypt by the Persians. — Indifference of Xerxes to the invasion of Greece — persons who advised and instigated him — persuasions which they employed — prophecies produced by Onomakritus. — Xerxes resolves to invade Greece. — Historical manner and conception of Herodotus. — Xerxes announces his project to an assembly of Persian counsellors — Mardonius and Artabanus, the evil and good genius. — Xerxes is induced by Artabanus to renounce his project — his repeated dreams — divine command to invade Greece. — Religious conception of the sequences of history — common both to Persians and Greeks. — Vast preparations of Xerxes — March of Xerxes from the interior of Asia — collection of the invading army at Sardis — his numerous fleet and large magazines of provision beforehand. — He throws a bridge of boats across the Hellespont. — The bridge is destroyed by a storm — Wrath of Xerxes — he puts to death the engineers and punishes the Hellespont. — Remarks on this story of the punishment inflicted on the Hellespont: there is no sufficient reason for disbelieving its reality. — Reconstruction of the bridge — description of it in detail. — Xerxes cuts a ship-canal across the isthmus of Mount Athos. — Superior intelligence of the Phenicians. — Employment of the lash over the workmen engaged on the canal — impression made thereby on the Greeks. — Bridge of boats thrown across the Strymon. — March of Xerxes from Sardis — disposition of his army. — Story of the rich Kappadokian Pythius — his son put to death by order of Xerxes. — March to Abydos — respect shown to Ilium by Xerxes. — Xerxes and his army cross over the Hellespontine bridges. — March to Doriskus in Thrace, near the mouth of the Hebrus — his fleet joins him here. — Review and muster on the plain of Doriskus — immense variety of the nations brought together. — Numbering of the army — method employed. — Immense and incredible totals brought out by Herodotus. — Comments upon the evidence of Herodotus and upon himself as witness and judge. — Other testimonies about the number of the Persians. — Xerxes passes in review the land-force and the fleet at Doriskus — his conversation with the Spartan king Demaratus. — March of Xerxes from Doriskus westward along Thrace. — Contributions levied on the Grecian towns on the coast of Thrace — particularly Thasus and Abdêra. — Xerxes crosses the Strymon — marches to Akanthus — zeal of the Akanthians in regard to the canal of Athos. — March of Xerxes to Therma — his fleet join him in the Thermaic Gulf. — Favorable prospects of the invasion — zeal of the Macedonian prince to assist Xerxes.

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CHAPTER XXXIX.

PROCEEDINGS IN GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE TIME OF THE BATTLE OF THERMOPYLÆ.

Violent proceedings and death of Kleomenês king of Sparta. — Complaint of the Æginetans at Sparta against Kleomenês and Leotychidês, on the subject of the hostages which those two kings had taken from Ægina. — The Spartans deliver Leotychidês to the Æginetans, who require him to go with them to Athens, to get back the hostages. — Refusal of the Athenians to give up the hostages — reprisals of the Æginetans. — The Æginetan Nikodromus lays a scheme for a democratical revolution in Ægina, in concert with Athens — the

movement fails. — Treatment of the defeated conspirators — sacrilege. — The Athenians land a force in Ægina — war which ensues. — Effect of this war in inducing the Athenians to enlarge their military force. — Themistoklês and Aristeidês, the chief men at Athens — intense rivalry between them. — Banishment of the latter by ostracism. — Conversion of Athens from a land power into a naval power proposed and urged by Themistoklês. — Views and long-sighted calculations of Themistoklês — he was at this time more essential to his country than Aristeidês. — Fleet of Athens — the salvation of Greece as well as of herself. — Valuable fund new first available to Athens from the silver mines of Laurium in Attica. — Themistoklês prevails upon the Athenian people to forego the distribution of this fund, and employ it in building an increased number of ships. — Preparations of Xerxes — known beforehand in Greece. — Heralds from Persia to demand earth and water from the Grecian cities — many of them comply and submit. — Pan-Hellenic congress convened jointly by Athens and Sparta at the Isthmus of Corinth. — Important effect on Grecian mind. — Effects of the congress in healing feuds among the different Greeks — especially between Athens and Ægina. — Alarm and mistrust prevalent throughout Greece. — Terror conveyed in the reply of the Delphian oracle to the Athenian envoys. — Sentence of the oracle frightful, yet obscure: efforts of the Athenians to interpret it: ingenuity and success of Themistoklês. — Great and genuine Pan-Hellenic patriotism of the Athenians — strongly attested by Herodotus, as his own judgment. — Unwillingness, or inability, on the part of a large proportion of Greeks, to resist the Persians. — Ambiguous neutrality of Argos. — Different stories current in Greece about Argos — opinion of Herodotus. — Refusal or equivocation of the Kretans and Korkyræans. — Mission to Gelon at Syracuse — his reply. — Grecian army sent into Thessaly, to defend the defile of Tempê against Xerxes. — On arriving, they find that it cannot be successfully held against him, and retire. — Consequences of this retreat — the Thessalians, and nearly all Hellas north of Kithæron, either submit to Xerxes or waver.

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CHAPTER XL.

BATTLES OF THERMOPYLÆ AND ARTEMISIUM.

Engagement taken by the Confederate Greeks against such Greeks as joined the Persians. — Resolution taken to defend Thermopylæ as well as the adjoining strait of Eubœa. — Pass of Thermopylæ and its neighborhood. — The Greeks take post at Thermopylæ — Leonidas, king of Sparta, conducts the force thither — the combined fleet under Eurybiadês occupy the Eubœan strait. — Numbers and composition of the force of Leonidas. — Phocians and Lokrians. — Olympian and Karneian festivals — the Greeks could not bring themselves to postpone these, even under such imminent danger. — Path over Mount Œta by which Thermopylæ might be evaded — Leonidas first informed of it on reaching the spot — the Phocians engage to defend it. — Numbers and composition of the Greek fleet at Artemisium. — Three triremes of the Grecian fleet sent forward as scouts — their first encounter with the Persian fleet. — Capture of these three triremes — panic of the general Grecian fleet, who abandon Artemisium, and retire to Chalkis. — Imminent danger of the Greek scheme of defence — they are rescued by a terrific storm. — Movements of Xerxes from Therma. — He arrives with his army in the Malian territory, close upon the pass of Thermopylæ. — Advance of the Persian fleet — it is overtaken by a destructive storm and hurricane on the coast of Magnesia. — Immense damage inflicted upon it by the storm. — Encouragement occasioned to the Greek fleet — they return from Chalkis to Artemisium. — Delay of Xerxes with his land-force near Trachis. — Impressions of Xerxes about the defenders at Thermopylæ — conversation with Demaratus, whom he will not believe. — Doubts about the motives ascribed by Herodotus to Xerxes. — First attack upon Thermopylæ — made by the Median troops — repulsed. — Repeated attacks, by the best troops in the Persian army, all repulsed with slaughter. — Embarrassment of Xerxes — he is relieved from it by hearing of the path over the mountain. — A Persian detachment under Hydarnês march over the mountain-path, driving away the Phocian guard. — They arrive in the rear of Leonidas. — Debate among the defenders of Thermopylæ, when it became known that the Persians were approaching their rear. — Resolution of Leonidas to stay and die in the pass. — The three hundred Spartans, together with the Thespians, remain with Leonidas: the rest of the detachment retire. — Doubts about the Theban contingent. — Last exploits and death of Leonidas and his band. — Individuals among them distinguished — scorn exhibited towards Aristodêmus who did not fight. — Fate of the Theban contingent. — Impressions of Xerxes after the combat — advice given to him by Demaratus — he rejects it. — Proceedings of the two fleets, at Artemisium and Aphetæ — alarm among the Grecian fleet — Themistoklês determines them to stay and fight, at the urgent instance of the Eubœans. — Important service thus rendered by Themistoklês. — Confident hopes of the Persian fleet — they detach a squadron to sail round Eubœa, and take the Greeks in the rear. — Sea-fight of Artemisium — advantage gained by the Greeks. — Second storm — increased damage to the Persian fleet,

and ruin to the detachment sent round Eubœa. — Renewed sea-fight off Artemisium — indecisive — but the Greek fleet resolves to retreat. — They retreat immediately on hearing of the disaster at Thermopylæ — they go to Salamis. — Advance of the Persian fleet to Eubœa — manœuvres ascribed to Xerxes in respect of the dead bodies at Thermopylæ — Numbers of dead on both sides. — Subsequent commemorating inscriptions. — Impressive epigram of Simonides.

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CHAPTER XLI.

BATTLE OF SALAMIS. — RETREAT OF XERXES.

Surprise and terror of the Greeks immediately after the battle of Thermopylæ. — No ulterior plan of defence formed — no new position to be found, capable of defending Attica — the Peloponnesians crowd to fortify the Isthmus of Corinth. — Hopeless situation of the Athenians — no measures yet taken to remove their families from Attica. — The Athenians abandon Attica, removing their families and property to Salamis, Ægina, Trœzen, etc. — Unavoidable hurry and sufferings of the emigrants. — Energy of the Athenians, and unanimity of the leaders — Themistoklês proposes the restoration of Aristeidês from exile. — Numbers and composition of the combined Greek fleet at Salamis. — Xerxes occupies Athens and Attica — the Persian fleet enters the road of Phalêrum. — The Persian army ravage the Phocian townships in their march from Thermopylæ to Attica — pillage of the temple at Abæ. — Persian division detached against the temple of Delphi. — Failure, flight, and ruin of the detachment. — Xerxes with the Peisistratids in Athens — the acropolis holds out — is taken and sacked. — Atoning visit of the Peisistratids to the ruined acropolis. — Xerxes reviews his fleet at Phalêrum — debate about the policy of fighting a naval battle at Salamis — prudent counsel of Queen Artemisia. — Resolution taken by Xerxes to fight at Salamis. — Dissensions among the Greeks in the fleet at Salamis. Resolution taken to remove the fleet to the Isthmus. — Ruinous consequences, if that resolution had been executed. — Themistoklês opposes the resolution, persuades Eurybiadês, and prevails upon him to reopen the debate. — Synod of Grecian chiefs again convened — Themistoklês tries to get the former resolution rescinded — the Peloponnesians adhere to it — angry words. — Menace of Themistoklês to retire with the Athenian squadron, unless a battle were to be fought at Salamis — Eurybiadês takes upon him to adopt this measure. — The Peloponnesian chiefs, silenced for the moment, afterwards refuse obedience. Third synod convened — renewed disputes; the majority opposed to Themistoklês and determined on retreating to the Isthmus. — Desperate stratagem of Themistoklês — he sends a private message across to Xerxes, persuading him to surround the Greek fleet in the night, and thus render retirement impossible. — Impatient haste of Xerxes to prevent any of the Greeks from escaping — his fleet incloses the Greeks during the night. — Aristeidês comes in the night to the Greek fleet from Ægina — informs the chiefs that they are inclosed by the Persians, and that escape has become impossible. — Position of Xerxes — order of the fleets, and plan of attack. — Battle of Salamis — confusion and complete defeat of the Persians. — Distinguished gallantry of Queen Artemisia. — Expectations of the Greeks that the conflict would be renewed — fears of Xerxes for his own personal safety — he sends his fleet away to Asia. — Xerxes resolves to go back himself to Asia — advice and recommendation of Mardonius, who is left behind, as general, to finish the conquest of Greece. — The Greeks pursue the Persian fleet as far as Andros — second stratagem of Themistoklês by secret message to Xerxes. — Themistoklês with the fleet — levying money in the Cyclades. — Xerxes evacuates Attica and returns home by land, with the larger portion of his army. — Retreating march of Xerxes to the Hellespont — sufferings of his troops. He finds the bridge broken, and crosses the strait on shipboard into Asia. — Joy of the Greeks — distribution of honors and prizes. — Honors rendered to Themistoklês.

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CHAPTER XLII.

BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALE. — FINAL REPULSE OF THE PERSIANS.

The Persian fleet, after retiring from Greece, winters at Kymê, and collects in the spring at Samos. — The Greek fleet assembles in the spring at Ægina. — General adherence of the *medizing* Greeks to Mardonius — revolt of Potidæa — which is besieged in vain by Artabazus. — Mardonius, after wintering in Thessaly, resumes operations in the spring in Bœotia. He consults the Bœotian oracles. — Mardonius sends Alexander of Macedon to Athens, to offer the most honorable terms of peace. — Temptation to Athens to accept this offer — fear of the

Lacedæmonians that she would accept it — Lacedæmonian envoys sent to Athens to prevent it. — Resolute reply of the Athenians, and determination to carry on the war, in spite of great present suffering. — Selfish indifference displayed by Sparta and the Peloponnesians towards Athens. — The Spartans, having fortified the Isthmus, leave Attica undefended: Mardonius occupies Athens a second time. — Second migration of the Athenians to Salamis — their bitter disappointment and anger against Sparta for deserting them. — Second offer of Mardonius to the Athenians — again refused — intense resolution which they display. — Remonstrance sent by the Athenians to Sparta — ungenerous slackness of the Spartans. — Large Spartan force collected under Pausanias at the Isthmus. — Mardonius, after ravaging Attica, retires into Bœotia. — Discouragement in the army of Mardonius generally: Thersander of Orchomenus at the banquet: jealousies between Mardonius and Artabazus, the second in command — zeal and eagerness of the Thebans. — Numbers of the Greeks collected under Pausanias. — March of Pausanias over Kithæron into Bœotia. — He is attacked by the Persian cavalry under Masistius, and much harassed — superior efficiency of the Athenians against cavalry — Masistius is slain. — The Greeks quit the protection of the mountain-grounds and take up a position nearer to Platæa, along the Asôpus. — Mardonius alters his position, and posts himself nearly opposite to the Greeks on the other side of the Asôpus. — Unwillingness of both armies to begin the attack — the prophets on both sides discourage first aggression. — Mardonius annoys the Greeks with his cavalry, and cuts off their supplies in the rear. — Impatience of Mardonius — in spite of the reluctance of Artabazus and other officers he determines on a general attack: he tries to show that the prophecies are favorable to him. — His intention communicated to the Athenians in the night by Alexander of Macedon. — Pausanias changes places in the line between the Spartans and Athenians. — Mardonius again attacks them with his cavalry. — In consequence of the annoyance of the Persian cavalry, Pausanias determines to move in the night into the Island. — Confusion of the Grecian army in executing this night-movement. — Refusal of the Spartan lochage Amompharetus to obey the order for the night-march. — Mistrust of Pausanias and the Spartans, exhibited by the Athenians. — Pausanias moves without Amompharetus, who speedily follows him. — Astonishment of Mardonius on discovering that the Greeks had retreated during the night — he pursues and attacks them with disorderly impatience. — Battle of Platæa. — Great personal bravery of the Persians — they are totally defeated, and Mardonius slain. — The Athenians on the left wing defeat the Thebans. — Artabazus, with a large Persian corps, abandons the contest and retires out of Greece — the rest of the Persian army take up their position in the fortified camp. — Small proportion of the armies on each side which really fought. — The Greeks attack and carry the fortified camp. — Loss on both sides. — Funeral obsequies by the Greeks — monuments — dead body of Mardonius — distribution of booty. — Pausanias summons Thebes, requiring the surrender of the leaders — these men give themselves up, and are put to death. — Honors and distinctions among the Greek warriors. — Reverential tribute to Platæa, as the scene of the victory, and to the Platæans: solemnities decreed to be periodically celebrated by the latter, in honor of the slain. — Permanent Grecian confederacy decreed by the victors, to hold meetings at Platæa. — Proceedings of the Grecian fleet: it moves to the rescue of Samos from the Persians. — The Persian fleet abandons Samos and retires to Mykalê in Ionia. — Mistrust of the fidelity of the Ionians entertained by the Persian generals. — The Greeks land to attack the Persians ashore — revelation of the victory of Platæa, gained by their countrymen on the same morning, springs up in their minds before the battle. — Battle of Mykalê — revolt of the Ionians in the Persian camp — complete defeat of the Persians. — Retirement of the defeated Persian army to Sardis. — Reluctance of the Spartans to adopt the continental Ionians into their alliance — proposition to transport them across the Ægean into Western Greece — rejected by the Athenians. — The Grecian fleet sails to the Hellespont: the Spartans return home, but the Athenians remain to attack the Chersonese. — Siege of Sestos — antipathy of the Chersonesites against Artayktês. — Capture of Sestos — crucifixion of Artayktês. — Return of the fleet to Athens.

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CHAPTER XLIII.

EVENTS IN SICILY DOWN TO THE EXPULSION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND.

Agrigentum and Gela superior to Syracuse before 500 B. C. — Phalaris despot of Agrigentum. — Syracuse in 500 B. C. — oligarchical government under the Gamori, or privileged descendants of the original proprietary colonists — the Demos — the Kyllyrii, or Serfs. — Early governments of the Greek cities in Sicily — original oligarchies subverted in many places by despots — attempted colony of the Spartan prince Dorieus. — Kleander despot of Gela, B. C. about 500. — First rise of Gelo and Ænesidêmus in his service. Têlinês, the first marked ancestor of Gelo. — Gelo — in high command among the mercenaries of Hippokratês despot of Gela. — Fate

of the Ionic town of Zanklê, afterwards Messina — it is seized by the Samians — conduct of Hippokratês. — Hippokratês is victorious over the Syracusans — takes Kamarina — dies. — Gelo becomes in his place despot of Gela. — Greatness of Gelo — he gets possession of Syracuse, and transfers the seat of his power from Gela to Syracuse. — Conquest of various Sicilian towns by Gelo — he transports the oligarchy to Syracuse and sells the Demos for slaves. — Increased power and population of Syracuse under Gelo — it becomes the first city in Sicily. — Power of Gelo when the envoys from Sparta and Athens came to entreat his aid, B. C. 481. — Plans of Gelo for strengthening Sicilian Hellenism against the barbaric interests in the islands. — Spartan and Athenian envoys apply to Gelo — his answer. — Carthaginian invasion of Sicily, simultaneous with the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. — The Carthaginian army under Hamilkar besiege Himera — battle of Himera — complete victory gained over them by Gelo. — Supremacy of Gelo in Sicily — he grants peace to the Carthaginians. — Conduct of Gelo towards the confederate Greeks who were contending against Xerxes. — Number of prisoners taken at the battle of Himera and distributed among the Carthaginian cities — their prosperity, especially that of Agrigentum. — Death and obsequies of Gelo. — Number of new citizens whom Gelo had introduced at Syracuse. — Hiero, brother and successor of Gelo at Syracuse — jealous of his brother Polyzêlus — harsh as a ruler — quarrel between Hiero of Syracuse and Thêro of Agrigentum — appeased by the poet Simonides. — Severe treatment of the inhabitants of Himera by Thêro. — Power and exploits of Hiero — against the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians — against Anaxilaus — he founds the city of Ætna — new wholesale transplantation of inhabitants — compliments of Pindar. — Death of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, and of Thêro of Agrigentum. Thrasydæus, son of Thêro, rules Agrigentum and Himera. His cruel government — he is defeated by Hiero and expelled. — Great power of Hiero, after the defeat of Thrasydæus — his death. — Thrasybulus, brother and successor of Hiero — disputes among the members of the Gelonian family. — Cruelties and unpopularity of Thrasybulus — mutiny against him at Syracuse. — Expulsion of Thrasybulus, and extinction of the Gelonian dynasty. — Popular governments established in all the Sicilian cities — confusion and disputes arising out of the number of new citizens and mercenaries domiciliated by the Gelonian princes. — Internal dissensions and combat in Syracuse. — Defeat of the Gelonians — Syracuse made into one popular government, one city, one fortification. — Disorders in other Sicilian cities, arising from the return of exiles who had been dispossessed under the Gelonian dynasty. Katana and Ætna. — General congress and compromise — the exiles are provided for — Kamarina again restored as a separate autonomous city. — Reactionary feelings against the previous despotism, and in favor of popular government, at Syracuse and in the other cities. — Italiot Greeks — destructive defeat of the inhabitants of Tarentum and of Rhegium.

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CHAPTER XLIV.

FROM THE BATTLE OF PLATÆA AND MYKALE DOWN TO THE DEATHS OF THEMISTOKLES AND ARISTEIDES.

Causes of the disgraceful repulse of Xerxes from Greece — his own defects — inferior quality and slackness of most of his army. — Tendency to exaggerate the heroism of the Greeks. — Comparison of the invasion of Greece by Xerxes with the invasion of Persia afterwards by Alexander the Great. — No improvement in warfare among the Persians during that interval of one hundred and fifty years — great improvement among the Greeks. — Progressive spirit in Greece — operating through Athenian initiative. — Conduct of Athens in the repulse of the Persians — her position, temper, and influence, after that event. — Proceedings of the Athenians to restore their city — jealous obstructions caused by the Peloponnesians. — Stratagem of Themistoklês to procure for the Athenians the opportunity of fortifying their city. — Athens fortified — confusion of the Spartans — disappointment of the allies. — Effect of this intended, but baffled, intervention upon Athenian feelings. — Enlargement of the walls of Athens. — Large plans of Themistoklês for the naval aggrandizement of the city — fortified town and harbor provided at Peiræus — vast height and thickness projected for the walls. — Advantages of the enlarged and fortified harbor — increase of metics and of commerce at Athens. — Resolution to build twenty new triremes annually. — Expedition of the united Greek fleet against Asia, under the Spartan Pausanias — capture of Byzantium. — Misconduct of Pausanias — refusal of the allies to obey him — his treasonable correspondence with Xerxes. — Pausanias, having assurances of aid from Xerxes, becomes more intolerable in his behavior. He is recalled to Sparta. — The allies transfer the headship from Sparta to Athens. — Importance of this change in the relations of the Grecian states. — Tendency of the Spartan kings to become corrupted on foreign service — Leotychidês. — Momentary Pan-Hellenic union under Sparta, immediately after the repulse of Xerxes — now broken up and passing into a schism, with two distinct parties and chiefs, Sparta and Athens. — Proceedings of Athens in her capacity of leader — good conduct of Aristeidês. — Formation of the confederacy of Delos, under Athens as president — general meetings of allies held in that is-

land. — Assessment of the confederacy and all its members, made by Aristeidês — definite obligation in ships and money — money total — Hellênotamiæ. — Rapid growth, early magnitude, of the confederacy of Delos: willing adhesion of the members. — State and power of Persia at the time when the confederacy of Delos was first formed. — Conduct of Pausanias after being removed from the command — he prosecutes his treasonable designs in conjunction with Persia. — He is recalled to Sparta — imprisoned — put on his trial — tries to provoke the Helots to revolt. — He is detected by the revelation of a slave — incredulity or fear of the Ephors. — His arrest and death — atonement made for offended sanctuary. — Themistoklês is compromised in the detected treason of Pausanias. — Position of Themistoklês at Athens — tendency of Athenian parties and politics. — Effect of the events of the Persian war upon Athenian political sentiment — stimulus to democracy. — Alteration of the Kleisthenean constitution — all citizens without exception are rendered politically admissible to office: first, universal eligibility and election of magistrates — next, sortition, or drawing by lot. — Increase of the power of the Stratêgi — alteration in the functions and diminution of the importance of the archons. — Administration of Athens enlarged — new functionaries appointed — distribution between Athens and Peiræus. — Political career and precarious tenor of Themistoklês — bitter rivals against him — Kimon, Alkmæon, etc. — His liability to charges of corruption. — Themistoklês is charged with accepting bribes from Persia — acquitted at Athens. — Increased bitterness of feud between him and his political rivals, after this acquittal. He is ostracized. — While in banishment under ostracism, the Lacedæmonians prefer a charge of treason against him. — Flight and adventures of Themistoklês. — Themistoklês gets over to Asia, and seeks refuge with the Persian king. — Stories about the relations between the Persian king and Themistoklês. — Real treatment of Themistoklês in Persia. — Influence which he acquires with the Persian king. — Large reward which he receives — His death at Magnesia. — Death of Aristeidês — his poverty.

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CHAPTER XLV.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENS AS HEAD. — FIRST FORMATION AND RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

Consequence of the formation of the confederacy of Delos. — Bifurcation of Grecian politics between Sparta and Athens. — Distinction between the confederacy of Delos, with Athens as president — and the Athenian empire which grew out of it. — Tendency to confuse these two, and to impute to Athens long-sighted plans of ambition. — The early years, after the formation of the confederacy of Delos, were years of active exertion on the part of Athens. — Our imperfect knowledge of them. — Necessity of continued action against the Persians, even after the battles of Platæa and Mykalê. This necessity was the cause, both of the willing organization of the confederacy of Delos and of the maritime improvement of Athens. — Confederacy of Delos — sworn to by all the members — perpetual and peremptory — not allowing retirement nor evasion. — Enforcing sanction of Athens, strictly exercised, in harmony with the general synod. — Gradual alteration in the relations of the allies — substitution of money-payment for personal service, demanded by the allies themselves, suitable to the interests and feelings of Athens. — Change in the position as well as in the feelings of Athens. — Growing unpopularity of Athens throughout Greece — causes of it. — Synod of Delos — gradually declines in importance and vanishes. — Superior qualities and merit of the Athenians as compared with the confederates of Delos generally. — Tribute first raised by the synod of Delos — assessment of Aristeidês. — Events between B. C. 476-466. — Eion — Skyros — Karystus. — Athens as guardian of the Ægean sea against piracy. — The Hero Theseus. — First revolt among the members of the confederacy of Delos — Naxos revolts and is reconquered. — Operations of Athens and the confederacy against Persia. — Defeat of the Persians by Kimon at the river Eurymedon. — Revolt of Thasos from the confederacy of Delos. — Siege of Thasos by the Athenians under Kimon. — Mines in Thrace. — First attempt of Athens to found a city at Ennea Hodoi on the Strymon above Eion. The attempt fails and the settlers are slain. — Reduction of Thasos after a blockade of two years — it is disarmed and dismantled. — Application of the Thasians to Sparta for aid — granted, but not carried into effect — glimpse of hostilities between Sparta and Athens. — Trial and acquittal of Kimon at Athens. — Great increase of the Athenian power. — Proceedings in Central Greece between 470-464 B. C. Thebes and the Bœotian towns. Discredit of Thebes. — Sparta restores and upholds the supremacy of Thebes over the lesser Bœotian towns. — Events in Peloponnesus — Arcadia — Elis, etc. — Terrible earthquake at Sparta, 464 B. C. — Revolt of the Helots. — The Lacedæmonians invoke the aid of their allies against the revolted Helots. — March of the Athenians under Kimon into Laconia, to aid them. — Mistrust conceived by the Lacedæmonians of their Athenian auxiliaries, who are dismissed from Laconia. Displeasure and change of policy at Athens. — The Athenians renounce the alliance of Sparta, and contract alliance with Argos. Position of Argos — her conquest

of Mykênæ and other towns. — Megara becomes allied with Athens. Growing hatred of Corinth and the neighboring Peloponnesian states towards Athens. — Energetic simultaneous action of the Athenians — in Cyprus, Phenicia, Egypt, and Greece — they build the first "Long Wall" from Megara to Nisæa. — War of Athens against Corinth, Ægina, etc. Total defeat of the Æginetans at sea. — The Athenians besiege Ægina — the Corinthians, Epidaurians, etc. are defeated by the Athenians under Myrônidês. — The Long Walls between Athens and Peiræus are projected — espoused by Periklês, opposed by Kimon — political contentions at Athens — importance of the Long Wall. — Expedition of the Lacedæmonians into Bœotia — they restore the ascendancy of Thebes. — Intention of the Spartan army in Bœotia to threaten Athens and sustain the Athenian oligarchical party opposed to the Long Walls. — Battle of Tanagra — defeat of the Athenians. — Effects of the battle — generous behavior of Kimon — he is recalled from ostracism. — Compromise and reconciliation between the rival leaders and parties at Athens. — Victory of Œnophyta gained by the Athenians — they acquire ascendency over all Bœotia, Phocis, and Lokris. — Completion of the Long Walls. — Conquest of Ægina, which is disarmed, dismantled, and rendered tributary. — The Athenians first sail round Peloponnesus — their operations in the gulf of Corinth. — Defeat and losses of the Athenians in Egypt. — The revolted Helots in Laconia capitulate and leave the country. — Truce for five years concluded between Athens and Lacedæmonians, through the influence of Kimon. — Fresh expeditions of Kimon against Persia. — Death of Kimon at Cyprus — victories of the Athenian fleet — it returns home. — No farther expeditions of the Athenians against Persia — convention concluded between them. — Mistakes and exaggerations respecting this convention — doubts raised as to its historical reality. Discussion of those doubts — confirmatory hints of Thucydidês. — Thucydidês, son of Melêsias, succeeds Kimon as leading opponent of Periklês. — Transfer of the common fund of the confederacy from Delos to Athens. — Gradual passage of the confederacy into an Athenian empire. — Transfer of the fund was proposed by the Samians. — Position of Athens with a numerous alliance both of inland and maritime states. — Commencement of reverses and decline of power to Athens. — Revolt of Bœotia from Athens — defeat of the Athenians at Korôneia — they evacuate Bœotia. — Revolt of Phocis, Lokris, Eubœa, and Megara: invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians under the Lacedæmonian king Pleistoanax. — Eubœa reconquered by Periklês. — Humiliation and despondency of Athens. — Conclusion of the Thirty years' truce. — Diminution of Athenian power. — Feud between Athens and Megara.

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CHAPTER XLVI.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKLES.

First establishment of the democratical judicial system at Athens. — Union, in the same hands, of functions both administrative and judicial in early Athens — great powers of the magistrates, as well as of the senate of Areopagus. — Magistrates generally wealthy men — oligarchical tendencies of the senate of Areopagus — increase of democratical sentiment among the bulk of the citizens. — Political parties in Athens. — Periklês and Ephialtês democratical: Kimon, oligarchical or conservative. — Democratical Dikasteries, or Jury-courts, constituted by Periklês and Ephialtês. — How these dikasteries were arranged. — Pay to the dikasts introduced and made regular. — The magistrates are deprived of their judicial and confined to administrative functions. — Senate of Areopagus — its antiquity — semi-religious character — large and undefined controlling power. — Large powers of the senate of Areopagus, in part abused, became inconsistent with the feelings of the people after the Persian invasion. — New interests and tendencies then growing up at Athens. — Senate of Areopagus — a centre of action for the conservative party and Kimon. — Opposition between Kimon and Periklês — inherited from their fathers. — Character and working of Periklês. — Reserved, philosophical, and business-like habits of Periklês — his little pains to court popularity — less of the demagogue than Kimon. — Ephialtês belonging to the democratical party, and originally equal to Periklês in influence. — Efforts of Ephialtês against magisterial abuse. — Kimon and his party, more powerful than Ephialtês and Periklês, until the time when the Athenian troops were dismissed from Laconia. — Ostracism of Kimon. — Measures carried by Ephialtês and Periklês to abridge the power of the senate of Areopagus as well as of individual magistrates. — Institution of the paid dikasteries. — Separation of judicial from administrative functions. — Assassination of Ephialtês by the conservative party. — Commencement of the great ascendency of Periklês, after the death of Ephialtês. Compromise between him and Kimon. — Brilliant success of Athens, and era of the maximum of her power. — Other constitutional changes. — The Nomophylakes. — The Nomothetæ — distinction between laws and psephisms, or special decrees — process by which laws were enacted and repealed. — Procedure in making or repealing of laws assimilated to the procedure in judicial trials. — Graphê Paranomôn — indictment against the mover of illegal or unconstitutional propositions. — Working of the Graphê Paranomôn. — Conservative

spirit in which it is framed. — Restraint upon new propositions, and upon the unlimited initiative belonging to every citizen. — Abusive extension of the Graphê Paranomôn afterwards. — It was often used as a simple way of procuring the repeal of an existing law — without personal aim against the author of the law. — Numbers and pay of the dikasts, as provided by Periklês. — The Athenian democracy, as constituted by Periklês, remained substantially unaltered afterwards down to the loss of Athenian independence — excepting the temporary interruptions of the Four Hundred and the Thirty. — Working of the numerous dikasteries — their large numbers essential to exclude corruption or intimidation — liability of individual magistrates to corruption. — The Athenian dikasteries are jury-trial applied on the broadest scale — exhibiting both its excellences and its defects in an exaggerated form. — The encomiums usually pronounced upon the theory of jury-trial would apply yet more strongly to the Athenian dikasteries. — Imperfections of jury-trial — exaggerated in the procedure of the dikasteries. — Powerful effects of the dikasteries in exercising and stimulating the intellect and feelings of individual citizens. — Necessity of learning to speak — growth of professional teachers of rhetoric — professional composers of speeches for others. — Rhetors and Sophists. — Polemics of Sokratês, himself a sophist, against the sophists generally. — Sophists and rhetors were the natural product of the age and of the democracy. — The dikasteries were composed, not exclusively of poor men, but of middling and poorer citizens indiscriminately.

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CHAPTER XXXVIII.

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE MARCH OF XERXES AGAINST GREECE.

In the last chapter but one of the preceding volume, I described the Athenian victory at Marathon, the repulse of the Persian general Datis, and the return of his armament across the Ægean to the Asiatic coast. He had been directed to conquer both Eretria and Athens: an order which he had indeed executed in part with success, as the string of Eretrian prisoners brought to Susa attested,—but which remained still unfulfilled in regard to the city principally obnoxious to Darius. Far from satiating his revenge upon Athens, the Persian monarch was compelled to listen to the tale of an ignominious defeat. His wrath against the Athenians rose to a higher pitch than ever, and he commenced vigorous preparations for a renewed attack upon them, as well as upon Greece generally. Resolved upon assembling the entire force of his empire, he directed the various satraps and sub-governors throughout all Asia to provide troops, horses, and ships, both of war and burden. For no less than three years the empire was agitated by this immense levy, which Darius determined to conduct in person against Greece.[1] Nor was his determination abated by a revolt of the Egyptians, which broke out about the time when his preparations were completed. He was on the point of undertaking simultaneously the two enterprises,—the conquest of Greece and the reconquest of Egypt,—when he was surprised by death, after a reign of thirty-six years. As a precaution previous to this intended march, he had nominated as successor Xerxes, his son by Atossa; for the ascendency of that queen insured to Xerxes the preference over his elder brother Artabazanes, son of Darius by a former wife, and born before the latter became king. The choice of the reigning monarch passed unquestioned, and Xerxes succeeded without opposition.[2] It deserves to be remarked, that though we shall meet with several acts of cruelty and atrocity perpetrated in the Persian regal family, there is nothing like that systematic fratricide which has been considered necessary to guarantee succession in Turkey and other Oriental empires.

The intense wrath against Athens, which had become the predominant sentiment in the mind of Darius, was yet unappeased at the time of his death, and it was fortunate for the Athenians that his crown now passed to a prince less obstinately hostile as well as in every respect inferior. Xerxes, personally the handsomest[3] and most stately man amid the immense crowd which he led against Greece, was in character timid and faint-hearted, over and above those defects of vanity, childish self-conceit, and blindness of appreciation, which he shared more or less with all the Persian kings. Yet we shall see that, even under his conduct, the invasion of Greece was very near proving successful: and it well might have succeeded altogether, had he been

either endued with the courageous temperament, or inflamed with the fierce animosity, of his father.

On succeeding to the throne, Xerxes found the forces of the empire in active preparation, pursuant to the orders of Darius; except Egypt, which was in a state of revolt. His first necessity was to reconquer this country; a purpose for which the great military power now in readiness was found amply sufficient. Egypt was subdued and reduced to a state of much harder dependence than before: we may presume that the tribute was increased, as well as the numbers of the Persian occupying force maintained, by contributions levied on the natives. Achæmenes, brother of Xerxes, was installed there as satrap.

But Xerxes was not at first equally willing to prosecute the schemes of his deceased father against Greece. At least such is the statement of Herodotus; who represents Mardonius as the grand instigator of the invasion, partly through thirst for warlike enterprise, partly from a desire to obtain the intended conquest as a satrapy for himself. Nor were there wanting Grecian counsellors to enforce his recommendation, both by the promise of help and by the color of religion. The great family of the Aleuadæ, belonging to Larissa, and perhaps to other towns in Thessaly, were so eager in the cause, that their principal members came to Susa to offer an easy occupation of that frontier territory of Hellas: while the exiled Peisistratids from Athens still persevered in striving to procure their own restoration at the tail of a Persian army. On the present occasion, they brought with them to Susa a new instrument, the holy mystic Onomakritus,—a man who had acquired much reputation, not by prophesying himself, but by collecting, arranging, interpreting, and delivering out, prophetic verses passing under the name of the ancient seer or poet Musæus. Thirty years before, in the flourishing days of the Peisistratids, he had lived at Athens, enjoying the confidence of Hipparchus, and consulted by him as the expositor of these venerated documents. But having been detected by the poet Lasus of Hermione, in the very act of interpolating them with new matter of his own, Hipparchus banished him with indignation. The Peisistratids, however, now in banishment themselves, forgot or forgave this offence, and carried Onomakritus with his prophecies to Susa, announcing him as a person of oracular authority, to assist in working on the mind of Xerxes. To this purpose his interpolations, or his omissions, were now directed: for when introduced to the Persian monarch, he recited emphatically various encouraging predictions wherein the bridging of the Hellespont and the triumphant march of a barbaric host into Greece, appeared as predestined; while he carefully kept back all those of a contrary tenor, which portended calamity and disgrace. So at least Herodotus,[4] strenuous in upholding the credit of Bakis, Musæus, and other Grecian prophets whose verses were in circulation, expressly assures us. The religious encouragements of Onomakritus, and the political cooperation proffered by the Aleuadæ, enabled Mardonius effectually to overcome the reluctance of his master. Nor indeed was it difficult to show, according to the feelings then prevalent, that a new king of

Persia was in honor obliged to enlarge the boundaries of the empire.[5] The conquering impulse springing from the first founder was as yet unexhausted; the insults offered by the Athenians remained still unavenged: and in addition to this double stimulus to action, Mardonius drew a captivating picture of Europe as an acquisition;—"it was the finest land in the world, produced every variety of fruit-bearing trees, and was too good a possession for any mortal man except the Persian kings."[6] Fifteen years before, the Milesian Aristagoras,[7] when entreating the Spartans to assist the Ionic revolt, had exaggerated the wealth and productiveness of Asia in contrast with the poverty of Greece,—a contrast less widely removed from the truth, at that time, than the picture presented by Mardonius.

Having thus been persuaded to alter his original views, Xerxes convoked a meeting of the principal Persian counsellors, and announced to them his resolution to invade Greece, setting forth the mingled motives of revenge and aggrandizement which impelled him, and representing the conquest of Greece as carrying with it that of all Europe, so that the Persian empire would become coextensive with the æther of Zeus and the limits of the sun's course. On the occasion of this invasion, now announced and about to take place, we must notice especially the historical manner and conception of our capital informant,—Herodotus. The invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and the final repulse of his forces, constitute the entire theme of his three last books, and the principal object of his whole history, towards which the previous matter is intended to conduct. Amidst those prior circumstances, there are doubtless many which have a substantive importance and interest of their own, recounted at so much length that they appear coördinate and principal, so that the thread of the history is for a time put out of sight. Yet we shall find, if we bring together the larger divisions of his history, omitting the occasional prolixities of detail, that such thread is never lost in the historian's own mind: it may be traced by an attentive reader, from his preface and the statement immediately following it—of Crœsus, as the first barbaric conqueror of the Ionian Greeks—down to the full expansion of his theme, "Græcia Barbariæ lento collisa duello," in the expedition of Xerxes. That expedition, as forming the consummation of his historical scheme, is not only related more copiously and continuously than any events preceding it, but is also ushered in with an unusual solemnity of religious and poetical accompaniment, so that the seventh book of Herodotus reminds us in many points of the second book of the Iliad: probably too, if the lost Grecian epics had reached us, we should trace many other cases in which the imagination of the historian has unconsciously assimilated itself to them. The dream sent by the gods to frighten Xerxes, when about to recede from his project,—as well as the ample catalogue of nations and eminent individuals embodied in the Persian host,—have both of them marked parallels in the Iliad: and Herodotus seems to delight in representing to himself the enterprise against Greece as an antithesis to that of the Atreidæ against Troy. He enters into the internal feelings of Xerxes with as much familiarity as Homer into those of Agamemnon, and introduces "the counsel of Zeus" as not less direct, special, and overruling, than it ap-

pears in the Iliad and Odyssey:[8] though the godhead in Herodotus, compared with Homer, tends to become neuter instead of masculine or feminine, and retains only the jealous instincts of a ruler, apart from the appetites, lusts, and caprices of a man: acting, moreover, chiefly as a centralized, or at least as a homogeneous, force, in place of the discordant severalty of agents conspicuous in the Homeric theology. The religious idea, so often presented elsewhere in Herodotus,—that the godhead was jealous and hostile to excessive good fortune or immoderate desires in man,—is worked into his history of Xerxes as the ever-present moral and as the main cause of its disgraceful termination: for we shall discover as we proceed, that the historian, with that honorable frankness which Plutarch calls his "malignity," neither ascribes to his countrymen credit greater than they deserve for personal valor, nor seeks to veil the many chances of defeat which their mismanagement laid open.[9]

I have already mentioned that Xerxes is described as having originally been averse to the enterprise, and only stimulated thereto by the persuasions of Mardonius: this was probably the genuine Persian belief, for the blame of so great a disaster would naturally be transferred from the monarch to some evil counsellor.[10] As soon as Xerxes, yielding to persuasion, has announced to the Persian chief men whom he had convoked his resolution to bridge over the Hellespont and march to the conquest of Greece and Europe, Mardonius is represented as expressing his warm concurrence in the project, extolling the immense force[11] of Persia and depreciating the Ionians in Europe—so he denominated them—as so poor and disunited that success was not only certain but easy. Against the rashness of this general—the evil genius of Xerxes—we find opposed the prudence and long experience of Artabanus, brother of the deceased Darius, and therefore uncle to the monarch. The age and relationship of this Persian Nestor emboldens him to undertake the dangerous task of questioning the determination which Xerxes, though professing to invite the opinions of others, had proclaimed as already settled in his own mind. The speech which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Artabanus is that of a thoughtful and religious Greek: it opens with the Grecian conception of the necessity of hearing and comparing opposite views, prior to any final decision,—reproves Mardonius for falsely depreciating the Greeks and seducing his master into personal danger,—sets forth the probability that the Greeks, if victorious at sea, would come and destroy the bridge by which Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont,—reminds the latter of the imminent hazard which Darius and his army had undergone in Scythia, from the destruction—averted only by Histiæus and his influence—of the bridge over the Danube: such prudential suggestions being further strengthened by adverting to the jealous aversion of the godhead towards overgrown human power.[12]

The impatient monarch silences his uncle in a tone of insult and menace: nevertheless, in spite of himself, the dissuasions work upon him so powerfully, that before night they gradually alter his resolution, and decide him to renounce the scheme. In this latter disposition he falls asleep, when a dream appears: a tall, stately man

stands over him, denounces his change of opinion, and peremptorily commands him to persist in the enterprise as announced. In spite of this dream, Xerxes still adheres to his altered purpose, assembles his council the next morning, and after apologizing for his angry language towards Artabanus, acquaints them to their great joy that he adopts the recommendations of the latter, and abandons his project against Greece. But in the following night, no sooner has Xerxes fallen asleep, than the same dream and the same figure again appear to him, repeating the previous command in language of terrific menace. The monarch, in a state of great alarm, springs from his bed and sends for Artabanus, whom he informs of the twice-repeated vision and divine mandate interdicting his change of resolution. "If (says he) it be the absolute will of God that this expedition against Greece should be executed, the same vision will appear to thee also, provided thou puttest on my attire, sittest in my throne, and sleepest in my bed."[13] Not without reluctance, Artabanus obeys this order (for it was high treason in any Persian to sit upon the regal throne[14]), but he at length complies, expecting to be able to prove to Xerxes that the dream deserved no attention. "Many dreams (he says) are not of divine origin, nor anything better than mere wandering objects such as we have been thinking upon during the day: this dream, of whatever nature it may be, will not be foolish enough to mistake me for the king, even if I be in the royal attire and bed; but if it shall still continue to appear to thee, I shall myself confess it to be divine."[15] Accordingly, Artabanus is placed in the regal throne and bed, and, as soon as he falls asleep, the very same figure shows itself to him also, saying, "Art thou he who dissuadest Xerxes, on the plea of solicitude for his safety, from marching against Greece? Xerxes has already been forewarned of that which he will suffer if he disobeys, and thou too shalt not escape, either now or in future, for seeking to avert that which must and shall be." With these words the vision assumes a threatening attitude, as though preparing to burn out the eyes of Artabanus with hot irons, when the sleeper awakes in terror, and runs to communicate with Xerxes. "I have hitherto, O king, recommended to thee to rest contented with that vast actual empire on account of which all mankind think thee happy; but since the divine impulsion is now apparent, and since destruction from on high is prepared for the Greeks, I too alter my opinion, and advise thee to command the Persians as God directs; so that nothing may be found wanting on thy part for that which God puts into thy hands."[16]

It is thus that Herodotus represents the great expedition of Xerxes to have originated: partly in the rashness of Mardonius, who reaps his bitter reward on the field of battle at Platæa,—but still more in the influence of "mischievous Oneiros," who is sent by the gods—as in the second book of the Iliad—to put a cheat upon Xerxes, and even to overrule by terror both his scruples and those of Artabanus. The gods having determined—as in the instances of Astyagês, Polykratês, and others—that the Persian empire shall undergo signal humiliation and repulse at the hands of the Greeks, constrain the Persian monarch into a ruinous enterprise against his own better judgment. Such religious imagination is not to be regarded as peculiar to

Herodotus, but as common to him with his contemporaries generally, Greeks as well as Persians, though peculiarly stimulated among the Greeks by the abundance of their epic or quasi-historical poetry: modified more or less in each individual narrator, it is made to supply connecting links as well as initiating causes for the great events of history. As a cause for this expedition, incomparably the greatest fact and the most fertile in consequences, throughout the political career both of Greeks and Persians, nothing less than a special interposition of the gods would have satisfied the feelings either of one nation or the other. The story of the dream has its rise, as Herodotus tells us,[17] in Persian fancy, and is in some sort a consolation for the national vanity; but it is turned and colored by the Grecian historian, who mentions also a third dream, which appeared to Xerxes after his resolution to march was finally taken, and which the mistake of the Magian interpreters falsely construed[18] into an encouragement, though it really threatened ruin. How much this religious conception of the sequence of events belongs to the age, appears by the fact, that it not only appears in Pindar and the Attic tragedians generally, but pervades especially the Persæ of Æschylus, exhibited seven years after the battle of Salamis,—in which we find the premonitory dreams as well as the jealous enmity of the gods towards vast power and overweening aspirations in man,[19] though without any of that inclination, which Herodotus seems to have derived from Persian informants, to exculpate Xerxes by representing him as disposed himself to sober counsels, but driven in a contrary direction by the irresistible fiat of the gods.[20]

While we take due notice of those religious conceptions with which both the poet and the historian surround this vast conflict of Greeks and barbarians, we need look no farther than ambition and revenge for the real motives of the invasion: considering that it had been a proclaimed project in the mind of Darius for three years previous to his death, there was no probability that his son and successor would gratuitously renounce it. Shortly after the reconquest of Egypt, he began to make his preparations, the magnitude of which attested the strength of his resolve as well as the extent of his designs. The satraps and subordinate officers, throughout the whole range of his empire, received orders to furnish the amplest quota of troops and munitions of war,—horse and foot, ships of war, horse-transports, provisions, or supplies of various kinds, according to the circumstances of the territory; while rewards were held out to those who should execute the orders most efficiently. For four entire years these preparations were carried on, and as we are told that similar preparations had been going forward during the three years preceding the death of Darius, though not brought to any ultimate result, we cannot doubt that the maximum of force, which the empire could possibly be made to furnish,[21] was now brought to execute the schemes of Xerxes. The Persian empire was at this moment more extensive than ever it will appear at any subsequent period; for it comprised maritime Thrace and Macedonia as far as the borders of Thessaly, and nearly all the islands of the Ægean north of Krete and east of Eubœa, including even the Cyclades. There existed Persian forts and garrisons at Doriskus, Eion, and other places on the coast of

Thrace, while Abdêra, with the other Grecian settlements on that coast were numbered among the tributaries of Susa.[22] It is necessary to bear in mind these boundaries of the empire, at the time when Xerxes mounted the throne, as compared with its reduced limits at the later time of the Peloponnesian war,—partly that we may understand the apparent chances of success to his expedition, as they presented themselves both to the Persians and to the *medizing* Greeks,—partly that we may appreciate the after-circumstances connected with the formation of the Athenian maritime empire.

In the autumn of the year 481 B. C., the vast army thus raised by Xerxes arrived, from all quarters of the empire, at or near to Sardis; a large portion of it having been directed to assemble at Kritala in Kappadokia, on the eastern side of the Halys, where it was joined by Xerxes himself on the road from Susa.[23] From thence he crossed the Halys, and marched through Phrygia and Lydia, passing through the Phrygian towns of Kelænæ, Anaua, and Kolossæ, and the Lydian town of Kallatêbus, until he reached Sardis, where winter-quarters were prepared for him. But this land force, vast as it was (respecting its numbers, I shall speak farther presently), was not all that the empire had been required to furnish. Xerxes had determined to attack Greece, not by traversing the Ægean, as Datis had passed to Eretria and Marathon, but by a land force and fleet at once: the former crossing the Hellespont, and marching through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly; while the latter was intended to accompany and coöperate. A fleet of one thousand two hundred and seven ships of war, besides numerous vessels of service and burden, had been assembled on the Hellespont and on the coasts of Thrace and Ionia; moreover, Xerxes, with a degree of forethought much exceeding that which his father Darius had displayed in the Scythian expedition, had directed the formation of large magazines of provisions at suitable maritime stations along the line of march, from the Hellespont to the Strymonic gulf. During the four years of military preparation, there had been time to bring together great quantities of flour and other essential articles from Asia and Egypt.[24]

If the whole contemporary world were overawed by the vast assemblage of men and muniments of war which Xerxes thus brought together, so much transcending all past, we might even say all subsequent, experience,—they were no less astounded by two enterprises which entered into his scheme,—the bridging of the Hellespont, and the cutting of a ship-canal through the isthmus of Mount Athos. For the first of the two there had indeed been a precedent, since Darius about thirty-five years before had caused a bridge to be thrown over the Thracian Bosphorus, and crossed it in his march to Scythia; but this bridge, though constructed by the Ionians and by a Samian Greek, having had reference only to distant regions, seems to have been little known or little thought of among the Greeks generally, as we may infer from the fact, that the poet Æschylus[25] speaks as if he had never heard of it, while the bridge of Xerxes was ever remembered, both by Persians and by Greeks, as a most

imposing display of Asiatic omnipotence. The bridge of boats—or rather, the two separate bridges not far removed from each other—which Xerxes caused to be thrown across the Hellespont, stretched from the neighborhood of Abydos, on the Asiatic side to the coast between Sestos and Madytus on the European, where the strait is about an English mile in breadth. The execution of the work was at first intrusted, not to Greeks, but to Phenicians and Egyptians, who had received orders long beforehand to prepare cables of extraordinary strength and size expressly for the purpose; the material used by the Phenicians was flax, that employed by the Egyptians was the fibre of the papyrus. Already had the work been completed and announced to Xerxes as available for transit, when a storm arose, so violent as altogether to ruin it. The wrath of the monarch, when apprized of this catastrophe, burst all bounds; it was directed partly against the chief-engineers, whose heads he caused to be struck off,[26] but partly also against the Hellespont itself. He commanded that the strait should be scourged with three hundred lashes, and that a set of fetters should be let down into it as a farther punishment: moreover Herodotus had heard, but does not believe, that he even sent irons for the purpose of branding it. "Thou bitter water (exclaimed the scourgers while inflicting this punishment), this is the penalty which our master inflicts upon thee, because thou hast wronged him though he hath never wronged thee. King Xerxes *will* cross thee, whether thou wilt or not; but thou deservest not sacrifice from any man, because thou art a treacherous river of (useless) salt water."[27]

Such were the insulting terms heaped by order of Xerxes on the rebellious Hellespont,—Herodotus calls them "non-Hellenic and blasphemous terms," which, together with their brevity, leads us to believe that he gives them as he heard them, and that they are not of his own invention, like so many other speeches in his work, where he dramatizes, as it were, a given position. It has been common, however, to set aside in this case not merely the words, but even the main incident of punishment inflicted on the Hellespont,[28] as a mere Greek fable rather than a real fact: the extreme childishness and absurdity of the proceeding giving to it the air of an enemy's calumny. But this reason will not appear sufficient, if we transport ourselves back to the time and to the party concerned. To transfer to inanimate objects the sensitive as well as the willing and designing attributes of human beings, is among the early and wide-spread instincts of mankind, and one of the primitive forms of religion: and although the enlargement of reason and experience gradually displaces this elementary Fetichism, and banishes it from the regions of reality into those of conventional fictions, yet the force of momentary passion will often suffice to supersede the acquired habit, and even an intelligent man[29] may be impelled in a moment of agonizing pain to kick or beat the lifeless object from which he has suffered. By the old procedure, never formally abolished, though gradually disused, at Athens, —an inanimate object which had caused the death of a man was solemnly tried and cast out of the border: and the Arcadian youths, when they returned hungry from an unsuccessful day's hunting,[30] scourged and pricked the god Pan or his statue by

way of revenge. Much more may we suppose a young Persian monarch, corrupted by universal subservience around him, to be capable of thus venting an insane wrath: and the vengeance ascribed by Herodotus to Cyrus towards the river Gyndês (which he caused to be divided into three hundred and sixty streamlets, because one of his sacred horses had been drowned in it), affords a fair parallel to the scourging of the Hellespont by Xerxes. To offer sacrifice to rivers, and to testify in this manner gratitude for service rendered by rivers, was a familiar rite in the ancient religion. While the grounds for distrusting the narrative are thus materially weakened, the positive evidence will be found very forcible. The expedition of Xerxes took place when Herodotus was about four years old, so that he afterwards enjoyed ample opportunity of conversing with persons who had witnessed and taken part in it: and the whole of his narrative shows that he availed himself largely of such access to information. Besides, the building of the bridge across the Hellespont, and all the incidents connected with it, were acts essentially public in their nature,—known to many witnesses, and therefore the more easily verified,—the decapitation of the unfortunate engineers was an act fearfully impressive, and even the scourging of the Hellespont, while essentially public, appears to Herodotus[31] (as well as to Arrian, afterwards), not childish but impious. The more attentively we balance, in the case before us, the positive testimony against the intrinsic negative probabilities, the more shall we be disposed to admit without diffidence the statement of our original historian.

New engineers—perhaps Greek along with, or in place of, Phenicians and Egyptians—were immediately directed to recommence the work, which Herodotus now describes in detail, and which was doubtless executed with increased care and solidity. To form the two bridges, two lines of ships—triremes and pentekonters blended together—were moored across the strait breastwise, with their sterns towards the Euxine, and their heads towards the Ægean, the stream flowing always rapidly towards the latter.[32] They were moored by anchors head and stern, and by very long cables. The number of ships placed to carry the bridge nearest to the Euxine was three hundred and sixty: the number in the other, three hundred and fourteen. Over or through each of the two lines of ships, across from shore to shore, were stretched six vast cables, which discharged the double function of holding the ships together, and of supporting the bridge-way to be laid upon them. They were tightened by means of capstans on each shore: in three different places along that line, a gap was left between the ships for the purpose of enabling trading vessels, in voyage to or from the Euxine, to pass and repass beneath the cables.

Out of the six cables assigned to each bridge, two were of flax and four of papyrus, combined for the sake of increased strength; for it seems that in the bridges first made, which proved too weak to resist the winds, the Phenicians had employed cables of flax for one bridge, the Egyptians those of papyrus for the other.[33] Over these again were laid planks of wood, sawn to the appropriate width, secured by ropes to keep them in their places: and lastly, upon this foundation the causeway it-

self was formed, out of earth and wood, with a palisade on each side high enough to prevent the cattle which passed over from seeing the water.

The other great work which Xerxes caused to be performed, for facilitating his march, was, the cutting through of the isthmus which connects the stormy promontory of Mount Athos with the main land.[34] That isthmus, near the point where it joins the main land, was about twelve stadia or furlongs across, from the Strymonic to the Toronaic gulf: and the canal dug by order of Xerxes was broad and deep enough for two triremes to sail abreast. In this work too, as well as in the bridge across the Hellespont, the Phenicians were found the ablest and most efficient among all the subjects of the Persian monarch; but the other tributaries, especially the Greeks from the neighboring town of Akanthus, and indeed the entire maritime forces of the empire,[35] were brought together to assist. The head-quarters of the fleet were first at Kymê and Phokæa, next at Elæus in the southern extremity of the Thracian Chersonese, from which point it could protect and second at once the two enterprises going forward at the Hellespont and at Mount Athos. The canal-cutting at the latter was placed under the general directions of two noble Persians,—Bubarês and Artachæus, and distributed under their measurement as task-work among the contingents of the various nations; an ample supply of flour and other provisions being brought for sale in the neighboring plain from various parts of Asia and Egypt.

Three circumstances in the narrative of Herodotus, respecting this work, deserve special notice. First, the superior intelligence of the Phenicians, who, within sight of that lofty island of Thasos which had been occupied three centuries before by their free ancestors, were now laboring as instruments to the ambition of a foreign conqueror. Amidst all the people engaged, they alone took the precaution of beginning the excavation at a breadth far greater than the canal was finally destined to occupy, so as gradually to narrow it, and leave a convenient slope for the sides: the others dug straight down, so that the time as well as the toil of their work was doubled by the continual falling in of the sides,—a remarkable illustration of the degree of practical intelligence then prevalent, since the nations assembled were many and diverse. Secondly, Herodotus remarks that Xerxes must have performed this laborious work from motives of mere ostentation: "for it would have cost no trouble at all," he observes,[36] "to drag all the ships in the fleet across the isthmus; so that the canal was nowise needed." So familiar a process was it, in the mind of a Greek of the fifth century B. C., to transport ships by mechanical force across an isthmus; a special groove, or slip, being seemingly prepared for them: such was the case at the Diolkus across the isthmus of Corinth. Thirdly, it is to be noted, that the men who excavated the canal at Mount Athos worked under the lash; and these, be it borne in mind, were not bought slaves, but freemen, except in so far as they were tributaries of the Persian monarch; and that the father of Herodotus, a native of Halikarnassus, and a subject of the brave queen Artemisia, may perhaps have been among them. We shall find other examples as we proceed, of this indiscriminate use of the whip, and full

conviction of its indispensable necessity, on the part of the Persians,[37]—even to drive the troops of their subject-contingents on to the charge in battle. To employ the scourge in this way towards freemen, and especially towards freemen engaged in military service, was altogether repugnant both to Hellenic practice and to Hellenic feeling: the Asiatic and insular Greeks were relieved from it, as from various other hardships, when they passed out of Persian dominion to become, first allies, afterwards subjects, of Athens: and we shall be called upon hereafter to take note of this fact, when we appreciate the complaints preferred against the hegemony of Athens.

At the same time that the subject-contingents of Xerxes excavated this canal, which was fortified against the sea at its two extremities by compact earthen walls, or embankments, they also threw bridges of boats over the river Strymon: and these two works, together with the renovated double bridge across the Hellespont, were both announced to Xerxes as completed and ready for passage, on his arrival at Sardis at the beginning of winter, 481-480 B. C. Whether the whole of his vast army arrived at Sardis at the same time as himself, and wintered there, may reasonably be doubted; but the whole was united at Sardis and ready to march against Greece, at the beginning of spring, 480 B. C.

While wintering at Sardis, the Persian monarch despatched heralds to all the cities of Greece, except Sparta and Athens, to demand the received tokens of submission, earth and water: for news of his prodigious armament was well calculated to spread terror even among the most resolute of them. And he at the same time sent orders to the maritime cities in Thrace and Macedonia to prepare "dinner" for himself and his vast suite as he passed on his march. That march was commenced at the first beginning of spring, and continued in spite of several threatening portents during the course of it,—one of which Xerxes was blind enough not to comprehend, though, according to Herodotus, nothing could be more obvious than its signification, [38]—while another was misinterpreted into a favorable omen by the compliant answer of the Magian priests. On quitting Sardis, the vast host was divided into two nearly equal columns: a spacious interval being left between the two for the king himself, with his guards and select Persians. First of all[39] came the baggage, carried by beasts of burden, immediately followed by one half of the entire body of infantry, without any distinction of nations: next, the select troops, one thousand Persian cavalry, with one thousand Persian spearmen, the latter being distinguished by carrying their spears with the point downwards, as well as by the spear itself, which had a golden pomegranate at its other extremity, in place of the ordinary spike or point whereby the weapon was planted in the ground when the soldier was not on duty. Behind these troops walked ten sacred horses, of vast power and splendidly caparisoned, bred on the Nisæan plains in Media: next, the sacred chariot of Zeus, drawn by eight white horses,—wherein no man was ever allowed to mount, not even the charioteer, who walked on foot behind with the reins in his hand. Next after the sacred chariot came that of Xerxes himself, drawn by Nisæan horses; the charioteer,

a noble Persian, named Patiramphês, being seated in it by the side of the monarch,—who was often accustomed to alight from the chariot and to enter a litter. Immediately about his person were a chosen body of one thousand horse-guards, the best troops and of the highest breed among the Persians, having golden apples at the reverse extremity of their spears, and followed by other detachments of one thousand horse, ten thousand foot, and ten thousand horse, all native Persians. Of these ten thousand Persian infantry, called the Immortals, because their number was always exactly maintained, nine thousand carried spears with pomegranates of silver at the reverse extremity, while the remaining one thousand distributed in front, rear, and on each side of this detachment, were marked by pomegranates of gold on their spears. With them ended what we may call the household troops: after whom, with an interval of two furlongs, the remaining host followed pell-mell.[40] Respecting its numbers and constituent portions I shall speak presently, on occasion of the great review at Doriskus.

On each side of the army, as it marched out of Sardis, was seen suspended one half of the body of a slaughtered man, placed there expressly for the purpose of impressing a lesson on the subjects of Persia. It was the body of the eldest son of the wealthy Pythius, a Phrygian old man resident at Kelænæ, who had entertained Xerxes in the course of his march from Kappadokia to Sardis, and who had previously recommended himself by rich gifts to the preceding king Darius. So abundant was his hospitality to Xerxes, and so pressing his offers of pecuniary contribution for the Grecian expedition, that the monarch asked him what was the amount of his wealth. "I possess (replied Pythius) besides lands and slaves, two thousand talents of silver, and three million nine hundred and ninety-three thousand of golden darics, wanting only seven thousand of being four million. All this gold and silver do I present to thee, retaining only my lands and slaves, which will be quite enough." Xerxes replied by the strongest expressions of praise and gratitude for his liberality; at the same time refusing his offer, and even giving to Pythius out of his own treasure the sum of seven thousand darics, which was wanting to make up the exact sum of four million. The latter was so elated with this mark of favor, that when the army was about to depart from Sardis, he ventured, under the influence of terror from the various menacing portents, to prefer a prayer to the Persian monarch. His five sons were all about to serve in the invading army against Greece: his prayer to Xerxes was, that the eldest of them might be left behind, as a stay to his own declining years, and that the service of the remaining four with the army might be considered as sufficient. But the unhappy father knew not what he asked. "Wretch! (replied Xerxes) dost thou dare to talk to me about *thy* son, when I am myself on the march against Greece, with my sons, brothers, relatives, and friends? thou who art my slave, and whose duty it is to follow me, with thy wife and thy entire family? Know that the sensitive soul of man dwells in his ears: on hearing good things, it fills the body with delight, but boils with wrath when it hears the contrary. As, when thou didst good deeds and madest good offers to me, thou canst not boast of having surpassed the

king in generosity,—so now, when thou hast turned round and become impudent, the punishment inflicted on thee shall not be the full measure of thy deserts, but something less. For thyself and for thy four sons, the hospitality which I received from thee shall serve as protection; but for that one son whom thou especially wishest to keep in safety, the forfeit of his life shall be thy penalty." He forthwith directed that the son of Pythius should be put to death, and his body severed in twain: of which one half was to be fixed on the right-hand, the other on the left-hand, of the road along which the army was to pass.[41]

A tale essentially similar, yet rather less revolting, has been already recounted respecting Darius, when undertaking his expedition against Scythia. Both tales illustrate the intense force of sentiment with which the Persian kings regarded the obligation of universal personal service, when they were themselves in the field. They seem to have measured their strength by the number of men whom they collected around them, with little or no reference to quality: and the very mention of exemption—the idea that a subject and a slave should seek to withdraw himself from a risk which the monarch was about to encounter—was an offence not to be pardoned. In this as in the other acts of Oriental kings, whether grateful, munificent, or ferocious, we trace nothing but the despotic force of personal will, translating itself into act without any thought of consequences, and treating subjects with less consideration than an ordinary Greek master would have shown towards his slaves.

From Sardis, the host of Xerxes directed its march to Abydos, first across Mysia and the river Kaïkus,—then through Atarneus, Karinê, and the plain of Thêbê: they passed Adramyttium and Antandrus, and crossed the range of Ida, most part of which was on their left hand, not without some loss from stormy weather and thunder.[42] From hence they reached Ilium and the river Skamander, the stream of which was drunk up, or probably in part trampled and rendered undrinkable, by the vast host of men and animals: in spite of the immortal interest which the Skamander derives from the Homeric poems, its magnitude is not such as to make this fact surprising. To the poems themselves, even Xerxes did not disdain to pay tribute: he ascended the holy hill of Ilium,—reviewed the Pergamus where Priam was said to have lived and reigned,—sacrificed one thousand oxen to the patron goddess Athênê,—and caused the Magian priests to make libations in honor of the heroes who had fallen on that venerated spot. He even condescended to inquire into the local details, [43] abundantly supplied to visitors by the inhabitants of Ilium, of that great real or mythical war to which Grecian chronologers had hardly yet learned to assign a precise date: and doubtless when he contemplated the narrow area of that Troy which all the Greeks confederated under Agamemnon had been unable for ten years to overcome, he could not but fancy that these same Greeks would fall an easy prey before his innumerable host. Another day's march between Rhœteium, Ophryneium, and Dardanus on the left-hand, and the Teukrians of Gergis on the right-hand,

brought him to Abydos, where his two newly-constructed bridges over the Hellespont awaited him.

On this transit from Asia into Europe Herodotus dwells with peculiar emphasis,—and well he might do so, since when we consider the bridges, the invading number, the unmeasured hopes succeeded by no less unmeasured calamity,—it will appear not only to have been the most imposing event of his century, but to rank among the most imposing events of all history. He surrounds it with much dramatic circumstance, not only mentioning the marble throne erected for Xerxes on a hill near Abydos, from whence he surveyed both his masses of land-force covering the shore, and his ships sailing and racing in the strait (a race in which the Phenicians of Sidon surpassed the Greeks and all the other contingents), but also superadding to this real fact a dialogue with Artabanus, intended to set forth the internal mind of Xerxes. He farther quotes certain supposed exclamations of the Abydenes at the sight of his superhuman power. "Why (said one of these terror-stricken spectators[44]), why dost thou, O Zeus, under the shape of a Persian man and the name of Xerxes, thus bring together the whole human race for the ruin of Greece? It would have been easy for thee to accomplish *that* without so much ado." Such emphatic ejaculations exhibit the strong feeling which Herodotus or his informants throw into the scene, though we cannot venture to apply to them the scrutiny of historical criticism.

At the first moment of sunrise, so sacred in the mind of Orientals,[45] the passage was ordered to begin: the bridges being perfumed with frankincense and strewed with myrtle boughs, while Xerxes himself made libations into the sea with a golden censer, and offered up prayers to Helios, that he might effect without hindrance his design of conquering Europe even to its farthest extremity. Along with his libation he cast into the Hellespont the censer itself, with a golden bowl and a Persian scimitar;—"I do not exactly know[46] (adds the historian) whether he threw them in as a gift to Helios, or as a mark of repentance and atonement to the Hellespont for the stripes which he had inflicted upon it." Of the two bridges, that nearest to the Euxine was devoted to the military force,—the other, to the attendants, the baggage, and the beasts of burden. The ten thousand Persians, called Immortals, all wearing garlands on their heads, were the first to pass over, and Xerxes himself, with the remaining army, followed next, though in an order somewhat different from that which had been observed in quitting Sardis: the monarch having reached the European shore, saw his troops crossing the bridges after him "under the lash." But in spite of the use of this sharp stimulus to accelerate progress, so vast were the numbers of his host, that they occupied no less than seven days and seven nights, without a moment of intermission, in the business of crossing over,—a fact to be borne in mind presently, when we come to discuss the totals computed by Herodotus.[47]

Having thus cleared the strait, Xerxes directed his march along the Thracian Chersonese, to the isthmus whereby it is joined with Thrace, between the town of Kardia on his left hand and the tomb of Hellê on his right,—the eponymous heroine of the

strait. After passing this isthmus, he turned westward along the coast of the gulf of Melas and the Ægean sea,—crossing the river from which that gulf derived its name, and even drinking its waters up—according to Herodotus—with the men and animals of his army. Having passed by the Æolic city of Ænus and the harbor called Stentoris, he reached the sea-coast and plain called Doriskus, covering the rich delta near the mouth of the Hebrus: a fort had been built there and garrisoned by Darius. The spacious plain called by this same name reached far along the shore to Cape Serreium, and comprised in it the towns of Salê and Zonê, possessions of the Samothracian Greeks planted on the territory once possessed by the Thracian Kikones on the mainland. Having been here joined by his fleet, which had doubled[48] the southernmost promontory of the Thracian Chersonese, he thought the situation convenient for a general review and enumeration both of his land and his naval force.

Never probably in the history of mankind has there been brought together a body of men from regions so remote and so widely diverse, for one purpose and under one command, as those which were now assembled in Thrace near the mouth of the Hebrus. About the numerical total we cannot pretend to form any definite idea; about the variety of contingents there is no room for doubt. "What Asiatic nation was there (asks Herodotus,[49] whose conceptions of this expedition seem to outstrip his powers of language) that Xerxes did not bring against Greece?" Nor was it Asiatic nations alone, comprised within the Oxus, the Indus, the Persian gulf, the Red Sea, the Levant, the Ægean and the Euxine: we must add to these also the Egyptians, the Ethiopians on the Nile south of Egypt, and the Libyans from the desert near Kyrênê. Not all the expeditions, fabulous or historical, of which Herodotus had ever heard, appeared to him comparable to this of Xerxes, even for total number; much more in respect of variety of component elements. Forty-six different nations,[50] each with its distinct national costume, mode of arming, and local leaders, formed the vast land-force; eight other nations furnished the fleet, on board of which Persians, Medes, and Sakæ served as armed soldiers or marines; and the real leaders, both of the entire army and of all its various divisions, were native Persians of noble blood, who distributed the various native contingents into companies of thousands, hundreds, and tens. The forty-six nations composing the land-force were as follows: Persians, Medes, Kissians, Hyrkanians, Assyrians, Baktrians, Sakæ, Indians, Arians, Parthians, Chorasmians, Sogdians, Gandarians, Dadikæ, Kaspians, Sarangæ, Paktyes, Utii, Myki, Parikanii, Arabians, Ethiopians in Asia and Ethiopians south of Egypt, Libyans, Paphlagonians, Ligyes, Matieni, Mariandyni, Syrians, Phrygians, Armenians, Lydians, Mysians, Thracians, Kabêlians, Mares, Kolchians, Alarodians, Saspeires, Sagartii. The eight nations who furnished the fleet were: Phenicians, three hundred ships of war; Egyptians, two hundred; Cypriots, one hundred and fifty; Kilikians, one hundred; Pamphylians, thirty; Lykians, fifty; Karians, seventy; Ionic Greeks, one hundred; Doric Greeks, thirty; Æolic Greeks, sixty; Hellespontic Greeks, one hundred; Greeks from the islands in the Ægean, seventeen; in all one thousand two hundred and seven triremes, or ships of war, with three banks of oars. The descriptions of

costume and arms which we find in Herodotus are curious and varied; but it is important to mention that no nation except the Lydians, Pamphylians, Cypriots and Karians (partially also the Egyptian marines on shipboard) bore arms analogous to those of the Greeks (*i. e.* arms fit for steady conflict and sustained charge,[51]—for hand combat in line as well as for defence of the person,—but inconveniently heavy either in pursuit or in flight); while the other nations were armed with missile weapons,—light shields of wicker or leather, or no shields at all,—turbans or leather caps instead of helmets,—swords, and scythes. They were not properly equipped either for fighting in regular order or for resisting the line of spears and shields which the Grecian hoplites brought to bear upon them; their persons too were much less protected against wounds than those of the latter; some of them indeed, as the Mysians and Libyans, did not even carry spears, but only staves with the end hardened in the fire. [52] A nomadic tribe of Persians, called Sagartii, to the number of eight thousand horsemen, came armed only with a dagger and with the rope known in South America as the lasso, which they cast in the fight to entangle an antagonist. The Æthiopians from the Upper Nile had their bodies painted half red and half white, wore the skins of lions and panthers, and carried, besides the javelin, a long bow with arrows of reed, tipped with a point of sharp stone.

It was at Doriskus that the fighting men of the entire land-army were first numbered; for Herodotus expressly informs us that the various contingents had never been numbered separately, and avows his own ignorance of the amount of each. The means employed for numeration were remarkable. Ten thousand men were counted, [53] and packed together as closely as possible: a line was drawn, and a wall of inclosure built around the space which they had occupied, into which all the army was directed to enter successively, so that the aggregate number of divisions, comprising ten thousand each, was thus ascertained. One hundred and seventy of these divisions were affirmed by the informants of Herodotus to have been thus numbered, constituting a total of one million seven hundred thousand foot, besides eighty thousand horse, many war-chariots from Libya and camels from Arabia, with a presumed total of twenty thousand additional men.[54] Such was the vast land-force of the Persian monarch: his naval equipments were of corresponding magnitude, comprising not only the twelve hundred and seven triremes,[55] or war-ships, of three banks of oars, but also three thousand smaller vessels of war and transports. The crew of each trireme comprised two hundred rowers, and thirty fighting-men, Persians or Sakæ; that of each of the accompanying vessels included eighty men, according to an average which Herodotus supposes not far from the truth. If we sum up these items, the total numbers brought by Xerxes from Asia to the plain and to the coast of Doriskus would reach the astounding figure of two million three hundred and seventeen thousand men. Nor is this all. In the farther march from Doriskus to Thermopylæ, Xerxes pressed into his service men and ships from all the people whose territory he traversed: deriving from hence a reinforcement of one hundred and twenty triremes with aggregate crews of twenty-four thousand men, and of three

hundred thousand new land troops, so that the aggregate of his force when he appeared at Thermopylæ was two million six hundred and forty thousand men. To this we are to add, according to the conjecture of Herodotus, a number not at all inferior, as attendants, slaves, sutlers, crews of the provision-craft and ships of burden, etc., so that the male persons accompanying the Persian king when he reached his first point of Grecian resistance amounted to five million two hundred and eighty-three thousand two hundred and twenty! So stands the prodigious estimate of this army, the whole strength of the Eastern world, in clear and express figures of Herodotus, [56] who himself evidently supposes the number to have been even greater; for he conceives the number of "camp followers" as not only equal to, but considerably larger than, that of fighting-men. We are to reckon, besides, the eunuchs, concubines, and female cooks, at whose number Herodotus does not pretend to guess: together with cattle, beasts of burden, and Indian dogs, in indefinite multitude, increasing the consumption of the regular army.

To admit this overwhelming total, or anything near to it, is obviously impossible: yet the disparaging remarks which it has drawn down upon Herodotus are noway merited.[57] He takes pains to distinguish that which informants told him, from that which he merely guessed. His description of the review at Doriskus is so detailed, that he had evidently conversed with persons who were present at it, and had learned the separate totals promulgated by the enumerators,—infantry, cavalry, and ships of war, great and small. As to the number of triremes, his statement seems beneath the truth, as we may judge from the contemporary authority of Æschylus, who in the "Persæ" gives the exact number of twelve hundred and seven Persian ships as having fought at Salamis: but between Doriskus and Salamis, Herodotus[58] has himself enumerated six hundred and forty-seven ships as lost or destroyed, and only one hundred and twenty as added. No exaggeration, therefore, can well be suspected in this statement, which would imply about two hundred and seventy-six thousand as the number of the crews, though there is here a confusion or omission in the narrative which we cannot clear up. But the aggregate of three thousand smaller ships, and still more, that of one million seven hundred thousand infantry, are far less trustworthy. There would be little or no motive for the enumerators to be exact, and every motive for them to exaggerate,—an immense nominal total would be no less pleasing to the army than to the monarch himself,—so that the military total of land-force and ships' crews, which Herodotus gives as two million six hundred and forty-one thousand on the arrival at Thermopylæ, may be dismissed as unwarranted and incredible. And the computation whereby he determines the amount of non-military persons present, as equal or more than equal to the military, is founded upon suppositions noway admissible; for though in a Grecian well-appointed army it was customary to reckon one light-armed soldier, or attendant, for every hoplite, no such estimate can be applied to the Persian host. A few grandees and leaders might be richly provided with attendants of various kinds, but the great mass of the army would have none at all. Indeed, it appears that the only way in which we can render

the military total, which must at all events have been very great, consistent with the conditions of possible subsistence, is by supposing a comparative absence of attendants, and by adverting to the fact of the small consumption, and habitual patience as to hardship of Orientals in all ages. An Asiatic soldier will at this day make his campaign upon scanty fare, and under privations which would be intolerable to an European.[59] And while we thus diminish the probable consumption, we have to consider that never in any case of ancient history had so much previous pains been taken to accumulate supplies on the line of march: in addition to which the cities in Thrace were required to furnish such an amount of provisions, when the army passed by, as almost brought them to ruin. Herodotus himself expresses his surprise how provisions could have been provided for so vast a multitude; and were we to admit his estimate literally, the difficulty would be magnified into an impossibility. Weighing the circumstances of the case well, and considering that this army was the result of a maximum of effort throughout the vast empire, that a great numerical total was the thing chiefly demanded, and that prayers for exemption were regarded by the Great King as a capital offence, and that provisions had been collected for three years before along the line of march,—we may well believe that the numbers of Xerxes were greater than were ever assembled in ancient times, or perhaps at any known epoch of history. But it would be rash to pretend to guess at any positive number, in the entire absence of ascertained data: and when we learn from Thucydides that he found it impossible to find out the exact numbers of the small armies of Greeks who fought at Mantineia,[60] we shall not be ashamed to avow our inability to count the Asiatic multitudes at Doriskus. We may remark, however, that, in spite of the reinforcements received afterwards in Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, it may be doubted whether the aggregate total ever afterwards increased; for Herodotus takes no account of desertions, which yet must have been very numerous, in a host disorderly, heterogeneous, without any interest in the enterprise, and wherein the numbers of each separate contingent were unknown.

Ktesias gives the total of the host at eight hundred thousand men, and one thousand triremes, independent of the war-chariots: if he counts the crews of the triremes apart from the eight hundred thousand men, as seems probable, the total will then be considerably above a million. Ælian assigns an aggregate of seven hundred thousand men: Diodorus[61] appears to follow partly Herodotus, partly other authorities. None of these witnesses enable us to correct Herodotus, in a case where we are obliged to disbelieve him. He is, in some sort, an original witness, having evidently conversed with persons actually present at the muster of Doriskus, giving us both their belief as to the numbers, together with the computation, true or false, circulated among them by authority. Moreover, the contemporary Æschylus, while agreeing with him exactly as to the number of triremes, gives no specific figure as to the land-force, but conveys to us, in his Persæ, a general sentiment of vast number, which may seem in keeping with the largest statement of Herodotus: the Persian empire is drained of men,—the women of Susa are left without husbands and broth-

ers,—the Baktrian territory has not been allowed to retain even its old men.[62] The terror-striking effect of this crowd was probably quite as great as if its numbers had really corresponded to the ideas of Herodotus.

After the numeration had taken place, Xerxes passed in his chariot by each of the several contingents, observed their equipment, and put questions to which the royal scribes noted down the answers: he then embarked on board a Sidonian trireme, which had been already fitted up with a gilt tent, and sailed along the prows of his immense fleet, moored in line about four hundred feet from the shore, and every vessel completely manned for action. Such a spectacle was well calculated to rouse emotions of arrogant confidence, and it was in this spirit that he sent forthwith for Demaratus, the exiled king of Sparta, who was among his auxiliaries,—to ask whether resistance on the part of the Greeks to such a force was even conceivable. The conversation between them, dramatically given by Herodotus, is one of the most impressive manifestations of sentiment in the Greek language.[63] Demaratus assures him that the Spartans most certainly, and the Dorians of Peloponnesus probably, will resist him to the death, be the difference of numbers what it may. Xerxes receives the statement with derision, but exhibits no feeling of displeasure: an honorable contrast to the treatment of Charidemus a century and a half afterwards, by the last monarch of Persia.[64]

After the completion of the review, Xerxes with the army pursued his march westward, in three divisions and along three different lines of road, through the territories of seven distinct tribes of Thracians, interspersed with Grecian maritime colonies: all was still within his own empire, and he took reinforcements from each as he passed: the Thracian Satræ were preserved from this levy by their unassailable seats amidst the woods and snows of Rhodopê. The islands of Samothrace and Thasus, with their subject towns on the mainland, and the Grecian colonies Dikæa,[65] Maroneia, and Abdêra, were successively laid under contribution for contingents of ships or men; and, what was still more ruinous, they were further constrained to provide a day's meal for the immense host as it passed: for the day of his passage the Great King was their guest. Orders had been transmitted for this purpose long beforehand, and for many months the citizens had been assiduously employed in collecting food for the army, as well as delicacies for the monarch,—grinding flour of wheat and barley, fattening cattle, keeping up birds and fowls; together with a decent display of gold and silver plate for the regal dinner. A superb tent was erected for Xerxes and his immediate companions, while the army received their rations in the open region around: on commencing the march next morning, the tent with all its rich contents was plundered, and nothing restored to those who had furnished it. Of course, so prodigious a host, which had occupied seven days and seven nights in crossing the double Hellespontine bridge, must also have been for many days on its march through the territory, and therefore at the charge, of each one among the cities, so that the cost brought them to the brink of ruin, and even in some cases drove them

to abandon house and home. The cost incurred by the city of Thasus, on account of their possessions of the mainland, for this purpose, was no less than four hundred talents[66] (equal to ninety-two thousand eight hundred pounds): while at Abdêra, the witty Megakreon recommended to his countrymen to go in a body to the temples and thank the gods, because Xerxes was pleased to be satisfied with one meal in the day. Had the monarch required breakfast as well as dinner, the Abderites must have been reduced to the alternative either of exile or of utter destitution.[67] A stream called Lissus, which seems to have been of no great importance, is said to have been drunk up by the army, together with a lake of some magnitude near Pistyrus.[68]

Through the territory of the Edonian Thracians and the Pierians, between Pangæus and the sea, Xerxes and his army reached the river Strymon at the important station called Ennea Hodoi, or Nine-Roads, afterwards memorable by the foundation of Amphipolis. Bridges had been already thrown over the river, to which the Magian priests rendered solemn honors by sacrificing white horses and throwing them into the stream. Nor were his religious feelings satisfied without the more precious sacrifices often resorted to by the Persians: he here buried alive nine native youths and nine maidens, in compliment to Nine-Roads, the name of the Spot:[69] moreover, he also left, under the care of the Pæonians of Siris, the sacred chariot of Zeus, which had been brought from the seat of empire, but which doubtless was found inconvenient on the line of march. From the Strymon he marched forward along the Strymonic gulf, passing through the territory of the Bisaltæ, near the Greek colonies of Argilus and Stageirus, until he came to the Greek town of Akanthus, hard by the isthmus of Athos, which had been recently cut through. The fierce king of the Bisaltæ[70] refused submission to Xerxes, fled to Rhodopê for safety, and forbade his six sons to join the Persian host. Unhappily for themselves, they nevertheless did so, and when they came back he caused all of them to be blinded.

All the Greek cities, which Xerxes had passed by, obeyed his orders with sufficient readiness, and probably few doubted the ultimate success of so prodigious an armament. But the inhabitants of Akanthus had been eminent for their zeal and exertions in the cutting of the canal, and had probably made considerable profits during the operation; Xerxes now repaid their zeal by contracting with them the tie of hospitality, accompanied with praise and presents; though he does not seem to have exempted them from the charge of maintaining the army while in their territory. He here separated himself from his fleet, which was directed to sail through the canal of Athos, to double the two southwestern capes of the Chalkidic peninsula, to enter the Thermaic gulf, and to await his arrival at Therma. The fleet in its course gathered additional troops from the Greek towns in the two peninsulas of Sithonia and Pallênê, as well as on the eastern side of the Thermaic gulf, in the region called Krusis, or Krossæa, on the continental side of the isthmus of Pallênê. These Greek towns were numerous, but of little individual importance. Near Therma (Salonichi) in Mygdonia, in the interior of the gulf and eastward of the mouth of the Axius, the fleet awaited

the arrival of Xerxes by land from Akanthus. He seems to have had a difficult march, and to have taken a route considerably inland, through Pæonia and Krestônia,—a wild, woody, and untrodden country, where his baggage-camels were set upon by lions, and where there were also wild bulls, of prodigious size and fierceness: at length he rejoined his fleet at Therma, and stretched his army throughout Mygdonia, the ancient Pieria, and Bottiæis, as far as the mouth of the Haliakmôn.[71]

Xerxes had now arrived within sight of Mount Olympus, the northern boundary of what was properly called Hellas; after a march through nothing but subject territory, with magazines laid up beforehand for the subsistence of his army, with additional contingents levied in his course, and probably with Thracian volunteers joining him in the hopes of plunder. The road along which he had marched was still shown with solemn reverence by the Thracians, and protected both from intruders and from tillage, even in the days of Herodotus.[72] The Macedonian princes, the last of his western tributaries, in whose territory he now found himself,—together with the Thessalian Aleuadæ,—undertook to conduct him farther. Nor did the task as yet appear difficult: what steps the Greeks were taking to oppose him, shall be related in the coming chapter.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

PROCEEDINGS IN GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE TIME OF THE BATTLE OF THERMOPYLÆ.

Our information respecting the affairs of Greece immediately after the repulse of the Persians from Marathon, is very scanty.

Kleomenês and Leotychidês, the two kings of Sparta (the former belonging to the elder, or Eurystheneïd, the latter to the younger, or the Prokleïd, race), had conspired for the purpose of dethroning the former Prokleïd king Demaratus: and Kleomenês had even gone so far as to tamper with the Delphian priestess for this purpose. His manœuvre being betrayed shortly afterwards, he was so alarmed at the displeasure of the Spartans, that he retired into Thessaly, and from thence into Arcadia, where he employed the powerful influence of his regal character and heroic lineage to arm the Arcadian people against his country. The Spartans, alarmed in their turn, voluntarily invited him back with a promise of amnesty. But his renewed lease did not last long: his habitual violence of character became aggravated into decided insanity, insomuch that he struck with his stick whomsoever he met; and his relatives were forced to confine him in chains under a Helot sentinel. By severe menaces, he one day constrained this man to give him his sword, with which he mangled himself dreadfully and perished. So shocking a death was certain to receive a religious interpretation, but which among the misdeeds of his life had drawn down upon him the divine wrath, was a point difficult to determine. Most of the Greeks imputed it to the sin of his having corrupted the Pythian priestess:[73] but the Athenians and Argeians were each disposed to an hypothesis of their own,—the former believed that the gods had thus punished the Spartan king for having cut timber in the sacred grove of Eleusis,—the latter recognized the avenging hand of the hero Argus, whose grove Kleomenês had burnt, along with so many suppliant warriors who had taken sanctuary in it. Without pronouncing between these different suppositions, Herodotus contents himself with expressing his opinion that the miserable death of Kleomenês was an atonement for his conduct to Demaratus. But what surprises us most is, to hear that the Spartans, usually more disposed than other Greeks to refer every striking phenomenon to divine agency, recognized on this occasion nothing but a vulgar physical cause: Kleomenês had gone mad, they affirmed, through habits of intoxication, learned from some Scythian envoys who had come to Sparta.[74]

The death of Kleomenês, and the discredit thrown on his character, emboldened the Æginetans to prefer a complaint at Sparta respecting their ten hostages whom Kleomenês and Leotychidês had taken away from the island, a little before the invasion of Attica by the Persians under Datis, and deposited at Athens as guarantee to the Athenians against aggression from Ægina at that critical moment. Leotychidês

was the surviving auxiliary of Kleomenês in the requisition of these hostages, and against him the Æginetans complained. Though the proceeding was one unquestionably beneficial to the general cause of Greece,[75] yet such was the actual displeasure of the Lacedæmonians against the deceased king and his acts, that the survivor Leotychidês was brought to a public trial, and condemned to be delivered up as prisoner in atonement to the Æginetans. The latter were about to carry away their prisoner, when a dignified Spartan named Theasidês, pointed out to them the danger which they were incurring by such an indignity against the regal person,—the Spartans, he observed, had passed sentence under feelings of temporary wrath, which would probably be exchanged for sympathy if they saw the sentence realized.

Accordingly the Æginetans, instead of executing the sentence, contented themselves with stipulating that Leotychidês should accompany them to Athens and redemand their hostages detained there. The Athenians refused to give up the hostages, in spite of the emphatic terms in which the Spartan king set forth the sacred obligation of restoring a deposit:[76] they justified the refusal in part by saying that the deposit had been lodged by the two kings jointly, and could not be surrendered to one of them alone: but they probably recollected that the hostages were placed less as a deposit than as a security against Æginetan hostility,—which security they were not disposed to forego.

Leotychidês having been obliged to retire without success, the Æginetans resolved to adopt measures of retaliation for themselves: they waited for the period of a solemn festival celebrated every fifth year at Sunium, on which occasion a ship peculiarly equipped and carrying some of the leading Athenians as Theôrs, or sacred envoys, sailed thither from Athens. This ship they found means to capture, and carried all on board prisoners to Ægina. Whether an exchange took place, or whether the prisoners and hostages on both sides were put to death, we do not know; but the consequence of their proceeding was an active and decided war between Athens and Ægina,[77] beginning seemingly about 488 or 487 B. C., and lasting until 481 B. C., the year preceding the invasion of Xerxes.

An Æginetan citizen named Nikodromus took advantage of this war to further a plot against the government of the island: having been before, as he thought, unjustly banished, he now organized a revolt of the people against the ruling oligarchy, concerting with the Athenians a simultaneous invasion in support of his plan. Accordingly, on the appointed day he rose with his partisans in arms and took possession of the Old Town,—a strong post which had been superseded in course of time by the more modern city on the sea-shore, less protected though more convenient.[78] But no Athenians appeared, and without them he was unable to maintain his footing: he was obliged to make his escape from the island after witnessing the complete defeat of his partisans,—a large body of whom, seven hundred in number, fell into the hands of the government, and were led out for execution. One man alone among these prisoners burst his chains, fled to the sanctuary of Dêmêtêr Thesmophorus,

and was fortunate enough to seize the handle of the door before he was overtaken. In spite of every effort to drag him away by force, he clung to it with convulsive grasp: his pursuers did not venture to put him to death in such a position, but they severed the hands from the body and then executed him, leaving the hands still hanging to and grasping[79] the door-handle, where they seem to have long remained without being taken off. Destruction of the seven hundred prisoners does not seem to have drawn down upon the Æginetan oligarchy either vengeance from the gods or censure from their contemporaries; but the violation of sanctuary, in the case of that one unfortunate man whose hands were cut off, was a crime which the goddess Dêmêtêr never forgave. More than fifty years afterwards, in the first year of the Peloponnesian war, the Æginetans, having been previously conquered by Athens, were finally expelled from their island: such expulsion was the divine judgment upon them for this ancient impiety, which half a century of continued expiatory sacrifice had not been sufficient to wipe out.[80]

The Athenians who were to have assisted Nikodromus arrived at Ægina one day too late. Their proceedings had been delayed by the necessity of borrowing twenty triremes from the Corinthians, in addition to fifty of their own: with these seventy sail they defeated the Æginetans, who met them with a fleet of equal number, and then landed on the island. The Æginetans solicited aid from Argos, but that city was either too much displeased with them, or too much exhausted by the defeat sustained from the Spartan Kleomenês, to grant it. Nevertheless, one thousand Argeian volunteers, under a distinguished champion of the pentathlon named Eurybatês, came to their assistance, and a vigorous war was carried on, with varying success, against the Athenian armament.

At sea, the Athenians sustained a defeat, being attacked at a moment when their fleet was in disorder, so that they lost four ships with their crews: on land they were more successful, and few of the Argeian volunteers survived to return home. The general of the latter, Eurybatês, confiding in his great personal strength and skill, challenged the best of the Athenian warriors to single combat: he slew three of them in succession, but the arm of the fourth, Sôphanês of Dekeleia, was victorious, and proved fatal to him.[81] At length the invaders were obliged to leave the island without any decisive result, and the war seems to have been prosecuted by frequent descents and privateering on both sides,—in which Nikodromus and the Æginetan exiles, planted by Athens on the coast of Attica near Sunium, took an active part;[82] the advantage on the whole being on the side of Athens.

The general course of this war, and especially the failure of the enterprise concerned with Nikodromus in consequence of delay in borrowing ships from Corinth, were well calculated to impress upon the Athenians the necessity of enlarging their naval force. And it is from the present time that we trace among them the first growth of that decided tendency towards maritime activity, which coincided so hap-

pily with the expansion of their democracy, and opened a new phase in Grecian history, as well as a new career for themselves.

The exciting effect produced upon them by the repulse of the Persians at Marathon has been dwelt upon in my preceding volume. Miltiades, the victor in that field, having been removed from the scene under circumstances already described, Aristeidês and Themistoklês became the chief men at Athens: and the former was chosen archon during the succeeding year. His exemplary uprightness in magisterial functions insured to him lofty esteem from the general public, not without a certain proportion of active enemies, some of them sufferers by his justice. These enemies naturally became partisans of his rival, Themistoklês, who had all the talents necessary for bringing them into coöperation: and the rivalry between the two chiefs became so bitter and menacing, that even Aristeidês himself is reported to have said, "If the Athenians were wise, they would cast both of us into the barathrum." Under such circumstances, it is not too much to say that the peace of the country was preserved mainly by the institution called Ostracism, of which so much has been said in the preceding volume. After three or four years of continued political rivalry, the two chiefs appealed to a vote of ostracism, and Aristeidês was banished.

Of the particular points on which their rivalry turned, we are unfortunately little informed. But it is highly probable that one of them was, the important change of policy above alluded to,—the conversion of Athens from a land-power into a sea-power,—the development of this new and stirring element in the minds of the people. By all authorities, this change of policy is ascribed principally and specially to Themistoklês:[83] on that account, if for no other reason, Aristeidês would probably be found opposed to it,—but it was, moreover, a change not in harmony with that old-fashioned Hellenism, undisturbed uniformity of life and narrow range of active duty and experience, which Aristeidês seems to have approved in common with the subsequent philosophers. The seaman was naturally more of a wanderer and cosmopolite than the heavy-armed soldier: the modern Greek seaman even at this moment is so to a remarkable degree, distinguished for the variety of his ideas and the quickness of his intelligence:[84] the land-service was a type of steadiness and inflexible ranks, the sea-service that of mutability and adventure. Such was the idea strongly entertained by Plato and other philosophers:[85] though we may remark that they do not render justice to the Athenian seaman, whose training was far more perfect and laborious, and his habits of obedience far more complete,[86] than that of the Athenian hoplite, or horseman: a training beginning with Themistoklês, and reaching its full perfection about the commencement of the Peloponnesian war.

In recommending extraordinary efforts to create a navy as well as to acquire nautical practice, Themistoklês displayed all that sagacious appreciation of the circumstances and dangers of the time for which Thucydides gives him credit: and there can be no doubt that Aristeidês, though the honester politician of the two, was at this particular crisis the less essential to his country. Not only was there the struggle

with Ægina, a maritime power equal or more than equal, and within sight of the Athenian harbor,—but there was also in the distance a still more formidable contingency to guard against. The Persian armament had been driven with disgrace from Attica back to Asia; but the Persian monarch still remained with undiminished means of aggression and increased thirst for revenge; and Themistoklês knew well that the danger from that quarter would recur greater than ever. He believed that it would recur again in the same way, by an expedition across the Ægean like that of Datis to Marathon;[87] against which the best defence would be found in a numerous and well-trained fleet. Nor could the large preparations of Darius for renewing the attack remain unknown to a vigilant observer, extending as they did over so many Greeks subject to the Persian empire. Such positive warning was more than enough to stimulate the active genius of Themistoklês, who now prevailed upon his countrymen to begin with energy the work of maritime preparation, as well against Ægina as against Persia.[88] Not only were two hundred new ships built, and citizens trained as seamen,—but the important work was commenced, during the year when Themistoklês was either archon or general, of forming and fortifying a new harbor for Athens at Peiræus, instead of the ancient open bay of Phalêrum. The latter was indeed somewhat nearer to the city, but Peiræus, with its three separate natural ports, [89] admitting of being closed and fortified, was incomparably superior in safety as well as in convenience. It is not too much to say, with Herodotus,—that the Æginetan "war was the salvation of Greece, by constraining the Athenians to make themselves a maritime power."[90] The whole efficiency of the resistance subsequently made to Xerxes turned upon this new movement in the organization of Athens, allowed as it was to attain tolerable completeness through a fortunate concurrence of accidents; for the important delay of ten years, between the defeat of Marathon and the fresh invasion by which it was to be avenged, was in truth the result of accident. First, the revolt of Egypt; next, the death of Darius; thirdly, the indifference of Xerxes, at his first accession, towards Hellenic matters,—postponed until 480 B. C., an invasion which would naturally have been undertaken in 487 or 486 B. C., and which would have found Athens at that time without her wooden walls,—the great engine of her subsequent salvation.

Another accidental help, without which the new fleet could not have been built,—a considerable amount of public money,—was also by good fortune now available to the Athenians. It is first in an emphatic passage of the poet Æschylus, and next from Herodotus on the present occasion, that we hear of the silver mines of Laurium[91] in Attica, and the valuable produce which they rendered to the state. They were situated in the southern portion of the territory, not very far from the promontory of Sunium,[92] amidst a district of low hills which extended across much of the space between the eastern sea at Thorikus, and the western at Anaphlystus. At what time they first began to be worked, we have no information; but it seems hardly possible that they could have been worked with any spirit or profitable result until after the expulsion of Hippias and the establishment of the democratical constitution of Kleis-

thenês. Neither the strong local factions, by which different portions of Attica were set against each other before the time of Peisistratus, nor the rule of that despot succeeded by his two sons, were likely to afford confidence and encouragement. But when the democracy of Kleisthenês first brought Attica into one systematic and comprehensive whole, with equal rights to all the parts, and a common centre at Athens,—the power of that central government over the mineral wealth of the country, and its means of binding the whole people to respect agreements concluded with individual undertakers, would give a new stimulus to private speculation in the district of Laurium. It was the practice of the Athenian government either to sell, or to let for a long term of years, particular districts of this productive region to individuals or companies,—on consideration partly of a sum or fine paid down, partly of a reserved rent equal to one-twenty-fourth part of the gross produce.

We are told by Herodotus that there was in the Athenian treasury, at the time when Themistoklês made his proposition to enlarge the naval force, a great sum[93] arising from the Laurian mines, out of which a distribution was on the point of being made among the citizens,—ten drachms to each man. This great amount in hand must probably have been the produce of the purchase-money or fines received from recent sales, since the small annual reserved rent can hardly have been accumulated during many successive years: new and enlarged enterprises in mines must be supposed to have been recently begun by individuals under contract with the government, in order to produce at the moment so overflowing an exchequer and to furnish means for the special distribution contemplated. Themistoklês availed himself of this precious opportunity,—set forth the necessities of the war with Ægina and the still more formidable menace from the great enemy in Asia,—and prevailed upon the people to forego the promised distribution for the purpose of obtaining an efficient navy.[94] One cannot doubt that there must have been many speakers who would try to make themselves popular by opposing this proposition and supporting the distribution, insomuch that the power of the people generally to feel the force of a distant motive as predominant over a present gain deserves notice as an earnest of their approaching greatness.

Immense, indeed, was the recompense reaped for this self-denial, not merely by Athens but by Greece generally, when the preparations of Xerxes came to be matured, and his armament was understood to be approaching. The orders for equipment of ships and laying in of provisions, issued by the Great King to his subject Greeks in Asia, the Ægean, and Thrace, would of course become known throughout Greece Proper,—especially the vast labor bestowed on the canal of Mount Athos, which would be the theme of wondering talk with every Thasian or Akanthian citizen who visited the festival games in Peloponnesus. All these premonitory evidences were public enough, without any need of that elaborate stratagem whereby the exiled Demaratus is alleged to have secretly transmitted, from Susa to Sparta, intelligence of the approaching expedition.[95] The formal announcements of Xerxes all

designated Athens as the special object of his wrath and vengeance;[96] and other Grecian cities might thus hope to escape without mischief: so that the prospect of the great invasion did not at first provoke among them any unanimous dispositions to resist. Accordingly, when the first heralds despatched by Xerxes from Sardis in the autumn of 481 B. C., a little before his march to the Hellespont, addressed themselves to the different cities with demand of earth and water, many were disposed to comply. Neither to Athens, nor to Sparta, were any heralds sent; and these two cities were thus from the beginning identified in interest and in the necessity of defence. Both of them sent, in this trying moment, to consult the Delphian oracle: while both at the same time joined to convene a Pan-Hellenic congress at the Isthmus of Corinth, for the purpose of organizing resistance against the expected invader.

I have in the preceding volume pointed out the various steps whereby the separate states of Greece were gradually brought, even against their own natural instincts, into something approaching more nearly to political union. The present congress, assembled under the influence of common fear from Persia, has more of a Pan-Hellenic character than any political event which has yet occurred in Grecian history. It extends far beyond the range of those Peloponnesian states who constitute the immediate allies of Sparta: it comprehends Athens, and is even summoned in part by her strenuous instigation: it seeks to combine, moreover, every city of Hellenic race and language, however distant, which can be induced to take part in it,—even the Kretans, Korkyræans, and Sicilians. It is true that all these states do not actually come, but earnest efforts are made to induce them to come: the dispersed brethren of the Hellenic family are intreated to marshal themselves in the same ranks for a joint political purpose,[97]—the defence of the common hearth and metropolis of the race. This is a new fact in Grecian history, opening scenes and ideas unlike to anything which has gone before,—enlarging, prodigiously, the functions and duties connected with that headship of Greece which had hitherto been in the hands of Sparta, but which is about to become too comprehensive for her to manage,—and thus introducing increased habits of coöperation among the subordinate states, as well as rival hopes of aggrandizement among the leaders. The congress at the isthmus of Corinth marks such further advance in the centralizing tendencies of Greece, and seems at first to promise an onward march in the same direction: but the promise will not be found realized.

Its first step was, indeed, one of inestimable value. While most of the deputies present came prepared, in the name of their respective cities, to swear reciprocal fidelity and brotherhood, they also addressed all their efforts to appease the feuds and dissensions which reigned among the particular members of their own meeting. Of these the most prominent, as well as the most dangerous, was the war still subsisting between Athens and Ægina. The latter was not exempt, even now, from suspicions of *medizing*,[98] *i. e.*, embracing the cause of the Persians, which had been raised by her giving earth and water ten years before to Darius: but her present con-

duct gave no countenance to such suspicions: she took earnest part in the congress as well as in the joint measures of defence, and willingly consented to accommodate her difference with Athens.[99] In this work of reconciling feuds, so essential to the safety of Greece, the Athenian Themistoklês took a prominent part, as well as Cheileos of Tegea in Arcadia.[100] The congress proceeded to send envoys and solicit coöperation from such cities as were yet either equivocal or indifferent, especially Argos, Korkyra, and the Kretan and Sicilian Greeks,—and at the same time to despatch spies across to Sardis, for the purpose of learning the state and prospects of the assembled army.

These spies presently returned, having been detected and condemned to death by the Persian generals, but released by express order of Xerxes, who directed that the full strength of his assembled armament should be shown to them, in order that the terror of the Greeks might be thus magnified. The step was well calculated for such a purpose: but the discouragement throughout Greece was already extreme, at this critical period when the storm was about to burst upon them. Even to intelligent and well-meaning Greeks, much more to the careless, the timid, or the treacherous, —Xerxes with his countless host appeared irresistible, and indeed something more than human:[101] of course, such an impression would be encouraged by the large number of Greeks already his tributaries: and we may even trace a manifestation of a wish to get rid of the Athenians altogether, as the chief objects of Persian vengeance and chief hindrance to tranquil submission. This despair of the very continuance of Hellenic life and autonomy breaks forth even from the sanctuary of Hellenic religion, the Delphian temple; when the Athenians, in their distress and uncertainty, sent to consult the oracle. Hardly had their two envoys performed the customary sacrifices, and sat down in the inner chamber near the priestess Aristonikê, when she at once exclaimed: "Wretched men, why sit ye there? Quit your land and city, and flee afar! Head, body, feet, and hands are alike rotten: fire and sword, in the train of the Syrian chariot, shall overwhelm you: nor only your city, but other cities also, as well as many even of the temples of the gods,—which are now sweating and trembling with fear, and foreshadow, by drops of blood on their roofs, the hard calamities impending. Get ye away from the sanctuary, with your souls steeped in sorrow."[102]

So terrific a reply had rarely escaped from the lips of the priestess. The envoys were struck to the earth by it, and durst not carry it back to Athens. In their sorrow they were encouraged yet to hope by an influential Delphian citizen named Timon (we trace here, as elsewhere, the underhand working of these leading Delphians on the priestess), who advised them to provide themselves with the characteristic marks of supplication, and to approach the oracle a second time in that imploring guise: "O lord, we pray thee (they said), have compassion on these boughs of supplication, and deliver to us something more comfortable concerning our country; else we quit not thy sanctuary, but remain here until death." Upon which the priestess replied:

"Athênê with all her prayers and all her sagacity cannot propitiate Olympian Zeus. [103] But this assurance I will give you, firm as adamant: when everything else in the land of Kekrops shall be taken, Zeus grants to Athênê that the wooden wall alone shall remain unconquered, to defend you and your children. Stand not to await the assailing horse and foot from the continent, but turn your backs and retire: you shall yet live to fight another day. O divine Salamis, thou too shalt destroy the children of women, either at the seed-time or at the harvest."[104]

This second answer was a sensible mitigation of the first: it left open some hope of escape, though faint, dark, and unintelligible,—and the envoys wrote it down to carry back to Athens, not concealing, probably, the terrific sentence which had preceded it. When read to the people, the obscurity of the meaning provoked many different interpretations. What was meant by "the wooden wall?" Some supposed that the acropolis itself, which had originally been surrounded with a wooden palisade, was the refuge pointed out: but the greater number, and among them most of those who were by profession expositors of prophecy, maintained that the wooden wall indicated the fleet. But these professional expositors, while declaring that the god bade them go on shipboard, deprecated all idea of a naval battle, and insisted on the necessity of abandoning Attica forever: the last lines of the oracle, wherein it was said that Salamis would destroy the children of women, appeared to them to portend nothing but disaster in the event of a naval combat. Such was the opinion of those who passed for the best expositors of the divine will: it harmonized completely with the despairing temper then prevalent, heightened by the terrible sentence pronounced in the first oracle; and emigration to some foreign land presented itself as the only hope of safety even for their persons. The fate of Athens,—and of Greece generally, which would have been helpless without Athens,—now hung upon a thread, when Themistoklês, the great originator of the fleet, interposed with equal steadfastness of heart and ingenuity, to insure the proper use of it. He contended that if the god had intended to designate Salamis as the scene of a naval disaster to the Greeks, that island would have been called in the oracle by some such epithet as "wretched Salamis:" but the fact that it was termed "divine Salamis," indicated that the parties, destined to perish there, were the enemies of Greece, not the Greeks themselves. He encouraged his countrymen, therefore, to abandon their city and country, and to trust themselves to the fleet as the wooden wall recommended by the god, but with full determination to fight and conquer on board.[105] Great, indeed, were the consequences which turned upon this bold stretch of exegetical conjecture. Unless the Athenians had been persuaded, by some plausible show of interpretation, that the sense of the oracle encouraged instead of forbidding a naval combat, they would in their existing depression have abandoned all thought of resistance.

Even with the help of an encouraging interpretation, however, nothing less than the most unconquerable resolution and patriotism could have enabled the Athenians

to bear up against such terrific denunciations from the Delphian god, and persist in resistance in place of seeking safety by emigration. Herodotus emphatically impresses this truth upon his readers:[106] nay, he even steps out of his way to do so, proclaiming Athens as the real saviour of Greece. Writing as he did about the beginning of the Peloponnesian war,—at a time when Athens, having attained the maximum of her empire, was alike feared, hated, and admired, by most of the Grecian states,—he knows that the opinion which he is giving will be unpopular with his hearers generally, and he apologizes for it as something wrung from him against his will by the force of the evidence.[107] Nor was it only that the Athenians dared to stay and fight against immense odds: they, and they alone, threw into the cause that energy and forwardness whereby it was enabled to succeed,[108] as will appear farther in the sequel. But there was also a third way, not less deserving of notice, in which they contributed to the result. As soon as the congress of deputies met at the isthmus of Corinth, it became essential to recognize some one commanding state, and with regard to the land-force no one dreamed of contesting the preëminence of Sparta. But in respect to the fleet, her pretensions were more disputable, since she furnished at most only sixteen ships, and little or no nautical skill; while Athens brought two-thirds of the entire naval force, with the best ships and seamen. Upon these grounds the idea was at first started, that Athens should command at sea. and Sparta on land: but the majority of the allies manifested a decided repugnance, announcing that they would follow no one but a Spartan. To the honor of the Athenians, they at once waived their pretensions, as soon as they saw that the unity of the confederate force, at this moment of peril, would be compromised.[109] To appreciate this generous abnegation of a claim in itself so reasonable, we must recollect that the love of preëminence was among the most prominent attributes of the Hellenic character: a prolific source of their greatness and excellence, but producing also no small amount both of their follies and their crimes. To renounce at the call of public obligation a claim to personal honor and glory, is perhaps the rarest of all virtues in a son of Hellen.

We find thus the Athenians nerved up to the pitch of resistance,—prepared to see their country wasted, and to live as well as to fight on shipboard, when the necessity should arrive,—furnishing two thirds of the whole fleet, and yet prosecuting the building of fresh ships until the last moment,[110]—sending forth the ablest and most forward leader in the common cause, while content themselves to serve like other states under the leadership of Sparta. During the winter preceding the march of Xerxes from Sardis, the congress at the Isthmus was trying, with little success, to bring the Grecian cities into united action. Among the cities north of Attica and Peloponnesus, the greater number were either inclined to submit, like Thebes and the greater part of Bœotia, or at least lukewarm in the cause of independence,—so rare at this trying moment (to use the language of the unfortunate Platæans fifty-three years afterwards), was the exertion of resolute Hellenic patriotism against the invader.[111] Even in the interior of Peloponnesus, the powerful Argos maintained an

ambiguous neutrality. It was one of the first steps of the congress to send special envoys to Argos, to set forth the common danger and solicit coöperation; the result is certain, that no coöperation was obtained,—the Argeians did nothing throughout the struggle; but as to their real position, or the grounds of their refusal, contradictory statements had reached the ears of Herodotus. They themselves affirmed that they were ready to have joined the Hellenic cause, in spite of dissuasion from the Delphian oracle,—exacting only as conditions, that the Spartans should conclude a truce with them for thirty years, and should equally divide the honors of headship with Argos. To the proposed truce there would probably have been no objection, nor was there any as to the principle of dividing the headship: but the Spartans added, that they had two kings, while the Argeians had only one; and inasmuch as neither of the two Spartan kings could be deprived of his vote, the Argeian king could only be admitted to a third vote conjointly with them. This proposition appeared to the Argeians, who considered that even the undivided headship was no more than their ancient right, as nothing better than insolent encroachment. and incensed them so much that they desired the envoys to quit their territory before sunset,—preferring even a tributary existence under Persia to a formal degradation as compared with Sparta.[112]

Such was the story told by the Argeians themselves, but seemingly not credited either by any other Greeks or by Herodotus himself. The prevalent opinion was, that the Argeians had a secret understanding with Xerxes, and some even affirmed that they had been the parties who invited him into Greece, as a means both of protection and of vengeance to themselves against Sparta after their defeat by Kleomenês. And Herodotus himself evidently believed that they *medized*, though he is half afraid to say so, and disguises his opinion in a cloud of words which betray the angry polemics going on about the matter, even fifty years afterwards.[113] It is certain that in act the Argeians were neutral, and one of their reasons for neutrality was, that they did not choose to join any Pan-Hellenic levy except in the capacity of chiefs; but probably the more powerful reason was, that they shared the impression then so widely diffused throughout Greece as to the irresistible force of the approaching host, and chose to hold themselves prepared for the event. They kept up secret negotiations even with Persian agents, yet not compromising themselves while matters were still pending; nor is it improbable, in their vexation against Sparta, that they would have been better pleased if the Persians had succeeded,—all which may reasonably be termed, *medizing*.

The absence of Hellenic fidelity in Argos was borne out by the parallel examples of Krete and Korkyra, to which places envoys from the Isthmus proceeded at the same time. The Kretans declined to take any part, on the ground of prohibitory injunctions from the oracle;[114] the Korkyræans promised without performing, and even without any intention to perform. Their neutrality was a serious loss to the Greeks, since they could fit out a naval force of sixty triremes, second only to that of

Athens. With this important contingent they engaged to join the Grecian fleet, and actually set sail from Korkyra; but they took care not to sail round cape Malea, or to reach the scene of action. Their fleet remained on the southern or western coast of Peloponnesus, under pretence of being weatherbound, until the decisive result of the battle of Salamis was known. Their impression was that the Persian monarch would be victorious, in which case they would have made a merit of not having arrived in time; but they were also prepared with the plausible excuse of detention from foul winds, when the result turned out otherwise, and when they were reproached by the Greeks for their absence.[115] Such duplicity is not very astonishing, when we recollect that it was the habitual policy of Korkyra to isolate herself from Hellenic confederacies.[116]

The envoys who visited Korkyra proceeded onward on their mission to Gelon, the despot of Syracuse. Of that potentate, regarded by Herodotus as more powerful than any state in Greece, I shall speak more fully in a subsequent chapter: it is sufficient to mention now, that he rendered no aid against Xerxes. Nor was it in his power to do so, whatever might have been his inclinations; for the same year which brought the Persian monarch against Greece, was also selected by the Carthaginians for a formidable invasion of Sicily, which kept the Sicilian Greeks to the defence of their own island. It seems even probable that this simultaneous invasion had been concerted between the Persians and Carthaginians.[117]

The endeavors of the deputies of Greeks at the Isthmus had thus produced no other reinforcement to their cause except some fair words from the Korkyræans. It was near the time when Xerxes was about to pass the Hellespont, in the beginning of 480 B. C., that the first actual step for resistance was taken, at the instigation of the Thessalians. Though the great Thessalian family of the Aleuadæ were among the companions of Xerxes, and the most forward in inviting him into Greece, with every promise of ready submission from their countrymen, it seems that these promises were in reality unwarranted: the Aleuadæ were at the head only of a minority, and perhaps were even in exile, like the Peisistratidæ:[118] while most of the Thessalians were disposed to resist Xerxes, for which purpose they now sent envoys to the Isthmus,[119] intimating the necessity of guarding the passes of Olympus, the northernmost entrance of Greece. They offered their own cordial aid in this defence, adding that they should be under the necessity of making their own separate submission, if this demand were not complied with. Accordingly, a body of ten thousand Grecian heavy-armed infantry, under the command of the Spartan Euænetus and the Athenian Themistoklês, were despatched by sea to Halus in Achæa Phthiôtis, where they disembarked and marched by land across Achæa and Thessaly.[120] Being joined by the Thessalian horse, they occupied the defile of Tempê, through which the river Peneius makes its way to the sea, by a cleft between the mountains Olympus and Ossa.

The long, narrow, and winding defile of Tempê, formed then, and forms still, the single entrance, open throughout winter as well as summer, from lower or maritime Macedonia into Thessaly: the lofty mountain precipices approach so closely as to leave hardly room enough in some places for a road: it is thus eminently defensible, and a few resolute men would be sufficient to arrest in it the progress of the most numerous host.[121] But the Greeks soon discovered that the position was such as they could not hold,—first, because the powerful fleet of Xerxes would be able to land troops in their rear; secondly, because there was also a second entrance passable in summer, from upper Macedonia into Thessaly, by the mountain-passes over the range of Olympus; an entrance which traversed the country of the Perrhæbians and came into Thessaly near Gonnus, about the spot where the defile of Tempê begins to narrow. It was in fact by this second pass, evading the insurmountable difficulties of Tempê, that the advancing march of the Persians was destined to be made, under the auspices of Alexander, king of Macedon, tributary to them, and active in their service; who sent a communication of this fact to the Greeks at Tempê, admonishing them that they would be trodden under foot by the countless host approaching, and urging them to renounce their hopeless position.[122] This Macedonian prince passed for a friend, and probably believed himself to be acting as such in dissuading the Greeks from unavailing resistance to Persia: but he was in reality a very dangerous mediator; and as such the Spartans had good reason to dread him, in a second intervention of which we shall hear more hereafter.[123] On the present occasion, the Grecian commanders were quite ignorant of the existence of any other entrance into Thessaly, besides Tempê, until their arrival in that region. Perhaps it might have been possible to defend both entrances at once, and considering the immense importance of arresting the march of the Persians at the frontiers of Hellas, the attempt would have been worth some risk. So great was the alarm, however, produced by the unexpected discovery, justifying, or seeming to justify, the friendly advice of Alexander, that they remained only a few days at Tempê, then at once retired back to their ships, and returned by sea to the isthmus of Corinth,—about the time when Xerxes was crossing the Hellespont.[124]

This precipitate retreat produced consequences highly disastrous and discouraging. It appeared to leave all Hellas north of mount Kithæron and of the Megarid territory without defence, and it served either as reason or pretext for the majority of the Grecian states north of that boundary to make their submission to Xerxes, which some of them had already begun to do before.[125] When Xerxes in the course of his march reached the Thermaic gulf, within sight of Olympus and Ossa, the heralds whom he had sent from Sardis brought him tokens of submission from a third portion of the Hellenic name,—the Thessalians, Dolopes, Ænianes, Perrhæbians, Magnêtes, Lokrians, Dorians, Melians, Phthiôtid Achæans, and Bœotians,—among the latter is included Thebes, but not Thespiæ or Platæa. The Thessalians, especially, not only submitted, but manifested active zeal and rendered much service in the cause of Xerxes, under the stimulus of the Aleuadæ, whose party now became predomi-

nant: they were probably indignant at the hasty retreat of those who had come to defend them.[126]

Had the Greeks been able to maintain the passes of Olympus and Ossa, all this northern fraction might probably have been induced to partake in the resistance instead of becoming auxiliaries to the invader. During the six weeks or two months which elapsed between the retreat of the Greeks from Tempê and the arrival of Xerxes at Therma, no new plan of defence appears to have been formed; for it was not until that arrival became known at the Isthmus that the Greek army and fleet made its forward movement to occupy Thermopylæ and Artemisium.[127]

CHAPTER XL.

BATTLES OF THERMOPYLÆ AND ARTEMISIUM.

It was while the northerly states of Greece were thus successively falling off from the common cause, that the deputies assembled at the Isthmus took among themselves the solemn engagement, in the event of success, to inflict upon these recusant brethren condign punishment,—to tithe them in property, and perhaps to consecrate a tenth of their persons, for the profit of the Delphian god. Exception was to be made in favor of those states which had been driven to yield by irresistible necessity. [128] Such a vow seemed at that moment little likely to be executed it was the manifestation of a determined feeling binding together the states which took the pledge, but it cannot have contributed much to intimidate the rest.

To display their own force, was the only effective way of keeping together doubtful allies; and the pass of Thermopylæ was now fixed upon as the most convenient point of defence, next to that of Tempê,—leaving out indeed, and abandoning to the enemy, Thessalians, Perrhæbians, Magnêtes, Phthiôtid Achæans, Dolopes, Ænianes, Malians, etc., who would all have been included if the latter line had been adhered to; but comprising the largest range consistent with safety. The position of Thermopylæ presented another advantage which was not to be found at Tempê; the mainland was here separated from the island of Eubœa only by a narrow strait, about two English miles and a half in its smallest breadth, between mount Knêmis and cape Kênæum. On the northern portion of Eubœa, immediately facing Magnesia and Achæa Phthiôtis, was situated the line of coast called Artemisium: a name derived from the temple of Artemis, which was its most conspicuous feature, belonging to the town of Histiæa. It was arranged that the Grecian fleet should be mustered there, in order to coöperate with the land-force, and to oppose the progress of the Persians on both elements at once. To fight in a narrow space[129] was supposed favorable to the Greeks on sea not less than on land, inasmuch as their ships were both fewer in number and heavier in sailing than those in the Persian service. From the position of Artemisium, it was calculated that they might be able to prevent the Persian fleet from advancing into the narrow strait which severs Eubœa, to the north and west, from the mainland, and which, between Chalkis and Bœotia, becomes not too wide for a bridge. It was at this latter point that the Greek seamen would have preferred to place their defence: but the occupation of the northern part of the Eubœan strait was indispensable to prevent the Persian fleet from landing troops in the rear of the defenders of Thermopylæ.

Of this Eubœan strait, the western limit is formed by what was then called the Maliac gulf, into which the river Spercheius poured itself,—after a course from west to east between the line of Mount Othrys to the north, and Mount Œta to the south,

—near the town of Antikyra. The lower portion of this spacious and fertile valley of the Spercheius was occupied by the various tribes of the Malians, bordering to the north and east on Achæa Phthiôtis: the southernmost Malians, with their town of Trachis, occupied a plain—in some places considerable, in others very narrow—inclosed between mount Œta and the sea. From Trachis the range of Œta stretched eastward, bordering close on the southern shore of the Maliac gulf: between the two lay the memorable pass of Thermopylæ.[130] On the road from Trachis to Thermopylæ, immediately outside of the latter and at the mouth of the little streams called the Phenix and the Asôpus, was placed the town of Anthêla, celebrated for its temples of Amphiktyon and of the Amphiktyonic Dêmêtêr, as well as for the autumnal assemblies of the Amphiktyonic council, for whom seats were provided in the temple.

Immediately near to Anthêla, the northern slope of the mighty and prolonged ridge of Œta approached so close to the gulf, or at least to an inaccessible morass which formed the edge of the gulf, as to leave no more than one single wheel track between. This narrow entrance formed the western gate of Thermopylæ. At some little distance, seemingly about a mile, to the eastward, the same close conjunction between the mountain and the sea was repeated,—thus forming the eastern gate of Thermopylæ, not far from the first town of the Lokrians, called Alpêni. The space between these two gates was wider and more open, but it was distinguished, and is still distinguished, by its abundant flow of thermal springs, salt and sulphureous. Some cells were here prepared for bathers, which procured for the place the appellation of Chytri, or the Pans: but the copious supply of mineral water spread its mud and deposited its crust over all the adjacent ground; and the Phocians, some time before, had designedly endeavored so to conduct the water as to render the pass utterly impracticable, at the same time building a wall across it near to the western gate. They had done this in order to keep off the attacks of the Thessalians, who had been trying to extend their conquests southward and eastward. The warm springs, here as in other parts of Greece, were consecrated to Hêraklês,[131] whose legendary exploits and sufferings ennobled all the surrounding region,—mount Œta, Trachis, cape Kenæum, Lichades islands, the river Dyras: some fragments of these legends have been transmitted and adorned by the genius of Sophoklês, in his drama of the Trachinian maidens.

Such was the general scene—two narrow openings with an intermediate mile of enlarged road and hot springs between them—which passed in ancient times by the significant name of Thermopylæ, the Hot Gates; or sometimes, more briefly, Pylæ—The Gates. At a point also near Trachis, between the mountains and the sea, about two miles outside or westward of Thermopylæ, the road was hardly less narrow, but it might be turned by marching to the westward, since the adjacent mountains were lower, and presented less difficulty of transit; while at Thermopylæ itself, the overhanging projection of mount Œta was steep, woody, and impracticable, leaving ac-

cess, from Thessaly into Lokris and the territories southeast of Œta, only through the strait gate;[132] save and except an unfrequented as well as circuitous mountain-path, which will be presently spoken of. The wall originally built across the pass by the Phocians was now half-ruined by age and neglect: but the Greeks easily reëstablished it, determined to await in this narrow pass, in that age narrower even than the defile of Tempê, the approach of the invading host. The edge of the sea line appears to have been for the most part marsh, fit neither for walking nor for sailing: but there were points at which boats could land, so that constant communication could be maintained with the fleet at Artemisium, while Alpêni was immediately in their rear to supply provisions.

Though the resolution of the Greek deputies assembled at the Isthmus, to defend conjointly Thermopylæ and the Eubœan strait, had been taken, seemingly, not long after the retreat from Tempê, their troops and their fleet did not actually occupy these positions until Xerxes was known to have reached the Thermaic gulf. Both were then put in motion; the land-force under the Spartan king Leonidas, the naval force under the Spartan commander Eurybiadês, apparently about the latter part of the month of June. Leonidas was the younger brother, the successor, and the son-in-law, of the former Eurystheneid king Kleomenês, whose only daughter Gorgo he had married. Another brother of the same family—Dorieus, older than Leonidas—had perished, even before the death of Kleomenês, in an unsuccessful attempt to plant a colony in Sicily; and room had been thus made for the unexpected succession of the youngest brother. Leonidas now conducted from the Isthmus to Thermopylæ a select band of three hundred Spartans,—all being citizens of mature age, and persons who left at home sons to supply their places.[133] Along with them were five hundred hoplites from Tegea, five hundred from Mantineia, one hundred and twenty from the Arcadian Orchomenus, one thousand from the rest of Arcadia, four hundred from Corinth, two hundred from Phlius, and eighty from Mykenæ. There were also, doubtless, Helots and other light troops, in undefined number, and probably a certain number of Lacedæmonian hoplites, not Spartans. In their march through Bœotia they were joined by seven hundred hoplites of Thespiæ, hearty in the cause, and by four hundred Thebans, of more equivocal fidelity, under Leontiadês. It appears, indeed, that the leading men of Thebes, at that time under a very narrow oligarchy, decidedly *medized*, or espoused the Persian interest, as much as they dared before the Persians were actually in the country: and Leonidas, when he made the requisition for a certain number of their troops to assist in the defence of Thermopylæ, was doubtful whether they would not refuse compliance, and openly declare against the Greek cause. The Theban chiefs thought it prudent to comply, though against their real inclinations, and furnished a contingent of four hundred men,[134] chosen from citizens of a sentiment opposed to their own. Indeed the Theban people, and the Bœotians generally, with the exception of Thespiæ and Platæa, seem to have had little sentiment on either side, and to have followed passively the inspirations of their leaders.

With these troops Leonidas reached Thermopylæ, whence he sent envoys to invite the junction of the Phocians and the Lokrians of Opus. The latter had been among those who had sent earth and water to Xerxes, of which they are said to have repented: the step was taken, probably, only from fear, which at this particular moment prescribed acquiescence in the summons of Leonidas, justified by the plea of necessity in case the Persians should prove ultimately victorious:[135] while the Phocians, if originally disposed to *medize*, were now precluded from doing so by the fact that their bitter enemies, the Thessalians, were active in the cause of Xerxes, and influential in guiding his movements.[136] The Greek envoys added strength to their summons by all the encouragement in their power. "The troops now at Thermopylæ, they said, were a mere advanced body, preceding the main strength of Greece, which was expected to arrive every day: on the side of the sea, a sufficient fleet was already on guard: nor was there any cause for fear, since the invader was, after all, not a god, but a man, exposed to those reverses of fortune which came inevitably on all men, and most of all, upon those in preëminent condition."[137] Such arguments prove but too evidently the melancholy state of terror which then pervaded the Greek mind: whether reassured by them or not, the great body of the Opuntian Lokrians, and one thousand Phocians, joined Leonidas at Thermopylæ.

That this terror was both genuine and serious, there cannot be any doubt: and the question naturally suggests itself, why the Greeks did not at once send their full force instead of a mere advanced guard? The answer is to be found in another attribute of the Greek character,—it was the time of celebrating both the Olympic festival-games on the banks of the Alpheius, and the Karneian festival at Sparta and most of the other Dorian states.[138] Even at a moment when their whole freedom and existence were at stake, the Greeks could not bring themselves to postpone these venerated solemnities: especially the Peloponnesian Greeks, among whom this force of religious routine appears to have been the strongest. At a period more than a century later, in the time of Demosthenes, when the energy of the Athenians had materially declined, we shall find them, too, postponing the military necessities of the state to the complete and splendid fulfilment of their religious festival obligations,—starving all their measures of foreign policy in order that the Theôric exhibitions might be imposing to the people and satisfactory to the gods. At present, we find little disposition in the Athenians to make this sacrifice,—certainly much less than in the Peloponnesians. The latter, remaining at home to celebrate their festivals while an invader of superhuman might was at their gates, remind us of the Jews in the latter days of their independence, who suffered the operations of the besieging Roman army round their city to be carried on without interruption during the Sabbath.[139] The Spartans and their confederates reckoned that Leonidas with his detachment would be strong enough to hold the pass of Thermopylæ until the Olympic and Karneian festivals should be past, after which period they were prepared to march to his aid with their whole military force:[140] and they engaged to assemble in Bœotia

for the purpose of defending Attica against attack on the land-side, while the great mass of the Athenian force was serving on shipboard.

At the time when this plan was laid, they believed that the narrow pass of Thermopylæ was the only means of possible access for an invading army. But Leonidas, on reaching the spot, discovered for the first time that there was also a mountain-path starting from the neighborhood of Trachis, ascending the gorge of the river Asôpus and the hill called Anopæa, then crossing the crest of Œta and descending in the rear of Thermopylæ near the Lokrian town of Alpêni. This path—then hardly used, though its ascending half now serves as the regular track from Zeitun, the ancient Lamia, to Salona on the Corinthian gulf, the ancient Amphissa—was revealed to him by its first discoverers, the inhabitants of Trachis, who in former days had conducted the Thessalians over it to attack Phocis, after the Phocians had blocked up the pass of Thermopylæ. It was therefore not unknown to the Phocians: it conducted from Trachis into their country, and they volunteered to Leonidas that they would occupy and defend it.[141] But the Greeks thus found themselves at Thermopylæ under the same necessity of providing a double line of defence, for the mountain-path as well as for the defile, as that which had induced their former army to abandon Tempê: and so insufficient did their numbers seem, when the vast host of Xerxes was at length understood to be approaching, that a panic terror seized them; and the Peloponnesian troops especially, anxious only for their own separate line of defence at the isthmus of Corinth, wished to retreat thither forthwith. The indignant remonstrances of the Phocians and Lokrians, who would thus have been left to the mercy of the invader, induced Leonidas to forbid this retrograde movement: but he thought it necessary to send envoys to the various cities, insisting on the insufficiency of his numbers, and requesting immediate reinforcements.[142] So painfully were the consequences now felt, of having kept back the main force until after the religious festivals in Peloponnesus.

Nor was the feeling of confidence stronger at this moment in their naval armament, though it had mustered in far superior numbers at Artemisium on the northern coast of Eubœa, under the Spartan Eurybiadês. It was composed as follows: one hundred Athenian triremes, manned in part by the citizens of Platæa, in spite of their total want of practice on shipboard; forty Corinthian, twenty Megarian, twenty Athenian, manned by the inhabitants of Chalkis, and lent to them by Athens; eighteen Æginetan, twelve Sikyonian, ten Lacedæmonian, eight Epidaurian, seven Eretrian, five Trœzenian, two from Styrus in Eubœa, and two from the island of Keos. There were thus in all two hundred and seventy-one triremes; together with nine pentekonters, furnished partly by Keos and partly by the Lokrians of Opus. Themistoklês was at the head of the Athenian contingent, and Adeimantus of the Corinthian; of other officers we hear nothing.[143] Three cruising vessels, an Athenian, an Æginetan, and a Trœzenian, were pushed forward along the coast of Thessaly, beyond the island of Skiathos, to watch the advancing movements of the Persian fleet from Therma.

It was here that the first blood was shed in this memorable contest. Ten of the best ships in the Persian fleet, sent forward in the direction of Skiathos, fell in with these three Grecian triremes, who probably supposing them to be the precursors of the entire fleet sought safety in flight. The Athenian trireme escaped to the mouth of the Peneius, where the crew abandoned her, and repaired by land to Athens, leaving the vessel to the enemy: the other two ships were overtaken and captured afloat,—not without a vigorous resistance on the part of the Æginetan, one of whose hoplites, Pythês, fought with desperate bravery, and fell covered with wounds. So much did the Persian warriors admire him, that they took infinite pains to preserve his life, and treated him with the most signal manifestations both of kindness and respect, while they dealt with his comrades as slaves.

On board the Trœzenian vessel, which was the first to be captured, they found a soldier named Leon, of imposing stature: this man was immediately taken to the ship's head and slain, as a presaging omen in the approaching contest: perhaps, observes the historian, his name may have contributed to determine his fate.[144] The ten Persian ships advanced no farther than the dangerous rock Myrmêx, between Skiathos and the mainland, which had been made known to them by a Greek navigator of Skyros, and on which they erected a pillar to serve as warning for the coming fleet. Still, so intense was the alarm which their presence—communicated by fire-signals[145] from Skiathos, and strengthened by the capture of the three look-out ships—inspired to the fleet at Artemisium, that they actually abandoned their station, believing that the entire fleet of the enemy was at hand.[146] They sailed up the Eubœan strait to Chalkis, as the narrowest and most defensible passage; leaving scouts on the high lands to watch the enemy's advance.

Probably this sudden retreat was forced upon the generals by the panic of their troops, similar to that which king Leonidas, more powerful than Eurybiadês and Themistoklês, had found means to arrest at Thermopylæ. It ruined for the time the whole scheme of defence, by laying open the rear of the army at Thermopylæ to the operations of the Persian fleet. But that which the Greeks did not do for themselves was more than compensated by the beneficent intervention of their gods, who opposed to the invader the more terrible arms of storm and hurricane. He was allowed to bring his overwhelming host, land-force as well as naval, to the brink of Thermopylæ and to the coast of Thessaly, without hindrance or damage; but the time had now arrived when the gods appeared determined to humble him, and especially to strike a series of blows at his fleet which should reduce it to a number not beyond what the Greeks could contend with.[147] Amidst the general terror which pervaded Greece, the Delphians were the first to earn the gratitude of their countrymen by announcing that divine succor was at hand.[148] On entreating advice from their own oracle, they were directed to pray to the Winds, who would render powerful aid to Greece. Moreover, the Athenian seamen, in their retreat at Chalkis, recollecting that Boreas was the husband of the Attic princess or heroine Oreithyia, daughter of their

ancient king Erechtheus, addressed fervent prayers to their son-in-law for his help in need. Never was help more effective, or more opportune, than the destructive storm, presently to be recounted, on the coast of Magnesia, for which grateful thanks and annual solemnities were still rendered even in the time of Herodotus, at Athens as well as at Delphi.[149]

Xerxes had halted on the Thermaic gulf for several days, employing a large portion of his numerous army in cutting down the woods and clearing the roads, on the pass over Olympus from upper Macedonia into Perrhæbia, which was recommended by his Macedonian allies as preferable to the defile of Tempê.[150] Not intending to march through the latter, he is said to have gone by sea to view it; and remarks are ascribed to him on the facility of blocking it up so as to convert all Thessaly into one vast lake.[151] His march from Therma through Macedonia, Perrhæbia, Thessaly, and Achæa Phthiôtis, into the territory of the Malians and the neighborhood of Thermopylæ, occupied eleven or twelve days:[152] the people through whose towns he passed had already made their submission, and the Thessalians especially were zealous in seconding his efforts. His numerous host was still farther swelled by the presence of these newly-submitted people, and by the Macedonian troops under Alexander; so that the river Onochônus in Thessaly, and even the Apidanus in Achæa Phthiôtis, would hardly suffice to supply it, but were drunk up, according to the information given to Herodotus. At Alus in Achæa, he condescended to listen to the gloomy legend connected with the temple of Zeus Laphysteus and the sacred grove of the Athamantid family: he respected and protected these sacred places,—an incident which shows that the sacrilege and destruction of temples imputed to him by the Greeks, though true in regard to Athens, Abæ, Milêtus, etc., was by no means universally exhibited, and is even found qualified by occasional instances of great respect for Grecian religious feeling.[153] Along the shore of the Malian gulf he at length came into the Trachinian territory near Thermopylæ, where he encamped, seemingly awaiting the arrival of the fleet, so as to combine his farther movements in advance, [154] now that the enemy were immediately in his front.

But his fleet was not destined to reach the point of communication with the same ease as he had arrived before Thermopylæ. After having ascertained by the ten ships already mentioned, which captured the three Grecian guardships, that the channel between Skiathos and the mainland was safe, the Persian admiral Megabates sailed with his whole fleet from Therma, or from Pydna,[155] his station in the Thermaic gulf, eleven days after the monarch had begun his land-march; and reached in one long day's sail the eastern coast of Magnesia, not far from its southernmost promontory. The greater part of this line of coast, formed by the declivities of Ossa and Pelion, is thoroughly rocky and inhospitable: but south of the town called Kasthanæa there was a short extent of open beach, where the fleet rested for the night before coming to the line of coast called the Sêpias Aktê.[156] The first line of ships were moored to the land, but the larger number of this immense fleet swung at anchor in

a depth of eight lines. In this condition they were overtaken the next morning by a sudden and desperate hurricane,—a wind called by the people of the country Hellespontias, which blew right upon the shore. The most active among the mariners found means to forestall the danger by beaching and hauling their vessels ashore; but a large number, unable to take such a precaution, were carried before the wind and dashed to pieces near Melibœa, Kasthanæa, and other points of this unfriendly region. Four hundred ships of war, according to the lowest estimate, together with a countless heap of transports and provision craft, were destroyed: and the loss of life as well as property was immense. For three entire days did the terrors of the storm last, during which time the crews ashore, left almost without defence, and apprehensive that the inhabitants of the country might assail or plunder them, were forced to break up the ships driven ashore in order to make a palisade out of the timbers.[157] Though the Magian priests who accompanied the armament were fervent in prayer and sacrifice,—not merely to the Winds, but also to Thetis and the Nereids, the tutelary divinities of Sêpias Aktê,—they could obtain no mitigation until the fourth day: [158] thus long did the prayers of Delphi and Athens, and the jealousy of the gods against superhuman arrogance, protract the terrible visitation. At length, on the fourth day, calm weather returned, when all those ships which were in condition to proceed, put to sea and sailed along the land, round the southern promontory of Magnesia, to Aphetæ, at the entrance of the gulf of Pagasæ. Little, indeed, had Xerxes gained by the laborious cutting through mount Athos, in hopes to escape the unseen atmospheric enemies which howl around that formidable promontory: the work of destruction to his fleet was only transferred to the opposite side of the intervening Thracian sea.

Had the Persian fleet reached Aphetæ without misfortune, they would have found the Eubœan strait evacuated by the Greek fleet and undefended, so that they would have come immediately into communication with the land army, and would have acted upon the rear of Leonidas and his division. But the storm completely altered this prospect, and revived the spirits of the Greek fleet at Chalkis. It was communicated to them by their scouts on the high lands of Eubœa, who even sent them word that the entire Persian fleet was destroyed: upon which, having returned thanks and offered libations to Poseidon the Saviour, the Greeks returned back as speedily as they could to Artemisium. To their surprise, however, they saw the Persian fleet, though reduced in number, still exhibiting a formidable total and appearance at the opposite station of Aphetæ. The last fifteen ships of that fleet, having been so greatly crippled by the storm as to linger behind the rest, mistook the Greek ships for their own comrades, fell into the midst of them, and were all captured. Sandôkês, sub-satrap of the Æolic Kymê,—Aridôlis, despot of Alabanda in Karia,—and Penthylus, despot of Paphos in Cyprus,—the leaders of this squadron, were sent prisoners to the isthmus of Corinth, after having been questioned respecting the enemy: the latter of these three had brought to Xerxes a contingent of twelve ships, out of which

eleven had foundered in the storm, while the last was now taken with himself aboard.[159]

Meanwhile Xerxes, encamped within sight of Thermopylæ, suffered four days to pass without making any attack: a probable reason may be found in the extreme peril of his fleet, reported to have been utterly destroyed by the storm: but Herodotus assigns a different cause. Xerxes could not believe, according to him, that the Greeks at Thermopylæ, few as they were in number, had any serious intention to resist: he had heard in his march that a handful of Spartans and other Greeks, under an Herakleid leader, had taken post there, but he treated the news with scorn: and when a horseman,—whom he sent to reconnoitre them, and who approached near enough to survey their position, without exciting any attention among them by his presence,—brought back to him a description of the pass, the wall of defence, and the apparent number of the division, he was yet more astonished and puzzled. It happened too, that at the moment when this horseman rode up, the Spartans were in the advanced guard, outside of the wall: some were engaged in gymnastic exercises, others in combing their long hair, and none of them heeded the approach of the hostile spy. Xerxes next sent for the Spartan king, Demaratus, to ask what he was to think of such madness; upon which the latter reminded him of their former conversation at Doriskus, again assuring him that the Spartans in the pass would resist to the death, in spite of the smallness of their number; and adding, that it was their custom, in moments of special danger, to comb their hair with peculiar care. In spite of this assurance from Demaratus, and of the pass not only occupied, but in itself so narrow and impracticable, before his eyes, Xerxes still persisted in believing that the Greeks did not intend to resist, and that they would disperse of their own accord. He delayed the attack for four days: on the fifth he became wroth at the impudence and recklessness of the petty garrison before him, and sent against them the Median and Kissian divisions, with orders to seize them and bring them as prisoners into his presence.[160]

Though we read thus in Herodotus, it is hardly possible to believe that we are reading historical reality: we rather find laid out before us a picture of human self-conceit in its most exaggerated form, ripe for the stroke of the jealous gods, and destined, like the interview between Crœsus and Solon, to point and enforce that moral which was ever present to the mind of the historian; whose religious and poetical imagination, even unconsciously to himself, surrounds the naked facts of history with accompaniments of speech and motive which neither Homer nor Æschylus would have deemed unsuitable. The whole proceedings of Xerxes, and the immensity of host which he summoned, show that he calculated on an energetic resistance; and though the numbers of Leonidas, compared with the Persians, were insignificant, they could hardly have looked insignificant in the position which they then occupied, —an entrance little wider than a single carriage-road, with a cross wall, a prolonged space somewhat widened, and then another equally narrow exit, behind it. We are

informed by Diodorus[161] that the Lokrians, when they first sent earth and water to the Persian monarch, engaged at the same time to seize the pass of Thermopylæ on his behalf, and were only prevented from doing so by the unexpected arrival of Leonidas; nor is it unlikely that the Thessalians, now the chief guides of Xerxes,[162] together with Alexander of Macedon, would try the same means of frightening away the garrison of Thermopylæ, as had already been so successful in causing the evacuation of Tempê. An interval of two or three days might be well bestowed for the purpose of leaving to such intrigues a fair chance of success: the fleet, meanwhile, would be arrived at Aphetæ after the dangers of the storm: we may thus venture to read the conduct of Xerxes in a manner somewhat less childish than it is depicted by Herodotus.

The Medes, whom Xerxes first ordered to the attack, animated as well by the recollection of their ancient Asiatic supremacy as by the desire of avenging the defeat of Marathon,[163] manifested great personal bravery. The position was one in which bows and arrows were of little avail: a close combat hand to hand was indispensable, and in this the Greeks had every advantage of organization as well as armor. Short spears, light wicker shields, and tunics, in the assailants, were an imperfect match for the long spears, heavy and spreading shields, steady ranks,[164] and practised fighting of the defenders. Yet the bravest men of the Persian army pressed on from behind, and having nothing but numbers in their favor, maintained long this unequal combat, with great slaughter to themselves and little loss to the Greeks. Though constantly repulsed, the attack was as constantly renewed, for two successive days: the Greek troops were sufficiently numerous to relieve each other when fatigued, since the space was so narrow that few could contend at once; and even the Immortals, or ten thousand choice Persian guards, and the other choice troops of the army, when sent to the attack on the second day, were driven back with the same disgrace and the same slaughter as the rest. Xerxes surveyed this humiliating repulse from a lofty throne expressly provided for him: "thrice (says the historian, with Homeric vivacity) did he spring from his throne, in agony for his army."[165]

At the end of two days' fighting no impression had been made, the pass appeared impracticable, and the defence not less triumphant than courageous,—when a Malian, named Ephialtês, revealed to Xerxes the existence of the unfrequented mountain-path. This at least was the man singled out by the general voice of Greece as the betrayer of the fatal secret: after the final repulse of the Persians, he fled his country for a time, and a reward was proclaimed by the Amphiktyonic assembly for his head; having returned to his country too soon, he was slain by a private enemy, whom the Lacedæmonians honored as a patriot.[166] There were, however, other Greeks who were also affirmed to have earned the favor of Xerxes by the same valuable information; and very probably there may have been more than one informant, —indeed, the Thessalians, at that time his guides, can hardly have been ignorant of it. So little had the path been thought of, however, that no one in the Persian army

knew it to be already occupied by the Phocians. At nightfall, Hydarnês with a detachment of Persians was detached along the gorge of the river Asôpus, ascended the path of Anopæa, through the woody region between the mountains occupied by the Œtæans and those possessed by the Trachinians, and found himself at daybreak near the summit, within sight of the Phocian guard of one thousand men. In the stillness of daybreak, the noise of his army trampling through the wood[167] aroused the defenders; but the surprise was mutual, and Hydarnês in alarm asked his guide whether these men also were Lacedæmonians. Having ascertained the negative, he began the attack, and overwhelmed the Phocians with a shower of arrows, so as to force them to abandon the path and seek their own safety on a higher point of the mountain. Anxious only for their own safety, they became unmindful of the inestimable opening which they were placed to guard. Had the full numerical strength of the Greeks been at Thermopylæ, instead of staying behind for the festivals, they might have planted such a force on the mountain-path as would have rendered it not less impregnable than the pass beneath.

Hydarnês, not troubling himself to pursue the Phocians, followed the descending portion of the mountain-path, shorter than the ascending, and arrived in the rear of Thermopylæ not long after midday.[168] But before he had yet completed his descent, the fatal truth had already been made known to Leonidas, that the enemy were closing in upon him behind. Scouts on the hills, and deserters from the Persian camp, especially a Kymæan[169] named Tyrastiadas, had both come in with the news: and even if such informants had been wanting, the prophet Megistias, descended from the legendary seer Melampus, read the approach of death in the gloomy aspect of the morning sacrifices. It was evident that Thermopylæ could be no longer defended; but there was ample time for the defenders to retire, and the detachment of Leonidas were divided in opinion on the subject. The greater number of them were inclined to abandon a position now become untenable, and to reserve themselves for future occasions on which they might effectively contribute to repel the invader. Nor is it to be doubted that such was the natural impulse, both of brave soldiers and of prudent officers, under the circumstances. But to Leonidas the idea of retreat was intolerable. His own personal honor, together with that of his Spartan companions and of Sparta herself,[170] forbade him to think of yielding to the enemy the pass which he had been sent to defend. The laws of his country required him to conquer or die in the post assigned to him, whatever might be the superiority of number on the part of the enemy:[171] moreover, we are told that the Delphian oracle had declared that either Sparta itself, or a king of Sparta, must fall a victim to the Persian arms. Had he retired, he could hardly have escaped that voice of reproach which, in Greece especially, always burst upon the general who failed: while his voluntary devotion and death would not only silence every whisper of calumny, but exalt him to the pinnacle of glory both as a man and as a king, and set an example of chivalrous patriotism at the moment when the Greek world most needed the lesson.

The three hundred Spartans under Leonidas were found fully equal to this act of generous and devoted self-sacrifice. Perhaps he would have wished to inspire the same sentiment to the whole detachment: but when he found them indisposed, he at once ordered them to retire, thus avoiding all unseemly reluctance and dissension: [172] the same order was also given to the prophet Megistias, who however refused to obey it and stayed, though he sent away his only son.[173] None of the contingents remained with Leonidas except the Thespian and the Theban. The former, under their general Demophilus, volunteered to share the fate of the Spartans, and displayed even more than Spartan heroism, since they were not under that species of moral constraint which arises from the necessity of acting up to a preëstablished fame and superiority. But retreat with them presented no prospect better than the mere preservation of life, either in slavery or in exile and misery; since Thespiæ was in Bœotia, sure to be overrun by the invaders;[174] while the Peloponnesian contingents had behind them the isthmus of Corinth, which they doubtless hoped still to be able to defend. With respect to the Theban contingent, we are much perplexed; for Herodotus tells us that they were detained by Leonidas against their will as hostages, that they took as little part as possible in the subsequent battle, and surrendered themselves prisoners to Xerxes as soon as they could. Diodorus says that the Thespians alone remained with the Spartans; and Pausanias, though he mentions the eighty Mykenæans as having stayed along with the Thespians (which is probably incorrect), says nothing about the Thebans.[175] All things considered, it seems probable that the Thebans remained, but remained by their own offer,—being citizens of the anti-Persian party, as Diodorus represents them to have been, or perhaps because it may have been hardly less dangerous for them to retire with the Peloponnesians, than to remain, suspected as they were of *medism*: but when the moment of actual crisis arrived, their courage not standing so firm as that of the Spartans and Thespians, they endeavored to save their lives by taking credit for *medism*, and pretending to have been forcibly detained by Leonidas.

The devoted band thus left with Leonidas at Thermopylæ consisted of the three hundred Spartans, with a certain number of Helots attending them, together with seven hundred Thespians and apparently four hundred Thebans. If there had been before any Lacedæmonians, not Spartans, present, they must have retired with the other Peloponnesians. By previous concert with the guide, Ephialtês, Xerxes delayed his attack upon them until near noon, when the troops under Hydarnês might soon be expected in the rear. On this last day, however, Leonidas, knowing that all which remained was to sell the lives of his detachment dearly, did not confine himself to the defensive,[176] but advanced into the wider space outside of the pass; becoming the aggressor and driving before him the foremost of the Persian host, many of whom perished as well by the spears of the Greeks as in the neighboring sea and morass, and even trodden down by their own numbers. It required all the efforts of the Persian officers, assisted by threats and the plentiful use of the whip, to force their men on to the fight. The Greeks fought with reckless bravery and desperation

against this superior host, until at length their spears were broken, and they had no weapon left except their swords. It was at this juncture that Leonidas himself was slain, and around his body the battle became fiercer than ever: the Persians exhausted all their efforts to possess themselves of it, but were repulsed by the Greeks four several times, with the loss of many of their chiefs, especially two brothers of Xerxes. Fatigued, exhausted, diminished in number, and deprived of their most effective weapons, the little band of defenders retired, with the body of their chief, into the narrow strait behind the cross wall, where they sat all together on a hillock, exposed to the attack of the main Persian army on one side, and of the detachment of Hydarnês, which had now completed its march, on the other. They were thus surrounded, overwhelmed with missiles, and slain to a man; not losing courage even to the last, but defending themselves with their remaining daggers, with their unarmed hands, and even with their mouths.[177]

Thus perished Leonidas with his heroic comrades,—three hundred Spartans and seven hundred Thespians. Amidst such equal heroism, it seemed difficult to single out any individual as distinguished: nevertheless, Herodotus mentions the Spartans Diênekês, Alpheus, and Maron,—and the Thespian Dithyrambus,—as standing preëminent. The reply ascribed to the first became renowned.[178] "The Persian host (he was informed) is so prodigious that their arrows conceal the sun." "So much the better (he answered), we shall then fight them in the shade." Herodotus had asked and learned the name of every individual among this memorable three hundred, and even six hundred years afterwards, Pausanias could still read the names engraved on a column at Sparta.[179] One alone among them—Aristodêmus—returned home, having taken no part in the combat. He, together with Eurytus, another soldier, had been absent from the detachment on leave, and both were lying at Alpêni, suffering from a severe complaint in the eyes. Eurytus, apprized that the fatal hour of the detachment was come, determined not to survive it, asked for his armor, and desired his attendant Helot to lead him to his place in the ranks; where he fell gallantly fighting, while the Helot departed and survived. Aristodêmus did not imitate this devotion of his sick comrade: overpowered with physical suffering, he was carried to Sparta—but he returned only to scorn and infamy among his fellow-citizens.[180] He was denounced as "the coward Aristodêmus;" no one would speak or communicate with him, or even grant him a light for his fire.[181] After a year of such bitter disgrace, he was at length enabled to retrieve his honor at the battle of Platæa, where he was slain, after surpassing all his comrades in heroic and even reckless valor.

Amidst the last moments of this gallant band, we turn with repugnance to the desertion and surrender of the Thebans. They are said to have taken part in the final battle, though only to save appearances and under the pressure of necessity: but when the Spartans and Thespians, exhausted and disarmed, retreated to die upon the little hillock within the pass, the Thebans then separated themselves, approached the enemy with outstretched hands, and entreated quarter. They now loudly pro-

claimed that they were friends and subjects of the Great King, and had come to Thermopylæ against their own consent; all which was confirmed by the Thessalians in the Persian army. Though some few were slain before this proceeding was understood by the Persians, the rest were admitted to quarter; not without the signal disgrace, however, of being branded with the regal mark as untrustworthy slaves,—an indignity to which their commander, Leontiadês was compelled to submit along with the rest. Such is the narrative which Herodotus recounts, without any expression of mistrust or even of doubt: Plutarch emphatically contradicts it, and even cites a Bœotian author,[182] who affirms that Anaxarchus, not Leontiadês, was commander of the Thebans at Thermopylæ. Without calling in question the equivocal conduct and surrender of this Theban detachment, we may reasonably dismiss the story of this ignominious branding, as an invention of that strong anti-Theban feeling which prevailed in Greece after the repulse of Xerxes.

The wrath of that monarch, as he went over the field after the close of the action, vented itself upon the corpse of the gallant Leonidas, whose head he directed to be cut off and fixed on a cross. But it was not wrath alone which filled his mind: he was farther impressed with involuntary admiration of the little detachment which had here opposed to him a resistance so unexpected and so nearly invincible,—he now learned to be anxious respecting the resistance which remained behind. "Demaratus (said he to the exiled Spartan king at his side), thou art a good man: all thy predictions have turned out true: now tell me, how many Lacedæmonians are there remaining, and are they all such warriors as these fallen men?" "O king (replied Demaratus), the total of the Lacedæmonians and of their towns is great; in Sparta alone, there are eight thousand adult warriors, all equal to those who have here fought; and the other Lacedæmonians, though inferior to them, are yet excellent soldiers." "Tell me (rejoined Xerxes), what will be the least difficult way of conquering such men?" Upon which Demaratus advised him to send a division of his fleet to occupy the island of Kythêra, and from thence to make war on the southern coast of Laconia, which would distract the attention of Sparta, and prevent her from coöperating in any combined scheme of defence against his land-force. Unless this were done, the entire force of Peloponnesus would be assembled to maintain the narrow isthmus of Corinth, where the Persian king would have far more terrible battles to fight than anything which he had yet witnessed.[183]

Happily for the safety of Greece, Achæmenes, the brother of Xerxes, interposed to dissuade the monarch from this prudent plan of action; not without aspersions on the temper and motives of Demaratus, who, he affirmed, like other Greeks, hated all power, and envied all good fortune, above his own. The fleet, added he, after the damage sustained by the recent storm, would bear no farther diminution of number: and it was essential to keep the entire Persian force, on land as well as on sea, in one undivided and coöperating mass.[184]

A few such remarks were sufficient to revive in the monarch his habitual sentiment of confidence in overpowering number: yet while rejecting the advice of Demaratus, he emphatically repelled the imputations against the good faith and sincere attachment of that exiled prince.[185]

Meanwhile the days of battle at Thermopylæ had been not less actively employed by the fleets at Aphetæ and Artemisium. It has already been mentioned that the Greek ships, having abandoned their station at the latter place and retired to Chalkis, were induced to return, by the news that the Persian fleet had been nearly ruined by the recent storm,—and that, on returning to Artemisium, the Grecian commanders felt renewed alarm on seeing the enemy's fleet, in spite of the damage just sustained, still mustering in overwhelming number at the opposite station of Aphetæ. Such was the effect of this spectacle, and the impression of their own inferiority, that they again resolved to retire without fighting, leaving the strait open and undefended. Great consternation was caused by the news of their determination among the inhabitants of Eubœa, who entreated Eurybiadês to maintain his position for a few days, until they could have time to remove their families and their property. But even such postponement was thought unsafe, and refused: and he was on the point of giving orders for retreat, when the Eubœans sent their envoy, Pelagon, to Themistoklês, with the offer of thirty talents, on condition that the fleet should keep its station and hazard an engagement in defence of the island. Themistoklês employed the money adroitly and successfully, giving five talents to Eurybiadês, with large presents besides to the other leading chiefs: the most unmanageable among them was the Corinthian Adeimantus,—who at first threatened to depart with his own squadron alone, if the remaining Greeks were mad enough to remain. His alarm was silenced, if not tranquillized, by a present of three talents.[186]

However Plutarch may be scandalized at such inglorious revelations preserved to us by Herodotus respecting the underhand agencies of this memorable struggle, there is no reason to call in question the bribery here described. But Themistoklês doubtless was only tempted to do, and enabled to do, by means of the Eubœan money, that which he would have wished and had probably tried to accomplish without the money,—to bring on a naval engagement at Artemisium. It was absolutely essential to the maintenance of Thermopylæ, and to the general plan of defence, that the Eubœan strait should be defended against the Persian fleet, nor could the Greeks expect a more favorable position to fight in. We may reasonably presume that Themistoklês, distinguished not less by daring than by sagacity, and the great originator of maritime energies in his country, concurred unwillingly in the projected abandonment of Artemisium: but his high mental capacity did not exclude that pecuniary corruption which rendered the presents of the Eubœans both admissible and welcome,—yet still more welcome to him perhaps, as they supplied means of bringing over the other opposing chiefs and the Spartan admiral.[187] It was finally determined, therefore, to remain, and if necessary, to hazard an engagement in the Eu-

bœan strait: but at any rate to procure for the inhabitants of the island a short interval to remove their families. Had these Eubœans heeded the oracles, says Herodotus,[188] they would have packed up and removed long before: for a text of Bakis gave them express warning: but, having neglected the sacred writings as unworthy of credit, they were now severely punished for such presumption.

Among the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, on the other hand, the feeling prevalent was one of sanguine hope and confidence in their superior numbers, forming a strong contrast with the discouragement of the Greeks at Artemisium. Had they attacked the latter immediately, when both fleets first saw each other from their opposite stations, they would have gained an easy victory, for the fleet would have fled, as the admiral was on the point of ordering, even without an attack. But this was not sufficient for the Persians, who wished to cut off every ship among their enemies even from flight and escape.[189] Accordingly, they detached two hundred ships to circumnavigate the island of Eubœa, and to sail up the Eubœan strait from the south, in the rear of the Greeks,—and postponing their own attack in front until this squadron should be in position to intercept the retreating Greeks. But though the manœuvre was concealed by sending the squadron round outside of the island of Skiathos, it became known immediately among the Greeks, through a deserter,—Skyllias of Skionê. This man, the best swimmer and diver of his time, and now engaged like other Thracian Greeks in the Persian service, passed over to Artemisium, and communicated to the Greek commanders both the particulars of the late destructive storm, and the despatch of the intercepting squadron.[190]

It appears that his communications, respecting the effects of the storm and the condition of the Persian fleet, somewhat reassured the Greeks, who resolved during the ensuing night to sail from their station at Artemisium for the purpose of surprising the detached squadron of two hundred ships, and who even became bold enough, under the inspirations of Themistoklês, to go out and offer battle to the main fleet near Aphetæ.[191] Wanting to acquire some practical experience, which neither leaders nor soldiers as yet possessed, of the manner in which Phœnicians and others in the Persian fleet handled and manœuvred their ships, they waited till a late hour of the afternoon, when little daylight remained.[192] Their boldness in thus advancing out, with inferior numbers and even inferior ships, astonished the Persian admirals, and distressed the Ionians and other subject Greeks who were serving them as unwilling auxiliaries: to both it seemed that the victory of the Persian fleet, which was speedily brought forth to battle, and was numerous enough to encompass the Greeks, would be certain as well as complete. The Greek ships were at first marshalled in a circle, with the sterns in the interior, and presenting their prows in front at all points of the circumference;[193] in this position, compressed into a narrow space, they seemed to be awaiting the attack of the enemy, who formed a larger circle around them: but on a second signal given, their ships assumed the aggressive, rowed out from the inner circle in direct impact against the hostile ships around, and

took or disabled no less than thirty of them: in one of which Philaon, brother of Gorgus, despot of Salamis in Cyprus, was made prisoner. Such unexpected forwardness at first disconcerted the Persians, who however rallied and inflicted considerable damage and loss on the Greeks: but the near approach of night put an end to the combat, and each fleet retired to its former station,—the Persians to Aphetæ, the Greeks to Artemisium.[194]

The result of this first day's combat, though indecisive in itself, surprised both parties and did much to exalt the confidence of the Greeks. But the events of the ensuing night did yet more. Another tremendous storm was sent by the gods to aid them. Though it was the middle of summer,—a season when rain rarely falls in the climate of Greece,—the most violent wind, rain, and thunder, prevailed during the whole night, blowing right on shore against the Persians at Aphetæ, and thus but little troublesome to the Greeks on the opposite side of the strait. The seamen of the Persian fleet, scarcely recovered from the former storm at Sêpias Aktê, were almost driven to despair by this repetition of the same peril: the more so when they found the prows of their ships surrounded, and the play of their oars impeded, by the dead bodies and the spars from the recent battle, which the current drove towards their shore. If this storm was injurious to the main fleet at Aphetæ, it proved the entire ruin of the squadron detached to circumnavigate Eubœa, who, overtaken by it near the dangerous eastern coast of that island, called the Hollows of Eubœa, were driven upon the rocks and wrecked. The news of this second conspiracy of the elements, or intervention of the gods, against the schemes of the invaders, was highly encouraging to the Greeks; and the seasonable arrival of fifty-three fresh Athenian ships, who reinforced them the next day, raised them to a still higher pitch of confidence. In the afternoon of the same day, they sailed out against the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, and attacked and destroyed some Kilikian ships even at their moorings; the fleet having been too much damaged by the storm of the preceding night to come out and fight. [195]

But the Persian admirals were not of a temper to endure such insults,—still less to let their master hear of them. About noon on the ensuing day, they sailed with their entire fleet near to the Greek station at Artemisium, and formed themselves into a half moon; while the Greeks kept near to the shore, so that they could not be surrounded, nor could the Persians bring their entire fleet into action; the ships running foul of each other, and not finding space to attack. The battle raged fiercely all day, and with great loss and damage on both sides: the Egyptians bore off the palm of valor among the Persians, the Athenians among the Greeks. Though the positive loss sustained by the Persians was by far the greater, and though the Greeks, being near their own shore, became masters of the dead bodies as well as of the disabled ships and floating fragments,—still, they were themselves hurt and crippled in greater proportion with reference to their inferior total: and the Athenian vessels especially, foremost in the preceding combat, found one half of their number out of condition to

renew it.[196] The Egyptians alone had captured five Grecian ships with their entire crews.

Under these circumstances, the Greek leaders,—and Themistoklês, as it seems, among them,—determined that they could no longer venture to hold the position of Artemisium, but must withdraw the naval force farther into Greece:[197] though this was in fact a surrender of the pass of Thermopylæ, and though the removal which the Eubœans were hastening was still unfinished. These unfortunate men were forced to be satisfied with the promise of Themistoklês to give them convoy for their boats and their persons; abandoning their sheep and cattle for the consumption of the fleet, as better than leaving them to become booty for the enemy. While the Greeks were thus employed in organizing their retreat, they received news which rendered retreat doubly necessary. The Athenian Abrônychus, stationed with his ship near Thermopylæ, in order to keep up communication between the army and fleet, brought the disastrous intelligence that Xerxes was already master of the pass, and that the division of Leonidas was either destroyed or in flight. Upon this the fleet abandoned Artemisium forthwith, and sailed up the Eubœan strait; the Corinthian ships in the van, the Athenians bringing up the rear. Themistoklês, conducting the latter, stayed long enough at the various watering-stations and landing-places to inscribe on some neighboring stones invitations to the Ionian contingents serving under Xerxes: whereby the latter were conjured not to serve against their fathers, but to desert, if possible,—or at least, to fight as little and as backwardly as they could. Themistoklês hoped by this stratagem perhaps to detach some of the Ionians from the Persian side, or, at any rate, to render them objects of mistrust, and thus to diminish their efficiency.[198] With no longer delay than was requisite for such inscriptions, he followed the remaining fleet, which sailed round the coast of Attica, not stopping until it reached the island of Salamis.

The news of the retreat of the Greek fleet was speedily conveyed by a citizen of Histiæa to the Persians at Aphetæ, who at first disbelieved it, and detained the messenger until they had sent to ascertain the fact. On the next day, their fleet passed across to the north of Eubœa, and became master of Histiæa and the neighboring territory: from whence many of them, by permission and even invitation of Xerxes, crossed over to Thermopylæ to survey the field of battle and the dead. Respecting the number of the dead, Xerxes is asserted to have deliberately imposed upon the spectators: he buried all his own dead, except one thousand, whose bodies were left out,—while the total number of Greeks who had perished at Thermopylæ, four thousand in number, were all left exposed, and in one heap, so as to create an impression that their loss had been much more severe than their own. Moreover, the bodies of the slain Helots were included in the heap, all of them passing for Spartans or Thespians in the estimation of the spectators. We are not surprised to hear, however, that this trick, gross and public as it must have been, really deceived very few.[199] According to the statement of Herodotus, twenty thousand men were slain on the

side of the Persians,—no unreasonable estimate, if we consider that they wore little defensive armor, and that they were three days fighting. The number of Grecian dead bodies is stated by the same historian as four thousand: if this be correct, it must include a considerable proportion of Helots, since there were no hoplites present on the last day except the three hundred Spartans, the seven hundred Thespians, and the four hundred Thebans. Some hoplites were of course slain in the first two days' battles, though apparently not many. The number who originally came to the defence of the pass seems to have been about seven thousand:[200] but the epigram, composed shortly afterwards, and inscribed on the spot by order of the Amphiktyonic assembly, transmitted to posterity the formal boast that four thousand warriors "from Peloponnesus had here fought with three hundred myriads or three million of enemies."[201] Respecting this alleged Persian total, some remarks have already been made: the statement of four thousand warriors from Peloponnesus, must indicate all those who originally marched out of that peninsula under Leonidas. Yet the Amphiktyonic assembly, when they furnished words to record this memorable exploit, ought not to have immortalized the Peloponnesians apart from their extra-Peloponnesian comrades, of merit fully equal,—especially the Thespians, who exhibited the same heroic self-devotion as Leonidas and his Spartans, without having been prepared for it by the same elaborate and iron discipline. While this inscription was intended as a general commemoration of the exploit, there was another near it, alike simple and impressive, destined for the Spartan dead separately: "Stranger, tell the Lacedæmonians, that we lie here, in obedience to their orders." On the hillock within the pass, where this devoted band received their death-wounds, a monument was erected, with a marble lion in honor of Leonidas; decorated, apparently, with an epigram by the poet Simonides. That distinguished genius composed at least one ode, of which nothing but a splendid fragment now remains, to celebrate the glories of Thermopylæ; besides several epigrams, one of which was consecrated to the prophet Megistias, "who, though well aware of the fate coming upon him, would not desert the Spartan chiefs."

CHAPTER XLI.

BATTLE OF SALAMIS. — RETREAT OF XERXES.

THE sentiment, alike durable and unanimous, with which the Greeks of after-times looked back on the battle of Thermopylæ, and which they have communicated to all subsequent readers, was that of just admiration for the courage and patriotism of Leonidas and his band. But among the contemporary Greeks that sentiment, though doubtless sincerely felt, was by no means predominant: it was overpowered by the more pressing emotions of disappointment and terror. So confident were the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the defensibility of Thermopylæ and Artemisium, that when the news of the disaster reached them, not a single soldier had yet been put in motion: the season of the festival games had passed, but no active step had yet been taken.[202] Meanwhile the invading force, army and fleet, was in its progress towards Attica and Peloponnesus, without the least preparations,—and, what was still worse, without any combined and concerted plan,—for defending the heart of Greece. The loss sustained by Xerxes at Thermopylæ, insignificant in proportion to his vast total, was more than compensated by the fresh Grecian auxiliaries which he now acquired. Not merely the Malians, Lokrians, and Dorians, but also the great mass of the Bœotians, with their chief town Thebes, all except Thespiæ and Platæa, now joined him.[203] Demaratus, his Spartan companion, moved forward to Thebes to renew an ancient tie of hospitality with the Theban oligarchical leader, Attagînus, while small garrisons were sent by Alexander of Macedon to most of the Bœotian towns,[204] as well to protect them from plunder as to insure their fidelity. The Thespians, on the other hand, abandoned their city, and fled into Peloponnesus; while the Platæans, who had been serving aboard the Athenian ships at Artemisium,[205] were disembarked at Chalkis as the fleet retreated, for the purpose of marching by land to their city, and removing their families. Nor was it only the land-force of Xerxes which had been thus strengthened; his fleet also had received some accessions from Karystus in Eubœa, and from several of the Cyclades,—so that the losses sustained by the storm at Sêpias and the fights at Artemisium, if not wholly made up, were at least in part repaired, while the fleet remained still prodigiously superior in number to that of the Greeks.[206]

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, near fifty years after these events, the Corinthian envoys reminded Sparta that she had allowed Xerxes time to arrive from the extremity of the earth at the threshold of Peloponnesus, before she took any adequate precautions against him: a reproach true almost to the letter.[207] It was only when roused and terrified by the news of the death of Leonidas, that the Lacedæmonians and the other Peloponnesians began to put forth their full strength. But it was then too late to perform the promise made to Athens, of taking up a position in

Bœotia so as to protect Attica. To defend the isthmus of Corinth was all that they now thought of, and seemingly all that was now open to them: thither they rushed with all their available population under the conduct of Kleombrotus, king of Sparta (brother of Leonidas), and began to draw fortifications across it, as well as to break up the Skironian road from Megara to Corinth, with every mark of anxious energy. The Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, Eleians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, Trœzenians, and Hermionians, were all present here in full numbers; many myriads of men (bodies of ten thousand each) working and bringing materials night and day.[208] As a defence to themselves against attack by land, this was an excellent position: they considered it as their last chance,[209] abandoning all hope of successful resistance at sea. But they forgot that a fortified isthmus was no protection even to themselves against the navy of Xerxes,[210] while it professedly threw out not only Attica, but also Megara and Ægina. And thus rose a new peril to Greece from the loss of Thermopylæ: no other position could be found which, like that memorable strait, comprehended and protected at once all the separate cities. The disunion thus produced brought them within a hair's breadth of ruin.

If the causes of alarm were great for the Peloponnesians, yet more desperate did the position of the Athenians appear. Expecting, according to agreement, to find a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia ready to sustain Leonidas, or at any rate to coöperate in the defence of Attica, they had taken no measures to remove their families or property: but they saw with indignant disappointment as well as dismay, on retreating from Artemisium, that the conqueror was in full march from Thermopylæ, that the road to Attica was open to him, and that the Peloponnesians were absorbed exclusively in the defence of their own isthmus and their own separate existence.[211] The fleet from Artemisium had been directed to muster at the harbor of Trœzen, there to await such reinforcements as could be got together: but the Athenians entreated Eurybiadês to halt at Salamis, so as to allow them a short time for consultation in the critical state of their affairs, and to aid them in the transport of their families. While Eurybiadês was thus staying at Salamis, several new ships which had reached Trœzen came over to join him; and in this way Salamis became for a time the naval station of the Greeks, without any deliberate intention beforehand.[212]

Meanwhile Themistoklês and the Athenian seamen landed at Phalêrum, and made their mournful entry into Athens. Gloomy as the prospect appeared, there was little room for difference of opinion,[213] and still less room for delay. The authorities and the public assembly at once issued a proclamation, enjoining every Athenian to remove his family out of the country in the best way he could. We may conceive the state of tumult and terror which followed on this unexpected proclamation, when we reflect that it had to be circulated and acted upon throughout all Attica, from Sunium to Orôpus, within the narrow space of less than six days; for no longer interval elapsed before Xerxes actually arrived at Athens, where indeed he might have arrived even sooner.[214] The whole Grecian fleet was doubtless employed in carrying

out the helpless exiles; mostly to Trœzen, where a kind reception and generous support were provided for them (the Trœzenian population being seemingly semi-Ionic, and having ancient relations of religion as well as of traffic with Athens),—but in part also to Ægina: there were, however, many who could not, or would not, go father than Salamis. Themistoklês impressed upon the sufferers that they were only obeying the oracle, which had directed them to abandon the city and to take refuge behind the wooden walls; and either his policy, or the mental depression of the time, gave circulation to other stories, intimating that even the divine inmates of the acropolis were for a while deserting it. In the ancient temple of Athênê Polias on that rock, there dwelt, or was believed to dwell, as guardian to the sanctuary and familiar attendant of the goddess, a sacred serpent, for whose nourishment a honey-cake was placed once in the month. The honey-cake had been hitherto regularly consumed; but at this fatal moment the priestess announced that it remained untouched: the sacred guardian had thus set the example of quitting the acropolis, and it behooved the citizens to follow the example, confiding in the goddess herself for future return and restitution. The migration of so many ancient men, women, and children, was a scene of tears and misery inferior only to that which would have ensued on the actual capture of the city.[215] Some few individuals, too poor to hope for maintenance, or too old to care for life, elsewhere,—confiding, moreover, in their own interpretation[216] of the wooden wall which the Pythian priestess had pronounced to be inexpugnable,—shut themselves up in the acropolis along with the administrators of the temple, obstructing the entrance or western front with wooden doors and palisades.[217] When we read how great were the sufferings of the population of Attica near half a century afterwards, compressed for refuge within the spacious fortifications of Athens at the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian war,[218] we may form some faint idea of the incalculably greater misery which overwhelmed an emigrant population, hurrying, they knew not whither, to escape the long arm of Xerxes. Little chance did there seem that they would ever revisit their homes except as his slaves.

In the midst of circumstances thus calamitous and threatening, neither the warriors nor the leaders of Athens lost their energy,—arm as well as mind was strung to the loftiest pitch of human resolution. Political dissensions were suspended: Themistoklês proposed to the people a decree, and obtained their sanction, inviting home all who were under sentence of temporary banishment: moreover, he not only included but even specially designated among them his own great opponent Aristeidês, now in the third year of ostracism. Xanthippus the accuser, and Kimon the son, of Miltiadês, were partners in the same emigration: the latter, enrolled by his scale of fortune among the horsemen of the state, was seen with his companions cheerfully marching through the Kerameikus to dedicate their bridles in the acropolis, and to bring away in exchange some of the sacred arms there suspended, thus setting an example of ready service on shipboard, instead of on horseback.[219] It was absolutely essential to obtain supplies of money, partly for the aid of the poorer exiles,

but still more for the equipment of the fleet; there were no funds in the public treasury,—but the Senate of Areopagus, then composed in large proportion of men from the wealthier classes, put forth all its public authority as well as its private contributions and example to others,[220] and thus succeeded in raising the sum of eight drachms for every soldier serving.

This timely help was indeed partly obtained by the inexhaustible resource of Themistoklês, who, in the hurry of embarkation, either discovered or pretended that the Gorgon's head from the statue of Athênê was lost, and directing upon this ground every man's baggage to be searched, rendered any treasures, which private citizens might be carrying out, available to the public service.[221] By the most strenuous efforts, these few important days were made to suffice for removing the whole population of Attica,—those of military competence to the fleet at Salamis,—the rest to some place of refuge,—together with as much property as the case admitted. So complete was the desertion of the country, that the host of Xerxes, when it became master, could not seize and carry off more than five hundred prisoners.[222] Moreover, the fleet itself, which had been brought home from Artemisium partially disabled, was quickly repaired, so that, by the time the Persian fleet arrived, it was again in something like fighting condition.

The combined fleet which had now got together at Salamis consisted of three hundred and sixty-six ships,—a force far greater than at Artemisium. Of these, no less than two hundred were Athenian; twenty among which, however, were lent to the Chalkidians, and manned by them. Forty Corinthian ships, thirty Æginetan, twenty Megarian, sixteen Lacedæmonian, fifteen Sikyonian, ten Epidaurian, seven from Ambrakia, and as many from Eretria, five from Trœzen, three from Hermionê, and the same number from Leukas; two from Keos, two from Styra, and one from Kythnos; four from Naxos, despatched as a contingent to the Persian fleet, but brought by the choice of their captains and seamen to Salamis;—all these triremes, together with a small squadron of the inferior vessels called pentekonters, made up the total. From the great Grecian cities in Italy there appeared only one trireme, a volunteer, equipped and commanded by an eminent citizen named Phayllus, thrice victor at the Pythian games.[223] The entire fleet was thus a trifle larger than the combined force, three hundred and fifty-eight ships, collected by the Asiatic Greeks at Ladê, fifteen years earlier, during the Ionic revolt. We may doubt, however, whether this total, borrowed from Herodotus, be not larger than that which actually fought a little afterwards at the battle of Salamis, and which Æschylus gives decidedly as consisting of three hundred sail, in addition to ten prime and chosen ships. That great poet, himself one of the combatants, and speaking in a drama represented only seven years after the battle, is better authority on the point even than Herodotus.[224]

Hardly was the fleet mustered at Salamis, and the Athenian population removed, when Xerxes and his host overran the deserted country, his fleet occupying the road-

stead of Phalêrum with the coast adjoining. His land-force had been put in motion under the guidance of the Thessalians, two or three days after the battle of Thermopylæ, and he was assured by some Arcadians who came to seek service, that the Peloponnesians were, even at that moment, occupied with the celebration of the Olympic games. "What prize does the victor receive?" he asked. Upon the reply made, that the prize was a wreath of the wild olive, Tritantæchmês, son of the monarch's uncle Artabanus, is said to have burst forth, notwithstanding the displeasure both of the monarch himself and of the bystanders: "Heavens, Mardonius, what manner of men are these against whom thou hast brought us to fight! men who contend not for money, but for honor!"[225] Whether this be a remark really delivered, or a dramatic illustration imagined by some contemporary of Herodotus, it is not the less interesting as bringing to view a characteristic of Hellenic life, which contrasts not merely with the manners of contemporary Orientals, but even with those of the earlier Greeks themselves during the Homeric times.

Among all the various Greeks between Thermopylæ and the borders of Attica, there were none except the Phocians disposed to refuse submission: and they refused only because the paramount influence of their bitter enemies the Thessalians made them despair of obtaining favorable terms.[226] Nor would they even listen to a proposition of the Thessalians, who, boasting that it was in their power to guide as they pleased the terrors of the Persian host, offered to insure lenient treatment to the territory of Phocis, provided a sum of fifty talents were paid to them.[227] The proposition being indignantly refused, they conducted Xerxes through the little territory of Doris, which *medized* and escaped plunder, into the upper valley of the Kephisus, among the towns of the inflexible Phocians. All of them were found deserted; the inhabitants having previously escaped either to the wide-spreading summit of Parnassus, called Tithorea, or even still farther, across that mountain into the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians. Ten or a dozen small Phocian towns, the most considerable of which were Elateia and Hyampolis, were sacked and destroyed by the invaders, nor was the holy temple and oracle of Apollo at Abæ better treated than the rest: all its treasures were pillaged, and it was then burnt. From Panopeus Xerxes detached a body of men to plunder Delphi, marching with his main army through Bœotia, in which country he found all the towns submissive and willing, except Thespiæ and Platæa: both were deserted by their citizens, and both were now burnt. From hence he conducted his army into the abandoned territory of Attica, reaching without resistance the foot of the acropolis at Athens.[228]

Very different was the fate of that division which he had detached from Panopeus against Delphi: Apollo defended his temple here more vigorously than at Abæ. The cupidity of the Persian king was stimulated by accounts of the boundless wealth accumulated at Delphi, especially the profuse donations of Crœsus. The Delphians, in the extreme of alarm, while they sought safety for themselves on the heights of Parnassus, and for their families by transport across the gulf into Achaia, consulted the

oracle whether they should carry away or bury the sacred treasures. Apollo directed them to leave the treasures untouched, saying that he was competent himself to take care of his own property. Sixty Delphians alone ventured to remain, together with Akêratus, the religious superior: but evidences of superhuman aid soon appeared to encourage them. The sacred arms suspended in the interior cell, which no mortal hand was ever permitted to touch, were seen lying before the door of the temple; and when the Persians, marching along the road called Schistê, up that rugged path under the steep cliffs of Parnassus which conducts to Delphi, had reached the temple of Athênê Pronœa,—on a sudden, dreadful thunder was heard,—two vast mountain crags detached themselves and rushed down with deafening noise among them, crushing many to death,—the war-shout was also heard from the interior of the temple of Athênê. Seized with a panic terror, the invaders turned round and fled; pursued not only by the Delphians, but also, as they themselves affirmed, by two armed warriors of superhuman stature and destructive arm. The triumphant Delphians confirmed this report, adding that the two auxiliaries were the heroes Phylakus and Autonoüs, whose sacred precincts were close adjoining: and Herodotus himself when he visited Delphi, saw in the sacred ground of Athênê the identical masses of rock which had overwhelmed the Persians.[229] Thus did the god repel these invaders from his Delphian sanctuary and treasures, which remained inviolate until one hundred and thirty years afterwards, when they were rifled by the sacrilegious hands of the Phocian Philomêlus. On this occasion, as will be seen presently, the real protectors of the treasures were the conquerors at Salamis and Platæa.

Four months had elapsed since the departure from Asia when Xerxes reached Athens, the last term of his advance. He brought with him the members of the Peisistratid family, who doubtless thought their restoration already certain,—and a few Athenian exiles attached to their interest. Though the country was altogether deserted, the handful of men collected in the acropolis ventured to defy him: nor could all the persuasions of the Peisistratids, eager to preserve the holy place from pillage, induce them to surrender.[230] The Athenian acropolis,—a craggy rock rising abruptly about one hundred and fifty feet, with a flat summit of about one thousand feet long from east to west, by five hundred feet broad from north to south,—had no practicable access except on the western side:[231] moreover, in all parts where there seemed any possibility of climbing up, it was defended by the ancient fortification called the Pelasgic wall. Obliged to take the place by force, the Persian army was posted around the northern and western sides, and commenced their operations from the eminence immediately adjoining on the northwest, called Areopagus:[232] from whence they bombarded, if we may venture upon the expression, with hot missiles, the woodwork before the gates; that is, they poured upon it multitudes of arrows with burning tow attached to them. The wooden palisades and boarding presently took fire and were consumed: but when the Persians tried to mount to the assault by the western road leading up to the gate, the undaunted little garrison still

kept them at bay, having provided vast stones, which they rolled down upon them in the ascent. For a time the Great King seemed likely to be driven to the slow process of blockade; but at length some adventurous men among the besiegers tried to scale the precipitous rock before them on its northern side, hard by the temple or chapel of Aglaurus, which lay nearly in front of the Persian position, but behind the gates and the western ascent. Here the rock was naturally so inaccessible, that it was altogether unguarded, and seemingly even unfortified:[233] moreover, the attention of the little garrison was all concentrated on the host which fronted the gates. Hence the separate escalading party was enabled to accomplish their object unobserved, and to reach the summit in the rear of the garrison; who, deprived of their last hope, either cast themselves headlong from the walls, or fled for safety to the inner temple. The successful escaladers opened the gates to the entire Persian host, and the whole acropolis was presently in their hands. Its defenders were slain, its temples pillaged, and all its dwellings and buildings, sacred as well as profane, consigned to the flames.[234] The citadel of Athens fell into the hands of Xerxes by a surprise, very much the same as that which had placed Sardis in those of Cyrus.[235]

Thus was divine prophecy fulfilled: Attica passed entirely into the hands of the Persians, and the conflagration of Sardis was retaliated upon the home and citadel of its captors, as it also was upon their sacred temple of Eleusis. Xerxes immediately despatched to Susa intelligence of the fact, which is said to have excited unmeasured demonstrations of joy, confuting, seemingly, the gloomy predictions of his uncle Artabanus.[236] On the next day but one, the Athenian exiles in his suite received his orders, or perhaps obtained his permission, to go and offer sacrifice amidst the ruins of the acropolis, and atone, if possible, for the desecration of the ground: they discovered that the sacred olive-tree near the chapel of Erechtheus, the special gift of the goddess Athênê, though burnt to the ground by the recent flames, had already thrown out a fresh shoot of one cubit long,—at least the piety of restored Athens afterwards believed this encouraging portent,[237] as well as that which was said to have been seen by Dikæus, an Athenian companion of the Peisistratids, in the Thriasian plain. It was now the day set apart for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries; and though in this sorrowful year there was no celebration, nor any Athenians in the territory, Dikæus still fancied that he beheld the dust and heard the loud multitudinous chant, which was wont to accompany in ordinary times the processional march from Athens to Eleusis. He would even have revealed the fact to Xerxes himself, had not Demaratus deterred him from doing so: but he as well as Herodotus construed it as an evidence that the goddesses themselves were passing over from Eleusis to help the Athenians at Salamis. But whatever may have been received in after times, on that day certainly no man could believe in the speedy resurrection of conquered Athens as a free city: not even if he had witnessed the portent of the burnt olive-tree suddenly sprouting afresh with preternatural vigor. So hopeless did the circumstances of the Athenians then appear, not less to their confederates assembled at Salamis than to the victorious Persians.

About the time of the capture of the acropolis, the Persian fleet also arrived safely in the bay of Phalêrum, reinforced by ships from Karystus as well as from various islands of the Cyclades, so that Herodotus reckons it to have been as strong as before the terrible storm at Sêpias Aktê,—an estimate certainly not admissible.[238]

Soon after their arrival, Xerxes himself descended to the shore to inspect the fleet, as well as to take counsel with the various naval leaders about the expediency of attacking the hostile fleet, now so near him in the narrow strait between Salamis and the coasts of Attica. He invited them all to take their seats in an assembly, wherein the king of Sidon occupied the first place and the king of Tyre the second. The question was put to each of them separately by Mardonius, and when we learn that all pronounced in favor of immediate fighting, we may be satisfied that the decided opinion of Xerxes himself must have been well known to them beforehand. One exception alone was found to this unanimity,—Artemisia, queen of Halikarnassus in Karia; into whose mouth Herodotus puts a speech of some length, deprecating all idea of fighting in the narrow strait of Salamis,—predicting that if the land-force were moved forward to attack Peloponnesus, the Peloponnesians in the fleet at Salamis would return for the protection of their own homes, and thus the fleet would disperse, the rather as there was little or no food in the island,—and intimating, besides, unmeasured contempt for the efficacy of the Persian fleet and seamen as compared with the Greek, as well as for the subject contingents of Xerxes generally. That queen Artemisia gave this prudent counsel, there is no reason to question; and the historian of Halikarnassus may have had means of hearing the grounds on which her opinion rested: but I find a difficulty in believing that she can have publicly delivered any such estimate of the maritime subjects of Persia,—an estimate not merely insulting to all who heard it, but at the time not just, though it had come to be nearer the truth at the time when Herodotus wrote,[239] and though Artemisia herself may have lived to entertain the conviction afterwards. Whatever may have been her reasons, the historian tells us that friends as well as rivals were astonished at her rashness in dissuading the monarch from a naval battle, and expected that she would be put to death. But Xerxes heard the advice with perfect good temper, and even esteemed the Karian queen the more highly: though he resolved that the opinion of the majority, or his own opinion, should be acted upon: and orders were accordingly issued for attacking the next day,[240] while the land-force should move forward towards Peloponnesus.

Whilst on the shore of Phalêrum, an omnipotent will compelled seeming unanimity and precluded all real deliberation,—great, indeed, was the contrast presented by the neighboring Greek armament at Salamis, among the members of which unmeasured dissension had been reigning. It has already been stated that the Greek fleet had originally got together at that island, not with any view of making it a naval station, but simply in order to cover and assist the emigration of the Athenians. This object being accomplished, and Xerxes being already in Attica, Eurybiadês convoked

the chiefs to consider what position was the fittest for a naval engagement. Most of them, especially those from Peloponnesus, were averse to remaining at Salamis, and proposed that the fleet should be transferred to the isthmus of Corinth, where it would be in immediate communication with the Peloponnesian land-force, so that in case of defeat at sea, the ships would find protection on shore, and the men would join in the land service,—while if worsted in a naval action near Salamis, they would be inclosed in an island from whence there were no hopes of escape.[241] In the midst of the debate, a messenger arrived with news of the capture and conflagration of Athens and her acropolis by the Persians: and such was the terror produced by this intelligence, that some of the chiefs, without even awaiting the conclusion of the debate and the final vote, quitted the council forthwith, and began to hoist sail, or prepare their rowers, for departure. The majority came to a vote for removing to the Isthmus, but as night was approaching, actual removal was deferred until the next morning.[242]

Now was felt the want of a position like that of Thermopylæ, which had served as a protection to all the Greeks at once, so as to check the growth of separate fears and interests. We can hardly wonder that the Peloponnesian chiefs,—the Corinthian in particular, who furnished so large a naval contingent, and within whose territory the land-battle at the Isthmus seemed about to take place,—should manifest such an obstinate reluctance to fight at Salamis, and should insist on removing to a position where, in case of naval defeat, they could assist, and be assisted by, their own soldiers on land. On the other hand, Salamis was not only the most favorable position, in consequence of its narrow strait, for the inferior numbers of the Greeks, but could not be abandoned without breaking up the unity of the allied fleet; since Megara and Ægina would thus be left uncovered, and the contingents of each would immediately retire for the defence of their own homes,—while the Athenians also, a large portion of whose expatriated families were in Salamis and Ægina, would be in like manner distracted from combined maritime efforts at the Isthmus. If transferred to the latter place, probably not even the Peloponnesians themselves would have remained in one body; for the squadrons of Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, etc., each fearing that the Persian fleet might make a descent on one or other of these separate ports, would go home to repel such a contingency, in spite of the efforts of Eurybiadês to keep them together. Hence the order for quitting Salamis and repairing to the Isthmus was nothing less than a sentence of extinction for all combined maritime defence; and it thus became doubly abhorrent to all those who, like the Athenians, Æginetans, and Megarians, were also led by their own separate safety to cling to the defence of Salamis. In spite of all such opposition, however, and in spite of the protest of Themistoklês, the obstinate determination of the Peloponnesian leaders carried the vote for retreat, and each of them went to his ship to prepare for it on the following morning.

When Themistoklês returned to his ship, with the gloom of this melancholy resolution full upon his mind, and with the necessity of providing for removal of the expatriated Athenian families in the island as well as for that of the squadron,—he found an Athenian friend named Mnêsiphilus, who asked him what the synod of chiefs had determined. Concerning this Mnêsiphilus, who is mentioned generally as a sagacious practical politician, we unfortunately have no particulars: but it must have been no common man whom fame selected, truly or falsely, as the inspiring genius of Themistoklês. On learning what had been resolved, Mnêsiphilus burst out into remonstrance on the utter ruin which its execution would entail: there would presently be neither any united fleet to fight, nor any aggregate cause and country to fight for. [243] He vehemently urged Themistoklês again to open the question, and to press by every means in his power for a recall of the vote for retreat, as well as for a resolution to stay and fight at Salamis. Themistoklês had already in vain tried to enforce the same view: but disheartened as he was by ill-success, the remonstrances of a respected friend struck him so forcibly as to induce him to renew his efforts. He went instantly to the ship of Eurybiadês, asked permission to speak with him, and being invited aboard, reopened with him alone the whole subject of the past discussion, enforcing his own views as emphatically as he could. In this private communication, all the arguments bearing upon the case were more unsparingly laid open than it had been possible to do in an assembly of the chiefs, who would have been insulted if openly told that they were likely to desert the fleet when once removed from Salamis. Speaking thus freely and confidentially, and speaking to Eurybiadês alone, Themistoklês was enabled to bring him partially round, and even prevailed upon him to convene a fresh synod. So soon as this synod had assembled, even before Eurybiadês had explained the object and formally opened the discussion, Themistoklês addressed himself to each of the chief's separately, pouring forth at large his fears and anxiety as to the abandonment of Salamis: insomuch that the Corinthian Adeimantus rebuked him by saying: "Themistoklês, those who in the public festival-matches rise up before the proper signal, are scourged." "True, (rejoined the Athenian), but those who lag behind the signal win no crowns."[244]

Eurybiadês then explained to the synod that doubts had arisen in his mind, and that he called them together to reconsider the previous resolve: upon which Themistoklês began the debate, and vehemently enforced the necessity of fighting in the narrow sea of Salamis and not in the open waters at the Isthmus,—as well as of preserving Megara and Ægina: contending that a naval victory at Salamis would be not less effective for the defence of Peloponnesus than if it took place at the Isthmus, whereas, if the fleet were withdrawn to the latter point, they would only draw the Persians after them. Nor did he omit to add, that the Athenians had a prophecy assuring to them victory in this, their own island. But his speech made little impression on the Peloponnesian chiefs, who were even exasperated at being again summoned to reopen a debate already concluded,—and concluded in a way which they deemed essential to their safety. In the bosom of the Corinthian Adeimantus, especially, this

feeling of anger burst all bounds. He sharply denounced the presumption of Themistoklês, and bade him be silent as a man who had now no free Grecian city to represent,—Athens being in the power of the enemy: nay, he went so far as to contend that Eurybiadês had no right to count the vote of Themistoklês, until the latter could produce some free city as accrediting him to the synod. Such an attack, alike ungenerous and insane, upon the leader of more than half of the whole fleet, demonstrates the ungovernable impatience of the Corinthians to carry away the fleet to their Isthmus: it provoked a bitter retort against them from Themistoklês, who reminded them that while he had around him two hundred well-manned ships, he could procure for himself anywhere both city and territory as good or better than Corinth. But he now saw clearly that it was hopeless to think of enforcing his policy by argument, and that nothing would succeed except the direct language of intimidation. Turning to Eurybiadês, and addressing him personally, he said: "If thou wilt stay here, and fight bravely here, all will turn out well: but if thou wilt not stay, thou wilt bring Hellas to ruin.[245] For with us, all our means of war are contained in our ships. Be thou yet persuaded by me. If not, we Athenians shall migrate with our families on board, just as we are, to Siris in Italy, which is ours from of old, and which the prophecies announce that we are one day to colonize. You chiefs then, when bereft of allies like us, will hereafter recollect what I am now saying."

Eurybiadês had before been nearly convinced by the impressive pleading of Themistoklês. But this last downright menace clenched his determination, and probably struck dumb even the Corinthian and Peloponnesian opponents: for it was but too plain, that without the Athenians the fleet was powerless. He did not however put the question again to vote, but took upon himself to rescind the previous resolution and to issue orders for staying at Salamis to fight. In this order all acquiesced, willing or unwilling;[246] the succeeding dawn saw them preparing for fight instead of for retreat, and invoking the protection and companionship of the Æakid heroes of Salamis,—Telamon and Ajax: they even sent a trireme to Ægina to implore Æakus himself and the remaining Æakids. It seems to have been on this same day, also, that the resolution of fighting at Salamis was taken by Xerxes, whose fleet was seen in motion, towards the close of the day, preparing for attack the next morning.

But the Peloponnesians, though not venturing to disobey the orders of the Spartan admiral, still retained unabated their former fears and reluctance, which began again after a short interval to prevail over the formidable menace of Themistoklês, and were further strengthened by the advices from the Isthmus. The messengers from that quarter depicted the trepidation and affright of their absent brethren while constructing their cross wall at that point, to resist the impending land invasion. Why were *they* not there also, to join hands and to help in the defence,—even if worsted at sea,—at least on land, instead of wasting their efforts in defence of Attica, already in the hands of the enemy? Such were the complaints which passed from man to man, with many a bitter exclamation against the insanity of Eurybiadês: at length the

common feeling broke out in public and mutinous manifestation, and a fresh synod of the chiefs was demanded and convoked.[247] Here the same angry debate, and the same irreconcilable difference, was again renewed; the Peloponnesian chiefs clamoring for immediate departure, while the Athenians, Æginetans,[248] and Megarians, were equally urgent in favor of staying to fight. It was evident to Themistoklês that the majority of votes among the chiefs would be against him, in spite of the orders of Eurybiadês; and the disastrous crisis, destined to deprive Greece of all united maritime defence, appeared imminent,—when he resorted to one last stratagem to meet the desperate emergency, by rendering flight impossible. Contriving a pretext for stealing away from the synod, he despatched a trusty messenger across the strait with a secret communication to the Persian generals. Sikinnus his slave,—seemingly an Asiatic Greek,[249] who understood Persian, and had perhaps been sold during the late Ionic revolt, but whose superior qualities are marked by the fact that he had the care and teaching of the children of his master,—was instructed to acquaint them privately, in the name of Themistoklês, who was represented as wishing success at heart to the Persians, that the Greek fleet was not only in the utmost alarm, meditating immediate flight, but that the various portions of it were in such violent dissension, that they were more likely to fight against each other than against any common enemy. A splendid opportunity, it was added, was thus opened to the Persians, if they chose to avail themselves of it without delay, first, to inclose and prevent their flight, and then to attack a disunited body, many of whom would, when the combat began, openly espouse the Persian cause.[250]

Such was the important communication despatched by Themistoklês across the narrow strait, only a quarter of a mile in breadth at the narrowest part, which divides Salamis from the neighboring continent on which the enemy were posted. It was delivered with so much address as to produce the exact impression which he intended, and the glorious success which followed caused it to pass for a splendid stratagem: had defeat ensued, his name would have been covered with infamy. What surprises us the most is, that after having reaped signal honor from it in the eyes of the Greeks, as a stratagem, he lived to take credit for it, during the exile of his latter days,[251] as a capital service rendered to the Persian monarch: nor is it improbable, when we reflect upon the desperate condition of Grecian affairs at the moment, that such facility of double interpretation was in part his inducement for sending the message.

It appears to have been delivered to Xerxes shortly after he had issued his orders for fighting on the next morning: and he entered so greedily into the scheme, as to direct his generals to close up the strait of Salamis on both sides during the night, [252] to the north as well as to the south of the town of Salamis, at the risk of their heads if any opening were left for the Greeks to escape. The station of the numerous Persian fleet was along the coast of Attica,—its head-quarters were in the bay of Phalêrum, but doubtless parts of it would occupy those three natural harbors, as yet

unimproved by art, which belonged to the deme of Peiræus,—and would perhaps extend besides to other portions of the western coast southward of Phalêrum: while the Greek fleet was in the harbor of the town called Salamis, in the portion of the island facing mount Ægaleos, in Attica. During the night,[253] a portion of the Persian fleet, sailing from Peiræus northward along the western coast of Attica, closed round to the north of the town and harbor of Salamis, so as to shut up the northern issue from the strait on the side of Eleusis: while another portion blocked up the other issue between Peiræus and the southeastern corner of the island, landing a detachment of troops on the desert island of Psyttaleia, near to that corner.[254] These measures were all taken during the night, to prevent the anticipated flight of the Greeks, and then to attack them in the narrow strait close on their own harbor the next morning.

Meanwhile, that angry controversy among the Grecian chiefs, in the midst of which Themistoklês had sent over his secret envoy, continued without abatement and without decision. It was the interest of the Athenian general to prolong the debate, and to prevent any concluding vote until the effect of his stratagem should have rendered retreat impossible: nor was prolongation difficult in a case so critical, where the majority of chiefs was on one side and that of naval force on the other,—especially as Eurybiadês himself was favorable to the view of Themistoklês. Accordingly, the debate was still unfinished at nightfall, and either continued all night, or was adjourned to an hour before daybreak on the following morning, when an incident, interesting as well as important, gave to it a new turn. The ostracized Aristeidês arrived at Salamis from Ægina. Since the revocation of his sentence, proposed by Themistoklês himself, he had had no opportunity of revisiting Athens, and he now for the first time rejoined his countrymen in their exile at Salamis; not uninformed of the dissensions raging, and of the impatience of the Peloponnesians to retire to the Isthmus. He was the first to bring the news that such retirement had become impracticable from the position of the Persian fleet, which his own vessel, in coming from Ægina, had only eluded under favor of night. He caused Themistoklês to be invited out from the assembled synod of chiefs, and after a generous exordium, wherein he expressed his hope that their rivalry would for the future be only a competition in doing good to their common country, apprized him that the new movement of the Persians excluded all hope of now reaching the Isthmus and rendered farther debate useless. Themistoklês expressed his joy at the intelligence, and communicated his own secret message whereby he had himself brought the movement about, in order that the Peloponnesian chiefs might be forced to fight at Salamis, even against their own consent. He moreover desired Aristeidês to go himself into the synod, and communicate the news: for if it came from the lips of Themistoklês, the Peloponnesians would treat it as a fabrication. So obstinate indeed was their incredulity, that they refused to accept it as truth even on the assertion of Aristeidês: nor was it until the arrival of a Tenian vessel, deserting from the Persian fleet, that they at last brought themselves to credit the actual posture of affairs and the entire impossibility of re-

treat. Once satisfied of this fact, they prepared themselves at dawn for the impending battle.[255]

Having caused his land-force to be drawn up along the shore opposite to Salamis, Xerxes had erected for himself a lofty seat, or throne, upon one of the projecting declivities of mount Ægaleos, near the Herakleion and immediately overhanging the sea,[256]—from whence he could plainly review all the phases of the combat and the conduct of his subject troops. He was persuaded himself that they had not done their best at Artemisium, in consequence of his absence, and that his presence would inspire them with fresh valor: moreover, his royal scribes stood ready by his side to take the names both of the brave and of the backward combatants. On the right wing of his fleet, which approached Salamis on the side of Eleusis, and was opposed to the Athenians on the Grecian left,—were placed the Phenicians and Egyptians; on his left wing the Ionians,[257]—approaching from the side of Peiræus, and opposed to the Lacedæmonians, Æginetans, and Megarians. The seamen of the Persian fleet, however, had been on shipboard all night, in making that movement which had brought them into their actual position: while the Greek seamen now began without previous fatigue, fresh from the animated harangues of Themistoklês and the other leaders: moreover, just as they were getting on board, they were joined by the triremes which had been sent to Ægina to bring to their aid Æakus, with the other Æakid heroes. Honored with this precious heroic aid, which tended so much to raise the spirits of the Greeks, the Æginetan trireme now arrived just in time to take her post in the line, having eluded pursuit from the intervening enemy.[258]

The Greeks rowed forward from the shore to attack with the usual pæan, or war-shout, which was confidently returned by the Persians; and the latter were the most forward of the two to begin the fight: for the Greek seamen, on gradually nearing the enemy, became at first disposed to hesitate,—and even backed water for a space, so that some of them touched ground on their own shore: until the retrograde movement was arrested by a supernatural feminine figure hovering over them, who exclaimed with a voice that rang through the whole fleet,—"Ye worthies, how much farther are ye going to back water?" The very circulation of this fable attests the dubious courage of the Greeks at the commencement of the battle.[259] The brave Athenian captains Ameinias and Lykomêdês (the former, brother of the poet Æschylus) were the first to obey either the feminine voice or the inspirations of their own ardor: though according to the version current at Ægina, it was the Æginetan ship, the carrier of the Æakid heroes, which first set this honorable example.[260] The Naxian Demokritus was celebrated by Simonides as the third ship in action. Ameinias, darting forth from the line, charged with the beak of his ship full against a Phenician, and the two became entangled so that he could not again get clear: other ships came in aid on both sides, and the action thus became general. Herodotus, with his usual candor, tells us that he could procure few details about the action, except as to what concerned Artemisia, the queen of his own city: so that we know hardly any-

thing beyond the general facts. But it appears that, with the exception of the Ionic Greeks, many of whom—apparently a greater number than Herodotus likes to acknowledge—were lukewarm, and some even averse;[261] the subjects of Xerxes conducted themselves generally with great bravery: Phenicians, Cyprians, Kilikians, Egyptians, vied with the Persians and Medes serving as soldiers on shipboard, in trying to satisfy the exigent monarch who sat on shore watching their behavior. Their signal defeat was not owing to any want of courage,—but, first, to the narrow space which rendered their superior number a hindrance rather than a benefit: next, to their want of orderly line and discipline as compared with the Greeks: thirdly, to the fact that, when once fortune seemed to turn against them, they had no fidelity or reciprocal attachment, and each ally was willing to sacrifice or even to run down others, in order to effect his own escape. Their numbers and absence of concert threw them into confusion, and caused them to run foul of each other: those in the front could not recede, nor could those in the rear advance:[262] the oar-blades were broken by collision,—the steersmen lost control of their ships, and could no longer adjust the ship's course so as to strike that direct blow with the beak which was essential in ancient warfare. After some time of combat, the whole Persian fleet was driven back and became thoroughly unmanageable, so that the issue was no longer doubtful, and nothing remained except the efforts of individual bravery to protract the struggle. While the Athenian squadron on the left, which had the greatest resistance to surmount, broke up and drove before them the Persian right, the Æginetans on the right intercepted the flight of the fugitives to Phalêrum:[263] Demokritus, the Naxian captain, was said to have captured five ships of the Persians with his own single trireme. The chief admiral, Ariabignês, brother of Xerxes, attacked at once by two Athenian triremes, fell, gallantly trying to board one of them, and the number of distinguished Persians and Medes who shared his fate was great:[264] the more so, as few of them knew how to swim, while among the Greek seamen who were cast into the sea, the greater number were swimmers, and had the friendly shore of Salamis near at hand. It appears that the Phenician seamen of the fleet threw the blame of defeat upon the Ionic Greeks; and some of them, driven ashore during the heat of the battle under the immediate throne of Xerxes, excused themselves by denouncing the others as traitors. The heads of the Ionic leaders might have been endangered if the monarch had not seen with his own eyes an act of surprising gallantry by one of their number. An Ionic trireme from Samothrace charged and disabled an Attic trireme, but was herself almost immediately run down by an Æginetan. The Samothracian crew, as their vessel lay disabled on the water, made such excellent use of their missile weapons, that they cleared the decks of the Æginetan, sprung on board, and became masters of her. This exploit, passing under the eyes of Xerxes himself, induced him to treat the Phenicians as dastardly calumniators, and to direct their heads to be cut off: his wrath and vexation, Herodotus tells us, were boundless, and he scarcely knew on whom to vent it.[265]

In this disastrous battle itself, as in the debate before the battle, the conduct of Artemisia of Halikarnassus was such as to give him full satisfaction. It appears that this queen maintained her full part in the battle until the disorder had become irretrievable; she then sought to escape, pursued by the Athenian trierarch, Ameinias, but found her progress obstructed by the number of fugitive or embarrassed comrades before her. In this dilemma, she preserved herself from pursuit by attacking one of her own comrades; she charged the trireme of the Karian prince, Damasithymus, of Kalyndus, ran it down and sunk it, so that the prince with all his crew perished. Had Ameinias been aware that the vessel which he was following was that of Artemisia, nothing would have induced him to relax in the pursuit,—for the Athenian captains were all indignant at the idea of a female invader assailing their city;[266] but knowing her ship only as one among the enemy, and seeing her thus charge and destroy another enemy's ship, he concluded her to be a deserter, turned his pursuit elsewhere, and suffered her to escape. At the same time, it so happened that the destruction of the ship of Damasithymus happened under the eyes of Xerxes and of the persons around him on shore, who recognized the ship of Artemisia, but supposed the ship destroyed to be a Greek. Accordingly they remarked to him, "Master, seest thou not how well Artemisia fights, and how she has just sunk an enemy's ship?" Assured that it was really her deed, Xerxes is said to have replied, "My men have become women; my women, men." Thus was Artemisia not only preserved, but exalted to a higher place in the esteem of Xerxes by the destruction of one of his own ships,—among the crew of which not a man survived to tell the true story.[267]

Of the total loss of either fleet, Herodotus gives us no estimate; but Diodorus states the number of ships destroyed on the Grecian side as forty, on the Persian side as two hundred; independent of those which were made prisoners with all their crews. To the Persian loss is to be added, the destruction of all those troops whom they had landed before the battle in the island of Psyttaleia: as soon as the Persian fleet was put to flight, Aristeidês carried over some Grecian hoplites to that island, overpowered the enemy, and put them to death to a man. This loss appears to have been much deplored, as they were choice troops; in great proportion, the native Persian guards.[268]

Great and capital as the victory was, there yet remained after it a sufficient portion of the Persian fleet to maintain even maritime war vigorously, not to mention the powerful land-force, as yet unshaken. And the Greeks themselves, immediately after they had collected in their island, as well as could be done, the fragments of shipping and the dead bodies, made themselves ready for a second engagement.[269] But they were relieved from this necessity by the pusillanimity[270] of the invading monarch, in whom the defeat had occasioned a sudden revulsion from contemptuous confidence, not only to rage and disappointment, but to the extreme of alarm for his own personal safety. He was possessed with a feeling of mingled wrath and mistrust against his naval force, which consisted entirely of subject nations,—Phenicians,

Egyptians, Kilikians, Cyprians, Pamphylians, Ionic Greeks, etc., with a few Persians and Medes serving on board, in a capacity probably not well suited to them. None of these subjects had any interest in the success of the invasion, or any other motive for service except fear, while the sympathies of the Ionic Greeks were even decidedly against it. Xerxes now came to suspect the fidelity, or undervalue the courage, of all these naval subjects;[271] he fancied that they could make no resistance to the Greek fleet, and dreaded lest the latter should sail forthwith to the Hellespont, so as to break down the bridge and intercept his personal retreat; for, upon the maintenance of that bridge he conceived his own safety to turn, not less than that of his father Darius, when retreating from Scythia, upon the preservation of the bridge over the Danube.[272] Against the Phenicians, from whom he had expected most, his rage broke out in such fierce threats, that they stole away from the fleet in the night, and departed homeward.[273] Such a capital desertion made future naval struggle still more hopeless, and Xerxes, though at first breathing revenge, and talking about a vast mole or bridge to be thrown across the strait to Salamis, speedily ended by giving orders to the whole fleet to leave Phalêrum in the night,—not without disembarking, however, the best soldiers who served on board.[274] They were to make straight for the Hellespont, and there to guard the bridge against his arrival.[275]

This resolution was prompted by Mardonius, who saw the real terror which beset his master, and read therein sufficient evidence of danger to himself. When Xerxes despatched to Susa intelligence of his disastrous overthrow, the feeling at home was not simply that of violent grief for the calamity, and fear for the personal safety of the monarch,—it was farther imbittered by anger against Mardonius, as the instigator of this ruinous enterprise. That general knew full well that there was no safety for him[276] in returning to Persia with the shame of failure on his head: it was better for him to take upon himself the chance of subduing Greece, which he had good hopes of being yet able to do,—and to advise the return of Xerxes himself to a safe and easy residence in Asia. Such counsel was eminently palatable to the present alarm of the monarch, while it opened to Mardonius himself a fresh chance not only of safety, but of increased power and glory. Accordingly, he began to reassure his master, by representing that the recent blow was after all not serious,—that it had only fallen upon the inferior part of his force, and upon worthless foreign slaves, like Phenicians, Egyptians, etc., while the native Persian troops yet remained unconquered and unconquerable, fully adequate to execute the monarch's revenge upon Hellas;—that Xerxes might now very well retire with the bulk of his army if he were disposed, and that he, Mardonius, would pledge himself to complete the conquest, at the head of three hundred thousand chosen troops. This proposition afforded at the same time consolation for the monarch's wounded vanity, and safety for his person: his confidential Persians, and Artemisia herself, on being consulted, approved of the step. The latter had acquired his confidence by the dissuasive advice which she had given before the recent deplorable engagement, and she had every motive now to encourage a proposition indicating solicitude for his person, as well as relieving herself from

the obligation of farther service. "If Mardonius desires to remain (she remarked, contemptuously[277]), by all means let him have the troops: should he succeed, thou wilt be the gainer: should he even perish, the loss of some of thy slaves is trifling, so long as thou remainest safe, and thy house in power. Thou hast already accomplished the purpose of thy expedition, in burning Athens." Xerxes, while adopting this counsel, and directing the return of his fleet, showed his satisfaction with the Halikarnassian queen, by intrusting her with some of his children, directing her to transport them to Ephesus.

The Greeks at Salamis learned with surprise and joy the departure of the hostile fleet from the bay of Phalêrum, and immediately put themselves in pursuit; following as far as the island of Andros without success. Themistoklês and the Athenians are even said to have been anxious to push on forthwith to the Hellespont, and there break down the bridge of boats, in order to prevent the escape of Xerxes,—had they not been restrained by the caution of Eurybiadês and the Peloponnesians, who represented that it was dangerous to detain the Persian monarch in the heart of Greece. Themistoklês readily suffered himself to be persuaded, and contributed much to divert his countrymen from the idea; while he at the same time sent the faithful Sikinnus a second time to Xerxes, with the intimation that he, Themistoklês, had restrained the impatience of the Greeks to proceed without delay and burn the Hellespontine bridge,—and that he had thus, from personal friendship to the monarch, secured for him a safe retreat.[278] Though this is the story related by Herodotus, we can hardly believe that, with the great Persian land-force in the heart of Attica, there could have been any serious idea of so distant an operation as that of attacking the bridge at the Hellespont. It seems more probable that Themistoklês fabricated the intention, with a view of frightening Xerxes away, as well as of establishing a personal claim upon his gratitude in reserve for future contingences.

Such crafty manœuvres and long-sighted calculations of possibility, seem extraordinary: but the facts are sufficiently attested,—since Themistoklês lived to claim as well as to receive fulfilment of the obligation thus conferred,—and though extraordinary, they will not appear inexplicable, if we reflect, first, that the Persian game, even now, after the defeat of Salamis, was not only not desperate, but might perfectly well have succeeded, if it had been played with reasonable prudence: next, that there existed in the mind of this eminent man an almost unparalleled combination of splendid patriotism, long-sighted cunning, and selfish rapacity. Themistoklês knew better than any one else that the cause of Greece had appeared utterly desperate, only a few hours before the late battle: moreover, a clever man, tainted with such constant guilt, might naturally calculate on being one day detected and punished, even if the Greeks proved successful.

He now employed the fleet among the islands of the Cyclades, for the purpose of levying fines upon them as a punishment for adherence to the Persian. He first laid siege to Andros, telling the inhabitants that he came to demand their money, bring-

ing with him two great gods,—Persuasion and Necessity. To which the Andrians replied, that "Athens was a great city, and blest with excellent gods: but that *they* were miserably poor, and that there were two unkind gods who always stayed with them and would never quit the island,—Poverty and Helplessness.[279] In these gods the Andrians put their trust, refusing to deliver the money required; for the power of Athens could never overcome their inability." While the fleet was engaged in contending against the Andrians with their sad protecting deities, Themistoklês sent round to various other cities, demanding from them private sums of money on condition of securing them from attack. From Karystus, Paros, and other places, he thus extorted bribes for himself apart from the other generals,[280] but it appears that Andros was found unproductive, and after no very long absence, the fleet was brought back to Salamis.[281]

The intimation sent by Themistoklês perhaps had the effect of hastening the departure of Xerxes, who remained in Attica only a few days after the battle of Salamis, and then withdrew his army through Bœotia into Thessaly, where Mardonius made choice of the troops to be retained for his future operations. He retained all the Persians, Medes, Sakæ, Baktrians, and Indians, horse as well as foot, together with select detachments of the remaining contingents: making in all, according to Herodotus, three hundred thousand men. But as it was now the beginning of September, and as sixty thousand out of his forces, under Artabazus, were destined to escort Xerxes himself to the Hellespont, Mardonius proposed to Winter in Thessaly, and to postpone farther military operations until the ensuing spring.[282]

Having left most of these troops under the orders of Mardonius in Thessaly, Xerxes marched away with the rest to the Hellespont, by the same road as he had taken in his advance a few months before. Respecting his retreat, a plentiful stock of stories were circulated,[283]—inconsistent with each other, fanciful and even incredible: Grecian imagination, in the contemporary poet Æschylus, as well as in the Latin moralizers Seneca or Juvenal,[284] delighted in handling this invasion with the maximum of light and shadow,—magnifying the destructive misery and humiliation of the retreat so as to form an impressive contrast with the superhuman pride of the advance, and illustrating the antithesis with unbounded license of detail. The sufferings from want of provision were doubtless severe, and are described as frightful and death-dealing: the magazines stored up for the advancing march had been exhausted, so that the retiring army were now forced to seize upon the corn of the country through which they passed,—an insufficient maintenance, eked out by leaves, grass, the bark of trees, and other wretched substitutes for food. Plague and dysentery aggravated their misery, and occasioned many to be left behind among the cities through whose territory the retreat was carried; strict orders being left by Xerxes that these cities should maintain and tend them. After forty-five days' march from Attica, he at length found himself at the Hellespont, whither his fleet, retreating from Salamis, had arrived long before him.[285] But the short-lived bridge had already

been knocked to pieces by a storm, so that the army was transported on shipboard across to Asia, where it first obtained comfort and abundance, and where the change from privation to excess engendered new maladies. In the time of Herodotus, the citizens of Abdêra still showed the gilt cimeter and tiara, which Xerxes had presented to them when he halted there in his retreat, in token of hospitality and satisfaction: and they even went the length of affirming that never, since his departure from Attica, had he loosened his girdle until he reached their city. So fertile was Grecian fancy in magnifying the terror of the repulsed invader! who reëntered Sardis, with a broken army and humbled spirit, only eight months after he had left it, as the presumed conqueror of the western world.[286]

Meanwhile the Athenians and Peloponnesians, liberated from the immediate presence of the enemy either on land or sea, and passing from the extreme of terror to sudden ease and security, indulged in the full delight and self-congratulation of unexpected victory. On the day before the battle, Greece had seemed irretrievably lost: she was now saved even against all reasonable hope, and the terrific cloud impending over her was dispersed.[287] In the division of the booty, the Æginetans were adjudged to have distinguished themselves most in the action, and to be entitled to the choice lot; while various tributes of gratitude were also set apart for the gods. Among them were three Phenician triremes, which were offered in dedication to Ajax at Salamis, to Athênê at Sunium, and to Poseidon at the isthmus of Corinth; farther presents were sent to Apollo at Delphi, who, on being asked whether he was satisfied, replied, that all had done their duty to him except the Æginetans: from them he required additional munificence on account of the prize awarded to them, and they were constrained to dedicate in the temple four golden stars upon a staff of brass, which Herodotus himself saw there. Next to the Æginetans, the second place of honor was awarded to the Athenians; the Æginetan Polykritus, and the Athenians Eumenês and Ameinias, being ranked first among the individual combatants.[288] Respecting the behavior of Adeimantus and the Corinthians in the battle, the Athenians of the time of Herodotus drew the most unfavorable picture, representing them to have fled at the commencement, and to have been only brought back by the information that the Greeks were gaining the victory. Considering the character of the debates which had preceded, and the impatient eagerness manifested by the Corinthians to fight at the Isthmus instead of at Salamis, some such backwardness on their part, when forced into a battle at the latter place, would not be in itself improbable: yet in this case it seems that not only the Corinthians themselves, but also the general voice of Greece, contradicted the Athenian story, and defended them as having behaved with bravery and forwardness. We must recollect that, at the time when Herodotus probably collected his information, a bitter feeling of hatred prevailed between Athens and Corinth, and Aristeus, son of Adeimantus, was among the most efficient enemies of the former.[289]

Besides the first and second prizes of valor, the chiefs at the Isthmus tried to adjudicate among themselves the first and second prizes of skill and wisdom. Each of them deposited two names on the altar of Poseidon: and when these votes came to be looked at, it was found that each man had voted for himself as deserving the first prize, but that Themistoklês had a large majority of votes for the second.[290] The result of such voting allowed no man to claim the first prize, nor could the chiefs give a second prize without it; so that Themistoklês was disappointed of his reward, though exalted so much the higher, perhaps, through that very disappointment, in general renown. He went shortly afterwards to Sparta, where he received from the Lacedæmonians honors such as were never paid, before nor afterwards, to any foreigner. A crown of olive was indeed given to Eurybiadês as the first prize, but a like crown was at the same time conferred on Themistoklês as a special reward for unparalleled sagacity; together with a chariot, the finest which the city afforded. Moreover, on his departure, the three hundred select youths called Hippeis, who formed the active guard and police of the country, all accompanied him in a body as escort of honor to the frontiers of Tegea.[291] Such demonstrations were so astonishing, from the haughty and immovable Spartans, that they were ascribed by some authors to their fear lest Themistoklês should be offended by being deprived of the general prize,—and they are even said to have excited the jealousy of the Athenians so much, that he was displaced from his post of general and Xanthippus nominated.[292] Neither of these last reports is likely to be true, nor is either of them confirmed by Herodotus: the fact that Xanthippus became general of the fleet during the ensuing year, is in the regular course of Athenian change of officers, and implies no peculiar jealousy of Themistoklês.

CHAPTER XLII.

BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALE. — FINAL REPULSE OF THE PERSIANS.

THOUGH the defeat at Salamis deprived the Persians of all hope from farther maritime attack of Greece, they still anticipated success by land from the ensuing campaign of Mardonius. Their fleet, after having conveyed the monarch himself with his accompanying land-force across the Hellespont, retired to winter at Kymê and Samos: in the latter of which places large rewards were bestowed upon Theomêstor and Phylakus, two Samian captains who had distinguished themselves in the late engagement. Theomêstor was even nominated despot of Samos under Persian protection.[293] Early in the spring they were reassembled, to the number of four hundred sail, but without the Phenicians, at the naval station of Samos, intending, however, only to maintain a watchful guard over Ionia, and hardly supposing that the Greek fleet would venture to attack them.[294]

For a long time, the conduct of that fleet was such as to justify such a belief in its enemies. Assembled at Ægina in the spring, to the number of one hundred and ten ships, under the Spartan king Leotychidês, it advanced as far as Delos, but not farther eastward: nor could all the persuasions of Chian and other Ionian envoys, despatched both to the Spartan authorities and to the fleet, and promising to revolt from Persia as soon as the Grecian fleet should appear, prevail upon Leotychidês to hazard any aggressive enterprise. Ionia and the western waters of the Ægean had now been for fifteen years completely under the Persians, and so little visited by the Greeks, that a voyage thither appeared, especially to the maritime inexperience of a Spartan king, like going to the Pillars of Hêraklês,[295]—not less venturesome than the same voyage appeared fifty-two years afterwards to the Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas, when he first hazarded his fleet amidst the preserved waters of the Athenian empire.

Meanwhile the hurried and disastrous retreat of Xerxes had produced less disaffection among his subjects and allies than might have been anticipated. Alexander, king of Macedon, the Thessalian Aleuadæ,[296] and the Bœotian leaders, still remained in hearty coöperation with Mardonius: nor were there any, except the Phocians, whose fidelity to him appeared questionable, among all the Greeks northwest of the boundaries of Attica and Megaris. It was only in the Chalkidic peninsula, that any actual revolt occurred. Potidæa, situated on the isthmus of Pallênê, together with the other towns in the long tongue of Pallênê, declared themselves independent: and the neighboring town of Olynthus, occupied by the semi-Grecian tribe of Bottiæans, was on the point of following their example. The Persian general, Artabazus, on his return from escorting Xerxes to the Hellespont, undertook the reduction of these towns, and succeeded perfectly with Olynthus. He took the town,

slew all the inhabitants, and handed it over to a fresh population, consisting of Chalkidic Greeks, under Kritobulus of Torônê. It was in this manner that Olynthus, afterwards a city of so much consequence and interest, first became Grecian and Chalkidic. But Artabazus was not equally successful in the siege of Potidæa, the defence of which was aided by citizens from the other towns in Pallênê. A plot which he concerted with Timoxenus, commander of the Skiônæan auxiliaries in the town, became accidentally disclosed: a considerable body of his troops perished while attempting to pass at low tide under the walls of the city, which were built across the entire breadth of the narrow isthmus joining the Pallenæan peninsula to the mainland: and after three months of blockade, he was forced to renounce the enterprise, withdrawing his troops to rejoin Mardonius, in Thessaly.[297]

The latter, before he put himself in motion for the spring campaign, thought it advisable to consult the Grecian oracles, especially those within the limits of Bœotia and Phocis. He sent a Karian, named Mys, familiar with the Greek as well as the Karian language, to consult Trophônius at Lebadeia, Amphiaraus, and the Ismenian Apollo at Thebes, Apollo at mount Ptôon near Akræphiæ, and Apollo at the Phocian Abæ. This step was probably intended as a sort of ostentatious respect towards the religious feelings of allies upon whom he was now very much dependent: but neither the questions put, nor the answers given, were made public: and the only remarkable fact which Herodotus had heard was, that the priest of the Ptôian Apollo delivered his answer in Karian, or at least in a language intelligible to no person present except the Karian Mys himself.[298] It appears, however, that at this period, when Mardonius was seeking to strengthen himself by oracles, and laying his plans for establishing a separate peace and alliance with Athens against the Peloponnesians, some persons in his interest circulated predictions, that the day was approaching when the Persians and the Athenians jointly would expel the Dorians from Peloponnesus.[299] The way was thus paved for him to send an envoy to Athens,—Alexander, king of Macedon; who was instructed to make the most seductive offers, to promise reparation of all the damage done in Attica, as well as the active future friendship of the Great King, and to hold out to the Athenians a large acquisition of new territory as the price of their consent to form with him an equal and independent alliance.[300] The Macedonian prince added warm expressions of his own interest in the welfare of the Athenians, recommending them, as a sincere friend, to embrace propositions so advantageous as well as so honorable: especially as the Persian power must in the end prove too much for them, and Attica lay exposed to Mardonius and his Grecian allies, without being covered by any common defence as Peloponnesus was protected by its isthmus.[301]

This offer, despatched in the spring, found the Athenians reëstablished wholly or partially in their half-ruined city. A simple tender of mercy and tolerable treatment, if despatched by Xerxes from Thermopylæ the year before, might perhaps have been sufficient to detach them from the cause of Hellas: and even at the present moment,

though the pressure of overwhelming terror had disappeared, there were many inducements for them to accede to the proposition of Mardonius. The alliance of Athens would insure to the Persian general unquestionable predominance in Greece, and to Athens herself protection from farther ravage as well as the advantage of playing the winning game: while his force, his position, and his alliances, even as they then stood, threatened a desolating and doubtful war, of which Attica would bear the chief brunt. Moreover, the Athenians were at this time suffering privations of the severest character; for not only did their ruined houses and temples require to be restored, but they had lost the harvest of the past summer, together with the seed of the past autumn.[302] The prudential view of the case being thus favorable to Mardonius rather than otherwise, and especially strengthened by the distress which reigned at Athens, the Lacedæmonians were so much afraid lest Alexander should carry his point, that they sent envoys to dissuade the Athenians from listening to him, as well as to tender succor during the existing poverty of the city. After having heard both parties, the Athenians delivered their reply in terms of solemn and dignified resolution, which their descendants delighted in repeating. To Alexander they said: "Cast not in our teeth that the power of the Persian is many times greater than ours: we too know *that*, as well as thou: but we, nevertheless, love freedom well enough to resist him in the best manner we can. Attempt not the vain task of talking us over into alliance with him. Tell Mardonius that as long as the sun shall continue in his present path, we will never contract alliance with Xerxes: we will encounter him in our own defence, putting our trust in the aid of those gods and heroes to whom he has shown no reverence, and whose houses and statues he has burned. Come thou not to us again with similar propositions, nor persuade us, even in the spirit of good-will, into unholy proceedings: thou art the guest and friend of Athens, and we would not that thou shouldst suffer injury at our hands."[303]

To the Spartans, the reply of the Athenians was of a similar decisive tenor: protesting their unconquerable devotion to the common cause and liberties of Hellas, and promising that no conceivable temptations, either of money or territory, should induce them to desert the ties of brotherhood, common language, and religion. So long as a single Athenian survived, no alliance should ever be made with Xerxes. They then thanked the Spartans for offering them aid during the present privations: but while declining such offers, they reminded them that Mardonius, when apprized that his propositions were refused, would probably advance immediately, and they therefore earnestly desired the presence of a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia to assist in the defence of Attica.[304] The Spartan envoys, promising fulfilment of this request, [305] and satisfied to have ascertained the sentiments of Athens, departed.

Such unshaken fidelity on the part of the Athenians to the general cause of Greece, in spite of present suffering, combined with seductive offers for the future, was the just admiration of their descendants, and the frequent theme of applause by their orators.[306] But among the contemporary Greeks it was hailed only as a relief

from danger, and repaid by a selfish and ungenerous neglect. The same feeling of indifference towards all Greeks outside of their own Isthmus, which had so deeply endangered the march of affairs before the battle of Salamis, now manifested itself a second time among the Spartans and Peloponnesians. The wall across the Isthmus, which they had been so busy in constructing, and on which they had relied for protection against the land-force of Xerxes, had been intermitted and left unfinished when he retired: but it was resumed as soon as the forward march of Mardonius was anticipated. It was, however, still unfinished at the time of the embassy of the Macedonian prince to Athens, and this incomplete condition of their special defence was one reason of their alarm lest the Athenians should accept the terms proposed. That danger being for the time averted, they redoubled their exertions at the Isthmus, so that the wall was speedily brought into an adequate state of defence, and the battlements along the summit were in course of being constructed. Thus safe behind their own bulwark, they thought nothing more of their promise to join the Athenians in Bœotia, and to assist in defending Attica against Mardonius: indeed, their king Kleombrotus, who commanded the force at the Isthmus, was so terrified by an obscuration of the sun at the moment when he was sacrificing to ascertain the inclinations of the gods in reference to the coming war, that he even thought it necessary to retreat with the main force to Sparta, where he soon after died.[307] Besides these two reasons,—indifference and unfavorable omens,—which restrained the Spartans from aiding Attica, there was also a third: they were engaged in celebrating the festival of the Hyakinthia, and it was their paramount object, says the historian,[308] to fulfil "the exigences of the god." As the Olympia and the Karneia in the preceding year, so now did the Hyakinthia, prevail over the necessities of defence, putting out of sight both the duties of fidelity towards an exposed ally, and the bond of an express promise.

Meanwhile, Mardonius, informed of the unfavorable reception which his proposals had received at Athens, put his army in motion forthwith from Thessaly, joined by all his Grecian auxiliaries, and by fresh troops from Thrace and Macedonia. As he marched through Bœotia, the Thebans, who heartily espoused his cause, endeavored to dissuade him from farther military operations against the united force of his enemies,—urging him to try the efficacy of bribes, presented to the leading men in the different cities, for the purpose of disuniting them. But Mardonius, eager to repossess himself of Attica, heeded not their advice: about ten months after the retreat of Xerxes, he entered the country without resistance, and again established the Persian head-quarters in Athens, May or June, 479 B. C.[309]

Before he arrived, the Athenians had again removed to Salamis, under feelings of bitter disappointment and indignation. They had in vain awaited the fulfilment of the Spartan promise, that a Peloponnesian army should join them in Bœotia for the defence of their frontier; at length, being unable to make head against the enemy alone, they found themselves compelled to transport their families across to Salamis.

[310] The migration was far less terrible than that of the preceding summer, since Mardonius had no fleet to harass them; but it was more gratuitous, and might have been obviated had the Spartans executed their covenant, which would have brought about the battle of Platæa two months earlier than it actually was fought.

Mardonius, though master of Athens, was so anxious to conciliate the Athenians, that he at first abstained from damaging either the city or the country, and despatched a second envoy to Salamis to repeat the offers made through Alexander of Macedon: he thought that they might now be listened to, since he could offer the exemption of Attica from ravage, as an additional temptation. Murychidês, a Hellespontine Greek, was sent to renew these propositions to the Athenian senate at Salamis; but he experienced a refusal not less resolute than that of Alexander of Macedon when sent to Athens, and all but unanimous. One unfortunate senator, Lykidas, made an exception to this unanimity, and ventured to recommend acceptance of the propositions of Murychidês. So furious was the wrath, or so strong the suspicion of corruption, which his single-voiced negative provoked, that senators and people both combined to stone him to death: while the Athenian women in Salamis, hearing what had passed, went of their own accord to the house of Lykidas, and stoned to death his wife and children. In the desperate pitch of resolution to which the Athenians were now wound up, an opponent passed for a traitor: unanimity, even though extorted by terror, was essential to their feelings.[311] Murychidês, though his propositions were refused, was dismissed without injury.

While the Athenians thus gave renewed proofs of their steadfast attachment to the cause of Hellas, they at the same time sent envoys, conjointly with Megara and Platæa, to remonstrate with the Spartans on their backwardness and breach of faith, and to invoke them even thus late to come forth at once and meet Mardonius in Attica: not omitting to intimate, that if they were thus deserted, it would become imperatively necessary for them, against their will, to make terms with the enemy. So careless, however, were the Spartan ephors respecting Attica and the Megarid, that they postponed giving an answer to these envoys for ten successive days, while in the mean time they pressed with all their efforts the completion of the isthmic fortifications. And after having thus amused the envoys as long as they could, they would have dismissed them at last with a negative answer,—such was their fear of adventuring beyond the Isthmus,—had not a Tegean, named Chileos, whom they much esteemed, and to whom they communicated the application, reminded them that no fortifications at the Isthmus would suffice for the defence of Peloponnesus, if the Athenians became allied with Mardonius, and thus laid the peninsula open by sea. The strong opinion of this respected Tegean, proved to the ephors that their selfish policy would not be seconded by their chief Peloponnesian allies, and brought to their attention, probably for the first time, that danger by sea might again be renewed, though the Persian fleet had been beaten in the preceding year, and was now at a distance from Greece. It changed their resolution, not less completely than

suddenly; and they despatched forthwith in the night five thousand Spartan citizens to the Isthmus,—each man with seven Helots attached to him. And when the Athenian envoys, ignorant of this sudden change of policy, came on the next day to give peremptory notice that Athens would no longer endure such treacherous betrayal, but would forthwith take measures for her own security and separate pacification,—the ephors affirmed on their oath that the troops were already on their march, and were probably by this time out of the Spartan territory.[312] Considering that this step was an expiation, imperfect, tardy, and reluctant, for foregoing desertion and breach of promise,—the ephors may probably have thought that the mystery of the night-march, and the sudden communication of it as an actual fact to the envoys, in the way of reply, would impress more emphatically the minds of the latter,—who returned with the welcome tidings to Salamis, and prepared their countrymen for speedy action. Five thousand Spartan citizens, each with seven light-armed Helots as attendants, were thus on their march to the theatre of war. Throughout the whole course of Grecian history, we never hear of any number of Spartan citizens at all approaching to five thousand being put on foreign service at the same time. But this was not all: five thousand Lacedæmonian Periœki, each with one light-armed Helot to attend him, were also despatched to the Isthmus, to take part in the same struggle. Such unparalleled efforts afford sufficient measure of the alarm which, though late yet real, now reigned at Sparta. Other Peloponnesian cities followed the example, and a large army was now collected under the Spartan Pausanias.

It appears that Mardonius was at this moment in secret correspondence with the Argeians, who, though professing neutrality, are said to have promised him that they would arrest the march of the Spartans beyond their own borders.[313] We may reasonably doubt whether they ever made such a promise: but at any rate, the suddenness of the march as well as the greatness of the force prevented them from fulfilling it; and they were forced to content themselves with apprizing Mardonius instantly of the fact, through their swiftest courier. It determined that general to evacuate Attica, and to carry on the war in Bœotia,—a country in every way more favorable to him. He had for some time refrained from committing devastations in or round Athens, hoping that the Athenians might be induced to listen to his propositions; but the last days of his stay were employed in burning and destroying whatever had been spared by the host of Xerxes during the preceding summer. After a fruitless attempt to surprise a body of one thousand Lacedæmonians which had been detached for the protection of Megara,[314] he withdrew all his army into Bœotia, not taking either the straight road to Platæa through Eleutheræ, or to Thebes through Phylê, both which roads were mountainous and inconvenient for cavalry, but marching in the northeasterly direction to Dekeleia, where he was met by some guides from the adjoining regions near the river Asôpus, and conducted through the deme of Sphendaleis to Tanagra. He thus found himself, by a route longer but easier, in Bœotia, on the plain of the Asôpus: along which river he next day marched westward to Skôlus, a town in the territory of Thebes, seemingly near to that of Platæa.[315] He then took up a po-

sition not far off, in the plain on the left bank of the Asôpus: his left wing over against Erythræ, his centre over against Hysiæ, and his right in the territory of Platæa: and he employed his army in constructing forthwith a fortified camp[316] of ten furlongs square, defended by wooden walls and towers, cut from trees in the Theban territory.

Mardonius found himself thus with his numerous army, in a plain favorable for cavalry; with a camp more or less defensible,—the fortified city of Thebes[317] in his rear,—and a considerable stock of provisions as well as a friendly region behind him from whence to draw more. Few among his army, however, were either hearty in the cause or confident of success:[318] even the native Persians had been disheartened by the flight of the monarch the year before, and were full of melancholy auguries. A splendid banquet to which the Theban leader Attagînus invited Mardonius, along with fifty Persians and fifty Theban or Bœotian guests, exhibited proofs of this depressed feeling, which were afterwards recounted to Herodotus himself by one of the guests present,—an Orchomenian citizen of note named Thersander. The banquet being so arranged as that each couch was occupied by one Persian and one Theban, this man was accosted by his Persian neighbor in Greek, who inquired to what city he belonged, and, upon learning that he was an Orchomenian,[319] continued thus: "Since thou hast now partaken with me in the same table and cup, I desire to leave with thee some memorial of my convictions: the rather, in order that thou mayst be thyself forewarned so as to take the best counsel for thine own safety. Seest thou these Persians here feasting, and the army which we left yonder encamped near the river? Yet a little while, and out of all these thou shalt behold but few surviving." Thersander listened to these words with astonishment, spoken as they were with strong emotion and a flood of tears, and replied: "Surely, thou art bound to reveal this to Mardonius, and to his confidential advisers:" but the Persian rejoined: "My friend, man cannot avert that which God hath decreed to come: no one will believe the revelation, sure though it be. Many of us Persians know this well, and are here serving only under the bond of necessity. And truly this is the most hateful of all human sufferings,—to be full of knowledge, and at the same time to have no power over any result."[320] "This (observes Herodotus) I heard myself from the Orchomenian Thersander, who told me farther that he mentioned the fact to several persons about him, even before the battle of Platæa." It is certainly one of the most curious revelations in the whole history; not merely as it brings forward the historian in his own personality, communicating with a personal friend of the Theban leaders, and thus provided with good means of information as to the general events of the campaign,—but also as it discloses to us, on testimony not to be suspected, the real temper of the native Persians, and even of the chief men among them. If so many of these chiefs were not merely apathetic, but despondent, in the cause, much more decided would be the same absence of will and hope in their followers and the subject allies. To follow the monarch in his overwhelming march of the preceding year, was gratifying in many ways to the native Persians: but every man was sick of the enterprise as now

cut down under Mardonius: and Artabazus, the second in command, was not merely slack but jealous of his superior.[321] Under such circumstances we shall presently not be surprised to find the whole army disappearing forthwith, the moment Mardonius is slain.

Among the Grecian allies of Mardonius, the Thebans and Bœotians were active and zealous, most of the remainder lukewarm, and the Phocians even of doubtful fidelity. Their contingent of one thousand hoplites, under Harmokydês, had been tardy in joining him, having only come up since he retired from Attica into Bœotia: and some of the Phocians even remained behind in the neighborhood of Parnassus, prosecuting manifest hostilities against the Persians. Aware of the feeling among this contingent, which the Thessalians took care to place before him in an unfavorable point of view, Mardonius determined to impress upon them a lesson of intimidation. Causing them to form in a separate body on the plain, he then brought up his numerous cavalry all around them: while the phêmê, or sudden simultaneous impression, ran through the Greek allies as well as the Phocians themselves, that he was about to shoot them down.[322] The general Harmokydês, directing his men to form a square and close their ranks, addressed to them short exhortations to sell their lives dearly, and to behave like brave Greeks against barbarian assassins,—when the cavalry rode up, apparently to the charge, and advanced close to the square, with uplifted javelins and arrows on the string, some few of which were even actually discharged. The Phocians maintained, as enjoined, steady ranks with a firm countenance, and the cavalry wheeled about without any actual attack or damage. After this mysterious demonstration, Mardonius condescended to compliment the Phocians on their courage, and to assure them, by means of a herald, that he had been greatly misinformed respecting them: he at the same time exhorted them to be faithful and forward in service for the future, and promised that all good behavior should be amply recompensed. Herodotus seems uncertain,—difficult as the supposition is to entertain,—whether Mardonius did not really intend at first to massacre the Phocians in the field, and desisted from the intention only on seeing how much blood it would cost to accomplish. However this may be, the scene itself was a remarkable reality, and presented one among many other proofs of the lukewarmness and suspicious fidelity of the army.[323]

Conformably to the suggestion of the Thebans, the liberties of Greece were now to be disputed in Bœotia: and not only had the position of Mardonius already been taken, but his camp also fortified, before the united Grecian army approached Kithæron in its forward march from the Isthmus. After the full force of the Lacedæmonians had reached the Isthmus, they had to await the arrival of their Peloponnesian and other confederates. The hoplites who joined them were as follows: from Tegea, fifteen hundred; from Corinth, five thousand,—besides a small body of three hundred from the Corinthian colony of Potidæa; from the Arcadian Orchomenus, six hundred; from Sikyon, three thousand; from Epidaurus, eight hundred; from Trœzen,

one thousand; from Lepreon, two hundred; from Mykênæ and Tiryns, four hundred; from Phlius, one thousand; from Hermionê, three hundred; from Eretria and Styra, six hundred; from Chalkis, four hundred; from Ambrakia, five hundred; from Leukas and Anaktorium, eight hundred; from Palê in Kephallenia, two hundred; from Ægina, five hundred. On marching from the Isthmus to Megara, they took up three thousand Megarian hoplites; and as soon as they reached Eleusis in their forward progress, the army was completed by the junction of eight thousand Athenian hoplites, and six hundred Platæan, under Aristeidês, who passed over from Salamis.[324] The total force of hoplites, or heavy-armed troops, was thus thirty-eight thousand seven hundred men: there were no cavalry, and but very few bowmen; but if we add those who are called light-armed, or unarmed generally,—some perhaps with javelins or swords, but none with any defensive armor,—the grand total was not less than one hundred and ten thousand men. Of these light-armed, or unarmed, there were, as computed by Herodotus; thirty-five thousand in attendance on the five thousand Spartan citizens, and thirty-four thousand five hundred in attendance on the other hoplites,—together with eighteen hundred Thespians, who were properly hoplites, yet so badly armed as not to be reckoned in the ranks.[325]

Such was the number of Greeks present or near at hand in the combat against the Persians at Platæa, which took place some little time afterwards: but it seems that the contingents were not at first completely full, and that new additions[326] continued to arrive until a few days before the battle, along with the convoys of cattle and provisions which came for the subsistence of the army. Pausanias marched first from the Isthmus to Eleusis, where he was joined by the Athenians from Salamis: at Eleusis, as well as at the Isthmus, the sacrifices were found encouraging, and the united army then advanced across the ridge of Kithæron, so as to come within sight of the Persians. When Pausanias saw them occupying the line of the Asôpus in the plain beneath, he kept his own army on the mountain declivity near Erythræ, without choosing to adventure himself in the level ground. Mardonius, finding them not disposed to seek battle in the plain, despatched his numerous and excellent cavalry under Masistius, the most distinguished officer in his army, to attack them. For the most part, the ground was so uneven as to check their approach,—but the Megarian contingent, which happened to be more exposed than the rest, were so hard pressed that they were forced to send to Pausanias for aid. They appear to have had not only no cavalry, but no bowmen or light-armed troops of any sort with missile weapons; while the Persians, excellent archers and darters, using very large bows, and trained in such accomplishments from their earliest childhood, charged in successive squadrons and overwhelmed the Greeks with darts and arrows,—not omitting contemptuous taunts on their cowardice for keeping back from the plain.[327] So general was then the fear of the Persian cavalry, that Pausanias could find none of the Greeks, except the Athenians, willing to volunteer and go to the rescue of the Megarians. A body of Athenians, however, especially three hundred chosen troops under Olympiodorus, strengthened with some bowmen, immediately marched to the spot

and took up the combat with the Persian cavalry. For some time the struggle was sharp and doubtful: at length the general, Masistius,—a man renowned for bravery, lofty in stature, clad in conspicuous armor, and mounted on a Nisæan horse with golden trappings,—charging at the head of his troops, had his horse struck by an arrow in the side. The animal immediately reared and threw his master on the ground, close to the ranks of the Athenians, who, rushing forward, seized the horse, and overpowered Masistius before he could rise. So impenetrable were the defences of his helmet and breastplate,[328] however, that they had considerable difficulty in killing him, though he was in their power: at length a spearman pierced him in the eye. The death of the general passed unobserved by the Persian cavalry, but as soon as they missed him and became aware of the loss, they charged furiously and in one mass to recover the dead body. At first the Athenians, too few in number to resist the onset, were compelled for a time to give way, abandoning the body; but reinforcements presently arriving at their call, the Persians were driven back with loss, and it finally remained in their possession.[329]

The death of Masistius, coupled with that final repulse of the cavalry which left his body in possession of the Greeks, produced a strong effect on both armies, encouraging the one as much as it disheartened the other. Throughout the camp of Mardonius, the grief was violent and unbounded, manifested by wailings so loud as to echo over all Bœotia; while the hair of men, horses, and cattle, was abundantly cut in token of mourning. The Greeks, on the other hand, overjoyed at their success, placed the dead body in a cart, and paraded it around the army: even the hoplites ran out of their ranks to look at it; not only hailing it as a valuable trophy, but admiring its stature and proportions.[330] And so much was their confidence increased, that Pausanias now ventured to quit the protection of the mountain-ground, inconvenient from its scanty supply of water, and to take up his position in the plain beneath, interspersed only with low hillocks. Marching from Erythræ in a westerly direction along the declivities of Kithæron, and passing by Hysiæ, the Greeks occupied a line of camp in the Platæan territory along the Asôpus and on its right bank; with their right wing near to the fountain called Gargaphia,[331] and their left wing near to the chapel, surrounded by a shady grove, of the Platæan hero, Androkratês. In this position they were marshalled according to nations, or separate fractions of the Greek name,—the Lacedæmonians on the right wing, with the Tegeans and Corinthians immediately joining them,—and the Athenians on the left wing; a post which, as second in point of dignity, was at first claimed by the Tegeans, chiefly on grounds of mythical exploits, to the exclusion of the Athenians, but ultimately adjudged by the Spartans, after hearing both sides, to Athens.[332] In the field, even Lacedæmonians followed those democratical forms which pervaded so generally Grecian military operations: in this case, it was not the generals, but the Lacedæmonian troops in a body, who heard the argument, and delivered the verdict by unanimous acclamation.

Mardonius, apprized of this change of position, marched his army also a little farther to the westward, and posted himself opposite to the Greeks, divided from them by the river Asôpus. At the suggestion of the Thebans, he himself, with his Persians and Medes, the picked men of his army, took post on the left wing, immediately opposite to the Lacedæmonians on the Greek right, and even extending so far as to cover the Tegean ranks on the left of the Lacedæmonians: Baktrians, Indians, Sakæ, with other Asiatics and Egyptians, filled the centre: and the Greeks and Macedonians in the service of Persia, the right,—over against the hoplites of Athens. The numbers of these last-mentioned Greeks Herodotus could not learn, though he estimates them conjecturally at fifty thousand:[333] nor can we place any confidence in the total of three hundred thousand, which he gives as belonging to the other troops of Mardonius, though probably it cannot have been much less.

In this position lay the two armies, separated only by a narrow space including the river Asôpus, and each expecting a battle, whilst the sacrifices on behalf of each were offered up. Pausanias, Mardonius, and the Greeks in the Persian army, had each a separate prophet to offer sacrifice, and to ascertain the dispositions of the gods; the two first had men from the most distinguished prophetic breeds in Elis,—the latter invited one from Leukas.[334] All received large pay, and the prophet of Pausanias had indeed been honored with a recompense above all pay,—the gift of full Spartan citizenship for himself as well as for his brother. It happened that the prophets on both sides delivered the same report of their respective sacrifices,—favorable for resistance if attacked; unfavorable for beginning the battle. At a moment when doubt and indecision was the reigning feeling on both sides, this was the safest answer for the prophet to give, and the most satisfactory for the soldiers to hear. And though the answer from Delphi had been sufficiently encouraging, and the kindness of the patron-heroes of Platæa[335] had been solemnly invoked, yet Pausanias did not venture to cross the Asôpus and begin the attack, in the face of a pronounced declaration from his prophet. Nor did even Hegesistratus, the prophet employed by Mardonius, choose on his side to urge an aggressive movement, though he had a deadly personal hatred against the Lacedæmonians, and would have been delighted to see them worsted. There arose commencements of conspiracy, perhaps encouraged by promises or bribes from the enemy, among the wealthier Athenian hoplites, to establish an oligarchy at Athens under Persian supremacy, like that which now existed at Thebes,—a conspiracy full of danger at such a moment, though fortunately repressed[336] by Aristeidês, with a hand at once gentle and decisive. Moreover, the annoyance inflicted by the Persian cavalry, under the guidance of the Thebans, was incessant: their constant assaults, and missile weapons from the other side of the Asôpus, prevented the Greeks from using it for supplies of water, so that the whole army was forced to water at the fountain Gargaphia, at the extreme right of the position,[337] near the Lacedæmonian hoplites. Moreover, the Theban leader, Timegenidas, remarking the convoys which arrived over the passes of Kithæron, in the rear of the Grecian camp, and the constant reinforcements of hoplites which ac-

companied them, prevailed upon Mardonius to employ his cavalry in cutting off such communication. The first movement of this sort, undertaken by night against the pass called the Oak Heads, was eminently successful: a train of five hundred beasts of burden with supplies, was attacked descending into the plain with its escort, all of whom were either slain or carried prisoners to the Persian camp: nor was it safe for any farther convoys to approach the Greeks.[338] Eight days had already been passed in inaction before Timegenidas suggested, or Mardonius executed, this manœuvre, which it is fortunate for the Greeks that he did not attempt earlier, and which afforded clear proof how much might be hoped from an efficient employment of his cavalry, without the ruinous risk of a general action. Nevertheless, after waiting two days longer, his impatience became uncontrollable, and he determined on a general battle forthwith.[339] In vain did Artabazus endeavor to dissuade him from the step,—taking the same view as the Thebans, that in a pitched battle the united Grecian army was invincible, and that the only successful policy was that of delay and corruption to disunite them: he recommended standing on the defensive, by means of Thebes, well fortified and amply provisioned,—which would allow time for distributing effective bribes among the leading men throughout the various Grecian cities. This suggestion, which Herodotus considers as wise and likely to succeed, was repudiated by Mardonius as cowardly and unworthy of the recognized superiority of the Persian arms.[340]

But while he overruled, by virtue of superior authority, the objections of all around him, Persian as well as Greek, he could not but feel daunted by their reluctant obedience, which he suspected might arise from their having heard oracles or prophecies of unfavorable augury. He therefore summoned the chief officers, Greek as well as Persian, and put the question to them, whether they knew any prophecy announcing that the Persians were doomed to destruction in Greece. All were silent: some did not know the prophecies, but others, Herodotus intimates, knew them full well, though they did not dare to speak. Receiving no answer, Mardonius said, "Since ye either do not know or will not tell, I, who know well, will myself speak out. There is an oracle to the effect, that Persian invaders of Greece shall plunder the temple of Delphi, and shall afterwards all be destroyed. Now we, being aware of this, shall neither go against that temple, nor try to plunder it: on that ground, therefore, we shall not be destroyed. Rejoice ye, therefore, ye who are well-affected to the Persians,—we shall get the better of the Greeks." With that he gave orders to prepare everything for a general attack and battle on the morrow.[341]

It is not improbable that the Orchomenian Thersander was present at this interview, and may have reported it to Herodotus. But the reflection of the historian himself is not the least curious part of the whole, as illustrating the manner in which these prophecies sunk into men's minds, and determined their judgments. Herodotus knew, though he does not cite it, the particular prophecy to which Mardonius made allusion; and he pronounces, in the most affirmative tone,[342] that it had no refer-

ence to the Persians: it referred to an ancient invasion of Greece by the Illyrians and the Encheleis. But both Bakis, from whom he quotes four lines, and Musæus had prophesied, in the plainest manner, the destruction of the Persian army on the banks of the Thermôdon and Asôpus. And these are the prophecies which we must suppose the officers convoked by Mardonius to have known also, though they did not dare to speak out: it was the fault of Mardonius himself that he did not take warning.

The attack of a multitude like that of Mardonius was not likely under any circumstances to be made so rapidly as to take the Greeks by surprise: but the latter were forewarned of it by a secret visit from Alexander, king of Macedon; who, riding up to the Athenian advanced posts in the middle of the night, desired to speak with Aristeidês and the other generals. Announcing to them alone his name, and proclaiming his earnest sympathy for the Grecian cause, as well as the hazard which he incurred by this nightly visit,—he apprized them that Mardonius, though eager for a battle long ago, could not by any effort obtain favorable sacrifices, but was, nevertheless, even in spite of this obstacle, determined on an attack the next morning. "Be ye prepared accordingly; and if ye succeed in this war (said he) remember to liberate me also from the Persian yoke: I too am a Greek by descent, and thus risk my head because I cannot endure to see Greece enslaved."[343]

The communication of this important message, made by Aristeidês to Pausanias, elicited from him a proposal not a little surprising as coming from a Spartan general. He requested the Athenians to change places with the Lacedæmonians in the line. "We Lacedæmonians (said he) now stand opposed to the Persians and Medes, against whom we have never yet contended, while ye Athenians have fought and conquered them at Marathon. March ye then over to the right wing and take our places, while we will take yours in the left wing, against the Bœotians and Thessalians, with whose arms and attack we are familiar." The Athenians readily acceded, and the reciprocal change of order was accordingly directed: nor was it yet quite completed when day broke, and the Theban allies of Mardonius immediately took notice of what had been done. That general commanded a corresponding change in his own line, so as to place the native Persians once more over against the Lacedæmonians: upon which Pausanias, seeing that his manœuvre had failed, led back his Lacedæmonians to the right wing, while a second movement on the part of Mardonius replaced both armies in the order originally observed.[344]

No incident similar to this will be found throughout the whole course of Lacedæmonian history. To evade encountering the best troops in the enemy's line, and to depart for this purpose from their privileged post on the right wing, was a step well calculated to lower them in the eyes of Greece, and could hardly have failed to produce that effect, if the intention had been realized: it is at the same time the highest compliment to the formidable reputation of the native Persian troops,—a reputation recognized by Herodotus, and well sustained at least by their personal bravery.[345] Nor can we wonder that this publicly manifested reluctance on the part of the lead-

ing troops in the Grecian army contributed much to exalt the rash confidence of Mardonius: a feeling which Herodotus, in Homeric style,[346] casts into the speech of a Persian herald sent to upbraid the Lacedæmonians, and challenge them to a "single combat with champions of equal numbers, Lacedæmonians against Persians." This herald, whom no one heard or cared for, and who serves but as a mouthpiece for bringing out the feelings belonging to the moment, was followed by something very real and terrible,—a vigorous attack on the Greek line by the Persian cavalry; whose rapid motions, and showers of arrows and javelins, annoyed the Greeks on this day more than ever. The latter, as has been before stated, had no cavalry whatever; nor do their light troops, though sufficiently numerous, appear to have rendered any service, with the exception of the Athenian bowmen. How great was the advantage gained by the Persian cavalry, is shown by the fact that they for a time drove away the Lacedæmonians from the fountain of Gargaphia, so as to choke it up and render it unfit for use. As the army had been prevented by the cavalry from resorting to the river Asôpus, this fountain had been of late the only watering-place: and without it the position which they then occupied became untenable,—while their provisions also were exhausted, inasmuch as the convoys, from fear of the Persian cavalry, could not descend from Kithæron to join them.[347]

In this dilemma, Pausanias summoned the Grecian chiefs to his tent, and after an anxious debate the resolution was taken, in case Mardonius should not bring on a general action in the course of the day, to change their position during the night, when there would be no interruption from the cavalry; and to occupy the ground called the island, distant about ten furlongs in a direction nearly west, and seemingly north of the town of Platæa, which was itself about twenty furlongs distant: this island, improperly so denominated, included the ground comprised between two branches of the river Oeroê,[348] both of which flow from Kithæron, and, after flowing for a certain time in channels about three furlongs apart, form a junction and run in a northwesterly direction towards one of the recesses of the gulf of Corinth,—quite distinct from the Asôpus, which, though also rising near at hand in the lowest declivities under Kithæron, takes an easterly direction and discharges itself into the sea opposite Eubœa. When in this so-called island, the army would be secure of water from the stream in their rear; nor would they, as now, expose an extended breadth of front to a numerous hostile cavalry separated from them only by the Asôpus.[349] It was farther resolved, that so soon as the army should once be in occupation of the island, half of the troops should forthwith march onward to disengage the convoys blocked up on Kithæron and conduct them to the camp. Such was the plan settled in council among the different Grecian chiefs; the march to be commenced at the beginning of the second night-watch, when the enemy's cavalry would have completely withdrawn.

In spite of what Mardonius is said to have determined, he passed the whole day without any general attack: but his cavalry, probably elated by the recent demonstra-

tion of the Lacedæmonians, were on that day more daring and indefatigable than ever, and inflicted much loss as well as severe suffering;[350] insomuch that the centre of the Greek force (Corinthians, Megarians, etc., between the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans on the right, and the Athenians on the left), when the hour arrived for retiring to the island, commenced their march indeed, but forgot or disregarded the preconcerted plan and the orders of Pausanias, in their impatience to obtain a complete shelter against the attacks of the cavalry. Instead of proceeding to the island, they marched a distance of twenty furlongs directly to the town of Platæa, and took up a position in front of the Heræum, or temple of Hêrê, where they were protected partly by the buildings, partly by the comparatively high ground on which the town with its temple stood. Between the position which the Greeks were about to leave and that which they had resolved to occupy (*i. e.* between the course of the Asôpus and that of the Oeroê), there appear to have been a range of low hills: the Lacedæmonians, starting from the right wing, had to march directly over these hills, while the Athenians, from the left, were to turn them and get into the plain on the other side.[351] Pausanias, apprized that the divisions of the centre had commenced their night-march, and concluding of course that they would proceed to the island according to orders, allowed a certain interval of time in order to prevent confusion, and then directed that the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans should also begin their movement towards that same position. But here he found himself embarrassed by an unexpected obstacle. The movement was retrograde, receding from the enemy, and not consistent with the military honor of a Spartan; nevertheless, most of the taxiarchs, or leaders of companies, obeyed without murmuring; but Amompharetus, lochage or captain of that band which Herodotus calls the lochus of Pitana,[352] obstinately refused. Not having been present at the meeting in which the resolution had been taken, he now heard it for the first time with astonishment and disdain, declaring "that he for one would never so far disgrace Sparta as to run away from the foreigner."[353] Pausanias, with the second in command, Euryanax, exhausted every effort to overcome his reluctance: but they could by no means induce him to retreat; nor did they dare to move without him, leaving his entire lochus exposed alone to the enemy.[354]

Amidst the darkness of night, and in this scene of indecision and dispute, an Athenian messenger on horseback reached Pausanias, instructed to ascertain what was passing, and to ask for the last directions: for in spite of the resolution taken after formal debate, the Athenian generals still mistrusted the Lacedæmonians, and doubted whether, after all, they would act as they had promised: the movement of the central division having become known to them, they sent at the last moment before they commenced their own march, to assure themselves that the Spartans were about to move also. A profound, and even an exaggerated mistrust, but too well justified by the previous behavior of the Spartans towards Athens, is visible in this proceeding:[355] yet it proved fortunate in its results,—for if the Athenians, satisfied with executing their part in the preconcerted plan, had marched at once to the island, the

Grecian army would have been severed without the possibility of reuniting, and the issue of the battle might have proved altogether different. The Athenian herald found the Lacedæmonians still stationary in their position, and the generals in hot dispute with Amompharetus; who despised the threat of being left alone to make head against the Persians, and when reminded that the resolution had been taken by general vote of the officers, took up with both hands a vast rock, fit for the hands of Ajax or Hektor, and cast it at the feet of Pausanias, saying—"This is *my* pebble, wherewith I give my vote not to run away from the strangers." Pausanias denounced him as a madman,—desiring the herald to report the scene of embarrassment which he had just come to witness, and to entreat the Athenian generals not to commence their retreat until the Lacedæmonians should also be in march. In the mean time the dispute continued, and was even prolonged by the perverseness of Amompharetus until the morning began to dawn; when Pausanias, afraid to remain longer, gave the signal for retreat,—calculating that the refractory captain, when he saw his lochus really left alone, would probably make up his mind to follow. Having marched about ten furlongs, across the hilly ground which divided him from the island, he commanded a halt,—either to await Amompharetus, if he chose to follow, or to be near enough to render aid and save him, if he were rash enough to stand his ground single-handed. Happily the latter, seeing that his general had really departed, overcame his scruples, and followed him; overtaking and joining the main body in its first halt near the river Moloeis and the temple of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr.[356] The Athenians, commencing their movement at the same time with Pausanias, got round the hills to the plain on the other side and proceeded on their march towards the island.

When the day broke, the Persian cavalry were astonished to find the Grecian position deserted. They immediately set themselves to the pursuit of the Spartans, whose march lay along the higher and more conspicuous ground, and whose progress had moreover been retarded by the long delay of Amompharetus: the Athenians on the contrary, marching without halt and being already behind the hills, were not open to view. To Mardonius, this retreat of his enemy inspired an extravagant and contemptuous confidence, which he vented in full measure to the Thessalian Aleuadæ: "These are your boasted Spartans, who changed their place just now in the line, rather than fight the Persians, and have here shown by a barefaced flight what they are really worth!" With that, he immediately directed his whole army to pursue and attack, with the utmost expedition. The Persians crossed the Asôpus, and ran after the Greeks at their best speed, pell-mell, without any thought of order or preparations for overcoming resistance: the army already rang with shouts of victory, in full confidence of swallowing up the fugitives as soon as they were overtaken.

The Asiatic allies all followed the example of this disorderly rush forward:[357] but the Thebans and the other Grecian allies on the right wing of Mardonius, appear to have maintained somewhat better order.

Pausanias had not been able to retreat farther than the neighborhood of the Demetrion, or temple of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr, where he had halted to take up Amompharetus. Overtaken first by the Persian horse, and next by Mardonius with the main body, he sent a horseman forthwith to apprize the Athenians, and to entreat their aid. Nor were the Athenians slack in complying with his request: but they speedily found themselves engaged in conflict against the Theban allies of the enemy, and therefore unable to reach him.[358] Accordingly, the Lacedæmonians and Tegeates had to encounter the Persians single-handed, without any assistance from the other Greeks. The Persians, on arriving within bowshot of their enemies, planted in the ground the spiked extremities of their gerrha, or long wicker shields, forming a continuous breastwork, from behind which they poured upon the Greeks a shower of arrows:[359] their bows were of the largest size, and drawn with no less power than skill. In spite of the wounds and distress thus inflicted, Pausanias persisted in the indispensable duty of offering the battle sacrifice, and the victims were for some time unfavorable, so that he did not venture to give orders for advance and close combat. Many were here wounded or slain in the ranks,[360] among them the brave Kallikratês, the handsomest and strongest man in the army: until Pausanias, wearied out with this compulsory and painful delay, at length raised his eyes to the conspicuous Heræum of the Platæans, and invoked the merciful intervention of Hêrê to remove that obstacle which confined him to the spot. Hardly had he pronounced the words, when the victims changed and became favorable:[361] but the Tegeans, while he was yet praying, anticipated the effect and hastened forward against the enemy, followed by the Lacedæmonians as soon as Pausanias gave the word. The wicker breastwork before the Persians was soon overthrown by the Grecian charge: nevertheless the Persians, though thus deprived of their tutelary hedge, and having no defensive armor, maintained the fight with individual courage, the more remarkable because it was totally unassisted by discipline or trained collective movement, against the drilled array, the regulated step, the well-defended persons, and the long spears, of the Greeks.[362] They threw themselves upon the Lacedæmonians, seizing hold of their spears, and breaking them: many of them devoted themselves in small parties of ten to force by their bodies a way into the lines, and to get to individual close combat with the short spear and the dagger.[363] Mardonius himself, conspicuous upon a white horse, was among the foremost warriors, and the thousand select troops who formed his body-guard distinguished themselves beyond all the rest. At length he was slain by the hand of a distinguished Spartan named Aeimnêstus; his thousand guards mostly perished around him, and the courage of the remaining Persians, already worn out by the superior troops against which they had been long contending, was at last thoroughly broken by the death of their general. They turned their backs and fled, not resting until they got into the wooden fortified camp constructed by Mardonius behind the Asôpus. The Asiatic allies also, as soon as they saw the Persians defeated, took to flight without striking a blow.[364]

The Athenians on the left, meanwhile, had been engaged in a serious conflict with the Bœotians; especially the Theban leaders with the hoplites immediately around them, who fought with great bravery, but were at length driven back, after the loss of three hundred of their best troops. The Theban cavalry, however, still maintained a good front, protecting the retreat of the infantry and checking the Athenian pursuit, so that the fugitives were enabled to reach Thebes in safety; a better refuge than the Persian fortified camp.[365] With the exception of the Thebans and Bœotians, none of the other *medizing* Greeks rendered any real service: instead of sustaining or reinforcing the Thebans, they never once advanced to the charge, but merely followed in the first movement of flight. So that, in point of fact, the only troops in this numerous Perso-Grecian army who really fought, were the native Persians and Sakæ on the left, and the Bœotians on the right: the former against the Lacedæmonians, the latter against the Athenians.[366]

Nor did even all the native Persians take part in the combat. A body of forty thousand men under Artabazus, of whom some must doubtless have been native Persians, left the field without fighting and without loss. That general, seemingly the ablest man in the Persian army, had been from the first disgusted with the nomination of Mardonius as commander-in-chief, and had farther incurred his displeasure by deprecating any general action. Apprized that Mardonius was hastening forward to attack the retreating Greeks, he marshalled his division and led them out towards the scene of action, though despairing of success, and perhaps not very anxious that his own prophecies should be contradicted. And such had been the headlong impetuosity of Mardonius in his first forward movement,—so complete his confidence of overwhelming the Greeks when he discovered their retreat,—that he took no pains to insure the concerted action of his whole army: accordingly, before Artabazus arrived at the scene of action, he saw the Persian troops, who had been engaged under the commander-in-chief, already defeated and in flight. Without making the least attempt either to save them or to retrieve the battle, he immediately gave orders to his own division to retreat: not repairing, however, either to the fortified camp, or to Thebes, but abandoning at once the whole campaign, and taking the direct road through Phocis to Thessaly, Macedonia, and the Hellespont.[367]

As the native Persians, the Sakæ, and the Bœotians, were the only real combatants on the one side, so also were the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians, on the other. It has already been mentioned that the central troops of the Grecian army, disobeying the general order of march, had gone during the night to the town of Platæa instead of to the island. They were thus completely severed from Pausanias, and the first thing which they heard about the battle, was, that the Lacedæmonians were gaining the victory. Elate with this news, and anxious to come in for some share of the honor, they rushed to the scene of action, without any heed of military order; the Corinthians taking the direct track across the hills, while the Megarians, Phliasians, and others, marched by the longer route along the plain, so as to turn the

hills and arrive at the Athenian position. The Theban horse under Asôpodôrus, employed in checking the pursuit of the victorious Athenian hoplites, seeing these fresh troops coming up in thorough disorder, charged them vigorously, and drove them back to take refuge in the high ground, with the loss of six hundred men.[368] But this partial success had no effect in mitigating the ruin of the general defeat.

Following up their pursuit, the Lacedæmonians proceeded to attack the wooden redoubt wherein the Persians had taken refuge. But though they were here aided by all or most of the central Grecian divisions, who had taken no part in the battle, they were yet so ignorant of the mode of assailing walls, that they made no progress, and were completely baffled, until the Athenians arrived to their assistance. The redoubt was then stormed, not without a gallant and prolonged resistance on the part of its defenders. The Tegeans, being the first to penetrate into the interior, plundered the rich tent of Mardonius, whose manger for his horses, made of brass, remained long afterwards exhibited in their temple of Athênê Alea,—while his silver-footed throne, and cimeter[369] were preserved in the acropolis of Athens, along with the breastplate of Masistius. Once within the wall, effective resistance ceased, and the Greeks slaughtered without mercy as well as without limit; so that if we are to credit Herodotus, there survived only three thousand men out of the three hundred thousand which had composed the army of Mardonius,—save and except the forty thousand men who accompanied Artabazus in his retreat.[370] Respecting these numbers, the historian had probably little to give except some vague reports, without any pretence of computation: about the Grecian loss, his statement deserves more attention, when he tells us that there perished ninety-one Spartans, sixteen Tegeans, and fifty-two Athenians. Herein, however, is not included the loss of the Megarians when attacked by the Theban cavalry, nor is the number of slain Lacedæmonians, not Spartans, specified; while even the other numbers actually stated are decidedly smaller than the probable truth, considering the multitude of Persian arrows and the unshielded right side of the Grecian hoplite. On the whole, the affirmation of Plutarch, that not less than thirteen hundred and sixty Greeks were slain in the action, appears probable: all doubtless hoplites,—for little account was then made of the light-armed, nor indeed are we told that they took any active part in the battle.[371] Whatever may have been the numerical loss of the Persians, this defeat proved the total ruin of their army: but we may fairly presume that many were spared and sold into slavery,[372] while many of the fugitives probably found means to join the retreating division of Artabazus. That general made a rapid march across Thessaly and Macedonia, keeping strict silence about the recent battle, and pretending to be sent on a special enterprise by Mardonius, whom he reported to be himself approaching. If Herodotus is correct (though it may well be doubted whether the change of sentiment in Thessaly and the other *medizing* Grecian states was so rapid as he implies), Artabazus succeeded in traversing these countries before the news of the battle became generally known, and then retreated by the straightest and shortest route through the interior of Thrace to Byzantium, from whence he passed into

Asia: the interior tribes, unconquered and predatory, harassed his retreat considerably; but we shall find long afterwards Persian garrisons in possession of many principal places on the Thracian coast.[373] It will be seen that Artabazus afterwards rose higher than ever in the estimation of Xerxes.

Ten days did the Greeks employ after their victory, first in burying the slain, next in collecting and apportioning the booty. The Lacedæmonians, the Athenians, the Tegeans, the Megarians, and the Phliasians, each buried their dead apart, erecting a separate tomb in commemoration: the Lacedæmonians, indeed, distributed their dead into three fractions, in three several burial-places: one for those champions who enjoyed individual renown at Sparta, and among whom were included the most distinguished men slain in the recent battle, such as Poseidonius, Amompharetus, the refractory captain, Philokyon, and Kallikratês,—a second for the other Spartans and Lacedæmonians,[374]—and a third for the Helots. Besides these sepulchral monuments, erected in the neighborhood of Platæa by those cities whose citizens had really fought and fallen, there were several similar monuments to be seen in the days of Herodotus, raised by other cities which falsely pretended to the same honor, with the connivance and aid of the Platæans.[375] The body of Mardonius was discovered among the slain, and treated with respect by Pausanias, who is even said to have indignantly repudiated advice offered to him by an Æginetan, that he should retaliate upon it the ignominious treatment inflicted by Xerxes upon the dead Leonidas.[376] On the morrow, the body was stolen away and buried; by whom, was never certainly known, for there were many different pretenders who obtained reward on this plea from Artyntês, the son of Mardonius: the funereal monument was yet to be seen in the time of the traveller Pausanias.[377]

The spoil was rich and multifarious,—gold and silver in Darics as well as in implements and ornaments, carpets, splendid arms and clothing, horses, camels, etc., even the magnificent tent of Xerxes, left on his retreat with Mardonius, was included.[378] By order of the general Pausanias, the Helots collected all the valuable articles into one spot for division; not without stealing many of the golden ornaments, which, in ignorance of the value, they were persuaded by the Æginetans to sell as brass. After reserving a tithe for the Delphian Apollo, together with ample offerings for the Olympic Zeus and the Isthmian Poseidon, as well as for Pausanias as general,—the remaining booty was distributed among the different contingents of the army in proportion to their respective numbers.[379] The concubines of the Persian chiefs were among the prizes distributed: there were probably however among them many of Grecian birth, restored to their families; and one especially, overtaken in her chariot amidst the flying Persians, with rich jewels and a numerous suite, threw herself at the feet of Pausanias himself, imploring his protection. She proved to be the daughter of his personal friend Hegetoridês, of Kos, carried off by the Persian Pharandatês; and he had the satisfaction of restoring her to her father.[380] Large as the booty col-

lected was, there yet remained many valuable treasures buried in the ground, which the Platæan inhabitants afterwards discovered and appropriated.

The real victors in the battle of Platæa were the Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and Tegeans: the Corinthians and others, forming part of the army opposed to Mardonius, did not reach the field until the battle was ended, though they doubtless aided both in the assault of the fortified camp and in the subsequent operations against Thebes, and were universally recognized, in inscriptions and panegyrics, among the champions who had contributed to the liberation of Greece.[381] It was not till after the taking of the Persian camp that the contingents of Elis and Mantineia, who may perhaps have been among the convoys prevented by the Persian cavalry from descending the passes of Kithæron, first reached the scene of action. Mortified at having missed their share in the glorious exploit, the new-comers were at first eager to set off in pursuit of Artabazus: but the Lacedæmonian commander forbade them, and they returned home without any other consolation than that of banishing their generals for not having led them forth more promptly.[382]

There yet remained the most efficient ally of Mardonius,—the city of Thebes; which Pausanias summoned on the eleventh day after the battle, requiring that the *medizing* leaders should be delivered up, especially Timêgenidas and Attagînus. On receiving a refusal, he began to batter their walls, and to adopt the still more effective measure of laying waste their territory,—giving notice that the work of destruction would be continued until these chiefs were given up. After twenty days of endurance, the latter at length proposed, if it should prove that Pausanias peremptorily required their persons and refused to accept a sum of money in commutation, to surrender themselves voluntarily as the price of liberation for their country. A negotiation was accordingly entered into with Pausanias, and the persons demanded were surrendered to him, excepting Attagînus, who found means to escape at the last moment. His sons, whom he left behind, were delivered up as substitutes, but Pausanias refused to touch them, with the just remark, which in those times was even generous,[383] that they were nowise implicated in the *medism* of their father. Timêgenidas and the remaining prisoners were carried off to Corinth, and immediately put to death, without the smallest discussion or form of trial: Pausanias was apprehensive that if any delay or consultation were granted, their wealth and that of their friends would effectually purchase voices for their acquittal,—indeed, the prisoners themselves had been induced to give themselves up partly in that expectation.[384] It is remarkable that Pausanias himself, only a few years afterwards, when attainted of treason, returned and surrendered himself at Sparta, under similar hopes of being able to buy himself off by money.[385] In this hope, indeed, he found himself deceived, as Timêgenidas had been deceived before: but the fact is not the less to be noted, as indicating the general impression that the leading men in a Grecian city were usually open to bribes in judicial matters, and that individuals superior to this temptation were rare exceptions. I shall have occasion to dwell upon this recognized

untrustworthiness of the leading Greeks when I come to explain the extremely popular cast of the Athenian judicature.

Whether there was any positive vote taken among the Greeks respecting the prize of valor at the battle of Platæa, may well be doubted: and the silence of Herodotus goes far to negative an important statement of Plutarch, that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians were on the point of coming to an open rupture, each thinking themselves entitled to the prize,—that Aristeidês appeased the Athenians, and prevailed upon them to submit to the general decision of the allies,—and that Megarian and Corinthian leaders contrived to elude the dangerous rock by bestowing the prize on the Platæans, to which proposition both Aristeidês and Pausanias acceded.[386] But it seems that the general opinion recognized the Lacedæmonians and Pausanias as bravest among the brave, seeing that they had overcome the best troops of the enemy and slain the general. In burying their dead warriors, the Lacedæmonians singled out for peculiar distinction Philokyon, Poseidonius, and Amompharetus the lochage, whose conduct in the fight atoned for his disobedience to orders. There was one Spartan, however, who had surpassed them all,—Aristodêmus, the single survivor of the troop of Leonidas at Thermopylæ. Having ever since experienced nothing but disgrace and insult from his fellow-citizens, this unfortunate man had become reckless of life, and at Platæa he stepped forth single-handed from his place in the ranks, performing deeds of the most heroic valor, and determined to regain by his death the esteem of his countrymen. But the Spartans refused to assign to him the same funereal honors as were paid to the other distinguished warriors, who had manifested exemplary forwardness and skill, yet without any desperate rashness, and without any previous taint such as to render life a burden to them. Subsequent valor might be held to efface this taint, but could not suffice to exalt Aristodêmus to a level with the most honored citizens.[387]

But though we cannot believe the statement of Plutarch, that the Platæans received by general vote the prize of valor, it is certain that they were largely honored and recompensed, as the proprietors of that ground on which the liberation of Greece had been achieved. The market-place and centre of their town was selected as the scene for the solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, offered up by Pausanias, after the battle, to Zeus Eleutherius, in the name and presence of all the assembled allies. The local gods and heroes of the Platæan territory, who had been invoked in prayer before the battle, and who had granted their soil as a propitious field for the Greek arms, were made partakers of this ceremony, and witnesses as well as guarantees of the engagements with which it was accompanied.[388] The Platæans, now re-entering their city, which the Persian invasion had compelled them to desert, were invested with the honorable duty of celebrating the periodical sacrifice in commemoration of this great victory, as well as of rendering care and religious service at the tombs of the fallen warriors. As an aid to enable them to discharge this obligation, which probably might have pressed hard upon them at a time when their city was

half-ruined and their fields unsown, they received out of the prize-money the large allotment of eighty talents, which was partly employed in building and adorning a handsome temple of Athênê,—the symbol probably of renewed connection with Athens. They undertook to render religious honors every year to the tombs of the warriors, and to celebrate in every fifth year the grand public solemnity of the Eleutheria with gymnastic matches analogous to the other great festival games of Greece.[389] In consideration of the discharge of these duties, together with the sanctity of the ground, Pausanias, and the whole body of allies, bound themselves by oath to guarantee the autonomy of Platæa, and the inviolability of her territory. This was an emancipation of the town from the bond of the Bœotian federation, and from the enforcing supremacy of Thebes as its chief.

But the engagement of the allies appears to have had other objects also, larger than that of protecting Platæa, or establishing commemorative ceremonies. The defensive league against the Persians was again sworn to by all of them, and rendered permanent: an aggregate force of ten thousand hoplites, one thousand cavalry, and one hundred triremes, for the purpose of carrying on the war, was agreed to and promised, the contingent of each ally being specified: moreover, the town of Platæa was fixed on as the annual place of meeting, where deputies from all of them were annually to assemble.[390] This resolution is said to have been adopted on the proposition of Aristeidês, whose motives it is not difficult to trace. Though the Persian army had sustained a signal defeat, no one knew how soon it might reassemble, or be reinforced; indeed, even later, after the battle of Mykalê had become known, a fresh invasion of the Persians was still regarded as not improbable,[391] nor did any one then anticipate that extraordinary fortune and activity whereby the Athenians afterwards organized an alliance such as to throw Persia on the defensive. Moreover, the northern half of Greece was still *medizing*, either in reality or in appearance, and new efforts on the part of Xerxes might probably keep up his ascendency in those parts. Now assuming the war to be renewed, Aristeidês and the Athenians had the strongest interest in providing a line of defence which should cover Attica as well as Peloponnesus, and in preventing the Peloponnesians from confining themselves to their isthmus, as they had done before. To take advantage for this purpose of the new-born reverence and gratitude which now bound the Lacedæmonians to Platæa, was an idea eminently suitable to the moment, though the unforeseen subsequent start of Athens, combined with other events, prevented both the extensive alliance and the inviolability of Platæa, projected by Aristeidês, from taking effect.[392]

On the same day that Pausanias and the Grecian land army conquered at Platæa, the naval armament under Leotychidês and Xanthippus was engaged in operations hardly less important, at Mykalê on the Asiatic coast. The Grecian commanders of the fleet, which numbered one hundred and ten triremes, having advanced as far as Delos, were afraid to proceed farther eastward, or to undertake any offensive operations against the Persians at Samos, for the rescue of Ionia,—although Ionian en-

voys, especially from Chios and Samos, had urgently solicited aid both at Sparta and at Delos. Three Samians, one of them named Hegesistratus, came to assure Leotychidês, that their countrymen were ready to revolt from the despot Theomêstor, whom the Persians had installed there, so soon as the Greek fleet should appear off the island. In spite of emphatic appeals to the community of religion and race, Leotychidês was long deaf to the entreaty; but his reluctance gradually gave way before the persevering earnestness of the orator. While yet not thoroughly determined, he happened to ask the Samian speaker what was his name. To which the latter replied, "Hegesistratus, *i. e.* army-leader." "I accept Hegesistratus as an omen (replied Leotychidês, struck with the significance of this name), pledge thou thy faith to accompany us,—let thy companions prepare the Samians to receive us, and we will go forthwith." Engagements were at once exchanged, and while the other two envoys were sent forward to prepare matters in the island, Hegesistratus remained to conduct the fleet, which was farther encouraged by favorable sacrifices, and by the assurances of the prophet Dêiphonus, hired from the Corinthian colony of Apollonia. [393]

When they reached the Heræum near Kalami in Samos,[394] and had prepared themselves for a naval engagement, they discovered that the enemy's fleet had already been withdrawn from the island to the neighboring continent. For the Persian commanders had been so disheartened with the defeat of Salamis that they were not disposed to fight again at sea: we do not know the numbers of their fleet, but perhaps a considerable proportion of it may have consisted of Ionic Greeks, whose fidelity was now very doubtful. Having abandoned the idea of a sea-fight, they permitted their Phenician squadron to depart, and sailed with their remaining fleet to the promontory of Mykalê near Miletus.[395] Here they were under the protection of a land-force of sixty thousand men, under the command of Tigranês,—the main reliance of Xerxes for the defence of Ionia: the ships were dragged ashore, and a rampart of stones and stakes was erected to protect them, while the defending army lined the shore, and seemed amply sufficient to repel attack from seaward.[396]

It was not long before the Greek fleet arrived. Disappointed of their intention of fighting, by the flight of the enemy from Samos, they had at first proposed either to return home, or to turn aside to the Hellespont: but they were at last persuaded by the Ionian envoys to pursue the enemy's fleet and again offer battle at Mykalê. On reaching that point, they discovered that the Persians had abandoned the sea, intending to fight only on land. So much had the Greeks now become emboldened, that they ventured to disembark and attack the united land-force and sea-force before them: but since much of their chance of success depended on the desertion of the Ionians, the first proceeding of Leotychidês was, to copy the previous manœuvre of Themistoklês, when retreating from Artemisium, at the watering-places of Eubœa. Sailing along close to the coast, he addressed, through a herald of loud voice, earnest appeals to the Ionians among the enemy to revolt; calculating, even if they

did not listen to him, that he should at least render them mistrusted by the Persians. He then disembarked his troops and marshalled them for the purpose of attacking the Persian camp on land; while the Persian generals, surprised by this daring manifestation, and suspecting, either from his manœuvre or from previous evidences, that the Ionians were in secret collusion with him, ordered the Samian contingent to be disarmed, and the Milesians to retire to the rear of the army, for the purpose of occupying the various mountain roads up to the summit of Mykalê,—with which the latter were familiar as a part of their own territory.[397]

Serving as these Greeks in the fleet were, at a distance from their own homes, and having left a powerful army of Persians and Greeks under Mardonius in Bœotia, they were of course full of anxiety lest his arms might prove victorious and extinguish the freedom of their country. It was under these feelings of solicitude for their absent brethren that they disembarked, and were made ready for attack by the afternoon. But it was the afternoon of an ever-memorable day,—the fourth of the month Boëdromion (about September) 479 B. C. By a remarkable coincidence, the victory of Platæa in Bœotia had been gained by Pausanias that very morning. At the moment when the Greeks were advancing to the charge, a divine phêmê, or message, flew into the camp,—whilst a herald's staff was seen floated to the shore by the western wave, the symbol of electric transmission across the Ægean;—the revelation, sudden, simultaneous, irresistible, struck at once upon the minds of all, as if the multitude had one common soul and sense, acquainting them that on that very morning their countrymen in Bœotia had gained a complete victory over Mardonius. At once the previous anxiety was dissipated, and the whole army, full of joy and confidence, charged with redoubled energy. Such is the account given by Herodotus,[398] and doubtless universally accepted in his time, when the combatants of Mykalê were alive to tell their own story: he moreover mentions another of those coincidences which the Greek mind always seized upon with so much avidity, there was a chapel of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr close to the field of battle at Mykalê as well as at Platæa. Diodorus and other later writers,[399] who wrote when the impressions of the time had vanished, and when divine interventions were less easily and literally admitted, treat the whole proceeding as if it were a report designedly circulated by the generals, for the purpose of encouraging their army.

The Lacedæmonians on the right wing, and the portion of the army near them, had a difficult path before them, over hilly ground and ravine; while the Athenians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, and Trœzenians, and the left half of the army, marching only along the beach, came much sooner into conflict with the enemy. The Persians, as at Platæa, employed their *gerrha*, or wicker bucklers, planted by spikes in the ground, as a breastwork, from behind which they discharged their arrows, and they made a strenuous resistance to prevent this defence from being overthrown. Ultimately, the Greeks succeeded in demolishing it, and in driving the enemy into the interior of the fortification, where they in vain tried to maintain themselves against the ardor of the

pursuers, who forced their way into it almost along with the defenders. Even when this last rampart was carried, and when the Persian allies had fled, the native Persians still continued to prolong the struggle with undiminished bravery. Unpractised in line and drill, and acting only in small knots,[400] with disadvantages of armor, such as had been felt severely at Platæa, they still maintained an unequal conflict with the Greek hoplites; nor was it until the Lacedæmonians with their half of the army arrived to join in the attack, that the defence was abandoned as hopeless. The revolt of the Ionians in the camp put the finishing stroke to this ruinous defeat: first, the disarmed Samians; next, other Ionians and Æolians; lastly, the Milesians who had been posted to guard the passes in the rear, not only deserted, but took an active part in the attack; and the Milesians especially, to whom the Persians had trusted for guidance up to the summits of Mykalê, led them by wrong roads, threw them into the hands of their pursuers, and at last set upon them with their own hands. A large number of the native Persians, together with both the generals of the land-force, Tigranês and Mardontês, perished in this disastrous battle: the two Persian admirals, Artayntês and Ithamithrês, escaped, but the army was irretrievably dispersed, while all the ships which had been dragged up on the shore fell into the hands of the assailants, and were burned. But the victory of the Greeks was by no means bloodless: among the left wing, upon which the brunt of the action had fallen, a considerable number of men were slain, especially Sikyonians, with their commander Perilaus.[401] The honors of the battle were awarded, first to the Athenians, next to the Corinthians, Sikyonians, and Trœzenians; the Lacedæmonians having done comparatively little. Hermolykus the Athenian, a celebrated pankratiast, was the warrior most distinguished for individual feats of arms.[402]

The dispersed Persian army, so much of it at least as had at first found protection on the heights of Mykalê, was withdrawn from the coast forthwith to Sardis under the command of Artayntês, whom Masistês, the brother of Xerxes, bitterly reproached on the score of cowardice in the recent defeat: the general was at length so maddened by a repetition of these insults, that he drew his cimeter and would have slain Masistês, had he not been prevented by a Greek of Halikarnassus named Xenagoras,[403] who was rewarded by Xerxes with the government of Kilikia. Xerxes was still at Sardis, where he had remained ever since his return, and where he conceived a passion for the wife of his brother Masistês; the consequences of his passion entailed upon that unfortunate woman sufferings too tragical to be described, by the orders of his own queen, the jealous and savage Amêstris.[404] But he had no fresh army ready to send down to the coast, so that the Greek cities, even on the continent, were for the time practically liberated from Persian supremacy, while the insular Greeks were in a position of still greater safety.

The commanders of the victorious Grecian fleet had full confidence in their power of defending the islands, and willingly admitted the Chians, Samians, Lesbians, and the other islanders hitherto subjects of Persia, to the protection and reciprocal en-

gagements of their alliance. We may presume that the despots Stratis and Theomêstor were expelled from Chios and Samos.[405] But the Peloponnesian commanders hesitated in guaranteeing the same secure autonomy to the continental cities, which could not be upheld against the great inland power without efforts incessant as well as exhausting. Nevertheless, not enduring to abandon these continental Ionians to the mercy of Xerxes, they made the offer to transplant them into European Greece, and to make room for them by expelling the *medizing* Greeks from their seaport towns. But this proposition was at once repudiated by the Athenians, who would not permit that colonies originally planted by themselves should be abandoned, thus impairing the metropolitan dignity of Athens.[406] The Lacedæmonians readily acquiesced in this objection, and were glad, in all probability, to find honorable grounds for renouncing a scheme of wholesale dispossession eminently difficult to execute, [407]—yet, at the same time, to be absolved from onerous obligations towards the Ionians, and to throw upon Athens either the burden of defending or the shame of abandoning them. The first step was thus taken, which we shall quickly see followed by others, for giving to Athens a separate ascendency and separate duties in regard to the Asiatic Greeks, and for introducing first, the confederacy of Delos,—next, Athenian maritime empire.

From the coast of Ionia the Greek fleet sailed northward to the Hellespont, chiefly at the instance of the Athenians, and for the purpose of breaking down the Xerxeian bridge; for so imperfect was their information, that they believed this bridge to be still firm and in passable condition in September, 479 B. C., though it had been broken and useless at the time when Xerxes crossed the strait in his retreat, ten months before, about November, 480 B. C.[408] Having ascertained on their arrival at Abydos the destruction of the bridge, Leotychidês and the Peloponnesians returned home forthwith; but Xanthippus with the Athenian squadron resolved to remain and expel the Persians from the Thracian Chersonese. This peninsula had been in great part an Athenian possession, for the space of more than forty years, from the first settlement of the elder Miltiadês[409] down to the suppression of the Ionic revolt, although during part of that time tributary to Persia: from the flight of the second Miltiadês to the expulsion of Xerxes from Greece (493-480 B. C.), a period during which the Persian monarch was irresistible and full of hatred to Athens, no Athenian citizen would find it safe to live there. But the Athenian squadron from Mykalê were now naturally eager both to reëstablish the ascendency of Athens and to regain the properties of Athenian citizens in the Chersonese,—probably many of the leading men, especially Kimon, son of Miltiadês, had extensive possessions there to recover, as Alkibiades had in after days, with private forts of his own.[410] To this motive for attacking the Chersonese may be added another,—the importance of its corn-produce as well as of a clear passage through the Hellespont for the corn ships out of the Propontis to Athens and Ægina.[411] Such were the reasons which induced Xanthippus and the leading Athenians, even without the coöperation of the Peloponnesians, to undertake the siege of Sestus,—the strongest place in the peninsula, the key of the strait, and

the centre in which all the neighboring Persian garrisons, from Kardia and elsewhere, had got together, under Œobazus and Artayktês.[412]

The Grecian inhabitants of the Chersonese readily joined the Athenians in expelling the Persians, who, taken altogether by surprise, had been constrained to throw themselves into Sestus, without stores of provisions or means of making a long defence. But of all the Chersonesites the most forward and exasperated were the inhabitants of Elæus,—the southernmost town of the peninsula, celebrated for its tomb, temple, and sacred grove of the hero Protesilaus, who figured in the Trojan legend as the foremost warrior in the host of Agamemnon to leap ashore, and as the first victim to the spear of Hektor. The temple of Protesilaus, conspicuously placed on the sea-shore,[413] was a scene of worship and pilgrimage not merely for the inhabitants of Elæus, but also for the neighboring Greeks generally, insomuch that it had been enriched with ample votive offerings, and probable deposits for security,—money, gold and silver saucers, brazen implements, robes, and various other presents. The story ran, that when Xerxes was on his march across the Hellespont into Greece, Artayktês, greedy of all this wealth, and aware that the monarch would not knowingly permit the sanctuary to be despoiled, preferred a wily request to him: "Master, here is the house of a Greek, who, in invading thy territory, met his just reward and perished: I pray thee give his house to me, in order that people may learn for the future not to invade *thy* land,"—the whole soil of Asia being regarded by the Persian monarchs as their rightful possession, and Protesilaus having been in this sense an aggressor against them. Xerxes, interpreting the request literally, and not troubling himself to ask who the invader was, consented: upon which, Artayktês, while the army were engaged in their forward march into Greece, stripped the sacred grove of Protesilaus, carrying all the treasures to Sestus. Nor was he content without still farther outraging Grecian sentiment: he turned cattle into the grove, ploughed and sowed it, and was even said to have profaned the sanctuary by visiting it with his concubines.[414] Such proceedings were more than enough to raise the strongest antipathy against him among the Chersonesite Greeks, who now crowded to reinforce the Athenians and blocked him up in Sestus. After a certain length of siege, the stock of provisions in the town failed, and famine began to make itself felt among the garrison, which nevertheless still held out, by painful shifts and endurance, until a late period in the autumn, when the patience even of the Athenian besiegers was well-nigh exhausted; nor was it without difficulty that the leaders repressed the clamorous desire manifested in their own camp to return to Athens.

Impatience having been appeased, and the seamen kept together, the siege was pressed without relaxation, and presently the privations of the garrison became intolerable; so that Artayktês and Œobazus were at last reduced to the necessity of escaping by stealth, letting themselves down with a few followers from the wall at a point where it was imperfectly blockaded. Œobazus found his way into Thrace, where, however, he was taken captive by the Absinthian natives and offered up as a

sacrifice to their god Pleistôrus: Artayktês fled northward along the shores of the Hellespont, but was pursued by the Greeks, and made prisoner near Ægos Potamos, after a strenuous resistance. He was brought with his son in chains to Sestus, which immediately after his departure had been cheerfully surrendered by its inhabitants to the Athenians. It was in vain that he offered a sum of one hundred talents as compensation to the treasury of Protesilaus, and a farther sum of two hundred talents to the Athenians as personal ransom for himself and his son. So deep was the wrath inspired by his insults to the sacred ground, that both the Athenian commander Xanthippus and the citizens of Elæus disdained everything less than a severe and even cruel personal atonement for the outraged Protesilaus. Artayktês, after having first seen his son stoned to death before his eyes, was hung up to a lofty board fixed for the purpose, and left to perish, on the spot where the Xerxeian bridge had been fixed.[415] There is something in this proceeding more Oriental than Grecian: it is not in the Grecian character to aggravate death by artificial and lingering preliminaries.

After the capture of Sestus, the Athenian fleet returned home with their plunder, towards the commencement of winter, not omitting to carry with them the vast cables of the Xerxeian bridge, which had been taken in the town, as a trophy to adorn the acropolis of Athens.[416]

CHAPTER XLIII.

EVENTS IN SICILY DOWN TO THE EXPULSION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND.

I HAVE already mentioned, in the third volume of this history, the foundation of the Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily, together with the general fact, that in the sixth century before the Christian era, they were among the most powerful and flourishing cities that bore the Hellenic name. Beyond this general fact, we obtain little insight into their history.

Though Syracuse, after it fell into the hands of Gelo, about 485 B. C., became the most powerful city in Sicily, yet in the preceding century Gela and Agrigentum, on the south side of the island, had been its superiors. The latter, within a few years of its foundation, fell under the dominion of one of its own citizens, named Phalaris; a despot energetic, warlike, and cruel. An exile from Astypalæa near Rhodes, but a rich man, and an early settler at Agrigentum, he contrived to make himself despot, seemingly, about the year 570 B. C. He had been named to one of the chief posts in the city, and having undertaken at his own cost the erection of a temple to Zeus Polieus in the acropolis (as the Athenian Alkmæônids rebuilt the burnt temple of Delphi), he was allowed on this pretence to assemble therein a considerable number of men; whom he armed, and availed himself of the opportunity of a festival of Dêmêtêr to turn them against the people. He is said to have made many conquests over the petty Sikan communities in the neighborhood: but exaction and cruelties towards his own subjects are noticed as his most prominent characteristic, and his brazen bull passed into imperishable memory. This piece of mechanism was hollow, and sufficiently capacious to contain one or more victims inclosed within it, to perish in tortures when the metal was heated: the cries of these suffering prisoners passed for the roarings of the animal. The artist was named Perillus, and is said to have been himself the first person burnt in it, by order of the despot. In spite of the odium thus incurred, Phalaris maintained himself as despot for sixteen years; at the end of which period a general rising of the people, headed by a leading man named Telemachus, terminated both his reign and his life.[417] Whether Telemachus became despot or not, we have no information: sixty years afterwards, we shall find his descendant Thêron established in that position.

It was about the period of the death of Phalaris that the Syracusans reconquered their revolted colony of Kamarina (in the southeast of the island between Syracuse and Gela), expelled or dispossessed the inhabitants, and resumed the territory.[418] With the exception of this accidental circumstance, we are without information about the Sicilian cities until a time rather before 500 B. C., just when the war between Kro-

ton and Sybaris had extinguished the power of the latter, and when the despotism of the Peisistratids at Athens had been exchanged for the democratical constitution of Kleisthenês. The first forms of government among the Sicilian Greeks, as among the cities of Greece Proper in the early historical age, appear to have been all oligarchical: we do not know under what particular modifications, but probably all more or less resembling that of Syracuse, where the Gamori—or wealthy proprietors descended from the original colonizing chiefs—possessing large landed properties titled by a numerous Sikel serf population called Kyllyrii, formed the qualified citizens, out of whom, as well as by whom, magistrates and generals were chosen; while the Demos, or non-privileged freemen, comprised the small proprietary cultivators who maintained themselves, by manual labor and without slaves, from their own lands or gardens, together with the artisans and tradesmen. In the course of two or three generations, many individuals of the privileged class would have fallen into poverty and would find themselves more nearly on a par with the non-privileged; while such members of the latter as might rise to opulence were not for that reason admitted into the privileged body. Here were ample materials for discontent: ambitious leaders, often themselves members of the privileged body, put themselves at the head of the popular opposition, overthrew the oligarchy, and made themselves despots; democracy being at that time hardly known anywhere in Greece. The general fact of this change, preceded by occasional violent dissensions among the privileged class themselves,[419] is all that we are permitted to know, without those modifying circumstances by which it must have been accompanied in every separate city. Towards or near the year 500 B. C., we find Anaxilaus despot at Rhegium, Skythês at Zanklê, Têrillus at Himera, Peithagoras at Selinus, Kleander at Gela, and Panætius at Leontini.[420] It was about the year 509 B. C. that the Spartan prince Dorieus conducted a body of emigrants to the territories of Eryx and Egesta, near the northwestern corner of the island, in hopes of expelling the non-Hellenic inhabitants and founding a new Grecian colony. But the Carthaginians, whose Sicilian possessions were close adjoining, and who had already aided in driving Dorieus from a previous establishment at Kinyps in Libya,—now lent such vigorous assistance to the Egestæan inhabitants, that the Spartan prince, after a short period of prosperity, was defeated and slain with most of his companions: such of them as escaped, under the orders of Euryleon, took possession of Minoa, which bore from henceforward the name of Herakleia,[421]—a colony and dependency of the neighboring town of Selinus, of which Peithagoras was then despot. Euryleon joined the malcontents at Selinus, overthrew Peithagoras, and established himself as despot, until, after a short possession of power, he was slain in a popular mutiny.[422]

We are here introduced to the first known instance of that series of contests between the Phenicians and Greeks in Sicily, which, like the struggles between the Saracens and the Normans in the eleventh and twelfth centuries after the Christian era, were destined to determine whether the island should be a part of Africa or a part of Europe,—and which were only terminated, after the lapse of three centuries,

by the absorption of both into the vast bosom of Rome. It seems that the Carthaginians and Egestæans not only overwhelmed Dorieus, but also made some conquests of the neighboring Grecian possessions, which were subsequently recovered by Gelo of Syracuse.[423]

Not long after the death of Dorieus, Kleander, despot of Gela, began to raise his city to ascendency over the other Sicilian Greeks, who had hitherto been, if not all equal, at least all independent. His powerful mercenary force, levied in part among the Sikel tribes,[424] did not preserve him from the sword of a Geloan citizen named Sabyllus, who slew him after a reign of seven years: but it enabled his brother and successor Hippokratês to extend his dominion over nearly half of the island. In that mercenary force two officers, Gelo and Ænesidêmus (the latter a citizen of Agrigentum, of the conspicuous family of the Emmenidæ, and descended from Telemachus, the deposer of Phalaris), particularly distinguished themselves. Gelo was descended from a native of Têlos near the Triopian cape, one of the original settlers who accompanied the Rhodian Antiphêmus to Sicily. His immediate ancestor, named Têlinês, had first raised the family to distinction, by valuable aid to a defeated political party, who had been worsted in a struggle, and forced to seek shelter in the neighboring town of Maktorium. Têlinês was possessed of certain peculiar sacred rites (or visible and portable holy symbols, with a privileged knowledge of the ceremonial acts and formalities of divine service under which they were to be shown) for propitiating the subterranean goddesses, Dêmêtêr and Persephonê; "from whom he obtained them, or how he got at them himself (says Herodotus) I cannot say:" but such was the imposing effect of his presence and manner of exhibiting them, that he ventured to march into Gela at the head of the exiles from Maktorium, and was enabled to reinstate them in power,—deterring the people from resistance in the same manner as the Athenians had been overawed by the spectacle of Phyê-Athênê in the chariot along with Peisistratus. The extraordinary boldness of this proceeding excites the admiration of Herodotus, especially as he had been informed that Têlinês was of an unwarlike temperament: the restored exiles rewarded it by granting to him, and to his descendants after him, the hereditary dignity of hierophants of the two goddesses, [425]—a function certainly honorable, and probably lucrative, connected with the administration of consecrated property and with the enjoyment of a large portion of its fruits.

Gelo thus belonged to an ancient and distinguished hierophantic family at Gela, being the eldest of four brothers, sons of Deinomenes,—Gelo, Hiero, Polyzelus, and Thrasybulus: and he further ennobled himself by such personal exploits in the army of the despot Hippokratês as to be promoted to the supreme command of the cavalry. It was greatly to his activity that the despot owed a succession of victories and conquests, in which the Ionic or Chalkidic cities of Kallipolis, Naxos, Leontini, and Zanklê, were successively reduced to dependence.[426]

The fate of Zanklê,—seemingly held by its despot Skythês, in a state of dependent alliance under Hippokratês, and in standing feud with Anaxilaus of Rhegium, on the opposite side of the strait of Messina,—was remarkable. At the time when the Ionic revolt in Asia was suppressed, and Milêtus reconquered by the Persians (B. C. 494-493), a natural sympathy was manifested by the Ionic Greeks in Sicily towards the sufferers of the same race on the east of the Ægean sea. Projects were devised for assisting the Asiatic refugees to a new abode, and the Zanklæans especially, invited them to form a new Pan-Ionic colony upon the territory of the Sikels, called Kalê Aktê, on the north coast of Sicily,—a coast presenting fertile and attractive situations, and along the whole line of which there was only one Grecian colony,—Himera. This invitation was accepted by the refugees from Samos and Milêtus, who accordingly put themselves on shipboard for Zanklê; steering, as was usual, along the coast of Akarnania to Korkyra, from thence across to Tarentum, and along the Italian coast to the strait of Messina. It happened that when they reached the town of Epizephyrian Lokri, Skythês, the despot of Zanklê, was absent from his city, together with the larger portion of his military force, on an expedition against the Sikels,—perhaps undertaken to facilitate the contemplated colony at Kalê Aktê: and his enemy the Rhegian Anaxilaus, taking advantage of this accident, proposed to the refugees at Lokri that they should seize for themselves, and retain, the unguarded city of Zanklê. They followed his suggestion, and possessed themselves of the city, together with the families and property of the absent Zanklæans; who speedily returned to repair their loss, while their prince Skythês farther invoked the powerful aid of his ally and superior, Hippokratês. The latter, however, provoked at the loss of one of his dependent cities, seized and imprisoned Skythês, whom he considered as the cause of it,[427] at Inykus, in the interior of the island; but he found it at the same time advantageous to accept a proposition made to him by the Samians, captors of the city, and to betray the Zanklæans whom he had come to aid. By a convention, ratified with an oath, it was agreed that Hippokratês should receive for himself all the extra-mural, and half the intra-mural, property and slaves belonging to Zanklæans, leaving the other half to the Samians. Among the property without the walls, not the least valuable part consisted in the persons of those Zanklæans whom Hippokratês had come to assist, but whom he now carried away as slaves: excepting, however, from this lot, three hundred of the principal citizens, whom he delivered over to the Samians to be slaughtered,—probably lest they might find friends to procure their ransom, and afterwards disturb the Samian possession of the town. Their lives were however spared by the Samians, though we are not told what became of them. This transaction, alike perfidious on the part of the Samians and of Hippokratês, secured to the former a flourishing city, and to the latter an abundant booty. We are glad to learn that the imprisoned Skythês found means to escape to Darius, king of Persia, from whom he received a generous shelter,—imperfect compensation for the iniquity of his fellow Greeks.[428] The Samians, however, did not long retain possession of their conquest, but were expelled by the very person who had instigated them to seize it,—

Anaxilaus, of Rhegium. He planted in it new inhabitants, of Dorian and Messenian race, recolonizing it under the name of Messênê,—a name which it ever afterwards bore;[429] and it appears to have been governed either by himself or by his son Kleophron, until his death about B. C. 476.

Besides the conquests above mentioned, Hippokratês of Gela was on the point of making the still more important acquisition of Syracuse, and was only prevented from doing so, after defeating the Syracusans at the river Helôrus, and capturing many prisoners, by the mediation of the Corinthians and Korkyræans, who prevailed on him to be satisfied with the cession of Kamarina and its territory as a ransom. Having repeopled this territory, which became thus annexed to Gela, he was prosecuting his conquests farther among the Sikels, when he died or was killed at Hybla. His death caused a mutiny among the Geloans, who refused to acknowledge his sons, and strove to regain their freedom; but Gelo, the general of horse in the army, espousing the cause of the sons with energy, put down by force the resistance of the people. As soon as this was done, he threw off the mask, deposed the sons of Hippokratês, and seized the sceptre himself.[430]

Thus master of Gela, and succeeding probably to the ascendency enjoyed by his predecessor over the Ionic cities, Gelo became the most powerful man in the island; but an incident which occurred a few years afterwards (B. C. 485), while it aggrandized him still farther, transferred the seat of his power from Gela to Syracuse. The Syracusan Gamori, or oligarchical order of proprietary families, probably humbled by their ruinous defeat at the Helôrus, were dispossessed of the government by a combination between their serf-cultivators, called the Kyllyrii, and the smaller freemen, called the Demos; they were forced to retire to Kasmenæ, where they invoked the aid of Gelo to restore them. That ambitious prince undertook the task, and accomplished it with facility; for the Syracusan people, probably unable to resist their political opponents when backed by such powerful foreign aid, surrendered to him without striking a blow.[431] But instead of restoring the place to the previous oligarchy, Gelo appropriated it to himself, and left Gela to be governed by his brother Hiero. He greatly enlarged the city of Syracuse, and strengthened its fortifications: probably it was he who first carried it beyond the islet of Ortygia, so as to include a larger space of the adjacent mainland (or rather island of Sicily) which bore the name of Achradina. To people this enlarged space, he brought all the residents in Kamarina, which town he dismantled,—and more than half of those in Gela; which was thus reduced in importance, while Syracuse became the first city in Sicily, and even received fresh addition of inhabitants from the neighboring towns of Megara and Eubœa. Both these towns, like Syracuse, were governed by oligarchies, with serf cultivators dependent upon them, and a Dêmos, or body of smaller freemen, excluded from the political franchise: both were involved in war with Gelo, probably to resist his encroachments,—both were besieged and taken. The oligarchy who ruled these cities, and who were the authors as well as leaders of the year, anticipated nothing but ruin

at the hands of the conqueror; while the Demos, who had not been consulted and had taken no part in the war (which we must presume to have been carried on by the oligarchy and their serfs alone), felt assured that no harm would be done to them. His behavior disappointed the expectations of both. After transporting both of them to Syracuse, he established the oligarchs in that town as citizens, and sold the Demos as slaves, under covenant that they should be exported from Sicily. "His conduct (says Herodotus[432]) was dictated by the conviction, that a Demos was a most troublesome companion to live with." It appears that the state of society which he wished to establish was that of Patricians and clients, without any Plebs; something like that of Thessaly, where there was a proprietary oligarchy living in the cities, with Penestæ, or dependent cultivators, occupying and tilling the land on their account,—but no small self-working proprietors or tradesmen in sufficient number to form a recognized class. And since Gelo was removing the free population from these conquered towns, and leaving in or around the towns no one except the serf-cultivators, we may presume that the oligarchical proprietors when removed might still continue, even as residents at Syracuse, to receive the produce raised for them by others: but the small self-working proprietors, if removed in like manner, would be deprived of subsistence, because their land would be too distant for personal tillage, and they had no serfs. While therefore we fully believe, with Herodotus, that Gelo considered the small free proprietors as "troublesome yoke-fellows,"—a sentiment perfectly natural to a Grecian despot, unless where he found them useful aids to his own ambition against a hostile oligarchy,—we must add that they would become peculiarly troublesome in his scheme of concentrating the free population of Syracuse, seeing that he would have to give them land in the neighborhood or to provide in some other way for their maintenance.

So large an accession of size, walls, and population, rendered Syracuse the first Greek city in Sicily. And the power of Gelo, embracing as it did not merely Syracuse, but so considerable a portion of the rest of the island, Greek as well as Sikel, was the greatest Hellenic force then existing. It appears to have comprised the Grecian cities on the east and southeast of the island from the borders of Agrigentum to those of Zanklê or Messênê, together with no small proportion of the Sikel tribes. Messênê was under the rule of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, Agrigentum under that of Thêro son of Ænesidêmus, Himera under that of Terillus; while Selinus, close on the borders of Egesta and the Carthaginian possessions, had its own government free or despotic, but appears to have been allied with or dependent upon Carthage.[433] A dominion thus extensive doubtless furnished ample tribute; besides which Gelo, having conquered and dispossessed many landed proprietors and having recolonized Syracuse, could easily provide both lands and citizenship to recompense adherents. Hence, he was enabled to enlarge materially the military force transmitted to him by Hippokratês, and to form a naval force besides. Phormis[434] the Mænalian, who took service under him and became citizen of Syracuse, with fortune enough to send donatives to Olympia,—and Agêsias, the Iamid prophet from Stymphâlus,[435]—are

doubtless not the only examples of emigrants joining him from Arcadia; for the Arcadian population were poor, brave, and ready for mercenary soldiership; nor can we doubt that the service of a Greek despot in Sicily must have been more attractive to them than that of Xerxes.[436] Moreover, during the ten years between the battles of Marathon and Salamis, when not only so large a portion of the Greek cities had become subject to Persia, but the prospect of Persian invasion hung like a cloud over Greece Proper, the increased feeling of insecurity throughout the latter probably rendered emigration to Sicily unusually inviting.

These circumstances in part explain the immense power and position which Herodotus represents Gelo to have enjoyed, towards the autumn of 481 B. C., when the Greeks from the isthmus of Corinth, confederated to resist Xerxes, sent to solicit his aid. He was then imperial leader of Sicily: he could offer to the Greek—so the historian tells us—twenty thousand hoplites, two hundred triremes, two thousand cavalry, two thousand archers, two thousand slingers, two thousand light-armed horse, besides furnishing provisions for the entire Grecian force as long as the war might last.[437] If this numerical statement could be at all trusted, which I do not believe, Herodotus would be much within the truth in saying, that there was no other Hellenic power which would bear the least comparison with that of Gelo:[438] and we may well assume such general superiority to be substantially true, though the numbers above mentioned may be an empty boast rather than a reality.

Owing to the great power of Gelo, we now for the first time trace an incipient tendency in Sicily to combined and central operations. It appears that Gelo had formed the plan of uniting the Greek forces in Sicily for the purpose of expelling the Carthaginians and Egestæans, either wholly or partially, from their maritime possessions in the western corner of the island, and of avenging the death of the Spartan prince, Dorieus;—that he even attempted, though in vain, to induce the Spartans and other central Greeks to coöperate in this plan,—and that, upon their refusal, he had in part executed it with the Sicilian forces alone.[439] We have nothing but a brief and vague allusion to this exploit, wherein Gelo appears as the chief and champion of Hellenic against barbaric interests in Sicily,—the forerunner of Dionysius, Timoleon, and Agathoklês. But he had already begun to conceive himself, and had already been recognized by others, in this commanding position, when the envoys of Sparta, Athens, Corinth, etc., reached him from the isthmus of Corinth, in 481 B. C., to entreat his aid for the repulse of the vast host of invaders about to cross the Hellespont. Gelo, after reminding them that they had refused a similar application for aid from him, said that, far from requiting them at the hour of need in the like ungenerous spirit, he would bring to them an overwhelming reinforcement (the numbers as given by Herodotus have been already stated), but upon one condition only,—that he should be recognized as generalissimo of the entire Grecian force against the Persians. His offer was repudiated, with indignant scorn, by the Spartan envoy: and Gelo then so far abated in his demand, as to be content with the command either of

the land-force or the naval force, whichever might be judged preferable. But here the Athenian envoy interposed his protest: "We are sent here (said he) to ask for an army, and not for a general; and thou givest us the army, only in order to make thyself general. Know, that even if the Spartans would allow thee to command at sea, *we* would not. The naval command is ours, if they decline it: we Athenians, the oldest nation in Greece,—the only Greeks who have never migrated from home,—whose leader before Troy stands proclaimed by Homer as the best of all the Greeks for marshalling and keeping order in an army,—we, who moreover furnish the largest naval contingent in the fleet,—*we* will never submit to be commanded by a Syracusan."

"Athenian stranger (replied Gelo), ye seem to be provided with commanders, but ye are not likely to have soldiers to be commanded. Ye may return as soon as you please, and tell the Greeks that their year is deprived of its spring."[440]

That envoys were sent from Peloponnesus to solicit assistance from Gelo against Xerxes, and that they solicited in vain, is an incident not to be disputed: but the reason assigned for refusal—conflicting pretensions about the supreme command—may be suspected to have arisen less from historical transmission, than from the conceptions of the historian, or of his informants, respecting the relations between the parties. In his time, Sparta, Athens, and Syracuse were the three great imperial cities of Greece, and his Sicilian witnesses, proud of the great past power of Gelo, might well ascribe to him that competition for preëminence and command which Herodotus has dramatized. The immense total of forces which Gelo is made to promise becomes the more incredible, when we reflect that he had another and a better reason for refusing aid altogether. He was attacked at home, and was fully employed in defending himself.

The same spring which brought Xerxes across the Hellespont into Greece, also witnessed a formidable Carthaginian invasion of Sicily. Gelo had already been engaged in war against them, as has been above stated, and had obtained successes, which they would naturally seek the first opportunity of retrieving. The vast Persian invasion of Greece, organized for three years before, and drawing contingents not only from the whole eastern world, but especially from their own metropolitan brethren at Tyre and Sidon, was well calculated to encourage them: and there seems good reason for believing that the simultaneous attack on the Greeks both in Peloponnesus and in Sicily, was concerted between the Carthaginians and Xerxes,[441]—probably by the Phenicians on behalf of Xerxes. Nevertheless, this alliance does not exclude other concurrent circumstances in the interior of the island, which supplied the Carthaginians both with invitation and with help. Agrigentum, though not under the dominion of Gelo, was ruled by his friend and relative Thêro: while Rhegium and Messênê under the government of Anaxilaus, Himera under that of his father-in-law Terillus, and Selinus, seem to have formed an opposing minority among the Sicilian Greeks; at variance with Gelo and Thêro, but in amity and correspondence with Carthage.[442] It was seemingly about the year 481 B. C., that Thêro, perhaps invited

by an Himeræan party, expelled from Himera the despot Terillus, and became possessed of the town. Terillus applied for aid to Carthage, backed by his son-in-law Anaxilaus, who espoused the quarrel so warmly, as even to tender his own children as hostages to Hamilkar the Carthaginian suffes, or general, the personal friend or guest of Terillus. The application was favorably entertained, and Hamilkar, arriving at Panormus in the eventful year 480 B. C., with a fleet of three thousand ships of war and a still larger number of storeships, disembarked a land-force of three hundred thousand men: which would even have been larger, had not the vessels carrying the cavalry and the chariots happened to be dispersed by storms.[443] These numbers we can only repeat as we find them, without trusting them any farther than as proof that the armament was on the most extensive scale. But the different nations of whom Herodotus reports the land-force to have consisted are trustworthy and curious: it included Phenicians, Libyans, Iberians, Ligyes, Helisyki, Sardinians, and Corsicans.[444] This is the first example known to us of those numerous mercenary armies, which it was the policy of Carthage to compose of nations different in race and language,[445] in order to obviate conspiracy or mutiny against the general. Having landed at Panormus, Hamilkar marched to Himera, dragged his vessels on shore under the shelter of a rampart, and then laid siege to the town: while the Himeræans, reinforced by Thêro and the army of Agrigentum, determined on an obstinate defence, and even bricked up the gates. Pressing messages were despatched to solicit aid from Gelo, who collected his whole force, said to have amounted to fifty thousand foot, and five thousand horse, and marched to Himera. His arrival restored the courage of the inhabitants, and after some partial fighting, which turned out to the advantage of the Greeks, a general battle ensued. It was obstinate and bloody, lasting from sunrise until late in the afternoon; and its success was mainly determined by an intercepted letter which fell into the hands of Gelo,—a communication from the Selinuntines to Hamilkar, promising to send a body of horse to his aid, and intimating the time at which they would arrive. A party of Gelo's horse, instructed to personate this reinforcement from Selinus, were received into the camp of Hamilkar, where they spread consternation and disorder, and are even said to have slain the general and set fire to the ships: while the Greek army, brought to action at this opportune moment, at length succeeded in triumphing over both superior numbers and a determined resistance. If we are to believe Diodorus, one hundred and fifty thousand men were slain on the side of the Carthaginians; the rest fled partly to the Sikanian mountains, where they became prisoners of the Agrigentines,—partly to a hilly ground, where, from want of water, they were obliged to surrender at discretion: twenty ships alone escaped with a few fugitives, and these twenty were destroyed by a storm in the passage, so that only one small boat arrived at Carthage with the disastrous tidings.[446] Dismissing such unreasonable exaggerations, we can only venture to assert that the battle was strenuously disputed, the victory complete, and the slain as well as the prisoners numerous. The body of Hamilkar was never discovered, in spite of careful search ordered by Gelo: the Carthaginians affirmed, that as soon

as the defeat of his army became irreparable, he had cast himself into the great sacrificial fire, wherein he had been offering entire victims (the usual sacrifice consisting only of a small part of the beast),[447] to propitiate the gods, and had there been consumed. The Carthaginians erected funereal monuments to him, graced with periodical sacrifices, both in Carthage and in their principal colonies:[448] on the field of battle itself also, a monument was raised to him by the Greeks. On that monument, seventy years afterwards, his victorious grandson, fresh from the plunder of this same city of Himera, offered the bloody sacrifice of three thousand Grecian prisoners.[449]

We may presume that Anaxilaus with the forces of Rhegium shared in the defeat of the foreign invader whom he had called in, and probably other Greeks besides. All of them were now compelled to sue for peace from Gelo, and to solicit the privilege of being enrolled as his dependent allies, which was granted to them without any harder imposition than the tribute probably involved in that relation.[450] Even the Carthaginians themselves were so intimidated by the defeat, that they sent envoys to ask for peace at Syracuse, which they are said to have obtained mainly by the solicitation of Damaretê, wife of Gelo, on condition of paying two thousand talents to defray the costs of the war, and of erecting two temples in which the terms of the treaty were to be permanently recorded.[451] If we could believe the assertion of Theophrastus, Gelo exacted from the Carthaginians a stipulation that they would for the future abstain from human sacrifices in their religious worship:[452] but such an interference with foreign religious rites would be unexampled in that age, and we know, moreover, that the practice was not permanently discontinued at Carthage. [453] Indeed, we may reasonably suspect that Diodorus, copying from writers like Ephorus, and Timæus, long after the events, has exaggerated considerably the defeat, the humiliation, and the amercement, of the Carthaginians. For the words of the poet Pindar, a very few years after the battle of Himera, represent a fresh Carthaginian invasion as matter of present uneasiness and alarm:[454] and the Carthaginian fleet is found engaged in aggressive warfare on the coast of Italy, requiring to be coerced by the brother and successor of Gelo.

The victory of Himera procured for the Sicilian cities immunity from foreign war together with a rich plunder. Splendid offerings of thanksgiving to the gods were dedicated in the temples of Himera, Syracuse, and Delphi: and the epigram of Simonidês,[455] composed for the tripod offered in the latter temple, described Gelo with his three brothers Hiero, Polyzêlus, and Thrasybulus, as the joint liberators of Greece from the Barbarian, along with the victors of Salamis and Platæa. And the Sicilians alleged that he was on the point of actually sending reinforcements to the Greeks against Xerxes, in spite of the necessity of submitting to Spartan command, when the intelligence of the defeat and retreat of that prince reached him. But we find another statement decidedly more probable,—that he sent a confidential envoy named Kadmus, to Delphi, with orders to watch the turn of the Xerxeian invasion,

and in case it should prove successful (as he thought that it probably would be) to tender presents and submission to the victorious invader on behalf of Syracuse.[456] When we consider that until the very morning of the battle of Salamis, the cause of Grecian independence must have appeared to an impartial spectator almost desperate, we cannot wonder that Gelo should take precautions for preventing the onward progress of the Persians towards Sicily, which was already sufficiently imperiled by its formidable enemies in Africa. The defeat of the Persians at Salamis, and of the Carthaginians at Himera, cleared away, suddenly and unexpectedly, the terrific cloud from Greece as well as from Sicily, and left a sky comparatively brilliant with prosperous hopes.

To the victorious army of Gelo, there was abundant plunder for recompense as well as distribution: among the most valuable part of the plunder were the numerous prisoners taken, who were divided among the cities in proportion to the number of troops furnished by each. Of course the largest shares must have fallen to Syracuse and Agrigentum: while the number acquired by the latter was still farther increased by the separate capture of those prisoners who had dispersed throughout the mountains in and near the Agrigentine territory. All the Sicilian cities allied with or dependent on Gelo, but especially the two last mentioned, were thus put in possession of a number of slaves as public property, who were kept in chains to work,[457] and were either employed on public undertakings for defence, ornament, and religious solemnity,—or let out to private masters so as to afford a revenue to the state. So great was the total of these public slaves at Agrigentum, that though many were employed on state-works, which elevated the city to signal grandeur during the flourishing period of seventy years which intervened between the recent battle and its subsequent capture by the Carthaginians,—there nevertheless remained great numbers to be let out to private individuals, some of whom had no less than five hundred slaves respectively in their employment.[458]

The peace which now ensued left Gelo master of Syracuse and Gela, with the Chalkidic Greek towns on the east of the island; while Thêro governed in Agrigentum, and his son Thrasydæus in Himera. In power as well as in reputation, Gelo was unquestionably the chief person in the island; moreover, he was connected by marriage, and lived on terms of uninterrupted friendship, with Thêro. His conduct both at Syracuse and towards the cities dependent upon him, was mild and conciliating. But his subsequent career was very short: he died of a dropsical complaint, not much more than a year after the battle of Himera, while the glories of that day were fresh in every one's recollection. As the Syracusan law rigorously interdicted expensive funerals, Gelo had commanded that his own obsequies should be conducted in strict conformity to the law: nevertheless, the zeal of his successor as well as the attachment of the people disobeyed these commands. The great mass of citizens followed his funeral procession from the city to the estate of his wife, fifteen miles distant: nine massive towers were erected to distinguish the spot; and the solemnities of

heroic worship were rendered to him. Nor did the respectful recollections of the conqueror of Himera ever afterwards die out among the Syracusan people, though his tomb was defaced, first by the Carthaginians, and afterwards by the despot Agathoklês.[459] And when we recollect the destructive effects caused by the subsequent Carthaginian invasions, we shall be sensible how great was the debt of gratitude owing to Gelo by his contemporaries.

It was not merely as conqueror of Himera, but as a sort of second founder of Syracuse,[460] that Gelo was thus solemnly worshipped. The size, the strength, and the population of the town were all greatly increased under him. Besides the number of new inhabitants which he brought from Gela, the Hyblæan Megara, and the Sicilian Eubœa, we are informed that he also inscribed on the roll of citizens no less than ten thousand mercenary soldiers. It will, moreover, appear that these new-made citizens were in possession of the islet of Ortygia, and the portion of the city closely bordering on it, which bore the name of Achradina,[461]—the interior strongholds of Syracuse. It has already been stated that Ortygia was the original settlement, and that the city did not overstep the boundaries of the islet before the enlargements of Gelo. We do not know by what arrangements Gelo provided new lands for so large a number of newcomers; but when we come to notice the antipathy with which these latter were regarded by the remaining citizens, we shall be inclined to believe that the old citizens had been dispossessed and degraded.

Gelo left a son in tender years; but his power passed, by his own direction, to two of his brothers, Polyzêlus and Hiero; the former of whom married the widow of the deceased prince, and was named, according to his testamentary directions, commander of the military force,—while Hiero was intended to enjoy the government of the city. Whatever may have been the wishes of Gelo, however, the real power fell to Hiero,—a man of energy and determination, and munificent as a patron of contemporary poets, Pindar, Simonidês, Bacchylidês, Epicharmus, Æschylus, and others; but the victim of a painful internal complaint, jealous in his temper, cruel and rapacious in his government,[462] and noted as an organizer of that systematic espionage which broke up all freedom of speech among his subjects. Especially jealous of his brother Polyzêlus, who was very popular in the city, he despatched him on a military expedition against the Krotoniates, with a view of indirectly accomplishing his destruction: but Polyzêlus, aware of the snare, fled to Agrigentum, and sought protection from his brother-in-law, the despot Thêron; from whom Hiero redemanded him, and, on receiving a refusal, prepared to enforce the demand by arms. He had already advanced on his march as far as the river Gela, but no actual battle appears to have taken place: it is interesting to hear that Simonidês the poet, esteemed and rewarded by both these princes, was the mediator of peace between them.[463]

The temporary breach, and sudden reconciliation, between these two powerful despots, proved the cause of sorrow and ruin at Himera. That city, under the dominion of the Agrigentine Thêro, was administered by his son Thrasydæus,—a youth

whose oppressive conduct speedily excited the strongest antipathy. The Himeræans, knowing that they had little chance of redress from Thêro against his son, took advantage of the quarrel between him and Hiero to make propositions to the latter, and to entreat his aid for the expulsion of Thrasydæus, tendering themselves as subjects of Syracuse. It appears that Kapys and Hippokratês, cousins of Thêro, but at variance with him, and also candidates for the protection of Hiero, were concerned in this scheme for detaching Himera from the dominion of Thêro. But so soon as peace had been concluded, Hiero betrayed to Thêro both the schemes and the malcontents at Himera. We seem to make out that Kapys and Hippokratês collected some forces to resist Thêro, but were defeated by him at the river Himera:[464] his victory was followed by seizing and putting to death a large number of Himeræan citizens. So great was the number slain, coupled with the loss of others who fled for fear of being slain, that the population of the city was sensibly and inconveniently diminished. Thêro invited and enrolled a large addition of new citizens, chiefly of Dorian blood. [465]

The power of Hiero, now reconciled both with Thêro and with his brother Polyzêlus, is marked by several circumstances as noway inferior to that of Gelo, and probably the greatest not merely in Sicily, but throughout the Grecian world. The citizens of the distant city of Cumæ, on the coast of Italy, harassed by Carthaginian and Tyrrhenian fleets, entreated his aid, and received from him a squadron which defeated and drove off their enemies:[466] he even settled a Syracusan colony in the neighboring island of Pithekusa. Anaxilaus, despot of Rhegium and Messênê, had attacked, and might probably have overpowered, his neighbors, the Epizephyrian Lokrians; but the menaces of Hiero, invoked by the Lokrians, and conveyed by the envoy Chromius, compelled him to desist.[467] Those heroic honors, which in Greece belonged to the œkist of a new city, were yet wanting to him; and he procured them by the foundation of the new city of Ætna,[468] on the site and in the place of Katana, the inhabitants of which he expelled, as well as those of Naxos. While these Naxians and Katanæans were directed to take up their abode at Leontini along with the existing inhabitants, Hiero planted ten thousand new inhabitants in his adopted city of Ætna: five thousand from Syracuse and Gela,—with an equal number from Peloponnesus. They served as an auxiliary force, ready to be called forth in the event of discontents at Syracuse, as we shall see by the history of his successor: he gave them not only the territory which had before belonged to Katana, but also a large addition besides, chiefly at the expense of the neighboring Sikel tribes. His son Deinomenês, and his friend and confidant, Chromius, enrolled as an Ætnæan, became joint administrators of the city: its religious and social customs were assimilated to the Dorian model,[469] and Pindar dreams of future relations between the despot and citizens of Ætna, analogous to those between king and citizens at Sparta. Both Hiero and Chromius were proclaimed as Ætnæans at the Pythian and Nemean games, when their chariots gained victories; on which occasion the assembled crowd heard for the first time of the new Hellenic city of Ætna. We see, by the compliments of Pindar,[470]

that Hiero was vain of his new title as founder; but we must remark that it was procured, not, as in most cases, by planting Greeks on a spot previously barbarous, but by the dispossession and impoverishment of other Grecian citizens, who seem to have given no ground of offence. Both in Gelo and Hiero we see the first exhibition of that propensity to violent and wholesale transplantation of inhabitants from one seat to another, which was not uncommon among Assyrian and Persian despots, and which was exhibited on a still larger scale by the successors of Alexander the Great in their numerous new-built cities.

Anaxilaus of Rhegium died shortly after that message of Hiero which had compelled him to spare the Lokrians; but such was the esteem entertained for his memory, and so efficient the government of Mikythus, a manumitted slave whom he constituted regent, that Rhegium and Messênê were preserved for his children, yet minors.[471] But a still more important change in Sicily was caused by the death of the Agrigentine Thêro, which took place, seemingly, about 472 B. C. This prince, a partner with Gelo in the great victory over the Carthaginians, left a reputation of good government as well as ability among the Agrigentines, which we find perpetuated in the laureate strains of Pindar,—and his memory doubtless became still farther endeared from comparison with his son and successor. Thrasydæus, now master both of Himera and Agrigentum, displayed on a larger scale the same oppressive and sanguinary dispositions which had before provoked rebellion at the former city. Feeling himself detested by his subjects, he enlarged the military force which had been left by his father, and engaged so many new mercenaries, that he became master of a force of twenty thousand men, horse and foot. And in his own territory, perhaps, he might long have trodden with impunity in the footsteps of Phalaris, had he not imprudently provoked his more powerful neighbor, Hiero. In an obstinate and murderous battle between these two princes, two thousand men were slain on the side of the Syracusans, and four thousand on that of the Agrigentines: an immense slaughter, considering that it mostly fell upon the Greeks in the two armies, and not upon the non-Hellenic mercenaries.[472] But the defeat of Thrasydæus was so complete, that he was compelled to flee not only from Agrigentum, but from Sicily: he retired to Megara, in Greece Proper, where he was condemned to death and perished.[473] The Agrigentines, thus happily released from their oppressor, sued for and obtained peace from Hiero: they are said to have established a democratical government, but we learn that Hiero sent many citizens into banishment from Agrigentum and Himera, as well as from Gela,[474] nor can we doubt that all the three were numbered among his subject cities. The moment of freedom only commenced for them when the Gelonian dynasty shared the fate of the Theronian.

The victory over Thrasydæus rendered Hiero more completely master of Sicily than his brother Gelo had been before him. The last act which we hear of him, is, his interference on behalf of his brothers-in-law,[475] the sons of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, who were now of age to govern. He encouraged them to prefer, and probably

showed himself ready to enforce, their claim against Mikythus, who had administered Rhegium since the death of Anaxilaus, for the property as well as the sceptre. Mikythus complied readily with the demand, rendering an account so exact and faithful, that the sons of Anaxilaus themselves entreated him to remain and govern,—or more probably to lend his aid to their government. This request he was wise enough to refuse: he removed his own property and retired to Tegea in Arcadia. Hiero died shortly afterwards, of the complaint under which he had so long suffered, after a reign of ten years.[476]

On the death of Hiero, the succession was disputed between his brother Thrasybulus, and his nephew, the youthful son of Gelo, so that the partisans of the family became thus divided. Thrasybulus, surrounding his nephew with temptations to luxurious pleasure, contrived to put him indirectly aside, and thus to seize the government for himself.[477] This family division,—a curse often resting upon the blood-relations of Grecian despots, and leading to the greatest atrocities,[478]—coupled with the conduct of Thrasybulus himself, caused the downfall of the mighty Gelonian dynasty. The bad qualities of Hiero were now seen greatly exaggerated, but without his energy, in Thrasybulus,—who put to death many citizens, and banished still more, for the purpose of seizing their property, until at length he provoked among the Syracusans intense and universal hatred, shared even by many of the old Gelonian partisans. Though he tried to strengthen himself by increasing his mercenary force, he could not prevent a general revolt from breaking out among the Syracusan population. By summoning those citizens whom Hiero had planted in his new city of Ætna, as well as various troops from his dependent allies, he found himself at the head of fifteen thousand men, and master of the interior strongholds of the city,—the island of Ortygia with Achradina, while the great body of the revolted Syracusans were assembled in the outer city called Tychê. Though superior in number, yet being no match in military efficiency for the forces of Thrasybulus, they were obliged to invoke aid from the other cities in Sicily, as well as from the Sikel tribes,—proclaiming the Gelonian dynasty as the common enemy of freedom in the island, and holding out universal independence as the reward of victory. It was fortunate for them that there was no brother-despot, like the powerful Thêro, to espouse the cause of Thrasybulus: Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, Himera, and even the Sikel tribes, all responded to the call with alacrity, so that a large force, both military and naval, came to reinforce the Syracusans: Thrasybulus was totally defeated, first in a naval action, next on land, and obliged to shut himself up in Ortygia and Achradina, where he soon found his situation hopeless. He accordingly opened a negotiation with his opponents, which ended in his abdication and retirement to Lokri, while the mercenary troops whom he had brought together were also permitted to depart unmolested.[479] The expelled Thrasybulus afterwards lived and died as a private citizen at Lokri,—a very different fate from that which had befallen Thrasydæus, son of Thêro at Megara, though both seem to have given the same provocation.

Thus fell the powerful Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse, after a continuance of eighteen years.[480] Its fall was nothing less than an extensive revolution throughout Sicily. Among the various cities of the island there had grown up many petty despots, each with his separate mercenary force; acting as the instruments, and relying on the protection, of the great despot at Syracuse. All these were now expelled, and governments more or less democratical were established everywhere.[481] The sons of Anaxilaus maintained themselves a little longer at Rhegium and Messênê, but the citizens of these two towns at length followed the general example, compelled them to retire,[482] and began their era of freedom.

But though the Sicilian despots had thus been expelled, the free governments established in their place were exposed at first to much difficulty and collision. It has been already mentioned that Gelo, Hiero, Thêro, Thrasydæus, Thrasybulus, etc., had all condemned many citizens to exile with confiscation of property; and had planted on the soil new citizens and mercenaries in numbers no less considerable. To what race these mercenaries belonged, we are not told: it is probable that they were only in part Greeks. Such violent mutations, both of persons and property, could not occur without raising bitter conflicts, of interest as well as of feeling, between the old, the new, and the dispossessed proprietors, as soon as the iron hand of compression was removed. This source of angry dissension was common to all the Sicilian cities, but in none did it flow more profusely than in Syracuse. In that city, the new mercenaries last introduced by Thrasybulus, had retired at the same time with him, many of them to the Hieronian city of Ætna, from whence they had been brought; but there yet remained the more numerous body introduced principally by Gelo, partly also by Hiero, —the former alone had enrolled ten thousand, of whom more than seven thousand yet remained. What part these Gelonian citizens had taken in the late revolution, we do not find distinctly stated: they seem not to have supported Thrasybulus, as a body, and probably many of them took part against him. After the revolution had been accomplished, a public assembly of the Syracusans was convened, in which the first resolution was, to provide for the religious commemoration of the event, by erecting a colossal statue of Zeus Eleutherius, and by celebrating an annual festival to be called the Eleutheria, with solemn matches and sacrifices. They next proceeded to determine the political constitution; and such was the predominant reaction, doubtless aggravated by the returned exiles, of hatred and fear against the expelled dynasty,—that the whole body of new citizens, who had been domiciliated under Gelo and Hiero, were declared ineligible to magistracy or honor. This harsh and sweeping disqualification, falling at once upon a numerous minority, naturally provoked renewed irritation and civil war. The Gelonian citizens, the most warlike individuals in the state, and occupying, as favored partisans of the previous dynasty, the inner and separately fortified sections of Syracuse,[483]—Achradina and Ortygia,—placed themselves in open revolt; while the general mass of citizens, masters of all the outer sections of the city, were not strong enough to assail with success this defensible position. They could only block it up, and intercept its supplies, which the

garrison within were forced to come out and fight for. This disastrous internal war continued for some months, with many partial conflicts both by land and sea: the general body of citizens became accustomed to arms, while a chosen regiment of six hundred trained volunteers acquired especial efficiency. Unable to maintain themselves longer, the Gelonians were forced to hazard a general battle, which, after an obstinate struggle, terminated in their complete defeat. The chosen band of six hundred, who had eminently contributed to this victory, received from their fellow-citizens a crown of honor, and a reward of one mina per head.[484]

The meagre annals, wherein these interesting events are indicated rather than described, tell us scarcely anything of the political arrangements which resulted from so important a victory. Probably the Gelonians were expelled: but we may assume as certain, that the separate fortifications of the island and Achradina were abolished, and that from henceforward there was only one fortified city, until the time of the despot Dionysius, more than fifty years afterwards.[485]

Meanwhile the rest of Sicily had experienced disorders analogous in character to those of Syracuse. At Gela, at Agrigentum, at Himera, the reaction against the Gelonian dynasty had brought back in crowds the dispossessed exiles; who, claiming restitution of their properties and influence, found their demands sustained by the population generally. The Katanæans, whom Hiero had driven from their own city to Leontini, in order that he might convert Katana into his own settlement Ætna, assembled in arms and allied themselves with the Sikel prince Duketius, to reconquer their former home and to restore to the Sikels that which Hiero had taken from them for enlargement of the Ætnæan territory. They were aided by the Syracusans, to whom the neighborhood of these Hieronian partisans was dangerous: but they did not accomplish their object until after a long contest and several battles with the Ætnæans. A convention was at length concluded, by which the latter evacuated Katana and were allowed to occupy the town and territory,—seemingly Sikel,—of Ennesia, or Inessa, upon which they bestowed the name of Ætna,[486] with monuments commemorating Hiero as the founder,—while the tomb of the latter at Katana was demolished by the restored inhabitants.

These conflicts, disturbing the peace of all Sicily, came to be so intolerable, that a general congress was held between the various cities to adjust them. It was determined by joint resolution to readmit the exiles and to extrude the Gelonian settlers everywhere: but an establishment was provided for these latter in the territory of Messênê. It appears that the exiles received back their property, or at least an assignment of other lands in compensation for it. The inhabitants of Gela were enabled to provide for their own exiles by reëstablishing the city of Kamarina,[487] which had been conquered from Syracuse by Hippokratês, despot of Gelo, but which Gelo, on transferring his abode to Syracuse, had made a portion of the Syracusan territory, conveying its inhabitants to the city of Syracuse. The Syracusans now renounced the possession of it,—a cession to be explained probably by the fact, that among the

new-comers transferred by Gelo to Syracuse, there were included not only the previous Kamarinæans, but also many who had before been citizens of Gela.[488] For these men, now obliged to quit Syracuse, it would be convenient to provide an abode at Kamarina, as well as for the other restored Geloan exiles; and we may farther presume that this new city served as a receptacle for other homeless citizens from all parts of the island. It was consecrated by the Geloans as an independent city, with Dorian rights and customs: its lands were distributed anew, and among its settlers were men rich enough to send prize chariots to Peloponnesus, as well as to pay for odes of Pindar. The Olympic victories of the Kamarinæan Psaumis secured for his new city an Hellenic celebrity, at a moment when it hardly yet emerged from the hardships of an initiatory settlement.[489]

Such was the great reactionary movement in Sicily against the high-handed violences of the previous despots. We are only enabled to follow it generally, but we see that all their transplantations and expulsions of inhabitants were reversed, and all their arrangements overthrown. In the correction of the past injustice, we cannot doubt that new injustice was in many cases committed, nor are we surprised to hear that at Syracuse many new enrolments of citizens took place without any rightful claim,[490] probably accompanied by grants of land. The reigning feeling at Syracuse would now be quite opposite to that of the days of Gelo, when the Demos, or aggregate of small self-working proprietors, was considered as "a troublesome yoke-fellow," fit only to be sold into slavery for exportation: it is highly probable that the new table of citizens now prepared included that class of men in larger number than ever, on principles analogous to the liberal enrolments of Kleisthenês at Athens. In spite of all the confusion, however, with which this period of popular government opens, lasting for more than fifty years until the despotism of the elder Dionysius, we shall find it far the best and most prosperous portion of Sicilian history. We shall arrive at it in a subsequent chapter.

Respecting the Grecian cities along the coast of Italy, during the period of the Gelonian dynasty, a few words will exhaust the whole of our knowledge. Rhegium, with its despots Anaxilaus and Mikythus, figures chiefly as a Sicilian city, and has been noticed as such in the stream of Sicilian politics. But it is also involved in the only event which has been preserved to us respecting this portion of the history of the Italian Greeks. It was about the year B. C. 473, that the Tarentines undertook an expedition against their non-Hellenic neighbors the Iapygians, in hopes of conquering Hyria and the other towns belonging to them. Mikythus, despot of Rhegium, against the will of his citizens, despatched three thousand of them by constraint as auxiliaries to the Tarentines. But the expedition proved signally disastrous to both. The Iapygians, to the number of twenty thousand men, encountered the united Grecian forces in the field, and completely defeated them: the battle having taken place in a hostile country, it seems that the larger portion, both of Rhegians and Tarentines, perished, insomuch that Herodotus pronounces it to have been the greatest

Hellenic slaughter within his knowledge.[491] Of the Tarentines slain, a great proportion were opulent and substantial citizens, the loss of whom sensibly affected the city; strengthening the Demos, and rendering the constitution more democratical. In what particulars the change consisted we do not know: the expression of Aristotle gives reason to suppose that even before this event the constitution had been popular.[492]

CHAPTER XLIV.

FROM THE BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALE DOWN TO THE DEATHS OF THEMISTOKLES AND ARISTEIDES.

After having in the last chapter followed the repulse of the Carthaginians by the Sicilian Greeks, we now return to the central Greeks and the Persians,—a case in which the triumph was yet more interesting to the cause of human improvement generally. The disproportion between the immense host assembled by Xerxes, and the little which he accomplished, naturally provokes both contempt for Persian force and an admiration for the comparative handful of men by whom they were so ignominiously beaten. Both these sentiments are just, but both are often exaggerated beyond the point which attentive contemplation of the facts will justify. The Persian mode of making war (which we may liken to that of the modern Turks,[493] now that the period of their energetic fanaticism has passed away) was in a high degree disorderly and inefficient: the men indeed, individually taken, especially the native Persians, were not deficient in the qualities of soldiers, but their arms and their organization were wretched,—and their leaders yet worse. On the other hand, the Greeks, equal, if not superior, in individual bravery, were incomparably superior in soldier-like order as well as in arms: but here too the leadership was defective, and the disunion a constant source of peril. Those who, like Plutarch (or rather the Pseudo-Plutarch) in his treatise on the Malignity of Herodotus, insist on acknowledging nothing but magnanimity and heroism in the proceedings of the Greeks throughout these critical years, are forced to deal very harshly with the inestimable witness on whom our knowledge of the facts depends,—and who intimates plainly that, in spite of the devoted courage displayed, not less by the vanquished at Thermopylæ than by the victors at Salamis, Greece owed her salvation chiefly to the imbecility, cowardice, and credulous rashness, of Xerxes.[494] Had he indeed possessed either the personal energy of Cyrus or the judgment of Artemisia, it may be doubted whether any excellence of management, or any intimacy of union, could have preserved the Greeks against so great a superiority of force; but it is certain that all their courage as soldiers in line would have been unavailing for that purpose, without a higher degree of generalship, and a more hearty spirit of coöperation, than that which they actually manifested.

One hundred and fifty years after this eventful period, we shall see the tables turned, and the united forces of Greece under Alexander of Macedon becoming invaders of Persia. We shall find that in Persia no improvement has taken place during this long interval,—that the scheme of defence under Darius Codomannus labors under the same defects as that of attack under Xerxes,—that there is the same blind and exclusive confidence in pitched battles with superior numbers,[495]—that the ad-

vice of Mentor the Rhodian, and of Charidemus, is despised like that of Demaratus and Artemisia,—that Darius Codomannus, essentially of the same stamp as Xerxes, is hurried into the battle of Issus by the same ruinous temerity as that which threw away the Persian fleet at Salamis,—and that the Persian native infantry (not the cavalry) even appear to have lost that individual gallantry which they displayed so conspicuously at Platæa. But on the Grecian side, the improvement in every way is very great: the orderly courage of the soldier has been sustained and even augmented, while the generalship and power of military combination has reached a point unexampled in the previous history of mankind. Military science may be esteemed a sort of creation during this interval, and will be found to go through various stages: Demosthenês and Brasidas, the Cyreian army and Xenophon, Agesilaus, Iphikratês, Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon, Alexander:[496] for the Macedonian princes are borrowers of Greek tactics, though extending and applying them with a personal energy peculiar to themselves, and with advantages of position such as no Athenian or Spartan ever enjoyed. In this comparison between the invasion of Xerxes and that of Alexander we contrast the progressive spirit of Greece, serving as herald and stimulus to the like spirit in Europe, with the stationary mind of Asia, occasionally roused by some splendid individual, but never appropriating to itself new social ideas or powers, either for war or for peace.

It is out of the invasion of Xerxes that those new powers of combination, political as well as military, which lighten up Grecian history during the next two centuries, take their rise. They are brought into agency through the altered position and character of the Athenians—improvers, to a certain extent, of military operations on land, but the great creators of marine tactics and manœuvring in Greece,—and the earliest of all Greeks who showed themselves capable of organizing and directing the joint action of numerous allies and dependents,—thus uniting the two distinctive qualities of the Homeric Agamemnon,[497]—ability in command, with vigor in execution.

In the general Hellenic confederacy, which had acted against Persia under the presidency of Sparta, Athens could hardly be said to occupy any ostensible rank above that of an ordinary member: the post of second dignity in the line at Platæa had indeed been adjudged to her, but only after a contending claim from Tegea. But without any difference in ostensible rank, she was in the eye and feeling of Greece no longer the same power as before. She had suffered more, and at sea had certainly done more, than all the other allies put together: even on land at Platæa, her hoplites had manifested a combination of bravery, discipline, and efficiency against the formidable Persian cavalry superior even to the Spartans: nor had any Athenian officer committed so perilous an act of disobedience as the Spartan Amompharetus. After the victory of Mykalê, when the Peloponnesians all hastened home to enjoy their triumph, the Athenian forces did not shrink from prolonged service for the important object of clearing the Hellespont, thus standing forth as the willing and for-

ward champions of the Asiatic Greeks against Persia. Besides these exploits of Athens collectively, the only two individuals gifted with any talents for command, whom this momentous conquest had thrown up, were both of them Athenians: first, Themistoklês; next, Aristeidês. From the beginning to the end of the struggle, Athens had displayed an unreserved Pan-Hellenic patriotism, which had been most ungenerously requited by the Peloponnesians; who had kept within their isthmian walls, and betrayed Attica twice to hostile ravage; the first time, perhaps, unavoidably,—but the second time a culpable neglect, in postponing their outward march against Mardonius. And the Peloponnesians could not but feel, that while they had left Attica unprotected, they owed their own salvation at Salamis altogether to the dexterity of Themistoklês and the imposing Athenian naval force.

Considering that the Peloponnesians had sustained little or no mischief by the invasion, while the Athenians had lost for the time even their city and country, with a large proportion of their movable property irrecoverably destroyed,—we might naturally expect to find the former, if not lending their grateful and active aid to repair the damage in Attica, at least cordially welcoming the restoration of the ruined city by its former inhabitants. Instead of this, we find the same selfishness again prevalent among them; ill-will and mistrust for the future, aggravated by an admiration which they could not help feeling, overlays all their gratitude and sympathy. The Athenians, on returning from Salamis after the battle of Platæa, found a desolate home to harbor them. Their country was laid waste,—their city burnt or destroyed; so that there remained but a few houses standing, wherein the Persian officers had taken up their quarters,—and their fortifications for the most part razed or overthrown. It was their first task to bring home their families and effects from the temporary places of shelter at Trœzen, Ægina, and Salamis. After providing what was indispensably necessary for immediate wants, they began to rebuild their city and its fortifications on a scale of enlarged size in every direction.[498] But as soon as they were seen to be employed on this indispensable work, without which neither political existence nor personal safety was practicable, the allies took the alarm, preferred complaints to Sparta, and urged her to arrest the work: in the front of these complainants, probably, stood the Æginetans, as the old enemies of Athens, and as having most to apprehend from her might at sea. The Spartans, perfectly sympathizing with the jealousy and uneasiness of their allies, were even disposed, from old association, to carry their dislike of fortifications still farther, so that they would have been pleased to see all the other Grecian cities systematically defenceless like Sparta itself.[499] But while sending an embassy to Athens, to offer a friendly remonstrance against the project of re-fortifying the city, they could not openly and peremptorily forbid the exercise of a right common to every autonomous community,—nor did they even venture, at a moment when the events of the past months were fresh in every one's remembrance, to divulge their real jealousies as to the future. They affected to offer prudential reasons against the scheme, founded on the chance of a future Persian invasion; in which case it would be a dangerous advantage for the invader to find any

fortified city outside of Peloponnesus to further his operations, as Thebes had recently seconded Mardonius. They proposed to the Athenians, therefore, not merely to desist from their own fortifications, but also to assist them in demolishing all fortifications of other cities beyond the limits of Peloponnesus,—promising shelter within the isthmus, in case of need, to all exposed parties.

A statesman like Themistoklês was not likely to be imposed upon by this diplomacy: but he saw that the Spartans had the power of preventing the work if they chose, and that it could only be executed by the help of successful deceit. By his advice, the Athenians dismissed the Spartan envoys, saying that they would themselves send to Sparta and explain their views. Accordingly, Themistoklês himself was presently despatched thither, as one among three envoys instructed to enter into explanations with the Spartan authorities; but his two colleagues, Aristeidês and Abronichus, by previous concert, were tardy in arriving,—and he remained inactive at Sparta, making use of their absence as an excuse for not even demanding an audience, but affecting surprise that their coming was so long delayed. But while Aristeidês and Abronichus, the other two envoys, were thus studiously kept back, the whole population of Athens labored unremittingly at the walls. Men, women, and children, all tasked their strength to the utmost during this precious interval: neither private houses, nor sacred edifices, were spared to furnish materials; and such was their ardor in the enterprise, that, before the three envoys were united at Sparta, the wall had already attained a height sufficient at least to attempt defence. Yet the interval had been long enough to provoke suspicion, even in the slow mind of the Spartans, while the more watchful Æginetans sent them positive intelligence that the wall was rapidly advancing. Themistoklês, on hearing this allegation, peremptorily denied the truth of it; and the personal esteem entertained towards him was at that time so great, that his assurance[500] obtained for some time unqualified credit, until fresh messengers again raised suspicions in the minds of the Spartans. In reply to these, Themistoklês urged the ephors to send envoys of their own to Athens, and thus convince themselves of the state of the facts. They unsuspectingly acted upon his recommendation, while he at the same time transmitted a private communication to Athens, desiring that the envoys might not be suffered to depart until the safe return of himself and his colleagues, which he feared might be denied them when his trick came to be divulged. Aristeidês and Abronichus had now arrived,—the wall was announced to be of a height at least above contempt,—and Themistoklês at once threw off the mask: he avowed the stratagem practised,—told the Spartans that Athens was already fortified sufficiently to insure the safety and free will of its inhabitants,—and warned them that the hour of constraint was now past, the Athenians being in a condition to define and vindicate for themselves their own rights and duties in reference to Sparta and the allies. He reminded them that the Athenians had always been found competent to judge for themselves, whether in joint consultation, or in any separate affair, such as the momentous crisis of abandoning their city and taking to their ships: they had now, in the exercise of this self-judgment, resolved

upon fortifying their city, as a step indispensable to themselves and advantageous even to the allies generally. Nor could there be any equal or fair interchange of opinion unless all the allies had equal means of defence: either all must be unfortified, or Athens must be fortified as well as the rest.[501]

Mortified as the Spartans were by a revelation which showed that they had been not only detected in a dishonest purpose, but completely outwitted,—they were at the same time overawed by the decisive tone of Themistoklês, whom they never afterwards forgave. To arrest beforehand erection of the walls would have been practicable, though not perhaps without difficulty; to deal by force with the fact accomplished, was perilous in a high degree: moreover, the inestimable services just rendered by Athens became again predominant in their minds, so that sentiment and prudence for the time coincided. They affected therefore to accept the communication without manifesting any offence, nor had they indeed put forward any pretence which required to be formally retracted. The envoys on both sides returned home, and the Athenians completed their fortifications without obstruction,[502]—yet not without murmurs on the part of the allies, who bitterly reproached Sparta afterwards for having let slip this golden opportunity of arresting the growth of the giant.[503]

If the allies were apprehensive of Athens before, the mixture of audacity, invention, and deceit, whereby she had just eluded the hindrance opposed to her fortifications, was well calculated to aggravate their uneasiness. On the other hand, to the Athenians, the mere hint of intervention to debar them from that common right of self-defence which was exercised by every autonomous city except Sparta, must have appeared outrageous injustice,—aggravated by the fact that it was brought upon them by their peculiar sufferings in the common cause, and by the very allies who, without their devoted forwardness, would now have been slaves of the Great King. And the intention of the allies to obstruct the fortifications must have been known to every soul in Athens, from the universal press of hands required to hurry the work and escape interference; just as it was proclaimed to after-generations by the shapeless fragments and irregular structure of the wall, in which even sepulchral stones and inscribed columns were seen imbedded.[504] Assuredly, the sentiment connected with this work, performed as it was alike by rich and poor, strong and weak,—men, women, and children,—must have been intense as well as equalizing: all had endured the common miseries of exile, all had contributed to the victory, all were now sharing the same fatigue for the defence of their recovered city, in order to counterwork the ungenerous hindrance of their Peloponnesian allies. We must take notice of these stirring circumstances, peculiar to the Athenians and acting upon a generation which had now been nursed in democracy for a quarter of a century, and had achieved unaided the victory of Marathon,—if we would understand that still stronger burst of aggressive activity, persevering self-confidence, and aptitude as well as thirst for command,—together with that still wider spread of democratical organization,—which marks their character during the age immediately following.

The plan of the new fortification was projected on a scale not unworthy of the future grandeur of the city. Its circuit was sixty stadia, or about seven miles, with the acropolis nearly in the centre: but the circuit of the previous walls is unknown, so that we are unable to measure the extent of that enlargement which Thucydidês testifies to have been carried out on every side. It included within the town the three hills of the Areopagus, the Pnyx, and the Museum; while on the south of the town it was carried for a space even on the southern bank of the Ilissus, thus also comprising the fountain Kallirhoê.[505] In spite of the excessive hurry in which it was raised, the structure was thoroughly solid and sufficient against every external enemy: but there is reason to believe that its very large inner area was never filled with buildings. Empty spaces, for the temporary shelter of inhabitants driven in from the country with their property, were eminently useful to a Grecian city-community; to none more useful than to the Athenians, whose principal strength lay in their fleet, and whose citizens habitually resided in large proportion in their separate demes throughout Attica.

The first indispensable step, in the renovation of Athens after her temporary extinction, was now happily accomplished: the city was made secure against external enemies. But Themistoklês, to whom the Athenians owed the late successful stratagem, and whose influence must have been much strengthened by its success, had conceived plans of a wider and more ambitious range. He had been the original adviser of the great maritime start taken by his countrymen, as well as of the powerful naval force which they had created during the last few years, and which had so recently proved their salvation. He saw in that force both the only chance of salvation for the future, in case the Persians should renew their attack by sea,—a contingency at that time seemingly probable,—and boundless prospects of future ascendency over the Grecian coasts and islands: it was the great engine of defence, of offence, and of ambition. To continue this movement required much less foresight and genius than to begin it, and Themistoklês, the moment that the walls of the city had been finished, brought back the attention of his countrymen to those wooden walls which had served them as a refuge against the Persian monarch. He prevailed upon them to provide harbor-room at once safe and adequate, by the enlargement end fortification of the Peiræus. This again was only the prosecution of an enterprise previously begun: for he had already, while in office two or three years before,[506] made his countrymen sensible that the open roadstead of Phalêrum was thoroughly insecure, and had prevailed upon them to improve and employ in part the more spacious harbors of Peiræus and Munychia,—three natural basins, all capable of being closed and defended. Something had then been done towards the enlargement of this port, though it had probably been subsequently ruined by the Persian invaders: but Themistoklês now resumed the scheme on a scale far grander than he could then have ventured to propose,—a scale which demonstrates the vast auguries present to his mind respecting the destinies of Athens. Peiræus and Munychia, in his new plan, constituted a fortified space as large as the enlarged Athens, and with a wall far

more elaborate and unassailable. The wall which surrounded them, sixty stadia in circuit,[507] was intended by him to be so stupendous, both in height and thickness, as to render assault hopeless, and to enable the whole military population to act on shipboard, leaving only old men and boys as a garrison.[508] We may judge how vast his project was, when we learn that the wall, though in practice always found sufficient, was only carried up to half the height which he had contemplated.[509] In respect to thickness, however, his ideas were exactly followed: two carts meeting one another brought stones which were laid together right and left on the outer side of each, and thus formed two primary parallel walls, between which the interior space—of course, at least as broad as the joint breadth of the two carts—was filled up, "not with rubble, in the usual manner of the Greeks, but constructed, throughout the whole thickness, of squared stones, cramped together with metal."[510] The result was a solid wall, probably not less than fourteen or fifteen feet thick, since it was intended to carry so very unusual a height. In the exhortations whereby he animated the people to this fatiguing and costly work, he labored to impress upon them that Peiræus was of more value to them than Athens itself, and that it afforded a shelter into which, if their territory should be again overwhelmed by a superior land-force, they might securely retire, with full liberty of that maritime action in which they were a match for all the world.[511] We may even suspect that if Themistoklês could have followed his own feelings, he would have altered the site of the city from Athens to Peiræus: the attachment of the people to their ancient and holy rock doubtless prevented any such proposition. Nor did he at that time, probably, contemplate the possibility of those long walls which in a few years afterwards consolidated the two cities into one.

Forty-five years afterwards, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we shall hear from Periklês, who espoused and carried out the large ideas of Themistoklês, this same language about the capacity of Athens to sustain a great power exclusively or chiefly upon maritime action. But the Athenian empire was then an established reality, whereas in the time of Themistoklês it was yet a dream, and his bold predictions, surpassed as they were by the future reality, mark that extraordinary power of practical divination which Thucydidês so emphatically extols in him. And it proves the exuberant hope which had now passed into the temper of the Athenian people, when we find them, on the faith of these predictions, undertaking a new enterprise of so much toil and expense; and that too when just returned from exile into a desolated country, at a moment of private distress and public impoverishment. However, Peiræus served other purposes besides its direct use as a dockyard for military marine: its secure fortifications and the protection of the Athenian navy, were well calculated to call back those metics, or resident foreigners, who had been driven away by the invasion of Xerxes, and who might feel themselves insecure in returning, unless some new and conspicuous means of protection were exhibited. To invite them back, and to attract new residents of a similar description, Themistoklês proposed to exempt them from the metoikion, or non-freeman's annual tax:[512] but this exemp-

tion can only have lasted for a time, and the great temptation for them to return must have consisted in the new securities and facilities for trade, which Athens, with her fortified ports and navy, now afforded. The presence of numerous metics was profitable to the Athenians, both privately and publicly: much of the trading, professional, and handicraft business was in their hands: and the Athenian legislation, while it excluded them from the political franchise, was in other respects equitable and protective to them. In regard to trading pursuits, the metics had this advantage over the citizens,—that they were less frequently carried away for foreign military service. The great increase of their numbers, from this period forward, while it tended materially to increase the value of property all throughout Attica, but especially in Peiræus and Athens, where they mostly resided, helps us to explain the extraordinary prosperity, together with the excellent cultivation, prevalent throughout the country before the Peloponnesian war. The barley, vegetables, figs, and oil, produced in most parts of the territory,—the charcoal prepared in the flourishing deme of Acharnæ,[513]—and the fish obtained in abundance near the coast,—all found opulent buyers and a constant demand from the augmenting town population.

We are farther told that Themistoklês[514] prevailed on the Athenians to build every year twenty new ships of the line,—so we may designate the trireme. Whether this number was always strictly adhered to, it is impossible to say: but to repair the ships, as well as to keep up their numbers, was always regarded among the most indispensable obligations of the executive government.

It does not appear that the Spartans offered any opposition to the fortification of the Peiræus, though it was an enterprise greater, more novel, and more menacing, than that of Athens. But Diodorus tells us, probably enough, that Themistoklês thought it necessary to send an embassy to Sparta,[515] intimating that his scheme was to provide a safe harbor for the collective navy of Greece, in the event of future Persian attack.

Works on so vast a scale must have taken a considerable time, and absorbed much of the Athenian force; yet they did not prevent Athens from lending active aid towards the expedition which, in the year after the battle of Platæa (B. C. 478) set sail for Asia under the Spartan Pausanias. Twenty ships from the various cities of Peloponnesus[516] were under his command: the Athenians alone furnished thirty, under the orders of Aristeidês and Kimon: other triremes also came from the Ionian and insular allies. They first sailed to Cyprus, in which island they liberated most of the Grecian cities from the Persian government: next, they turned to the Bosphorus of Thrace, and undertook the siege of Byzantium, which, like Sestus in the Chersonese, was a post of great moment, as well as of great strength,—occupied by a considerable Persian force, with several leading Persians and even kinsmen of the monarch. The place was captured,[517] seemingly after a prolonged siege: it might probably hold out even longer than Sestus, as being taken less unprepared. The line

of communication between the Euxine sea and Greece was thus cleared of obstruction.

The capture of Byzantium proved the signal for a capital and unexpected change in the relations of the various Grecian cities; a change, of which the proximate cause lay in the misconduct of Pausanias, but towards which other causes, deep-seated as well as various, also tended. In recounting the history of Miltiades,[518] I noticed the deplorable liability of the Grecian leading men to be spoiled by success: this distemper worked with singular rapidity on Pausanias. As conqueror of Platæa, he had acquired a renown unparalleled in Grecian experience, together with a prodigious share of the plunder: the concubines, horses,[519] camels, and gold plate, which had thus passed into his possession, were well calculated to make the sobriety and discipline of Spartan life irksome, while his power also, though great on foreign command, became subordinate to that of the ephors when he returned home. His newly-acquired insolence was manifested immediately after the battle, in the commemorative tripod dedicated by his order at Delphi, which proclaimed himself by name and singly, as commander of the Greeks and destroyer of the Persians: an unseemly boast, of which the Lacedæmonians themselves were the first to mark their disapprobation, by causing the inscription to be erased, and the names of the cities who had taken part in the combat to be all enumerated on the tripod.[520] Nevertheless, he was still sent on the command against Cyprus and Byzantium, and it was on the capture of this latter place that his ambition and discontent first ripened into distinct treason. He entered into correspondence with Gongylus the Eretrian exile (now a subject of Persia, and invested with the property and government of a district in Mysia), to whom he intrusted his new acquisition of Byzantium, and the care of the valuable prisoners taken in it. These prisoners were presently suffered to escape, or rather sent away underhand to Xerxes; together with a letter from the hand of Pausanias himself, to the following effect: "Pausanias, the Spartan commander, having taken these captives, sends them back, in his anxiety to oblige thee. I am minded, if it so please thee, to marry thy daughter, and to bring under thy dominion both Sparta and the rest of Greece: with thy aid, I think myself competent to achieve this. If my proposition be acceptable, send some confidential person down to the seaboard, through whom we may hereafter correspond." Xerxes, highly pleased with the opening thus held out, immediately sent down Artabazus (the same who had been second in command in Bœotia) to supersede Megabatês in the satrapy of Daskylium; the new satrap, furnished with a letter of reply bearing the regal seal, was instructed to further actively the projects of Pausanias. The letter was to this purport: "Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias. Thy name stands forever recorded in my house as a well-doer, on account of the men whom thou hast saved for me beyond sea at Byzantium: and thy propositions now received are acceptable to me. Relax not either night or day in accomplishing that which thou promisest, nor let thyself be held back by cost, either gold or silver, or numbers of men, if thou standest in need of them, but trans-

act in confidence thy business and mine jointly with Artabazus, the good man whom I have now sent, in such manner as may be best for both of us."[521]

Throughout the whole of this expedition, Pausanias had been insolent and domineering, degrading the allies at quarters and watering-places in the most offensive manner as compared with the Spartans, and treating the whole armament in a manner which Greek warriors could not tolerate, even in a Spartan Herakleid, and a victorious general. But when he received the letter from Xerxes, and found himself in immediate communication with Artabazus, as well as supplied with funds for corruption,[522] his insane hopes knew no bounds, and he already fancied himself son-in-law of the Great King, as well as despot of Hellas. Fortunately for Greece, his treasonable plans were not deliberately laid and veiled until ripe for execution, but manifested with childish impatience. He clothed himself in Persian attire—(a proceeding which the Macedonian army, a century and a half afterwards, could not tolerate,[523] even in Alexander the Great)—he traversed Thrace with a body of Median and Egyptian guards,—he copied the Persian chiefs, both in the luxury of his table and in his conduct towards the free women of Byzantium. Kleonikê, a Byzantine maiden of conspicuous family, having been ravished from her parents by his order, was brought to his chamber at night: he happened to be asleep, and being suddenly awakened, knew not at first who was the person approaching his bed, but seized his sword and slew her.[524] Moreover, his haughty reserve, with uncontrolled bursts of wrath, rendered him unapproachable; and the allies at length came to regard him as a despot rather than a general. The news of such outrageous behavior, and the manifest evidences of his alliance with the Persians, were soon transmitted to the Spartans, who recalled him to answer for his conduct, and seemingly the Spartan vessels along with him.[525]

In spite of the flagrant conduct of Pausanias, the Lacedæmonians acquitted him on the allegations of positive and individual wrong; yet, mistrusting his conduct in reference to collusion with the enemy, they sent out Dorkis to supersede him as commander. But a revolution, of immense importance for Greece, had taken place in the minds of the allies. The headship, or hegemony, was in the hands of Athens, and Dorkis the Spartan found the allies not disposed to recognize his authority.

Even before the battle of Salamis, the question had been raised,[526] whether Athens was not entitled to the command at sea, in consequence of the preponderance of her naval contingent. The repugnance of the allies to any command except that of Sparta, either on land or water, had induced the Athenians to waive their pretensions at that critical moment. But the subsequent victories had materially exalted the latter in the eyes of Greece: while the armament now serving, differently composed from that which had fought at Salamis, contained a large proportion of the newly-enfranchised Ionic Greeks, who not only had no preference for Spartan command, but were attached to the Athenians on every ground,—as well from kindred race, as from the certainty that Athens with her superior fleet was the only protector

upon whom they could rely against the Persians. Moreover, it happened that the Athenian generals on this expedition, Aristeidês and Kimon, were personally just and conciliating, forming a striking contrast with Pausanias. Hence the Ionic Greeks in the fleet, when they found that the behavior of the latter was not only oppressive towards themselves but also revolting to Grecian sentiment generally, addressed themselves to the Athenian commanders for protection and redress, on the plausible ground of kindred race;[527] entreating to be allowed to serve under Athens as leader instead of Sparta. Plutarch tells us that Aristeidês not only tried to remonstrate with Pausanias, who repelled him with arrogance,—which is exceedingly probable,—but that he also required, as a condition of his compliance with the request of the Ionic allies, that they should personally insult Pausanias, so as to make reconciliation impracticable: upon which a Samian and a Chian captain deliberately attacked and damaged the Spartan admiral-ship in the harbor of Byzantium.[528] The historians from whom Plutarch copied this latter statement must have presumed in the Athenians a disposition to provoke that quarrel with Sparta which afterwards sprung up as it were spontaneously: but the Athenians had no interest in doing so, nor can we credit the story,—which is, moreover, unnoticed by Thucydidês. To give the Spartans a just ground of indignation, would have been glaring imprudence on the part of Aristeidês: but he had every motive to entertain the request of the allies, and he began to take his measures for acting as their protector and chief. And his proceedings were much facilitated by the circumstance that the Spartan government about this time recalled Pausanias to undergo an examination, in consequence of the universal complaints against him which had reached them. He seems to have left no Spartan authority behind him,—even the small Spartan squadron accompanied him home: so that the Athenian generals had the best opportunity for insuring to themselves and exercising that command which the allies besought them to undertake. So effectually did they improve the moment, that when Dorkis arrived to replace Pausanias, they were already in full supremacy; while Dorkis, having only a small force, and being in no condition to employ constraint, found himself obliged to return home.[529]

This incident, though not a declaration of war against Sparta, was the first open renunciation of her authority as presiding state among the Greeks; the first avowed manifestation of a competitor for that dignity, with numerous and willing followers; the first separation of Greece—considered in herself alone and apart from foreign solicitations, such as the Persian invasion—into two distinct organized camps, each with collective interests and projects of its own. In spite of mortified pride, Sparta was constrained, and even in some points of view not indisposed, to patient acquiescence: for she had no means of forcing the dispositions of the Ionic allies, while the war with Persia altogether,—having now become no longer strictly defensive, and being withal maritime as well as distant from her own territory,—had ceased to be in harmony with her home routine and strict discipline. Her grave senators, especially an ancient Herakleid named Hetœmaridas, reproved the impatience of the younger citizens, and discountenanced the idea of permanent maritime command as a dan-

gerous innovation: they even treated it as an advantage, that Athens should take the lead in carrying on the Persian war, since it could not be altogether dropped; nor had the Athenians as yet manifested any sentiments positively hostile, to excite their alarm.[530] Nay, they actually took credit in the eyes of Athens, about a century afterwards, for having themselves advised this separation of command at sea from command on land.[531] Moreover, if the war continued under Spartan guidance, there would be a continued necessity for sending out their kings or chief men to command: and the example of Pausanias showed them the depraving effect of such military power, remote as well as unchecked. The example of their king Leotychidês, too, near about this time, was a second illustration of the same tendency. At the same time, apparently, that Pausanias embarked for Asia to carry on the war against the Persians, Leotychidês was sent with an army into Thessaly to put down the Aleuadæ and those Thessalian parties who had sided with Xerxes and Mardonius. Successful in this expedition, he suffered himself to be bribed, and was even detected with a large sum of money actually on his person: in consequence of which the Lacedæmonians condemned him to banishment, and razed his house to the ground: he died afterwards in exile at Tegea.[532] Two such instances were well calculated to make the Lacedæmonians distrust the conduct of their Herakleid leaders when on foreign service, and this feeling weighed much in inducing them to abandon the Asiatic headship in favor of Athens. It appears that their Peloponnesian allies retired from this contest at the same time as they did, so that the prosecution of the war was thus left to Athens as chief of the newly-emancipated Greeks.[533]

It was from these considerations that the Spartans were induced to submit to that loss of command which the misconduct of Pausanias had brought upon them. Their acquiescence facilitated the immense change about to take place in Grecian politics. According to the tendencies in progress prior to the Persian invasion, Sparta had become gradually more and more the president of something like a Pan-Hellenic union, comprising the greater part of the Grecian states. Such at least was the point towards which things seemed to be tending; and if many separate states stood aloof from this union, none of them at least sought to form any counter-union, if we except the obsolete and impotent pretensions of Argos. The preceding volumes of this history have shown that Sparta had risen to such ascendency, not from her superior competence in the management of collective interests, nor even in the main from ambitious efforts on her own part to acquire it,—but from the converging tendencies of Grecian feeling, which required some such presiding state, and from the commanding military power, rigid discipline, and ancient undisturbed constitution, which attracted that feeling towards Sparta. The necessities of common defence against Persia greatly strengthened these tendencies, and the success of the defence, whereby so many Greeks were emancipated who required protection against their former master, seemed destined to have the like effect still more. For an instant, after the battles of Platæa and Mykalê,—when the town of Platæa was set apart as a consecrated neutral spot for an armed confederacy against the Persian, with periodi-

cal solemnities and meetings of deputies,—Sparta was exalted to be the chief of a full Pan-Hellenic union, Athens being only one of the principal members: and had Sparta been capable either of comprehensive policy, of self-directed and persevering efforts, or of the requisite flexibility of dealing, embracing distant Greeks as well as near,—her position was now such, that her own ascendency, together with undivided Pan-Hellenic union, might long have been maintained. But she was lamentably deficient in all the requisite qualities, and the larger the union became, the more her deficiency stood manifest. On the other hand, Athens, now entering into rivalry as a sort of leader of opposition, possessed all those qualities in a remarkable degree, over and above that actual maritime force which was the want of the day; so that the opening made by Spartan incompetence and crime, so far as Pausanias was concerned, found her in every respect prepared. But the sympathies of the Peloponnesians still clung to Sparta, while those of the Ionian Greeks had turned to Athens: and thus not only the short-lived symptoms of an established Pan-Hellenic union, but even all tendencies towards it from this time disappear. There now stands out a manifest schism, with two pronounced parties, towards one of which nearly all the constituent atoms of the Grecian world gravitate: the maritime states, newly enfranchised from Persia, towards Athens,—the land-states, which had formed most part of the confederate army at Platæa, towards Sparta.[534] Along with this national schism and called into action by it, appears the internal political schism in each separate city between oligarchy and democracy. Of course, the germ of these parties had already previously existed in the separate states, but the energetic democracy of Athens, and the pronounced tendency of Sparta to rest upon the native oligarchies in each separate city as her chief support, now began to bestow, on the conflict of internal political parties, an Hellenic importance, and an aggravated bitterness, which had never before belonged to it.

The departure of the Spartan Dorkis left the Athenian generals at liberty; and their situation imposed upon them the duty of organizing the new confederacy which they had been chosen to conduct. The Ionic allies were at this time not merely willing and unanimous, but acted as the forward movers in the enterprise; for they stood in obvious need of protection against the attacks of Persia, and had no farther kindness to expect from Sparta or the Peloponnesians. But even had they been less under the pressure of necessity, the conduct of Athens, and of Aristeidês as the representative of Athens, might have sufficed to bring them into harmonious coöperation. The new leader was no less equitable towards the confederates than energetic against the common enemy. The general conditions of the confederacy were regulated in a common synod of the members, appointed to meet periodically for deliberative purposes, in the temple of Apollo and Artemis at Delos,—of old, the venerated spot for the religious festivals of the Ionic cities, and at the same time a convenient centre for the members. A definite obligation, either in equipped ships of war or in money, was imposed upon every separate city; and the Athenians, as leaders, determined in which form contribution should be made by each: their assessment must of

course have been reviewed by the synod, nor had they at this time power to enforce any regulation not approved by that body. It had been the good fortune of Athens to profit by the genius of Themistoklês on two recent critical occasions (the battle of Salamis and the rebuilding of her walls), where sagacity, craft, and decision were required in extraordinary measure, and where pecuniary probity was of less necessity: it was no less her good fortune now,—in the delicate business of assessing a new tax and determining how much each state should bear, without precedents to guide them, when unimpeachable honesty in the assessor was the first of all qualities,—*not* to have Themistoklês; but to employ in his stead the well-known, we might almost say the ostentatious, probity of Aristeidês. This must be accounted good fortune, since at the moment when Aristeidês was sent out, the Athenians could not have anticipated that any such duty would devolve upon him. His assessment not only found favor at the time of its original proposition, when it must have been freely canvassed by the assembled allies—but also maintained its place in general esteem, as equitable and moderate, after the once responsible headship of Athens had degenerated into an unpopular empire.[535]

Respecting this first assessment, we scarcely know more than one single fact,—the aggregate in money was four hundred and sixty talents, equal to about one hundred and six thousand pounds sterling. Of the items composing such aggregate,—of the individual cities which paid it,—of the distribution of obligations to furnish ships and to furnish money,—we are entirely ignorant: the little information which we possess on these points relates to a period considerably later, shortly before the Peloponnesian war, under the uncontrolled empire then exercised by Athens. Thucydidês, in his brief sketch, makes us clearly understand the difference between *presiding* Athens, with her autonomous and regularly assembled allies in 476 B. C., and *imperial* Athens, with her subject allies in 432 B. C.; the Greek word equivalent to *ally* left either of these epithets to be understood, by an ambiguity exceedingly convenient to the powerful states,—and he indicates the general causes of the change: but he gives us few particulars as to the modifying circumstances, and none at all as to the first start. He tells us only that the Athenians appointed a peculiar board of officers, called the Hellênotamiæ, to receive and administer the common fund,—that Delos was constituted the general treasury, where the money was to be kept,—and that the payment thus levied was called the *phorus*;[536] a name which appears then to have been first put into circulation, though afterwards usual,—and to have conveyed at first no degrading import, though it afterwards became so odious as to be exchanged for a more innocent synonym.

Endeavoring as well as we can to conceive the Athenian alliance in its infancy, we are first struck with the magnitude of the total sum contributed; which will appear the more remarkable when we reflect that many of the contributing cities furnished ships besides. We may be certain that all which was done at first was done by general consent, and by a freely determining majority: for Athens, at the time when the

Ionic allies besought her protection against Spartan arrogance, could have had no power of constraining unwilling parties, especially when the loss of supremacy, though quietly borne, was yet fresh and rankling among the countrymen of Pausanias. So large a total implies, from the very first, a great number of contributing states, and we learn from hence to appreciate the powerful, wide-spread, and voluntary movement which then brought together the maritime and insular Greeks distributed throughout the Ægean sea and the Hellespont. The Phenician fleet, and the Persian land-force, might at any moment reappear, nor was there any hope of resisting either except by confederacy: so that confederacy, under such circumstances, became, with these exposed Greeks, not merely a genuine feeling, but at that time the first of all their feelings. It was their common fear, rather than Athenian ambition, which gave birth to the alliance, and they were grateful to Athens for organizing it. The public import of the name Hellênotamiæ, coined for the occasion,—the selection of Delos as a centre, and the provision for regular meetings of the members,—demonstrate the patriotic and fraternal purpose which the league was destined to serve. In truth, the protection of the Ægean sea against foreign maritime force and lawless piracy, as well as that of the Hellespont and Bosphorus against the transit of a Persian force, was a purpose essentially public, for which all the parties interested were bound in equity to provide by way of common contribution: any island or seaport which might refrain from contributing, was a gainer at the cost of others: and we cannot doubt that the general feeling of this common danger as well as equitable obligation, at a moment when the fear of Persia was yet serious, was the real cause which brought together so many contributing members, and enabled the forward parties to shame into concurrence such as were more backward. How the confederacy came to be turned afterwards to the purposes of Athenian ambition, we shall see at the proper time: but in its origin it was an equal alliance, in so far as alliance between the strong and the weak can ever be equal,—not an Athenian empire: nay, it was an alliance in which every individual member was more exposed, more defenceless, and more essentially benefited in the way of protection, than Athens. We have here in truth one of the few moments in Grecian history wherein a purpose at once common, equal, useful, and innocent, brought together spontaneously many fragments of this disunited race, and overlaid for a time that exclusive bent towards petty and isolated autonomy which ultimately made slaves of them all. It was a proceeding equitable and prudent, in principle as well as in detail; promising at the time the most beneficent consequences,—not merely protection against the Persians, but a standing police of the Ægean sea, regulated by a common superintending authority. And if such promise was not realized, we shall find that the inherent defects of the allies, indisposing them to the hearty appreciation and steady performance of their duties as equal confederates, are at least as much chargeable with the failure as the ambition of Athens. We may add that, in selecting Delos as a centre, the Ionic allies were conciliated by a renovation of the solemnities which their fathers, in the days of former freedom, had crowded to witness in that sacred island.

At the time when this alliance was formed, the Persians still held not only the important posts of Eion on the Strymon and Doriskus in Thrace, but also several other posts in that country,[537] which are not specified to us. We may thus understand why the Greek cities on and near the Chalkidic peninsula,—Argilus, Stageirus, Akanthus, Skôlus, Olynthus, Spartôlus, etc.,—which we know to have joined under the first assessment of Aristeidês, were not less anxious[538] to seek protection in the bosom of the new confederacy, than the Dorian islands of Rhodes and Kos, the Ionic islands of Samos and Chios, the Æolic Lesbos and Tenedos, or continental towns such as Milêtus and Byzantium: by all of whom adhesion to this alliance must have been contemplated, in 477 or 476 B. C., as the sole condition of emancipation from Persia. Nothing more was required, for the success of a foreign enemy against Greece generally, than complete autonomy of every Grecian city, small as well as great,—such as the Persian monarch prescribed and tried to enforce ninety years afterwards, through the Lacedæmonian Antalkidas, in the pacification which bears the name of the latter: some sort of union, organized and obligatory upon each city, was indispensable to the safety of all. Nor was it by any means certain, at the time when the confederacy of Delos was first formed, that, even with that aid, the Asiatic enemy would be effectually kept out; especially as the Persians were strong, not merely from their own force, but also from the aid of internal parties in many of the Grecian states,—traitors within, as well as exiles without.

Among these, the first in rank as well as the most formidable, was the Spartan Pausanias. Summoned home from Byzantium to Sparta, in order that the loud complaints against him might be examined, he had been acquitted[539] of the charges of wrong and oppression against individuals; yet the presumptions of *medism*, or treacherous correspondence with the Persians, appeared so strong that, though not found guilty, he was still not reappointed to the command. Such treatment seems to have only emboldened him in the prosecution of his designs against Greece, and he came out with this view to Byzantium in a trireme belonging to Hermionê, under pretence of aiding as a volunteer without any formal authority in the war. He there resumed his negotiations with Artabazus: his great station and celebrity still gave him a strong hold on men's opinions, and he appears to have established a sort of mastery in Byzantium, from whence the Athenians, already recognized heads of the confederacy, were constrained to expel him by force:[540] and we may be very sure that the terror excited by his presence as well as by his known designs tended materially to accelerate the organization of the confederacy under Athens. He then retired to Kolônæ in the Troad, where he continued for some time in the farther prosecution of his schemes, trying to form a Persian party, despatching emissaries to distribute Persian gold among various cities of Greece, and probably employing the name of Sparta to impede the formation of the new confederacy:[541] until at length the Spartan authorities, apprized of his proceedings, sent a herald out to him, with peremptory orders that he should come home immediately along with the herald: if he dis-

obeyed, "the Spartans would declare war against him," or constitute him a public enemy.

As the execution of this threat would have frustrated all the ulterior schemes of Pausanias, he thought it prudent to obey; the rather, as he felt entire confidence of escaping all the charges against him at Sparta by the employment of bribes,[542] the means for which were abundantly furnished to him through Artabazus. He accordingly returned along with the herald, and was, in the first moments of indignation, imprisoned by order of the ephors; who, it seems, were legally competent to imprison him, even had he been king instead of regent. But he was soon let out, on his own requisition, and under a private arrangement with friends and partisans, to take his trial against all accusers.[543] Even to stand forth as accuser against so powerful a man was a serious peril: to undertake the proof of specific matter of treason against him was yet more serious: nor does it appear that any Spartan ventured to do either. It was known that nothing short of the most manifest and invincible proof would be held to justify his condemnation, and amidst a long chain of acts carrying conviction when taken in the aggregate, there was no single treason sufficiently demonstrable for the purpose. Accordingly, Pausanias remained not only at large but unaccused, still audaciously persisting both in his intrigues at home and his correspondence abroad with Artabazus. He ventured to assail the unshielded side of Sparta by opening negotiations with the Helots, and instigating them to revolt; promising them both liberation and admission to political privilege;[544] with a view, first, to destroy the board of ephors, and render himself despot in his own country,—next, to acquire through Persian help the supremacy of Greece. Some of those Helots to whom he addressed himself revealed the plot to the ephors, who, nevertheless, in spite of such grave peril, did not choose to take measures against Pausanias upon no better information,—so imposing was still his name and position. But though some few Helots might inform, probably many others both gladly heard the proposition and faithfully kept the secret: we shall find, by what happened a few years afterwards, that there were a large number of them who had their spears in readiness for revolt. Suspected as Pausanias was, yet by the fears of some and the connivance of others, he was allowed to bring his plans to the very brink of consummation; and his last letters to Artabazus,[545] intimating that he was ready for action, and bespeaking immediate performance of the engagements concerted between them, were actually in the hands of the messenger. Sparta was saved from an outbreak of the most formidable kind, not by the prudence of her authorities, but by a mere accident, or rather by the fact that Pausanias was not only a traitor to his country, but also base and cruel in his private relations.

The messenger to whom these last letters were intrusted was a native of Argilus in Thrace, a favorite and faithful slave of Pausanias; once connected with him by that intimate relation which Grecian manners tolerated, and admitted even to the full confidence of his treasonable projects. It was by no means the intention of this Argilian

to betray his master; but, on receiving the letter to carry, he recollected, with some uneasiness, that none of the previous messengers had ever come back. Accordingly, he broke the seal and read it, with the full view of carrying it forward to its destination, if he found nothing inconsistent with his own personal safety: he had farther taken the precaution to counterfeit his master's seal, so that he could easily reclose the letter. On reading it, he found his suspicions confirmed by an express injunction that the bearer was to be put to death,—a discovery which left him no alternative except to deliver it to the ephors. But those magistrates, who had before disbelieved the Helot informers, still refused to believe even the confidential slave with his master's autograph and seal, and with the full account besides, which doubtless he would communicate at the same time, of all that had previously passed in the Persian correspondence, not omitting copies of those letters between Pausanias and Xerxes, which I have already cited from Thucydidês—for in no other way can they have become public. Partly from the suspicion which, in antiquity, always attached to the testimony of slaves, except when it was obtained under the pretended guarantee of torture, partly from the peril of dealing with so exalted a criminal,—the ephors would not be satisfied with any evidence less than his own speech and their own ears. They directed the Argilian slave to plant himself as a suppliant in the sacred precinct of Poseidon, near Cape Tænarus, under the shelter of a double tent, or hut, behind which two of them concealed themselves. Apprized of this unexpected mark of alarm, Pausanias hastened to the temple, and demanded the reason: upon which the slave disclosed his knowledge of the contents of the letter, and complained bitterly that, after long and faithful service,—with a secrecy never once betrayed, throughout this dangerous correspondence,—he was at length rewarded with nothing better than the same miserable fate which had befallen the previous messengers. Pausanias, admitting all these facts, tried to appease the slave's disquietude, and gave him a solemn assurance of safety if he would quit the sanctuary; urging him at the same time to proceed on the journey forthwith, in order that the schemes in progress might not be retarded.

All this passed within the hearing of the concealed ephors; who at length thoroughly satisfied, determined to arrest Pausanias immediately on his return to Sparta. They met him in the public street, not far from the temple of Athênê Chalkiœkus (or of the Brazen House); but as they came near, either their menacing looks, or a significant nod from one of them, revealed to this guilty man their purpose; and he fled for refuge to the temple, which was so near that he reached it before they could overtake him. He planted himself as a suppliant, far more hopeless than the Argilian slave whom he had so recently talked over at Tænarus, in a narrow-roofed chamber belonging to the sacred building; where the ephors, not warranted in touching him, took off the roof, built up the doors, and kept watch until he was on the point of death by starvation. According to a current story,[546]—not recognized by Thucydidês, yet consistent with Spartan manners,—his own mother was the person who placed the first stone to build up the door, in deep abhorrence of his treason. His last

moments being carefully observed, he was brought away just in time to expire without, and thus to avoid the desecration of the temple. The first impulse of the ephors was to cast his body into the ravine, or hollow, called the Kæadas, the usual place of punishment for criminals: probably, his powerful friends averted this disgrace, and he was buried not far off, until, some time afterwards, under the mandate of the Delphian oracle, his body was exhumed and transported to the exact spot where he had died. Nor was the oracle satisfied even with this reinterment: pronouncing the whole proceeding to be a profanation of the sanctity of Athênê, it enjoined that two bodies should be presented to her as an atonement for the one carried away. In the very early days of Greece,—or among the Carthaginians, even at this period,—such an injunction would probably have produced the slaughter of two human victims: on the present occasion, Athênê, or Hikesius, the tutelary god of suppliants, was supposed to be satisfied by two brazen statues; not, however, without some attempts to make out that the expiation was inadequate.[547]

Thus perished a Greek who reached the pinnacle of renown simply from the accidents of his lofty descent, and of his being general at Platæa, where it does not appear that he displayed any superior qualities. His treasonable projects implicated and brought to disgrace a man far greater than himself, the Athenian Themistoklês.

The chronology of this important period is not so fully known as to enable us to make out the full dates of particular events; but we are obliged—in consequence of the subsequent events connected with Themistoklês, whose flight to Persia is tolerably well marked as to date—to admit an interval of about nine years between the retirement of Pausanias from his command at Byzantium, and his death. To suppose so long an interval engaged in treasonable correspondence, is perplexing; and we can only explain it to ourselves very imperfectly by considering that the Spartans were habitually slow in their movements, and that the suspected regent may perhaps have communicated with partisans, real or expected, in many parts of Greece. Among those whom he sought to enlist as accomplices was Themistoklês, still in great power,—though, as it would seem, in declining power,—at Athens: and the charge of collusion with the Persians connects itself with the previous movement of political parties in that city.

The rivalry of Themistoklês and Aristeidês had been greatly appeased by the invasion of Xerxes, which had imposed upon both the peremptory necessity of coöperation against a common enemy. Nor was it apparently resumed, during the times which immediately succeeded the return of the Athenians to their country: at least we hear of both in effective service, and in prominent posts. Themistoklês stands forward as the contriver of the city walls and architect of Peiræus: Aristeidês is commander of the fleet, and first organizer of the confederacy of Delos. Moreover, we seem to detect a change in the character of the latter: he had ceased to be the champion of Athenian old-fashioned landed interest, against Themistoklês as the originator of the maritime innovations. Those innovations had now, since the battle

of Salamis, become an established fact; a fact of overwhelming influence on the destinies and character, public as well as private, of the Athenians. During the exile at Salamis, every man, rich or poor, landed proprietor or artisan, had been for the time a seaman: and the anecdote of Kimon, who dedicated the bridle of his horse in the acropolis, as a token that he was about to pass from the cavalry to service on shipboard,[548] is a type of that change of feeling which must have been impressed more or less upon every rich man in Athens. From henceforward the fleet is endeared to every man as the grand force, offensive and defensive, of the state, in which character all the political leaders agree in accepting it: we ought to add, at the same time, that this change was attended with no detriment either to the land-force or to the landed cultivation of Attica, both of which will be found to acquire extraordinary development during the interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. Still, the triremes and the men who manned them, taken collectively, were now the determining element in the state: moreover, the men who manned them had just returned from Salamis, fresh from a scene of trial and danger, and from a harvest of victory, which had equalized for the moment all Athenians as sufferers, as combatants, and as patriots. Such predominance of the maritime impulse, having become pronounced immediately after the return from Salamis, was farther greatly strengthened by the construction and fortification of the Peiræus,—a new maritime Athens, as large as the old inland city,—as well as by the unexpected formation of the confederacy at Delos, with all its untried prospects and stimulating duties.

The political change arising from hence in Athens was not less important than the military. "The maritime multitude, authors of the victory of Salamis,"[549] and instruments of the new vocation of Athens as head of the Delian confederacy, appear now ascendant in the political constitution also; not in any way as a separate or privileged class, but as leavening the whole mass, strengthening the democratical sentiment, and protesting against all recognized political inequalities. In fact, during the struggle at Salamis, the whole city of Athens had been nothing else than "a maritime multitude," among which the proprietors and chief men had been confounded, until, by the efforts of all, the common country had been reconquered: nor was it likely that this multitude, after a trying period of forced equality, during which political privilege had been effaced, would patiently acquiesce in the full restoration of such privilege at home. We see by the active political sentiment of the German people, after the great struggles of 1813 and 1814, how much an energetic and successful military effort of the people at large, blended with endurance of serious hardship, tends to stimulate the sense of political dignity and the demand for developed citizenship: and if this be the tendency even among a people habitually passive on such subjects, much more was it to be expected in the Athenian population, who had gone through a previous training of near thirty years under the democracy of Kleisthenês. At the time when that constitution was first established,[550] it was perhaps the most democratical in Greece: it had worked extremely well and had diffused among the people a sentiment favorable to equal citizenship and unfriendly to avowed privilege: so that

the impressions made by the struggle at Salamis found the popular mind prepared to receive them. Early after the return to Attica, the Kleisthenean constitution was enlarged as respects eligibility to the magistracy. According to that constitution, the fourth or last class on the Solonian census, including the considerable majority of the freemen, were not admissible to offices of state, though they possessed votes in common with the rest: no person was eligible to be a magistrate unless he belonged to one of the three higher classes. This restriction was now annulled, and eligibility extended to all the citizens. We may appreciate the strength of feeling with which such reform was demanded, when we find that it was proposed by Aristeidês; a man the reverse of what is called a demagogue, and a strenuous friend of the Kleisthenean constitution. No political system would work after the Persian war, which formally excluded "the maritime multitude" from holding magistracy. I rather imagine, as has been stated in the previous volume, that election of magistrates was still retained, and not exchanged for drawing lots until a certain time, though not a long time, afterwards. That which the public sentiment first demanded was the recognition of the equal and open principle: after a certain length of experience, it was found that poor men, though legally qualified to be chosen, were in point of fact rarely chosen: then came the lot, to give them an equal chance with the rich. The principle of sortition, or choice by lot, was never applied, as I have before remarked, to all offices at Athens,—never, for example, to the stratêgi, or generals, whose functions were more grave and responsible than those of any other person in the service of the state, and who always continued to be elected by show of hands.

In the new position into which Athens was now thrown, with so great an extension of what may be termed her foreign relations, and with a confederacy which imposed the necessity of distant military service, the functions of the stratêgi naturally tended to become both more absorbing and complicated; while the civil administration became more troublesome, if not more difficult, from the enlargement of the city, and the still greater enlargement of Peiræus,—leading to an increase of town population, and especially to an increase of the metics, or resident non-freemen. And it was probably about this period, during the years immediately succeeding the battle of Salamis,—when the force of old habit and tradition had been partially enfeebled by so many stirring novelties,—that the archons were withdrawn altogether from political and military duties, and confined to civil or judicial administration. At the battle of Marathon, the polemarch is a military commander, president of the ten stratêgi: [551] we know him afterwards only as a civil magistrate, administering justice to the metics, or non-freemen, while the stratêgi perform military duties without him. I conceive that this alteration, indicating as it does a change in the character of the archons generally, must have taken place at the time which we have now reached,[552] —a time when the Athenian establishments on all sides required a more elaborate distribution of functionaries. The distribution of so many Athenian boards of functionaries, part to do duty in the city, and part in the Peiræus, cannot have commenced until after this period, when Peiræus had been raised by Themistoklês to the

dignity of town, fortress, and state-harbor. Such boards were the astynomi and agoranomi, who maintained the police of streets and markets,—the metronomi, who watched over weights and measures,—the sitophylakes, who carried into effect various state regulations respecting the custody and sale of corn,—with various others who acted not less in Peiræus than in the city.[553] We may presume that each of these boards was originally created as the exigency appeared to call for it, at a period later than that which we have now reached, most of these duties of detail having been at first discharged by the archons, and afterwards, when these latter became too full of occupation, confided to separate administrators. The special and important change which characterized the period immediately succeeding the battle of Salamis, was the more accurate line drawn between the archons and the stratêgi; assigning the foreign and military department entirely to the stratêgi, and rendering the archons purely civil magistrates,—administrative as well as judicial; while the first creation of the separate boards above named was probably an ulterior enlargement, arising out of increase of population, power, and trade, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. It was by some such steps that the Athenian administration gradually attained that complete development which it exhibits in practice during the century from the Peloponnesian war downward, to which nearly all our positive and direct information relates.

With this expansion both of democratical feeling and of military activity at Athens, Aristeidês appears to have sympathized; and the popularity thus insured to him, probably heightened by some regret for his previous ostracism, was calculated to acquire permanence from his straightforward and incorruptible character, now brought into strong relief from his function as assessor to the new Delian confederacy. On the other hand, the ascendency of Themistoklês, though so often exalted by his unrivalled political genius and daring, as well as by the signal value of his public recommendations, was as often overthrown by his duplicity of means and unprincipled thirst for money. New political opponents sprung up against him, men sympathizing with Aristeidês, and far more violent in their antipathy than Aristeidês himself. Of these, the chief were Kimon—son of Miltiades—and Alkmæon; moreover, it seems that the Lacedæmonians, though full of esteem for Themistoklês immediately after the battle of Salamis, had now become extremely hostile to him,—a change which may be sufficiently explained from his stratagem respecting the fortifications of Athens, and his subsequent ambitious projects in reference to the Peiræus. The Lacedæmonian influence, then not inconsiderable in Athens, was employed to second the political combinations against him.[554] He is said to have given offence by manifestations of personal vanity,—by continual boasting of his great services to the state, and by the erection of a private chapel, close to his own house, in honor of Artemis Aristobulê, or Artemis of admirable counsel; just as Pausanias had irritated the Lacedæmonians by inscribing his own single name on the Delphian tripod, and as the friends of Aristeidês had displeased the Athenians by endless encomiums upon his justice.[555] But the main cause of his discredit was, the prostitution of his great

influence for arbitrary and corrupt purposes. In the unsettled condition of so many different Grecian communities, recently emancipated from Persia, when there was past misrule to avenge, wrong-doers to be deposed and perhaps punished, exiles to be restored, and all the disturbance and suspicions accompanying so great a change of political condition as well as of foreign policy,—the influence of the leading men at Athens must have been great in determining the treatment of particular individuals. Themistoklês, placed at the head of an Athenian squadron and sailing among the islands, partly for the purposes of war against Persia, partly for organizing the new confederacy,—is affirmed to have accepted bribes without scruple, for executing sentences just and unjust,—restoring some citizens, expelling others, and even putting some to death. We learn this from a friend and guest of Themistoklês,—the poet Timokreon of Ialysus in Rhodes, who had expected his own restoration from the Athenian commander, but found that it was thwarted by a bribe of three talents from his opponents; so that he was still kept in exile on the charge of *medism*. The assertions of Timokreon, personally incensed on this ground against Themistoklês, are doubtless to be considered as passionate and exaggerated: nevertheless, they are a valuable memorial of the feelings of the time, and are far too much in harmony with the general character of this eminent man to allow of our disbelieving them entirely. Timokreon is as emphatic in his admiration of Aristeidês as in his censure of Themistoklês, whom he denounces as "a lying and unjust traitor."[556]

Such conduct as that described by this new Archilochus, even making every allowance for exaggeration, must have caused Themistoklês to be both hated and feared among the insular allies, whose opinion was now of considerable importance to the Athenians. A similar sentiment grew up partially against him in Athens itself, and appears to have been connected with suspicions of treasonable inclinations towards the Persians. As the Persians could offer the highest bribes, a man open to corruption might naturally be suspected of inclinations towards their cause; and if Themistoklês had rendered preëminent service against them, so also had Pausanias, whose conduct had undergone so fatal a change for the worse. It was the treason of Pausanias, suspected and believed against him by the Athenians even when he was in command at Byzantium, though not proved against him at Sparta until long afterwards,—which first seems to have raised the presumption of *medism* against Themistoklês also, when combined with the corrupt proceedings which stained his public conduct: we must recollect, also, that Themistoklês had given some color to these presumptions, even by the stratagems in reference to Xerxes, which wore a double-faced aspect, capable of being construed either in a Persian or in a Grecian sense. The Lacedæmonians, hostile to Themistoklês since the time when he had outwitted them respecting the walls of Athens,—and fearing him also as a supposed accomplice of the suspected Pausanias,—procured the charge of *medism* to be preferred against him at Athens; by secret instigations, and, as it is said, by bribes, to his political opponents.[557] But no satisfactory proof could be furnished of the accusation, which Themistoklês himself strenuously denied, not without emphatic appeals

to his illustrious services. In spite of violent invectives against him from Alkmæon and Kimon, tempered, indeed, by a generous moderation on the part of Aristeidês, [558] his defence was successful. He carried the people with him and was acquitted of the charge. Nor was he merely acquitted, but, as might naturally be expected, a reaction took place in his favor: his splendid qualities and exploits were brought impressively before the public mind, and he seemed for the time to acquire greater ascendency than ever.[559]

Such a charge, and such a failure, must have exasperated to the utmost the animosity between him and his chief opponents,—Aristeidês, Kimon, Alkmæon, and others; nor can we wonder that they were anxious to get rid of him by ostracism. In explaining this peculiar process, I have already stated that it could never be raised against any one individual separately and ostensibly,—and that it could never be brought into operation at all, unless its necessity were made clear, not merely to violent party men, but also to the assembled senate and people, including, of course, a considerable proportion of the more moderate citizens. We may well conceive that the conjuncture was deemed by many dispassionate Athenians well suited for the tutelary intervention of ostracism, the express benefit of which consisted in its separating political opponents when the antipathy between them threatened to push one or the other into extra-constitutional proceedings,—especially when one of those parties was Themistoklês, a man alike vast in his abilities and unscrupulous in his morality. Probably also there were not a few who wished to revenge the previous ostracism of Aristeidês: and lastly, the friends of Themistoklês himself, elate with his acquittal and his seemingly augmented popularity, might indulge hopes that the vote of ostracism would turn out in his favor, and remove one or other of his chief political opponents. From all these circumstances we learn without astonishment, that a vote of ostracism was soon after resorted to. It ended in the temporary banishment of Themistoklês.

He retired into exile, and was residing at Argos, whither he carried a considerable property, yet occasionally visiting other parts of Peloponnesus,[560]—when the exposure and death of Pausanias, together with the discovery of his correspondence, took place at Sparta. Among this correspondence were found proofs, which Thucydidês seems to have considered as real and sufficient, of the privity of Themistoklês. According to Ephorus and others, he is admitted to have been solicited by Pausanias, and to have known his plans,—but to have kept them secret while refusing to coöperate in them,[561]—but probably after his exile he took a more decided share in them than before; being well-placed for that purpose at Argos, a city not only unfriendly to Sparta, but strongly believed to have been in collusion with Xerxes at his invasion of Greece. On this occasion the Lacedæmonians sent to Athens, publicly to prefer a formal charge of treason against him, and to urge the necessity of trying him as a Pan-Hellenic criminal before the synod of the allies assembled at Sparta. [562] Whether this latter request would have been granted, or whether Themistoklês

would have been tried at Athens, we cannot tell: for no sooner was he apprized that joint envoys from Sparta and Athens had been despatched to arrest him, than he fled forthwith from Argos to Korkyra. The inhabitants of that island, though owing gratitude to him and favorably disposed, could not venture to protect him against the two most powerful states in Greece, but sent him to the neighboring continent. Here, however, being still tracked and followed by the envoys, he was obliged to seek protection from a man whom he had formerly thwarted in a demand at Athens, and who had become his personal enemy,—Admêtus, king of the Molossians. Fortunately for him, at the moment when he arrived, Admêtus was not at home; and Themistoklês, becoming a suppliant to his wife, conciliated her sympathy so entirely, that she placed her child in his arms and planted him at the hearth in the full solemnity of supplication to soften her husband. As soon as Admêtus returned, Themistoklês revealed his name, his pursuers, and his danger,—entreating protection as a helpless suppliant in the last extremity. He appealed to the generosity of the Epirotic prince not to take revenge on a man now defenceless, for offence given under such very different circumstances; and for an offence too, after all, not of capital moment, while the protection now entreated was to the suppliant a matter of life or death. Admêtus raised him up from the hearth with the child in his arms,—an evidence that he accepted the appeal and engaged to protect him; refusing to give him up to the envoys, and at last only sending him away on the expression of his own wish to visit the king of Persia. Two Macedonian guides conducted him across the mountains to Pydna, in the Thermaic gulf, where he found a merchant-ship about to set sail for the coast of Asia Minor, and took a passage on board; neither the master nor the crew knowing his name. An untoward storm drove the vessel to the island of Naxos, at that moment besieged by an Athenian armament: had he been forced to land there, he would of course have been recognized and seized, but his wonted subtlety did not desert him. Having communicated both his name and the peril which awaited him, he conjured the master of the ship to assist in saving him, and not to suffer any one of the crew to land; menacing that if by any accident he were discovered, he would bring the master to ruin along with himself, by representing him as an accomplice induced by money to facilitate the escape of Themistoklês: on the other hand, in case of safety, he promised a large reward. Such promises and threats weighed with the master, who controlled his crew, and forced them to beat about during a day and a night off the coast, without seeking to land. After that dangerous interval, the storm abated, and the ship reached Ephesus in safety.[563]

Thus did Themistoklês, after a series of perils, find himself safe on the Persian side of the Ægean. At Athens, he was proclaimed a traitor, and his property confiscated: nevertheless, as it frequently happened in cases of confiscation, his friends secreted a considerable sum, and sent it over to him in Asia, together with the money which he had left at Argos; so that he was thus enabled liberally to reward the ship-captain who had preserved him. With all this deduction, the property which he possessed of a character not susceptible of concealment, and which was therefore

actually seized, was found to amount to eighty talents, according to Theophrastus,—to one hundred talents, according to Theopompus. In contrast with this large sum, it is melancholy to learn that he had begun his political career with a property not greater than three talents.[564] The poverty of Aristeidês at the end of his life presents an impressive contrast to the enrichment of his rival.

The escape of Themistoklês, and his adventures in Persia, appear to have formed a favorite theme for the fancy and exaggeration of authors a century afterwards: we have thus many anecdotes which contradict either directly or by implication the simple narrative of Thucydidês. Thus we are told that at the moment when he was running away from the Greeks, the Persian king also had proclaimed a reward of two hundred talents for his head, and that some Greeks on the coast of Asia were watching to take him for this reward: that he was forced to conceal himself strictly near the coast, until means were found to send him up to Susa in a closed litter, under pretence that it was a woman for the king's harem: that Mandanê, sister of Xerxes, insisted upon having him delivered up to her as an expiation for the loss of her son at the battle of Salamis: that he learned Persian so well, and discoursed in it so eloquently, as to procure for himself an acquittal from the Persian judges, when put upon his trial through the importunity of Mandanê: that the officers of the king's household at Susa, and the satraps in his way back, threatened him with still farther perils: that he was admitted to see the king in person, after having received a lecture from the chamberlain on the indispensable duty of falling down before him to do homage, etc., with several other uncertified details,[565] which make us value more highly the narrative of Thucydidês. Indeed, Ephorus, Deinô, Kleitarchus, and Herakleidês, from whom these anecdotes appear mostly to be derived, even affirmed that Themistoklês had found Xerxes himself alive and seen him: whereas, Thucydidês and Charon, the two contemporary authors, for the former is *nearly* contemporary, asserted that he had found Xerxes recently dead, and his son Artaxerxes on the throne.

According to Thucydidês, the eminent exile does not seem to have been exposed to the least danger in Persia. He presented himself as a deserter from Greece, and was accepted as such: moreover,—what is more strange, though it seems true,—he was received as an actual benefactor of the Persian king, and a sufferer from the Greeks on account of such dispositions,—in consequence of his communications made to Xerxes respecting the intended retreat of the Greeks from Salamis, and respecting the contemplated destruction of the Hellespontine bridge. He was conducted by some Persians on the coast up to Susa, where he addressed a letter to the king couched in the following terms, such as probably no modern European king would tolerate except from a Quaker: "I, Themistoklês, am come to thee, having done to thy house more mischief than any other Greek, as long as I was compelled in my own defence to resist the attack of thy father,—but having also done him yet greater good, when I could do so with safety to myself, and when his retreat was endangered. Reward is yet owing to me for my past service: moreover, I am now here,

chased away by the Greeks, in consequence of my attachment to thee,[566] but able still to serve thee with great effect. I wish to wait a year, and then to come before thee in person to explain my views."

Whether the Persian interpreters, who read this letter to Artaxerxes Longimanus, exactly rendered its brief and direct expression, we cannot say. But it made a strong impression upon him, combined with the previous reputation of the writer, and he willingly granted the prayer for delay: though we shall not readily believe that he was so transported as to show his joy by immediate sacrifice to the gods, by an unusual measure of convivial indulgence, and by crying out thrice in his sleep, "I have got Themistoklês the Athenian,"—as some of Plutarch's authors informed him.[567] In the course of the year granted, Themistoklês had learned so much of the Persian language and customs as to be able to communicate personally with the king, and acquire his confidence: no Greek, says Thucydidês, had ever before attained such a commanding influence and position at the Persian court. His ingenuity was now displayed in laying out schemes for the subjugation of Greece to Persia, which were eminently captivating to the monarch, who rewarded him with a Persian wife and large presents, sending him down to Magnesia, on the Mæander, not far from the coast of Ionia. The revenues of the district round that town, amounting to the large sum of fifty talents yearly, were assigned to him for bread: those of the neighboring seaport of Myus, for articles of condiment to his bread, which was always accounted the main nourishment: those of Lampsakus on the Hellespont, for wine.[568] Not knowing the amount of these two latter items, we cannot determine how much revenue Themistoklês received altogether: but there can be no doubt; judging from the revenues of Magnesia alone, that he was a great pecuniary gainer by his change of country. After having visited various parts of Asia,[569] he lived for a certain time at Magnesia, in which place his family joined him from Athens. How long his residence at Magnesia lasted we do not know, but seemingly long enough to acquire local estimation and leave mementos behind him. He at length died of sickness, when sixty-five years old, without having taken any step towards the accomplishment of those victorious campaigns which he had promised to Artaxerxes. That sickness was the real cause of his death, we may believe on the distinct statement of Thucydidês;[570] who at the same time notices a rumor partially current in his own time, of poison voluntarily taken, from painful consciousness on the part of Themistoklês himself that the promises made could never be performed,—a farther proof of the general tendency to surround the last years of this distinguished man with impressive adventures, and to dignify his last moments with a revived feeling, not unworthy of his earlier patriotism. The report may possibly have been designedly circulated by his friends and relatives, in order to conciliate some tenderness towards his memory (his sons still continued citizens at Athens, and his daughters were married there). These friends farther stated that they had brought back his bones to Attica, at his own express command, and buried them privately without the knowledge of the Athenians; no condemned traitor being permitted to be buried in Attic soil. If, however, we even

suppose that this statement was true, no one could point out with certainty the spot wherein such interment had taken place: nor does it seem, when we mark the cautious expressions of Thucydidês,[571] that he himself was satisfied of the fact: moreover, we may affirm with confidence that the inhabitants of Magnesia, when they showed the splendid sepulchral monument erected in honor of Themistoklês in their own market-place, were persuaded that his bones were really inclosed within it.

Aristeidês died about three or four years after the ostracism of Themistoklês;[572] but respecting the place and manner of his death, there were several contradictions among the authors whom Plutarch had before him. Some affirmed that he perished on foreign service in the Euxine sea; others, that he died at home, amidst the universal esteem and grief of his fellow-citizens. A third story, confined to the single statement of Kraterus, and strenuously rejected by Plutarch, represents Aristeidês as having been falsely accused before the Athenian judicature and condemned to a fine of fifty minæ, on the allegation of having taken bribes during the assessment of the tribute upon the allies,—which fine he was unable to pay, and was therefore obliged to retire to Ionia, where he died. Dismissing this last story, we find nothing certain about his death except one fact,—but that fact at the same time the most honorable of all,—that he died very poor. It is even asserted that he did not leave enough to pay funeral expenses,—that a sepulchre was provided for him at Phalêrum at the public cost, besides a handsome donation to his son Lysimachus, and a dowry to each of his two daughters. In the two or three ensuing generations, however, his descendants still continued poor, and even at that remote day, some of them received aid out of the public purse, from the recollection of their incorruptible ancestor. Near a century and a half afterwards, a poor man, named Lysimachus, descendant of the just Aristeidês, was to be seen at Athens, near the chapel of Iacchus, carrying a mysterious tablet, and obtaining his scanty fee of two oboli for interpreting the dreams of the passers by: Demetrius the Phalerean procured from the people, for the mother and aunt of this poor man, a small daily allowance.[573] On all these points the contrast is marked when we compare Aristeidês with Themistoklês. The latter, having distinguished himself by ostentatious cost at Olympia, and by a choregic victory at Athens, with little scruple as to the means of acquisition,—ended his life at Magnesia in dishonorable affluence, greater than ever, and left an enriched posterity both at that place and at Athens. More than five centuries afterwards, his descendant, the Athenian Themistoklês, attended the lectures of the philosopher Ammonius at Athens, as the comrade and friend of Plutarch himself.[574]

CHAPTER XLV.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENS AS HEAD. — FIRST FORMATION AND RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

I HAVE already recounted, in the preceding chapter, how the Asiatic Greeks, breaking loose from the Spartan Pausanias, entreated Athens to organize a new confederacy, and to act as presiding city (Vorort),—and how this confederacy, framed not only for common and pressing objects, but also on principles of equal rights and constant control on the part of the members, attracted soon the spontaneous adhesion of a large proportion of Greeks, insular or maritime, near the Ægean sea. I also noticed this event as giving commencement to a new era in Grecian politics. For whereas there had been before a tendency, not very powerful, yet on the whole steady and increasing, towards something like one Pan-Hellenic league under Sparta as president,—from henceforward that tendency disappears and a bifurcation begins: Athens and Sparta divide the Grecian world between them, and bring a much larger number of its members into coöperation, either with one or the other, than had ever been so arranged before.

Thucydidês marks precisely, as far as general words can go, the character of the new confederacy during the first years after its commencement: but unhappily he gives us scarcely any particular facts,—and in the absence of such controlling evidence, a habit has grown up of describing loosely the entire period between 477 B. C., and 405 B. C. (the latter date is that of the battle of Ægos Potamos), as constituting "the Athenian empire." This word denotes correctly enough the last part, perhaps the last forty years, of the seventy-two years indicated; but it is misleading when applied to the first part: nor, indeed, can any single word be found which faithfully characterizes as well the one part as the other. A great and serious change had taken place, and we disguise the fact of that change, if we talk of the Athenian hegemony, or headship, as a portion of the Athenian empire. Thucydidês carefully distinguishes the two, speaking of the Spartans as having lost, and of the Athenians as having acquired, not empire, but headship, or hegemony.[575] The transition from the Athenian hegemony to the Athenian empire was doubtless gradual, so that no one could determine precisely where the former ends and the latter begins: but it had been consummated before the thirty years' truce, which was concluded fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war,—and it was in fact the substantial cause of that war. Empire then came to be held by Athens,—partly as a fact established, resting on acquiescence rather than attachment or consent on the minds of the subjects,—partly as a corollary from necessity of union combined with her superior force: while this latter point, superiority of force as a legitimate title, stood more and more forward, both in the language of her speakers and in the conceptions of her citizens.

Nay, the Athenian orators of the middle of the Peloponnesian war venture to affirm that their empire had been of this same character ever since the repulse of the Persians: an inaccuracy so manifest, that if we could suppose the speech made by the Athenian Euphêmus at Kamarina in 415 B. C. to have been heard by Themistoklês or Aristeidês fifty years before, it would have been alike offensive to the prudence of the one and to the justice of the other. The imperial state of Athens, that which she held at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when her allies, except Chios and Lesbos, were tributary subjects, and when the Ægean sea was an Athenian lake,—was of course the period of her greatest splendor and greatest action upon the Grecian world. It was also the period most impressive to historians, orators, and philosophers,—suggesting the idea of some one state exercising dominion over the Ægean, as the natural condition of Greece, so that if Athens lost such dominion, it would be transferred to Sparta,—holding out the dispersed maritime Greeks as a tempting prize for the aggressive schemes of some new conqueror,—and even bringing up by association into men's fancies the mythical Minos of Krete, and others, as having been rulers of the Ægean in times anterior to Athens.

Even those who lived under the full-grown Athenian empire had before them no good accounts of the incidents between 479-450 B. C.; for we may gather from the intimation of Thucydidês, as well as from his barrenness of facts, that while there were chroniclers both for the Persian invasion and for the times before, no one cared for the times immediately succeeding.[576] Hence, the little light which has fallen upon this blank has all been borrowed—if we except the careful Thucydidês—from a subsequent age; and the Athenian hegemony has been treated as a mere commencement of the Athenian empire: credit has been given to Athens for a long-sighted ambition, aiming from the Persian war downwards at results which perhaps Themistoklês[577] may have partially divined, but which only time and successive accidents opened even to distant view. But such systematic anticipation of subsequent results is fatal to any correct understanding, either of the real agents or of the real period; both of which are to be explained from the circumstances preceding and actually present, with some help, though cautious and sparing, from our acquaintance with that which was then an unknown future. When Aristeidês and Kimon dismissed the Lacedæmonian admiral Dorkis, and drove Pausanias away from Byzantium on his second coming out, they had to deal with the problem immediately before them; they had to complete the defeat of the Persian power, still formidable,—and to create and organize a confederacy as yet only inchoate. This was quite enough to occupy their attention, without ascribing to them distant views of Athenian maritime empire.

In that brief sketch of incidents preceding the Peloponnesian war, which Thucydidês introduces as "the throwing off of his narrative,"[578] he neither gives, nor professes to give, a complete enumeration of all which actually occurred. During the interval between the first desertion of the Asiatic allies from Pausanias to Athens, in 477 B. C.,—and the revolt of Naxos in 466 B. C.,—he recites three incidents only: first,

the siege and capture of Eion, on the Strymon, with its Persian garrison,—next, the capture of Skyros, and appropriation of the island to Athenian kleruchs, or out-citizens,—thirdly, the war with Karystus in Eubœa, and reduction of the place by capitulation. It has been too much the practice to reason as if these three events were the full history of ten or eleven years. Considering what Thucydidês states respecting the darkness of this period, we might perhaps suspect that they were all which he could learn about it on good authority: and they are all, in truth, events having a near and special bearing on the subsequent history of Athens herself,—for Eion was the first stepping-stone to the important settlement of Amphipolis, and Skyros in the time of Thucydidês was the property of outlying Athenian citizens, or kleruchs. Still, we are left in almost entire ignorance of the proceedings of Athens, as conducting the newly-established confederate force: for it is certain that the first ten years of the Athenian hegemony must have been years of most active warfare against the Persians. One positive testimony to this effect has been accidentally preserved to us by Herodotus, who mentions, that "before the invasion of Xerxes, there were Persian commanders and garrisons everywhere in Thrace and the Hellespont,[579] all of whom were conquered by the Greeks after that invasion, with the single exception of Maskamês, governor of Doriskus, who could never be taken, though many different Grecian attempts were made upon the fortress. Of those who were captured by the Greeks, not one made any defence sufficient to attract the admiration of Xerxes, except Bogês, governor of Eion." Bogês, after bravely defending himself, and refusing offers of capitulation, found his provisions exhausted, and farther resistance impracticable. He then kindled a vast funeral pile,—slew his wives, children, concubines, and family, and cast them into it,—threw his precious effects over the wall into the Strymon,—and lastly, precipitated himself into the flames.[580] His brave despair was the theme of warm encomium among the Persians, and his relatives in Persia were liberally rewarded by Xerxes. This capture of Eion, effected by Kimon, has been mentioned, as already stated, by Thucydidês; but Herodotus here gives us to understand that it was only one of a string of enterprises, all unnoticed by Thucydidês, against the Persians. Nay, it would seem from his language, that Maskamês maintained himself in Doriskus during the whole reign of Xerxes, and perhaps longer, repelling successive Grecian assaults.

The valuable indication here cited from Herodotus would be of itself a sufficient proof that the first years of the Athenian hegemony were full of busy and successful hostility against the Persians. And in truth this is what we should expect: the battles of Salamis, Platæa, and Mykalê, drove the Persians out of Greece, and overpowered their main armaments, but did not remove them at once from all the various posts which they occupied throughout the Ægean and Thrace. Without doubt, the Athenians had to clear the coasts and the islands of a great number of different Persian detachments: an operation never short nor easy, with the then imperfect means of siege, as we may see by the cases of Sestus and Eion; nor, indeed, always practicable, as the case of Doriskus teaches us. The fear of these Persians, yet remaining in

the neighborhood,[581] and even the chance of a renewed Persian invading armament, formed one pressing motive for Grecian cities to join the new confederacy: while the expulsion of the enemy added to it those places which he had occupied. It was by these years of active operations at sea against the common enemy, that the Athenians first established[582] that constant, systematic, and laborious training, among their own ships' crews, which transmitted itself with continual improvements down to the Peloponnesian war: it was by these, combined with the present fear, that they were enabled to organize the largest and most efficient confederacy ever known among Greeks,—to bring together deliberative deputies,—to plant their own ascendency as enforcers of the collective resolutions,—and to raise a prodigious tax from universal contribution. Lastly, it was by these same operations, prosecuted so successfully as to remove present alarm, that they at length fatigued the more lukewarm and passive members of the confederacy, and created in them a wish either to commute personal service for pecuniary contribution, or to escape from the obligation of service in any way. The Athenian nautical training would never have been acquired,—the confederacy would never have become a working reality,—the fatigue and discontents among its members would never have arisen,—unless there had been a real fear of the Persians, and a pressing necessity for vigorous and organized operations against them, during the ten years between 477 and 466 B. C.

As to the ten years from 477-466 B. C., there has been a tendency almost unconscious to assume that the particular incidents mentioned by Thucydidês about Eion, Skyros, Karystus, and Naxos, constitute the sum total of events. To contradict this assumption, I have suggested proof sufficient, though indirect, that they are only part of the stock of a very busy period,—the remaining details of which, indicated in outline by the large general language of Thucydidês, we are condemned not to know. Nor are we admitted to be present at the synod of Delos, which during all this time continued its periodical meetings: though it would have been highly interesting to trace the steps whereby an institution which at first promised to protect not less the separate rights of the members than the security of the whole, so lamentably failed in its object. We must recollect that this confederacy, formed for objects common to all, limited to a certain extent the autonomy of each member; both conferring definite rights and imposing definite obligations. Solemnly sworn to by all, and by Aristeidês on behalf of Athens, it was intended to bind the members in perpetuity,—marked even in the form of the oath, which was performed by casting heavy lumps of iron into the sea never again to be seen.[583] As this confederacy was thus both perpetual and peremptory, binding each member to the rest, and not allowing either retirement or evasion, so it was essential that it should be sustained by some determining authority and enforcing sanction. The determining authority was provided by the synod at Delos: the enforcing sanction was exercised by Athens as president. And there is every reason to presume that Athens, for a long time, performed this duty in a legitimate and honorable manner, acting in execution of the resolves of the synod, or at least in full harmony with its general purposes. She exacted from every

member the regulated quota of men or money, employing coercion against recusants, and visiting neglect of military duty with penalties. In all these requirements she only discharged her appropriate functions as chosen leader of the confederacy, and there can be no reasonable doubt that the general synod went cordially along with her[584] in strictness of dealing towards those defaulters who obtained protection without bearing their share of the burden.

But after a few years, several of the confederates becoming weary of personal military service, prevailed upon the Athenians to provide ships and men in their place, and imposed upon themselves in exchange a money-payment of suitable amount. This commutation, at first probably introduced to meet some special case of inconvenience, was found so suitable to the taste of all parties that it gradually spread through the larger portion of the confederacy. To unwarlike allies, hating labor and privation, it was a welcome relief,—while to the Athenians, full of ardor and patient of labor, as well as discipline, for the aggrandizement of their country, it afforded constant pay for a fleet more numerous than they could otherwise have kept afloat. It is plain from the statement of Thucydidês that this altered practice was introduced from the petition of the confederates themselves, not from any pressure or stratagem, on the part of Athens.[585] But though such was its real source, it did not the less fatally degrade the allies in reference to Athens, and extinguish the original feeling of equal rights and partnership in the confederacy, with communion of danger as well as of glory, which had once bound them together. The Athenians came to consider themselves as military chiefs and soldiers, with a body of tribute-paying subjects, whom they were entitled to hold in dominion, and restrict, both as to foreign policy and internal government, to such extent as they thought expedient,—but whom they were also bound to protect against foreign enemies. The military force of these subject-states was thus in a great degree transferred to Athens, by their own act, just as that of so many of the native princes in India has been made over to the English. But the military efficiency of the confederacy against the Persians was much increased, in proportion as the vigorous resolves of Athens[586] were less and less paralyzed by the contentions and irregularity of a synod; so that the war was prosecuted with greater success than ever, while those motives of alarm, which had served as the first pressing stimulus to the formation of the confederacy, became every year farther and farther removed.

Under such circumstances several of the confederate states grew tired even of paying their tribute,—and averse to continuance as members. They made successive attempts to secede, but Athens, acting seemingly in conjunction with the synod, repressed their attempts one after the other,—conquering, fining, and disarming the revolters; which was the more easily done, since in most cases their naval force had been in great part handed over to her. As these events took place, not all at once, but successively in different years,—the number of mere tribute-paying allies as well as of subdued revolters continually increasing,—so there was never any one moment

of conspicuous change in the character of the confederacy: the allies slid unconsciously into subjects, while Athens, without any predetermined plan, passed from a chief into a despot. By strictly enforcing the obligations of the pact upon unwilling members, and by employing coercion against revolters, she had become unpopular in the same proportion as she acquired new power,—and that, too, without any guilt of her own. In this position, even if she had been inclined to relax her hold upon the tributary subjects, considerations of her own safety would have deterred her from doing so; for there was reason to apprehend that they might place their strength at the disposal of her enemies. It is very certain that she never was so inclined; it would have required a more self-denying public morality than has ever been practised by any state, either ancient or modern, even to conceive the idea of relinquishing voluntarily an immense ascendency as well as a lucrative revenue: least of all was such an idea likely to be conceived by Athenian citizens, whose ambition increased with their power, and among whom the love of Athenian ascendency was both passion and patriotism. But though the Athenians were both disposed and qualified to push all the advantages offered, and even to look out for new, we must not forget that the foundations of their empire were laid in the most honorable causes: voluntary invitation, efforts both unwearied and successful against a common enemy, unpopularity incurred in discharge of an imperative duty, and inability to break up the confederacy without endangering themselves as well as laying open the Ægean sea to the Persians.[587]

There were two other causes, besides that which has just been adverted to, for the unpopularity of imperial Athens. First, the existence of the confederacy, imposing permanent obligations, was in conflict with the general instinct of the Greek mind, tending towards separate political autonomy of each city, as well as with the particular turn of the Ionic mind, incapable of that steady personal effort which was requisite for maintaining the synod of Delos, on its first large and equal basis. Next,—and this is the great cause of all,—Athens, having defeated the Persians, and thrust them to a distance, began to employ the force and the tribute of her subject-allies in warfare against Greeks, wherein these allies had nothing to gain from success,—everything to apprehend from defeat,—and a banner to fight for, offensive to Hellenic sympathies. On this head, the subject-allies had great reason to complain, throughout the prolonged wars of Greek against Greek, for the purpose of sustaining Athenian predominance: but on the point of practical grievances or oppressions, they had little ground for discontent, and little feeling of actual discontent, as I shall show more fully hereafter. Among the general body of citizens in the subject-allied cities, the feeling towards Athens was rather indifference than hatred: the movement of revolt against her proceeded from small parties of leading men, acting apart from the citizens, and generally with collateral views of ambition for themselves: and the positive hatred towards her was felt chiefly by those who were not her subjects.

It is probable that the same indisposition to personal effort, which prompted the confederates of Delos to tender money-payment as a substitute for military service, also induced them to neglect attendance at the synod. But we do not know the steps whereby this assembly, at first an effective reality, gradually dwindled into a mere form and vanished. Nothing, however, can more forcibly illustrate the difference of character between the maritime allies of Athens, and the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta, than the fact,—that while the former shrank from personal service, and thought it an advantage to tax themselves in place of it,—the latter were "ready enough with their bodies," but uncomplying and impracticable as to contributions. [588] The contempt felt by these Dorian landsmen for the military efficiency of the Ionians recurs frequently, and appears even to have exceeded what the reality justified: but when we turn to the conduct of the latter twenty years earlier, at the battle of Ladê, in the very crisis of the Ionic revolt from Persia,[589]—we detect the same want of energy, the same incapacity of personal effort and labor, as that which broke up the confederacy of Delos with all its beneficial promise. To appreciate fully the indefatigable activity and daring, together with the patient endurance of laborious maritime training, which characterized the Athenians of that day,—we have only to contrast them with these confederates, so remarkably destitute of both. Amidst such glaring inequalities of merit, capacity, and power, to maintain a confederacy of equal members was impossible: it was in the nature of things that the confederacy should either break up, or be transmuted into an Athenian empire.

It has already been mentioned that the first aggregate assessment of tribute, proposed by Aristeidês, and adopted by the synod at Delos, was four hundred and sixty talents in money. At that time many of the confederates paid their quota, not in money but in ships; but this practice gradually diminished, as the commutations above alluded to, of money in place of ships, were multiplied, while the aggregate tribute, of course, became larger. It was no more than six hundred talents[590] at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, forty-six years after the first formation of the confederacy; from whence we may infer that it was never at all increased upon individual members during the interval. For the difference between four hundred and sixty talents and six hundred admits of being fully explained by the numerous commutations of service for money, as well as by the acquisitions of new members, which doubtless Athens had more or less the opportunity of making. It is not to be imagined that the confederacy had attained its maximum number, at the date of the first assessment of tribute: there must have been various cities, like Sinopê and Ægina, subsequently added.[591]

Without some such preliminary statements as those just given, respecting the new state of Greece between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, beginning with the Athenian hegemony, or headship, and ending with the Athenian empire, the reader would hardly understand the bearing of those particular events which our authorities enable us to recount; events unhappily few in number, though the period

must have been full of action, and not well authenticated as to dates. The first known enterprise of the Athenians in their new capacity—whether the first absolutely or not, we cannot determine—between 476 B. C. and 466 B. C., was the conquest of the important post of Eion, on the Strymon, where the Persian governor, Bogês, starved out after a desperate resistance, destroyed himself rather than capitulate, together with his family and precious effects, as has already been stated. The next events named are their enterprises against the Dolopes and Pelasgi in the island of Skyros, seemingly about 470 B. C., and the Dryopes in the town and district of Karystus, in Eubœa. To the latter, who were of a different kindred from the inhabitants of Chalkis and Eretria, and received no aid from them, they granted a capitulation: the former were more rigorously dealt with, and expelled from their island. Skyros was barren, and had little to recommend it, except a good maritime position and an excellent harbor; while its inhabitants, seemingly akin to the Pelasgian residents in Lemnos, prior to the Athenian occupation of that spot, were alike piratical and cruel. Some Thessalian traders, recently plundered and imprisoned by them, had raised a complaint against them before the Amphiktyonic synod, which condemned the island to make restitution: the mass of the islanders threw the burden upon those who had committed the crime; and these men, in order to evade payment, invoked Kimon with the Athenian armament,—who conquered the island, expelled the inhabitants, and peopled it with Athenian settlers.

Such clearance was a beneficial act, suitable to the new character of Athens as guardian of the Ægean sea against piracy: but it seems also connected with Athenian plans. The island lay very convenient for the communication with Lemnos, which the Athenians had doubtless reoccupied after the expulsion of the Persians,[592] and became, as well as Lemnos, a recognized adjunct, or outlying portion, of Attica: moreover, there were old legends which connected the Athenians with it, as the tomb of their hero Theseus, whose name, as the mythical champion of democracy, was in peculiar favor at the period immediately following the return from Salamis. It was in the year 476 B. C., that the oracle had directed them to bring home the bones of Theseus from Skyros, and to prepare for that hero a splendid entombment and edifice in their new city: they had tried to effect this, but the unsocial manners of the Dolopians had prevented a search, and it was only after Kimon had taken the island that he found, or pretended to find, the body. It was brought to Athens in the year 469 B. C.,[593] and after being welcomed by the people in solemn and joyous procession, as if the hero himself had come back, was deposited in the interior of the city,—the monument called the Theseium, with its sacred precinct being built on the spot, and invested with the privilege of a sanctuary for men of poor condition who might feel ground for dreading the oppressions of the powerful, as well as for slaves in case of cruel usage.[594] Such were the protective functions of the mythical hero of democracy, whose installation is interesting as marking the growing intensity of democratical feeling in Athens since the Persian war.

It was about two years or more after this incident, that the first breach of union in the confederacy of Delos took place. The important island of Naxos, the largest of the Cyclades,—an island which thirty years before had boasted a large marine force and eight thousand hoplites,—revolted; on what special ground we do not know: but probably the greater islands fancied themselves better able to dispense with the protection of the confederacy than the smaller,—at the same time that they were more jealous of Athens. After a siege, of unknown duration, by Athens and the confederate force, it was forced to surrender, and reduced to the condition of a tributary subject; [595] its armed ships being doubtless taken away, and its fortifications razed: whether any fine or ulterior penalty was levied, we have no information.

We cannot doubt that the reduction of this powerful island, however untoward in its effects upon the equal and self-maintaining character of the confederacy, strengthened its military force by placing the whole Naxian fleet with new pecuniary contributions in the hands of the chief: nor is it surprising to hear that Athens sought both to employ this new force, and to obliterate the late act of severity, by increased exertions against the common enemy. Though we know no particulars respecting operations against Persia, since the attack on Eion, such operations must have been going on; but the expedition under Kimon, undertaken not long after the Naxian revolt, was attended with memorable results. That commander, having under him two hundred triremes from Athens, and one hundred from the various confederates, was despatched to attack the Persians on the south-western and southern coast of Asia Minor. He attacked and drove out several of their garrisons from various Grecian settlements, both in Karia and Lykia: among others, the important trading city of Phasêlis, though at first resisting, and even standing a siege, was prevailed upon by the friendly suggestions of the Chians in Kimon's armament to pay a contribution of ten talents and join in the expedition. From the length of time occupied in these various undertakings, the Persian satraps had been enabled to assemble a powerful force, both fleet and army, near the mouth of the river Eurymedon, in Pamphylia, under the command of Tithraustês and Pherendatês, both of the regal blood. The fleet, chiefly Phenician, seems to have consisted of two hundred ships, but a farther reinforcement of eighty Phenician ships was expected, and was actually near at hand, and the commanders were unwilling to hazard a battle before its arrival. Kimon, anxious for the same reason to hasten on the combat, attacked them vigorously: partly from their inferiority of numbers, partly from discouragement at the absence of the reinforcement, they seem to have made no strenuous resistance. They were put to flight and driven ashore; so speedily, and with so little loss to the Greeks, that Kimon was enabled to disembark his men forthwith, and attack the land-force which was drawn up on shore to protect them. The battle on land was long and gallantly contested, but Kimon at length gained a complete victory, dispersed the army with the capture of many prisoners, and either took or destroyed the entire fleet. As soon as his victory and his prisoners were secured, he sailed to Cyprus for the purpose of intercepting the reinforcement of eighty Phenician ships in their way, and was fortu-

nate enough to attack them while yet they were ignorant of the victories of the Eurymedon. These ships too were all destroyed, though most of the crews appear to have escaped ashore on the island. Two great victories, one at sea and the other on land, gained on the same day by the same armament, counted with reason among the most glorious of all Grecian exploits, and were extolled as such in the inscription on the commemorative offering to Apollo, set up out of the tithe of the spoils.[596] The number of prisoners, as well as the booty taken by the victors, was immense.

A victory thus remarkable, which thrust back the Persians to the region eastward of Phasêlis, doubtless fortified materially the position of the Athenian confederacy against them; but it tended not less to exalt the reputation of Athens, and even to popularize her with the confederates generally, from the large amount of plunder divisible among them. Probably this increased power and popularity stood her in stead throughout her approaching contest with Thasos, at the same time that it explains the increasing fear and dislike of the Peloponnesians.

Thasos was a member of the confederacy of Delos; but her quarrel with Athens seems to have arisen out of causes quite distinct from confederate relations. It has been already stated that the Athenians had within the last few years expelled the Persians from the important post of Eion, on the Strymon, the most convenient post for the neighboring region of Thrace, which was not less distinguished for its fertility than for its mining wealth. In the occupation of this post, the Athenians had had time to become acquainted with the productive character of the adjoining region, chiefly occupied by the Edonian Thracians; and it is extremely probable that many private settlers arrived from Athens, with the view of procuring grants or making their fortunes by partnership with powerful Thracians in working the gold-mines round Mount Pangæus. In so doing, they speedily found themselves in collision with the Greeks of the opposite island of Mount Thasos, who possessed a considerable strip of land, with various dependent towns on the continent of Thrace, and derived a large revenue from the mines of Skaptê Hylê, as well as from others in the neighborhood.[597] The condition of Thasos at this time, about 465 B. C., indicates to us the progress which the Grecian states in the Ægean had made since their liberation from Persia. It had been deprived both of its fortifications and of its maritime force, by order of Darius, about 491 B. C., and must have remained in this condition until after the repulse of Xerxes; but we now find it well-fortified and possessing a powerful maritime force.

In what precise manner the quarrel between the Thasians and the Athenians of Eion manifested itself, respecting the trade and the mines in Thrace, we are not informed; but it reached such a height that the Athenians were induced to send a powerful armament against the island, under the command of Kimon.[598] Having vanquished the Thasian force at sea, they disembarked, gained various battles, and blocked up the city by land as well as by sea. And at the same time they undertook—what seems to have been part and parcel of the same scheme—the establishment of a larger and more powerful colony on Thracian ground not far from Eion. On the

Strymon, about three miles higher up than Eion, near the spot where the river narrows itself again out of a broad expanse of the nature of a lake, was situated the Edonian town or settlement called Ennea Hodoi, (Nine Ways), a little above the bridge, which here served as an important communication for all the people of the interior. Both Histiæus and Aristagoras, the two Milesian despots, had been tempted by the advantages of this place to commence a settlement there: both of them had failed, and a third failure on a still grander scale was now about to be added. The Athenians sent thither a large body of colonists, ten thousand in number, partly from their own citizens, partly collected from their allies: and the temptations of the site probably rendered volunteers numerous. As far as Ennea Hodoi was concerned, they were successful in conquering it and driving away the Edonian possessors: but on trying to extend themselves farther to the eastward, to a spot called Drabêskus, convenient for the mining region, they encountered a more formidable resistance from a powerful alliance of Thracian tribes, who had come to the aid of the Edonians in decisive hostility to the new colony,—probably not without instigation from the inhabitants of Thasos. All or most of the ten thousand colonists were slain in this warfare, and the new colony was for the time completely abandoned: we shall find it resumed hereafter.[599]

Disappointed as the Athenians were in this enterprise, they did not abandon the blockade of Thasos, which held out more than two years, and only surrendered in the third year. Its fortifications were razed; its ships of war, thirty-three in number, taken away:[600] its possessions and mining establishments on the opposite continent relinquished: moreover, an immediate contribution in money was demanded from the inhabitants, over and above the annual payment assessed upon them for the future. The subjugation of this powerful island was another step in the growing dominion of Athens over her confederates.

The year before the Thasians surrendered, however, they had taken a step which deserves particular notice, as indicating the newly-gathering clouds in the Grecian political horizon. They had made secret application to the Lacedæmonians for aid, entreating them to draw off the attention of Athens by invading Attica; and the Lacedæmonians, without the knowledge of Athens, having actually engaged to comply with this request, were only prevented from performing their promise by a grave and terrible misfortune at home.[601] Though accidentally unperformed, however, this hostile promise is a most significant event: it marks the growing fear and hatred on the part of Sparta and the Peloponnesians towards Athens, merely on general grounds of the magnitude of her power, and without any special provocation. Nay, not only had Athens given no provocation, but she was still actually included as a member of the Lacedæmonian alliance, and we shall find her presently both appealed to and acting as such. We shall hear so much of Athens, and that too with truth, as pushing and aggressive,—and of Sparta as homekeeping and defensive,—that the incident just mentioned becomes important to remark. The first intent of un-

provoked and even treacherous hostility—the germ of the future Peloponnesian war—is conceived and reduced to an engagement by Sparta.

We are told by Plutarch, that the Athenians, after the surrender of Thasos and the liberation of the armament, had expected from Kimon some farther conquests in Macedonia,—and even that he had actually entered upon that project with such promise of success, that its farther consummation was certain as well as easy. Having under these circumstances relinquished it and returned to Athens, he was accused by Periklês and others of having been bought off by bribes from the Macedonian king Alexander; but was acquitted after a public trial.[602]

During the period which had elapsed between the first formation of the confederacy of Delos and the capture of Thasos (about thirteen or fourteen years, B. C. 477-463), the Athenians seem to have been occupied almost entirely in their maritime operations, chiefly against the Persians,—having been free from embarrassments immediately around Attica. But this freedom was not destined to last much longer; and during the ensuing ten years, their foreign relations near home become both active and complicated; while their strength expands so wonderfully, that they are found competent at once to obligations on both sides of the Ægean sea, the distant as well as the near.

Of the incidents which had taken place in Central Greece during the twelve or fifteen years immediately succeeding the battle of Platæa, we have scarcely any information. The feelings of the time, between those Greeks who had supported and those who had resisted the Persian invader, must have remained unfriendly even after the war was at an end, and the mere occupation of the Persian numerous host must have inflicted severe damage both upon Thessaly and Bœotia. At the meeting of the Amphiktyonic synod which succeeded the expulsion of the invaders, a reward was proclaimed for the life of the Melian Ephialtês, who had betrayed to Xerxes the mountain-path over Œta, and thus caused the ruin of Leonidas at Thermopylæ: moreover, if we may trust Plutarch, it was even proposed by Lacedæmon that all the *medizing* Greeks should be expelled from the synod,[603]—a proposition which the more long-sighted views of Themistoklês successfully resisted. Even the stronger measure, of razing the fortifications of all the extra-Peloponnesian cities, from fear that they might be used to aid some future invasion, had suggested itself to the Lacedæmonians,—as we see from their language on the occasion of rebuilding the walls of Athens; and in regard to Bœotia, it appears that the headship of Thebes as well as the coherence of the federation was for the time almost suspended. The destroyed towns of Platæa and Thespiæ were restored, and the latter in part repeopled,[604] under Athenian influence; and the general sentiment of Peloponnesus as well as of Athens would have sustained these towns against Thebes, if the latter had tried at that time to enforce her supremacy over them in the name of "ancient Bœotian right and usage."[605] The Theban government was then in discredit for its previous *medism*,—even in the eyes of Thebans themselves;[606] while the party opposed

to Thebes in the other towns was so powerful, that many of them would probably have been severed from the federation to become allies of Athens like Platæa, if the interference of Lacedæmon had not arrested such a tendency. The latter was in every other part of Greece an enemy to organized aggregation of cities, either equal or unequal, and was constantly bent on keeping the little autonomous communities separate;[607] whence she sometimes became by accident the protector of the weaker cities against compulsory alliance imposed upon them by the stronger: the interest of her own ascendency was in this respect analogous to that of the Persians when they dictated the peace of Antalkidas,—of the Romans in administering their extensive conquests,—and of the kings of medieval Europe in breaking the authority of the barons over their vassals. But though such was the policy of Sparta elsewhere, her fear of Athens, which grew up during the ensuing twenty years, made her act differently in regard to Bœotia: she had no other means of maintaining that country as her own ally and as the enemy of Athens, except by organizing the federation effectively, and strengthening the authority of Thebes. It is to this revolution in Spartan politics that Thebes owed the recovery of her ascendency,[608]—a revolution so conspicuously marked, that the Spartans even aided in enlarging her circuit and improving her fortifications: nor was it without difficulty that she maintained this position, even when recovered, against the dangerous neighborhood of Athens, a circumstance which made her not only a vehement partisan of Sparta, but even more furiously anti-Athenian than Sparta, down to the close of the Peloponnesian war.

The revolution, just noticed, in Spartan politics towards Bœotia, did not manifest itself until about twenty years after the commencement of the Athenian maritime confederacy. During the course of those twenty years, we know that Sparta had had more than one battle to sustain in Arcadia, against the towns and villages of that country, in which she came forth victorious: but we have no particulars respecting these incidents. We also know that a few years after the Persian invasion, the inhabitants of Elis concentrated themselves from many dispersed townships into the one main city of Elis:[609] and it seems probable that Lepreum in Triphylia, and one or two of the towns of Achaia, were either formed or enlarged by a similar process near about the same time.[610] Such aggregation of towns out of preëxisting separate villages was not conformable to the views, nor favorable to the ascendency, of Lacedæmon: but there can be little doubt that her foreign policy, after the Persian invasion, was both embarrassed and discredited by the misconduct of her two contemporary kings, Pausanias, who, though only regent, was practically equivalent to a king, and Leotychidês,—not to mention the rapid development of Athens and Peiræus. But in the year B. C. 464, the year preceding the surrender of Thasos to the Athenian armament, a misfortune of yet more terrific moment befell Sparta. A violent earthquake took place in the immediate neighborhood of Sparta itself, destroying a large portion of the town, and a vast number of lives, many of them Spartan citizens. It was the judgment of the earth-shaking god Poseidon, according to the view of the Lacedæmonians themselves, for a recent violation of his sanctuary at Tænarus, from

whence certain suppliant Helots had been dragged away not long before for punishment,[611]—not improbably some of those Helots whom Pausanias had instigated to revolt. The sentiment of the Helots, at all times one of enmity towards their masters, appears at this moment to have been unusually inflammable: so that an earthquake at Sparta, especially an earthquake construed as divine vengeance for Helot blood recently spilt, was sufficient to rouse many of them at once into revolt, together with some even of the Perioeki. The insurgents took arms and marched directly upon Sparta, which they were on the point of mastering during the first moments of consternation, had not the bravery and presence of mind of the young king Archidamus reanimated the surviving citizens and repelled the attack. But though repelled, the insurgents were not subdued: for some time they maintained the field against the Spartan force, and sometimes with considerable advantage, since Aeimnêstus, the warrior by whose hand Mardonius had fallen at Platæa, was defeated and slain with three hundred followers in the plain of Stenyklêrus, overpowered by superior numbers.[612] When at length defeated, they occupied and fortified the memorable hill of Ithômê, the ancient citadel of their Messenian forefathers. Here they made a long and obstinate defence, supporting themselves doubtless by incursions throughout Laconia: nor was defence difficult, seeing that the Lacedæmonians were at that time confessedly incapable of assailing even the most imperfect species of fortification. After the siege had lasted some two or three years, without any prospect of success, the Lacedæmonians, beginning to despair of their own sufficiency for the undertaking, invoked the aid of their various allies, among whom we find specified the Æginetans, the Athenians, and the Platæans.[613] The Athenian troops are said to have consisted of four thousand men, under the command of Kimon; Athens being still included in the list of Lacedæmonian allies.

So imperfect were the means of attacking walls at that day, even for the most intelligent Greeks, that this increased force made no immediate impression on the fortified hill of Ithômê. And when the Lacedæmonians saw that their Athenian allies were not more successful than they had been themselves, they soon passed from surprise into doubt, mistrust, and apprehension. The troops had given no ground for such a feeling, and Kimon, their general, was notorious for his attachment to Sparta; yet the Lacedæmonians could not help calling to mind the ever-wakeful energy and ambition of these Ionic strangers, whom they had introduced into the interior of Laconia, together with their own promise—though doubtless a secret promise—to invade Attica, not long before, for the benefit of the Thasians. They even began to fear that the Athenians might turn against them, and listen to solicitations for espousing the cause of the besieged. Under the influence of such apprehensions, they dismissed the Athenian contingent forthwith, on pretence of having no farther occasion for them; while all the other allies were retained, and the siege or blockade went on as before.[614]

This dismissal, ungracious in the extreme, and probably rendered even more offensive by the habitual roughness of Spartan dealing, excited the strongest exasperation both among the Athenian soldiers and the Athenian people,—an exasperation heightened by circumstances immediately preceding. For the resolution to send auxiliaries into Laconia, when the Lacedæmonians first applied for them, had not been taken without considerable debate at Athens: the party of Periklês and Ephialtês, habitually in opposition to Kimon, and partisans of the forward democratical movement, had strongly discountenanced it, and conjured their countrymen not to assist in renovating and strengthening their most formidable rival. Perhaps the previous engagement of the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica on behalf of the Thasians may have become known to them, though not so formally as to exclude denial; and even supposing this engagement to have remained unknown at that time to every one, there were not wanting other grounds to render the policy of refusal plausible. But Kimon, with an earnestness which even the philo-Laconian Kritias afterwards characterized as a sacrifice of the grandeur of Athens to the advantage of Lacedæmon,[615] employed all his credit and influence in seconding the application. The maintenance of alliance with Sparta on equal footing,—peace among the great powers of Greece, and common war against Persia,—together with the prevention of all farther democratical changes in Athens,—were the leading points of his political creed. As yet, both his personal and political ascendency was predominant over his opponents: as yet, there was no manifest conflict, which had only just begun to show itself in the case of Thasos, between the maritime power of Athens, and the union of land-force under Sparta: and Kimon could still treat both of these phenomena as coexisting necessities of Hellenic well-being. Though no way distinguished as a speaker, he carried with him the Athenian assembly by appealing to a large and generous patriotism, which forbade them to permit the humiliation of Sparta. "Consent not to see Hellas lamed of one leg, and Athens drawing without her yoke-fellow;"[616] such was his language, as we learn from his friend and companion, the Chian poet Ion: and in the lips of Kimon it proved effective. It is a speech of almost melancholy interest, since ninety years passed over before such an appeal was ever again addressed to an Athenian assembly.[617] The despatch of the auxiliaries was thus dictated by a generous sentiment, to the disregard of what might seem political prudence: and we may imagine the violent reaction which took place in Athenian feeling, when the Lacedæmonians repaid them by singling out their troops from all the other allies as objects of insulting suspicion,—we may imagine the triumph of Periklês and Ephialtês, who had opposed the mission,—and the vast loss of influence to Kimon, who had brought it about,—when Athens received again into her public assemblies the hoplites sent back from Ithômê.

Both in the internal constitution, indeed,—of which more presently,—and in the external policy of Athens, the dismissal of these soldiers was pregnant with results. The Athenians immediately passed a formal resolution to renounce the alliance between themselves and Lacedæmon against the Persians. They did more: they looked

out for land enemies of Lacedæmon, with whom to ally themselves. Of these by far the first, both in Hellenic rank and in real power, was Argos. That city, neutral during the Persian invasion, had now recovered from the effects of the destructive defeat suffered about thirty years before from the Spartan king Kleomenês: the sons of the ancient citizens had grown to manhood, and the temporary predominance of the Periœki, acquired in consequence of the ruinous loss of citizens in that defeat, had been again put down. In the neighborhood of Argos, and dependent upon it, were situated Mykenæ, Tiryns, and Midea,—small in power and importance, but rich in mythical renown. Disdaining the inglorious example of Argos, at the period of danger, these towns had furnished contingents both to Thermopylæ and Platæa, which their powerful neighbor had been unable either to prevent at the time, or to avenge afterwards, from fear of the intervention of Lacedæmon. But so soon as the latter was seen to be endangered and occupied at home, with a formidable Messenian revolt, the Argeians availed themselves of the opportunity to attack not only Mykenæ and Tiryns, but also Orneæ, Midea, and other semi-dependent towns around them. Several of these were reduced; and the inhabitants robbed of their autonomy, were incorporated with the domain of Argos: but the Mykenians, partly from the superior gallantry of their resistance, partly from jealousy of their mythical renown, were either sold as slaves or driven into banishment.[618] Through these victories Argos was now more powerful than ever, and the propositions of alliance made to her by Athens, while strengthening both the two against Lacedæmon, opened to her a new chance of recovering her lost headship in Peloponnesus. The Thessalians became members of this new alliance, which was a defensive alliance against Lacedæmon: and hopes were doubtless entertained of drawing in some of the habitual allies of the latter.

The new character which Athens had thus assumed, as a competitor for landed alliances, not less than for maritime ascendency, came opportunely for the protection of the neighboring town of Megara. It appears that Corinth, perhaps instigated, like Argos, by the helplessness of the Lacedæmonians, had been making border encroachments on the one side upon Kleônæ, on the other side upon Megara:[619] on which ground the latter, probably despairing of protection from Lacedæmon, renounced the Lacedæmonian connection, and obtained permission to enrol herself as an ally of Athens.[620] This was an acquisition of signal value to the Athenians, since it both opened to them the whole range of territory across the outer isthmus of Corinth to the interior of the Krissæan gulf, on which the Megarian port of Pegæ was situated, and placed them in possession of the passes of Mount Geraneia, so that they could arrest the march of a Peloponnesian army over the isthmus, and protect Attica from invasion. It was, moreover, of great importance in its effects on Grecian politics: for it was counted as a wrong by Lacedæmon, gave deadly offence to the Corinthians, and lighted up the flames of war between them and Athens; their allies, the Epidaurians and Æginetans, taking their part. Though Athens had not yet been guilty of unjust encroachment against any Peloponnesian state, her ambition and en-

ergy had inspired universal awe; while the maritime states in the neighborhood, such as Corinth, Epidaurus, and Ægina, saw these terror-striking qualities threatening them at their own doors, through her alliance with Argos and Megara. Moreover, it is probable that the ancient feud between the Athenians and Æginetans, though dormant since a little before the Persian invasion, had never been appeased or forgotten: so that the Æginetans, dwelling within sight of Peiræus, were at once best able to appreciate, and most likely to dread, the enormous maritime power now possessed by Athens. Periklês was wont to call Ægina the eyesore of Peiræus:[621] but we may be very sure that Peiræus, grown into a vast fortified port, within the existing generation, was in a much stronger degree the eyesore of Ægina.

The Athenians were at this time actively engaged in prosecuting the war against Persia, having a fleet of no less than two hundred sail, equipped by or from the confederacy collectively, now serving in Cyprus and on the Phenician coast. Moreover, the revolt of the Egyptians under Inaros, about 460 B. C., opened to them new means of action against the Great King; and their fleet, by invitation of the revolters, sailed up the Nile to Memphis, where there seemed at first a good prospect of throwing off the Persian dominion. Yet in spite of so great an abstraction from their disposable force, their military operations near home were conducted with unabated vigor: and the inscription which remains,—a commemoration of their citizens of the Erechtheid tribe, who were slain in one and the same year, in Cyprus, Egypt, Phenicia, the Halieis, Ægina, and Megara,—brings forcibly before us that energy which astonished and even alarmed their contemporaries. Their first proceedings at Megara were of a nature altogether novel, in the existing condition of Greece. It was necessary for the Athenians to protect their new ally against the superiority of Peloponnesian land-force, and to insure a constant communication with it by sea; but the city, like most of the ancient Hellenic towns, was situated on a hill at some distance from the sea, separated from its port Nisæa by a space of nearly one mile. One of the earliest proceedings of the Athenians was to build two lines of wall, near and parallel to each other, connecting the city with Nisæa, so that the two thus formed one continuous fortress, wherein a standing Athenian garrison was maintained, with the constant means of succor from Athens in case of need. These "long walls," though afterwards copied in other places, and on a larger scale, were at that juncture an ingenious invention, for the purpose of extending the maritime arm of Athens to an inland city.

The first operations of Corinth, however, were not directed against Megara. The Athenians having undertaken a landing in the territory of the Halieis, the population of the southern Argolic peninsula, bordering on Trœzen and Hermionê, were defeated on land by the Corinthian and Epidaurian forces: possibly it may have been in this expedition that they acquired possession of Trœzen, which we find afterwards in their dependence, without knowing when it became so. But in a sea-fight which took place off the island of Kekryphaleia, between Ægina and the Argolic peninsula, the

Athenians gained the victory. After this victory and defeat,—neither of them apparently very decisive,—the Æginetans began to take a more energetic part in the war, and brought out their full naval force, together with that of their allies,—Corinthians, Epidaurians, and other Peloponnesians: while Athens equipped a fleet of corresponding magnitude, summoning her allies also; though we do not know the actual numbers on either side. In the great naval battle which ensued off the island of Ægina, the superiority of the new nautical tactics, acquired by twenty years' practice of the Athenians since the Persian war,—over the old Hellenic ships and seamen, as shown in those states where, at the time of the battle of Marathon, the maritime strength of Greece had resided,—was demonstrated by a victory most complete and decisive. The Peloponnesian and Dorian seamen had as yet had no experience of the improved seacraft of Athens, and when we find how much they were disconcerted with it, even twenty-eight years afterwards, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we shall not wonder at its destructive effect upon them in this early battle. The maritime power of Ægina was irrecoverably ruined: the Athenians captured seventy ships of war, landed a large force upon the island, and commenced the siege of the city by land as well as by sea.[622]

If the Lacedæmonians had not been occupied at home by the blockade of Ithômê, they would have been probably induced to invade Attica as a diversion to the Æginetans; especially as the Persian Megabazus came to Sparta at this time on the part of Artaxerxes to prevail upon them to do so, in order that the Athenians might be constrained to retire from Egypt: this Persian brought with him a large sum of money, but was nevertheless obliged to return without effecting his mission.[623] The Corinthians and Epidaurians, however, while they carried to Ægina a reinforcement of three hundred hoplites, did their best to aid her farther by an attack upon Megara; which place, it was supposed, the Athenians could not possibly relieve without withdrawing their forces from Ægina, inasmuch as so many of their men were at the same time serving in Egypt. But the Athenians showed themselves equal to all these three exigencies at one and the same time,—to the great disappointment of their enemies. Myrônidês marched from Athens to Megara at the head of the citizens in the two extremes of military age, old and young; these being the only troops at home. He fought the Corinthians near the town, gaining a slight, but debatable advantage, which he commemorated by a trophy, as soon as the Corinthians had returned home. But the latter when they arrived at home, were so much reproached by their own old citizens, for not having vanquished the refuse of the Athenian military force,[624] that they returned back at the end of twelve days and erected a trophy on their side, laying claim to a victory in the past battle. The Athenians, marching out of Megara, attacked them a second time, and gained on this occasion a decisive victory. The defeated Corinthians were still more unfortunate in their retreat; for a body of them, missing their road, became entangled in a space of private ground, inclosed on every side by a deep ditch, and having only one narrow entrance. Myrônidês, detecting this fatal mistake, planted his hoplites at the entrance to pre-

vent their escape, and then surrounded the enclosure with his light-armed troops, who, with their missile weapons, slew all the Corinthian hoplites, without possibility either of flight or resistance. The bulk of the Corinthian army effected their retreat, but the destruction of this detachment was a sad blow to the city.[625]

Splendid as the success of the Athenians had been during this year, both on land and at sea, it was easy for them to foresee that the power of their enemies would presently be augmented by the Lacedæmonians taking the field. Partly on this account,—partly also from the more energetic phase of democracy, and the long-sighted views of Periklês, which were now becoming ascendent in the city,—the Athenians began the stupendous undertaking of connecting Athens with the sea by means of long walls. The idea of this measure had doubtless been first suggested by the recent erection of long walls, though for so much smaller a distance, between Megara and Nisæa: for without such an intermediate stepping-stone, the idea of a wall forty stadia long (equal to four and a half miles) to join Athens with Peiræus, and another wall of thirty-five stadia (equal to about four miles) to join it with Phalêrum, would have appeared extravagant even to the sanguine temper of Athenians,—as it certainly would have seemed a few years earlier to Themistoklês himself. Coming as an immediate sequel of great recent victories, and while Ægina, the great Dorian naval power, was prostrate and under blockade, it excited the utmost alarm among the Peloponnesians,—being regarded as the second great stride,[626] at once conspicuous and of lasting effect, in Athenian ambition, next to the fortification of Peiræus. But besides this feeling in the bosom of enemies, the measure was also interwoven with the formidable contention of political parties then going on at Athens. Kimon had been recently ostracized; and the democratical movement pressed by Periklês and Ephialtês—of which more presently—was in its full tide of success, yet not without a violent and unprincipled opposition on the part of those who supported the existing constitution. Now, the long walls formed a part of the foreign policy of Periklês, continuing on a gigantic scale the plans of Themistoklês when he first schemed the Peiræus. They were framed to render Athens capable of carrying on war against any superiority of landed attack, and of bidding defiance to the united force of Peloponnesus. But though thus calculated for contingencies which a long-sighted man might see gathering in the distance, the new walls were, almost on the same grounds, obnoxious to a considerable number of Athenians: to the party recently headed by Kimon, who were attached to the Lacedæmonian connection, and desired above all things to maintain peace at home, reserving the energies of the state for anti-Persian enterprise: to many landed proprietors in Attica, whom they seemed to threaten with approaching invasion and destruction of their territorial possessions: to the rich men and aristocrats of Athens, averse to a still closer contact and amalgamation with the maritime multitude in Peiræus: lastly, perhaps, to a certain vein of old Attic feeling, which might look upon the junction of Athens with the separate demes of Peiræus and Phalêrum as effacing the special associations connected with the holy rock of Athênê. When, to all these grounds of opposition, we

add, the expense and trouble of the undertaking itself, the interference with private property, the peculiar violence of party which happened then to be raging, and the absence of a large proportion of military citizens in Egypt,—we shall hardly be surprised to find that the projected long walls brought on a risk of the most serious character both for Athens and her democracy. If any farther proof were wanting of the vast importance of these long walls, in the eyes both of friends and of enemies, we might find it in the fact, that their destruction was the prominent mark of Athenian humiliation after the battle of Ægos Potamos, and their restoration the immediate boon of Pharnabazus and Konon after the victory of Knidus.

Under the influence of the alarm now spread by the proceedings of Athens, the Lacedæmonians were prevailed upon to undertake an expedition out of Peloponnesus, although the Helots in Ithômê were not yet reduced to surrender. Their force consisted of fifteen hundred troops of their own, and ten thousand of their various allies, under the regent Nikomêdês. The ostensible motive, or the pretence, for this march, was the protection of the little territory of Doris against the Phocians, who had recently invaded it and taken one of its three towns. The mere approach of so large a force immediately compelled the Phocians to relinquish their conquest, but it was soon seen that this was only a small part of the objects of Sparta, and that her main purposes, under instigation of the Corinthians, were directed against the aggrandizement of Athens. It could not escape the penetration of Corinth, that the Athenians might presently either enlist or constrain the towns of Bœotia into their alliance, as they had recently acquired Megara, in addition to their previous ally, Platæa: for the Bœotian federation was at this time much disorganized, and Thebes, its chief, had never recovered her ascendency since the discredit of her support lent to the Persian invasion. To strengthen Thebes, and to render her ascendency effective over the Bœotian cities, was the best way of providing a neighbor at once powerful and hostile to the Athenians, so as to prevent their farther aggrandizement by land: it was the same policy as Epaminondas pursued eighty years afterwards in organizing Arcadia and Messênê against Sparta. Accordingly, the Peloponnesian force was now employed partly in enlarging and strengthening the fortifications of Thebes herself, partly in constraining the other Bœotian cities into effective obedience to her supremacy: probably by placing their governments in the hands of citizens of known oligarchical politics,[627] and perhaps banishing suspected opponents. To this scheme the Thebans lent themselves with earnestness; promising to keep down for the future their border neighbors, so as to spare the necessity of armies coming from Sparta.[628]

But there was also a farther design, yet more important, in contemplation by the Spartans and Corinthians. The oligarchical opposition at Athens were so bitterly hostile to the Long Walls, to Periklês, and to the democratical movement, that several of them opened a secret negotiation with the Peloponnesian leaders, inviting them into Attica, and entreating their aid in an internal rising for the purpose not only of

putting a stop to the Long Walls, but also of subverting the democracy. And the Peloponnesian army, while prosecuting its operations in Bœotia, waited in hopes of seeing the Athenian malcontents in arms, encamping at Tanagra, on the very borders of Attica, for the purpose of immediate coöperation with them. The juncture was undoubtedly one of much hazard for Athens, especially as the ostracized Kimon and his remaining friends in the city were suspected of being implicated in the conspiracy. But the Athenian leaders, aware of the Lacedæmonian operations in Bœotia, knew also what was meant by the presence of the army on their immediate borders, and took decisive measures to avert the danger. Having obtained a reinforcement of one thousand Argeians and some Thessalian horse, they marched out to Tanagra, with the full Athenian force then at home; which must, of course, have consisted chiefly of the old and the young, the same who had fought under Myrônidês at Megara; for the blockade of Ægina was still going on. Nor was it possible for the Lacedæmonian army to return into Peloponnesus without fighting; for the Athenians, masters of the Megarid, were in possession of the difficult highlands of Geraneia, the road of march along the isthmus; while the Athenian fleet, by means of the harbor of Pegæ, was prepared to intercept them, if they tried to come by sea across the Krissæan gulf, by which way it would appear that they had come out. Near Tanagra, a bloody battle took place between the two armies, wherein the Lacedæmonians were victorious, chiefly from the desertion of the Thessalian horse, who passed over to them in the very heat of the engagement.[629] But though the advantage was on their side, it was not sufficiently decisive to favor the contemplated rising in Attica: nor did the Peloponnesians gain anything by it, except an undisturbed retreat over the highlands of Geraneia, after having partially ravaged the Megarid.

Though the battle of Tanagra was a defeat, yet there were circumstances connected with it which rendered its effects highly beneficial to Athens. The ostracized Kimon presented himself on the field as soon as the army had passed over the boundaries of Attica, requesting to be allowed to occupy his station as an hoplite and to fight in the ranks of his tribe,—the Œnêis. But such was the belief, entertained by the members of the senate and by his political enemies present, that he was an accomplice in the conspiracy known to be on foot, that permission was refused and he was forced to retire. In departing, he conjured his personal friends, Euthippus, of the deme Anaphlystus, and others, to behave in such a manner as might wipe away the stain resting upon his fidelity, and in part also upon theirs. His friends retained his panoply, and assigned to it the station in the ranks which he would himself have occupied: they then entered the engagement with desperate resolution, and one hundred of them fell side by side in their ranks. Periklês, on his part, who was present among the hoplites of his own tribe, the Akamantis, aware of this application and repulse of Kimon, thought it incumbent upon him to display not merely his ordinary personal courage, but an unusual recklessness of life and safety, though it happened that he escaped unwounded. All these incidents brought about a generous sympathy and spirit of compromise among the contending parties at Athens, while the un-

shaken patriotism of Kimon and his friends discountenanced and disarmed those conspirators who had entered into correspondence with the enemy, at the same time that it roused a repentant admiration towards the ostracized leader himself. Such was the happy working of this new sentiment that a decree was shortly proposed and carried,—proposed too, by Periklês himself,—to abridge the ten years of Kimon's ostracism, and permit his immediate return.[630] We may recollect that, under circumstances partly analogous, Themistoklês had himself proposed the restoration of his rival Aristeidês from ostracism, a little before the battle of Salamis:[631] and in both cases, the suspension of enmity between the two leaders was partly the sign, partly also the auxiliary cause, of reconciliation and renewed fraternity among the general body of citizens. It was a moment analogous to that salutary impulse of compromise, and harmony of parties, which followed the extinction of the oligarchy of Four Hundred, forty-six years afterwards, and on which Thucydidês dwells emphatically as the salvation of Athens in her distress,—a moment rare in free communities generally, not less than among the jealous competitors for political ascendency at Athens.[632]

So powerful was this burst of fresh patriotism and unanimity after the battle of Tanagra, which produced the recall of Kimon, and appears to have overlaid the preëxisting conspiracy, that the Athenians were quickly in a condition to wipe off the stain of their defeat. It was on the sixty-second day after the battle that they undertook an aggressive march under Myrônidês into Bœotia: the extreme precision of this date,—being the single case throughout the summary of events between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, wherein Thucydidês is thus precise, marks how strong an impression it made upon the memory of the Athenians. At the battle of Œnophyta, engaged against the aggregate Theban and Bœotian forces,—or, if Diodorus is to be trusted, in two battles, of which that of Œnophyta was the last, Myrônidês was completely victorious. The Athenians became masters of Thebes as well as of the remaining Bœotian towns; reversing all the arrangements recently made by Sparta,—establishing democratical governments,—and forcing the aristocratical leaders, favorable to Theban ascendency and Lacedæmonian connection, to become exiles. Nor was it only Bœotia which the Athenians thus acquired: Phocis and Lokris were both successively added to the list of their dependent allies,—the former being in the main friendly to Athens and not disinclined to the change, while the latter were so decidedly hostile that one hundred of their chiefs were detained and sent to Athens as hostages. The Athenians thus extended their influence,—maintained through internal party-management, backed by the dread of interference from without in case of need,—from the borders of the Corinthian territory, including both Megara and Pêgæ, to the strait of Thermopylæ.[633]

These important acquisitions were soon crowned by the completion of the Long Walls and the conquest of Ægina. That island, doubtless starved out by its protracted blockade, was forced to capitulate on condition of destroying its fortifications, surren-

dering all its ships of war, and submitting to annual tribute as a dependent ally of Athens. The reduction of this once powerful maritime city, marked Athens as mistress of the sea on the Peloponnesian coast not less than on the Ægean. Her admiral Tolmidês displayed her strength by sailing round Peloponnesus, and even by the insult of burning the Lacedæmonian ports of Methônê and of Gythium. He took Chalkis, a possession of the Corinthians, and Naupaktus belonging to the Ozolian Lokrians, near the mouth of the Corinthian gulf,—disembarked troops near Sikyon with some advantage in a battle against opponents from that town,—and either gained or forced into the Athenian alliance not only Zakynthus and Kephallênia, but also some of the towns of Achaia; for we afterwards find these latter attached to Athens without knowing when the connection began.[634]

During the ensuing year the Athenians renewed their attack upon Sikyon, with a force of one thousand hoplites under Periklês himself, sailing from the Megarian harbor of Pêgæ in the Krissæan gulf. This eminent man, however, gained no greater advantage than Tolmidês,—defeating the Sikyonian forces in the field and driving them within their walls: he afterwards made an expedition into Akarnania, taking the Achæan allies in addition to his own forces, but miscarried in his attack on Œniadæ and accomplished nothing. Nor were the Athenians more successful in a march undertaken this same year against Thessaly, for the purpose of restoring Orestes, one of the exiled princes or nobles of Pharsalus. Though they took with them an imposing force, including their Bœotian and Phocian allies, the powerful Thessalian cavalry forced them to keep in a compact body and confined them to the ground actually occupied by their hoplites; while all their attempts against the city failed, and their hopes of internal rising were disappointed.[635]

Had the Athenians succeeded in Thessaly, they would have acquired to their alliance nearly the whole of extra-Peloponnesian Greece: but even without Thessaly their power was prodigious, and had now attained a maximum height, from which it never varied except to decline. As a counterbalancing loss against so many successes, we have to reckon their ruinous defeat in Egypt, after a war of six years against the Persians (B. C. 460-455). At first, they had gained brilliant advantages, in conjunction with the insurgent prince Inarôs; expelling the Persians from all Memphis except the strongest part, called the White Fortress: and such was the alarm of the Persian king, Artaxerxes, at the presence of the Athenians in Egypt, that he sent Megabazus with a large sum of money to Sparta, in order to induce the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica. This envoy, however, failed, and an augmented Persian force being sent to Egypt under Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus,[636] drove the Athenians and their allies, after an obstinate struggle, out of Memphis into the island of the Nile called Prosôpîtis. Here they were blocked up for eighteen months, until at length Megabyzus turned the arm of the river, laid the channel dry, and stormed the island by land. A very few Athenians escaped by land to Kyrênê: the rest were either slain or made captive, and Inarôs himself was crucified. And the calamity of Athens was

farther aggravated by the arrival of fifty fresh Athenian ships, which, coming after the defeat, but without being aware of it, sailed into the Mendesian branch of the Nile, and thus fell unawares into the power of the Persians and Phenicians; very few either of the ships or men escaping. The whole of Egypt became again subject to the Persians, except Amyrtæus, who contrived, by retiring into the inaccessible fens, still to maintain his independence. One of the largest armaments ever sent forth by Athens and her confederacy was thus utterly ruined.[637]

It was about the time of the destruction of the Athenian army in Egypt, and of the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by Tolmidês, that the internal war, carried on by the Lacedæmonians, against the Helots or Messenians at Ithômê, ended. These besieged men, no longer able to stand out against a protracted blockade, were forced to abandon this last fortress of ancient Messenian independence, stipulating for a safe retreat from Peloponnesus with their wives and families, with the proviso, that if any one of them ever returned to Peloponnesus, he should become the slave of the first person who seized him. They were established by Tolmidês at Naupaktus, which had recently been taken by the Athenians from the Ozolian Lokrians,[638]—where they will be found rendering good service to Athens in the following wars.

After the victory of Tanagra, the Lacedæmonians made no farther expeditions out of Peloponnesus for several succeeding years, not even to prevent Bœotia and Phocis from being absorbed into the Athenian alliance. The reason of this remissness lay, partly, in their general character; partly, in the continuance of the siege of Ithômê, which occupied them at home; but still more, perhaps, in the fact that the Athenians, masters of the Megarid, were in occupation of the road over the highlands of Geraneia, and could therefore obstruct the march of any army out from Peloponnesus. Even after the surrender of Ithômê, the Lacedæmonians remained inactive for three years, after which time a formal truce was concluded with Athens by the Peloponnesians generally, for five years longer.[639] This truce was concluded in a great degree through the influence of Kimon,[640] who was eager to resume effective operations against the Persians; while it was not less suitable to the political interests of Periklês that his most distinguished rival should be absent on foreign service,[641] so as not to interfere with his influence at home. Accordingly, Kimon equipped a fleet of two hundred triremes, from Athens and her confederates, and set sail for Cyprus, from whence he despatched sixty ships to Egypt, at the request of the insurgent prince Amyrtæus, who was still maintaining himself against the Persians amidst the fens,—while with the remaining armament he laid siege to Kitium. In the prosecution of this siege, he died, either of disease or of a wound. The armament, under his successor, Anaxikrates, became so embarrassed for want of provisions that they abandoned the undertaking altogether, and went to fight the Phenician and Kilikian fleet near Salamis, in Cyprus. They were here victorious, first on sea, and afterwards on land, though probably not on the same day, as at the Eurymedon; after which they

returned home, followed by the sixty ships which had gone to Egypt for the purpose of aiding Amyrtæus.[642]

From this time forward no farther operations were undertaken by Athens and her confederacy against the Persians. And it appears that a convention was concluded between them, whereby the Great King on his part promised two things: To leave free, undisturbed, and untaxed, the Asiatic maritime Greeks, not sending troops within a given distance of the coast: to refrain from sending any ships of war either westward of Phasêlis (others place the boundary at the Chelidonean islands, rather more to the westward) or within the Kyanean rocks at the confluence of the Thracian Bosphorus with the Euxine. On their side, the Athenians agreed to leave him in undisturbed possession of Cyprus and Egypt. Kallias, an Athenian of distinguished family, with some others of his countrymen, went up to Susa to negotiate this convention: and certain envoys from Argos, then in alliance with Athens, took the opportunity of going thither at the same time, to renew the friendly understanding which their city had established with Xerxes at the period of his invasion of Greece.[643]

As is generally the case with treaties after hostility,—this convention did little more than recognize the existing state of things, without introducing any new advantage or disadvantage on either side, or calling for any measures to be taken in consequence of it. We may hence assign a reasonable ground for the silence of Thucydidês, who does not even notice the convention as having been made: we are to recollect always that in the interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, he does not profess to do more than glance briefly at the main events. But the boastful and inaccurate authors of the ensuing century, orators, rhetors, and historians, indulged in so much exaggeration and untruth respecting this convention, both as to date and as to details,—and extolled as something so glorious the fact of having imposed such hard conditions on the Great King,—that they have raised a suspicion against themselves. Especially, they have occasioned critics to ask the very natural question, how this splendid achievement of Athens came to be left unnoticed by Thucydidês? Now the answer to such question is, that the treaty itself was really of no great moment: it is the state of facts and relations implied in the treaty, and existing substantially before it was concluded, which constitutes the real glory of Athens. But to the later writers, the treaty stood forth as the legible evidence of facts which in their time were passed and gone; while Thucydidês and his contemporaries, living in the actual fulness of the Athenian empire, would certainly not appeal to the treaty as an evidence, and might well pass it over, even as an event, when studying to condense the narrative. Though Thucydidês has not mentioned the treaty, he says nothing which disproves its reality, and much which is in full harmony with it. For we may show, even from him: 1. That all open and direct hostilities between Athens and Persia ceased, after the last-mentioned victories of the Athenians near Cyprus: that this island is renounced by Athens, not being included by Thucydidês in his catalogue of Athenian allies prior to the Peloponnesian war;[644] and that no farther aid is given by

Athens to the revolted Amyrtæus in Egypt. 2. That down to the time when the Athenian power was prostrated by the ruinous failure at Syracuse, no tribute was collected by the Persian satraps in Asia Minor from the Greek cities on the coast, nor were Persian ships of war allowed to appear in the waters of the Ægean,[645] nor was the Persian king admitted to be sovereign of the country down to the coast. Granting, therefore, that we were even bound, from the silence of Thucydidês, to infer that no treaty was concluded, we should still be obliged also to infer, from his positive averments, that a state of historical fact, such as the treaty acknowledged and prescribed, became actually realized. But when we reflect farther, that Herodotus[646] certifies the visit of Kallias and other Athenian envoys to the court of Susa, we can assign no other explanation of such visit so probable as the reality of this treaty: certainly, no envoys would have gone thither during a state of recognized war; and though it may be advanced as possible that they may have gone with the view to conclude a treaty, and yet not have succeeded,—this would be straining the limits of possibility beyond what is reasonable.[647]

We may therefore believe in the reality of this treaty between Athens and Persia, improperly called the Kimonian treaty: improperly, since not only was it concluded after the death of Kimon, but the Athenian victories by which it was immediately brought on were gained after his death. Nay, more,—the probability is, that if Kimon had lived, it would not have been concluded at all; for his interest as well as his glory led him to prosecute the war against Persia, since he was no match for his rival Periklês, either as a statesman or as an orator, and could only maintain his popularity by the same means whereby he had earned it,—victories and plunder at the cost of the Persians. His death insured more complete ascendency to Periklês, whose policy and character were of a cast altogether opposite:[648] while even Thucydidês, son of Melêsias, who succeeded Kimon, his relation, as leader of the anti-Periklean party, was also a man of the senate and public assembly rather than of campaigns and conquests. Averse to distant enterprises and precarious acquisitions, Periklês was only anxious to maintain unimpaired the Hellenic ascendency of Athens, now at its very maximum: he was well aware that the undivided force and vigilance of Athens would not be too much for this object,—nor did they in fact prove sufficient, as we shall presently see. With such dispositions he was naturally glad to conclude a peace, which excluded the Persians from all the coasts of Asia Minor, westward of the Chelidoneans, as well as from all the waters of the Ægean, under the simple condition of renouncing on the part of Athens farther aggressions against Cyprus, Phenicia, Kilikia, and Egypt. The Great King on his side had had sufficient experience of Athenian energy to fear the consequences of such aggressions, if prosecuted; nor did he lose much by relinquishing formally a tribute which at the time he could have little hope of realizing, and which of course he intended to resume on the first favorable opportunity. Weighing all these circumstances, we shall find that the peace, improperly called Kimonian, results naturally from the position and feelings of the contracting parties.

Athens was now at peace both abroad and at home, under the administration of Periklês, with a great empire, a great fleet, and a great accumulated treasure. The common fund collected from the contributions of the confederates, and originally deposited at Delos, had before this time been transferred to the acropolis at Athens. At what precise time this transfer took place, we cannot state: nor are we enabled to assign the successive stages whereby the confederacy, chiefly with the freewill of its own members, became transformed from a body of armed and active warriors under the guidance of Athens, into disarmed and passive tribute-payers, defended by the military force of Athens,—from allies free, meeting at Delos, and self-determining, into subjects isolated, sending their annual tribute, and awaiting Athenian orders. But it would appear that the change had been made before this time: some of the more resolute of the allies had tried to secede, but Athens had coerced them by force, and reduced them to the condition of tribute-payers, without ships or defence; and Chios, Lesbos, and Samos were now the only allies free and armed on the original footing. Every successive change of an armed ally into a tributary,—every subjugation of a seceder,—tended of course to cut down the numbers, and enfeeble the authority, of the Delian synod; and, what was still worse, it altered the reciprocal relation and feelings both of Athens and her allies,—exalting the former into something like a despot, and degrading the latter into mere passive subjects.

Of course, the palpable manifestation of the change must have been the transfer of the confederate fund from Delos to Athens. The only circumstance which we know respecting this transfer is, that it was proposed by the Samians,[649]—the second power in the confederacy, inferior only to Athens, and least of all likely to favor any job or sinister purpose of the Athenians. It is farther said that, when the Samians proposed it, Aristeidês characterized it as a motion unjust, but useful: we may well doubt, however, whether it was made during his lifetime. When the synod at Delos ceased to be so fully attended as to command respect,—when war was lighted up, not only with Persia, but with Ægina and Peloponnesus,—the Samians might not unnaturally feel that the large accumulated fund, with its constant annual accessions, would be safer at Athens than at Delos, which latter island would require a permanent garrison and squadron to insure it against attack. But whatever may have been the grounds on which the Samians proceeded, when we find them coming forward to propose the transfer, we may reasonably infer that it was not displeasing, and did not appear unjust, to the larger members of the confederacy,—and that it was no high-handed and arbitrary exercise of power, as it is often called, on the part of Athens.

After the conclusion of the war with Ægina, and the consequences of the battle of Œnophyta, the position of Athens became altered more and more. She acquired a large catalogue of new allies, partly tributary, like Ægina,—partly in the same relation as Chios, Lesbos, and Samos; that is, obliged only to a conformity of foreign policy and to military service. In this last category were Megara, the Bœotian cities, the

Phocians, Lokrians, etc. All these, though allies of Athens, were strangers to Delos and the confederacy against Persia; and accordingly, that confederacy passed insensibly into a matter of history, giving place to the new conception of imperial Athens, with her extensive list of allies, partly free, partly subject. Such transition, arising spontaneously out of the character and circumstances of the confederates themselves, was thus materially forwarded by the acquisitions of Athens extraneous to the confederacy. She was now not merely the first maritime state of Greece, but perhaps equal to Sparta even in land-power,—possessing in her alliance Megara, Bœotia, Phocis, Lokris, together with Achæa and Trœzen, in Peloponnesus. Large as this aggregate already was, both at sea and on land, yet the magnitude of the annual tribute, and still more the character of the Athenians themselves, superior to all Greeks in that combination of energy and discipline which is the grand cause of progress, threatened still farther increase. Occupying the Megarian harbor of Pêgæ, the Athenians had full means of naval action on both sides of the Corinthian isthmus: but, what was of still greater importance to them, by their possession of the Megarid, and of the highlands of Geraneia, they could restrain any land-force from marching out of Peloponnesus, and were thus, considering besides their mastery at sea, completely unassailable in Attica. Ever since the repulse of Xerxes, Athens had been advancing in an uninterrupted course of power and prosperity at home, as well as of victory and ascendency abroad,—to which there was no exception, except the ruinous enterprise in Egypt. Looking at the position of Greece, therefore, about 448 B. C.,—after the conclusion of the five years' truce between the Peloponnesians and Athens, and of the so-called Kimonian peace between Persia and Athens,—a discerning Greek might well calculate upon farther aggrandizement of this imperial state as the tendency of the age; and accustomed as every Greek was to the conception of separate town-autonomy as essential to a freeman and a citizen, such prospect could not but inspire terror and aversion. The sympathy of the Peloponnesians for the islanders and ultra-maritime states, who constituted the original confederacy of Athens, was not considerable; but when the Dorian island of Ægina was subjugated also, and passed into the condition of a defenceless tributary, they felt the blow sorely on every ground. The ancient celebrity and eminent service rendered at the battle of Salamis, of this memorable island, had not been able to protect it; while those great Æginetan families, whose victories at the sacred festival-games Pindar celebrates in a large proportion of his odes, would spread the language of complaint and indignation throughout their numerous "guests" in every Hellenic city. Of course, the same anti-Athenian feeling would pervade those Peloponnesian states who had been engaged in actual hostility with Athens,—Corinth, Sikyon, Epidaurus, etc., as well as Sparta, the once-recognized head of Hellas, but now tacitly degraded from her preëminence, baffled in her projects respecting Bœotia, and exposed to the burning of her port at Gythium, without being able even to retaliate upon Attica. Putting all those circumstances together, we may comprehend the powerful feeling of dislike and apprehension now diffused so widely over Greece against the upstart despot city; whose as-

cendency, newly acquired, maintained by superior force, and not recognized as legitimate,—threatened, nevertheless, still farther increase. Sixteen years hence, this same sentiment will be found exploding into the Peloponnesian war; but it became rooted in the Greek mind during the period which we have now reached, when Athens was much more formidable than she had come to be at the commencement of that war: nor shall we thoroughly appreciate the ideas of that later period, unless we take them as handed down from the earlier date of the five years' truce, about 451-446 B. C.

Formidable as the Athenian empire both really was and appeared to be, however, this wide-spread feeling of antipathy proved still stronger, so that, instead of the threatened increase, the empire underwent a most material diminution. This did not arise from the attack of open enemies; for during the five years' truce, Sparta undertook only one movement, and that not against Attica: she sent troops to Delphi, in an expedition dignified with the name of the Sacred War,—expelled the Phocians, who had assumed to themselves the management of the temple,—and restored it to the native Delphians. To this the Athenians made no direct opposition: but as soon as the Lacedæmonians were gone, they themselves marched thither and placed the temple again in the hands of the Phocians, who were then their allies.[650] The Delphians were members of the Phocian league, and there was a dispute of old standing as to the administration of the temple,—whether it belonged to them separately or to the Phocians collectively. The favor of those who administered it counted as an element of considerable moment in Grecian politics; the sympathies of the leading Delphians led them to embrace the side of Sparta, but the Athenians now hoped to counteract this tendency by means of their preponderance in Phocis. We are not told that the Lacedæmonians took any ulterior step in consequence of their views being frustrated by Athens,—a significant evidence of the politics of that day.

The blow which brought down the Athenian empire from this its greatest exaltation, was struck by the subjects themselves. The Athenian ascendency over Bœotia, Phocis, Lokris, and Eubœa, was maintained, not by means of garrisons, but through domestic parties favorable to Athens, and a suitable form of government; just in the same way as Sparta maintained her influence over her Peloponnesian allies.[651] After the victory of Œnophyta, the Athenians had broken up the governments in the Bœotian cities established by Sparta before the battle of Tanagra, and converted them into democracies at Thebes and elsewhere. Many of the previous leading men had thus been sent into exile: and as the same process had taken place in Phocis and Lokris, there was at this time a considerable aggregate body of exiles, Bœotian, Phocian, Lokrian, Eubœan, Æginetan, etc., all bitterly hostile to Athens, and ready to join in any attack upon her power. We learn farther that the democracy,[652] established at Thebes after the battle of Œnophyta, was ill-conducted and disorderly: which circumstances laid open Bœotia still farther to the schemes of assailants on the watch for every weak point. These various exiles, all joining their forces and concerting

measures with their partisans in the interior, succeeded in mastering Orchomenus, Chæroneia, and some other less important places in Bœotia. The Athenian general, Tolmidês, marched to expel them, with one thousand Athenian hoplites and an auxiliary body of allies. It appears that this march was undertaken in haste and rashness: the hoplites of Tolmidês, principally youthful volunteers, and belonging to the best families of Athens, disdained the enemy too much to await a larger and more commanding force: nor would the people listen even to Periklês, when he admonished them that the march would be full of hazard, and adjured them not to attempt it without greater numbers as well as greater caution.[653] Fatally, indeed, were his predictions justified. Though Tolmidês was successful in his first enterprise,—the recapture of Chæroneia, wherein he placed a garrison,—yet in his march, probably incautious and disorderly, when departing from that place, he was surprised and attacked unawares, near Korôneia, by the united body of exiles and their partisans. No defeat in Grecian history was ever more complete or ruinous. Tolmidês himself was slain, together with many of the Athenian hoplites, while a large number of them were taken prisoners. In order to recover these prisoners, who belonged to the best families in the city, the Athenians submitted to a convention whereby they agreed to evacuate Bœotia altogether: in all the cities of that country, the exiles were restored, the democratical government overthrown, and Bœotia was transformed from an ally of Athens into her bitter enemy.[654] Long, indeed, did the fatal issue of this action dwell in the memory of the Athenians,[655] and inspire them with an apprehension of Bœotian superiority in heavy armor on land: but if the hoplites under Tolmidês had been all slain on the field, their death would probably have been avenged and Bœotia would not have been lost,—whereas, in the case of living citizens, the Athenians deemed no sacrifice too great to redeem them. We shall discover hereafter in the Lacedæmonians a feeling very similar, respecting their brethren captured at Sphakteria.

The calamitous consequences of this defeat came upon Athens in thick and rapid succession. The united exiles, having carried their point in Bœotia, proceeded to expel the philo-Athenian government both from Phocis and Lokris, and to carry the flame of revolt into Eubœa. To this important island Periklês himself proceeded forthwith, at the head of a powerful force; but before he had time to complete the reconquest, he was summoned home by news of a still more formidable character. The Megarians had revolted from Athens: by a conspiracy previously planned, a division of hoplites from Corinth, Sikyon, and Epidaurus, was already admitted as garrison into their city: the Athenian soldiers who kept watch over the Long Walls had been overpowered and slain, except a few who escaped into the fortified port of Nisæa. As if to make the Athenians at once sensible how seriously this disaster affected them, by throwing open the road over Geraneia,—Pleistoanax, king of Sparta, was announced as already on his march for an invasion of Attica. He did, in truth, conduct an army, of mixed Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesian allies, into Attica, as far as the neighborhood of Eleusis and the Thriasian plain. He was a very young man, so that a

Spartan of mature years, Kleandridês, had been attached to him by the ephors as adjutant and counsellor. Periklês, it is said, persuaded both the one and the other, by means of large bribes, to evacuate Attica without advancing to Athens. We may well doubt whether they had force enough to adventure so far into the interior, and we shall hereafter observe the great precautions with which Archidamus thought it necessary to conduct his invasion, during the first year of the Peloponnesian war, though at the head of a more commanding force. Nevertheless, on their return, the Lacedæmonians, believing that they might have achieved it, found both of them guilty of corruption. Both were banished: Kleandridês never came back, and Pleistoanax himself lived for a long time in sanctuary near the temple of Athênê, at Tegea, until at length he procured his restoration by tampering with the Pythian priestess, and by bringing her bought admonitions to act upon the authorities at Sparta.[656]

So soon as the Lacedæmonians had retired from Attica, Periklês returned with his forces to Eubœa, and reconquered the island completely. With that caution which always distinguished him as a military man, so opposite to the fatal rashness of Tolmidês, he took with him an overwhelming force of fifty triremes and five thousand hoplites. He admitted most of the Eubœan towns to surrender, altering the government of Chalkis by the expulsion of the wealthy oligarchy called the Hippobotæ; but the inhabitants of Histiæa, at the north of the island, who had taken an Athenian merchantman and massacred all the crew, were more severely dealt with,—the free population being all or in great part expelled, and the land distributed among Athenian kleruchs, or out-settled citizens.[657]

But the reconquest of Eubœa was far from restoring Athens to the position which she had occupied before the fatal engagement of Korôneia. Her land empire was irretrievably gone, together with her recently acquired influence over the Delphian oracle; and she reverted to her former condition of an exclusively maritime potentate. For though she still continued to hold Nisæa and Pegæ, yet her communication with the latter harbor was now out off by the loss of Megara and its appertaining territory, so that she thus lost her means of acting in the Corinthian gulf, and of protecting as well as of constraining her allies in Achaia. Nor was the port of Nisæa of much value to her, disconnected from the city to which it belonged, except as a post for annoying that city. Moreover, the precarious hold which she possessed over unwilling allies had been demonstrated in a manner likely to encourage similar attempts among her maritime subjects,—attempts which would now be seconded by Peloponnesian armies invading Attica. The fear of such a combination of embarrassments, and especially of an irresistible enemy carrying ruin over the flourishing territory round Eleusis and Athens, was at this moment predominant in the Athenian mind. We shall find Periklês, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, fourteen years afterwards, exhausting all his persuasive force, and not succeeding without great difficulty, in prevailing upon his countrymen to endure the hardship of invasion,—even in defence of their maritime empire, and when events had been gradually so ripening as to render the

prospect of war familiar, if not inevitable. But the late series of misfortunes had burst upon them so rapidly and unexpectedly, as to discourage even Athenian confidence, and to render the prospect of continued war full of gloom and danger. The prudence of Periklês would doubtless counsel the surrender of their remaining landed possessions or alliances, which had now become unprofitable, in order to purchase peace; but we may be sure that nothing short of extreme temporary despondency could have induced the Athenian assembly to listen to such advice, and to accept the inglorious peace which followed. A truce for thirty years was concluded with Sparta and her allies, in the beginning of 445 B. C., whereby Athens surrendered Nisæa, Pegæ, Achaia, and Trœzen,—thus abandoning Peloponnesus altogether,[658] and leaving the Megarians—with their full territory and their two ports—to be included among the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta.

It was to the Megarians, especially, that the altered position of Athens after this truce was owing: it was their secession from Attica and junction with the Peloponnesians, which laid open Attica to invasion. Hence, arose the deadly hatred on the part of the Athenians towards Megara, manifested during the ensuing years,—a sentiment the more natural, as Megara had spontaneously sought the alliance of Athens a few years before as a protection against the Corinthians, and had then afterwards, without any known ill-usage on the part of Athens, broken off from the alliance and become her enemy, with the fatal consequence of rendering her vulnerable on the land-side. Under such circumstances we shall not be surprised to find the antipathy of the Athenians against Megara strongly pronounced, insomuch that the system of exclusion which they adopted against her was among the most prominent causes of the Peloponnesian war.

Having traced what we may call the foreign relations of Athens down to this thirty years' truce, we must notice the important internal and constitutional changes which she had experienced during the same interval.

CHAPTER XLVI.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKLES.

THE period which we have now passed over appears to have been that in which the democratical cast of Athenian public life was first brought into its fullest play and development, as to judicature, legislation, and administration.

The great judicial change was made by the methodical distribution of a large proportion of the citizens into distinct judicial divisions, by the great extension of their direct agency in that department, and by the assignment of a constant pay to every citizen so engaged. It has been already mentioned that even under the democracy of Kleisthenês, and until the time succeeding the battle of Platæa, large powers still remained vested both in the individual archons and in the senate of Areopagus: which latter was composed exclusively of the past archons after their year of office, sitting in it for life,—though the check exercised by the general body of citizens, assembled for law-making in the ekklesia, and for judging in the heliæa, was at the same time materially increased. We must farther recollect, that the distinction between powers administrative and judicial, so highly valued among the more elaborate governments of modern Europe, since the political speculations of the last century, was in the early history of Athens almost unknown. Like the Roman kings,[659] and the Roman consuls before the appointment of the prætor, the Athenian archons not only administered, but also exercised jurisdiction, voluntary as well as contentious,—decided disputes, inquired into crimes, and inflicted punishment. Of the same mixed nature were the functions of the senate of Areopagus, and even of the annual senate of Five Hundred, the creation of Kleisthenês. The stratêgi, too, as well as the archons, had doubtless the double competence—in reference to military, naval, and foreign affairs—of issuing orders and of punishing by their own authority, disobedient parties: the *imperium* of the magistrates, generally, enabled them to enforce their own mandates as well as to decide in cases of doubt whether any private citizen had or had not been guilty of infringement. Nor was there any appeal from these magisterial judgments; though the magistrates were subject, under the Kleisthenean constitution, to personal responsibility for their general behavior, before the people judicially assembled, at the expiration of their year of office,—and to the farther animadversion of the ekklesia, or public deliberative assembly, meeting periodically during the course of that year: in some of which ekklesiæ, the question might formally be raised for deposing any magistrate, even before his year was expired.[660] Still, in spite of such partial checks, the accumulation, in the same hand, of powers to administer, judge, punish, and decide civil disputes, without any other canon than the few laws then existing, and without any appeal,—must have been painfully felt, and must have often led to corrupt, arbitrary, and oppressive dealing: and if this be true of in-

dividual magistrates, exposed to annual accountability, it is not likely to have been less true of the senate of Areopagus, which, acting collectively, could hardly be rendered accountable, and in which the members sat for life.[661]

I have already mentioned that shortly after the return of the expatriated Athenians from Salamis, Aristeidês had been impelled, by the strong democratical sentiment which he found among his countrymen, to propose the abolition of all pecuniary qualification for magistracies, so as to render every citizen legally eligible. This innovation, however, was chiefly valuable as a victory and as an index of the predominant sentiment: notwithstanding the enlarged promise of eligibility, little change probably took place in the fact, and rich men were still most commonly chosen. Hence the magistrates, possessing the large powers administrative and judicial above described,—and still more the senate of Areopagus, which sat for life,—still belonging almost entirely to the wealthier class, remained animated more or less with the same oligarchical interest and sympathies, which manifested themselves in the abuse of authority. At the same time the democratical sentiment among the mass of Athenians went on steadily increasing from the time of Aristeidês to that of Periklês: Athens became more and more maritime, the population of Peiræus augmented in number as well as in importance, and the spirit even of the poorest citizen was stimulated by that collective aggrandizement of his city to which he himself individually contributed. Before twenty years had elapsed, reckoning from the battle of Platæa, this new fervor of democratical sentiment made itself felt in the political contests of Athens, and found able champions in Periklês and Ephialtês, rivals of what may be called the conservative party, headed by Kimon.

We have no positive information that it was Periklês who introduced the lot, in place of election, for the choice of archons and various other magistrates, but the change must have been introduced nearly at this time, and with a view of equalizing the chances of office to every candidate, poor as well as rich, who chose to give in his name, and who fulfilled certain personal and family conditions ascertained in the dokimasy, or preliminary examination. But it was certainly to Periklês and Ephialtês that Athens owed the elaborate constitution of her popular dikasteries, or jury courts regularly paid, which exercised so important an influence upon the character of the citizens. These two eminent men deprived both the magistrates and the senate of Areopagus of all the judicial and penal competence which they had hitherto possessed, save and except the power of imposing a small fine. This judicial power, civil as well as criminal, was transferred to numerous dikasts, or panels of jurors selected from the citizens; six thousand of whom were annually drawn by lot and sworn, and then distributed into ten panels of five hundred each, the remainder forming a supplement in case of vacancies. The magistrate, instead of deciding causes, or inflicting punishment by his own authority, was now constrained to impanel a jury,—that is, to submit each particular case, which might call for a penalty greater than the small fine to which he was competent, to the judgment of one or other among these numerous

popular dikasteries. Which of the ten he should take, was determined by lot, so that no one knew beforehand what dikastery would try any particular cause: he himself presided over it during the trial, and submitted to it the question at issue, with the results of his own preliminary examination, in addition to the speeches of accuser and accused, with the statements of their witnesses. So also the civil judicature, which had before been exercised in controversies between man and man by the archons, was withdrawn from them and transferred to these dikasteries under the presidence of an archon. It is to be remarked, that the system of reference to arbitration for private causes[662] was extensively applied at Athens: a certain number of public arbitrators were annually appointed, to one of whom—or to some other citizen adopted by mutual consent of the parties—all private disputes were submitted in the first instance. If dissatisfied with the decision, either party might afterwards carry the matter before the dikastery: but it appears that in many cases the decision of the arbitrator was acquiesced in without this ultimate resort.

I do not here mean to affirm that there never was any trial by the people before the time of Periklês and Ephialtês: I doubt not that, before their time, the numerous judicial assembly called Heliæa, pronounced upon charges against accountable magistrates as well as upon various other accusations of public importance; and perhaps in some cases, separate bodies of them may have been drawn by lot for particular trials. But it is not the less true, that the systematic distribution and constant employment of the numerous dikasts of Athens cannot have begun before the age of these two statesmen, since it was only then that the practice of paying them began: for so large a sacrifice of time on the part of poor men, wherein M. Boëckh states, [663] doubtless in very exaggerated language, that "nearly one-third of the citizens sat as judges every day," cannot be conceived without an assured remuneration. From and after the time of Periklês, these dikasteries were the exclusive assemblies for trial of all causes, civil as well as criminal, with some special exceptions, such as cases of homicide and a few others: but before his time, the greater number of these causes had been adjudged either by individual magistrates or by the senate of Areopagus. We may therefore conceive how great and important was the revolution wrought by that statesman, when he first organized these dikastic assemblies into systematic action, and transferred to them nearly all the judicial power which had before been exercised by magistrates and senate. The position and influence of these latter became radically altered: the most commanding functions of the archon were abrogated, and he retained only the power of receiving complaints, inquiring into them, exercising some small preliminary interference with the parties for the furtherance of the cause or accusation, fixing the day for trial, and presiding over the dikastic assembly, by whom peremptory verdict was pronounced. His administrative functions remained unaltered, but his powers, inquisitorial and determining, as a judge, passed away.[664]

In reference to the senate of Areopagus also, the changes introduced were not less considerable. That senate, anterior to the democracy in point of date, and standing alone in the enjoyment of a life-tenure, appears to have exercised an undefined and extensive control which long continuance had gradually consecrated. It was invested with a kind of religious respect, and believed to possess mysterious traditions emanating from a divine source:[665] especially, the cognizance which it took of intentional homicide was a part of old Attic religion not less than of judicature. Though put in the background for a time, after the expulsion of the Peisistratids, it had gradually recovered itself when recruited by the new archons under the Kleisthenean constitution; and during the calamitous sufferings of the Persian invasion, its forwardness and patriotism had been so highly appreciated as to procure for it an increased sphere of ascendency. Trials for homicide were only a small part of its attributions: it exercised judicial competence in many other cases besides, and what was of still greater moment, it maintained a sort of censorial police over the lives and habits of the citizens,—it professed to enforce a tutelary and paternal discipline, beyond that which the strict letter of the law could mark out, over the indolent, the prodigal, the undutiful, and the deserters from old rite and custom. To crown all, the senate of Areopagus also exercised a supervision over the public assembly, taking care that none of the proceedings of those meetings should be such as to infringe the established laws of the country. These were powers immense as well as undefined, not derived from any formal grant of the people, but having their source in immemorial antiquity, and sustained by general awe and reverence: when we read the serious expressions of this sentiment in the mouths of the later orators,—Demosthenês, Æschinês, or Deinarchus,—we shall comprehend how strong it must have been a century and a half before them, at the period of the Persian invasion. Isokratês, in his Discourse usually called *Areopagiticus*, written a century and a quarter after that invasion, draws a picture of what the senate of Areopagus had been while its competence was yet undiminished, and ascribes to it a power of interference little short of paternal despotism, which he asserts to have been most salutary and improving in its effect. That the picture of this rhetor is inaccurate,—and to a great degree indeed ideal, insinuating his own recommendations under the color of past realities,—is sufficiently obvious: but it enables us to presume generally, the extensive regulating power of the senate of Areopagus, in affairs both public and private, at the time which we are now describing.

Such powers were pretty sure to be abused, and when we learn that the Spartan senate[666] was lamentably open to bribery, we can hardly presume much better of the life-sitting elders at Athens. But even if their powers had been guided by all that beneficence of intention which Isokratês affirms, they were in their nature such as could only be exercised over a passive and stationary people: and the course of events at Athens, at that time peculiarly, presented conditions altogether the reverse. During the pressure of the Persian invasion, indeed, the senate of Areopagus had been armed with more than ordinary authority, which it had employed so creditably

as to strengthen its influence, and tighten its supervision during the period immediately following: but that same trial had also called forth in the general body of the citizens a fresh burst of democratical sentiment, and an augmented consciousness of force, both individual and national. Here then were two forces, not only distinct but opposite and conflicting, both put into increased action at the same time.[667] Nor was this all: a novel cast was just then given to Athenian life and public habits by many different circumstances,—the enlargement of the city, the creation of the fortified port and new town of Peiræus, the introduction of an increased nautical population, the active duties of Athens as head of the Delian confederacy, etc. All these circumstances tended to open new veins of hope and feeling, and new lines of action, in the Athenians between 480-460 B. C., and by consequence to render the interference of the senate of Areopagus, essentially old-fashioned and conservative as it was, more and more difficult. But at the very time when prudence would have counselled that it should have been relaxed or modified, the senate appear to have rendered it stricter, or at least to have tried to do so: which could not fail to raise against them a considerable body of enemies. Not merely the democratical innovators, but also the representatives of new interests generally at Athens, became opposed to the senate as an organ of vexatious repression, employed for oligarchical purposes.[668]

From the character of the senate of Areopagus, and the ancient reverence with which it was surrounded, it served naturally as a centre of action to the oligarchical or conservative party,—that party which desired to preserve the Kleisthenean constitution unaltered, with undiminished authority, administrative as well as judicial, both to individual magistrates and to the collective Areopagus. Of this sentiment, at the time of which we are now speaking, Kimon was the most conspicuous leader, and his brilliant victories at the Eurymedon, as well as his exploits in other warlike enterprises, doubtless strengthened very much his political influence at home. The same party also probably included the large majority of rich and old families at Athens; who, so long as the magistracies were elected and not chosen by lot, usually got themselves chosen, and had every interest in keeping the power of such offices as high as they could. Moreover, the party was farther strengthened by the pronounced support of Sparta, imparted chiefly through Kimon, proxenus of Sparta at Athens. Of course, such aid could only have been indirect, yet it appears to have been of no inconsiderable moment,—for when we consider that Ægina had been in ancient feud with Athens, and Corinth in a temper more hostile than friendly, the good feeling of the Lacedæmonians might well appear to Athenian citizens eminently desirable to preserve: and the philo-Laconian character of the leading men at Athens contributed to disarm the jealousy of Sparta during that critical period while the Athenian maritime ascendency was in progress.[669]

The political opposition between Periklês and Kimon was hereditary, since Xanthippus, the father of the former, had been the accuser of Miltiadês, the father of the

latter. Both were of the first families in the city, and this, combined with the military talents of Kimon, and the great statesmanlike superiority of Periklês, placed both the one and the other at the head of the two political parties which divided Athens. Periklês must have begun his political career very young, since he maintained a position first of great influence, and afterwards of unparalleled moral and political ascendency, for the long period of forty years, against distinguished rivals, bitter assailants, and unscrupulous libellers (about 467-428 B. C.) His public life began about the time when Themistoklês was ostracized, and when Aristeidês was passing off the stage, and he soon displayed a character which combined the pecuniary probity of the one with the resource and large views of the other; superadding to both a discretion and mastery of temper never disturbed,—an excellent musical and lettered education received from Pythokleidês,—an eloquence such as no one before had either heard or conceived,—and the best philosophy which the age afforded. His military duties as a youthful citizen were faithfully and strenuously performed, but he was timid in his first political approaches to the people,—a fact perfectly in unison with the caution of his temperament, but which some of his biographers[670] explained by saying that he was afraid of being ostracized, and that his countenance resembled that of the despot Peisistratus. We may be pretty sure, however, that this personal resemblance, like the wonderful dream ascribed to his mother[671] when pregnant of him, was an after-thought of enemies, when his ascendency was already established, —and that young beginners were in little danger of ostracism. The complexion of political parties in Athens had greatly changed since the days of Themistoklês and Aristeidês; for the Kleisthenean constitution, though enlarged by the latter after the return from Salamis to the extent of making all citizens without exception eligible for magistracy, had become unpopular with the poorer citizens, and to the keener democratical feeling which now ran through Athens and Peiræus.

It was to this democratical party,—the party of movement against that of resistance, or of reformers against conservatives, if we are to employ modern phraseology,—that Periklês devoted his great rank, character, and abilities. From the low arts which it is common to ascribe to one who espouses the political interests of the poor against the rich, he was remarkably exempt: he was indefatigable in his attention to public business, but he went little into society, and disregarded almost to excess the airs of popularity: his eloquence was irresistibly impressive, yet he was by no means prodigal of it, taking care to reserve himself, like the Salaminian trireme, for solemn occasions, and preferring for the most part to employ the agency of friends and partisans:[672] moreover, he imbibed from his friend and teacher Anaxagoras, a tinge of physical philosophy, which greatly strengthened his mind,[673] and armed him against many of the reigning superstitions,— but which at the same time tended to rob him of the sympathy of the vulgar, rich as well as poor. The arts of demagogy were in fact much more cultivated by the oligarchical Kimon, whose open-hearted familiarity of manner was extolled, by his personal friend the poet Ion, in contrast with the reserved and stately demeanor of his rival Periklês. Kimon employed the rich plunder,

procured by his maritime expeditions, in public decorations as well as in largesses to the poorer citizens,—throwing open his fields and fruits to all the inhabitants of his deme, and causing himself to be attended in public by well-dressed slaves, directed to tender their warm tunics in exchange for the threadbare garments of those who seemed in want; while the property of Periklês was administered with a strict, though benevolent economy, by his ancient steward Evangelus,—the produce of his lands being all sold, and the consumption of his house supplied by purchase in the market. [674] It was by such regularity that his perfect and manifest independence of all pecuniary seduction was sustained. In taste, in talent, and in character, Kimon was the very opposite of Perikles,—a brave and efficient commander, a lavish distributor, a man of convivial and amorous habits, but incapable of sustained attention to business, untaught in music or letters, and endued with Laconian aversion to rhetoric and philosophy; while the ascendency of Periklês was founded on his admirable combination of civil qualities,—probity, firmness, diligence, judgment, eloquence, and power of guiding partisans. As a military commander, though noway deficient in personal courage, he rarely courted distinction, and was principally famous for his care of the lives of the citizens, discountenancing all rash or distant enterprises: his private habits were sober and recluse,—his chief conversation was with Anaxagoras, Protagoras,[675] Zeno, the musician Damon, and other philosophers,—while the tenderest domestic attachment bound him to the engaging and cultivated Aspasia.

Such were the two men who stood forward at this time as most conspicuous in Athenian party-contest,—the expanding democracy against the stationary democracy of the past generation, which now passed by the name of oligarchy,—the ambitious and talkative energy spread even among the poor population, which was now forming more and more the characteristic of Athens, against the unlettered and uninquiring valor of the conquerors of Marathon.[676] Ephialtês, son of Sophônidês, was at this time the leading auxiliary, seemingly indeed the equal of Periklês, and no way inferior to him in personal probity, though he was a poor man:[677] as to aggressive political warfare, he was even more active than Periklês, who appears throughout his long public life to have manifested but little bitterness against political enemies. Unfortunately, our scanty knowledge of the history of Athens brings before us only some general causes and a few marked facts: the details and the particular persons concerned are not within our sight: yet the actual course of political events depends everywhere mainly upon these details, as well as upon the general causes. Before Ephialtês advanced his main proposition for abridging the competence of the senate of Areopagus, he appears to have been strenuous in repressing the practical abuse of magisterial authority, by accusations brought against the magistrates at the period of their regular accountability. After repeated efforts to check the practical abuse of these magisterial powers,[678] Ephialtês and Periklês were at last conducted to the proposition of cutting them down permanently, and introducing an altered system.

We are not surprised to find that such proceedings provoked extreme bitterness of party-feeling, and it is probable that this temper may have partly dictated the accusation preferred against Kimon, about 463 B. C., after the surrender of Thasos, for alleged reception of bribes from the Macedonian prince Alexander,—an accusation of which he was acquitted. At this time the oligarchical or Kimonian party was decidedly the most powerful: and when the question was proposed for sending troops to aid the Lacedæmonians in reducing the revolted Helots on Ithômê, Kimon carried the people along with him to comply, by an appeal to their generous feelings, in spite of the strenuous opposition of Ephialtês.[679] But when Kimon and the Athenian hoplites returned home, having been dismissed by Sparta under circumstances of insulting suspicion, as has been mentioned in the preceding chapter, the indignation of the citizens was extreme: they renounced their alliance with Sparta, and entered into amity with Argos. Of course the influence of Kimon, and the position of the oligarchical party, was materially changed by this incident: and in the existing bitterness of political parties, it is not surprising that his opponents should take the opportunity for proposing, soon afterwards, a vote of ostracism,[680]—a challenge, indeed, which may, perhaps, have been accepted not unwillingly by Kimon and his party, since they might still fancy themselves the strongest, and suppose that the sentence of banishment would fall upon Ephialtês or Periklês. However, the vote ended in the expulsion of Kimon, a sure proof that his opponents were now in the ascendent. On this occasion, as on the preceding, we see the ostracism invoked to meet a period of intense political conflict, the violence of which it would at least abate, by removing for the time one of the contending leaders.

It was now that Periklês and Ephialtês carried their important scheme of judicial reform. The senate of Areopagus was deprived of its discretionary censorial power, as well as of all its judicial competence except that which related to homicide. The individual magistrates, as well as the senate of Five Hundred, were also stripped of their judicial attributes, except the power of imposing a small fine,[681] which were transferred to the newly created panels of salaried dikasts, lotted off in ten divisions from the aggregate heliæa. Ephialtês[682] first brought down the laws of Solon from the acropolis to the neighborhood of the marketplace, where the dikasteries sat,—a visible proof that the judicature was now popularized.

In the representations of many authors, the full bearing of this great constitutional change is very inadequately conceived. What we are commonly told, is, that Periklês was the first to assign a salary to these numerous dikasteries at Athens; he bribed the people with the public money, says Plutarch, in order to make head against Kimon, who bribed them out of his own private purse: as if the pay were the main feature in the case, and as if all which Periklês did, was to make himself popular by paying the dikasts for judicial service, which they had before rendered gratuitously. The truth is, that this numerous army of dikasts, distributed into ten regiments and summoned to act systematically throughout the year, was now for the

first time organized: the commencement of their pay is also the commencement of their regular judicial action. What Periklês really did, was to sever for the first time from the administrative competence of the magistrates that judicial authority which had originally gone along with it. The great men who had been accustomed to hold these offices were lowered both in influence and authority:[683] while on the other hand a new life, habit, and sense of power, sprang up among the poorer citizens. A plaintiff, having cause of civil action, or an accuser, invoking punishment against citizens guilty of injury either to himself or to the state, had still to address himself to one or other of the archons, but it was only with a view of ultimately arriving before the dikastery, by whom the cause was to be tried. While the magistrates acting individually were thus restricted to simple administration and preliminary police, they experienced a still more serious loss of power in their capacity of members of the Areopagus, after the year of archonship was expired. Instead of their previous unmeasured range of supervision and interference, they were now deprived of all judicial sanction, beyond that small power of fining, which was still left both to individual magistrates, and to the senate of Five Hundred. But the cognizance of homicide was still expressly reserved to them,—for the procedure, in this latter case, religious not less than judicial, was so thoroughly consecrated by ancient feeling, that no reformer could venture to disturb or remove it.[684] It was upon this same ground probably that the stationary party defended *all* the prerogatives of the senate of Areopagus,—denouncing the curtailments proposed by Ephialtês as impious and guilty innovations.[685] How extreme their resentment became, when these reforms were carried, and how fierce was the collision of political parties at this moment, we may judge by the result. The enemies of Ephialtês caused him to be privately assassinated, by the hand of a Bœotian of Tanagra, named Aristodikus. Such a crime—rare in the political annals of Athens, for we come to no known instance of it afterwards, until the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, in 411 B. C.—marks at once the gravity of the change now introduced, the fierceness of the opposition offered, and the unscrupulous character of the conservative party: Kimon was in exile, and had no share in the deed. Doubtless the assassination of Ephialtês produced an effect unfavorable in every way to the party who procured it: the popular party, in their resentment, must have become still more attached to the judicial reforms just assured to them, while the hands of Periklês, the superior leader, left behind and now acting singly, must have been materially strengthened.

It is from this point that the administration of that great man may be said to date: he was now the leading adviser, we might almost say prime minister, of the Athenian people. His first years were marked by a series of brilliant successes, already mentioned, the acquisition of Megara as an ally, and the victorious war against Corinth and Ægina. But when he proposed the great and valuable improvement of the Long Walls, thus making one city of Athens and Peiræus, the same oligarchical party which had opposed his judicial changes and assassinated Ephialtês again stood forward in vehement resistance. Finding direct opposition unavailing, they did not

scruple to enter into treasonable correspondence with Sparta, invoking the aid of a foreign force for the overthrow of the democracy; so odious had it become in their eyes since the recent innovations. How serious was the hazard incurred by Athens, near the time of the battle of Tanagra, has been already recounted; together with the rapid and unexpected reconciliation of parties after that battle, principally owing to the generous patriotism of Kimon and his immediate friends. He was restored from ostracism on this occasion, before his full time had expired, and the rivalry between him and Periklês henceforward becomes mitigated, or even converted into a compromise,[686] whereby the internal affairs of the city were left to the one, and the conduct of foreign expeditions to the other. The successes of Athens during the ensuing ten years were more brilliant than ever, and she attained the maximum of her power: which doubtless had a material effect in imparting stability to the democracy, as well as to the administration of Periklês, and enabled both the one and the other to stand the shock of those great public reverses, which deprived the Athenians of their dependent landed alliances, during the interval between the defeat of Korôneia and the thirty years' truce.

Along with the important judicial revolution brought about by Periklês, were introduced other changes belonging to the same scheme and system.

Thus a general power of supervision, both over the magistrates and over the public assembly, was vested in seven magistrates, now named for the first time, called Nomophylakes, or Law-Guardians, and doubtless changed every year. These nomophylakes sat alongside of the proëdri, or presidents, both in the senate and in the public assembly, and were charged with the duty of interposing whenever any step was taken or any proposition made contrary to the existing laws: they were also empowered to constrain the magistrates to act according to law.[687] We do not know whether they possessed the presidency of a dikastery,—that is, whether they could themselves cause one of the panels of jurors to be summoned, and put an alleged delinquent on his trial before it, under their presidency, or whether they were restricted to entering a formal protest, laying the alleged illegality before the public assembly. To appoint magistrates, however, invested with this special trust of watching and informing, was not an unimportant step; for it would probably enable Ephialtês to satisfy many objectors who feared to abolish the superintending power of the Areopagus without introducing any substitute. The nomophylakes were honored with a distinguished place at the public processions and festivals, and were even allowed, like the archons, to enter the senate of Areopagus after their year of office had expired: but they never acquired any considerable power, such as that senate had itself exercised. Their interference must have been greatly superseded by the introduction and increasing application of the Graphê Paranomôn, presently to be explained; nor are they even noticed in the description of that misguided assembly which condemned the six generals after the battle of Arginusæ, by a gross violation of legal form not less than of substantial justice.[688] After the expulsion of the Thirty, the

senate of Areopagus was again invested with a supervision over magistrates, though without anything like its ancient ascendency.

Another important change which we may with probability refer to Periklês, is the institution of the Nomothetæ. These men were, in point of fact, dikasts, members of the six thousand citizens annually sworn in that capacity. But they were not, like the dikasts for trying causes, distributed into panels, or regiments, known by a particular letter, and acting together throughout the entire year: they were lotted off to sit together only on special occasion and as the necessity arose. According to the reform now introduced, the ekklesia, or public assembly, even with the sanction of the senate of Five Hundred, became incompetent either to pass a new law or to repeal a law already in existence; it could only enact a *psephism*,—that is, properly speaking, a decree, applicable only to a particular case; though the word was used at Athens in a very large sense, sometimes comprehending decrees of general as well as permanent application. In reference to laws, a peculiar judicial procedure was established. The thesmothetæ were directed annually to examine the existing laws, noting any contradictions or double laws on the same matter; and in the first prytany (tenth part) of the Attic year, on the eleventh day, an ekklesia was held, in which the first business was to go through the laws *seriatim*, and submit them for approval or rejection: first beginning with the laws relating to the senate, next, those of more general import, especially such as determined the functions and competence of the magistrates. If any law was condemned by the vote of the public assembly, or if any citizen had a new law to propose, the third assembly of the prytany was employed, previous to any other business, in the appointment of nomothetæ, and in the provision of means to pay their salary. Previous notice was required to be given publicly by every citizen who had new propositions of the sort to make, in order that the time necessary for the sitting of the nomothetæ might be measured according to the number of matters to be submitted to their cognizance. Public advocates were farther named to undertake the formal defence of all the laws attacked, and the citizen who proposed to repeal them had to make out his case against this defence, to the satisfaction of the assembled nomothetæ. These latter were taken from the six thousand sworn dikasts, and were of different numbers according to circumstances: sometimes we hear of them as five hundred, sometimes as one thousand, and we may be certain that the number was always considerable.

The effect of this institution was, to place the making or repealing of laws under the same solemnities and guarantees as the trying of causes or accusations in judicature. We must recollect that the citizens who attended the ekklesia, or public assembly, were not sworn like the dikasts; nor had they the same solemnity of procedure, nor the same certainty of hearing both sides of the question set forth, nor the same full preliminary notice. How much the oath sworn was brought to act upon the minds of the dikasts, we may see by the frequent appeals to it in the orators, who contrast them with the unsworn public assembly.[689] And there can be no doubt that the

nomothetæ afforded much greater security than the public assembly, for a proper decision. That security depended upon the same principle as we see to pervade all the constitutional arrangements of Athens; upon a fraction of the people casually taken, but sufficiently numerous to have the same interest with the whole,—not permanent, but delegated for the occasion,—assembled under a solemn sanction, and furnished with a full exposition of both sides of the case. The power of passing psephisms, or special decrees, still remained with the public assembly, which was doubtless much more liable to be surprised into hasty or inconsiderate decision than either the dikastery or the nomothetæ,—in spite of the necessity of previous authority from the senate of Five Hundred, before any proposition could be submitted to it.

As an additional security both to the public assembly and the nomothetæ against being entrapped into decisions contrary to existing law, another remarkable provision has yet to be mentioned,—a provision probably introduced by Periklês at the same time as the formalities of law-making by means of specially delegated nomothetæ. This was the Graphê Paranomôn,—indictment for informality or illegality,—which might be brought on certain grounds against the proposer of any law or any psephism, and rendered him liable to punishment by the dikastery. He was required, in bringing forward his new measure, to take care that it should not be in contradiction with any preëxisting law,—or if there were any such contradiction, to give formal notice of it, to propose the repeal of that which existed, and to write up publicly beforehand what his proposition was,—in order that there might never be two contradictory laws at the same time in operation, nor any illegal decree passed either by the senate or by the public assembly. If he neglected this precaution, he was liable to prosecution under the graphê paranomôn, which any Athenian citizen might bring against him before the dikastery, through the intervention and under the presidency of the thesmothetæ.

Judging from the title of this indictment, it was originally confined to the special ground of formal contradiction between the new and the old. But it had a natural tendency to extend itself: the citizen accusing would strengthen his case by showing that the measure which he attacked contradicted not merely the letter, but the spirit and purpose of existing laws,—and he would proceed from hence to denounce it as generally mischievous and disgraceful to the state. In this unmeasured latitude, we find the graphê paranomôn at the time of Demosthenês: the mover of a new law or psephism, even after it had been regularly discussed and passed, was liable to be indicted, and had to defend himself not only against alleged informalities in his procedure, but also against alleged mischiefs in the substance of his measure. If found guilty by the dikastery, the punishment inflicted upon him by them was not fixed, but variable according to circumstances; for the indictment belonged to that class wherein, after the verdict of guilty, first a given amount of punishment was proposed by the accuser, next, another and lighter amount was named by the accused party against himself,—the dikastery being bound to make their option between one and

the other, without admitting any third modification,—so that it was the interest even of the accused party to name against himself a measure of punishment sufficient to satisfy the sentiment of the dikasts, in order that they might not prefer the more severe proposition of the accuser. At the same time, the accuser himself, as in other public indictments, was fined in the sum of one thousand drachms, unless the verdict of guilty obtained at least one-fifth of the suffrages of the dikastery. The personal responsibility of the mover, however, continued only one year after the introduction of his new law: if the accusation was brought at a greater distance of time than one year, the accuser could invoke no punishment against the mover, and the sentence of the dikasts neither absolved nor condemned anything but the law. Their condemnation of the law, with or without the author, amounted *ipso facto* to a repeal of it.

Such indictment against the author of a law or of a decree, might be preferred either at some stage prior to its final enactment,—as after its acceptance simply by the senate, if it was a decree, or after its approval by the public assembly, and prior to its going before the nomothetæ, if it was a law,—or after it had reached full completion by the verdict of the nomothetæ. In the former case, the indictment stayed its farther progress until sentence had been pronounced by the dikasts.

This regulation is framed in a thoroughly conservative spirit, to guard the existing laws against being wholly or partially nullified by a new proposition. As, in the procedure of the nomothetæ, whenever any proposition was made for distinctly repealing any existing law, it was thought unsafe to intrust the defence of the law so assailed to the chance of some orator gratuitously undertaking it, and paid advocates were appointed for the purpose; so also, when any citizen made a new positive proposition, sufficient security was not supposed to be afforded by the chance of opponents rising up at the time; and a farther guarantee was provided in the personal responsibility of the mover. That the latter, before he proposed a new decree or a new law, should take care that there was nothing in it inconsistent with existing laws,—or, if there were, that he should first formally bring forward a direct proposition for the repeal of such preëxistent law,—was in no way unreasonable: it imposed upon him an obligation such as he might perfectly well fulfil,—it served as a check upon the use of that right, of free speech and initiative in the public assembly, which belonged to every Athenian without exception,[690] and which was cherished by the democracy as much as it was condemned by oligarchical thinkers,—it was a security to the dikasts, who were called upon to apply the law to particular cases, against the perplexity of having conflicting laws quoted before them, and being obliged in their verdict to set aside either one or the other. In modern European governments, even the most free and constitutional, laws have been both made and applied either by select persons or select assemblies, under an organization so different as to put out of sight the idea of personal responsibility on the proposer of a new law. Moreover, even in such assemblies, private initiative has either not existed at all, or has been of comparatively little effect, in law-making; while in the application of laws when made, there

has always been a permanent judicial body exercising an action of its own, more or less independent of the legislature, and generally interpreting away the text of contradictory laws so as to keep up a tolerably consistent course of forensic tradition. But at Athens, the fact that the proposer of a new decree, or of a new law, had induced the senate or the public assembly to pass it, was by no means supposed to cancel his personal responsibility, if the proposition was illegal: he had deceived the senate or the people, in deliberately keeping back from them a fact which he knew, or at least might and ought to have known.

But though a full justification may thus be urged on behalf of the graphê paranomôn, as originally conceived and intended, it will hardly apply to that indictment as applied afterwards in its plenary and abusive latitude. Thus Æschinês indicts Ktesiphon under it for having, under certain circumstances, proposed a crown to Demosthenês. He begins by showing that the proposition was illegal,—for this was the essential foundation of the indictment: he then goes on farther to demonstrate, in a splendid harangue, that Demosthenês was a vile man and a mischievous politician: accordingly, assuming the argument to be just, Ktesiphon had deceived the people in an aggravated way,—first, by proposing a reward under circumstances contrary to law; next, by proposing it in favor of an unworthy man. The first part of the argument only is of the essence of the graphê paranomôn: the second part is in the nature of an abuse growing out of it,—springing from that venom of personal and party enmity which is inseparable, in a greater or less degree, from free political action, and which manifested itself with virulence at Athens, though within the limits of legality. That this indictment, as one of the most direct vents for such enmity, was largely applied and abused at Athens, is certain; but though it probably deterred unpractised citizens from originating new propositions, it did not produce the same effect upon those orators who made politics a regular business, and who could therefore both calculate the temper of the people, and reckon upon support from a certain knot of friends. Aristophon, towards the close of his political life, made it a boast that he had been thus indicted and acquitted seventy-five times. Probably, the worst effect which it produced was that of encouraging the vein of personality and bitterness which pervades so large a proportion of Attic oratory, even in its most illustrious manifestations; turning deliberative into judicial eloquence, and interweaving the discussion of a law, or decree, along with a declamatory harangue against the character of its mover. We may at the same time add that the graphê paranomôn was often the most convenient way of getting a law or a psephism repealed, so that it was used even when the annual period had passed over, and when the mover was therefore out of danger,—the indictment being then brought only against the law, or decree, as in the case which forms the subject of the harangue of Demosthenês against Leptinês. If the speaker of this harangue obtained a verdict, he procured at once the repeal of the law, or decree, without proposing any new provision in its place; which he would be required to do,—if not peremptorily, at least by common usage,—if he had carried the law for repeal before the nomothetæ.

The dikasteries provided under the system of Periklês varied in number of members: we never hear of less than two hundred members,—most generally of five hundred,—and sometimes also of one thousand, fifteen hundred, two thousand members, on important trials.[691] Each man received pay from the treasurers, called Kolakretæ, after his day's business was over, of three oboli, or half a drachm: at least this was the amount paid during the early part of the Peloponnesian war. M. Boëckh supposes that the original pay proposed by Periklês was one obolus, afterwards tripled by Kleon; but his opinion is open to much doubt. It was indispensable to propose a measure of pay sufficient to induce citizens to come, and come frequently, if not regularly: now one obolus seems to have proved afterwards an inadequate temptation even to the ekklesiasts, or citizens who attended the public assembly, who were less frequently wanted, and must have had easier sittings, than the dikasts: much less, therefore, would it be sufficient in the case of the latter. I incline to the belief that the pay originally awarded was three oboli:[692] the rather, as these new institutions seem to have nearly coincided in point of time with the transportation of the confederate treasure from Delos to Athens,—so that the exchequer would then appear abundantly provided. As to the number of dikasts actually present on each day of sitting, or the minimum number requisite to form a sitting, we are very imperfectly informed. Though each of the ten panels or divisions of dikasts included five hundred individuals, seldom probably did all of them attend; but it also seldom happened, probably, that all the ten divisions sat on the same day: there was therefore an opportunity of making up deficiencies in division A, when its lot was called and when its dikasts did not appear in sufficient numbers, from those who belonged to division B or Δ, besides the supplementary dikasts who were not comprised in any of the ten divisions: though on all these points we cannot go beyond conjecture. Certain it is, however, that the dikasteries were always numerous, and that none of the dikasts could know in what causes they would be employed, so that it was impossible to tamper with them beforehand.[693]

Such were the great constitutional innovations of Periklês and Ephialtês,—changes full of practical results,—the transformation as well as the complement of that democratical system which Kleisthenês had begun, and to which the tide of Athenian feeling had been gradually mounting up, during the preceding twenty years. The entire force of these changes is generally not perceived, because the popular dikasteries and the nomothetæ are so often represented as institutions of Solon, and as merely supplied with pay by Periklês. This erroneous supposition prevents all clear view of the growth of the Athenian democracy, by throwing back its last elaborations to the period of its early and imperfect start. To strip the magistrates of all their judicial power, except that of imposing a small fine, and the Areopagus of all its jurisdiction, except in cases of homicide,—providing popular, numerous, and salaried dikasts to decide all the judicial business at Athens, as well as to repeal and enact laws; this was the consummation of the Athenian democracy: no serious constitutional alteration—I except the temporary interruptions of the Four Hundred and the

Thirty—was afterwards made until the days of Macedonian interference. As Periklês made it, so it remained in the days of Demosthenês,—though with a sensible change in the character, and abatement in the energies, of the people, rich as well as poor.

In appreciating the practical working of these numerous dikasteries at Athens, in comparison with such justice as might have been expected from individual magistrates, we have to consider, first, that personal and pecuniary corruption seems to have been a common vice among the leading men of Athens and Sparta, when acting individually or in boards of a few members, and not uncommon even with the kings of Sparta,—next, that in the Grecian cities generally, as we know even from the oligarchical Xenophon (he particularly excepts Sparta), the rich and great men were not only insubordinate to the magistrates, but made a parade of showing that they cared nothing about them.[694] We know, also, from the same unsuspected source, [695] that while the poorer Athenian citizens who served on ship board were distinguished for the strictest discipline, the hoplites, or middling burghers, who formed the infantry, were less obedient, and the rich citizens who served on horseback the most disobedient of all. To make rich and powerful criminals effectively amenable to justice, has indeed been found so difficult everywhere, until a recent period of history, that we should be surprised if it were otherwise in Greece. When we follow the reckless demeanor of rich men like Kritias, Alkibiadês,[696] and Meidias, even under the full grown democracy of Athens, we may be very sure that their predecessors under the Kleisthenean constitution would have been often too formidable to be punished or kept down by an individual archon of ordinary firmness,[697] even assuming him to be upright and wellintentioned. Now the dikasteries established by Periklês were inaccessible both to corruption and intimidation: their number, their secret suffrage, and the impossibility of knowing beforehand what individuals would sit in any particular cause, prevented both the one and the other. And besides that the magnitude of their number, extravagant, according to our ideas of judicial business, was essential to this tutelary effect,[698] it served farther to render the trial solemn and the verdict imposing on the minds of parties and spectators, as we may see by the fact that, in important causes, the dikastery was doubled or tripled. Nor was it possible, by any other means than numbers,[699] to give dignity to an assembly of citizens, of whom many were poor, some old, and all were despised individually by rich accused persons who were brought before them,—as Aristophanês and Xenophon give us plainly to understand.[700] If we except the strict and peculiar educational discipline of Sparta, these numerous dikasteries afforded the only organ which Grecian politics could devise, for getting redress against powerful criminals, public as well as private, and for obtaining a sincere and uncorrupt verdict.

Taking the general working of the dikasteries, we shall find that they are nothing but jury-trial applied on a scale broad, systematic, unaided, and uncontrolled, beyond all other historical experience, and that they therefore exhibit in exaggerated proportions both the excellences and the defects characteristic of the jury-system, as

compared with decision by trained and professional judges. All the encomiums, which it is customary to pronounce upon jury-trial, will be found predicable of the Athenian dikasteries in a still greater degree: all the reproaches, which can be addressed on good ground to the dikasteries, will apply to modern juries also, though in a less degree. Nor is the parallel less just, though the dikasteries, as the most democratical feature of democracy itself, have been usually criticized with marked disfavor,—every censure, or sneer, or joke against them, which can be found in ancient authors, comic as well as serious, being accepted as true almost to the letter; while juries are so popular an institution, that their merits have been over-stated, in England at least, and their defects kept out of sight. The theory of the Athenian dikastery, and the theory of jury-trial, as it has prevailed in England since the revolution of 1688, are one and the same: recourse to a certain number of private citizens, taken by chance, or without possibility of knowing beforehand who they will be, sworn to hear fairly and impartially plaintiff and defendant, accuser and accused, and to find a true verdict, according to their consciences, upon a distinct issue before them. But in Athens this theory was worked out to its natural consequences; while English practice, in this respect as in so many others, is at variance with English theory: the jury, though an ancient and a constant portion of the judicial system, has never been more than a portion,—kept in subordination, trammels, and pupilage, by a powerful crown, and by judges presiding over an artificial system of law. In the English state trials, down to a period not long before the revolution of 1688, any jurors who found a verdict contrary to the dictation of the judge were liable to fine; and at an earlier period, if a second jury on being summoned found an opposite verdict, even to the terrible punishment of attaint.[701] And though, for the last century and a half, the verdict of the jury has been free as to matters of fact, new trials having taken the place of the old attaint, yet the ascendency of the presiding judge over their minds, and his influence over the procedure as the authority on matters of law, has always been such as to overrule the natural play of their feelings and judgment as men and citizens,[702] sometimes to the detriment, much oftener to the benefit—always excepting political trials—of substantial justice. But in Athens, the dikasts judged of the law as well as of the fact: the laws were not numerous, and were couched in few, for the most part familiar, words. To determine how the facts stood, and whether, if the facts were undisputed, the law invoked was properly applicable to them, were parts of the integral question submitted to them, and comprehended in their verdict: moreover, each dikastery construed the law for itself, without being bound to follow the decisions of those which had preceded it, except in so far as such analogy might really influence the convictions of the members. They were free, self-judging persons, unassisted by the schooling, but at the same time untrammelled by the awe-striking ascendency, of a professional judge, obeying the spontaneous inspirations of their own consciences, and recognizing no authority except the laws of the city, with which they were familiar.

Trial by jury, as practised in England since 1688, has been politically most valuable, as a security against the encroachments of an anti-popular executive: partly for this reason, partly for others, not necessary to state here, it has had greater credit as an instrument of judicature generally, and has been supposed to produce much more of what is good in English administration of justice, than really belongs to it. Amidst the unqualified encomiums so frequently bestowed upon the honesty, the unprejudiced rectitude of appreciation, the practical instinct for detecting falsehood and resisting sophistry, in twelve citizens taken by hazard and put into a jury-box,—comparatively little account is taken either of the aids, or of the restrictions, or of the corrections in the shape of new trials, under which they act, or of the artificial forensic medium into which they are plunged for the time of their service: so that the theory of the case presumes them to be more of spontaneous agents, and more analogous to the Athenian dikasts than the practice confirms. Accordingly, when we read these encomiums in modern authors, we shall find that both the direct benefits ascribed to jury-trial in insuring pure and even-handed justice, and still more its indirect benefits in improving and educating the citizens generally, might have been set forth yet more emphatically in a laudatory harangue of Periklês about the Athenian dikasteries. If it be true that an Englishman or an American counts more certainly on an impartial and uncorrupt verdict from a jury of his country, than from a permanent professional judge, much more would this be the feeling of an ordinary Athenian, when he compared the dikasteries with the archon. The juror hears and judges under full persuasion that he himself, individually, stands in need of the same protection or redress invoked by others: so also did the dikast. As to the effects of jury-trial, in diffusing respect to the laws and constitution, in giving to every citizen a personal interest in enforcing the former and maintaining the latter, in imparting a sentiment of dignity to small and poor men, through the discharge of a function exalted as well as useful, in calling forth the patriotic sympathies, and exercising the mental capacities of every individual; all these effects were produced in a still higher degree by the dikasteries at Athens; from their greater frequency, numbers, and spontaneity of mental action, without any professional judge, upon whom they could throw the responsibility of deciding for them.[703]

On the other hand, the imperfections inherent in jury-trial were likewise disclosed in an exaggerated form under the Athenian system. Both juror and dikast represent the average man of the time and of the neighborhood, exempt, indeed, from pecuniary corruption or personal fear, deciding according to what he thinks justice, or to some genuine feeling of equity, mercy, religion, or patriotism, which in reference to the case before him he thinks as good as justice,—but not exempt from sympathies, antipathies, and prejudices, all of which act the more powerfully because there is often no consciousness of their presence, and because they even appear essential to his idea of plain and straight-forward good sense. According as a jury are composed of Catholics or Protestants, Irishmen or Englishmen, tradesmen, farmers, or inhabitants of a frontier on which smuggling prevails, there is apt to prevail among them a

corresponding bias: at the time of any great national delusion, such as the Popish Plot,—or of any powerful local excitement, such as that of the Church and King mobs, at Birmingham, in 1791, against Dr. Priestley and the Dissenters,—juries are found to perpetrate what a calmer age recognizes to have been gross injustice. A jury who disapprove of the infliction of capital punishment for a particular crime, will acquit prisoners in spite of the clearest evidence of guilt. It is probable that a delinquent, indicted for any state offence before the dikastery, at Athens,—having only a private accuser to contend against, with equal power of speaking in his own defence, of summoning witnesses, and of procuring friends to speak for him,—would have better chance of a fair trial than he would now have anywhere, except in England and the United States of America; and better than he would have had in England down to the seventeenth century.[704] Juries bring the common feeling as well as the common reason of the public,—or often, indeed, only the separate feeling of particular fractions of the public,—to dictate the application of the law to particular cases: they are a protection against anything worse,—especially against such corruption and servility as are liable to taint permanent official persons, but they cannot possibly reach anything better. Now the dikast trial at Athens effected the same object, and had in it only the same ingredients of error and misdecision, as the English jury: but it had them in stronger dose,[705] without the counteracting authority of a judge, and without the benefit of a procedure such as has now been obtained in England. The feelings of the dikasts counted for more, and their reason for less: not merely because of their greater numbers, which naturally heightened the pitch of feeling in each individual, but also because the addresses of orators or parties formed the prominent part of the procedure, and the depositions of witnesses only a very subordinate part; the dikast,[706] therefore, heard little of the naked facts, the appropriate subjects for his reason,—but he was abundantly supplied with the plausible falsehoods, calumnies, irrelevant statements and suggestions, etc., of the parties, and that too in a manner skilfully adapted to his temper. To keep the facts of the case before the jury, apart from the falsehood and coloring of parties, is the most useful function of the modern judge, whose influence is also considerable as a restraint upon the pleader. The helps to the reason of the dikast were thus materially diminished, while the action upon his feelings, of anger as well as of compassion, was sharpened, as compared with the modern juror.[707] We see, in the remaining productions of the Attic orators, how much there is of plausible deception, departure from the true issue, and appeals to sympathies, antipathies, and prejudices of every kind; addressed to the dikasteries.[708] Of course, such artifices were resorted to by opposite speakers in each particular trial, nor have we any means of knowing to what extent they actually perverted the judgment of the hearers.[709] Probably, the frequent habit of sitting in dikastery, gave them a penetration in detecting sophistry not often possessed by non-professional citizens: nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that, in a considerable proportion of cases, success depended less upon the intrinsic merits of a case, than upon apparent airs of innocence and truth-telling, dexterity of

statement, and good general character, in the parties, their witnesses, and the friends who addressed the court on their behalf. The accusatory speeches in Attic oratory, wherein punishment is invoked upon an alleged delinquent, are expressed with a bitterness which is now banished from English criminal judicature, though it was common in the state trials of two centuries ago. Against them may be set the impassioned and emphatic appeals made by defendants and their friends to the commiseration of the dikasts; appeals the more often successful, because they came last, immediately before decision was pronounced. This is true of Rome as well as of Athens. [710]

As an organ for judicial purposes, the Athenian dikasteries were thus a simple and plenary manifestation of jury-trial, with its inherent excellences and defects both brought out in exaggerated relief: they insured a decision at once uncorrupt, public-minded, and imposing,—together with the best security which the case admitted against illegal violences on the part of the rich and great.[711] Their extreme publicity, as well as their simple and oral procedure, divested of that verbal and ceremonial technicality which marked the law of Rome, even at its outset, was no small benefit: and as the verdicts of the dikasts, even when wrong, depended upon causes of misjudgment common to them with the general body of the citizens, so they never appeared to pronounce unjustly, nor lost the confidence of their fellow-citizens generally. But whatever may have been their defects as judicial instruments, as a stimulus both to thought and speech, their efficacy was unparalleled, in the circumstances of Athenian society. Doubtless, they would not have produced the same effect if established at Thebes or Argos: the susceptibilities of the Athenian mind, as well as the previous practice and expansive tendencies of democratical citizenship, were also essential conditions,—and that genuine taste of sitting in judgment, and hearing both sides fairly, which, however Aristophanês may caricature and deride it, was alike honorable and useful to the people. The first establishment of the dikasteries is nearly coincident with the great improvement of Attic tragedy in passing from Æschylus to Sophoklês. The same development of the national genius, now preparing splendid manifestations both in tragic and comic poetry, was called with redoubled force into the path of oratory, by the new judicial system. A certain power of speech now became necessary, not merely for those who intended to take a prominent part in politics, but also for private citizens to vindicate their rights, or repel accusations in a court of justice. It was an accomplishment of the greatest practical utility, even apart from ambitious purposes; hardly less so than the use of arms or the practice of the gymnasium. Accordingly, the teachers of grammar and rhetoric, and the composers of written speeches to be delivered by others, now began to multiply and to acquire an unprecedented importance,—as well at Athens as under the contemporary democracy of Syracuse,[712] in which, also, some form of popular judicature was established. Style and speech began to be reduced to a system, and so communicated: not always happily, for several of the early rhetors[713] had adopted an artificial, ornate, and conceited manner, from which Attic good taste afterwards

liberated itself,—but the very character of a teacher of rhetoric as an art,—a man giving precepts and putting himself forward in show-lectures as a model for others, is a feature first belonging to the Periklean age, and indicates a new demand in the minds of the citizens. We begin to hear, in the generation now growing up, of the rhetor and the sophist, as persons of influence and celebrity. These two names denoted persons of similar moral and intellectual endowments, or often indeed the same person, considered in different points of view;[714] either as professing to improve the moral character, or as communicating power and facility of expression, or as suggesting premises for persuasion, illustrations on the common-places of morals and politics, argumentative abundance on matters of ordinary experience, dialectical subtlety in confuting an opponent, etc.[715] Antipho of the deme Rhamnus in Attica, Thrasymachus of Chalkêdon, Tisias of Syracuse, Gorgias of Leontini, Protagoras of Abdêra, Prodikus of Keôs, Theodôrus of Byzantium, Hippias of Elis, Zeno of Elea, were among the first who distinguished themselves in these departments of teaching. Antipho was the author of the earliest composed speech really spoken in a dikastery, and preserved down to the later critics.[716] These men were mostly not citizens of Athens, though many of them belonged to towns comprehended in the Athenian empire, at a time when important judicial causes belonging to these towns were often carried up to be tried at Athens,—while all of them looked to that city as a central point of action and distinction. The term *sophist*, which Herodotus[717] applies with sincere respect to men of distinguished wisdom, such as Solon, Anacharsis, Pythagoras, etc., now came to be applied to these teachers of virtue, rhetoric, conversation, and disputation; many of whom professed acquaintance with the whole circle of human science, physical as well as moral (then narrow enough), so far as was necessary to talk about any portion of it plausibly and effectively, and to answer any question which might be proposed to them. Though these men passed from one Grecian town to another, partly in the capacity of envoys from their fellow-citizens, partly as exhibiting their talents to numerous hearers, with much renown and large gain,[718]—they appeared to have been viewed with jealousy and dislike by a large portion of the public:[719] for at a time when every citizen pleaded his own cause before the dikastery, they imparted, to those who were rich enough to purchase it, a peculiar skill in the common weapons, which made them seem like fencing-masters, or professional swordsmen, amidst a society of untrained duellists.[720] Moreover, Sokratês,—himself a product of the same age, and a disputant on the same subjects,—and bearing the same name of a *sophist*,[721] but despising political and judicial practice, and looking to the production of intellectual stimulus and moral impressions upon his hearers,—Sokratês carried on throughout his life a constant polemical warfare against the sophists and rhetors, in that negative vein in which he was unrivalled. And as the works of these latter have not remained, it is chiefly from the observations of their opponents that we know them; so that they are in a situation such as that in which Sokratês himself would have been, if we had been compelled to judge of him only from the Clouds of Aristophanês, or from those unfavorable im-

pressions respecting his character, which we know, even from the Apologies of Plato and Xenophon, to have been generally prevalent at Athens. This is not the opportunity, however, for trying to distinguish the good from the evil in the working of the sophists and rhetors: at present, it is enough that they were the natural product of the age,—supplying those wants, and answering to that stimulus, which arose partly from the deliberations of the ekklesia, but still more from the contentions before the dikastery,—in which latter a far greater number of citizens took active part, with or without their own consent. The public and frequent dikasteries constituted by Periklês, opened to the Athenian mind precisely that career of improvement which was best suited to its natural aptitude: they were essential to the development of that demand out of which grew not only Grecian oratory, but also, as secondary products, the speculative moral and political philosophy, and the didactic analysis of rhetoric and grammar, which long survived after Grecian creative genius had passed away. [722] And it was one of the first measures of the oligarchy of Thirty, to forbid, by an express law, any teaching of the art of speaking. Aristophanês derides the Athenians for their love of talk and controversy, as if it had enfeebled their military energy: but in his time, most undoubtedly, that reproach was not true; nor did it become true, even in part, until the crushing misfortunes which marked the close of the Peloponnesian war. During the course of that war, restless and energetic action was the characteristic of Athens, even in a greater degree than oratory or political discussion, though before the time of Demosthenês a material alteration had taken place.

The establishment of these paid dikasteries at Athens was thus one of the most important and prolific events in all Grecian history. The pay helped to furnish a maintenance for old citizens, past the age of military service. Elderly men were the best persons for such a service, and were preferred for judicial purposes both at Sparta, and, as it seems, in heroic Greece: nevertheless, we need not suppose that *all* the dikasts were either old or poor, though a considerable proportion of them were so, and though Aristophanês selects these qualities as among the most suitable subjects for his ridicule. Periklês has been often censured for this institution, as if he had been the first to insure pay to dikasts who before served for nothing, and had thus introduced poor citizens into courts previously composed of citizens above poverty. But, in the first place, this supposition is not correct in point of fact, inasmuch as there were no such constant dikasteries previously acting without pay; next, if it had been true, the habitual exclusion of the poor citizens would have nullified the popular working of these bodies, and would have prevented them from answering any longer to the reigning sentiment at Athens. Nor could it be deemed unreasonable to assign a regular pay to those who thus rendered regular service: it was, indeed, an essential item in the whole scheme[723] and purpose; so that the suppression of the pay of itself seems to have suspended the dikasteries, while the oligarchy of Four Hundred was established,—and it can only be discussed in that light. As the fact stands, we may suppose that the six thousand heliasts who filled the dikasteries were composed of

the middling and poorer citizens indiscriminately: though there was nothing to exclude the richer, if they chose to serve.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Herodot. vii, 3, 4.

[2] Herodot. vii, 1-4. He mentions—simply as a report, and seemingly without believing it himself—that Demaratus the exiled king of Sparta was at Susa at the moment when Darius was about to choose a successor among his sons (this cannot consist with Ktesias, Persic. c. 23): and that he suggested to Xerxes a convincing argument by which to determine the mind of his father, urging the analogy of the law of regal succession at Sparta, whereby the son of a king, born after his father became king, was preferred to an elder son born before that event. The existence of such a custom at Sparta may well be doubted.

Some other anecdotes, not less difficult of belief than this, and alike calculated to bestow a factitious importance on Demaratus, will be noticed in the subsequent pages. The latter received from the Persian king the grant of Pergamus and Teuthrania, with their land-revenues, which his descendants long afterwards continued to occupy (Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 1-6): and perhaps these descendants may have been among the persons from whom Herodotus derived his information respecting the expedition of Xerxes. See vii, 239.

Plutarch (De Fraterno Amore, p. 488) gives an account in many respects different concerning the circumstances which determined the succession of Xerxes to the throne, in preference to his elder brother.

[3] Herod. vii, 187. The like personal beauty is ascribed to Darius Codomannus, the last of the Persian kings (Plutarch, Alexand. c. 21).

[4] Herodot. vii, 6; viii, 20, 96, 77. Ὀνομάκριτος—κατέλεγε τῶν χρησμῶν· εἰ μέν τι ἐνέοι σφάλμα φέρον τῷ Πέρσῃ, τῶν μὲν ἔλεγε οὐδέν· ὁ δὲ τὰ εὐτυχέστατα ἐκλεγόμενος, ἔλεγε τόν τε Ἑλλήσποντον ὡς ζευχθῆναι χρέον εἴη ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς Πέρσεω, τήν τε ἔλασιν ἐξηγεόμενος, etc.

An intimation somewhat curious respecting this collection of prophecies; it was of an extremely varied character, and contained promises or threats to meet any emergency which might arise.

[5] Æschylus, Pers. 761.

[6] Herodot. vii, 5. ὡς ἡ Εὐρώπη περικαλλὴς χώρη, καὶ δένδρεα παντοῖα φέρει τὰ ἥμερα, βασιλέϊ τε μούνῳ θνητῶν ἀξίη ἐκτῆσθαι—χώρην παμφορωτέρην (vii, 8).

[7] Herodot. v, 49.

[8] Homer, Iliad, i, 3. Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή. Herodotus is characterized as Ὁμήρου ζηλωτὴς—Ὁμηρικώτατος (Dionys. Halic. ad Cn. Pompeium, p. 772, Reiske; Longinus De Sublim. p. 86, ed. Pearce).

[9] While Plutarch—if indeed the treatise De Herodoti Malignitate be the work of Plutarch—treats Herodotus as uncandid, malicious, corrupt, the calumniator of great men and glorious deeds,—Dionysius of Halikarnassus, on the contrary, with more reason, treats him as a pattern of excellent dispositions in an historian, contrasting him in this respect with Thucydides, to whom he imputes an unfriendly spirit in criticizing Athens, arising from his long banishment: Ἡ μὲν Ἡροδότου διάθεσις ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιεικὴς, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς συνηδομένη, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς συναλγοῦσα· ἡ δὲ Θουκυδίδου διάθεσις αὐθέκαστός τις καὶ πικρὰ, καὶ τῇ πατρίδι τῆς φυγῆς μνησικακοῦσα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἁμαρτήματα ἐπεξέρχεται καὶ μάλα ἀκριβῶς, τῶν δὲ κατὰ νοῦν κεχωρηκότων καθάπαξ οὐ μέμνηται ἢ ὥσπερ ἠναγκασμένος. (Dionys. Hal. ad. Cn. Pompeium de Præcip. Historicis Judic. p. 774, Reisk.)

Precisely the same fault which Dionysius here imputes to Thucydides (though in other places he acquits him, ἀπὸ παντὸς φθόνου καὶ πάσης κολακείας, p. 824), Plutarch and Dio cast far more harshly upon Herodotus. In neither case is the reproach deserved.

Both the moralists and the rhetoricians of ancient times were very apt to treat history, not as a series of true matters of fact, exemplifying the laws of human nature and society, and enlarging our knowledge of them for purposes of future inference,—but as if it were a branch of fiction, so to be handled as to please our taste or improve our morality. Dionysius, blaming Thucydides for the choice of his subject, goes so far as to say that the Peloponnesian war, a period of ruinous discord in Greece, ought to have been left in oblivion and never to have

passed into history (σιωπῇ καὶ λήθῃ παραδοθεὶς, ὑπο τῶν ἐπιγιγνομένων ἠγνοῆσθαι, ibid. p. 768),—and that especially Thucydides ought never to have thrown the blame of it upon his own city, since there were many other causes to which it might have been imputed (ἑτέραις ἔχοντα πολλαῖς ἀφορμαῖς περιάψαι τὰς αἰτίας, p. 770).

[10] Herodot. viii, 99. Μαρδόνιον ἐν αἰτίῃ τιθέντες: compare c. 100.

[11] Herodot. vii, 9.

[12] Herodot. vii, 10.

[13] Herodot. vii, 15. Εἰ ὦν θεός ἐστι ὁ ἐπιπέμπων καὶ οἱ πάντως ἐν ἡδονῇ ἐστι γενέσθαι στρατηλασίην ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἐπιπτήσεται καὶ σοὶ τώυτὸ τοῦτο ὄνειρον, ὁμοίως καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐντελλόμενον. Εὑρίσκω δὲ ὧδε ἂν γινόμενα ταῦτα, εἰ λάβοις τὴν ἐμὴν σκευὴν πᾶσαν, καὶ ἐνδὺς, μετὰ τοῦτο ἵζοιο ἐς τὸν ἐμὸν θρόνον, καὶ ἔπειτα ἐν κοίτῃ τῇ ἐμῇ κατυπνώσειας. Compare vii, 8. θεὸς τε οὕτω ἄγει, etc.

[14] See Brissonius, De Regno Persarum, lib. i, p. 27.

[15] Herodot. vii, 16. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐς τοσοῦτό γε εὐηθείης ἀνήκει τοῦτο, ὅτι δή κοτέ ἐστι τὸ ἐπιφαινόμενόν τοι ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ, ὥστε δόξει ἐμὲ ὁρῶν σὲ ὁρᾷν, τῇ σῇ ἐσθῆτι τεκμαιρόμενον. … εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐπιφοιτήσειέ γε συνεχέως, φαίην ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς θεῖον εἶναι.

[16] Herodot. vii, 18. Ἐπεὶ δὲ δαιμονίη τις γίγνεται ὁρμὴ, καὶ Ἕλληνας, ὡς ἔοικε, φθορὴ τις καταλαμβάνει θεήλατος, ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς τράπομαι, καὶ τὴν γνώμην μετατίθεμαι. … Ποίεε δὲ οὕτω ὅκως, τοῦ θεοῦ παραδίδοντος, τῶν σῶν ἐνδεήσεται μηδέν.

The expression τοῦ θεοῦ παραδίδοντος in this place denotes what is expressed by τὸ χρέον γίγνεσθαι, c. 17. The dream threatens Artabanus and Xerxes for trying to turn aside the current of destiny,—or in other words, to contravene the predetermined will of the gods.

[17] Herodot. vii, 12. Καὶ δή κου ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ εἶδε ὄψιν τοιήνδε, ὡς λέγεται ὑπὸ Περσέων.

Herodotus seems to use ὄνειρον in the neuter gender, not ὄνειρος in the masculine: for the alteration of Bähr (ad vii, 16) of ἐῶντα in place of ἐῶντος, is not at all called for. The masculine gender ὄνειρος is commonly used in Homer; but there are cases of the neuter ὄνειρον.

Respecting the influence of dreams in determining the enterprises of the early Turkish Sultans, see Von Hammer, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, book ii, vol. i, p. 49.

[18] Compare the dream of Darius Codomannus. Plutarch, Alexander, c. 18. Concerning the punishment inflicted by Astyagês on the Magians for misinterpreting his dreams, see Herodot. i, 128.

Philochorus, skilled in divination, affirmed that Nikias put a totally wrong interpretation upon that fatal eclipse of the moon which induced him to delay his retreat, and proved his ruin (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23).

[19] Æschylus, Pers. 96, 104, 181, 220, 368, 745, 825: compare Sophocl. Ajax, 129, 744, 775, and the end of the Œdipus Tyrannus; Euripid. Hecub. 58; Pindar, Olymp. viii. 86; Isthm. vi, 39; Pausanias, ii, 33, 3. Compare the sense of the word δεισιδαίμων in Xenophon, Agesilaus, c. 11, sect. 8,—"the man who in the midst of success fears the envious gods,"—opposed to the person who confides in its continuance; and Klausen, Theologumena Æschyli, p. 18.

[20] The manner in which Herodotus groups together the facts of his history, in obedience to certain religious and moral sentiments in his own mind, is well set forth in Hoffmeister, Sittlich—religiöse Lebensansicht des Herodotos, Essen, 1832, especially sects. 21, 22, pp. 112, *seqq.* Hoffmeister traces the veins of sentiment running through, and often overlaying, or transforming, the matters of fact through a considerable portion of the nine books. He does not, perhaps, sufficiently advert to the circumstance, that the informants from whom Herodotus collected his facts were for the most part imbued with sentiments similar to himself; so that the religious and moral vein pervaded more or less his original materials, and did not need to be added by himself. There can be little doubt that the priests, the ministers of temples and oracles, the exegetæ or interpreting guides around these holy places were among his chief sources for instructing himself: a stranger, visiting so many different cities must have been constantly in a situation to have no other person whom he could consult. The temples were interesting both in themselves and in the trophies and offerings which they exhibited, while the persons belonging to them were, as a general rule, accessible and communicative to strangers, as we may see both from Pausanias and Plutarch,—both of whom, however, had books before them also to consult, which Herodotus hardly had at all. It was not only the priests and ministers of temples in Egypt, of Hêraklês at Tyre,

and of Bêlus at Babylon, that Herodotus questioned (i, 181; ii, 3, 44, 143), but also those of Delphi (Δελφῶν οἶδα ἐγὼ οὕτως ἀκούσας γενέσθαι, i, 20: compare i, 91, 92, 51); Dôdôna (ii, 52); of the Ismenian Apollo at Thebes (v, 59); of Athênê Alea at Tegea (i, 66); of Dêmêtêr at Paros (vi, 134—if not the priests, at least persons full of temple inspirations); of Halus in Achaia Phthiôtis (vii, 197); of the Kabeiri in Thrace (ii, 51); of persons connected with the Herôon of Protesilaus in the Chersonese (ix, 116, 120). The facts which these persons communicated to him were always presented along with associations referring to their own functions or religious sentiments, nor did Herodotus introduce anything new when he incorporated them as such in his history. The treatise of Plutarch—"Cur Pythia nunc non reddat Oracula Carmine"—affords an instructive description of the ample and multifarious narratives given by the expositors at Delphi, respecting the eminent persons and events of Grecian history, so well fitted to satisfy the visitors who came full of curiosity—φιλοθεάμονες, φιλόλογοι, and φιλομαθεῖς (Plutarch, ib. p. 394)—such as Herodotus was in a high degree. Compare pp. 396, 397, 400, 407, of the same treatise: also Plutarch, De Defectu Oraculorum, p. 417—οἱ Δελφῶν θεολόγοι, etc. Plutarch remarks that in his time political life was extinguished in Greece, and that the questions put to the Pythian priestess related altogether to private and individual affairs; whereas, in earlier times, almost all political events came somehow or other under her cognizance, either by questions to be answered, or by commemorative public offerings (p. 407). In the time of Herodotus, the great temples, especially those of Delphi and Olympia, were interwoven with the whole web of Grecian political history. See the Dissertation of Preller, annexed to his edition of Polemonis Fragmenta, c. 3, pp. 157-162; De Historiâ atque Arte Periegetarum; also K. F. Hermann, Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen, part 1, ch. 12, p. 52.

The religious interpretation of historical phenomena is not peculiar to Herodotus, but belongs to him in common with his informants and his age generally, as indeed Hoffmeister remarks (pp. 31-136): though it is remarkable to notice the frankness with which he (as well as the contemporary poets: see the references in Monk ad Euripid. Alcestis, 1154) predicates envy and jealousy of the gods, in cases where the conduct, which he supposes them to pursue, is really such as would deserve that name in a man,—and such as he himself ascribes to the despot (iii, 80): he does not think himself obliged to *call* the gods just and merciful while he is attributing to them acts of envy and jealousy in their dealing with mankind. But the religious interpretation does not reign alone throughout the narrative of Herodotus: it is found side by side with careful sifting of fact and specification of positive, definite, appreciable causes: and this latter vein is what really distinguishes the historian from his age,—forming the preparation for Thucydides, in whom it appears predominant and almost exclusive. See this point illustrated in Creuzer, Historische Kunst der Griechen, Abschnitt iii, pp. 150-159.

Jäger (Disputationes Herodoteæ, p. 16. Göttingen, 1828) professes to detect evidences of old age (senile ingenium) in the moralizing color which overspreads the history of Herodotus, but which I believe to have belonged to his middle and mature age not less than to his latter years,—if indeed he lived to be very old, which is noway proved, except upon reasons which I have already disputed in my preceding volume. See Bähr, Commentatio de Vitâ et Scriptis Herodoti, in the fourth volume of his edition, c. 6, p. 388.

[21] Herodot. vii, 19. χῶρον πάντα ἐρευνῶν τῆς ἠπείρου.

[22] Herodot. vii, 106. Κατέστασαν γὰρ ἔτι πρότερον ταύτης τῆς ἐξελάσιος (*i. e.* the invasion by Xerxes) ὕπαρχοι ἐν τῇ Θρηΐκῃ καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου πανταχῇ. vii, 108. ἐδεδούλωτο γὰρ, ὡς καὶ πρότερόν μοι δεδήλωται, ἡ μέχρι Θεσσαλίης πᾶσα, καὶ ἦν ὑπὸ βασιλῆα δασμοφόρος, Μεγαβάζου τε καταστρεψαμένου καὶ ὕστερον Μαρδονίου; also vii, 59, and Xenophon, Memorab. iii, 5, 11. Compare Æschylus Pers. 871-896, and the vision ascribed to Cyrus in reference to his successor Darius, covering with his wings both Europe and Asia (Herodot. i, 209).

[23] Herodot. vii, 26-31.

[24] Herodot. vii. 23-25.

[25] Æschylus, Pers. 731, 754, 873.

[26] Plutarch (De Tranquillitate Animi, p. 470), speaks of them as having had their noses and ears cut off.

[27] Herodot. vii, 34, 35. ἐνετέλλετο δὴ ὧν ῥαπίζοντας, λέγειν βάρβαρά τε καὶ ἀτάσθαλα, Ὦ πικρὸν ὕδωρ, δεσπότης τοι δίκην ἐπιτιθεῖ τήνδε, ὅτι μιν ἠδίκησας, οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐκείνου ἄδικον παθόν. Καὶ βασιλεὺς μὲν Ξέρξης διαβήσεταί σε, ἤν τε σύ γε βούλῃ, ἤν τε καὶ μή· σοὶ δὲ κατὰ δίκην ἄρα οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων θύει, ὡς ἐόντι καὶ δολερῷ καὶ ἀλμυρῷ ποταμῷ.

The assertion—that no one was in the habit of sacrificing to the Hellespont—appears strange, when we look to the subsequent conduct of Xerxes himself (vii, 53): compare vii, 113, and vi, 76. The epithet *salt* employed as a reproach, seems to allude to the undrinkable character of the water.

[28] See Stanley and Blomfield ad Æschyl. Pers. 731, and K. O. Müller (in his Review of Benjamin Constant's work Sur la Religion), Kleine Schriften, vol. ii, p. 59.

[29] See Auguste Comte, Traité de Philosophie Positive, vol. v, leçon 52, pp. 40, 46.

[30] See vol. ii, part 2, c. i, p. 297 of the present work; and compare Wachsmuth, Hellenisch. Alterthümer, 2, i, p. 320, and K. F. Hermann, Griech. Staatsalterthümer, sect. 104.

For the manner in which Cyrus dealt with the river Gyndês, see Herodot. i, 202. The Persian satrap Pharnuchês was thrown from his horse at Sardis, and received an injury of which he afterwards died: he directed his attendants to lead the horse to the place where the accident had happened, to cut off all his legs, and leave him to perish there (Herodot. vii, 88). The kings of Macedonia offered sacrifice even during the time of Herodotus, to the river which had been the means of preserving the life of their ancestor Perdikkas; after he had crossed it, the stream swelled and arrested his pursuers (Herodot. viii, 138): see an analogous story about the inhabitants of Apollonia and the river Aöus, Valerius Maxim. i, 5, 2.

After the death of the great boxer, wrestler, etc., Theagenês of Thasus, a statue was erected to his honor. A personal enemy, perhaps one of the fourteen hundred defeated competitors, came every night to gratify his wrath and revenge by flogging the statue. One night the statue fell down upon this scourger and killed him; upon which his relatives indicted the statue for murder: it was found guilty by the Thasians, and thrown into the sea. The gods, however, were much displeased with the proceeding, and visited the Thasians with continued famine, until at length a fisherman by accident fished up the statue, and it was restored to its place (Pausan. vi, 11. 2). Compare the story of the statue of Hermês in Babrius, Fabul. 119, edition of Mr. Lewis.

[31] Herodot. vii, 35-54: compare viii, 109. Arrian, Exp. Alex. vii, 14. 9.

[32] Herodot. vii, 36. The language in which Herodotus describes the position of these ships which formed the two bridges, seems to me to have been erroneously or imperfectly apprehended by most of the commentators: see the notes of Bähr, Kruse, Wesseling, Rennell, and especially Larcher: Schweighäuser is the most satisfactory—τοῦ μὲν Πόντου ἐπικαρσίας, τοῦ δὲ Ἑλλησπόντου κατὰ ῥόον. The explanation given by Tzetzes of ἐπικαρσίας by the word πλαγίας seems to me hardly exact: it means, not *oblique*, but *at right angles with*. The course of the Bosphorus and Hellespont, flowing out of the Euxine sea, is conceived by the historian as meeting that sea at right angles; and the ships, which were moored near together along the current of the strait, taking the line of each from head to stern, were therefore also at right angles with the Euxine sea. Moreover, Herodotus does not mean to distinguish the two bridges hereby, and to say that the ships of the one bridge were τοῦ Πόντου ἐπικαρσίας, and those of the other bridge τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου κατὰ ῥόον, as Bähr and other commentators suppose: *both* the predicates apply alike to *both* the bridges,—as indeed it stands to reason that the arrangement of ships best for one bridge must also have been best for the other. Respecting the meaning of ἐπικάρσιος in Herodotus, see iv, 101; i, 180. In the Odyssey (ix, 70: compare Eustath. ad loc.) ἐπικάρσιαι does not mean oblique, but headlong before the wind: compare ἐπίκαρ, Iliad, xviii, 392. The circumstance stated by Herodotus—that in the bridge higher up the stream, or nearest to the Euxine, there were in all three hundred and sixty vessels, while in the other bridge there were no more than three hundred and fourteen—has perplexed the commentators, and induced them to resort to inconvenient explanations,—as that of saying, that in the higher bridge the vessels were moored not in a direct line across, but in a line slanting, so that the extreme vessel on the European side was lower down the stream than the extreme vessel on the Asiatic side. This is one of the false explanations given of ἐπικαρσίας (*slanting*, *schräg*): while the idea of Gronovius and Larcher, that the vessels in the higher bridge presented *their broadside* to the current, is still more inadmissible. But the difference in the number of ships employed in the one bridge compared with the other seems to admit of an easier explanation. We need not suppose, nor does Herodotus say, that the two bridges were quite close together: considering the multitude which had to cross them, it would be convenient that they should be placed at a certain distance from each other. If they were a mile or two apart, we may well suppose that the breadth of the strait was not exactly the same in the two places chosen, and that it may have been broader at the point of the upper bridge,—which, moreover, might require to be made more secure, as having to meet the first force of the current. The greater number of vessels in the upper bridge will thus be accounted for in a simple and satisfactory manner.

In some of the words used by Herodotus there appears an obscurity: they run thus,—ἐζεύγνυσαν δὲ ὧδε· Πεντηκοντέρους καὶ τριήρεας συνθέντες, ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν (these words are misprinted in Bähr's edition) πρὸς τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου ἑξήκοντά τε καὶ τριηκοσίας, ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἑτέρην τέσσερες καὶ δέκα καὶ τριηκοσίας (τοῦ μὲν Πόντου, ἐπικαρσίας, τοῦ δὲ Ἑλλησπόντου κατὰ ῥόον), ἵνα ἀνακωχεύῃ τὸν τόνον τῶν ὅπλων· συνθέντες δὲ, ἀγκύρας κατῆκαν περιμήκεας, etc.

There is a difficulty respecting the words ἵνα ἀνακωχεύῃ τὸν τόνον τῶν ὅπλων,—what is the nominative case to this verb? Bähr says in his note, *sc.* ὁ ῥόος, and he construes τῶν ὅπλων to mean the cables whereby the anchors were held fast. But if we read farther on, we shall see that τὰ ὅπλα mean, not the anchor-cables, but the cables which were stretched across from shore to shore to form the bridge; the very same words τῶν ὅπλων τοῦ τόνου, applied to these latter cables, occur a few lines afterwards. I think that the nominative case belonging to ἀνακωχεύῃ is ἡ γεφύρα (not ὁ ῥόος), and that the words from τοῦ μὲν Πόντου down to ῥόον are to be read parenthetically, as I have printed them above: the express object for which the ships were moored was, "that the bridge might hold up, or sustain, the tension of its cables stretched across from shore to shore." I admit that we should naturally expect ἀνακωχεύωσι and not ἀνακωχεύῃ, since the proposition would be true of *both* bridges; but though this makes an awkward construction, it is not inadmissible, since each bridge had been previously described in the singular number.

Bredow and others accuse Herodotus of ignorance and incorrectness in this description of the bridges, but there seems nothing to bear out this charge.

Herodotus (iv, 85), Strabo (xiii, p. 591), and Pliny (H. N. iv, 12; vi, 1) give seven stadia as the breadth of the Hellespont in its narrowest part. Dr. Pococke also assigns the same breadth: Tournefort allows but a mile (vol. ii, lett. 4). Some modern French measurements give the distance as something considerably greater,—eleven hundred and thirty or eleven hundred and fifty toises (see Miot's note on his translation of Herodotus). The Duke of Ragusa states it at seven hundred toises (Voyage en Turquie, vol. ii, p. 164). If we suppose the breadth to be one mile, or five thousand two hundred and eighty feet, three hundred and sixty vessels at an average breadth of fourteen and two thirds feet would exactly fill the space. Rennell says, "Eleven feet is the breadth of a barge: vessels of the size of the smallest coasting-craft were adequate to the purpose of the bridge." (On the Geography of Herodotus, p. 127.)

The recent measurements or estimates stated by Miot go much beyond Herodotus: that of the Duke of Ragusa nearly coincides with him. But we need not suppose that the vessels filled up entirely the whole breadth, without leaving any gaps between: we only know, that there were no gaps left large enough for a vessel in voyage to sail through, except in three specified places.

[33] For the long celebrity of these cables, see the epigram of Archimêlus, composed two centuries and a half afterwards, in the time of Hiero the Second, of Syracuse, ap. Athenæum, v, 209.

Herodotus states that in thickness and compact make (παχυτὴς καὶ καλλονὴ) the cables of flax were equal to those of papyrus; but that in weight the former were superior; for each cubit in length of the flaxen cable weighed a talent: we can hardly reason upon this, because we do not know whether he means an Attic, an Euboic, or an Æginæan talent: nor, if he means an Attic talent, whether it be an Attic talent of commerce, or of the monetary standard.

The cables contained in the Athenian dockyard are distinguished as σχοίνια ὀκτωδάκτυλα, ἑξδάκτυλα,—in which expressions, however, M. Boeckh cannot certainly determine whether circumference or diameter be meant: he thinks probably the former. See his learned book, Das Seewesen der Athener, ch. x, p. 165.

[34] For a specimen of the destructive storms near the promontory of Athos, see Ephorus, Fragment. 121, ed. Didot; Diodor. xiii, 41.

[35] Herodot. vii, 22, 23, 116; Diodor. xi. 2.

[36] Herodot. vii, 24: ὡς μὲν ἐμὲ συμβαλλεόμενον εὑρίσκειν, μεγαλοφροσύνης εἵνεκα αὐτὸ Ξέρξης ὀρύσσειν ἐκέλευε, ἐθέλων τε δύναμιν ἀποδείκνυσθαι, καὶ μνημόσυνα λιπέσθαι· παρεὸν γὰρ, μηδένα πόνον λαβόντας, τὸν ἰσθμὸν τὰς νέας διειρύσαι, ὀρύσσειν ἐκέλευε διώρυχα τῇ θαλάσσῃ, εὖρος ὡς δύο τριήρεας πλέειν ὁμοῦ ἐλαστρευμένας.

According to the manner in which Herodotus represents this excavation to have been performed, the earth dug out was handed up from man to man from the bottom of the canal to the top—the whole performed by hand, without any aid of cranes or barrows.

The pretended work of turning the course of the river Halys, which Grecian report ascribed to Crœsus on the advice of Thales, was a far greater work than the cutting at Athos (Herodot. i, 75).

As this ship-canal across the isthmus of Athos has been treated often as a fable both by ancients (Juvenal, Sat. x) and by moderns (Cousinéry, Voyage en Macédoine), I transcribe the observations of Colonel Leake. That excellent observer points out evident traces of its past existence: but in my judgment, even if no such traces now remained, the testimony of Herodotus and Thucydides (iv, 109) would alone be sufficient to prove that it *had* existed really. The observations of Colonel Leake illustrate at the same time the motives in which the canal originated: "The canal (he says) seems to have been not more than sixty feet wide. As history does not mention that it was ever kept in repair after the time of Xerxes, the waters from the heights around have naturally filled it in part with soil, in the course of ages. It might, however, without much labor, be renewed: and there can be no doubt that it would be useful to the navigation of the Ægean: for such is the fear entertained by the Greek boatmen, of the strength and uncertain direction of the currents around Mount Athos, and of the gales and high seas to which the vicinity of the mountain is subject during half the year, and which are rendered more formidable by the deficiency of harbors in the gulf of Orfaná, that I could not, as long as I was on the peninsula, and though offering a high price, prevail upon any boat to carry me from the eastern side of the peninsula to the western. Xerxes, therefore, was perfectly justified in cutting this canal, as well from the security which it afforded to his fleet, as from the facility of the work and the advantages of the ground, which seems made expressly to tempt such an undertaking. The experience of the losses which the former expedition under Mardonius had suffered suggested the idea. The circumnavigation of the capes Ampelus and Canastræum was much less dangerous, as the gulfs afford some good harbors, and it was the object of Xerxes to collect forces from the Greek cities in those gulfs as he passed. If there be any difficulty arising from the narrative of Herodotus, it is in comprehending how the operation should have required so long a time as three years, when the king of Persia had such multitudes at his disposal, and among them Egyptians and Babylonians, accustomed to the making of canals." (Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii, ch. 24, p. 145.)

These remarks upon the enterprise are more judicious than those of Major Rennell (Geogr. of Herodot. p. 116). I may remark that Herodotus does not affirm that the actual cutting of the canal occupied three years,—he assigns that time to the cutting with all its preliminary arrangements included,—προετοιμάζετο ἐκ τριῶν ἐτέων κου μάλιστα τὰ ἐς τὸν Ἄθων (vii, 22).

[37] Herodot. vii, 22: ὥρυσσον ὑπὸ μαστίγων παντοδαποὶ τῆς στρατιῆς· διάδοχοι δ' ἐφοίτων.—vii, 56: Ξέρξης δὲ, ἐπεί τε διέβη ἐς τὴν Εὐρώπην, ἐθηεῖτο τὸν στρατὸν ὑπὸ μαστίγων διαβαίνοντα:—compare vii, 103, and Xenophon, Anabasis, iii, 4-25.

The essential necessity, and plentiful use, of the whip, towards subject-tributaries, as conceived by the ancient Persians, finds its parallel in the modern Turks. See the Mémoires du Baron de Tott, vol. i, p. 256, *seqq.*, and his dialogue on this subject with his Turkish conductor Ali-Aga.

[38] Herodot. vii, 57. Τέρας σφι ἐφάνη μέγα, τὸ Ξέρξης ἐν οὐδενὶ λόγῳ ἐποιήσατο, καίπερ εὐσύμβλητον ἐόν· ἵππος γὰρ ἔτεκε λαγόν. Εὐσύμβλητον ὦν τῇδε ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἔμελλε μὲν ἐλᾶν στρατιὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ξέρξης ἀγαυρότατα καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατα, ὀπίσω δὲ περὶ ἑωϋτοῦ τρέχων ἥξειν ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν χῶρον.

The prodigy was, that a mare brought forth a hare, which signified that Xerxes would set forth on his expedition to Greece with strength and splendor, but that he would come back in timid and disgraceful flight.

The implicit faith of Herodotus, first in the reality of the fact,—next, in the certainty of his interpretation,—deserves notice, as illustrating his canon of belief, and that of his age. The interpretation is doubtless here the generating cause of the story interpreted: an ingenious man, after the expedition has terminated, imagines an appropriate simile for its proud commencement and inglorious termination (Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus), and the simile is recounted, either by himself or by some hearer who is struck with it, as if it had been a real antecedent fact. The aptness of this supposed antecedent fact to foreshadow the great Persian invasion (τὸ εὐσύμβλητον of Herodotus) serves as presumptive evidence to bear out the witness asserting it; while departure from the established analogies of nature affords no motive for disbelief to a man who admits that the gods occasionally send special signs and warnings.

[39] Compare the description of the processional march of Cyrus, as given in the Cyropædia of Xenophon, viii, 2, 1-20.

[40] Herodot. vii, 41. Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἵππον διελέλειπτο καὶ δύο σταδίους, καὶ ἔπειτα ὁ λοιπὸς ὅμιλος ἤϊε ἀναμίξ.

[41] The incident respecting Pythius is in Herodot. vii, 27, 28, 38, 39. I place no confidence in the estimate of the wealth of Pythius; but in other respects, the story seems well entitled to credit.

[42] Herodot. vii, 42.

[43] Herodot. vii, 43. θεησάμενος δὲ, καὶ πυθόμενος κείνων ἕκαστα, etc.

[44] Herodot. vii, 45, 53, 56. Ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δὴ ἀνδρὶ εἰδόμενος Πέρσῃ, καὶ οὔνομα ἀντὶ Διὸς Ξέρξην θέμενος, ἀνάστατον τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐθέλεις ποιῆσαι, ἄγων πάντας ἀνθρώπους; καὶ γὰρ ἄνευ τουτέων ἐξῆν τοι ποιέειν ταῦτα.

[45] Tacitus, Histor. iii, 24. "Undique clamor, et orientem solem, ita in Syriâ mos est, consalutavêre,"—in his striking description of the night battle near Cremona, between the Roman troops of Vitellius and Vespasian, and the rise of the sun while the combat was yet unfinished: compare also Quintus Curtius (iii, 3, 8, p. 41, ed. Mützel).

[46] Herodot. vii, 54. ταῦτα οὐκ ἔχω ἀτρεκέως διακρῖναι, οὔτε εἰ τῷ Ἡλίῳ ἀνατιθεὶς κατῆκε ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, οὔτε εἰ μετεμέλησέ οἱ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον μαστιγώσαντι, καὶ ἀντὶ τούτων τὴν θάλασσαν ἐδωρέετο.

[47] Herodot. vii, 55, 56. Διέβη δὲ ὁ στρατὸς αὐτοῦ ἐν ἑπτὰ ἡμέρῃσι καὶ ἐν ἑπτὰ εὐφρόνῃσι, ἐλινύσας οὐδένα χρόνον.

[48] Herodot. vii, 58-59; Pliny, H. N. iv, 11. See some valuable remarks on the topography of Doriskus and the neighborhood of the town still called Enos, in Grisebach, Reise durch Rumelien und nach Brussa, ch. vi, vol. i, pp. 157-159 (Göttingen, 1841). He shows reason for believing that the indentation of the coast, marked on the map as the gulf of Ænos, did not exist in ancient times, any more than it exists now.

[49] Herodot. vii, 20-21.

[50] See the enumeration in Herodotus, vii, 61-96. In chapter 76, one name has dropped out of the text (see the note of Wesseling and Schweighäuser), which, in addition to those specified under the head of the land-force, makes up exactly forty-six. It is from this source that Herodotus derives the boast which he puts into the mouth of the Athenians (ix, 27) respecting the battle of Marathon, in which they pretend to have vanquished forty-six nations,—ἐνικήσαμεν ἔθνεα ἓξ καὶ τεσσαράκοντα: though there is no reason for believing that so great a number of contingents were engaged with Datis at Marathon.

Compare the boasts of Antiochus king of Syria. (B. C. 192) about his immense Asiatic host brought across into Greece, as well as the contemptuous comments of the Roman consul Quinctius (Livy, xxxv, 48-49). "Varia enim genera armorum, et multa nomina gentium inauditarum, Dahas, et Medos, et Cadusios, et Elymæos—Syros omnes esse: haud paulo mancipiorum melius, propter servilia ingenia, quam militum genus:" and the sharp remark of the Arcadian envoy Antiochus (Xenophon, Hellen. vii, 1, 33). Quintus Curtius also has some rhetorical turns about the number of nations, whose names even were hardly known, tributary to the Persian empire (iii, 4, 29; iv, 45, 9), "ignota etiam ipsi Dario gentium nomina," etc.

[51] Herodot. vii, 89-93.

[52] Herodot. vii, 61-81.

[53] The army which Darius had conducted against Scythia is said to have been counted by divisions of ten thousand each, but the process is not described in detail (Herodot. iv, 87).

[54] Herodot. vii, 60, 87, 184. This same rude mode of enumeration was employed by Darius Codomannus a century and a half afterwards, before he marched his army to the field of Issus (Quintus Curtius, iii, 2, 3, p. 24, Mutzel).

[55] Herodot. vii, 89-97.

[56] Herodot. vii, 185-186. ἐπάγων πάντα τὸν ἠῷον στρατὸν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίης (vii, 157). "Vires Orientis et ultima secum Bactra ferens," to use the language of Virgil about Antony at Actium.

[57] Even Dahlmann, who has many good remarks in defence of Herodotus, hardly does him justice (Herodot, Aus seinem Buche sein Leben, ch. xxxiv, p. 176).

[58] Only one hundred and twenty ships of war are mentioned by Herodotus (vii, 185) as having joined afterwards from the seaports in Thrace. But four hundred were destroyed, if not more, in the terrible storm on the coast of Magnesia (vii, 190); and the squadron of two hundred sail, detached by the Persians round Eubœa,

were also all lost (viii, 7); besides forty-five taken or destroyed in the various sea-fights near Artemisium (vii, 194; viii, 11). Other losses are also indicated (viii, 14-16).

As the statement of Æschylus for the number of the Persian triremes at Salamis appears well-entitled to credit, we must suppose either that the number of Doriskus was greater than Herodotus has mentioned, or that a number greater than that which he has stated joined afterwards.

See a good note of Amersfoordt, ad Demosthen. Orat. de Symmoriis, p. 88 (Leyden, 1821).

[59] See on this point Volney, Travels in Egypt and Syria, ch. xxiv, vol. ii, pp. 70, 71; ch. xxxii, p. 367; and ch. xxxix, p. 435, (Engl. transl.).

Kinneir, Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire, pp. 22-23. Bernier, who followed the march of Aurungzebe from Delhi, in 1665, says that some estimated the number of persons in the camp at three hundred thousand, others at different totals, but that no one knew, nor had they ever been counted. He says: "You are, no doubt, at a loss to conceive how so vast a number both of men and animals can be maintained in the field. The best solution of the difficulty will be found in the temperance and simple diet of the Indians." (Bernier, Travels in the Mogul Empire, translated by Brock, vol. ii, App. p. 118).

So also Petit de la Croix says, about the enormous host of Genghis-Khan: "Les hommes sont si sobres, qu'ils s'accommodent de toutes sortes d'alimens."

That author seems to estimate the largest army of Genghis at seven hundred thousand men (Histoire de Genghis, liv. ii, ch. vi, p. 193).

[60] Thucydid. v, 68. Xenophon calls the host of Xerxes *innumerable*,—ἀναρίθμητον στρατιάν (Anabas. iii, 2, 13).

It seems not to be considered necessary for a Turkish minister to know the numbers of an assembled Turkish army. In the war between the Russians and Turks in 1770, when the Turkish army was encamped at Babadag near the Balkan, Baron de Tott tells us: "Le Visir me demanda un jour fort sérieusement si l'armée Ottomane étoit nombreuse. C'est à vous que je m'adresserois, lui dis-je, si j'étais curieux de le savoir. Je l'ignore, me repondit-il. Si vous l'ignorez, comment pourrois-je en être instruit? *En lisant la Gazette de Vienna*, me répliqua-t-il. Je restai confondu."

The Duke of Ragusa (in his voyage en Hongrie, Turquie, etc.), after mentioning the prodigiously exaggerated statements current about the numbers slain in the suppressed insurrection of the Janissaries at Constantinople in 1826, observes: "On a dit et répété, que leur nombre s'étoit élévé a huit ou dix mille, et cette opinion s'est accréditée (it was really about five hundred). Mais les Orientaux en général, et les Turcs en particulier, n'ont aucune idée des nombres: ils les emploient sans exactitude, et ils sont par caractère portés à l'exagération. D'un autre coté, le gouvernement a dû favoriser cette opinion populaire, pour frapper l'imagination et inspirer une plus grande terreur." (Vol. ii, p. 37.)

[61] Ktesias, Persica, c. 22, 23; Ælian, V. H. xiii, 3; Diodorus, xi, 2-11.

Respecting the various numerical statements in this case, see the note of Bos ad Cornel. Nepot. Themistocl. c. 2, pp. 75, 76.

The Samian poet Chœrilus, a few years younger than Herodotus, and contemporary with Thucydides, composed an epic poem on the expedition of Xerxes against Greece. Two or three short fragments of it are all that is preserved: he enumerated all the separate nations who furnished contingents to Xerxes, and we find not only the Sakæ, but also the Solymi (apparently the Jews, and so construed by Josephus) among them. See Fragments, iii and iv, in Næke's edition of Chœrilus, pp. 121-134. Josephus cont. Apion. p. 454, ed. Havercamp.

[62] Æschylus, Pers. 14-124, 722-737. Heeren (in his learned work on the commerce of the ancient world, Über den Verkehr der alten Welt, part 1, sect. 1, pp. 162, 558, 3d edition) thinks that Herodotus had seen the actual muster-roll, made by Persian authority, of the army at Doriskus. I cannot think this at all probable: it is much more reasonable to believe that all his information was derived from Greeks who had accompanied the expedition. He must have seen and conversed with many such. The Persian royal scribes, or secretaries, accompanied the king, and took note of any particular fact or person who might happen to strike his attention (Herodot. vii, 100; viii, 90), or to exhibit remarkable courage. They seem to have been specially attached to the person of the king as ministers to his curiosity and amusement, rather than keepers of authentic and continuous records.

Heeren is disposed to accept the numerical totals, given by Herodotus as to the army of Xerxes, much too easily, in my judgment: nor is he correct in supposing that the contingents of the Persian army marched with their wives and families (pp. 557-559).

[63] When Herodotus specifies his informants—it is much to be regretted that he does not specify them oftener—they seem to be frequently Greeks, such as Dikæus the Athenian exile, Thersander of Orchomenus in Bœotia, Archias of Sparta, etc. (iii, 55; viii, 65; ix, 16.) He mentions the Spartan king Demaratus often, and usually under circumstances both of dignity and dramatic interest: it is highly probable that he may have conversed with that prince himself, or with his descendants, who remained settled for a long time in Teuthrania, near the Æolic coast of Asia Minor (Xenoph. Hellenica, iii, 1, 6), and he may thus have heard of representations offered by the exiled Spartan king to Xerxes. Nevertheless, the remarks made by Hoffmeister, on the speeches ascribed to Demaratus by Herodotus, are well deserving of attention (Sittlich-religiöse Lebensansicht des Herodotos, p. 118).

"Herodotus always brings into connection with insolent kings some man or other through whom he gives utterance to his own lessons of wisdom. To Crœsus, at the summit of his glory, comes the wise Solon: Crœsus himself, reformed by his captivity, performs the same part towards Cyrus and Kambyses: Darius, as a prudent and honest man, does not require any such counsellor; but Xerxes in his pride has the sententious Artabanus and the sagacious Demaratus attached to him; while Amasis king of Egypt is employed to transmit judicious counsel to Polykratês, the despot of Samos. Since all these men speak one and the same language, it appears certain that they are introduced by Herodotus merely as spokesmen for his own criticisms on the behavior and character of the various monarchs,—criticisms which are nothing more than general maxims, moral and religious, brought out by Solon, Crœsus, or Artabanus, on occasion of particular events. The speeches interwoven by Herodotus have, in the main, not the same purpose as those of Tacitus,—to make the reader more intimately acquainted with the existing posture of affairs, or with the character of the agents,—but a different purpose quite foreign to history: they embody in the narrative his own personal convictions respecting human life and the divine government."

This last opinion of Hoffmeister is to a great degree true, but is rather too absolutely delivered.

[64] Herodot. vii, 101-104. How inferior is the scene between Darius and Charidemus, in Quintus Curtius! (iii, 2, 9-19, p. 20, ed. Mutzel.)

Herodotus takes up substantially the same vein of sentiment and the same antithesis as that which runs through the Persæ of Æschylus; but he handles it like a social philosopher, with a strong perception of the real causes of Grecian superiority.

It is not improbable that the skeleton of the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus was a reality, heard by Herodotus from Demaratus himself or from his sons; for the extreme specialty with which the Lacedæmonian exile confines his praise to the Spartans and Dorians, not including the other Greeks, hardly represents the feeling of Herodotus himself.

The minuteness of the narrative which Herodotus gives respecting the deposition and family circumstances of Demaratus (vi, 63, *seq.*), and his view of the death of Kleomenês as an atonement to that prince for injury done, may seem derived from family information (vi, 84).

[65] Herodot. vii, 109, 111, 118.

[66] This sum of four hundred talents was equivalent to the entire annual tribute charged in the Persian king's rent-roll, upon the satrapy comprising the western and southern coast of Asia Minor, wherein were included all the Ionic and Æolic Greeks, besides Lykians, Pamphylians, etc. (Herodot. iii, 90.)

[67] Herodot. vii, 118-120. He gives (vii, 187) the computation of the quantity of corn which would have been required for daily consumption, assuming the immense numbers as he conjectures them, and reckoning one chœnix of wheat for each man's daily consumption, equal to one eighth of a medimnus. It is unnecessary to examine a computation founded on such inadmissible data.

[68] Herodot. vii, 108, 109.

[69] Herodot. vii, 114. He pronounces this savage practice to be specially Persian. The old and cruel Persian queen Amestris, wife of Xerxes, sought to prolong her own life by burying alive fourteen victims, children of illustrious men, as offerings to the subterranean god.

[70] Herodot. viii, 116.

[71] Herodot. vii, 122-127.

Respecting the name Pieria, and the geography of these regions, see the previous volume, vol. iv, ch. xxv. p. 14.

[72] Herodot. vii, 116.

[73] Herodot. vi, 74, 75.

[74] Herodot. vi, 84.

[75] Herodot. vi, 61. Κλεομένεα, ἐόντα ἐν τῇ Αἰγίνῃ, καὶ κοινὰ τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀγαθὰ προεργαζόμενον, etc.

[76] Herodot. vi, 85: compare vi, 49-73, and the preceding volume of this history, c. xxxvi, pp. 437-441.

[77] Herodot. vi, 87, 88.

Instead of ἦν γὰρ δὴ τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι πεντήρης ἐπὶ Σουνίῳ (vi, 87), I follow the reading proposed by Schömann and sanctioned by Boëckh—πεντετηρίς. It is hardly conceivable that the Athenians at that time should have had any ships with five banks of oars (πεντήρης): moreover, apart from this objection, the word πεντήρης makes considerable embarrassment in the sentence; see Boëckh, Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen, chap. vii, pp. 75, 76.

The elder Dionysius of Syracuse is said to have been the first Greek who constructed πεντήρεις or quinquereme ships (Diodor. xiv, 40, 41).

There were many distinct pentaëterides, or solemnities celebrated every fifth year, included among the religious customs of Athens: see Aristoteles, Πολιτ. Fragm. xxvii, ed. Neumann; Pollux, viii, 107.

[78] See Thucyd. i, 8.

The acropolis at Athens, having been the primitive city inhabited, bore the name of *The City* even in the time of Thucydides (ii, 15), at a time when Athens and Peiræus covered so large a region around and near it.

[79] Herodot. vi, 91. χεῖρες δὲ κεῖναι ἐμπεφυκυῖαι ἦσαν τοῖσι ἐπισπαστῆρσι. The word κεῖναι for ἐκεῖναι, "those hands," appears so little suitable in this phrase, that I rather imagine the real reading to have been κειναὶ (the Ionic dialect for κεναὶ), "the hands with nothing attached to them:" compare a phrase not very unlike, Homer, Iliad, iii, 376, κεινὴ δὲ τρυφάλεια ἅμ' ἕσπετο, etc.

Compare the narrative of the arrest of the Spartan king Pausanias, and of the manner in which he was treated when in sanctuary at the temple of Athênê Chalkiœkos (Thucyd. i, 134).

[80] Herodot. vi, 91. Ἀπὸ τούτου δὲ καὶ ἄγος σφι ἐγένετο, τὸ ἐκθύσασθαι οὐκ οἷοί τε ἐγένοντο ἐπιμηχανώμενοι, ἀλλ' ἔφθησαν ἐκπεσόντες πρότερον ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἢ σφι ἵλεον γενέσθαι τὴν θεόν.

Compare Thucyd. ii, 27 about the final expulsion from Ægina. The Lacedæmonians assigned to these expelled Æginetans a new abode in the territory of Thyrea, on the eastern coast of Peloponnesus, where they were attacked, taken prisoners, and put to death by the Athenians, in the eighth year of the war (Thucyd. iv, 57). Now Herodotus, while he mentions the expulsion, does not allude to their subsequent and still more calamitous fate. Had he known the fact, he could hardly have failed to notice it, as a farther consummation of the divine judgment. We may reasonably presume ignorance in this case, which would tend to support the opinion thrown out in my preceding volume (chap. xxxiii, p. 225, note) respecting the date of composition of his history,—in the earliest years of the Peloponnesian war.

[81] Herodot. ix, 75.

[82] Herodot. vi, 90-93. Thucyd. i, 41. About Sôphanês, comp. ix, 75.

How much damage was done by such a privateering war, between countries so near as Ægina and Attica, may be seen by the more detailed description of a later war of the same kind in 388 B. C. (Xenophon, Hellenic. v. 1.)

[83] Plutarch, Themist. c. 19.

[84] See Mr. Galt's interesting account of the Hydriot sailors, Voyages and Travels in the Mediterranean, pp. 376-378 (London, 1802).

"The city of Hydra originated in a small colony of boatmen belonging to the Morea, who took refuge in the island from the tyranny of the Turks. About forty years ago they had multiplied to a considerable number, their little village began to assume the appearance of a town, and they had cargoes that went as far as Constantinople. In their mercantile transactions, the Hydriots acquired the reputation of greater integrity than the other Greeks, as well as of being the most intrepid navigators in the Archipelago; and they were of course regularly preferred. Their industry and honesty obtained its reward. The islands of Spezzia, Paros, Myconi, and Ipsara, resemble Hydra in their institutions, and possess the same character for commercial activity. In paying their sailors, Hydra and its sister islands have a peculiar custom. The whole amount of the freight is considered as a common stock, from which the charges of victualing the ship are deducted. The remainder is then divided into two equal parts: one is allotted to the crew, and equally shared among them without reference to age or rank; the other part is appropriated to the ship and captain. The capital of the cargo is a trust given to the captain and crew on certain fixed conditions. The character and manners of the Hydriot sailors, from the moral effect of these customs, are much superior in regularity to the ideas that we are apt to entertain of sailors. They are sedate, well-dressed, well-bred, shrewd, informed, and speculative. They seem to form a class, in the orders of mankind, which has no existence among us. By their voyages, they acquire a liberality of notion which we expect only among gentlemen, while in their domestic circumstances their conduct is suitable to their condition. The Greeks are all traditionary historians, and possess much of that kind of knowledge to which the term *learning* is usually applied. This, mingled with the other information of the Hydriots, gives them that advantageous character of mind which I think they possess."

[85] Plato, Legg. iv, pp. 705, 706. Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 19. Isokratês, Panathenaic, c. 43.

Plutarch, Philopœmen. c. 14. Πλὴν Ἐπαμεινώνδαν μὲν ἔνιοι λέγουσιν ὀκνοῦντα γεῦσαι τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν ὠφελειῶν τοὺς πολίτας, ὅπως αὐτῷ μὴ λάθωσιν ἀντὶ μονίμων ὁπλιτῶν, κατὰ Πλάτωνα, ναῦται γενόμενοι καὶ διαφθαρέντες, ἄπρακτον ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ τῶν νήσων ἀπελθεῖν ἐκουσίως: compare vii, p. 301.

[86] See the remarkable passage in Xenophon (Memorab. iii, 5, 19), attesting that the Hoplites and the Hippeis, the persons first in rank in the city were also the most disobedient on military service.

[87] Thucyd. i, 93. ἰδὼν (Themistoklês) τῆς βασιλέως στρατιᾶς τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἔφοδον εὐπορωτέραν τῆς κατὰ γῆν οὖσαν.

[88] Thucyd. i, 14. Herodot. vii, 144.

[89] Thucyd. i, 93.

[90] Herodot. vii, 144. Οὗτος γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος συστὰς ἔσωσε τότε τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἀναγκάσας θαλασσίους γενέσθαι Ἀθηναίους.

Thucyd. i, 18. ναυτικοὶ ἐγένοντο.

[91] Æschylus, Persæ, 235.

[92] The mountain region of Laurium has been occasionally visited by modern travellers, but never carefully surveyed until 1836, when Dr. Fiedler examined it mineralogically by order of the present Greek government. See his Reisen durch Griechenland, vol. i, pp. 39, 73. The region is now little better than a desert, but Fiedler especially notices the great natural fertility of the plain near Thorikus, together with the good harbor at that place, —both circumstances of great value at the time when the mines were in work. Many remains are seen of shafts sunk in ancient times,—and sunk in so workmanlike a manner as to satisfy the eye of a miner of the present day.—p. 76.

[93] Herodot. vii, 144. Ὅτε Ἀθηναίοισι γενομένων χρημάτων μεγάλων ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τὰ ἐκ τῶν μετάλλων σφι προσῆλθε τῶν ἀπὸ Λαυρείου, ἔμελλον λάξεσθαι ὀρχηδὸν ἕκαστος δέκα δραχμάς.

[94] All the information—unfortunately it is very scanty—which we possess respecting the ancient mines of Laurium, is brought together in the valuable Dissertation of M. Boëckh, translated and appended to the English translation of his Public Economy of Athens. He discusses the fact stated in this chapter of Herodotus, in sect. 8 of that Dissertation: but there are many of his remarks in which I cannot concur.

After multiplying ten drachmæ by the assumed number of twenty thousand Athenian citizens, making a sum total distributed of thirty-three and one-third talents, he goes on: "That the distribution was made annually might have been presumed from the principles of the Athenian administration, without the testimony of Cornelius Nepos. We are not, therefore, to suppose that the savings of several years are meant, nor merely a surplus; but that all the public money arising from the mines, as it was not required for any other object, was divided among the members of the community," (p. 632).

We are hardly authorized to conclude from the passage of Herodotus that *all* the sum received from the mines was about to be distributed: the treasury was very rich, and a distribution was about to be made,—but it does not follow that nothing was to be left in the treasury after the distribution. Accordingly, all calculations of the total produce of the mines, based upon this passage of Herodotus, are uncertain. Nor is it clear that there was any regular annual distribution, unless we are to take the passage of Cornelius Nepos as proving it: but he talks rather about the magistrates employing this money for jobbing purposes,—not about a regular distribution: "Nam cum pecunia publica quæ ex metallis redibat, largitione magistratuum quotannis periret." Corn. Nep. Themist. c. 2. A story is told by Polyænus, from whomsoever he copied it,—of a sum of one hundred talents in the treasury, which Themistoklês persuaded the people to hand over to one hundred rich men, for the purpose of being expended as the latter might direct, with an obligation to reimburse the money in case the people were not satisfied with the expenditure: these rich men employed each the sum awarded to him in building a new ship, much to the satisfaction of the people (Polyæn. i, 30). This story differs materially from that of Herodotus, and we cannot venture either to blend the two together or to rely upon Polyænus separately.

I imagine that the sum of thirty three talents, or fifty talents, necessary for the distribution, formed part of a larger sum lying in the treasury, arising from the mines. Themistoklês persuaded the people to employ the *whole* sum in ship-building, which of course implied that the distribution was to be renounced. Whether there had been distributions of a similar kind in former years, as M. Boëckh affirms, is a matter on which we have no evidence. M. Boëckh seems to me not to have kept in view the fact, which he himself states just before, that there were two sources of receipt into the treasury,—original purchase-money paid down, and reserved annual rent. It is from the former source that I imagine the large sum lying in the treasury to have been derived: the small reserved rent probably went among the annual items of the state-budget.

[95] Herodot. vii, 239.

[96] Herodot. vii, 8-138.

[97] Herodot. vii, 145. Φρονήσαντες εἴ κως ἕν τε γένοιτο τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν, καὶ εἰ συγκύψαντες τωὐτὸ πρήσσοιεν πάντες, ὡς δεινῶν ἐπιόντων ὁμοίως πᾶσι Ἕλλησι.

[98] Herodot. viii, 92.

[99] Herodot. vii, 145.

[100] Plutarch, Themistokl. c. 10. About Cheileos, Herodot. ix, 9.

[101] Herodot. vii, 203. οὐ γὰρ θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἐπιόντα ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπον, etc.: compare also vii, 56.

[102] Herodot. vii, 140.

Ἀλλ' ἴτον ἐξ ἀδύτοιο, κακοῖς δ' ἐπικίδνατε θυμόν.

The general sense and scope of the oracle appears to me clear, in this case. It is a sentence of nothing but desolation and sadness; though Bähr and Schweighäuser, with other commentators, try to infuse into it some thing of encouragement by construing θυμόν, *fortitude*. The translation of Valla and Schultz is nearer to the truth. But even when the general sense of an oracle is plain (which it hardly ever is), the particular phrases are always wild and vague.

[103] Herodot. vii, 141.

Οὐ δύναται Παλλὰς Δὶ’ Ὀλύμπιον ἐξιλάσασθαι

Λισσομένη πολλοῖσι λόγοις καὶ μήτιδι πυκνῇ.

Compare with this the declaration of Apollo to Crœsus of Lydia (i, 91).

[104]

… Τεῖχος Τριτογενεῖ ξύλινον διδοῖ εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς

Μοῦνον ἀπόρθητον τελέθειν, τὸ σὲ τέκνα τ’ ὀνήσει.

… … … … … .

… … … … … .

Ὦ θεία Σαλαμὶς, ἀπολεῖς δὲ σὺ τέκνα γυναικῶν, etc.

(Herodot. vii, 141).

[105] Herodot. vii, 143. Ταύτῃ Θεμιστοκλέους ἀποφαινομένου, Ἀθηναῖοι ταῦτά σφι ἔγνωσαν αἱρετώτερα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ τῶν χρησμολόγων, οἳ οὐκ εἴων ναυμαχίην ἀρτέεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἐκλιπόντας χώρην τὴν Ἀττικὴν, ἄλλην τινὰ οἰκίζειν.

There is every reason to accept the statement of Herodotus as true, respecting these oracles delivered to the Athenians, and the debated interpretation of them. They must have been discussed publicly in the Athenian assembly, and Herodotus may well have conversed with persons who had heard the discussion. Respecting the other oracle which he states to have been delivered to the Spartans,—intimating that either Sparta must be conquered or a king of Sparta must perish,—we may well doubt whether it was in existence before the battle of Thermopylæ (Herodot. vii, 220).

The later writers, Justin (ii, 12), Cornelius Nepos (c. 2), and Polyænus (i, 30), give an account of the proceeding of Themistoklês, inferior to Herodotus in vivacity as well as in accuracy.

[106] Herodot. vii, 139. οὐδὲ σφέας χρηστήρια φοβερὰ, ἐλθόντα ἐκ Δελφῶν, καὶ ἐς δεῖμα βαλόντα, ἔπεισε ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν Ἑλλάδα, etc.

For the abundance of oracles and prophecies, from many different sources, which would be current at such a moment of anxiety, we may compare the analogy of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, described by the contemporary historian (Thucyd. ii, 8).

[107] Herodot. vii, 139. Ἐνθαῦτα ἀναγκαίῃ ἐξέργομαι γνώμην ἀποδέξασθαι, ἐπίφθονον μὲν πρὸς τῶν πλεόνων ἀνθρώπων· ὅμως δὲ, τῇ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἀληθὲς, οὐκ ἐπισχήσω. Εἰ Ἀθηναῖοι, καταῤῥωδήσαντες τὸν ἐπιόντα κίνδυνον, ἐξέλιπον τὴν σφετέρην, etc. … Νῦν δὲ, Ἀθηναίους ἄν τις λέγων σωτῆρας γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος, οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοι τὸ ἀληθές, etc.

The whole chapter deserves peculiar attention, as it brings before us the feelings of those contemporaries to whom his history is addressed, and the mode of judging with which they looked back on the Persian war. One is apt unconsciously to fancy that an ancient historian writes for men in the abstract, and not for men of given sentiments, prejudices, and belief. The persons whom Herodotus addressed are those who were so full of admiration for Sparta, as to ascribe to her chiefly the honor of having beaten back the Persians; and to maintain that, even without the aid of Athens, the Spartans and Peloponnesians both could have defended, and would have defended, the isthmus of Corinth, fortified as it was by a wall built expressly. The Peloponnesian allies of that day forgot that they were open to attack by sea as well as by land.

[108] Herodot. vii, 139. ἑλόμενοι δὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιεῖναι ἐλευθέρην, τοῦτο τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν πᾶν τὸ λοιπὸν, ὅσον μὴ ἐμήδισε, αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ἦσαν οἱ ἐπεγείραντες, καὶ βασιλέα μετά γε θεοὺς ἀνωσάμενοι.

[109] Herodot. viii, 2, 3: compare vii, 161.

[110] Herodot. vii, 144.

[111] Thucyd. iii, 56. ἐν καιροῖς οἷς σπάνιον ἦν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τινὰ ἀρετὴν τῇ Ξέρξου δυνάμει ἀντιτάξασθαι.

This view of the case is much more conformable to history than the boasts of later orators respecting widespread patriotism in these times. See Demosthen. Philipp. iii, 37, p. 120.

[112] Herodot. vii, 147-150.

[113] The opinion of Herodotus is delivered in a remarkable way, without mentioning the name of the Argeians, and with evident reluctance. After enumerating all the Grecian contingents assembled for the defence of the Isthmus, and the different inhabitants of Peloponnesus, ethnically classified, he proceeds to say: Τούτων ὦν τῶν ἑπτὰ ἐθνέων αἱ λοιπαὶ πόλις, πάρεξ τῶν κατέλεξα, ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ἑκατέατο· εἰ δὲ ἐλευθέρως ἔξεστι εἰπεῖν, ἐκ τοῦ μέσου κατήμενοι ἐμήδιζον (viii, 73). This assertion includes the Argeians without naming them.

Where he speaks respecting the Argeians by name, he is by no means so free and categorical; compare vii, 152,—he will give no opinion of his own, differing from the allegation of the Argeians themselves,—he mentions other stories, incompatible with that allegation, but without guaranteeing their accuracy,— he delivers a general admonition that those who think they have great reason to complain of the conduct of others would generally find, on an impartial scrutiny, that others have as much reason to complain of them,—"and thus the conduct of Argos has not been *so much worse than that of others*,"—οὕτω δὴ οὐκ Ἀργείοισι αἴσχιστα πεποίηται.

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when the history of Herodotus was probably composed, the Argeians were in a peculiarly favorable position. They took part neither with Athens nor Lacedæmon, each of whom was afraid of offending them. An historian who openly countenanced a grave charge of treason against them in the memorable foregone combat against Xerxes, was thus likely to incur odium from both parties in Greece.

The comments of Plutarch on Herodotus in respect to this matter are of little value (De Herodoti Malignit. c. 28, p. 863), and are indeed unfair, since he represents the Argeian version of the facts as being universally believed (ἅπαντες ἴσασιν), which it evidently was not.

[114] Herodot. vii, 169.

[115] Herodot. vii, 168.

[116] Thucyd. i, 32-37. It is perhaps singular that the Corinthian envoys in Thucydides do not make any allusion to the duplicity of the Korkyræans in regard to the Persian invasion, in the strong invective which they deliver against Korkyra before the Athenian assembly (Thucydid. i, 37-42). The conduct of Corinth herself, however, on the same occasion, was not altogether without reproach.

[117] Herodot. vii, 158-167. Diodor. xi, 22.

[118] See Schol. ad Aristeid., Anathenaic. p. 138.

[119] Herodot. vii, 172: compare c. 130.

[120] Herodot. vii, 173.

[121] Herodot. vii, 172. τὴν ἐσβολὴν τὴν Ὀλυμπικήν. See the description and plan of Tempê in Dr. Clarke's Travels, vol. iv, ch. ix, p. 280; and the Dissertation of Kriegk, in which all the facts about this interesting defile are collected and compared (Das Thessalische Tempe. Frankfort, 1834).

The description of Tempê in Livy (xliii, 18; xliv, 6) seems more accurate than that in Pliny (H. N. iv, 8). We may remark that both the one and the other belong to times subsequent to the formation and organization of the Macedonian empire, when it came to hold Greece in a species of dependence. The Macedonian princes after Alexander the Great, while they added to the natural difficulties of Tempê by fortifications, at the same time made the road more convenient as a military communication. In the time of Xerxes, these natural difficulties had never been approached by the hand of art, and were doubtless much greater.

The present road through the pass is about thirteen feet broad in its narrowest part, and between fifteen and twenty feet broad elsewhere,—the pass is about five English miles in length (Kriegk, pp. 21-33).

[122] Herodot. vii, 173.

[123] Herodot. viii, 140-143.

[124] Herodot. vii, 173, 174.

[125] Diodor. xi, 3. ἔτι παρούσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς Τέμπεσι φυλακῆς, etc.

[126] Herodot. vii, 131, 132, 174.

[127] Herodot. vii, 177

[128] Herodot. vii, 132; Diodor. xi, 3.

[129] Herodot. viii, 15-60. Compare Isokratês, Panegyric, Or. iv, p. 59.

I shall have occasion presently to remark the revolution which took place in Athenian feeling on this point between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars.

[130] The word *Pass* commonly conveys the idea of a path inclosed between mountains. In this instance it is employed to designate a narrow passage, having mountains on one side only, and water (or marsh ground) on the other.

[131] According to one of the numerous hypotheses for refining religious legend into matter of historical and physical fact, Hêraklês as supposed to have been an engineer, or water-finder, in very early times,—δεινὸς περὶ ζήτησιν ὑδάτων καὶ συναγωγήν. See Plutarch, Cum principibus viris philosopho esse disserendum, c. i, p. 776.

[132] About Thermopylæ, see Herodot. vii, 175, 176, 199, 200.

Ἡ δὲ αὖ διὰ Τρηχῖνος ἔσοδος ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἔστι, τῇ στεινότατον, ἡμίπλεθρον· οὐ μέντοι κατὰ τοῦτό γ' ἔστι τὸ στεινότατον τῆς χώρης τῆς ἄλλης, ἀλλ' ἔμπροσθέ τε Θερμοπυλέων καὶ ὄπισθε· κατά τε Ἀλπηνοὺς, ὄπισθε ἐόντας, ἐοῦσα ἁμαξιτὸς μούνη· καὶ ἔμπροσθε κατὰ Φοίνικα ποταμὸν, ἁμαξιτὸς ἄλλη μούνη.

Compare Pausanias, vii, 15, 2. τὸ στένον τὸ Ἡρακλείας τε μεταξὺ καὶ Θερμοπυλέων; Strabo, ix, p. 429; and Livy, xxxvi, 12.

Herodotus says about Thermopylæ—στεινοτέρη γὰρ ἐφαίνετο ἐοῦσα τῆς εἰς Θεσσαλίην, *i. e.* than the defile of Tempê.

If we did not possess the clear topographical indications given by Herodotus, it would be almost impossible to comprehend the memorable event here before us; for the configuration of the coast, the course of the rivers, and the general local phenomena, have now so entirely changed, that modern travellers rather mislead than assist. In the interior of the Maliac gulf, three or four miles of new land have been formed by the gradual accumulation of river deposit, so that the gulf itself is of much less extent, and the mountain bordering the gate of Thermopylæ is not now near to the sea. The river Spercheius has materially altered its course; instead of flowing into the sea in an easterly direction considerably north of Thermopylæ, as it did in the time of Herodotus, it has been diverted southward in the lower part of its course, with many windings, so as to reach the sea much south of the pass: while the rivers Dyras, Melas, and Asôpus, which in the time of Herodotus all reached the sea separately between the mouth of Spercheius and Thermopylæ, now do not reach the sea at all, but fall into the Spercheius. Moreover, the perpetual flow of the thermal springs has tended to accumulate deposit and to raise the level of the soil generally throughout the pass. Herodotus seems to consider the road between the two gates of Thermopylæ as bearing north and south, whereas it would bear more nearly east and west. He knows nothing of the appellation of Callidromus, applied by Livy and Strabo to an undefined portion of the eastern ridge of Œta.

Respecting the past and present features of Thermopylæ, see the valuable observations of Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. ii, ch. x, pp. 7-40; Gell, Itinerary of Greece, p. 239; Kruse, Hellas, vol. iii, ch. x, p. 129. Dr. Clarke observes: "The hot springs issue principally from two mouths at the foot of the limestone precipices of Œta, upon the left of the causeway, which here passes close under the mountain, and on this part of it scarcely admits two horsemen abreast of each other, the morass on the right, between the causeway and the sea, being so dangerous, that we were very near being buried, with our horses, by our imprudence in venturing a few paces into it from the paved road." (Clarke's Travels, vol. iv, ch. viii, p. 247.)

[133] Herodot. vii, 177, 205. ἐπιλεξάμενος ἄνδρας τε τοὺς κατεστεῶτας τριηκοσίους, καὶ τοῖσι ἐτύγχανον παῖδες ἐόντες.

In selecting men for a dangerous service, the Spartans took by preference those who already had families: if such a man was slain, he left behind him a son to discharge his duties to the state, and to maintain the continuity of the family sacred rites, the extinction of which was considered as a great misfortune. In our ideas, the life of the father of a family in mature age would be considered as of more value, and his death a greater loss, than that of a younger and unmarried man.

[134] Herodot. vii, 205; Thucyd. iii, 62; Diodor. xi, 4; Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 18.

The passage of Thucydides is very important here, as confirming, to a great degree, the statement of Herodotus, and enabling us to appreciate the criticisms of Plutarch, on this particular point very plausible (De Herodoti Malign. pp. 865, 866). The latter seems to have copied from a lost Bœotian author named Aristophanes, who tried to make out a more honorable case for his countrymen in respect to their conduct in the Persian war.

The statement of Diodorus,—Θηβαίων ἀπὸ τῆς ἑτέρας μέριδος ὡς τετρακόσιοι,—is illustrated by a proceeding of the Korkyræan government (Thucyd. iii, 75), when they enlisted their enemies in order to send them away: also that of the Italian Cumæ (Dionys. Hal. vii, 5).

[135] Diodor. xi, 4.

[136] Herodot. viii, 30.

[137] Herodot. vii, 203. λέγοντες δι' ἀγγέλων, ὡς αὐτοὶ μὲν ἥκοιεν πρόδρομοι τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ τῶν συμμάχων προσδόκιμοι πᾶσάν εἰσι ἡμέρην· … καὶ σφι εἴη δεινὸν οὐδέν· οὐ γὰρ θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἐπίοντα ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπον· εἶναι δὲ θνητὸν οὐδένα, οὐδὲ ἔσεσθαι, τῷ κακὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γινομένῳ οὐ συνεμίχθη, τοῖσι δὲ μεγίστοισι αὐτέων, μέγιστα· ὀφείλειν ὦν καὶ τὸν ἐπελαύνοντα, ὡς ἐόντα θνητὸν, ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης πεσέειν ἄν.

[138] Herodot. vii, 206. It was only the Dorian states (Lacedæmon, Argos, Sikyon, etc.) which were under obligation of abstinence from aggressive military operations during the month of the Karneian festival: other states (even in Peloponnesus), Elis, Mantineia, etc., and of course Athens, were not under similar restraint (Thucyd. v, 54, 75).

[139] Josephus, Bell. Judaic. i, 7, 3; ii, 16, 4; ibid. Antiqq. Judaic. xiv, 4, 2. If their bodies were attacked on the Sabbath, the Jews defended themselves; but they would not break through the religious obligations of the day in order to impede any military operations of the besiegers. See Reimar. ad Dion. Cass. lxvi, 7.

[140] Herodot. vii, 206; viii, 40.

[141] Herodot. vii, 212, 216, 218.

[142] Herodot. vii, 207.

[143] Herodot. viii, 1, 2, 3. Diodorus (xi, 12) makes the Athenian number stronger by twenty triremes.

[144] Herodot. vii, 180. τάχα δ' ἄν τι καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπαύροιτο.

Respecting the influence of a name and its etymology, in this case unhappy for the possessor, compare Herodot. ix, 91; and Tacit. Hist. iv, 53.

[145] For the employment of fire-signals, compare Livy, xxviii, 5; and the opening of the Agamemnon of Æschylus, and the same play, v. 270, 300; also Thucydides, iii, 22-80.

[146] Herodot. vii, 181, 182, 183.

[147] Herodot. vii, 184. μέχρι μὲν δὴ τούτου τοῦ χώρου καὶ τῶν Θερμοπυλέων, ἀπαθής τε κακῶν ἦν ὁ στρατὸς, καὶ πλῆθος ἦν τηνικαῦτα ἔτι τόσον, etc.—viii, 13. ἐποιέετο δὲ πᾶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅκως ἂν ἐξισωθείη τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ τὸ Περσικὸν, μηδὲ πολλῷ πλέον εἴη. Compare viii, 109; and Diodor. xi, 13.

[148] Herodot. vii, 178. Δελφοὶ δὲ δεξάμενοι τὸ μαντήϊον, πρῶτα μὲν, Ἑλλήνων τοῖσι βουλομένοισι εἶναι ἐλευθέροισι ἐξήγγειλαν τὰ χρησθέντα αὐτοῖσι· καὶ σφι δεινῶς καταῤῥωδέουσι τὸν βάρβαρον ἐξαγγείλαντες, χάριν ἀθάνατον κατέθεντο.

[149] Herodot. vii, 189. The language of the historian in this chapter is remarkable: his incredulous reason rather gets the better of religious acquiescence.

Clemens Alexandrinus, reciting this incident together, with some other miracles of Ækus, Aristæus, Empedoklês, etc., reproves his pagan opponents for their inconsistency, while believing these, in rejecting the miracles of Moses and the prophets (Stromat. vi, pp. 629, 630).

[150] The pass over which Xerxes passed was that by Petra, Pythium, and Oloosson,—"saltum ad Petram,"—"Perrhæbiæ saltum,"—(Livy, xlv, 21; xliv, 27.) Petra was near the point where the road passed from Pieria, or lower Macedonia, into upper Macedonia (see Livy, xxxix, 26).

Compare respecting this pass, and the general features of the neighboring country, Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii, ch. xviii, pp. 337-343, and ch. xxx, p. 430; also Boué, La Turquie en Europe, vol. i, pp. 198-202.

The Thracian king Sitalkês, like Xerxes on this occasion, was obliged to cause the forests to be cut, to make a road for his army, in the early part of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. ii, 98).

[151] Herodot. vii, 130, 131. That Xerxes, struck by the view of Olympus and Ossa, went to see the narrow defile between them, is probable enough; but the remarks put into his mouth are probably the fancy of some ingenious contemporary Greeks, suggested by the juxtaposition of such a landscape and such a monarch. To suppose this narrow defile walled up, was easy for the imagination of any spectator: to suppose that *he* could order it to be done, was in character with a monarch who disposed of an indefinite amount of manual labor, and who had just finished the cutting of Athos. Such dramatic fitness was quite sufficient to convert that which *might have been* said into that which *was* said, and to procure for it a place among the historical anecdotes communicated to Herodotus.

[152] The Persian fleet did not leave Therma until eleven days after Xerxes and his land-force (Herodot. vii, 183); it arrived in one day on the Sêpias Aktê, or southeastern coast of Magnesia (ibid.), was then assailed and distressed for three days by the hurricane (vii, 191), and proceeded immediately afterwards to Aphetæ (vii, 193). When it arrived at the latter places, Xerxes himself had been *three days* in the Malian territory (vii, 196).

[153] This point is set forth by Hoffmeister, Sittlich-religiöse Lebensansicht des Herodotos, Essen, 1832, sect. 19, p. 93.

[154] Herodot. vii, 196, 197, 201.

[155] Diodor. xi, 12.

[156] Diodorus (xi, 12), Plutarch (Themistoklês, 8), and Mannert (Geogr. der Gr. und Römer, vol. vii, p. 596), seem to treat Sêpias as a *cape*, the southeastern corner of Magnesia: this is different from Herodotus, who mentions it as a line of some extent (ἅπασα ἡ ἀκτὴ ἡ Σηπιὰς, vii, 191), and notices separately τὴν ἄκρην τῆς Μαγνησίης, vii, 193.

The geography of Apollonius Rhodius (i, 560-580) seems sadly inaccurate.

[157] Herodot. vii, 189-191.

[158] Herodot. vii, 191. On this occasion, as in regard to the prayers addressed by the Athenians to Boreas, Herodotus suffers a faint indication of skepticism to escape him: ἡμέρας γὰρ δὴ ἐχείμαζε τρεῖς· τέλος δὲ, ἔντομά τε ποιεῦντες καὶ καταείδοντες γόοισι τῷ ἀνέμῳ οἱ Μάγοι, πρός τε τούτοισι, καὶ Θέτι καὶ τῇσι Νηρηΐσι θύοντες, ἔπαυσαν τετάρτῃ ἡμέρῃ· ἢ ἄλλως κως αὐτὸς ἐθέλων ἐκόπασε.

[159] Herodot. vii, 194.

[160] Herod. vii, 208, 210. πέμπει ἐς αὐτοὺς Μήδους τε καὶ Κισσίους θυμωθεὶς, ἐντειλάμενός σφεας ζωγρήσαντας ἄγειν ἐς ὄψιν τὴν ἐωϋτοῦ.

[161] Diodor. xi, 4.

[162] Herodot. vii, 174; viii, 29-32.

[163] Diodor. xi, 6.

[164] Herodot. vii, 211; ix, 62, 63; Diodor. xi, 7: compare Æschyl. Pers. 244.

[165] Herodot. vii, 212. Ἐν ταύτῃσι τῇσι προσόδοισι τῆς μάχης λέγεται βασιλέα, θηεύμενον, τρὶς ἀναδραμεῖν ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου, δείσαντα περὶ τῇ στρατιῇ. See Homer, Iliad, xx, 62; Æschyl. Pers. 472.

[166] Herodot. vii, 213, 214; Diodor. xi, 8.

Ktesias states that it was two powerful men of Trachis, Kalliadês and Timaphernês, who disclosed to Xerxes the mountain-path (Persica, c. 24).

[167] Herodot. vii, 217, 218. ἠώς τε δὴ διέφαινε—ἦν μὲν δὴ νηνεμίη, ψόφου δὲ γενομένου πολλοῦ, etc.

I cannot refrain from transcribing a remark of Colonel Leake: "The *stillness of the dawn*, which saved the Phocians from being surprised, is very characteristic of the climate of Greece in the season when the occurrence took place, and like many other trifling circumstances occurring in the history of the Persian invasion, is an interesting proof of the accuracy and veracity of the historian." (Travels in Northern Greece, vol. ii, c. x, p. 55.)

[168] Herodot. vii, 216, 217.

[169] Diodor. xi, 9.

[170] Herodot. vii, 219. ἐνθαῦτα ἐβουλεύοντο οἱ Ἕλληνες, καὶ σφεων ἐσχίζοντο αἱ γνῶμαι.

[171] Herodot. vii, 104.

[172] Herodot. vii, 220. Ταύτῃ καὶ μᾶλλον τῇ γνώμῃ πλεῖστός εἰμι, Λεωνίδην, ἐπεί τε ἤσθετο τοὺς συμμάχους ἐόντας ἀπροθύμους, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας συνδιακινδυνεύειν, κελεῦσαί σφεας ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι· αὐτῷ δὲ ἀπιέναι οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν· μένοντι δὲ αὐτοῦ κλέος μέγα ἐλείπετο, καὶ ἡ Σπάρτης εὐδαιμονίη οὐκ ἐξηλείφετο.

Compare a similar act of honorable self-devotion, under less conspicuous circumstances, of the Lacedæmonian commander Anaxibius, when surprised by the Athenians under Iphikratês in the territory of Abydus (Xenophon. Hellenic. iv, 8, 38). He and twelve Lacedæmonian harmosts, all refused to think of safety by flight. He said to his men, when resistance was hopeless, Ἄνδρες, ἐμοὶ μὲν καλὸν ἔνθαδε ἀποθανεῖν· ὑμεῖς δὲ, πρὶν συμμίξαι τοῖς πολεμίοις, σπεύδετε εἰς τὴν σωτηρίαν.

[173] Herodot. vii, 221. According to Plutarch, there were also two persons belonging to the Herakleid lineage, whom Leonidas desired to place in safety, and for that reason gave them a despatch to carry home. They indignantly refused, and stayed to perish in the fight (Plutarch. Herodot. Malign. p. 866).

[174] The subsequent distress of the surviving Thespians is painfully illustrated by the fact, that in the battle of Platæa in the following year, they had no heavy armor (Herodot. ix, 30). After the final repulse of Xerxes, they were forced to recruit their city by the admission of new citizens (Herodot. viii, 75).

[175] Herodot. vii, 222. Θηβαῖοι μὲν ἀέκοντες ἕμενον, καὶ οὐ βουλόμενοι, κατεῖχε γάρ σφεας Λεωνίδης, ἐν ὁμήρων λόγῳ ποιεύμενος. How could these Thebans serve as hostages? Against what evil were they intended to guard Leonidas, or what advantages could they confer upon him? Unwilling comrades on such an occasion would be noway desirable. Plutarch (De Herodot. Malign. p. 865) severely criticizes this statement of Herodotus, and on very plausible grounds: among the many unjust criticisms in his treatise, this is one of the few exceptions.

Compare Diodorus, xi, 9; and Pausan. x, 20, 1.

Of course the Thebans, taking part as they afterwards did heartily with Xerxes, would have an interest in representing that their contingent had done as little as possible against him, and may have circulated the story that Leonidas detained them as hostages. The politics of Thebes *before* the battle of Thermopylæ were essentially double-faced and equivocal: not daring to take any open part against the Greeks before the arrival of Xerxes.

The eighty Mykenæans, like the other Peloponnesians, had the isthmus of Corinth behind them as a post which presented good chances of defence.

[176] The story of Diodorus (xi, 10) that Leonidas made an attack upon the Persian camp during the night, and very nearly penetrated tn the regal tent, from which Xerxes was obliged to flee, suddenly, in order to save his life, while the Greeks, after having caused immense slaughter in the camp, were at length overpowered and slain,—is irreconcilable with Herodotus and decidedly to be rejected. Justin, however (ii, 11), and Plutarch (De Herodot. Malign. p. 866), follow it. The rhetoric of Diodorus is not calculated to strengthen the evidence in its favor. Plutarch had written, or intended to write, a biography of Leonidas (De Herodot. Mal. ibid.); but it is not preserved.

[177] Herodot. vii, 225.

[178] Herodot. vii, 226.

[179] Herodot. vii, 224. ἐπυθόμην δὲ καὶ ἁπάντων τῶν τριακοσίων. Pausanias, iii, 14, 1. Annual festivals, with a panegyrical oration and gymnastic matches, were still celebrated even in his time in honor of Leonidas, jointly with Pausanias, whose subsequent treason tarnished his laurels acquired at Platæa. It is remarkable, and not altogether creditable to Spartan sentiment, that the two kings should have been made partners in the same public honors.

[180] Herod. vii, 229. Ἀριστόδημον—λειποψυχέοντα λειφθῆναι—ἀλγήσαντα ἀπονοστῆσαι ἐς Σπάρτην. The commentators are hard upon Aristodêmus when they translate these epithets, "animo deficientem, timidum, pusillanimum," considering that ἐλειποψύχησε is predicated by Thucydides (iv, 12) even respecting the gallant Brasidas. Herodotus scarcely intends to imply anything like pusillanimity, but rather the effect of extreme physical suffering. It seems, however, that there were different stories about the cause which had kept Aristodêmus out of the battle.

The story of another soldier, named Pantitês, who having been sent on a message by Leonidas into Thessaly, did not return in time for the battle, and was so disgraced when he went back to Sparta that he hanged himself,—given by Herodotus as a report, is very little entitled to credit. It is not likely that Leonidas would send an envoy into Thessaly, then occupied by the Persians: moreover, the disgrace of Aristodêmus is particularly explained by Herodotus by the difference between his conduct and that of his comrade Eurytus: whereas Pantitês stood alone.

[181] See the story of the single Athenian citizen, who returned home alone, after all his comrades had perished in an unfortunate expedition to the island of Ægina. The widows of the slain warriors crowded round him, each asking him what had become of her husband, and finally put him to death by pricking with their bodkins (Herodot. v, 87).

In the terrible battle of St. Jacob on the Birs, near Basle (August, 1444), where fifteen hundred Swiss crossed the river and attacked forty thousand French and Germans under the Dauphin of France, against strong remonstrances from their commanders,—all of them were slain, after deeds of unrivalled valor and great loss to the enemy, except sixteen men, who receded from their countrymen in crossing the river, thinking the enterprise desperate. These sixteen men, on their return, were treated with intolerable scorn and hardly escaped execution (Vogelin, Geschichte der Schweizer Eidgenossenschaft, vol. i, ch. 5, p. 393).

[182] Herodot. vii, 233; Plutarch, Herodot. Malign. p. 867. The Bœotian history of Aristophanês, cited by the latter, professed to be founded in part upon memorials arranged according to the sequence of magistrates and generals—ἐκ τῶν κατὰ ἄρχοντας ὑπομνημάτων ἱστόρησε.

[183] Herodot. vii, 235.

[184] Herodot. vii, 236.

[185] Herodot. vii, 237. "The citizen (Xerxes is made to observe) does indeed naturally envy another citizen more fortunate than himself, and if asked for counsel, will keep back what he has best in his mind, unless he be a man of very rare virtue. But a foreign friend usually sympathizes heartily with the good fortune of another foreigner, and will give him the best advice in his power whenever he is asked."

[186] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 7; Herodot. viii, 5, 6.

[187] The expression of Herodotus is somewhat remarkable: Οὗτοί τε δὴ πληγέντες δώροισι (Eurybiadês, Adeimantus, etc.), ἀναπεπεισμένοι ἦσαν, καὶ τοῖσι Εὐβοέεσι ἐκεχάριστο· αὐτός τε ὁ Θεμιστοκλέης ἐκέρδηνε, ἐλάνθανε δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ ἔχων.

[188] Herodot. viii, 20. Οἱ γὰρ Εὐβοέες παραχρησάμενοι τὸν Βάκιδος χρησμὸν ὡς οὐδὲν λέγοντα, οὔτε τι ἐξεκομίσαντο οὐδὲν, οὔτε προεσάξαντο, ὡς παρεσομένου σφι πολέμου· περιπετέα δὲ ἐποιήσαντο σφίσι αὐτοῖσι τὰ πρήγματα. Βάκιδι γὰρ ὧδε ἔχει περὶ τούτων ὁ χρησμός·

Φράζεο, βαρβαρόφωνον ὅταν ζυγὸν εἰς ἅλα βάλλῃ

Βύβλινον, Εὐβοίης ἀπέχειν πολυμηκάδας αἶγας.

Τούτοισι δὲ οὐδὲν τοῖσι ἔπεσι χρησαμένοισι ἐν τοῖσι τότε παρεοῦσί τε καὶ προσδοκίμοισι κακοῖσι, παρῆν σφι συμφορῇ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὰ μέγιστα.

[189] Herodot. viii, 6. καὶ ἔμελλον δῆθεν ἐκφεύξεσθαι (οἱ Ἕλληνες)· ἔδει δὲ μηδὲ πυρφόρον, τῷ ἐκείνων (Περσῶν) λόγῳ, περιγενέσθαι.

[190] Herodot. viii, 7, 8. Wonderful stories were recounted respecting the prowess of Skyllias as a diver.

[191] Diodorus, xi, 12.

[192] Herodot. viii, 9. δείλην ὀψίην γινομένην τῆς ἡμέρης φυλάξαντες, αὐτοὶ ἐπανέπλωον ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους, ἀπόπειραν αὐτῶν ποιήσασθαι βουλόμενοι τῆς τε μάχης καὶ τοῦ διεκπλόου.

[193] Compare the description in Thucyd. ii, 84, of the naval battle between the Athenian fleet under Phormio and the Lacedæmonian fleet, where the ships of the latter are marshalled in this same array.

[194] Herodot. viii, 11. πολλὸν παρὰ δόξαν ἀγωνισάμενοι—ἑτεραλκέως ἀγωνιζομένους, etc.

[195] Herodot. viii, 12, 13, 14; Diodor. xi, 12.

[196] Herodot. viii, 17, 18.

[197] Herodot. viii, 18. δρησμὸν δὴ ἐβούλευον ἔσω ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

[198] Herodot. viii, 19, 21, 22; Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 9.

[199] Herodot. viii, 24, 25. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐλάνθανε τοὺς διαβεβηκότας Ξέρξης ταῦτα πρήξας περὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς τοὺς ἑωϋτοῦ· καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ γελοῖον ἦν, etc.

[200] About the numbers of the Greeks at Thermopylæ, compare Herodot. vii, 202; Diodorus, xi, 4; Pausanias, x, 20, 1; and Manso's Sparta, vol. ii, p. 308; Beylage 24th.

Isokratês talks about one thousand Spartans, with a few allies, Panegyric, Or. iv, p. 59. He mentions also only sixty Athenian ships of war at Artemisium: in fact, his numerical statements deserve little attention.

[201] Herodot. vii, 228.

[202] Herodot. viii, 40, 71, 73.

[203] Herodot. viii, 66. Diodorus calls the battle of Thermopylæ a *Kadmeian victory* for Xerxes,—which is true only in the letter, but not in the spirit: he doubtless lost a greater number of men in the pass than the Greeks, but the advantage which he gained was prodigious (Diodor. xi, 12); and Diodorus himself sets forth the terror of the Greeks after the event (xi, 13-15).

[204] Plutarch, De Herodot. Malignit. p. 864; Herodot. viii, 34.

[205] Herodot. viii, 44, 50.

[206] Herodot. viii, 66.

[207] Thucyd. i, 69. τόν τε γὰρ Μῆδον αὐτοὶ ἴσμεν ἀπὸ περάτων γῆς πρότερον ἐπὶ Πελοπόννησον ἐλθόντα, πρὶν τὰ παρ' ὑμῶν ἀξίως προαπαντῆσαι.

[208] Herodot. viii, 71. συνδραμόντες ἐκ τῶν πολίων.

[209] Herodot. viii, 74.

[210] Herodot. vii, 139.

[211] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 9. ἅμα μὲν ὀργὴ τῆς προδοσίας εἶχε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἅμα δὲ δυσθυμία καὶ κατήφεια μεμονωμένους.

Herodot. viii, 40. δοκέοντες γὰρ εὑρήσειν Πελοποννησίους πανδημεὶ ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίῃ ὑποκατημένους τὸν βάρβαρον, τῶν μὲν εὗρον οὐδὲν ἐὸν, οἱ δὲ ἐπυνθάνοντο τὸν Ἰσθμὸν αὐτοὺς τειχέοντας ἐς τὴν Πελοπόννησον, περὶ πλείστου δὲ ποιουμένους περιεῖναι, καὶ ταύτην ἔχοντας ἐν φυλακῇ, τὰ τε ἄλλα ἀπιέναι.

Thucyd. i, 74. ὅτε γοῦν ἦμεν (we Athenians) ἔτι σῶοι, οὐ παρεγένεσθε (Spartans).

Both Lysias (Oratio Funebr. c. 8) and Isokratês take pride in the fact that the Athenians, in spite of being thus betrayed, never thought of making separate terms for themselves with Xerxes (Panegyric, Or. iv. p. 60). But

there is no reason to believe that Xerxes would have granted them separate terms: his particular vengeance was directed against them. Isokratês has confounded in his mind the conduct of the Athenians when they refused the offers of Mardonius in the year following the battle of Salamis, with their conduct before the battle of Salamis against Xerxes.

[212] Herodot. viii, 40-42.

[213] Plato, Legg. iii, p. 699.

[214] Herodot. viii, 66, 67. There was, therefore, but little time for the breaking up and carrying away of furniture, alluded to by Thucydides, i, 18—διανοηθέντες ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἀνασκευασάμενοι, etc.

[215] Herodot. viii, 41; Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. x.

In the years 1821 and 1822, during the struggle which preceded the liberation of Greece, the Athenians were forced to leave their country and seek refuge in Salamis three several times. These incidents are sketched in a manner alike interesting and instructive by Dr. Waddington, in his Visit to Greece (London, 1825), Letters, vi, vii, x. He states, p. 92, "Three times have the Athenians emigrated in a body, and sought refuge from the sabre among the houseless rocks of Salamis. Upon these occasions, I am assured, that many have dwelt in caverns, and many in miserable huts, constructed on the mountain-side by their own feeble hands. Many have perished too, from exposure to an intemperate climate; many, from diseases contracted through the loathsomeness of their habitations; many from hunger and misery. On the retreat of the Turks, the survivors returned to their country. But to what a country did they return? To a land of desolation and famine; and in fact, on the first reoccupation of Athens, after the departure of Omer Brioni, several persons are known to have subsisted for some time on grass, till a supply of corn reached the Piræus from Syra and Hydra."

A century and a half ago, also in the war between the Turks and Venetians, the population of Attica was forced to emigrate to Salamis, Ægina, and Corinth. M. Buchon observes, "Les troupes Albanaises, envoyées en 1688 par les Turcs (in the war against the Venetians) se jetèrent sur l'Attique, mettant tout à feu et à sang. En 1688, les chroniques d'Athènes racontent que ses malheureux habitants furent obligés de se refugier à Salamine, à Egine, et à Corinthe, et que ce ne fut qu'après trois ans qu'ils purent rentrer en partie dans leur ville et dans leurs champs. Beaucoup des villages de l'Attique sont encore habités par les déscendans de ces derniers envahisseurs, et avant la dernière révolution, on n'y parloit que la langue albanaise: mais leur physionomie diffère autant que leur langue de la physionomie de la race Grecque." (Buchon, La Grèce Continentale et la Morée. Paris, 1843, ch. ii, p. 82.)

[216] Pausanias seems to consider these poor men somewhat presumptuous for pretending to understand the oracle better than Themistoklês,—Ἀθηναίων τοὺς πλέον τι ἐς τὸν χρησμὸν ἢ Θεμιστοκλῆς εἰδέναι νομίζοντας (i, 18, 2).

[217] Herodot. viii, 50.

[218] Thucyd. ii, 16, 17.

[219] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 10, 11; and Kimon, c. 5.

[220] Whether this be the incident which Aristotle (Politic. v, 3, 5) had in his mind, we cannot determine.

[221] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. x.

[222] Herodot. ix, 99.

[223] Herodot. viii, 43-48.

[224] Æschylus, Persæ, 347; Herodot. viii, 48; vi, 9; Pausanias, i, 14, 4. The total which Herodotus announces is three hundred and seventy-eight; but the items which he gives amount, when summed up, only to three hundred and sixty-six. There seems no way of reconciling this discrepancy except by some violent change, which we are not warranted in making.

Ktesias represents that the numbers of the Persian war-ships at Salamis were above one thousand, those of the Greeks seven hundred (Persica, c. 26).

The Athenian orator in Thucydides (i, 74) calls the total of the Grecian fleet at Salamis "nearly four hundred ships, and the Athenian contingent somewhat less than *two parts* of this total (ναῦς μέν γε ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν)."

The Scholiast, with Poppo and most of the commentators on this passage, treat τῶν δύο μοιρῶν as meaning unquestionably *two parts out of three*: and if this be the sense, I should agree with Dr. Arnold in considering the assertion as a mere exaggeration of the orator, not at all carrying the authority of Thucydides himself. But I cannot think that we are here driven to such a necessity; for the construction of Didot and Göller, though Dr. Arnold pronounces it "a most undoubted error," appears to me perfectly admissible. They maintain that αἱ δύο μοιραὶ does not of necessity mean two parts *out of three*: in Thucydid. i, 10, we find καίτοι Πελοποννήσου τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοιρὰς νέμονται, where the words mean *two parts out of five*. Now in the passage before us, we have ναῦς μέν γε ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν: and Didot and Göller contend, that in the word τετρακοσίας is implied a quaternary division of the whole number,—*four hundreds* or *hundredth parts*: so that the whole meaning would be—"To the aggregate *four hundreds* of ships we contributed something less than *two*." The word τετρακοσίας, equivalent to τέσσαρας ἑκατοντάδας, naturally includes the general idea of τέσσαρας μοιράς: and this would bring the passage into exact analogy with the one cited above,—τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοιράς. With every respect to the judgment of Dr. Arnold on an author whom he had so long studied, I cannot enter into the grounds on which he has pronounced this interpretation of Didot and Göller to be "an undoubted error." It has the advantage of bringing the assertion of the orator in Thucydides into harmony with Herodotus, who states the Athenians to have furnished one hundred and eighty ships at Salamis.

Wherever such harmony can be secured by an admissible construction of existing words, it is an unquestionable advantage, and ought to count as a reason in the case, if there be a doubt between two admissible constructions. But on the other hand, I protest against altering numerical statements in one author, simply in order to bring him into accordance with another, and without some substantive ground in the text itself. Thus, for example, in this very passage of Thucydides, Bloomfield and Poppo propose to alter τετρακοσίας into τριακοσίας, in order that Thucydides may be in harmony with Æschylus and other authors, though not with Herodotus; while Didot and Göller would alter τριακοσίων into τετρακοσίων in Demosthenes de Coronâ (c. 70), in order that Demosthenes may be in harmony with Thucydides. Such emendations appear to me inadmissible in principle: we are not to force different witnesses into harmony by retouching their statements.

[225] Herodot. viii, 26. Παπαὶ, Μαρδόνιε, κοίους ἐπ' ἄνδρας ἤγαγες μαχησομένους ἡμέας, οἳ οὐ περὶ χρημάτων τὸν ἀγῶνα ποιεῦνται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἀρετῆς.

[226] Herodot. viii, 30.

[227] Herodot. viii, 28, 29.

[228] Herodot. viii, 32-34.

[229] Herodot. viii, 38, 39; Diodor. xi, 14; Pausan. x, 8, 4.

Compare the account given in Pausanias (x, 23) of the subsequent repulse of Brennus and the Gauls from Delphi: in his account, the repulse is not so exclusively the work of the gods as in that of Herodotus: there is a larger force of human combatants in defence of the temple, though greatly assisted by divine intervention: there is also loss on both sides. A similar descent of crags from the summit is mentioned.

See for the description of the road by which the Persians marched, and the extreme term of their progress, Ulrichs, Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland, ch. iv, p. 46; ch. x, p. 146.

Many great blocks of stone and cliff are still to be seen near the spot, which have rolled down from the top, and which remind the traveller of these passages.

The attack here described to have been made by order of Xerxes upon the Delphian temple, seems not easy to reconcile with the words of Mardonius, Herodot. ix, 42: still less can it be reconciled with the statement of Plutarch (Numa, c. 9), who says that the Delphian temple was burnt by the Medes.

[230] Herodot. viii, 52.

[231] Pausanias, i, 22, 4; Kruse, Hellas, vol. ii, ch. vi, p. 76. Ernst Curtius (Die Akropolis von Athens, p. 5, Berlin, 1844) says that the plateau of the acropolis is rather less than four hundred feet higher than the town: Fiedler states it to be one hundred and seventy-eight fathoms, or one thousand and sixty-eight feet above the level of the sea. (Reise durch das Königreich Griechenland, i, p. 2); he gives the length and breadth of the plateau in the same figures as Kruse, whose statement I have copied in the text. In Colonel Leake's valuable Topography of Athens, I do not find any distinct statement about the height of the acropolis. We must understand Kruse's statement, if he and Curtius are both correct, to refer only to the precipitous impracticable portion of the whole rock.

[232] Athenian legend represented the Amazons as having taken post on the Areopagus, and fortified it as a means of attacking the acropolis,—ἀντεπύργωσαν (Æschyl. Eumenid. 638).

[233] Herodot. viii, 52, 53. … ἔμπροσθε ὦν πρὸ τῆς ἀκροπόλιος, ὄπισθε δὲ τῶν πύλεων καὶ τῆς ἀνόδου, τῇ δὴ οὔτε τις ἐφύλασσε, οὔτ' ἂν ἤλπισε μή κοτέ τις κατὰ ταῦτα ἀναβαίη ἀνθρώπων, ταύτῃ ἀνέβησάν τινες κατὰ τὸ ἱρὸν τῆς Κέκροπος θυγατρὸς Ἀγλαύρου, καίτοιπερ ἀποκρήμνου ἐόντος τοῦ χώρου.

That the Aglaurion was on the north side of the acropolis, appears clearly made out; see Leake, Topography of Athens, ch. v, p. 261; Kruse, Hellas, vol. ii, ch. vi, p. 119; Forchhammer, Topographie Athens, pp. 365, 366; in Kieler Philologischen Studien, 1841. Siebelis (in the Plan of Athens prefixed to his edition of Pausanias, and in his note on Pausanias, i, 18, 2) places the Aglaurion erroneously on the eastern side of the acropolis.

The expressions ἔμπροσθε πρὸ τῆς ἀκροπόλιος appear to refer to the position of the Persian army, who would naturally occupy the northern and western fronts of the acropolis: since they reached Athens from the north,—and the western side furnished the only regular access. The hill called Areopagus would thus be nearly in the centre of their position. Forchhammer explains these expressions unsatisfactorily.

[234] Herodot. viii, 52, 53.

[235] Herodot. i, 84.

[236] Herodot. v, 102; viii, 53-99; ix, 65. ἔδεε γὰρ κατὰ τὸ θεοπρόπιον πᾶσαν τὴν Ἀττικὴν τὴν ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ γενέσθαι ὑπὸ Πέρσῃσι.

[237] Herodot. viii, 55-65.

[238] Herodot. viii, 66. Colonel Leake observes upon this statement (Athens and the Demi of Attica, App. vol. ii, p. 250), "*About one thousand ships* is the greatest accuracy we can pretend to, in stating the strength of the Persian fleet at Salamis: and from these are to be deducted, in estimating the number of ships engaged in the battle, those which were sent to occupy the Megaric strait of Salamis, two hundred in number."

The estimate of Colonel Leake appears somewhat lower than the probable reality. Nor do I believe the statement of Diodorus, that ships were detached to occupy the Megaric strait: see a note shortly following.

[239] The picture drawn in the Cyropædia of Xenophon represents the subjects of Persia as spiritless and untrained to war (ἀνάλκιδες καὶ ἀσύντακτοι) and even designedly kept so, forming a contrast to the native Persians (Xenophon, Cyropæd. viii, 1, 45).

[240] Herodot. viii, 68, 69, 70.

[241] Herodot. viii, 70.

[242] Herodot. viii. 49, 50, 56.

[243] Herodot. viii, 57. Οὗτοι ἄρα ἦν ἀπαίρωσι τὰς νῆας ἀπὸ Σαλαμῖνος, περὶ οὐδεμίης ἔτι πατρίδος ναυμαχήσεις· κατὰ γὰρ πόλις ἕκαστοι τρέψονται, etc. Compare vii, 139, and Thucyd. i, 73.

[244] Herodot. viii, 58, 59. The account given by Herodotus, of these memorable debates which preceded the battle of Salamis, is in the main distinct, instructive, and consistent. It is more probable than the narrative of Diodorus (xi, 15, 16), who states that Themistoklês succeeded in fully convincing both Eurybiadês and the Peloponnesian chiefs of the propriety of fighting at Salamis, but that, in spite of all their efforts, the armament would not obey them, and insisted on going to the Isthmus. And it deserves our esteem still more, if we contrast it with the loose and careless accounts of Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos. Plutarch (Themist. c. 11) describes the scene as if Eurybiadês was the person who desired to restrain the forwardness and oratory of Themistoklês, and with that view, first made to him the observation given in my text out of Herodotus, which Themistoklês followed up by the same answer,—next, lifted up his stick to strike Themistoklês, upon which the latter addressed to him the well-known observation,—"Strike, but hear me," (Πάταξον μὲν, ἄκουσον δέ.) Larcher expresses his surprise that Herodotus *should have suppressed* so impressive an anecdote as this latter: but we may see plainly from the tenor of his narrative that he cannot have heard it. In the narrative of Herodotus, Themistoklês gives no offence to *Eurybiadês*, nor is the latter at all displeased with him: nay, Eurybiadês is even brought over by the persuasion of Themistoklês, and disposed to fall in with his views. The persons whom Herodotus represents as angry with Themistoklês, are the Peloponnesian chiefs, especially Adeimantus the Corinthian. They are angry too, let it be added, not without plausible reason: a formal vote has just been taken by the majority, after full discussion; and here is the chief of the minority, who persuades Eurybiadês to reopen the whole debate: not an unreasonable cause for displeasure. Moreover, it is *Adeimantus*, not *Eurybiadês*, who addresses to Themistoklês the remark, that "persons who rise before the proper signal are scourged:" and he makes the remark because Themistoklês goes on speaking to, and trying to persuade, the various chiefs, *before* the business of the assembly has been formally opened. Themistoklês draws upon himself the censure by sinning against the forms of business, and talking before the proper time. But Plutarch puts the remark into the mouth of Eurybiadês, without any previous circumstance to justify it, and without any fitness. His narrative represents Eurybiadês as the person who was anxious both to transfer the ships to the Isthmus, and to prevent Themistoklês from offering any opposition to it: though such an attempt to check argumentative opposition from the commander of the Athenian squadron is noway credible.

Dr. Blomfield (ad Æschyl. Pers. 728) imagines that the story about Eurybiadês threatening Themistoklês with his stick, grew out of the story as related in Herodotus, though to Herodotus himself it was unknown. I cannot think that this is correct, since the story will not fit on to the narrative of that historian: it does not consist with his conception of the relations between Eurybiadês and Themistoklês.

[245] Herodot. viii, 61, 62. Σὺ εἰ μενέεις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μένων ἔσεαι ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀνατρέψεις τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

All the best commentators treat this as an elliptical phrase,—some such words as σώσεις τὴν Ἑλλάδα or καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι, being understood after ἀγαθός. I adopt their construction, not without doubts whether it be the true one.

[246] Herodot. viii, 64. Οὕτω μὲν οἱ περὶ Σαλαμῖνα, ἔπεσι ἀκροβολισάμενοι, ἐπεί τε Εὐρυβιάδῃ ἔδοξε, αὐτοῦ παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς ναυμαχήσοντες.

[247] Herodot. viii, 74. ἕως μὲν δὴ αὐτῶν ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὶ παρίστατο, θώυμα ποιεύμενοι τὴν Εὐρυβιάδεω ἀβουλίην· τέλος δὲ, ἐξερράγη ἐς τὸ μέσον, σύλλογός τε δὴ ἐγίνετο, καὶ πολλὰ ἐλέγετο περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, etc. Compare Plutarch, Themist. c. 12.

[248] Lykurgus (cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. 185) numbers the Æginetans among those who were anxious to escape from Salamis during the night, and were only prevented from doing so by the stratagem of Themistoklês. This is a great mistake, as indeed these orators are perpetually misconceiving the facts of their past history. The Æginetans had an interest not less strong than the Athenians in keeping the fleet together and fighting at Salamis.

[249] Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 12) calls Sikinnus a *Persian by birth*, which cannot be true.

[250] Herodot. viii, 75.

[251] Thucydid. i, 137. It is curious to contrast this with Æschylus, Persæ, 351, *seq.* See also Herodot. viii, 109, 110.

Isokratês might well remark about the ultimate rewards given by the Persians to Themistoklês,—Θεμιστοκλέα δ', ὃς ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος αὐτοὺς κατεναυμάχησε, τῶν μεγίστων δωρέων ἠξίωσαν (Panegyric, Or. iv, p. 74),—though that orator speaks as if he knew nothing about the stratagem by which Themistoklês compelled the Greeks to fight at Salamis against their will. See the same Oration, c. 27, p. 61.

[252] Æschylus, Persæ, 370.

Herodotus does not mention this threat to the generals, nor does he even notice the personal interference of Xerxes in any way, so far as regards the night-movement of the Persian fleet. He treats the communication of Sikinnus as having been made to the Persian generals, and the night-movement as undertaken by them. The statement of the contemporary poet seems the more probable of the two: but he omits, as might be expected, all notice of the perilous dissensions in the Greek camp.

[253] Diodorus (xi, 17) states that the Egyptian squadron in the fleet of Xerxes was detached to block up the outlet between Salamis and the Megarid; that is, to sail round the southwestern corner of the island to the northwestern strait. Where the northwestern corner of the island is separated by a narrow strait from Megara, near the spot where the fort of Budorum was afterwards situated, during the Peloponnesian war.

Herodotus mentions nothing of this movement, and his account evidently implies that the Greek fleet was inclosed to the north of the town of Salamis, the Persian right wing having got between that town and Eleusis. The movement announced by Diodorus appears to me unnecessary and improbable. If the Egyptian squadron had been placed there, they would have been far indeed removed from the scene of the action, but we may see that Herodotus believed them to have taken actual part in the battle along with the rest (viii, 100).

[254] Herodot. viii, 76. Τοῖσι δὲ ὡς πιστὰ ἐγίνετο τὰ ἀγγελθέντα, τοῦτο μὲν, ἐς τὴν νησίδα τὴν Ψυττάλειαν, μεταξὺ Σαλαμῖνός τε κειμένην καὶ τῆς ἠπείρου, πολλοὺς τῶν Περσέων ἀπεβίβασαν· τοῦτο δὲ, ἐπειδὴ ἐγίνοντο μέσαι νύκτες, ἀνῆγον μὲν τὸ ἀπ' ἑσπέρης κέρας κυκλούμενοι πρὸς τὴν Σαλαμῖνα· ἀνῆγον δὲ οἱ ἀμφὶ τὴν Κέον τε καὶ τὴν Κυνόσουραν τεταγμένοι, κατεῖχόν τε μέχρι Μουνυχίης πάντα τὸν πορθμὸν τῇσι νηῦσι.

He had previously stated Phalêrum as the main station of the Persian fleet; not necessarily meaning that the whole of it was there. The passage which I have just transcribed intimated what the Persians did to accomplish their purpose of surrounding the Greeks in the harbor of Salamis and the first part of it, wherein he speaks of the western (more properly northwestern) wing, presents no extraordinary difficulty, though we do not know how far the western wing extended before the movement was commenced. Probably it extended to the harbor of Peiræus, and began from thence its night-movement along the Attic coast to get beyond the town of Salamis. But the second part of the passage is not easy to comprehend, where he states that, "those who were stationed about Keos and Kynosura also moved, and beset with their ships the whole strait as far as Munychia." What places are Keos and Kynosura, and where were they situated? The only known places of those names, are the island of Keos, not far south of cape Sunium in Attica,—and the promontory Kynosura, on the northeastern coast of Attica, immediately north of the bay of Marathon. It seems hardly possible to suppose that Herodotus meant this latter promontory, which would be too distant to render the movement which he describes at all practicable: even the island of Keos is somewhat open to the same objection, though not in so great a degree, of being too distant. Hence Barthélemy, Kruse, Bähr, and Dr. Thirlwall, apply the names Keos and Kynosura to two promontories (the southernmost and the southeasternmost) of the island of Salamis, and Kiepert has realized their idea in his newly published maps. But in the first place, no authority is produced for giving these names to two promon-

tories in the island, and the critics only do it because they say it is necessary to secure a reasonable meaning to this passage of Herodotus. In the next place, if we admit their supposition, we must suppose that, *before this night-movement commenced*, the Persian fleet was already stationed in part of *the island of Salamis*: which appears to me highly improbable. Whatever station that fleet occupied before the night-movement, we may be very sure that it was not upon an island then possessed by the enemy: it was somewhere on the coast of Attica: and the names Keos and Kynosura must belong to some unknown points in *Attica*, not in Salamis. I cannot therefore adopt the supposition of these critics, though on the other hand Larcher is not satisfactory in his attempt to remove the objections which apply to the supposition of Keos and Kynosura as commonly understood. It is difficult in this case to reconcile the statement of Herodotus with geographical considerations, and I rather suspect that on this occasion the historian has been himself misled by too great a desire to find the oracle of Bakis truly fulfilled. It is from Bakis that he copies the name Kynosura (viii, 77).

[255] Herodot. viii, 79, 80.

Herodotus states, doubtless correctly, that Aristeidês, immediately after he had made the communication to the synod, went away, not pretending to take part in the debate: Plutarch represents him as present, and as taking part in it (Aristeidês, c. 9). According to Plutarch, Themistoklês desires Aristeidês to assist him in persuading Eurybiadês: according to Herodotus, Eurybiadês was already persuaded: it was the Peloponnesian chiefs who stood out.

The details of Herodotus will be found throughout both more credible and more consistent than those of Plutarch and the later writers.

[256] Æschylus, Pers. 473; Herodot. viii, 90. The throne with silver feet, upon which Xerxes had sat, was long preserved in the acropolis of Athens,—having been left at his retreat. Harpokration, Ἀργυρόπους δἰφρος.

A writer, to whom Plutarch refers,—Akestodôrus,—affirmed that the seat of Xerxes was erected, not under mount Ægaleos, but much further to the northwest, on the borders of Attica and the Megarid, under the mountains called Kerata (Plutarch, Themistoklês, 13). If this writer was acquainted with the topography of Attica, we must suppose him to have ascribed an astonishingly long sight to Xerxes: but we may probably take the assertion as a sample of that carelessness in geography which marks so many ancient writers. Ktesias recognizes the Ἡρακλεῖον (Persica, c. 26)

[257] Herodot. viii, 85; Diodor. xi, 16.

[258] Herodot. viii, 83; Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 13; Aristeidês, c. 9; Pelopidas, c. 21). Plutarch tells a story out of Phanias respecting an incident in the moment before the action, which it is pleasing to find sufficient ground for rejecting. Themistoklês, with the prophet Euphrantidês, was offering sacrifice by the side of the admiral's galley, when three beautiful youths, nephews of Xerxes, were brought in prisoners. As the fire was just then blazing brilliantly, and sneezing was heard from the right, the prophet enjoined Themistoklês to offer these three prisoners as a propitiatory offering to Dionysus Omêstês: which the clamor of the bystanders compelled him to do against his will. This is what Plutarch states in his life of Themistoklês; in his life of Aristeidês, he affirms that these youths were brought prisoners from Psyttaleia, when Aristeidês attacked *it at the beginning of the action*. Now Aristeidês did not attack Psyttaleia until the naval combat was nearly over, so that no prisoners can have been brought from thence at the commencement of the action: there could therefore have been no Persian prisoners to sacrifice, and the story may be dismissed as a fiction.

[259] Herodot. viii, 84. φανεῖσαν δὲ διακελεύσασθαι, ὥστε καὶ ἅπαν ἀκοῦσαι τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων στρατόπεδον, ὀνειδίσασαν πρότερον τάδε· Ὦ δαιμόνιοι, μέχρι κόσου ἔτι πρύμναν ἀνακρούεσθε;

Æschylus (Pers. 396-415) describes finely the war-shout of the Greeks and the response of the Persians: for very good reasons, he does not notice the incipient backwardness of the Greeks, which Herodotus brings before us.

The war-shout, here described by Æschylus, a warrior actually engaged, shows us the difference between a naval combat of that day and the improved tactics of the Athenians fifty years afterwards, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Phormio especially enjoins on his men the necessity of silence (Thucyd. ii, 89).

[260] Simonides, Epigram 138, Bergk; Plutarch, De Herodot. Malignitate, c. 36.

According to Plutarch (Themist. 12) and Diodorus (xi, 17), it was the Persian admiral's ship which was first charged and captured: if the fact had been so, Æschylus would probably have specified it.

[261] Herodot. viii, 85; Diodor. xi, 16. Æschylus, in the Persæ, though he gives a long list of the names of those who fought against Athens, does not make any allusion to the Ionic or to any other Greeks as having formed part of the catalogue. See Blomfield ad Æschyl. Pers. 42. Such silence easily admits of explanation: yet it affords an additional reason for believing that the persons so admitted did not fight very heartily.

[262] Herodot. viii, 86; Diodor. xi, 17. The testimony of the former, both to the courage manifested by the Persian fleet, and to their entire want of order and system, is decisive, as well as to the effect of the personal overlooking of Xerxes.

[263] Simonides, Epigr. 138, Bergk.

[264] The many names of Persian chiefs whom Æschylus reports as having been slain, are probably for the most part inventions of his own, to please the ears of his audience. See Blomfield, Præfat. ad Æschyl. Pers. p. xii.

[265] Herodot. viii, 90.

[266] Compare the indignant language of Demosthenês a century and a quarter afterwards, respecting the second Artemisia, queen of Karia, as the enemy of Athens,—ὑμεῖς δ' ὄντες Ἀθηναῖοι βάρβαρον ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ταῦτα γυναῖκα, φοβηθήσεσθε (Demosthenes, De Rhodior. Libertat. c. x, p. 197).

[267] Herodot. viii, 87, 88, 93. The story given here by Herodotus respecting the stratagem whereby Artemisia escaped, seems sufficiently probable; and he may have heard it from fellow-citizens of his own who were aboard her vessel. Though Plutarch accuses him of extravagant disposition to compliment this queen, it is evident that he does not himself like the story, nor consider it to be a compliment; for he himself insinuates a doubt: "I do not know whether she ran down the Kalyndian ship intentionally, or came accidentally into collision with it." Since the shock was so destructive that the Kalyndian ship was completely run down and sunk, so that every man of her crew perished, we may be pretty sure that it was intentional; and the historian merely suggests a possible hypothesis to palliate an act of great treachery. Though the story of the sinking of the Kalyndian ship has the air of truth, however, we cannot say the same about the observation of Xerxes, and the notice which he is reported to have taken of the act: all this reads like nothing but romance.

We have to regret (as Plutarch observes, De Malign. Herodot. p. 873) that Herodotus tells us so much less about others than about Artemisia; but he doubtless *heard* more about her than about the rest, and perhaps his own relatives may have been among her contingent.

[268] Herodot. viii, 95; Plutarch, Aristid. c. 9; Æschyl. Pers. 454-470; Diodor. xii, 19.

[269] Herodot. viii, 96.

[270] The victories of the Greeks over the Persians were materially aided by the personal timidity of Xerxes, and of Darius Codomannus at Issus and Arbela (Arrian, ii, 11, 6; iii, 14, 3).

[271] See this feeling especially in the language of Mardonius to Xerxes (Herodot. viii, 100), as well as in that put into the mouth of Artemisia by the historian (viii, 68), which indicates the general conception of the historian himself, derived from the various information which reached him.

[272] Herodot. vii, 10.

[273] This important fact is not stated by Herodotus: but it is distinctly given in Diodorus, xi, 19. It seems probable enough.

If the tragedy of Phrynichus, entitled *Phœnissæ*, had been preserved, we should have known more about the position and behavior of the Phenician contingent in this invasion. It was represented at Athens only three years after the battle of Salamis, in B. C. 477 or 476, with Themistoklês as choregus, four years earlier than the Persæ of Æschylus, which was affirmed by Glaukus to have been (παραπεποιῆσθαι) altered from it. The Chorus in the Phœnissæ consisted of Phenician women, possibly the widows of those Phenicians whom Xerxes had caused to be beheaded after the battle (Herodot. viii, 90, as Dr. Blomfield supposes, Præf. ad Æsch. Pers. p. ix), or only of Phenicians absent on the expedition. The fragments remaining of this tragedy, which gained the prize, are too scanty to sustain any conjectures as to its scheme or details (see Welcker Griechische Tragœd. vol. i, p. 26; and Droysen, Phrynichos, Æschylos, und die Trilogie, pp. 4-6).

[274] Herodot. ix, 32.

[275] Herodot. viii, 97-107. Such was the terror of these retreating seamen, that they are said to have mistaken the projecting cliffs of Cape Zôstêr (about half-way between Peiræus and Sunium) for ships, and redoubled the haste of their flight as if an enemy were after them,—a story which we can treat as nothing better than silly exaggeration in the Athenian informants of Herodotus.

Ktesias, Pers. c. xxvi; Strabo, ix, p. 395; the two latter talk about the intention to carry a mole across from Attica to Salamis, as if it had been conceived *before* the battle.

[276] Compare Herodot. vii, 10.

[277] Herodot. viii, 101, 102.

[278] Herodot. viii, 109, 110; Thucyd. i, 137. The words ἦν ψευδῶς προσεποιήσατο may probably be understood in a sense somewhat larger than that which they naturally bear in Thucydidês. In point of fact, not only was it false that Themistoklês was the person who dissuaded the Greeks from going to the Hellespont, but it was also false that the Greeks had ever any serious intention of going there. Compare Cornelius Nepos, Themistokl. c. 5.

[279] Herodot. viii, 111. ἐπεὶ Ἀνδρίους γε εἶναι γεωπείνας ἐς τὰ μέγιστα ἀνήκοντας, καὶ θεοὺς δύο ἀχρήστους οὐκ ἐκλείπειν σφέων τὴν νῆσον, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ φιλοχωρέειν—Πενίην τε καὶ Ἀμηχανίην.

Compare Alkæus, Fragm. 90, ed. Bergk, and Herodot. vii, 172.

[280] Herodot. viii, 112; Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 21,—who cites a few bitter lines from the contemporary poet Timokreon.

[281] Herodot. viii, 112-121.

[282] Herodot. viii, 114-126.

[283] The account given by Æschylus of this retiring march appears to me exaggerated, and in several points incredible (Persæ, 482-513). That they suffered greatly during the march from want of provisions, is doubtless true, and that many of them died of hunger. But we must consider in deduction: 1. That this march took place in the months of October and November, therefore not very long after the harvest. 2. That Mardonius maintained a large army in Thessaly all the winter, and brought them out in fighting condition in the spring. 3. That Artabazus also, with another large division, was in military operation in Thrace all the winter, after having escorted Xerxes into safety.

When we consider these facts, it will seem that the statements of Æschylus, even as to the sufferings by famine, must be taken with great allowance. But his statement about the passage of the Strymon appears to me incredible, and I regret to find myself on this point differing from Dr. Thirlwall, who considers it an undoubted fact. (Hist. Greece, ch. xv, p. 351, 2d ed.) "The river had been frozen in the night hard enough to bear those who arrived first. But the ice suddenly gave way under the morning sun, and numbers perished in the waters,"—so Dr. Thirlwall states, after Æschylus,—adding, in a note, "It is a little surprising that Herodotus, when he is describing the miseries of the retreat, does not notice this disaster, which is so prominent in the narrative of the Persian messenger in Æschylus. There can, however, be no doubt as to the fact: and perhaps it may furnish a useful warning, not to lay too much stress on the silence of Herodotus, as a ground for rejecting even important and interesting facts which are only mentioned by later writers," etc.

That a large river, such as the Strymon, near its mouth (180 yards broad, and in latitude about N. 40° 50′), at a period which could not have been later than the beginning of November, should have been frozen over in one night so hardly and firmly as to admit of a portion of the army marching over it at daybreak, before the sun became warm,—is a statement which surely requires a more responsible witness than Æschylus to avouch it. In fact, he himself describes it as a "frost out of season," (χειμῶν' ἄωρον,) brought about by a special interposition of the gods. If he is to be believed, none of the fugitives were saved, except such as were fortunate enough to cross the Strymon on the ice during the interval between break of day and the sun's heat. One would imagine that there was a pursuing enemy on their track, leaving them only a short time for escape: whereas in fact, they had no enemy to contend with,—nothing but the difficulty of finding subsistence. During the advancing march of Xerxes, a bridge of boats had been thrown over the Strymon: nor can any reason be given why that bridge should not still have been subsisting: Artabazus must have recrossed it after he had accompanied the monarch to the Hellespont. I will add, that the town and fortress of Eion, which commanded the mouth of the Strymon,

remained as an important strong-hold of the Persians some years after this event, and was only captured, after a desperate resistance, by the Athenians and their confederates under Kimon.

The Athenian auditors of the Persæ would not criticize nicely, the historical credibility of that which Æschylus told them about the sufferings of their retreating foe, nor his geographical credibility when he placed Mount Pangæus on the hither side of the Strymon, to persons marching out of Greece (Persæ, 494). But I must confess that, to my mind, his whole narrative of the retreat bears the stamp of the poet and the religious man, not of the historical witness. And my confidence in Herodotus is increased when I compare him on this matter with Æschylus,—as well in what he says as in what he does not say.

[284] Juvenal, Satir. x, 178.

> Ille tamen qualis rediit, Salamine relictâ,
>
> In Caurum atque Eurum solitus sævire flagellis, etc.

[285] Herodot. viii, 130.

[286] See the account of the retreat of Xerxes, in Herodotus, viii, 115-120, with many stories which he mentions only to reject. The description given in the Persæ of Æschylus (v, 486, 515, 570) is conceived in the same spirit. The strain reaches its loudest pitch in Justin (ii, 13), who tells us that Xerxes was obliged to cross the strait in a fishing-boat. "Ipse cum paucis Abydon contendit. Ubi cum solutum pontem hibernis tempestatibus offendisset, piscatoriâ scaphâ trepidus trajecit. Erat res spectaculo digna et, æstimatione sortis humanæ, rerum varietate miranda—in exiguo latentem videre navigio, quem paulo ante vix æquor omne capiebat: carentem etiam omni servorum ministerio, cujus exercitus propter multitudinem terris graves erant."

[287] Herodot. viii, 109. ἡμεῖς δὲ, εὕρημα γὰρ εὑρήκαμεν ἡμέας αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, μὴ διώκωμεν ἄνδρας φεύγοντας.

[288] Herodot. viii, 93-122; Diodor. xi, 27.

[289] Herodot. viii, 94; Thucyd. i, 42, 103. τὸ σφοδρὸν μῖσος from Corinth towards Athens. About Aristeus, Thucyd. ii, 67.

Plutarch (De Herodot. Malignit. p. 870) employs many angry words in refuting this Athenian scandal, which the historian himself does not uphold as truth. The story advanced by Dio Chrysostom (Or. xxxvii, p. 456), that Herodotus asked for a reward from the Corinthians, and on being refused, inserted this story into his history for the purpose of being revenged upon them, deserves no attention without some reasonable evidence: the statement of Diyllus, that he received ten talents from the Athenians as a reward for his history, would be much less improbable, so far as the fact of pecuniary reward, apart from the magnitude of the sum: but this also requires proof. Dio Chrysostom is not satisfied with rejecting this tale of the Athenians, but goes the length of affirming that the Corinthians carried off the palm of bravery, and were the cause of the victory. The epigrams of Simonides, which he cites, prove nothing of the kind (p. 459). Marcellinus (Vit. Thucyd. p. xvi), insinuates a charge against Herodotus, something like that of Plutarch and Dio.

[290] Herodot. viii, 123. Plutarch (Themist. c. 17: compare De Herodot. Malign. p. 871) states that *each individual* chief gave his second vote to Themistoklês. The more we test Herodotus by comparison with others, the more we shall find him free from the exaggerating spirit.

[291] Herodot. viii 124; Plutarch, Themist. c. 17.

[292] Diodor. xi, 27; compare Herodot. viii, 125, and Thucyd. i, 74.

[293] Herodot. viii, 85.

[294] Herodot. viii, 130; Diodor xi. 27.

[295] Herodot. viii, 131, 132: compare Thucyd. iii, 29-32.

Herodotus says, that the Chian envoys had great difficulty in inducing Leotychidês to proceed even as far as Delos,—τὸ γὰρ προσωτέρω πᾶν δεινὸν ἦν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι, οὔτε τῶν χώρων ἐοῦσι ἐμπείροισι, στρατιῆς τε πάντα πλέα ἐδόκεε εἶναι· τὴν δὲ Σάμον ἐπιστέατο δόξῃ καὶ Ἡρακλέας στήλας ἴσον ἀπέχειν.

This last expression of Herodotus has been erroneously interpreted by some of the commentators, as if it were a measure of the geographical ignorance, either of Herodotus himself, or of those whom he is describing. In my judgment, no inferences of this kind ought to be founded upon it: it marks fear of an enemy's country which they had not been accustomed to visit, and where they could not calculate the risk beforehand,—rather than any serious comparison between one distance and another. Speaking of our forefathers, such of them as were little used to the sea, we might say,—"A voyage to Bordeaux or Lisbon seemed to them as distant as a voyage to the Indies,"—by which we should merely affirm something as to their state of feeling, not as to their geographical knowledge.

[296] Herodot. ix, 1, 2, 67; viii, 136.

[297] Herodot. viii, 128, 129.

[298] Herodot. viii, 134, 135; Pausanias, ix, 24, 3.

[299] Herodot. viii. 141. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ … ἀναμνησθέντες τῶν λογίων, ὥς σφεας χρεὸν ἐστι ἅμα τοῖσι ἄλλοισι Δωριεῦσι ἐκπίπτειν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ὑπὸ Μήδων τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων, κάρτα τε ἔδεισαν μὴ ὁμολογήσωσι τῷ Πέρσῃ Ἀθηναῖοι, etc.

Such oracles must have been generated by the hopes of the *medizing* party in Greece at this particular moment: there is no other point of time to which they could be at all adapted,—no other, in which expulsion of all the Dorians from Peloponnesus, by united Persians and Athenians, could be even dreamed of. The Lacedæmonians are indeed said here, "to call to mind the prophecies,"—as if these latter were old, and not now produced for the first time. But we must recollect that a fabricator of prophecies, such as Onomakritus, would in all probability at once circulate them as old; that is, as forming part of some old collection like that of Bakis or Musæus. And Herodotus doubtless, himself, believed them to be old, so that he would naturally give credit to the Lacedæmonians for the same knowledge, and suppose them to be alarmed by "calling these prophecies to mind."

[300] Herodot. ix, 7.

[301] Herodot. viii, 142.

[302] Herodot. viii, 142. Πιεζευμένοισι μέντοι ὑμῖν συναχθόμεθα (say the Spartan envoys to the Athenians), καὶ ὅτι καρπῶν ἐστερήθητε διξῶν ἤδη, καὶ ὅτι οἰκοφθόρησθε χρόνον ἤδη πολλόν. Seeing that this is spoken before the invasion of Mardonius, the loss of *two crops* must include the seed of the preceding autumn; and the advice of Themistoklês to his countrymen,—καὶ τις οἰκίην τε ἀναπλασάσθω, καὶ σπόρου ἀνακῶς ἐχέτω (viii, 109)—must have been found impracticable in most cases to carry into effect.

[303] Lykurgus the Athenian orator, in alluding to this incident a century and a half afterwards, represents the Athenians as having been "on the point of stoning Alexander,"—μικροῦ δεῖν κατέλευσαν (Lykurg. cont. Leokrat. c. 17. p. 186)—one among many specimens of the careless manner in which these orators deal with past history.

[304] Herodot. viii, 143, 144; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 10. According to Plutarch, it was Aristeidês who proposed and prepared the reply to be delivered. But here as elsewhere, the loose, exaggerating style of Plutarch contrasts unfavorably with the simplicity and directness of Herodotus.

[305] Herodot. ix, 7. συνθέμενοι δὲ ἡμῖν τὸν Πέρσην ἀντιώσεσθαι ἐς τὴν Βοιωτίην, etc.

Diodorus gives the account of this embassy to Athens substantially in the same manner, coupling it however with some erroneous motives (xi, 28).

[306] Herodot. ix, 7. ἐπιστάμενοί τε ὅτι κερδαλεώτερόν ἐστι ὁμολογέειν τῷ Πέρσῃ μᾶλλον ἢ πολεμέειν, etc.

The orators are not always satisfied with giving to Athens the credit which she really deserved: they venture to represent the Athenians as having refused these brilliant offers from Xerxes on his first invasion, instead of from Mardonius in the ensuing summer. Xerxes never made any offers to them. See Isokratês, Or. iv, Panegyric, c. 27, p. 61.

[307] Herodot. ix, 10.

[308] Herodot. ix, 7. Οἱ γὰρ δὴ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὄρταζόν τε τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον καί σφι ἦν Ὑακίνθια· περὶ πλείστου δ' ἦγον τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πορσύνειν· ἅμα δὲ τὸ τεῖχός σφι τὸ ἐν τῷ Ἰσθμῷ ἐτείχεον, καὶ ἤδη ἐπάλξεις ἐλάμβανε.

Nearly a century after this, we are told that it was always the practice for the Amyklæan hoplites to go home for the celebration of the Hyakinthia, on whatever expedition they might happen to be employed (Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 5, 11).

[309] Diodor. xi, 28; Herodot. ix, 2, 3, 17. οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες παρεῖχον στρατιὴν καὶ συνεσέβαλον ἐς Ἀθήνας ὅσοι περ ἐμήδιζον Ἑλλήνων τῶν ταὐτῃ οἰκημένων, etc.

[310] Herodot. ix, 4.

[311] Herodot. ix, 5. I dare not reject this story about Lykidas (see Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 30, p. 222), though other authors recount the same incident as having happened to a person named Kyrsilus, during the preceding year, when the Athenians quitted Athens: see Demosthen. de Coronâ, p. 296, c. 59; and Cicero de Officiis, iii, 11. That two such acts were perpetrated by the Athenians, is noway probable: and if we are to choose between the two, the story of Herodotus is far the more probable. In the migration of the preceding year, we know that a certain number of Athenians actually did stay behind in the acropolis, and Kyrsilus might have been among them, if he had chosen. Moreover, Xerxes held out no offers, and gave occasion to no deliberation; while the offers of Mardonius might really appear to a well-minded citizen deserving of attention.

Isokrates (Or. iv, Panegyric. p. 74, c. 42) states that the Athenians condemned many persons to death for *medism* (in allusion doubtless to Themistoklês as one), but he adds,—"even now they imprecate curses on any citizen who enters into amicable negotiation with the Persians,"—ἐν δὲ τοῖς συλλόγοις ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀρὰς ποιοῦνται, εἴτις ἐπικηρυκεύεται Πέρσαις τῶν πολιτῶν. It is difficult to believe that in his time any such imprecation can have been included in the solemnities whereby the Athenian meetings were opened.

[312] Herodot. ix, 10, 11; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 10. Plutarch had read a decree ascribed to Aristeidês, in which Kimon, Xanthippus, and Myrônidês, were named envoys to Sparta. But it is impossible that Xanthippus could have taken part in the embassy, seeing that he was now in command of the fleet.

Probably the Helots must have followed: one hardly sees how so great a number could have been all suddenly collected, and marched off in one night, no preparations having been made beforehand.

Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. ch. xvi, p. 366) suspects the correctness of the narrative of Herodotus, on grounds which do not appear to me convincing. It seems to me that, after all, the literal narrative is more probable than anything which we can substitute in its place. The Spartan foreign policy all depended on the five ephors; there was no public discussion or criticism. Now the conduct of these ephors is consistent and intelligible,—though selfish, narrow-minded, and insensible to any dangers except what are present and obvious. Nor can I think, with Dr. Thirlwall, that the manner of communication ultimately adopted is of the nature of a jest.

[313] Herodot. ix, 12.

[314] There were stories current at Megara, even in the time of Pausanias, respecting some of these Persians, who were said to have been brought to destruction by the intervention of Artemis (Pausan. i, 40, 2).

[315] Herodot. ix, 15. The situation of the Attic deme Sphendalê, or Sphendaleis, seems not certainly known (Ross, Über die Demen von Attika, p. 138); but Colonel Leake and Mr. Finlay think that it stood "near Aio Merkurio, which now gives name to the pass leading from Dekeleia through the ridges of Parnes into the extremity of the Tanagrian plain, at a place called Malakasa." (Leake, Athens and the Demi of Attica, vol. ii, sect. iv, p. 123.)

Mr. Finlay (Oropus and the Diakria, p. 38) says that "Malakasa is the only place on this road where a considerable body of cavalry could conveniently halt."

It appears that the Bœotians from the neighborhood of the Asôpus were necessary as guides for this road. Perhaps even the territory of Orôpus was at this time still a part of Bœotia: we do not certainly know at what period it was first conquered by the Athenians.

The combats between Athenians and Bœotians will be found to take place most frequently in this southeastern region of Bœotia,—Tanagra, Œnophyta, Delium, etc.

[316] Herodot. ix, 15.

[317] The strong town of Thebes was of much service to him (Thucyd. i, 90).

[318] Herodot. ix, 40, 45, 67; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 18.

[319] Herodot. ix, 16. Thersander, though an Orchomenian, passes as a Theban—Πέρσην τε καὶ Θηβαῖον ἐν κλίνῃ ἑκάστῃ—a proof of the intimate connection between Thebes and Orchomenus at this time, which is farther illustrated by Pindar, Isthm. i, 51 (compare the Scholia ad loc. and at the beginning of the Ode), respecting the Theban family of Herodotus and Asôpodôrus. The ancient mythical feud appears to have gone to sleep, but a deadly hatred will be found to grow up in later times between these two towns.

[320] Herodot. ix, 16, 17. The last observation here quoted is striking and emphatic—ἐχθίστη δὲ ὀδύνη ἐστὶ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι αὕτη, πολλὰ φρονέοντα μηδενὸς κρατέειν. It will have to be more carefully considered at a later period of this history, when we come to touch upon the scientific life of the Greeks, and upon the philosophy of happiness and duty as conceived by Aristotle. If carried fully out, this position is the direct negative of what Aristotle lays down in his Ethics, as to the superior happiness of the βίος θεωρητικὸς, or life of scientific observation and reflection.

[321] Herodot. ix, 66.

[322] Herodot. ix, 17. διεξῆλθε φήμη, ὡς κατακοντιεῖ σφέας. Respecting φήμη, see a note a little farther on, at the battle of Mykalê, in this same chapter.

Compare the case of the Delians at Adramyttium, surrounded and slain with missiles by the Persian satrap, though not his enemies—περιστήσας τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ κατηκόντισε (Thucyd. viii, 108).

[323] Οὐκ ἔχω δ' ἀτρεκέως εἰπεῖν, οὔτε εἰ ἦλθον μὲν ἀπολέοντες τοὺς Φωκέας, δεηθέντων τῶν Θεσσαλῶν, etc. (Herodot. ix, 18.)

This confession of uncertainty as to motives and plans, distinguishing between them and the visible facts which he is describing, is not without importance as strengthening our confidence in the historian.

[324] Compare this list of Herodotus with the enumeration which Pausanias read inscribed on the statue of Zeus, erected at Olympia by the Greeks who took part in the battle of Platæa (Pausan. v, 23, 1).

Pausanias found inscribed all the names here indicated by Herodotus except the Palês of Kephallenia: and he found in addition the Eleians Keans, Kythnians, Tenians, Naxians, and Mêlians. The five last names are islanders in the Ægean: their contingents sent to Platæa must, at all events, have been very small, and it is surprising to hear that they sent any,—especially when we recollect that there was a Greek fleet at this moment on service, to which it would be natural that they should join themselves in preference to land-service.

With respect to the name of the Eleians, the suspicion of Bröndstedt is plausible, that Pausanias may have mistaken the name of the Palês of Kephallenia for theirs, and may have fancied that he read ΓΑΛΕΙΟΙ when it was really written ΠΑΛΕΙΣ, in an inscription at that time about six hundred years old. The place in the series wherein Pausanias places the name of the Eleians, strengthens the suspicion. Unless it be admitted, we shall be driven, as the most probable alternative, to suppose a fraud committed by the vanity of the Eleians, which may easily have led them to alter a name originally belonging to the Palês. The reader will recollect that the Eleians were themselves the superintendents and curators at Olympia.

Plutarch seems to have read the same inscription as Pausanias (De Herodoti Malignit. p. 873).

[325] Herodot. ix, 19, 28, 29.

[326] Herodot. ix, 28. οἱ ἐπιφοιτῶντές τε καὶ οἱ ἀρχὴν ἐλθόντες Ἑλλήνων.

[327] About the missile weapons and skill of the Persians, see Herodot. i, 136; Xenophon, Anabas. iii, 4, 17.

Cyrus the younger was eminent in the use both of the bow and the javelin (Xenoph. Anab. i, 8, 26; i, 9, 5: compare Cyropæd. i, 2, 4).

[328] See Quintus Curtius, iii, 11, 15; and the note of Mützel.

[329] Herodot. ix, 21, 22, 23; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 14.

[330] Herodot. ix, 24, 25. οἰμωγῇ τε χρεώμενοι ἁπλέτῳ· ἅπασαν γὰρ τὴν Βοιωτίην κατεῖχε ἠχώ, etc.

The exaggerated demonstrations of grief, ascribed to Xerxes and Atossa. in the Persæ of Æschylus, have often been blamed by critics: we may see from this passage how much they are in the manners of Orientals of that day.

[331] Herodot. ix, 25-30; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 11. τὸ τοῦ Ἀνδροκράτους ἡρῷον ἐγγὺς ἄλσει πυκνῶν καὶ συσκίων δένδρων περιεχόμενον.

The expression of Herodotus respecting this position taken by Pausanias, Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ταχθέντες ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀσωπῷ ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο, as well as the words which follow in the next chapter (31)—Οἱ βάρβαροι, πυθόμενοι εἶναι τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐν Πλαταιῇσι, παρῇσαν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀσωπὸν τὸν ταύτῃ ῥέοντα,—show plainly that the Grecian troops were encamped along the Asôpus on the Platæan side, while the Persians in their second position occupied the ground on the opposite, or Theban side of the river. Whichever army commenced the attack had to begin by passing the Asôpus (c. 36-59).

For the topography of this region, and of the positions occupied by the two armies, compare Squire, in Walpole's Turkey, p. 338; Kruse, Hellas, vol. ii, ch. vi, p. 9, *seq.*, and ch. viii, p. 592. *seq.*: and the still more copious and accurate information of Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, ch. xvi, vol. ii, pp. 324-360. Both of them have given plans of the region; that which I annex is borrowed from Kiepert's maps. I cannot but think that the fountain Gargaphia is not yet identified, and that both Kruse and Leake place the Grecian position farther from the river Asôpus than is consistent with the words of Herodotus; which words seem to specify points near the two extremities, indicating that the fountain of Gargaphia was near the river towards the right of the Grecian position, and the chapel of Androkratês also *near* the river towards the left of that position, where the Athenians were posted. Nor would such a site for a chapel of Androkratês be inconsistent with Thucydides (iii, 24), who merely mentions that chapel as being on the right hand of the first mile of road from Platæa to Thebes.

Considering the length of time which has elapsed since the battle, it would not be surprising if the spring of Gargaphia were no longer recognizable. At any rate, neither the fountain pointed out by Colonel Leake (p. 332) nor that of Vergutiani, which had been supposed by Colonel Squire and Dr. Clarke, appear to me suitable for Gargaphia.

The errors of that plan of the battle of Platæa which accompanies the Voyage d'Anacharsis, are now well understood.

[332] Herodot. ix, 26-29. Judging from the battles of Corinth (B. C. 396) and Mantineia (B. C. 418), the Tegeans seem afterwards to have dropped this pretension to occupy the left wing, and to have preferred the post in the line next to the Lacedæmonians (Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 2, 19).

[333] Herodot. ix, 31, 32.

[334] Herodot. ix, 36, 38. μεμισθωμένος οὐκ ὀλίγου.

These prophets were men of great individual consequence, as may be seen by the details which Herodotus gives respecting their adventures: compare also the history of Euenius, ix, 93.

[335] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. xi; Thucyd. ii, 74.

[336] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 13.

[337] Herodot. ix, 40, 49, 50. τήν τε κρήνην τὴν Γαργαφίην, ἀπ' ἧς ὑδρεύετο πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα τὸ Ἑλληνικόν—ἐρυκόμενοι δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀσωποῦ, οὕτω δὴ ἐπὶ τὴν κρήνην ἐφοίτεον· ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ γάρ σφι οὐκ ἐξῆν ὕδωρ φορέεσθαι, ὑπό τε τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τοξευμάτων.

Diodorus (xi, 30) affirms that the Greek position was so well defended by the nature of the ground, and so difficult of attack, that Mardonius was prevented from making use of his superior numbers. It is evident from the account of Herodotus that this is quite incorrect. The position seems to have had no protection except what it derived from the river Asôpus, and the Greeks were ultimately forced to abandon it by the incessant attacks of the Persian cavalry. The whole account, at once diffuse and uninstructive, given by Diodorus of this battle (xi, 30-36), forms a strong contrast with the clear, impressive, and circumstantial narrative of Herodotus.

[338] Herodot. ix, 38, 39.

[339] Herodot. ix, 40, 41.

[340] Herodot. ix, 42.

[341] Herodot. ix, 42.

[342] Herodot. ix, 43. Τοῦτον δ' ἔγωγε τὸν χρησμὸν τὸν Μαρδόνιος εἶπε ἐς Πέρσας ἔχειν, ἐς Ἰλλυρίους τε καὶ τὸν Ἐγχελέων στρατὸν οἶδα πεποιημένον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐς Πέρσας. Ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν Βάκιδι ἐς ταύτην τὴν μάχην ἔστι πεποιημένα, etc.

[343] Herodot. ix, 44-45. The language about the sacrifices is remarkable,—λέγω δὲ ὧν ὅτι Μαρδονίῳ τε καὶ τῇ στρατιῇ οὐ δύναται τὰ σφάγια καταθύμια γενέσθαι· πάλαι γὰρ ἂν ἐμάχεσθε, etc.

Mardonius had tried many unavailing efforts to procure better sacrifices: it *could* not be done.

[344] Herodot. ix, 47; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 16. Here, as on many other occasions, Plutarch rather spoils than assists the narrative of Herodotus.

[345] Herodot. ix, 71.

[346] Compare the reproaches of Hektor to Diomêdês (Iliad, viii, 161).

[347] Herodot. ix, 49, 50. Pausanias mentions that the Platæans restored the fountain of Gargaphia after the victory (τὸ ὕδωρ ἀνεσώσαντο); but he hardly seems to speak as if he had himself seen it (ix, 4, 2).

[348] See a good description of the ground in Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, ch. xvi, vol. ii, p. 358.

[349] Herodot. ix, 51. Ἐς τοῦτον δὴ τὸν χῶρον ἐβουλεύσαντο μεταστῆναι, ἵνα καὶ ὕδατι ἔχωσι χρᾶσθαι ἀφθόνῳ, καὶ οἱ ἱππέες σφέας μὴ σινοίατο, ὥσπερ κατ' ἰθὺ ἐόντων.

The last words have reference to the position of the two hostile armies, extended front to front along the course of the Asôpus.

[350] Herodot. ix, 52. κείνην μὲν τὴν ἡμέρην πᾶσαν, προσκειμένης τῆς ἵππου, εἶχον πόνον ἄτρυτον.

[351] Herodot. ix, 56. Παυσανίης—σημήνας ἀπῆγε διὰ τῶν κολωνῶν τοὺς λοιποὺς πάντας· εἵποντο δὲ καὶ Τεγεῆται. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ταχθέντες ἦϊσαν τὰ ἔμπαλιν ἢ Λακεδαιμόνιοι. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε ὄχθων ἀντείχοντο καὶ τῆς ὑπωρείης τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ, κάτω τραφθέντες ἐς τὸ πεδίον.

With which we must combine another passage, c. 59, intimating that the track of the Athenians led them to turn and get behind the hills, which prevented Mardonius from seeing them, though they were marching along the plain: Μαρδόνιος—ἐπεῖχε ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Τεγεήτας μούνους· Ἀθηναίους γὰρ τραπομένους ἐς τὸ πεδίον ὑπὸ τῶν ὄχθων οὐ κατεώρα.

[352] There is on this point a difference between Thucydides and Herodotus: the former affirms that there never was any Spartan lochus so called (Thucyd. i, 21).

We have no means of reconciling the difference, nor can we be certain that Thucydides is right in his negative comprehending all past time—ὃς οὐδ' ἐγένετο πώποτε.

[353] Herodot. ix, 53, 54.

[354] Herodot. ix, 52, 53.

[355] Herodot. ix, 54, Ἀθηναῖοι—εἶχον ἀτρέμας σφέας αὐτοὺς ἵνα ἐτάχθησαν, ἐπιστάμενοι τὰ Λακεδαιμονίων φρονήματα, ὡς ἄλλα φρονεόντων καὶ ἄλλα λεγόντων.

[356] Herodot. xi. 56, 57.

[357] Herodot. ix, 59. ἐδίωκον ὡς ποδῶν ἕκαστος εἶχον, οὔτε κόσμῳ οὐδενὶ κοσμηθέντες, οὔτε τάξι. Καὶ οὗτοι μὲν βοῇ τε καὶ ὁμίλῳ ἐπήϊσαν, ὡς ἀναρπασόμενοι τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

Herodotus dwells especially on the reckless and disorderly manner in which the Persians advanced: Plutarch, on the contrary, says of Mardonius,—ἔχων συντεταγμένην τὴν δύναμιν ἐπεφέρετο τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, etc. (Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 17.)

Plutarch also says that Pausanias ἦγε τὴν ἄλλην δύναμιν πρὸς τὰς Πλαταιὰς, etc., which is quite contrary to the real narrative of Herodotus. Pausanias intended to march to the island, not to Platæa: he did not reach either the one or the other.

[358] Herodot. ix, 60, 61.

[359] About the Persian bow, see Xenoph. Anabas. iii, 4, 17.

[360] Herod. ix, 72.

[361] Herodot. ix, 62. Καὶ τοῖσι Λακεδαιμονίοισι αὐτίκα μετὰ τὴν εὐχὴν τὴν Παυσανίεω ἐγίνετο θυομένοισι τὰ σφάγια χρηστά. Plutarch exaggerates the long-suffering of Pausanias (Aristeid. c. 17, ad finem).

The lofty and conspicuous site of the Heræon, visible to Pausanias at the distance where he was, is plainly marked in Herodotus (ix, 61).

For incidents illustrating the hardships which a Grecian army endured from its reluctance to move without favorable sacrifices, see Xenophon, Anabasis, vi, 4, 10-25; Hellenic. iii, 2, 17.

[362] Herodot. ix, 62, 63. His words about the courage of the Persians are remarkable: λήματι μέν νυν καὶ ῥώμῃ οὐκ ἔσσονες ἦσαν οἱ Πέρσαι· ἄνοπλοι δὲ ἐόντες, καὶ πρὸς, ἀνεπιστήμονες ἦσαν, καὶ οὐκ ὁμοῖοι τοῖσι ἐναντίοισι σοφίην … πλεῖστον γὰρ σφεας ἐδηλέετο ἡ ἐσθὴς ἐρῆμος ἐοῦσα ὅπλων· πρὸς γὰρ ὁπλίτας ἐόντες γυμνῆτες ἀγῶνα ἐποιεῦντο. Compare the striking conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus (Herodot. vii, 104).

The description given by Herodotus of the gallant rush made by these badly-armed Persians, upon the presented line of spears in the Lacedæmonian ranks, may be compared with Livy (xxxii, 17), a description of the Romans attacking the Macedonian phalanx, and with the battle of Sempach (June, 1386), in which fourteen hundred half-armed Swiss overcame a large body of fully-armed Austrians, with an impenetrable front of projecting spears; which for some time they were unable to break in upon, until at length one of their warriors, Arnold von Winkelried, grasped an armful of spears, and precipitated himself upon them, making a way for his countrymen over his dead body. See Vogelin, Geschichte der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, ch. vi, p. 240, or indeed any history of Switzerland, for a description of this memorable incident.

[363] For the arms of the Persians, see Herodot. vii, 61.

Herodotus states in another place that the Persian troops adopted the Egyptian breastplates (θώρηκας): probably this may have been after the battle of Platæa. Even at this battle, the Persian leaders on horseback had strong defensive armor, as we may see by the case of Masistius, above narrated: by the time of the battle of Kunaxa, the habit had become more widely diffused (Xenoph. Anabas. i, 8, 6; Brisson, De Regno Persarum, lib. iii, p. 361), for the cavalry at least.

[364] Herodot. ix, 64, 65.

[365] Herodot. ix, 67, 68.

[366] Herodot. ix, 67, 68. Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων τῶν μετὰ βασιλέος ἐθελοκακεόντων … καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων ὁ πᾶς ὅμιλος οὔτε διαμαχεσάμενος οὐδενὶ οὔτε τι ἀποδεξάμενος ἔφυγεν.

[367] Herodot. ix, 66.

[368] Herodot. ix, 69.

[369] Herodot. ix, 70; Demosthenês cont. Timokrat. p. 741, c. 33. Pausanias (i, 27, 2) doubts whether this was really the cimeter of Mardonius, contending that the Lacedæmonians would never have permitted the Athenians to take it.

[370] Herodot. ix, 70: compare Æschyl. Pers. 805-824. He singles out "the Dorian spear" as the great weapon of destruction to the Persians at Platæa,—very justly. Dr. Blomfield is surprised at this compliment; but it is to be recollected that all the earlier part of the tragedy had been employed in setting forth the glory of Athens at Salamis, and he might well afford to give the Peloponnesians the credit which they derived at Platæa. Pindar distributes the honor between Sparta and Athens in like manner (Pyth. i, 76).

[371] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 19. Kleidemus, quoted by Plutarch, stated that all the fifty-two Athenians who perished belonged to the tribe Æantis, which distinguished itself in the Athenian ranks. But it seems impossible to believe that no citizens belonging to the other nine tribes were killed.

[372] Diodorus, indeed, states that Pausanias was so apprehensive of the numbers of the Persians, that he forbade his soldiers to give quarter or take any prisoners (xi, 32); but this is hardly to be believed, in spite of his assertion. His statement that the Greeks lost ten thousand men is still less admissible.

[373] Herodot. ix, 89. The allusions of Demosthenês to Perdikkas king of Macedonia, who is said to have attacked the Persians on their flight from Platæa, and to have rendered their ruin complete, are too loose to de-

serve attention; more especially as Perdikkas was *not then* king of Macedonia (Demosthenês cont. Aristokrat. pp. 687, c. 51; and περὶ Συντάξεως, p. 173, c. 9).

[374] Herodot. ix, 84. Herodotus indeed assigns this second burial-place only to the other *Spartans*, apart from the Select. He takes no notice of the Lacedæmonians not Spartans, either in the battle or in reference to burial, though he had informed us that five thousand of them were included in the army. Some of them must have been slain, and we may fairly presume that they were buried along with the Spartan citizens generally. As to the word ἰρέας, or εἴρενας, or ἱππέας (the two last being both conjectural readings), it seems impossible to arrive at any certainty: we do not know by what name these select warriors were called.

[375] Herodot. ix, 85. Τῶν δ' ἄλλων ὅσοι καὶ φαίνονται ἐν Πλαταιῇσι ἐόντες τάφοι, τούτους δὲ, ὡς ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι, ἐπαισχυνομένους τῇ ἀπεστοῖ τῆς μάχης, ἑκάστους χώματα χῶσαι κεινὰ, τῶν ἐπιγινομένων εἵνεκεν ἀνθρώπων· ἐπεὶ καὶ Αἰγινητέων ἐστὶ αὐτόθι καλεόμενος τάφος, τὸν ἐγὼ ἀκούω καὶ δέκα ἔτεσι ὕστερον μετὰ ταῦτα, δεηθέντων τῶν Αἰγινητέων, χῶσαι Κλεάδην τὸν Αὐτοδίκου, ἄνδρα Πλαταιέα, πρόξεινον ἐόντα αὐτῶν.

This is a curious statement, derived by Herodotus doubtless from personal inquiries made at Platæa.

[376] Herodot. ix, 78, 79. This suggestion, so abhorrent to Grecian feeling, is put by the historian into the mouth of the Æginetan Lampôn. In my preceding note, I have alluded to another statement made by Herodotus, not very creditable to the Æginetans: there is, moreover, a third (ix, 80), in which he represents them as having cheated the Helots in their purchases of the booty. We may presume him to have heard all these anecdotes at Platæa: at the time when he probably visited that place, not long before the Peloponnesian war, the inhabitants were united in the most intimate manner with Athens, and doubtless sympathized in the hatred of the Athenians against Ægina. It does not from hence follow that the stories are all untrue. I disbelieve, indeed, the advice said to have been given by Lampôn to crucify the body of Mardonius,—which has more the air of a poetical contrivance for bringing out an honorable sentiment, than of a real incident. But there seems no reason to doubt the truth of the other two stories. Herodotus does but too rarely specify his informants: it is interesting to scent out the track in which his inquiries have been prosecuted.

After the battle of Kunaxa, and the death of Cyrus the younger, his dead body had the head and hands cut off, by order of Artaxerxes, and nailed to a cross (Xenoph. Anab. i, 10, 1; iii, 1, 17).

[377] Herodot. ix, 84; Pausanias, ix, 2, 2.

[378] Herodot. ix, 80, 81: compare vii, 41-83.

[379] Diodorus (xi, 33) states this proportional distribution. Herodotus only says—ἔλαβον ἕκαστοι τῶν ἄξιοι ἦσαν (ix, 81).

[380] Herodot. ix, 76, 80, 81, 82. The fate of these female companions of the Persian grandees, on the taking of the camp by an enemy, forms a melancholy picture here as well as at Issus, and even at Kunaxa: see Diodor. xvii, 35; Quintus Curtius, iii, xi, 21; Xenoph. Anab. i, 10, 2.

[381] Plutarch animadverts severely (De Malign. Herodot. p. 873; compare Plut. Aristeid. c. 19) upon Herodotus, because he states that none of the Greeks had any share in the battle of Platæa except the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians: the orator Lysias repeats the same statement (Oratio Funebr. c. 9).

If this were the fact (Plutarch asks) how comes it that the inscriptions and poems of the time recognize the exploit as performed by the whole Grecian army, Corinthians and others included? But these inscriptions do not really contradict what is affirmed by Herodotus. The actual battle happened to be fought only by a part of the collective Grecian army; but this happened in a great measure by accident; the rest were little more than a mile off, and until within a few hours had been occupying part of the same continuous line of position; moreover, if the battle had lasted a little longer, they would have come up in time to render actual help. They would naturally be considered, therefore, as entitled to partake in the glory of the entire result.

When however in after-times a stranger visited Platæa, and saw Lacedæmonian, Tegean, and Athenian tombs, but no Corinthian nor Æginetan, etc., he would naturally inquire how it happened that none of these latter had fallen in the battle, and would then be informed that they were not really present at it. Hence the motive for these cities to erect empty sepulchral monuments on the spot, as Herodotus informs us that they afterwards did or caused to be done by individual Platæans.

[382] Herodot. ix, 77.

[383] See, a little above in this chapter, the treatment of the wife and children of the Athenian senator Lykidas (Herodot. ix, 5). Compare also Herodot. iii, 116; ix, 120.

[384] Herodot. ix, 87, 88.

[385] Thucyd. i, 131. καὶ πιστεύων χρήμασι διαλύσειν τὴν διαβολήν. Compare Thucyd. viii, 45, where he states that the trierarchs and generals of the Lacedæmonian and allied fleet, all except Hermokratês of Syracuse, received bribes from Tissaphernes to betray the interests both of their seamen and of their country: also c. 49 of the same book about the Lacedæmonian general Astyochus. The bribes received by the Spartan kings Leotychidês and Pleistoanax are recorded (Herodot. vi, 72; Thucyd. ii, 21).

[386] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 20; De Herodot. Malign. p. 873.

[387] Herodot. iv, 71, 72.

[388] Thucyd. ii, 71, 72. So the Roman emperor Vitellius, on visiting the field of Bebriacum, where his troops had recently been victorious, "instaurabat sacrum Diis loci." (Tacitus, Histor. ii, 70.)

[389] Thucyd. ii, 71; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 19-21; Strabo, ix, p. 412; Pausanias, ix, 2, 4.

The Eleutheria were celebrated on the fourth of the Attic month Boedromion, which was the day on which the battle itself was fought; while the annual decoration of the tombs, and ceremonies in honor of the deceased, took place on the sixteenth of the Attic month Mæmaktêrion. K. F. Hermann (Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen, ch. 63, note 9) has treated these two celebrations as if they were one.

[390] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 21.

[391] Thucyd. i, 90.

[392] It is to this general and solemn meeting, held at Platæa after the victory, that we might probably refer another vow noticed by the historians and orators of the subsequent century, if that vow were not of suspicious authenticity. The Greeks, while promising faithful attachment, and continued peaceful dealing among themselves, and engaging at the same time to amerce in a tithe of their property all who had *medized*,—are said to have vowed that they would not repair or rebuild the temples which the Persian invader had burnt; but would leave them in their half-ruined condition as a monument of his sacrilege. Some of the injured temples near Athens were seen in their half-burnt state even by the traveller Pausanias (x, 35, 2), in his time. Periklês, forty years after the battle, tried to convoke a Pan-Hellenic assembly at Athens, for the purpose of deliberating what should be done with these temples (Plutarch, Periklês, c. 17). Yet Theopompus pronounced this alleged oath to be a fabrication, though both the orator Lykurgus and Diodorus profess to report it verbatim. We may safely assert that the oath, *as they give it*, is not genuine; but perhaps the vow of tithing those who had voluntarily joined Xerxes, which Herodotus refers to an earlier period, when success was doubtful, may now have been renewed in the moment of victory: see Diodor. ix, 29; Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 19, p. 193; Polybius, ix, 33; Isokrates, Or. iv; Panegyr. c. 41, p. 74; Theopompus, Fragm. 167, ed. Didot; Suidas, v. Δεκατεύειν, Cicero de Republicâ, iii, 9, and the beginning of the chapter last but one preceding, of this history.

[393] Herodot. ix, 91, 92, 95; viii, 132, 133. The prophet of Mardonius at Platæa bore the same name, and was probably the more highly esteemed for it (Herodot. ix, 37).

Diodorus states the fleet as comprising two hundred and fifty triremes (xi, 34).

The anecdotes respecting the Apolloniate Euenius, the father of Deïphonus, will be found curious and interesting (Herodot. ix, 98, 94). Euenius, as a recompense for having been unjustly blinded by his countrymen, had received from the gods the grant of prophecy transmissible to his descendants: a new prophetic breed was thus created, alongside of the Iamids, Telliads, Klytiads, etc.

[394] Herodot. ix, 96. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένοντο τῆς Σαμίης πρὸς Καλάμοισι, οἱ μὲν αὐτοῦ ὁρμισάμενοι κατὰ τὸ Ἡραῖον τὸ ταύτῃ, παρεσκευάζοντο ἐς ναυμαχίην.

It is by no means certain that the Heræum here indicated is the celebrated temple which stood near the city of Samos (iii, 80): the words of Herodotus rather seem to indicate that another temple of Hêrê, in some other part of the island, is intended.

[395] Herodotus describes the Persian position by topographical indications known to his readers, but not open to be determined by us,—Gæson, Skolopœis, the chapel of Dêmêtêr, built by Philistus, one of the primitive

colonists of Miletus, etc. (ix, 96): from the language of Herodotus, we may suppose that Gæson was the name of a town as well as of a river (Ephonas ap. Athenæ. vi, p. 311).

The eastern promontory (cape Poseidion) of Samos was separated only by seven stadia from Mykalê (Strabo, xiv, p. 637), near to the place where Glaukê was situated (Thucyd. viii. 79),—modern observers make the distance rather more than a mile (Poppo, Prolegg. ad Thucyd. vol. ii, p. 465).

[396] Herodot. ix, 96, 97.

[397] Herodot. ix, 98, 99, 104.

[398] Herodot. ix, 100, 101. ἰοῦσι δέ σφι (Ἕλλησι) φήμη τε ἐσέπτατο ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον πᾶν, καὶ κηρυκήϊον ἐφάνη ἐπὶ τῆς κυματωγῆς κείμενον. ἡ δὲ φήμη διῆλθέ σφι ὧδε, ὡς οἱ Ἕλληνες τὴν Μαρδονίου στρατιὴν νικῷεν ἐν Βοιωτίῃ μαχόμενοι. Δῆλα δὴ πολλοῖσι τεκμηρίοισί ἐστι τὰ θεῖα τῶν πρηγμάτων· εἰ καὶ τότε τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρης συμπιπτούσης τοῦ τε ἐν Πλαταιῇσι καὶ τοῦ ἐν Μυκάλῃ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι τρώματος, φήμη τοῖσι Ἕλλησι τοῖσι ταύτῃ ἐσαπίκετο, ὥστε θαρσῆσαί τε τὴν στρατιὴν πολλῷ μᾶλλον, καὶ ἐθέλειν προθυμότερον κινδυνεύειν … γεγονέναι δὲ νίκην τῶν μετὰ Παυσανίεω Ἑλλήνων ὀρθῶς σφι ἡ φήμη συνέβαινε ἐλθοῦσα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν Πλαταιῇσι πρωῒ ἔτι τῆς ἡμέρης ἐγίνετο· τὸ δὲ ἐν Μυκάλῃ, περὶ δείλην … ἦν δὲ ἀῤῥωδίη σφι πρὶν τὴν φήμην ἐσαπικέσθαι, οὔτι περὶ σφέων αὐτῶν οὕτω, ὡς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, μὴ περὶ Μαρδονίῳ πταίσῃ ἡ Ἑλλάς, ὡς μέντοι ἡ κληδὼν αὕτη σφι ἐσέπτατο, μᾶλλόν τι καὶ ταχύτερον τὴν πρόσοδον ἐποιεῦντο: compare Plutarch, Paul. Emilius, c. 24, 25, about the battle of Pydna. The φήμη which circulated through the assembled army of Mardonius in Bœotia, respecting his intention to kill the Phocians, turned out incorrect (Herodot. ix, 17).

Two passages in Æschines (cont. Timarchum. c. 27, p. 57, and De Fals. Legat. c. 45, p. 290) are peculiarly valuable as illustrating the ancient idea of Φήμη,—a divine voice, or vocal goddess, generally considered as informing a crowd of persons at once, or moving them all by one and the same unanimous feeling,—the Vox Dei passing into the Vox Populi. There was an altar to Φήμη at Athens (Pausan. i, 17, 1); compare Hesiod. Opp. Di. 761, and the Ὄσσα of Homer, which is essentially the same idea as Φήμη: Iliad, ii, 93. μετὰ δέ σφισιν Ὄσσα δεδήει Ὀτρύνουσ' ἰέναι, Διὸς ἄγγελος; also Odyssey, i, 282—opposed to the idea of a distinct human speaker or informant—ἦν τίς τοι εἴπῃσι βροτῶν, ἢ Ὄσσαν ἀκούσῃς Ἐκ Διὸς, ἥτε μάλιστα φέρει κλέος ἀνθρώποισι; and Odyss. xxiv, 412. Ὄσσα δ' ἄρ' ἄγγελος ὦκα κατὰ πτόλιν ᾤχετο πάντη, Μνηστήρων στυγερὸν θάνατον καὶ κῆρ' ἐνέπουσα. The word κληδὼν is used in the same meaning by Sophokles, Philoktet. 255 (see Andokides de Mysteriis, c. 22, p. 64): and Herodotus in the passage now before us considers the two as identical,—compare also Herodot. v, 72: both words are used also to signify an omen conveyed by some undesigned human word or speech, which in that particular case is considered as determined by the special intervention of the gods for the information of some person who hears it: see Homer, Odyss. xx, 100: compare also Aristophan. Aves, 719; Sophoklês, Œdip. Tyr. 43-472; Xenophon, Symposion, c. 14, s. 48.

The descriptions of *Fama* by Virgil, Æneid, iv, 17 6, *seqq.*, and Ovid Metamorph. xii, 40, *seqq.*, are more diffuse and overcharged, departing from the simplicity of the Greek conception.

We may notice, as partial illustrations of what is here intended, those sudden, unaccountable impressions of panic terror which occasionally ran through the ancient armies or assembled multitudes, and which were supposed to be produced by Pan or by Nymphs—indeed sudden, violent, and contagious impressions of every kind, not merely of fear. Livy, x, 28. "Victorem equitatum velut *lymphaticus* pavor dissipat." ix, 27. "Milites, incertum ob quam causam, *lymphatis* similes ad arma discurrunt,"—in Greek, νυμφόληπτοι: compare Polyæn, iv. 3, 26, and an instructive note of Mutzel, ad Quint. Curt. iv, 46, 1 (iv, 12, 14).

But I cannot better illustrate that idea, which the Greeks invested with divinity under the name of Φήμη, than by transcribing a striking passage from M. Michelet's Histoire de la Révolution Françoise. The illustration is the more instructive, because the religious point of view, which in Herodotus is predominant,—and which, to the believing mind, furnishes an explanation preëminently satisfactory,—has passed away in the historian of the nineteenth century, and gives place to a graphic description of the real phenomenon, of high importance in human affairs; the common susceptibilities, common inspiration and common spontaneous impulse, of a multitude, effacing for the time each man's separate individuality.

M. Michelet is about to describe that ever-memorable event, the capture of the Bastile, on the 14th of July, 1789 (ch. vii, vol. i, p. 105).

"Versailles, avec un gouvernement organisé, un roi, des ministres, un général, une armée, n'étoit qu'hésitation, doute, incertitude, dans la plus complète anarchie morale.

"Paris, bouleversé, délaissé de toute autorité légale, dans un désordre apparent, atteignit, le 14 Juillet, ce qui moralement est l'ordre le plus profond, l'unanimité des esprits.

"Le 13 Juillet, Paris ne songeait qu'à se defendre. Le 14, il attaqua.

"Le 13, au soir, il y avoit encore des doutes, il n'y en eut plus le matin. Le soir étoit plein de troubles, de fureur désordonnée. Le matin fut lumineux et d'une sérénité terrible.

"*Une idée se leva sur Paris avec le jour, et tous virent la même lumière. Une lumière dans les esprits, et dans chaque cœur une voix*: Va, et tu prendras la Bastille!

"Cela étoit impossible, insensé, étrange à dire;… Et tous le crurent néanmoins. Et cela se fit.

"La Bastille, pour être une vieille forteresse, n'en étoit pas moins imprenable, à moins d'y mettre plusieurs jours, et beaucoup d'artillerie. Le peuple n'avoit en cette crise ni le temps ni les moyens de faire un siége régulier. L'eût il fait, la Bastille n'avoit pas à craindre, ayant assez de vivres pour attendre un secours si proche, et d'immenses munitions de guerre. Ses murs de dix pieds d'épaisseur au sommet des tours, de trente et quarante à la base, pouvaient rire longtemps des boulets: et ses batteries, à elle, dont le feu plongeoit sur Paris, auroient pu en attendant démolir tout le Marais, tout le Faubourg St. Antoine.

"L'attaque de la Bastille ne fut un acte nullement raisonnable. Ce fut un acte de foi.

"*Personne ne proposa. Mais tous crurent et tous agirent.* Le long des rues, des quais, des ponts, des boulevards, la foule criait à la foule—à la Bastille—à la Bastille. Et dans le tocsin qui sonnoit, tous entendoient: à la Bastille.

"*Personne, je le répète, ne donna l'impulsion.* Les parleurs du Palais Royal passèrent le temps à dresser une liste de proscription, à juger à mort la Reine, la Polignac, Artois, le prévôt Flesselles, d'autres encore. Les noms des vainqueurs de la Bastille n'offrent pas un seul des faiseurs de motions. Le Palais Royal ne fut pas le point de départ, et ce n'est pas non plus au Palais Royal que les vainqueurs raménèrent les depouilles et les prisonniers.

"Encore moins les électeurs qui siégeaient à l'Hotel de Ville eurent ils l'idée de l'attaque. Loin de là, pour l'empêcher, pour prévenir le carnage que la Bastille pouvoit faire si aisément, ils allèrent jusqu'à promettre au gouverneur, que s'il retirait ses canons, on ne l'attaqueroit pas. Les électeurs ne trahissoient pas comme ils en furent accusés; mais ils n'avoient pas la foi.

"Qui l'eut? Celui qui eut aussi le dévoument, la force, pour accomplir sa foi. Qui? Le peuple, tout le monde."

[399] Diodor. xi, 35; Polyæn. i, 33. Justin (ii, 14) is astonished in relating "tantam famæ velocitatem."

[400] Herodot. ix, 102, 103. Οὗτοι δὲ (Πέρσαι), κατ' ὀλίγους γινόμενοι, ἐμάχοντο τοῖσι αἰεὶ ἐς τὸ τεῖχος ἐσπίπτουσι Ἑλλήνων.

[401] Herodot. ix, 104, 105. Diodorus (xi, 36) seems to follow different authorities from Herodotus: his statement varies in many particulars, but is less probable.

Herodotus does not specify the loss on either side, nor Diodorus that of the Greeks; but the latter says that forty thousand Persians and allies were slain.

[402] Herodot. ix, 105.

[403] Herodot. ix, 107. I do not know whether we may suppose Herodotus to have heard this from his fellow-citizen Xenagoras.

[404] Herodot. ix, 108-113. He gives the story at considerable length: it illustrates forcibly and painfully the interior of the Persian regal palace.

[405] Herodot. viii, 132.

[406] Herodot. ix, 106; Diodor. xi, 37. The latter represents the Ionians and Æolians as having actually consented to remove into European Greece, and indeed the Athenians themselves as having at first consented to it, though the latter afterwards repented and opposed the scheme.

[407] Such wholesale transportations of population from one continent to another have always been more or less in the habits of Oriental despots, the Persians in ancient times and the Turks in more modern times: to a conjunction of free states, like the Greeks, they must have been impracticable.

See Von Hammer, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, vol. i, book vi, p. 251, for the forced migrations of people from Asia into Europe, directed by the Turkish Sultan Bajazet (A. D. 1390-1400).

[408] Herodot. viii, 115, 117; ix, 106, 114.

[409] See the preceding volume of this history, ch. xxx, p 119; ch. xxxiv, p. 271; ch. xxxv, p. 307.

[410] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5. 17. τὰ ἑαυτοῦ τείχη.

[411] Herodot. vii, 147. Schol. ad Aristophan. Equites, 262.

In illustration of the value set by Athens upon the command of the Hellespont, see Demosthenês, De Fals. Legat. c. 59.

[412] Herodot. ix, 114, 115. Σηστὸν—φρούριον καὶ φυλακὴν τοῦ παντὸς Ἑλλησπόντου—Thucyd. viii, 62: compare Xenophon, Hellenic. ii, 1, 25.

[413] Thucyd. viii, 102.

[414] Herodot. ix, 116: compare i, 4. Ἀρταΰκτης, ἀνὴρ Πέρσης, δεινὸς δὲ καὶ ἀτάσθαλος· ὃς καὶ βασιλέα ἐλαύνοντα ἐπ' Ἀθήνας ἐξηπάτησε, τὰ Πρωτεσίλεω τοῦ Ἰφίκλου χρήματα ἐξ Ἐλαιοῦντος ὑφελόμενος. Compare Herodot. ii, 64.

[415] Herodot. ix, 118, 119, 120. Οἱ γὰρ Ἐλαιούσιοι τιμωρέοντες τῷ Πρωτεσίλεῳ ἐδέοντό μιν καταχρησθῆναι καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ταύτῃ ὁ νόος ἔφερε.

[416] Herodot. ix, 121. It must be either to the joint Grecian armament of this year, or to that of the former year, that Plutarch must intend his celebrated story respecting the proposition of Themistoklês, condemned by Aristeidês, to apply (Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 20; Aristeidês, c. 22). He tells us that the Greek fleet was all assembled to pass the winter in the Thessalian harbor of Pagasæ, when Themistoklês formed the project of burning all the other Grecian ships except the Athenian, in order that no city except Athens might have a naval force. Themistoklês, he tells us, intimated to the people, that he had a proposition, very advantageous to the state, to communicate; but that it could not be publicly proclaimed and discussed: upon which they desired him to mention it privately to Aristeidês. Themistoklês did so: and Aristeidês told the people, that the project was at once eminently advantageous and not less eminently unjust. Upon which the people renounced it forthwith, without asking what it was.

Considering the great celebrity which this story has obtained, some allusion to it was necessary, though it has long ceased to be received as matter of history. It is quite inconsistent with the narrative of Herodotus, as well as with all the conditions of the time: Pagasæ was *Thessalian*, and as such hostile to the Greek fleet rather than otherwise: the fleet seems to have never been there: moreover, we may add, that taking matters as they then stood, when the fear from Persia was not at all terminated, the Athenians would have lost more than they gained by burning the ships of the other Greeks, so that Themistoklês was not very likely to conceive the scheme, nor Aristeidês to describe it in the language put into his mouth.

The story is probably the invention of some Greek of the Platonic age, who wished to contrast justice with expediency, and Aristeidês with Themistoklês,—as well as to bestow at the same time panegyric upon Athens in the days of her glory.

[417] Everything which has ever been said about Phalaris is noticed and discussed in the learned and acute Dissertation of Bentley on the Letters of Phalaris: compare also Seyffert, Akragas und sein Gebiet, pp. 57-61, who, however, treats the pretended Letters of Phalaris with mere consideration than the readers of Dr. Bentley will generally be disposed to sanction.

The story of the brazen bull of Phalaris seems to rest on sufficient evidence: it is expressly mentioned by Pindar, and the bull itself, after having been carried away to Carthage when the Carthaginians took Agrigentum, was restored to the Agrigentines by Scipio when he took Carthage. See Aristot. Polit. v, 8, 4; Pindar, Pyth. i, 185; Polyb. xii, 25; Diodor. xiii, 90; Cicero in Verr. iv, 33.

It does not appear that Timæus really called in question the historical reality of the bull of Phalaris, though he has been erroneously supposed to have done so. Timæus affirmed that the bull which was shown in his own time at Agrigentum was not the identical machine: which was correct, for it must have been *then* at Carthage, from whence it was not restored to Agrigentum until after 146 B. C. See a note of Boeckh on the Scholia ad Pindar. Pyth. i, 185.

[418] Thucyd. vi, 5; Schol. ad Pindar. Olymp. v, 19; compare Wesseling ad Diodor. xi, 76.

[419] At Gela, Herodot. vii, 153; at Syracuse, Aristot. Politic. v, 3, 1.

[420] Aristot. Politic. v, 8, 4; v, 10, 4. Καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα μεταβάλλει ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ὥσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ σχεδὸν αἱ πλεῖσται τῶν ἀρχαίων· ἐν Λεοντίνοις εἰς τὴν Παναιτίου τυραννίδα, καὶ ἐν Γέλᾳ εἰς τὴν Κλεάνδρου, καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς πόλεσιν ὡσαύτως.

[421] Diodorus ascribes the foundation of Herakleia to Dorieus; this seems not consistent with the account of Herodotus, unless we are to assume that the town of Herakleia which Dorieus founded was destroyed by the Carthaginians, and that the name Herakleia was afterwards given by Euryleon or his successors to that which had before been called Minoa (Diodor. iv, 23).

A funereal monument in honor of Athenæus, one of the settlers who perished with Dorieus, was seen by Pausanias at Sparta (Pausanias, iii, 16, 4).

[422] Herodot. v, 43, 46.

[423] Herodot. vii, 158. The extreme brevity of his allusion is perplexing, as we have no collateral knowledge to illustrate it.

[424] Polyænus, v, 6.

[425] See about Têlinês and this hereditary priesthood, Herodot. vii, 153. τούτους ὧν ὁ Τηλίνης κατήγαγε ἐς Γέλην, ἔχων οὐδεμίαν ἀνδρῶν δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἰρὰ τούτων τῶν θεῶν· ὅθεν δὲ αὐτὰ ἔλαβε, ἢ αὐτὸς ἐκτήσατο, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχω εἶπαι. τούτοισι δὲ ὧν πίσυνος ἐὼν, κατήγαγε, ἐπ' ᾧ τε οἱ ἀπόγονοι αὐτοῦ ἱροφάνται τῶν θεῶν ἔσονται: compare a previous passage of this history, vol. i, chap. i, p. 26.

It appears from Pindar, that Hiero exercised this hereditary priesthood (Olymp. vi, 160 (95), with the Scholia ad loc. and Scholia ad Pindar. Pyth. ii, 27).

About the story of Phyê personifying Athênê at Athens, see above, vol. iv of this history, chap. xxx, p. 105.

The ancient religious worship addressed itself more to the eye than to the ear; the words spoken were of less importance than the things exhibited, the persons performing, and the actions done. The vague sense of the Greek and Latin neuter, ἱερὰ, or *sacra*, includes the entire ceremony, and is difficult to translate into a modern language: but the verbs connected with it, ἔχειν, κεκτῆσθαι, κομίζειν, φαίνειν, ἱερὰ—ἱεροφάντης, etc., relate to exhibition and action. This was particularly the case with the mysteries (or solemnities not thrown open to the general public but accessible only to those who went through certain preliminary forms, and under certain restrictions) in honor of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, as well as of other deities in different parts of Greece. The λεγόμενα, or things *said* on these occasions, were of less importance than the δρώμενα and δεικνύμενα, or *matters shown and things done* (see Pausanias, ii, 37, 3). Herodotus says, about the lake of Sais in Egypt, Ἐν δὲ τῇ λίμνῃ ταύτῃ τὰ δείκηλα τῶν παθέων αὐτοῦ (of Osiris) νυκτὸς ποιεῦσι, τὰ καλέουσι μυστήρια Αἰγύπτιοι: he proceeds to state that the Thesmophoria celebrated in honor of Dêmêtêr in Greece were of the same nature, and gives his opinion that they were imported into Greece from Egypt. Homer (Hymn. Cerer. 476): compare Pausan. ii, 14, 2.

Δεῖξεν Τριπτολέμῳ τε, Διόκλεΐ τε πληξίππῳ

Δρησμοσύνην ἱερῶν· καὶ ἐπέφραδεν ὄργια παισὶ

Πρεσβυτέρῃς Κελέοιο…

Ὄλβιος, ὃς τάδ' ὄπωπεν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων, etc.

Compare Euripid. Hippolyt. 25; Pindar, Fragm. xcvi; Sophocl. Frag. lviii, ed. Brunck; Plutarch, De Profect. in Virtute, c. 10, p. 81: De Isid. et Osir. p. 353, c. 3. ὡς γὰρ οἱ τελούμενοι κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν θορύβῳ καὶ βοῇ πρὸς

ἀλλήλους ὠθούμενοι συνίασι, δρωμένων δὲ καὶ δεικνυμένων τῶν ἱερῶν, προσέχουσιν ἤδη μετὰ φόβου καὶ σιωπῆς: and Isokratês, Panegyric. c. 6, about Eleusis, τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ νῦν δείκνυμεν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτόν. These mysteries consisted thus chiefly of exhibition and action addressed to the eyes of the communicants, and Clemens Alexandrinus calls them a mystic drama—Δηὼ καὶ Κόρη δρᾶμα ἐγενέσθην μυστικὸν, καὶ τὴν πλάνην καὶ τὴν ἁρπαγὴν καὶ τὸ πένθος ἡ Ἐλευσὶς δᾳδουχεῖ. The word ὄργια is originally nothing more than a consecrated expression for ἔργα—ἱερὰ ἔργα (see Pausanias, iv, 1, 4, 5), though it comes afterwards to designate the whole ceremony, matters shown as well as matters done—τὰ ὄργια κομίζων—ὀργίων παντοίων συνθέτης, etc.: compare Plutarch, Alkibiad. 22-34.

The sacred objects exhibited formed an essential part of the ceremony, together with the chest in which such of them as were movable were brought out—τελετῆς ἐγκύμονα μυστίδα κίστην (Nonnus, ix, 127). Æschines, in assisting the religious lustrations performed by his mother, was bearer of the chest—κιστόφορος καὶ λικνόφορος (Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 79, p. 313). Clemens Alexandrius (Cohort. ad Gent. p. 14) describes the objects which were contained in these mystic chests of the Eleusinian mysteries,—cakes of particular shape, pomegranates, salt, ferules, ivy, etc. The communicant was permitted, as a part of the ceremony, to take these out of the chest and put them into a basket, afterwards putting them back again: "Jejunavi et ebibi cyceonem: ex cistâ sumpsi et in calathum misi: accepi rursus, in cistulam transtuli," (Arnobius ad Gent. v, 175, ed. Elmenherst,) while the uninitiated were excluded from seeing it, and forbidden from looking at it "even from the house-top."

Τὸν κάλαθον κατιόντα χαμαὶ θασεῖσθε βέβαλοι

Μήδ' ἀπὸ τῶ τέγεος.

(Kallimachus, Hymn. in Cererem, 4.)

Lobeck, in his learned and excellent treatise, Aglaophamus (i, p. 51), says: "Sacrorum nomine tam Græci, quam Romani, præcipuè signa et imagines Deorum, omnemque sacram supellectilem dignari solent. Quæ res animum illuc potius inclinat, ut putem Hierophantas ejusmodi ἱερὰ in conspectum hominum protulisse, sive deorum simulacra, sive vasa sacra et instrumenta aliave priscæ religionis monumenta; qualia in sacrario Eleusinio asservata fuisse, etsi nullo testimonio affirmare possumus, tamen probabilitatis speciem habet testimonio similem. Namque non solum in templis ferè omnibus cimelia venerandæ antiquitatis condita erant, sed in mysteriis ipsis talium rerum mentio occurrit, quas initiati summâ cum veneratione aspicerent, non initiatis ne aspicere quidem liceret…. Ex his testimoniis efficitur (p. 61) sacra quæ Hierophanta ostendit, illa ipsa fuisse ἄγια φάσματα sive simulacra Deorum, eorumque aspectum qui præbeant δείξαι τὰ ἱερὰ vel παρέχειν vel φαίνειν dici, et ab hoc quasi primario Hierophantæ actu tum Eleusiniorum sacerdotum principem nomen accepisse, tum totum negotium esse nuncupatum."

Compare also K. F. Hermann, Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen, part ii, ch. ii, sect. 32.

A passage in Cicero de Haruspicum Responsis (c. 11), which is transcribed almost entirely by Arnobius adv. Gentes, iv, p. 148, demonstrates the minute precision required at Rome in the performance of the festival of the Megalesia: the smallest omission or alteration was supposed to render the festival unsatisfactory to the gods.

The memorable history of the Holy Tunic at Treves, in 1845, shows what immense and wide-spread effect upon the human mind may be produced, even in the nineteenth century, by ἱερὰ δεικνύμενα.

[426] Herodot. vii, 154.

[427] Herodot. vi, 22, 23. Σκύθην μὲν τὸν μούναρχον τῶν Ζαγκλαίων, ὡς ἀποβαλόντα τὴν πόλιν, ὁ Ἱπποκράτης πεδήσας, καὶ τὸν ἀδελφεὸν αὐτοῦ Πυθογένεα, ἐς Ἴνυκον πόλιν ἀπέπεμψε.

The words ὡς ἀποβαλόντα seem to imply the relation preëxisting between Hippokratês and Skythês, as superior and subject; and punishment inflicted by the former upon the latter for having lost an important post.

[428] Herodot. vi, 23, 24. Aristotle (Politic. v, 2, 11) represents the Samians as having been first actually received into Zanklê, and afterwards expelling the prior inhabitants: his brief notice is not to be set against the perspicuous narrative of Herodotus.

[429] Thucyd. vi, 4; Schol. ad Pindar. Pyth. ii, 84; Diodor. xi, 48.

[430] Herodot. vii, 155; Thucyd. vi, 5. The ninth Nemean Ode of Pindar (v, 40), addressed to Chromius the friend of Hiero of Syracuse, commemorates, among other exploits, his conduct at the battle of the Helôrus.

[431] Herodot. vii, 155. Ὁ γὰρ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Συρηκοσίων ἐπιόντι Γέλωνι παραδιδοῖ τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἑωϋτόν.

Aristotle (Politic. v, 2, 6) alludes to the Syracusan democracy prior to the despotism of Gelo as a case of democracy ruined by its own lawlessness and disorder. But such can hardly have been the fact, if the narrative of Herodotus is to be trusted. The expulsion of the Gamori was not an act of lawless democracy, but the rising of free subjects and slaves against a governing oligarchy. After the Gamori were expelled, there was no time for the democracy to constitute itself, or to show in what degree it possessed capacity for government, since the narrative of Herodotus indicates that the restoration by Gelo followed closely upon the expulsion. And the superior force, which Gelo brought to the aid of the expelled Gamori, is quite sufficient to explain the submission of the Syracusan people, had they been ever so well administered. Perhaps Aristotle may have had before him reports different from those of Herodotus: unless, indeed, we might venture to suspect that the name of *Gelo* appears in Aristotle by lapse of memory in place of that of *Dionysius*. It is highly probable that the partial disorder into which the Syracusan democracy had fallen immediately before the despotism of Dionysius, was one of the main circumstances which enabled him to acquire the supreme power; but a similar assertion can hardly be made applicable to the early times preceding Gelo, in which, indeed, democracy was only just beginning in Greece.

The confusion often made by hasty historians between the names of Gelo and Dionysius, is severely commented on by Dionysius of Halikarnassus (Antiq. Roman. vii, 1, p. 1314): the latter, however, in his own statement respecting Gelo, is not altogether free from error, since he describes Hippokratês as *brother* of Gelo. We must accept the supposition of Larcher, that Pausanias (vi, 9, 2), while professing to give the date of Gelo's occupation of *Syracuse*, has really given the date of Gelo's occupation of *Gela* (see M. Fynes Clinton, Fast. Hellen. ad ann. 491 B. C.).

[432] Herodot. vii, 156. Μεγαρέας τε τοὺς ἐν Σικελίῃ, ὡς πολιορκεόμενοι ἐς ὁμολογίην προσεχώρησαν, τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν παχέας, ἀειραμένους τε πόλεμον αὐτῷ καὶ προσδοκέοντας ἀπολέεσθαι διὰ τοῦτο, ἄγων ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας πολιήτας ἐποίησε· τὸν δὲ δῆμον τῶν Μεγαρέων, οὐκ ἐόντα μεταίτιον τοῦ πολέμου τούτου, οὐδὲ προσδεκόμενον κακὸν οὐδὲν πείσεσθαι, ἀγαγὼν καὶ τούτους ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας, ἀπέδοτο ἐπ' ἐξαγωγῇ ἐκ Σικελίης. Τὠυτὸ δὲ τούτου καὶ Εὐβοέας τοὺς ἐν Σικελίῃ ἐποίησε διακρίνας. Ἐποίεε δὲ ταῦτα τούτους ἀμφοτέρους, νομίσας δῆμον εἶναι συνοίκημα ἀχαριτώτατον.

[433] Diodor. xi, 21.

[434] Pausan. v, 27, 1, 2. We find the elder Dionysius, about a century afterwards, transferring the entire free population of conquered towns (Kaulonia and Hipponium in Italy, etc.) to Syracuse (Diodor. xiv, 106, 107).

[435] See the sixth Olympic Ode of Pindar, addressed to the Syracusan Agêsias. The Scholiast on v. 5, of that ode,—who says that not Agêsias himself, but some of his progenitors migrated from Stymphâlus to Syracuse,—is contradicted not only by the Scholiast on v. 167, where Agêsias is rightly termed both Ἀρκὰς and Συρακόσιος; but also by the better evidence of Pindar's own expressions,—συνοικιστήρ τε τᾶν κλεινᾶν Συρακοσσᾶν,—οἴκοθεν οἴκαδε, with reference to Stymphâlus and Syracuse,—δὺ' ἀγκύραι (v, 6, 99, 101 = 166-174).

Ergotelês, an exile from Knôssus in Krete, must have migrated somewhere about this time to Himera in Sicily. See the twelfth Olympic Ode of Pindar.

[436] Herodot. viii, 26.

[437] Herodot. vii, 157. σὺ δὲ δυνάμιός τε ἥκεις μεγάλης, καὶ μοῖρά τοι τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐκ ἐλαχίστη μέτα, ἄρχοντί γε Σικελίης: and even still stronger, c. 163. ἐὼν Σικελίης τύραννος.

The word ἄρχων corresponds with ἀρχὴ, such as that of the Athenians, and is less strong than τύραννος.

The numerical statement is contained in the speech composed by Herodotus for Gelo (vii, 158).

[438] Herodot. vii, 145. τὰ δὲ Γέλωνος πρήγματα μεγάλα ἐλέγετο εἶναι· οὐδαμῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τῶν οὐ πολλὸν μέζω.

[439] Herodot. vii, 158. Gelo says to the envoys from Peloponnesus:—Ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, λόγον ἔχοντες πλεονέκτην, ἐτολμήσατε ἐμὲ σύμμαχον ἐπὶ τὸν βάρβαρον παρακαλέοντες ἐλθεῖν. Αὐτοὶ δὲ, ἐμεῦ πρότερον

δεηθέντος βαρβαρικοῦ στρατοῦ συνεπάψασθαι, ὅτε μοι πρὸς Καρχηδονίους νεῖκος συνῆπτο, ἐπισκήπτοντός τε τὸν Δωριέος τοῦ Ἀναξανδρίδεω πρὸς Ἐγεσταίων φόνον ἐκπρήξασθαι, ὑποτείνοντός τε τὰ ἐμπόρια συνελευθεροῦν, ἀπ' ὧν ὑμῖν μεγάλαι ὠφελίαι τε καὶ ἐπαυρέσιες γεγόνασι· οὔτε ἐμεῦ εἵνεκα ἤλθετε βοηθήσοντες, οὔτε τὸν Δωριέος φόνον ἐκπρηξόμενοι· τὸ δὲ κατ' ὑμέας τάδε ἅπαντα ὑπὸ βαρβάροισι νέμεται. Ἀλλὰ εὖ γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄμεινον κατέστη· νῦν δὲ, ἐπειδὴ περιελήλυθε ὁ πόλεμος καὶ ἀπῖκται ἐς ὑμέας, οὕτω δὴ Γέλωνος μνῆστις γέγονε.

It is much to be regretted that we have no farther information respecting the events which these words glance at. They seem to indicate that the Carthaginians and Egestæans had made some encroachments, and threatened to make more: that Gelo had repelled them by actual and successful war. I think it strange, however, that he should be made to say: "*You* (the Peloponnesians) have derived great and signal advantages from these seaports;"—the profit derived from the latter by *the Peloponnesians* can never have been so great as to be singled out in this pointed manner. I should rather have expected, ἀπ' ὧν ἡμῖν (and not ἀπ' ὧν ὑμῖν),—which must have been true in point of fact, and will be found to read quite consistently with the general purport of Gelo's speech.

[440] Herodot. vii, 161, 162. Polybius (xii, 26) does not seem to have read this embassy as related by Herodotus,—or at least he must have preferred some other account of it;—he gives a different account of the answer which they made to Gelo: an answer (not insolent, but) business-like and evasive,—πραγματικώτατον ἀπόκριμα, etc. See Timæus, Fragm. 87, ed. Didot.

[441] Ephorus, Fragment. 111, ed. Didot; Diodor. xi, 1, 20. Mitford and Dahlmann (Forschungen, *Herodotus*, etc., sect. 35, p. 186) call in question this alliance or understanding between Xerxes and the Carthaginians; but on no sufficient grounds, in my judgment.

[442] Herodot. vii, 165; Diodor. xi, 23: compare also xiii, 55, 59. In like manner Rhegium and Messênê formed the opposing interest to Syracuse, under Dionysius the elder (Diodor. xiv, 44).

[443] Herodotus (vii, 165) and Diodorus (xi, 20) both give the number of the land-force: the latter alone gives that of the fleet.

[444] Herodot. vii, 165. The Ligyes came from the southern junction of Italy and France; the gulfs of Lyons and Genoa. The Helisyki cannot be satisfactorily verified: Niebuhr considers them to have been the *Volsci*: an ingenious conjecture.

[445] Polyb. i, 67. His description of the mutiny of the Carthaginian mercenaries, after the conclusion of the first Punic war, is highly instructive.

[446] Diodor. xi, 21-24.

[447] Herodotus, vii, 167. σώματα ὅλα καταγίζων. This passage of Herodotus receives illustration from the learned comment of Mövers on the Phenician inscription recently discovered at Marseilles. It was the usual custom of the Jews, and it had been in old times the custom with the Phenicians (Porphyr. de Abstin. iv, 15), to burn the victim entire: the Phenicians departed from this practice, but the departure seems to have been considered as not strictly correct, and in times of great misfortune or anxiety the old habit was resumed (Mövers, Das Opferwesen der Karthager. Breslau, 1847, pp. 71-118).

[448] Herodot. vii, 166, 167. Hamilkar was son of a Syracusan mother: a curious proof of *connubium* between Carthage and Syracuse. At the moment when the elder Dionysius declared war against Carthage, in 398 B. C., there were many Carthaginian merchants dwelling both in Syracuse and in other Greco-Sicilian cities, together with ships and other property. Dionysius gave license to the Syracusans, at the first instant when he had determined on declaring war, to plunder all this property (Diodor. xiv, 46). This speedy multiplication of Carthaginians with merchandise in the Grecian cities, so soon after a bloody war had been concluded, is a strong proof of the spontaneous tendencies of trade.

[449] Diodor. xiii, 62. According to Herodotus, the battle of Himera took place on the same day as that of Salamis; according to Diodorus, on the same day as that of Thermopylæ. If we are forced to choose between the two witnesses, there can be no hesitation in preferring the former: but it seems more probable that neither is correct.

As far as we can judge from the brief allusions of Herodotus, he must have conceived the battle of Himera in a manner totally different from Diodorus. Under such circumstances, I cannot venture to trust the details given by the latter.

[450] I presume this treatment of Anaxilaus by Gelo must be alluded to in Diodorus, xi, 66: at least it is difficult to understand what other "great benefit" Gelo had conferred on Anaxilaus.

[451] Diodor. xi, 26.

[452] Schol. ad Pindar. Pyth. ii, 3; Plutarch, De Serâ Numinis Vindictâ, p. 552, c. 6.

[453] Diodor. xx, 14.

[454] Pindar, Nem. ix, 67 (= 28 B.) with the Scholia.

[455] Simonidês, Epigr. 141, ed. Bergk.

[456] Herodot. vii, 163-165: compare Diodor. xi, 26; Ephorus, Fragm. 111, ed. Didot.

[457] Diodor. xi, 25. αἱ δὲ πόλεις εἰς πέδας κατέστησαν τοὺς διαιρεθέντας αἰχμαλώτους, καὶ τὰ δημόσια τῶν ἔργων διὰ τούτων ἐπεσκεύαζον.

For analogous instances of captives taken in war being employed in public works by the captors, and laboring in chains, see the cases of Tegea and Samos in Herodot. i, 66; iii, 39.

[458] Diodor. xi, 25. Respecting slaves belonging to the public, and let out for hire to individual employers, compare the large financial project conceived by Xenophon, De Vectigalibus, capp. 3 and 4.

[459] Diodor. xi, 38, 67; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 29; Aristotle, Γελώων Πολιτεία; Fragm. p. 106, ed. Neumann.

[460] Diodor. xi, 49.

[461] Diodor. xi, 72, 73.

[462] Diodor. xi, 67; Aristotel. Politic. v, 9, 3. In spite of the compliments directly paid by Pindar to Hiero (πραῦς ἀστοῖς, οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς, ξείνοις δὲ θαυμαστὸς πατὴρ, Pyth. iii, 71 = 125), his indirect admonitions and hints sufficiently attest the real character (see Dissen ad Pindar. Pyth. i, and ii, pp. 161-182).

[463] Diodor. xi, 48; Schol. Pindar, Olymp. ii, 29.

[464] Schol. ad Pindar. Olymp. ii, 173. For the few facts which can be made out respecting the family and genealogy of Thêro, see Göller, De Situ et Origine Syracusarum, ch. vii, pp. 19-22. The Scholiasts of Pindar are occasionally useful in explaining his brief historical allusions; but they seem to have had very few trustworthy materials before them for so doing.

[465] Diodor. xi, 48, 49.

[466] The brazen helmet, discovered near the site of Olympia, with the name of Hiero and the victory at Cumæ inscribed on it, yet remains as an interesting relic to commemorate this event: it was among the offerings presented by Hiero to the Olympic Zeus: see Boechk, Corp. Inscriptt. Græc. No. 16, part i, p. 34.

[467] Diodor. xi, 51; Pindar, i, 74 (= 140); ii, 17 (= 35) with the Scholia; Epicharmus, Fragment, p. 19, ed. Krusemann; Schol. Pindar. Pyth. i, 98; Strabo, v, p. 247.

[468] Ἱέρων οἰκιστὴς ἀντὶ τυράννου βουλόμενος εἶναι, Κατάνην ἐξελὼν Αἴτνην μετωνόμασε τὴν πόλιν, ἑαυτὸν οἰκιστὴν προσαγορεύσας (Schol. ad Pindar. Nem. i, 1).

Compare the subsequent case of the foundation of Thurii, among the citizens of which violent disputes arose, in determining who should be recognized as œkist of the place. On referring to the oracle, Apollo directed them to commemorate *himself* as œkist (Diodor. xii, 35).

[469] Chromius ἐπίτροπος τῆς Αἴτνης (Schol. Pind. Nem. ix, 1). About the Dorian institutions of Ætna, etc., Pindar, Pyth. i, 60-71.

Deinomenês survived his father, and commemorated the Olympic victories of the latter by costly offerings at Olympia (Pausan. vi, 12, 1).

[470] Pindar, Pyth. i, 60 (= 117); iii, 69 (= 121). Pindar. ap. Strabo. vi, p. 269. Compare Nemea, ix, 1-30, addressed to Chromius. Hiero is proclaimed in some odes as a Syracusan; but Syracuse and the newly-founded Ætna are intimately joined together: see Nemea, i, *init.*

[471] Justin, iv, 2.

[472] So I conceive the words of Diodorus are to be understood,—πλεῖστοι τῶν παραταξαμένων Ἑλλήνων πρὸς Ἕλληνας ἔπεσον (Diodor. xi, 53).

[473] Diodor. xi, 53. ἐκεῖ θανάτου καταγνωσθεὶς ἐτελεύτησεν. This is a remarkable specimen of the feeling in a foreign city towards an oppressive τύραννος. The Megarians of Greece Proper were much connected with Sicily, through the Hyblæan Megara, as well as Selinus.

[474] Diodor. xi, 76. Οἱ κατὰ τὴν Ἱέρωνος δυναστείαν ἐκπεπτωκότες ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων πόλεων—τούτων δ' ἦσαν Γελῶοι καὶ Ἀκραγαντῖνοι καὶ Ἱμεραῖοι.

[475] Hiero had married the daughter of Anaxilaus, but he seems also to have had two other wives,—the sister or cousin of Thêro, and the daughter of a Syracusan named Nikoklês: this last was the mother of his son

Deinomenês (Schol. Pindar. Pyth. i, 112).

We read of Kleophron, son of Anaxilaus, governing Messênê during his father's lifetime: probably this young man must have died, otherwise Mikythus would not have succeeded (Schol. Pindar. Pyth. ii, 34).

[476] Diodor. xi, 66.

[477] Aristotel. Politic. v, 8, 19. Diodorus does not mention the son of Gelo.

Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellenici, App. chap. 10, p. 264, *seq.*) has discussed all the main points connected with Syracusan and Sicilian chronology.

[478] Xenophon, Hiero, iii, 8. Εἰ τοίνυν ἐθέλεις κατανοεῖν, εὑρήσεις μὲν τοὺς ἰδιώτας ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα φιλουμένους, τοὺς δὲ τυράννους πολλοὺς μὲν παῖδας ἑαυτῶν ἀπεκτονηκότας, πολλοὺς δ' ὑπὸ παίδων αὐτοὺς ἀπολωλότας, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀδελφοὺς ἐν τυραννίσιν ἀλληλοφόνους γεγενημένους, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ γυναικῶν τῶν ἑαυτῶν τυράννους διεφθαρμένους, καὶ ὑπὸ ἑταίρων γε τῶν μάλιστα δοκούντων φίλων εἶναι: compare Isokratês, De Pace, Orat. viii, p. 182, § 138.

So also Tacitus (Hist. v, 9) respecting the native kings of Judæa, after the expulsion of the Syrian dynasty: "Sibi ipsi reges imposuere: qui, mobilitate vulgi expulsi, resumptâ per arma dominatione, fugas civium, urbium eversiones,—*fratrum, conjugum, parentum, neces,— aliaque solita regibus ausi*," etc.

[479] Diodor. ix, 67, 68.

[480] Aristotel. Politic. v, 8, 23.

[481] Diodor. xi, 68.

[482] Diodor. xi, 76.

[483] Diodor. xi, 73. τήν τε Ἀχραδινὴν καὶ τὴν Νῆσον· ἀμφοτέρων τῶν τόπων τούτων ἐχόντων ἴδιον τεῖχος, καλῶς κατεσκευασμένον.

Diodorus goes on to say that the general mass of citizens τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς τετραμμένον αὐτῆς ἐπετείχισαν.,—if we could venture to construe this last word rigidly, we might suppose that the parts of the city, *exterior* to Achradina and the island, had before been unfortified.

Aristotle (Politic. v, 2, 11) mentions, as one of his illustrations of the mischief of receiving new citizens, that the Syracusans, after the Gelonian dynasty, admitted the foreign mercenaries to citizenship, and from hence came to sedition and armed conflict. But the incident cannot fairly be quoted in illustration of that principle which he brings it to support. The mercenaries, so long as the dynasty lasted, had been the first citizens in the community: after its overthrow, they became the inferior, and were rendered inadmissible to honors. It is hardly matter of surprise that so great a change of position excited them to rebel; but this is not a case properly adducible to prove the difficulty of adjusting matters with new-coming citizens.

After the expulsion of Agathoklês from Syracuse, nearly two centuries after these events, the same quarrel and sedition was renewed, by the exclusion of his mercenaries from magistracy and posts of honor (Diodor. xxi, Fragm. p. 282).

[484] Diodor. xi, 72, 73, 76.

[485] Diodorus, xiv, 7.

[486] Diodorus, xi, 76; Strabo, vi, 268. Compare, as an analogous event, the destruction of the tomb of Agnon, the œkist of Amphipolis, after the revolt of that city from Athens (Thucyd. v, 11).

[487] Diodor. xi, 76. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Καμαρίναν μὲν Γελῶοι κατοικίσαντες ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατεκληροὐχησαν.

See the note of Wesseling upon this passage. There can be little doubt that in Thucydides (vi, 5) the correction of κατῳκίσθη ὑπὸ Γελώων (in place of ὑπὸ Γέλωνος) is correct.

[488] Herodot. vii, 155.

[489] See the fourth and fifth Olympic odes of Pindar, referred to Olympiad 82, or 452 B. C., about nine years after the Geloans had reëstablished Kamarina. Τὰν νέοικον ἕδραν (Olymp. v, 9); ἀπ' ἀμαχανίας ἄγων ἐς φάος τόνδε δᾶμον ἀστῶν (Olymp. v, 14).

[490] Diodor. xi. 86. πολλῶν εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε πεπολιτογραφημένων.

[491] Herodot. vii, 170; Diodor. xi, 52. The latter asserts that the Iapygian victors divided their forces, part of them pursuing the Rhegian fugitives, the rest pursuing the Tarentines. Those who followed the former were so rapid in their movements, that they entered, he says, along with the fugitives into the town of Rhegium, and even became masters of it.

To say nothing of the fact, that Rhegium continues afterwards, as before, under the rule of Mikythus,—we may remark that Diodorus must have formed to himself a strange idea of the geography of southern Italy, to talk of pursuit and flight *from Iapygia to Rhegium*.

[492] Aristotel. Polit. v, 2, 8. Aristotle has another passage (vi, 3, 5) in which he comments on the government of Tarentum: and O. Müller applies this second passage to illustrate the particular constitutional changes which were made after the Iapygian disaster. I think this juxtaposition of the two passages unauthorized: there is nothing at all to connect them together. See History of the Dorians, iii, 9, 14.

[493] Mr. Waddington's Letters from Greece, describing the Greek revolution of 1821, will convey a good idea of the stupidity of Turkish warfare: compare also the second volume of the Memoirs of Baron de Tott, part iii.

[494] Thucyd. i, 69. ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτὸν περὶ αὑτῷ τὰ πλείω σφαλέντα, etc.: compare Thucyd. vi, 33.

[495] Thucyd. i, 142. πλήθει τὴν ἀμαθίαν θρασύνοντες, etc.

[496] See a remarkable passage in the third Philippic of Demosthenês, c. 10, p. 123.

[497]

Ἀμφότερον, βασιλεύς τ' ἀγαθὸς, κρατερός τ' αἰχμήτης.

Homer, Iliad, iii, 179.

[498] Thucyd. i. 89.

[499] Thucyd. i, 90. τὰ μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἥδιον ἂν ὁρῶντες μήτε ἐκείνους μητ' ἄλλον μηδένα τεῖχος ἔχοντα, τὸ δὲ πλέον, τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐξοτρυνόντων καὶ φοβουμένων τοῦ τε ναυτικοῦ αὐτῶν τὸ πλῆθος, ὃ πρὶν οὐχ ὑπῆρχε, καὶ τὴν ἐς τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον τόλμαν γενομένην.

[500] Thucyd. i. 91, τῷ μὲν Θεμιστοκλεῖ ἐπείθοντο διὰ φιλίαν αὐτοῦ.

[501] Thucyd. i. 91, Οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε εἶναι μὴ ἀπὸ ἀντιπάλου παρασκευῆς ὁμοῖόν τι ἢ ἴσον ἐς τὸ κοινὸν βουλεύεσθαι. Ἢ πάντας οὖν ἀτειχίστους ἔφη χρῆναι ξυμμαχεῖν ἢ καὶ τάδε νομίζειν ὀρθῶς ἔχειν.

[502] We are fortunate enough to possess this narrative, respecting the rebuilding of the walls of Athens, as recounted by Thucydidês. It is the first incident which he relates, in that general sketch of events between the Persian and Peloponnesian war, which precedes his professed history (i, 89-92). Diodorus (xi, 39, 40), Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 19), and Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 6, 7), seem all to have followed Thucydidês, though Plutarch also notices a statement of Theopompus, to the effect that Themistoklês accomplished his object by bribing the ephors. This would not be improbable in itself,—nor is it inconsistent with the narrative of Thucydidês; but the latter either had not heard or did not believe it.

[503] Thucyd. i, 69. Καὶ τῶνδε ὑμεῖς αἴτιοι (says the Corinthian envoy addressing the Lacedæmonians), τό τε πρῶτον ἐάσαντες αὐτοὺς (the Athenians) τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ κρατῦναι, καὶ ὕστερον τὰ μακρὰ στῆσαι τειχη, etc.

[504] Thucyd. i, 93. Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 7) exaggerates this into a foolish conceit.

[505] For the dimensions and direction of the Themistoklean walls of Athens, see especially the excellent Treatise of Forchhammer—Topographie von Athen—published in the Kieler Philologische Studien. Kiel, 1841.

The plan of Athens, prepared by Kiepert after his own researches and published among his recent maps, adopts for the most part the ideas of Forchhammer, as to the course of the walls.

[506] Thucyd. i. 93. ἔπεισε δὲ καὶ τοῦ Πειραιέως τὰ λοιπὰ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς οἰκοδομεῖν (ὑπῆρκτο δ' αὐτοῦ πρότερον ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀρχῆς, ἧς κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν Ἀθηναίοις ἦρξε).

Upon which words the Scholiast observes (Κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν)—κατά τινα ἐνιαυτὸν ἡγεμὼν ἐγένετο· πρὸ δὲ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἦρξε Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα.

It seems hardly possible, having no fuller evidence to proceed upon, to determine to which of the preceding years Thucydidês means to refer this ἀρχὴ of Themistoklês. Mr. Fynes Clinton, after discussing the opinions of Dodwell and Corsini (see Fasti Hellenici, ad ann. 481 B. C. and Preface, p. xv), inserts Themistoklês as archon eponymus in 481 B. C., the year before the invasion of Xerxes, and supposes the Peiræus to have been commenced in that year. This is not in itself improbable: but he cites the Scholiast as having asserted the same thing before him (πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἦρξε Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα), in which I apprehend that he is not borne out by the analogy of the language: ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα, in the accusative case, denotes only the duration of the ἀρχὴ, not the position of the year (compare Thucyd. iii, 68).

I do not feel certain that Thucydidês meant to designate Themistoklês as having been archon eponymus, or as having been one of the nine archons. He may have meant, "during the year when Themistoklês was stratêgus (or general)," and the explanation of the Scholiast, who employs the word ἡγεμὼν, rather implies that he so understood it. The stratêgi were annual as well as the archons. Now we know that Themistoklês was one of the generals in 480 B. C., and that he commanded in Thessaly, at Artemisium, and at Salamis. The Peiræus may have been begun in the early part of 480 B. C., when Xerxes was already on his march, or at least at Sardis.

[507] Thucyd. ii, 13.

[508] Thucyd. i, 93.

[509] Thucyd. i, 93. Τὸ δὲ ὕψος ἤμισυ μάλιστα ἐτελέσθη οὗ διενοεῖτο· ἐβούλετο γὰρ τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ πάχει ἀφιστάναι τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιβουλάς, ἀνθρώπων δὲ ἐνόμιζεν ὀλίγων καὶ τῶν ἀχρειοτάτων ἀρκέσειν τὴν φυλακὴν, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβήσεσθαι.

[510] Thucyd. i, 93. The expressions are those of Colonel Leake, derived from inspection of the scanty remnant of these famous walls still to be seen—Topography of Athens, ch. ix, p. 411: see edit. p. 293, Germ. transl. Compare Aristophan. Aves, 1127, about the breadth of the wall of Nephelokokkygia.

[511] Thucyd. i, 93 (compare Cornel. Nepos, Themistok. c. 6) ταῖς ναυσὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνθίστασθαι.

[512] Diodor. xi, 43.

[513] See the lively picture of the Acharnian demots in the comedy of Aristophanês so entitled.

Respecting the advantages derived from the residence of metics and from foreign visitors, compare the observations of Isokratês, more than a century after this period, Orat. iv, De Pace, p. 163, and Xenophon, De Vectigalibus, c. iv.

[514] Diodor. xi, 43.

[515] Diodor. xi, 41, 42, 43. I mean, that the fact of such an embassy being sent to Sparta is probable enough,—separating that fact from the preliminary discussions which Diodorus describes as having preceded it in the assembly of Athens, and which seem unmeaning as well as incredible. His story—that Themistoklês told the assembly that he had a conceived scheme of great moment to the state, but that it did not admit of being made public beforehand, upon which the assembly named Aristeidês and Xanthippus to hear it confidentially and judge of it—seems to indicate that Diodorus had read the well-known tale of the project of Themistoklês to burn the Grecian fleet in the harbor of Pagasæ, and that he jumbled it in his memory with this other project for enlarging and fortifying the Peiræus.

[516] Thucyd. i, 94; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 23. Diodorus (xi, 44) says that the Peloponnesian ships were fifty in number: his statement is not to be accepted, in opposition to Thucydidês.

[517] Thucyd. i, 94.

[518] See the volume of this history immediately preceding, ch. xxxvi, p. 372.

[519] Herodot. ix, 81.

[520] In the Athenian inscriptions on the votive offerings dedicated after the capture of Eion, as well as after the great victories near the river Eurymedon, the name of Kimon the commander is not even mentioned (Plutarch, Kimon, c. 7; Diodor. xi, 62).

A strong protest, apparently familiar to Grecian feeling, against singling out the general particularly, to receive the honors of victory, appears in Euripid. Andromach. 694: striking verses, which are said to have been indignantly repeated by Kleitus, during the intoxication of the banquet wherein he was slain by Alexander (Quint. Curtius, viii, 4, 29 (viii, 4); Plutarch, Alexand. c. 51).

[521] These letters are given by Thucydidês verbatim (i, 128, 129): he had seen them or obtained copies (ὡς ὕστερον ἀνευρέθη)—they were, doubtless, communicated along with the final revelations of the confidential Argilian slave. As they are autographs, I have translated them literally, retaining that abrupt transition from the third person to the first, which is one of their peculiarities. Cornelius Nepos, who translates the letter of Pausanias, has effaced this peculiarity, and carries the third person from the beginning to the end (Cornel. Nep. Pausan. c. 2).

[522] Diodor. xi, 44.

[523] Arrian. Exp. Alex. iv, 7, 7; vii, 8, 4; Quint. Curt. vi, 6, 10 (vi, 21, 11).

[524] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 6; also Plutarch, De Ser. Numin. Vind. c. 10, p. 555. Pausanias, iii, 17, 8. It is remarkable that the latter heard the story of the death of Kleonikê from the lips of a Byzantine citizen of his own day, and seems to think that it had never found place in any written work.

[525] Thucyd. i, 95-131: compare Duris and Nymphis apud Athenæum, xii, p. 535.

[526] Herodot. viii, 2, 3. Compare the language of the Athenian envoy, as it stands in Herodotus (vii, 155) addressed to Gelo.

[527] Thucyd. i, 95. ἠξίουν αὐτοὺς ἡγεμόνας σφῶν γενέσθαι κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ Παυσανίᾳ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἥν που βιάζηται.

[528] 2 Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 23.

[529] Thucyd. i, 95; Diodorus, xi, 44-47.

[530] Thucyd. i, 95. Following Thucydidês in his conception of these events, I have embodied in the narrative as much as seems consistent with it in Diodorus (xi, 50), who evidently did not here copy Thucydidês, but probably had Ephorus for his guide. The name of Hetœmaridas, as an influential Spartan statesman on this occasion, is probable enough; but his alleged speech on the mischiefs of maritime empire, which Diodorus seems to have had before him, composed by Ephorus, would probably have represented the views and feelings of the year 350 B. C., and not those of 476 B. C. The subject would have been treated in the same manner as Isokratês, the master of Ephorus, treats it, in his Crat. viii, De Pace, pp. 179, 180.

[531] Xenophon, Hellen. vi, 5, 34. It was at the moment when the Spartans were soliciting Athenian aid, after their defeat at Leuktra. ὑπομιμνήσκοντες μὲν, ὡς τὸν βάρβαρον κοινῇ ἀπεμαχέσαντο—ἀναμιμνήσκοντες δὲ, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοί τε ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἠρέθησαν ἡγεμόνες τοῦ ναυτικοῦ, καὶ τῶν κοινῶν χρημάτων φύλακες, τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ταῦτα συμβουλομένων· αὐτοί τε κατὰ γῆν ὁμολογουμένως ὑφ' ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμόνες προκριθείησαν, συμβουλομένων αὖ ταῦτα τῶν Ἀθηναίων.

[532] Herodot. vi, 72; Diodor. xi, 48; Pausanias, iii, 7, 8: compare Plutarch, De Herodoti Malign. c. 21, p. 859.

Leotychidês died, according to Diodorus, in 476 B. C.: he had commanded at Mykalê in 479 B. C. The expedition into Thessaly must therefore have been in one of the two intermediate years, if the chronology of Diodorus were, in this case, thoroughly trustworthy. But Mr. Clinton (Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, ch. iii, p. 210) has shown that Diodorus is contradicted by Plutarch, about the date of the accession of Archidamus,—and by others, about the date of the revolt at Sparta. Mr. Clinton places the accession of Archidamus and the banishment of Leotychidês (of course, therefore, the expedition into Thessaly) in 469 B. C. I incline to believe that the expedition of Leotychidês against the Thessalian Aleuadæ took place in the year or in the second year following the battle of Platæa, because they had been the ardent and hearty allies of Mardonius in Bœotia, and because the war would seem not to have been completed without putting them down and making the opposite party in Thessaly predominant.

Considering how imperfectly we know the Lacedæmonian chronology of this date, it is very possible that some confusion may have arisen in the case of Leotychidês, from the difference between the date of his *banishment* and that of his *death*. King Pleistoanax afterwards, having been banished for the same offence as that committed by Leotychidês, and having lived many years in banishment, was afterwards restored: and the years which he had passed in banishment were counted as a part of his reign (Fast. Hellen. l. c. p. 211). The date of Archidamus may, perhaps, have been reckoned in one account from the *banishment* of Leotychidês,—in another, from his *death*; the rather, as Archidamus must have been very young, since he reigned forty-two years even after 469 B. C. And the date which Diodorus has given as that of the death of Leotychidês, may really be only the date of his banishment, in which he lived until 469 B. C.

[533] Thucyd. i, 18.

[534] Thucyd. i, 18. Καὶ μεγάλου κινδύνου ἐπικρεμασθέντος οἵ τε Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῶν ξυμπολεμησάντων Ἑλλήνων ἡγήσαντο δυνάμει προὔχοντες, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, διανοηθέντες ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἀνασκευασάμενοι, ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐμβάντες ναυτικοὶ ἐγένοντο. Κοινῇ δὲ ἀπωσάμενοι τὸν βάρβαρον, ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ διεκρίθησαν πρός τε Ἀθηναίους καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, οἵ τε ἀποστάντες βασιλέως Ἕλληνες καὶ οἱ ξυμπολεμήσαντες. Δυνάμει γὰρ ταῦτα μέγιστα διεφάνη· ἴσχυον γὰρ οἱ μὲν κατὰ γῆν, οἱ δὲ ναυσί. Καὶ ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον συνέμεινεν ἡ ὁμαιχμία, ἔπειτα δὲ διενεχθέντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπολέμησαν μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς ἀλλήλους· καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων εἴτινές που διασταῖεν, πρὸς τούτους ἤδη ἐχώρουν. Ὥστε ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἐς τόνδε ἀεὶ τὸν πόλεμον, etc.

This is a clear and concise statement of the great revolution in Grecian affairs, comparing the period before and after the Persian war. Thucydidês goes on to trace briefly the consequences of this bisection of the Grecian world into two great leagues,—the growing improvement in military skill, and the increasing stretch of military effort on both sides from the Persian invasion down to the Peloponnesian war;—he remarks also, upon the difference between Sparta and Athens in their way of dealing with their allies respectively. He then states the striking fact, that the military force put forth separately by Athens and her allies on the one side, and by Sparta and her allies on the other, during the Peloponnesian war, were each of them greater than the entire force which had been employed by both together in the most powerful juncture of their confederacy against the Persian invaders,—Καὶ ἐγένετο αὐτοῖς ἐς τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον ἡ ἰδία παρασκευὴ μείζων ἢ ὡς τὰ κράτιστά ποτε μετὰ ἀκραιφνοῦς τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἤνθησαν (i, 19).

I notice this last passage especially (construing it as the Scholiast seems to do), not less because it conveys an interesting comparison, than because it has been understood by Dr. Arnold, Göller, and other commentators, in a sense which seems to me erroneous. They interpret thus: αὐτοῖς to mean the Athenians only, and not the Lacedæmonians,—ἡ ἰδία παρασκευὴ to denote the forces equipped by Athens herself, apart from her allies,—and ἀκραιφνοῦς ξυμμαχίας to refer "to the Athenian alliance only, at a period a little before the conclusion of the thirty years' treaty, when the Athenians were masters not only of the islands, and the Asiatic Greek colonies, but had also united to their confederacy Bœotia and Achaia on the continent of Greece itself." (Dr. Arnold's note.) Now so far, as the words go, the meaning assigned by Dr. Arnold might be admissible; but if we trace the thread of ideas in Thucydidês, we shall see that the comparison, as these commentators conceive it, between Athens alone and Athens aided by her allies—between the Athenian empire as it stood during the Peloponnesian war, and the same empire as it *had* stood before the thirty years' truce—is quite foreign to his thoughts. Nor had Thucydidês said one word to inform the reader, that the Athenian empire at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war had diminished in magnitude, and thus was no longer ἀκραιφνής: without which previous notification, the comparison supposed by Dr. Arnold could not be clearly understood. I conceive that there are two periods, and two sets of circumstances, which, throughout all this passage, Thucydidês means to contrast: first, confederate Greece at the time of the Persian war; next, bisected Greece in a state of war, under the double headship of Sparta and Athens. Αὐτοῖς refers as much to Sparta as to Athens—ἀκραιφνοῦς τῆς ξυμμαχίας means what had been before expressed by ὁμαιχμία—and ποτε set against τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον, is equivalent to the expression which had before been used—ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἐς τόνδε ἀεὶ τὸν πόλεμον.

[535] Thucyd. v, 18; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 24. Plutarch states that the allies expressly asked the Athenians to send Aristeidês for the purpose of assessing the tribute. This is not at all probable: Aristeidês, as commander of the Athenian contingent under Pausanias, was at Byzantium when the mutiny of the Ionians against Pausanias occurred, and was the person to whom they applied for protection. As such, he was the natural person to undertake such duties as devolved upon Athens, without any necessity of supposing that he was specially asked for to perform it.

Plutarch farther states that a certain contribution had been levied from the Greeks towards the war, even during the headship of Sparta. This statement also is highly improbable. The headship of Sparta covers only one single campaign, in which Pausanias had the command: the Ionic Greeks sent their ships to the fleet, which would be held sufficient, and there was no time for measuring commutations into money.

Pausanias states, but I think quite erroneously, that the name of Aristeidês was robbed of its due honor because he was the first person who ἔταξε φοροὺς τοῖς Ἕλλησι (Pausan. viii, 52, 2). Neither the assessment nor the name of Aristeidês was otherwise than popular.

Aristotle employs the name of Aristeidês as a symbol of unrivalled probity (Rhetoric. ii, 24, 2).

[536] Thucyd. i, 95, 96.

[537] Herodot. vii, 106. ὕπαρχοι ἐν τῇ Θρηϊκῃ καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου πανταχῇ. Οὗτοι ὦν πάντες, οἵ τε ἐκ Θρηϊκης καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου, πλὴν τοῦ ἐν Δορίσκῳ, ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων ὕστερον ταύτης τῆς στρατηλασίης ἐξῃρέθησαν, etc.

[538] Thucyd. v, 18. Τὰς δὲ πόλεις, φερούσας τὸν φόρον τὸν ἐπ' Ἀριστείδου, αὐτονόμους εἶναι…. εἰσὶ δὲ, Ἄργιλος, Στάγειρος, Ἄκανθος, Σκῶλος, Ὄλυνθος, Σπάρτωλος.

[539] Cornelius Nepos states that he was fined (Pausanias, c. 2), which is neither noticed by Thucydidês, nor at all probable, looking at the subsequent circumstances connected with him.

[540] Thucyd. i, 130, 131. Καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Βυζαντίου βίᾳ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐκπολιορκηθεὶς, etc.: these words seem to imply that he had acquired a strong position in the town.

[541] It is to this time that I refer the mission of Arthmius of Zeleia (an Asiatic town, between Mount Ida and the southern coast of the Propontis) to gain over such Greeks as he could by means of Persian gold. In the course of his visit to Greece, Arthmius went to Athens: his purpose was discovered, and he was compelled to flee: while the Athenians, at the instance of Themistoklês, passed an indignant decree, declaring him and his race enemies of Athens, and of all the allies of Athens,—and proclaiming that whoever should slay him would be guiltless; because he had brought in Persian gold to bribe the Greeks. This decree was engraven on a brazen column, and placed on record in the acropolis, where it stood near the great statue of Athênê Promachos, even in the time of Demosthenês and his contemporary orators. See Demosthen. Philippic. iii, c. 9, p. 122, and De Fals. Legat. c. 76, p. 428; Æschin. cont. Ktesiphont. ad fin. Harpokrat. v. Ἄτιμος—Deinarchus cont. Aristogeiton, sects. 25, 26.

Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 6, and Aristeidês, tom. ii, p. 218) tells us that Themistoklês proposed this decree against Arthmius and caused it to be passed. But Plutarch refers it to the time when Xerxes was on the point of invading Greece. Now it appears to me that the incident cannot well belong to that point of time. Xerxes did not rely upon bribes, but upon other and different means, for conquering Greece: besides, the very tenor of the decree shows that it must have been passed after the formation of the confederacy of Delos,—for it pronounces Arthmius to be an enemy of Athens and of all the allies of Athens. To a native of Zeleia it might be a serious penalty to be excluded and proscribed from all the cities in alliance with Athens; many of them being on the coast of Asia. I know no point of time to which the mission of Arthmius can be so conveniently referred as this, —when Pausanias and Artabazus were engaged in this very part of Asia, in contriving plots to get up a party in Greece. Pausanias was thus engaged for some years,—before the banishment of Themistoklês.

[542] Thucyd. i, 131. Ὁ δὲ βουλόμενος ὡς ἥκιστα ὕποπτος εἶναι καὶ πιστεύων χρήμασι διαλύσειν τὴν διαβολὴν, ἀνεχώρει τὸ δεύτερον ἐς Σπάρτην.

[543] Thucyd. i, 131. Καὶ ἐς μὲν τὴν εἰρκτὴν ἐσπίπτει τὸ πρῶτον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφόρων· ἔπειτα διαπραξάμενος ὕστερον ἐξῆλθε, καὶ καθίστησιν ἑαυτὸν ἐς κρίσιν τοῖς βουλομένοις περὶ αὐτῶν ἐλέγχειν.

The word διαπραξάμενος indicates, first, that Pausanias himself originated the efforts to get free,—next, that he came to an underhand arrangement: very probably by a bribe, though the word does not necessarily imply it. The Scholiast says so, distinctly,—χρήμασι καὶ λόγοις διαπραξάμενος δηλόνοτι διακρουσάμενος τὴν κατηγορίαν. Dr. Arnold translates διαπραξάμενος, "having settled the business."

[544] Aristotel. Politic. iv, 13, 13; v, 1, 5; v, 6, 2; Herodot. v, 32. Aristotle calls Pausanias *king*, though he was only *regent*: the truth is, that he had all the power of a Spartan king, and seemingly more, if we compare his treatment with that of the Prokleid king Leotychidês.

[545] Thucyd. i, 132. ὁ μέλλων τὰς τελευταίας βασιλεῖ ἐπιστολὰς πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον κομιεῖν, ἀνὴρ Ἀργίλιος, etc.

[546] Diodor. xi, 45; Cornel. Nepos, Pausan. c. 5; Polyæn. viii, 51.

[547] Thucyd. i, 133, 134: Pausanias, iii, 17, 9.

[548] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 8.

[549] Aristotel. Politic. v, 3, 5. Καὶ πάλιν ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος, γενόμενος αἴτιος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμῖνα νίκης, καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας καὶ διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν δύναμιν, τὴν δημοκατίαν ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποίησεν.

Ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος (Thucyd. viii, 72 and *passim*).

[550] For the constitution of Kleisthenês, see vol. iv, of this History, ch. xxxi, p. 142, *seqq.*

[551] Herod. vi, 109.

[552] Aristotel. Πολιτειῶν Fragm. xlvii, ed. Neumann; Harpokration, v. Πολέμαρχος; Pollux, viii, 91: compare Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Prozess, ch. ii, p. 50, *seqq.*

[553] See Aristotel. Πολιτειῶν Fragm. ii, v, xxiii, xxxviii, l, ed. Neumann; Schömann, Antiqq. Jur. Publ. Græc. c. xli, xlii, xliii.

[554] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16; Scholion 2, ad Aristophan. Equit. 84.

[555] Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 22; Kimon, c. 5-8; Aristeidês, c. 25); Diodorus, xi, 54.

[556] Plutarch, Themist. c. 21

[557] This accusation of treason brought against Themistoklês at Athens, *prior to his ostracism*, and at the instigation of the Lacedæmonians,—is mentioned by Diodorus (xi, 54). Thucydidês and Plutarch take notice only of the second accusation, *after* his ostracism. But Diodorus has made his narrative confused, by supposing the first accusation preferred at Athens to have come after the full detection of Pausanias and exposure of his correspondence; whereas these latter events, coming after the first accusation, supplied new proofs before unknown, and thus brought on the second, after Themistoklês had been ostracized. But Diodorus has preserved to us the important notice of this first accusation at Athens, followed by trial, acquittal, and temporary glorification of Themistoklês,—and preceding his ostracism.

The indictment stated by Plutarch to have been preferred against Themistoklês by Leôbotas son of Alkmæon, at the instance of the Spartans, probably relates to the first accusation at which Themistoklês was acquitted. For when Themistoklês was arraigned after the discovery of Pausanias, he did not choose to stay, nor was there any actual trial: it is not, therefore, likely that the name of the accuser would be preserved,—Ὁ δὲ γραψάμενος αὐτὸν προδοσίας Λεωβώτης ἦν Ἀλκμαίωνος, ἅμα συνεπαιτιωμένων τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν (Plutarch, Themist. c. 23).

Compare the second Scholion on Aristophan. Equit. 84, and Aristeidês, Orat. xlvi, Ὑπὲρ τῶν Τεττάρων (vol. ii, p. 318, ed. Dindorf, p. 243, Jebb).

[558] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 25.

[559] Diodor. xi, 54. τότε μὲν ἀπέφυγε τὴν τῆς προδοσίας κρίσιν· διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον μετὰ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν μέγας ἦν παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις· ἠγάπων γὰρ αὐτὸν διαφερόντως οἱ πολῖται· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, οἱ μὲν, φοβηθέντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, οἱ δὲ, φθονήσαντες τῇ δόξῃ, τῶν μὲν εὐεργεσιῶν ἐπελάθοντο, τὴν δὲ ἴσχυν καὶ τὸ φρόνημα ταπεινοῦν ἔσπευδον.

[560] Thucyd. i, 137. ἦλθε γὰρ αὐτῷ ὕστερον ἔκ τε Ἀθηνῶν παρὰ τῶν φίλων, καὶ ἐξ Ἄργους ἃ ὑπεξέκειτο, etc.

I follow Mr. Fynes Clinton, in considering the year 471 B. C. to be the date of the ostracism of Themistoklês. It may probably be so, nor is there any evidence positively to contradict it: but I think Mr. Clinton states it too confidently, as he admits that Diodorus includes, in the chapters which he devotes to one archon, events which must have happened in several different years (see Fast. Hellen. B. C. 471).

After the expedition under the command of Pausanias in 478 B. C., we have no one date at once certain and accurate, until we come to the death of Xerxes, where Diodorus is confirmed by the Canon of the Persian kings, B. C. 465. This last event determines by close approximation and inference, the flight of Themistoklês, the siege

of Naxos, and the death of Pausanias: for the other events of this period, we are reduced to a more vague approximation, and can ascertain little beyond their order of succession.

[561] Thucyd. i, 135; Ephorus ap. Plutarch. de Malign. Herodoti, c. 5, p. 855; Diodor. xi, 54; Plutarch, Themist. c. 23.

[562] Diodor. xi, 55.

[563] Thucyd. i, 137. Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 8) for the most part follows Thucydidês, and professes to do so; yet he is not very accurate, especially about the relations between Themistoklês and Admêtus. Diodorus (xi, 56) seems to follow chiefly other guides: also to a great extent Plutarch (Themist. c. 24-26). There were evidently different accounts of his voyage, which represented him as reaching, not Ephesus, but the Æolic Kymê. Diodorus does not notice his voyage by sea.

[564] Plutarch, Themist. c. 25; also Kritias ap. Ælian. V. H. x, 17: compare Herodot. viii, 12.

[565] Diodor. xi, 56; Plutarch, Themist. c. 24-30.

[566] "Proditionem *ultrò imputabant* (says Tacitus, Hist. ii, 60, respecting Paullinus and Proculus, the generals of the army of Otho, when they surrendered to Vitellius after the defeat at Bebriacum), spatium longi ante prœlium itineris, fatigationem Othonianorum, permixtum vehiculis agmen, ac *pleraque fortuita fraudi suæ assignantes*.—Et Vitellius credidit de perfidiâ, et fraudem absolvit."

[567] Plutarch, Themist. c. 28.

[568] Thucyd. i, 138; Diodor. xi, 57. Besides the three above-named places, Neanthês and Phanias described the grant as being still fuller and more specific: they stated that Perkôtê was granted to Themistoklês for bedding, and Palæskêpsis for clothing (Plutarch, Themist. c. 29; Athenæus, i, p. 29).

This seems to have been a frequent form of grants from the Persian and Egyptian kings, to their queens, relatives, or friends,—a grant nominally to supply some particular want or taste: see Dr. Arnold's note on the passage of Thucydidês. I doubt his statement, however, about the land-tax, or rent; I do not think that it was a tenth or a fifth of the produce of the soil in these districts which was granted to Themistoklês, but the portion of regal revenue, or tribute, levied in them. The Persian kings did not take the trouble to assess and collect the tribute: they probably left that to the inhabitants themselves, provided the sum total were duly paid.

[569] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 31. πλανώμενος περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν: this statement seems probable enough, though Plutarch rejects it.

[570] Thucyd. i, 138. Νοσήσας δὲ τελευτᾷ τὸν βίον· λέγουσι δέ τινες καὶ ἑκούσιον φαρμάκῳ ἀποθανεῖν αὐτὸν, ἀδύνατον νομίσαντα εἶναι ἐπιτελέσαι βασιλεῖ ἃ ὑπέσχετο.

This current story, as old as Aristophanês (Equit. 83, compare the Scholia), alleged that Themistoklês had poisoned himself by drinking bull's blood (see Diodor. xi, 58), who assigns to this act of taking poison a still more sublime patriotic character by making it part of a design on the part of Themistoklês to restrain the Persian king from warring against Greece.

Plutarch (Themist. c. 31, and Kimon, c. 18) and Diodorus both state, as an unquestionable fact, that Themistoklês died by poisoning himself: omitting even to notice the statement of Thucydidês, that he died of disease. Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 10) follows Thucydidês. Cicero (Brutus, c. 11) refers the story of the suicide by poison to Clitarchus and Stratoklês, recognizing it as contrary to Thucydidês. He puts into the mouth of his fellow dialogist, Atticus, a just rebuke of the facility with which historical truth was sacrificed to rhetorical purpose.

[571] Thucyd. i, 138. τὰ δὲ ὀστᾶ φασὶ κομισθῆναι αὐτοῦ οἱ προσήκοντες οἴκαδε κελεύσαντος ἐκείνου, καὶ τεθῆναι κρύφα Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ· οὐ γὰρ ἐξῆν θάπτειν, ὡς ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ φεύγοντος.

Cornelius Nepos, who here copies Thucydidês, gives this statement by mistake, as if Thucydidês had himself affirmed it: "Idem (sc. Thucydidês) ossa ejus clam in Atticâ ab amicis sepulta, quoniam legibus non concederetur, quod proditionis esset damnatus, memoriæ prodidit." This shows the haste or inaccuracy with which these secondary authors so often cite: Thucydidês is certainly not a witness *for* the fact: if anything, he may be said to count somewhat against it.

Plutarch (Themist. c. 32) shows that the burial-place of Themistoklês, supposed to be in Attica, was yet never verified before his time: the guides of Pausanias, however, in the succeeding century, had become more confident (Pausanias, i, 1, 3).

[572] Respecting the probity of Aristeidês, see an interesting fragment of Eupolis, the comic writer (Δῆμοι, Fragm, iv, p. 457, ed. Meineke).

[573] Plutarch, Arist. c. 26, 27; Cornelius Nepos. Arist. c. 3: compare Aristophan. Vesp. 53.

[574] Plutarch, Themist. c. 5-32.

[575] Thucyd. i, 94. ἐξεπολιόρκησαν (Βυζάντιον) ἐν τῇδε τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ, i.e. under the Spartan hegemony, before the Athenians were invited to assume the hegemony: compare ἡγησάμενοι, i, 77, and Herodot. viii, 2, 3. Next, we have (i, 95) φοιτῶντές τε (the Ionians, etc.) πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἠξίουν αὐτοὺς ἡγεμόνας σφῶν γενέσθαι κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές. Again, When the Spartans send out Dorkis in place of Pausanias, the allies οὐκέτι ἐφίεσαν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν. Then, as to the ensuing proceedings of the Athenians (i, 96)—παραλαβόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἑκόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ τὸ Παυσανίου μῖσος, etc.: compare i. 75,—ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστῆναι, and vi, 76.

Then the transition from the ἡγεμονία to the ἀρχή (i, 97)—ἡγούμενοι δὲ αὐτονόμων τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ ἀπὸ κοινῶν ξυνόδων βουλευόντων, τόσαδε ἐπῆλθον πολέμῳ τε καὶ διαχειρίσει πραγμάτων μεταξὺ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ.

Thucydidês then goes on to say, that he shall notice these "many strides in advance" which Athens made, starting from her original hegemony, so as to show in what manner the Athenian empire, or ἀρχὴ, was originally formed,—ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν ἔχει τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἐν οἵῳ τρόπῳ κατέστη. The same transition from the ἡγεμονία to the ἀρχὴ is described in the oration of the Athenian envoy at Sparta, shortly before the Peloponnesian war (i, 75): but as it was rather the interest of the Athenian orator to confound the difference between ἡγεμονία and ἀρχὴ, so, after he has clearly stated what the relation of Athens to her allies had been at first, and how it afterwards became totally changed, Thucydidês makes him slur over the distinction, and say,—οὕτως οὐδ' ἡμεῖς θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν πεποιήκαμεν … εἰ ἀρχήν τε διδομένην ἐδεξάμεθα καὶ ταύτην μὴ ἀνεῖμεν, etc.; and he then proceeds to defend the title of Athens to command on the ground of superior force and worth: which last plea is advanced a few years afterwards, still more nakedly and offensively, by the Athenian speakers. Read also the language of the Athenian Euphêmus at Kamarina (vi, 82), where a similar confusion appears, as being suitable to the argument.

It is to be recollected that the word *hegemony*, or headship, is extremely general, denoting any case of following a leader, and of obedience, however temporary, qualified, or indeed little more than honorary. Thus it is used by the Thebans to express their relation towards the Bœotian confederated towns (ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑφ' ἡμῶν, Thuc. iii, 61, where Dr. Arnold draws attention to the distinction between that verb and ἄρχειν, and holds language respecting the Athenian ἀρχὴ, more precise than his language in the note ad Thucyd. i, 94), and by the Corinthians to express their claims as metropolis of Korkyra, which were really little more than honorary,—ἐπὶ τῷ ἡγεμόνες τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι (Thucyd. i, 38): compare vii, 55. Indeed, it sometimes means simply a guide (iii, 98; vii, 50).

But the words ἀρχὴ, ἄρχειν, ἄρχεσθαι, voc. pass., are much less extensive in meaning, and imply both superior dignity and coercive authority to a greater or less extent: compare Thucyd. v, 69; ii, 8, etc. The πόλις ἀχὴν ἔχουσα is analogous to ἀνὴρ τύραννος (vi, 85).

Herodotus is less careful in distinguishing the meanings of these words than Thucydidês: see the discussion of the Lacedæmonian and Athenian envoys with Gelo (vii. 155-162). But it is to be observed that he makes Gelo ask for the ἡγεμονία and not for the ἀρχὴ,—putting the claim in the least offensive form: compare also the claim of the Argeians for ἡγεμονία (vii, 148).

[576] Thucyd. i, 97. τοῖς πρὸ ἐμοῦ ἅπασιν ἐκλιπὲς ἦν τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον, καὶ ἢ τὰ πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ξυνετίθεσαν ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ Μηδικά· τούτων δὲ ὅσπερ καὶ ἥψατο ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ξυγγραφῇ Ἑλλάνικος, βραχέως τε καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ἐπεμνήσθη.

Hellanikus, therefore, had done no more than *touch* upon the events of this period: and he found so little good information within his reach as to fall into chronological blunders.

[577] Thucyd. i, 93. τῆς γὰρ δὴ θαλάσσης πρῶτος ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἀνθεκτέα ἐστὶ, καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς ξυγκατεσκεύαζεν.

Dr. Arnold says in his note, "εὐθὺς signifies probably immediately after the retreat of the Persians." I think it refers to an earlier period,—that point of time when Themistoklês first counselled the building of the fleet, or at least when he counselled them to abandon their city and repose all their hopes in their fleet. It is only by this supposition that we get a reasonable meaning for the words ἐτόλμησε εἰπεῖν, "he was the *first who dared to say*,"—which implies a counsel of extraordinary boldness. "For he was the first who dared to advise them to grasp at the sea, and from that moment forward he helped to establish their empire." The word ξυγκατεσκεύαζε seems to denote a collateral consequence, not directly contemplated, though perhaps divined, by Themistoklês.

[578] Thucyd. i, 97 ἔγραψα δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ τὴν ἐκβολὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐποιησάμην διὰ τόδε, etc.

[579] Herodot. vii, 106, 107. Κατέστασαν γὰρ ἔτι πρότερον ταύτης τῆς ἐλάσιος ὕπαρχοι ἐν τῇ Θρηϊκῇ καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου πανταχῇ. Οὗτοι ὦν πάντες, οἵ τε ἐκ Θρηϊκης καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου, πλὴν τοῦ ἐν Δορίσκῳ, ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων ὕστερον ταύτης τῆς στρατηλασίης ἐξηρέθησαν· τὸν δὲ ἐν Δορίσκῳ Μασκάμην οὐδαμοὶ κω ἐδυνάσθησαν ἐξελεῖν, πολλῶν πειρησαμένων.

The loose chronology of Plutarch is little to be trusted; but he, too, acknowledges the continuance of Persian occupations in Thrace, by aid of the natives, until a period later than the battle of the Eurymedon (Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14).

It is a mistake to suppose, with Dr. Arnold, in his note on Thucyd. viii, 62, "that Sestus was almost the last place held by the Persians in Europe."

Weissenborn (Hellen oder Beiträge zur genaueren Erforschung der altgriechischen Geschichte, Jena, 1844, p. 144, note 31) has taken notice of this important passage of Herodotus, as well as of that in Plutarch; but he does not see how much it embarrasses all attempts to frame a certain chronology for those two or three events which Thucydidês gives us between 476-466 B. C.

[580] Kutzen (De Atheniensium Imperio Cimonis atque Periclis tempore constituto. Grimæ, 1837. Commentatio, i, p. 8) has good reason to call in question the stratagem ascribed to Kimon by Pausanias (viii, 8, 2) for the capture of Eion.

[581] To these "remaining operations against the Persians" the Athenian envoy at Lacedæmon alludes, in his speech prior to the Peloponnesian war—ὑμῶν μὲν (you Spartans) οὐκ ἐθελησάντων παραμεῖναι πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου, ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστῆναι, etc. (Thucyd. i, 75:) and again, iii, 11. τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τῶν ἔργων.

Compare also Plato, Menexen. c. 11. αὐτὸς δὲ ἠγγέλλετο βασιλεὺς διανοεῖσθαι ὡς ἐπιχειρήσων πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας, etc.

[582] The Athenian nautical training begins directly after the repulse of the Persians. Τὸ δὲ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐπιστήμονας γενέσθαι (says Periklês respecting the Peloponnesians, just at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war) οὐ ῥᾳδίως αὐτοῖς προσγενήσεται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑμεῖς, μελετῶντες αὐτὸ εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν, ἐξείργασθέ πω (Thucyd. i, 142).

[583] Plutarch. Aristeidês. c. 24.

[584] Such concurrence of the general synod is in fact implied in the speech put by Thucydidês into the mouth of the Mitylenæan envoys at Olympia, in the third year of the Peloponnesian war: a speech pronounced by parties altogether hostile to Athens (Thucyd. iii, 11)—ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μαρτυρίῳ ἐχρῶντο (the Athenians) μὴ ἂν τούς γε ἰσοψήφους ἄκοντας, εἰ μή τι ἠδίκουν οἷς ἐπῄεσαν, ξυστρατεύειν.

[585] Thucyd. i, 97-99. Αἰτίαι δὲ ἄλλαι ἦσαν τῶν ἀποστάσεων, καὶ μέγισται, αἱ τῶν φόρων καὶ νεῶν ἐκδεῖαι καὶ λιποστράτιον, εἴ τῳ ἐγένετο· οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκριβῶς ἔπρασσον, καὶ λυπηροὶ ἦσαν, οὐκ εἰωθόσιν οὐδὲ βουλομένοις ταλαιπωρεῖν προσάγοντες τὰς ἀνάγκας. Ἦσαν δέ πως καὶ ἄλλως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες, καὶ οὔτε ξυνεστράτευον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου, ῥᾴδιόν τε προσάγεσθαι ἦν αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἀφισταμένους· ὧν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ἐγένοντο οἱ ξύμμαχοι· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀπόκνησιν ταύτην τῶν στρατειῶν, οἱ πλείους αὐτῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἀπ' οἴκου ὦσι, χρήματα ἐτάξαντο ἀντὶ τῶν νεῶν τὸ ἰκνούμενον ἀνάλωμα φέρειν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις ηὔξετο τὸ ναυτικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς δαπάνης ἣν ἐκεῖνοι ξυμφέροιεν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ὅποτε ἀποσταῖεν, ἀπαράσκευοι καὶ ἄπειροι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντο.

[586] See the contemptuous remarks of Periklês upon the debates of the Lacedæmonian allies at Sparta (Thucyd. i, 141).

[587] The speech of the Athenian envoy at Sparta, a little before the Peloponnesian war, sets forth the growth of the Athenian empire, in the main, with perfect justice (Thucyd. i, 75, 76). He admits and even exaggerates its unpopularity, but shows that such unpopularity was, to a great extent, and certainly as to its first origin, unavoidable as well as undeserved. He of course, as might be supposed, omits those other proceedings by which Athens had herself aggravated it.

Καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν τήνδε (τὴν ἀρχὴν) ἐλάβομεν οὐ βιασάμενοι … ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἔργου κατηναγκάσθημεν τὸ πρῶτον προαγαγεῖν αὐτὴν ἐς τόδε, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ δέους, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τιμῆς, ὕστερον καὶ ὠφελείας. Καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ἔτι ἐδόκει εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀπηχθημένους, καί τινων καὶ ἤδη ἀποστάντων κεχειρωμένων, ὑμῶν τε ἡμῖν οὐκέτι ὁμοίως φίλων, ἀλλ' ὑπόπτων καὶ διαφόρων ὄντων, ἀνέντας κινδυνεύειν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν αἱ ἀποστάσεις πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐγίγνοντο· πᾶσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον τὰ ξυμφέροντα τῶν μεγίστων πέρι κινδύνων εὖ τίθεσθαι.

The whole speech well merits attentive study: compare also the speech of Periklês at Athens, in the second year of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. ii, 63).

[588] Thucyd. i, 141. σώμασι δὲ ἑτοιμότεροι οἱ αὐτουργοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ χρήμασι πολεμεῖν, etc.

[589] See Herodot. vi, 12, and the preceding volume of this history, chap. xxxv, vol. iv, p. 301.

[590] Thucyd. ii, 13.

[591] Thucyd. i, 108; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 20.

[592] Xenophon, Hellenic, v, 1, 31.

[593] Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellenic. ad ann. 476 B. C.) places the conquest of Skyros by Kimon in the year 476 B. C. He says, after citing a passage from Thucyd. i, 98, and from Plutarch, Theseus, c. 36, as well as a proposed correction of Bentley, which he justly rejects: "The island was actually conquered in the year of the archon Phædon, B. C. 476. This we know from Thucyd. i, 98, and Diodor. xi, 41-48, combined. Plutarch named the archon Phædon, with reference to the *conquest* of the island: then, by a negligence not unusual with him, connected the oracle with that fact, as a contemporary transaction: although in truth the oracle was not procured till six or seven years afterwards."

Plutarch has many sins to answer for against chronological exactness; but the charge here made against him is undeserved. He states that the oracle was given in (476 B. C.) the year of the archon Phædon; and that the body of Theseus was brought back to Athens in (469 B. C.) the year of the archon Aphepsion. There is nothing to contradict either statement; nor do the passages of Thucydidês and Diodorus, which Mr. Clinton adduces, prove that which he asserts. The two passages of Diodorus have, indeed, no bearing upon the event: and in so far as Diodorus is in this case an authority at all, he goes against Mr. Clinton, for he states Skyros to have been conquered in 470 B. C. (Diodor. xi, 60). Thucydidês only tells us that the operations against Eion, Skyros, and Karystus, took place in the order here indicated, and at some periods between 476 and 466 B. C.; but he does not enable us to determine positively the date of either. Upon what authority Mr. Clinton states, that "the oracle was not procured till six or seven years afterwards," (*i. e.*, after the conquest,) I do not know: the account of Plutarch goes rather to show that it was procured six or seven years *before* the conquest: and this may stand good until some better testimony is produced to contradict it. As our information now stands, we have no testimony as to the year of the conquest except that of Diodorus, who assigns it to 470 B. C., but as he assigns both the conquest of Eion and the expeditions of Kimon against Karia and Pamphylia with the victories of the Eurymedon, all to the same year, we cannot much trust his authority. Nevertheless, I incline to believe him as to the date of the conquest of Skyros: because it seems to me very probable that this conquest took place in the year immediately before that in which the body of Theseus was brought to Athens, which latter event may be referred with great confidence to 469 B. C., in consequence of the interesting anecdote related by Plutarch about the first prize gained by the poet Sophoklês.

Mr. Clinton has given in his Appendix (Nos. vi-viii, pp. 248-253) two Dissertations respecting the chronology of the period from the Persian war down to the close of the Peloponnesian war. He has rendered much service by correcting the mistake of Dodwell, Wesseling, and Mitford (founded upon an inaccurate construction of a passage in Isokratês) in supposing, after the Persian invasion of Greece, a Spartan hegemony, lasting ten years, prior to the commencement of the Athenian hegemony. He has shown that the latter must be reckoned as commencing in 477, or 476 B. C., immediately after the mutiny of the allies against Pausanias,—whose command,

however, need not be peremptorily restricted to one year, as Mr. Clinton (p. 252) and Dodwell maintain: for the words of Thucydidês, ἐν τῇδε τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ, imply nothing as to annual duration, and designate merely "the hegemony which preceded that of Athens."

But the refutation of this mistake does not enable us to establish any good positive chronology for the period between 477 and 466 B. C. It will not do to construe Πρῶτον μὲν (Thuc. i, 98) in reference to the Athenian conquest of Eion, as if it must necessarily mean "*the year after*" 477 B. C. If we could imagine that Thucydidês had told us all the military operations between 477-466 B. C., we should be compelled to admit plenty of that "interval of inaction" against which Mr. Clinton so strongly protests (p. 252). Unhappily, Thucydidês has told us but a small portion of the events which really happened.

Mr. Clinton compares the various periods of duration assigned by ancient authors to that which is improperly called the Athenian "empire,"—between 477-405 B. C. (pp. 248, 249.) I confess that I rather agree with Dr. Gillies, who admits the discrepancy between these authors broadly and undisguisedly, than with Mr. Clinton, who seeks to bring them into comparative agreement. His explanation is only successful in regard to one of them,—Demosthenês; whose two statements (forty-five years in one place and seventy-three years in another) are shown to be consistent with each other as well as chronologically just. But surely it is not reasonable to correct the text of the orator Lykurgus from ἐννενήκοντα to ἑβδομήκοντα, and then to say, that "Lykurgus may be added to the number of those who describe the period as seventy years," (p. 250.) Neither are we to bring Andokidês into harmony with others, by supposing that "his calculation ascends to the battle of Marathon, from the date of which (B. C. 490) to the battle of Ægos Potami, are just eighty-five years." (Ibid.) Nor ought we to justify a computation by Demosthenês, of sixty-five years, by saying, "that it terminates at the Athenian defeat in Sicily," (p. 249).

The truth is, that there is more or less chronological inaccuracy in all these passages, except those of Demosthenês,—and historical inaccuracy in *all* of them, not even excepting those. It is not true that the Athenians ἦρξαν τῆς θαλάσσης—ἦρξαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων—προστάται ἦσαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων—for seventy-three years. The historical language of Demosthenês, Plato, Lysias, Isokratês, Andokidês, Lykurgus, requires to be carefully examined before we rely upon it.

[594] Plutarch (Kimon, c. 8; Theseus, c. 36). ἐστὶ δὲ φύξιον οἰκέταις καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ταπεινοτέροις καὶ δεδιόσι κρείττονας, ὡς καὶ τοῦ Θησέως προστατικοῦ τινος καὶ βοηθητικοῦ γενομένου καὶ προσδεχομένου φιλανθρώπως τὰς τῶν ταπεινοτέρων δεήσεις.

[595] Thucyd. i, 98. It has already been stated in the preceding chapter, that Themistoklês, as a fugitive, passed close to Naxos while it was under siege, and incurred great danger of being taken.

[596] For the battles of the Eurymedon, see Thucyd. i, 100; Diodor. xi, 60-62; Plutarch, Kimon, 12, 13.

The accounts of the two latter appear chiefly borrowed from Ephorus and Kallisthenês, authors of the following century; and from Phanodemus, an author later still. I borrow sparingly from them, and only so far as consists with the brief statement of Thucydidês. The narrative of Diodorus is exceedingly confused, indeed hardly intelligible.

Phanodemus stated the number of the Persian fleet at six hundred ships; Ephorus, at three hundred and fifty. Diodorus, following the latter, gives three hundred and forty. Plutarch mentions the expected reinforcement of eighty Phenician ships; which appears to me a very credible circumstance, explaining the easy nautical victory of Kimon at the Eurymedon. From Thucydidês, we know that the vanquished fleet at the Eurymedon consisted of no more than two hundred ships; for so I venture to construe the words of Thucydidês, in spite of the authority of Dr. Arnold,—Καὶ εἷλον (Ἀθηναῖοι) τριήρεις Φοινίκων καὶ διέφθειραν τὰς πάσας ἐς (τὰς) διακοσίας. Upon which Dr. Arnold observes: "Amounting in all to two hundred: that is, that the whole number of ships taken or destroyed was two hundred,—not that the whole fleet consisted of no more." Admitting the correctness of this construction (which may be defended by viii, 21), we may remark that the defeated Phenician fleet, according to the universal practice of antiquity, ran ashore to seek protection from its accompanying land-force. When, therefore, this land-force was itself defeated and dispersed, the ships would all naturally fall into the power of the victors; or if any escaped, it would be merely by accident. Moreover, the smaller number is in this case more likely to be the truth, as we must suppose an easy naval victory in order to leave strength for a strenuous land-battle on the same day.

It is remarkable that the inscription on the commemorative offering only specifics "one hundred Phenician ships with their crews" as having been captured (Diodor. xi, 62). The other hundred ships were probably de-

stroyed. Diodorus represents Kimon as having captured three hundred and forty ships, though he himself cites the inscription which mentions only one hundred.

[597] About Thasos, see Herodot. vi, 46-48; vii, 118. The position of Ragusa in the Adriatic, in reference to the despots of Servia and Bosnia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, was very similar to that of Athens and Thasos in regard to the Thracian princes of the interior. In Engel's History of Ragusa we find an account of the large gains made in that city by its contracts to work the gold and silver mines belonging to these princes (Engel, Geschichte des Freystaates Ragusa, sect. 36, p. 163. Wien, 1807).

[598] Thucyd. i, 100, 101; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14; Diodor xi, 70.

[599] Thucyd. i, 101. Philip of Macedon, in his dispute more than a century after this period with the Athenians respecting the possession of Amphipolis, pretended that his ancestor, Alexander, had been the first to acquire possession of the spot after the expulsion of the Persians from Thrace, (see Philippi Epistola ap. Demosthen. p. 164, R.) If this pretence had been true, Ennea Hodoi would have been in possession of the Macedonians at this time, when the first Athenian attempt was made upon it: but the statement of Thucydidês shows that it was then an Edonian township.

[600] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14. Galêpsus and Œsymê were among the Thasian settlements on the mainland of Thrace (Thucyd. iv, 108).

[601] Thucyd. i, 101. οἱ δὲ ὑπέσχοντο μὲν κρύφα τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἔμελλον, διεκωλύθησαν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ γενομένου σεισμοῦ.

[602] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14.

[603] Plutarch, Themistokl. c. 20.

[604] See the case of Sikinnus, the person through whom Themistoklês communicated with Xerxes before the battle of Salamis, and for whom he afterwards procured admission among the batch of newly-introduced citizens at Thespiæ (Herodot. viii. 75).

[605] Τὰ τῶν Βοιωτῶν πάτρια—τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια (Thucyd. iii, 61-65).

[606] Thucyd. iii, 62.

[607] See, among many other evidences, the remarkable case of the Olynthian confederacy (Xenophon, Hellen. v, 2, 16).

[608] Diodor. xi, 81; Justin, iii, 6.

[609] Diodor. xi. 54; Strabo, viii, p. 337.

[610] Strabo, viii, pp. 337, 348, 356.

[611] Thucyd. i, 101-128; Diodor. xi, 62.

[612] Herodot. ix. 64.

[613] Thucyd. i, 102; iii, 54; iv, 57.

[614] Thucyd. i, 102. τὴν μὲν ὑποψίαν οὐ δηλοῦντες, εἰπόντες δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲν προσδέονται αὐτῶν ἔτι.

Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. ann. 464-461 B. C.), following Plutarch, recognizes two Lacedæmonian requests to Athens, and two Athenian expeditions to the aid of the Spartans, both under Kimon; the first in 464 B. C., immediately on the happening of the earthquake and consequent revolt,—the second in 461 B. C., after the war had lasted some time.

In my judgment, there is no ground for supposing more than one application made to Athens, and one expedition. The duplication has arisen from Plutarch, who has construed too much as historical reality the comic exaggeration of Aristophanês (Aristoph. Lysistrat. 1138; Plutarch, Kimon, 16). The heroine of the latter, Lysistrata, wishing to make peace between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, and reminding each of the services which they had received from the other, might permit herself to say to the Lacedæmonians: "Your envoy, Perikleidas, came to Athens, pale with terror, and put himself a suppliant at the altar to entreat our help as a matter of life and death, while Poseidon was still shaking the earth, and the Messenians were pressing you hard: then Kimon with four thousand hoplites went and achieved your complete salvation." This is all very telling and forcible, as a

portion of the Aristophanic play, but there is no historical truth in it except the fact of an application made and an expedition sent in consequence.

We know that the earthquake took place at the time when the siege of Thasos was yet going on, because it was the reason which prevented the Lacedæmonians from aiding the besieged by an invasion of Attica. But Kimon commanded at the siege of Thasos (Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14); accordingly, he could not have gone as commander to Laconia at the time when this first expedition is alleged to have been undertaken.

Next, Thucydidês acknowledges only one expedition: nor, indeed, does Diodorus (xi, 64), though this is of minor consequence. Now mere silence on the part of Thucydidês, in reference to the events of a period which he only professes to survey briefly, is not always a very forcible negative argument. But in this case, his account of the expedition of 461 B. C., with its very important consequences, is such as to exclude the supposition that *he knew* of any prior expedition, two or three years earlier. Had he known of any such, he could not have written the account which now stands in his text. He dwells especially on the prolongation of the war, and on the incapacity of the Lacedæmonians for attacking walls, as the reasons why they invoked the Athenians as well as their other allies: he implies that their presence in Laconia was a new and threatening incident: moreover, when he tells us how much the Athenians were incensed by their abrupt and mistrustful dismissal, he could not have omitted to notice, as an aggravation of this feeling, that, only two or three years before, they had rescued Lacedæmon from the brink of ruin. Let us add, that the supposition of Sparta, the first military power in Greece, and distinguished for her unintermitting discipline, being reduced all at once to a condition of such utter helplessness as to owe her safety to foreign intervention,—is highly improbable in itself: inadmissible, except on very good evidence.

For the reasons here stated. I reject the first expedition into Laconia mentioned in Plutarch.

[615] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16.

[616] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16. Ὁ δ' Ἴων ἀπομνημονεύει καὶ τὸν λόγον, ᾧ μάλιστα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐκίνησε, παρακαλὼν μήτε τὴν Ἑλλάδα χωλὴν, μήτε τὴν πόλιν ἑτερόζυγα, περιϊδεῖν γεγενημένην.

[617] See Xenophon, Hellenic. vi, 3,—about 372 B. C.—a little before the battle of Leuktra.

[618] Diodor. xi, 65; Strabo, viii, p. 372; Pausan. ii, 16, 17, 25. Diodorus places this incident in 468 B. C.: but as it undoubtedly comes after the earthquake at Sparta, we must suppose it to have happened about 463 B. C. See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, 8.

[619] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 17.

[620] Thucyd. i. 103.

[621] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 8.

[622] Thucyd. i, 105; Lysias, Orat. Funebr. c. 10. Diodor. xi. 78.

[623] Thucyd. i, 109.

[624] Lysias, Orat. Funebr. c. 10. ἐνίκων μαχόμενοι ἅπασαν τὴν δύναμιν τὴν ἐκείνων τοῖς ἤδη ἀπειρηκόσι καὶ τοῖς οὔπω δυναμένοις, etc.

The incident mentioned by Thucydidês about the Corinthians, that the old men of their own city were so indignant against them on their return, is highly characteristic of Grecian manners,—κακιζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρεσβυτέρων, etc.

[625] Thucyd. i, 106. πάθος μέγα τοῦτο Κορινθίοις ἐγένετο. Compare Diodor. xi, 78, 79,—whose chronology, however, is very misleading.

[626] Καὶ τῶνδε ὑμεῖς αἴτιοι, τό τε πρῶτον ἐάσαντες αὐτοὺς τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ κρατῦναι, καὶ ὕστερον τὰ μακρὰ στῆσαι τείχη,—is the language addressed by the Corinthians to the Spartans, in reference to Athens, a little before the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i, 69).

[627] Diodor. xii, 81; Justin, iii, 6. Τῆς μὲν τῶν Θηβαίων πόλεως μείζονα τὸν περίβολον κατεσκεύασαν, τὰς δ' ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ πόλεις ἠνάγκασαν ὑποτάττεσθαι τοῖς Θηβαίοις.

[628] Diodor. l. c. It must probably be to the internal affairs of Bœotia, somewhere about this time, full as they were of internal dissension, that the dictum and simile of Periklês alludes,—which Aristotle notices in his

Rhetoric. iii, 4, 2.

[629] Thucyd. i, 107.

[630] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14; Periklês, c. 10. Plutarch represents the Athenians as having recalled Kimon from fear of the Lacedæmonians who had just beaten them at Tanagra, and for the purpose of procuring peace. He adds that Kimon obtained peace for them forthwith. Both these assertions are incorrect. The extraordinary successes in Bœotia, which followed so quickly after the defeat at Tanagra, show that the Athenians were under no impressions of fear at that juncture, and that the recall of Kimon proceeded from quite different feelings. Moreover, the peace with Sparta was not made till some years afterwards.

[631] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 10.

[632] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 17; Periklês, c. 10; Thucyd. viii, 97. Plutarch observes, respecting this reconciliation of parties after the battle of Tanagra, after having mentioned that Periklês himself proposed the restoration of Kimon—

Οὕτω τότε πολιτικαὶ μὲν ἦσαν αἱ διαφοραὶ, μέτριοι δὲ οἱ θυμοὶ καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐανάκλητοι σύμφερον, ἡ δὲ φιλοτιμία πάντων ἐπικρατοῦσα τῶν παθῶν τοῖς τῆς πατρίδος ὑπεχώρει καίροις.

Which remarks are very analogous to those of Thucydidês, in recounting the memorable proceedings of the year 411 B. C., after the deposition of the oligarchy of Four Hundred (Thucyd. viii, 97).

Καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες· μετρία γὰρ ἥ τε ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς ξύγκρασις ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐκ πονηρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένων τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀνήνεγκε τὴν πόλιν. I may remark that the explanatory note of Dr. Arnold on this passage is less instructive than his notes usually are, and even involves, in my judgment, an erroneous supposition as to the meaning. Dr. Arnold says: "It appears that the constitution as now fixed, was *at first*, in the opinion of Thucydidês, the best that Athens had ever enjoyed within his memory; that is, the best since the complete ascendancy of the democracy effected under Periklês. But how long a period is meant to be included by the words τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον, and when, and how, did the implied change take place? Τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον can hardly apply to the whole remaining term of the war, as if this improved constitution had been first subverted by the triumph of the oligarchy under the Thirty, and then superseded by the restoration of the old democracy after their overthrow. Yet Xenophon mentions no intermediate change in the government between the beginning of his history and the end of the war," etc.

Now I do not think that Dr. Arnold rightly interprets τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον. The phrase appears to me equivalent to τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον πρῶτον: the words τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον, apply the comparison altogether to the period *preceding* this event here described, and not to the period *following* it. "And it was *during this period first*, in my time at least, that the Athenians most of all behaved like good citizens: for the Many and the Few met each other in a spirit of moderation, and this first brought up the city from its deep existing distress." No such comparison is intended as Dr. Arnold supposes, between the first moments after this juncture, and the subsequent changes: the comparison is between the political temper of the Athenians at this juncture, and their usual temper as far back as Thucydidês could recollect.

Next, the words εὖ πολιτεύσαντες are understood by Dr. Arnold in a sense too special and limited,—as denoting merely the new constitution, or positive organic enactments, which the Athenians now introduced. But it appears to me that the words are of wider import: meaning the general temper of political parties, both reciprocally towards each other and towards the commonwealth: their inclination to relinquish antipathies, to accommodate points of difference, and to coöperate with each other heartily against the enemy, suspending those ἰδίας φιλοτιμίας, ἰδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας (ii, 65) noticed as having been so mischievous before. Of course, any constitutional arrangements introduced at such a period would partake of the moderate and harmonious spirit then prevalent, and would therefore form a part of what is commended by Thucydidês: but his commendation is not confined to them specially. Compare the phrase ii, 38. ἐλευθέρως δὲ τά τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν, etc.

[633] Thucyd. i, 108; Diodor. xi, 81, 82.

[634] Thucyd. i, 108-115; Diodor. xi, 84.

[635] Thucyd. i, 111; Diodor. xi, 85.

[636] Herodot. iii, 160.

[637] Thucyd. i, 104, 109, 110; Diodor. xi, 77; xii, 3. The story of Diodorus, in the first of these two passages,—that most of the Athenian forces were allowed to come back under a favorable capitulation granted by the Persian generals,—is contradicted by the total ruin which he himself states to have befallen them in the latter passages, as well as by Thucydidês.

[638] Thucyd. i, 103; Diodor. xi, 84.

[639] Thucyd. i, 112.

[640] Theopompus, Fragm. 92, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 18; Diodor. xi, 86.

It is to be presumed that this is the peace which Æschines (De Fals. Legat. c. 54, p. 300) and Andokides or the Pseudo-Andokides (De Pace, c. 1), state to have been made by Miltiades, son of Kimon, proxenus of the Lacedæmonians; assuming that Miltiades son of Kimon is put by them, through lapse of memory, for Kimon son of Miltiades. But the passages of these orators involve so much both of historical and chronological inaccuracy, that it is unsafe to cite them, and impossible to amend them except by conjecture. Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellen. Appendix, 8, p. 257) has pointed out some of these inaccuracies; and there are others besides, not less grave, especially in the oration ascribed to Andokides. It is remarkable that both of them seem to recognize only *two* long walls, the northern and the southern wall; whereas, in the time of Thucydidês, there were *three* long walls: the two near and parallel, connecting Athens with Peiræus, and a third connecting it with Phalêrum. This last was never renewed, after all of them had been partially destroyed at the disastrous close of the Peloponnesian war: and it appears to have passed out of the recollection of Æschines, who speaks of the two walls as they existed in his time. I concur with the various critics who pronounce the oration ascribed to Andokides to be spurious.

[641] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 10, and Reipublic. Gerend. Præcep. p. 812.

An understanding to this effect between the two rivals is so natural, that we need not resort to the supposition of a secret agreement concluded between them through the mediation of Elpinikê, sister of Kimon, which Plutarch had read in some authors. The charms as well as the intrigues of Elpinikê appear to have figured conspicuously in the memoirs of Athenian biographers: they were employed by one party as a means of calumniating Kimon, by the other for discrediting Periklês.

[642] Thucyd. i, 112; Diodorus, xii, 13. Diodorus mentions the name of the general Anaxikrates. He affirms farther that Kimon lived not only to take Kitium and Mallus, but also to gain these two victories. But the authority of Thucydidês, superior on every ground to Diodorus, is more particularly superior as to the death of Kimon, with whom he was connected by relationship.

[643] Herodot. vii, 151; Diodor. xii, 3, 4. Demosthenês (De False Legat. c. 77, p. 428, R: compare De Rhodior. Libert. c. 13, p. 199) speaks of this peace as τὴν ὑπὸ πάντων θρυλλουμένην εἰρήνεν. Compare Lykurgus, cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. 187; Isokratês, Panegyr. c. 33, 34, p. 244; Areopagitic. c. 37, pp. 150, 229; Panathenaic, c. 20, p. 360.

The loose language of these orators makes it impossible to determine what was the precise limit in respect of vicinity to the coast. Isokratês is careless enough to talk of the river Halys as the boundary; Demosthenês states it as "a day's course for a horse,"—which is probably larger than the truth.

The two boundaries marked by sea, on the other hand, are both clear and natural, in reference to the Athenian empire,—the Kyanean rocks at one end, Phasêlis, or the Chelidonian islands—there is no material distance between these two last-mentioned places—on the other.

Dahlmann, at the end of his Dissertation on the reality of this Kimonian peace, collects the various passages of authors wherein it is mentioned: among them are several out of the rhetor Aristeidês (Forschungen pp. 140-148).

[644] Thucyd. ii, 14.

[645] Thucyd. viii, 5, 6, 56. As this is a point on which very erroneous representations have been made by some learned critics, especially by Dahlmann and Manso (see the treatises cited in the subsequent note 647), I transcribe the passage of Thucydidês. He is speaking of the winter of B. C. 412, immediately succeeding the ruin of the Athenian army at Syracuse, and after redoubled exertions had been making—even some months before that ruin actually took place—to excite active hostile proceedings against Athens from every quarter (Thucyd. vii, 25): it being seen that there was a promising opportunity for striking a heavy blow at the Athenian power. The

satrap Tissaphernes encouraged the Chians and Erythræans to revolt, sending an envoy along with them to Sparta with persuasions and promises of aid,—ἐπήγετο καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης τοὺς Πελοποννησίους καὶ ὑπισχνεῖτο τροφὴν παρέξειν. Ὑπὸ βασιλέως γὰρ νεωστὶ ἐτύγχανε πεπραγμένος τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους, οὓς δι' Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐ δυνάμενος πράσσεσθαι ἐπωφείλησε. Τούς τε οὖν φόρους μᾶλλον ἐνόμιζε κομιεῖσθαι, κακώσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ἅμα βασιλεῖ ξυμμάχους Λακεδαιμονίους ποιήσειν, etc. In the next chapter, Thucydidês tells us that the satrap Pharnabazus wanted to obtain Lacedæmonian aid in the same manner as Tissaphernes, for *his* satrapy also, in order that he might detach the Greek cities from Athens, and be able to levy the tribute upon them. Two Greeks go to Sparta, sent by Pharnabazus, ὅπως ναῦς κομίσειαν ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον, καὶ αὐτὸς, εἰ δύναιτο ἅπερ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης προὐθυμεῖτο, τάς τε ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῇ πόλεις Ἀθηναίων ἀποστήσειε διὰ τοὺς φόρους, καὶ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ βασιλεῖ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ποιήσειε.

These passages, strange to say, are considered by Manso and Dahlmann as showing that the Grecian cities on the Asiatic coast, though subject to the Athenian empire, continued, nevertheless, to pay their tribute regularly to Susa. To me, the passages appear to disprove this very supposition: they show that it was essential for the satrap to detach these cities from the Athenian empire, as a means of procuring tribute from them to Persia: that the Athenian empire, while it lasted, prevented him from getting any tribute from the cities subject to it. Manso and Dahlmann have overlooked the important meaning of the adverb of time νεωστὶ—"lately." By that word, Thucydidês expressly intimates that the court of Susa *had only recently* demanded from Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, tribute from the maritime Greeks within their satrapies: and he implies that *until recently no such demand* had been made upon them. The court of Susa, apprized, doubtless, by Grecian exiles and agents, of the embarrassments into which Athens had fallen, conceived this a suitable moment for exacting tributes; to which, doubtless, it always considered itself entitled, though the power of Athens had compelled it to forego them. Accordingly, the demand was now for the first time sent down to Tissaphernes, and he "*became a debtor* for them" to the court (ἐπωφείλησε), until he could collect them: which he could not at first do, even then, embarrassed as Athens was,—and which, *à fortiori*, he could not have done before, when Athens was in full power.

We learn from these passages two valuable facts. 1. That the maritime Asiatic cities belonging to the Athenian empire paid no tribute to Susa, from the date of the full organization of the Athenian confederacy down to a period after the Athenian defeat in Sicily. 2. That, nevertheless, these cities always continued, throughout this period, to stand rated in the Persian king's books each for its appropriate tribute,—the court of Susa waiting for a convenient moment to occur, when it should be able to enforce its demands, from misfortune accruing to Athens.

This state of relations, between the Asiatic Greeks and the Persian court under the Athenian empire, authenticated by Thucydidês, enables us to explain a passage of Herodotus, on which also both Manso and Dahlmann have dwelt (p. 94) with rather more apparent plausibility, as proving their view of the case. Herodotus, after describing the rearrangement and remeasurement of the territories of the Ionic cities by the satrap Artaphernes (about 493 B. C., after the suppression of the Ionic revolt), proceeds to state that he assessed the tribute of each with reference to this new measurement, and that the assessment remained unchanged until his own (Herodotus's) time,—καὶ τὰς χώρας σφέων μετρήσας κατὰ παρασάγγας … φόρους ἔταξε ἑκάστοισι, οἳ κατὰ χώρην διατελέουσι ἔχοντες ἐκ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου αἰεὶ ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ, ὡς ἐτάχθησαν ἐξ Ἀρταφέρνεος· ἐτάχθησαν δὲ σχεδὸν κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τὰ καὶ πρότερον εἶχον (vi, 42). Now Dahlmann and Manso contend that Herodotus here affirms the tribute of the Ionic cities to Persia to have been continuously and regularly paid, down to his own time. But in my judgment this is a mistake: Herodotus speaks, not about the *payment*, but about the *assessment*: and these were two very different things, as Thucydidês clearly intimates in the passage which I have cited above. The *assessment* of all the Ionic cities in the Persian king's books remained unaltered all through the Athenian empire; but the *payment* was not enforced until immediately before 412 B. C., when the Athenians were supposed to be too weak to hinder it. It is evident by the account of the general Persian revenues, throughout all the satrapies, which we find in the third book of Herodotus, that he had access to official accounts of the Persian finances, or at least to Greek secretaries who knew those accounts. He would be told, that these assessments remained unchanged from the time of Artaphernes downward: whether they were *realized* or not was another question, which the "books" would probably not answer, and which he might or might not know.

The passages above cited from Thucydidês appear to me to afford positive proof that the Greek cities on the Asiatic *coast*—not those in the interior, as we may see by the case of Magnesia given to Themistoklês—paid no tribute to Persia during the continuance of the Athenian empire. But if there were no such positive proof, I should still maintain the same opinion. For if these Greeks went on paying tribute, what is meant by the phrases, of their having "*revolted* from Persia," of their "having *been liberated* from the king," (οἱ ἀποστάντες

βασιλέως Ἕλληνες—οἱ ἀπὸ Ἰωνίας καὶ Ἑλλησπόντου ἤδη ἀφεστηκότες ἀπὸ βασιλέως—ὅσοι ἀπὸ βασιλέως νεωστὶ ἠλευθέρωντο, Thucyd. i, 18, 89, 95)?

So much respecting the payment of tribute. As to the other point,—that between 477 and 412 B. C., no Persian ships were tolerated along the coast of Ionia, which coast, though claimed by the Persian king, was not recognized by the Greeks as belonging to him,—proof will be found in Thucyd. viii, 56: compare Diodor. iv, 26.

[646] Herodot. vi, 151. Diodorus also states that this peace was concluded by Kallias the Athenian (xii, 4).

[647] I conclude, on the whole, in favor of this treaty as an historical fact,—though sensible that some of the arguments urged against it are not without force. Mr. Mitford and Dr. Thirlwall (ch. xvii, p. 474), as well as Manso and Dahlmann, not to mention others, have impugned the reality of the treaty: and the last-mentioned author, particularly, has examined the case at length and set forth all the grounds of objection; urging, among some which are really serious, others which appear to me weak and untenable (Manso, Sparta, vol. iii, Beylage x, p. 471; Dahlmann, Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte, vol. i, Ueber den Kimonischen Frieden, pp. 1-148). Boëckh admits the treaty as an historical fact.

If we deny altogether the historical reality of the treaty, we must adopt some such hypothesis as that of Dahlmann (p. 40): "The distinct mention and averment of such a peace as having been formally concluded, appears to have first arisen among the schools of the rhetors at Athens, shortly after the peace of Antalkidas, and as an oratorical antithesis to oppose to that peace."

To which we must add the supposition, that some persons must have taken the trouble to cause this fabricated peace to be engraved on a pillar, and placed, either in the Metrôon or somewhere else in Athens, among the records of Athenian glories. For that it was so engraved on a column is certain (Theopompus ap. Harpokration. Ἀττικοῖς γράμμασι). The suspicion started by Theopompus (and founded on the fact that the peace was engraved, not in ancient Attic, but in Ionic letters—the latter sort having been only legalized in Athens after the archonship of Eukleides), that this treaty was a subsequent invention and not an historical reality, does not weigh with me very much. Assuming the peace to be real, it would naturally be drawn up and engraved in the character habitually used among the Ionic cities of Asia Minor, since they were the parties most specially interested in it: or it might even have been reëngraved, seeing that nearly a century must have elapsed between the conclusion of the treaty and the time when Theopompus saw the pillar. I confess that the hypothesis of Dahlmann appears to me more improbable than the historical reality of the treaty. I think it more likely that there *was* a treaty, and that the orators talked exaggerated and false matters respecting it,—rather than that they fabricated the treaty from the beginning with a deliberate purpose, and with the false name of an envoy conjoined.

Dahlmann exposes justly and forcibly—an easy task, indeed—the loose, inconsistent, and vainglorious statements of the orators respecting this treaty. The chronological error by which it was asserted to have been made shortly after the victories of the Eurymedon—and was thus connected with the name of Kimon—is one of the circumstances which have most tended to discredit the attesting witnesses: but we must not forget that Ephorus (assuming that Diodorus in this case copies Ephorus, which is highly probable—xii, 3, 4) did not fall into this mistake, but placed the treaty in its right chronological place, after the Athenian expedition under Kimon against Cyprus and Egypt in 450-449 B. C. Kimon died before the great results of this expedition were consummated, as we know from Thucydidês: on this point Diodorus speaks equivocally, but rather giving it to be understood that Kimon lived to complete the whole, and then died of sickness.

The absurd exaggeration of Isokratês, that the treaty bound the Persian kings not to come westward of the river Halys, has also been very properly censured. He makes this statement in two different orations (Areopagatic. p. 150; Panathenaic. p. 462).

But though Dahlmann succeeds in discrediting the orators, he tries in vain to show that the treaty is in itself improbable, or inconsistent with any known historical facts. A large portion of his dissertation is employed in this part of the case, and I think quite unsuccessfully. The fact that the Persian satraps are seen at various periods after the treaty lending aid—underhand, yet without taking much pains to disguise it—to Athenian revolted subjects, does not prove that no treaty had been concluded. These satraps would, doubtless, be very glad to infringe the treaty, whenever they thought they could do so with advantage: if any misfortune had happened to Athens from the hands of the Peloponnesians,—for example, if the Athenians had been unwise enough to march their aggregate land-force out of the city to repel the invading Peloponnesians from Attica, and had been totally defeated,—the Persians would, doubtless, have tried to regain Ionia forthwith. So the Lacedæmonians, at a time when they were actually in alliance with Athens, listened to the persuasions of the revolted Thasians, and

promised secretly to invade Attica, in order to aid their revolt (Thucyd. i, 103). Because a treaty is very imperfectly observed,—or rather because the parties, without coming to open war, avail themselves of opportunities to evade it and encroach upon its prescriptions,—we are not entitled to deny that it has ever been made (Dahlmann, p. 116).

It seems to me that the objections which have been taken by Dahlmann and others against the historical reality of this treaty, tell for the most part only against the exaggerated importance assigned to it by subsequent orators.

[648] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 21-28.

[649] Plutarch, Aristeidês. c. 25.

[650] Thucyd. i, 112; compare Philochor. Fragm. 88, ed. Didot.

[651] Thucyd. i, 19. Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς ἔχοντες φόρου τοὺς ξυμμάχους, κατ' ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς μόνον ἐπιτηδείως ὅπως πολιτεύσουσι θεραπεύοντες—the same also i, 76-144.

[652] Aristotel. Politic. v, 2, 6. Καὶ ἐν Θήβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις μάχην, κακῶς πολιτευομένων, ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη.

[653] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 18; also, his comparison between Periklês and Fabius Maximus, c. 3.

Kleinias, father of the celebrated Alkibiadês, was slain in this battle: he had served, thirty-three years before, at the sea-fight of Artemisium: he cannot therefore be numbered among the youthful warriors, though a person of the first rank (Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 1).

[654] Thucyd. i, 113; Diodor. xii, 6. Platæa appears to have been considered as quite dissevered from Bœotia: it remained in connection with Athens as intimately as before.

[655] Xenophon, Memorabil. iii, 5, 4.

[656] Thucyd. i, 114; v, 16, Plutarch, Periklês, c. 22.

[657] Thucyd. i, 114; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 23; Diodor. xii, 7.

[658] Thucyd. i, 114, 115; ii, 21; Diodor. xii, 5. I do not at all doubt that the word Achaia here used, means the country in the north part of Peloponnesus, usually known by that name. The suspicions of Göller and others, that it means, not this territory, but some unknown town, appear to me quite unfounded. Thucydidês had never noticed the exact time when the Athenians acquired Achaia as a dependent ally, though he notices the Achæans (i, 111) in that capacity. This is one argument, among many, to show that we must be cautious in reasoning from the silence of Thucydidês against the reality of an event,—in reference to this period between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, where his whole summary is so brief.

In regard to the chronology of these events, Mr. Fynes Clinton remarks: "The disasters in Bœotia produced the revolt of Eubœa and Megara about eighteen months after, in Anthestêrion 445 B. C.: and the Peloponnesian invasion of Attica, on the expiration of the five years' truce," (ad ann. 447 B. C.)

Mr. Clinton seems to me to allow a longer interval than is probable: I incline to think that the revolt of Eubœa and Megara followed more closely upon the disasters in Bœotia, in spite of the statement of archons given by Diodorus: οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον, the expression of Thucydidês means probably no more than three or four months; and the whole series of events were evidently the product of one impulse. The truce having been concluded in the beginning of 445 B. C., it seems reasonable to place the revolt of Eubœa and Megara, as well as the invasion of Attica by Pleistoanax, in 446 B. C.—and the disasters in Bœotia, either in the beginning of 446 B. C., or the close of 447 B. C.

It is hardly safe to assume, moreover (as Mr. Clinton does, ad ann. 450, as well as Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. xvii, p. 478), that the five years' truce must have been actually expired before Pleistoanax and the Lacedæmonians invaded Attica: the thirty years' truce, afterwards concluded, did not run out its full time.

[659] See K. F. Hermann, Griechische Staatsalterthümer, sects. 53-107, and his treatise De Jure et Auctoritate Magistratuum ap. Athen. p. 53 (Heidelb. 1829); also Rein, Römisches Privatrecht, pp. 26, 408, Leips. 1836. M. Laboulaye also insists particularly upon the confusion of administrative and judiciary functions among the Romans (Essai sur les Loix Criminelles des Romains, pp. 23, 79, 107, etc.): and compare Mr. G. C. Lewis, Essay on the Government of Dependencies, p. 42, with his citation from Hugo, Geschichte des Römischen Rechts, p. 42. Mr. Lewis has given just and valuable remarks upon the goodness of the received classification of powers as a theory, and upon the extent to which the separation of them either has been, or can be, carried in practice: see also Note E, in the same work, p. 347.

The separation of administrative from judicial functions appears unknown in early societies. M. Meyer observes, respecting the judicial institutions of modern Europe: "Anciennement les fonctions administratives et judiciaires n'étoient pas distinctes. Du temps de la liberté des Germains et même long temps après, les plaids de la nation ou ceux du comté rendoient la justice et administroient les intérêts nationaux ou locaux dans une seule

et même assemblée: sous le régime féodal, le roi ou l'empereur dans son conseil, sa cour, son parlement composé des hauts barons ecclésiastiques et laïes, exerçait tous les droits de souveraineté comme de justice: dans la commune, le bailli, mayeur, ou autre fonctionnaire nommé par le prince, administraient les intérêts communaux et jugeoient les bourgeois de l'avis de la communauté entière, des corporations qui la composoient, ou des autorités et conseils qui la réprésentoient: on n'avoit pas encore soupçonné que le jugement d'une cause entre particuliers pût être étranger à la cause commune."—Meyer, Esprit des Institutions Judiciaires, book v, chap. 11, vol. iii, p. 239; also chap. 18, p. 383.

[660] A case of such deposition of an archon by vote of the public assembly, even before the year of office was expired, occurs in Demosthenês, cont. Theokrin. c. 7: another, the deposition of a stratêgus, in Demosthen. cont. Timoth. c. 3.

[661] Æschinês (cont. Ktesiphont, c. 9, p. 373) speaks of the senate of Areopagus as ὑπεύθυνος, and so it was doubtless understood to be: but it is difficult to see how accountability could be practically enforced against such a body. They could only be responsible in this sense,—that, if any one of their number could be proved to have received a bribe, he would be individually punished. But in this sense the dikasteries themselves would also be responsible: though it is always affirmed of them that they were not responsible.

[662] Respecting the procedure of arbitration at Athens, and the public as well as private arbitrators, see the instructive treatise of Hudtwalcker, Ueber die öffentlichen und Privat-Schiedsrichter (Diaeteten) zu Athen: Jena, 1812.

Each arbitrator seems to have sat alone to inquire into and decide disputes: he received a small fee of one drachma from both parties: also an additional fee when application was made for delay (p. 16). Parties might by mutual consent fix upon any citizen to act as arbitrator: but there were a certain number of public arbitrators, elected or drawn by lot from the citizens every year: and a plaintiff might bring his cause before any one of these. They were liable to be punished under εὔθυναι, at the end of their year of office, if accused and convicted of corruption or unfair dealing.

The number of these public diætetæ, or arbitrators, was unknown when Hudtwalcker's book was published. An inscription, since discovered by Professor Ross, and published in his work, Über die Demen von Attika, p. 22, records the names of all the diætetæ for the year of the archon Antiklês, B. C. 325, with the name of the tribe to which each belonged.

The total number is one hundred and four: the number in each tribe is unequal; the largest number is in Kekropis, which furnishes sixteen; the smallest in Pandionis, which sends only three. They must have been either elected or drawn by lot from the general body of citizens, without any reference to tribes. The inscription records the names of the diætetæ for this year B. C. 325, in consequence of their being crowned or receiving a vote of thanks from the people. The fragment of a like inscription for the year B. C. 337, also exists.

[663] Public Economy of the Athenians, book ii, chap. xiv, p. 227. Engl. transl.

M. Boëckh must mean that the whole six thousand, or nearly the whole, were employed every day. It appears to me that this supposition greatly overstates both the number of days and the number of men actually employed. For the inference in the text, however, a much smaller number is sufficient.

See the more accurate remark of Schömann, Antiquit. Juris Public. Græcor., sect. lxxi, p. 310.

[664] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 9, 3. Καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴν Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς· τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς· καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἕκαστος τῶν δημαγωγῶν προήγαγεν, αὔξων εἰς τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν. Φαίνεται δ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν Σόλωνος γενέσθαι τοῦτο προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ συμπτώματος. Τῆς ναυαρχίας γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ὁ δῆμος αἴτιος γενόμενος ἐφρονηματίσθη, καὶ δημαγωγοὺς ἔλαβε φαύλους, ἀντιπολιτευομένων τῶν ἐπιεικῶν· ἐπεὶ Σόλων γ' ἔοικε τὴν ἀναγκαιοτάτην ἀποδιδόναι τῷ δήμῳ δύναμιν, τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν· μηδὲ γὰρ τούτου κύριος ὢν ὁ δῆμος δοῦλος ἂν εἴη καὶ πολέμιος.

The words τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς, are commonly translated, "Periklês first gave pay to the dikasteries," wherein it is assumed that these bodies had before judged gratuitously. But it appears to me that the words ought to be translated, "Periklês first constituted the paid dikasteries:" that is, the dikasteries as well as the pay were of his introduction.

It is evident from this whole passage that Aristotle did not suppose the dikasteries, either gratuitous or paid, to have been constituted by Solon, but to have been foreign to the purpose of that lawgiver, and to have been

novelties emanating from Periklês and Ephialtês, at the same time that the judicial functions of the senate of Areopagus were cut down.

[665] Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. Or. i, p. 91. φυλάττει τὰς ἀπορρήτους διαθήκας, ἐν αἷς τὰ τῆς πόλεως σωτήρια κεῖται, etc. So also Æschinês calls this senate τὴν σκυθρωπὸν καὶ τῶν μεγίστων κυρίαν βουλὴν (cont. Ktesiphont. c. 9, p. 373: compare also cont. Timarchum, c. 16, p. 41; Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. c. 65, p. 641). Plutarch, Solon, c. 19. τὴν ἄνω βουλὴν ἐπίσκοπον πάντων καὶ φύλακα τῶν νόμων, etc.

Ἐδίκαζον οὖν οἱ Ἀρεοπαγῖται περὶ πάντων σχεδὸν τῶν σφαλμάτων καὶ παρανομιῶν, ὡς ἅπαντά φησιν Ἀνδροτίων ἐν πρώτῃ καὶ Φιλόχορος ἐν δευτέρᾳ καὶ τρίτῃ τῶν Ἀτθίδων (Philochorus, Fr. 17-58, ed. Didot, p. 19, ed. Siebelis).

See about the Areopagus, Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Att. sect. lxvi.; K. F. Hermann, Griech. Staatsalterthümer, sect. 109.

[666] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 18.

[667] Aristotle particularly indicates these two conflicting tendencies in Athens, the one immediately following the other, in a remarkable passage of his Politics (v, 3, 5).

Μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ εἰς δῆμον καὶ εἰς πολιτείαν ἐκ τοῦ εὐδοκιμῆσαί τι ἢ αὐξηθῆναι ἢ ἀρχεῖον ἢ μόριον τῆς πόλεως· οἷον, ἡ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴ εὐδοκιμήσασα ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ἔδοξε συντονωτέραν ποιῆσαι τὴν πολιτείαν. Καὶ πάλιν ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος γενόμενος αἴτιος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμῖνα νίκης καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν δύναμιν, τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποίησεν.

The word συντονωτέραν ("stricter, more rigid,") stands opposed in another passage to ἀνειμένας (iv, 3, 5).

[668] Plutarch. Reipub. Ger. Præcept. p. 805. Οὐκ ἀγνοῶ δὲ, ὅτι βουλήν τινες ἐπαχθῆ καὶ ὀλιγαρχικὴν κολούσαντες, ὥσπερ Ἐφιάλτης Ἀθήνῃσι καὶ Φορμίων παρ' Ἠλείοις, δύναμιν ἅμα καὶ δόξαν ἔσχον.

About the oligarchical character of the Areopagites, see Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. pp 46, 98.

[669] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16; Themistoklês, c. 20.

[670] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 4-7., *seq.*

[671] Herodot. vi, 131.

[672] Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 812; Periklês, c. 5, 6, 7.

[673] Plato, Phædrus, c. 54, p. 270; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 8; Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 46.

[674] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 9, 16; Kimon, c. 10; Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. p. 818.

[675] The personal intercourse between Periklês and Protagoras is attested by the interesting fragment of the latter which we find in Plutarch, Consolat. ad Apollonium, c. 33, p. 119.

[676] Aristophan. Nubes, 972, 1000, *seq.* and Ranæ, 1071.

[677] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 10; Ælian, V. H. ii, 43; xi, 9.

[678] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 10: compare Valer. Maxim. iii, 8, 4. Ἐφιάλτην μὲν οὖν, φοβερὸν ὄντα τοῖς ὀλιγαρχικοῖς καὶ περὶ τὰς εὐθύνας καὶ διώξεις τῶν τὸν δῆμον ἀδικούντων ἀπαραίτητον, ἐπιβουλεύσαντες οἱ ἐχθροὶ δι' Ἀριστοδίκου τοῦ Ταναγρικοῦ κρυφαίως ἀνεῖλον, etc.

[679] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16.

[680] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 17. Οἱ δὲ πρὸς ὀργὴν ἀπελθόντες ἤδη τοῖς λακωνίζουσι φανερῶς ἐχαλέπαινον, καὶ τὸν Κίμωνα μικρᾶς ἐπιλαβόμενοι προφάσεως ἐξωστράκισαν εἰς ἔτη δέκα.

I transcribe this passage as a specimen of the inaccurate manner in which the ostracism is so often described. Plutarch says: "The Athenians took advantage of a slight pretence to ostracize Kimon:" but it was the peculiar characteristic of ostracism that it had no *pretence*: it was a judgment passed without specific or assigned cause.

[681] Demosthen. cont. Euerg. et Mnesibul. c. 12.

[682] Harpokration—Ὁ κάτωθεν νόμος—Pollux, viii, 128.

[683] Arist. Polit. iv, 5, 6. ἔτι δ' οἱ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγκαλοῦντες τὸν δῆμόν φασι δεῖν κρίνειν· ὁ δὲ ἀσμένως δέχεται τὴν πρόκλησιν· ὥστε καταλύονται πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρχαί, etc.; compare vi, 1, 8.

The remark of Aristotle is not justly applicable to the change effected by Periklês, which transferred the power taken from the magistrates, not to the people but to certain specially constituted, though numerous and popular dikasteries, sworn to decide in conformity with known and written laws. Nor is the separation of judicial competence from administrative, to be characterized as "dissolving or extinguishing magisterial authority." On the contrary, it is conformable to the best modern notions. Periklês cannot be censured for having effected this separation, however persons may think that the judicature which he constituted was objectionable.

Plato seems also to have conceived administrative power as essentially accompanied by judicial (Legg. vi, p. 767)—πάντα ἄρχοντα ἀναγκαῖον καὶ δικαστὴν εἶναι τινων—an opinion, doubtless, perfectly just, up to a certain narrow limit: the separation between the two sorts of powers cannot be rendered *absolutely* complete.

[684] Demosthen. cont. Neær. p. 1372; cont. Aristokrat. p. 642.

Meier (Attischer Prozess, p. 143) thinks that the senate of Areopagus was also deprived of its cognizance of homicide as well as of its other functions, and that this was only restored after the expulsion of the Thirty. He supposes this to be proved by a passage of Lysias which he produces (De Cæde Eratosthenis, pp. 31-33).

M. Boëckh and O. Müller adopt the same opinion as Meier, and seemingly on the authority of the same passage, (see the Dissertation of O. Müller on the Eumenides of Æschylus, p. 113, Eng. transl.) But in the first place, this opinion is contradicted by an express statement in the anonymous biographer of Thucydidês, who mentions the trial of Pyrilampês for murder before the Areopagus; and contradicted also, seemingly, by Xenophon (Memorab. iii, 5, 20); in the next place, the passage of Lysias appears to me to bear a different meaning. He says: ᾧ καὶ πάτριόν ἐστι καὶ ἐφ' ὑμῶν ἀποδέδοται τοῦ φόνου τὰς δίκας δικάζειν: now—even if we admit the conjectural reading ἐφ' ὑμῶν in place of ἐφ' ὑμῖν to be correct—still, this restoration of functions to the Areopagus, refers naturally to the restored democracy after the violent interruption occasioned by the oligarchy of Thirty. Considering how many persons the Thirty caused to be violently put to death, and the complete subversion of all the laws which they introduced, it seems impossible to suppose that the Areopagus could have continued to hold its sittings and try accusations for intentional homicide, under their government. On the return of the democracy after the Thirty were expelled, the functions of the senate of Areopagus would return also.

If the supposition of the eminent authors mentioned above were correct,—if it were true that the Areopagus was deprived not only of its supervising function generally, but also of its cognizance of homicide, during the fifty-five years which elapsed between the motion of Ephialtês and the expulsion of the Thirty,—this senate must have been without any functions at all during that long interval; it must have been for all practical purposes non-existent. But during so long a period of total suspension, the citizens would have lost all their respect for it; it could not have retained so much influence as we know that it actually possessed immediately before the Thirty (Lysias c. Eratosth. c. 11, p. 126); and it would hardly have been revived after the expulsion of the Thirty. Whereas, by preserving during that period its jurisdiction in cases of homicide, apart from those more extended privileges which had formerly rendered it obnoxious, the ancient traditional respect for it was kept alive, and it was revived, after the fall of the Thirty, as a venerable part of the old democracy; even apparently with some extension of privileges.

The inferences which O. Müller wishes to draw, as to the facts of these times, from the Eumenides of Æschylus, appear to me ill-supported. In order to sustain his view, that, by virtue of the proposition of Ephialtês "the Areopagus almost entirely ceased to be a high court of judicature," (sect. 36, p. 109,) he is forced to alter the chronology of the events, and to affirm that the motion of Ephialtês must have been carried subsequently to the representation of the Eumenides, though Diodorus mentions it in the year next but one before, and there is nothing to contradict him. All that we can safely infer from the very indistinct allusions in Æschylus, is, that he himself was full of reverence for the Areopagus, and that the season was one in which party bitterness ran so high as to render something like civil war (ἐμφύλιον Ἄρη, v. 864) within the scope of reasonable apprehension. Probably, he may have been averse to the diminution of the privileges of the Areopagus by Ephialtês: yet even thus much is not altogether certain, inasmuch as he puts it forward prominently and specially as a tribunal for homicide, exercising this jurisdiction by inherent prescription, and confirmed in it by the Eumenides themselves. Now when we consider that such jurisdiction was precisely the thing confirmed and left by Ephialtês to the Areopagus, we might plausibly argue that Æschylus, by enhancing the solemnity and predicting the perpetuity of

the remaining privilege, intended to conciliate those who resented the recent innovations, and to soften the hatred between the two opposing parties.

The opinion of Boëckh, O. Müller, and Meier, respecting the withdrawal from the senate of Areopagus of the judgments on homicide, by the proposition of Ephialtês, has been discussed, and in my judgment refuted, by Forchhammer, in a valuable Dissertation, De Areopago non privato per Ephialten Homicidii Judiciis. Kiel, 1828.

[685] This is the language of those authors whom Diodorus copied (Diodor. xi, 77)—οὐ μὴν ἀθρόως γε διέφυγε τηλικούτοις ἀνομήμασιν ἐπιβαλόμενος (Ephialtês), ἀλλὰ τῆς νυκτὸς ἀναιρεθεὶς, ἄδηλον ἔσχε τὴν τοῦ βίου τελευτήν. Compare Pausanias, i, 29, 15.

Plutarch (Periklês, c. 10) cites Aristotle as having mentioned the assassination of Ephialtês. Antipho, however, states that the assassin was never formally known or convicted (De Cæde Hero. c. 68).

The enemies of Periklês circulated a report, mentioned by Idomeneus, that it was he who had procured the assassination of Ephialtês, from jealousy of the superiority of the latter (Plutarch, Periklês, c. 10). We may infer from this report how great the eminence of Ephialtês was.

[686] The intervention of Elpinikê, the sister of Kimon, in bringing about this compromise between her brother and Periklês, is probable enough (Plutarch, Periklês, c. 10, and Kimon, c. 14). Clever and engaging, she seems to have played an active part in the political intrigues of the day: but we are not at all called upon to credit the scandals insinuated by Eupolis and Stesimbrotus.

[687] We hear about these nomophylakes in a distinct statement cited from Philochorus, by Photius, Lexic. p. 674, Porson. Νομοφύλακες· ἕτεροί εἰσι τῶν θεσμοθετῶν, ὡς Φιλόχορος ἐν ζ'· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχοντες ἀνέβαινον εἰς Ἄρειον πάγον ἐστεφανώμενοι, οἱ δὲ νομοφύλακες χρύσια στρόφια ἄγοντες· καὶ ταῖς θεαῖς ἐνάντιον ἀρχόντων ἐκαθέζοντο· καὶ τὴν πομπὴν ἔπεμπον τῇ Παλλάδι· τὰς δὲ ἀρχὰς ἠνάγκαζον τοῖς νόμοις χρῆσθαι· καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ καὶ ἐν τῇ βουλῇ μετὰ τῶν προέδρων ἐκάθηντο, κωλύοντες τὰ ἀσύμφορα τῇ πόλει πράττειν· ἔπτα δὲ ἦσαν· καὶ κατέστησαν, ὡς Φιλόχορος, ὅτε Ἐφιάλτης μόνῃ κατέλιπε τῇ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῇ τὰ ὑπὲρ τοῦ σώματος.

Harpokration, Pollux, and Suidas, give substantially the same account of these magistrates, though none except Photius mentions the exact date of their appointment. There is no adequate ground for the doubt which M. Boëckh expresses about the accuracy of this statement: see Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Pub. Græc. sect. lxvi; and Cicero, Legg. iii, 20.

[688] See Xenophon, Hellenic. i, 7; Andokidês de Mysteriis, p. 40.

[689] Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 20, pp. 725, 726. Ἆρ' οὖν τῷ δοκεῖ συμφέρειν τῇ πόλει τοιοῦτος νόμος, ὃς δικαστηρίου γνώσεως αὐτὸς κυριώτερος ἔσται, καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ὀμωμοκότων γνώσεις τοῖς ἀνωμότοις προστάξει λύειν; Ἐνθυμεῖσθε, ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαστηρίου καὶ τῆς καταγνώσεως οἵ διεπήδησεν (Timokratês) ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον, ἐκκλέπτων τὸν ἠδικηκότα! Compare Demosthen. cont. Eubulid. c. 15.

See, about the nomothetæ, Schömann, De Comitiis, ch. vii, p. 248, *seqq.*, and Platner, Prozess und Klagen bey den Attikern, Abschn. ii, 3, 3, p. 33, *seqq.*

Both of them maintain, in my opinion erroneously, that the nomothetæ are an institution of Solon. Demosthenês, indeed, ascribes it to Solon (Schömann, p. 268): but this counts, in my view, for nothing, when I see that all the laws which he cites for governing the proceedings of the nomothetæ, bear unequivocal evidence of a time much later. Schömann admits this to a certain extent, and in reference to the style of these laws,—"Illorum quidem fragmentorum, quæ in Timokrateâ extant, *recentiorem Solonis ætate formam atque orationem apertum est.*" But it is not merely the style which proves them to be of post-Solonian date: it is the mention of post-Solonian institutions, such as the ten prytanies into which the year was divided, the ten statues of the eponymi,—all derived from the creation of the ten tribes by Kleisthenês. On the careless employment of the name of Solon by the orators, whenever they desire to make a strong impression on the dikasts, I have already remarked.

[690] The privation of this right of public speech (παῤῥησία) followed on the condemnation of any citizen to the punishment called ἀτιμία, disfranchisement, entire or partial (Demosthen. cont. Neær. p. 1352, c. 9; cont. Meidiam, p. 545, c. 27). Compare for the oligarchical sentiment, Xenophon, Republ. Athen. i, 9.

[691] See Meier, Attisch. Prozess, p. 139. Andokidês mentions a trial under the indictment of γραφὴ παρανόμων, brought by his father Leogoras against a senator named Speusippus, wherein six thousand dikasts

sat,—that is, the entire body of heliasts. However, the loose speech so habitual with Andokidês, renders this statement very uncertain (Andokidês de Mysteriis, p. 3, § 29).

See Matthiæ, De Judiciis Atheniensium, in his Miscellanea Philologica, vol. i, p. 252. Matthiæ questions the reading of that passage in Demosthenês (cont. Meideam, p. 585), wherein two hundred dikasts are spoken of as sitting in judgment: he thinks it ought to be πεντακοσίους instead of διακοσίους,—but this alteration would be rash.

[692] See on this question, Boëckh, Public Econ. of Athens, ch. xv, p. 233; K. F. Hermann, Griech. Staatsalt. § 134.

The proof which M. Boëckh brings to show, first, that the original pay was one obolus,—next, that Kleon was the first to introduce the triobolus,—is in both cases very inconclusive.

Certain passages from the Scholiast, stating that the pay of the dikasts fluctuated (οὐκ ἔστηκεν—ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἐδίδοτο) do not so naturally indicate a rise from one obolus to three, as a change backwards and forwards according to circumstances. Now it seems that there were some occasions when the treasury was so very poor that it was doubtful whether the dikasts could be paid: see Lysias, cont. Epikrat. c. 1; cont. Nikomach. c. 22; and Aristophan. Equit. 1370. The amount of pay may, therefore, have been sometimes affected by this cause.

[693] There is a remarkable passage on this point in the treatise of Xenophon, De Republic. Athen. iii, 6. He says:—

Φέρε δὴ, ἀλλὰ φησί τις χρῆναι δικάζειν μὲν, ἐλάττους δὲ δικάζειν. Ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, ἐὰν μὲν πολλὰ (both Weiske and Schneider substitute πολλὰ here in place of ὀλίγα, which latter makes no sense) ποιῶνται δικαστήρια, ὀλίγοι ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἔσονται τῷ δικαστηρίῳ· ὥστε καὶ διασκευάσασθαι ῥᾴδιον ἔσται πρὸς ὀλίγους δικαστὰς, καὶ συνδεκάσαι (so Schneider and Matthiæ, in place of συνδικάσαι) πολὺ ἧττον δικαίως δικάζειν.

That there was a good deal of bribery at Athens, where individuals could be approached and dealt with, is very probable (see Xenoph. de Repub. Ath. iii. 3): and we may well believe that there were also particular occasions on which money was given to the dikasts, some of whom were punished with death for such corrupt receipt (Æschinês cont. Timarch. c. 17-22, pp. 12-15). But the passage above quoted from Xenophon, an unfriendly witness, shows that the precautions taken to prevent corruption of the dikasteries were well-devised and successful, though these precautions might sometimes be eluded.

[694] Xenophon, De Republ. Laced. c. 8, 2. Τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ταῦτα, ὅτι ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν οἱ δυνατώτεροι οὔτε βούλονται δοκεῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς φοβεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ νομίζουσι τοῦτο ἀνελεύθερον εἶναι· ἐν δὲ τῇ Σπάρτῃ οἱ κράτιστοι καὶ ὑπέρχονται μάλιστα τὰς ἀρχάς, etc.

Respecting the violent proceedings committed by powerful men at Thebes, whereby it became almost impossible to procure justice against them for fear of being put to death, see Dikæarchus, Vit. Græc. Fragm. ed. Fabr. p. 143, and Polybius, xx, 4, 6; xxiii, 2.

[695] Xenophon, Memorab. iii, 5, 18. Μηδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Περίκλεις, οὕτως ἤγου ἀνηκέστῳ πονηρίᾳ νοσεῖν Ἀθηναίους· Οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὡς εὔτακτοι μέν εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς ναυτικοῖς, εὐτάκτως δ' ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι πείθονται τοῖς ἐπιστάταις, οὐδένων δὲ καταδεέστερον ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς ὑπηρετοῦσι τοῖς διδασκάλοις; Τοῦτο γάρ τοι, ἔφη, καὶ θαυμαστόν ἐστι· τὸ τοὺς μὲν τοιούτους πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς ἐφεστῶσι, τοὺς δὲ ὁπλίτας, καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς, οἳ δοκοῦσι καλοκαγαθίᾳ προκεκρίσθαι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀπειθεστάτους εἶναι πάντων.

[696] See Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 12-25; Thucyd. vi, 15, and the speech which he gives as spoken by Alkibiadês in the assembly, vi, 17; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 7-8-16, and the Oration of Demosthenês against Meidias throughout: also Fragm. v. of the Πέλαργοι of Aristophanês, Meineke, ii, p. 1128.

[697] Sir Thomas Smith, in his Treatise on the Commonwealth of England, explains the Court of Star-chamber as originally constituted in order "to deal with offenders too stout for the ordinary course of justice." The abundant compounds of the Greek language furnish a single word exactly describing this same class of offenders,—Ὑβριστοδικαι—the title of one of the lost comedies of Eupolis: see Meineke, Historia Critica Comicorum Græcorum, vol. i, p. 145.

Dean Tucker observes, in his Treatise on Civil Government: "There was hardly a session of parliament, from the time of Henry the Third to Henry the Eighth, but laws were enacted for restraining the feuds, robberies, and

oppressions of the barons and their dependents on the one side,—and to moderate and check the excesses and extortions of the royal purveyors on the other; these being the two capital evils then felt. Respecting the tyranny of the ancient baronage, even squires as well as others were not ashamed to wear the liveries of their leaders, and to glory in every badge of distinction, whereby they might be known to be retained as the bullies of such or such great men, and to engage in their quarrels, just or unjust, right or wrong. The histories of those times, together with the statutes of the realm, inform us that they associated (or, as they called it, *confederated* together) in great bodies, parading on horseback in fairs and markets, and clad in armor, to the great terror of peaceable subjects; nay, that they attended their lords to parliament, equipped in the same military dress, and even dared sometimes to present themselves before the judge of assize, and to enter the courts of justice, in a hostile manner,—while their principals sat with the judges on the bench, intimidating the witnesses, and influencing the juries by looks, nods, signs and signals." (Treatise concerning Civil Government, p. 337, by Josiah Tucker, D. D. London, 1781.)

The whole chapter (pp. 301-355) contains many statutes and much other matter, illustrating the intimidation exercised by powerful men in those days over the course of justice.

A passage among the Fragmenta of Sallust, gives a striking picture of the conduct of powerful citizens under the Roman Republic. (Fragm. lib. i, p. 158, ed. Delph.)

"At discordia, et avaritia, et ambitio, et cætera secundis rebus oriri sueta mala, post Carthaginis excidium maximè aucta sunt. Nam injuriæ validiorum, et ob eas discessio plebis à Patribus, aliæque dissensiones domi fuere jam inde à principio: neque amplius, quam regibus exactis, dum metus à Tarquinio et bellum grave cum Etruriâ positum est, æquo et modesto jure agitatum: dein, servili imperio patres plebem exercere: de vitâ atque tergo, regio more consulere: agro pellere, et à cæteris expertibus, soli in imperio agere. Quibus servitiis, et maximè fœnoris onere, oppressa plebes, cum assiduis bellis tributum simul et militiam toleraret, armata Montem Sacrum et Aventinum insedit. Tumque tribunos plebis, et alia sibi jura paravit. Discordiarum et certaminis utrimque finis fuit secundum bellum Punicum."

Compare the exposition of the condition of the cities throughout Europe in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, in Hüllmann's Städte-Wesen des Mittelalters, especially vol. iii, pp. 196-199, *seqq.*

The memorable institution which spread through nearly all the Italian cities during these centuries, of naming as podesta, or supreme magistrate, a person not belonging to the city itself, to hold office for a short time,—was the expedient which they resorted to for escaping the extreme perversion of judicial and administrative power, arising out of powerful family connections. The restrictions which were thought necessary to guard against either favor or antipathies on the part of the podesta, are extremely singular. (Hüllmann, vol. iii, pp. 252-261, *seqq.*)

"The proceedings of the patrician families in these cities (observes Hüllmann) in respect to the debts which they owed, was among the worst of the many oppressions to which the trading classes were exposed at their hands, one of the greatest abuses which they practised by means of their superior position. How often did they even maltreat their creditors, who came to demand merely what was due to them!" (Städte-Wesen, vol. ii, p. 229.)

Machiavel's History of Florence illustrates, throughout, the inveterate habit of the powerful families to set themselves above the laws and judicial authority. Indeed, he seems to regard this as an incorrigible chronic malady in society, necessitating ever-recurring disputes between powerful men and the body of the people. "The people (he says) desire to live according to the laws; the great men desire to overrule the laws: it is therefore impossible that the two should march in harmony." "Volendo il popolo vivere secondo le leggi, e i potenti comandare a quelle, non è possibile che capino insieme." (Machiavelli, Istorie Fiorentine, liv. ii, p. 79, ad ann. 1282.)

The first book of the interesting tale, called the Promessi Sposi, of Manzoni,—itself full of historical matter, and since published with illustrative notes by the historian Cantù,—exhibits a state of judicial administration, very similar to that above described, in the Milanese, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: demonstrated by repeated edicts, all ineffectual, to bring powerful men under the real control of the laws.

Because men of wealth and power, in the principal governments of modern Europe, are now completely under the control of the laws, the modern reader is apt to suppose that this is the natural state of things. It is therefore not unimportant to produce some references, which might be indefinitely multiplied, reminding him of the very different phenomena which past history exhibits almost everywhere.

[698] The number of Roman judices employed to try a criminal cause under the *quæstiones perpetuæ* in the last century and a half of the Republic, seems to have varied between one hundred, seventy-five, seventy, fifty-six, fifty-one, thirty-two, etc. (Laboulaye, Essai sur les Loix Criminelles des Romains, p. 336, Paris, 1845.)

In the time of Augustus, there was a total of four thousand judices at Rome, distributed into four decuries (Pliny, H. N. xxxiii, 1, 31).

The venality, as well as the party corruption of these Roman judices, or jurors, taken from the senatorial and equestrian orders, the two highest and richest orders in the state,—was well-known and flagrant (Appian, Bell. Civ. i, 22, 35, 37; Laboulaye, ibid. pp. 217-227; Walter, Geschichte des Römischen Rechts, ch. xxviii, sect. 237, 238; Asconius in Ciceron. Verrin. pp. 141-145, ed. Orell.; and Cicero himself, in the remarkable letter to Atticus, Ep. ad Attic. i, 16).

[699] Numerous dikasteries taken by lot seem to have been established in later times in Rhodes and other Grecian cities, though Rhodes was not democratically constituted, and to have worked satisfactorily. Sallust says (in his Oratio ii. ad Cæsarem de Republicâ ordinandâ, p. 561, ed. Cort.): "Judices à paucis probari regnum est; ex pecuniâ legi, inhonestum. Quare omnes primæ classis judicare placet; sed numero plures quam judicant. Neque Rhodios, neque alias civitates unquam suorum judiciorum pœnituit; ubi promiscuè dives et pauper, ut cuique sors tulit, de maximis rebus juxtà ac de minimis disceptat."

The necessity of a numerous judicature, in a republic where there is no standing army, or official force professionally constituted, as the only means of enforcing public-minded justice against powerful criminals, is insisted upon by Machiavel, Discorsi sopra Tito Livio, lib. i, c. 7.

"Potrebbesi ancora allegare, a fortificazione della soprascritta conclusione, l'accidente seguito pur in Firenze contra Piero Soderini: il quale al tutto seguì per non essere in quella republica alcuno modo di accuse contro alla ambizione dei potenti cittadini: perchè lo accusare un potente a otto giudici in una republica, non basta: bisogna che i giudici siano assai, perchè pochi sempre fanno a modo de' pochi," etc.: compare the whole of the same chapter.

[700] Aristophan. Vesp. 570; Xenophon, Rep. Ath. i, 18. We are not to suppose that *all* the dikasts who tried a cause were very poor: Demosthenês would not talk to very poor men, as to "the slave whom each of them might have left at home." (Demosthenês cont. Stephan. A. c. 26, p. 1127.)

It was criminal by law in the dikasts to receive bribes in the exercise of their functions, as well as in every citizen to give money to them (Demosth. cont. Steph. B. c. 13, p. 1137). And it seems perfectly safe to affirm that in practice the dikasts were never tampered with beforehand: had the fact been otherwise, we must have seen copious allusions to it in the many free-spoken pleadings which remain to us, just as there are in the Roman orators: whereas, in point of fact, there are hardly any such allusions. The word δεκάζων (in Isokratês de Pac. Or. viii, p. 169, sect. 63) does not allude to obtaining by corrupt means verdicts of dikasts in the dikastery, but to obtaining by such means votes for offices in the public assembly, where the election took place by show of hands. Isokratês says that this was often done in his time, and so perhaps it may have been: but in the case of the dikasteries, much better security was taken against it.

The statement of Aristotle (from his Πολιτεῖαι, Fragm. xi, p. 69, ed. Neumann: compare Harpokration v. Δεκάζειν; Plutarch, Coriolan. c. 14; and Pollux, viii, 121) intimates that Anytus was the first person who taught the art τοῦ δεκάζειν τὰ δικαστήρια, a short time before the battle of Ægos Potamos. But besides, that the information on this point is to the last degree vague, we may remark that between the defeat of the oligarchy of Four Hundred and the battle of Ægos Potamos, the financial and political condition of Athens was so exceedingly embarrassed, that it may well be doubted whether she could maintain the paid dikasteries on the ordinary footing. Both all the personal service of the citizens, and all the public money, must have been put in requisition at that time for defence against the enemy, without leaving any surplus for other purposes: there was not enough even to afford constant pay to the soldiers and sailors (compare Thucyd. vi, 91; viii, 69, 71, 76, 86). If therefore, in this time of distress, the dikasteries were rarely convoked, and without any certainty of pay, a powerful accused person might find it more easy to tamper with them beforehand, than it had been before, or than it came to be afterwards, when the system was regularly in operation. We can hardly reason with safety, therefore, from the period shortly preceding the battle of Ægos Potamos, either to that which preceded the Sicilian expedition, or to that which followed the subversion of the Thirty.

[701] Mr. Jardine, in his interesting and valuable publication, Criminal Trials, vol. i, p. 115, after giving an account of the trial of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton in 1553, for high treason, and his acquittal, observes: "There is

one circumstance in this trial, which ought not to be passed over without an observation. It appears that after the trial was over, the jury were required to give recognizances to answer for their verdict, and were afterwards imprisoned for nearly eight months, and heavily fined, by a sentence of the Star-chamber. Such was the security which the trial by jury afforded to the subject in those times: and such were the perils to which juries were then exposed, who ventured to act upon their conscientious opinions in state prosecutions! But even these proceedings against the jury, monstrous as they appear to our improved notions of the administration of justice, must not be considered as a wanton exercise of unlawful power on this particular occasion. The fact is, that the judges of England had for centuries before exercised a similar authority, though not without some murmuring against it; and it was not until more than a century after it, in the reign of Charles the Second, that a solemn decision was pronounced against its legality."

… "In the reign of James the First, it was held by the Lord Chancellor Egerton, together with the two Chief Justices and the Chief Baron, that when a party indicted is *found guilty on the trial*, the jury shall not be questioned; but on the other side, when a jury hath *acquitted* a felon or a traitor against manifest proof, they may be charged in the Star-chamber for their partiality in finding a manifest offender not guilty. After the abolition of the Star-chamber, there were several instances in the reign of Charles the Second, in which it was resolved, that both grand and petit juries might be fined for giving verdicts against plain evidence and the directions of the court." Compare Mr. Amos's Notes on Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliæ, c. 27.

[702] Respecting the French juries, M. Cottu (Réflexions sur la Justice Criminale, p. 79) remarks:—

"Le désir ardent de bien faire dont les jurés sont généralement animés, et la crainte de s'égarer, les jette dans une obéissance passive à l'impulsion qui leur est donnée par le président de la Cour d'Assise, et si ce magistrat sait s'emparer de leur estime, alors leur confiance en lui ne connoit plus de bornes. Ils le considèrent comme l'étoile qui doit les guider dans l'obscurité qui les environne, et pleins d'un respect aveugle pour son opinion, ils n'attendent que la manifestation qu'il leur en fait pour la sanctionner par leur déclaration. Ainsi au lieu de deux juges que l'accusé devoit avoir, il n'en a bien souvent qu'un seul, qui est le président de la Cour d'Assise."

Anselm Feuerbach (in the second part of his work, Ueber die Oeffentlichkeit und Mündlichkeit der Gerechtigkeitspflege, which contains his review of the French judicial system, Ueber die Gerichtsverfassung Frankreichs, Abt. iii, H. v, p. 477) confirms this statement from a large observation of the French courts of justice.

The habit of the French juries, in so many doubtful cases, to pronounce a verdict of guilty, by a majority of seven against five, in which case the law threw the actual condemnation upon the judges present in court, directing their votes to be counted along with those of the jury, is a remarkable proof of this aversion of the jury to the responsibility of decision; see Feuerbach, ibid. p. 481, *seqq.* Compare also the treatise of the same author, Betrachtungen über das Geschwornen Gericht. pp. 186-198.

[703] I transcribe from an eminent lawyer of the United States, Mr. Livingston, author of a Penal Code for the State of Louisiana (Preface, pp. 12-16), an eloquent panegyric on trial by jury. It contains little more than the topics commonly insisted on, but it is expressed with peculiar warmth, and with the greater fulness, inasmuch as the people of Louisiana, for whom the author was writing, had no familiarity with the institution and its working. The reader will observe that almost everything here said in recommendation of the jury might have been urged by Periklês with much truer and wider application, in enforcing his transfer of judicial power from individual magistrates to the dikasteries.

"By our constitution (*i. e.* in Louisiana), the right of a trial by jury is secured to the accused, but it is not exclusively established. This, however, may be done by law, and there are so many strong reasons in its favor, that it has been thought proper to insert in the codes a precise declaration that, in all criminal prosecutions, the trial by jury is a privilege which cannot be renounced. Were it left entirely at the option of the accused, a desire to propitiate the favor of the judge, ignorance of his interest, or the confusion incident to his situation, might induce him to waive the advantage of a trial by his country, and thus by degrees accustom the people to a spectacle which they ought never to behold,—a single man determining the fact, applying the law, and disposing at his will of the life, liberty, and reputation of a citizen…. Those who advocate the present disposition of our law say,—admitting the trial by jury to be an advantage, the law does enough when it gives the accused the option to avail himself of its benefits; he is the best judge whether it will be useful to him; and it would be unjust to direct him in so important a choice. This argument is specious, but not solid. There are reasons, and some have already been stated, to show that this choice cannot be freely exercised. There is, moreover, another interest be-

sides that of the culprit to be considered. If he be guilty, the state has an interest in his conviction: and, whether guilty or innocent, it has a higher interest,—that the fact should be fairly canvassed before judges inaccessible to influence, and unbiased by any false views of official duty. It has an interest in the character of its administration of justice, and a paramount duty to perform in rendering it free from suspicion. It is not true, therefore, to say that the laws do enough when they give the choice between a fair and impartial trial, and one that is liable to the greatest objections. They must do more; they must restrict that choice, so as not to suffer an ill-advised individual to degrade them into instruments of ruin, though it should be voluntarily inflicted; or of death, though that death should be suicide.

"Another advantage of rendering this mode of trial obligatory is, that it diffuses the most valuable information among every rank of citizens; it is a school, of which every jury that is impanelled is a separate class, where the dictates of the laws, and the consequences of disobedience to them, are practically taught. The frequent exercise of these important functions, moreover, gives a sense of dignity and self-respect, not only becoming to the character of a free citizen, but which adds to his private happiness. Neither party-spirit, nor intrigue, nor power, can deprive him of this share in the administration of justice, though they can humble the pride of every other office and vacate every other place. Every time he is called on to act in this capacity, he must feel *that though placed in the humblest station, he is yet the guardian of the life, the liberty, and the reputation of his fellow-citizens against injustice and oppression; and that while his plain understanding has been found the best refuge for innocence, his incorruptible integrity is pronounced a sure pledge that guilt will not escape*. A state whose *most obscure citizens* are thus individually elevated to perform these august functions; who are alternately the defenders of the injured, the dread of the guilty, the vigilant guardians of the constitution; without whose consent no punishment can be inflicted, no disgrace incurred; who can by their voice arrest the blow of oppression, and direct the hand of justice where to strike,—such a state can never sink into slavery, or easily submit to oppression. Corrupt rulers may pervert the constitution: ambitious demagogues may violate its precepts: foreign influence may control its operations; but while the people enjoy the trial by jury, taken by lot from among themselves, they cannot cease to be free. The information it spreads, the sense of dignity and independence it inspires, the courage it creates, will always give them an energy of resistance that can grapple with encroachments, and a renovating spirit that will make arbitrary power despair. The enemies of freedom know this: they know how admirable a vehicle it is, to convey the contagion of those liberal principles which attack the vitals of their power, and they therefore guard against its introduction with more care than they would take to avoid pestilential disease. In countries where it already exists, they insidiously endeavor to innovate, because they dare not openly destroy: changes inconsistent with the spirit of the institution are introduced, under the plausible pretext of improvement: *the common class of citizens are too ill-informed to perform the functions of jurors, —a selection is necessary*. This choice must be confided to an agent of executive power, and must be made among the most eminent for education, wealth, and respectability; so that, after several successful operations of political chemistry, a shining result may be obtained, freed, indeed, from all republican dross, but without any of the intrinsic value that is found in the rugged but inflexible integrity, and incorruptible worth, of the original composition. Men impanelled by this process, bear no resemblance but in name to *the sturdy, honest, unlettered jurors who derive no dignity but from the performance of their duties; and the momentary exercise of whose functions gives no time for the work of corruption or the influence of fear*. By innovations such as these the institution is so changed as to leave nothing to attach the affections or awaken the interest of the people, and it is neglected as an useless, or abandoned as a mischievous, contrivance."

Consistently with this earnest admiration of jury-trial, Mr. Livingston, by the provisions of his code, limits very materially the interference of the presiding judge, thus bringing back the jurors more nearly to a similarity with the Athenian dikasts (p. 85): "I restrict the charge of the judge to an opinion of the law, and to the repetition of the evidence, *only when required by any one of the jury*. The practice of repeating all the testimony from notes, always (from the nature of things) imperfectly, not seldom inaccurately, and sometimes carelessly taken,—has a double disadvantage: it makes the jurors, who rely more on the judge's notes than on their own memory, inattentive to the evidence: and it gives them an imperfect copy of that which the nature of the trial by jury requires that they should record in their own minds. Forced to rely upon themselves, the necessity will quicken their attention, and it will be only when they disagree in their recollection, that recourse will be had to the notes of the judge." Mr. Livingston goes on to add, that the judges, from their old habits, acquired as practising advocates, are scarcely ever neutral,—almost always take a side, and generally against the prisoners on trial.

The same considerations as those which Mr. Livingston here sets forth to demonstrate the value of jury-trial, are also insisted upon by M. Charles Comte, in his translation of Sir Richard Phillips's Treatise on Juries, enlarged with many valuable reflections on the different shape which the jury-system has assumed in England and

France. (Des Pouvoirs et des Obligations des Jurys, traduit de l'Anglois, par Charles Comte, 2d ed. Paris, 1828, with preliminary Considérations sur le Pouvoir Judiciaire, pp. 100, *seqq.*)

The length of this note forbids my citing anything farther either from the eulogistic observations of Sir Richard Phillips or from those of M. Comte: but they would be found, like those of Mr. Livingston, even more applicable to the dikasteries of Athens than to the juries of England and America.

[704] Mr. Jardine (Criminal Trials, Introduct. p. 8) observes, that the "proceedings against persons accused of state offences, in the earlier periods of our history, do not deserve the name of trials: they were a mere mockery of justice," etc.

Respecting what English juries have been, it is curious to peruse the following remarks of Mr. Daines Barrington, Observations on the Statutes, p. 409. In remarking on a statute of Henry the Seventh, A. D. 1494, he says:

"The twenty-first chapter recites: That perjury is much and customarily used within the city of London, among such persons as passen and been impannelled in issue, joined between party and party.'

"This offence hath been before this statute complained of in preambles to several laws, being always the perjury of a *juror*, who finds a verdict contrary to his oath, and not that which we hear too much of at present, in the witnesses produced at a trial.

"In the Dance of Death, written originally in French, by Macharel, and translated by John Lydgate in this reign, with some additions, to adapt it to English characters,—a juryman is mentioned, who had often been bribed for giving a false verdict, which shows the offence to have been very common. The sheriff, who summoned the jury, was likewise greatly accessory to this crime, by summoning those who were most partial and prejudiced. Carew, in his account of Cornwall, informs us that it was a common article in an attorney's bill, to charge *pro amicitiâ vicecomitis*.

"It is likewise remarkable, that partiality and perjury in jurors of the city of London is more particularly complained of than in other parts of England, by the preamble of this and other statutes. Stow informs us that in 1468, many jurors of this city were punished by having papers fixed on their heads, stating their offence of having been tampered with by the parties to the suit. He likewise complains that this crying offence continued in the time of Queen Elizabeth, when he wrote his account of London: and Fuller, in his English Worthies, mentions it as a proverbial saying, that London juries hang half and save half. Grafton also, in his Chronicle, informs us that the Chancellor of the diocese of London was indicted for a murder, and that the bishop wrote a letter to Cardinal Wolsey, in behalf of his officer, to stop the prosecution, 'because London juries were so prejudiced, that they would find Abel guilty for the murder of Cain.'

"The punishment for a false verdict by the petty jury is by writ of attaint: and the statute directs, that half of the grand-jury, when the trial is *per medietatem linguæ*, shall be strangers, not Londoners.

'And there's no London jury, but are led

In evidence as far by common fame,

As they are by present deposition.'

(Ben Jonson's Magnetic Lady, Act. iii, Sc. 3.)

"It appears by 15 Henry the Sixth, c. 5,—which likewise recites the great increase of perjury in jurors, and in the strongest terms,—that in every attaint there were thirteen defendants: the twelve jurors who gave the verdict, and the plaintiff or defendant who had obtained it, who therefore was supposed to have used corrupt means to procure it. For this reason, if the verdict was given in favor of the crown, no attaint could be brought, because the king could not be joined as a defendant with the jury who were prosecuted."

Compare also the same work, pp. 394-457, and Mr. Amos's Notes on Fortescue de Laudib. Leg. Angliæ, c. 27.

[705] In France, jury-trial was only introduced for the first time by the Constituent Assembly in 1790, and then only for criminal procedure: I transcribe the following remarks on the working of it from the instructive article in Merlin's "Répertoire de Jurisprudence," article *Juré*. Though written in a spirit very favorable to the jury, it proclaims the reflections of an observing lawyer on the temper and competence of the jurymen whom he had

seen in action, and on their disposition to pronounce the verdict according to the *feeling* which the case before them inspired.

"Pourquoi faut il qu'une institution qui rassure les citoyens contre l'endurcissement et la prévention si funeste à l'innocence, que peut produire l'habitude de juger les crimes … qu'une institution qui donne pour juges à un accusé, des citoyens indépendans de toute espèce d'influence, ses pairs, ses égaux … pourquoi faut il que cette institution, dont les formes sont simples, touchantes, patriarchales, dont la théorie flatte et entraine l'esprit par une séduction irrésistible, ait été si souvent méconnue, trompée par l'ignorance et la pusillanimité, prostitutée peut-être par une vile et coupable corruption?

"Rendons pourtant justice aux erreurs, même à la prévarication, des jurés: ils ont trop de fois acquitté les coupables, mais il n'a pas encore été prouvé qu'ils eussent jamais fait couler une goutte de sang innocent: et si l'on pouvoit supposer qu'ils eussent vu quelquefois le crime là où il n'y en avoit qu'une apparence trompeuse et fausse, ce ne seroit pas leur conscience qu'il faudroit accuser: ce seroit la fatalité malheureuse des circonstances qui auroient accompagné l'accusation, et qui auroit trompé de même les juges les plus pénétrans et les plus exercés à rechercher la vérité et à la démêler du mensonge.

"Mais les reproches qu'ont souvent mérités les jurés, c'est d'avoir cédé à *une fausse commisération*, ou à l'intérêt qu'étoient parvenus à leur inspirer les familles d'accusés qui avaient un rang dans la société: c'est souvent d'être sortis de leurs attributions, qui se bornent à apprécier les faits, et les juger d'une manière différente de la loi. *J'ai vu cent exemples de ces usurpations de pouvoir et de ce despotisme des jurés.* Trop souvent ils out voulu voir une action innocente, là où la loi avoit dit qu'il y avait un crime, et alors ils n'ont pas craint de se jouer de la vérité pour tromper et éluder la loi." … "Serat-il possible d'améliorer l'institution des jurés, et d'en prévenir les écarts souvent trop scandaleux? Gardons nous d'en douter. Que l'on commence par composer le jury de propriétaires intéressés à punir le crime pour le rendre plus rare: que surtout on en éloigne les artisans, les petits cultivateurs, hommes chez qui sans doute la probité est heureusement fort commune, mais dont l'esprit est peu exercé, et qui, accoutumés aux déférences, aux égards, cèdent toujours à l'opinion de ceux de leurs collègues dont le rang est plus distingué: ou qui, familiarisés seulement avec les idées relatives à leur profession, n'ont jamais eu, dans tout le reste, que des idées d'emprunt ou d'inspiration. On sait qu'aujourdhui ce sont ces hommes qui dans presque toute la France forment toujours la majorité des jurés: mettez au milieu d'eux un homme d'un état plus élevé, d'un esprit délié, d'une élocution facile, il entrainera ses collègues, il décidera la délibération: et si cet homme a le jugement faux ou le cœur corrompu, cette délibération sera nécessairement mauvaise.

"Mais pourra-t-on parvenir à vaincre l'insouciance des propriétaires riches et éclairés, à leur faire abandonner leurs affaires, leurs familles, leurs habitudes, pour les entrainer dans les villes, et leur y faire remplir des fonctions qui tourmentent quelquefois la probité, et donnent des inquiétudes d'autant plus vives que la conscience est plus délicate? Pourquoi non? Pourquoi les mêmes classes de citoyens qui dans les huit ou dix premiers mois de 1792, se portaient avec tant de zèle à l'exercice de ces fonctions, les fuiroient elles aujourdhui? surtout si, pour les y rappeler, la loi fait mouvoir les deux grands ressorts qui sont dans sa main, si elle s'engage à récompenser l'exactitude, et à punir la négligence?" (Merlin, Répertoire de Jurisprudence, art. Jurés, p. 97.)

In these passages, it deserves notice, that what is particularly remarked about juries, both English and French, is, their reluctance to convict accused persons brought before them. Now the character of the Athenian dikasts, as described by Mr. Mitford and by many other authors, is the precise reverse of this: an extreme severity and cruelty, and a disposition to convict all accused persons brought before them, upon little or no evidence, —especially rich accused persons. I venture to affirm that, to ascribe to them such a temper generally, is not less improbable in itself, than unsupported by any good evidence. In the speeches remaining to us from defendants, we do indeed find complaints made of the severity of the dikasteries: but in those speeches which come from accusers, there are abundance of complaints to the contrary,—of over-indulgence on the part of the dikasteries, and consequent impunity of criminals. Nor does Aristophanês,—by whom most modern authors are guided, even when they do not quote him,—when fairly studied, bear out the temper ascribed by Mr. Mitford to the dikasts; even if we admitted Aristophanês to be a faithful and trustworthy witness, which no man who knows his picture of Sokratês will be disposed to do. Aristophanês takes hold of every quality which will raise a laugh against the dikasts, and his portrait of them as wasps was well calculated for this purpose,—to describe them as boiling over with acrimony, irritation, impatience, to find some one whom they could convict and punish. But even he, when he comes to describe these dikasts in action, represents them as obeying the appeals to their pity, as well as those to their anger,—as being yielding and impressionable when their feelings are approached on either side, and unable, when they hear the exculpatory appeal of the accused, to maintain the anger which had been raised by the speech of the accuser. (See Aristophan. Vesp. 574, 713, 727, 794.) More-

over, if from the Vespæ we turn to the Nubes, where the poet attacks the sophists and not the dikasts, we are there told that the sophists could arm any man with fallacies and subterfuges which would enable him to procure acquittal from the dikasts, whatever might be the crime committed.

I believe that this open-mindedness, and impressibility of the feelings on all sides, by art, eloquence, prayers, tears, invectives, etc., is the true character of the Athenian dikasts. And I also believe that they were, as a general rule, more open to commiseration than to any other feeling,—like what is above said respecting the French jurymen: εὐκίνητος πρὸς ὀργὴν (ὁ Ἀθηναίων δῆμος), εὐμετάθετος πρὸς ἔλεον,—this expression of Plutarch about the Athenian demos is no less true about the dikasts: compare also the description given by Pliny (H. N. xxxv, 10) of the memorable picture of the Athenian demos by the painter Parrhasius.

[706] That the difference between the dikast and the juryman, in this respect, is only one of degree, I need hardly remark. M. Merlin observes, "Je ne pense pas, comme bien des gens, que pour être propre aux fonctions de juré, il suffise d'avoir *une intelligence ordinaire et de la probité*. Si l'accusé paroissoit seul aux débats avec les témoins, il ne faudroit sans doute que du bon sens pour reconnoitre la vérité dans des déclarations faites avec simplicité et dégagées de tout raisonnement: mais il y paroit assisté presque toujours d'un ou de plusieurs défenseurs qui par des interpellations captieuses, embarrassent ou égarent les témoins; et par une discussion subtile, souvent sophistique, quelquefois éloquente, enveloppent la vérité des nuages, et rendent l'évidence même problématique. Certes, il faut plus que de bonnes intentions, il faut plus que du bon sens, pour ne pas se laisser entrainer à ces fausses lueurs, pour se garantir des écarts de la sensibilité, et pour se maintenir immuablement dans la ligne du vrai, au milieu de ces impulsions données en même temps à l'esprit et au cœur." (Merlin, Répertoire de Jurisprudence, art. Jurés, p. 98).

At Athens, there were no professional advocates: the accuser and the accused—or the plaintiff and defendant, if the cause was civil—each appeared in person with their witnesses, or sometimes with depositions which the witnesses had sworn to before the archon: each might come with a speech prepared by Antipho (Thucyd. viii, 68) or some other rhetor: each might have one or more ξυνηγόρους to speak on his behalf after himself, but seemingly only out of the space of time allotted to him by the clepsydra. In civil causes, the defendant must have been perfectly acquainted with the plaintiff's case, since, besides the anakrisis, or preliminary examination before the archon, the cause had been for the most part already before an arbitrator. In a criminal case, the accused party had only the anakrisis to guide him, as to the matter of which he was to be accused: but it appears from the prepared speeches of accused parties which we now possess, that this anakrisis must have been sufficiently copious to give him a good idea of that which he had to rebut. The accuser was condemned to a fine of one thousand drachms, if he did not obtain on the verdict one-fifth of the votes of the dikasts engaged.

Antipho not only composed speeches for pleaders before the dikastery, but also gave them valuable advice generally as to the manner of conducting their case, etc., though he did not himself speak before the dikasts: so also Ktesiklês the λογόγραφος (Demosthenês cont. Theokrin. c. 5) acted as general adviser, or attorney.

[707] Aristotle, in the first and second chapters of his Treatise de Rhetoricâ, complains that the teachers and writers on rhetoric who preceded him, treated almost entirely of the different means of working on the feelings of the dikasts, and of matters "extraneous to the real question which the dikasts ought to try." (περὶ τῶν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τὰ πλεῖστα πραγματεύονται· διαβολὴ γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργὴ, οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστὴν, etc., i, 1, 1: compare, i, 2, 3, and iii, 1, 2.)

This is sufficient to show how prominent such appeals to the feelings of the dikasts were, in actual fact and practice, even if we did not know it from the perusal of the orations themselves.

Respecting the habit of accused persons to bring their wives and children before the dikasts as suppliants for them, to obtain mercy or acquittal, see Aristophan. Vesp. 567-976; Andokidês de Mysteriis (ad finem), and Lysias, Orat. iv, de Vulnere (ad finem).

[708] To a person accustomed to the judicature of modern Europe, conducted throughout all its stages by the instrumentality of professional men,—judges, advocates, attorneys, etc.,—and viewed by the general public as a matter in which no private citizen either could act or ought to act for himself,—nothing is more remarkable in reading the Attic judicial orations, to a certain extent also the Roman, than the entire absence of this professional feeling, and the exhibition of justice both invoked and administered by private citizens exclusively. The nearest analogy to this, which modern justice presents, is to be found in the courts of Requests and other courts for trying causes limited to small sums of property,—too small to be worth the notice of judges and lawyers.

These courts, in spite of their direct and important bearing on the welfare and security of the poorer classes, have received little elucidation. The History of the Birmingham Court of Requests, by Mr. William Hutton,—lately republished by Messrs. Chambers,—forms an exception to this remark, and is full of instruction in respect to the habits, the conduct, and the sufferings of poor persons. It furnishes, besides, the closest approach that I know to the feelings of Athenian dikasts and pleaders, though of course with many important differences. Mr. Hutton was for many years unremitting in his attendance as a commissioner, and took warm interest in the honorable working of the court. His remarks upon the position, the duties, and the difficulties of the commissioners, illustrated by numerous cases given in detail, are extremely interesting, and represent thoughts which must have often suggested themselves to intelligent dikasts at Athens.

"Law and equity (he says, p. 34) often vary. If the commissioners cannot decide *against* law, they can decide *without* it. Their oath binds them to proceed according to *good conscience* (περὶ ὁτοῦ οὔκ εἰσι νόμοι, γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ, was the oath of the Athenian dikast). A man only needs information to be able to decide."

A few words from p. 36, about the sources of misjudgment. "Misinformation is another source of evil: both parties equally treat the commissioners with deceit. The only people who can throw light upon the subject will not.

"It is difficult not to be won by the first speaker, if he carries the air of mildness and is master of his tale; or not to be biased in favor of infirmity or infancy. Those who cannot assist themselves, we are much inclined to assist.

"Nothing dissolves like tears. Though they arise from weakness, they are powerful advocates, which instantly disarm, particularly those which the afflicted wish to hide. They come from the heart and will reach it, if the judge has a heart to reach. Distress and pity are inseparable.

"Perhaps there never was a judge, from seventeen to seventy, who could look with indifference upon beauty in distress; if he could, he was unfit to be a judge. He should be a stranger to decision, who is a stranger to compassion. All these matters influence the man, and warp his judgment."

This is a description, given by a perfectly honest and unprofessional judge, of his own feelings when on the bench. It will be found illustrated by frequent passages in the Attic pleaders, where they address themselves to the feelings here described in the bosom of the dikasts.

[709] Demosthenês (cont. Phormio. p. 913, c. 2) emphatically remarks, how much more cautious witnesses were of giving false testimony before the numerous dikastery, than before the arbitrator.

[710] Asconius gives an account of the begging off and supplication to the judices at Rome, when sentence was about to be pronounced upon Scaurus, whom Cicero defended (ad Ciceron. Orat. pro Scauro, p. 28, ed. Orelli): "Laudaverunt Scaurum consulares novem—Horum magna pars per tabellas laudaverunt, qui aberant: inter quos Pompeius quoque. Unus prætereà adolescens laudavit, frater ejus, Faustus Cornelius, Syllæ filius. Is in laudatione multa humiliter et cum lacrimis locutus non minus audientes permovit, quam Scaurus ipse permoverat. Ad genua judicum, cum sententiæ ferrentur, bifariam se diviserunt qui pro eo rogabant: ab uno latere Scaurus ipse et M. Glabrio, sororis filius, et Paulus, et P. Lentulus, et L. Æmilius Buca, et C. Memmius, supplicaverunt: ex alterâ parte Sylla Faustus, frater Scauri, et T. Annius Milo, et T. Peducæus, et C. Cato, et M. Octavius Lænas."

Compare also Cicero, Brutus, c. 23, about the defence of Sergius Galba; Quintilian, I. O. ii, 15.

[711] Plato, in his Treatise de Legibus (vi, p. 768) adopts all the distinguishing principles of the Athenian dikasteries. He particularly insists, that the citizen, who does not take his share in the exercise of this function, conceives himself to have no concern or interest in the commonwealth,—τὸ παράπαν τῆς πόλεως οὐ μέτοχος εἶναι.

[712] Aristot. ap. Cicero. Brut. c. 12. "Itaque cum sublatis in Siciliâ tyrannis res privatæ longo intervallo judiciis repeterentur, tum primum quod esset acuta ea gens et controversa naturâ, artem et præcepta Siculos Coracem et Tisiam conscripsisse," etc. Compare Diodor. xi, 87; Pausan. vi, 17, 8.

[713] Especially Gorgias: see Aristotel. Rhetor. iii, 1, 26; Timæus, Fr.; Dionys. Halicarn. De Lysiâ Judicium, c. 3; also Foss, Dissertatio de Gorgiâ Leontino, p. 20 (Halle, 1828); and Westermann, Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland und Rom., sects. 30, 31.

[714] Plato (Gorgias, c. 20-75; Protagoras, c. 9). Lysias is sometimes designated as a sophist (Demosthen. cont. Neær. c. 7, p. 1351; Athenæ. xiii. p. 592). There is no sufficient reason for supposing with Taylor (Vit. Lysiæ, p. 56, ed. Dobson) that there were two persons named Lysias, and that the person here named is a different man from the author of the speeches which remain to us: see Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fast. H. p. 360. Appendix, c. 20.

[715] See the first book of Aristotle's Rhetoric—alluded to in a former note—for his remarks on the technical teachers of rhetoric before his time. He remarks—and Plato remarked before him (i, 1 and 2)—that their teaching was for the most part thoroughly narrow and practical, bearing exclusively on what was required for the practice of the dikastery (περὶ τοῦ δικάζεσθαι πάντες πειρῶνται τεχνολογεῖν): see also a remarkable passage in his Treatise de Sophisticis Elenchis, c. 32, ad finem. And though he himself lays down a far more profound and comprehensive theory of rhetoric, and all matters appertaining to it,—in a treatise which has rarely been surpassed in power of philosophical analysis,—yet when he is recommending his speculations to notice, he appeals to the great practical value of rhetorical teaching, as enabling a man to "help himself," and fight his own battles, in case of need—Ἄτοπον εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχρὸν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ, λόγῳ δὲ οὐκ αἰσχρόν (i, 1, 3: compare iii, 1, 2; Plato Gorgias, c, 41-55; Protagoras, c. 9; Phædrus, c. 43-50; Euthydem. c. 1-31 and Xenophon, Memorab. iii, 12, 2, 3).

See also the character of Proxenus in the Anabasis of Xenophon, ii, 6, 16; Plutarch, Vit. x, Orator. p. 307; Aristoph. Nubes, 1108; Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 48; Plato, Alkibiadês, i, c. 31, p. 119; and a striking passage in Plutarch's Life of Cato the elder, c. 1.

[716] Plutarch, Vit. x, Orator. p. 832; Quintilian, iii, 1, 10. Compare Van Spaan, or Ruhnken, Dissertatio de Antiphonte Oratore Attico, pp. 8, 9, prefixed to Dobson's edition of Antipho and Andokidês. Antipho is said to have been the teacher of the historian Thucydidês. The statement of Plutarch, that the father of Antipho was also a sophist, can hardly be true.

[717] Herodot. i, 29; iv, 95.

[718] Plato (Hippias Major, c. 1, 2; Menon, p. 95; and Gorgias, c. 1, with Stallbaum's note); Diodor. xii, 53; Pausan. vi, 17, 8.

[719] Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 31. To teach or learn the art of speech was the common reproach made by the vulgar against philosophers and lettered men,—τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον (Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 31). Compare Æschinês cont. Timar. about Demosthenês, c. 25, 27, which illustrates the curious fragment of Sophoklês, 865. Οἱ γὰρ γύναν δροι καὶ λέγειν ἡσκηκότες.

[720] Such is probably the meaning of that remarkable passage in which Thucydidês describes the Athenian rhetor, Antipho, (viii, 68): Ἀντιφῶν, ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναίων ἀρετῇ τε οὐδενὸς ὕστερος, καὶ κράτιστος ἐνθυμηθῆναι γενόμενος καὶ ἃ ἂν γνοίη εἰπεῖν· καὶ ἐς μὲν δῆμον οὐ παριὼν οὐδ' ἐς ἄλλον ἀγῶνα ἑκούσιος οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ὑπόπτως τῷ πλήθει διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος διακείμενος, τοὺς μέντοι ἀγωνιζομένους καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ, πλεῖστα εἷς ἀνὴρ, ὅστις ξυμβουλεύσαιτό τι, δυνάμενος ὠφελεῖν. "Inde illa circa occultandam eloquentiam simulatio," observes Quintilian, Inst. Or. iv, 1, 8.

Compare Plato (Protagoras, c. 8; Phædrus, c. 86), Isokratês cont. Sophistas, Or. xiii, p. 295, where he complains of the teachers,—οἵτινες ὑπέσχοντο, δικάζεσθαι διδάσκειν, ἐκλεξάμενοι τὸ δυσχερέστατον τῶν ὀνομάτων, ὃ τῶν φθονούντων ἔργον εἴη λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν προεστώτων τῆς τοιαύτης παιδεύσεως, Demosthen. De Fals. Legat, c. 70, 71, pp. 417-420; and Æschin. cont. Ktesiphon. c. 9, p. 371,—κακοῦργον σοφιστὴν, οἰόμενον ῥήμασι τοὺς νόμους ἀναιρήσειν.

[721] Æschinês cont. Timarch. c. 34, p. 74. Ὑμεῖς μὲν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, Σωκράτην μὲν τὸν σοφιστὴν ἀπεκτείνατε, ὅτι Κριτίαν ἐφάνη πεπαιδευκὼς, ἕνα τῶν τριάκοντα τῶν τὸν δῆμον καταλυσάντων.

Among the sophists whom Isokratês severely criticizes, he evidently seems to include Plato, as may be seen by the contrast between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη, which he particularly notes, and which is so conspicuously set forth in the Platonic writings (Isokratês cont. Sophistas, Or. xiii, p. 293; also p. 295). We know also that Lysias called both Plato and Æschinês the disciple of Sokratês, by the name of *sophists* (Aristeidês, Orat. Platonic. xlvi, Ὑπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων, p. 407, vol. ii, ed. Dindorf). Aristeidês remarks justly that the name sophist was a general name, including all the philosophers, teachers, and lettered men.

The general name, *sophists*, in fact, included good, bad, and indifferent; like "the philosophers, the political economists, the metaphysicians," etc. I shall take a future opportunity of examining the indiscriminate censures

against them as a class, which most modern writers have copied implicitly from the polemics of ancient times.

[722] Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 31. λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν. Xenophon ascribes the passing of this law to a personal hatred of Kritias against Sokratês, and connects it with an anecdote exceedingly puerile, when considered as the alleged cause of that hatred, as well as of the consequent law. But it is evident that the law had a far deeper meaning, and was aimed directly at one of the prominent democratical habits.

[723] Thucyd. viii, 67. Compare a curious passage, even in reference to the time of Demosthenês, in the speech of that orator contra Bœotum de Nomine, c. 5. καὶ εἰ μισθὸς ἐπορίσθη τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, εἰσῆγον ἂν με δῆλον ὅτι, etc.



GEORGE GROTE.

HISTORY OF GREECE.

BY

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FROM THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE, FOURTEEN YEARS BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, DOWN TO THE BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA, IN THE YEAR BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

Personal activity now prevalent among the Athenian citizens — empire of Athens again exclusively maritime, after the Thirty years' truce. — Chios, Samos, and Lesbos, were now the only free allies of Athens, on the same footing as the original confederates of Delos — the rest were subject and tributary. — Athens took no pains to inspire her allies with the idea of a common interest — nevertheless, the allies were gainers by the continuance of her empire. — Conception of Periklês — Athens, an imperial city, owing protection to the subject-allies; who, on their part, owed obedience and tribute. — Large amount of revenue laid by and accumulated by Athens, during the years preceding the Peloponnesian war. — Pride felt by Athenian citizens in the imperial power of their city. — Numerous Athenian citizens planted out as kleruchs by Periklês. — Chersonesus of Thrace. Sinôpê. — Active personal and commercial relations between Athens and all parts of the Ægean. — Amphipolis in Thrace founded by Athens. — Agnon is sent out as Œkist. — Situation and importance of Amphipolis. — Foundation, by the Athenians, of Thurii, on the southern coast of Italy. — Conduct of the refugee inhabitants of the ruined Sybaris — their encroachments in the foundation of Thurii: they are expelled, and Thurii reconstituted. — Herodotus and Lysias — both domiciliated as citizens at Thurii. Few Athenian citizens settled there as colonists. — Period from 445-431 B.C. Athens at peace. Her political condition. Rivalry of Periklês with Thucydidês son of Melêsias. — Points of contention between the two parties: 1. Peace with Persia. 2. Expenditure of money for the decoration of Athens. — Defence of Periklês perfectly good against his political rivals. — Pan-Hellenic schemes and sentiment of Periklês. — Bitter contention of parties at Athens — vote of ostracism — Thucydidês is ostracized about 443 B.C. — New works undertaken at Athens. Third Long Wall. Docks in Peiræus — which is newly laid out as a town, by the architect Hippodamus. — Odeon, Parthenon, Propylæa. Other temples. Statues of Athênê. — Illustrious artists and architects — Pheidias, Iktînus, Kallikratês. — Effect of these creations of art and architecture upon the minds of contemporaries. — Attempt of Periklês to convene a general congress at Athens, of deputies from all the Grecian states. — Revolt of Samos from the Athenians. — Athenian armament against Samos, under Periklês, Sophoklês the tragedian, etc. — Doubtful and prolonged contest — great power of Samos — it is at last reconquered, disarmed, and dismantled. — None of the other allies of Athens, except Byzantium, revolted at the same time. — Application of the Samians to Sparta for aid against Athens — it is refused, chiefly through the Corinthians. — Government of Samos after the reconquest — doubtful whether the Athenians renewed the democracy which they had recently established. — Funeral oration pronounced by Periklês upon the Athenian citizens slain in the Samian war. — Position of the Athenian empire — relation of Athens to her subject allies — their feelings towards her generally were those of indifference and acquiescence, not of hatred. — Particular grievances complained of in the dealing of Athens with her allies. — Annual tribute — changes made in its amount. Athenian officers and inspectors throughout the empire. — Disputes and offences in and among the subject-allies, were brought for trial before the dikasteries at Athens. Productive of some disadvantages, but of preponderance of advantage to the subject-allies themselves. — Imperial Athens compared with imperial Sparta. — Numerous Athenian citizens spread over the Ægean — the allies had no redress against them, except through the Athe-

nian dikasteries. — The dikasteries afforded protection against misconduct both of Athenian citizens and Athenian officers. — The dikasteries, defective or not, were the same tribunals under which every Athenian held his own security. — Athenian empire was affected for the worse by the circumstances of the Peloponnesian war: more violence was introduced into it by that war than had prevailed before. — The subject-allies of Athens had few practical grievances to complain of. — The Grecian world was now divided into two great systems; with a right supposed to be vested in each, of punishing its own refractory members. — Policy of Corinth, from being pacific, becomes warlike. — Disputes arise between Corinth and Korkyra — case of Epidamnus. — The Epidamnians apply for aid in their distress to Korkyra; they are refused — the Corinthians send aid to the place. — The Korkyræans attack Epidamnus — armament sent thither by Corinth. — Remonstrance of the Korkyræans with Corinth and the Peloponnesians. — Hostilities between Corinth and Korkyra — naval victory of the latter. — Large preparations made by Corinth for renewing the war. — Application of the Korkyræans to be received among the allies of Athens. — Address of the Korkyræan envoys to the Athenian public assembly. Principal topics upon which it insists, as given in Thucydidês. — Envoys from Corinth address the Athenian assembly in reply. — Decision of the Athenians — a qualified compliance with the request of Korkyra. The Athenian triremes sent to Korkyra. — Naval combat between the Corinthians and Korkyræans: rude tactics on both sides. — The Korkyræans are defeated. — Arrival of a reinforcement from Athens — the Corinthian fleet retires, carrying off numerous Korkyræan prisoners. — Hostilities not yet professedly begun between Athens and Corinth. — Hatred conceived by the Corinthians towards Athens. — They begin to stir up revolt among the Athenian allies — Potidæa, colony of Corinth, but ally of Athens. — Relations of Athens with Perdikkas king of Macedonia, his intrigues along with Corinth against her — he induces the Chalkidians to revolt from her — increase of Olynthus. — Revolt of Potidæa — armament sent thither from Athens. — Combat near Potidæa, between the Athenian force and the allied Corinthians. Potidæans, and Chalkidians. — Victory of the Athenians. — Potidæa placed in blockade by the Athenians.

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CHAPTER XLVIII.

FROM THE BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA DOWN TO THE END OF THE FIRST YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

State of feeling in Greece between the Thirty years' truce and the Peloponnesian war — recognized probability of war — Athens at that time not encroaching — decree interdicting trade with the Megarians. — Zealous importunity of the Corinthians in bringing about a general war, for the purpose of preserving Potidæa. — Relations of Sparta with her allies — they had a determining vote, whether they would or would not approve of a course of policy which had been previously revived by Sparta separately. — Assembly of the Spartans separately addressed by envoys of the allied powers, complaining that Athens had violated the truce. — The Corinthian envoys address the assembly last, after the envoys of the other allies have inflamed it against Athens. — International customs of the time, as bearing upon the points in dispute between Athens and Corinth. — Athens in the right. — Tenor of the Corinthian address — little allusion to recent wrong — strong efforts to raise hatred and alarm against Athens. — Remarkable picture drawn of Athens by her enemies. — Reply made by an Athenian envoy, accidentally present in Sparta. — His account of the empire of Athens — how it had been acquired, and how it was maintained. — He adjures them not to break the truce, but to adjust all differences by that pacific appeal which the truce provided. — The Spartans exclude strangers, and discuss the point among themselves in the assembly. — Most Spartan speakers are in favor of war. King Archidamus opposes war. His speech. — The speech of Archidamus is ineffectual. Short, but warlike appeal of the Ephor Stheneläidas. — Vote of the Spartan assembly in favor of war. — The Spartans send to Delphi — obtain an encouraging reply. — General congress of allies at Sparta. Second speech of the Corinthian envoys, enforcing the necessity and propriety of war. — Vote of the majority of the allies in favor of war, B.C. 432. — Views and motives of the opposing powers. — The hopes and confidence, on the side of Sparta; the fears, on the side of Athens. Heralds sent from Sparta to Athens with complaints and requisitions meanwhile the preparations for war go on. — Requisitions addressed by Sparta to Athens — demand for the expulsion of the Alkmæonidæ as impious — aimed at Periklês. — Position of Periklês at Athens: bitter hostility of his political opponents: attacks made upon him. — Prosecution of Aspasia. Her character and accomplishments. — Family relations of Periklês — his connection with Aspasia. License of the comic writers in their attacks upon both. — Prosecution of Anaxagoras the philosopher as well as of Aspasia — Anaxagoras retires from Athens — Periklês defends Aspasia before the dikastery, and obtains her acquittal. — Prosecution of the sculptor Pheidias for embezzlement — instituted by the political opponents of Periklês. — Charge of peculation against Periklês himself. — Probability that Periklês was never even tried for peculation, certainly that he was never found

guilty of it. — Requisition from the Lacedæmonians, for the banishment of Periklês — arrived when Periklês was thus pressed by his political enemies — rejected. — Counter-requisition sent by the Athenians to Sparta, for expiation of sacrilege. — Fresh requisitions sent from Sparta to Athens — to withdraw the troops from Potidæa — to leave Ægina free — to readmit the Megarians to Athenian harbors. — Final and peremptory requisition of Sparta — public assembly held at Athens on the whole subject of war and peace. — Great difference of opinion in the assembly — important speech of Periklês. — Periklês strenuously urges the Athenians not to yield. — His review of the comparative forces, and probable chances of success or defeat, in the war. — The assembly adopts the recommendation of Periklês — firm and determined reply sent to Sparta. — Views of Thucydidês respecting the grounds, feelings, and projects of the two parties now about to embark in war. — Equivocal period — war not yet proclaimed — first blow struck, not by Athens, but by her enemies. — Open violation of the truce by the Thebans — they surprise Platæa in the night. — The gates of Platæa are opened by an oligarchical party within — a Theban detachment are admitted into the agora at night — at first apparently successful, afterwards overpowered and captured. — Large force intended to arrive from Thebes to support the assailants early in the morning — they are delayed by the rain and the swelling of the Asôpus — they commence hostilities against the Platæan persons and property without the walls. — Parley between the Platæans and the Theban force without — the latter evacuate the territory — the Theban prisoners in Platæa are slain. — Messages from Platæa to Athens — answer. — Grecian feeling, already predisposed to the war, was wound up to the highest pitch by the striking incident at Platæa. — Preparations for war on the part of Athens — intimations sent round to her allies — Akarnanians recently acquired by Athens as allies — recent capture of the Amphilochian Argos by the Athenian Phormio. — Strength and resources of Athens and her allies — military and naval means — treasure. — Ample grounds for the confidence expressed by Periklês in the result. — Position and power of Sparta and the Peloponnesian allies — they are full of hope and confidence of putting down Athens speedily. — Efforts of Sparta to get up a naval force. — Muster of the combined Peloponnesian force at the isthmus of Corinth, under Archidamus, to invade Attica. — Last envoy sent to Athens — he is dismissed without being allowed to enter the town. — March of Archidamus into Attica — his fruitless siege of Œnoê. — Expectation of Archidamus that Athens would yield at the last moment. — Difficulty of Periklês in persuading the Athenians to abandon their territory and see it all ravaged. — Attica deserted — the population flock within the walls of Athens. Hardships, privations, and distress endured. — March of Archidamus into Attica. — Archidamus advances to Acharnæ, within seven miles of Athens. — Intense clamor within the walls of Athens — eagerness to go forth and fight. — Trying position, firmness, and sustained ascendency, of Periklês, in dissuading them from going forth. — The Athenians remain within their walls: partial skirmishes only, no general action. — Athenian fleet is despatched to ravage the coasts of Peloponnesus — first notice of the Spartan Brasidas — operations of the Athenians in Akarnania, Kephallênia, etc. — The Athenians expel the Æginetans from Ægina, and people the island with Athenian kleruchs. The Æginetans settle at Thyrea in Peloponnesus. — The Athenians invade and ravage the Megarid: sufferings of the Megarians. — Measures taken by Athens for permanent defence. — Sum put by in the acropolis, against urgent need, not to be touched unless under certain defined dangers. — Capital punishment against any who should propose otherwise. — Remarks on this decree. — Blockade of Potidæa — Sitalkês king of the Odrysian Thracians — alliance made between him and Athens. — Periklês is chosen orator to deliver the funeral discourse over the citizens slain during the year. — Funeral oration of Periklês. — Sketch of Athenian political constitution, and social life, as conceived by Periklês. — Eulogy upon Athens and the Athenian character. — Mutual tolerance of diversity of tastes and pursuits in Athens. — It is only true partially and in some memorable instances that the state interfered to an exorbitant degree with individual liberty in Greece. — Free play of individual taste and impulse in Athens — importance of this phenomenon in society. — Extraordinary and many-sided activity of Athens. — Peculiar and interesting moment at which the discourse of Periklês was delivered. Athens now at the maximum of her power — declining tendency commences soon afterwards.

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CHAPTER XLIX.

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND YEAR DOWN TO THE END OF THE THIRD YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

Barren results of the operations during the first year of war. — Second invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians — more spreading and ruinous than the first. — Commencement of the pestilence or epidemic at Athens. — Description of the epidemic by Thucydidês — his conception of the duty of exactly observing and recording. — Extensive and terrible suffering of Athens. — Inefficacy of remedies — despair and demoralization of the Athe-

nians. — Lawless recklessness of conduct engendered. — Great loss of life among the citizens — blow to the power of Athens. — Athenian armament sent first against Peloponnesus, next, against Potidæa — it is attacked and ruined by the epidemic. — Irritation of the Athenians under their sufferings and losses — they become incensed against Periklês — his unshaken firmness in defending himself. — Athenian public assembly — last speech of Periklês — his high tone of self-esteem against the public discontent. Powerful effect of his address — new resolution shown for continuing the war — nevertheless, the discontent against Periklês still continues. He is accused and condemned in a fine. — Old age of Periklês — his family misfortunes and suffering. He is reëlected stratêgus — restored to power and to the confidence of the people. — Last moments and death of Periklês. His life and character. — Judgment of Thucydidês respecting Periklês. — Earlier and later political life of Periklês — how far the one differed from the other. — Accusation against Periklês of having corrupted the Athenian people — untrue, and not believed by Thucydidês. — Great progress and improvement of the Athenians under Periklês. — Periklês is not to blame for the Peloponnesian war. — Operations of war languid, under the pressure of the epidemic. — Attack of the Ambrakiots on the Amphilochian Argos: the Athenian Phormio is sent with a squadron to Naupaktus. — Injury done to Athenian commerce by Peloponnesian privateers — The Lacedæmonians put to death all their prisoners taken at sea, even neutrals. — Lacedæmonian envoys seized in their way to Persia and put to death by the Athenians. — Surrender of Potidæa — indulgent capitulation granted by the Athenian generals. — Third year of the war — king Archidamus marches to Platæa — no invasion of Attica. — Remonstrance of the Platæans to Archidamus — his reply — he summons Platæa in vain. — The Platæans resolve to stand out and defy the Lacedæmonian force. — Invocation and excuse of Archidamus on hearing the refusal of the Platæans. — Commencement of the siege of Platæa. — Operations of attack and defence — the besiegers make no progress, and are obliged to resort to blockade. — Wall of circumvallation built round Platæa — the place completely beleaguered and a force left to maintain the blockade. — Athenian armament sent to Potidæa and Chalkidic Thrace — it is defeated and returns. — Operations on the coast of Akarnania. — Joint attack upon Akarnania, by land and sea, concerted between the Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians. — Assemblage of the Ambrakiots, Peloponnesians, and Epirotic allies — divisions of Epirots. — They march to attack the Akarnanian town of Stratus. — Rashness of the Epirots — defeat and repulse of the army. — The Peloponnesian fleet comes from Corinth to Akarnania — movements of the Athenian Phormio to oppose it. — Naval battle between Phormio and the Peloponnesian fleet — his complete victory. — Reflections upon these two defeats of the Peloponnesians. — Indignation of the Lacedæmonians at the late naval defeat: they collect a larger fleet under Knêmus to act against Phormio. — Inferior numbers of Phormio — his manœuvring. — The Peloponnesian fleet forces Phormio to a battle on the line of coast near Naupaktus. Dispositions and harangues on both sides. — Battle near Naupaktus. The Peloponnesian fleet at first successful, but afterwards defeated. — Retirement of the defeated Peloponnesian fleet. — Phormio is reinforced — his operations in Akarnania — he returns to Athens. — Attempt of Knêmus and Brasidas to surprise Peiræus, starting from Corinth. — Alliance of the Athenians with the Odrysian king Sitalkês. — Power of the Odrysians in Thrace — their extensive dominion over the other Thracian tribes. — Sitalkês, at the instigation of Athens, undertakes to attack Perdikkas and the Chalkidians of Thrace. — His vast and multifarious host of Thracians and other barbarians. — He invades and ravages Macedonia and Chalkidikê. — He is forced to retire by the severity of the season and want of Athenian coöperation.

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CHAPTER L.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FOURTH YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR DOWN TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMOTIONS AT KORKYRA.

Fourth year of the war — internal suffering at Athens. — Renewed invasion of Attica. — Revolt of Mitylênê and most part of Lesbos from Athens. — Proceedings of Athens — powerful condition of Mitylênê — Athenian fleet sent thither under Kleïppidês. — Kleïppidês fails in surprising Mitylênê — carries on an imperfect blockade. — He receives reinforcements, and presses the siege with greater vigor — want of resolution on the part of the Mitylenæans. — The Mitylenæan envoys address themselves to the Spartans at the Olympic festival, entreating aid. — Tone and topics of their address. — Practical grounds of complaint on the part of the Mitylenæans against Athens few or none. — The Peloponnesians promise assistance to Mitylênê — energetic demonstrations of the Athenians. — Asôpius son of Phormio in Akarnania. — The accumulated treasure of Athens exhausted by her efforts — necessity for her to raise a direct contribution. — Outbreak of the Platæans from their blockaded town. — Their plan of escape — its extraordinary difficulty and danger. Half of the garrison of Platæa escapes to Athens. — Blockade of Mitylênê closely carried on by the Athenian general Pachês — the

Mitylenæans are encouraged to hold out by the Lacedæmonians, who send thither Salæthus. — Mitylênê holds out till provisions are exhausted — Salæthus arms all the people of Mitylênê for a general sally — the people refuse to join — the city is surrendered to Athens, at discretion. — The Peloponnesian fleet under Alkidas arrives off the coast of Ionia — astonishment and alarm which its presence creates. — Pachês, after the capture of Mitylênê, pursues the fleet of Alkidas, which returns to Peloponnesus without having done anything. — Pachês at Notium — he captures the place — his perfidy towards Hippias, the leader of the garrison. — Notium recolonized from Athens as a separate town. — Pachês sends to Athens about a thousand Mitylenæan prisoners, the persons chiefly concerned in the late revolt, together with Salæthus. — Important debate in the Athenian assembly upon the treatment of the prisoners. — First mention of Kleon by Thucydidês — new class of politicians to which he belonged. — Eukratês, Kleon, Lysiklês, Hyperbolus, etc. — Character of Kleon. — Indignation of the Athenians against Mitylênê — proposition of Kleon to put to death the whole male population of military age is carried and passed. — Repentance of the Athenians after the decree is passed. A fresh assembly is convened to reconsider the decree. — Account of the second assembly given by Thucydidês — speech of Kleon in support of the resolution already passed. — Remarks on the speech of Kleon. — Speech of Diodotus in opposition to Kleon — second decree mitigating the former. Rapid voyage of the trireme which carries the second decree to Mitylênê — it arrives just in time to prevent the execution of the first. — Those Mitylenæans whom Pachês had sent to Athens are put to death — treatment of Mitylênê by the Athenians. — Enormities committed by Pachês at Mitylênê — his death before the Athenian dikastery. — Surrender of Platæa to the Lacedæmonians. — The Platæan captive garrison are put upon their trial before Lacedæmonian judges. — Speech of the Platæan deputies to these judges on behalf of themselves and their comrades. — Reply of the Thebans. — The Platæans are sentenced to death by the Lacedæmonian judges, and all slain. — Reason of the severity of the Lacedæmonians — cases of Platæa and Mitylênê compared. — Circumstances of Korkyra — the Korkyræan captives are sent back from Corinth, under agreement to effect a revolution in the government and foreign politics of the island. — Their attempts to bring about a revolution — they prosecute the democratical leader Peithias — he prosecutes five of them in revenge — they are found guilty. — They assassinate Peithias and several other senators, and make themselves masters of the government — they decree neutrality — their unavailing mission to Athens. — The oligarchical party at Korkyra attack the people — obstinate battle in the city — victory of the people — arrival of the Athenian admiral Nikostratus. — Moderation of Nikostratus — proceedings of the people towards the vanquished oligarchs. — Arrival of the Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas, with a fleet of fifty-three triremes. Renewed terror and struggle in the island. — Naval battle off Korkyra between Nikostratus and Alkidas. — Confusion and defenceless state of Korkyra — Alkidas declines to attack it — arrival of the Athenian fleet under Eurymedon — flight of Alkidas. — Vengeance of the victorious Demos in Korkyra against the prostrate oligarchs — fearful bloodshed. — Lawless and ferocious murders — base connivance of Eurymedon. — Band of oligarchical fugitives escape to the mainland — afterwards land again on the island and establish themselves on Mount Istônê. — Political reflections introduced by Thucydidês on occasion of the Korkyræan massacre. — The political enormities of Korkyra were the worst that occurred in the whole war. — How these enormities began and became exaggerated. Conduct of the opposing parties. — Contrast between the bloody character of revolutions at Korkyra and the mild character of analogous phenomena at Athens. — Bad morality of the rich and great men throughout the Grecian cities.

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CHAPTER LI.

FROM THE TROUBLES IN KORKYRA, IN THE FIFTH YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, DOWN TO THE END OF THE SIXTH YEAR.

Capture of Minôa, opposite Megara, by the Athenians under Nikias. — Nikias — his first introduction, position, and character. — Varying circumstances and condition of the oligarchical party at Athens. — Points of analogy between Nikias and Periklês — material differences. — Care of Nikias in maintaining his popularity and not giving offence; his very religious character. — His diligence in increasing his fortune — speculations in the mines of Laurium — letting out of slaves for hire. — Nikias first opposed to Kleon — next to Alkibiadês. — Oligarchical clubs, or Hetæries, at Athens, for political and judicial purposes. — Kleon — his real function that of opposition — real power inferior to Nikias. — Revival of the epidemic distemper at Athens for another year — atmospheric and terrestrial disturbances in Greece. Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica suspended for this year. — Foundation of the colony of Herakleia by the Lacedæmonians, near Thermopylæ — its numerous settlers, great promise, and unprosperous career. — Athenian expedition against Melos, under Nikias. — Proceedings of the Athenians under Demosthenês in Akarnania. — Expedition of Demosthenês against Ætolia — his large

plans. — March of Demosthenês — impracticability of the territory of Ætolia. — rudeness and bravery of the inhabitants. — He is completely beaten and obliged to retire with loss. — Attack of Ætolians and Peloponnesians under Eurylochus upon Naupaktus. — Naupaktus is saved by Demosthenês and the Akarnanians. — Eurylochus, repulsed from Naupaktus, concerts with the Ambrakiots an attack on Argos. — Demosthenês and the Athenians, as well as the Akarnanians, come to the protection of Argos. — March of Eurylochus across Akarnania to join the Ambrakiots. — Their united army is defeated by Demosthenês at Olpæ — Eurylochus slain. — The surviving Spartan commander makes a separate capitulation for himself and the Peloponnesians, deserting the Ambrakiots. — The Ambrakiots sustain much loss in their retreat. — Another large body of Ambrakiots, coming from the city as a reinforcement, is intercepted by Demosthenês at Idomenê and cut to pieces. — Despair of the Ambrakiot herald on seeing the great number of slain. — Defenceless and feeble condition of Ambrakia after this ruinous loss. — Attempt to calculate the loss of the Ambrakiots. — Convention concluded between Ambrakia on one side, and the Akarnanians and Amphilochians on the other. — Return of Demosthenês in triumph to Athens. — Purification of Delos by the Athenians. Revival of the Delian festival with peculiar splendor.

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CHAPTER LII.

SEVENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.—CAPTURE OF SPHAKTERIA.

Seventh year of the war — invasion of Attica. — Distress in Korkyra from the attack of the oligarchical exiles. A Peloponnesian fleet and an Athenian fleet are both sent thither. — Demosthenês goes on board the Athenian fleet with a separate command. — He fixes upon Pylus in Laconia for the erection of a fort. Locality of Pylus and Sphakteria. — Eurymedon the admiral of the fleet insists upon going on to Korkyra, without stopping at Pylus. The fleet are driven into Pylus by a storm. — Demosthenês fortifies the place, through the voluntary zeal of the soldiers. He is left there with a garrison while the fleet goes on to Korkyra. — Slow march of the Lacedæmonians to recover Pylus. — Preparations of Demosthenês to defend Pylus against them. — Proceedings of the Lacedæmonian army — they send a detachment to occupy the island of Sphakteria, opposite Pylus. — They attack the place by sea and land — gallant conduct of Brasidas in the attack on the sea-side. — Return of Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet to Pylus. — He defeats the Lacedæmonian fleet in the harbor of Pylus. — The Lacedæmonian detachment is blocked up by the Athenian fleet in the island of Sphakteria — armistice concluded at Pylus. — Mission of Lacedæmonian envoys to Athens, to propose peace and solicit the release of their soldiers in Sphakteria. — The Athenians, at the instance of Kleon, require the restoration of Nisæa, Pegæ, Trœzen, and Achaia, as conditions of giving up the men in Sphakteria and making peace. — The envoys will not consent to these demands — Kleon prevents negotiation — they are sent back to Pylus without any result. — Remarks on this assembly and on the conduct of Athens. — The armistice is terminated, and war resumed at Pylus. Eurymedon keeps possession of the Lacedæmonian fleet. — Blockade of Sphakteria by the Athenian fleet — difficulty and hardships to the sea men of the fleet. — Protracted duration and seeming uncertainty of the blockade — Demosthenês sends to Athens for reinforcements to attack the island. — Proceedings in the Athenian assembly on receiving this news — proposition of Kleon — manœuvre of his political enemies to send him against his will as general to Pylus. — Reflections upon this proceeding and upon the conduct of parties at Athens. — Kleon goes to Pylus with a reinforcement — condition of the island of Sphakteria — numbers and positions of the Lacedæmonians in it. — Kleon and Demosthenês land their forces in the island, and attack it. — Numerous light troops of Demosthenês employed against the Lacedæmonians in Sphakteria. — Distress of the Lacedæmonians — their bravery and long resistance. They retreat to their last redoubt at the extremity of the island. They are surrounded and forced to surrender. — Astonishment caused throughout Greece by the surrender of Lacedæmonian hoplites — diminished lustre of Spartan arms. — Judgment pronounced by Thucydidês himself — reflections upon it. — Prejudice of Thucydidês in regard to Kleon. Kleon displayed sound judgment and decision, and was one of the essential causes of the success. — Effect produced at Athens by the arrival of the Lacedæmonian prisoners. — The Athenians prosecute the war with increased hopefulness and vigor. The Lacedæmonians make new advances for peace without effect. — Remarks upon the policy of Athens — her chance was now universally believed to be most favorable in prosecuting the war. — Fluctuations in Athenian feeling for or against the war: there were two occasions on which Kleon contributed to influence them towards it. — Expedition of Nikias against the Corinthian territory. — He reëmbarks — ravages Epidaurus — establishes a post on the peninsula of Methana. — Eurymedon with the Athenian fleet goes to Korkyra. Defeat and captivity of the Korkyræan exiles in the island. — The captives are put to death — cruelty and horrors in the proceeding. — Capture of Anaktorium by the Athenians and

Akarnanians. — Proceedings of the Athenians at Chios and Lesbos. — The Athenians capture Artaphernes, a Persian envoy, on his way to Sparta. — Succession of Persian kings — Xerxes, Artaxerxes Longimanus, etc., Darius Nothus.

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CHAPTER LIII.

EIGHTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

Important operations of the eighth year of the war. — Capture of Kythêra by the Athenians. Nikias ravages the Laconian coast. — Capture of Thyrea — all the Æginetans resident there are either slain in the attack or put to death afterwards as prisoners. — Alarm and depression among the Lacedæmonians — their insecurity in regard to the Helots. — They entrap, and cause to be assassinated, two thousand of the bravest Helots. — Request from the Chalkidians and Perdikkas that Spartan aid may be sent to them under Brasidas. — Brasidas is ordered to go thither, with Helot and Peloponnesian hoplites. — Elate and enterprising dispositions prevalent at Athens. Plan formed against Megara. Condition of Megara. — The Athenians, under Hippokratês and Demosthenês, attempt to surprise Nisæa and Megara. — Conspirators within open the gate, and admit them into the Megarian Long Walls. They master the whole line of the Long Walls. — The Athenians march to the gates of Megara — failure of the scheme of the party within to open them. — The Athenians attack Nisæa — the place surrenders to them. — Dissension of parties in Megara — intervention of Brasidas. — Brasidas gets together an army, and relieves Megara — no battle takes place — the Athenians retire. — Revolution at Megara — return of the exiles from Pegæ, under pledge of amnesty — they violate their oaths, and effect a forcible oligarchical revolution. — Combined plan by Hippokratês and Demosthenês for the invasion of Bœotia on three sides at once. — Demosthenês, with an Akarnanian force, makes a descent on Bœotia at Siphæ in the Corinthian gulf — his scheme fails and he retires. — Disappointment of the Athenian plans — no internal movements take place in Bœotia. Hippokratês marches with the army from Athens to Delium in Bœotia. — Hippokratês fortifies Delium, after which the army retires homeward. — Gathering of the Bœotian military force at Tanagra. Pagondas, the Theban bœotarch, determines them to fight. — Marshalling of the Bœotian army — great depth of the Theban hoplites — special Theban band of Three Hundred. — Order of battle of the Athenian army. — Battle of Delium — vigorously contested — advantage derived from the depth of the Theban phalanx. — Defeat and flight of the Athenians — Hippokratês, with one thousand hoplites, is slain. — Interchange of heralds — remonstrance of the Bœotians against the Athenians for desecrating the temple of Delium — they refuse permission to bury the slain except on condition of quitting Delium. — Answer of the Athenian herald — he demands permission to bury the bodies of the slain. — The Bœotians persist in demanding the evacuation of Delium as a condition for granting permission to bury the dead. Debate on the subject. Remarks on the debate. — Siege and capture of Delium by the Bœotians. — Sokratês and Alkibiadês, personally engaged at Delium. — March of Brasidas through Thessaly to Thrace and Macedonia. Rapidity and address with which he gets through Thessaly. — Relations between Brasidas and Perdikkas — Brasidas enters into an accommodation with Arrhibæus — Perdikkas is offended. — Brasidas marches against Akanthus. State of parties in the town. — He is admitted personally into the town to explain his views — his speech before the Akanthian assembly. — Debate in the Akanthian assembly, and decision of the majority voting secretly to admit him, after much opposition. — Reflections upon this proceeding — good political habits of the Akanthians. — Evidence which this proceeding affords, that the body of citizens (among the Athenian allies) did not hate Athens, and were not anxious to revolt. — Brasidas establishes intelligences in Argilus. He lays his plan for the surprise of Amphipolis. — Night-march of Brasidas from Arnê, through Argilus to the river Strymon and Amphipolis. — He becomes master of the lands round Amphipolis, but is disappointed in gaining admission into the town. — He offers to the citizens the most favorable terms of capitulation, which they accept. — Amphipolis capitulates. — Thucydidês arrives at Eion from Thasus with his squadron — not in time to preserve Amphipolis — he preserves Eion. — Alarm and dismay produced at Athens by the capture of Amphipolis — increased hopes among her enemies. — Extraordinary personal glory, esteem, and influence acquired by Brasidas. — Inaction and despondency of Athens after the battle of Delium, especially in reference to arresting the conquests of Brasidas in Thrace. — Loss of Amphipolis was caused by the negligence of the Athenian commanders — Euklês, and the historian Thucydidês. — The Athenians banish Thucydidês on the proposition of Kleon. — Sentence of banishment passed on Thucydidês by the Athenians — grounds of that sentence. — He justly incurred their verdict of guilty. — Preparations of Brasidas in Amphipolis for extended conquest — his operations against the Aktê, or promontory of Athos. — He attacks Torônê in the Sithonian peninsula — he is admitted into the town by an internal party — surprises and takes it. — Some part of the population, with the

small Athenian garrison, retire to the separate citadel called Lêkythus. — Conciliating address of Brasidas to the assembly at Torônê. — He attacks Lêkythus and takes it by storm. — Personal ability and conciliatory efficiency of Brasidas.

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CHAPTER LIV.

TRUCE FOR ONE YEAR.—RENEWAL OF WAR AND BATTLE OF AMPHIPOLIS.—PEACE OF NIKIAS.

Eighth year of the war — began with most favorable promise for Athens — closed with great reverses to her. — Desire of Spartans to make peace in order to regain the captives — they decline sending reinforcements to Brasidas. — King Pleistoanax at Sparta — eager for peace — his special reasons — his long banishment recently terminated by recall. — Negotiations during the winter of 424-423 B.C. for peace. — Truce for one year concluded, in March 423 B.C. — Conditions of the truce. — Resolution to open negotiations for a definitive treaty. — New events in Thrace — revolt of Skiônê from Athens to Brasidas, two days after the truce was sworn. — Brasidas crosses over to Skiônê — his judicious conduct — enthusiastic admiration for him there. — Brasidas brings across reinforcements to Skiônê — he conveys away the women and children into a place of safety. — Commissioners from Sparta and Athens arrive in Thrace, to announce to Brasidas the truce just concluded. Dispute respecting Skiônê. The war continues in Thrace, but is suspended everywhere else. — Revolt of Mendê from Athens — Brasidas receives the offers of the Mendæans — engages to protect them and sends to them a garrison against Athens. He departs upon an expedition against Arrhibæus in the interior of Macedonia. — Nikias and Nikostratus arrive with an Athenian armament in Pallênê. They attack Mendê. The Lacedæmonian garrison under Polydamidas at first repulses them. — Dissensions among the citizens of Mendê — mutiny of the Demos against Polydamidas — the Athenians are admitted into the town. — The Athenians besiege and blockade Skiônê. Nikias leaves a blockading force there, and returns to Athens. — Expedition of Brasidas along with Perdikkas into Macedonia against Arrhibæus. — Retreat of Brasidas and Perdikkas before the Illyrians. — Address of Brasidas to his soldiers before the retreat. — Contrast between Grecian and barbaric military feeling. — Appeal of Brasidas to the right of conquest or superior force. — The Illyrians attack Brasidas in his retreat, but are repulsed. — Breach between Brasidas and Perdikkas: the latter opens negotiations with the Athenians. — Relations between Athens and the Peloponnesians — no progress made towards definitive peace — Lacedæmonian reinforcement on its way to Brasidas, prevented from passing through Thessaly. — Incidents in Peloponnesus — the temple of Hêrê near Argos accidentally burnt. — War in Arcadia — battle between Mantineia and Tegea. — Bœotians at peace *de facto*, though not parties to the truce. — Hard treatment of the Thespians by Thebes. — Expiration of the truce for one year. Disposition of both Sparta and Athens at that time towards peace; but peace impossible in consequence of the relations of parties in Thrace. — No actual resumption of hostilities, although the truce had expired, from the month of March to the Pythian festival in August. — Alteration in the language of statesmen at Athens — instances of Kleon and his partisans to obtain a vigorous prosecution of the war in Thrace. — Brasidas — an opponent of peace — his views and motives. — Kleon — an opponent of peace — his views and motives as stated by Thucydidês. Kleon had no personal interest in war. — To prosecute the war vigorously in Thrace was at this time the real political interest of Athens. — Question of peace or war, as it stood between Nikias and Kleon, in March 422 B.C., after the expiration of the truce for one year. — Kleon's advocacy of war at this moment perfectly defensible — unjust account of his motive given by Thucydidês. — Kleon at this time adhered more closely than any other Athenian public man to the foreign policy of Periklês. — Dispositions of Nikias and the peace-party in reference to the reconquest of Amphipolis. — Kleon conducts an expedition against Amphipolis — he takes Torônê. — He arrives at Eion — sends envoys to invite Macedonian and Thracian auxiliaries. — Dissatisfaction of his own troops with his inaction while waiting for these auxiliaries. — He is forced by these murmurs to make a demonstration — he marches from Eion along the walls of Amphipolis to reconnoitre the top of the hill — apparent quiescence in Amphipolis. — Brasidas, at first on Mount Kerdylium — presently moves into the town across the bridge. — His exhortation to his soldiers. — Kleon tries to effect his retreat. — Brasidas sallies out upon the army in its retreat — the Athenians are completely routed — Brasidas and Kleon both slain. — Profound sorrow in Thrace for the death of Brasidas — funeral honors paid him in Amphipolis. — The Athenian armament, much diminished by its loss in the battle, returns home. — Remarks on the battle of Amphipolis — wherein consisted the faults of Kleon. — Disgraceful conduct of the Athenian hoplites — the defeat of Amphipolis arose partly from political feeling hostile to Kleon. — Important effect of the death of Brasidas, in reference to the prospects of the war — his admirable character and efficiency. — Feelings of Thucydidês towards Brasidas and Kleon. — Character of Kleon — his foreign policy. Internal policy of Kleon as a citi-

zen in constitutional life. — Picture in the Knights of Aristophanês. — Unfairness of judging Kleon upon such evidence. — Picture of Sokratês by Aristophanês is noway resembling. — The vices imputed by Aristophanês to Kleon are not reconcilable one with the other. — Kleon — a man of strong and bitter opposition talents — frequent in accusation — often on behalf of poor men suffering wrong. — Necessity for voluntary accusers at Athens — general danger and obloquy attending the function. — We have no evidence to decide in what proportion of cases he accused wrongfully. — Private dispute between Kleon and Aristophanês. — Negotiations for peace during the winter following the battle of Amphipolis. — Peace called the Peace of Nikias — concluded in March 421 B.C. — Conditions of peace. — The peace is only partially accepted by the allies of Sparta. — The Bœotians, Megarians, and Corinthians, all repudiate it.

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CHAPTER XLVII.

FROM THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE, FOURTEEN YEARS BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, DOWN TO THE BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA, IN THE YEAR BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

THE judicial alterations effected at Athens by Periklês and Ephialtês, described in the preceding chapter, gave to a large proportion of the citizens direct jury functions and an active interest in the constitution, such as they had never before enjoyed; the change being at once a mark of previous growth of democratical sentiment during the past, and a cause of its farther development during the future. The Athenian people were at this time ready for personal exertion in all directions: military service on land or sea was not less conformable to their dispositions than attendance in the ekklesia or in the dikastery at home. The naval service especially was prosecuted with a degree of assiduity which brought about continual improvement in skill and efficiency, and the poorer citizens, of whom it chiefly consisted, were more exact in obedience and discipline than any of the more opulent persons from whom the infantry or the cavalry were drawn.[1] The maritime multitude, in addition to self-confidence and courage, acquired by this laborious training an increased skill, which placed the Athenian navy every year more and more above the rest of Greece: and the perfection of this force became the more indispensable as the Athenian empire was now again confined to the sea and seaport towns; the reverses immediately preceding the thirty years truce having broken up all Athenian land ascendency over Megara, Bœotia, and the other continental territories adjoining to Attica.

The maritime confederacy,—originally commenced at Delos, under the headship of Athens, but with a common synod and deliberative voice on the part of each member,—had now become transformed into a confirmed empire on the part of Athens, over the remaining states as foreign dependencies; all of them rendering tribute except Chios, Samos, and Lesbos. These three still remained on their original footing of autonomous allies, retaining their armed force, ships, and fortifications, with the obligation of furnishing military and naval aid when required, but not of paying tribute: the discontinuance of the deliberative synod, however, had deprived them of their original security against the encroachments of Athens. I have already stated generally the steps, we do not know them in detail, whereby this important change was brought about, gradually and without any violent revolution,—for even the transfer of the common treasure from Delos to Athens, which was the most palpable symbol and evidence of the change, was not an act of Athenian violence, since it was adopted on the proposition of the Samians. The change resulted in fact almost inevitably from the circumstances of the case, and from the eager activity of the Athenians contrasted with the backwardness and aversion to personal service on the

part of the allies. We must recollect that the confederacy, even in its original structure, was contracted for permanent objects, and was permanently binding by the vote of its majority, like the Spartan confederacy, upon every individual member:[2] it was destined to keep out the Persian fleet, and to maintain the police of the Ægean. Consistently with these objects, no individual member could be allowed to secede from the confederacy, and thus to acquire the benefit of protection at the cost of the remainder: so that when Naxos and other members actually did secede, the step was taken as a revolt, and Athens only did her duty as president of the confederacy in reducing them. By every such reduction, as well as by that exchange of personal service for money-payment, which most of the allies voluntarily sought, the power of Athens increased, until at length she found herself with an irresistible navy in the midst of disarmed tributaries, none of whom could escape from her constraining power,—and mistress of the sea, the use of which was indispensable to them. The synod of Delos, even if it had not before become partially deserted, must have ceased at the time when the treasure was removed to Athens,—probably about 460 B.C., or shortly afterwards.

The relations between Athens and her allies were thus materially changed by proceedings which gradually evolved themselves and followed one upon the other without any preconcerted plan: she became an imperial or despot city, governing an aggregate of dependent subjects, all without their own active concurrence, and in many cases doubtless contrary to their own sense of political right. It was not likely that they should conspire unanimously to break up the confederacy, and discontinue the collection of contribution from each of the members: nor would it have been at all desirable that they should do so: for while Greece generally would have been a great loser by such a proceeding, the allies themselves would have been the greatest losers of all, inasmuch as they would have been exposed without defence to the Persian and Phenician fleets. But the Athenians committed the capital fault of taking the whole alliance into their own hands, and treating the allies purely as subjects, without seeking to attach them by any form of political incorporation or collective meeting and discussion,—without taking any pains to maintain community of feeling with the idea of a joint interest,—without admitting any control, real or even pretended, over themselves as managers. Had they attempted to do this, it might have proved difficult to accomplish,—so powerful was the force of geographical dissemination, the tendency to isolated civic life, and the repugnance to any permanent extramural obligations, in every Grecian community: but they do not appear to have ever made the attempt. Finding Athens exalted by circumstances to empire, and the allies degraded into subjects, the Athenian statesmen grasped at the exaltation as a matter of pride as well as profit:[3] nor did even Periklês, the most prudent and far-sighted of them, betray any consciousness that an empire without the cement of some all-pervading interest or attachment, must have a natural tendency to become more and more burdensome and odious, and ultimately to crumble in pieces. Such was the course of

events which, if the judicious counsels of Periklês had been followed, might have been postponed but could not have been averted.

Instead of trying to cherish or restore the feelings of equal alliance, Periklês formally disclaimed it. He maintained that Athens owed to her subject allies no account of the money received from them, so long as she performed her contract by keeping away the Persian enemy, and maintaining the safety of the Ægean waters.[4] This was, as he represented, the obligation which Athens had undertaken; and, provided it were faithfully discharged, the allies had no right to ask questions or institute control. That it was faithfully discharged no one could deny: no ship of war except that of Athens and her allies was ever seen between the eastern and western shores of the Ægean. An Athenian fleet of sixty triremes was kept on duty in these waters, chiefly manned by Athenian citizens, and beneficial as well from the protection afforded to commerce as for keeping the seaman in constant pay and training.[5] And such was the effective superintendence maintained, that in the disastrous period preceding the thirty years' truce, when Athens lost Megara and Bœotia, and with difficulty recovered Eubœa, none of her numerous maritime subjects took the opportunity to revolt.

The total of these distinct tributary cities is said to have amounted to one thousand, according to a verse of Aristophanês,[6] which cannot be under the truth, though it may well be, and probably is, greatly above the truth. The total annual tribute collected at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, and probably also for the years preceding it, is given by Thucydidês at about six hundred talents; of the sums paid by particular states, however, we have little or no information.[7] It was placed under the superintendence of the Hellenotamiæ; originally officers of the confederacy, but now removed from Delos to Athens, and acting altogether as an Athenian treasury-board. The sum total of the Athenian revenue,[8] from all sources, including this tribute, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, is stated by Xenophon at one thousand talents: customs, harbor, and market dues, receipts from the silver-mines at Laurium, rents of public property, fines from judicial sentences, a tax per head upon slaves, the annual payment made by each metic, etc., may have made up a larger sum than four hundred talents; which sum, added to the six hundred talents from tribute, would make the total named by Xenophon. But a verse of Aristophanês, [9] during the ninth year of the Peloponnesian war, B.C. 422, gives the general total of that time as "nearly two thousand talents:" this is in all probability much above the truth, though we may well imagine that the amount of tribute-money levied upon the allies may have been augmented during the interval: I think that the alleged duplication of the tribute by Alkibiadês, which Thucydidês nowhere notices, is not borne out by any good evidence, nor can I believe that it ever reached the sum of twelve hundred talents.[10] Whatever may have been the actual magnitude of the Athenian budget, however, prior to the Peloponnesian war, we know that during the larger part of the administration of Periklês, the revenue, including tribute, was so managed as to

leave a large annual surplus; insomuch that a treasure of coined money was accumulated in the acropolis during the years preceding the Peloponnesian war,—which treasure, when at its maximum, reached the great sum of nine thousand seven hundred talents (equal to two million two hundred and thirty thousand pounds), and was still at six thousand talents, after a serious drain for various purposes, at the moment when that war began.[11] This system of public economy, constantly laying by a considerable sum year after year,—in which Athens stood alone, since none of the Peloponnesian states had any public reserve whatever,[12]—goes far of itself to vindicate Periklês from the charge of having wasted the public money in mischievous distributions for the purpose of obtaining popularity; and also to exonerate the Athenian Demos from that reproach of a greedy appetite for living by the public purse which it is common to ascribe to them. After the death of Kimon, no farther expeditions were undertaken against the Persians, and even for some years before his death, not much appears to have been done: so that the tribute-money remained unexpended, though it was the duty of Athens to hold it in reserve against future attack, which might at any time be renewed.

Though we do not know the exact amount of the other sources of Athenian revenue, however, we know that the tribute received from the allies was by far the largest item in it.[13] And altogether the exercise of empire abroad became a prominent feature in Athenian life, and a necessity to Athenian sentiment, not less than democracy at home. Athens was no longer, as she had been once, a single city, with Attica for her territory: she was a capital or imperial city,—a despot city, was the expression used by her enemies, and even sometimes by her own citizens,[14]—with many dependencies attached to her, and bound to follow her orders. Such was the manner in which not merely Periklês and the other leading statesmen, but even the humblest Athenian citizen, conceived the dignity of Athens; and the sentiment was one which carried with it both personal pride and stimulus to active patriotism. To establish Athenian interests among the dependent territories, was one important object in the eyes of Periklês, and while he discountenanced all distant[15] and rash enterprises, such as invasions of Egypt or Cyprus, he planted out many kleruchies and colonies of Athenian citizens, intermingled with allies, on islands, and parts of the coast. He conducted one thousand citizens to the Thracian Chersonese, five hundred to Naxos, and two hundred and fifty to Andros. In the Chersonese, he farther repelled the barbarous Thracian invaders from without, and even undertook the labor of carrying a wall of defence across the isthmus, which connected the peninsula with Thrace; since the barbarous Thracian tribes, though expelled some time before by Kimon,[16] had still continued to renew their incursions from time to time. Ever since the occupation of the elder Miltiadês, about eighty years before, there had been in this peninsula many Athenian proprietors, apparently intermingled with half-civilized Thracians: the settlers now acquired both greater numerical strength and better protection, though it does not appear that the cross-wall was permanently maintained. The maritime expeditions of Periklês even extended into the Euxine sea, as far as the

important Greek city of Sinôpê, then governed by a despot named Timesilaus, against whom a large proportion of the citizens were in active discontent. He left Lamachus with thirteen Athenian triremes to assist in expelling the despot, who was driven into exile along with his friends and party: the properties of these exiles were confiscated, and assigned to the maintenance of six hundred Athenian citizens, admitted to equal fellowship and residence with the Sinôpeans. We may presume that on this occasion Sinôpê became a member of the Athenian tributary alliance, if it had not been so before: but we do not know whether Kotyôra and Trapezus, dependencies of Sinôpê, farther eastward, which the ten thousand Greeks found on their retreat fifty years afterwards, existed in the time of Periklês or not. Moreover, the numerous and well-equipped Athenian fleet, under the command of Periklês, produced an imposing effect upon the barbarous princes and tribes along the coast,[17] contributing certainly to the security of Grecian trade, and probably to the acquisition of new dependent allies.

It was by successive proceedings of this sort that many detachments of Athenian citizens became settled in various portions of the maritime empire of the city,—some rich, investing their property in the islands as more secure—from the incontestable superiority of Athens at sea—even than Attica, which, since the loss of the Megarid, could not be guarded against a Peloponnesian land invasion,[18]—others poor, and hiring themselves out as laborers.[19] The islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, as well as the territory of Estiæa, on the north of Eubœa, were completely occupied by Athenian proprietors and citizens,—other places partially so occupied. And it was doubtless advantageous to the islanders to associate themselves with Athenians in trading enterprises, since they thereby obtained a better chance of the protection of the Athenian fleet. It seems that Athens passed regulations occasionally for the commerce of her dependent allies, as we see by the fact, that shortly before the Peloponnesian war, she excluded the Megarians from all their ports. The commercial relations between Peiræus and the Ægean reached their maximum during the interval immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war: nor were these relations confined to the country east and north of Attica: they reached also the western regions. The most important settlements founded by Athens during this period were Amphipolis in Thrace, and Thurii in Italy.

Amphipolis was planted by a colony of Athenians and other Greeks, under the conduct of the Athenian Agnon, in 437 B.C. It was situated near the river Strymon, in Thrace, on the eastern bank, and at the spot where the Strymon resumes its river-course after emerging from the lake above. It was originally a township or settlement of the Edonian Thracians, called Ennea Hodoi, or Nine Ways,—in a situation doubly valuable, both as being close upon the bridge over the Strymon, and as a convenient centre for the ship-timber and gold and silver mines of the neighboring region,—and distant about three English miles from the Athenian settlement of Eion at the mouth of the river. The previous unsuccessful attempts to form establishments at Ennea

Hodoi have already been noticed,—first, that of Histiæus the Milesian, followed up by his brother Aristagoras (about 497-496 B.C.), next, that of the Athenians about 465 B.C., under Leagrus and others,—on both these occasions the intruding settlers had been defeated and expelled by the native Thracian tribes, though on the second occasion the number sent by Athens was not less than ten thousand.[20] So serious a loss deterred the Athenians for a long time from any repetition of the attempt: though it is highly probable that individual citizens from Eion and from Thasus connected themselves with powerful Thracian families, and became in this manner actively engaged in mining, to their own great profit,—as well as to the profit of the city collectively, since the property of the kleruchs, or Athenian citizens occupying colonial lands, bore its share in case of direct taxes being imposed on Athenian property generally. Among such fortunate adventurers we may number the historian Thucydidês himself; seemingly descended from Athenian parents intermarrying with Thracians, and himself married to a wife either Thracian or belonging to a family of Athenian colonists in that region, through whom he became possessed of a large property in the mines, as well as of great influence in the districts around.[21] This was one of the various ways in which the collective power of Athens enabled her chief citizens to enrich themselves individually.

The colony under Agnon, despatched from Athens in the year 437 B.C., appears to have been both numerous and well sustained, inasmuch as it conquered and maintained the valuable position of Ennea Hodoi in spite of those formidable Edonian neighbors who had baffled the two preceding attempts. Its name of Ennea Hodoi was exchanged for that of Amphipolis,—the hill on which the new town was situated being bounded on three sides by the river. The settlers seem to have been of mixed extraction, comprising no large proportion of Athenians: some were of Chalkidic race, others came from Argilus, a Grecian city colonized from Andros, which possessed the territory on the western bank of the Strymon, immediately opposite to Amphipolis, [22] and which was included among the subject allies of Athens. Amphipolis, connected with the sea by the Strymon and the port of Eion, became the most important of all the Athenian dependencies in reference to Thrace and Macedonia.

The colony of Thurii on the coast of the gulf of Tarentum in Italy, near the site and on the territory of the ancient Sybaris, was founded by Athens about seven years earlier than Amphipolis, not long after the conclusion of the thirty years' truce with Sparta, B.C. 443. Since the destruction of the old Sybaris by the Krotoniates, in 509 B.C., its territory had for the most part remained unappropriated: the descendants of the former inhabitants, dispersed at Laus and in other portions of the territory, were not strong enough to establish any new city; nor did it suit the views of the Krotoniates themselves to do so. After an interval of more than sixty years, however, during which one unsuccessful attempt at occupation had been made by some Thessalian settlers, these Sybarites at length prevailed upon the Athenians to undertake and protect the recolonization; the proposition having been made in vain to the

Spartans. Lampon and Xenokritus, the former a prophet and interpreter of oracles, were sent by Periklês with ten ships as chiefs of the new colony of Thurii, founded under the auspices of Athens. The settlers were collected from all parts of Greece, and included Dorians, Ionians, islanders, Bœotians, as well as Athenians. But the descendants of the ancient Sybarites procured themselves to be treated as privileged citizens, and monopolized for themselves the possession of political powers, as well as the most valuable lands in the immediate vicinity of the walls; while their wives also assumed an offensive preëminence over the other women of the city in the public religious processions. Such spirit of privilege and monopoly appears to have been a frequent manifestation among the ancient colonies, and often fatal either to their tranquillity or to their growth; sometimes to both. In the case of Thurii, founded under the auspices of the democratical Athens, it was not likely to have any lasting success: and we find that after no very long period, the majority of the colonists rose in insurrection against the privileged Sybarites, either slew or expelled them, and divided the entire territory of the city, upon equal principles, among the colonists of every different race. This revolution enabled them to make peace with the Krotoniates, who had probably been unfriendly so long as their ancient enemies, the Sybarites, were masters of the city, and likely to turn its powers to the purpose of avenging their conquered ancestors. And the city from this time forward, democratically governed, appears to have flourished steadily and without internal dissension for thirty years, until the ruinous disasters of the Athenians before Syracuse occasioned the overthrow of the Athenian party at Thurii. How miscellaneous the population of Thurii was, we may judge from the denominations of the ten tribes,—such was the number of tribes established, after the model of Athens,—Arkas, Achaïs, Eleia, Bœotia, Amphiktyonis, Doris, Ias, Athenaïs, Euboïs, Nesiôtis. From this mixture of race they could not agree in recognizing or honoring an Athenian œkist, or indeed any œkist except Apollo.[23] The Spartan general, Kleandridas, banished a few years before for having suffered himself to be bribed by Athens along with king Pleistoanax, removed to Thurii, and was appointed general of the citizens in their war against Tarentum. That war was ultimately adjusted by the joint foundation of the new city of Herakleia, half-way between the two,—in the fertile territory called Siritis. [24]

The most interesting circumstance respecting Thurii is, that the rhetor Lysias, and the historian Herodotus, were both domiciliated there as citizens. The city was connected with Athens, yet seemingly only by a feeble tie; nor was it numbered among the tributary subject allies.[25] From the circumstance that so large a proportion of the settlers at Thurii were not native Athenians, we may infer that there were not many of the latter at that time who were willing to put themselves so far out of connection with Athens,—even though tempted by the prospect of lots of land in a fertile and promising territory. And Periklês was probably anxious that those poor citizens for whom emigration was desirable should become kleruchs in some of the is-

lands or ports of the Ægean, where they would serve—like the colonies of Rome—as a sort of garrison for the insurance of the Athenian empire.[26]

The fourteen years between the thirty years' truce and the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war, are a period of full maritime empire on the part of Athens,—partially indeed resisted, but never with success. They are a period of peace with all cities extraneous to her own empire; and of splendid decorations to the city itself, from the genius of Pheidias and others, in sculpture as well as in architecture. Since the death of Kimon, Periklês had become more and more the first citizen in the commonwealth: his qualities told for more the longer they were known, and even the disastrous reverses which preceded the thirty years' truce had not overthrown him, since he had protested against that expedition of Tolmidês into Bœotia out of which they first arose. But if the personal influence of Periklês had increased, the party opposed to him seems also to have become stronger and better organized than it had been before; and to have acquired a leader in many respects more effective than Kimon,—Thucydidês, son of Melêsias. The new chief was a near relative of Kimon, but of a character and talents more analogous to that of Periklês: a statesman and orator rather than a general, though competent to both functions if occasion demanded, as every leading man in those days was required to be. Under Thucydidês, the political and parliamentary opposition against Periklês assumed a constant character and an organization such as Kimon, with his exclusively military aptitudes, had never been able to establish. The aristocratical party in the commonwealth,—the "honorable and respectable" citizens, as we find them styled, adopting their own nomenclature,—now imposed upon themselves the obligation of undeviating regularity in their attendance on the public assembly, sitting together in a particular section, so as to be conspicuously parted from the Demos. In this manner, their applause and dissent, their mutual encouragement to each other, their distribution of parts to different speakers, was made more conducive to the party purposes than it had been before, when these distinguished persons had been intermingled with the mass of citizens.[27] Thucydidês himself was eminent as a speaker, inferior only to Periklês,—perhaps hardly inferior even to him. We are told that in reply to a question put to him by Archidamus, whether Periklês or he were the better wrestler, Thucydidês replied: "Even when I throw him, he denies that he has fallen, gains his point, and talks over those who have actually seen him fall."[28]

Such an opposition made to Periklês, in all the full license which a democratical constitution permitted, must have been both efficient and embarrassing; but the pointed severance of the aristocratical chiefs, which Thucydidês, son of Melêsias, introduced, contributed probably at once to rally the democratical majority round Periklês, and to exasperate the bitterness of party-conflict.[29] As far as we can make out the grounds of the opposition, it turned partly upon the pacific policy of Periklês towards the Persians, partly upon his expenditure for home ornament. Thucydidês contended that Athens was disgraced in the eyes of the Greeks, by having drawn the

confederate treasure from Delos to her own acropolis, under pretence of greater security, and then employing it, not in prosecuting war against the Persians,[30] but in beautifying Athens by new temples and costly statues. To this Periklês replied, that Athens had undertaken the obligation, in consideration of the tribute-money, to protect her allies and keep off from them every foreign enemy,—that she had accomplished this object completely at the present, and retained a reserve sufficient to guarantee the like security for the future;—that, under such circumstances, she owed no account to her allies of the expenditure of the surplus, but was at liberty to expend it for purposes useful and honorable to the city. In this point of view it was an object of great public importance to render Athens imposing in the eyes both of the allies and of Hellas generally, by improved fortifications,—by accumulated ornaments, sculptural and architectural,—and by religious festivals,—frequent, splendid, musical, and poetical.

Such was the answer made by Periklês in defence of his policy against the opposition headed by Thucydidês. And as far as we can make out the ground taken by both parties, the answer was perfectly satisfactory. For when we look at the very large sum which Periklês continually kept in reserve in the treasury, no one could reasonably complain that his expenditure for ornamental purposes was carried so far as to encroach upon the exigences of defence. What Thucydidês and his partisans appear to have urged, was, that this common fund should still continue to be spent in aggressive warfare against the Persian king, in Egypt and elsewhere,—conformably to the projects pursued by Kimon during his life.[31] But Periklês was right in contending that such outlay would have been simply wasteful; of no use either to Athens or her allies, though risking all the chances of distant defeat, such as had been experienced a few years before in Egypt. The Persian force was already kept away, both from the waters of the Ægean and the coast of Asia, either by the stipulations of the treaty of Kallias, or—if that treaty be supposed apocryphal—by a conduct practically the same as those stipulations would have enforced. The *allies*, indeed, might have had some ground of complaint against Periklês, either for not reducing the amount of tribute required from them, seeing that it was more than sufficient for the legitimate purposes of the confederacy, or for not having collected their positive sentiment as to the disposal of it. But we do not find that this was the argument adopted by Thucydidês and his party, nor was it calculated to find favor either with aristocrats or democrats, in the Athenian assembly.

Admitting the injustice of Athens—an injustice common to both the parties in that city, not less to Kimon than to Periklês—in acting as despot instead of chief, and in discontinuing all appeal to the active and hearty concurrence of her numerous allies, we shall find that the schemes of Periklês were at the same time eminently Pan-Hellenic. In strengthening and ornamenting Athens, in developing the full activity of her citizens, in providing temples, religious offerings, works of art, solemn festivals, all of surpassing attraction,—he intended to exalt her into something greater than an im-

perial city with numerous dependent allies. He wished to make her the centre of Grecian feeling, the stimulus of Grecian intellect, and the type of strong democratical patriotism combined with full liberty of individual taste and aspiration. He wished not merely to retain the adherence of the subject states, but to attract the admiration and spontaneous deference of independent neighbors, so as to procure for Athens a moral ascendency much beyond the range of her direct power. And he succeeded in elevating the city to a visible grandeur,[32] which made her appear even much stronger than she really was,—and which had the farther effect of softening to the minds of the subjects the humiliating sense of obedience; while it served as a normal school, open to strangers from all quarters, of energetic action even under full license of criticism,—of elegant pursuits economically followed,—and of a love for knowledge without enervation of character. Such were the views of Periklês in regard to his country, during the years which preceded the Peloponnesian war, as we find them recorded in his celebrated Funeral Oration, pronounced in the first year of that war,—an exposition forever memorable of the sentiment and purpose of Athenian democracy, as conceived by its ablest president.

So bitter, however, was the opposition made by Thucydidês and his party to this projected expenditure,—so violent and pointed did the scission of aristocrats and democrats become,—that the dispute came after no long time to that ultimate appeal which the Athenian constitution provided for the case of two opposite and nearly equal party-leaders,—a vote of ostracism. Of the particular details which preceded this ostracism, we are not informed; but we see clearly that the general position was such as the ostracism was intended to meet. Probably the vote was proposed by the party of Thucydidês, in order to procure the banishment of Periklês, the more powerful person of the two, and the most likely to excite popular jealousy. The challenge was accepted by Periklês and his friends, and the result of the voting was such that an adequate legal majority condemned Thucydidês to ostracism.[33] And it seems that the majority must have been very decisive, for the party of Thucydidês was completely broken by it: and we hear of no other single individual equally formidable as a leader of opposition, throughout all the remaining life of Periklês.

The ostracism of Thucydidês apparently took place about two years[34] after the conclusion of the thirty years' truce,—443-442 B.C.,—and it is to the period immediately following that the great Periklêan works belong. The southern wall of the acropolis had been built out of the spoils brought by Kimon from his Persian expeditions; but the third of the long walls connecting Athens with the harbor was the proposition of Periklês, at what precise time we do not know. The long walls originally completed—not long after the battle of Tanagra, as has already been stated—were two, one from Athens to Peiræus, another from Athens to Phalêrum: the space between them was broad, and if in the hands of an enemy, the communication with Peiræus would be interrupted. Accordingly, Periklês now induced the people to construct a third or intermediate wall, running parallel with the first wall to Peiræus, and

within a short distance[35]—seemingly near one furlong—from it: so that the communication between the city and the port was placed beyond all possible interruption, even assuming an enemy to have got within the Phaleric wall. It was seemingly about this time, too, that the splendid docks and arsenal in Peiræus, alleged by Isokratês to have cost one thousand talents, were constructed:[36] while the town itself of Peiræus was laid out anew with straight streets intersecting at right angles. Apparently, this was something new in Greece,—the towns generally, and Athens itself in particular, having been built without any symmetry, or width, or continuity of streets:[37] and Hippodamus the Milesian, a man of considerable attainments in the physical philosophy of the age, derived much renown as the earliest town architect, for having laid out the Peiræus on a regular plan. The market-place, or one of them at least, permanently bore his name,—the Hippodamian agora.[38] At a time when so many great architects were displaying their genius in the construction of temples, we are not surprised to hear that the structure of towns began to be regularized also: moreover, we are told that the new colonial town of Thurii, to which Hippodamus went as a settler, was also constructed in the same systematic form as to straight and wide streets.[39]

The new scheme upon which the Peiræus was laid out, was not without its value as one visible proof of the naval grandeur of Athens. But the buildings in Athens and on the acropolis formed the real glory of the Periklêan age. A new theatre, termed the Odeon, was constructed for musical and poetical representations at the great Panathenaic solemnity; next, the splendid temple of Athênê, called the Parthenon, with all its masterpieces of decorative sculpture and reliefs; lastly, the costly portals erected to adorn the entrance of the acropolis, on the western side of the hill, through which the solemn processions on festival days were conducted. It appears that the Odeon and the Parthenon were both finished between 445 and 437 B.C.: the Propylæa somewhat later, between 437 and 431 B.C., in which latter year the Peloponnesian war began.[40] Progress was also made in restoring or reconstructing the Erechtheion, or ancient temple of Athênê Polias, the patron goddess of the city,—which had been burnt in the invasion of Xerxes; but the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war seems to have prevented the completion of this, as well as of the great temple of Dêmêter, at Eleusis, for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries,—that of Athênê, at Sunium,—and that of Nemesis, at Rhamnus. Nor was the sculpture less memorable than the architecture: three statues of Athênê, all by the hand of Pheidias, decorated the acropolis,—one colossal, forty-seven feet high, of ivory, in the Parthenon,[41]—a second of bronze, called the Lemnian Athênê,—a third of colossal magnitude, also in bronze, called Athênê Promachos, placed between the Propylæa and the Parthenon, and visible from afar off, even to the navigator approaching Peiræus by sea.

It is not, of course, to Periklês that the renown of these splendid productions of art belongs: but the great sculptors and architects by whom they were conceived

and executed, belonged to that same period of expanding and stimulating Athenian democracy which called forth a similar creative genius in oratory, in dramatic poetry, and in philosophical speculation. One man especially, of immortal name,—Pheidias,—born a little before the battle of Marathon, was the original mind in whom the sublime ideal conceptions of genuine art appear to have disengaged themselves from that hardness of execution and adherence to a consecrated type, which marked the efforts of his predecessors.[42] He was the great director and superintendent of all those decorative additions whereby Periklês imparted to Athens a majesty such as had never before belonged to any Grecian city: the architects of the Parthenon and the other buildings—Iktînus, Kallikratês, Korœbus, Mnesiklês, and others—worked under his superintendence: and he had, besides, a school of pupils and subordinates to whom the mechanical part of his labors was confided. With all the great additions which Pheidias made to the grandeur of Athens, his last and greatest achievement was out of Athens,—the colossal statue of Zeus, in the great temple of Olympia, executed in the years immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. The effect produced by this stupendous work, sixty feet high, in ivory and gold, embodying in visible majesty some of the grandest conceptions of Grecian poetry and religion, upon the minds of all beholders for many centuries successively,—was such as never has been, and probably never will be, equalled in the annals of art, sacred or profane.

Considering these prodigious achievements in the field of art only as they bear upon Athenian and Grecian history, they are phenomena of extraordinary importance. When we read the profound impression which they produced upon Grecian spectators of a later age, we may judge how immense was the effect upon that generation which saw them both begun and finished. In the year 480 B.C., Athens had been ruined by the occupation of Xerxes: since that period, the Greeks had seen, first, the rebuilding and fortifying of the city on an enlarged scale,—next, the addition of Peiræus with its docks and magazines,—thirdly, the junction of the two by the long walls, thus including the most numerous concentrated population, wealth, arms, ships, etc., in Greece,[43]—lastly, the rapid creation of so many new miracles of art,—the sculptures of Pheidias as well as the paintings of the Thasian painter, Polygnôtus, in the temple of Theseus, and in the portico called Pœkilê. Plutarch observes[44] that the celerity with which the works were completed was the most remarkable circumstance connected with them; and so it probably might be, in respect to the effect upon the contemporary Greeks. The gigantic strides by which Athens had reached her maritime empire were now immediately succeeded by a series of works which stamped her as the imperial city of Greece, gave to her an appearance of power even greater than the reality, and especially put to shame the old-fashioned simplicity of Sparta.[45] The cost was doubtless prodigious, and could only have been borne at a time when there was a large treasure in the acropolis, as well as a considerable tribute annually coming in: if we may trust a computation which seems to rest on plausible grounds, it cannot have been much less than three thousand talents in the aggregate,—about six hundred and ninety thousand pounds.[46] The expenditure of

so large a sum was, of course, the source of great private gain to the contractors, tradesmen, merchants, artisans of various descriptions, etc., concerned in it: in one way or another, it distributed itself over a large portion of the whole city. And it appears that the materials employed for much of the work were designedly of the most costly description, as being most consistent with the reverence due to the gods: marble was rejected as too common for the statue of Athênê, and ivory employed in its place;[47] while the gold with which it was surrounded weighed not less than forty talents.[48] A large expenditure for such purposes, considered as pious towards the gods, was at the same time imposing in reference to Grecian feeling, which regarded with admiration every variety of public show and magnificence, and repaid by grateful deference the rich men who indulged in it. Periklês knew well that the visible splendor of the city, so new to all his contemporaries, would cause her great real power to appear even greater than its reality, and would thus procure for her a real, though unacknowledged influence—perhaps even an ascendency—over all cities of the Grecian name. And it is certain that even among those who most hated and feared her, at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, there prevailed a powerful sentiment of involuntary deference.

A step taken by Periklês, apparently not long after the commencement of the thirty years' truce, evinces how much this ascendency was in his direct aim, and how much he connected it with views both of harmony and usefulness for Greece generally. He prevailed upon the people to send envoys to every city of the Greek name, great and small, inviting each to appoint deputies for a congress to be held at Athens. Three points were to be discussed in this intended congress. 1. The restitution of those temples which had been burnt by the Persian invaders. 2. The fulfilment of such vows, as on that occasion had been made to the gods. 3. The safety of the sea and of maritime commerce for all. Twenty elderly Athenians were sent round to obtain the convocation of this congress at Athens,—a Pan-Hellenic congress for Pan-Hellenic purposes. But those who were sent to Bœotia and Peloponnesus completely failed in their object, from the jealousy, noway astonishing, of Sparta and her allies: of the rest we hear nothing, for this refusal was quite sufficient to frustrate the whole scheme.[49] It is to be remarked that the dependent allies of Athens appear to have been summoned just as much as the cities perfectly autonomous; so that their tributary relation to Athens was not understood to degrade them. We may sincerely regret that such congress did not take effect, as it might have opened some new possibilities of converging tendency and alliance for the dispersed fractions of the Greek name,—a comprehensive benefit, to which Sparta was at once incompetent and indifferent, but which might, perhaps, have been realized under Athens, and seems in this case to have been sincerely aimed at by Periklês. The events of the Peloponnesian war, however, extinguished all hopes of any such union.

The interval of fourteen years, between the beginning of the thirty years' truce and that of the Peloponnesian war, was by no means one of undisturbed peace to

Athens. In the sixth year of that period occurred the formidable revolt of Samos.

That island appears to have been the most powerful of all the allies of Athens,[50] —more powerful even than Chios or Lesbos, and standing on the same footing as the two latter; that is, paying no tribute-money,—a privilege when compared with the body of the allies,—but furnishing ships and men when called upon, and retaining, subject to this condition, its complete autonomy, its oligarchical government, its fortifications, and its military force. Like most of the other islands near the coast, Samos possessed a portion of territory on the mainland, between which and the territory of Milêtus, lay the small town of Priênê, one of the twelve original members contributing to the Pan-Ionic solemnity. Respecting the possession of this town of Priênê, a war broke out between the Samians and Milesians, in the sixth year of the thirty years' truce (B.C. 440-439): whether the town had before been independent, we do not know, but in this war the Milesians were worsted, and it fell into the hands of the Samians. The defeated Milesians, enrolled as they were among the tributary allies of Athens, complained to her of the conduct of the Samians, and their complaint was seconded by a party in Samos itself opposed to the oligarchy and its proceedings. The Athenians required the two disputing cities to bring the matter before discussion and award at Athens, with which the Samians refused to comply:[51] whereupon an armament of forty ships was despatched from Athens to the island, and established in it a democratical government; leaving in it a garrison, and carrying away to Lemnos fifty men and as many boys from the principal oligarchical families, to serve as hostages. Of these families, however, a certain number retired to the mainland, where they entered into negotiations with Pissuthnês, the satrap of Sardis, to procure aid and restoration. Obtaining from him seven hundred mercenary troops, and passing over in the night to the island, by previous concert with the oligarchical party, they overcame the Samian democracy as well as the Athenian garrison, who were sent over as prisoners to Pissuthnês. They were farther lucky enough to succeed in stealing away from Lemnos their own recently deposited hostages, and they then proclaimed open revolt against Athens, in which Byzantium also joined. It seems remarkable, that though, by such a proceeding, they would of course draw upon themselves the full strength of Athens, yet their first step was to resume aggressive hostilities against Milêtus,[52] whither they sailed with a powerful naval force of seventy ships, twenty of them carrying troops aboard.

Immediately on the receipt of this grave intelligence, a fleet of sixty triremes—probably all that were in complete readiness—was despatched to Samos under ten generals, two of whom were Periklês himself and the poet Sophoklês,[53] both seemingly included among the ten ordinary stratêgi of the year. But it was necessary to employ sixteen of these ships, partly in summoning contingents from Chios and Lesbos, to which islands Sophoklês went in person;[54] partly in keeping watch off the coast of Karia for the arrival of the Phenician fleet, which report stated to be approaching; so that Periklês had only forty-four ships remaining in his squadron. Yet

he did not hesitate to attack the Samian fleet of seventy ships on its way back from Milêtus, near the island of Tragia, and was victorious in the action. Presently, he was reinforced by forty ships from Athens, and by twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos, so as to be able to disembark at Samos, where he overcame the Samian land-force, and blocked up the harbor with a portion of his fleet, surrounding the city on the land-side with a triple wall. Meanwhile, the Samians had sent Stesagoras with five ships to press the coming of the Phenician fleet, and the report of their approach became again so prevalent that Periklês felt obliged to take sixty ships, out of the total one hundred and twenty-five, to watch for them off the coast of Kaunus and Karia, where he remained for about fourteen days. The Phenician fleet[55] never came, though Diodorus affirms that it was actually on its voyage. Pissuthnês certainly seems to have promised, and the Samians to have expected it: but I incline to believe that, though willing to hold out hopes and encourage revolt among the Athenian allies, the satrap, nevertheless, did not choose openly to violate the convention of Kallias, whereby the Persians were forbidden to send a fleet westward of the Chelidonian promontory. The departure of Periklês, however, so much weakened the Athenian fleet off Samos, that the Samians, suddenly sailing out of their harbor in an opportune moment, at the instigation and under the command of one of their most eminent citizens, the philosopher Melissus,—surprised and ruined the blockading squadron, and gained a victory over the remaining fleet, before the ships could be fairly got out to sea.[56] For fourteen days they remained masters of the sea, carrying in and out all that they thought proper: nor was it until the return of Periklês that they were again blocked up. Reinforcements, however, were now multiplied to the blockading squadron,—from Athens, forty ships, under Thucydidês,[57] Agnon, and Phormion, and twenty under Tlepolemus and Antiklês, besides thirty from Chios and Lesbos,—making altogether near two hundred sail. Against this overwhelming force, Melissus and the Samians made an unavailing attempt at resistance, but were presently quite blocked up, and remained so for nearly nine months, until they could hold out no longer. They then capitulated, being compelled to raze their fortifications, to surrender all their ships of war, to give hostages for future good conduct, and to make good by stated instalments the whole expense of the enterprise, said to have reached one thousand talents. The Byzantines, too, made their submission at the same time.[58]

Two or three circumstances deserve notice respecting this revolt, as illustrating the existing condition of the Athenian empire. First, that the whole force of Athens, together with the contingents from Chios and Lesbos, was necessary in order to crush it, so that even Byzantium, which joined in the revolt, seems to have been left unassailed. Now, it is remarkable that none of the dependent allies near Byzantium, or anywhere else, availed themselves of so favorable an opportunity to revolt also: a fact which seems plainly to imply that there was little positive discontent then prevalent among them. Had the revolt spread to other cities, probably Pissuthnês might have realized his promise of bringing in the Phenician fleet, which would have been a

serious calamity for the Ægean Greeks, and was only kept off by the unbroken maintenance of the Athenian empire.

Next, the revolted Samians applied for aid, not only to Pissuthnês, but also to Sparta and her allies; among whom, at a special meeting, the question of compliance or refusal was formally debated. Notwithstanding the thirty years' truce then subsisting, of which only six years had elapsed, and which had been noway violated by Athens,—many of the allies of Sparta voted for assisting the Samians: what part Sparta herself took, we do not know,—but the Corinthians were the main and decided advocates for the negative. They not only contended that the truce distinctly forbade compliance with the Samian request, but also recognized the right of each confederacy to punish its own recusant members, and this was the decision ultimately adopted, for which the Corinthians afterwards took credit, in the eyes of Athens, as the chief authors.[59] Certainly, if the contrary policy had been pursued, the Athenian empire might have been in great danger, the Phenician fleet would probably have been brought in also, and the future course of events might have been greatly altered.

Again, after the reconquest of Samos, we should assume it almost as a matter of certainty, that the Athenians would renew the democratical government which they had set up just before the revolt. Yet, if they did so, it must have been again overthrown, without any attempt to uphold it on the part of Athens. For we hardly hear of Samos again, until twenty-seven years afterwards, towards the latter division of the Peloponnesian war, in 412 B.C., and it then appears with an established oligarchical government of geomori, or landed proprietors, against which the people make a successful rising during the course of that year.[60] As Samos remained, during the interval between 439 B.C. and 412 B.C., unfortified, deprived of its fleet, and enrolled among the tribute-paying allies of Athens,—and as it, nevertheless, either retained or acquired its oligarchical government; so we may conclude that Athens cannot have systematically interfered to democratize by violence the subject-allies, in cases where the natural tendency of parties ran towards oligarchy. The condition of Lesbos at the time of its revolt, hereafter to be related, will be found to confirm this conclusion.[61]

On returning to Athens after the reconquest of Samos, Periklês was chosen to pronounce the funeral oration over the citizens slain in the war, to whom, according to custom, solemn and public obsequies were celebrated in the suburb called Kerameikus. This custom appears to have been introduced shortly after the Persian war, [62] and would doubtless contribute to stimulate the patriotism of the citizens, especially when the speaker elected to deliver it was of the personal dignity as well as the oratorical powers of Periklês. He was twice public funeral orator by the choice of the citizens: once after the Samian success, and a second time in the first year of the Peloponnesian war. His discourse on the first occasion has not reached us,[63] but the second has been fortunately preserved, in substance at least, by Thucydidês, who also briefly describes the funeral ceremony,—doubtless the same on all occasions.

The bones of the deceased warriors were exposed in tents three days before the ceremony, in order that the relatives of each might have the opportunity of bringing offerings: they were then placed in coffins of cypress, and carried forth on carts to the public burial-place at the Kerameikus; one coffin for each of the ten tribes, and one empty couch, formally laid out, to represent those warriors whose bones had not been discovered or collected. The female relatives of each followed the carts, with loud wailings, and after them a numerous procession both of citizens and strangers. So soon as the bones had been consigned to the grave, some distinguished citizen, specially chosen for the purpose, mounted an elevated stage, and addressed to the multitude an appropriate discourse. Such was the effect produced by that of Periklês after the Samian expedition, that, when he had concluded, the audience present testified their emotion in the liveliest manner, and the women especially crowned him with garlands, like a victorious athlete.[64] Only Elpinikê, sister of the deceased Kimon, reminded him that the victories of her brother had been more felicitous, as gained over Persians and Phenicians, and not over Greeks and kinsmen. And the contemporary poet Ion, the friend of Kimon, reported what he thought an unseemly boast of Periklês,—to the effect that Agamemnon had spent ten years in taking a foreign city, while *he* in nine months had reduced the first and most powerful of all the Ionic communities.[65] But if we possessed the actual speech pronounced, we should probably find that he assigned all the honor of the exploit to Athens and her citizens generally, placing their achievement in favorable comparison with that of Agamemnon and his host,—not himself with Agamemnon.

Whatever may be thought of this boast, there can be no doubt that the result of the Samian war not only rescued the Athenian empire from great peril,[66] but rendered it stronger than ever: while the foundation of Amphipolis, which was effected two years afterwards, strengthened it still farther. Nor do we hear, during the ensuing few years, of any farther tendencies to disaffection among its members, until the period immediately before the Peloponnesian war. The feeling common among them towards Athens, seems to have been neither attachment nor hatred, but simple indifference and acquiescence in her supremacy. Such amount of positive discontent as really existed among them, arose, not from actual hardships suffered, but from the general political instinct of the Greek mind,—desire of separate autonomy for each city; which manifested itself in each, through the oligarchical party, whose power was kept down by Athens, and was stimulated by the sentiment communicated from the Grecian communities without the Athenian empire. According to that sentiment, the condition of a subject-ally of Athens was treated as one of degradation and servitude: and in proportion as fear and hatred of Athens became more and more predominant among the allies of Sparta, they gave utterance to the sentiment more and more emphatically, so as to encourage discontent artificially among the subject-allies of the Athenian empire. Possessing complete mastery of the sea, and every sort of superiority requisite for holding empire over islands, Athens had yet no sentiment to appeal to in her subjects, calculated to render her empire popular, except that of

common democracy, which seems at first to have acted without any care on her part to encourage it, until the progress of the Peloponnesian war made such encouragement a part of her policy. And had she even tried sincerely to keep up in the allies the feeling of a common interest, and the attachment to a permanent confederacy, the instinct of political separation would probably have baffled all her efforts. But she took no such pains,—with the usual morality that grows up in the minds of the actual possessors of power, she conceived herself entitled to exact obedience as her right; and some of the Athenian speakers in Thucydidês go so far as to disdain all pretence of legitimate power, even such as might fairly be set up, resting the supremacy of Athens on the naked plea of superior force.[67] As the allied cities were mostly under democracies,—through the indirect influence rather than the systematic dictation of Athens,—yet each having its own internal aristocracy in a state of opposition; so the movements for revolt against Athens originated with the aristocracy or with some few citizens apart: while the people, though sharing more or less in the desire for autonomy, had yet either a fear of their own aristocracy or a sympathy with Athens, which made them always backward in revolting, sometimes decidedly opposed to it. Neither Periklês nor Kleon, indeed, lay stress on the attachment of the people as distinguished from that of the Few, in these dependent cities; but the argument is strongly insisted on by Diodorus,[68] in the discussion respecting Mitylênê after its surrender: and as the war advanced, the question of alliance with Athens or Sparta became more and more identified with the internal preponderance of democracy or oligarchy in each.[69] We shall find that in most of those cases of actual revolt where we are informed of the preceding circumstances, the step is adopted or contrived by a small number of oligarchical malcontents, without consulting the general voice; while in those cases where the general assembly is consulted beforehand, there is manifested indeed a preference for autonomy, but nothing like a hatred of Athens or decided inclination to break with her. In the case of Mitylênê,[70] in the fourth year of the war, it was the aristocratical government which revolted, while the people, as soon as they obtained arms, actually declared in favor of Athens: and the secession of Chios, the greatest of all the allies, in the twentieth year of the Peloponnesian war, even after all the hardships which the allies had been called upon to bear in that war, and after the ruinous disasters which Athens had sustained before Syracuse,—was both prepared beforehand and accomplished by secret negotiations of the Chian oligarchy, not only without the concurrence, but against the inclination, of their own people.[71] In like manner, the revolt of Thasos would not have occurred, had not the Thasian democracy been previously subverted by the Athenian Peisander and his oligarchical confederates. So in Akanthus, in Amphipolis, in Mendê, and those other Athenian dependencies which were wrested from Athens by Brasidas, we find the latter secretly introduced by a few conspirators, while the bulk of the citizens do not hail him at once as a deliverer, like men sick of Athenian supremacy: they acquiesce, not without debate, when Brasidas is already in the town, and his demeanor, just as well as conciliating, soon gains their esteem: but neither in Akanthus nor in Am-

phipolis would he have been admitted by the free decision of the citizens, if they had not been alarmed for the safety of their friends, their properties, and their harvest, still exposed in the lands without the walls.[72] These particular examples warrant us in affirming, that though the oligarchy in the various allied cities desired eagerly to shake off the supremacy of Athens, the people were always backward in following them, sometimes even opposed, and hardly ever willing to make sacrifices for the object. They shared the universal Grecian desire for separate autonomy,[73] felt the Athenian empire as an extraneous pressure which they would have been glad to shake off, whenever the change could be made with safety: but their condition was not one of positive hardship, nor did they overlook the hazardous side of such a change,—partly from the coercive hand of Athens, partly from new enemies against whom Athens had hitherto protected them, and not least, from their own oligarchy. Of course, the different allied cities were not all animated by the same feelings, some being more averse to Athens than others.

The particular modes in which Athenian supremacy was felt as a grievance by the allies appear to have been chiefly three. 1. The annual tribute. 2. The encroachments, exactions, or perhaps plunder, committed by individual Athenians, who would often take advantage of their superior position, either as serving in the naval armaments, as invested with the function of inspectors as placed in garrison, or as carrying on some private speculation. 3. The obligation under which the allies were placed, of bringing a large proportion of their judicial trials to be settled before the dikasteries at Athens.

As to the tribute, I have before remarked that its amount had been but little raised from its first settlement down to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, at which time it was six hundred talents yearly:[74] it appears to have been reviewed, and the apportionment corrected, in every fifth year, at which period the collecting officers may probably have been changed; but we shall afterwards find it becoming larger and more burdensome. The same gradual increase may probably be affirmed respecting the second head of inconvenience,—vexation caused to the allies by individual Athenians, chiefly officers of armaments, or powerful citizens.[75] Doubtless this was always more or less a real grievance, from the moment when the Athenians became despots in place of chiefs, but it was probably not very serious in extent until after the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, when revolt on the part of the allies became more apprehended, and when garrisons, inspectors, and tribute-gathering ships became more essential in the working of the Athenian empire.

But the third circumstance above noticed—the subjection of the allied cities to the Athenian dikasteries—has been more dwelt upon as a grievance than the second, and seems to have been unduly exaggerated. We can hardly doubt that the beginning of this jurisdiction exercised by the Athenian dikasteries dates with the synod of Delos, at the time of the first formation of the confederacy. It was an indispensable element of that confederacy, that the members should forego their right of private

war among each other, and submit their differences to peaceable arbitration,—a covenant introduced even into alliances much less intimate than this was, and absolutely essential to the efficient maintenance of any common action against Persia.[76] Of course, many causes of dispute, public as well as private, must have arisen among these wide-spread islands and seaports of the Ægean, connected with each other by relations of fellow-feeling, of trade, and of common apprehensions. The synod of Delos, composed of the deputies of all, was the natural board of arbitration for such disputes, and a habit must thus have been formed, of recognizing a sort of federal tribunal,—to decide peaceably how far each ally had faithfully discharged its duties, both towards the confederacy collectively, and towards other allies with their individual citizens separately,—as well as to enforce its decisions and punish refractory members, pursuant to the right which Sparta and her confederacy claimed and exercised also.[77] Now from the beginning, the Athenians were the guiding and enforcing presidents of this synod, and when it gradually died away, they were found occupying its place as well as clothed with its functions. It was in this manner that their judicial authority over the allies appears first to have begun, as the confederacy became changed into an Athenian empire,—the judicial functions of the synod being transferred along with the common treasure to Athens, and doubtless much extended. And on the whole, these functions must have been productive of more good than evil to the allies themselves, especially to the weakest and most defenceless among them.

Among the thousand towns which paid tribute to Athens,—taking this numerical statement of Aristophanês, not in its exact meaning, but simply as a great number,—if a small town, or one of its citizens, had cause of complaint against a larger, there was no channel except the synod of Delos, or the Athenian tribunal, through which it could have any reasonable assurance of fair trial or justice. It is not to be supposed that all the private complaints and suits between citizen and citizen, in each respective subject town, were carried up for trial to Athens: yet we do not know distinctly how the line was drawn between matters carried up thither and matters tried at home. The subject cities appear to have been interdicted from the power of capital punishment, which could only be inflicted after previous trial and condemnation at Athens:[78] so that the latter reserved to herself the cognizance of most of the grave crimes,—or what may be called "the higher justice" generally. And the political accusations preferred by citizen against citizen, in any subject city, for alleged treason, corruption, non-fulfilment of public duty, etc., were doubtless carried to Athens for trial,—perhaps the most important part of her jurisdiction.

But the maintenance of this judicial supremacy was not intended by Athens for the substantive object of amending the administration of justice in each separate allied city: it went rather to regulate the relations between city and city,—between citizens of different cities,—between Athenian citizens or officers, and any of these allied cities with which they had relations,—between each city itself, as a dependent

government with contending political parties, and the imperial head, Athens. All these were problems which imperial Athens was called on to solve, and the best way of solving them would have been through some common synod emanating from all the allies: putting this aside, we shall find that the solution provided by Athens was perhaps the next best, and we shall be the more induced to think so, when we compare it with the proceedings afterwards adopted by Sparta, when she had put down the Athenian empire. Under Sparta, the general rule was, to place each of the dependent cities under the government of a dekadarchy or oligarchical council of ten among its chief citizens, together with a Spartan harmost, or governor, having a small garrison under his orders. It will be found, when we come to describe the Spartan maritime empire, that these arrangements exposed each dependent city to very great violence and extortion, while, after all, they solved only a part of the problem: they served only to maintain each separate city under the dominion of Sparta, without contributing to regulate the dealings between the citizens of one and those of another, or to bind together the empire as a whole. Now the Athenians did not, as a system, place in their dependent cities, governors analogous to the harmosts, though they did so occasionally under special need; but their fleets and their officers were in frequent relation with these cities; and as the principal officers were noways indisposed to abuse their position, so the facility of complaint, constantly open to the Athenian popular dikastery, served both as redress and guarantee against misrule of this description. It was a guarantee which the allies themselves sensibly felt and valued, as we know from Thucydidês: the chief source from whence they had to apprehend evil was the Athenian officials and principal citizens, who could misemploy the power of Athens for their own private purposes,—but they looked up to the "Athenian Demos as a chastener of such evil-doers and as a harbor of refuge to themselves."[79] If the popular dikasteries at Athens had not been thus open, the allied cities would have suffered much more severely from the captains and officials of Athens in their individual capacity. And the maintenance of political harmony, between the imperial city and the subject ally, was insured by Athens through the jurisdiction of her dikasteries with much less cost of injustice and violence than by Sparta; for though oligarchical partisans might sometimes be unjustly condemned at Athens, yet such accidental wrong was immensely overpassed by the enormities of the Spartan harmosts and dekadarchies, who put numbers to death without any trial at all.

So again, it is to be recollected that Athenian private citizens, not officially employed, were spread over the whole range of the empire as kleruchs, proprietors, or traders; of course, therefore, disputes would arise between them and the natives of the subject cities, as well as among these latter themselves, in cases where both parties did not belong to the same city. Now in such cases the Spartan imperial authority was so exercised as to afford little or no remedy, since the action of the harmost or the dekadarchy was confined to one separate city; while the Athenian dikasteries, with universal competence and public trial, afforded the only redress which

the contingency admitted. If a Thasian citizen believed himself aggrieved by the historian Thucydidês, either as commander of the Athenian fleet off the station, or as proprietor of gold mines in Thrace, he had his remedy against the latter by accusation before the Athenian dikasteries, to which the most powerful Athenian was amenable not less than the meanest Thasian. To a citizen of any allied city, it might be an occasional hardship to be sued before the courts at Athens, but it was also often a valuable privilege to him to be able to sue before those courts others whom else he could not have reached. He had his share both of the benefit and of the hardship. Athens, if she robbed her subject-allies of their independence, at least gave them in exchange the advantage of a central and common judiciary authority; thus enabling each of them to enforce claims of justice against the rest, in a way which would not have been practicable, to the weaker at least, even in a state of general independence.

Now Sparta seems not even to have attempted anything of the kind with regard to her subject-allies, being content to keep them under the rule of a harmost, and a partisan oligarchy; and we read anecdotes which show that no justice could be obtained at Sparta, even for the grossest outrages committed by the harmost, or by private Spartans out of Laconia. The two daughters of a Bœotian named Skedasus, of Leuktra in Bœotia, had been first violated and then slain by two Spartan citizens: the son of a citizen of Oreus, in Eubœa, had been also outraged and killed by the harmost Aristodêmus:[80] in both cases the fathers went to Sparta to lay the enormity before the ephors and other authorities, and in both cases a deaf ear was turned to their complaints. But such crimes, if committed by Athenian citizens or officers, might have been brought to a formal exposure before the public sitting of the dikastery, and there can be no doubt that both would have been severely punished: we shall see hereafter that an enormity of this description, committed by the Athenian general Pachês, at Mitylênê, cost him his life before the Athenian dikasts.[81] Xenophon, in the dark and one-sided representation which he gives of the Athenian democracy, remarks, that if the subject-allies had not been made amenable to justice, at Athens, they would have cared little for the people of Athens, and would have paid court only to those individual Athenians—generals, trierarchs, or envoys—who visited the islands on service; but under the existing system, the subjects were compelled to visit Athens either as plaintiffs or defendants, and were thus under the necessity of paying court to the bulk of the people also,—that is, to those humbler citizens out of whom the dikasteries were formed; they supplicated the dikasts in court for favor or lenient dealing.[82] However true this may be, we must remark that it was a lighter lot to be brought for trial before the dikastery, than to be condemned without redress by the general on service, or to be forced to buy off his condemnation by a bribe; and, moreover, that the dikastery was open not merely to receive accusations against citizens of the allied cities, but also to entertain the complaints which they preferred against others.

Assuming the dikasteries at Athens to be ever so defective as tribunals for administering justice, we must recollect that they were the same tribunals under which every Athenian citizen held his own fortune or reputation, and that the native of any subject city was admitted to the same chance of justice as the native of Athens. Accordingly, we find the Athenian envoy at Sparta, immediately before the Peloponnesian war, taking peculiar credit to the imperial city on this ground for equal dealing with her subject-allies. "If our power (he says) were to pass into other hands, the comparison would presently show how moderate we are in the use of it: but as regards us, our very moderation is unfairly turned to our disparagement rather than to our praise. For even though we put ourselves at disadvantage in matters litigated with our allies, and though we have appointed such matters to be judged among ourselves and under laws equal to both parties, we are represented as animated by nothing better than a love of litigation."[83] "Our allies (he adds) would complain less if we made open use of our superior force with regard to them; but we discard such maxims, and deal with them upon an equal footing: and they are so accustomed to this, that they think themselves entitled to complain at every trifling disappointment of their expectations.[84] They suffered worse hardships under the Persians before our empire began, and they would suffer worse under you (the Spartans), if you were to succeed in conquering us and making our empire yours." History bears out the boast of the Athenian orator, both as to the time preceding and following the empire of Athens.[85] And an Athenian citizen, indeed, might well regard it, not as a hardship, but as a privilege, that subject-allies should be allowed to sue him before the dikastery, and to defend themselves before the same tribunal, either in case of wrong done to him, or in case of alleged treason to the imperial authority of Athens: they were thereby put upon a level with himself. Still more would he find reason to eulogize the universal competence of these dikasteries in providing a common legal authority for all disputes of the numerous distinct communities of the empire, one with another, and for the safe navigation and general commerce of the Ægean. That complaints were raised against it among the subject-allies, is noway surprising: for the empire of Athens generally was inconsistent with that separate autonomy to which every town thought itself entitled,—and this was one of its prominent and constantly operative institutions, as well as a striking mark of dependence to the subordinate communities. Yet we may safely affirm, that if empire was to be maintained at all, no way of maintaining it could be found at once less oppressive and more beneficial than the superintending competence of the dikasteries,—a system not taking its rise in the mere "love of litigation," if, indeed, we are to reckon this a real feature in the Athenian character, which I shall take another opportunity of examining, much less in those petty collateral interests indicated by Xenophon,[86] such as the increased customs duty, rent of houses, and hire of slaves at Peiræus, and the larger profits of the heralds, arising from the influx of suitors. It was nothing but the power, originally inherent in the confederacy of Delos, of arbitration between members and enforcement of duties towards the whole,—a power inherited by Athens from that

synod, and enlarged to meet the political wants of her empire; to which end it was essential, even in the view of Xenophon himself.[87] It may be that the dikastery was not always impartial between Athenian citizens privately, or the Athenian commonwealth collectively, and the subject-allies,—and in so far the latter had good reason to complain; but on the other hand, we have no ground for suspecting it of deliberate or standing unfairness, or of any other defects than such as were inseparable from its constitution and procedure, whoever might be the parties under trial.

We are now considering the Athenian empire as it stood before the Peloponnesian war; before the increased exactions and the multiplied revolts, to which that war gave rise,—before the cruelties which accompanied the suppression of those revolts, and which so deeply stained the character of Athens,—before that aggravated fierceness, mistrust, contempt of obligation, and rapacious violence, which Thucydidês so emphatically indicates as having been infused into the Greek bosom by the fever of an all-pervading contest.[88] There had been before this time many revolts of the Athenian dependencies, from the earliest at Naxos down to the latest at Samos: all had been successfully suppressed, but in no case had Athens displayed the same unrelenting rigor as we shall find hereafter manifested towards Mitylênê, Skiônê, and Mêlos. The policy of Periklês, now in the plenitude of his power at Athens, was cautious and conservative, averse to forced extension of empire as well as to those increased burdens on the dependent allies which such schemes would have entailed, and tending to maintain that assured commerce in the Ægean by which all of them must have been gainers,—not without a conviction that the contest must arise sooner or later between Athens and Sparta, and that the resources as well as the temper of the allies must be husbanded against that contingency. If we read in Thucydidês the speech of the envoy from Mitylênê[89] at Olympia, delivered to the Lacedæmonians and their allies in the fourth year of the Peloponnesian war, on occasion of the revolt of the city from Athens,—a speech imploring aid and setting forth the strongest case against Athens which the facts could be made to furnish,—we shall be surprised how weak the case is, and how much the speaker is conscious of its weakness. He has nothing like practical grievances and oppressions to urge against the imperial city,—he does not dwell upon enormity of tribute, unpunished misconduct of Athenian officers, hardship of bringing causes for trial to Athens, or other sufferings of the subjects generally,—he has nothing to say except that they were defenceless and degraded subjects, and that Athens held authority over them without and against their own consent: and in the case of Mitylênê, not so much as this could be said, since she was on the footing of an equal, armed, and autonomous ally. Of course, this state of forced dependence was one which the allies, or such of them as could stand alone, would naturally and reasonably shake off whenever they had an opportunity:[90] but the negative evidence, derived from the speech of the Mitylenæan orator, goes far to make out the point contended for by the Athenian speaker at Sparta immediately before the war,—that, beyond the fact of such forced dependence, the allies had little practically to complain of. A city like Mitylênê, more-

over, would be strong enough to protect itself and its own commerce without the help of Athens: but to the weaker allies, the breaking up of the Athenian empire would have greatly lessened the security both of individuals and of commerce, in the waters of the Ægean, and their freedom would thus have been purchased at the cost of considerable positive disadvantages.[91]

Nearly the whole of the Grecian world, putting aside Italian, Sicilian, and African Greeks, was at this time included either in the alliance of Lacedæmon or in that of Athens, so that the truce of thirty years insured a suspension of hostilities everywhere. Moreover, the Lacedæmonian confederates had determined by majority of votes to refuse the request of Samos for aid in her revolt against Athens: whereby it seemed established, as practical international law, that neither of these two great aggregate bodies should intermeddle with the other, and that each should restrain or punish its own disobedient members.[92] Of this refusal, which materially affected the course of events, the main advisers had been the Corinthians, in spite of that fear and dislike of Athens which prompted many of the allies to vote for war.[93] The position of the Corinthians was peculiar; for while Sparta and her other allies were chiefly land-powers, Corinth had been from early times maritime, commercial, and colonizing,—she had been indeed once the first naval power in Greece, along with Ægina; but either she had not increased it at all during the last forty years, or, if she had, her comparative naval importance had been entirely sunk by the gigantic expansion of Athens. The Corinthians had both commerce and colonies,—Leukas, Anaktorium, Ambrakia, Korkyra, etc., along or near the coast of Epirus: they had also their colony Potidæa, situated on the isthmus of Pallênê, in Thrace, and intimately connected with them: and the interest of their commerce made them extremely averse to any collision with the superior navy of the Athenians. It was this consideration which had induced them to resist the impulse of the Lacedæmonian allies towards war on behalf of Samos: for though their feelings, both of jealousy and hatred against Athens were even now strong,[94] arising greatly out of the struggle a few years before for the acquisition of Megara to the Athenian alliance,—prudence indicated that, in a war against the first naval power in Greece, they were sure to be the greatest losers. So long as the policy of Corinth pointed towards peace, there was every probability that war would be avoided, or at least accepted only in a case of grave necessity, by the Lacedæmonian alliance. But a contingency, distant as well as unexpected, which occurred about five years after the revolt of Samos, reversed all these chances, and not only extinguished the dispositions of Corinth towards peace, but even transformed her into the forward instigator of war.

Amidst the various colonies planted from Corinth along the coast of Epirus, the greater number acknowledged on her part an hegemony, or supremacy.[95] What extent of real power and interference this acknowledgment implied, in addition to the honorary dignity, we are not in a condition to say; but the Corinthians were popular, and had not carried their interference beyond the point which the colonists them-

selves found acceptable. To these amicable relations, however, the powerful Korkyra formed a glaring exception, having been generally at variance, sometimes in the most aggravated hostility, with its mother-city, and withholding from her even the accustomed tributes of honorary and filial respect. It was amidst such relations of habitual ill-will between Corinth and Korkyra, that a dispute grew up respecting the city of Epidamnus, known afterwards, in the Roman times, as Dyrrachium, hard by the modern Durazzo,—a colony founded by the Korkyræans on the coast of Illyria, in the Ionic gulf, considerably to the north of their own island. So strong was the sanctity of Grecian custom in respect to the foundation of colonies, that the Korkyræans, in spite of their enmity to Corinth, had been obliged to select the œkist, or founder-in-chief of Epidamnus, from that city,—a citizen of Herakleid descent, named Phalius,—along with whom there had also come some Corinthian settlers: so that Epidamnus, though a Korkyræan colony, was nevertheless a recognized granddaughter, if the expression may be allowed, of Corinth, the recollection of which was perpetuated by the solemnities periodically celebrated in honor of the œkist.[96]

Founded on the isthmus of an outlaying peninsula on the sea-coast of the Illyrian Taulantii, Epidamnus was at first very prosperous, and acquired a considerable territory as well as a numerous population. But during the years immediately preceding the period which we have now reached, it had been exposed to great reverses: internal sedition between the oligarchy and the people, aggravated by attacks from the neighboring Illyrians, had crippled its power: and a recent revolution, in which the people put down the oligarchy, had reduced it still farther,—since the oligarchical exiles, collecting a force and allying themselves with the Illyrians, harassed the city grievously both by sea and land. The Epidamnian democracy was in such straits as to be forced to send to Korkyra for aid: their envoys sat down as suppliants at the temple of Hêrê, cast themselves on the mercy of the Korkyræans, and besought them to act both as mediators with the exiled oligarchy and as auxiliaries against the Illyrians. Though the Korkyræans themselves, democratically governed, might have been expected to sympathize with these suppliants and their prayers, yet their feeling was decidedly opposite: for it was the Epidamnian oligarchy who were principally connected with Korkyra, from whence their forefathers had emigrated, and where their family burial-places as well as their kinsmen were still to be found:[97] while the demos, or small proprietors and tradesmen of Epidamnus, may perhaps have been of miscellaneous origin, and at any rate had no visible memorials of ancient lineage in the mother-island. Having been refused aid from Korkyra, and finding their distressed condition insupportable, the Epidamnians next thought of applying to Corinth: but as this was a step of questionable propriety, their envoys were directed first to take the opinion of the Delphian god. His oracle having given an unqualified sanction, they proceeded to Corinth with their mission; describing their distress as well as their unavailing application at Korkyra,—tendering Epidamnus to the Corinthians as to its œkists and chiefs, with the most urgent entreaties for immediate aid to preserve it from ruin,—and not omitting to insist on the divine sanction just obtained. It was

found easy to persuade the Corinthians, who, looking upon Epidamnus as a joint colony from Corinth and Korkyra, thought themselves not only authorized, but bound, to undertake its defence, a resolution much prompted by their ancient feud against Korkyra. They speedily organized an expedition, consisting partly of intended new settlers, partly of a protecting military force,—Corinthian, Leukadian, and Ambrakiôtic: which combined body, in order to avoid opposition from the powerful Korkyræan navy, was marched by land as far as Apollônia, and transported from thence by sea to Epidamnus.[98]

The arrival of such a reinforcement rescued the city for the moment, but drew upon it a formidable increase of peril from the Korkyræans, who looked upon the interference of Corinth as an infringement of their rights, and resented it in the strongest manner. Their feelings were farther inflamed by the Epidamnian oligarchical exiles, who, coming to the island with petition for succor, and appeals to the tombs of their Korkyræan ancestors, found a ready sympathy. They were placed on board a fleet of twenty-five triremes, afterwards strengthened by a farther reinforcement, which was sent to Epidamnus with the insulting requisition that they should be forthwith restored, and the new-comers from Corinth dismissed. No attention being paid to these demands, the Korkyræans commenced the blockade of the city with forty ships, and with an auxiliary land-force of Illyrians,—making proclamation that any person within, citizen or not, might depart safely if he chose, but would be dealt with as an enemy if he remained. How many persons profited by this permission we do not know: but at least enough to convey to Corinth the news that their troops in Epidamnus were closely besieged. The Corinthians immediately hastened the equipment of a second expedition,—sufficient not only for the rescue of the place, but to surmount that resistance which the Korkyræans were sure to offer. In addition to thirty triremes, and three thousand hoplites, of their own, they solicited aid both in ships and money from many of their allies: eight ships fully manned were furnished by Megara, four by Palês, in the island of Kephallênia, five by Epidaurus, two by Trœzen, one by Hermionê, ten by Leukas, and eight by Ambrakia,—together with pecuniary contributions from Thebes, Phlius, and Elis. They farther proclaimed a public invitation for new settlers to Epidamnus, promising equal political rights to all; an option being allowed to anyone who wished to become a settler without being ready to depart at once, to insure future admission by depositing the sum of fifty Corinthian drachmas. Though it might seem that the prospects of these new settlers were full of doubt and danger, such was the confidence entertained in the metropolitan protection of Corinth, that many were found as well to join the fleet, as to pay down the deposit for the liberty of future junction.

All these proceedings on the part of Corinth, though undertaken with intentional hostility towards Korkyra, had not been preceded by any formal proposition, such as was customary among Grecian states,—a harshness of dealing arising not merely from her hatred towards Korkyra, but also from the peculiar political position of that

island, which stood alone and isolated, not enrolled either in the Athenian or in the Lacedæmonian alliance. The Korkyræans, well aware of the serious preparation now going on at Corinth, and of the union among so many cities against them, felt themselves hardly a match for it alone, in spite of their wealth and their formidable naval force of one hundred and twenty triremes, inferior only to that of Athens. They made an effort to avert the storm by peaceable means, prevailing upon some mediators from Sparta and Sikyon to accompany them to Corinth; where, while they required that the forces and settlers recently despatched to Epidamnus should be withdrawn, denying all right on the part of Corinth to interfere in that colony,—they at the same time offered, if the point were disputed, to refer it for arbitration either to some impartial Peloponnesian city, or to the Delphian oracle; such arbiter to determine to which of the two cities Epidamnus as a colony really belonged, and the decision to be obeyed by both. They solemnly deprecated recourse to arms, which, if persisted in, would drive them as a matter of necessity to seek new allies such as they would not willingly apply to. To this the Corinthians answered, that they could entertain no proposition until the Korkyræan besieging force was withdrawn from Epidamnus: whereupon the Korkyræans rejoined that they would withdraw it at once, provided the new settlers and the troops sent by Corinth were removed at the same time. Either there ought to be this reciprocal retirement, or the Korkyræans would acquiesce in this *statu quo* on both sides, until the arbiters should have decided.[99]

Although the Korkyræans had been unwarrantably harsh in rejecting the first supplication from Epidamnus, yet in their propositions made at Corinth, right and equity were on their side. But the Corinthians had gone too far, and assumed an attitude too decidedly aggressive, to admit of listening to arbitration, and accordingly, so soon as their armament was equipped, they set sail for Epidamnus, despatching a herald to declare war formally against the Korkyræans. As soon as the armament, consisting of seventy triremes, under Aristeus, Kallikratês, and Timanor, with two thousand five hundred hoplites, under Archetimus and Isarchidas, had reached Cape Aktium, at the mouth of the Ambrakian gulf, it was met by a Korkyræan herald in a little boat forbidding all farther advance,—a summons of course unavailing, and quickly followed by the appearance of the Korkyræan fleet. Out of the one hundred and twenty triremes which constituted the naval establishment of the island, forty were engaged in the siege of Epidamnus, but all the remaining eighty were now brought into service; the older ships being specially repaired for the occasion. In the action which ensued, they gained a complete victory, destroying fifteen Corinthian ships, and taking a considerable number of prisoners. And on the very day of the victory, Epidamnus surrendered to their besieging fleet, under covenant that the Corinthians within it should be held as prisoners, and that the other new-comers should be sold as slaves. The Corinthians and their allies did not long keep the sea after their defeat, but retired home, while the Korkyræans remained undisputed masters of the neighboring sea. Having erected a trophy on Leukimmê, the adjoining promontory of their island, they proceeded, according to the melancholy practice of Grecian warfare, to kill all

their prisoners,—except the Corinthians, who were carried home and detained as prizes of great value for purposes of negotiation. They next began to take vengeance on those allies of Corinth, who had lent assistance to the recent expedition: they ravaged the territory of Leukas, burned Kyllênê, the seaport of Elis, and inflicted so much damage that the Corinthians were compelled towards the end of the summer to send a second armament to Cape Aktium, for the defence of Leukas, Anaktorium, and Ambrakia. The Korkyræan fleet was again assembled near Cape Leukimmê, but no farther action took place, and at the approach of winter both armaments were disbanded.[100]

Deeply were the Corinthians humiliated by their defeat at sea, together with the dispersion of the settlers whom they had brought together; and though their original project was frustrated by the loss of Epidamnus, they were only the more bent on complete revenge against their old enemy Korkyra. They employed themselves, for two entire years after the battle, in building new ships and providing an armament adequate to their purposes: and in particular, they sent round not only to the Peloponnesian seaports, but also to the islands under the empire of Athens, in order to take into their pay the best class of seamen. By such prolonged efforts, ninety well-manned Corinthian ships were ready to set sail in the third year after the battle: and the entire fleet, when reinforced by the allies, amounted to not less than one hundred and fifty sail: twenty-seven triremes from Ambrakia, twelve from Megara, ten from Elis, as many from Leukas, and one from Anaktorium. Each of these allied squadrons had officers of its own, while the Corinthian Xenokleidês and four others were commanders-in-chief.[101]

But the elaborate preparations going on at Corinth were no secret to the Korkyræans, who well knew, besides, the numerous allies which that city could command, and her extensive influence throughout Greece. So formidable an attack was more than they could venture to brave, alone and unaided. They had never yet enrolled themselves among the allies either of Athens or of Lacedæmon: it had always been their pride and policy to maintain a separate line of action, which, by means of their wealth, their power, and their very peculiar position, they had hitherto been enabled to do with safety. That they had been able so to proceed with safety, however, was considered both by friends and enemies as a peculiarity belonging to their island; from whence we may draw an inference how little the islands in the Ægean, now under the Athenian empire, would have been able to maintain any real independence, if that empire had been broken up. But though Korkyra had been secure in this policy of isolation up to the present moment, such had been the increase and consolidation of forces elsewhere throughout Greece, that even she could pursue it no longer. To apply for admission into the Lacedæmonian confederacy, wherein her immediate enemy exercised paramount influence, being out of the question, she had no choice except to seek alliance with Athens. That city had as yet no dependencies in the Ionic gulf; she was not of kindred lineage, nor had she had any previous ami-

cable relations with the Dorian Korkyra. But if there was thus no previous fact or feeling to lay the foundation of alliance, neither was there anything to forbid it: for in the truce between Athens and Sparta, it had been expressly stipulated, that any city, not actually enrolled in the alliance of either, might join the one or the other at pleasure.[102] While the proposition of alliance was thus formally open either for acceptance or refusal, the time and circumstances under which it was to be made rendered it full of grave contingencies to all parties; and the Korkyræan envoys, who now for the first time visited Athens, for the purpose of making it, came thither with doubtful hopes of success, though to their island the question was one of life or death.

According to the modern theories of government, to declare war, to make peace, and to contract alliances, are functions proper to be intrusted to the executive government apart from the representative assembly. According to ancient ideas, these were precisely the topics most essential to submit for the decision of the full assembly of the people: and in point of fact they were so submitted, even under governments only partially democratical; much more, of course, under the complete democracy of Athens. The Korkyræan envoys, on reaching that city, would first open their business to the stratêgi, or generals of the state, who would appoint a day for them to be heard before the public assembly, with full notice beforehand to the citizens. The mission was no secret, for the Korkyræans had themselves intimated their intention at Corinth, at the time when they proposed reference of the quarrel to arbitration: and even without such notice, the political necessity of the step was obvious enough to make the Corinthians anticipate it. Lastly, their *proxeni* at Athens, Athenian citizens who watched over Corinthian interests, public and private, in confidential correspondence with that government,—and who, sometimes by appointment, sometimes as volunteers, discharged partly the functions of ambassadors in modern times, would communicate to them the arrival of the Korkyræan envoys. So that, on the day appointed for the latter to be heard before the public assembly, Corinthian envoys were also present to answer them and to oppose the granting of their prayer.

Thucydidês has given in his history the speeches of both; that is, speeches of his own composition, but representing in all probability the substance of what was actually said, and of what he perhaps himself heard. Though pervaded throughout by the peculiar style and harsh structure of the historian, these speeches are yet among the plainest and most business-like in his whole work, bringing before us thoroughly the existing situation; which was one of doubt and difficulty, presenting reasons of considerable force on each of the opposite sides. The Korkyræans, after lamenting their previous improvidence, which had induced them to defer seeking alliance until the hour of need arrived, presented themselves as claimants for the friendship of Athens, on the strongest grounds of common interest and reciprocal usefulness. Though their existing danger and want of Athenian support was now urgent, it had not been brought upon them in an unjust quarrel, or by disgraceful conduct: they had pro-

posed to Corinth a fair arbitration respecting Epidamnus, and their application had been refused,—which showed where the right of the case lay; moreover, they were now exposed single-handed, not to Corinth alone, whom they had already vanquished, but to a formidable confederacy, organized under her auspices, including choice mariners hired even from the allies of Athens. In granting their prayer, Athens would, in the first place, neutralize this misemployment of her own mariners, and would, at the same time, confer an indelible obligation, protect the cause of right, and secure to herself a most important reinforcement. For, next to her own, the Korkyræan naval force was the most powerful in Greece, and this was now placed within her reach: if, by declining the present offer, she permitted Korkyra to be overcome, that naval force would pass to the side of her enemies: for such were Corinth and the Peloponnesian alliance,—and such they would soon be openly declared. In the existing state of Greece, a collision between that alliance and Athens could not long be postponed: and it was with a view to this contingency that the Corinthians were now seeking to seize Korkyra along with her naval force.[103] The policy of Athens, therefore, imperiously called upon her to frustrate such a design, by now assisting the Korkyræans. She was permitted to do this by the terms of the thirty years' truce: and although some might contend that, in the present critical conjuncture, acceptance of Korkyra was tantamount to a declaration of war with Corinth, yet the fact would falsify such predictions; for Athens would so strengthen herself that her enemies would be more than ever unwilling to attack her. She would not only render her naval force irresistibly powerful, but would become mistress of the communication between Sicily and Peloponnesus, and thus prevent the Sicilian Dorians from sending reinforcements to the Peloponnesians.[104]

To these representations on the part of the Korkyræans, the Corinthian speakers made reply. They denounced the selfish and iniquitous policy pursued by Korkyra, not less in the matter of Epidamnus, than in all former time,[105]—which was the real reason why she had ever been ashamed of honest allies. Above all things, she had always acted undutifully and wickedly towards Corinth, her mother-city, to whom she was bound by those ties of colonial allegiance which Grecian morality recognized, and which the other Corinthian colonies cheerfully obeyed.[106] Epidamnus was not a Korkyræan, but a Corinthian colony, and the Korkyræans, having committed wrong in besieging it, had proposed arbitration without being willing to withdraw their troops while arbitration was pending: they now impudently came to ask Athens to become accessory after the fact in such injustice. The provision of the thirty years' truce might seem indeed to allow Athens to receive them as allies: but that provision was not intended to permit the reception of cities already under the tie of colonial allegiance elsewhere,—still less the reception of cities engaged in an active and pending quarrel, where any countenance to one party in the quarrel was necessarily a declaration of war against the opposite. If either party had a right to invoke the aid of Athens on this occasion, Corinth had a better right than Korkyra: for the latter had never had any transactions with the Athenians, while Corinth was not only still under

covenant of amity with them, through the thirty years' truce,—but had also rendered material service to them by dissuading the Peloponnesian allies from assisting the revolted Samos. By such dissuasion, the Corinthians had upheld the principle of Grecian international law, that each alliance was entitled to punish its own refractory members: they now called upon Athens to respect this principle, by not interfering between Corinth and her colonial allies,[107] especially as the violation of it would recoil inconveniently upon Athens herself, with her numerous dependencies. As for the fear of an impending war between the Peloponnesian alliance and Athens, such a contingency was as yet uncertain,—and might possibly never occur at all, if Athens dealt justly, and consented to conciliate Corinth on this critical occasion: but it would assuredly occur if she refused such conciliation, and the dangers thus entailed upon Athens would be far greater than the promised naval coöperation of Korkyra would compensate.[108]

Such was the substance of the arguments urged by the contending envoys before the Athenian public assembly, in this momentous debate. For two days did the debate continue, the assembly being adjourned over to the morrow: so considerable was the number of speakers, and probably also the divergence of their views. Unluckily, Thucydidês does not give us any of these Athenian discourses,—not even that of Periklês, who determined the ultimate result. Epidamnus, with its disputed question of metropolitan right, occupied little of the attention of the Athenian assembly: but the Korkyræan naval force was indeed an immense item, since the question was, whether it should stand on their side or against them,—an item which nothing could counterbalance except the dangers of a Peloponnesian war. "Let us avoid this last calamity (was the opinion of many) even at the sacrifice of seeing Korkyra conquered, and all her ships and seamen in the service of the Peloponnesian league." "You will not really avoid it, even by that great sacrifice (was the reply of others): the generating causes of war are at work,—and it will infallibly come, whatever you may determine respecting Korkyra: avail yourselves of the present opening, instead of being driven ultimately to undertake the war at great comparative disadvantage." Of these two views, the former was at first decidedly preponderant in the assembly;[109] but they gradually came round to the latter, which was conformable to the steady conviction of Periklês. It was, however, resolved to take a sort of middle course, so as to save Korkyra, and yet, if possible, to escape violation of the existing truce and the consequent Peloponnesian war. To comply with the request of the Korkyræans, by adopting them unreservedly as allies, would have laid the Athenians under the necessity of accompanying them in an attack of Corinth, if required,—which would have been a manifest infringement of the truce. Accordingly, nothing more was concluded than an alliance for purposes strictly defensive, to preserve Korkyra and her possessions in case they were attacked: nor was any greater force equipped to back this resolve than a squadron of ten triremes, under Lacedæmonius, son of Kimon. The smallness of this force would satisfy the Corinthians that no aggression was contemplated against their city, while it would save Korkyra from ruin, and would in fact feed

the war so as to weaken and cripple the naval force of both parties,[110]—which was the best result that Athens could hope for. The instructions to Lacedæmonius and his two colleagues were express; not to engage in fight with the Corinthians unless they were actually approaching Korkyra, or some Korkyræan possession, with a view to attack: but in that case to do his best on the defensive.

The great Corinthian armament of one hundred and fifty sail soon took its departure from the gulf, and reached a harbor on the coast of Epirus, at the cape called Cheimerium, nearly opposite to the southern extremity of Korkyra: they there established a naval station and camp, summoning to their aid a considerable force from the friendly Epirotic tribes in the neighborhood. The Korkyræan fleet of one hundred and ten sail, under Meikiadês and two others, together with the ten Athenian ships, took station at one of the adjoining islands called Sybota, while the land force and one thousand Zakynthian hoplites were posted on the Korkyræan Cape Leukimmê. Both sides prepared for battle: the Corinthians, taking on board three days' provisions, sailed by night from Cheimerium, and encountered in the morning the Korkyræan fleet advancing towards them, distributed into three squadrons, one under each of the three generals, and having the ten Athenian ships at the extreme right. Opposed to them were ranged the choice vessels of the Corinthians, occupying the left of their aggregate fleet: next came the various allies, with Megarians and Ambrakiots on the extreme right. Never before had two such numerous fleets, both Grecian, engaged in battle; but the tactics and manœuvring were not commensurate to the numbers. The decks were crowded with hoplites and bowmen, while the rowers below, on the Korkyræan side at least, were in great part slaves: the ships, on both sides, being rowed forward so as to drive in direct impact, prow against prow, were grappled together, and a fierce hand-combat was then commenced between the troops on board of each, as if they were on land,—or rather, like boarding-parties: all upon the old-fashioned system of Grecian sea-fight, without any of those improvements which had been introduced into the Athenian navy during the last generation. In Athenian naval attack, the ship, the rowers, and the steersman, were of much greater importance than the armed troops on deck: by strength and exactness of rowing, by rapid and sudden change of direction, by feints calculated to deceive, the Athenian captain sought to drive the sharp beak of his vessel, not against the prow, but against the weaker and more vulnerable parts of his enemy,—side, oars, or stern. The ship thus became in the hands of her crew the real weapon of attack, which was first to disable the enemy and leave him unmanageable on the water; and not until this was done did the armed troops on deck begin their operations.[111] Lacedæmonius, with his ten armed ships, though forbidden by his instructions to share in the battle, lent as much aid as he could by taking station at the extremity of the line, and by making motions as if about to attack; while his seamen had full leisure to contemplate what they would despise as the lubberly handling of the ships on both sides. All was confusion after the battle had been joined; the ships on both sides became entangled, the oars broken and unmanageable, orders could neither

be heard nor obeyed, and the individual valor of the hoplites and bowmen on deck was the decisive point on which victory turned.

On the right wing of the Corinthians, the left of the Korkyræans was victorious; their twenty ships drove back the Ambrakiot allies of Corinth, and not only pursued them to the shore, but also landed and plundered the tents. Their rashness in thus keeping so long out of the battle proved incalculably mischievous, the rather as their total number was inferior: for their right wing, opposed to the best ships of Corinth, was after a hard struggle thoroughly beaten. Many of the ships were disabled, and the rest obliged to retreat as they could,—a retreat which the victorious ships on the other wing might have protected, had there been any effective discipline in the fleet, but which now was only imperfectly aided by the ten Athenian ships under Lacedæmonius. These Athenians, though at first they obeyed the instructions from home, in abstaining from actual blows, yet,—when the battle became doubtful, and still more, when the Corinthians were pressing their victory,—could no longer keep aloof, but attacked the pursuers in good earnest, and did much to save the defeated Korkyræans. As soon as the latter had been pursued as far as their own island, the victorious Corinthians returned to the scene of action, which was covered with disabled and water-logged ships, their own and their enemies, as well as with seamen, soldiers, and wounded men, either helpless aboard the wrecks, or keeping above water as well as they could,—among them many of their own citizens and allies, especially on their defeated right wing. Through these disabled vessels they sailed, not attempting to tow them off, but looking only to the crews aboard, and making some of them prisoners, but putting the greater number to death: some even of their own allies were thus slain, not being easily distinguishable. They then picked up their own dead bodies as well as they could, and transported them to Sybota, the nearest point of the coast of Epirus; after which they again mustered their fleet, and returned to resume the attack against the Korkyræans on their own coast. The latter got together as many of their ships as were seaworthy, together with the small reserve which had remained in harbor, in order to prevent at any rate a landing on the coast: and the Athenian ships, now within the strict letter of their instructions, prepared to coöperate with full energy in the defence. It was already late in the afternoon: but the Corinthian fleet, though their pæan had already been shouted for attack, were suddenly seen to back water instead of advancing; presently they headed round, and sailed directly away to the Epirotic coast. Nor did the Korkyræans comprehend the cause of this sudden retreat, until at length it was proclaimed that an unexpected relief of twenty fresh Athenian ships was approaching, under Glaukon and Andokidês, which the Corinthians had been the first to descry, and had even believed to be the forerunners of a larger fleet. It was already dark when these fresh ships reached Cape Leukimmê, having traversed the waters covered with wrecks and dead bodies; [112] and at first the Korkyræans even mistook them for enemies. The reinforcement had been sent from Athens, probably after more accurate information of the comparative force of Corinth and Korkyra, under the impression that the original ten ships

would prove inadequate for the purpose of defence,—an impression more than verified by the reality.

Though the twenty Athenian ships were not, as the Corinthians had imagined, the precursors of a larger fleet, they were found sufficient to change completely the face of affairs. In the preceding action, the Korkyræans had had seventy ships sunk or disabled,—the Corinthians only thirty,—so that the superiority of numbers was still on the side of the latter, who were, however, encumbered with the care of one thousand prisoners, eight hundred of them slaves, captured, not easy either to lodge or to guard in the narrow accommodations of an ancient trireme. Even apart from this embarrassment, the Corinthians were in no temper to hazard a second battle against thirty Athenian ships, in addition to the remaining Korkyræan: and when their enemies sailed across to offer them battle on the Epirotic coast, they not only refused it, but thought of nothing but immediate retreat,—with serious alarm lest the Athenians should now act aggressively, treating all amicable relations between Athens and Corinth as practically extinguished by the events of the day before. Having ranged their fleet in line, not far from shore, they tested the dispositions of the Athenian commanders by sending forward a little boat with a few men to address to them the following remonstrance,—the men carried no herald's staff (*we* should say, no flag of truce), and were therefore completely without protection against an enemy. "Ye act wrongfully, Athenians (they exclaimed), in beginning the war and violating the truce; for ye are using arms to oppose us in punishing our enemies. If it be really your intention to hinder us from sailing against Korkyra, or anywhere else that we choose, in breach of the truce, take first of all us who now address you, and deal with us as enemies." It was not the fault of the Korkyræans that this last idea was not instantly realized: for such of them as were near enough to hear, instigated the Athenians by violent shouts to kill the men in the boat. But the latter, far from listening to such an appeal, dismissed them with the answer: "We neither begin the war nor break the truce, Peloponnesians; we have come simply to aid these Korkyræans, our allies. If ye wish to sail anywhere else, we make no opposition: but if ye are about to sail against Korkyra, or any of her possessions, we shall use our best means to prevent you." Both the answer, and the treatment of the men in the boat, satisfied the Corinthians that their retreat would be unopposed, and they accordingly commenced it as soon as they could get ready, staying, however, to erect a trophy at Sybota, on the Epirotic coast, in commemoration of their advantage on the preceding day. In their voyage homeward, they surprised Anaktorium, at the mouth of the Ambrakiôtic gulf, which they had hitherto possessed jointly with the Korkyræans; planting in it a reinforcement of Corinthian settlers as guarantee for future fidelity. On reaching Corinth, the armament was disbanded, and the great majority of the prisoners taken —eight hundred slaves—were sold; but the remainder, two hundred and fifty in number, were detained and treated with peculiar kindness. Many of them were of the first and richest families of the island, and the Corinthians designed to gain them over, so

as to make them instruments for effecting a revolution in the island. The calamitous incidents arising from their return will appear in a future chapter.

Thus relieved from all danger, the Korkyræans picked up the dead bodies and the wrecks which had floated during the night on to their island, and even found sufficient pretence to erect a trophy, chiefly in consequence of their partial success on the left wing. In truth, they had been only rescued from ruin by the unexpected coming of the last Athenian ships: but the last result was as triumphant to them as it was disastrous and humiliating to the Corinthians, who had incurred an immense cost, and taxed all their willing allies, only to leave their enemy stronger than she was before. From this time forward they considered the thirty years' truce as broken, and conceived a hatred, alike deadly and undisguised, against Athens; so that the latter gained nothing by the moderation of her admirals in sparing the Corinthian fleet off the coast of Epirus. An opportunity was not long wanting for the Corinthians to strike a blow at their enemy, through one of her wide-spread dependencies.

On the isthmus of that lesser peninsula called Pellênê, which forms the westernmost of the three prongs of the greater peninsula called Chalkidikê, between the Thermaic and the Strymonic gulfs, was situated the Dorian town of Potidæa, one of the tributary allies of Athens, but originally colonized from Corinth, and still maintaining a certain metropolitan allegiance towards the latter: insomuch that every year certain Corinthians were sent thither as magistrates, under the title of Epidemiurgi. On various points of the neighboring coast, also, there were several small towns belonging to the Chalkidians and Bottiæans, enrolled in like manner in the list of Athenian tributaries. The neighboring inland territory, Mygdonia and Chalkidikê,[113] was held by the Macedonian king Perdikkas, son of that Alexander who had taken part, fifty years before, in the expedition of Xerxes. These two princes appear gradually to have extended their dominions, after the ruin of Persian power in Thrace by the exertions of Athens, until at length they acquired all the territory between the rivers Axius and Strymon. Now Perdikkas had been for some time the friend and ally of Athens; but there were other Macedonian princes, his brother Philip and Derdas, holding independent principalities in the upper country,[114] apparently on the higher course of the Axius near the Pæonian tribes, with whom he was in a state of dispute. These princes having been accepted as the allies of Athens, Perdikkas from that time became her active enemy, and it was from his intrigues that all the difficulties of Athens on that coast took their first origin. The Athenian empire was much less complete and secure over the seaports on the mainland than over the islands:[115] for the former were always more or less dependent on any powerful land-neighbor, sometimes more dependent on him than upon the mistress of the sea; and we shall find Athens herself cultivating assiduously the favor of Sitalkês and other strong Thracian potentates, as an aid to her dominion over the seaports.[116] Perdikkas immediately began to incite and aid the Chalkidians and Bottiæans to revolt from Athens, and the violent enmity against the latter, kindled in the bosoms of the Corinthians by the re-

cent events at Korkyra, enabled him to extend the same projects to Potidæa. Not only did he send envoys to Corinth in order to concert measures for provoking the revolt of Potidæa, but also to Sparta, instigating the Peloponnesian league to a general declaration of war against Athens.[117] And he farther prevailed on many of the Chalkidian inhabitants to abandon their separate small towns on the sea-coast, for the purpose of joint residence at Olynthus, which was several stadia from the sea. Thus that town, as well as the Chalkidian interest, became much strengthened, while Perdikkas farther assigned some territory near Lake Bolbê to contribute to the temporary maintenance of the concentrated population.

The Athenians were not ignorant both of his hostile preparations and of the dangers which awaited them from Corinth after the Korkyræan sea-fight; immediately after which they sent to take precautions against the revolt of Potidæa; requiring the inhabitants to take down their wall on the side of Pellênê, so as to leave the town open on the side of the peninsula, or on what may be called the sea-side, and fortified only towards the mainland,—requiring them farther both to deliver hostages and to dismiss the annual magistrates who came to them from Corinth. An Athenian armament of thirty triremes and one thousand hoplites, under Archestratus and ten others, despatched to act against Perdikkas in the Thermaic gulf, was directed at the same time to enforce these requisitions against Potidæa, and to repress any dispositions to revolt among the neighboring Chalkidians. Immediately on receiving these requisitions, the Potidæans sent envoys both to Athens, for the purpose of evading and gaining time,—and to Sparta, in conjunction with Corinth, in order to determine a Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica, in the event of Potidæa being attacked by Athens. From the Spartan authorities they obtained a distinct affirmative promise, in spite of the thirty years' truce still subsisting: at Athens they had no success, and they accordingly openly revolted (seemingly about midsummer, 432 B.C.), at the same time that the armament under Archestratus sailed. The Chalkidians and Bottiæans revolted at the same time, at the express instigation of Corinth, accompanied by solemn oaths and promises of assistance.[118] Archestratus with his fleet, on reaching the Thermaic gulf, found them all in proclaimed enmity, but was obliged to confine himself to the attack of Perdikkas in Macedonia, not having numbers enough to admit of a division of his force. He accordingly laid siege to Therma, in coöperation with the Macedonian troops from the upper country, under Philip and the brothers of Derdas; after taking that place, he next proceeded to besiege Pydna. But it would probably have been wiser had he turned his whole force instantly to the blockade of Potidæa; for during the period of more than six weeks that he spent in the operations against Therma, the Corinthians conveyed to Potidæa a reinforcement of sixteen hundred hoplites and four hundred light-armed, partly their own citizens, partly Peloponnesians, hired for the occasion,—under Aristeus, son of Adeimantus, a man of such eminent popularity, both at Corinth and at Potidæa, that most of the soldiers volunteered on his personal account. Potidæa was thus put into a state of complete defence shortly after the news of its revolt reached Athens, and long before any sec-

ond armament could be sent to attack it. A second armament, however, was speedily sent forth.—forty triremes and two thousand Athenian hoplites, under Kallias, son of Kalliades,[119] with four other commanders,—who, on reaching the Thermaic gulf, joined the former body at the siege of Pydna. After prosecuting the siege in vain for a short time, they found themselves obliged to patch up an accommodation on the best terms they could with Perdikkas, from the necessity of commencing immediate operations against Aristeus and Potidæa. They then quitted Macedonia, first crossing by sea from Pydna to the eastern coast of the Thermaic gulf,—next attacking, though without effect, the town of Berœa,—and then marching by land along the eastern coast of the gulf, in the direction of Potidæa. On the third day of easy march, they reached the seaport called Gigônus, near which they encamped.[120]

In spite of the convention concluded at Pydna, Perdikkas, whose character for faithlessness we shall have more than one occasion to notice, was now again on the side of the Chalkidians, and sent two hundred horse to join them, under the command of Iolaus. Aristeus posted his Corinthians and Potidæans on the isthmus near Potidæa, providing a market without the walls, in order that they might not stray in quest of provisions: his position was on the side towards Olynthus,—which was about seven miles off, but within sight, and in a lofty and conspicuous situation. He here awaited the approach of the Athenians, calculating that the Chalkidians from Olynthus would, upon the hoisting of a given signal, assail them in the rear when they attacked him. But Kallias was strong enough to place in reserve his Macedonian cavalry and other allies as a check against Olynthus; while with his Athenians and the main force he marched to the isthmus and took position in front of Aristeus. In the battle which ensued, Aristeus and the chosen band of Corinthians immediately about him were completely successful, breaking the troops opposed to them, and pursuing for a considerable distance: but the remaining Potidæans and Peloponnesians were routed by the Athenians and driven within the walls. On returning from pursuit, Aristeus found the victorious Athenians between him and Potidæa, and was reduced to the alternative either of cutting his way through them into the latter town, or of making a retreating march to Olynthus. He chose the former as the least of two hazards, and forced his way through the flank of the Athenians, wading into the sea in order to turn the extremity of the Potidæan wall, which reached entirely across the isthmus, with a mole running out at each end into the water: he effected this daring enterprise and saved his detachment, though not without considerable difficulty and some loss. Meanwhile, the auxiliaries from Olynthus, though they had begun their march on seeing the concerted signal, had been kept in check by the Macedonian horse, so that the Potidæans had been beaten and the signal again withdrawn, before they could make any effective diversion: nor did the cavalry on either side come into action. The defeated Potidæans and Corinthians, having the town immediately in their rear, lost only three hundred men, while the Athenians lost one hundred and fifty, together with the general Kallias.[121]

The victory was, however, quite complete, and the Athenians, after having erected their trophy, and given up the enemy's dead for burial, immediately built their blockading wall across the isthmus, on the side of the mainland, so as to cut off Potidæa from all communication with Olynthus and the Chalkidians. To make the blockade complete, a second wall across the isthmus was necessary, on the other side towards Pallênê: but they had not force enough to detach a completely separate body for this purpose, until after some time they were joined by Phormio with sixteen hundred fresh hoplites from Athens. That general, landing at Aphytis, in the peninsula of Pallênê, marched slowly up to Potidæa, ravaging the territory in order to draw out the citizens to battle: but the challenge not being accepted, he undertook, and finished without obstruction, the blockading wall on the side of Pallênê, so that the town was now completely inclosed, and the harbor watched by the Athenian fleet. The wall once finished, a portion of the force sufficed to guard it, leaving Phormio at liberty to undertake aggressive operations against the Chalkidic and Bottiæan townships. The capture of Potidæa was now only a question of more or less time, and Aristeus, in order that the provisions might last longer, proposed to the citizens to choose a favorable wind, get on shipboard, and break out suddenly from the harbor, taking their chance of eluding the Athenian fleet, and leaving only five hundred defenders behind: though he offered himself to be among those left behind, he could not determine the citizens to so bold an enterprise, and he therefore sallied forth in the way proposed with a small detachment, in order to try and procure relief from without,—especially some aid or diversion from Peloponnesus. But he was able to accomplish nothing beyond some partial warlike operations among the Chalkidians,[122] and a successful ambuscade against the citizens of Sermylus, which did nothing for the relief of the blockaded town: it had, however, been so well-provisioned that it held out for two whole years,—a period full of important events elsewhere.

From these two contests between Athens and Corinth, first indirectly at Korkyra, next distinctly and avowedly at Potidæa, sprung those important movements in the Lacedæmonian alliance which will be recounted in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

FROM THE BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA DOWN TO THE END OF THE FIRST YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

Even before the recent hostilities at Korkyra and Potidæa, it had been evident to reflecting Greeks that the continued observance of the thirty years' truce was very uncertain, and that the mingled hatred, fear, and admiration, which Athens inspired throughout Greece, would prompt Sparta and the Spartan confederacy to seize the first favorable opening for breaking down the Athenian power. That such was the disposition of Sparta, was well understood among the Athenian allies, however considerations of prudence and general slowness in resolving might postpone the moment of carrying it into effect. Accordingly, not only the Samians when they revolted had applied to the Spartan confederacy for aid, which they appear to have been prevented from obtaining chiefly by the pacific interests then animating the Corinthians,—but also the Lesbians had endeavored to open negotiations with Sparta for a similar purpose, though the authorities—to whom alone the proposition could have been communicated, since it remained secret and was never executed—had given them no encouragement.[123] The affairs of Athens had been administered under the ascendency of Periklês, without any view to extension of empire or encroachment upon others, though with constant view to the probabilities of war, and with anxiety to keep the city in a condition to meet it: but even the splendid internal ornaments, which Athens at that time acquired, were probably not without their effect in provoking jealousy on the part of other Greeks as to her ultimate views. The only known incident, wherein Athens had been brought into collision with a member of the Spartan confederacy prior to the Korkyræan dispute, was the decree passed in regard to Megara,—prohibiting the Megarians, on pain of death, from all trade or intercourse as well with Athens as with all ports within the Athenian empire. This prohibition was grounded on the alleged fact, that the Megarians had harbored runaway slaves from Athens, and had appropriated and cultivated portions of land upon the border; partly land, the property of the goddesses of Eleusis,—partly a strip of territory disputed between the two states, and therefore left by mutual understanding in common pasture without any permanent inclosure.[124] In reference to this latter point, the Athenian herald, Anthemokritus had been sent to Megara to remonstrate, but had been so rudely dealt with, that his death shortly afterwards was imputed as a crime to the Megarians.[125] We may well suppose that ever since the revolt of Megara, fourteen years before, which caused to Athens an irreparable mischief, the feeling prevalent between the two towns had been one of bitter enmity, manifesting itself in many ways, but so much exasperated by recent events as to provoke Athens to a signal revenge.[126] Exclusion from Athens and all the ports in her empire, comprising nearly every island and seaport in the Ægean, was so ruinous to the Megarians, that they

loudly complained of it at Sparta, representing it as an infraction of the thirty years' truce; though it was undoubtedly within the legitimate right of Athens to enforce,—and was even less harsh than the systematic expulsion of foreigners by Sparta, with which Periklês compared it.

These complaints found increased attention after the war of Korkyra and the blockade of Potidæa by the Athenians. The sentiments of the Corinthians towards Athens had now become angry and warlike in the highest degree: nor was it simply resentment for the past which animated them, but also the anxiety farther to bring upon Athens so strong a hostile pressure as should preserve Potidæa and its garrison from capture. Accordingly, they lost no time in endeavoring to rouse the feelings of the Spartans against Athens, and in inducing them to invite to Sparta all such of the confederates as had any grievances against that city. Not merely the Megarians but several other confederates, appeared there as accusers; while the Æginetans, though their insular position made it perilous for them to appear, made themselves vehemently heard through the mouths of others, complaining that Athens withheld from them that autonomy to which they were entitled under the truce.[127]

According to the Lacedæmonian practice, it was necessary first that the Spartans themselves, apart from their allies, should decide whether there existed a sufficient case of wrong done by Athens against themselves or against Peloponnesus,—either in violation of the thirty years' truce, or in any other way. If the determination of Sparta herself were in the negative, the case would never even be submitted to the vote of the allies; but if it were in the affirmative, then the latter would be convoked to deliver their opinion also: and assuming that the majority of votes coincided with the previous decision of Sparta, the entire confederacy stood then pledged to the given line of policy,—if the majority was contrary, the Spartans would stand alone, or with such only of the confederates as concurred. Each allied city, great or small, had an equal right of suffrage. It thus appears that Sparta herself did not vote as a member of the confederacy, but separately and individually as leader,—and that the only question ever submitted to the allies was, whether they would or would not go along with her previous decision. Such was the course of proceeding now followed: the Corinthians, together with such other of the confederates as felt either aggrieved or alarmed by Athens, presented themselves before the public assembly of Spartan citizens, prepared to prove that the Athenians had broken the truce, and were going on in a course of wrong towards Peloponnesus.[128] Even in the oligarchy of Sparta, such a question as this could only be decided by a general assembly of Spartan citizens, qualified both by age, by regular contribution to the public mess, and by obedience to Spartan discipline. To the assembly so constituted the deputies of the various allied cities addressed themselves, each setting forth his case against Athens. The Corinthians chose to reserve themselves to the last, after the assembly had been previously inflamed by the previous speakers.

Of this important assembly, on which so much of the future fate of Greece turned, Thucydidês has preserved an account unusually copious. First, the speech delivered by the Corinthian envoys. Next, that of some Athenian envoys, who happening to be at the same time in Sparta on some other matters, and being present in the assembly so as to have heard the speeches both of the Corinthians and of the other complainants, obtained permission from the magistrates to address the assembly in their turn. Thirdly, the address of the Spartan king Archidamus, on the course of policy proper to be adopted by Sparta. Lastly, the brief, but eminently characteristic, address of the ephor Stheneläidas, on putting the question for decision. These speeches, the composition of Thucydidês himself, contain substantially the sentiments of the parties to whom they are ascribed: neither of them is distinctly a reply to that which has preceded, but each presents the situation of affairs from a different point of view.

The Corinthians knew well that the audience whom they were about to address had been favorably prepared for them,—for the Lacedæmonian authorities had already given an actual promise to them and to the Potidæans at the moment before Potidæa revolted, that they would invade Attica. So great was the revolution in sentiment of the Spartans, since they had declined lending aid to the much more powerful island of Lesbos, when it proposed to revolt,—a revolution occasioned by the altered interests and sentiments of Corinth. Nor were the Corinthians ignorant that their positive grounds of complaint against Athens, in respect of wrong or violation of the existing truce, were both few and feeble. Neither in the dispute about Potidæa nor about Korkyra, had Athens infringed the truce or wronged the Peloponnesian alliance. In both, she had come into collision with Corinth, singly and apart from the confederacy: she had a right, both according to the truce and according to the received maxims of international law, to lend defensive aid to the Korkyræans at their own request,—she had a right also, according to the principles laid down by the Corinthians themselves on occasion of the revolt of Samos, to restrain the Potidæans from revolting. She had committed nothing which could fairly be called an aggression: indeed the aggression, both in the case of Potidæa and in that of Korkyra, was decidedly on the side of the Corinthians: and the Peloponnesian confederacy could only be so far implicated as it was understood to be bound to espouse the separate quarrels, right or wrong, of Corinth. All this was well known to the Corinthian envoys; and accordingly we find that, in their speech at Sparta, they touch but lightly, and in vague terms, on positive or recent wrongs. Even that which they do say completely justifies the proceedings of Athens about the affair of Korkyra, since they confess without hesitation the design of seizing the large Korkyræan navy for the use of the Peloponnesian alliance: while in respect of Potidæa, if we had only the speech of the Corinthian envoy before us without any other knowledge, we should have supposed it to be an independent state, not connected by any permanent bonds with Athens,—we should have supposed that the siege of Potidæa by Athens was an unprovoked aggression upon an autonomous ally of Corinth,[129]—we should never have imag-

ined that Corinth had deliberately instigated and aided the revolt of the Chalkidians as well as of the Potidæans against Athens. It might be pretended that she had a right to do this, by virtue of her undefined metropolitan relations with Potidæa: but at any rate, the incident was not such as to afford any decent pretext for charge against the Athenians, either of outrage towards Corinth,[130] or of wrongful aggression against the Peloponnesian confederacy.

To dwell much upon specific allegations of wrong, would not have suited the purpose of the Corinthian envoy; for against such, the thirty years' truce expressly provided that recourse should be had to amicable arbitration,—to which recourse he never once alludes. He knew that, as between Corinth and Athens, war had already begun at Potidæa; and his business, throughout nearly all of a very emphatic speech is, to show that the Peloponnesian confederacy, and especially Sparta, is bound to take instant part in it, not less by prudence than by duty. He employs the most animated language to depict the ambition, the unwearied activity, the personal effort abroad as well as at home, the quick resolves, the sanguine hopes never dashed by failure,—of Athens; as contrasted with the cautious, home-keeping, indolent, scrupulous routine of Sparta. He reproaches the Spartans with their backwardness and timidity, in not having repressed the growth of Athens before she reached this formidable height,—especially in having allowed her to fortify her city after the retreat of Xerxes, and afterwards to build the long walls from the city to the sea.[131] The Spartans, he observes, stood alone among all Greeks, in the notable system of keeping down an enemy not by acting, but delaying to act,—not arresting his growth, but putting him down when his force was doubled. Falsely, indeed, had they acquired the reputation of being sure, when they were in reality merely slow:[132] in resisting Xerxes, as in resisting Athens, they had always been behindhand, disappointing and leaving their friends to ruin,—while both these enemies had only failed of complete success through their own mistakes.

After half apologizing for the tartness of these reproofs,—which, however, as the Spartans were now well-disposed to go to war forthwith, would be well-timed and even agreeable,—the Corinthian orator vindicates the necessity of plain-speaking by the urgent peril of the emergency, and the formidable character of the enemy who threatened them. "You do not reflect (he says) how thoroughly different the Athenians are from yourselves. *They* are innovators by nature; sharp both in devising, and in executing what they have determined: *you* are sharp only in keeping what you have got, in determining on nothing beyond, and in doing even less than absolute necessity requires.[133] *They* again dare beyond their means, run risks beyond their own judgment, and keep alive their hopes even in desperate circumstances: *your* peculiarity is, that your performance comes short of your power,—you have no faith even in what your judgment guarantees,—when in difficulties, you despair of all escape. *They* never hang back,—*you* are habitual laggards: they love foreign service,—you cannot stir from home: for they are always under the belief that their move-

ments will lead to some farther gain, while you fancy that new projects will endanger what you have already. When successful, they make the greatest forward march; when defeated, they fall back the least. Moreover, they task their bodies on behalf of their city as if they were the bodies of others,—while their minds are most of all their own, for exertion in her service.[134] When their plans for acquisition do not come successfully out, they feel like men robbed of what belongs to them: yet the acquisitions when realized appear like trifles compared with what remains to be acquired. If they sometimes fail in an attempt, new hopes arise in some other direction to supply the want: for with them alone the possession and the hope of what they aim at is almost simultaneous, from their habit of quickly executing all that they have once resolved. And in this manner do they toil throughout all their lives amidst hardship and peril, disregarding present enjoyment in the continual thirst for increase,—knowing no other festival recreation except the performance of active duty,—and deeming inactive repose a worse condition than fatiguing occupation. To speak the truth in two words: such is their inborn temper, that they will neither remain at rest themselves, nor allow rest to others.[135]

"Such is the city which stands opposed to you, Lacedæmonians,—yet ye still hang back from action…. Your continual scruples and apathy would hardly be safe, even if ye had neighbors like yourselves in character: but as to dealings with Athens, your system is antiquated and out of date. In politics as in art, it is the modern improvements which are sure to come out victorious: and though unchanged institutions are best, if a city be not called upon to act,—yet multiplicity of active obligations requires multiplicity and novelty of contrivance.[136] It is through these numerous trials that the means of Athens have acquired so much more new development than yours."

The Corinthians concluded by saying, that if, after so many previous warnings, now repeated for the last time, Sparta still refused to protect her allies against Athens,—if she delayed to perform her promise made to the Potidæans, of immediately invading Attica,—they, the Corinthians, would forthwith look for safety in some new alliance, and they felt themselves fully justified in doing so. They admonished her to look well to the case, and to carry forward Peloponnesus with undiminished dignity as it had been transmitted to her from her predecessors.[137]

Such was the memorable picture of Athens and her citizens, as exhibited by her fiercest enemy, before the public assembly at Sparta. It was calculated to impress the assembly, not by appeal to recent or particular misdeeds, but by the general system of unprincipled and endless aggression which was imputed to Athens during the past,—and by the certainty held out that the same system, unless put down by measures of decisive hostility, would be pushed still farther in future to the utter ruin of Peloponnesus. And to this point did the Athenian envoy—staying in Sparta about some other negotiation, and now present in the assembly—address himself in reply, after having asked and obtained permission from the magistrates. The empire of Athens was now of such standing that the younger men present had no personal

knowledge of the circumstances under which it had grown up: and what was needed as information for them would be impressive as a reminder even to their seniors.[138]

He began by disclaiming all intention of defending his native city against the charges of specific wrong or alleged infractions of the existing truce: this was no part of his mission, nor did he recognize Sparta as a competent judge in disputes between Athens and Corinth. But he nevertheless thought it his duty to vindicate Athens against the general character of injustice and aggression imputed to her, as well as to offer a solemn warning to the Spartans against the policy towards which they were obviously tending. He then proceeded to show that the empire of Athens had been honorably earned and amply deserved,—that it had been voluntarily ceded, and even pressed upon her,—and that she could not abdicate it without emperiling her own separate existence and security. Far from thinking that the circumstances under which it was acquired needed apology, he appealed to them with pride as a testimony of the genuine Hellenic patriotism of that city which the Spartan congress now seemed disposed to run down as an enemy.[139] He then dwelt upon the circumstances attending the Persian invasion, setting forth the superior forwardness and the unflinching endurance of Athens, in spite of ungenerous neglect from Sparta and the other Greeks,—the preponderance of her naval force in the entire armament,—the directing genius of her general Themistoklês, complimented even by Sparta herself,—and the title of Athens to rank on that memorable occasion as the principal saviour of Greece. This alone ought to save her empire from reproach: but this was not all,—for that empire had been tendered to her by the pressing instance of the allies, at a time when Sparta had proved herself both incompetent and unwilling to prosecute the war against Persia.[140] By simple exercise of the constraining force inseparable from her presidential obligations, and by the reduction of various allies who revolted, Athens had gradually become unpopular, while Sparta too had become her enemy instead of her friend. To relax her hold upon her allies would have been to make them the allies of Sparta against her; and thus the motive of fear was added to those of ambition and revenue, in inducing Athens to maintain her imperial dominion by force. In her position, no Grecian power either would or could have acted otherwise: no Grecian power, certainly not Sparta, would have acted with so much equity and moderation, or given so little ground of complaint to her subjects. Worse they *had* suffered, while under Persia; worse they *would* suffer, if they came under Sparta, who held her own allies under the thraldom of an oligarchical party in each city; and if they hated Athens, this was only because subjects always hated the *present* dominion, whatever that might be.[141]

Having justified both the origin and the working of the Athenian empire, the envoy concluded by warning Sparta to consider calmly, without being hurried away by the passions and invectives of others, before she took a step from which there was no retreat, and which exposed the future to chances such as no man on either side could foresee. He called on her not to break the truce mutually sworn to, but to ad-

just all differences, as Athens was prepared to do, by the amicable arbitration which that truce provided. Should she begin war, the Athenians would follow her lead and resist her, calling to witness those gods under whose sanction the oaths were taken. [142]

The facts recounted in the preceding chapters will have shown, that the account given by the Athenian envoy at Sparta, of the origin and character of the empire exercised by his city, though doubtless the account of a partisan, is in substance correct and equitable; the envoys of Athens had not yet learned to take the tone which they assumed in the sixteenth and seventeenth years of the coming war, at Melos and Kamarina. At any time previous to the affair of Korkyra, the topics insisted upon by the Athenian would probably have been profoundly listened to at Sparta. But now the mind of the Spartans was made up. Having cleared the assembly of all "strangers," and even all allies, they proceeded to discuss and determine the question among themselves. Most of their speakers held but one language,[143]—expatiating on the wrongs already done by Athens, and urging the necessity of instant war. There was, however, one voice, and that a commanding voice, raised against this conclusion: the ancient and respected king Archidamus opposed it.

The speech of Archidamus is that of a deliberate Spartan, who, setting aside both hatred to Athens and blind partiality to allies, looks at the question with a view to the interests and honor of Sparta only,—not, however, omitting her imperial as well as her separate character. The preceding native speakers, indignant against Athens, had probably appealed to Spartan pride, treating it as an intolerable disgrace that almost the entire land-force of Dorian Peloponnesus should be thus bullied by one single Ionic city, and should hesitate to commence a war which one invasion of Attica would probably terminate. As the Corinthians had tried to excite the Spartans by well-timed taunts and reproaches, so the subsequent speakers had aimed at the same objects by panegyric upon the well-known valor and discipline of the city. To all these arguments Archidamus set himself to reply. Invoking the experience of the elders his contemporaries around him, he impressed upon the assembly the grave responsibility, the uncertainties, difficulties, and perils, of the war into which they were hurrying without preparation.[144] He reminded them of the wealth, the population, greater than that of any other Grecian city, the naval force, the cavalry, the hoplites, the large foreign dominion of Athens,—and then asked by what means they proposed to put her down?[145] Ships, they had few; trained seamen, yet fewer; wealth, next to none. They could indeed invade and ravage Attica, by their superior numbers and land-force: but the Athenians had possessions abroad sufficient to enable them to dispense with the produce of Attica, while their great navy would retaliate the like ravages upon Peloponnesus. To suppose that one or two devastating expeditions into Attica would bring the war to an end, would be a deplorable error: such proceedings would merely enrage the Athenians, without impairing their real strength, and the war would thus be prolonged, perhaps, for a whole generation.[146] Before they de-

termined upon war, it was absolutely necessary to provide more efficient means for carrying it on; and to multiply their allies, not merely among the Greeks, but among foreigners also: while this was in process, envoys ought to be sent to Athens to remonstrate and obtain redress for the grievances of the allies. If the Athenians granted this,—which they very probably would do, when they saw the preparations going forward, and when the ruin of the highly-cultivated soil of Attica was held over them *in terrorem* without being actually consummated,—so much the better: if they refused, in the course of two or three years war might be commenced with some hopes of success. Archidamus reminded his countrymen that their allies would hold *them* responsible for the good or bad issue of what was now determined;[147] admonishing them, in the true spirit of a conservative Spartan, to cling to that cautious policy which had been ever the characteristic of the state, despising both taunts on their tardiness and panegyric on their valor. "We, Spartans, owe both our bravery and our prudence to our admirable public discipline: it makes us warlike, because the sense of shame is most closely connected with discipline, as valor is with the sense of shame: it makes us prudent, because our training keeps us too ignorant to set ourselves above our own institutions, and holds us under sharp restraint so as not to disobey them.[148] And thus, not being overwise in unprofitable accomplishments, we Spartans are not given to disparage our enemy's strength in clever speech, and then meet him with short-comings in reality: we think that the capacity of neighboring states is much on a par, and that the chances in reserve for both parties are too uncertain to be discriminated beforehand by speech. We always make real preparations against our enemies, as if they were proceeding wisely on their side: we must count upon security through our own precautions, not upon the chance of their errors. Indeed, there is no great superiority in one man as compared with another: he is the stoutest who is trained in the severest trials. Let us, for our parts, not renounce this discipline, which we have received from our fathers, and which we still continue, to our very great profit: let us not hurry on, in one short hour, a resolution upon which depend so many lives, so much property, so many cities, and our own reputation besides. Let us take time to consider, since our strength puts it fully in our power to do so. Send envoys to the Athenians on the subject of Potidæa, and of the other grievances alleged by our allies,—and that too, the rather as they are ready to give us satisfaction: against one who offers satisfaction, custom forbids you to proceed, without some previous application, as if he were a proclaimed wrong-doer. But, at the same time, make preparation for war; such will be the course of policy at once the best for your own power and the most terror-striking to your enemies."[149]

The speech of Archidamus was not only in itself full of plain reason and good sense, but delivered altogether from the point of view of a Spartan; appealing greatly to Spartan conservative feeling and even prejudice. But in spite of all this, and in spite of the personal esteem entertained for the speaker, the tide of feeling in the opposite direction was at that moment irresistible. Sthenelaïdas—one of the five ephors, to whom it fell to put the question for voting—closed the debate; and his few

words mark at once the character of the man, the temper of the assembly, and the simplicity of speech, though without the wisdom of judgment, for which Archidamus had taken credit to his countrymen.

"I don't understand (he said) these long speeches of the Athenians. They have praised themselves abundantly, but they have never rebutted what is laid to their charge,—that they are guilty of wrong against our allies and against Peloponnesus. Now, if in former days they were good men against the Persians, and are now evil-doers against us, they deserve double punishment, as having become evil-doers instead of good.[150] But *we* are the same now as we were then: we know better than to sit still while our allies are suffering wrong: we shall not adjourn our aid while they cannot adjourn their sufferings.[151] Others have in abundance wealth, ships, and horses,—but *we* have good allies, whom we are not to abandon to the mercy of the Athenians: nor are we to trust our redress to arbitration and to words, when our wrongs are not confined to words. We must help them speedily and with all our strength. Nor let any one tell us that we can with honor deliberate when we are actually suffering wrong,—it is rather for those who intend to do the wrong, to deliberate well beforehand. Resolve upon war then, Lacedæmonians, in a manner worthy of Sparta: suffer not the Athenians to become greater than they are: let us not betray our allies to ruin, but march, with the aid of the gods, against the wrong-doers."

With these few words, so well calculated to defeat the prudential admonitions of Archidamus, Stheneläidas put the question for the decision of the assembly,—which, at Sparta, was usually taken neither by show of hands nor by deposit of balls in an urn, but by cries analogous to the Aye or No of the English House of Commons,—the presiding ephor declaring which of the cries predominated. On this occasion the cry for war was manifestly the stronger:[152] yet Stheneläidas affected inability to determine which of the two cries was the louder, in order that he might have an excuse for bringing about a more impressive manifestation of sentiment and a stronger apparent majority,—since a portion of the minority would probably be afraid to show their real opinions as individuals openly. He accordingly directed a division, like the Speaker of the English House of Commons, when his decision in favor of aye or no is questioned by any member: "Such of you as think that the truce has been violated, and that the Athenians are doing us wrong, go to *that* side; such as think the contrary, to the other side." The assembly accordingly divided, and the majority was very great on the warlike side of the question.

The first step of the Lacedæmonians, after coming to this important decision was, to send to Delphi and inquire of the oracle whether it would be beneficial to them to undertake the war: the answer brought back (Thucydidês seems hardly certain that it was really given[153]) was,—that if they did their best they would be victorious, and that the god would help them, invoked or uninvoked. They at the same time convened a general congress of their allies at Sparta, for the purpose of submitting their recent resolution to the vote of all.

To the Corinthians, in their anxiety for the relief of Potidæa, the decision of this congress was not less important than that which the Spartans had just taken separately: and they sent round envoys to each of the allies, entreating them to authorize war without reserve. Through such instigations, acting upon the general impulse then prevalent, the congress came together in a temper decidedly warlike: most of the speakers were full of invective against Athens, and impatient for action, while the Corinthians, waiting as before to speak the last, wound up the discussion by a speech well calculated to insure a hearty vote. Their former speech had been directed to shame, exasperate, and alarm the Lacedæmonians: this point had now been carried, and they had to enforce, upon the allies generally, the dishonor as well as the impolicy of receding from a willing leader. The cause was one in which all were interested, the inland states not less than the maritime, for both would find themselves ultimately victims of the encroaching despot city: whatever efforts were necessary for the war, ought cheerfully to be made, since it was only through war that they could arrive at a secure and honorable peace. There were good hopes that this might soon be attained, and that the war would not last long,—so decided was the superiority of the confederacy, in numbers, in military skill, and in the equal heart and obedience of all its members.[154] The naval superiority of Athens depended chiefly upon hired seamen,—and the confederacy, by borrowing from the treasuries of Delphi and Olympia, would soon be able to overbid her, take into pay her best mariners, and equal her equipment at sea: they would excite revolt among her allies, and establish a permanent fortified post for the ruin of Attica. To make up a common fund for this purpose, was indispensably necessary; for Athens was far more than a match for each of them single-handed, and nothing less than hearty union could save them all from successive enslavement,—the very supposition of which was intolerable to Peloponnesian freemen, whose fathers had liberated Greece from the Persian. Let them not shrink from endurance and sacrifice in such a cause,—it was their hereditary pride to purchase success by laborious effort. The Delphian god had promised them his coöperation; and the whole of Greece would sympathize in the cause, either from fear of the despotism of Athens, or from hopes of profit. They would not be the first to break the truce, for the Athenians had already broken it, as the declaration of the Delphian god distinctly implied. Let them lose no time in sending aid to the Potidæans, a Dorian population now besieged by Ionians, as well as to those other Greeks whom Athens had enslaved. Every day the necessity for effort was becoming stronger, and the longer it was delayed, the more painful it would be when it came. "Be ye persuaded then, (concluded the orator), that this city, which has constituted herself despot of Greece, has her position against all of us alike, some for present rule, others for future conquest; let us assail and subdue her, that we may dwell securely ourselves hereafter, and may emancipate those Greeks who are now in slavery."[155]

If there were any speeches delivered at this congress in opposition to the war, they were not likely to be successful in a cause wherein even Archidamus had failed.

After the Corinthian had concluded, the question was put to the deputies of every city, great and small, indiscriminately and the majority decided for war.[156] This important resolution was adopted about the end of 432 B.C., or the beginning of January 431 B.C.: the previous decision of the Spartans separately may have been taken about two months earlier, in the preceding October or November 432 B.C.

Reviewing the conduct of the two great Grecian parties at this momentous juncture, with reference to existing treaties and positive grounds of complaint, it seems clear that Athens was in the right. She had done nothing which could fairly be called a violation of the thirty years' truce: and for such of her acts as were alleged to be such, she offered to submit them to that amicable arbitration which the truce itself prescribed. The Peloponnesian confederates were manifestly the aggressors in the contest; and if Sparta, usually so backward, now came forward in a spirit so decidedly opposite, we are to ascribe it partly to her standing fear and jealousy of Athens, partly to the pressure of her allies, especially of the Corinthians. Thucydidês, recognizing these two as the grand determining motives, and indicating the alleged infractions of truce as simple occasions or pretexts, seems to consider the fear and hatred of Athens as having contributed more to determine Sparta than the urgency of her allies.[157] That the extraordinary aggrandizement of Athens, during the period immediately succeeding the Persian invasion, was well calculated to excite alarm and jealousy in Peloponnesus, is indisputable: but if we take Athens as she stood in 432 B.C., it deserves notice that she had neither made, nor, so far as we know, tried to make, a single new acquisition during the whole fourteen years which had elapsed since the conclusion of the thirty years' truce;[158]— and, moreover, that that truce marked an epoch of signal humiliation and reduction of her power. The triumph which Sparta and the Peloponnesians then gained, though not sufficiently complete to remove all fear of Athens, was yet great enough to inspire them with the hope that a second combined effort would subdue her. This mixture of fear and hope was exactly the state of feeling out of which war was likely to grow,—and we see that even before the quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, sagacious Greeks everywhere anticipated war as not far distant:[159] it was near breaking out even on occasion of the revolt of Samos,[160] and peace was then preserved partly by the commercial and nautical interests of Corinth, partly by the quiescence of Athens. But the quarrel of Corinth and Korkyra, which Sparta might have appeased beforehand had she thought it her interest to do so,—and the junction of Korkyra with Athens,—exhibited the latter as again in a career of aggrandizement, and thus again brought into play the warlike feelings of Sparta; while they converted Corinth from the advocate of peace into a clamorous organ of war. The revolt of Potidæa,—fomented by Corinth, and encouraged by Sparta in the form of a positive promise to invade Attica,—was, in point of fact, the first distinct violation of the truce, and the initiatory measure of the Peloponnesian war: nor did the Spartan meeting, and the subsequent congress of allies at Sparta, serve any other purpose than to provide such formalities as were requisite to insure the concurrent and hearty action of numbers, and to clothe with imposing sanction a

state of war already existing in reality, though yet unproclaimed. The sentiment in Peloponnesus at this moment was not the fear of Athens, but the hatred of Athens,—and the confident hope of subduing her. And indeed such confidence was justified by plausible grounds: men might well think that the Athenians would never endure the entire devastation of their highly cultivated soil,—or at least that they would certainly come forth to fight for it in the field, which was all that the Peloponnesians desired. Nothing except the unparalleled ascendency and unshaken resolution of Periklês, induced the Athenians to persevere in a scheme of patient defence, and to trust to that naval superiority which the enemies of Athens, save and except the judicious Archidamus, had not yet learned fully to appreciate. Moreover, the confident hopes of the Peloponnesians were materially strengthened by the wide-spread sympathy in favor of their cause, proclaiming, as it did, the intended liberation of Greece from a despot city.[161]

To Athens, on the other hand, the coming war presented itself in a very different aspect; holding out scarcely any hope of possible gain, and the certainty of prodigious loss and privation,—even granting, that, at this heavy cost, her independence and union at home, and her empire abroad, could be upheld. By Periklês, and by the more long-sighted Athenians, the chance of unavoidable war was foreseen even before the Korkyræan dispute.[162] But Periklês was only the first citizen in a democracy, esteemed, trusted, and listened to, more than any one else by the body of the citizens, but warmly opposed in most of his measures, under the free speech and latitude of individual action which reigned at Athens,—and even bitterly hated by many active political opponents. The formal determination of the Lacedæmonians, to declare war, must of course have been made known at Athens by those Athenian envoys, who had entered an unavailing protest against it in the Spartan assembly. No steps were taken by Sparta to carry this determination into effect until after the congress of allies and their pronounced confirmatory vote. Nor did the Spartans even then send any herald, or make any formal declaration. They despatched various propositions to Athens, not at all with a view of trying to obtain satisfaction, or of providing some escape from the probability of war; but with the contrary purpose,—of multiplying demands, and enlarging the grounds of quarrel.[163] Meanwhile, the deputies retiring home from the congress to their respective cities, carried with them the general resolution for immediate warlike preparations to be made, with as little delay as possible.[164]

The first requisition addressed by the Lacedæmonians to Athens was a political manœuvre aimed at Periklês, their chief opponent in that city. His mother, Agaristê, belonged to the great family of the Alkmæônids, who were supposed to be under an inexpiable hereditary taint, in consequence of the sacrilege committed by their ancestor Megaklês, nearly two centuries before, in the slaughter of the Kylonian suppliants near the altar of the Venerable Goddesses.[165] Ancient as this transaction was, it still had sufficient hold on the mind of the Athenians to serve as the basis of a po-

litical manœuvre: about seventy-seven years before, shortly after the expulsion of Hippias from Athens, it had been so employed by the Spartan king Kleomenês, who at that time exacted from the Athenians a clearance of the ancient sacrilege, to be effected by the banishment of Kleisthenês, the founder of the democracy, and his chief partisans. This demand, addressed by Kleomenês to the Athenians, at the instance of Isagoras, the rival of Kleisthenês,[166] had been then obeyed, and had served well the purposes of those who sent it; a similar blow was now aimed by the Lacedæmonians at Periklês, the grand nephew of Kleisthenês, and doubtless at the instance of his political enemies: religion required, it was pretended, that "the abomination of the goddess should be driven out."[167] If the Athenians complied with this demand, they would deprive themselves, at this critical moment, of their ablest leader; but the Lacedæmonians, not expecting compliance, reckoned at all events upon discrediting Periklês with the people, as being partly the cause of the war through family taint of impiety,[168]—and this impression would doubtless be loudly proclaimed by his political opponents in the assembly.

The influence of Periklês with the Athenian public had become greater and greater as their political experience of him was prolonged. But the bitterness of his enemies appears to have increased along with it; and not long before this period, he had been indirectly assailed, through the medium of accusations against three different persons, all more or less intimate with him,—his mistress Aspasia, the philosopher Anaxagoras, and the sculptor Pheidias. We cannot make out either the exact date, or the exact facts, of either of these accusations. Aspasia, daughter of Axiochus, was a native of Milêtus, beautiful, well educated, and ambitious. She resided at Athens, and is affirmed, though upon very doubtful evidence, to have kept slave-girls to be let out as courtezans; whatever may be the case with this report, which is most probably one of the scandals engendered by political animosity against Periklês, [169] it is certain that so remarkable were her own fascinations, her accomplishments, and her powers, not merely of conversation, but even of oratory and criticism,—that the most distinguished Athenians of all ages and characters, Sokratês among the number, visited her, and several of them took their wives along with them to hear her also. The free citizen women of Athens lived in strict and almost oriental recluseness, as well after being married as when single: everything which concerned their lives, their happiness, or their rights, was determined or managed for them by male relatives: and they seem to have been destitute of all mental culture and accomplishments. Their society presented no charm nor interest, which men accordingly sought for in the company of the class of women called hetæræ, or courtezans, literally female companions; who lived a free life, managed their own affairs, and supported themselves by their powers of pleasing. These women were numerous, and were doubtless of every variety of personal character: but the most distinguished and superior among them, such as Aspasia and Theodotê,[170] appear to have been the only women in Greece, except the Spartan, who either inspired strong passion or exercised mental ascendency.

Periklês had been determined in his choice of a wife by those family considerations which were held almost obligatory at Athens, and had married a woman very nearly related to him, by whom he had two sons, Xanthippus and Paralus. But the marriage, having never been comfortable, was afterwards dissolved by mutual consent, according to that full liberty of divorce which the Attic law permitted; and Periklês concurred with his wife's male relations, who formed her legal guardians, in giving her a way to another husband.[171] He then took Aspasia to live with him, had a son by her, who bore his name, and continued ever afterwards on terms of the greatest intimacy and affection with her. Without adopting those exaggerations which represent Aspasia as having communicated to Periklês his distinguished eloquence, or even as having herself composed orations for public delivery, we may well believe her to have been qualified to take interest and share in that literary and philosophical society which frequented the house of Periklês, and which his unprincipled son Xanthippus,—disgusted with his father's regular expenditure, as withholding from him the means of supporting an extravagant establishment,—reported abroad with exaggerating calumnies and turned into derision. It was from that worthless young man, who died of the Athenian epidemic during the lifetime of Periklês, that his political enemies and the comic writers of the day were mainly furnished with scandalous anecdotes to assail the private habits of this distinguished man.[172] The comic writers attacked him for alleged intrigues with different women, but the name of Aspasia they treated as public property, without any mercy or reserve: she was the Omphalê, the Deianeira, or the Hêrê, to this great Hêraklês or Zeus of Athens. At length one of these comic writers, Hermippus, not contented with scenic attacks, indicted her before the dikastery for impiety, as participant in the philosophical discussions held, and the opinions professed, in the society of Periklês, by Anaxagoras and others. Against Anaxagoras himself, too, a similar indictment is said to have been preferred, either by Kleon or by Thucydidês, son of Melêsias, under a general resolution recently passed in the public assembly, at the instance of Diopeithês. And such was the sensitive antipathy of the Athenian public, shown afterwards fatally in the case of Sokratês, and embittered in this instance by all the artifices of political faction, against philosophers whose opinions conflicted with the received religious dogmas, that Periklês did not dare to place Anaxagoras on his trial: the latter retired from Athens, and the sentence of banishment was passed against him in his absence.[173] But he himself defended Aspasia before the diakastery: in fact, the indictment was as much against him as against her: one thing alleged against her, and also against Pheidias, was, the reception of free women to facilitate the intrigues of Periklês. He defended her successfully, and procured a verdict of acquittal: but we are not surprised to hear that his speech was marked by the strongest personal emotions, and even by tears.[174] The dikasts were accustomed to such appeals to their sympathies, sometimes even to extravagant excess, from ordinary accused persons: but in Periklês, so manifest an outburst of emotion stands out as something quite unparalleled: for constant self-mastery was one of the most prominent features in his character.

[175] And we shall find him near the close of his political life, when he had become for the moment unpopular with the Athenian people, distracted as they were at the moment with the terrible sufferings of the pestilence,—bearing up against their unmerited anger not merely with dignity, but with a pride of conscious innocence and desert which rises almost into defiance; insomuch that the rhetor Dionysius, who criticizes the speech of Periklês as if it were simply the composition of Thucydidês, censures that historian for having violated dramatic propriety by a display of insolence where humility would have been becoming.[176]

It appears, also, as far as we can judge amidst very imperfect data, that the trial of the great sculptor Pheidias, for alleged embezzlement in the contract for his celebrated gold and ivory statue of Athênê,[177] took place nearly at this period. That statue had been finished and dedicated in the Parthenon in 437 B.C., since which period Pheidias had been engaged at Olympia, in his last and great masterpiece, the colossal statue of the Olympian Zeus. On his return to Athens from the execution of this work, about 433 or 432 B.C., the accusation of embezzlement was instituted against him by the political enemies of Periklês.[178] A slave of Pheidias, named Menon, planted himself as a suppliant at the altar, professing to be cognizant of certain facts which proved that his master had committed peculation. Motion was made to receive his depositions, and to insure to his person the protection of the people; upon which he revealed various statements impeaching the pecuniary probity of Pheidias, and the latter was put in prison, awaiting the day for his trial before the dikastery. The gold employed and charged for in the statue, however, was all capable of being taken off and weighed, so as to verify its accuracy, which Periklês dared the accusers to do. Besides the charge of embezzlement, there were other circumstances which rendered Pheidias unpopular: it had been discovered that, in the reliefs on the friese of the Parthenon, he had introduced the portraits both of himself and of Periklês in conspicuous positions. It seems that Pheidias died in prison before the day of trial; and some even said, that he had been poisoned by the enemies of Periklês, in order that the suspicions against the latter, who was the real object of attack, might be aggravated. It is said also that Drakontidês proposed and carried a decree in the public assembly, that Periklês should be called on to give an account of the money which he had expended, and that the dikasts, before whom the account was rendered, should give their suffrage in the most solemn manner from the altar: this latter provision was modified by Agnon, who, while proposing that the dikasts should be fifteen hundred in number, retained the vote by pebbles in the urn according to ordinary custom.[179]

If Periklês was ever tried on such a charge, there can be no doubt that he was honorably acquitted: for the language of Thucydidês respecting his pecuniary probity is such as could never have been employed if a verdict of guilty on a charge of peculation had ever been publicly pronounced. But we cannot be certain that he ever was tried: indeed, another accusation urged by his enemies, and even by Aristophanês, in

the sixth year of the Peloponnesian war, implies that no trial took place: for it was alleged that Periklês, in order to escape this danger, "blew up the Peloponnesian war," and involved his country in such confusion and peril as made his own aid and guidance indispensably necessary to her: especially that he passed the decree against the Megarians by which the war was really brought on.[180] We know enough, however, to be certain that such a supposition is altogether inadmissible. The enemies of Periklês were far too eager, and too expert in Athenian political warfare, to have let him escape by such a stratagem: moreover, we learn from the assurance of Thucydidês, that the war depended upon far deeper causes,—that the Megarian decree was in no way the real cause of it,—that it was not Periklês, but the Peloponnesians, who brought it on, by the blow struck at Potidæa.

All that we can make out, amidst these uncertified allegations, is, that in the year or two immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war, Periklês was hard pressed by the accusations of political enemies,—perhaps even in his own person, but certainly in the persons of those who were most in his confidence and affection.[181] And it was in this turn of his political position that the Lacedæmonians sent to Athens the above-mentioned requisition, that the ancient Kylonian sacrilege might be at length cleared out; in other words, that Periklês and his family might be banished. Doubtless, his enemies, as well as the partisans of Lacedæmon at Athens, would strenuously support this proposition: and the party of Lacedæmon at Athens was always strong, even during the middle of the war: to act as proxenus to the Lacedæmonians was accounted an honor even by the greatest Athenian families.[182] On this occasion, however, the manœuvre did not succeed, nor did the Athenians listen to the requisition for banishing the sacrilegious Alkmæônids. On the contrary, they replied that the Spartans, too, had an account of sacrilege to clear off; for they had violated the sanctuary of Poseidon, at Cape Tænarus, in dragging from it some helot suppliants to be put to death,—and the sanctuary of Athênê Chalkiœkus at Sparta, in blocking up and starving to death the guilty regent Pausanias. To require that Laconia might be cleared of these two acts of sacrilege, was the only answer which the Athenians made to the demand sent for the banishment of Periklês.[183] Probably, the actual effect of that demand was, to strengthen him in the public esteem:[184] very different from the effect of the same manœuvre when practised before by Kleomenês against Kleisthenês.

Other Spartan envoys shortly afterwards arrived, with fresh demands. The Athenians were now required: 1. To withdraw their troops from Potidæa. 2. To replace Ægina in its autonomy. 3. To repeal the decree of exclusion against the Megarians. It was upon the latter that the greatest stress was laid; an intimation being held out that war might be avoided if such repeal were granted. We see plainly, from this proceeding, that the Lacedæmonians acted in concert with the anti-Periklêan leaders at Athens. To Sparta and her confederacy the decree against the Megarians was of less importance than the rescue of the Corinthian troops now blocked up in Potidæa: but

on the other hand, the party opposed to Periklês would have much better chance of getting a vote of the assembly against him on the subject of the Megarians: and this advantage, if gained, would serve to enfeeble his influence generally. No concession was obtained, however, on either of the three points: even in respect to Megara, the decree of exclusion was vindicated and upheld against all the force of opposition. At length the Lacedæmonians—who had already resolved upon war, and had sent these envoys in mere compliance with the exigencies of ordinary practice, not with any idea of bringing about an accommodation—sent a third batch of envoys with a proposition, which at least had the merit of disclosing their real purpose without disguise. Rhamphias and two other Spartans announced to the Athenians the simple injunction: "The Lacedæmonians wish the peace to stand; and it *may* stand, if you will leave the Greeks autonomous." Upon this demand, so very different from the preceding, the Athenians resolved to hold a fresh assembly on the subject of war or peace, to open the whole question anew for discussion, and to determine, once for all, on a peremptory answer.[185]

The last demands presented on the part of Sparta, which went to nothing less than the entire extinction of the Athenian empire,—combined with the character, alike wavering and insincere, of the demands previously made, and with the knowledge that the Spartan confederacy had pronounced peremptorily in favor of war,—seemed likely to produce unanimity at Athens, and to bring together this important assembly under the universal conviction that war was inevitable. Such, however, was not the fact. The reluctance to go to war was sincere amidst the large majority of the assembly; while among a considerable portion of them it was so preponderant, that they even now reverted to the opening which the Lacedæmonians had before held out about the anti-Megarian decree, as if that were the chief cause of war. There was much difference of opinion among the speakers, several of whom insisted upon the repeal of this decree, treating it as a matter far too insignificant to go to war about, and denouncing the obstinacy of Periklês for refusing to concede such a trifle.[186] Against this opinion Periklês entered his protest, in an harangue decisive and encouraging, which Dionysius of Halikarnassus ranks among the best speeches in Thucydidês: the latter historian may probably himself have heard the original speech.

"I continue, Athenians, to adhere to the same conviction, that we must not yield to the Peloponnesians,—though I know that men are in one mood when they sanction the resolution to go to war, and in another when actually in the contest,—their judgments then depending upon the turn of events. I have only to repeat now what I have said on former occasions,—and I adjure you who follow my views to adhere to what we jointly resolve, though the result should be partially unfavorable: or else, not to take credit for wisdom in the event of success.[187] For it is very possible that the contingencies of events may depart more from all reasonable track than the counsels of man: such are the unexpected turns which we familiarly impute to fortune. The Lacedæmonians have before now manifested their hostile aims against us,

but on this last occasion more than ever. While the truce prescribes that we are to give and receive amicable satisfaction for our differences, and each to retain what we possess,—they not only have not asked for such satisfaction, but will not receive it when tendered by us: they choose to settle complaints by war and not by discussion: they have got beyond the tone of complaint, and are here already with that of command. For they enjoin us to withdraw from Potidæa, to leave Ægina free, and to rescind the decree against the Megarians: nay, these last envoys are even come to proclaim to us, that we must leave all the Greeks free. Now let none of you believe, that we shall be going to war about a trifle, if we refuse to rescind the Megarian decree,—which they chiefly put forward, as if its repeal would avert the war,—let none of you take blame to yourselves as if we had gone to war about a small matter. For this small matter contains in itself the whole test and trial of your mettle: if ye yield it, ye will presently have some other greater exaction put upon you, like men who have already truckled on one point from fear: whereas if ye hold out stoutly, ye will make it clear to them that they must deal with you more upon a footing of equality."[188]

Periklês then examined the relative strength of parties and the chances of war. The Peloponnesians were a self-working population, with few slaves, and without wealth, either private or public; they had no means of carrying on distant or long-continued war: they were ready to expose their persons, but not at all ready to contribute from their very narrow means:[189] in a border-war, or a single land battle, they were invincible, but for systematic warfare against a power like Athens, they had neither competent headship, nor habits of concert and punctuality, nor money to profit by opportunities, always rare and accidental, for successful attack. They might, perhaps, establish a fortified post in Attica, but it would do little serious mischief; while at sea, their inferiority and helplessness would be complete, and the irresistible Athenian navy would take care to keep it so. Nor would they be able to reckon on tempting away the able foreign seamen from Athenian ships by means of funds borrowed from Olympia or Delphi:[190] for besides that the mariners of the dependent islands would find themselves losers even by accepting a higher pay, with the certainty of Athenian vengeance afterwards,—Athens herself would suffice to man her fleet in case of need, with her own citizens and metics: she had within her own walls steersmen and mariners better as well as more numerous than all Greece besides. There was but one side on which Athens was vulnerable: Attica unfortunately was not an island,—it was exposed to invasion and ravage. To this the Athenians must submit, without committing the imprudence of engaging a land battle to avert it: they had abundant lands out of Attica, insular as well as continental, to supply their wants, and they could in their turn, by means of their navy, ravage the Peloponnesian territories, whose inhabitants had no subsidiary lands to recur to.[191]

"Mourn not for the loss of land and houses (continued the orator): reserve your mourning for men: houses and land acquire not men, but men acquire them.[192]

Nay, if I thought I could prevail upon you, I would exhort you to march out and ravage them yourselves, and thus show to the Peloponnesians that, for them at least, ye will not truckle. And I could exhibit many further grounds for confidently anticipating success, if ye will only be willing not to aim at increased dominion when we are in the midst of war, and not to take upon yourselves new self-imposed risks; for I have ever been more afraid of our own blunders than of the plans of our enemy.[193] But these are matters for future discussion, when we come to actual operations: for the present let us dismiss these envoys with the answer: That we will permit the Megarians to use our markets and harbors, if the Lacedæmonians on their side will discontinue their (xenêlasy or) summary expulsions of ourselves and our allies from their own territory,—for there is nothing in the truce to prevent either one or the other: that we will leave the Grecian cities autonomous, if we *had* them as autonomous at the time when the truce was made,—and as soon as the Lacedæmonians shall grant to *their* allied cities autonomy such as each of them shall freely choose, not such as is convenient to Sparta: that while we are ready to give satisfaction according to the truce, we will not begin war, but will repel those who do begin it. Such is the reply at once just and suitable to the dignity of this city. We ought to make up our minds that war is inevitable: the more cheerfully we accept it, the less vehement shall we find our enemies in their attack: and where the danger is greatest, there also is the final honor greatest, both for a state and for a private citizen. Assuredly our fathers, when they bore up against the Persians,—having no such means as we possess to start from, and even compelled to abandon all that they did possess,—both repelled the invader and brought matters forward to our actual pitch, more by advised operation than by good fortune, and by a daring courage greater than their real power. We ought not to fall short of them: we must keep off our enemies in every way, and leave an unimpaired power to our successors."[194]

These animating encouragements of Periklês carried with them the majority of the assembly, so that answer was made to the envoys, such as he recommended, on each of the particular points in debate. It was announced to them, moreover, on the general question of peace or war, that the Athenians were prepared to discuss all the grounds of complaint against them, pursuant to the truce, by equal and amicable arbitration,—but that they would do nothing under authoritative demand.[195] With this answer the envoys returned to Sparta, and an end was put to negotiation.

It seems evident, from the account of Thucydidês, that the Athenian public was not brought to this resolution without much reluctance, and great fear of the consequences, especially destruction of property in Attica: and that a considerable minority took opposition on the Megarian decree,—the ground skilfully laid by Sparta for breaking the unanimity of her enemy, and strengthening the party opposed to Periklês. But we may also decidedly infer from the same historian,—especially from the proceedings of Corinth and Sparta, as he sets them forth,—that Athens could not have avoided the war without such an abnegation, both of dignity and power as no

nation under any government will ever submit to, and as would have even left her without decent security for her individual rights. To accept the war tendered to her, was a matter not merely of prudence but of necessity: the tone of exaction assumed by the Spartan envoys would have rendered concession a mere evidence of weakness and fear. As the account of Thucydidês bears out the judgment of Periklês on this important point,[196] so it also shows us that Athens was not less in the right upon the received principles of international dealing. It was not Athens, as the Spartans[197] themselves afterwards came to feel, but her enemies, who broke the provisions of the truce, by encouraging the revolt of Potidæa, and by promising invasion of Attica: it was not Athens, but her enemies, who, after thus breaking the truce, made a string of exorbitant demands, in order to get up as good a case as possible for war.[198] The case made out by Periklês, justifying the war on grounds both of right and prudence, is in all its main points borne out by the impartial voice of Thucydidês. And though it is perfectly true, that the ambition of Athens had been great, and the increase of her power marvellous, during the thirty-five years between the repulse of Xerxes and the thirty years' truce,—it is not less true that by that truce she lost very largely, and that she acquired nothing to compensate such loss during the fourteen years between the truce and the Korkyræan alliance. The policy of Periklês had not been one of foreign aggrandizement, or of increasing vexation and encroachment towards other Grecian powers: even the Korkyræan alliance was noway courted by him, and was in truth accepted with paramount regard to the obligations of the existing truce: while the circumstances out of which that alliance grew, testify a more forward ambition on the part of Corinth than on that of Athens, to appropriate to herself the Korkyræan naval force. It is common to ascribe the Peloponnesian war to the ambition of Athens, but this is a partial view of the case. The aggressive sentiment, partly fear, partly hatred, was on the side of the Peloponnesians, who were not ignorant that Athens desired the continuance of peace, but were resolved not to let her stand as she was at the conclusion of the thirty years' truce; it was their purpose to attack her and break down her empire, as dangerous, wrongful, and anti-Hellenic. The war was thus partly a contest of principle, involving the popular proclamation of the right of every Grecian state to autonomy, against Athens: partly a contest of power, wherein Spartan and Corinthian ambition was not less conspicuous, and far more aggressive in the beginning, than Athenian.

Conformably to what is here said, the first blow of the war was struck, not by Athens, but against her. After the decisive answer given to the Spartan envoys, taken in conjunction with the previous proceedings, and the preparations actually going on among the Peloponnesian confederacy,—the truce could hardly be said to be still in force, though there was no formal proclamation of rupture. A few weeks passed in restricted and mistrustful intercourse;[199] though individuals who passed the borders did not think it necessary to take a herald with them, as in time of actual war. Had the excess of ambition been on the side of Athens compared with her enemies, this was the time for her to strike the first blow, carrying with it of course great probabil-

ity of success, before their preparations were completed. But she remained strictly within the limits of the truce, and the disastrous series of mutual aggressions, destined to tear in pieces the entrails of Hellas, was opened by her enemy and her neighbor.

The little town of Platæa, still hallowed by the memorable victory over the Persians, as well as by the tutelary consecration received from Pausanias, was the scene of this unforeseen enterprise. It stood in Bœotia, immediately north of Kithæron; on the borders of Attica on one side, and of the Theban territory on the other, from which it was separated by the river Asôpus: the distance between Platæa and Thebes being about seventy stadia, or a little more than eight miles. Though Bœotian by descent, the Platæans were completely separated from the Bœotian league, and in hearty alliance, as well as qualified communion of civil rights, with the Athenians, who had protected them against the bitter enmity of Thebes, for a period of time now nearly three generations. But in spite of this long prescription, the Thebans, as chiefs of the Bœotian league, still felt themselves wronged by the separation of Platæa: and an oligarchical faction of wealthy Platæans espoused their cause, [200] with a view of subverting the democratical government of the town, of destroying its leaders, their political rivals, and of establishing an oligarchy with themselves as the chiefs. Naukleidês, and others of this faction, entered into a secret conspiracy with Eurymachus and the oligarchy of Thebes: to both it appeared a tempting prize, since war was close at hand, to take advantage of this ambiguous interval, before watches had been placed, and the precautions of a state of war commenced, and to surprise the town of Platæa in the night: moreover, a period of religious festival was chosen, in order that the population might be most completely off their guard.[201] Accordingly, on a rainy night towards the close of March 431 B.C.,[202] a body of rather more than three hundred Theban hoplites, commanded by two of the Bœotarchs, Pythangelus, and Diemporus, and including Eurymachus in the ranks, presented themselves at the gate of Platæa during the first sleep of the citizens: Naukleidês and his partisans opened the gate and conducted them to the agora, which they reached and occupied in military order without the least resistance. The best part of the Theban military force was intended to arrive at Platæa by break of day, in order to support them.[203]

Naukleidês and his friends, following the instincts of political antipathy, were eager to conduct the Thebans to the houses of their opponents, the democratical leaders, in order that the latter might be seized or despatched. But to this the Thebans would not consent: believing themselves now masters of the town, and certain of a large reinforcement at daylight, they thought they could overawe the citizens into an apparently willing acquiescence in their terms, without any actual violence: they wished, moreover, rather to soften and justify, than to aggravate, the gross public wrong already committed. Accordingly their herald was directed to invite, by public proclamation, all Platæans who were willing to return to their ancient sympathies of

race, and to the Bœotian confederacy, that they should come forth and take station as brethren in the armed ranks of the Thebans. And the Platæans, suddenly roused from sleep by the astounding news that their great enemy was master of the town, supposed amidst the darkness that the number of assailants was far greater than the reality: so that in spite of their strong attachment to Athens, they thought their case hopeless, and began to open negotiations. But as they soon found out, in spite of the darkness, as the discussion proceeded, that the real numbers of the Thebans were not greater than could be dealt with,—they speedily took courage and determined to attack them; establishing communication with each other by breaking through the walls of their private houses, in order that they might not be detected in moving about in the streets or ways,[204]—and forming barricades with wagons across such of these ways as were suitable. A little before daybreak, when their preparations were fully completed, they sallied forth from their houses to the attack, and immediately came to close quarters with the Thebans. The latter, still fancying themselves masters of the town, and relying upon a satisfactory close to the discussions when daylight should arrive, now found themselves surprised in their turn, and under great disadvantages: for they had been out all night under a heavy rain,—they were in a town which they did not know, with narrow, crooked, and muddy ways, such as they would have had difficulty in finding even by daylight. Nevertheless, on finding themselves suddenly assailed, they got as well as they could into close order, and repelled the Platæans two or three times: but the attack was still repeated, with loud shouts, while the women also screamed, and howled, and threw tiles from the flat-roofed houses, until at length the Thebans became dismayed and broken. But flight was not less difficult than resistance; for they could not find their way out of the city, and even the gate by which they entered, the only one open, had been closed by a Platæan citizen, who thrust into it the point of a javelin in place of the peg whereby the bar was commonly held fast. Dispersed about the city, and pursued by men who knew every inch of the ground, some ran to the top of the wall, and jumped down on the outside, most of them perished in the attempt,—a few others escaped through an unguarded gate, by cutting through the bar with a hatchet which a woman gave to them,—while the greater number of them ran into the open doors of a large barn or building in conjunction with the wall, mistaking these doors for an approach to the town-gate. They were here blocked up without the chance of escape, and the Platæans at first thought of setting fire to the building: but at length a convention was concluded, whereby they, as well as all the other Thebans in the city, agreed to surrender at discretion.[205]

Had the reinforcements from Thebes arrived at the expected hour, this disaster would have been averted. But the heavy rain and dark night retarded their whole march, while the river Asôpus was so much swollen as to be with difficulty fordable: so that before they reached the gates of Platæa, their comrades within were either slain or captured. Which fate had befallen them, the Thebans without could not tell: but they immediately resolved to seize what they could find, persons as well as prop-

erty, in the Platæan territory,—no precautions having been taken as yet to guard against the perils of war by keeping within the walls,—in order that they might have something to exchange for such Thebans as were prisoners. Before this step could be executed, however, a herald came forth from the town to remonstrate with them upon their unholy proceeding in having so flagrantly violated the truce, and especially to warn them not to do any wrong without the walls. If they retired without inflicting farther mischief, their prisoners within should be given up to them; if otherwise, these prisoners would be slain immediately. A convention having been concluded and sworn to on this basis, the Thebans retired without any active measures. Such at least was the Theban account of what preceded their retirement: but the Platæans gave a very different statement; denying that they had made any categorical promise or sworn any oath,—and affirming that they had engaged for nothing, except to suspend any decisive step with regard to the prisoners until discussion had been entered into to see if a satisfactory agreement could be concluded.

As Thucydidês records both of these statements, without intimating to which of the two he himself gave the preference, we may presume that both of them found credence with respectable persons. The Theban story is undoubtedly the most probable: but the Platæans appear to have violated the understanding, even upon their own construction of it. For no sooner had the Thebans retired, than they (the Platæans) hastily brought in their citizens and the best of their movable property within the walls, and then slew all their prisoners forthwith; without even entering into the formalities of negotiation. The prisoners thus put to death, among whom was Eurymachus himself, were one hundred and eighty in number.[206]

On the first entrance of the Theban assailants at night, a messenger had started from Platæa to carry the news to Athens: a second messenger followed him to report the victory and capture of the prisoners, as soon as it had been achieved. The Athenians sent back a herald without delay, enjoining the Platæans to take no step respecting the prisoners until consultation should be had with Athens. Periklês doubtless feared what turned out to be the fact: for the prisoners had been slain before his messenger could arrive. Apart from the terms of the convention, and looking only to the received practice of ancient warfare, their destruction could not be denounced as unusually cruel, though the Thebans, when fortune was in their favor, chose to designate it as such,[207]—but impartial contemporaries would notice, and the Athenians in particular would deeply lament, the glaring impolicy of the act. For Thebes, the best thing of all would of course be to get back her captured citizens forthwith: but next to that, the least evil would be to hear that they had been put to death. In the hands of the Athenians and Platæans, they would have been the means of obtaining from her much more valuable sacrifices than their lives, considered as a portion of Theban power, were worth: so strong was the feeling of sympathy for imprisoned citizens, several of them men of rank and importance,—as may be seen by the past conduct of Athens after the battle of Korôneia, and by that of Sparta, hereafter

to be recounted, after the taking of Sphakteria. The Platæans, obeying the simple instinct of wrath and vengeance, threw away this great political advantage, which the more long-sighted Periklês would gladly have turned to account.

At the time when the Athenians sent their herald to Platæa, they also issued orders for seizing all Bœotians who might be found in Attica; while they lost no time in sending forces to provision Platæa, and placing it on the footing of a garrison town, removing to Athens the old men and sick, with the women and children. No complaint or discussion, respecting the recent surprise, was thought of by either party: it was evident to both that the war was now actually begun,—that nothing was to be thought of except the means of carrying it on,—and that there could be no farther personal intercourse except under the protection of heralds.[208] The incident at Platæa, striking in all its points, wound up both parties to the full pitch of warlike excitement. A spirit of resolution and enterprise was abroad everywhere, especially among those younger citizens, yet unacquainted with the actual bitterness of war, whom the long truce but just broken had raised up; and the contagion of high-strung feeling spread from the leading combatants into every corner of Greece, manifesting itself partly in multiplied oracles, prophecies, and religious legends adapted to the moment:[209] a recent earthquake at Delos, too, as well as various other extraordinary physical phenomena, were construed as prognostics of the awful struggle impending,—a period fatally marked not less by eclipses, earthquakes, drought, famine, and pestilence, than by the direct calamities of war.[210]

An aggression so unwarrantable as the assault on Platæa tended doubtless to strengthen the unanimity of the Athenian assembly, to silence the opponents of Periklês, and to lend additional weight to those frequent exhortations,[211] whereby the great statesman was wont to sustain the courage of his countrymen. Intelligence was sent round to forewarn and hearten up the numerous allies of Athens, tributary as well as free: the latter, with the exception of the Thessalians, Akarnanians, and Messenians at Naupaktus, were all insular,—Chians, Lesbians, Korkyræans, and Zakynthians: to the island of Kephallênia also they sent envoys, but it was not actually acquired to their alliance until a few months afterwards.[212] With the Akarnanians, too, their connection had only been commenced a short time before, seemingly during the preceding summer, arising out of the circumstances of the town of Argos in Amphilochia. That town, situated on the southern coast of the Ambrakian gulf, was originally occupied by a portion of the Amphilochi, a non-Hellenic tribe, whose lineage apparently was something intermediate between Akarnanians and Epirots. Some colonists from Ambrakia, having been admitted as co-residents with the Amphilochian inhabitants of this town, presently expelled them, and retained the town with its territory exclusively for themselves. The expelled inhabitants, fraternizing with their fellow tribes around as well as with the Akarnanians, looked out for the means of restoration; and in order to obtain it, invited the assistance of Athens. Accordingly, the Athenians sent an expedition of thirty triremes, under Phormio, who,

joining the Amphilochians and Akarnanians, attacked and carried Argos, reduced the Ambrakiots to slavery, and restored the town to the Amphilochians and Akarnanians. It was on this occasion that the alliance of the Akarnanians with Athens was first concluded, and that their personal attachment to the Athenian admiral, Phormio, commenced.[213]

The numerous subjects of Athens, whose contributions stood embodied in the annual tribute, were distributed all over and around the Ægean, including all the islands north of Krete, with the exception of Melos and Thera.[214] Moreover, the elements of force collected in Athens itself, were fully worthy of the metropolis of so great an empire. Periklês could make a report to his countrymen of three hundred triremes fit for active service; twelve hundred horsemen and horse-bowmen; sixteen hundred bowmen; and the great force of all, not less than twenty-nine thousand hoplites,—mostly citizens, but in part also metics. The chosen portion of these hoplites, both as to age and as to equipment, were thirteen thousand in number; while the remaining sixteen thousand, including the elder and younger citizens and the metics, did garrison-duty on the walls of Athens and Peiræus,—on the long line of wall which connected Athens both with Peiræus and Phalêrum,—and in the various fortified posts both in and out of Attica. In addition to these large military and naval forces, the city possessed in the acropolis, an accumulated treasure of coined silver amounting to not less than six thousand talents, or about one million four hundred thousand pounds, derived from annual laying by of tribute from the allies and perhaps of other revenues besides: the treasure had at one time been as large as nine thousand seven hundred talents, or about two million two hundred and thirty thousand pounds, but the cost of the recent religious and architectural decorations at Athens, as well as at the siege of Potidæa, had reduced it to six thousand. Moreover, the acropolis and the temples throughout the city were rich in votive offerings, deposits, sacred plate, and silver implements for the processions and festivals, etc., to an amount estimated at more than five hundred talents; while the great statue of the goddess recently set up by Pheidias in the Parthenon, composed of ivory and gold, included a quantity of the latter metal not less than forty talents in weight,—equal in value to more than four hundred talents of silver,—and all of it go arranged that it could be taken off from the statue at pleasure. In alluding to these sacred valuables among the resources of the state, Periklês spoke of them only as open to be so applied in case of need, with the firm resolution of replacing them during the first season of prosperity, just as the Corinthians had proposed to borrow from Delphi and Olympia. Besides the hoard thus actually in hand, there came in a large annual revenue, amounting, under the single head of tribute from the subject allies, to six hundred talents, equal to about one hundred and thirty-eight thousand pounds; besides all other items,[215] making up a general total of at least one thousand talents, or about two hundred and thirty thousand pounds.

To this formidable catalogue of means for war were to be added other items not less important, but which did not admit of being weighed and numbered; the unrivalled maritime skill and discipline of the seamen,—the democratical sentiment, alike fervent and unanimous, of the general mass of citizens,—and the superior development of directing intelligence. And when we consider that the enemy had indeed on his side an irresistible land-force, but scarcely anything else,—few ships, no trained seamen, no funds, no powers of combination or headship,—we may be satisfied that there were ample materials for an orator like Periklês to draw an encouraging picture of the future. He could depict Athens as holding Peloponnesus under siege by means of her navy and a chain of insular posts;[216] and he could guarantee success[217] as the sure reward of persevering, orderly, and well-considered exertion, combined with firm endurance under a period of temporary but unavoidable suffering; and combined too with another condition hardly less difficult for Athenian temper to comply with,—abstinence from seductive speculations of distant enterprise, while their force was required by the necessities of war near home.[218] But such prospects were founded upon a long-sighted calculation, looking beyond immediate loss, and therefore likely to take less hold of the mind of an ordinary citizen,—or at any rate, to be overwhelmed for the moment by the pressure of actual hardship. Moreover, the best which Periklês could promise was a successful resistance,—the unimpaired maintenance of that great empire to which Athens had become accustomed; a policy purely conservative, without any stimulus from the hope of positive acquisition,—and not only without the sympathy of other states, but with feelings of simple acquiescence on the part of most of her allies,—of strong hostility everywhere else.

On all these latter points the position of the Peloponnesian alliance was far more encouraging. So powerful a body of confederates had never been got together,—not even to resist Xerxes. Not only the entire strength of Peloponnesus—except Argeians and Achæans, both of whom were neutral at first, though the Achæan town of Pellênê joined even at the beginning, and all the rest subsequently—was brought together, but also the Megarians, Bœotians, Phocians, Opuntian Lokrians, Ambrakiots, Leukadians, and Anaktorians. Among these, Corinth, Megara, Sikyon, Pellênê, Elis, Ambrakia, and Leukas, furnished maritime force, while the Bœotians, Phocians, and Lokrians supplied cavalry. Many of these cities, however, supplied hoplites besides; but the remainder of the confederates furnished hoplites only. It was upon this latter force, not omitting the powerful Bœotian cavalry, that the main reliance was placed; especially for the first and most important operation of the war,—the devastation of Attica. Bound together by the strongest common feeling of active antipathy to Athens, the whole confederacy was full of hope and confidence for this immediate forward march,—so gratifying at once both to their hatred and to their love of plunder, by the hand of destruction laid upon the richest country in Greece,—and presenting a chance even of terminating the war at once, if the pride of the Athenians should be so intolerably stung as to provoke them to come out and fight. Certainty of immediate success, at the first outset, a common purpose to be accomplished and a

common enemy to be put down, and favorable sympathies throughout Greece,—all these circumstances filled the Peloponnesians with sanguine hopes at the beginning of the war: and the general persuasion was, that Athens, even if not reduced to submission by the first invasion, could not possibly hold out more than two or three summers against the repetition of this destructive process.[219] Strongly did this confidence contrast with the proud and resolute submission to necessity, not without desponding anticipations of the result, which reigned among the auditors of Periklês. [220]

But though the Peloponnesians entertained confident belief of carrying their point by simple land-campaign, they did not neglect auxiliary preparations for naval and prolonged war. The Lacedæmonians resolved to make up the naval force already existing among themselves and their allies to an aggregate of five hundred triremes; chiefly by the aid of the friendly Dorian cities on the Italian and Sicilian coast. Upon each of them a specific contribution was imposed, together with a given contingent; orders being transmitted to them to make such preparations silently without any immediate declaration of hostility against Athens, and even without refusing for the present to admit any single Athenian ship into their harbors.[221] Besides this, the Lacedæmonians laid their schemes for sending envoys to the Persian king, and to other barbaric powers,—a remarkable evidence of melancholy revolution in Grecian affairs, when that potentate, whom the common arm of Greece had so hardly repulsed a few years before, was now invoked to bring the Phenician fleet again into the Ægean for the purpose of crushing Athens.

The invasion of Attica, however, without delay, was the primary object to be accomplished; and for that the Lacedæmonians issued circular orders immediately after the attempted surprise at Platæa. Though the vote of the allies was requisite to sanction any war, yet when that vote had once been passed, the Lacedæmonians took upon themselves to direct all the measures of execution. Two-thirds of the hoplites of each confederate city,—apparently two-thirds of a certain assumed rating, for which the city was held liable in the books of the confederacy, so that the Bœotians and others who furnished cavalry were not constrained to send two-thirds of their entire force of hoplites,—were summoned to be present on a certain day at the isthmus of Corinth, with provisions and equipment for an expedition of some length. [222] On the day named, the entire force was found duly assembled, and the Spartan king Archidamus, on taking the command, addressed to the commanders and principal officers from each city a discourse of solemn warning as well as encouragement. His remarks were directed chiefly to abate the tone of sanguine over-confidence which reigned in the army. After adverting to the magnitude of the occasion, the mighty impulse agitating all Greece, and the general good wishes which accompanied them against an enemy so much hated,—he admonished them not to let their great superiority of numbers and bravery seduce them into a spirit of rash disorder. "We are about to attack (he said) an enemy admirably equipped in every way, so

that we may be very certain that they will come out and fight,[223] even if they be not now actually on the march to meet us at the border, at least when they see us in their territory ravaging and destroying their property. All men exposed to any unusual indignity become incensed, and act more under passion than under calculation, when it is actually brought under their eyes: much more will the Athenians do so, accustomed as they are to empire, and to ravage the territory of others rather than to see their own so treated."

Immediately on the army being assembled, Archidamus sent Melêsippus as envoy to Athens to announce the coming invasion, being still in hopes that the Athenians would yield. But a resolution had been already adopted, at the instance of Periklês, to receive neither herald nor envoy from the Lacedæmonians when once their army was on its march: so that Melêsippus was sent back without even being permitted to enter the city. He was ordered to quit the territory before sunset, with guides to accompany him and prevent him from addressing a word to any one. On parting from his guides at the border, Melêsippus exclaimed,[224] with a solemnity but too accurately justified by the event: "This day will be the beginning of many calamities to the Greeks."

Archidamus, as soon as the reception of his last envoy was made known to him, continued his march from the isthmus into Attica,—which territory he entered by the road of Œnoê, the frontier Athenian fortress of Attica towards Bœotia. His march was slow, and he thought it necessary to make a regular attack on the fort of Œnoê, which had been put into so good a state of defence, that after all the various modes of assault, in which the Lacedæmonians were not skilful, had been tried in vain,[225] —and after a delay of several days before the place,—he was compelled to renounce the attempt.

The want of enthusiasm on the part of the Spartan king,—his multiplied delays, first at the isthmus, next in the march, and lastly before Œnoê,—were all offensive to the fiery impatience of the army, who were loud in their murmurs against him. He acted upon the calculation already laid down in his discourse at Sparta,[226]—that the highly cultivated soil of Attica was to be looked upon as a hostage for the pacific dispositions of the Athenians, who would be more likely to yield when devastation, though not yet inflicted, was nevertheless impending, and at their doors. In this point of view, a little delay at the border was no disadvantage; and perhaps the partisans of peace at Athens may have encouraged him to hope that it would enable them to prevail. Nor can we doubt that it was a moment full of difficulty to Periklês at Athens. He had to proclaim to all the proprietors in Attica the painful truth, that they must prepare to see their lands and houses overrun and ruined; and that their persons, families, and movable property, must be brought in for safety either to Athens, or to one of the forts in the territory,—or carried across to one of the neighboring islands. It would, indeed, make a favorable impression when he told them that Archidamus was his own family friend, yet only within such limits as consisted with duty

to the city: in case, therefore, the invaders, while ravaging Attica, should receive instruction to spare his own lands, he would forthwith make them over to the state as public property: nor was such a case unlikely to arise, if not from the personal feeling of Archidamus, at least from the deliberate manœuvre of the Spartans, who would seek thus to set the Athenian public against Periklês, as they had tried to do before by demanding the banishment of the sacrilegious Alkmæônid race.[227] But though this declaration would doubtless provoke a hearty cheer, the lesson which he had to inculcate, not simply for admission as prudent policy, but for actual practice, was one revolting alike to the immediate interest, the dignity, and the sympathies of his countrymen. To see their lands all ravaged, without raising an arm to defend them,—to carry away their wives and families, and to desert and dismantle their country residences, as they had done during the Persian invasion,—all in the confidence of compensation in other ways and of remote ultimate success,—were recommendations which, probably, no one but Periklês could have hoped to enforce. They were, moreover, the more painful to execute, inasmuch as the Athenian citizens had very generally retained the habits of residing permanently, not in Athens, but in the various demes of Attica; many of which still preserved their temples, their festivals, their local customs, and their limited municipal autonomy, handed down from the day when they had once been independent of Athens.[228] It was but recently that the farming, the comforts, and the ornaments, thus distributed over Attica, had been restored from the ruin of the Persian invasion, and brought to a higher pitch of improvement than ever; yet the fruits of this labor, and the scenes of these local affections, were now to be again deliberately abandoned to a new aggressor, and exchanged for the utmost privation and discomfort. Archidamus might well doubt whether the Athenians would nerve themselves up to the pitch of resolution necessary for this distressing step, when it came to the actual crisis; and whether they would not constrain Periklês against his will to make propositions for peace. His delay on the border, and postponement of actual devastation, gave the best chance for such propositions being made; though as this calculation was not realized, the army raised plausible complaints against him for having allowed the Athenians time to save so much of their property.

From all parts of Attica the residents flocked within the spacious walls of Athens, which now served as shelter for the houseless, like Salamis, forty-nine years before: entire families with all their movable property, and even with the woodwork of their houses; the sheep and cattle were conveyed to Eubœa and the other adjoining islands.[229] Though a few among the fugitives obtained dwellings or reception from friends, the greater number were compelled to encamp in the vacant spaces of the city and Peiræus, or in and around the numerous temples of the city,—always excepting the acropolis and the eleusinion, which were at all times strictly closed to profane occupants; but even the ground called *the Pelasgikon*, immediately under the acropolis, which, by an ancient and ominous tradition, was interdicted to human abode,[230] was made use of under the present necessity. Many, too, placed their

families in the towers and recesses of the city walls,[231] or in sheds, cabins, tents, or even tubs, disposed along the course of the long walls to Peiræus. In spite of so serious an accumulation of losses and hardships, the glorious endurance of their fathers in the time of Xerxes was faithfully copied, and copied too under more honorable circumstances, since at that time there had been no option possible; whereas, the march of Archidamus might, perhaps, now have been arrested by submissions, ruinous indeed to Athenian dignity, yet not inconsistent with the security of Athens, divested of her rank and power. Such submissions, if suggested as they probably may have been by the party opposed to Periklês, found no echo among the suffering population.

After having spent several days before Œnoê without either taking the fort or receiving any message from the Athenians, Archidamus marched onward to Eleusis and the Thriasian plain,—about the middle of June, eighty days after the surprise of Platæa. His army was of irresistible force, not less than sixty thousand hoplites, according to the statement of Plutarch,[232] or of one hundred thousand, according to others: considering the number of constituent allies, the strong feeling by which they were prompted, and the shortness of the expedition combined with the chance of plunder, even the largest of these two numbers is not incredibly great, if we take it to include not hoplites only, but cavalry and light-armed also: but as Thucydidês, though comparatively full in his account of this march, has stated no general total, we may presume that he had heard none upon which he could rely. As the Athenians had made no movement towards peace, Archidamus anticipated that they would come forth to meet him in the fertile plain of Eleusis and Thria, which was the first portion of territory that he sat down to ravage: but no Athenian force appeared to oppose him, except a detachment of cavalry, who were repulsed in a skirmish near the small lakes called Rheiti. Having laid waste this plain without any serious opposition, Archidamus did not think fit to pursue the straight road which from Thria conducted directly to Athens across the ridge of Mount Ægaleos, but turned off to the westward, leaving that mountain on his right hand until he came to Krôpeia, where he crossed a portion of the line of Ægaleos over to Acharnæ. He was here about seven miles from Athens, on a declivity sloping down into the plain which stretches westerly and northwesterly from Athens, and visible from the city walls: and he here encamped, keeping his army in perfect order for battle, but at the same time intending to damage and ruin the place and its neighborhood. Acharnæ was the largest and most populous of all the demes in Attica, furnishing no less than three thousand hoplites to the national line, and flourishing as well by its corn, vines, and olives, as by its peculiar abundance of charcoal-burning from the forests of ilex on the neighboring hills: moreover, if we are to believe Aristophanês, the Acharnian proprietors were not merely sturdy "hearts of oak," but peculiarly vehement and irritable.[233] It illustrates the condition of a Grecian territory under invasion, when we find this great deme, which could not have contained less than twelve thousand free inhabitants of both sexes and all ages, with at least an equal number of slaves, completely de-

serted. Archidamus calculated that when the Athenians actually saw his troops so close to their city, carrying fire and sword over their wealthiest canton, their indignation would become uncontrollable, and they would march out forthwith to battle. The Acharnian proprietors especially, he thought, would be foremost in inflaming this temper, and insisting upon protection to their own properties,—or, if the remaining citizens refused to march out along with them, they would, after having been thus left undefended to ruin, become discontented and indifferent to the general weal. [234]

Though his calculation was not realized, it was, nevertheless, founded upon most rational grounds. What Archidamus anticipated was on the point of happening, and nothing prevented it, except the personal ascendency of Periklês, strained to its very utmost. So long as the invading army was engaged in the Thriasian plain, the Athenians had some faint hope that it might—like Pleistoanax, fourteen years before—advance no farther into the interior: but when it came to Acharnæ, within sight of the city walls,—when the ravagers were actually seen destroying buildings, fruit-trees, and crops, in the plain of Athens, a sight strange to every Athenian eye except to those very old men who recollected the Persian invasion,—the exasperation of the general body of citizens rose to a pitch never before known. The Acharnians first of all, next the youthful citizens generally,—became madly clamorous for arming and going forth to fight. Knowing well their own great strength, but less correctly informed of the superior strength of the enemy, they felt confident that victory was within their reach. Groups of citizens were everywhere gathered together,[235] angrily debating the critical question of the moment; while the usual concomitants of excited feeling,—oracles and prophecies of diverse tenor, many of them, doubtless, promising success against the enemy at Acharnæ,—were eagerly caught up and circulated.

In this inflamed temper of the Athenian mind, Periklês was naturally the great object of complaint and wrath. He was denounced as the cause of all the existing suffering: he was reviled as a coward for not leading out the citizens to fight, in his capacity of general: the rational convictions as to the necessity of the war and the only practicable means of carrying it on, which his repeated speeches had implanted, seemed to be altogether forgotten.[236] This burst of spontaneous discontent was, of course, fomented by the numerous political enemies of Periklês, and particularly by Kleon,[237] now rising into importance as an opposition-speaker; whose talent for invective was thus first exercised under the auspices of the high aristocratical party, as well as of an excited public. But no manifestations, however violent, could disturb either the judgment or the firmness of Periklês. He listened, unmoved, to all the declarations made against him, and resolutely refused to convene any public assembly, or any meeting invested with an authorized character, under the present irritated temper of the citizens.[238] It appears that he, as general, or rather the board of ten generals, among whom he was one, must have been invested constitutionally with the power, not only of calling the ekklesia when they thought fit, but also of preventing it

from meeting,[239] and of postponing even those regular meetings which commonly took place at fixed times, four times in the prytany. No assembly, accordingly, took place, and the violent exasperation of the people was thus prevented from realizing itself in any rash public resolution. That Periklês should have held firm against this raging force, is but one among the many honorable points in his political character; but it is far less wonderful than the fact, that his refusal to call the ekklesia was efficacious to prevent the ekklesia from being held. The entire body of Athenians were now assembled within the walls, and if he refused to convoke the ekklesia, they might easily have met in the Pnyx, without him; for which it would not have been difficult at such a juncture to provide plausible justification. The inviolable respect which the Athenian people manifested on this occasion for the forms of their democratical constitution—assisted doubtless by their long-established esteem for Periklês, yet opposed to an excitement alike intense and pervading, and to a demand apparently reasonable, in so far as regarded the calling of an assembly for discussion,—is one of the most memorable incidents in their history.

While Periklês thus decidedly forbade any general march out for battle, he sought to provide as much employment as possible for the compressed eagerness of the citizens. The cavalry were sent out, together with the Thessalian cavalry their allies, for the purpose of restraining the excursions of the enemy's light troops, and protecting the lands near the city from plunder.[240] At the same time, he fitted out a powerful expedition, which sailed forth to ravage Peloponnesus, even while the invaders were yet in Attica.[241] Archidamus, after having remained engaged in the devastation of Acharnæ long enough to satisfy himself that the Athenians would not hazard a battle, turned away from Athens in a northwesterly direction towards the demes between Mount Brilêssus and Mount Parnês, on the road passing through Dekeleia. The army continued ravaging these districts until their provisions were exhausted, and then quitted Attica by the northwestern road near Orôpus, which brought them into Bœotia. The Oropians were not Athenians, but dependent upon Athens, and the district of Græa, a portion of their territory, was laid waste; after which, the army dispersed and retired back to their respective homes.[242] It would seem that they quitted Attica towards the end of July, having remained in the country between thirty and forty days.

Meanwhile, the Athenian expedition under Karkinus, Prôteas, and Sokratês, joined by fifty Korkyræan ships, and by some other allies, sailed round Peloponnesus, landing in various parts to inflict damage, and among other places, at Methônê (Modon) on the southwestern peninsula of the Lacedæmonian territory.[243] The place, neither strong nor well-garrisoned, would have been carried with little difficulty, had not Brasidas the son of Tellis,—a gallant Spartan now mentioned for the first time, but destined to great celebrity afterwards,—who happened to be on guard at a neighboring post, thrown himself into it with one hundred men by a rapid movement, before the dispersed Athenian troops could be brought together to prevent him. He infused

such courage into the defenders of the place that every attack was repelled, and the Athenians were forced to reëmbark,—an act of prowess which procured for him the first public honors bestowed by the Spartans during this war. Sailing northward along the western coast of Peloponnesus, the Athenians landed again on the coast of Elis, a little south of the promontory called Cape Ichthys: they ravaged the territory for two days, defeating both the troops in the neighborhood and three hundred chosen men from the central Eleian territory. Strong winds on a harborless coast now induced the captains to sail with most of the troops round Cape Ichthys, in order to reach the harbor of Pheia on the northern side of it; while the Messenian hoplites, marching by land across the promontory, attacked Pheia and carried it by assault. When the fleet arrived, all were reëmbarked,—the full force of Elis being under march to attack them: they then sailed northward, landing on various other spots to commit devastation, until they reached Sollium, a Corinthian settlement on the coast of Akarnania. They captured this place, which they handed over to the inhabitants of the neighboring Akarnanian town of Palærus,—as well as Astakus, from whence they expelled the despot Euarchus, and enrolled the town as a member of the Athenian alliance. From hence they passed over to Kephallênia, which they were fortunate enough also to acquire as an ally of Athens without any compulsion,—with its four distinct towns, or districts, Palês, Kranii, Samê, and Pionê. These various operations took up near three months from about the beginning of July, so that they returned to Athens towards the close of September,[244]—the beginning of the winter half of the year, according to the distribution of Thucydidês.

Nor was this the only maritime expedition of the summer: thirty more triremes, under Kleopompus, were sent through the Euripus to the Lokrian coast opposite to the northern part of Eubœa. Some disembarkations were made, whereby the Lokrian towns of Thronium and Alopê were sacked, and farther devastation inflicted: while a permanent garrison was planted, and a fortified post erected, in the uninhabited island of Atalanta, opposite to the Lokrian coast, in order to restrain privateers from Opus and the other Lokrian towns in their excursions against Eubœa.[245] It was farther determined to expel the Æginetan inhabitants from Ægina, and to occupy the island with Athenian colonists. This step was partly rendered prudent by the important position of the island midway between Attica and Peloponnesus; but a concurrent motive, and probably the stronger motive, was the gratification of ancient antipathy and revenge against a people who had been among the foremost in provoking the war and in inflicting upon Athens so much suffering. The Æginetans with their wives and children were all put on shipboard and landed in Peloponnesus,—where the Spartans permitted them to occupy the maritime district and town of Thyrea, their last frontier towards Argos: some of them, however, found shelter in other parts of Greece. The island was made over to a detachment of Athenian kleruchs, or citizen proprietors, sent thither by lot.[246]

To the sufferings of the Æginetans, which we shall hereafter find still more deplorably aggravated, we have to add those of the Megarians. Both had been most zealous in kindling the war, but upon none did the distress of war fall so heavily. Both probably shared the premature confidence felt among the Peloponnesian confederacy, that Athens could never hold out more than a year or two,—and were thus induced to overlook their own undefended position against her. Towards the close of September, the full force of Athens, citizens and metics, marched into the Megarid under Periklês, and laid waste the greater part of the territory: while they were in it, the hundred ships which had been circumnavigating Peloponnesus, having arrived at Ægina on their return, went and joined their fellow-citizens in the Megarid, instead of going straight home. The junction of the two formed the largest Athenian force that had ever yet been seen together: there were ten thousand citizen hoplites, independent of three thousand others who were engaged in the siege of Potidæa, and three thousand metic hoplites,—besides a large number of light troops.[247] Against so large a force the Megarians could of course make no head, and their territory was all laid waste, even to the city walls. For several years of the war, the Athenians inflicted this destruction once, and often twice in the same year: a decree was proposed in the Athenian ekklesia by Charinus, though perhaps not carried, to the effect that the stratêgi every year should swear, as a portion of their oath of office,[248] that they would twice invade and ravage the Megarid. As the Athenians at the same time kept the port of Nisæa blocked up, by means of their superior naval force and of the neighboring coast of Salamis, the privations imposed on the Megarians became extreme and intolerable.[249] Not merely their corn and fruits, but even their garden vegetables near the city, were rooted up and destroyed, and their situation seems often to have been that of a besieged city hard pressed by famine. Even in the time of Pausanias, so many centuries afterwards, the miseries of the town during these years were remembered and communicated to him, being assigned as the reason why one of their most memorable statues had never been completed.[250]

To these various military operations of Athens during the course of this summer, some other measures of moment are to be added; and Thucydidês also notices an eclipse of the sun which modern astronomical calculations refer to the third of August: had this eclipse happened three months earlier, immediately before the entrance of the Peloponnesians into Attica, it might probably have been construed as an unfavorable omen, and caused the postponement of the scheme. Expecting a prolonged struggle, the Athenians now made arrangements for placing Attica in a permanent state of defence, both by sea and land; what these arrangements were, we are not told in detail, but one of them was sufficiently remarkable to be named particularly. They set apart one thousand talents out of the treasure in the acropolis as an inviolable reserve, not to be touched except on the single contingency of a hostile naval force about to assail the city, with no other means at hand to defend it. They further enacted, that if any citizen should propose, or any magistrate put the question, in the public assembly, to make any different application of this reserve, he

should be punishable with death. Moreover, they resolved every year to keep back one hundred of their best triremes, and trierarchs to command and equip them, for the same special necessity.[251] It may be doubted whether this latter provision was placed under the same stringent sanction, or observed with the same rigor, as that concerning the money, which latter was not departed from until the twentieth year of the war, after all the disasters of the Sicilian expedition, and on the terrible news of the revolt of Chios. It was on that occasion that the Athenians first repealed the sentence of capital punishment against the proposer of this forbidden change, and next appropriated the money to meet the then imminent peril of the commonwealth.[252]

The resolution here taken about this sacred reserve, and the rigorous sentence interdicting contrary propositions, is pronounced by Mr. Mitford to be an evidence of the indelible barbarism of democratical government.[253] But we must recollect, first, that the sentence of capital punishment was one which could hardly by possibility come into execution; for no citizen would be so mad as to make the forbidden proposition, while this law was in force. Whoever desired to make it, would first begin by proposing to repeal the prohibitory law, whereby he would incur no danger, whether the assembly decided in the affirmative or negative; and if he obtained an affirmative decision, he would then, and then only, proceed to move the reappropriation of the fund. To speak the language of English parliamentary procedure, he would first move the suspension or abrogation of the standing order whereby the proposition was forbidden,—next, he would move the proposition itself: in fact, such was the mode actually pursued, when the thing at last came to be done.[254] But though the capital sentence could hardly come into effect, the proclamation of it *in terrorem* had a very distinct meaning. It expressed the deep and solemn conviction which the people entertained of the importance of their own resolution about the reserve,—it forewarned all assemblies and all citizens to come, of the danger of diverting it to any other purpose,—it surrounded the reserve with an artificial sanctity, which forced every man who aimed at the reappropriation to begin with a preliminary proposition, formidable on the very face of it, as removing a guarantee which previous assemblies had deemed of immense value, and opening the door to a contingency which they had looked upon as treasonable. The proclamation of a lighter punishment, or a simple prohibition without any definite sanction whatever, would neither have announced the same emphatic conviction, nor produced the same deterring effect. The assembly of 431 B.C. could not in any way enact laws which subsequent assemblies could not reverse; but it could so frame its enactments, in cases of peculiar solemnity, as to make its authority strongly felt upon the judgment of its successors, and to prevent them from entertaining motions for repeal, except under necessity at once urgent and obvious. Far from thinking that the law now passed at Athens displayed barbarism, either in the end or in the means, I consider it principally remarkable for its cautious and long-sighted view of the future,—qualities the exact reverse of barbarism,—and worthy of the general character of Periklês, who probably suggested it. Athens was just entering into a war which threatened to be of indefinite length, and

was certain to be very costly. To prevent the people from exhausting all their accumulated fund, and to place them under a necessity of reserving something against extreme casualties, was an object of immense importance. Now the particular casualty, which Periklês, assuming him to be the proposer, named as the sole condition of touching this one thousand talents, might be considered as of all others the most improbable, in the year 431 B.C. So immense was then the superiority of the Athenian naval force, that to suppose it defeated, and a Peloponnesian fleet in full sail for Peiræus, was a possibility which it required a statesman of extraordinary caution to look forward to, and which it is truly wonderful that the people generally could have been induced to contemplate. Once tied up to this purpose, however, the fund lay ready for any other terrible emergency: and we shall find the actual employment of it incalculably beneficial to Athens, at a moment of the gravest peril, when she could hardly have protected herself without some such special resource. The people would scarcely have sanctioned so rigorous an economy, had it not been proposed to them at a period so early in the war that their available reserve was still much larger: but it will be forever to the credit of their foresight as well as constancy, that they should first have adopted such a precautionary measure, and afterwards adhered to it for nineteen years, under severe pressure for money, until at length a case arose which rendered farther abstinence really, and not constructively, impossible.

To display their force and take revenge by disembarking and ravaging parts of Peloponnesus, was doubtless of much importance to Athens during this first summer of the war: though it might seem that the force so employed was quite as much needed in the conquest of Potidæa, which still remained under blockade,—and of the neighboring Chalkidians in Thrace, still in revolt. It was during the course of this summer that a prospect opened to Athens of subduing these towns, through the assistance of Sitalkês, king of the Odrysian Thracians. That prince had married the sister of Nymphodôrus, a citizen of Abdêra; who engaged to render him, and his son Sadokus, allies of Athens. Sent for to Athens and appointed proxenus of Athens at Abdêra, which was one of the Athenian subject allies, Nymphodôrus made this alliance, and promised, in the name of Sitalkês, that a sufficient Thracian force should be sent to aid Athens in the reconquest of her revolted towns: the honor of Athenian citizenship was at the same time conferred upon Sadokus.[255] Nymphodôrus farther established a good understanding between Perdikkas of Macedonia and the Athenians, who were persuaded to restore to him Therma, which they had before taken from him. The Athenians had thus the promise of powerful aid against the Chalkidians and Potidæans: yet the latter still held out, with little prospect of immediate surrender. Moreover, the town of Astakus, in Akarnania, which the Athenians had captured during the summer, in the course of their expedition round Peloponnesus, was recovered during the autumn by the deposed despot Euarchus, assisted by forty Corinthian triremes and one thousand hoplites. This Corinthian armament, after restoring Euarchus, made some unsuccessful descents both upon other parts of

Akarnania and upon the island of Kephallênia: in the latter, they were entrapped into an ambuscade, and obliged to return home with considerable loss.[256]

It was towards the close of this autumn also that Periklês, chosen by the people for the purpose, delivered the funeral oration at the public interment of those warriors who had fallen during the campaign. The ceremonies of this public token of respect have already been described in a former chapter, on occasion of the conquest of Samos: but that which imparted to the present scene an imperishable interest, was the discourse of the chosen statesman and orator; probably heard by Thucydidês himself, and in substance reproduced. A large crowd of citizens and foreigners, of both sexes and all ages, accompanied the funeral procession from Athens to the suburb called the outer Kerameikus, where Periklês, mounted upon a lofty stage prepared for the occasion, closed the ceremony with his address. The law of Athens not only provided this public funeral and commemorative discourse, but also assigned maintenance at the public expense to the children of the slain warriors until they attained military age: a practice which was acted on throughout the whole war, though we have only the description and discourse belonging to this single occasion. [257]

The eleven chapters of Thucydidês which comprise this funeral speech are among the most memorable relics of antiquity; considering that under the language and arrangement of the historian,—always impressive, though sometimes harsh and peculiar, like the workmanship of a powerful mind, misled by a bad or an unattainable model,—we possess the substance and thoughts of the illustrious statesman. A portion of it, of course, is and must be common-place, belonging to all discourses composed for a similar occasion. Yet this is true only of a comparatively small portion: much of it is peculiar, and every way worthy of Periklês,—comprehensive, rational, and full, not less of sense and substance than of earnest patriotism. It thus forms a strong contrast with the jejune, though elegant, rhetoric of other harangues, mostly[258] not composed for actual delivery; and deserves, in comparison with the funeral discourses remaining to us from Plato, and the Pseudo-Demosthenês, and even Lysias, the honorable distinction which Thucydidês claims for his own history,—an ever-living possession, and not a mere show-piece for the moment.

In the outset of his speech, Periklês distinguishes himself from those who had preceded him in the same function of public orator, by dissenting from the encomiums which it had been customary to bestow on the law enjoining these funeral harangues: he thinks that the publicity of the funeral itself, and the general demonstrations of respect and grief by the great body of citizens, tell more emphatically in token of gratitude to the brave dead, when the scene passes in silence, than when it is translated into the words of a speaker, who may easily offend, either by incompetency or by apparent feebleness, or perhaps even by unseasonable exaggeration. Nevertheless, the custom having been embodied in law, and elected as he has been

by the citizens, he comes forward to discharge the duty imposed upon him in the best manner he can.[259]

One of the remarkable features in this discourse is, its business-like, impersonal character: it is Athens herself who undertakes to commend and decorate her departed sons, as well as to hearten up and admonish the living.

After a few words on the magnitude of the empire, and on the glorious efforts as well as endurance whereby their forefathers and they had acquired it,—Periklês proceeds to sketch the plan of life, the constitution, and the manners, under which such achievements were brought about.[260]

"We live under a constitution such as noway to envy the laws of our neighbors,—ourselves an example to others, rather than mere imitators. It is called a democracy, since its permanent aim tends towards the many and not towards the few: in regard to private matters and disputes, the laws deal equally with every man: while looking to public affairs and to claims of individual influence, every man's chance of advancement is determined, not by party-favor but by real worth, according as his reputation stands in his own particular department: nor does poverty, or obscure station, keep him back,[261] if he really has the means of benefiting the city. And our social march is free, not merely in regard to public affairs, but also in regard to intolerance of each other's diversity of daily pursuits. For we are not angry with our neighbor for what he may do to please himself, nor do we ever put on those sour looks,[262] which, though they do no positive damage, are not the less sure to offend. Thus conducting our private social intercourse with reciprocal indulgence, we are restrained from wrong on public matters by fear and reverence of our magistrates for the time being, and of our laws,—especially such laws as are instituted for the protection of wrongful sufferers, and even such others as, though not written, are enforced by a common sense of shame. Besides this, we have provided for our minds numerous recreations from toil, partly by our customary solemnities of sacrifice and festival throughout the year, partly by the elegance of our private establishments,—the daily charm of which banishes the sense of discomfort. From the magnitude of our city, the products of the whole earth are brought to us, so that our enjoyment of foreign luxuries is as much our own and assured as those which we grow at home. In respect to training for war, we differ from our opponents (the Lacedæmonians) on several material points. First, we lay open our city as a common resort: we apply no xenêlasy to exclude even an enemy either from any lesson or any spectacle, the full view of which he may think advantageous to him; for we trust less to manœuvres and quackery than to our native bravery, for warlike efficiency. Next, in regard to education, while the Lacedæmonians, even from their earliest youth, subject themselves to an irksome exercise for the attainment of courage, we, with our easy habits of life, are not less prepared than they, to encounter all perils within the measure of our strength. The proof of this is, that the Peloponnesian confederates do not attack us one by one, but with their whole united force; while we, when we attack them at home, overpower for the

most part all of them who try to defend their own territory. None of our enemies has ever met and contended with our entire force; partly in consequence of our large navy,—partly from our dispersion in different simultaneous land-expeditions. But when they chance to be engaged with any part of it, if victorious, they pretend to have vanquished us all,—if defeated, they pretend to have been vanquished by all.

"Now, if we are willing to brave danger, just as much under an indulgent system as under constant toil, and by spontaneous courage as much as under force of law,—we are gainers in the end, by not vexing ourselves beforehand with sufferings to come, yet still appearing in the hour of trial not less daring than those who toil without ceasing.

"In other matters, too, as well as in these, our city deserves admiration. For we combine elegance of taste with simplicity of life, and we pursue knowledge without being enervated:[263] we employ wealth, not for talking and ostentation, but as a real help in the proper season: nor is it disgraceful to any one who is poor to confess his poverty, though he *may* rather incur reproach for not actually keeping himself out of poverty. The magistrates who discharge public trusts fulfil their domestic duties also,—the private citizen, while engaged in professional business, has competent knowledge on public affairs: for we stand alone in regarding the man who keeps aloof from these latter, not as harmless, but as useless. Moreover, we always hear and pronounce on public matters, when discussed by our leaders,—or perhaps strike out for ourselves correct reasonings about them: far from accounting discussion an impediment to action, we complain only if we are not told what is to be done before it becomes our duty to do it. For, in truth, we combine in the most remarkable manner these two qualities,—extreme boldness in execution, with full debate beforehand on that which we are going about: whereas, with others, ignorance alone imparts boldness,—debate introduces hesitation. Assuredly, those men are properly to be regarded as the stoutest of heart, who, knowing most precisely both the terrors of war and the sweets of peace, are still not the less willing to encounter peril.

"In fine, I affirm that our city, considered as a whole, is the schoolmistress of Greece;[264] while, viewed individually, we enable the same man to furnish himself out and suffice to himself in the greatest variety of ways, and with the most complete grace and refinement. This is no empty boast of the moment, but genuine reality: and the power of the city, acquired through the dispositions just indicated, exists to prove it. Athens alone, of all cities, stands forth in actual trial greater than her reputation: her enemy, when he attacks her, will not have his pride wounded by suffering defeat from feeble hands,—her subjects will not think themselves degraded as if their obedience were paid to an unworthy superior.[265] Having thus put forward our power, not uncertified, but backed by the most evident proofs, we shall be admired not less by posterity than by our contemporaries. Nor do we stand in need either of Homer or of any other panegyrist, whose words may for the moment please, while the truth when known would confute their intended meaning: we have compelled all

land and sea to become accessible to our courage, and have planted everywhere imperishable monuments of our kindness as well as of our hostility.

"Such is the city on behalf of which these warriors have nobly died in battle, vindicating her just title to unimpaired rights,[266]—and on behalf of which all of us here left behind must willingly toil. It is for this reason that I have spoken at length concerning the city, at once to draw from it the lesson that the conflict is not for equal motives between us and enemies who possess nothing of the like excellence,—and to demonstrate by proofs the truth of my encomium pronounced upon her."

Periklês pursues at considerable additional length the same tenor of mixed exhortation to the living and eulogy of the dead; with many special and emphatic observations addressed to the relatives of the latter, who were assembled around and doubtless very near him. But the extract which I have already made is so long, that no farther addition would be admissible: yet it was impossible to pass over lightly the picture of the Athenian commonwealth in its glory, as delivered by the ablest citizen of the age. The effect of the democratical constitution, with its diffused and equal citizenship, in calling forth not merely strong attachment, but painful self-sacrifice, on the part of all Athenians,—is nowhere more forcibly insisted upon than in the words above cited of Periklês, as well as in others afterwards: "Contemplating as you do daily before you the actual power of the state, and becoming passionately attached to it, when you conceive its full greatness, reflect that it was all acquired by men of daring, acquainted with their duty, and full of an honorable sense of shame in their actions,"[267]—such is the association which he presents between the greatness of the state as an object of common passion, and the courage, intelligence, and mutual esteem, of individual citizens, as its creating and preserving causes: poor as well as rich being alike interested in the partnership.

But the claims of patriotism, though put forward as essentially and deservedly paramount, are by no means understood to reign exclusively, or to absorb the whole of the democratical activity. Subject to these, and to those laws and sanctions which protect both the public and individuals against wrong, it is the pride of Athens to exhibit a rich and varied fund of human impulse,—an unrestrained play of fancy and diversity of private pursuit, coupled with a reciprocity of cheerful indulgence between one individual and another, and an absence even of those "black looks" which so much embitter life, even if they never pass into enmity of fact. This portion of the speech of Periklês deserves peculiar attention, because it serves to correct an assertion, often far too indiscriminately made, respecting antiquity as contrasted with modern societies,—an assertion that the ancient societies sacrificed the individual to the state, and that only in modern times has individual agency been left free to the proper extent. This is preëminently true of Sparta: it is also true, in a great degree, of the ideal societies depicted by Plato and Aristotle: but it is pointedly untrue of the Athenian democracy, nor can we with any confidence predicate it of the major part of the Grecian cities.

I shall hereafter return to this point when I reach the times of the great speculative philosophers: in the mean time I cannot pass over this speech of Periklês without briefly noticing the inference which it suggests, to negative the supposed exorbitant interference of the state with individual liberty, as a general fact among the ancient Greek republics. There is no doubt that he has present to his mind a comparison with the extreme narrowness and rigor of Sparta, and that therefore his assertions of the extent of positive liberty at Athens must be understood as partially qualified by such contrast. But even making allowance for this, the stress which he lays upon the liberty of thought and action at Athens, not merely from excessive restraint of law, but also from practical intolerance between man and man, and tyranny of the majority over individual dissenters in taste and pursuit,—deserves serious notice, and brings out one of those points in the national character upon which the intellectual development of the time mainly depended. The national temper was indulgent in a high degree to all the varieties of positive impulses: the peculiar promptings in every individual bosom were allowed to manifest themselves and bear fruit, without being suppressed by external opinion, or trained into forced conformity with some assumed standard: antipathies against any of them formed no part of the habitual morality of the citizen. While much of the generating causes of human hatred was thus rendered inoperative, and while society was rendered more comfortable, more instructive, and more stimulating,—all its germs of productive fruitful genius, so rare everywhere, found in such an atmosphere the maximum of encouragement. Within the limits of the law, assuredly as faithfully observed at Athens as anywhere in Greece, individual impulse, taste, and even eccentricity, were accepted with indulgence, instead of being a mark as elsewhere for the intolerance of neighbors or of the public. This remarkable feature in Athenian life will help us in a future chapter to explain the striking career of Sokratês, and it farther presents to us, under another face, a great part of that which the censors of Athens denounced under the name of "democratical license." The liberty and diversity of individual life in that city were offensive to Xenophon,[268] Plato, and Aristotle,—attached either to the monotonous drill of Sparta, or to some other ideal standard, which, though much better than the Spartan in itself, they were disposed to impress upon society with a heavy-handed uniformity. That liberty of individual action, not merely from the over-restraints of law, but from the tyranny of jealous opinion, such as Periklês depicts in Athens, belongs more naturally to a democracy, where there is no select one or few to receive worship and set the fashion, than to any other form of government. But it is very rare even in democracies: nor can we dissemble the fact that none of the governments of modern times, democratical, aristocratical, or monarchical, presents any thing like the picture of generous tolerance towards social dissent, and spontaneity of individual taste, which we read in the speech of the Athenian statesman. In all of them, the intolerance of the national opinion cuts down individual character to one out of a few set types, to which every person, or every family, is constrained to adjust itself, and beyond which all exceptions meet either with hatred or with derision. To impose upon

men such restraints either of law or of opinion as are requisite for the security and comfort of society, but to encourage rather than repress the free play of individual impulse subject to those limits,—is an ideal, which, if it was ever approached at Athens, has certainly never been attained, and has indeed comparatively been little studied or cared for in any modern society.

Connected with this reciprocal indulgence of individual diversity, was not only the hospitable reception of all strangers at Athens, which Periklês contrasts with the xenêlasy or jealous expulsion practised at Sparta,—but also the many-sided activity, bodily and mental, visible in the former, so opposite to that narrow range of thought, exclusive discipline of the body and never-ending preparation for war, which formed the system of the latter. His assertion that Athens was equal to Sparta, even in her own solitary excellence,—efficiency on the field of battle,—is doubtless untenable; but not the less impressive is his sketch of that multitude of concurrent impulses which at this same time agitated and impelled the Athenian mind,—the strength of one not implying the weakness of the remainder: the relish for all pleasures of art and elegance, and the appetite for intellectual expansion, coinciding in the same bosom with energetic promptitude as well as endurance: abundance of recreative spectacles, yet noway abating the cheerfulness of obedience even to the hardest calls of patriotic duty: that combination of reason and courage which encountered danger the more willingly from having discussed and calculated it beforehand: lastly, an anxious interest as well as a competence of judgment in public discussion and public action, common to every citizen rich and poor, and combined with every man's own private industry. So comprehensive an ideal of many-sided social development, bringing out the capacities for action and endurance, as well as those for enjoyment, would be sufficiently remarkable, even if we supposed it only existing in the imagination of a philosopher: but it becomes still more so when we recollect that the main features of it at least were drawn from the fellow-citizens of the speaker. It must be taken, however, as belonging peculiarly to the Athens of Periklês and his contemporaries; nor would it have suited either the period of the Persian war, fifty years before, or that of Demosthenês, seventy years afterwards. At the former period, the art, the letters, and the philosophy, were as yet backward, while even the active energy and democratical stimulus, though very powerful, had not been worked up to the pitch which they afterwards reached: at the latter period, although the intellectual manifestations of Athens subsist in full or even increased vigor, we shall find the personal enterprise and energetic spirit of her citizens materially abated. As the circumstances, which I have already recounted, go far to explain the previous upward movement, so those which fill the coming chapters, containing the disasters of the Peloponnesian war, will be found to explain still more completely the declining tendency shortly about to commence. Athens was brought to the brink of entire ruin, from which it is surprising that she recovered at all,—but noway surprising that she recovered at the expense of a considerable loss of personal energy in the character of her citizens.

And thus the season at which Periklês delivered his discourse lends to it an additional and peculiar pathos. It was delivered at a time when Athens was as yet erect and at her maximum for though her real power was, doubtless, much diminished, compared with the period before the thirty years' truce, yet the great edifices and works of art, achieved since then, tended to compensate that loss, in so far as the sense of greatness was concerned; and no one, either citizen or enemy, considered Athens as having at all declined. It was delivered at the commencement of the great struggle with the Peloponnesian confederacy, the coming hardships of which Periklês never disguised either to himself or to his fellow-citizens, though he fully counted upon eventual success. Attica had been already invaded; it was no longer "the unwasted territory," as Euripidês had designated it in his tragedy Medea,[269] represented three or four months before the march of Archidamus,—and a picture of Athens in her social glory was well calculated both to rouse the pride and nerve the courage of those individuals citizens, who had been compelled once, and would be compelled again and again, to abandon their country-residence and fields for a thin tent or confined hole in the city.[270] Such calamities might, indeed, be foreseen: but there was one still greater calamity, which, though actually then impending, could not be foreseen: the terrific pestilence which will be recounted in the coming chapter. The bright colors, and tone of cheerful confidence, which pervade the discourse of Periklês, appear the more striking from being in immediate antecedence to the awful description of this distemper: a contrast to which Thucydidês was, doubtless, not insensible, and which is another circumstance enhancing the interest of the composition.

CHAPTER XLIX.

FROM THE BEGINNING OE THE SECOND YEAR DOWN TO THE END OF THE THIRD YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

At the close of one year after the attempted surprise of Platæa by the Thebans, the belligerent parties in Greece remained in an unaltered position as to relative strength. Nothing decisive had been accomplished on either side, either by the invasion of Attica, or by the flying descents round the coast of Peloponnesus: in spite of mutual damage inflicted,—doubtless, in the greatest measure upon Attica,—no progress was yet made towards the fulfilment of those objects which had induced the Peloponnesians to go to war. Especially, the most pressing among all their wishes —the relief of Potidæa—was noway advanced; for the Athenians had not found it necessary to relax the blockade of that city. The result of the first year's operations had thus been to disappoint the hopes of the Corinthians and the other ardent instigators of war, while it justified the anticipations both of Periklês and of Archidamus.

A second devastation of Attica was resolved upon for the commencement of spring; and measures were taken for carrying it all over that territory, since the settled policy of Athens not to hazard a battle with the invaders was now ascertained. About the end of March, or beginning of April, the entire Peloponnesian force—two-thirds from each confederate city, as before—was assembled under the command of Archidamus, and marched into Attica. This time they carried the work of systematic destruction, not merely over the Thriasian plain and the plain immediately near to Athens, as before; but also to the more southerly portions of Attica, down even as far as the mines of Laurium. They traversed and ravaged both the eastern and the western coast, remaining not less than forty days in the country. They found the territory deserted as before, all the population having retired within the walls.[271]

In regard to this second invasion, Periklês recommended the same defensive policy as he had applied to the first; and, apparently, the citizens had now come to acquiesce in it, if not willingly, at least with a full conviction of its necessity. But a new visitation had now occurred, diverting their attention from the invader, though enormously aggravating their sufferings. A few days after Archidamus entered Attica, a pestilence, or epidemic sickness, broke out unexpectedly at Athens.

It appears that this terrific disorder had been raging for some time throughout the regions round the Mediterranean; having begun, as was believed, in Æthiopia,—thence passing into Egypt and Libya, and overrunning a considerable portion of Asia under the Persian government: about sixteen years before, too, there had been a similar calamity in Rome and in various parts of Italy. Recently, it had been felt in Lemnos and some other islands of the Ægean, yet seemingly not with such intensity

as to excite much notice generally in the Grecian world: at length it passed to Athens, and first showed itself in the Peiræus. The progress of the disease was as rapid and destructive as its appearance had been sudden; whilst the extraordinary accumulation of people within the city and long walls, in consequence of the presence of the invaders in the country, was but too favorable to every form of contagion. Families crowded together in close cabins and places of temporary shelter,[272] —throughout a city constructed, like most of those in Greece, with little regard to the conditions of salubrity,—and in a state of mental chagrin from the forced abandonment and sacrifice of their properties in the country, transmitted the disorder with fatal facility from one to the other. Beginning as it did about the middle of April, the increasing heat of summer farther aided the disorder, the symptoms of which, alike violent and sudden, made themselves the more remarked because the year was particularly exempt from maladies of every other description.[273]

Of this plague,—or, more properly, eruptive typhoid fever,[274] distinct from, yet analogous to, the smallpox,—a description no less clear than impressive has been left by the historian Thucydidês, himself not only a spectator but a sufferer. It is not one of the least of his merits, that his notice of the symptoms, given at so early a stage of medical science and observation, is such as to instruct the medical reader of the present age, and to enable the malady to be understood and identified. The observations, with which that notice is ushered in, deserve particular attention. "In respect to this distemper (he says), let every man, physician or not, say what he thinks respecting the source from whence it may probably have arisen, and respecting the causes which he deems sufficiently powerful to have produced so great a revolution. But I, having myself had the distemper, and having seen others suffering under it, will state *what it actually was*, and will indicate, in addition, such other matters, as will furnish any man, who lays them to heart, with knowledge and the means of calculation beforehand, in case the same misfortune should ever again occur."[275] To record past facts, as a basis for rational prevision in regard to the future,—the same sentiment which Thucydidês mentions in his preface,[276] as having animated him to the composition of his history,—was at that time a duty so little understood, that we have reason to admire not less the manner in which he performs it in practice, than the distinctness with which he conceives it in theory. We may infer from his language that speculation in his day was active respecting the causes of this plague, according to the vague and fanciful physics and scanty stock of ascertained facts, which was all that could then be consulted. By resisting the itch of theorising from one of those loose hypotheses which then appeared plausibly to explain everything, he probably renounced the point of view from which most credit and interest would be derivable at the time: but his simple and precise summary of observed facts carries with it an imperishable value, and even affords grounds for imagining, that he was no stranger to the habits and training of his contemporary, Hippokratês, and the other Asklepiads of Cos.[277]

It is hardly within the province of an historian of Greece to repeat after Thucydidês the painful enumeration of symptoms, violent in the extreme, and pervading every portion of the bodily system, which marked this fearful disorder. Beginning in Peiræus, it quickly passed into the city, and both the one and the other was speedily filled with sickness and suffering, the like of which had never before been known. The seizures were perfectly sudden, and a large proportion of the sufferers perished, after deplorable agonies, on the seventh or on the ninth day: others, whose strength of constitution carried them over this period, found themselves the victims of exhausting and incurable diarrhœa afterwards: with others again, after traversing both these stages, the distemper fixed itself in some particular member, the eyes, the genitals, the hands, or the feet, which were rendered permanently useless, or in some cases amputated, even where the patient himself recovered. There were also some whose recovery was attended with a total loss of memory, so that they no more knew themselves or recognized their friends. No treatment or remedy appearing, except in accidental cases, to produce any beneficial effect, the physicians or surgeons whose aid was invoked became completely at fault; while trying their accustomed means without avail, they soon ended by catching the malady themselves and perishing: nor were the charms and incantations[278] to which the unhappy patient resorted, likely to be more efficacious. While some asserted that the Peloponnesians had poisoned the cisterns of water, others referred the visitation to the wrath of the gods, and especially to Apollo, known by hearers of the Iliad as author of pestilence in the Greek host before Troy. It was remembered that this Delphian god had promised the Lacedæmonians, in reply to their application immediately before the war, that he would assist them whether invoked or uninvoked,—and the disorder now raging was ascribed to the intervention of their irresistible ally: while the elderly men farther called to mind an oracular verse sung in the time of their youth: "The Dorian war will come, and pestilence along with it."[279] Under the distress which suggested, and was reciprocally aggravated by, these gloomy ideas, prophets were consulted, and supplications with solemn procession were held at the temples, to appease the divine wrath.

When it was found that neither the priest nor the physician could retard the spread, or mitigate the intensity, of the disorder, the Athenians abandoned themselves to utter despair, and the space within the walls became a scene of desolating misery. Every man attacked with the malady at once lost his courage,—a state of depression, itself among the worst features of the case, which made him lie down and die, without the least attempt to seek for any preservatives. And though, at first, friends and relatives lent their aid to tend the sick with the usual family sympathies, yet so terrible was the number of these attendants who perished, "like sheep," from such contact, that at length no man would thus expose himself; while the most generous spirits, who persisted longest in the discharge of their duty, were carried off in the greatest numbers.[280] The patient was thus left to die alone and unheeded: sometimes all the inmates of a house were swept away one after the other, no man

being willing to go near it: desertion on one hand, attendance on the other, both tended to aggravate the calamity. There remained only those who, having had the disorder and recovered, were willing to tend the sufferers. These men formed the single exception to the all-pervading misery of the time,—for the disorder seldom attacked any one twice, and when it did, the second attack was never fatal. Elate with their own escape, they deemed themselves out of the reach of all disease, and were full of compassionate kindness for others whose sufferings were just beginning. It was from them, too, that the principal attention to the bodies of deceased victims proceeded: for such was the state of dismay and sorrow, that even the nearest relatives neglected the sepulchral duties, sacred beyond all others in the eyes of a Greek. Nor is there any circumstance which conveys to us so vivid an idea of the prevalent agony and despair, as when we read, in the words of an eye-witness, that the deaths took place among this close-packed crowd without the smallest decencies of attention,[281]—that the dead and the dying lay piled one upon another, not merely in the public roads, but even in the temples, in spite of the understood defilement of the sacred building,—that half-dead sufferers were seen lying round all the springs, from insupportable thirst,—that the numerous corpses thus unburied and exposed, were in such a condition, that the dogs which meddled with them died in consequence, while no vultures or other birds of the like habits ever came near. Those bodies which escaped entire neglect, were burnt or buried[282] without the customary mourning, and with unseemly carelessness. In some cases, the bearers of a body, passing by a funeral pile on which another body was burning, would put their own there to be burnt also;[283] or perhaps, if the pile was prepared ready for a body not yet arrived, would deposit their own upon it, set fire to the pile, and then depart. Such indecent confusion would have been intolerable to the feelings of the Athenians, in any ordinary times.

To all these scenes of physical suffering, death, and reckless despair, was superadded another evil, which affected those who were fortunate enough to escape the rest. The bonds both of law and morality became relaxed, amidst such total uncertainty of every man both for his own life, and that of others. Men cared not to abstain from wrong, under circumstances in which punishment was not likely to overtake them,—nor to put a check upon their passions, and endure privations in obedience even to their strongest conviction, when the chance was so small of their living to reap reward or enjoy any future esteem. An interval short and sweet, before their doom was realized—before they became plunged in the wide-spread misery which they witnessed around, and which affected indiscriminately the virtuous and the profligate—was all they looked to enjoy; embracing with avidity the immediate pleasures of sense, as well as such positive gains, however ill-gotten, as could be made the means of procuring them, and throwing aside all thought both of honor or of long-sighted advantage. Life and property were alike ephemeral, nor was there any hope left but to snatch a moment of enjoyment, before the outstretched hand of destiny should fall upon its victims.

The melancholy picture of society under the pressure of a murderous epidemic, with its train of physical torments, wretchedness, and demoralization, has been drawn by more than one eminent author, but by none with more impressive fidelity and conciseness than by Thucydidês,[284] who had no predecessor, and nothing but the reality to copy from. We may remark that, amidst all the melancholy accompaniments of the time, there are no human sacrifices, such as those offered up at Carthage during pestilence to appease the anger of the gods,—there are no cruel persecutions against imaginary authors of the disease, such as those against the Untori (anointers of doors) in the plague of Milan in 1630.[285] Three years altogether did this calamity desolate Athens: continuously, during the entire second and third years of the war,—after which, followed a period of marked abatement for a year and a half: but it then revived again, and lasted for another year, with the same fury as at first. The public loss, over and above the private misery, which this unexpected enemy inflicted upon Athens, was incalculable. Out of twelve hundred horsemen, all among the rich men of the state, three hundred died of the epidemic; besides four thousand and four hundred hoplites out of the roll formerly kept, and a number of the poorer population so great as to defy computation.[286] No efforts of the Peloponnesians could have done so much to ruin Athens, or to bring the war to a termination such as they desired: and the distemper told the more in their favor, as it never spread at all into Peloponnesus, though it passed from Athens to some of the more populous islands.[287] The Lacedæmonian army was withdrawn from Attica somewhat earlier than it would otherwise have been, for fear of taking the contagion.[288]

But it was while the Lacedæmonians were yet in Attica, and during the first freshness of the terrible malady, that Periklês equipped and conducted from Peiræus an armament of one hundred triremes, and four thousand hoplites to attack the coasts of Peloponnesus: three hundred horsemen were also carried in some horse-transports, prepared for the occasion out of old triremes. To diminish the crowd accumulated in the city, was doubtless of beneficial tendency, and perhaps those who went aboard, might consider it as a chance of escape to quit an infected home. But unhappily they carried the infection along with them, which desolated the fleet not less than the city, and crippled all its efforts. Reinforced by fifty ships of war from Chios and Lesbos, the Athenians first landed near Epidaurus in Peloponnesus, ravaging the territory, and making an unavailing attempt upon the city: next, they made like incursions on the more southerly portions of the Argolic peninsula,—Trœzen, Halieis, and Hermionê; and lastly attacked and captured Prasiæ, on the eastern coast of Laconia. On returning to Athens, the same armament was immediately conducted, under Agnon and Kleopompus, to press the siege of Potidæa, the blockade of which still continued without any visible progress. On arriving there, an attack was made on the walls by battering engines, and by the other aggressive methods then practised; but nothing whatever was achieved. In fact, the armament became incompetent for all serious effort, from the aggravated character which the distemper here assumed,

communicated by the soldiers fresh from Athens, even to those who had before been free from it at Potidæa. So frightful was the mortality, that out of the four thousand hoplites under Agnon, no less than ten hundred and fifty died in the short space of forty days. The armament was brought back in this melancholy condition to Athens, while the reduction of Potidæa was left, as before, to the slow course of blockade. [289]

On returning from the expedition against Peloponnesus, Periklês found his countrymen almost distracted[290] with their manifold sufferings. Over and above the raging epidemic, they had just gone over Attica and ascertained the devastations committed by the invaders throughout all the territory—except the Marathonian[291] Tetrapolis and Dekeleia; districts spared, as we are told, through indulgence founded on an ancient legendary sympathy—during their long stay of forty days. The rich had found their comfortable mansions and farms, the poor their modest cottages, in the various demes, torn down and ruined. Death,[292] sickness, loss of property, and despair of the future, now rendered the Athenians angry and intractable to the last degree; and they vented their feelings against Periklês, as the cause, not merely of the war, but also of all that they were now enduring. Either with or without his consent, they sent envoys to Sparta to open negotiations for peace, but the Spartans turned a deaf ear to the proposition. This new disappointment rendered them still more furious against Periklês, whose long-standing political enemies now doubtless found strong sympathy in their denunciations of his character and policy. That unshaken and majestic firmness, which ranked first among his many eminent qualities, was never more imperiously required, and never more effectively manifested. In his capacity of stratêgus, or general, he convoked a formal assembly of the people, for the purpose of vindicating himself publicly against the prevailing sentiment, and recommending perseverance in his line of policy. The speeches made by his opponents, assuredly very bitter, are not given by Thucydidês; but that of Periklês himself is set down at considerable length, and a memorable discourse it is. It strikingly brings into relief both the character of the man and the impress of actual circumstances,—an impregnable mind, conscious not only of right purposes, but of just and reasonable anticipations, and bearing up with manliness, or even defiance, against the natural difficulty of the case, heightened by an extreme of incalculable misfortune. He had foreseen,[293] while advising the war originally, the probable impatience of his countrymen under its first hardships, but he could not foresee the epidemic by which that impatience had been exasperated into madness: and he now addressed them, not merely with unabated adherence to his own deliberate convictions, but also in a tone of reproachful remonstrance against their unmerited change of sentiment towards him,—seeking at the same time to combat that uncontrolled despair which, for the moment, overlaid both their pride and their patriotism. Far from humbling himself before the present sentiment, it is at this time that he sets forth his titles to their esteem in the most direct and unqualified manner, and claims the continuance of that which they had so long accorded, as something belonging to him by acquired right.

His main object, throughout this discourse, is to fill the minds of his audience with patriotic sympathy for the weal of the entire city, so as to counterbalance the absorbing sense of private woe. If the collective city flourishes, he argues, private misfortunes may at least be borne: but no amount of private prosperity will avail, if the collective city falls; a proposition literally true in ancient times, and under the circumstances of ancient warfare, though less true at present. "Distracted by domestic calamity, ye are now angry both with me, who advised you to go to war, and with yourselves, who followed the advice. Ye listened to me, considering me superior to others in judgment, in speech, in patriotism, and in incorruptible probity,[294]—nor ought I now to be treated as culpable for giving such advice, when in point of fact the war was unavoidable, and there would have been still greater danger in shrinking from it. I am the same man, still unchanged,—but ye, in your misfortunes, cannot stand to the convictions which ye adopted when yet unhurt. Extreme and unforeseen, indeed, are the sorrows which have fallen upon you: yet, inhabiting as ye do a great city, and brought up in dispositions suitable to it, ye must also resolve to bear up against the utmost pressure of adversity, and never to surrender your dignity. I have often explained to you that ye have no reason to doubt of eventual success in the war, but I will now remind you, more emphatically than before, and even with a degree of ostentation suitable as a stimulus to your present unnatural depression,—that your naval force makes you masters, not only of your allies, but of the entire sea,[295]—one half of the visible field for action and employment. Compared with so vast a power as this, the temporary use of your houses and territory is a mere trifle,—an ornamental accessory not worth considering; and this, too, if ye preserve your freedom, ye will quickly recover. It was your fathers who first gained this empire, without any of the advantages which ye now enjoy; ye must not disgrace yourselves by losing what they acquired. Delighting as ye all do in the honor and empire enjoyed by the city, ye must not shrink from the toils whereby alone that honor is sustained: moreover, ye now fight, not merely for freedom instead of slavery, but for empire against loss of empire, with all the perils arising out of imperial unpopularity. It is not safe for you now to abdicate, even if ye chose to do so; for ye hold your empire like a despotism,—unjust perhaps in the original acquisition, but ruinous to part with when once acquired. Be not angry with me, whose advice ye followed in going to war, because the enemy have done such damage as might be expected from them; still less on account of this unforeseen distemper: I know that this makes me an object of your special present hatred, though very unjustly, unless ye will consent to give me credit also for any unexpected good luck which may occur. Our city derives its particular glory from unshaken bearing up against misfortune: her power, her name, her empire of Greeks over Greeks, are such as have never before been seen: and if we choose to be great, we must take the consequence of that temporary envy and hatred which is the necessary price of permanent renown. Behave ye now in a manner worthy of that glory: display that courage which is essential to protect you against disgrace at present, as well as to guarantee your honor for the fu-

ture. Send no farther embassy to Sparta, and bear your misfortunes without showing symptoms of distress."[296]

The irresistible reason, as well as the proud and resolute bearing of this discourse, set forth with an eloquence which it was not possible for Thucydidês to reproduce,—together with the age and character of Periklês,—carried the assent of the assembled people; who, when in the Pnyx, and engaged according to habit on public matters, would for a moment forget their private sufferings in considerations of the safety and grandeur of Athens: possibly, indeed, those sufferings, though still continuing, might become somewhat alleviated when the invaders quitted Attica, and when it was no longer indispensable for all the population to confine itself within the walls. Accordingly, the assembly resolved that no farther propositions should be made for peace, and that the war should be prosecuted with vigor. But though the public resolution thus adopted showed the ancient habit of deference to the authority of Periklês, the sentiments of individuals taken separately were still those of anger against him, as the author of that system which had brought them into so much distress. His political opponents—Kleon, Simmias, or Lakratidas, perhaps all three in conjunction—took care to provide an opportunity for this prevalent irritation to manifest itself in act, by bringing an accusation against him before the dikastery. The accusation is said to have been preferred on the ground of pecuniary malversation, and ended by his being sentenced to pay a considerable fine, the amount of which is differently reported,—fifteen, fifty, or eighty talents, by different authors.[297] The accusing party thus appeared to have carried their point, and to have disgraced, as well as excluded from reëlection, the veteran statesman. But the event disappointed their expectations: the imposition of the fine not only satiated all the irritation of the people against him, but even occasioned a serious reaction in his favor, and brought back as strongly as ever the ancient sentiment of esteem and admiration. It was quickly found that those who had succeeded Periklês as generals, neither possessed nor deserved in an equal degree, the public confidence, and he was accordingly soon reëlected, with as much power and influence as he had ever in his life enjoyed.[298]

But that life—long, honorable, and useful—had already been prolonged considerably beyond the sixtieth year, and there were but too many circumstances, besides the recent fine, which tended to hasten as well as to embitter its close. At the very moment when Periklês was preaching to his countrymen, in a tone almost reproachful, the necessity of manful and unabated devotion to the common country, in the midst of private suffering,—he was himself among the greatest of sufferers, and most hardly pressed to set the example of observing his own precepts. The epidemic carried off not merely his two sons, the only two legitimate, Xanthippus and Paralus, but also his sister, several other relatives, and his best and most useful political friends. Amidst this train of domestic calamities, and in the funeral obsequies of so many of his dearest friends, he remained master of his grief, and maintained his habitual self-command, until the last misfortune,—the death of his favorite son Paralus,

which left his house without any legitimate representative to maintain the family and the hereditary sacred rites. On this final blow, though he strove to command himself as before, yet, at the obsequies of the young man, when it became his duty to place a garland on the dead body, his grief became uncontrollable, and he burst out, for the first time of his life, into profuse tears and sobbing.[299]

In the midst of these several personal trials he received the intimation, through Alkibiadês and some other friends, of the restored confidence of the people towards him, and of his re-election to the office of stratêgus: nor was it without difficulty that he was persuaded to present himself again at the public assembly, and resume the direction of affairs. The regret of the people was formally expressed to him for the recent sentence,—perhaps, indeed, the fine may have been repaid to him, or some evasion of it permitted, saving the forms of law,[300]—in the present temper of the city; which was farther displayed towards him by the grant of a remarkable exemption from a law of his own original proposition. He had himself, some years before, been the author of that law, whereby the citizenship of Athens was restricted to persons born both of Athenian fathers and Athenian mothers, under which restriction several thousand persons, illegitimate on the mother's side, are said to have been deprived of the citizenship, on occasion of a public distribution of corn. Invidious as it appeared to grant, to Periklês singly, an exemption from a law which had been strictly enforced against so many others, the people were now moved not less by compassion than by anxiety to redress their own previous severity. Without a legitimate heir, the house of Periklês, one branch of the great Alkmæônid gens by his mother's side, would be left deserted, and the continuity of the family sacred rites would be broken,—a misfortune painfully felt by every Athenian family, as calculated to wrong all the deceased members, and provoke their posthumous displeasure towards the city. Accordingly, permission was granted to Periklês to legitimize, and to inscribe in his own gens and phratry his natural son by Aspasia, who bore his own name.[301]

It was thus that Periklês was reinstated in his post of stratêgus, as well as in his ascendency over the public counsels,—seemingly about August or September, 430 B.C. He lived about one year longer, and seems to have maintained his influence as long as his health permitted. Yet we hear nothing of him after this moment, and he fell a victim, not to the violent symptoms of the epidemic, but to a slow and wearing fever,[302] which underminded his strength as well as his capacity. To a friend who came to ask after him when in this disease, Periklês replied by showing a charm or amulet which his female relations had hung about his neck,—a proof how low he was reduced, and how completely he had become a passive subject in the hands of others. And according to another anecdote which we read, yet more interesting and equally illustrative of his character,—it was during his last moments, when he was lying apparently unconscious and insensible, that the friends around his bed were passing in review the acts of his life, and the nine trophies which he had erected at

different times for so many victories. He heard what they said, though they fancied that he was past hearing, and interrupted them by remarking: "What you praise in my life, belongs partly to good fortune,—and is, at best, common to me with many other generals. But the peculiarity of which I am most proud, you have not noticed, —no Athenian has ever put on mourning on my account."[303]

Such a cause of self-gratulation, doubtless more satisfactory to recall at such a moment than any other, illustrates that long-sighted calculation, aversion to distant or hazardous enterprise, and economy of the public force, which marked his entire political career; a career long, beyond all parallel, in the history of Athens,—since he maintained a great influence, gradually swelling into a decisive personal ascendency, for between thirty and forty years. His character has been presented in very different lights, by different authors, both ancient and modern, and our materials for striking the balance are not so good as we could wish. But his immense and long-continued ascendency, as well as his unparalleled eloquence, are facts attested not less by his enemies than by his friends,—nay, even more forcibly by the former than by the latter. The comic writers, who hated him, and whose trade it was to deride and hunt down every leading political character, exhaust their powers of illustration in setting forth both the one and the other:[304] Telekleidês, Kratinus, Eupolis, Aristophanês, all hearers and all enemies, speak of him like Olympian Zeus, hurling thunder and lightning,—like Hêraklês and Achilles,—as the only speaker on whose lips persuasion sat, and who left his sting in the minds of his audience: while Plato the philosopher,[305] who disapproved of his political working, and of the moral effects which he produced upon Athens, nevertheless extols his intellectual and oratorical ascendency: "his majestic intelligence,"—in language not less decisive than Thucydidês. There is another point of eulogy, not less valuable, on which the testimony appears uncontradicted: throughout his long career, amidst the hottest political animosities, the conduct of Periklês towards opponents was always mild and liberal.[306] The conscious self-esteem and arrogance of manner with which the contemporary poet Ion reproached him,[307] contrasting it with the unpretending simplicity of his own patron Kimon,—though probably invidiously exaggerated, is doubtless in substance well founded, and those who read the last speech given above out of Thucydidês, will at once recognize in it this attribute. His natural taste, his love of philosophical research, and his unwearied application to public affairs, all contributed to alienate him from ordinary familiarity, and to make him careless, perhaps improperly careless, of the lesser means of conciliating public favor.

But admitting this latter reproach to be well founded, as it seems to be, it helps to negative that greater and graver political crime which has been imputed to him, of sacrificing the permanent well-being and morality of the state to the maintenance of his own political power,—of corrupting the people by distributions of the public money. "He gave the reins to the people (in Plutarch's words[308]), and shaped his administration for their immediate favor, by always providing at home some public

spectacle, or festival, or procession, thus nursing up the city in elegant pleasures,—and by sending out every year sixty triremes, manned by citizen-seamen on full pay, who were thus kept in practice and acquired nautical skill." Now the charge here made against Periklês, and supported by allegations in themselves honorable rather than otherwise,—of a vicious appetite for immediate popularity, and of improper concessions to the immediate feelings of the people against their permanent interests,—is precisely that which Thucydidês, in the most pointed manner denies; and not merely denies, but contrasts Periklês with his successors in the express circumstances that *they* did so, while *he* did not. The language of the contemporary historian[309] well deserves to be cited: "Periklês, powerful from dignity of character as well as from wisdom, and conspicuously above the least tinge of corruption, held back the people with a free hand, and was their real leader instead of being led by them. For not being a seeker of power from unworthy sources, he did not speak with any view to present favor, but had sufficient sense of dignity to contradict them on occasion, even braving their displeasure. Thus, whenever he perceived them insolently and unseasonably confident, he shaped his speeches in such manner as to alarm and beat them down: when again he saw them unduly frightened, he tried to counteract it, and restore them confidence: so that the government was in name a democracy, but in reality an empire exercised by the first citizen in the state. But those who succeeded after his death, being more equal one with another, and each of them desiring preëminence over the rest, adopted the different course of courting the favor of the people, and sacrificing to that object even important state-interests. From whence arose many other bad measures, as might be expected in a great and imperial city, and especially the Sicilian expedition," etc.

It will be seen that the judgment here quoted from Thucydidês contradicts, in the most unqualified manner, the reproaches commonly made against Periklês, of having corrupted the Athenian people by distributions of the public money, and by giving way to their unwise caprices, for the purpose of acquiring and maintaining his own political power. Nay, the historian particularly notes the opposite qualities,—self-judgment, conscious dignity, indifference to immediate popular applause or wrath, when set against what was permanently right and useful,—as the special characteristic of that great statesman. A distinction might indeed be possible, and Plutarch professes to note such distinction, between the earlier and the later part of his long political career: he began, so that biographer says, by corrupting the people in order to acquire power, but having acquired it, he employed it in an independent and patriotic manner, so that the judgment of Thucydidês, true respecting the later part of his life, would not be applicable to the earlier. This distinction may be to a certain degree well founded, inasmuch as the power of opposing a bold and successful resistance to temporary aberrations of the public mind, necessarily implies an established influence, and can hardly ever be exercised even by the firmest politician during his years of commencement: he is at that time necessarily the adjunct of some party or tendency which he finds already in operation, and has to stand forward actively and as-

siduously before he can create for himself a separate personal influence. But while we admit the distinction to this extent, there is nothing to warrant us in restricting the encomium of Thucydidês exclusively to the later life of Periklês, or in representing the earlier life as something in pointed contrast with that encomium. Construing fairly what the historian says, he evidently did not so conceive the earlier life of Periklês. Either those political changes which are held by Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and others, to demonstrate the corrupting effect of Periklês and his political ascendency,—such as the limitation of the functions of the Areopagus, as well as of the power of the magistrates, the establishment of the numerous and frequent popular dikasteries with regular pay, and perhaps also the assignment of pay to those who attended the ekklesia, the expenditure for public works, religious edifices and ornaments, the diobely (or distribution of two oboli per head to the poorer citizens at various festivals, in order that they might be able to pay for their places in the theatre), taking it as it then stood, etc.,—did not appear to Thucydidês mischievous and corrupting, as these other writers thought them; or else he did not particularly refer them to Periklês.

Both are true, probably, to some extent. The internal political changes at Athens, respecting the Areopagus and the dikasteries, took place when Periklês was a young man, and when he cannot be supposed to have yet acquired the immense personal ascendency which afterwards belonged to him. Ephialtês in fact seems in those early days to have been a greater man than Periklês, if we may judge by the fact that he was selected by his political adversaries for assassination,—so that they might with greater propriety be ascribed to the party with which Periklês was connected, rather than to that statesman himself. But next, we have no reason to presume that Thucydidês considered these changes as injurious, or as having deteriorated the Athenian character. All that he does say as to the working of Periklês on the sentiment and actions of his countrymen, is eminently favorable. He represents the presidency of that statesman as moderate, cautious, conservative, and successful; he describes him as uniformly keeping back the people from rash enterprises, and from attempts to extend their empire,—as looking forward to the necessity of a war, and maintaining the naval, military, and financial forces of the state in constant condition to stand it,—as calculating, with long-sighted wisdom, the conditions on which ultimate success depended. If we follow the elaborate funeral harangue of Periklês, which Thucydidês, since he produces it at length, probably considered as faithfully illustrating the political point of view of that statesman, we shall discover a conception of democratical equality no less rational than generous; an anxious care for the recreation and comfort of the citizens, but no disposition to emancipate them from active obligation, either public or private,—and least of all, any idea of dispensing with such activity by abusive largesses out of the general revenue. The whole picture, drawn by Periklês, of Athens, "as the schoolmistress of Greece," implies a prominent development of private industry and commerce, not less than of public citizenship and soldiership,—of letters, arts, and recreative varieties of taste.

Though Thucydidês does not directly canvass the constitutional changes effected in Athens under Periklês, yet everything which he does say leads us to believe that he accounted the working of that statesman, upon the whole, on Athenian power as well as on Athenian character, eminently valuable, and his death as an irreparable loss. And we may thus appeal to the judgment of an historian who is our best witness in every conceivable respect, as a valid reply to the charge against Periklês, of having corrupted the Athenian habits, character, and government. If he spent a large amount of the public treasure upon religious edifices and ornaments, and upon stately works for the city,—yet the sum which he left untouched, ready for use at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, was such as to appear more than sufficient for all purposes of defence, or public safety, or military honor. It cannot be shown of Periklês that he ever sacrificed the greater object to the less,—the permanent and substantially valuable, to the transitory and showy,—assured present possessions, to the lust of new, distant, or uncertain conquests. If his advice had been listened to, the rashness which brought on the defeat of the Athenian Tolmidês, at Korôneia in Bœotia, would have been avoided, and Athens might probably have maintained her ascendency over Megara and Bœotia, which would have protected her territory from invasion, and given a new turn to the subsequent history. Periklês is not to be treated as the author of the Athenian character: he found it with its very marked positive characteristics and susceptibilities, among which, those which he chiefly brought out and improved were the best. The lust of expeditions against the Persians, which Kimon would have pushed into Egypt and Cyprus, he repressed, after it had accomplished all which could be usefully aimed at: the ambition of Athens he moderated rather than encouraged: the democratical movement of Athens he regularized, and worked out into judicial institutions, which became one of the prominent features of Athenian life, and worked, in my judgment, with a very large balance of benefit to the national mind as well as to individual security, in spite of the many defects in their direct character as tribunals. But that point in which there was the greatest difference between Athens, as Periklês found if, and as he left it, is, unquestionably, the pacific and intellectual development,—rhetoric, poetry, arts, philosophical research, and recreative variety. To which if we add, great improvement in the cultivation of the Attic soil,—extension of Athenian trade,—attainment and laborious maintenance of the maximum of maritime skill, attested by the battles of Phormio,—enlargement of the area of complete security by construction of the Long Walls,—lastly, the clothing of Athens in her imperial mantle, by ornaments, architectural and sculptural,—we shall make out a case of genuine progress realized during the political life of Periklês, such as the evils imputed to him, far more imaginary than real, will go but a little way to alloy. How little, comparatively speaking, of the picture drawn by Periklês in his funeral harangue of 431 B.C. would have been correct, if the harangue had been delivered over those warriors who fell at Tanagra, twenty-seven years before!

It has been remarked by M. Boeckh,[310] that Periklês sacrificed the landed proprietors of Attica to the maritime interests and empire of Athens. This is of course founded on the destructive invasions of the country during the Peloponnesian war; for down to the commencement of that war the position of Attic cultivators and proprietors was particularly enviable: and the censure of M. Boeckh, therefore, depends upon the question, how far Periklês contributed to produce, or had it in his power to avert, this melancholy war, in its results so fatal, not merely to Athens, but to the entire Grecian race. Now here again, if we follow attentively the narrative of Thucydidês, we shall see that in the judgment of that historian, not only Periklês did not bring on the war, but he could not have averted it without such concession as Athenian prudence, as well as Athenian patriotism peremptorily forbade: moreover, we shall see, that the calculations on which Periklês grounded his hopes of success if driven to war, were, in the opinion of the historian, perfectly sound and safe. We may even go farther, and affirm, that the administration of Periklês during the fourteen years preceding the war, exhibits a "moderation," to use the words of Thucydidês, [311] dictated especially by anxiety to avoid raising causes of war; though in the months immediately preceding the breaking out of the war, after the conduct of the Corinthians at Potidæa, and the resolutions of the congress at Sparta, he resisted strenuously all compliance with special demands from Sparta,—demands essentially insincere, and in which partial compliance would have lowered the dignity of Athens without insuring peace. The stories about Pheidias, Aspasia, and the Megarians, even if we should grant that there is some truth at the bottom of them, must, if we follow Thucydidês, be looked upon at worst as concomitants and pretexts, rather than as real causes, of the war: though modern authors, in speaking of Periklês, are but too apt to use expressions which tacitly assume these stories to be well founded.

Seeing then that Periklês did not bring on and could not have averted the Peloponnesian war,—that he steered his course in reference to that event with the long-sighted prudence of one who knew that the safety and the dignity of imperial Athens were essentially interwoven,—we have no right to throw upon him the blame of sacrificing the landed proprietors of Attica. These might, indeed, be excused for complaining, where they suffered so ruinously; but the impartial historian, looking at the whole of the case, cannot admit their complaints as a ground for censuring the Athenian statesman.

The relation of Athens to her allies, the weak point of her position, it was beyond the power of Periklês seriously to amend, probably also beyond his will, since the idea of political incorporation, as well as that of providing a common and equal confederate bond, sustained by effective federal authority between different cities, was rarely entertained even by the best Greek minds.[312] We hear that he tried to summon at Athens a congress of deputies from all cities of Greece, the allies of Athens included;[313] but the scheme could not be brought to bear, in consequence of the reluctance, noway surprising, of the Peloponnesians. Practically, the allies were not

badly treated during his administration: and if, among the other bad consequences of the prolonged war, they, as well as Athens, and all other Greeks come to suffer more and more, this depends upon causes with which he is not chargeable, and upon proceedings which departed altogether from his wise and sober calculations. Taking him altogether, with his powers of thought, speech, and action,—his competence, civil and military, in the council as well as in the field,—his vigorous and cultivated intellect, and his comprehensive ideas of a community in pacific and many-sided development,—his incorruptible public morality, caution, and firmness, in a country where all those qualities were rare, and the union of them in the same individual of course much rarer,—we shall find him without a parallel throughout the whole course of Grecian history.

Under the great mortality and pressure of sickness at Athens, their operations of war naturally languished; while the enemies also, though more active, had but little success. A fleet of one hundred triremes, with one thousand hoplites on board, was sent by the Lacedæmonians under Knêmus to attack Zakynthus, but accomplished nothing beyond devastation of the open parts of the island, and then returned home. And it was shortly after this, towards the month of September, that the Ambrakiots made an attack upon the Amphilochian town called Argos, situated on the southern coast of the gulf of Ambrakia: which town, as has been recounted in the preceding chapter, had been wrested from them two years before by the Athenians, under Phormio, and restored to the Amphilochians and Akarnanians. The Ambrakiots, as colonists and allies of Corinth, were at the same time animated by active enmity to the Athenian influence in Akarnania, and by desire to regain the lost town of Argos. Procuring aid from the Chaonians, and some other Epirotic tribes, they marched against Argos, and after laying waste the territory, endeavored to take the town by assault, but were repulsed, and obliged to retire.[314] This expedition appears to have impressed the Athenians with the necessity of a standing force to protect their interest in those parts; so that in the autumn Phormio was sent with a squadron of twenty triremes to occupy Naupaktus, now inhabited by the Messenians, as a permanent naval station, and to watch the entrance of the Corinthian gulf.[315] We shall find in the events of the succeeding year ample confirmation of this necessity.

Though the Peloponnesians were too inferior in maritime force to undertake formal war at sea against Athens, their single privateers, especially the Megarian privateers from the harbor of Nisæa, were active in injuring her commerce,[316]—and not merely the commerce of Athens, but also that of other neutral Greeks, without scruple or discrimination. Several merchantmen and fishing-vessels, with a considerable number of prisoners, were thus captured.[317] Such prisoners as fell into the hands of the Lacedæmonians,—even neutral Greeks as well as Athenians,—were all put to death, and their bodies cast into clefts of the mountains. In regard to the neutrals, this capture was piratical, and the slaughter unwarrantably cruel, judged even by the received practice of the Greeks, deficient as that was on the score of humanity: but

to dismiss these neutral prisoners, or to sell them as slaves, would have given publicity to a piratical capture and provoked the neutral towns, so that the prisoners were probably slain as the best way of getting rid of them and thus suppressing evidence. [318]

Some of these Peloponnesian privateers ranged as far as the southwestern coast of Asia Minor, where they found temporary shelter, and interrupted the trading-vessels from Phasêlis and Phenicia to Athens; to protect which, the Athenians despatched, in the course of the autumn, a squadron of six triremes under Melêsander. He was farther directed to insure the collection of the ordinary tribute from Athenian subject-allies, and probably to raise such contributions as he could elsewhere. In the prosecution of this latter duty, he undertook an expedition from the sea-coast against one of the Lykian towns in the interior, but his attack was repelled with loss, and he himself slain.[319]

An opportunity soon offered itself to the Athenians, of retaliating on Sparta for this cruel treatment of the maritime prisoners. In execution of the idea projected at the commencement of the war, the Lacedæmonians sent Anêristus and two others as envoys to Persia, for the purpose of soliciting from the Great King aids of money and troops against Athens; the dissensions among the Greeks thus gradually paving the way for him to regain his ascendency in the Ægean. Timagoras of Tegea, together with an Argeian named Pollis, without any formal mission from his city, and the Corinthian Aristeus, accompanied them. As the sea was in the power of Athens, they travelled overland through Thrace to the Hellespont; and Aristeus, eager to leave nothing untried for the relief of Potidæa, prevailed upon them to make application to Sitalkês, king of the Odrysian Thracians. That prince was then in alliance with Athens, and his son Sadokus had even received the grant of Athenian citizenship: yet the envoys thought it possible not only to detach him from the Athenian alliance, but even to obtain from him an army to act against the Athenians and raise the blockade of Potidæa,—this being refused, they lastly applied to him for a safe escort to the banks of the Hellespont, in their way towards Persia. But Learchus and Ameiniadês, then Athenian residents near the person of Sitalkês, had influence enough not only to cause rejection of these requests, but also to induce Sadokus, as a testimony of zeal in his new character of Athenian citizen, to assist them in seizing the persons of Aristeus and his companions in their journey through Thrace. Accordingly, the whole party were seized and conducted as prisoners to Athens, where they were forthwith put to death, without trial or permission to speak,—and their bodies cast into rocky chasms, as a reprisal for the captured seamen slain by the Lacedæmonians.[320]

Such revenge against Aristeus, the instigator of the revolt of Potidæa, relieved the Athenians from a dangerous enemy; and that blockaded city was now left to its fate. About midwinter it capitulated, after a blockade of two years, and after going through the extreme of suffering from famine, to such a degree that some of those who died were even eaten by the survivors. In spite of such intolerable distress, the

Athenian generals, Xenophon son of Euripidês and his two colleagues, admitted them to favorable terms of capitulation,—permitting the whole population and the Corinthian allies to retire freely, with a specified sum of money per head, as well as with one garment for each man and two for each woman,—so that they found shelter among the Chalkidic townships in the neighborhood. These terms were singularly favorable, considering the desperate state of the city, which must very soon have surrendered at discretion: but the hardships, even of the army without, in the cold of winter, were very severe, and they had become thoroughly tired both of the duration and the expense of the siege. The cost to Athens had been not less than two thousand talents; since the assailant force had never been lower than three thousand hoplites, during the entire two years of the siege, and for a portion of the time considerably greater,—each hoplite receiving two drachmas *per diem*. The Athenians at home, when they learned the terms of the capitulation, were displeased with the generals for the indulgence shown,—since a little additional patience would have constrained the city to surrender at discretion: in which case the expense would have been partly made good by selling the prisoners as slaves,—and Athenian vengeance probably gratified by putting the warriors to death.[321] A body of one thousand colonists were sent from Athens to occupy Potidæa and its vacant territory.[322]

Two full years had now elapsed since the actual commencement of war, by the attack of the Thebans on Platæa; yet the Peloponnesians had accomplished nothing of what they expected. They had not rescued Potidæa, nor had their twice-repeated invasion, although assisted by the unexpected disasters arising from the epidemic, as yet brought Athens to any sufficient humiliation,—though perhaps the envoys which she had sent during the foregoing summer with propositions for peace, contrary to the advice of Periklês, may have produced an impression that she could not hold out long. At the same time, the Peloponnesian allies had on their side suffered little damage, since the ravages inflicted by the Athenian fleet on their coast may have been nearly compensated by the booty which their invading troops gained in Attica. Probably by this time the public opinion in Greece had contracted an unhappy familiarity with the state of war, so that nothing but some decisive loss and humiliation on one side at least, if not on both, would suffice to terminate it. In this third spring, the Peloponnesians did not repeat their annual march into Attica,—deterred, partly, we may suppose, by fear of the epidemic yet raging there,—but still more by the strong desire of the Thebans to take their revenge on Platæa.

To this ill-fated city, Archidamus marched forthwith, at the head of the confederate army. But no sooner had he entered and begun to lay waste the territory, than the Platæan heralds came forth to arrest his hand, and accosted him in the following terms: "Archidamus, and ye men of Lacedæmon, ye act wrong, and in a manner neither worthy of yourselves nor of your fathers, in thus invading the territory of Platæa. For the Lacedæmonian Pausanias, son of Kleombrotus, after he had liberated Greece from the Persians, in conjunction with those Greeks who stood forward

to bear their share of the danger, offered sacrifice to Zeus Eleutherius, in the market-place of Platæa; and there, in presence of all the allies, assigned to the Platæans their own city and territory to hold in full autonomy, so that none should invade them wrongfully, or with a view to enslave them: should such invasion occur, the allies present pledged themselves to stand forward with all their force as protectors. While your fathers made to us this grant, in consideration of our valor and forwardness in that perilous emergency, ye are now doing the precise contrary: ye are come along with our worst enemies, the Thebans, to enslave us. And we on our side now adjure you, calling to witness the gods who sanctioned that oath, as well as your paternal and our local gods, not to violate the oath by doing wrong to the Platæan territory, but to let us live on in that autonomy which Pausanias guaranteed."[323]

Whereunto Archidamus replied: "Ye speak fairly, men of Platæa, if your conduct shall be in harmony with your words. Remain autonomous yourselves, as Pausanias granted, and help us to liberate those other Greeks, who, after having shared in the same dangers and sworn the same oath along with you, have now been enslaved by the Athenians. It is for their liberation and that of the other Greeks that this formidable outfit of war has been brought forth. Pursuant to your oaths, ye ought by rights, and we now invite you, to take active part in this object. But if ye cannot act thus, at least remain quiet, conformably to the summons which we have already sent to you; enjoy your own territory, and remain neutral,—receiving both parties as friends, but neither party for warlike purposes. With this we shall be satisfied."

The reply of Archidamus discloses by allusion a circumstance which the historian had not before directly mentioned; that the Lacedæmonians had sent a formal summons to the Platæans to renounce their alliance with Athens and remain neutral: at what time this took place,[324] we do not know, but it marks the peculiar sentiment attaching to the town. But the Platæans did not comply with the invitation thus twice repeated. The heralds, having returned for instructions into the city, brought back for answer, that compliance was impossible, without the consent of the Athenians, since their wives and families were now harbored at Athens: besides, if they should profess neutrality, and admit both parties as friends, the Thebans might again make an attempt to surprise their city. In reply to their scruples, Archidamus again addressed them: "Well, then, hand over your city and houses to us Lacedæmonians: mark out the boundaries of your territory: specify the number of your fruit-trees, and all your other property which admits of being numbered; and then retire whithersoever ye choose, as long as the war continues. As soon as it is over, we will restore to you all that we have received,—in the interim, we will hold it in trust, and keep it in cultivation, and pay you such an allowance as shall suffice for your wants."[325]

The proposition now made was so fair and tempting, that the general body of the Platæans were at first inclined to accept it, provided the Athenians would acquiesce; and they obtained from Archidamus a truce long enough to enable them to send envoys to Athens. After communication with the Athenian assembly, the envoys re-

turned to Platæa, bearing the following answer: "Men of Platæa, the Athenians say they have never yet permitted you to be wronged since the alliance first began,—nor will they now betray you, but will help you to the best of their power. And they adjure you, by the oaths which your fathers swore to them, not to depart in any way from the alliance."

This message awakened in the bosoms of the Platæans the full force of ancient and tenacious sentiment. They resolved to maintain, at all cost, and even to the extreme of ruin, if necessity should require it, their union with Athens. It was indeed impossible that they could do otherwise, considering the position of their wives and families, without the consent of the Athenians; and though we cannot wonder that the latter refused consent, we may yet remark, that, in their situation, a perfectly generous ally might well have granted it. For the forces of Platæa counted for little as a portion of the aggregate strength of Athens; nor could the Athenians possibly protect it against the superior land-force of their enemies,—in fact, so hopeless was the attempt that they never even tried, throughout the whole course of the long subsequent blockade.

The final refusal of the Platæans was proclaimed to Archidamus, by word of mouth from the walls, since it was not thought safe to send out any messenger. As soon as the Spartan prince heard the answer, he prepared for hostile operations,—apparently with very sincere reluctance, attested in the following invocation, emphatically pronounced:—

"Ye gods and heroes, who hold the Platæan territory, be ye my witnesses, that we have not in the first instance wrongfully—not until these Platæans have first renounced the oaths binding on all of us—invaded this territory, in which our fathers defeated the Persians after prayers to you, and which ye granted as propitious for Greeks to fight in,—nor shall we commit wrong in what we may do farther, for we have taken pains to tender reasonable terms, but without success. Be ye now consenting parties: may those who are beginning the wrong receive punishment for it,—may those who are aiming to inflict penalty righteously, obtain their object."

It was thus that Archidamus, in language delivered probably under the walls, and within hearing of the citizens who manned them, endeavored to conciliate the gods and heroes of that town which he was about to ruin and depopulate. The whole of this preliminary debate,[326] so strikingly and dramatically set forth by Thucydidês, illustrates forcibly the respectful reluctance with which the Lacedæmonians first brought themselves to assail this scene of the glories of their fathers. What deserves remark is, that their direct sentiment attaches itself, not at all to the Platæan people, but only to the Platæan territory; it is purely local, though it becomes partially transferred to the people, as tenants of this spot, by secondary association. It was, however, nothing but the long-standing antipathy[327] of the Thebans which induced Archidamus to undertake the enterprise; for the conquest of Platæa was of no avail

towards the main objects of the war, though its exposed situation caused it to be crushed between the two great contending forces in Greece.

Archidamus now commenced the siege forthwith, in full hopes that his numerous army, the entire strength of the Peloponnesian confederacy, would soon capture a place of no great size, and probably not very well fortified; yet defended by a resolute garrison of four hundred native citizens, with eighty Athenians: there was no one else in the town except one hundred and ten female slaves for cooking. The fruit-trees, cut down in laying waste the cultivated land, sufficed to form a strong palisade all round the town, so as completely to block up the inhabitants. Next, Archidamus, having abundance of timber near at hand in the forests of Kithæron, began to erect a mound up against a portion of the town wall, so as to be able to march up by an inclined plane, and thus take the place by assault. Wood, stones, and earth, were piled up in a vast heap,—cross palings of wood being carried on each side of it, in parallel lines at right angles to the town wall, for the purpose of keeping the loose mass of materials between them together. For seventy days and as many nights did the army labor at this work, without any intermission, taking turns for food and repose: and through such unremitting assiduity, the mound approached near to the height of the town wall. But as it gradually mounted up, the Platæans were not idle on their side: they constructed an additional wall of wood, which they planted on the top of their own town wall, so as to heighten the part over against the enemy's mound: sustaining it by brickwork behind, for which the neighboring houses furnished materials: hides, raw as well as dressed, were suspended in front of it, in order to protect their workmen against missiles, and the woodwork against fire-carrying arrows.[328] And as the besiegers still continued heaping up materials, to carry their mound up to the height even of this recent addition, the Platæans met them by breaking a hole in the lower part of their town wall, and pulling in the earth from the lower portion of the mound; which thus gave way at the top and left a vacant space near the wall, until the besiegers filled it up by letting down quantities of stiff clay rolled up in wattled reeds, which could not be pulled away in the same manner. Again, the Platæans dug a subterranean passage from the interior of their town to the ground immediately under the mound, and thus carried away unseen the lower earth belonging to the latter; so that the besiegers saw their mound continually sinking down, in spite of fresh additions at the top,—yet without knowing the reason. Nevertheless, it was plain that these stratagems would be in the end ineffectual, and the Platæans accordingly built a new portion of town wall in the interior, in the shape of a crescent, taking its start from the old town wall on each side of the mound: the besiegers were thus deprived of all benefit from the mound, assuming it to be successfully completed; since when they had marched over it, there stood in front of them a new town wall to be carried in like manner.

Nor was this the only method of attack employed. Archidamus farther brought up battering engines, one of which greatly shook and endangered the additional height

of wall built by the Platæans over against the mound; while others were brought to bear on different portions of the circuit of the town wall. Against these new assailants, various means of defence were used: the defenders on the walls threw down ropes, got hold of the head of the approaching engine, and pulled it by main force out of the right line, either upwards or sideways: or they prepared heavy wooden beams on the wall, each attached to both ends by long iron chains to two poles projecting at right angles from the wall, by means of which poles it was raised up and held aloft: so that at the proper moment, when the battering machine approached the wall, the chain was suddenly let go, and the beam fell down with great violence directly upon the engine and broke off its projecting beak.[329] However rude these defensive processes may seem, they were found effective against the besiegers, who saw themselves, at the close of three months' unavailing efforts, obliged to renounce the idea of taking the town in any other way than by the process of blockade and famine,—a process alike tedious and costly.[330]

Before they would incur so much inconvenience, however, they had recourse to one farther stratagem,—that of trying to set the town on fire. From the height of their mound, they threw down large quantities of fagots, partly into the space between the mound and the newly-built crescent piece of wall,—partly, as far as they could reach, into other parts of the city: pitch and other combustibles were next added, and the whole mass set on fire. The conflagration was tremendous, such as had never been before seen: a large portion of the town became unapproachable, and the whole of it narrowly escaped destruction. Nothing could have preserved it, had the wind been rather more favorable: there was indeed a farther story, of a most opportune thunder-storm coming to extinguish the flames, which Thucydidês does not seem to credit.[331] In spite of much partial damage, the town remained still defensible, and the spirit of the inhabitants unsubdued.

There now remained no other resource except to build a wall of circumvallation round Platæa, and trust to the slow process of famine. The task was distributed in suitable fractions among the various confederate cities, and completed about the middle of September, a little before the autumnal equinox.[332] Two distinct walls were constructed, with sixteen feet of intermediate space all covered in, so as to look like one very thick wall: there were, moreover, two ditches, out of which the bricks for the wall had been taken,—one on the inside towards Platæa, and the other on the outside against any foreign relieving force. The interior covered space between the walls was intended to serve as permanent quarters for the troops left on guard, consisting half of Bœotians and half of Peloponnesians.[333]

At the same time that Archidamus began the siege of Platæa, the Athenians on their side despatched a force of two thousand hoplites and two hundred horsemen, to the Chalkidic peninsula, under Xenophon son of Euripidês (with two colleagues), the same who had granted so recently the capitulation of Potidæa. It was necessary doubtless, to convoy and establish the new colonists who were about to occupy the

deserted site of Potidæa: moreover, the general had acquired some knowledge of the position and parties of the Chalkidic towns, and hoped to be able to act against them with effect. They first invaded the territory belonging to the Bottiæan town of Spartôlus, not without hopes that the city itself would be betrayed to them by intelligences within: but this was prevented by the arrival of an additional force from Olynthus, partly hoplites, partly peltasts. These peltasts, a species of troops between heavy-armed and light-armed, furnished with a pelta (or light shield), and short spear, or javelin, appear to have taken their rise among these Chalkidic Greeks, being equipped in a manner half Greek and half Thracian: we shall find them hereafter much improved and turned to account by some of the ablest Grecian generals. The Chalkidic hoplites are generally of inferior merit: on the other hand, their cavalry and their peltasts are very good: in the action which now took place under the walls of Spartôlus, the Athenian hoplites defeated those of the enemy, but their cavalry and their light troops were completely worsted by the Chalkidic. These latter, still farther strengthened by the arrival of fresh peltasts from Olynthus, ventured even to attack the Athenian hoplites, who thought it prudent to fall back upon the two companies left in reserve to guard the baggage. During this retreat they were harassed by the Chalkidic horse and light-armed, who retired when the Athenians turned upon them, but attacked them on all sides when on their march; and employed missiles so effectively that the retreating hoplites could no longer maintain a steady order, but took to flight, and sought refuge at Potidæa. Four hundred and thirty hoplites, near one-fourth of the whole force, together with all three generals, perished in this defeat, and the expedition returned in dishonor to Athens.[334]

In the western parts of Greece, the arms of Athens and her allies were more successful. The repulse of the Ambrakiots from the Amphilochian Argos, during the preceding year, had only exasperated them and induced them to conceive still larger plans of aggression against both the Akarnanians and Athenians. In concert with their mother-city Corinth, where they obtained warm support, they prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to take part in a simultaneous attack of Akarnania, by land as well as by sea, which would prevent the Akarnanians from concentrating their forces in any one point, and put each of their townships upon an isolated self-defence; so that all of them might be overpowered in succession, and detached, together with Kephallênia and Zakynthus, from the Athenian alliance. The fleet of Phormio at Naupaktus, consisting only of twenty triremes, was accounted incompetent to cope with a Peloponnesian fleet such as might be fitted out at Corinth. There was even some hope that the important station at Naupaktus might itself be taken, so as to expel the Athenians completely from those parts.

The scheme of operations now projected was far more comprehensive than anything which the war had yet afforded. The land-force of the Ambrakiots, together with their neighbors and fellow-colonists the Leukadians and Anaktorians, assembled near their own city, while their maritime force was collected at Leukas, on the Akar-

nanian coast. The force at Ambrakia was joined, not only by Knêmus, the Lacedæmonian admiral, with one thousand Peloponnesian hoplites, who found means to cross over from Peloponnesus, eluding the vigilance of Phormio,—but also by a numerous body of Epirotic and Macedonian auxiliaries, collected even from the distant and northernmost tribes. A thousand Chaonians were present, under the command of Photyus and Nikanor, two annual chiefs chosen from the regal gens. Neither this tribe, nor the Thesprotians who came along with them, acknowledged any hereditary king. The Molossians and Atintânes, who also joined the force, were under Sabylinthus, regent on behalf of the young prince Tharypas. There came, besides, the Paranæi, from the banks of the river Aôus under their king Orœdus, together with one thousand Orestæ, a tribe rather Macedonian than Epirot, sent by their king Antiochus. Even king Perdikkas, though then nominally in alliance with Athens, sent one thousand of his Macedonian subjects, who, however, arrived too late to be of any use.[335] This large and diverse body of Epirotic invaders, a new phenomenon in Grecian history, and got together doubtless by the hopes of plunder, proves the extensive relations of the tribes of the interior with the city of Ambrakia,—a city destined to become in later days the capital of the Epirotic king Pyrrhus.

It had been concerted that the Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth should join that already assembled at Leukas, and act upon the coast of Akarnania at the same time that the land-force marched into that territory. But Knêmus finding the land-force united and ready, near Ambrakia, deemed it unnecessary to await the fleet from Corinth, and marched straight into Akarnania, through Limnæa, a frontier village territory belonging to the Amphilochian Argos. He directed his march upon Stratus,—an interior town, and the chief place in Akarnania,—the capture of which would be likely to carry with it the surrender of the rest; especially as the Akarnanians, distracted by the presence of the ships at Leukas, and alarmed by the large body of invaders on their frontier, did not dare to leave their own separate homes, so that Stratus was left altogether to its own citizens. Nor was Phormio, though they sent an urgent message to him, in any condition to help them; since he could not leave Naupaktus unguarded, when the large fleet from Corinth was known to be approaching. Under such circumstances, Knêmus and his army indulged the most confident hopes of overpowering Stratus without difficulty. They marched in three divisions: the Epirots in the centre,—the Leukadians and Anaktorians on the right,—the Peloponnesians and Ambrakiots, together with Knêmus himself, on the left. So little expectation was entertained of resistance, that these three divisions took no pains to keep near or even in sight of each other. Both the Greek divisions, indeed, maintained a good order of march, and kept proper scouts on the look out; but the Epirots advanced without any care or order whatever; especially the Chaonians, who formed the van. These men, accounted the most warlike of all the Epirotic tribes, were so full of conceit and rashness, that when they approached near to Stratus, they would not halt to encamp and assail the place conjointly with the Greeks; but marched along with the other Epirots right forward to the town, intending to attack it single-handed, and

confident that they should carry it at the first assault, before the Greeks came up, so that the entire glory would be theirs. The Stratians watched and profited by this imprudence. Planting ambuscades in convenient places, and suffering the Epirots to approach without suspicion near to the gates, they then suddenly sallied out and attacked them, while the troops in ambuscade rose up and assailed them at the same time. The Chaonians who formed the van, thus completely surprised, were routed with great slaughter; while the other Epirots fled, after but little resistance. So much had they hurried forward in advance of their Greek allies, that neither the right nor the left division were at all aware of the battle, until the flying barbarians, hotly pursued by the Akarnanians, made it known to them. The two divisions then joined, protected the fugitives, and restrained farther pursuit,—the Stratians declining to come to hand-combat with them until the other Akarnanians should arrive. They seriously annoyed the forces of Knêmus, however, by distant slinging, in which the Akarnanians were preëminently skilful; nor did Knêmus choose to persist in his attack under such discouraging circumstances. As soon as night arrived, so that there was no longer any fear of slingers, he retreated to the river Anapus, a distance of between nine and ten miles. Well aware that the news of the victory would attract other Akarnanian forces immediately to the aid of Stratus, he took advantage of the arrival of his own Akarnanian allies from Œniadæ (the only town in the country which was attached to the Lacedæmonian interest), and sought shelter near their city. From thence his troops dispersed, and returned to their respective homes.[336]

Meanwhile, the Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth, which had been destined to coöperate with Knêmus off the coast of Akarnania, had found difficulties in its passage, alike unexpected and insuperable. Mustering forty-seven triremes of Corinth, Sikyon, and other places, with a body of soldiers on board, and with accompanying store-vessels,—it departed from the harbor of Corinth, and made its way along the northern coast of Achaia. Its commanders, not intending to meddle with Phormio and his twenty ships at Naupaktus, never for a moment imagined that he would venture to attack a number so greatly superior: the triremes were, accordingly, fitted out more as transports for numerous soldiers than with any view to naval combat,—and with little attention to the choice of skilful rowers.[337]

Except in the combat near Korkyra, and there only partially, the Peloponnesians had never yet made actual trial of Athenian maritime efficiency, at the point of excellence which it had now reached: themselves retaining the old unimproved mode of fighting and of working ships at sea, they had no practical idea of the degree to which it had been superseded by Athenian training. Among the Athenians, on the contrary, not only the seamen generally had a confirmed feeling of their own superiority,—but Phormio especially, the ablest of all their captains, always familiarized his men with the conviction, that no Peloponnesian fleet, be its number ever so great, could possibly contend against them with success.[338] Accordingly, the Corinthian admirals, Machaon and his two colleagues, were surprised to observe that Phormio

with his small Athenian squadron, instead of keeping safe in Naupaktus, was moving in parallel line with them and watching their progress until they should get out of the Corinthian gulf into the more open sea. Having advanced along the northern coast of Peloponnesus as far as Patræ in Achaia, they then altered their course, and bore to the northwest in order to cross over towards the Ætolian coast, in their way to Akarnania. In doing this, however, they perceived that Phormio was bearing down upon them from Chalkis and the mouth of the river Euenus, and they now discovered for the first time that he was going to attack them. Disconcerted by this incident, and not inclined for a naval combat in the wide and open sea, they altered their plan of passage, returned to the coast of Peloponnesus, and brought to for the night at some point near to Rhium, the narrowest breadth of the strait. Their bringing to was a mere feint intended to deceive Phormio, and induce him to go back for the night to his own coast: for, during the course of the night, they left their station, and tried to get across the breadth of the gulf, where it was near the strait, and comparatively narrow, before Phormio could come down upon them: and if the Athenian captain had really gone back to take night-station on his own coast, they would probably have got across to the Ætolian or northern coast without any molestation in the wide sea: but he watched their movements closely, kept the sea all night, and was thus enabled to attack them in mid-channel, even during the shorter passage near the strait, at the first dawn of morning.[339] On seeing his approach, the Corinthian admirals ranged their triremes in a circle with the prows outward, like the spokes of a wheel; the circle was made as large as it could be without leaving opportunity to the Athenian assailing ships to practise the manœuvre of the diekplus,[340] and the interior space was sufficient, not merely for the store-vessels, but also for five chosen triremes, who were kept as a reserve, to dart out when required through the intervals between the outer triremes.

In this position they were found and attacked shortly after daybreak, by Phormio, who bore down upon them with his ships in single file, all admirable sailors, and his own ship leading; all being strictly forbidden to attack until he should give the signal. He rowed swiftly round the Peloponnesian circle, nearing the prows of their ships as closely as he could, and making constant semblance of being about to come to blows. Partly from the intimidating effect of this manœuvre, altogether novel to the Peloponnesians,—partly from the natural difficulty, well known to Phormio, of keeping every ship in its exact stationary position,—the order of the circle, both within and without, presently became disturbed. It was not long before a new ally came to his aid, on which he fully calculated, postponing his actual attack until this favorable incident occurred. The strong land-breeze out of the gulf of Corinth, always wont to begin shortly after daybreak, came down upon the Peloponnesian fleet with its usual vehemence, at a moment when the steadiness of their order was already somewhat giving way, and forced their ships more than ever out of proper relation one to the other. The triremes began to run foul of each other, or become entangled with the store-vessels: so that in every ship the men aboard were obliged to keep pushing off

their neighbors on each side with poles,—not without loud clamor and mutual reproaches, which prevented both the orders of the captain, and the cheering sound or song whereby the keleustês animated the rowers and kept them to time, from being at all audible. Moreover, the fresh breeze had occasioned such a swell, that these rowers, unskilful under all circumstances, could not get their oars clear of the water, and the pilots thus lost all command over their vessels.[341] The critical moment was now come, and Phormio gave the signal for attack. He first drove against and disabled one of the admiral's ships,—his comrades next assailed others with equal success,—so that the Peloponnesians, confounded and terrified, attempted hardly any resistance, but broke their order and sought safety in flight. They fled partly to Patræ, partly to Dymê, in Achaia, pursued by the Athenians; who, with scarcely the loss of a man, captured twelve triremes, took aboard and carried away almost the entire crews, and sailed off with them to Molykreium, or Antirrhium, the northern cape at the narrow mouth of the Corinthian gulf, opposite to the corresponding cape called Rhium in Achaia. Having erected at Antirrhium a trophy for the victory, dedicating one of the captive triremes to Poseidon, they returned to Naupaktus; while the Peloponnesian ships sailed along the shore from Patræ to Kyllênê, the principal port in the territory of Elis. They were here soon afterwards joined by Knêmus, who passed over with his squadron from Leukas.[342]

These two incidents, just recounted, with their details,—the repulse of Knêmus and his army from Stratus, and the defeat of the Peloponnesian fleet by Phormio,—afford ground for some interesting remarks. The first of the two displays the great inferiority of the Epirots to the Greeks,—and even to the less advanced portion of the Greeks,—in the qualities of order, discipline, steadiness, and power of coöperation for a joint purpose. Confidence of success with them is exaggerated into childish rashness, so that they despise even the commonest precautions either in march or attack; while the Greek divisions on their right and on their left are never so elate as to omit either. If, on land, we thus discover the inherent superiority of Greeks over Epirots involuntarily breaking out,—so in the sea-fight we are no less impressed with the astonishing superiority of the Athenians over their opponents; a superiority, indeed, noway inherent, such as that of Greeks over Epirots, but depending in this case on previous toil, training, and inventive talent, on the one side, compared with neglect and old-fashioned routine on the other. Nowhere does the extraordinary value of that seamanship, which the Athenians had been gaining by years of improved practice, stand so clearly marked as in these first battles of Phormio. It gradually becomes less conspicuous as we advance in the war, since the Peloponnesians improve, learning seamanship as the Russians, under Peter the Great, learned the art of war from the Swedes, under Charles the Twelfth,—while the Athenian triremes and their crews seem to become less choice and effective, even before the terrible disaster at Syracuse, and are irreparably deteriorated after that misfortune.

To none did the circumstances of this memorable sea-fight seem so incomprehensible as to the Lacedæmonians. They had heard, indeed, of the seamanship of Athens, but had never felt it, and could not understand what it meant: so they imputed the defeat to nothing but disgraceful cowardice, and sent indignant orders to Knêmus at Kyllênê, to take the command, equip a larger and better fleet, and repair the dishonor. Three Spartan commissioners—Brasidas, Timokratês, and Lykophron—were sent down to assist him with their advice and exertions in calling together naval contingents from the different allied cities: and by this means, under the general resentment occasioned by the recent defeat, a large fleet of seventy-seven triremes was speedily mustered at Panormus,—a harbor of Achaia near to the promontory of Rhium, and immediately within the interior gulf. A land-force was also collected at the same place ashore, to aid the operations of the fleet. Such preparations did not escape the vigilance of Phormio, who transmitted to Athens news of his victory, at the same time urgently soliciting reinforcements to contend with the increasing strength of the enemy. The Athenians immediately sent twenty fresh ships to join him: but they were induced by the instances of a Kretan named Nikias, their proxenus at Gortyn, to allow him to take the ships first to Krete, on the faith of his promise to reduce the hostile town of Kydonia. He had made this promise as a private favor to the inhabitants of Polichna, border enemies of Kydonia; but when the fleet arrived he was unable to fulfil it: nothing was effected except ravage of the Kydonian lands, and the fleet was long prevented by adverse winds and weather from getting away.[343] This ill-advised diversion of the fleet from its straight course to join Phormio is a proof how much the counsels of Athens were beginning to suffer from the loss of Periklês, who was just now in his last illness and died shortly afterwards. That liability to be seduced by novel enterprises and projects of acquisition, against which he so emphatically warned his countrymen,[344] was even now beginning to manifest its disastrous consequences.

Through the loss of this precious interval, Phormio now found himself, with no more than his original twenty triremes, opposed to the vastly increased forces of the enemy,—seventy-seven triremes, with a large force on land to back them: the latter, no mean help in ancient warfare. He took up his station near the Cape Antirrhium, or the Molykric Rhium, as it was called,—the opposite cape to the Achaic Rhium: the line between them, seemingly about an English mile in breadth, forms the entrance of the Corinthian gulf. The Messenian force from Naupaktus attended him, and served on land. But he kept on the outside of the gulf, anxious to fight in a large and open breadth of sea, which was essential to Athenian manœuvring: while his adversaries on their side remained on the inside of the Achaic cape, from the corresponding reason,—feeling that to them the narrow sea was advantageous, as making the naval battle like to a land battle, effacing all superiority of nautical skill.[345] If we revert back to the occasion of the battle of Salamis, we find that narrowness of space was at that time accounted the best of all protections for a smaller fleet against a larger. But such had been the complete change of feeling, occasioned by the system

of manœuvring introduced since that period in the Athenian navy, that amplitude of sea room is now not less coveted by Phormio than dreaded by his enemies. The improved practice of Athens had introduced a revolution in naval warfare.

For six or seven days successively, the two fleets were drawn out against each other,—Phormio trying to entice the Peloponnesians to the outside of the gulf, while they on their side did what they could to bring him within it.[346] To him, every day's postponement was gain, since it gave him a new chance of his reinforcements arriving: for that very reason, the Peloponnesian commanders were eager to accelerate an action, and at length resorted to a well-laid plan for forcing it on. But in spite of immense numerical superiority, such was the discouragement and reluctance, prevailing among their seamen, many of whom had been actual sufferers in the recent defeat,—that Knêmus and Brasidas had to employ emphatic exhortations; insisting on the favorable prospect before them,—pointing out that the late battle had been lost only by mismanagement and imprudence, which would be for the future corrected,—and appealing to the inherent bravery of the Peloponnesian warrior. They concluded by a hint, that while those who behaved well in the coming battle would receive due honor, the laggards would assuredly be punished:[347] a topic rarely touched upon by ancient generals in their harangues on the eve of battle, and demonstrating conspicuously the reluctance of many of the Peloponnesian seamen, who had been brought to the fight again chiefly by the ascendency and strenuous commands of Sparta. To this reluctance Phormio pointedly alluded, in the encouraging exhortations which he on his side addressed to his men: for they too, in spite of their habitual confidence at sea, strengthened by the recent victory, were dispirited by the smallness of their numbers. He reminded them of their long practice and rational conviction of superiority at sea, such as no augmentation of numbers, especially with an enemy conscious of his own weakness, could overbalance: and he called upon them to show their habitual discipline and quick apprehension of orders, and above all to perform their regular movements in perfect silence during the actual battle,[348]—useful in all matters of war, and essential to the proper conduct of a sea-fight. The idea of entire silence on board the Athenian ships while a sea-fight was going on, is not only striking as a feature in the picture, but is also one of the most powerful evidences of the force of self-control and military habits among these citizen-seamen.

The habitual position of the Peloponnesian fleet off Panormus was within the strait, but nearly fronting the breadth of it,—opposite to Phormio, who lay on the outer side of the strait, as well as off the opposite cape: in the Peloponnesian line, therefore, the right wing occupied the north, or northeast side towards Naupaktus. Knêmus and Brasidas now resolved to make a forward movement up the gulf, as if against that town, which was the main Athenian station; for they knew that Phormio would be under the necessity of coming to the defence of the place, and they hoped to pin him up and force him to action close under the land, where Athenian manœu-

vring would be unavailing. Accordingly, they commenced this movement early in the morning, sailing in line of four abreast towards the northern coast of the inner gulf; the right squadron, under the Lacedæmonian Timokratês, was in the van, according to its natural position,[349] and care had been taken to place in it twenty of the best sailing ships, since the success of the plan of action was known beforehand to depend upon their celerity. As they had foreseen, Phormio the moment he saw their movement, put his men on shipboard, and rowed into the interior of the strait, though with the greatest reluctance; for the Messenians were on land alongside of him, and he knew that Naupaktus, with their wives and families, and a long circuit of wall,[350] was utterly undefended. He ranged his ships in line of battle ahead, probably his own the leading ship; and sailed close along the land towards Naupaktus, while the Messenians marching ashore kept near to him. Both fleets were thus moving in the same direction, and towards the same point, the Athenian close along shore, the Peloponnesians somewhat farther off.[351] The latter had now got Phormio into the position which they wished, pinned up against the land, with no room for tactics. On a sudden the signal was given, and the whole Peloponnesian fleet facing to the left, changed from column into line, and instead of continuing to sail along the coast, rowed rapidly with their prows shore-ward to come to close quarters with the Athenians. The right squadron of the Peloponnesians occupying the side towards Naupaktus, was especially charged with the duty of cutting off the Athenians from all possibility of escaping thither; and the best ships had been placed on the right for that important object. As far as the commanders were concerned, the plan of action completely succeeded; the Athenians were caught in a situation where resistance was impossible, and had no chance of escape except in flight. But so superior were they in rapid movement even to the best Peloponnesians, that eleven ships, the headmost out of the twenty, just found means to run by,[352] before the right wing of the enemy closed in upon the shore; and made the best of their way to Naupaktus. The remaining nine ships were caught and driven ashore with serious damage,—their crews being partly slain, partly escaping by swimming. The Peloponnesians towed off one trireme with its entire crew, and some others empty; but more than one of them was rescued by the bravery of the Messenian hoplites, who, in spite of their heavy panoply, rushed into the water and got aboard them, fighting from the decks and driving off the enemy even after the rope had been actually made fast, and the process of dragging off had begun.[353]

The victory of the Peloponnesians seemed assured, and while their left and centre were thus occupied, the twenty ships of their right wing parted company with the rest, in order to pursue the eleven fugitive Athenian ships which they had failed in cutting off. Ten of these got clear away into the harbor of Naupaktus, and there posted themselves in an attitude of defence near the temple of Apollo, before any of the pursuers could come near; while the eleventh, somewhat less swift, was neared by the Lacedæmonian admiral; who, on board a Leukadian trireme, pushed greatly ahead of his comrades, in hopes of overtaking at least this one prey. There happened

to lie moored a merchant vessel, at the entrance of the harbor of Naupaktus; and the Athenian captain in his flight, observing that the Leukadian pursuer was for the moment alone, seized the opportunity for a bold and rapid manœuvre. He pulled swiftly round the merchant vessel, directed his trireme so as to meet the advancing Leukadian, and drove his beak against her midships with an impact so violent as to disable her at once; her commander, the Lacedæmonian admiral, Timokratês, was so stung with anguish at this unexpected catastrophe, that he slew himself forthwith, and fell overboard into the harbor. The pursuing vessels coming up behind, too, were so astounded and dismayed by it, that the men, dropping their oars, held water, and ceased to advance; while some even found themselves half aground, from ignorance of the coast. On the other hand, the ten Athenian triremes in the harbor were beyond measure elated by the incident, so that a single word from Phormio sufficed to put them in active forward motion, and to make them strenuously attack the embarrassed enemy: whose ships, disordered by the heat of pursuit, and having been just suddenly stopped, could not be speedily got again under way, and expected nothing less than renewed attack. First, the Athenians broke the twenty pursuing ships, on the right wing; next, they pursued their advantage against the left and centre, who had probably neared to the right; so that after a short resistance, the whole were completely routed, and fled across the gulf to their original station at Panormus.[354] Not only did the eleven Athenian ships thus break, terrify, and drive away the entire fleet of the enemy, with the capture of six of the nearest Peloponnesian triremes,—but they also rescued those ships of their own which had been driven ashore and taken in the early part of the action: moreover, the Peloponnesian crews sustained a considerable loss, both in killed and in prisoners.

Thus, in spite not only of the prodigious disparity of numbers, but also of the disastrous blow which the Athenians had sustained at first, Phormio ended by gaining a complete victory; a victory, to which even the Lacedæmonians were forced to bear testimony, since they were obliged to ask a truce for burying and collecting their dead, while the Athenians on their part picked up the bodies of their own warriors. The defeated party, however, still thought themselves entitled, in token of their success in the early part of the action, to erect a trophy on the Rhium of Achaia, where they also dedicated the single Athenian trireme which they had been able to carry off. Yet they were so completely discomfited,—and farther, so much in fear of the expected reinforcement from Athens,—that they took advantage of the night to retire, and sail into the gulf to Corinth: all except the Leukadians, who returned to their own home.

Nor was it long before the reinforcement actually arrived, after that untoward detention which had wellnigh exposed Phormio and his whole fleet to ruin. It confirmed his mastery of the entrance of the gulf and of the coast of Akarnania, where the Peloponnesians had now no naval force at all. To establish more fully the Athenian influence in Akarnania, he undertook during the course of the autumn an expedition,

landing at Astakus, and marching into the Akarnanian inland country with four hundred Athenian hoplites and four hundred Messenians. Some of the leading men of Stratus and Koronta, who were attached to the Peloponnesian interest, he caused to be sent into exile, while the chief named Kynês, of Koronta, who seems to have been hitherto in exile, was reëstablished in his native town. The great object was, to besiege and take the powerful town of Œniadæ, near the mouth of the Achelôus; a town at variance with the other Akarnanians, and attached to the Peloponnesians. But the great spread of the waters of the Achelôus rendered this siege impracticable during the winter, and Phormio returned to the station at Naupaktus. From hence he departed to Athens towards the end of the winter, carrying home both his prize-ships and such of his prisoners as were freemen. The latter were exchanged man for man against Athenian prisoners in the hands of Sparta.[355]

After abandoning the naval contest at Rhium, and retiring to Corinth, Knêmus and Brasidas were prevailed upon by the Megarians, before the fleet dispersed, to try the bold experiment of a sudden inroad upon Peiræus. Such was the confessed superiority of the Athenians at sea, that, while they guarded amply the coasts of Attica against privateers, they never imagined the possibility of an attack upon their own main harbor. Accordingly, Peiræus was not only unprotected by any chain across the entrance, but destitute even of any regular guard-ships manned and ready. The seamen of the retiring Peloponnesian armament, on reaching Corinth, were immediately disembarked and marched, first across the isthmus, next to Megara,—each man carrying his sitting-cloth,[356] and his oar, together with the loop whereby the oar was fastened to the oar-hole in the side, and thus prevented from slipping. There lay forty triremes in Nisæa, the harbor of Megara, which, though old and out of condition, were sufficient for so short a trip; and the seamen immediately on arriving, launched these and got aboard. But such was the awe entertained of Athens and her power, that when the scheme came really to be executed, the courage of the Peloponnesians failed, though there was nothing to hinder them from actually reaching Peiræus: but it was pretended that the wind was adverse, and they contented themselves with passing across to the station of Budorum, in the opposite Athenian island of Salamis, where they surprised and seized the three guard-ships which habitually blockaded the harbor of Megara, and then landed upon the island. They spread themselves over a large part of Salamis, ravaged the properties, and seized men as well as goods. Fire-signals immediately made known this unforeseen aggression, both at Peiræus and at Athens, occasioning in both the extreme of astonishment and alarm; for the citizens in Athens, not conceiving distinctly the meaning of the signals, fancied that Peiræus itself had fallen into the hands of the enemy. The whole population rushed down to the Peiræus at break of day, and put to sea with all the triremes that were ready against the Peloponnesians; but these latter, aware of the danger which menaced them, made haste to quit Salamis with their booty, and the three captured guard-ships. The lesson was salutary to the Athenians: from henceforward Peiræus was furnished with a chain across the mouth, and a regular guard, down to

the end of the war.[357] Forty years afterwards, however, we shall find it just as negligently watched, and surprised with much more boldness and dexterity, by the Lacedæmonian captain Teleutias.[358]

As during the summer of this year, the Ambrakiots had brought down a numerous host of Epirotic tribes to the invasion of Akarnania, in conjunction with the Peloponnesians,—so during the autumn, the Athenians obtained aid against the Chalkidians of Thrace from a still more powerful barbaric prince, Sitalkês, king of the Odrysian Thracians. Amidst the numerous tribes, between the Danube and the Ægean sea,—who all bore the generic name of Thracians, though each had a special name besides,—the Odrysians were at this time the most warlike and powerful. The Odrysian king Têrês, father of Sitalkês, had made use of this power to subdue[359] and render tributary a great number of these different tribes, especially those whose residence was in the plain rather than in the mountains. His dominion, the largest existing between the Ionian sea and the Euxine, extended from Abdêra, or the mouth of the Nestus, in the Ægean sea, to the mouth of the Danube in the Euxine; though it seems that this must be understood with deductions, since many intervening tribes, especially mountain tribes, did not acknowledge his authority. Sitalkês himself had invaded and conquered some of the Pæonian tribes who joined the Thracians on the west, between the Axius and the Strymon.[360] Dominion, in the sense of the Odrysian king, meant tribute, presents, and military force when required; and with the two former, at least, we may conclude that he was amply supplied, since his nephew and successor Seuthes, under whom the revenue increased and attained its maximum, received four hundred talents annually in gold and silver as tribute, and the like sum in various presents, over and above many other presents of manufactured articles and ornaments. These latter came from the Grecian colonies on the coast, which contributed moreover largely to the tribute, though in what proportions we are not informed: even Grecian cities not in Thrace sent presents to forward their trading objects, as purchasers for the produce, the plunder, and the slaves, acquired by Thracian chiefs or tribes.[361] The residence of the Odrysians properly so called, and of the princes of that tribe now ruling over so many of the remaining tribes, appears to have been about twelve days' journey inland from Byzantium,[362] in the upper regions of the Hebrus and Strymon, south of Mount Hæmus, and northeast of Rhodopê. The Odrysian chiefs were connected by relationship more or less distant with those of the subordinate tribes, and by marriage even with the Scythian princes north of the Danube: the Scythian prince Ariapeithês[363] had married the daughter of the Odrysian Têrês, the first who extended the dominion of his tribe over any considerable portion of Thrace.

The natural state of the Thracian tribes—in the judgment of Herodotus, permanent and incorrigible—was that of disunion and incapacity of political association; were such association possible, he says, they would be strong enough to vanquish every other nation,—though Thucydidês considers them as far inferior to the Scythi-

ans. The Odrysian dominion had probably not reached, at the period when Herodotus made his inquiries, the same development which Thucydidês describes in the third year of the Peloponnesian war, and which imparted to these tribes an union, partial indeed and temporary, but such as they never reached either before or afterwards. It has been already mentioned that the Odrysian prince Sitalkês, had taken for his wife, or rather for one of his wives, the sister of Nymphodôrus, a Greek, of Abdêra; by whose mediation he had been made the ally, and his son Sadokus even a citizen, of Athens,—and had been induced to promise that he would reconquer the Chalkidians of Thrace for the benefit of the Athenians,[364]—his ancient kinsmen, according to the mythe of Tereus as interpreted by both parties. At the same time, Perdikkas, king of Macedonia, had offended him by refusing to perform a promise made of giving him his sister in marriage,—a promise made as consideration for the interference of Sitalkês and Nymphodôrus in procuring for him peace with Athens, at a moment when he was much embarrassed by civil dissensions with his brother Philip. The latter prince, ruling in his own name, and seemingly independent of Perdikkas, over a portion of the Macedonians along the upper course of the Axius, had been expelled by his more powerful brother, and taken refuge with Sitalkês: he was now apparently dead, but his son Amyntas received from the Odrysian prince the promise of restoration. The Athenians had ambassadors resident with Sitalkês, and they sent Agnon as special envoy to concert arrangements for his march against the Chalkidians, with which an Athenian armament was destined to coöperate. In treating with Sitalkês, it was necessary to be liberal in presents, both to himself and to the subordinate chieftains who held power dependent upon him: nothing could be accomplished among the Thracians except by the aid of bribes,[365] and the Athenians were more competent to supply this exigency than any other people in Greece. The joint expedition against the Chalkidians was finally resolved.

But the forces of Sitalkês, collected from many different portions of Thrace, were tardy in coming together. He summoned all the tribes under his dominion, between Hæmus, Rhodopê, and the two seas: the Getæ, between Mount Hæmus and the Danube, equipped like the Scythians, their neighbors on the other side of the river, with bow and arrow on horseback, also joined him, as well as the Agrianes, the Lææi, and the other Pæonian tribes subject to his dominion; lastly, several of the Thracian tribes called Dii, distinguished by their peculiar short swords, and maintaining a fierce independence on the heights of Rhodopê, were tempted by the chance of plunder, or the offer of pay, to flock to his standard. Altogether, his army amounted, or was supposed to amount, to one hundred and fifty thousand men, one third of it cavalry, who were for the most part Getæ and Odrysians proper. The most formidable warriors in his camp were the independent tribes of Rhodopê; but the whole host, alike numerous, warlike, predatory, and cruel, spread terror amidst all those who were within even the remote possibilities of its march.

Starting from the central Odrysian territory, and bringing with him Agnon and the other Athenian envoys, he first crossed the uninhabited mountain called Kerkinê, which divided the Pæonians on the west from the Thracian tribes called Sinti and Mædi on the east, until he reached the Pæonian town or district called Dobêrus;[366] it was here that many troops and additional volunteers reached him, making up his full total. From Dobêrus, probably marching down along one of the tributary streams of the Axius, he entered into that portion of Upper Macedonia, which lies along the higher Axius, and which had constituted the separate principality of Philip: the presence in his army of Amyntos son of Philip, induced some of the fortified places, Gortynia, Atalantê, and others, to open their gates without resistance, while Eidomenê was taken by storm, and Eurôpus in vain attacked. From hence, he passed still farther southward into Lower Macedonia, the kingdom of Perdikkas; ravaging the territory on both sides of the Axius even to the neighborhood of the towns Pella and Kyrrhus; and apparently down as far south as the mouth of the river and the head of the Thermaic gulf. Farther south than this he did not go, but spread his force over the districts between the left bank of the Axius and the head of the Strymonic gulf,—Mygdonia, Krestônia, and Anthemus,—while a portion of his army was detached to overrun the territory of the Chalkidians and Bottiæans. The Macedonians under Perdikkas, renouncing all idea of contending on foot against so overwhelming a host, either fled or shut themselves up in the small number of fortified places which the country presented. The cavalry from Upper Macedonia, indeed, well armed and excellent, made some orderly and successful charges against the Thracians, lightly armed with javelins, short swords, and the pelta, or small shield,—but it was presently shut in, harassed on all sides by superior numbers, and compelled to think only of retreat and extrication.[367]

Luckily for the enemies of the Odrysian king, his march was not made until the beginning of winter, seemingly about November or December. We may be sure that the Athenians, when they concerted with him the joint attack upon the Chalkidians, intended that it should be in a better time of the year: having probably waited to hear that his army was in motion, and waited long in vain, they began to despair of his coming at all, and thought it not worth while to despatch any force of their own to the spot.[368] Some envoys and presents only were sent as compliments, instead of the coöperating armament; and this disappointment, coupled with the severity of the weather, the nakedness of the country, and the privations of his army at that season, induced Sitalkês soon to enter into negotiations with Perdikkas; who, moreover, gained over Seuthes, nephew of the Odrysian prince, by promising his sister Stratonikê in marriage, together with a sum of money, on condition that the Thracian host should be speedily withdrawn. This was accordingly done, after it had been distributed for thirty days over Macedonia: during eight of those days his detachment had ravaged the Chalkidic lands. But the interval had been quite long enough to diffuse terror all around: such a host of fierce barbarians had never before been brought together, and no one knew in what direction they might be disposed to carry

their incursions. The independent Thracian tribes (Panæi, Odomantê, Drôi, and Dersæi) in the plains on the northeast of the Strymon, and near Mount Pangæus, not far from Amphipolis, were the first to feel alarm lest Sitalkês should take the opportunity of trying to conquer them; on the other side, the Thessalians, Magnêtes, and other Greeks north of Thermopylæ, anticipated that he would carry his invasion farther south, and began to organize means for resisting him: even the general Peloponnesian confederacy heard with uneasiness of this new ally whom Athens was bringing into the field, perhaps against them. All such alarms were dissipated, when Sitalkês, after remaining thirty days, returned by the way he came, and the formidable avalanche was thus seen to melt away without falling on them. The faithless Perdikkas, on this occasion, performed his promise to Seuthes, having drawn upon himself much mischief by violating his previous similar promise to Sitalkês.[369]

CHAPTER L.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FOURTH YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR DOWN TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMOTIONS AT KORKYRA.

THE second and third years of the war had both been years of great suffering with the Athenians, from the continuance of the epidemic, which did not materially relax until the winter of the third year (B.C. 429-428). It is no wonder that, under the pressure of such a calamity, their military efforts were enfeebled, although the victories of Phormio had placed their maritime reputation at a higher point than ever. To their enemies, the destructive effects of this epidemic—effects still felt, although the disorder itself was suspended during the fourth year of the war—afforded material assistance as well as encouragement to persevere; and the Peloponnesians, under Archidamus, again repeated during this year their invasion and ravage of Attica, which had been intermitted during the year preceding. As before, they met with no serious resistance: entering the country about the beginning of May, they continued the process of devastation until their provisions were exhausted.[370] To this damage the Athenians had probably now accustomed themselves: but they speedily received, even while the invaders were in their country, intelligence of an event far more embarrassing and formidable,—the revolt of Mitylênê and of the greater part of Lesbos.

This revolt, indeed, did not come even upon the Athenians wholly unawares; but the idea of it was of longer standing than they suspected, for the Mitylenæan oligarchy had projected it before the war, and had made secret application to Sparta for aid, but without success. Some time after hostilities broke out, they resumed the design, which was warmly promoted by the Bœotians, kinsmen of the Lesbians in Æolic lineage and dialect. The Mitylenæan leaders appear to have finally determined on revolt during the preceding autumn or winter; but they thought it prudent to make ample preparations before they declared themselves openly: and, moreover, they took measures for constraining three other towns in Lesbos—Antissa, Eresus, and Pyrrha—to share their fortunes, to merge their own separate governments, and to become incorporated with Mitylênê. Methymna, the second town in Lesbos, situated on the north of the island, was decidedly opposed to them and attached to Athens. The Mitylenæans built new ships, put their walls in an improved state of defence, carried out a mole in order to narrow the entrance of their harbor, and render it capable of being closed with a chain, despatched emissaries to hire Scythian bowmen and purchase corn in the Euxine, and took such other measures as were necessary for an effective resistance. Though the oligarchical character of their government gave them much means of secrecy, and above all, dispensed with the necessity of consulting the people beforehand,—still, measures of such importance could not be taken without

provoking attention. Intimation was sent to the Athenians by various Mitylenæan citizens, partly from private feeling, partly in their capacity of *proxeni* (or *consuls*, to use a modern word which approaches to the meaning) for Athens,—especially by a Mitylenæan named Doxander, incensed with the government for having disappointed his two sons of a marriage with two orphan heiresses.[371] Not less communicative were the islanders of Tenedos, animated by ancient neighborly jealousy towards Mitylênê; so that the Athenians were thus forewarned both of the intrigues between Mitylênê and the Spartans and of her certain impending revolt unless they immediately interfered.[372]

This news seems to have become certain about February or March 428 B.C.: but such was then the dispirited condition of the Athenians,—arising from two years' suffering under the epidemic, and no longer counteracted by the wholesome remonstrances of Periklês,—that they could not at first bring themselves to believe what they were so much afraid to find true. Lesbos, like Chios, was their ally, upon an equal footing, still remaining under those conditions which had been at first common to all the members of the confederacy of Delos. Mitylênê paid no tribute to Athens: it retained its walls, its large naval force, and its extensive landed possessions on the opposite Asiatic continent: its government was oligarchical, administering all internal affairs without the least reference to Athens. Its obligations as an ally were, that, in case of war, it was held bound to furnish armed ships, whether in determinate number or not, we do not know: it would undoubtedly be restrained from making war upon Tenedos, or any other subject-ally of Athens: and its government or its citizens would probably be held liable to answer before the Athenian dikasteries, in case of any complaint of injury from the government or citizens of Tenedos or of any other ally of Athens,—these latter being themselves also accountable before the same tribunals, under like complaints from Mitylênê. That city was thus in practice all but independent, and so extremely powerful that the Athenians in their actual state of depression were fearful of coping with it, and therefore loth to believe the alarming intelligence which reached them. They sent envoys with a friendly message to persuade the Mitylenæans to suspend their proceedings, and it was only when these envoys returned without success that they saw the necessity of stronger measures. Ten Mitylenæan triremes, serving as contingent in the Athenian fleet, were seized, and their crews placed under guard; while Kleïppidês, then on the point of starting, along with two colleagues, to conduct a fleet of forty triremes round Peloponnesus, was directed to alter his destination and to proceed forthwith to Mitylênê.[373] It was expected that he would reach that town about the time of the approaching festival of Apollo Maloeis, celebrated in its neighborhood,—on which occasion the whole Mitylenæan population was in the habit of going forth to the temple: so that the town, while thus deserted, might easily be surprised and seized by the fleet. In case this calculation should be disappointed, Kleïppidês was instructed to require that the Mitylenæans should surrender their ships of war and raze their fortifications, and, in case of refusal, to attack them immediately.

But the publicity of debate at Athens was far too great to allow such a scheme to succeed. The Mitylenæans had their spies in the city, and the moment the resolution was taken, one of them set off to communicate it at Mitylênê. Crossing over to Geræstus in Eubœa, he got aboard a merchantman on the point of departure, and reached Mitylênê with a favorable wind on the third day from Athens: so that when Kleïppidês arrived shortly afterwards, he found the festival adjourned and the government prepared for him. The requisition which he sent in was refused, and the Mitylenæan fleet even came forth from the harbor to assail him, but was beaten back with little difficulty: upon which, the Mitylenæan leaders, finding themselves attacked before their preparations were completed, and desiring still to gain time before they declared their revolt, opened negotiations with Kleïppidês, and prevailed on him to suspend hostilities until ambassadors could be sent to Athens,—protesting that they had no serious intention of revolting. This appears to have been about the middle of May, soon after the Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica. Kleïppidês was induced, not very prudently, to admit this proposition, under the impression that his armament was insufficient to cope with a city and island so powerful; and he remained moored off the harbor at the north of Mitylênê until the envoys, among whom was included one of the very citizens of Mitylênê who had sent to betray the intended revolt, but who had since changed his opinion, should return from Athens. Meanwhile the Mitylenæan government, unknown to Kleïppidês, and well aware that the embassy would prove fruitless, took advantage of the truce to send secret envoys to Sparta, imploring immediate aid: and on the arrival of the Lacedæmonian Meleas and the Theban Hermæondas, who had been despatched to Mitylênê earlier, but had only come in by stealth since the arrival of Kleïppidês, a second trireme was sent along with them, carrying additional envoys to reiterate the solicitation. These arrivals and despatches were carried on without the knowledge of the Athenian admiral, chiefly in consequence of the peculiar site of the town, which had originally been placed upon a little islet divided from Lesbos by a narrow channel, or *euripus*, and had subsequently been extended across into the main island,—like Syracuse, and so many other Grecian settlements. It had consequently two harbors, one north, the other south of the town: Kleïppidês was anchored off the former, but the latter remained unguarded.[374]

During the absence of the Mitylenæan envoys at Athens, reinforcements reached the Athenian admiral from Lemnos, Imbros, and some other allies, as well as from the Lesbian town of Methymna: so that when the envoys returned, as they presently did, with an unfavorable reply, war was resumed with increased vigor. The Mitylenæans, having made a general sally with their full military force, gained some advantage in the battle; yet, not feeling bold enough to maintain the field, they retreated back behind their walls. The news of their revolt, when first spread abroad, had created an impression unfavorable to the stability of the Athenian empire: but when it was seen that their conduct was irresolute, and their achievements disproportionate to their supposed power, a reaction of feeling took place,—and the Chians

and other allies came in with increased zeal in obedience to the summons of Athens for reinforcements. Kleïppidês soon found his armament large enough to establish two separate camps, markets for provision, and naval stations, north and south of the town, so as to watch and block up both the harbors at once.[375] But he commanded little beyond the area of his camp, and was unable to invest the city by land; especially as the Mitylenæans had received reinforcements from Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus, the other towns of Lesbos which acted with them. They were even sufficiently strong to march against Methymna, in hopes that it would be betrayed to them by a party within; but this expectation was not realized, nor could they do more than strengthen the fortifications, and confirm the Mitylenæan supremacy, in the other three subordinate towns; in such manner that the Methymnæans, who soon afterwards attacked Antissa, were repulsed with considerable loss. In this undecided condition the island continued, until, somewhere about the month of August B.C. 428, the Athenians sent Pachês to take the command, with a reinforcement of one thousand hoplites, who rowed themselves thither in triremes. The Athenians were now in force enough not only to keep the Mitylenæans within their walls, but also to surround the city with a single wall of circumvallation, strengthened by separate forts in suitable positions. By the beginning of October, Mitylênê was thus completely blockaded, by land as well as by sea.[376]

Meanwhile, the Mitylenæan envoys, after a troublesome voyage, reached Sparta a little before the Olympic festival, about the middle of June. The Spartans directed them to come to Olympia at the festival, where all the members of the Peloponnesian confederacy would naturally be present,—and there to set forth their requests, after the festival was concluded, in presence of all.[377] Thucydidês has given us, at some length, his version of the speech wherein this was done,—a speech not a little remarkable. Pronounced as it was by men who had just revolted from Athens, having the strongest interest to raise indignation against her as well as sympathy for themselves,—and before an audience exclusively composed of the enemies of Athens, all willing to hear, and none present to refute, the bitterest calumnies against her, we should have expected a confident sense of righteous and well-grounded though perilous effort on the part of the Mitylenæans, and a plausible collection of wrongs and oppressions alleged against the common enemy. Instead of which, the speech is apologetic and embarrassed: the speaker not only does not allege any extortion or severe dealing from Athens towards the Mitylenæans, but even admits the fact that they had been treated by her with marked honor;[378] and that, too, during a long period of peace, during which she stood less in awe of her allies generally, and would have had much more facility in realizing any harsh purposes towards them, than she could possibly enjoy now that the war had broken out, when their discontents would be likely to find powerful protectors.[379] According to his own showing, the Mitylenæans, while they had been perfectly well treated by Athens during the past, had now acquired, by the mere fact of war, increased security for continuance of the like treatment during the future. It is upon this ground of security for

the future, nevertheless, that he rests the justification of the revolt, not pretending to have any subject of positive complaint. The Mitylenæans, he contends, could have no prospective security against Athens: for she had successively and systematically brought into slavery all her allies, except Lesbos and Chios, though all had originally been upon an equal footing: and there was every reason for fearing that she would take the first convenient opportunity of reducing the two last remaining to the same level,—the rather as their position was now one of privilege and exception, offensive to her imperial pride and exaggerated ascendency. It had hitherto suited the policy of Athens to leave these two exceptions, as a proof that the other allies had justly incurred their fate, since otherwise Lesbos and Chios, having equal votes, would not have joined forces in reducing them:[380] but this policy was now no longer necessary, and the Mitylenæans, feeling themselves free only in name, were imperatively called upon by regard for their own safety to seize the earliest opportunity for emancipating themselves in reality. Nor was it merely regard for their own safety, but a farther impulse of Pan-Hellenic patriotism; a desire to take rank among the opponents, and not among the auxiliaries of Athens, in her usurpation of sovereignty over so many free Grecian states.[381] The Mitylenæans had, however, been compelled to revolt with preparations only half-completed, and had therefore a double claim upon the succor of Sparta,—the single hope and protectress of Grecian autonomy. And Spartan aid—if now lent immediately and heartily, in a renewed attack on Attica during this same year, by sea as well as by land—could not fail to put down the common enemy, exhausted as she was by pestilence as well as by the cost of three years' war, and occupying her whole maritime force, either in the siege of Mitylênê or round Peloponnesus. The orator concluded by appealing not merely to the Hellenic patriotism and sympathies of the Peloponnesians, but also to the sacred name of the Olympic Zeus, in whose precinct the meeting was held, that his pressing entreaty might not be disregarded.[382]

In following this speech of the orator, we see the plain confession that the Mitylenæans had no reason whatever to complain of the conduct of Athens towards themselves: she had respected alike their dignity, their public force, and their private security. This important fact helps us to explain, first, the indifference which the Mitylenæan people will be found to manifest in the revolt; next, the barbarous resolution taken by the Athenians after its suppression. The reasons given for the revolt are mainly two. 1. The Mitylenæans had no security that Athens would not degrade them into the condition of subject-allies like the rest. 2. They did not choose to second the ambition of Athens, and to become parties to a war, for the sake of maintaining an empire essentially offensive to Grecian political instincts. In both these two reasons there is force; and both touch the sore point of the Athenian empire. That empire undoubtedly contradicted one of the fundamental instincts of the Greek mind, —the right of every separate town to administer its own political affairs apart from external control. The Peloponnesian alliance recognized this autonomy in theory, by the general synod and equal voting of all the members at Sparta, on important occa-

sions; though it was quite true,[383] as Periklês urged at Athens, that in practice nothing more was enjoyed than an autonomy confined by Spartan leading-strings,—and though Sparta held in permanent custody hostages for the fidelity of her Arcadian allies, summoning their military contingents without acquainting them whither they were destined to march. But Athens proclaimed herself a despot, effacing the autonomy of her allies not less in theory than in practice: far from being disposed to cultivate in them any sense of a real common interest with herself, she did not even cheat them with those forms and fictions which so often appease discontent in the absence of realities. Doubtless, the nature of her empire, at once widely extended, maritime, and unconnected, or only partially connected, with kindred of race, rendered the forms of periodical deliberation difficult to keep up; at the same time that it gave to her as naval chief an ascendency much more despotic than could have been exercised by any chief on land. It is doubtful whether she could have overcome—it is certain that she did not try to overcome—these political difficulties; so that her empire stood confessed as a despotism, opposed to the political instinct of the Greek mind; and the revolts against it, like this of Mitylênê,—in so far as they represented a genuine feeling, and were not merely movements of an oligarchical party against their own democracy,—were revolts of this offended instinct, much more than consequences of actual oppression. The Mitylenæans might certainly affirm that they had no security against being one day reduced to the common condition of subject-allies like the rest; yet an Athenian speaker, had he been here present, might have made no mean reply to this portion of their reasoning;—he would have urged that, had Athens felt any dispositions towards such a scheme, she would have taken advantage of the fourteen years' truce to execute it; and he would have shown that the degradation of the allies by Athens, and the change in her position from president to despot had been far less intentional and systematic than the Mitylenæan orator affirmed.

To the Peloponnesian auditors, however, the speech of the latter proved completely satisfactory; the Lesbians were declared members of the Peloponnesian alliance, and a second attack upon Attica was decreed. The Lacedæmonians, foremost in the movement, summoned contingents from their various allies, and were early in arriving with their own at the isthmus: they there began to prepare carriages or trucks for dragging across the isthmus the triremes which had fought against Phormio, from the harbor of Lechæum into the Saronic gulf, in order to employ them against Athens. But the remaining allies did not answer to the summons, remaining at home occupied with their harvest; and the Lacedæmonians, sufficiently disappointed with this languor and disobedience, were still farther confounded by the unexpected presence of one hundred Athenian triremes off the coast of the isthmus. The Athenians, though their own presence at the Olympic festival was forbidden by the war, had doubtless learned more or less thoroughly the proceedings which had taken place there respecting Mitylênê. Perceiving the general belief entertained of their depressed and helpless condition, they determined to contradict this by a great

and instant effort, and accordingly manned forthwith one hundred triremes, requiring the personal service of all men, citizens as well as metics; and excepting only the two richest classes of the Solonian census, *i. e.* the pentakosiomedimni, and the hippeis, or horsemen. With this prodigious fleet they made a demonstration along the isthmus in view of the Lacedæmonians, and landed in various parts of the Peloponnesian coast to inflict damage. At the same time, thirty other Athenian triremes, despatched sometime previously to Akarnania, under Asôpius, son of Phormio, landed at different openings in Laconia, for the same purpose; and this news reached the Lacedæmonians at the isthmus while the other great Athenian fleet was parading before their eyes.[384] Amazed at so unexpected a demonstration of strength, they began to feel how much the Mitylenæans had misled them respecting the exhaustion of Athens, and how incompetent they were, especially without the presence of their allies, to undertake any joint effective movement by sea and land against Attica. They therefore returned home, resolving to send an expedition of forty triremes, under Alkidas, to the relief of Mitylênê itself; at the same time transmitting requisitions to their various allies, in order that these triremes might be furnished.[385]

Meanwhile, Asôpius, with his thirty triremes, had arrived in Akarnania, from whence all the ships except twelve were sent home. He had been nominated commander as the son of Phormio, who appears either to have died, or to have become unfit for service, since his victories of the preceding year; and the Akarnanians had preferred a special request that a son, or at least some relative of Phormio, should be invested with the command of the squadron; so beloved was his name and character among them. Asôpius, however, accomplished nothing of importance, though he again undertook conjointly with the Akarnanians a fruitless march against Œniadæ. Ultimately, he was defeated and slain, in attempting a disembarkation on the territory of Leukas.[386]

The sanguine announcement made by the Mitylenæans at Olympia, that Athens was rendered helpless by the epidemic, had indeed been strikingly contradicted by her recent display; since, taking numbers and equipment together, the maritime force which she had put forth this summer, manned as it was by a higher class of seamen, surpassed all former years; although, in point of number only, it was inferior to the two hundred and fifty triremes which she had sent out during the first summer of the war.[387] But the assertion that Athens was impoverished in finances was not so destitute of foundation: for the whole treasure in the acropolis, six thousand talents at the commencement of the war, was now consumed, with the exception of that reserve of one thousand talents which had been solemnly set aside against the last exigences of defensive resistance. This is not surprising, when we learn that every hoplite engaged for near two years and a half in the blockade of Potidæa, received two drachmas per day, one for himself and a second for an attendant: there were during the whole time of the blockade three thousand hoplites engaged there,

—and for a considerable portion of the time, four thousand six hundred; besides the fleet, all the seamen of which received one drachma per day per man. Accordingly the Athenians were now for the first time obliged to raise a direct contribution among themselves, to the amount of two hundred talents, for the purpose of prosecuting the siege of Mitylênê: and they at the same time despatched Lysiklês with four colleagues, in command of twelve triremes, to collect money. What relation these money-gathering ships bore to the regular tribute paid by the subject-allies, or whether they were allowed to visit these latter, we do not know: in the present case, Lysiklês landed at Myus, near the mouth of the Mæander, and marched up the country to levy contributions on the Karian villages in the plain of that river: but he was surprised by the Karians, perhaps aided by the active Samian exiles at Anæa in the neighborhood, and slain, with a considerable number of his men.[388]

While the Athenians thus held Mitylênê under siege, their faithful friends, the Platæans, had remained closely blockaded by the Peloponnesians and Bœotians for more than a year, without any possibility of relief. At length, provisions began to fail, and the general, Eupompidês, backed by the prophet Theænetus,—these prophets[389] were often among the bravest soldiers in the army,—persuaded the garrison to adopt the daring but seemingly desperate resolution of breaking out over the blockading wall, and in spite of its guards. So desperate, indeed, did the project seem, that at the moment of execution, one half of the garrison shrank from it as equivalent to certain death: the other half, about two hundred and twelve in number, persisted and escaped. Happy would it have been for the remainder had they even perished in the attempt, and thus forestalled the more melancholy fate in store for them!

It has been already stated, that the circumvallation of Platæa was accomplished by a double wall and a double ditch, one ditch without the encircling walls, another between them and the town; the two walls being sixteen feet apart, joined together, and roofed all round, so as to look like one thick wall, and to afford covered quarters for the besiegers. Both the outer and inner circumference were furnished with battlements, and after every ten battlements came a roofed tower, covering the whole breadth of the double wall,—allowing a free passage inside, but none outside. In general, the entire circuit of the roofed wall was kept under watch night and day: but on wet nights the besiegers had so far relaxed their vigilance as to retire under cover of the towers, and leave the intermediate spaces unguarded: and it was upon this omission that the plan of escape was founded. The Platæans prepared ladders of a proper height to scale the blockading double wall, ascertaining its height by repeatedly counting the ranges of bricks, which were quite near enough for them to discern, and not effectually covered with whitewash. On a cold and dark December night, amidst rain, sleet, and a roaring wind, they marched forth from the gates, lightly armed, some few with shields and spears, but most of them with breastplates, javelins, and bows and arrows: the right foot was naked, and the left foot alone

shod, so as to give to it a more assured footing on the muddy ground.[390] Taking care to sally out with the wind in their faces, and at such a distance from each other as to prevent any clattering of arms, they crossed the inner ditch and reached the foot of the wall without being discovered: the ladders, borne in the van, were immediately planted, and Ammeas, son of Korœbus, followed by eleven others, armed only with a short sword and breastplate, mounted the wall: others, armed with spears, followed him, their shields being carried and handed to them when on the top by comrades behind. It was the duty of this first company to master and maintain the two towers, right and left, so as to keep the intermediate space free for passing over. This was successfully done, the guards in both towers being surprised and slain, without alarming the remaining besiegers: and many of the Platæans had already reached the top of the wall, when the noise of a tile accidently knocked down by one of them, betrayed what was passing. Immediately a general clamor was raised, alarm was given, and the awakened garrison rushed up from beneath to the top of the wall, yet not knowing where the enemy was to be found; a perplexity farther increased by the Platæans in the town, who took this opportunity of making a false attack on the opposite side. Amidst such confusion and darkness, the blockading detachment could not tell where to direct their blows, and all remained at their posts, except a reserve of three hundred men, kept constantly in readiness for special emergencies, who marched out and patrolled the outside of the ditch to intercept any fugitives from within. At the same time, fire-signals were raised to warn their allies at Thebes,—but here again the Platæans in the town had foreseen and prepared fire-signals on their part, which they hoisted forthwith, in order to deprive this telegraphic communication of all special meaning.[391]

Meanwhile, the escaping Platæans, masters of the two adjoining towers,—on the top of which some of them mounted, while others held the doorway through, so as to repel with spears and darts all approach of the blockaders,—prosecuted their flight without interruption over the space between, shoving down the battlements in order to make it more level and plant a greater number of ladders. In this manner they all successively got over and crossed the outer ditch; every man, immediately after crossing, standing ready on the outer bank, with bow and javelin, to repel assailants and maintain safe passages for his comrades in the rear. At length, when all had descended, there remained the last and greatest difficulty,—the escape of those who occupied the two towers and kept the intermediate portion of wall free: yet even this was accomplished successfully and without loss. The outer ditch was, however, found embarrassing,—so full of water from the rain as to be hardly fordable, yet with thin ice on it also, from a previous frost: for the storm, which in other respects was the main help to their escape, here retarded their passage of the ditch by an unusual accumulation of water. It was not, however, until all had crossed except the defenders of the towers,—who were yet descending and scrambling through,—that the Peloponnesian reserve of three hundred were seen approaching the spot with torches. Their unshielded right side was turned towards the ditch, and the Platæans, already

across and standing on the bank, immediately assailed them with arrows and javelins,—in which the torches enabled them to take tolerable aim, while the Peloponnesians on their side could not distinguish their enemies in the dark, and had no previous knowledge of their position. They were thus held in check until the rearmost Platæans had surmounted the difficulties of the passage: after which the whole body stole off as speedily as they could, taking at first the road towards Thebes, while their pursuers were seen with their torch-lights following the opposite direction, on the road which led by the heights called Dryos-Kephalæ to Athens: after having marched about three quarters of a mile on the road to Thebes, leaving the chapel of the Hero Androkratês on their right hand, the fugitives quitted it, and striking to the eastward towards Erythræ and Hysiæ, soon found themselves in safety among the mountains which separate Bœotia from Attica at that point; from whence they passed into the glad harbor and refuge of Athens.[392]

Two hundred and twelve brave men thus emerged to life and liberty, breaking loose from that impending fate which too soon overtook the remainder, and preserving for future times the genuine breed and honorable traditions of Platæa. One man alone was taken prisoner at the brink of the outer ditch, while a few, who had enrolled themselves originally for the enterprise, lost courage and returned in despair even from the foot of the inner wall; telling their comrades within that the whole band had perished. Accordingly, at daybreak, the Platæans within sent out a herald to solicit a truce for burial of the dead bodies, and it was only by the answer made to this request, that they learned the actual truth. The description of this memorable outbreak exhibits not less daring in the execution than skill and foresight in the design; and is the more interesting, inasmuch as the men who thus worked out their salvation were precisely the bravest men, who best deserved it.

Meanwhile, Pachês and the Athenians kept Mitylênê closely blocked up, the provisions were nearly exhausted, and the besieged were already beginning to think of capitulation,—when their spirits were raised by the arrival of the Lacedæmonian envoy Salæthus, who had landed at Pyrrha on the west of Lesbos, and contrived to steal in through a ravine which obstructed the continuity of the blockading wall,—about February 427 B.C. He encouraged the Mitylenæans to hold out, assuring them that a Peloponnesian fleet under Alkidas was on the point of setting out to assist them, and that Attica would be forthwith invaded by the general Peloponnesian army. His own arrival, also, and his stay in the town, was in itself no small encouragement: we shall see hereafter, when we come to the siege of Syracuse by the Athenians, how much might depend upon the presence of one single Spartan. All thought of surrender was accordingly abandoned, and the Mitylenæans awaited with impatience the arrival of Alkidas, who started from Peloponnesus at the beginning of April, with forty-two triremes; while the Lacedæmonian army at the same time invaded Attica, in order to keep the attention of Athens fully employed. Their ravages on this occasion were more diligent, searching, and destructive to the country than before, and

were continued the longer because they awaited the arrival of news from Lesbos. But none reached them, their stock of provisions was exhausted, and the army was obliged to break up.[393]

The news, when it did arrive, proved very unsatisfactory.

Salæthus and the Mitylenæans had held out until their provisions were completely exhausted, but neither relief, nor tidings, reached them from Peloponnesus. At length, even Salæthus became convinced that no relief would come; he projected, therefore, as a last hope, a desperate attack upon the Athenians and their wall of blockade. For this purpose, he distributed full panoplies among the mass of the people, or commons, who had hitherto been without them, having at best nothing more than bows or javelins.[394] But he had not sufficiently calculated the consequences of this important step. The Mitylenæan multitude, living under an oligarchical government, had no interest whatever in the present contest, which had been undertaken without any appeal to their opinion. They had no reason for aversion to Athens, seeing that they suffered no practical grievance from the Athenian alliance: and we shall find hereafter that even among the subject-allies—to say nothing of a privileged ally like Mitylênê—the bulk of the citizens were never forward, sometimes positively reluctant, to revolt. The Mitylenæan oligarchy had revolted, in spite of the absence of practical wrongs, because they desired an uncontrolled town-autonomy as well as security for its continuance: but this was a feeling to which the people were naturally strangers, having no share in the government of their own town, and being kept dead and passive, as it was the interest of the oligarchy that they should be, in respect to political sentiment. A Grecian oligarchy might obtain from its people quiet submission under ordinary circumstances, but if ever it required energetic effort, the genuine devotion under which alone such effort could be given, was found wanting. Accordingly, the Mitylenæan demos, so soon as they found themselves strengthened and ennobled by the possession of heavy armor, refused obedience to the orders of Salæthus for marching out and imperiling their lives in a desperate struggle. They were under the belief—not unnatural under the secrecy of public affairs habitually practised by an oligarchy, but which, assuredly, the Athenian demos would have been too well informed to entertain—that their governors were starving them, and had concealed stores of provisions for themselves. Accordingly, the first use which they made of their arms was, to demand that these concealed stores should be brought out and fairly apportioned to all, threatening, unless their demand was complied with at once, to enter into negotiations with the Athenians, and surrender the city. The ruling Mitylenæans, unable to prevent this, but foreseeing that it would be their irretrievable ruin, preferred the chance of negotiating themselves for a capitulation. It was agreed with Pachês, that the Athenian armament should enter into possession of Mitylênê; that the fate of its people and city should be left to the Athenian assembly, and that the Mitylenæans should send envoys to Athens to plead their cause: until the return of these envoys, Pachês engaged that no one should be either killed, or

put in chains, or sold into slavery. Nothing was said about Salæthus, who hid himself as well as he could in the city. In spite of the guarantee received from Pachês, so great was the alarm of those Mitylenæans who had chiefly instigated the revolt, that when he actually took possession of the city, they threw themselves as suppliants upon the altars for protection; but being induced, by his assurances, to quit their sanctuary, were placed in the island of Tenedos until answer should be received from Athens.[395]

Having thus secured possession of Mitylênê, Pachês sent round some triremes to the other side of the island, and easily captured Antissa. But before he had time to reduce the two remaining towns of Pyrrha and Eresus, he received news which forced him to turn his attention elsewhere.

To the astonishment of every one, the Peloponnesian fleet of Alkidas was seen on the coast of Ionia. It ought to have been there much earlier, and had Alkidas been a man of energy, it would have reached Mitylênê even before the surrender of the city. But the Peloponnesians, when about to advance into the Athenian waters and brave the Athenian fleet, were under the same impressions of conscious weakness and timidity—especially since the victories of Phormio in the preceding year—as that which beset land-troops who marched up to attack the Lacedæmonian heavy-armed.[396] Alkidas, though unobstructed by the Athenians, who were not aware of his departure,—though pressed to hasten forward by Lesbian and Ionian exiles on board, and aided by expert pilots from those Samian exiles who had established themselves at Anæa,[397] on the Asiatic continent, and acted as zealous enemies of Athens,—nevertheless, instead of sailing straight to Lesbos, lingered first near Peloponnesus, next at the island of Delos, making capture of private vessels with their crews; until at length, on reaching the islands of Ikarus and Mykonus, he heard the unwelcome tidings that the besieged town had capitulated. Not at first crediting the report, he sailed onward to Embaton, in the Erythræan territory on the coast of Asia Minor, where he found the news confirmed. As only seven days had elapsed since the capitulation had been concluded, Teutiaplus, an Eleian captain in the fleet, strenuously urged the daring project of sailing on forthwith, and surprising Mitylênê by night in its existing unsettled condition: no preparation would have been made for receiving them, and there was good chance that the Athenians might be suddenly overpowered, the Mitylenæans again armed, and the town recovered.

Such a proposition, which was indeed something more than daring, did not suit the temper of Alkidas. Nor could he be induced by the solicitation of the exiles to fix and fortify himself either in any port of Ionia, or in the Æolic town of Kymê, so as to afford support and countenance to such subjects of the Athenian empire as were disposed to revolt; though he was confidently assured that many of them would revolt on his proclamation, and that the satrap Pissuthnês of Sardis would help him to defray the expense. Having been sent for the express purpose of relieving Mitylênê, Alkidas believed himself interdicted from any other project, and determined to return

to Peloponnesus at once, dreading nothing so much as the pursuit of Pachês and the Athenian fleet. From Embaton, accordingly, he started on his return, coasting southward along Asia Minor as far as Ephesus. But the prisoners taken in his voyage were now an encumbrance to his flight; and their number was not inconsiderable, since all the merchant-vessels in his route had approached the fleet without suspicion, believing it to be Athenian: a Peloponnesian fleet near the coast of Ionia was as yet something unheard of and incredible. To get rid of his prisoners, Alkidas stopped at Myonnêsus, near Teos, and there put to death the greater number of them,—a barbarous proceeding, which excited lively indignation among the neighboring Ionic cities to which they belonged; insomuch that when he reached Ephesus, the Samian exiles dwelling at Anæa, who had come forward so actively to help him, sent him a spirited remonstrance, reminding him that the slaughter of men neither engaged in war, nor enemies, nor even connected with Athens, except by constraint, was disgraceful to one who came forth as the liberator of Greece,—and that, if he persisted, he would convert his friends into enemies, not his enemies into friends. So keenly did Alkidas feel this animadversion, that he at once liberated the remainder of his prisoners, several of them Chians; and then started from Ephesus, taking his course across sea towards Krete and Peloponnesus. After much delay off the coast of Krete from stormy weather, which harassed and dispersed his fleet, he at length reached in safety the harbor of Kyllênê in Elis, where his scattered ships were ultimately reunited.[398]

Thus inglorious was the voyage of the first Peloponnesian admiral who dared to enter that *Mare clausum* which passed for a portion of the territory of Athens.[399] But though he achieved little, his mere presence excited everywhere not less dismay than astonishment: for the Ionic towns were all unfortified, and Alkidas might take and sack any one of them by sudden assault, even though unable to hold it permanently. Pressing messages reached Pachês from Erythræ and from several other places, while the Athenian triremes called Paralus and Salaminia, the privileged vessels which usually carried public and sacred deputations, had themselves seen the Peloponnesian fleet anchored at Ikarus, and brought him the same intelligence. Pachês, having his hands now free by the capture of Mitylênê, set forth immediately in pursuit of the intruder, whom he chased as far the island of Patmos. It was there ascertained that Alkidas had finally disappeared from the eastern waters, and the Athenian admiral, though he would have rejoiced to meet the Peloponnesian fleet in the open sea, accounted it fortunate that they had not taken up a position in some Asiatic harbor,—in which case it would have been necessary for him to undertake a troublesome and tedious blockade,[400] besides all the chances of revolt among the Athenian dependencies. We shall see how much, in this respect, depended upon the personal character of the Lacedæmonian commander, when we come hereafter to the expedition of Brasidas.

On his return from Patmos to Mitylênê, Pachês was induced to stop at Notium by the solicitations of some exiles. Notium was the port of Kolophon, from which it was

some little distance, as Peiræus was from Athens.[401]

About three years before, a violent internal dissension had taken place in Kolophon, and one of the parties, invoking the aid of the Persian Itamanes (seemingly one of the generals of the satrap Pissuthnês), had placed him in possession of the town; whereupon the opposite party, forced to retire, had established itself separately and independently at Notium. But the Kolophonians who remained in the town soon contrived to procure a party in Notium, whereby they were enabled to regain possession of it, through the aid of a body of Arcadian mercenaries in the service of Pissuthnês. These Arcadians formed a standing garrison at Notium, in which they occupied a separate citadel, or fortified space, while the town became again attached as harbor to Kolophon. A considerable body of exiles, however, expelled on that occasion, now invoked the aid of Pachês to reinstate them, and to expel the Arcadians. On reaching the place, the Athenian general prevailed upon Hippias, the Arcadian captain, to come forth to a parley, under the promise that, if nothing mutually satisfactory could be settled, he would again replace him, "safe and sound," in the fortification. But no sooner had the Arcadian come forth to this parley, than Pachês, causing him to be detained under guard, but without fetters or ill-usage, immediately attacked the fortification while the garrison were relying on the armistice, carried it by storm, and put to death both the Arcadians and the Persians who were found within. Having got possession of the fortification, he next brought Hippias again into it, "safe and sound," according to the terms of the convention, which was thus literally performed, and then immediately afterwards caused him to be shot with arrows and javelins. Of this species of fraud, founded on literal performance and real violation of an agreement, there are various examples in Grecian history; but nowhere do we read of a more flagitious combination of deceit and cruelty than the behavior of Pachês at Notium. How it was noticed at Athens, we do not know: but we may remark, not without surprise, that Thucydidês recounts it plainly and calmly without a single word of comment.[402]

Notium was separated from Kolophon, and placed in possession of those Kolophonians who were opposed to the Persian supremacy in the upper town. But as it had been down to this time a mere appendage of Kolophon and not a separate town, the Athenians soon afterwards sent œkists and performed for it the ceremonies of colonization according to their own laws and customs, inviting from every quarter the remaining exiles of Kolophon.[403] Whether any new settlers went from Athens itself, we do not know: but the step was intended to confer a sort of Hellenic citizenship, and recognized collective personality, on the new-born town of Notium; without which, neither its theôry or solemn deputation would have been admitted to offer public sacrifice, nor its private citizens to contend for the prize, at Olympic and other great festivals.

Having cleared the Asiatic waters from the enemies of Athens, Pachês returned to Lesbos, reduced the towns of Pyrrha and Eresus, and soon found himself so com-

pletely master both of Mitylênê and the whole island, as to be able to send home the larger part of his force; carrying with them as prisoners those Mitylenæans who had been deposited in Tenedos, as well as others, prominently implicated in the late revolt, to the number altogether of rather more than a thousand. The Lacedæmonian Salæthus, being recently detected in his place of concealment, was included among the prisoners transmitted.

Upon the fate of these prisoners the Athenians had now to pronounce, and they entered upon the discussion in a temper of extreme wrath and vengeance. As to Salæthus, their resolution to put him to death was unanimous and immediate, nor would they listen to his promises, assuredly delusive, of terminating the blockade of Platæa, in case his life were spared. What to do with Mitylênê and its inhabitants was a point more doubtful, and was submitted to formal debate in the public assembly.

It is in this debate that Thucydidês first takes notice of Kleon, who is, however, mentioned by Plutarch as rising into importance some few years earlier, during the lifetime of Periklês. Under the great increase of trade and population in Athens and Peiræus during the last forty years, a new class of politicians seem to have grown up, men engaged in various descriptions of trade and manufacture, who began to rival more or less in importance the ancient families of Attic proprietors. This change was substantially analogous to that which took place in the cities of mediæval Europe, when the merchants and traders of the various guilds gradually came to compete with, and ultimately supplanted, the patrician families in whom the supremacy had originally resided. In Athens, persons of ancient family and station enjoyed at this time no political privilege, and since the reforms of Ephialtês and Periklês, the political constitution had become thoroughly democratical. But they still continued to form the two highest classes in the Solonian census founded on property,—the pentakosiomedimni, and the hippeis, or knights: new men enriched by trade doubtless got into these classes, but probably only in minority, and imbibed the feeling of the class as they found it, instead of bringing into it any new spirit. Now an individual Athenian of this class, though without any legal title to preference, yet when he stood forward as candidate for political influence, continued to be decidedly preferred and welcomed by the social sentiment at Athens, which preserved in its spontaneous sympathies distinctions effaced from the political code.[404] Besides this place ready prepared for him in the public sympathy, especially advantageous at the outset of political life,—he found himself farther borne up by the family connections, associations, and political clubs, etc., which exercised very great influence both on the politics and the judicature of Athens, and of which he became a member as a matter of course. Such advantages were doubtless only auxiliary, carrying a man up to a certain point of influence, but leaving him to achieve the rest by his own personal qualities and capacity. But their effect was nevertheless very real, and those who, without possessing them, met and buffeted him in the public assembly, contended against great disadvantages. A person of such low or middling station ob-

tained no favorable presumptions or indulgence on the part of the public to meet him half-way,—nor had he established connections to encourage first successes, or help him out of early scrapes. He found others already in possession of ascendency, and well-disposed to keep down new competitors; so that he had to win his own way unaided, from the first step to the last, by qualities personal to himself; by assiduity of attendance, by acquaintance with business, by powers of striking speech, and withal by unflinching audacity, indispensable to enable him to bear up against that opposition and enmity which he would incur from the high-born politicians, and organized party clubs, as soon as he appeared to be rising up into ascendency.

The free march of political and judicial affairs raised up several such men, during the years beginning and immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. Even during the lifetime of Periklês, they appear to have arisen in greater or less numbers: but the personal ascendency of that great man,—who combined an aristocratical position with a strong and genuine democratical sentiment, and an enlarged intellect rarely found attached to either,—impressed a peculiar character on Athenian politics. The Athenian world was divided into his partisans and his opponents, among each of whom there were individuals high-born and low-born,—though the aristocratical party, properly so called, the majority of wealthy and high-born Athenians, either opposed or disliked him. It is about two years after his death that we begin to hear of a new class of politicians: Eukratês, the rope-seller; Kleon, the leather-seller; Lysiklês, the sheep-seller; Hyperbolus, the lamp-maker;[405] the two first of whom must have been already well-known as speakers in the ekklesia, even during the lifetime of Periklês. Among them all, the most distinguished was Kleon, son of Kleænetus.

Kleon acquired his first importance among the speakers against Periklês, so that he would thus obtain for himself, during his early political career, the countenance of the numerous and aristocratical anti-Perikleans. He is described by Thucydidês in general terms as a person of the most violent temper and character in Athens,—as being dishonest in his calumnies, and virulent in his invective and accusation.[406] Aristophanês, in his comedy of the Knights, reproduces these features, with others new and distinct, as well as with exaggerated details, comic, satirical, and contemptuous. His comedy depicts Kleon in the point of view in which he would appear to the knights of Athens,—a leather-dresser, smelling of the tan-yard,—a low-born brawler, terrifying opponents by the violence of his criminations, the loudness of his voice, the impudence of his gestures,—moreover, as venal in his politics, threatening men with accusations, and then receiving money to withdraw them; a robber of the public treasury, persecuting merit as well as rank, and courting the favor of the assembly by the basest and most guilty cajolery. The general attributes set forth by Thucydidês (apart from Aristophanês, who does not profess to write history), we may well accept; the powerful and violent invective of Kleon, often dishonest, together with his self-confidence and audacity in the public assembly. Men of the middling class, like Kleon and Hyperbolus, who persevered in addressing the public assembly and trying

to take a leading part in it, against persons of greater family pretension than themselves, were pretty sure to be men of more than usual audacity. Had they not possessed this quality, they would never have surmounted the opposition made to them: we may well believe that they had it to a displeasing excess,—and even if they had not, the same measure of self-assumption which in Alkibiadês would be tolerated from his rank and station, would in them pass for insupportable impudence. Unhappily, we have no specimens to enable us to appreciate the invective of Kleon. We cannot determine whether it was more virulent than that of Demosthenês and Æschinês, seventy years afterwards,—each of those eminent orators imputing to the other the grossest impudence, calumny, perjury, corruption, loud voice, and revolting audacity of manner, in language which Kleon can hardly have surpassed in intensity of vituperation, though he doubtless fell immeasurably short of it in classical finish. Nor can we even tell in what degree Kleon's denunciations of the veteran Periklês were fiercer than those memorable invectives against the old age of Sir Robert Walpole, with which Lord Chatham's political career opened. The talent for invective possessed by Kleon, employed first against Periklês, would be counted as great impudence by the partisans of that illustrious statesman, as well as by impartial and judicious citizens; but among the numerous enemies of Periklês, it would be applauded as a burst of patriotic indignation, and would procure for the orator that extraneous support at first which would sustain him until he acquired his personal hold on the public assembly.[407]

By what degrees or through what causes that hold was gradually increased, we do not know; but at the time when the question of Mitylênê came on for discussion, it had grown into a sort of ascendency which Thucydidês describes by saying that Kleon was "at that time by far the most persuasive speaker in the eyes of the people." The fact of Kleon's great power of speech, and his capacity of handling public business in a popular manner, is better attested than anything else respecting him, because it depends upon two witnesses both hostile to him,—Thucydidês and Aristophanês. The assembly and the dikastery were Kleon's theatre and holding-ground: for the Athenian people taken collectively in their place of meeting, and the Athenian people taken individually, were not always the same person and had not the same mode of judgment: Demos sitting in the Pnyx, was a different man from Demos at home.[408] The lofty combination of qualities possessed by Periklês exercised ascendency over both one and the other; but the qualities of Kleon swayed considerably the former without standing high in the esteem of the latter.

When the fate of Mitylênê and its inhabitants was submitted to the Athenian assembly, Kleon took the lead in the discussion. There never was a theme more perfectly suited to his violent temperament and power of fierce invective. Taken collectively, the case of Mitylênê presented a revolt as inexcusable and aggravated as any revolt could be: and we have only to read the grounds of it, as set forth by the Mitylenæan speakers themselves before the Peloponnesians at Olympia, to be satis-

fied that such a proceeding, when looked at from the Athenian point of view, would be supposed to justify, and even to require, the very highest pitch of indignation. The Mitylenæans admit, not only that they have no ground of complaint against Athens, but that they have been well and honorably treated by her, with special privilege. But they fear that she may oppress them in future: they hate the very principle of her empire, and eagerly instigate, as well as aid, her enemies to subdue her: they select the precise moment in which she has been worn down by a fearful pestilence, invasion, and cost of war. Nothing more than this would be required to kindle the most intense wrath in the bosom of an Athenian patriot: but there was yet another point which weighed as much as the rest, if not more: the revolters had been the first to invite a Peloponnesian fleet across the Ægean, and the first to proclaim, both to Athens and her allies, the precarious tenure of her empire.[409] The violent Kleon would on this occasion find in the assembly an audience hardly less violent than himself, and would easily be able to satisfy them that anything like mercy to the Mitylenæans was treason to Athens. He proposed to apply to the captive city the penalties tolerated by the custom of war in their harshest and fullest measure: to kill the whole Mitylenæan male population of military age, probably about six thousand persons,—and to sell as slaves all the women and children.[410] The proposition, though strongly opposed by Diodotus and others, was sanctioned and passed by the assembly, and a trireme was forthwith despatched to Mitylênê, enjoining Pachês to put it in execution.[411]

Such a sentence was, in principle, nothing more than a very rigorous application of the received laws of war. Not merely the reconquered rebel, but even the prisoner of war, apart from any special convention, was at the mercy of his conqueror, to be slain, sold, or admitted to ransom: and we shall find the Lacedæmonians carrying out the maxim without the smallest abatement towards the Platæan prisoners, in the course of a very short time. And doubtless the Athenian people, so long as they remained in assembly, under that absorbing temporary intensification of the common and predominant sentiment which springs from the mere fact of multitude, and so long as they were discussing the principle of the case, What had Mitylênê deserved? thought only of this view. Less than the most rigorous measure of war, they would conceive, would be inadequate to the wrong done by the Mitylenæans. But when the assembly broke up,—when the citizen, no longer wound up by sympathizing companions and animated speakers in the Pnyx, subsided into the comparative quiescence of individual life,—when the talk came to be, not about the propriety of passing such a resolution, but about the details of executing it, a sensible change and marked repentance became presently visible. We must also recollect, and it is a principle of no small moment in human affairs, especially among a democratical people like the Athenians, who stand charged with so many resolutions passed and afterwards unexecuted, that the sentiment of wrath against the Mitylenæans had been really in part discharged by the mere *passing* of the sentence, quite apart from its execution; just as a furious man relieves himself from overboiling anger by imprecations against

others which he would himself shrink from afterwards realizing. The Athenians, on the whole the most humane people in Greece,—though humanity, according to our ideas, cannot be predicated of any Greeks,—became sensible that they had sanctioned a cruel and frightful decree, and the captain and seamen,[412] to whom it was given to carry, set forth on their voyage with mournful repugnance. The Mitylenæan envoys present in Athens, who had probably been allowed to speak in the assembly and plead their own cause, together with those Athenians who had been proxeni and friends of Mitylênê, and the minority generally of the previous assembly, soon discerned, and did their best to foster, this repentance; which became, during the course of the same evening, so powerful as well as so wide-spread, that the stratêgi acceded to the prayer of the envoys, and convoked a fresh assembly for the morrow to reconsider the proceeding. By so doing, they committed an illegality, and exposed themselves to the chance of impeachment: but the change of feeling among the people was so manifest as to overbear any such scruples.[413]

Though Thucydidês had given us only a short summary, without any speeches, of what passed in the first assembly,—yet as to the second assembly, he gives us at length the speeches both of Kleon and Diodotus, the two principal orators of the first also. We may be sure that this second assembly was in all points one of the most interesting and anxious of the whole war; and though we cannot certainly determine what were the circumstances which determined Thucydidês in his selection of speeches, yet this cause, as well as the signal defeat of Kleon, whom he disliked, may probably be presumed to have influenced him here. That orator came forward to defend his proposition passed on the preceding day, and denounced in terms of indignation the unwise tenderness and scruples of the people, who could not bear to treat their subject-allies, according to the plain reality, as men held only by naked fear. He dwelt upon the mischief and folly of reversing on one day what had been decided on the day preceding,—upon the guilty ambition of orators, who sacrificed the most valuable interests of the commonwealth either to pecuniary gains, or to the personal credit of speaking with effect, triumphing over rivals, and setting up their own fancies in place of fact and reality. He deprecated the mistaken encouragement given to such delusions by a public "wise beyond what was written," who came to the assembly, not to apply their good sense in judging of public matters, but merely for the delight of hearing speeches.[414] He restated the heinous and unprovoked wrong committed by the Mitylenæans,—and the grounds for inflicting upon them that maximum of punishment which "justice" enjoined. He called for "justice" against them; nothing less, but nothing more: warning the assembly that the imperial necessities of Athens essentially required the constant maintenance of a sentiment of fear in the minds of unwilling subjects, and that they must prepare to see their empire pass away if they suffered themselves to be guided either by compassion for those who, if victors, would have no compassion on them,[415]—or by unseasonable moderation towards those who would neither feel nor requite it,—or by the mere impression of seductive discourses. Justice against the Mitylenæans, not less than the

strong political interests of Athens, required the infliction of the sentence decreed on the day preceding.[416]

The harangue of Kleon is in many respects remarkable. If we are surprised to find a man, whose whole importance resided in his tongue, denouncing so severely the license and the undue influence of speech in the public assembly, we must recollect that Kleon had the advantage of addressing himself to the intense prevalent sentiment of the moment,—that he could, therefore, pass off the dictates of this sentiment as plain, downright, honest sense and patriotism; while the opponents, speaking against the reigning sentiment, and therefore driven to collateral argument, circumlocution, and more or less of manœuvre, might be represented as mere clever sophists, showing their talents in making the worse appear the better reason,—if not actually bribed, at least unprincipled, and without any sincere moral conviction. As this is a mode of dealing with questions both of public concern and of private morality, not less common at present than it was in the time of the Peloponnesian war,—to seize upon some strong and tolerably wide-spread sentiment among the public, to treat the dictates of that sentiment as plain common sense and obvious right, and then to shut out all rational estimate of coming good and evil as if it were unholy or immoral, or at best mere uncandid subtlety,—we may well notice a case in which Kleon employs it to support a proposition now justly regarded as barbarous.

Applying our modern views to this proposition, indeed, the prevalent sentiment would not only not be in favor of Kleon, but would be irresistibly in favor of his opponents. To put to death in cold blood some six thousand persons, would so revolt modern feelings, as to overbalance all considerations of past misconduct in the persons to be condemned. Nevertheless, the speech of Diodotus, who followed and opposed Kleon, not only contains no appeal to any such merciful predispositions, but even positively disclaims appealing to them: the orator deprecates, not less than Kleon, the influence of compassionate sentiment, or of a spirit of mere compromise and moderation.[417] He farther discards considerations of justice or the analogies of criminal judicature,[418]—and rests his opposition altogether upon reasons of public prudence, bearing upon the future welfare and security of Athens.

He begins by vindicating[419] the necessity of reconsidering the resolution just passed, and insists on the mischief of deciding so important a question in haste or under strong passion; he enters a protest against the unwarrantable insinuations of corruption or self-conceit by which Kleon had sought to silence or discredit his opponents;[420] and then, taking up the question on the ground of public wisdom and prudence, he proceeds to show that the rigorous sentence decreed on the preceding day was not to be defended. That sentence would not prevent any other among the subject-allies from revolting, if they saw, or fancied that they saw, a fair chance of success: but it might perhaps drive them,[421] if once embarked in revolt, to persist even to desperation, and bury themselves under the ruins of their city. While every means ought to be employed to prevent them from revolting, by precautions before-

hand, it was a mistaken reckoning to try to deter them by enormity of punishment, inflicted afterwards upon such as were reconquered. In developing this argument, the speaker gives some remarkable views on the theory of punishment generally, and on the small addition obtained in the way of preventive effect even by the greatest aggravation of the suffering inflicted upon the condemned criminal,—views which might have passed as rare and profound even down to the last century.[422] And he farther supports his argument by emphatically setting forth the impolicy of confounding the Mitylenæan Demos in the same punishment with their oligarchy: the revolt had been the act exclusively of the latter, and the former had not only taken no part in it, but, as soon as they obtained possession of arms, had surrendered the city spontaneously. In all the allied cities, it was the commons who were well-affected to Athens, and upon whom her hold chiefly depended against the doubtful fidelity of the oligarchies:[423] but this feeling could not possibly continue, if it were now seen that all the Mitylenæans indiscriminately were confounded in one common destruction. Diodotus concludes by recommending that those Mitylenæans whom Pachês had sent to Athens as chiefs of the revolt, should be put upon their trial separately; but that the remaining population should be spared.[424]

This speech is that of a man who feels that he has the reigning and avowed sentiment of the audience against him, and that he must therefore win his way by appeals to their reason. The same appeals, however, might have been made, and perhaps had been made, during the preceding discussion, without success; but Diodotus knew that the reigning sentiment, though still ostensibly predominant, had been silently undermined during the last few hours, and that the reaction towards pity and moderation, which had been growing up under it, would work in favor of his arguments, though he might disclaim all intention of invoking its aid. After several other discourses, both for and against,—the assembly came to a vote, and the proposition of Diodotus was adopted; but adopted by so small a majority, that the decision seemed at first doubtful.[425]

But the trireme carrying the first vote had started the day before, and was already twenty-four hours on its way to Mitylênê. A second trireme was immediately put to sea, bearing the new decree; yet nothing short of superhuman exertions could enable it to reach the condemned city before the terrific sentence now on its way might be actually in course of execution. The Mitylenæan envoys stored the vessel well with provisions, promising large rewards to the crew if they arrived in time; and an intensity of effort was manifested, without parallel in the history of Athenian seamanship,—the oar being never once relaxed between Athens and Mitylênê, and the rowers merely taking turns for short intervals of rest, with refreshment of barley-meal steeped with wine and oil swallowed on their seats. Luckily, there was no unfavorable wind to retard them: but the object would have been defeated, if it had not happened that the crew of the first trireme were as slow and averse in the transmission of their rigorous mandate, as those of the second were eager for the delivery of

the reprieve in time. And, after all, it came no more than just in time; the first trireme had arrived, the order for execution was actually in the hands of Pachês, and his measures were already preparing. So near was the Mitylenæan population to this wholesale destruction:[426] so near was Athens to the actual perpetration of an enormity which would have raised against her throughout Greece a sentiment of exasperation more deadly than that which she afterwards incurred even from the proceedings at Melos, Skiônê, and elsewhere. Had the execution been realized, the person who would have suffered most by it, and most deservedly, would have been the proposer, Kleon. For if the reaction in Athenian sentiment was so immediate and sensible after the mere passing of the sentence, far more violent would it have been when they learned that the deed had been irrevocably done, and when all its painful details were presented to their imaginations: and Kleon would have been held responsible as the author of that which had so disgraced them in their own eyes. As the case turned out, he was fortunate enough to escape this danger; and his proposition, to put to death those Mitylenæans whom Pachês had sent home as the active revolting party, was afterwards adopted and executed. It doubtless appeared so moderate after the previous decree passed but rescinded, as to be adopted with little resistance, and to provoke no after-repentance: yet the men so slain were rather more than one thousand in number.[427]

Besides this sentence of execution, the Athenians razed the fortifications of Mitylênê, and took possession of all her ships of war. In lieu of tribute, they farther established a new permanent distribution of the land of the island; all except Methymna, which had remained faithful to them. They distributed it into three thousand lots, of which three hundred were reserved for consecration to the gods, and the remainder assigned to Athenian kleruchs, or proprietary settlers, chosen by lot among the citizens; the Lesbian proprietors still remaining on the land as cultivating tenants, and paying to the Athenian kleruch an annual rent of two minæ, near four pounds sterling, for each lot. We should have been glad to learn more about this new land-settlement than the few words of the historian suffice to explain. It would seem that two thousand seven hundred Athenian citizens, with their families must have gone to reside, for the time at least, in Lesbos, as kleruchs; that is, without abnegating their rights as Athenian citizens, and without being exonerated either from Athenian taxation, or from personal military service. But it seems certain that these men did not continue long to reside in Lesbos: and we may even suspect that the kleruchic allotment of the island must have been subsequently abrogated. There was a strip on the opposite mainland of Asia, which had hitherto belonged to Mitylênê; this was now separated from that town, and henceforward enrolled among the tributary subjects of Athens.[428]

To the misfortunes of Mitylênê belongs, as a suitable appendix, the fate of Pachês, the Athenian commander, whose perfidy at Notium has been recently recounted. It appears, that having contracted a passion for two beautiful free women

at Mitylênê, Hellânis and Lamaxis, he slew their husbands, and got possession of them by force. Possibly, they may have had private friends at Athens, which must of course have been the case with many Mitylenæan families: at all events they repaired thither, bent on obtaining redress for this outrage, and brought their complaint against Pachês before the Athenian dikastery, in that trial of accountability to which every officer was liable at the close of his command. So profound was the sentiment which their case excited, in this open and numerous assembly of Athenian citizens, that the guilty commander, not waiting for sentence, slew himself with his sword in open court.[429]

The surrender of Platæa to the Lacedæmonians took place not long after that of Mitylênê to the Athenians,—somewhat later in the same summer. Though the escape of one-half of the garrison had made the provisions last longer for the rest, still they had now come to be exhausted, and the remaining defenders were enfeebled and on the point of perishing by starvation. The Lacedæmonian commander of the blockading force, knowing their defenceless condition, could easily have taken the town by storm, had he not been forbidden by express orders from Sparta. For the Spartan government, calculating that peace might one day be concluded with Athens on terms of mutual cession of places acquired by war, wished to acquire Platæa, not by force but by capitulation and voluntary surrender, which would serve as an excuse for not giving it up: though such a distinction, between capture by force and by capitulation, not admissible in modern diplomacy, was afterwards found to tell against the Lacedæmonians quite as much as in their favor.[430] Acting upon these orders, the Lacedæmonian commander sent in a herald, summoning the Platæans to surrender voluntarily, and submit themselves to the Lacedæmonians as judges,—with a stipulation "that the wrong-doers[431] should be punished, but that none should be punished unjustly." To the besieged, in their state of hopeless starvation, all terms were nearly alike, and they accordingly surrendered the city. After a few days' interval, during which they received nourishment from the blockading army, five persons arrived from Sparta to sit in judgment upon their fate,—one, Aristomenidas, a Herakleid of the regal family.[432]

The five Spartans having taken their seat as judges, doubtless in full presence of the blockading army, and especially with the Thebans, the great enemies of Platæa, by their side,—the prisoners taken, two hundred Platæans and twenty-five Athenians, were brought up for trial, or sentence. No accusation was preferred against them by any one: but the simple question was put to them by the judges: "Have you, during the present war, rendered any service to the Lacedæmonians or to their allies?" The Platæans were confounded at a question alike unexpected and preposterous: it admitted but of one answer,—but before returning any categorical answer at all, they entreated permission to plead their cause at length. In spite of the opposition of the Thebans,[433] their request was granted: and Astymachus and Lakon, the latter proxenus of Sparta at Platæa, were appointed to speak on behalf of the

body. Possibly, both these delegates may have spoken: if so, Thucydidês has blended the two speeches into one.

A more desperate position cannot be imagined, for the interrogatory was expressly so framed as to exclude allusion to any facts preceding the Peloponnesian war,—but the speakers, though fully conscious how slight was their chance of success, disregarded the limits of the question itself, and while upholding with unshaken courage the dignity of their little city, neglected no topic which could touch the sympathies of their judges. After remonstrating against the mere mockery of trial and judgment to which they were submitted, they appealed to the Hellenic sympathies, and lofty reputation for commanding virtue, of the Lacedæmonians,—they adverted to the first alliance of Platæa with Athens, concluded at the recommendation of the Lacedæmonians themselves, who had then declined, though formally solicited, to undertake the protection of the town against Theban oppression. They next turned to the Persian war, wherein Platæan patriotism towards Greece was not less conspicuous than Theban treason,[434]—to the victory gained over the Persians on their soil, whereby it had become hallowed under the promises of Pausanias, and by solemn appeals to the local gods. From the Persian war, they passed on to the flagitious attack made by the Thebans on Platæa, in the midst of the truce,—nor did they omit to remind the judges of an obligation personal to Sparta,—the aid which they had rendered, along with the Athenians, to Sparta, when pressed by the revolt of the Helots at Ithôme. This speech is as touching as any which we find in Thucydidês, and the skill of it consists in the frequency with which the hearers are brought back, time after time, and by well-managed transitions, to these same topics.[435] And such was the impression which it seemed to make on the five Lacedæmonian judges, that the Thebans near at hand found themselves under the necessity of making a reply to it: although we see plainly that the whole scheme of proceeding—the formal and insulting question, as well as the sentence destined to follow upon answer given—had been settled beforehand between them and the Lacedæmonians.

The Theban speakers contended that the Platæans had deserved, and brought upon themselves by their own fault, the enmity of Thebes,—that they had stood forward earnestly against the Persians, only because Athens had done so too, and that all the merit, whatever it might be, which they had thereby acquired, was counterbalanced and cancelled by their having allied themselves with Athens afterwards for the oppression and enslavement of the Æginetans, and of other Greeks equally conspicuous for zeal against Xerxes, and equally entitled to protection under the promises of Pausanias. The Thebans went on to vindicate their nocturnal surprise of Platæa, by maintaining that they had been invited by the most respectable citizens of the town,[436] who were anxious only to bring back Platæa from its alliance with a stranger to its natural Bœotian home,—and that they had abstained from anything like injurious treatment of the inhabitants, until constrained to use force in their own defence. They then reproached the Platæans, in their turn, with that breach of faith

whereby ultimately the Theban prisoners in the town had been put to death. And while they excused their alliance with Xerxes, at the time of the Persian invasion, by affirming that Thebes was then under a dishonest party-oligarchy, who took this side for their own factious purposes, and carried the people with them by force,—they at the same time charged the Platæans with permanent treason against the Bœotian customs and brotherhood.[437] All this was farther enforced by setting forth the claims of Thebes to the gratitude of Lacedæmon, both for having brought Bœotia into the Lacedæmonian alliance, at the time of the battle of Korôneia, and for having furnished so large a portion of the common force in the war then going on.[438]

The discourse of the Thebans, inspired by bitter, and as yet unsatisfied hatred against Platæa, proved effectual: or rather it was superfluous,—the minds of the Lacedæmonians having before been made up. After the proposition twice made by Archidamus to the Platæans, inviting them to remain neutral, and even offering to guarantee their neutrality,—after the solemn apologetic protest tendered by him upon their refusal, to the gods, before he began the siege,—the Lacedæmonians conceived themselves exonerated from all obligation to respect the sanctity of the place;[439] looking upon the inhabitants as having voluntarily renounced their inviolability and sealed their own ruin. Hence the importance attached to that protest, and the emphatic detail with which it is set forth in Thucydidês. The five judges, as their only reply to the two harangues, again called the Platæans before them, and repeated to every one of them individually, the same question which had before been put: each one of them, as he successively replied in the negative,[440] was taken away and killed, together with the twenty-five Athenian prisoners. The women captured were sold as slaves: and the town and territory of Platæa were handed over to the Thebans, who at first established in them a few oligarchical Platæan exiles, together with some Megarian exiles,—but after a few months recalled this step, and blotted out Platæa,[441] as a separate town and territory, from the muster-roll of Hellas. They pulled down all the private buildings and employed the materials to build a vast barrack all round the Heræum, or temple of Hêrê, two hundred feet in every direction, with apartments of two stories above and below; partly as accommodation for visitors to the temple, partly as an abode for the tenant-farmers or graziers who were to occupy the land. A new temple of one hundred feet in length, was also built in honor of Hêrê, and ornamented with couches, prepared from the brass and iron furniture found in the private houses of the Platæans.[442] The Platæan territory was let out for ten years, as public property belonging to Thebes, and was hired by private Theban cultivators.

Such was the melancholy fate of Platæa, after sustaining a blockade of about two years.[443] Its identity and local traditions seemed thus extinguished, and the sacrifices, in honor of the deceased victors who had fought under Pausanias, suspended, —which the Platæan speakers had urged upon the Lacedæmonians as an impiety not to be tolerated,[444] and which perhaps the latter would hardly have consented to

under any other circumstances except from an anxious desire of conciliating the Thebans in their prominent antipathy. It is in this way that Thucydidês explains the conduct of Sparta, which he pronounces to have been rigorous in the extreme.[445] And in truth it was more rigorous, considering only the principle of the case, and apart from the number of victims, than even the first unexecuted sentence of Athens against the Mitylenæans: for neither Sparta, nor even Thebes, had any fair pretence for considering Platæa as a revolted town, whereas Mitylênê was a city which had revolted under circumstances peculiarly offensive to Athens. Moreover, Sparta promised trial and justice to the Platæans on their surrender: Pachês promised nothing to the Mitylenæans, except that their fate should be reserved for the decision of the Athenian people. This little city—interesting from its Hellenic patriotism, its grateful and tenacious attachments, and its unmerited suffering—now existed only in the persons of its citizens harbored at Athens: we shall find it hereafter restored, destroyed again, and finally again restored: so checkered was the fate of a little Grecian state swept away by the contending politics of the greater neighbors. The slaughter of the twenty-five Athenian prisoners, like that of Salæthus by the Athenians, was not beyond the rigor admitted and tolerated, though not always practised, on both sides, towards prisoners of war.

We have now gone through the circumstances, painfully illustrating the manners of the age, which followed on the surrender of Mitylênê and Platæa. We next pass to the west of Greece,—the island of Korkyra,—where we shall find scenes not less bloody, and even more revolting.

It has been already mentioned,[446] that in the naval combats between the Corinthians and Korkyræans during the year before the Peloponnesian war, the former had captured two hundred and fifty Korkyræan prisoners, men of the first rank and consequence in the island. Instead of following the impulse of blind hatred in slaughtering their prisoners, the Corinthians displayed, if not greater humanity, at least a more long-sighted calculation: they had treated the prisoners well, and made every effort to gain them over, with a view of employing them on the first opportunity to effect a revolution in the island,—to bring it into alliance with Corinth,[447] and disconnect it from Athens. Such an opportunity appears first to have occurred during the winter or spring of the present year, while both Mitylênê and Platæa were under blockade; probably about the time when Alkidas departed for Ionia, and when it was hoped that not only Mitylênê would be relieved, but the neighboring dependencies of Athens excited to revolt, and her whole attention thus occupied in that quarter. Accordingly, the Korkyræan prisoners were then sent home from Corinth, nominally under a heavy ransom of eight hundred talents, for which those Korkyræan citizens who acted as proxeni to Corinth made themselves responsible:[448] the proxeni, lending themselves thus to the deception, were doubtless participant in the entire design.

But it was soon seen in what form the ransom was really to be paid. The newcomers, probably at first heartily welcomed, after so long a detention, employed all

their influence, combined with the most active personal canvass, to bring about a complete rupture of all alliance with Athens. Intimation being sent to Athens of what was going on, an Athenian trireme arrived with envoys to try and defeat these manœuvres; while a Corinthian trireme also brought envoys from Corinth to aid the views of the opposite party. The mere presence of Corinthian envoys indicated a change in the political feeling of the island: but still more conspicuous did this change become, when a formal public assembly, after hearing both envoys, decided,—that Korkyra would maintain her alliance with Athens according to the limited terms of simple mutual defence originally stipulated;[449] but would at the same time be in relations of friendship with the Peloponnesians, as she had been before the Epidamnian quarrel. But the alliance between Athens and Korkyra had since become practically more intimate, and the Korkyræan fleet had aided the Athenians in the invasion of Peloponnesus:[450] accordingly, the resolution, now adopted, abandoned the present to go back to the past,—and to a past which could not be restored.

Looking to the war then raging between Athens and the Peloponnesians, such a declaration was self-contradictory: nor, indeed, did the oligarchical party intend it as anything else than a step to a more complete revolution, both foreign and domestic. They followed it up by a political prosecution against Peithias, the citizen of greatest personal influence among the people, who acted by his own choice as proxenus to the Athenians. They accused him of practising to bring Korkyra into slavery to Athens. What were the judicial institutions of the island, under which he was tried, we do not know: but he was acquitted of the charge; and he then revenged himself by accusing in his turn five of the richest among his oligarchical prosecutors, of the crime of sacrilege,—as having violated the sanctity of the sacred grove of Zeus and Alkinous, by causing stakes, for their vine-props, to be cut in it.[451] This was an act distinctly forbidden by law, under penalty of a stater or four drachms for every stake so cut: but it is no uncommon phenomenon, even in societies politically better organized than Korkyra, to find laws existing and unrepealed, yet habitually violated, sometimes even by every one, but still oftener by men of wealth and power, whom most people would be afraid to prosecute: moreover, in this case, no individual was injured by the act, and any one who came forward to prosecute would incur the odium of an informer,—which probably Peithias might not have chosen to brave under ordinary circumstances, though he thought himself justified in adopting this mode of retaliation against those who had prosecuted him. The language of Thucydidês implies that the fact was not denied: nor is there any difficulty in conceiving that these rich men may have habitually resorted to the sacred property for vine-stakes. On being found guilty and condemned, they cast themselves as suppliants at the temples, and entreated the indulgence of being allowed to pay the fine by instalments: but Peithias, then a member of the (annual) senate, to whom the petition was referred, opposed it, and caused its rejection, leaving the law to take its course. It was moreover understood, that he was about to avail himself of his character of senator,—and of his increased favor, probably arising from the recent judicial acquit-

tal,—to propose in the public assembly a reversal of the resolution recently passed, and a new resolution to recognize only the same friends and the same enemies as Athens.

Pressed by the ruinous fine upon the five persons condemned, as well as by the fear that Peithias might carry his point and thus completely defeat their project of Corinthian alliance, the oligarchical party resolved to carry their point by violence and murder. They collected a party armed with daggers, burst suddenly into the senate-house during full sitting, and there slew Peithias with sixty other persons, partly senators, partly private individuals: some others of his friends escaped the same fate by getting aboard the Attic trireme which had brought the envoys, and which was still in the harbor, but now departed forthwith to Athens. These assassins, under the fresh terror arising from their recent act, convoked an assembly, affirmed that what they had done was unavoidable to guard Korkyra against being made the slave of Athens, and proposed a resolution of full neutrality, both towards Athens and towards the Peloponnesians,—to receive no visit from either of the belligerents, except of a pacific character, and with one single ship at a time. And this resolution the assembly was constrained to pass,—it probably was not very numerous, and the oligarchical partisans were at hand in arms.[452] At the same time they sent envoys to Athens, to communicate the recent events with such coloring as suited their views, and to dissuade the fugitive partisans of Peithias from provoking any armed Athenian intervention, such as might occasion a counter-revolution in the island.[453] With some of the fugitives, representations of this sort, or perhaps the fear of compromising their own families, left behind, prevailed: but most of them, and the Athenians along with them, appreciated better both what had been done, and what was likely to follow. The oligarchical envoys, together with such of the fugitives as had been induced to adopt their views, were seized by the Athenians as conspirators, and placed in detention at Ægina; while a fleet of sixty Athenian triremes, under Eurymedon, was immediately fitted out to sail for Korkyra,—for which there was the greater necessity, as the Lacedæmonian fleet, under Alkidas, lately mustered at Kyllênê after its return from Ionia, was understood to be on the point of sailing thither.[454]

But the oligarchical leaders at Korkyra knew better than to rely on the chances of this mission to Athens, and proceeded in the execution of their conspiracy with that rapidity which was best calculated to insure its success. On the arrival of a Corinthian trireme, which brought ambassadors from Sparta, and probably also brought news that the fleet of Alkidas would shortly appear,—they organized their force, and attacked the people and the democratical authorities. The Korkyræan Demos were at first vanquished and dispersed; but during the night they collected together and fortified themselves in the upper parts of the town near the acropolis, and from thence down to the Hyllaic harbor, one of the two harbors which the town possessed; while the other harbor and the chief arsenal, facing the mainland of Epirus, was held by the oligarchical party, together with the market-place near to it, in and around which

the wealthier Korkyræans chiefly resided. In this divided state the town remained throughout the ensuing day, during which the Demos sent emissaries round the territory soliciting aid from the working slaves, and promising to them emancipation as a reward; while the oligarchy also hired and procured eight hundred Epirotic mercenaries from the mainland. Reinforced by the slaves, who flocked in at the call received, the Demos renewed the struggle on the morrow, more furiously than before. Both in position and numbers they had the advantage over the oligarchy, and the intense resolution with which they fought communicated itself even to the women, who, braving danger and tumult, took active part in the combat, especially by flinging tiles from the housetops. Towards the afternoon, the people became decidedly victorious, and were even on the point of carrying by assault the lower town, together with the neighboring arsenal, both held by the oligarchy,—nor had the latter any other chance of safety except the desperate resource of setting fire to that part of the town, with the market-place, houses, and buildings all around it, their own among the rest. This proceeding drove back the assailants, but destroyed much property belonging to merchants in the warehouses, together with a large part of the town: indeed, had the wind been favorable the entire town would have been consumed. The people being thus victorious, the Corinthian trireme, together with most of the Epirotic mercenaries, thought it safer to leave the island; while the victors were still farther strengthened on the ensuing morning by the arrival of the Athenian admiral Nikostratus, with twelve triremes from Naupaktus,[455] and five hundred Messenian hoplites.

Nikostratus did his best to allay the furious excitement prevailing, and to persuade the people to use their victory with moderation. Under his auspices, a convention of amnesty and peace was concluded between the contending parties, save only ten proclaimed individuals of the most violent oligarchs, who were to be tried as ringleaders: these men of course soon disappeared, so that there would have been no trial at all, which seems to have been what Nikostratus desired. At the same time an alliance offensive and defensive was established between Korkyra and Athens, and the Athenian admiral was then on the point of departing, when the Korkyræan leaders entreated him to leave with them, for greater safety, five ships out of his little fleet of twelve,—offering him five of their own triremes instead. Notwithstanding the peril of this proposition to himself, Nikostratus acceded to it, and the Korkyræans, preparing the five ships to be sent along with him, began to enroll among the crews the names of their principal enemies. To the latter this presented the appearance of sending them to Athens, which they accounted a sentence of death. Under this impression they took refuge as suppliants in the temple of the Dioskuri, where Nikostratus went to visit them and tried to reassure them by the promise that nothing was intended against their personal safety. But he found it impossible to satisfy them, and as they persisted in refusing to serve, the Korkyræan Demos began to suspect treachery. They took arms again, searched the houses of the recusants for arms, and were bent on putting some of them to death, if Nikostratus had not taken them under his protection. The principal men of the defeated party, to the number of about

four hundred, now took sanctuary in the temple and sacred ground of Hêrê; and the leaders of the people, afraid that in this inviolable position they might still cause further insurrection in the city, opened a negotiation and prevailed upon them to be ferried across to the little island immediately opposite to the Heræum; where they were kept under watch, with provisions regularly transmitted across to them, for four days. [456]

At the end of these four days, while the uneasiness of the popular leaders still continued, and Nikostratus still adjourned his departure, a new phase opened in this melancholy drama. The Peloponnesian fleet under Alkidas arrived at the road of Sybota on the opposite mainland,—fifty-three triremes in number, for the forty triremes brought back from Ionia had been reinforced by thirteen more from Leukas and Ambrakia, and the Lacedæmonians had sent down Brasidas as advising companion,—himself worth more than the new thirteen triremes, if he had been sent to supersede Alkidas, instead of bringing nothing but authority to advise.[457] Despising the small squadron of Nikostratus, then at Naupaktus, they were only anxious to deal with Korkyra before reinforcements should arrive from Athens: but the repairs necessary for the ships of Alkidas, after their disastrous voyage home, occasioned an unfortunate delay. When the Peloponnesian fleet was seen approaching from Sybota at break of day, the confusion in Korkyra was unspeakable: the Demos and the newly-emancipated slaves were agitated alike by the late terrible combat and by fear of the invaders,—the oligarchical party, though defeated, was still present and forming a considerable minority, and the town was half burnt. Amidst such elements of trouble, there was little authority to command, and still less confidence or willingness to obey. Plenty of triremes were indeed at hand, and orders were given to man sixty of them forthwith,—while Nikostratus, the only man who preserved the cool courage necessary for effective resistance, entreated the Korkyræan leaders to proceed with regularity, and to wait till all were manned, so as to sail forth from the harbor in a body. He offered himself with his twelve Athenian triremes to go forth first alone, and occupy the Peloponnesian fleet, until the Korkyræan sixty triremes could all come out in full array to support him. He accordingly went forth with his squadron; but the Korkyræans, instead of following his advice, sent their ships out one by one and without any selection of crews. Two of them deserted forthwith to the enemy, while others presented the spectacle of crews fighting among themselves; even those which actually joined battle came up by single ships, without the least order or concert.

The Peloponnesians, soon seeing that they had little to fear from such enemies, thought it sufficient to set twenty of their ships against the Korkyræans, while with the remaining thirty-three they moved forward to contend with the twelve Athenians. Nikostratus, having plenty of sea-room, was not afraid of this numerical superiority,—the more so, as two of his twelve triremes were the picked vessels of the Athenian navy,—the Salaminia and the Paralus.[458] He took care to avoid entangling himself with the centre of the enemy, and to keep rowing about their flanks; and as he

presently contrived to disable one of their ships, by a fortunate blow with the beak of one of his vessels, the Peloponnesians, instead of attacking him with their superior numbers, formed themselves into a circle and stood on the defensive, as they had done in the first combat with Phormio in the middle of the strait at Rhium. Nikostratus (like Phormio) rowed round this circle, trying to cause confusion by feigned approach, and waiting to see some of the ships lose their places or run foul of each other, so as to afford him an opening for attack. And he might perhaps have succeeded, if the remaining twenty Peloponnesian ships, seeing the proceeding, and recollecting with dismay the success of a similar manœuvre in the former battle, had not quitted the Korkyræan ships, whose disorderly condition they despised, and hastened to join their comrades. The whole fleet of fifty-three triremes now again took the aggressive, and advanced to attack Nikostratus, who retreated before them, but backing astern and keeping the head of his ships towards the enemy. In this manner he succeeded in drawing them away from the town, so as to leave to most of the Korkyræan ships opportunity for getting back to the harbor; while such was the superior manœuvring of the Athenian triremes, that the Peloponnesians were never able to come up with him or force him to action. They returned back in the evening to Sybota, with no greater triumph than their success against the Korkyræans, thirteen of whose triremes they carried away as prizes.[459]

It was the expectation in Korkyra, that they would on the morrow make a direct attack—which could hardly have failed of success—on the town and harbor; and we may easily believe (what report afterwards stated), that Brasidas advised Alkidas to this decisive proceeding. And the Korkyræan leaders, more terrified than ever, first removed their prisoners from the little island to the Heræum, and then tried to come to a compromise with the oligarchical party generally, for the purpose of organizing some effective and united defence. Thirty triremes were made ready and manned, wherein some even of the oligarchical Korkyræans were persuaded to form part of the crews. But the slackness of Alkidas proved their best defence: instead of coming straight to the town, he contented himself with landing in the island at some distance from it, on the promontory of Leukimnê: after ravaging the neighboring lands for some hours, he returned to his station at Sybota. He had lost an opportunity which never again returned: for on the very same night the fire-signals of Leukas telegraphed to him the approach of the fleet under Eurymedon from Athens,—sixty triremes. His only thought was now for the escape of the Peloponnesian fleet, which was in fact saved by this telegraphic notice. Advantage was taken of the darkness to retire close along the land as far as the isthmus which separates Leukas from the mainland,—across which isthmus the ships were dragged by hand or machinery, so that they might not fall in with or be descried by the Athenian fleet in sailing round the Leukadian promontory. From hence Alkidas made the best of his way home to Peloponnesus, leaving the Korkyræan oligarchs to their fate.[460]

That fate was deplorable in the extreme. The arrival of Eurymedon opens a third unexpected transition in this checkered narrative,—the Korkyræan Demos passing, abruptly and unexpectedly, from intense alarm and helplessness to elate and irresistible mastery. In the bosom of Greeks, and in a population seemingly amongst the least refined of all Greeks,—including too a great many slaves just emancipated against the will of their masters, and of course the fiercest and most discontented of all the slaves in the island,—such a change was but too sure to kindle a thirst for revenge almost ungovernable, as the only compensation for foregone terror and suffering. As soon as the Peloponnesian fleet was known to have fled, and that of Eurymedon was seen approaching, the Korkyræan leaders brought into the town the five hundred Messenian hoplites who had hitherto been encamped without; thus providing a resource against any last effort of despair on the part of their interior enemies. Next, the thirty ships recently manned,—and held ready, in the harbor facing the continent, to go out against the Peloponnesian fleet, but now no longer needed, were ordered to sail round to the other or Hyllaic harbor. Even while they were thus sailing round, some obnoxious men of the defeated party, being seen in public, were slain: but when the ships arrived at the Hyllaic harbor, and the crews were disembarked, a more wholesale massacre was perpetrated, by singling out those individuals of the oligarchical faction who had been persuaded on the day before to go aboard as part of the crews, and putting them to death.[461] Then came the fate of those suppliants, about four hundred in number, who had been brought back from the islet opposite, and were yet under sanctuary in the sacred precinct of the Heræum. It was proposed to them to quit sanctuary and stand their trial; and fifty of them having accepted the proposition, were put on their trial,—all condemned, and all executed. Their execution took place, as it seems, immediately on the spot, and within actual view of the unhappy men still remaining in the sacred ground;[462] who, seeing that their lot was desperate, preferred dying by their own hands to starvation or the sword of their enemies. Some hung themselves on branches of the trees surrounding the temple, others helped their friends in the work of suicide, and, in one way or another, the entire band thus perished: it was probably a consolation to them to believe, that this desecration of the precinct would bring down the anger of the gods upon their surviving enemies.

Eurymedon remained with his fleet for seven days, during all which time the victorious Korkyræans carried on a sanguinary persecution against the party who had been concerned in the late oligarchical revolution. Five hundred of this party contrived to escape by flight to the mainland; while those who did not, or could not flee, were slain wherever they could be found. Some received their death-wounds even on the altar itself,—others shared the same fate, after having been dragged away from it by violence. In one case, a party of murderers having pursued their victims to the temple of Dionysius, refrained from shedding their blood, but built up the doorway and left them to starve; as the Lacedæmonians had done on a former occasion respecting Pausanias. Such was the ferocity of the time, that in one case a father slew

his own son. Nor was it merely the oligarchical party who thus suffered: the floodgates of private feud were also opened, and various individuals, under false charges of having been concerned in the oligarchical movements, were slain by personal enemies or debtors. This deplorable suspension of legal, as well as moral restraints, continued during the week of Eurymedon's stay,—a period long enough to satiate the fierce sentiment out of which it arose;[463] yet without any apparent effort on his part to soften the victors or protect the vanquished. We shall see farther reason hereafter to appreciate the baseness and want of humanity in his character: but had Nikostratus remained in command, we may fairly presume, judging by what he had done in the earlier part of the sedition, with very inferior force, that he would have set much earlier limits to the Korkyræan butchery: unfortunately, Thucydidês tells us nothing at all about Nikostratus, after the naval battle of the preceding day.[464]

We should have been glad to hear something about the steps taken in the way of restoration or healing, after this burst of murderous fury, in which doubtless the newly-emancipated slaves were not the most backward, and after the departure of Eurymedon. But here again Thucydidês disappoints our curiosity. We only hear from him, that the oligarchical exiles who had escaped to the mainland were strong enough to get possession of the forts and most part of the territory there belonging to Korkyra; just as the exiles from Samos and Mitylênê became more or less completely masters of the Peræa or mainland possessions belonging to those islands. They even sent envoys to Corinth and Sparta, in hopes of procuring aid to accomplish their restoration by force, but their request found no favor, and they were reduced to their own resources. After harassing for some time the Korkyræans in the island by predatory incursions, so as to produce considerable dearth and distress, they at length collected a band of Epirotic mercenaries, passed over to the island, and there established a fortified position on the mountain called Istônê, not far from the city. They burned their vessels in order to cut off all hopes of retreat, and maintained themselves for near two years on a system of ravage and plunder which inflicted great misery on the island.[465] This was a frequent way whereby, of old, invaders wore out and mastered a city, the walls of which they found impregnable. The ultimate fate of these occupants of Istônê, which belongs to a future chapter, will be found to constitute a close suitable to the bloody drama yet unfinished in Korkyra.

Such a drama could not be acted, in an important city belonging to the Greek name, without producing a deep and extensive impression throughout all the other cities. And Thucydidês has taken advantage of it to give a sort of general sketch of Grecian politics during the Peloponnesian war; violence of civil discord in each city, aggravated by foreign war, and by the contending efforts of Athens and Sparta,—the former espousing the democratical party everywhere; the latter, the oligarchical. The Korkyræan sedition was the first case in which these two causes of political antipathy and exasperation were seen acting with full united force, and where the malignity of sentiment and demoralization flowing from such an union was seen without disguise.

The picture drawn by Thucydidês, of moral and political feeling under these influences, will ever remain memorable as the work of an analyst and a philosopher: he has conceived and described the perverting causes with a spirit of generalization which renders these two chapters hardly less applicable to other political societies, far distant both in time and place,—especially, under many points of view, to France between 1789 and 1799,—than to Greece in the fifth century before the Christian era. The deadly bitterness infused into intestine party contests by the accompanying dangers of foreign war and intervention of foreign enemies,—the mutual fears between political rivals, where each thinks that the other will forestall him in striking a mortal blow, and where constitutional maxims have ceased to carry authority either as restraint or as protection,—the superior popularity of the man who is most forward with the sword, or who runs down his enemies in the most unmeasured language, coupled with the disposition to treat both prudence in action and candor in speech as if it were nothing but treachery or cowardice,—the exclusive regard to party ends, with the reckless adoption, and even admiring preference, of fraud or violence as the most effectual means,—the loss of respect for legal authority, as well as of confidence in private agreement, and the surrender even of blood and friendship to the overruling ascendency of party-ties,—the perversion of ordinary morality, bringing with it altered signification of all the common words importing blame or approbation,—the unnatural predominance of the ambitious and contentious passions, overpowering in men's minds all real public objects, and equalizing for the time the better and the worse cause, by taking hold of democracy on one side and aristocracy on the other as mere pretences to sanctify personal triumph,—all these gloomy social phenomena, here indicated by the historian, have their causes deeply seated in the human mind, and are likely, unless the bases of constitutional morality shall come to be laid more surely and firmly than they have hitherto been, to recur from time to time, under diverse modifications, "so long as human nature shall be the same as it is now," to use the language of Thucydidês himself.[466] He has described, with fidelity not inferior to his sketch of the pestilence at Athens, the symptoms of a certain morbid political condition, wherein the vehemence of intestine conflict, instead of being kept within such limits as consists with the maintenance of one society among the contending parties, becomes for the time inflamed and poisoned with all the unscrupulous hostility of foreign war, chiefly from actual alliance between parties within the state and foreigners without. In following the impressive description of the historian, we have to keep in mind the general state of manners in his time, especially the cruelties tolerated by the laws of war, as compared with that greater humanity and respect for life which has grown up during the last two centuries in modern Europe. And we have farther to recollect that if he had been describing the effects of political fury among Carthaginians and Jews, instead of among his contemporary Greeks, he would have added to his list of horrors mutilation, crucifixion, and other refinements on simple murder.

The language of Thucydidês is to be taken rather as a generalization and concentration of phenomena which he had observed among different communities, rather than as belonging altogether to any one of them. Nor are we to believe—what a superficial reading of his opening words might at first suggest—that the bloodshed in Korkyra was only the earliest, but by no means the worst, of a series of similar horrors spread over the Grecian world. The facts stated in his own history suffice to show that though the same causes which worked upon this unfortunate island became disseminated, and produced analogous mischiefs throughout many other communities, yet the case of Korkyra, as it was the first, so it was also the worst and most aggravated in point of intensity. Fortunately, the account of Thucydidês enables us to understand it from beginning to end, and to appreciate the degree of guilt of the various parties implicated, which we can seldom do with certainty; because when once the interchange of violence has begun, the feelings arising out of the contest itself presently overpower in the minds of both parties the original cause of dispute, as well as all scruples as to fitness of means. Unjustifiable acts in abundance are committed by both, and in comparing the two, we are often obliged to employ the emphatic language which Tacitus uses respecting Otho and Vitellius: "Deteriorem fore, quisquis vicisset;" of two bad men, all that the Roman world could foresee was, that the victor, whichsoever he was, would prove the worst.

But in regard to the Korkyræan revolution, we can arrive at a more discriminating criticism. We see that it is from the beginning the work of a selfish oligarchical party, playing the game of a foreign enemy, and the worst and most ancient enemy of the island,—aiming to subvert the existing democracy and acquire power for themselves, and ready to employ any measure of fraud or violence for the attainment of these objects. While the democracy which they attack is purely defensive and conservative, the oligarchical movers, having tried fair means in vain, are the first to employ foul means, which latter they find retorted with greater effect against themselves. They set the example of judicial prosecution against Peithias, for the destruction of a political antagonist; in the use of this same weapon, he proves more than a match for them, and employs it to their ruin. Next, they pass to the use of the dagger in the senate-house, against him and his immediate fellow-leaders, and to the wholesale application of the sword against the democracy generally. The Korkyræan Demos are thus thrown upon the defensive, and instead of the affections of ordinary life, all the most intense anti-social sentiments,—fear, pugnacity, hatred, vengeance, obtain unqualified possession of their bosoms; exaggerated too through the fluctuations of victory and defeat successively brought by Nikostratus, Alkidas, and Eurymedon. Their conduct as victors is such as we should expect under such maddening circumstances, from coarse men, mingled with liberated slaves: it is vindictive and murderous in the extreme, not without faithless breach of assurances given. But we must remember that they are driven to stand upon their defence, and that all their energies are indispensable to make that defence successful. They are provoked by an aggression no less guilty in the end than in the means,—an aggression, too, the more

gratuitous, because, if we look at the state of the island at the time when the oligarchical captives were restored from Corinth, there was no pretence for affirming that it had suffered, or was suffering, any loss, hardship, or disgrace, from its alliance with Athens. These oligarchical insurgents find the island in a state of security and tranquillity,—since the war imposed upon it little necessity for effort,—they plunge it into a sea of blood, with enormities as well as suffering on both sides, which end at length in their own complete extermination. Our compassion for their final misery must not hinder us from appreciating the behavior whereby it was earned.

In the course of a few years from this time, we shall have occasion to recount two political movements in Athens, similar in principle and general result to this Korkyræan revolution; exhibiting oligarchical conspirators against an existing and conservative democracy, with this conspiracy at first successful, but afterwards put down, and the Demos again restored. The contrast between Athens and Korkyra, under such circumstances, will be found highly instructive, especially in regard to the Demos, both in the hours of defeat and in those of victory. It will then be seen how much the habit of active participation in political and judicial affairs,—of open, conflicting discussion, discharging the malignant passions by way of speech, and followed by appeal to the vote,—of having constantly present, to the mind of every citizen, in his character of dikast or ekklesiast, the conditions of a pacific society, and the paramount authority of a constitutional majority,—how much all these circumstances, brought home as they were at Athens more than in any other democracy to the feelings of individuals, contributed to soften the instincts of intestine violence and revenge, even under very great provocation.

But the case of Korkyra, as well as that of Athens, different in so many respects, conspire to illustrate another truth, of much importance in Grecian history. Both of them show how false and impudent were the pretensions set up by the rich and great men of the various Grecian cities, to superior morality, superior intelligence, and greater fitness for using honorably and beneficially the powers of government, as compared with the mass of the citizens. Though the Grecian oligarchies, exercising powerful sway over fashion, and more especially over the meaning of words, bestowed upon themselves the appellation of "the best men, the honorable and good, the elegant, the superior," etc., and attached to those without their own circle epithets of a contrary tenor, implying low moral attributes,—no such difference will be found borne out by the facts of Grecian history.[467] Abundance of infirmity, with occasional bad passions, was doubtless liable to work upon the people generally, often corrupting and misguiding even the Athenian democracy, the best apparently of all the democracies in Greece. But after all, the rich and great men were only a part of the people, and taking them as a class, apart from honorable individual exceptions, by no means the best part. If exempted by their position from some of the vices which beset smaller and poorer men, they imbibed from that same position an un-

measured self-importance, and an excess of personal ambition as well as of personal appetite, peculiar to themselves, not less anti-social in tendency, and operating upon a much grander scale. To the prejudices and superstitions belonging to the age, they were noway superior, considering them as a class; while their animosities among one another, virulent and unscrupulous, were among the foremost causes of misfortune in Grecian commonwealth,—and indeed many of the most exceptionable acts committed by the democracies, consisted in their allowing themselves to be made the tools of one aristocrat for the ruin of another. Of the intense party-selfishness which characterized them as a body, sometimes exaggerated into the strongest anti-popular antipathy, as we see in the famous oligarchical oath cited by Aristotle,[468] we shall find many illustrations as we advance in the history, but none more striking than this Korkyræan revolution.

CHAPTER LI.

FROM THE TROUBLES IN KORKYRA, IN THE FIFTH YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, DOWN TO THE END OF THE SIXTH YEAR.

About the same time as the troubles of Korkyra occurred, Nikias, the Athenian general, conducted an armament against the rocky island of Minôa, which lay at the mouth of the harbor of Megara, and was occupied by a Megarian fort and garrison. The narrow channel, which separated it from the Megarian port of Nisæa, and formed the entrance of the harbor, was defended by two towers projecting out from Nisæa, which Nikias attacked and destroyed by means of battering machines from his ships. He thus cut off Minôa from communication on that side with the Megarians, and fortified it on the other side, where it communicated with the mainland by a lagoon bridged over with a causeway. Minôa, thus becoming thoroughly insulated, was more completely fortified and made an Athenian possession; since it was eminently convenient to keep up an effective blockade against the Megarian harbor, which the Athenians had hitherto done only from the opposite shore of Salamis.[469]

Though Nikias, son of Nikeratus, had been for some time conspicuous in public life, and is said to have been more than once stratêgus along with Periklês, this is the first occasion on which Thucydidês introduces him to our notice. He was now one of the stratêgi, or generals of the commonwealth, and appears to have enjoyed, on the whole, a greater and more constant personal esteem than any citizen of Athens, from the present time down to his death. In wealth and in family he ranked among the first class of Athenians: in political character, Aristotle placed him, together with Thucydidês son of Melêsias and Theramenês, above all other names in Athenian history,—seemingly even above Periklês.[470] Such a criticism, from Aristotle, deserves respectful attention, though the facts before us completely belie so lofty an estimate. It marks, however, the position occupied by Nikias in Athenian politics, as the principal person of what maybe called the oligarchical party, succeeding Kimon and Thucydidês, and preceding Theramenês. In looking to the conditions under which this party continued to subsist, we shall see that, during the interval between Thucydidês (son of Melêsias) and Nikias, the democratical forms had acquired such confirmed ascendency, that it would not have suited the purpose of any politician to betray evidence of positive hostility to them, prior to the Sicilian expedition, and the great embarrassment in the foreign relations of Athens which arose out of that disaster. After that change, the Athenian oligarchs became emboldened and aggressive, so that we shall find Theramenês among the chief conspirators in the revolution of the Four Hundred: but Nikias represents the oligarchical party in its previous state of quiescence and torpidity, accommodating itself to a sovereign democracy, and existing in the form of common sentiment rather than of common purposes. And it is a remark-

able illustration of the real temper of the Athenian people, that a man of this character, known as an oligarch but not feared as such, and doing his duty sincerely to the democracy, should have remained until his death the most esteemed and influential man in the city. He was a man of a sort of even mediocrity, in intellect, in education, and in oratory: forward in his military duties, and not only personally courageous in the field, but also competent as a general under ordinary circumstances:[471] assiduous in the discharge of all political duties at home, especially in the post of stratêgus, or one of the ten generals of the state, to which he was frequently chosen and rechosen. Of the many valuable qualities combined in his predecessor Periklês, the recollection of whom was yet fresh in the Athenian mind, Nikias possessed two, on which, most of all his influence rested,—though, properly speaking, that influence belongs to the sum total of his character, and not to any special attributes in it: First, he was thoroughly incorruptible, as to pecuniary gains,—a quality so rare in Grecian public men of all the cities, that when a man once became notorious for possessing it, he acquired a greater degree of trust than any superiority of intellect could have bestowed upon him: next, he adopted the Periklêan view as to the necessity of a conservative or stationary foreign policy for Athens, and of avoiding new acquisitions at a distance, adventurous risks, or provocation to fresh enemies. With this important point of analogy, there were at the same time material differences between them, even in regard to foreign policy. Periklês was a conservative, resolute against submitting to loss or abstraction of empire, as well as refraining from aggrandizement: Nikias was in policy faint-hearted, averse to energetic effort for any purpose whatever, and disposed, not only to maintain peace, but even to purchase it by considerable sacrifices. Nevertheless, he was the leading champion of the conservative party of his day, always powerful at Athens: and as he was constantly familiar with the details and actual course of public affairs, capable of giving full effect to the cautious and prudential point of view, and enjoying unqualified credit for honest purposes,—his value as a permanent counsellor was steadily recognized, even though in particular cases his counsel might not be followed.

Besides these two main points, which Nikias had in common with Periklês, he was perfect in the use of those minor and collateral modes of standing well with the people, which that great man had taken little pains to practise. While Periklês attached himself to Aspasia, whose splendid qualities did not redeem, in the eyes of the public, either her foreign origin or her unchastity, the domestic habits of Nikias appear to have been strictly conformable to the rules of Athenian decorum. Periklês was surrounded by philosophers, Nikias by prophets,—whose advice was necessary both as a consolation to his temperament, and as a guide to his intelligence under difficulties; one of them was constantly in his service and confidence, and his conduct appears to have been sensibly affected by the difference of character between one prophet and another,[472] just as the government of Louis the Fourteenth, and other Catholic princes, has been modified by the change of confessors. To a life thus rigidly decorous and ultra-religious—both eminently acceptable to the Athenians—Nikias

added the judicious employment of a large fortune with a view to popularity. Those liturgies—or expensive public duties undertaken by rich men each in his turn, throughout other cities of Greece as well as in Athens—which fell to his lot were performed with such splendor, munificence, and good taste, as to procure for him universal encomiums; and so much above his predecessors as to be long remembered and extolled. Most of these liturgies were connected with the religious service of the state, so that Nikias, by his manner of performing them, displayed his zeal for the honor of the gods at the same time that he laid up for himself a store of popularity. Moreover, the remarkable caution and timidity—not before an enemy, but in reference to his own fellow-citizens—which marked his character, rendered him preëminently scrupulous as to giving offence or making personal enemies. While his demeanor towards the poorer citizens generally was equal and conciliating, the presents which he made were numerous, both to gain friends and to silence assailants. We are not surprised to hear that various bullies, whom the comic writers turn to scorn, made their profit out of this susceptibility,—but most assuredly Nikias as a public man, though he might occasionally be cheated out of money, was greatly assisted by the reputation which he thus acquired.

The expenses unavoidable in such a career, combined with strict personal honesty, could not have been defrayed except by another quality, which ought not to count as discreditable to Nikias, though in this too he stood distinguished from Periklês. He was a careful and diligent money-getter; a speculator in the silver mines of Laurium, and proprietor of one thousand slaves, whom he let out for work in them, receiving a fixed sum per head for each: the superintending slaves who managed the details of this business were men of great ability and high pecuniary value.[473] Most of the wealth of Nikias was held in this form, and not in landed property. Judging by what remains to us of the comic authors, this must have been considered as a perfectly gentlemanlike way of making money: for while they abound with derision of the leather-dresser Kleon, the lamp-maker Hyperbolus, and the vegetable-selling mother to whom Euripidês owes his birth, we hear nothing from them in disparagement of the slave-letter Nikias. The degree to which the latter was thus occupied with the care of his private fortune, together with the general moderation of his temper, made him often wish to abstract himself from public duty: but such unambitious reluctance, rare among the public men of the day, rather made the Athenians more anxious to put him forward and retain his services. In the eyes of the Pentakosiomedimni and the Hippeis, the two richest classes in Athens, he was one of themselves,—and on the whole, the best man, as being so little open to reproach or calumny, whom they could oppose to the leather-dressers and lamp-makers who often out-talked them in the public assembly. The hoplites, who despised Kleon,—and did not much regard even the brave, hardy, and soldierlike Lamachus, because he happened to be poor,[474]—respected in Nikias the union of wealth and family with honesty, courage, and carefulness in command. The maritime and trading multitude esteemed him as a decorous, honest, religious gentleman, who gave splendid chore-

gies, treated the poorest men with consideration, and never turned the public service into a job for his own profit,—who, moreover, if he possessed no commanding qualities, so as to give to his advice imperative and irresistible authority, was yet always worthy of being consulted, and a steady safeguard against public mischief. Before the fatal Sicilian expedition, he had never commanded on any very serious or difficult enterprise, but what he had done had been accomplished successfully; so that he enjoyed the reputation of a fortunate as well as a prudent commander.[475] He appears to have acted as proxenus to the Lacedæmonians at Athens; probably by his own choice, and among several others.

The first half of the political life of Nikias,—after the time when he rose to enjoy full consideration in Athens, being already of mature age,—was spent in opposition to Kleon; the last half, in opposition to Alkibiadês. To employ terms which are not fully suitable to the Athenian democracy, but which yet bring to view the difference intended to be noted better than any others, Nikias was a minister or ministerial man, often actually exercising and always likely to exercise official functions,—Kleon was a man of the opposition, whose province it was to supervise and censure official men for their public conduct. We must divest these words of that sense which they are understood to carry in English political life,—a standing parliamentary majority in favor of one party: Kleon would often carry in the public assembly resolutions, which his opponents Nikias and others of like rank and position,—who served in the posts of stratêgus, ambassador, and other important offices designated by the general vote, were obliged against their will to execute. In attaining such offices they were assisted by the political clubs, or established *conspiracies* (to translate the original literally), among the leading Athenians, to stand by each other both for acquisition of office and for mutual insurance under judicial trial. These clubs, or hetæries, must without doubt have played a most important part in the practical working of Athenian politics, and it is much to be regretted that we are possessed of no details respecting them. We know that in Athens they were thoroughly oligarchical in disposition,[476]—while equality, or something near to it, in rank and position must have been essential to the social harmony of the members: in some towns, it appears that such political associations existed under the form of gymnasia,[477] for the mutual exercise of the members, or of syssitia for joint banquets. At Athens they were numerous, and doubtless not habitually in friendship with each other, since the antipathies among different oligarchical men were exceedingly strong, and the union brought about between them at the time of the Four Hundred arose only out of common desire to put down the democracy, and lasted but a little while. But the designation of persons to serve in the capacity of stratêgus and other principal offices greatly depended upon them,—as well as the facility of passing through that trial of accountability to which every man was liable after his year of office. Nikias, and men generally of his rank and fortune, helped by these clubs, and lending help in their turn, composed what may be called the ministers, or executive individual functionaries of Athens: the men who acted, gave orders to individual men as to specific acts, and saw to the execu-

tion of that which the senate and the public assembly resolved. Especially in regard to the military and naval force of the city, so large and so actively employed at this time, the powers of detail possessed by the stratêgi must have been very great and essential to the safety of the state.

While Nikias was thus in what may be called ministerial function, Kleon was not of sufficient importance to attain the same, but was confined to the inferior function of opposition: we shall see in the coming chapter how he became as it were promoted, partly by his own superior penetration, partly by the dishonest artifice and misjudgment of Nikias and other opponents, in the affair of Sphakteria. But his vocation was now to find fault, to censure, to denounce; his theatre of action was the senate, the public assembly, the dikasteries; his principal talent was that of speech, in which he must unquestionably have surpassed all his contemporaries. The two gifts which had been united in Periklês—superior capacity for speech as well as for action—were now severed, and had fallen, though both in greatly inferior degree, the one to Nikias, the other to Kleon. As an opposition-man, fierce and violent in temper, Kleon was extremely formidable to all acting functionaries; and from his influence in the public assembly, he was doubtless the author of many important positive measures, thus going beyond the functions belonging to what is called opposition. But though the most effective speaker in the public assembly, he was not for that reason the most influential person in the democracy: his powers of speech in fact, stood out the more prominently, because they were found apart from that station, and those qualities which were considered, even at Athens, all but essential to make a man a leader in political life. To understand the political condition of Athens at this time, it has been necessary to take this comparison between Nikias and Kleon, and to remark, that though the latter might be a more victorious speaker, the former was the more guiding and influential leader; the points gained by Kleon were all noisy and palpable, sometimes however, without doubt, of considerable moment,—but the course of affairs was much more under the direction of Nikias.

It was during the summer of this year, the fifth of the war,—B.C. 427, that the Athenians began operations on a small scale in Sicily; probably contrary to the advice both of Nikias and Kleon, neither of them seemingly favorable to these distant undertakings. I reserve, however, the series of Athenian measures in Sicily—which afterwards became the turning-point of the fortunes of the state—for a department by themselves. I shall take them up separately, and bring them down to the Athenian expedition against Syracuse, when I reach the date of that important event.

During the autumn of the same year, the epidemic disorder, after having intermitted for some time, resumed its ravages at Athens, and continued for one whole year longer, to the sad ruin both of the strength and the comfort of the city. And it seems that this autumn, as well as the ensuing summer, were distinguished by violent atmospheric and terrestrial disturbance. Numerous earthquakes were experienced at Athens, in Eubœa, in Bœotia, especially near Orchomenus. Sudden waves of the sea

and unexampled tides were also felt on the coast of Eubœa and Lokris, and the islands of Atalantê and Peparêthus; the Athenian fort and one of the two guard-ships at Atalantê were partially destroyed. The earthquakes produced one effect favorable to Athens; they deterred the Lacedæmonians from invading Attica. Agis, king of Sparta, had already reached the isthmus for that purpose; but the repeated earthquakes were looked upon as an unfavorable portent, and the scheme was abandoned.[478]

These earthquakes, however, were not considered as calculated to deter the Lacedæmonians from the foundation of Herakleia, a new colony near the strait of Thermopylæ. On this occasion, we hear of a branch of the Greek population not before mentioned during the war. The coast immediately north of the strait of Thermopylæ was occupied by the three subdivisions of the Malians,—Paralii, Hierês, and Trachinians. These latter, immediately adjoining Mount Œta on its north side,—as well as the Dorians, the little tribe properly so called, which was accounted the primitive hearth of the Dorians generally, who joined the same mountain-range on the south,—were both of them harassed and plundered by the predatory mountaineers, probably Ætolians, on the high lands between them. At first, the Trachinians were disposed to throw themselves on the protection of Athens; but not feeling sufficiently assured as to the way in which she would deal with them, they joined with the Dorians in claiming aid from Sparta: in fact, it does not appear that Athens, possessing naval superiority only, and being inferior on land, could have given them effective aid. The Lacedæmonians eagerly embraced the opportunity, and determined to plant a strong colony in this tempting situation: there was wood in the neighboring regions for ship-building,[479] so that they might hope to acquire a naval position for attacking the neighboring island of Eubœa, while the passage of troops against the subject-allies of Athens in Thrace, would also be facilitated; the impracticability of such passage had forced them, three years before, to leave Potidæa to its fate. A considerable body of colonists, Spartans and Lacedæmonian Periœki, was assembled under the conduct of three Spartan œkists,—Leon, Damagon, and Alkidas; the latter we are to presume, though Thucydidês does not say so, was the same admiral who had met with such little success in Ionia and at Korkyra. Proclamation was farther made to invite the junction of all other Greeks as colonists, excepting by name Ionians, Achæans, and some other tribes not here specified. Probably the distinct exclusion of the Achæans must have been rather the continuance of ancient sentiment than dictated by any present reasons; since the Achæans were not now pronounced enemies of Sparta. A number of colonists, stated as not less than ten thousand, flocked to the place, having confidence in the stability of the colony under the powerful protection of Sparta; and a new town, of large circuit, was built and fortified under the name of Herakleia;[480] not far from the site of Trachis, about two miles and a quarter from the nearest point of the Maliac gulf, but about double that distance from the strait of Thermopylæ. Near to the latter, and for the purpose of keeping effective possession of it, a port, with dock and accommodation for shipping, was constructed.

A populous city, established under Lacedæmonian protection in this important post, alarmed the Athenians, and created much expectation in every part of Greece: but the Lacedæmonian œkists were harsh and unskilful in their management, and the Thessalians, to whom the Trachinian territory was tributary, considered the colony as an encroachment upon their soil. Anxious to prevent its increase, they harassed it with hostilities from the first moment, while the Œtæan assailants were not idle: and Herakleia, thus pressed from without, and misgoverned within, dwindled down from its original numbers and promise, barely maintaining its existence.[481] We shall find it in later times, however, revived, and becoming a place of considerable importance.

The main Athenian armament of this summer, consisting of sixty triremes, under Nikias, undertook an expedition against the island of Melos. Melos and Thera, both inhabited by ancient colonists from Lacedæmon, had never been from the beginning, and still refused to be, members of the Athenian alliance, or subjects of the Athenian empire. They thus stood out as exceptions to all the other islands in the Ægean, and the Athenians thought themselves authorized to resort to constraint and conquest; believing themselves entitled to command over all the islands. They might indeed urge, and with considerable plausibility, that the Melians now enjoyed their share of the protection of the Ægean from piracy, without contributing at all to the cost of it: but considering the obstinate reluctance and strong Lacedæmonian prepossessions of the Melians, who had taken no part in the war, and given no ground of offence to Athens, the attempt to conquer them by force could hardly be justified even as a calculation of gain and loss, and was a mere gratification to the pride of power in carrying out what, in modern days, we should call the principle of maritime empire. Melos and Thera formed awkward corners, which defaced the symmetry of a great proprietor's field;[482] and the former ultimately entailed upon Athens the heaviest of all losses,—a deed of blood which deeply dishonored her annals. On this occasion, Nikias visited the island with his fleet, and after vainly summoning the inhabitants, ravaged the lands, but retired without undertaking a siege. He then sailed away, and came to Orôpus, on the northeast frontier of Attica, bordering on Bœotia: the hoplites on board his ships landed in the night, and marched into the interior of Bœotia, to the vicinity of Tanagra. They were here met, according to signal raised, by a military force from Athens, which marched thither by land; and the joint Athenian army ravaged the Tanagræan territory, gaining an insignificant advantage over its defenders. On retiring, Nikias reassembled his armament, sailed northward along the coast of Lokris with the usual ravages, and returned home without effecting anything farther.[483]

About the same time that he started, thirty other Athenian triremes, under Demosthenês and Proklês, had been sent round Peloponnesus to act upon the coast of Akarnania. In conjunction with the whole Akarnanian force, except the men of Œniade,—with fifteen triremes from Korkyra, and some troops from Kephallênia and Za-

kynthus,—they ravaged the whole territory of Leukas, both within and without the isthmus, and confined the inhabitants to their town, which was too strong to be taken by anything but a wall of circumvallation and a tedious blockade. And the Akarnanians, to whom the city was especially hostile, were urgent with Demosthenês to undertake this measure forthwith, since the opportunity might not again recur, and success was nearly certain.

But this enterprising officer committed the grave imprudence of offending them on a matter of great importance, in order to attack a country of all others the most impracticable,—the interior of Ætolia. The Messenians of Naupaktus, who suffered from the depredations of the neighboring Ætolian tribes, inflamed his imagination by suggesting to him a grand scheme of operations,[484] more worthy of the large force which he commanded than the mere reduction of Leukas. The various tribes of Ætolians,—rude, brave, active, predatory, and unrivalled in the use of the javelin, which they rarely laid out of their hands,—stretched across the country from between Parnassus and Œta to the eastern bank of the Achelôus. The scheme suggested by the Messenians was, that Demosthenês should attack the great central Ætolian tribes,—the Apodôti, Ophioneis, and Eurytânes: if they were conquered, all the remaining continental tribes between the Ambrakian gulf and Mount Parnassus might be invited or forced into the alliance of Athens,—the Akarnanians being already included in it. Having thus got the command of a large continental force,[485] Demosthenês contemplated the ulterior scheme of marching at the head of it on the west of Parnassus, through the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians,—inhabiting the north of the Corinthian gulf, friendly to Athens, and enemies to the Ætolians, whom they resembled both in their habits and in their fighting,—until he arrived at Kytinium, in Doris, in the upper portion of the valley of the river Kephisus. He would then easily descend that valley into the territory of the Phocians, who were likely to join the Athenians if a favorable opportunity occurred, but who might at any rate be constrained to do so. From Phocis, the scheme was to invade from the northward the conterminous territory of Bœotia, the great enemy of Athens: which might thus perhaps be completely subdued, if assailed at the same time from Attica. Any Athenian general, who could have executed this comprehensive scheme, would have acquired at home a high and well-merited celebrity. But Demosthenês had been ill-informed, both of the invincible barbarians and the pathless country comprehended under the name of Ætolia: some of the tribes spoke a language scarcely intelligible to Greeks, and even eat their meat raw, while the country has even down to the present time remained not only unconquered, but untraversed, by an enemy in arms.

Demosthenês accordingly retired from Leukas, in spite of the remonstrance of the Akarnanians, who not only could not be induced to accompany him, but went home in visible disgust, He then sailed with his other forces—Messenians, Kephallenians, and Zakynthians—to Œneon, in the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians, a maritime township on the Corinthian gulf, not far eastward of Naupaktus,—where his army

was disembarked, together with three hundred epibatæ (or marines) from the triremes,—including on this occasion, what was not commonly the case on shipboard,[486] some of the choice hoplites, selected all from young men of the same age, on the Athenian muster-roll. Having passed the night in the sacred precinct of Zeus Nemeus at Œneon, memorable as the spot where the poet Hesiod was said to have been slain, he marched early in the morning, under the guidance of the Messenian Chromon, into Ætolia; on the first day he took Potidania, on the second Krokyleium, on the third Teichium,—all of them villages unfortified and undefended, for the inhabitants abandoned them and fled to the mountains above. He was here inclined to halt and wait the junction of the Ozolian Lokrians, who had engaged to invade Ætolia at the same time, and were almost indispensable to his success, from their familiarity with Ætolian warfare and similarity of weapons. But the Messenians again persuaded him to advance without delay into the interior, in order that the villages might be separately attacked and taken before any collective force could be gathered together: and Demosthenês was so encouraged by having as yet encountered no resistance, that he advanced to Ægitium, which he also found deserted, and captured without opposition.

Here however was the term of his good fortune. The mountains round Ægitium were occupied not only by the inhabitants of that village, but also by the entire force of Ætolia, collected even from the distant tribes Bomiês and Kalliês, who bordered on the Maliac gulf. The invasion of Demosthenês had become known beforehand to the Ætolians, who not only forewarned all their tribes of the approaching enemy, but also sent ambassadors to Sparta and Corinth to ask for aid.[487] However, they showed themselves fully capable of defending their own territory, without foreign aid: and Demosthenês found himself assailed, in his position at Ægitium, on all sides at once, by these active highlanders, armed with javelins, pouring down from the neighboring hills. Not engaging in any close combat, they retreated when the Athenians advanced forward to charge them,—resuming their aggression the moment that the pursuers, who could never advance far in consequence of the ruggedness of the ground, began to return to the main body. The small number of bowmen along with Demosthenês for some time kept their unshielded assailants at bay; but the officer commanding the bowmen was presently slain, and the stock of arrows became nearly exhausted; and what was still worse, Chromon, the Messenian, the only man who knew the country, and could serve as guide, was slain also. The bowmen became thus either ineffective or dispersed; while the hoplites exhausted themselves in vain attempts to pursue and beat off an active enemy, who always returned upon them, and in every successive onset thinned and distressed them more and more. At length the force of Demosthenês was completely broken, and compelled to take flight; but without beaten roads, without guides, and in a country not only strange to them, but impervious from continual mountain, rock, and forest. Many of them were slain in the flight by pursuers, superior not less in rapidity of movement than in knowledge of the country: some even lost themselves in the forest, and perished miserably in

flames kindled around them by the Ætolians: and the fugitives were at length reassembled at Œneon, near the sea, with the loss of Proklês, the colleague of Demosthenês in command, as well as of one hundred and twenty hoplites, among the best-armed and most vigorous in the Athenian muster-roll.[488] The remaining force was soon transported back from Naupaktus to Athens, but Demosthenês remained behind, being too much afraid of the displeasure of his countrymen to return at such a moment. It is certain that his conduct was such as justly to incur their displeasure; and that the expedition against Ætolia, alienating an established ally and provoking a new enemy, had been conceived with a degree of rashness which nothing but the unexpected favor of fortune could have counterbalanced.

The force of the new enemy whom his unsuccessful attack had raised into activity, soon made itself felt. The Ætolian envoys despatched to Sparta and Corinth found it easy to obtain the promise of a considerable force to join them in an expedition against Naupaktus: and about the month of September, a body of three thousand Peloponnesian hoplites, including five hundred from the newly-founded colony of Herakleia, was assembled at Delphi, under the command of Eurylochus, Makarius, and Menedemus. Their road of march to Naupaktus lay through the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians, whom they proposed either to gain over or to subdue. With Amphissa, the largest Lokrian township, and in the immediate neighborhood of Delphi, they had little difficulty,—for the Amphissians were in a state of feud with their neighbors on the other side of Parnassus, and were afraid that the new armament might become the instrument of Phocian antipathy against them. On the very first application they joined the Spartan alliance, and gave hostages for their fidelity to it: moreover, they persuaded many other Lokrian petty villages—among others the Myoneis, who were masters of the most difficult pass on the road—to do the same. Eurylochus received from these various townships reinforcements for his army, as well as hostages for their fidelity, whom he deposited at Kytinium in Doris: and he was thus enabled to march through all the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians without resistance; except from Œneon and Eupalion, both which places he took by force. Having arrived in the territory of Naupaktus, he was there joined by the full force of the Ætolians; and their joint efforts, after laying waste all the neighborhood, captured the Corinthian colony of Molykreion, which had become subject to the Athenian empire.[489]

Naupaktus, with a large circuit of wall and thinly defended, was in the greatest danger, and would certainly have been taken, had it not been saved by the efforts of the Athenian Demosthenês, who had remained there ever since the unfortunate Ætolian expedition. Apprized of the coming march of Eurylochus, he went personally to the Akarnanians, and persuaded them to send a force to aid in the defence of Naupaktus: for a long time they turned a deaf ear to his solicitations, in consequence of the refusal to blockade Leukas, but they were at length induced to consent. At the head of one thousand Akarnanian hoplites, Demosthenês threw himself into Naupak-

tus; and Eurylochus, seeing that the town had thus been placed out of the reach of attack, abandoned all his designs upon it,—marching farther westward to the neighboring territories of Ætolia, Kalydon, Pleuron, and Proschium, near the Achelôus and the borders of Akarnania. The Ætolians, who had come down to join him for the common purpose of attacking Naupaktus, here abandoned him and retired to their respective homes. But the Ambrakiots, rejoiced to find so considerable a Peloponnesian force in their neighborhood, prevailed upon him to assist them in attacking the Amphilochian Argos as well as Akarnania; assuring him that there was now a fair prospect of bringing the whole of the population of the mainland, between the Ambrakian and Corinthian gulfs, under the supremacy of Lacedæmon. Having persuaded Eurylochus thus to keep his forces together and ready, they themselves with three thousand Ambrakiot hoplites invaded the territory of the Amphilochian Argos, and captured the fortified hill of Olpæ immediately bordering on the Ambrakian gulf, about three miles from Argos itself: this hill had been in former days employed by the Akarnanians as a place for public judicial congress of the whole nation.[490]

This enterprise, communicated forthwith to Eurylochus, was the signal for movement on both sides. The Akarnanians marched with their whole force to the protection of Argos, and occupied a post called Krênæ in the Amphilochian territory, hoping to be able to prevent Eurylochus from effecting his junction with the Ambrakiots at Olpæ. They at the same time sent urgent messages to Demosthenês at Naupaktus, and to the Athenian guard-squadron of twenty triremes under Aristotelês and Hierophon, entreating their aid in the present need, and inviting Demosthenês to act as their commander. They had forgotten their displeasure against him arising out of his recent refusal to blockade at Leukas,—for which they probably thought that he had been sufficiently punished by his disgrace in Ætolia; while they knew and esteemed his military capacity. In fact, the accident whereby he had been detained at Naupaktus, now worked fortunately for them as well as for him: it secured to them a commander whom all of them respected, obviating the jealousies among their own numerous petty townships,—it procured for him the means of retrieving his own reputation at Athens. Demosthenês, not backward in seizing this golden opportunity, came speedily into the Ambrakian gulf with the twenty Athenian triremes, conducting two hundred Messenian hoplites and sixty Athenian bowmen. He found the whole Akarnanian force concentrated at the Amphilochian Argos, and was named general along with the Akarnanian generals, but in reality enjoying the whole direction of the operations.

He found also the whole of the enemy's force, both the three thousand Ambrakiot hoplites and the Peloponnesian division under Eurylochus, already united and in position at Olpæ, about three miles off. For Eurylochus, as soon as he was apprized that the Ambrakiots had reached Olpæ, broke up forthwith his camp at Proschium in Ætolia, knowing that his best chance of traversing the hostile territory of Akarnania consisted in celerity: the whole Akarnanian force, however, had already gone to Argos,

so that his march was unopposed through that country. He crossed the Achelôus, marched westward of Stratus, through the Akarnanian townships of Phytia, Medeon, and Limnæa, then quitting both Akarnania and the direct road from Akarnania to Argos, he struck rather eastward into the mountainous district of Thyamus, in the territory of the Agræans, who were enemies of the Akarnanians. From hence he descended at night into the territory of Argos, and passed unobserved under cover of the darkness between Argos itself, and the Akarnanian force at Krênæ; so as to join in safety the three thousand Ambrakiots at Olpæ; to their great joy,—for they had feared that the enemy at Argos and Krênæ would have arrested his passage; and feeling their force inadequate to contend alone, they had sent pressing messages home to demand large reinforcements for themselves and their own protection.[491]

Demosthenês thus found an united and formidable enemy, superior in number to himself, at Olpæ, and conducted his troops from Argos and Krênæ to attack them. The ground was rugged and mountainous, and between the two armies lay a steep ravine which neither liked to be the first to pass, so that they lay for five days inactive. If Herodotus had been our historian, he would probably have ascribed this delay to unfavorable sacrifices (which may probably have been the case), and would have given us interesting anecdotes respecting the prophets on both sides; but the more positive and practical genius of Thucydidês merely acquaints us, that on the sixth day both armies put themselves in order of battle,—both probably tired of waiting. The ground being favorable for ambuscade, Demosthenês hid in a bushy dell four hundred hoplites and light-armed, so that they might spring up suddenly in the midst of the action upon the Peloponnesian left, which outflanked his right. He was himself on the right with the Messenians and some Athenians, opposed to Eurylochus on the left of the enemy: the Akarnanians, with the Amphilochian akontists, or darters, occupied his left, opposed to the Ambrakiot hoplites: Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians were, however, intermixed in the line of Eurylochus, and it was only the Mantineans who maintained a separate station of their own towards the left centre. The battle accordingly began, and Eurylochus with his superior numbers was proceeding to surround Demosthenês, when on a sudden the men in ambush rose up and set upon his rear. A panic seized his men, and they made no resistance worthy of their Peloponnesian reputation: they broke and fled, while Eurylochus, doubtless exposing himself with peculiar bravery in order to restore the battle, was early slain. Demosthenês, having near him his best troops, pressed them vigorously and their panic communicated itself to the troops in the centre, so that all were put to flight and pursued to Olpæ. On the right of the line of Eurylochus, the Ambrakiots, the most warlike Greeks in the Epirotic regions, completely defeated the Akarnanians opposed to them, and carried their pursuit even as far as Argos. So complete, however, was the victory gained by Demosthenês over the remaining troops, that these Ambrakiots had great difficulty in fighting their way back to Olpæ, which was not accomplished without severe loss, and late in the evening. Among all the beaten troops, the Mantineans were those who best maintained their retreating order.[492] The loss in the

army of Demosthenês was about three hundred: that of the opponents much greater, but the number is not specified.

Of the three Spartan commanders, two, Eurylochus and Makarius, had been slain: the third, Menedæus, found himself beleaguered both by sea and land,—the Athenian squadron being on guard along the coast. It would seem, indeed, that he might have fought his way to Ambrakia, especially as he would have met the Ambrakiot reinforcement coming from the city. But whether this were possible or not, the commander, too much dispirited to attempt it, took advantage of the customary truce granted for burying the dead, to open negotiations with Demosthenês and the Akarnanian generals, for the purpose of obtaining an unmolested retreat. This was peremptorily refused: but Demosthenês (with the consent of the Akarnanian leaders) secretly intimated to the Spartan commander and those immediately around him, together with the Mantineans and other Peloponnesian troops,—that if they chose to make a separate and surreptitious retreat, abandoning their comrades, no opposition would be offered: for he designed by this means, not merely to isolate the Ambrakiots, the great enemies of Argos and Akarnania, along with the body of miscellaneous mercenaries who had come under Eurylochus, but also to obtain the more permanent advantage of disgracing the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the eyes of the Epirotic Greeks, as cowards and traitors to military fellowship. The very reason which prompted Demosthenês to grant a separate facility of escape, ought to have been imperative with Menedæus and the Peloponnesians around him, to make them spurn it with indignation: yet such was their anxiety for personal safety, that this disgraceful convention was accepted, ratified, and carried into effect forthwith. It stands alone in Grecian history, as a specimen of separate treason in officers, to purchase safety for themselves by abandoning those under their command. Had the officers been Athenian, it would have been doubtless quoted as an example of the pretended faithlessness of democracy: but as it was the act of a Spartan commander in conjunction with many leading Peloponnesians, we can only remark upon it as a farther manifestation of that intra-Peloponnesian selfishness, and carelessness of obligation towards extra-Peloponnesian Greeks, which we found so lamentably prevalent during the invasion of Xerxes; in this case indeed heightened by the fact that the men deserted were fellow-Dorians and fellow-soldiers, who had just fought in the same ranks.

As soon as the ceremony of burying the dead had been completed, Menedæus, and the Peloponnesians who were protected by this secret convention, stole away slyly and in small bands under pretence of collecting wood and vegetables: on getting to a little distance, they quickened their pace and made off,—much to the dismay of the Ambrakiots, who ran after them and tried to overtake them. The Akarnanians pursued, and their leaders had much difficulty in explaining to them the secret convention just concluded. Nor was it without some suspicions of treachery, and even personal hazard, from their own troops, that they at length caused the fugitive

Peloponnesians to be respected; while the Ambrakiots, the most obnoxious of the two to Akarnanian feeling, were pursued without any reserve, and two hundred of them were slain before they could escape into the friendly territory of the Agræans.[493] To distinguish Ambrakiots from Peloponnesians, similar in race and dialect, was, however, no easy task, and much dispute arose in individual cases.

Unfairly as this loss fell upon Ambrakia, a far more severe calamity was yet in store for her. The large reinforcement from the city, which had been urgently invoked by the detachment at Olpæ, started in due course as soon as it could be got ready, and entered the territory of Amphilochia about the time when the battle of Olpæ was fought, but ignorant of that misfortune, and hoping to arrive soon enough to stand by their friends. Their march was made known to Demosthenês, on the day after the battle, by the Amphilochians; who, at the same time, indicated to him the best way of surprising them in the rugged and mountainous road along which they had to march, at the two conspicuous peaks called Idomenê, immediately above a narrow pass leading farther on to Olpæ. It was known beforehand, by the line of march of the Ambrakiots, that they would rest for the night at the lower of these two peaks, ready to march through the pass on the next morning. On that same night, a detachment of Amphilochians, under direction from Demosthenês, seized the higher of the two peaks; while that commander himself, dividing his forces into two divisions, started from his position at Olpæ in the evening after supper. One of these divisions, having the advantage of Amphilochian guides in their own country, marched by an unfrequented mountain road to Idomenê; the other, under Demosthenês himself, went directly through the pass leading from Idomenê to Olpæ. After marching all night, they reached the camp of the Ambrakiots a little before daybreak,—Demosthenês himself with his Messenians in the van. The surprise was complete; the Ambrakiots were found still lying down and asleep, while even the sentinels, uninformed of the recent battle,—hearing themselves accosted in the Doric dialect by the Messenians, whom Demosthenês had placed in front for that express purpose, and not seeing very clearly in the morning twilight, mistook them for some of their own fellow-citizens coming back from the other camp. The Akarnanians and Messenians thus fell among the Ambrakiots sleeping and unarmed, and without any possibility of resistance. Large numbers of them were destroyed on the spot, and the remainder fled in all directions among the neighboring mountains, none knowing the roads and the country; it was the country of the Amphilochians, subjects of Ambrakia, but subjects averse to their condition, and now making use of their perfect local knowledge and light-armed equipment, to inflict a terrible revenge on their masters. Some of the Ambrakiots became entangled in ravines,—others fell into ambuscades laid by the Amphilochians. Others again, dreading most of all to fall into the hands of the Amphilochians, barbaric in race as well as intensely hostile in feeling, and seeing no other possibility of escaping them, swam off to the Athenian ships cruising along the shore. There were but a small proportion of them who survived to return to Ambrakia.[494]

The complete victory of Idomenê, admirably prepared by Demosthenês, was achieved with scarce any loss: and the Akarnanians, after erecting their trophy, despoiled the enemy's dead and carried off the arms thus taken to Argos.

On the morrow they were visited by a herald, coming from those Ambrakiots who had fled into the Agræan territory, after the battle of Olpæ, and the subsequent pursuit. He came with the customary request from defeated soldiers, for permission to bury their dead who had fallen in that pursuit. Neither he, nor those from whom he came, knew anything of the destruction of their brethren at Idomenê,—just as these latter had been ignorant of the defeat at Olpæ; while, on the other hand, the Akarnanians in the camp, whose minds were full of the more recent and capital advantage at Idomenê, supposed that the message referred to the men slain in that engagement. The numerous panoplies just acquired at Idomenê lay piled up in the camp, and the herald, on seeing them, was struck with amazement at the size of the heap, so much exceeding the number of those who were missing in his own detachment. An Akarnanian present asked the reason of his surprise, and inquired how many of his comrades had been slain,—meaning to refer to the slain at Idomenê. "About two hundred," the herald replied. "Yet these arms here show, not that number, but more than a thousand men." "Then they are not the arms of those who fought with us." "Nay, but they are; if ye were the persons who fought yesterday at Idomenê." "We fought with no one yesterday: it was the day before yesterday, in the retreat." "O, then ye have to learn, that *we* were engaged yesterday with these others, who were on their march as reinforcement from the city of Ambrakia."

The unfortunate herald now learned for the first time that the large reinforcement from his city had been cut to pieces. So acute was his feeling of mingled anguish and surprise, that he raised a loud cry of woe, and hurried away at once, without saying another word; not even prosecuting his request about the burial of the dead bodies,—which appears on this fatal occasion to have been neglected.[495]

His grief was justified by the prodigious magnitude of the calamity, which Thucydidês considers to have been the greatest that afflicted any Grecian city during the whole war prior to the peace of Nikias; so incredibly great, indeed, that though he had learned the number slain, he declines to set it down, from fear of not being believed,—a scruple which we, his readers, have much reason to regret. It appears that nearly the whole adult military population of Ambrakia was destroyed, and Demosthenês was urgent with the Akarnanians to march thither at once: had they consented, Thucydidês tells us positively that the city would have surrendered without a blow.[496] But they refused to undertake the enterprise, fearing, according to the historian, that the Athenians at Ambrakia would be more troublesome neighbors to them than the Ambrakiots. That this reason was operative, we need not doubt: but it can hardly have been either the single, or even the chief, reason; for, had it been so, they would have been equally afraid of Athenian coöperation in the blockade of Leukas, which they had strenuously solicited from Demosthenês, and had quarrelled

with him for refusing. Ambrakia was less near to them than Leukas, and in its present exhausted state, inspired less fear: but the displeasure arising from the former refusal of Demosthenês had probably never been altogether appeased, nor were they sorry to find an opportunity of mortifying him in a similar manner.

In the distribution of the spoil, three hundred panoplies were first set apart as the perquisite of Demosthenês: the remainder were then distributed, one-third for the Athenians, the other two-thirds among the Akarnanian townships. The immense reserve, personally appropriated to Demosthenês, enables us to make some vague conjecture as to the total loss of Ambrakiots. The fraction of one-third, assigned to the Athenian people, must have been, we may imagine, six times as great, and perhaps even in larger proportion, than the reserve of the general: for the latter was at that time under the displeasure of the people, and anxious above all things to regain their favor,—an object which would be frustrated rather than promoted, if his personal share of the arms were not greatly disproportionate to the collective claim of the city. Reasoning upon this supposition, the panoplies assigned to Athens would be eighteen hundred, and the total of Ambrakiot slain, whose arms became public property, would be five thousand four hundred. To which must be added some Ambrakiots killed in their flight from Idomenê by the Amphilochians, in dells, ravines, and by-places: probably those Amphilochians, who slew them, would appropriate the arms privately, without bringing them into the general stock. Upon this calculation, the total number of Ambrakiot slain in both battles and both pursuits, would be about six thousand: a number suitable to the grave expressions of Thucydidês, as well as to his statements, that the first detachment which marched to Olpæ was three thousand strong, and that the message sent home invoked as reinforcement the total force of the city. How totally helpless Ambrakia had become, is still more conclusively proved by the fact that the Corinthians were obliged shortly afterwards to send by land a detachment of three hundred hoplites for its defence.[497]

The Athenian triremes soon returned to their station at Naupaktus, after which a convention was concluded between the Akarnanians and Amphilochians on the one side, and the Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians—who had fled after the battle of Olpæ into the territory of Salynthius and the Agræi—on the other, insuring a safe and unmolested egress to both of the latter.[498] With the Ambrakiots a more permanent pacification was effected: the Akarnanians and Amphilochians concluded with them a peace and alliance for one hundred years, on condition that they should surrender all the Amphilochian territory and hostages in their possession, and should bind themselves to furnish no aid to Anaktorium, then in hostility to the Akarnanians. Each party, however, maintained its separate alliance,—the Ambrakiots with the Peloponnesian confederacy, the Akarnanians with Athens: it was stipulated that the Akarnanians should not be required to assist the Ambrakiots against Athens, nor the Ambrakiots to assist the Akarnanians against the Peloponnesian league; but against all other enemies, each engaged to lend aid to the other.[499]

To Demosthenês personally, the events on the coast of the Ambrakian gulf proved a signal good fortune, well-earned indeed by the skill which he had displayed. He was enabled to atone for his imprudence in the Ætolian expedition, and to reëstablish himself in the favor of the Athenian people. He sailed home in triumph to Athens, during the course of the winter, with his reserved present of three hundred panoplies, which acquired additional value from the accident, that the larger number of panoplies, reserved out of the spoil for the Athenian people, were captured at sea, and never reached Athens. Accordingly, those brought by Demosthenês were the only trophy of the victory, and as such were deposited in the Athenian temples, where Thucydidês mentions them as still existing at the time when he wrote.[500]

It was in the same autumn that the Athenians were induced by an oracle to undertake the more complete purification of the sacred island of Delos. This step was probably taken to propitiate Apollo, since they were under the persuasion that the terrible visitation of the epidemic was owing to his wrath. And as it was about this period that the second attack of the epidemic, after having lasted a year, disappeared,—many of them probably ascribed this relief to the effect of their pious cares at Delos. All the tombs in the island were opened; the dead bodies were then exhumed, and reinterred in the neighboring island of Rheneia: and orders were given that for the future no deaths and no births should take place in the sacred island. Moreover, the ancient Delian festival—once the common point of meeting and solemnity for the whole Ionic race, and celebrated for its musical contests, before the Lydian and Persian conquests had subverted the freedom and prosperity of Ionia—was now renewed. The Athenians celebrated the festival with its accompanying matches, even the chariot-race, in a manner more splendid than had ever been known in former times: and they appointed a similar festival to be celebrated every fourth year. At this period they were excluded both from the Olympic and the Pythian games, which probably made the revival of the Delian festival more gratifying to them. The religious zeal and munificence of Nikias was strikingly displayed at Delos.[501]

CHAPTER LII.

SEVENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.—CAPTURE OF SPHAKTERIA.

The invasion of Attica by the Lacedæmonians had now become an ordinary enterprise, undertaken in every year of the war except the third and sixth, and then omitted only from accidental causes; though the same hopes were no longer entertained from it as at the commencement of the war. During the present spring, Agis king of Sparta conducted the Peloponnesian army into the territory, seemingly about the end of April, and repeated the usual ravages.

It seemed, however, as if Korkyra were about to become the principal scene of the year's military operations: for the exiles of the oligarchical party, having come back to the island and fortified themselves on Mount Istônê, carried on war with so much activity against the Korkyræans in the city, that distress and even famine reigned there; while sixty Peloponnesian triremes were sent thither to assist the aggressors. As soon as it became known at Athens how hardly the Korkyræans in the city were pressed, orders were given to an Athenian fleet of forty triremes, about to sail for Sicily under Eurymedon and Sophoklês, to halt in their voyage at Korkyra, and to lend whatever aid might be needed.[502] But during the course of this voyage, an incident occurred elsewhere, neither foreseen nor imagined by any one, which gave a new character and promise to the whole war,—illustrating forcibly the observations of Periklês and Archidamus before its commencement, on the impossibility of calculating what turn events might take.[503]

So high did Demosthenês stand in the favor of his countrymen, after his brilliant successes in the Ambrakian gulf, that they granted him permission, at his own request, to go aboard and to employ the fleet in any descent which he might think expedient on the coast of Peloponnesus. The attachment of this active officer to the Messenians at Naupaktus, inspired him with the idea of planting a detachment of them on some well-chosen maritime post in the ancient Messenian territory, from whence they would be able permanently to harass the Lacedæmonians and provoke revolt among the Helots,—the more so, from their analogy of race and dialect. The Messenians, active in privateering, and doubtless well acquainted with the points of this coast, all of which had formerly belonged to their ancestors, had probably indicated to him Pylus, on the southwestern shore. That ancient and Homeric name was applied specially and properly to denote the promontory which forms the northern termination of the modern bay of Navarino, opposite to the island of Sphagia, or Sphakteria; though in vague language the whole neighboring district seems also to have been called Pylus. Accordingly, in circumnavigating Laconia, Demosthenês requested that the fleet might be detained at this spot long enough to enable him to fortify it, engaging himself to stay afterwards and maintain it with a garrison. It was

an uninhabited promontory, about forty-five miles from Sparta; that is, as far distant as any portion of her territory, presenting rugged cliffs, and easy of defence both by sea and land: but its great additional recommendation, with reference to the maritime power of Athens, consisted in its overhanging the spacious and secure basin now called the bay of Navarino. That basin was fronted and protected by the islet called Sphakteria, or Sphagia, untrodden, untenanted, and full of wood, which stretched along the coast for about a mile and three quarters, leaving only two narrow entrances: one at its northern end, opposite to the position fixed on by Demosthenês, so confined as to admit only two triremes abreast,—the other at the southern end, about four times as broad; while the inner water approached by these two channels was both roomy and protected. It was on the coast of Peloponnesus, a little within the northern or narrowest of the two channels, that Demosthenês proposed to plant his little fort,—the ground being itself eminently favorable, and a spring of fresh water[504] in the centre of the promontory.[505]

But Eurymedon and Sophoklês decidedly rejected all proposition of delay; and with much reason, since they had been informed (though seemingly without truth) that the Peloponnesian fleet had actually reached Korkyra: they might well have remembered the mischief which had ensued three years before from the delay of the reinforcement sent to Phormio in some desultory operations on the coast of Krete. The fleet accordingly passed by Pylus without stopping: but a terrible storm drove them back and forced them to seek shelter in the very harbor which Demosthenês had fixed upon,—the only harbor anywhere near. That officer took advantage of this accident to renew his proposition, which however appeared to the commanders chimerical: there were plenty of desert capes round Peloponnesus, they said, if he chose to waste the resources of the city in occupying them,[506]—nor were they at all moved by his reasons in reply. Finding himself thus unsuccessful, Demosthenês presumed upon the undefined permission granted to him by the Athenian people, to address himself first to the soldiers, last of all to the taxiarchs, or inferior officers, and to persuade them to second his project, even against the will of the commanders. Much inconvenience might well have arisen from such clashing of authority: but it happened that both the soldiers and the taxiarchs took the same view of the case as their commanders, and refused compliance: nor can we be surprised at such reluctance, when we reflect upon the seeming improbability of being able to maintain such a post against the great real, and still greater supposed, superiority of Lacedæmonian land-force. It happened, however, that the fleet was detained there for some days by stormy weather; so that the soldiers, having nothing to do, were seized with the spontaneous impulse of occupying themselves with the fortification, and crowded around to execute it with all the emulation of eager volunteers. Having contemplated nothing of the kind on starting from Athens, they had neither tools for cutting stone, nor hods for carrying mortar:[507] accordingly, they were compelled to build their wall by collecting such pieces of rock or stones as they found, and putting them together as each happened to fit in: whenever mortar was needed, they brought it up on their

backs bent inwards, with hands joined behind them to prevent it from slipping away. Such deficiencies were made up, however, partly by the unbounded ardor of the soldiers, partly by the natural difficulties of the ground, which hardly required fortification except at particular points; the work was completed in a rough way in six days, and Demosthenês was left in garrison with five ships, while Eurymedon with the main fleet sailed away to Korkyra. The crews of the five ships, two of which, however, were sent away to warn Eurymedon afterwards, would amount to about one thousand in all: but there presently arrived two armed Messenian privateers, from which Demosthenês obtained a reinforcement of forty Messenian hoplites, together with a supply of wicker shields, though more fit for show than for use, wherewith to arm his rowers. Altogether, it appears that he must have had about two hundred hoplites, besides the half-armed seamen.[508]

Intelligence of this attempt to plant, even upon the Lacedæmonian territory, the annoyance and insult of a hostile post, was soon transmitted to Sparta,—yet no immediate measures were taken to march to the spot; as well from the natural slowness of the Spartan character, strengthened by a festival which happened to be then going on, as from the confidence entertained that, whenever attacked, the expulsion of the enemy was certain. A stronger impression, however, was made by the news upon the Lacedæmonian army invading Attica, who were at the same time suffering from want of provisions, the corn not being yet ripe, and from an unusually cold spring: accordingly, Agis marched them back to Sparta, and the fortification of Pylus thus produced the effect of abridging the invasion to the unusually short period of fifteen days. It operated in like manner to the protection of Korkyra: for the Peloponnesian fleet, recently arrived thither, or still on its way, received orders immediately to return for the attack of Pylus. Having avoided the Athenian fleet by transporting the ships across the isthmus at Leukas, it reached Pylus about the same time as the Lacedæmonian land-force from Sparta, composed of the Spartans themselves and the neighboring Periœki: for the more distant Periœki, as well as the Peloponnesian allies, being just returned from Attica, were summoned to come as soon as they could, but did not accompany this first march.[509]

At the last moment, before the Peloponnesian fleet came in and occupied the harbor, Demosthenês detached two out of his five triremes to warn Eurymedon and the main fleet, and to entreat immediate succor: the remaining ships he hauled ashore under the fortification, protecting them by palisades planted in front, and preparing to defend himself in the best manner he could. Having posted the larger portion of his force,—some of them mere seamen without arms, and many only half-armed,—round the assailable points of the fortification, to resist attacks from the land-force, he himself, with sixty chosen hoplites and a few bowmen, marched out of the fortification down to the sea-shore. It was on that side that the wall was weakest, for the Athenians, confident in their naval superiority, had given themselves little trouble to provide against an assailant fleet. Accordingly, Demosthenês foresaw that

the great stress of the attack would lie on the sea-side, and his only chance of safety consisted in preventing the enemy from landing; a purpose, seconded by the rocky and perilous shore, which left no possibility of approach for ships, except on a narrow space immediately under the fortification. It was here that he took post, on the water's edge, addressing a few words of encouragement to his men, and warning them that it was useless now to display acuteness in summing up perils which were but too obvious,—and that the only chance of escape lay in boldly encountering the enemy before they could set foot ashore; the difficulty of effecting a landing from ships in the face of resistance being better known to Athenian mariners than to any one else.[510]

With a fleet of forty-three triremes, under Thrasymelidas, and a powerful land-force, simultaneously attacking, the Lacedæmonians had good hopes of storming at once a rock so hastily converted into a military post. But as they foresaw that the first attack might possibly fail, and that the fleet of Eurymedon would probably return, they resolved to occupy forthwith the island of Sphakteria, the natural place where the Athenian fleet would take station for the purpose of assisting the garrison ashore. The neighboring coast on the mainland of Peloponnesus was both harborless and hostile, so that there was no other spot near, where they could take station. And the Lacedæmonian commanders reckoned upon being able to stop up, as it were mechanically, both the two entrances into the harbor, by triremes lashed together, from the island to the mainland, with their prows pointing outwards; so that they would be able at any rate, occupying the island as well as the two channels, to keep off the Athenian fleet, and to hold Demosthenês closely blocked up[511] on the rock of Pylus, where his provisions would quickly fail him. With these views, they drafted off by lot some hoplites from each of the Spartan lochi, accompanied as usual by Helots, and sent them across to Sphakteria; while their land-force and their fleet approached at once to attack the fortification.

Of the assault on the land-side, we hear little: the Lacedæmonians were proverbially unskilful in the attack of anything like a fortified place, and they appear now to have made little impression. But the chief stress and vigor of the attack came on the sea-side, as Demosthenês had foreseen. The landing-place, even where practicable, was still rocky and difficult,—and so narrow in dimensions, that the Lacedæmonian ships could only approach by small squadrons at a time; while the Athenians maintained their ground firmly to prevent a single man from setting foot on land. The assailing triremes rowed up with loud shouts and exhortations to each other, striving to get so placed as that the hoplites in the bow could effect a landing: but such were the difficulties arising partly from the rocks and partly from the defence, that squadron after squadron tried this in vain. Nor did even the gallant example of Brasidas procure for them any better success. That officer, commanding a trireme, and observing that some of the pilots near him were cautious in driving their ships close in shore for fear of breaking them against the rocks, indignantly called to them not to

spare the planks of their vessels, when the enemy had insulted them by erecting a fort in the country: Lacedæmonians, he exclaimed, ought to carry the landing by force, even though their ships should be dashed to pieces,—nor ought the Peloponnesian allies to be backward in sacrificing their ships for Sparta, in return for the many services which she had rendered to them.[512] Foremost in performance as well as in exhortation, Brasidas constrained his own pilot to drive his ship close in, and advanced in person even on to the landing-steps for the purpose of leaping first ashore. But here he stood exposed to all the weapons of the Athenian defenders, who beat him back and pierced him with so many wounds, that he fainted away, and fell back into the bows, or foremost part of the trireme, beyond the rowers; while his shield, slipping away from the arm, dropped down and rolled overboard into the sea. His ship was obliged to retire, like the rest, without having effected any landing: and all these successive attacks from the sea, repeated for one whole day and a part of the next were repulsed by Demosthenês and his little band with victorious bravery. To both sides it seemed a strange reversal of ordinary relations,[513] that the Athenians, essentially maritime, should be fighting on land—and that, too, Lacedæmonian land—against the Lacedæmonians, the select land-warriors of Greece, now on shipboard, and striving in vain to compass a landing on their own shore. The Athenians, in honor of their success, erected a trophy, the chief ornament of which was the shield of Brasidas, which had been cast ashore by the water.

On the third day, the Lacedæmonians did not repeat their attack, but sent some of their vessels round to Asinê, in the Messenian gulf, for timber to construct battering machines; which they intended to employ against the wall of Demosthenês, on the side towards the harbor, where it was higher, and could not be assailed without machines, but where, at the same time, there was great facility in landing,—for their previous attack had been made on the side fronting the sea, where the wall was lower, but the difficulties of landing insuperable.[514] But before these ships came back, the face of affairs was seriously changed by the unwelcome return of the Athenian fleet from Zakynthus, under Eurymedon, reinforced by four Chian ships, and some of the guard-ships at Naupaktus, so as now to muster fifty sail. The Athenian admiral, finding the enemy's fleet in possession of the harbor, and seeing both the island of Sphakteria occupied, and the opposite shore covered with Lacedæmonian hoplites,[515]—for the allies from all parts of Peloponnesus had now arrived,—looked around in vain for a place to land, and could find no other night-station except the uninhabited island of Prôtê, not very far distant. From hence he sailed forth in the morning to Pylus, prepared for a naval engagement,—hoping that perhaps the Lacedæmonians might come out to fight him in the open sea, but resolved, if this did not happen, to force his way in and attack the fleet in the harbor; the breadth of sea between Sphakteria and the mainland being sufficient to admit of nautical manœuvre.[516] The Lacedæmonian admirals, seemingly confounded by the speed of the Athenian fleet in coming back, never thought of sailing out of the harbor to fight, nor did they even realize their scheme of blocking up the two entrances of the harbor

with triremes closely lashed together. Both entrances were left open, though they determined to defend themselves within: but even here, so defective were their precautions, that several of their triremes were yet moored, and the rowers not fully aboard, when the Athenian admirals sailed in by both entrances at once to attack them. Most of the Lacedæmonian triremes, afloat, and in fighting trim, resisted the attack for a certain time, but were at length vanquished, and driven back to the shore, many of them with serious injury.[517] Five of them were captured and towed off, one with all her crew aboard, and the Athenians, vigorously pursuing their success, drove against such as took refuge on the shore, as well as those which were not manned at the moment when the attack began, and had not been able to get afloat or into action. Some of the vanquished triremes being deserted by their crews, who jumped out upon the land, the Athenians were proceeding to tow them off, when the Lacedæmonian hoplites on the shore opposed a new and strenuous resistance. Excited to the utmost pitch by witnessing the disgraceful defeat of their fleet, and aware of the cruel consequences which turned upon it,—they marched all armed into the water, seized the ships to prevent them from being dragged off, and engaged in a desperate conflict to baffle the assailants: we have already seen a similar act of bravery, two years before, on the part of the Messenian hoplites accompanying the fleet of Phormio near Naupaktus.[518] Extraordinary daring and valor was here displayed on both sides, in the attack as well as in the defence, and such was the clamor and confusion, that neither the land skill of the Lacedæmonians, nor the sea skill of the Athenians, were of much avail: the contest was one of personal valor and considerable suffering on both sides. At length the Lacedæmonians carried their point, and saved all the ships ashore; none being carried away except those at first captured. Both parties thus separated: the Athenians retired to the fortress at Pylus, where they were doubtless hailed with overflowing joy by their comrades, and where they erected a trophy for their victory, giving up the enemy's dead for burial, and picking up the floating wrecks and pieces.[519]

But the great prize of the victory was neither in the five ships captured, nor in the relief afforded to the besieged at Pylus. It lay in the hoplites occupying the island of Sphakteria, who were now cut off from the mainland, as well as from all supplies. The Athenians, sailing round it in triumph, already looked upon them as their prisoners; while the Lacedæmonians on the opposite mainland, deeply distressed, but not knowing what to do, sent to Sparta for advice. So grave was the emergency, that the ephors came in person to the spot forthwith. Since they could still muster sixty triremes, a greater number than the Athenians,—besides a large force on land, and the whole command of the resources of the country,—while the Athenians had no footing on shore except the contracted promontory of Pylus, we might have imagined that a strenuous effort to carry off the imprisoned detachment across the narrow strait to the mainland would have had a fair chance of success. And probably, if either Demosthenês or Brasidas had been in command, such an effort would have been made. But Lacedæmonian courage was rather steadfast and unyielding than

adventurous: and, moreover, the Athenian superiority at sea exercised a sort of fascination over men's minds, analogous to that of the Spartans themselves on land; so that the ephors, on reaching Pylus, took a desponding view of their position, and sent a herald to the Athenian generals to propose an armistice, in order to allow time for envoys to go to Athens and treat for peace.

To this Eurymedon and Demosthenês assented, and an armistice was concluded on the following terms: The Lacedæmonians agreed to surrender not only all their triremes now in the harbor, but also all the rest in their ports, altogether to the number of sixty; also, to abstain from all attack upon the fortress at Pylus, either by land or sea, for such time as should be necessary for the mission of envoys to Athens as well as for their return, both to be effected in an Athenian trireme provided for the purpose. The Athenians on their side engaged to desist from all hostilities during the like interval; but it was agreed that they should keep strict and unremitting watch over the island, yet without landing upon it. For the subsistence of the detachment in the island, the Lacedæmonians were permitted to send over every day two chœnikes of barley-meal in cakes, ready baked, two kotylæ of wine,[520] and some meat, for each hoplite,—together with half that quantity for each of the attendant Helots; but this was all to be done under the supervision of the Athenians, with peremptory obligation to send no secret additional supplies. It was, moreover, expressly stipulated that if any one provision of the armistice, small or great, were violated, the whole should be considered as null and void. Lastly, the Athenians engaged, on the return of the envoys from Athens, to restore the triremes in the same condition as they received them.

Such terms sufficiently attest the humiliation and anxiety of the Lacedæmonians; while the surrender of their entire naval force to the number of sixty triremes, which was forthwith carried into effect, demonstrates at the same time that they sincerely believed in the possibility of obtaining peace. Well aware that they were themselves the original beginners of the war, at a time when the Athenians desired peace, and that the latter had besides made fruitless overtures while under the pressure of the epidemic, they presumed that the same dispositions still prevailed at Athens, and that their present pacific wishes would be so gladly welcomed as to procure without difficulty the relinquishment of the prisoners in Sphakteria.[521]

The Lacedæmonian envoys, conveyed to Athens in an Athenian trireme, appeared before the public assembly to set forth their mission, according to custom, prefacing their address with some apologies for that brevity of speech which belonged to their country. Their proposition was in substance a very simple one: "Give up to us the men in the island, and accept, in exchange for this favor, peace, with the alliance of Sparta." They enforced their cause, by appeals, well-turned and conciliatory, partly indeed to the generosity, but still more to the prudential calculation of Athens; explicitly admitting the high and glorious vantage-ground on which she was now placed, as well as their own humbled dignity and inferior position.[522] They, the Lacedæmoni-

ans, the first and greatest power in Greece, were now smitten by adverse fortune of war,—and that too without misconduct of their own, so that they were for the first time obliged to solicit an enemy for peace; which Athens had the precious opportunity of granting, not merely with honor to herself, but also in such manner as to create in their minds an ineffaceable friendship. And it became Athens to make use of her present good fortune while she had it,—not to rely upon its permanence, nor to abuse it by extravagant demands; her own imperial prudence, as well as the present circumstances of the Spartans, might teach her how unexpectedly the most disastrous casualties occurred. By granting what was now asked, she might make a peace which would be far more durable than if it were founded on the extorted compliances of a weakened enemy, because it would rest on Spartan honor and gratitude; the greater the previous enmity, the stronger would be such reactionary sentiment. [523] But if Athens should now refuse, and if, in the farther prosecution of the war, the men in Sphakteria should perish,—a new and inexpiable ground of quarrel,[524] peculiar to Sparta herself, would be added to those already subsisting, which rather concerned Sparta as the chief of the Peloponnesian confederacy. Nor was it only the good-will and gratitude of the Spartans which Athens would earn by accepting the proposition tendered to her; she would farther acquire the grace and glory of conferring peace on Greece, which all the Greeks would recognize as her act. And when once the two preëminent powers, Athens and Sparta, were established in cordial amity, the remaining Grecian states would be too weak to resist what they two might prescribe.[525]

Such was the language held by the Lacedæmonians in the assembly at Athens. It was discreetly calculated for their purpose, though when we turn back to the commencement of the war, and read the lofty declarations of the Spartan ephors and assembly respecting the wrongs of their allies and the necessity of extorting full indemnity for them from Athens, the contrast is indeed striking. On this occasion, the Lacedæmonians acted entirely for themselves and from consideration of their own necessities; severing themselves from their allies, and soliciting a special peace for themselves, with as little scruple as the Spartan general, Menedæus, during the preceding year, when he abandoned his Ambrakiot confederates after the battle of Olpæ, to conclude a separate capitulation with Demosthenês.

The course proper to be adopted by Athens in reference to the proposition, however, was by no means obvious. In all probability, the trireme which brought the Lacedæmonian envoys also brought the first news of that unforeseen and instantaneous turn of events which had rendered the Spartans in Sphakteria certain prisoners,—so it was then conceived,—and placed the whole Lacedæmonian fleet in their power; thus giving a totally new character of the war. The sudden arrival of such prodigious intelligence,—the astounding presence of Lacedæmonian envoys, bearing the olive-branch, and in an attitude of humiliation,—must have produced in the susceptible public of Athens emotions of the utmost intensity; an elation and confidence

such as had probably never been felt since the reconquest of Samos. It was difficult at first to measure the full bearings of the new situation, and even Periklês himself might have hesitated what to recommend: but the immediate and dominant impression with the general public was, that Athens might now ask her own terms, as consideration for the prisoners in the island.[526] Of this reigning tendency Kleon[527] made himself the emphatic organ, as he had done three years before in the sentence passed on the Mitylenæans; a man who—like leading journals, in modern times—often appeared to guide the public because he gave vehement utterance to that which they were already feeling, and carried it out in its collateral bearings and consequences. On the present occasion, he doubtless spoke with the most genuine conviction; for he was full of the sentiment of Athenian force and Athenian imperial dignity, as well as disposed to a sanguine view of future chances. Moreover, in a discussion like that now opened, where there was much room for doubt, he came forward with a proposition at once plain and decisive. Reminding the Athenians of the dishonorable truce of thirty years to which they had been compelled by the misfortunes of the time to accede, fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war,—Kleon insisted that now was the time for Athens to recover what she had then lost,—Nisæa, Pegæ, Trœzen, and Achaia. He proposed that Sparta should be required to restore these to Athens, in exchange for the soldiers now blocked up in Sphakteria; after which a truce might be concluded for as long a time as might be deemed expedient.

This decree, adopted by the assembly, was communicated as the answer of Athens to the Lacedæmonian envoys, who had probably retired after their first address, and were now sent for again into the assembly, to hear it. On being informed of the resolution, they made no comment on its substance, but invited the Athenians to name commissioners, who might discuss with them freely and deliberately suitable terms for a pacification. Here, however, Kleon burst upon them with an indignant rebuke. He had thought from the first, he said, that they came with dishonest purposes, but now the thing was clear,—nothing else could be meant by this desire to treat with some few men apart from the general public. If they had really any fair proposition to make, he called upon them to proclaim it openly to all. But this the envoys could not bring themselves to do. They had probably come with authority to make certain concessions, but to announce these concessions forthwith would have rendered negotiation impossible, besides dishonoring them in the face of their allies. Such dishonor would be incurred, too, without any advantage, if the Athenians should after all reject the terms, which the temper of the assembly before them rendered but too probable. Moreover, they were totally unpractised in the talents for dealing with a public assembly, such discussions being so rare as to be practically unknown in the Lacedæmonian system. To reply to the denunciation of a vehement speaker like Kleon, required readiness of elocution, dexterity, and self-command, which they had had no opportunity of acquiring. They remained silent,—abashed by the speaker and intimidated by the temper of the assembly: their mission was thus terminated, and they were reconveyed in the trireme to Pylus.[528]

It is probable that if these envoys had been able to make an effective reply to Kleon, and to defend their proposition against his charge of fraudulent purpose, they would have been sustained by Nikias and a certain number of leading Athenians, so that the assembly might have been brought at least to try the issue of a private discussion between diplomatic agents on both sides. But the case was one in which it was absolutely necessary that the envoys should stand forward with some defence for themselves; which Nikias might effectively second, but could not originate: and as they were incompetent to this task, the whole affair broke down. We shall hereafter find other examples, in which the incapacity of Lacedæmonian envoys, to meet the open debate of Athenian political life, is productive of mischievous results. In this case, the proposition of the envoys to enter into treaty with select commissioners, was not only quite reasonable, but afforded the only possibility—though doubtless not a certainty—of some ultimate pacification: and the manœuvre whereby Kleon discredited it was a grave abuse of publicity, not unknown in modern, though more frequent in ancient, political life. Kleon probably thought that if commissioners were named, Nikias, Lachês, and other politicians of the same rank and color, would be the persons selected; persons whose anxiety for peace and alliance with Sparta would make them over-indulgent and careless in securing the interests of Athens: and it will be seen, when we come to describe the conduct of Nikias four years afterwards, that this suspicion was not ill-grounded.

Unfortunately Thucydidês, in describing the proceedings of this assembly, so important in its consequences because it intercepted a promising opening for peace, is brief as usual,—telling us only what was said by Kleon and what was decided by the assembly. But though nothing is positively stated respecting Nikias and his partisans, we learn from other sources, and we may infer from what afterwards occurred, that they vehemently opposed Kleon, and that they looked coldly on the subsequent enterprise against Sphakteria as upon his peculiar measure.[529]

It has been common to treat the dismissal of the Lacedæmonian envoys on this occasion as a peculiar specimen of democratical folly. But over-estimation of the prospective chances arising out of success, to a degree more extravagant than that of which Athens was now guilty, is by no means peculiar to democracy. Other governments, opposed to democracy not less in temper than in form,—an able despot like the emperor Napoleon, and a powerful aristocracy like that of England,[530]—have found success to the full as misleading. That Athens should desire to profit by this unexpected piece of good fortune, was perfectly reasonable: that she should make use of it to regain advantages which former misfortunes had compelled herself to surrender, was a feeling not unnatural. And whether the demand was excessive, or by how much, is a question always among the most embarrassing for any government—kingly, oligarchical, or democratical—to determine.

We may, however, remark that Kleon gave an impolitic turn to Athenian feeling, by directing it towards the entire and literal reacquisition of what had been lost

twenty years before. Unless we are to consider his quadruple demand as a flourish, to be modified by subsequent negotiation, it seems to present some plausibility, but little of long-sighted wisdom: for while, on the one hand, it called upon Sparta to give up much which was not in her possession and must have been extorted by force from allies,—on the other hand, the situation of Athens was not the same as it had been when she concluded the thirty years' truce; nor does it seem that the restoration of Achaia and Trœzen would have been of any material value to her. Nisæa and Pegæ—which would have been tantamount to the entire Megarid, inasmuch as Megara itself could hardly have been held with both its ports in the possession of an enemy—would, indeed, have been highly valuable, since she could then have protected her territory against invasion from Peloponnesus, besides possessing a port in the Corinthian gulf. And it would seem that if able commissioners had now been named for private discussion with the Lacedæmonian envoys, under the present urgent desire of Sparta, coupled with her disposition to abandon her allies,—this important point might possibly have been pressed and carried, in exchange for Sphakteria. Nay, even if such acquisition had been found impracticable, still, the Athenians would have been able to effect some arrangement which would have widened the breach, and destroyed the confidence, between Sparta and her allies; a point of great moment for them to accomplish. There was therefore every reason for trying what could be done by negotiation, under the present temper of Sparta; and the step, by which Kleon abruptly broke off such hopes, was decidedly mischievous.

On the return of the envoys without success to Pylus,[531] twenty days after their departure from that place, the armistice immediately terminated; and the Lacedæmonians redemanded the triremes which they had surrendered. But Eurymedon refused compliance with this demand, alleging that the Lacedæmonians had, during the truce, made a fraudulent attempt to surprise the rock of Pylus, and had violated the stipulations in other ways besides; while it stood expressly stipulated in the truce, that the violation by either side even of the least among its conditions, should cancel all obligation on both sides. Thucydidês, without distinctly giving his opinion, seems rather to imply, that there was no just ground for the refusal: though if any accidental want of vigilance had presented to the Lacedæmonians an opportunity for surprising Pylus, they would be likely enough to avail themselves of it, seeing that they would thereby drive off the Athenian fleet from its only landing-place, and render the continued blockade of Sphakteria impracticable. However the truth may be, Eurymedon persisted in his refusal, in spite of loud protests of the Lacedæmonians against his perfidy. Hostilities were energetically resumed: the Lacedæmonian army on land began again to attack the fortifications of Pylus, while the Athenian fleet became doubly watchful in the blockade of Sphakteria, in which they were reinforced by twenty fresh ships from Athens, making a fleet of seventy triremes in all. Two ships were perpetually rowing round the island in opposite directions, throughout the whole day; while at night, the whole fleet were kept on watch, except on the seaside of the island in stormy weather.[532]

The blockade, however, was soon found to be more full of privation in reference to the besiegers themselves, and more difficult of enforcement in respect to the island and its occupants, than had been originally contemplated. The Athenians were much distressed for want of water; they had only one really good spring in the fortification of Pylus itself, quite insufficient for the supply of a large fleet: many of them were obliged to scrape the shingle and drink such brackish water as they could find; while ships as well as men were perpetually afloat, since they could take rest and refreshment only by relays successively landing on the rock of Pylus, or even on the edge of Sphakteria itself, with all the chance of being interrupted by the enemy,—there being no other landing-place,[533] and the ancient trireme affording no accommodation either for eating or sleeping. At first, all this was patiently borne, in the hopes that Sphakteria would speedily be starved out, and the Spartans forced to renew the request for capitulation: but no such request came, and the Athenians in the fleet gradually became sick in body as well as impatient and angry in mind. In spite of all their vigilance, clandestine supplies of provisions continually reached the island, under the temptation of large rewards offered by the Spartan government. Able swimmers contrived to cross the strait, dragging after them by ropes skins full of linseed and poppy-seed mixed with honey; while merchant vessels, chiefly manned by Helots, started from various parts of the Laconian coast, selecting by preference the stormy nights, and encountering every risk in order to run their vessel with its cargo ashore on the sea-side of the island, at a time when the Athenian guard-ships could not be on the lookout.[534] They cared little about damage to their vessel in landing, provided they could get the cargo on shore; for ample compensation was insured to them, together with emancipation to every Helot who succeeded in reaching the island with a supply. Though the Athenians redoubled their vigilance, and intercepted many of these daring smugglers, still, there were others who eluded them: moreover, the rations supplied to the island by stipulation during the absence of the envoys in their journey to Athens had been so ample, that Epitadas the commander had been able to economize, and thus to make the stock hold out longer. Week after week passed without any symptoms of surrender, and the Athenians not only felt the present sufferings of their own position, but also became apprehensive for their own supplies, all brought by sea round Peloponnesus to this distant and naked shore. They began even to mistrust the possibility of thus indefinitely continuing the blockade against the contingencies of such violent weather, as would probably ensue at the close of summer. In this state of weariness and uncertainty, the active Demosthenês began to organize a descent upon the island, with the view of carrying it by force. He not only sent for forces from the neighboring allies, Zakynthus and Naupaktus, but also transmitted an urgent request to Athens that reinforcements might be furnished to him for the purpose, making known explicitly both the uncomfortable condition of the armament, and the unpromising chances of simple blockade.[535]

The arrival of these envoys caused infinite mortification to the Athenians at home. Having expected to hear, long before, that Sphakteria had surrendered, they were

now taught to consider even the ultimate conquest as a matter of doubt: they were surprised that the Lacedæmonians sent no fresh envoys to solicit peace, and began to suspect that such silence was founded upon well-grounded hopes of being able to hold out. But the person most of all discomposed was Kleon, who observed that the people now regretted their insulting repudiation of the Lacedæmonian message, and were displeased with him as the author of it; while, on the contrary, his numerous political enemies were rejoiced at the turn which events had taken, as it opened a means of effecting his ruin. At first, Kleon contended that the envoys had misrepresented the state of facts; to which the latter replied by entreating, that if their accuracy were mistrusted, commissioners of inspection might be sent to verify it; and Kleon himself, along with Theogonês, was forthwith named for this function.

But it did not suit Kleon's purpose to go as commissioner to Pylus, since his mistrust of the statement was a mere general suspicion, not resting on any positive evidence: moreover, he saw that the dispositions of the assembly tended to comply with the request of Demosthenês, and to despatch a reinforcing armament. He accordingly altered his tone at once: "If ye really believe the story (he said), do not waste time in sending commissioners, but sail at once to capture the men. It would be easy with a proper force, if our generals were *men* (here he pointed reproachfully to his enemy Nikias, then stratêgus[536]), to sail and take the soldiers in the island. That is what *I* at least would do, if *I* were general." His words instantly provoked a hostile murmur from a portion of the assembly: "Why do you not sail then at once, if you think the matter so easy?" while Nikias, taking up this murmur, and delighted to have caught his political enemy in a trap, stood forward in person, and pressed him to set about the enterprise without delay; intimating the willingness of himself and his colleagues to grant him any portion of the military force of the city which he chose to ask for. Kleon at first closed with this proposition, believing it to be a mere stratagem of debate and not seriously intended: but so soon as he saw that what was said was really meant, he tried to back out, and observed to Nikias: "It is your place to sail: *you* are general, not I."[537] Nikias only replied by repeating his exhortation, renouncing formally the command against Sphakteria, and calling upon the Athenians to recollect what Kleon had said, as well as to hold him to his engagement. The more Kleon tried to evade the duty, the louder and more unanimous did the cry of the assembly become that Nikias should surrender it to him, and that *he* should undertake it. At last, seeing that there was no possibility of receding, Kleon reluctantly accepted the charge, and came forward to announce his intention in a resolute address: "I am not at all afraid of the Lacedæmonians (he said): I shall sail without even taking with me any of the hoplites from the regular Athenian muster-roll, but only the Lemnian and Imbrian hoplites who are now here (that is, Athenian kleruchs or out-citizens who had properties in Lemnos and Imbros, and habitually resided there), together with some peltasts, brought from Ænos, in Thrace, and four hundred bowmen. With this force, added to what is already at Pylos, I engage in the space of twenty days either to bring the Lacedæmonians in Sphakteria hither as prisoners, or to kill them in

the island." The Athenians—observes Thucydidês—laughed somewhat at Kleon's looseness of tongue; but prudent men had pleasure in reflecting that one or other of the two advantages was now certain: either they would get rid of Kleon, which they anticipated as the issue at once most probable and most desirable,—or, if mistaken on this point, the Lacedæmonians in the island would be killed or taken.[538] The vote was accordingly passed for the immediate departure of Kleon, who caused Demosthenês to be named as his colleague in command, and sent intelligence to Pylus at once that he was about to start with the reinforcement solicited.

This curious scene, interesting as laying open the interior feeling of the Athenian assembly, suggests, when properly considered, reflections very different from those which have been usually connected with it. It seems to be conceived by most historians as a mere piece of levity or folly in the Athenian people, who are supposed to have enjoyed the excellent joke of putting an incompetent man against his own will at the head of this enterprise, in order that they might amuse themselves with his blunders: Kleon is thus contemptible, and the Athenian people ridiculous. Certainly, if that people had been disposed to conduct their public business upon such childish fancies as are here implied, they would have made a very different figure from that which history actually presents to us. The truth is, that in regard to Kleon's alleged looseness of tongue, which excited more or less of laughter among the persons present, there was no one really ridiculous except the laughers themselves: for the announcement which he made was so far from being extravagant, that it was realized to the letter, and realized, too, let us add, without any peculiar aid from unforeseen favorable accident. To show how much this is the case, we have only to contrast the jesters before the fact with the jesters after it. While the former deride Kleon as a promiser of extravagant and impossible results, we find Aristophanês, in his comedy of the Knights, about six months afterwards,[539] laughing at him as having achieved nothing at all,—as having cunningly put himself into the shoes of Demosthenês, and stolen away from that general the glory of taking Sphakteria, after all the difficulties of the enterprise had been already got over, and "the cake ready baked,"—to use the phrase of the comic poet. Both of the jests are exaggerations in opposite directions; but the last in order of time, if it be good at all against Kleon, is a galling sarcasm against those who derided Kleon as an extravagant boaster.

If we intend fairly to compare the behavior of Kleon with that of his political adversaries, we must distinguish between the two occasions: first, that in which he had frustrated the pacific mission of the Lacedæmonian envoys; next, the subsequent delay and dilemma which has been recently described. On the first occasion, his advice appears to have been mistaken in policy, as well as offensive in manner: his opponents, proposing a discussion by special commissioners as a fair chance for honorable terms of peace, took a juster view of the public interests. But the case was entirely altered when the mission for peace (wisely or unwisely) had been broken up, and when the fate of Sphakteria had been committed to the chances of war. There

were then imperative reasons for prosecuting the war vigorously, and for employing all the force requisite to insure the capture of that island. And looking to this end, we shall find that there was nothing in the conduct of Kleon either to blame or to deride; while his political adversaries, Nikias among them, are deplorably timid, ignorant, and reckless of the public interest; seeking only to turn the existing disappointment and dilemma into a party opportunity for ruining him.

To grant the reinforcement asked for by Demosthenês was obviously the proper measure, and Kleon saw that the people would go along with him in proposing it: but he had at the same time good grounds for reproaching Nikias, and the other stratêgi, whose duty it was to originate that proposition, with their backwardness in remaining silent, and in leaving the matter to go by default, as if it were Kleon's affair and not theirs. His taunt: "This is what *I* would have done, if *I* were general," was a mere phrase of the heat of debate, such as must have been very often used, without any idea on the part of the hearers of construing it as a pledge which the speaker was bound to realize: nor was it any disgrace to Kleon to decline a charge which he had never sought, and to confess his incompetence to command. The reason why he was forced into the post, in spite of his own unaffected reluctance, was not, as some historians would have us believe, because the Athenian people loved a joke, but from two feelings, both perfectly serious, which divided the assembly,—feelings opposite in their nature, but coinciding on this occasion to the same result. His enemies loudly urged him forward, anticipating that the enterprise under him would miscarry, and that he would thus be ruined: his friends, perceiving this manœuvre, but not sharing in such anticipations, and ascribing his reluctance to modesty, pronounced themselves so much the more vehemently on behalf of their leader, and repaid the scornful cheer by cheers of sincere encouragement. "Why do you not try your hand at this enterprise, Kleon, if you think it so easy? You will soon find that it is too much for you;" was the cry of his enemies: to which his friends would reply: "Yes, to be sure, try, Kleon: by all means, try: do not be backward; we warrant that you will come honorably out of it, and we will stand by you." Such cheer and counter-cheer is precisely in the temper of an animated multitude, as Thucydidês[540] states it, divided in feeling; and friends as well as enemies thus concurred to impose upon Kleon a compulsion not to be eluded. Of all the parties here concerned those whose conduct is the most unpardonably disgraceful are Nikias and his oligarchical friends; who force a political enemy into a supreme command against his own strenuous protest, persuaded that he will fail so as to compromise the lives of many soldiers, and the destinies of the state on an important emergency,—but satisfying themselves with the idea that they shall bring him to disgrace and ruin.

It is to be remarked, that Nikias and his fellow stratêgi were backward on this occasion, partly because they were really afraid of the duty. They anticipated a resistance to the death at Sphakteria, such as that at Thermopylæ: in which case, though victory might perhaps be won by a superior assailant force, it would not be won

without much bloodshed and peril, besides an inexpiable quarrel with Sparta. If Kleon took a more correct measure of the chances, he ought to have credit for it, as one "bene ausus vana contemnere." And it seems probable, that if he had not been thus forward in supporting the request of Demosthenês for reinforcement,—or rather, if he had not been so placed that he was compelled to be forward,—Nikias and his friends would have laid aside the enterprise, and reopened negotiations for peace, under circumstances neither honorable nor advantageous to Athens. Kleon was in this manner one main author of the most important success which Athens obtained throughout the whole war.

On joining Demosthenês with his reinforcement, Kleon found every preparation for attack made by that general, and the soldiers at Pylus eager to commence such aggressive measures as would relieve them from the tedium of a blockade. Sphakteria had become recently more open to assault in consequence of an accidental conflagration of the wood, arising from a fire kindled by the Athenian seamen, while landing at the skirt of the island, and cooking their food: under the influence of a strong wind, most of the wood in the island had thus caught fire and been destroyed. To Demosthenês this was an accident especially welcome; for the painful experience of his defeat in the forest-covered hills of Ætolia had taught him how difficult it was for assailants to cope with an enemy whom they could not see, and who knew all the good points of defence in the country.[541] The island being thus stripped of its wood, he was enabled to survey the garrison, to count their number, and to lay his plan of attack on certain data. He now, too, for the first time, discovered that he had underrated their real number, having before suspected that the Lacedæmonians had sent in rations for a greater total than was actually there. The island was occupied altogether by four hundred and twenty Lacedæmonian hoplites, out of whom more than one hundred and twenty were native Spartans, belonging to the first families in the city. The commander, Epitadas, with the main body, occupied the centre of the island, near the only spring of water which it afforded:[542] an advanced guard of thirty hoplites was posted not far from the sea-shore, in the end of the island farthest from Pylus; while the end immediately fronting Pylus, peculiarly steep and rugged, and containing even a rude circuit of stones, of unknown origin, which served as a sort of defence, was held as a post of reserve.[543]

Such was the prey which Kleon and Demosthenês were anxious to grasp. On the very day of the arrival of the former, they sent a herald to the Lacedæmonian generals on the mainland, inviting the surrender of the hoplites on the island, on condition of being simply detained under guard without any hardship, until a final pacification should take place. Of course the summons was refused; after which, leaving only one day for repose, the two generals took advantage of the night to put all their hoplites aboard a few triremes, making show as if they were merely commencing the ordinary nocturnal circumnavigation, so as to excite no suspicion in the occupants of the island. The entire body of Athenian hoplites, eight hundred in number, were thus

disembarked in two divisions, one on each side of the island, a little before daybreak: the advanced guard of thirty Lacedæmonians, completely unprepared, were surprised even in their sleep and all slain.[544] At the point of day, the entire remaining force from the seventy-two triremes was also disembarked, leaving on board only the thalamii, or lowest tier of rowers, and reserving only a sufficient number to man the walls of Pylus. Altogether, there could not have been less than ten thousand troops employed in the attack of the island,—men of all arms: eight hundred hoplites, eight hundred peltasts, eight hundred bowmen; the rest armed with javelins, slings, and stones. Demosthenês kept his hoplites in one compact body, but distributed the light-armed into separate companies of about two hundred men each, with orders to occupy the rising grounds all round, and harass the flanks and rear of the Lacedæmonians.[545]

To resist this large force, the Lacedæmonian commander Epitadas had only three hundred and sixty hoplites around him; for his advanced guard of thirty men had been slain, and as many more must have been held in reserve to guard the rocky station in his rear: of the Helots who were with him, Thucydidês says nothing, during the whole course of the action. As soon as he saw the numbers and disposition of his enemies, Epitadas placed his men in battle array, and advanced to encounter the main body of hoplites whom he saw before him. But the Spartan march was habitually slow:[546] moreover, the ground was rough and uneven, obstructed with stumps, and overlaid with dust and ashes, from the recently burnt wood, so that a march at once rapid and orderly was hardly possible: and he had to traverse the whole intermediate space, since the Athenian hoplites remained immovable in their position. No sooner had his march commenced, than he found himself assailed both in rear and flanks, especially in the right or unshielded flank, by the numerous companies of light-armed.[547] Notwithstanding their extraordinary superiority of number, these men were at first awe-stricken at finding themselves in actual contest with Lacedæmonian hoplites:[548] still, they began the fight, poured in their missile weapons, and so annoyed the march that the hoplites were obliged to halt, while Epitadas ordered the most active among them to spring out of their ranks and repel the assailants. But pursuers with spear and shield had little chance of overtaking men lightly clad and armed, who always retired, in whatever direction the pursuit was commenced, had the advantage of difficult ground, redoubled their annoyance against the rear of the pursuers as soon as the latter retreated to resume their place in the ranks, and always took care to get round to the rear of the hoplites.

After some experience of the inefficacy of Lacedæmonian pursuit, the light-armed, becoming far bolder than at first, closed upon them nearer and more universally, with arrows, javelins, and stones, raising shouts and clamor that rent the air, rendering the word of command inaudible by the Lacedæmonian soldiers, who at the same time were almost blinded by the thick clouds of dust, kicked up from the recently spread wood-ashes.[549] Such method of fighting was one for which the

Lykurgean drill made no provision, and the longer it continued the more painful did the embarrassment of the exposed hoplites become: their repeated efforts to destroy or even to reach nimble and ever-returning enemies, all proved abortive, whilst their own numbers were incessantly diminished by wounds which they could not return. Their only offensive arms consisted of the long spear and short sword usual to the Grecian hoplite, without any missile weapons whatever; nor could they even pick up and throw back the javelins of their enemies, since the points of these javelins commonly broke off and stuck in the shields, or sometimes even in the body which they had wounded. Moreover, the bows of the archers, doubtless carefully selected before starting from Athens, were powerfully drawn, so that their arrows may sometimes have pierced and inflicted wounds even through the shield or the helmet,—but at any rate, the stuffed doublet, which formed the only defence of the hoplite on his unshielded side, was a very inadequate protection against them.[550] Under this trying distress did the Lacedæmonians continue for a long time, poorly provided for defence, and altogether helpless for aggression,—without being able to approach at all nearer to the Athenian hoplites. At length the Lacedæmonian commander, seeing that his position grew worse and worse, gave orders to close the ranks and retreat to the last redoubt in the rear: but this movement was not accomplished without difficulty, for the light-armed assailants became doubly clamorous and forward, and many wounded men, unable to move, or at least to keep in rank, were overtaken and slain.[551]

A diminished remnant, however, reached the last post in safety, and they were here in comparative protection, since the ground was so rocky and impracticable that their enemies could not attack them either in flank or rear: though the position at any rate could not have been long tenable separately, inasmuch as the only spring of water in the island was in the centre, which they had just been compelled to abandon. The light-armed being now less available, Demosthenês and Kleon brought up their eight hundred Athenian hoplites, who had not before been engaged; but the Lacedæmonians were here at home[552] with their weapons, and enabled to display their well-known superiority against opposing hoplites, especially as they had the advantage of higher ground against enemies charging from beneath. Although the Athenians were double their own numbers and withal yet unexhausted, they were repulsed in many successive attacks. The besieged maintained their ground in spite of all their previous fatigue and suffering, harder to be borne from the scanty diet on which they had recently subsisted. The struggle lasted so long that heat and thirst began to tell even upon the assailants, when the commander of the Messenians came to Kleon and Demosthenês, and intimated that they were now laboring in vain; promising at the same time that if they would confide to him a detachment of light troops and bowmen, he would find his way round to the higher cliffs, in the rear of the assailants.[553] He accordingly stole away unobserved from the rear, scrambling round over pathless crags, and by an almost impracticable footing on the brink of the sea, amidst approaches which the Lacedæmonians had left unguarded, never imag-

ining that they could be molested in that direction. He suddenly appeared with his detachment on the higher peak above them, so that their position was thus commanded, and they found themselves, as at Thermopylæ, between two fires, without any hope of escape. Their enemies in front, encouraged by the success of the Messenians, pressed forward with increased ardor, until at length the courage of the Lacedæmonians gave way, and the position was carried.[554]

A few moments more, and they would have been all overpowered and slain, when Kleon and Demosthenês, anxious to carry them as prisoners to Athens, constrained their men to halt, and proclaimed by herald an invitation to surrender, on condition of delivering up their arms and being held at the disposal of the Athenians. Most of them, incapable of farther effort, closed with the proposition forthwith, signifying compliance by dropping their shields and waving both hands above their heads. The battle being thus ended, Styphon the commander—originally only third in command, but now chief, since Epitadas had been slain, and the second in command, Hippagretês, was lying disabled by wounds on the field—entered into conference with Kleon and Demosthenês, and entreated permission to send across for orders to the Lacedæmonians on the mainland. The Athenian commanders, though refusing this request, sent themselves and invited Lacedæmonian heralds over from the mainland, through whom communications were exchanged twice or three times between Styphon and the chief Lacedæmonian authorities. At length the final message came: "The Lacedæmonians direct you to take counsel for yourselves, but to do nothing disgraceful."[555] Their counsel was speedily taken; they surrendered themselves and delivered up their arms; two hundred and ninety-two in number, the survivors of the original total of four hundred and twenty. And out of these, no less than one hundred and twenty were native Spartans, some of them belonging to the first families in the city.[556] They were kept under guard during that night, and distributed on the morrow among the Athenian trierarchs to be conveyed as prisoners to Athens; while a truce was granted to the Lacedæmonians on shore, in order that they might carry across the dead bodies for burial. So careful had Epitadas been in husbanding the provisions, that some food was yet found in the island; though the garrison had subsisted for fifty-two days upon casual supplies, aided by such economies as had been laid by during the twenty days of the armistice, when food of a stipulated quantity was regularly furnished. Seventy-two days had thus elapsed, from the first imprisonment in the island to the hour of their surrender.[557]

The best troops in modern times would neither incur reproach, nor occasion surprise, by surrendering, under circumstances in all respects similar to this gallant remnant in Sphakteria. Yet in Greece the astonishment was prodigious and universal, when it was learned that the Lacedæmonians had consented to become prisoners: [558] for the terror inspired by their name, and the deep-struck impression of Thermopylæ, had created a belief that they would endure any extremity of famine, and perish in the midst of any superiority of hostile force, rather than dream of giving up

their arms and surviving as captives. The events of Sphakteria, shocking as they did this preconceived idea, discredited the military prowess of Sparta in the eyes of all Greece, and especially in those of her own allies. Even in Sparta itself, too, the same feeling prevailed,—partially revealed in the answer transmitted to Styphon from the generals on shore, who did not venture to forbid surrender, yet discountenanced it by implication: and it is certain that the Spartans would have lost less by their death than by their surrender. But we read with disgust the spiteful taunt of one of the allies of Athens (not an Athenian) engaged in the affair, addressed in the form of a question to one of the prisoners: "Have your best men then been all slain?" The reply conveyed an intimation of the standing contempt entertained by the Lacedæmonians for the bow and its chance-strokes in the line: "That would be a capital arrow which could single out the best man." The language which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Demaratus, composed in the early years of the Peloponnesian war, attests this same belief in Spartan valor: "The Lacedæmonians die, but never surrender."[559] Such impression was from henceforward, not indeed effaced, but sensibly enfeebled, and never again was it restored to its former pitch.

But the general judgment of the Greeks respecting the capture of Sphakteria, remarkable as it is to commemorate, is far less surprising than that pronounced by Thucydidês himself. Kleon and Demosthenês returning with a part of the squadron and carrying all the prisoners, started from Sphakteria on the next day but one after the action, and reached Athens within twenty days after Kleon had left it. Thus, "the promise of Kleon, *insane as it was*, came true," observes the historian.[560]

Men with arms in their hands have always the option between death and imprisonment, and Grecian opinion was only mistaken in assuming as a certainty that the Lacedæmonians would choose the former. But Kleon had never promised to bring them home as prisoners: his promise was disjunctive,—that they should be either so brought home, or slain, within twenty days: and no sentence throughout the whole of Thucydidês astonishes me so much as that in which he stigmatizes such an expectation as "insane." Here are four hundred and twenty Lacedæmonian hoplites, without any other description of troops to aid them,—without the possibility of being reinforced,—without any regular fortification,—without any narrow pass, such as that of Thermopylæ,—without either a sufficient or a certain supply of food,—cooped up in a small open island less than two miles in length. Against them are brought ten thousand troops of diverse arms, including eight hundred fresh hoplites from Athens, and marshalled by Demosthenês, a man alike enterprising and experienced: for the talents as well as the presence and preparations of Demosthenês are a part of the data of the case, and the personal competence of Kleon to command alone, is foreign to the calculation. Now if, under such circumstances, Kleon engaged that this forlorn company of brave men should be either slain or taken prisoners, how could he be looked upon, I will not say as indulging in an insane boast, but even as overstepping the most cautious and mistrustful estimate of probability? Even to doubt of

this result, much more to pronounce such an opinion as that of Thucydidês, implies an idea not only of superhuman power in the Lacedæmonian hoplites, but of disgraceful cowardice on the part of Demosthenês and the assailants. Nor was the interval of twenty days, named by Kleon, at all extravagantly narrow, considering the distance of Athens from Pylus: for the attack of this petty island could not possibly occupy more than one or two days at the utmost, though the blockade of it might by various accidents have been prolonged, or might even, by some terrible storm, be altogether broken off. If, then, we carefully consider this promise made by Kleon in the assembly, we shall find that so far from deserving the sentence pronounced upon it by Thucydidês, of being a mad boast which came true by accident, it was a reasonable and even a modest anticipation of the future:[561] reserving the only really doubtful point in the case, whether the garrison of the island would be ultimately slain or made prisoners. Demosthenês, had he been present at Athens instead of being at Pylus, would willingly have set his seal to the engagement taken by Kleon.

I repeat with reluctance, though not without belief, the statement made by one of the biographers of Thucydidês,[562] that Kleon was the cause of the banishment of the latter as a general, and has therefore received from him harder measure than was due in his capacity of historian. But though this sentiment is not probably without influence in dictating the unaccountable judgment which I have just been criticizing,—as well as other opinions relative to Kleon, on which I shall say more in a future chapter,—I nevertheless look upon that judgment not as peculiar to Thucydidês, but as common to him with Nikias and those whom we must call, for want of a better name, the oligarchical party of the time at Athens. And it gives us some measure of the prejudice and narrowness of vision which prevailed among that party at the present memorable crisis; so pointedly contrasting with the clear-sighted and resolute calculations, and the judicious conduct in action, of Kleon, who, when forced against his will into the post of general, did the very best which could be done in his situation,—he selected Demosthenês as colleague and heartily seconded his operations. Though the military attack of Sphakteria, one of the ablest specimens of generalship in the whole war, and distinguished not less by the dextrous employment of different descriptions of troops, than by care to spare the lives of the assailants,—belongs altogether to Demosthenês, yet if Kleon had not been competent to stand up in the Athenian assembly and defy those gloomy predictions which we see attested in Thucydidês, Demosthenês would never have been reinforced nor placed in condition to land on the island. The glory of the enterprise, therefore, belongs jointly to both: and Kleon, far from stealing away the laurels of Demosthenês (as Aristophanês represents, in his comedy of the Knights), was really the means of placing them on his head, though he at the same time deservedly shared them. It has hitherto been the practice to look at Kleon only from the point of view of his opponents, through whose testimony we know him: but the real fact is, that this history of the events of Sphakteria, when properly surveyed, is a standing disgrace to those opponents and no inconsiderable honor to him; exhibiting them as alike destitute of political fore-

sight and of straightforward patriotism,—as sacrificing the opportunities of war, along with the lives of their fellow-citizens and soldiers, for the purpose of ruining a political enemy. It was the duty of Nikias, as stratêgus, to propose, and undertake in person if necessary, the reduction of Sphakteria: if he thought the enterprise dangerous, that was a good reason for assigning to it a larger military force, as we shall find him afterwards reasoning about the Sicilian expedition,—but not for letting it slip or throwing it off upon others.[563]

The return of Kleon and Demosthenês to Athens, within the twenty days promised, bringing with them near three hundred Lacedæmonian prisoners, must have been by far the most triumphant and exhilarating event which had occurred to the Athenians throughout the whole war. It at once changed the prospects, position, and feelings of both the contending parties. Such a number of Lacedæmonian prisoners, especially one hundred and twenty Spartans, was a source of almost stupefaction to the general body of Greeks, and a prize of inestimable value to the captors. The return of Demosthenês in the preceding year from the Ambrakian gulf, when he brought with him three hundred Ambrakian panoplies, had probably been sufficiently triumphant; but the entry into Peiræus on this occasion from Sphakteria, with three hundred Lacedæmonian prisoners, must doubtless have occasioned emotions transcending all former experience; and it is much to be regretted that no description is preserved to us of the scene, as well as of the elate manifestations of the people when the prisoners were marched up from Peiræus to Athens. We should be curious, also, to read some account of the first Athenian assembly held after this event,—the overwhelming cheers heaped upon Kleon by his joyful partisans, who had helped to invest him with the duties of general, in confidence that he would discharge them well,—contrasted with the silence or retraction of Nikias, and the other humiliated political enemies. But all such details are unfortunately denied to us, though they constitute the blood and animation of Grecian history, now lying before us only in its skeleton.

The first impulse of the Athenians was to regard the prisoners as a guarantee to their territory against invasion:[564] they resolved to keep them securely guarded until the peace, but if, at any time before that event, the Lacedæmonian army should enter Attica, to bring forth the prisoners and put them to death in sight of the invaders. They were at the same time full of spirits in regard to the prosecution of the war, and became farther confirmed in the hope, not merely of preserving their power undiminished, but even of recovering much of what they had lost before the thirty years' truce. Pylus was placed in an improved state of defence, with the adjoining island of Sphakteria, doubtless as a subsidiary occupation: the Messenians, transferred thither from Naupaktus, and overjoyed to find themselves once more masters even of an outlying rock of their ancestorial territory, began with alacrity to overrun and ravage Laconia, while the Helots, shaken by the recent events, manifested inclination to desert to them. The Lacedæmonian authorities, experiencing evils before unfelt

and unknown, became sensibly alarmed lest such desertions should spread through the country. Reluctant as they were to afford obvious evidence of their embarrassments, they nevertheless brought themselves, probably under the pressure of the friends and relatives of the Sphakterian captives, to send to Athens several missions for peace; but all proved abortive.[565] We are not told what they offered, but it did not come up to the expectations which the Athenians thought themselves entitled to indulge.

We, who now review these facts with a knowledge of the subsequent history, see that the Athenians could have concluded a better bargain with the Lacedæmonians during the six or eight months succeeding the capture of Sphakteria, than it was ever open to them to make afterwards; and they had reason to repent that they let slip the opportunity. Perhaps also Periklês, had he been still alive, might have taken the same prudent measure of the future, and might have had ascendency enough over his countrymen to be able to arrest the tide of success at its highest point, before it began to ebb again. But if we put ourselves back into the situation of Athens during the autumn which succeeded the return of Kleon and Demosthenês from Sphakteria, we shall easily enter into the feelings under which the war was continued. The actual possession of the captives now placed Athens in a far better position than she had occupied at a time when they were only blocked up in Sphakteria, and when the Lacedæmonian envoys first arrived to ask for peace. She was now certain of being able to command peace with Sparta on terms at least tolerable, whenever she chose to invite it,—she had also a fair certainty of escaping the hardship of invasion. Next, and this was perhaps the most important feature of the case, the apprehension of Lacedæmonian prowess was now greatly lowered, and the prospects of success to Athens considered as prodigiously improved,[566] even in the estimation of impartial Greeks; much more in the eyes of the Athenians themselves. Moreover, the idea of a tide of good fortune, of the favor of the gods, now begun and likely to continue, of future success as a corollary from past, was one which powerfully affected Grecian calculations generally. Why not push the present good fortune, and try to regain the most important points lost before and by the thirty years' truce, especially in Megara and Bœotia,—points which Sparta could not concede by negotiation, since they were not in her possession? Though these speculations failed, as we shall see in the coming chapter, yet there was nothing unreasonable in undertaking them. Probably, the almost universal sentiment of Athens was at this moment warlike,—and even Nikias, humiliated as he must have been by the success in Sphakteria, would forget his usual caution in the desire of retrieving his own personal credit by some military exploit. That Demosthenês, now in full measure of esteem, would be eager to prosecute the war, with which his prospects of personal glory were essentially associated, just as Thucydidês[567] observes about Brasidas on the Lacedæmonian side, can admit of no doubt. The comedy of Aristophanês, called the Acharnians, was acted about six months before the affair of Sphakteria, when no one could possibly look forward to such an event,—the comedy of the Knights, about six months after it.[568]

Now, there is this remarkable difference between the two,—that while the former breathes the greatest sickness of war, and presses in every possible way the importance of making peace, although at that time Athens had an opportunity of coming even to a decent accommodation,—the latter, running down Kleon with unmeasured scorn and ridicule, talks in one or two places only of the hardships of war, and drops altogether that emphasis and repetition with which peace had been dwelt upon in the Acharnians,—although coming out at a time when peace was within the reach of the Athenians.

To understand properly the history of this period, therefore, we must distinguish various occasions which are often confounded. At the moment when Sphakteria was first blockaded, and when the Lacedæmonians first sent to solicit peace, there was a considerable party at Athens disposed to entertain the offer, and the ascendency of Kleon was one of the main causes why it was rejected. But after the captives were brought home from Sphakteria, the influence of Kleon, though positively greater than it had been before, was no longer required to procure the dismissal of Lacedæmonian pacific offers and the continuance of the war: the general temper of Athens was then warlike, and there were very few to contend strenuously for an opposite policy. During the ensuing year, however, the chances of war turned out mostly unfavorable to Athens, so that by the end of that year she had become much more disposed to peace.[569] The truce for one year was then concluded,—but even after that truce was expired, Kleon still continued eager, and on good grounds, as will be shown hereafter, for renewing the war in Thrace, at a time when a large proportion of the Athenian public had grown weary of it. He was one of the main causes of that resumption of warlike operations, which ended in the battle of Amphipolis, fatal both to himself and to Brasidas. There were thus two distinct occasions on which the personal influence and sanguine character of Kleon seems to have been of sensible moment in determining the Athenian public to war instead of peace. But at the moment which we have now reached, that is, the year immediately following the capture of Sphakteria, the Athenians were all sufficiently warlike without him; probably Nikias himself as well as the rest.

It was one of the earliest proceedings of Nikias, immediately after the inglorious exhibition which he had made in reference to Sphakteria, to conduct an expedition, in conjunction with two colleagues, against the Corinthian territory: he took with him eighty triremes, two thousand Athenian hoplites, two hundred horsemen aboard of some horse transports, and some additional hoplites from Milêtus, Andros, and Karystus.[570] Starting from Peiræus in the evening, he arrived a little before daybreak on a beach at the foot of the hill and village of Solygeia,[571] about seven miles from Corinth, and two or three miles south of the isthmus. The Corinthian troops, from all the territory of Corinth, within the isthmus, were already assembled at the isthmus itself to repel him; for intelligence of the intended expedition had reached Corinth some time before from Argos, with which latter place the scheme of the ex-

pedition may have been in some way connected. The Athenians having touched the coast during the darkness, the Corinthians were only apprized of the fact by fire-signals from Solygeia. Not being able to hinder the landing, they despatched forthwith half their forces, under Battus and Lykophron, to repel the invader, while the remaining half were left at the harbor of Kenchreæ, on the northern side of Mount Oneion, to guard the port of Krommyon, outside of the isthmus, in case it should be attacked by sea. Battus with one lochus of hoplites threw himself into the village of Solygeia, which was unfortified, while Lykophron conducted the remaining troops to attack the Athenians. The battle was first engaged on the Athenian right, almost immediately after its landing, on the point called Chersonesus. Here the Athenian hoplites, together with their Karystian allies, repelled the Corinthian attack, after a stout and warmly disputed hand-combat of spear and shield: but the Corinthians, retreating up to a higher point of ground, returned to the charge, and with the aid of a fresh lochus, drove the Athenians back to the shore and to their ships: from hence the latter again turned, and again recovered a partial advantage.[572] The battle was no less severe on the left wing of the Athenians: but here, after a contest of some length, the latter gained a more decided victory, greatly by the aid of their cavalry,—pursuing the Corinthians, who fled in some disorder to a neighboring hill and there took up a position.[573] The Athenians were thus victorious throughout the whole line, with the loss of about forty-seven men, while the Corinthians had lost two hundred and twelve, together with the general Lykophron. The victors erected their trophy, stripped the dead bodies, and buried their own dead.

The Corinthian detachment left at Kenchreæ could not see the battle, in consequence of the interposing ridge of Mount Oneium: but it was at last made known to them by the dust of the fugitives, and they forthwith hastened to help. Reinforcements also came both from Corinth and from Kenchreæ, and as it seemed, too, from the neighboring Peloponnesian cities, so that Nikias thought it prudent to retire aboard his ships, and halt upon some neighboring islands. It was here first discovered that two of the Athenians slain had not been picked up for burial; upon which he immediately sent a herald to solicit a truce, in order to procure these two missing bodies. We have here a remarkable proof of the sanctity attached to that duty; for the mere sending of the herald was tantamount to confession of defeat.[574]

From hence Nikias sailed to Krommyon, where he ravaged the neighborhood for a few hours and rested for the night. On the next day he reëmbarked, sailed along the coast of Epidaurus, upon which he inflicted some damage in passing, and stopped at last on the peninsula of Methana, between Epidaurus and Trœzen.[575] On this peninsula he established a permanent garrison, drawing a fortification across the narrow neck of land which joined it to the Epidaurian peninsula. This was his last exploit, and he then sailed home: but the post at Methana long remained as a centre for pillaging the neighboring regions of Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Halieis.

While Nikias was engaged in this expedition, Eurymedon and Sophoklês had sailed forward from Pylus with a considerable portion of that fleet which had been engaged in the capture of Sphakteria, to the island of Korkyra. It has been already stated that the democratical government at Korkyra had been suffering severe pressure and privation from the oligarchical fugitives, who had come back into the island with a body of barbaric auxiliaries, and established themselves upon Mount Istônê, not far from the city.[576] Eurymedon and the Athenians joining the Korkyræans in the city, attacked and stormed the post on Mount Istônê; while the vanquished, retiring first to a lofty and inaccessible peak, were forced to surrender themselves on terms to the Athenians. They abandoned their mercenary auxiliaries altogether, and only stipulated that they should themselves be sent to Athens, and left to the discretion of the Athenian people. Eurymedon, assenting to these terms, deposited the disarmed prisoners in the neighboring islet of Ptychia, under the distinct condition that, if a single man tried to escape, the whole capitulation should be null and void.[577]

Unfortunately for these prisoners, the orders given to Eurymedon carried him onward straight to Sicily. It was irksome, therefore, to him to send away a detachment of his squadron to convey these men to Athens,—while the honors of delivering them there would be reaped, not by himself, but by the officer to whom they might be confided: and the Korkyræans in the city, on their part, were equally anxious that the prisoners should not be sent to Athens; for their animosity against them was bitter in the extreme, and they were afraid that the Athenians might spare their lives, so that their hostility against the island might be again resumed. And thus a mean jealousy on the part of Eurymedon, combined with revenge and insecurity on the part of the victorious Korkyræans, brought about a cruel catastrophe, paralleled nowhere else in Greece, though too well in keeping with the previous acts of the bloody drama enacted in this island.

The Korkyræan leaders, seemingly not without the privity of Eurymedon, sent across to Ptychia fraudulent emissaries under the guise of friends to the prisoners. These emissaries—assuring the prisoners that the Athenian commanders, in spite of the convention signed, were about to hand them over to the Korkyræan people for destruction—induced some of them to attempt escape in a boat prepared for the purpose. By concert, the boat was seized in the act of escaping, so that the terms of the capitulation were really violated: upon which Eurymedon handed over the prisoners to their enemies in the island, who imprisoned them all together in one vast building, under guard of hoplites. From this building they were drawn out in companies of twenty men each, chained together in couples, and compelled to march between two lines of hoplites marshalled on each side of the road. Those who loitered in the march were hurried on by whips from behind: as they advanced, their private enemies on both sides singled them out, striking and piercing them until at length they miserably perished. Three successive companies were thus destroyed, ere the remaining prisoners in the interior, who thought merely that their place of detention

was about to be changed, suspected what was passing: at length they found it out, and one and all then refused either to quit the building or to permit any one else to enter. They at the same time piteously implored the intervention of the Athenians, if it were only to kill them, and thus preserve them from the cruelties of their merciless countrymen. The latter abstained from attempts to force the door of the building, but made an aperture in the roof, from whence they shot down arrows, and poured showers of tiles, upon the prisoners within; who sought at first to protect themselves, but at length abandoned themselves to despair, and assisted with their own hands in the work of destruction. Some of them pierced their throats with the arrows shot down from the roof: others hung themselves, either with cords from some bedding which happened to be in the building, or with strips torn and twisted from their own garments. Night came on, but the work of destruction, both from above and within, was continued without intermission, so that before morning all these wretched men perished, either by the hands of their enemies or by their own. At daybreak, the Korkyræans entered the building, piled up the dead bodies on carts, and transported them out of the city: the exact number we are not told, but seemingly it cannot have been less than three hundred. The women who had been taken at Istônê along with these prisoners, were all sold as slaves.[578]

Thus finished the bloody dissensions in this ill-fated island: for the oligarchical party were completely annihilated, the democracy was victorious, and there were no farther violences throughout the whole war.[579] It will be recollected that these deadly feuds began with the return of the oligarchical prisoners from Corinth, bringing along with them projects both of treason and of revolution: they ended with the annihilation of that party, in the manner above described; the interval being filled by mutual atrocities and retaliation, wherein of course the victors had most opportunity of gratifying their vindictive passions. Eurymedon, after the termination of these events, proceeded onward with the Athenian squadron to Sicily: what he did there will be described in a future chapter devoted to Sicilian affairs exclusively.

The complete prostration of Ambrakia during the campaign of the preceding year had left Anaktorium without any defence against the Akarnanians and Athenian squadron from Naupaktus. They besieged and took it during the course of the present summer;[580] expelling the Corinthian proprietors, and repeopling the town and its territory with Akarnanian settlers from all the townships in the country.

Throughout the maritime empire of Athens matters continued perfectly tranquil, except that the inhabitants of Chios, during the course of the autumn, incurred the suspicion of the Athenians from having recently built a new wall to their city, as if it were done with the intention of taking the first opportunity to revolt.[581] They solemnly protested their innocence of any such designs, but the Athenians were not satisfied without exacting the destruction of the obnoxious wall. The presence on the opposite continent of an active band of Mitylenæan exiles, who captured both

Rhœteium and Antandrus during the ensuing spring, probably made the Athenians more anxious and vigilant on the subject of Chios.[582]

The Athenian regular tribute-gathering squadron circulated among the maritime subjects, and captured, during the course of the present autumn, a prisoner of some importance and singularity. It was a Persian ambassador, Artaphernes, seized at Eion on the Strymon, in his way to Sparta with despatches from the Great King. He was brought to Athens, and his despatches, which were at some length, and written in the Assyrian character, were translated and made public. The Great King told the Lacedæmonians, in substance, that he could not comprehend what they meant; for that among the numerous envoys whom they had sent, no two told the same story. Accordingly he desired them, if they wished to make themselves understood, to send some envoys with fresh and plain instructions to accompany Artaphernes.[583] Such was the substance of the despatch, conveying a remarkable testimony as to the march of the Lacedæmonian government in its foreign policy. Had any similar testimony existed respecting Athens, demonstrating that her foreign policy was conducted with half as much unsteadiness and stupidity, ample inferences would have been drawn from it to the discredit of democracy. But there has been no motive generally to discredit Lacedæmonian institutions, which included kingship in double measure,—two parallel lines of hereditary kings: together with an entire exemption from everything like popular discussion. The extreme defects in the foreign management of Sparta, revealed by the despatch of Artaphernes, seem traceable partly to an habitual faithlessness often noted in the Lacedæmonian character, partly to the annual change of ephors, so frequently bringing into power men who strove to undo what had been done by their predecessors, and still more to the absence of everything like discussion or canvass of public measures among the citizens. We shall find more than one example, in the history about to follow, of this disposition on the part of ephors, not merely to change the policy of their predecessors, but even to subvert treaties sworn and concluded by them: and such was the habitual secrecy of Spartan public business, that in doing this they had neither criticism nor discussion to fear. Brasidas, when he started from Sparta on the expedition which will be described in the coming chapter, could not trust the assurances of the Lacedæmonian executive without binding them by the most solemn oaths.[584]

The Athenians sent back Artaphernes in a trireme to Ephesus, and availed themselves of this opportunity for procuring access to the Great King. They sent envoys along with him, with the intention that they should accompany him up to Susa: but on reaching Asia, the news had just arrived that King Artaxerxes had recently died. Under such circumstances, it was not judged expedient to prosecute the mission, and the Athenians dropped their design.[585]

Respecting the great monarchy of Persia, during this long interval of fifty-four years since the repulse of Xerxes from Greece, we have little information before us except the names of the successive kings. In the year 465 B.C. Xerxes was assassi-

nated by Artabanus and Mithridates, through one of those plots of great household officers, so frequent in oriental palaces. He left two sons, or at least two sons present and conspicuous among a greater number, Darius and Artaxerxes. But Artabanus persuaded Artaxerxes that Darius had been the murderer of Xerxes, and thus prevailed upon him to revenge his father's death by becoming an accomplice in killing his brother Darius: he next tried to assassinate Artaxerxes himself, and to appropriate the crown. Artaxerxes however, apprized beforehand of the scheme, either slew Artabanus with his own hand or procured him to be slain and then reigned (known under the name of Artaxerxes Longimanus) for forty years, down to the period at which we are now arrived.[586]

Mention has already been made of the revolt of Egypt from the dominion of Artaxerxes, under the Libyan prince Inanes, actively aided by the Athenians. After a few years of success, this revolt was crushed and Egypt again subjugated, by the energy of the Persian general Megabyzus, with severe loss to the Athenian forces engaged. After the peace of Kallias, erroneously called the Kimonian peace, between the Athenians and the king of Persia, war had not been since resumed. We read in Ktesias, amidst various anecdotes seemingly collected at the court of Susa, romantic adventures ascribed to Megabyzus, his wife Amytis, his mother Amestris, and a Greek physician of Kos, named Apollonides. Zopyrus son of Megabyzus, after the death of his father, deserted from Persia and came as an exile to Athens.[587]

At the death of Artaxerxes Longimanus, the family violences incident to a Persian succession were again exhibited. His son Xerxes succeeded him, but was assassinated, after a reign of a few weeks or months. Another son, Sogdianus, followed, who perished in like manner after a short interval.[588] Lastly, a third son, Ochus (known under the name of Darius Nothus), either abler or more fortunate, kept his crown and life between nineteen and twenty years. By his queen, the savage Parysatis, he was father to Artaxerxes Mnemon and Cyrus the younger, both names of interest in reference to Grecian history, to whom we shall hereafter recur.

CHAPTER LIII.

EIGHTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

THE eighth year of the war, on which we now touch, presents events of a more important and decisive character than any of the preceding. In reviewing the preceding years, we observe that though there is much fighting, with hardship and privation inflicted on both sides, yet the operations are mostly of a desultory character, not calculated to determine the event of the war. But the capture of Sphakteria and its prisoners, coupled with the surrender of the whole Lacedæmonian fleet, was an event full of consequences and imposing in the eyes of all Greece. It stimulated the Athenians to a series of operations, larger and more ambitious than anything which they had yet conceived; directed, not merely against Sparta in her own country, but also to the reconquest of that ascendency in Megara and Bœotia which they had lost on or before the thirty years' truce. On the other hand, it intimidated so much both the Lacedæmonians, the revolted Chalkidic allies of Athens in Thrace, and Perdikkas, king of Macedonia, that between them the expedition of Brasidas, which struck so serious a blow at the Athenian empire, was concerted. This year is thus the turning-point of the war. If the operations of Athens had succeeded, she would have regained nearly as great a power as she enjoyed before the thirty years' truce: but it happened that Sparta, or rather the Spartan Brasidas, was successful, gaining enough to neutralize all the advantages derived by Athens from the capture of Sphakteria.

The first enterprise undertaken by the Athenians in the course of the spring was against the island of Kythêra, on the southern coast of Laconia. It was inhabited by Lacedæmonian Periœki, and administered by a governor, and garrison of hoplites, annually sent thither. It was the usual point of landing for merchantmen from Libya and Egypt; and as it lay very near to Cape Malea, immediately over against the gulf of Gythium,—the only accessible portion of the generally inhospitable coast of Laconia,—the chance that it might fall into the hands of an enemy was considered as so menacing to Sparta, that some politicians are said to have wished the island at the bottom of the sea.[589] Nikias, in conjunction with Nikostratus and Autoklês, conducted thither a fleet of sixty triremes, with two thousand Athenian hoplites, some few horsemen, and a body of allies, mainly Milesians. There were in the island two towns,—Kythêra and Skandeia: the former having a lower town close to the sea, fronting Cape Malea, and an upper town on the hill above; the latter, seemingly, on the south or west coast. Both were attacked at the same time by order of Nikias; ten triremes and a body of Milesian[590] hoplites disembarked and captured Skandeia; while the Athenians landed at Kythêra, and drove the inhabitants out of the lower town into the upper, where they speedily capitulated. A certain party among them

had indeed secretly invited the coming of Nikias, through which intrigue easy terms were obtained for the inhabitants. Some few men, indicated by the Kytherians in intelligence with Nikias, were carried away as prisoners to Athens: but the remainder were left undisturbed, and enrolled among the tributary allies under obligation to pay four talents per annum; an Athenian garrison being placed at Kythêra for the protection of the island. From hence Nikias employed seven days in descents and inroads upon the coast, near Helos, Asinê, Aphrodisia, Kotyrta, and elsewhere. The Lacedæmonian force was disseminated in petty garrisons, which remained each for the defence of its own separate post, without uniting to repel the Athenians, so that there was only one action, and that of little importance, which the Athenians deemed worthy of a trophy.

In returning home from Kythêra, Nikias first ravaged the small strip of cultivated land near Epidaurus Limêra, on the rocky eastern coast of Laconia, and then attacked the Æginetan settlement at Thyrea, the frontier strip between Laconia and Argolis. This town and district had been made over by Sparta to the Æginetans, at the time when they were expelled from their own island by Athens, in the first year of the war. The new inhabitants, finding the town too distant from the sea[591] for their maritime habits, were now employed in constructing a fortification close on the shore; in which work a Lacedæmonian detachment under Tantalus, on guard in that neighborhood, was assisting them. When the Athenians landed, both Æginetans and Lacedæmonians at once abandoned the new fortification. The former, with the commanding officer, Tantalus, occupied the upper town of Thyrea; but the Lacedæmonian troops, not thinking it tenable, refused to take part in the defence, and retired to the neighboring mountains, in spite of urgent entreaty from the Æginetans. The Athenians, immediately after landing, marched up to the town of Thyrea, and carried it by storm, burning or destroying everything within it: all the Æginetans were either killed or made prisoners, and even Tantalus, disabled by his wounds, became prisoner also. From hence the armament returned to Athens, where a vote was taken as to the disposal of the prisoners. The Kytherians brought home were distributed for safe custody among the dependent islands: Tantalus was retained along with the prisoners from Sphakteria; but a harder fate was reserved for the Æginetans; they were all put to death, victims to the long-standing apathy between Athens and Ægina. This cruel act was nothing more than a strict application of admitted customs of war in those days: had the Lacedæmonians been the victors, there can be little doubt that they would have acted with equal rigor.[592]

The occupation of Kythêra, in addition to Pylus, by an Athenian garrison, following so closely upon the capital disaster in Sphakteria, produced in the minds of the Spartans feelings of alarm and depression such as they had never before experienced. Within the course of a few short months their position had completely changed from superiority and aggression abroad to insult and insecurity at home. They anticipated nothing less than incessant foreign attacks on all their weak points,

with every probability of internal defection, from the standing discontent of the Helots: nor was it unknown to them, probably, that even Kythêra itself had been lost partly through betrayal. The capture of Sphakteria had caused peculiar sensations among the Helots, to whom the Lacedæmonians had addressed both appeals and promises of emancipation, in order to procure succor for their hoplites while blockaded in the island; and if the ultimate surrender of these hoplites had abated the terrors of Lacedæmonian prowess throughout all Greece, this effect had been produced to a still greater degree among the oppressed Helots. A refuge at Pylus, and a nucleus which presented some possibility of expanding into regenerated Messenia, were now before their eyes; while the establishment of an Athenian garrison at Kythêra opened a new channel of communication with the enemies of Sparta, so as to tempt all the Helots of daring temper to stand forward as liberators of their enslaved race.[593] The Lacedæmonians, habitually cautious at all times, felt now as if the tide of fortune had turned decidedly against them, and acted with confirmed mistrust and dismay, confining themselves to measures strictly defensive, and organizing a force of four hundred cavalry, together with a body of bowmen, beyond their ordinary establishment.

But the precaution which they thought it necessary to take in regard to the Helots, affords the best measure of their apprehensions at the moment, and exhibits, indeed, a refinement of fraud and cruelty rarely equalled in history. Wishing to single out from the general body such as were most high-couraged and valiant, the ephors made proclamation, that those Helots, who conceived themselves to have earned their liberty by distinguished services in war, might stand forward to claim it. A considerable number obeyed the call; probably many who had undergone imminent hazards during the preceding summer, in order to convey provisions to the blockaded soldiers in Sphakteria.[594] They were examined by the government, and two thousand of them were selected as fully worthy of emancipation; which was forthwith bestowed upon them in public ceremonial, with garlands, visits to the temples, and the full measure of religious solemnity. The government had now made the selection which it desired; presently every man among these newly-enfranchized Helots was made away with, no one knew how.[595] A stratagem at once so perfidious in the contrivance, so murderous in the purpose, and so complete in the execution, stands without parallel in Grecian history,—we might almost say, without a parallel in any history. It implies a depravity far greater than the rigorous execution of a barbarous customary law against prisoners of war or rebels, even in large numbers. The ephors must have employed numerous instruments, apart from each other, for the performance of this bloody deed; yet it appears that no certain knowledge could be obtained of the details; a striking proof of the mysterious efficiency of this Council of Five, surpassing even that of the Council of Ten at Venice, as well as of the utter absence of public inquiry or discussion.

It was while the Lacedæmonians were in this state of uneasiness at home, that envoys reached them from Perdikkas of Macedonia and the Chalkidians of Thrace, entreating aid against Athens; who was considered likely, in her present tide of success, to resume aggressive measures against them. There were, moreover, other parties, in the neighboring cities[596] subject to Athens, who secretly favored the application, engaging to stand forward in open revolt as soon as any auxiliary force should arrive to warrant their incurring the hazard. Perdikkas (who had on his hands a dispute with his kinsman Arrhibæus, prince of the Lynkestæ-Macedonians, which he was anxious to be enabled to close successfully) and the Chalkidians offered at the same time to provide the pay and maintenance, as well as to facilitate the transit, of the troops who might be sent to them; and what was of still greater importance to the success of the enterprise, they specially requested that Brasidas might be invested with the command.[597] He had now recovered from his wounds received at Pylus, and his reputation for adventurous valor, great as it was from positive desert, stood out still more conspicuously, because not a single other Spartan had as yet distinguished himself. His other great qualities, apart from personal valor, had not yet been shown, for he had never been in any supreme command. But he burned with impatience to undertake the operation destined for him by the envoys; although at this time it must have appeared so replete with difficulty and danger, that probably no other Spartan except himself would have entered upon it with the smallest hopes of success. To raise up embarrassments for Athens, in Thrace, was an object of great consequence to Sparta, while she also obtained an opportunity of sending away another large detachment of her dangerous Helots. Seven hundred of these latter were armed as hoplites and placed under the orders of Brasidas, but the Lacedæmonians would not assign to him any of their own proper forces. With the sanction of the Spartan name, with seven hundred Helot hoplites, and with such other hoplites as he could raise in Peloponnesus by means of the funds furnished from the Chalkidians, Brasidas prepared to undertake this expedition, alike adventurous and important.

Had the Athenians entertained any suspicion of his design, they could easily have prevented him from ever reaching Thrace. But they knew nothing of it until he had actually joined Perdikkas, nor did they anticipate any serious attack from Sparta, in this moment of her depression, much less an enterprise far bolder than any which she had ever been known to undertake. They were now elate with hopes of conquests to come on their own part, their affairs being so prosperous and promising that parties favorable to their interests began to revive, both in Megara and in Bœotia; while Hippokratês and Demosthenês, the two chief stratêgi for the year, were men of energy, well qualified both to project and execute military achievements.

The first opportunity presented itself in regard to Megara. The inhabitants of that city had been greater sufferers by the war than any other persons in Greece: they had been the chief cause of bringing down the war upon Athens, and the Athenians revenged upon them all the hardships which they themselves endured from the

Lacedæmonian invasion. Twice in every year they laid waste the Megarid, which bordered upon their own territory; and that too with such destructive hands throughout its limited extent, that they intercepted all subsistence from the lands near the town, at the same time keeping the harbor of Nisæa closely blocked up. Under such hard conditions the Megarians found much difficulty in supplying even the primary wants of life.[598] But their case had now, within the last few months, become still more intolerable by an intestine commotion in the city, ending in the expulsion of a powerful body of exiles, who seized and held possession of Pegæ, the Megarian port in the gulf of Corinth. Probably imports from Pegæ had been their chief previous resource against the destruction which came on them from the side of Athens; so that it became scarcely possible to sustain themselves, when the exiles in Pegæ not only deprived them of this resource, but took positive part in harassing them. These exiles were oligarchical, and the government in Megara had now become more or less democratical: but the privations in the city presently reached such a height, that several citizens began to labor for a compromise, whereby the exiles in Pegæ might be readmitted. It was evident to the leaders in Megara that the bulk of the citizens could not long sustain the pressure of enemies from both sides, but it was also their feeling that the exiles in Pegæ, their bitter political rivals, were worse enemies than the Athenians, and that the return of these exiles would be a sentence of death to themselves. To prevent this counter-revolution, they opened a secret correspondence with Hippokratês and Demosthenês, engaging to betray both Megara and Nisæa to the Athenians; though Nisæa, the harbor of Megara, about one mile from the city, was a separate fortress occupied by a Peloponnesian garrison, and by them exclusively, as well as the Long Walls, for the purpose of holding Megara fast to the Lacedæmonian confederacy.[599]

The scheme for surprise was concerted, and what is more remarkable, in the extreme publicity of all Athenian affairs, and in a matter to which many persons must have been privy, was kept secret, until the instant of execution. A large Athenian force, four thousand hoplites and six hundred cavalry, was appointed to march at night by the high road through Eleusis to Megara: but Hippokratês and Demosthenês themselves went on shipboard from Peiræus to the island of Minôa, which was close against Nisæa, and had been for some time under occupation by an Athenian garrison. Here Hippokratês concealed himself with six hundred hoplites, in a hollow space out of which brick earth had been dug, on the mainland opposite to Minôa, and not far from the gate in the Long Wall which opened near the junction of that wall with the ditch and wall surrounding Nisæa; while Demosthenês, with some light-armed Platæans and a detachment of active young Athenians, called Peripoli, and serving as the movable guard of Attica, in their first or second year of military service, placed himself in ambush in the sacred precinct of Arês, still closer to the same gate.

To procure that the gate should be opened, was the task of the conspirators within. Amidst the shifts to which the Megarians had been reduced in order to obtain

supplies, especially since the blockade of Minôa, predatory exit by night was not omitted. Some of these conspirators had been in the habit, before the intrigue with Athens was projected, of carrying out a small sculler-boat by night upon a cart, through this gate, by permission of the Peloponnesian commander of Nisæa and the Long Walls. The boat, when thus brought out, was carried down to the shore along the hollow of the dry ditch which surrounded the wall of Nisæa, then put to sea for some nightly enterprise, and was brought back again along the ditch before daylight in the morning; the gate being opened, by permission, to let it in. This was the only way by which any Megarian vessel could get to sea, since the Athenians at Minôa were complete masters of the harbor. On the night fixed for the surprise, this boat was carried out and brought back at the usual hour. But the moment that the gate in the Long Wall was opened to readmit it, Demosthenês and his comrades sprang forward to force their way in; the Megarians along with the boat at the same time setting upon and killing the guards, in order to facilitate his entrance. This active and determined band were successful in mastering the gate, and keeping it open until the six hundred hoplites under Hippokratês came up, and got into the interior space between the Long Walls. They immediately mounted the walls on each side, every man as he came in, with little thought of order, to drive off or destroy the Peloponnesian guards; who, taken by surprise, and fancying that the Megarians generally were in concert with the enemy against them,—confirmed, too, in such belief by hearing the Athenian herald proclaim aloud that every Megarian who chose might take his post in the line of Athenian hoplites,[600]—made at first some resistance, but were soon discouraged, and fled into Nisæa. By a little after daybreak, the Athenians found themselves masters of all the line of the Long Walls, and under the very gates of Megara,—reinforced by the larger force which, having marched by land through Eleusis, arrived at the concerted moment.

Meanwhile, the Megarians within the city were in the greatest tumult and consternation. But the conspirators, prepared with their plan, had resolved to propose that the gates should be thrown open, and that the whole force of the city should be marched out to fight the Athenians: when once the gates should be open, they themselves intended to take part with the Athenians, and facilitate their entrance,—and they had rubbed their bodies over with oil in order to be visibly distinguished in the eyes of the latter. Their plan was only frustrated the moment before it was about to be put in execution, by the divulgation of one of their own comrades. Their opponents in the city, apprized of what was in contemplation, hastened to the gate, and intercepted the men rubbed with oil as they were about to open it. Without betraying any knowledge of the momentous secret which they had just learned, these opponents loudly protested against opening the gate and going out to fight an enemy for whom they had never conceived themselves, even in moments of greater strength, to be a match in the open field. While insisting only on the public mischiefs of the measure, they at the same time planted themselves in arms against the gate, and declared that they would perish before they would allow it to be opened. For this ob-

stinate resistance the conspirators were not prepared, so that they were forced to abandon their design and leave the gate closed.

The Athenian generals, who were waiting in expectation that it would be opened, soon perceived by the delay that their friends within had been baffled, and immediately resolved to make sure of Nisæa, which lay behind them; an acquisition important not less in itself, than as a probable means for the mastery of Megara. They set about the work with the characteristic rapidity of Athenians. Masons and tools in abundance were forthwith sent for from Athens, and the army distributed among themselves the wall of circumvallation round Nisæa in distinct parts. First, the interior space between the Long Walls themselves was built across, so as to cut off the communication with Megara; next, walls were carried out from the outside of both the Long Walls down to the sea, so as completely to inclose Nisæa, with its fortifications and ditch. The scattered houses which formed a sort of ornamented suburb to Nisæa, furnished bricks for this inclosing circle, or were sometimes even made to form a part of it as they stood, with the parapets on their roofs; while the trees were cut down to supply material wherever palisades were suitable. In a day and a half the work of circumvallation was almost completed, so that the Peloponnesians in Nisæa saw before them nothing but a hopeless state of blockade. Deprived of all communication, they not only fancied that the whole city of Megara had joined the Athenians, but they were moreover without any supply of provisions, which had been always furnished to them in daily rations from the city. Despairing of any speedy relief from Peloponnesus, they accepted easy terms of capitulation offered to them by the Athenian generals.[601] After delivering up their arms, each man among them was to be ransomed for a stipulated price; we are not told how much, but doubtless a moderate sum. The Lacedæmonian commander, and such other Lacedæmonians as might be in Nisæa, were, however, required to surrender themselves as prisoners to the Athenians, to be held at their disposal. On these terms Nisæa was surrendered to the Athenians, who cut off its communication with Megara, by keeping the intermediate space between the Long Walls effectively blocked up,—walls, of which they had themselves, in former days, been the original authors.[602]

Such interruption of communication by the Long Walls indicated in the minds of the Athenian generals a conviction that Megara was now out of their reach. But the town in its present distracted state, would certainly have fallen into their hands,[603] had it not been snatched from them by the accidental neighborhood and energetic intervention of Brasidas. That officer, occupied in the levy of troops for his Thracian expedition, was near Corinth and Sikyon, when he first learned the surprise and capture of the Long Walls. Partly from the alarm which the news excited among these Peloponnesian towns, partly from his own personal influence, he got together a body of two thousand seven hundred Corinthian hoplites, six hundred Sikyonian and four hundred Phliasian, besides his own small army, and marched with this united force to Tripodiskus, in the Megarid, half-way between Megara and Pegæ, on the road over

Mount Geraneia; having first despatched a pressing summons to the Bœotians to request that they would meet him at that point with reinforcements. He trusted by a speedy movement to preserve Megara, and perhaps even Nisæa; but on reaching Tripodiskus in the night, he learned that the latter place had already surrendered. Alarmed for the safety of Megara, he proceeded thither by a night-march without delay. Taking with him only a chosen band of three hundred men, he presented himself, without being expected, at the gates of the city; entreating to be admitted, and offering to lend his immediate aid for the recovery of Nisæa. One of the two parties in Megara would have been glad to comply; but the other, knowing well that in that case the exiles in Pegæ would be brought back upon them, was prepared for a strenuous resistance, in which case the Athenian force, still only one mile off, would have been introduced as auxiliaries. Under these circumstances the two parties came to a compromise, and mutually agreed to refuse admittance to Brasidas. They expected that a battle would take place between him and the Athenians, and each calculated that Megara would follow the fortunes of the victor.[604]

Returning back without success to Tripodiskus, Brasidas was joined there early in the morning by two thousand Bœotian hoplites and six hundred cavalry; for the Bœotians had been put in motion by the same news as himself, and had even commenced their march, before his messenger arrived, with such celerity as to have already reached Platæa.[605] The total force under Brasidas was thus increased to six thousand hoplites and six hundred cavalry, with whom he marched straight to the neighborhood of Megara. The Athenian light troops, dispersed over the plain, were surprised and driven in by the Bœotian cavalry; but the Athenian cavalry, coming to their aid, maintained a sharp action with the assailants, wherein, after some loss on both sides, a slight advantage remained on the side of the Athenians. They granted a truce for the burial of the Bœotian officer of cavalry, who was slain with some others. After this indecisive cavalry skirmish, Brasidas advanced with his main force into the plain, between Megara and the sea, taking up a position near to the Athenian hoplites, who were drawn up in battle array, hard by Nisæa and the Long Walls. He thus offered them battle if they chose it; but each party expected that the other would attack and each was unwilling to begin the attack on his own side, Brasidas was well aware that, if the Athenians refused to fight, Megara would be preserved from falling into their hands,—which loss it was his main object to prevent, and which had in fact been prevented only by his arrival. If he attacked and was beaten, he would forfeit this advantage,—while, if victorious, he could hardly hope to gain much more. The Athenian generals on their side reflected, that they had already secured a material acquisition in Nisæa, which cut off Megara from their sea; that the army opposed to them was not only superior in number of hoplites, but composed of contingents from many different cities, so that no one city hazarded much in the action; while their own force was all Athenian, and composed of the best hoplites in Athens, which would render a defeat severely ruinous to the city: nor did they think it worth while to encounter this risk, even for the purpose of gaining possession of

Megara. With such views in the leaders on both sides, the two armies remained for some time in position, each waiting for the other to attack: at length the Athenians, seeing that no aggressive movement was contemplated by their opponents, were the first to retire into Nisæa. Thus left master of the field, Brasidas retired in triumph to Megara, the gates of which were now opened without reserve to admit him.[606]

The army of Brasidas, having gained the chief point for which it was collected, speedily dispersed,—he himself resuming his preparations for Thrace; while the Athenians on their side also returned home, leaving an adequate garrison for the occupation both of Nisæa and of the Long Walls. But the interior of Megara underwent a complete and violent revolution. While the leaders friendly to Athens, not thinking it safe to remain, fled forthwith and sought shelter with the Athenians,[607] the opposite party opened communication with the exiles at Pegæ and readmitted them into the city; binding them however, by the most solemn pledges, to observe absolute amnesty of the past and to study nothing but the welfare of the common city. The new-comers only kept their pledge during the interval which elapsed until they acquired power to violate it with effect. They soon got themselves placed in the chief commands of state, and found means to turn the military force to their own purposes. A review and examination of arms, of the hoplites in the city, having been ordered, the Megarian lochi were so marshalled and tutored as to enable the leaders to single out such victims as they thought expedient. They seized many of their most obnoxious enemies, some of them suspected as accomplices in the recent conspiracy with Athens: the men thus seized were subjected to the forms of a public trial, before that which was called a public assembly; wherein each voter, acting under military terror, was constrained to give his suffrage openly. All were condemned to death and executed, to the number of one hundred.[608] The constitution of Megara was then shaped into an oligarchy of the closest possible kind, a few of the most violent men taking complete possession of the government. But they must probably have conducted it with vigor and prudence for their own purposes, since Thucydidês remarks that it was rare to see a revolution accomplished by so small a party, and yet so durable. How long it lasted, he does not mention. A few months after these incidents, the Megarians regained possession of their Long Walls, by capture from the Athenians,[609] to whom indeed they could have been of no material service, and levelled the whole line of them to the ground: but the Athenians still retained Nisæa. We may remark, as explaining in part the durability of this new government, that the truce concluded at the beginning of the ensuing year must have greatly lightened the difficulties of any government, whether oligarchical or democratical, in Megara.

The scheme for surprising Megara had been both laid and executed with skill, and only miscarried through an accident to which such schemes are always liable, as well as by the unexpected celerity of Brasidas. It had, moreover, succeeded so far as to enable the Athenians to carry Nisæa,—one of the posts which they had surrendered by the thirty years' truce, and of considerable positive value to them: so that it

counted on the whole as a victory, leaving the generals with increased encouragement to turn their activity elsewhere. Accordingly, very soon after the troops had been brought back from the Megarid,[610] Hippokratês and Demosthenês concerted a still more extensive plan for the invasion of Bœotia, in conjunction with some malcontents in the Bœotian towns, who desired to break down and democratize the oligarchical governments, and especially through the agency of a Theban exile named Ptœodôrus. Demosthenês, with forty triremes, was sent round Peloponnesus to Naupaktus, with instructions to collect an Akarnanian force, to sail into the inmost recess of the Corinthian or Krissæan gulf, and to occupy Siphæ, a maritime town belonging to the Bœotian Thespiæ, where intelligences had been already established. On the same day, determined beforehand, Hippokratês engaged to enter Bœotia, with the main force of Athens, at the southeastern corner of the territory near Tanagra, and to fortify Delium, the temple of Apollo, on the coast of the Eubœan strait: while at the same time it was concerted that some Bœotian and Phocian malcontents should make themselves masters of Chæroneia on the borders of Phocis. Bœotia would thus be assailed on three sides at the same moment, so that the forces of the country would be distracted and unable to coöperate. Internal movements were farther expected to take place in some of the cities, such as perhaps to establish democratical governments and place them at once in alliance with the Athenians.

Accordingly, about the month of August, Demosthenês sailed from Athens to Naupaktus, where he collected his Akarnanian allies,—now stronger and more united than ever, since the refractory inhabitants of Œniadæ had been at length compelled to join their Akarnanian brethren: moreover, the neighboring Agræans with their prince Salynthius were also brought into the Athenian alliance. On the appointed day, seemingly about the beginning of October, he sailed with a strong force of these allies up to Siphæ, in full expectation that it would be betrayed to him.[611] But the execution of this enterprise was less happy than that against Megara. In the first place, there was a mistake as to the day understood between Hippokratês and Demosthenês: in the next place, the entire plot was discovered and betrayed by a Phocian of Phanoteus (bordering on Chæroneia) named Nicomachus,—communicated first to the Lacedæmonians and through them to the bœotarchs. Siphæ and Chæroneia were immediately placed in a state of defence, and Demosthenês, on arriving at the former place, found not only no party within it favorable to him, but a formidable Bœotian force which rendered attack unavailing: moreover, Hippokratês had not yet begun his march, so that the defenders had nothing to distract their attention from Siphæ.[612] Under these circumstances, not only was Demosthenês obliged to withdraw without striking a blow, and to content himself with an unsuccessful descent upon the territory of Sikyon,[613] but all the expected internal movements in Bœotia were prevented from breaking out.

It was not till after the Bœotian troops, having repelled the attack by sea, had retired from Siphæ, that Hippokratês commenced his march from Athens to invade the

Bœotian territory near Tanagra. He was probably encouraged by false promises from the Bœotian exiles, otherwise it seems remarkable that he should have persisted in executing his part of the scheme alone, after the known failure of the other part. It was, however, executed in a manner which implies unusual alacrity and confidence. The whole military population of Athens was marched into Bœotia, to the neighborhood of Delium, the eastern coast-extremity of the territory belonging to the Bœotian town of Tanagra; the expedition comprising all classes, not merely citizens, but also metics or resident non-freemen, and even non-resident strangers then by accident at Athens. Of course this statement must be understood with the reserve of ample guards left behind for the city: but besides the really effective force of seven thousand hoplites, and several hundred horsemen, there appear to have been not less than twenty-five thousand light-armed, half-armed, or unarmed attendants accompanying the march.[614] The number of hoplites is here prodigiously great; brought together by general and indiscriminate proclamation, not selected by a special choice of the stratêgi out of the names on the muster-roll, as was usually the case for any distant expedition.[615] As to light-armed, there was at this time no trained force of that description at Athens, except a small body of archers. No pains had been taken to organize either darters or slingers: the hoplites, the horsemen, and the seamen, constituted the whole effective force of the city. Indeed, it appears that the Bœotians also were hardly less destitute than the Athenians of native darters and slingers, since those which they employed in the subsequent siege of Delium were in great part hired from the Malian gulf.[616] To employ at one and the same time heavy-armed and light-armed, was not natural to any Grecian community, but was a practice which grew up with experience and necessity. The Athenian feeling, as manifested in the Persæ of Æschylus a few years after the repulse of Xerxes, proclaims exclusive pride in the spear and shield, with contempt for the bow: and it was only during this very year, when alarmed by the Athenian occupation of Pylus and Kythêra, that the Lacedæmonians, contrary to their previous custom, had begun to organize a regiment of archers.[617] The effective manner in which Demosthenês had employed the light-armed in Sphakteria against the Lacedæmonian hoplites, was well calculated to teach an instructive lesson as to the value of the former description of troops.

The Bœotian Delium,[618] which Hippokratês now intended to occupy and fortify, was a temple of Apollo, strongly situated and overhanging the sea, about five miles from Tanagra, and somewhat more than a mile from the border territory of Orôpus, —a territory originally Bœotian, but at this time dependent on Athens, and even partly incorporated in the political community of Athens, under the name of the Deme of Græa.[619] Orôpus itself was about a day's march from Athens, by the road which led through Dekeleia and Sphendalê, between the mountains Parnês and Phelleus: so that as the distance to be traversed was so inconsiderable, and the general feeling of the time was that of confidence, it is probable that men of all ages, arms, and dispositions crowded to join the march, in part from mere curiosity and

excitement. Hippokratês reached Delium on the day after he had started from Athens: on the succeeding day he began his work of fortification, which was completed, all hands aiding, and tools as well as workmen having been brought along with the army from Athens, in two days and a half. Having dug a ditch all round the sacred ground, he threw up the earth in a bank alongside of the ditch, planting stakes, throwing in fascines, and adding layers of stone and brick, to keep the work together, and make it into a rampart of tolerable height and firmness. The vines[620] round the temple, together with the stakes which served as supports to them, were cut to obtain wood; the houses adjoining furnished bricks and stone: the outer temple-buildings themselves also, on some of the sides, served as they stood to facilitate and strengthen the defence; but there was one side on which the annexed building, once a portico, had fallen down: and here the Athenians constructed some wooden towers as a help to the defenders. By the middle of the fifth day after leaving Athens, the work was so nearly completed, that the army quitted Delium, and began its march homeward, out of Bœotia; halting, after it had proceeded about a mile and a quarter, within the Athenian territory of Orôpus. It was here that the hoplites awaited the coming of Hippokratês, who still remained at Delium, stationing the garrison, and giving his final orders about future defence; while the greater number of the light-armed and unarmed, separating from the hoplites, and seemingly without any anticipation of the coming danger, continued their return-march to Athens.[621] Their position was probably about the western extremity of the plain of Orôpus, on the verge of the low heights between that plain and Delium.[622]

During these five days, however, the forces from all parts of Bœotia had time to muster at Tanagra: and their number was just completed as the Athenians were beginning their march homeward from Delium. Contingents had arrived, not only from Thebes and its dependent townships around, but also from Haliartus, Korôneia, Orchomenus, Kôpæ, and Thespiæ: that of Tanagra joined on the spot. The government of the Bœotian confederacy at this time was vested in eleven bœotarchs,—two chosen from Thebes, the rest in unknown proportion by the other cities, immediate members of the confederacy,—and in four senates, or councils, the constitution of which is not known. Though all the bœotarchs, now assembled at Tanagra, formed a sort of council of war, yet the supreme command was vested in Pagondas and Aranthidês, the bœotarchs from Thebes; either in Pagondas as the senior of the two, or perhaps in both, alternating with each other day by day.[623] As the Athenians were evidently in full retreat, and had already passed the border, all the other bœotarchs, except Pagondas, were unwilling to hazard a battle[624] on soil not Bœotian, and were disposed to let them return home without obstruction. Such reluctance is not surprising, when we reflect that the chances of defeat were considerable, and that probably some of these bœotarchs were afraid of the increased power which a victory would lend to the oppressive tendencies of Thebes. But Pagondas strenuously opposed this proposition, and carried the soldiers of the various cities along with him, even in opposition to the sentiments of their separate leaders, in favor of imme-

diately fighting. He called them apart and addressed them by separate divisions, in order that all might not quit their arms at one and the same moment.[625] He characterized the sentiment of the other bœotarchs as an unworthy manifestation of weakness, which, when properly considered, had not even the recommendation of superior prudence. For the Athenians had just invaded the country, and built a fort for the purpose of continuous devastation; nor were they less enemies on one side of the border than on the other. Moreover, they were the most restless and encroaching of all enemies; and the Bœotians, who had the misfortune to be their neighbors, could only be secure against them by the most resolute promptitude in defending themselves, as well as in returning the blows first given. If they wished to protect their autonomy and their property against the condition of slavery under which their neighbors in Eubœa had long suffered, as well as so many other portions of Greece, their only chance was to march onward and beat these invaders, following the glorious example of their fathers and predecessors in the field of Korôneia. The sacrifices were favorable to an advancing movement, and Apollo, whose temple the Athenians had desecrated by converting it into a fortified place, would lend his cordial aid to the Bœotian defence.[626]

Finding his exhortations favorably received, Pagondas conducted the army by a rapid march to a position close to the Athenians. He was anxious to fight them before they should have retreated farther; and, moreover, the day was nearly spent,—it was already late in the afternoon. Having reached a spot where he was only separated from the Athenians by a hill, which prevented either army from seeing the other, he marshalled his troops in the array proper for fighting. The Theban hoplites, with their dependent allies, ranged in a depth of not less than twenty-five shields, occupied the right wing: the hoplites of Haliartus, Korôneia, Kôpæ, and its neighborhood, were in the centre: those of Thespiæ, Tanagra, and Orchomenus, on the left; for Orchomenus, being the second city in Bœotia next to Thebes, obtained a second post of honor at the opposite extremity of the line. Each contingent adopted its own mode of marshalling the hoplites, and its own depth of files: on this point there was no uniformity, a remarkable proof of the prevalence of dissentient custom in Greece, and how much each town, even among confederates, stood apart as a separate unit.[627] Thucydidês specifies only the prodigious depth of the Theban hoplites; respecting the rest, he merely intimates that no common rule was followed. There is another point also which he does not specify, but which, though we learn it only on the inferior authority of Diodorus, appears both true and important. The front ranks of the Theban heavy-armed were filled by three hundred select warriors, of distinguished bodily strength, valor, and discipline, who were accustomed to fight in pairs, each man being attached to his neighbor by a peculiar tie of intimate friendship. These pairs were termed the heniochi and parabatæ, charioteers and companions; a denomination probably handed down from the Homeric times, when the foremost heroes really combated in chariots in front of the common soldiers, but now preserved after it had outlived its appropriate meaning.[628] This band, composed of the

finest men in the various palæstræ of Thebes, and enjoying a peculiar training for the defence of the kadmeia, or citadel, was in after-days detached from the front ranks of the phalanx, and organized into a separate regiment under the name of the Sacred Lochus, or Band: we shall see how much it contributed to the short-lived military ascendency of Thebes. On both flanks of this mass of Bœotian hoplites, about seven thousand in total number, were distributed one thousand cavalry, five hundred peltasts, and ten thousand light-armed or unarmed. The language of the historian seems to imply that the light-armed on the Bœotian side were something more effective than the mere multitude who followed the Athenians.

Such was the order in which Pagondas marched his army over the hill, halting them for a moment in front and sight of the Athenians, to see that the ranks were even, before he gave the word for actual charge.[629] Hippokratês, on his side, apprized while still at Delium, that the Bœotians had moved from Tanagra, first sent orders to his army to place themselves in battle array, and presently arrived himself to command them; leaving three hundred cavalry at Delium, partly as garrison, partly for the purpose of acting on the rear of the Bœotians during the battle. The Athenian hoplites were ranged eight deep along the whole line,—with the cavalry, and such of the light-armed as yet remained, placed on each flank. Hippokratês, after arriving on the spot, and surveying the ground occupied, marched along the front of the line briefly encouraging his soldiers; who, as the battle was just on the Orôpian border, might fancy that they were not in their own country, and that they were therefore exposed without necessity. He, too, in a strain similar to that adopted by Pagondas, reminded the Athenians, that on either side of the border they were alike fighting for the defence of Attica, to keep the Bœotians out of it; since the Peloponnesians would never dare to enter the country without the aid of the Bœotian horse.[630] He farther called to their recollection the great name of Athens, and the memorable victory of Myronidês, at Œnophyta, whereby their fathers had acquired possession of all Bœotia. But he had scarcely half-finished his progress along the line, when he was forced to desist by the sound of the Bœotian pæan. Pagondas, after a few additional sentences of encouragement, had given the word: the Bœotian hoplites were seen charging down the hill; and the Athenian hoplites, not less eager, advanced to meet them at a running step.[631]

At the extremity of the line on each side, the interposition of ravines prevented the actual meeting of the two armies: but throughout all the rest of the line, the clash was formidable and the conduct of both sides resolute. Both armies, maintaining their ranks compact and unbroken, came to the closest quarters; to the contact and pushing of shields against each other.[632] On the left half of the Bœotian line, consisting of hoplites from Thespiæ, Tanagra, and Orchomenus, the Athenians were victorious. The Thespians, who resisted longest, even after their comrades had given way, were surrounded and sustained the most severe loss from the Athenians; who in the ardor of success, while wheeling round to encircle the enemy, became disor-

dered and came into conflict even with their own citizens, not recognizing them at the moment: some loss of life was the consequence.

While the left of the Bœotian line was thus worsted and driven back for protection to the right, the Thebans on that side gained decided advantage. Though the resolution and discipline of the Athenians was noway inferior, yet as soon as the action came to close quarters and to propulsion with shield and spear, the prodigious depth of the Theban column (more than triple of the depth of the Athenians, twenty-five against eight) enabled them to bear down their enemies by mere superiority of weight and mass. Moreover, the Thebans appear to have been superior to the Athenians in gymnastic training and acquired bodily force, as they were inferior both in speech and in intelligence. The chosen Theban warriors in the front rank were especially superior: but apart from such superiority, if we assume simple equality of individual strength and resolution on both sides,[633] it is plain that when the two opposing columns came into conflict, shield against shield, the comparative force of forward pressure would decide the victory. This motive is sufficient to explain the extraordinary depth of the Theban column, which was increased by Epameinondas, half a century afterwards, at the battle of Leuktra, from a depth of twenty-five men to the still more astonishing depth of fifty: nor need we suspect the correctness of the text, with some critics, or suppose, with others, that the great depth of the Theban files arose from the circumstance that the rear ranks were too poor to provide themselves with armor.[634] Even in a depth of eight, which was that of the Athenian column in the present engagement,[635] and seemingly the usual depth in a battle, the spears of the four rear ranks could hardly have protruded sufficiently beyond the first line to do any mischief. The great use of all the ranks behind the first four, was partly to take the place of such of the foremost lines as might be slain, partly, to push forward the lines before them from behind. The greater the depth of the files, the more irresistible did this propelling force become: hence the Thebans at Delium, as well as at Leuktra, found their account in deepening the column to so remarkable a degree, to which we may fairly presume that their hoplites were trained beforehand.

The Thebans on the right thus pushed back[636] the troops on the left of the Athenian line, who retired at first slowly, and for a short space, maintaining their order unbroken, so that the victory of the Athenians on their own right would have restored the battle, had not Pagondas detached from the rear two squadrons of cavalry; who, wheeling unseen round the hill behind, suddenly appeared to the relief of the Bœotian left, and produced upon the Athenians on that side, already deranged in their ranks by the ardor of pursuit, the intimidating effect of a fresh army arriving to reinforce the Bœotians. And thus, even on the right, the victorious portion of their line, the Athenians lost courage and gave way; while on the left, where they were worsted from the beginning, they found themselves pressed harder and harder by the pursuing Thebans: so that in the end, the whole Athenian army was broken, dispersed, and fled. The garrison of Delium, reinforced by three hundred cavalry, whom

Hippokratês had left there to assail the rear of the Bœotians during the action, either made no vigorous movement, or were repelled by a Bœotian reserve stationed to watch them. Flight having become general among the Athenians, the different parts of their army took different directions: the right sought refuge at Delium, the centre fled to Orôpus, and the left took a direction towards the high lands of Parnês. The pursuit of the Bœotians was vigorous and destructive: they had an efficient cavalry, strengthened by some Lokrian horse who had arrived even during the action: their peltasts also, and their light-armed, would render valuable service against retreating hoplites.[637] Fortunately for the vanquished, the battle had begun very late in the afternoon, leaving no long period of daylight: this important circumstance saved the Athenian army from almost total destruction.[638] As it was, however, the general Hippokratês, together with nearly one thousand hoplites, and a considerable number of light-armed and attendants, were slain; while the loss of the Bœotians, chiefly on their defeated left wing, was rather under five hundred hoplites. Some prisoners[639] seem to have been made, but we hear little about them. Those who had fled to Delium and Orôpus were conveyed back by sea to Athens.

The victors retired to Tanagra, after erecting their trophy, burying their own dead, and despoiling those of their enemies. An abundant booty of arms from the stripped warriors, long remained to decorate the temples of Thebes, and the spoil in other ways is said to have been considerable. Pagondas also resolved to lay siege to the newly-established fortress at Delium: but before commencing operations,—which might perhaps prove tedious, since the Athenians could always reinforce the garrison by sea,—he tried another means of attaining the same object. He despatched to the Athenians a herald, who, happening in his way to meet the Athenian herald, coming to ask the ordinary permission for burial of the slain, warned him that no such request would be entertained until the message of the Bœotian general had first been communicated, and thus induced him to come back to the Athenian commanders. The Bœotian herald was instructed to remonstrate against the violation of holy custom committed by the Athenians in seizing and fortifying the temple of Delium; wherein their garrison was now dwelling, performing numerous functions which religion forbade to be done in a sacred place, and using as their common drink the water especially consecrated to sacrificial purposes. The Bœotians therefore solemnly summoned them in the name of Apollo, and the gods inmates along with him, to evacuate the place, carrying away all that belonged to them: and the herald gave it to be understood, that, unless this summons were complied with, no permission would be granted to bury the dead.

Answer was returned by the Athenian herald, who now went to the Bœotian commanders, to the following effect: "The Athenians did not admit that they had hitherto been guilty of any wrong in reference to the temple, and protested that they would persist in respecting it for the future as much as possible. Their object in taking possession of it had been no evil sentiment towards the holy place, but the necessity of

avenging the repeated invasions of Attica by the Bœotians. Possession of the territory, according to the received maxims of Greece, always carried along with it possession of temples therein situated, under obligation to fulfil all customary obligations to the resident god, as far as circumstances permitted. It was upon this maxim that the Bœotians had themselves acted when they took possession of their present territory, expelling the prior occupants and appropriating the temples: it was upon the same maxim that the Athenians would act in retaining so much of Bœotia as they had now conquered, and in conquering more of it, if they could. Necessity compelled them to use the consecrated water—a necessity not originating in the ambition of Athens, but in prior Bœotian aggressions upon Attica,—a necessity which they trusted that the gods would pardon, since their altars were allowed as a protection to the involuntary offender, and none but he who sinned without constraint experienced their displeasure. The Bœotians were guilty of far greater impiety in refusing to give back the dead, except upon certain conditions connected with the holy ground, than the Athenians, who merely refused to turn the duty of sepulture into an unseemly bargain. Tell us unconditionally (concluded the Athenian herald) that we may bury our dead under truce, pursuant to the maxims of our forefathers. Do not tell us that we may do so on condition of going out of Bœotia, for we are no longer in Bœotia; we are in our own territory, won by the sword."

The Bœotian generals dismissed the herald with a reply short and decisive: "If you are in Bœotia, you may take away all that belongs to you, but only on condition of going out of it. If on the other hand you are in your own territory, you can take your own resolution without asking us."[640]

In this debate, curious as an illustration of Grecian manners and feelings, there seems to have been special pleading and evasion on both sides. The final sentence of the Bœotians was good as a reply to the incidental argument raised by the Athenian herald, who had rested the defence of Athens in regard to the temple of Delium on the allegation that the territory was Athenian, not Bœotian, Athenian by conquest and by the right of the strongest, and had concluded by affirming the same thing about Oropia, the district to which the battle-field belonged. It was only this same argument, of actual superior force, which the Bœotians retorted, when they said: "If the territory to which your application refers is yours by right of conquest (*i. e.* if you are *de facto* masters of it, and are strongest within it), you can of course do what you think best in it: you need not ask any truce at our hands; you can bury your dead without a truce."[641] The Bœotians knew that at this moment the field of battle was under guard by a detachment of their army,[642] and that the Athenians could not obtain the dead bodies without permission; but since the Athenian herald had asserted the reverse as a matter of fact, we can hardly wonder that they resented the production of such an argument; meeting it by a reply sufficiently pertinent in mere diplomatic fencing.

But if the Athenian herald, instead of raising the incidental point of territorial property, combined with an incautious definition of that which constituted territorial property, as a defence against the alleged desecration of the temple of Delium, had confined himself to the main issue, he would have put the Bœotians completely in the wrong. According to principles universally respected in Greece, the victor, if solicited, was held bound to grant to the vanquished a truce for burying his dead; to grant and permit it absolutely, without annexing any conditions. On this, the main point in debate, the Bœotians sinned against the most sacred international law of Greece, when they exacted the evacuation of the temple at Delium as a condition for consenting to permit the burial of the Athenian dead. Ultimately, after they had taken Delium, we shall find that they did grant it unconditionally; and we may doubt whether they would have ever persisted in refusing it, if the Athenian herald had pressed this one important principle separately and exclusively; and if he had not, by an unskilful plea in vindication of the right to occupy and live at Delium, both exasperated their feelings, and furnished them with a collateral issue as a means of evading the main demand.[643]

To judge this curious debate with perfect impartiality, we ought to add, in reference to the conduct of the Athenians in occupying Delium, that for an enemy to make special choice of a temple, as a post to be fortified and occupied, was a proceeding certainly rare, perhaps hardly admissible, in Grecian warfare. Nor does the vindication offered by the Athenian herald meet the real charge preferred. It is one thing for an enemy of superior force to overrun a country, and to appropriate everything within it, sacred as well as profane: it is another thing for a border enemy, not yet in sufficient force for conquering the whole, to convert a temple of convenient site into a regular garrisoned fortress, and make it a base of operations against the neighboring population. On this ground, the Bœotians might reasonably complain of the seizure of Delium: though I apprehend that no impartial interpreter of Grecian international custom would have thought them warranted in attaching it as a condition to their grant of the burial-truce when solicited.

All negotiation being thus broken off, the Bœotian generals prepared to lay siege to Delium, aided by two thousand Corinthian hoplites, together with some Megarians and the late Peloponnesian garrison of Nisæa, who joined after the news of the battle. Though they sent for darters and slingers, probably Œtæans and Ætolians, from the Maliac gulf, yet their direct attacks were at first all repelled by the garrison, aided by an Athenian squadron off the coast, in spite of the hasty and awkward defences by which alone the fort was protected. At length they contrived a singular piece of fire-mechanism, which enabled them to master the place. They first sawed in twain a thick beam, pierced a channel through it long-ways from end to end, coated most part of the channel with iron, and then joined the two halves accurately together. From the farther end of this hollowed beam they suspended by chains a boiler, full of pitch, brimstone, and burning charcoal; lastly, an iron tube projected from the end of

the interior channel of the beam, in a direction so as to come near to the boiler. Such was the machine, which, constructed at some distance, was brought on carts and placed close to the wall, near the palisading and the wooden towers. The Bœotians then applied great bellows to their own end of the beam, blowing violently with a close current of air through the interior channel, so as to raise an intense fire in the boiler at the other end. The wooden portions of the wall, soon catching fire, became untenable for the defenders, who escaped in the best way they could, without attempting farther resistance. Two hundred of them were made prisoners and a few slain; but the greater number got safely on shipboard. This recapture of Delium took place on the seventeenth day after the battle, during all which interval the Athenians slain had remained on the field unburied. Presently, however, arrived the Athenian herald to make fresh application for the burial-truce; which was now forthwith granted, and granted unconditionally.[644]

Such was the memorable expedition and battle of Delium, a fatal discouragement to the feeling of confidence and hope which had previously reigned at Athens, besides the painful immediate loss which it inflicted on the city. Among the hoplites who took part in the vigorous charge and pushing of shields, the philosopher Sokratês is to be numbered. His bravery both in the battle and the retreat was much extolled by his friends, and doubtless with good reason: he had before served with credit in the ranks of the hoplites at Potidæa, and he served also at Amphipolis: his patience under hardship and endurance of heat and cold being not less remarkable than his personal bravery. He and his friend Lachês were among those hoplites, who, in the retreat from Delium, instead of flinging away their arms and taking to flight, kept their ranks, their arms, and their firmness of countenance; insomuch that the pursuing cavalry found it dangerous to meddle with them, and turned to an easier prey in the disarmed fugitives. Alkibiadês also served at Delium in the cavalry, and helped to protect Sokratês in the retreat. The latter was thus exposing his life at Delium nearly at the same time when Aristophanês was exposing him to derision in the comedy of the Clouds, as a dreamer alike morally worthless and physically incapable.[645]

Severe as the blow was which the Athenians suffered at Delium, their disasters in Thrace about the same time, or towards the close of the same summer and autumn, were yet more calamitous. I have already mentioned the circumstances which led to the preparation of a Lacedæmonian force intended to act against the Athenians in Thrace, under Brasidas, in concert with the Chalkidians, revolted subjects of Athens, and with Perdikkas of Macedon. Having frustrated the Athenian designs against Megara (as described above),[646] Brasidas completed the levy of his division,—seventeen hundred hoplites, partly Helots, partly Dorian Peloponnesians,—and conducted them, towards the close of the summer, to the Lacedæmonian colony of Herakleia, in the Trachinian territory near the Maliac gulf. To reach Macedonia and Thrace, it was necessary for him to pass through Thessaly, which was no easy task;

for the war had now lasted so long that every state in Greece had become mistrustful of the transit of armed foreigners. Moreover, the mass of the Thessalian population were decidedly friendly to Athens, nor had he any sufficient means to force a passage: while, should he wait to apply for formal permission, there was much doubt whether it would be granted, and perfect certainty of such delay and publicity as would put the Athenians on their guard. But though such was the temper of the Thessalian people, yet the Thessalian governments, all oligarchical, sympathized with Lacedæmon; and the federal authority or power of the tagus, which bound together the separate cities, was generally very weak. What was of still greater importance, the Macedonian Perdikkas, as well as the Chalkidians, had in every city powerful guests and partisans, whom they prevailed upon to exert themselves actively in forwarding the passage of the army.[647]

To these men Brasidas sent a message at Pharsalus, as soon as he reached Herakleia; and Nikonidas, of Larissa, with other Thessalian friends of Perdikkas, assembling at Melitæa, in Achaia Phthiôtis, undertook to escort him through Thessaly. By their countenance and support, combined with his own boldness, dexterity, and rapid movements, he was enabled to accomplish the seemingly impossible enterprise of running through the country, not only without the consent but against the feeling of its inhabitants, simply by such celerity as to forestall opposition. After traversing Achaia Phthiôtis, a territory dependent on the Thessalians, Brasidas began his march from Melitæa through Thessaly itself, along with his powerful native guides. Notwithstanding all possible secrecy and celerity, his march became so far divulged, that a body of volunteers from the neighborhood, offended at the proceeding, and unfriendly to Nikonidas, assembled to oppose his progress down the valley of the river Enipeus. Reproaching him with wrongful violation of an independent territory, by the introduction of armed forces without permission from the general government, they forbade him to proceed farther. His only chance of making progress lay in disarming their opposition by fair words. His guides excused themselves by saying that the suddenness of his arrival had imposed upon them as his guests the obligation of conducting him through, without waiting to ask for formal permission: to offend their countrymen, however, was the farthest thing from their thoughts and they would renounce the enterprise if the persons now assembled persisted in their requisition. The same conciliatory tone was adopted by Brasidas himself. "He protested his strong feeling of respect and friendship for Thessaly and its inhabitants: his arms were directed against the Athenians, not against them: nor was he aware of any unfriendly relation subsisting between the Thessalians and Lacedæmonians, such as to exclude either of them from the territory of the other. Against the prohibition of the parties now before him, he could not possibly march forward, nor would he think of attempting it; but he put it to their good feeling whether they ought to prohibit him." Such conciliatory language was successful in softening the opponents and inducing them to disperse. But so afraid were his guides of renewed opposition in other parts, that they hurried him forward still more rapidly,[648] and he "passed through the

country at a running pace without halting." Leaving Melitæa in the morning, he reached Pharsalus on the same night, encamping on the river Apidanus: thence he proceeded on the next day to Phakium, and on the day afterwards into Perrhæbia, [649] a territory adjoining to and dependent on Thessaly, under the mountain range of Olympus. Here he was in safety, so that his Thessalian guides left him; while the Perrhæbians conducted him over the pass of Olympus—the same over which the army of Xerxes had marched—to Dium, in Macedonia, in the territory of Perdikkas, on the northern edge of the mountain.[650]

The Athenians were soon apprized of this stolen passage, so ably and rapidly executed, in a manner which few other Greeks, certainly no other Lacedæmonian, would have conceived to be possible. Aware of the new enemy thus brought within reach of their possessions in Thrace, they transmitted orders thither for greater vigilance, and at the same time declared open war against Perdikkas;[651] but unfortunately without sending any efficient force, at the moment when timely defensive intervention was imperiously required. Perdikkas immediately invited Brasidas to join him in the attack of Arrhibæus, prince of the Macedonians, called Lynkestæ, or of Lynkus; a summons which the Spartan could not decline, since Perdikkas provided half of the pay and maintenance of the army,—but which he obeyed with reluctance, anxious as he was to commence operations against the allies of Athens. Such reluctance was still farther strengthened by envoys from the Chalkidians of Thrace, who, as zealous enemies of Athens, joined him forthwith, but discouraged any vigorous efforts to relieve Perdikkas from embarrassing enemies in the interior, in order that the latter might be under more pressing motives to conciliate and assist them. Accordingly Brasidas, though he joined Perdikkas, and marched along with the Macedonian army towards the territory of the Lynkestæ, was not only averse to active military operations, but even entertained with favor propositions from Arrhibæus, wherein the latter expressed his wish to become the ally of Lacedæmon, and offered to refer all his differences with Perdikkas to the arbitration of the Spartan general himself. Communicating these propositions to Perdikkas, Brasidas invited him to listen to an equitable compromise, admitting Arrhibæus into the alliance of Lacedæmon. But Perdikkas indignantly refused: "He had not called in Brasidas as a judge, to decide disputes between him and his enemies, but as an auxiliary, to put them down wherever he might point them out: and he protested against the iniquity of Brasidas in entering into terms with Arrhibæus, while the Lacedæmonian army was half paid and maintained by him," (Perdikkas.[652]) Notwithstanding such remonstrances, and even a hostile protest, Brasidas persisted in his intended conference with Arrhibæus, and was so far satisfied with the propositions made that he withdrew his troops without marching over the pass into Lynkus. Too feeble to act alone, Perdikkas loudly complained, and contracted his allowance for the future so as to provide for only one-third of the army of Brasidas instead of one-half.

To this inconvenience, however, Brasidas submitted, in haste to begin his march into Chalkidikê, and his operations jointly with the Chalkidians, for seducing or subduing the subject-allies of Athens. His first operation was against Akanthus, on the isthmus of the peninsula of Athos, the territory of which he invaded a little before the vintage, probably about the middle of September; when the grapes were ripe, but still out, and the whole crop of course exposed to ruin at the hands of an enemy superior in force: so important was it to Brasidas to have escaped the necessity of wasting another month in conquering the Lynkestæ. There was within the town of Akanthus a party in concert with the Chalkidians, anxious to admit him, and to revolt openly from Athens. But the mass of the citizens were averse to this step: and it was only by dwelling on the terrible loss from exposure of the crop without, that the anti-Athenian party could persuade them even to grant the request of Brasidas to be admitted singly,[653] so as to explain his purposes formally before the public assembly, which would take its own decision afterwards. "For a Lacedæmonian (says Thucydidês) he was no mean speaker:" and if he is to have credit for that which we find written in Thucydidês, such an epithet would be less than his desert. Doubtless, however, the substance of the speech is genuine: and it is one of the most interesting in Grecian history; partly as a manifesto of professed Lacedæmonian policy, partly because it had a great practical effect in determining, on an occasion of paramount importance, a multitude which, though unfavorably inclined to him, was not beyond the reach of argument. I give the chief points of the speech, without binding myself to the words.

"Myself and my soldiers have been sent, Akanthians, to realize the purpose which we proclaimed on beginning the war; that we took arms to liberate Greece from the Athenians. Let no man blame us for having been long in coming, or for the mistake which we made at the outset in supposing that we should quickly put down the Athenians by operations against Attica, without exposing you to any risk. Enough, that we are now here on the first opportunity, resolved to put them down if you will lend us your aid. To find myself shut out of your town, nay, to find that I am not heartily welcomed, astonishes me. We, Lacedæmonians, undertook this long and perilous march, in the belief that we were coming to friends eagerly expecting us; and it would indeed be terrible if you should now disappoint us, and stand out against your own freedom as well as that of other Greeks. Your example, standing high as you do both for prudence and power, will fatally keep back other Greeks, and make them suspect that I am wanting either in power to protect them against Athens, or in honest purpose. Now, in regard to power, my own present army was one which the Athenians, though superior in number, were afraid to fight near Nisæa; nor are they at all likely to send an equal force hither against me by sea. And in regard to my purpose, it is not one of mischief, but of liberation, the Lacedæmonian authorities having pledged themselves to me by the most solemn oaths, that every city which joins me shall retain its autonomy. You have therefore the best assurance both as to my purposes and as to my power; still less need you apprehend

that I am come with factious designs, to serve the views of any particular men among you, and to remodel your established constitution to the disadvantage either of the many or of the few. That would be worse than foreign subjugation, so that we Lacedæmonians should be taking all this trouble to earn hatred instead of gratitude. We should play the part of unworthy traitors, worse even than that high-handed oppression of which we accuse the Athenians: we should at once violate our oaths and sin against our strongest political interests. Perhaps you may say, that though you wish me well, you desire for your parts to be let alone, and to stand aloof from a dangerous struggle. You will tell me to carry my propositions elsewhere, to those who can safely embrace them, but not to thrust my alliance upon any people against their own will. If this should be your language, I shall first call your local gods and heroes to witness that I have come to you with a mission of good, and have employed persuasion in vain; I shall then proceed to ravage your territory and extort your consent, thinking myself justly entitled to do so, on two grounds. First, that the Lacedæmonians may not sustain actual damage from these good wishes which you profess towards me without actually joining,—damage in the shape of that tribute which you annually send to Athens. Next, that the Greeks generally may not be prevented by you from becoming free. It is only on the ground of common good, that we Lacedæmonians can justify ourselves for liberating any city against its own will; but as we are conscious of desiring only extinction of the empire of others, not acquisition of empire for ourselves, we should fail in our duty if we suffered you to obstruct that liberation which we are now carrying to all. Consider well my words, then: take to yourselves the glory of beginning the era of emancipation for Greece, save your own properties from damage, and attach an ever-honorable name to the community of Akanthus."[654]

Nothing could be more plausible or judicious than this language of Brasidas to the Akanthians, nor had they any means of detecting the falsity of the assertion, which he afterwards repeated in other places besides,[655] that he had braved the forces of Athens at Nisæa with the same army as that now on the outside of the walls. Perhaps the simplicity of his speech and manner may even have lent strength to his assurances. As soon as he had retired, the subject was largely discussed in the assembly, with much difference of opinion among the speakers, and perfect freedom on both sides: and the decision, not called for until after a long debate, was determined partly by the fair promises of Brasidas, partly by the certain loss which the ruin of the vine-crop would entail. The votes of the citizens present being taken secretly, a majority resolved to accede to the propositions of Brasidas and revolt from Athens.[656] Exacting the renewal of his pledge and that of the Lacedæmonian authorities, for the preservation of full autonomy to every city which should join him, they received his army into the town. The neighboring city of Stageirus, a colony of Andros, as Akanthus also was, soon followed the example.[657]

There are few acts in history wherein Grecian political reason and morality appear to greater advantage than in this proceeding of the Akanthians. The habit of fair, free, and pacific discussion; the established respect to the vote of the majority; the care to protect individual independence of judgment by secret suffrage; the deliberate estimate of reasons on both sides by each individual citizen, all these main laws and conditions of healthy political action appear as a part of the confirmed character of the Akanthians. We shall not find Brasidas entering other towns in a way so creditable or so harmonious.

But there is another inference which the scene just described irresistibly suggests. It affords the clearest proof that the Akanthians had little to complain of as subject-allies of Athens, and that they would have continued in that capacity, if left to their own choice, without the fear of having their crop destroyed. Such is the pronounced feeling of the mass of the citizens: the party who desire otherwise are in a decided minority. It is only the combined effect of severe impending loss, and of tempting assurances held out by the worthiest representative whom Sparta ever sent out, which induces them to revolt from Athens: nor even then is the resolution taken without long opposition, and a large dissentient minority, in a case where secret suffrage insured free and genuine expression of preference from every individual. Now, it is impossible that the scene in Akanthus at this critical moment could have been of such a character, had the empire of Athens been practically odious and burdensome to the subject-allies, as it is commonly depicted. Had such been the fact; had the Akanthians felt that the imperial ascendency of Athens oppressed them with hardship or humiliation, from which their neighbors, the revolted Chalkidians in Olynthus and elsewhere, were exempt, they would have hailed the advent of Brasidas with that cordiality which he himself expected and was surprised not to find. The sense of present grievance, always acute and often excessive, would have stood out as their prominent impulse: nor would they have needed either intimidation or cajolery to induce them to throw open their gates to the liberator, who, in his speech within the town, finds no actual suffering to appeal to, but is obliged to gain over an audience evidently unwilling by alternate threats and promises.

As in Akanthus, so in most of the other Thracian subjects of Athens, the bulk of the citizens, though strongly solicited by the Chalkidians, manifest no spontaneous disposition to revolt from Athens. We shall find the party who introduce Brasidas to be a conspiring minority, who not only do not consult the majority beforehand, but act in such a manner as to leave no free option to the majority afterwards, whether they will ratify or reject: bring in a foreign force to overawe them and compromise them without their own consent in hostility against Athens. Now that which makes the events of Akanthus so important as an evidence, is, that the majority is not thus entrapped and compressed, but pronounces its judgment freely after ample discussion: the grounds of that judgment are clearly set forth to us, so as to show that hatred of Athens, if even it exists at all, is in no way a strong or determining feeling.

Had there existed any such strong feeling among the subject-allies of Athens in the Chalkidic peninsula, there was no Athenian force now present to hinder them all from opening their gates to the liberator Brasidas by spontaneous majorities, as he himself, encouraged by the sanguine promises of the Chalkidians, evidently expected that they would do. But nothing of this kind happened.

That which I before remarked in recounting the revolt of Mitylênê, a privileged ally of Athens, is now confirmed in the revolt of Akanthus, a tributary and subject-ally. The circumstances of both prove that imperial Athens inspired no hatred, and occasioned no painful grievance, to the population of her subject-cities generally: the movements against her arose from party-minorities, of the same character as that Platæan party which introduced the Theban assailants into Platæa at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war. There are of course differences of sentiment between one town and another; but the conduct of the towns generally demonstrates that the Athenian empire was not felt by them to be a scheme of plunder and oppression, as Mr. Mitford and others would have us believe. It is indeed true that Athens managed her empire with reference to her own feelings and interests, and that her hold was rather upon the prudence than upon the affection of her allies, except in so far as those among them who were democratically governed sympathized with her democracy: it is also true that restrictions in any form on the autonomy of each separate city were offensive to the political instincts of the Greeks: moreover, Athens took less and less pains to disguise or soften the real character of her empire, as one resting simply on established fact and superior force. But this is a different thing from the endurance of practical hardship and oppression, which, had it been real, would have inspired strong positive hatred among the subject-allies, such as Brasidas expected to find universal in Thrace, but did not really find, in spite of the easy opening which his presence afforded.

The acquisition of Akanthus and Stageirus enabled Brasidas in no very long time to extend his conquests; to enter Argilus, and from thence to make the capital acquisition of Amphipolis.

Argilus was situated between Stageirus and the river Strymon, along the western bank of which river its territory extended. Along the eastern bank of the same river, —south of the lake which it forms under the name of Kerkinitis, and north of the town of Eion at its mouth, was situated the town and territory of Amphipolis, communicating with the lands of Argilus by the important bridge there situated. The Argilians were colonists from Andros, like Akanthus and Stageirus, and the adhesion of those two cities to Brasidas gave him opportunity to cultivate intelligences in Argilus, wherein there had existed a standing discontent against Athens, ever since the foundation of the neighboring city of Amphipolis.[658] The latter city had been established by the Athenian Agnon, at the head of a numerous body of colonists, on a spot belonging to the Edonian Thracians, called Ennea Hodoi, or Nine Ways, about five years prior to the commencement of the war (B.C. 437), after two previous at-

tempts to colonize it,—one by Histiæus and Aristagoras, at the period of the Ionic revolt, and a second by the Athenians about 465 B.C., both of which lamentably failed. So valuable, however, was the site, from its vicinity to the gold and silver mines near Mount Pangæus and to large forests of ship-timber, as well as for command of the Strymon, and for commerce with the interior of Thrace and Macedonia, that the Athenians had sent a second expedition under Agnon, who founded the city and gave it the name of Amphipolis. The resident settlers there, however, were only in small proportion Athenian citizens; the rest of mixed origin, some of them Argilian, a considerable number Chalkidians. The Athenian general Euklês was governor in the town, though seemingly with no paid force under his command.

Among these mixed inhabitants a conspiracy was organized to betray the town to Brasidas, the inhabitants of Argilus as well as the Chalkidians each of them tampering with those of the same race who resided in Amphipolis; and the influence of Perdikkas, not inconsiderable, in consequence of the commerce of the place with Macedonia, was employed to increase the number of partisans. Of all the instigators, however, the most strenuous as well as the most useful were the inhabitants of Argilus. Amphipolis, together with the Athenians as its founders, had been odious to them from its commencement; and its foundation had doubtless abridged their commerce and importance as masters of the lower course of the Strymon. They had been long laying snares against the city, and the arrival of Brasidas now presented to them an unexpected chance of success. It was they who enabled him to accomplish the surprise, deferring proclamation of their own defection from Athens until they could make it subservient to his conquest of Amphipolis.

Starting with his army from Arnê in the Chalkidic peninsula, Brasidas arrived in the afternoon at Aulon and Bromiskus, near the channel whereby the lake Bolbê is connected with the sea: from hence, after his men had supped, he began his night-march to Amphipolis, on a cold and snowy night of November, or the beginning of December. He reached Argilus in the middle of the night, where the leaders at once admitted him, proclaiming their revolt from Athens. With their aid and guidance, he then hastened forward without delay to the bridge across the Strymon, which he reached before break of day.[659] It was guarded only by a feeble piquet,—the town of Amphipolis itself being situated on the hill at some little distance higher up the river;[660] so that Brasidas, preceded by the Argilian conspirators, surprised and overpowered the guard without difficulty. Thus master of this important communication, he crossed with his army forthwith into the territory of Amphipolis, where his arrival spread the utmost dismay and terror. The governor Euklês, the magistrates, and the citizens, were all found wholly unprepared: the lands belonging to the city were occupied by residents, with their families and property around them, calculating upon undisturbed security, as if there had been no enemy within reach. Such of these as were close to the city succeeded in running thither with their families, though leaving their property exposed,—but the more distant became in person as well as in prop-

erty at the mercy of the invader. Even within the town, filled with the friends and relatives of these victims without, indescribable confusion reigned, of which the conspirators within tried to avail themselves in order to get the gates thrown open. And so complete was the disorganization, that if Brasidas had marched up without delay to the gates and assaulted the town, many persons supposed that he would have carried it at once. Such a risk, however, was too great even for his boldness, the rather as repulse would have been probably his ruin. Moreover, confiding in the assurances of the conspirators that the gates would be thrown open, he thought it safer to seize as many persons as he could from the out-citizens, as a means of working upon the sentiments of those within the walls; lastly, this process of seizure and plunder was probably more to the taste of his own soldiers, and could not well be hindered.

But he waited in vain for the opening of the gates. The conspirators in the city, in spite of the complete success of their surprise and the universal dismay around them, found themselves unable to carry the majority along with them. As in Akanthus, so in Amphipolis, those who really hated Athens and wished to revolt were only a party-minority; the greater number of citizens, at this critical moment, stood by Euklês and the few native Athenians around him in resolving upon defence, and in sending off an express to Thucydidês (the historian) at Thasos, the colleague of Euklês, as general in the region of Thrace, for immediate aid. This step, of course immediately communicated to Brasidas from within, determined him to make every effort for enticing the Amphipolitans to surrender before the reinforcement should arrive; the rather, as he was apprized that Thucydidês, being a large proprietor and worker of gold mines in the neighboring region, possessed extensive personal influence among the Thracian tribes, and would be able to bring them together for the relief of the place, in conjunction with his own Athenian squadron. He therefore sent in propositions for surrender on the most favorable terms, guaranteeing to every citizen who chose to remain, Amphipolitan or even Athenian, continued residence with undisturbed property and equal political rights, and granting to every one who chose to depart, five days for the purpose of carrying away his property.

Such easy conditions, when made known in the city, produced presently a sensible change of opinion among the citizens, proving acceptable both to Athenians and Amphipolitans, though on different grounds.[661] The properties of the citizens without, as well as many of their relatives, were all in the hands of Brasidas: no one counted upon the speedy arrival of reinforcement; and even if it did arrive, the city might be preserved, but the citizens without would still be either slain or made captive: a murderous battle would ensue, and perhaps, after all, Brasidas, assisted by the party within, might prove victorious. The Athenian citizens in Amphipolis, knowing themselves to be exposed to peculiar danger, were perfectly well pleased with his offer, as extricating them from a critical position and procuring for them the means of escape, with comparatively little loss; while the non-Athenian citizens, partakers in

the same relief from peril, felt little reluctance in accepting a capitulation which preserved both their rights and their properties inviolate, and merely severed them from Athens, towards which city they felt, not hatred, but indifference. Above all, the friends and relatives of the citizens exposed in the out-region were strenuous in urging on the capitulation, so that the conspirators soon became bold enough to proclaim themselves openly, insisting upon the moderation of Brasidas and the prudence of admitting him. Euklês found that the tone of opinion, even among his own Athenians, was gradually turned against him, nor could he prevent the acceptance of the terms, and the admission of the enemy into the city, on that same day.

No such resolution would have been adopted, had the citizens been aware how near at hand Thucydidês and his forces were. The message despatched early in the morning from Amphipolis found him at Thasos with seven triremes; with which he instantly put to sea, so as to reach Eion at the mouth of the Strymon, within three miles of Amphipolis, on the same evening. He hoped to be in time for saving Amphipolis, but the place had surrendered a few hours before. He arrived, indeed, only just in time to preserve Eion; for parties in that town were already beginning to concert the admission of Brasidas, who would probably have entered it at daybreak the next morning. Thucydidês, putting the place in a condition of defence, successfully repelled an attack which Brasidas made both by land and by boats on the river. He at the same time received and provided for the Athenian citizens who were retiring from Amphipolis.[662]

The capture of this city, perhaps the most important of all the foreign possessions of Athens, and the opening of the bridge over the Strymon, by which even all her eastern allies became approachable by land, occasioned prodigious emotion throughout all the Grecian world. The dismay felt at Athens[663] was greater than had been ever before experienced: hope and joy prevailed among her enemies, and excitement and new aspirations became widely spread among her subject-allies. The bloody defeat at Delium, and the unexpected conquests of Brasidas, now again lowered the *prestige* of Athenian success, sixteen months after it had been so powerfully exalted by the capture of Sphakteria. The loss of reputation which Sparta had then incurred, was now compensated by a reaction against the unfounded terrors since conceived about the probable career of her enemy. It was not merely the loss of Amphipolis, serious as that was, which distressed the Athenians, but also their insecurity respecting the maintenance of their whole empire: they knew not which of their subject-allies might next revolt, in contemplation of aid from Brasidas, facilitated by the newly-acquired Strymonian bridge. And as the proceedings of that general counted in part to the credit of his country, it was believed that Sparta, now for the first time shaking off her languor,[664] had taken to herself the rapidity and enterprise once regarded as the exclusive characteristic of Athens. But besides all these chances of evil to the Athenians, there was another yet more threatening, the personal ascendency and position of Brasidas himself. It was not merely the boldness, the fertility of ag-

gressive resource, the quick movements, the power of stimulating the minds of soldiers, which lent efficiency to that general; but also his incorruptible probity, his good faith, his moderation, his abstinence from party-cruelty or jobbing, and from all intermeddling with the internal constitutions of the different cities, in strict adherence to that manifesto whereby Sparta had proclaimed herself the liberator of Greece. Such talents and such official worth had never before been seen combined. Set off as they were by the full brilliancy of successes such as were deemed incredible before they actually occurred, they inspired a degree of confidence and turned a tide of opinion towards this eminent man which rendered him personally one of the first powers in Greece. Numerous solicitations were transmitted to him at Amphipolis from parties among the subject-allies of Athens, in their present temper of large hopes from him and diminished fear of the Athenians: the anti-Athenian party in each was impatient to revolt, the rest of the population less restrained by fear.[665]

Of those who indulged in these sanguine calculations, many had yet to learn by painful experience that Athens was still but little abated in power: but her inaction during this important autumn had been such as may well explain their mistake. It might have been anticipated that, on hearing the alarming news of the junction of Brasidas with the Chalkidians, and Perdikkas so close upon their dependent allies, they would forthwith have sent a competent force to Thrace, which, if despatched at that time, would probably have obviated all the subsequent disasters. So they would have acted at any other time, and perhaps even then, if Periklês had been alive. But the news arrived just at the period when Athens was engaged in the expedition against Bœotia, which ended very shortly in the ruinous defeat of Delium. Under the discouragement arising from the death of the stratêgus, Hippokratês, and one thousand citizens, the idea of a fresh expedition to Thrace would probably have been intolerable to Athenian hoplites: the hardships of a winter service in Thrace, as experienced a few years before in the blockade of Potidæa, would probably also aggravate their reluctance. In Grecian history, we must steadfastly keep in mind that we are reading about citizen soldiers, not about professional soldiers; and that the temper of the time, whether of confidence or dismay, modifies to an unspeakable degree all the calculations of military and political prudence. Even after the rapid successes of Brasidas, not merely at Akanthus and Stageirus, but even at Amphipolis, they sent only a few inadequate guards[666] to the points most threatened, thus leaving to their enterprising enemy the whole remaining winter for his operations, without hindrance. Without depreciating the merits of Brasidas, we may see that his extraordinary success was in great part owing to the no less extraordinary depression which at that time pervaded the Athenian public: a feeling encouraged by Nikias and other leading men of the same party, who were building upon it in order to get the Lacedæmonian proposals for peace accepted.

But while we thus notice the short-comings of Athens, in not sending timely forces against Brasidas, we must at the same time admit, that the most serious and

irreparable loss which she sustained, that of Amphipolis, was the fault of her officers more than her own. Euklês, and the historian Thucydidês, the two joint Athenian commanders in Thrace, to whom she had confided the defence of that important town, had means amply sufficient to place it beyond all risk of capture, if they had employed the most ordinary vigilance and precaution beforehand. That Thucydidês became an exile immediately after this event, and remained so for twenty years, is certain from his own statement: and we hear, upon what in this case is quite sufficient authority, that the Athenians condemned him, probably Euklês also, to banishment, on the proposition of Kleon.[667]

In considering this sentence, historians[668] commonly treat Thucydidês as an innocent man, and find nothing to condemn except the calumnies of the demagogue along with the injustice of the people. But this view of the case cannot be sustained, when we bring together all the facts even as indicated by Thucydidês himself. At the moment when Brasidas surprised Amphipolis, Thucydidês was at Thasos; and the event is always discussed as if he was there by necessity or duty; as if Thasos was his special mission. Now we know from his own statement that his command was not special or confined to Thasos: he was sent as joint commander along with Euklês generally to Thrace, and especially to Amphipolis.[669] Both of them were jointly and severally responsible for the proper defence of Amphipolis, with the Athenian empire and interests in that quarter such nomination of two or more officers, coördinate and jointly responsible, being the usual habit of Athens, wherever the scale or the area of military operations was considerable, instead of naming one supreme responsible commander, with subordinate officers acting under him and responsible to him. If, then, Thucydidês "was stationed at Thasos," to use the phrase of Dr. Thirlwall, this was because he chose to station himself there, in the exercise of his own discretion.

Accordingly, the question which we have to put is, not whether Thucydidês did all that could be done, after he received the alarming express at Thasos, which is the part of the case that *he* sets prominently before us, but whether he and Euklês jointly took the best general measures for the security of the Athenian empire in Thrace; especially for Amphipolis, the first jewel of her empire. They suffer Athens to be robbed of that jewel, and how? Had they a difficult position to defend? Were they overwhelmed by a superior force? Were they distracted by simultaneous revolts in different places, or assailed by enemies unknown or unforeseen? Not one of these grounds for acquittal can be pleaded. First, their position was of all others the most defensible: they had only to keep the bridge over the Strymon adequately watched and guarded, or to retain the Athenian squadron at Eion, and Amphipolis was safe. Either one or the other of these precautions would have sufficed; both together would have sufficed so amply, as probably to prevent the scheme of attack from being formed. Next, the force under Brasidas was in noway superior, not even adequate to the capture of the inferior place Eion, when properly guarded, much less to that of Amphipolis. Lastly, there were no simultaneous revolts to distract attention, nor un-

known enemies to confound a well-laid scheme of defence. There was but one enemy, in one quarter, having one road by which to approach; an enemy of surpassing merit, indeed, and eminently dangerous to Athens, but without any chance of success except from the omissions of the Athenian officers.

Now Thucydidês and Euklês both knew that Brasidas had prevailed upon Akanthus and Stageirus to revolt, and that too in such a way as to extend his own personal influence materially: they knew that the population of Argilus was of Andrian origin,[670] like that of Akanthus and Stageirus, and therefore peculiarly likely to be tempted by the example of those two towns. Lastly, they knew, and Thucydidês himself tells us,[671] that this Argilian population—whose territory bordered on the Strymon and the western foot of the bridge, and who had many connections in Amphipolis—had been long disaffected to Athens, and especially to the Athenian possession of that city. Yet, having such foreknowledge, ample warning for the necessity of a vigilant defence, Thucydidês and Euklês withdraw, or omit, both the two precautions upon which the security of Amphipolis rested; precautions both of them obvious, either of them sufficient. The one leaves the bridge under a feeble guard,[672] and is caught so unprepared everywhere, that one might suppose Athens to be in profound peace; the other is found with his squadron, not at Eion, but at Thasos; an island out of all possible danger, either from Brasidas, who had no ships, or any other enemy. The arrival of Brasidas comes on both of them like a clap of thunder. Nothing more is required than this plain fact, under the circumstances, to prove their improvidence as commanders.

The presence of Thucydidês on the station of Thrace was important to Athens, partly because he possessed valuable family connections, mining property, and commanding influence among the continental population round Amphipolis.[673] This was one main reason why he was named; the Athenian people confiding partly in his private influence, over and above the public force under his command, and looking to him, even more than to his colleague Euklês, for the continued security of the town: instead of which they find that not even their own squadron under him is at hand near the vulnerable point, at the moment when the enemy comes. Of the two, perhaps, the conduct of Euklês admits of conceivable explanation more easily than that of Thucydidês. For it seems that Euklês had no paid force in Amphipolis; only the citizen hoplites, partly Athenian, partly of other lineage. Doubtless, these men found it irksome to keep guard through the winter on the Strymonian bridge: and Euklês might fancy that, by enforcing a large perpetual guard, he ran the risk of making Athens unpopular: moreover, strict constancy of watch, night after night, when no actual danger comes, with an unpaid citizen force, is not easy to maintain. This is an insufficient excuse, but it is better than anything which can be offered on behalf of Thucydidês; who had with him a paid Athenian force, and might just as well have kept it at Eion as at Thasos. We may be sure that the absence of Thucydidês with his

fleet, at Thasos, was one essential condition in the plot laid by Brasidas with the Argilians.

To say, with Dr. Thirlwall, that "human prudence and activity could not have accomplished more than Thucydidês did, *under the same circumstances*," is true as matter of fact, and creditable as far as it goes. But it is wholly inadmissible as a justification, and meets only one part of the case. An officer in command is responsible, not only for doing most "under the circumstances," but also for the circumstances themselves, in so far as they are under his control; and nothing is more under his control than the position which he chooses to occupy. If the emperor Napoleon, or the duke of Wellington, had lost, by surprise of an enemy not very numerous, a post of supreme importance which they thought adequately protected, would they be satisfied to hear from a responsible officer in command: "Having no idea that the enemy would attempt any surprise, I thought that I might keep my force half a day's journey off from the post exposed, at another post which it was physically impossible for the enemy to reach; but, the moment I was informed that the surprise had occurred, I hastened to the scene, did all that human prudence and activity could do to repel the enemy; and though I found that he had already mastered the capital post of all, yet I beat him back from a second post which he was on the point of mastering also?" Does any one imagine that these illustrious chiefs, smarting under the loss of an inestimable position which alters the whole prospects of a campaign, would be satisfied with such a report, and would dismiss the officer with praises for his vigor and bravery, "under the circumstances?" They would most assuredly reply, that he had done right in coming back, that his conduct after coming back had been that of a brave man, and that there was no impeachment on his courage. But they would at the same time add, that his want of judgment and foresight, in omitting to place the valuable position really exposed under sufficient guard beforehand, and leaving it thus open to the enemy, while he himself was absent in another place which was out of danger, and his easy faith that there would be no dangerous surprise, at a time when the character of the enemy's officer, as well as the disaffection of the neighbors (Argilus), plainly indicated that there *would* be, if the least opening were afforded, that these were defects meriting serious reproof, and disqualifying him from any future command of trust and responsibility. Nor can we doubt that the whole feeling of the respective armies, who would have to pay with their best blood the unhappy miscalculation of this officer, would go along with such a sentence; without at all suspecting themselves to be guilty of injustice, or of "directing the irritation produced by the loss against an innocent object."

The vehement leather-seller in the Pnyx, at Athens, when he brought forward what are called "his calumnies" against Thucydidês and Euklês, as having caused, through culpable omission, a fatal and irreparable loss to their country, might perhaps state his case with greater loudness and acrimony; but it may be doubted whether he would say anything more really galling than would be contained in the

dignified rebuke of an esteemed modern general to a subordinate officer under similar circumstances. In my judgment, not only the accusation against these two officers—I assume Euklês to have been included—was called for on the fairest *presumptive* grounds, which would be sufficient as a justification of the leather-sell Kleon, but the positive verdict of guilty against them was fully merited. Whether the banishment inflicted was a greater penalty than the case warranted, I will not take upon me to pronounce. Every age has its own standard of feeling for measuring what is a proper intensity of punishment: penalties which our grandfathers thought right and meet, would in the present day appear intolerably rigorous. But when I consider the immense value of Amphipolis to Athens, combined with the conduct whereby it was lost, I cannot think that there was a single Athenian, or a single Greek, who would deem the penalty of banishment too severe.

It is painful to find such strong grounds of official censure against a man who, as an historian, has earned the lasting admiration of posterity,—my own, among the first and warmest. But in criticizing the conduct of Thucydidês the officer, we are bound in common justice to forget Thucydidês the historian. He was not known in the latter character, at the time when this sentence was passed: perhaps he never would have been so known, like the Neapolitan historian Colletta, if exile had not thrown him out of the active duties and hopes of a citizen. It may be doubted whether he ever went home from Eion to encounter the grief, wrath, and alarm, so strongly felt at Athens after the loss of Amphipolis. Condemned, either with or without appearance, he remained in banishment for twenty years;[674] nor did he return to Athens until after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war. Of this long exile, much is said to have been spent on his property in Thrace: yet he also visited most parts of Greece, enemies of Athens as well as neutral states. However much we may deplore such a misfortune on his account, mankind in general have, and ever will have, the strongest reason to rejoice at it. To this compulsory leisure we owe the completion, or rather the near approach to completion, of his history: nor is it less certain that the opportunities which an exile enjoyed of personally consulting neutrals and enemies, contributed much to form that impartial, comprehensive, Pan-Hellenic spirit, which reigns generally throughout his immortal work.

Meanwhile, Brasidas, installed in Amphipolis about the beginning of December, 424 B.C., employed his increased power only the more vigorously against Athens. His first care was to reconstitute Amphipolis; a task wherein the Macedonian Perdikkas, whose intrigues had contributed to the capture, came and personally assisted. That city was going through a partial secession and renovation of inhabitants, and was now moreover cut off from the port of Eion and the mouth of the river, which remained in the hands of the Athenians. Many new arrangements must have been required, as well for its internal polity as for its external defence. Brasidas took measures for building ships of war, in the lake above the city, in order to force the lower part of the river:[675] but his most important step was to construct a palisade work,

[676] connecting the walls of the city with the bridge. He thus made himself permanently master of the crossing of the Strymon, so as to shut the door by which he himself had entered, and at the same time to keep an easy communication with Argilus and the western bank of the Strymon. He also made some acquisitions on the eastern side of the river. Pittakus, prince of the neighboring Edonian-Thracian township of Myrkinus, had been recently assassinated by his wife Brauro, and by some personal enemies: he had probably been the ally of Athens, and his assassins now sought to strengthen themselves by courting the alliance of the new conqueror of Amphipolis. The Thasian continental colonies of Galêpsus and Œsymê also declared their adhesion to him.

While he sent to Lacedæmon, communicating his excellent position as well as his large hopes, he at the same time, without waiting for the answer, began acting for himself, with all the allies whom he could get together. He marched first against the peninsula called Aktê,—the narrow tongue of land which stretches out from the neighborhood of Akanthus to the mighty headland called Mount Athos,—near thirty miles long, and between four and five miles for the most part in breadth.[677] The long, rugged, woody ridge,—covering this peninsula so as to leave but narrow spaces for dwelling or cultivation, or feeding of cattle,—was at this time occupied by many distinct petty communities, some of them divided in race and language. Sanê, a colony from Andros, was situated in the interior gulf, called the Singitic gulf, between Athos and the Sithonian peninsula, near the Xerxeian canal: the rest of the Aktê was distributed among Bisaltians, Krestônians, and Edonians, all fractions of the Thracian name; Pelasgians, or Tyrrhenians, of the race which had once occupied Lemnos and Imbros, and some Chalkidians. Some of these little communities spoke habitually two languages. Thyssus, Kleône, Olophyxus, and others, all submitted on the arrival of Brasidas; but Sanê and Dion held out, nor could he bring them to terms even by ravaging their territory.

He next marched into the Sithonian peninsula, to attack Torônê, situated near the southern extremity of that peninsula, opposite to Cape Kanastræum, the extreme headland of the peninsula of Pallênê.[678]

Torônê was inhabited by a Chalkidic population, but had not partaken in the revolt of the neighboring Chalkidians against Athens. A small Athenian garrison had been sent there, probably since the recent dangers, and were now defending it, as well as repairing the town-wall in various parts where it had been so neglected as to crumble down. They occupied as a sort of distinct citadel the outlying cape called Lêkythus, joining by a narrow isthmus the hill on which the city stood, and forming a port wherein lay two Athenian triremes as guard-ships. A small party in Torônê, without privity[679] or even suspicion of the rest, entered into correspondence with Brasidas, and engaged to provide for him the means of entering and mastering the town. Accordingly, he advanced by a night-march to the temple of the Dioskuri, Kastor and Pollux, within about a quarter of a mile of the town-gates, which he reached a little

before daybreak, sending forward one hundred peltasts to be still nearer, and to rush upon the gate at the instant when signal was made from within. His Torônæan partisans, some of whom were already concealed on the spot, awaiting his arrival, made their final arrangements with him, and then returned into the town, conducting with them seven determined men from his army, armed only with daggers, and having Lysistratus of Olynthus as their chief: twenty men had been originally named for this service, but the danger appeared so extreme, that only seven of them were bold enough to go. This forlorn hope, enabled to creep in, through a small aperture in the wall towards the sea, were conducted silently up to the topmost watch-tower on the city hill, where they surprised and slew the guards, and set open a neighboring postern gate, looking towards Cape Kanastræum, as well as the great gate leading towards the agora. They then brought in the peltasts from without, who, impatient with the delay, had gradually stolen closely under the walls: some of these peltasts kept possession of the great gate, others were led round to the postern at the top, while the fire-signal was forthwith lighted to invite Brasidas himself. He and his men hastened forward towards the city at their utmost speed and with loud shouts, a terror-striking notice of his presence to the unprepared citizens. Admission was easy through the open gates, but some also clambered up by means of beams or a sort of scaffolding, which was lying close to the wall as a help to the workmen repairing it. And while the assailants were thus active in every direction, Brasidas himself conducted a portion of them, to assure himself of the high and commanding parts of the city.

So completely were the Torônæans surprised and thunderstruck, that hardly any attempt was made to resist. Even the fifty Athenian hoplites who occupied the agora, being found still asleep, were partly slain, and partly compelled to seek refuge in the separately-garrisoned cape of Lêkythus, whither they were followed by a portion of the Torônæan population; some from attachment to Athens, others from sheer terror. To these fugitives Brasidas addressed a proclamation, inviting them to return, and promising them perfect security, for person, property, and political rights; while at the same time he sent a herald with a formal summons to the Athenians in Lêkythus, requiring them to quit the place as belonging to the Chalkidians, but permitting them to carry away their property. They refused to evacuate the place, but solicited a truce of one day for the purpose of burying their slain. Brasidas granted them two days, which were employed both by them and by him in preparations for the defence and attack of Lêkythus; each party fortifying the houses on or near the connecting isthmus.

In the mean time he convened a general assembly of the Torônæan population, whom he addressed in the same conciliating and equitable language as he had employed elsewhere. "He had not come to harm either the city, or any individual citizen. Those who had let him in, ought not to be regarded as bad men or traitors, for they had acted with a view to the benefit and the liberation of their city, not in order to

enslave it, or to acquire profit for themselves. On the other hand, he did not think the worse of those who had gone over to Lêkythus, for their liking towards Athens: he wished them to come back freely; and he was sure that the more they knew the Lacedæmonians the better they would esteem them. He was prepared to forgive and forget previous hostility, but while he invited all of them to live for the future as cordial friends and fellow-citizens, he should also for the future hold each man responsible for his conduct, either as friend or as enemy."

On the expiration of the two days' truce, Brasidas attacked the Athenian garrison in Lêkythus, promising a recompense of thirty minæ to the soldier who should first force his way into it. Notwithstanding very poor means of defence, partly a wooden palisade, partly houses with battlements on the roof, this garrison repelled him for one whole day: on the next morning he brought up a machine, for the same purpose as that which the Bœotians had employed at Delium, to set fire to the woodwork. The Athenians on their side, seeing this fire-machine approaching, put up, on a building in front of their position, a wooden scaffolding, upon which many of them mounted, with casks of water and large stones to break it or to extinguish the flames. At last, the weight accumulated becoming greater than the scaffolding could support, it broke down with a prodigious noise; so that all the persons and things upon it rolled down in confusion. Some of these men were hurt, yet the injury was not in reality serious; had not the noise, the cries, and strangeness of the incident alarmed those behind, who could not see precisely what had occurred, to such a degree, that they believed the enemy to have already forced the defences. Many of them accordingly took to flight, and those who remained were insufficient to prolong the resistance successfully; so that Brasidas, perceiving the disorder and diminished number of the defenders, relinquished his fire-machine, and again renewed his attempt to carry the place by assault, which now fully succeeded. A considerable proportion of the Athenians and others in the fort escaped across the narrow gulf to the peninsula of Pallênê, by means of the two triremes and some merchant-vessels at hand: but every man found in it was put to death. Brasidas, thus master of the fort, and considering that he owed his success to the sudden rupture of the Athenian scaffolding, regarded this incident as a divine interposition, and presented the thirty minæ, which he had promised as a reward to the first man who broke in, to the goddess Athênê, for her temple at Lêkythus. He moreover consecrated to her the entire cape of Lêkythus; not only demolishing the defences, but also dismantling the private residences which it contained,[680] so that nothing remained except the temple, with its ministers and appurtenances.

What proportion of the Torônæans who had taken refuge at Lêkythus had been induced to return by the proclamation of Brasidas, alike generous and politic, we are not informed. His language and conduct were admirably calculated to set this little community again in harmonious movement, and to obliterate the memory of past feuds. And above all, it inspired a strong sentiment of attachment and gratitude to-

wards himself personally; a sentiment which gained strength with every successive incident in which he was engaged, and which enabled him to exercise a greater ascendency than could ever be acquired by Sparta, and in some respects greater than had ever been possessed by Athens. It is this remarkable development of commanding individuality, animated throughout by straightforward public purposes, and binding together so many little communities who had few other feelings in common, which lends to the short career of this eminent man a romantic and even an heroic interest.

During the remainder of the winter Brasidas employed himself in setting in order the acquisitions already made, and in laying plans for farther conquests in the spring. [681] But the beginning of spring—or the close of the eighth year, and beginning of the ninth year of the war, as Thucydidês reckons—brought with it a new train of events, which will be recounted in the following chapter.

CHAPTER LIV.

TRUCE FOR ONE YEAR.—RENEWAL OF WAR AND BATTLE OF AMPHIPOLIS.—PEACE OF NIKIAS.

THE eighth year of the war, described in the last chapter, had opened with sanguine hopes for Athens, and with dark promise for Sparta, chiefly in consequence of the memorable capture of Sphakteria towards the end of the preceding summer. It included, not to mention other events, two considerable and important enterprises on the part of Athens, against Megara and against Bœotia; the former plan, partially successful, the latter, not merely unsuccessful, but attended with a ruinous defeat. Lastly, the losses in Thrace, following close upon the defeat at Delium, together with the unbounded expectations everywhere entertained from the future career of Brasidas, had again seriously lowered the impression entertained of Athenian power. The year thus closed amidst humiliations the more painful to Athens, as contrasted with the glowing hopes with which it had begun.

It was now that Athens felt the full value of those prisoners whom she had taken at Sphakteria. With those prisoners, as Kleon and his supporters had said truly, she might be sure of making peace whenever she desired it.[682] Having such a certainty to fall back upon, she had played a bold game, and aimed at larger acquisitions during the past year; and this speculation, though not in itself unreasonable, had failed: moreover, a new phenomenon, alike unexpected by all, had occurred, when Brasidas broke open and cut up her empire in Thrace. Still, so great was the anxiety of the Spartans to regain their captives, who had powerful friends and relatives at home, that they considered the victories of Brasidas chiefly as a stepping-stone towards that object, and as a means of prevailing upon Athens to make peace. To his animated representations sent home from Amphipolis, setting forth the prospects of still farther success and entreating reinforcements, they had returned a discouraging reply, dictated in no small degree by the miserable jealousy of some of their chief men; [683] who, feeling themselves cast into the shade, and looking upon his splendid career as an eccentric movement breaking loose from Spartan routine, were thus on personal as well as political grounds disposed to labor for peace. Such collateral motives, working upon the caution usual with Sparta, determined her to make use of the present fortune and realized conquests of Brasidas as a basis for negotiation and recovery of the prisoners; without opening the chance of ulterior enterprises, which though they might perhaps end in results yet more triumphant, would unavoidably put in risk that which was now secure.[684] The history of the Athenians during the past year might, indeed, serve as a warning to deter the Spartans from playing an adventurous game.

Ever since the capture of Sphakteria, the Lacedæmonians had been attempting, directly or indirectly, negotiations for peace and the recovery of the prisoners; their pacific dispositions being especially instigated by king Pleistoanax, whose peculiar circumstances gave him a strong motive to bring the war to a close. He had been banished from Sparta, fourteen years before the commencement of the war, and a little before the thirty years' truce, under the charge of having taken bribes from the Athenians on occasion of invading Attica. For more than eighteen years, he lived in banishment, close to the temple of Zeus Lykæus, in Arcadia; in such constant fear of the Lacedæmonians, that his dwelling-house was half within the consecrated ground. [685] But he never lost the hope of procuring restoration, through the medium of the Pythian priestess at Delphi, whom he and his brother Aristoklês kept in their pay. To every sacred legation which went from Sparta to Delphi, she repeated the same imperative injunction: "They must bring back the seed of (Hêraklês) the demi-god son of Zeus, from foreign land to their own: if they did not, it would be their fate to plough with a silver ploughshare." The command of the god, thus incessantly repeated and backed by the influence of those friends who supported Pleistoanax at home, at length produced an entire change of sentiment at Sparta. In the fourth or fifth year of the Peloponnesian war, the exile was recalled; and not merely recalled, but welcomed with unbounded honors, received with the same sacrifices and choric shows as those which were said to have been offered to the primitive kings, on the first settlement of Sparta.

As in the case of Kleomenês and Demaratus, however, it was not long before the previous intrigue came to be detected, or at least generally suspected and believed; to the great discredit of Pleistoanax, though he could not be again banished. Every successive public calamity which befell the state, the miscarriages of Alkidas, the defeat of Eurylochus in Amphilochia, and above all, the unprecedented humiliation in Sphakteria, were imputed to the displeasure of the gods in consequence of the impious treachery of Pleistoanax. Suffering under such an imputation, this king was most eager to exchange the hazards of war for the secure march of peace, so that he was thus personally interested in opening every door for negotiation with Athens, and in restoring himself to credit by regaining the prisoners.[686]

After the battle of Delium,[687] the pacific dispositions of Nikias, Lachês, and the philo-Laconian party, began to find increasing favor at Athens;[688] while the unforeseen losses in Thrace, coming thick upon each other, each successive triumph of Brasidas apparently increasing his means of achieving more, tended to convert the discouragement of the Athenians into positive alarm. Negotiations appear to have been in progress throughout great part of the winter: and the continual hope that these might be brought to a close, combined with the impolitic aversion of Nikias and his friends to energetic military action, help to explain the unwonted apathy of Athens, under the pressure of such disgraces. But so much did her courage flag, towards the close of the winter, that she came to look upon a truce as her only

means[689] of preservation against the victorious progress of Brasidas. What the tone of Kleon now was, we are not directly informed: he would probably still continue opposed to the propositions of peace, at least indirectly, by insisting on terms more favorable than could be obtained. On this point, his political counsels would be wrong; but on another point, they would be much sounder and more judicious than those of his rival Nikias: for he would recommend a strenuous prosecution of hostilities by Athenian force against Brasidas in Thrace. At the present moment this was the most urgent political necessity of Athens, whether she entertained or rejected the views of peace: and the policy of Nikias, who cradled up the existing depression of the citizens by encouraging them to rely on the pacific inclinations of Sparta, was ill-judged and disastrous in its results, as the future will hereafter show.

Attempts were made by the peace-party both at Athens and Sparta to negotiate at first for a definitive peace: but the conditions of such a peace were not easy to determine, so as to satisfy both parties, and became more and more difficult, with every success of Brasidas. At length the Athenians, eager above all things to arrest his progress, sent to Sparta to propose a truce for one year, desiring the Spartans to send to Athens envoys with full powers to settle the terms: the truce would allow time and tranquillity for settling the conditions of a definitive treaty. The proposition of the truce for one year,[690] together with the first two articles ready prepared, came from Athens, as indeed we might have presumed even without proof; since the interest of Sparta was rather against it, as allowing to the Athenians the fullest leisure for making preparations against farther losses in Thrace. But her main desire was, not so much to put herself in condition to make the best possible peace, as to insure some peace which would liberate her captives: and she calculated that when once the Athenians had tasted the sweets of peace for one year, they would not again voluntarily impose upon themselves the rigorous obligations of war.[691]

In the month of March, 423 B.C., on the fourteenth day of the month Elaphebolion at Athens, and on the twelfth day of the month Gerastius at Sparta, a truce for one year was concluded and sworn, between Athens on one side, and Sparta, Corinth, Sikyon, Epidaurus, and Megara, on the other.[692] The Spartans, instead of merely despatching plenipotentiaries to Athens as the Athenians had desired, went a step farther: in concurrence with the Athenian envoys, they drew up a form of truce, approved by themselves and their allies, in such manner that it only required to be adopted and ratified by the Athenians. The general principle of the truce was *uti possidetis*, and the conditions were in substance as follows:—

1. Respecting the temple at Delphi, every Greek shall have the right to make use of it honestly and without fear, pursuant to the customs of his particular city. The main purpose of this stipulation, prepared and sent verbatim from Athens, was to allow Athenian visitors to go thither, which had been impossible during the war, in consequence of the hostility of the Bœotians[693] and Phocians: the Delphian authorities also were in the interest of Sparta, and doubtless the Athenians received no formal

invitation to the Pythian games. But the Bœotians and Phocians were no parties to the truce: accordingly the Lacedæmonians, while accepting the article and proclaiming the general liberty in principle, do not pledge themselves to enforce it by arms as far as the Bœotians and Phocians are concerned, but only to try and persuade them by amicable representations. The liberty of sacrificing at Delphi was at this moment the more welcome to the Athenians, as they seem to have fancied themselves under the displeasure of Apollo.[694]

2. All the contracting parties will inquire out and punish, each according to its own laws, such persons as may violate the property of the Delphian god.[695] This article also is prepared at Athens, for the purpose seemingly of conciliating the favor of Apollo and the Delphians. The Lacedæmonians accept the article literally, of course.

3. The Athenian garrisons at Pylus, Kythêra, Nisæa, and Minôa, and Methana in the neighborhood of Trœzen, are to remain as at present. No communication to take place between Kythêra and any portion of the mainland belonging to the Lacedæmonian alliance. The soldiers occupying Pylus shall confine themselves within the space between Buphras and Tomeus; those in Nisæa and Minôa, within the road which leads from the chapel of the hero Nisus to the temple of Poseidon, without any communication with the population beyond that limit. In like manner, the Athenians in the peninsula of Methana near Trœzen, and the inhabitants of the latter city, shall observe the special convention concluded between them respecting boundaries.[696]

4. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall make use of the sea for trading purposes, on their own coasts, but shall not have liberty to sail in any ship of war, nor in any rowed merchant-vessel of tonnage equal to five hundred talents. [All war-ships were generally impelled by oar: they sometimes used sails, but never when wanted for fighting. Merchant-vessels seem generally to have sailed, but were sometimes rowed: the limitation of size is added, to insure that the Lacedæmonians shall not, under color of merchantmen, get up a warlike navy.]

5. There shall be free communication by sea as well as by land between Peloponnesus and Athens for herald or embassy with suitable attendants, to treat for a definitive peace or for the adjustment of differences.

6. Neither side shall receive deserters from the other, whether free or slave. [This article was alike important to both parties. Athens had to fear the revolt of her subject-allies, Sparta the desertion of Helots.]

7. Disputes shall be amicably settled, by both parties, according to their established laws and customs.

Such was the substance of the treaty prepared at Sparta, seemingly in concert with Athenian envoys, and sent by the Spartans to Athens for approval, with the following addition: "If there be any provision which occurs to you, more honorable or just than these, come to Lacedæmon and tell us: for neither the Spartans nor their

allies will resist any just suggestions. But let those who come, bring with them full powers to conclude, in the same manner as you desire of us. The truce shall be for one year."

By the resolution which Lachês proposed in the Athenian public assembly, ratifying the truce, the people farther decreed that negotiations should be open for a definitive treaty, and directed the stratêgi to propose to the next ensuing assembly, a scheme and principles for conducting the negotiations. But at the very moment when the envoys between Sparta and Athens were bringing the truce to final adoption, events happened in Thrace which threatened to cancel it altogether. Two days[697] after the important fourteenth of Elaphebolion, but before the truce could be made known in Thrace, Skiônê revolted from Athens to Brasidas.

Skiônê was a town calling itself Achæan, one of the numerous colonies which, in the want of an acknowledged mother city, traced its origin to warriors returning from Troy. It was situated in the peninsula of Pallênê (the westernmost of those three narrow tongues of land into which Chalkidikê branches out); conterminous with the Eretrian colony Mendê. The Skiônæans, not without considerable dissent among themselves, proclaimed their revolt from Athens, under concert with Brasidas. He immediately crossed the gulf into Pallênê, himself in a little boat, but with a trireme close at his side; calculating that she would protect him against any small Athenian vessel,—while any Athenian trireme which he might encounter would attack his trireme, paying no attention to the little boat in which he himself was. The revolt of Skiônê was, from the position of the town, a more striking defiance of Athens than any of the preceding events. For the isthmus connecting Pallênê with the mainland was occupied by the town of Potidæa, a town assigned at the period of its capture seven years before to Athenian settlers, though probably containing some other residents besides. Moreover, the isthmus was so narrow, that the wall of Potidæa barred it across completely from sea to sea: Pallênê was therefore a quasi-island, not open to the aid of land-force from the continent, like the towns previously acquired by Brasidas. The Skiônæans thus put themselves, without any foreign aid, into conflict against the whole force of Athens, bringing into question her empire not merely over continental towns, but over islands.

Even to Brasidas himself their revolt appeared a step of astonishing boldness. On being received into the city, he convened a public assembly, and addressed to them the same language which he had employed at Akanthus and Torônê, disavowing all party preferences as well as all interference with the internal politics of the town, and exhorting them only to unanimous efforts against the common enemy. He bestowed upon them at the same time the warmest praise for their courage. "They, though exposed to all hazards of islanders, had stood forward of their own accord to procure freedom,[698] without waiting like cowards to be driven on by a foreign force towards what was clearly their own good. He considered them capable of any measure of future heroism, if the danger now impending from Athens should be averted, and he

should assign to them the very first post of honor among the faithful allies of Lacedæmon." This generous, straightforward, and animating tone of exhortation, appealing to the strongest political instinct of the Greek mind, the love of complete city autonomy, and coming from the lips of one whose whole conduct had hitherto been conformable to it, had proved highly efficacious in all the previous towns. But in Skiônê it roused the population to the highest pitch of enthusiasm:[699] it worked even upon the feelings of the dissentient minority, bringing them round to partake heartily in the movement: it produced a unanimous and exalted confidence which made them look forward cheerfully to all the desperate chances in which they had engaged themselves; and it produced at the same time, in still more unbounded manifestation, the same personal attachment and admiration as Brasidas inspired elsewhere. The Skiônæans not only voted to him publicly a golden crown, as the liberator of Greece, but when it was placed on his head, the burst of individual sentiment and sympathy was the strongest of which the Grecian bosom was capable. "They crowded round him individually, and encircled his head with fillets, like a victorious athlete,"[700] says the historian. This remarkable incident illustrates what I observed before, that the achievements, the self-relying march, the straightforward politics and probity of this illustrious man, who in character was more Athenian than Spartan, yet with the good qualities of Athens predominant, inspired a personal emotion towards him such as rarely found its way into Grecian political life. The sympathy and admiration felt in Greece towards a victorious athlete was not merely an intense sentiment in the Grecian mind, but was, perhaps of all others, the most wide-spread and Pan-Hellenic. It was connected with the religion, the taste, and the love of recreation, common to the whole nation, while politics tended rather to disunite the separate cities: it was farther a sentiment at once familiar and exclusively personal. Of its exaggerated intensity throughout Greece the philosophers often complained, not without good reason; but Thucydidês cannot convey a more lively idea of the enthusiasm and unanimity with which Brasidas was welcomed at Skiônê, just after the desperate resolution taken by the citizens, than by using this simile.

The Lacedæmonian commander knew well how much the utmost resolution of the Skiônæans was needed, and how speedily their insular position would draw upon them the vigorous invasion of Athens. He accordingly brought across to Pallênê a considerable portion of his army, not merely with a view to the defence of Skiônê, but also with the intention of surprising both Mendê and Potidæa, in both which places there were small parties of conspirators prepared to open the gates.

It was in this position that he was found by the commissioners who came to announce formally the conclusion of the truce for one year, and to enforce its provisions: Athenæus from Sparta, one of the three Spartans who had sworn to the treaty: Aristonymus, from Athens. The face of affairs was materially altered by this communication; much to the satisfaction of the newly acquired allies of Sparta in Thrace, who accepted the truce forthwith, but to the great chagrin of Brasidas,

whose career was thus suddenly arrested. But he could not openly refuse obedience, and his army was accordingly transferred from the peninsula of Pallênê to Torônê.

The case of Skiônê, however, immediately raised an obstruction, doubtless very agreeable to him. The commissioners who had come in an Athenian trireme, had heard nothing of the revolt of that place, and Aristonymus was astonished to find the enemy in Pallênê. But on inquiring into the case, he discovered that the Skiônæans had not revolted until two days after the day fixed for the commencement of the truce: accordingly, while sanctioning the truce for all the other cities in Thrace, he refused to comprehend Skiônê in it, sending immediate news home to Athens. Brasidas, protesting loudly against this proceeding, refused on his part to abandon Skiônê, which was peculiarly endeared to him by the recent scenes; and even obtained the countenance of the Lacedæmonian commissioners, by falsely asseverating that the city had revolted before the day named in the truce. Violent was the burst of indignation when the news sent home by Aristonymus reached Athens: nor was it softened, when the Lacedæmonians, acting upon the version of the case sent to them by Brasidas and Athenæus, despatched an embassy hither to claim protection for Skiônê, or at any rate to procure the adjustment of the dispute by arbitration or pacific decision. Having the terms of the treaty on their side, the Athenians were least of all disposed to relax from their rights in favor of the first revolting islanders. They resolved at once to undertake an expedition for the reconquest of Skiônê; and farther, on the proposition of Kleon, to put to death all the adult male inhabitants of that place as soon as it should have been reconquered. At the same time, they showed no disposition to throw up the truce generally; and the state of feeling on both sides tended to this result, that, while the war continued in Thrace, it was suspended everywhere else.[701]

Fresh intelligence soon arrived, carrying exasperation at Athens yet farther, of the revolt of Mendê, the adjoining town to Skiônê. Those Mendæans, who had laid their measures for secretly introducing Brasidas, were at first baffled by the arrival of the truce-commissioners; but they saw that he retained his hold on Skiônê, in spite of the provisions of the truce, and they ascertained that he was willing still to protect them if they revolted, though he could not be an accomplice, as originally projected, in the surprise of the town. Being, moreover, only a small party, with the sentiment of the population against them, they were afraid, if they now relinquished their scheme, of being detected and punished for the partial steps already taken, when the Athenians should come against Skiônê. They therefore thought it on the whole the least dangerous course to persevere. They proclaimed their revolt from Athens, constraining the reluctant citizens to obey them:[702] the government seems before to have been democratical, but they now found means to bring about an oligarchical revolution along with the revolt. Brasidas immediately accepted their adhesion, and willingly undertook to protect them, professing to think that he had a right to do so, because they had revolted openly after the truce had been proclaimed. But the truce

upon this point was clear, which he himself virtually admitted, by setting up as justification certain alleged matters in which the Athenians had themselves violated it. He immediately made preparation for the defence both of Mendê and Skiônê against the attack, which was now rendered more certain than before, conveying the women and children of those two towns across to the Chalkidic Olynthus, and sending thither as garrison five hundred Peloponnesian hoplites with three hundred Chalkidic peltasts; the commander of which force, Polydamidas, took possession of the acropolis with his own troops separately.[703] Brasidas then withdrew himself with the greater part of his army, to accompany Perdikkas on an expedition into the interior against Arrhibæus and the Lynkêstæ. On what ground, after having before entered into terms with Arrhibæus, he now became his active enemy, we are left to conjecture: probably his relations with Perdikkas, whose alliance was of essential importance, were such that this step was forced upon him against his will, or he may really have thought that the force under Polydamidas was adequate to the defence of Mendê and Skiônê; an idea which the unaccountable backwardness of Athens for the last six or eight months might well foster. Had he even remained, indeed, he could hardly have saved them, considering the situation of Pallênê and the superiority of Athens at sea; but his absence made their ruin certain.[704]

While Brasidas was thus engaged far in the interior, the Athenian armament under Nikias and Nikostratus reached Potidæa: fifty triremes, ten of them Chian; one thousand hoplites and six hundred bowmen from Athens; one thousand mercenary Thracians, with some peltasts from Methônê and other towns in the neighborhood. From Potidæa, they proceeded by sea to Cape Poseidonium, near which they landed for the purpose of attacking Mendê. Polydamidas, the Peloponnesian commander in the town, took post with his force of seven hundred hoplites, including three hundred Skiônæans, upon an eminence near the city, strong and difficult of approach: upon which the Athenian generals divided their forces; Nikias, with sixty Athenian chosen hoplites, one hundred and twenty Methonean peltasts, and all the bowmen, tried to march up the hill by a side path and thus turn the position; while Nikostratus with the main army attacked it in front. But such were the extreme difficulties of the ground that both were repulsed: Nikias was himself wounded, and the division of Nikostratus was thrown into great disorder, narrowly escaping a destructive defeat. The Mendæans, however, evacuated the position in the night and retired into the city; while the Athenians, sailing round on the morrow to the suburb on the side of Skiônê, ravaged the neighboring lands; and Nikias on the ensuing day carried his devastations still farther, even to the border of the Skiônæan territory.

But dissensions had already commenced within the walls, and the Skiônæan auxiliaries, becoming mistrustful of their situation, took advantage of the night to return home. The revolt of Mendê had been brought about against the will of the citizens by the intrigues and for the benefit of an oligarchical faction: moreover, it does not appear that Brasidas personally visited the town, as he had visited Skiônê and the other

revolted towns: had he come, his personal influence might have done much to soothe the offended citizens, and create some disposition to adopt the revolt as a fact accomplished, after they had once been compromised with Athens. But his animating words had not been heard, and the Peloponnesian troops whom he had sent to Mendê, were mere instruments to sustain the newly erected oligarchy and keep out the Athenians. The feelings of the citizens generally towards them were soon unequivocally displayed. Nikostratus with half of the Athenian force was planted before that gate of Mendê which opened towards Potidæa: in the neighborhood of that gate, within the city, was the place of arms and the chief station both of the Peloponnesians and of the citizens; and Polydamidas, intending to make a sally forth, was marshalling both of them in battle order, when one of the Mendæan Demos, manifesting with angry vehemence a sentiment common to most of them, told him, "that he would not sally forth, and did not choose to take part in the contest." Polydamidas seized hold of the man to punish him, when the mass of the armed Demos, taking part with their comrade, made a sudden rush upon the Peloponnesians. The latter, unprepared for such an onset, sustained at first some loss, and were soon forced to retreat into the acropolis; the rather, as they saw some of the Mendæans open the gates to the besiegers without, which induced them to suspect a preconcerted betrayal. No such concert, however, existed, though the besieging generals, when they saw the gates thus suddenly opened, soon comprehended the real position of affairs. But they found it impossible to restrain their soldiers, who pushed in forthwith, from plundering the town; and they had even some difficulty in saving the lives of the citizens.[705]

Mendê being thus taken, the Athenian generals desired the body of the citizens to resume their former government, leaving it to them to single out and punish the authors of the late revolt. What use was made of this permission, we are not told; but probably most of the authors had already escaped into the acropolis along with Polydamidas. Having erected a wall of circumvallation round the acropolis, joining the sea at both ends, and left a force to guard it, the Athenians moved away to begin the siege of Skiônê, where they found both the citizens and the Peloponnesian garrison posted on a strong hill, not far from the walls. As it was impossible to surround the town without being masters of this hill, the Athenians attacked it at once, and were more fortunate than they had been before Mendê; for they carried it by assault, compelling the defenders to take refuge in the town. After erecting their trophy, they commenced the wall of circumvallation. Before it was finished, the garrison who had been shut up in the acropolis of Mendê, got into Skiônê at night, having broken out by a sudden sally where the blockading wall around them joined the sea. But this did not hinder Nikias from prosecuting his operations, so that Skiônê was in no long time completely inclosed, and a division placed to guard the wall of circumvallation.[706]

Such was the state of affairs which Brasidas found on returning from the inland Macedonia. Unable either to recover Mendê or to relieve Skiônê, he was forced to

confine himself to the protection of Torônê. Nikias, however, without attacking Torônê, returned soon afterwards with his armament to Athens, leaving Skiônê under blockade.

The march of Brasidas into Macedonia had been unfortunate in every way, and nothing but his extraordinary gallantry rescued him from utter ruin. The joint force of himself and Perdikkas consisted of three thousand Grecian hoplites, Peloponnesian, Akanthian, and Chalkidian, with one thousand Macedonian and Chalkidian horse, and a considerable number of non-Hellenic auxiliaries. As soon as they had got beyond the mountain-pass into the territory of the Lynkêstæ, they were met by Arrhibæus, and a battle ensued, in which that prince was completely worsted. They halted here for a few days, awaiting—before they pushed forward to attack the villages in the territory of Arrhibæus—the arrival of a body of Illyrian mercenaries, with whom Perdikkas had concluded a bargain.[707] At length Perdikkas became impatient to advance without them; while Brasidas, on the contrary, apprehensive for the fate of Mendê during his absence, was bent on returning back. The dissension between them becoming aggravated, they parted company and occupied separate encampments at some distance from each other, when both received unexpected intelligence which made Perdikkas as anxious to retreat as Brasidas. The Illyrians, having broken their compact, had joined Arrhibæus, and were now in full march to attack the invaders. The untold number of these barbarians was reported as overwhelming, and such was their reputation for ferocity as well as for valor, that the Macedonian army of Perdikkas, seized with a sudden panic, broke up in the night and fled without orders, hurrying Perdikkas himself along with them, and not even sending notice to Brasidas, with whom nothing had been concerted about the retreat. In the morning, the latter found Arrhibæus and the Illyrians close upon him, while the Macedonians were already far advanced in their journey homeward.

The contrast between the man of Hellas and of Macedonia, general as well as soldiers, was never more strikingly exhibited than on this critical occasion. The soldiers of Brasidas, though surprised as well as deserted, lost neither their courage nor their discipline: the commander preserved not only his presence of mind, but his full authority. His hoplites were directed to form in a hollow square, or oblong, with the light-armed and attendants in the centre, for the retreating march: youthful soldiers were posted either in the outer ranks, or in convenient stations, to run out swiftly and repel the assailing enemy; while Brasidas himself, with three hundred chosen men, formed the rear-guard.[708]

The short harangue which, according to a custom universal with Grecian generals, he addressed to his troops immediately before the enemy approached, is in many respects remarkable. Though some were Akanthians, some Chalkidians, some Helots, he designates all by the honorable title of "Peloponnesians." Reassuring them against the desertion of their allies, as well as against the superior numbers of the advancing enemy, he invokes their native, homebred courage.[709] "*Ye* do not require

the presence of allies to inspire you with bravery, nor do ye fear superior numbers of an enemy; for ye belong not to those political communities in which the larger number governs the smaller, but to those in which a few men rule subjects more numerous than themselves, having acquired their power by no other means than by superiority in battle." Next, Brasidas tried to dissipate the *prestige* of the Illyrian name; his army had already vanquished the Lynkêstæ, and these other barbarians were noway better. A nearer acquaintance would soon show that they were only formidable from the noise, the gestures, the clashing of arms, and the accompaniments of their onset; and that they were incapable of sustaining the reality of close combat, hand to hand. "They have no regular order (said he) such as to impress them with shame for deserting their post: flight and attack are with them in equally honorable esteem, so that there is nothing to test the really courageous man: their battle, wherein every man fights as he chooses, is just the thing to furnish each with a decent pretence for running away." "Repel ye their onset whenever it comes; and so soon as opportunity offers, resume your retreat in rank and order. Ye will soon arrive in a place of safety; and ye will be convinced that such crowds, when their enemy has stood to defy the first onset, keep aloof with empty menace and a parade of courage which never strikes; while if their enemy gives way, they show themselves smart and bold in running after him where there is no danger."[710]

The superiority of disciplined and regimented force over disorderly numbers, even with equal undivided courage, is now a truth so familiar, that we require an effort of imagination to put ourselves back into the fifth century before the Christian era, when this truth was recognized only among the Hellenic communities; when the practice of all their neighbors—Illyrians, Thracians, Asiatics, Epirots, and even Macedonians—implied ignorance or contradiction of it. In respect to the Epirots, the difference between their military habits and those of the Greeks has been already noticed, having been pointedly manifested in the memorable joint attack on the Akarnanian town of Stratus, in the second year of the war.[711] Both Epirots and Macedonians, however, are a step nearer to the Greeks than either Thracians, or these Illyrian barbarians against whom Brasidas was now about to contend, and in whose case the contrast comes out yet more forcibly. Nor is it merely the contrast between two modes of fighting which the Lacedæmonian commander impresses upon his soldiers: he gives what may be called a moral theory of the principles on which that contrast is founded,—a theory of large range and going to the basis of Grecian social life, in peace as well as in war. The sentiment in each individual man's bosom, of a certain place which he has to fill and duties which he has to perform, combined with fear of the displeasure of his neighbors as well as of his own self-reproach if he shrinks back, but at the same time essentially bound up and reciprocating with the feeling that his neighbors are under corresponding obligations towards him,—this sentiment, which Brasidas invokes as the settled military creed of his soldiers in their ranks, was not less the regulating principle of their intercourse in peace as citizens of the same community. Simple as this principle may seem, it would have found no response in

the army of Xerxes, or of the Thracian Sitalkês, or of the Gaul Brennus. The Persian soldier rushes to death by order of the Great King, perhaps under terror of a whip which the Great King commands to be administered to him: the Illyrian or the Gaul scorns such a stimulus, and obeys only the instigation of his own pugnacity, or vengeance, or love of blood, or love of booty, but recedes as soon as that individual sentiment is either satisfied or overcome by fear. It is the Greek soldier alone who feels himself bound to his comrades by ties reciprocal and indissoluble,[712]—who obeys neither the will of a king, nor his own individual impulse, but a common and imperative sentiment of obligation,—whose honor or shame is attached to his own place in the ranks, never to be abandoned nor overstepped. Such conceptions of military duty, established in the minds of these soldiers whom Brasidas addressed, will come to be farther illustrated when we describe the memorable Retreat of the Ten Thousand: at present, I merely indicate them as forming a part of that general scheme of morality, social and political as well as military, wherein the Greeks stood exalted above the nations who surrounded them.

But there is another point in the speech of Brasidas which deserves notice. He tells his soldiers: "Courage is your homebred property; for ye belong to communities wherein the small number governs the larger, simply by reason of superior prowess in themselves and conquest by their ancestors." First, it is remarkable that a large proportion of the Peloponnesian soldiers, whom Brasidas thus addresses, consisted of Helots, the conquered race, not the conquerors: yet so easily does the military or regimental pride supplant the sympathies of race, that these men would feel flattered by being addressed as if they were themselves sprung from the race which had enslaved their ancestors. Next, we here see the right of the strongest invoked as the legitimate source of power, and as an honorable and ennobling recollection, by an officer of Dorian race, oligarchical politics, unperverted intellect, and estimable character: and we shall accordingly be prepared, when we find a similar principle hereafter laid down by the Athenian envoys at Melos, to disallow the explanation of those who treat it merely as a theory invented by demagogues and sophists, upon one or other of whom it is common to throw the blame of all that is objectionable in Grecian politics or morality.

Having finished his harangue, Brasidas gave orders for retreat. As soon as his march began, the Illyrians rushed upon him with all the confidence and shouts of pursuers against a flying enemy, believing that they should completely destroy his army. But wherever they approached near, the young soldiers specially stationed for the purpose, turned upon and beat them back with severe loss; while Brasidas himself, with his rear-guard of three hundred, was present everywhere rendering vigorous aid. When the Lynkêstæ and Illyrians attacked, the army halted and repelled them, after which it resumed its retreating march. The barbarians found themselves so rudely handled, and with such unwonted vigor,—for they probably had had no previous experience of Grecian troops,—that after a few trials they desisted from

meddling with the army in its retreat along the plain. They ran forward rapidly, partly in order to overtake the Macedonians under Perdikkas, who had fled before, partly to occupy the narrow pass, with high hills on each side, which formed the entrance into Lynkêstis, and which lay in the road of Brasidas. When the latter approached this narrow pass, he saw the barbarians masters of it; several of them were already on the summits, and more were ascending to reinforce them; while a portion of them were moving down upon his rear. Brasidas immediately gave orders to his chosen three hundred, to charge up the most assailable of the two hills, with their best speed, before it became more numerously occupied, not staying to preserve compact ranks. This unexpected and vigorous movement disconcerted the barbarians, who fled, abandoning the eminence to the Greeks, and leaving their own men in the pass exposed on one of their flanks.[713] The retreating army, thus master of one of the side hills, was enabled to force its way through the middle pass, and to drive away the Lynkêstian and Illyrian occupants. Having got through this narrow outlet, Brasidas found himself on the higher ground, nor did his enemies dare to attack him farther: so that he was enabled to reach, even in that day's march, the first town or village in the kingdom of Perdikkas, called Arnissa. So incensed were his soldiers with the Macedonian subjects of Perdikkas, who had fled on the first news of danger without giving them any notice, that they seized and appropriated all the articles of baggage, not inconsiderable in number, which happened to have been dropped in the disorder of a nocturnal flight; and they even unharnessed and slew the oxen out of the baggage carts.[714]

Perdikkas keenly resented this behavior of the troops of Brasidas, following as it did immediately upon his own quarrel with that general, and upon the mortification of his repulse from Lynkêstis. From this moment he broke off his alliance with the Peloponnesians, and opened negotiations with Nikias, then engaged in constructing the wall of blockade round Skiônê. Such was the general faithlessness of this prince, however, that Nikias required as a condition of the alliance, some manifest proof of the sincerity of his intentions; and Perdikkas was soon enabled to afford a proof of considerable importance.[715]

The relations between Athens and Peloponnesus, since the conclusion of the truce in the preceding March, had settled into a curious combination. In Thrace, war was prosecuted by mutual understanding, and with unabated vigor; but everywhere else the truce was observed. The main purpose of the truce, however, that of giving time for discussions preliminary to a definitive peace, was completely frustrated; nor does the decree of the Athenian people, which stands included in their vote sanctioning the truce, for sending and receiving envoys to negotiate such a peace, ever seem to have been executed.

Instead of this, the Lacedæmonians despatched a considerable reinforcement by land to join Brasidas; probably at his own request, and also instigated by hearing of the Athenian armament now under Nikias in Pallênê. But Ischagoras, the commander

of the reinforcement, on reaching the borders of Thessaly, found all farther progress impracticable, and was compelled to send back his troops. For Perdikkas, by whose powerful influence alone Brasidas had been enabled to pass through Thessaly, now directed his Thessalian guests to keep the new-comers off; which was far more easily executed, and was gratifying to the feelings of Perdikkas himself, as well as an essential service to the Athenians.[716] Ischagoras, however, with a few companions, but without his army, made his way to Brasidas, having been particularly directed by the Lacedæmonians to inspect and report upon the state of affairs. He numbered among his companions a few select Spartans of the military age, intended to be placed as harmosts or governors in the cities reduced by Brasidas: this was among the first violations, apparently often repeated afterwards, of the ancient Spartan custom, that none except elderly men, above the military age, should be named to such posts. Indeed, Brasidas himself was an illustrious departure from the ancient rule. The mission of these officers was intended to guard against the appointment of any but Spartans to such posts, for there were no Spartans in the army of Brasidas. One of the new-comers, Klearidas, was made governor of Amphipolis; another, Pasitelidas, of Torônê.[717] It is probable that these inspecting commissioners may have contributed to fetter the activity of Brasidas: and the newly-declared hostility of Perdikkas, together with disappointment in the non-arrival of the fresh troops intended to join him, much abridged his means. We hear of only one exploit performed by him at this time, and that too more than six months after the retreat from Macedonia, about January or February 422 B.C. Having established intelligence with some parties in the town of Potidæa, in the view of surprising it, he contrived to bring up his army in the night to the foot of the walls, and even to plant his scaling ladders, without being discovered. The sentinel carrying and ringing the bell had just passed by on the wall, leaving for a short interval an unguarded space (the practice apparently being, to pass this bell round along the walls from one sentinel to another throughout the night), when some of the soldiers of Brasidas took advantage of the moment to try and mount. But before they could reach the top of the wall, the sentinel came back, alarm was given, and the assailants were compelled to retreat.[718]

In the absence of actual war between the ascendent powers in and near Peloponnesus, during the course of this summer, Thucydidês mentions to us some incidents which perhaps he would have omitted had there been great warlike operations to describe. The great temple of Hêrê, between Mykenæ and Argos (nearer to the former, and in early times more intimately connected with it, but now an appendage of the latter, Mykenæ itself having been subjected and almost depopulated by the Argeians), enjoyed an ancient Pan-Hellenic reputation; the catalogue of its priestesses, seemingly with a statue or bust of each, was preserved or imagined through centuries of past time, real and mythical, beginning with the goddess herself or her immediate nominees. Chrysis, an old woman, who had been priestess there for fifty-six years, happened to fall asleep in the temple with a burning lamp near to her head: the fillet encircling her head took fire, and though she herself escaped unhurt,

the temple itself, very ancient, and perhaps built of wood, was consumed. From fear of the wrath of the Argeians, Chrysis fled to Phlius, and subsequently thought it necessary to seek protection as a suppliant in the temple of Athênê Alea, at Tegea: Phaeinis was appointed priestess in her place.[719] The temple was rebuilt on an adjoining spot by Eupolemus, of Argos, continuing as much as possible the antiquities and traditions of the former, but with greater splendor and magnitude: Pausanias, the traveller, who describes this temple as a visitor, near six hundred years afterwards, saw near it the remnant of the old temple which had been burned.

We hear farther of a war in Arcadia, between the two important cities of Mantineia and Tegea, each attended by its Arcadian allies, partly free, partly subject. In a battle fought between them at Laodikion, the victory was disputed: each party erected a trophy, each sent spoils to the temple of Delphi. We shall have occasion soon to speak farther of these Arcadian dissensions.

The Bœotians had been no parties to the truce sworn between Sparta and Athens in the preceding month of March; but they seem to have followed the example of Sparta in abstaining from hostilities *de facto*: and we may conclude that they acceded to the request of Sparta so far as to allow the transit of Athenian visitors and sacred envoys through Bœotia to the Delphian temple. The only actual incident which we hear of in Bœotia during this interval, is one which illustrates forcibly the harsh and ungenerous ascendency of the Thebans over the inferior Bœotian cities. [720] The Thebans destroyed the walls of Thespiæ, and condemned the city to remain unfortified, on the charge of *atticizing* tendencies. How far this suspicion was well founded we have no means of judging: but the Thespians, far from being dangerous at this moment, were altogether helpless, having lost the flower of their military force at the battle of Delium, where their station was on the defeated wing. It was this very helplessness, brought upon them by their services to Thebes against Athens, which now both impelled and enabled the Thebans to enforce the rigorous sentence above mentioned.[721]

But the month of March, or the Attic Elaphebolion, 422 B.C., the time prescribed for expiration of the one year's truce, had now arrived. It has already been mentioned that this truce had never been more than partially observed: Brasidas in Thrace had disregarded it from the beginning, and both the contracting powers had tacitly acquiesced in the anomalous condition, of war in Thrace coupled with peace elsewhere. Either of them had thus an excellent pretext for breaking the truce altogether; and as neither acted upon this pretext, we plainly see that the paramount feeling and ascendent parties, among both, tended to peace of their own accord, at that time. Nor was there anything except the interest of Brasidas, and of those revolted subjects of Athens to whom he had bound himself, which kept alive the war in Thrace. Under such a state of feeling, the oath taken to maintain the truce still seemed imperative on both parties, always excepting Thracian affairs. Moreover, the Athenians were to a certain degree soothed by their success at Mendê and Skiônê,

and by their acquisition of Perdikkas as an ally, during the summer and autumn of 423 B.C. But the state of sentiment between the contracting parties was not such as to make it possible to treat for any longer peace, or to conclude any new agreement, though neither were disposed to depart from that which had been already concluded.

The mere occurrence of the last day of the truce made no practical difference at first in this condition of things. The truce had expired: either party might renew hostilities; but neither actually did renew them. To the Athenians, there was this additional motive for abstaining from hostilities for a few months longer: the great Pythian festival would be celebrated at Delphi in July or the beginning of August, and as they had been excluded from that holy spot during all the interval between the beginning of the war and the conclusion of the one year's truce, their pious feelings seem now to have taken a peculiar longing towards the visits, pilgrimages, and festivals connected with it. Though the truce, therefore, had really ceased, no actual warfare took place until the Pythian games were over.[722]

But though the actions of Athens remained unaltered, the talk at Athens became very different. Kleon and his supporters renewed their instances to obtain a vigorous prosecution of the war, and renewed them with great additional strength of argument; the question being now open to considerations of political prudence, without any binding obligation.

"At this time (observes Thucydidês)[723] the great enemies of peace were, Brasidas on one side, and Kleon on the other: the former, because he was in full success and rendered illustrious by the war; the latter, because he thought that if peace were concluded, he should be detected in his dishonest politics, and be less easily credited in his criminations of others." As to Brasidas, the remark of the historian is indisputable: it would be wonderful, indeed, if he, in whom so many splendid qualities were brought out by the war, and who had moreover contracted obligations with the Thracian towns which gave him hopes and fears of his own, entirely apart from Lacedæmon,—it would be wonderful if the war and its continuance were not in his view the paramount object. In truth, his position in Thrace constituted an insurmountable obstacle to any solid or steady peace, independently of the dispositions of Kleon.

But the coloring which Thucydidês gives to Kleon's support of the war is open to much greater comment. First, we may well raise the question, whether Kleon had any real interest in war,—whether his personal or party consequence in the city was at all enhanced by it. He had himself no talent or competence for warlike operations, which tended infallibly to place ascendency in the hands of others, and to throw him into the shade. As to his power of carrying on dishonest intrigues with success, that must depend on the extent of his political ascendency; while matter of crimination against others, assuming him to be careless of truth or falsehood, could hardly be

wanting either in war or peace; and if the war brought forward unsuccessful generals open to his accusations, it would also throw up successful generals who would certainly outshine him, and would probably put him down. In the life which Plutarch has given us of Phokion, a plain and straightforward military man, we read that one of the frequent and criminative speakers of Athens, of character analogous to that which is ascribed to Kleon, expressed his surprise on hearing Phokion dissuade the Athenians from embarking in a new war: "Yes (said Phokion), I think it right to dissuade them; though I know well, that if there be war, I shall have command over you; if there be peace, you will have command over me."[724] This is surely a more rational estimate of the way in which war affects the comparative importance of the orator and the military officer, than that which Thucydidês pronounces in reference to the interests of Kleon. Moreover, when we come to follow the political history of Syracuse, we shall find the demagogue Athenagoras ultra-pacific, and the aristocrat Hermokratês far more warlike:[725] the former is afraid, not without reason, that war will raise into consequence energetic military leaders dangerous to the popular constitution. We may add, that Kleon himself had not been always warlike: he commenced his political career as an opponent of Periklês, when the latter was strenuously maintaining the necessity and prudence of beginning the Peloponnesian war. [726]

But farther, if we should even grant that Kleon had a separate party-interest in promoting the war, it will still remain to be considered, whether, at this particular crisis, the employment of energetic warlike measures in Thrace was not really the sound and prudent policy for Athens. Taking Periklês as the best judge of that policy, we shall find him at the outset of the war inculcating emphatically two important points: 1. To stand vigorously upon the defensive, maintaining unimpaired their maritime empire, "keeping their subject-allies well in hand," submitting patiently even to see Attica ravaged. 2. To abstain from trying to enlarge their empire or to make new conquests during the war.[727] Consistently with this well-defined plan of action, Periklês, had he lived, would have taken care to interfere vigorously and betimes to prevent Brasidas from making his conquests: had such interference been either impossible or accidentally frustrated, he would have thought no efforts too great to recover them. To maintain undiminished the integrity of the empire, as well as that impression of Athenian force upon which the empire rested, was his cardinal principle. Now it is impossible to deny that in reference to Thrace, Kleon adhered more closely than his rival Nikias to the policy of Periklês. It was to Nikias, more than to Kleon, that the fatal mistake made by Athens in not interfering speedily after Brasidas first broke into Thrace is to be imputed: it was Nikias and his partisans, desirous of peace at almost any price, and knowing that the Lacedæmonians also desired it, who encouraged his countrymen, at a moment of great public depression of spirit, to leave Brasidas unopposed in Thrace, and rely on the chance of negotiation with Sparta for arresting his progress. The peace-party at Athens carried their point of the truce for a year, with the promise and for the express purpose of checking the farther con-

quests of Brasidas; also with the farther promise of maturing that truce into a permanent peace, and obtaining under the peace even the restoration of Amphipolis.

Such was the policy of Nikias and his party, the friends of peace and opponents of Kleon. And the promises which they thus held out might perhaps appear plausible in March 422 B.C., at the moment when the truce for one year was concluded. But the subsequent events had frustrated them in the most glaring manner, and had even shown the best reason for believing that no such expectations could possibly be realized while Brasidas was in unbroken and unopposed action. For the Lacedæmonians, though seemingly sincere in concluding the truce on the basis of *uti possidetis*, and desiring to extend it to Thrace as well as elsewhere, had been unable to enforce the observance of it upon Brasidas, or to restrain him even from making new acquisitions, so that Athens never obtained the benefit of the truce, exactly in that region where she most stood in need of it. Only by the despatch of her armament to Skiônê and Mendê had she maintained herself in possession even of Pallênê. Now what was the lesson to be derived from this experience, when the Athenians came to discuss their future policy, after the truce was at an end? The great object of all parties at Athens was to recover the lost possessions in Thrace, especially Amphipolis. Nikias, still urging negotiations for peace, continued to hold out hopes that the Lacedæmonians would be willing to restore that place, as the price of their captives now at Athens; and his connection with Sparta would enable him to announce her professions even upon authority. But to this Kleon might make, and doubtless did make, a complete reply, grounded upon the most recent experience: "If the Lacedæmonians consent to the restitution of Amphipolis (he would say), it will probably be only with the view of finding some means to escape performance, and yet to get back their prisoners. But granting that they are perfectly sincere, they will never be able to control Brasidas, and those parties in Thrace who are bound up with him by community of feeling and interest; so that after all, you will give them back their prisoners on the faith of an equivalent beyond their power to realize. Look at what has happened during the truce! So different are the views and obligations of Brasidas in Thrace from those of the Lacedæmonians, that he would not even obey their order when they directed him to stand as he was, and to desist from farther conquest: much less will he obey them when they direct him to surrender what he has already got: least of all, if they enjoin the surrender of Amphipolis, his grand acquisition and his central point for all future effort. Depend upon it, if you desire to regain Amphipolis, you will only regain it by energetic employment of force, as has happened with Skiônê and Mendê: and you ought to put forth your strength for this purpose immediately, while the Lacedæmonian prisoners are yet in your hands, instead of waiting until after you shall have been deluded into giving them up, thereby losing all your hold upon Lacedæmon."

Such anticipations were fully verified by the result: for subsequent history will show that the Lacedæmonians, when they had bound themselves by treaty to give

up Amphipolis, either would not, or could not, enforce performance of their stipulation, even after the death of Brasidas: much less could they have done so during his life, when there was his great personal influence, strenuous will, and hopes of future conquest, to serve as increased obstruction to them. Such anticipations were also plainly suggested by the recent past: so that in putting them into the mouth of Kleon, we are only supposing him to read the lesson open before his eyes.

Now since the war-policy of Kleon, taken at this moment after the expiration of the one year's truce, may be thus shown to be not only more conformable to the genius of Periklês, but also founded on a juster estimate of events both past and future, than the peace-policy of Nikias, what are we to say to the historian, who, without refuting such presumptions, every one of which is deduced from his own narrative, nay, without even indicating their existence, merely tells us that "Kleon opposed the peace in order that he might cloke dishonest intrigues and find matter for plausible crimination?" We cannot but say of this criticism, with profound regret that such words must be pronounced respecting any judgment of Thucydidês, that it is harsh and unfair towards Kleon, and careless in regard to truth and the instruction of his readers. It breathes not that same spirit of honorable impartiality which pervades his general history: it is an interpolation by the officer whose improvidence had occasioned to his countrymen the fatal loss of Amphipolis, retaliating upon the citizen who justly accused him: it is conceived in the same tone as his unaccountable judgment in the matter of Sphakteria.

Rejecting on this occasion the judgment of Thucydidês, we may confidently affirm that Kleon had rational public grounds for urging his countrymen to undertake with energy the reconquest of Amphipolis. Demagogue and leather-seller though he was, he stands here honorably distinguished, as well from the tameness and inaction of Nikias, who grasped at peace with hasty credulity through sickness of the efforts of war, as from the restless movement and novelties, not merely unprofitable but ruinous, which we shall presently find springing up under the auspices of Alkibiadês. Periklês had said to his countrymen, at a time when they were enduring all the miseries of pestilence, and were in a state of despondency even greater than that which prevailed in B.C. 422: "You hold your empire and your proud position, by the condition of being willing to encounter cost, fatigue, and danger: abstain from all views of enlarging the empire, but think no effort too great to maintain it unimpaired. To lose what we have once got is more disgraceful than to fail in attempts at acquisition."[728] The very same language was probably held by Kleon when exhorting his countrymen to an expedition for the reconquest of Amphipolis. But when uttered by him, it would have a very different effect from that which it had formerly produced when held by Periklês, and different also from that which it would now have produced if held by Nikias. The entire peace-party would repudiate it when it came from Kleon; partly out of dislike to the speaker, partly from a conviction, doubtless felt by every one, that an expedition against Brasidas would be a hazardous and painful ser-

vice to all concerned in it, general as well as soldiers; partly also from a persuasion, sincerely entertained at the time, though afterwards proved to be illusory by the result, that Amphipolis might really be got back through peace with the Lacedæmonians.

If Kleon, in proposing the expedition, originally proposed himself as the commander, a new ground of objection, and a very forcible ground, would thus be furnished. Since everything which Kleon does is understood to be a manifestation of some vicious or silly attribute, we are told that this was an instance of his absurd presumption, arising out of the success of Pylus, and persuading him that he was the only general who could put down Brasidas. But if the success at Pylus had really filled him with such overweening military conceit, it is most unaccountable that he should not have procured for himself some command during the year which immediately succeeded the affair at Sphakteria, the eighth year of the war: a season of most active warlike enterprise, when his presumption and influence arising out of the Sphakterian victory must have been fresh and glowing. As he obtained no command during this immediately succeeding period we may fairly doubt whether he ever really conceived such excessive personal presumption of his own talents for war, and whether he did not retain after the affair of Sphakteria the same character which he had manifested in that affair, reluctance to engage in military expeditions himself, and a disposition to see them commanded as well as carried on by others. It is by no means certain that Kleon, in proposing the expedition against Amphipolis, originally proposed to take the command of it himself: I think it at least equally probable, that his original wish was to induce Nikias or the stratêgi to take the command of it, as in the case of Sphakteria. Nikias, doubtless, opposed the expedition as much as he could: when it was determined by the people, in spite of his opposition, he would peremptorily decline the command for himself, and would do all he could to force it upon Kleon, or at least would be better pleased to see it under his command than under that of any one else. He would be not less glad to exonerate himself from a dangerous service than to see his rival entangled in it; and he would have before him the same alternative which he and his friends had contemplated with so much satisfaction in the affair of Sphakteria: either the expedition would succeed, in which case Amphipolis would be taken, or it would fail, and the consequence would be the ruin of Kleon. The last of the two was really the more probable at Amphipolis, as Nikias had erroneously imagined it to be at Sphakteria.

It is easy to see, however, that an expedition proposed under these circumstances by Kleon, though it might command a majority in the public assembly, would have a large proportion of the citizens unfavorable to it, and even wishing that it might fail. Moreover, Kleon had neither talents nor experience for commanding an army, and the being engaged under his command in fighting against the ablest officer of the time, could inspire no confidence to any man in putting on his armor. From all these circumstances united, political as well as military, we are not surprised to

hear that the hoplites whom he took out with him went with much reluctance.[729] An ignorant general, with unwilling soldiers, many of them politically disliking him, stood little chance of wresting Amphipolis from Brasidas: but had Nikias or the stratêgi done their duty, and carried the entire force of the city under competent command to the same object, the issue would probably have been different as to gain and loss; certainly very different as to dishonor.

Kleon started from Peiræus, apparently towards the beginning of August, with twelve hundred Athenian, Lemnian, and Imbrian hoplites, and three hundred horsemen, troops of excellent quality and condition: besides an auxiliary force of allies, number not exactly known, and thirty triremes. This armament was not of magnitude at all equal to the taking of Amphipolis; for Brasidas had equal numbers, besides all the advantages of the position. But it was a part of the scheme of Kleon, on arriving at Eion, to procure Macedonian and Thracian reinforcements before he commenced his attack. He first halted in his voyage near Skiônê, from which place he took away such of the hoplites as could be spared from the blockade. He next sailed across the gulf from Pallênê to the Sithonian peninsula, to a place called the Harbor of the Kolophonians, near Torônê.[730] Having here learned that neither Brasidas himself, nor any considerable Peloponnesian garrison were present in Torônê, he landed his forces and marched to attack the town, sending ten triremes at the same time round a promontory which separated the harbor of the Kolophonians from Torônê, to assail the latter place from seaward. It happened that Brasidas, desiring to enlarge the fortified circle of Torônê, had broken down a portion of the old wall, and employed the materials in building a new and larger wall inclosing the proasteion, or suburb: this new wall appears to have been still incomplete and in an imperfect state of defence. Pasitelidas, the Peloponnesian commander, resisted the attack of the Athenians as long as he could; but when already beginning to give way, he saw the ten Athenian triremes sailing into the harbor, which was hardly guarded at all. Abandoning the defence of the suburb, he hastened to repel these new assailants, but came too late, so that the town was entered from both sides at once. Brasidas, who was not far off, rendered aid with the utmost celerity, but was yet at five miles' distance from the city when he learned the capture, and was obliged to retire unsuccessfully. Pasitelidas the commander, with the Peloponnesian garrison and the Torônæan male population, were despatched as prisoners to Athens; while the Torônæan women and children, by a fate but too common in those days, were sold as slaves.[731]

After this not unimportant success, Kleon sailed round the promontory of Athos to Eion at the mouth of the Strymon, within three miles of Amphipolis. From hence, in execution of his original scheme, he sent envoys to Perdikkas, urging him to lend effective aid as the ally of Athens in the attack of Amphipolis, with his whole forces; and to Pollês the king of the Thracian Odomantes, inviting him also to come with as many Thracian mercenaries as could be levied. The Edonians, the Thracian tribe nearest to Amphipolis, took part with Brasidas: and the local influence of the ban-

ished Thucydidês would no longer be at the service of Athens, much less at the service of Kleon. Awaiting the expected reinforcements, Kleon employed himself, first in an attack upon Stageirus in the Strymonic gulf, which was repulsed; next upon Galêpsus, on the coast opposite the island of Thasos, which was successful. But the reinforcements did not at once arrive, and being too weak to attack Amphipolis without them, he was obliged to remain inactive at Eion; while Brasidas on his side made no movement out of Amphipolis, but contented himself with keeping constant watch over the forces of Kleon, the view of which he commanded from his station on the hill of Kerdylion, on the western bank of the river-communication with Amphipolis by the bridge. Some days elapsed in such inaction on both sides; but the Athenian hoplites, becoming impatient of doing nothing, soon began to give vent to those feelings of dislike which they had brought out from Athens against their general, "whose ignorance and cowardice (says the historian) they contrasted with the skill and bravery of his opponent."[732] Athenian hoplites, if they felt such a sentiment, were not likely to refrain from manifesting it; and Kleon was presently made aware of the fact in a manner sufficiently painful to force him against his will into some movement; which, however, he did not intend to be anything else than a march for the purpose of surveying the ground all round the city, and a demonstration to escape the appearance of doing nothing, being aware that it was impossible to attack the place with any effect before his reinforcements arrived.

To comprehend the important incidents which followed, it is necessary to say a few words on the topography of Amphipolis, as far as we can understand it on the imperfect evidence before us. That city was placed on the left bank of the Strymon, on a conspicuous hill around which the river makes a bend, first in a southwesterly direction, then, after a short course to the southward, back in a southeasterly direction. Amphipolis had for its only artificial fortification one long wall, which began near the point northeast of the town, where the river narrows again into a channel, after passing through the lake Kerkinitis, ascended along the eastern side of the hill, crossing the ridge which connects it with Mount Pangæus, and then descended so as to touch the river again at another point south of the town; thus being, as it were, a string to the highly-bent bow formed by the river. On three sides therefore, north, west, and south, the city was defended only by the Strymon, and was thus visible without any intervening wall to spectators from the side of the sea (south), as well as from the side of the continent (or west and north).[733] At some little distance below the point where the wall touched the river south of the city, was the bridge,[734] a communication of great importance for the whole country, which connected the territory of Amphipolis with that of Argilus. On the western or right bank of the river, bordering it, and forming an outer bend corresponding to the bend of the river, was situated Mount Kerdylium: in fact, the course of the Strymon is here determined by these two steep eminences, Kerdylium on the west, and the hill of Amphipolis on the east, between which it flows. At the time when Brasidas first took the place, the bridge was totally unconnected with the long city wall; but during the intervening

eighteen months, he had erected a palisade work—probably an earthen bank topped with a palisade—connecting the two. By means of this palisade, the bridge was thus at the time of Kleon's expedition comprehended within the fortifications of the city; and Brasidas, while keeping watch on Mount Kerdylium, could pass over whenever he chose into the city, without any fear of impediment.[735]

In the march which Kleon now undertook, he went up to the top of the ridge which runs nearly in an easterly direction from Amphipolis to Mount Pangæus, in order to survey the city and its adjoining ground on the northern and northeastern side which he had not yet seen; that is, the side towards the lake, and towards Thrace, [736] which was not visible from the lower ground near Eion. The road which he was to take from Eion lay at a small distance eastward of the city long wall, and from the palisade which connected that wall with the bridge. But he had no expectation of being attacked in his march, the rather as Brasidas with the larger portion of his force was visible on Mount Kerdylium: moreover, the gates of Amphipolis were all shut, not a man was on the wall, nor were any symptoms of movement to be detected. As there was no evidence before him of intention to attack, he took no precautions, and marched in careless and disorderly array.[737] Having reached the top of the ridge, and posted his army on the strong eminence fronting the highest portion of the Long Wall, he surveyed at leisure the lake before him, and the side of the city which lay towards Thrace, or towards Myrkinus, Drabêskus, etc., thus viewing all the descending portion of the Long Wall northward towards the Strymon. The perfect quiescence of the city imposed upon and even astonished him: it seemed altogether undefended, and he almost fancied that, if he had brought battering-engines, he could have taken it forthwith.[738] Impressed with the belief that there was no enemy prepared to fight, he took his time to survey the ground; while his soldiers became more and more relaxed and careless in their trim, some even advancing close up to the walls and gates.

But this state of affairs was soon materially changed. Brasidas knew that the Athenian hoplites would not long endure the tedium of absolute inaction, and he calculated that by affecting extreme backwardness and apparent fear, he should seduce Kleon into some incautious movement of which advantage might be taken. His station on Mount Kerdylium enabled him to watch the march of the Athenian army from Eion, and when he saw them pass up along the road outside of the Long Wall of Amphipolis,[739] he immediately crossed the river with his forces and entered the town. But it was not his intention to march out and offer them open battle; for his army, though equal in number to theirs, was extremely inferior in arms and equipment;[740] in which points the Athenian force now present was so admirably provided, that his own men would not think themselves a match for it, if the two armies faced each other in open field. He relied altogether on the effect of sudden sally and well-timed surprise, when the Athenians should have been thrown into a feeling of contemptuous security by an exaggerated show of impotence in their enemy.

Having offered the battle sacrifice at the temple of Athênê, Brasidas called his men together to address to them the usual encouragements prior to an engagement. After appealing to the Dorian pride of his Peloponnesians, accustomed to triumph over Ionians, he explained to them his design of relying upon a bold and sudden movement with comparatively small numbers, against the Athenian army when not prepared for it,[741] when their courage was not wound up to battle pitch, and when, after carelessly mounting the hill to survey the ground, they were thinking only of quietly returning to quarters. He himself at the proper moment would rush out from one gate, and be foremost in conflict with the enemy: Klearidas, with that bravery which became him as a Spartan, would follow the example by sallying out from another gate: and the enemy, taken thus unawares, would probably make little resistance. For the Amphipolitans, this day and their own behavior would determine whether they were to be allies of Lacedæmon, or slaves of Athens, perhaps sold into captivity or even put to death as a punishment for their recent revolt.

These preparations, however, could not be completed in secrecy; for Brasidas and his army were perfectly visible while descending the hill of Kerdylium, crossing the bridge and entering Amphipolis, to the Athenian scouts without: moreover, so conspicuous was the interior of the city to spectators without, that the temple of Athênê, and Brasidas with its ministers around him, performing the ceremony of sacrifice, was distinctly recognized. The fact was made known to Kleon as he stood on the high ridge taking his survey, while at the same time those who had gone near to the gates reported that the feet of many horses and men were beginning to be seen under them, as if preparing for a sally.[742] He himself went close to the gate, and satisfied himself of this circumstance: we must recollect that there was no defender on the walls, and no danger from missiles. Anxious to avoid coming to any real engagement before his reinforcements should arrive, he at once gave orders for retreat, which he thought might be accomplished before the attack from within could be fully organized; for he imagined that a considerable number of troops would be marched out, and ranged in battle order, before the attack was actually begun, not dreaming that the sally would be instantaneous, made with a mere handful of men. Orders having been proclaimed to wheel to the left, and retreat in column on the left flank towards Eion, Kleon, who was himself on the top of the hill with the right wing, waited only to see his left and centre actually in march on the road to Eion, and then directed his right also to wheel to the left and follow them.

The whole Athenian army were thus in full retreat, marching in a direction nearly parallel to the Long Wall of Amphipolis, with their right or unshielded side exposed to the enemy, when Brasidas, looking over the southernmost gates of the Long Wall with his small detachment ready marshalled near him, burst out into contemptuous exclamations on the disorder of their array.[743] "These men will not stand us; I see it by the quivering of their spears and of their heads. Men who reel about in that way,

never stand an assailing enemy. Open the gates for me instantly, and let us sally out with confidence."

With that, both the gate of the Long Wall nearest to the palisade, and the adjoining gate of the palisade itself, were suddenly thrown open, and Brasidas with his one hundred and fifty chosen soldiers issued out through them to attack the retreating Athenians. Running rapidly down the straight road which joined laterally the road towards Eion along which the Athenians were marching, he charged their central division on the right flank:[744] their left wing had already got beyond him on the road towards Eion. Taken completely unprepared, conscious of their own disorderly array, and astounded at the boldness of their enemy, the Athenians of the centre were seized with panic, made not the least resistance, and presently fled. Even the Athenian left, though not attacked at all, instead of halting to lend assistance, shared the panic and fled in disorder. Having thus disorganized this part of the army, Brasidas passed along the line to press his attack on the Athenian right: but in this movement he was mortally wounded and carried off the field, unobserved by his enemies. Meanwhile Klearidas, sallying forth from the Thracian gate, had attacked the Athenian right on the ridge opposite to him, immediately after it began its retreat. But the soldiers on the Athenian right had probably seen the previous movement of Brasidas against the other division, and though astonished at the sudden danger, had thus a moment's warning, before they were themselves assailed, to halt and take close rank on the hill. Klearidas here found a considerable resistance, in spite of the desertion of Kleon; who, more astonished than any man in his army by a catastrophe so unlooked for, lost his presence of mind and fled at once; but was overtaken by a Thracian peltast from Myrkinus and slain. His soldiers on the right wing, however, repelled two or three attacks in front from Klearidas, and maintained their ground, until at length the Chalkidian cavalry and the peltasts from Myrkinus, having come forth out of the gates, assailed them with missiles in flank and rear so as to throw them into disorder. The whole Athenian army was thus put to flight; the left hurrying to Eion, the men of the right dispersing and seeking safety among the hilly grounds of Pangæus in their rear. Their sufferings and loss in the flight, from the hands of the pursuing peltasts and cavalry, were most severe: and when they at last again mustered at Eion, not only the commander Kleon, but six hundred Athenian hoplites, half of the force sent out, were found missing.[745]

So admirably had the attack been concerted, and so entire was its success, that only seven men perished on the side of the victors. But of those seven, one was the gallant Brasidas himself, who being carried into Amphipolis, lived just long enough to learn the complete victory of his troops and then expired. Great and bitter was the sorrow which his death occasioned throughout Thrace, especially among the Amphipolitans. He received, by special decree, the distinguished honor of interment within their city, the universal habit being to inter even the most eminent deceased persons in a suburb without the walls. All the allies attended his funeral in arms and

with military honors: his tomb was encircled by a railing, and the space immediately fronting it was consecrated as the great agora of the city, which was remodelled accordingly. He was also proclaimed œkist, or founder, of Amphipolis, and as such, received heroic worship with annual games and sacrifices to his honor.[746] The Athenian Agnon, the real founder and originally recognized œkist of the city, was stripped of all his commemorative honors and expunged from the remembrance of the people: his tomb and the buildings connected with it, together with every visible memento of his name, being destroyed. Full of hatred as the Amphipolitans now were towards Athens,—and not merely of hatred, but of fear, since the loss which they had just sustained of their saviour and protector,—they felt repugnance to the idea of rendering farther worship to an Athenian œkist. Nor was it convenient to keep up such a religious link with Athens, now that they were forced to look anxiously to Lacedæmon for assistance. Klearidas, as governor of Amphipolis, superintended those numerous alterations in the city which this important change required, together with the erection of the trophy, just at the spot where Brasidas had first charged the Athenians; while the remaining armament of Athens, having obtained the usual truce and buried their dead, returned home without farther operations.

There are few battles recorded in history wherein the disparity and contrast of the two generals opposed has been so manifest,—consummate skill and courage on the one side against ignorance and panic on the other. On the singular ability and courage of Brasidas there can be but one verdict of unqualified admiration: but the criticism passed by Thucydidês on Kleon, here as elsewhere, cannot be adopted without reserves. He tells us that Kleon undertook his march, from Eion up to the hill in front of Amphipolis, in the same rash and confident spirit with which he had embarked on the enterprise against Pylus, in the blind confidence that no one would resist him.[747] Now I have already, in a former chapter, shown grounds for concluding that the anticipations of Kleon respecting the capture of Sphakteria, far from being marked by any spirit of unmeasured presumption, were sober and judicious, realized to the letter without any unlooked-for aid from fortune. Nor are the remarks, here made by Thucydidês on that affair, more reasonable than the judgment on it in his former chapter; for it is not true, as he here implies, that Kleon expected no resistance in Sphakteria: he calculated on resistance, but knew that he had force sufficient to overcome it. His fault even at Amphipolis, great as that fault was, did not consist in rashness and presumption. This charge at least is rebutted by the circumstance, that he himself wished to make no aggressive movement until his reinforcements should arrive, and that he was only constrained, against his own will, to abandon his intended temporary inactivity during that interval, by the angry murmurs of his soldiers, who reproached him with ignorance and backwardness, the latter quality being the reverse of that with which he is branded by Thucydidês.

When Kleon was thus driven to do something, his march up to the top of the hill, for the purpose of reconnoitring the ground, was not in itself unreasonable, and

might have been accomplished in perfect safety, if he had kept his army in orderly array, prepared for contingencies. But he suffered himself to be completely out-generalled and overreached by that simulated consciousness of impotence and unwillingness to fight, which Brasidas took care to present to him. Among all military stratagems, this has perhaps been the most frequently practised with success against inexperienced generals, who are thrown off their guard and induced to neglect precaution, not because they are naturally more rash or presumptuous than ordinary men, but because nothing except either a high order of intellect, or special practice and training, will enable a man to keep steadily present to his mind liabilities even real and serious, when there is no discernible evidence to suggest their approach; much more when there *is* positive evidence, artfully laid out by a superior enemy, to create belief in their absence. A fault substantially the same had been committed by Thucydidês himself and his colleague Euklês a year and a half before, when they suffered Brasidas to surprise the Strymonian bridge and Amphipolis: not even taking common precautions, nor thinking it necessary to keep the fleet at Eion. They were not men peculiarly rash and presumptuous, but ignorant and unpractised, in a military sense; incapable of keeping before them dangerous contingencies which they perfectly knew, simply because there was no present evidence of approaching explosion.

This military incompetence, which made Kleon fall into the trap laid for him by Brasidas, also made him take wrong measures against the danger, when he unexpectedly discovered at last that the enemy within were preparing to attack him. His fatal error consisted in giving instant order for retreat, under the vain hope that he could get away before the enemy's attack could be brought to bear.[748] An abler officer, before he commenced the retreating march so close to the hostile walls, would have taken care to marshal his men in proper array, to warn and address them with the usual harangue, and to wind up their courage to the fighting-point: for up to that moment they had no idea of being called upon to fight; and the courage of Grecian hoplites, taken thus unawares while hurrying to get away in disorder visible both to themselves and their enemies, without any of the usual preliminaries of battle, was but too apt to prove deficient. To turn the right or unshielded flank to the enemy, was unavoidable from the direction of the retreating movement; nor is it reasonable to blame Kleon for this, as some historians have done, or for causing his right wing to move too soon in following the lead of the left, as Dr. Arnold seems to think. The grand fault seems to have consisted in not waiting to marshal his men and prepare them for standing fight during their retreat. Let us add, however, and the remark, if it serves to explain Kleon's idea of being able to get away before he was actually assailed, counts as a double compliment to the judgment as well as boldness of Brasidas, that no other Lacedæmonian general of that day perhaps, not even Demosthenês, the most enterprising general of Athens, would have ventured upon an attack with so very small a band, relying altogether upon the panic produced by his sudden movement.

But the absence of military knowledge and precaution is not the worst of Kleon's faults on this occasion. His want of courage at the moment of conflict is yet more lamentable, and divests his end of that personal sympathy which would otherwise have accompanied it. A commander who has been out-generalled is under a double force of obligation to exert and expose himself, to the uttermost, in order to retrieve the consequences of his own mistakes. He will thus at least preserve his own personal honor, whatever censure he may deserve on the score of deficient knowledge and judgment.[749]

What is said about the disgraceful flight of Kleon himself, must be applied, with hardly less severity of criticism, to the Athenian hoplites under him. They behaved in a manner altogether unworthy of the reputation of their city; especially the left wing, which seems to have broken and run away without waiting to be attacked. And when we read in Thucydidês, that the men who thus disgraced themselves were among the best, and the best-armed hoplites in Athens; that they came out unwillingly under Kleon; that they began their scornful murmurs against him before he had committed any fault, despising him for backwardness when he was yet not strong enough to attempt anything serious, and was only manifesting a reasonable prudence in waiting the arrival of expected reinforcements; when we read this, we shall be led to compare the expedition against Amphipolis with former manœuvres respecting the attack of Sphakteria, and to discern other causes for its failure besides the military incompetence of the commander. These hoplites brought out with them from Athens the feelings prevalent among the political adversaries of Kleon. The expedition was proposed and carried by him, contrary to their wishes: they could not prevent it, but their opposition enfeebled it from the beginning, kept within too narrow limits the force assigned to it, and was one main reason which frustrated its success.

Had Periklês been alive, Amphipolis might perhaps still have been lost, since its capture was the fault of the officers employed to defend it. But if lost, it would probably have been attacked and recovered with the same energy as the revolted Samos had been, with the full force and the best generals that Athens could furnish. With such an armament under good officers, there was nothing at all impracticable in the reconquest of the place; especially as at that time it had no defence on three sides except the Strymon, and might thus be approached by Athenian ships on that navigable river. The armament of Kleon,[750] even if his reinforcements had arrived, was hardly sufficient for the purpose. But Periklês would have been able to concentrate upon it the whole strength of the city, without being paralyzed by the contentions of political party: he would have seen as clearly as Kleon, that the place could only be recovered by force, and that its recovery was the most important object to which Athens could devote her energies.

It was thus that the Athenians, partly from political intrigue, partly from the incompetence of Kleon, underwent a disastrous defeat instead of carrying Amphipolis.

But the death of Brasidas converted their defeat into a substantial victory. There remained no Spartan either like or second to that eminent man, either as a soldier or a conciliating politician; none who could replace him in the confidence and affection of the allies of Athens in Thrace; none who could prosecute those enterprising plans against Athens on her unshielded side, which he had first shown to be practicable. The fears of Athens, and the hopes of Sparta, in respect to the future, disappeared alike with him. The Athenian generals, Phormio and Demosthenês, had both of them acquired among the Akarnanians an influence personal to themselves, apart from their post and from their country: but the career of Brasidas, exhibited an extent of personal ascendency and admiration, obtained as well as deserved, such as had never before been paralleled by any military chieftain in Greece: and Plato might well select him as the most suitable historical counterpart to the heroic Achilles.[751] All the achievements of Brasidas were his own individually, with nothing more than bare encouragement, sometimes even without encouragement, from his country. And when we recollect the strict and narrow routine in which as a Spartan he had been educated, so fatal to the development of everything like original thought or impulse, and so completely estranged from all experience of party or political discussion, we are amazed at his resource and flexibility of character, his power of adapting himself to new circumstances and new persons, and his felicitous dexterity in making himself the rallying-point of opposite political parties in each of the various cities which he acquired. The combination "of every sort of practical excellence," valor, intelligence, probity, and gentleness of dealing, which his character presented, was never forgotten among the subject-allies of Athens, and procured for other Spartan officers in subsequent years favorable presumptions, which their conduct was seldom found to realize.[752] At the time when Brasidas perished, in the flower of his age, he was unquestionably the first man in Greece; and though it is not given to us to predict what he would have become had he lived, we may be sure that the future course of the war would have been sensibly modified; perhaps even to the advantage of Athens, since she might have had sufficient occupation at home to keep her from the disastrous enterprise in Sicily.

Thucydidês seems to take pleasure in setting forth the gallant exploits of Brasidas, from the first at Methônê to the last at Amphipolis, not less than the dark side of Kleon; both, though in different senses, the causes of his banishment. He never mentions the latter except in connection with some proceeding represented as unwise or discreditable. The barbarities which the offended majesty of empire thought itself entitled to practise in ancient times against dependencies revolted and reconquered, reach their maximum in the propositions against Mitylênê and Skiônê: both of them are ascribed to Kleon by name as their author. But when we come to the slaughter of the Melians, equally barbarous, and worse in respect to grounds of excuse, inasmuch as the Melians had never been subjects of Athens, we find Thucydidês mentioning the deed without naming the proposer.[753]

Respecting the foreign policy of Kleon, the facts already narrated will enable the reader to form an idea of it as compared with that of his opponents. I have shown grounds for believing that Thucydidês has forgotten his usual impartiality in criticizing this personal enemy; that in regard to Sphakteria, Kleon was really one main and indispensable cause of procuring for his country the greatest advantage which she obtained throughout the whole war; and that in regard to his judgment as advocating the prosecution of war, three different times must be distinguished: 1. After the first blockade of the hoplites in Sphakteria; 2. After the capture of the island; 3. After the expiration of the one year truce. On the earliest of those three occasions he was wrong, for he seems to have shut the door on all possibilities of negotiation, by his manner of dealing with the Lacedæmonian envoys. On the second occasion, he had fair and plausible grounds to offer on behalf of his opinion, though it turned out unfortunate: moreover, at that time, all Athens was warlike, and Kleon is not to be treated as the peculiar adviser of that policy. On the third and last occasion, after the expiration of the truce, the political counsel of Kleon was right, judicious, and truly Periklêan, much surpassing in wisdom that of his opponents. We shall see in the coming chapters how those opponents managed the affairs of the state after his death; how Nikias threw away the interests of Athens in the enforcement of the conditions of peace; how Nikias and Alkibiadês together shipwrecked the power of their country on the shores of Syracuse. And when we judge the demagogue Kleon in this comparison, we shall find ground for remarking that Thucydidês is reserved and even indulgent towards the errors and vices of other statesmen, harsh only towards those of his accuser.

As to the internal policy of Kleon, and his conduct as a politician in Athenian constitutional life, we have but little trustworthy evidence. There exists, indeed, a portrait of him, drawn in colors broad and glaring, most impressive to the imagination, and hardly effaceable from the memory; the portrait in the "Knights" of Aristophanês. It is through this representation that Kleon has been transmitted to posterity, crucified by a poet who admits himself to have had a personal grudge against him, just as he has been commemorated in the prose of an historian whose banishment he had proposed. Of all the productions of Aristophanês, so replete with comic genius throughout, the "Knights" is the most consummate and irresistible; the most distinct in its character, symmetry, and purpose. Looked at with a view to the object of its author, both in reference to the audience and to Kleon, it deserves the greatest possible admiration, and we are not surprised to learn that it obtained the first prize. It displays the maximum of that which wit combined with malice can achieve, in covering an enemy with ridicule, contempt, and odium. Dean Swift would have desired nothing worse, even for Ditton and Winston. The old man, Demos of Pnyx, introduced on the stage as personifying the Athenian people,—Kleon, brought on as his newly-bought Paphlagonian slave, who by coaxing, lying, impudent and false denunciation of others, has gained his master's ear, and heaps ill-usage upon every one else, while he enriches himself,—the Knights, or chief members of what we may call

the Athenian aristocracy, forming the Chorus of the piece as Kleon's pronounced enemies,—the sausage-seller from the market-place, who, instigated by Nikias find Demosthenês along with these Knights, overdoes Kleon in all his own low arts, and supplants him in the favor of Demos; all this, exhibited with inimitable vivacity of expression, forms the masterpiece and glory of libellous comedy. The effect produced upon the Athenian audience when this piece was represented at the Lenæan festival, January B.C. 424, about six months after the capture of Sphakteria, with Kleon himself and most of the real Knights present, must have been intense beyond what we can now easily imagine. That Kleon could maintain himself after this humiliating exposure, is no small proof of his mental vigor and ability. It does not seem to have impaired his influence, at least not permanently; for not only do we see him the most effective opponent of peace during the next two years, but there is ground for believing that the poet himself found it convenient to soften his tone towards this powerful enemy.

So ready are most writers to find Kleon guilty, that they are satisfied with Aristophanês as a witness against him: though no other public man, of any age or nation, has ever been condemned upon such evidence. No man thinks of judging Sir Robert Walpole, or Mr. Fox, or Mirabeau, from the numerous lampoons put in circulation against them: no man will take measure of a political Englishman from Punch, or of a Frenchman from the Charivari. The unrivalled comic merit of the "Knights" of Aristophanês is only one reason the more for distrusting the resemblance of its picture to the real Kleon. We have means too of testing the candor and accuracy of Aristophanês by his delineation of Sokratês, whom he introduced in the comedy of "Clouds" in the year after that of the "Knights." As a comedy, the "Clouds" stands second only to the "Knights": as a picture of Sokratês, it is little better than pure fancy: it is not even a caricature, but a totally different person. We may indeed perceive single features of resemblance; the bare feet, and the argumentative subtlety, belong to both; but the entire portrait is such, that if it bore a different name, no one would think of comparing it with Sokratês, whom we know well from other sources. With such an analogy before us, not to mention what we know generally of the portraits of Periklês by these authors, we are not warranted in treating the portrait of Kleon as a likeness, except on points where there is corroborative evidence. And we may add, that some of the hits against him, where we can accidentally test their pertinence, are decidedly not founded in fact; as, for example, where the poet accuses Kleon of having deliberately and cunningly robbed Demosthenês of his laurels in the enterprise against Sphakteria.[754]

In the prose of Thucydidês, we find Kleon described as a dishonest politician, a wrongful accuser of others, the most violent of all the citizens:[755] throughout the verse of Aristophanês, these same charges are set forth with his characteristic emphasis, but others are also superadded; Kleon practises the basest artifices and deceptions to gain favor with the people, steals the public money, receives bribes, and

extorts compositions from private persons by wholesale, and thus enriches himself under pretence of zeal for the public treasury. In the comedy of the Acharnians, represented one year earlier than the Knights, the poet alludes with great delight to a sum of five talents, which Kleon had been compelled "to disgorge": a present tendered to him by the insular subjects of Athens, if we may believe Theopompus, for the purpose of procuring a remission of their tribute, and which the Knights, whose evasions of military service he had exposed, compelled him to relinquish.[756]

But when we put together the different heads of indictment accumulated by Aristophanês, it will be found that they are not easily reconcilable one with the other; for an Athenian, whose temper led him to violent crimination of others, at the inevitable price of multiplying and exasperating personal enemies, would find it peculiarly dangerous, if not impossible, to carry on peculation for his own account. If, on the other hand, he took the latter turn, he would be inclined to purchase connivance from others even by winking at real guilt on their part, far from making himself conspicuous as a calumniator of innocence. We must therefore discuss the side of the indictment which is indicated in Thucydidês; not Kleon, as truckling to the people and cheating for his own pecuniary profit (which is certainly not the character implied in his speech about the Mitylenæans, as given to us by the historian),[757] but Kleon as a man of violent temper and fierce political antipathies, a bitter speaker, and sometimes dishonest in his calumnies against adversaries. These are the qualities which, in all countries of free debate, go to form what is called a great opposition speaker. It was thus that the elder Cato, "the universal biter, whom Persephonê was afraid even to admit into Hades after his death," was characterized at Rome, even by the admission of his admirers to some extent, and in a still stronger manner by those who were unfriendly to him, as Thucydidês was to Kleon.[758] In Cato, such a temper was not inconsistent with a high sense of public duty. And Plutarch recounts an anecdote respecting Kleon, that, on first beginning his political career, he called his friends together, and dissolved his intimacy with them, conceiving that private friendships would distract him from his paramount duty to the commonwealth.[759]

Moreover, the reputation of Kleon as a frequent and unmeasured accuser of others, may be explained partly by a passage of his enemy Aristophanês: a passage the more deserving of confidence as a just representation of fact, since it appears in a comedy (the "Frogs") represented (405 B.C.) fifteen years after the death of Kleon, and five years after that of Hyperbolus, when the poet had less motive for misrepresentations against either. In the "Frogs," the scene is laid in Hades, whither the god Dionysus goes, in the attire of Hêraklês and along with his slave Xanthias, for the purpose of bringing up again to earth the deceased poet Euripidês. Among the incidents, Xanthias, in the attire which his master had worn, is represented as acting with violence and insult towards two hostesses of eating-houses; consuming their substance, robbing them, refusing to pay when called upon, and even threatening their lives with a drawn sword. Upon which the women, having no other redress left,

announce their resolution of calling, the one upon her protector Kleon, the other on Hyperbolus, for the purpose of bringing the offender to justice before the dikastery. [760] This passage shows us, if inferences on comic evidence are to be held as admissible, that Kleon and Hyperbolus became involved in accusations partly by helping poor persons who had been wronged to obtain justice before the dikastery. A rich man who had suffered injury might apply to Antipho or some other rhetor for paid advice and aid as to the conduct of his complaint; but a poor man or woman would think themselves happy to obtain the gratuitous suggestion, and sometimes the auxiliary speech, of Kleon or Hyperbolus; who would thus extend their own popularity, by means very similar to those practised by the leading men in Rome.[761]

But besides lending aid to others, doubtless Kleon was often also a prosecutor, in his own name, of official delinquents, real or alleged. That some one should undertake this duty was indispensable for the protection of the city; otherwise, the responsibility to which official persons were subjected after their term of office would have been merely nominal: and we have proof enough that the general public morality of these official persons, acting individually, was by no means high. But the duty was at the same time one which most persons would and did shun. The prosecutor, while obnoxious to general dislike, gained nothing even by the most complete success; and if he failed so much as not to procure a minority of votes among the dikasts, equal to one-fifth of the numbers present, he was condemned to pay a fine of one thousand drachms. What was still more serious, he drew upon himself a formidable mass of private hatred, from the friends, partisans, and the political club, of the accused party, extremely menacing to his own future security and comfort, in a community like Athens. There was therefore little motive to accept, and great motive to decline, the task of prosecuting on public grounds. A prudent politician at Athens would undertake it occasionally, and against special rivals, but he would carefully guard himself against the reputation of doing it frequently or by inclination, and the orators constantly do so guard themselves in those speeches which yet remain.

It is this reputation which Thucydidês fastens upon Kleon, and which, like Cato the censor at Rome, he probably merited; from native acrimony of temper, from a powerful talent for invective and from his position, both inferior and hostile to the Athenian knights, or aristocracy, who overshadowed him by their family importance. But in what proportion of cases his accusations were just or calumnious, the real question upon which a candid judgment turns, we have no means of deciding, either in his case or that of Cato. "To lash the wicked (observes Aristophanês himself[762]) is not only no blame, but is even a matter of honor to the good." It has not been common to allow to Kleon the benefit of this observation, though he is much more entitled to it than Aristophanês. For the attacks of a poetical libeller admit neither of defence nor retaliation; whereas a prosecutor before the dikastery found his opponent prepared to reply or even to retort, and was obliged to specify his charge, as well as

to furnish proof of it; so that there was a fair chance for the innocent man not to be confounded with the guilty.

The quarrel of Kleon with Aristophanês is said to have arisen out of an accusation which he brought against that poet[763] in the Senate of Five Hundred, on the subject of his second comedy, the "Babylonians," exhibited B.C. 426, at the festival of the urban Dionysia in the month of March. At that season many strangers were present at Athens, and especially many visitors and deputies from the subject-allies, who were bringing their annual tribute: and as the "Babylonians," (now lost), like so many other productions of Aristophanês, was full of slashing ridicule, not only against individual citizens but against the functionaries and institutions of the city,[764] Kleon instituted a complaint against it in the senate, as an exposure dangerous to the public security before strangers and allies. We have to recollect that Athens was then in the midst of an embarrassing war; that the fidelity of her subject-allies was much doubted; that Lesbos, the greatest of her allies, had been reconquered only in the preceding year, after a revolt both troublesome and perilous to the Athenians. Under such circumstances, Kleon had good reason for thinking that a political comedy of the Aristophanic vein and talent tended to degrade the city in the eyes of strangers, even granting that it was innocuous when confined to the citizens themselves. The poet complains[765] that Kleon summoned him before the senate, with terrible threats and calumny: but it does not appear that any penalty was inflicted. Nor, indeed, had the senate competence to find him guilty or punish him except to the extent of a small fine: they could only bring him to trial before the dikastery, which in this case plainly was not done. He himself, however, seems to have felt the justice of the warning: for we find that three out of his four next following plays, before the Peace of Nikias,—the Acharnians, the Knights, and the Wasps,—were represented at the Lenæan festival,[766] in the month of January, a season when no strangers nor allies were present. Kleon was doubtless much incensed with the play of the Knights, and seems to have annoyed the poet either by bringing an indictment against him for exercising freemen's rights without being duly qualified, since none but citizens were allowed to appear and act in the dramatic exhibitions, or by some other means which are not clearly explained. Nor can we make out in what way the poet met him, though it appears that finding less public sympathy than he thought himself entitled to, he made an apology without intending to be bound by it.[767] Certain it is, that his remaining plays subsequent to the Knights, though containing some few bitter jests against Kleon, manifest no second deliberate set against him.

The battle of Amphipolis removed at once the two most pronounced individual opponents of peace, Kleon and Brasidas. Athens too was more than ever discouraged and averse to prolonged fighting; for the number of hoplites slain at Amphipolis doubtless filled the city with mourning, besides the unparalleled disgrace now tarnishing Athenian soldiership. The peace-party under the auspices of Nikias and Lachês, relieved at once from the internal opposition of Kleon, as well as from the

foreign enterprise of Brasidas, were enabled to resume their negotiations with Sparta in a spirit promising success. King Pleistoanax, and the Spartan ephors of the year, were on their side equally bent on terminating the war, and the deputies of all the allies were convoked at Sparta for discussion with the envoys of Athens. Such discussion was continued during the whole autumn and winter after the battle of Amphipolis, without any actual hostilities on either side. At first, the pretensions advanced were found very conflicting; but at length, after several debates, it was agreed to treat upon the basis of each party surrendering what had been acquired by war. The Athenians insisted at first on the restoration of Platæa; but the Thebans replied that Platæa was theirs neither by force nor by treason, but by voluntary capitulation and surrender of the inhabitants. This distinction seems to our ideas somewhat remarkable, since the capitulation of a besieged town is not less the result of force than capture by storm. But it was adopted in the present treaty; and under it the Athenians, while foregoing their demand of Platæa, were enabled to retain Nisæa, which they had acquired from the Megarians, and Anaktorium and Sollium,[768] which they had taken from Corinth. To insure accommodating temper on the part of Athens, the Spartans held out the threat of invading Attica in the spring, and of establishing a permanent fortification in the territory: and they even sent round proclamation to their allies, enjoining all the details requisite for this step. Since Attica had now been exempt from invasion for three years, the Athenians were probably not insensible to this threat of renewal under a permanent form.

At the beginning of spring, about the end of March, 421 B.C., shortly after the urban Dionysia at Athens, the important treaty was concluded for the term of fifty years. The following were its principal conditions:—

1. All shall have full liberty to visit all the public temples of Greece, for purposes of private sacrifice, consultation of oracle, or public sacred mission. Every man shall be undisturbed both in going and coming. [The value of this article will be felt, when we recollect that the Athenians and their allies had been unable to visit the Olympic or Pythian festival since the beginning of the war.]

2. The Delphians shall enjoy full autonomy and mastery of their temple and their territory. [This article was intended to exclude the ancient claim of the Phocian confederacy to the management of the temple; a claim which the Athenians had once supported, before the thirty years' truce: but they had now little interest in the matter, since the Phocians were in the ranks of their enemies.]

3. There shall be peace for fifty years, between Athens and Sparta with their respective allies, with abstinence from mischief, either overt or fraudulent, by land as well as by sea.

4. Neither party shall invade for purposes of mischief the territory of the other, not by any artifice or under any pretence.

Should any subject of difference arise, it shall be settled by equitable means, and by oaths tendered and taken, in form to be hereafter agreed on.

5. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the Athenians.

They shall farther *relinquish* to the Athenians Argilus, Stageirus, Akanthus, Skôlus, Olynthus, and Spartôlus. But these cities shall remain autonomous, on condition of paying tribute to Athens according to the assessment of Aristeidês. Any of their citizens who may choose to quit them shall be at liberty to do so, and to carry away his property. Nor shall the cities be counted hereafter either as allies of Athens or of Sparta, unless Athens shall induce them by amicable persuasions to become her allies, which she is at liberty to do if she can.

The inhabitants of Mekyberna, Sanê, and Singê, shall dwell independently in their respective cities, just as much as the Olynthians and Akanthians. [These were towns which adhered to Athens, and were still numbered as her allies; though they were near enough to be molested by Olynthus[769] and Akanthus, against which this clause was intended to insure them.]

The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall also restore Panaktum to the Athenians.

6. The Athenians shall restore to Sparta Koryphasium, Kythêra, Methônê, Pteleum, Atalantê, with all the captives in their hands from Sparta or her allies. They shall farther release all Spartans or allies of Sparta now blocked up in Skiônê.

7. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall also restore all the captives in their hands, from Athens or her allies.

8. Respecting Skiônê, Torônê, Sermylus, or any other town in the possession of Athens, the Athenians may take their own measures.

9. Oaths shall be exchanged between the contracting parties, according to the solemnities held most binding in each city respectively, and in the following words: "I will adhere to this convention and truce sincerely and without fraud." The oaths shall be annually renewed, and the terms of peace shall be inscribed on columns at Olympia, Delphi, and the Isthmus, as well as at Sparta and Athens.

10. Should any matter have been forgotten in the present convention, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians may alter it by mutual understanding and consent, without being held to violate their oaths.

These oaths were accordingly exchanged: they were taken by seventeen principal Athenians, and as many Spartans, on behalf of their respective countries, on the 26th day of the month Artemisius at Sparta, and on the 24th day of Elaphebolion at Athens, immediately after the urban Dionysia; Pleistolas being ephor eponymus at Sparta, and Alkæus archon eponymus at Athens. Among the Lacedæmonians swearing, are included the two kings Agis and Pleistoanax, the ephor Pleistolas, and per-

haps other ephors, but this we do not know, and Tellis, the father of Brasidas. Among the Athenians sworn, are comprised Nikias, Lachês, Agnon, Lamachus, and Demosthenês.[770]

Such was the peace—commonly known by the name of the Peace of Nikias—concluded in the beginning of the eleventh spring of the war, which had just lasted ten full years. Its conditions were put to the vote at Sparta, in the assembly of deputies from the Lacedæmonian allies, the majority of whom accepted them: which, according to the condition adopted and sworn to by every member of the confederacy,[771] made it binding upon all. There was, indeed, a special reserve allowed to any particular state in case of religious scruple, arising out of the fear of offending some of their gods or heroes, but, saving this reserve, the peace had been formally acceded to by the decision of the confederates. But it soon appeared how little the vote of the majority was worth, even when enforced by the strong pressure of Lacedæmon herself, when the more powerful members were among the dissentient minority. The Bœotians, Megarians, and Corinthians, all refused to accept it; nor does it seem that any deputies from the allies took the oath along with the Lacedæmonian envoys; though the truce for a year, two years before,[772] had been sworn to by Lacedæmonian, Corinthian, Megarian, Sikyonian, and Epidaurian envoys.

The Corinthians were displeased because they did not recover Sollium and Anaktorium; the Megarians, because they did not regain Nisæa; the Bœotians, because they were required to surrender Panaktum. In spite of the urgent solicitations of Sparta, the deputies of all these powerful states not only denounced the peace as unjust, and voted against it in the general assembly of allies, but refused to accept it when the vote was carried, and went home to their respective cities for instructions. [773]

Such were the conditions, and such the accompanying circumstances, of the Peace of Nikias, which terminated, or professed to terminate, the great Peloponnesian war, after a duration of ten years. Its consequences and fruits, in many respects such as were not anticipated by either of the concluding parties, will be seen in my next volume.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Xenophon, Memorab. iii, 5, 18.

[2] Thucyd. v. 30: about the Spartan confederacy,—εἰρημένον, κύριον εἶναι, ὅ,τι ἂν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ξυμμάχων ψηφίσηται, ἢν μή τι θεῶν ἢ ἡρώων κώλυμα ᾖ.

[3] Thucyd. ii, 63. τῆς τε πόλεως ὑμᾶς εἰκὸς τῷ τιμωμένῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄρχειν, ᾧπερ ἅπαντες ἀγάλλεσθε, βοηθεῖν, καὶ μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς πόνους, ἢ μηδὲ τὰς τιμὰς διώκειν, etc.

[4] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 12.

[5] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 11.

[6] Aristophan. Vesp. 707.

[7] The island of Kythêra was conquered by the Athenians from Sparta in 425 B.C., and the annual tribute then imposed upon it was four talents (Thucyd. iv, 57). In the Inscription No. 143, ap. Boeckh, Corp. Inscr., we find some names enumerated of tributary towns, with the amount of tribute opposite to each, but the stone is too much damaged to give us much information. Tyrodiza, in Thrace, paid one thousand drachms: some other towns, or junctions of towns, not clearly discernible, are rated at one thousand, two thousand, three thousand drachms, one talent, and even ten talents. This inscription must be anterior to 415 B.C., when the tribute was converted into a five per cent. duty upon imports and exports: see Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, and his Notes upon the above-mentioned Inscription.

It was the practice of Athens not always to rate each tributary city separately, but sometimes to join several in one collective rating; probably each responsible for the rest. This seems to have provoked occasional remonstrances from the allies, in some of which the rhetor, Antipho, was employed to furnish the speech which the complainants pronounced before the dikastery: see Antipho ap. Harpokration, v. Ἀπόταξις—Συντελεῖς. It is greatly to be lamented that the orations composed by Antipho, for the Samothrakians and Lindians,—the latter inhabiting one of the three separate towns in the island of Rhodes,—have not been preserved.

[8] Xenophon, Anab. vii, 1, 27. οὐ μεῖον χιλίων ταλάντων: compare Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, b. iii, ch. 7, 15, 19.

[9] Aristophan. Vesp. 660. τάλαντ᾽ ἐγγὺς δισχίλια.

[10] Very excellent writers on Athenian antiquity (Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, c. 15, 19, b. iii; Schömann, Antiq. J. P. Att. sect. lxxiv; K. F. Hermann, Gr. Staatsalterthümer, sect. 157: compare, however, a passage in Boeckh, ch. 17, p. 421, Eng. transl., where he seems to be of an opposite opinion) accept this statement, that the tribute levied by Athenians upon her allies was doubled some years after the commencement of the Peloponnesian war,—at which time it was six hundred talents,—and that it came to amount to twelve hundred talents. Nevertheless, I cannot follow them, upon the simple authority of Æschinês, and the Pseudo-Andokidês (Æschin. De Fals. Legat. c. 54, p. 301; Andokidês, De Pace, c. 1, and the same orator cont. Alkibiad. c. 4). For we may state pretty confidently, that neither of the two orations here ascribed to Andokidês is genuine: the oration against Alkibiadês most decidedly not genuine. There remains, therefore, as an original evidence, only the passage of Æschinês, which has, apparently, been copied by the author of the Oration De Pace, ascribed to Andokidês. Now the chapter of Æschinês, which professes to furnish a general but brief sketch of Athenian history for the century succeeding the Persian invasion, is so full of historical and chronological inaccuracies, that we can hardly accept it, when standing alone, as authority for any matter of fact. In a note on the chapter immediately preceding, I have already touched upon its extraordinary looseness of statement,—pointed out by various commentators, among them particularly by Mr. Fynes Clinton: see above, chap. xlv, note [2], pp. 409-411, in the preceding volume.

The assertion, therefore, that the tribute from the Athenian allies was raised to the sum of twelve hundred talents annually, comes to us only from the orator Æschinês as an original witness: and in him it forms part of a tissue of statements alike confused and incorrect. But against it we have a powerful negative argument,—the

perfect silence of Thucydidês. Is it possible that that historian would have omitted all notice of a step so very important in its effects, if Athens had really adopted it? He mentions to us the commutation by Athens of the tribute from her allies into a duty of five per cent. payable by them on their exports and imports (vii, 28)—this was in the nineteenth year of the war, 413 B.C. But anything like the duplication of the tribute all at once, would have altered much more materially the relations between Athens and her allies and would have constituted in the minds of the latter a substantive grievance, such as to aggravate the motive for revolt in a manner which Thucydidês could hardly fail to notice. The orator Æschinês refers the augmentation of the tribute, up to twelve hundred talents, to the time succeeding the peace of Nikias: M. Boeckh (Public Econ. of Athens, b. iii, ch. 15-19, pp. 400-434) supposes it to have taken place earlier than the representation of the Vespæ of Aristophanês, that is, about three years before that peace, or 423 B.C. But this would have been just before the time of the expedition of Brasidas into Thrace, and his success in exciting revolt among the dependencies of Athens: if Athens had doubled her tribute upon all the allies, just before that expedition, Thucydidês could not have omitted to mention it, as increasing the chances of success to Brasidas, and helping to determine the resolutions of the Akanthians and others, which were by no means adopted unanimously or without hesitation, to revolt.

In reference to the oration called that of Andokidês against Alkibiadês, I made some remarks in the fourth volume of this History (vol. iv, ch. xxxi, p. 151), tending to show it to be spurious and of a time considerably later than that to which it purports to belong. I will here add one other remark, which appears to me decisive, tending to the same conclusion.

The oration professes to be delivered in a contest of ostracism between Nikias, Alkibiadês, and the speaker: one of the three, he says, must necessarily be ostracized, and the question is, to determine which of the three: accordingly, the speaker dwells upon many topics calculated to raise a bad impression of Alkibiadês, and a favorable impression of himself.

Among the accusations against Alkibiadês, one is, that after having recommended, in the assembly of the people, that the inhabitants of Melos should be sold as slaves, he had himself purchased a Melian woman among the captives, and had had a son by her: it was criminal, argues the speaker, to beget offspring by a woman whose relations he had contributed to cause to be put to death, and whose city he had contributed to ruin (c. 8).

Upon this argument I do not here touch, any farther than to bring out the point of chronology. The speech, if delivered at all, must have been delivered, at the earliest, nearly a year after the capture of Melos by the Athenians: it may be of later date, but it *cannot possibly be earlier*.

Now Melos surrendered in the winter immediately preceding the great expedition of the Athenians to Sicily in 415 B.C., which expedition sailed about midsummer (Thucyd. v, 116; vi, 30). Nikias and Alkibiadês both went as commanders of that expedition: the latter was recalled to Athens for trial on the charge of impiety about three months afterwards, but escaped in the way home, was condemned and sentenced to banishment in his absence, and did not return to Athens until 407 B.C., long after the death of Nikias, who continued in command of the Athenian armament in Sicily, enjoying the full esteem of his countrymen, until its complete failure and ruin before Syracuse,—and perished himself afterwards as a Syracusan prisoner.

Taking these circumstances together, it will at once be seen that there never can have been any time, ten months or more after the capture of Melos, when Nikias and Alkibiadês *could* have been exposed to a vote of ostracism at Athens. The thing is absolutely impossible: and the oration in which such historical and chronological incompatibilities are embodied, must be spurious: furthermore, it must have been composed long after the pretended time of delivery, when the chronological series of events had been forgotten.

I may add that the story of this duplication of the tribute by Alkibiadês is virtually contrary to the statement of Plutarch, probably borrowed from Æschinês, who states that the demagogues *gradually* increased (κατὰ μικρὸν) the tribute to thirteen hundred talents (Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 24).

[11] Thucyd. ii, 13.

[12] Thucyd. i, 80. The foresight of the Athenian people, in abstaining from immediate use of public money and laying it up for future wants, would be still more conspicuously demonstrated, if the statement of Æschinês, the orator, were true, that they got together seven thousand talents between the peace of Nikias and the Sicilian expedition. M. Boeckh believes this statement, and says: "It is not impossible that one thousand talents might have been laid by every year, as the amount of tribute received was so considerable." (Public Economy of Athens, ch. xx. p. 446, Eng. Trans.) I do not believe the statement: but M. Boeckh and others, who do admit it,

ought in fairness to set it against the many remarks which they pass in condemnation of the democratical prodigality.

[13] Thucyd. i. 122-143; ii, 13. The πεντηκοστὴ, or duty of two per cent. upon imports and exports at the Peiræus, produced to the state a revenue of thirty-six talents in the year in which it was farmed by Andokidês, somewhere about 400 B.C., after the restoration of the democracy at Athens from its defeat and subversion at the close of the Peloponnesian war (Andokidês de Mysteriis, c. 23, p. 65). This was at a period of depression in Athenian affairs, and when trade was doubtless not near so good as it had been during the earlier part of the Peloponnesian war.

It seems probable that this must have been the most considerable permanent source of Athenian revenue next to the tribute; though we do not know what rate of customs-duty was imposed at the Peiræus during the Peloponnesian war. Comparing together the two passages of Xenophon (Republ. Ath. 1, 17, and Aristophan. Vesp. 657), we may suppose that the regular and usual rate of duty was one per cent. or one ἑκατοστὴ,—while in case of need this may have been doubled or tripled.—τὰς πολλὰς ἑκατοστάς, (see Boeckh, b. iii, chs. 1-4, pp. 298-318, Eng. Trans.) The amount of revenue derived even from this source, however, can have borne no comparison to the tribute.

[14] By Periklês, Thucyd. ii, 63. By Kleon, Thucyd. iii, 37. By the envoys at Melos, v, 89. By Euphemus, vi, 85. By the hostile Corinthians, i, 124 as a matter of course.

[15] Plutarch, Periklês. c. 20.

[16] Plutarch, Kimon. c. 14.

[17] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 19, 20.

[18] Xenophon, Rep. Ath. ii, 16. τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν ταῖς νήσοις παρατίθενται, πιστεύοντες τῇ ἀρχῇ τῇ κατὰ θάλασσαν· τὴν δὲ Ἀττικὴν γῆν περιορῶσι τεμνομένην, γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι εἰ αὐτὴν ἐλεήσουσιν, ἑτέρων ἀγαθῶν μειζόνων στερήσονται.

Compare also Xenophon (Memorabil. ii, 8, 1, and Symposion, iv, 31).

[19] See the case of the free laborer and the husbandman at Naxos, Plato, Euthyphro, c. 3.

[20] Thucyd. i. 100.

[21] Thucyd. iv, 105; Marcellinus, Vit. Thucyd. c. 19. See Rotscher, Leben des Thukydides, ch. i, 4, p. 96, who gives a genealogy of Thucydidês, as far as it can be made out with any probability. The historian was connected by blood with Miltiadês and Kimon, as well as with Olorus, king of one of the Thracian tribes, whose daughter Hegesipylê was wife of Miltiadês, the conqueror of Marathon. In this manner, therefore, he belonged to one of the ancient heroic families of Athens, and even of Greece, being an Ækid through Ajax and Philæus (Marcellin. c. 2).

[22] Thucyd. iv, 102; v, 6.

[23] Diodor. xii, 35.

[24] Diodor. xii, 11, 12; Strabo. vi, 264: Plutarch, Periklês, c. 22.

[25] The Athenians pretended to no subject allies beyond the Ionian gulf, Thucyd. vi, 14: compare vi, 45, 104; vii, 34. Thucydidês does not even mention Thurii, in his catalogue of the allies of Athens at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. ii, 15).

[26] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 11.

[27] Compare the speech of Nikias, in reference to the younger citizens and partisans of Alkibiadês sitting together near the latter in the assembly,—οὓς ἐγὼ ὁρῶν νῦν ἐνθάδε τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνδρὶ *παρακελευστοὺς καθημένους* φοβοῦμαι, καὶ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις ἀντιπαρακελεύομαι μὴ καταισχυνθῆναι, εἴ τῳ τις παρακάθηται τῶνδε, etc. (Thucyd. vi, 13.) See also Aristophanês, Ekklesiaz. 298, *seq.*, about partisans sitting near together.

[28] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 8. Ὅταν ἐγὼ καταβάλω παλαίων, ἐκεῖνος ἀντιλέγων ὡς οὐ πέπτωκε, νικᾷ, καὶ μεταπείθει τοὺς ὁρῶντας.

[29] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 11. ἡ δ᾽ ἐκείνων ἄμιλλα καὶ φιλοτιμία τῶν ἀνδρῶν βαθυτάτην τομὴν τεμοῦσα τῆς πόλεως, τὸ μὲν δῆμον, τὸ δ᾽ ὀλίγους ἐποίησε καλεῖσθαι.

[30] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 12. διέβαλλον ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις βοῶντες, ὡς ὁ μὲν δῆμος ἀδοξεῖ καὶ κακῶς ἀκούει τὰ κοινὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων χρήματα πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκ Δήλου μεταγαγών, ἢ δ᾽ ἔνεστιν αὐτῷ πρὸς τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας εὐπρεπεστάτη τῶν προφάσεων, δείσαντα τοὺς βαρβάρους ἐκεῖθεν ἀνελέσθαι καὶ φυλάττειν ἐν ὀχυρῷ τὰ κοινά, ταύτην ἀνῄρηκε Περικλῆς, etc.

Compare the speech of the Lesbians, and their complaints against Athens, at the moment of their revolt in the fourth year of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. iii, 10); where a similar accusation is brought forward,—ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐωρῶμεν αὐτοὺς (the Athenians) τὴν μὲν τοῦ Μήδου ἔχθραν ἀνιέντας, τὴν δὲ τῶν ξυμμάχων δούλωσιν ἐπαγομένους, etc.

[31] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 20.

[32] Thucyd. i, 10.

[33] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 11-14. Τέλος δὲ πρὸς τὸν Θουκυδίδην *εἰς ἀγῶνα* περὶ τοῦ ὀστράκου καταστὰς *καὶ διακινδυνεύσας*, ἐκεῖνον μὲν ἐξέβαλε, κατέλυσε δὲ τὴν ἀντιτεταγμένην ἑταιρείαν. See, in reference to the principle of the ostracism, a remarkable incident at Magnesia, between two political rivals, Krêtinês and Hermeias: also the just reflections of Montesquieu, Esprit des Loix, xxvi, c. 17; xxix, c. 7.

[34] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 16: the indication of time, however, is vague.

[35] Plato, Gorgias, p. 455, with Scholia; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 13: Forchhammer, Topographie von Athen, in Kieler Philologische Studien, pp. 279-282.

[36] Isokratês, Orat. vii: Areopagit. p. 153. c. 27.

[37] See Dikæarchus, Vit. Græciæ, Fragm. ed. Fuhr. p. 140: compare the description of Platæa in Thucydidês, ii, 3.

All the older towns now existing in the Grecian islands are put together in this same manner,—narrow, muddy, crooked ways,—few regular continuous lines of houses: see Ross, Reisen in den Griechischen Inseln, Letter xxvii, vol. ii, p. 20.

[38] Aristotle, Politic. ii, 5, 1; Xenophon, Hellen. ii, 4, 1; Harpokration, v, Ἱπποδάμεια.

[39] Diodor, xii, 9.

[40] Leake, Topography of Athens, Append. ii and iii, pp. 328-336, 2d edit.

[41] See Leake, Topography of Athens, 2d ed. p. 111, Germ. transl. O. Müller (De Phidiæ Vitâ, p. 18) mentions no less than eight celebrated statues of Athênê, by the hand of Pheidias,—four in the acropolis of Athens.

[42] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 13-15; O. Müller, De Phidiæ Vitâ, pp 34-60, also his work, Archäologie der Kunst, sects. 108-113.

[43] Thucyd. i, 80. καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἄριστα ἐξήρτυνται, πλούτῳ τε ἰδίῳ καὶ δημοσίῳ καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ ἵπποις καὶ ὅπλοις, καὶ ὄχλῳ ὅσος οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἑνὶ γε χωρίῳ Ἑλληνικῷ ἐστὶν, etc.

[44] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 13.

[45] Thucyd. i, 10.

[46] See Leake, Topography of Athens, Append. iii, p. 329, 2d ed. Germ. transl. Colonel Leake, with much justice, contends that the amount of two thousand and twelve talents, stated by Harpokration out of Philochorus as the cost of the Propylæa alone, must be greatly exaggerated. Mr. Wilkins (Atheniensia, p. 84) expresses the same opinion; remarking that the transport of marble from Pentelikus to Athens is easy and on a descending road.

Demetrius Phalereus (ap. Cicer. de Officiis, ii, 17) blamed Periklês for the large sum expended upon the Propylæa; nor is it wonderful that he uttered this censure, if he had been led to rate the cost of them at two thousand and twelve talents.

[47] Valer. Maxim. i, 7, 2.

[48] Thucyd. ii, 13.

[49] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 17. Plutarch gives no precise date, and O. Müller (De Phidiæ Vitâ, p. 9) places these steps for convocation of a congress before the first war between Sparta and Athens and the battle of Tanagra,—*i. e.*, before 460 B.C. But this date seems to me improbable: Thebes was not yet renovated in power, nor had Bœotia as yet recovered from the fruits of her alliance with the Persians; moreover, neither Athens nor Periklês himself seem to have been at that time in a situation to conceive so large a project; which suits in every respect much better for the later period, after the thirty years' truce, but before the Peloponnesian war.

[50] Thucyd. i, 115; viii, 76; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 28.

[51] Thucyd. i, 115; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 25. Most of the statements which appear in this chapter of Plutarch—over and above the concise narrative of Thucydidês—appear to be borrowed from exaggerated party stories of the day. We need make no remark upon the story, that Periklês was induced to take the side of Milêtus against Samos, by the fact that Aspasia was a native of Milêtus. Nor is it at all more credible that the satrap Pissuthnês, from good-will towards Samos, offered Periklês ten thousand golden staters as an inducement to spare Samos. It may perhaps be true however, that the Samian oligarchy, and those wealthy men whose children were likely to be taken as hostages, tried the effect of large bribes upon the mind of Periklês, to prevail upon him not to alter the government.

[52] Thucyd. i, 114, 115.

[53] Strabo, xiv, p. 638; Schol. Aristeidês, t. iii, p. 485, Dindorf.

[54] See the interesting particulars recounted respecting Sophoklês by the Chian poet, Ion, who met and conversed with him during the course of this expedition (Athenæus, xiii, p. 603). He represents the poet as uncommonly pleasing and graceful in society, but noway distinguished for active capacity. Sophoklês was at this time in peculiar favor, from the success of his tragedy, Antigonê, the year before. See the chronology of these events discussed and elucidated in Boeckh's preliminary Dissertation to the Antigonê, c. 6-9.

[55] Diodor. xi, 27.

[56] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 26. Plutarch seems to have had before him accounts respecting this Samian campaign, not only from Ephorus, Stesimbrotus, and Duris, but also from Aristotle: and the statements of the latter must have differed thus far from Thucydidês, that he affirmed Melissus the Samian general to have been victorious over Periklês himself, which is not to be reconciled with the narrative of Thucydidês.

The Samian historian, Duris, living about a century after this siege, seems to have introduced many falsehoods respecting the cruelties of Athens: see Plutarch, *l. c.*

[57] It appears very improbable that this Thucydidês can be the historian himself. If it be Thucydidês son of Melêsias, we must suppose him to have been restored from ostracism before the regular time,—a supposition indeed noway inadmissible in itself, but which there is nothing else to countenance. The author of the Life of Sophoklês, as well as most of the recent critics, adopt this opinion.

On the other hand, it may have been a third person named Thucydidês; for the name seems to have been common, as we might guess from the two words of which it is compounded. We find a third Thucydidês mentioned viii, 92—a native of Pharsalus: and the biographer, Marcellinus seems to have read of many persons so called (Θουκὐδιδαι πολλοὶ, p. xvi, ed. Arnold). The subsequent history of Thucydidês son of Melêsias, is involved in complete obscurity. We do not know the incident to which the remarkable passage in Aristophanês (Acharn. 703) alludes,—compare Vespæ, 946: nor can we confirm the statement which the Scholiast cites from Idomeneus, to the effect that Thucydidês was banished and fled to Artaxerxes: see Bergk. Reliq. Com. Att. p. 61.

[58] Thucyd. i, 117; Diodor. xii, 27, 28; Isokratês, De Permutat. Or. xv, sect. 118; Cornel. Nepos, Vit. Timoth. c. 1.

The assertion of Ephorus (see Diodorus, xii, 28, and Ephori Fragm. 117 ed. Marx, with the note of Marx) that Periklês employed battering machines against the town, under the management of the Klazomenian Artemon, was called in question by Herakleidês Ponticus, on the ground that Artemon was a contemporary of Anakreon, near a century before: and Thucydidês represents Periklês to have captured the town altogether by blockade.

[59] Thucyd. i, 40, 41.

[60] Thucyd. viii, 21.

[61] Compare Wachsmuth, Hellenische Alterthumskunde, sect. 58, vol. ii, p. 82.

[62] See Westermann, Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland und Rom; Diodor. xi, 33; Dionys. Hal. A. R. v, 17.

Periklês, in the funeral oration preserved by Thucydidês (ii, 35-40), begins by saying—Οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε εἰρηκότων ἤδη ἐπαινοῦσι *τὸν προσθέντα* τῷ νόμῳ τὸν λόγον τόνδε, etc.

The Scholiast, and other commentators—K. F. Weber and Westermann among the number—make various guesses as to *what* celebrated man is here designated as the introducer of the custom of a funeral harangue. The Scholiast says, Solon: Weber fixes on Kimon: Westermann, on Aristeidês: another commentator on Themistoklês. But we may reasonably doubt whether *any one* very celebrated man is specially indicated by the words τὸν προσθέντα. To commend the introducer of the practice, is nothing more than a phrase for commending the practice itself.

[63] Some fragments of it seem to have been preserved, in the time of Aristotle: see his treatise De Rhetoricâ, i, 7; iii, 10, 3.

[64] Compare the enthusiastic demonstrations which welcomed Brasidas at Skiônê (Thucyd. iv, 121).

[65] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 28; Thucyd. ii, 34.

[66] A short fragment remaining from the comic poet Eupolis (Κόλακες, Fr. xvi, p. 493, ed. Meineke), attests the anxiety at Athens about the Samian war, and the great joy when the island was reconquered: compare Aristophan. Vesp. 283.

[67] Thucyd. iii, 37; ii, 63. See the conference, at the island of Melos in the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. v, 89, *seq.*), between the Athenian commissioners and the Melians. I think, however, that this conference is less to be trusted as based in reality, than the speeches in Thucydidês generally,—of which more hereafter.

[68] Thucyd. iii, 47. Νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὑμῖν ὁ δῆμος ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν εὔνους ἐστὶ, καὶ ἢ οὐ ξυναφίσταται τοῖς ὀλίγοις, ἢ ἐὰν βιασθῇ, ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀποστήσασι πολέμιος εὐθὺς, etc.

[69] See the striking observations of Thucydidês, iii, 82, 83; Aristotel. Politic. v, 6, 9.

[70] Thucyd. iii, 27.

[71] Thucyd. viii, 9-14. He observes, also, respecting the Thasian oligarchy just set up in lieu of the previous democracy by the Athenian oligarchical conspirators who were then organizing the revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens,—that they immediately made preparations for revolting from Athens,—ξυνέβη οὖν αὐτοῖς μάλιστα ἃ ἐβούλοντο, τὴν πόλιν τε ἀκινδύνως ὀρθοῦσθαι, καὶ *τὸν ἐναντιωσόμενον δῆμον καταλελύσθαι* (viii, 64).

[72] Thucyd. iv, 86, 88, 106, 123.

[73] See the important passage, Thucyd. viii, 48.

[74] Xenophon. Repub. Athen. iii, 5. πλὴν αἱ τάξεις τοῦ φόρου· τοῦτο δὲ γίγνεται ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δι᾽ ἔτους πέμπτου.

[75] Xenophon. Repub. Athen. i, 14. Περὶ δὲ τῶν συμμάχων, οἱ ἐκπλέοντες συκοφαντοῦσιν, ὡς δοκοῦσι, καὶ μισοῦσι τοὺς χρηστοὺς, etc.

Who are the persons designated by the expression οἱ ἐκπλέοντες, appears to be specified more particularly a little farther on (i, 18); it means the generals, the officers, the envoys, etc. sent forth by Athens.

[76] See the expression in Thucydidês (v, 27) describing the conditions required when Argos was about to extend her alliances in Peloponnesus. The conditions were two. 1. That the city should be autonomous. 2. Next, that it should be willing to submit its quarrels to equitable arbitration,—ἥτις αὐτόνομός τέ ἐστι, καὶ δίκας ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας δίδωσι.

In the oration against the Athenians, delivered by the Syracusan Hermokratês at Kamarina, Athens is accused of having enslaved her allies partly on the ground that they neglected to perform their military obligations, partly because they made war upon each other (Thucyd. vi, 76), partly also on other specious pretences. How far this charge against Athens is borne out by the fact, we can hardly say; in all those particular examples which

Thucydidês mentions of subjugation of allies by Athens, there is a cause perfectly definite and sufficient,—not a mere pretence devised by Athenian ambition.

[77] According to the principle laid down by the Corinthians shortly before the Peloponnesian war,—τοὺς προσήκοντας ξυμμάχους αὐτόν τινα κολάζειν (Thucyd. i, 40-43).

The Lacedæmonians, on preferring their accusation of treason against Themistoklês, demanded that he should be tried at Sparta, before the common Hellenic synod which held its sitting there, and of which Athens was then a member: that is, the Spartan confederacy, or alliance,—ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ συνεδρίου τῶν Ἑλλήνων (Diodor. xi, 55).

[78] Antipho, De Cæde Herôdis, c. 7, p. 135. ὃ οὐδὲ πόλει ἔξεστιν, ἄνευ Ἀθηναίων οὐδένα θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαι.

[79] Thucyd. viii, 48. Τούς τε καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ὀνομαζομένους οὐκ ἐλάσσω αὐτοὺς (that is, the subject-allies) νομίζειν σφίσι πράγματα παρέξειν τοῦ δήμου, πορισταὶς ὄντας καὶ ἐσηγητὰς τῶν κακῶν τῷ δήμῳ, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πλείω αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖσθαι· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις εἶναι καὶ ἄκριτοι ἂν καὶ βιαιότερον ἀποθνήσκειν, τὸν δὲ δῆμον σφῶν τε καταφυγὴν εἶναι καὶ ἐκείνων σωφρονιστήν. Καὶ ταῦτα παρ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἐπισταμένας τὰς πόλεις σαφῶς αὐτὸς εἰδέναι, ὅτι οὕτω νομίζουσιν. This is introduced as the deliberate judgment of the Athenian commander Phrynichus, whom Thucydidês greatly commends for his sagacity, and with whom he seems in this case to have concurred.

Xenophon (Rep. Ath. i. 14, 15) affirms that the Athenian officers on service passed many unjust sentences upon the oligarchical party in the allied cities,—fines, sentences of banishment, capital punishments; and that the Athenian people, though they had a strong public interest in the prosperity of the allies, in order that their tribute might be larger, nevertheless thought it better that any individual citizen of Athens should pocket what he could out of the plunder of the allies, and leave to the latter nothing more than was absolutely necessary for them to live and work, without any superfluity, such as might tempt them to revolt.

That the Athenian officers on service may have succeeded too often in unjust peculation at the cost of the allies, is probable enough: but that the Athenian people were pleased to see their own individual citizens so enriching themselves is certainly not true. The large jurisdiction of the dikasteries was intended, among other effects, to open to the allies a legal redress against such misconduct on the part of the Athenian officers: and the passage above cited from Thucydidês proves that it really produced such an effect.

[80] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 20; Plutarch, Amator. Narrat. c. 3, p. 773.

[81] See *infra*, chap. 49.

[82] Xenophon, Rep. Athen, i, 18. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ μὲν μὴ ἐπὶ δίκας ἦεσαν οἱ σύμμαχοι, τοὺς ἐκπλέοντας Ἀθηναίων ἐτίμων ἂν μόνους, τούς τε στρατηγοὺς καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ πρέσβεις· νῦν δ᾽ ἠνάγκασται τὸν δῆμον κολακεύειν τῶν Ἀθηναίων εἷς ἕκαστος τῶν συμμάχων, γιγνώσκων ὅτι δεῖ μὲν ἀφικόμενον Ἀθήναζε δίκην δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν, οὐκ ἐν ἄλλοις τισὶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, ὅς ἐστι δὴ νόμος Ἀθήνῃσι. Καὶ ἀντιβολῆσαι ἀναγκάζεται ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, καὶ εἰσιόντος του, ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τῆς χειρός. Διὰ τοῦτο οὖν οἱ σύμμαχοι δοῦλοι τοῦ δήμου τῶν Ἀθηναίων καθεστᾶσι μᾶλλον.

[83] Thucyd. i, 76, 77. Ἄλλους γ᾽ ἂν οὖν οἰόμεθα τὰ ἡμέτερα λαβόντας δεῖξαι ἂν μάλιστα εἴ τι μετριάζομεν· ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἀδοξία τὸ πλέον ἢ ἔπαινος οὐκ εἰκότως περιέστη. Καὶ ἐλασσούμενοι γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ξυμβολαίαις πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους δίκαις, καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις νόμοις ποιήσαντες τὰς κρίσεις, φιλοδικεῖν δοκοῦμεν, etc.

I construe ξυμβολαίαις δίκαις as connected in meaning with ξυμβόλαια and not with ξύμβολα—following Duker and Bloomfield in preference to Poppo and Göller: see the elaborate notes of the two latter editors. Δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων indicated the arrangements concluded by special convention between two different cities, by consent of both, for the purpose of determining controversies between their respective citizens: they were something essentially apart from the ordinary judicial arrangements of either state. Now what the Athenian orator here insists upon is exactly the contrary of this idea: he says, that the allies were admitted to the benefit of Athenian trial and Athenian laws, in like manner with the citizens themselves. The judicial arrangements by which the Athenian allies were brought before the Athenian dikasteries cannot, with propriety, be said to be δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων; unless the act of original incorporation into the confederacy of Delos is to be regarded as a ξύμβολον, or agreement,—which in a large sense it might be, though not in the proper sense in which δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων are commonly mentioned. Moreover. I think that the passage of Antipho (De Cæde Herôdis, p. 745) proves that it was the citizens of places *not in alliance with Athens*, who litigated with Athenians according to

δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων,—not the allies of Athens while they resided in their own native cities; for I agree with the interpretation which Boeckh puts upon this passage, in opposition to Platner and Schömann (Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, book iii, ch. xvi, p. 403, Eng. transl.; Schömann, Der Attisch. Prozess, p. 778; Platner, Prozess und Klagen bei den Attikern, ch. iv, 2, pp. 110-112, where the latter discusses both the passages of Antipho and Thucydidês).

The passages in Demosthenês Orat. de Halones. c. 3, pp. 98, 99; and Andokidês cont. Alkibiad. c. 7, p. 121 (I quote this latter oration, though it is undoubtedly spurious, because we may well suppose the author of it to be conversant with the nature and contents of ξύμβολα), give us a sufficient idea of these judicial conventions, or ξύμβολα,—special and liable to differ in each particular case. They seem to me essentially distinct from that systematic scheme of proceeding whereby the dikasteries of Athens were made cognizant of all, or most, important controversies among or between the allied cities, as well as of political accusations.

M. Boeckh draws a distinction between the *autonomous* allies (Chios and Lesbos, at the time immediately before the Peloponnesian war) and the *subject*-allies: "the former class (he says) retained possession of unlimited jurisdiction, whereas the latter were compelled to try all their disputes in the courts of Athens." Doubtless this distinction would prevail to a certain degree, but how far it was pushed we can hardly say. Suppose that a dispute took place between Chios and one of the subject islands, or between an individual Chian and an individual Thasian; would not the Chian plaintiff sue, or the Chian defendant be sued, before the Athenian dikastery? Suppose that an Athenian citizen or officer became involved in dispute with a Chian, would not the Athenian dikastery be the competent court, whichever of the two were plaintiff or defendant? Suppose a Chian citizen or magistrate to be suspected of fomenting revolt, would it not be competent to any accuser, either Chian or Athenian, to indict him before the dikastery at Athens? Abuse of power, or peculation, committed by Athenian officers at Chios, must of course be brought before the Athenian dikasteries, just as much as if the crime had been committed at Thasos or Naxos. We have no evidence to help us in regard to these questions; but I incline to believe that the difference in respect to judicial arrangement, between the autonomous and the subject-allies, was less in degree than M. Boeckh believes. We must recollect that the arrangement was not all pure hardship to the allies,—the liability to be prosecuted was accompanied with the privilege of prosecuting for injuries received.

There is one remark, however, which appears to me of importance for understanding the testimonies on this subject. The Athenian empire, properly so called, which began by the confederacy of Delos after the Persian invasion, was completely destroyed at the close of the Peloponnesian war, when Athens was conquered and taken. But after some years had elapsed, towards the year 377 B.C., Athens again began to make maritime conquests, to acquire allies, to receive tribute, to assemble a synod, and to resume her footing of something like an imperial city. But her power over her allies, during this second period of empire, was nothing like so great as it had been during the first, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars: nor can we be at all sure that what is true of the second is also true of the first. Now I think it probable, that those statements of the grammarians, which represent the allies as carrying on δίκας ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων in ordinary practice with the Athenians, may really be true about the second empire or alliance. Bekker Anecdota, p. 436. Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων ἐδίκαζον τοῖς ὑπηκόοις· οὕτως Ἀριστοτέλης. Pollux, viii. 63. Ἀπὸ συμβόλων δὲ δίκη ἦν, ὅτε οἱ σύμμαχοι ἐδικάζοντο. Also Hesychius, i, 489. The statement here ascribed to Aristotle may very probably be true about the second alliance, though it cannot be held true for the first. In the second, the Athenians may really have had σύμβολα, or special conventions for judicial business, with many of their principal allies, instead of making Athens the authoritative centre, and heir to the Delian synod, as they did during the first. It is to be remarked, however, that Harpokration, in the explanation which he gives of σύμβολα treats them in a perfectly general way, as contentions for settlement of judicial controversy between city and city, without any particular allusion to Athens and her allies. Compare Heffter, Athenäische Gerichtsverfassung, iii, 1, 3, p. 91.

[84] Thucyd. i. 77. Οἱ δὲ (the allies) *εἰθισμένοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὁμιλεῖν*, etc.

[85] Compare Isokratês, Or. iv, Panegyric. pp. 62-66, sects. 116-138; and Or. xii, Panathenaic. pp. 247-254, sects. 72-111; Or. viii, De Pace, p. 178, sect. 119, *seqq.*; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13; Cornel. Nepos, Lysand. c. 2, 3.

[86] Xenophon, Repub. Ath. i, 17.

[87] Xenophon, Repub. Ath. i, 16. He states it as one of the advantageous consequences, which induced the Athenians to bring the suits and complaints of the allies to Athens for trial—that the prytaneia, or fees paid upon entering a cause for trial, became sufficiently large to furnish all the pay for the dikasts throughout the year.

But in another part of his treatise (iii, 2, 3), he represents the Athenian dikasteries as overloaded with judicial business, much more than they could possibly get through; insomuch that there were long delays before causes could be brought on for trial. It could hardly be any great object, therefore, to multiply complaints artificially, in order to make fees for the dikasts.

[88] See his well-known comments on the seditions at Korkyra, iii, 82, 83.

[89] Thucyd. iii, 11-14.

[90] So the Athenian orator Diodotus puts it in his speech deprecating the extreme punishment about to be inflicted on Mitylênê—ἤν τινα ἐλεύθερον καὶ βίᾳ ἀρχόμενον *εἰκότως πρὸς αὐτονομίαν ἀποστάντα χειρωσώμεθα*, etc. (Thucyd. iii, 46.)

[91] It is to be recollected that the Athenian empire was essentially *a government of dependencies*; Athens, as an imperial state, exercising authority over subordinate governments. To maintain beneficial relations between two governments, one supreme, the other subordinate, and to make the system work to the satisfaction of the people in the one as well as of the people in the other, has always been found a problem of great difficulty. Whoever reads the instructive volume of Mr. G. C. Lewis (Essay on the Government of Dependencies), and the number of instances of practical misgovernment in this matter which are set forth therein, will be inclined to think that the empire of Athens over her allies makes comparatively a creditable figure. It will, most certainly, stand full comparison with the government of England, over dependencies, in the last century; as illustrated by the history of Ireland, with the penal laws against the Catholics; by the Declaration of Independence, published in 1776, by the American colonies, setting forth the grounds of their separation; and by the pleadings of Mr. Burke against Warren Hastings.

A statement and legal trial alluded to by Mr. Lewis (p. 367), elucidates, farther, two points not unimportant on the present occasion: 1. The illiberal and humiliating vein of sentiment which is apt to arise in citizens of the supreme government towards those of the subordinate. 2. The protection which English jury-trial, nevertheless, afforded to the citizens of the dependency against oppression by English officers.

"An action was brought, in the court of Common Pleas, in 1773, by Mr. Anthony Fabrigas, a native of Minorca, against General Mostyn, the governor of the island. The facts proved at the trial were, that Governor Mostyn had arrested the plaintiff, imprisoned him, and transported him to Spain, without any form of trial, on the ground that the plaintiff had presented to him a petition for redress of grievances, in a manner which he deemed improper. Mr. Justice Gould left it to the jury to say, whether the plaintiff's behavior was such as to afford a just conclusion that he was about to stir up sedition and mutiny in the garrison, or whether he meant no more than earnestly to press his suit and obtain a redress of grievances. If they thought the latter, the plaintiff was entitled to recover in the action. The jury gave a verdict for the plaintiff *with* £3,000 *damages*. In the following term, an application was made for a new trial, which was refused by the whole court.

"The following remarks of the counsel for Governor Mostyn, on this trial, contain a plain and *naïve* statement of the doctrine, *that a dependency is to be governed, not for its own interest, but for that of the dominant state*. 'Gentlemen of the jury,' said the counsel, 'it will be time for me now to take notice of another circumstance, notorious to all the gentlemen who have been settled in the island, that the natives of Minorca are but ill-affected to the English, and to the English government. It is not much to be wondered at. They are the descendants of Spaniards; and they consider Spain as the country to which they ought naturally to belong: it is not at all to be wondered at that they are indisposed to the English, whom they consider as their conquerors.—Of all the Minorquins in the island, the plaintiff perhaps stands singularly and eminently the most seditious, turbulent, and dissatisfied subject to the crown of Great Britain that is to be found in Minorca. Gentlemen, *he is, or chooses to be called, the patriot of Minorca*. Now patriotism is a very pretty thing among ourselves, and we owe much to it: we owe our liberties to it; but we should have but little to value, and we should have but little of what we now enjoy, were it not for our trade. *And for the sake of our trade, it is not fit that we should encourage patriotism in Minorca*; for it is there destructive of our trade, and there is an end to our trade in the Mediterranean, if it goes there. But *here it is very well*; for the body of the people in this country will have it: they have demanded it,—and in consequence of their demands, they have enjoyed liberties which they will transmit to their posterity,—and it is not in the power of this government to deprive them of it. But they will take care of all our conquests abroad. If that spirit prevailed in Minorca, the consequence would be the loss of that country, and of course of our Mediterranean trade. We should be sorry to set all our slaves free in our plantations.'"

The prodigious sum of damages awarded by the jury, shows the strength of their sympathy with this Minorquin plaintiff against the English officer. I doubt not that the feeling of the dikastery at Athens was much of the same kind, and often quite as strong; sincerely disposed to protect the subject-allies against misconduct of Athenian trierarchs, or inspectors.

The feelings expressed in the speech above cited would also often find utterance from Athenian orators in the assembly; and it would not be difficult to produce parallel passages, in which these orators imply discontent on the part of the allies to be the natural state of things, such as Athens could not hope to escape. The speech here given shows that such feelings arise, almost inevitably, out of the uncomfortable relation of two governments, one supreme and the other subordinate. They are not the product of peculiar cruelty and oppression on the part of the Athenian democracy, as Mr. Mitford and so many others have sought to prove.

[92] See the important passage already adverted to in a prior note.

Thucyd. i, 40. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σαμίων ἀποστάντων ψῆφον προσεθέμεθα ἐναντίαν ὑμῖν, τῶν ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων δίχα ἐψηφισμένων εἰ χρὴ αὐτοῖς ἀμύνειν, *φανερῶς δὲ ἀντείπομεν τοὺς προσήκοντας ξυμμάχους αὐτόν τινα κολάζειν*.

[93] Thucyd. i. 33.

[94] Thucyd. i. 42.

[95] Thucyd. i, 38. ἡγεμόνες τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι.

[96] Thucyd. i, 24, 25.

[97] Thucyd. i, 26. ἦλθον γὰρ ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν οἱ τῶν Ἐπιδαμνίων φυγάδες, τάφους τε ἀποδεικνύντες καὶ ξυγγένειαν ἣν προϊσχόμενοι ἐδέοντο σφᾶς κατάγειν.

[98] Thucyd. i, 26.

[99] Thucyd. i, 28.

[100] Thucyd. i, 29, 30.

[101] Thucyd. i, 31-46.

[102] Thucyd. i, 35-40.

[103] Thucyd. i, 33. Τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους φόβῳ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πολεμησείοντας, καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους δυναμένους παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ ὑμῖν ἐχθροὺς ὄντας καὶ προκαταλαμβάνοντας ἡμᾶς νῦν ἐς τὴν ὑμετέραν ἐπιχείρησιν, ἵνα μὴ τῷ κοινῷ ἔχθει κατ᾽ αὐτῶν μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων στῶμεν, etc.

[104] Thucyd. i, 32-36.

[105] The description given by Herodotus (vii, 168: compare Diodor. xi. 15), of the duplicity of the Korkyræans when solicited to aid the Grecian cause at the time of the invasion of Xerxes, seems to imply that the unfavorable character of them, given by the Corinthians, coincided with the general impression throughout Greece.

Respecting the prosperity and insolence of the Korkyræans, see Aristotle apud Zenob. Proverb. iv, 49.

[106] Thucyd. i, 38. ἄποικοι δὲ ὄντες ἀφεστᾶσί τε διὰ παντὸς καὶ νῦν πολεμοῦσι, λέγοντες ὡς οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ κακῶς πάσχειν ἐκπεμφθείησαν· ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐδ᾽ αὐτοὶ φαμεν ἐπὶ τῷ ὑπὸ τούτων ὑβρίζεσθαι κατοικίσαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ ἡγεμόνες τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι· αἱ γοῦν ἄλλαι ἀποικίαι τιμῶσιν ἡμᾶς, καὶ μάλιστα ὑπὸ ἀποίκων στεργόμεθα.

This is a remarkable passage in illustration of the position of the metropolis in regard to her colony. The relation was such as to be comprised under the general word *hegemony*: superiority and right to command on the one side, inferiority with duty of reverence and obedience on the other,—limited in point of extent, though we do not know where the limit was placed, and varying probably in each individual case. The Corinthians sent annual magistrates to Potidæa, called Epidemiurgi (Thucyd. i, 56).

[107] Thucyd. i, 40. φανερῶς δὲ ἀντείπομεν *τοὺς προσήκοντας ξυμμάχους αὐτόν τινα κολάζειν*.

[108] Thucyd. i, 37-43.

[109] Thucyd. i, 44. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἀκούσαντες ἀμφοτέρων, γενομένης καὶ δὶς ἐκκλησίας, τῇ μὲν προτέρᾳ οὐχ ἧσσον τῶν Κορινθίων ἀπεδέξαντο τοὺς λόγους, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετέγνωσαν, etc.

Οὐχ ἧσσον, in the language of Thucydidês, usually has the positive meaning of *more*.

[110] Thucyd. i, 44. Plutarch (Periklês, c. 29) ascribes the smallness of the squadron despatched under Lacedæmonius to a petty spite of Periklês against that commander, as the son of his old political antagonist, Kimon. From whomsoever he copied this statement, the motive assigned seems quite unworthy of credit.

[111] Πεζομαχεῖν ἀπὸ νεῶν—to turn the naval battle into a land-battle on shipboard, was a practice altogether repugnant to Athenian feeling, as we see remarked also in Thucyd. iv, 14: compare also vii, 61.

The Corinthian and Syracusan ships ultimately came to counteract the Athenian manœuvring by constructing their prows with increased solidity and strength, and forcing the Athenian vessel to a direct shock, which its weaker prow was unable to bear (Thucyd. vii, 36).

[112] Thucyd. i, 51. διὰ τῶν νεκρῶν καὶ ναυαγίων προσκομισθεῖσαι κατέπλεον ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον.

[113] See the geographical Commentary of Gatterer upon Thrace, embodied in Poppo, Prolegg. ad Thucyd. vol. ii, ch. 29.

The words τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης—τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης χωρία (Thucyd. ii, 29) denote generally the towns in Chalkidikê,—places *in the direction or in the skirts of* Thrace, rather than parts of Thrace itself.

[114] Thucyd. i, 57; ii, 100.

[115] See two remarkable passages illustrating this difference, Thucyd. iv, 120-122.

[116] Thucyd. ii, 29-98. Isokratês has a remarkable passage on this subject in the beginning of Or. v, ad Philippum, sects. 5-7. After pointing out the imprudence of founding a colony on the skirts of the territory of a powerful potentate, and the excellent site which had been chosen far Kyrênê, as being near only to feeble tribes,—he goes so far as to say that the possession of Amphipolis would be injurious rather than beneficial to Athens, because it would render her dependent upon Philip, from his power of annoying her colonists,—just as she had been dependent before upon Mêdokus, the Thracian king, in consequence of her colonists in the Chersonese,—ἀναγκασθησόμεθα τὴν αὐτὴν εὔνοιαν ἔχειν τοῖς σοῖς πράγμασι διὰ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα (at Amphipolis) κατοικοῦντας, οἵαν περ εἴχομεν Μηδόκῳ τῷ παλαιῷ διὰ τοὺς ἐν Χερρονήσῳ γεωργοῦντας.

[117] Thucyd. i, 56, 57.

[118] Thucyd. v, 30.

[119] Kallias was a young Athenian of noble family, who had paid the large sum of one hundred minæ to Zeno of Elea, the philosopher, for rhetorical, philosophical, and sophistical instruction (Plato, Alkibiadês, i, c. 31, p. 119).

[120] Thucyd. i, 61. The statement of Thucydidês presents some geographical difficulties which the critics have not adequately estimated. Are we to assume as certain, that the *Berœa* here mentioned must be the Macedonian town of that name, afterwards so well known, distant from the sea westward one hundred and sixty stadia, or nearly twenty English miles (see Tafel, Historia Thessalonicæ, p. 58), on a river which flows into the Haliakmon, and upon one of the lower ridges of Mount Bermius?

The words of Thucydidês here are—Ἔπειτα δὲ ξύμβασιν ποιησάμενοι καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἀναγκαίαν πρὸς τὸν Περδίκκαν, ὡς αὐτοὺς κατήπειγεν ἡ Ποτίδαια καὶ ὁ Ἀριστεὺς παρεληλυθώς, *ἀπανίστανται ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας*, καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Βέροιαν κἀκεῖθεν ἐπιστρέψαντες, καὶ πειράσαντες πρῶτον τοῦ χωρίου καὶ οὐχ ἑλόντες, ἐπορεύοντο κατὰ γῆν πρὸς τὴν Ποτίδαιαν—ἅμα δὲ νῆες παρέπλεον ἑβδομήκοντα.

"The natural route from Pydna to Potidæa (observes Dr. Arnold in his note) lay along the coast; and Berœa was *quite out of the way*, at some *distance to the westward*, near the fort of the Bermian mountains. But the hope of surprising Berœa induced the Athenians to deviate from their direct line of march; then, after the failure of this treacherous attempt, they returned again to the sea-coast, and continued to follow it till they arrived at Gigônus."

I would remark upon this: 1. The words of Thucydidês imply that Berœa was *not in* Macedonia, but *out* of it (see Poppo, Proleg. ad Thucyd. vol. ii, pp. 408-418). 2. He uses no expression which in the least implies that the attempt on Berœa on the part of the Athenians was *treacherous*, that is, contrary to the convention just con-

cluded; though, had the fact been so, he would naturally have been led to notice it, seeing that the deliberate breach of the convention was the very first step which took place after it was concluded. 3. What can have induced the Athenians to leave their fleet and march near twenty miles inland to Mount Bermius and Berœa, to attack a Macedonian town which they could not possibly hold,—when they cannot even stay to continue the attack on Pydna, a position maritime, useful, and tenable,—in consequence of the pressing necessity of taking immediate measures against Potidæa? 4. If they were compelled by this latter necessity to patch up a peace on any terms with Perdikkas, would they immediately endanger this peace by going out of their way to attack one of his forts? Again, Thucydidês says, "that, proceeding by slow land-marches, they reached Gigônus, and encamped *on the third day*,"—κατ᾽ ὀλίγον δὲ προϊόντες τριταῖοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγωνον καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο. The computation of time must here be made either from Pydna or from Berœa; and the reader who examines the map will see that neither from the one nor the other—assuming the Berœa on Mount Bermius—would it be possible for an army to arrive at Gigônus on the third day, marching round the head of the gulf, with easy days' marches; the more so, as they would have to cross the rivers Lydias, Axius. and Echeidôrus, all not far from their mouths, —or, if these rivers could not be crossed, to get on board the fleet and reland on the other side.

This clear mark of time laid down by Thucydidês,—even apart from the objections which I have just urged in reference to Berœa on Mount Bermius,—made me doubt whether Dr. Arnold and the other commentators have correctly conceived the operations of the Athenian troops between Pydna and Gigônus. The *Berœa* which Thucydidês means cannot be more distant from Gigônus, at any rate, than a third day's easy march, and therefore cannot be the Berœa on Mount Bermius. But there was another town named Berœa, either in Thrace or in Emathia, though we do not know its exact site (see Wassi ad Thucyd. i, 61; Steph. Byz. v, Βέρης; Tafel, Thessalonica, Index). This other Berœa, situated somewhere between Gigônus and Therma, and out of the limits of that Macedonia which Perdikkas governed, may probably be the place which Thucydidês here indicates. The Athenians, raising the siege of Pydna, crossed the gulf *on shipboard* to Berœa, and after vainly trying to surprise that town, marched along *by land* to Gigônus. Whoever inspects the map will see that the Athenians would naturally employ their large fleet to transport the army by the short transit across the gulf from Pydna (see Livy, xliv, 10), and thus avoid the fatiguing land-march round the head of the gulf. Moreover, the language of Thucydidês would seem to make the land-march *begin at Berœa* and not at Pydna,—*ἀπανίστανται* ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας, καὶ *ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Βέροιαν* κἀκεῖθεν ἐπιστρέψαντες, καὶ πειράσαντες πρῶτον τοῦ χωρίου καὶ οὐχ ἑλόντες, *ἐπορεύοντο κατὰ γῆν* πρὸς Ποτίδαιαν—ἅμα δὲ νῆες παρέπλεον ἑβδομήκοντα. Κατ᾽ ὀλίγον δὲ προϊόντες τριταῖοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγωνον καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο. The change of tense between ἀπανίστανται and ἐπορεύοντο,—and the connection of the participle ἀφικόμενοι with the latter verb,—seems to divide the whole proceeding into two distinct parts; first, departure from Macedonia to Berœa, as it would seem, by sea,—next, a land-march from Berœa to Gigônus, of three short days.

This is the best account, as it strikes me, of a passage, the real difficulties of which are imperfectly noticed by the commentators.

The site of Gigônus cannot be exactly determined, since all that we know of the towns on the coast between Potidæa and Æneia, is derived from their enumerated names in Herodotus (vii, 123); nor can we be absolutely certain that he has enumerated them all in the exact order in which they were placed. But I think that both Col. Leake and Kiepert's map place Gigônus too far from Potidæa; for we see, from this passage of Thucydidês, that it formed the camp from which the Athenian general went forth immediately to give battle to an enemy posted between Olynthus and Potidæa; and the Scholiast says of Gigônus,—οὐ πολὺ ἄπεχον Ποτιδαίας: and Stephan. Byz. Γίγωνος, πόλις Θρᾴκης *προσεχὴς τῇ Παλλήνῃ*.

See Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxxi, p. 452. That excellent observer calculates the march, from Berœa on Mount Bermius to Potidæa, as being one of four days, about twenty miles each day. Judging by the map, this seems lower than the reality; but admitting it to be correct, Thucydidês would never describe such a march as *κατ᾽ ὀλίγον* δὲ προϊόντες τριταῖοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγωνον: it would be a march rather rapid and fatiguing, especially as it would include the passage of the rivers. Nor is it likely, from the description of this battle in Thucydidês (i, 62), that Gigônus could be anything like a full day's march from Potidæa. According to his description, the Athenian army advanced by three very easy marches; then arriving at Gigônus, they encamp, being now near the enemy, who on their side are already encamped, expecting them,—προσδεχόμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους *ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο* πρὸς Ὀλύνθου ἐν τῷ ἰσθμῷ: the imperfect tense indicates that they were already there at the time when the Athenians took camp at Gigônus; which would hardly be the case if the Athenians had come by three successive marches from Berœa on Mount Bermius.

I would add, that it is no more wonderful that there should be one Berœa in Thrace and another in Macedonia, than that there should be one Methônê in Thrace and another in Macedonia (Steph. B. Μεθώνη).

[121] Thucyd. i, 62, 63.

[122] Thucyd. i, 65.

[123] Thucyd. iii, 2-13. This proposition of the Lesbians at Sparta must have been made before the collision between Athens and Corinth at Korkyra.

[124] Thucyd. i, 139. ἐπικαλοῦντες ἐπεργασίαν Μεγαρεῦσι τῆς γῆς τῆς ἱερᾶς καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου, etc. Plutarch, Periklês, c. 30; Schol. ad Aristophan. Pac. 609.

I agree with Göller that two distinct violations of right are here imputed to the Megarians: the one, that they had cultivated land, the property of the goddesses at Eleusis,—the other, that they had appropriated and cultivated the unsettled pasture land on the border. Dr. Arnold's note takes a different view, less correct, in my opinion: "The land on the frontier was consecrated to prevent it from being inclosed: in which case the boundaries might have been a subject of perpetual dispute between the two countries," etc. Compare Thucyd. v, 42, about the border territory round Panaktum.

[125] Thucydidês (i, 139), in assigning the reasons of this sentence of exclusion passed by Athens against the Megarians, mentions only the two allegations here noticed,—wrongful cultivation of territory, and reception of runaway slaves. He does not allude to the herald, Anthemokritus: still less does he notice that gossip of the day, which Aristophanês and other comedians of this period turn to account in fastening the Peloponnesian war upon the personal sympathies of Periklês, namely, that first, some young men of Athens stole away the courtezan, Simætha, from Megara: next, the Megarian youth revenged themselves by stealing away from Athens "two engaging courtezans," one of whom was the mistress of Periklês; upon which the latter was so enraged that he proposed the sentence of exclusion against the Megarians (Aristoph. Acharn. 501-516; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 30).

Such stories are chiefly valuable as they make us acquainted with the political scandal of the time. But the story of the herald, Anthemokritus, and his death, cannot be altogether rejected. Though Thucydidês, not mentioning the fact, did not believe that the herald's death had really been occasioned by the Megarians; yet there probably was a popular belief at Athens to that effect, under the influence of which the deceased herald received a public burial near the Thriasian gate of Athens, leading to Eleusis: see Philippi Epistol. ad Athen. ap. Demosthen. p. 159, R.; Pausan. i, 36, 3; iii, 4, 2. The language of Plutarch (Periklês, c. 30) is probably literally correct,—"the herald's death *appeared* to have been caused by the Megarians,"—αἰτίᾳ τῶν Μεγαρέων ἀποθανεῖν ἔδοξε. That neither Thucydidês, nor Periklês himself, believed that the Megarians had really caused his death, is pretty certain: otherwise, the fact would have been urged when the Lacedæmonians sent to complain of the sentence of exclusion,—being a deed so notoriously repugnant to all Grecian feeling.

[126] Thucyd. i, 67. Μεγαρῆς, δηλοῦντες μὲν καὶ ἕτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα διάφορα, μάλιστα δὲ, λιμένων τε εἴργεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ, etc.

[127] Thucyd. i, 67. λέγοντες οὐκ εἶναι αὐτόνομοι κατὰ τὰς σπονδάς. O. Müller (Æginet. p. 180) and Göller in his note, think that the *truce* (or *covenant* generally) here alluded to is, not the thirty years' truce, concluded fourteen years before the period actually present, but the ancient alliance against the Persians, solemnly ratified and continued after the victory of Platæa. Dr. Arnold, on the contrary, thinks that the thirty years' truce is alluded to, which the Æginetans interpreted (rightly or not) as entitling them to independence.

The former opinion might seem to be countenanced by the allusion to Ægina in the speech of the Thebans (iii, 64): but on the other hand, if we consult i, 115, it will appear possible that the wording of the thirty years' truce may have been general, as,—Ἀποδοῦναι δὲ Ἀθηναίους ὅσα ἔχουσι Πελοποννησίων: at any rate, the Æginetans may have pretended that, by the same rule as Athens gave up Nisæa, Pegæ, etc., she ought also to renounce Ægina.

However, we must recollect that the one plea does not exclude the other: the Æginetans may have taken advantage of *both* in enforcing their prayer for interference. This seems to have been the idea of the Scholiast, when he says—κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τῶν σπονδῶν.

[128] Thucyd. i, 67. κατεβόων ἐλθόντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὅτι σπονδάς τε λελυκότες εἶεν καὶ ἀδικοῖεν τὴν Πελοπόννησον. The change of tense in these two verbs is to be noticed.

[129] Thucyd. i, 68. οὐ γὰρ ἂν Κέρκυράν τε ὑπολαβόντες βίᾳ ἡμῶν εἶχον, καὶ Ποτίδαιαν ἐπολιόρκουν, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐπικαιρότατον χωρίον πρὸς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ἀποχρῆσθαι, ἡ δὲ ναυτικὸν ἂν μέγιστον παρέσχε Πελοποννησίοις.

[130] Thucyd. i, 68. ἐν οἷς προσήκει ἡμᾶς οὐχ ἥκιστα εἰπεῖν, ὅσῳ καὶ μέγιστα ἐγκλήματα ἔχομεν, ὑπὸ μὲν Ἀθηναίων ὑβριζόμενοι, ὑπὸ δὲ ὑμῶν ἀμελούμενοι.

[131] Thucyd. i, 69.

[132] Thucyd. i, 69. ἡσυχάζετε γὰρ μόνοι Ἑλλήνων, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ τῇ δυνάμει τινὰ ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι, καὶ μόνοι οὐκ ἀρχομένην τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, διπλασιουμένην δὲ, καταλύοντες. Καίτοι ἐλέγεσθε ἀσφαλεῖς εἶναι, ὧν ἄρα ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἔργου ἐκράτει· τόν τε γὰρ Μῆδον, etc.

[133] Thucyd. i, 70. Οἱ μέν γε νεωτεροποιοὶ, καὶ ἐπιχειρῆσαι ὀξεῖς καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργῳ ὃ ἂν γνῶσιν· ὑμεῖς δὲ τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σώζειν, καὶ ἐπιγνῶναι μηδὲν, καὶ ἔργῳ οὐδὲ τἀναγκαῖα ἐξικέσθαι.

The meaning of the word ὀξεῖς—*sharp*—when applied to the latter half of the sentence, is in the nature of a sarcasm. But this is suitable to the character of the speech. Göller supposes some such word as ἱκανοὶ, instead of ὀξεῖς, to be understood: but we should thereby both depart from the more obvious syntax, and weaken the general meaning.

[134] Thucyd. i, 70. ἔτι δὲ τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν ἀλλοτριωτάτοις ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως χρῶνται, τῇ γνώμῃ δὲ οἰκειοτάτῃ ἐς τὸ πράσσειν τι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς.

It is difficult to convey, in translation, the antithesis between ἀλλοτριωτάτοις and οἰκειοτάτῃ—not without a certain conceit, which Thucydidês is occasionally fond of.

[135] Thucyd. *l. c.* καὶ ταῦτα μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων δι᾽ ὅλου τοῦ αἰῶνος μοχθοῦσι, καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ κτᾶσθαι καὶ μήτε ἑορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πρᾶξαι, ξυμφορὰν δὲ οὐχ ἧσσον ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα ἢ ἀσχολίαν ἐπίπονον· ὥστε εἴ τις αὐτοὺς ξυνελὼν φαίη πεφυκέναι ἐπὶ τῷ μήτε αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἡσυχίαν μήτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἐᾷν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποι.

[136] Thucyd. i, 71. ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα πρὸς αὐτούς ἐστιν. Ἀνάγκη δ᾽, ὥσπερ τέχνης, ἀεὶ τὰ ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρατεῖν· καὶ ἡσυχαζούσῃ μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα ἄριστα, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκαζομένοις ἰέναι, πολλῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ.

[137] Thucyd. i, 71.

[138] Thucyd. i, 72.

[139] Thucyd. i, 73. ῥηθήσεται δὲ οὐ παραιτήσεως μᾶλλον ἕνεκα ἢ μαρτυρίου, καὶ δηλώσεως πρὸς οἵαν ὑμῖν πόλιν μὴ εὖ βουλευομένοις ὁ ἀγὼν καταστήσεται.

[140] Thucyd. i, 75. Ἆρ᾽ ἄξιοί ἐσμεν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ προθυμίας ἕνεκα τῆς τότε καὶ γνώμης συνέσεως, ἀρχῆς γε ἧς ἔχομεν τοῖς Ἕλλησι μὴ οὕτως ἄγαν ἐπιφθόνως διακεῖσθαι; καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν τήνδε ἐλάβομεν οὐ βιασάμενοι, ἀλλ᾽ ὑμῶν μὲν οὐκ ἐθελησάντων παραμεῖναι πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου, ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων, καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστῆναι· ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἔργου κατηναγκάσθημεν τὸ πρῶτον προαγαγεῖν αὐτὴν ἐς τόδε, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ δέους, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τιμῆς, ὕστερον καὶ ὠφελείας.

[141] Thucyd. i, 77.

[142] Thucyd. i, 78. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ πω τοιαύτῃ ἁμαρτίᾳ ὄντες, οὔτ᾽ αὐτοὶ οὔτε ὑμᾶς ὁρῶντες, λέγομεν ὑμῖν, ἕως ἔτι αὐθαίρετος ἀμφοτέροις ἡ εὐβουλία, σπονδὰς μὴ λύειν μηδὲ παραβαίνειν τοὺς ὅρκους, τὰ δὲ διάφορα δίκῃ λύεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ξυνθήκην· ἢ θεοὺς τοὺς ὁρκίους μάρτυρας ποιούμενοι, πειρασόμεθα ἀμύνεσθαι πολέμου ἄρχοντας ταύτῃ ᾗ ἂν ὑφηγῆσθε.

[143] Thucyd. i, 79. καὶ τῶν μὲν πλειόνων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αἱ γνῶμαι ἔφερον, ἀδικεῖν τε Ἀθηναίους ἤδη, καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι ἐν τάχει.

[144] Thucyd. i, 80.

[145] Thucyd. i, 80. πρὸς δὲ ἄνδρας, οἳ γῆν τε ἑκὰς ἔχουσι καὶ προσέτι πολέμου ἐμπειρότατοί εἰσι, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἄριστα ἐξήρτυνται, πλούτῳ τε ἰδίῳ καὶ δημοσίῳ καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ ἵπποις καὶ ὅπλοις, καὶ ὄχλῳ, ὅσος οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἑνί γε χωρίῳ Ἑλληνικῷ ἐστὶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ξυμμάχους πολλοὺς φόρου ὑποτελεῖς ἔχουσι, πῶς χρὴ πρὸς τούτους ῥᾳδίως πόλεμον ἄρασθαι, καὶ τίνι πιστεύσαντας ἀπαρασκεύους ἐπειχθῆναι.

[146] Thucyd. i, 81. δέδοικα δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ καὶ τοῖς παισὶν αὐτὸν ὑπολίπωμεν, etc.

[147] Thucyd. i, 82, 83.

[148] Thucyd. i, 84. Πολεμικοί τε καὶ εὔβουλοι διὰ τὸ εὔκοσμον γιγνόμεθα, τὸ μὲν, ὅτι αἰδὼς σωφροσύνης πλεῖστον μετέχει, αἰσχύνης δὲ εὐψυχία· εὔβουλοι δὲ, ἀμαθέστερον τῶν νόμων τῆς ὑπεροψίας παιδευόμενοι, καὶ ξὺν χαλεπότητι σωφρονέστερον ἢ ὥστε αὐτῶν ἀνηκουστεῖν· καὶ μὴ, τὰ ἀχρεῖα ξυνετοὶ ἄγαν ὄντες, τὰς τῶν πολεμίων παρασκευὰς λόγῳ καλῶς μεμφόμενοι, ἀνομοίως ἔργῳ ἐπεξιέναι, νομίζειν δὲ τάς τε διανοίας τῶν πέλας παραπλησίους εἶναι, καὶ τὰς προσπιπτούσας τύχας οὐ λόγῳ διαιρετάς.

In the construction of the last sentence, I follow Haack and Poppo, in preference to Göller and Dr. Arnold.

The wording of this part of the speech of Archidamus is awkward and obscure, though we make out pretty well the general sense. It deserves peculiar attention, as coming from a king of Sparta, personally, too, a man of superior judgment. The great points of the Spartan character are all brought out. 1. A narrow, strictly-defined, and uniform range of ideas. 2. Compression of all other impulses and desires, but an increased sensibility to their own public opinion. 3. Great habits of endurance as well as of submission.

The way in which the features of Spartan character are deduced from Spartan institutions, as well as the pride which Archidamus expresses in the ignorance and narrow mental range of his countrymen, are here remarkable. A similar championship of ignorance and narrow-mindedness is not only to be found among those who deride the literary and oratorical tastes of the Athenian democracy (see Aristophanês, Ran. 1070: compare Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 9-49), but also in the speech of Kleon (Thucyd. iii, 37).

[149] Thucyd. i, 84, 85.

[150] Compare a similar sentiment in the speech of the Thebans against the Platæans (Thucyd. iii, 67).

[151] Thucyd. i, 86. ἡμεῖς δὲ ὁμοῖοι καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἐσμὲν, καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, ἢν σωφρονῶμεν, οὐ περιοψόμεθα ἀδικουμένους, οὐδὲ μελλήσομεν τιμωρεῖν· οἱ δὲ οὐκέτι μέλλουσι κακῶς πάσχειν.

There is here a play upon the word μέλλειν, which it is not easy to preserve in a translation.

[152] Thucyd. i, 87. βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς φανερῶς ἀποδεικνυμένους τὴν γνώμην ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν μᾶλλον ὁρμῆσαι, etc.

[153] Thucyd. i, 118. ὁ δὲ ἀνεῖλεν αὐτοῖς, *ὡς λέγεται*, etc.

[154] Thucyd. i, 120, 121. Κατὰ πολλὰ δὲ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς ἐπικρατῆσαι, πρῶτον μὲν πλήθει προὔχοντας καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ πολεμικῇ, ἔπειτα *ὁμοίως* πάντας ἐς τὰ παραγγελλόμενα ἰόντας.

I conceive that the word *ὁμοίως* here alludes to the equal interest of all the confederates in the quarrel, as opposed to the Athenian power, which was composed partly of constrained subjects, partly of hired mercenaries: to both of which points, as weaknesses in the enemy, the Corinthian orator goes on to allude. The word ὁμοίως here designates the same fact as Periklês, in his speech at Athens (i, 141), mentions under the words πάντες ἰσόψηφοι: the Corinthian orator treats it as an advantage to have all confederates equal and hearty in the cause: Periklês, on the contrary, looking at the same fact from the Athenian point of view, considers it as a disadvantage, since it prevented unity of command and determination.

Poppo's view of this passage seems to me erroneous.

The same idea is reproduced, c. 124. εἴπερ βεβαιότατον τὸ ταὐτὰ ξυμφέροντα καὶ πόλεσι καὶ ἰδιώταις εἶναι, etc.

[155] Thucyd. i, 123, 124.

[156] Thucyd. i, 125. καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἐψηφίσαντο πολεμεῖν. It seems that the decision was not absolutely unanimous.

[157] Thucyd. i, 88. Ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰς σπονδὰς λελύσθαι καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι, *οὐ τοσοῦτον τῶν ξυμμάχων πεισθέντες τοῖς λόγοις, ὅσον φοβούμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους*, μὴ ἐπὶ μεῖζον δυνηθῶσιν, ὁρῶντες αὐτοῖς τὰ πολλὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑποχείρια ἤδη ὄντα: compare also c. 23 and 118.

[158] Plutarch's biography of Periklês is very misleading, from its inattention to chronology, ascribing to an earlier time feelings and tendencies which really belong to a later. Thus he represents (c. 20) the desire for acquiring possession of Sicily, and even of Carthage and the Tyrrhenian coast, as having become very popular at

Athens even before the revolt of Megara and Eubœa, and before those other circumstances which preceded the thirty years' truce: and he gives much credit to Periklês for having repressed such unmeasured aspirations. But ambitious hopes directed towards Sicily could not have sprung up in the Athenian mind until after the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. It was impossible that they could make any step in that direction until they had established their alliance with Korkyra, and this was only done in the year before the Peloponnesian war,—done too, even then, in a qualified manner, and with much reserve. At the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, the Athenians had nothing but fears, while the Peloponnesians had large hopes of aid, from the side of Sicily. While it is very true, therefore, that Periklês was eminently useful in discouraging rash and distant enterprises of ambition generally, we cannot give him the credit of keeping down Athenian desires of acquisition in Sicily, or towards Carthage,—if, indeed, this latter ever was included in the catalogue of Athenian hopes,—for such desires were hardly known until after his death, in spite of the assertion again repeated by Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 17.

[159] Thucyd. i, 33-36.

[160] Thucyd. i, 40, 41.

[161] Thucyd. ii, 8.

[162] Thucyd. i, 45; Plutarch, Periklês. c. 8.

[163] Thucyd. i, 126. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐπρεσβεύοντο τῷ χρόνῳ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους *ἐγκλήματα ποιούμενοι, ὅπως σφίσιν ὅτι μεγίστη πρόφασις εἴη τοῦ πολεμεῖν, ἢν μή τι ἐσακούωσι.*

[164] Thucyd. i, 125.

[165] See the account of the Kylonian troubles, and the sacrilege which followed, in vol. iii, of this History, ch. x, p. 110.

[166] See Herodot. v, 70: compare vi, 131; Thucyd. i, 126; and vol. iv, ch. xxxi, p. 163 of this History.

[167] Thucyd. i, 126. ἐκέλευον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὸ ἄγος ἐλαύνειν τῆς θεοῦ.

[168] Thucyd. i, 127.

[169] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 24. Respecting Aspasia, see Plato, Menexenus, c. 3, 4; Xenophon, Memorab. ii, 6, 36; Harpokration, v, Ἀσπασία. Aspasia was, doubtless, not an uncommon name among Grecian women; we know of one Phokæan girl who bore it, the mistress of Cyrus the younger (Plutarch, Artaxer. c. 26). The story about Aspasia having kept slave-girls for hire, is stated by both Plutarch and Athenæus (xiii, p. 570); but we may well doubt whether there is any better evidence for it than that which is actually cited by the latter, the passage in Aristophanês, Acharn. 497-505:—

> Κἀθ᾽ οἱ Μεγαρῆς ὀδύναις πεφυσιγγωμένοι
>
> Ἀντεξέκλεψαν Ἀσπασίας *πόρνα δύο* or *πόρνας δύο*.

Athenæus reads the latter, but the reading πόρνα δύο appears in the received text of Aristophanês. Critics differ, whether Ἀσπασίας is the genitive case singular of Ἀσπασία, or the accusative plural of the adjective ἀσπάσιος. I believe that it is the latter; but intended as a play on the word, capable of being understood either as a substantive or as an adjective—ἀσπασίας πόρνας δύο, or Ἀσπασίας πόρνας δύο. There is a similar play on the word, in a line of Kratinus, quoted by Plutarch, Periklês, c. 24.

At the time, if ever, when this theft of the Megarian youth took place, Aspasia must have been the beloved mistress and companion of Periklês; and it is inconceivable that she should have kept slave-girls for hire *then*, whatever she may have done before.

That reading and construction of the verse above cited, which I think the least probable of the two, has been applied by the commentators of Thucydidês to explain a line of his history, and applied in a manner which I am persuaded is erroneous. When the Lacedæmonians desired the Athenians to repeal the decree excluding the Megarians from their ports, the Athenians refused, alleging that the Megarians had appropriated some lands which were disputed between the two countries, and some which were even sacred property,—and also, that "*they had received runaway slaves from Athens*,"—καὶ ἀνδραπόδων ὑποδοχὴν τῶν ἀφισταμένων (i, 139). The Scholiast gives a perfectly just explanation of these last words—ὡς ὅτι δούλους αὐτῶν ἀποφεύγοντας ἐδέχοντο.

But Wasse puts a note to the passage to this effect—"*Aspasiæ servos*, v, Athenæum, p. 570; Aristoph. Acharn. 525, et Schol." This note of Wasse is adopted and transcribed by the three best and most recent commentators on Thucydidês,—Poppo, Göller, and Dr. Arnold. Yet, with all respect to their united authority, the supposition is neither natural, as applied to the words, nor admissible, as regards the matter of fact. Ἀνδράποδα ἀφιστάμενα mean naturally (not *Aspasiæ servos*, or more properly *servas*, for the very gender ought to have made Wasse suspect the correctness of his interpretation,—but) the runaway slaves of proprietors generally in Attica; of whom the Athenians lost so prodigious a number after the Lacedæmonian garrison was established at Dekeleia (Thucyd. vii, 28: compare i, 142; and iv, 118, about the αὐτόμολοι). Periklês might well set forth the reception of such runaway slaves as a matter of complaint against the Megarians, and the Athenian public assembly would feel it so likewise: moreover, the Megarians are charged, not with having *stolen away* the slaves, but with *harboring* them (ὑποδοχὴν). But to suppose that Periklês, in defending the decree of exclusion against the Megarians, would rest the defence on the ground that some Megarian youth had run away with two girls of the *cortège* of Aspasia, argues a strange conception both of him and of the people. If such an incident ever really happened, or was even supposed to have happened, we may be sure that it would be cited by his opponents, as a means of bringing contempt upon the real accusation against the Megarians,—the purpose for which Aristophanês produces it. This is one of the many errors in respect to Grecian history, arising from the practice of construing passages of comedy as if they were serious and literal facts.

[170] The visit of Sokratês with some of his friends to Theodotê, his dialogue with her, and the description of her manner of living, is among the most curious remnants of Grecian antiquity, on a side very imperfectly known to us (Xenophon, Memorab. iii, 11).

Compare the citations from Eubulus and Antiphanês, the comic writers, apud Athenæum, xiii, p. 571, illustrating the differences of character and behavior between some of these hetæræ and others,—and Athenæ. xiii, p. 589.

[171] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 24 Εἶτα τῆς συμβιώσεως οὐκ οὔσης αὐτοῖς ἀρεστῆς, ἐκείνην μὲν ἑτέρῳ βουλομένην συνεξέδωκεν, αὐτὸς δὲ Ἀσπασίαν λαβὼν ἔστερξε διαφερόντως.

[172] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 13-36.

[173] This seems the more probable story: but there are differences of statement and uncertainties upon many points: compare Plutarch, Periklês, c. 16-32; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23; Diogen. Laërt. ii, 12, 13. See also Schaubach, Fragment. Anaxagoræ, pp. 47-52.

[174] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 32.

[175] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 7, 36-39.

[176] Thucyd. ii, 60, 61: compare also his striking expressions, c. 65; Dionys. Halikarn. De Thucydid. Judic. c. 44, p. 924.

[177] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 31. Φειδίας—ἐργολάβος τοῦ ἀγάλματος.

This tale, about protecting Pheidias under the charge of embezzlement, was the story most widely in circulation against Periklês—ἡ χειρίστη μὲν αἰτία πασῶν, ἔχουσα δὲ πλείστους μάρτυρας (Plutarch, Periklês, c. 31).

[178] See the Dissertation of O. Müller (De Phidiæ Vitâ, c. 17, p. 35), who lays out the facts in the order in which I have given them.

[179] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 13-32.

[180] Aristophan. Pac. 587-603: compare Acharn. 512; Ephorus, ap. Diodor. xii, 38-40; and the Scholia on the two passages of Aristophanês; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 32.

Diodorus (as well as Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 7) relates another tale, that Alkibiadês once approached Periklês when he was in evident low spirits and embarrassment, and asked him the reason: Periklês told him that the time was near at hand for rendering his accounts, and that he was considering how this could be done: upon which Alkibiadês advised him to consider rather how he could evade doing it. The result of this advice was that Periklês plunged Athens into the Peloponnesian war: compare Aristophan. Nub. 855, with the Scholia,—and Ephorus, Fragm. 118, 119, ed. Marx, with the notes of Marx.

It is probable enough that Ephorus copied the story, which ascribes the Peloponnesian war to the accusations against Pheidias and Periklês, from Aristophanês or other comic writers of the time. But it deserves remark, that

even Aristophanês is not to be considered as certifying it. For if we consult the passage above referred to in his comedy *Pax*, we shall find that, first, Hermês tells the story about Pheidias, Periklês, and the Peloponnesian war; upon which both Trygæus, and the Chorus, remark that *they never heard a word of it before*: that it is quite *new* to them.

Tryg. Ταῦτα τοίνυν, μὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, ᾽γὼ ᾽πεπύσμην οὐδενὸς,
Οὐδ᾽ ὅπως αὐτῇ (Εἰρήνῃ) προσήκοι Φειδίας ἠκηκόη.
Chorus. Οὐδ᾽ ἔγωγε πλήν γε νυνί.

If Aristophanês had stated the story ever so plainly, his authority could only have been taken as proving that it was a part of the talk of the time: but the lines just cited make him as much a contradicting as an affirming witness.

[181] It would appear that not only Aspasia and Anaxagoras, but also the musician and philosopher Damon, the personal friend and instructor of Periklês, must have been banished at a time when Periklês was old,—perhaps somewhere near about this time. The passage in Plato, Alkibiadês, i, c. 30, p. 118, proves that Damon was in Athens, and intimate with Periklês, when the latter was of considerable age—καὶ νῦν ἔτι *τηλικοῦτος* ὢν Δάμωνι σύνεστιν αὐτοῦ τούτου ἕνεκα.

Damon is said to have been ostracized,—perhaps he was tried and condemned to banishment: for the two are sometimes confounded.

[182] See Thucyd. v, 43; vi, 89.

[183] Thucyd. i, 128, 135, 139.

[184] Plutarch, Perikl. c. 33.

[185] Thucyd. i, 39. It rather appears, from the words of Thucydidês, that these various demands of the Lacedæmonians were made by *one* embassy, joined by new members arriving with fresh instructions, but remaining during a month or six weeks, between January and March 431 B.C., installed in the house of the proxenus of Sparta at Athens: compare Xenophon Hellenic. v, 4, 22.

[186] Thucyd. i, 139; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 31.

[187] Thucyd. i, 140. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν πραγμάτων οὐχ ἧσσον ἀμαθῶς χωρῆσαι ἢ καὶ τὰς διανοίας τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· διόπερ καὶ τὴν τύχην ὅσα ἂν παρὰ λόγον ξυμβῇ, εἰώθαμεν αἰτιᾶσθαι. I could have wished, in the translation, to preserve the play upon the words ἀμαθῶς χωρῆσαι, which Thucydidês introduces into this sentence, and which seems to have been agreeable to his taste. Ἀμαθῶς, when referred to ξυμφορὰς, is used in a passive sense by no means common,—"in a manner which cannot be learned, departing from all reasonable calculation." Ἀμαθῶς, when referred to διανοίας, bears its usual meaning,—"ignorant, deficient in learning or in reason."

[188] Thucyd. i, 140.

[189] Thucyd. i, 141. αὐτουργοί τε γάρ εἰσι Πελοποννήσιοι, καὶ οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ χρήματά ἐστιν αὐτοῖς· ἔπειτα χρονίων πολέμων καὶ διαποντίων ἄπειροι, διὰ τὸ βραχέως αὐτοὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους ὑπὸ πενίας ἐπιφέρειν.

[190] Thucyd. i, 143. εἴτε καὶ κινήσαντες τῶν Ὀλυμπίασιν ἢ Δελφοῖς χρημάτων μισθῷ μείζονι πειρῷντο ἡμῶν ὑπολαβεῖν τοὺς ξένους τῶν ναυτῶν, μὴ ὄντων μὲν ἡμῶν ἀντιπάλων, ἐσβάντων αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν μετοίκων, δεινὸν ἂν ἦν· νῦν δὲ τόδε τε ὑπάρχει, καὶ, ὅπερ κράτιστον, κυβερνήτας ἔχομεν πολίτας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ὑπηρεσίαν πλείους καὶ ἀμείνους ἢ πᾶσα ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλάς.

This is in reply to those hopes which we know to have been conceived by the Peloponnesian leaders, and upon which the Corinthian speaker in the Peloponnesian congress had dwelt (i, 121). Doubtless Periklês would be informed of the tenor of all these public demonstrations at Sparta.

[191] Thucyd. i, 141, 142, 143.

[192] Thucyd. i, 143. τήν τε ὀλόφυρσιν μὴ οἰκιῶν καὶ γῆς ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν σωμάτων· οὐ γὰρ τάδε τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ ἄνδρες ταῦτα κτῶνται.

[193] Thucyd. i, 144. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔχω ἐς ἐλπίδα τοῦ περιέσεσθαι, ἢν ἐθέλητε ἀρχήν τε μὴ ἐπικτᾶσθαι ἅμα πολεμοῦντες, καὶ κινδύνους αὐθαιρέτους μὴ προστίθεσθαι· μᾶλλον γὰρ πεφόβημαι τὰς οἰκείας ἡμῶν ἁμαρτίας ἢ τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων διανοίας.

[194] Thucyd. i, 143, 144.

[195] Thucyd. i, 145. καὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀπεκρίναντο τῇ ἐκείνου γνώμῃ, καθ᾽ ἕκαστά τε ὡς ἔφρασε, καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν οὐδὲν κελευόμενοι ποιήσειν, δίκῃ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας ἑτοῖμοι εἶναι διαλύεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐγκλημάτων ἐπὶ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ.

[196] In spite of the contrary view taken by Plutarch, Periklês, c. 31: comparison of Perikl. and Fab. Max. c. 3.

[197] Thucyd. iv, 21. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοσαῦτα εἶπον, νομίζοντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ σπονδῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν, σφῶν δὲ ἐναντιουμένων κωλύεσθαι, διδομένης δὲ εἰρήνης ἀσμένως δέξεσθαί τε καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀποδώσειν.

See also an important passage (vii, 18) about the feelings of the Spartans. The Spartans thought, says Thucydidês, ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ πολέμῳ (the beginning of the Peloponnesian war) σφέτερον τὸ παρανόμημα μᾶλλον γενέσθαι, ὅτι τε ἐς Πλάταιαν ἦλθον Θηβαῖοι ἐν σπονδαῖς, καὶ εἰρημένον ἐν ταῖς πρότερον ξυνθήκαις ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν ἢν δίκας θέλωσι διδόναι, αὐτοὶ οὐχ ὑπήκουον ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως δυστυχεῖν τε ἐνόμιζον, etc.

[198] Thucyd. i, 126. ὅπως σφίσιν ὅτι μεγίστη πρόφασις εἴη τοῦ πολεμεῖν.

[199] Thucyd. i, 146. ἐπεμίγνυντο δ᾽ ὅμως ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους ἐφοίτων, ἀκηρύκτως μὲν, ἀνυπόπτως δ᾽ οὔ· σπονδῶν γὰρ ξύγχυσις τὰ γιγνόμενα ἦν, καὶ πρόφασις τοῦ πολεμεῖν.

[200] Thucyd. ii, 2. βουλόμενοι ἰδίας ἕνεκα δυνάμεως ἄνδρας τε τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς σφίσιν ὑπεναντίους διαφθεῖραι, καὶ τὴν πόλιν τοῖς Θηβαίοις προσποιῆσαι: also iii, 65. ἄνδρες οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ γένει, etc.

[201] Thucyd. iii, 56.

[202] Thucyd. ii, 2. ἅμα ἦρι ἀρχομένῳ—seems to indicate a period rather before than after the first of April: we may consider the bisection of the Thucydidean year into θέρος and χείμων as marked by the equinoxes. His summer and winter are each a half of the year (Thucyd. v, 20), though Poppo erroneously treats the Thucydidean winter as only four months (Poppo, Proleg. i, c. v, p. 72, and ad Thucyd. ii, 2: see F. W. Ullrich, Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thukydidês, p. 32, Hamburg, 1846).

[203] Thucyd. ii, 2-5. *θέμενοι δὲ ἐς τὴν ἀγορὰν τὰ ὅπλα* … καὶ ἀνεῖπεν ὁ κήρυξ, εἴτις βούλεται κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν ξυμμαχεῖν, *τίθεσθαι παρ᾽ αὐτοὺς τὰ ὅπλα*.

Dr. Arnold has a note upon this passage, explaining τίθεσθαι, or θέσθαι τὰ ὅπλα, to mean, "piling the arms," or getting rid of their spears and shields by piling them all in one or more heaps. He says: "The Thebans, therefore, as usual on a halt, proceeded to pile their arms, and by inviting the Platæans to come and pile theirs with them, they meant that they should come in arms from their several houses to join them, and thus naturally pile their spears and shields with those of their friends, to be taken up together with theirs, whenever there should be occasion either to march or to fight." The same explanation of the phrase had before been given by Wesseling and Larcher, ad Herodot. ix, 52; though Bähr on the passage is more satisfactory.

Both Poppo and Göller also sanction Dr. Arnold's explanation: yet I cannot but think that it is unsuitable to the passage before us, as well as to several other passages in which τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα occurs: there may be other passages in which it will suit, but as a general explanation it appears to me inadmissible. In most cases, the words mean "*armati consistere*,"—to ground arms,—to maintain rank, resting the spear and shield (see Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 12) upon the ground. In the incident now before us, the Theban hoplites enter Platæa, a strange town, with the population decidedly hostile, and likely to be provoked more than ever by this surprise, add to which, that it is pitch dark, and a rainy night. Is it likely, that the first thing which they do will be to pile their arms? The darkness alone would render it a slow and uncertain operation to resume the arms: so that when the Platæans attacked them, as they did, quite suddenly and unexpectedly, and while it was yet dark, the Thebans would have been—upon Dr. Arnold's supposition—altogether defenceless and unarmed (see ii, 3.

προσέβαλόν τε εὐθὺς—οἱ Πλαταιῆς—καὶ ἐς χεῖρας ἦεσαν κατὰ τάχος) which certainly they were not. Dr. Arnold's explanation may suit the case of the soldier in camp, but certainly not that of the soldier in presence of an enemy, or under circumstances of danger: the difference of the two will be found illustrated in Xenophon, Hellenic. ii, 4, 5, 6.

Nor do the passages referred to by Dr. Arnold himself bear out his interpretation of the phrase τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα. That interpretation is, moreover, not conveniently applicable either to Thucyd. vii, 3, or viii, 25,—decidedly inapplicable to iv, 68 (θησόμενον τὰ ὅπλα), in the description of the night attack on Megara, very analogous to this upon Platæa,—and not less decidedly inapplicable to two passages of Xenophon's Anabasis, i, 5, 14; iv, 3, 7.

Schneider, in the Lexicon appended to his edition of Xenophon's Anabasis, has a long but not very distinct article upon τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα.

[204] Thucyd. ii, 3. ἐδόκει οὖν ἐπιχειρητέα εἶναι, καὶ ξυνελέγοντο διορύσσοντες τοὺς κοινοὺς τοίχους παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους, ὅπως μὴ διὰ τῶν ὁδῶν φανεροὶ ὦσιν ἰόντες, ἁμάξας δὲ ἄνευ τῶν ὑποζυγίων ἐς τὰς ὁδοὺς καθίστασαν, ἵν᾽ ἀντὶ τείχους ᾖ, καὶ τἆλλα ἐξήρτυον, etc.

I may be permitted to illustrate this by a short extract from the letter of M. Marrast, mayor of Paris, to the National Assembly, written during the formidable insurrection of June 25, 1848, in that city, and describing the proceedings of the insurgents: "Dans la plupart des rues longues, étroites et couvertes de barricades qui vont de l'Hôtel de Ville à la Rue St. Antoine, la garde nationale mobile, et la troupe de ligne, ont dû faire le siège de chaque maison; et ce qui rendait l'œuvre plus périlleuse, c'est que les insurgés avaient établi, de chaque maison à chaque maison, des communications intérieures qui reliaient les maisons entre elles, en sorte qu'ils pouvaient se rendre, comme par une allée couverte, d'un point éloigné jusqu'au centre d'une suite de barricades qui les protégeaient." (Lettre publiée dans le journal, le National, June 26, 1848).

[205] Thucyd. ii, 3, 4.

[206] Thucyd. ii, 5, 6; Herodot. vii, 233. Demosthenês (cont. Neæram, c. 25, p. 1379) agrees with Thucydidês in the statement that the Platæans slew their prisoners. From whom Diodorus borrowed his inadmissible story, that the Platæans gave up their prisoners to the Thebans, I cannot tell (Diodor. xii, 41, 42).

The passage in this oration against Neæra is also curious, both as it agrees with Thucydidês on many points, and as it differs from him on several others: in some sentences, even the words agree with Thucydidês (ὁ γὰρ Ἀσωπὸς ποταμὸς μέγας ἐῤῥύη, καὶ διαβῆναι οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἦν, etc.: compare Thucyd. ii, 2); while on other points there is discrepancy. Demosthenês—or the Pseudo-Demosthenês—states that Archidamus, king of Sparta, planned the surprise of Platæa,—that the Platæans only discovered, when morning dawned, the small real number of the Thebans in the town,—that the larger body of Thebans, when they at last did arrive near Platæa after the great delay in their march, were forced to retire by the numerous force arriving from Athens, and that the Platæans then destroyed their prisoners in the town. Demosthenês mentions nothing about any convention between the Platæans and the Thebans without the town, respecting the Theban prisoners within.

On every point on which the narrative of Thucydidês differs from that of Demosthenês, that of the former stands out as the most coherent and credible.

[207] Thucyd. iii, 66.

[208] Thucyd. ii, 1-6.

[209] Thucyd. ii. 7, 8. ἥ τε ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς πᾶσα μετέωρος ἦν, ξυνιουσῶν τῶν πρώτων πόλεων.

[210] Thucyd. i, 23.

[211] Thucyd. ii, 13. ἅπερ καὶ πρότερον, etc., ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ ἄλλα, οἷάπερ εἰώθει, Περικλῆς ἐς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ περιέσεσθαι τῷ πολέμῳ.

[212] Thucyd. ii, 7, 22, 30.

[213] Thucyd. ii, 68. The time at which this expedition of Phormio and the capture of Argos happened, is not precisely marked by Thucydidês. But his words seem to imply that it was before the commencement of the war, as Poppo observes. Phormio was sent to Chalkidikê about October or November 432 B.C. (i, 64); and the expedition against Argos probably occurred between that event and the naval conflict of Korkyræans and Atheni-

ans against Corinthians with their allies, Ambrakiots included,—which conflict had happened in the preceding spring.

[214] Thucyd. ii, 9.

[215] Thucyd. ii, 13; Xenophon, Anabas. vii, 4.

[216] Thucyd. ii, 7. ὡς βεβαίως πέριξ τὴν Πελοπόννησον καταπολεμήσοντες. vi, 90. πέριξ τὴν Πελοπόννησον πολιορκοῦντες.

[217] Thucyd. ii, 65. τοσοῦτον τῷ Περικλεῖ ἐπερίσσευσε τότε ἀφ᾽ ὧν αὐτὸς προέγνω, καὶ πάνυ ἂν ῥᾳδίως περιγενέσθαι τῶν Πελοποννησίων αὐτῶν τῷ πολέμῳ.

[218] Thucyd. i, 144. ἢν ἐθέλητε ἀρχήν τε μὴ ἐπικτᾶσθαι ἅμα πολεμοῦντες, καὶ κινδύνους αὐθαιρέτους μὴ προστίθεσθαι.

[219] Thucyd. vii, 28. ὅσον κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου, οἱ μὲν ἐνιαυτὸν, οἱ δὲ δύο, οἱ δὲ τριῶν γε ἐτῶν, *οὐδεὶς πλείω χρόνον ἐνόμιζον περιοίσειν αὐτοὺς* (the Athenians), *εἰ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐσβάλοιεν ἐς τὴν χώραν*: compare v, 14.

[220] Thucyd. vi, 11. διὰ τὸ *παρὰ γνώμην αὐτῶν, πρὸς ἃ ἐφοβεῖσθε τὸ πρῶτον, περιγεγενῆσθαι*, καταφρονήσαντες ἤδη καὶ τῆς Σικελίας ἐφίεσθε. It is Nikias, who, in dissuading the expedition against Syracuse, reminds the Athenians of their past despondency at the beginning of the war.

[221] Thucyd. ii, 7. Diodorus says that the Italian and Sicilian allies were required to furnish two hundred triremes (xii, 41). Nothing of the kind seems to have been actually furnished.

[222] Thucyd. ii, 10-12.

[223] Thucyd. ii, 11. ὥστε χρὴ καὶ πάνυ ἐλπίζειν διὰ μάχης ἰέναι αὐτοὺς, εἰ μὴ καὶ νῦν ὥρμηνται, ἐν ᾧ οὔπω πάρεσμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ἐν τῇ γῇ ὁρῶσιν ἡμᾶς δῃοῦντάς τε καὶ τἀκείνων φθείροντας.

These reports of speeches are of great value as preserving a record of the feelings and expectations of actors, apart from the result of events. What Archidamus so confidently anticipated, did *not* come to pass.

[224] Thucyd. ii, 12.

[225] Thucyd. ii, 18. πᾶσαν ἰδέαν πειράσαντες οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἑλεῖν. The situation of Œnoê is not exactly agreed upon by topographical inquirers: it was near Eleutheræ, and on one of the roads from Attica into Bœotia (Harpokration, v, Οἰνόη; Herodot. v, 74). Archidamus marched, probably, from the isthmus over Geraneia, and fell into this road in order to receive the junction of the Bœotian contingent after it had crossed Kithæron.

[226] Thucyd. i, 82; ii, 18.

[227] Thucyd. ii, 13: compare Tacitus, Histor. v, 23. "Cerealis, insulam Batavorum hostiliter populatus, agros Civilis, *notâ arte ducum*, intactos sinebat." Also Livy, ii, 39.

Justin affirms that the Lacedæmonian invaders actually did leave the lands of Periklês uninjured, and that he made them over to the people (iii, 7). Thucydidês does not say whether the case really occurred: see also Polyænus, i, 36.

[228] Thucyd. ii, 15, 16.

[229] Thucyd. ii, 14.

[230] Thucyd. ii, 17. καὶ τὸ Πελασγικὸν καλούμενον τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, ὃ καὶ ἐπάρατόν τε ἦν μὴ οἰκεῖν καί τι καὶ Πυθικοῦ μαντείου ἀκροτελεύτιον τοιόνδε διεκώλυε, λέγον ὡς *τὸ Πελασγικὸν ἀργὸν ἄμεινον*, ὅμως ὑπὸ τῆς παραχρῆμα ἀνάγκης ἐξῳκήθη.

Thucydidês then proceeds to give an explanation of his own for this ancient prophecy, intended to save its credit, as well as to show that his countrymen had not, as some persons alleged, violated any divine mandate by admitting residents into the Pelasgikon. When the oracle said: "The Pelasgikon is better unoccupied," it did not mean to interdict the occupation of that spot, but to foretell that it would never be occupied until a time of severe calamity arrived. The necessity of occupying it grew only out of national suffering. Such is the explanation suggested by Thucydidês.

[231] Aristophanês, Equites, 789. οἰκοῦντ᾽ ἐν ταῖς πιθάκναισι κἀν γυπαρίοις καὶ πυργιδίοις. The philosopher Diogenês, in taking up his abode in a tub, had thus examples in history to follow.

[232] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 33.

[233] See the Acharneis of Aristophanês, represented in the sixth year of the Peloponnesian war, v, 34, 180, 254, etc.

πρεσβῦταί τινες

Ἀχαρνικοὶ, στιπτοὶ γέροντες, πρίνινοι,

ἀτεράμονες, Μαραθωνομάχαι, σφενδάμνινοι, etc.

[234] Thucyd. ii, 20.

[235] Thucyd. ii, 21. κατὰ ξυστάσεις δὲ γιγνόμενοι ἐν πολλῇ ἔριδι ἦσαν: compare Euripidês, Herakleidæ, 416; and Andromachê, 1077.

[236] Thucyd. ii, 21. παντί τε τρόπῳ ἀνηρέθιστο ἡ πόλις καὶ τὸν Περικλέα ἐν ὀργῇ εἶχον, καὶ ὧν παρήνεσε πρότερον ἐμέμνηντο οὐδέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκάκιζον ὅτι στρατηγὸς ὢν οὐκ ἐπεξάγοι, αἴτιόν τε σφίσιν ἐνόμιζον πάντων ὧν ἔπασχον.

[237] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 33.

[238] Thucyd. ii, 22.

[239] See Schömann, De Comitiis, c. iv, p. 62. The prytanes (*i. e.* the fifty senators belonging to that tribe whose turn it was to preside at the time), as well as the stratêgi, had the right of convoking the ekklesia: see Thucyd. iv, 118, in which passage, however, they are represented as convoking it in conjunction with the stratêgi: probably a discretion on the point came gradually to be understood as vested in the latter.

[240] Thucyd. ii, 22. The funeral monument of these slain Thessalians, was among those seen by Pausanias near Athens, on the side of the Academy (Pausan. i, 29, 5).

[241] Diodorus (xii, 42) would have us believe, that the expedition sent out by Periklês, ravaging the Peloponnesian coast, induced the Lacedæmonians to hurry away their troops out of Attica. Thucydidês gives no countenance to this,—nor is it at all credible.

[242] Thucyd. ii, 23. The reading Γραϊκὴν, belonging to Γραία, seems preferable to Πειραϊκὴν. Poppo and Göller adopt the former, Dr. Arnold the latter. Græa was a small maritime place in the vicinity of Orôpus (Aristotel. ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Τάναγρα),—known also now as an Attic deme belonging to the tribe Pandionis: this has been discovered for the first time by an inscription published in Professor Ross's work (Ueber die Demen von Attika, pp. 3-5). Orôpus was not an Attic deme; the Athenian citizens residing in it were probably enrolled as Γραῆς.

[243] Thucyd. ii, 25; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 34; Justin, iii, 7, 5.

[244] Thucyd. ii, 25-30; Diodor. xii, 43, 44.

[245] Thucyd. ii, 26-32; Diodor. xii, 44.

[246] Thucyd. ii, 27.

[247] Thucyd. ii, 31; Diodor. xii, 44.

[248] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 30.

[249] See the striking picture in the Acharneis of Aristophanês (685-781) of the distressed Megarian selling his hungry children into slavery with their own consent: also Aristoph. Pac. 432.

The position of Megara, as the ally of Sparta and enemy of Athens, was uncomfortable in the same manner,—though not to the same intense pitch of suffering,—in the war which preceded the battle of Leuktra, near fifty years after this (Demosthen. cont. Neær., p. 1357, c. 12).

[250] Pausan. i, 40, 3.

[251] Thucyd. ii, 24.

[252] Thucyd. viii, 15.

[253] Mitford, Hist. of Greece, ch. xiv, sect. 1, vol. iii, p. 100. "Another measure followed, which, taking place at the time when Thucydidês wrote and Periklês spoke, and while Periklês held the principal influence in the administration, strongly marks both the inherent weakness and the indelible barbarism of democratical government. A decree of the people directed…. But so little confidence was placed in a decree so important, sanctioned only by the present will of that giddy tyrant, the multitude of Athens, against whose caprices, since the depression of the court of Areopagus, no balancing power remained,—that the denunciation of capital punishment was proposed against whosoever should propose, and whosoever should *concur in* (?) any decree for the disposal of that money to any other purpose, or in any other circumstances."

[254] Thucyd. viii, 15. τὰ δὲ χίλια τάλαντα, ὧν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου ἐγλίχοντο μὴ ἄψεσθαι, εὐθὺς ἔλυσαν τὰς ἐπικειμένας ζημίας τῷ εἰπόντι ἢ ἐπιψηφίσαντι, ὑπὸ τῆς παρούσης ἐκπλήξεως, καὶ ἐψηφίσαντο κινεῖν.

[255] Thucyd. ii, 29.

[256] Thucyd. ii, 33.

[257] Thucyd. ii, 34-45. Sometimes, also, the allies of Athens, who had fallen along with her citizens in battle, had a part in the honors of the public burial (Lysias, Orat. Funebr. c. 13).

[258] The critics, from Dionysius of Halikarnassus downward, agree, for the most part, in pronouncing the feeble Λόγος Ἐπιτάφιος, ascribed to Demosthenês, to be not really his. Of those ascribed to Plato and Lysias also, the genuineness has been suspected, though upon far less grounds. The Menexenus, if it be really the work of Plato, however, does not add to his fame: but the harangue of Lysias, a very fine composition, may well be his, and may, perhaps, have been really delivered,—though probably not delivered by him, as he was not a qualified citizen.

See the general instructions, in Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhetoric. c. 6, pp. 258-268, Reisk, on the contents and composition of a funeral discourse,—Lysias is said to have composed several,—Plutarch, Vit. x, Orator. p. 836.

Compare, respecting the funeral discourse of Periklês, K. F. Weber, Über die Stand-Rede des Periklês (Darmstadt, 1827); Westermann, Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland und Rom. sects. 35, 63, 64; Kutzen, Perikles, als Staatsman, p. 158, sect. 12 (Grimma, 1834).

Dahlmann (Historische Forschungen, vol. i, p. 23) seems to think that the original oration of Periklês contained a large sprinkling of mythical allusions and stories out of the antiquities of Athens, such as we now find in the other funeral orations above alluded to; but that Thucydidês himself deliberately left them out in his report. But there seems no foundation for this suspicion. It is much more consonant to the superior tone of dignity which reigns throughout all this oration, to suppose that the mythical narratives, and even the previous historical glories of Athens, never found any special notice in the speech of Periklês,—nothing more than a general recognition, with an intimation that he does not dwell upon them at length because they were well known to his audience,—μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εἰδόσιν οὐ βουλόμενος ἐάσω (ii, 36).

[259] Thucyd. ii, 35.

[260] Thucyd. ii, 36. Ἀπὸ δὲ οἵας τε ἐπιτηδεύσεως ἤλθομεν ἐπ᾽ αὐτὰ, καὶ μεθ᾽ οἵας πολιτείας, καὶ τρόπων ἐξ οἵων μεγάλα ἐγένετο, ταῦτα δηλώσας πρῶτον εἶμι, etc.

In the Demosthenic or pseudo-Demosthenic Orat. Funebris, c. 8, p. 1397—χρηστῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων συνήθεια, τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας ὑπόθεσις, etc.

[261] Thucyd. ii, 37. οὐδ᾽ αὖ κατὰ πενίαν, ἔχων δέ τι ἀγαθὸν δρᾶσαι τὴν πόλιν, ἀξιώματος ἀφανείᾳ κεκώλυται: compare Plato, Menexenus, c. 8.

[262] Thucyd. ii, 37. ἐλευθέρως δὲ τά τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν, καὶ ἐς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὑποψίαν, οὐ δι᾽ ὀργῆς τὸν πέλας, εἰ καθ᾽ ἡδονήν τι δρᾷ, ἔχοντες, οὐδὲ ἀζημίους μέν, λυπηρὰς δὲ, τῇ ὄψει ἀχθηδόνας προστιθέμενοι. Ἀνεπαχθῶς δὲ τὰ ἴδια προσομιλοῦντες τὰ δημόσια διὰ δέος μάλιστα οὐ παρανομοῦμεν, τῶν τε ἀεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντων ἀκροάσει καὶ τῶν νόμων, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὅσοι τε ἐπ᾽ ὠφελείᾳ τῶν ἀδικουμένων κεῖνται, καὶ ὅσοι ἄγραφοι ὄντες αἰσχύνην ὁμολογουμένην φέρουσι.

[263] Thucyd. ii, 40. φιλοκαλοῦμεν γὰρ μετ᾽ εὐτελείας, καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας· πλούτῳ τε ἔργου μᾶλλον καιρῷ ἢ λόγου κόμπῳ χρώμεθα, καὶ τὸ πένεσθαι οὐχ ὁμολογεῖν τινὶ αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλὰ μὴ διαφεύγειν ἔργῳ αἴσχιον.

The first strophe of the Chorus in Euripid. Medea, 824-841, may be compared with the tenor of this discourse of Periklês: the praises of Attica are there dwelt upon, as a country too good to receive the guilty Medea.

[264] Thucyd. ii, 41. ξυνελὼν τε λέγω, τὴν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσιν εἶναι, καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον δοκεῖν ἄν μοι τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα παρ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν εἴδη καὶ μετὰ χαρίτων μάλιστ᾽ ἂν εὐτραπέλως τὸ σῶμα αὔταρκες παρέχεσθαι.

The abstract word παίδευσιν, in place of the concrete παιδευτρία, seems to soften the arrogance of the affirmation.

[265] Thucyd. ii, 41. μόνη γὰρ τῶν νῦν ἀκοῆς κρείσσων ἐς πεῖραν ἔρχεται, καὶ μόνη οὔτε τῷ πολεμίῳ ἐπελθόντι ἀγανάκτησιν ἔχει ὑφ᾽ οἵων κακοπαθεῖ, οὔτε τῷ ὑπηκόῳ κατάμεμψιν ὡς οὐχ ὑπ᾽ ἀξίων ἄρχεται.

[266] Thucyd. ii. 42. περὶ τοιαύτης οὖν πόλεως οἵδε τε γενναίως δικαιοῦντες μὴ ἀφαιρεθῆναι αὐτὴν μαχόμενοι ἐτελεύτησαν, καὶ τῶν λειπομένων πάντα τινὰ εἰκὸς ἐθέλειν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς κάμνειν.

I am not sure that I have rightly translated δικαιοῦντες μὴ ἀφαιρεθῆναι αὐτὴν,—but neither Poppo, nor Göller, nor Dr. Arnold, say anything about these words, which yet are not at all clear.

[267] Thucyd. ii. 43. τὴν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἔργῳ θεωμένους καὶ ἐραστὰς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς, καὶ ὅταν ὑμῖν μεγάλη δόξῃ εἶναι, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, etc.

Αἰσχυνόμενοι: compare Demosthen. Orat. Funebris, c. 7, p. 1396. Αἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῶν ὀλίγων δυναστεῖαι δέος μὲν ἐνεργάζονται τοῖς πολίταις, αἰσχύνην δ᾽ οὐ παριστᾶσιν.

[268] Compare the sentiment of Xenophon, the precise reverse of that which is here laid down by Periklês, extolling the rigid discipline of Sparta, and denouncing the laxity of Athenian life (Xenophon, Memorab. iii, 5, 15; iii, 12, 5). It is curious that the sentiment appears in this dialogue as put in the mouth of the younger Periklês (illegitimate son of the great Periklês) in a dialogue with Sokratês.

[269] Euripidês, Medea, 824. ἱερᾶς χώρας ἀπορθήτου τ᾽, etc.

[270] The remarks of Dionysius Halikarnassus, tending to show that the number of dead buried on this occasion was so small, and the actions in which they had been slain so insignificant, as to be unworthy of so elaborate an harangue as this of Periklês,—and finding fault with Thucydidês on that ground,—are by no means well-founded or justifiable. He treats Thucydidês like a dramatic writer putting a speech into the mouth of one of his characters, and he considers that the occasion chosen for this speech was unworthy. But though this assumption would be correct with regard to many ancient historians, and to Dionysius himself in his Roman history,—it is not correct with reference to Thucydidês. The speech of Periklês was a real speech, heard, reproduced, and doubtless dressed up, by Thucydidês: if therefore more is said than the number of the dead or the magnitude of the occasion warranted, this is the fault of Periklês, and not of Thucydidês. Dionysius says that there were many other occasions throughout the war much more worthy of an elaborate funeral harangue,—especially the disastrous loss of the Sicilian army. But Thucydidês could not have heard any of them, after his exile in the eighth year of the war: and we may well presume that none of them would bear any comparison with this of Periklês. Nor does Dionysius at all appreciate the full circumstances of this first year of the war,—which, when completely felt, will be found to render the splendid and copious harangue of the great statesman eminently seasonable. See Dionys. H. de Thucyd. Judic. pp. 849-851.

[271] Thucyd. ii, 47-55.

[272] Thucyd. ii, 52; Diodor. xii, 45; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 34. It is to be remarked, that the Athenians, though their persons and movable property were crowded within the walls, had not driven in their sheep and cattle also, but had transported them over to Eubœa and the neighboring islands (Thucyd. ii, 14). Hence they escaped a serious aggravation of their epidemic: for in the accounts of the epidemics which desolated Rome under similar circumstances, we find the accumulation of great numbers of cattle, along with human beings, specified as a terrible addition to the calamity (see Livy, iii, 66; Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. x, 53: compare Niebuhr, Römisch. Gesch. vol. ii, p. 90).

[273] Thucyd. ii, 49. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔτος, ὡς ὡμολογεῖτο, ἐκ πάντων μάλιστα δὴ ἐκεῖνο ἄνοσον ἐς τὰς ἄλλας ἀσθενείας ἐτύγχανεν ὄν. Hippokratês, in his description of the epidemic fever at Thasos, makes a similar remark on the absence of all other disorders at the time (Epidem. i, 8, vol. ii, p. 640, ed. Littré).

[274] "La description de Thucydide (observes M. Littré, in his introduction to the works of Hippokratês, tom. i, p. 122), est tellement bonne qu'elle suffit pleinement pour nous faire comprendre ce que cette ancienne maladie a été: et il est fort à regretter que des médecins tels qu'Hippocrate et Galien n'aient rien écrit sur les grandes épidémies, dont ils ont été les spectateurs. Hippocrate a été témoin de cette peste racontée par Thucydide, et il ne nous en a pas laissé la description. Galien vit également la fièvre éruptive qui désola le monde sous Marc Aurèle, et qu'il appelle lui-même la longue peste. Cependant excepté quelques mots épars dans ses volumineux ouvrages, excepté quelques indications fugitives, il ne nous a rien transmis sur un événement médical aussi important; à tel point que si nous n'avions pas le récit de Thucydide, il nous seroit fort difficile de nous faire une idée de celle qu'a vue Galien, et qui est la même (comme M. Hecker s'est attaché à le démontrer) que la maladie connue sous le nom de Peste d'Athènes. C'était une fièvre éruptive différente de la variole, et éteinte aujourdhui. On a cru en voir les traces dans les *charbons* (ἄνθρακες) des livres Hippocratiques."

Both Krauss (Disquisitio de naturâ morbi Atheniensium. Stuttgard, 1831, p. 38) and Hæser (Historisch. Patholog. Untersuchungen. Dresden 1839, p. 50) assimilate the pathological phenomena specified by Thucydidês to different portions of the Ἐπιδημίαι of Hippokratês. M. Littré thinks that the resemblance is not close or precise, so as to admit of the one being identified with the other. "Le tableau si frappant qu'en a tracé ce grand historien ne se réproduit pas certainement avec une netteté suffisante dans les brefs détails donnés par Hippocrate. La maladie d'Athènes avoit un type si tranché, que tous ceux qui en ont parlé ont du le réproduire dans ses parties essentielles." (Argument aux 2^{me} Livre des Epidémies, Œuvres d'Hippocrate, tom. v. p. 64.) There appears good reason to believe that the great epidemic which prevailed in the Roman world under Marcus Aurelius—the Pestis Antoniniana—was a renewal of what is called the Plague of Athens.

[275] Thucyd. ii, 48. λεγέτω μὲν οὖν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἕκαστος γιγνώσκει, καὶ ἰατρὸς καὶ ἰδιώτης, ἀφ᾽ ὅτου εἰκὸς ἦν γενέσθαι αὐτὸ, καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἅστινας νομίζει τοσαύτης μεταβολῆς ἱκανὰς εἶναι δύναμιν ἐς τὸ μεταστῆσαι σχεῖν· ἐγὼ δὲ οἷόν τε ἐγίγνετο λέξω, καὶ ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἄν τις σκοπῶν, εἴ ποτε καὶ αὖθις ἐπιπέσοι, μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ἔχοι τι προειδὼς μὴ ἀγνοεῖν, ταῦτα δηλώσω, αὐτός τε νοσήσας καὶ αὐτὸς ἰδὼν ἄλλους πάσχοντας.

Demokritus, among others, connected the generation of these epidemics with his general system of atoms, atmospheric effluvia, and εἴδωλα: see Plutarch, Symposiac. viii, 9, p. 733; Demokriti Fragment., ed. Mullach, lib. iv, p. 409.

The causes of the Athenian epidemic as given by Diodorus (xii, 58)—unusual rains, watery quality of grain, absence of the Etesian winds, etc., may perhaps be true of the revival of the epidemic in the fifth year of the war, but can hardly be true of its first appearance; since Thucydidês states that the year in other respects was unusually healthy, and the epidemic was evidently brought from foreign parts to Peiræus.

[276] Thucyd. i, 22.

[277] See the words of Thucydidês. ii, 49. καὶ ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς πᾶσαι, *ὅσαι ὑπὸ ἰατρῶν ὠνομασμέναι εἰσὶν*, ἐπῆσαν,—which would seem to indicate a familiarity with the medical terminology: compare also his allusion to the speculations of the physicians, cited in the previous note; and c. 51—*τὰ πάσῃ διαίτῃ θεραπευόμενα*, etc.

In proof how rare the conception was, in ancient times, of the importance of collecting and registering particular medical facts, I transcribe the following observations from M. Littré (Œuvres d'Hippocrate, tom. iv, p. 646, Remarques Retrospectives).

"Toutefois ce qu'il importe ici de constater, ce n'est pas qu'Hippocrate a observé de telle ou telle manière, mais c'est qu'il a eu l'idée de recueillir et de consigner des faits particuliers. En effet, rien, dans l'antiquité, n'a été plus rare que ce soin: outre Hippocrate, je ne connois qu'Erasistrate qui se soit occupé de relater sous cette forme les résultats de son expérience clinique. Ni Galien lui-même, ni Arétée, ni Soranus, ni les autres qui sont arrivés jusqu'à nous, n'ont suivi un aussi louable exemple. Les observations consignées dans la collection Hippocratique constituent la plus grande partie, à beaucoup près, de ce que l'antiquité a possédé en ce genre: et si, en commentant le travail d'Hippocrate, on l'avait un peu imité, nous aurions des matériaux à l'aide desquels nous prendrions une idée bien plus précise de la pathologie de ces siècles reculés…. Mais tout en exprimant ce regret et en reconnaissant cette utilité relative à nous autres modernes et véritablement considérable, il faut ajouter que l'antiquité avoit dans les faits et la doctrine Hippocratiques un aliment qui lui a suffi—et qu'une collection, même étendue, d'histoires particulières n'auroit pas alors modifié la médecine, du moins la médecine scientifique, essentiellement et au delà de la limite que comportoit la physiologie. Je pourrai montrer ailleurs que la doctrine d'Hippocrate et de l'école de Cos a été la seule solide, la seule fondée sur un aperçu vrai de la nature

organisée; et que les sectes postérieures, méthodisme et pneumatisme, n'ont bâti leurs théories que sur des hypothèses sans consistance. Mais ici je me contente de remarquer, que la pathologie, en tant que science, ne peut marcher qu'à la suite de la physiologie, dont elle n'est qu'une des faces: et d'Hippocrate à Galien inclusivement, la physiologie ne fit pas assez de progrès pour rendre insuffisante la conception Hippocratique. Il en résulte, nécessairement, que la pathologie, toujours considérée comme science, n'auroit pu, par quelque procédé que ce fût, gagner que des corrections et des augmentations de détail."

[278] Compare the story of Thalêtas appeasing an epidemic at Sparta by his music and song (Plutarch, De Musicâ, p. 1146).

Some of the ancient physicians were firm believers in the efficacy of these charms and incantations. Alexander of Tralles says, that having originally treated them with contempt, he had convinced himself of their value by personal observation, and altered his opinion (ix, 4)—ἔνιοι γοῦν οἴονται τοῖς τῶν γραῶν μύθοις ἐοικέναι τὰς ἐπῳδὰς, ὥσπερ κἀγὼ μέχρι πολλοῦ· τῷ χρόνῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶς φαινομένων ἐπείσθην εἶναι δύναμιν ἐν αὐταῖς. See an interesting and valuable dissertation, Origines Contagii, by Dr. C. F. Marx (Stuttgard, 1824, p. 129).

The suffering Hêraklês, in his agony under the poisoned tunic, invokes the ἀοιδὸς along with the χειροτέχνης ἰατοριὰς (Sophoklês, Trachin. 1005).

[279] Thucyd. ii, 54.

Φάσκοντες οἱ πρεσβύτεροι πάλαι ᾄδεσθαι—

Ἥξει Δωριακὸς πόλεμος, καὶ λοιμὸς ἅμ᾽ αὐτῷ.

See also the first among the epistles ascribed to the orator Æschinês, respecting a λοιμὸς in Delos.

It appears that there was a debate whether, in this Hexameter verse, λιμὸς (famine) or λοιμὸς (pestilence) was the correct reading: and the probability is, that it had been originally composed with the word λιμὸς,—for men might well fancy beforehand that *famine* would be a sequel of the Dorian war, but they would not be likely to imagine *pestilence* as accompanying it. Yet, says Thucydidês, the reading λοιμὸς was held decidedly preferable, as best fitting to the actual circumstances (οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ἃ ἔπασχον τὴν μνήμην ἐποιοῦντο). And "if (he goes on to say) there should ever hereafter come another Dorian war, and famine along with it, the oracle will probably be reproduced with the word λιμὸς as part of it."

This deserves notice, as illustrating the sort of admitted license with which men twisted the oracles or prophecies, so as to hit the feelings of the actual moment.

[280] Compare Diodor. xiv, 70, who mentions similar distresses in the Carthaginian army besieging Syracuse, during the terrible epidemic with which it was attacked in 395 B.C.; and Livy, xxv, 26, respecting the epidemic at Syracuse when it was besieged by Marcellus and the Romans.

[281] Thucyd. ii, 52. Οἰκιῶν γὰρ οὐχ ὑπαρχουσῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν καλύβαις πνιγηραῖς ὥρᾳ ἔτους διαιτωμένων, ὁ φθόρος ἐγίγνετο οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ νεκροὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλοις ἀποθνήσκοντες ἔκειντο, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐκαλινδοῦντο καὶ περὶ τὰς κρήνας ἁπάσας ἠμιθνῆτες, τοῦ ὕδατος ἐπιθυμίᾳ. Τά τε ἱερὰ ἐν οἷς ἐσκήνηντο, νεκρῶν πλέα ἦν, αὐτοῦ ἐναποθνῃσκόντων· ὑπερβιαζομένου γὰρ τοῦ κακοῦ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐκ ἔχοντες, ὅ,τι γένωνται, ἐς ὀλιγωρίαν ἐτράποντο καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων ὁμοίως.

[282] Thucyd. ii, 50: compare Livy, xli, 21, describing the epidemic at Rome in 174 B.C. "Cadavera, intacta à canibus et vulturibus, tabes absumebat: satisque constabat, nec illo, nec priore anno in tantâ strage boum hominumque vulturium usquam visum."

[283] Thucyd. ii, 52. From the language of Thucydidês, we see that this was regarded at Athens as highly unbecoming. Yet a passage of Plutarch seems to show that it was very common, in his time, to burn several bodies on the same funeral pile (Plutarch, Symposiac. iii, 4, p. 651).

[284] The description in the sixth book of Lucretius, translated and expanded from Thucydidês,—that of the plague at Florence in 1348, with which the Decameron of Boccacio opens,—and that of Defoe, in his History of the Plague in London, are all well known.

[285] "Carthaginienses, cum inter cetera mala etiam peste laborarent, cruentâ sacrorum religione, et scelere pro remedio, usi sunt: quippe homines ut victimas immolabant; pacem deorum sanguine eorum exposcentes, pro quorum vitâ Dii rogari maximè solent." (Justin, xviii, 6.)

For the facts respecting the plague of Milan and the Untori, see the interesting novel of Manzoni, Promessi Sposi, and the historical work of the same author, Storia della Colonna Infame.

[286] Thucyd. iii, 87. τοῦ δὲ ἄλλου ὄχλου ἀνεξεύρετος ἀριθμός. Diodorus makes them above 10,000 (xii, 58) freemen and slaves together, which must be greatly beneath the reality.

[287] Thucyd. ii, 54. τῶν ἄλλων χωρίων τὰ πολυανθρωπότατα. He does not specify what places these were: perhaps Chios, but hardly Lesbos, otherwise the fact would have been noticed when the revolt of that island occurs.

[288] Thucyd. ii, 57.

[289] Thucyd. ii, 56-58.

[290] Thucyd. ii, 59. ἠλλοίωντο τὰς γνώμας.

[291] Diodor. xii, 45; Ister ap. Schol. ad Soph. Œdip. Colon. 689; Herodot. ix.

[292] Thucyd. ii, 65. Ὁ μὲν δῆμος, ὅτι ἀπ᾽ ἐλασσόνων ὁρμώμενος, ἐστέρητο καὶ τούτων· οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ, καλὰ κτήματα κατὰ τὴν χώραν οἰκοδομίαις τε καὶ πολυτελέσι κατασκευαῖς ἀπολωλεκότες.

[293] Thucyd. i, 140.

[294] Thucyd. ii, 60. καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιούτῳ ἀνδρὶ ὀργίζεσθε, ὃς οὐδενὸς οἴομαι ἧσσων εἶναι γνῶναί τε τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι ταῦτα, φιλόπολίς τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων.

[295] Thucyd. ii, 62. δηλώσω δὲ καὶ τόδε, ὅ μοι δοκεῖτε οὔτ᾽ αὐτοὶ πώποτε ἐνθυμηθῆναι ὑπάρχον ὑμῖν μεγέθους πέρι ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν, οὔτ᾽ ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς πρὶν λόγοις· οὐδ᾽ ἂν νῦν ἐχρησάμην κομπωδεστέραν ἔχοντι τὴν προσποίησιν, εἰ μὴ καταπεπληγμένους ὑμᾶς παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἑώρων. Οἴεσθε μὲν γὰρ τῶν ξυμμάχων μόνον ἄρχειν—ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποφαίνω δύο μερῶν τῶν ἐς χρῆσιν φανερῶν, γῆς καὶ θαλάττης, τοῦ ἑτέρου ὑμᾶς παντὸς κυριωτάτους ὄντας, ἐφ᾽ ὅσον τε νῦν νέμεσθε, καὶ ἢν ἐπιπλέον βουληθῆτε.

[296] Thucyd. ii, 60-64. I give a general summary of this memorable speech, without setting forth its full contents, still less the exact words.

[297] Thucyd. ii, 65: Plato, Gorgias, p. 515, c. 71: Plutarch, Periklês, c. 35; Diodor. xii, c. 38-45. About Simmias, as the vehement enemy of Periklês, see Plutarch, Reipub. Ger. Præcept. p. 805.

Plutarch and Diodorus both state that Periklês was not only fined, but also removed from his office of stratêgus. Thucydidês mentions the fine, but not the removal: and his silence leads me to doubt the reality of the latter event altogether. For with such a man as Periklês, a vote of removal would have been a penalty more marked and cutting than the fine; moreover, removal from office, though capable of being pronounced by vote of the public assembly, would hardly be inflicted as penalty by the dikastery.

I imagine the events to have passed as follows: The stratêgi, with most other officers of the commonwealth, were changed or reëlected at the beginning of Hekatombæon, the first month of the Attic year; that is, somewhere about midsummer. Now the Peloponnesian army, invading Attica about the end of March or beginning of April, and remaining forty days, would leave the country about the first week in May. Periklês returned from his expedition against Peloponnesus shortly after they left Attica; that is, about the middle of May (Thucyd. ii, 57): there still remained, therefore, a month or six weeks before his office of stratêgus naturally expired, and required renewal. It was during this interval (which Thucydidês expresses by the words ἔτι δ᾽ ἐστρατήγει, ii, 59) that he convoked the assembly and delivered the harangue recently mentioned.

But when the time for a new election of stratêgi arrived, the enemies of Periklês opposed his reëlection, and brought a charge against him, in that trial of accountability to which every magistrate at Athens was exposed, after his period of office. They alleged against him some official misconduct in reference to the public money, and the dikastery visited him with a fine. His reëlection was thus prevented, and with a man who had been so often reëlected, this might be loosely called "taking away the office of general:" so that the language of Plutarch and Diodorus, as well as the silence of Thucydidês, would, on this supposition, be justified.

[298] Thucyd. ii, 65.

[299] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 36.

[300] See Plutarch, Demosthen. c. 27, about the manner of bringing about such an evasion of a fine: compare also the letter of M. Boeckh, in Meineke, Fragment. Comic. Græcor. ad Fragm. Eupolid. ii, 527.

[301] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 37.

[302] Plutarch (Perik. c. 38) treats the slow disorder under which he suffered as one of the forms of the epidemic: but this can hardly be correct, when we read the very marked character of the latter, as described by Thucydidês.

[303] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 38.

[304] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 4, 8, 13, 16; Eupolis. Δῆμοι, Fragm. vi. p. 459, ed. Meineke. Cicero (De Orator. iii, 34; Brutus, 9-11) and Quintilian (ii, 16, 19; x, 1, 82) count only as witnesses at second-hand.

[305] Plato, Gorgias, c. 71, p. 516; Phædrus, c. 54. p. 270. Περικλέα, τὸν οὕτω μεγαλοπρεπῶς σοφὸν ἄνδρα. Plato, Mens. p. 94, B.

[306] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 10-39.

[307] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 5.

[308] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 11. Διὸ καὶ τότε μάλιστα τῷ δήμῳ τὰς ἡνίας ἀνεὶς ὁ Περικλῆς ἐπολιτεύετο πρὸς χάριν—ἀεὶ μέν τινα θέαν πανηγυρικὴν ἢ ἑστίασιν ἢ πομπὴν εἶναι μηχανώμενος ἐν ἄστει, καὶ διαπαιδαγωγῶν οὐκ ἀμούσοις ἡδοναῖς τὴν πόλιν—ἑξήκοντα δὲ τριήρεις καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκπέμπων, ἐν αἷς πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἔπλεον ὀκτὼ μῆνας ἔμμισθοι, μελετῶντες ἅμα καὶ μανθάνοντες τὴν ναυτικὴν ἐμπειρίαν.

Compare c. 9, where Plutarch states that Periklês, having no other means of contending against the abundant private largesses of his rival, Kimon, resorted to the expedient of distributing the public money among the citizens, in order to gain influence; acting in this matter upon the advice of his friend, Demonidês, according to the statement of Aristotle.

[309] Thucyd. ii, 65. Ἐκεῖνος μὲν (Περικλῆς) δυνατὸς ὢν τῷ *τε ἀξιώματι* καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ, *χρημάτων τε διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος γενόμενος, κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως*, καὶ οὐκ ἦγετο μᾶλλον ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ἦγε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κτώμενος ἐξ οὐ προσηκόντων τὴν δύναμιν πρὸς ἡδονήν τι λέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχων ἐπ᾽ *ἀξιώσει* καὶ πρὸς ὀργήν τι ἀντειπεῖν. Ὁπότε γοῦν αἴσθοιτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησσεν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι· καὶ δεδιότας αὖ ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν. Ἐγίγνετο δὲ λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή. Οἱ δὲ ὕστερον ἴσοι μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὄντες, καὶ ὀρεγόμενοι τοῦ πρῶτος ἕκαστος γίγνεσθαι, ἐτράποντο καθ᾽ ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι. Ἐξ ὧν, ἄλλα τε πολλά, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη, καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς· ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνώμης ἁμάρτημα ἦν, etc. Compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 3.

Ἀξίωσις and ἀξίωμα, as used by Thucydidês seem to differ in this respect: Ἀξίωσις signifies, a man's dignity, or pretensions to esteem and influence as felt and measured by himself; *his sense of dignity*; Ἀξίωμα means his *dignity*, properly so called; as felt and appreciated by others. See i, 37, 41, 69.

[310] Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, b. iii, ch. xv. p. 399, Eng. Trans.

Kutzen, in the second Beylage to his treatise, Periklês als Staatsmann (pp. 169-200), has collected and inserted a list of various characters of Periklês, from twenty different authors, English, French, and German. That of Wachsmuth is the best of the collection,—though even he appears to think that Periklês is to blame for having introduced a set of institutions which none but himself could work well.

[311] Thucyd. ii, 65. *μετρίως ἐξηγεῖτο*. i, 144. δίκας δὲ ὅτι ἐθέλομεν δοῦναι κατὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας, πολέμου δὲ οὐκ ἄρξομεν, ἀρχομένους δὲ ἀμυνούμεθα.

[312] Herodotus (1, 170) mentions that previous to the conquest of the twelve Ionic cities in Asia by Crœsus, Thalês had advised them to consolidate themselves all into one single city government at Teos, and to reduce the existing cities to mere demes or constituent, fractional municipalities,—τὰς δὲ ἄλλας πόλιας οἰκεομένας μηδὲν ἧσσον νομίζεσθαι κατάπερ εἰ δῆμοι εἶεν. It is remarkable to observe that Herodotus himself bestows his unqualified commendation on this idea.

[313] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 17.

[314] Thucyd. ii, 68.

[315] Thucyd. ii, 69.

[316] Thucyd. iii, 51.

[317] Thucyd. ii, 67-69; Herodot. vii, 137. Respecting the Lacedæmonian privateering during the Peloponnesian war, compare Thucyd. v, 115: compare also Xenophon, Hellen. v, 1, 29.

[318] Thucyd. ii, 67. Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὕπηρξαν, τοὺς ἐμπόρους οὓς ἔλαβον Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐν ὁλκάσι περὶ Πελοπόννησον πλέοντας ἀποκτείναντες καὶ ἐς φάραγγας ἐσβαλόντες. Πάντας γὰρ δὴ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὅσους λάβοιεν ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ, ὡς πολεμίους διέφθειρον, καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Ἀθηναίων ξυμπολεμοῦντας καὶ τοὺς μηδὲ μεθ᾽ ἑτέρων.

The Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas slew all the prisoners taken on board merchantmen off the coast of Ionia, in the ensuing year (Thucyd. iii, 32). Even this was considered extremely rigorous, and excited strong remonstrance; yet the mariners slain were not neutrals, but belonged to the subject-allies of Athens: moreover, Alkidas was in his flight, and obliged to make choice between killing his prisoners or setting them free.

[319] Thucyd. ii, 69.

[320] Thucyd. ii. 67. Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Greece, vol. iii, ch. 20, p. 129) says that "the envoys were sacrificed chiefly to give a decent color to the baseness" of killing Aristeus, from whom the Athenians feared subsequent evil, in consequence of his ability and active spirit. I do not think this is fairly contained in the words of Thucydidês. He puts in the foreground of Athenian motive, doubtless, fear from the future energy of Aristeus; but if that had been the only motive, the Athenians would probably have slain him singly without the rest: they would hardly think it necessary to provide themselves with "any decent color," in the way that Dr. Thirlwall suggests. Thucydidês names the special feeling of the Athenians against Aristeus (in my judgment), chiefly in order to explain the extreme haste of the Athenian sentence of execution—αὐθήμερον—ἀκρίτους, etc.: they were under the influence of combined motives,—fear, revenge, retaliation.

The envoys here slain were sons of Sperthiês and Bulis, former Spartan heralds who had gone up to Xerxes at Susa to offer their heads as atonement for the previous conduct of the Spartans in killing the heralds of Darius. Xerxes dismissed them unhurt,—so that the anger of Talthybius (the heroic progenitor of the family of heralds at Sparta) remained still unsatisfied: it was only satisfied by the death of their two sons, now slain by the Athenians. The fact that the two persons now slain were sons of those two (Sperthiês and Bulis) who had previously gone to Susa to tender their lives,—is spoken of as a "romantic and tragical coincidence." But there surely is very little to wonder at. The functions of herald at Sparta, were the privilege of a particular gens, or family: every herald, therefore, was *ex officio* the son of a herald. Now when the Lacedæmonians, at the beginning of this Peloponnesian war, were looking out for two members of the heraldic gens to send up to Susa, upon whom would they so naturally fix as upon the sons of those two men who had been to Susa before? These sons had doubtless heard their fathers talk a great deal about it,—probably with interest and satisfaction, since they derived great glory from the unaccepted offer of their lives in atonement. There was a particular reason why these two men should be taken, in preference to any other heralds, to fulfil this dangerous mission: and doubtless when they perished in it, the religious imagination of the Lacedæmonians would group all the series of events as consummation of the judgment inflicted by Talthybius in his anger (Herodot. vii, 135—ὡς λέγουσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι).

It appears that Anêristus, the herald here slain, had distinguished himself personally in that capture of fishermen on the coast of Peloponnesus by the Lacedæmonians, for which the Athenians were now retaliating (Herodot. vii, 137). Though this passage of Herodotus is not clear, yet the sense here put upon it is the natural one,—and clearer (in my judgment) than that which O. Müller would propose instead of it (Dorians, ii, p. 437).

[321] Thucyd. ii, 70; iii, 17. However, the displeasure of the Athenians against the commanders cannot have been very serious, since Xenophon was appointed to command against the Chalkidians in the ensuing year.

[322] Diodor. xii, 46.

[323] Thucyd. ii, 71, 72.

[324] This previous summons is again alluded to afterwards, on occasion of the slaughter of the Platæan prisoners (iii, 68): διότι *τόν τε ἄλλον χρόνον* ἠξίουν δῆθεν, etc.

[325] Thucyd. ii, 73, 74.

[326] Thucyd. ii, 71-75.

[327] Thucyd. iii, 68.

[328] Thucyd. ii, 75.

[329] The various processes, such as those here described, employed both for offence and defence in the ancient sieges, are noticed and discussed in Æneas Poliorketic. c. 33, *seq.*

[330] Thucyd. ii, 76.

[331] Thucyd. ii, 77.

[332] Thucyd. ii, 78. καὶ ἐπειδὴ πᾶν ἐξείργαστο περὶ Ἀρκτούρου ἐπιτολάς, etc. at the period of the year when the star Arcturus rises immediately before sunrise,—that is, sometime between the 12th and 17th of September: see Göller's note on the passage. Thucydidês does not often give any fixed marks to discriminate the various periods of the year, as we find it here done. The Greek months were all lunar months, or nominally so: the names of months, as well as the practice of intercalation to rectify the calendar, varied from city to city; so that if Thucydidês had specified the day of the Attic month Boêdromion (instead of specifying the rising of Arcturus) on which this work was finished, many of his readers would not have distinctly understood him. Hippokratês also, in indications of time for medical purposes, employs the appearance of Arcturus and other stars.

[333] Thucyd. ii, 78; iii, 21. From this description of the double wall and covered quarters provided for what was foreknown as a long blockade, we may understand the sufferings of the Athenian troops (who probably had no double wall), in the two years' blockade of Potidæa,—and their readiness to grant an easy capitulation to the besieged: see a few pages above.

[334] Thucyd. ii, 79.

[335] Thucyd. ii, 80.

[336] Thucyd. ii, 82; Diodor. xii, 48.

[337] Thucyd. ii, 83. οὐχ ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν, ἀλλὰ στρατιωτικώτερον παρεσκευασμένοι: compare the speech of Knêmus, c. 87. The unskilfulness of the rowers is noticed (c. 84).

[338] Thucyd. ii, 88. πρότερον μὲν γὰρ *ἀεὶ αὐτοῖς ἔλεγε* (Phormio) καὶ προπαρεσκεύαζε τὰς γνώμας, ὡς οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς πλῆθος νεῶν τοσοῦτον, ἢν ἐπιπλέῃ, ὅ,τι οὐχ ὑπομενετέον αὐτοῖς ἐστί· καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται ἐκ πολλοῦ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀξίωσιν ταύτην εἰλήφεσαν, *μηδένα ὄχλον Ἀθηναῖοι ὄντες Πελοποννησίων νεῶν ὑποχωρεῖν*.

This passage is not only remarkable as it conveys the striking persuasion entertained by the Athenians of their own naval superiority, but also as it discloses the frank and intimate communication between the Athenian captain and his seamen,—so strongly pervading and determining the feelings of the latter. Compare what is told respecting the Syracusan Hermokratês, Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 30.

[339] Thucyd. ii, 83. Ἐπειδὴ μέντοι ἀντιπαραπλέοντάς τε ἐώρων αὐτοὺς (that is, when the Corinthians saw the Athenian ships) παρὰ γῆν σφῶν κομιζομένων, καὶ ἐκ Πατρῶν τῆς Ἀχαΐας πρὸς τὴν ἀντιπέρας ἤπειρον διαβαλλόντων ἐπὶ Ἀκαρνανίας κατεῖδον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῆς Χαλκίδος καὶ τοῦ Εὐήνου ποταμοῦ προσπλέοντας σφίσι, *καὶ οὐκ ἔλαθον νυκτὸς ὑφορμισάμενοι*, οὕτω δὴ ἀναγκάζονται ναυμαχεῖν κατὰ μέσον τὸν πορθμόν.

There is considerable difficulty in clearly understanding what was here done, especially what is meant by the words οὐκ ἔλαθον νυκτὸς ὑφορμισάμενοι, which words the Scholiast construed as if the nominative case to ἔλαθον were οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, whereas the natural structure of the sentence, as well as the probabilities of fact, lead the best commentators to consider οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι as the nominative case to that verb. The remark of the Scholiast, however, shows us, that the difficulty of understanding the sentence dates from ancient times.

Dr. Arnold—whose explanation is adopted by Poppo and Göller—says: "The two fleets were moving parallel to one another along the opposite shores of the Corinthian gulf. But even when they had sailed out of the strait at Rhium, the opposite shores were still so near, that the Peloponnesians hoped to cross over without opposition, if they could so far deceive the Athenians, as to the spot where they brought to for the night, as to induce them either to stop too soon, or to advance too far, that they might not be exactly opposite to them to intercept

the passage. If they could lead the Athenians to think that they meant to advance in the night beyond Patræ, the Athenian fleet was likely to continue its own course along the northern shore, to be ready to intercept them when they should endeavor to run across to Acarnania. But the Athenians, aware that they had stopped at Patræ, stopped themselves at Chalkis, instead of proceeding further to the westward; and thus were so nearly opposite to them, that the Peloponnesians had not time to get more than half-way across, before they found themselves encountered by their watchful enemy."

This explanation seems to me not satisfactory, nor does it take account of all the facts of the case. The first belief of the Peloponnesians was, that Phormio would not dare to attack them at all: accordingly, having arrived at Patræ, they stretched from thence across the gulf to the mouth of the Euenus,—the natural way of proceeding according to ancient navigation,—going in the direction of Akarnania (ἐπὶ Ἀκαρνανίας). As they were thus stretching across, they perceived Phormio bearing down upon them from the Euenus: this was a surprise to them, and as they wished to avoid a battle in the mid-channel, they desisted from proceeding farther that day, in hopes to be able to deceive Phormio in respect of their night-station. They made a feint of taking night-station on the shore between Patræ and Rhium, near the narrow part of the strait; but, in reality, they "slipped anchor and put to sea during the night," as Mr. Bloomfield says, in hopes of getting across the shorter passage under favor of darkness, before Phormio could come upon them. That they must have done this is proved by the fact, that the subsequent battle was fought on the morrow in the mid-channel *very little after daybreak* (we learn this from what Thucydidês says about the gulf-breeze, for which Phormio waited before he would commence his attack—ὅπερ ἀναμένων τε περιέπλει, καὶ εἰώθει γίγνεσθαι *ἐπι τὴν ἕω*). If Phormio had returned to Chalkis, they would probably have succeeded; but he must have kept the sea all night, which would be the natural proceeding of a vigilant captain, determined not to let the Peloponnesians get across without fighting: so that he was upon them in the mid-channel immediately that day broke.

Putting all the statements of Thucydidês together, we may be convinced that this is the way in which the facts occurred. But of the precise sense of ὑφορμισάμενοι, I confess I do not feel certain: Haack says, it means "clam appellere ad littus," but here, I think, that sense will not do: for the Peloponnesians did not wish, and could indeed hardly hope, to conceal from Phormio the spot where they brought to for the night, and to make him suppose that they brought to at some point of the shore west of Patræ, when in reality they passed the night in Patræ,—which is what Dr. Arnold supposes. The shore west of Patræ makes a bend to the southwest,—forming the gulf of Patras,—so that the distance from the northern, or Ætolian and Akarnanian, side of the gulf becomes for a considerable time longer and longer, and the Peloponnesians would thus impose upon themselves a longer crossing, increasing the difficulty of getting over without a battle. But ὑφορμισάμενοι may reasonably be supposed to mean, especially in conjunction with οὐκ ἔλαθον, "taking up a simulated or imperfect night-station," in which they did not really intend to stay all night, and which could be quitted at short notice and with ease. The preposition ὑπὸ, in composition, would thus have the sense, not of *secrecy* (*clam*) but of *sham-performance*, or of mere going through the forms of an act for the purpose of making a false impression (like ὑποφέρειν, Xenoph. Hell. iv, 72). Mr. Bloomfield proposes conjecturally ἀφορμισάμενοι, meaning, "that the Peloponnesians slipped their anchors in the night:" I place no faith in the conjecture, but I believe him to be quite right in supposing, that the Peloponnesians *did actually* slip their anchors in the night.

Another point remains to be adverted to. The battle took place κατὰ μέσον τὸν πορθμόν. Now we need not understand this expression to allude to the narrowest part of the sea, or the strait, strictly and precisely; that is, the line of seven stadia between Rhium and Antirrhium. But I think we must understand it to mean a portion of sea not far westward of the strait, where the breadth, though greater than that of the strait itself, is yet not so great as it becomes in the line drawn northward from Patræ. We cannot understand πορθμὸς (as Mr. Bloomfield and Poppo do,—see the note of the latter on the Scholia) to mean *trajectus* simply, that is to say, the passage across even the widest portion of the gulf of Patras: nor does the passage cited out of c. 86 require us so to understand it. Πορθμὸς, in Thucydidês, means a strait, or narrow crossing of sea, and Poppo himself admits that Thucydidês always uses it so: nor would it be reasonable to believe that he would call the line of sea across the gulf, from Patræ to the mouth of the Euenus, a πορθμός. See the note of Göller, on this point.

[340] Thucyd. ii, 86. μὴ δίδοντες διέκπλουν. The great object of the fast-sailing Athenian trireme was, to drive its beak against some weak part of the adversary's ship: the stern, the side, or the oars,—not against the beak, which was strongly constructed as well for defence as for offence. The Athenian, therefore, rowing through the intervals of the adversary's line, and thus getting in their rear, turned rapidly, and got the opportunity, before the ship of the adversary could change its position, of striking it either in the stern or some weak part. Such a manœuvre was called the *diekplus*. The success of it, of course, depended upon the extreme rapid-

ity and precision of the movements of the Athenian vessel, so superior in this respect to its adversary, not only in the better construction of the ship, but the excellence of rowers and steersmen.

[341] See Dr. Arnold's note upon this passage of Thucydidês, respecting the keleustês and his functions: to the passages which he indicates as reference, I will add two more of Plautus, Mercat. iv, 2, 5, and Asinaria, iii, 1, 15.

When we conceive the structure of an ancient trireme, we shall at once see, first, how essential the keleustês was, to keep the rowers in harmonious action,—next, how immense the difference must have been between practised and unpractised rowers. The trireme had, in all, one hundred and seventy rowers, distributed into three tiers. The upper tier, called thranitæ, were sixty-two in number, or thirty-one on each side: the middle tier, or zygitæ, as well as the lowest tier, or thalamitæ, were each fifty-four in number, or twenty-seven on each side. Besides these, there were belonging to each trireme a certain number, seemingly about thirty, of supplementary oars (κῶπαι περινέω), to be used by the epibatæ, or soldiers, serving on board, in case of rowers being killed, or oars broken. Each tier of rowers was distributed along the whole length of the vessel, from head to stern, or at least along the greater part of it; but the seats of the higher tiers were not placed in the exact perpendicular line above the lower. Of course, the oars of the thranitæ, or uppermost tier, were the longest: those of the thalamitæ, or lowest tier, the shortest: those of the zygitæ, of a length between the two. Each oar was rowed only by one man. The thranitæ, as having the longest oars, were most hardly worked and most highly paid. What the length of the oars was, belonging to either tier, we do not know, but some of the supplementary oars appear to have been about fifteen feet in length.

What is here stated, appears to be pretty well ascertained, chiefly from the inscriptions discovered at Athens a few years ago, so full of information respecting the Athenian marine,—and from the most instructive commentary appended to these inscriptions by M. Boeckh, Seewesen der Athener, ch. ix, pp. 94, 104, 115. But there is a great deal still, respecting the equipment of an ancient trireme, unascertained and disputed.

Now there was nothing but the voice of the keleustês to keep these one hundred and seventy rowers all to good time with their strokes. With oars of different length, and so many rowers, this must have been no easy matter, and apparently quite impossible, unless the rowers were trained to act together. The difference between those who were so trained and those who were not, must have been immense. We may imagine the difference between the ships of Phormio and those of his enemies, and the difficulty of the latter in contending with the swell of the sea,—when we read this description of the ancient trireme.

About two hundred men, that is to say, one hundred and seventy rowers and thirty supernumeraries, mostly epibatæ or hoplites serving on board, besides the pilot, the man at the ship's bow, the keleustês, etc., probably some half dozen officers, formed the crew of a trireme: compare Herodot. viii, 17; vii, 184, where he calculates the thirty epibatæ over and above the two hundred. Dr. Arnold thinks that, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the epibatæ on board an Athenian trireme were no more than ten: but this seems not quite made out: see his note on Thucyd. iii, 95.

The Venetian galleys in the thirteenth century were manned by about the same number of men. "Les galères Vénitiens du convoi de Flandre devaient être montées par deux cent hommes libres, dont 180 rameurs, et 12 archers. Les arcs ou balistes furent préscrits en 1333 pour toutes les galères de commerce armées." (Depping, Histoire du Commerce entre le Levant et l'Europe, vol. i, p. 163.)

[342] Thucyd. ii, 84.

[343] Thucyd. ii, 85.

[344] Thucyd. i, 144. Πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔχω ἐς ἐλπίδα τοῦ περιέσεσθαι, ἢν ἐθέλητε ἀρχήν τε μὴ ἐπικτᾶσθαι ἅμα πολεμοῦντες, καὶ κινδύνους αὐθαιρέτους μὴ προστίθεσθαι· μᾶλλον γὰρ πεφόβημαι τὰς οἰκείας ἡμῶν ἁμαρτίας ἢ τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων διανοίας.

[345] Thucyd. ii, 86-89: compare vii, 36-49.

[346] Thucyd. ii, 86.

[347] Thucyd. ii, 87. Τῶν δὲ πρότερον ἡγεμόνων οὐ χεῖρον τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ἡμεῖς παρασκευάσομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδώσομεν πρόφασιν οὐδενὶ κακῷ γενέσθαι· ἢν δέ τις ἄρα καὶ βουληθῇ, κολασθήσεται τῇ πρεπούσῃ ζημίᾳ, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ τιμήσονται τοῖς προσήκουσιν ἄθλοις τῆς ἀρετῆς.

[348] Thucyd. ii, 89. Καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ *κόσμον καὶ σιγὴν* περὶ πλείστου ἡγεῖσθε, ὃ ἔς τε τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν ξυμφέρει, καὶ ναυμαχίᾳ οὐχ ἥκιστα, etc.

[349] Thucyd. ii, 90. ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ταξάμενοι τὰς ναῦς. Matthiæ in his Grammar (sect. 584), states that ἐπὶ τεσσάρων means "four deep," and cites this passage of Thucydidês as an instance of it. But the words certainly mean here *four abreast*; though it is to be recollected that a column four abreast, when turned into line, becomes four deep.

[350] Thucyd. iii, 102.

[351] Thucyd. ii, 90. Οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ ἐπέπλεον ἐς τὸν κόλπον καὶ τὰ στενὰ, βουλόμενοι ἄκοντας ἔσω προαγαγεῖν αὐτοὺς, ἀναγόμενοι ἅμα ἕῳ ἔπλεον, ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ταξάμενοι τὰς ναῦς, *ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν ἔσω* ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου, δεξιῷ κέρᾳ ἡγουμένῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ ὥρμουν· ἐπὶ δ᾽ αὐτῷ εἴκοσι νῆας ἔταξαν τὰς ἄριστα πλεούσας, ὅπως, εἰ ἄρα νομίσας ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύπακτον αὐτοὺς πλεῖν ὁ Φορμίων καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιβοηθῶν ταύτῃ παραπλέοι, μὴ διαφύγοιεν πλέοντα τὸν ἐπίπλουν σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι *ἔξω τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως*, ἀλλ᾽ αὗται αἱ νῆες περικλῄσειαν.

It will be seen that I have represented in the text the movement of the Peloponnesian fleet as directed ostensibly and to all appearance against Naupaktus: and I translate the words in the fourth line of the above passage—ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου—as meaning "*against the station of the Athenians up the gulf within*," that is, against Naupaktus. Mr. Bloomfield gives that meaning to the passage, though not to the words; but the Scholiast, Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Göller, all construe it differently, and maintain that the words τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν mean *the Peloponnesian shore*. To my view, this latter interpretation renders the whole scheme of the battle confused and unintelligible; while with the other meaning it is perfectly clear, and all the circumstances fit in with each other.

Dr. Arnold does not seem even to admit that τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν can mean anything else but the coast of Peloponnesus. He says: "The Scholiast says that ἐπὶ is here used for παρά. It would be better to say that it has a mixed signification of motion towards a place and neighborhood to it: expressing that the Peloponnesians sailed *towards* their own land (*i. e.* towards Corinth, Sikyon, and Pellênê, to which places the greater number of the ships belonged), instead of standing over to the opposite coast, which belonged to their enemies: and at the same time kept close *upon* their own land, in the sense of ἐπὶ with a dative case."

It appears to me that Dr. Arnold's supposition of Corinth and Sikyon as the meaning of τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν is altogether far-fetched and improbable. As a matter of fact, it would only be true of part of the confederate fleet; while it would be false with regard to ships from Elis, Leukas, etc. And if it had been true with regard to all, yet the distance of Corinth from the Peloponnesian station was so very great, that Thucydidês would hardly mark *direction* by referring to a city so very far off. Then again, both the Scholiast and Dr. Arnold do great violence to the meaning of the preposition ἐπὶ with an accusative case, and cite no examples to justify it. What the sense of ἐπὶ is with an accusative case signifying locality, is shown by Thucydidês in this very passage.—εἰ ἄρα νομίσας *ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύπακτον* αὐτοὺς πλεῖν ὁ Φορμίων, etc. (again, c. 85. ἐπὶ Κυδωνίαν πλεῦσαι; and i. 29, ἐπὶ Ἐπίδαμνον, etc.—ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτοῦ of Perdikkas, i, 57), that is, against, or to go thither with a hostile purpose. So sensible does the Scholiast seem to be of this, that he affirms ἐπὶ to be used instead of παρά. This is a most violent supposition, for nothing can be more different than the two phrases ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν and παρὰ τὴν γῆν. Dr. Arnold again assigns to ἐπὶ with an accusative case another sense, which he himself admits that it only has with a dative.

I make these remarks with a view to show that the sense which Dr. Arnold and others put upon the words of Thucydidês,—ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν,—departs from the usual, and even from the legitimate meaning of the words. But I have a stronger objection still. If that sense be admitted, it will be found quite inconsistent with the subsequent proceedings, as Thucydidês describes; and any one who will look at the map in reading this chapter, will see plainly that the fact is so. If, as Dr. Arnold supposes, the Peloponnesian fleet kept close along the shore of Peloponnesus, what was there in their movements to alarm Phormio for the safety of Naupaktus, or to draw him so reluctantly into the strait? Or if we even grant this, and suppose that Phormio construed the movement along the coast of Achaia to indicate designs against Naupaktus, and that he therefore came into the gulf and sailed along his own shore to defend the town,—still the Peloponnesians would be separated from him by the whole breadth of the gulf at that point; and as soon as they altered their line of direction for the purpose of crossing the gulf and attacking him, he would have the whole breadth of the gulf in which to take his measures for meeting them, so that instead of finding himself jammed up against the land, he would have been able to go out and fight them in the wide water, which he so much desired. The whole description given by Thucydidês, of

the sudden wheeling of the Peloponnesian fleet, whereby Phormio's ships were assailed, and nine of them cut off, shows that the two fleets must have been very close together when that movement was undertaken. If they had not been close,—if the Peloponnesians had had to row any considerable distance after wheeling,—all the Athenian ships might have escaped along shore without any difficulty. In fact, the words of Thucydidês imply that *both* the two fleets, at the time when the wheel of the Peloponnesians was made, *were sailing in parallel directions along the northern coast in the direction of Naupaktus*,—ὅπως εἰ ἄρα νομίσας ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύπακτον αὐτοὺς πλεῖν ὁ Φορμίων *καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιβοηθῶν* ταύτῃ παραπλέοι,—"if he *also*, with a view to defend the place, should sail along that coast," (that is, if he, *as well as they*:) which seems to be the distinct meaning of the particle καὶ in this place.

Now if we suppose the Peloponnesian fleet to have sailed from its original station towards Naupaktus, all the events which follow become thoroughly perspicuous and coherent. I apprehend that no one would ever have entertained any other idea, except from the words of Thucydidês,—ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν *ἑαυτῶν* γῆν ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου. Since the subject or nominative case of the verb ἔπλεον is οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, it has been supposed that the word *ἑαυτῶν* must necessarily refer to the Peloponnesians; and Mr. Bloomfield, with whom I agree as to the signification of the passage, proposes to alter *ἑαυτῶν* into *αὐτῶν*. It appears to me that this alteration is not necessary, and that ἑαυτῶν may very well be construed so as to refer to the *Athenians*, not to the Lacedæmonians. The reflective meaning of the pronoun ἑαυτῶν is *not necessarily* thrown back upon the subject of the action *immediately* preceding it, in a complicated sentence where there is more than one subject and more than one action. Thus, for instance, in this very passage of Thucydidês which I have transcribed, we find the word ἑαυτῶν a second time used, and used so that its meaning is thrown back, not upon the subject immediately preceding, but upon a subject more distant from it,—ἐπὶ δ᾽ αὐτῷ (τῷ κέρατι) εἴκοσι ναῦς ἔταξαν τὰς ἄριστα πλεούσας, ὅπως, εἰ ἄρα…, μὴ διαφύγοιεν πλέοντα τὸν ἐπίπλουν σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι *ἔξω τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως*, ἀλλ᾽ αὖται αἱ νῆες περικλήσειαν. Now here the words τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως, allude to the Peloponnesian fleet, not to the Athenians, which latter is the subject immediately preceding. Poppo and Göller both admit such to be the true meaning; and if this be admissible, there appears to me no greater difficulty in construing the words ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν to mean, "the land of the *Athenians*," *not* "the land of the *Peloponnesians*." Ἑαυτῶν might have been more unambiguously expressed by ἐκείνων αὐτῶν; for the reflective signification embodied in αὐτῶν is here an important addition to the meaning: "Since the Athenians did not sail into the interior of the gulf and the narrow waters, the Peloponnesians, wishing to bring them in even reluctantly, sailed *against the Athenians' own land* in the interior."

Another passage may be produced from Thucydidês, in which the two words ἑαυτοῦ and ἐκείνου are both used in the same sentence and designate the same person, ii, 13. Περικλῆς, ὑποτοπήσας, ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος αὐτῷ ξένος ὢν ἐτύγχανε, μὴ πολλάκις ἡ αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ βουλόμενος χαρίζεσθαι τοὺς ἀγροὺς αὐτοῦ παραλίπῃ καὶ μὴ δῃώσῃ, ἢ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων κελευσάντων ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ *ἑαυτοῦ* γένηται τοῦτο, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄγη ἐλαύνειν προεῖπον ἕνεκα *ἐκείνου*· προηγόρευε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος μὲν οἱ ξένος εἴη, οὐ μέντοι ἐπὶ κακῷ γε τῆς πόλεως γένοιτο, τοὺς δ᾽ ἀγροὺς *τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ* καὶ οἰκίας ἢν ἄρα μὴ δῃώσωσιν οἱ πολέμιοι ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀφιησιν αὐτὰ δημόσια εἶναι. Here ἑαυτοῦ and ἐκείνου (compare an analogous passage, Xenophon, Hellen. i, 1, 27) both refer to Periklês; and ἑαυτοῦ is twice used, so that it reflects back not upon the subject of the action immediately preceding it, but upon another subject farther behind. Again, iv, 99. Οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ ἀπεκρίναντο, εἰ μὲν ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ εἰσίν (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι), ἀπιόντας *ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν* ἀποφέρεσθαι τὰ σφέτερα· εἰ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ *ἐκείνων*, αὐτοὺς γιγνώσκειν τὸ ποιητέον. Here the use of ἑαυτῶν and ἐκείνων is remarkable. Ἑαυτῶν refers to the Bœotians, though the Athenians are the subject of the action immediately preceding; while ἐκείνων refers to the Athenians, in another case where they are the subject of the action immediately preceding. We should almost have expected to find the position of the two words reversed. Again, in iv, 57, we have—Καὶ τούτους μὲν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβουλεύσαντο καταθέσθαι ἐς τὰς νήσους, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Κυθηρίους *οἰκοῦντας τὴν ἑαυτῶν* φόρον τέσσαρα τάλαντα φέρειν. Here ἑαυτῶν refers to the subject of the action immediately preceding—that is, to Κυθηρίους, not to Ἀθηναῖοι: but when we turn to another chapter, iii, 78: οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι φοβούμενοι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὴν περικύκλωσιν, ἀθρόαις μὲν οὐ προσέπιπτον οὐδὲ κατὰ μέσον *ταῖς ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς τεταγμέναις* (ναυσὶ)—we find ἑαυτῶν thrown back upon the subject, *not* immediately preceding it. The same, iv, 47—εἴ ποὺ τίς τινα ἴδοι ἐχθρὸν ἑαυτοῦ; and ii, 95. Ὁ γὰρ Περδίκκας αὐτῷ ὑποσχόμενος, εἰ Ἀθηναίοις τε διαλλάξειεν *ἑαυτὸν* (*i. e.* Perdikkas), κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς τῷ πολέμῳ πιεζόμενον, etc.

Compare also Homer, Odyss. xvii, 387. Πτωχὸν δ᾽ οὐκ ἄν τις καλέοι, τρύξοντα ἓ αὐτόν; and Xenophon, Memorab. iv, 2, 28; i, 6, 3; v, 2, 24; Anabas. vii. 2, 10; 6, 43; Hellen. v, 2, 39.

It appears to me, that when we study the use of the pronoun ἑαυτὸς, we shall see reason to be convinced that in the passage of Thucydidês now before us, the phrase οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἔπλεον ἐς τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν, need

not necessarily be referred to the *Peloponnesian* land, but may in perfect conformity with analogy be understood to mean the *Athenian* land. I am sure that, in so construing it, we shall not put so much violence upon the meaning as the Scholiast and Dr. Arnold have put upon the preposition ἐπὶ, when the Scholiast states that ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν means the same thing as παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν, and when Dr. Arnold admits this opinion, only adding a new meaning which does not usually belong to ἐπὶ with an accusative case.

An objection to the meaning which I propose may possibly be grounded on the word νομίσας, applied to Phormio. If the Peloponnesian fleet was sailing directly towards Naupaktus, it may be urged, Phormio would not be said to *think* that they were going thither, but *to see* or *become aware* of it. But in reply to this we may observe, that the Peloponnesians never really intended to attack Naupaktus, though they directed their course towards it; they wished in reality to draw Phormio within the strait, and there to attack him. The historian, therefore, says with propriety, that Phormio would *believe*, and not that he would *perceive*, them to be going thither, since his belief would really be erroneous.

[352] Thucyd. ii, 90. How narrow the escape was, is marked in the words of the historian—τῶν δὲ ἔνδεκα μὲν αἵπερ ἡγοῦντο *ὑπεκφεύγουσι* τὸ κέρας τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ τὴν ἐπιστροφήν, ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν.

The proceedings of the Syracusan fleet against that of the Athenians in the harbor of Syracuse, and the reflections of the historian upon them, illustrate this attack of the Peloponnesians upon the fleet of Phormio (Thucyd. vii. 36).

[353] Compare the like bravery on the part of the Lacedæmonian hoplites at Pylus (Thucyd. iv, 14).

[354] Thucyd. ii, 92. It is sufficiently evident that the Athenians defeated and drove off not only the twenty Peloponnesian ships of the right or pursuing wing,—but also the left and centre. Otherwise, they would not have been able to recapture those Athenian ships which had been lost at the beginning of the battle. Thucydidês, indeed, does not expressly mention the Peloponnesian left and centre as following the right in their pursuit towards Naupaktus. But we may presume that they partially did so, probably careless of much order, as being at first under the impression that the victory was gained. They were probably, therefore, thrown into confusion without much difficulty, when the twenty ships of the right were beaten and driven back upon them,—even though the victorious Athenian triremes were no more than eleven in number.

[355] Thucyd. ii, 102, 103.

[356] Thucyd. ii, 93. ἐδόκει δὲ λαβόντα τῶν ναυτῶν ἕκαστον τὴν κώπην, καὶ τὸ ὑπηρέσιον, καὶ τὸν τροπωτῆρα, etc. On these words there is an interesting letter of Dr. Bishop's published in the Appendix to Dr. Arnold's Thucydidês, vol. i. His remarks upon ὑπηρέσιον are more satisfactory than those upon τροπωτήρ. Whether the fulcrum of the oar was formed by a thowell, or a notch, on the gunwale, or by a perforation in the ship's side, there must in both cases have been required—since it seems to have had nothing like what Dr. Bishop calls a *nut*—a thong to prevent it from slipping down towards the water; especially with the oars of the thranitæ, or upper tier of rowers, who pulled at so great an elevation, comparatively speaking, above the water. Dr. Arnold's explanation of τροπωτὴρ is suited to the case of a boat, but not to that of a trireme. Dr. Bishop shows that the explanation of the purpose of the ὑπηρέσιον, given by the Scholiast, is not the true one.

[357] Thucyd. ii, 94.

[358] Xenophon, Hellen. v. 1, 19.

[359] Thucyd. ii, 29, 95, 96.

[360] Thucyd. ii, 99.

[361] See Xenophon, Anabas. vii, 3, 16; 4, 2. Diodorus (xii, 50) gives the revenue of Sitalkês as more than one thousand talents annually. This sum is not materially different from that which Thucydidês states to be the annual receipt of Seuthes, successor of Sitalkês,—revenue, properly so called, and presents, both taken together.

Traders from Parium, on the Asiatic coast of the Propontis, are among those who come with presents to the Odrysian king, Mêdokus (Xenophon *ut supra*).

[362] Xenoph. Anabas. *l. c.*

[363] Herodot. iv, 80.

[364] Xenophon, Anabas. vii, 2, 31; Thucyd. ii, 29; Aristophan. Aves, 366. Thucydidês goes out of his way to refute this current belief,—a curious exemplification of ancient legend applied to the convenience of present politics.

[365] Thucyd. ii, 97. Φόρος δὲ ἐκ πάσης τῆς βαρβάρου καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων, ὅσον προσῆξαν ἐπὶ Σεύθου, ὃς ὕστερον Σιτάλκου βασιλεύσας πλεῖστον δὴ ἐποίησε, τετρακοσίων ταλάντων μάλιστα δύναμις, ἃ χρυσὸς καὶ ἄργυρος εἴη· καὶ δῶρα οὐκ ἐλάσσω τούτων χρυσοῦ τε καὶ ἀργύρου προσεφέρετο, χωρὶς δὲ ὅσα ὑφαντά τε καὶ λεῖα, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κατασκευὴ, καὶ οὐ μόνον αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς παραδυναστεύουσι καὶ γενναίοις Ὀδρυσῶν· κατεστήσαντο γὰρ τοὐναντίον τῆς Περσῶν βασιλείας τὸν νόμον, ὄντα μὲν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Θρᾳξὶ, λαμβάνειν μᾶλλον ἢ διδόναι, καὶ αἴσχιον ἦν αἰτηθέντα μὴ δοῦναι ἢ αἰτήσαντα μὴ τυχεῖν· ὅμως δὲ κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πλέον αὐτῷ ἐχρήσαντο· οὐ γὰρ ἦν πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν μὴ διδόντα δῶρα· ὥστε ἐπὶ μέγα ἡ βασιλεία ἦλθεν ἰσχύος.

This universal necessity of presents and bribes may be seen illustrated in the dealings of Xenophon and the Cyreian army with the Thracian prince Seuthes, described in the Anabasis, vii, chapters 1 and 2. It appears that even at that time, B.C. 401, the Odrysian dominion, though it had passed through disturbances and had been practically enfeebled, still extended down to the neighborhood of Byzantium. In commenting upon the venality of the Thracians, the Scholiast has a curious comparison with his own time—καὶ οὐκ ἦν τι πρᾶξαι παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς τὸν μὴ διδόντα χρήματα· *ὅπερ καὶ νῦν ἐν Ῥωμαίοις*. The Scholiast here tells us that the venality in his time as to public affairs, in the Roman empire, was not less universal: of what century of the Roman empire he speaks, we do not know: perhaps about 500-600 A.D.

The contrast which Thucydidês here draws between the Thracians and the Persians is also illustrated by what Xenophon says respecting the habits of the younger Cyrus: (Anabas. i, 9, 22): compare also the romance of the Cyropædia, viii, 14, 31, 32.

[366] See Gatterer (De Herodoti et Thucydidis Thraciâ), sects. 44-57; Poppo (Prolegom. ad Thucydidem), vol. ii, ch. 31, about the geography of this region, which is very imperfectly known, even in modern times. We can hardly pretend to assign a locality to these ancient names.

Thucydidês, in his brief statements respecting this march of Sitalkês, speaks like one who had good information about the inland regions; as he was likely to have from his familiarity with the coasts, and resident proprietorship in Thrace (Thucyd. ii, 100; Herodot. v, 16).

[367] Thucyd. ii, 100; Xenophon, Memorab. iii, 9, 2.

[368] Thucyd. ii, 101. ἐπειδὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ παρῆσαν ταῖς ναυσὶν, ἀπιστοῦντες αὐτὸν μὴ ἥξειν, etc.

[369] Thucyd. ii, 101.

[370] Thucyd. iii, 1.

[371] Aristotel. Politic. v, 2, 3. The fact respecting Doxander here mentioned is stated by Aristotle, and there is no reason to question its truth. But Aristotle states it in illustration of a general position,—that the private quarrels of principal citizens are often the cause of great misfortune to the commonwealth. He represents Doxander and his private quarrel as having brought upon Mitylênê the resentment of the Athenians and the war with Athens—Δόξανδρος—ἦρξε τῆς στάσεως, καὶ παρώξυνε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, πρόξενος ὢν τῆς πόλεως.

Having the account of Thucydidês before us, we are enabled to say that this is an incorrect conception, as far as concerns the *cause* of the war,—though the fact in itself may be quite true.

[372] Thucyd. iii, 2.

[373] Thucyd. iii, 3.

[374] Thucyd. iii, 3, 4: compare Strabo, xiii, p. 617; and Plehn, Lesbiaca, pp. 12-18.

Thucydidês speaks of the spot at the mouth of the northern harbor as being called Malea, which was also undoubtedly the name of the southeastern promontory of Lesbos. We must therefore presume that there were two places on the seaboard of Lesbos which bore that name.

The easternmost of the two southern promontories of Peloponnesus was also called Cape Malea.

[375] Thucyd. iii, 6.

[376] Thucyd. iii, 18.

[377] Thucyd. iii, 9.

[378] Thucyd. iii, 10. μηδὲ τῳ χείρους δόξωμεν εἶναι, εἰ *ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ τιμώμενοι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν* ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀφιστάμεθα.

The language in which the Mitylenæan envoys describe the treatment which their city had received from Athens, is substantially as strong as that which Kleon uses afterwards in his speech at Athens, when he reproaches them with their ingratitude,—Kleon says (iii, 39), αὐτόνομοί τε οἰκοῦντες, καὶ *τιμώμενοι ἐς τὰ πρῶτα ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν*, τοιαῦτα εἰργάσαντο, etc.

[379] Thucyd. iii, 12. οὐ μέντοι ἐπὶ πολὺ γ᾽ ἂν ἐδοκοῦμεν δυνηθῆναι (περιγίγνεσθαι), εἰ μὴ ὁ πόλεμος ὅδε κατέστη, παραδείγμασι χρώμενοι τοῖς ἐς τοὺς ἄλλους. Τίς οὖν αὐτὴ ἡ φιλία ἐγίγνετο ἢ ἐλευθερία πιστὴ, ἐν ᾗ παρὰ γνώμην ἀλλήλους ὑπεδεχόμεθα, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ δεδιότες ἐθεράπευον, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐκείνους ἐν τῇ ἡσυχίᾳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐποιοῦμεν.

[380] Thucyd. iii, 11. Αὐτόνομοι δὲ ἐλείφθημεν οὐ δι᾽ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅσον αὐτοῖς ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐπρεπείᾳ τε λόγου, καὶ γνώμης μᾶλλον ἐφόδῳ ἢ ἰσχύος, τὰ πράγματα ἐφαίνετο καταληπτά. Ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μαρτυρίῳ ἐχρῶντο, μὴ ἂν *τούς γε ἰσοψήφους ἄκοντας*, εἰ μή τι ἠδίκουν οἷς ἐπῄεσαν, *ξυστρατεύειν*.

[381] Thucyd. iii, 13.

[382] Thucyd. iii, 13, 14.

[383] Thucyd. i, 144. Καὶ ὅταν κἀκεῖνοι (the Lacedæmonians) ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀποδῶσι πόλεσι, μὴ *σφίσι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἑκάστοις, ὡς βούλονται*.

About the hostages detained by Sparta for the fidelity of her allies, see Thucyd. v, 54, 61.

[384] Thucyd. iii, 7-16.

[385] Thucyd. iii, 15, 16.

[386] Thucyd. iii, 7.

[387] Thucyd. iii, 17. Καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον, ὃν αἱ νῆες ἔπλεον, ἐν τοῖς πλεῖσται δὴ νῆες ἅμ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐνεργοὶ κάλλει ἐγένοντο, παραπλήσιαι δὲ καὶ ἔτι πλείους ἀρχομένου τοῦ πολέμου. Τήν τε γὰρ Ἀττικὴν καὶ Εὔβοιαν καὶ Σαλαμῖνα ἑκατὸν ἐφύλασσον, καὶ περὶ Πελοπόννησον ἕτεραι ἑκατὸν ἦσαν, χωρὶς δὲ αἱ περὶ Ποτίδαιαν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις χωρίοις, ὥστε αἱ πᾶσαι ἅμα ἐγίγνοντο ἐν ἑνὶ θέρει διακόσιαι καὶ πεντήκοντα. Καὶ τὰ χρήματα τοῦτο μάλιστα ὑπανάλωσε μετὰ Ποτιδαίας, etc.

I have endeavored to render as well as I can this obscure and difficult passage; difficult both as to grammar and as to sense, and not satisfactorily explained by any of the commentators,—if, indeed, it can be held to stand now as Thucydidês wrote it. In the preceding chapter, he had mentioned that this fleet of one hundred sail was manned largely from the hoplite class of citizens (iii, 16). Now we know from other passages in his work (see v, 8; vi, 31) how much difference there was in the appearance and efficiency of an armament, according to the class of citizens who served on it. We may then refer the word κάλλος to the excellence of outfit hence arising: I wish, indeed, that any instance could be produced of κάλλος in this sense, but we find the adjective κάλλιστος (Thucyd. v, 60) στρατόπεδον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο *κάλλιστον* Ἑλληνικὸν τῶν μέχρι τοῦδε ξυνῆλθεν. In v, 8, Thucydidês employs the word ἀξίωμα to denote the same meaning; and in vi, 31, he says: παρασκευὴ γὰρ αὐτὴ πρώτη ἐκπλεύσασα μιᾶς πόλεως δυνάμει Ἑλληνικῇ πολυτελεστάτη δὴ καὶ εὐπρεπεστάτη τῶν εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐγένετο. It may be remarked that in that chapter too, he contrasts the expedition against Sicily with two other Athenian expeditions, equal to it in number, but inferior in equipment: the same comparison which I believe he means to take in this passage.

[388] Thucyd. iii, 19.

[389] Thucyd. iii, 20. Compare Xenophon, Hellen. ii, 4, 19; Herodot. ix, 37; Plutarch, Aratus, c. 25.

[390] Thucyd. iii, 22. Dr. Arnold, in his note, construes this passage as if the right or bare foot were the *least* likely to slip in the mud, and the left or shod foot the *most* likely. The Scholiast and Wasse maintain the opposite opinion, which is certainly the more obvious sense of the text, though the sense of Dr. Arnold would also be admissible. The naked foot is very liable to slip in the mud, and might easily be rendered less liable, by san-

dals, or covering particularly adapted to that purpose. Besides, Wasse remarks justly, that the warrior who is to use his *right* arm requires to have his *left* foot firmly planted.

[391] Thucyd. iii, 22. φρυκτοὶ τε ᾔροντο ἐς τὰς Θήβας πολέμιοι, etc. It would seem by this statement that the blockaders must have been often in the habit of transmitting intelligence to Thebes by means of fire-signals; each particular combination of lights having more or less of a special meaning. The Platæans had observed this, and foresaw that the same means would be used on the night of the outbreak, to bring assistance from Thebes forthwith. If they had not observed it *before*, they could not have prepared for the moment when the new signal would be hoisted, so as to confound its meaning—ὅπως ἀσαφῆ τὰ σημεῖα ᾖ….

Compare iii, 80. I agree with the general opinion stated in Dr. Arnold's note respecting these fire-signals, and even think that it might have been sustained more strongly.

"Non enim (observes Cicero, in the fifth oration against Verres, c. 36), sicut erat nuper consuetudo, prædonum adventum significabat *ignis è speculâ sublatus aut tumulo*: sed flamma ex ipso incendio navium et calamitatem acceptam et periculum reliquum nuntiabat."

[392] Thucyd. iii, 24. Diodorus (xii, 56) gives a brief summary of these facts, without either novelty or liveliness.

[393] Thucyd. iii, 25, 26.

[394] Thucyd. iii, 27. ὁ Σάλαιθος, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐ προσδεχόμενος ἔτι τὰς ναῦς, ὁπλίζει τὸν δῆμον, πρότερον ψιλὸν ὄντα, ὡς ἐπεξιὼν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις.

[395] Thucyd. iii, 28.

[396] Thucyd. iv, 34. τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένοι ὡς ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους.

[397] Thucyd. iv, 75.

[398] Thucyd. iii, 32, 33-69.

[399] Thucyd. v, 56. Ἀργεῖοι δ᾽ ἐλθόντες παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίους ἐπεκάλουν ὅτι, γεγραμμένον ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς *διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν* ἑκάστους μὴ ἐᾶν πολεμίους διιέναι, ἐάσειαν *κατὰ θάλασσαν* (Λακεδαιμονίους) παραπλεῦσαι.

We see that the sea is here reckoned as a portion of the Athenian territory; and even the portion of sea near to Peloponnesus,—much more, that on the coast of Ionia.

[400] Thucyd. iii, 33.

[401] The dissensions between Notium and Kolophon are noticed by Aristot. Politic. v, 3, 2.

[402] Thucyd. iii, 34.

[403] Thucyd. iii, 34; C. A. Pertz, Colophoniaca, p. 36. (Göttingen, 1848.)

[404] Thucyd. v, 43. Ἀλκιβιάδης—ἀνὴρ ἡλικίᾳ μὲν ὢν ἔτι τότε νέος, ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει, ἀξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος. Compare Xenophon, Memorabil. i, 2, 25; iii, 6, 1.

[405] Aristophan. Equit. 130, *seqq.*, and Scholia; Eupolis, Demi, Fram. xv, p. 466, ed. Meineke. See the remarks in Ranck, Commentat. de Vitâ Aristophanis, p. cccxxxiv, *seqq.*

[406] Thucyd. iii, 36. Κλέων—ὢν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα βιαιότατος τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ τῷ δήμῳ παραπολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανώτατος.

He also mentions Kleon a second time, two years afterwards, but in terms which also seem to imply a first introduction,—μάλιστα δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐνῆγε Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὢν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος, iv, 21-28, also v, 16. Κλέων—νομίζων καταφανέστερος ἂν εἶναι κακουργῶν, καὶ ἀπιστότερος διαβάλλων, etc.

[407] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 33. Ἐπεφύετο δὲ καὶ Κλέων, ἤδη διὰ τῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ὀργῆς τῶν πολιτῶν πορευόμενος εἰς τὴν δημαγωγίαν.

Periklês was δηχθεὶς αἴθωνι Κλέωνι—in the words of the comic author Hermippus.

[408] Aristophan. Equit. 750.

[409] Thucyd. iii, 36. προσξυνεβάλετο οὐκ ἐλάχιστον τῆς ὁρμῆς, etc.

[410] I infer this total number from the fact that the number sent to Athens by Pachês, as foremost instigators, was rather more than one thousand (Thucyd. iii, 50). The total of ἡβῶντες, or males of military age, must have been (I imagine) six times this number.

[411] Thucyd. iii, 36.

[412] Thucyd. iii, 36. Καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετάνοιά τις εὐθὺς ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀναλογισμὸς, ὡμὸν τὸ βούλευμα καὶ μέγα ἐγνῶσθαι, πόλιν ὅλην διαφθεῖραι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους.

The feelings of the seamen, in the trireme appointed to carry the order of execution, are a striking point of evidence in this case: τῆς προτέρας νεὼς οὐ σπουδῇ πλεούσης ἐπὶ πρᾶγμα ἀλλόκοτον, etc. (iii, 50).

[413] Thucyd. iii, 36. As to the illegality, see Thucyd. vi, 14, which I think is good evidence to prove that there was illegality. I agree with Schömann on this point, in spite of the doubts of Dr. Arnold.

[414] Thucyd. iii, 37. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε νόμων σοφώτεροι βούλονται φαίνεσθαι, τῶν τε ἀεὶ λεγομένων ἐς τὸ κοινὸν περιγίγνεσθαι … οἱ δ᾽ ἀπιστοῦντες τῇ ἑαυτῶν ξυνέσει ἀμαθέστεροι μὲν τῶν νόμων ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀδυνατώτεροι δὲ τοῦ καλῶς εἰπόντος μέμψασθαι λόγον.

Compare the language of Archidamus at Sparta in the congress, where he takes credit to the Spartans for being ἀμαθέστερον τῶν νόμων τῆς ὑπεροψίας παιδευόμενοι, etc. (Thucyd. i, 84)—very similar in spirit to the remarks of Kleon about the Athenians.

[415] Thucyd. iii, 40. μηδὲ τρισὶ τοῖς ἀξυμφορωτάτοις τῇ ἀρχῇ, οἴκτῳ, καὶ ἡδονῇ λόγων, καὶ ἐπιεικείᾳ, ἁμαρτάνειν.

[416] Thucyd. iii, 40. πειθόμενοι δὲ ἐμοὶ τά τε δίκαια ἐς Μυτιληναίους καὶ τὰ ξύμφορα ἅμα ποιήσετε· ἄλλως δὲ γνόντες τοῖς μὲν οὐ χαριεῖσθε, ὑμᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον δικαιώσεσθε.

[417] Thucyd. iii. 48: compare the speech of Kleon. iii, 40. ὑμεῖς δὲ γνόντες ἀμείνω τάδε εἶναι, καὶ μήτε οἴκτῳ πλέον νείμαντες μήτε ἐπιεικείᾳ, *οἷς οὐδὲ ἐγὼ ἐῶ προσάγεσθαι*, ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν παραινουμένων, etc.

Dr. Arnold distinguishes οἶκτος (or ἔλεος) from ἐπιεικεία, by saying that "the former is a feeling, the latter a habit: οἶκτος, pity or compassion, may occasionally touch those who are generally very far from being ἐπιεικεῖς—mild or gentle. Ἐπιεικεία relates to all persons,—οἶκτος, to particular individuals." The distinction here taken is certainly in itself just, and ἐπιεικὴς sometimes has the meaning ascribed to it by Dr. Arnold: but in this passage I believe it has a different meaning. The contrast between οἶκτος and ἐπιεικεία—as Dr. Arnold explains them—would be too feeble, and too little marked, to serve the purpose of Kleon and Diodotus. Ἐπιεικεία here rather means the disposition to stop short of your full rights; a spirit of fairness and adjustment; an abatement on your part likely to be requited by abatement on the part of your adversary: compare Thucyd. i, 76; iv, 19; v, 86; viii, 93.

[418] Thucyd. iii, 44. ἐγὼ δὲ παρῆλθον οὔτε ἀντερῶν περὶ Μυτιληναίων οὔτε κατηγορήσων· οὐ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀδικίας ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγὼν, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας εὐβουλίας … *δικαιότερος γὰρ ὢν αὐτοῦ (Κλέωνος) ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὴν νῦν ὑμετέραν ὀργὴν ἐς Μυτιληναίους*, τάχα ἂν ἐπισπάσαιτο· *ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ δικαζόμεθα πρὸς αὐτούς, ὥστε τῶν δικαίων δεῖν*, ἀλλὰ βουλευόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅπως χρησίμως ἕξουσιν.

So Mr. Burke, in his speech on Conciliation with America (Burke's Works, vol. iii. pp. 69-74), in discussing the proposition of prosecuting the acts of the refractory colonies as criminal: "The thing seems a great deal too big for my ideas of jurisprudence. It should seem, to my way of conceiving such matters, that there is a wide difference in reason and policy, between the mode of proceeding on the irregular conduct of scattered individuals, or even of bands of men who disturb order within the state,—and the civil dissensions which may from time to time agitate the several communities which compose a great empire. It looks to me to be narrow and pedantic, to apply the ordinary ideas of criminal justice to this great public contest. I do not know the method of drawing up an indictment against a whole people," etc.—"My consideration is narrow, confined, and wholly limited to the policy of the question."

[419] Thucyd. iii, 42.

[420] Thucyd. iii, 43.

[421] Thucyd. iii, 45, 46.

[422] Compare this speech of Diodotus with the views of punishment implied by Xenophon in his Anabasis, where he is describing the government of Cyrus the younger:—

"Nor can any man contend, that Cyrus suffered criminals and wrong-doers to laugh at him: he punished them with the most unmeasured severity (ἀφειδέστατα πάντων ἐτιμωρεῖτο). And you might often see along the frequented roads men deprived of their eyes, their hands, and their feet: so that in his government either Greek or barbarian, if he had no criminal purpose, might go fearlessly through and carry whatever he found convenient." (Anabasis, i, 9, 13.)

The severity of the punishment is, in Xenophon's mind, the measure both of its effects in deterring criminals, and of the character of the ruler inflicting it.

[423] Thucyd. iii, 47. Νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὑμῖν ὁ δῆμος ἐν πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν εὔνους ἐστὶ, καὶ ἢ οὐ ξυναφίσταται τοῖς ὀλίγοις, ἢ ἐὰν βιασθῇ, ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀποστήσασι πολέμιος εὐθὺς, καὶ τῆς ἀντικαθισταμένης πόλεως τὸ πλῆθος ξύμμαχον ἔχοντες ἐς πόλεμον ἐπέρχεσθε.

[424] Thucyd. iii, 48.

[425] Thucyd. iii, 49. ἐγένοντο ἐν τῇ χειροτονίᾳ ἀγχώμαλοι, ἐκράτησε δ᾽ ἡ τοῦ Διοδότου.

[426] Thucyd. iii, 49. παρὰ τοσοῦτον μὲν ἡ Μυτιλήνη ἦλθε κινδύνου.

[427] Thucyd. iii, 50.

[428] Thucyd. iii, 50; iv, 52. About the Lesbian kleruchs, see Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, B. iii, c. 18; Wachsmuth, Hell. Alt. i. 2, p. 36. These kleruchs must originally have gone thither as a garrison, as M. Boeckh remarks; and may probably have come back, either all or a part, when needed for military service at home, and when it was ascertained that the island might be kept without them. Still, however, there is much which is puzzling in this arrangement. It seems remarkable that the Athenians, at a time when their accumulated treasure had been exhausted, and when they were beginning to pay direct contributions from their private property, should sacrifice five thousand four hundred minæ (ninety talents) annual revenue capable of being appropriated by the state, unless that sum were required to maintain the kleruchs as resident garrison for the maintenance of Lesbos. And as it turned out afterwards that their residence was not necessary, we may doubt whether the state did not convert the kleruchic grants into a public tribute, wholly or partially.

We may farther remark, that if the kleruch be supposed a citizen resident at Athens, but receiving rent from his lot of land in some other territory,—the analogy between him and the Roman colonist fails. The Roman colonists, though retaining their privileges as citizens, were sent out to reside on their grants of land, and to constitute a sort of resident garrison over the prior inhabitants, who had been despoiled of a portion of territory to make room for them.

See, on this subject and analogy, the excellent Dissertation of Madwig: De jure et conditione coloniarum Populi Romani quæstio historica,—Madwig, Opuscul. Copenhag. 1834. Diss. viii, p. 246.

M. Boeckh and Dr. Arnold contend justly that at the time of the expedition of Athens against Syracuse and afterwards (Thucyd. vii, 57; viii, 23), there could have been but few, if any, Athenian kleruchs resident in Lesbos. We might even push this argument farther, and apply the same inference to an earlier period, the eighth year of the war (Thucyd. iv, 75), when the Mitylenæan exiles were so active in their aggressions upon Antandrus and the other towns, originally Mitylenæan possessions, on the opposite mainland. There was no force near at hand on the part of Athens to deal with these exiles except the ἀργυρόλογαι νῆες,—had there been kleruchs at Mitylênê, they would probably have been able to defeat the exiles in their first attempts, and would certainly have been among the most important forces to put them down afterwards,—whereas Thucydidês makes no allusion to them.

Farther, the oration of Antipho (De Cæde Herod. c. 13) makes no allusion to Athenian kleruchs, either as resident in the island, or even as absentees receiving the annual rent mentioned by Thucydidês. The Mitylenæan citizen, father of the speaker of that oration, had been one of those implicated—as he says, unwillingly—in the past revolt of the city against Athens: since the deplorable termination of that revolt he had continued possessor of his Lesbian property, and continued also to discharge his obligations as well (choregic obligations—χορηγίας) towards Mitylênê as (his obligations of pecuniary payment—τέλη) towards Athens. If the arrangement mentioned by Thucydidês had been persisted in, this Mitylenæan proprietor would have paid nothing towards the city of Athens, but merely a rent of two minæ to some Athenian kleruch, or citizen; which can hardly be reconciled with the words of the speaker as we find them in Antipho.

[429] See the Epigram of Agathias, 57, p. 377. Agathias, ed. Bonn.

Ἑλλανὶς τριμάκαιρα, καὶ ἁ χαρίεσσα Λάμαξις,
ἥστην μὲν πάτρας φέγγεα Λεσβιάδος.
Ὤκκα δ᾽ Ἀθηναίῃσι σὺν ὅλκασιν ἔνθαδε κέλσας
τὰν Μιτυληναίαν γᾶν ἀλάπαξε Πάχης,
Τᾶν κουρᾶν αδίκως ἡράσσατο, τὼς δὲ συνεύνως
ἔκτανεν, ὡς τήνας τᾇδε βιησόμενος.
Ταὶ δὲ κατ᾽ Αἰγαίοιο ῥόου πλατὺ λαῖτμα φερέσθην,
καὶ ποτὶ τὰν κραναὰν Μοψοπίαν δραμέτην,
Δάμῳ δ᾽ ἀγγελέτην ἀλιτήμονος ἔργα Πάχητος
μέσφα μιν εἰς ὁλοὴν κῆρα συνηλασάτην.
Τοῖα μέν, ὦ κούρα, πεπονήκατον· ἄψ δ᾽ ἐπὶ πάτραν
ἤκετον, ἐν δ᾽ αὐτᾷ κεῖσθον ἀποφθιμένα.
Εὖ δὲ πόνων ἀπόνασθον, ἐπεὶ ποτὶ σᾶμα συνεύνων
εὔδετον, ἐς κλεινᾶς μνᾶμα σαοφροσύνας·
Ὑμνεῦσιν δ᾽ ἔτι πάντες ὁμόφρονας ἡρωΐνας,
πάτρας καὶ ποσίων πήματα τισαμένας.

Plutarch (Nikias, 6: compare Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 26) states the fact of Pachês having slain himself before the dikastery on occasion of his trial of accountability. Πάχητα τὸν ἔλοντα Λέσβον, ὃς, εὐθύνας δίδους τῆς στρατηγίας, ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ δικαστηρίῳ σπασάμενος ξίφος ἀνεῖλεν ἑαυτὸν, etc.

The statement in Plutarch, and that in the Epigram, hang together so perfectly well, that each lends authority to the other, and I think there is good reason for crediting the Epigram. The suicide of Pachês, and that too before the dikasts, implies circumstances very different from those usually brought in accusation against a general on trial: it implies an intensity of anger in the numerous dikasts greater than that which acts of peculation would be likely to raise, and such as to strike a guilty man with insupportable remorse and humiliation. The story of Lamaxis and Hellânis would be just of a nature to produce this vehement emotion among the Athenian dikasts. Moreover, the words of the Epigram,—μέσφα μιν εἰς ὁλοὴν κῆρα συνηλασάτην,—are precisely applicable to a self-inflicted death. It would seem by the Epigram, moreover, that, even in the time of Agathias (A.D. 550—the reign of Justinian), there must have been preserved at Mitylênê a sepulchral monument commemorating this incident.

Schneider (ad Aristotel. Politic. v, 3, 2) erroneously identifies this story with that of Doxander and the two ἐπίκληροι whom he wished to obtain in marriage for his two sons.

[430] Thucyd. v, 17.

[431] Thucyd. iii, 52. προσπέμπει δ᾽ αὐτοῖς κήρυκα λέγοντα, εἰ βούλονται παραδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν *ἑκόντες* τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, καὶ δικασταῖς ἐκείνοις χρήσασθαι, τούς τε ἀδίκους κολάζειν, παρὰ δίκην δὲ οὐδένα.

[432] Pausan. iii, 9, 1.

[433] Thucyd. iii, 60. ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐκείνοις *παρὰ γνώμην τὴν αὑτῶν* μακρότερος λόγος ἐδόθη τῆς πρὸς τὸ ἐρώτημα ἀποκρίσεως. αὐτῶν here means *the Thebans*.

[434] See this point emphatically set forth in Orat. xiv, called Λόγος Πλαταϊκὸς, of Isokratês, p. 308, sect. 62.

The whole of that oration is interesting to be read in illustration of the renewed sufferings of the Platæans near fifty years after this capture.

[435] Thucyd. iii, 54-59. Dionysius of Halikarnassus bestows especial commendation on the speech of the Platæan orator (De Thucyd. Hist. Judic. p. 921). Concurring with him as to its merits, I do not concur in the opinion which he expresses that it is less artistically put together than those other harangues which he considers inferior.

Mr. Mitford doubts whether these two orations are to be taken as approximating to anything really delivered on the occasion. But it seems to me that the means possessed by Thucydidês for informing himself of what was actually said at this scene before the captured Platæa must have been considerable and satisfactory: I therefore place full confidence in them, as I do in most of the other harangues in his work, so far as *the substance* goes.

[436] Thucyd. iii, 65.

[437] Thucyd. iii, 66. τὰ πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια—iii, 62. ἔξω τῶν ἄλλων Βοιωτῶν παραβαίνοντες τὰ πάτρια.

[438] Thucyd. iii, 61-68. It is probable that the slaughter of the Theban prisoners taken in the town of Platæa was committed by the Platæans in breach of a convention concluded with the Thebans: and on this point, therefore, the Thebans had really ground to complain. Respecting this convention, however, there were two conflicting stories, between which Thucydidês does not decide: see Thucyd. ii, 3, 4, and this History, above, chap. xlviii.

[439] Thucyd. iii, 68; ii, 74. To construe the former of these passages (iii, 68) as it now stands, is very difficult, if not impossible; we can only pretend to give what seems to be its substantial meaning.

[440] Diodorus (xii, 56) in his meagre abridgment of the siege and fate of Platæa, somewhat amplifies the brevity and simplicity of the question as given by Thucydidês.

[441] Thucyd. iii, 57. ὑμᾶς δὲ (you Spartans) καὶ ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ πανοικησίᾳ διὰ Θηβαίους (Πλάταιαν) *ἐξαλεῖψαι*.

[442] Thucyd. iii, 69.

[443] Demosthenês—or the Pseudo-Demosthenês—in the oration against Neæra (p. 1380, c. 25), says that the blockade of Platæa was continued for ten years before it surrendered,—ἐπολιόρκουν αὐτοὺς διπλῷ τείχει περιτειχίσαντες δέκα ἔτη. That the real duration of the blockade was only *two* years, is most certain: accordingly, several eminent critics—Palmerius, Wasse, Duker, Taylor, Auger, etc., all with one accord confidently enjoin us to correct the text of Demosthenês from δέκα to δύο. "Repone *fidenter* δύο," says Duker.

I have before protested against corrections of the text of ancient authors grounded upon the reason which all these critics think so obvious and so convincing; and I must again renew the protest here. It shows how little the principles of historical evidence have been reflected upon, when critics can thus concur in forcing dissentient witnesses into harmony, and in substituting a true statement of their own in place of an erroneous statement which one of these witnesses gives them. And in the present instance, the principle adopted by these critics is the less defensible, because the Pseudo-Demosthenês introduces a great many other errors and inaccuracies respecting Platæa, besides his mistake about the duration of the siege. The ten years' siege of Troy was constantly present to the imaginations of these literary Greeks.

[444] Thucyd. iii, 59.

[445] Thucyd. iii, 69. σχεδὸν δέ τι καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν περὶ Πλαταιῶν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὕτως ἀποτετραμμένοι ἐγένοντο Θηβαίων ἕνεκα, νομίζοντες ἐς τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοὺς ἄρτι τότε καθιστάμενον ὠφελίμους εἶναι.

[446] See above, chap. xlvii.

[447] Thucyd. i, 55.

[448] Thucyd. iii, 70: compare Diodor. xii, 57.

[449] Thucyd. i, 44.

[450] Thucyd. ii, 25.

[451] Thucyd. iii, 70. φάσκων τέμνειν χάρακας ἐκ τοῦ τε Διὸς τεμένους καὶ τοῦ Ἀλκίνου· ζημία δὲ καθ' ἑκάστην χάρακα ἐπέκειτο στατήρ.

The present tense τέμνειν seems to indicate that they were going on habitually making use of the trees in the grove for this purpose. Probably it is this cutting and fixing of stakes to support the vines, which is meant by

the word χαρακισμὸς in Pherekratês. Pers. ap. Athenæum, vi, p. 269.

The Oration of Lysias (Or. vii), against Nikomachus, ὑπὲρ τοῦ σηκοῦ ἀπολογία, will illustrate this charge made by Peithias at Korkyra. There were certain ancient olive-trees near Athens, consecrated and protected by law, so that the proprietors of the ground on which they stood were forbidden to grub them up, or to dig so near as to injure the roots. The speaker in that oration defends himself against a charge of having grubbed up one of these and sold the wood. It appears that there were public visitors whose duty it was to watch over these old trees: see the note of Markland on that oration, p. 270.

[452] Thucyd. iii, 71. ὡς δὲ εἶπον, καὶ *ἐπικυρῶσαι ἠνάγκασαν τὴν γνώμην*.

[453] Thucyd. iii, 71. καὶ τοὺς ἐκεῖ καταπεφευγότας πείσοντας μηδὲν ἀνεπιτήδειον πράσσειν, ὅπως μή τις ἐπιστροφὴ γένηται.

[454] Thucyd. iii, 80.

[455] Thucyd. iii, 74, 75.

[456] Thucyd. iii, 75, 76.

[457] Thucyd. iii, 69-76.

[458] These two triremes had been with Pachês at Lesbos (Thucyd. iii, 33), immediately on returning from thence, they must have been sent round to join Nikostratus at Naupaktus. We see in what constant service they were kept.

[459] Thucyd. iii, 77, 78, 79.

[460] Thucyd. iii, 80.

[461] Thucyd. iii, 80, 81. καὶ ἐκ τῶν νεῶν, ὅσους ἔπεισαν ἐσβῆναι, ἐκβιβάζοντες ἀπεχώρησαν. It is certain that the reading ἀπεχώρησαν here must be wrong: no satisfactory sense can be made out of it. The word substituted by Dr. Arnold is ἀνεχρῶντο; that preferred by Göller is ἀπεχρῶντο; others recommend ἀπεχρήσαντο; Hermann adopts ἀπεχώρισαν, and Dionysius, in his copy, read ἀνεχώρησαν. I follow the meaning of the words proposed by Dr. Arnold and Göller, which appear to be both equivalent to ἐκτεῖνον. This meaning is at least plausible and consistent; though I do not feel certain that we have the true sense of the passage.

[462] Thucyd. iii, 81. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν ἱκετῶν, ὅσοι οὐκ ἐπείσθησαν, *ὡς ἑώρων τὰ γιγνόμενα*, διέφθειραν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἀλλήλους, etc. The meagre abridgment of Diodorus (xii, 57) in reference to these events in Korkyra, is hardly worth notice.

[463] Thucyd. iii, 85. Οἱ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν Κερκυραῖοι *τοιαύταις ὀργαῖς ταῖς πρώταις* ἐς ἀλλήλους ἐχρήσαντο, etc.

[464] In reading the account of the conduct of Nikostratus, as well as that of Phormio, in the naval battles of the preceding summer, we contract a personal interest respecting both of them. Thucydidês does not seem to have anticipated that his account would raise such a feeling in the minds of his readers, otherwise he probably would have mentioned something to gratify it. Respecting Phormio, his omission is the more remarkable; since we are left to infer, from the request made by the Akarnanians to have his son sent as commander, that he must have died or become disabled: yet the historian does not distinctly say so (iii, 7).

The Scholiast on Aristophanês (Pac. 347) has a story that Phormio was asked for by the Akarnanians, but that he could not serve in consequence of being at that moment under sentence for a heavy fine, which he was unable to pay: accordingly, the Athenians contrived a means of evading the fine, in order that he might be enabled to serve. It is difficult to see how this can be reconciled with the story of Thucydidês, who says that the son of Phormio went instead of his father.

Compare Meineke, Histor. Critic. Comicc. Græc. vol. i, p. 144, and Fragment. Eupolid. vol. ii, p. 527. Phormio was introduced as a chief character in the Ταξίαρχοι of Eupolis; as a brave, rough, straightforward soldier something like Lamachus in the Acharneis of Aristophanês.

[465] Thucyd. iii, 85.

[466] Thucyd. iii, 82. γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ ἀεὶ ἐσόμενα ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαίτερα καὶ τοῖς εἴδεσι διηλλαγμένα, ὡς ἂν ἕκασται αἱ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντυχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται, etc.

The many obscurities and perplexities of construction which pervade these memorable chapters, are familiar to all readers of Thucydidês, ever since Dionysius of Halikarnassus, whose remarks upon them are sufficiently severe (Judic. de Thucyd. p. 883). To discuss difficulties which the best commentators are sometimes unable satisfactorily to explain, is no part of the business of this work: yet there is one sentence which I venture to notice as erroneously construed by most of them, following the Scholiast.

Τὸ δ᾽ ἐμπλήκτως ὀξὺ ἀνδρὸς μοίρᾳ προσετέθη, ἀσφάλεια δὲ (Dr. Arnold and others read ἀσφαλείᾳ in the dative) τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι, ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὔλογος.

The Scholiast explains the latter half of this as follows: τὸ ἐπιπολὺ βουλεύσασθαι δι᾽ ἀσφάλειαν πρόφασις ἀποτροπῆς ἐνομίζετο,,—and this explanation is partly adopted by Poppo, Göller, and Dr. Arnold, with differences about ἀσφάλεια and ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι, but all agreeing about the word ἀποτροπὴ so that the sentence is made to mean, in the words of Dr. Arnold: "But safely to concert measures against an enemy, was accounted but a decent pretence for *declining the contest with him altogether*."

Now the signification here assigned to ἀποτροπὴ is one which does not belong to it. Ἀποτροπὴ, in Thucydidês as well as elsewhere, does not mean "tergiversation, or declining the contest:" it has an active sense, and means, "the deterring, preventing, or dissuading another person from something which he might be disposed to do,—or the warding off of some threatening danger or evil:" the remarkable adjective ἀποτροπαῖος is derived from it, and προτροπὴ, in rhetoric, is its contrary term. In Thucydidês it is used in this active sense (iii, 45): compare also Plato, Legg. ix, c. 1, p. 853; Isokratês, Areopagatic. Or. vii, p. 143, sect. 17; Æschinês cont. Ktesiphon. c. 68, p. 442: Æschyl. Pers. 217; nor do the commentators produce any passage to sustain the passive sense which they assign to it in the sentence here under discussion, whereby they would make it equivalent to ἀναχωρεῖν—ἀναχώρησις—or ἐξαναχωρεῖν (Thucyd. iv, 28; v, 65), "a backing out."

Giving the meaning which they do to ἀποτροπὴ, the commentators are farther unavoidably embarrassed how to construe ἀσφάλεια δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι, as may be seen by the notes of Poppo, Göller, and Dr. Arnold. The Scholiast and Göller give to the word ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι the very unusual meaning of "repeated and careful deliberation," instead of its common meaning of "laying snares for another, concerting secret measures of hostility:" and Poppo and Dr. Arnold alter ἀσφάλεια into the dative case ἀσφαλείᾳ, which, if it were understood to be governed by προσετέθη, might make a fair construction,—but which they construe along with τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι, though the position of the particle δὲ, upon that supposition, appears to me singularly awkward.

The great difficulty of construing the sentence arises from the erroneous meaning attached to the word ἀποτροπὴ. But when we interpret that word "deterrence, or prevention," according to the examples which I have cited, the whole meaning of the sentence will become clear and consistent. Of the two modes of hurting a party-enemy—1. violent and open attack; 2. secret manœuvre and conspiracy—Thucydidês remarks first, what was thought of the one; next, what was thought of the other, in the perverted state of morality which he is discussing.

Τὸ δ᾽ ἐμπλήκτως ὀξὺ ἀνδρὸς μοίρᾳ προσετέθη—ἀσφάλεια δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι, ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὔλογος.

"Sharp and reckless attack was counted among the necessities of the manly character: secret conspiracy against an enemy was held to be safe precaution,—a specious pretence of preventing him from doing the like."

According to this construction, τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι is the subject; ἀσφάλεια belongs to the predicate and the concluding words, ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὔλογος, are an epexegesis, or explanatory comment, upon ἀσφάλεια. Probably we ought to consider some such word as ἐνομίζετο to be understood,—just as the Scholiast understands that word for his view of the sentence.

[467] See the valuable preliminary discourse, prefixed to Welcker's edition of Theognis, page xxi, sect. 9, *seq.*

[468] Aristotel. Politic. v. 7, 19. Καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσομαι, καὶ βουλεύσω ὅ,τι ἂν ἔχω κακόν.

[469] Thucyd. iii, 51. See the note of Dr. Arnold, and the plan embodied in his work, for the topography of Minôa, which has now ceased to be an island, and is a hill on the mainland near the shore.

[470] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 2, 3.

[471] Καίτοι ἔγωγε καὶ τιμῶμαι ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου (says Nikias, in the Athenian assembly, Thucyd. vi, 9) *καὶ ἧσσον ἑτέρων περὶ τῷ ἐμαυτοῦ σώματι ὀῤῥωδῶ·* νομίζων ὁμοίως ἀγαθὸν πολίτην εἶναι, ὃς ἂν καὶ

τοῦ σώματός τι καὶ τῆς οὐσίας προνοῆται.

The whole conduct of Nikias before Syracuse, under the most trying circumstances, more than bears out this boast.

[472] Thucyd. vii. 50; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 4, 5, 23. Τῷ μέντοι Νικίᾳ συνηνέχθη τότε μηδὲ μάντιν ἔχειν ἔμπειρον· ὁ γὰρ συνήθης αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ πολὺ τῆς δεισιδαιμονίας ἀφαιρῶν Στιλβίδης ἐτεθνήκει μικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν. This is suggested by Plutarch as an excuse for mistakes on the part of Nikias.

[473] Xenophon, Memorab. ii, 5, 2; Xenophon, De Vectigalibus, iv, 14.

[474] Thucyd. v, 7; Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 21. Ὁ γὰρ Λάμαχος ἦν μὲν πολεμικὸς καὶ ἀνδρώδης, ἀξίωμα δ᾽ οὐ προσῆν οὐδ᾽ ὄγκος αὐτῷ διὰ πενίαν; compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 15.

[475] Thucyd. v, 16. Νικίας πλεῖστα τῶν τότε εὖ φερόμενος ἐν στρατηγίαις,—Νικίας μὲν βουλόμενος, ἐν ᾧ ἀπαθὴς ἦν καὶ ἠξιοῦτο, διασώσασθαι *τὴν εὐτυχίαν*, etc.—vi, 17. ἕως ἐγώ τε (Alkibiadês) ἔτι ἀκμάζω μετ᾽ αὐτῆς καὶ ὁ Νικίας *εὐτυχὴς* δοκεῖ εἶναι, etc.

[476] Thucyd. viii, 54. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Πείσανδρος τάς τε ξυνωμοσίας, αἵπερ ἐτύγχανον πρότερον ἐν τῇ πόλει οὖσαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς, ἀπάσας ἐπελθών, καὶ παρακελευσάμενος ὅπως ξυστραφέντες καὶ κοινῇ βουλευσάμενοι καταλύσουσι τὸν δῆμον, καὶ τἆλλα παρασκευάσας, etc.

After having thus organized the hetæries, and brought them into coöperation for his revolutionary objects against the democracy, Peisander departed from Athens to Samos: on his return, he finds that these hetæries have been very actively employed, and had made great progress towards the subversion of the democracy: they had assassinated the demagogue Androklês and various other political enemies,—οἱ δὲ ἀμφὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον—ἦλθον ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας,—καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι τὰ πλεῖστα τοῖς ἑταίροις προειργασμένα, etc. (viii, 65.)

The political ἑταίρεια to which Alkibiadês belonged is mentioned in Isokratês, De Bigis, Or. xvi, p. 348, sect. 6. λέγοντες ὡς ὁ πατὴρ *συνάγοι τὴν ἑταίρειαν ἐπὶ νεωτέροις πράγμασι*. Allusions to these ἑταιρεῖαι and to their well-known political and judicial purposes (unfortunately they are only allusions), are found in Plato, Theætet. c. 79, p. 173, σπουδαὶ δὲ ἑταιρειῶν ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὰς, etc.: also Plato, Legg. ix, c. 3, p. 856; Plato, Republic, ii, c. 8, p. 365, where they are mentioned in conjunction with συνωμοσίαι—ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λανθάνειν ξυνωμοσίας τε καὶ ἑταιρείας συνάξομεν—also in Pseudo-Andokidês cont. Alkibiad. c. 2, p. 112. Compare the general remarks of Thucydidês, iii, 82, and Demosthenês cont. Stephan. ii, p. 1157.

Two Dissertations, by Messrs. Vischer and Büttner, collect the scanty indications respecting these hetæries, together with some attempts to enlarge and speculate upon them, which are more ingenious than trustworthy (Die Oligarchische Partei und die Hetairien in Athen, von W. Vischer, Basel, 1836; Geschichte der politischen Hetairien zu Athen, von Hermann Büttner, Leipsic, 1840).

[477] About the political workings of the Syssitia and Gymnasia, see Plato Legg. i, p. 636; Polybius, xx, 6.

[478] Thucyd. iii, 87, 89, 90.

[479] Respecting this abundance of wood, as well as the site of Herakleia generally, consult Livy, xxxvi, 22.

[480] Diodor. xii, 59. Not merely was Hêraklês the mythical progenitor of the Spartan kings, but the whole region near Œta and Trachis was adorned by legends and heroic incidents connected with him: see the drama of the Trachiniæ by Sophoklês.

[481] Thucyd. iii, 92, 93; Diodor xi, 49; xii, 59.

[482] Horat. Sat. ii, 6, 8:—

O! si angulus iste

Proximus accedat, qui nunc denormat agellum!

[483] Thucyd. iii, 91.

[484] Thucyd. iii, 95. Δημοσθένης δ᾽ ἀναπείθεται κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ὑπὸ Μεσσηνίων ὡς καλὸν αὐτῷ στρατιᾶς τοσαύτης ξυνειλεγμένης, etc.

[485] Thucyd. iii, 95. τὸ ἄλλο ἠπειρωτικὸν τὸ ταύτῃ. None of the tribes properly called Epirots, would be comprised in this expression: the name ἠπειρῶται is here a general name, not a proper name, as Poppo and Dr. Arnold remark. Demosthenês would calculate on getting under his orders the Akarnanians and Ætolians, and some other tribes besides; but *what* other tribes, it is not easy to specify: perhaps the Agræi, east of Amphilochia, among them.

[486] Thucyd. iii, 98. The epibatæ, or soldiers serving on shipboard (marines), were more usually taken from the thetes, or the poorest class of citizens, furnished by the state with a panoply for the occasion,—not from the regular hoplites on the muster-roll. Maritime soldiery is, therefore, usually spoken of as something inferior: the present triremes of Demosthenês are noticed in the light of an exception (ναυτικῆς καὶ φαύλου στρατιᾶς, Thucyd. vi, 21).

So among the Romans, service in the legions was accounted higher and more honorable than that of the classiarii milites (Tacit. Histor. i, 87).

The Athenian epibatæ, though not forming a corps permanently distinct, correspond in function to the English marines, who seem to have been first distinguished permanently from other foot-soldiers about the year 1684. "It having been found necessary on many occasions to embark a number of soldiers on board our ships of war, and mere landsmen being at first extremely unhealthy,—and at first, until they had been accustomed to the sea, in a great measure unserviceable,—it was at length judged expedient to appoint certain regiments for that service, who were trained to the different modes of sea-fighting, and also made useful in some of those manœuvres of a ship where a great many hands were required. These, from the nature of their duty, were distinguished by the appellation of *maritime soldiers*, or marines."—Grose's Military Antiquities of the English Army, vol. i, p. 186. (London, 1786.)

[487] Thucyd. iii, 100. Προπέμψαντες πρότερον ἔς τε Κόρινθον καὶ ἐς Λακεδαίμονα πρέσβεις—πείθουσιν ὥστε σφίσι πέμψαι στρατιὰν ἐπὶ Ναύπακτον διὰ τὴν τῶν *Ἀθηναίων ἐπαγωγήν*.

It is not here meant, I think—as Göller and Dr. Arnold suppose—that the Ætolians sent envoys to Lacedæmon before there was any talk or thought of the invasion of Ætolia, simply in prosecution of the standing antipathy which they bore to Naupaktus: but that they had sent envoys immediately when they heard of the preparations for invading Ætolia,—yet before the invasion actually took place. The words διὰ τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπαγωγήν show that this is the meaning.

The word ἐπαγωγὴ is rightly construed by Haack, against the Scholiast: "Because the Naupaktians were bringing in the Athenians to invade Ætolia."

[488] Thucyd. iii, 98.

[489] Thucyd. iii, 101, 102.

[490] Thucyd. iii, 102-105.

[491] Thucyd. iii, 105, 106, 107.

[492] Thucyd. iii, 107, 108: compare Polyænus, iii, 1.

[493] Thucyd. iii, 111.

[494] Thucyd. iii, 112.

[495] Thucyd. iii, 113.

[496] Thucyd. iii, 113. πάθος γὰρ τοῦτο μιᾷ πόλει Ἑλληνίδι μέγιστον δὴ τῶν *κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε* ἐγένετο. Καὶ ἀριθμὸν οὐκ ἔγραψα τῶν ἀποθανόντων, διότι ἄπιστον τὸ πλῆθος λέγεται ἀπολέσθαι, ὡς πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως. Ἀμπρακίαν μέντοι *οἶδα* ὅτι, εἰ ἐβουλήθησαν Ἀκαρνᾶνες καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι, Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Δημοσθένει πειθόμενοι, ἐξελεῖν, αὐτοβοεὶ ἂν εἷλον· νῦν δὲ ἔδεισαν, μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔχοντες αὐτὴν χαλεπώτεροι σφίσι πάροικοι ὦσι.

We may remark that the expression κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε, when it occurs in the first, second, third, or first half of the fourth Book of Thucydidês, seems to allude to the first ten years of the Peloponnesian war, which ended with the peace of Nikias.

In a careful dissertation, by Franz Wolfgang Ullrich, analyzing the structure of the history of Thucydidês, it is made to appear that the first, second, and third Books, with the first half of the fourth, were composed during

the interval between the peace of Nikias and the beginning of the last nine years of the war, called the Dekeleian war; allowing for two passages in these early books which must have been subsequently introduced.

The later books seem to have been taken up by Thucydidês as a separate work, continuing the former, and a sort of separate preface is given for them (v, 26), γέγραφε δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὁ αὐτὸς Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ἐξῆς, etc. It is in this later portion that he first takes up the view peculiar to him, of reckoning the whole twenty-seven years as one continued war only nominally interrupted (Ullrich, Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thukydidês, pp. 85, 125, 138, etc. Hamburgh, 1846).

Compare ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷδε (iii, 98), which in like manner means the war prior to the peace of Nikias.

[497] Thucyd. iii, 114. Diodorus (xii, 60) abridges the narrative of Thucydidês.

[498] Thucyd. iii, 114. Ἀκαρνᾶνες δὲ καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι, ἀπελθόντων Ἀθηναίων καὶ Δημοσθένους, τοῖς ὡς Σαλύνθιον καὶ Ἀγραίους καταφυγοῦσιν Ἀμπρακιώταις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ἀναχώρησιν ἐσπείσαντο ἐξ Οἰνιαδῶν, οἵπερ καὶ μετανέστησαν παρὰ Σαλυνθίον.

This is a very difficult passage. Hermann has conjectured, and Poppo, Göller, and Dr. Arnold all approve, the reading παρὰ Σαλυνθίου instead of the two last words of this sentence. The passage might certainly be construed with this emendation, though there would still be an awkwardness in the position of the relative οἵπερ with regard to its antecedent, and in the position of the particle καὶ, which ought then properly to come after μετανέστησαν, and not before it. The sentence would then mean, that "the Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians, who had originally taken refuge with Salynthius, had moved away from his territory to Œniadæ," from which place they were now to enjoy safe departure.

I think, however, that the sentence would construe equally well, or at least with no greater awkwardness, without any conjectural alteration of the text, if we suppose Οἰνιαδῶν to be not merely the name of the place, but the name of the inhabitants: and the word seems to be used in this double sense (Thucyd. ii, 100). As the word is already in the patronymic form, it would be difficult to deduce from it a new *nomen gentile*. Several of the Attic demes, which are in the patronymic form, present this same double meaning. If this supposition be admitted, the sentence will mean, that "safe retreat was granted to Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians from the Œniade, who *also*—καὶ, that is, they as well as the Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians—went up to the territory of Salynthius." These Œniadæ were enemies of the general body of Akarnanians (ii, 100), and they may well have gone thither to help in extricating the fugitive Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians.

[499] Thucyd. iii, 114.

[500] Thucyd. iii, 114. Τὰ δὲ *νῦν ἀνακείμενα ἐν τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς ἱεροῖς* Δημοσθένει ἐξῃρέθησαν, τριακόσιαι πανοπλίαι, καὶ ἄγων αὐτὰς κατέπλευσε. Καὶ ἐγένετο ἅμα αὐτῷ μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Αἰτωλίας ξυμφορὰν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς πράξεως ἀδεεστέρα ἡ κάθοδος.

[501] Thucyd. iii, 104; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 3, 4; Diodor. xii, 58.

[502] Thucyd. iv, 2, 3.

[503] Thucyd. i, 140; ii, 11.

[504] Thucyd. iv, 26.

[505] Topography of Sphakteria and Pylus. The description given by Thucydidês, of the memorable incidents in or near Pylus and Sphakteria, is perfectly clear, intelligible, and consistent with itself, as to topography. But when we consult the topography of the scene as it stands now, we find various circumstances which cannot possibly be reconciled with Thucydidês. Both Colonel Leake (Travels in the Morea, vol. i, pp. 402-415) and Dr. Arnold (Appendix to the second and third volume of his Thucydidês, p. 444) have given plans of the coast, accompanied with valuable remarks.

The main discrepancy, between the statement of Thucydidês and the present state of the coast, is to be found in the breadth of the two channels between Sphakteria and the mainland. The southern entrance into the bay of Navarino is now between thirteen hundred and fourteen hundred yards, with a depth of water varying from five, seven, twenty-eight, thirty-three fathoms; whereas Thucydidês states it as being only a breadth adequate to admit eight or nine triremes abreast. The northern entrance is about one hundred and fifty yards in width, with a shoal or bar of sand lying across it on which there are not more than eighteen inches of water:

Thucydidês tells us that it afforded room for no more than two triremes, and his narrative implies a much greater depth of water, so as to make the entrance for triremes perfectly unobstructed.

Colonel Leake supposes that Thucydidês was misinformed as to the breadth of the southern passage; but Dr. Arnold has on this point given a satisfactory reply,—that the narrowness of the breadth is not merely affirmed in the numbers of Thucydidês, but is indirectly implied in his narrative, where he tells us that the Lacedæmonians intended to choke up both of them by triremes closely packed. Obviously, this expedient could not be dreamt of, except for a very narrow mouth. The same reply suffices against the doubts which Bloomfield and Poppo (Comment. p. 10) raise about the genuineness of the numerals ὀκτὼ or ἐννέα in Thucydidês; a doubt which merely transfers the supposed error from Thucydidês to the writer of the MS.

Dr. Arnold has himself raised a still graver doubt; whether the island now called Sphagia be really the same as Sphakteria, and whether the bay of Navarino be the real harbor of Pylus. He suspects that the Pale-Navarino which has been generally understood to be Pylus, was in reality the ancient Sphakteria, separated from the mainland in ancient times by a channel at the north as well as by another at the southeast,—though now it is not an island at all. He farther suspects that the lake or lagoon called Lake of Osmyn Aga, north of the harbor of Navarino, and immediately under that which he supposes to have been Sphakteria, was the ancient harbor of Pylus, in which the sea-fight between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians took place. He does not, indeed, assert this as a positive opinion, but leans to it as the most probable, admitting that there are difficulties either way.

Dr. Arnold has stated some of the difficulties which beset this hypothesis (p. 447), but there was one which he has not stated, which appears to me the most formidable of all, and quite fatal to the admissibility of his opinion. If the Paleokastro of Navarino was the real ancient Sphakteria, it must have been a second island situated to the northward of Sphagia. There must therefore have been *two* islands close together off the coast and near the scene. Now if the reader will follow the account of Thucydidês, he will see that there certainly was no more than *one* island,—Sphakteria, without any other near or adjoining to it; see especially c. 13: the Athenian fleet under Eurymedon, on first arriving, was obliged to go back some distance to the island of Prôtê, because *the island* of Sphakteria was full of Lacedæmonian hoplites: if Dr. Arnold's hypothesis were admitted, there would have been nothing to hinder them from landing on Sphagia itself,—the same inference may be deduced from c. 8. The statement of Pliny (H. N. iv, 12) that there were *tres Sphagiæ* off Pylus, unless we suppose with Hardouin that two of them were mere rocks, appears to me inconsistent with the account of Thucydidês.

I think that there is no alternative except to suppose that a great alteration has taken place in the two passages which separate Sphagia from the mainland, during the interval of two thousand four hundred years which separates us from Thucydidês. The mainland to the south of Navarino must have been much nearer than it is now to the southern portion of Sphagia, while the northern passage also must have been then both narrower and clearer. To suppose a change in the configuration of the coast to this extent, seems noway extravagant: any other hypothesis which may be started will be found involved in much greater difficulty.

[506] Thucyd. iv, 3. The account, alike meagre and inaccurate, given by Diodorus, of these interesting events in Pylus and Sphakteria, will be found in Diodor. xii, 61-64.

[507] Thucyd. iv, 4.

[508] Thucyd. iv, 9. Demosthenês placed the *greater number* (τοὺς πολλοὺς) of his hoplites round the walls of his post, and selected *sixty* of them to march down to the shore. This implies a total which can hardly be less than two hundred.

[509] Thucyd. iv, 8.

[510] Thucyd. iv, 10.

[511] Thucyd. iv, 8. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἔσπλους ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀντιπρώροις βύζην κλῄσειν ἔμελλον.

[512] Thucyd. iv, 11, 12; Diodor. xii. Consult an excellent note of Dr. Arnold on this passage, in which he contrasts the looseness and exaggeration of Diodorus with the modest distinctness of Thucydidês.

[513] Thucyd. iv, 12. ἐπὶ πολὺ γὰρ ἐποίει τῆς δόξης *ἐν τῷ τότε*, τοῖς μὲν ἠπειρώταις μάλιστα εἶναι καὶ τὰ πεζὰ κρατίστοις, τοῖς δὲ θαλασσίοις τε καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶ πλεῖστον προέχειν.

[514] Thucyd. iv, 13. ἐλπίζοντες τὸ κατὰ τὸν λιμένα τεῖχος ὕψος μὲν ἔχειν, ἀποβάσεως δὲ μάλιστα οὔσης ἐλεῖν μηχαναῖς. See Poppo's note upon this passage.

[515] Thucyd. iv, 14.

[516] Thucyd. iv, 13. The Lacedæmonians παρεσκευάζοντο, ἢν ἐσπλέῃ τις, ὡς ἐν τῷ λιμένι ὄντι οὐ σμικρῷ ναυμαχήσοντες.

The expression, "the harbor which was not small," to designate the spacious bay of Navarino, has excited much remark from Mr. Bloomfield and Dr. Arnold, and was indeed one of the reasons which induced the latter to suspect that the harbor meant by Thucydidês was *not* the bay of Navarino, but the neighboring lake of Osmyn Aga.

I have already discussed that supposition in a former note: but in reference to the expression οὐ σμικρῷ, we may observe, first, that the use of negative expressions to convey a positive idea would be in the ordinary manner of Thucydidês.

But farther, I have stated in a previous note that it is indispensable, in my judgment, to suppose the island of Sphakteria to have touched the mainland much more closely in the time of Thucydidês than it does now. At that time, therefore, very probably, the basin of Navarino was not so large as we now find it.

[517] Thucyd. iv, 14. *ἔτρωσαν* μὲν πολλὰς, πέντε δ᾽ ἔλαβον. We cannot in English speak of *wounding* a trireme,—though the Greek word is both lively and accurate, to represent the blow inflicted by the impinging beak of an enemy's ship.

[518] See above, in this History, chap. xlix.

[519] Thucyd. iv, 13, 14.

[520] Thucyd. iv, 16. The chœnix was equivalent to about two pints, English dry measure: it was considered as the usual daily sustenance for a slave. Each Lacedæmonian soldier had, therefore, double of this daily allowance, besides meat, in weight and quantity not specified: the fact that the quantity of meat is not specified, seems to show that they did not fear abuse in this item.

The kotyla contained about half a pint, English wine measure: each Lacedæmonian soldier had, therefore, a pint of wine daily. It was always the practice in Greece to drink the wine with a large admixture of water.

[521] Thucyd. iv, 21: compare vii, 18.

[522] Thucyd. iv, 18. γνῶτε δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰς ἡμετέρας νῦν ξυμφορὰς ἀπιδόντες, etc.

[523] Thucyd. iv, 19.

[524] Thucyd. iv, 20. ἡμῖν δὲ καλῶς, εἴπερ πότε, ἔχει ἀμφοτέροις ἡ ξυναλλαγὴ, πρίν τι ἀνήκεστον διὰ μέσου γενόμενον ἡμᾶς καταλαβεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ἀνάγκη ἀΐδιον ὑμῖν ἔχθραν πρὸς τῇ *κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίαν* ἔχειν, ὑμᾶς δὲ στερηθῆναι ὧν νῦν προκαλούμεθα.

I understand these words κοινὴ and ἰδία agreeably to the explanation of the Scholiast, from whom Dr. Arnold, as well as Poppo and Göller, depart, in my judgment erroneously. The whole war had been begun in consequence of the complaints of the Peloponnesian allies, and of wrongs alleged to have been done to *them* by Athens: Sparta herself had no ground of complaint,—nothing of which she desired redress.

Dr. Arnold translates it: "We shall hate you not only nationally, for the wound you have inflicted on Sparta; but also individually, because so many of us will have lost our near relations from your inflexibility." "The Spartan aristocracy (he adds) would feel it a personal wound to lose at once so many of its members, connected by blood or marriage with its principal families: compare Thucyd. v, 15."

We must recollect, however, that the Athenians could not possibly know at this time that the hoplites inclosed in Sphakteria belonged in great proportion to the first families in Sparta. And the Spartan envoys would surely have the diplomatic prudence to abstain from any facts or arguments which would reveal, or even suggest, to them so important a secret.

[525] Thucyd. iv, 20. ἡμῶν γὰρ καὶ ὑμῶν ταὐτὰ λεγόντων τό γε ἄλλο Ἑλληνικὸν ἴστε ὅτι ὑποδεέστερον ὂν τὰ μέγιστα τιμήσει.

Aristophanês, Pac. 1048. Ἐξὸν σπεισαμένοις κοινῇ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἄρχειν.

[526] Thucyd. iv, 21.

[527] Thucyd. iv, 21. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐνῆγε Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὢν καὶ τῷ δήμῳ πιθανώτατος· καὶ ἔπεισεν ἀποκρίνασθαι, etc.

This sentence reads like a first introduction of Kleon to the notice of the reader. It would appear that Thucydidês had forgotten that he had before introduced Kleon on occasion of the Mitylenæan surrender, and that too in language very much the same, iii, 36. καὶ Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου,—ὢν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα βιαιότατος τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ τῷ δήμῳ παρὰ πολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανώτατος, etc.

[528] Thucyd. iv, 22.

[529] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 7; Philochorus, Fragm. 105, ed. Didot.

[530] Let us read some remarks of Mr. Burke on the temper of England during the American war.

"You remember that in the beginning of this American war, you were greatly divided: and a very strong body, if not the strongest, opposed itself to the madness which every art and every power were employed to render popular, in order that the errors of the rulers might be lost in the general blindness of the nation. This opposition continued until after our great, but most unfortunate, victory at Long Island. Then all the mounds and banks of our constancy were borne down at once; and the frenzy of the American war broke in upon us like a deluge. This victory, which seemed to put an immediate end to all difficulties, perfected in us that spirit of domination which our unparalleled prosperity had but too long nurtured. We had been so very powerful, and so very prosperous, that even the humblest of us were degraded into the devices and follies of kings. We lost all measure between means and ends; and our headlong desires became our politics and our morals. All men who wished for peace, or retained any sentiments of moderation, were overborne or silenced: and this city (Bristol) was led by every artifice (and probably with the more management, because *I* was one of your members) to distinguish itself by its zeal for that fatal cause." Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol previous to the election (Works, vol. iii, p. 365).

Compare Mr. Burke's Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, p. 174 of the same volume.

[531] Thucyd. iv, 39.

[532] Thucyd. iv, 23.

[533] Thucyd. iv, 25. τῶν νεῶν οὐκ ἐχούσων ὅρμον. This does not mean (as some of the commentators seem to suppose, see Poppo's note) that the Athenians had not plenty of sea-room in the harbor: it means, that they had no station ashore, except the narrow space of Pylus itself.

[534] Thucyd. iv, 26.

[535] Thucyd. iv, 27, 29, 30.

[536] Thucyd. iv, 27. Καὶ ἐς Νικίαν τὸν Νικηράτου στρατηγὸν ὄντα ἀπεσήμαινεν, ἐχθρὸς ὢν καὶ ἐπιτιμῶν—ῥᾴδιον εἶναι παρασκευῇ, εἰ ἄνδρες εἶεν οἱ στρατηγοί, πλεύσαντας λαβεῖν τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ· καὶ αὐτός γ᾽ ἂν, εἰ ἦρχε, ποιῆσαι τοῦτο. Ὁ δὲ Νικίας τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων τι ὑποθορυβησάντων ἐς τὸν Κλέωνα, ὅτι οὐ καὶ νῦν πλεῖ, εἰ ῥᾴδιόν γε αὐτῷ φαίνεται· καὶ ἅμα ὁρῶν αὐτὸν ἐπιτιμῶντα, ἐκέλευεν ἥντινα βούλεται δύναμιν λαβόντα τὸ ἐπὶ σφᾶς εἶναι, ἐπιχειρεῖν.

[537] Thucyd. iv, 28. ὁ δὲ (Κλέων) τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἰόμενος αὐτὸν (Νικίαν) λόγῳ μόνον ἀφιέναι, ἑτοῖμος ἦν, γνοὺς δὲ τῷ ὄντι παραδωσείοντα ἀνεχώρει, καὶ οὐκ ἔφη αὐτὸς ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνον στρατηγεῖν, δεδιὼς ἤδη καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰόμενός οἱ αὐτὸν τολμῆσαι ὑποχωρῆσαι. Αὖθις δὲ ὁ Νικίας ἐκέλευε καὶ ἐξίστατο τῆς ἐπὶ Πύλῳ ἀρχῆς, καὶ μάρτυρας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐποιεῖτο. Οἱ δὲ, *οἷον ὄχλος φιλεῖ ποιεῖν*, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ὁ Κλέων ὑπέφευγε τὸν πλοῦν καὶ ἐξανεχώρει τὰ εἰρημένα, τόσῳ ἐπεκελεύοντο τῷ Νικίᾳ παραδιδόναι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐκείνῳ ἐπεβόων πλεῖν. Ὥστε οὐκ ἔχων ὅπως τῶν εἰρημένων ἔτι ἐξαπαλλαγῇ, ὑφίσταται τὸν πλοῦν, καὶ παρελθὼν οὔτε φοβεῖσθαι ἔφη Λακεδαιμονίους, etc.

[538] Thucyd. iv, 28. Τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ἐνέπεσε μέν τι καὶ γέλωτος τῇ κουφολογίᾳ αὐτοῦ· ἀσμένοις δ᾽ ὅμως ἐγίγνετο τοῖς σώφροσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, λογιζομένοις δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν τοῦ ἑτέρου τεύξεσθαι—ἢ Κλέωνος ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι, *ὃ μᾶλλον ἤλπιζον, ἢ σφαλεῖσι γνώμης* Λακεδαιμονίους σφίσι χειρώσασθαι.

[539] Aristophanês, Equit. 54:—

… καὶ πρωὴν γ᾽ ἐμοῦ

Μᾶζαν μεμαχότος ἐν Πύλῳ Λακωνικὴν,

Πανουργότατά πως περιδραμὼν ὑφαρπάσας

Αὐτὸς παρέθηκε τὴν ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ μεμαγμένην.

It is Demosthenês who speaks in reference to Kleon,—termed in that comedy the Paphlagonian slave of Demos.

Compare v. 391,

Κᾆτ᾽ ἀνὴρ ἔδοξεν εἶναι, τἀλλότριον ἀμὼν θέρος, etc.,

and 740-1197.

So far from cunningly thrusting himself into the post as general, Kleon did everything he possibly could to avoid the post, and was only forced into it by the artifices of his enemies. It is important to notice how little the jests of Aristophanês can be taken as any evidence of historical reality.

[540] Thucyd. iv, 28. οἷον ὄχλος φιλεῖ ποιεῖν, etc.

[541] Thucyd. iv, 30.

[542] Colonel Leake gives an interesting illustration of these particulars in the topography of the island which may even now be verified (Travels in Morea, vol. i, p. 408).

[543] Thucyd. iv, 31.

[544] Thucyd. iv, 32.

[545] Thucyd. iv, 32.

[546] Thucyd. v, 71.

[547] Thucyd. iv, 33.

[548] Thucyd. iv, 33. ὥσπερ ὅτε πρῶτον ἀπέβαινον *τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένοι* ὡς ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, etc.

[549] Thucyd. iv, 34: compare with this the narrative of the destruction of the Lacedæmonian mora near Lechæum, by Iphikratês and the Peltastæ (Xenophon. Hellen. iv, 5, 11).

[550] Thucyd. iv, 34. Τό τε ἔργον ἐνταῦθα χαλεπὸν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καθίστατο· οὔτε γὰρ οἱ πῖλοι ἔστεγον τὰ τοξεύματα, δοράτιά τε ἐναποκέκλαστο βαλλομένων, εἶχον δὲ οὐδὲν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς χρήσασθαι, ἀποκεκλημένοι μὲν τῇ ὄψει τοῦ προορᾶν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μείζονος βοῆς τῶν πολεμίων τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς παραγγελλόμενα οὐκ ἐσακούοντες, κινδύνου δὲ πανταχόθεν περιεστῶτος, καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ἐλπίδα καθ᾽ ὅ,τι χρὴ ἀμυνομένους σωθῆναι.

There has been doubt and difficulty in this passage, even from the time of the Scholiasts. Some commentators have translated πῖλοι *caps* or *hats*,—others, *padded cuirasses* of wool or felt, round the breast and back: see the notes of Duker, Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Göller. That the word πῖλος is sometimes used for the helmet, or head-piece, is unquestionable,—sometimes even (with or without χαλκοὺς) for a brazen helmet (see Aristophan. Lysis. 562; Antiphanês ap. Athenæ. xi, p. 503); but I cannot think that on this occasion Thucydidês would specially indicate the head of the Lacedæmonian hoplite as his chief vulnerable part. Dr. Arnold, indeed, offers a reason to prove that he might naturally do so; but in my judgment the reason is very insufficient.

Πῖλοι means stuffed clothing of wool or felt, whether employed to protect head, body, or feet: and I conceive, with Poppo and others, that it here indicates the body-clothing of the Lacedæmonian hoplite; his body being the part most open to be wounded on the side undefended by the shield, as well as in the rear. That the word πῖλοι will bear this sense may be seen in Pollux, vii, 171; Plato, Timæus, p. 74; and Symposion, p. 220, c. 35: respecting πῖλος as applied to the foot-covering,—Bekker, Chariklês, vol. ii, p. 376.

[551] Thucyd. iv, 35.

[552] Thucyd. iv, 33. τῇ σφετέρᾳ ἐμπειρίᾳ χρήσασθαι, etc.

[553] Thucyd. iv, 36.

[554] Thucyd. iv, 37.

[555] Thucyd. iv. 38. Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κελεύουσιν ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν βουλεύεσθαι, μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν ποιοῦντας.

[556] Thucyd. iv, 38; v, 15.

[557] Thucyd. iv, 39.

[558] Thucyd. iv, 40. παρὰ γνώμην τε δὴ μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτο τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐγένετο, etc.

[559] To adopt a phrase, the counterpart of that which has been ascribed to the Vieille Garde of the Emperor Napoleon's army; compare Herodot. vii, 104.

[560] Thucyd. iv, 39. Καὶ τοῦ Κλέωνος *καίπερ μανιώδης οὖσα ἡ ὑπόσχεσις ἀπέβη*· ἐντὸς γὰρ εἴκοσιν ἡμερῶν ἤγαγε τοὺς ἄνδρας, ὥσπερ ὑπέστη.

Mr. Mitford, in recounting these incidents, after having said, respecting Kleon: "In a *very extraordinary train of circumstances* which followed, *his impudence and his fortune* (if, in the want of another, we may use that term) wonderfully favored him," goes on to observe, two pages farther:—

"It however soon appeared, that though for a man like Cleon, unversed in military command, the undertaking was rash and the bragging promise abundantly ridiculous, yet the business was not so desperate as it was in the moment generally imagined: and in fact the folly of the Athenian people, in committing such a trust to such a man, far exceeded that of the man himself, whose impudence seldom carried him beyond the control of his cunning. He had received intelligence that Demosthenês had already formed the plan and was preparing for the attempt, with the forces upon the spot and in the neighborhood. Hence, his apparent moderation in the demand for troops; which he judiciously accommodated to the gratification of the Athenian people, by avoiding to require any Athenians. He farther showed his judgment, when the decree was to be passed which was finally to direct the expedition, by a request which was readily granted, that Demosthenês might be joined with him in the command." (Mitford, Hist. of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xv, sect. vii. pp. 250-253.)

It appears as if no historian could write down the name of Kleon without attaching to it some disparaging verb or adjective. We are here told in the same sentence that Kleon was an *impudent braggart* for *promising the execution of the enterprise*,—and yet that the enterprise itself was *perfectly feasible*. We are told in one sentence that he was rash and ridiculous for promising this, *unversed as he was in military command*: a few words farther, we are informed that he expressly requested that the most competent man to be found, Demosthenês, might be named his colleague. We are told of the *cunning of Kleon*, and that *Kleon had received intelligence from Demosthenês*,—as if this were some private communication to himself. But Demosthenês had sent no news to Kleon, nor did Kleon know anything which was not equally known to every man in the assembly. *The folly of the people in committing the trust to Kleon* is denounced,—as if Kleon had sought it himself, or as if his friends had been the first to propose it for him. If the folly of the people was thus great, what are we to say of the knavery of the oligarchical party, with Nikias at their head, who impelled the people into this folly, for the purpose of ruining a political antagonist, and who forced Kleon into the post against his own most unaffected reluctance? Against this manœuvre of the oligarchical party, neither Mr. Mitford nor any other historian says a word. When Kleon judges circumstances rightly, as Mr. Mitford allows that he did in this case, he has credit for nothing better than *cunning*.

The truth is, that the people committed no folly in appointing Kleon, for he justified the best expectations of his friends. But Nikias and his friends committed great knavery in proposing it, since they fully believed that he would fail. And, even upon Mr. Mitford's statement of the case, the opinion of Thucydidês which stands at the beginning of this note is thoroughly unjustifiable; not less unjustifiable than the language of the modern historian about the "extraordinary circumstances," and the way in which Kleon was "favored by fortune." Not a single incident can be specified in the narrative to bear out these invidious assertions.

[561] The jest of an unknown comic writer (probably Eupolis or Aristophanês, in one of the many lost dramas) against Kleon: "that he showed great powers of prophecy after the fact," (Κλέων Προμηθεύς ἐστι μετὰ τὰ

πράγματα, Lucian, Prometheus, c. 2), may probably have reference to his proceedings about Sphakteria: if so, it is certainly undeserved.

In the letter which he sent to announce the capture of Sphakteria and the prisoners to the Athenians, it is affirmed that he began with the words—Κλέων Ἀθηναίων τῇ Βουλῇ καὶ τῷ Δήμῳ χαίρειν. This was derided by Eupolis, and is even considered as a piece of insolence, though it is difficult to see why (Schol. ad Aristophan. Plut. 322; Bergk, De Reliquiis Comœdiæ Antiquæ, p. 362).

[562] Vit. Thucydidis, p. xv, ed. Bekker.

[563] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 8; Thucyd. v, 7.

[564] Thucyd. iv, 41.

[565] Thucyd. iv, 41: compare Aristophan. Equit. 648 with Schol.

[566] Thucyd. iv, 79.

[567] Thucyd. v, 16.

[568] The Acharneis was performed at the festival of the Lenæa, at Athens, January, 425 B.C.: the Knights, at the same festival in the ensuing year, 424 B.C.

The capture of Sphakteria took place about July, B.C. 425: between the two dates above. See Mr. Clinton's Fasti Hellenici, ad ann.

[569] Thucyd. iv, 117; v, 14.

[570] Thucyd. iv, 42. Τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους μετὰ ταῦτα *εὐθύς*, etc.

[571] See the geographical illustrations of this descent in Dr. Arnold's plan and note appended to the second volume of his Thucydidês,—and in Colonel Leake, Travels in Morea, ch. xxviii, p. 235; xxix, p. 309.

[572] Thucyd. iv, 43.

[573] Thucyd. iv, 44. ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα,—an expression which Dr. Arnold explains, here as elsewhere, to mean "piling the arms:" I do not think such an explanation is correct, even here: much less in several other places to which he alludes. See a note on the surprise of Platæa by the Thebans, immediately before the Peloponnesian war.

[574] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 6.

[575] Thucyd. iv, 45.

[576] Thucyd. iv, 2-45.

[577] Thucyd. iv, 46.

[578] Thucyd. iv, 47, 48.

[579] Thucyd. iv, 48.

[580] Thucyd. iv, 49.

[581] Thucyd. iv, 51.

[582] Thucyd. iv, 52.

[583] Thucyd. iv, 50. ἐν αἷς πολλῶν ἄλλων γεγραμμένων κεφάλαιον ἦν, πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅ,τι βούλονται· πολλῶν γὰρ ἐλθόντων πρέσβεων οὐδένα ταὐτὰ λέγειν· εἰ οὖν βούλονται σαφὲς λέγειν, πέμψαι μετὰ τοῦ Πέρσου ἄνδρας ὡς αὐτόν.

[584] Thucyd. iv, 86. ὅρκοις τε Λακεδαιμονίων καταλαβὼν τὰ τέλη τοῖς μεγίστοις, ἢ μὴν, etc.

[585] Thucyd. iv, 50; Diodor. xii, 64. The Athenians do not appear to have ever before sent envoys or courted alliance with the Great King; though the idea of doing so must have been noway strange to them, as we may see by the humorous scene of Pseudartabas in the Acharneis of Aristophanês, acted in the year before this event.

[586] Diodor. xi, 65; Aristotel. Polit. v, 8, 3; Justin, iii, 1; Ktesias, Persica, c. 29, 30. It is evident that there were contradictory stories current respecting the plot to which Xerxes fell a victim: but we have no means of determining what the details were.

[587] Ktesias, Persica, c. 38-43; Herodot. iii, 80.

[588] Diodor. xii, 64-71; Ktesias, Persica, c. 44-46.

[589] Thucyd. iv, 54; Herodot. vii, 235. The manner in which Herodotus alludes to the dangers which would arise to Sparta from the occupation of Kythêra by an enemy, furnishes one additional probability tending to show that his history was composed before the actual occupation of the island by Nikias, in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war. Had he been cognizant of this latter event, he would naturally have made some allusion to it.

The words of Thucydidês in respect to the island of Kythêra are, the Lacedæmonians πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποιοῦντο· ἦν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τῶν τε ἀπ᾽ Αἰγύπτου καὶ Λιβύης ὁλκάδων προσβολὴ, καὶ λῃσταὶ ἅμα τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἧσσον ἐλύπουν ἐκ θαλάσσης, ᾗπερ μόνον οἷόν τ᾽ ἦν κακουργεῖσθαι· *πᾶσα γὰρ ἀνέχει* πρὸς τὸ Σικελικὸν καὶ Κρητικὸν πέλαγος.

I do not understand this passage, with Dr. Arnold and Göller, to mean, that Laconia was unassailable by land, but very assailable by sea. It rather means that the only portion of the coast of Laconia where a maritime invader could do much damage, was in the interior of the Laconic gulf, near Helos, Gythium, etc., which is in fact the only plain portion of the coast of Laconia. The two projecting promontories, which end, the one in Cape Malea, the other in Cape Tænarus, are high, rocky, harborless, and afford very little temptation to a disembarking enemy. "The whole Laconian coast is *high projecting cliff*, where it fronts the Sicilian and Kretan seas,"—*πᾶσα ἀνέχει*. The island of Kythêra was particularly favorable for facilitating descents on the territory near Helos and Gythium. The ἁλιμενότης of Laconia is noticed in Xenophon, Hellen. iv, 8, 7, where he describes the occupation of the island by Konon and Pharnabazus.

See Colonel Leake's description of this coast, and the high cliffs between Cape Matapan—Tænarus—and Kalamata, which front the Sicilian sea, as well as those eastward of Cape St. Angelo, or Malea, which front the Kretan sea (Travels in Morea, vol. i, ch. vii, p. 261: "tempestuous, rocky, unsheltered coast of Mesamani," ch. viii, p. 320; ch. vi, p. 205; Strabo, viii, p. 368; Pausan. iii, c. xxvi, 2).

[590] Thucyd. iv, 54. δισχιλίοις Μιλησίων ὁπλίταις. It seems impossible to believe that there could have been so many as two thousand *Milesian* hoplites: but we cannot tell where the mistake lies.

[591] Thucyd. iv, 56. He states that Thyrea was ten stadia, or about a mile and one-fifth, distant from the sea. But Colonel Leake (Travels in the Morea, vol. ii, ch. xxii, p. 492), who has discovered quite sufficient ruins to identify the spot, affirms "that it is at least three times that distance from the sea."

This explains to us the more clearly why the Æginetans thought it necessary to build their new fort.

[592] Thucyd. iv, 58; Diodor. xii, 65.

[593] Thucyd. iv, 41, 55, 56.

[594] Thucyd. iv, 80.

[595] Thucyd. iv, 80. Καὶ προκρίναντες ἐς δισχιλίους, οἱ μὲν ἐστεφανώσαντό τε καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ περιῆλθον ὡς ἠλευθερωμένοι· οἱ δὲ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἠφάνισάν τε αὐτοὺς, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἤσθετο ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἕκαστος διεφθάρη: compare Diodor. xii, 67.

Dr. Thirlwall (History of Greece, vol. iii. ch. xxiii, p. 244, 2d edit. *note*) thinks that this assassination of Helots by the Spartans took place at some other time unascertained, and not at the time here indicated. I cannot concur in this opinion. It appears to me, that there is the strongest probable reason for referring the incident to the time immediately following the disaster in Sphakteria, which Thucydidês so especially marks (iv, 41) by the emphatic words: Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀμαθεῖς ὄντες ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ λῃστείας καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου πολέμου, τῶν τε Εἱλώτων αὐτομολούντων καὶ φοβούμενοι μὴ καὶ ἐπὶ μακρότερον σφίσι τι νεωτερισθῇ τῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν, οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἔφερον. This was just after the Messenians were first established at Pylus, and began their incursions over Laconia, with such temptations as they could offer to the Helots to desert. And it was naturally just then that the fear, entertained by the Spartans of their Helots, became exaggerated to the maximum, leading to the perpetration of the act mentioned in the text. Dr. Thirlwall observes, "that the Spartan government would not or-

der the massacre of the Helots at a time when it could employ them on foreign service." But to this it may be replied, that the capture of Sphakteria took place in July or August, while the expedition under Brasidas was not organized until the following winter or spring. There was therefore an interval of some months during which the government had not yet formed the idea of employing the Helots on foreign service. And this interval is quite sufficient to give a full and distinct meaning to the expression καὶ τότε (Thucyd. iv, 80) on which Dr. Thirlwall insists; without the necessity of going back to any more remote point of antecedent time.

[596] Thucyd. iv, 79.

[597] Thucyd. iv, 80. προὐθυμήθησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδῆς ἄνδρα ἕν τε τῇ Σπάρτῃ δοκοῦντα δραστήριον εἶναι ἐς τὰ πάντα, etc.

[598] The picture drawn by Aristophanês (Acharn. 760) is a caricature, but of suffering probably but too real.

[599] Thucyd. iv, 66. Strabo (ix, p. 391) gives eighteen stadia as the distance between Megara and Nisæa; Thucydidês only eight. There appears sufficient reason to prefer the latter: see Reinganum, Das alte Megaris, pp. 121-180.

[600] Thucyd. iv, 68. Ξυνέπεσε γὰρ καὶ τὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων κήρυκα ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ γνώμης κηρύξαι, τὸν βουλόμενον ἰέναι Μεγαρέων μετὰ Ἀθηναίων θησόμενον τὰ ὅπλα.

Here we have the phrase τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα employed in a case where Dr. Arnold's explanation of it would be eminently unsuitable. There could be no thought of *piling arms* at a critical moment of actual fighting, with result as yet doubtful.

[601] Thucyd. iv, 69.

[602] Thucyd. i, 103; iv, 69. Καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ἀπορρήξαντες ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλεως καὶ τὴν Νίσαιαν παραλαβόντες, τἆλλα παρεσκευάζοντο.

I cannot think, with Poppo and Göller, that the participle ἀπορρήξαντες is to be explained as meaning that the Athenians PULLED DOWN the portion of the Long Walls near Megara. This may have been done, but it would be an operation of no great importance; for to pull down a portion of the wall would not bar the access from the city, which it was the object of the Athenians to accomplish. "They broke off" the communication along the road between the Long Walls from the city to Nisæa, by building across or barricading the space between: similar to what is said a little above,—*διοικοδομησάμενοι* τὸ πρὸς Μεγαρέας, etc. Diodorus (xii, 66) abridges Thucydidês.

[603] Thucyd. iv, 73. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ὤφθησαν ἐλθόντες (Brasidas with his troops) οὐκ ἂν ἐν τύχῃ γίγνεσθαι σφίσιν, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς ἂν ὥσπερ ἡσσηθέντων στερηθῆναι εὐθὺς τῆς πόλεως.

[604] Thucyd. iv, 71.

[605] Thucyd. iv, 72.

[606] Thucyd. iv, 73.

[607] We find some of them afterwards in the service of Athens, employed as light-armed troops in the Sicilian expedition (Thucyd. vi, 43).

[608] Thucyd. iv, 74. οἱ δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγένοντο, καὶ ἐξέτασιν ὅπλων ἐποιήσαντο, διαστήσαντες τοὺς λόχους, ἐξελέξαντο τῶν τε ἐχθρῶν καὶ οἳ ἐδόκουν μάλιστα ξυμπρᾶξαι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἄνδρας ὡς ἑκατόν· καὶ *τούτων πέρι ἀναγκάσαντες τὸν δῆμον ψῆφον φανερὰν διενεγκεῖν*, ὡς κατεγνώσθησαν, ἔκτειναν, καὶ ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν τὰ μάλιστα κατέστησαν τὴν πόλιν. καὶ πλεῖστον δὴ χρόνον αὕτη ὑπ᾽ ἐλαχίστων γενομένη ἐκ στάσεως μετάστασις ξυνέμεινεν.

[609] Thucyd. iv, 109.

[610] Thucyd. iv, 76. εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Μεγαρίδος ἀναχώρησιν, etc.

[611] Thucyd. iv, 77.

[612] Thucyd. iv, 89.

[613] Thucyd. iv, 101.

[614] Thucyd. iv, 93, 94. He states that the Bœotian ψιλοὶ were above ten thousand, and that the Athenian ψιλοὶ were πολλαπλάσιοι τῶν ἐναντίων. We can hardly take this number as less than twenty-five thousand ψιλῶν καὶ σκευοφόρων (iv, 101).

The hoplites, as well as the horsemen, had their baggage and provision carried for them by attendants: see Thucyd. iii, 17; vii, 75.

[615] Thucyd. iv, 90. Ὁ δ᾽ Ἱπποκράτης ἀναστήσας Ἀθηναίους πανδημεὶ, αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς μετοίκους καὶ ξένων ὅσοι παρῆσαν, etc.: also πανστρατιᾷ (iv, 94).

The meaning of the word πανδημεὶ is well illustrated by Nikias in his exhortation to the Athenian army near Syracuse, immediately antecedent to the first battle with the Syracusans,—levy *en masse*, as opposed to hoplites specially selected (vi, 66-68),—ἄλλως τε καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας πανδημεί τε ἀμυνομένους, καὶ οὐκ ἀπολέκτους, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς—καὶ προσέτι Σικελιώτας, etc.

When a special selection took place, the names of the hoplites chosen by the generals to take part in any particular service were written on boards according to their tribes: each of these boards was affixed publicly against the statue of the Heros Eponymus of the tribe to which it referred: Aristophanês, Equites, 1369; Pac. 1184, with Scholiast; Wachsmuth, Hellen. Alterthumsk. ii, p. 312.

[616] Thucyd. iv, 100.

[617] Thucyd. iv, 55.

[618] Thucyd. iv, 90; Livy, xxxv, 51.

[619] Dikæarch. Bίος Ἑλλάδος. Fragm. ed. Fuhr, pp. 142-230; Pausan. i, 34, 2; Aristotle ap. Stephan. Byz. v, Ὠρωπός. See also Col. Leake, Athens and the Demi of Attica, vol. ii, sect. iv, p. 123; Mr. Finlay, Oropus and the Diakria, p. 38; Ross, Die Demen von Attika, p. 6, where the Deme of Græa is verified by an inscription, and explained for the first time.

The road taken by the army of Hippokratês in the march to Delium, was the same as that by which the Lacedæmonian army in their first invasion of Attica had retired from Attica into Bœotia (Thucyd. ii, 23).

[620] Dikæarchus (Bίος Ἑλλάδος, p. 142, ed. Fuhr) is full of encomiums on the excellence of the wine drunk at Tanagra, and of the abundant olive-plantations on the road between Orôpus and Tanagra.

Since tools and masons were brought from Athens to fortify Nisæa about three months before (Thucyd. iv, 69), we may be pretty sure that similar apparatus was carried to Delium, though Thucydidês does not state it.

[621] Thucyd. iv, 90. That the vines round the temple had supporting-stakes, which furnished the σταυροὺς used by the Athenians, we may reasonably presume: the same as those χάρακες which are spoken of in Korkyra, iii, 70: compare Pollux, i, 162.

[622] "The plain of Oropus (observes Col. Leake) expands from its upper angle at *Oropó* towards the mouth of the Asopus, and stretches about five miles along the shore, from the foot of the hills of Markópulo on the east to the village of Khalkúki on the west, where begin some heights extending westward towards Dhilisi, the ancient Delium."—"The plain of Oropus is separated from the more inland plain of Tanagra by rocky gorges through which the Asopus flows." (Leake, Athens and the Demi of Attica, vol. ii. sect. iv, p. 112.)

[623] Thucyd. iv, 93; v, 38. Akræphiæ may probably be considered as either a dependency of Thebes, or included in the general expression of Thucydidês, after the word Κωπαιῆς—οἱ περὶ τὴν λίμνην. Anthêdon and Lebadeia, which are recognized as separate autonomous townships in various Bœotian inscriptions, are not here named in Thucydidês. But there is no certain evidence respecting the number of immediate members of the Bœotian confederacy: compare the various conjectures in Boeckh, ad Corp. Inscript. tom. i, p. 727; O. Müller, Orchomenus, p. 402; Kruse, Hellas, tom. ii, p. 548.

[624] Thucyd. iv, 91. τῶν ἄλλων Βοιωταρχῶν, οἵ *εἰσιν ἕνδεκα*, οὐ ξυνεπαινούντων μάχεσθαι, etc.

The use of the present tense εἰσιν marks the number eleven as that of *all the bœotarchs*; at this time, according to Boeckh's opinion, ad Corp. Inscript. i, vol. i, p. 729. The number, however, appears to have been variable.

[625] Thucyd. iv, 91. προσκαλῶν ἑκάστους κατὰ λόχους, ὅπως μὴ ἀθρόοι ἐκλίποιεν τὰ ὅπλα, ἔπειθε τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς ἰέναι ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα ποιεῖσθαι.

Here Dr. Arnold observes: "This confirms and illustrates what has been said in the note on ii, 2, 5, as to the practice of the Greek soldiers piling their arms the moment they halted in a particular part of the camp, and always attending the speeches of their general without them."

In the case here before us, it appears that the Bœotians did come by separate lochi, pursuant to command, to hear the words of Pagondas, and also that each lochus left its arms to do so; though even here it is not absolutely certain that τὰ ὅπλα does not mean *the military station*, as Dukas interprets it. But Dr. Arnold generalizes too hastily from hence to a customary practice as between soldiers and their general. The proceeding of the Athenian general Hippokratês, on this very occasion, near Delium, to be noticed a page or two forward, exhibits an arrangement totally different. Moreover, the note on ii, 2, 5, to which Dr. Arnold refers, has no sort of analogy to the passage here before us, which does not include the words τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα; whereas these words are the main matters in chapter ii, 2, 5. Whoever attentively compares the two, will see that Dr. Arnold, followed by Poppo and Göller, has stretched an explanation which suits the passage here before us to other passages where it is no way applicable.

[626] Thucyd. iv, 92.

[627] Thucyd. iv, 93. ἐπ᾽ ἀσπίδας δὲ πέντε μὲν καὶ εἴκοσι Θηβαῖοι ἐτάξαντο, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ὡς ἕκαστοι ἔτυχον.

What is still more remarkable, in the battle of Mantincia, in 418 B.C. between the Lacedæmonians on one side and the Athenians, Argeians, Mantincians, etc., on the other, the different lochi or divisions of the Lacedæmonian army were not all marshalled in the same depth of files. Each lochage, or commander of the lochus, directed the depth of his own division (Thucyd. v, 68).

[628] Diodor. xii, 70. Προεμάχοντο δὲ πάντων οἱ παρ᾽ ἐκείνοις Ἡνίοχοι καὶ Παραβάται καλούμενοι, ἄνδρες ἐπίλεκτοι τριακόσιοι…. Οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι διαφέροντες ταῖς τῶν σωμάτων ῥώμαις, etc.

Compare Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18, 19.

[629] Thucyd. iv, 93. Καὶ ἐπειδὴ καλῶς αὐτοῖς εἶχεν, ὑπερεφάνησαν (the Bœotians) τοῦ λόφου καὶ *ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα* τεταγμένοι ὥσπερ ἔμελλον, etc.

I transcribe this passage for the purpose of showing how impossible it is to admit the explanation which Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Göller give of these words ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα (see Notes ad Thucyd. ii, 2). They explain the words to mean, that the soldiers "piled their arms into a heap," disarmed themselves for the time. But the Bœotians, in the situation here described, cannot possibly have parted with their arms, they were just on the point of charging the enemy: immediately afterwards, Pagondas gives the word, the pæan for charging is sung, and the rush commences. Pagondas had, doubtless, good reason for directing a momentary halt, to see that his ranks were in perfectly good condition before the charge began. But to command his troops to "pile their arms" would be the last thing that he would think of.

In the interpretation of τεταγμένοι ὥσπερ ἔμελλον, I agree with the Scholiast, who understands μαχέσασθαι or μαχεῖσθαι after ἔμελλον (compare Thucyd. v, 66), dissenting from Dr. Arnold and Göller, who would understand τάσσεσθαι; which, as it seems to me, makes a very awkward meaning, and is not sustained by the passage produced as parallel (viii, 51).

The infinitive verb, understood after ἔμελλον, need not necessarily be a verb actually occurring before: it may be a verb suggested by the general scope of the sentence: see ἐμέλλησαν, iv, 123.

[630] Thucyd. iv, 95.

[631] Thucyd. iv, 95, 96. Καθεστώτων δ᾽ ἐς τὴν τάξιν καὶ ἤδη μελλόντων ξυνιέναι, Ἱπποκράτης ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐπιπαριὼν τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν Ἀθηναίων παρεκελεύετό τε καὶ ἔλεγε τοιάδε…. Τοιαῦτα τοῦ Ἱπποκράτους παρακελευομένου, καὶ μέχρι μὲν μέσου τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἐπελθόντος, τὸ δὲ πλέον οὐκέτι φθάσαντος, οἱ Βοιωτοὶ, παρακελευσαμένου καὶ σφίσιν ὡς διὰ ταχέων καὶ ἐνταῦθα Παγώνδου, παιωνίσαντες ἐπῄεσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου, etc.

This passage contradicts what is affirmed by Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Göller, to have been a *general practice*, that the soldiers "piled their arms and *always* attended the speeches of their generals without them." (See his note ad Thucyd. iv, 91.)

[632] Thucyd. iv, 96. καρτερᾷ μάχῃ καὶ ὠθισμῷ ἀσπίδων ξυνεστήκει, etc. Compare Xenophon, Cyropæd. vii, 1, 32.

[633] The proverbial expression of Βοιωτίαν ὗν, "the Bœotian sow," was ancient even in the town of Pindar (Olymp. vi, 90, with the Scholia and Boeckh's note): compare also Ephorus, Fragment 67, ed. Marx: Dikæarchus, Βίος Ἑλλάδος, p. 143, ed. Fuhr; Plato, Legg. i, p. 636; and Symposion, p. 182, "pingues Thebani et valentes," Cicero de Fato, iv, 7.

Xenophon (Memorab. iii, 5, 2, 15; iii, 12, 5: compare Xenoph. de Athen. Republ. i, 13) maintains the natural bodily capacity of Athenians to be equal to that of Bœotians, but deplores the want of σωμασκία, or bodily training.

[634] See the notes of Dr. Arnold and Poppo, ad Thucyd. iv, 96.

[635] Compare Thucyd. v, 68; vi, 67.

[636] Thucyd. iv, 96. Τὸ δὲ δεξιὸν, ᾗ οἱ Θηβαῖοι ἦσαν, ἐκράτει τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ *ὠσάμενοι* κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπηκολούθουν.

The word ὠσάμενοι (compare iv, 35; vi, 70), exactly expresses the forward pushing of the mass of hoplites with shield and spear.

[637] Thucyd. iv, 96; Athenæus, v, p. 215. Diodorus (xii, 70) represents that the battle began with a combat of cavalry, in which the Athenians had the advantage. This is quite inconsistent with the narrative of Thucydidês.

[638] Diodorus (xii, 70) dwells upon this circumstance.

[639] Pyrilampês is spoken of as having been wounded and taken prisoner in the retreat by the Thebans (Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, c. 11, p. 581). See also Thucyd. v, 35, where allusion is made to some prisoners.

[640] See the two difficult chapters, iv, 98, 99, in Thucydidês.

[641] See the notes of Poppo, Göller, Dr. Arnold, and other commentators, on these chapters.

Neither these notes, nor the Scholiast, seem to me in all parts satisfactory; nor do they seize the spirit of the argument between the Athenian herald and the Bœotian officers, which will be found perfectly consistent as a piece of diplomatic interchange.

In particular, they do not take notice that it is the *Athenian* herald who first raises the question, what is Athenian territory and what is Bœotian: and that he defines Athenian territory to be that in which the force of Athens is superior. The retort of the Bœotians refers to that definition; not to the question of rightful claim to any territory, apart from actual superiority of force.

[642] Thucyd. iv, 97.

[643] Thucydidês, in describing the state of mind of the Bœotians, does not seem to imply that they thought this a good and valid ground, upon which they could directly take their stand; but merely that they considered it a fair diplomatic way of meeting the alternative raised by the Athenian herald; for εὐπρεπὲς means nothing more than this.

Οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἐσπένδοντο *δῆθεν* ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνων (Ἀθηναίων)· τὸ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν (Βοιωτῶν) *εὐπρεπὲς* εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀπιόντας καὶ ἀπολαβεῖν ἃ ἀπαιτοῦσιν.

The adverb δῆθεν also marks the reference to the special question, as laid out by the Athenian herald.

[644] Thucyd. iv, 100, 101.

[645] See Plato (Symposion, c. 36, p. 221; Lachês, p. 181; Charmidês, p. 153; Apolog. Sokratis, p. 28), Strabo, ix, p. 403.

Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 7. We find it mentioned among the stories told about Sokratês in the retreat from Delium, that his life was preserved by the inspiration of his familiar dæmon, or genius, which instructed him on one doubtful occasion which of two roads was the safe one to take (Cicero, de Divinat. i, 54; Plutarch, de Genio Sokratis, c. 11, p. 581).

The skepticism of Athenæus (v, p. 215) about the military service of Sokratês is not to be defended, but it may probably be explained by the exaggerations and falsehoods which he had read, ascribing to the philosopher superhuman gallantry.

[646] See above, page 378.

[647] Thucyd. iv, 78.

[648] Thucyd. iv, 78. Ὁ δὲ, κελευόντων τῶν ἀγωγῶν, πρίν τι πλέον ξυστῆναι τὸ κωλῦσον, ἐχώρει οὐδὲν ἐπισχὼν δρόμῳ.

[649] The geography of Thessaly is not sufficiently known to enable us to verify these positions with exactness. That which Thucydidês calls the Apidanus, is the river formed by the junction of the Apidanus and Enipeus. See Kiepert's map of ancient Thessaly (Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, ch. xlii, vol. iv, p. 470; and Dr. Arnold's note on this chapter of Thucydidês).

We must suppose that Brasidas was detained a considerable time in parleying with the opposing band of Thessalians. Otherwise, it would seem that the space between Melitæa and Pharsalus would not be a great distance to get over in an entire day's march, considering that the pace was as rapid as the troops could sustain. The much greater distance between Larissa and Melitæa, was traversed in one night by Philip king of Macedon, the son of Demetrius, with an army carrying ladders and other aids for attacking a town, etc. (Polyb. v, 97.)

[650] Thucyd. iv, 78.

[651] Thucyd. iv, 82.

[652] Thucyd. iv, 83.

[653] Thucyd. iv, 84. Οἱ δὲ *περὶ τοῦ δέχεσθαι αὐτὸν κατ᾽ ἀλλήλους ἐστασίαζον, οἵ τε μετὰ τῶν Χαλκιδέων ξυνεπάγοντες καὶ ὁ δῆμος* ὅμως δὲ, *διὰ τοῦ καρποῦ τὸ δέος ἔτι ἔξω ὄντος*, πεισθὲν τὸ πλῆθος ὑπὸ τοῦ Βρασίδου δέξασθαί τε αὐτὸν μόνον καὶ ἀκούσαντας βουλεύσασθαι, δέχεται, etc.

[654] Thucyd. iv, 85, 86, 87.

[655] Thucyd. iv, 108.

[656] Thucyd. iv, 88. Οἱ δὲ Ἀκάνθιοι, πολλῶν λεχθέντων πρότερον ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα, κρύφα διαψηφισάμενοι, διά τε τὸ ἐπαγωγὰ εἰπεῖν τὸν Βρασίδαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ καρποῦ φόβῳ, ἔγνωσαν οἱ πλείους ἀφίστασθαι Ἀθηναίων.

[657] Thucyd. iv, 88; Diodor. xii, 67.

[658] Thucyd. iv, 103. μάλιστα δὲ οἱ Ἀργίλιοι, ἐγγύς τε προσοικοῦντες καὶ ἀεί ποτε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὄντες ὕποπτοι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τῷ χωρίῳ (Amphipolis).

[659] Thucyd. iv, 104. Κατέστησαν τὸν στρατὸν πρὸ ἕω ἐπὶ τὴν γέφυραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ.

Bekker's reading of πρὸ ἕω appears to me preferable to πρόσω. The latter word really adds nothing to the meaning; whereas the fact that Brasidas got over the river before daylight is one both new and material: it is not necessarily implied in the previous words ἐκείνῃ τῇ νυκτί.

[660] Thucyd. iv, 104. Ἀπέχει δὲ τὸ πόλισμα πλέον τῆς διαβάσεως, καὶ οὐ καθεῖτο τείχη ὥσπερ νῦν, φυλακὴ δέ τις βραχεῖα καθειστήκει, etc.

Dr. Arnold, with Dobree, Poppo, and most of the commentators, translates these words: "The town (of Amphipolis) is farther off (from Argilus) than the passage of the river." But this must be of course true, and conveys no new information, seeing that Brasidas had to cross the river to reach the town. Smith and Bloomfield are right, I think, in considering τῆς διαβάσεως as governed by ἀπέχει and not by πλέον,—"the city is at some distance from the crossing:" and the objection which Poppo makes against them, that πλέον must necessarily imply a comparison with something, cannot be sustained: for Thucydidês often uses ἐκ πλείονος (iv, 103; viii, 83), as precisely identical with ἐκ πολλοῦ (i, 68; iv, 67; v, 69); also περὶ πλείονος.

In the following chapter, on occasion of the battle of Amphipolis, some farther remarks will be found on the locality.

[661] Thucyd. iv, 106. Οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἀκούσαντες *ἀλλοιότεροι* ἐγένοντο τὰς γνώμας, etc.

The word ἀλλοιότεροι seems to indicate both the change of view, compared with what had been before, and new divergence introduced among themselves.

[662] Thucyd. iv, 105, 106; Diodor. xii, 68.

[663] Thucyd. iv, 108. Ἐχομένης δὲ τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς μέγα δέος κατέστησαν, etc.

The prodigious importance of the site of Amphipolis, with its adjoining bridge forming the communication between the regions east and west of the Strymon, was felt not only by Philip of Macedon, as will hereafter appear, but also by the Romans after their conquest of Macedonia. Of the four regions into which the Romans distributed Macedonia, "pars prima (says Livy, xlv, 30) habet opportunitatem Amphipoleos; quæ objecta claudit omnes ab oriente sole in Macedoniam aditus."

[664] Thucyd. iv, 108. Τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, διὰ τὸ ἡδονὴν ἔχον ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα, καὶ ὅτι *τὸ πρῶτον Λακεδαιμονίων ὀργώντων ἔμελλον πειρᾶσθαι*, κινδυνεύειν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν (the subject-allies of Athens).

[665] Thucyd. iv, 108.

[666] Thucyd. iv, 108. Οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι φυλακὰς ὡς ἐξ ὀλίγου καὶ ἐν χειμῶνι, διέπεμπον ἐς τὰς πόλεις etc.

[667] Thucyd. v, 26. See the biography of Thucydidês by Marcellinus, prefixed to all the editions, p. 19, ed. Arnold.

[668] I transcribe the main features from the account of Dr. Thirlwall, whose judgment coincides on this occasion with what is generally given (Hist. of Greece, ch. xxiii, vol. iii, p. 268).

"On the evening of the same day Thucydidês, with seven galleys which he happened to have with him at Thasos, when he received the despatch from Euklês, sailed into the mouth of the Strymon, and learning the fall of Amphipolis proceeded to put Eion in a state of defence. His timely arrival saved the place, which Brasidas attacked the next morning, both from the river and the land, without effect: and the refugees who retired by virtue of the treaty from Amphipolis, found shelter at Eion, and contributed to its security. *The historian rendered an important service to his country: and it does not appear that human prudence and activity could have accomplished anything more under the same circumstances.* Yet *his unavoidable failure* proved the occasion of a sentence, under which he spent twenty years of his life in exile: and he was only restored to his country in the season of her deepest humiliation by the public calamities. So much only can be gathered with certainty from his language: for he has not condescended to mention either the charge which was brought against him, or the nature of the sentence, which he may either have suffered, or avoided by a voluntary exile. A statement, very probable in itself, though resting on slight authority, attributes his banishment to Cleon's calumnies: *that the irritation produced by the loss of Amphipolis should have been so directed against an innocent object, would perfectly accord with the character of the people and of the demagogue*. Posterity has gained by the injustice of his contemporaries," etc.

[669] Thucyd. iv, 104. Οἱ δ᾽ ἐναντίοι τοῖς προδιδοῦσι (that is, at Amphipolis) κρατοῦντες τῷ πλήθει ὥστε μὴ αὐτίκα τὰς πύλας ἀνοίγεσθαι, πέμπουσι μετὰ Εὐκλέους τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ὃς ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηναίων παρῆν αὐτοῖς φύλαξ τοῦ χωρίου, *ἐπὶ τὸν ἕτερον στρατηγὸν τῶν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, Θουκυδίδην τὸν Ὀλόρου, ὃς τάδε ξυνέγραψεν, ὄντα περὶ Θάσον* (ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ νῆσος, Παρίων ἀποικία, ἀπέχουσα τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως ἡμισείας ἡμέρας μάλιστα πλοῦν) κελεύοντες σφίσι βοηθεῖν.

Here Thucydidês describes himself as "the other general along with Euklês, of the region of or towards Thrace." There cannot be a clearer designation of the extensive range of his functions and duties.

I adopt here the reading τῶν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, the genitive case of the well-known Thucydidean phrase τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, in preference to τὸν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης; which would mean in substance the same thing, though not so precisely, nor so suitably to the usual manner of the historian. Bloomfield, Bekker, and Göller have all introduced τῶν into the text, on the authority of various MSS.: Poppo and Dr. Arnold also both express a preference for it, though they still leave τὸν in the text.

Moreover, the words of Thucydidês himself, in the passage where he mentions his own long exile, plainly prove that he was sent out as general, not to Thasos, but *to Amphipolis*: (v, 26) καὶ ξυνέβη μοι φεύγειν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ ἔτη εἴκοσι *μετὰ τὴν ἐς Ἀμφίπολιν στρατηγίαν*, etc.

[670] Compare Thucyd. iv, 84, 88, 103.

[671] Thucyd. iv, 103. *μάλιστα δὲ οἱ Ἀργίλιοι, ἐγγύς τε προσοικοῦντες καὶ ἀεί ποτε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὄντες ὕποπτοι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τῷ χωρίῳ* (Amphipolis), ἐπειδὴ παρέτυχεν ὁ καιρὸς καὶ Βρασίδας ἦλθεν, ἔπραξάν τε *ἐκ πλείονος* πρὸς τοὺς ἐμπολιτεύοντας σφῶν ἐκεῖ ὅπως ἐνδοθήσεται ἡ πόλις, etc.

[672] Thucyd. iv, 103. *φυλακὴ δέ τις βραχεῖα καθειστήκει, ἣν βιασάμενος ῥᾳδίως* ὁ Βρασίδας, ἅμα μὲν τῆς προδοσίας οὔσης, ἅμα δὲ καὶ χειμῶνος ὄντος καὶ *ἀπροσδοκήτος προσπεσών*, διέβη τὴν γέφυραν, etc.

[673] Thucyd. iv, 105. καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ δύνασθαι ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις *τῶν ἠπειρωτῶν*, etc.

Rotscher, in his Life of Thucydidês (Leben des Thukydides, Göttingen, 1842, sect. 4, pp. 97-99), admits it to be the probable truth, that Thucydidês was selected for this command expressly in consequence of his private influence in the region around. Yet this biographer still repeats the view generally taken, that Thucydidês did everything which an able commander could do, and was most unjustly condemned.

[674] Thucyd. v, 26.

[675] Thucyd. iv, 104-108.

[676] This is the σταύρωμα, mentioned (v, 10) as existing a year and a half afterwards, at the time of the battle of Amphipolis. I shall say more respecting the topography of Amphipolis, when I come to describe that battle.

[677] See Grisebach, Reise durch Rumelien und Brura, vol. i, ch. viii, p. 226.

[678] Thucyd. iv, 109.

[679] Thucyd. iv, 110. καὶ αὐτὸν *ἄνδρες ὀλίγοι ἐπῆγον κρύφα*, ἑτοῖμοι ὄντες τὴν πόλιν παραδοῦναι, iv, 113. Τῶν δὲ Τορωναίων γιγνομένης τῆς ἀλώσεως *τὸ μὲν πολὺ, οὐδὲν εἰδὸς, ἐθορυβεῖτο*, etc.

[680] Thucyd. iv. 114, 115. νομίσας ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ ἢ ἀνθρωπείῳ τὴν ἅλωσιν γενέσθαι.

[681] Thucyd. iv, 119.

[682] Thucyd. iv, 21.

[683] Thucyd. iv, 108. Ὁ δὲ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα ἐφιέμενος στρατιάν τε προσαποστέλλειν ἐκέλευε…. Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ μὲν καὶ φθόνῳ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἀνδρῶν οὐχ ὑπηρέτησαν αὐτῷ, etc.

[684] Thucyd. iv, 117. Τοὺς γὰρ δὴ ἄνδρας περὶ πλέονος ἐποιοῦντο κομίσασθαι, ὡς ἔτι Βρασίδας εὐτύχει· καὶ ἔμελλον, ἐπὶ μεῖζον χωρήσαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος, τῶν μὲν στέρεσθαι, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου ἀμυνόμενοι κινδυνεύειν καὶ κρατήσειν.

This is a perplexing passage, and the sense put upon it by the best commentators appears to me unsatisfactory.

Dr. Arnold observes: "The sense required must be something of this sort. If Brasidas were still more successful, the consequence would be that they would lose their men taken at Sphakteria, and after all would run the risk of not being finally victorious." To the same purpose, substantially Haack, Poppo, Göller, etc. But surely this is a meaning which cannot have been present to the mind of Thucydidês. For how could the fact, of Brasidas being *more successful*, cause the Lacedæmonians to lose the chance of regaining their prisoners? The larger the acquisitions of Brasidas, the greater chance did the Lacedæmonians stand of getting back their prisoners, because they would have more to give up in exchange for them. And the meaning proposed by the commentators, inadmissible under all circumstances, is still more excluded by the very words immediately preceding in Thucydidês: "The Lacedæmonians were above all things anxious to get back their prisoners, while Brasidas was yet in full success;" (for ὡς with ἔτι must mean substantially the same as ἕως.) It is impossible immediately after this, that he can go on to say: "Yet if Brasidas became *still more successful*, they would *lose* the chance of getting the prisoners back." Bauer and Poppo, who notice this contradiction, profess to solve it by saying, "that if Brasidas pushed his successes farther, the Athenians would be seized with such violence of hatred and indignation, that they would put the prisoners to death." Poppo supports this by appealing to iv, 41, which passage, however, will be found to carry no proof in the case: and the hypothesis is in itself inadmissible, put up to sustain an inadmissible meaning.

Next, as to the words ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος (ἐπὶ μεῖζον χωρήσαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος); Göller translates these: "Postquam Brasidas in majus profecisset, et *sua arma cum potestate Atheniensium æquasset*." To the same purpose also Haack and Poppo. But if this were the meaning, it would seem to imply, that Brasidas had, as yet, done nothing and gained nothing; that his gains were all to be made during the future. Whereas the fact is distinctly the reverse, as Thucydidês himself has told us in the line preceding: Brasidas had already made immense acquisitions,—so great and serious, that the principal anxiety of the Lacedæmonians was to make use of what he had already gained as a means of getting back their prisoners, before the tide of fortune could turn against him.

Again, the last part of the sentence is considered by Dr. Arnold and other commentators as corrupt; nor is it agreed to what previous subject τοῖς δὲ is intended to refer.

So inadmissible, in my judgment, is the meaning assigned by the commentators to the general passage, that, if no other meaning could be found in the words, I should regard the whole sentence as corrupt in some way or other. But I think another meaning may be found.

I admit that the words ἐπὶ μεῖζον χωρήσαντος αὐτοῦ *might* signify, "if he should arrive at greater success;" upon the analogy of i, 17, and i, 118, ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως—ἐπὶ μέγα ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως. But they do not necessarily, nor even naturally, bear this signification. Χωρεῖν ἐπὶ (with accus. case) means to *march upon*, to *aim at*, to *go at* or *go for* (adopting an English colloquial equivalent), ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀντικρὺς ἐλευθερίαν (Thucyd. viii, 64). The phrase might be used, whether the person of whom it was affirmed succeeded in his object or not. I conceive that in this place the words mean: "if Brasidas should go at something greater;" if he should aim at, "or march upon, greater objects;" without affirming the point, one way or the other, whether he would attain or miss what he aimed at.

Next, the words ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος do not refer, in my judgment, to the future gains of Brasidas, or to their magnitude and comparative avail in negotiation. The words rather mean: "if he should set out in open contest and hostility that which he had already acquired," (thus exposing it to the chance of being lost), "if he should put himself and his already-acquired gains in battle-front against the enemy." The meaning would be then substantially the same as καταστήσαντος ἑαυτὸν ἀντίπαλον. The two words here discussed are essentially obscure and elliptical, and every interpretation must proceed by bringing into light those ideas which they imperfectly indicate. Now, the interpretation which I suggest keeps quite as closely to the meaning of the two words as that of Haack and Göller; while it brings out a general sense, making the whole sentence, of which these two words form a part, distinct and instructive. The substantive, which would be understood along with ἀντίπαλα, would be τὰ πράγματα; or perhaps τὰ εὐτυχήματα, borrowed from the verb εὐτύχει, which immediately precedes.

In the latter part of the sentence, I think that τοῖς δὲ refers to the same subject as ἀντίπαλα: in fact, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἀμυνόμενοι is only a fuller expression of the same general idea as ἀντίπαλα.

The whole sentence would then be construed thus: "For they were most anxious to recover their captives while Brasidas was yet in good fortune; while they were likely, if he should go at more, and put himself as he now stood into hostile contention, to remain deprived of their captives; and even in regard to their successes, to take the chance of danger or victory in equal conflict."

The sense here brought out is distinct and rational; and I think it lies fairly in the words. Thucydidês does not intend to represent the Lacedæmonians as feeling, that if Brasidas should *really gain* more than he had gained already, such further acquisition would be a disadvantage to them, and prevent them from recovering their captives. He represents them as preferring *the certainty* of those acquisitions which Brasidas had already made, to *the chance and hazard* of his aiming at greater; which could not be done without endangering that which was now secure, and not only secure, but sufficient, if properly managed, to procure the restoration of the captives.

Poppo refers τοῖς δὲ to the Athenians: Göller refers it to the remaining Spartan military force, apart from the captives who were detained at Athens. The latter reference seems to me inadmissible, for τοῖς δὲ must signify some persons or things which have been before specified or indicated; and that which Göller supposes it to mean has not been before indicated. To refer it to the Athenians, with Poppo and Haack, in his second edition, we should have to look a great way back for the subject, and there is, moreover, a difficulty in construing ἀμυνόμενοι with the dative case. Otherwise, this reference would be admissible; though I think it better to refer τοῖς δὲ to the same subject as ἀντίπαλα. In the phrase κινδυνεύειν, or κινδυνεύσειν, for there seems no sufficient reason why this old reading should be altered, *καὶ* κρατήσειν, the particle *καὶ* has a disjunctive sense, of which there are analogous examples; see Kühner, Griechische Grammmatik, sect. 726, signifying, substantially, the same as ἢ: and examples even in Thucydidês, in such phrases as τοιαῦτα καὶ παραπλήσια (i, 22, 143), τοιαύτη καὶ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τοὐτων, v, 74; see Poppo's note on i, 22.

[685] Thucyd. v, 17. ἥμισυ τῆς οἰκίας τοῦ ἱεροῦ τότε τοῦ Διὸς οἰκοῦντα φόβῳ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.

"The reason was, that he might be in sanctuary at an instant's notice, and yet might be able to perform some of the common offices of life without profanation, which could not have been the case had the whole dwelling been within the sacred precinct." (Dr. Arnold's note.)

[686] Thucyd. v, 17, 18.

[687] Thucyd. v, 15. σφαλέντων δ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τῷ Δηλίῳ *παραχρῆμα* οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, γνόντες νῦν μᾶλλον ἂν ἐνδεξομένους, ποιοῦνται τὴν ἐνιαύσιον ἐκεχειρίαν, etc.

[688] Thucyd. iv, 118; v, 43.

[689] Thucyd. iv, 117. νομίσαντες Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τὸν Βρασίδαν σφῶν προσαποστῆσαι οὐδὲν πρὶν παρασκευάσαιντο καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν, etc.

[690] This appears from the form of the truce in Thucyd. iv, 118; it is prepared at Sparta, in consequence of a previous proposition from Athens; in sect. 6. οἱ δὲ ἰόντες, τέλος ἔχοντες ἰόντων, ᾗπερ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἡμᾶς κελεύετε.

[691] Thucyd. iv, 117. καὶ γενομένης ἀνακωχῆς κακῶν καὶ ταλαιπωρίας μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμήσειν (τοὺς Ἀθηναίους) αὐτοὺς πειρασαμένους ξυναλλαγῆναι, etc.

[692] Thucyd. iv, 119. The fourteenth of Elaphebolion, and the twelfth of Gerastius, designate the same day. The truce went ready-prepared from Sparta to Athens, together with envoys Spartan, Corinthian, Megarian, Sikyonian, and Epidaurian. The truce was accepted by the Athenian assembly, and sworn to at once by all the envoys as well as by three Athenian stratêgi (σπείσασθαι δὲ *αὐτίκα μάλα* τὰς πρεσβείας ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τὰς παρούσας, iv, 118, 119); that day being fixed on as the commencement.

The lunar months in different cities were never in precise agreement.

[693] See Aristophan. Aves, 188.

[694] Thucyd. v, 1-32. They might perhaps believe that the occupation of Delium had given offence to Apollo.

[695] Thucyd. iv, 118 Περὶ δὲ τῶν χρημάτων τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὅπως *τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας* ἐξευρήσομεν, etc. Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. vol. iii. ch. xxiii, p. 273) thinks that this article has reference to past appropriation of the Delphian treasure by the Peloponnesian alliance, for warlike purposes. Had such a reference been intended, we should probably have found the past participle, τοὺς ἀδικήσαντας: whereas the present participle, as it now stands, is perfectly general, designating acts future and contingent.

[696] Thucyd. iv, 118: see Poppo's note.

[697] Thucyd. iv, 122.

[698] Thucyd. iv, 120. ὄντες οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ νησιῶται, etc.

[699] Thucyd. iv, 121. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Σκιωναῖοι ἐπῄρθησάν τε τοῖς λόγοις, καὶ θαρσήσαντες πάντες ὁμοίως, καὶ οἷς πρότερον μὴ ἤρεσκε τὰ πρασσόμενα, etc.

[700] Thucyd. iv, 121. Καὶ δημοσίᾳ μὲν χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ ἀνέδησαν ὡς ἐλευθεροῦντα τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἰδίᾳ τε ἐταινίουν τε καὶ προσήρχοντο ὥσπερ ἀθλητῇ.

Compare Plutarch, Periklês, c. 28: compare also Krause (Olympia), sect. 17, p. 162 (Wien, 1838). It was customary to place a fillet of cloth or linen on the head of the victors at Olympia, before putting on the olive wreath.

[701] Thucyd. iv, 122, 123.

[702] Thucyd. iv, 123. Διὸ καὶ οἱ Μενδαῖοι μᾶλλον ἐτόλμησαν, τήν τε τοῦ Βρασίδου γνώμην ὁρῶντες ἑτοίμην, καὶ ἅμα τῶν *πρασσόντων σφίσιν ὀλίγων τε ὄντων*, καὶ ὡς τότε ἐμέλλησαν οὐκέτι ἀνέντων, ἀλλὰ *καταβιασαμένων παρὰ γνώμην τοὺς πολλούς*, iv, 130. ὁ δῆμος εὐθὺς ἀναλαβὼν τὰ ὅπλα περιοργὴς ἐχώρει ἐπί τε Πελοποννησίους *καὶ τοὺς τὰ ἐναντία σφίσι μετ᾽ αὐτῶν πράξαντας*, etc.

The Athenians, after the conquest of the place, desire the Mendæans πολιτεύειν ὥσπερ εἰωθέσαν.

Mendê is another case in which the bulk of the citizens were averse to revolt from Athens, in spite of neighboring example.

[703] Thucyd. iv, 130.

[704] Thucyd. iv, 123, 124.

[705] Thucyd. iv, 130; Diodor. xii, 72.

[706] Thucyd. iv, 131.

[707] Thucyd. iv, 124.

[708] Thucyd. iv, 125.

[709] Thucyd. iv, 126. Ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ εἶναι ὑμῖν προσήκει τὰ πολέμια, οὐ διὰ ξυμμάχων παρουσίαν ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ οἰκείαν ἀρετήν, καὶ μηδὲν πλῆθος πεφοβῆσθαι ἑτέρων, οἵ γε (μηδὲ) ἀπὸ πολιτειῶν τοιούτων ἥκετε, ἐν αἷς οὐ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων ἄρχουσιν, ἀλλὰ πλειόνων μᾶλλον ἐλάσσους· *οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ κτησάμενοι τὴν δυναστείαν ἢ τῷ μαχόμενοι κρατεῖν*.

[710] Thucyd. iv, 126. Οὔτε γὰρ τάξιν ἔχοντες αἰσχυνθεῖεν ἂν λιπεῖν τινα χώραν βιαζόμενοι· ἥ τε φυγὴ αὐτῶν καὶ ἡ ἔφοδος ἴσην ἔχουσα δόξαν τοῦ καλοῦ ἀνεξέλεγκτον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον ἔχει· αὐτοκράτωρ δὲ μάχη μάλιστ᾽ ἂν καὶ πρόφασιν τοῦ σώζεσθαι (se sauver) τινι πρεπόντως πορίσειε.

Σαφῶς τε πᾶν τὸ προϋπάρχον δεινὸν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ὁρᾶτε, ἔργῳ μὲν βραχὺ ὄν, ὄψει δὲ καὶ ἀκοῇ κατάσπερχον. Ὃ ὑπομείναντες ἐπιφερόμενον, καὶ ὅταν καιρὸς ᾖ, κόσμῳ καὶ τάξει αὖθις ὑπαγαγόντες, ἔς τε τὸ ἀσφαλὲς θᾶσσον ἀφίξεσθε, καὶ γνώσεσθε τὸ λοιπὸν ὅτι οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὄχλοι τοῖς μὲν τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον δεξαμένοις *ἄποθεν ἀπειλαῖς τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μελλήσει ἐπικομποῦσιν*, οἳ δ᾽ ἂν εἴξωσιν αὐτοῖς, κατὰ πόδας τὸ εὔψυχον ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ ὀξεῖς ἐπιδείκνυνται.

The word μέλλησις which occurs twice in this chapter in regard to the Illyrians, is very expressive and at the same time difficult to translate into any other language,—"what they seem on the point of doing, but never realize." See also i, 69.

The speech of the Roman consul Manlius, in describing the Gauls, deserves to be compared: "Procera corpora, promissæ et rutilatæ comæ, vasta scuta, prælongi gladii: ad hoc cantus ineuntium prælium, et ululatus et tripudia, et quatientium scuta in patrium quendam morem horrendus armorum crepitus: *omnia de industriâ composita ad terrorem*" (Livy, xxxviii, 17.)

[711] Thucyd. ii, 81. See above, chap. xlviii, of this History.

[712] See the memorable remarks of Hippokratês and Aristotle on the difference in respect of courage between Europeans and Asiatics, as well as between Hellens and non-Hellens (Hippokratês, De Aëre, Locis, et Aquis, c. 24, ed. Littré, sect. 116, *seq.*, ed. Petersen; Aristotel. Politic. vii, 6, 1-5), and the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus (Herodot. vii, 103, 104).

[713] Thucyd. iv, 128. It is not possible clearly to understand this passage without some knowledge of the ground to which it refers. I presume that the regular road through the defile, along which the main army of Brasidas passed, was long and winding, making the ascent to the top very gradual, but at the same time exposed on both sides from the heights above. The detachment of three hundred scaled the steep heights on one side, and drove away the enemy, thus making it impossible for him to remain any longer even in the main road. But I do not suppose, with Dr. Arnold, that the main army of Brasidas followed the three hundred, and "broke out of the valley by scaling one of its sides:" they pursued the main road, as soon as it was cleared for them.

[714] Thucyd. iv, 127, 128.

[715] Thucyd. iv, 128-132. Some lines of the comic poet Hermippus are preserved (in the Φορμοφόροι, Meineke, Fragm. p. 407) respecting Sitalkês and Perdikkas. Among the presents brought home by Dionysus in his voyage, there is numbered "the itch from Sitalkês, intended for the Lacedæmonians, and many shiploads of lies from Perdikkas." Καὶ παρὰ Περδίκκου ψεύδη ναυσὶν πάνυ πολλαῖς.

[716] Thucyd. iv, 132.

[717] Thucyd. iv, 132. Καὶ *τῶν ἡβώντων αὐτῶν* παρανόμως ἄνδρας ἐξῆγον ἐκ Σπάρτης, ὥστε τῶν πόλεων ἄρχοντας καθιστάναι καὶ μὴ *τοῖς ἐντυχοῦσιν* ἐπιτρέπειν.

Most of the commentators translate ἡβώντων, "*young men*," which is not the usual meaning of the word: it signifies, "*men of military age*," which includes both young and middle-aged. If we compare iv, 132 with iii, 36, v, 32, and v, 116, we shall see that ἡβῶντες really has this larger meaning: compare also μέχρι ἥβης (ii, 46), which means, "until the age of military service commenced."

It is not therefore necessary to suppose that the men taken out by Ischagoras were very young, for example that they were below the age of thirty, as Manso, O. Müller, and Göller would have us believe. It is enough that they were within the limits of the military age, both ways.

Considering the extraordinary reverence paid to old age at Sparta, it is by no means wonderful that old men should have been thought exclusively fitted for such commands, in the ancient customs and constitution.

The extensive operations, however, in which Sparta became involved through the Peloponnesian war, would render it impossible to maintain such a maxim in practice: but at this moment, the step was still recognized as a departure from a received maxim, and is characterized as such by Thucydidês under the term παρανόμως.

I explain τοῖς ἐντυχοῦσιν to refer to the case of men *not Spartans* being named to these posts: see in reference to this point, the stress which Brasidas lays on the fact that Klearidas was a Spartan, Thucyd. v, 9.

[718] Thucyd. iv, 135.

[719] Thucyd. ii, 5; iv, 133; Pausan. ii, 17, 7; iii, 5, 6. Hellanikus (a contemporary of Thucydidês, but somewhat older, coming in point of age between him and Herodotus) had framed a chronological series of these priestesses of Hêrê, with a history of past events belonging to the supposed times of each. And such was the Pan-Hellenic importance of the temple at this time, that Thucydidês, when he describes accurately the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, tells us, as one of his indications of time, that Chrysis had then been forty-eight years priestess at the Heræum. To employ the series of Olympic prize-runners and Olympiads as a continuous distribution of time, was a practice which had not yet got footing.

The catalogue of these priestesses of Hêrê, beginning with mythical and descending to historical names, is illustrated by the inscription belonging to the temple of Halikarnassus in Boeckh, Corpus Inscr. No. 2655: see Boeckh's Commentary, and Preller, Hellanici Fragmenta, pp. 34, 46.

[720] Xenophon, Memorabil. iii, 5, 6.

[721] Thucyd. iv, 133.

[722] This seems to me the most reasonable sense to put upon the much-debated passage of Thucyd. v, 1. Τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους αἱ μὲν ἐνιαύσιοι σπονδαὶ διελέλυντο μέχρι τῶν Πυθίων· καὶ ἐν τῇ *ἐκεχειρίᾳ*

Ἀθηναῖοι Δηλίους ἀνέστησαν ἐκ Δήλου; again, v, 2. Κλέων δὲ Ἀθηναίους πείσας ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης χωρία ἐξέπλευσε μετὰ τὴν *ἐκεχειρίαν*, etc.

Thucydidês says here, that "the truce was dissolved:" the bond imposed upon both parties was untied, and both resumed their natural liberty. But he does not say that "*hostilities recommenced*" before the Pythia, as Göller and other critics affirm that he says. The interval between the 14th of the month Elaphebolion and the Pythian festival was one in which there was no binding truce any longer in force, and yet no actual hostilities: it was an ἀνακωχὴ ἄσπονδος, to use the words of Thucydidês, when he describes the relations between Corinth and Athens in the ensuing year (v, 32).

The word ἐκεχειρία here means, in my judgment, the truce proclaimed at the season of the Pythian festival,—quite distinct from the truce for one year which had expired a little while before. The change of the word in the course of one line from σπονδαὶ to ἐκεχειρία marks this distinction.

I agree with Dr. Arnold, dissenting both from M. Boeckh and from Mr. Clinton, in his conception of the events of this year. Kleon sailed on his expedition to Thrace after the Pythian holy truce, in the beginning of August: between that date and the end of September, happened the capture of Torônê and the battle of Amphipolis. But the way in which Dr. Arnold defends his opinion is not at all satisfactory. In the Dissertation appended to his second volume of Thucydidês (p. 458), he says: "The words in Thucydidês αἱ ἐνιαύσιοι σπονδαὶ διελέλυντο μέχρι Πυθίων, mean, as I understand them, 'that the truce for a year had *lasted on* till the Pythian games, and then ended:' that is, instead of expiring on the 14th of Elaphebolion, it had been *tacitly continued* nearly four months longer, till after midsummer: and it was not till the middle of Hekatombæon that Cleon was sent out to recover Amphipolis."

Such a construction of the word διελέλυντο appears to me inadmissible, nor is Dr. Arnold's defence of it, p. 454, of much value: σπονδὰς διαλύειν is an expression well known to Thucydidês (iv, 23; v, 36), "to dissolve the truce." I go along with Boeckh and Mr. Clinton in construing the words, except that I strike out what they introduce from their own imagination. They say: "The truce was ended, and *the war again renewed*, up to the time of the Pythian games." Thucydidês only says "that the truce was dissolved;" he does not say "*that the war was renewed*." It is not at all necessary to Dr. Arnold's conception of the facts that the words should be translated as he proposes. His remarks also (p. 460) upon the relation of the Athenians to the Pythian games, appear to me just: but he does not advert to the fact, which would have strengthened materially what he there says, that the Athenians had been excluded from Delphi and from the Pythian festival between the commencement of the war and the one year's truce. I conceive that the Pythian games were celebrated about July or August. In an earlier part of this History (ch. xxviii, vol. iv, p. 67), I said that they were celebrated in *autumn*; it ought rather to be "towards the end of summer."

[723] Thucyd. v, 16. Κλέων τε καὶ Βρασίδας, οἵπερ ἀμφοτέρωθεν μάλιστα ἠναντιοῦντο τῇ εἰρήνῃ, ὁ μὲν, διὰ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν τε καὶ τιμᾶσθαι ἐκ τοῦ πολεμεῖν, ὁ δὲ, γενομένης ἡσυχίας καταφανέστερος νομίζων ἂν εἶναι κακουργῶν, καὶ ἀπιστότερος διαβάλλων, etc.

[724] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.

[725] See the speeches of Athenagoras and Hermokratês, Thucyd. vi, 33-36.

[726] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 33-35.

[727] Thucyd. i, 142, 143, 144; ii, 13. καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν ᾗπερ ἰσχύουσιν ἐξαρτύεσθαι, *τά τε τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ χειρὸς ἔχειν*—λέγων τὴν ἰσχὺν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τούτων εἶναι τῶν χρημάτων τῆς προσόδου, etc.

[728] Thucyd. ii, 63. Τῆς δὲ πόλεως ὑμᾶς εἰκὸς τῷ τιμωμένῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄρχειν, ᾧπερ ἅπαντες ἀγάλλεσθε, βοηθεῖν, καὶ μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς πόνους ἢ μηδὲ τὰς τιμὰς διώκειν, etc. c. 62, αἴσχιον δὲ, ἔχοντας ἀφαιρεθῆναι ἢ κτωμένους ἀτυχῆσαι. Contrast the tenor of the two speeches of Periklês (Thucyd. i, 140-144; ii, 60-64) with the description which Thucydidês gives of the simple "avoidance of risk," (τὸ ἀκίνδυνον), which characterized Nikias (v. 16).

[729] Thucyd. v, 7. καὶ οἴκοθεν ὡς ἄκοντες αὐτῷ ξυνῆλθον.

[730] The town of Torônê was situated near the extremity of the Sithonian peninsula, on the side looking towards Pallênê. But the territory belonging to the town comprehended all the extremity of the peninsula on both sides, including the terminating point Cape Ampelos,—Ἄμπελον τὴν Τορωναίην ἄκρην (Herodot. vii, 122). Herodotus calls the Singitic gulf θάλασσαν τὴν ἄντιον Τορώνης (vii, 122).

The ruins of Torônê, bearing the ancient name, and Kufo, a land-locked harbor near it, are still to be seen (Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 119).

[731] Thucyd. v, 3.

[732] Thucyd. v, 7. Ὁ δὲ Κλέων τέως μὲν ἡσύχαζεν, ἔπειτα δὲ *ἠναγκάσθη* ποιῆσαι ὅπερ ὁ Βρασίδας προσεδέχετο. Τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν ἀχθομένων μὲν τῇ ἕδρᾳ, ἀναλογιζομένων δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου ἡγεμονίαν, πρὸς οἵαν ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τόλμαν μεθ᾽ οἵας ἀνεπιστημοσύνης καὶ μαλακίας γενήσοιτο, καὶ οἴκοθεν ὡς ἄκοντες αὐτῷ ξυνῆλθον, αἰσθόμενος τὸν θροῦν, καὶ οὐ βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς διὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καθημένους βαρύνεσθαι, ἀναλαβὼν ἦγε.

[733] Thucyd. iv, 102. Ἀπὸ τῆς νῦν πόλεως, ἣν Ἀμφίπολιν Ἄγνων ὠνόμασεν, ὅτι ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα περιῤῥέοντος τοῦ Στρύμονος, διὰ τὸ περιέχειν αὐτὴν, τείχει μακρῷ ἀπολαβὼν ἐκ ποταμοῦ ἐς ποταμὸν, περιφανῆ ἐς θάλασσάν τε καὶ τὴν ἤπειρον ᾤκισεν.

Ὁ καλλιγέφυρος ποταμὸς Στρύμων, Euripid. Rhesus, 346.

I annex a plan which will convey some idea of the hill of Amphipolis and the circumjacent territory: compare the plan in Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxv, p. 191, and that from Mr. Hawkins, which is annexed to the third volume of Dr. Arnold's Thucydidês, combined with a Dissertation which appears in the second volume of the same work, p. 450. See also the remarks in Kutzen, De Atheniensium imperio circa Strymonem, ch. ii, pp. 18-21; Weissenborn, Beiträge zur genaueren Erforschung der alt-griechischen Geschichte, pp. 152-156; Cousinéry, Voyage dans la Macédoine, vol. i, ch. iv, p. 124, *seq.*

Colonel Leake supposes the ancient bridge to have been at the same point of the river as the modern bridge; that is, north of Amphipolis, and a little westward of the corner of the lake. On this point I differ from him, and have placed it, with Dr. Arnold, near the southeastern end of the reach of the Strymon, which flows round Amphipolis. But there is another circumstance, in which Col. Leake's narrative corrects a material error in Dr. Arnold's Dissertation. Colonel Leake particularly notices the high ridge which connects the hill of Amphipolis with Mount Pangæus to the eastward (pp. 182, 183, 191-194), whereas Dr. Arnold represents them as separated by a deep ravine (p. 451): upon which latter supposition the whole account of Kleon's march and survey appears to me unintelligible.

The epithet which Thucydidês gives to Amphipolis, "conspicuous both towards the sea and towards the land," which occasions some perplexity to the commentators, appears to me one of obvious propriety. Amphipolis was indeed situated on a hill; so were many other towns: but its peculiarity was, that on three sides it had no wall to interrupt the eye of the spectator: one of those sides was towards the sea.

Kutzen and Cousinéry make the long wall to be the segment of a curve highly bent, touching the river at both ends. But I agree with Weissenborn that this is inadmissible; and that the words "long wall" imply something near a straight direction.

[734] Ἀπέχει δὲ τὸ πόλισμα πλέον τῆς διαβάσεως: see a note a few pages ago upon these words. This does not necessarily imply that the bridge was at any considerable distance from the extreme point where the long wall touched the river to the south: but this latter point was a good way off from the town properly so called, which occupied the higher slope of the hill. We are not to suppose that the *whole* space between the long wall and the river was covered by buildings.

[735] Thucyd. v. 10. Καὶ ὁ μὲν (Brasidas) κατὰ τὰς ἐπὶ τὸ σταύρωμα πύλας, καὶ τὰς πρώτας τοῦ μακροῦ τείχους τότε ὄντος ἐξελθὼν, ἔθει δρόμῳ τὴν ὁδὸν ταύτην εὐθεῖαν, ᾗπερ νῦν, etc.

The explanation which I have here given to the word σταύρωμα is not given by any one else; but it appears to me the only one calculated to impart clearness and consistency to the whole narrative.

When Brasidas surprised Amphipolis first, the bridge was completely unconnected with the Long Wall, and at a certain distance from it. But when Thucydidês wrote his history, there were a pair of *connecting walls* between the bridge and the fortifications of the city as they then stood—οὐ καθεῖτο τείχη ὥσπερ νῦν (iv, 103): the whole fortifications of the city had been altered during the intermediate period.

Now the question is, was the Long Wall of Amphipolis connected or unconnected with the bridge, at the time of the conflict between Brasidas and Kleon? Whoever reads the narrative of Thucydidês attentively will see, I think, that they must have been connected, though Thucydidês does not in express terms specify the fact. For if the bridge had been detached from the wall, as it was when Brasidas surprised the place first, the hill of

Kerdylium on the opposite side of the river would have been an unsafe position for him to occupy. He might have been cut off from Amphipolis by an enemy attacking the bridge. But we shall find him remaining quietly on the hill of Kerdylium with the perfect certainty of entering Amphipolis at any moment that he chose. If it be urged that the bridge, though unconnected with the Long Wall, might still be under a strong separate guard, I reply, that on that supposition an enemy from Eion would naturally attack the bridge first. To have to defend a bridge completely detached from the city, simply by means of a large constant guard, would materially aggravate the difficulties of Brasidas. If it had been possible to attack the bridge separately from the city, something must have been said about it in describing the operations of Kleon, who is represented as finding nothing to meddle with except the fortifications of the town.

Assuming, then, that there was such a line of connection between the bridge and the Long Wall, added by Brasidas since the first capture of the place, I know no meaning so natural to give to the word σταύρωμα. No other distinct meaning is proposed by any one. There was, of course, a gate, or more than one, in the Long Wall, leading into the space inclosed by the palisade; through this gate Brasidas would enter the town when he crossed from Kerdylium. This gate is called by Thucydidês αἱ ἐπὶ τὸ σταύρωμα πύλαι. There must have been also a gate, or more than one, in the palisade itself, leading into the space without: so that passengers or cattle traversing the bridge from the westward and going to Myrkinus (*e. g.*) would not necessarily be obliged to turn out of their way and enter the town of Amphipolis.

On the plan which I have here given, the line running nearly from north to south represents the Long Wall of Agnon, touching the river at both ends, and bounding as well as fortifying the town of Amphipolis on its eastern side.

The shorter line, which cuts off the southern extremity of this Long Wall, and joins the river immediately below the bridge, represents the σταύρωμα, or palisade: probably it was an earthen mound and ditch, with a strong palisade at the top.

By means of this palisade, the bridge was included in the fortifications of Amphipolis, and Brasidas could pass over from Mount Kerdylium into the city whenever he pleased.

[736] Thucyd. v, 7; compare Colonel Leake, *l. c.* p. 182; αὐτὸς ἐθεᾶτο τὸ λιμνῶδες τοῦ Στρύμονος, καὶ τὴν θέσιν τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τῇ Θρᾴκῃ, ὡς ἔχοι.

[737] Thucyd. v, 7. Κατὰ θέαν δὲ μᾶλλον ἔφη ἀναβαίνειν τοῦ χωρίου, καὶ τὴν μείζω παρασκευὴν περιέμενεν, οὐχ ὡς τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ, ἢν ἀναγκάζηται, περισχήσων, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς κύκλῳ περιστὰς βίᾳ αἱρήσων τὴν πόλιν.

The words οὐχ ὡς τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ, etc. do not refer to μείζω παρασκευὴν, as the Scholiast, with whom Dr. Arnold agrees, considers them, but to the general purpose and dispositions of Kleon. "He marched up, not like one who is abundantly provided with means of safety, in case of being put on his defence; but like one who is going to surround the city and take it at once."

Nor do these last words represent any real design conceived in the mind of Kleon (for Amphipolis from its locality *could not be really surrounded*), but are merely given as illustrating the careless confidence of his march from Eion up to the ridge: in the same manner as Herodotus describes the forward rush of the Persians before the battle of Platæa, to overtake the Greeks whom they supposed to be running away—Καὶ οὗτοι μὲν βοῇ τε καὶ ὁμίλῳ ἐπήισαν, ὡς *ἁναρπασόμενοι* τοὺς Ἕλληνας (ix, 59): compare viii, 28.

[738] Thucyd. v, 7. ὥστε καὶ μηχανὰς ὅτι οὐκ κατῆλθεν ἔχων, ἁμαρτεῖν ἐδόκει· ἐλεῖν γὰρ ἂν τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὸ ἐρῆμον.

I apprehend that the verb κατῆλθεν refers to the coming of the armament to Eion: analogous to what is said v, 2, *κατέπλευσεν* ἐς τὸν Τορωναίων λιμένα: compare i, 51; iii, 4, etc. The march from Eion up to the ridge could not well be expressed by the word κατῆλθεν: but the arrival of the expedition at the Strymon, the place of its destination, might be so described. Battering-engines would be brought from nowhere else but from Athens.

Dr. Arnold interprets the word κατῆλθεν to mean that Kleon had first marched up to a higher point, and then descended from this point upon Amphipolis. But I contest the correctness of this assumption, as a matter of topography: it does not appear to me that Kleon ever reached any point higher than the summit of the hill and wall of Amphipolis. Besides, even if he had reached a higher point of the mountain, he could not well talk of "bringing down battering-machines *from that point*."

[739] Thucyd. v, 6. Βρασίδας δὲ—ἀντεκάθητο καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τῷ Κερδυλίῳ· ἔστι δὲ τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο Ἀργιλίων, πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ, οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχον τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως, καὶ *κατεφαίνετο πάντα αὐτόθεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἔλαθεν αὐτόθεν ὁρμώμενος ὁ Κλέων τῷ στρατῷ*, etc.

[740] Thucyd. v, 8.

[741] Thucyd. v, 9. Τοὺς γὰρ ἐναντίους εἰκάζω καταφρονήσει τε ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐλπίσαντας ὡς ἂν ἐπεξέλθοι τις αὐτοῖς ἐς μάχην, ἀναβῆναί τε πρὸς τὸ χωρίον, καὶ νῦν ἀτάκτως κατὰ θέαν τετραμμένους ὀλιγωρεῖν…. Ἕως οὖν ἔτι *ἀπαράσκευοι θαρσοῦσι*, καὶ τοῦ ὑπαπιέναι πλέον ἢ τοῦ μένοντος, ἐξ ὧν ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχουσιν, *ἐν τῷ ἀνειμένῳ αὐτῶν τῆς γνώμης, καὶ πρὶν ξυνταχθῆναι μᾶλλον τὴν δόξαν*, ἐγὼ μέν, etc.

The words τὸ ἀνειμένον τῆς γνώμης are full of significance in regard to ancient military affairs. The Grecian hoplites, even the best of them, required to be peculiarly *wound up* for a battle; hence the necessity of the harangue from the general which always preceded. Compare Xenophon's eulogy of the manœuvres of Epameinondas before the battle of Mantineia, whereby he made the enemy fancy that he was not going to fight, and took down the preparation in the minds of their soldiers for battle: ἔλυσε μὲν τῶν πλείστων πολεμίων τὴν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πρὸς μάχην παρασκευὴν, etc. (Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 5, 22.)

[742] Thucyd. v, 10. Τῷ δὲ Κλέωνι, φανεροῦ γενομένου αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ Κερδυλίου καταβάντος καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπιφανεῖ οὔσῃ ἔξωθεν περὶ τὸ ἱεροῦ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς θυομένου καὶ ταῦτα πράσσοντος, ἀγγέλλεται (προὐκεχωρήκει γὰρ τότε κατὰ τὴν θέαν) ὅτι ἥ τε στρατιὰ ἅπασα φανερὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἐν τῇ πόλει, etc.

Kleon did not himself *see* Brasidas sacrificing, or see the enemy's army within the city; others on the lower ground were better situated for seeing what was going on in Amphipolis, than he was while on the high ridge. Others saw it, and gave intimation to him.

[743] Thucyd. v, 10. Οἱ ἄνδρες ἡμᾶς οὐ μένουσι (q. μενοῦσι?)· δῆλοι δὲ τῶν τε δοράτων τῇ κινήσει καὶ τῶν κεφαλῶν· οἷς γὰρ ἂν τοῦτο γίγνηται, οὐκ εἰώθασι μένειν τοὺς ἐπιόντας.

This is a remarkable illustration of the regular movement of heads and spears, which characterized a well-ordered body of Grecian hoplites.

[744] Thucyd. v, 10. Καὶ ὁ μὲν, κατὰ τὰς ἐπὶ τὸ σταύρωμα πύλας, καὶ τὰς πρώτας τοῦ μακροῦ τείχους τότε ὄντος ἐξελθὼν, ἔθει δρόμῳ τὴν ὁδὸν ταύτην εὐθεῖαν, ᾗπερ νῦν κατὰ τὸ καρτερώτατον τοῦ χωρίου ἰόντι τὸ τροπαῖον ἕστηκε.

Brasidas and his men sallied forth by two different gates at the same time. One was the first gate in the Long Wall, which would be the first gate in order, to a person coming from the southward. The other was the *gate upon the palisade* (αἱ ἐπὶ τὸ σταύρωμα πύλαι), that is, the gate in the Long Wall which opened *from the town upon the palisade*. The persons who sallied out by this gate would get out to attack the enemy by the gate in the palisade itself.

The gate in the Long Wall which opened from the town upon the palisade, would be that by which Brasidas himself with his army entered Amphipolis from Mount Kerdylium. It probably stood open at this moment when he directed the sally forth: that which had to be opened at the moment, was the gate in the palisade, together with the first gate in the Long Wall.

The last words cited in Thucydidês—ᾗπερ νῦν κατὰ τὸ καρτερώτατον τοῦ χωρίου ἰόντι τὸ τροπαῖον ἕστηκε—are not intelligible without better knowledge of the topography than we possess. What Thucydidês means by "the strongest point in the place," we cannot tell. We only understand that the trophy was erected in the road by which a person went up to that point. We must recollect that the expressions of Thucydidês here refer to the ground as it stood sometime afterwards, not as it stood at the time of the battle between Kleon and Brasidas.

[745] It is almost painful to read the account given by Diodorus (xii, 73, 74) of the battle of Amphipolis, when one's mind is full of the distinct and admirable narrative of Thucydidês, only defective by being too brief. It is difficult to believe that Diodorus is describing the same event; so totally different are all the circumstances, except that the Lacedæmonians at last gain the victory. To say, with Wesseling in his note, "Hæc *non usquequaque* conveniunt Thucydideis," is prodigiously below the truth.

[746] Thucyd. v, 11. Aristotle, a native of Stageirus near to Amphipolis, cites the sacrifices rendered to Brasidas as an instance of institutions established by special and local enactment (Ethic. Nikomach. v, 7).

In reference to the aversion now entertained by the Amphipolitans to the continued worship of Agnon as their œkist, compare the discourse addressed by the Platæans to the Lacedæmonians, pleading for mercy. The Thebans, if they became possessors of the Platæid, would not continue the sacrifices to the gods who had granted victory at the great battle of Platæa, nor funereal mementos to the slain (Thucyd. iii, 58).

[747] Thucyd. v, 7. Καὶ ἐχρήσατο τῷ τρόπῳ ᾧπερ καὶ ἐς τὴν Πύλον εὐτυχήσας ἐπίστευσέ τι φρονεῖν· ἐς μάχην μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἤλπισέν οἱ ἐπεξιέναι οὐδένα, κατὰ θέαν δὲ μᾶλλον ἔφη ἀναβαίνειν τοῦ χωρίου, καὶ τὴν μείζω παρασκευὴν περιέμενεν, etc.

[748] Thucyd. v, 10. Οἰόμενος φθήσεσθαι ἀπελθὼν, etc.

[749] Contrast the brave death of the Lacedæmonian general Anaxibius, when he found himself out-generalled and surprised by the Athenian Iphikratês (Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 38).

[750] Amphipolis was actually thus attacked by the Athenians eight years afterwards, by ships on the Strymon, Thucyd. vii, 9. Εὐετίων στρατηγὸς Ἀθηναίων, μετὰ Περδίκκου στρατεύσας ἐπ᾽ Ἀμφίπολιν Θρᾳξὶ πολλοῖς, τὴν μὲν πόλιν οὐχ εἶλεν, ἐς δὲ τὸν Στρύμονα περικομίσας τριήρεις ἐκ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐπολιόρκει, ὁρμώμενος ἐξ Ἰμεραίου. (In the eighteenth year of the war.) But the fortifications of the place seem to have been materially altered during the interval. Instead of one long wall, with three sides open to the river, it seems to have acquired a curved wall, only open to the river on a comparatively narrow space near to the lake; while this curved wall joined the bridge southerly by means of a parallel pair of long walls with road between.

[751] Plato, Symp. c. 36, p. 221.

[752] Thuc. iv, 81. δόξας εἶναι κατὰ πάντα ἀγαθὸς, etc.

[753] Thucyd. v, 116.

[754] Aristophan. Equit. 55, 391, 740, etc. In one passage of the play, Kleon is reproached with pretending to be engaged at Argos in measures for winning the alliance of that city, but in reality, under cover of this proceeding, carrying on clandestine negotiations with the Lacedæmonians (464). In two other passages, he is denounced as being the person who obstructs the conclusion of peace with the Lacedæmonians (790, 1390).

[755] Thucyd. v, 17; iii, 45. καταφανέστερος μὲν εἶναι κακουργῶν, καὶ ἀπιστότερος διαβάλλων—βιαιότατος τῶν πολιτῶν.

[756] Aristophan. Acharn. 8, with the Scholiast, who quotes from Theopompus. Theopompus, Fragment, 99, 100, 101, ed. Didot.

[757] The public speaking of Kleon was characterized by Aristotle and Theopompus (see Schol. ad Lucian. Timon, c. 30), not as wheedling, but as full of arrogance; in this latter point too like that of the elder Cato at Rome (Plutarch, Cato, c. 14). The derisory tone of Cato in his public speaking, too, is said to have been impertinent and disgusting (Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 803, c. 7).

[758] An epigram which Plutarch (Cato, c. 1) gives us from a poet contemporary of Cato the Censor, describes him:—

Πυῤῥὸν, *πανδακέτην*, γλαυκόμματον, οὐδὲ θανόντα

Πόρκιον εἰς Ἀΐδην Περσεφόνη δέχεται.

Livy says, in an eloquent encomium on Cato (xxxix, 40): "Simultates nimio plures et exercuerunt eum, et ipse exercuit eas: nec facile dixeris utrum magis presserit eum nobilitas, an ille agitaverit nobilitatem. Asperi procul dubio animi, et linguæ acerbæ et immodice liberæ fuit: sed invicti a cupiditatibus animi et rigidæ innocentiæ: contemptor gratiæ, divitiarum…. Hunc sicut omni vitâ, tum censuram petentem premebat nobilitas; coierantque candidati omnes ad dejiciendum honore eum; non solum ut ipsi potius adipiscerentur, nec quia indignabantur novum hominem censorem videre; sed etiam quod tristem censuram, periculosamque multorum famæ, et *ab læso a plerisque et lædendi cupido*, expectabant."

See also Plutarch (Cato, c. 15, 16: his comparison between Aristeidês and Cato, c. 2) about the prodigious number of accusations in which Cato was engaged, either as prosecutor or as party prosecuted. His bitter feud with the *nobilitas* is analogous to that of Kleon against the Hippeis.

I need hardly say that the comparison of Cato with Kleon applies only to domestic politics: in the military courage and energy for which Cato was distinguished, Kleon is utterly wanting, nor are we entitled to ascribe to him anything like the superiority of knowledge and general intelligence which we find recorded of Cato.

The expression of Cicero respecting Kleon: "turbulentum quidem civem, sed tamen eloquentem," (Cicero, Brutus, 7) appears to be a translation of the epithets of Thucydidês—βιαιότατος—τῷ δήμῳ πιθανώτατος (iii, 45).

The remarks made too by Latin critics on the style and temper of Cato's speeches, might almost seem to be a translation of the words of Thucydidês about Kleon. Fronto said about Cato: "Concionatur Cato *infeste*, Gracchus turbulente, Tullius copiose. Jam in judiciis *sævit* idem Cato, triumphat Cicero, tumultuatur Gracchus." See Dübner's edition of Meyer's Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta, p. 117 (Paris, 1837).

[759] Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præcept. p. 806. Compare two other passages in the same treatise, p. 805, where Plutarch speaks of the ἀπόνοια καὶ δεινότης of Kleon; and p. 812, where he says, with truth, that Kleon was not at all qualified to act as general in a campaign.

[760] Aristophan. Ran. 566-576.

[761] Here again we find Cato the elder represented as constantly in the forum at Rome, lending aid of this kind, and espousing the cause of others who had grounds of complaint (Plutarch, Cato, c. 3), πρωῒ μὲν εἰς ἀγορὰν βαδίζει καὶ παρίσταται τοῖς δεομένοις—τοὺς μὲν θαυμαστὰς καὶ φίλους ἐκτᾶτο διὰ τῶν ξυνηγοριῶν, etc.

[762] Aristophan. Equit. 1271:—

Λοιδορῆσαι τοὺς πονηροὺς, οὐδέν ἐστ᾽ ἐπίφθονον,

Ἀλλὰ τιμὴ τοῖσι χρηστοῖς, ὅστις εὖ λογίζεται.

[763] It appears that the complaint was made ostensibly against Kalistratus, in whose name the poet brought out the "Babylonians," (Schol. ad Arist. Vesp. 1284), and who was of course the responsible party, though the real author was doubtless perfectly well known. The Knights was the first play brought out by the poet in his own name.

[764] See Acharn. 377, with the Scholia, and the anonymous biography of Aristophanês.

Both Meineke (Aristoph. Fragm. Comic. Gr. vol. ii, p. 966) and Ranke (Commentat. de Aristoph. Vitâ, p. cc-cxxx) try to divine the plot of the "Babylonians;" but there is no sufficient information to assist them.

[765] Aristoph. Acharn. 355-475.

[766] See the Arguments prefixed to these three plays; and Acharn. 475, Equit. 881.

It is not known whether the first comedy, entitled *The Clouds* (represented in the earlier part of B.C. 423, a year after the Knights, and a year before the Wasps), appeared at the Lenæan festival of January, or at the urban Dionysia in March. It was unsuccessful, and the poet partially altered it with the view to a second representation. If it be true that this second representation took place during the year immediately following (B.C. 422: see Mr. Clinton's Fasti Hellenici, ad ann. 422), it must have been at the urban Dionysia in March, just at the time when the truce for one year was coming to a close; for the Wasps was represented in that year at the Lenæan festival, and the same poet would hardly be likely to bring out two plays. The inference which Ranke draws from Nubes 310, that it was represented at the Dionysia, is not, however, very conclusive (Ranke, Commentat. de Aristoph. Vitâ, p. ccxxi, prefixed to his edition of the Plutus).

[767] See the obscure passage, Vespæ, 1285, *seqq.*; Aristoph. Vita Anonymi, p. xiii, ed. Bekker; Demosthen. cont. Meid. p. 532.

It appears that Aristophanês was of Æginetan parentage (Acharn. 629); so that the γραφὴ ξενίας (indictment for undue assumption of the rights of an Athenian citizen) was founded upon a real fact. Between the time of the conquest of Ægina by Athens, and the expulsion of the native inhabitants in the first year of the Peloponnesian war (an interval of about twenty years), probably no inconsiderable number of Æginetans became intermingled or intermarried with Athenian citizens. Especially men of poetical talent in the subject-cities would find it their interest to repair to Athens: Ion came from Chios, and Achæus from Eretria; both tragic composers.

The comic author Eupolis seems also to have directed some taunts against the foreign origin of Aristophanês, if Meineke is correct in his interpretation of a passage (Historia Comicor. Græc. i, p. 111).

[768] Thucyd. v, 17-30. The statement in cap. 30 seems to show that this was the ground on which the Athenians were allowed to retain Sollium and Anaktorium. For if their retention of these two places had been distinctly and in terms at variance with the treaty, the Corinthians would doubtless have chosen this fact as the ostensible ground of their complaint: whereas they preferred to have recourse to a πρόσχημα, or sham plea.

[769] Compare v, 39 with v, 18, which seems to me to refute the explanation suggested by Dr. Arnold, and adopted by Poppo.

The use of the word ἀποδόντων in regard to the restoration of Amphipolis to Athens, and of the word παρέδοσαν in regard to the *relinquishment* of the other cities, deserves notice. Those who drew up the treaty, which is worded in a very confused way, seem to have intended that the word παρέδοσαν should apply both to Amphipolis and the other cities, but that the word ἀποδόντων should apply exclusively to Amphipolis. The word παρέδοσαν is of course applicable to the restoration of Amphipolis, for that which is *restored* is of course *delivered up*. But it is remarkable that this word παρέδοσαν does not properly apply to the other cities: for they were not *delivered up* to Athens, they were only *relinquished*, as the clauses immediately following farther explain. Perhaps there is a little Athenian pride in the use of the word, first to intimate indirectly that the Lacedæmonians were to *deliver up* various cities to Athens, then to add words afterwards, which show that the cities were only to be *relinquished*, not surrendered to Athens.

The provision, for guaranteeing liberty of retirement and carrying away of property, was of course intended chiefly for the Amphipolitans, who would naturally desire to emigrate, if the town had been actually restored to Athens.

[770] Thucyd. v, 19.

[771] Thucyd. v, 17-30. παραβήσεσθαί τε ἔφασαν (the Lacedæmonians said) αὐτοὺς (the Corinthians) τοὺς ὅρκους, καὶ ἤδη ἀδικεῖν ὅτι οὐ δέχονται τὰς Ἀθηναίων σπονδὰς, εἰρημένον, κύριον εἶναι ὅτι ἂν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ξυμμάχων ψηφίσηται, ἢν μή τι θεῶν ἢ ἡρώων κώλυμα ᾖ.

[772] Compare Thucyd. iv, 119; v, 19. Though the words of the peace stand ὤμοσαν κατὰ πόλεις (v, 18), yet it seems that this oath was not *actually* taken by any of the allied cities; only by the Lacedæmonians themselves, upon the vote of the majority of the confederates (v, 17: compare v, 23).

[773] Thucyd. v, 22.



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BY

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CHAPTER LVI.

FROM THE FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD 90, DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEIA.

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CHAPTER LVII.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXTINCTION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY.

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FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE ATHENIANS TO ATTACK SYRACUSE, DOWN TO THE FIRST WINTER AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL IN SICILY.

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FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE OF SYRACUSE BY NIKIAS, DOWN TO THE SECOND ATHENIAN EXPEDITION UNDER DEMOSTHENES, AND THE RESUMPTION OF THE GENERAL WAR.

Movements of Nikias in the early spring. — Local condition and fortifications of Syracuse, at the time when Nikias arrived. — Inner and Outer City. — Localities without the wall of the outer city — Epipolæ. — Possibilities of the siege when Nikias first arrived in Sicily — increase of difficulties through his delay. — Increased importance of the upper ground of Epipolæ. Intention of the Syracusans to occupy the summit of Epipolæ. — The summit is surprised by the Athenians. — The success of this surprise was essential to the effective future prosecution of the siege. — First operations of the siege. — Central work of the Athenians on Epipolæ, called The Circle. — First counter-wall of the Syracusans. — Its direction, south of the Athenian circle — its completion. — It is stormed, taken, and destroyed by the Athenians. — Nikias occupies the southern cliff — and prosecutes his line of blockade south of the Circle. — Second counter-work of the Syracusans — reaching across the marsh, south of Epipolæ, to the river Anapus. — This counter-work attacked and taken by Lamachus — general battle — death of Lamachus. — Danger of the Athenian circle and of Nikias — victory of the Athenians. — Entrance of the Athenian fleet into the Great Harbor. — The southern portion of the wall of blockade, across the marsh to the Great Harbor, is prosecuted and nearly finished. — The Syracusans offer no farther obstruction — despondency at Syracuse — increasing closeness of the siege. — Order of the besieging opera-

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CHAPTER LX.

FROM THE RESUMPTION OF DIRECT HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA, DOWN TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY.

Active warlike preparations throughout Greece during the winter of 414-413 B.C. — Invasion of Attica by Agis and the Peloponnesian force — fortification of Dekeleia. — Second expedition from Athens against Syracuse, under Demosthenês. — Operations of Gylippus at Syracuse. He determines to attack the Athenians at sea. — Naval combat in the harbor of Syracuse — the Athenians victorious. — Gylippus surprises and takes Plemmyrium. — Important consequences of the capture. — Increased spirits and confidence of the Syracusans, even for sea-fight. — Efforts of the Syracusans to procure farther reinforcements from the Sicilian towns. — Conflicts between the Athenians and Syracusans in the Great Harbor. — Defeat of a Sicilian reinforcement marching to aid Syracuse — Renewed attack by Gylippus on the Athenians. — Disadvantages of the Athenian fleet in the harbor. Their naval tactics impossible in the narrow space. — Improvements in Syracusan ships suited to the narrow space. — The Syracusans threaten attack upon the Athenian naval station. — Additional preparations of Nikias — battle renewed. — Complete defeat of the Athenians. — Danger of the Athenian armament — arrival of Demosthenês with the second armament. — Voyage of Demosthenês from Korkyra. — Imposing effect of his entry into the Great Harbor. — Revived courage of the Athenians. Judicious and decisive resolutions of Demosthenês. — Position and plans of Demosthenês. — Nocturnal march of Demosthenês to surprise Epipolæ, and turn the Syracusan line of defence. — Partial success at first — complete and ruinous defeat finally. — Disorder of the Athenians — great loss in the flight. — Elate spirits, and renewed aggressive plans, of the Syracusans. — Deliberation and different opinions of the Athenian generals. — Demosthenês insists on departing from Sicily — Nikias opposes him. — Demosthenês insists at least on removing out of the Great Harbor. — Nikias refuses to consent to such removal. — The armament remains in the Great Harbor, neither acting nor retiring. — Infatuation of Nikias. — Increase of force and confidence in Syracuse. — Nikias at length consents to retreat. Orders for retreat privately circulated. — Eclipse of the moon — Athenian retreat postponed. — Eclipses considered as signs — differently interpreted — opinion of Philochorus. — Renewed attacks of the Syracusans — defeat of the Athenian fleet in the Great Harbor. — Partial success ashore against Gylippus. — The Syracusans determine to block up the mouth of the harbor, and destroy or capture the whole Athenian armament. — Large views of the Syracusans against the power of Athens — new hazards now opened to endanger that power. — Vast numbers, and miscellaneous origin, of the combatants now engaged in fighting for or against Syracuse. — The Syracusans block up the mouth of the harbor. — The Athenians resolve to force their way out — preparations made by the generals. — Exhortations of Nikias on putting the crews aboard. — Agony of Nikias — his efforts to encourage the officers. — Bold and animated language of Gylippus to the

Syracusan fleet. — Syracusan arrangements. Condition of the Great Harbor — sympathizing population surrounding it. — Attempt of the Athenian fleet to break out — battle in the Great Harbor. — Long-continued and desperate struggle — intense emotion — total defeat of the Athenians. — Military operations of ancient times — strong emotions which accompanied them. — Causes of the defeat of the Athenians. — Feelings of the victors and vanquished after the battle. — Resolution of Demosthenês and Nikias to make a second attempt — the armament are too much discouraged to obey. — The Athenians determine to retreat by land — they postpone their retreat, under false communications from Syracuse. — The Syracusans block up the roads, to intercept their retreat. — Retreat of the Athenians — miserable condition of the army. — Wretchedness arising from abandoning the sick and wounded. — Attempt of the generals to maintain some order — energy of Nikias. — Exhortations of Nikias to the suffering army. — Commencement of the retreat — harassed and impeded by the Syracusans. — Continued conflict — no progress made by the retreating army. — Violent storm — effect produced on both parties — change of feeling in the last two years. — Night march of the Athenians, in an altered direction, towards the southern sea. — Separation of the two divisions under Nikias and Demosthenês. The first division under Nikias gets across the river Erineus. — The rear division under Demosthenês is pursued, overtaken, and forced to surrender. — Gylippus overtakes and attacks the division of Nikias. — Nikias gets to the river Asinarus — intolerable thirst and suffering of the soldiers — he and his division become prisoners. — Total numbers captured. — Hard treatment and sufferings of the Athenian prisoners at Syracuse. — Treatment of Nikias and Demosthenês — difference of opinion among the conquerors. — Influence of the Corinthians — efforts of Gylippus — both the generals are slain. — Disgrace of Nikias after his death, at Athens — continued respect for the memory of Demosthenês. — Opinion of Thucydidês about Nikias. — How far that opinion is just. — Opinion of the Athenians about Nikias — their steady over-confidence and over-esteem for him, arising from his respectable and religious character. — Over-confidence in Nikias was the greatest personal mistake which the Athenian public ever committed.

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CHAPTER LXI.

FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY, DOWN TO THE OLIGARCHICAL CONSPIRACY OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS.

Consequences of the ruin of the Athenian armament in Sicily. — Occupation of Dekeleia by the Lacedæmonians — its ruinous effects upon Athens. — Athens becomes a military post — heavy duty in arms imposed upon the citizens. — Financial pressure. — Athens dismisses her Thracian mercenaries — massacre at Mykalêssus. — The Thracians driven back with slaughter by the Thebans. — Athenian station at Naupaktus — decline of the naval superiority of Athens. — Naval battle near Naupaktus — indecisive result. — Last news of the Athenians from Syracuse — ruin of the army there not officially made known to them. — Reluctance of the Athenians to believe the full truth. — Terror and affliction at Athens. — Energetic resolutions adopted by the Athenians — Board of Probûli. — Prodigious effect of the catastrophe upon all Greeks — enemies and allies of Athens as well as neutrals — and even on the Persians. — Motions of king Agis. — The Eubœans apply to Agis for aid in revolting from Athens — the Lesbians also apply, and are preferred. — The Chians, with the same view, make application to Sparta. — Envoys from Tissaphernês and Pharnabazus come to Sparta at the same time. — Alkibiadês at Sparta — his recommendations determine the Lacedæmonians to send aid to Chios. — Synod of the Peloponnesian allies at Corinth — measures resolved. — Isthmian festival — scruples of the Corinthians — delay about Chios — suspicions of Athens. — Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth to Chios — it is defeated by the Athenians. — Small squadron starts from Sparta under Chalkideus and Alkibiadês, to go to Chios. — Energetic advice of Alkibiadês — his great usefulness to Sparta. — Arrival of Alkibiadês at Chios — revolt of the island from Athens. — General population of Chios was disinclined to revolt from Athens. — Dismay occasioned at Athens by the revolt of Chios — the Athenians set free and appropriate their reserved fund. — Athenian force despatched to Chios under Strombichidês. — Activity of the Chians in promoting revolt among the other Athenian allies — Alkibiadês determines Milêtus to revolt. — First alliance between the Peloponnesians and Tissaphernês, concluded by Chalkideus at Milêtus. — Dishonorable and disadvantageous conditions of the treaty. — Energetic efforts of Athens — democratical revolution at Samos. — Peloponnesian fleet at Kenchreæ — Astyochus is sent as Spartan admiral to Ionia. — Expedition of the Chians against Lesbos. — Ill success of the Chians — Lesbos is maintained by the Athenians. — Harassing operations of the Athenians against Chios. — Hardships suffered by the Chians — prosperity of the island up to this time. — Fresh forces from Athens — victory of the Athenians near Milêtus. — Fresh Peloponnesian forces arrive — the Athenians retire, pursuant to the strong recommendation of Phrynichus. — Capture of Iasus by the Peloponnesians — rich plunder — Amorgês made prisoner. — Tissaphernês begins to furnish pay to the Peloponnesian fleet. He reduces the rate

of pay for the future. — Powerful Athenian fleet at Samos — unexpected renovation of the navy of Athens. — Astyochus at Chios and on the opposite coast. — Pedaritus, Lacedæmonian governor at Chios — disagreement between him and Astyochus. — Astyochus abandons Chios and returns to Milêtus — accident whereby he escaped the Athenian fleet. — The Athenians establish a fortified post in Chios, to ravage the island. — Dorieus arrives on the Asiatic coast with a squadron from Thurii, to join Astyochus — maritime contests near Knidus. — Second Peloponnesian treaty with Tissaphernês, concluded by Astyochus and Theramenês. — Comparison of the second treaty with the first. — Arrival of a fresh Peloponnesian squadron under Antisthenês at Kaunus — Lichas comes out as Spartan commissioner. — Astyochus goes with the fleet from Milêtus to join the newly-arrived squadron — he defeats the Athenian squadron under Charmînus. — Peloponnesian fleet at Knidus — double dealing of Tissaphernês — breach between him and Lichas. — Peloponnesian fleet masters Rhodes, and establishes itself in that island. — Long inaction of the fleet at Rhodes — paralyzing intrigues of Tissaphernês — corruption of the Lacedæmonian officers.

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CHAPTER LV.

FROM THE PEACE OF NIKIAS TO THE OLYMPIC FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD NINETY.

My last chapter and last volume terminated with the peace called the Peace of Nikias, concluded in March 421 B.C., between Athens and the Spartan confederacy, for fifty years.

This peace—negotiated during the autumn and winter succeeding the defeat of the Athenians at Amphipolis, wherein both Kleon and Brasidas were slain—resulted partly from the extraordinary anxiety of the Spartans to recover their captives who had been taken at Sphakteria, partly from the discouragement of the Athenians, leading them to listen to the peace-party who acted with Nikias. The general principle adopted for the peace was, the restitution by both parties of what had been acquired by war, yet excluding such places as had been surrendered by capitulation: according to which reserve the Athenians, while prevented from recovering Platæa, continued to hold Nisæa, the harbor of Megara. The Lacedæmonians engaged to restore Amphipolis to Athens, and to relinquish their connection with the revolted allies of Athens in Thrace; that is, Argilus, Stageirus, Akanthus, Skôlus, Olynthus, and Spartôlus. These six cities, however, were not to be enrolled as allies of Athens unless they chose voluntarily to become so, but only to pay regularly to Athens the tribute originally assessed by Aristeidês, as a sort of recompense for the protection of the Ægean sea against private war or piracy. Any inhabitant of Amphipolis or the other cities, who chose to leave them, was at liberty to do so, and to carry away his property. Farther, the Lacedæmonians covenanted to restore Panaktum to Athens, together with all the Athenian prisoners in their possession. As to Skiônê, Torônê, and Sermylus, the Athenians were declared free to take their own measures. On their part, they engaged to release all captives in their hands, either of Sparta or her allies; to restore Pylus, Kythêra, Methônê, Pteleon, and Atalantê; and to liberate all the Peloponnesian or Brasidean soldiers now under blockade in Skiônê.

Provision was also made, by special articles, that all Greeks should have free access to the sacred Pan-Hellenic festivals, either by land or sea; and that the autonomy of the Delphian temple should be guaranteed.

The contracting parties swore to abstain in future from all injury to each other, and to settle by amicable decision any dispute which might arise.[1]

Lastly, it was provided that if any matter should afterwards occur as having been forgotten, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians might by mutual consent amend the treaty as they thought fit. So prepared, the oaths were interchanged between seventeen principal Athenians and as many principal Lacedæmonians.

Earnestly bent as Sparta herself was upon the peace, and ratified as it had been by the vote of a majority among her confederates, still, there was a powerful minority who not only refused their assent but strenuously protested against its conditions. The Corinthians were discontented because they did not receive back Sollium and Anaktorium; the Megarians, because they did not regain Nisæa; the Bœotians, because Panaktum was to be restored to Athens: the Eleians also on some other ground which we do not distinctly know. All of them, moreover, took common offence at the article which provided that Athens and Sparta might, by mutual consent, and without consulting the allies, amend the treaty in any way that they thought proper.[2] Though the peace was sworn, therefore, the most powerful members of the Spartan confederacy remained all recusant.

So strong was the interest of the Spartans themselves, however, that having obtained the favorable vote of the majority, they resolved to carry the peace through, even at the risk of breaking up the confederacy. Besides the earnest desire of recovering their captives from the Athenians, they were farther alarmed by the fact that their truce for thirty years concluded with Argos was just now expiring. They had indeed made application to Argos for renewing it, through Lichas the Spartan proxenus of that city. But the Argeians had refused, except upon the inadmissible condition that the border territory of Kynuria should be ceded to them: there was reason to fear therefore that this new and powerful force might be thrown into the scale of Athens, if war were allowed to continue.[3]

Accordingly, no sooner had the peace been sworn than the Spartans proceeded to execute its provisions. Lots being drawn to determine whether Sparta or Athens should be the first to make the cessions required, the Athenians drew the favorable lot: an advantage so very great, under the circumstances, that Theophrastus affirmed Nikias to have gained the point by bribery. There is no ground for believing such alleged bribery; the rather, as we shall presently find Nikias gratuitously throwing away most of the benefit which the lucky lot conferred.[4]

The Spartans began their compliance by forthwith releasing all the Athenian prisoners in their hands, and despatching Ischagoras with two other envoys to Amphipolis and the Thracian towns. These envoys were directed to proclaim the peace as well as to enforce its observance upon the Thracian towns, and especially to command Klearidas, the Spartan commander in Amphipolis, that he should surrender the town to the Athenians. But on arriving in Thrace, these envoys met with nothing but unanimous opposition: and so energetic were the remonstrances of the Chalkidians, both in Amphipolis and out of it, that even Klearidas refused obedience to his own government, pretending that he was not strong enough to surrender the place against the resistance of the Chalkidians. Thus completely baffled, the envoys returned to Sparta, whither Klearidas thought it prudent to accompany them, partly to explain his own conduct, partly in hopes of being able to procure some modification of the terms. But he found this impossible, and he was sent back to Amphipolis with

peremptory orders to surrender the place to the Athenians, if it could possibly be done; if that should prove beyond his force, then to come away, and bring home every Peloponnesian soldier in the garrison. Perhaps the surrender was really impracticable to a force no greater than that which Klearidas commanded, since the reluctance of the population was doubtless obstinate. At any rate, he represented it to be impracticable: the troops accordingly came home, but the Athenians still remained excluded from Amphipolis, and all the stipulations of the peace respecting the Thracian towns remained unperformed. Nor was this all. The envoys from the recusant minority (Corinthians and others), after having gone home for instructions, had now come back to Sparta with increased repugnance and protest against the injustice of the peace, so that all the efforts of the Spartans to bring them to compliance were fruitless.[5]

The latter were now in serious embarrassment. Not having executed their portion of the treaty, they could not demand that Athens should execute hers: and they were threatened with the double misfortune of forfeiting the confidence of their allies without acquiring any one of the advantages of the treaty. In this dilemma they determined to enter into closer relations, and separate relations, with Athens, at all hazard of offending their allies. Of the enmity of Argos, if unaided by Athens, they had little apprehension; while the moment was now favorable for alliance with Athens, from the decided pacific tendencies reigning on both sides, as well as from the known philo-Laconian sentiment of the leaders Nikias and Lachês. The Athenian envoys had remained at Sparta ever since the swearing of the peace, awaiting the fulfilment of the conditions; Nikias or Lachês, one or both, being very probably among them. When they saw that Sparta was unable to fulfil her bond, so that the treaty seemed likely to be cancelled, they would doubtless encourage, and perhaps may even have suggested, the idea of a separate alliance between Sparta and Athens, as the only expedient for covering the deficiency; promising that under that alliance the Spartan captives should be restored. Accordingly, a treaty was concluded between the two, for fifty years; not merely of peace, but of defensive alliance. Each party pledged itself to assist in repelling any invaders of the territory of the other, to treat them as enemies, and not to conclude peace with them without the consent of the other. This was the single provision of the alliance, with one addition, however, of no mean importance, for the security of Lacedæmon. The Athenians engaged to lend their best and most energetic aid in putting down any rising of the Helots which might occur in Laconia. Such a provision indicates powerfully the uneasiness felt by the Lacedæmonians respecting their serf-population: but at the present moment it was of peculiar value to them, since it bound the Athenians to restrain, if not to withdraw, the Messenian garrison of Pylos, planted there by themselves for the express purpose of provoking the Helots to revolt.

An alliance with stipulations so few and simple took no long time to discuss. It was concluded very speedily after the return of the envoys from Amphipolis, proba-

bly not more than a month or two after the former peace. It was sworn to by the same individuals on both sides; with similar declaration that the oath should be annually renewed, and also with similar proviso that Sparta and Athens might by mutual consent either enlarge or contract the terms, without violating the oath.[6] Moreover, the treaty was directed to be inscribed on two columns: one to be set up in the temple of Apollo at Amyklæ, the other in the temple of Athênê, in the acropolis of Athens.

The most important result of this new alliance was something not specified in its provisions, but understood, we may be well assured, between the Spartan ephors and Nikias at the time when it was concluded. All the Spartan captives at Athens were forthwith restored.[7]

Nothing can demonstrate more powerfully the pacific and acquiescent feeling now reigning at Athens, as well as the strong philo-Laconian inclinations of her leading men (at this moment Alkibiadês was competing with Nikias for the favor of Sparta, as will be stated presently), than the terms of this alliance, which bound Athens to assist in keeping down the Helots, and the still more important after-proceeding, of restoring the Spartan captives. Athens thus parted irrevocably with her best card, and promised to renounce her second best, without obtaining the smallest equivalent beyond what was contained in the oath of Sparta to become her ally. For the last three years and a half, ever since the capture of Sphakteria, the possession of these captives had placed her in a position of decided advantage in regard to her chief enemy; advantage, however, which had to a certain extent been countervailed by subsequent losses. This state of things was fairly enough represented by the treaty of peace deliberately discussed during the winter, and sworn to at the commencement of spring, whereby a string of concessions, reciprocal and balancing, had been imposed on both parties. Moreover, Athens had been lucky enough in drawing lots to find herself enabled to wait for the actual fulfilment of such concessions by the Spartans, before she consummated her own. Now the Spartans had not as yet realized any one of their promised concessions: nay, more; in trying to do so, they had displayed such a want either of power or of will, as made it plain, that nothing short of the most stringent necessity would convert their promises into realities. Yet, under these marked indications, Nikias persuades his countrymen to conclude a second treaty which practically annuls the first, and which insures to the Spartans gratuitously all the main benefits of the first, with little or none of the correlative sacrifices. The alliance of Sparta could hardly be said to count as a consideration: for that alliance was at this moment, under the uncertain relations with Argos, not less valuable to Sparta herself than to Athens. There can be little doubt that, if the game of Athens had now been played with prudence, she might have recovered Amphipolis in exchange for the captives: for the inability of Klearidas to make over the place, even if we grant it to have been a real fact and not merely simulated, might have been removed by decisive coöperation on the part of Sparta with an Athenian armament

sent to occupy the place. In fact, that which Athens was now induced to grant was precisely the original proposition transmitted to her by the Lacedæmonians four years before, when the hoplites were first inclosed in Sphakteria, but before the actual capture. They then tendered no equivalent, but merely said, through their envoys, "Give us the men in the island, and accept in exchange peace, together with our alliance."[8] At that moment there were some plausible reasons in favor of granting the proposition: but even then, the case of Kleon against it was also plausible and powerful, when he contended that Athens was entitled to make a better bargain. But *now*, there were no reasons in its favor, and a strong concurrence of reasons against it. Alliance with the Spartans was of no great value to Athens: peace was of material importance to her; but peace had been already sworn to on both sides, after deliberate discussion, and required now only to be carried into execution. That equal reciprocity of concession, which presented the best chance of permanent result, had been agreed on; and fortune had procured for her the privilege of receiving the purchase-money before she handed over the goods. Why renounce so advantageous a position, accepting in exchange a hollow and barren alliance, under the obligation of handing over her most precious merchandise upon credit, and upon credit as delusive in promise as it afterwards proved unproductive in reality? The alliance, in fact, prevented the peace from being fulfilled: it became, as Thucydidês himself[9] admits, no peace, but a simple suspension of direct hostilities.

Thucydidês states on more than one occasion, and it was the sentiment of Nikias himself, that at the moment of concluding the peace which bears his name, the position of Sparta was one of disadvantage and dishonor in reference to Athens;[10] alluding chiefly to the captives in the hands of the latter; for as to other matters, the defeats of Delium and Amphipolis, with the serious losses in Thrace, would more than countervail the acquisitions of Nisæa, Pylus, Kythêra, and Methônê. Yet so inconsiderate and short-sighted were the philo-Laconian leanings of Nikias and the men who now commanded confidence at Athens, that they threw away this advantage, suffered Athens to be cheated of all those hopes which they had themselves held out as the inducement for peace, and nevertheless yielded gratuitously to Sparta all the main points which she desired. Most certainly there was never any public recommendation of Kleon, as far as our information goes, so ruinously impolitic as this alliance with Sparta and surrender of the captives, wherein both Nikias and Alkibiadês concurred. Probably the Spartan ephors amused Nikias, and he amused the Athenian assembly, with fallacious assurances of certain obedience in Thrace, under alleged peremptory orders given to Klearidas. And now that the vehement leather-dresser, with his criminative eloquence, had passed away, replaced only by an inferior successor, the lamp-maker[11] Hyperbolus, and leaving the Athenian public under the undisputed guidance of citizens eminent for birth and station, descended from gods and heroes, there remained no one to expose effectively the futility of such assurances, or to enforce the lesson of simple and obvious prudence: "Wait, as you are entitled to wait, until the Spartans have performed the onerous

part of their bargain, before you perform the onerous part of yours. Or, if you choose to relax in regard to some of the concessions which they have sworn to make, at any rate stick to the capital point of all, and lay before them the peremptory alternative—Amphipolis in exchange for the captives."

The Athenians were not long in finding out how completely they had forfeited the advantage of their position, and their chief means of enforcement, by giving up the captives; which imparted a freedom of action to Sparta such as she had never enjoyed since the first blockade of Sphakteria. Yet it seems that under the present ephors Sparta was not guilty of any deliberate or positive act which could be called a breach of faith. She gave orders to Klearidas to surrender Amphipolis if he could; if not, to evacuate it, and bring the Peloponnesian troops home. Of course, the place was not surrendered to the Athenians, but evacuated; and she then considered that she had discharged her duty to Athens, as far as Amphipolis was concerned, though she had sworn to restore it, and her oath remained unperformed.[12] The other Thracian towns were equally deaf to her persuasions, and equally obstinate in their hostility to Athens. So also were the Bœotians, Corinthians, Megarians, and Eleians: but the Bœotians, while refusing to become parties to the truce along with Sparta, concluded for themselves a separate convention or armistice with Athens, terminable at ten days' notice on either side.[13]

In this state of things, though ostensible relations of peace and free reciprocity of intercourse between Athens and Peloponnesus were established, the discontent of the Athenians, and the remonstrances of their envoys at Sparta, soon became serious. The Lacedæmonians had sworn for themselves and their allies, yet the most powerful among these allies, and those whose enmity was most important to Athens, continued still recusant. Neither Panaktum, nor the Athenian prisoners in Bœotia, were yet restored to Athens; nor had the Thracian cities yet submitted to the peace. In reply to the remonstrances of the Athenian envoys, the Lacedæmonians affirmed that they had already surrendered all the Athenian prisoners in their own hands, and had withdrawn their troops from Thrace, which was, they said, all the intervention in their power, since they were not masters of Amphipolis, nor capable of constraining the Thracian cities against their will. As to the Bœotians and Corinthians, the Lacedæmonians went so far as to profess readiness to take arms along with Athens, [14] for the purpose of constraining them to accept the peace, and even spoke about naming a day, after which these recusant states should be proclaimed as joint enemies, both by Sparta and Athens. But their propositions were always confined to vague words, nor would they consent to bind themselves by any written or peremptory instrument. Nevertheless, so great was their confidence either in the sufficiency of these assurances, or in the facility of Nikias, that they ventured to require from Athens the surrender of Pylus, or at least the withdrawal of the Messenian garrison with the Helot deserters from that place, leaving in it none but native Athenian soldiers, until farther progress should be made in the peace. But the feeling of the

Athenians was now seriously altered, and they received this demand with marked coldness. None of the stipulations of the treaty in their favor had yet been performed, none even seemed in course of being performed: so that they now began to suspect Sparta of dishonesty and deceit, and deeply regretted their inconsiderate surrender of the captives.[15] Their remonstrances at Sparta, often repeated during the course of the summer, produced no positive effect: nevertheless, they suffered themselves to be persuaded to remove the Messenians and Helots from Pylus to Kephallenia, replacing them by an Athenian garrison.[16]

The Athenians had doubtless good reason to complain of Sparta. But the persons of whom they had still better reason to complain, were Nikias and their own philo-Laconian leaders; who had first accepted from Sparta promises doubtful as to execution, and next—though favored by the lot in regard to priority of cession, and thus acquiring proof that Sparta either would not or could not perform her promises—renounced all these advantages, and procured for Sparta almost gratuitously the only boon for which she seriously cared. The many critics on Grecian history, who think no term too harsh for the demagogue Kleon, ought in fairness to contrast his political counsel with that of his rivals, and see which of the two betokens greater forethought in the management of the foreign relations of Athens. Amphipolis had been once lost by the improvident watch of Thucydidês and Euklês: it was now again lost by the improvident concessions of Nikias.

So much was the Peloponnesian alliance unhinged by the number of states which had refused the peace, and so greatly was the ascendency of Sparta for the time impaired, that new combinations were now springing up in the peninsula. It has already been mentioned that the truce between Argos and Sparta was just now expiring: Argos therefore was free, with her old pretensions to the headship of Peloponnesus, backed by an undiminished fulness of wealth, power, and population. Having taken no direct part in the late exhausting war, she had even earned money by lending occasional aid on both sides;[17] while her military force was just now farther strengthened by a step of very considerable importance. She had recently set apart a body of a thousand select hoplites, composed of young men of wealth and station, to receive constant military training at the public expense, and to be enrolled as a separate regiment by themselves, apart from the other citizens.[18] To a democratical government like Argos, such an institution was internally dangerous, and pregnant with mischief, which will be hereafter described. But at the present moment, the democratical leaders of Argos seem to have thought only of the foreign relations of their city, now that her truce with Sparta was expiring, and that the disorganized state of the Spartan confederacy opened new chances to her ambition of regaining something like headship in Peloponnesus.

The discontent of the recusant Peloponnesian allies was now inducing them to turn their attention towards Argos as a new chief. They had mistrusted Sparta, even before the peace, well knowing that she had separate interests from the confederacy,

arising from desire to get back her captives: in the terms of peace, it seemed as if Sparta and Athens alone were regarded, the interests of the remaining allies, especially those in Thrace, being put out of sight. Moreover, that article in the treaty of peace whereby it was provided that Athens and Sparta might by mutual consent add or strike out any article that they chose, without consulting the allies, excited general alarm, as if Sparta were meditating some treason in conjunction with Athens against the confederacy.[19] And the alarm, once roused, was still farther aggravated by the separate treaty of alliance between Sparta and Athens, which followed so closely afterwards, as well as by the restoration of the Spartan captives.

Such general displeasure among the Peloponnesian states at the unexpected combination of Athenians and Lacedæmonians, strengthened in the case of each particular state by private interests of its own, first manifested itself openly through the Corinthians. On retiring from the conferences at Sparta,—where the recent alliance between the Athenians and Spartans had just been made known, and where the latter had vainly endeavored to prevail upon their allies to accept the peace,—the Corinthians went straight to Argos to communicate what had passed, and to solicit interference. They suggested to the leading men in that city, that it was now the duty of Argos to step forward as saviour of Peloponnesus, which the Lacedæmonians were openly betraying to the common enemy, and to invite for that purpose, into alliance for reciprocal defence, every autonomous Hellenic state which would bind itself to give and receive amicable satisfaction in all points of difference. They affirmed that many cities, from hatred of Sparta, would gladly comply with such invitation; especially if a board of commissioners in small number were named, with full powers to admit all suitable applicants; so that, in case of rejection, there might at least be no exposure before the public assembly in the Argeian democracy. This suggestion—privately made by the Corinthians, who returned home immediately afterwards—was eagerly adopted both by leaders and people at Argos, as promising to realize their long-cherished pretensions to headship. Twelve commissioners were accordingly appointed, with power to admit any new allies whom they might think eligible, except Athens and Sparta. With either of those two cities, no treaty was allowed without the formal sanction of the public assembly.[20]

Meanwhile, the Corinthians, though they had been the first to set the Argeians in motion, nevertheless thought it right, before enrolling themselves publicly in the new alliance, to invite a congress of Peloponnesian malcontents to Corinth. It was the Mantineians who made the first application to Argos under the notice just issued. And here we are admitted to a partial view of the relations among the secondary and interior states of Peloponnesus. Mantineia and Tegea, being conterminous as well as the two most considerable states in Arcadia, were in perpetual rivalry, which had shown itself only a year and a half before in a bloody but indecisive battle.[21] Tegea, situated on the frontiers of Laconia, and oligarchically governed, was tenaciously attached to Sparta: while for that very reason, as well as from the democratical charac-

ter of her government, Mantineia was less so, though she was still enrolled in and acted as a member of the Peloponnesian confederacy. She had recently conquered for herself[22] a little empire in her own neighborhood, composed of village districts in Arcadia, reckoned as her subject allies, and comrades in her ranks at the last battle with Tegea. This conquest had been made even during the continuance of the war with Athens; a period when the lesser states of Peloponnesus generally, and even subject-states as against their own imperial states, were under the guarantee of the confederacy, to which they were required to render their unpaid service against the common enemy; so that she was apprehensive of Lacedæmonian interference at the request and for the emancipation of these subjects, who lay, moreover, near to the borders of Laconia. Such interference would probably have been invoked earlier; only that Sparta had been under pressing embarrassments—and farther, had assembled no general muster of the confederacy against Athens—ever since the disaster in Sphakteria. But now she had her hands free, together with a good pretext as well as motive for interference.

To maintain the autonomy of all the little states, and prevent any of them from being mediatized or grouped into aggregations under the ascendency of the greater, had been the general policy of Sparta; especially since her own influence as general leader was increased by insuring to every lesser state a substantive vote at the meetings of the confederacy.[23] Moreover, the rivalry of Tegea would probably operate here as an auxiliary motive against Mantineia. Under such apprehensions, the Mantineians hastened to court the alliance and protection of Argos, with whom they enjoyed the additional sympathy of a common democracy. Such revolt from Sparta[24] (for so it was considered) excited great sensation throughout Peloponnesus, together with considerable disposition, amidst the discontent then prevalent, to follow the example.

In particular, it contributed much to enhance the importance of the congress at Corinth; whither the Lacedæmonians thought it necessary to send special envoys to counteract the intrigues going on against them. Their envoy addressed to the Corinthians strenuous remonstrance, and even reproach, for the leading part which they had taken in stirring up dissension among the old confederates, and organizing a new confederacy under the presidency of Argos. "They (the Corinthians) were thus aggravating the original guilt and perjury which they had committed by setting at nought the formal vote of a majority of the confederacy, and refusing to accept the peace,—for it was the sworn and fundamental maxim of the confederacy, that the decision of the majority should be binding on all, except in such cases as involved some offence to gods or heroes." Encouraged by the presence of many sympathizing deputies, Bœotian, Megarian, Chalkidian from Thrace,[25] etc., the Corinthians replied with firmness. But they did not think it good policy to proclaim their real ground for rejecting the peace, namely, that it had not procured for themselves the restoration of Sollium and Anaktorium: since, first, this was a question in which their allies

present had no interest; next, it did not furnish any valid excuse for their resistance to the vote of the majority. Accordingly, they took their stand upon a pretence at once generous and religious; upon that reserve for religious scruples, which the Lacedæmonian envoy had himself admitted, and which of course was to be construed by each member with reference to his own pious feeling. "It *was* a religious impediment (the Corinthians contended) which prevented us from acceding to the peace with Athens, notwithstanding the vote of the majority; for we had previously exchanged oaths, ourselves apart from the confederacy, with the Chalkidians of Thrace at the time when they revolted from Athens: and we should have infringed those separate oaths, had we accepted a treaty of peace in which these Chalkidians were abandoned. As for alliance with Argos, we consider ourselves free to adopt any resolution which we may deem suitable, after consultation with our friends here present." With this unsatisfactory answer the Lacedæmonian envoys were compelled to return home. Yet some Argeian envoys, who were also present in the assembly for the purpose of urging the Corinthians to realize forthwith the hopes of alliance which they had held out to Argos, were still unable on their side to obtain a decided affirmative, being requested to come again at the next conference.[26]

Though the Corinthians had themselves originated the idea of the new Argeian confederacy and compromised Argos in an open proclamation, yet they now hesitated about the execution of their own scheme. They were restrained in part doubtless by the bitterness of Lacedæmonian reproof; for the open consummation of this revolt, apart from its grave political consequences, shocked a train of very old feelings; but still more by the discovery that their friends, who agreed with them in rejecting the peace, decidedly refused all open revolt from Sparta and all alliance with Argos. In this category were the Bœotians and Megarians. Both of these states—left to their own impression and judgment by the Lacedæmonians, who did not address to them any distinct appeal as they had done to the Corinthians—spontaneously turned away from Argos, not less from aversion towards the Argeian democracy than from sympathy with the oligarchy at Sparta:[27] they were linked together by communion of interest, not merely as being both neighbors and intense enemies of Attica, but as each having a body of democratical exiles who might perhaps find encouragement at Argos. Discouraged by the resistance of these two important allies, the Corinthians hung back from visiting Argos, until they were pushed forward by a new accidental impulse, the application of the Eleians; who, eagerly embracing the new project, sent envoys first to conclude alliance with the Corinthians, and next to go on and enroll Elis as an ally of Argos. This incident so confirmed the Corinthians in their previous scheme, that they speedily went to Argos, along with the Chalkidians of Thrace, to join the new confederacy.

The conduct of Elis, like that of Mantineia, in thus revolting from Sparta, had been dictated by private grounds of quarrel, arising out of relations with their dependent ally Lepreum. The Lepreates had become dependent on Elis some time before

the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, in consideration of aid lent by the Eleians to extricate them from a dangerous war against some Arcadian enemies. To purchase such aid, they had engaged to cede to the Eleians half their territory; but had been left in residence and occupation of it, under the stipulation of paying one talent yearly as tribute to the Olympian Zeus; in other words, to the Eleians as his stewards. When the Peloponnesian war began,[28] and the Lacedæmonians began to call for the unpaid service of the Peloponnesian cities generally, small as well as great, against Athens, the Lepreates were, by the standing agreement of the confederacy, exempted for the time from continuing to pay their tribute to Elis. Such exemption ceased with the war; at the close of which Elis became entitled, under the same agreement, to resume the suspended tribute. She accordingly required that the payment should then be recommenced: but the Lepreates refused, and when she proceeded to apply force, threw themselves on the protection of Sparta, by whose decision the Eleians themselves at first agreed to abide, having the general agreement of the confederacy decidedly in their favor. But it presently appeared that Sparta was more disposed to carry out her general system of favoring the autonomy of the lesser states, than to enforce the positive agreement of the confederacy. Accordingly the Eleians, accusing her of unjust bias, renounced her authority as arbitrator, and sent a military force to occupy Lepreum. Nevertheless, the Spartans persisted in their adjudication, pronounced Lepreum to be autonomous, and sent a body of their own hoplites to defend it against the Eleians. The latter loudly protested against this proceeding, and pronounced the Lacedæmonians as having robbed them of one of their dependencies, contrary to that agreement which had been adopted by the general confederacy when the war began,—to the effect that each imperial city should receive back at the end of the war all the dependencies which it possessed at the beginning, on condition of waiving its title to tribute and military service from them so long as the war lasted. After fruitless remonstrances with Sparta, the Eleians eagerly embraced the opportunity now offered of revolting from her, and of joining the new league with Corinth and Argos.[29]

That new league, including Argos, Corinth, Elis, and Mantineia, had now acquired such strength and confidence, that the Argeians and Corinthians proceeded on a joint embassy to Tegea to obtain the junction of that city, seemingly the most powerful in Peloponnesus next to Sparta and Argos. What grounds they had for expecting success we are not told. The mere fact of Mantineia having joined Argos, seemed likely to deter Tegea, as the rival Arcadian power, from doing the same: and so it proved, for the Tegeans decidedly refused the proposal, not without strenuous protestations that they would stand by Sparta in everything. The Corinthians were greatly disheartened by this repulse, which they had by no means expected, having been so far misled by general expressions of discontent against Sparta as to believe that they could transfer nearly the whole body of confederates to Argos. But they now began to despair of all farther extension of Argeian headship, and even to regard their own position as insecure on the side of Athens; with whom they were not

at peace, while by joining Argos they had forfeited their claim upon Sparta and all her confederacy, including Bœotia and Megara. In this embarrassment they betook themselves to the Bœotians, whom they again entreated to join them in the Argeian alliance: a request already once refused, and not likely to be now granted, but intended to usher in a different request preferred at the same time. The Bœotians were entreated to accompany the Corinthians to Athens, and obtain for them from the Athenians an armistice terminable at ten days' notice, such as that which they had contracted for themselves. In case of refusal, they were farther entreated to throw up their own agreement, and to conclude no other without the concurrence of the Corinthians. So far the Bœotians complied, as to go to Athens with the Corinthians, and back their application for an armistice, which the Athenians declined to grant, saying that the Corinthians were already included in the general peace, if they were allies of Sparta. On receiving this answer the Corinthians entreated the Bœotians, putting it as a matter of obligation, to renounce their own armistice, and make common cause as to all future compact. But this request was steadily refused. The Bœotians maintained their ten days' armistice; and the Corinthians were obliged to acquiesce in their existing condition of peace *de facto*, though not guaranteed by any pledge of Athens.[30]

Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians were not unmindful of the affront which they had sustained by the revolt of Mantineia and Elis. At the request of a party among the Parrhasii, the Arcadian subjects of Mantineia, they marched under king Pleistoanax into that territory, and compelled the Mantineians to evacuate the fort which they had erected within it; which the latter were unable to defend, though they received a body of Argeian troops to guard their city, and were thus enabled to march their whole force to the threatened spot. Besides liberating the Arcadian subjects of Mantineia, the Lacedæmonians also planted an additional body of Helots and Neodamodes at Lepreum, as a defence and means of observation on the frontiers of Elis. [31] These were the Brasidean soldiers, whom Klearidas had now brought back from Thrace. The Helots among them had been manumitted as a reward, and allowed to reside where they chose. But as they had imbibed lessons of bravery under their distinguished commander, their presence would undoubtedly be dangerous among the serfs of Laconia: hence the disposition of the Lacedæmonians to plant them out. We may recollect that not very long before, they had caused two thousand of the most soldierly Helots to be secretly assassinated, without any ground of suspicion against these victims personally, but simply from fear of the whole body and of course greater fear of the bravest.[32]

It was not only against danger from the returning Brasidean Helots that the Lacedæmonians had to guard, but also against danger—real or supposed—from their own Spartan captives, liberated by Athens at the conclusion of the recent alliance. Though the surrender of Sphakteria had been untarnished by any dishonor, nevertheless these men could hardly fail to be looked upon as degraded, in the eyes of

Spartan pride; or at least they might fancy that they were so looked upon, and thus become discontented. Some of them were already in the exercise of various functions, when the ephors contracted suspicions of their designs, and condemned them all to temporary disqualification for any official post, placing the whole of their property under trust-management, and interdicting them, like minors, from every act either of purchase or sale.[33] This species of disfranchisement lasted for a considerable time; but the sufferers were at length relieved from it, the danger being supposed to be over. The nature of the interdict confirms, what we know directly from Thucydidês, that many of these captives were among the first and wealthiest families in the state, and the ephors may have apprehended that they would employ their wealth in acquiring partisans and organizing revolt among the Helots. We have no facts to enable us to appreciate the situation; but the ungenerous spirit of the regulation, as applied to brave warriors recently come home from a long imprisonment—justly pointed out by modern historians—would not weigh much with the ephors under any symptoms of public danger.

Of the proceedings of the Athenians during this summer we hear nothing, except that the town of Skiônê at length surrendered to them after a long-continued blockade, and that they put to death the male population of military age, selling the women and children into slavery. The odium of having proposed this cruel resolution two years and a half before, belongs to Kleon; that of executing it, nearly a year after his death, to the leaders who succeeded him, and to his countrymen generally. The reader will, however, now be sufficiently accustomed to the Greek laws of war not to be surprised at such treatment against subjects revolted and reconquered. Skiônê and its territory was made over to the Platæan refugees. The native population of Delos, also, who had been removed from that sacred spot during the preceding year, under the impression that they were too impure for the discharge of the sacerdotal functions, were now restored to their island. The subsequent defeat of Amphipolis had created a belief at Athens that this removal had offended the gods; under which impression, confirmed by the Delphian oracle, the Athenians now showed their repentance by restoring the Delian exiles.[34] They farther lost the towns of Thyssus on the peninsula of Athos, and Mekyberna on the Sithonian gulf, which were captured by the Chalkidians of Thrace.[35]

Meanwhile the political relations throughout the powerful Grecian states remained all provisional and undetermined. The alliance still subsisted between Sparta and Athens, yet with continual complaints on the part of the latter that the prior treaty remained unfulfilled. The members of the Spartan confederacy were discontented; some had seceded, and others seemed likely to do the same; while Argos, ambitious to supplant Sparta, was trying to put herself at the head of a new confederacy, though as yet with very partial success. Hitherto, however, the authorities of Sparta—king Pleistoanax as well as the ephors of the year—had been sincerely desirous to maintain the Athenian alliance, so far as it could be done without sacrifice, and with-

out the real employment of force against recusants, of which they had merely talked in order to amuse the Athenians. Moreover, the prodigious advantage which they had gained by recovering the prisoners, doubtless making them very popular at home, would attach them the more firmly to their own measure. But at the close of the summer—seemingly about the end of September or beginning of October, B.C. 421—the year of these ephors expired, and new ephors were nominated for the ensuing year. Under the existing state of things this was an important revolution: for out of the five new ephors, two—Kleobûlus and Xenarês—were decidedly hostile to peace with Athens, and the remaining three apparently indifferent.[36] And we may here remark, that this fluctuation and instability of public policy, which is often denounced as if it were the peculiar attribute of a democracy, occurs quite as much under the constitutional monarchy of Sparta, the least popular government in Greece, both in principle and detail.

The new ephors convened a special congress at Sparta for the settlement of the pending differences, at which among the rest Athenian, Bœotian, and Corinthian envoys were all present. But, after prolonged debates, no approach was made to agreement; so that the congress was on the point of breaking up, when Kleobûlus and Xenarês, together with many of their partisans,[37] originated, in concert with the Bœotian and Corinthian deputies, a series of private underhand manœuvres for the dissolution of the Athenian alliance. This was to be effected by bringing about a separate alliance between Argos and Sparta, which the Spartans sincerely desired, and would grasp at in preference, so these ephors affirmed, even if it cost them the breach of their new tie with Athens. The Bœotians were urged, first to become allies of Argos themselves, and then to bring Argos into alliance with Sparta. But it was farther essential that they should give up Panaktum to Sparta, so that it might be tendered to the Athenians in exchange for Pylos; for Sparta could not easily go to war with them while they remained masters of the latter.[38]

Such were the plans which Kleobûlus and Xenarês laid with the Corinthian and Bœotian deputies, and which the latter went home prepared to execute. Chance seemed to favor the purpose at once: for on their road home, they were accosted by two Argeians, senators in their own city, who expressed an earnest anxiety to bring about alliance between the Bœotians and Argos. The Bœotian deputies, warmly encouraging this idea, urged the Argeians to send envoys to Thebes as solicitors of the alliance; and communicated to the bœotarchs, on their arrival at home, both the plans laid by the Spartan ephors and the wishes of these Argeians. The bœotarchs also entered heartily into the entire scheme; receiving the Argeian envoys with marked favor, and promising, as soon as they should have obtained the requisite sanction, to send envoys of their own and ask for alliance with Argos.

That sanction was to be obtained from "the Four Senates of the Bœotians;" bodies, of the constitution of which nothing is known. But they were usually found so passive and acquiescent that the bœotarchs, reckoning upon their assent as a matter

of course, even without any full exposition of reasons, laid all their plans accordingly.[39] They proposed to these four Senates a resolution in general terms, empowering themselves in the name of the Bœotian federation to exchange oaths of alliance with any Grecian city which might be willing to contract on terms mutually beneficial: their particular object being, as they stated, to form alliance with the Corinthians, Megarians, and Chalkidians of Thrace, for mutual defence, and for war as well as peace with others only by common consent. To this specific object they anticipated no resistance on the part of the Senates, inasmuch as their connection with Corinth had always been intimate, while the position of the four parties named was the same, all being recusants of the recent peace. But the resolution was advisedly couched in the most comprehensive terms, in order that it might authorize them to proceed farther afterwards, and conclude alliance on the part of the Bœotians and Megarians with Argos; that ulterior purpose being however for the present kept back, because alliance with Argos was a novelty which might surprise and alarm the Senates. The manœuvre, skilfully contrived for entrapping these bodies into an approval of measures which they never contemplated, illustrates the manner in which an oligarchical executive could elude the checks devised to control its proceedings. But the bœotarchs, to their astonishment, found themselves defeated at the outset: for the Senates would not even hear of alliance with Corinth, so much did they fear to offend Sparta by any special connection with a city which had revolted from her. Nor did the bœotarchs think it safe to divulge their communications with Kleobûlus and Xenarês, or to acquaint the Senates that the whole plan originated with a powerful party in Sparta herself. Accordingly, under this formal refusal on the part of the Senates, no farther proceedings could be taken. The Corinthian and Chalkidian envoys left Thebes, while the promise of sending Bœotian envoys to Argos remained unexecuted.[40]

But the anti-Athenian ephors at Sparta, though baffled in their schemes for arriving at the Argeian alliance through the agency of the Bœotians, did not the less persist in their views upon Panaktum. That place—a frontier fortress in the mountainous range between Attica and Bœotia, apparently on the Bœotian side of Phylê, and on or near the direct road from Athens to Thebes which led through Phylê[41]—had been an Athenian possession, until six months before the peace, when it had been treacherously betrayed to the Bœotians.[42] A special provision of the treaty between Athens and Sparta, prescribed that it should be restored to Athens; and Lacedæmonian envoys were now sent on an express mission to Bœotia, to request from the Bœotians the delivery of Panaktum as well as of their Athenian captives, in order that by tendering these to Athens she might be induced to surrender Pylos. The Bœotians refused compliance with this request, except on condition that Sparta should enter into special alliance with them as she had done with the Athenians. Now the Spartans stood pledged by their covenant with the latter, either by its terms or by its recognized import, not to enter into any new alliance without their consent. But they were eagerly bent upon getting possession of Panaktum; while the prospect of

breach with Athens, far from being a deterring motive, was exactly that which Kleobûlus and Xenarês desired. Under these feelings, the Lacedæmonians consented to and swore the special alliance with Bœotia. But the Bœotians, instead of handing over Panaktum for surrender, as they had promised, immediately razed the fortress to the ground; under pretence of some ancient oaths which had been exchanged between their ancestors and the Athenians, to the effect that the district round it should always remain without resident inhabitants, as a neutral strip of borderland, and under common pasture.

These negotiations, after having been in progress throughout the winter, ended in the accomplishment of the alliance and the destruction of Panaktum at the beginning of spring or about the middle of March. And while the Lacedæmonian ephors thus seemed to be carrying their point on the side of Bœotia, they were agreeably surprised by an unexpected encouragement to their views from another quarter. An embassy arrived at Sparta from Argos, to solicit renewal of the peace just expiring. The Argeians found that they made no progress in the enlargement of their newly-formed confederacy, while their recent disappointment with the Bœotians made them despair of realizing their ambitious projects of Peloponnesian headship. But when they learned that the Lacedæmonians had concluded a separate alliance with the Bœotians, and that Panaktum had been razed, their disappointment was converted into positive alarm for the future. Naturally inferring that this new alliance would not have been concluded except in concert with Athens, they interpreted the whole proceeding as indicating that Sparta had prevailed upon the Bœotians to accept the peace with Athens, the destruction of Panaktum being conceived as a compromise to obviate disputes respecting possession. Under such a persuasion,—noway unreasonable in itself, when the two contracting governments, both oligarchical and both secret, furnished no collateral evidence to explain their real intent,—the Argeians saw themselves excluded from alliance not merely with Bœotia, Sparta, and Tegea, but also with Athens; which latter city they had hitherto regarded as a sure resort in case of hostility with Sparta. Without a moment's delay, they despatched Eustrophus and Æson, two Argeians much esteemed at Sparta, and perhaps proxeni of that city, to press for a renewal of their expiring truce with the Spartans, and to obtain the best terms they could.

To the Lacedæmonian ephors this application was eminently acceptable, the very event which they had been manœuvring underhand to bring about: and negotiations were opened, in which the Argeian envoys at first proposed that the disputed possession of Thyrea should be referred to arbitration. But they found their demand met by a peremptory negative, the Lacedæmonians refusing to enter upon such a discussion, and insisting upon simple renewal of the peace now at an end. At last the Argeian envoys, eagerly bent upon keeping the question respecting Thyrea open, in some way or other, prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to assent to the following singular agreement. Peace was concluded between Athens and Sparta for fifty years;

but if at any moment within that interval, excluding either periods of epidemic or periods of war, it should suit the views of either party to provoke a combat by chosen champions of equal number for the purpose of determining the right to Thyrea, there was to be full liberty of doing so; the combat to take place within the territory of Thyrea itself, and the victors to be interdicted from pursuing the vanquished beyond the undisputed border of either territory. It will be recollected, that about one hundred and twenty years before this date, there had been a combat of this sort by three hundred champions on each side, in which, after desperate valor on both sides, the victory as well as the disputed right still remained undetermined. The proposition made by the Argeians was a revival of this old practice of judicial combat: nevertheless, such was the alteration which the Greek mind had undergone during the interval, that it now appeared a perfect absurdity, even in the eyes of the Lacedæmonians, the most old-fashioned people in Greece.[43] Yet since they hazarded nothing, practically, by so vague a concession, and were supremely anxious to make their relations smooth with Argos, in contemplation of a breach with Athens, they at last agreed to the condition, drew up the treaty, and placed it in the hands of the envoys to carry back to Argos. Formal acceptance and ratification, by the Argeian public assembly, was necessary to give it validity: should this be granted, the envoys were invited to return to Sparta at the festival of the Hyakinthia, and there go through the solemnity of the oaths.

Amidst such strange crossing of purposes and interests, the Spartan ephors seemed now to have carried all their points; friendship with Argos, breach with Athens, and yet the means—through the possession of Panaktum—of procuring from Athens the cession of Pylos. But they were not yet on firm ground. For when their deputies, Andromedês and two colleagues, arrived in Bœotia for the purpose of going on to Athens and prosecuting the negotiation about Panaktum, at the time when Eustrophus and Æson were carrying on their negotiation at Sparta, they discovered for the first time that the Bœotians, instead of performing their promise to hand over Panaktum, had razed it to the ground. This was a serious blow to their chance of success at Athens: nevertheless, Andromedês proceeded thither, taking with him all the Athenian captives in Bœotia. These he restored at Athens, at the same time announcing the demolition of Panaktum as a fact: Panaktum as well as the prisoners was thus *restored*, he pretended; for the Athenians would not now find a single enemy in the place: and he claimed the cession of Pylos in exchange.[44]

But he soon found that the final term of Athenian compliance had been reached. It was probably on this occasion that the separate alliance concluded between Sparta and the Bœotians first became discovered at Athens; since not only were the proceedings of these oligarchical governments habitually secret, but there was a peculiar motive for keeping this alliance concealed until the discussion about Panaktum and Pylos had been brought to a close. Both this alliance, and the demolition of Panaktum, excited among the Athenians the strongest marks of disgust and anger;

aggravated probably rather than softened by the quibble of Andromedês, that demolition of the fort, being tantamount to restitution, and precluding any farther tenancy by the enemy, was a substantial satisfaction of the treaty; and aggravated still farther by the recollection of all the other unperformed items in the treaty. A whole year had now elapsed, amidst frequent notes and protocols, to employ a modern phrase; yet not one of the conditions favorable to Athens had yet been executed, except the restitution of her captives, seemingly not many in number; while she on her side had made to Sparta the capital cession on which almost everything hinged. A long train of accumulated indignation, brought to a head by this mission of Andromedês, discharged itself in the harshest dismissal and rebuke of himself and his colleagues.[45]

Even Nikias, Lachês, and the other leading men, to whose improvident facility and misjudgment the embarrassment of the moment was owing, were probably not much behind the general public in exclamation against Spartan perfidy, if it were only to divert attention from their own mistake. But there was one of them—Alkibiadês son of Kleinias—who took this opportunity of putting himself at the head of the vehement anti-Laconian sentiment which now agitated the ekklesia, and giving to it a substantive aim.

The present is the first occasion on which we hear of this remarkable man as taking a prominent part in public life. He was now about thirty-one or thirty-two years old, which in Greece was considered an early age for a man to exercise important command. But such was the splendor, wealth, and antiquity of his family, of Æakid lineage through the heroes Eurysakês and Ajax, and such the effect of that lineage upon the democratical public of Athens,[46] that he stepped speedily and easily into a conspicuous station. Belonging also through his mother Deinomachê to the gens of the Alkmæonidæ, he was related to Periklês, who became his guardian when he was left an orphan at about five years old, along with his younger brother Kleinias. It was at that time that their father Kleinias was slain at the battle of Koroneia, having already served with honor in a trireme of his own at the sea-fight of Artemisium against the Persians. A Spartan nurse named Amykla was provided for the young Alkibiadês, and a slave named Zopyrus chosen by his distinguished guardian to watch over him; but even his boyhood was utterly ungovernable, and Athens was full of his freaks and enormities, to the unavailing regret of Periklês and his brother Ariphron.[47] His violent passions, love of enjoyment, ambition of preëminence, and insolence towards others,[48] were manifested at an early age, and never deserted him throughout his life. His finished beauty of person both as boy, youth, and mature man, caused him to be much run after by women,[49] and even by women of generally reserved habits. Moreover, even before the age when such temptations were usually presented, the beauty of his earlier youth, while going through the ordinary gymnastic training, procured for him assiduous caresses, compliments, and solicitations of every sort, from the leading Athenians who frequented the public palæstræ. These men not only endured his petulance, but were even flattered when he would

condescend to bestow it upon them. Amidst such universal admiration and indulgence, amidst corrupting influences exercised from so many quarters and from so early an age, combined with great wealth and the highest position, it was not likely that either self-restraint or regard for the welfare of others would ever acquire development in the mind of Alkibiadês. The anecdotes which fill his biography reveal the utter absence of both these constituent elements of morality; and though, in regard to the particular stories, allowance must doubtless be made for scandal and exaggeration, yet the general type of character stands plainly marked and sufficiently established in all.

A dissolute life, and an immoderate love of pleasure in all its forms, is what we might naturally expect from a young man so circumstanced; and it appears that with him these tastes were indulged with an offensive publicity which destroyed the comfort of his wife Hipparetê, daughter of Hipponikus who was slain at the battle of Delium. She had brought him a large dowry of ten talents: when she sought a divorce, as the law of Athens permitted, Alkibiadês violently interposed to prevent her from obtaining the benefit of the law, and brought her back by force to his house even from the presence of the magistrate. It is this violence of selfish passion, and reckless disregard of social obligation towards every one, which forms the peculiar characteristic of Alkibiadês. He strikes the schoolmaster whose house he happens to find unprovided with a copy of Homer; he strikes Taureas,[50] a rival chorêgus, in the public theatre, while the representation is going on; he strikes Hipponikus, who afterwards became his father-in-law, out of a wager of mere wantonness, afterwards appeasing him by an ample apology; he protects the Thasian poet Hêgêmon, against whom an indictment had been formally lodged before the archon, by effacing it with his own hand from the published list in the public edifice, called Metrôon; defying both magistrate and accuser to press the cause on for trial.[51] Nor does it appear that any injured person ever dared to bring Alkibiadês to trial before the dikastery, though we read with amazement the tissue of lawlessness[52] which marked his private life; a combination of insolence and ostentation with occasional mean deceit when it suited his purpose. But amidst the perfect legal, judicial, and constitutional equality, which reigned among the citizens of Athens, there still remained great social inequalities between one man and another, handed down from the times preceding the democracy: inequalities which the democratical institutions limited in their practical mischiefs, but never either effaced or discredited, and which were recognized as modifying elements in the current, unconscious vein of sentiment and criticism, by those whom they injured as well as by those whom they favored. In the speech which Thucydidês[53] ascribes to Alkibiadês before the Athenian public assembly, we find the insolence of wealth and high social position not only admitted as a fact, but vindicated as a just morality; and the history of his life, as well as many other facts in Athenian society, show that if not approved, it was at least tolerated in practice to a serious extent, in spite of the restraints of the democracy.

Amidst such unprincipled exorbitances of behavior, Alkibiadês stood distinguished for personal bravery. He served as a hoplite in the army under Phormion at the siege of Potidæa in 432 B.C. Though then hardly twenty years of age, he was among the most forward soldiers in the battle, received a severe wound, and was in great danger; owing his life only to the exertions of Sokratês, who served in the ranks along with him. Eight years afterwards, Alkibiadês also served with credit in the cavalry at the battle of Delium, and had the opportunity of requiting his obligation to Sokratês, by protecting him against the Bœotian pursuers. As a rich young man, also, choregy and trierarchy became incumbent upon him; expensive duties, which, as we might expect, he discharged not merely with sufficiency, but with ostentation. In fact, expenditure of this sort, though compulsory up to a certain point upon all rich men, was so fully repaid, to all those who had the least ambition, in the shape of popularity and influence, that most of them spontaneously went beyond the requisite minimum for the purpose of showing themselves off. The first appearance of Alkibiadês in public life is said to have been as a donor, for some special purpose, in the ekklesia, when various citizens were handing in their contributions: and the loud applause which his subscription provoked was at that time so novel and exciting to him, that he suffered a tame quail which he carried in his bosom to escape. This incident excited mirth and sympathy among the citizens present: the bird was caught and restored to him by Antiochus, who from that time forward acquired his favor, and in after days became his pilot and confidential lieutenant.[54]

To a young man like Alkibiadês, thirsting for power and preëminence, a certain measure of rhetorical facility and persuasive power was indispensable. With a view to this acquisition, he frequented the society of various sophistical and rhetorical teachers,[55] Prodikus, Protagoras, and others; but most of all that of Sokratês. His intimacy with Sokratês has become celebrated on many grounds, and is commemorated both by Plato and Xenophon, though unfortunately with less instruction than we could desire. We may readily believe Xenophon, when he tells us that Alkibiadês—like the oligarchical Kritias, of whom we shall have much to say hereafter—was attracted to Sokratês by his unrivalled skill of dialectical conversation, his suggestive influence over the minds of his hearers, in eliciting new thoughts and combinations, his mastery of apposite and homely illustrations, his power of seeing far beforehand the end of a long cross-examination, his ironical affectation of ignorance, whereby the humiliation of opponents was rendered only the more complete, when they were convicted of inconsistency and contradiction out of their own answers. The exhibitions of such ingenuity were in themselves highly interesting, and stimulating to the mental activity of listeners, while the faculty itself was one of peculiar value to those who proposed to take the lead in public debate; with which view both these ambitious young men tried to catch the knack from Sokratês,[56] and to copy his formidable string of interrogations. Both of them doubtless involuntarily respected the poor, self-sufficing, honest, temperate, and brave citizen, in whom this eminent talent resided; especially Alkibiadês, who not only owed his life to the generous valor of Sokratês at Potidæa,

but had also learned in that service to admire the iron physical frame of the philosopher in his armor, enduring hunger, cold, and hardship.[57] But we are not to suppose that either of them came to Sokratês with the purpose of hearing and obeying his precepts on matters of duty, or receiving from him a new plan of life. They came partly to gratify an intellectual appetite, partly to acquire a stock of words and ideas, with facility of argumentative handling, suitable for their after-purpose as public speakers. Subjects moral, political, and intellectual, served as the theme sometimes of discourse, sometimes of discussion, in the society of all these sophists, Prodikus and Protagoras not less than Sokratês; for in the Athenian sense of the word, Sokratês was a sophist as well as the others: and to the rich youths of Athens, like Alkibiadês and Kritias, such society was highly useful.[58] It imparted a nobler aim to their ambition, including mental accomplishments as well as political success: it enlarged the range of their understandings, and opened to them as ample a vein of literature and criticism as the age afforded: it accustomed them to canvass human conduct, with the causes and obstructions of human well-being, both public and private: it even suggested to them indirectly lessons of duty and prudence, from which their social position tended to estrange them, and which they would hardly have submitted to hear except from the lips of one whom they intellectually admired. In learning to talk, they were forced to learn more or less to think, and familiarized with the difference between truth and error: nor would an eloquent lecturer fail to enlist their feelings in the great topics of morals and politics. Their thirst for mental stimulus and rhetorical accomplishments had thus, as far as it went, a moralizing effect, though this was rarely their purpose in the pursuit.[59]

Alkibiadês, full of impulse and ambition of every kind, enjoyed the conversation of all the eminent talkers and lecturers to be found in Athens, that of Sokratês most of all and most frequently. The philosopher became greatly attached to him, and doubtless lost no opportunity of inculcating on him salutary lessons, as far as could be done, without disgusting the pride of a haughty and spoiled youth who was looking forward to the celebrity of public life. But unhappily his lessons never produced any serious effect, and ultimately became even distasteful to the pupil. The whole life of Alkibiadês attests how faintly the sentiment of obligation, public or private, ever got footing in his mind; how much the ends which he pursued were dictated by overbearing vanity and love of aggrandizement. In the later part of life, Sokratês was marked out to public hatred by his enemies, as having been the teacher of Alkibiadês and Kritias. And if we could be so unjust as to judge of the morality of the teacher by that of these two pupils, we should certainly rank him among the worst of the Athenian sophists.

At the age of thirty-one or thirty-two, the earliest at which it was permitted to look forward to an ascendent position in public life, Alkibiadês came forward with a reputation stained by private enormities, and with a number of enemies created by his insolent demeanor. But this did not hinder him from stepping into that position to

which his rank, connections, and club-partisans, afforded him introduction; nor was he slow in displaying his extraordinary energy, decision, and capacity of command. From the beginning to the end of his eventful political life, he showed a combination of boldness in design, resource in contrivance, and vigor in execution, not surpassed by any one of his contemporary Greeks: and what distinguished him from all was his extraordinary flexibility of character[60] and consummate power of adapting himself to new habits, new necessities, and new persons, whenever circumstances required. Like Themistoklês, whom he resembled as well in ability and vigor as in want of public principle and in recklessness about means, Alkibiadês was essentially a man of action. Eloquence was in him a secondary quality, subordinate to action; and though he possessed enough of it for his purposes, his speeches were distinguished only for pertinence of matter, often imperfectly expressed, at least according to the high standard of Athens.[61] But his career affords a memorable example of splendid qualities, both for action and command, ruined and turned into instruments of mischief by the utter want of morality, public and private. A strong tide of individual hatred was thus roused against him, as well from middling citizens whom he had insulted, as from rich men whom his ruinous ostentation outshone. For his exorbitant voluntary expenditure in the public festivals, transcending the largest measure of private fortune, satisfied discerning men that he would reimburse himself by plundering the public, and even, if opportunity offered, by overthrowing[62] the constitution to make himself master of the persons and properties of his fellow-citizens. He never inspired confidence or esteem in any one; and sooner or later, among a public like that of Athens, so much accumulated odium and suspicion was sure to bring a public man to ruin, in spite of the strongest admiration for his capacity. He was always the object of very conflicting sentiments: "The Athenians desired him, hated him, but still wished to have him," was said in the latter years of his life by a contemporary poet; while we find also another pithy precept delivered in regard to him: "You ought not to keep a lion's whelp in your city at all; but, if you choose to keep him, you must submit yourself to his behavior."[63] Athens had to feel the force of his energy, as an exile and enemy, but the great harm which he did to her was in his capacity of adviser; awakening in his countrymen the same thirst for showy, rapacious, uncertain, perilous aggrandizement which dictated his own personal actions.

Mentioning Alkibiadês now for the first time, I have somewhat anticipated on future chapters, in order to present a general idea of his character, hereafter to be illustrated. But at the moment which we have now reached (March, 420 B.C.) the lion's whelp was yet young, and had neither acquired his entire strength nor disclosed his full-grown claws.

He began to put himself forward as a party leader, seemingly not long before the Peace of Nikias. The political traditions hereditary in his family, as in that of his relation Periklês, were democratical: his grandfather Alkibiadês had been vehement in his opposition to the Peisistratids, and had even afterwards publicly renounced an es-

tablished connection of hospitality with the Lacedæmonian government, from strong antipathy to them on political grounds. But Alkibiadês himself, in commencing political life, departed from this family tradition, and presented himself as a partisan of oligarchical and philo-Laconian sentiment, doubtless far more consonant to his natural temper than the democratical. He thus started in the same general party with Nikias and Thessalus son of Kimôn, who afterwards became his bitter opponents; and it was in part probably to put himself on a par with them, that he took the marked step of trying to revive the ancient family tie of hospitality with Sparta, which his grandfather had broken off.[64]

To promote this object, he displayed peculiar solicitude for the good treatment of the Spartan captives, during their detention at Athens. Many of them being of high family at Sparta, he naturally calculated upon their gratitude, as well as upon the favorable sympathies of their countrymen, whenever they should be restored. He advocated both the peace and the alliance with Sparta, and the restoration of her captives; and indeed not only advocated these measures, but tendered his services, and was eager to be employed, as the agent of Sparta for carrying them through at Athens. From these selfish hopes in regard to Sparta, and especially from the expectation of acquiring, through the agency of the restored captives, the title of Proxenus of Sparta, Alkibiadês thus became a partisan of the blind and gratuitous philo-Laconian concessions of Nikias. But the captives on their return were either unable, or unwilling, to carry the point which he wished; while the authorities at Sparta rejected all his advances, not without a contemptuous sneer at the idea of confiding important political interests to the care of a youth chiefly known for ostentation, profligacy, and insolence. That the Spartans should thus judge, is noway astonishing, considering their extreme reverence both for old age and for strict discipline. They naturally preferred Nikias and Lachês, whose prudence would commend, if it did not originally suggest, their mistrust of the new claimant. Nor had Alkibiadês yet shown the mighty movement of which he was capable. But this contemptuous refusal of the Spartans stung him so to the quick, that, making an entire revolution in his political course,[65] he immediately threw himself into anti-Laconian politics with an energy and ability which he was not before known to possess.

The moment was favorable, since the recent death of Kleon, for a new political leader to espouse this side; and was rendered still more favorable by the conduct of the Lacedæmonians. Month after month passed, remonstrance after remonstrance was addressed, yet not one of the restitutions prescribed by the treaty in favor of Athens had yet been accomplished. Alkibiadês had therefore ample pretext for altering his tone respecting the Spartans, and for denouncing them as deceivers who had broken their solemn oaths, abusing the generous confidence of Athens. Under his present antipathies, his attention naturally turned to Argos, in which city he possessed some powerful friends and family guests. The condition of that city, now free by the expiration of the peace with Sparta, opened a possibility of connection with

Athens, and this policy was strongly recommended by Alkibiadês, who insisted that Sparta was playing false with the Athenians, merely in order to keep their hands tied until she had attacked and put down Argos separately. This particular argument had less force when it was seen that Argos acquired new and powerful allies, Mantineia, Elis, and Corinth; but on the other hand, such acquisitions rendered Argos positively more valuable as an ally to the Athenians.

It was not so much, however, the inclination towards Argos, but the growing wrath against Sparta, which furthered the philo-Argeian plans of Alkibiadês; and when the Lacedæmonian envoy Andromedês arrived at Athens from Bœotia, tendering to the Athenians the mere ruins of Panaktum in exchange for Pylos; when it farther became known that the Spartans had already concluded a special alliance with the Bœotians without consulting Athens, the unmeasured expression of displeasure in the Athenian ekklesia showed Alkibiadês that the time was now come for bringing on a substantive decision. While he lent his own voice to strengthen this discontent against Sparta, he at the same time despatched a private intimation to his correspondents at Argos, exhorting them, under assurances of success and promise of his own strenuous aid, to send without delay an embassy to Athens in conjunction with the Mantineians and Eleians, requesting to be admitted as Athenian allies. The Argeians received this intimation at the very moment when their citizens Eustrophus and Æson were negotiating at Sparta for the renewal of the peace, having been sent thither under great uneasiness lest Argos should be left without allies to contend single-handed against the Lacedæmonians. But no sooner was the unexpected chance held out to them of alliance with Athens, a former friend, a democracy like their own, an imperial state at sea, but not interfering with their own primacy in Peloponnesus, —than they became careless of Eustrophus and Æson, and despatched forthwith to Athens the embassy advised. It was a joint embassy, Argeian, Eleian, and Mantineian:[66] the alliance between these three cities had already been rendered more intimate by a second treaty concluded since that treaty to which Corinth was a party; but Corinth had refused all concern in the second.[67]

But the Spartans had been already alarmed by the harsh repulse of their envoy Andromedês, and probably warned by reports from Nikias and their other Athenian friends of the crisis impending respecting alliance between Athens and Argos. Accordingly they sent off without a moment's delay three citizens extremely popular at Athens,[68] Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius; with full powers to settle all matters of difference. The envoys were instructed to deprecate all alliance of Athens with Argos, to explain that the alliance of Sparta with Bœotia had been concluded without any purpose or possibility of evil to Athens, and at the same time to renew the demand that Pylos should be restored to them in exchange for the demolished Panaktum. Such was still the confidence of the Lacedæmonians in the strength of assent at Athens, that they did not yet despair of obtaining an affirmative, even to this very unequal proposition: and when the three envoys, under the introduction and advice

of Nikias, had their first interview with the Athenian senate, preparatory to an audience before the public assembly, the impression which they made, on stating that they came with full powers of settlement, was highly favorable. It was indeed so favorable, that Alkibiadês became alarmed lest, if they made the same statement in the public assembly, holding out the prospect of some trifling concessions, the philo-Laconian party might determine public feeling to accept a compromise, and thus preclude all idea of alliance with Argos.

To obviate such a defeat of his plans, he resorted to a singular manœuvre. One of the Lacedæmonian envoys, Endius, was his private guest, by an ancient and particular intimacy subsisting between their two families.[69] This probably assisted in procuring for him a secret interview with the envoys, and enabled him to address them with greater effect, on the day before the meeting of the public assembly, and without the knowledge of Nikias. He accosted them in the tone of a friend of Sparta, anxious that their proposition should succeed; but he intimated that they would find the public assembly turbulent and angry, very different from the tranquil demeanor of the senate: so that if they proclaimed themselves to have come with full powers of settlement, the people would burst out with fury, to act upon their fears and bully them into extravagant concessions. He therefore strongly urged them to declare that they had come, not with any full powers of settlement, but merely to explain, discuss, and report: the people would then find that they could gain nothing by intimidation, explanations would be heard, and disputed points be discussed with temper, and he (Alkibiadês) would speak emphatically in their favor. He would advise, and felt confident that he could persuade, the Athenians to restore Pylos, a step which his opposition had hitherto been the chief means of preventing. He gave them his solemn pledge—confirmed by an oath, according to Plutarch—that he would adopt this conduct, if they would act upon his counsel.[70] The envoys were much struck with the apparent sagacity of these suggestions,[71] and still more delighted to find that the man from whom they anticipated the most formidable opposition was prepared to speak in their favor. His language obtained with them, probably, the more ready admission and confidence, inasmuch as he had volunteered his services to become the political agent of Sparta only a few months before; and he appeared now to be simply resuming that policy. They were sure of the support of Nikias and his party, under all circumstances; if, by complying with the recommendation of Alkibiadês, they could gain *his* strenuous advocacy and influence also, they fancied that their cause was sure of success. Accordingly, they agreed to act upon his suggestion, not only without consulting but without even warning Nikias, which was exactly what Alkibiadês desired, and had probably required them to promise.

Next day, the public assembly met, and the envoys were introduced; upon which Alkibiadês himself, in a tone of peculiar mildness, put the question to them, upon what footing they came?[72] what powers they brought with them? They immediately declared that they had brought no full powers for treating and settlement, but only

came to explain and discuss. Nothing could exceed the astonishment with which this declaration was heard. The senators present, to whom these envoys a day or two before had publicly declared the distinct contrary,—the assembled people, who, made aware of this previous affirmation, had come prepared to hear the ultimatum of Sparta from their lips,—lastly, most of all, Nikias himself,—their confidential agent and probably their host at Athens,—who had doubtless announced them as plenipotentiaries, and concerted with them the management of their cases before the assembly,—all were alike astounded, and none knew what to make of the words just heard. But the indignation of the people equalled their astonishment: there was a unanimous burst of wrath against the standing faithlessness and duplicity of Lacedæmonians; never saying the same thing two days together. To crown the whole, Alkibiadês himself affected to share all the surprise of the multitude, and was even the loudest of them all in invectives against the envoys; denouncing Lacedæmonian perfidy and evil designs in language far more bitter than he had ever employed before. Nor was this all:[73] he took advantage of the vehement acclamation which welcomed these invectives to propose that the Argeian envoys should be called in and the alliance with Argos concluded forthwith. And this would certainly have been done, if a remarkable phenomenon—an earthquake—had not occurred to prevent it; causing the assembly to be adjourned to the next day, pursuant to a religious scruple then recognized as paramount.

This remarkable anecdote comes in all its main circumstances from Thucydidês. It illustrates forcibly that unprincipled character which will be found to attach to Alkibiadês through life, and presents indeed an unblushing combination of impudence and fraud, which we cannot better describe than by saying that it is exactly in the vein of Fielding's Jonathan Wild. In depicting Kleon and Hyperbolus, historians vie with each other in strong language to mark the impudence which is said to have been their peculiar characteristic. Now we have no particular facts before us to measure the amount of truth in this, though as a general charge it is sufficiently credible. But we may affirm, with full assurance, that none of the much-decried demagogues of Athens—not one of those sellers of leather, lamps, sheep, ropes, pollard, and other commodities, upon whom Aristophanês heaps so many excellent jokes—ever surpassed, if they ever equalled, the impudence of this descendant of Æakus and Zeus in his manner of overreaching and disgracing the Lacedæmonian envoys. These latter, it must be added, display a carelessness of public faith and consistency, a facility in publicly unsaying what they have just before publicly said, and a treachery towards their own confidential agent, which is truly surprising, and goes far to justify the general charge of habitual duplicity so often alleged against the Lacedæmonian character.[74]

The disgraced envoys would doubtless quit Athens immediately: but this opportune earthquake gave Nikias a few hours to recover from his unexpected overthrow. In the assembly of the next day, he still contended that the friendship of Sparta was

preferable to that of Argos, and insisted on the prudence of postponing all consummation of engagement with the latter until the real intentions of Sparta, now so contradictory and inexplicable, should be made clear. He contended that the position of Athens, in regard to the peace and alliance, was that of superior honor and advantage; the position of Sparta, one of comparative disgrace: Athens had thus a greater interest than Sparta in maintaining what had been concluded. But he at the same time admitted that a distinct and peremptory explanation must be exacted from Sparta as to her intentions, and he requested the people to send himself with some other colleagues to demand it. The Lacedæmonians should be apprised that Argeian envoys were already present in Athens with propositions, and that the Athenians might already have concluded this alliance, if they could have permitted themselves to do wrong to the existing alliance with Sparta. But the Lacedæmonians, if their intentions were honorable, must show it forthwith: 1. By restoring Panaktum, not demolished, but standing. 2. By restoring Amphipolis also. 3. By renouncing their special alliance with the Bœotians, unless the Bœotians on their side chose to become parties to the peace with Athens.[75]

The Athenian assembly, acquiescing in the recommendation of Nikias, invested him with the commission which he required: a remarkable proof, after the overpowering defeat of the preceding day, how strong was the hold which he still retained upon them, and how sincere their desire to keep on the best terms with Sparta. This was a last chance granted to Nikias and his policy; a perfectly fair chance, since all that was asked of Sparta was just; but it forced him to bring matters to a decisive issue with her, and shut out all farther evasion. His mission to Sparta failed altogether: the influence of Kleobûlus and Xenarês, the anti-Athenian ephors, was found predominant, so that not one of his demands was complied with. And even when he formally announced that unless Sparta renounced her special alliance with the Bœotians or compelled the Bœotians to accept the peace with Athens, the Athenians would immediately contract alliance with Argos, the menace produced no effect. He could only obtain, and that too as a personal favor to himself, that the oaths as they stood should be formally renewed; an empty concession, which covered but faintly the humiliation of his retreat to Athens. The Athenian assembly listened to his report with strong indignation against the Lacedæmonians, and with marked displeasure even against himself, as the great author and voucher of this unperformed treaty; while Alkibiadês was permitted to introduce the envoys—already at hand in the city—from Argos, Mantineia, and Elis, with whom a pact was at once concluded.[76]

The words of this, which Thucydidês gives us doubtless from the record on the public column, comprise two engagements; one for peace, another for alliance.

The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, have concluded a treaty of peace by sea and by land, without fraud or mischief, each for themselves and for the allies over whom each exercise empire.[77] [The express terms in which these states announce themselves as imperial states and their allies as dependencies, deserve no-

tice. No such words appear in the treaty between Athens and Lacedæmon. I have already mentioned that the main ground of discontent on the part of Mantineia and Elis towards Sparta, was connected with their imperial power.]

Neither of them shall bear arms against the other for purposes of damage.

The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, shall be allies with each other for one hundred years. If any enemy shall invade Attica, the three contracting cities shall lend the most vigorous aid in their power at the invitation of Athens. Should the forces of the invading city damage Attica and then retire, the three will proclaim that city their enemy and attack it: neither of the four shall in that case suspend the war, without consent of the others.

Reciprocal obligations imposed upon Athens, in case Argos, Mantineia, or Elis, shall be attacked.

Neither of the four contracting powers shall grant passage to troops through their own territory, or the territory of allies over whom they may at the time be exercising command, either by land or sea, unless upon joint resolution.[78]

In case auxiliary troops shall be required and sent under this treaty, the city sending shall furnish their maintenance for the space of thirty days, from the day of their entrance upon the territory of the city requiring. Should their services be needed for a longer period, the city requiring shall furnish their maintenance, at the rate of three Æginæan oboli for each hoplite, light-armed or archer, and of one Æginæan drachma or six oboli for each horseman, per day. The city requiring shall possess the command, so long as the service required shall be in her territory. But if any expedition shall be undertaken by joint resolution, then the command shall be shared equally between all.

Such were the substantive conditions of the new alliance. Provision was then made for the oaths,—by whom? where? when? in what words? how often? they were to be taken. Athens was to swear on behalf of herself and her allies; but Argos, Elis, and Mantineia, with their respective allies, were to swear by separate cities. The oaths were to be renewed every four years; by Athens, within thirty days before each Olympic festival, at Argos, Elis, and Mantineia; by these three cities, at Athens, ten days before each festival of the greater Panathenæa. "The words of the treaty of peace and alliance, and the oaths sworn, shall be engraven on stone columns, and put up in the temples of each of the four cities; and also upon a brazen column, to be put up by joint cost at Olympia, for the festival now approaching."

"The four cities may, by joint consent, make any change they please in the provisions of this treaty, without violating their oaths."[79]

The conclusion of this new treaty introduced a greater degree of complication into the grouping and association of the Grecian cities than had ever before been

known. The ancient Spartan confederacy, and the Athenian empire still subsisted. A peace had been concluded between them, ratified by the formal vote of the majority of the confederates, yet not accepted by several of the minority. Not merely peace, but also special alliance had been concluded between Athens and Sparta; and a special alliance between Sparta and Bœotia. Corinth, member of the Spartan confederacy, was also member of a defensive alliance with Argos, Mantineia, and Elis; which three states had concluded a more intimate alliance, first with each other (without Corinth), and now recently with Athens. Yet both Athens and Sparta still retained the alliance[80] concluded between themselves, without formal rupture on either side, though Athens still complained that the treaty had not been fulfilled. No relations whatever subsisted between Argos and Sparta. Between Athens and Bœotia there was an armistice terminable at ten days' notice. Lastly, Corinth could not be prevailed upon, in spite of repeated solicitation from the Argeians, to join the new alliance of Athens with Argos: so that no relations subsisted between Corinth and Athens; while the Corinthians began, though faintly, to resume their former tendencies towards Sparta.[81]

The alliance between Athens and Argos, of which particulars have just been given, was concluded not long before the Olympic festival of the 90th Olympiad, or 420 B.C.: the festival being about the beginning of July, the treaty might be in May.[82] That festival was memorable, on more than one ground. It was the first which had been celebrated since the conclusion of the peace, the leading clause of which had been expressly introduced to guarantee to all Greeks free access to the great Pan-Hellenic temples, with liberty of sacrificing, consulting the oracle, and witnessing the matches. For the last eleven years, including two Olympic festivals, Athens herself, and apparently all the numerous allies of Athens, had been excluded from sending their solemn legation, or theôry, and from attending as spectators, at the Olympic games.[83] Now that such exclusion was removed, and that the Eleian heralds (who came to announce the approaching games and proclaim the truce connected with them) again trod the soil of Attica,—the Athenian visit was felt both by themselves and by others as a novelty. Some curiosity was entertained to see what figure the theôry of Athens would make as to show and splendor. Nor were there wanting spiteful rumors, that Athens had been so much impoverished by the war, as to be prevented from appearing with appropriate magnificence at the altar and in the presence of Olympic Zeus.

Alkibiadês took pride in silencing these surmises, as well as in glorifying his own name and person, by a display more imposing than had ever been previously beheld. He had already distinguished himself in the local festivals and liturgies of Athens by an ostentation surpassing Athenian rivals: but he now felt himself standing forward as the champion and leader of Athens before Greece. He had discredited his political rival Nikias, given a new direction to the politics of Athens by the Argeian alliance, and was about to commence a series of intra-Peloponnesian operations against the

Lacedæmonians. On all these grounds he determined that his first appearance on the plain of Olympia should impose upon all beholders. The Athenian theôry, of which he was a member, was set out with first-rate splendor, and with the amplest show of golden ewers, censers, etc., for the public sacrifice and procession.[84] But when the chariot-races came on, Alkibiadês himself appeared as competitor at his own cost,—not merely with one well-equipped chariot and four, which the richest Greeks had hitherto counted as an extraordinary personal glory, but with the prodigious number of seven distinct chariots, each with a team of four horses. And so superior was their quality, that one of his chariots gained a first prize, and another a second prize, so that Alkibiadês was twice crowned with sprigs of the sacred olive-tree, and twice proclaimed by the herald. Another of his seven chariots also came in fourth: but no crown or proclamation, it seems, was awarded to any after the second in order. We must recollect that he had competitors from all parts of Greece to contend against, not merely private men, but even despots and governments. Nor was this all. The tent which the Athenian theôrs provided for their countrymen, visitors to the games, was handsomely adorned; but a separate tent, which Alkibiadês himself provided for a public banquet to celebrate his triumph, together with the banquet itself, was set forth on a scale still more stately and expensive. The rich allies of Athens—Ephesus, Chios, and Lesbos—are said to have lent him their aid in enhancing this display. It is highly probable that they would be glad to cultivate his favor, as he had now become one of the first men in Athens, and was in an ascendent course. But we must farther recollect that they, as well as Athens, had been excluded from the Olympic festival, so that their own feelings on first returning might well prompt them to take a genuine interest in this imposing reappearance of the Ionic race at the common sanctuary of Hellas.

Five years afterwards, on an important discussion which will be hereafter described, Alkibiadês maintained publicly before the Athenian assembly that his unparalleled Olympic display had produced an effect upon the Grecian mind highly beneficial to Athens;[85] dissipating the suspicions entertained that she was ruined by the war, and establishing beyond dispute her vast wealth and power. He was doubtless right to a considerable extent; though not sufficient to repel the charge from himself, which it was his purpose to do, both of overweening personal vanity, and of that reckless expenditure which he would be compelled to try and overtake by peculation or violence at the public cost. All the unfavorable impressions suggested to prudent Athenians by his previous life, were aggravated by this stupendous display; much more, of course, the jealousy and hatred of personal competitors. And this feeling was not the less real, though as a political man he was now in the full tide of public favor.

If the festival of the 90th Olympiad was peculiarly distinguished by the reappearance of Athenians and those connected with them, it was marked by a farther novelty yet more striking, the exclusion of the Lacedæmonians. This exclusion was the

consequence of the new political interests of the Eleians, combined with their increased consciousness of force arising out of the recent alliance with Argos, Athens, and Mantineia. It has already been mentioned that since the peace with Athens, the Lacedæmonians, acting as arbitrators in the case of Lepreum, which the Eleians claimed as their dependency, had declared it to be autonomous, and had sent a body of troops to defend it. Probably the Eleians had recently renewed their attacks upon the district, since the junction with their new allies; for the Lacedæmonians had detached thither a fresh body of one thousand hoplites immediately prior to the Olympic festival. Out of the mission of this fresh detachment the sentence of exclusion arose. The Eleians were privileged administrators of the festival, regulating the details of the ceremony itself, and formally proclaiming by heralds the commencement of the Olympic truce during which all violation of the Eleian territory by an armed force was a sin against the majesty of Zeus. On the present occasion they affirmed that the Lacedæmonians had sent the one thousand hoplites into Lepreum, and had captured a fort called Phyrkus, both Eleian possessions, after the proclamation of the truce. They accordingly imposed upon Sparta the fine prescribed by the "Olympian law," of two minæ for each man, two thousand minæ in all; a part to Zeus Olympius, a part to the Eleians themselves. During the interval between the proclamation of the truce and the commencement of the festival, the Lacedæmonians sent to remonstrate against this fine, which they alleged to have been unjustly imposed, inasmuch as the heralds had not yet proclaimed the truce at Sparta when the hoplites reached Lepreum. The Eleians replied that the truce had already at that time been proclaimed among themselves (for they always proclaimed it first at home, before their heralds crossed the borders), so that *they* were interdicted from all military operations; of which the Lacedæmonian hoplites had taken advantage to commit their last aggressions. To which the Lacedæmonians rejoined, that the behavior of the Eleians themselves contradicted their own allegation, for they had sent the Eleian heralds to Sparta to proclaim the truce after they knew of the sending of the hoplites, thus showing that they did not consider the truce to have been already violated. The Lacedæmonians added, that after the herald reached Sparta, they had taken no farther military measures. How the truth stood in this disputed question, we have no means of deciding. But the Eleians rejected the explanation, though offering, if the Lacedæmonians would restore to them Lepreum, to forego such part of the fine as would accrue to themselves, and to pay out of their own treasury on behalf of the Lacedæmonians the portion which belonged to the god. This new proposition being alike refused, was again modified by the Eleians. They intimated that they would be satisfied if the Lacedæmonians, instead of paying the fine at once, would publicly on the altar at Olympia, in presence of the assembled Greeks, take an oath to pay it at a future date. But the Lacedæmonians would not listen to the proposition either of payment or of promise. Accordingly the Eleians, as judges under the Olympic law, interdicted them from the temple of Olympic Zeus, from the privilege of sacrificing there, and from attendance and competition at the games; that is, from

attendance in the form of the sacred legation called theôry, occupying a formal and recognized place at the solemnity.[86]

As all the other Grecian states—with the single exception of Lepreum—were present by their theôries[87] as well as by individual spectators, so the Spartan theôry "shone by its absence" in a manner painfully and insultingly conspicuous. So extreme, indeed, was the affront put upon the Lacedæmonians, connected as they were with Olympia by a tie ancient, peculiar, and never yet broken; so pointed the evidence of that comparative degradation into which they had fallen, through the peace with Athens coming at the back of the Sphakterian disaster,[88] that they were supposed likely to set the exclusion at defiance; and to escort their theôrs into the temple at Olympia for sacrifice, under the protection of an armed force. The Eleians even thought it necessary to put their younger hoplites under arms, and to summon to their aid one thousand hoplites from Mantineia as well as the same number from Argos, for the purpose of repelling this probable attack: while a detachment of Athenian cavalry were stationed at Argos during the festival, to lend assistance in case of need. The alarm prevalent among the spectators of the festival was most serious, and became considerably aggravated by an incident which occurred after the chariot racing. Lichas,[89] a Lacedæmonian of great wealth and consequence, had a chariot running in the lists, which he was obliged to enter, not in his own name, but in the name of the Bœotian federation. The sentence of exclusion hindered him from taking any ostensible part, but it did not hinder him from being present as a spectator; and when he saw his chariot proclaimed victorious under the title of Bœotian, his impatience to make himself known became uncontrollable. He stepped into the midst of the lists, and placed a chaplet on the head of the charioteer, thus advertising himself as the master. This was a flagrant indecorum and known violation of the order of the festival: accordingly, the official attendants with their staffs interfered at once in performance of their duty, chastising and driving him back to his place with blows.[90] Hence arose an increased apprehension of armed Lacedæmonian interference. None such took place, however: the Lacedæmonians, for the first and last time in their history, offered their Olympic sacrifice at home, and the festival passed off without any interruption.[91] The boldness of the Eleians in putting this affront upon the most powerful state in Greece is so astonishing, that we can hardly be mistaken in supposing their proceeding to have been suggested by Alkibiadês and encouraged by the armed aid from the allies. He was at this moment not less ostentatious in humiliating Sparta than in showing off Athens.

Of the depressed influence and estimation of Sparta, a farther proof was soon afforded by the fate of her colony, the Trachinian Herakleia, established near Thermopylæ, in the third year of the war. That colony—though at first comprising a numerous body of settlers, in consequence of the general trust in Lacedæmonian power, and though always under the government of a Lacedæmonian harmost—had never prospered. It had been persecuted from the beginning by the neighboring

tribes, and administered with harshness as well as peculation by its governors. The establishment of the town had been regarded from the beginning by the neighbors, especially the Thessalians, as an invasion of their territory; and their hostilities, always vexatious, had, in the winter succeeding the Olympic festival just described, been carried to a greater point of violence than ever. They had defeated the Herakleots in a ruinous battle, and slain Xenarês the Lacedæmonian governor. But though the place was so reduced as to be unable to maintain itself without foreign aid, Sparta was too much embarrassed by Peloponnesian enemies and waverers to be able to succor it; and the Bœotians, observing her inability, became apprehensive that the interference of Athens would be invoked. Accordingly they thought it prudent to occupy Herakleia with a body of Bœotian troops, dismissing the Lacedæmonian governor Hegesippidas for alleged misconduct. Nor could the Lacedæmonians prevent this proceeding, though it occasioned them to make indignant remonstrance. [92]

CHAPTER LVI.

FROM THE FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD NINETY DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEIA.

SHORTLY after the remarkable events of the Olympic festival described in my last chapter, the Argeians and their allies sent a fresh embassy to invite the Corinthians to join them. They thought it a promising opportunity, after the affront just put upon Sparta, to prevail upon the Corinthians to desert her: but Spartan envoys were present also, and though the discussions were much protracted, no new resolution was adopted. An earthquake—possibly an earthquake not real, but simulated for convenience—abruptly terminated the congress. The Corinthians—though seemingly distrusting Argos, now that she was united with Athens, and leaning rather towards Sparta—were unwilling to pronounce themselves in favor of one so as to make an enemy of the other.[93]

In spite of this first failure, the new alliance of Athens and Argos manifested its fruits vigorously in the ensuing spring. Under the inspirations of Alkibiadês, Athens was about to attempt the new experiment of seeking to obtain intra-Peloponnesian followers and influence. At the beginning of the war, she had been maritime, defensive, and simply conservative, under the guidance of Periklês. After the events of Sphakteria, she made use of that great advantage to aim at the recovery of Megara and Bœotia, which she had before been compelled to abandon by the thirty years' truce, at the recommendation of Kleon. In this attempt she employed the eighth year of the war, but with signal ill-success; while Brasidas during that period broke open the gates of her maritime empire, and robbed her of many important dependencies. The grand object of Athens then became, to recover these lost dependencies, especially Amphipolis: Nikias and his partisans sought to effect such recovery by making peace, while Kleon and his supporters insisted that it could never be achieved except by military efforts. The expedition under Kleon against Amphipolis had failed, the peace concluded by Nikias had failed also: Athens had surrendered her capital advantage, without regaining Amphipolis; and if she wished to regain it, there was no alternative except to repeat the attempt which had failed under Kleon. And this perhaps she might have done, as we shall find her projecting to do in the course of about four years forward, if it had not been, first, that the Athenian mind was now probably sick and disheartened about Amphipolis, in consequence of the prodigious disgrace so recently undergone there; next, that Alkibiadês, the new chief adviser or prime minister of Athens—if we may be allowed to use an inaccurate expression, which yet suggests the reality of the case—was prompted by his personal impulses to turn the stream of Athenian ardor into a different channel. Full of antipathy to Sparta, he regarded the interior of Peloponnesus as her most vulnerable point, espe-

cially in the present disjointed relations of its component cities. Moreover, his personal thirst for glory was better gratified amidst the centre of Grecian life than by undertaking an expedition into a distant and barbarous region: lastly, he probably recollected with discomfort the hardships and extreme cold, insupportable to all except the iron frame of Sokrates, which he had himself endured at the blockade of Potidæa twelve years before,[94] and which any armament destined to conquer Amphipolis would have to go through again. It was under these impressions that he now began to press his intra-Peloponnesian operations against Lacedæmon, with the view of organizing a counter-alliance under Argos sufficient to keep her in check, and at any rate to nullify her power of carrying invasion beyond the Isthmus. All this was to be done without ostensibly breaking the peace and alliance between Athens and Lacedæmon, which stood in conspicuous letters on pillars erected in both cities.

Coming to Argos at the head of a few Athenian hoplites and bowmen, and reinforced by Peloponnesian allies, Alkibiadês exhibited the spectacle of an Athenian general traversing the interior of the peninsula, and imposing his own arrangements in various quarters, a spectacle at that moment new and striking.[95] He first turned his attention to the Achæan towns in the northwest, where he persuaded the inhabitants of Patræ to ally themselves with Athens, and even to undertake the labor of connecting their town with the sea by means of long walls, so as to place themselves within the protection of Athens from seaward. He farther projected the erection of a fort and the formation of a naval station at the extreme point of Cape Rhium, just at the narrow entrance of the Corinthian gulf; whereby the Athenians, who already possessed the opposite shore by means of Naupaktus, would have become masters of the commerce of the gulf. But the Corinthians and Sikyonians, to whom this would have been a serious mischief, despatched forces enough to prevent the consummation of the scheme, and probably also to hinder the erection of the walls at Patræ.[96] Yet the march of Alkibiadês doubtless strengthened the anti-Laconian interest throughout the Achæan coast.

He then returned to take part with the Argeians in a war against Epidaurus. To acquire possession of this city would much facilitate the communication between Athens and Argos, since it was not only immediately opposite to the island of Ægina now occupied by the Athenians, but also opened to the latter an access by land, dispensing with the labor of circumnavigating Cape Skyllæum, the southeastern point of the Argeian and Epidaurian peninsula, whenever they sent forces to Argos. Moreover, the territory of Epidaurus bordered to the north on that of Corinth, so that the possession of it would be an additional guarantee for the neutrality of the Corinthians. Accordingly it was resolved to attack Epidaurus, for which a pretext was easily found. As presiding and administering state of the temple of Apollo Pythäeus (situated within the walls of Argos), the Argeians enjoyed a sort of religious supremacy over Epidaurus and other neighboring cities, seemingly the remnant of that extensive supremacy, political as well as religious, which in early times had been theirs.[97] The

Epidaurians owed to this temple certain sacrifices and other ceremonial obligations, one of which, arising out of some circumstance which we cannot understand, was now due and unperformed: at least so the Argeians alleged. Such default imposed upon them the duty of getting together a military force to attack the Epidaurians and enforce the obligation.

Their invading march, however, was for a time suspended by the news that king Agis with the full force of Lacedæmon and her allies had advanced as far as Leuktra, one of the border towns of Laconia on the northwest, towards Mount Lykæum and the Arcadian Parrhasii. What this movement meant was known only to Agis himself, who did not even explain the purpose to his own soldiers or officers, or allies.[98] But the sacrifice constantly offered before passing the border was found so unfavorable, that he abandoned his march for the present and returned home. The month Karneius, a period of truce as well as religious festival among the Dorian states, being now at hand, he directed the allies to hold themselves prepared for an out-march as soon as that month had expired.

On being informed that Agis had dismissed his troops, the Argeians prepared to execute their invasion of Epidaurus. The day on which they set out was already the twenty-sixth of the month preceding the Karneian month, so that there remained only three days before the commencement of that latter month with its holy truce, binding upon the religious feelings of the Dorian states generally, to which Argos, Sparta, and Epidaurus all belonged. But the Argeians made use of that very peculiarity of the season, which was accounted likely to keep them at home, to facilitate their scheme, by playing a trick with the calendar, and proclaiming one of those arbitrary interferences with the reckoning of time which the Greeks occasionally employed to correct the ever-recurring confusion of their lunar system. Having begun their march on the twenty-sixth of the month before Karneius, the Argeians called each succeeding day still the twenty-sixth, thus disallowing the lapse of time, and pretending that the Karneian month had not yet commenced. This proceeding was farther facilitated by the circumstance, that their allies of Athens, Elis, and Mantineia, not being Dorians, were under no obligation to observe the Karneian truce. Accordingly, the army marched from Argos into the territory of Epidaurus, and spent seemingly a fortnight or three weeks in laying it waste; all this time being really, according to the reckoning of the other Dorian states, part of the Karneian truce, which the Argeians, adopting their own arbitrary computation of time, professed not to be violating. The Epidaurians, unable to meet them single-handed in the field, invoked the aid of their allies: who, however, had already been summoned by Sparta for the succeeding month, and did not choose, any more than the Spartans, to move during the Karneian month itself. Some allies, however, perhaps the Corinthians, came as far as the Epidaurian border, but did not feel themselves strong enough to lend aid by entering the territory alone.[99]

Meanwhile the Athenians had convoked another congress of deputies at Mantineia, for the purpose of discussing propositions of peace: perhaps this may have been a point carried by Nikias at Athens, in spite of Alkibiadês. What other deputies attended we are not told; but Euphamidas, coming as envoy from Corinth, animadverted even at the opening of the debates upon the inconsistency of assembling a peace congress while war was actually raging in the Epidaurian territory. So much were the Athenian deputies struck with this observation, that they departed, persuaded the Argeians to retire from Epidaurus, and then came back to resume negotiations. Still, however, the pretensions of both parties were found irreconcilable, and the congress broke up; upon which the Argeians again returned to renew their devastation in Epidaurus, while the Lacedæmonians, immediately on the expiration of the Karneian month, marched out again, as far as their border town of Karyæ, but were again arrested and forced to return by unfavorable border-sacrifices. Intimation of their out-march, however, was transmitted to Athens; upon which Alkibiadês, at the head of one thousand Athenian hoplites, was sent to join the Argeians. But before he arrived, the Lacedæmonian army had been already disbanded; so that his services were no longer required, and the Argeians carried their ravages over one-third of the territory of Epidaurus before they at length evacuated it.[100]

The Epidaurians were reinforced about the end of September by a detachment of three hundred Lacedæmonian hoplites under Agesippidas, sent by sea without the knowledge of the Athenians. Of this, the Argeians preferred loud complaints at Athens; and they had good reason to condemn the negligence of the Athenians as allies, for not having kept better naval watch at their neighboring station of Ægina, and for having allowed this enemy to enter the harbor of Epidaurus. But they took another ground of complaint, somewhat remarkable. In the alliance between Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantineia, it had been stipulated that neither of the four should suffer the passage of troops through its territory, without the joint consent of all. Now the sea was accounted a part of the territory of Athens: so that the Athenians had violated this article of the treaty by permitting the Lacedæmonians to send troops by sea to Epidaurus. And the Argeians now required Athens, in compensation for this wrong, to carry back the Messenians and Helots from Kephallenia to Pylos, and allow them to ravage Laconia. The Athenians, under the persuasion of Alkibiadês, complied with their requisition; inscribing, at the foot of the pillar on which their alliance with Sparta stood recorded, that the Lacedæmonians had not observed their oaths. Nevertheless, they still abstained from formally throwing up their treaty with Lacedæmon, or breaking it in any other way.[101] The relations between Athens and Sparta thus remained in name, peace and alliance, so far as concerns direct operations against each other's territory; in reality, hostile action as well as hostile manœuvring, against each other, as allies respectively of third parties.

The Argeians, after having prolonged their incursions on the Epidaurian territory throughout all the autumn, made in the winter an unavailing attempt to take the

town itself by storm. Though there was no considerable action, but merely a succession of desultory attacks, in some of which the Epidaurians even had the advantage, yet they still suffered serious hardship, and pressed their case forcibly on the sympathy of Sparta. Thus importuned, and mortified as well as alarmed by the increasing defection or coldness which they now experienced throughout Peloponnesus, the Lacedæmonians determined during the course of the ensuing summer to put forth their strength vigorously, and win back their lost ground.[102]

Towards the month of June (B.C. 418) they marched with their full force, freemen as well as Helots, under king Agis, against Argos. The Tegeans and other Arcadian allies joined them on the march, while their other allies near the Isthmus,—Bœotians, Megarians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Phliasians, etc., were directed to assemble at Phlius. The number of these latter allies were very considerable, for we hear of five thousand Bœotian hoplites, and two thousand Corinthian: the Bœotians had with them also five thousand light-armed, five hundred horsemen, and five hundred foot-soldiers, who ran alongside of the horsemen. The numbers of the rest, or of Spartans themselves, we do not know; nor probably did Thucydidês himself know: for we find him remarking elsewhere the impenetrable concealment of the Lacedæmonians on all public affairs, in reference to the numbers at the subsequent battle of Mantineia. Such muster of the Lacedæmonian alliance was no secret to the Argeians, who marching first to Mantineia, and there taking up the force of that city as well as three thousand Eleian hoplites who came to join them, met the Lacedæmonians in their march at Methydrium in Arcadia. The two armies being posted on opposite hills, the Argeians had resolved to attack Agis the next day, so as to prevent him from joining his allies at Phlius. But he eluded this separate encounter by decamping in the night, reached Phlius, and operated his junction in safety. We do not hear that there was in the Lacedæmonian army any commander of lochus, who, copying the unreasonable punctilio of Amompharetus before the battle of Platæa, refused to obey the order of retreat before the enemy, to the imminent risk of the whole army. And the fact, that no similar incident occurred now, may be held to prove that the Lacedæmonians had acquired greater familiarity with the exigencies of actual warfare.

As soon as the Lacedæmonian retreat was known in the morning, the Argeians left their position also, and marched with their allies, first to Argos itself; next, to Nemea, on the ordinary road from Corinth and Phlius to Argos, by which they imagined that the invaders would approach. But Agis acted differently. Distributing his force into three divisions, he himself with the Lacedæmonians and Arcadians, taking a short, but very rugged and difficult road, crossed the ridge of the mountains and descended straight into the plain near Argos. The Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians, were directed to follow another mountain road, which entered the same plain upon a different point; while the Bœotians, Corinthians, and Sikyonians, followed the longer, more even, and more ordinary route, by Nemea. This route,

though apparently frequented and convenient, led for a considerable distance along a narrow ravine, called the Trêtus, bounded on each side by mountains. The united army under Agis was much superior in number to the Argeians: but if all had marched in one line by the frequented route through the narrow Trêtus, their superiority of number would have been of little use, whilst the Argeians would have had a position highly favorable to their defence. By dividing his force, and taking the mountain road with his own division, Agis got into the plain of Argos in the rear of the Argeian position at Nemea. He anticipated that when the Argeians saw him devastating their properties near the city, they would forthwith quit the advantageous ground near Nemea, to come and attack him in the plain: the Bœotian division would thus find the road by Nemea and the Trêtus open, and would be able to march without resistance into the plain of Argos, where their numerous cavalry would act with effect against the Argeians engaged in attacking Agis. This triple march was executed. Agis with his division, and the Corinthians with theirs, got across the mountains into the Argeian plain during the night; while the Argeians,[103] hearing at daybreak that he was near their city, ravaging Saminthus and other places, left their position at Nemea to come down to the plain and attack him. In their march they had a partial skirmish with the Corinthian division, which had reached a high ground immediately above the Argeian plain, and which lay nearly in the road. But this affair was indecisive, and they soon found themselves in the plain near to Agis and the Lacedæmonians, who lay between them and their city.

On both sides, the armies were marshalled, and order taken for battle. But the situation of the Argeians was in reality little less than desperate: for while they had Agis and his division in their front, the Corinthian detachment was near enough to take them in flank, and the Bœotians marching along the undefended road through the Trêtus would attack them in the rear. The Bœotian cavalry too would act with full effect upon them in the plain, since neither Argos, Elis, nor Mantineia, seemed to have possessed any horsemen; a description of force which ought to have been sent from Athens, though from some cause which does not appear, the Athenian contingent had not yet arrived. Nevertheless, in spite of this very critical position, both the Argeians and their allies were elate with confidence and impatient for battle; thinking only of the division of Agis immediately in their front, which appeared to be inclosed between them and their city, and taking no heed to the other formidable enemies in their flank and rear. But the Argeian generals were better aware than their soldiers of the real danger; and just as the two armies were about to charge, Alkiphron, proxenus of the Lacedæmonians at Argos, accompanied Thrasyllus, one of the five generals of the Argeians, to a separate parley with Agis, without the least consultation or privity on the part of their own army. They exhorted Agis not to force on a battle, assuring him that the Argeians were ready both to give and receive equitable satisfaction, in all matters of complaint which the Lacedæmonians might urge against them, and to conclude a just peace for the future. Agis, at once acquiescing in the proposal, granted them a truce of four months to accomplish what they had promised.

He on his part also took this step without consulting either his army or his allies, simply addressing a few words of confidential talk to one of the official Spartans near him. Immediately, he gave the order for retreat, and the army, instead of being led to battle, was conducted out of the Argeian territory, through the Nemean road whereby the Bœotians had just been entering. But it required all the habitual discipline of Lacedæmonian soldiers to make them obey this order of the Spartan king, alike unexpected and unwelcome.[104] For the army were fully sensible both of the prodigious advantages of their position, and of the overwhelming strength of the invading force, so that all the three divisions were loud in their denunciations of Agis, and penetrated with shame at the thoughts of so disgraceful a retreat. And when they all saw themselves in one united body at Nemea, previous to breaking up and going home,—so as to have before their eyes their own full numbers and the complete equipment of one of the finest Hellenic armies which had ever been assembled,—the Argeian body of allies, before whom they were now retiring, appeared contemptible in the comparison, and they separated with yet warmer and more universal indignation against the king who had betrayed their cause.

On returning home, Agis incurred not less blame from the Spartan authorities than from his own army, for having thrown away so admirable an opportunity of subduing Argos. This was assuredly no more than he deserved: but we read with no small astonishment that the Argeians and their allies on returning were even more exasperated against Thrasyllus,[105] whom they accused of having traitorously thrown away a certain victory. They had indeed good ground, in the received practice, to censure him for having concluded a truce without taking the sense of the people. It was their custom on returning from a march, to hold a public court-martial before entering the city, at a place called the Charadrus, or winter torrent near the walls, for the purpose of adjudicating on offences and faults committed in the army. Such was their wrath on this occasion against Thrasyllus, that they would scarcely be prevailed upon even to put him upon his trial, but began to stone him. He was forced to seek personal safety at the altar; upon which the soldiers tried him, and he was condemned to have his property confiscated.[106]

Very shortly afterwards the expected Athenian contingent arrived, which probably ought to have come earlier: one thousand hoplites, with three hundred horsemen, under Lachês and Nikostratus. Alkibiadês came as ambassador, probably serving as a soldier also among the horsemen. The Argeians, notwithstanding their displeasure against Thrasyllus, nevertheless felt themselves pledged to observe the truce which he had concluded, and their magistrates accordingly desired the newly-arrived Athenians to depart. Nor was Alkibiadês even permitted to approach and address the public assembly, until the Mantineian and Eleian allies insisted that thus much at least should not be refused. An assembly was therefore convened, in which these allies took part, along with the Argeians. Alkibiadês contended strenuously that the recent truce with the Lacedæmonians was null and void; since it had been contracted

without the privity of all the allies, distinctly at variance with the terms of the alliance. He therefore called upon them to resume military operations forthwith, in conjunction with the reinforcement now seasonably arrived. His speech so persuaded the assembly, that the Mantineians and Eleians consented at once to join him in an expedition against the Arcadian town of Orchomenus; the Argeians, also, though at first reluctant, very speedily followed them thither. Orchomenus was a place important to acquire, not merely because its territory joined that of Mantineia on the northward, but because the Lacedæmonians had deposited therein the hostages which they had taken from Arcadian townships and villages as guarantee for fidelity. Its walls were however in bad condition, and its inhabitants, after a short resistance, capitulated. They agreed to become allies of Mantineia, to furnish hostages for faithful adhesion to such alliance, and to deliver up the hostages deposited with them by Sparta.[107]

Encouraged by first success, the allies debated what they should next undertake; the Eleians contending strenuously for a march against Lepreum, while the Mantineians were anxious to attack their enemy and neighbor Tegea. The Argeians and Athenians preferred the latter, incomparably the more important enterprise of the two: but such was the disgust of the Eleians at the rejection of their proposition, that they abandoned the army altogether, and went home. Notwithstanding their desertion, however, the remaining allies continued together at Mantineia, organizing their attack upon Tegea, in which city they had a strong favorable party, who had actually laid their plans, and were on the point of proclaiming the revolt of the city from Sparta,[108] when the philo-Laconian Tegeans just saved themselves by despatching the most urgent message to Sparta, and receiving the most rapid succor. The Lacedæmonians, filled with indignation at the news of the surrender of Orchomenus, vented anew all their displeasure against Agis, whom they now threatened with the severe punishment of demolishing his house and fining him in the sum of one hundred thousand drachmæ, or about twenty-seven and two-thirds Attic talents. He urgently entreated that an opportunity might be afforded to him of redeeming by some brave deed the ill name which he had incurred: if he failed in doing so, then they might inflict on him what penalty they chose. The penalty was accordingly withdrawn: but a restriction, new to the Spartan constitution, was now placed upon the authority of the king. It had been before a part of his prerogative to lead out the army single-handed and on his own authority; but a council of ten was now named, without whose concurrence he was interdicted from exercising such power.[109]

To the great good fortune of Agis, a pressing message now arrived announcing the imminent revolt of Tegea, the most important ally of Sparta, and close upon her border. Such was the alarm occasioned by this news that the whole military population instantly started off to relieve the place, Agis at their head, the most rapid movement ever known to have been made by Lacedæmonian soldiers.[110] When they arrived at Orestheium in Arcadia, in their way, perhaps hearing that the danger

was somewhat less pressing, they sent back to Sparta one-sixth part of the forces, for home defence, the oldest as well as the youngest men. The remainder marched forward to Tegea, where they were speedily joined by their Arcadian allies. They farther sent messages to the Corinthians and Bœotians, as well as to the Phocians and Lokrians, invoking the immediate presence of these contingents in the territory of Mantineia. The arrival of such reinforcements, however, even with all possible zeal on the part of the cities contributing, could not be looked for without some lapse of time; the rather, as it appears, that they could not get into the territory of Mantineia except by passing through that of Argos,[111] which could not be safely attempted until they had all formed a junction. Accordingly Agis, impatient to redeem his reputation, marched at once with the Lacedæmonians and the Arcadian allies present, into the territory of Mantineia, and took up a position near the Herakleion, or temple of Hêraklês,[112] from whence he began to ravage the neighboring lands. The Argeians and their allies presently came forth from Mantineia, planted themselves near him, but on very rugged and impracticable ground, and thus offered him battle. Nothing daunted by the difficulties of the position, he marshalled his army and led it up to attack them. His rashness on the present occasion might have produced as much mischief as his inconsiderate concession to Thrasyllus near Argos, had not an ancient Spartan called out to him that he was now merely proceeding "to heal mischief by mischief." So forcibly was Agis impressed either with this timely admonition, or by the closer view of the position which he had undertaken to assault, that he suddenly halted the army and gave orders for retreat, though actually within distance no greater than the cast of a javelin from the enemy.[113]

His march was now intended to draw the Argeians away from the difficult ground which they occupied. On the frontier between Mantineia and Tegea—both situated on a lofty but inclosed plain, drained only by katabothra, or natural subterranean channels in the mountains—was situated a head of water, the regular efflux of which seems to have been kept up by joint operations of both cities for their mutual benefit. Thither Agis now conducted his army, for the purpose of turning the water towards the side of Mantineia, where it would occasion serious damage; calculating that the Mantineians and their allies would certainly descend from their position to hinder it. No stratagem however was necessary to induce the latter to adopt this resolution. For so soon as they saw the Lacedæmonians, after advancing to the foot of the hill, first suddenly halt, next retreat, and lastly disappear, their surprise was very great: and this surprise was soon converted into contemptuous confidence and impatience to pursue the flying enemy. The generals not sharing such confidence, hesitated at first to quit their secure position: upon which the troops became clamorous, and loudly denounced them for treason in letting the Lacedæmonians quietly escape a second time, as they had before done near Argos. These generals would probably not be the same with those who had incurred, a short time before, so much undeserved censure for their convention with Agis: but the murmurs on the present occasion, hardly less unreasonable, drove them, not without considerable shame and

confusion, to give orders for advance. They abandoned the hill, marched down into the plain so as to approach the Lacedæmonians, and employed the next day in arranging themselves in good battle order, so as to be ready to fight at a moment's notice.

Meanwhile it appears that Agis had found himself disappointed in his operations upon the water. He had either not done so much damage, or not spread so much terror, as he had expected: and he accordingly desisted, putting himself again in march to resume his position at the Herakleion, and supposing that his enemies still retained their position on the hill. But in the course of this march he came suddenly upon the Argeian and allied army where he was not in the least prepared to see them: they were not only in the plain, but already drawn up in perfect order of battle. The Mantineians occupied the right wing, the post of honor, because the ground was in their territory: next to them stood their dependent Arcadian allies: then the chosen Thousand-regiment of Argos, citizens of wealth and family, trained in arms at the cost of the state: alongside of them, the remaining Argeian hoplites, with their dependent allies of Kleônæ and Orneæ: last of all, on the left wing, stood the Athenians, their hoplites as well as their horsemen.

It was with the greatest surprise that Agis and his army beheld this unexpected apparition. To any other Greeks than Lacedæmonians, the sudden presentation of a formidable enemy would have occasioned a feeling of dismay from which they would have found it difficult to recover; and even the Lacedæmonians, on this occasion, underwent a momentary shock unparalleled in their previous experience.[114] But they now felt the full advantage of their rigorous training and habit of military obedience, as well as of that subordination of officers which was peculiar to themselves in Greece. In other Grecian armies orders were proclaimed to the troops in a loud voice by a herald, who received them personally from the general: each *taxis*, or company, indeed, had its own taxiarch, but the latter did not receive his orders separately from the general, and seems to have had no personal responsibility for the execution of them by his soldiers. Subordinate and responsible military authority was not recognized. Among the Lacedæmonians, on the contrary, there was a regular gradation of military and responsible authority, "commanders of commanders," each of whom had his special duty in insuring the execution of orders.[115] Every order emanated from the Spartan king when he was present, and was given to the polemarchs (each commanding a mora, the largest military division), who intimated it to the lochagi, or colonels, of the respective lochi. These again gave command to each pentekontêr, or captain of a pentekosty; lastly, he to the enômotarch, who commanded the lowest subdivision, called an enômoty. The soldier thus received no immediate orders except from the enômotarch, who was in the first instance responsible for his enômoty; but the pentekontêr and the lochage were responsible also each for his larger division; the pentekosty including four enômoties, and the lochus four pentekosties, at least so the numbers stood on this occasion. All the various military manœuvres were fa-

miliar to the Lacedæmonians from their unremitting drill, so that their armies enjoyed the advantage of readier obedience along with more systematic command. Accordingly, though thus taken by surprise, and called on now for the first time in their lives, to form in the presence of an enemy, they only manifested the greater promptitude[116] and anxious haste in obeying the orders of Agis, transmitted through the regular series of officers. The battle array was attained with regularity as well as with speed.

The extreme left of the Lacedæmonian line belonged by ancient privilege to the Skiritæ; mountaineers of the border district of Laconia, skirting the Arcadian Parrhasii, seemingly east of the Eurotas, near its earliest and highest course. These men, originally Arcadians, now constituted a variety of Laconian Periœki, with peculiar duties as well as peculiar privileges. Numbered among the bravest and most active men in Peloponnesus, they generally formed the vanguard in an advancing march; and the Spartans stand accused of having exposed them to danger as well as toil with unbecoming recklessness.[117] Next to the Skiritæ, who were six hundred in number, stood the enfranchised Helots, recently returned from serving with Brasidas in Thrace, and the Neodamôdes, both probably summoned home from Lepreum, where we were told before that they had been planted. After them, in the centre of the entire line, came the Lacedæmonian lochi, seven in number, with the Arcadian dependent allies, Heræan and Mænalian, near them. Lastly, in the right wing, stood the Tegeans, with a small division of Lacedæmonians occupying the extreme right, as the post of honor. On each flank there were some Lacedæmonian horsemen.[118]

Thucydidês, with a frankness which enhances the value of his testimony wherever he gives it positively, informs us that he cannot pretend to set down the number of either army. It is evident that this silence is not for want of having inquired; but none of the answers which he received appeared to him trustworthy: the extreme secrecy of Lacedæmonian politics admitted of no certainty about *their* numbers, while the empty numerical boasts of other Greeks were not less misleading. In the absence of assured information about aggregate number, the historian gives us some general information accessible to every inquirer, and some facts visible to a spectator. From his language it is conjectured, with some probability, by Dr. Thirlwall and others, that he was himself present at the battle, though in what capacity we cannot determine, as he was an exile from his country. First, he states that the Lacedæmonian army *appeared* more numerous than that of the enemy. Next he tells us, that independent of the Skiritæ on the left, who were six hundred in number, the remaining Lacedæmonian front, to the extremity of their right wing, consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men, each enômoty having four men in front. In respect to depth, the different enômoties were not all equal; but for the most part, the files were eight deep. There were seven lochi in all (apart from the Skiritæ); each lochus comprised four pentekosties, each pentekosty contained four enômoties.[119] Multiplying four hundred and forty-four by eight, and adding the six hundred Skiritæ, this would make a total

of four thousand one hundred and eighty-four hoplites, besides a few horsemen on each flank. Respecting light-armed, nothing is said. I have no confidence in such an estimate—but the total is smaller than we should have expected, considering that the Lacedæmonians had marched out from Sparta with their entire force on a pressing emergency, and that they had only sent home one-sixth of their total, their oldest and youngest soldiers.

It does not appear that the generals on the Argeian side made any attempt to charge while the Lacedæmonian battle-array was yet incomplete. It was necessary for them, according to Grecian practice, to wind up the courage of their troops by some words of exhortation and encouragement: and before these were finished, the Lacedæmonians may probably have attained their order. The Mantineian officers reminded their countrymen that the coming battle would decide whether Mantineia should continue to be a free and imperial city, with Arcadian dependencies of her own, as she now was, or should again be degraded into a dependency of Lacedæmon. The Argeian leaders dwelt upon the opportunity which Argos now had of recovering her lost ascendency in Peloponnesus, and of revenging herself upon her worst enemy and neighbor. The Athenian troops were exhorted to show themselves worthy of the many brave allies with whom they were now associated, as well as to protect their own territory and empire by vanquishing their enemy in Peloponnesus.

It illustrates forcibly the peculiarity of Lacedæmonian character, that to them no similar words of encouragement were addressed either by Agis or any of the officers. "They knew (says the historian[120]) that long practice beforehand in the business of war, was a better preservative than fine speeches on the spur of the moment." As among professional soldiers, bravery was assumed as a thing of course, without any special exhortation: but mutual suggestions were heard among them with a view to get their order of battle and position perfect, which at first it probably was not, from the sudden and hurried manner in which they had been constrained to form. Moreover, various war-songs, perhaps those of Tyrtæus, were chanted in the ranks. At length the word was given to attack: the numerous pipers in attendance—an hereditary caste at Sparta—began to play, while the slow, solemn, and equable march of the troops adjusted itself to the time given by these instruments without any break or wavering in the line. A striking contrast to this deliberate pace was presented by the enemy: who having no pipers or other musical instruments, rushed forward to the charge with a step vehement and even furious,[121] fresh from the exhortations just addressed to them.

It was the natural tendency of all Grecian armies, when coming into conflict, to march not exactly straight forward, but somewhat aslant towards the right. The soldiers on the extreme right of both armies set the example of such inclination, in order to avoid exposing their own unshielded side; while for the same reason every man along the line took care to keep close to the shield of his right-hand neighbor. We see from hence that, with equal numbers, the right was not merely the post of

honor, but also of comparative safety. So it proved on the present occasion, even the Lacedæmonian discipline being noway exempt from this cause of disturbance. Though the Lacedæmonian front, from their superior numbers, was more extended than that of the enemy, still their right files did not think themselves safe without slanting still farther to the right, and thus outflanked very greatly the Athenians on the opposite left wing; while on the opposite side the Mantineians who formed the right wing, from the same disposition to keep the left shoulder forward, outflanked, though not in so great a degree, the Skiritæ and Brasideians on the Lacedæmonian left. King Agis, whose post was with the lochi in the centre, saw plainly that when the armies closed, his left would be certainly taken in flank and perhaps even in the rear. Accordingly, he thought it necessary to alter his dispositions even at this critical moment, which he relied upon being able to accomplish through the exact discipline, practised evolutions, and slow march, of his soldiers.

The natural mode of meeting the impending danger would have been to bring round a division from the extreme right, where it could well be spared, to the extreme left against the advancing Mantineians. But the ancient privilege of the Skiritæ, who always fought by themselves on the extreme left, forbade such an order. [122] Accordingly, Agis gave signal to the Brasideians and Skiritæ to make a flank movement on the left so as to get on equal front with the Mantineians; while in order to fill up the vacancy thus created in his line, he sent orders to the two polemarchs Aristoklês and Hipponoidas, who had their lochi on the extreme right of the line, to move to the rear and take post on the right of the Brasideians, so as again to close up the line. But these two polemarchs, who had the safest and most victorious place in the line, chose to keep it, disobeying his express orders: so that Agis, when he saw that they did not move, was forced to send a second order countermanding the flank movement of the Skiritæ, and directing them to fall in upon the centre, back into their former place. But it had now become too late to execute this second command before the hostile armies closed: and the Skiritæ and Brasideians were thus assailed while in disorder and cut off from their own centre. The Mantineians, finding them in this condition, defeated and drove them back; while the chosen Thousand of Argos, breaking in by the vacant space between the Brasideians and the Lacedæmonian centre, took them on the right flank and completed their discomfiture. They were routed and pursued even to the Lacedæmonian baggage-wagons in the rear; some of the elder troops who guarded the wagons being slain, and the whole Lacedæmonian left wing altogether dispersed.

But the victorious Mantineians and their comrades, thinking only of what was immediately before them, wasted thus a precious time when their aid was urgently needed elsewhere. Matters passed very differently on the Lacedæmonian centre and right; where Agis, with his body-guard of three hundred chosen youths called Hippeis, and with the Spartan lochi, found himself in front conflict with the centre and left of the enemy;—with the Argeians, their elderly troops and the so-called Five

Lochi, with the Kleonæans and Orneates, dependent allies of Argos, and with the Athenians. Over all these troops they were completely victorious, after a short resistance, indeed, on some points with no resistance at all. So formidable was the aspect and name of the Lacedæmonians, that the opposing troops gave way without crossing spears; and even with a panic so headlong, that they trod down each other in anxiety to escape.[123] While thus defeated in front, they were taken in flank by the Tegeans and Lacedæmonians on the right of Agis's army, and the Athenians here incurred serious hazard of being all cut to pieces, had they not been effectively aided by their own cavalry close at hand. Moreover Agis, having decidedly beaten and driven them back was less anxious to pursue them than to return to the rescue of his own defeated left wing; so that even the Athenians, who were exposed both in flank and front, were enabled to effect their retreat in safety. The Mantineians and the Argeian Thousand, though victorious on their part of the line, yet seeing the remainder of their army in disorderly flight, had little disposition to renew the combat against Agis and the conquering Lacedæmonians. They sought only to effect their retreat, which however could not be done without severe loss, especially on the part of the Mantineians; and which Agis might have prevented altogether, had not the Lacedæmonian system, enforced on this occasion by the counsels of an ancient Spartan named Pharax, enjoyed abstinence from prolonged pursuit against a defeated enemy.[124]

There fell in this battle seven hundred men of the Argeians, Kleonæans, and Orneates; two hundred Athenians, together with both the generals Lachês and Nikostratus; and two hundred Mantineians. The loss of the Lacedæmonians, though never certainly known, from the habitual secrecy of their public proceedings, was estimated at about three hundred men. They stripped the enemy's dead, spreading out to view the arms thus acquired, and selecting some for a trophy; then picked up their own dead and carried them away for burial at Tegea, granting the customary burial-truce to the defeated enemy. Pleistoanax, the other Spartan king, had advanced as far as Tegea with a reinforcement composed of the elder and younger citizens; but on hearing of the victory, he returned back home.[125]

Such was the important battle of Mantineia, fought in the month of June 418 B.C. Its effect throughout Greece was prodigious. The numbers engaged on both sides were very considerable for a Grecian army of that day, though seemingly not so large as at the battle of Delium five years before: the number and grandeur of the states whose troops were engaged was, however, greater than at Delium. But what gave peculiar value to the battle was, that it wiped off at once the preëxisting stain upon the honor of Sparta. The disaster in Sphakteria, disappointing all previous expectation, had drawn upon her the imputation of something like cowardice; and there were other proceedings which, with far better reason, caused her to be stigmatized as stupid and backward. But the victory of Mantineia silenced all such disparaging criticism, and replaced Sparta in her old position of military preëminence before the

eyes of Greece. It worked so much the more powerfully because it was entirely the fruit of Lacedæmonian courage, with little aid from that peculiar skill and tactics, which was generally seen concomitant, but had in the present case been found comparatively wanting. The manœuvre of Agis, in itself not ill-conceived, for the purpose of extending his left wing, had failed through the disobedience of the two refractory polemarchs: but in such a case the shame of failure falls more or less upon all parties concerned; nor could either general or soldiers be considered to have displayed at Mantineia any of that professional aptitude which caused the Lacedæmonians to be styled "artists in warlike affairs." So much the more conspicuously did Lacedæmonian courage stand out to view. After the left wing had been broken, and when the Argeian Thousand had penetrated into the vacant space between the left and centre, so that they might have taken the centre in flank, and ought to have done so, had they been well advised, the troops in the centre, instead of being daunted as most Grecian soldiers would have been, had marched forward against the enemies in their front, and gained a complete victory. The consequences of the battle were thus immense in reëstablishing the reputation of the Lacedæmonians, and in exalting them again to their ancient dignity of chiefs of Peloponnesus.[126]

We are not surprised to hear that the two polemarchs, Aristoklês and Hipponoidas, whose disobedience had wellnigh caused the ruin of the army, were tried and condemned to banishment as cowards, on their return to Sparta.[127]

Looking at the battle from the point of view of the other side, we may remark, that the defeat was greatly occasioned by the selfish caprice of the Eleians in withdrawing their three thousand men immediately before the battle, because the other allies, instead of marching against Lepreum, preferred to attempt the far more important town of Tegea: an additional illustration of the remark of Periklês at the beginning of the war, that numerous and equal allies could never be kept in harmonious coöperation.[128] Shortly after the defeat, the three thousand Eleians came back to the aid of Mantineia,—probably regretting their previous untoward departure,—together with a reinforcement of one thousand Athenians. Moreover, the Karneian month began, a season which the Lacedæmonians kept rigidly holy; even despatching messengers to countermand their extra-Peloponnesian allies, whom they had invoked prior to the late battle,[129] and remaining themselves within their own territory, so that the field was for the moment left clear for the operations of a defeated enemy. Accordingly, the Epidaurians, though they had made an inroad into the territory of Argos during the absence of the Argeian main force at the time of the late battle, and had gained a partial success, now found their own territory overrun by the united Eleians, Mantineians, and Athenians, who were bold enough even to commence a wall of circumvallation round the town of Epidaurus itself. The entire work was distributed between them to be accomplished; but the superior activity and perseverance of the Athenians was here displayed in a conspicuous manner. For while the portion of work committed to them—the fortification of the cape on which the

Heræum or temple of Hêrê was situated—was indefatigably prosecuted and speedily brought to completion, their allies, both Eleians and Mantineians, abandoned the tasks respectively allotted to them in impatience and disgust. The idea of circumvallation being for this reason relinquished, a joint garrison was left in the new fort at Cape Heræum, after which the allies evacuated the Epidaurian territory.[130]

So far, the Lacedæmonians appeared to have derived little positive benefit from their late victory: but the fruits of it were soon manifested in the very centre of their enemy's force, at Argos. A material change had taken place since the battle in the political tendencies of that city. There had been within it always an opposition party, philo-Laconian and anti-democratical: and the effect of the defeat of Mantineia had been to strengthen this party as much as it depressed their opponents. The democratical leaders, who, in conjunction with Athens and Alkibiades, had aspired to maintain an ascendency in Peloponnesus hostile and equal, if not superior to Sparta, now found their calculations overthrown and exchanged for the discouraging necessities of self-defence against a victorious enemy. And while these leaders thus lost general influence by so complete a defeat of their foreign policy, the ordinary democratical soldiers of Argos brought back with them from the field of Mantineia, nothing but humiliation and terror of the Lacedæmonian arms. But the chosen Argeian Thousand-regiment returned with very different feelings. Victorious over the left wing of their enemies, they had not been seriously obstructed in their retreat even by the Lacedæmonian centre. They had thus reaped positive glory,[131] and doubtless felt contempt for their beaten fellow-citizens. Now it has been already mentioned that these Thousand were men of rich families, and the best military age, set apart by the Argeian democracy to receive permanent training at the public expense, just at a time when the ambitious views of Argos first began to dawn, after the Peace of Nikias. So long as Argos was likely to become or continue the imperial state of Peloponnesus, these Thousand wealthy men would probably find their dignity sufficiently consulted in upholding her as such, and would thus acquiesce in the democratical government. But when the defeat of Mantineia reduced Argos to her own limits, and threw her upon the defensive, there was nothing to counterbalance their natural oligarchical sentiments, so that they became decided opponents of the democratical government in its distress. The oligarchical party in Argos, thus encouraged and reinforced, entered into a conspiracy with the Lacedæmonians to bring the city into alliance with Sparta as well as to overthrow the democracy.[132]

As the first step towards the execution of this scheme, the Lacedæmonians, about the end of September, marched out their full forces as far as Tegea, thus threatening invasion, and inspiring terror at Argos. From Tegea they sent forward as envoy Lichas, proxenus of the Argeians at Sparta, with two alternative propositions: one for peace, which he was instructed to tender and prevail upon the Argeians to accept, if he could; another, in case they refused, of a menacing character. It was the scheme of the oligarchical faction first to bring the city into alliance with Lacedæmon

and dissolve the connection with Athens, before they attempted any innovation in the government. The arrival of Lichas was the signal for them to manifest themselves by strenuously pressing the acceptance of his pacific proposition. But they had to contend against a strong resistance; since Alkibiadês, still in Argos, employed his utmost energy to defeat their views. Nothing but the presence of the Lacedæmonian army at Tegea, and the general despondency of the people, at length enabled them to carry their point, and to procure acceptance of the proposed treaty; which being already adopted by the ekklesia at Sparta, was sent ready prepared to Argos, and there sanctioned without alteration. The conditions were substantially as follows:—

"The Argeians shall restore the boys whom they have received as hostages from Orchomenus, and the men-hostages from the Mænalii. They shall restore to the Lacedæmonians the men now in Mantineia, whom the Lacedæmonians had placed as hostages for safe custody in Orchomenus, and whom the Argeians and Mantineians have carried away from that place. They shall evacuate Epidaurus, and raze the fort recently erected near it. The Athenians, unless they also forthwith evacuate Epidaurus, shall be proclaimed as enemies to Lacedæmon as well as to Argos, and to the allies of both. The Lacedæmonians shall restore all the hostages whom they now have in keeping, from whatever place they may have been taken. Respecting the sacrifice alleged to be due to Apollo by the Epidaurians, the Argeians will consent to tender to them an oath, which if they swear, they shall clear themselves.[133] Every city in Peloponnesus, small or great, shall be autonomous and at liberty to maintain its own ancient constitution. If any extra-Peloponnesian city shall come against Peloponnesus with mischievous projects, Lacedæmon and Argos will take joint counsel against it, in the manner most equitable for the interest of the Peloponnesians generally. The extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be in the same position with reference to this treaty as the allies of Lacedæmon and Argos in Peloponnesus, and shall hold their own in the same manner. The Argeians shall show this treaty to their allies, who shall be admitted to subscribe to it, if they think fit. But if the allies desire anything different, the Argeians shall send them home about their business."[134]

Such was the agreement sent ready prepared by the Lacedæmonians to Argos, and there literally accepted. It presented a reciprocity little more than nominal, imposing one obligation of no importance upon Sparta; though it answered the purpose of the latter by substantially dissolving the alliance of Argos with its three confederates.

But this treaty was meant by the oligarchical party in Argos only as preface to a series of ulterior measures. As soon as it was concluded, the menacing army of Sparta was withdrawn from Tegea, and was exchanged for free and peaceful intercommunication between the Lacedæmonians and Argeians. Probably Alkibiadês at the same time retired, while the renewed visits and hospitalities of Lacedæmonians at Argos strengthened the interest of their party more than ever. They were soon powerful enough to persuade the Argeian assembly formally to renounce the alliance

with Athens, Elis, and Mantineia, and to conclude a special alliance with Sparta, on the following terms:—

"There shall be peace and alliance for fifty years between the Lacedæmonians and the Argeians—upon equal terms—each giving amicable satisfaction, according to its established constitution, to all complaints preferred by the other. On the same condition, also, the other Peloponnesian cities shall partake in this peace and alliance, holding their own territory, laws, and separate constitution. All extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be put upon the same footing as the Lacedæmonians themselves. The allies of Argos shall also be put upon the same footing as Argos herself, holding their own territory undisturbed. Should occasion arise for common military operations on any point, the Lacedæmonians and Argeians shall take counsel together, determining in the most equitable manner they can for the interest of their allies. If any one of the cities hereunto belonging, either in or out of Peloponnesus, shall have disputes either about boundaries or other topics, she shall be held bound to enter upon amicable adjustment.[135] If any allied city shall quarrel with another allied city, the matter shall be referred to some third city satisfactory to both. Each city shall render justice to her own citizens according to her own ancient constitution."

It will be observed that in this treaty of alliance, the disputed question of headship is compromised or evaded. Lacedæmon and Argos are both put upon an equal footing, in respect to taking joint counsel for the general body of allies: they two alone are to decide, without consulting the other allies, though binding themselves to have regard to the interests of the latter. The policy of Lacedæmon also pervades the treaty, that of insuring autonomy to all the lesser states of Peloponnesus, and thus breaking up the empire of Elis, Mantineia, or any other larger state which might have dependencies.[136] And accordingly the Mantineians, finding themselves abandoned by Argos, were constrained to make their submission to Sparta, enrolling themselves again as her allies, renouncing all command over their Arcadian subjects, and delivering up the hostages of these latter, according to the stipulation in the treaty between Lacedæmon and Argos.[137] The Lacedæmonians do not seem to have meddled farther with Elis. Being already possessed of Lepreum,—through the Brasideian settlers planted there,—they perhaps did not wish again to provoke the Eleians, from fear of being excluded a second time from the Olympic festival.

Meanwhile the conclusion of the alliance with Lacedæmon—about November or December, 418 B.C.—had still farther depressed the popular leaders at Argos. The oligarchical faction, and the chosen regiment of the Thousand, all men of wealth and family, as well as bound together by their common military training, now saw their way clearly to the dissolution of the democracy by force, and to the accomplishment of a revolution. Instigated by such ambitious views, and flattered by the idea of admitted headship jointly with Sparta, they espoused the new policy of the city with extreme vehemence, and began immediately to multiply occasions of collision with

Athens. Joint Lacedæmonian and Argeian envoys were despatched to Thrace and Macedonia. With the Chalkidians of Thrace, the revolted subjects of Athens, the old alliance was renewed and even new engagements concluded; while Perdikkas of Macedonia was urged to renounce his covenants with Athens, and join the new confederacy. In that quarter the influence of Argos was considerable; for the Macedonian princes prized very highly their ancient descent from Argos, which constituted them brethren of the Hellenic family. Accordingly, Perdikkas consented to the demand and concluded the new treaty; insisting, however, with his habitual duplicity, that the step should for the moment be kept secret from Athens.[138] In farther pursuance of the new tone of hostility to that city, joint envoys were also sent thither, to require that the Athenians should quit Peloponnesus, and especially that they should evacuate the fort recently erected near Epidaurus. It seems to have been held jointly by Argeians, Mantineians, Eleians, and Athenians; and as the latter were only a minority of the whole, the Athenians in the city judged it prudent to send Dêmosthenês to bring them away. That general not only effected the retreat, but also contrived a stratagem, which gave to it the air almost of an advantage. On his first arrival in the fort, he proclaimed a gymnastic match outside of the gates for the amusement of the whole garrison, contriving to keep back the Athenians within until all the rest had marched out: then hastily shutting the gates, he remained master of the place.[139] Having no intention, however, of keeping it, he made it over presently to the Epidaurians themselves, with whom he renewed the truce to which they had been parties jointly with the Lacedæmonians five years before, two years before the Peace of Nikias.[140]

The mode of proceeding here resorted to by Athens, in respect to the surrender of the fort, seems to have been dictated by a desire to manifest her displeasure against the Argeians. This was exactly what the Argeian leaders and oligarchical party, on their side, most desired; the breach with Athens had become irreparable, and their plans were now matured for violently subverting their own democracy. They concerted with Sparta a joint military expedition, of one thousand hoplites from each city,—the first joint expedition under the new alliance,—against Sikyôn, for the purpose of introducing more thorough-paced oligarchy into the already oligarchical Sikyônian government. It is possible that there may have been some democratical opposition gradually acquiring strength at Sikyôn: but that city seems to have been, as far as we know, always oligarchical in policy, and passively faithful to Sparta. Probably, therefore, the joint enterprise against Sikyôn was nothing more than a pretext to cover the introduction of one thousand Lacedæmonian hoplites into Argos, whither the joint detachment immediately returned, after the business at Sikyôn had been accomplished. Thus reinforced, the oligarchical leaders and the chosen Thousand at Argos put down by force the democratical constitution in that city, slew the democratical leaders, and established themselves in complete possession of the government.[141]

This revolution, accomplished about February, B.C. 417, the result of the victory of Mantineia and the consummation of a train of policy laid by Sparta, raised her ascendency in Peloponnesus to a higher and more undisputed point than it had ever before attained. The towns in Achaia were as yet not sufficiently oligarchical for her purpose, perhaps since the march of Alkibiadês thither, two years before; accordingly, she now remodelled their governments in conformity with her own views. The new rulers of Argos were subservient to her, not merely from oligarchical sympathy, but from need of her aid to keep down internal rising against themselves: so that there was neither enemy, nor even neutral, to counter-work her or to favor Athens, throughout the whole peninsula.

But the Spartan ascendency at Argos was not destined to last. Though there were many cities in Greece, in which oligarchies long maintained themselves unshaken, through adherence to a traditional routine and by being usually in the hands of men accustomed to govern, yet an oligarchy erected by force upon the ruins of a democracy was rarely of long duration. The angry discontent of the people, put down by temporary intimidation, usually revived, and threatened the security of the rulers enough to render them suspicious and probably cruel. Nor was such cruelty their only fault: they found their emancipation from democratical restraints too tempting to be able to control either their lust or their rapacity. With the population of Argos, comparatively coarse and brutal in all ranks, and more like Korkyra than like Athens, such abuse was pretty sure to be speedy as well as flagrant. Especially the chosen regiment of the Thousand—men in the vigor of their age, and proud of their military prowess as well as of their wealthier station—construed the new oligarchical government which they had helped to erect as a period of individual license to themselves. The behavior and fate of their chief, Bryas, illustrates the general demeanor of the troop. After many other outrages against persons of poorer condition, he one day met in the streets a wedding procession, in which the person of the bride captivated his fancy. He caused her to be violently torn from her company, carried her to his house, and possessed himself of her by force. But in the middle of the night, this high-spirited woman revenged herself for the outrage by putting out the eyes of the ravisher while he was fast asleep:[142] a terrible revenge, which the pointed clasp-pins of the feminine attire sometimes enabled women[143] to take upon those who wronged them. Having contrived to make her escape, she found concealment among her friends, as well as protection among the people generally against the indignant efforts of the chosen Thousand to avenge their leader.

From incidents such as this, and from the multitude of petty insults which so flagitious an outrage implies as coexistent, we are not surprised to learn that the Demos of Argos soon recovered their lost courage, and resolved upon an effort to put down their oligarchical oppressors. They waited for the moment when the festival called the Gymnopædiæ was in course of being solemnized at Sparta,—a festival at which the choric performances of men and boys were so interwoven with Spartan

religion as well as bodily training, that the Lacedæmonians would make no military movement until they were finished. At this critical moment, the Argeian Demos rose in insurrection, and after a sharp contest gained a victory over the oligarchy, some of whom were slain, while others only saved themselves by flight. Even at the first instant of danger, pressing messages had been sent to Sparta for aid. But the Lacedæmonians at first peremptorily refused to move during the period of their festival: nor was it until messenger after messenger had arrived to set forth the pressing necessity of their friends, that they reluctantly put aside their festival to march towards Argos. They were too late: the precious moment had already passed by. They were met at Tegea by an intimation that their friends were overthrown, and Argos in possession of the victorious people. Nevertheless, various exiles who had escaped still promised them success, urgently entreating them to proceed, but the Lacedæmonians refused to comply, returned to Sparta, and resumed their intermitted festival.[144]

Thus was the oligarchy of Argos overthrown, after a continuance of about four months,[145] from February to June, 417 B.C., and the chosen Thousand-regiment either dissolved or destroyed. The movement excited great sympathy in several Peloponnesian cities,[146] who were becoming jealous of the exorbitant preponderance of Sparta. Nevertheless, the Argeian Demos, though victorious within the city, felt so much distrust of being able to maintain themselves, that they sent envoys to Sparta to plead their cause and to entreat favorable treatment: a proceeding which proves the insurrection to have been spontaneous, not fomented by Athens. But the envoys of the expelled oligarchs were there to confront them, and the Lacedæmonians, after a lengthened discussion, adjudging the Demos to have been guilty of wrong, proclaimed the resolution of sending forces to put them down. Still, the habitual tardiness of Lacedæmonian habits prevented any immediate or separate movement. Their allies were to be summoned, none being very zealous in the cause, and least of all at this moment, when the period of harvest was at hand; so that about three months intervened before any actual force was brought together.

This important interval was turned to account by the Argeian Demos, who, being plainly warned that they were to look on Sparta only as an enemy, immediately renewed their alliance with Athens. Regarding her as their main refuge, they commenced the building of long walls to connect their city with the sea, in order that the road might always be open for supplies and reinforcement from Athens, in case they should be confined to their walls by a superior Spartan force. The whole Argeian population—men and women, free and slave—set about the work with the utmost ardor: while Alkibiadês brought assistance from Athens,[147] especially skilled masons and carpenters, of whom they stood in much need. The step may probably have been suggested by himself, as it was the same which, two years before, he had urged upon the inhabitants of Patræ. But the construction of walls adequate for defence, along the line of four miles and a half between Argos and the sea,[148] required a long time. Moreover, the oligarchical party within the town, as well as the

exiles without,—a party defeated but not annihilated,—strenuously urged the Lacedæmonians to put an end to the work, and even promised them a counter-revolutionary movement in the town as soon as they drew near to assist; the same intrigue which had been entered into by the oligarchical party at Athens forty years before, when the walls down to Peiræus were in course of erection.[149] Accordingly about the end of September, 417 B.C., king Agis conducted an army of Lacedæmonians and allies against Argos, drove the population within the city, and destroyed so much of the long walls as had been already raised. But the oligarchical party within were not able to realize their engagements of rising in arms, so that he was obliged to retire after merely ravaging the territory and taking the town of Hysiæ, where he put to death all the freemen who fell into his hands. After his departure, the Argeians retaliated these ravages upon the neighboring territory of Phlius, where the exiles from Argos chiefly resided.[150]

The close neighborhood of such exiles, together with the declared countenance of Sparta, and the continued schemes of the oligarchical party within the walls, kept the Argeian democracy in perpetual uneasiness and alarm throughout the winter, in spite of their recent victory and the suppression of the dangerous regiment of a Thousand. To relieve them in part from embarrassment, Alkibiadês was despatched thither early in the spring with an Athenian armament and twenty triremes. His friends and guests appear to have been now in the ascendency, as leaders of the democratical government; and in concert with them, he selected three hundred marked oligarchical persons, whom he carried away and deposited in various Athenian islands, as hostages for the quiescence of the party, B.C. 416. Another ravaging march was also undertaken by the Argeians into the territory of Phlius, wherein, however, they sustained nothing but loss. And again, about the end of September, the Lacedæmonians gave the word for a second expedition against Argos. But having marched as far as the borders, they found the sacrifices—always offered previous to leaving their own territory—so unfavorable, that they returned back and disbanded their forces. The Argeian oligarchical party, in spite of the hostages recently taken from them, had been on the watch for this Lacedæmonian force, and had projected a rising; or at least were suspected of doing so, to such a degree that some of them were seized and imprisoned by the government, while others made their escape.[151] Later in the same winter, however, the Lacedæmonians became more fortunate with their border sacrifices, entered the Argeian territory in conjunction with their allies (except the Corinthians, who refused to take part), and established the Argeian oligarchical exiles at Orneæ: from which town these latter were again speedily expelled, after the retirement of the Lacedæmonian army, by the Argeian democracy with the aid of an Athenian reinforcement.[152]

To maintain the renewed democratical government of Argos, against enemies both internal and external, was an important policy to Athens, as affording the basis, which might afterwards be extended, of an anti-Laconian party in Peloponnesus. But

at the present time the Argeian alliance was a drain and an exhaustion rather than a source of strength to Athens: very different from the splendid hopes which it had presented prior to the battle of Mantineia, hopes of supplanting Sparta in her ascendency within the Isthmus. It is remarkable, that in spite of the complete alienation of feeling between Athens and Sparta,—and continued reciprocal hostilities, in an indirect manner, so long as each was acting as ally of some third party,—nevertheless, neither the one nor the other would formally renounce the sworn alliance, nor obliterate the record inscribed on its stone column. Both parties shrank from proclaiming the real truth, though each half year brought them a step nearer to it in fact. Thus during the course of the present summer (416 B.C.) the Athenian and Messenian garrison at Pylos became more active than ever in their incursions on Laconia, and brought home large booty; upon which the Lacedæmonians, though still not renouncing the alliance, publicly proclaimed their willingness to grant what we may call letters of marque, to any one, for privateering against Athenian commerce. The Corinthians also, on private grounds of quarrel, commenced hostilities against the Athenians.[153] Yet still Sparta and her allies remained in a state of formal peace with Athens: the Athenians resisted all the repeated solicitations of the Argeians to induce them to make a landing on any part of Laconia and commit devastation.[154] Nor was the license of free intercourse for individuals as yet suspended. We cannot doubt that the Athenians were invited to the Olympic festival of 416 B.C. (the 91st Olympiad), and sent thither their solemn legation along with those of Sparta and other Dorian Greeks.

Now that they had again become allies of Argos, the Athenians probably found out, more fully than they had before known, the intrigue carried on by the former Argeian government with the Macedonian Perdikkas. The effects of these intrigues, however, had made themselves felt even earlier in the conduct of that prince, who, having as an ally of Athens engaged to coöperate with an Athenian expedition projected under Nikias for the spring or summer of 417 B.C. against the Chalkidians of Thrace and Amphipolis, now withdrew his concurrence, receded from the alliance of Athens, and frustrated the whole scheme of expedition. The Athenians accordingly placed the ports of Macedonia under naval blockade, proclaiming Perdikkas an enemy.[155]

Nearly five years had elapsed since the defeat of Kleon, without any fresh attempt to recover Amphipolis: the project just alluded to appears to have been the first. The proceedings of the Athenians with regard to this important town afford ample proof of that want of wisdom on the part of their leading men Nikias and Alkibiades, and of erroneous tendencies on the part of the body of the citizens, which we shall gradually find conducting their empire to ruin. Among all their possessions out of Attica, there was none so valuable as Amphipolis: the centre of a great commercial and mining region, situated on a large river and lake which the Athenian navy could readily command, and claimed by them with reasonable justice, since it was

their original colony, planted by their wisest statesman, Periklês. It had been lost only through unpardonable negligence on the part of their generals; and when lost, we should have expected to see the chief energies of Athens directed to the recovery of it; the more so, as, if once recovered, it admitted of being made sure and retained as a future possession. Kleon is the only leading man who at once proclaims to his countrymen the important truth that it never can be recovered except by force. He strenuously urges his countrymen to make the requisite military effort, and prevails upon them in part to do so, but the attempt disgracefully fails; partly through his own incompetence as commander, whether his undertaking of that duty was a matter of choice or of constraint, partly through the strong opposition and antipathy against him from so large a portion of his fellow-citizens, which rendered the military force not hearty in the enterprise. Next, Nikias, Lachês, and Alkibiadês, all concur in making peace and alliance with the Lacedæmonians, with express promise and purpose to procure the restoration of Amphipolis. But after a series of diplomatic proceedings, which display as much silly credulity in Nikias as selfish deceit in Alkibiadês, the result becomes evident, as Kleon had insisted, that peace will not restore to them Amphipolis, and that it can only be regained by force. The fatal defect of Nikias is now conspicuously seen: his inertness of character and incapacity of decided or energetic effort. When he discovered that he had been out-manœuvred by the Lacedæmonian diplomacy, and had fatally misadvised his countrymen into making important cessions on the faith of equivalents to come, we might have expected to find him spurred on by indignant repentance for this mistake, and putting forth his own strongest efforts, as well as those of his country, in order to recover those portions of her empire which the peace had promised, but did not restore. Instead of which he exhibits no effective movement, while Alkibiadês begins to display the defects of his political character, yet more dangerous than those of Nikias, the passion for showy, precarious, boundless, and even perilous novelties. It is only in the year 417 B.C., after the defeat of Mantineia had put an end to the political speculations of Alkibiadês in the interior of Peloponnesus, that Nikias projects an expedition against Amphipolis; and even then it is projected only contingent upon the aid of Perdikkas, a prince of notorious perfidy. It was not by any half-exertions of force that the place could be regained, as the defeat of Kleon had sufficiently proved. We obtain from these proceedings a fair measure of the foreign politics of Athens at this time, during what is called the Peace of Nikias, preparing us for that melancholy catastrophe which will be developed in the coming chapters, where she is brought near to ruin by the defects of Nikias and Alkibiadês combined for, by singular misfortune, she does not reap the benefit of the good qualities of either.

It was in one of the three years between 420-416 B.C., though we do not know in which, that the vote of ostracism took place, arising out of the contention between Nikias and Alkibiadês.[156] The political antipathy between the two having reached a point of great violence, it was proposed that a vote of ostracism should be taken, and this proposition—probably made by the partisans of Nikias, since Alkibiadês was

the person most likely to be reputed dangerous—was adopted by the people. Hyperbolus the lamp-maker, son of Cheremês, a speaker of considerable influence in the public assembly, strenuously supported it, hating Nikias not less than Alkibiadês. Hyperbolus is named by Aristophanês as having succeeded Kleon in the mastership of the rostrum in the Pnyx:[157] if this were true, his supposed demagogic preëminence would commence about September 422 B.C., the period of the death of Kleon. Long before that time, however, he had been among the chief butts of the comic authors, who ascribe to him the same baseness, dishonesty, impudence, and malignity in accusation, as that which they fasten upon Kleon, though in language which seems to imply an inferior idea of his power. And it may be doubted whether Hyperbolus ever succeeded to the same influence as had been enjoyed by Kleon, when we observe that Thucydidês does not name him in any of the important debates which took place at and after the Peace of Nikias. Thucydidês only mentions him once, in 411 B.C., while he was in banishment under sentence of ostracism, and resident at Samos. He terms him, "one Hyperbolus, a low busy-body, who had been ostracized, not from fear of dangerous excess of dignity and power, but through his wickedness and his being felt as a disgrace to the city."[158] This sentence of Thucydidês is really the only evidence against Hyperbolus: for it is not less unjust in his case than in that of Kleon to cite the jests and libels of comedy as if they were so much authentic fact and trustworthy criticism. It was at Samos that Hyperbolus was slain by the oligarchical conspirators who were aiming to overthrow the democracy at Athens. We have no particular facts respecting him to enable us to test the general character given by Thucydidês.

At the time when the resolution was adopted at Athens, to take a vote of ostracism suggested by the political dissension between Nikias and Alkibiadês, about twenty-four years had elapsed since a similar vote had been resorted to; the last example having been that of Periklês and Thucydidês son of Melêsius, the latter of whom was ostracized about 442 B.C. The democratical constitution had become sufficiently confirmed to lessen materially the necessity for ostracism as a safeguard against individual usurpers: moreover, there was now full confidence in the numerous dikasteries as competent to deal with the greatest of such criminals, thus abating the necessity as conceived in men's minds, not less than the real necessity, for such precautionary intervention. Under such a state of things, altered reality as well as altered feeling, we are not surprised to find that the vote of ostracism now invoked, though we do not know the circumstances which immediately preceded it, ended in an abuse, or rather in a sort of parody, of the ancient preventive. At a moment of extreme heat of party dispute, the friends of Alkibiadês probably accepted the challenge of Nikias and concurred in supporting a vote of ostracism; each hoping to get rid of the opponent. The vote was accordingly decreed, but before it actually took place, the partisans of both changed their views, and preferred to let the political dissension proceed without closing it by separating the combatants. But the ostracizing vote, having been formally pronounced, could not now be prevented from

taking place: it was always, however, perfectly general in its form, admitting of any citizen being selected for temporary banishment. Accordingly, the two opposing parties, each doubtless including various clubs, or hetæries, and according to some accounts the friends of Phæax also, united to turn the vote against some one else: and they fixed upon a man whom all of them jointly disliked, Hyperbolus.[159] By thus concurring, they obtained a sufficient number of votes against him to pass the sentence, and he was sent into temporary banishment. But such a result was in no one's contemplation when the vote was decreed to take place, and Plutarch even represents the people as clapping their hands at it as a good joke. It was presently recognized by every one, seemingly even by the enemies of Hyperbolus, as a gross abuse of the ostracism. And the language of Thucydidês himself distinctly implies this; for if we even grant that Hyperbolus fully deserved the censure which that historian bestows, no one could treat his presence as dangerous to the commonwealth; nor was the ostracism introduced to meet low dishonesty or wickedness. It was, even before, passing out of the political morality of Athens; and this sentence consummated its extinction, so that we never hear of it as employed afterwards. It had been extremely valuable in earlier days, as a security to the growing democracy against individual usurpation of power, and against dangerous exaggeration of rivalry between individual leaders: but the democracy was now strong enough to dispense with such exceptional protection. Yet if Alkibiadês had returned as victor from Syracuse, it is highly probable that the Athenians would have had no other means than the precautionary antidote of ostracism to save themselves from him as despot.

It was in the beginning of summer (416 B.C.) that the Athenians undertook the siege and conquest of the Dorian island of Mêlos, one of the Cyclades, and the only one, except Thêra, which was not already included in their empire. Mêlos and Thêra were both ancient colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom they had strong sympathies of lineage. They had never joined the confederacy of Delos, nor been in any way connected with Athens; but at the same time, neither had they ever taken part in the recent war against her, nor given her any ground of complaint,[160] until she landed and attacked them in the sixth year of the recent war. She now renewed her attempt, sending against the island a considerable force under Kleomêdês and Tisias: thirty Athenian triremes, with six Chian and two Lesbian, twelve hundred Athenian hoplites, and fifteen hundred hoplites from the allies, with three hundred bowmen and twenty horse-bowmen. These officers, after disembarking their forces, and taking position, sent envoys into the city summoning the government to surrender, and to become a subject-ally of Athens.

It was a practice, frequent, if not universal, in Greece, even in governments not professedly democratical—to discuss propositions for peace or war before the assembly of the people. But on the present occasion the Melian leaders departed from this practice, and admitted the envoys only to a private conversation with their executive council. Of this conversation Thucydidês professes to give a detailed and elaborate

account, at surprising length, considering his general brevity. He sets down thirteen distinct observations, with as many replies, interchanged between the Athenian envoys and the Melians; no one of them separately long, and some very short; but the dialogue carried on is dramatic, and very impressive. There is, indeed, every reason for concluding that what we here read in Thucydidês is in far larger proportion his own and in smaller proportion authentic report, than any of the other speeches which he professes to set down. For this was not a public harangue, in respect to which he might have had the opportunity of consulting the recollection of many different persons: it was a private conversation, wherein three or four Athenians, and perhaps ten or a dozen Melians, may have taken part. Now as all the Melian population were slain immediately after the capture of the town, there remained only the Athenian envoys through whose report Thucydidês could possibly have heard what really passed. That he did hear either from or through them the general character of what passed, I make no doubt: but there is no ground for believing that he received from them anything like the consecutive stream of debate, which, together with part of the illustrative reasoning, we must refer to his dramatic genius and arrangement.

The Athenian begins by restricting the subject of discussion to the mutual interests of both parties in the peculiar circumstances in which they now stand, in spite of the disposition of the Melians to enlarge the range of topics, by introducing considerations of justice and appealing to the sentiment of impartial critics. He will not multiply words to demonstrate the just origin of the Athenian empire, erected on the expulsion of the Persians, or to set forth injury suffered, as pretext for the present expedition. Nor will he listen to any plea on the part of the Melians, that they, though colonists of Sparta, have never fought alongside of her or done Athens wrong. He presses upon them to aim at what is attainable under existing circumstances, since they know as well as he that justice in the reasoning of mankind is settled according to equal compulsion on both sides; the strong doing what their power allows, and the weak submitting to it.[161] To this the Melians reply, that—omitting all appeal to justice, and speaking only of what was expedient—they hold it to be even expedient for Athens not to break down the common moral sanction of mankind, but to permit that equity and justice shall still remain as a refuge for men in trouble, with some indulgence even towards those who may be unable to make out a case of full and strict right. Most of all was this the interest of Athens herself, inasmuch as her ruin, if it ever occurred, would be awful both as punishment to herself and as lesson to others.—"We are not afraid of *that* (rejoined the Athenian) even if our empire should be overthrown. It is not imperial cities like Sparta who deal harshly with the conquered. Moreover, our present contest is not undertaken against Sparta; it is a contest to determine whether subjects shall by their own attack prevail over their rulers. This is a risk for us to judge of: in the mean time, let us remind you that we come here for the advantage of our own empire, and that we are now speaking with a view to your safety; wishing to get you under our empire without trouble to ourselves, and to preserve you for the mutual benefit of both of us."—"Cannot you leave us alone, and let

us be your friends instead of enemies, but neither allies of you nor of Sparta?" said the Melians.—"No (is the reply); your friendship does us more harm than your enmity: your friendship is a proof of our weakness, in the eyes of our subject-allies; your enmity will give a demonstration of our power."—"But do your subjects really take such a measure of equity, as to put us, who have no sort of connection with you, on the same footing with themselves, most of whom are your own colonists, while many of them have even revolted from you and been reconquered?"—"They do: for they think that both one and the other have fair ground for claiming independence, and that if you are left independent, this arises only from your power and from our fear to attack you. So that your submission will not only enlarge our empire, but strengthen our security throughout the whole; especially as you are islanders, and feeble islanders too, while we are lords of the sea."—"But surely that very circumstance is in other ways a protection to you, as evincing your moderation: for if you attack us, you will at once alarm all neutrals, and convert them into enemies."—"We are in little fear of continental cities, who are out of our reach and not likely to take part against us, but only of islanders; either yet unincorporated in our empire, like you, or already in our empire and discontented with the constraint which it imposes. It is such islanders who by their ill-judged obstinacy are likely, with their eyes open, to bring both us and themselves into peril."—"We know well (said the Melians, after some other observations had been interchanged) how terrible it is to contend against your superior power, and your good fortune; nevertheless, we trust that in point of fortune we shall receive fair treatment from the gods, since we stand upon grounds of right against injustice; and as to our inferior power, we trust that the deficiency will be made up by our ally Sparta, whose kindred race will compel her from very shame to aid us."—"We too (replied the Athenians) think that we shall not be worse off than others in regard to the divine favor. For we neither advance any claim, nor do any act, overpassing that which men believe in regard to the gods, and wish in regard to themselves. What we believe about the gods is the same as that which we see to be the practice of men: the impulse of nature inclines them of necessity to rule over what is inferior in force to themselves. This is the principle on which we now proceed,—not having been the first either to lay it down or to follow it, but finding it established and likely to continue for ever,—and knowing well too that you or others in our position would do as much. As for your expectations from the Lacedæmonians, founded on the disgrace of their remaining deaf to your call, we congratulate you indeed on your innocent simplicity, but we at the same time deprecate such foolishness. For the Lacedæmonians are indeed most studious of excellence in regard to themselves and their own national customs. But looking at their behavior towards others, we affirm roundly, and can prove by many examples of their history, that they are of all men the most conspicuous in construing what is pleasing as if it were honorable, and what is expedient as if it were just. Now that is not the state of mind which you require, to square with your desperate calculations of safety."

After various other observations interchanged in a similar tenor, the Athenian envoys, strenuously urging upon the Melians to reconsider the matter more cautiously among themselves, withdrew, and after a certain interval were recalled by the Melian council to hear the following words: "We hold to the same opinion, as at first, men of Athens: we shall not surrender the independence of a city which has already stood for seven hundred years; we shall yet make an effort to save ourselves, relying on that favorable fortune which the gods have hitherto vouchsafed to us, as well as upon aid from men, and especially from the Lacedæmonians. We request that we may be considered as your friends, but as hostile to neither party, and that you will leave the island after concluding such a truce as may be mutually acceptable."—"Well (said the Athenian envoys), you alone seem to consider future contingencies as clearer than the facts before your eyes, and to look at an uncertain distance, through your own wishes, as if it were present reality. You have staked your all upon the Lacedæmonians, upon fortune, and upon fond hopes; and, with your all, you will come to ruin."

The siege was forthwith commenced. A wall of circumvallation, distributed in portions among the different allies of Athens, was constructed round the town; which was left under full blockade, both by sea and land, while the rest of the armament retired home. The town remained blocked up for several months. During the course of that time, the besieged made two successful sallies, which afforded them some temporary relief, and forced the Athenians to send an additional detachment, under Philokratês. At length the provisions within were exhausted; plots for betrayal commenced among the Melians themselves, so that they were constrained to surrender at discretion. The Athenians resolved to put to death all the men of military age and to sell the women and children as slaves. Who the proposer of this barbarous resolution was, Thucydidês does not say; but Plutarch and others inform us that Alkibiadês[162] was strenuous in supporting it. Five hundred Athenian settlers were subsequently sent thither, to form a new community: apparently not as kleruchs, or out-citizens of Athens, but as new Melians.[163]

Taking the proceedings of the Athenians towards Mêlos from the beginning to the end, they form one of the grossest and most inexcusable pieces of cruelty combined with injustice which Grecian history presents to us. In appreciating the cruelty of such wholesale executions, we ought to recollect that the laws of war placed the prisoner altogether at the disposal of his conqueror, and that an Athenian garrison, if captured by the Corinthians in Naupaktus, Nisæa, or elsewhere, would assuredly have undergone the same fate, unless in so far as they might be kept for exchange. But the treatment of the Melians goes beyond all rigor of the laws of war; for they had never been at war with Athens, nor had they done anything to incur her enmity. Moreover, the acquisition of the island was of no material value to Athens; not sufficient to pay the expenses of the armament employed in its capture. And while the gain was thus in every sense slender, the shock to Grecian feeling by the whole pro-

ceeding seems to have occasioned serious mischief to Athens. Far from tending to strengthen her entire empire, by sweeping in this small insular population, who had hitherto been neutral and harmless, it raised nothing but odium against her, and was treasured up in after times as among the first of her misdeeds.

To gratify her pride of empire by a new conquest—easy to effect, though of small value—was doubtless her chief motive; probably also strengthened by pique against Sparta, between whom and herself a thoroughly hostile feeling subsisted, and by a desire to humiliate Sparta through the Melians. This passion for new acquisition, superseding the more reasonable hopes of recovering the lost portions of her empire, will be seen in the coming chapters breaking out with still more fatal predominance.

Both these two points, it will be observed, are prominently marked in the dialogue set forth by Thucydidês. I have already stated that this dialogue can hardly represent what actually passed, except as to a few general points, which the historian has followed out into deductions and illustrations,[164] thus dramatizing the given situation in a powerful and characteristic manner. The language put into the mouth of the Athenian envoys is that of pirates and robbers, as Dionysius of Halikarnassus[165] long ago remarked; intimating his suspicion that Thucydidês had so set out the case for the purpose of discrediting the country which had sent him into exile. Whatever may be thought of this suspicion, we may at least affirm that the arguments which he here ascribes to Athens are not in harmony even with the defects of the Athenian character. Athenian speakers are more open to the charge of equivocal wording, multiplication of false pretences, softening down the bad points of their case, putting an amiable name upon vicious acts, employing what is properly called *sophistry*, where their purpose needs it.[166] Now the language of the envoy at Mêlos, which has been sometimes cited as illustrating the immorality of the class or profession—falsely called a school—named Sophists at Athens, is above all things remarkable for a sort of audacious frankness; a disdain not merely of sophistry, in the modern sense of the word, but even of such plausible excuse as might have been offered. It has been strangely argued, as if "*The good old plan, that they should take who have the power, and they should keep who can*," had been first discovered and openly promulgated by Athenian sophists; whereas the true purpose and value of sophists, even in the modern and worst sense of the word—putting aside the perversion of applying that sense to the persons called sophists at Athens—is, to furnish plausible matter of deceptive justification, so that the strong man may be enabled to act upon this "good old plan" as much as he pleases, but without avowing it, and while professing fair dealing or just retaliation for some imaginary wrong. The wolf in Æsop's fable (of the Wolf and the Lamb) speaks like a sophist; the Athenian envoy at Mêlos speaks in a manner totally unlike a sophist, either in the Athenian sense or in the modern sense of the word; we may add, unlike an Athenian at all, as Dionysius has observed.

As a matter of fact and practice, it is true that stronger states, in Greece and in the contemporary world, did habitually tend, as they have tended throughout the course of history down to the present day, to enlarge their power at the expense of the weaker. Every territory in Greece, except Attica and Arcadia, had been seized by conquerors who dispossessed or enslaved the prior inhabitants. We find Brasidas reminding his soldiers of the good sword of their forefathers, which had established dominion over men far more numerous than themselves, as matter of pride and glory:[167] and when we come to the times of Philip and Alexander of Macedon, we shall see the lust of conquest reaching a pitch never witnessed among free Greeks. Of right thus founded on simple superiority of force, there were abundant examples to be quoted, as parallels to the Athenian conquest of Mêlos: but that which is unparalleled is the mode adopted by the Athenian envoy of justifying it, or rather of setting aside all justification, looking at the actual state of civilization in Greece. A barbarous invader casts his sword into the scale in lieu of argument: a civilized conqueror is bound by received international morality to furnish some justification,—a good plea, if he can,—a false plea, or sham plea, if he has no better. But the Athenian envoy neither copies the contemptuous silence of the barbarian nor the smooth lying of the civilized invader. Though coming from the most cultivated city in Greece, where the vices prevalent were those of refinement and not of barbarism, he disdains the conventional arts of civilized diplomacy more than would have been done by an envoy even of Argos or Korkyra. He even disdains to mention, what might have been said with perfect truth as a matter of fact, whatever may be thought of its sufficiency as a justification, that the Melians had enjoyed for the last fifty years the security of the Ægean waters at the cost of Athens and her allies, without any payment of their own.

So at least he is made to do in the Thucydidean dramatic fragment,—Μήλου Ἅλωσις (The Capture of Melos),—if we may parody the title of the lost tragedy of Phrynichus "The Capture of Miletus." And I think a comprehensive view of the history of Thucydidês will suggest to us the explanation of this drama, with its powerful and tragical effect. The capture of Mêlos comes immediately before the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which was resolved upon three or four months afterwards, and despatched during the course of the following summer. That expedition was the gigantic effort of Athens, which ended in the most ruinous catastrophe known to ancient history. From such a blow it was impossible for Athens to recover. Though thus crippled, indeed, she struggled against its effects with surprising energy; but her fortune went on, in the main, declining,—yet with occasional moments of apparent restoration,—until her complete prostration and subjugation by Lysander. Now Thucydidês, just before he gets upon the plane of this descending progress, makes a halt, to illustrate the sentiment of Athenian power in its most exaggerated, insolent, and cruel manifestation, by this dramatic fragment of the envoys at Mêlos. It will be recollected that Herodotus, when about to describe the forward march of Xerxês into Greece, destined to terminate in such fatal humiliation, impresses his

readers with an elaborate idea of the monarch's insolence and superhuman pride, by various conversations between him and the courtiers about him, as well as by other anecdotes, combined with the overwhelming specifications of the muster at Doriskus. Such moral contrasts and juxtapositions, especially that of ruinous reverse following upon overweening good fortune, were highly interesting to the Greek mind. And Thucydidês—having before him an act of great injustice and cruelty on the part of Athens, committed exactly at this point of time—has availed himself of the form of dialogue, for once in his history, to bring out the sentiments of a disdainful and confident conqueror in dramatic antithesis. They are, however, his own sentiments, conceived as suitable to the situation; not those of the Athenian envoy,—still less, those of the Athenian public,—least of all, those of that much-calumniated class of men, the Athenian sophists.

CHAPTER LVII.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXTINCTION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY.

In the preceding chapters, I have brought down the general history of the Peloponnesian war to the time immediately preceding the memorable Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which changed the whole face of the war. At this period, and for some time to come, the history of the Peloponnesian Greeks becomes intimately blended with that of the Sicilian Greeks. But hitherto the connection between the two has been merely occasional, and of little reciprocal effect: so that I have thought it for the convenience of the reader to keep the two streams entirely separate, omitting the proceedings of Athens in Sicily during the first ten years of the war. I now proceed to fill up this blank: to recount as much as can be made out of Sicilian events during the interval between 461-416 B.C., and to assign the successive steps whereby the Athenians entangled themselves in ambitious projects against Syracuse, until they at length came to stake the larger portion of their force upon that fatal hazard.

The extinction of the Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse,[168] followed by the expulsion or retirement of all the other despots throughout the island, left the various Grecian cities to reorganize themselves in free and self-constituted governments. Unfortunately, our memorials respecting this revolution are miserably scanty; but there is enough to indicate that it was something much more than a change from single-headed to popular government. It included, farther, transfers on the largest scale both of inhabitants and of property. The preceding despots had sent many old citizens into exile, transplanted others from one part of Sicily to another, and provided settlements for numerous emigrants and mercenaries devoted to their interest. Of these proceedings much was reversed, when the dynasties were overthrown, so that the personal and proprietary revolution was more complicated and perplexing than the political. After a period of severe commotion, an accommodation was concluded, whereby the adherents of the expelled dynasty were planted partly in the territory of Messêne, partly in the reëstablished city of Kamarina in the eastern portion of the southern coast, bordering on Syracuse.[169]

But though peace was thus reëstablished, these large mutations of inhabitants first begun by the despots,—and the incoherent mixture of races, religious institutions, dialects, etc., which was brought about unavoidably during the process,—left throughout Sicily a feeling of local instability, very different from the long traditional tenures in Peloponnesus and Attica, and numbered by foreign enemies among the elements of its weakness.[170] The wonder indeed rather is, that such real and powerful causes of disorder were soon so efficaciously controlled by the popular governments, that the half century now approaching was decidedly the most prosperous and undisturbed period in the history of the island.

The southern coast of Sicily was occupied, beginning from the westward by Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina. Then came Syracuse, possessing the south-eastern cape, and the southern portion of the eastern coast: next, on the eastern coast, Leontini, Katana, and Naxos: Messênê, on the strait adjoining Italy. The centre of the island, and even much of the northern coast, was occupied by the non-Hellenic Sikels and Sikans: on this coast, Himera was the only Grecian city. Between Himera and Cape Lilybæum, the western corner of the island was occupied by the non-Hellenic cities of Egesta and Eryx, and by the Carthaginian seaports, of which Panormus (Palermo) was the principal.

Of these various Grecian cities, all independent, Syracuse was the first in power, Agrigentum the second. The causes above noticed, disturbing the first commencement of popular governments in all of them, were most powerfully operative at Syracuse. We do not know the particulars of the democratical constitution which was there established, but its stability was threatened by more than one ambitious pretender, eager to seize the sceptre of Gelo and Hiero. The most prominent among these pretenders was Tyndarion, who employed a considerable fortune in distributing largesses and procuring partisans among the poor. His political designs were at length so openly manifested, that he was brought to trial, condemned, and put to death; yet not without an abortive insurrection of his partisans to rescue him. After several leading citizens had tried, and failed in a similar manner, the people thought it expedient to pass a law similar to the Athenian ostracism, authorizing the infliction of temporary preventive banishment.[171] Under this law several powerful citizens were actually and speedily banished; and such was the abuse of the new engine, by the political parties in the city, that men of conspicuous position are said to have become afraid of meddling with public affairs. Thus put in practice, the institution is said to have given rise to new political contentions not less violent than those which it checked, insomuch that the Syracusans found themselves obliged to repeal the law not long after its introduction. We should have been glad to learn some particulars concerning this political experiment, beyond the meagre abstract given by Diodorus, and especially to know the precautionary securities by which the application of the ostracizing sentence was restrained at Syracuse. Perhaps no care was taken to copy the checks and formalities provided by Kleisthenês at Athens. Yet under all circumstances, the institution, though tutelary, if reserved for its proper emergencies, was eminently open to abuse, so that we have no reason to wonder that abuse occurred, especially at a period of great violence and discord. The wonder rather is, that it was so little abused at Athens.

Although the ostracism, or petalism, at Syracuse was speedily discontinued, it may probably have left a salutary impression behind, as far as we can judge from the fact that new pretenders to despotism are not hereafter mentioned. The republic increases in wealth, and manifests an energetic action in foreign affairs. The Syracusan admiral Phaÿllus was despatched with a powerful fleet to repress the piracies of the

Tyrrhenian maritime towns, and after ravaging the island of Elba, returned home, under the suspicion of having been bought off by bribes from the enemy; on which accusation he was tried and banished, a second fleet of sixty triremes under Apellês being sent to the same regions. The new admiral not only plundered many parts of the Tyrrhenian coast, but also carried his ravages into the island of Corsica, at that time a Tyrrhenian possession, and reduced the island of Elba completely. His return was signalized by a large number of captives and a rich booty.[172]

Meanwhile the great antecedent revolutions, among the Grecian cities in Sicily had raised a new spirit among the Sikels of the interior, and inspired the Sikel prince Duketius, a man of spirit and ability, with large ideas of aggrandizement. Many exiled Greeks having probably sought service with him, it was either by their suggestion, or from having himself caught the spirit of Hellenic improvement, that he commenced the plan of bringing the petty Sikel communities into something like city life and collective coöperation. Having acquired glory by the capture of the Grecian town of Morgantina, he induced all the Sikel communities, with the exception of Hybla, to enter into a sort of federative compact. Next, in order to obtain a central point for the new organization, he transferred his own little town from the hill-top, called Menæ, down to a convenient spot of the neighboring plain, near to the sacred precinct of the gods called Paliki.[173] As the veneration paid to these gods, determined in part by the striking volcanic manifestations in the neighborhood, rendered this plain a suitable point of attraction for Sikels generally, Duketius was enabled to establish a considerable new city of Palikê, with walls of large circumference, and an ample range of adjacent land which he distributed among a numerous Sikel population, probably with some Greeks intermingled.

The powerful position which Duketius had thus acquired is attested by the aggressive character of his measures, intended gradually to recover a portion at least of that ground which the Greeks had appropriated at the expense of the indigenous population. The Sikel town of Ennesia had been seized by the Hieronian Greeks expelled from Ætna, and had received from them the name of Ætna:[174] Duketius now found means to reconquer it, after ensnaring by stratagem the leading magistrate. He was next bold enough to invade the territory of the Agrigentines, and to besiege one of their country garrisons called Motyum. We are impressed with a high idea of his power, when we learn that the Agrigentines, while marching to relieve the place, thought it necessary to invoke aid from the Syracusans, who sent to them a force under Bolkon. Over this united force Duketius gained a victory, in consequence of the treason or cowardice of Bolkon, as the Syracusans believed, insomuch that they condemned him to death. In the succeeding year, however, the good fortune of the Sikel prince changed. The united army of these two powerful cities raised the blockade of Motyum, completely defeated him in the field, and dispersed all his forces. Finding himself deserted by his comrades and even on the point of being betrayed, he took the desperate resolution of casting himself upon the mercy of the Syracusans. He

rode off by night to the gates of Syracuse, entered the city unknown, and sat down as a suppliant on the altar in the agora, surrendering himself together with all his territory. A spectacle thus unexpected brought together a crowd of Syracuse citizens, exciting in them the strongest emotions: and when the magistrates convened the assembly for the purpose of deciding his fate, the voice of mercy was found paramount, in spite of the contrary recommendations of some of the political leaders. The most respected among the elder citizens—earnestly recommending mild treatment towards a foe thus fallen and suppliant, coupled with scrupulous regard not to bring upon the city the avenging hand of Nemesis—found their appeal to the generous sentiment of the people welcomed by one unanimous cry of "Save the suppliant."[175] Duketius, withdrawn from the altar, was sent off to Corinth, under his engagement to live there quietly for the future; the Syracusans providing for his comfortable maintenance.

Amidst the cruelty habitual in ancient warfare, this remarkable incident excites mingled surprise and admiration. Doubtless the lenient impulse of the people mainly arose from their seeing Duketius actually before them in suppliant posture at their altar, instead of being called upon to determine his fate in his absence,—just as the Athenian people were in like manner moved by the actual sight of the captive Dorieus, and induced to spare his life, on an occasion which will be hereafter recounted.[176] If in some instances the assembled people, obeying the usual vehemence of multitudinous sentiment, carried severities to excess,—so, in other cases, as well as in this, the appeal to their humane impulses will be found to have triumphed over prudential regard for future security. Such was the fruit which the Syracusans reaped for sparing Duketius, who, after residing a year or two at Corinth, violated his parole. Pretending to have received an order from the oracle, he assembled a number of colonists, whom he conducted into Sicily to found a city at Kalê Aktê on the northern coast belonging to the Sikels. We cannot doubt that when the Syracusans found in what manner their lenity was requited, the speakers who had recommended severe treatment would take great credit on the score of superior foresight. [177]

But the return of this energetic enemy was not the only mischief which the Syracusans suffered. Their resolution to spare Duketius had been adopted without the concurrence of the Agrigentines, who had helped to conquer him; and the latter, when they saw him again in the island, and again formidable, were so indignant that they declared war against Syracuse. A standing jealousy prevailed between these two great cities, the first and second powers in Sicily. War actually broke out between them, wherein other Greek cities took part. After lasting some time, with various acts of hostility, and especially a serious defeat of the Agrigentines at the river Himera, these latter solicited and obtained peace.[178] The discord between the two cities, however, had left leisure to Duketius to found the city of Kalê Aktê, and to make some progress in reëstablishing his ascendency over the Sikels, in which oper-

ation he was overtaken by death. He probably left no successor to carry on his plans, so that the Syracusans, pressing their attacks vigorously, reduced many of the Sikel townships in the island, regaining his former conquest, Morgantinê, and subduing even the strong position and town called Trinakia,[179] after a brave and desperate resistance on the part of the inhabitants.

By this large accession both of subjects and of tribute, combined with her recent victory over Agrigentum, Syracuse was elevated to the height of power, and began to indulge schemes for extending her ascendency throughout the island: with which view her horsemen were doubled in number, and one hundred new triremes were constructed.[180] Whether any, or what, steps were taken to realize her designs our historian does not tell us. But the position of Sicily remains the same at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war: Syracuse, the first city as to power, indulging in ambitious dreams, if not in ambitious aggressions; Agrigentum, a jealous second, and almost a rival; the remaining Grecian states maintaining their independence, yet not without mistrust and apprehension.

Though the particular phenomena of this period, however, have not come to our knowledge, we see enough to prove that it was one of great prosperity for Sicily. The wealth, commerce, and public monuments of Agrigentum, especially appear to have even surpassed those of the Syracusans. Her trade with Carthage and the African coast was both extensive and profitable; for at this time neither the vine nor the olive were much cultivated in Libya, and the Carthaginians derived their wine and oil from the southern territory of Sicily,[181] particularly that of Agrigentum. The temples of the city, among which that of Olympic Zeus stood foremost, were on the grandest scale of magnificence, surpassing everything of the kind in Sicily. The population of the city, free as well as slave, was very great: the number of rich men keeping chariots and competing for the prize at the Olympic games was renowned, not less than the accumulation of works of art, statues and pictures,[182] with manifold insignia of ornament and luxury. All this is particularly brought to our notice because of the frightful catastrophe which desolated Agrigentum in 406 B.C. from the hands of the Carthaginians. It was in the interval which we are now describing that this prosperity was accumulated; doubtless not in Agrigentum alone, but more or less throughout all the Grecian cities of the island.

Nor was it only in material prosperity that they were distinguished. At this time, the intellectual movement in some of the Italian and Sicilian towns was very considerable. The inconsiderable town of Elea in the gulf of Poseidonia nourished two of the greatest speculative philosophers in Greece, Parmenidês and Zeno. Empedoklês of Agrigentum was hardly less eminent in the same department, yet combining with it a political and practical efficiency. The popular character of the Sicilian governments stimulated the cultivation of rhetorical studies, wherein not only Empedoklês and Pôlus at Agrigentum, but Tisias and Korax at Syracuse, and still more, Gorgias at Leontini, acquired great reputation.[183] The constitution established at Agrigentum

after the dispossession of the Theronian dynasty was at first not thoroughly democratical, the principal authority residing in a large Senate of One Thousand members. We are told even that an ambitious club of citizens were aiming at the reëstablishment of a despotism, when Empedoklês, availing himself of wealth and high position, took the lead in a popular opposition; so as not only to defeat this intrigue, but also to put down the Senate of One Thousand, and render the government completely democratical. His influence over the people was enhanced by the vein of mysticism, and pretence to miraculous or divine endowments, which accompanied his philosophical speculations, in a manner similar to Pythagoras.[184] The same combination of rhetoric with physical speculation appears also in Gorgias of Leontini, whose celebrity as a teacher throughout Greece was both greater and earlier than that of any one else. It was a similar demand for popular speaking in the assembly and the judicatures which gave encouragement to the rhetorical teachers Tisias and Korax at Syracuse.

In this state of material prosperity, popular politics, and intellectual activity, the Sicilian towns were found at the breaking out of the great struggle between Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy in 431 B.C. In that struggle the Italian and Sicilian Greeks had no direct concern, nor anything to fear from the ambition of Athens; who, though she had founded Thurii in 443 B.C., appears to have never aimed at any political ascendency even over that town, much less anywhere else on the coast. But the Sicilian Greeks, though forming a system apart in their own island, from which it suited the dominant policy of Syracuse to exclude all foreign interference,[185] were yet connected, by sympathy, and on one side even by alliances, with the two main streams of Hellenic politics. Among the allies of Sparta were numbered all or most of the Dorian cities of Sicily,—Syracuse, Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, perhaps Himera and Messênê,—together with Lokri and Tarentum in Italy: among the allies of Athens, perhaps the Chalkidic or Ionic Rhegium in Italy.[186] Whether the Ionic cities in Sicily—Naxos, Katana, and Leontini—were at this time united with Athens by any special treaty, is very doubtful. But if we examine the state of politics prior to the breaking out of the war, it will be found that the connection of the Sicilian cities on both sides with Central Greece was rather one of sympathy and tendency than of pronounced obligation and action. The Dorian Sicilians, though doubtless sharing the antipathy of the Peloponnesian Dorians to Athens, had never been called upon for any coöperation with Sparta; nor had the Ionic Sicilians yet learned to look to Athens for protection against their powerful neighbor Syracuse.

It was the memorable quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, and the intervention of Athens in that quarrel (B.C. 433-432), which brought the Sicilian parties one step nearer to coöperation in the Peloponnesian quarrel, in two different ways; first, by exciting the most violent anti-Athenian war spirit in Corinth, with whom the Sicilian Dorians held their chief commerce and sympathy,—next, by providing a basis for the action of Athenian maritime force in Italy and Sicily, which would have been impracti-

cable without an established footing in Korkyra. But Plutarch—whom most historians have followed—is mistaken, and is contradicted by Thucydidês, when he ascribes to the Athenians at this time ambitious projects in Sicily of the nature of those which they came to conceive seven or eight years afterwards. At the outbreak, and for some years before the outbreak, of the war, the policy of Athens was purely conservative, and that of her enemies aggressive, as I have shown in a former chapter. At that moment, Sparta and Corinth anticipated large assistance from the Sicilian Dorians, in ships of war, in money, and in provisions; while the value of Korkyra as an ally of Athens consisted in affording facilities for obstructing such reinforcements, far more than from any anticipated conquests.[187]

In the spring of 431 B.C., the Spartans, then organizing their first invasion of Attica, and full of hope that Athens would be crushed in one or two campaigns, contemplated the building of a vast fleet of five hundred ships of war among the confederacy. A considerable portion of this charge was imposed upon the Italian and Sicilian Dorians, and a contribution in money besides; with instructions to refrain from any immediate declaration against Athens until their fleet should be ready.[188] Of such expected succor, indeed, little was ever realized in any way; in ships, nothing at all. But the expectations and orders of Sparta, show that here as elsewhere she was then on the offensive, and Athens only on the defensive. Probably the Corinthians had encouraged the expectation of ample reinforcements from Syracuse and the neighboring towns, a hope which must have contributed largely to the confidence with which they began the struggle. What were the causes which prevented it from being realized, we are not distinctly told; and we find Hermokratês the Syracusan reproaching his countrymen fifteen years afterwards, immediately before the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse, with their antecedent apathy.[189] But it is easy to see, that as the Sicilian Greeks had no direct interest in the contest,—neither wrongs to avenge, nor dangers to apprehend, from Athens,—nor any habit of obeying requisitions from Sparta, so they might naturally content themselves with expressions of sympathy and promises of aid in case of need, without taxing themselves to the enormous extent which it pleased Sparta to impose, for purposes both aggressive and purely Peloponnesian. Perhaps the leading men in Syracuse, from attachment to Corinth, may have sought to act upon the order. But no similar motive would be found operative either at Agrigentum or at Gela or Selinus.

Though the order was not executed, however, there can be little doubt that it was publicly announced and threatened, thus becoming known to the Ionic cities in Sicily as well as to Athens; and that it weighed materially in determining the latter afterwards to assist those cities, when they sent to invoke her aid. Instead of despatching their forces to Peloponnesus, where they had nothing to gain, the Sicilian Dorians preferred attacking the Ionic cities in their own island, whose territory they might have reasonable hopes of conquering and appropriating,—Naxos, Katana, and Leontini. These cities doubtless sympathized with Athens in her struggle against Sparta;

yet, far from being strong enough to assist her or to threaten their Dorian neighbors, they were unable to defend themselves without Athenian aid. They were assisted by the Dorian city of Kamarina, which was afraid of her powerful border city Syracuse, and by Rhegium in Italy; while Lokri in Italy, the bitter enemy of Rhegium, sided with Syracuse against them. In the fifth summer of the war, finding themselves blockaded by sea and confined to their walls, they sent to Athens, both to entreat succor, as allies[190] and Ionians, and to represent that, if Syracuse succeeded in crushing them, she and the other Dorians in Sicily would forthwith send over the positive aid which the Peloponnesians had so long been invoking. The eminent rhetor Gorgias of Leontini, whose peculiar style of speaking is said to have been new to the Athenian assembly, and to have produced a powerful effect, was at the head of this embassy. It is certain that this rhetor procured for himself numerous pupils and large gains, not merely in Athens but in many other towns of Central Greece,[191] though it is exaggeration to ascribe to his pleading the success of the present application.

Now the Athenians had a real interest as well in protecting these Ionic Sicilians from being conquered by the Dorians in the island, as in obstructing the transport of Sicilian corn to Peloponnesus: and they sent twenty triremes under Lachês and Charœadês, with instructions, while accomplishing these objects, to ascertain the possibility of going beyond the defensive, and making conquests. Taking station at Rhegium, Lachês did something towards rescuing the Ionic cities in part from their maritime blockade, and even undertook an abortive expedition against the Lipari isles, which were in alliance with Syracuse.[192] Throughout the ensuing year, he pressed the war in the neighborhood of Rhegium and Messênê, his colleague Charœadês being slain. Attacking Mylæ in the Messenian territory, he was fortunate enough to gain so decisive an advantage over the troops of Messênê, that that city itself capitulated to him, gave hostages, and enrolled itself as ally of Athens and the Ionic cities.[193] He also contracted an alliance with the non-Hellenic city of Egesta, in the northwest portion of Sicily, and he invaded the territory of Lokri, capturing one of the country forts on the river Halex:[194] after which, in a second debarkation, he defeated a Lokrian detachment under Proxenus. But he was unsuccessful in an expedition into the interior of Sicily against Inêssus. This was a native Sikel township, held in coercion by a Syracusan garrison in the acropolis; which the Athenians vainly attempted to storm, being repulsed with loss.[195] Lachês concluded his operations in the autumn by an ineffective incursion on the territory of Himera and on the Lipari isles. On returning to Rhegium at the beginning of the ensuing year (B.C. 425), he found Pythodôrus already arrived from Athens to supersede him.[196]

That officer had come as the forerunner of a more considerable expedition, intended to arrive in the spring, under Eurymedon and Sophoklês, who were to command in conjunction with himself. The Ionic cities in Sicily, finding the squadron under Lachês insufficient to render them a match for their enemies at sea, had been emboldened to send a second embassy to Athens, with request for farther reinforce-

ments, at the same time making increased efforts to enlarge their own naval force. It happened that at this moment the Athenians had no special employment elsewhere for their fleet, which they desired to keep in constant practice. They accordingly resolved to send to Sicily forty additional triremes, in full hopes of bringing the contest to a speedy close.[197]

Early in the ensuing spring, Eurymedon and Sophoklês started from Athens for Sicily in command of this squadron, with instructions to afford relief at Korkyra in their way, and with Demosthenês on board to act on the coast of Peloponnesus. It was this fleet which, in conjunction with the land-forces under the command of Kleon, making a descent almost by accident on the Laconian coast at Pylos, achieved for Athens the most signal success of the whole war, the capture of the Lacedæmonian hoplites in Sphakteria.[198] But the fleet was so long occupied, first in the blockade of that island, next in operations at Korkyra, that it did not reach Sicily until about the month of September.[199]

Such delay, eminently advantageous for Athens generally, was fatal to her hopes of success in Sicily during the whole summer. For Pythodôrus, acting only with the fleet previously commanded by Lachês at Rhegium, was not merely defeated in a descent upon Lokri, but experienced a more irreparable loss by the revolt of Messênê, which had surrendered to Lachês a few months before; and which, together with Rhegium, had given to the Athenians the command of the strait. Apprized of the coming Athenian fleet, the Syracusans were anxious to deprive them of this important base of operations against the island; and a fleet of twenty sail—half Syracusan, half Lokrian—was enabled by the concurrence of a party in Messênê to seize the town. It would appear that the Athenian fleet was then at Rhegium, but that town was at the same time threatened by the entrance of the entire land-force of Lokri, together with a body of Rhegine exiles: these latter were even not without hopes of obtaining admission by means of a favorable party in the town. Though such hopes were disappointed, yet the diversion prevented all succor from Rhegium to Messênê. The latter town now served as a harbor for the fleet hostile to Athens,[200] which was speedily reinforced to more than thirty sail, and began maritime operations forthwith, in hopes of crushing the Athenians and capturing Rhegium, before Eurymedon should arrive. But the Athenians, though they had only sixteen triremes together with eight others from Rhegium, gained a decided victory, in an action brought on accidentally for the possession of a merchantman sailing through the strait. They put the enemy's ships to flight, and drove them to seek refuge, some under protection of the Syracusan land-force at Cape Pelôrus near Messênê, others under the Lokrian force near Rhegium, each as they best could, with the loss of one trireme.[201] This defeat so broke up the scheme of Lokrian operations against the latter place, that their land-force retired from the Rhegine territory, while the whole defeated squadron was reunited on the opposite coast under Cape Pelôrus. Here the ships were moored close on shore under the protection of the land-force, when the Atheni-

ans and Rhegines came up to attack them; but without success, and even with the loss of one trireme, which the men on shore contrived to seize and detain by a grappling-iron; her crew escaping by swimming to the vessels of their comrades. Having repulsed the enemy, the Syracusans got aboard, and rowed close along-shore, partly aided by tow-ropes, to the harbor of Messênê, in which transit they were again attacked, but the Athenians were a second time beaten off with the loss of another ship. Their superior seamanship was of no avail in this along-shore fighting.[202]

The Athenian fleet was now suddenly withdrawn in order to prevent an intended movement in Kamarina, where a philo-Syracusan party under Archias threatened revolt: and the Messenian forces, thus left free, invaded the territory of their neighbor, the Chalkidic city of Naxos, sending their fleet round to the mouth of the Akesinês near that city. They were ravaging the lands, and were preparing to storm the town, when a considerable body of the indigenous Sikels were seen descending the neighboring hills to succor the Naxians: upon which the latter, elate with the sight, and mistaking the new comers for their Grecian brethren from Leontini, rushed out of the gates and made a vigorous sally at a moment when their enemies were unprepared. The Messenians were completely defeated, with the loss of no less than one thousand men, and with a still greater loss sustained in their retreat home from the pursuit of the Sikels. Their fleet went back also to Messênê, from whence such of the ships as were not Messenian returned home. So much was the city weakened by its recent defeat, that a Lokrian garrison was sent for its protection under Demomelês, while the Leontines and Naxians, together with the Athenian squadron on returning from Kamarina, attacked it by land and sea in this moment of distress. A well-timed sally of the Messenians and Lokrians, however, dispersed the Leontine land-force; but the Athenian force, landing from their ships, attacked the assailants while in the disorder of pursuit, and drove them back within the walls. The scheme against Messênê, however, had now become impracticable, so that the Athenians crossed the strait to Rhegium.[203]

Thus indecisive was the result of operations in Sicily, during the first half of the seventh year of the Peloponnesian war: nor does it appear that the Athenians undertook anything considerable during the autumnal half, though the full fleet under Eurymedon had then joined Pythodôrus.[204] Yet while the presence of so large an Athenian fleet at Rhegium would produce considerable effect upon the Syracusan mind, the triumphant promise of Athenian affairs, and the astonishing humiliation of Sparta during the months immediately following the capture of Sphakteria, probably struck much deeper. In the spring of the eighth year of the war, Athens was not only in possession of the Spartan prisoners, but also of Pylos and Kythêra, so that a rising among the Helots appeared noway improbable. She was in the full swing of hope, while her discouraged enemies were all thrown on the defensive. Hence the Sicilian Dorians, intimidated by a state of affairs so different from that in which they had begun the war three years before, were now eager to bring about a pacification in their

island.[205] The Dorian city of Kamarina, which had hitherto acted along with the Ionic or Chalkidic cities, was the first to make a separate accommodation with its neighboring city of Gela; at which latter place deputies were invited to attend from all the cities in the island, with a view to the conclusion of peace.[206]

This congress met in the spring of 424 B.C., when Syracuse, the most powerful city in Sicily, took the lead in urging the common interest which all had in the conclusion of peace. The Syracusan Hermokratês, chief adviser of this policy in his native city, now appeared to vindicate and enforce it in the congress. He was a well-born, brave, and able man, clear-sighted in regard to the foreign interests of his country; but at the same time of pronounced oligarchical sentiments, mistrusted by the people, seemingly with good reason, in regard to their internal constitution. The speech which Thucydidês places in his mouth, on the present occasion, sets forth emphatically the necessity of keeping Sicily at all cost free from foreign intervention, and of settling at home all differences which might arise between the various Sicilian cities. Hermokratês impressed upon his hearers that the aggressive schemes of Athens, now the greatest power in Greece, were directed against all Sicily, and threatened all cities alike, Ionians not less than Dorians. If they enfeebled one another by internal quarrels, and then invited the Athenians as arbitrators, the result would be ruin and slavery to all. The Athenians were but too ready to encroach everywhere, even without invitation: they had now come, with a zeal outrunning all obligation, under pretence of aiding the Chalkidic cities who had never aided them, but in the real hope of achieving conquest for themselves. The Chalkidic cities must not rely upon their Ionic kindred for security against evil designs on the part of Athens: as Sicilians, they had a paramount interest in upholding the independence of the island. If possible, they ought to maintain undisturbed peace; but if that were impossible, it was essential at least to confine the war to Sicily, apart from any foreign intruders. Complaints should be exchanged, and injuries redressed, by all, in a spirit of mutual forbearance; of which Syracuse—the first city in the island, and best able to sustain the brunt of war—was prepared to set the example, without that foolish over-valuation of favorable chances so ruinous even to first-rate powers, and with full sense of the uncertainty of the future. Let them all feel that they were neighbors, inhabitants of the same island, and called by the common name of Sikeliots; and let them all with one accord repel the intrusion of aliens in their affairs, whether as open assailants or as treacherous mediators.[207]

This harangue from Hermokratês, and the earnest dispositions of Syracuse for peace, found general sympathy among the Sicilian cities, Ionic as well as Doric. All of them doubtless suffered by the war, and the Ionic cities, who had solicited the intervention of the Athenians as protectors against Syracuse, conceived from the evident uneasiness of the latter a fair assurance of her pacific demeanor for the future. Accordingly, the peace was accepted by all the belligerent parties, each retaining what they possessed, except that the Syracusans agreed to cede Morgantinê to Kamarina,

on receipt of a fixed sum of money.[208] The Ionic cities stipulated that Athens should be included in the pacification; a condition agreed to by all, except the Epizephyrian Lokrians.[209] They then acquainted Eurymedon and his colleagues with the terms; inviting them to accede to the pacification in the name of Athens, and then to withdraw their fleet from Sicily. Nor had these generals any choice but to close with the proposition. Athens thus was placed on terms of peace with all the Sicilian cities, with liberty of access reciprocally to any single ship of war, but no armed force to cross the sea between Sicily and Peloponnesus. Eurymedon then sailed with his fleet home.[210]

On reaching Athens, however, he and his colleagues were received by the people with much displeasure. He himself was fined, and his colleagues Sophoklês and Pythodôrus banished, on the charge of having been bribed to quit Sicily, at a time when the fleet—so the Athenians believed—was strong enough to have made important conquests. Why the three colleagues were differently treated we are not informed.[211] This sentence was harsh and unmerited; for it does not seem that Eurymedon had it in his power to prevent the Ionic cities from concluding peace, while it is certain that without them he could have achieved nothing serious. All that seems unexplained in his conduct, as recounted by Thucydidês, is, that his arrival at Rhegium with the entire fleet in September, 425 B.C., does not seem to have been attended with any increased vigor or success, in the prosecution of the war. But the Athenians—besides an undue depreciation of the Sicilian cities, which we shall find fatally misleading them hereafter—were at this moment at the maximum of extravagant hopes, counting upon new triumphs everywhere, impatient of disappointment, and careless of proportion between the means intrusted to, and the objects expected from, their commanders. Such unmeasured confidence was painfully corrected in the course of a few months, by the battle of Delium and the losses in Thrace. But at the present moment, it was probably not less astonishing than grievous to the three generals, who had all left Athens prior to the success in Sphakteria.

The Ionic cities in Sicily were soon made to feel that they had been premature in sending away the Athenians. Dispute between Leontini and Syracuse, the same cause which had occasioned the invocation of Athens three years before, broke out afresh soon after the pacification of Gela. The democratical government of Leontini came to the resolution of strengthening their city by the enrolment of many new citizens; and a redivision of the territorial property of the state was projected in order to provide lots of land for these new-comers. But the aristocracy of the town upon whom the necessity would thus be imposed of parting with a portion of their lands, forestalled the project, seemingly before it was even formally decided, by entering into a treasonable correspondence with Syracuse, bringing in a Syracusan army, and expelling the Demos.[212] While these exiles found shelter as they could in other cities, the rich Leontines deserted and dismantled their own city, transferred their residence to Syracuse, and were enrolled as Syracusan citizens. To them the opera-

tion was exceedingly profitable, since they became masters of the properties of the exiled Demos in addition to their own. Presently, however, some of them, dissatisfied with their residence in Syracuse, returned to the abandoned city, and fitted up a portion of it called Phokeis, together with a neighboring strong post called Brikinnies. Here, after being joined by a considerable number of the exiled Demos, they contrived to hold out for some time against the efforts of the Syracusans to expel them from their fortifications.

The new enrolment of citizens, projected by the Leontine democracy, seems to date during the year succeeding the pacification of Gela, and was probably intended to place the city in a more defensible position in case of renewed attacks from Syracuse, thus compensating for the departure of the Athenian auxiliaries. The Leontine Demos, in exile and suffering, doubtless bitterly repenting that they had concurred in dismissing these auxiliaries, sent envoys to Athens with complaints, and renewed prayers for help.[213]

But Athens was then too much pressed to attend to their call; her defeat at Delium and her losses in Thrace had been followed by the truce for one year; and even during that truce, she had been called upon for strenuous efforts in Thrace to check the progress of Brasidas. After the expiration of that truce, she sent Phæax and two colleagues to Sicily (B.C. 422) with the modest force of two triremes. He was directed to try and organize an anti-Syracusan party in the island, for the purpose of reëstablishing the Leontine Demos. In passing along the coast of Italy, he concluded amicable relations with some of the Grecian cities, especially with Lokri, which had hitherto stood aloof from Athens; and his first addresses in Sicily appeared to promise success. His representations of danger from Syracusan ambition were well received both at Kamarina and Agrigentum. For on the one hand, that universal terror of Athens, which had dictated the pacification of Gela, had now disappeared; while on the other hand, the proceeding of Syracuse in regard to Leontini was well calculated to excite alarm. We see by that proceeding that sympathy between democracies in different towns was not universal: the Syracusan democracy had joined with the Leontine aristocracy to expel the Demos, just as the despot Gelon had combined with the aristocracy of Megara and Eubœa, sixty years before, and had sold the Demos of those towns into slavery. The birthplace of the famous rhetor Gorgias was struck out of the list of inhabited cities; its temples were deserted; and its territory had become a part of Syracuse. All these were circumstances so powerfully affecting Grecian imagination, that the Kamarinæans, neighbors of Syracuse on the other side, might well fear lest the like unjust conquest, expulsion, and absorption, should soon overtake them. Agrigentum, though without any similar fear, was disposed from policy, and jealousy of Syracuse, to second the views of Phæax. But when the latter proceeded to Gela, in order to procure the adhesion of that city in addition to the other two, he found himself met by so resolute an opposition that his whole scheme was frustrated, nor did he think it advisable even to open his case at Selinus or

Himera. In returning, he crossed the interior of the island through the territory of the Sikels to Katana, passing in his way by Brikinnies, where the Leontine Demos were still maintaining a precarious existence. Having encouraged them to hold out by assurances of aid, he proceeded on his homeward voyage. In the strait of Messina, he struck upon some vessels conveying a body of expelled Lokrians from Messênê to Lokri. The Lokrians had got possession of Messênê after the pacification of Gela, by means of an internal sedition; but after holding it some time, they were now driven out by a second revolution. Phæax, being under agreement with Lokri, passed by these vessels without any act of hostility.[214]

The Leontine exiles at Brikinnies, however, received no benefit from his assurances, and appear soon afterwards to have been completely expelled. Nevertheless, Athens was noway disposed, for a considerable time, to operations in Sicily. A few months after the visit of Phæax to that island, came the Peace of Nikias: the consequences of that peace occupied her whole attention in Peloponnesus, while the ambition of Alkibiadês carried her on for three years in intra-Peloponnesian projects and coöperation with Argos against Sparta. It was only in the year 417 B.C., when these projects had proved abortive, that she had leisure to turn her attention elsewhere. During that year, Nikias had contemplated an expedition against Amphipolis in conjunction with Perdikkas, whose desertion frustrated the scheme. The year 416 B.C. was that in which Mêlos was besieged and taken.

Meanwhile the Syracusans had cleared and appropriated all the territory of Leontini, which city now existed only in the talk and hopes of its exiles. Of these latter a portion seem to have continued at Athens, pressing their entreaties for aid, which began to obtain some attention about the year 417 B.C., when another incident happened to strengthen their chance of success. A quarrel broke out between the neighboring cities of Selinus (Hellenic) and Egesta (non-Hellenic) in the western corner of Sicily; partly about a piece of land on the river which divided the two territories, partly about some alleged wrong in cases of internuptial connection. The Selinuntines, not satisfied with their own strength, obtained assistance from the Syracusans their allies, and thus reduced Egesta to considerable straits by land as well as by sea. [215] Now the Egestæans had allied themselves with Lachês ten years before, during the first expedition sent by the Athenians to Sicily; upon the strength of which alliance they sent to Athens, to solicit her intervention for their defence, after having in vain applied both to Agrigentum and to Carthage. It may seem singular that Carthage did not at this time readily embrace the pretext for interference, considering that, ten years afterwards, she interfered with such destructive effect against Selinus. At this time, however, the fear of Athens and her formidable navy appears to have been felt even at Carthage,[216] thus protecting the Sicilian Greeks against the most dangerous of their neighbors.

The Egestæan envoys reached Athens in the spring of 416 B.C., at a time when the Athenians had no immediate project to occupy their thoughts, except the enter-

prise against Mêlos, which could not be either long or doubtful. Though urgent in setting forth the necessities of their position, they at the same time did not appear, like the Leontines, as mere helpless suppliants, addressing themselves to Athenian compassion. They rested their appeal chiefly on grounds of policy. The Syracusans, having already extinguished one ally of Athens (Leontini), were now hard pressing upon a second (Egesta), and would thus successively subdue them all: as soon as this was completed, there would be nothing left in Sicily except an omnipotent Dorian combination, allied to Peloponnesus both by race and descent, and sure to lend effective aid in putting down Athens herself. It was therefore essential for Athens to forestall this coming danger by interfering forthwith to uphold her remaining allies against the encroachments of Syracuse. If she would send a naval expedition adequate to the rescue of Egesta, the Egestæans themselves engaged to provide ample funds for the prosecution of the war.[217]

Such representations from the envoys, and fears of Syracusan aggrandizement as a source of strength to Peloponnesus, worked along with the prayers of the Leontines in rekindling the appetite of Athens for extending her power in Sicily. The impression made upon the Athenian public, favorable from the first, was wound up to a still higher pitch by renewed discussion. The envoys were repeatedly heard in the public assembly,[218] together with those citizens who supported their propositions. At the head of these was Alkibiadês, who aspired to the command of the intended expedition, tempting alike to his love of glory, of adventure, and of personal gain. But it is plain from these renewed discussions that at first the disposition of the people was by no means decided, much less unanimous, and that a considerable party sustained Nikias in a prudential opposition. Even at last, the resolution adopted was not one of positive consent, but a mean term such as perhaps Nikias himself could not resist. Special envoys were despatched to Egesta, partly to ascertain the means of the town to fulfil its assurance of defraying the costs of war, partly to make investigations on the spot and report upon the general state of affairs.

Perhaps the commissioners despatched were men themselves friendly to the enterprise; nor is it impossible that some of them may have been individually bribed by the Egestæans; at least such a supposition is not forbidden by the average state of Athenian public morality. But the most honest or even suspicious men could hardly be prepared for the deep-laid stratagems put in practice to delude them, on their arrival at Egesta. They were conducted to the rich temple of Aphroditê on Mount Eryx, where the plate and donatives were exhibited before them; abundant in number, and striking to the eye, yet composed mostly of silver-gilt vessels, which, though falsely passed off as solid gold, were in reality of little pecuniary value. Moreover, the Egestæan citizens were profuse in their hospitalities and entertainments both to the commissioners and to the crews of the triremes.[219] They collected together all the gold and silver vessels, dishes, and goblets, of Egesta, which they farther enlarged by borrowing additional ornaments of the same kind from the neighboring cities, Hel-

lenic as well as Carthaginian. At each successive entertainment, every Egestæan host exhibited all this large stock of plate as his own property, the same stock being transferred from house to house for the occasion. A false appearance was thus created, of the large number of wealthy men in Egesta; and the Athenian seamen, while their hearts were won by the caresses, saw with amazement this prodigious display of gold and silver, and were thoroughly duped by the fraud.[220] To complete the illusion, by resting it on a basis of reality and prompt payment, sixty talents of uncoined silver were at once produced as ready for the operations of war. With this sum in hand, the Athenian commissioners, after finishing their examination, and the Egestæan envoys also, returned to Athens, which they reached in the spring of 415 B.C.,[221] about three months after the capture of Mêlos.

The Athenian assembly being presently convened to hear their report, the deluded commissioners drew a magnificent picture of the wealth, public and private, which they had actually seen and touched at Egesta, and presented the sixty talents —one month's pay for a fleet of sixty triremes—as a small instalment out of the vast stock remaining behind. While they thus officially certified the capacity of the Egestæans to perform their promise of defraying the cost of the war, the seamen of their trireme, addressing the assembly in their character of citizens,—beyond all suspicion of being bribed,—overflowing with sympathy for the town in which they had just been so cordially welcomed, and full of wonder at the display of wealth which they had witnessed, would probably contribute still more effectually to kindle the sympathies of their countrymen. Accordingly, when the Egestæan envoys again renewed their petitions and representations, confidently appealing to the scrutiny which they had undergone,—when the distress of the suppliant Leontines was again depicted,—the Athenian assembly no longer delayed coming to a final decision. They determined to send forthwith sixty triremes to Sicily, under three generals with full powers,—Nikias, Alkibiadês, and Lamachus; for the purpose, first, of relieving Egesta; next, as soon as that primary object should have been accomplished, of reëstablishing the city of Leontini; lastly, of furthering the views of Athens in Sicily, by any other means which they might find practicable.[222] Such resolution being passed, a fresh assembly was appointed for the fifth day following, to settle the details.

We cannot doubt that this assembly, in which the reports from Egesta were first delivered, was one of unqualified triumph to Alkibiadês and those who had from the first advocated the expedition, as well as of embarrassment and humiliation to Nikias, who had opposed it. He was probably more astonished than any one else at the statements of the commissioners and seamen, because he did not believe in the point which they went to establish. Yet he could not venture to contradict eye-witnesses speaking in evident good faith, and as the assembly went heartily along with them, he labored under great difficulty in repeating his objections to a scheme now so much strengthened in public favor. Accordingly, his speech was probably hesitat-

ing and ineffective; the more so, as his opponents, far from wishing to make good any personal triumph against himself, were forward in proposing his name first on the list of generals, in spite of his own declared repugnance.[223] But when the assembly broke up, he became fearfully impressed with the perilous resolution which it had adopted, and at the same time conscious that he had not done justice to his own case against it. He therefore resolved to avail himself of the next assembly, four days afterwards, for the purpose of reopening the debate, and again denouncing the intended expedition. Properly speaking, the Athenians might have declined to hear him on this subject; indeed, the question which he raised could not be put without illegality: the principle of the measure had been already determined, and it remained only to arrange the details, for which special purpose the coming assembly had been appointed. But he was heard, and with perfect patience; and his harangue, a valuable sample, both of the man and of the time, is set forth at length by Thucydidês. I give here the chief points of it, not confining myself to the exact expressions.

"Though we are met to-day, Athenians, to settle the particulars of the expedition already pronounced against Sicily, yet I think we ought to take farther counsel whether it be well to send that expedition at all; nor ought we thus hastily to plunge, at the instance of aliens, into a dangerous war noway belonging to us. To myself personally, indeed, your resolution has offered an honorable appointment, and for my own bodily danger I care as little as any man: yet no considerations of personal dignity have ever before prevented me, nor shall now prevent me, from giving you my honest opinion, however it may clash with your habitual judgments. I tell you, then, that in your desire to go to Sicily, you leave many enemies here behind you, and that you will bring upon yourselves new enemies from thence to help them. Perhaps you fancy that your truce with Sparta is an adequate protection. In name, indeed (though only in name, thanks to the intrigues of parties both here and there), that truce may stand, so long as your power remains unimpaired; but on your first serious reverses, the enemy will eagerly take the opportunity of assailing you. Some of your most powerful enemies have never even accepted the truce; and if you divide your force as you now propose, they will probably set upon you at once along with the Sicilians, whom they would have been too happy to procure as coöperating allies at the beginning of the war. Recollect that your Chalkidian subjects in Thrace are still in revolt, and have never yet been conquered: other continental subjects, too, are not much to be trusted; and you are going to redress injuries offered to Egesta, before you have yet thought of redressing your own. Now your conquests in Thrace, if you make any, can be maintained; but Sicily is so distant, and the people so powerful, that you will never be able to maintain permanent ascendency; and it is absurd to undertake an expedition wherein conquest cannot be permanent, while failure will be destructive. The Egestæans alarm you by the prospect of Syracusan aggrandizement. But to me it seems that the Sicilian Greeks, even if they become subjects of Syracuse, will be less dangerous to you than they are at present: for as matters stand now, they might possibly send aid to Peloponnesus, from desire on the part of

each to gain the favor of Lacedæmon, but imperial Syracuse would have no motive to endanger her own empire for the purpose of putting down yours. You are now full of confidence, because you have come out of the war better than you at first feared. But do not trust the Spartans: they, the most sensitive of all men to the reputation of superiority, are lying in wait to play you a trick in order to repair their own dishonor: their oligarchical machinations against you demand all your vigilance, and leave you no leisure to think of these foreigners at Egesta. Having just recovered ourselves somewhat from the pressure of disease and war, we ought to reserve this newly-acquired strength for our own purposes, instead of wasting it upon the treacherous assurances of desperate exiles from Sicily."

Nikias then continued, doubtless turning towards Alkibiadês: "If any man, delighted to be named to the command, though still too young for it, exhorts you to this expedition in his own selfish interests, looking to admiration for his ostentation in chariot-racing, and to profit from his command, as a means of making good his extravagances, do not let such a man gain celebrity for himself at the hazard of the entire city. Be persuaded that such persons are alike unprincipled in regard to the public property and wasteful as to their own, and that this matter is too serious for the rash counsels of youth. I tremble when I see before me this band sitting, by previous concert, close to their leader in the assembly; and I in my turn exhort the elderly men, who are near them, not to be shamed out of their opposition by the fear of being called cowards. Let them leave to these men the ruinous appetite for what is not within reach, in the conviction that few plans ever succeed from passionate desire; many, from deliberate foresight. Let them vote against the expedition; maintaining undisturbed our present relations with the Sicilian cities, and desiring the Egestæans to close the war against Selinus, as they have begun it, without the aid of Athens. [224] Nor be thou afraid, prytanis (Mr. President), to submit this momentous question again to the decision of the assembly, seeing that breach of the law, in the presence of so many witnesses, cannot expose thee to impeachment, while thou wilt afford opportunity for the correction of a perilous misjudgment."

Such were the principal points in the speech of Nikias on this memorable occasion. It was heard with attention, and probably made some impression, since it completely reopened the entire debate, in spite of the formal illegality. Immediately after he sat down, while his words were yet fresh in the ears of the audience, Alkibiadês rose to reply. The speech just made, bringing the expedition again into question, endangered his dearest hopes both of fame and of pecuniary acquisition; for his dreams went farther than those of any man in Athens; not merely to the conquest of all Sicily, but also to that of Carthage and the Carthaginian empire. Opposed to Nikias, both in personal character and in political tendencies, he had pushed his rivalry to such a degree of bitterness that at one moment a vote of ostracism had been on the point of deciding between them. That vote had indeed been turned aside by joint consent, and discharged upon Hyperbolus; yet the hostile feeling still

continued on both sides, and Nikias had just manifested it by a parliamentary attack of the most galling character; all the more galling because it was strictly accurate and well deserved. Provoked as well as alarmed, Alkibiadês started up forthwith, his impatience breaking loose from the formalities of an exordium.

"Athenians, I both have better title than others to the post of commander,—for the taunts of Nikias force me to begin here,—and I count myself fully worthy of it. Those very matters with which he reproaches me are sources not merely of glory to my ancestors and myself, but of positive advantage to my country. For the Greeks, on witnessing my splendid theôry at Olympia, were induced to rate the power of Athens even above the reality, having before regarded it as broken down by the war; when I sent into the lists seven chariots, being more than any private individual had ever sent before, winning the first prize, coming in also second and fourth, and performing all the accessories in a manner suitable to an Olympic victory. Custom attaches honor to such exploits, but the power of the performers is at the same time brought home to the feelings of spectators. My exhibitions at Athens, too, choregic and others, are naturally viewed with jealousy by my rivals here; but in the eyes of strangers they are evidences of power. Such so-called folly is by no means useless, when a man at his own cost serves the city as well as himself. Nor is it unjust, when a man has an exalted opinion of himself, that he should not conduct himself towards others as if he were their equal; for the man in misfortune finds no one to bear a share of it. Just as, when we are in distress, we find no one to speak to us, in like manner let a man lay his account to bear the insolence of the prosperous, or else let him give equal dealing to the low, and then claim to receive it from the high. I know well that such exalted personages, and all who have in any way attained eminence, have been during their lifetime unpopular, chiefly in society with their equals, and to a certain extent with others also; while after their decease, they have left such a reputation as to make people claim kindred with them falsely, and to induce their country to boast of them, not as though they were aliens or wrongdoers, but as her own citizens and as men who did her honor. It is this glory which I desire, and in pursuit of which I incur such reproaches for my private conduct. Yet look at my public conduct, and see whether it will not bear comparison with that of any other citizen. I brought together the most powerful states in Peloponnesus without any serious cost or hazard to you, and made the Lacedæmonians peril their all at Mantineia on the fortune of one day: a peril so great, that, though victorious, they have not even yet regained their steady belief in their own strength."

"Thus did my youth, and my so-called monstrous folly, find suitable words to address the Peloponnesian powers, and earnestness to give them confidence and obtain their coöperation. Be not now, therefore, afraid of this youth of mine: but so long an I possess it in full vigor, and so long as Nikias retains his reputation for good fortune, turn us each to account in our own way."[225]

Having thus vindicated himself personally, Alkibiadês went on to deprecate any change of the public resolution already taken. The Sicilian cities, he said, were not so formidable as was represented. Their population was numerous, indeed, but fluctuating, turbulent, often on the move, and without local attachment. No man there considered himself as a permanent resident, nor cared to defend the city in which he dwelt; nor were there arms or organization for such a purpose. The native Sikels, detesting Syracuse, would willingly lend their aid to her assailants. As to the Peloponnesians, powerful as they were, they were not more desperate enemies now than they had been in former days:[226] they might invade Attica by land whether the Athenians sailed to Sicily or not; but they could do no mischief by sea, for Athens would still have in reserve a navy sufficient to restrain them. What valid ground was there, therefore, to evade performing obligations which Athens had sworn to her Sicilian allies? To be sure, *they* could bring no help to Attica in return; but Athens did not want them on her own side of the water; she wanted them in Sicily, to prevent her Sicilian enemies from coming over to attack her. She had originally acquired her empire by a readiness to interfere wherever she was invited; nor would she have made any progress, if she had been backward or prudish in scrutinizing such invitations. She could not now set limits to the extent of her imperial sway; she was under a necessity not merely to retain her present subjects, but to lay snares for new subjects, on pain of falling into dependence herself if she ceased to be imperial. Let her then persist in the resolution adopted, and strike terror into the Peloponnesians by undertaking this great expedition. She would probably conquer all Sicily; at least she would humble Syracuse: in case even of failure, she could always bring back her troops, from her unquestionable superiority at sea. The stationary and inactive policy recommended by Nikias was not less at variance with the temper, than with the position, of Athens, and would be ruinous to her if pursued. Her military organization would decline, and her energies would be wasted in internal rub and conflict, instead of that steady activity and acquisition which had become engrafted upon her laws and habits, which could not be now renounced, even if bad in itself, without speedy destruction.[227]

Such was substantially the reply of Alkibiadês to Nikias. The debate was now completely reopened, so that several speakers addressed the assembly on both sides; more, however, decidedly in favor of the expedition than against it. The alarmed Egestæans and Leontines renewed their supplications, appealing to the plighted faith of the city: probably also those Athenians who had visited Egesta, again stood forward to protest against what they would call the ungenerous doubts and insinuations of Nikias. By all these appeals, after considerable debate, the assembly was so powerfully moved, that their determination to send the fleet became more intense than ever; and Nikias, perceiving that farther direct opposition was useless, altered his tactics. He now attempted a manœuvre, designed indirectly to disgust his countrymen with the plan, by enlarging upon its dangers and difficulties, and insisting upon a prodigious force as indispensable to surmount them. Nor was he

without hopes that they might be sufficiently disheartened by such prospective hardships, to throw up the scheme altogether. At any rate, if they persisted, he himself as commander would thus be enabled to execute it with completeness and confidence.

Accepting the expedition, therefore, as the pronounced fiat of the people, he reminded them that the cities which they were about to attack, especially Syracuse and Selinus, were powerful, populous, free: well prepared in every way with hoplites, horsemen, light-armed troops, ships of war, plenty of horses to mount their cavalry, and abundant corn at home. At best, Athens could hope for no other allies in Sicily except Naxus and Katana, from their kindred with the Leontines. It was no mere fleet, therefore, which could cope with enemies like these on their own soil. The fleet indeed must be prodigiously great, for the purpose not merely of maritime combat, but of keeping open communication at sea, and insuring the importation of subsistence. But there must besides be a large force of hoplites, bowmen, and slingers, a large stock of provisions in transports, and, above all an abundant amount of money: for the funds promised by the Egestæans would be found mere empty delusion. The army must be not simply a match for the enemy's regular hoplites and powerful cavalry, but also independent of foreign aid from the first day of their landing.[228] If not, in case of the least reverse, they would find everywhere nothing but active enemies, without a single friend. "I know (he concluded) that there are many dangers against which we must take precaution, and many more in which we must trust to good fortune, serious as it is for mere men to do so. But I choose to leave as little as possible in the power of fortune, and to have in hand all means of reasonable security at the time when I leave Athens. Looking merely to the interests of the commonwealth, this is the most assured course; while to us who are to form the armament, it is indispensable for preservation. If any man thinks differently, I resign to him the command."[229]

The effect of this second speech of Nikias on the assembly, coming as it did after a long and contentious debate, was much greater than that which had been produced by his first. But it was an effect totally opposite to that which he himself had anticipated and intended. Far from being discouraged or alienated from the expedition by those impediments which he had studiously magnified, the people only attached themselves to it with yet greater obstinacy. The difficulties which stood in the way of Sicilian conquest served but to endear it to them the more, calling forth increased ardor and eagerness for personal exertion in the cause. The people not only accepted, without hesitation or deduction, the estimate which Nikias had laid before them of risk and cost, but warmly extolled his frankness not less than his sagacity, as the only means of making success certain. They were ready to grant without reserve everything which he asked, with an enthusiasm and unanimity such as was rarely seen to reign in an Athenian assembly. In fact, the second speech of Nikias had brought the two dissentient veins of the assembly into a confluence and harmony, all the more welcome because unexpected. While his partisans seconded it as the best

way of neutralizing the popular madness, his opponents—Alkibiadês, the Egestæans, and the Leontines—caught at it with acclamation, as realizing more than they had hoped for, and more than they could ever have ventured to propose. If Alkibiadês had demanded an armament on so vast a scale, the people would have turned a deaf ear. But such was their respect for Nikias—on the united grounds of prudence, good fortune, piety, and favor with the gods—that his opposition to their favorite scheme had really made them uneasy; and when he made the same demand, they were delighted to purchase his concurrence by adopting all such conditions as he imposed.[230]

It was thus that Nikias, quite contrary to his own purpose, not only imparted to the enterprise a gigantic magnitude which its projectors had never contemplated, but threw into it the whole soul of Athens, and roused a burst of ardor beyond all former example. Every man present, old as well as young, rich and poor, of all classes and professions, was eager to put down his name for personal service. Some were tempted by the love of gain, others by the curiosity of seeing so distant a region, others again by the pride and supposed safety of enlisting in so irresistible an armament. So overpowering was the popular voice in calling for the execution of the scheme, that the small minority who retained their objections were afraid to hold up their hands, for fear of incurring the suspicion of want of patriotism. When the excitement had somewhat subsided, an orator named Demostratus, coming forward as spokesman of this sentiment, urged Nikias to declare at once, without farther evasion, what force he required from the people. Disappointed as Nikias was, yet being left without any alternative, he sadly responded to the appeal; saying, that he would take farther counsel with his colleagues, but that speaking on his first impression, he thought the triremes required must be not less than one hundred, nor the hoplites less than five thousand, Athenians and allies together. There must farther be a proportional equipment of other forces and accompaniments, especially Kretan bowmen and slingers. Enormous as this requisition was, the vote of the people not only sanctioned it without delay, but even went beyond it. They conferred upon the generals full power to fix both the numbers of the armament and every other matter relating to the expedition, just as they might think best for the interest of Athens.

Pursuant to this momentous resolution, the enrolment and preparation of the forces was immediately begun. Messages were sent to summon sufficient triremes from the nautical allies, as well as to invite hoplites from Argos and Mantineia, and to hire bowmen and slingers elsewhere. For three months, the generals were busily engaged in this proceeding, while the city was in a state of alertness and bustle, fatally interrupted, however, by an incident which I shall recount in the next chapter.

Considering the prodigious consequences which turned on the expedition of Athens against Sicily, it is worth while to bestow a few reflections on the preliminary proceedings of the Athenian people. Those who are accustomed to impute all the misfortunes of Athens to the hurry, passion, and ignorance of democracy, will not

find the charge borne out by the facts which we have been just considering. The supplications of Egestæans and Leontines, forwarded to Athens about the spring or summer of 416 B.C., undergo careful and repeated discussion in the public assembly. They at first meet with considerable opposition, but the repeated debates gradually kindle both the sympathies and the ambition of the people. Still, however, no decisive step is taken without more ample and correct information from the spot, and special commissioners are sent to Egesta for the purpose. These men bring back a decisive report, triumphantly certifying all that the Egestæans had promised: nor can we at all wonder that the people never suspected the deep-laid fraud whereby their commissioners had been duped.

Upon the result of that mission to Egesta, the two parties for and against the projected expedition had evidently joined issue; and when the commissioners returned, bearing testimony so decisive in favor of the former, the party thus strengthened thought itself warranted in calling for a decision immediately, after all the previous debates. Nevertheless, the measure still had to surmount the renewed and hearty opposition of Nikias, before it became finally ratified. It was this long and frequent debate, with opposition often repeated but always outreasoned, which working gradually deeper and deeper conviction in the minds of the people, brought them all into hearty unanimity to support it, and made them cling to it with that tenacity which the coming chapters will demonstrate. In so far as the expedition was an error, it certainly was not error arising either from hurry, or want of discussion, or want of inquiry. Never in Grecian history was any measure more carefully weighed beforehand, or more deliberately and unanimously resolved.

The position of Nikias in reference to the measure is remarkable. As a dissuasive and warning counsellor, he took a right view of it; but in that capacity he could not carry the people along with him. Yet such was their steady esteem for him personally, and their reluctance to proceed in the enterprise without him, that they eagerly embraced any conditions which he thought proper to impose. And the conditions which he named had the effect of exaggerating the enterprise into such gigantic magnitude as no one in Athens had ever contemplated; thus casting into it so prodigious a proportion of the blood of Athens, that its discomfiture would be equivalent to the ruin of the commonwealth. This was the first mischief occasioned by Nikias, when, after being forced to relinquish his direct opposition, he resorted to the indirect manœuvre of demanding more than he thought the people would be willing to grant. It will be found only the first among a sad series of other mistakes, fatal to his country as well as to himself.

Giving to Nikias, however, for the present, full credit for the wisdom of his dissuasive counsel and his skepticism about the reports from Egesta, we cannot but notice the opposite quality in Alkibiadês. His speech is not merely full of overweening insolence, as a manifestation of individual character, but of rash and ruinous instigations in regard to the foreign policy of his country. The arguments whereby he enforces

the expedition against Syracuse are indeed more mischievous in their tendency than the expedition itself, for the failure of which Alkibiades is not to be held responsible. It might have succeeded in its special object, had it been properly conducted; but even if it had succeeded, the remark of Nikias is not the less just, that Athens was aiming at an unmeasured breadth of empire, which it would be altogether impossible for her to preserve. When we recollect the true political wisdom with which Periklês had advised his countrymen to maintain strenuously their existing empire, but by no means to grasp at any new acquisitions while they had powerful enemies in Peloponnesus, we shall appreciate by contrast the feverish system of never-ending aggression inculcated by Alkibiadês, and the destructive principles which he lays down, that Athens must forever be engaged in new conquests, on pain of forfeiting her existing empire and tearing herself to pieces by internal discord. Even granting the necessity for Athens to employ her military and naval force, as Nikias had truly observed, Amphipolis and the revolted subjects in Thrace were still unsubdued; and the first employment of Athenian force ought to be directed against them, instead of being wasted in distant hazards and treacherous novelties, creating for Athens a position in which she could never permanently maintain herself. The parallel which Alkibiadês draws, between the enterprising spirit whereby the Athenian empire had been first acquired, and the undefined speculations which he was himself recommending, is altogether fallacious. The Athenian empire took its rise from Athenian enterprise, working in concert with a serious alarm and necessity on the part of all the Grecian cities in or round the Ægean sea. Athens rendered an essential service by keeping off the Persians, and preserving that sea in a better condition than it had ever been in before: her empire had begun by being a voluntary confederacy, and had only passed by degrees into constraint; while the local situation of all her subjects was sufficiently near to be within the reach of her controlling navy. Her new career of aggression in Sicily, was in all these respects different. Nor is it less surprising to find Alkibiadês asserting that the multiplication of subjects in that distant island, employing a large portion of the Athenian naval force to watch them, would impart new stability to the preëxisting Athenian empire; to read the terms in which he makes light of enemies both in Peloponnesus and in Sicily, the Sicilian war being a new enterprise hardly less in magnitude and hazard than the Peloponnesian,[231] and to notice the credit which he claims to himself for his operations in Peloponnesus and the battle of Mantineia,[232] although it had ended in complete failure; restoring the ascendency of Sparta to the maximum at which it had stood before the events of Sphakteria! There is in fact no speech in Thucydidês so replete with rash misguiding, and fallacious counsels, as this harangue of Alkibiadês.

As a man of action, Alkibiadês was always brave, vigorous, and full of resource; as a politician and adviser, he was especially mischievous to his country, because he addressed himself exactly to their weak point, and exaggerated their sanguine and enterprising temper into a temerity which overlooked all permanent calculation. The Athenians had now contracted the belief that they, as lords of the sea, were entitled

to dominion and receipt of tribute from all islands; a belief which they had not only acted upon, but openly professed, in their attack upon Mêlos during the preceding autumn. As Sicily was an island, it seemed to fall naturally under this category of subjects; nor ought we to wonder, amidst the inaccurate geographical data current in that day, that they were ignorant how much larger Sicily was[233] than the largest island in the Ægean. Yet they seem to have been aware that it was a prodigious conquest to struggle for; as we may judge from the fact, that the object was one kept back rather than openly avowed, and that they acceded to all the immense preparations demanded by Nikias.[234] Moreover, we shall see presently, that even the armament which was despatched had conceived nothing beyond vague and hesitating ideas of something great to be achieved in Sicily. But if the Athenian public were rash and ignorant, in contemplating the conquest of Sicily, much more extravagant were the views of Alkibiadês, who looked even beyond Sicily to the conquest of Carthage and her empire. Nor was it merely ambition which he desired to gratify; he was not less eager for the immense private gains which would be consequent upon success, in order to supply those deficiencies which his profligate expenditure had occasioned. [235]

When we recollect how loudly the charges have been preferred against Kleon, of presumption, of rash policy, and of selfish motive, in reference to Sphakteria, to the prosecution of the war generally, and to Amphipolis; and when we compare these proceedings with the conduct of Alkibiadês as here described, we shall see how much more forcibly such charges attach to the latter than the former. It will be seen before this volume is finished, that the vices of Alkibiadês, and the defects of Nikias, were the cause of far greater ruin to Athens than either Kleon or Hyperbolus, even if we regard the two latter with the eyes of their worst enemies.

CHAPTER LVIII.

FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE ATHENIANS TO ATTACK SYRACUSE, DOWN TO THE FIRST WINTER AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL IN SICILY.

For the two or three months immediately succeeding the final resolution taken by the Athenians to invade Sicily, described in the last chapter, the whole city was elate and bustling with preparation. I have already mentioned that this resolution, though long opposed by Nikias with a considerable minority, had at last been adopted—chiefly through the unforeseen working of that which he intended as a counter-manœuvre—with a degree of enthusiasm and unanimity, and upon an enlarged scale, which surpassed all the anticipations of its promoters. The prophets, circulators of oracles, and other accredited religious advisers, announced generally the favorable dispositions of the gods, and promised a triumphant result.[236] All classes in the city, rich and poor,—cultivators, traders, and seamen, old and young, all embraced the project with ardor; as requiring a great effort, yet promising unparalleled results, both of public aggrandizement and individual gain. Each man was anxious to put down his own name for personal service; so that the three generals, Nikias, Alkibiadês, and Lamachus, when they proceeded to make their selection of hoplites, instead of being forced to employ constraint and incur ill-will, as happened when an expedition was unpopular, had only to choose the fittest among a throng of eager volunteers. Every man provided himself with his best arms and with bodily accoutrements, useful as well as ostentatious, for a long voyage and for the exigencies of a varied land-and-sea-service. Among the trierarchs, or rich citizens, who undertook each in his turn the duty of commanding a ship of war, the competition was yet stronger. Each of them accounted it an honor to be named, and vied with his comrades to exhibit his ship in the most finished state of equipment. The state, indeed, furnished both the trireme with its essential tackle and oars, and the regular pay for the crew; but the trierarch, even in ordinary cases, usually incurred various expenses besides, to make the equipment complete and to keep the crew together. Such additional outlay, neither exacted nor defined by law, but only by custom and general opinion, was different in every individual case, according to temper and circumstances. But on the present occasion, zeal and forwardness were universal: each trierarch tried to procure for his own ship the best crew, by offers of additional reward to all, but especially to the thranitæ or rowers on the highest of the three tiers:[237] and it seems that the seamen were not appointed specially to one ship, but were at liberty to accept these offers, and to serve in any ship they preferred. Each trierarch spent more than had ever been known before in pay, outfit, provision, and even external decoration of his vessel. Besides the best crews which Athens herself could furnish, picked seamen were also required from subject-allies, and were bid for in the same way by the trierarchs.[238]

Such efforts were much facilitated by the fact, that five years had now elapsed since the Peace of Nikias, without any considerable warlike operations. While the treasury had become replenished with fresh accumulations,[239] and the triremes increased in number, the military population, reinforced by additional numbers of youth, had forgotten both the hardships of the war and the pressure of epidemic disease. Hence the fleet now got together, while it surpassed in number all previous armaments of Athens, except a single one in the second year of the previous war under Periklês, was incomparably superior even to that, and still more superior to all the rest, in the other ingredients of force, material as well as moral; in picked men, universal ardor, ships as well as arms in the best condition, and accessories of every kind in abundance. Such was the confidence of success, that many Athenians went prepared for trade as well as for combat; so that the private stock thus added to the public outfit, and to the sums placed in the hands of the generals, constituted an unparalleled aggregate of wealth. Much of this was visible to the eye, contributing to heighten that general excitement of Athenian imagination which pervaded the whole city while the preparations were going forward: a mingled feeling of private sympathy and patriotism,—a dash of uneasiness from reflection on the distant and unknown region wherein the fleet was to act,—yet an elate confidence in Athenian force, such as had never before been entertained.[240] We hear of Sokratês the philosopher, and Meton the astronomer, as forming exceptions to this universal tone of sanguine anticipation: the familiar genius which constantly waited upon the philosopher is supposed to have forewarned him of the result. Nor is it impossible that he may have been averse to the expedition, though the fact is less fully certified than we could wish. Amidst a general predominance of the various favorable religious signs and prophecies, there were also some unfavorable. Usually, on all public matters of risk or gravity, there were prophets who gave assurances in opposite ways: those which turned out right were treasured up: the rest were at once forgotten, or never long remembered.[241]

After between two and three months of active preparations, the expedition was almost ready to start, when an event happened which fatally poisoned the prevalent cheerfulness of the city. This was the mutilation of the Hermæ, one of the most extraordinary events in all Grecian history.

These Hermæ, or half-statues of the god Hermês, were blocks of marble about the height of the human figure. The upper part was cut into a head, face, neck, and bust; the lower part was left as a quadrangular pillar, broad at the base, without arms, body, or legs, but with the significant mark of the male sex in front. They were distributed in great numbers throughout Athens, and always in the most conspicuous situations; standing beside the outer doors of private houses as well as of temples, near the most frequented porticos, at the intersection of cross ways, in the public agora. They were thus present to the eye of every Athenian in all his acts of intercommunion, either for business or pleasure, with his fellow-citizens. The religious

feelings of the Greeks considered the god to be planted or domiciliated where his statue stood,[242] so that the companionship, sympathy, and guardianship of Hermês became associated with most of the manifestations of conjunct life at Athens,—political, social, commercial, or gymnastic. Moreover, the quadrangular fashion of these statues, employed occasionally for other gods besides Hermês, was a most ancient relic handed down from the primitive rudeness of Pelasgian workmanship and was popular in Arcadia as well as peculiarly frequent in Athens.[243]

About the end of May, 415 B.C., in the course of one and the same night, all these Hermæ, one of the most peculiar marks of the city, were mutilated by unknown hands. Their characteristic features were knocked off or levelled, so that nothing was left except a mass of stone with no resemblance to humanity or deity. All were thus dealt with in the same way, save and except very few: nay, Andokidês affirms, and I incline to believe him, that there was but *one* which escaped unharmed.[244]

It is of course impossible for any one to sympathize fully with the feelings of a religion not his own: indeed, the sentiment with which, in the case of persons of different creeds, each regards the strong emotions growing out of causes peculiar to the other, is usually one of surprise that such trifles and absurdities can occasion any serious distress or excitement.[245] But if we take that reasonable pains, which is incumbent on those who study the history of Greece, to realize in our minds the religious and political associations of the Athenians,[246] noted in ancient times for their superior piety, as well as for their accuracy and magnificence about the visible monuments embodying that feeling,—we shall in part comprehend the intensity of mingled dismay, terror, and wrath, which beset the public mind on the morning after this nocturnal sacrilege, alike unforeseen and unparalleled. Amidst all the ruin and impoverishment which had been inflicted by the Persian invasion of Attica, there was nothing which was so profoundly felt or so long remembered as the deliberate burning of the statues and temples of the gods.[247] If we could imagine the excitement of a Spanish or Italian town, on finding that all the images of the Virgin had been defaced during the same night, we should have a parallel, though a very inadequate parallel, to what was now felt at Athens, where religious associations and persons were far more intimately allied with all civil acts and with all the proceedings of every-day life; where, too, the god and his efficiency were more forcibly localized, as well as identified with the presence and keeping of the statue. To the Athenians, when they went forth on the following morning, each man seeing the divine guardian at his doorway dishonored and defaced, and each man gradually coming to know that the devastation was general, it would seem that the town had become as it were godless; that the streets, the market-place, the porticos, were robbed of their divine protectors; and what was worse still, that these protectors, having been grossly insulted, carried away with them alienated sentiments, wrathful and vindictive instead of tutelary and sympathizing. It was on the protection of the gods, that all their political constitution as well as the blessings of civil life depended; insomuch that the curses of the gods

were habitually invoked as sanction and punishment for grave offences, political as well as others:[248] an extension and generalization of the feeling still attached to the judicial oath. This was, in the minds of the people of Athens, a sincere and literal conviction, not simply a form of speech to be pronounced in prayers and public harangues, without being ever construed as a reality in calculating consequences and determining practical measures. Accordingly, they drew from the mutilation of the Hermæ the inference, not less natural than terrifying, that heavy public misfortune was impending over the city, and that the political constitution to which they were attached was in imminent danger of being subverted.[249]

Such was the mysterious incident which broke in upon the eager and bustling movement of Athens, a few days before the Sicilian expedition was in condition for starting. In reference to that expedition it was taken to heart as a most depressing omen.[250] It would doubtless have been so determined, had it been a mere undesigned accident happening to any venerated religious object, just as we are told that similar misgivings were occasioned by the occurrence, about this same time, of the melancholy festival of the Adonia, wherein the women loudly bewailed the untimely death of Adonis.[251] The mutilation of the Hermæ, however, was something much more ominous than the worst accident. It proclaimed itself as the deliberate act of organized conspirators, not inconsiderable in number, whose names and final purpose were indeed unknown, but who had begun by committing sacrilege of a character flagrant and unheard of. For intentional mutilation of a public and sacred statue, where the material afforded no temptation to plunder, is a case to which we know no parallel: much more mutilation by wholesale, spread by one band and in one night throughout an entire city. Though neither the parties concerned, nor their purposes, were ever more than partially made out, the concert and conspiracy itself is unquestionable.

It seems probable, as far as we can form an opinion, that the conspirators had two objects, perhaps some of them one and some the other: to ruin Alkibiadês, to frustrate or delay the expedition. How they pursued the former purpose, will be presently seen: towards the latter, nothing was ostensibly done, but the position of Teukrus, and other metics implicated, renders it more likely that they were influenced by sympathies with Corinth and Megara,[252] prompting them to intercept an expedition which was supposed to promise great triumphs to Athens, rather than corrupted by the violent antipathies of intestine politics. Indeed, the two objects were intimately connected with each other; for the prosecution of the enterprise, while full of prospective conquest to Athens, was yet more pregnant with future power and wealth to Alkibiadês himself. Such chances would disappear if the expedition could be prevented; nor was it at all impossible that the Athenians, under the intense impression of religious terror consequent on the mutilation of the Hermæ, might throw up the scheme altogether. Especially Nikias, exquisitely sensitive in his own religious conscience, and never hearty in his wish for going, a fact perfectly known to the en-

emy,[253] would hasten to consult his prophets, and might reasonably be expected to renew his opposition on the fresh ground offered to him, or at least to claim delay until the offended gods should have been appeased. We may judge how much such a proceeding was in the line of his character, and of the Athenian character, when we find him, two years afterwards, with the full concurrence of his soldiers, actually sacrificing the last opportunity of safe retreat for the half-ruined Athenian army in Sicily, and refusing even to allow the proposition to be debated, in consequence of an eclipse of the moon; and when we reflect that Spartans and other Greeks frequently renounced public designs if an earthquake happened before the execution.[254]

But though the chance of setting aside the expedition altogether might reasonably enter into the plans of the conspirators, as a likely consequence of the intense shock inflicted on the religious mind of Athens, and especially of Nikias, this calculation was not realized. Probably matters had already proceeded too far even for Nikias to recede. Notice had been sent round to all the allies; forces were already on their way to the rendezvous at Korkyra; the Argeian and Mantineian allies were arriving at Peiræus to embark. So much the more eagerly did the conspirators proceed in the other part of their plan, to work that exaggerated religious terror, which they had themselves artificially brought about, for the ruin of Alkibiadês.

Few men in Athens either had or deserved to have a greater number of enemies, political as well as private, than Alkibiades; many of them being among the highest citizens, whom he offended by his insolence, and whose liturgies and other customary exhibitions he outshone by his reckless expenditure. His importance had been already so much increased, and threatened to be so much more increased, by the Sicilian enterprise, that they no longer observed any measures in compassing his ruin. That which the mutilators of the Hermæ seem to have deliberately planned, his other enemies were ready to turn to profit.

Amidst the mournful dismay spread by the discovery of so unparalleled a sacrilege, it appeared to the Athenian people,—as it would have appeared to the ephors at Sparta, or to the rulers in every oligarchical city of Greece,—that it was their paramount and imperative duty to detect and punish the authors. So long as these latter were walking about unknown and unpunished, the temples were defiled by their presence, and the whole city was accounted under the displeasure of the gods, who would inflict upon it heavy public misfortunes.[255] Under this displeasure every citizen felt himself comprehended, so that the sense of public security as well as of private comfort were alike unappeased, until the offenders should be discovered and atonement made by punishing or expelling them. Large rewards were accordingly proclaimed to any person who could give information, and even impunity to any accomplice whose confession might lay open the plot. Nor did the matter stop here. Once under this painful shock of religious and political terror, the Athenians became eager talkers and listeners on the subject of other recent acts of impiety. Every one was impatient to tell all that he knew, and more than he knew, about such incidents;

while to exercise any strict criticism upon the truth of such reports, would argue weakness of faith and want of religious zeal, rendering the critic himself a suspected man, "metuunt dubitasse videri." To rake out and rigorously visit all such offenders, and thus to display an earnest zeal for the honor of the gods, was accounted one auxiliary means of obtaining absolution from them for the recent outrage. Hence an additional public vote was passed, promising rewards and inviting information from all witnesses,—citizens, metics, or even slaves,—respecting any previous acts of impiety which might have come within their cognizance,[256] but at the same time providing that informers who gave false depositions should be punished capitally.[257]

The Senate of Five Hundred were invested with full powers of action; while Diognêtus, Peisander, Chariklês, and others, were named commissioners for receiving and prosecuting inquiries, and public assemblies were held nearly every day to receive reports.[258] The first informations received, however, did not relate to the grave and recent mutilation of the Hermæ, but to analogous incidents of older date; to certain defacements of other statues, accomplished in drunken frolic; and above all, to ludicrous ceremonies celebrated in various houses,[259] by parties of revellers caricaturing and divulging the Eleusinian mysteries. It was under this latter head that the first impeachment was preferred against Alkibiadês.

So fully were the preparations of the armament now complete, that the trireme of Lamachus—who was doubtless more diligent about the military details than either of his two colleagues—was already moored in the outer harbor, and the last public assembly was held for the departing officers,[260] who probably laid before their countrymen an imposing account of the force assembled, when Pythonikus rose to impeach Alkibiadês. "Athenians," said he, "you are going to despatch this great force and incur all this hazard, at a moment when I am prepared to show you that your general Alkibiadês is one of the profaners of the holy mysteries, in a private house. Pass a vote of impunity, and I will produce to you forthwith a slave of one here present, who, though himself not initiated in the mysteries, shall repeat to you what they are. Deal with me in any way you choose, if my statement prove untrue." While Alkibiadês strenuously denied the allegation, the prytanes—senators presiding over the assembly, according to the order determined by lot for that year among the ten tribes—at once made proclamation for all uninitiated citizens to depart from the assembly, and went to fetch the slave—Andromachus by name—whom Pythonikus had indicated. On being introduced, Andromachus deposed before the assembly that he had been with his master in the house of Polytion, when Alkibiadês, Nikiadês, and Melêtus, went through the sham celebration of the mysteries; many other persons being present, and especially three other slaves besides himself. We must presume that he verified this affirmation by describing what the mysteries were which he had seen, the test which Pythonikus had offered.[261]

Such was the first direct attack made upon Alkibiadês by his enemies. Pythonikus, the demagogue Androklês, and other speakers, having put in evidence this irreverent

proceeding,—probably in substance true,—enlarged upon it with the strongest invective, imputed to him many other acts of the like character, and even denounced him as cognizant of the recent mutilation of the Hermæ. All had been done, they said, with a view to accomplish his purpose of subverting the democracy, when bereft of its divine protectors; a purpose manifested by the constant tenor of his lawless, overbearing, antipopular demeanor. Infamous as this calumny was, so far as regarded the mutilation of the Hermæ,—for whatever else Alkibiadês may have done, of that act he was unquestionably innocent, being the very person who had most to lose by it, and whom it ultimately ruined,—they calculated upon the reigning excitement to get it accredited, and probably to procure his deposition from the command, preparatory to public trial. But in spite of all the disquietude arising from the recent sacrilege, their expectations were defeated. The strenuous denial of Alkibiadês, aided by his very peculiar position as commander of the armament, as well as by the reflection that the recent outrage tended rather to spoil his favorite projects in Sicily, found general credence. The citizens enrolled to serve, manifested strong disposition to stand by him; the allies from Argos and Mantineia were known to have embraced the service chiefly at his instigation; the people generally had become familiar with him as the intended conqueror in Sicily, and were loth to be balked of this project. From all these circumstances, his enemies, finding little disposition to welcome the accusations which they preferred, were compelled to postpone them until a more suitable time.[262]

But Alkibiadês saw full well the danger of having such charges hanging over his head, and the peculiar advantage which he derived from his accidental position at the moment. He implored the people to investigate the charges at once; proclaiming his anxiety to stand trial and even to suffer death, if found guilty,—accepting the command only in case he should be acquitted,—and insisting above all things on the mischief to the city, of sending him on such an expedition with the charge undecided, as well as on the hardship to himself, of being aspersed by calumny during his absence, without power of defence. Such appeals, just and reasonable in themselves, and urged with all the vehemence of a man who felt that the question was one of life or death to his future prospects, were very near prevailing. His enemies could only defeat them by the trick of putting up fresh speakers, less notorious for hostility to Alkibiadês. These men affected a tone of candor, deprecated the delay which would be occasioned in the departure of the expedition, if he were put upon his trial forthwith, and proposed deferring the trial until a certain number of days after his return.[263] Such was the determination ultimately adopted; the supporters of Alkibiadês probably not fully appreciating its consequences, and conceiving that the speedy departure of the expedition was advisable even for his interest, as well as agreeable to their own feelings. And thus his enemies, though baffled in their first attempt to bring on his immediate ruin, carried a postponement which insured to them leisure for thoroughly poisoning the public mind against him, and choosing their own

time for his trial. They took care to keep back all farther accusation until he and the armament had departed.[264]

The spectacle of its departure was indeed so imposing, and the moment so full of anxious interest, that it banished even the recollection of the recent sacrilege. The entire armament was not mustered at Athens; for it had been judged expedient to order most of the allied contingents to rendezvous at once at Korkyra. But the Athenian force alone was astounding to behold. There were one hundred triremes, sixty of which were in full trim for rapid nautical movement, while the remaining forty were employed as transports for the soldiers. There were fifteen hundred select citizen hoplites, chosen from the general muster-roll, and seven hundred Thêtes, or citizens too poor to be included in the muster-roll, who served as hoplites on shipboard, —epibatæ, or marines,—each with a panoply furnished by the state. To these must be added, five hundred Argeian and two hundred and fifty Mantineian hoplites, paid by Athens and transported on board Athenian ships.[265] The number of horsemen was so small, that all were conveyed in a single horse transport. But the condition, the equipment, the pomp both of wealth and force, visible in the armament, was still more impressive than the number. At daybreak on the day appointed, when all the ships were ready in Peiræus, for departure, the military force was marched down in a body from the city and embarked. They were accompanied by nearly the whole population, metics and foreigners as well as citizens, so that the appearance was that of a collective emigration, like the flight to Salamis sixty-five years before. While the crowd of foreigners, brought thither by curiosity, were amazed by the grandeur of the spectacle, the citizens accompanying were moved by deeper and more stirring anxieties. Their sons, brothers, relatives, and friends, were just starting on the longest and largest enterprise which Athens had ever undertaken; against an island extensive as well as powerful, known to none of them accurately, and into a sea of undefined possibilities; glory and profit on the one side, but hazards of unassignable magnitude on the other. At this final parting, ideas of doubt and danger became far more painfully present than they had been in any of the preliminary discussions; and in spite of all the reassuring effect of the unrivalled armament before them, the relatives now separating at the water's edge could not banish the dark presentiment that they were bidding each other farewell for the last time.

The moment immediately succeeding this farewell—when all the soldiers were already on board, and the keleustês was on the point of beginning his chant to put the rowers in motion—was peculiarly solemn and touching. Silence having been enjoined and obtained by sound of trumpet, both the crews in every ship and the spectators on shore followed the voice of the herald in praying to the gods for success, and in singing the pæan. On every deck were seen bowls of wine prepared, out of which the officers and the epibatæ made libations, with goblets of silver and gold. At length the final signal was given, and the whole fleet quitted Peiræus in single file, displaying the exuberance of their yet untried force by a race of speed as far as Ægina.[266]

Never in Grecian history was an invocation more unanimous, emphatic, and imposing, addressed to the gods; never was the refusing nod of Zeus more stern or peremptory. All these details, given by Thucydidês, of the triumphant promise which now issued from Peiræus, derive a painful interest from their contrast with the sad issue which will hereafter be unfolded.

The fleet made straight for Korkyra, where the contingents of the maritime allies, with the ships for burden and provisions, were found assembled. The armament thus complete was passed in review, and found to comprise one hundred and thirty-four triremes with two Rhodian pentekonters; five thousand one hundred hoplites; four hundred and eighty bowmen, eighty of them Kretan; seven hundred Rhodian slingers; and one hundred and twenty Megarian exiles serving as light troops. Of vessels of burden, in attendance with provisions, muniments of war, bakers, masons, and carpenters, etc., the number was not less than five hundred; besides which, there was a considerable number of private trading-ships, following it voluntarily for purposes of profit.[267] Three fast-sailing triremes were despatched in advance to ascertain which of the cities in Italy and Sicily would welcome the arrival of the armament; and especially to give notice at Egesta, that the succor solicited was now on its way, requiring at the same time that the money promised by the Egestæans should be produced. Having then distributed by lot the armament into three divisions, one under each of the generals, Nikias, Alkibiadês, and Lamachus, they crossed the Ionic gulf from Korkyra to the Iapygian promontory.

In their progress southward along the coast of Italy to Rhegium, they met with a very cold reception from the various Grecian cities. None would receive them within their walls or even sell them provisions without. The utmost which they would grant was, the liberty of taking moorings and of watering; and even thus much was denied to them both at Tarentum and at the Epizephyrian Lokri. At Rhegium, immediately on the Sicilian strait, though the town-gate was still kept shut, they were so far more hospitably treated, that a market of provisions was furnished to them, and they were allowed to encamp in the sacred precinct of Artemis, not far from the walls. They here hauled their ships ashore and took repose until the return of the three scout-ships from Egesta; while the generals entered into negotiation with the magistrates and people of Rhegium, endeavoring to induce them to aid the armament in reëstablishing the dispossessed Leontines, who were of common Chalkidian origin with themselves. But the answer returned was discouraging. The Rhegines would promise nothing more than neutrality, and coöperation in any course of policy which it might suit the other Italian Greeks to adopt. Probably they, as well as the other Italian Greeks, were astonished and intimidated by the magnitude of the newly-arrived force, and desired to leave themselves open latitude of conduct for the future, not without mistrust of Athens and her affected forwardness for the restoration of the Leontines. To the Athenian generals, however, such a negative from Rhegium was an

unwelcome disappointment; for that city had been the ally of Athens in the last war, and they had calculated on the operation of Chalkidic sympathies.[268]

It was not until after the muster of the Athenians at Korkyra, about July 415 B.C., that the Syracusans became thoroughly convinced both of their approach, and of the extent of their designs against Sicily. Intimation had indeed reached Syracuse, from several quarters, of the resolution taken by the Athenians in the preceding March to assist Egesta and Leontini, and of the preparations going on in consequence. There was, however, a prevailing indisposition to credit such tidings. Nothing in the state of Sicily held out any encouragement to Athenian ambition: the Leontines could give no aid, the Egestæans very little, and that little at the opposite corner of the island; while the Syracusans considered themselves fully able to cope with any force which Athens was likely to send. Some derided the intelligence as mere idle rumor; others anticipated, at most, nothing more serious than the expedition sent from Athens ten years before.[269] No one could imagine the new eagerness and obstinacy with which she had just thrown herself into the scheme of Sicilian conquest, nor the formidable armament presently about to start. Nevertheless, the Syracusan generals thought it their duty to make preparations, and strengthen the military condition of the state. [270]

Hermokratês, however, whose information was more complete, judged these preparations insufficient, and took advantage of a public assembly—held seemingly about the time that the Athenians were starting from Peiræus—to impress such conviction on his countrymen, as well as to correct their incredulity. He pledged his own credit that the reports which had been circulated were not merely true, but even less than the full truth; that the Athenians were actually on their way, with an armament on the largest scale, and vast designs of conquering all Sicily. While he strenuously urged that the city should be put in immediate condition for repelling a most formidable invasion, he deprecated all alarm as to the result, and held out the firmest assurances of ultimate triumph. The very magnitude of the approaching force would intimidate the Sicilian cities and drive them into hearty defensive coöperation with Syracuse. Rarely indeed did any large or distant expedition ever succeed in its object, as might be seen from the failure of the Persians against Greece, by which failure Athens herself had so largely profited. Preparations, however, both effective and immediate, were indispensable; not merely at home, but by means of foreign missions, to the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, to the Sikels, and to the Carthaginians, who had for some time been suspicious of the unmeasured aggressive designs of Athens, and whose immense wealth would now be especially serviceable, and to Lacedæmon and Corinth, for the purpose of soliciting aid in Sicily, as well as renewed invasion of Attica. So confident did he (Hermokratês) feel of their powers of defence, if properly organized, that he would even advise the Syracusans with their Sicilian[271] allies to put to sea at once, with all their naval force and two months' provisions, and to sail forthwith to the friendly harbor of Tarentum, from whence they would be able to

meet the Athenian fleet and prevent it even from crossing the Ionic gulf from Korkyra. They would thus show that they were not only determined on defence, but even forward in coming to blows: the only way of taking down the presumption of the Athenians, who now speculated upon Syracusan lukewarmness, because they had rendered no aid to Sparta when she solicited it at the beginning of the war. The Syracusans would probably be able to deter or obstruct the advance of the expedition until winter approached: in which case Nikias, the ablest of the three generals, who was understood to have undertaken the scheme against his own consent, would probably avail himself of the pretext to return.[272]

Though these opinions of Hermokratês were espoused farther by various other citizens in the assembly, the greater number of speakers held an opposite language, and placed little faith in his warnings. We have already noticed Hermokratês nine years before as envoy of Syracuse and chief adviser at the congress of Gela,—then, as now, watchful to bar the door against Athenian interference in Sicily,—then, as now, belonging to the oligarchical party, and of sentiments hostile to the existing democratical constitution; but brave as well as intelligent in foreign affairs. A warm and even angry debate arose upon his present speech.[273] Though there was nothing, in the words of Hermokratês himself, disparaging either to the democracy or to the existing magistrates, yet it would seem that his partisans who spoke after him must have taken up a more criminative tone, and must have exaggerated that which he characterized as the "habitual quiescence" of the Syracusans, into contemptible remissness and disorganization under those administrators and generals, characterized as worthless, whom the democracy preferred. Amidst the speakers, who, in replying to Hermokratês and the others, indignantly repelled such insinuations and retorted upon their authors, a citizen named Athenagoras was the most distinguished. He was at this time the leading democratical politician, and the most popular orator, in Syracuse.[274]

"Every one[275] (said he), except only cowards and bad citizens, must wish that the Athenians *would* be fools enough to come here and put themselves into our power. The tales which you have just heard are nothing better than fabrications, got up to alarm you; and I wonder at the folly of these alarmists in fancying that their machinations are not seen through.[276] You will be too wise to take measure of the future from their reports: you will rather judge from what able men, such as the Athenians, are likely to do. Be assured that they will never leave behind them the Peloponnesians in menacing attitude, to come hither and court a fresh war not less formidable: indeed, I think they account themselves lucky that we, with our powerful cities, have never come across to attack them. And if they *should* come, as it is pretended, they will find Sicily a more formidable foe than Peloponnesus: nay, our own city alone will be a match for twice the force which they can bring across. The Athenians, knowing all this well enough, will mind their own business, in spite of all the fictions which men on this side of the water conjure up, and which they have already

tried often before, sometimes even worse than on the present occasion, in order to terrify you, and get themselves nominated to the chief posts.[277] One of these days, I fear they may even succeed, from our want of precautions beforehand. Such intrigues leave but short moments of tranquillity to our city; they condemn it to an intestine discord worse than foreign war, and have sometimes betrayed it even to despots and usurpers. However, if you will listen to me, I will try and prevent anything of this sort at present; by simple persuasion to you, by chastisement to these conspirators, and by watchful denunciation of the oligarchical party generally. Let me ask, indeed, what is it that you younger nobles covet? To get into command at your early age? The law forbids you, because you are yet incompetent. Or, do you wish not to be under equal laws with the many? But how can you pretend that citizens of the same city should not have the same rights? Some one will tell me[278] that democracy is neither intelligent nor just, and that the rich are the persons best fitted to command. But I affirm, first, that the people are the sum total, and the oligarchy merely a fraction; next, that rich men are the best trustees of the aggregate wealth existing in the community,—intelligent men, the best counsellors,—and the multitude, the best qualified for hearing and deciding after such advice. In a democracy, these functions, one and all, find their proper place. But oligarchy, though imposing on the multitude a full participation in all hazards, is not content even with an exorbitant share in the public advantages, but grasps and monopolizes the whole for itself. [279] This is just what you young and powerful men are aiming at, though you will never be able to keep it permanently in a city such as Syracuse. Be taught by me, or at least alter your views, and devote yourselves to the public advantage of our common city. Desist from practising, by reports such as these, upon the belief of men who know you too well to be duped. If even there be any truth in what you say, and if the Athenians *do* come, our city will repel them in a manner worthy of her reputation. She will not take you at your word, and choose *you* commanders, in order to put the yoke upon her own neck. She will look for herself, construe your communications for what they really mean, and, instead of suffering you to talk her out of her free government, will take effective precautions for maintaining it against you."

Immediately after this vehement speech from Athenagoras, one of the stratêgi who presided in the assembly interposed; permitting no one else to speak, and abruptly closing the assembly, with these few words: "We generals deprecate this interchange of personal vituperation, and trust that the hearers present will not suffer themselves to be biased by it. Let us rather take care, in reference to the reports just communicated, that we be one and all in a condition to repel the invader. And even should the necessity not arise, there is no harm in strengthening our public force with horses, arms, and the other muniments of war. *We* generals shall take upon ourselves the care and supervision of these matters, as well as of the missions to neighboring cities, for procuring information and for other objects. We have, indeed, already busied ourselves for the purpose, and we shall keep you informed of what we learn."

The language of Athenagoras, indicating much virulence of party feeling, lets us somewhat into the real working of politics among the Syracusan democracy. Athenagoras at Syracuse was like Kleon at Athens, the popular orator of the city. But he was by no means the most influential person, nor had he the principal direction of public affairs. Executive and magisterial functions belonged chiefly to Hermokratês and his partisans, the opponents of Athenagoras. Hermokratês has already appeared as taking the lead at the congress of Gela nine years before, and will be seen throughout the coming period almost constantly in the same position; while the political rank of Athenagoras is more analogous to that which we should call a leader of opposition, a function of course suspended under pressing danger, so that we hear of him no more. At Athens as at Syracuse, the men who got to real power and handled the force and treasures of the state, were chiefly of the rich families, often of oligarchical sentiments, acquiescing in the democracy as an uncomfortable necessity, and continually open to be solicited by friends or kinsmen to conspire against it. Their proceedings were doubtless always liable to the scrutiny, and their persons to the animadversion, of the public assembly: hence arose the influence of the demagogue, such as Athenagoras and Kleon, the bad side of whose character is so constantly kept before the readers of Grecian history. By whatever disparaging epithets such character may be surrounded, it is in reality the distinguishing feature of a free government under all its forms, whether constitutional monarchy or democracy. By the side of the real political actors, who hold principal office and wield personal powers, there are always abundant censors and critics,—some better, others worse, in respect of honesty, candor, wisdom, or rhetoric,—the most distinguished of whom acquires considerable importance, though holding a function essentially inferior to that of the authorized magistrate or general.

We observe here, that Athenagoras, far from being inclined to push the city into war, is averse to it, even beyond reasonable limit; and denounces it as the interested policy of the oligarchical party. This may show how little it was any constant interest or policy on the part of the persons called demagogues, to involve their city in unnecessary wars: a charge which has been frequently advanced against them, because it so happens that Kleon, in the first half of the Peloponnesian war, discountenanced the propositions of peace between Athens and Sparta. We see by the harangue of Athenagoras that the oligarchical party were the usual promoters of war: a fact which we should naturally expect, seeing that the rich and great, in most communities, have accounted the pursuit of military glory more conformable to their dignity than any other career. At Syracuse, the ascendency of Hermokratês was much increased by the invasion of the Athenians, while Athenagoras does not again appear. The latter was egregiously mistaken in his anticipations respecting the conduct of Athens, though right in his judgment respecting her true political interest. But it is very unsafe to assume that nations will always pursue their true political interest, where present temptations of ambition or vanity intervene. Positive information was in this instance a surer guide than speculations *à priori* founded upon the probable

policy of Athens. But that the imputations advanced by Athenagoras against the oligarchical youth, of promoting military organization with a view to their own separate interest, were not visionary, may be seen by the analogous case of Argos, two or three years before. The democracy of Argos, contemplating a more warlike and aggressive policy, had been persuaded to organize and train the select regiment of one thousand hoplites, chosen from the oligarchical youth: within three years, this regiment subverted the democratical constitution.[280] Now the persons, respecting whose designs Athenagoras expresses so much apprehension, were exactly the class at Syracuse corresponding to the select thousand at Argos.

The political views, proclaimed in this remarkable speech, are deserving of attention, though we cannot fully understand it without having before us those speeches to which it replies. Not only is democratical constitution forcibly contrasted with oligarchy, but the separate places which it assigns to wealth, intelligence, and multitude, are laid down with a distinctness not unworthy of Aristotle.

Even before the debate here adverted to, the Syracusan generals had evidently acted upon views more nearly approaching to those of Hermokratês than to those of Athenagoras. Already alive to the danger, they were apprized by their scouts when the Athenian armament was passing from Korkyra to Rhegium, and pushed their preparations with the utmost activity, distributing garrisons and sending envoys among their Sikel dependencies, while the force within the city was mustered and placed under all the conditions of war.[281] The halt of the Athenians at Rhegium afforded increased leisure for such equipment. That halt was prolonged for more than one reason. In the first place, Nikias and his colleagues wished to negotiate with the Rhegines, as well as to haul ashore and clean their ships: next, they awaited the return of the three scout-ships from Egesta: lastly, they had as yet formed no plan of action in Sicily.

The ships from Egesta returned with disheartening news. Instead of the abundant wealth which had been held forth as existing in that town, and upon which the resolutions of the Athenians as to Sicilian operations had been mainly grounded, it turned out that no more than thirty talents in all could be produced. What was yet worse, the elaborate fraud, whereby the Egestæans had duped the commissioners on their first visit, was now exposed; and these commissioners, on returning to Rhegium from their second visit, were condemned to the mortification of proclaiming their own credulity, visited by severe taunts and reproaches from the army. Disappointed in the source from whence they had calculated on obtaining money,—for it appears that both Alkibiadês and Lamachus had sincerely relied on the pecuniary resources of Egesta, though Nikias was always mistrustful,—the generals now discussed their plan of action.

Nikias—availing himself of the fraudulent conduct on the part of the Egestæan allies, now become palpable—wished to circumscribe his range of operations within the

rigorous letter of the vote which the Athenian assembly had passed. He proposed to sail at once against Selinus; then, formally to require the Egestæans to provide the means of maintaining the armament, or, at least, of maintaining those sixty triremes which they themselves had solicited. Since this requisition would not be realized, he would only tarry long enough to obtain from the Selinuntines some tolerable terms of accommodation with Egesta, and then return home; exhibiting, as they sailed along, to all the maritime cities, this great display of Athenian naval force. And while he would be ready to profit by any opportunity which accident might present for serving the Leontines or establishing new alliances, he strongly deprecated any prolonged stay in the island for speculative enterprises, all at the cost of Athens.[282]

Against this scheme Alkibiadês protested, as narrow, timid, and disgraceful to the prodigious force with which they had been intrusted. He proposed to begin by opening negotiations with all the other Sicilian Greeks,—especially Messênê, convenient both as harbor for their fleet and as base of their military operations,—to prevail upon them to coöperate against Syracuse and Selinus. With the same view, he recommended establishing relations with the Sikels of the interior, in order to detach such of them as were subjects of Syracuse, as well as to insure supplies of provisions. As soon as it had been thus ascertained what extent of foreign aid might be looked for, he would open direct attack forthwith against Syracuse and Selinus; unless, indeed, the former should consent to reëstablish Leontini, and the latter to come to terms with Egesta.[283]

Lamachus, delivering his opinion last, dissented from both his colleagues. He advised, that they should proceed at once, without any delay, to attack Syracuse, and fight their battle under its walls. The Syracusans, he urged, were now in terror and only half-prepared for defence. Many of their citizens, and much property, would be found still lingering throughout the neighboring lands, not yet removed within the walls, and might thus be seized for the subsistence of their army;[284] while the deserted town and harbor of Megara, very near to Syracuse both by land and by sea, might be occupied by the fleet as a naval station. The imposing and intimidating effect of the armament, not less than its real efficiency, was now at the maximum, immediately after its arrival. If advantage were taken of this first impression to strike an instant blow at their principal enemy, the Syracusans would be found destitute of the courage, not less than of the means, to resist: but the longer such attack was delayed, the more this first impression of dismay would be effaced, giving place to a reactionary sentiment of indifference and even contempt, when the much-dreaded armament was seen to accomplish little or nothing. As for the other Sicilian cities, nothing would contribute so much to determine their immediate adhesion, as successful operations against Syracuse.[285]

But Lamachus found no favor with either of the other two, and being thus compelled to choose between the plans of Alkibiadês and Nikias, gave his support to that of the former, which was the mean term of the three. There can be no doubt—as far

as it is becoming to pronounce respecting that which never reached execution—that the plan of Lamachus was far the best and most judicious; at first sight, indeed, the most daring, but intrinsically the safest, easiest, and speediest, that could be suggested. For undoubtedly the siege and capture of Syracuse, was the one enterprise indispensable towards the promotion of Athenian views in Sicily. The sooner that was commenced, the more easily it would be accomplished: and its difficulties were in many ways aggravated, in no way abated, by those preliminary precautions upon which Alkibiadês insisted. Anything like delay tended fearfully to impair the efficiency, real as well as reputed, of an ancient aggressive armament, and to animate as well as to strengthen those who stood on the defensive, a point on which we shall find painful evidence presently. The advice of Lamachus, alike soldier-like and far-sighted, would probably have been approved and executed either by Brasidas or by Demosthenês; while the dilatory policy still advocated by Alkibiadês, even after the suggestion of Lamachus had been started, tends to show that if he was superior in military energy to one of his colleagues, he was not less inferior to the other. Indeed, when we find him talking of besieging Syracuse, *unless* the Syracusans would consent to the reëstablishment of Leontini, it seems probable that he had not yet made up his mind peremptorily to besiege the city at all; a fact completely at variance with those unbounded hopes of conquest which he is reported as having conceived even at Athens. It is possible that he may have thought it impolitic to contradict too abruptly the tendencies of Nikias, who, anxious as he was chiefly to find some pretext for carrying back his troops unharmed, might account the proposition of Lamachus too desperate even to be discussed. Unfortunately, the latter, though the ablest soldier of the three, was a poor man, of no political position, and little influence among the hoplites. Had he possessed, along with his own straightforward military energy, the wealth and family ascendency of either of his colleagues, the achievements as well as the fate of this splendid armament would have been entirely altered, and the Athenians would have entered Syracuse not as prisoners but as conquerors.

Alkibiadês, as soon as his plan had become adopted by means of the approval of Lamachus, sailed across the strait in his own trireme from Rhegium to Messênê. Though admitted personally into the city, and allowed to address the public assembly, he could not induce them to conclude any alliance, or to admit the armament to anything beyond a market of provisions without the walls. He accordingly returned back to Rhegium, from whence he and one of his colleagues immediately departed with sixty triremes for Naxos. The Naxians cordially received the armament, which then steered southward along the coast of Sicily to Katana. In the latter place the leading men and the general sentiment were at this time favorable to Syracuse, so that the Athenians, finding admittance refused, were compelled to sail farther southward and take their night-station at the mouth of the river Terias. On the ensuing day they made sail with their ships in single column immediately in front of Syracuse itself, while an advanced squadron of ten triremes were even despatched into the Great Harbor, south of the town, for the purpose of surveying on this side the city

with its docks and fortifications, and for the farther purpose of proclaiming from shipboard by the voice of the herald: "The Leontines now in Syracuse are hereby invited to come forth without apprehension and join their friends and benefactors, the Athenians." After this empty display, they returned back to Katana.[286]

We may remark that this proceeding was completely at variance with the judicious recommendation of Lamachus. It tended to familiarize the Syracusans with the sight of the armament piece-meal, without any instant action, and thus to abate in their minds the terror-striking impression of its first arrival.

At Katana, Alkibiadês personally was admitted into the town, and allowed to open his case before the public assembly, as he had been at Messênê. Accident alone enabled him to carry his point, for the general opinion was averse to his propositions. While most of the citizens were in the assembly listening to his discourse, some Athenian soldiers without, observing a postern-gate carelessly guarded, broke it open and showed themselves in the market-place. The town was thus in the power of the Athenians, so that the leading men who were friends of Syracuse thought themselves lucky to escape in safety, while the general assembly came to a resolution accepting the alliance proposed by Alkibiadês.[287] The whole Athenian armament was now conducted from Rhegium to Katana, which was established as head-quarters. Intimation was farther received from a party at Kamarina, that the city might be induced to join them, if the armament showed itself: accordingly, the whole armament proceeded thither, and took moorings off the shore, while a herald was sent up to the city. But the Kamarinæans declined to admit the army, and declared that they would abide by the existing treaty; which bound them to receive at any time one single ship, but no more, unless they themselves should ask for it. The Athenians were therefore obliged to return to Katana. Passing by Syracuse both going and returning, they ascertained the falsehood of a report that the Syracusans were putting a naval force afloat; moreover, they landed near the city and ravaged some of the neighboring lands. The Syracusan cavalry and light troops soon appeared, and a skirmish with trifling loss ensued, before the invaders retired to their ships,[288] the first blood shed in this important struggle, and again at variance with the advice of Lamachus.

Serious news awaited them on their return to Katana. They found the public ceremonial trireme, called the Salaminian, just arrived from Athens, the bearer of a formal resolution of the assembly, requiring Alkibiadês to come home and stand his trial for various alleged matters of irreligion combined with treasonable purposes. A few other citizens specified by name were commanded to come along with him under the same charge; but the trierarch of the Salaminian was especially directed to serve him only with the summons, without any guard or coercion, so that he might return home in his own trireme.[289]

This summons, pregnant with momentous results both to Athens and to her enemies, arose out of the mutilation of the Hermæ, described a few pages back, and the

inquiries instituted into the authorship of that deed, since the departure of the armament. The extensive and anxious sympathies connected with so large a body of departing citizens, combined with the solemnity of the scene itself, had for the moment suspended the alarm caused by that sacrilege; but it speedily revived, and the people could not rest without finding out by whom the deed had been done. Considerable rewards, one thousand and even ten thousand drachms, were proclaimed to informers; of whom others soon appeared, in addition to the slave Andromachus, before mentioned. A metic named Teukrus had fled from Athens, immediately after the event, to Megara, from whence he sent intimation to the senate at Athens that he had himself been a party concerned in the recent sacrilege concerning the mysteries, as well as cognizant of the mutilation of the Hermæ, and that, if impunity were guaranteed to him, he would come back and give full information. A vote of the senate was immediately passed to invite him. He denounced by name eleven persons as having been concerned, jointly with himself, in the mock-celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries, and eighteen different persons, himself not being one, as the violators of the Hermæ. A woman named Agaristê, daughter of Alkmæonidês,—these names bespeak her great rank and family in the city,—deposed farther that Alkibiadês, Axiochus, and Adeimantus, had gone through a parody of the mysteries in a similar manner, in the house of Charmidês. And lastly Lydus, slave of a citizen named Phereklês, stated that the like scene had been enacted in the house of his master in the deme Thêmakus, giving the names of the parties present, one of whom—though asleep, and unconscious of what was passing—he stated to be Leogoras, the father of Andokidês.[290] Of the parties named in these different depositions, the greater number seem to have fled from the city at once; but all who remained were put into prison to stand future trial.[291] Those informers received the promised rewards, after some debate as to the parties entitled to receive the reward; for Pythonikus, the citizen who had produced the slave Andromachus, pretended to the first claim, while Androkles, one of the senators, contended that the senate collectively ought to receive[292] the money; a strange pretension, which we do not know how he justified. At last, however, at the time of the Panathenaic festival, Andromachus the slave received the first reward of ten thousand drachms; Teukrus the metic, the second reward of one thousand drachms.

A large number of citizens, many of them of the first consideration in the city, were thus either lying in prison or had fled into exile. But the alarm, the agony, and the suspicion, in the public mind, went on increasing rather than diminishing. The information hitherto received had been all partial, and, with the exception of Agaristê, all the informants had been either slaves or metics, not citizens; while Teukrus, the only one among them who had stated anything respecting the mutilation of the Hermæ, did not profess to be a party concerned, or to know all those who were.[293] The people had heard only a succession of disclosures, all attesting a frequency of irreligious acts, calculated to insult and banish the local gods who protected their country and constitution; all indicating that there were many powerful citizens bent

on prosecuting such designs, interpreted as treasonable, yet none communicating any full or satisfactory idea of the Hermokopid plot, of the real conspirators, or of their farther purposes. The enemy was among themselves, yet they knew not where to lay hands upon him. Amidst the gloomy terrors, political blended with religious, which distracted their minds, all the ancient stories of the last and worst oppressions of the Peisistratid despots, ninety-five years before, became again revived, and some new despots, they knew not who, seemed on the point of occupying the acropolis. To detect the real conspirators, was the only way of procuring respite from this melancholy paroxysm, for which purpose the people were willing to welcome questionable witnesses, and to imprison on suspicion citizens of the best character, until the truth could be ascertained.[294]

The public distraction was aggravated by Peisander and Chariklês, who acted as commissioners of investigation, furious and unprincipled politicians,[295] at that time professing exaggerated attachment to the democratical constitution, though we shall find both of them hereafter among the most unscrupulous agents in its subversion. These men loudly proclaimed that the facts disclosed indicated the band of Hermokopid conspirators to be numerous, with an ulterior design of speedily putting down the democracy; and they insisted on pressing their investigations until full discovery should be attained. And the sentiment of the people, collectively taken, responded to this stimulus; though individually, every man was so afraid of becoming himself the next victim arrested, that when the herald convoked the senate for the purpose of receiving informations, the crowd in the market-place straightway dispersed.

It was amidst such eager thirst for discovery, that a new informer appeared, Diokleidês, who professed to communicate some material facts connected with the mutilation of the Hermæ, affirming that the authors of it were three hundred in number. He recounted that, on the night on which that incident occurred, he started from Athens to go to the mines of Laureion; wherein he had a slave working on hire, on whose account he was to receive pay. It was full moon, and the night was so bright that he began his journey mistaking it for daybreak.[296] On reaching the propylæum of the temple of Dionysus, he saw a body of men about three hundred in number descending from the Odeon towards the public theatre. Being alarmed at this unexpected sight, he concealed himself behind a pillar, from whence he had leisure to contemplate this body of men, who stood for some time conversing together, in groups of fifteen or twenty each, and then dispersed: the moon was so bright that he could discern the faces of most of them. As soon as they had dispersed, he pursued his walk to Laureion, from whence he returned next day, and learned to his surprise that during the night the Hermæ had been mutilated; also, that commissioners of inquiry had been named, and the reward of ten thousand drachms proclaimed for information. Impressed at once with the belief that the nocturnal crowd whom he had seen were authors of the deed, he happened soon afterwards to see one of

them, Euphêmus, sitting in the workshop of a brazier, and took him aside to the neighboring temple of Hephæstus, where he mentioned in confidence that he had seen the party at work and could denounce them, but that he preferred being paid for silence, instead of giving information and incurring private enmities. Euphêmus thanked him for the warning, desiring him to come next day to the house of Leogoras and his son Andokidês, where he would see them as well as the other parties concerned. Andokidês and the rest offered to him, under solemn covenant, the sum of two talents, or twelve thousand drachms, thus overbidding the reward of ten thousand drachms proclaimed by the senate to any truth-telling informer, with admission to a partnership in the benefits of their conspiracy, supposing that it should succeed. Upon his reply that he would consider the proposition, they desired him to meet them at the house of Kallias son of Têleklês, brother-in-law of Andokidês: which meeting accordingly took place, and a solemn bargain was concluded in the acropolis. Andokidês and his friends engaged to pay the two talents to Diokleidês at the beginning of the ensuing month, as the price of his silence. But since this engagement was never performed, Diokleidês came with his information to the senate. [297]

Such—according to the report of Andokidês—was the story of this informer, which he concluded by designating forty-two individuals, out of the three hundred whom he had seen. The first names whom he specified were those of Mantitheus and Aphepsion, two senators actually sitting among his audience. Next came the remaining forty, among whom were Andokidês and many of his nearest relatives, his father Leogoras, his first or second cousins and brother-in-law, Charmidês, Taureas, Nisæus, Kalias son of Alkmæon, Phrynichus, Eukratês (brother of Nikias the commander in Sicily), and Kritias. But as there were a still greater number of names—assuming the total of three hundred to be correct—which Diokleidês was unable to specify, the commissioner Peisander proposed that Mantitheus and Aphepsion should be at once seized and tortured, in order to force them to disclose their accomplices; the psephism passed in the archonship of Skamandrius, whereby it was unlawful to apply the torture to any free Athenian, being first abrogated. Illegal, not less than cruel, as this proposition was, the senate at first received it with favor. But Mantitheus and Aphepsion, casting themselves as suppliants upon the altar in the senate-house, pleaded so strenuously for their rights as citizens, to be allowed to put in bail and stand trial before the dikastery, that this was at last granted.[298] No sooner had they provided their sureties, than they broke their covenant, mounted their horses, and deserted to the enemy, without any regard to their sureties, who were exposed by law to the same trial and the same penalties as would have overtaken the offenders themselves. This sudden flight, together with the news that a Bœotian force was assembled on the borders of Attica, exasperated still farther the frantic terror of the public mind. The senate at once took quiet measures for seizing and imprisoning all the remaining forty whose names had been denounced; while by concert with the strategi, all the citizens were put under arms; those who dwelt in the

city, mustering in the market-place; those in and near the long walls, in the Theseium; those in Peiræus, in the square called the Market-place of Hippodamus. Even the horsemen of the city were convoked by sound of trumpet in the sacred precinct of the Anakeion. The senate itself remained all night in the acropolis, except the prytanes, or fifty senators of the presiding tribe, who passed the night in the public building called the Tholus. Every man in Athens felt the terrible sense of an internal conspiracy on the point of breaking out, perhaps along with an invasion of the foreigner, prevented only by the timely disclosure of Diokleidês, who was hailed as the saviour of the city, and carried in procession to dinner at the prytaneium.[299]

Miserable as the condition of the city was generally, yet more miserable was that of the prisoners confined; and worse, in every way, was still to be looked for, since the Athenians would know neither peace nor patience until they could reach, by some means or other, the names of the undisclosed conspirators. The female relatives and children of Andokidês, and his companions, were by permission along with them in the prison,[300] aggravating by their tears and wailings the affliction of the scene, when Charmidês, one of the parties confined, addressed himself to Andokidês, as his cousin and friend, imploring him to make a voluntary disclosure of all that he knew, in order to preserve the lives of so many innocent persons, his immediate kinsmen, as well as to rescue the city out of a feverish alarm not to be endured. "You know (he said) all that passed about the mutilation of the Hermæ, and your silence will now bring destruction not only upon yourself, but also upon your father and upon all of us; while if you inform, whether you have been an actor in the scene or not, you will obtain impunity for yourself and us, and at the same time soothe the terrors of the city." Such instances on the part of Charmidês,[301] aided by the supplications of the other prisoners present, overcame the reluctance of Andokidês to become informer, and he next day made his disclosures to the senate. "Euphilêtus (he said) was the chief author of the mutilation of the Hermæ. He proposed the deed at a convivial party where I was present, but I denounced it in the strongest manner and refused all compliance. Presently, I broke my collar-bone, and injured my head, by a fall from a young horse, so badly as to be confined to my bed; when Euphilêtus took the opportunity of my absence to assure the rest of the company falsely that I had consented, and that I had agreed to cut the Hermes near my paternal house, which the tribe Ægeïs have dedicated. Accordingly, they executed the project, while I was incapable of moving, without my knowledge: they presumed that *I* would undertake the mutilation of this particular Hermes, and you see that this is the only one in all Athens which has escaped injury. When the conspirators ascertained that I had not been a party, Euphilêtus and Melêtus threatened me with a terrible revenge unless I observed silence: to which I replied that it was not I, but their own crime, which had brought them into danger."

Having recounted this tale, in substance, to the senate, Andokidês tendered his slaves, both male and female, to be tortured, in order that they might confirm his

story that he was in his bed and unable to leave it, on the night when the Hermæ were mutilated. It appears that the torture was actually applied (according to the custom so cruelly frequent at Athens in the case of slaves), and that the senators thus became satisfied of the truth of what Andokidês affirmed. He delivered in twenty-two names of citizens as having been the mutilators of the Hermæ: eighteen of these names, including Euphilêtus and Melêtus, had already been specified in the information of Teukrus; the remaining four, were Panætius, Diakritus, Lysistratus, and Chæredêmus; all of whom fled, the instant their names were mentioned, without waiting the chance of being seized. As soon as the senate heard the story of Andokidês, they proceeded to question Diokleidês over again; who confessed that he had given a false deposition, and begged for mercy, mentioning Alkibiadês the Phegusian—a relative of the commander in Sicily—and Amiantus, as having suborned him to the crime. Both of them fled immediately on this revelation; but Diokleidês was detained, sent before the dikastery for trial, and put to death.[302]

The foregoing is the story which Andokidês, in the oration De Mysteriis, delivered between fifteen and twenty years afterwards, represented himself to have communicated to the senate at this perilous crisis. But it probably is not the story which he really did tell, certainly not that which his enemies represented him as having told: least of all does it communicate the whole truth, or afford any satisfaction to such anxiety and alarm as are described to have been prevalent at the time. Nor does it accord with the brief information of Thucydidês, who tells us that Andokidês impeached himself, along with others, as participant in the mutilation.[303] Among the accomplices against whom he informed, his enemies affirmed that his own nearest relatives were included, though this latter statement is denied by himself. We may be sure, therefore, that the tale which Andokidês really told was something very different from what now stands in his oration. But what it really was we cannot make out; nor should we gain much even if it could be made out, since even at the time, neither Thucydidês nor other intelligent critics could determine how far it was true. The mutilation of the Hermæ remained to them always an unexplained mystery; though they accounted Andokidês the principal organizer.[304]

That which is at once most important and most incontestable, is the effect produced by the revelations of Andokidês, true or false, on the public mind at Athens. He was a young man of rank and wealth in the city, belonging to the sacred family of the Kerykes,—said to trace his pedigree to the hero Odysseus,—and invested on a previous occasion with an important naval command; whereas the preceding informers had been metics and slaves. Moreover, he was making confession of his own guilt. Hence the people received his communications with implicit confidence. They were delighted to have got to the bottom of the terrible mystery: and the public mind subsided from its furious terrors into comparative tranquillity. The citizens again began to think themselves in safety and to resume their habitual confidence in each other, while the hoplites everywhere on guard were allowed to return to their homes.

[305] All the prisoners in custody on suspicion, except those against whom Andokidês informed were forthwith released: those who had fled out of apprehension, were allowed to return; while those whom he named as guilty, were tried, convicted, and put to death. Such of them as had already fled, were condemned to death in their absence, and a reward offered for their heads.[306] And though discerning men were not satisfied with the evidence upon which these sentences were pronounced, yet the general public fully believed themselves to have punished the real offenders, and were thus inexpressibly relieved from the depressing sense of unexpiated insult to the gods, as well as of danger to their political constitution from the withdrawal of divine protection.[307] Andokidês himself was pardoned, and was for the time an object, apparently, even of public gratitude, so that his father Leogoras who had been among the parties imprisoned, ventured to indict a senator named Speusippus for illegal proceedings towards him, and obtained an almost unanimous verdict from the dikastery.[308] But the character of a statue-breaker and an informer could never be otherwise than odious at Athens. Andokidês was either banished by the indirect effect of a general disqualifying decree; or at least found that he had made so many enemies, and incurred so much obloquy, by his conduct in this affair, as to make it necessary for him to quit the city. He remained in banishment for many years, and seems never to have got clear of the hatred which his conduct in this nefarious proceeding so well merited.[309]

But the comfort arising out of these disclosures respecting the Hermæ, though genuine and inestimable at the moment, was soon again disturbed. There still remained the various alleged profanations of the Eleusinian mysteries, which had not yet been investigated or brought to atonement; and these were the more sure to be pressed home, and worked with a factitious exaggeration of pious zeal, since the enemies of Alkibiadês were bent upon turning them to his ruin. Among all the ceremonies of Attic religion, there was none more profoundly or universally reverenced than the mysteries of Eleusis, originally enjoined by the goddess Dêmêtêr herself, in her visit to that place, to Eumolpus and the other Eleusinian patriarch, and transmitted as a precious hereditary privilege in their families.[310] Celebrated annually in the month of August or September, under the special care of the basileus, or second archon, these mysteries were attended by vast crowds from Athens as well as from other parts of Greece, presenting to the eye a solemn and imposing spectacle, and striking the imagination still more powerfully by the special initiation which they conferred, under pledge of secrecy, upon pious and predisposed communicants. Even the divulgation in words to the uninitiated, of that which was exhibited to the eye and ear of the assembly in the interior of the Eleusinian temple, was accounted highly criminal: much more the actual mimicry of these ceremonies for the amusement of a convivial party. Moreover, the individuals who held the great sacred offices at Eleusis,—the hierophant, the daduch (torch-bearer), and the keryx, or herald,—which were transmitted by inheritance in the Eumolpidæ and other great families of antiquity and importance, were personally insulted by such proceedings, and vindi-

cated their own dignity at the same time that they invoked punishment on the offenders in the name of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê. The most appalling legends were current among the Athenian public, and repeated on proper occasions even by the hierophant himself, respecting the divine judgments which always overtook such impious men.[311]

When we recollect how highly the Eleusinian mysteries were venerated by Greeks not born in Athens and even by foreigners, we shall not wonder at the violent indignation excited in the Athenian mind by persons who profaned or divulged them; especially at a moment when their religious sensibilities had been so keenly wounded, and so tardily and recently healed, in reference to the Hermæ.[312] It was about this same time[313] that a prosecution was instituted against the Melian philosopher Diagoras for irreligious doctrines. Having left Athens before trial, he was found guilty in his absence, and a reward was offered for his life.

Probably the privileged sacred families, connected with the mysteries, were foremost in calling for expiation from the state to the majesty of the two offended goddesses, and for punishment on the delinquents.[314] And the enemies of Alkibiadês, personal as well as political, found the opportunity favorable for reviving that charge against him which they had artfully suffered to drop before his departure to Sicily. The matter of fact alleged against him—the mock-celebration of these holy ceremonies—was not only in itself probable, but proved by reasonably good testimony against him and some of his intimate companions. Moreover, the overbearing insolence of demeanor habitual with Alkibiadês, so glaringly at variance with the equal restraints of democracy, enabled his enemies to impute to him not only irreligious acts, but anti-constitutional purposes; an association of ideas which was at this moment the more easily accredited, since his divulgation and parody of the mysteries did not stand alone, but was interpreted in conjunction with the recent mutilation of the Hermæ—as a manifestation of the same anti-patriotic and irreligious feeling, if not part and parcel of the same treasonable scheme. And the alarm on this subject was now renewed by the appearance of a Lacedæmonian army at the isthmus, professing to contemplate some enterprise in conjunction with the Bœotians, a purpose not easy to understand, and presenting every appearance of being a cloak for hostile designs against Athens. So fully was this believed among the Athenians, that they took arms, and remained under arms one whole night in the sacred precinct of the Theseium. No enemy indeed appeared, either without or within; but the conspiracy had only been prevented from breaking out, so they imagined, by the recent inquiries and detection. Moreover, the party in Argos connected with Alkibiadês were just at this time suspected of a plot for the subversion of their own democracy, which still farther aggravated the presumptions against him, while it induced the Athenians to give up to the Argeian democratical government the oligarchical hostages which had been taken from that town a few months before,[315] in order that it might put these hostages to death, whenever it thought fit.

Such incidents materially aided the enemies of Alkibiadês in their unremitting efforts to procure his recall and condemnation. Among them were men very different in station and temper: Thessalus son of Kimon, a man of the highest lineage and of hereditary oligarchical politics, as well as Androklês, a leading demagogue or popular orator. It was the former who preferred against him in the senate the memorable impeachment, which, fortunately for our information, is recorded verbatim.

"Thessalus son of Kimon, of the deme Lakiadæ, hath impeached Alkibiadês son of Kleinias, of the deme Skambônidæ, as guilty of crime in regard to the two goddesses Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, in mimicking the mysteries, and exhibiting them to his companions in his own house, wearing the costume of the hierophant: applying to himself the name of hierophant; to Polytion, that of daduch; to Theodôrus that of herald, and addressing his remaining companions as mysts and epopts; all contrary to the sacred customs and canons, of old established by the Eumolpidæ, the Kerykes, and the Eleusinian priests."[316]

Similar impeachments being at the same time presented against other citizens now serving in Sicily along with Alkibiadês, the accusers moved that he and the rest might be sent for to come home and take their trial. We may observe that the indictment against him is quite distinct and special, making no allusion to any supposed treasonable or anti-constitutional projects: probably, however, these suspicions were pressed by his enemies in their preliminary speeches, for the purpose of inducing the Athenians to remove him from the command of the army forthwith, and send for him home. For such a step it was indispensable that a strong case should be made out: but the public was at length thoroughly brought round, and the Salaminian trireme was despatched to Sicily to fetch him. Great care however was taken, in sending this summons, to avoid all appearance of prejudgment, or harshness, or menace. The trierarch was forbidden to seize his person, and had instructions to invite him simply to accompany the Salaminian home in his own trireme: so as to avoid the hazard of offending the Argeian and Mantineian allies serving in Sicily, or the army itself.[317]

It was on the return of the Athenian army from their unsuccessful attempt at Kamarina, to their previous quarters at Katana, that they found the Salaminian trireme newly arrived from Athens with this grave requisition against the general. We may be sure that Alkibiadês received private intimation from his friends at Athens, by the same trireme, communicating to him the temper of the people, so that his resolution was speedily taken. Professing to obey, he departed in his own trireme on the voyage homeward, along with the other persons accused, the Salaminian trireme being in company; but as soon as they arrived at Thurii, in coasting along Italy, he and his companions quitted the vessel and disappeared. After a fruitless search on the part of the Salaminian trierarch, the two triremes were obliged to return to Athens without him. Both Alkibiadês and the rest of the accused—one of whom[318] was his own cousin and namesake—were tried, condemned to death on non-appearance, and their property confiscated; while the Eumolpidæ and the other Eleusinian sacred

families pronounced him to be accursed by the gods, for his desecration of the mysteries,[319] and recorded the condemnation on a plate of lead.

Probably his disappearance and exile were acceptable to his enemies at Athens: at any rate, they thus made sure of getting rid of him; while had he come back, his condemnation to death, though probable, could not be considered as certain. In considering the conduct of the Athenians towards Alkibiadês, we have to remark, that the people were guilty of no act of injustice. He had committed—at least there was fair reason for believing that he had committed—an act criminal in the estimation of every Greek; the divulgation and profanation of the mysteries. This act—alleged against him in the indictment very distinctly, divested of all supposed ulterior purpose, treasonable or otherwise—was legally punishable at Athens, and was universally accounted guilty in public estimation, as an offence at once against the religious sentiment of the people and against the public safety, by offending the two goddesses, Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, and driving them to withdraw their favor and protection. The same demand for legal punishment would have been supposed to exist in a Christian Catholic country, down to a very recent period of history, if instead of the Eleusinian mysteries we suppose the sacrament of the mass to have been the ceremony ridiculed; though such a proceeding would involve no breach of obligation to secrecy. Nor ought we to judge what would have been the measure of penalty formerly awarded to a person convicted of such an offence, by consulting the tendency of penal legislation during the last sixty years. Even down to the last century it would have been visited with something sharper than the draught of hemlock, which is the worst that could possibly have befallen Alkibiadês at Athens, as we may see by the condemnation and execution of the Chevalier de la Barre at Abbeville, in 1766. The uniform tendency of Christian legislation,[320] down to a recent period, leaves no room for reproaching the Athenians with excessive cruelty in their penal visitation of offences against the religious sentiment. On the contrary, the Athenians are distinguished for comparative mildness and tolerance, as we shall find various opportunities for remarking.

Now in reviewing the conduct of the Athenians towards Alkibiadês, we must consider, that this violation of the mysteries, of which he was indicted in good legal form, was an action for which he really deserved punishment, if any one deserved it. Even his enemies did not fabricate this charge, or impute it to him falsely; though they were guilty of insidious and unprincipled manœuvres to exasperate the public mind against him. Their machinations begin with the mutilation of the Hermæ; an act of new and unparalleled wickedness, to which historians of Greece seldom do justice. It was not, like the violations of the mysteries, a piece of indecent pastime committed within four walls, and never intended to become known. It was an outrage essentially public, planned and executed by conspirators for the deliberate purpose of lacerating the religious mind of Athens, and turning the prevalent terror and distraction to political profit. Thus much is certain; though we cannot be sure who

the conspirators were, nor what was their exact or special purpose. That the destruction of Alkibiadês was one of the direct purposes of the conspirators, is highly probable. But his enemies, even if they were not among the original authors, at least took upon themselves half the guilt of the proceeding, by making it the basis of treacherous machinations against his person. How their scheme, which was originally contrived to destroy him before the expedition departed, at first failed, was then artfully dropped, and at length effectually revived, after a long train of calumny against the absent general, has been already recounted. It is among the darkest chapters of Athenian political history, indicating, on the part of the people, strong religious excitability, without any injustice towards Alkibiadês; but indicating, on the part of his enemies, as well as of the Hermokopids generally, a depth of wicked contrivance rarely paralleled in political warfare. It is to these men, not to the people, that Alkibiadês owes his expulsion, aided indeed by the effect of his own previous character. In regard to the Hermæ, the Athenians condemned to death—after and by consequence of the deposition of Andokidês—a small number of men who may perhaps have been innocent victims, but whom they sincerely believed to be guilty; and whose death not only tranquillized comparatively the public mind, but served as the only means of rescue to a far larger number of prisoners confined on suspicion. In regard to Alkibiadês, they came to no collective resolution, except that of recalling him to take his trial, a resolution implying no wrong in those who voted for it, whatever may be the guilt of those who proposed and prepared it by perfidious means. [321]

In order to appreciate the desperate hatred with which the exile Alkibiadês afterwards revenged himself on his countrymen, it has been necessary to explain to what extent he had just ground of complaint against them. On being informed that they had condemned him to death in his absence, he is said to have exclaimed: "I shall show them that I am alive." He fully redeemed his word.[322]

The recall and consequent banishment of Alkibiadês was mischievous to Athens in several ways. It transferred to the enemy's camp an angry exile, to make known her weak points, and to rouse the sluggishness of Sparta. It offended a portion of the Sicilian armament, most of all probably the Argeians and Mantineians, and slackened their zeal in the cause.[323] And what was worst of all, it left the armament altogether under the paralyzing command of Nikias. For Lamachus, though still equal in nominal authority, and now invested with the command of one-half instead of one-third of the army, appears to have had no real influence except in the field.

Nikias now proceeded to execute that scheme which he had first suggested, to sail round from Katana to Selinus and Egesta, with the view of investigating the quarrel between the two as well as the financial means of the latter. Passing through the strait and along the north coast of the island, he first touched at Himera, where admittance was refused to him; he next captured a Sikanian maritime town named Hykkara, together with many prisoners; among them the celebrated courtezan Laïs,

then a very young girl.[324] Having handed over this place to the Egestæans, Nikias went in person to inspect their city and condition; but could obtain no more money than the thirty talents which had been before announced on the second visit of the commissioners. He then restored the prisoners from Hykkara to their Sikanian countrymen, receiving a ransom of one hundred and twenty talents,[325] and conducted the Athenian land-force across the centre of the island, through the territory of the friendly Sikels to Katana; making an attack in his way upon the hostile Sikel town of Hybla, in which he was repulsed. At Katana he was rejoined by his naval force.

It was now seemingly about the middle of October, and three months had elapsed since the arrival of the Athenian armament at Rhegium; during which period they had achieved nothing except the acquisition of Naxus and Katana as allies—unless we are to reckon the insignificant capture of Hykkara. But Naxus and Katana, as Chalkidic cities, had been counted upon beforehand even by Nikias; together with Rhegium, which had been found reluctant, to his great disappointment. What is still worse, in reference to the character of the general, not only nothing serious had been achieved, but nothing serious had been attempted. The precious moment pointed out by Lamachus for action, when the terrific menace of the recent untried armament was at its maximum, and preparation as well as confidence was wanting at Syracuse, had been irreparably wasted. Every day the preparations of the Syracusans improved and their fears diminished; the invader, whom they had looked upon as so formidable, turned out both hesitating and timorous,[326] and when he had disappeared out of their sight to Hykkara and Egesta, still more when he assailed in vain the insignificant Sikel post of Hybla, their minds underwent a reaction from dismay to extreme confidence. The mass of Syracusan citizens, now reinforced by allies from Selinus and other cities, called upon their generals to lead to the attack of the Athenian position at Katana, since the Athenians did not dare to approach Syracuse; while Syracusan horsemen even went so far as to insult the Athenians in their camp, riding up to ask if they were come to settle as peaceable citizens in the island, instead of restoring the Leontines. Such unexpected humiliation, acting probably on the feelings of the soldiers, at length shamed Nikias out of his inaction, and compelled him to strike a blow for the maintenance of his own reputation. He devised a stratagem for approaching Syracuse in such a manner as to elude the opposition of the Syracusan cavalry, informing himself as to the ground near the city, through some exiles serving along with him.[327]

He despatched to Syracuse a Katanæan citizen, in his heart attached to Athens, yet apparently neutral and on good terms with the other side, as bearer of a pretended message and proposition from the friends of Syracuse at Katana. Many of the Athenian soldiers, so the message ran, were in the habit of passing the night within the walls, apart from their camp and arms. It would be easy for the Syracusans by a vigorous attack at daybreak, to surprise them thus unprepared and dispersed; while the philo-Syracusan party at Katana promised to aid, by closing the gates, assailing

the Athenians within, and setting fire to the ships. A numerous body of Katanæans, they added, were eager to coöperate in the plan now proposed.

This communication, reaching the Syracusan generals at a moment when they were themselves elate and disposed to an aggressive movement, found such incautious credence, that they sent back the messenger to Katana with cordial assent and agreement for a precise day. Accordingly, a day or two before, the entire Syracusan force was marched out towards Katana, and encamped for the night on the river Symæthus, in the Leontine territory, within about eight miles of Katana. But Nikias, with whom the whole proceeding originated, choosing this same day to put on shipboard his army, together with his Sikel allies present, sailed by night southward along the coast, rounding the island of Ortygia, into the Great Harbor of Syracuse. Arrived thither by break of day, he disembarked his troops unopposed south of the mouth of the Anâpus, in the interior of the Great Harbor, near the hamlet which stretched towards the temple of Zeus Olympius. Having broken down the neighboring bridge, where the Helôrine road crossed the Anâpus, he took up a position protected by various embarrassing obstacles,—houses, walls, trees, and standing water, besides the steep ground of the Olympieion itself on his left wing; so that he could choose his own time for fighting, and was out of the attack of the Syracusan horse. For the protection of his ships on the shore, he provided a palisade work by cutting down the neighboring trees; and even took precautions for his rear by throwing up a hasty fence of wood and stones touching the shore at the inner bay called Daskon. He had full leisure for such defensive works, since the enemy within the walls made no attempt to disturb him, while the Syracusan horse only discovered his manœuvre on arriving before the lines at Katana; and though they lost no time in returning, the march back was a long one.[328] Such was the confidence of the Syracusans, however, that even after so long a march, they offered battle forthwith; but as Nikias did not quit his position, they retreated, to take up their night-station on the other side of the Helôrine road, probably a road bordered on each side by walls.

On the next morning, Nikias marched out of his position and formed his troops in order of battle, in two divisions, each eight deep. His front division was intended to attack; his rear division—in hollow square, with the baggage in the middle—was held in reserve near the camp, to lend aid where aid might be wanted; cavalry there was none. The Syracusan hoplites, seemingly far more numerous than his, presented the levy in mass of the city, without any selection; they were ranged in the deeper order of sixteen, alongside of their Selinuntine allies. On the right wing were posted their horsemen, the best part of their force, not less than twelve hundred in number; together with two hundred horsemen from Gela, twenty from Kamarina, about fifty bowmen, and a company of darters. The hoplites, though full of courage, had little training; and their array, never precisely kept, was on this occasion farther disturbed by the immediate vicinity of the city. Some had gone in to see their families; others,

hurrying out to join, found the battle already begun, and took rank wherever they could.[329]

Thucydidês, in describing this battle, gives us, according to his practice, a statement of the motives and feelings which animated the combatants on both sides, and which furnished a theme for the brief harangue of Nikias. This appears surprising to one accustomed to modern warfare, where the soldier is under the influence simply of professional honor and disgrace, without any thought of the cause for which he is fighting. In ancient times, such a motive was only one among many others, which, according to the circumstances of the case, contributed to elevate or depress the soldier's mind at the eve of action. Nikias adverted to the recognized military preëminence of chosen Argeians, Mantineians, and Athenians, as compared to the Syracusan levy in mass, who were full of belief in their own superiority,—this is a striking confession of the deplorable change which had been wrought by his own delay,—but who would come short in actual conflict, from want of discipline.[330] Moreover, he reminded them that they were far away from home, and that defeat would render them victims, one and all, of the Syracusan cavalry. He little thought, nor did his prophets forewarn him, that such a calamity, serious as it would have been, was even desirable for Athens, since it would have saved her from the far more overwhelming disasters which will be found to sadden the coming chapters of this history.

While the customary sacrifices were being performed, the slingers and bowmen on both sides became engaged in skirmishing. But presently the trumpets sounded, and Nikias ordered his first division of hoplites to charge at once rapidly, before the Syracusans expected it. Judging from his previous backwardness, they never imagined that he would be the first to give orders for charging; nor was it until they saw the Athenian line actually advancing towards them that they lifted their own arms from the ground and came forward to give the meeting. The shock was bravely encountered on both sides, and for some time the battle continued hand to hand with undecided result. There happened to supervene a violent storm of rain, with thunder and lightning, which alarmed the Syracusans, who construed it as an unfavorable augury, while to the more practised Athenian hoplites, it seemed a mere phenomenon of the season,[331] so that they still farther astonished the Syracusans by the unabated confidence with which they continued the fight. At length the Syracusan army was broken, dispersed, and fled; first, before the Argeians on the right, next, before the Athenians in the centre. The victors pursued as far as was safe and practicable, without disordering their ranks: for the Syracusan cavalry, which had not yet been engaged, checked all who pressed forward, and enabled their own infantry to retire in safety behind the Helôrine road.[332]

So little were the Syracusans dispirited with this defeat, that they did not retire within their city until they had sent an adequate detachment to guard the neighboring temple and sacred precinct of the Olympian Zeus, wherein there was much de-

posited wealth, which they feared that the Athenians might seize. Nikias, however, without approaching the sacred ground, contented himself with occupying the field of battle, burnt his own dead, and stripped the arms from the dead of the enemy. The Syracusans and their allies lost two hundred and fifty men, the Athenians fifty. [333]

On the morrow, having granted to the Syracusans their dead bodies for burial, and collected the ashes of his own dead, Nikias reëmbarked his troops, put to sea, and sailed back to his former station at Katana. He conceived it impossible, without cavalry and a farther stock of money, to maintain his position near Syracuse or to prosecute immediate operations of siege or blockade. And as the winter was now approaching, he determined to take up winter quarters at Katana; though considering the mild winter at Syracuse, and the danger of marsh fever near the Great Harbor in summer, the change of season might well be regarded as a questionable gain. But he proposed to employ the interval in sending to Athens for cavalry and money, as well as in procuring the like reinforcements from his Sicilian allies, whose numbers he calculated now on increasing by the accession of new cities after his recent victory, and to get together magazines of every kind for beginning the siege of Syracuse in the spring. Despatching a trireme to Athens with these requisitions, he sailed with his forces to Messênê, within which there was a favorable party who gave hopes of opening the gates to him. Such a correspondence had already been commenced before the departure of Alkibiadês: but it was the first act of revenge which the departing general took on his country, to betray the proceedings to the philo-Syracusan party in Messênê. Accordingly, these latter, watching their opportunity, rose in arms before the arrival of Nikias, put to death their chief antagonists, and held the town by force against the Athenians; who after a fruitless delay of thirteen days, with scanty supplies and under stormy weather, were forced to return to Naxos, where they established a palisaded camp and station, and went into winter quarters.[334]

The recent stratagem of Nikias, followed by the movement into the harbor of Syracuse, and the battle, had been ably planned and executed. It served to show the courage and discipline of the army, as well as to keep up the spirits of the soldiers themselves, and to obviate those feelings of disappointment which the previous inefficiency of the armament tended to arouse. But as to other results, the victory was barren; we may even say, positively mischievous, since it imparted a momentary stimulus which served as an excuse to Nikias for the three months of total inaction which followed, and since it neither weakened nor humiliated the Syracusans, but gave them a salutary lesson which they turned to account while Nikias was in his winter quarters. His apathy during these first eight months after the arrival of the expedition at Rhegium (from July 415 B.C. to March 414 B.C.), was the most deplorable of all calamities to his army, his country, and himself. Abundant proofs of this will be seen in the coming events: at present, we have only to turn back to his own predictions and recommendations. All the difficulties and dangers to be surmounted in

Sicily had been foreseen by himself and impressed upon the Athenians: in the first instance, as grounds against undertaking the expedition; but the Athenians, though unfortunately not allowing them to avail in that capacity, fully admitted their reality, and authorized him to demand whatever force was necessary to overcome them.[335] He had thus been allowed to bring with him a force calculated upon his own ideas, together with supplies and implements for besieging; yet when arrived, he seems only anxious to avoid exposing that force in any serious enterprise, and to find an excuse for conducting it back to Athens. That Syracuse was the grand enemy, and that the capital point of the enterprise was the siege of that city, was a truth familiar to himself as well as every man at Athens:[336] upon the formidable cavalry of the Syracusans, Nikias had himself insisted, in the preliminary debates. Yet, after four months of mere trifling, and pretence of action so as to evade dealing with the real difficulty, the existence of this cavalry is made an excuse for a farther postponement of four months until reinforcements can be obtained from Athens. To all the intrinsic dangers of the case, predicted by Nikias himself with proper discernment, was thus superadded the aggravated danger of his own factitious delay; frittering away the first impression of his armament, giving the Syracusans leisure to enlarge their fortifications, and allowing the Peloponnesians time to interfere against Attica as well as to succor Sicily. It was the unhappy weakness of this commander to shrink from decisive resolutions of every kind, and at any rate to postpone them until the necessity became imminent: the consequence of which was,—to use an expression of the Corinthian envoy before the Peloponnesian war in censuring the dilatory policy of Sparta,—that never acting, yet always seeming about to act, he found his enemy in double force instead of single, at the moment of actual conflict.[337]

Great, indeed, must have been the disappointment of the Athenians, when, after having sent forth in the month of June, an expedition of unparalleled efficiency, they receive in the month of November a despatch to acquaint them that the general has accomplished little except one indecisive victory; and that he has not even attempted anything serious, nor can do so unless they send him farther cavalry and money. Yet the only answer which they made was, to grant and provide for this demand without any public expression of discontent or disappointment against him.[338] And this is the more to be noted, since the removal of Alkibiadês afforded an inviting and even valuable opportunity for proposing to send out a fresh colleague in his room. If there were no complaints raised against Nikias at Athens, so neither are we informed of any such, even among his own soldiers in Sicily, though *their* disappointment must have been yet greater than that of their countrymen at home, considering the expectations with which they had come out. We may remember that the delay of a few days at Eion, under perfectly justifiable circumstances, and while awaiting the arrival of reinforcements actually sent for, raised the loudest murmurs against Kleon in his expedition against Amphipolis, from the hoplites in his own army.[339] The contrast is instructive, and will appear yet more instructive as we advance forward.

Meanwhile the Syracusans were profiting by the lesson of their recent defeat. In the next public assembly which ensued, Hermokratês addressed them in the mingled tone of encouragement and admonition. He praised their bravery, while he deprecated their want of tactics and discipline. Considering the great superiority of the enemy in this last respect, he regarded the recent battle as giving good promise for the future; and he appealed with satisfaction to the precautions taken by Nikias in fortifying his camp, as well as to his speedy retreat after the battle. He pressed them to diminish the excessive number of fifteen generals, whom they had hitherto been accustomed to nominate to the command; to reduce the number to three, conferring upon them at the same time fuller powers than had been before enjoyed, and swearing a solemn oath to leave them unfettered in the exercise of such powers; lastly, to enjoin upon these generals the most strenuous efforts, during the coming winter, for training and arming the whole population. Accordingly Hermokratês himself, with Herakleidês and Sikanus, were named to the command. Ambassadors were sent both to Sparta and to Corinth, for the purpose of entreating assistance in Sicily, as well as of prevailing on the Peloponnesians to recommence a direct attack against Attica; [340] so as at least to prevent the Athenians from sending farther reinforcements to Nikias, and perhaps even to bring about the recall of his army.

But by far the most important measure which marked the nomination of the new generals, was, the enlargement of the line of fortifications at Syracuse. They constructed a new wall, inclosing an additional space and covering both their inner and their outer city to the westward, reaching from the outer sea to the Great Harbor, across the whole space fronting the rising slope of the hill of Epipolæ, and stretching far enough westward to inclose the sacred precinct of Apollo Temenites. This was intended as a precaution, in order that if Nikias, resuming operations in the spring, should beat them in the field and confine them to their walls, he might, nevertheless, be prevented from carrying a wall of circumvallation from sea to sea without covering a great additional extent of ground.[341] Besides this, the Syracusans fitted up and garrisoned the deserted town of Megara, on the coast to the north of Syracuse; they established a regular fortification and garrison in the Olympieion or temple of Zeus Olympius, which they had already garrisoned after the recent battle with Nikias; and they planted stakes in the sea to obstruct the convenient landing-places. All these precautions were useful to them; and we may even say that the new outlying fortification, inclosing the Temenites, proved their salvation in the coming siege, by so lengthening the circumvallation necessary for the Athenians to construct, that Gylippus had time to arrive before it was finished. But there was one farther precaution which the Syracusans omitted at this moment, when it was open to them without any hindrance, to occupy and fortify the Euryâlus, or the summit of the hill of Epipolæ. Had they done this now, probably the Athenians could never have made progress with their lines of circumvallation: but they did not think of it until too late, as we shall presently see.

Nevertheless it is important to remark, in reference to the general scheme of Athenian operations in Sicily, that if Nikias had adopted the plan originally recommended by Lamachus, or if he had begun his permanent besieging operations against Syracuse in the summer or autumn of 415 B.C., instead of postponing them, as he actually did, to the spring of 414 B.C., he would have found none of these additional defences to contend against, and the line of circumvallation necessary for his purpose would have been shorter and easier. Besides these permanent and irreparable disadvantages, his winter's inaction at Naxos drew upon him the farther insult, that the Syracusans marched to his former quarters at Katana and burned the tents which they found standing, ravaging at the same time the neighboring fields.[342]

Kamarina maintained an equivocal policy which made both parties hope to gain it; and in the course of this winter the Athenian envoy Euphêmus with others was sent thither to propose a renewal of that alliance, between the city and Athens, which had been concluded ten years before. Hermokratês the Syracusan went to counteract his object; and both of them, according to Grecian custom, were admitted to address the public assembly.

Hermokratês began by denouncing the views, designs, and past history of Athens. He did not, he said, fear her power, provided the Sicilian cities were united and true to each other: even against Syracuse alone, the hasty retreat of the Athenians after the recent battle had shown how little they confided in their own strength. What he did fear, was, the delusive promises and insinuations of Athens, tending to disunite the island, and to paralyze all joint resistance. Every one knew that her purpose in this expedition was to subjugate all Sicily,—that Leontini and Egesta served merely as convenient pretences to put forward,—and that she could have no sincere sympathy for Chalkidians in Sicily, when she herself held in slavery the Chalkidians in Eubœa. It was, in truth, nothing else but an extension of the same scheme of rapacious ambition, whereby she had reduced her Ionian allies and kinsmen to their present wretched slavery, now threatened against Sicily. The Sicilians could not too speedily show her that they were no Ionians, made to be transferred from one master to another, but autonomous Dorians from the centre of autonomy, Peloponnesus. It would be madness to forfeit this honorable position through jealousy or lukewarmness among themselves. Let not the Kamarinæans imagine that Athens was striking her blow at Syracuse alone: they were themselves next neighbors of Syracuse, and would be the first victims if she were conquered. They might wish, from apprehension or envy, to see the superior power of Syracuse humbled, but this could not happen without endangering their own existence. They ought to do for her what they would have asked her to do if the Athenians had invaded Kamarina, instead of lending merely nominal aid, as they had hitherto done. Their former alliance with Athens was for purposes of mutual defence, not binding them to aid her in schemes of pure aggression. To hold aloof, give fair words to both parties, and leave Syracuse to fight the battle of Sicily single-handed, was as unjust as it was dishonorable. If she came

off victor in the struggle, she would take care that the Kamarinæans should be no gainers by such a policy. The state of affairs was so plain, that he (Hermokratês) could not pretend to enlighten them: but he solemnly appealed to their sentiments of common blood and lineage. The Dorians of Syracuse were assailed by their eternal enemies the Ionians, and ought not to be now betrayed by their own brother Dorians of Kamarina.[343]

Euphêmus, in reply, explained the proceedings of Athens in reference to her empire, and vindicated her against the charges of Hermokratês. Though addressing a Dorian assembly, he did not fear to take his start from the position laid down by Hermokratês, that Ionians were the natural enemies of Dorians. Under this feeling Athens, as an Ionian city, had looked about to strengthen herself against the supremacy of her powerful Dorian neighbors in Peloponnesus. Finding herself after the repulse of the Persian king at the head of those Ionians and other Greeks who had just revolted from him, she had made use of her position as well as of her superior navy to shake off the illegitimate ascendency of Sparta. Her empire was justified by regard for her own safety against Sparta, as well as by the immense superiority of her maritime efforts in the rescue of Greece from the Persians. Even in reference to her allies, she had good ground for reducing them to subjection, because they had made themselves the instruments and auxiliaries of the Persian king in his attempt to conquer her. Prudential views for assured safety to herself had thus led her to the acquisition of her present empire, and the same views now brought her to Sicily. He was prepared to show that the interests of Kamarina were in full accordance with those of Athens. The main purpose of Athens in Sicily was to prevent her Sicilian enemies from sending aid to her Peloponnesian enemies, to accomplish which, powerful Sicilian allies were indispensable to her. To enfeeble or subjugate her Sicilian allies would be folly: if she did this, they would not serve her purpose of keeping the Syracusans employed in their own island. Hence her desire to reëstablish the expatriated Leontines, powerful and free, though she retained the Chalkidians in Eubœa as subjects. Near home, she wanted nothing but subjects, disarmed and tribute-paying, while in Sicily, she required independent and efficient allies; so that the double conduct, which Hermokratês reproached as inconsistent, proceeded from one and the same root of public prudence. Pursuant to that motive, Athens dealt differently with her different allies, according to the circumstances of each. Thus, she respected the autonomy of Chios and Methymna, and maintained equal relations with other islanders near Peloponnesus; and such were the relations which she now wished to establish in Sicily.

No: it was Syracuse, not Athens, whom the Kamarinæans and other Sicilians had really ground to fear. Syracuse was aiming at the acquisition of imperial sway over the island; and that which she had already done towards the Leontines showed what she was prepared to do when the time came, against Kamarina and others. It was under this apprehension that the Kamarinæans had formerly invited Athens into

Sicily: it would be alike unjust and impolitic were they now to repudiate her aid, for she could accomplish nothing without them; if they did so on the present occasion, they would repent it hereafter when exposed to the hostility of a constant encroaching neighbor, and when Athenian auxiliaries could not again be had. He repelled the imputations which Hermokratês had cast upon Athens, but the Kamarinæans were not sitting as judges or censors upon her merits. It was for them to consider whether that meddlesome disposition, with which Athens was reproached, was not highly beneficial as the terror of oppressors, and the shield of weaker states, throughout Greece. He now tendered it to the Kamarinæans as their only security against Syracuse; calling upon them, instead of living in perpetual fear of her aggression, to seize the present opportunity of attacking her on an equal footing, jointly with Athens.[344]

In these two remarkable speeches, we find Hermokratês renewing substantially the same line of counsel as he had taken up ten years before at the congress of Gela, to settle all Sicilian differences at home, and above all things to keep out the intervention of Athens; who if she once got footing in Sicily, would never rest until she reduced all the cities successively. This was the natural point of view for a Syracusan politician; but by no means equally natural, nor equally conclusive, for an inhabitant of one of the secondary Sicilian cities, especially of the conterminous Kamarina. And the oration of Euphêmus is an able pleading to demonstrate that the Kamarinæans had far more to fear from Syracuse than from Athens. His arguments to this point are at least highly plausible, if not convincing: but he seems to lay himself open to attack from the opposite quarter. If Athens cannot hope to gain any subjects in Sicily, what motive has she for interfering? This Euphêmus meets by contending that if she does not interfere, the Syracusans and their allies will come across and render assistance to the enemies of Athens in Peloponnesus. It is manifest, however, that under the actual circumstances of the time, Athens could have no real fears of this nature, and that her real motives for meddling in Sicily were those of hope and encroachment, not of self-defence. But it shows how little likely such hopes were to be realized, and therefore how ill-advised the whole plan of interference in Sicily was, —that the Athenian envoy could say to the Kamarinæans, in the same strain as Nikias had spoken at Athens when combating the wisdom of the expedition: "Such is the distance of Sicily from Athens, and such the difficulty of guarding cities of great force and ample territory combined, that if we wished to hold you Sicilians as subjects, we should be unable to do it: we can only retain you as free and powerful allies."[345] What Nikias said at Athens to dissuade his countrymen from the enterprise, under sincere conviction, Euphêmus repeated at Kamarina for the purpose of conciliating that city; probably, without believing it himself, yet the anticipation was not on that account the less true and reasonable.

The Kamarinæans felt the force of both speeches, from Hermokratês and Euphêmus. Their inclinations carried them towards the Athenians, yet not without a certain misgiving in case Athens should prove completely successful. Towards the Syracu-

sans, on the contrary, they entertained nothing but unqualified apprehension, and jealousy of very ancient date; and even now their great fear was, of probable suffering, if the Syracusans succeeded against Athens without their coöperation. In this dilemma, they thought it safest to give an evasive answer, of friendly sentiment towards both parties, but refusal of aid to either; hoping thus to avoid an inexpiable breach, whichever way the ultimate success might turn.[346]

For a city comparatively weak and situated like Kamarina, such was perhaps the least hazardous policy. In December, 415 B.C., no human being could venture to predict how the struggle between Nikias and the Syracusans in the coming year would turn out; nor were the Kamarinæans prompted by any hearty feeling to take the extreme chances with either party. Matters had borne a different aspect, indeed, in the preceding month of July 415 B.C., when the Athenians first arrived. Had the vigorous policy urged by Lamachus been then followed up, the Athenians would always have appeared likely to succeed, if, indeed, they had not already become conquerors of Syracuse; so that waverers like the Kamarinæans would have remained attached to them from policy. The best way to obtain allies, Lamachus had contended, was, to be prompt and decisive in action, and to strike at the capital point at once, while the intimidating effect of their arrival was fresh. Of the value of his advice, an emphatic illustration is afforded by the conduct of Kamarina.[347]

Throughout the rest of the winter, Nikias did little or nothing. He merely despatched envoys for the purpose of conciliating the Sikels in the interior, where the autonomous Sikels, who dwelt in the central regions of the island, for the most part declared in his favor,—especially the powerful Sikel prince Archônidês,—sending provisions and even money to the camp at Naxos. Against some refractory tribes, Nikias sent detachments for purposes of compulsion; while the Syracusans on their part did the like to counteract him. Such Sikel tribes as had become dependents of Syracuse, stood aloof from the struggle. As the spring approached, Nikias transferred his position from Naxos to Katana, reëstablishing that camp which the Syracusans had destroyed.[348]

He farther sent a trireme to Carthage, to invite coöperation from that city; and a second to the Tyrrhenian maritime cities on the southern coast of Italy, some of whom had proffered to him their services, as ancient enemies of Syracuse, and now realized their promises. From Carthage nothing was obtained; why, we do not know; for we shall find the Carthaginians, six years hence, invading Sicily with prodigious forces; and if they entertained any such intentions, it would seem that the presence of Nikias in Sicily must have presented the most convenient moment for executing them. To the Sikels, Egestæans, and all the other allies of Athens, Nikias sent orders for bricks, iron bars, clamps, and everything suitable for the wall of circumvallation, which was to be commenced with the first burst of spring.

While such preparations were going on in Sicily, debates of portentous promise took place at Sparta. Immediately after the battle near the Olympieion, and the retreat of Nikias into winter quarters, the Syracusans had despatched envoys to Peloponnesus to solicit reinforcements. Here, again, we are compelled to notice the lamentable consequences arising out of the inaction of Nikias. Had he commenced the siege of Syracuse on his first arrival, it may be doubted whether any such envoys would have been sent to Peloponnesus at all; at any rate, they would not have arrived in time to produce decisive effects.[349] After exerting what influence they could upon the Italian Greeks in their voyage, the Syracusan envoys reached Corinth, where they found the warmest reception and obtained promises of speedy succor. The Corinthians furnished envoys of their own to accompany them to Sparta, and to back their request for Lacedæmonian aid.

They found at the congress at Sparta another advocate upon whom they could not reasonably have counted, Alkibiadês. That exile had crossed over from Thurii to the Eleian port of Kyllênê in Peloponnesus in a merchant-vessel,[350] and now appeared at Sparta on special invitation and safe-conduct from the Lacedæmonians; of whom he was at first vehemently afraid, in consequence of having raised against them that Peloponnesian combination which had given them so much trouble before the battle of Mantineia. He now appeared, too, burning with hostility against his country, and eager to inflict upon her all the mischief in his power. Having been the chief evil genius to plunge her, mainly for selfish ends of his own, into this ill-starred venture, he was now about to do his best to turn it into her irreparable ruin. His fiery stimulus, and unmeasured exaggerations, supplied what was wanting in Corinthian and Syracusan eloquence, and inflamed the tardy good-will of the Spartan ephors into comparative decision and activity.[351] His harangue in the Spartan congress is given to us by Thucydidês, who may possibly have heard it, as he was then himself in exile. Like the earlier speech which he puts into the mouth of Alkibiadês at Athens, it is characteristic in a high degree; and interesting in another point of view as the latest composed speech of any length which we find in his history. I give here the substance, without professing to translate the words.

"First, I must address you, Lacedæmonians, respecting the prejudices current against me personally, before I can hope to find a fair hearing on public matters. You know it was I, who renewed my public connection with Sparta, after my ancestors before me had quarrelled with you and renounced it. Moreover, I assiduously cultivated your favor on all points, especially by attentions to your prisoners at Athens: but while I was showing all this zeal towards you, you took the opportunity of the peace which you made with Athens to employ my enemies as your agents, thus strengthening their hands, and dishonoring me. It was this conduct of yours which drove me to unite with the Argeians and Mantineians; nor ought you to be angry with me for mischief which you thus drew upon yourselves. Probably some of you hate me too, without any good reason, as a forward partisan of democracy. My fam-

ily were always opposed to the Peisistratid despots; and as all opposition to a reigning dynasty takes the name of The People, so from that time forward we continued to act as leaders of the people.[352] Moreover, our established constitution was a democracy, so that I had no choice but to obey, though I did my best to maintain a moderate line of political conduct in the midst of the reigning license. It was not my family, but others, who in former times as well as now, led the people into the worst courses, those same men who sent me into exile. I always acted as leader, not of a party, but of the entire city; thinking it right to uphold that constitution in which Athens had enjoyed her grandeur and freedom, and which I found already existing. [353] For as to democracy, all we Athenians of common sense well knew its real character. Personally, I have better reason than any one else to rail against it, if one *could* say anything new about such confessed folly; but I did not think it safe to change the government, while you were standing by as enemies.

"So much as to myself personally: I shall now talk to you about the business of the meeting, and tell you something more than you yet know. Our purpose in sailing from Athens, was, first to conquer the Sicilian Greeks; next, the Italian Greeks; afterwards, to make an attempt on the Carthaginian empire and on Carthage herself. If all or most of this succeeded, we were then to attack Peloponnesus. We intended to bring to this enterprise the entire power of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, besides large numbers of Iberian and other warlike barbaric mercenaries, together with many new triremes built from the abundant forests of Italy, and large supplies both of treasure and provision. We could thus blockade Peloponnesus all round with our fleet, and at the same time assail it with our land-force; and we calculated, by taking some towns by storm and occupying others as permanent fortified positions, that we should easily conquer the whole peninsula, and then become undisputed masters of Greece. You thus hear the whole scheme of our expedition from the man who knows it best; and you may depend on it that the remaining generals will execute all this, if they can. Nothing but your intervention can hinder them. If, indeed, the Sicilian Greeks were all united, they might hold out; but the Syracusans standing alone cannot, beaten as they already have been in a general action, and blocked up as they are by sea. If Syracuse falls into the hands of the Athenians, all Sicily and all Italy will share the same fate; and the danger which I have described will be soon upon you.

"It is not therefore simply for the safety of Sicily,—it is for the safety of Peloponnesus,—that I now urge you to send across, forthwith, a fleet with an army of hoplites as rowers; and what I consider still more important than an army, a Spartan general to take the supreme command. Moreover, you must also carry on declared and vigorous war against Athens here, that the Syracusans may be encouraged to hold out, and that Athens may be in no condition to send additional reinforcements thither. You must farther fortify and permanently garrison Dekeleia in Attica:[354] that is the contingency which the Athenians have always been most afraid of, and which therefore you may know to be your best policy. You will thus get into your own

hands the live and dead stock of Attica, interrupt the working of the silver mines at Laureion, deprive the Athenians of their profits from judicial fines as well as of their landed revenue, and dispose the subject-allies to withhold their tribute.

"None of you ought to think the worse of me because I make this vigorous onset upon my country in conjunction with her enemies, I who once passed for a patriot. [355] Nor ought you to mistrust my assurances, as coming from the reckless passion of an exile. The worst enemies of Athens are not those who make open war like you, but those who drive her best friends into hostility. I loved my country,[356] while I was secure as a citizen; I love her no more, now that I am wronged. In fact, I do not conceive myself to be assailing a country still mine; I am rather trying to win back a country now lost to me. The real patriot is not he, who, having unjustly lost his country, acquiesces in patience, but he whose ardor makes him try every means to regain her.

"Employ me without fear, Lacedæmonians, in any service of danger or suffering; the more harm I did you formerly as an enemy, the more good I can now do you as a friend. But above all, do not shrink back from instant operations both in Sicily and in Attica, upon which so much depends. You will thus put down the power of Athens, present as well as future; you will dwell yourselves in safety; and you will become the leaders of undivided Hellas, by free consent and without force."[357]

Enormous consequences turned upon this speech, no less masterly in reference to the purpose and the audience, than infamous as an indication of the character of the speaker. If its contents became known at Athens, as they probably did, the enemies of Alkibiadês would be supplied with a justification of their most violent political attacks. That imputation which they had taken so much pains to fasten upon him, citing in proof of it alike his profligate expenditure, overbearing insolence, and derision of the religious ceremonies of the state,[358]—that he detested the democracy in his heart, submitted to it only from necessity, and was watching for the first safe opportunity of subverting it,—appears here in his own language as matter of avowal and boast. The sentence of condemnation against him would now be unanimously approved, even by those who at the time had deprecated it; and the people would be more firmly persuaded than before of the reality of the association between irreligious manifestations and treasonable designs. Doubtless the inferences so drawn from the speech would be unsound, because it represented, not the actual past sentiments of Alkibiadês, but those to which he now found it convenient to lay claim. As far as so very selfish a politician could be said to have any preference, democracy was, in some respects, more convenient to him than oligarchy. Though offensive to his taste, it held out larger prospects to his love of show, his adventurous ambition, and his rapacity for foreign plunder; while under an oligarchy, the jealous restraints and repulses imposed on him by a few equals, would be perhaps more galling to his temper than those arising from the whole people.[359] He takes credit in his speech for moderation, as opposed to the standing license of democracy. But this is a pre-

tence absurd even to extravagance, and which Athenians of all parties would have listened to with astonishment. Such license as that of Alkibiadês had never been seen at Athens; and it was the adventurous instincts of the democracy towards foreign conquest, combined with their imperfect apprehension of the limits and conditions under which alone their empire could be permanently maintained, which he stimulated up to the highest point, and then made use of for his own power and profit. As against himself, he had reason for accusing his political enemies of unworthy manœuvres, and even of gross political wickedness, if they were authors or accomplices—as seems probable of some—in the mutilation of the Hermæ. But most certainly, their public advice to the commonwealth was far less mischievous than his. And if we are to strike the balance of personal political merit between Alkibiadês and his enemies, we must take into the comparison his fraud upon the simplicity of the Lacedæmonian envoys, recounted in the last chapter but one of this History.

If, then, that portion of the speech of Alkibiadês, wherein he touches upon Athenian politics and his own past conduct, is not to be taken as historical evidence, just as little can we trust the following portion in which he professes to describe the real purposes of Athens in her Sicilian expedition. That any such vast designs as those which he announces were ever really contemplated even by himself and his immediate friends, is very improbable; that they were contemplated by the Athenian public, by the armament, or by Nikias, is utterly incredible. The tardiness and timid movements of the armament—during the first eight months after arriving at Rhegium—recommended by Nikias, partially admitted even by Alkibiadês, opposed only by the unavailing wisdom of Lamachus, and not strongly censured when known at Athens, conspire to prove that their minds were not at first fully made up even to the siege of Syracuse; that they counted on alliances and money in Sicily which they did not find; and that those who sailed from Athens with large hopes of brilliant and easy conquest were soon taught to see the reality with different eyes. If Alkibiadês had himself conceived at Athens the designs which he professed to reveal in his speech at Sparta, there can be no doubt that he would have espoused the scheme of Lamachus, or rather would have originated it himself. We find him, indeed, in his speech delivered at Athens before the determination to sail, holding out hopes that by means of conquests in Sicily, Athens might become mistress of all Greece. But this is there put as an alternative and as a favorable possibility, is noticed only in one place, without expansion or amplification, and shows that the speaker did not reckon upon finding any such expectations prevalent among his hearers. Alkibiadês could not have ventured to promise, in his discourse at Athens, the results which he afterwards talked of at Sparta as having been actually contemplated,—Sicily, Italy, Carthage, Iberian mercenaries, etc., all ending in a blockading fleet large enough to gird round Peloponnesus.[360] Had he put forth such promises, the charge of juvenile folly which Nikias urged against him would probably have been believed by every one. His speech at Sparta, though it has passed with some as a fragment of true

Grecian history, is in truth little better than a gigantic romance dressed up to alarm his audience.[361]

Intended for this purpose, it was eminently suitable and effective. The Lacedæmonians had already been partly moved by the representations from Corinth and Syracuse, and were even prepared to send envoys to the latter place with encouragement to hold out against Athens. But the Peace of Nikias and the alliance succeeding it, still subsisted between Athens and Sparta. It had indeed been partially and indirectly violated in many ways, but both the contracting parties still considered it as subsisting, nor would either of them yet consent to break their oaths openly and avowedly. For this reason—as well as from the distance of Sicily, great even in the estimation of the more nautical Athenians—the ephors could not yet make up their minds to despatch thither any positive aid. It was exactly in this point of hesitation between the will and the deed that the energetic and vindictive exile from Athens found them. His flaming picture of the danger impending,—brought home to their own doors, and appearing to proceed from the best informed of all witnesses,—overcame their reluctance at once; while he at the same time pointed out the precise steps whereby their interference would be rendered of most avail. The transfer of Alkibiadês to Sparta thus reverses the superiority of force between the two contending chiefs of Greece: "Momentumque fuit mutatus Curio rerum."[362] He had not yet shown his power of doing his country good, as we shall find him hereafter engaged, during the later years of the war: his first achievements were but too successful in doing her harm.

The Lacedæmonians forthwith resolved to send an auxiliary force to Syracuse. But as this could not be done before the spring, they nominated Gylippus commander, directing him to proceed thither without delay, and to take counsel with the Corinthians for operations as speedily as the case admitted.[363] We do not know that Gylippus had as yet given any positive evidence of that consummate skill and activity which we shall presently be called upon to describe. He was probably chosen on account of his superior acquaintance with the circumstances of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks; since his father Kleandridas, after having been banished from Sparta fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war for taking Athenian bribes, had been domiciliated as a citizen at Thurii.[364] Gylippus desired the Corinthians to send immediately two triremes for him to Asinê, in the Messenian gulf, and to prepare as many others as their docks could furnish.

CHAPTER LIX.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE OF SYRACUSE BY NIKIAS, DOWN TO THE SECOND ATHENIAN EXPEDITION UNDER DEMOSTHENES, AND THE RESUMPTION OF THE GENERAL WAR.

THE Athenian troops at Katana, probably tired of inaction, were put in motion in the early spring, even before the arrival of the reinforcements from Athens, and sailed to the deserted walls of Megara, not far from Syracuse, which the Syracusans had recently garrisoned. Having in vain attacked the Syracusan garrison, and laid waste the neighboring fields, they reëmbarked, landed again for similar purposes at the mouth of the river Terias, and then, after an insignificant skirmish, returned to Katana. An expedition into the interior of the island procured for them the alliance of the Sikel town of Kentoripa; and the cavalry being now arrived from Athens, they prepared for operations against Syracuse. Nikias had received from Athens two hundred and fifty horsemen fully equipped, for whom horses were to be procured in Sicily,[365] thirty horse-bowmen, and three hundred talents in money. He was not long in furnishing them with horses from Egesta and Katana, from which cities he also received some farther cavalry, so that he was presently able to muster six hundred and fifty cavalry in all.[366]

Even before this cavalry could be mounted, Nikias made his first approach to Syracuse. For the Syracusan generals on their side, apprized of the arrival of the reinforcement from Athens, and aware that besieging operations were on the point of being commenced, now thought it necessary to take the precaution of occupying and guarding the roads of access to the high ground of Epipolæ which overhung their outer city.

Syracuse consisted at this time of two parts, an inner and outer city. The former was comprised in the island of Ortygia, the original settlement founded by Archias, and within which the modern city is at this moment included: the latter or outer city, afterwards known by the name of Achradina, occupied the high ground of the peninsula north of Ortygia, but does not seem to have joined the inner city, or to have been comprised in the same fortification. This outer city was defended, on the north and east, by the sea, with rocks presenting great difficulties of landing, and by a sea-wall; so that on these sides it was out of the reach of attack. Its wall on the land-side, beginning from the sea somewhat eastward of the entrance of the cleft now called Santa Bonagia, or Panagia, ran in a direction westward of south as far as the termination of the high ground of Achradina, and then turned eastward along the stone quarries now known as those of the Capucins and Novanteris, where the ground is in part so steep, that probably little fortification was needed. This fortified high land of Achradina thus constituted the outer city; while the lower ground, situ-

ated between it and the inner city, or Ortygia, seems at this time not to have been included in the fortifications of either, but was employed (and probably had been employed even from the first settlement in the island), partly for religious processions, games, and other multitudinous ceremonies; partly for the burial of the dead, which, according to invariable Grecian custom, was performed without the walls of the city. Extensive catacombs yet remain to mark the length of time during which this ancient Nekropolis served its purpose.

To the northwest of the outer city wall, in the direction of the port called Trogilus, stood an unfortified suburb which afterwards became enlarged into the distinct walled town of Tychê. West of the southern part of the same outer city wall, nearly southwest of the outer city itself, stood another suburb, afterwards known and fortified as Neapolis, but deriving its name, in the year 415 B.C., from having within it the statue and consecrated ground of Apollo Temenitês,[367] which stood a little way up on the ascent of the hill of Epipolæ, and stretching from thence down southward in the direction of the Great Harbor. Between these two suburbs lay a broad open space, the ground rising in gradual acclivity from Achradina to the westward, and diminishing in breadth as it rose higher, until at length it ended in a small conical mound, called in modern times the Belvedere. This acclivity formed the eastern ascent of the long ridge of high ground called Epipolæ. It was a triangle upon an inclined plane, of which Achradina was the base: to the north as well as to the south, it was suddenly broken off by lines of limestone cliff (forming the sides of the triangle), about fifteen or twenty feet high, and quite precipitous, except in some few openings made for convenient ascent. From the western point or apex of the triangle, the descent was easy and gradual—excepting two or three special mounds, or cliffs—towards the city, the interior of which was visible from this outer slope.

According to the warfare of that time, Nikias could only take Syracuse by building a wall of circumvallation so as to cut off its supplies by land, and at the same time blockading it by sea. Now looking at the inner and outer city as above described, at the moment when he first reached Sicily, we see that—after defeating the Syracusans and driving them within their walls, which would be of course the first part of the process—he might have carried his blockading wall in a direction nearly southerly from the innermost point of the cleft of Santa Bonagia, between the city wall and the Temenitês so as to reach the Great Harbor at a spot not far westward of the junction of Ortygia with the main land. Or he might have landed in the Great Harbor, and executed the same wall, beginning from the opposite end. Or he might have preferred to construct two blockading walls, one for each city separately: a short wall would have sufficed in front of the isthmus joining Ortygia, while a separate wall might have been carried to shut up the outer city, across the unfortified space constituting the Nekropolis, so as to end not in the Great Harbor, but in the coast of the Nekropolis opposite to Ortygia. Such were the possibilities of the case at the time when Nikias first reached Rhegium. But during the many months of inaction which he had al-

lowed, the Syracusans had barred out both these possibilities, and had greatly augmented the difficulties of his intended enterprise. They had constructed a new wall, covering both their inner and their outer city,—stretching across the whole front which faced the slope of Epipolæ, from the Great Harbor to the opposite sea near Santa Bonagia,—and expanding westward so as to include within it the statue and consecrated ground of Apollo Temenitês, with the cliff near adjoining to it known by the name of the Temenite Cliff. This was done for the express purpose of lengthening the line indispensable for the besiegers to make their wall a good blockade.[368] After it was finished, Nikias could not begin his blockade from the side of the Great Harbor, since he would have been obstructed by the precipitous southern cliff of Epipolæ. He was under the necessity of beginning his wall from a portion of the higher ground of Epipolæ, and of carrying it both along a greater space and higher up on the slope, until he touched the Great Harbor at a point farther removed from Ortygia.

Syracuse having thus become assailable only from the side of Epipolæ, the necessity so created for carrying on operations much higher up on the slope, gave to the summit of that eminence a greater importance than it had before possessed. Nikias, doubtless furnished with good local information by the exiles, seems to have made this discovery earlier than the Syracusan generals, who—having been occupied in augmenting their defences on another point, where they were yet more vulnerable—did not make it until immediately before the opening of the spring campaign. It was at that critical moment that they proclaimed a full muster, for break of day, in the low mead on the left bank of the Anapus. After an inspection of arms, and probably final distribution of forces for the approaching struggle, a chosen regiment of six hundred hoplites was placed under the orders of an Andrian exile named Diomilus, in order to act as garrison of Epipolæ, as well as to be in constant readiness wherever they might be wanted.[369] These men were intended to occupy the strong ground on the summit of the hill, and thus obstruct all the various approaches to it, seemingly not many in number, and all narrow.

But before they had yet left their muster, to march to the summit, intelligence reached them that the Athenians were already in possession of it. Nikias and Lamachus, putting their troops on board at Katana, had sailed during the preceding night to a landing-place not far from a place called Leon, or the Lion, which was only six or seven furlongs from Epipolæ, and seems to have lain between Megara and the peninsula of Thapsus. They here landed their hoplites, and placed their fleet in safety under cover of a palisade across the narrow isthmus of Thapsus, before day and before the Syracusans had any intimation of their arrival. Their hoplites immediately moved forward with rapid step to ascend Epipolæ, mounting seemingly from the northeast, by the side towards Megara and farthest removed from Syracuse; so that they first reached the summit called Euryalus, near the apex of the triangle above described. From hence they commanded the slope of Epipolæ beneath them, and the town of Syracuse to the eastward. They were presently attacked by the Syracu-

sans, who broke up their muster in the mead as soon as they heard the news. But as the road by which they had to march, approaching Euryalus from the southwest, was circuitous, and hardly less than three English miles in length, they had the mortification of seeing that the Athenians were already masters of the position; and when they hastened up to retake it, the rapid pace had so disordered their ranks, that the Athenians attacked them at great advantage, besides having the higher ground. The Syracusans were driven back to their city with loss, Diomilus with half his regiment being slain; while the Athenians remained masters of the high ground of Euryalus, as well as of the upper portion of the slope of Epipolæ.[370]

This was a most important advantage; indeed, seemingly essential to the successful prosecution of the siege. It was gained by a plan both well laid and well executed, grounded upon the omission of the Syracusans to occupy a post of which they did not at first perceive the importance, and which in fact only acquired its preëminent importance from the new enlargement made by the Syracusans in their fortifications. To that extent, therefore, it depended upon a favorable accident which could not have been reasonably expected to occur. The capture of Syracuse was certain, upon the supposition that the attack and siege of the city had been commenced on the first arrival of the Athenians in the island, without giving time for any improvement in its defensibility. But the moment such delay was allowed, success ceased to be certain, depending more or less upon this favorable turn of accident. The Syracusans actually did a great deal to create additional difficulty to the besiegers, and might have done more, especially in regard to the occupation of the high ground above Epipolæ. Had they taken this precaution, the effective prosecution of the siege would have been rendered extremely difficult, if not completely frustrated.

On the next morning, Nikias and Lamachus marched their army down the slope of Epipolæ near to the Syracusan walls, and offered battle, which the enemy did not accept. They then withdrew the Athenian troops; after which their first operation was to construct a fort on the high ground called Labdalum, near the western end of the upper northern cliffs bordering Epipolæ, on the brink of the cliff, and looking northward towards Megara. This was intended as a place of security wherein both treasures and stores might be deposited, so as to leave the army unencumbered in its motions. The Athenian cavalry being now completed by the new arrivals from Egesta, Nikias descended from Labdalum to a new position called Sykê, lower down on Epipolæ, seemingly about midway between the northern and southern cliffs. He here constructed, with as much rapidity as possible, a walled inclosure, called the Circle, intended as a centre from whence the projected wall of circumvallation was to start northward towards the sea at Trogilus, southward towards the Great Harbor. This Circle appears to have covered a considerable space, and was farther protected by an outwork in front covering an area of one thousand square feet.[371] Astounded at the rapidity with which the Athenians executed this construction,[372] the Syracusans marched their forces out, and prepared to give battle in order to interrupt it. But

when the Athenians, relinquishing the work, drew up on their side in battle order, the Syracusan generals were so struck with their manifest superiority in soldier-like array, as compared with the disorderly trim of their own ranks, that they withdrew their soldiers back into the city without venturing to engage; merely leaving a body of horse to harass the operations of the besiegers, and constrain them to keep in masses. The newly-acquired Athenian cavalry, however, were here brought for the first time into effective combat. With the aid of one tribe of their own hoplites, they charged the Syracusan horse, drove them off with some loss, and erected their trophy. This is the only occasion on which we read of the Athenian cavalry being brought into conflict; though Nikias had made the absence of cavalry the great reason for his prolonged inaction.

Interruption being thus checked, Nikias continued his blockading operations; first completing the Circle,[373] then beginning his wall of circumvallation in a northerly direction from the Circle towards Trogilus: for which purpose a portion of his forces were employed in bringing stones and wood, and depositing them in proper places along the intended line. So strongly did Hermokratês feel the inferiority of the Syracusan hoplites in the field, that he discouraged any fresh general action, and proposed to construct a counter-wall, or cross-wall, traversing the space along which the Athenian circumvallation must necessarily be continued so as to impede its farther progress. A tenable counter-wall, if they could get time to carry it sufficiently far to a defensible terminus, would completely defeat the intent of the besiegers: but even if Nikias should interrupt the work by his attacks, the Syracusans calculated on being able to provide a sufficient force to repel them, during the short time necessary for hastily constructing the palisade, or front outwork. Such palisade would serve them as a temporary defence, while they finished the more elaborate cross-wall behind it, and would, even at the worst, compel Nikias to suspend all his proceedings and employ his whole force to dislodge them.[374]

Accordingly, they took their start from the postern-gate near the grove of Apollo Temenitês; a gate in the new wall, erected four or five months before, to enlarge the fortified space of the city. From this point, which was lower down on the slope of Epipolæ than the Athenian circle, they carried their palisade and counter-wall up the slope, in a direction calculated to intersect the intended line of hostile circumvallation southward of the Circle. The nautical population from Ortygia could be employed in this enterprise, since the city was still completely undisturbed by sea, and mistress of the great harbor, the Athenian fleet not having yet moved from Thapsus. Besides this active crowd of workmen, the sacred olive-trees in the Temenite grove were cut down to serve as materials; and by such efforts the work was presently finished to a sufficient distance for traversing and intercepting the blockading wall intended to come southward from the Circle. It seems to have terminated at the brink of the precipitous southern cliff of Epipolæ, which prevented the Athenians from turning it and attacking it in flank; while it was defended in front by a stockade and topped with

wooden towers for discharge of missiles. One tribe of hoplites was left to defend it, while the crowd of Syracusans who had either been employed on the work or on guard, returned back to the city.

During all this process, Nikias had not thought it prudent to interrupt them.[375] Employed as he seems to have been on the Circle, and on the wall branching out from his Circle northward, he was unwilling to march across the slope of Epipolæ to attack them with half his forces, leaving his own rear exposed to attack from the numerous Syracusans in the city, and his own Circle only partially guarded. Moreover, by such delay, he was enabled to prosecute his own part of the circumvallation without hindrance, and to watch for an opportunity of assaulting the new counter-wall with advantage. Such an opportunity soon occurred, just at the time when he had accomplished the farther important object of destroying the aqueducts, which supplied the city, partially at least, with water for drinking. The Syracusans appear to have been filled with confidence, both by the completion of their counter-wall, which seemed an effective bar to the besiegers, and by his inaction. The tribe left on guard presently began to relax in their vigilance: instead of occupying the wall, tents were erected behind it to shelter them from the midday sun; while some even permitted themselves to take repose during that hour within the city walls. Such negligence did not escape the Athenian generals, who silently prepared an assault for midday. Three hundred chosen hoplites, with some light troops clothed in panoplies for the occasion, were instructed to sally out suddenly and run across straight to attack the stockade and counter-wall; while the main Athenian force marched in two divisions under Nikias and Lamachus; half towards the city walls, to prevent any succor from coming out of the gates, half towards the Temenite postern-gate from whence the stockade and cross-wall commenced. The rapid forward movement of the chosen three hundred was crowned with full success. They captured both the stockade and the counter-wall, feebly defended by its guards; who, taken by surprise, abandoned their post and fled along behind their wall to enter the city by the Temenite postern-gate. Before all of them could get in, however, both the pursuing three hundred, and the Athenian division which marched straight to that point, had partially come up with them: so that some of these assailants even forced their way along with them through the gate into the interior of the Temenite city wall. Here, however, the Syracusan strength within was too much for them: these foremost Athenians and Argeians were thrust out again with loss. But the general movement of the Athenians had been completely triumphant. They pulled down the counter-wall, plucked up the palisade, and carried the materials away for the use of their own circumvallation.

As the recent Syracusan counter-work had been carried to the brink of the southern cliff, which rendered it unassailable in flank, Nikias was warned of the necessity of becoming master of this cliff, so as to deprive them of this resource in future. Accordingly, without staying to finish his blockading wall, regularly and continuously from the Circle southward, across the slope of Epipolæ, he left the Circle under a

guard, and marched across at once to take possession of the southern cliff, at the point where the blockading wall was intended to reach it. This point of the southern cliff he immediately fortified as a defensive position, whereby he accomplished two objects. First, he prevented the Syracusans from again employing the cliff as a flank defence for a second counter-wall.[376] Next, he acquired the means of providing a safe and easy road of communication between the high ground of Epipolæ and the low marshy ground beneath, which divided Epipolæ from the Great Harbor, and across which the Athenian wall of circumvallation must necessarily be presently carried. As his troops would have to carry on simultaneous operations, partly on the high ground above, partly on the low ground beneath, he could not allow them to be separated from each other by a precipitous cliff which would prevent ready mutual assistance. The intermediate space between the Circle and the fortified point of the cliff, was for the time left with an unfinished wall, with the intention of coming back to it, as was in fact afterwards done, and this portion of wall was in the end completed. The Circle, though isolated, was strong enough for the time to maintain itself against attack, and was adequately garrisoned.

By this new movement, the Syracusans were debarred from carrying a second counter-wall on the same side of Epipolæ, since the enemy were masters of the terminating cliff on the southern side of the slope. They now turned their operations to the lower ground or marsh between the southern cliff of the Epipolæ and the Great Harbor; being as yet free on that side, since the Athenian fleet was still at Thapsus. Across that marsh—and seemingly as far as the river Anapus, to serve as a flank barrier—they resolved to carry a palisade work with a ditch, so as to intersect the line which the Athenians must next pursue in completing the southernmost portion of their circumvallation. They so pressed the prosecution of this new cross palisade, beginning from the lower portion of their own city walls, and stretching in a southwesterly direction across the low ground as far as the river Anapus, that, by the time the new Athenian fortification on the cliff was completed, the new Syracusan obstacle was completed also, and a stockade with a ditch seemed to shut out the besiegers from reaching the Great Harbor.

Lamachus overcame the difficulty before him with ability and bravery. Descending unexpectedly, one morning before daybreak, from his fort on the cliff of Epipolæ into the low ground beneath,—and providing his troops with planks and broad gates to bridge over the marsh where it was scarcely passable,—he contrived to reach and surprise the palisade with the first dawn of morning. Orders were at the same time given for the Athenian fleet to sail round from Thapsus into the Great Harbor, so as to divert the attention of the enemy, and get on the rear of the new palisade work. But before the fleet could arrive, the palisade and ditch had been carried, and its defenders driven off. A large Syracusan force came out from the city to sustain them, and retake it, so that a general action now ensued, in the low ground between the cliff of Epipolæ, the harbor, and the river Anapus. The superior discipline of the Athe-

nians proved successful: the Syracusans were defeated and driven back on all sides, so that their right wing fled into the city, and their left (including the larger portion of their best force, the horsemen), along the banks of the river Anapus, to reach the bridge. Flushed with victory, the Athenians hoped to cut them off from this retreat, and a chosen body of three hundred hoplites ran fast in hopes of getting to the bridge first. In this hasty movement they fell into disorder, so that the Syracusan cavalry turned upon them, put them to flight, and threw them back upon the Athenian right wing, to which the fugitives communicated their own panic and disorder. The fate of the battle appeared to be turning against the Athenians, when Lamachus, who was on the left wing, hastened to their aid with the Argeian hoplites and as many bowmen as he could collect. His ardor carried him incautiously forward, so that he crossed a ditch with very few followers, before the remaining troops could follow him. He was here attacked and slain,[377] in single combat with a horseman named Kallikratês: but the Syracusans were driven back when his soldiers came up, and had only just time to snatch and carry off his dead body, with which they crossed the bridge and retreated behind the Anapus. The rapid movement of this gallant officer was thus crowned with complete success, restoring the victory to his own right wing: a victory dearly purchased by the forfeit of his own life.[378]

Meanwhile the visible disorder and temporary flight of the Athenian right wing, and the withdrawal of Lamachus from the left to reinforce it, imparted fresh courage to the Syracusan right, which had fled into the town. They again came forth to renew the contest; while their generals attempted a diversion by sending out a detachment from the northwestern gates of the city to attack the Athenian circle on the mid-slope of Epipolæ. As this Circle lay completely apart and at considerable distance from the battle, they hoped to find the garrison unprepared for attack, and thus to carry it by surprise. Their manœuvre, bold and well-timed, was on the point of succeeding. They carried with little difficulty the covering outwork in front, and the Circle itself, probably stripped of part of its garrison to reinforce the combatants in the lower ground, was only saved by the presence of mind and resource of Nikias, who was lying ill within it. He directed the attendants immediately to set fire to a quantity of wood which lay, together with the battering engines of the army, in front of the circle-wall, so that the flames prevented all farther advance on the part of the assailants, and forced them to retreat. The same flames also served as a signal to the Athenians engaged in the battle beneath, who immediately sent reinforcements to the relief of their general; while at the same time the Athenian fleet, just arrived from Thapsus, was seen sailing into the Great Harbor. This last event, threatening the Syracusans on a new side, drew off their whole attention to the defence of their city, so that both their combatants from the field and their detachment from the Circle were brought back within the walls.[379]

Had the recent attempt on the Circle succeeded, carrying with it the death or capture of Nikias, and combined with the death of Lamachus in the field on that

same day, it would have greatly brightened the prospects of the Syracusans, and might even have arrested the farther progress of the siege, from the want of an authorized commander. But in spite of such imminent hazard, the actual result of the day left the Athenians completely victorious, and the Syracusans more discouraged than ever. What materially contributed to their discouragement, was, the recent entrance of the Athenian fleet into the Great Harbor, wherein it was henceforward permanently established, in coöperation with the army in a station near the left bank of the Anapus.

Both the army and the fleet now began to occupy themselves seriously with the construction of the southernmost part of the wall of circumvallation; beginning immediately below the Athenian fortified point of descent from the southern cliff of Epipolæ, and stretching across the lower marshy ground to the Great Harbor. The distance between these two extreme points was about eight stadia or nearly an English mile: the wall was double, with gates, and probably towers, at suitable intervals, inclosing a space of considerable breadth, doubtless roofed over in part, since it served afterwards, with the help of the adjoining citadel on the cliff, as shelter and defence for the whole Athenian army. The Syracusans could not interrupt this process, nor could they undertake a new counter-wall up the mid-slope of Epipolæ, without coming out to fight a general battle, which they did not feel competent to do. Of course the Circle had now been put into condition to defy a second surprise.

But not only were they thus compelled to look on without hindering the blockading wall towards the Harbor. It was now, for the first time, that they began to taste the real restraints and privations of a siege.[380] Down to this moment, their communication with the Anapus and the country beyond, as well as with all sides of the Great Harbor, had been open and unimpeded; whereas now, the arrival of the Athenian fleet, and the change of position of the Athenian army, had cut them off from both,[381] so that little or no fresh supplies of provision could reach them except at the hazard of capture from the hostile ships. On the side of Thapsus, where the northern cliff of Epipolæ affords only two or three practicable passages of ascent, they had before been blocked up by the Athenian army and fleet; and a portion of the fleet seems even now to have been left at Thapsus: so that nothing now remained open, except a portion, especially the northern portion, of the slope of Epipolæ. Of this outlet the besieged, especially their numerous cavalry, doubtless availed themselves, for the purpose of excursions and of bringing in supplies. But it was both longer and more circuitous for such purposes than the plain near the Great Harbor and the Helôrine road: moreover, it had to pass by the high and narrow pass of Euryâlus, and might thus be rendered unavailable to the besieged, whenever Nikias thought fit to occupy and fortify that position. Unfortunately for himself and his army, he omitted this easy but capital precaution, even at the moment when he must have known Gylippus to be approaching.

In regard to the works actually undertaken, the order followed by Nikias and Lamachus can be satisfactorily explained. Having established their fortified post on the centre of the slope of Epipolæ, they were in condition to combat opposition and attack any counter-wall on whichever side the enemy might erect it. Commencing in the first place the execution of the northern portion of the blockading line, they soon desist from this and turn their attention to the southern portion, because it was here that the Syracusans carried their two first counter-works. In attacking the second counter-work of the Syracusans, across the marsh to the Anapus, they chose a suitable moment for bringing the main fleet round from Thapsus into the Great Harbor, with a view to its coöperation. After clearing the lower ground, they probably deemed it advisable, in order to establish a safe and easy communication with their fleet, that the double wall across the marsh, from Epipolæ to the Harbor, should stand next for execution; for which there was this farther reason, that they thereby blocked up the most convenient exit and channel of supply for Syracuse. There are thus plausible reasons assignable why the northern portion of the line of blockade, from the Athenian camp on Epipolæ to the sea at Trogilus, was left to the last, and was found open, at least the greater part of it, by Gylippus.

While the Syracusans thus began to despair of their situation, the prospects of the Athenians were better than ever, promising certain and not very distant triumph. The reports circulating through the neighboring cities all represented them as in the full tide of success, so that many Sikel tribes, hitherto wavering, came in to tender their alliance, while three armed pentekonters also arrived from the Tyrrhenian coast. Moreover, abundant supplies were furnished from the Italian Greeks generally. Nikias, now sole commander since the death of Lamachus, had even the glory of receiving and discussing proposals from Syracuse for capitulation, a necessity which was openly and abundantly canvassed within the city itself. The ill-success of Hermokratês and his colleagues had caused them to be recently displaced from their functions as generals, to which Herakleidês, Euklês, and Tellias, were appointed. But this change did not give them confidence to hazard a fresh battle, while the temper of the city, during such period of forced inaction, was melancholy in the extreme. Though several propositions for surrender, perhaps unofficial, yet seemingly sincere, were made to Nikias, nothing definitive could be agreed upon as to the terms.[382] Had the Syracusan government been oligarchical, the present distress would have exhibited a large body of malcontents upon whom he could have worked with advantage; but the democratical character of the government maintained union at home in this trying emergency.[383]

We must take particular note of these propositions in order to understand the conduct of Nikias during the present critical interval. He had been from the beginning in secret correspondence with a party in Syracuse;[384] who, though neither numerous nor powerful in themselves, were now doubtless both more active and more influential than ever they had been before. From them he received constant and not

unreasonable assurances that the city was on the point of surrendering, and could not possibly hold out. And as the tone of opinion without, as well as within, conspired to raise such an impression in his mind, so he suffered himself to be betrayed into a fatal languor and security as to the farther prosecution of the besieging operations. The injurious consequences of the death of Lamachus now became evident. From the time of the departure from Katana down to the battle in which that gallant officer perished,—a period seemingly of about three months, from about March to June 414 B.C.,—the operations of the siege had been conducted with great vigor as well as unremitting perseverance, and the building-work, especially, had been so rapidly executed as to fill the Syracusans with amazement. But so soon as Nikias is left sole commander, this vigorous march disappears and is exchanged for slackness and apathy. The wall across the low ground near the harbor might have been expected to proceed more rapidly, because the Athenian position generally was much stronger, the chance of opposition from the Syracusans was much lessened, and the fleet had been brought into the Great Harbor to coöperate. Yet in fact it seems to have proceeded more slowly; Nikias builds it at first as a double wall, though it would have been practicable to complete the whole line of blockade with a single wall before the arrival of Gylippus, and afterwards, if necessary, to have doubled it either wholly or partially, instead of employing so much time in completing this one portion that Gylippus arrived before it was finished, scarcely less than two months after the death of Lamachus. Both the besiegers and their commander now seem to consider success as certain, without any chance of effective interruption from within, still less from without; so that they may take their time over the work, without caring whether the ultimate consummation comes a month sooner or later.

Though such was the present temper of the Athenian troops, Nikias could doubtless have spurred them on and accelerated the operations, had he himself been convinced of the necessity of doing so. Hitherto, we have seen him always overrating the gloomy contingencies of the future, and disposed to calculate as if the worst was to happen which possibly could happen. But a great part of what passes for caution in his character, was in fact backwardness and inertia of temperament, aggravated by the melancholy addition of a painful internal complaint. If he wasted in indolence the first six months after his arrival in Sicily, and turned to inadequate account the present two months of triumphant position before Syracuse, both these mistakes arose from the same cause; from reluctance to act except under the pressure and stimulus of some obvious necessity. Accordingly, he was always behindhand with events; but when necessity became terrible, so as to subdue the energies of other men, then did he come forward and display unwonted vigor, as we shall see in the following chapter. But now, relieved from all urgency of apparent danger, and misled by the delusive hopes held out through his correspondence in the town, combined with the atmosphere of success which exhilarated his own armament, Nikias fancied the surrender of Syracuse inevitable, and became, for one brief moment preceding his calamitous end, not merely sanguine, but even careless and presumptuous in the

extreme. Nothing short of this presumption could have let in his destroying enemy, Gylippus.[385]

That officer—named by the Lacedæmonians commander in Sicily, at the winter-meeting which Alkibiadês had addressed at Sparta—had employed himself in getting together forces for the purpose of the expedition. But the Lacedæmonians, though so far stimulated by the representations of the Athenian exile as to promise aid, were not forward to perform the promise. Even the Corinthians, decidedly the most hearty of all in behalf of Syracuse, were yet so tardy, that in the month of June, Gylippus was still at Leukas, with his armament not quite ready to sail. To embark in a squadron for Sicily, against the numerous and excellent Athenian fleet now acting there, was a service not tempting to any one, and demanding both personal daring and devotion. Moreover, every vessel from Sicily, between March and June 414 B.C., brought intelligence of progressive success on the part of Nikias and Lamachus, thus rendering the prospects of Corinthian auxiliaries still more discouraging.

At length, in the month of June, arrived the news of that defeat of the Syracusans wherein Lamachus was slain, and of its important consequences in forwarding the operations of the besiegers. Great as those consequences were, they were still farther exaggerated by report. It was confidently affirmed, by messenger after messenger, that the wall of circumvallation had been completed, and that Syracuse was now invested on all sides.[386] Both Gylippus and the Corinthians were so far misled as to believe this to be the fact, and despaired, in consequence, of being able to render any effective aid against the Athenians in Sicily. But as there still remained hopes of being able to preserve the Greek cities in Italy, Gylippus thought it important to pass over thither at once with his own little squadron of four sail, two Lacedæmonians and two Corinthians, and the Corinthian captain Pythên; leaving the Corinthian main squadron to follow as soon as it was ready. Intending then to act only in Italy, Gylippus did not fear falling in with the Athenian fleet. He first sailed to Tarentum, friendly and warm in his cause. From hence he undertook a visit to Thurii, where his father Kleandridas, exiled from Sparta, had formerly resided as citizen. After trying to profit by this opening for the purpose of gaining the Thurians, and finding nothing but refusal, he passed on farther southward, until he came opposite to the Terinæan gulf near the southeastern cape of Italy. Here a violent gust of wind off the land overtook him, exposed his vessels to the greatest dangers, and drove him out to sea, until at length, standing in a northerly direction, he was fortunate enough to find shelter again at Tarentum.[387] But such was the damage which his ships had sustained, that he was forced to remain here while they were hauled ashore and refitted.[388]

So untoward a delay threatened to intercept altogether his farther progress. For the Thurians had sent intimation of his visit as well as of the number of his vessels, to Nikias at Syracuse; treating with contempt the idea of four triremes coming to attack the powerful Athenian fleet. In the present sanguine phase of his character, Nikias sympathized with the flattering tenor of the message, and overlooked the

gravity of the fact announced. He despised Gylippus as a mere privateer, nor would he even take the precaution of sending four ships from his numerous fleet to watch and intercept the new-comer. Accordingly Gylippus, after having refitted his ships at Tarentum, advanced southward along the coast without opposition to the Epizephyrian Lokri. Here he first learned, to his great satisfaction, that Syracuse was not yet so completely blockaded but that an army might still reach and relieve it from the interior, entering it by the Euryâlus and the heights of Epipolæ. Having deliberated whether he should take the chance of running his ships into the harbor of Syracuse, despite the watch of the Athenian fleet, or whether he should sail through the strait of Messina to Himera at the north of Sicily, and from thence levy an army to cross the island and relieve Syracuse by land, he resolved on the latter course, and passed forthwith through the strait, which he found altogether unguarded. After touching both at Rhegium and Messênê, he arrived safely at Himera. Even at Rhegium, there was no Athenian naval force; though Nikias had, indeed, sent thither four Athenian triremes, after he had been apprized that Gylippus had reached Lokri, rather from excess of precaution, than because he thought it necessary. But this Athenian squadron reached Rhegium too late: Gylippus had already passed the strait; and fortune, smiting his enemy with blindness, landed him unopposed on the fatal soil of Sicily.

The blindness of Nikias would indeed appear unaccountable, were it not that we shall have worse yet to recount. To appreciate his misjudgment fully, and to be sensible that we are not making him responsible for results which could not have been foreseen, we have only to turn back to what had been said six months before by the exile Alkibiadês at Sparta: "Send forthwith an army to Sicily (he exhorted the Lacedæmonians); *but send at the same time, what will be yet more valuable than an army, a Spartan to take the supreme command*." It was in fulfilment of this recommendation, the wisdom of which will abundantly appear, that Gylippus had been appointed. And had he even reached Syracuse alone in a fishing-boat, the effect of his presence, carrying the great name of Sparta, and full assurance of Spartan intervention to come, not to mention his great personal ability, would have sufficed to give new life to the besieged. Yet Nikias—having, through a lucky accident, timely notice of his approach, when a squadron of four ships would have prevented his reaching the island—disdains even this most easy precaution, and neglects him as a freebooter of no significance. Such neglect too is the more surprising, since the well-known philo-Laconian tendencies of Nikias would have led us to expect, that he would overvalue rather than undervalue the imposing ascendency of the Spartan name.

Gylippus, on arriving at Himera, as commander named by Sparta, and announcing himself as forerunner of Peloponnesian reinforcements, met with a hearty welcome. The Himeræans agreed to aid him with a body of hoplites, and to furnish panoplies for the seamen in his vessels. On sending to Selinus, Gela, and some of

the Sikel tribes in the interior, he received equally favorable assurances; so that he was enabled in no very long time to get together a respectable force. The interest of Athens among the Sikels had been recently weakened by the death of one of her most active partisans, the Sikel prince Archonidês, a circumstance which both enabled Gylippus to obtain more of their aid, and facilitated his march across the island. He was enabled to undertake this inland march from Himera to Syracuse at the head of seven hundred hoplites from his own vessels, seamen and epibatæ taken together; one thousand hoplites and light troops, with one hundred horse, from Himera, some horse and light troops from Selinus and Gela, and one thousand Sikels.[389] With these forces, some of whom joined him on the march, he reached Euryâlus and the heights of Epipolæ above Syracuse, assaulting and capturing the Sikel fort of Ietæ in his way, but without experiencing any other opposition.

His arrival was all but too late, and might have been actually too late, had not the Corinthian admiral Goggylus got to Syracuse a little before him. The Corinthian fleet of twelve triremes, under Erasinidês—having started from Leukas later than Gylippus, but as soon as it was ready—was now on its way to Syracuse. But Goggylus had been detained at Leukas by some accident, so that he did not depart until after all the rest. Yet he reached Syracuse the soonest; probably striking a straighter course across the sea, and favored by weather. He got safely into the harbor of Syracuse, escaping the Athenian guardships, whose watch doubtless partook of the general negligence of the besieging operations.[390]

The arrival of Goggylus at that moment was an accident of unspeakable moment, and was in fact nothing less than the salvation of the city. Among all the causes of despair in the Syracusan mind, there was none more powerful than the circumstance, that they had not as yet heard of any relief approaching, or of any active intervention in their favor, from Peloponnesus. Their discouragement increasing from day to day, and the interchange of propositions with Nikias becoming more frequent, matters had at last so ripened that a public assembly was just about to be held to sanction a definitive capitulation.[391] It was at this critical juncture that Goggylus arrived, apparently a little before Gylippus reached Himera. He was the first to announce that both the Corinthian fleet and a Spartan commander were now actually on their voyage, and might be expected immediately, intelligence which filled the Syracusans with enthusiasm and with renewed courage. They instantly threw aside all idea of capitulation, and resolved to hold out to the last.

It was not long before they received intimation that Gylippus had reached Himera, which Goggylus at his arrival could not know, and was raising an army to march across for their relief. After the interval necessary for his preparations and for his march, probably not less than between a fortnight and three weeks, they learned that he was approaching Syracuse by the way of Euryâlus and Epipolæ. He was presently seen coming, having ascended Epipolæ by Euryâlus; the same way by which the Athenians had come from Katana in the spring, when they commenced the

siege. As he descended the slope of Epipolæ, the whole Syracusan force went out in a body to hail his arrival and accompany him into the city.[392]

Few incidents throughout the whole siege of Syracuse appear so unaccountable as the fact, that the proceedings and march of Gylippus, from his landing at Himera to the moment of his entering the town, were accomplished without the smallest resistance on the part of Nikias. After this instant, the besiegers pass from incontestable superiority in the field, and apparent certainty of prospective capture of the city, to a state of inferiority, not only excluding all hope of capture, but even sinking, step by step, into absolute ruin. Yet Nikias had remained with his eyes shut and his hands tied, not making the least effort to obstruct so fatal a consummation. After having despised Gylippus, in his voyage along the coast of Italy, as a freebooter with four ships, he now despises him not less at the head of an army marching from Himera. If he was taken unawares, as he really appears to have been,[393] the fault was altogether his own, and the ignorance such as we must almost call voluntary. For the approach of Gylippus must have been well known to him beforehand. He must have learned from the four ships which he sent to Rhegium, that Gylippus had already touched thither in passing through the strait, on his way to Himera. He must therefore have been well aware, that the purpose was to attempt the relief of Syracuse by an army from the interior; and his correspondence among the Sikel tribes must have placed him in cognizance of the equipment going on at Himera. Moreover, when we recollect that Gylippus reached that place without either troops or arms; that he had to obtain forces not merely from Himera, but also from Selinus and Gela, as well as to sound the Sikel towns, not all of them friendly; lastly, that he had to march all across the island, partly through hostile territory, it is impossible to allow less interval than a fortnight or three weeks between his landing at Himera and his arrival at Epipolæ. Farther, Nikias must have learned, through his intelligence in the interior of Syracuse, the important revolution which had taken place in Syracusan opinion through the arrival of Goggylus, even before the landing of Gylippus in Sicily was known. He was apprized, from that moment, that he had to take measures, not only against renewed obstinate hostility within the town, but against a fresh invading enemy without. Lastly, that enemy had first to march all across Sicily, during which march he might have been embarrassed and perhaps defeated,[394] and could then approach Syracuse only by one road, over the high ground of Euryâlus in the Athenian rear, through passes few in number, easy to defend, by which Nikias had himself first approached, and through which he had only got by a well-laid plan of surprise. Yet Nikias leaves these passes unoccupied and undefended; he takes not a single new precaution; the relieving army enters Syracuse as it were over a broad and free plain.

If we are amazed at the insolent carelessness with which Nikias disdained the commonest precautions for repelling the foreknown approach, by sea, of an enemy formidable even single-handed, what are we to say of that unaccountable blindness

which led him to neglect the same enemy when coming at the head of a relieving army, and to omit the most obvious means of defence in a crisis upon which his future fate turned? Homer would have designated such neglect as a temporary delirium inflicted by the fearful inspiration of Atê: the historian has no such explanatory name to give, and can only note it as a sad and suitable prelude to the calamities too nearly at hand.

At the moment when the fortunate Spartan auxiliary was thus allowed to march quietly into Syracuse, the Athenian double wall of circumvallation, between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbor, eight stadia long, was all but completed: a few yards only of the end close to the harbor were wanting. But Gylippus cared not to interrupt its completion. He aimed at higher objects, and he knew, what Nikias, unhappily, never felt and never lived to learn, the immense advantage of turning to active account that first impression and full tide of confidence which his arrival had just infused into the Syracusans. Hardly had he accomplished his junction with them, when he marshalled the united force in order of battle, and marched up to the lines of the Athenians. Amazed as they were, and struck dumb by his unexpected arrival, they too formed in battle order, and awaited his approach. His first proceeding marked how much the odds of the game were changed. He sent a herald to tender to them a five days' armistice, on condition that they should collect their effects and withdraw from the island. Nikias disdained to return any reply to this insulting proposal; but his conduct showed how much *he* felt, as well as Gylippus, that the tide was now turned. For when the Spartan commander, perceiving now for the first time the disorderly trim of his Syracusan hoplites, thought fit to retreat into more open ground farther removed from the walls, probably in order that he might have a better field for his cavalry, Nikias declined to follow him, and remained in position close to his own fortifications.[395] This was tantamount to a confession of inferiority in the field. It was a virtual abandonment of the capture of Syracuse, a tacit admission that the Athenians could hope for nothing better in the end than the humiliating offer which the herald had just made to them. So it seems to have been felt by both parties; for from this time forward, the Syracusans become and continue aggressors, the Athenians remaining always on the defensive, except for one brief instant after the arrival of Demosthenês.

After drawing off his troops and keeping them encamped for that night on the Temenite cliff, seemingly within the added fortified inclosure of Syracuse, Gylippus brought them out again the next morning, and marshalled them in front of the Athenian lines, as if about to attack. But while the attention of the Athenians was thus engaged, he sent a detachment to surprise the fort of Labdalum, which was not within view of their lines. The enterprise was completely successful. The fort was taken, and the garrison put to the sword; while the Syracusans gained another unexpected advantage during the day, by the capture of one of the Athenian triremes which was watching their harbor. Gylippus pursued his successes actively, by immedi-

ately beginning the construction of a fresh counter-wall, from the outer city wall in a northwesterly direction aslant up the slope of Epipolæ; so as to traverse the intended line of the Athenian circumvallation on the north side of their Circle, and render blockade impossible. He availed himself, for this purpose, of stones laid by the Athenians for their own circumvallation, at the same time alarming them by threatening attack upon their lower wall, between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbor, which was now just finished, so as to leave their troops disposable for action on the higher ground. Against one part of the wall, which seemed weaker than the rest, he attempted a nocturnal surprise, but finding the Athenians in vigilant guard without, he was forced to retire. This part of the wall was now heightened, and the Athenians took charge of it themselves, distributing their allies along the remainder. [396]

These attacks, however, appear to have been chiefly intended as diversions, in order to hinder the enemy from obstructing the completion of the counter-wall. Now was the time for Nikias to adopt vigorous aggressive measures both against this wall and against the Syracusans in the field, unless he chose to relinquish all hope of ever being able to beleaguer Syracuse. And, indeed, he seems actually to have relinquished such hope, even thus early after he had seemed certain master of the city. For he now undertook a measure altogether new; highly important in itself, but indicating an altered scheme of policy. He resolved to fortify Cape Plemmyrium,—the rocky promontory which forms one extremity of the narrow entrance of the Great Harbor, immediately south of the point of Ortygia,—and to make it a secure main station for the fleet and stores. The fleet had been hitherto stationed in close neighborhood of the land-force, in a fortified position at the extremity of the double blockading wall between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbor. From such a station in the interior of the harbor, it was difficult for the Athenian triremes to perform the duties incumbent on them, of watching the two ports of Syracuse—one on each side of the isthmus which joins Ortygia to the mainland—so as to prevent any exit of ships from within, or ingress of ships from without, and of insuring the unobstructed admission by sea of supplies for their own army. For both these purposes, the station of Plemmyrium was far more convenient; and Nikias now saw that henceforward his operations would be for the most part maritime. Without confessing it openly, he thus practically acknowledged that the superiority of land-force had passed to the side of his opponents, and that a successful prosecution of the blockade had become impossible.[397]

Three forts, one of considerable size and two subsidiary, were erected on the seaboard of Cape Plemmyrium, which became the station for triremes as well as for ships of burden. Though the situation was found convenient for all naval operations, it entailed also serious disadvantages; being destitute of any spring of water, such as the memorable fountain of Arethusa on the opposite island of Ortygia. So that for supplies of water, and of wood also, the crews of the ships had to range a consider-

able distance, exposed to surprise from the numerous Syracusan cavalry placed in garrison at the temple of Zeus Olympius. Day after day, losses were sustained in this manner, besides the increased facilities given for desertion, which soon fatally diminished the efficiency of each ship's crew. As the Athenian hopes of success now declined, both the slaves and the numerous foreigners who served in their navy became disposed to steal away. And though the ships of war, down to this time, had been scarcely at all engaged in actual warfare, yet they had been for many months continually at sea and on the watch, without any opportunity of hauling ashore to refit. Hence the naval force, now about to be called into action as the chief hope of the Athenians, was found lamentably degenerated from that ostentatious perfection in which it had set sail fifteen months before, from the harbor of Peiræus.

The erection of the new forts at Plemmyrium, while by withdrawing the Athenian forces it left Gylippus unopposed in the prosecution of his counter-wall, at the same time emboldened him by the manifest decline of hope which it implied. Day after day he brought out his Syracusans in battle-array, planting them near the Athenian lines; but the Athenians showed no disposition to attack. At length he took advantage of what he thought a favorable opportunity to make the attack himself; but the ground was so hemmed in by various walls—the Athenian fortified lines on one side, the Syracusan front or Temenitic fortification on another, and the counter-wall now in course of construction on a third—that his cavalry and darters had no space to act. Accordingly, the Syracusan hoplites, having to fight without these auxiliaries, were beaten and driven back with loss, the Corinthian Goggylus being among the slain. [398] On the next day, Gylippus had the prudence to take the blame of this defeat upon himself. It was all owing to his mistake, he publicly confessed, in having made choice of a confined space wherein neither cavalry nor darters could avail. He would presently give them another opportunity, in a fairer field, and he exhorted them to show their inbred superiority, as Dorians and Peloponnesians, by chasing these Ionians with their rabble of islanders out of Sicily. Accordingly, after no long time, he again brought them up in order of battle; taking care, however, to keep in the open space, beyond the extremity of the walls and fortifications.

On this occasion, Nikias did not decline the combat, but marched out into the open space to meet him. He probably felt encouraged by the result of the recent action; but there was a farther and more pressing motive. The counter-wall of intersection, which the Syracusans were constructing, was on the point of cutting the Athenian line of circumvallation, so that it was essential for Nikias to attack without delay, unless he formally abnegated all farther hope of successful siege. Nor could the army endure, in spite of altered fortune, irrevocably to shut themselves out from such hope, without one struggle more. Both armies were therefore ranged in battle order on the open space beyond the walls, higher up the slope of Epipolæ; Gylippus placing his cavalry and darters to the right of his line, on the highest and most open ground. In the midst of the action between the hoplites on both sides, these troops

on the right charged the left flank of the Athenians with such vigor, that they completely broke it. The whole Athenian army underwent a thorough defeat, and only found shelter within its fortified lines. And in the course of the very next night, the Syracusan counter-wall was pushed so far as to traverse and get beyond the projected line of Athenian blockade, reaching presently as far as the edge of the northern cliff: so that Syracuse was now safe, unless the enemy should not only recover their superiority in the field, but also become strong enough to storm and carry the new-built wall.[399]

Farther defence was also obtained by the safe arrival of the Corinthian, Ambrakiotic, and Leukadian fleet of twelve triremes, under Erasinidês, which Nikias had vainly endeavored to intercept. He had sent twenty sail to the southern coast of Italy; but the new-comers had had the good luck to avoid them.

Erasinidês and his division lent their hands to the execution of a work which completed the scheme of defence for the city. Gylippus took the precaution of constructing a fort or redoubt on the high ground of Epipolæ, so as to command the approach to Syracuse from the high ground of Euryalus; a step which Hermokratês had not thought of until too late, and which Nikias had never thought of at all, during his period of triumph and mastery. He erected a new fort on a suitable point of the high ground, backed by three fortified positions or encampments at proper distances in the rear of it, intended for bodies of troops to support the advanced post in case it was attacked. A continuous wall was then carried from this advanced post down the slope of Epipolæ, so as to reach and join the counter-wall recently constructed; whereby this counter-wall, already traversing and cutting the Athenian line of circumvallation, became in fact prolonged up the whole slope of Epipolæ, and barred all direct access from the Athenians in their existing lines up to the summit of that eminence, as well as up to the northern cliff. The Syracusans had now one continuous and uninterrupted line of defence; a long single wall, resting at one extremity on the new-built fort upon the high ground of Epipolæ, at the other extremity, upon the city wall. This wall was only single; but it was defended, along its whole length, by the permanent detachments occupying the three several fortified positions or encampments just mentioned. One of these positions was occupied by native Syracusans; a second, by Sicilian Greeks; a third, by other allies. Such was the improved and systematic scheme of defence which the genius of Gylippus first projected, and which he brought to execution at the present moment:[400] a scheme, the full value of which will be appreciated when we come to describe the proceedings of the second Athenian armament under Demosthenês.

Not content with having placed the Syracusans out of the reach of danger, Gylippus took advantage of their renewed confidence to infuse into them projects of retaliation against the enemy who had brought them so near to ruin. They began to equip their ships in the harbor, and to put their seamen under training, in hopes of qualifying themselves to contend with the Athenians even on their own element;

while Gylippus himself quitted the city to visit the various cities of the island, and to get together farther reinforcements, naval as well as military. And as it was foreseen that Nikias on his part would probably demand aid from Athens, envoys, Syracusan as well as Corinthian, were despatched to Peloponnesus, to urge the necessity of forwarding additional troops, even in merchant vessels, if no triremes could be spared to convey them.[401] Should no reinforcements reach the Athenian camp, the Syracusans well knew that its efficiency must diminish by every month's delay, while their own strength, in spite of heavy cost and effort, was growing with their increased prospects of success.

If this double conviction was present to sustain, the ardor of the Syracusans, it was not less painfully felt amidst the Athenian camp, now blocked up like a besieged city, and enjoying no free movement except through their ships and their command of the sea. Nikias saw that if Gylippus should return with any considerable additional force, even the attack upon him by land would become too powerful to resist, besides the increasing disorganization of his fleet. He became fully convinced that to remain as they were was absolute ruin. As all possibility of prosecuting the siege of Syracuse successfully was now at an end, a sound judgment would have dictated that his position in the harbor had become useless as well as dangerous, and that the sooner it was evacuated the better. Probably Demosthenês would have acted thus, under similar circumstances; but such foresight and resolution were not in the character of Nikias, who was afraid, moreover, of the blame which it would bring down upon him at home, if not from his own army. Not venturing to quit his position without orders from Athens, he determined to send home thither an undisguised account of his critical position, and to solicit either reinforcements or instructions to return.

It was now, indeed, the end of September (B.C. 414), so that he could not even hope for an answer before midwinter, nor for reinforcements, if such were to be sent, until the ensuing spring was far advanced. Nevertheless, he determined to encounter this risk, and to trust to vigilant precautions for safety during the interval, precautions which, as the result will show, were within a hair's breadth of proving insufficient. But as it was of the last importance to him to make his countrymen at home fully sensible of the grave danger of his position, he resolved to transmit a written despatch; not trusting to the oral statement of a messenger, who might be wanting either in courage, in presence of mind, or in competent expression, to impress the full and sad truth upon a reluctant audience.[402] Accordingly he sent home a despatch, which seems to have reached Athens about the end of November, and was read formally in the public assembly by the secretary of the city. Preserved by Thucydidês verbatim, it stands as one of the most interesting remnants of antiquity, and well deserves a literal translation.

"Our previous proceedings have been already made known to you, Athenians, in many other despatches;[403] but the present crisis is such as to require your delibera-

tion more than ever, when you shall have heard the situation in which we stand. After we had overcome in many engagements the Syracusans, against whom we were sent, and had built the fortified lines which we now occupy, there came upon us the Lacedæmonian Gylippus, with an army partly Peloponnesian, partly Sicilian. Him too we defeated, in the first action; but in a second, we were overwhelmed by a crowd of cavalry and darters, and forced to retire within our lines. And thus the superior number of our enemies has compelled us to suspend our circumvallation, and remain inactive; indeed, we cannot employ in the field even the full force which we possess, since a portion of our hoplites are necessarily required for the protection of our walls. Meanwhile the enemy have carried out a single intersecting counter-wall beyond our line of circumvallation, so that we can no longer continue the latter to completion, unless we have force enough to attack and storm their counter-wall. And things have come to such a pass, that we, who profess to besiege others, are ourselves rather the party besieged, by land at least, since the cavalry leave us scarce any liberty of motion. Farther, the enemy have sent envoys to Peloponnesus to obtain reinforcements, while Gylippus in person is going round the Sicilian cities, trying to stir up to action such of them as are now neutral, and to get, from the rest, additional naval and military supplies. For it is their determination, as I understand, not merely to assail our lines on shore with their land-force, but also to attack us by sea with their ships.

"Be not shocked when I tell you, that they intend to become aggressors even at sea. They know well, that our fleet was at first in high condition, with dry ships[404] and excellent crews; but now the ships have rotted, from remaining too long at sea, and the crews are ruined. Nor have we the means of hauling our ships ashore to refit, since the enemy's fleet, equal or superior in numbers, always appears on the point of attacking us. We see them in constant practice, and they can choose their own moment for attack. Moreover, they can keep their ships high and dry more than we can; for they are not engaged in maintaining watch upon others; while to us, who are obliged to retain all our fleet on guard, nothing less than prodigious superiority of number could insure the like facility. And were we to relax ever so little in our vigilance, we should no longer be sure of our supplies, which we bring in even now with difficulty close under their walls.

"Our crews, too, have been and are still wasting away from various causes. Among the seamen who are our own citizens, many, in going to a distance for wood, for water, or for pillage, are cut off by the Syracusan cavalry. Such of them as are slaves, desert, now that our superiority is gone, and that we have come to equal chances with our enemy; while the foreigners whom we pressed into our service, make off straight to some of the neighboring cities; and those who came, tempted by high pay, under the idea of enriching themselves by traffic rather than of fighting, now that they find the enemy in full competence to cope with us by sea as well as by land, either go over to him as professed deserters, or get away as they can amidst

the wide area of Sicily.[405] Nay, there are even some, who, while trafficking here on their own account, bribe the trierarchs to accept Hykkarian slaves as substitutes, and thus destroy the strict discipline of our marine. And you know as well as I, that no crew ever continues long in perfect condition, and that the first class of seamen, who set the ship in motion, and maintain the uniformity of the oar-stroke, is but a small fraction of the whole number.

"Among all these embarrassments, the worst of all is, that I as general can neither prevent the mischief, from the difficulty of your tempers to govern, nor can I provide supplementary recruits elsewhere, as the enemy can easily do from many places open to him. We have nothing but the original stock which we brought out with us, both to make good losses and to do present duty; for Naxus and Katana, our only present allies, are of insignificant strength. And if our enemy gain but one farther point,—if the Italian cities, from whence we now draw our supplies, should turn against us, under the impression of our present bad condition, with no reinforcement arriving from you,—we shall be starved out, and he will bring the war to triumphant close, even without a battle.

"Pleasanter news than these I could easily have found to send you; but assuredly nothing so useful, seeing that the full knowledge of the state of affairs here is essential to your deliberations. Moreover, I thought it even the safer policy to tell you the truth without disguise, understanding as I do your real dispositions, that you never listen willingly to any but the most favorable assurances, yet are angry in the end if they turn to unfavorable results. Be thoroughly satisfied, that in regard to the force against which you originally sent us, both your generals and your soldiers have done themselves no discredit. But now that all Sicily is united against us, and that farther reinforcements are expected from Peloponnesus, you must take your resolution with full knowledge that we here have not even strength to contend against our present difficulties. You must either send for us home, or you must send us a second army, land-force as well as naval, not inferior to that which is now here, together with a considerable supply of money. You must farther send a successor to supersede me, as I am incapable of work from a disease in the kidneys. I think myself entitled to ask this indulgence at your hands, for while my health lasted I did you much good service in various military commands. But whatever you intend, do it at the first opening of spring, without any delay: for the new succors which the enemy is getting together in Sicily, will soon be here, and those which are to come from Peloponnesus, though they will be longer in arriving, yet, if you do not keep watch, will either elude or forestall you as they have already once done."[406]

Such was the memorable despatch of Nikias, which was read to the public assembly of Athens about the end of November, or beginning of December, 414 B.C., brought by officers who strengthened its effect by their own oral communications, and answered all such inquiries as were put to them.[407] We have much reason to regret that Thucydidês does not give us any idea of the debate which so gloomy a

revelation called forth. He tells us merely the result: the Athenians resolved to comply with the second portion of the alternative put by Nikias; not to send for the present armament home, but to reinforce it by a second powerful armament, both of land and naval force, in prosecution of the same objects. But they declined his other personal request, and insisted on continuing him in command; passing a vote, however, to name Menander and Euthydemus, officers already in the army before Syracuse, joint commanders along with him, in order to assist him in his laborious duties. They sent Eurymedon speedily, about the winter solstice, in command of ten triremes to Syracuse, carrying one hundred and twenty talents of silver, together with assurances of coming aid to the suffering army. And they resolved to equip a new and formidable force, under Demosthenês and Eurymedon, to go thither as reinforcement in the earliest months of the spring. Demosthenês was directed to employ himself actively in getting this larger force ready.[408]

This letter of Nikias—so authentic, so full of matter, and so characteristic of the manners of the time—suggests several serious reflections, in reference both to himself and to the Athenian people. As to himself, there is nothing so remarkable as the sentence of condemnation which it pronounces on his own past proceedings in Sicily. When we find him lamenting the wear and tear of the armament, and treating the fact as notorious that even the best naval force could only maintain itself in good condition for a short time, what graver condemnation could be passed upon those eight months which he wasted in trifling measures, after his arrival in Sicily, before commencing the siege of Syracuse? When he announces that the arrival of Gylippus with his auxiliary force before Syracuse, made the difference to the Athenian army between triumph and something bordering on ruin, the inquiry naturally suggests itself, whether he had done his best to anticipate, and what precautions he had himself taken to prevent, the coming of the Spartan general. To which the answer must be, that, so far from anticipating the arrival of new enemies as a possible danger, he had almost invited them from abroad by his delay, and that he had taken no precautions at all against them, though forewarned and having sufficient means at his disposal. The desertion and demoralization of his naval force, doubtless but too real, was, as he himself points out, mainly the consequence of this turn of fortune, and was also the first commencement of that unmanageable temper of the Athenian soldiery, numbered among his difficulties. For it would be injustice to this unfortunate army not to recognize that they first acquiesced patiently in prolonged inaction, because their general directed it, and next did their duty most gallantly in the operations of the siege, down to the death of Lamachus.

If even with our imperfect knowledge of the case, the ruin complained of by Nikias be distinctly traceable to his own remissness and oversight, much more must this conviction have been felt by intelligent Athenians, both in the camp and in the city, as we shall see by the conduct of Demosthenês[409] hereafter to be related. Let us conceive the series of despatches, to which Nikias himself alludes, as having been

transmitted home, from their commencement. We must recollect that the expedition was originally sent from Athens with hopes of the most glowing character, and with a consciousness of extraordinary efforts about to be rewarded with commensurate triumphs. For some months, the despatches of the general disclose nothing but movements either abortive or inglorious; adorned, indeed, by one barren victory, but accompanied by an intimation that he must wait till the spring, and that reinforcements must be sent to him, before he can undertake the really serious enterprise. Though the disappointment occasioned by this news at Athens must have been mortifying, nevertheless his requisition was complied with; and the despatches of Nikias, during the spring and summer of 414 B.C., become cheering. The siege of Syracuse is described as proceeding successfully, and at length, about July or August, as being on the point of coming to a triumphant close, in spite of a Spartan adventurer, named Gylippus, making his way across the Ionian sea with a force too contemptible to be noticed. Suddenly, without any intermediate step to smooth the transition, comes a despatch announcing that this adventurer has marched into Syracuse at the head of a powerful army, and that the Athenians are thrown upon the defensive, without power of proceeding with the siege. This is followed, after a short time, by the gloomy and almost desperate communication above translated.

When we thus look at the despatch, not merely as it stands singly, but as falling in series with its antecedents, the natural effect which we should suppose it likely to produce upon the Athenians, would be a vehement burst of wrath and displeasure against Nikias. Upon the most candid and impartial scrutiny, he deserved nothing less. And when we consider, farther, the character generally ascribed by historians of Greece to the Athenian people, that they are represented as fickle, ungrateful, and irritable, by standing habit; as abandoning upon the most trifling grounds those whom they had once esteemed, forgetting all prior services, visiting upon innocent generals the unavoidable misfortunes of war, and impelled by nothing better than demagogic excitements, we naturally expect that the blame really deserved by Nikias would be exaggerated beyond all due measure, and break forth in a storm of violence and fury. Yet what is the actual resolution taken in consequence of his despatch, after the full and free debate of the Athenian assembly? Not a word of blame or displeasure is proclaimed. Doubtless there must have been individual speakers who criticized him as he deserved. To suppose the contrary, would be to think meanly indeed of the Athenian assembly. But the general vote was one not simply imputing no blame, but even pronouncing continued and unabated confidence. The people positively refuse to relieve him from the command, though he himself solicits it in a manner sincere and even touching. So great is the value which they set upon his services, and the esteem which they entertain for his character, that they will not avail themselves of the easy opportunity which he himself provides to get rid of him.

It is not by way of compliment to the Athenians that I make these remarks on their present proceeding. Quite the contrary. The misplaced confidence of the Athenians in Nikias, on more than one previous occasion, but especially on this, betrays an incapacity of appreciating facts immediately before their eyes, and a blindness to decisive and multiplied evidences of incompetency, which is one of the least creditable manifestations of their political history. But we do learn from it a clear lesson, that the habitual defects of the Athenian character were very different from what historians commonly impute to them. Instead of being fickle, we find them tenacious in the extreme of confidence once bestowed, and of schemes once embarked upon: instead of ingratitude for services actually rendered, we find credit given for services which an officer ought to have rendered, but has not: instead of angry captiousness, we discover an indulgence not merely generous, but even culpable, in the midst of disappointment and humiliation: instead of a public assembly, wherein, as it is commonly depicted, the criminative orators were omnipotent, and could bring to condemnation any unsuccessful general, however meritorious; we see that even grave and well-founded accusations make no impression upon the people in opposition to preëstablished personal esteem; and personal esteem for a man who not only was no demagogue, but in every respect the opposite of a demagogue: an oligarch by taste, sentiment, and position; who yielded to the democracy nothing more than sincere obedience, coupled with gentleness and munificence in his private bearing. If Kleon had committed but a small part of those capital blunders which discredit the military career of Nikias, he would have been irretrievably ruined. So much weaker was *his* hold upon his countrymen, by means of demagogic excellences, as compared with those causes which attracted confidence to Nikias; his great family and position, his wealth dexterously expended, his known incorruptibility against bribes, and even comparative absence of personal ambition, his personal courage combined with reputation for caution, his decorous private life and ultra-religious habits. All this assemblage of negative merits, and decencies of daily life, in a citizen whose station might have enabled him to act with the insolence of Alkibiadês, placed Nikias on a far firmer basis of public esteem than the mere power of accusatory speech in the public assembly or the dikastery could have done. It entitled him to have the most indulgent construction put upon all his shortcomings, and spread a fatal varnish over his glaring incompetence for all grave and responsible command.

The incident now before us is one of the most instructive in all history, as an illustration of the usual sentiment, and strongest causes of error, prevalent among the Athenian democracy, and as a refutation of that exaggerated mischief which it is common to impute to the person called a demagogue. Happy would it have been for Athens had she now had Kleon present, or any other demagogue of equal power, at that public assembly which took the melancholy resolution of sending fresh forces to Sicily and continuing Nikias in the command! The case was one in which the accusatory eloquence of the demagogue was especially called for, to expose the real past mismanagement of Nikias, to break down that undeserved confidence in his

ability and caution which had grown into a sentiment of faith or routine, to prove how much mischief he had already done, and how much more he would do if continued.[410] Unluckily for Athens, she had now no demagogue who could convince the assembly beforehand of this truth, and prevent them from taking the most unwise and destructive resolution ever passed in the Pnyx.

What makes the resolution so peculiarly discreditable, is, that it was adopted in defiance of clear and present evidence. To persist in the siege of Syracuse, under present circumstances, was sad misjudgment; to persist in it with Nikias as commander, was hardly less than insanity. The first expedition, though even *that* was rash and ill-conceived, nevertheless presented tempting hopes which explain, if they do not excuse, the too light estimate of impossibility of lasting possession. Moreover, there was at that time a confusion,—between the narrow objects connected with Leontini and Egesta, and the larger acquisitions to be realized through the siege of Syracuse,—which prevented any clear and unanimous estimate of the undertaking in the Athenian mind. But now, the circumstances of Sicily were fully known: the mendacious promises of Egesta had been exposed; the hopes of allies for Athens in the island were seen to be futile; while Syracuse, armed with a Spartan general and Peloponnesian aid, had not only become inexpugnable, but had assumed the aggressive: lastly, the chance of a renewal of Peloponnesian hostility against Attica had been now raised into certainty. While perseverance in the siege of Syracuse, therefore, under circumstances so unpromising and under such necessity for increased exertions at home, was a melancholy imprudence in itself, perseverance in employing Nikias converted that imprudence into ruin, which even the addition of an energetic colleague in the person of Demosthenês was not sufficient to avert. Those who study the conduct of the Athenian people on this occasion, will not be disposed to repeat against them the charge of fickleness which forms one of the standing reproaches against democracy. Their mistake here arose from the very opposite quality; from what may be called obtuseness, or inability to get clear of two sentiments which had become deeply engraven on their minds; ideas of Sicilian conquest, and confidence in Nikias.

A little more of this alleged fickleness—or easy escape from past associations and impressibility to actual circumstances—would have been at the present juncture a tutelary quality to Athens. She would then have appreciated more justly the increased hazards thickening around her both in Sicily and at home. War with Sparta, though not yet actually proclaimed, had become impending and inevitable. Even in the preceding winter, the Lacedæmonians had listened favorably to the recommendation of Alkibiadês[411] that they should establish a fortified post at Dekeleia in Attica. They had not yet indeed brought themselves to execution of this resolve; for the peace between them and Athens, though indirectly broken in many ways, still subsisted in name, and they hesitated to break it openly, partly because they knew that the breach of peace had been on their side at the beginning of the Peloponn-

nesian war; attributing to this fault their capital misfortune at Sphakteria.[412] Athens on her side had also scrupulously avoided direct violation of the Lacedæmonian territory, in spite of much solicitation from her allies at Argos. But her reserve on this point gave way during the present summer, probably at the time when her prospect of taking Syracuse appeared certain. The Lacedæmonians having invaded and plundered the Argeian territory, thirty Athenian triremes were sent to aid in its defence, under Pythodôrus with two colleagues. This armament disembarked on the eastern coast of Laconia near Prasiæ and committed devastations: which direct act of hostility—coming in addition to the marauding excursions of the garrison of Pylos, and to the refusal of pacific redress at Athens—satisfied the Lacedæmonians that the peace had been now first and undeniably broken by their enemy, so that they might with a safe conscience recommence the war.[413]

Such was the state of feeling between the two great powers of Central Greece in November 414 B.C., when the envoys arrived from Syracuse; envoys from Nikias on the one part, from Gylippus and the Syracusans on the other; each urgently calling for farther support. The Corinthians and Syracusans vehemently pressed their claims at Sparta; nor was Alkibiadês again wanting, to renew his instances for the occupation of Dekeleia. It was in the face of this impending liability to renewed Peloponnesian invasion that the Athenians took their resolution, above commented on, to send a second army to Syracuse and prosecute the siege with vigor. If there were any hesitation yet remaining on the part of the Lacedæmonians, it disappeared so soon as they were made aware of the imprudent resolution of Athens; which not only created an imperative necessity for sustaining Syracuse, but also rendered Athens so much more vulnerable at home, by removing the better part of her force. Accordingly, very soon after the vote passed at Athens, an equally decisive resolution for direct hostilities was adopted at Sparta. It was determined that a Peloponnesian allied force should be immediately prepared, to be sent at the first opening of spring to Syracuse, and that at the same time Attica should be invaded, and the post of Dekeleia fortified. Orders to this effect were immediately transmitted to the whole body of Peloponnesian allies; especially requisitions for implements, materials, and workmen, towards the construction of the projected fort at Dekeleia.[414]

CHAPTER LX.

FROM THE RESUMPTION OF DIRECT HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA, DOWN TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY.

THE Syracusan war now no longer stands apart, as an event by itself, but becomes absorbed in the general war rekindling throughout Greece. Never was any winter so actively and extensively employed in military preparations, as the winter of 414-413 B.C., the months immediately preceding that which Thucydidês terms the nineteenth spring of the Peloponnesian war, but which other historians call the beginning of the Dekeleian war.[415] While Eurymedon went with his ten triremes to Syracuse, even in midwinter, Demosthenês exerted himself all the winter to get together the second armament for early spring. Twenty other Athenian triremes were farther sent round Peloponnesus to the station of Naupaktus, to prevent any Corinthian reinforcements from sailing out of the Corinthian gulf. Against these latter, the Corinthians on their side prepared twenty-five fresh triremes, to serve as a convoy to the transports carrying their hoplites.[416] In Corinth, Sikyôn, and Bœotia, as well as at Lacedæmon, levies of hoplites were going on for the armament to Syracuse, at the same time that everything was getting ready for the occupation of Dekeleia. Lastly, Gylippus was engaged with not less activity in stirring up all Sicily to take a more decisive part in the coming year's struggle.

From Cape Tænarus in Laconia, at the earliest moment of spring, embarked a force of six hundred Lacedæmonian hoplites—Helots and Neodamodes—under the Spartan Ekkritus, and three hundred Bœotian hoplites under the Thebans Xenon and Nikon, with the Thespian Hegesandrus. They were directed to cross the sea southward to Kyrênê in Libya, and from thence to make their way along the African coast to Sicily. At the same time a body of seven hundred hoplites under Alexarchus, partly Corinthians, partly hired Arcadians, partly Sikyonians, under constraint from their powerful neighbors,[417] departed from the northwest of Peloponnesus and the mouth of the Corinthian gulf for Sicily, the Corinthian triremes watching them until they were past the Athenian squadron at Naupaktus.

These were proceedings of importance: but the most important of all was the reinvasion of Attica at the same time by the great force of the Peloponnesian alliance, under the Spartan king Agis son of Archidamus. Twelve years had elapsed since Attica last felt the hand of the destroyer, a little before the siege of Sphakteria. The plain in the neighborhood of Athens was now first laid waste, after which the invaders proceeded to their special purpose of erecting a fortified post for occupation at Dekeleia. The work, apportioned among the allies present, who had come prepared with the means of executing it, was completed during the present summer,

and a garrison was established there composed of contingents relieving each other at intervals, under the command of king Agis himself. Dekeleia was situated on an outlying eminence belonging to the range called Parnês, about fourteen miles to the north of Athens, near the termination of the plain of Athens, and commanding an extensive view of that plain as well as of the plain of Eleusis. The hill on which it stood, if not the fort itself, was visible even from the walls of Athens. It was admirably situated both as a central point for excursions over Attica, and for communication with Bœotia; while the road from Athens to Orôpus, the main communication with Eubœa, passed through the gorge immediately under it.[418]

We read with amazement, and the contemporary world saw with yet greater amazement, that while this important work was actually going on, and while the whole Peloponnesian confederacy was renewing its pressure with redoubled force upon Athens, at that very moment,[419] the Athenians sent out, not only a fleet of thirty triremes under Chariklês to annoy the coasts of Peloponnesus, but also the great armament which they had resolved upon under Demosthenês, to push offensive operations against Syracuse. The force under the latter general consisted of sixty Athenian and five Chian triremes; of twelve hundred Athenian hoplites of the best class, chosen from the citizen muster-roll; with a considerable number of hoplites besides, from the subject-allies and elsewhere. There had been also engaged on hire fifteen hundred peltasts from Thrace, of the tribe called Dii; but these men did not arrive in time, so that Demosthenês set sail without them.[420] Chariklês having gone forward to take aboard a body of allies from Argos, the two fleets joined at Ægina, inflicted some devastations on the coasts of Laconia, and established a strong post on the island of Kythêra to encourage desertion among the Helots. From hence Chariklês returned with the Argeians, while Demosthenês conducted his armament round Peloponnesus to Korkyra.[421] On the Eleian coast, he destroyed a transport carrying hoplites to Syracuse, though the men escaped ashore: from thence he proceeded to Zakynthus and Kephallenia, from whence he engaged some additional hoplites, and to Anaktorium, in order to procure darters and slingers from Akarnania. It was here that he was met by Eurymedon with his ten triremes, who had gone forward to Syracuse in the winter with the pecuniary remittance urgently required, and was now returning to act as colleague of Demosthenês in the command.[422] The news brought by Eurymedon from Sicily was in every way discouraging. Yet the two admirals were under the necessity of sparing ten triremes from their fleet to reinforce Konon at Naupaktus, who was not strong enough alone to contend against the Corinthian fleet which watched him from the opposite coast. To make good this diminution, Eurymedon went forward to Korkyra, with the view of obtaining from the Korkyræans fifteen fresh triremes and a contingent of hoplites, while Demosthenês was getting together the Akarnanian darters and slingers.[423]

Eurymedon not only brought back word of the distressed condition of the Athenians in the harbor of Syracuse, but had also learned, during his way back, their heavy

additional loss by the capture of the fort at Plemmyrium. Gylippus returned to Syracuse early in the spring, nearly about the time when Agis invaded Attica and when Demosthenês quitted Peiræus. He returned with fresh reinforcements from the interior, and with redoubled ardor for decisive operations against Nikias before aid could arrive from Athens. It was his first care, in conjunction with Hermokratês, to inspire the Syracusans with courage for fighting the Athenians on shipboard. Such was the acknowledged superiority of the latter at sea, that this was a task of some difficulty, calling for all the eloquence and ascendency of the two leaders: "The Athenians (said Hermokratês to his countrymen) have not been always eminent at sea as they now are: they were once landsmen like you, and more than you, they were only forced on shipboard by the Persian invasion. The only way to deal with bold men like them, is to show a front bolder still. *They* have often by their audacity daunted enemies of greater real force than themselves, and they must now be taught that others can play the same game with them. Go right at them before they expect it; and you will gain more by thus surprising and intimidating them, than you will suffer by their superior science." Such lessons, addressed to men already in the tide of success, were presently efficacious, and a naval attack was resolved.[424]

The town of Syracuse had two ports, one on each side of the island of Ortygia. The lesser port—as it was called afterwards, the Portus Lakkius—lay northward of Ortygia, between that island and the low ground or Nekropolis near the outer city: the other lay on the opposite side of the isthmus of Ortygia within the Great Harbor. Both of them, it appears, were protected against attack from without, by piles and stakes planted in the bottom in front of them. But the lesser port was the more secure of the two, and the principal docks of the Syracusans were situated within it; the Syracusan fleet, eighty triremes strong, being distributed between them. The entire Athenian fleet was stationed under the fort of Plemmyrium, immediately opposite to the southern point of Ortygia.

Gylippus laid his plan with great ability, so as to take the Athenians completely by surprise. Having trained and prepared the naval force as thoroughly as he could, he marched out his land-force secretly by night, over Epipolæ and round by the right bank of the Anapus, to the neighborhood of the fort of Plemmyrium. With the first dawn of morning, the Syracusan fleet sailed out, at one and the same signal, from both the ports; forty-five triremes out of the lesser port, thirty-five out of the other. Both squadrons tried to round the southern point of Ortygia, so as to unite and to attack the enemy at Plemmyrium in concert. The Athenians, though unprepared and confused, hastened to man sixty ships; with twenty-five of which, they met the thirty-five Syracusans sailing forth from the Great Harbor, while with the other thirty-five they encountered the forty-five from the lesser port, immediately outside of the mouth of the Great Harbor. In the former of these two actions the Syracusans were at first victors; in the second also, the Syracusans from the outside forced their way into the mouth of the Great Harbor, and joined their comrades. But being little accus-

tomed to naval warfare, they presently fell into complete confusion, partly in consequence of their unexpected success: so that the Athenians, recovering from the first shock, attacked them anew and completely defeated them; sinking or disabling eleven ships, of three of which the crews were made prisoners, the rest being mostly slain.[425] Three Athenian triremes were destroyed also.

But this victory, itself not easily won, was more than counterbalanced by the irreparable loss of Plemmyrium. During the first excitement at the Athenian naval station, when the ships were in course of being manned to meet the unexpected onset from both ports at once, the garrison of Plemmyrium went to the water's edge to watch and encourage their countrymen, leaving their own walls thinly guarded, and little suspecting the presence of their enemy on the land side. This was just what Gylippus had anticipated. He attacked the forts at daybreak, taking the garrison completely by surprise, and captured them after a feeble resistance; first the greatest and most important fort, next the two smaller. The garrison sought safety as they could, on board the transports and vessels of burden at the station, and rowed across the Great Harbor to the land-camp of Nikias on the other side. Those who fled from the greater fort, which was the first taken, ran some risk from the Syracusan triremes, which were at that moment victorious at sea. But by the time that the two lesser forts were taken, the Athenian fleet had regained its superiority, so that there was no danger of similar pursuit in the crossing of the Great Harbor.

This well-concerted surprise was no less productive to the captors than fatal as a blow to the Athenians. Not only were many men slain, and many made prisoners, in the assault, but there were vast stores of every kind, and even a large stock of money found within the fort; partly belonging to the military chest, partly the property of the trierarchs and of private merchants, who had deposited it there as in the place of greatest security. The sails of not less than forty triremes were also found there, and three triremes which had been dragged up ashore. Gylippus caused one of the three forts to be pulled down, and carefully garrisoned the other two.[426]

Great as the positive loss was here to the Athenians at a time when their situation could ill bear it, the collateral damage and peril growing out of the capture of Plemmyrium was yet more serious, besides the alarm and discouragement which it spread among the army. The Syracusans were now masters of the mouth of the harbor on both sides, so that not a single storeship could enter without a convoy and a battle. What was of not less detriment, the Athenian fleet was now forced to take station under the fortified lines of its own land-force, and was thus cramped up on a small space in the innermost portion of the Great Harbor, between the city-wall and the river Anapus; the Syracusans being masters everywhere else, with full communication between their posts all round, hemming in the Athenian position both by sea and by land.

To the Syracusans, on the contrary, the result of the recent battle proved every way encouraging; not merely from the valuable acquisition of Plemmyrium, but even from the sea-fight itself, which had indeed turned out to be a defeat, but which promised at first to be a victory, had they not thrown away the chance by their own disorder. It removed all superstitious fear of Athenian nautical superiority; while their position was so much improved by having acquired the command of the mouth of the harbor, that they began even to assume the aggressive at sea. They detached a squadron of twelve triremes to the coast of Italy, for the purpose of intercepting some merchant vessels coming with a supply of money to the Athenians. So little fear was there of an enemy at sea, that these vessels seem to have been coming without convoy, and were for the most part destroyed by the Syracusans, together with a stock of ship-timber which the Athenians had collected near Kaulonia. In touching at Lokri, on their return, they took aboard a company of Thespian hoplites who had made their way thither in a transport. They were also fortunate enough to escape the squadron of twenty triremes which Nikias detached to lie in wait for them near Megara, with the loss of one ship, however, including her crew.[427]

One of this Syracusan squadron had gone forward from Italy with envoys to Peloponnesus, to communicate the favorable news of the capture of Plemmyrium, and to accelerate as much as possible, the operations against Attica, in order that no reinforcements might be sent from thence. At the same time, other envoys went from Syracuse—not merely Syracusans, but also Corinthians and Lacedæmonians—to visit the cities in the interior of Sicily. They made known everywhere the prodigious improvement in Syracusan affairs arising from the gain of Plemmyrium, as well as the insignificant character of the recent naval defeat. They strenuously pleaded for farther aid to Syracuse without delay, since there were now the best hopes of being able to crush the Athenians in the harbor completely, before the reinforcements about to be despatched could reach them.[428]

While these envoys were absent on their mission, the Great Harbor was the scene of much desultory conflict, though not of any comprehensive single battle. Since the loss of Plemmyrium, the Athenian naval station was in the northwest interior corner of that harbor, adjoining the fortified lines occupied by their land-army. It was inclosed and protected by a row of posts or stakes stuck in the bottom and standing out of the water.[429] The Syracusans on their side had also planted a stockade in front of the interior port of Ortygia, to defend their ships, their ship-houses, and their docks within. As the two stations were not far apart, each party watched for opportunities of occasional attack or annoyance by missile weapons to the other; and daily skirmishes of this sort took place, in which on the whole the Athenians seem to have had the advantage. They even formed the plan of breaking through the outworks of the Syracusan dockyard, and burning the ships within. They brought up a ship of the largest size, with wooden towers and side defences, against the line of posts fronting the dockyard, and tried to force the entrance, either by means of divers, who sawed

them through at the bottom, or by boat-crews, who fastened ropes round them and thus unfixed or plucked them out. All this was done under cover of the great vessel with its towers manned by light-armed, who exchanged showers of missiles with the Syracusan bowmen on the top of the ship-houses, and prevented the latter from coming near enough to interrupt the operation. The Athenians contrived thus to remove many of the posts planted, even the most dangerous among them, those which did not reach to the surface of the water, and which therefore a ship approaching could not see. But they gained little by it, since the Syracusans were able to plant others in their room. On the whole, no serious damage was done, either to the dockyard or to the ships within. And the state of affairs in the Great Harbor stood substantially unaltered, during all the time that the envoys were absent on their Sicilian tour, probably three weeks or a month.[430]

These envoys had found themselves almost everywhere well received. The prospects of Syracuse were now so triumphant, and those of Nikias with his present force so utterly hopeless, that the waverers thought it time to declare themselves; and all the Greek cities in Sicily, except Agrigentum, which still remained neutral (and of course except Naxos and Katana), resolved on aiding the winning cause. From Kamarina came five hundred hoplites, four hundred darters, and three hundred bowmen; from Gela, five triremes, four hundred darters, and two hundred horsemen. Besides these, an additional force from the other cities was collected, to march to Syracuse in a body across the interior of the island, under the conduct of the envoys themselves. But this part of the scheme was frustrated by Nikias, who was rendered more vigilant by the present desperate condition of his affairs, than he had been in reference to the cross march of Gylippus. At his instance, the Sikel tribes Kentoripes and Halikyæi, allies of Athens, were prevailed upon to attack the approaching enemy. They planned a skilful ambuscade, set upon them unawares, and dispersed them with the loss of eight hundred men. All the envoys were also slain, except the Corinthian, who conducted the remaining force, about fifteen hundred in number, to Syracuse.[431]

This reverse—which seems to have happened about the time when Demosthenês with his armament were at Korkyra, on the way to Syracuse—so greatly dismayed and mortified the Syracusans, that Gylippus thought it advisable to postpone awhile the attack which he intended to have made immediately on the reinforcement arriving.[432] The delay of these few days proved nothing less than the salvation of the Athenian army.

It was not until Demosthenês was approaching Rhegium within two or three days' sail of Syracuse, that the attack was determined on without farther delay. Preparation in every way had been made for it long before, especially for the most effective employment of the naval force. The captains and ship-masters of Syracuse and Corinth had now become fully aware of the superiority of Athenian nautical manœuvre, and of the causes upon which that superiority depended. The Athenian trireme was of a

build comparatively light, fit for rapid motion through the water, and for easy change of direction: its prow was narrow, armed with a sharp projecting beak at the end, but hollow and thin, not calculated to force its way through very strong resistance. It was never intended to meet, in direct impact and collision, the prow of an enemy: such a proceeding passed among the able seamen of Athens for gross awkwardness. In advancing against an enemy's vessel, they evaded the direct shock, steered so as to pass by it, then, by the excellence and exactness of their rowing, turned swiftly round, altered their direction and came back before the enemy could alter his: or perhaps rowed rapidly round him, or backed their ship stern foremost, until the opportunity was found for driving the beak of their ship against some weak part of his, against the midships, the quarter, the stern, or the oarblades without. In such manœuvres the Athenians were unrivalled: but none such could be performed unless there were ample sea-room, which rendered their present naval station the most disadvantageous that could be imagined. They were cooped up in the inmost part of a harbor of small dimensions, close on the station of their enemies, and with all the shore, except their own lines, in possession of those enemies: so that they could not pull round from want of space, nor could they back water, because they durst not come near shore. In this contracted area, the only mode of fighting possible was by straightforward collision, prow against prow; a process which not only shut out all their superior manœuvring, but was unsuited to the build of their triremes. On the other hand, the Syracusans, under the advice of the able Corinthian steersman Aristo, altered the construction of their triremes to meet the special exigency of the case, disregarding all idea of what had been generally looked upon as good nautical manœuvring.[433] Instead of the long, thin, hollow, and sharp, advancing beak, striking the enemy considerably above the water-level, and therefore doing less damage, they shortened the prow, but made it excessively heavy and solid, and lowered the elevation of the projecting beak: so that it became not so much calculated to pierce, as to break in and crush by main force all the opposing part of the enemy's ship, not far above the water. What were called the epôtids, "ear-caps," or nozzles, projecting forwards to the right and left of the beak, were made peculiarly thick, and sustained by under-beams let in to the hull of the ship. In the Attic build, the beak stood forward very prominent, and the epôtids on each side of it were kept back, serving the same purpose as what are called catheads, in modern ships, to which the anchors are suspended: but in the Corinthian build, the beak projected less, and the epôtids more, so that they served to strike the enemy: instead of having one single beak, the Corinthian ship might be said to have three nozzles.[434] The Syracusans relied on the narrowness of the space, for shutting out the Athenian evolutions, and bringing the contest to nothing more than a straightforward collision; in which the weaker vessel would be broken and stove in at the prow, and thus rendered unmanageable.

Having completed these arrangements, their land-force was marched out under Gylippus to threaten one side of the Athenian lines, while the cavalry and the garrison of the Olympieion marched up to the other side. The Athenians were putting

themselves in position to defend their walls from what seemed to be a land attack, when they saw the Syracusan fleet, eighty triremes strong, sailing out from its dock prepared for action: upon which they too, though at first confused by this unexpected appearance, put their crews on shipboard, and went out of their palisaded station, seventy-five triremes in number, to meet the enemy. The whole day passed off, however, in desultory and indecisive skirmish, with trifling advantage to the Syracusans, who disabled one or two Athenian ships, yet merely tried to invite the Athenians to attack, without choosing themselves to force on a close and general action. [435]

It was competent to the Athenians to avoid altogether a naval action, at least until the necessity arose for escorting fresh supplies into the harbor, by keeping within their station; and as Demosthenês was now at hand, prudence counselled this reserve. Nikias himself, too, is said to have deprecated immediate fighting, but to have been outvoted by his two newly-appointed colleagues Menander and Euthydemus, who were anxious to show what they could do without Demosthenês, and took their stand upon Athenian maritime honor, which peremptorily forbade them to shrink from the battle when offered.[436]

Though on the next day the Syracusans made no movement, yet Nikias foreseeing that they would speedily recommence, and noway encouraged by the equal manifestations of the preceding day, caused every trierarch to repair what damage his ship had sustained, and even took the precaution of farther securing his naval station by mooring merchant-vessels just alongside of the openings in the palisade, about two hundred feet apart. The prows of these vessels were provided with dolphins, or beams lifted up on high and armed at the end with massive heads of iron, which could be so let fall as to crush any ship entering:[437] any Athenian trireme which might be hard-pressed, would thus be enabled to get through this opening where no enemy could follow, and choose her own time for sailing out again. Before night these arrangements were completed, and at the earliest dawn of next day, the Syracusans reappeared, with the same demonstrations both of land force and naval force as before. The Athenian fleet having gone forth to meet them, several hours were spent in the like indecisive and partial skirmishes, until at length the Syracusan fleet sailed back to the city again without bringing on any general or close combat. The Athenians, construing this retirement of the enemy as evidence of backwardness and unwillingness to fight,[438] and supposing the day's duty at an end, retired on their side within their own station, disembarked, and separated to get their dinners at leisure, having tasted no food that day.

But ere they had been long ashore, they were astonished to see the Syracusan fleet sailing back to renew the attack, in full battle order. This was a manœuvre suggested by the Corinthian Aristo, the ablest steersman in the fleet; at whose instance, the Syracusan admirals had sent back an urgent request to the city authorities, that an abundant stock of provisions might for that day be brought down to the sea-

shore, and sale be rendered compulsory; so that no time should be lost, when the fleet returned thither, in taking a hasty meal without dispersion of the crews. Accordingly the fleet, after a short but sufficient interval allowed for refreshment thus close at hand, was brought back unexpectedly to the enemy's station. Confounded at the sight, the Athenian crews forced themselves again on board, most of them yet without refreshment, and in the midst of murmurs and disorder.[439] On sailing out of their station, the indecisive skirmishing again commenced, and continued for some time, until at length the Athenian captains became so impatient of prolonged and exhausting fatigue, that they resolved to begin of themselves, and make the action close as well as general. Accordingly, the word of command was given, and they rowed forward to make the attack, which was cheerfully received by the Syracusans. By receiving the attack instead of making it, the latter were better enabled to insure a straightforward collision of prow against prow, excluding all circuit, backing, or evolutions, on the part of the enemy: at any rate, their steersmen contrived to realize this plan, and to crush, stave in, or damage, the forepart of many of the Athenian triremes, simply by superior weight of material and solidity on their own side. The Syracusan darters on the deck, moreover, as soon as the combat became close, were both numerous and destructive; while their little boats rowed immediately under the sides of the Athenian triremes, broke the blades of their oars, and shot darts in through the oar-holes, against the rowers within. At length the Athenians, after sustaining the combat bravely for some time, found themselves at such disadvantage, that they were compelled to give way and to seek shelter within their own station. The armed merchant-vessels which Nikias had planted before the openings in the palisade were now found of great use in checking the pursuing Syracusans; two of whose triremes, in the excitement of victory, pushed forward too near to them and were disabled by the heavy implements on board, one of them being captured with all her crew. The general victory of the Syracusans, however, was complete: seven Athenian triremes were sunk or disabled, many others were seriously damaged, and numbers of seamen either slain or made prisoners.[440]

Overjoyed with the result of this battle, which seems to have been no less skilfully planned than bravely executed, the Syracusans now felt confident of their superiority by sea as well as on land, and contemplated nothing less than the complete destruction of their enemies in the harbor. The generals were already concerting measures for renewed attack both by land and by sea, and a week or two more would probably have seen the ruin of this once triumphant besieging armament, now full of nothing but discouragement. The mere stoppage of supplies, in fact, as the Syracusans were masters of the mouth of the harbor, would be sure to starve it out in no long time, if they maintained their superiority at sea. All their calculations were suspended, however, and the hopes of the Athenians for the time revived, by the entry of Demosthenês and Eurymedon with the second armament into the Great Harbor; which seems to have taken place on the very day, or on the second day, after the recent battle.[441] So important were the consequences which turned upon that postpone-

ment of the Syracusan attack, occasioned by the recent defeat of their reinforcing army from the interior. So little did either party think, at that moment, that it would have been a mitigation of calamity to Athens, if Demosthenês had *not* arrived in time; if the ruin of the first armament had been actually consummated before the coming of the second!

Demosthenês, after obtaining the required reinforcements at Korkyra, had crossed the Ionian sea to the islands called Chœrades on the coast of Iapygia; where he took aboard a band of one hundred and fifty Messapian darters, through the friendly aid of the native prince Artas, with whom an ancient alliance was renewed. Passing on farther to Metapontum, already in alliance with Athens, he was there reinforced with two triremes and three hundred darters, with which addition he sailed on to Thurii. Here he found himself cordially welcomed; for the philo-Athenian party was in full ascendency, having recently got the better in a vehement dissension, and passed a sentence of banishment against their opponents.[442] They not only took a formal resolution to acknowledge the same friends and the same enemies as the Athenians, but equipped a regiment of seven hundred hoplites and three hundred darters to accompany Demosthenês, who remained there long enough to pass his troops in review and verify the completeness of each division. After having held this review on the banks of the river Sybaris, he marched his troops by land through the Thurian territory to the banks of the river Hylias which divided it from Kroton. He was here met by Krotoniate envoys, who forbade the access to their territory: upon which he marched down the river to the sea-shore, got on shipboard, and pursued his voyage southward along the coast of Italy, touching at the various towns, all except the hostile Lokri.[443]

His entry into the harbor of Syracuse,[444] accomplished in the most ostentatious trim, with decorations and musical accompaniments, was no less imposing from the magnitude of his force than critical in respect to opportunity. Taking Athenians, allies, and mercenary forces, together, he conducted seventy-three triremes, five thousand hoplites, and a large number of light troops of every description,—archers, slingers, darters, etc., with other requisites for effective operation. At the sight of such an armament, not inferior to the first which had arrived under Nikias, the Syracusans lost for a moment the confidence of their recent triumph, and were struck with dismay as well as wonder.[445] That Athens could be rash enough to spare such an armament, at a moment when the full burst of Peloponnesian hostility was reopening upon her, and when Dekeleia was in course of being fortified, was a fact out of all reasonable probability, and not to be credited unless actually seen. And probably the Syracusans, though they knew that Demosthenês was on his way, had no idea beforehand of the magnitude of his armament.

On the other hand, the hearts of the discomfited and beleaguered Athenians again revived as they welcomed their new comrades. They saw themselves again masters by land as well as by sea; and they displayed their renewed superiority by

marching out of their lines forthwith and ravaging the lands near the Anapus; the Syracusans not venturing to engage in a general action, and merely watching the movement with some cavalry from the Olympieion.

But Demosthenês was not imposed upon by this delusive show of power, so soon as he had made himself master of the full state of affairs, and had compared his own means with those of the enemy. He found the army of Nikias not merely worn down with long-continued toil, and disheartened by previous defeat, but also weakened in a terrible degree by the marsh fever general towards the close of summer, in the low ground where they were encamped.[446]

He saw that the Syracusans were strong in multiplied allies, extended fortifications, a leader of great ability, and general belief that theirs was the winning cause. Moreover, he felt deeply the position of Athens at home, and her need of all her citizens against enemies within sight of her own walls. But above all, he came penetrated with the deplorable effects which had resulted from the mistake of Nikias, in wasting irreparably so much precious time, and frittering away the first terror-striking impression of his splendid armament. All these considerations determined Demosthenês to act, without a moment's delay and while the impression produced by his arrival was yet unimpaired, and to aim one great and decisive blow, such as might, if successful, make the conquest of Syracuse again probable. If this should fail, he resolved to abandon the whole enterprise, and return home with his armament forthwith.[447]

By means of the Athenian lines, he had possession of the southernmost portion of the slope of Epipolæ. But all along that slope from east to west, immediately in front or to the north of his position, stretched the counter-wall built by the Syracusans; beginning at the city wall on the lowest ground, and reaching up first in a northwesterly, next in a westerly direction, until it joined the fort on the upper ground near the cliff, where the road from Euryalus down to Syracuse passed. The Syracusans, as defenders, were on the north side of this counter-wall; he and the Athenians on the south side. It was a complete bar to his progress, nor could he stir a step without making himself master of it: towards which end there were only two possible means,—either to storm it in front, or to turn it from its western extremity by marching round up to the Euryalus. He began by trying the first method; but the wall was abundantly manned and vigorously defended; his battering machines were all burnt or disqualified, and every attempt which he made was completely repulsed. [448] There then remained only the second method, to turn the wall, ascending by circuitous roads to the heights of Euryalus behind it, and then attacking the fort in which it terminated.

But the march necessary for this purpose, first, up the valley of the Anapus, visible from the Syracusan posts above; next, ascending to the Euryalus by a narrow and winding path, was so difficult, that even Demosthenês, naturally sanguine, de-

spaired of being able to force his way up in the daylight, against an enemy seeing the attack. He was therefore constrained to attempt a night-surprise, for which, Nikias and his other colleagues consenting, he accordingly made preparations on the largest and most effective scale. He took the command himself, along with Menander and Eurymedon (Nikias being left to command within the lines),[449] conducting hoplites and light troops, together with masons and carpenters, and all other matters necessary for establishing a fortified post; lastly, giving orders that every man should carry with him provisions for five days.

Fortune so far favored him, that not only all these preliminary arrangements, but even his march itself, was accomplished without any suspicion of the enemy. At the beginning of a moonlight night, he quitted the lines, moved along the low ground on the left bank of the Anapus and parallel to that river for a considerable distance, then following various roads to the right, arrived at the Euryalus, or highest pitch of Epipolæ, where he found himself in the same track by which the Athenians in coming from Katana a year and a half before—and Gylippus in coming from the interior of the island about ten months before—had passed, in order to get to the slope of Epipolæ above Syracuse. He reached, without being discovered, the extreme Syracusan fort on the high ground, assailed it completely by surprise, and captured it after a feeble resistance. Some of the garrison within it were slain; but the greater part escaped, and ran to give the alarm to the three fortified camps of Syracusans and allies, which were placed one below another behind the long continuous wall,[450] on the declivity of Epipolæ, as well as to a chosen regiment of six hundred Syracusan hoplites under Hermokratês,[451] who formed a night-watch, or bivouac. This regiment hastened up to the rescue, but Demosthenês and the Athenian vanguard charging impetuously forward, drove them back in disorder upon the fortified positions in their rear. Even Gylippus and the Syracusan troops advancing upwards out of these positions, were at first carried back by the same retreating movement.

So far the enterprise of Demosthenês had been successful beyond all reasonable hope. He was master not only of the outer fort of the Syracusan position, but also of the extremity of their counter-wall which rested upon that fort; the counter-wall was no longer defensible, now that he had got on the north or Syracusan side of it, so that the men on the parapet, where it joined the fort, made no resistance, and fled. Some of the Athenians even began to tear down the parapets, and demolish this part of the counter-wall, an operation of extreme importance, since it would have opened to Demosthenês a communication with the southern side of the counter-wall, leading directly towards the Athenian lines on Epipolæ. At any rate, his plan of turning the counter-wall was already carried, if he could only have maintained himself in his actual position, even without advancing farther, and if he could have demolished two or three hundred yards of the upper extremity of the wall now in his power. Whether it would have been possible for him to maintain himself without farther advance, until day broke, and thus avoid the unknown perils of a night-battle, we cannot say. But

both he and his men, too much flushed with success to think of halting, hastened forward to complete their victory, and to prevent the disordered Syracusans from again recovering a firm array. Unfortunately, however, their ardor of pursuit—as it constantly happened with Grecian hoplites—disturbed the regularity of their own ranks, so that they were not in condition to stand the shock of the Bœotian hoplites, just emerged from their position, and marching up in steady and excellent order to the scene of action. The Bœotians charged them, and after a short resistance, broke them completely, forcing them to take flight. The fugitives of the van were thus driven back upon their own comrades advancing from behind, still under the impression of success, ignorant of what had passed in front, and themselves urged on by the fresh troops closing up in their rear.

In this manner the whole army presently became one scene of clamor and confusion wherein there was neither command nor obedience, nor could any one discern what was passing. The light of the moon rendered objects and figures generally visible, without being sufficient to discriminate friend from foe. The beaten Athenians, thrown back upon their comrades, were in many cases mistaken for enemies, and slain. The Syracusans and Bœotians, shouting aloud and pursuing their advantage, became intermingled with the foremost Athenians, and both armies thus grouped into knots which only distinguished each other by mutual demand of the watchword. This test also soon failed, since each party got acquainted with the watchword of the other, especially that of the Athenians, among whom the confusion was the greatest, became well known to the Syracusans, who kept together in larger parties. Above all, the effect of the pæan or war-shout on both sides was remarkable. The Dorians in the Athenian army—from Argos, Korkyra, and other places—raised a pæan not distinguishable from that of the Syracusans; accordingly, their shout struck terror into the Athenians themselves, who fancied that they had enemies in their own rear and centre. Such disorder and panic presently ended in a general flight. The Athenians hurried back by the same roads which they had ascended; but these roads were found too narrow for terrified fugitives, and many of them threw away their arms in order to scramble or jump down the cliffs, in which most of them perished. Even of those who safely effected their descent into the plain below, many—especially the newcomers belonging to the armament of Demosthenês—lost their way through ignorance, and were cut off the next day by the Syracusan horse. With terrible loss of numbers, and broken spirit, the Athenians at length found shelter within their own lines. Their loss of arms was even greater than that of men, from the throwing away of shields by those soldiers who leaped the cliff.[452]

The overjoyed Syracusans erected two trophies, one upon the road to Epipolæ, the other upon the exact and critical spot where the Bœotians had first withstood and first repelled the enemy. By this unexpected and overwhelming victory, their feelings were restored to the same pitch of confidence which had animated them before the arrival of Demosthenês. Again now masters of the field, they again indulged

the hope of storming the Athenian lines and destroying the armament; to which end, however, it was thought necessary to obtain additional reinforcements, and Gylippus went in person with this commission to the various cities of Sicily, while Sikanus with fifteen triremes was despatched to Agrigentum, then understood to be wavering, and in a political crisis.[453]

During this absence of Gylippus, the Athenian generals were left to mourn the recent reverse, and to discuss the exigencies of their untoward position. The whole armament was now full of discouragement and weariness; impatient to escape from a scene where fever daily thinned their numbers, and where they seemed destined to nothing but dishonor. Such painful evidences of increasing disorganization only made Demosthenês more strenuous in enforcing the resolution which he had taken before the attack on Epipolæ. He had done his best to strike one decisive blow; the chances of war had turned out against him, and inflicted a humiliating defeat; he now therefore insisted on relinquishing the whole enterprise and returning home forthwith. The season was yet favorable for the voyage (it seems to have been the beginning of August), while the triremes recently brought, as yet unused, rendered them masters at sea for the present. It was idle, he added, to waste more time and money in staying to carry on war against Syracuse, which they could not now hope to subdue, especially when Athens had so much need of them all at home, against the garrison of Dekeleia.[454]

This proposition, though espoused and seconded by Eurymedon, was peremptorily opposed by Nikias; who contended, first, that their present distress and the unpromising chances for the future, though he admitted the full reality of both, ought not nevertheless to be publicly proclaimed. A formal resolution to retire, passed in the presence of so many persons, would inevitably become known to the enemy, and therefore could never be executed with silence and secrecy,[455] as such a resolution ought to be. But farthermore, he (Nikias) took a decided objection to the resolution itself. He would never consent to carry back the armament, without specific authority from home to do so. Sure he was, that the Athenian people would never tolerate such a proceeding. When submitted to the public assembly at home, the conduct of the generals would be judged, not by persons who had been at Syracuse and cognizant of the actual facts, but by hearers who would learn all that they knew from the artful speeches of criminative orators. Even the citizens actually serving, though now loud in cries of suffering, and impatient to get home, would alter their tone when they were safe in the public assembly; and would turn round to denounce their generals as having been bribed to bring away the army. Speaking his own personal feelings, he knew too well the tempers of his countrymen to expose himself to the danger of thus perishing under a charge alike unmerited and disgraceful. Sooner would he incur any extremity of risk from the enemy.[456] It must be recollected too, he added, that if *their* affairs were now bad, those of Syracuse were as bad, and even worse. For more than a year, the war had been imposing upon the Syracusans

a ruinous cost, in subsistence for foreign allies as well as in keeping up outlying posts; so that they had already spent two thousand talents, besides heavy debts contracted and not paid. They could not continue in this course longer; yet the suspension of their payments would at once alienate their allies, and leave them helpless. The cost of the war—to which Demosthenês had alluded as a reason for returning home—could be much better borne by Athens; while a little farther pressure would utterly break down the Syracusans. He (Nikias) therefore advised to remain where they were and continue the siege;[457] the more so, as their fleet had now become unquestionably the superior.

Both Demosthenês and Eurymedon protested in the strongest language against the proposition of Nikias. Especially they treated the plan of remaining in the Great Harbor as fraught with ruin, and insisted, at the very least, on quitting this position without a moment's delay. Even admitting, for argument, the scruples of Nikias against abandoning the Syracusan war without formal authority from home, they still urged an immediate transfer of their camp from the Great Harbor to Thapsus or Katana. At either of these stations they could prosecute operations against Syracuse, with all the advantage of a wider range of country for supplies, a healthier spot, and above all, of an open sea, which was absolutely indispensable to the naval tactics of Athenians; escaping from that narrow basin which condemned them to inferiority even on their own proper element. At all events to remove, and remove forthwith, out of the Great Harbor, such was the pressing requisition of Demosthenês and Eurymedon.[458]

But even to the modified motion of transferring the actual position to Thapsus or Katana, Nikias refused to consent. He insisted on remaining as they were; and it appears that Menander and Euthydemus[459]—colleagues named by the assembly at home, before the departure of the second armament—must have voted under the influence of his authority; whereby the majority became on his side. Nothing less than being in a minority, probably, would have induced Demosthenês and Eurymedon to submit, on a point of such transcendent importance.

It was thus that the Athenian armament remained without quitting the harbor, yet apparently quite inactive, during a period which cannot have been less than between three weeks and a month, until Gylippus returned to Syracuse with fresh reinforcements. Throughout the army, hope of success appears to have vanished, while anxiety for return had become general. The opinions of Demosthenês and Eurymedon were doubtless well known, and orders for retreat were expected, but never came. Nikias obstinately refused to give them, during the whole of this fatal interval; which plunged the army into the abyss of ruin, instead of mere failure in their aggressive enterprise.

So unaccountable did such obstinacy appear, that many persons gave Nikias credit for knowing more than he chose to reveal. Even Thucydidês thinks that he was

misled by that party in Syracuse with whom he had always kept up a secret correspondence, seemingly apart from his colleagues, and who still urged him, by special messages, not to go away; assuring him that Syracuse could not possibly go on longer. Without fully trusting these intimations, he could not bring himself to act against them; and he therefore hung back from day to day, and refused to pronounce the decisive word.[460]

Nothing throughout the whole career of Nikias is so inexplicable as his guilty fatuity—for we can call it by no lighter name, seeing that it involved all the brave men around him in one common ruin with himself—at the present critical juncture. How can we suppose him to have really believed that the Syracusans, now in the flood-tide of success, and when Gylippus was gone forth to procure additional forces, would break down and be unable to carry on the war? Childish as such credulity seems, we are nevertheless compelled to admit it as real, to such an extent as to counterbalance all the pressing motives for departure, motives enforced by discerning colleagues as well as by the complaints of the army, and brought home to his own observation by the experience of the late naval defeat. At any rate, it served as an excuse for that fatal weakness of his character which made him incapable of taking resolutions founded on prospective calculations, and chained him to his actual position until he was driven to act by imminent necessity.

But we discern on the present occasion another motive, which counts for much in dictating his hesitation. The other generals think with satisfaction of going back to their country and rescuing the force which yet remained, even under circumstances of disappointment and failure. Not so Nikias: he knows too well the reception which he had deserved, and which might possibly be in store for him. Avowedly, indeed, he anticipates reproach from the Athenians against the generals, but only unmerited reproach, on the special ground of bringing away the army without orders from home; adding some harsh criticisms upon the injustice of the popular judgment and the perfidy of his own soldiers. But in the first place, we may remark, that Demosthenês and Eurymedon, though as much responsible as he was for this decision, had no such fear of popular injustice; or, if they had, saw clearly that the obligation of braving it was here imperative. And in the next place, no man ever had so little reason to complain of the popular judgment as Nikias. The mistakes of the people in regard to him had always been those of indulgence, over-esteem, and over-constancy. But Nikias foresaw too well that he would have more to answer for at Athens than the simple fact of sanctioning retreat under existing circumstances. He could not but remember the pride and sanguine hopes under which he had originally conducted the expedition out of Peiræus, contrasted with the miserable sequel and ignominious close, even if the account had been now closed, without worse. He could not but be conscious, more or less, how much of all this was owing to his own misjudgment; and under such impressions, the idea of meeting the free criticisms and scrutiny of his fellow-citizens—even putting aside the chance of judicial trial—must have been

insupportably humiliating. To Nikias,—a perfectly brave man, and suffering withal under an incurable disease,—life at Athens had neither charm nor honor left. Hence, as much as from any other reason, he was induced to withhold the order for departure; clinging to the hope that some unforeseen boon of fortune might yet turn up, and yielding to the idlest delusions from correspondents in the interior of Syracuse.[461]

Nearly a month after the night-battle on Epipolæ,[462] Gylippus and Sikanus both returned to Syracuse. The latter had been unsuccessful at Agrigentum, where the philo-Syracusan party had been sent into banishment before his arrival; but Gylippus brought with him a considerable force of Sicilian Greeks, together with those Peloponnesian hoplites who had started from Cape Tænarus in the early spring, and who had made their way from Kyrênê first along the coast of Africa, and then across to Selinus. Such increase of strength immediately determined the Syracusans to resume the aggressive both by land and by sea. In the Athenians, as they saw the new allies marching in over Epipolæ, it produced a deeper despondency, combined with bitter regret that they had not adopted the proposition of departing immediately after the battle of Epipolæ, when Demosthenês first proposed it. The late interval of lingering hopeless inaction with continued sickness, had farther weakened their strength, and Demosthenês now again pressed the resolution for immediate departure. Whatever fancies Nikias may have indulged about Syracusan embarrassments, were dissipated by the arrival of Gylippus; nor did he venture to persist in his former peremptory opposition, though even now he seems to have assented against his own conviction.[463] He however insisted, with good reason, that no formal or public vote should be taken on the occasion, but that the order should be circulated through the camp, as privately as possible, to be ready for departure at a given signal. Intimation was sent to Katana that the armament was on the point of coming away, with orders to forward no farther supplies.[464]

This plan was proceeding successfully: the ships were made ready, much of the property of the army had already been conveyed aboard without awakening the suspicion of the enemy, the signal would have been hoisted on the ensuing morning, and within a few hours this fated armament would have found itself clear of the harbor, with comparatively small loss,[465] when the gods themselves—I speak in the language and feelings of the Athenian camp—interfered to forbid its departure. On the very night before, the 27th August, 413 B.C., which was full moon, the moon was eclipsed. Such a portent, impressive to the Athenians at all times, was doubly so under their present despondency, and many of them construed it as a divine prohibition against departure until a certain time should have elapsed, with expiatory ceremonies to take off the effect. They made known their wish for postponement to Nikias and his colleagues; but their interference was superfluous, for Nikias himself was more deeply affected than any one else. He consulted the prophets, who declared that the army ought not to decamp until thrice nine days, a full circle of the moon, should have passed over.[466] And Nikias took upon himself to announce, that

until after the interval indicated by them, he would not permit even any discussion or proposition on the subject.

The decision of the prophets, which Nikias thus made his own, was a sentence of death to the Athenian army, yet it went along with the general feeling, and was obeyed without hesitation. Even Demosthenês, though if he had commanded alone, he might have tried to overrule it, found himself compelled to yield. Yet according to Philochorus, himself a professional diviner, skilful in construing the religious meaning of events, it was a decision decidedly wrong; that is, wrong according to the canonical principles of divination. To men planning escape, or any other operation requiring silence and secrecy, an eclipse of the moon, as hiding light and producing darkness, was, he affirmed, an encouraging sign, and ought to have made the Athenians even more willing and forward in quitting the harbor. We are told, too, that Nikias had recently lost by death Stilbidês, the ablest prophet in his service, and that he was thus forced to have recourse to prophets of inferior ability.[467] His piety left no means untried of appeasing the gods, by prayer, sacrifice, and expiatory ceremonies, continued until the necessity of actual conflict arrived.[468]

The impediment thus finally and irreparably intercepting the Athenian departure, was the direct, though unintended, consequence of the delay previously caused by Nikias. We cannot doubt, however, that, when the eclipse first happened, he regarded it as a sign confirmatory of the opinion which he had himself before delivered, and that he congratulated himself upon having so long resisted the proposition for going away. Let us add, that all those Athenians who were predisposed to look upon eclipses as signs from heaven of calamity about to come, would find themselves strengthened in that belief by the unparalleled woes even now impending over this unhappy army.

What interpretation the Syracusans, confident and victorious, put on the eclipse, we are not told. But they knew well how to interpret the fact, which speedily came to their knowledge, that the Athenians had fully resolved to make a furtive escape, and had only been prevented by the eclipse. Such a resolution, amounting to an unequivocal confession of helplessness, emboldened the Syracusans yet farther, to crush them as they were in the harbor, and never to permit them to occupy even any other post in Sicily. Accordingly, Gylippus caused his triremes to be manned and practised for several days: he then drew out his land-force, and made a demonstration of no great significance against the Athenian lines. On the morrow, he brought out all his forces, both land and naval; with the former of which he beset the Athenian lines, while the fleet, seventy-six triremes in number, was directed to sail up to the Athenian naval station. The Athenian fleet, eighty-six triremes strong, sailed out to meet it, and a close, general, and desperate action took place. The fortune of Athens had fled. The Syracusans first beat the centre division of the Athenians; next, the right division under Eurymedon, who in attempting an evolution to outflank the enemy's left, forgot those narrow limits of the harbor which were at every turn the ruin of the

Athenian mariner, neared the land too much, and was pinned up against it, in the recess of Daskon, by the vigorous attack of the Syracusans. He was here slain, and his division destroyed: successively, the entire Athenian fleet was beaten and driven ashore.

Few of the defeated ships could get into their own station. Most of them were forced ashore or grounded on points without those limits; upon which Gylippus marched down his land-force to the water's edge, in order to prevent the retreat of the crews as well as to assist the Syracusan seamen in hauling off the ships as prizes. His march, however, was so hurried and disorderly, that the Tyrrhenian troops, on guard at the flank of the Athenian station, sallied out against them as they approached, beat the foremost of them, and drove them away from the shore into the marsh called Lysimeleia. More Syracusan troops came to their aid; but the Athenians also, anxious above all things for the protection of their ships, came forth in greater numbers; and a general battle ensued in which the latter were victorious. Though they did not inflict much loss upon the enemy, yet they saved most of their own triremes which had been driven ashore, together with the crews, and carried them into the naval station. Except for this success on land, the entire Athenian fleet would have been destroyed: as it was, the defeat was still complete, and eighteen triremes were lost, all their crews being slain. This was probably the division of Eurymedon, which having been driven ashore in the recess of Daskon, was too far off from the Athenian station to receive any land assistance. As the Athenians were hauling in their disabled triremes, the Syracusans made a last effort to destroy them by means of a fireship, for which the wind happened to be favorable. But the Athenians found means to prevent her approach, and to extinguish the flames.[469]

Here was a complete victory gained over Athens on her own element, gained with inferior numbers, gained even over the fresh and yet formidable fleet recently brought by Demosthenês. It told but too plainly on which side the superiority now lay, how well the Syracusans had organized their naval strength for the specialties of their own harbor, how ruinous had been the folly of Nikias in retaining his excellent seamen imprisoned within that petty and unwholesome lake, where land and water alike did the work of their enemies. It not only disheartened the Athenians, but belied all their past experience, and utterly confounded them. Sickness of the whole enterprise, and repentance for having undertaken it, now became uppermost in their minds: yet it is remarkable that we hear of no complaints against Nikias separately. [470] But repentance came too late. The Syracusans, fully alive to the importance of their victory, sailed round the harbor in triumph as again their own,[471] and already looked on the enemy within it as their prisoners. They determined to close up and guard the mouth of it, from Plemmyrium to Ortygia, so as to leave no farther liberty of exit.

Nor were they insensible how vastly the scope of the contest was now widened, and the value of the stake before them enhanced. It was not merely to rescue their

own city from siege, nor even to repel and destroy the besieging army, that they were now contending. It was to extinguish the entire power of Athens, and liberate the half of Greece from dependence; for Athens could never be expected to survive so terrific a loss as that of the entire double armament before Syracuse.[472] The Syracusans exulted in the thought that this great achievement would be theirs, that their city was the field, and their navy the chief instrument of victory: a lasting source of glory to them, not merely in the eyes of contemporaries, but even in those of posterity. Their pride swelled when they reflected on the Pan-Hellenic importance which the siege of Syracuse had now acquired, and when they counted up the number and variety of Greek warriors who were now fighting, on one side or the other, between Euryalus and Plemmyrium. With the exception of the great struggle between Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy, never before had combatants so many and so miscellaneous been engaged under the same banners. Greeks, continental and insular, Ionic, Doric, and Æolic, autonomous and dependent, volunteers and mercenaries, from Miletus and Chios in the east to Selinus in the west, were all here to be found; and not merely Greeks, but also the barbaric Sikels, Egestæans, Tyrrhenians, and Iapygians. If the Lacædemonians, Corinthians, and Bœotians were fighting on the side of Syracuse, the Argeians and Mantineians, not to mention the great insular cities, stood in arms against her. The jumble of kinship among the combatants on both sides, as well as the cross action of different local antipathies, is put in lively antithesis by Thucydidês.[473] But amidst so vast an assembled number, of which they were the chiefs, the paymasters, and the centre of combination, the Syracusans might well feel a sense of personal aggrandizement, and a consciousness of the great blow which they were about to strike, sufficient to exalt them for the time above the level even of their great Dorian chiefs in Peloponnesus.

It was their first operation, occupying three days, to close up the mouth of the Great Harbor, which was nearly one mile broad, with vessels of every description, triremes, traders, boats, etc., anchored in an oblique direction, and chained together.[474] They at the same time prepared their naval force with redoubled zeal for the desperate struggle which they knew to be coming. They then awaited the efforts of the Athenians, who watched their proceedings with sadness and anxiety.

Nikias and his colleagues called together the principal officers to deliberate what was to be done. As they had few provisions remaining, and had counter-ordered their farther supplies, some instant and desperate effort was indispensable; and the only point in debate was, whether they should burn their fleet and retire by land, or make a fresh maritime exertion to break out of the harbor. Such had been the impression left by the recent sea-fight, that many in the camp leaned to the former scheme.[475] But the generals resolved upon first trying the latter, and exhausted all their combinations to give to it the greatest possible effect. They now evacuated the upper portion of their lines, both on the higher ground of Epipolæ, and even on the lower ground, such portion as was nearest to the southern cliff; confining themselves

to a limited fortified space close to the shore, just adequate for their sick, their wounded, and their stores; in order to spare the necessity for a large garrison to defend them, and thus leave nearly their whole force disposable for sea-service. They then made ready every trireme in the station, which could be rendered ever so imperfectly seaworthy, constraining every fit man to serve aboard them, without distinction of age, rank, or country. The triremes were manned with double crews of soldiers, hoplites as well as bowmen and darters, the latter mostly Akarnanians; while the hoplites, stationed at the prow with orders to board the enemy as quickly as possible, were furnished with grappling-irons to detain the enemy's ship immediately after the moment of collision, in order that it might not be withdrawn and the collision repeated, with all its injurious effects arising from the strength and massiveness of the Syracusan epôtids. The best consultation was held with the steersmen as to arrangement and manœuvres of every trireme, nor was any precaution omitted which the scanty means at hand allowed. In the well-known impossibility of obtaining new provisions, every man was anxious to hurry on the struggle.[476] But Nikias, as he mustered them on the shore immediately before going aboard, saw but too plainly that it was the mere stress of desperation which impelled them; that the elasticity, the disciplined confidence, the maritime pride, habitual to the Athenians on shipboard, was extinct, or dimly and faintly burning.

He did his best to revive them, by exhortations unusually emphatic and impressive. "Recollect (he said) that you too, not less than the Syracusans, are now fighting for your own safety and for your country; for it is only by victory in the coming struggle that any of you can ever hope to see his country again. Yield not to despair like raw recruits after a first defeat; you, Athenians and allies, familiar with the unexpected revolutions of war, will hope now for the fair turn of fortune, and fight with a spirit worthy of the great force which you see here around you. We generals have now made effective provision against our two great disadvantages, the narrow circuit of the harbor, and the thickness of the enemy's prows.[477] Sad as the necessity is, we have thrown aside all our Athenian skill and tactics, and have prepared to fight under the conditions forced upon us by the enemy, a land-battle on shipboard.[478] It will be for you to conquer in this last desperate struggle, where there is no friendly shore to receive you if you give way. You, hoplites on the deck, as soon as you have the enemy's trireme in contact, keep him fast, and relax not until you have swept away his hoplites and mastered his deck. You, seamen and rowers, must yet keep up your courage, in spite of this sad failure in our means, and subversion of our tactics. You are better defended on deck above, and you have more triremes to help you, than in the recent defeat. Such of you, as are not Athenian citizens, I entreat to recollect the valuable privileges which you have hitherto enjoyed from serving in the navy of Athens. Though not really citizens, you have been reputed and treated as such; you have acquired our dialect, you have copied our habits, and have thus enjoyed the admiration, the imposing station, and the security, arising from our great empire.[479] Partaking as you do freely in the benefits of that empire, do not now be-

tray it to these Sicilians and Corinthians whom you have so often beaten. For such of you as *are* Athenians, I again remind you that Athens has neither fresh triremes, nor fresh hoplites, to replace those now here. Unless you are now victorious, her enemies near home will find her defenceless; and our countrymen there will become slaves to Sparta, as you will to Syracuse. Recollect, every man of you, that you now going aboard here are the *all* of Athens,—her hoplites, her ships, her entire remaining city, and her splendid name.[480] Bear up then and conquer, every man with his best mettle, in this one last struggle, for Athens as well as yourselves, and on an occasion which will never return."

If, in translating the despatch written home ten months before by Nikias to the people of Athens, we were compelled to remark, that the greater part of it was the bitterest condemnation of his own previous policy as commander, so we are here carried back, when we find him striving to palliate the ruinous effects of that confined space of water which paralyzed the Athenian seamen, to his own obstinate improvidence in forbidding the egress of the fleet when insisted on by Demosthenês. His hearers probably were too much absorbed with the terrible present, to revert to irremediable mistakes of the past. Immediately on the conclusion of his touching address, the order was given to go aboard, and the seamen took their places. But when the triremes were fully manned, and the trierarchs, after superintending the embarkation, were themselves about to enter and push off, the agony of Nikias was too great to be repressed. Feeling more keenly than any man the intensity of this last death-struggle, and the serious, but inevitable, shortcomings of the armament in its present condition, he still thought that he had not said enough for the occasion. He now renewed his appeal personally to the trierarchs, all of them citizens of rank and wealth at Athens. They were all familiarly known to him, and he addressed himself to every man separately by his own name, his father's name, and his tribe, adjuring him by the deepest and most solemn motives which could touch the human feelings. Some he reminded of their own previous glories, others of the achievements of illustrious ancestors, imploring them not to dishonor or betray these precious titles: to all alike he recalled the charm of their beloved country, with its full political freedom and its unconstrained license of individual agency to every man: to all alike he appealed in the names of their wives, their children, and their paternal gods. He cared not for being suspected of trenching upon the common places of rhetoric: he caught at every topic which could touch the inmost affections, awaken the inbred patriotism, and rekindle the abated courage of the officers, whom he was sending forth to this desperate venture. He at length constrained himself to leave off, still fancying in his anxiety that he ought to say more, and proceeded to marshal the land-force for the defence of the lines, as well as along the shore, where they might render as much service and as much encouragement as possible to the combatants on shipboard.[481]

Very different was the spirit prevalent, and very opposite the burning words uttered, on the seaboard of the Syracusan station, as the leaders were mustering their

men immediately before embarkation. They had been apprized of the grappling-irons now about to be employed by the Athenians, and had guarded against them in part by stretching hides along their bows, so that the "iron hand" might slip off without acquiring any hold. The preparatory movements even within the Athenian station being perfectly visible, Gylippus sent the fleet out with the usual prefatory harangue. He complimented them on the great achievements which they had already performed in breaking down the naval power of Athens, so long held irresistible.[482] He reminded them that the sally of their enemies was only a last effort of despair, seeking nothing but escape, undertaken without confidence in themselves, and under the necessity of throwing aside all their own tactics in order to copy feebly those of the Syracusans.[483] He called upon them to recollect the destructive purposes which the invaders had brought with them against Syracuse, to inflict with resentful hand the finishing stroke upon this half-ruined armament, and to taste the delight of satiating a legitimate revenge.[484]

The Syracusan fleet—seventy-six triremes strong, as in the last battle—was the first to put off from shore; Pythen with the Corinthians in the centre, Sikanus and Agatharchus on the wings. A certain proportion of them were placed near the mouth of the harbor, in order to guard the barrier; while the rest were distributed around the harbor in order to attack the Athenians from different sides as soon as they should approach. Moreover, the surface of the harbor swarmed with the light craft of the Syracusans, in many of which embarked youthful volunteers, sons of the best families in the city;[485] boats of no mean service during the battle, saving or destroying the seamen cast overboard from disabled ships, as well as annoying the fighting Athenian triremes. The day was one sacred to Hêraklês at Syracuse; and the prophets announced that the god would insure victory to the Syracusans, provided they stood on the defensive, and did not begin the attack.[486] Moreover, the entire shore round the harbor, except the Athenian station and its immediate neighborhood, was crowded with Syracusan soldiers and spectators; while the walls of Ortygia, immediately overhanging the water, were lined with the feebler population of the city, the old men, women, and children. From the Athenian station presently came forth one hundred and ten triremes, under Demosthenês, Menander, and Euthydêmus, with the customary pæan, its tone probably partaking of the general sadness of the camp. They steered across direct to the mouth of the harbor, beholding on all sides the armed enemies ranged along the shore, as well as the unarmed multitudes who were imprecating the vengeance of the gods upon their heads; while for them there was no sympathy, except among the fellow-sufferers within their own lines. Inside of this narrow basin, rather more than five English miles in circuit, one hundred and ninety-four ships of war, each manned with more than two hundred men, were about to join battle, in the presence of countless masses around, all with palpitating hearts, and near enough both to see and hear; the most picturesque battle—if we could abstract our minds from its terrible interest —probably in history, without smoke or other impediments to vision, and in the clear atmosphere of Sicily, a serious and

magnified realization of those naumachiæ which the Roman emperors used to exhibit with gladiators on the Italian lakes, for the recreation of the people.

The Athenian fleet made directly for that portion of the barrier where a narrow opening—perhaps closed by a movable chain—had been left for merchant-vessels. Their first impetuous attack broke through the Syracusan squadron defending it, and they were already attempting to sever its connecting bonds, when the enemy from all sides crowded in upon them and forced them to desist. Presently the battle became general, and the combatants were distributed in various parts of the harbor. On both sides a fierce and desperate courage was displayed, even greater than had been shown on any of the former occasions. At the first onset, the skill and tactics of the steersmen shone conspicuous, well seconded by zeal on the part of the rowers and by their ready obedience to the voice of the keleustês. As the vessels neared, the bowmen, slingers, and throwers on the deck, hurled clouds of missiles against the enemy; next, was heard the loud crash of the two impinging metallic fronts, resounding all along the shore.[487] When the vessels were thus once in contact, they were rarely allowed to separate: a strenuous hand-fight then commenced by the hoplites in each, trying respectively to board and master their enemy's deck. It was not always, however, that each trireme had its own single and special enemy: sometimes one ship had two or three enemies to contend with at once, sometimes she fell aboard of one unsought, and became entangled. After a certain time, the fight still obstinately continuing, all sort of battle order became lost; the skill of the steersman was of little avail, and the voice of the keleustês was drowned amidst the universal din and mingled cries from victors as well as vanquished. On both sides emulous exhortations were poured forth, together with reproach and sarcasm addressed to any ship which appeared flinching from the contest; though factitious stimulus of this sort was indeed but little needed.

Such was the heroic courage on both sides, that for a long time victory was altogether doubtful, and the whole harbor was a scene of partial encounters, wherein sometimes Syracusans, sometimes Athenians, prevailed. According as success thus fluctuated, so followed the cheers or wailings of the spectators ashore. At one and the same time, every variety of human emotion might be witnessed; according as attention was turned towards a victorious or a defeated ship. It was among the spectators in the Athenian station above all, whose entire life and liberty were staked in the combat, that this emotion might be seen exaggerated into agony, and overpassing the excitement even of the combatants themselves.[488] Those among them who looked towards a portion of the harbor where their friends seemed winning, were full of joy and thanksgiving to the gods: such of their neighbors who contemplated an Athenian ship in difficulty, gave vent to their feelings in shrieks and lamentation; while a third group, with their eyes fixed on some portion of the combat still disputed, were plunged in all the agitations of doubt, manifested even in the tremulous swing of their bodies, as hope or fear alternately predominated. During all the time

that the combat remained undecided, the Athenians ashore were distracted by all these manifold varieties of intense sympathy. But at length the moment came, after a long-protracted struggle, when victory began to declare in favor of the Syracusans, who, perceiving that their enemies were slackening, redoubled their shouts as well as their efforts, and pushed them all back towards the land. All the Athenian triremes, abandoning farther resistance, were thrust ashore like shipwrecked vessels in or near their own station; a few being even captured before they could arrive there. The diverse manifestations of sympathy among the Athenians in the station itself were now exchanged for one unanimous shriek of agony and despair. The boldest of them rushed to rescue the ships and their crews from pursuit, others to man their walls in case of attack from land: many were even paralyzed at the sight, and absorbed with the thoughts of their own irretrievable ruin. Their souls were doubtless still farther subdued by the wild and enthusiastic joy which burst forth in maddening shouts from the hostile crowds around the harbor, in response to their own victorious comrades on shipboard.

Such was the close of this awful, heart-stirring, and decisive combat. The modern historian strives in vain to convey the impression of it which appears in the condensed and burning phrases of Thucydidês. We find in his description of battles generally, and of this battle beyond all others, a depth and abundance of human emotion which has now passed out of military proceedings. The Greeks who fight, like the Greeks who look on, are not soldiers withdrawn from the community, and specialized as well as hardened by long professional training, but citizens with all the passions, instincts, sympathies, joys, and sorrows of domestic as well as political life. Moreover, the non-military population in ancient times had an interest of the most intense kind in the result of the struggle; which made the difference to them, if not of life and death, at least of the extremity of happiness and misery. Hence the strong light and shade, the Homeric exhibition of undisguised impulse, the tragic detail of personal motive and suffering, which pervades this and other military descriptions of Thucydidês. When we read the few but most vehement words which he employs to depict the Athenian camp under this fearful trial, we must recollect that these were not only men whose all was at stake, but that they were moreover citizens full of impressibility, sensitive and demonstrative Greeks; and, indeed, the most sensitive and demonstrative of all Greeks. To repress all manifestations of strong emotion was not considered in ancient times essential to the dignity of the human character.

Amidst all the deep pathos, however, which the great historian has imparted to the final battle at Syracuse, he has not explained the causes upon which its ultimate issue turned. Considering that the Athenians were superior to their enemies in number, as one hundred and ten to seventy-six triremes, that they fought with courage not less heroic, and that the action was on their own element, we might have anticipated for them, if not a victory, at least a drawn battle, with equal loss on both sides. But we may observe, 1. The number of one hundred and ten triremes was formed by

including some hardly seaworthy.[489] 2. The crews were composed partly of men not used to sea-service; and the Akarnanian darters, especially, were for this reason unhandy with their missiles.[490] 3. Though the water had been hitherto the element favorable to Athens, yet her superiority in this respect was declining, and her enemies approaching nearer to her, even in the open sea. But the narrow dimensions of the harbor would have nullified her superiority at all times, and placed her even at great disadvantage,—without the means of twisting and turning her triremes so as to strike only at a vulnerable point of the enemy,—compared with the thick, heavy, straightforward butting of the Syracusans; like a nimble pugilist of light weight contending, in a very confined ring, against superior weight and muscle.[491] For the mere landfight on shipboard, Athenians had not only no advantage, but had on the contrary the odds against them. 4. The Syracusans enjoyed great advantage from having nearly the whole harbor lined round with their soldiers and friends; not simply from the force of encouraging sympathy, no mean auxiliary, but because any of their triremes, if compelled to fall back before an Athenian, found protection on the shore, and could return to the fight at leisure; while an Athenian in the same predicament had no escape. 5. The numerous light craft of the Syracusans doubtless rendered great service in this battle, as they had done in the preceding, though Thucydidês does not again mention them. 6. Lastly, both in the Athenian and Syracusan characters, the pressure of necessity was less potent as a stimulus to action, than hopeful confidence and elation, with the idea of a flood-tide yet mounting. In the character of some other races, the Jews for instance, the comparative force of these motives appears to be the other way.

About sixty Athenian triremes, little more than half of the fleet which came forth, were saved as the wreck from this terrible conflict. The Syracusans on their part had suffered severely; only fifty triremes remaining out of seventy-six. The triumph with which, nevertheless, on returning to the city, they erected their trophy, and the exultation which reigned among the vast crowds encircling the harbor, was beyond all measure or precedent. Its clamorous manifestations were doubtless but too well heard in the neighboring camp of the Athenians, and increased, if anything could increase, the soul-subduing extremity of distress which paralyzed the vanquished. So utterly did the pressure of suffering, anticipated as well as actual, benumb their minds and extinguish their most sacred associations, that no man among them, not even the ultra-religious Nikias, thought of picking up the floating bodies or asking for a truce to bury the dead. This obligation, usually so serious and imperative upon the survivors after a battle, now passed unheeded amidst the sorrow, terror, and despair, of the living man for himself.

Such despair, however, was not shared by the generals, to their honor be it spoken. On the afternoon of this terrible defeat, Demosthenês proposed to Nikias that at daybreak the ensuing morning they should man all the remaining ships—even now more in number than the Syracusan—and make a fresh attempt to break out of the

harbor. To this Nikias agreed, and both proceeded to try their influence in getting the resolution executed. But so irreparably was the spirit of the seamen broken, that nothing could prevail upon them to go again on shipboard: they would hear of nothing but attempting to escape by land.[492] Preparations were therefore made for commencing their march in the darkness of that very night. The roads were still open, and, had they so marched, a portion of them, at least, might even yet have been saved.[493] But there occurred one more mistake, one farther postponement, which cut off the last hopes of this gallant and fated remnant.

The Syracusan Hermokratês, fully anticipating that the Athenians would decamp that very night, was eager to prevent their retreat, because of the mischief which they might do if established in any other part of Sicily. He pressed Gylippus and the military authorities to send out forthwith, and block up the principal roads, passes, and fords, by which the fugitives would get off. Though sensible of the wisdom of his advice, the generals thought it wholly unexecutable. Such was the universal and unbounded joy which now pervaded the city, in consequence of the recent victory, still farther magnified by the circumstance that the day was sacred to Hêraklês,—so wild the jollity, the feasting, the intoxication, the congratulations, amidst men rewarding themselves after their recent effort and triumph, and amidst the necessary care for the wounded,—that an order to arm and march out would have been as little listened to as the order to go on shipboard was by the desponding Athenians. Perceiving that he could get nothing done until the next morning, Hermokratês resorted to a stratagem in order to delay the departure of the Athenians for that night. At the moment when darkness was beginning, he sent down some confidential friends on horseback to the Athenian wall. These men, riding up near enough to make themselves heard, and calling for the sentries, addressed them as messengers from the private correspondents of Nikias in Syracuse, who had sent to warn him, they affirmed, not to decamp during the night, inasmuch as the Syracusans had already beset and occupied the roads; but to begin his march quietly the next morning after adequate preparation.[494]

This fraud—the same as the Athenians had themselves practised two years before,[495] in order to tempt the Syracusans to march out against Katana—was perfectly successful: the sincerity of the information was believed, and the advice adopted. Had Demosthenês been in command alone, we may doubt whether he would have been so easily duped; for granting the accuracy of the fact asserted, it was not the less obvious that the difficulties, instead of being diminished, would be increased tenfold on the following day. We have seen, however, on more than one previous occasion, how fatally Nikias was misled by his treacherous advices from the philo-Athenians at Syracuse. An excuse for inaction was always congenial to his character; and the present recommendation, moreover, fell in but too happily with the temper of the army, now benumbed with depression and terror, like those unfortunate soldiers, in the Retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks, who were yielding to the

lethargy of extreme cold on the snows of Armenia, and whom Xenophon vainly tried to arouse.[496] Having remained over that night, the generals determined also to stay the next day,—in order that the army might carry away with them as much of their baggage as possible,—sending forward a messenger to the Sikels in the interior to request that they would meet the army, and bring with them a supply of provisions. [497] Gylippus and Hermokratês had thus ample time, on the following day, to send out forces and occupy all the positions convenient for obstructing the Athenian march. They at the same time towed into Syracuse as prizes all the Athenian triremes which had been driven ashore in the recent battle, and which now lay like worthless hulks, unguarded and unheeded,[498] seemingly even those within the station itself.

It was on the next day but one after the maritime defeat that Nikias and Demosthenês put their army in motion to attempt retreat. The camp had long been a scene of sickness and death from the prevalence of marsh fever; but since the recent battle the number of wounded men, and the unburied bodies of the slain, had rendered it yet more pitiable. Forty thousand miserable men—so prodigious was the total, including all ranks and functions—now set forth to quit it, on a march of which few could hope to see the end; like the pouring forth of the population of a large city starved out by blockade. Many had little or no provisions to carry, so low had the stock become reduced; but of those who had, every man carried his own, even the horsemen and hoplites, now for the first time either already left without slaves, by desertion, or knowing that no slave could now be trusted. But neither such melancholy equality of suffering, nor the number of sufferers, counted for much in the way of alleviation. A downcast stupor and sense of abasement possessed every man; the more intolerable, when they recollected the exit of the armament from Peiræus two years before, with prayers, and solemn pæans, and all the splendid dreams of conquest, set against the humiliation of the closing scene now before them, without a single trireme left out of two prodigious fleets.

But it was not until the army had actually begun its march that the full measure of wretchedness was felt and manifested. It was then that the necessity first became proclaimed, which no one probably spoke out beforehand, of leaving behind not merely the unburied bodies, but also the sick and the wounded. The scenes of woe which marked this hour passed endurance or description. The departing soldier sorrowed and shuddered with the sentiment of an unperformed duty, as he turned from the unburied bodies of the slain; but far more terrible was the trial, when he had to tear himself from the living sufferers, who implored their comrades, with wailings of agony and distraction, not to abandon them. Appealing to all the claims of pious friendship, they clung round their knees, and even crawled along the line of march until their strength failed. The silent dejection of the previous day was now exchanged for universal tears and groans, and clamorous outbursts of sorrow, amidst

which the army could not without the utmost difficulty be disengaged and put in motion.

After such heart-rending scenes, it might seem that their cup of bitterness was exhausted; but worse was yet in store, and the terrors of the future dictated a struggle against all the miseries of past and present. The generals did their best to keep up some sense of order as well as courage; and Nikias, particularly, in this closing hour of his career, displayed a degree of energy and heroism which he had never before seemed to possess. Though himself among the greatest personal sufferers of all, from his incurable complaint, he was seen everywhere in the ranks marshalling the troops, heartening up their dejection, and addressing them with a voice louder, more strenuous, and more commanding than was his wont.

"Keep up your hope still, Athenians (he said), even as we are now: others have been saved out of circumstances worse than ours. Be not too much humiliated, either with your defeats or with your present unmerited hardships. I too, having no advantage over any of you in strength,—nay, you see the condition to which I have been brought by my disease,—and accustomed even to superior splendor and good fortune in private as well as public life, I too am plunged in the same peril with the humblest soldier among you. Nevertheless, my conduct has been constantly pious towards the gods as well as just and blameless towards men; in recompense for which, my hope for the future is yet sanguine, at the same time that our actual misfortunes do not appall me in proportion to their intrinsic magnitude.[499] Perhaps, indeed, they may from this time forward abate; for our enemies have had their full swing of good fortune, and if, at the moment of our starting, we were under the jealous wrath of any of the gods, we have already undergone chastisement amply sufficient. Other people before us have invaded foreign lands, and after having done what was competent to human power, have suffered what was within the limit of human endurance. We too may reasonably hope henceforward to have the offended god dealing with us more mildly, for we are now objects fitter for his compassion than for his jealousy.[500] Look, moreover, at your own ranks, hoplites so numerous and so excellent: let that guard you against excessive despair, and recollect that, wherever you may sit down, you are yourselves at once a city; nor is there any other city in Sicily that can either repulse your attack or expel you if you choose to stay. Be careful yourselves to keep your march firm and orderly, every man of you with this conviction, that whatever spot he may be forced to fight in, that spot is his country and his fortress, and must be kept by victorious effort. As our provisions are very scanty, we shall hasten on night and day alike; and so soon as you reach any friendly village of the Sikels, who still remain constant to us from hatred to Syracuse, then consider yourselves in security. We have sent forward to apprize them, and intreat them to meet us with supplies. Once more, soldiers, recollect that to act like brave men is now a matter of necessity to you, and that if you falter, there is no refuge for you anywhere. Whereas if you now get clear of your enemies, such of you as are not

Athenians will again enjoy the sight of home, while such of you as *are* Athenians will live to renovate the great power of our city, fallen though it now be. *It is men that make a city; not walls, nor ships without men.*"[501]

The efforts of both commanders were in full harmony with these strenuous words. The army was distributed into two divisions; the hoplites marching in a hollow oblong, with the baggage and unarmed in the interior. The front division was commanded by Nikias, the rear by Demosthenês. Directing their course towards the Sikel territory, in the interior of the island, they first marched along the left bank of the Anapus until they came to the ford of that river, which they found guarded by a Syracusan detachment. They forced the passage, however, without much resistance, and accomplished on that day a march of about five miles, under the delay arising from the harassing of the enemy's cavalry and light troops. Encamping for that night on an eminence, they recommenced their march with the earliest dawn, and halted, after about two miles and a half, in a deserted village on a plain. They were in hopes of finding some provisions in the houses, and were even under the necessity of carrying along with them some water from this spot; there being none to be found farther on. As their intended line of march had now become evident, the Syracusans profited by this halt to get on before them, and to occupy in force a position on the road, called the Akræan cliff. Here the road, ascending a high hill, formed a sort of ravine bordered on each side by steep cliffs. The Syracusans erected a wall or barricade across the whole breadth of the road, and occupied the high ground on each side. But even to reach this pass was beyond the competence of the Athenians; so impracticable was it to get over the ground in the face of overwhelming attacks from the enemy's cavalry and light troops. They were compelled, after a short march, to retreat to their camp of the night before.[502]

Every hour added to the distress of their position; for their food was all but exhausted, nor could any man straggle from the main body without encountering certain destruction from the cavalry. Accordingly, on the next morning, they tried one more desperate effort to get over the hilly ground into the interior. Starting very early, they arrived at the foot of the hill called the Akræan cliff, where they found the barricades placed across the road, with deep files of Syracusan hoplites behind them, and crowds of light troops lining the cliffs on each border. They made the most strenuous and obstinate efforts to force this inexpugnable position, but all their struggles were vain, while they suffered miserably from the missiles of the troops above. Amidst all the discouragement of this repulse, they were yet farther disheartened by storms of thunder and lightning, which occurred during the time, and which they construed as portents significant of their impending ruin.[503]

This fact strikingly illustrates both the change which the last two years had wrought in the contending parties, and the degree to which such religious interpretations of phenomena depended for their efficacy on predisposing temper, gloomy or cheerful. In the first battle between Nikias and the Syracusans, near the Great Har-

bor, some months before the siege was begun, a similar thunder-storm had taken place: on that occasion the Athenian soldiers had continued the battle unmoved, treating it as a natural event belonging to the season, and such indifference on their part had still farther imposed upon the alarmed Syracusans.[504] Now, both the self-confidence and the religious impression had changed sides.

Exhausted by their fruitless efforts, the Athenians fell back a short space to repose, when Gylippus tried to surround them by sending a detachment to block up the narrow road in their rear. This, however, they prevented, effecting their retreat into the open plain, where they passed the night, and on the ensuing day attempted once more the hopeless march over the Akræan cliff. But they were not allowed even to advance so far as the pass and the barricade. They were so assailed and harassed by the cavalry and darters, in flank and rear, that, in spite of heroic effort and endurance, they could not accomplish a progress of so much as one single mile. Extenuated by fatigue, half-starved, and with numbers of wounded men, they were compelled to spend a third miserable night in the same fatal plain.

As soon as the Syracusans had retired for the night to their camp, Nikias and Demosthenês took counsel. They saw plainly that the route which they had originally projected, over the Akræan cliff into the Sikel regions of the interior and from thence to Katana, had become impracticable, and that their unhappy troops would be still less in condition to force it on the morrow than they had been on the day preceding. Accordingly, they resolved to make off during the night, leaving numerous fires burning to mislead the enemy; but completely to alter the direction, and to turn down towards the southern coast on which lay Kamarina and Gela. Their guides informed them that if they could cross the river Kakyparis, which fell into the sea south of Syracuse, on the southeastern coast of Sicily, or a river still farther on, called the Erineus,—they might march up the right bank of either into the regions of the interior. Accordingly, they broke up in the night, amidst confusion and alarm; in spite of which, the front division of the army under Nikias got into full march, and made considerable advance. By daybreak this division reached the southeastern coast of the island not far south of Syracuse, and fell into the track of the Helôrine road, which they pursued until they arrived at the Kakyparis. Even here, however, they found a Syracusan detachment beforehand with them, raising a redoubt, and blocking up the ford; nor could Nikias pass it without forcing his way through them. He marched straightforward to the Erineus, which he crossed on the same day, and encamped his troops on some high ground on the other side.[505]

Except at the ford of the Kakyparis, his march had been all day unobstructed by the enemy; and he thought it wiser to push hid troops as fast as possible, in order to arrive at some place both of safety and subsistence, without concerning himself about the rear division under Demosthenês. That division, the larger half of the army, started both later and in great disorder. Unaccountable panics and darkness made them part company or miss their way, so that Demosthenês, with all his efforts

to keep them together, made little progress, and fell much behind Nikias. He was overtaken by the Syracusans during the forenoon, seemingly before he reached the Kakyparis,[506] and at a moment when the foremost division was nearly six miles ahead, between the Kakyparis and the Erineus.

When the Syracusans discovered at dawn that their enemy had made off in the night, their first impulse was to accuse Gylippus of treachery in having permitted the escape. Such ungrateful surmises, however, were soon dissipated, and the cavalry set forth in rapid pursuit, until they overtook the rear division, which they immediately began to attack and impede. The advance of Demosthenês had been tardy before, and his division disorganized: but he was now compelled to turn and defend himself against an indefatigable enemy, who presently got before him and thus stopped him altogether. Their numerous light troops and cavalry assailed him on all sides and without intermission; employing nothing but missiles, however, and taking care to avoid any close encounter. While this unfortunate division were exerting their best efforts both to defend themselves, and if possible to get forward, they found themselves inclosed in a walled olive-ground, through the middle of which the road passed; a farm bearing the name, and probably once the property, of Polyzêlus, brother of the despot Gelon.[507] Entangled and huddled up in this inclosure, from whence exit at the farther end in the face of an enemy was found impossible, they were now overwhelmed with hostile missiles from the walls on all sides.[508] Though unable to get at the enemy, and deprived even of the resources of an active despair, they endured incessant harassing for the greater part of the day, without refreshment or repose, and with the number of their wounded continually increasing; until at length the remaining spirit of the unhappy sufferers was thoroughly broken. Perceiving their condition, Gylippus sent to them a herald with a proclamation; inviting all the islanders among them to come forth from the rest, and promising them freedom if they did so. The inhabitants of some cities, yet not many,—a fact much to their honor,—availed themselves of this offer and surrendered. Presently, however, a larger negotiation was opened, which ended by the entire division capitulating upon terms, and giving up their arms. Gylippus and the Syracusans engaged that the lives of all should be spared; that is, that none should be put to death either by violence, or by intolerable bonds, or by starvation. Having all been disarmed, they were forthwith conveyed away as prisoners to Syracuse, six thousand in number. It is a remarkable proof of the easy and opulent circumstances of many among these gallant sufferers, when we are told that the money which they had about them, even at this last moment of pressure, was sufficient to fill the concavities of four shields.[509] Disdaining either to surrender or to make any stipulation for himself personally, Demosthenês was on the point of killing himself with his own sword the moment that the capitulation was concluded; but his intention was prevented, and he was carried off a disarmed prisoner by the Syracusans.[510]

On the next day, Gylippus and the victorious Syracusans overtook Nikias on the right bank of the Erineus, apprized him of the capitulation of Demosthenês, and summoned him to capitulate also. He demanded leave to send a horseman for the purpose of verifying the statement; and on the return of the horseman, he made a proposition to Gylippus, that his army should be permitted to return home, on condition of Athens reimbursing to Syracuse the whole expense of the war, and furnishing hostages until payment should be made; one citizen against each talent of silver. These conditions were rejected; but Nikias could not yet bring himself to submit to the same terms for his division as Demosthenês. Accordingly, the Syracusans recommenced their attacks, which the Athenians, in spite of hunger and fatigue, sustained as they best could until night. It was the intention of Nikias again to take advantage of the night for the purpose of getting away. But on this occasion the Syracusans were on the watch, and as soon as they heard movement in the camp, they raised the pæan, or war-shout; thus showing that they were on the lookout, and inducing the Athenians again to lay down the arms which they had taken up for departure. A detachment of three hundred Athenians, nevertheless, still persisting in marching off, apart from the rest, forced their way through the posts of the Syracusans. These men got safely away, and nothing but the want of guides prevented them from escaping altogether.[511]

During all this painful retreat, the personal resolution displayed by Nikias was exemplary; his sick and feeble frame was made to bear up, and even to hearten up stronger men, against the extremity of hardship, exhausting the last fragment of hope or even possibility. It was now the sixth day of the retreat,—six days[512] of constant privation, suffering, and endurance of attack,—yet Nikias early in the morning attempted a fresh march, in order to get to the river Asinarus, which falls into the same sea, south of the Erineus, but is a more considerable stream, flowing deeply imbedded between lofty banks. This was a last effort of despair, with little hope of final escape, even if they did reach it. Yet the march was accomplished, in spite of renewed and incessant attacks all the way, from the Syracusan cavalry; who even got to the river before the Athenians, occupying the ford, and lining the high banks near it. Here the resolution of the unhappy fugitives at length gave way; when they reached the river, their strength, their patience, their spirit, and their hopes for the future, were all extinct. Tormented with raging thirst, and compelled by the attacks of the cavalry to march in one compact mass, they rushed into the ford all at once, treading down and tumbling over each other in the universal avidity for drink. Many thus perished from being pushed down upon the points of the spears, or lost their footing among the scattered articles of baggage, and were thus borne down under water.[513] Meanwhile, the Syracusans from above poured upon the huddled mass showers of missiles, while the Peloponnesian hoplites even descended into the river, came to close quarters with them, and slew considerable numbers. So violent, nevertheless, was the thirst of the Athenians, that all other suffering was endured in order to taste relief by drinking. And even when dead and wounded were heaped in the

river,—when the water was tainted and turbid with blood, as well as thick with the mud trodden up,—still, the new-comers pushed their way in and swallowed it with voracity.[514]

Wretched, helpless, and demoralized as the army now was, Nikias could think no farther of resistance. He accordingly surrendered himself to Gylippus, to be dealt with at the discretion of that general and of the Lacedæmonians,[515] earnestly imploring that the slaughter of the defenceless soldiers might be arrested. Accordingly, Gylippus gave orders that no more should be killed, but that the rest should be secured as captives. Many were slain before this order was understood; but of those who remained, almost all were made captive, very few escaping. Nay, even the detachment of three hundred, who had broken out in the night, having seemingly not known whither to go, were captured, and brought in by troops sent forth for the purpose.[516] The triumph of the Syracusans was in every way complete, they hung the trees on the banks of the Asinarus with Athenian panoplies as trophy, and carried back their prisoners in joyous procession to the city.

The number of prisoners thus made, is not positively specified by Thucydidês, as in the case of the division of Demosthenês, which had capitulated and laid down their arms in a mass within the walls of the olive-ground. Of the captives from the division of Nikias, the larger proportion were seized by private individuals, and fraudulently secreted for their own profit; the number obtained for the state being comparatively small, seemingly not more than one thousand.[517] The various Sicilian towns became soon full of these prisoners, sold as slaves for private account.

Not less than forty thousand persons in the aggregate had started from the Athenian camp to commence the retreat, six days before. Of these probably many, either wounded or otherwise incompetent even when the march began, soon found themselves unable to keep up, and were left behind to perish. Each of the six days was a day of hard fighting and annoyance from an indefatigable crowd of light troops, with little, and at last seemingly nothing, to eat. The number was thus successively thinned, by wounds, privations, and straggling, so that the six thousand taken with Demosthenês, and perhaps three thousand or four thousand captured with Nikias, formed the melancholy remnant. Of the stragglers during the march, however, we are glad to learn that many contrived to escape the Syracusan cavalry and get to Katana, where also those who afterwards ran away from their slavery under private masters, found a refuge.[518] These fugitive Athenians served as auxiliaries to repel the attacks of the Syracusans upon Katana.[519]

It was in this manner, chiefly, that Athens came to receive again within her bosom a few of those ill-fated sons whom she had drafted forth in two such splendid divisions to Sicily. For of those who were carried as prisoners to Syracuse, fewer yet could ever have got home. They were placed for safe custody, along with the other prisoners, in the stone-quarries of Syracuse,—of which there were several, partly on

the southern descent of the outer city towards the Nekropolis, or from the higher level to the lower level of Achradina,—partly in the suburb afterwards called Neapolis, under the southern cliff of Epipolæ. Into these quarries—deep hollows of confined space, with precipitous sides, and open at the top to the sky—the miserable prisoners were plunged, lying huddled one upon another, without the smallest protection or convenience. For subsistence, they received each day a ration of one pint of wheaten bread,—half the daily ration of a slave,—with no more than half a pint of water, so that they were not preserved from the pangs either of hunger or of thirst. Moreover, the heat of the midday sun, alternating with the chill of the autumn nights, was alike afflicting and destructive; while the wants of life having all to be performed where they were, without relief, the filth and stench presently became insupportable. Sick and wounded even at the moment of arrival, many of them speedily died; and happiest was he who died the first, leaving an unconscious corpse, which the Syracusans would not take the trouble to remove, to distress and infect the survivors. Under this condition and treatment they remained for seventy days; probably serving as a spectacle for the triumphant Syracusan population, with their wives and children, to come and look down upon, and to congratulate themselves on their own narrow escape from sufferings similar in kind at least, if not in degree. After that time the novelty of the spectacle had worn off, while the place must have become a den of abomination and a nuisance intolerable even to the citizens themselves. Accordingly, they now removed all the surviving prisoners, except the native Athenians and the few Italian or Sicilian Greeks among them. All those so removed were sold for slaves; [520] while the dead bodies were probably at the same time taken away, and the prison rendered somewhat less loathsome. What became of the remaining prisoners, we are not told; it may be presumed that those who could survive so great an extremity of suffering might after a certain time be allowed to get back to Athens on ransom. Perhaps some of them may have obtained their release; as was the case, we are told, with several of those who had been sold to private masters, by the elegance of their accomplishments and the dignity of their demeanor. The dramas of Euripidês were so peculiarly popular throughout all Sicily, that those Athenian prisoners who knew by heart considerable portions of them, won the affections of their masters. Some even of the stragglers from the army are affirmed to have procured for themselves, by the same attraction, shelter and hospitality during their flight. Euripidês, we are informed, lived to receive the thanks of several among these unhappy sufferers, after their return to Athens.[521] I cannot refrain from mentioning this story, though I fear its trustworthiness as matter of fact is much inferior to its pathos and interest.

Upon the treatment of Nikias and Demosthenês, not merely the Syracusans, but also the allies present, were consulted, and much difference of opinion was found. To keep them in confinement simply, without putting them to death, was apparently the opinion advocated by Hermokratês.[522] But Gylippus, then in full ascendency and an object of deep gratitude for his invaluable services, solicited as a reward to himself to

be allowed to conduct them back as prisoners to Sparta. To achieve this would have earned for him signal honor in the eyes of his countrymen; for while Demosthenês, from his success at Pylos, was their hated enemy, Nikias had always shown himself their friend as far as an Athenian could do so. It was to him that they owed the release of their prisoners taken at Sphakteria; and he had calculated upon this obligation when he surrendered himself prisoner to Gylippus, and not to the Syracusans.

In spite of all his influence, however, Gylippus could not carry this point. First, the Corinthians both strenuously opposed him themselves, and prevailed on the other allies to do the same. They were afraid that the wealth of Nikias would always procure for him the means of escaping from imprisonment, so as to do them farther injury, and they insisted on his being put to death. Next, those Syracusans, who had been in secret correspondence with Nikias during the siege, were yet more anxious to get him put out of the way, being apprehensive that, if tortured by their political opponents, he might disclose their names and intrigues. Such various influences prevailed, and Nikias as well as Demosthenês was ordered to be put to death by a decree of the public assembly, much to the discontent of Gylippus. Hermokratês vainly opposed the resolution, but perceiving that it was certain to be carried, he sent to them a private intimation before the discussion closed; and procured for them, through one of the sentinels, the means of dying by their own hands. Their bodies were publicly exposed before the city gates to the view of the Syracusan citizens;[523] while the day on which the final capture of Nikias and his army was accomplished, came to be celebrated as an annual festival, under the title of the Asinaria, on the twenty-sixth day of the Dorian month Karneius.[524]

Such was the close of the expedition, or rather of the two expeditions, undertaken by Athens against Syracuse. Never in Grecian history had a force so large, so costly, so efficient, and so full of promise and confidence, been turned out; never in Grecian history had ruin so complete and sweeping, or victory so glorious and unexpected, been witnessed.[525] Its consequences were felt from one end of the Grecian world to the other, as will appear in the coming chapters.

The esteem and admiration felt at Athens towards Nikias had been throughout lofty and unshaken; after his death it was exchanged for disgrace. His name was omitted, while that of his colleague Demosthenês was engraved, on the funereal pillar erected to commemorate the fallen warriors. This difference Pausanias explains by saying that Nikias was conceived to have disgraced himself as a military man by his voluntary surrender, which Demosthenês had disdained.[526]

The opinion of Thucydidês deserves special notice, in the face of this judgment of his countrymen. While he says not a word about Demosthenês, beyond the fact of his execution, he adds in reference to Nikias a few words of marked sympathy and commendation. "Such, or nearly such, (he says,) were the reasons why Nikias was put to death; though *he* assuredly, among all Greeks of my time, least deserved to

come to so extreme a pitch of ill-fortune, considering his exact performance of established duties to the divinity."[527]

If we were judging Nikias merely as a private man, and setting his personal conduct in one scale against his personal suffering on the other, the remark of Thucydidês would be natural and intelligible. But the general of a great expedition, upon whose conduct the lives of thousands of brave men as well as the most momentous interests of his country, depend, cannot be tried by any such standard. His private merit becomes a secondary point in the case, as compared with the discharge of his responsible public duties, by which he must stand or fall.

Tried by this more appropriate standard, what are we to say of Nikias? We are compelled to say, that if his personal suffering could possibly be regarded in the light of an atonement, or set in an equation against the mischief brought by himself both on his army and his country, it would not be greater than his deserts. I shall not here repeat the separate points in his conduct which justify this view, and which have been set forth as they have occurred, in the preceding pages. Admitting fully both the good intentions of Nikias, and his personal bravery, rising even into heroism during the last few days in Sicily, it is not the less incontestable, that, first, the failure of the enterprise, next, the destruction of the armament, is to be traced distinctly to his lamentable misjudgment. Sometimes petty trifling, sometimes apathy and inaction, sometimes presumptuous neglect, sometimes obstinate blindness even to urgent and obvious necessities, one or other of these his sad mental defects, will be found operative at every step, whereby this fated armament sinks down from exuberant efficiency into the last depth of aggregate ruin and individual misery. His improvidence and incapacity stand proclaimed, not merely in the narrative of the historian, but even in his own letter to the Athenians, and in his own speeches both before the expedition and during its closing misfortunes, when contrasted with the reality of his proceedings. The man whose flagrant incompetency brought such wholesale ruin upon two fine armaments intrusted to his command, upon the Athenian maritime empire, and ultimately upon Athens herself, must appear on the tablets of history under the severest condemnation, even though his personal virtues had been loftier than those of Nikias.

And yet our great historian, after devoting two immortal books to this expedition, after setting forth emphatically both the glory of its dawn and the wretchedness of its close, with a dramatic genius parallel to the Œdipus Tyrannus of Sophoklês, when he comes to recount the melancholy end of the two commanders, has no words to spare for Demosthenês,—far the abler officer of the two, who perished by no fault of his own,—but reserves his flowers to strew on the grave of Nikias, the author of the whole calamity—"What a pity! Such a respectable and religious man!"

Thucydidês is here the more instructive, because he exactly represents the sentiment of the general Athenian public towards Nikias during his lifetime. They could

not bear to condemn, to mistrust, to dismiss, or to do without, so respectable and religious a citizen. The private qualities of Nikias were not only held to entitle him to the most indulgent construction of all his public shortcomings, but also insured to him credit for political and military competence altogether disproportionate to his deserts. When we find Thucydidês, after narrating so much improvidence and mismanagement on the grand scale, still keeping attention fixed on the private morality and decorum of Nikias, as if it constituted the main feature of his character, we can understand how the Athenian people originally came both to over-estimate this unfortunate leader, and continued over-estimating him with tenacious fidelity even after glaring proof of his incapacity. Never in the political history of Athens did the people make so fatal a mistake in placing their confidence.

In reviewing the causes of popular misjudgment, historians are apt to enlarge prominently, if not exclusively, on demagogues and demagogic influences. Mankind being usually considered in the light of governable material, or as instruments for exalting, arming, and decorating their rulers, whatever renders them more difficult to handle in this capacity, ranks first in the category of vices. Nor can it be denied that this was a real and serious cause: clever criminative speakers often passed themselves off for something above their real worth; though useful and indispensable as a protection against worse, they sometimes deluded the people into measures impolitic or unjust. But, even if we grant, to the cause of misjudgment here indicated, a greater practical efficiency than history will fairly sanction, still, it is only one among others more mischievous. Never did any man at Athens, by mere force of demagogic qualities, acquire a measure of esteem at once so exaggerated and so durable, combined with so much power of injuring his fellow-citizens, as the anti-demagogic Nikias. The man who, over and above his shabby manœuvre about the expedition against Sphakteria, and his improvident sacrifice of Athenian interests in the alliance with Sparta, ended by inflicting on his country that cruel wound which destroyed so many of her citizens as well as her maritime empire, was not a leather-seller of impudent and criminative eloquence, but a man of ancient family and hereditary wealth, munificent and affable, having credit not merely for the largesses which he bestowed, but also for all the insolences, which as a rich man he might have committed, but did not commit,—free from all pecuniary corruption,—a brave man, and above all, an ultra-religious man, believed therefore to stand high in the favor of the gods, and to be fortunate. Such was the esteem which the Athenians felt for this union of good qualities purely personal and negative with eminent station, that they presumed the higher aptitudes of command,[528] and presumed them, unhappily, after proof that they did not exist,—after proof that what they had supposed to be caution was only apathy and mental weakness. No demagogic arts or eloquence would ever have created in the people so deep-seated an illusion as the imposing respectability of Nikias. Now it was against the overweening ascendency of such decorous and pious incompetence, when aided by wealth and family advantages, that the demagogic accusatory eloquence ought to have served as a natural bar and correc-

tive. Performing the functions of a constitutional opposition, it afforded the only chance of that tutelary exposure whereby blunders and shortcomings might be arrested in time. How insufficient was the check which it provided,—even at Athens, where every one denounces it as having prevailed in devouring excess,—the history of Nikias is an ever-living testimony.

CHAPTER LXI.

FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY, DOWN TO THE OLIGARCHICAL CONSPIRACY OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS.

In the preceding chapter we followed to its melancholy close the united armament of Nikias and Demosthenês, first in the harbor and lastly in the neighborhood of Syracuse, towards the end of September, 413 B.C.

The first impression which we derive from the perusal of that narrative is, sympathy for the parties directly concerned, chiefly for the number of gallant Athenians who thus miserably perished, partly also for the Syracusan victors, themselves a few months before on the verge of apparent ruin. But the distant and collateral effects of the catastrophe throughout Greece, were yet more momentous than those within the island in which it occurred.

I have already mentioned that even at the moment when Demosthenês with his powerful armament left Peiræus to go to Sicily, the hostilities of the Peloponnesian confederacy against Athens herself had been already recommenced. Not only was the Spartan king Agis ravaging Attica, but the far more important step of fortifying Dekeleia, for the abode of a permanent garrison, was in course of completion. That fortress, having been begun about the middle of March, was probably by the month of June in a situation to shelter its garrison, which consisted of contingents periodically furnished, and relieving each other alternately, from all the different states of the confederacy, under the permanent command of king Agis himself.

And now began that incessant marauding of domiciliated enemies—destined to last for nine years until the final capture of Athens—partially contemplated even at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, and recently enforced, with full comprehension of its disastrous effects, by the virulent antipathy of the exile Alkibiadês.[529] The earlier invasions of Attica had been all temporary, continuing for five or six weeks at the farthest, and leaving the country in repose for the remainder of the year. But the Athenians now underwent from henceforward the fatal experience of a hostile garrison within fifteen miles of their city; an experience peculiarly painful this summer, as well from its novelty as from the extraordinary vigor which Agis displayed in his operations. His excursions were so widely extended, that no part of Attica was secure or could be rendered productive. Not only were all the sheep and cattle destroyed, but the slaves too, especially the most valuable slaves, or artisans, began to desert to Dekeleia in great numbers; more than twenty thousand of them soon disappeared in this way. So terrible a loss of income, both to proprietors of land and to employers in the city, was farther aggravated by the increased cost and difficulty of import from

Eubœa. Provisions and cattle from that island had previously come over land from Oropus, but as that road was completely stopped by the garrison of Dekeleia, they were now of necessity sent round Cape Sunium by sea; a transit more circuitous and expensive, besides being open to attack from the enemy's privateers.[530] In the midst of such heavy privations, the demands on citizens and metics for military duty were multiplied beyond measure. The presence of the enemy at Dekeleia forced them to keep watch day and night throughout their long extent of wall, comprising both Athens and Peiræus: in the daytime the hoplites of the city relieved each other on guard, but at night, nearly all of them were either on the battlements or at the various military stations in the city. Instead of a city, in fact, Athens was reduced to the condition of something like a military post.[531] Moreover, the rich citizens of the state, who served as horsemen, shared in the general hardship; being called on for daily duty in order to restrain at least, since they could not entirely prevent, the excursions of the garrison of Dekeleia, their efficiency was, however, soon impaired by the laming of their horses on the hard and stony soil.[532]

Besides the personal efforts of the citizens, such exigencies pressed heavily on the financial resources of the state. Already the immense expense incurred in fitting out the two large armaments for Sicily, had exhausted all the accumulations laid by in the treasury during the interval since the Peace of Nikias; so that the attacks from Dekeleia, not only imposing heavy additional cost, but at the same time cutting up the means of paying, brought the finances of Athens into positive embarrassment. With the view of increasing her revenues, she altered the principle on which her subject-allies had hitherto been assessed: instead of a fixed sum of annual tribute, she now required from them payment of a duty of five per cent. on all imports and exports by sea.[533] How this new principle of assessment worked, we have unfortunately no information. To collect the duty and take precautions against evasion, an Athenian custom-house officer must have been required in each allied city. Yet it is difficult to understand how Athens could have enforced a system at once novel, extensive, vexatious, and more burdensome to the payers, when we come to see how much her hold over those payers, as well as her naval force, became enfeebled, before the close even of the actual year.[534]

Her impoverished finances also compelled her to dismiss a body of Thracian mercenaries, whose aid would have been very useful against the enemy at Dekeleia. These Thracian peltasts, thirteen hundred in number, had been hired at a drachma per day each man, to go with Demosthenês to Syracuse, but had not reached Athens in time. As soon as they came thither, the Athenians placed them under the command of Diitrephês, to conduct them back to their native country, with instructions to do damage to the Bœotians, as opportunity might occur, in his way through the Euripus. Accordingly, Diitrephês, putting them on shipboard, sailed round Sunium and northward along the eastern coast of Attica. After a short disembarkation near Tanagra, he passed on to Chalkis in Eubœa in the narrowest part of the strait, from

whence he crossed in the night to the Bœotian coast opposite, and marched up some distance from the sea to the neighborhood of the Bœotian town Mykalêssus. He arrived here unseen, lay in wait near a temple of Hermês about two miles distant, and fell upon the town unexpectedly at break of day. To the Mykalessians, dwelling in the centre of Bœotia, not far from Thebes, and at a considerable distance from the sea, such an assault was not less unexpected than formidable. Their fortifications were feeble, in some parts low, in other parts even tumbling down; nor had they even taken the precaution to close their gates at night: so that the barbarians under Diitrephês, entering the town without the smallest difficulty, began at once the work of pillage and destruction. The scene which followed was something alike novel and revolting to Grecian eyes. Not only were all the houses and even the temples plundered, but the Thracians farther manifested that raging thirst for blood which seemed inherent in their race. They slew every living thing that came in their way; men, women, children, horses, cattle, etc. They burst into a school, wherein many boys had just been assembled, and massacred them all. This scene of bloodshed, committed by barbarians who had not been seen in Greece since the days of Xerxes, was recounted with horror and sympathy throughout all Grecian communities, though Mykalêssus was in itself a town of second-rate or third-rate magnitude.[535]

The succor brought from Thebes, by Mykalessian fugitives, arrived unhappily only in time to avenge, but not to save, the inhabitants. The Thracians were already retiring with the booty which they could carry away, when the bœotarch Skirphondas overtook them, both with cavalry and hoplites, after having put to death some greedy plunderers who tarried too long in the town. He compelled them to relinquish most of their booty, and pursued them to the sea-shore; not without a brave resistance from these peltasts, who had a peculiar way of fighting which disconcerted the Thebans. But when they arrived at the sea-shore, the Athenian ships did not think it safe to approach very close, so that not less than two hundred and fifty Thracians were slain before they could get aboard;[536] and the Athenian commander, Diitrephês was so severely wounded that he died shortly afterwards. The rest pursued their voyage homeward.

Meanwhile, the important station of Naupaktus and the mouth of the Corinthian gulf again became the theatre of naval encounter. It will be recollected that this was the scene of the memorable victories gained by the Athenian admiral Phormion in the second year of the Peloponnesian war,[537] wherein the nautical superiority of Athens over her enemies, as to ships, crews, and admiral, had been so transcendently manifested. In that respect matters had now considerably changed. While the navy of Athens had fallen off since the days of Phormion, that of her enemy had improved: Ariston, and other skilful Corinthian steersmen, not attempting to copy Athenian tactics, had studied the best mode of coping with them, and had modified the build of their own triremes accordingly,[538] at Corinth as well as at Syracuse. Seventeen years before, Phormion with eighteen Athenian triremes would have thought

himself a full match for twenty-five Corinthian; but the Athenian admiral of this year, Konon, also a perfectly brave man, now judged so differently, that he constrained Demosthenês and Eurymedon to reinforce his eighteen triremes with ten others,—out of the best of their fleet, at a time when they had certainly none to spare,—on the ground that the Corinthian fleet opposite, of twenty-five sail, was about to assume the offensive against him.[539]

Soon afterwards Diphilus came to supersede Konon, with some fresh ships from Athens, which made the total number of triremes thirty-three. The Corinthian fleet, reinforced so as to be nearly of the same number, took up a station on the coast of Achaia opposite Naupaktus, at a spot called Erineus, in the territory of Rhypes. They ranged themselves across the mouth of a little indentation of the coast, or bay, in the shape of a crescent, with two projecting promontories as horns: each of these promontories was occupied by a friendly land-force, thus supporting the line of triremes at both flanks. This was a position which did not permit the Athenians to sail through the line, or manœuvre round it and in the rear of it. Accordingly, when the fleet of Diphilus came across from Naupaktus, it remained for some time close in front of the Corinthians, neither party venturing to attack; for the straightforward collision was destructive to the Athenian ships with their sharp, but light and feeble beaks, while it was favorable to the solid bows and thick epôtids, or ear-projections, of the Corinthian trireme. After considerable delay, the Corinthians at length began the attack on their side, yet not advancing far enough out to sea to admit of the manœuvring and evolutions of the Athenians. The battle lasted some time, terminating with no decisive advantage to either party. Three Corinthian triremes were completely disabled, though the crews of all escaped by swimming to their friends ashore: on the Athenian side, not one trireme became absolutely water-logged, but seven were so much damaged, by straightforward collision with the stronger bows of the enemy, that they became almost useless after they got back to Naupaktus. The Athenians had so far the advantage, that they maintained their station, while the Corinthians did not venture to renew the fight: moreover, both the wind and the current set towards the northern shore, so that the floating fragments and dead bodies came into possession of the Athenians. Each party thought itself entitled to erect a trophy, but the real feeling of victory lay on the side of Corinth, and that of defeat on the side of Athens. The reputed maritime superiority of the latter was felt by both parties to have sustained a diminution; and such assuredly would have been the impression of Phormion, had he been alive to witness it.[540]

This battle appears to have taken place, so far as we can make out, a short time before the arrival of Demosthenês at Syracuse, about the close of the month of May. We cannot doubt that the Athenians most anxiously expected news from that officer, with some account of victories obtained in Sicily, to console them for having sent him away at a moment when his services were so cruelly wanted at home. Perhaps they may even have indulged hopes of the near capture of Syracuse, as a means of

restoring their crippled finances. Their disappointment would be all the more bitter when they came to receive, towards the end of June or beginning of July, despatches announcing the capital defeat of Demosthenês in his attempt upon Epipolæ, and the consequent extinction of all hope that Syracuse could ever be taken. After these despatches, we may perhaps doubt whether any others subsequently reached Athens. The generals would not write home during the month of indecision immediately succeeding, when Demosthenês was pressing for retreat, and Nikias resisting it. They might possibly, however, write immediately on taking their resolution to retreat, at the time when they sent to Katana to forbid farther supplies of provisions, but this was the last practicable opportunity; for closely afterwards followed their naval defeat, and the blocking up of the mouth of the Great Harbor. The mere absence of intelligence would satisfy the Athenians that their affairs in Sicily were proceeding badly; but the closing series of calamities, down to the final catastrophe, would only come to their knowledge indirectly; partly through the triumphant despatches transmitted from Syracuse to Sparta, Corinth, and Thebes, partly through individual soldiers of their own armament who escaped.

According to the tale of Plutarch, the news was first made known at Athens through a stranger, who, arriving at Peiræus, went into a barber's shop and began to converse about it, as upon a theme which must of course be uppermost in every one's mind.

The astonished barber, hearing for the first time such fearful tidings, ran up to Athens to communicate it to the archons as well as to the public in the market-place. The public assembly being forthwith convoked, he was brought before it, and called upon to produce his authority, which he was unable to do, as the stranger had disappeared. He was consequently treated as a fabricator of uncertified rumors for the disturbance of the public tranquillity, and even put to the torture.[541] How much of this improbable tale may be true, we cannot determine; but we may easily believe that neutrals, passing from Corinth or Megara to Peiræus, were the earliest communicants of the misfortunes of Nikias and Demosthenês in Sicily during the months of July and August. Presently came individual soldiers of the armament, who had got away from the defeat and found a passage home; so that the bad news was but too fully confirmed. But the Athenians were long before they could bring themselves to believe, even upon the testimony of these fugitives, how entire had been the destruction of their two splendid armaments, without even a feeble remnant left to console them.[542]

As soon as the full extent of their loss was at length forced upon their convictions, the city presented a scene of the deepest affliction, dismay, and terror. Over and above the extent of private mourning, from the loss of friends and relatives, which overspread nearly the whole city, there prevailed utter despair as to the public safety. Not merely was the empire of Athens apparently lost, but Athens herself seemed utterly defenceless. Her treasury was empty, her docks nearly destitute of

triremes, the flower of her hoplites as well as of her seamen had perished in Sicily without leaving their like behind, and her maritime reputation was irretrievably damaged; while her enemies, on the contrary, animated by feelings of exuberant confidence and triumph, were farther strengthened by the accession of their new Sicilian allies. In these melancholy months—October, November, 413 B.C.—the Athenians expected nothing less than a vigorous attack, both by land and sea, from the Peloponnesian and Sicilian forces united, with the aid of their own revolted allies, an attack which they knew themselves to be in no condition to repel.[543]

Amidst so gloomy a prospect, without one ray of hope to cheer them on any side, it was but poor satisfaction to vent their displeasure on the chief speakers who had recommended their recent disastrous expedition, or on those prophets and reporters of oracles who had promised them the divine blessing upon it.[544] After this first burst both of grief and anger, however, they began gradually to look their actual situation in the face; and the more energetic speakers would doubtless administer the salutary lesson of reminding them how much had been achieved by their forefathers, sixty-seven years before, when the approach of Xerxes threatened them with dangers not less overwhelming. Under the peril of the moment, the energy of despair revived in their bosoms; they resolved to get together, as speedily as they could, both ships and money,—to keep watch over their allies, especially Eubœa,—and to defend themselves to the last. A Board of ten elderly men, under the title of Probûli, was named to review the expenditure, to suggest all practicable economies, and propose for the future such measures as occasion might seem to require. The propositions of these probûli were for the most part adopted, with a degree of unanimity and promptitude rarely seen in an Athenian assembly, springing out of that pressure and alarm of the moment which silenced all criticism.[545] Among other economies, the Athenians abridged the costly splendor of their choric and liturgic ceremonies at home, and brought back the recent garrison which they had established on the Laconian coast; they at the same time collected timber, commenced the construction of new ships, and fortified Cape Sunium, in order to protect their numerous transport ships in the passage from Eubœa to Peiræus.[546]

While Athens was thus struggling to make head against her misfortunes, all the rest of Greece was full of excitement and aggressive scheming against her. So vast an event as the destruction of this great armament had never happened since the expedition of Xerxes against Greece. It not only roused the most distant cities of the Grecian world, but also the Persian satraps and the court of Susa. It stimulated the enemies of Athens to redoubled activity; it emboldened her subject-allies to revolt; it pushed the neutral states, who all feared what she would have done if successful against Syracuse, now to declare war against her, and put the finishing stroke to her power as well as to her ambition. All of them, enemies, subjects, and neutrals, alike believed that the doom of Athens was sealed, and that the coming spring would see her captured. Earlier than the ensuing spring, the Lacedæmonians did not feel dis-

posed to act; but they sent round their instructions to the allies for operations both by land and sea to be then commenced; all these allies being prepared to do their best, in hopes that this effort would be the last required from them, and the most richly rewarded. A fleet of one hundred triremes was directed to be prepared against the spring; fifty of these being imposed in equal proportion on the Lacedæmonians themselves and the Bœotians; fifteen on Corinth; fifteen on the Phocians and Lokrians; ten on the Arcadians, with Pellênê and Sikyon; ten on Megara, Trœzen, Epidaurus, and Hermionê. It seems to have been considered that these ships might be built and launched during the interval between September and March.[547] The same large hopes, which had worked upon men's minds at the beginning of the war, were now again rife in the bosoms of the Peloponnesians;[548] the rather as that powerful force from Sicily, which they had then been disappointed in obtaining, might now be anticipated with tolerable assurance as really forthcoming.[549]

From the smaller allies, contributions in money were exacted for the intended fleet by Agis, who moved about during this autumn with a portion of the garrison of Dekeleia. In the course of his circuit, he visited the town of Herakleia, near the Maliac gulf, and levied large contributions on the neighboring Œtæans, in reprisal for the plunder which they had taken from that town, as well as from the Phthiot Achæans and other subjects of the Thessalians, though the latter vainly entered their protest against his proceedings.[550]

It was during the march of Agis through Bœotia that the inhabitants of Eubœa—probably of Chalkis and Eretria—applied to him, entreating his aid to enable them to revolt from Athens; which he readily promised, sending for Alkamenês at the head of three hundred Neodamode hoplites from Sparta, to be despatched across to the island as harmost. Having a force permanently at his disposal, with full liberty of military action, the Spartan king at Dekeleia was more influential even than the authorities at home, so that the disaffected allies of Athens addressed themselves in preference to him. It was not long before envoys from Lesbos visited him for this purpose. So powerfully was their claim enforced by the Bœotians (their kinsmen of the Æolic race), who engaged to furnish ten triremes for their aid, provided Agis would send ten others, that he was induced to postpone his promise to the Eubœans, and to direct Alkamenês as harmost to Lesbos instead of Eubœa,[551] without at all consulting the authorities at Sparta.

The threatened revolt of Lesbos and Eubœa, especially the latter, was a vital blow to the empire of Athens. But this was not the worst. At the same time that these two islands were negotiating with Agis, envoys from Chios, the first and most powerful of all Athenian allies, had gone to Sparta for the same purpose. The government of Chios,—an oligarchy, but distinguished for its prudent management and caution in avoiding risks,—considering Athens to be now on the verge of ruin, even in the estimation of the Athenians themselves, thought itself safe, together with the opposite city of Erythræ, in taking measures for achieving independence.[552]

Besides these three great allies, whose example in revolting was sure to be followed by others, Athens was now on the point of being assailed by other enemies yet more unexpected, the two Persian satraps of the Asiatic seaboard, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. No sooner was the Athenian catastrophe in Sicily known at the court of Susa, than the Great King claimed from these two satraps the tribute due from the Asiatic Greeks on the coast; for which they had always stood enrolled in the tribute records, though it had never been actually levied since the complete establishment of the Athenian empire. The only way to realize this tribute, for which the satraps were thus made debtors, was to detach the towns from Athens, and break up her empire;[553] for which purpose Tissaphernes sent an envoy to Sparta, in conjunction with those of the Chians and Erythræans. He invited the Lacedæmonians to conclude an alliance with the Great King, for joint operations against the Athenian empire in Asia; promising to furnish pay and maintenance for any forces which they might send, at the rate of one drachma per day for each man of the ship's crews.[554] He farther hoped by means of this aid to reduce Amorgês the revolted son of the late satrap Pissuthnês, who was established in the strong maritime town of Iasus, with a Grecian mercenary force and a considerable treasure, and was in alliance with Athens. The Great King had sent down a peremptory mandate, that Amorgês should be either brought prisoner to Susa or slain.

At the same moment, though without any concert, there arrived at Sparta Kalligeitus and Timagoras, two Grecian exiles in the service of Pharnabazus, bringing propositions of a similar character from that satrap, whose government[555] comprehended the coast lands north of Æolis, from the Euxine and Propontis, to the north-east corner of the Elæatic gulf. Eager to have the assistance of a Lacedæmonian fleet in order to detach the Hellespontine Greeks from Athens, and realize the tribute required by the court of Susa, Pharnabazus was at the same time desirous of forestalling Tissaphernes as the medium of alliance between Sparta and the Great King. The two missions having thus arrived simultaneously at Sparta, a strong competition arose between them, one striving to attract the projected expedition to Chios, the other to the Hellespont:[556] for which latter purpose, Kalligeitus had brought twenty-five talents, which he tendered as a first payment in part.

From all quarters, new enemies were thus springing up against Athens in the hour of her distress, and the Lacedæmonians had only to choose which they would prefer; a choice in which they were much guided by the exile Alkibiadês. It so happened that his family friend Endius was at this moment one of the board of ephors; while his personal enemy king Agis, with whose wife Timæa he carried on an intrigue,[557] was absent in command at Dekeleia. Knowing well the great power and importance of Chios, Alkibiadês strenuously exhorted the Spartan authorities to devote their first attention to that island. A periœkus named Phrynis, being sent thither to examine whether the resources alleged by the envoys were really forthcoming, brought back a satisfactory report, that the Chian fleet was not less than sixty

triremes strong: upon which the Lacedæmonians concluded an alliance with Chios and Erythræ, engaging to send a fleet of forty sail to their aid. Ten of these triremes, now ready in the Lacedæmonian ports—probably at Gythium—were directed immediately to sail to Chios, under the admiral Melanchridas. It seems to have been now midwinter; but Alkibiadês, and still more the Chian envoys, insisted on the necessity of prompt action, for fear that the Athenians should detect the intrigue. However, an earthquake just then intervening, was construed by the Spartans as an index of divine displeasure, so that they would not persist in sending either the same commander or the same ships. Chalkideus was named to supersede Melanchridas, while five new ships were directed to be equipped, so as to be ready to sail in the early spring along with the larger fleet from Corinth.[558]

As soon as spring arrived, three Spartan commissioners were sent to Corinth—in compliance with the pressing instances of the Chian envoys—to transport across the isthmus from the Corinthian to the Saronic gulf, the thirty-nine triremes now in the Corinthian port of Lechæum. It was at first proposed to send off all, at one and the same time, to Chios, even those which Agis had been equipping for the assistance of Lesbos; although Kalligeitus declined any concern with Chios, and refused to contribute for this purpose any of the money which he had brought. A general synod of deputies from the allies was held at Corinth, wherein it was determined, with the concurrence of Agis, to despatch the fleet first to Chios, under Chalkideus; next, to Lesbos, under Alkamenês; lastly, to the Hellespont, under Klearchus. But it was judged expedient to divide the fleet, and bring across twenty-one triremes out of the thirty-nine, so as to distract the attention of Athens, and divide her means of resistance. So low was the estimate formed of these means, that the Lacedæmonians did not scruple to despatch their expedition openly from the Saronic gulf, where the Athenians would have full knowledge both of its numbers and of its movements.[559]

Hardly had the twenty-one triremes, however, been brought across to Kenchreæ, when a fresh delay arose to obstruct their departure. The Isthmian festival, celebrated every alternate year, and kept especially holy by the Corinthians, was just approaching; nor would they consent to begin any military operations until it was concluded, though Agis tried to elude their scruples by offering to adopt the intended expedition as his own. It was during the delay which thus ensued that the Athenians were first led to conceive suspicions about Chios, whither they despatched Aristokratês, one of the generals of the year. The Chian authorities strenuously denied all projects of revolt, and being required by Aristokratês to furnish some evidence of their good faith, sent back along with him seven triremes to the aid of Athens. It was much against their own will that they were compelled thus to act; but they knew that the Chian people were in general averse to the idea of revolting from Athens, nor did they feel confidence enough to proclaim their secret designs without some manifestation of support from Peloponnesus, which had been so much delayed that they knew not when it would arrive. The Athenians, in their present state of weakness,

perhaps thought it prudent to accept insufficient assurances, for fear of driving this powerful island to open revolt. But during the Isthmian festival, to which they were invited along with other Greeks, they discovered farther evidences of the plot which was going on, and resolved to keep strict watch on the motions of the fleet now assembled at Kenchreæ, suspecting that this squadron was intended to second the revolting party in Chios.[560]

Shortly after the Isthmian festival, the squadron actually started from Kenchreæ to Chios, under Alkamenês; but an equal number of Athenian ships watched them as they sailed along the shore, and tried to tempt them farther out to sea, with a view to fight them. Alkamenês, however, desirous of avoiding a battle, thought it best to return back; upon which the Athenians also returned to Peiræus, mistrusting the fidelity of the seven Chian triremes which formed part of their fleet. Reappearing presently with a larger squadron of thirty-seven triremes, they pursued Alkamenês, who had again begun his voyage along the shore southward, and attacked him near the uninhabited harbor called Peiræum, on the frontiers of Corinth and Epidaurus. They here gained a victory, captured one of his ships, and damaged or disabled most of the remainder. Alkamenês himself was slain, and the ships were run ashore, where on the morrow the Peloponnesian land-force arrived in sufficient numbers to defend them. So inconvenient, however, was their station on this desert spot, that they at first determined to burn the vessels and depart. Nor was it without difficulty that they were induced, partly by the instances of king Agis, to guard the ships until an opportunity could be found for eluding the blockading Athenian fleet; a part of which still kept watch off the shore, while the rest were stationed at a neighboring islet.[561]

The Spartan ephors had directed Alkamenês, at the moment of his departure from Kenchræa, to despatch a messenger to Sparta, in order that the five triremes under Chalkideus and Alkibiadês might leave Laconia at the same moment. And these latter appear to have been actually under way, when a second messenger brought the news of the defeat and death of Alkamenês at Peiræum. Besides the discouragement arising from such a check at the outset of their plans against Ionia, the ephors thought it impossible to begin operations with so small a squadron as five triremes, so that the departure of Chalkideus was for the present countermanded. This resolution, perfectly natural to adopt, was only reversed at the strenuous instance of the Athenian exile Alkibiadês, who urged them to permit Chalkideus and himself to start forthwith. Small as the squadron was, yet as it would reach Chios before the defeat at Peiræum became public, it might be passed off as the precursor of the main fleet; while he (Alkibiadês) pledged himself to procure the revolt of Chios and the other Ionic cities, through his personal connection with the leading men, who would repose confidence in his assurances of the helplessness of Athens, as well as of the thorough determination of Sparta to stand by them. To these arguments, Alkibiadês added an appeal to the personal vanity of Endius; whom he instigated to

assume for himself the glory of liberating Ionia as well as of first commencing the Persian alliance, instead of leaving this enterprise to king Agis.[562]

By these arguments—assisted doubtless by his personal influence, since his advice respecting Gylippus and respecting Dekeleia had turned out so successful—Alkibiadês obtained the consent of the Spartan ephors, and sailed along with Chalkideus in the five triremes to Chios. Nothing less than his energy and ascendency could have extorted from men both dull and backward, a determination apparently so rash, yet, in spite of such appearance, admirably conceived, and of the highest importance. Had the Chians waited for the fleet now blocked up at Peiræum, their revolt would at least have been long delayed, and perhaps might not have occurred at all: the accomplishment of that revolt by the little squadron of Alkibiadês was the proximate cause of all the Spartan successes in Ionia, and was ultimately the means even of disengaging the fleet at Peiræum, by distracting the attention of Athens. So well did this unprincipled exile, while playing the game of Sparta, know where to inflict the dangerous wounds upon his country!

There was, indeed, little danger in crossing the Ægean to Ionia, with ever so small a squadron; for Athens in her present destitute condition had no fleet there, and although Strombichidês was detached with eight triremes from the blockading fleet off Peiræum, to pursue Chalkideus and Alkibiadês as soon as their departure was known, he was far behind them, and soon returned without success. To keep their voyage secret, they detained the boats and vessels which they met, and did not liberate them, until they reached Korykus in Asia Minor, the mountainous land southward of Erythræ. They were here visited by their leading partisans from Chios, who urged them to sail thither at once before their arrival could be proclaimed. Accordingly, they reached the town of Chios—on the eastern coast of the island, immediately opposite to Erythræ on the continent—to the astonishment and dismay of every one, except the oligarchical plotters who had invited them. By the contrivance of these latter, the council was found just assembling, so that Alkibiadês was admitted without delay, and invited to state his case. Suppressing all mention of the defeat at Peiræum, he represented his squadron as the foremost of a large Lacedæmonian fleet actually at sea and approaching, and affirmed Athens to be now helpless by sea as well as by land, incapable of maintaining any farther hold upon her allies. Under these impressions, and while the population were yet under their first impulse of surprise and alarm, the oligarchical council took the resolution of revolting. The example was followed by Erythræ, and soon afterwards by Klazomenæ, determined by three triremes from Chios. The Klazomenians had hitherto dwelt upon an islet close to the continent; on which latter, however, a portion of their town, called Polichnê, was situated, which they now resolved, in anticipation of attack from Athens, to fortify as their main residence. Both the Chians and Erythræans also actively employed themselves in fortifying their towns and preparing for war.[563]

In reviewing this account of the revolt of Chios, we find occasion to repeat remarks already suggested by previous revolts of other allies of Athens,—Lesbos, Akanthus, Torônê, Mendê, Amphipolis, etc. Contrary to what is commonly intimated by historians, we may observe first, that Athens did not systematically interfere to impose her own democratical government upon her allies; next, that the empire of Athens, though upheld mainly by an established belief in her superior force, was nevertheless by no means odious, nor the proposition of revolting from her acceptable to the general population of her allies. She had at this moment no force in Ionia; and the oligarchical government of Chios, wishing to revolt, was only prevented from openly declaring its intention by the reluctance of its own population, a reluctance which it overcame partly by surprise arising from the sudden arrival of Alkibiadês and Chalkideus, partly by the fallacious assurance of a still greater Peloponnesian force approaching.[564] Nor would the Chian oligarchy themselves have determined to revolt, had they not been persuaded that such was now the safer course, inasmuch as Athens was now ruined, and her power to protect, not less than her power to oppress, at an end.[565] The envoys of Tissaphernês had accompanied those of Chios to Sparta, so that the Chian government saw plainly that the misfortunes of Athens had only the effect of reviving the aggressions and pretensions of their former foreign master, against whom Athens had protected them for the last fifty years. We may well doubt, therefore, whether this prudent government looked upon the change as on the whole advantageous. But they had no motive to stand by Athens in her misfortunes, and good policy seemed now to advise a timely union with Sparta as the preponderant force. The sentiment entertained towards Athens by her allies, as I have before observed, was more negative than positive. It was favorable rather than otherwise, in the minds of the general population, to whom she caused little actual hardship or oppression; but averse, to a certain extent, in the minds of their leading men, since she wounded their dignity, and offended that love of town autonomy which was instinctive in the Grecian political mind.

The revolt of Chios, speedily proclaimed, filled every man at Athens with dismay. It was the most fearful symptom, as well as the heaviest aggravation, of their fallen condition; especially as there was every reason to apprehend that the example of this first and greatest among the allies would be soon followed by the rest. The Athenians had no fleet or force even to attempt its reconquest: but they now felt the full importance of that reserve of one thousand talents, which Perikles had set aside in the first year of the war against the special emergency of a hostile fleet approaching Peiræus. The penalty of death had been decreed against any one who should propose to devote this fund to any other purpose; and, in spite of severe financial pressure, it had remained untouched for twenty years. Now, however, though the special contingency foreseen had not yet arisen, matters were come to such an extremity, that the only chance of saving the remaining empire was by the appropriation of this money. An unanimous vote was accordingly passed to abrogate the penal enact-

ment, or standing order, against proposing any other mode of appropriation; after which the resolution was taken to devote this money to present necessities.[566]

By means of this new fund, they were enabled to find pay and equipment for all the triremes ready or nearly ready in their harbor, and thus to spare a portion from their blockading fleet off Peiræum; out of which Strombichidês with his squadron of eight triremes was despatched immediately to Ionia; followed, after a short interval, by Thrasyklês, with twelve others. At the same time, the seven Chian triremes which also formed part of this fleet, were cleared of their crews; among whom such as were slaves were liberated, while the freemen were put in custody. Besides fitting out an equal number of fresh ships to keep up the numbers of the blockading fleet, the Athenians worked with the utmost ardor to get ready thirty additional triremes. The extreme exigency of the situation, since Chios had revolted, was felt by every one: yet with all their efforts, the force which they were enabled to send was at first lamentably inadequate. Strombichidês, arriving at Samos, and finding Chios, Erythræ, and Klazomenæ already in revolt, reinforced his little squadron with one Samian trireme, and sailed to Teos,—on the continent, at the southern coast of that isthmus, of which Klazomenæ is on the northern,—in hopes of preserving that place. But he had not been long there when Chalkideus arrived from Chios with twenty-three triremes, all or mostly Chian; while the forces of Erythræ and Klazomenæ approached by land. Strombichidês was obliged to make a hasty flight back to Samos, vainly pursued by the Chian fleet. Upon this evidence of Athenian weakness, and the superiority of the enemy, the Teians admitted into their town the land-force without; by the help of which, they now demolished the wall formerly built by Athens to protect the city against attack from the interior. Some of the troops of Tissaphernês lending their aid in the demolition, the town was laid altogether open to the satrap; who, moreover, came himself shortly afterwards to complete the work.[567]

Having themselves revolted from Athens, the Chian government were prompted by considerations of their own safety to instigate revolt in all other Athenian dependencies; and Alkibiadês now took advantage of their forwardness in the cause to make an attempt on Milêtus. He was eager to acquire this important city, the first among all the continental allies of Athens, by his own resources and those of Chios, before the fleet could arrive from Peiræum; in order that the glory of the exploit might be insured to Endius, and not to Agis. Accordingly, he and Chalkideus left Chios with a fleet of twenty-five triremes, twenty of them Chian, together with the five which they themselves had brought from Laconia: these last five had been remanned with Chian crews, the Peloponnesian crews having been armed as hoplites and left as garrison in the island. Conducting his voyage as secretly as possible, he was fortunate enough to pass unobserved by the Athenian station at Samos, where Strombichidês had just been reinforced by Thrasyklês with the twelve fresh triremes from the blockading fleet at Peiræum. Arriving at Milêtus, where he possessed established connections among the leading men, and had already laid his train, as at

Chios, for revolt, Alkibiadês prevailed on them to break with Athens forthwith: so that when Strombichidês and Thrasyklês, who came in pursuit the moment they learned his movements, approached, they found the port shut against them, and were forced to take up a station on the neighboring island of Ladê. So anxious were the Chians for the success of Alkibiadês in this enterprise, that they advanced with ten fresh triremes along the Asiatic coast as far as Anæa, opposite to Samos, in order to hear the result and to render aid if required. A message from Chalkideus apprized them that he was master of Milêtus, and that Amorgês, the Persian ally of Athens at Iasus, was on his way at the head of an army; upon which they returned to Chios, but were unexpectedly seen in the way—off the temple of Zeus, between Lebedos and Kolophon—and pursued, by sixteen fresh ships just arrived from Athens, under the command of Diomedon. Of the ten Chian triremes, one found refuge at Ephesus, and five at Teos: the remaining four were obliged to run ashore and became prizes, though the crews all escaped. In spite of this check, however, the Chians came out again with fresh ships and some land-forces, as soon as the Athenian fleet had gone back to Samos, and procured the revolt both of Lebedos and Eræ from Athens.[568]

It was at Milêtus, immediately after the revolt, that the first treaty was concluded between Tissaphernês, on behalf of himself and the Great King, and Chalkideus, for Sparta and her allies. Probably the aid of Tissaphernês was considered necessary to maintain the town, when the Athenian fleet was watching it so closely on the neighboring island: at least it is difficult to explain otherwise an agreement so eminently dishonorable as well as disadvantageous to the Greeks:—

"The Lacedæmonians and their allies have concluded alliance with the Great King and Tissaphernês, on the following conditions: The king shall possess whatever territories and cities he himself had, or his predecessors had before him. The king, and the Lacedæmonians with their allies, shall jointly hinder the Athenians from deriving either money or other advantages from all those cities which have hitherto furnished to them any such. They shall jointly carry on war against the Athenians, and shall not renounce the war against them, except by joint consent. Whoever shall revolt from the king, shall be treated as an enemy by the Lacedæmonians and their allies; whoever shall revolt from the Lacedæmonians, shall in like manner be treated as an enemy by the king."[569]

As a first step to the execution of this treaty, Milêtus was handed over to Tissaphernês, who immediately caused a citadel to be erected and placed a garrison within it.[570] If fully carried out, indeed, the terms of the treaty would have made the Great King master not only of all the Asiatic Greeks and all the islanders in the Ægean, but also of all Thessaly and Bœotia, and the full ground which had once been covered by Xerxes.[571] Besides this monstrous stipulation, the treaty farther bound the Lacedæmonians to aid the king in keeping enslaved any Greeks who might be under his dominion. Nor did it, on the other hand, secure to them any pecuniary aid from him for the payment of their armament, which was their great mo-

tive for courting his alliance. We shall find the Lacedæmonian authorities themselves hereafter refusing to ratify the treaty, on the ground of its exorbitant concessions. But it stands as a melancholy evidence of the new source of mischief now opening upon the Asiatic and insular Greeks, the moment that the empire of Athens was broken up, the revived pretensions of their ancient lord and master; whom nothing had hitherto kept in check, for the last fifty years, except Athens, first as representative and executive agent, next as successor and mistress, of the confederacy of Delos. We thus see against what evils Athens had hitherto protected them: we shall presently see, what is partially disclosed in this very treaty, the manner in which Sparta realized her promise of conferring autonomy on each separate Grecian state.

The great stress of the war had now been transferred to Ionia and the Asiatic side of the Ægean sea. The enemies of Athens had anticipated that her entire empire in that quarter would fall an easy prey: yet in spite of two such serious defections as Chios and Milêtus, she showed an unexpected energy in keeping hold of the remainder. Her great and capital station, from the present time to the end of the war, was Samos; and a revolution which now happened, insuring the fidelity of that island to her alliance, was a condition indispensable to her power of maintaining the struggle in Ionia.

We have heard nothing about Samos throughout the whole war, since its reconquest by the Athenians after the revolt of 440 B.C.: but we now find it under the government of an oligarchy called the Geômori, the proprietors of land, as at Syracuse before the rule of Gelon. It cannot be doubted that these geômori were disposed to follow the example of the Chian oligarchy, and revolt from Athens, while the people at Samos, as at Chios, were averse to such a change. Under this state of circumstances, the Chian oligarchy had themselves conspired with Sparta, to trick and constrain their Demos by surprise into revolt, through the aid of five Peloponnesian ships. The like would have happened at Samos, had the people remained quiet. But they profited by the recent warning, forestalled the designs of their oligarchy, and rose in insurrection, with the help of three Athenian triremes which then chanced to be in the port. The oligarchy were completely defeated, but not without a violent and bloody struggle; two hundred of them being slain, and four hundred banished. This revolution secured—and probably nothing less than a democratical revolution could have secured, under the existing state of Hellenic affairs—the adherence of Samos to the Athenians; who immediately recognized the new democracy, and granted to it the privilege of an equal and autonomous ally. The Samian people confiscated and divided among themselves the property of such of the geômori as were slain or banished:[572] the remainder were deprived of all political privileges, and were even forbidden to intermarry with any of the families of the remaining citizens.[573] We may fairly suspect that this latter prohibition is only the retaliation of a similar exclusion which the oligarchy, when in power, had enforced to maintain the purity of their own

blood. What they had enacted as a privilege was now thrown back upon them as an insult.

On the other hand, the Athenian blockading fleet was surprised and defeated, with the loss of four triremes, by the Peloponnesian fleet at Peiræum, which was thus enabled to get to Kenchreæ, and to refit in order that it might be sent to Ionia. The sixteen Peloponnesian ships which had fought at Syracuse had already come back to Lechæum, in spite of the obstructions thrown in their way by the Athenian squadron under Hippoklês at Naupaktus.[574] The Lacedæmonian admiral Astyochus was sent to Kenchreæ to take the command and proceed to Ionia as admiral-in-chief: but it was some time before he could depart for Chios, whither he arrived with only four triremes, followed by six more afterwards.[575]

Before he reached that island, however, the Chians, zealous in the new part which they had taken up, and interested for their own safety in multiplying defections from Athens, had themselves undertaken the prosecution of the plans concerted by Agis and the Lacedæmonians at Corinth. They originated an expedition of their own, with thirteen triremes under a Lacedæmonian periœkus named Deiniadas, to procure the revolt of Lesbos; with the view, if successful, of proceeding afterwards to do the same among the Hellespontine dependencies of Athens. A land force under the Spartan Eualas, partly Peloponnesian, partly Asiatic, marched along the coast of the mainland northward towards Kymê, to coöperate in both these objects. Lesbos was at this time divided into at least five separate city governments; Methymna at the north of the island, Mitylênê towards the south-east, Antissa, Eresus, and Pyrrha on the west. Whether these governments were oligarchical or democratical we do not know, but the Athenian kleruchs who had been sent to Mitylênê after its revolt sixteen years before, must have long ago disappeared.[576] The Chian fleet first went to Methymna and procured the revolt of that place, where four triremes were left in guard, while the remaining nine sailed forward to Mitylênê, and succeeded in obtaining that important town also.[577]

Their proceedings, however, were not unwatched by the Athenian fleet at Samos. Unable to recover possession of Teos, Diomedon had been obliged to content himself with procuring neutrality from that town, and admission for the vessels of Athens as well as of her enemies: he had, moreover, failed in an attack upon Eræ.[578] But he had since been strengthened partly by the democratical revolution at Samos, partly by the arrival of Leon with ten additional triremes from Athens: so that these two commanders were now enabled to sail, with twenty-five triremes, to the relief of Lesbos. Reaching Mitylênê—the largest town in that island—very shortly after its revolt, they sailed straight into the harbor when no one expected them, seized the nine Chian ships with little resistance, and after a successful battle on shore, regained possession of the city. The Lacedæmonian admiral Astyochus—who had only been three days arrived at Chios from Kenchreæ with his four triremes—saw the Athenian fleet pass through the channel between Chios and the mainland, on its way to Les-

bos; and immediately on the same evening followed it to that island, to lend what aid he could, with one Chian trireme added to his own four, and some hoplites aboard. He sailed first to Pyrrha, and on the next day to Eresus, on the west side of the island, where he first learned the recapture of Mitylênê by the Athenians. He was here also joined by three out of the four Chian triremes which had been left to defend that place, and which had been driven away, with the loss of one of their number, by a portion of the Athenian fleet pushing on thither from Mitylênê. Astyochus prevailed on Eresus to revolt from Athens, and having armed the population, sent them by land together with his own hoplites under Eteonikus to Methymna, in hopes of preserving that place, whither he also proceeded with his fleet along the coast. But in spite of all his endeavors, Methymna as well as Eresus and all Lesbos was recovered by the Athenians, while he himself was obliged to return with his forces to Chios. The land troops which had marched along the mainland, with a view to farther operations at the Hellespont, were carried back to Chios and to their respective homes.[579]

The recovery of Lesbos, which the Athenians now placed in a better posture of defence, was of great importance in itself, and arrested for the moment all operations against them at the Hellespont. Their fleet from Lesbos was first employed in the recovery of Klazomenæ, which they again carried back to its original islet near the shore; the new town on the mainland, called Polichna, though in course of being built, being not yet sufficiently fortified to defend itself. The leading anti-Athenians in the town made their escape, and went farther up the country to Daphnûs. Animated by such additional success—as well as by a victory which the Athenians, who were blockading Milêtus, gained over Chalkideus, wherein that officer was slain—Leon and Diomedon thought themselves in a condition to begin aggressive measures against Chios, now their most active enemy in Ionia. Their fleet of twenty-five sail was well equipped with epibatæ; who, though under ordinary circumstances they were thêtes armed at the public cost, yet in the present stress of affairs were impressed from the superior hoplites in the city muster-roll.[580] They occupied the little islets called Œnussæ, near Chios on the northeast, as well as the forts of Sidussa and Pteleus in the territory of Erythræ; from which positions they began a series of harassing operations against Chios itself. Disembarking on the island at Kardamylê and Bolissus, they not only ravaged the neighborhood, but inflicted upon the Chian forces a bloody defeat. After two farther defeats, at Phanæ and at Leukonium, the Chians no longer dared to quit their fortifications; so that the invaders were left to ravage at pleasure the whole territory, being at the same time masters of the sea around, and blocking up the port.

The Athenians now retaliated upon Chios the hardships under which Attica itself was suffering; hardships the more painfully felt, inasmuch as this was the first time that an enemy had ever been seen in the island since the repulse of Xerxês from Greece and the organization of the confederacy of Delos, more than sixty years be-

fore. The territory of Chios was highly cultivated,[581] its commerce extensive, and its wealth among the greatest in all Greece. In fact, under the Athenian empire, its prosperity had been so marked and so uninterrupted, that Thucydidês expresses his astonishment at the undeviating prudence and circumspection of the government, in spite of circumstances well calculated to tempt them into extravagance. "Except Sparta (he says),[582] Chios is the only state that I know, which maintained its sober judgment throughout a career of prosperity, and became even more watchful in regard to security, in proportion as it advanced in power." He adds, that the step of revolting from Athens, though the Chian government now discovered it to have been an error, was at any rate a pardonable error; for it was undertaken under the impression, universal throughout Greece, and prevalent even in Athens herself after the disaster at Syracuse, that Athenian power, if not Athenian independence, was at an end, and undertaken in conjunction with allies seemingly more than sufficient to sustain it. This remarkable observation of Thucydidês doubtless includes an indirect censure upon his own city, as abusing her prosperity for purposes of unmeasured aggrandizement: a censure not undeserved in reference to the enterprise against Sicily. But it counts at the same time as a valuable testimony to the condition of the allies of Athens under the Athenian empire, and goes far in reply to the charge of practical oppression against the imperial city.

The operations now carrying on in Chios indicated such an unexpected renovation in Athenian affairs, that a party in the island began to declare in favor of reunion with Athens. The Chian government were forced to summon Astyochus, with his four Peloponnesian ships from Erythræ, to strengthen their hands, and keep down opposition, by seizing hostages from the suspected parties, as well as by other precautions. While the Chians were thus endangered at home, the Athenian interest in Ionia was still farther fortified by the arrival of a fresh armament from Athens at Samos. Phrynichus, Onomaklês, and Skironidês conducted a fleet of forty-eight triremes, some of them employed for the transportation of hoplites; of which latter there were aboard one thousand Athenians, and fifteen hundred Argeians. Five hundred of these Argeians, having come to Athens without arms, were clothed with Athenian panoplies for service. The newly-arrived armament immediately sailed from Samos to Milêtus, where it effected a disembarkation, in conjunction with those Athenians who had been before watching the place from the island of Ladê. The Milêsians marched forth to give them battle; mustering eight hundred of their own hoplites, together with the Peloponnesian seamen of the five triremes brought across by Chalkideus, and a body of troops, chiefly cavalry, yet with a few mercenary hoplites, under the satrap Tissaphernês. Alkibiadês, also, was present and engaged. The Argeians were so full of contempt for the Ionians of Milêtus who stood opposite to them, that they rushed forward to the charge with great neglect of rank or order; a presumption which they expiated by an entire defeat, with the loss of three hundred men. But the Athenians on their wing were so completely victorious over the Peloponnesians and others opposed to them, that all the army of the latter, and even

the Milesians themselves on returning from their pursuit of the Argeians, were forced to shelter themselves within the walls of the town. The issue of this combat excited much astonishment, inasmuch as, on each side, Ionian hoplites were victorious over Dorian.[583]

For a moment, the Athenian army, masters of the field under the walls of Milêtus, indulged the hope of putting that city under blockade, by a wall across the isthmus which connected it with the continent. But these hopes soon vanished when they were apprized, on the very evening of the battle, that the main Peloponnesian and Sicilian fleet, fifty-five triremes in number, was actually in sight. Of these fifty-five, twenty-two were Sicilian,—twenty from Syracuse and two from Selinus,—sent at the pressing instance of Hermokratês, and under his command, for the purpose of striking the final blow at Athens; so at least it was anticipated, in the beginning of 412 B.C. The remaining thirty-three triremes being Peloponnesian, the whole fleet was placed under the temporary command of Theramenês, until he could join the admiral Astyochus. Theramenês, halting first at the island of Lerus,—off the coast, towards the southward of Milêtus,—was there first informed of the recent victory of the Athenians, so that he thought it prudent to take station for the night in the neighboring gulf of Iasus. Here he was found by Alkibiadês, who came on horseback, in all haste, from Milêtus to the Milesian town of Teichiussa on that gulf. Alkibiadês strenuously urged him to lend immediate aid to the Milêsians, so as to prevent the construction of the intended wall of blockade; representing that if that city were captured, all the hopes of the Peloponnesians in Ionia would be extinguished. Accordingly, he prepared to sail thither the next morning: but, during the night, the Athenians thought it wise to abandon their position near Milêtus and return to Samos with their wounded and their baggage. Having heard of the arrival of Theramenês with his fleet, they preferred leaving their victory unimproved, to the hazard of a general battle. Two out of the three commanders, indeed, were at first inclined to take the latter course, insisting that the maritime honor of Athens would be tarnished by retiring before the enemy. But the third, Phrynichus, opposed with so much emphasis the proposition of fighting, that he at length induced his colleagues to retire. The fleet, he said, had not come prepared for fighting a naval battle, but full of hoplites for land-operations against Milêtus: the numbers of the newly-arrived Peloponnesians were not accurately known; and a defeat at sea, under existing circumstances, would be utter ruin to Athens. Thucydidês bestows much praise on Phrynichus for the wisdom of this advice, which was forthwith acted upon. The Athenian fleet sailed back to Samos; from which place the Argeian hoplites, sulky with their recent defeat, demanded to be conveyed home.[584]

On the ensuing morning, the Peloponnesian fleet sailed from the gulf of Iasus to Milêtus, expecting to find and fight the Athenians, and leaving their masts, sails, and rigging—as was usual when going into action—at Teichiussa. Finding Milêtus already relieved of the enemy, they stayed there only one day, in order to reinforce them-

selves with the twenty-five triremes which Chalkideus had originally brought thither, and which had been since blocked up by the Athenian fleet at Ladê, and then sailed back to Teichiussa to pick up the tackle there deposited. Being now not far from Iasus, the residence of Amorgês, Tissaphernês persuaded them to attack it by sea, in coöperation with his forces by land. No one at Iasus was aware of the arrival of the Peloponnesian fleet: the triremes approaching were supposed to be Athenians and friends, so that the place was entered and taken by surprise;[585] though strong in situation and fortifications, and defended by a powerful band of Grecian mercenaries. The capture of Iasus, in which the Syracusans distinguished themselves, was of signal advantage, from the abundant plunder which it distributed among the army; the place being rich from ancient date, and probably containing the accumulations of the satrap Pissuthnês, father of Amorgês. It was handed over to Tissaphernês, along with all the prisoners, for each head of whom he paid down a Daric stater, or twenty Attic drachmæ, and along with Amorgês himself, who had been taken alive, and whom the satrap was thus enabled to send up to Susa. The Grecian mercenaries captured in the place were enrolled in the service of the captors, and sent by land under Pedaritus to Erythræ, in order that they might cross over from thence to Chios.[586]

The arrival of the recent reinforcements to both the opposing fleets, and the capture of Iasus, took place about the autumnal equinox or the end of September; at which period, the Peloponnesian fleet being assembled at Milêtus, Tissaphernês paid to them the wages of the crews, at the rate of one Attic drachma per head per diem, as he had promised by his envoy at Sparta. But he at the same time gave notice for the future,—partly at the instigation of Alkibiadês, of which more hereafter,—that he could not continue so high a rate of pay, unless he should receive express instructions from Susa; and that, until such instructions came, he should give only half a drachma per day. Theramenês, being only commander for the interim, until the junction with Astyochus, was indifferent to the rate at which the men were paid,—a miserable jealousy, which marks the low character of many of these Spartan officers,—but the Syracusan Hermokratês remonstrated so loudly against the reduction, that he obtained from Tissaphernês the promise of a slight increase above the half drachma, though he could not succeed in getting the entire drachma continued.[587] For the present, however, the seamen were in good spirits; not merely from having received the high rate of pay, but from the plentiful booty recently acquired at Iasus;[588] while Astyochus and the Chians were also greatly encouraged by the arrival of so large a fleet. Nevertheless, the Athenians on their side were also reinforced by thirty-five fresh triremes, which reached Samos under Strombichidês, Charminus, and Euktêmon. The Athenian fleet from Chios was now recalled to Samos, where the commanders mustered their whole naval force, with a view of redividing it for ulterior operations.

Considering that in the autumn of the preceding year, immediately after the Syracusan disaster, the navy of Athens had been no less scanty in number of ships than defective in equipment, we read with amazement, that she had now at Samos no less than one hundred and four triremes in full condition and disposable for service, besides some others specially destined for the transport of troops. Indeed, the total number which she had sent out, putting together the separate squadrons, had been one hundred and twenty-eight.[589] So energetic an effort, and so unexpected a renovation of affairs from the hopeless prostration of last year, was such as no Grecian state except Athens could have accomplished; nor even Athens herself, had she not been aided by that reserve fund, consecrated twenty years before through the long-sighted calculation of Periklês.

The Athenians resolved to employ thirty triremes in making a landing, and establishing a fortified post, in Chios; and lots being drawn among the generals, Strombichidês with two others were assigned to the command. The other seventy-four triremes, remaining masters of the sea, made descents near Milêtus, and in vain tried to provoke the Peloponnesian fleet out of that harbor. It was some time before Astyochus actually went thither to assume his new command, being engaged in operations near to Chios, which island had been left comparatively free by the recall of the Athenian fleet to the general muster at Samos. Going forth with twenty triremes, —ten Peloponnesian and ten Chian,—he made a fruitless attack upon Pteleus, the Athenian fortified post in the Erythræan territory; after which he sailed to Klazomenæ, recently retransferred from the continent to the neighboring islet. He here —in conjunction with Tamôs, the Persian general of the district—enjoined the Klazomenians again to break with Athens, to leave their islet, and to take up their residence inland at Daphnûs, where the philo-Peloponnesian party among them still remained established since the former revolt. This demand being rejected, he attacked Klazomenæ, but was repulsed, although the town was unfortified, and was presently driven off by a severe storm, from which he found shelter at Kymê and Phokæa. Some of his ships sheltered themselves during the same storm on certain islets near to and belonging to Klazomenæ; on which they remained eight days, destroying and plundering the property of the inhabitants, and then rejoined Astyochus. That admiral was now anxious to make an attempt on Lesbos, from which he received envoys promising revolt from Athens. But the Corinthians and others in his fleet were so averse to the enterprise, that he was forced to relinquish it and sail back to Chios; his fleet, before it arrived there, being again dispersed by the storms, frequent in the month of November.[590]

Meanwhile Pedaritus, despatched by land from Milêtus,—at the head of the mercenary force made prisoners at Iasus, as well as of five hundred of the Peloponnesian seamen who had originally crossed the sea with Chalkideus, and since served as hoplites,—had reached Erythræ and from thence crossed the channel to Chios. To him and to the Chians, Astyochus now proposed to undertake the expedition to Les-

bos; but he experienced from them the same reluctance as from the Corinthians, a strong proof that the tone of feeling in Lesbos had been found to be decidedly philo-Athenian on the former expedition. Pedaritus even peremptorily refused to let him have the Chian triremes for any such purpose, an act of direct insubordination in a Lacedæmonian officer towards the admiral-in-chief, which Astyochus resented so strongly, that he immediately left Chios for Milêtus, carrying away with him all the Peloponnesian triremes, and telling the Chians, in terms of strong displeasure, that they might look in vain to him for aid, if they should come to need it. He halted with his fleet for the night under the headland of Korykus (in the Erythræan territory), on the north side; but while there, he received an intimation of a supposed plot to betray Erythræ by means of prisoners sent back from the Athenian station at Samos. Instead of pursuing his voyage to Milêtus, he therefore returned on the next day to Erythræ to investigate this plot, which turned out to be a stratagem of the prisoners themselves in order to obtain their liberation.[591]

The fact of his thus going back to Erythræ, instead of pursuing his voyage, proved, by accident, the salvation of his fleet. For it so happened that on that same night the Athenian fleet, under Strombichidês—thirty triremes, accompanied by some triremes carrying hoplites—had its station on the southern side of the same headland. Neither knew of the position of the other, and Astyochus, had he gone forward the next day towards Milêtus, would have fallen in with the superior numbers of his enemy. He farther escaped a terrible storm, which the Athenians encountered when they doubled the headland going northward. Descrying three Chian triremes, they gave chase, but the storm became so violent that even these Chians had great difficulty in making their own harbor, while the three foremost Athenian ships were wrecked on the neighboring shore, all the crews either perishing or becoming prisoners.[592] The rest of the Athenian fleet found shelter in the harbor of Phœnikus on the opposite mainland, under the lofty mountain called Mimas, north of Erythræ.

As soon as weather permitted, they pursued their voyage to Lesbos, from which island they commenced their operations of invading Chios and establishing in it a permanent fortified post. Having transported their land-force across from Lesbos, they occupied a strong maritime site called Delphinium, seemingly a projecting cape having a sheltered harbor on each side, not far from the city of Chios.[593] They bestowed great labor and time in fortifying this post, both on the land and the sea-side, during which process they were scarcely interrupted at all either by the Chians, or by Pedaritus and his garrison; whose inaction arose not merely from the discouragement of the previous defeats, but from the political dissension which now reigned in the city. A strong philo-Athenian party had pronounced itself; and though Tydeus its leader was seized by Pedaritus and put to death, still, his remaining partisans were so numerous, that the government was brought to an oligarchy narrower than ever, and to the extreme of jealous precaution, not knowing whom to trust. In spite of numerous messages sent to Milêtus, intreating succor, and representing the urgent peril

to which this greatest among all the Ionian allies of Sparta was exposed, Astyochus adhered to his parting menaces, and refused compliance. The indignant Pedaritus sent to prefer complaint against him at Sparta as a traitor. Meanwhile the fortress at Delphinium advanced so near towards completion, that Chios began to suffer from it as much as Athens suffered from Dekeleia, with the farther misfortune of being blocked up by sea. The slaves in this wealthy island—chiefly foreigners acquired by purchase, but more numerous than in any other Grecian state except Laconia—were emboldened by the manifest superiority and assured position of the invaders to desert in crowds; and the loss arising, not merely from their flight, but from the valuable information and aid which they gave to the enemy was immense.[594] The distress of the island increased every day, nor could anything relieve it except succor from without, which Astyochus still withheld.

That officer, on reaching Milêtus, found the Peloponnesian force on the Asiatic side of the Ægean just reinforced by a squadron of twelve triremes under Dorieus; chiefly from Thurii, which had undergone a political revolution since the Athenian disaster at Syracuse, and was now decidedly in the hands of the active philo-Laconian party; the chief persons friendly to Athens having been exiled.[595] Dorieus and his squadron, crossing the Ægean in its southern latitude, had arrived safely at Knidus, which had already been conquered by Tissaphernês from Athens, and had received a Persian garrison.[596] Orders were sent from Milêtus that half of this newly-arrived squadron should remain on guard at Knidus, while the other half should cruise near the Triopian cape to intercept the trading vessels from Egypt. But the Athenians, who had also learned the arrival of Dorieus, sent a powerful squadron from Samos, which captured all these six triremes off Cape Triopium, though the crews escaped ashore. They farther made an attempt to recover Knidus, which was very nearly successful, as the town was unfortified on the sea-side. On the morrow the attack was renewed, —but additional defences had been provided during the night, while the crews of the ships captured near Triopium had come in to help,—so that the Athenians were forced to return to Samos without any farther advantage than that of ravaging the Knidian territory. Astyochus took no step to intercept them, nor did he think himself strong enough to keep the sea against the seventy-four Athenian triremes at Samos, though his fleet at Milêtus was at this moment in high condition. The rich booty acquired at Iasus was unconsumed; the Milêsians were zealous in the confederate cause; while the pay from Tissaphernês continued to be supplied with tolerable regularity, though at the reduced rate mentioned a little above.[597]

Though the Peloponnesians had yet no ground of complaint—such as they soon came to have—against the satrap for irregularity of payment, still, the powerful fleet now at Milêtus inspired the commanders with a new tone of confidence, so that they became ashamed of the stipulations of that treaty to which Chalkideus and Alkibiadês, when first landing at Milêtus with their scanty armament, had submitted. Accordingly Astyochus, shortly after his arrival at Milêtus, and even before the depar-

ture of Theramenês,—whose functions had expired when he had handed over the fleet,—insisted on a fresh treaty with Tissaphernês, which was agreed on, to the following effect:—

"Convention and alliance is concluded, on the following conditions, between the Lacedæmonians, with their allies, and king Darius, his sons, and Tissaphernês. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall not attack or injure any territory or any city which belongs to Darius, or has belonged to his father or ancestors; nor shall they raise any tribute from any of the said cities. Neither Darius nor any of his subjects shall attack or injure the Lacedæmonians or their allies. Should the Lacedæmonians or their allies have any occasion for the king, or should the king have any occasion for the Lacedæmonians or their allies, let each meet, as much as may be, the wishes expressed by the other. Both will carry on jointly the war against Athens and her allies: neither party shall bring the war to a close, without mutual consent. The king shall pay and keep any army which he may have sent for, and which may be employed in his territory. If any of the cities parties to this convention shall attack the king's territory, the rest engage to hinder them, and to defend the king with their best power. And if any one within the king's territory, or within the territory subject to him,[598] shall attack the Lacedæmonians or their allies, the king shall hinder them, and lend his best defensive aid."

Looked at with the eyes of Pan-Hellenic patriotism, this second treaty of Astyochus and Theramenês was less disgraceful than the first treaty of Chalkideus. It did not formally proclaim that all those Grecian cities which had ever belonged to the king or to his ancestors, should still be considered as his subjects, nor did it pledge the Lacedæmonians to aid the king in hindering any of them from achieving their liberty. It still admitted, however, by implication, the same undiminished extent of the king's dominion, as it had stood when at its maximum under his predecessors; the same undefined rights of the king to meddle with Grecian affairs; the same unqualified abandonment of all the Greeks on the continent of Asia. The conclusion of this treaty was the last act performed by Theramenês, who was lost at sea shortly afterwards, on his voyage home, in a small boat, no one knew how.[599]

Astyochus, now alone in command, was still importuned by the urgent solicitations of the distressed Chians for relief, and, in spite of his reluctance, was compelled by the murmurs of his own army to lend an ear to them, when a new incident happened which gave him at least a good pretext for directing his attention southward. A Peloponnesian squadron of twenty-seven triremes under the command of Antisthenês, having started from Cape Malea about the winter tropic or close of 412 B.C., had first crossed the sea to Melos, where it dispersed ten Athenian triremes and captured three of them; then afterwards, from apprehension that these fugitive Athenians would make known its approach at Samos, had made a long circuit round by Krete, and thus ultimately reached Kaunus at the southeastern extremity of Asia Minor. This was the squadron which Kalligeitus and Timagoras had caused to be

equipped, having come over for that purpose a year before as envoys from the satrap Pharnabazus. Antisthenês was instructed first to get to Milêtus and put himself in concert with the main Lacedæmonian fleet; next, to forward these triremes, or another squadron of equal force under Klearchus, to the Hellespont, for the purpose of coöperating with Pharnabazus against the Athenian dependencies in that region. Eleven Spartans, the chief of whom was Lichas, accompanied Antisthenês, to be attached to Astyochus as advisers, according to a practice not unusual with the Lacedæmonians. These men were not only directed to review the state of affairs at Milêtus, and exercise control coördinate with Astyochus, but even empowered, if they saw reason, to dismiss that admiral himself, upon whom the complaints of Pedaritus from Chios had cast suspicion; and to appoint Antisthenês in his place.[600]

No sooner had Astyochus learned at Milêtus the arrival of Antisthenês at Kaunus, than he postponed all idea of lending aid to Chios, and sailed immediately to secure his junction with the twenty-seven new triremes as well as with the new Spartan counsellors. In his voyage southward he captured the city of Kôs, unfortified and half-ruined by a recent earthquake, and then passed on to Knidus; where the inhabitants strenuously urged him to go forward at once, even without disembarking his men, in order that he might surprise an Athenian squadron of twenty triremes under Charmînus; which had been despatched from Samos, after the news received from Melos, in order to attack and repel the squadron under Antisthenês. Charmînus, having his station at Symê, was cruising near Rhodes and the Lykian coast, to watch, though he had not been able to keep back, the Peloponnesian fleet just arrived at Kaunus. In this position he was found by the far more numerous fleet of Astyochus, the approach of which he did not at all expect. But the rainy and hazy weather had so dispersed it, that Charmînus, seeing at first only a few ships apart from the rest, mistook them for the smaller squadron of new-comers. Attacking the triremes thus seen, he at first gained considerable advantage, disabling three and damaging several others. But presently the dispersed vessels of the main fleet came in sight and closed round him, so that he was forced to make the best speed in escaping, first to the island called Teutlussa, next to Halikarnassus. He did not effect his escape without the loss of six ships; while the victorious Peloponnesians, after erecting their trophy on the island of Symê, returned to Knidus, where the entire fleet, including the twenty-seven triremes newly arrived, was now united.[601] The Athenians in Samos—whose affairs were now in confusion, from causes which will be explained in the ensuing chapter—had kept no watch on the movements of the main Peloponnesian fleet at Milêtus, and seem to have been ignorant of its departure until they were apprized of the defeat of Charmînus. They then sailed down to Symê, took up the sails and rigging belonging to that squadron, which had been there deposited, and then, after an attack upon Loryma, carried back their whole fleet, probably including the remnant of the squadron of Charmînus, to Samos.[602]

Though the Peloponnesian fleet now assembled at Knidus consisted of ninety-four triremes, much superior in number to the Athenian, it did not try to provoke any general action. The time of Lichas and his brother commissioners was at first spent in negotiations with Tissaphernês, who had joined them at Knidus, and against whom they found a strong feeling of discontent prevalent in the fleet. That satrap—now acting greatly under the advice of Alkibiadês, of which also more in the coming chapter—had of late become slack in the Peloponnesian cause, and irregular in furnishing pay to their seamen, during the last weeks of their stay at Milêtus. He was at the same time full of promises, paralyzing all their operations by assurances that he was bringing up the vast fleet of Phenicia to their aid: but in reality his object was, under fair appearances, merely to prolong the contest and waste the strength of both parties. Arriving in the midst of this state of feeling, and discussing with Tissaphernês the future conduct of the war, Lichas not only expressed displeasure at his past conduct, but even protested against the two conventions concluded by Chalkideus and by Theramenês, as being, both the one and the other, a disgrace to the Hellenic name. By the express terms of the former, and by the implications of the latter, not merely all the islands of the Ægean, but even Thessaly and Bœotia, were acknowledged as subject to Persia; so that Sparta, if she sanctioned such conditions, would be merely imposing upon the Greeks a Persian sceptre, instead of general freedom, for which she professed to be struggling. Lichas, declaring that he would rather renounce all prospect of Persian pay, than submit to such conditions, proposed to negotiate for a fresh treaty upon other and better terms, a proposition which Tissaphernês rejected with so much indignation as to depart without settling anything. [603]

His desertion did not discourage the Peloponnesian counsellors. Possessing a fleet larger than they had ever before had united in Asia, together with a numerous body of allies, they calculated on being able to get money to pay their men without Persian aid; and an invitation, which they just now received from various powerful men at Rhodes, tended to strengthen such confidence. The island of Rhodes, inhabited by a Dorian population considerable in number as well as distinguished for nautical skill, was at this time divided between three separate city governments, as it had been at the epoch of the Homeric Catalogue,—Lindus, Ialysus, and Kameirus; for the city called Rhodes, formed by a coalescence of all these three, dates only from two or three years after the period which we have now reached. Invited by several of the wealthy men of the island, the Peloponnesian fleet first attacked Kameirus, the population of which, intimidated by a force of ninety-four triremes, and altogether uninformed of their approach, abandoned their city, which had no defences, and fled to the mountains.[604] All the three Rhodian towns, destitute of fortifications, were partly persuaded, partly frightened, into the step of revolting from Athens and allying themselves with the Peloponnesians. The Athenian fleet, whose commanders were just now too busy with political intrigue to keep due military watch, arrived from

Samos too late to save Rhodes, and presently returned to the former island, leaving detachments at Chalkê and Kôs to harass the Peloponnesians with desultory attacks.

The Peloponnesians now levied from the Rhodians a contribution of thirty-two talents, and adopted the island as the main station for their fleet, instead of Milêtus. We can explain this change of place by their recent unfriendly discussion with Tissaphernês, and their desire to be more out of his reach.[605] But what we cannot so easily explain, is, that they remained on the island without any movement or military action, and actually hauled their triremes ashore, for the space of no less than eighty days; that is, from about the middle of January to the end of March 411 B.C. While their powerful fleet of ninety-four triremes, superior to that of Athens at Samos, was thus lying idle, their allies in Chios were known to be suffering severe and increasing distress, and repeatedly pressing for aid:[606] moreover, the promise of sending to coöperate with Pharnabazus against the Athenian dependencies on the Hellespont, remained unperformed.[607] We may impute such extreme military slackness mainly to the insidious policy of Tissaphernês, now playing a double game between Sparta and Athens. He still kept up intelligence with the Peloponnesians at Rhodes, paralyzed their energies by assurances that the Phenician fleet was actually on its way to aid them, and insured the success of these intrigues by bribes distributed personally among the generals and the trierarchs. Even Astyochus, the general-in-chief, took his share in this corrupt bargain, against which not one stood out except the Syracusan Hermokratês.[608] Such prolonged inaction of the armament, at the moment of its greatest force, was thus not simply the fruit of honest mistake, like the tardiness of Nikias in Sicily, but proceeded from the dishonesty and personal avidity of the Peloponnesian officers.

I have noticed, on more than one previous occasion, the many evidences which exist of the prevalence of personal corruption—even in its coarsest form, that of direct bribery—among the leading Greeks of all the cities, when acting individually. Of such evidences the incident here recorded is not the least remarkable. Nor ought this general fact ever to be forgotten by those who discuss the question between oligarchy and democracy, as it stood in the Grecian world. The confident pretensions put forth by the wealthy and oligarchical Greeks to superior virtue, public as well as private,—and the quiet repetition, by various writers modern and ancient, of the laudatory epithets implying such assumed virtue,—are so far from being borne out by history, that these individuals were perpetually ready as statesmen to betray their countrymen, or as generals even to betray the interests of their soldiers, for the purpose of acquiring money themselves. Of course, it is not meant that this was true of all of them; but it was true sufficiently often, to be reckoned upon as a contingency more than probable. If, speaking on the average, the leading men of a Grecian community were not above the commission of political misdeeds thus palpable, and of a nature not to be disguised even from themselves, far less would they be above the vices, always more or less mingled with self-delusion, of pride, power-seeking, party-

antipathy or sympathy, love of ease, etc. And if the community were to have any chance of guarantee against such abuses, it could only be by full license of accusation against delinquents, and certainty of trial before judges identified in interest with the people themselves. Such were the securities which the Grecian democracies, especially that of Athens, tried to provide; in a manner not always wise, still less always effectual, but assuredly justified, in the amplest manner, by the urgency and prevalence of the evil. Yet in the common representations given of Athenian affairs, this evil is overlooked or evaded; the precautions taken against it are denounced as so many evidences of democratical ill-temper and injustice; and the class of men, through whose initiatory action alone such precautions were enforced, are held up to scorn as demagogues and *sycophants*. Had these Peloponnesian generals and trierarchs, who under the influence of bribes wasted two important months in inaction, been Athenians, there might have been some chance of their being tried and punished; though even at Athens the chance of impunity to offenders, through powerful political clubs and other sinister artifices, was much greater than it ought to have been. So little is it consistent with the truth, however often affirmed, that judicial accusation was too easy, and judicial condemnation too frequent. When the judicial precautions provided at Athens are looked at, as they ought to be, side by side with the evil, they will be found imperfect, indeed, both in the scheme and in the working, but certainly neither uncalled for nor over-severe.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Thucyd. v, 17-29.

[2] Thucyd. v, 18.

[3] Thucyd. v, 14, 22, 76.

[4] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

[5] Thucyd. v, 21, 22.

[6] Thucyd. v, 23. The treaty of alliance seems to have been drawn up at Sparta, and approved or concerted with the Athenian envoys; then sent to Athens, and there adopted by the people; then sworn to on both sides. The interval between this second treaty and the first (οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον, v, 24), may have been more than a month; for it comprised the visit of the Lacedæmonian envoys to Amphipolis and the other towns of Thrace, the manifestation of resistance in those towns, and the return of Klearidas to Sparta to give an account of his conduct.

[7] Thucyd. v, 24.

[8] Thucyd. iv, 19. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ὑμᾶς προκαλοῦνται ἐς σπονδὰς καὶ διάλυσιν πολέμου, διδόντες μὲν εἰρήνην καὶ ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ἄλλην φιλίαν πολλὴν καὶ οἰκειότητα ἐς ἀλλήλους ὑπάρχειν, ἀνταιτοῦντες δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας.

[9] Thucyd. v, 26. οὐκ εἰκὸς ὃν εἰρήνην αὐτὴν κριθῆναι, etc.

[10] Thucyd. v, 28. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἥ τε Λακεδαίμων μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκουσε καὶ ὑπερώφθη διὰ τὰς ξυμφορὰς.—(Νικίας) λέγων ἐν μὲν τῷ σφετέρῳ καλῷ (Athenian) ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐκείνων ἀπρεπεῖ (Lacedæmonian) τὸν πόλεμον ἀναβάλλεσθαι, etc. (v, 46)—Οἷς πρῶτον μὲν (to the Lacedæmonians) διὰ ξυμφορῶν ἡ ξύμβασις, etc.

[11] Aristophan. Pac. 665-887.

[12] Thucyd. v, 21-35.

[13] Thucyd. v, 32.

[14] Thucyd. v, 35. λέγοντες ἀεὶ ὡς μετ' Ἀθηναίων τούτους, ἢν μὴ θέλωσι, κοινῇ ἀναγκάσουσι· *χρόνους δὲ προὔθεντο ἄνευ ξυγγραφῆς*, ἐν οἷς χρῆν τοὺς μὴ ἐσιόντας ἀμφοτέροις πολεμίους εἶναι.

[15] Thucyd. v, 35. τούτων οὖν ὁρῶντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲν ἔργῳ γιγνόμενον, ὑπετόπευον τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μηδὲν δίκαιον διανοεῖσθαι, ὥστε οὔτε Πύλον ἀπαιτούντων αὐτῶν ἀπεδίδοσαν, ἀλλὰ *καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας μετεμέλοντο ἀποδεδωκότες*, etc.

[16] Thucyd. v, 35. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ πολλῶν λόγων γενομένων ἐν τῷ θέρει τούτῳ, etc.

[17] Thucyd. v, 28. Aristophan. Pac. 467, about the Argeians, δίχοθεν μισθοφοροῦντες ἄλφιτα.

He characterizes the Argeians as anxious for this reason to prolong the war between Athens and Sparta. This passage, as well as the whole tenor of the play, affords ground for affirming that the Pax was represented during the winter immediately preceding the Peace of Nikias, about four or five months after the battle of Amphipolis and the death of Kleon and Brasidas; not two years later, as Mr. Clinton would place it, on the authority of a date in the play itself, upon which he lays too great stress.

[18] Thucyd. v, 67. Ἀργείων οἱ Χίλιοι λογάδες, οἷς ἡ πόλις *ἐκ πολλοῦ* ἄσκησιν τῶν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον δημοσίᾳ παρεῖχε.

Diodorus (xii, 75) represents the first formation of this Thousand-regiment at Argos as having taken place just about this time, and I think he is here worthy of credit; so that I do not regard the expression of Thucydidês ἐκ πολλοῦ as indicating a time more than two years prior to the battle of Mantineia. For Grecian military training,

two years of constant practice would be a *long* time. It is not to be imagined that the Argeian democracy would have incurred the expense and danger of keeping up this select regiment during all the period of their long peace, just now coming to an end.

[19] Thucyd. v, 29. μὴ μετὰ Ἀθηναίων σφᾶς βούλωνται Λακεδαιμόνιοι δουλώσασθαι: compare Diodorus, xii, 75.

[20] Thucyd. v, 28.

[21] Thucyd. iv, 134.

[22] Thucyd. v, 29. τοῖς γὰρ Μαντινεῦσι μέρος τι τῆς Ἀρκαδίας κατέστραπτο ὑπήκοον, ἔτι τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πολέμου ὄντος, καὶ ἐνόμιζον οὐ περιόψεσθαι σφᾶς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἄρχειν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σχολὴν ἦγον.

As to the way in which the agreement of the members of the confederacy modified the relations between subordinate and imperial states, see farther on, pages 25 and 26, in the case of Elis and Lepreum.

[23] Thucyd. i, 125.

[24] Thucyd. v, 29. *Ἀποστάντων δὲ τῶν Μαντινέων*, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Πελοπόννησος ἐς θροῦν καθίστατο ὡς καὶ σφίσι ποιητέον τοῦτο, νομίζοντες πλέον τέ τι εἰδότας μεταστῆναι αὐτοὺς, καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἅμα δι' ὀργῆς ἔχοντες, etc.

[25] Thucyd. v, 30. Κορίνθιοι δὲ παρόντων σφίσι τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅσοι οὐδ' αὐτοὶ ἐδέξαντο τὰς σπονδὰς (παρεκάλεσαν δὲ αὐτοὺς αὐτοὶ πρότερον) ἀντέλεγον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, *ἃ μὲν ἠδικοῦντο, οὐ δηλοῦντες ἄντικρυς*, etc.

[26] Thucyd. v, 30.

[27] Thucyd. v, 31. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ καὶ Μεγαρῆς τὸ αὐτὸ λέγοντες ἡσύχαζον, *περιορώμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων*, καὶ νομίζοντες σφίσι τὴν Ἀργείων δημοκρατίαν αὐτοῖς ὀλιγαρχουμένοις ἧσσον ξύμφορον εἶναι τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας.

These words, περιορώμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, are not clear, and have occasioned much embarrassment to the commentators, as well as some propositions for altering the text. It would undoubtedly be an improvement in the sense, if we were permitted (with Dobree) to strike out the words ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων as a gloss, and thus to construe περιορώμενοι as a middle verb, "waiting to see the event," or literally, "keeping a look-out about them." But taking the text as it now stands, the sense which I have given to it seems the best which can be elicited.

Most of the critics translate περιορώμενοι "slighted or despised by the Lacedæmonians." But in the first place, this is not true as a matter of fact: in the next place, if it were true, we ought to have an adversative conjunction instead of καὶ before νομίζοντες, since the tendency of the two motives indicated would then be in opposite directions. "The Bœotians, though despised by the Lacedæmonians, still thought a junction with the Argeian democracy dangerous." And this is the sense which Haack actually proposes, though it does great violence to the word καὶ.

Dr. Thirlwall and Dr. Arnold translate περιορώμενοι "feeling themselves slighted;" and the latter says, "The Bœotians and Megarians took neither side; not the Lacedæmonian, for they felt that the Lacedæmonians had slighted them; not the Argive, for they thought that the Argive democracy would suit them less than the constitution of Sparta." But this again puts an inadmissible meaning on ἡσύχαζον, which means "stood as they were." The Bœotians were not called upon to choose between two sides or two positive schemes of action: they were invited to ally themselves with Argos, and this they decline doing: they prefer to *remain as they are*, allies of Lacedæmon, but refusing to become parties to the peace. Moreover, in the sense proposed by Dr. Arnold, we should surely find an adversative conjunction in place of καὶ.

I submit that the word περιορᾶν does not necessarily mean "to slight or despise," but sometimes "to leave alone, to take no notice of, to abstain from interfering." Thus, Thucyd. i, 24. Ἐπιδάμνιοι—πέμπουσιν ἐς τὴν Κερκύραν πρέσβεις—δεόμενοι μὴ σφᾶς *περιορᾶν* φθειρομένους, etc. Again, i, 69, καὶ νῦν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οὐχ ἑκὰς ἀλλ' ἐγγὺς ὄντας *περιορᾶτε*, etc. The same is the sense of περιϊδεῖν and περιόψεσθαι, ii, 20. In all these passages there is no idea of *contempt* implied in the word: the "leaving alone" or "abstaining from interference," proceeds from feelings quite different from contempt.

So in the passage here before us, περιορώμενοι seems the *passive* participle in this sense. Thucydidês, having just described an energetic remonstrance sent by the Spartans to prevent Corinth from joining Argos, means to intimate (by the words here in discussion) that *no* similar *interference* was resorted to by them to prevent the Bœotians and Megarians from joining her: "The Bœotians and Megarians remained as they were, *left to themselves by the Lacedæmonians*, and thinking the Argeian democracy less suitable to them than the oligarchy of Sparta."

[28] Thucyd. v, 31. Καὶ μέχρι τοῦ Ἀττικοῦ πολέμου ἀπέφερον· ἔπειτα παυσαμένων διὰ πρόφασιν τοῦ πολέμου, οἱ Ἠλεῖοι ἐπηνάγκαζον, οἱ δ' ἐτράποντο πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους.

For the *agreement* here alluded to, see a few lines forward.

[29] Thucyd. v, 31. τὴν ξυνθήκην προφέροντες ἐν ᾗ εἴρητο, ἃ ἔχοντες ἐς τὸν Ἀττικὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντό τινες, ταῦτα ἔχοντας καὶ ἐξελθεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἴσον ἔχοντες ἀφίστανται, etc.

Of the agreement here alluded to among the members of the Peloponnesian confederacy, we hear only in this one passage. It was extremely important to such of the confederates as were imperial cities; that is, which had subordinates or subject-allies.

Poppo and Bloomfield wonder that the Corinthians did not appeal to this agreement in order to procure the restitution of Sollium and Anaktorium. But they misconceive the scope of the agreement, which did not relate to captures made during the war by the common enemy. It would be useless for the confederacy to enter into a formal agreement that none of the members should lose anything through capture made by the enemy. This would be a question of superiority of force, for no agreement could bind the enemy. But the confederacy might very well make a covenant among themselves, as to the relations between their own imperial *immediate* members, and the *mediate* or subordinate dependencies of each. Each imperial state consented to forego the tribute or services of its dependency, so long as the latter was called upon to lend its aid in the general effort of the confederacy against the common enemy. But the confederacy at the same time gave its guarantee, that the imperial state should reënter upon these suspended rights, so soon as the war should be at an end. This guarantee was clearly violated by Sparta in the case of Elis and Lepreum. On the contrary, in the case of Mantineia, mentioned a few pages back, p. 19, the Mantineians had violated the maxim of the confederacy, and Sparta was justified in interfering at the request of their subjects to maintain the autonomy of the latter.

[30] Thucyd. v, 32. Κορινθίοις δὲ ἀνακωχὴ ἄσπονδος ἦν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους.

Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks: "By ἄσπονδος is meant a mere agreement in words, not ratified by the solemnities of religion. And the Greeks, as we have seen, considered the breach of their word very different from the breach of their oath."

Not so much is here meant even as that which Dr. Arnold supposes. There was no agreement at all, either in words or by oath. There was a simple absence of hostilities, *de facto*, not arising out of any recognized pledge. Such is the meaning of ἀνακωχὴ, i, 66; iii, 25, 26.

The answer here made by the Athenians to the application of Corinth is not easy to understand. They might, with much better reason, have declined to conclude the ten day's armistice with the *Bœotians*, because these latter still remained allies of Sparta, though refusing to accede to the general peace; whereas the Corinthians, having joined Argos, had less right to be considered allies of Sparta. Nevertheless, we shall still find them attending the meetings at Sparta, and acting as allies of the latter.

[31] Thucyd. v, 33, 34. The Neodamodes were Helots previously enfranchised, or the sons of such.

[32] Thucyd. iv, 80.

[33] Thucyd. v, 34. Ἀτίμους ἐποίησαν, ἀτιμίαν δὲ τοιαύτην, ὥστε μήτε ἄρχειν, μήτε πριαμένους τι, ἢ πωλοῦντας, κυρίους εἶναι.

[34] Thucyd. v, 32.

[35] Thucyd. v, 35-39. I agree with Dr. Thirlwall and Dr. Arnold in preferring the conjecture of Poppo, Χαλκιδῆς, in this place.

[36] Thucyd. v, 36.

[37] Thucyd. v, 37. ἐπεσταλμένοι ἀπό τε τοῦ Κλεοβούλου καὶ Ξενάρους καὶ ὅσοι φίλοι ἦσαν αὐτοῖς, etc.

[38] Thucyd. v, 36.

[39] Thucyd. v, 38. οἰόμενοι τὴν βουλὴν, κἂν μὴ εἴπωσιν, οὐκ ἄλλα ψηφιεῖσθαι ἢ ἃ σφίσι προδιαγνόντες παραινοῦσιν … ταῖς τέσσαρσι βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν, αἵπερ ἅπαν τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσι.

[40] Thucyd. v, 38.

[41] See Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. ii, ch. xvii, p. 370.

[42] Thucyd. v, 3.

[43] Thucyd. v, 41. Τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐδόκει μωρία εἶναι ταῦτα· ἔπειτα (ἐπεθύμουν γὰρ τὸ Ἄργος πάντως φίλιον ἔχειν) ξυνεχώρησαν ἐφ' οἷς ἠξίουν, καὶ ξυνεγράψαντο.

By the forms of treaty which remain, we are led to infer that the treaty was not subscribed by any signatures, but drawn up by the secretary or authorized officer, and ultimately engraved on a column. The names of those who take the oath are recorded, but seemingly no official signature.

[44] Thucyd. v. 42.

[45] Thucyd. v. 42.

[46] Thucyd. v. 43. Ἀλκιβιάδης … ἀνὴρ ἡλικίᾳ μὲν ὢν ἔτι τότε νέος, ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει, ἀξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος.

The expression cf Plutarch, however, ἔτι μειράκιον, seems an exaggeration (Alkibiad. c. 10).

Kritias and Chariklês, in reply to the question of Sokratês, whom they had forbidden to converse with or teach young men, defined a *young man* to be one under thirty years of age, the senatorial age at Athens (Xenophon, Memor. i. 2. 35).

[47] Plato, Protagoras, c. 10, p. 320; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 2, 3, 4; Isokratês, De Bigis, Orat. xvi, p. 353, sect. 33, 34; Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 1.

[48] Πέπονθα δὲ πρὸς τοῦτον (Σωκράτη) μόνον ἀνθρώπων, *ὃ οὐκ ἄν τις οἴοιτο ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐνεῖναι, τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι ὀντινοῦν*.

This is a part of the language which Plato puts into the mouth of Alkibiadês, in the Symposion, c. 32, p. 216; see also Plato, Alkibiad. i, c. 1, 2, 3.

Compare his other contemporary, Xenophon, Memor. i, 2, 16-25.

Φύσει δὲ πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ μεγάλων πάθων ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ φιλόνεικον ἰσχυρότατον ἦν καὶ τὸ φιλόπρωτον, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστι τοῖς παιδικοῖς ὑπομνήμασι (Plutarch, Alkib. c. 2).

[49] I translate, with some diminution of the force of the words, the expression of a contemporary author, Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2. 24. Ἀλκιβιάδης δ' αὖ διὰ μὲν κάλλος ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν γυναικῶν *θηρώμενος*, etc.

[50] Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, c. 49; Thucyd. vi, 16; Antipho apud Athenæum, xii, p. 525.

[51] Athenæus, ix, p. 407.

[52] Thucyd. vi, 15. I translate the expression of Thucydidês, which is of great force and significance—φοβηθέντες γὰρ αὐτοῦ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα *παρανομίας* ἐς τὴν δίαιταν, etc. The same word is repeated by the historian, vi, 28. τὴν ἄλλην αὐτοῦ ἐς τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δημοτικὴν *παρανομίαν*.

The same phrase is also found in the short extract from the λοιδορία of Antipho (Athenæus, xii, p. 525).

The description of Alkibiadês, given in that Discourse called the Ἐρωτικὸς Λόγος, erroneously ascribed to Demosthenês (c. 12, p. 1414), is more discriminating than we commonly find in rhetorical compositions. Τοῦτο δ', Ἀλκιβιάδην εὐρήσεις φύσει μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν πολλῷ χεῖρον διακείμενον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπερηφάνως, τὰ δὲ ταπεινῶς, τὰ δ' ὑπεράκρως, ζῆν προῃρημένον· ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς Σωκράτους ὁμιλίας πολλὰ μὲν ἐπανορθωθέντα τοῦ βίου, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων ἐπικρυψάμενον.

Of the three epithets, whereby the author describes the bad tendencies of Alkibiadês, full illustrations will be seen in his proceedings, hereafter to be described. The improving influence here ascribed to Sokratês is unfortu-

nately far less borne out.

[53] Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 4; Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 2; Plato, Protagoras, c. 1.

I do not know how far the memorable narrative ascribed to Alkibiadês in the Symposium of Plato (c. 33, 34, pp. 216, 217) can be regarded as matter of actual fact and history, so far as Sokratês is concerned; but it is abundant proof in regard to the general relations of Alkibiadês with others: compare Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 29, 30; iv. 1-2.

Several of the dialogues of Plato present to us striking pictures of the palæstra, with the boys, the young men, the gymnastic teachers, engaged in their exercises or resting from them, and the philosophers and spectators who came there for amusement and conversation. See particularly the opening chapters of the Lysis and the Charmidês; also the Rivales, where the scene is laid in the house of a γραμματιστὴς, or schoolmaster. In the Lysis, Sokratês professes to set his own conversation with these interesting youths as an antidote to the corrupting flatteries of most of those who sought to gain their good-will. Οὕτω χρὴ, ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, τοῖς παιδικοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, ταπεινοῦντα καὶ συστέλλοντα, ἀλλὰ μὴ, ὥσπερ σὺ, χαυνοῦντα καὶ διαθρύπτοντα (Lysis, c. 7, p. 210).

See, in illustration of what is here said about Alkibiadês as a youth, Euripid. Supplic. 906 (about Parthenopæus), and the beautiful lines in the Atys of Catullus, 60-69.

There cannot be a doubt that the characters of all the Greek youth of any pretensions were considerably affected by this society and conversation of their boyish years; though the subject is one upon which the full evidence cannot well be produced and discussed.

[54] Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 10.

[55] See the description in the Protagoras of Plato, c. 8, p. 317.

[56] See Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 12-24, 39-47.

Κριτίας μὲν καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης, οὐκ ἀρέσκοντος αὐτοῖς Σωκράτους ὠμιλησάτην, ὃν χρόνον ὠμιλείτην αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὡρμηκότε προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως. Ἔτι γὰρ Σωκράτει ξυνόντες οὐκ ἄλλοις τισὶ μᾶλλον ἐπεχείρουν διαλέγεσθαι ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα πράττουσι τὰ πολιτικά.... Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τάχιστα τῶν πολιτευομένων ὑπέλαβον κρείττονες εἶναι, Σωκράτει μὲν οὐκ ἔτι προσήεσαν, οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἄλλως ἤρεσκεν· εἴτε προσέλθοιεν, ὑπὲρ ὧν, ἡμάρτανον ἐλεγχόμενοι ἤχθοντο· τὰ δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἔπραττον, ὥνπερ ἕνεκεν καὶ Σωκράτει προσῆλθον. Compare Plato, Apolog. Sokrat. c. 10, p. 23; c. 22, p. 33.

Xenophon represents Alkibiadês and Kritias as frequenting the society of Sokratês, for the same reason and with the same objects as Plato affirms that young men generally went to the Sophists: see Plato, Sophist. c. 20, p. 232 D.

"Nam et Socrati (observes Quintilian, Inst. Or. ii, 16) objiciunt comici, docere cum, quomodo pejorem causam meliorem reddat; et contra Tisiam et Gorgiam similia dicit polliceri Plato."

The representation given by Plato of the great influence acquired by Sokratês over Alkibiadês, and of the deference and submission of the latter, is plainly not to be taken as historical, even if we had not the more simple and trustworthy picture of Xenophon. Isokratês goes so far as to say that Sokratês was never known by any one as teacher of Alkibiadês: which is an exaggeration in the other direction. Isokratês, Busiris, Or. xi. sect. 6, p. 222.

[57] Plato, Symposium, c. 35-36, p. 220, etc.

[58] See the representation, given in the Protagoras of Plato, of the temper in which the young and wealthy Hippokratês goes to seek instruction from Protagoras, and of the objects which Protagoras proposes to himself in imparting the instruction. Plato, Protagoras, c. 2, p. 310 D.; c. 8, p. 316 C.; c. 9, p. 318, etc.: compare also Plato, Meno. p. 91, and Gorgias, c. 4. p. 449 E., asserting the connection, in the mind of Gorgias, between teaching to speak and teaching to think—λέγειν καὶ φρονεῖν, etc.

It would not be reasonable to repeat, as true and just, all the polemical charges against those who are called Sophists, even as we find them in Plato, without scrutiny and consideration. But modern writers on Grecian affairs run down the Sophists even more than Plato did, and take no notice of the admissions in their favor which he, though their opponent, is perpetually making.

This is a very extensive subject, to which I hope to revert.

[59] I dissent entirely from the judgment of Dr. Thirlwall, who repeats what is the usual representation of Sokratês and the Sophists, depicting Alkibiadês as "ensnared by the Sophists," while Sokratês is described as a good genius preserving him from their corruptions (Hist. of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, pp. 312, 313, 314). I think him also mistaken when he distinguishes so pointedly Sokratês from the Sophists; when he describes the Sophists as "pretenders to wisdom;" as "a new school;" as "teaching that there was no real difference between truth and falsehood, right and wrong," etc.

All the plausibility that there is in this representation, arises from a confusion between the original sense and the modern sense of the word Sophist; the latter seemingly first bestowed upon the word by Plato and Aristotle. In the common ancient acceptation of the word at Athens, it meant not a *school* of persons professing common doctrines, but a *class* of men bearing the same name, because they derived their celebrity from analogous objects of study and common intellectual occupation. The Sophists were men of similar calling and pursuits, partly speculative, partly professional; but they differed widely from each other, both in method and doctrine. (See for example Isokratês, cont. Sophistas, Orat. xiii; Plato, Meno. p. 87 B.) Whoever made himself eminent in speculative pursuits, and communicated his opinions by public lecture, discussion, or conversation, was called a Sophist, whatever might be the conclusions which he sought to expound or defend. The difference between taking money, and expounding gratuitously, on which Sokratês himself was so fond of dwelling (Xenoph. Memor. i, 6, 12), has plainly no essential bearing on the case. When Æschinês the orator reminds the dikasts, "Recollect that you Athenians put to death *the Sophist Sokratês*, because he was shown to have been the teacher of Kritias," (Æschin. cont. Timarch. c. 34, p. 74,) he uses the word in its natural and true Athenian sense. He had no point to make against Sokratês, who had then been dead more than forty years; but he describes him by his profession or occupation, just as he would have said, *Hippokratês the physician*, *Pheidias the sculptor*, etc. Dionysius of Halikarn. calls both Plato and Isokratês sophists (Ars Rhetor. De Compos. Verborum, p. 208 R.). The Nubes of Aristophanês, and the defences put forth by Plato and Xenophon, show that Sokratês was not only called by the name Sophist, but regarded just in the same light as that in which Dr. Thirlwall presents to us what he calls "the new School of the Sophists;" as "a corruptor of youth, indifferent to truth or falsehood, right or wrong," etc. See a striking passage in the Politicus of Plato, c. 38, p. 299 B. Whoever thinks, as I think, that these accusations were falsely advanced against Sokratês, will be careful how he advances them against the general profession to which Sokratês belonged.

That there were unprincipled and immoral men among the class of Sophists—as there are and always have been among schoolmasters, professors, lawyers, etc., and all bodies of men—I do not doubt; in what proportion, we cannot determine. But the extreme hardship of passing a sweeping condemnation on the great body of intellectual teachers at Athens, and canonizing exclusively Sokratês and his followers, will be felt, when we recollect that the well-known Apologue, called the *Choice of Hercules*, was the work of the Sophist Prodikus, and his favorite theme of lecture (Xenophon, Memor. ii, 1, 21-34). To this day, that Apologue remains without a superior, for the impressive simplicity with which it presents one of the most important points of view of moral obligation: and it has been embodied in a greater number of books of elementary morality than anything of Sokratês, Plato, or Xenophon. To treat the author of that Apologue, and the class to which he belonged, as teaching "that there was no real difference between right and wrong, truth and falsehood," etc., is a criticism not in harmony with the just and liberal tone of Dr. Thirlwall's history.

I will add that Plato himself, in a very important passage of the Republic (vi, c. 6, 7, pp. 492-493), refutes the imputation against the Sophists of being specially the corruptors of youth. He represents them as inculcating upon their youthful pupils that morality which was received as true and just in their age and society; nothing better, nothing worse. The grand corruptor, he says, is society itself; the Sophists merely repeat the voice and judgment of society. Without inquiring at present how far Plato or Sokratês were right in condemning the received morality of their countrymen, I most fully accept his assertion that the great body of the contemporary professional teachers taught what was considered good morality among the Athenian public: there were doubtless some who taught a better morality, others who taught a worse. And this may be said with equal truth of the great body of professional teachers in every age and nation.

Xenophon enumerates various causes to which he ascribes the corruption of the character of Alkibiadês; wealth, rank, personal beauty, flatterers, etc.; but he does not name the Sophists among them (Memorab. i, 2. 24, 25).

[60] Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 1; Satyrus apud Athenæum, xii, p. 534; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 23.

Οὗ γὰρ τοιούτων δεῖ, τοιοῦτος εἰμ' ἐγώ, says Odysseus, in the Philoktêtês of Sophoklês.

[61] I follow the criticism which Plutarch cites from Theophrastus, seemingly discriminating and measured: much more trustworthy than the vague eulogy of Nepos, or even of Demosthenês (of course not from his own knowledge), upon the eloquence of Alkibiadês (Plutarch, Alkib. c. 10); Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. c. 8, p. 804.

Antisthenês, companion and pupil of Sokratês, and originator of what is called the Cynic philosophy, contemporary and personally acquainted with Alkibiadês, was full of admiration for his extreme personal beauty, and pronounced him to be strong, manly, and audacious, but unschooled, *ἀπαίδευτον*. His scandals about the lawless life of Alkibiadês, however, exceed what we can reasonably admit, even from a contemporary (Antisthenês ap. Athenæum, v, p. 220, xii, p. 534). Antisthenês had composed a dialogue called Alkibiadês (Diog. Laërt. vi, 15).

See the collection of the Fragmenta Antisthenis (by A. G. Winckelmann, Zurich, 1842, pp. 17-19).

The comic writers of the day—Eupolis, Aristophanês, Pherekratês, and others—seem to have been abundant in their jests and libels against the excesses of Alkibiadês, real or supposed. There was a tale, untrue, but current in comic tradition, that Alkibiadês, who was not a man to suffer himself to be insulted with impunity, had drowned Eupolis in the sea, in revenge, for his comedy of the Baptæ. See Meineke, Fragm. Com. Græ. Eupolidis Βάπται and Κόλακες (vol. ii, pp. 447-494), and Aristophanês Τριφαλῆς, p. 1166: also Meineke's first volume, Historia Critica Comic. Græc. pp. 124-136; and the Dissertat. xix, in Buttmann's *Mythologus*, on the Baptæ and the Cotyttia.

[62] Thucyd. vi, 15. Compare Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præc. c. 4, p. 800. The sketch which Plato draws in the first three chapters of the ninth Book of the Republic, of the citizen who erects himself into a despot and enslaves his fellow-citizens, exactly suits the character of Alkibiadês. See also the same treatise, vi, 6-8, pp. 491-494, and the preface of Schleiermacher to his translation of the Platonic dialogue called Alkibiadês the first.

[63] Aristophan. Ranæ, 1445-1453; Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 16; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 9.

[64] Thucyd. v, 43, vi, 90; Isokratês, De Bigis, Or. xvi, p. 352, sect. 27-30.

Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 14) carelessly represents Alkibiadês as being actually proxenus of Sparta at Athens.

[65] Thucyd. v, 43. Οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήματι φιλονεικῶν ἠναντιοῦτο, ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι διὰ Νικίου καὶ Λάχητος ἔπραξαν τὰς σπονδὰς, αὐτὸν διὰ τὴν νεότητα ὑπεριδόντες καὶ κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν προξενίαν ποτὲ οὖσαν οὐ τιμήσαντες, ἢν τοῦ πάππου ἀπειπόντος αὐτὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους θεραπεύων διενοεῖτο ἀνανεώσασθαι. *Πανταχόθεν τε νομίζων ἐλασσοῦσθαι* τό τε πρῶτον ἀντεῖπεν, etc.

[66] Thucyd. v, 43.

[67] Thucyd. v, 48.

[68] Thucyd. v, 44. Ἀφίκοντο δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις *κατὰ τάχος*, etc.

[69] Thucyd. viii, 6. Ἐνδίῳ τῷ ἐφορεύοντι πατρικὸς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα φίλος—ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα Λακωνικὸν ἡ οἰκία αὐτῶν κατὰ τὴν ξενίαν ἔσχεν· Ἔνδιος γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐκαλεῖτο.

I incline to suspect, from this passage, that the father of Endius was not named Alkibiadês, but that Endius himself was nevertheless named Ἔνδιος Ἀλκιβιάδου, in consequence of the peculiar intimacy of connection with the Athenian family in which that name occurred. If the father of Endius was really named Alkibiadês, Endius himself would naturally, pursuant to general custom, be styled Ἔνδιος Ἀλκιβιάδου: there would be nothing in this denomination to call for the particular remark of Thucydidês. But according to the view of the Scholiast and most commentators, all that Thucydidês wishes to explain here is, how the father of Endius came to receive the name of Alkibiadês. Now if he had meant this, he surely would not have used the terms which we read: the circumstance to be explained would then have reference to the father of Endius, not to Endius himself, nor to the family generally. His words imply that the family, that is, each successive individual of the family, derived his Laconian designation (not from the name of his father, but) from his intimate connection of hospitality with the Athenian family of Alkibiadês. Each successive individual attached to his own personal name the genitive case Ἀλκιβιάδου, instead of the genitive of his real father's name. Doubtless this was an anomaly in Grecian practice; but on the present occasion, we are to expect something anomalous; had it not been such, Thucydidês would not have stepped aside to particularize it.

[70] Thucyd. v, 45. Μηχανᾶται δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοῖονδέ τι ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης· τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους πείθει, *πίστιν αὐτοῖς δοὺς*, ἢν μὴ ὁμολογήσωσιν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ αὐτοκράτορες ἥκειν, Πύλον τε αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν (*πείσειν γὰρ αὐτὸς Ἀθηναίους*, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἀντιλέγειν) καὶ τἆλλα ξυναλλάξειν. Βουλόμενος δὲ αὐτοὺς Νικίου τε ἀποστῆσαι ταῦτα ἔπραττε, καὶ ὅπως *ἐν τῷ δήμῳ διαβαλὼν αὐτοὺς ὡς οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς ἐν νῷ ἔχουσιν, οὐδὲ λέγουσιν οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ, τοὺς Ἀργείους ξυμμάχους ποιήσῃ*.

[71] Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 14). Ταῦτα δ' εἰπὼν *ὅρκους ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς*, καὶ μετέστησεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Νικίου παντάπασι πιστεύοντας αὐτῷ, καὶ *θαυμάζοντας ἅμα τὴν δεινότητα καὶ σύνεσιν*, ὡς οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀνδρὸς οὖσαν. Again, Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

[72] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 14. Ἐρωτώμενοι δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου *πάνυ φιλανθρώπως*, ἐφ' οἷς ἀφιγμένοι τυγχάνουσιν, οὐκ ἔφασαν ἥκειν αὐτοκράτορες.

[73] Thucyd. v, 45. Οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ἠνείχοντο, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου *πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον καταβοῶντος τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων*, ἐσήκουόν τε καὶ ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐθὺς παραγαγεῖν τοὺς Ἀργείους, etc.

Compare Plutarch, Alkib. c. 14; and Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

[74] Euripid. Andromach. 445-455; Herodot. ix, 54.

[75] Thucyd. v, 46.

[76] Thucyd. v, 46; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

[77] Thucyd. v, 47. ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ἄρχουσιν ἑκάτεροι.

[78] Thucyd. v, 48. καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων *ὧν ἂν ἄρχουσιν* ἕκαστοι. The tense and phrase here deserve notice, as contrasted with the phrase in the former part of the treaty—τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν *ἄρχουσιν* ἑκάτεροι.

The clause imposing actual obligation to hinder the passage of troops, required to be left open for application to the actual time.

[79] Thucyd. v, 47.

[80] Thucyd. v, 48.

[81] Thucyd. v, 48-50.

[82] Καταθέντων δὲ καὶ Ὀλυμπίασι στήλην χαλκῆν κοινῇ *Ὀλυμπίοις τοῖς νυνί* (Thucyd. v, 47), words of the treaty.

[83] Dorieus of Rhodes was victor in the Pankration, both in Olymp. 88 and 89, (428-424 B.C.). Rhodes was included among the tributary allies of Athens. But the athletes who came to contend were privileged and (as it were) sacred persons, who were never molested or hindered from coming to the festival, if they chose to come, under any state of war. Their inviolability was never disturbed even down to the harsh proceeding of Aratus (Plutarch, Aratus, c. 28).

But this does not prove that Rhodian visitors generally, or a Rhodian theôry, could have come to Olympia between 431-421 in safety.

From the presence of individuals, even as spectators, little can be inferred: because, even at this very Olympic festival of 420 B.C., Lichas the Spartan was present as a spectator, though all Lacedæmonians were formally excluded by proclamation of the Eleians (Thucyd. v, 50).

[84] Of the taste and elegance with which these exhibitions were usually got up in Athens, surpassing generally every other city in Greece, see a remarkable testimony in Xenophon, Memorabil. iii, 3, 12.

[85] Thucyd. vi, 16. Οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες καὶ ὑπὲρ δύναμιν μείζω ἡμῶν τὴν πόλιν ἐνόμισαν τῷ ἐμῷ διαπρεπεῖ τῆς Ὀλυμπίαζε θεωρίας, *πρότερον ἐλπίζοντες αὐτὴν καταπεπολεμῆσθαι*· διότι ἅρματα μὲν ἑπτὰ καθῆκα, ὅσα οὐδεὶς πω ἰδιώτης πρότερον, ἐνίκησά τε, καὶ δεύτερος καὶ τέταρτος ἐγενόμην, καὶ τἆλλα ἀξίως τῆς νίκης παρεσκευασάμην.

The full force of this grandiose display cannot be felt unless we bring to our minds the special position both of Athens and the Athenian allies towards Olympia,—and of Alkibiadês himself towards Athens, Argos, and the rest of Greece,—in the first half of the year 420 B.C.

Alkibiadês obtained from Euripidês the honor of an epinikian ode, or song of triumph, to celebrate this event; of which a few lines are preserved by Plutarch (Alkib. c. 11). It is curious that the poet alleges Alkibiadês to have been first, second, and *third*, in the course; while Alkibiadês himself, more modest and doubtless more exact, pretends only to first, second, and *fourth*. Euripidês informs us that Alkibiadês was crowned twice and proclaimed twice—δὶς στεφθέντ' ἐλαίᾳ κάρυκι βοᾷν παραδοῦναι. Reiske, Coray, and Schäfer, have thought it right to alter this word δὶς to τρὶς, without any authority, which completely alters the asserted fact. Sintenis in his edition of Plutarch has properly restored the word δὶς.

How long the recollection of this famous Olympic festival remained in the Athenian public mind, is attested partly by the Oratio de Bigis of Isokratês, composed in defence of the son of Alkibiadês at least twenty-five years afterwards, perhaps more. Isokratês repeats the loose assertion of Euripidês, πρῶτος, δεύτερος, and τρίτος (Or. xvi, p. 353, sect. 40). The spurious Oration called that of Andokidês against Alkibiadês also preserves many of the current tales, some of which I have admitted into the text, because I think them probable in themselves, and because that oration itself may reasonably be believed to be a composition of the middle of the fourth century B.C. That oration puts all the proceedings of Alkibiadês in a very invidious temper and with palpable exaggeration. The story of Alkibiadês having robbed an Athenian named Diomêdês of a fine chariot, appears to be a sort of variation on the story about Tisias, which figures in the oration of Isokratês; see Andokid. cont. Alkib. sect. 26: possibly Alkibiadês may have left one of the teams not paid for. The aid lent to Alkibiadês by the Chians, Ephesians, etc., as described in that oration, is likely to be substantially true, and may easily be explained. Compare Athenæ. i, p. 3.

Our information about the arrangements of the chariot-racing at Olympia is very imperfect. We do not distinctly know how the seven chariots of Alkibiadês ran,—in how many races,—for all the seven could not, in my judgment, have run in one and the same race. There must have been many other chariots to run, belonging to other competitors: and it seems difficult to believe that ever a greater number than ten can have run in the same race, since the course involved going *twelve* times round the goal (Pindar, Ol. iii, 33; vi, 75). Ten competing chariots run in the race described by Sophoklês (Electr. 708), and if we could venture to construe strictly the expression of the poet,—*δέκατον ἐκπληρῶν* ὄχον,—it would seem that ten was the extreme number permitted to run. Even so great a number as ten was replete with danger to the persons engaged, as may be seen by reading the description in Sophoklês (compare Demosth. Ἐρωτ. Λογ. p. 1410), who refers indeed to a Pythian and not an Olympic solemnity: but the main circumstances must have been common to both; and we know that the twelve turns (δωδεκάγναμπτον δωδεκάδρομον) *were* common to both (Pindar, Pyth. v, 31).

Alkibiadês was not the only person who gained a chariot victory at this 90th Olympiad, 420 B.C. Lichas the Lacedæmonian also gained one (Thucyd. v, 50), though the chariot was obliged to be entered in another name, since the Lacedæmonians were interdicted from attendance.

Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 316) says: "We are not aware that the Olympiad, in which these chariot-victories of Alkibiadês were gained, can be distinctly fixed. But it was probably Olymp. 89, B.C. 424."

In my judgment, both Olymp. 88 (B.C. 428) and Olymp. 89 (B.C. 424) are excluded from the possible supposition, by the fact that the general war was raging at both periods. To suppose that in the midst of the summer of these two fighting years, there was an Olympic truce for a month, allowing Athens and her allies to send thither their solemn legations, their chariots for competition, and their numerous individual visitors, appears to me contrary to all probability. The Olympic month of B.C. 424, would occur just about the time when Brasidas was at the Isthmus levying troops for his intended expedition to Thrace, and when he rescued Megara from the Athenian attack. This would not be a very quiet time for the peaceable Athenian visitors, with the costly display of gold and silver plate and the ostentatious theôry, to pass by, on its way to Olympia. During the time when the Spartans occupied Dekeleia, the solemn processions of communicants at the Eleusinian mysteries could never march along the Sacred Way from Athens to Eleusis. Xen. Hell. i, 4, 20.

Moreover, we see that the very first article both of the Truce for one year and of the Peace of Nikias, expressly stipulate for liberty to all to attend the common temples and festivals. The first of the two relates to Delphi expressly: the second is general, and embraces Olympia as well as Delphi. If the Athenians had visited Olympia in 428 or 424 B.C. without impediment, these stipulations in the treaties would have no purpose nor meaning. But the fact of their standing in the front of the treaty, proves that they were looked upon as of much interest and importance.

I have placed the Olympic festival wherein Alkibiadês contended with his seven chariots, in 420 B.C., in the peace, but immediately after the war. No other festival appears to me at all suitable.

Dr. Thirlwall farther assumes, as a matter of course, that there was only *one* chariot-race at this Olympic festival, that all the seven chariots of Alkibiadês ran in this one race, and that in the festival of 420 B.C., Lichas gained *the* prize: thus implying that Alkibiadês could not have gained the prize at the same festival.

I am not aware that there is any evidence to prove either of these three propositions. To me they all appear improbable and unfounded.

We know from Pausanias (vi, 13, 2) that even in the case of the stadiodromi, or runners who contended in the stadium, all were not brought out in one race. They were distributed into sets, or batches, of what number we know not. Each set ran its own heat, and the victors in each then competed with each other in a fresh heat; so that the victor who gained the grand final prize was sure to have won two heats.

Now if this practice was adopted with the foot-runners, much more would it be likely to be adopted with the chariot-racers in case many chariots were brought to the same festival. The danger would be lessened, the sport would be increased, and the glory of the competitors enhanced. The Olympic festival lasted five days, a long time to provide amusement for so vast a crowd of spectators. Alkibiadês and Lichas may therefore both have gained chariot-victories at the same festival: of course only one of them can have gained the grand final prize, and which of the two that was it is impossible to say.

[86] Thucyd. v, 49, 50.

[87] Thucyd. v, 50. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν εἴργοντο τοῦ ἱεροῦ, θυσίας καὶ ἀγώνων, καὶ οἴκοι ἔθυον· οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες ἐθεώρουν, πλὴν Λεπρεατῶν.

[88] Thucyd. v, 28. Κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἥ τε Λακεδαίμων μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκουσε, καὶ ὑπερώφθη διὰ τὰς ξυμφορὰς, οἵ τε Ἀργεῖοι ἄριστα ἔσχον τοῖς πᾶσι, etc.

[89] See a previous note, p. 56.

[90] Thucyd. v, 50. Λίχας ὁ Ἀρκεσιλάου Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι ὑπὸ τῶν ῥαβδούχων πληγὰς ἔλαβεν, ὅτι νικῶντος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ζεύγους, καὶ ἀνακηρυχθέντος Βοιωτῶν δημοσίου κατὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐξουσίαν τῆς ἀγωνίσεως προελθὼν ἐς τὸν ἀγῶνα ἀνέδησε τὸν ἡνίοχον, βουλόμενος δηλῶσαι ὅτι ἑαυτοῦ ἦν τὸ ἅρμα.

We see by comparison with this incident how much less rough and harsh was the manner of dealing at Athens, and in how much more serious a light blows to the person were considered. At the Athenian festival of the Dionysia, if a person committed disorder or obtruded himself into a place not properly belonging to him in the theatre, the archon or his officials were both empowered and required to repress the disorder by turning the person out, and fining him, if necessary. But they were upon no account to strike him. If they did, they were punishable themselves by the dikastery afterwards (Demosth. cont. Meidiam, c. 49).

[91] It will be seen, however, that the Lacedæmonians remembered and revenged themselves upon the Eleians for this insult twelve years afterwards during the plenitude of their power (Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 2, 21; Diodor. xiv, 17).

[92] Thucyd. v, 51, 52.

[93] Thucyd. v, 48-50.

[94] Plato, Symposion, c. 35, p. 220. δεινοὶ γὰρ αὐτόθι χειμῶνες, πάγου οἵου δεινοτάτου, etc.

[95] Thucyd. v, 52. Isokratês (De Bigis, sect. 17, p. 349) speaks of this expedition of Alkibiadês in his usual loose and exaggerated language: but he has a right to call attention to it as something very memorable at the time.

[96] Thucyd. v, 52.

[97] Thucyd. v, 53, with Dr. Arnold's note.

[98] Thucyd. v, 54. ᾔδει δὲ οὐδεὶς ὅποι στρατεύουσιν οὐδὲ αἱ πόλεις ἐξ ὧν ἐπέμφθησαν.

This incident shows that Sparta employed the military force of her allies without any regard to their feelings, quite as decidedly as Athens; though there were some among them too powerful to be thus treated.

[99] Thucyd. v, 54. Ἀργεῖοι δ' ἀναχωρησάντων αὐτῶν (the Lacedæmonians), τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ Καρνείου μηνὸς ἐξελθόντες τετράδι φθίνοντος, *καὶ ἄγοντες τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην πάντα τὸν χρόνον*, ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἐπιδαυρίαν καὶ *ἐδῄουν*· Ἐπιδαύριοι δὲ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπεκαλοῦντο· ὧν οἱ μὲν *τὸν μῆνα προυφασίσαντο*, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐς μεθορίαν τῆς Ἐπιδαυρίας ἐλθόντες ἡσύχαζον.

In explaining this passage, I venture to depart from the views of all the commentators; with the less scruple, as it seems to me that even the best of them are here embarrassed and unsatisfactory.

The meaning which I give to the words is the most strict and literal possible: "The Argeians, having set out on the 26th of the month before Karneius, and *keeping that day during the whole time*, invaded the Epidaurian territory, and went on ravaging it." By "during the whole time" is meant, during the whole time that this expedition lasted. That is, in my judgment, they kept the twenty-sixth day of the antecedent month for a whole fortnight or so; they called each successive day by the same name; they stopped the computed march of time; the twenty-seventh was never admitted to have arrived. Dr. Thirlwall translates it (Hist. Gr. vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 331): "They began their march on a day which they had *always* been used to keep holy." But surely the words πάντα τὸν χρόνον must denote some definite interval of time, and can hardly be construed as equivalent to ἀεί. Moreover the words, as Dr. Thirlwall construes them, introduce a new fact which has no visible bearing on the main affirmation of the sentence.

The meaning which I give may perhaps be called in question on the ground that such tampering with the calendar is too absurd and childish to have been really committed. Yet it is not more absurd than the two votes of the Athenian assembly (in 290 B.C.), who being in the month of Munychion, first passed a vote that that month should be the month Anthestêrion; next, that it should be the month Boêdromion; in order that Demetrius Poliorkêtês might be initiated both in the lesser and greater mysteries of Dêmêtêr, both at once and at the same time. Demetrius arrived at Athens in the month Munychion, and went through both ceremonies with little or no delay; the religious scruple, and the dignity of the Two Goddesses being saved by altering the name of the month twice (Plutarch, Demetrius, c. 26).

Besides, if we look to the conduct of the Argeians themselves at a subsequent period (B.C. 389, Xenophon, Hellen. iv, 7, 2, 5; v, 1, 29), we shall see them playing an analogous trick with the calendar in order to get the benefit of the sacred truce. When the Lacedæmonians invaded Argos, the Argeians despatched heralds with wreaths and the appropriate insignia, to warn them off on the ground of its being the period of the holy truce,—though it *really was not so*,—*οὐχ ὅποτε κάθηκοι ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ' ὅποτε ἐμβάλλειν μέλλοιεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τότε ὑπέφερον τοὺς μῆνας*—Οἱ δ' Ἀργεῖοι ἐπεὶ ἔγνωσαν οὐ δυνησόμενοι κωλύειν, ἔπεμψαν, ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν, ἐστεφανωμένους δύο κήρυκας *ὑποφέροντας σπονδάς*. On more than one occasion, this stratagem was successful: the Lacedæmonians did not dare to act in defiance of the summons of the heralds, who affirmed that it *was* the time of the truce, though in reality it was not so. At last, the Spartan king Agesipolis actually went both to Olympia and Delphi, to put the express question to those oracles, whether he was bound to accept the truce at any moment, right or wrong, when it might suit the convenience of the Argeians to bring it forward as a sham plea (ὑποφέρειν). The oracles both told him that he was under no obligation to submit to such a pretence; accordingly, he sent back the heralds, refusing to attend to their summons, and invaded the Argeian territory.

Now here is a case exactly in point, with this difference; that the Argeians, when they are invaders of Epidaurus, falsify the calendar in order to blot out the holy truce where it really ought to have come: whereas when they are the party invaded, they commit similar falsification in order to introduce the truce where it does not legitimately belong. I conceive, therefore, that such an analogous incident completely justifies the interpretation which I have given of the passage now before us in Thucydidês.

But even if I were unable to produce a case so exactly parallel, I should still defend the interpretation. Looking to the state of the ancient Grecian calendars, the proceeding imputed to the Argeians ought not to be looked on as too preposterous and absurd for adoption, with the same eyes as we should regard it now.

With the exception of Athens, we do not know completely the calendar of a single other Grecian city: but we know that the months of all were lunar months, and that the practice followed in regard to intercalation, for the prevention of inconvenient divergence between lunar and solar time, was different in each different city. Accordingly, the lunar month of one city did not, except by accident, either begin or end at the same time as the lunar month of another. M. Boeckh observes (ad Corp. Inscr. t. i, p. 734): "Variorum populorum menses, qui sibi secundum legitimos annorum cardines respondent, non quovis conveniunt anno, nisi cyclus intercalationum utrique populi idem sit: sed ubi differunt cycli, altero populo prius intercalante mensem dum non intercalat alter, eorum

qui non intercalarunt mensis certus cedit jam in eum mensem alterorum qui præcedit illum cui vulgo respondet certus iste mensis: quod tamen negligere solent chronologi." Compare also the valuable Dissertation of K. F. Hermann, Ueber die Griechische Monatskunde, Götting. 1844, pp. 21-27, where all that is known about the Grecian names and arrangement of months is well brought together.

The names of the Argeian months we hardly know at all (see K. F. Hermann, pp. 84-124): indeed, the only single name resting on positive proof, is that of a month *Hermæus*. How far the months of Argos agreed with those of Epidaurus or Sparta we do not know, nor have we any right to presume that they did agree. Nor is it by any means clear that every city in Greece had what may properly be called a *system* of intercalation, so correct as to keep the calendar right without frequent arbitrary interferences. Even at Athens, it is not yet satisfactorily proved that the Metonic calendar was ever actually received into civil use. Cicero, in describing the practice of the Sicilian Greeks about reckoning of time, characterizes their interferences for the purpose of correcting the calendar as occasional rather than systematic. Verres took occasion from these interferences to make a still more violent change, by declaring the Ides of January to be the calends of March (Cicero, Verr. ii, 52, 129).

Now where a people are accustomed to get wrong in their calendar, and to see occasional interferences introduced by authority to set them right, the step which I here suppose the Argeians to have taken about the invasion of Epidaurus will not appear absurd and preposterous. The Argeians would pretend that the real time for celebrating the festival of Karneia had not yet arrived. On that point, they were not bound to follow the views of other Dorian states, since there does not seem to have been any recognized authority for proclaiming the commencement of the Karneian truce, as the Eleians proclaimed the Olympic and the Corinthians the Isthmiac truce. In saying, therefore, that the twenty-sixth of the month preceding Karneius should be repeated, and that the twenty-seventh should not be recognized as arriving for a fortnight or three weeks, the Argeian government would only be employing an expedient the like of which had been before resorted to; though, in the case before us, it was employed for a fraudulent purpose.

The Spartan month *Hekatombeus* appears to have corresponded with the Attic month Hekatombæon; the Spartan month following it, *Karneius*, with the Attic month Metageitnion (Hermann, p. 112), our months July and August; such correspondence being by no means exact or constant. Both Dr. Arnold and Göller speak of Hekatombeus as if it were the *Argeian* month preceding Karneius: but we only know it as a *Spartan* month. Its name does not appear among the months of the Dorian cities in Sicily, among whom nevertheless Karneius seems universal. See Franz, Comm. ad Corp. Inscript. Græc. No. 5475, 5491, 5640. Part xxxii, p. 640.

The tricks played with the calendar at Rome, by political authorities for party purposes, are well known to every one. And even in some states of Greece, the course of the calendar was so uncertain as to serve as a proverbial expression for inextricable confusion. See Hesychius—*Ἐν Κέῳ τις ἡμέρα*; Ἐπὶ τῶν οὐκ εὐγνώστον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ οἶδεν ἐν Κέῳ τις ἡ ἡμέρα, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστᾶσιν αἱ ἡμέραι, ἀλλ' ὡς ἕκαστοι θέλουσιν ἄγουσι. See also Aristoph. Nubes, 605.

[100] Thucyd. v, 55. καὶ Ἀθηναίων αὐτοῖς χίλιοι ἐβοήθησαν ὁπλῖται καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης στρατηγὸς: πυθόμενοι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐξεστρατεῦσθαι· καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἔτι αὐτῶν ἔδει, ἀπῆλθον. This is the reading which Portus, Bloomfield, Didot, and Göller, either adopt or recommend; leaving out the particle δὲ which stands in the common text after πυθόμενοι.

If we do not adopt this reading, we must construe ἐξεστρατεῦσθαι, as Dr. Arnold and Poppo construe it, in the sense of "had already completed their expedition and returned home." But no authority is produced for putting such a meaning upon the verb ἐκστρατεύω: and the view of Dr. Arnold, who conceives that this meaning exclusively belongs to the preterite or pluperfect tense, is powerfully contradicted by the use of the word ἐξεστρατευμένων (ii, 7), the same verb and the same tense, yet in a meaning contrary to that which he assigns.

It appears to me the least objectionable proceeding of the two, to dispense with the particle δέ.

[101] Thucyd. v, 56.

[102] Thucyd. v, 37.

[103] Thucyd. v, 58. Οἱ δὲ Ἀργεῖοι γνόντες ἐβοήθουν *ἡμέρας ἤδη* ἐκ τῆς Νεμέας, etc.

[104] Thucyd. v, 60. Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι εἵποντο μὲν ὡς ἡγεῖτο διὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐν αἰτίᾳ δὲ εἶχον κατ' ἀλλήλους πολλῇ τὸν Ἄγιν, etc.

[105] Thucyd. v, 60. Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔτι ἐν πολλῷ πλέονι αἰτίᾳ εἶχον *τοὺς σπεισαμένους ἄνευ τοῦ πλήθους*, etc.

[106] Thucyd. v, 60.

[107] Thucyd. v, 62.

[108] Thucyd. v, 64. ὅσον οὐκ ἀφέστηκεν, etc.

[109] Thucyd. v, 63.

[110] Thucyd. v, 64. ἐνταῦθα δὴ βοήθεια τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων γίγνεται αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν Εἰλώτων πανδημεὶ ὀξεῖα καὶ οἵα οὔπω πρότερον. The out-march of the Spartans just before the battle of Platæa (described in Herodot. vii, 10) seems, however, to have been quite as rapid and instantaneous.

[111] Thucyd. v, 64. ξυνέκλῃε γὰρ διὰ μέσου.

[112] The Lacedæmonian kings appear to have felt a sense of protection in encamping near a temple of Hêraklês, their heroic progenitor (see Xenophon, Hellen. vii, 1, 31).

[113] Thucyd. v, 65. See an exclamation by an old Spartan mentioned as productive of important consequences, at the moment when a battle was going to commence, in Xenophon, Hellen. vii, 4, 25.

[114] Thucyd. v, 66. μάλιστα δὴ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐς ὃ ἐμέμνηντο, ἐν τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ ἐξεπλάγησαν· διὰ βραχείας γὰρ μελλήσεως ἡ παρασκευὴ αὐτοῖς ἐγίγνετο, etc.

[115] Thucyd. v, 66. Σχεδὸν γάρ τι πᾶν, πλὴν ὀλίγου, τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἄρχοντες ἀρχόντων εἰσὶ, καὶ τὸ ἐπιμελὲς τοῦ δρωμένου πολλοῖς προσήκει.

Xenophon, De Republ. Laced. xi, 5. Αἱ παραγωγαὶ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ κήρυκος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐνωμοτάρχου λόγῳ δηλοῦνται: compare xi, 8, τῷ ἐνωμοτάρχῃ παρεγγυᾶται εἰς μέτωπον παρ' ἄσπιδα καθίστασθαι, etc.

[116] Thucyd. v, 66. εὐθὺς ὑπὸ σπουδῆς καθίσταντο *ἐς κόσμον τὸν ἑαυτῶν*, Ἄγιδος τοῦ βασιλέως ἕκαστα ἐξηγουμένου κατὰ τὸν νόμον, etc.

[117] Xenophon, Cyrop. iv, 2. 1: see Diodor. xv, c. 32; Xenophon, Rep. Laced. xiii, 6.

[118] Thucyd. v, 67.

[119] Very little can be made out respecting the structure of the Lacedæmonian army. We know that the enômoty was the elementary division, the military unit: that the pentekosty was composed of a definite (not always the same) number of enômoties: that the lochus also was composed of a definite (not always the same) number of pentekosties. The mora appears to have been a still larger division, consisting of so many lochi (according to Xenophon, of four lochi): but Thucydidês speaks as if he knew no division larger than the lochus.

Beyond this very slender information, there seems no other fact certainly established about the Lacedæmonian military distribution. Nor ought we reasonably to expect to find that these words *enômoty*, *pentekosty*, lochus, etc., indicate any fixed number of men: our own names *regiment*, *company*, *troop*, *brigade*, *division*, etc., are all more or less indefinite as to positive numbers and proportion to each other.

That which was peculiar to the Lacedæmonian drill, was, the teaching a small number of men like an enômoty (twenty-five, thirty-two, thirty-six men, as we sometimes find it), to perform its evolutions under the command of its enômotarch. When this was once secured, it is probable that the combination of these elementary divisions was left to be determined in every case by circumstances.

Thucydidês states two distinct facts. 1. Each enômoty had *four men in front*. 2. Each enômoty *varied in depth*, according as every lochagus chose. Now Dobree asks, with much reason, how these two assertions are to be reconciled? Given the number of men in front, the depth of the enômoty is of course determined, without any reference to the discretion of any one. These two assertions appear distinctly contradictory; unless we suppose (what seems very difficult to believe) that the lochage might make one or two of the four files of the same enômoty deeper than the rest. Dobree proposes, as a means of removing this difficulty, to expunge some words from the text. One cannot have confidence, however, in the conjecture.

[120] Thucyd. v, 69. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ καθ' ἑκάστους τε καὶ μετὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν νόμων ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὧν ἠπίστοντο τὴν παρακέλευσιν τῆς μνήμης ἀγαθοῖς οὖσιν ἐποιοῦντο, εἰδότες ἔργων ἐκ πολλοῦ μελέτην πλείω σώζουσαν ἢ λόγων δι' ὀλίγου καλῶς ῥηθέντων παραίνεσιν.

[121] Thucyd. v, 70. Ἀργεῖοι μὲν καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, ἐντόνως καὶ ὀργῇ χωροῦντες, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ, βραδέως καὶ ὑπὸ αὐλητῶν πολλῶν νόμῳ ἐγκαθεστώτων, οὐ τοῦ θείου χάριν, ἀλλ' ἵνα ὁμαλῶς μετὰ ῥυθμοῦ βαίνοντες προσέλθοιεν καὶ μὴ διασπασθείη αὐτῶν ἡ τάξις, ὅπερ φιλεῖ τὰ μεγάλα στρατόπεδα ἐν ταῖς προσόδοις ποιεῖν.

[122] Thucyd. v, 67. Τότε δὲ κέρας μὲν εὐώνυμον Σκιρῖται αὐτοῖς καθίσταντο, *ἀεὶ ταύτην τὴν τάξιν μόνοι Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες*, etc.

The strong and precise language, which Thucydidês here uses, shows that this was a privilege pointedly noted and much esteemed: among the Lacedæmonians, especially, ancient routine was more valued than elsewhere. And it is essential to take notice of the circumstance, in order to appreciate the generalship of Agis, which has been rather hardly criticized.

[123] Thucyd. v, 72. (Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοὺς Ἀργείους) Ἔτρεψαν οὐδὲ ἐς χεῖρας τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑπομείναντας, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπῆσαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι εὐθὺς ἐνδόντας, καὶ ἐστὶν οὓς καὶ καταπατηθέντας, τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν.

The last words of this sentence present a difficulty which has perplexed all the commentators, and which none of them have yet satisfactorily cleared up.

They all admit that the expressions, *τοῦ, τοῦ μὴ*, preceding the infinitive mood as here, signify *design* or *purpose*; ἕνεκα being understood. But none of them can construe the sentence satisfactorily with this meaning: accordingly they here ascribe to the words a different and exceptional meaning. See the notes of Poppo, Göller, and Dr. Arnold, in which notes the views of other critics are cited and discussed.

Some say that τοῦ μὴ in this place means the same as ὥστε μή: others affirm, that it is identical with διὰ τὸ μὴ or with τῷ μή. "Formula *τοῦ, τοῦ μὴ* (say Bauer and Göller), plerumque *consilium* significat: interdum *effectum* (*i. e.* ὥστε μή); hic *causam* indicat (i. e. διὰ τὸ μὴ, or τῷ μή)." But I agree with Dr. Arnold in thinking that the last of these three alleged meanings is wholly unauthorized; while the second, which is adopted by Dr. Arnold himself, is sustained only by feeble and dubious evidence; for the passage of Thucydidês (ii, 4. τοῦ μὴ ἐκφεύγειν) may be as well construed, as Poppo's note thereupon suggests, without any such supposed exceptional sense of the words.

Now it seems to me quite possible to construe the words τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι here in their regular and legitimate sense of *ἕνεκα τοῦ*, or *consilium*. But first an error must be cleared up which pervades the view of most of the commentators. They suppose that those Argeians, who are here affirmed to have been "*trodden under foot*," were so trodden down by *the Lacedæmonians* in their advance. But this is in every way improbable. The Lacedæmonians were particularly slow in their motions, regular in their ranks, and backward as to pursuit, qualities which are dwelt upon by Thucydidês in regard to this very battle. They were not at all likely to overtake such terrified men as were only anxious to run away: moreover, if they did overtake them, they would spear them, not trample them under foot.

To be trampled under foot, though possible enough from the numerous Persian cavalry (Herodot. vii, 173; Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 4, 12), is not the treatment which defeated soldiers meet with from victorious hostile infantry in the field, especially Lacedæmonian infantry. But it is precisely the treatment which they meet with, if they be in one of the hinder ranks, from their own panic-stricken comrades in the front rank, who find the enemy closing upon them, and rush back madly to get away from him. Of course it was the Argeians in the front rank who were seized with the most violent panic, and who thus fell back upon their own comrades in the rear ranks, overthrowing and treading them down to secure their own escape. It seems quite plain that it was the Argeians in front—not the Lacedæmonians—who trod down their comrades in the rear (there were probably six or eight men in every file), in order to escape themselves before the Lacedæmonians should be upon them: compare Xen. Hellenic. iv, 4, 11; Œconomic. viii, 5.

There are therefore in the whole scene which Thucydidês describes, three distinct subjects: 1. The Lacedæmonians 2. The Argeians soldiers, who were trodden down. 3. Other Argeian soldiers, who trod them down in order to get away themselves. Out of these three he only specifies the first two; but the third is present to his mind, and is implied in his narrative, just as much as if he had written καταπατηθέντας *ὑπ' ἄλλων*, or ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, as in Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 4, 11.

Now it is to this third subject, implied in the narrative, but not formally specified (*i. e.* those Argeians who trod down their comrades in order to get away themselves), or rather to the second and third conjointly and confusedly, that the *design* or *purpose* (*consilium*) in the words τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι refers.

Farther, the commentators all construe τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν, as if the last word were an accusative case coming *after* φθῆναι and governed by it. But there is also another construction, equally good Greek, and much better for the sense. In my judgment, τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν is here the accusative case coming *before* φθῆναι and forming the *subject* of it. The words will thus read (ἕνεκα) τοῦ τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν μὴ φθῆναι (ἐπελθοῦσαν αὐτοῖς): "in order that the actual grasp of the Lacedæmonians might not be beforehand in coming upon them;" "might not come upon them too soon," *i. e.* "sooner than they could get away." And since the word ἐγκατάληψις is an abstract active substantive, so, in order to get at the real meaning here, we may substitute the concrete words with which it correlates, *i. e.* τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐγκαταλαβόντας, subject as well as attribute, for the active participle is here essentially involved.

The sentence would then read, supposing the ellipsis filled up and the meaning expressed in full and concrete words—ἔστιν οὓς καὶ καταπατηθέντας ὑπ' ἀλλήλων φευγόντων (or βιαζομένων), ἕνεκα τοῦ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μὴ φθῆναι ἐγκαταλαβόντας αὐτοὺς (τοὺς φεύγοντας): "As soon as the Lacedæmonians approached near, the Argeians gave way at once, without staying for hand-combat: and some were even trodden down by each other, or by their own comrades running away in order that the Lacedæmonians might not be beforehand in catching them sooner than they could escape."

Construing in this way the sentence as it now stands, we have τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι used in its regular and legitimate sense of *purpose*, or *consilium*. We have moreover a plain and natural state of facts, in full keeping with the general narrative. Nor is there any violence put upon the words. Nothing more is done than to expand a very elliptical sentence, and to fill up that entire sentence which was present to the writer's own mind. To do this properly is the chief duty, as well as the chief difficulty, of an expositor of Thucydidês.

[124] Thucyd. v, 73; Diodor. xii, 79.

[125] Thucyd. v, 73.

[126] Thucyd. v, 75. Καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοτε ἐπιφερομένην αἰτίαν ἔς τε μαλακίαν διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ξυμφορὰν, καὶ ἐς τὴν ἄλλην ἀβουλίαν τε καὶ βραδύτητα, ἐνὶ ἔργῳ τούτῳ ἀπελύσαντο· τύχῃ μέν, ὡς ἐδόκουν, κακιζόμενοι, γνώμῃ δὲ, οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀεὶ ὄντες.

[127] Thucyd. v, 72.

[128] Thucyd. i, 141.

[129] Thucyd. v, 75.

[130] Thucyd. v, 75.

[131] Aristotle (Politic. v, 4, 9) expressly notices the credit gained by the oligarchical force of Argos in the battle of Mantineia, as one main cause of the subsequent revolution, notwithstanding that the Argeians generally were beaten: *Οἱ γνώριμοι εὐδοκιμήσαντες* ἐν Μαντινείᾳ, etc.

An example of contempt entertained by victorious troops over defeated fellow-countrymen, is mentioned by Xenophon in the Athenian army under Alkibiadês and Thrasyllus, in one of the later years of the Peloponnesian war: see Xenophon, Hellen. i, 2, 15-17.

[132] Thucyd. v, 76; Diodor. xii, 80.

[133] Thucyd. v, 77. The text of Thucydidês is incurably corrupt, in regard to several words of this clause; though the general sense appears sufficiently certain, that the Epidaurians are to be allowed to clear themselves in respect to this demand by an oath. In regard to this purifying oath, it seems to have been essential that the oath should be *tendered* by one litigant party and *taken* by the other: perhaps therefore σέμεν or θέμεν λῆν (Valckenaer's conjecture) might be preferable to εἶμεν λῆν.

To Herodot. vi, 86, and Aristotel. Rhetoric. i, 16, 6, which Dr. Arnold and other commentators notice in illustration of this practice, we may add the instructive exposition of the analogous practice in the procedure of Roman law, as given by Von Savigny, in his System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, sects. 309-313, vol. vii, pp. 53-83. It was an oath tendered by one litigant party to the opposite, in hopes that the latter would refuse to take it; if taken, it had the effect of a judgment in favor of the swearer. But the Roman lawyers laid down many limits and formalities, with respect to this *jusjurandum delatum*, which Von Savigny sets forth with his usual perspicuity.

[134] Thucyd. v, 77. Ἐπιδείξαντας δὲ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ξυμβαλέσθαι, αἴ κα αὐτοῖς δοκῇ· αἰ δέ τι καὶ ἄλλο δοκῇ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις, *οἴκαδ᾽ ἀπιάλλειν*. See Dr. Arnold's note, and Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. xxiv. vol. iii, p. 342.

One cannot be certain about the meaning of these two last words, but I incline to believe that they express a peremptory and almost a hostile sentiment, such as I have given in the text. The allies here alluded to are Athens, Elis, and Mantineia; all hostile in feeling to Sparta. The Lacedæmonians could not well decline admitting these cities to share in this treaty as it stood; but would probably think it suitable to repel them even with rudeness, if they desired any change.

I rather imagine, too, that this last clause (ἐπιδείξαντας) has reference exclusively to the Argeians, and not to the Lacedæmonians also. The form of the treaty is, that of a resolution already taken at Sparta, and sent for approval to Argos.

[135] Thucyd. v, 79. Αἰ δέ τινι τᾶν πολίων ᾖ ἀμφίλογα, ἢ τᾶν ἐντὸς ἢ τᾶν ἐκτὸς Πελοποννάσου, αἴτε περὶ ὅρων αἴτε περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς, διακριθῆμεν.

The object of this clause I presume to be, to provide that the joint forces of Lacedæmon and Argos should not be bound to interfere for every separate dispute of each single ally with a foreign state, not included in the alliance. Thus, there were at this time standing disputes between Bœotia and Athens, and between Megara and Athens: the Argeians probably would not choose to pledge themselves to interfere for the maintenance of the alleged rights of Bœotia and Megara in these disputes. They guard themselves against such necessity in this clause.

M. H. Meier, in his recent Dissertation (Die Privat. Schiedsrichter und die öffentlichen Diäteten Athens (Halle, 1846), sect. 19, p. 41), has given an analysis and explanation of this treaty which seems to me on many points unsatisfactory.

[136] All the smaller states in Peloponnesus are pronounced by this treaty to be (if we employ the language employed with reference to the Delphians peculiarly in the Peace of Nikias) αὐτονόμους, αὐτοτελεῖς, αὐτοδίκους, Thucyd. v, 19. The last clause of this treaty guarantees αὐτοδικίαν to all, though in language somewhat different, τοῖς δὲ ἕταις κατὰ πάτρια δικάζεσθαι. The expression in this treaty αὐτοπόλιες is substantially equivalent to αὐτοτελεῖς in the former.

It is remarkable that we never find in Thucydidês the very convenient Herodotean word δωσίδικοι (Herodot. vi, 42), though there are occasions in these fourth and fifth books on which it would be useful to his meaning.

[137] Thucyd. v. 81; Diodor. xii, 81.

[138] Compare Thucyd. v, 80, and v, 83.

[139] The instances appear to have been not rare, wherein Grecian towns changed masters, by the citizens thus going out of the gates all together, or most part of them, for some religious festival. See the case of Smyrna (Herodot. i, 150), and the precautionary suggestions of the military writer Æneas, in his treatise called Poliorketicus, c. 17.

[140] Thucyd. v, 80. Καὶ ὕστερον Ἐπιδαυρίοις *ἀνανεωσάμενοι* τὰς σπονδὰς, αὐτοὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέδοσαν τὸ τείχισμα. We are here told that the Athenians RENEWED their truce with the Epidaurians: but I know no truce previously between them except the general truce for a year, which the Epidaurians swore to, in conjunction with Sparta (iv, 119), in the beginning of B.C. 423.

[141] Thucyd. v, 81. Καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀργεῖοι, χίλιοι ἑκάτεροι, ξυστρατεύσαντες τά τ᾽ ἐν Σικυῶνι ἐς ὀλίγους μᾶλλον κατέστησαν αὐτοὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐλθόντες, καὶ μετ᾽ ἐκεῖνα ξυναμφότεροι ἤδη καὶ τὸν ἐν Ἄργει δῆμον κατέλυσαν, καὶ ὀλιγαρχία ἐπιτηδεία τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις κατέστη: compare Diodor. xii, 80.

[142] Pausanias, ii, 20, 1.

[143] See Herodot. v, 87; Euripid. Hecub. 1152, and the note of Musgrave on line 1135 of that drama.

[144] Thucyd. v, 82; Diodor. xii, 80.

[145] Diodorus (xii, 80) says that it lasted eight months: but this, if correct at all, must be taken as beginning from the alliance between Sparta and Argos, and not from the first establishment of the oligarchy. The narrative of Thucydidês does not allow more than four months for the duration of the latter.

[146] Thucyd. v, 82. ξυνήδεσαν δὲ τὸν τειχισμὸν καὶ τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ τινὲς πόλεων.

[147] Thucyd. v, 82. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀργεῖοι πανδημεὶ, καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ οἰκέται, ἐτείχιζον, etc. Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 15.

[148] Pausanias, ii, 36, 3.

[149] Thucyd. i, 107.

[150] Thucyd. v, 83. Diodorus inaccurately states that the Argeians *had already* built their long walls down to the sea—πυθόμενοι τοὺς Ἀργείους *ᾠκοδομηκέναι τὰ μακρὰ τείχη μέχρι τῆς θαλάσσης* (xii, 81). Thucydidês uses the participle of the present tense—*τὰ οἰκοδομούμενα* τείχη ἑλόντες καὶ κατασκάψαντες, etc.

[151] Thucyd. v, 116. Λακεδαιμόνιοι, *μελλήσαντες* ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν στρατεύειν … ἀνεχώρησαν. Καὶ Ἀργεῖοι διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων *μέλλησιν* τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὰς ὑποτοπήσαντες, τοὺς μὲν ξυνέλαβον, οἱ δ' αὐτοὺς καὶ διέφυγον.

I presume μέλλησιν here is not used in its ordinary meaning of *loitering delay*, but is to be construed by the previous verb μελλήσαντες, and agreeably to the analogy of iv, 126—"prospect of action immediately impending:" compare Diodor. xii, 81.

[152] Thucyd. vi, 7.

[153] Thucyd. v, 115.

[154] Thucyd. vi, 105. The author of the loose and inaccurate Oratio de Pace, ascribed to Andokidês, affirms that the war was resumed by Athens against Sparta on the persuasion of the Argeians (Orat. de Pac. c. 1, 6, 3, 31, pp. 93-105). This assertion is indeed partially true: the alliance with Argos was one of the causes of the resumption of war, but only one among others, some of them more powerful. Thucydidês tells us that the *persuasions* of Argos, to induce Athens to throw up her alliance with Sparta were repeated and unavailing.

[155] Thucyd. v, 83.

[156] Dr. Thirlwall (History of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 360) places this vote of ostracism in midwinter or early spring of 415 B.C., immediately before the Sicilian expedition.

His grounds for this opinion are derived from the Oration called Andokidês against Alkibiadês, the genuineness of which he seems to accept (see his Appendix ii, on that subject, vol. iii, p. 494, *seq.*).

The more frequently I read over this Oration, the more do I feel persuaded that it is a spurious composition of one or two generations after the time to which it professes to refer. My reasons for this opinion have been already stated in previous notes, nor do I think that Dr. Thirlwall's Appendix is successful in removing the objections against the genuineness of the speech. See my preceding vol. vi, ch. xlvii, p. 6, note.

[157] Aristophan. Pac. 680.

[158] Thucyd. viii, 73. *Ὑπέρβολόν τέ τινα τῶν* Ἀθηναίων, μοχθηρὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὠστρακισμένον οὐ διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀξιώματος φόβον, ἀλλὰ διὰ πονηρίαν καὶ αἰσχύνην τῆς πόλεως. According to Androtion (Fragm. 48, ed. Didot.)—ὠστρακισμένον διὰ φαυλότητα.

Compare about Hyperbolus, Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11; Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 13; Ælian. V. H. xii, 43; Theopompus, Fragm. 102, 103, ed. Didot.

[159] Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 13; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11. Theophrastus says that the violent opposition at first, and the coalition afterwards, was not between Nikias and Alkibiadês, but between Phæax and Alkibiadês.

The coalition of votes and parties may well have included all three.

[160] Thucyd. iii, 91.

[161] In reference to this argumentation of the Athenian envoy, I call attention to the attack and bombardment of Copenhagen by the English government in 1807, together with the language used by the English envoy to the Danish Prince Regent on the subject. We read as follows in M. Thiers's Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire:—

"L'agent choisi étoit digne de sa mission. C'étoit M. Jackson qui avait été autrefois chargé d'affaires en France, avant l'arrivée de Lord Whitworth, à Paris, mais qu'on n'avoit pas pû y laisser, à cause du mauvais esprit

qu'il manifestoit en toute occasion. Introduit auprès du régent, il allégua de prétendues stipulations secrètes, en vertu desquelles le Danemark devoit, (disoit on) de gré ou de force, faire partie d'une coalition contre l'Angleterre: il donna comme raison d'agir la necessité où se trouvoit le cabinet Britannique de prendre des précautions pour que les forces navales du Danemark et le passage du Sund ne tombassent pas au pouvoir des François: et en conséquence il demanda au nom de son gouvernement, qu'on livrât à l'armée Angloise la forteresse de Kronenberg qui commande de Sund, le port de Copenhague, et enfin la flotte elle-même—promettant de garder le tout en dépôt, pour le compte du Danemark, qui seroit remis en possession de ce qu'on alloit lui enlever, dès que le danger seroit passé. M. Jackson assura que le Danemark ne perdroit rien, que l'on se conduiroit chez lui en auxiliaires et en amis—que les troupes Britanniques payeroient tout ce qu'elles consommeroient.—Et avec quoi, répondit le prince indigné, payeriez vous notre honneur perdu, si nous adhérions à cette infame proposition?—Le prince continuant, et opposant à cette perfide intention la conduite loyale du Danemark, qui n'avoit pris aucune précaution contre les Anglois, qui les avoit toutes prises contre les François, ce dont on abusoit pour le surprendre—*M. Jackson répondit à cette juste indignation par une insolente familiarité, disant que la guerre étoit la guerre, qu'il falloit se résigner à ces nécessités, et céder au plus fort quand on étoit le plus foible*. Le prince congédia l'agent Anglois avec des paroles fort dures, et lui déclara qu'il alloit se transporter à Copenhague, pour y remplir ses devoirs de prince et de citoyen Danois." (Thiers, Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire, tome viii, livre xxviii, p. 190.)

[162] Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 16. This is doubtless one of the statements which the composer of the Oration of Andokidês against Alkibiadês found current in respect to the conduct of the latter (sect. 123). Nor is there any reason for questioning the truth of it.

[163] Thucyd. v, 106. τὸ δὲ χωρίον αὐτοὶ ᾤκησαν, ἀποίκους ὕστερον πεντακοσίους πέμψαντες. Lysander restored some Melians to the island after the battle of Ægospotami (Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 9): some, therefore, must have escaped or must have been spared.

[164] Such is also the opinion of Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 348.

[165] Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Thucydid. c. 37-42, pp. 906-920, Reisk: compare the remarks in his Epistol. ad Cn. Pompeium, de Præcipuis Historicis, p. 774, Reisk.

[166] Plutarch, Alkibiad. 16. τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀεὶ τὰ πραότατα τῶν ὀνομάτων τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασι τιθεμένους, παιδιὰς καὶ φιλανθρωπίας. To the same purpose Plutarch, Solon, c. 15.

[167] Compare also what Brasidas says in his speech to the Akanthians, v, 86 *ἴσχυος δικαιώσει*, ἣν ἡ τύχη ἔδωκεν, etc.

[168] See above, vol. v, ch. xliii, pp. 204-239, for the history of these events. I now take up the thread from that chapter.

[169] Mr. Mitford, in the spirit which is usual with him, while enlarging upon the suffering occasioned by this extensive revolution both of inhabitants and of property throughout Sicily, takes no notice of the cause in which it originated, namely, the number of foreign mercenaries whom the Gelonian dynasty had brought in and enrolled as new citizens (Gelon alone having brought in ten thousand, Diodor. xi, 72), and the number of exiles whom they had banished and dispossessed.

I will here notice only one of his misrepresentations respecting the events of this period, because it is definite as well as important (vol. iv, p. 9, chap. xviii, sect. 1).

"But thus (he says) in every little state, lands were left to become public property, or to be assigned to new individual owners. *Everywhere, then, that favorite measure of democracy, the equal division of the lands of the state, was resolved upon*: a measure impossible to be perfectly executed; impossible to be maintained as executed; and of very doubtful advantage, if it could be perfectly executed and perfectly maintained."

Again, sect. iii, p. 23, he speaks of "that incomplete and iniquitous partition of lands," etc.

Now, upon this we may remark:—

1. The *equal division of the lands* of the state, here affirmed by Mr. Mitford, is a pure fancy of his own. He has no authority for it whatever. Diodorus says (xi, 76) κατεκληρούχησαν τὴν χώραν, etc.; and again (xi, 86) he speaks of τὸν ἀναδασμὸν τῆς χώρας: the *redivision* of the territory; but respecting *equality of division*, not one word does he say. Nor can any principle of division in this case be less probable than equality; for one of the great motives of the redivision was to provide for those exiles who had been dispossessed by the Gelonian dy-

nasty: and these men would receive lots, greater or less, on the ground of compensation for loss, greater or less as it might have been. Besides, immediately after the redivision, we find rich and poor mentioned, just as before (xi, 86).

2. Next, Mr. Mitford calls "the equal division of all the lands of the state" the *favorite measure of democracy*. This is an assertion not less incorrect. Not a single democracy in Greece, so far as my knowledge extends, can be produced, in which such equal partition is ever known to have been carried into effect. In the Athenian democracy, especially, not only there existed constantly great inequality of landed property, but the oath annually taken by the popular heliastic judges had a special clause, protesting emphatically against *redivision of the land or extinction of debts*.

[170] Thucyd. vi, 17.

[171] Diodor. xi, 86, 87. The institution at Syracuse was called the *petalism*; because, in taking the votes, the name of the citizen intended to be banished was written upon a leaf of olive, instead of a shell or potsherd.

[172] Diodor. xi. 87, 88.

[173] Diodor. xi, 78, 88, 90. The proceeding of Duketius is illustrated by the description of Dardanus in the Iliad, xx, 216:—

Κτίσσε δὲ Δαρδανίην, ἐπεὶ οὔπω Ἴλιος ἱρὴ

Ἐν πεδίῳ πεπόλιστο, πόλις μερόπων ἀνθρώπων,

Ἀλλ' ἔθ' ὑπωρείας ᾤκουν πολυπιδάκου Ἴδης.

Compare Plato, de Legg. iii, pp. 681, 682.

[174] Diodor. xi, 76.

[175] Diodor. xi, 91, 92. Ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὥσπερ τινὶ μιᾷ φωνῇ σώζειν ἅπαντες ἐβόων τὸν ἱκέτην.

[176] Xenophon, Hellen. i, 5, 19; Pausanias, vi, 7, 2.

[177] Mr. Mitford recounts as follows the return of Duketius to Sicily: "The Syracusan chiefs brought back Duketius from Corinth, apparently to make him instrumental to their own views for advancing the power of their commonwealth. They permitted, or rather encouraged him to establish a colony of mixed people, Greeks and Sicels, at Calé Acté, on the northern coast of the island," (ch. xviii, sect. i, vol. iv, p. 13.)

The statement that "the Syracusans brought back Duketius, or encouraged him to come back, or to found the colony of Kalê Aktê," is a complete departure from Diodorus on the part of Mr. Mitford; who transforms a breach of parole on the part of the Sikel *prince* into an ambitious manœuvre on the part of Syracusan *democracy*. The words of Diodorus, the only authority in the case, are as follows (xii, 8): Οὗτος δὲ (Duketius) ὀλίγον χρόνον μείνας ἐν τῇ Κορίνθῳ, *τὰς ὁμολογίας ἔλυσε*, καὶ προσποιησάμενος χρησμὸν ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἑαυτῷ δεδόσθαι, κτίσαι τὴν Καλὴν Ἀκτὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ, κατέπλευσεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον μετὰ πολλῶν οἰκητόρων· συνεπελάβοντο δὲ καὶ τῶν Σικελῶν τινες, ἐν οἷς ἦν καὶ Ἀρχωνίδης, ὁ τῶν Ἑρβιταίων δυναστεύων. Οὗτος μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν οἰκισμὸν τῆς Καλῆς Ἀκτῆς ἐγίνετο· Ἀκραγαντῖνοι δὲ, ἅμα μὲν φθονοῦντες τοῖς Συρακοσίοις, ἅμα δ' ἐγκαλοῦντες αὐτοῖς ὅτι Δουκέτιον ὄντα κοινὸν πολέμιον *διέσωσαν ἄνευ τῆς Ἀκραγαντίνων γνώμης*, πόλεμον ἐξήνεγκαν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις.

[178] Diodor. xii, 8.

[179] Diodor. xii, 29. For the reconquest of Morgantinê, see Thucyd. iv, 65.

Respecting this town of Trinakia, known only from the passage of Diodorus here, Paulmier (as cited in Wesseling's note), as well as Mannert (Geographie der Griechen und Römer, b. x, ch. xv, p. 446), intimate some skepticism; which I share so far as to believe that Diodorus has greatly overrated its magnitude and importance.

Nor can it be true, as Diodorus affirms, that Trinakia was *the only* Sikel township remaining unsubdued by the Syracusans, and that, after conquering that place, they had subdued them all. We know that there were no inconsiderable number of independent Sikels, at the time of the Athenian invasion of Sicily (Thucyd. vi, 88; vii, 2).

[180] Diodor. xii, 30.

[181] Diodor. xiii, 81.

[182] Diodor. xiii. 82, 83, 90.

[183] See Aristotle as cited by Cicero, Brut. c. 12; Plato, Phædr. p. 267, c. 113, 114; Dionys. Halic. Judicium de Isocrate, p. 534 R. and Epist. ii, ad Ammæum, p. 792; also Quintilian, iii, 1, 125. According to Cicero (de Inventione, ii, 2), the treatises of these ancient rhetoricians, "usque a principe illo et inventore Tisiâ," had been superseded by Aristotle, who had collected them carefully, "nominatim," and had improved upon their expositions. Dionysius laments that they had been so superseded (Epist. ad Ammæ. p. 722).

[184] Diogen. Laërt. viii, 64-71; Seyfert, Akragas und sein Gebiet, sect. ii, p. 70; Ritter, Geschichte der Alten Philosophie, vol. i. ch. vi, p. 533, *seqq.*

[185] Thucyd. iv. 61-64. This is the tenor of the speech delivered by Hermokratês at the congress of Gela in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war. His language is remarkable: he calls all non-Sicilian Greeks ἀλλοφύλους.

[186] The inscription in Boeckh's Corpus Inscriptt. (No. 74, part i, p. 112) relating to the alliance between Athens and Rhegium, conveys little certain information. Boeckh refers it to a covenant concluded in the archonship of Apseudês at Athens (Olymp. 86, 4, B.C. 433-432, the year before the Peloponnesian war), renewing an alliance which was even then of old date. But it appears to me that the supposition of a renewal is only his own conjecture; and even the name of the archon, *Apseudês*, which he has restored by a plausible conjecture, can hardly be considered as certain.

If we could believe the story in Justin iv, 3, Rhegium must have ceased to be Ionic before the Peloponnesian war. He states, that in a sedition at Rhegium, one of the parties called in auxiliaries from Himera. These Himeræan exiles having first destroyed the enemies against whom they were invoked, next massacred the friends who had invoked them: "ausi facinus nulli tyranno comparandum." They married the Rhegine women, and seized the city for themselves.

I do not know what to make of this story, which neither appears noticed in Thucydidês, nor seems to consist with what he does tell us.

[187] Thucyd. i, 36.

[188] Thucyd. ii, 7. Καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν, πρὸς ταῖς αὐτοῦ ὑπαρχούσαις, ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας τοῖς τἀκείνων ἑλομένοις, ναῦς ἐπετάχθησαν ποιεῖσθαι κατὰ μέγεθος τῶν πόλεων, ὡς ἐς τὸν πάντα ἀριθμὸν πεντακοσίων νεῶν ἐσόμενον, etc.

Respecting the construction of this perplexing passage, read the notes of Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Göller: compare Poppo, ad Thucyd. vol. i, ch. xv, p. 181.

I agree with Dr. Arnold and Göller in rejecting the construction of αὐτοῦ with ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας, in the sense of "those ships which were in Peloponnesus from Italy and Sicily." This would be untrue in point of fact, as they observe: there were no Sicilian ships of war in Peloponnesus.

Nevertheless I think, differing from them, that αὐτοῦ is not a pronoun referring to ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας, but is used in contrast with those words, and really means, "in or about Peloponnesus." It was contemplated that new ships should be built in Sicily and Italy, of sufficient number to make the total fleet of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, including the triremes already in Peloponnesus, equal to five hundred sail. But it was never contemplated that the triremes in Italy and Sicily *alone* should amount to five hundred sail, as Dr. Arnold, in my judgment, erroneously imagines. Five hundred sail for the entire confederacy would be a prodigious total: five hundred sail for Sicily and Italy alone, would be incredible.

To construe the sentence as it stands now, putting aside the conjecture of νῆες instead of ναῦς, or ἐπετάχθη instead of ἐπετάχθησαν, which would make it run smoothly, we must admit the supposition of a break or double construction, such as sometimes occurs in Thucydidês. The sentence begins with one form of construction and concludes with another. We must suppose, with Göller, that αἱ πόλεις understood as the nominative case to ἐπετάχθησαν. The dative cases (Λακεδαιμονίοις—ἑλομένοις) are to be considered, I apprehend, as governed by νῆες ἐπετάχθησαν: that is, these dative cases belong to the first form of construction, which Thucydidês has not carried out. The sentence is begun as if νῆες ἐπετάχθησαν were intended to follow.

[189] Thucyd. vi, 34: compare iii, 86.

[190] Thucyd. vi, 86.

[191] Thucyd. iii, 86; Diodor. xii, 53; Plato, Hipp. Maj. p. 282, B. It is remarkable that Thucydidês, though he is said, with much probability, to have been among the pupils of Gorgias, makes no mention of that rhetor personally as among the envoys. Diodorus probably copied from Ephorus, the pupil of Isokratês. Among the writers of the Isokratean school, the persons of distinguished rhetors, and their supposed political efficiency, counted for much more than in the estimation of Thucydidês. Pausanias (vi, 17, 3) speaks of Tisias also as having been among the envoys in this celebrated legation.

[192] Thucyd. iii, 88; Diodor. xii, 54.

[193] Thucyd. iii, 90; vi, 6.

[194] Thucyd. iii, 99.

[195] Thucyd. iii, 103.

[196] Thucyd. iii, 115.

[197] Thucyd. iii, 115.

[198] See the preceding vol. vi, ch. lii.

[199] Thucyd. iv, 48.

[200] Thucyd. iii, 115; iv, 1.

[201] Thucyd. iv, 24. Καὶ νικηθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ τάχους ἀπέπλευσαν, ὡς ἕκαστοι ἔτυχον, ἐς τὰ οἰκεῖα στρατόπεδα, τό τε ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ καὶ ἐν τῷ Ῥηγίῳ, μίαν ναῦν ἀπολέσαντες, etc.

I concur in Dr. Arnold's explanation of this passage, yet conceiving that the words ὡς ἕκαστοι ἔτυχον designate the flight as disorderly, insomuch that *all* the Lokrian ships did not get back to the Lokrian station, nor *all* the Syracusan ships to the Syracusan station: but each separate ship fled to either one or the other, as it best could.

[202] Thucyd. iv, 25. ἀποσιμωσάντων ἐκείνων καὶ προεμβαλόντων.

I do not distinctly understand the nautical movement which is expressed by ἀποσιμωσάντων, in spite of the notes of the commentators. And I cannot but doubt the correctness of Dr. Arnold's explanation, when he says "The Syracusans, on a sudden, threw off their towing-ropes, made their way to the open sea by a lateral movement, and thus became the assailants," etc. The open sea was what the Athenians required, in order to obtain the benefit of their superior seamanship.

[203] Thucyd. iv, 25.

[204] Thucyd. iv, 48.

[205] Compare a similar remark made by the Syracusan Hermokratês, nine years afterwards, when the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse was on its way, respecting the increased disposition to union among the Sicilian cities, produced by common fear of Athens (Thucyd. vi, 33).

[206] Thucyd. iv, 58.

[207] See the speech of Hermokratês, Thucyd. iv, 59-64. One expression in this speech indicates that it was composed by Thucydidês many years after its proper date, subsequently to the great expedition of the Athenians against Syracuse in 415 B.C.; though I doubt not that Thucydidês collected the memoranda for it at the time.

Hermokratês says: "The Athenians are now near us with *a few ships*, lying in wait for our blunders,"—οἱ δύναμιν ἔχοντες μεγίστην τῶν Ἑλλήνων τάς τε ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν τηροῦσιν, *ὀλίγαις ναυσὶ παρόντες*, etc. (iv, 60).

Now the fleet under the command of Eurymedon and his colleagues at Rhegium included all or most of the ships which had acted at Sphakteria and Korkyra, together with those which had been previously at the strait of Messina under Pythodôrus. It could not have been less than fifty sail, and may possibly have been sixty sail. It is

hardly conceivable that any Greek, speaking in the early spring of 424 B.C., should have alluded to this as a *small* fleet: assuredly, Hermokratês would not thus allude to it, since it was for the interest of his argument to exaggerate rather than extenuate, the formidable manifestations of Athens.

But Thucydidês, composing the speech after the great Athenian expedition of 415 B.C., so much more numerous and commanding in every respect, might not unnaturally represent the fleet of Eurymedon as "a few ships," when he tacitly compared the two. This is the only way that I know, of explaining such an expression.

The Scholiast observes that some of the copies in his time omitted the words ὀλίγαις ναυσὶ: probably they noticed the contradiction which I have remarked; and the passage *may* certainly be construed without those words.

[208] Thucyd. iv, 65. We learn from Polybius (Fragm. xii, 22, 23, one of the Excerpta recently published by Maii, from the Cod. Vatic.) that Timæus had in his twenty-first book described the congress of Gela at considerable length, and had composed an elaborate speech for Hermokratês: which speech Polybius condemns, as a piece of empty declamation.

[209] Thucyd. v, 5.

[210] Thucyd. vi, 13-52.

[211] Thucyd. iv, 65.

[212] Thucyd. v, 4. Λεοντῖνοι γὰρ, ἀπελθόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐκ Σικελίας μετὰ τὴν ξύμβασιν, πολίτας τε ἐπεγράψαντο πολλοὺς, καὶ ὁ δῆμος τὴν γῆν ἐπενόει ἀναδάσασθαι. Οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ αἰσθόμενοι Συρακοσίους τε ἐπάγονται καὶ ἐκβάλλουσι τὸν δῆμον. Καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπλανήθησαν ὡς ἕκαστοι, etc.

Upon this Dr. Arnold observes: "The principle on which this ἀναδασμὸς γῆς was redemanded, was this; that every citizen was entitled to his portion, κλῆρος, of the land of the state, and that the admission of new citizens rendered a redivision of the property of the state a matter at once of necessity and of justice. It is not probable that in any case the actual κλῆροι (properties) of the old citizens were required to be shared with the new members of the state; but only, as at Rome, the ager publicus, or land still remaining to the state itself, and not apportioned out to individuals. This land, however, being beneficially enjoyed by numbers of the old citizens, either as common pasture, or as being farmed by different individuals on very advantageous terms, a division of it among the newly-admitted citizens, although not, strictly speaking, a spoliation of private property, was yet a serious shock to a great mass of existing interests, and was therefore always regarded as a revolutionary measure."

I transcribe this note of Dr. Arnold rather from its intrinsic worth than from any belief that analogy of agrarian relations existed between Rome and Leontini. The ager publicus at Rome was the product of successive conquests from foreign enemies of the city: there may, indeed, have been originally a similar ager publicus in the peculiar domain of Rome itself, anterior to all conquests; but this must at any rate have been very small, and had probably been all absorbed and assigned in private property before the agrarian disputes began.

We cannot suppose that the Leontines had any ager publicus acquired by conquest, nor are we entitled to presume that they had any at all, capable of being divided. Most probably the lots for the new citizens were to be provided out of private property. But unfortunately we are not told how, nor on what principles and conditions. Of what class of men were the new emigrants? Were they individuals altogether poor, having nothing but their hands to work with; or did they bring with them any amount of funds, to begin their settlement on the fertile and tempting plain of Leontini? (compare Thucyd. i, 27, and Plato de Legib. v, p. 744, A.) If the latter, we have no reason to imagine that they would be allowed to acquire their new lots gratuitously. Existing proprietors would be forced to sell at a fixed price, but not to yield their properties without compensation. I have already noticed, that to a small self-working proprietor, who had no slaves, it was almost essential that his land should be near the city; and provided this were insured, it might be a good bargain for a new resident having some money, but no land elsewhere, to come in and buy.

We have no means of answering these questions: but the few words of Thucydidês do not present this measure as revolutionary, or as intended against the rich, or for the benefit of the poor. It was proposed, on public grounds, to strengthen the city by the acquisition of new citizens. This might be wise policy, in the close neighborhood of a doubtful and superior city, like Syracuse; though we cannot judge of the policy of the measure without knowing more. But most assuredly Mr. Mitford's representation can be noway justified from Thucydidês: "Time and circumstances had greatly altered the state of property in all the Sicilian commonwealths, since *that incomplete and iniquitous partition of lands*, which had been made, on the general establishment of democratical government, after the expulsion of the family of Gelon. In other cities, the poor rested under their lot; but in Leontini, they were warm in project *for a fresh and equal partition*; and to strengthen themselves against the party of the wealthy, they carried, in the general assembly, a decree for associating a number of new citizens." (Mitford, H. G. ch. xviii, sect. ii, vol. iv, p. 23.)

I have already remarked, in a previous note, that Mr. Mitford has misrepresented the redivision of lands which took place after the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty. That redivision had not been upon the principle of equal lots: it is not therefore correct to assert, as Mr. Mitford does, that the present movement at Leontini arose from the innovation made by time and circumstances in that equal division: as little is it correct to say, that the

poor at Leontini now desired "a fresh and equal partition." Thucydidês says *not one word about equal partition*. He puts forward the enrolment of new citizens as the substantive and primary resolution, actually taken by the Leontines; the redivision of the lands, as a measure consequent and subsidiary to this, and as yet existing only in project (ἐπενόει). Mr. Mitford states the fresh and equal division to have been the real object of desire, and the enrolment of new citizens to have been proposed with a view to attain it. His representation is greatly at variance with that of Thucydidês.

[213] Justin (iv, 4) surrounds the Sicilian envoys at Athens with all the insignia of misery and humiliation, while addressing the Athenian assembly: "Sordidâ veste, capillo barbâque promissis, et omni squaloris habitu ad misericordiam commovendam conquisito, concionem deformes adeunt."

[214] Thucyd. v, 4, 5.

[215] Thucyd. vi, 6; Diodor. xii, 82. The statement of Diodorus—that the Egestæans applied not merely to Agrigentum but also to Syracuse—is highly improbable. The war which he mentions as having taken place some years before between Egesta and Lilybæum (xi, 86) in 454 B.C., may probably have been a war between Egesta and Selinus.

[216] Thucyd. vi, 34.

[217] Thucyd. vi, 6; Diodor. xii, 83.

[218] Thucyd. vi, 6. ὧν ἀκούοντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῶν τε Ἐγεσταίων *πολλάκις λεγόντων* καὶ τῶν ξυναγορευόντων αὐτοῖς ἐψηφίσαντο, etc.

Mr. Mitford takes no notice of all these previous debates, when he imputes to the Athenians hurry and passion in the ultimate decision (ch. xviii. sect. ii, vol. iv, p. 30.)

[219] Thucyd. vi, 46. ἰδίᾳ ξενίσεις ποιούμενοι τῶν τριηριτῶν, τά τε ἐξ αὐτῆς Ἐγέστης ἐκπώματα καὶ χρυσᾶ καὶ ἀργυρᾶ ξυλλέξαντες, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐγγὺς πόλεων καὶ Φοινικικῶν καὶ Ἑλληνίδων αἰτησάμενοι, ἐσέφερον ἐς τὰς ἐστιάσεις ὡς οἰκεῖα ἕκαστοι. Καὶ πάντων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρωμένων, καὶ πανταχοῦ πολλῶν φαινομένων, μεγάλην τὴν ἔκπληξιν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τριήρων Ἀθηναίοις παρεῖχον, etc.

Such loans of gold and silver plate betoken a remarkable degree of intimacy among the different cities.

[220] Thucyd. vi, 46; Diodor. xii, 83.

[221] To this winter or spring, perhaps, we may refer the representation of the lost comedy Τριφάλης of Aristophanês. Iberians were alluded to in it, to be introduced by Aristarchus; seemingly, Iberian mercenaries, who were among the auxiliaries talked of at this time by Alkibiadês and the other prominent advisers of the expedition, as a means of conquest in Sicily (Thucyd. vi, 90). The word Τριφάλης was a nickname (not difficult to understand) applied to Alkibiadês, who was just now at the height of his importance, and therefore likely enough to be chosen as the butt of a comedy. See the few fragments remaining of the Τριφάλης, in Meineke, Fragm. Comic. Gr. vol. ii, pp. 1162-1167.

[222] Thucyd. vi, 8; Diodor. xii, 83.

[223] Thucyd. vi, 8. Ὁ δὲ Νικίας, ἀκούσιος μὲν ἠρημένος ἄρχειν, etc. The reading ἀκούσιος appears better sustained by MSS., and intrinsically more suitable, than ἀκούσας, which latter word probably arose from the correction of some reader who was surprised that Nikias made in the second assembly a speech which properly belonged to the first, and who explained this by supposing that Nikias had not been present at the first assembly. That he was not present, however, is highly improbable. The matter, nevertheless, does require some explanation; and I have endeavored to supply one in the text.

[224] Thucyd. vi, 9-14. Καὶ σὺ, ὦ πρύτανι, ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἡγεῖ σοι προσήκειν κήδεσθαί τε τῆς πόλεως, καὶ βούλει γενέσθαι πολίτης ἀγαθός, ἐπιψήφιζε, καὶ γνώμας προτίθει αὖθις Ἀθηναίοις, νομίσας, εἰ ὀρρώδεῖς τὸ ἀναψηφίσαι, τὸ μὲν λύειν τοὺς νόμους μὴ μετὰ τοσῶνδ' ἂν μαρτύρων αἰτίαν σχεῖν, τῆς δὲ πόλεως κακῶς βουλευσαμένης ἰατρὸς ἂν γενέσθαι, etc.

I cannot concur in the remarks of Dr. Arnold, either on this passage or upon the parallel case of the renewed debate in the Athenian assembly, on the subject of the punishment to be inflicted on the Mitylenæans (see above, vol. vi, ch. 1, p. 338, and Thucyd. iii, 36). It appears to me that Nikias was here asking the prytanis to do an illegal act, which might well expose him to accusation and punishment. Probably he *would* have been ac-

cused on this ground, if the decision of the second assembly had been different from what it actually turned out; if they had reversed the decision of the former assembly, but only by a small majority.

The distinction taken by Dr. Arnold between what was *illegal* and what was merely *irregular*, was little marked at Athens: both were called *illegal*, τοὺς νόμους λύειν. The rules which the Athenian assembly, a sovereign assembly, laid down for its own debates and decisions, were just as much *laws* as those which it passed for the guidance of private citizens. The English House of Commons is not a sovereign assembly, but only a portion of the sovereign power: accordingly, the rules which it lays down for its debates are not *laws*, but orders of the House: a breach of these orders, therefore, in debating any particular subject, would not be illegal, but merely irregular or informal. The same was the case with the French Chamber of Deputies, prior to the revolution of February, 1848: the rules which it laid down for its own proceedings were not laws, but simply *le réglement de la Chambre*. It is remarkable that the present National Assembly now sitting (March, 1849) has retained this expression, and adopted a *réglement* for its own business; though it is in point of fact a sovereign assembly, and the rules which it sanctions are, properly speaking, *laws*.

Both in this case, and in the Mitylenæan debate, I think the Athenian prytanis committed an illegality. In the first case, every one is glad of the illegality, because it proved the salvation of so many Mitylenæan lives. In the second case, the illegality was productive of practical bad consequences, inasmuch as it seems to have brought about the immense extension of the scale upon which the expedition was projected. But there will occur in a few years a third incident, the condemnation of the six generals after the battle of Arginusæ, in which the prodigious importance of a strict observance of forms will appear painfully and conspicuously manifest.

[225] Thucyd. vi, 16, 17.

[226] Thucyd. vi, 17. Καὶ νῦν οὔτε ἀνέλπιστοί πω μᾶλλον Πελοποννήσιοι ἐς ἡμᾶς ἐγένοντο, εἴτε καὶ πάνυ ἔῤῥωνται, etc.

The construction of ἀνέλπιστοι here is not certain: yet I cannot think that the meaning which Dr. Arnold and others assign to it is the most suitable. It rather seems to mean the same as in vii, 4, and vii, 47: "enemies beyond our hopes of being able to deal with."

[227] Thucyd. vi, 16-19.

[228] Thucyd. vi, 22.

[229] Thucyd. vi, 23. ὅπερ ἐγὼ φοβούμενος, καὶ εἰδὼς πολλὰ μὲν ἡμᾶς δέον βουλεύσασθαι, ἔτι δὲ πλείω εὐτυχῆσαι (*χαλεπὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπους ὄντας*), ὅτι ἐλάχιστα τῇ τύχῃ παραδοὺς ἐμαυτὸν βούλομαι ἐκπλεῖν, παρασκευῇ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰκότων ἀσφαλὴς ἐκπλεῦσαι. Ταῦτα γὰρ τῇ τε ξυμπάσῃ πόλει βεβαιότατα ἡγοῦμαι, καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς στρατευσομένοις σωτήρια· εἰ δέ τῳ ἄλλως δοκεῖ, παρίημι αὐτῷ τὴν ἀρχήν.

[230] Plutarch. Compare Nikias and Crassus, c. 3.

[231] Thucyd. vi, 1. οὐ πολλῷ τινι ὑποδεέστερον πόλεμον, etc.: compare vii, 28.

[232] Compare Plutarch, Præcept. Reipubl. Gerend. p. 804.

[233] Thucyd. v, 99; vi, 1-6.

[234] Thucyd. vi, 6. ἐφιέμενοι μὲν τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ προφάσει, τῆς πάσης (Σικελίας) ἄρξειν, βοηθεῖν δὲ ἅμα εὐπρεπῶς βουλόμενοι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ξυγγένεσι καὶ τοῖς προσγεγενημένοις ξυμμάχοις.

Even in the speech of Alkibiadês, the conquest of Sicily is only once alluded to, and that indirectly; rather as a favorable possibility, than as a result to be counted upon.

[235] Thucyd. vi, 15. Καὶ μάλιστα στρατηγῆσαί τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων Σικελίαν τε δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ Καρχηδόνα λήψεσθαι, καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἅμα εὐτυχήσας χρήμασί τε καὶ δόξῃ ὠφελήσειν. Ὢν γὰρ ἐν ἀξιώματι ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀστῶν, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις μείζοσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν οὐσίαν ἐχρῆτο ἔς τε τὰς ἱπποτροφίας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δαπάνας, etc.

Compare vi, 90. Plutarch (Alkib. c. 19; Nikias, c. 12). Plutarch sometimes speaks as if, not Alkibiadês alone (or at least in conjunction with a few partisans), but the Athenians generally, set out with an expectation of conquering Carthage as well as Sicily. In the speech which Alkibiadês made at Sparta after his banishment (Thucyd. vi, 90), he does indeed state this as the general purpose of the expedition. But it seems plain that he is here describing, to his countrymen generally, plans which were only fermenting in his own brain, as we may discern from a careful perusal of the first twenty chapters of the sixth book of Thucydidês.

In the inaccurate Oratio de Pace ascribed to Andokidês (sect. 30), it is alleged that the Syracusans sent an embassy to Athens, a little before this expedition, entreating to be admitted as allies of the Athenians, and affirming that Syracuse would be a more valuable ally to Athens than Egesta or Katana. This statement is wholly untrue.

[236] Thucyd. viii, 1.

[237] Thucyd. vi, 31. ἐπιφοράς τε πρὸς τῷ ἐκ δημοσίου μισθῷ διδόντων τοῖς θρανίταις τῶν ναυτῶν καὶ *ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις*, καὶ τἆλλα σημείοις καὶ κατασκευαῖς πολυτελέσι χρησαμένων, etc.

Dobree and Dr. Arnold explain ὑπηρεσίαις to mean *the petty officers*, such as κυβερνήτης, κελευστὴς, etc. Göller and Poppo construe it to mean "*the servants of the sailors*." Neither of the two seems to me satisfactory. I think the word means "to the crews generally;" the word ὑπερησία being a perfectly general word comprising all who received pay in the ship. All the examples produced in the notes of the commentators testify this meaning, which also occurs in the text itself two lines before. To construe ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις as meaning "the crews generally, or the remaining crews, along with the thranitæ," is doubtless more or less awkward. But it departs less from ordinary construction than either of the two senses which the commentators propose.

[238] Thucyd. vii, 13. οἱ ξένοι, οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ ἐσβάντες, etc.

[239] Thucyd. vi, 26. I do not trust the statement given in Æschinês, De Fals. Legat. c. 54, p. 302, and in Andokidês, De Pace, sect. 8, that seven thousand talents were laid by as an accumulated treasure in the acropolis during the Peace of Nikias, and that four hundred triremes, or three hundred triremes, were newly built. The numerous historical inaccuracies in those orations, concerning the facts prior to 400 B.C., are such as to deprive them of all authority, except where they are confirmed by other testimony; even if we admitted the oration ascribed to Andokidês as genuine, which in all probability it is not.

But there exists an interesting Inscription which proves that the sum of three thousand talents at least must have been laid by, during the interval between the conclusion of the Peace of Nikias and the Sicilian Expedition, in the acropolis; and that over and above this accumulated fund, the state was in condition to discharge, out of the current receipts, various sums which it had borrowed during the previous war from the treasury of various temples, and seems to have had besides a surplus for docks and fortifications. The Inscription above named records the vote passed for discharging these debts, and for securing the sums so paid in the opisthodomus, or back-chamber, of the Parthenon, for account of those gods to whom they respectively belonged. See Boeckh's Corp. Inscr. part ii, Inscr. Att. No. 76, p. 117; also the Staats-haushaltung der Athener of the same author, vol. ii, p. 198. This Inscription belongs unquestionably to one of the years between 421-415 B.C., to which year we cannot say.

[240] Thucyd. vi, 31; Diodor. xiii, 2, 3.

[241] Plutarch (Nikias, c. 12, 13; Alkibiad. c. 17). Immediately after the catastrophe at Syracuse, the Athenians were very angry with those prophets who had promised them success (Thucyd. viii, 1).

[242] Cicero, Legg. ii, 11. "Melius Græci atque nostri; qui, ut augerent pietatem in Deos, easdem illos urbes, quas nos, *incolere* voluerunt."

How much the Grecian mind was penetrated with the idea of the god as an actual inhabitant of the town, may be seen illustrated in the Oration of Lysias, cont. Andokid. sects. 15-46: compare Herodotus, v, 67; a striking story, as illustrated in this History, vol. iii, ch. ix, p. 34; also Xenophon, Hellen. vi, 4-7; Livy, xxxviii, 43.

In an Inscription in Boeckh's Corp. Insc. (part ii, No. 190, p. 320) a list of the names of Prytaneis, appears, at the head of which list figures the name of Athênê Polias.

[243] Pausanias, i, 24, 3; iv, 33, 4; viii, 31, 4; viii, 48, 4; viii, 41, 4; Plutarch, An Seni sit Gerenda Respubl. ad finem; Aristophan. Plut. 1153, and Schol.: compare O. Müller, Archäologie der Kunst, sect. 67; K. F. Hermann, Gottesdienstl. Alterth. der Griechen, sect. 15; Gerhard, De Religione Hermarum. Berlin, 1845.

[244] Thucyd. vi, 27. ὅσοι Ἑρμαῖ ἦσαν λίθινοι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇ Ἀθηναίων … *μιᾷ νυκτὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι* περιεκόπησαν τὰ πρόσωπα.

Andokidês (De Myst. sect. 63) expressly states that only a single one was spared—καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὁ Ἑρμῆς ὃν ὁρᾶτε πάντες, ὁ παρὰ τὴν πατρῴαν οἰκίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν, οὐ περιεκόπη, *μόνος τῶν Ἑρμῶν τῶν Ἀθήνῃσι*.

Cornelius Nepos (Alkibiad. c. 3) and Plutarch (Alkib. c. 13) copy Andokidês: in his life of Nikias (c. 18) the latter uses the expression of Thucydidês—οἱ πλεῖστοι. This expression is noway at variance with Andokidês, though it stops short of his affirmation. There is great mixture of truth and falsehood in the Oration of Andokidês; but I think that he is to be trusted as to this point.

Diodorus (xiii, 2) says that *all* the Hermæ were mutilated, not recognizing a single exception. Cornelius Nepos, by a singular inaccuracy, talks about the Hermæ as having been all *thrown down* (dejicerentur).

[245] It is truly astonishing to read the account given of this mutilation of the Hermæ, and its consequences, by Wachsmuth, Hellen. Alterthümer, vol. ii, sect. 65, pp. 191-196. While he denounces the Athenian people, for their conduct during the subsequent inquiry, in the most unmeasured language, you would suppose that the incident which plunged them into this mental distraction, at a moment of overflowing hope and confidence, was a mere trifle: so briefly does he pass it over, without taking the smallest pains to show in what way it profoundly wounded the religious feeling of Athens.

Büttner (Geschichte der politischen Hetærieen zu Athen. p. 65), though very brief, takes a fairer view than Wachsmuth.

[246] Pausanias, i, 17, 1; i, 24, 3; Harpokration v, Ἑρμαῖ. See Sluiter, Lectiones Andocideæ, cap. 2.

Especially the ἀγυιατίδες θεραπεῖαι (Eurip. Ion. 187) were noted at Athens: ceremonial attentions towards the divine persons who protected the public streets, a function performed by Apollo Aguieus, as well as by Hermes.

[247] Herodot. viii, 144; Æschylus, Pers. 810; Æschyl. Agam. 339. The wrath for any indignity offered to the statue of a god or goddess, and impatience to punish it capitally, is manifested as far back as the ancient epic poem of Arktinus: see the argument of the Ἰλίου Πέρσις in Proclus, and Welcker, Griechische Tragödien, *Sophoklês*, sect. 21, vol. i, p. 162. Herodotus cannot explain the indignities offered by Kambyses to the Egyptian statues and holy customs upon any other supposition than that of stark madness, ἐμάνη μεγάλως; Herod. iii, 37-38.

Timæus the Sicilian historian (writing about 320-290 B.C.) represented the subsequent defeat of the Athenians as a divine punishment for the desecration of the Hermæ, inflicted chiefly by the Syracusan Hermokratês, son of Hermon and descendant of the god Hermes (Timæi Fragm. 103-104, ed. Didot; Longinus, de Sublim. iv, 3).

The etymological thread of connection, between the Hermæ and Hermokratês, is strange enough: but what is of importance to remark, is the deep-seated belief that such an act must bring after it divine punishment, and that the Athenians as a people were collectively responsible, unless they could appease the divine displeasure. If this was the view taken by the historian Timæus a century and more after the transaction, much more keenly was it present to the minds of the Athenians of that day.

[248] Thucyd. viii, 97; Plato, Legg. ix, pp. 871 *b*, 881 *d*. ἡ τοῦ νόμου ἄρα, etc. Demosthen. Fals. Legat. p. 363, c. 24, p. 404, c. 60; Plutarch, Solon, c. 24.

[249] Dr. Thirlwall observes, in reference to the feeling at Athens after the mutilation of the Hermæ:—

"We indeed see so little connection between acts of daring impiety and designs against the state, that we can hardly understand how they could have been associated together as they were in the minds of the Athenians. But perhaps the difficulty may not without reason have appeared much less to the contemporaries of Alcibiadês, who were rather disposed by their views of religion to regard them as inseparable." (Hist. Gr. ch. xxv, vol. iii, p. 394.)

This remark, like so many others in Dr. Thirlwall's history, indicates a tone of liberality forming a striking contrast with Wachsmuth; and rare indeed among the learned men who have undertaken to depict the democracy of Athens. It might, however, have been stated far more strongly; for an Athenian citizen would have had quite as much difficulty in comprehending our *disjunction* of the two ideas, as we have in comprehending his *association* of the two.

[250] Thucyd. vi, 27. Καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μειζόνως ἐλάμβανον· τοῦ τε γὰρ ἐκπλοῦ οἰωνὸς ἐδόκει εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ἅμα νεωτέρων πραγμάτων καὶ δήμου καταλύσεως γεγενῆσθαι.

Cornelius Nepos, Alcibiad. c. 3. "Hoc quum appareret non sine magnimultorum consensione esse factam," etc.

[251] Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 18; Pherekratês, Fr. Inc. 84, ed. Meineke; Fragment. Comic. Græc. vol. ii, p. 358, also p. 1164; Aristoph. Frag. Inc. 120.

[252] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 18; Pseudo-Plutarch, Vit. X, Orator. p. 834, who professes to quote from Kratippus, an author nearly contemporary. The Pseudo-Plutarch, however, asserts, what cannot be true, that the Corinthians employed Leontine and Egestæan agents to destroy the Hermæ. The Leontines and Egestæans were exactly the parties who had greatest interest in getting the Sicilian expedition to start: they are the last persons whom the Corinthians would have chosen as instruments. The fact is, that no foreigners could well have done the deed: it required great familiarity with all the buildings, highways, and byways of Athens.

The Athenian Philochorus (writing about the date 310-280 B.C.) ascribed the mutilation of the Hermæ to the Corinthians; if we may believe the scholiast on Aristophanês; who, however, is not very careful, since he tells us that *Thucydidês* ascribed that act to Alkibiadês and his friends; which is not true (Philochor. Frag. 110, ed. Didot; Schol. Aristoph. Lysistr. 1094).

[253] Thucyd. vi, 34.

[254] See Thucyd. v, 45; v, 50; viii, 5. Xenophon, Hellen. iv, 7, 4.

[255] See the remarkable passage in the contemporary pleading of Antiphon on a trial for homicide (Orat. ii. Tetralog. 1. 1, 10).

Ἀσύμφορόν θ' ὑμῖν ἐστὶ τόνδε μιαρὸν καὶ ἄναγνον ὄντα εἰς τὰ τεμένη τῶν θεῶν εἰσιόντα μιαίνειν τὴν ἁγνείαν αὐτῶν ἐπί τε τὰς αὐτὰς τραπέζας ἰόντα *συγκαταπιμπλάναι τοὺς ἀναιτίους· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων αἵ τε ἀφορίαι γίγνονται δυστυχεῖς θ' αἱ πράξεις καθίστανται. Οἰκείαν* οὖν χρὴ τὴν *τιμωρίαν ἡγησαμένους*, αὐτῷ τούτῳ τὰ τούτου ἀσεβήματα ἀναθέντας, ἰδίαν μὲν τὴν συμφορὰν καθαρὰν δὲ τὴν πόλιν καταστῆσαι.

Compare Antiphon, De Cæde Herodis, sect. 83 and Sophoklês, Œdip. Tyrann. 26, 96, 170, as to the miseries which befell a country, so long as the person guilty of homicide remained to pollute the soil and until he was slain or expelled. See also Xenophon, Hiero. iv, 4, and Plato, Legg. x, p. 885-910, at the beginning and the end of the tenth book. Plato ranks (ὕβρις) outrage against sacred objects as the highest and most guilty species of ὕβρις; deserving the severest punishment. He considers that the person committing such impiety, unless he be punished or banished, brings evil and the anger of the gods upon the whole population.

[256] Thucyd. vi, 27.

[257] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sect. 20.

[258] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 14, 15, 36; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 18.

[259] Those who are disposed to imagine that the violent feelings and proceedings at Athens by the mutilation of the Hermæ were the consequence of her democratical government, may be reminded of an analogous event of modern times from which we are not yet separated by a century.

In the year 1766, at Abbeville in France, two young gentlemen of good family—the Chevalier d'Etallonde and Chevalier de la Barre—were tried, convicted, and condemned for having injured a wooden crucifix which stood on the bridge of that town: in aggravation of this offence they were charged with having sung indecent songs. The evidence to prove these points was exceedingly doubtful; nevertheless, both were condemned to have their tongues cut out by the roots, to have their right hands cut off at the church gate, then to be tied to a post in the market-place with an iron chain, and burnt by a slow fire. This sentence, after being submitted by way of appeal to the Parliament of Paris, and by them confirmed, was actually executed upon the Chevalier de la Barre—d'Etallonde having escaped—in July, 1766; with this mitigation, that he was allowed to be decapitated before he was burnt; but at the same time with this aggravation, that he was put to the torture, ordinary and extraordinary, to compel him to disclose his accomplices (Voltaire, Relation de la Mort du Chevalier de la Barre, Œuvres, vol. xlii, pp. 361-379, ed. Beuchot: also Voltaire, Le Cri du Sang Innocent, vol. xii, p. 133).

I extract from this treatise a passage showing how—as in this mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens—the occurrence of one act of sacrilege turns men's imagination, belief, and talk, to others, real or imaginary:—

"Tandis que Belleval ourdissoit sécrètement cette trame, il arriva malheureusement que le crucifix de bois, posé sur le pont d'Abbeville, étoit endommagé, et l'on soupçonna que des soldats ivres avoient commis cette insolence impie.

"Malheureusement l'evêque d'Amiens, étant aussi evêque d'Abbeville, donna à cette aventure une célébrité et une importance qu'elle ne méritoit pas. Il fit lancer des monitoires: il vint faire une procession solennelle auprès du crucifix; *et on ne parla en Abbeville que de sacrilèges pendant une année entière*. On disoit qu'il se formoit une nouvelle secte qui brisoit les crucifix, qui jettoit par terre toutes les hosties, et les perçoit à coups de couteaux. On assuroit qu'ils avoient répandu beaucoup de sang. Il y eut des femmes qui crurent en avoir été témoins. On renouvela tous les contes calomnieux répandus contre les Juifs dans tant de villes de l'Europe. Vous connoissez, Monsieur, jusqu'à quel point la populace porte la credulité et le fanatisme, toujours encouragé par les moines.

"La procédure une fois commencée, il y eut une foule de délations. Chacun disoit ce qu'il avoit vu ou cru voir —ce qu'il avoit entendu ou cru entendre."

It will be recollected that the sentence on the Chevalier de la Barre was passed, not by the people, nor by any popular judicature, but by a limited court of professional judges sitting at Abbeville, and afterwards confirmed by the Parlement de Paris, the first tribunal of professional judges in France.

[260] Andokidês (De Myster. s. 11) marks this time minutely—Ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἐκκλησία τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τοῖς εἰς Σικελίαν, Νικίᾳ καὶ Λαμάχῳ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, καὶ τριήρης ἡ στρατηγὶς ἤδη ἐξώρμει ἡ Λαμάχου· ἀναστὰς δὲ Πυθόνικος ἐν τῷ δήμῳ εἶπεν, etc.

[261] Andokid. de Myster. s. 11-13.

[262] Thucyd. vi, 29. Isokratês (Orat. xvi, De Bigis, sects. 7, 8) represents these proceedings before the departure for Sicily, in a very inaccurate manner.

[263] Thucyd. vi, 29. Οἱ δ' ἐχθροὶ, δεδιότες τό τε στράτευμα, μὴ εὔνουν ἔχῃ, ἢν ἤδη ἀγωνίζηται, ὅ τε δῆμος μὴ μαλακίζηται, θεραπεύων ὅτι δι' ἐκεῖνον οἵ τ' Ἀργεῖοι ξυνεστράτευον καὶ τῶν Μαντινέων τινες, ἀπέτρεπον καὶ ἀπέσπευδον, *ἄλλους ῥήτορας ἐνιέντες*, οἳ ἔλεγον νῦν μὲν πλεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ κατασχεῖν τὴν ἀγωγὴν, ἐλθόντα δὲ κρίνεσθαι ἐν ἡμέραις ῥηταῖς, βουλόμενοι ἐκ μείζονος διαβολῆς, ἢν ἔμελλον ῥᾷον αὐτοῦ ἀπόντος ποριεῖν, μετάπεμπτον κομισθέντα αὐτὸν ἀγωνίσασθαι.

Compare Plutarch, Alkib. c. 19.

[264] The account which Andokidês gives of the first accusation against Alkibiadês by Pythonikus, in the assembly, prior to the departure of the fleet, presents the appearance of being substantially correct, and I have followed it in the text. It is in harmony with the more brief indications of Thucydidês. But when Andokidês goes on to say, that "in consequence of this information, Polystratus was seized and put to death, while the rest of the parties denounced fled, and were condemned to death in their absence," (sect. 13,) this cannot be true. Alkibiadês most certainly did not flee, and was not condemned at *that time*. If Alkibiadês was not then tried, neither could the other persons have been tried, who were denounced as his accomplices in the same offence. My belief is that this information, having been first presented by the enemies of Alkibiadês before the sailing of the fleet, was dropped entirely for that time, both against him and against his accomplices. It was afterwards resumed, when the information of Andokidês himself had satisfied the Athenians on the question of the Hermokopids: and the impeachment presented by Thessalus son of Kimon against Alkibiadês, was founded, in part at least, upon the information presented by Andromachus.

If Polystratus was put to death at all, it could only have been on this second bringing forward of the charge, at the time when Alkibiadês was sent for and refused to come home. But we may well doubt whether he was put to death at that time or on that ground, when we see how inaccurate the statement of Andokidês is as to the consequences of the information of Andromachus. He mentions Panætius as one of those who fled in consequence of that information, and were condemned in their absence: but Panætius appears afterwards, in the very same speech, as *not* having fled at that time (sects. 13, 52, 67). Harpokration states (v. Πολύστρατος), on the authority of an oration ascribed to Lysias, that Polystratus was put to death on the charge of having been concerned in the mutilation of the Hermæ. This is quite different from the statement of Andokidês, and would lead us to suppose that Polystratus was one of those against whom Andokidês himself informed.

[265] Thucyd. vi, 43; vii, 57.

[266] Thucyd. vi, 32; Diodor. xiii, 3.

[267] Thucyd. vi, 44.

[268] Thucyd. vi, 44-46.

[269] Thucyd. vi, 32-35. Mr. Mitford observes: "It is not specified by historians, but the account of Thucydidês makes it evident, that there had been a revolution in the government of Syracuse, or at least a great change in its administration, since the oligarchical Leontines were admitted to the rights of Syracusan citizens (ch. xviii, sect. iii, vol. iv, p. 46). The democratical party now bore the sway," etc.

I cannot imagine upon what passage of Thucydidês Mr. Mitford founds this conjecture, which appears to me pure fancy. He had spoken of the government as a democracy before, he continues to speak of it as a democracy now, in the same unaltered vituperative strain.

[270] Thucyd. vi, 41. τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπιμεμελήμεθα ἤδη, etc.

[271] Thucyd. vi, 34. Ὃ δὲ μάλιστα ἐγὼ τε νομίζω ἐπίκαιρον, *ὑμεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ ξύνηθες ἥσυχον ἥκιστ' ἂν ὀξέως πείθοισθε*, ὅμως εἰρήσεται.

That "habitual quiescence" which Hermokratês here predicates of his countrymen, forms a remarkable contrast with the restless activity, and intermeddling carried even to excess, which Periklês and Nikias deprecate in the Athenians (Thucyd. i, 144; vi, 7). Both of the governments, however, were democratical. This serves as a lesson of caution respecting general predications about *all* democracies; for it is certain that one democracy differed in many respects from another. It may be doubted, however, whether the attribute here ascribed by Hermokratês to his countrymen was really deserved, to the extent which his language implies.

[272] Thucyd. vi, 33-36.

[273] Thucyd. vi, 32-35. τῶν δὲ Συρακοσίων ὁ δῆμος ἐν πολλῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔριδι ἦσαν, etc.

[274] Thucyd. vi, 35. παρελθὼν δ' αὐτοῖς Ἀθηναγόρας, ὃς δήμου τε προστάτης ἦν καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πιθανώτατος τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἔλεγε τοιάδε, etc.

The position ascribed here to Athenagoras seems to be the same as that which is assigned to Kleon at Athens—ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὢν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος, etc. (iv, 21).

Neither δήμου προστάτης nor δημαγωγὸς, denotes any express functions, or titular office (see the note of Dr. Arnold), at least in these places. It is possible that there may have been some Grecian town constitutions, in which there was an office bearing that title: but this is a point which cannot be affirmed. Nor would the words δήμου προστάτης always imply an equal degree of power: the person so designated might have more power in one town than in another. Thus in Megara (iv, 67) it seems that the oligarchical party had recently been banished: the leaders of the popular party had become the most influential men in the city. See also iii, 70, Peithias at Korkyra.

[275] Thucyd. vi, 36-40. I give the substance of what is ascribed to Athenagoras by Thucydidês, without binding myself to the words.

[276] Thucyd. vi, 36. τοὺς δ' ἀγγέλλοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ περιφόβους ὑμᾶς ποιοῦντας τῆς μὲν τόλμης οὐ θαυμάζω, τῆς δὲ ἀξυνεσίας, εἰ μὴ οἴονται ἔνδηλοι εἶναι.

[277] Thucyd. vi, 38. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι γιγνώσκοντες, τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν, εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, σῴζουσι, καὶ ἐνθένδε ἄνδρες οὔτε ὄντα, οὔτε ἂν γενόμενα, λογοποιοῦσιν. Οὓς ἐγὼ οὐ νῦν πρῶτον, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἐπίσταμαι, ἤτοι λόγοις γε τοιοῖσδε, καὶ ἔτι τούτων κακουργοτέροις, ἢ ἔργοις, βουλομένους καταπλήξαντας τὸ ὑμέτερον πλῆθος αὐτοὺς τῆς πόλεως ἄρχειν. Καὶ δέδοικα μέντοι μήποτε πολλὰ πειρῶντες καὶ κατορθώσωσιν, etc.

[278] Thucyd. vi, 39. φήσει τις δημοκρατίαν οὔτε ξυνετὸν οὔτ' ἴσον εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἔχοντας τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄρχειν ἄριστα βελτίστους. Ἐγὼ δὲ φημι πρῶτα μὲν, δῆμον ξύμπαν ὠνομάσθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ μέρος· ἔπειτα, *φύλακας μὲν ἀρίστους εἶναι χρημάτων τοὺς πλουσίους*, βουλεῦσαι δ' ἂν βέλτιστα τοὺς ξυνετοὺς, κρῖναι δ' ἂν ἀκούσαντας ἄριστα τοὺς πολλούς· καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως καὶ κατὰ μέρη καὶ ξύμπαντα ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ ἰσομοιρεῖν.

Dr. Arnold translates φύλακας χρημάτων, "having the care of the public purse," as if it were φύλακας τῶν δημοσίων χρημάτων. But it seems to me that the words carry a larger sense, and refer to the private property of these rich men, not to their functions as keepers of what was collected from taxation or tribute. Looking at a rich man from the point of view of the public, he is guardian of his own property until the necessities of the state require that he should spend more or less of it for the public defence or benefit: in the interim, he enjoys it as he pleases, but he will for his own interest take care that the property does not perish (compare vi, 9). This is

the service which he renders, *quatenus*, *rich man*, to the state; he may also serve it in other ways, but that would be by means of his personal qualities; thus he may, for example, be intelligent as well as rich (ξυνετὸς as well as πλούσιος), and then he may serve the state as *counsellor*, the second of the two categories named by Athenagoras. What that orator is here negativing is, the better title and superior fitness of the rich to exercise command, which was the claim put forward in their behalf. And he goes on to indicate what is their real position and service in a democracy; that they are to enjoy the revenue, and preserve the capital, of their wealth, subject to demands for public purposes when necessary, but not to expect command, unless they are personally competent. Properly speaking, that which he here affirms is true of the small lots of property taken in the mass, as well as of the large, and is one of the grounds of defence of private property against communism. But the rich man's property is an appreciable item to the state, individually taken; moreover, he is perpetually raising unjust pretensions to political power, so that it becomes necessary to define how much he is really entitled to.

[279] Thucyd. vi, 39. Ὀλιγαρχία δὲ τῶν μὲν κινδύνων τοῖς πολλοῖς μεταδίδωσι, τῶν δ' ὠφελίμων οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ξύμπαν ἀφελομένη ἔχει· *ἃ ὑμῶν οἵ τε δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ νέοι προθυμοῦνται*, ἀδύνατα ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει κατασχεῖν.

[280] See above, in this volume, chap. lvi.

[281] Thucyd. vi, 45.

[282] Thucyd. vi, 47; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 14.

[283] Thucyd. vi, 48. Οὕτως ἤδη Συρακούσαις καὶ Σελινοῦντι ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢν μὴ οἱ μὲν Ἐγεσταίοις ξυμβαίνωσιν, οἱ δὲ Λεοντίνους ἐῶσι κατοικίζειν.

[284] Compare iv, 104, describing the surprise of Amphipolis by Brasidas.

[285] Thucyd. vi, 49.

[286] Thucyd. vi, 50.

[287] Polyænus (i, 40, 4) treats this acquisition of Katana as the result, not of accident, but of a preconcerted plot. I follow the account as given by Thucydidês.

[288] Thucyd. vi, 52.

[289] Thucyd. vi. 53-61.

[290] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 14, 15, 35. In reference to the deposition of Agaristê, Andokidês again includes Alkibiadês among those who fled into banishment in consequence of it. Unless we are to suppose another Alkibiadês, not the general in Sicily, this statement cannot be true. There was another Alkibiadês, of the deme Phegus: but Andokidês in mentioning him afterwards (sect. 65), specifies his deme. He was cousin of Alkibiadês, and was in exile at the same time with him (Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 13).

[291] Andokidês (sects. 13-34) affirms that some of the persons, accused by Teukrus as mutilators of the Hermæ, were put to death upon his deposition. But I contest his accuracy on this point. For Thucydidês recognizes no one as having been put to death except those against whom Andokidês himself informed (see vi, 27, 53, 61). He dwells particularly upon the number of persons, and persons of excellent character, imprisoned on suspicion; but he mentions none as having been put to death except those against whom Andokidês gave testimony. He describes it as a great harshness, and as an extraordinary proof of the reigning excitement, that the Athenians should have detained so many persons upon suspicion, on the evidence of informers not entitled to credence. But he would not have specified this detention as extraordinary harshness, if the Athenians had gone so far as to put individuals to death upon the same evidence. Besides, to put these men to death would have defeated their own object, the full and entire disclosure of the plot and the conspirators. The ignorance in which they were of their internal enemies, was among the most agonizing of all their sentiments; and to put any prisoner to death until they arrived, or believed themselves to have arrived, at the knowledge of the whole, would tend so far to bar their own chance of obtaining evidence: ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἄσμενος λαβὼν, ὡς ᾤετο, τὸ σαφὲς, καὶ δεινὸν ποιούμενοι πρότερον εἰ τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας σφῶν τῷ πλήθει μὴ εἴσονται, etc.

Wachsmuth says (p. 194): "The bloodthirsty dispositions of the people had been excited by the previous murders: the greater the number of victims to be slaughtered, the better were the people pleased," etc. This is an inaccuracy quite in harmony with the general spirit of his narrative. It is contradicted, implicitly, by the very words of Thucydidês which he transcribes in his note 108.

[292] Andokid. de Mysteriis, sects. 27-28. καὶ Ἀνδροκλῆς *ὑπὲρ* τῆς βουλῆς.

[293] Andokid. de Myster. sect. 36. It seems that Diognêtus, who had been commissioner of inquiry at the time when Pythonikus presented the first information of the slave Andromachus, was himself among the parties denounced by Teukrus (And. de Mys. sects. 14, 15).

[294] Thucyd. vi, 53-60. οὐ δοκιμάζοντες τοὺς μηνυτὰς, ἀλλὰ πάντας ὑπόπτως ἀποδεχόμενοι, διὰ πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων πίστιν πάνυ χρηστοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν ξυλλαμβάνοντες κατέδουν, χρησιμώτερον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι βασανίσαι τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ εὑρεῖν, ἢ διὰ μηνυτοῦ πονηρίαν τινὰ καὶ χρηστὸν δοκοῦντα εἶναι αἰτιαθέντα ἀνέλεγκτον διαφυγεῖν….

… δεινὸν ποιούμενοι, εἰ τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας σφῶν τῷ πλήθει μὴ εἴσονται….

[295] Andokid. de Myst. sect. 36.

[296] Plutarch (Alkib. c. 20) and Diodorus (xiii, 2) assert that this testimony was glaringly false, since on the night in question it was *new moon*. I presume, at least, that the remark of Diodorus refers to the deposition of Diokleidês, though he never mentions the name of the latter, and even describes the deposition referred to with many material variations as compared with Andokidês. Plutarch's observation certainly refers to Diokleidês, whose deposition, he says, affirming that he had seen and distinguished the persons in question by the light of the moon, on a night when it was *new* moon, shocked all sensible men, but produced no effect upon the blind fury of the people. Wachsmuth (Hellenisch. Alterth. vol. ii, ch. viii, p. 194) copies this remark from Plutarch.

I disbelieve altogether the assertion that it was *new moon* on that night. Andokidês gives in great detail the deposition of Diokleidês, with a strong wish to show that it was false and perfidiously got up. But he nowhere mentions the fact that it was *new moon* on the night in question; though if we read his report and his comments upon the deposition of Diokleidês, we shall see that he never could have omitted such a means of discrediting the whole tale, if the fact had been so (Andokid. de Myster. sects. 37-43). Besides, it requires very good positive evidence to make us believe, that a suborned informer, giving his deposition not long after one of the most memorable nights that ever passed at Athens, would be so clumsy as to make particular reference to the circumstance that it was *full moon* (εἶναι δὲ πανσέληνον), if it had really been *new moon*.

[297] Andokid. de Myster. sects. 37-42.

[298] Considering the extreme alarm which then pervaded the Athenian mind, and their conviction that there were traitors among themselves whom yet they could not identify, it is to be noted as remarkable that they resisted the proposition of their commissioners for applying torture. We must recollect that the Athenians admitted the principle of the torture, as a good mode of eliciting truth as well as of testing depositions,—for they applied it often to the testimony of slaves,—sometimes apparently to that of metics. Their attachment to the established law, which forbade the application of it to citizens, must have been very great, to enable them to resist the great special and immediate temptation to apply it in this case to Mantitheus and Aphepsion, if only by way of exception.

The application of torture to witnesses and suspected persons, handed down from the Roman law, was in like manner recognized, and pervaded nearly all the criminal jurisprudence of Europe until the last century. I hope that the reader, after having gone through the painful narrative of the proceedings of the Athenians after the mutilation of the Hermæ, will take the trouble to peruse by way of comparison the *Storia della Colonna Infame*, by the eminent Alexander Manzoni, author of "I Promessi Sposi." This little volume, including a republication of Verri's "Osservazioni sulla Tortura," is full both of interest and instruction. It lays open the judicial enormities committed at Milan in 1630, while the terrible pestilence was raging there, by the examining judges and the senate, in order to get evidence against certain suspected persons called *Untori*; that is, men who were firmly believed by the whole population, with very few exceptions, to be causing and propagating the pestilence by means of certain ointment which they applied to the doors and walls of houses. Manzoni recounts with simple, eloquent, and impressive detail, the incredible barbarity with which the official lawyers at Milan, under the authority of the senate, extorted, by force of torture, evidence against several persons, of having committed this imaginary and impossible crime. The persons thus convicted were executed under horrible torments: the house of one of them, a barber named Mora, was pulled down, and a pillar with an inscription erected upon the site, to commemorate the deed. This pillar, the *Colonna Infame*, remained standing in Milan until the close of the 18th century. The reader will understand, from Manzoni's narrative, the degree to which public excitement and alarm can operate to poison and barbarize the course of justice in a Christian city, without a taint of democracy, and

with professional lawyers and judges to guide the whole procedure secretly, as compared with a pagan city, ultra-democratical, where judicial procedure as well as decision was all oral, public, and multitudinous.

[299] Andokid. de Myst. sects. 41-46.

[300] Andokid. de Myst. sect. 48: compare Lysias, Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. sect. 42.

[301] Plutarch (Alkib. c. 21) states that the person who thus addressed himself to, and persuaded Andokidês, was named Timæus. From whom he got the latter name, we do not know.

[302] The narrative, which I have here given in substance, is to be found in Andokid. de Myst. sects. 48-66.

[303] Thucyd. vi, 60. Καὶ ὁ μὲν *αὐτός τε καθ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατ' ἄλλων* μηνύει τὸ τῶν Ἑρμῶν, etc.

To the same effect, see the hostile oration of Lysias contra Andocidem, Or. vi, sects. 36, 37, 51: also Andokidês himself, De Mysteriis, sect. 71; De Reditu, sect. 7.

If we may believe the Pseudo-Plutarch (Vit. x, Orator, p. 834), Andokidês had on a previous occasion been guilty of drunken irregularity and damaging a statue.

[304] Thucyd. vi, 60. ἐνταῦθα ἀναπείθεται *εἷς τῶν δεδεμένων, ὅσπερ ἐδόκει αἰτιώτατος εἶναι*, ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνδεσμωτῶν τινὸς, εἴτε ἄρα καὶ τὰ ὄντα μηνῦσαι, εἴτε καὶ οὔ· ἐπ' ἀμφότερα γὰρ εἰκάζεται· τὸ δὲ σαφὲς οὐδεὶς οὔτε τότε οὔτε ὕστερον ἔχει εἰπεῖν περὶ τῶν δρασάντων τὸ ἔργον.

If the statement of Andokidês in the Oratio de Mysteriis is correct, the deposition previously given by Teukrus the metic must have been a true one; though this man is commonly denounced among the lying witnesses (see the words of the comic writer Phrynichus ap. Plutarch, Alkib. c. 20).

Thucydidês refuses even to mention the name of Andokidês, and expresses himself with more than usual reserve about this dark transaction, as if he were afraid of giving offence to great Athenian families. The bitter feuds which it left behind at Athens, for years afterwards, are shown in the two orations of Lysias and of Andokidês. If the story of Didymus be true, that Thucydidês after his return from exile to Athens died by a violent death (see Biogr. Thucyd. p. xvii. ed. Arnold), it would seem probable that all his reserve did not protect him against private enmities arising out of his historical assertions.

[305] Thucyd. vi, 60. Ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἄσμενος λαβὼν, ὡς ᾤετο, τὸ σαφὲς, etc.: compare Andokid. de Mysteriis, sects. 67, 68.

[306] Andokid. de Myster. sect 66; Thucyd. vi, 60; Philochorus, Fragment. 111, ed. Didot.

[307] Thucyd. vi, 60. ἡ μέντοι ἄλλη πόλις περιφανῶς ὠφέλητο: compare Andokid. de Reditu, sect. 8.

[308] See Andokid. de Mysteriis, sect. 17. There are several circumstances not easily intelligible respecting this γραφὴ παρανόμων, which Andokidês alleges that his father Leogoras brought against the senator Speusippus, before a dikastery of six thousand persons (a number very difficult to believe), out of whom he says that Speusippus only obtained two hundred votes; but if this trial ever took place at all, we cannot believe that it could have taken place until after the public mind was tranquillized by the disclosures of Andokidês, especially as Leogoras was actually in prison along with Andokidês immediately before those disclosures were given in.

[309] See for evidence of these general positions respecting the circumstances of Andokidês, the three Orations: Andokidês de Mysteriis, Andokidês de Reditu Suo, and Lysias contra Andokidem.

[310] Homer, Hymn. Cerer. 475. Compare the Epigram cited in Lobeck, Eleusinia, p. 47.

[311] Lysias cont. Andokid. init. et fin.; Andokid. de Myster. sect. 29. Compare the fragment of a lost Oration by Lysias against Kinêsias (Fragm. xxxi, p. 490, Bekker; Athenæus, xii, p. 551), where Kinêsias and his friends are accused of numerous impieties, one of which consisted in celebrating festivals on unlucky and forbidden days, "in derision of our gods and our laws,"—ὡς καταλεγῶντες τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων τῶν ἡμετέρων. The lamentable consequences which the displeasure of the gods had brought upon them are then set forth: the companions of Kinêsias had all miserably perished, while Kinêsias himself was living in wretched health and in a condition worse than death: τὸ δ' οὕτως ἔχοντα τοσοῦτον χρόνον διατελεῖν, καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἀποθνήσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι τελευτῆσαι τὸν βίον, τούτοις μόνοις προσήκει τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἅπερ οὗτος ἐξερματεκόσι.

The comic poets Strattis and Plato also marked out Kinêsias among their favorite subjects of derision and libel, and seem particularly to have represented his lean person and constant ill health as a punishment of the gods for his impiety. See Meineke, Fragm. Comic. Græc. (Strattis), vol. ii, p. 768 (Plato), p. 679.

[312] Lysias cont. Andokid. sects. 50, 51; Cornel. Nepos, Alcib. c. 4. The expressions of Pindar (Fragm. 96) and of Sophoklês (Fragm. 58, Brunck.—Œdip. Kolon. 1058) respecting the value of the Eleusinian mysteries, are very striking: also Cicero, Legg. ii, 14.

Horace will not allow himself to be under the same roof, or in the same boat, with any one who has been guilty of divulging these mysteries (Od. iii. 2, 26), much more then of deriding them.

The reader will find the fullest information about these ceremonies in the *Eleusinia*, forming the first treatise in the work of Lobeck called Aglaophamus; and in the Dissertation called *Eleusinia*, in K. O. Müller's Kleine Schriften. vol ii, p. 242, *seqq.*

[313] Diodor. xiii. 6

[314] We shall find these sacred families hereafter to be the most obstinate in opposing the return of Alkibiadês from banishment (Thucyd. viii, 53).

[315] Thucyd. vi, 53-61.

[316] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22. Θέσσαλος Κίμωνος Λακιάδης, Ἀλκιβιάδην Κλεινίου Σκαμβωνίδην εἰσήγγειλεν ἀδικεῖν περὶ τὼ θεὼ, τὴν Δήμητρα καὶ τὴν Κόρην, ἀπομιμούμενον τὰ μυστήρια, καὶ δεικνύοντα τοῖς αὑτοῦ ἑταίροις ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, ἔχοντα στολὴν οἵανπερ ἱεροφάντης ἔχων δεικνύει τὰ ἱερὰ, καὶ ὀνομάζοντα αὐτὸν μὲν ἱεροφάντην, Πολυτίωνα δὲ δᾳδοῦχον, κήρυκα δὲ Θεόδωρον Φηγεέα· τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἑταίρους, μύστας προσαγορεύοντα καὶ ἐπόπτας, παρὰ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ καθεστηκότα ὑπὸ τ' Εὐμολπιδῶν καὶ κηρύκων καὶ τῶν ἱερέων τῶν ἐξ Ἐλευσῖνος.

[317] Thucyd. vi, 61.

[318] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 13.

[319] Thucyd. vi. 61; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22-33; Lysias, Orat. vi, cont. Andokid. sect. 42.

Plutarch says that it would have been easy for Alkibiadês to raise a mutiny in the army at Katana, had he chosen to resist the order for coming home. But this is highly improbable. Considering what his conduct became immediately afterwards, we shall see good reason to believe that he *would* have taken this step, had it been practicable.

[320] To appreciate fairly the violent emotion raised at Athens by the mutilation of the Hermæ and by the profanation of the mysteries, it is necessary to consider the way in which analogous acts of sacrilege have been viewed in Christian and Catholic penal legislation, even down to the time of the first French Revolution.

I transcribe the following extract from a work of authority on French criminal jurisprudence—*Jousse*, Traité de la Justice Criminelle, Paris, 1771, part iv, tit. 27, vol. iii, p. 672:—

"Du Crime de Leze-Majesté Divine.—Les Crimes de Leze Majesté Divine, sont ceux qui attaquent Dieu immédiatement, et qu'on doit regarder par cette raison comme les plus atroces et les plus exécrables.—La Majesté de Dieu peut être offensée de plusieurs manières.—1. En niant l'existence de Dieu. 2. Par le crime de ceux qui attentent directement contre la Divinité: comme quand on profane ou qu'on foule aux pieds les saintes Hosties; ou qu'on *frappe les Images de Dieu* dans le dessein de l'insulter. C'est ce qu'on appelle *Crime de Leze-Majesté Divine au prémier Chef*."

Again in the same work, part iv, tit. 46, n. 5, 8, 10, 11, vol. iv, pp. 97-99:—

"*La profanation des Sacremens et des Mystères de la Réligion est un sacrilège des plus exécrables.* Tel est le crime de ceux qui emploient les choses sacrées à des usages communs et mauvais, *en dérision des Mystères*; ceux qui *profanent la sainte Eucharistie*, ou qui en abusent en quelque manière que ce soit; ceux qui en mépris de la Réligion, profanent les Fonts-Baptismaux; qui jettent par terre les saintes Hosties, ou qui les emploient à des usages vils et profanes: *ceux qui, en dérision de nos sacrés Mystères, les contrefont dans leurs débauches; ceux qui frappent, mutilent, abattent, les Images consacrées à Dieu, ou à la Sainte Vierge, ou aux Saints*, en mépris de la Réligion; et enfin, tous ceux qui commettent de semblables impiétés. Tous ces crimes *sont des*

crimes de Leze-Majesté divine au prémier chef, parce qu'ils s'attaquent immédiatement à Dieu, et ne se font à aucun dessein que de l'offenser."

"… La peine du Sacrilège, par l'Ancien Testament, étoit celle du feu, et d'être lapidé.—Par les Loix Romaines, les coupables étoient condamnés au fer, au feu, et aux bêtes farouches, suivant les circonstances.—En France, la peine du sacrilège est arbitraire, et dépend de la qualité et des circonstances du crime, du lieu, du temps, et de la qualité de l'accusé.—Dans *le sacrilège au prémier chef, qui attaque la Divinité, la Sainte Vierge, et les Saints*, v. g. à l'égard de ceux qui foulent aux pieds les saintes Hosties, ou qui les jettent à terre, ou en abusent, et qui les emploient à des usages vils et profanes, la peine est le feu, l'amende honorable, et le poing coupé. Il en est de même de ceux qui profanent les Fonts-Baptismaux; *ceux qui, en dérision de nos Mystères, s'en moquent et les contrefont dans leurs débauches*: ils doivent être punis de peine capitale, parce que ces crimes attaquent immédiatement la Divinité."

M. Jousse proceeds to cite several examples of persons condemned to death for acts of sacrilege, of the nature above described.

[321] The proceedings in England in 1678 and 1679, in consequence of the pretended Popish Plot, have been alluded to by various authors, and recently by Dr. Thirlwall, as affording an analogy to that which occurred at Athens after the mutilation of the Hermæ. But there are many material differences, and all, so far as I can perceive, to the advantage of Athens.

1. The "hellish and damnable plot of the Popish Recusants," (to adopt the words of the Houses of Lords and Commons,—see Dr. Lingard's History of England, vol. xiii, ch. v, p. 88,—words, the like of which were doubtless employed at Athens in reference to the Hermokopids,) was baseless, mendacious, and incredible, from the beginning. It started from no real fact: the whole of it was a tissue of falsehoods and fabrications proceeding from Oates, Bedloe, and a few other informers of the worst character.

At Athens, there was unquestionably a plot; the Hermokopids were real conspirators, not few in number. No one could doubt that they conspired for other objects besides the mutilation of the Hermæ. At the same time, no one knew what these objects were, nor who the conspirators themselves were.

If before the mutilation of the Hermæ, a man like Oates had pretended to reveal to the Athenian people a fabricated plot implicating Alkibiadês and others, he would have found no credence. It was not until after and by reason of that terror-striking incident, that the Athenians began to give credence to informers. And we are to recollect that they did not put any one to death on the evidence of these informers. They contented themselves with imprisoning on suspicion, until they got the confession and deposition of Andokidês. Those implicated in *that* deposition were condemned to death. Now Andokidês, as a witness, deserves but very qualified confidence; yet it is impossible to degrade him to the same level even as Teukrus or Diokleidês, much less to that of Oates and Bedloe. We cannot wonder that the people trusted him, and, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, it was the least evil that they should trust him. The witnesses upon whose testimony the prisoners under the Popish Plot were condemned, were even inferior to Teukrus and Diokleidês in presumptive credibility.

The Athenian people have been censured for their folly in believing the democratical constitution in danger, because the Hermæ had been mutilated. I have endeavored to show, that, looking to their religious ideas, the thread of connection between these two ideas is perfectly explicable. And why are we to quarrel with the Athenians because they took arms, and put themselves on their guard, when a Lacedæmonian or a Bœotian armed force was actually on their frontier?

As for the condemnation of Alkibiadês and others for profaning and divulging the Eleusinian mysteries, these are not for a moment to be put upon a level with the condemnations in the Popish Plot. These were true charges, at least there is strong presumptive reason for believing that they were true. Persons were convicted and punished for having done acts which they really had done, and which they knew to be legal crimes. Whether it be right to constitute such acts legal crimes, or not, is another question. The enormity of the Popish Plot consisted in punishing persons for acts which they had not done, and upon depositions of the most lying and worthless witnesses.

The state of mind into which the Athenians were driven after the cutting of the Hermæ, was indeed very analogous to that of the English people during the circulation of the Popish Plot. The suffering, terror, and distraction, I apprehend to have been even greater at Athens: but the cause of it was graver and more real, and the active injustice which it produced was far less than in England.

"I shall not detain the reader (says Dr. Lingard, Hist. Engl. xiii, p. 105) with a narrative of the partial trials and judicial murders of the unfortunate men, whose names had been inserted by Oates in his pretended discoveries. So violent was the excitement, so general the delusion created by the perjuries of the informer, that the voice of reason and the claims of justice were equally disregarded. Both judge and jury seemed to have no other object than to inflict vengeance on the supposed traitors. To speak in support of their witnesses, or to hint the improbability of the informations, required a strength of mind, a recklessness of consequences, which falls to the lot of few individuals: even the king himself, convinced as he was of the imposture, and contemptuously as he spoke of it in private, dared not exercise his prerogative of mercy to save the lives of the innocent."

It is to be noted that the House of Lords, both acting as a legislative body, and in their judicial character when the Catholic Lord Stafford was tried before them (ch. vi, pp. 231-241), displayed a degree of prejudice and injustice quite equal to that of the judges and juries in the law-courts.

Both the English judicature on this occasion, and the Milanese judicature on the occasion adverted to in a previous note, were more corrupted and driven to greater injustice by the reigning prejudice, than the purely popular dikastery of Athens in this affair of the Hermæ, and of the other profanations.

[322] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22.

[323] Thucyd. ii, 65. τά τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν, etc.

[324] The statements respecting the age and life of Laïs appear involved in inextricable confusion. See the note of Göller ad Philisti, Fragment. v.

[325] Diodor. viii, 6; Thucyd. vi, 62. Καὶ τἀνδράποδα *ἀπέδοσαν*, καὶ ἐγένοντο ἐξ αὐτῶν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν τάλαντα. The word ἀπέδοσαν seems to mean that the prisoners were handed over to their fellow-countrymen, the natural persons to negotiate for their release, upon private contract of a definite sum. Had Thucydidês said ἀπέδοντο, it would have meant that they were put up to auction for what they would fetch. This distinction is at least possible, and, in my judgment, more admissible than that proposed in the note of Dr. Arnold.

If, however, we refer to Thucyd. vi, 88, with Duker's note, we shall see that μεταπέμπειν is sometimes, though rarely, used in the sense of μεταπέμπεσθαι. The case may perhaps be the same with ἀπέδοσαν for ἀπέδοντο.

[326] Thucyd. vi, 63; vii, 42.

[327] Thucyd. vi, 63; Diodor. xiii, 6.

[328] Thucyd. vi, 65, 66; Diodor. xiii, 6; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 13.

[329] Thucyd. vi, 67-69.

[330] Thucyd. vi, 68, 69. ἄλλως δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας πανδημεί τε ἀμυνομένους, καὶ οὐκ ἀπολέκτους ὥσπερ ἡμᾶς· καὶ προσέτι Σικελιώτας, οἳ *ὑπερφρονοῦσι μὲν ἡμᾶς*, ὑπομένουσι δὲ οὔ· διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τῆς τόλμης ἥσσω ἔχειν.

This passage illustrates very clearly the meaning of the adverb πανδημεί. Compare πανδαμεὶ, πανομιλεὶ, Æschylus, Sept. Theb. 275.

[331] Thucyd. vi, 70. Τοῖς δ' ἐμπειροτέροις, τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα, καὶ ὥρᾳ ἔτους περαίνεσθαι δοκεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθεστῶτας, πολὺ μείζω ἔκπληξιν μὴ νικωμένους παρέχειν.

The Athenians, unfortunately for themselves, were not equally unmoved by eclipses of the moon. The force of this remark will be seen in the next chapter but one.

[332] Thucyd. vi, 70.

[333] Thucyd. vi, 71. Plutarch (Nikias, c. 16) states that Nikias refused from religious scruples to invade the sacred precinct, though his soldiers were eager to seize its contents.

Diodorus (xiii, 6) affirms erroneously that the Athenians became masters of the Olympieion. Pausanias too says the same thing (x, 28, 3), adding that Nikias abstained from disturbing either the treasures or the offerings, and left them still under the care of the Syracusan priests.

Plutarch farther states that Nikias stayed some days in his position before he returned to Katana. But the language of Thucydidês indicates that the Athenians returned on the day after the battle.

[334] Thucyd. vi, 71-74.

[335] Thucyd. vi, 21-26.

[336] Thucyd. vi, 20.

[337] Thucyd. i, 69. ἡσυχάζετε γὰρ μόνοι Ἑλλήνων, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ τῇ δυνάμει τινὰ ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι, καὶ μόνοι *οὐκ ἀρχομένην τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, ἀλλὰ διπλασιουμένην, καταλύοντες*.

[338] Αἰσχρὸν δὲ βιασθέντας ἀπελθεῖν, ἢ *ὕστερον ἐπιμεταπέμπεσθαι*, τὸ πρῶτον ἀσκέπτως βουλευσαμένους: "It is disgraceful to be driven out of Sicily by superior force, or to *send back here afterwards for fresh reinforcements, through our own fault in making bad calculations at first*." (Thucyd. vi, 21.)

This was a part of the last speech by Nikias himself at Athens, prior to the expedition. The Athenian people in reply had passed a vote that he and his colleagues should fix their own amount of force, and should have everything which they asked for. Moreover, such was the feeling in the city, that every one individually was anxious to put down his name to serve (vi, 26-31). Thucydidês can hardly find words sufficient to depict the completeness, the grandeur, the wealth public and private, of the armament.

As this goes to establish what I have advanced in the text,—that the actions of Nikias in Sicily stand most of all condemned by his own previous speeches at Athens,—so it seems to have been forgotten by Dr. Arnold, when he wrote his note on the remarkable passage, ii, 65, of Thucydidês,—ἐξ ὧν ἄλλα τε πολλὰ, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει, καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη, καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς· ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνώμης ἁμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὓς ἐπῄεσαν, ὅσον *οἱ ἐκπέμψαντες, οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες*, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας, τά τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν πρῶτον ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐταράχθησαν. Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks:—

"Thucydidês here expresses the same opinion which he repeats in two other places (vi, 31; vii, 42). namely, that the Athenian power was fully adequate to the conquest of Syracuse, *had not the expedition been mismanaged by the general, and insufficiently supplied by the government at home*. The words οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες signify "*not voting afterwards the needful supplies to their absent armament*:" for Nikias was prevented from improving his first victory over the Syracusans by the want of cavalry and money; and the whole winter was lost before he could get supplied from Athens. And subsequently the armament was allowed to be reduced to great distress and weakness, before the second expedition was sent to reinforce it." Göller and Poppo concur in this explanation.

Let us in the first place discuss the explanation here given of the words τὰ πρόσφορα ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες. It appears to me that these words do *not* signify "*voting the needful supplies*."

The word ἐπιγιγνώσκειν cannot be used in the same sense with ἐπιπέμπειν—παρασχεῖν (vii, 2-15), ἐκπορίζειν. As it would not be admissible to say ἐπιγιγνώσκειν ὅπλα, νῆας, ἵππους, χρήματα, etc., so neither can it be right to say ἐπιγιγνώσκειν τὰ πρόσφορα, if this latter word were used only as a comprehensive word for these particulars, meaning "*supplies*." The words really mean: "*taking farther resolutions* (after the expedition was gone) *unsuitable or mischievous to the absent armament*." Πρόσφορα is used here quite generally, agreeing with βουλεύματα, or some such word: indeed, we find the phrase τὰ πρόσφορα used in the most general sense, for "what is suitable;" "what is advantageous or convenient:" γυμνάσω τὰ πρόσφορα—πράσσεται τὰ πρόσφορα—τὰ πρόσφορ' ηὗξατ'—τὰ πρόσφορα δρῳης ἂν—τὸ ταῖσδε πρόσφορον. Euripid. Hippol. 112; Alkestis, 148; Iphig. Aul. 160, B; Helen. 1299; Troades, 304.

Thucydidês appears to have in view the violent party contests which broke out in reference to the Hermæ and the other irreligious acts at Athens, after the departure of the armament, especially to the mischief of recalling Alkibiadês, which grew out of those contests. He does not allude to the withholding of supplies from the armament; nor was it the purpose of any of the parties at Athens to withhold them. The party acrimony was directed against Alkibiadês exclusively, not against the expedition.

Next, as to the main allegation in Dr. Arnold's note, that *one of the causes* of the failure of the Athenian expedition in Sicily, was, that it was "insufficiently supplied by Athens." Of the two passages to which he refers in Thucydidês (vi, 31; vii, 42), the first distinctly contradicts this allegation, by setting forth the prodigious amount of force sent; the second says nothing about it, and indirectly discountenances it, by dwelling upon the glaring blunders of Nikias.

After the Athenians had allowed Nikias in the spring to name and collect the force which he thought requisite, how could they expect to receive a demand for farther reinforcements in the autumn, the army having really done nothing? Nevertheless, the supplies *were sent*, as soon as they could be, and as soon as Nikias expected them. If the whole winter was lost, that was not the fault of the Athenians.

Still harder is it in Dr. Arnold, to say, "that the armament *was allowed* to be reduced to great distress and weakness before the second expedition was sent to reinforce it." The second expedition was sent the moment that Nikias made known his distress and asked for it; his intimation of distress coming quite suddenly, almost immediately after most successful appearances.

It appears to me that nothing can be more incorrect or inconsistent with the whole tenor of the narrative of Thucydidês, than to charge the Athenians with having starved their expedition. What they are really chargeable with, is, the having devoted to it a disproportionate fraction of their entire strength, perfectly enormous and ruinous. And so Thucydidês plainly conceives it, when he is describing both the armament of Nikias and that of Demosthenês.

Thucydidês is very reserved in saying anything against Nikias, whom he treats throughout with the greatest indulgence and tenderness. But he lets drop quite sufficient to prove that he conceived the mismanagement of the general as *the cause* of the failure of the armament, not as "one of two causes," as Dr. Arnold here presents it. Of course, I recognize fully the consummate skill, and the aggressive vigor so unusual in a Spartan, of Gylippus, together with the effective influence which this exercised upon the result. But Gylippus would never have set foot in Syracuse, had he not been let in, first through the apathy, next through the contemptuous want of precaution, shown by Nikias (vii, 42).

[339] Thucyd. v, 7. See volume vi of this History, chap. liv, p. 464.

[340] Thucyd. vi, 72, 73.

[341] Thucyd. vi, 75. Ἐτείχιζον δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι πρός τε τῇ πόλει, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς ποιησάμενοι, *τεῖχος παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς* ὁρῶν, *ὅπως μὴ δι᾽ ἐλάσσονος εὐαποτείχιστοι ὦσιν*, ἢν ἄρα σφάλλωνται, etc.

I reserve the general explanation of the topography of Syracuse for the next chapter, when the siege begins.

[342] Thucyd. vi, 75.

[343] Thucyd. vi, 77-80.

[344] Thucyd. vi, 83-87.

[345] Thucyd. vi, 86. ἡμεῖς μέν γε οὔτε ἐμμεῖναι δυνατοὶ μὴ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν· εἴ τε καὶ γενόμενοι κακοὶ κατεργασαίμεθα, ἀδύνατοι κατασχεῖν, διὰ μῆκός τε πλοῦ καὶ ἀπορίᾳ φυλακῆς πόλεων μεγάλων καὶ παρασκευῇ ἠπειρωτίδων, etc.

This is exactly the language of Nikias in his speech to the Athenians. vi, 11.

[346] Thucyd. vi, 88.

[347] Compare the remarks of Alkibiadês, Thucyd. vi, 91.

[348] Thucyd. vi, 88.

[349] Thucyd. vi, 88; vii, 42.

[350] Plutarch (Alkib. c. 23) says that he went to reside at Argos; but this seems difficult to reconcile with the assertion of Thucydidês (vi, 61) that his friends at Argos had incurred grave suspicions of treason.

Cornelius Nepos (Alkib. c. 4) says, with greater probability of truth, that Alkibiadês went from Thurii, first to Elis, next to Thebes.

Isokratês (De Bigis, Orat. xvi, s. 10) says that the Athenians banished him out of all Greece, inscribed his name on a column, and sent envoys to demand his person from the Argeians; so that Alkibiadês *was compelled* to take refuge with the Lacedæmonians. This whole statement of Isokratês is exceedingly loose and untrustworthy, carrying back the commencement of the conspiracy of the Four Hundred to a time anterior to the banishment of Alkibiadês. But among all the vague sentences, this allegation that the Athenians banished him out of *all Greece* stands prominent. They could only banish him from the territory of Athens and her allies. Whether he

went to Argos, as I have already said, seems to me very doubtful: perhaps Plutarch copied the statement from this passage of Isokratês.

But under all circumstances, we are not to believe that Alkibiadês turned against his country, or went to Sparta, *upon compulsion*. The first act of his hostility to Athens, the disappointing her of the acquisition of Messênê, was committed before he left Sicily. Moreover, Thucydidês represents him as unwilling indeed to go to Sparta, but only unwilling because he was afraid of the Spartans; in fact, waiting for a safe-conduct and invitation from them. Thucydidês mentions nothing about his going to Argos (vi, 88).

[351] Thucyd. vi, 88.

[352] Thucyd. vi, 89. Τοῖς γὰρ τυράννοις ἀεί ποτε διάφοροί ἐσμεν, πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἐναντιούμενον τῷ δυναστεύοντι δῆμος ὠνόμασται· καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνου ξυμπαρέμεινεν ἡ προστασία ἡμῖν τοῦ πλήθους.

It is to be recollected that the Lacedæmonians had been always opposed to τύραννοι, or despots, and had been particularly opposed to the Peisistratid τύραννοι, whom they in fact put down. In tracing his democratical tendencies, therefore, to this source, Alkibiadês took the best means of excusing them before a Lacedæmonian audience.

[353] Thucyd. vi, 89. ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦ ξύμπαντος προέστημεν, δικαιοῦντες ἐν ᾧ σχήματι μεγίστη ἡ πόλις ἔτυχε καὶ ἐλευθερωτάτη οὖσα, καὶ ὅπερ ἐδέξατό τις, τοῦτο ξυνδιασῴζειν· ἐπεὶ δημοκρατίαν γε καὶ ἐγιγνώσκομεν οἱ φρονοῦντές τι, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐδενὸς ἂν χεῖρον, ὅσῳ καὶ λοιδορήσαιμι· ἀλλὰ περὶ ὁμολογουμένης ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἂν καινὸν λέγοιτο· καὶ τὸ μεθιστάναι αὐτὴν οὐκ ἐδόκει ἡμῖν ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι, ὑμῶν πολεμίων προσκαθημένων.

[354] The establishment and permanent occupation of a fortified post in Attica, had been contemplated by the Corinthians even before the beginning of the war (Thucyd. i, 122).

[355] Thucyd. vi, 92. Καὶ χείρων οὐδενὶ ἀξιῶ δοκεῖν ὑμῶν εἶναι, εἰ τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ μετὰ τῶν πολεμιωτάτων, φιλόπολίς ποτε δοκῶν εἶναι, νῦν ἐγκρατῶς ἐπέρχομαι.

[356] Thucyd. vi, 92. Τό τε φιλόπολι οὐκ ἐν ᾧ ἀδικοῦμαι ἔχω, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ ἀσφαλῶς ἐπολιτεύθην. Οὐδ' ἐπὶ πατρίδα οὖσαν ἔτι ἡγοῦμαι νῦν ἰέναι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν οὐκ οὖσαν ἀνακτᾶσθαι. Καὶ φιλόπολις οὗτος ὀρθῶς, οὐχ ὃς ἂν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως ἀπολέσας μὴ ἐπίῃ, ἀλλ' ὃς ἂν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν πειραθῇ αὐτὴν ἀναλαβεῖν.

[357] Thucyd. vi, 89-92.

[358] Thucyd. vi, 28.

[359] See a remarkable passage of Thucyd. viii, 89, ῥᾷον τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἐλασσούμενός τις φέρει, and the note in explanation of it, in a later chapter of this History, chap. lxii.

[360] Thucyd. vi, 12-17.

[361] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 17.

[362] Lucan, Pharsal. iv, 819.

[363] Thucyd. vi, 93; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 23; Diodor. xiii, 7.

[364] Thucyd. vi, 104.

[365] Horses were so largely bred in Sicily, that they even found their way into Attica and Central Greece, Sophoklês, Œd. Kolon. 312:—

γυναῖχ' ὁρῶ
Στείχουσαν ἡμῖν, ἆσσον, Αἰτναίας ἐπὶ
Πῶλου βεβῶσαν.

If the Scholiast is to be trusted, the Sicilian horses were of unusually great size.

[366] Thucyd. vi, 95-98.

[367] At the neighboring city of Gela, also, a little without the walls, there stood a large brazen statue of Apollo; of so much sanctity, beauty, or notoriety, that the Carthaginians in their invasion of the island, seven years after the siege of Syracuse by Nikias, carried it away with them and transported it to Tyre (Diodor. xiii, 108).

[368] Thucyd. vi, 75. Ἐτείχιζον δὲ καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ πρός τε τῇ πόλει, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς ποιησάμενοι, *τεῖχος παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς ὁρῶν, ὅπως μὴ δι᾽ ἐλάσσονος εὐαποτείχιστοι ὦσιν*, ἢν ἄρα σφάλλωνται, etc.

[369] Thucyd. vi, 96.

[370] Thucyd. vi, 97.

[371] Thucyd. vi, 98. ἐχώρουν πρὸς τὴν Συκῆν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἵναπερ καθεζόμενοι ἐτείχισαν τὸν κύκλον διὰ τάχους.

[372] The Athenians seem to have surpassed all other Greeks in the diligence and skill with which they executed fortifications: see some examples, Thucyd. v, 75-82; Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 4, 18.

[373] Dr. Arnold, in his note on Thucyd. vi, 98, says that the Circle is spoken of, in one passage of Thucydidês, as if it had *never been completed*. I construe this one passage differently from him (vii, 2, 4)—τῷ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου πρὸς τὸν Τρώγιλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν θάλασσαν: where I think τῷ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου is equivalent to ἑτέρωθι τοῦ κύκλου, as plainly appears from the accompanying mention of Trogilus and the northern sea. I am persuaded that the Circle was finished; and Dr. Arnold himself indicates two passages in which it is distinctly spoken of as having been completed.

[374] Thucyd. vi, 99. *Ὑποτειχίζειν* δὲ ἄμεινον ἐδόκει εἶναι (τοῖς Συρακουσίοις) ἢ ἐκεῖνοι (the Athenians) ἔμελλον ἄξειν τὸ τεῖχος· καὶ εἰ φθάσειαν, ἀποκλήσεις γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἅμα καὶ ἐν τούτῳ εἰ ἐπιβοηθοῖεν, μέρος ἀντιπέμπειν αὐτοὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς, καὶ φθάνειν ἂν αὐτοὶ τοῖς σταυροῖς *προκαταλαμβάνοντες τὰς ἐφόδους* ἐκείνους δὲ ἂν παυομένους τοῦ ἔργου πάντας ἂν πρὸς σφᾶς τρέπεσθαι.

The Scholiast here explains τὰς ἐφόδους to mean τὰ βάσιμα; adding ὀλίγα δὲ τὰ ἐπιβαθῆναι δυνάμενα, διὰ τὸ τελματῶδες εἶναι τὸ χωρίον. Though he is here followed by the best commentators, I cannot think that his explanation is correct. He evidently supposes that this first counter-wall of the Syracusans was built—as we shall see presently that the second counter-work was—across the marsh, or low ground between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbor. "The ground being generally marshy (τελματῶδες) there were only a few places where it could be crossed." But I conceive this supposition to be erroneous. The first counter-wall of the Syracusans was carried, as it seems to me, up the slope of Epipolæ, between the Athenian circle and the southern cliff: it commenced at the Syracusan newly-erected advanced wall, inclosing the Temenitês. This was all hard, firm ground, such as the Athenians could march across at any point: there might perhaps be some roughness here and there, but they would be mere exceptions to the general character of the ground.

It appears to me that τὰς ἐφόδους means simply, "the attacks of the Athenians," without intending to denote any special assailable points; προκαταλαμβάνειν τὰς ἐφόδους, means "to get beforehand with the attacks," (see Thucyd. i, 57, v, 30.) This is in fact the more usual meaning of ἔφοδος (compare vii, 5; vii, 43; i, 6; v, 35; vi, 63), "attack, approach, visit," etc. There are doubtless other passages in which it means, "the way or road through which the attack was made:" in one of these, however (vii, 51), all the best editors now read ἐσόδου instead of ἐφόδου.

It will be seen that arguments have been founded upon the inadmissible sense which the Scholiast here gives to the word ἔφοδοι: see Dr. Arnold, Memoir on the Map of Syracuse, Appendix to his ed. of Thucyd. vol. iii, p. 271.

[375] Thucyd. vi, 100.

[376] Thucyd. vi, 101. Τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ *ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου* ἐτείχιζον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν κρημνὸν τὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἕλους, ὃς τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα ὁρᾷ, καὶ ᾗπερ αὐτοῖς βραχύτατον ἐγίγνετο καταβᾶσι διὰ τοῦ ὁμάλου καὶ τοῦ ἕλους ἐς τὸν λιμένα τὸ περιτείχισμα.

I give in the text what I believe to be the meaning of this sentence, though the words ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου are not clear, and have been differently construed. Göller, in his first edition, had construed them as if it stood *ἀρξάμενοι* ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου: as if the fortification now begun on the cliff was continuous and in actual junction with the Circle. In his second edition, he seems to relinquish this opinion, and to translate them in a manner

similar to Dr. Arnold, who considers them as equivalent to ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου ὁρμώμενοι, but not at all implying that the fresh work performed was continuous with the Circle, which he believes not to have been the fact. If thus construed, the words would imply, "starting from the Circle as a base of operations." Agreeing with Dr. Arnold in his conception of the event signified, I incline, in construing the words, to proceed upon the analogy of two or three passages in Thucyd. i, 7; i, 46; i, 99; vi, 64—Αἱ δὲ παλαιαὶ πόλεις διὰ τὴν ληστείαν ἐπιπολὺ ἀντισχοῦσαν *ἀπὸ θαλάσσης μᾶλλον ᾠκίσθησαν* … Ἔστὶ δὲ λιμὴν, καὶ πόλις ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ *κεῖται ἀπὸ θαλάσσης* ἐν τῇ Ἐλαιάτιδι τῆς Θεσπρώτιδος, Ἐφύρη. In these passages ἀπὸ is used in the same sense as we find ἄποθεν, iv, 125, signifying "apart from, at some distance from;" but not implying any accompanying idea of motion, or proceeding from, either literal or metaphorical.

"The Athenians began to fortify, at some distance from their Circle, the cliff above the marsh," etc.

[377] Thucyd. vi, 102; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 18. Diodorus erroneously places the battle, in which Lamachus was slain, *after* the arrival of Gylippus (xiii, 8).

[378] Thucyd. vi, 102.

[379] Thucyd. vi, 102.

[380] Thucyd. vi, 103. οἷα δὲ εἰκὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀπορούντων καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ πρὶν πολιορκουμένων, etc.

[381] Diodorus, however, is wrong in stating (xiii, 7) that the Athenians occupied the temple of Zeus Olympius and the polichnê, or hamlet, surrounding it, on the right bank of the Anapus. These posts remained always occupied by the Syracusans, throughout the whole war (Thucyd. vii, 4, 37).

[382] Thucyd. vi, 103. πολλὰ ἐλέγετο πρός τε ἐκεῖνον καὶ πλείω ἔτι κατὰ τὴν πόλιν.

[383] Thucyd. vii, 55.

[384] Thucyd. vii, 49-86.

[385] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 18.

[386] Thucyd. vi, 104. ὡς αὐτοῖς αἱ ἀγγελίαι ἐφοίτων δειναὶ καὶ πᾶσαι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐψευσμέναι, ὡς ἤδη παντελῶς ἀποτετειχισμέναι αἱ Συράκουσαί εἰσι, τῆς μὲν Σικελίας οὐκέτι ἐλπίδα οὐδεμίαν εἶχεν ὁ Γύλιππος, τὴν δὲ Ἰταλίαν βουλόμενος περιποιῆσαι, etc. Compare Plutarch, Nikias. c. 18.

It will be seen from Thucydidês, that Gylippus heard this news while he was yet at Leukas.

[387] Thucyd. vi, 104. Ἄρας (Γύλιππος) παρέπλει τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ ἁρπασθεὶς ὑπ' ἀνέμου κατὰ τὸν Τεριναῖον κόλπον, ὃς ἐκπνεῖ ταύτῃ μέγας, κατὰ Βορέαν ἑστηκὼς ἀποφέρεται ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, καὶ πάλιν χειμασθεὶς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα Τάραντι προσμίσγει.

Though all the commentators here construe the words κατὰ Βορέαν ἑστηκὼς as if they agreed with ὃς or ἄνεμος, I cannot but think that these words really agree with Γύλιππος. Gylippus is overtaken by this violent off-shore wind while he is sailing southward along the eastern shore of what is now called Calabria Ultra: "setting his ship towards the north or *standing to the north* (to use the English nautical phrase), he is carried out to sea, from whence, after great difficulties, he again gets into Tarentum." If Gylippus was carried out to sea when in this position, and trying to get to Tarentum, he would naturally lay his course northward. What is meant by the words κατὰ Βορέαν ἑστηκὼς, as applied *to the wind*, I confess I do not understand; nor do the critics throw much light upon it. Whenever a point of the compass is mentioned in conjunction with any wind, it always seems to mean the point *from whence* the wind blows. Now, that κατὰ Βορέαν ἑστηκὼς means "a wind which blows steadily from the north," as the commentators affirm, I cannot believe without better authority than they produce. Moreover, Gylippus could never have laid his course for Tarentum, if there had been a strong wind in this direction; while such a wind would have forwarded him to Lokri, the very place whither he wanted to go. The mention of the *Terinæan* gulf is certainly embarrassing. If the words are right (which perhaps may be doubted), the explanation of Dr. Arnold in his note seems the best which can be offered. Perhaps, indeed,—for though improbable, this is not wholly impossible,—Thucydidês may himself have committed a geographical inadvertence, in supposing the Terinæan gulf to be on the east side of Calabria.

[388] Thucyd. vi, 104.

[389] Thucyd. vii, 1.

[390] Thucyd. vii, 2-7.

[391] Thucyd. vi, 103; vii, 2; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 19.

[392] Thucyd. vii, 2.

[393] Thucyd. vii, 3. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι, *αἰφνιδίως* τοῦ τε Γυλίππου καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων σφίσιν ἐπιόντων, etc.

[394] Compare an incident in the ensuing year, Thucyd. vii, 32. The Athenians, at a moment when they had become much weaker than they were now, had influence enough among the Sikel tribes to raise opposition to the march of a corps coming from the interior to the help of Syracuse. This auxiliary corps was defeated and nearly destroyed in its march.

[395] Thucyd. vii, 3.

[396] Thucyd. vii, 4.

[397] Thucyd. vii, 4.

[398] Thucyd. vii, 5; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 19.

[399] Thucyd. vii, 5, 6.

[400] Thucyd. vii, 7. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, αἵ τε τῶν Κορινθίων νῆες καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λευκαδίων ἐσέπλευσαν αἱ ὑπόλοιποι δώδεκα (ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Ἐρασινίδης Κορίνθιος), καὶ *ξυνετείχισαν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους.*

These words of Thucydidês are very obscure, and have been explained by different commentators in different ways. The explanation which I here give does not, so far as I know, coincide with any of them; yet I venture to think that it is the most plausible, and the only one satisfactory. Compare the Memoir of Dr. Arnold on his Map of Syracuse (Arn. Thucyd. vol. iii, p. 273), and the notes of Poppo and Göller. Dr. Arnold is indeed so little satisfied with any explanation which had suggested itself to him that he thinks some words must have dropped out.

[401] Thucyd. vii, 7.

[402] Thucyd. vii, 8.

[403] Thucyd. vii, 9. ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς ἐπιστολαῖς. The word *despatches*, which I use to translate ἐπιστολαῖς, is not inapplicable to oral, as well as to written messages, and thus retains the ambiguity involved in the original; for ἐπιστολαῖς, though usually implying, does not necessarily imply, *written* communications.

The words of Thucydidês (vii, 8) *may* certainly be construed to imply that Nikias had never on any previous occasion sent a written communication to Athens; and so Dr. Thirlwall understands them, though not without hesitation (Hist. Gr. ch. xxvi, vol. iii, p. 418). At the same time, I think them reconcilable with the supposition that Nikias may previously have sent written despatches, though much shorter than the present, leaving details and particulars to be supplied by the officer who carried them.

Mr. Mitford states the direct reverse of that which Dr. Thirlwall understands: "Nicias had used the precaution of frequently sending despatches in writing, with an exact account of every transaction." (Ch. xviii, sect v, vol. iv, p. 100.)

Certainly, the statement of Thucydidês does not imply this.

[404] It seems, that in Greek ship-building, moist and unseasoned wood was preferred, from the facility of bending it into the proper shape (Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. v, 7, 4).

[405] Thucyd. vii, 13. Καὶ οἱ ξένοι οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ ἐσβάντες, εὐθὺς κατὰ τὰς πόλεις ἀποχωροῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ μεγάλου μισθοῦ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπαρθέντες, καὶ οἰόμενοι χρηματιεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μαχεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ γνώμην ναύτικόν τε δὴ καὶ τἆλλα ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνθεστῶτα ὁρῶσιν, οἱ μὲν *ἐπ᾽ αὐτομολίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται*, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἕκαστοι δύνανται· πολλὴ δ᾽ ἡ Σικελία.

All the commentators bestow long notes in explanation of this phrase ἐπ᾽ αὐτομολίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται: but I cannot think that any of them are successful. There are even some who despair of success so much, as to wish to change αὐτομολίας by conjecture; see the citations in Poppo's long note.

But surely the literal sense of the words is here both defensible and instructive: "Some of them depart under pretence (or profession) of being deserters to the enemy." All the commentators reject this meaning, because

they say, it is absurd to talk of a man's announcing beforehand that he intends to desert to the enemy, and giving *that* as an excuse for quitting the camp. Such is not, in my judgment, the meaning of the word προφάσει here. It does not denote what a man said *before* he quitted the Athenian camp, he would of course say nothing of his intention to any one, but the color which he would put upon his conduct *after he got within* the Syracusan lines. He would present himself to them as a deserter to their cause; he would profess anxiety to take part in the defence; he would pretend to be tired of the oppressive Athenian dominion; for it is to be recollected, that all or most of these deserters were men belonging to the subject-allies of Athens. Those who passed over to the Syracusan lines would naturally recommend themselves by making profession of such dispositions, even though they did not really feel any such; for their real reason was, that the Athenian service had now become irksome, unprofitable, and dangerous; and the easiest manner of getting away from it was, to pass over as a deserter to Syracuse.

Nikias distinguishes these men from others, "who got away, as they could find opportunity, to some part or other of Sicily." These latter also would of course keep their intention of departing secret, until they got safe away into some Sicilian town; but when once there, they would make no profession of any feeling which they did not entertain. If they said anything, they would tell the plain truth, that they were making their escape from a position which now gave them more trouble than profit.

It appears to me that the words ἐπ' αὐτομολίας προφάσει will bear this sense perfectly well, and that it is the real meaning of Nikias.

Even before the Peloponnesian war was begun, the Corinthian envoy at Sparta affirms that the Athenians cannot depend upon their seamen standing true to them, since their navy was manned with hired foreign seamen rather than with natives—ὠνητὴ γὰρ ἡ Ἀθηναίων δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία (Thucyd. i, 121). The statement of Nikias proves that this remark was to a great extent well founded.

[406] Thucyd. vii, 11-15.

[407] Thucyd. vii, 10.

[408] Thucyd. vii, 16. There is here a doubt as to the reading, between one hundred and twenty talents, or twenty talents.

I agree with Dr. Arnold and other commentators in thinking that the money taken out by Eurymedon was far more probably the larger sum of the two, than the smaller. The former reading seems to deserve the preference. Besides, Diodorus states that Eurymedon took out with him one hundred and forty talents: his authority, indeed, does not count for much, but it counts for something, in coincidence with a certain force of intrinsic probability (Diodor. xiii, 8).

On an occasion such as this, to send a very small sum, such as twenty talents, would produce a discouraging effect upon the armament.

[409] Thucyd. vii, 42.

[410] Plutarch (Nikias, c. 20) tells us that the Athenians had been disposed to send a second armament to Sicily, even before the despatch of Nikias reached them: but that they had been prevented by certain men who were envious (φθόνῳ) of the glory and good fortune of Nikias.

No judgment can be more inconsistent with the facts of the case than this, facts recounted in general terms even by Plutarch himself.

[411] Thucyd. vi, 93.

[412] Thucyd. vii, 18.

[413] Thucyd. vi, 105; vii, 18.

[414] Thucyd. vii, 18.

[415] Diodor. xiii, 8.

[416] Thucyd. vii, 17.

[417] Thucyd. vii, 19-58. Σικυώνιοι ἀναγκαστοὶ στρατεύοντες.

[418] Thucyd. vii, 19-28, with Dr. Arnold's note.

[419] Thucyd. vii, 20. ἅμα τῆς Δεκελείας τῷ τειχισμῷ, etc. Compare Isokratês, Orat. viii, De Pace, s. 102, p. 236, Bekk.

[420] Thucyd. vii, 20-27.

[421] Thucyd. vii, 26.

[422] Thucyd. vii, 31. Ὄντι δ' αὐτῷ (Demosthenês) περὶ ταῦτα (Anaktorium) Εὐρυμέδων ἀπαντᾷ, ὃς τότε τοῦ χειμῶνος *τὰ χρήματα ἄγων τῇ στρατιᾷ ἀπεπέμφθη*, καὶ ἀγγέλλει, etc.

The meaning of this passage appears quite unambiguous, that Eurymedon had been sent to Sicily in the winter, to carry the sum of one hundred and twenty talents to Nikias, and was now on his return (see Thucyd. vii, 11). Nor is it without some astonishment that I read in Mr. Mitford: "At Anactorium, Demosthenês found Eurymedon *collecting provisions* for Sicily," etc. Mr. Mitford then says in a note (quoting the Scholiast, Ἤτοι τὰ πρὸς τροφὴν χρήσιμα, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ συντείνοντα αὐτοῖς, Schol.): "This is not the only occasion on which Thucydidês uses the term χρήματα for *necessaries in general*. Smith has translated accordingly: but the Latin has *pecuniam*, which does not express the sense intended here," (ch. xviii, sect. vi, vol. iv, p. 118.)

There cannot be the least doubt that the Latin is here right. The definite article makes the point quite certain, even if it were true (which I doubt) that Thucydidês sometimes uses the word χρήματα to mean "necessaries in general." I doubt still more whether he ever uses ἄγων in the sense of "collecting."

[423] Thucyd. vii, 31.

[424] Thucyd. vii, 21. Among the topics of encouragement dwelt upon by Hermokratês, it is remarkable that he makes no mention of that which the sequel proved to be the most important of all, the confined space of the harbor, which rendered Athenian ships and tactics unavailing.

[425] Thucyd. vii, 23; Diod. xiii, 9; Plut. Nikias, c. 20.

[426] Thucyd. vii, 23, 24.

[427] Thucyd. vii, 25.

[428] Thucyd. vii, 25.

[429] Thucyd. vii, 38.

[430] Thucyd. vii, 25.

[431] Thucyd. vii, 32, 33.

[432] Thucyd. vii, 33.

[433] Thucyd. vii, 36. τῇ δὲ πρότερον ἀμαθίᾳ τῶν κυβερνητῶν δοκούσῃ εἶναι, τὸ ἀντίπρωρον ξυγκροῦσαι, μάλιστ' ἂν αὐτοὶ χρήσασθαι· πλεῖστον γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ σχήσειν, etc.

Diodor. xiii, 10.

[434] Compare Thucyd. vii, 34-30; Diodor. xiii. 10; Eurip. Iph. Taur. 1335. See also the notes of Arnold, Poppo, and Didot, on the passages of Thucydidês.

It appears as if the ἀντηρίδες or sustaining beams were something new, now provided for the first time, in order to strengthen the epôtid and render it fit to drive in collision against the enemy. The words which Thucydidês employs to describe the position of these ἀντηρίδες, are to me very obscure, nor do I think that any of the commentators clear them up satisfactorily.

It is Diodorus who specifies that the Corinthians lowered the level of their prows, so as to strike nearer to the water, which Thucydidês does not mention.

A captive ship, when towed in as a prize, was disarmed by being deprived of her beak (Athenæus, xii, p. 535). Lysander reserved the beaks of the Athenian triremes captured at Ægospotami to grace his triumphal return (Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 8).

[435] Thucyd. vii, 37, 38.

[436] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 20. Diodorus (xiii, 10) represents the battle as having been brought on against the wish and intention of the Athenians generally, not alluding to any difference of opinion among the commanders.

[437] Thucyd. vii, 41. αἱ κεραῖαι δελφινοφόροι: compare Pollux, i, 85, and Fragment vi, of the comedy of the poet Pherekratês, entitled Ἄγριοι; Meineke, Fragm. Comic. Græc. vol. ii, p. 258, and the Scholiast. ad Aristoph. Equit. 759.

[438] Thucyd. vii, 40. Οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι, νομίσαντες αὐτοὺς ὡς ἡσσημένους σφῶν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἀνακρούσασθαι, etc.

[439] Thucyd. vii, 40.

[440] Thucyd. vii, 41.

[441] Thucyd. vii, 42.

[442] Thucyd. vii, 33-57.

[443] Thucyd. vii, 35.

[444] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 21.

[445] Thucyd. vii, 42.

[446] Thucyd. vii, 47-50.

[447] Thucyd. vii, 42.

[448] Thucyd. vii, 43.

[449] Thucyd. vii, 43. Diodorus tells us that Demosthenês took with him ten thousand hoplites, and ten thousand light troops, numbers which are not at all to be trusted (xiii, 11).

Plutarch (Nikias, c. 21) says that Nikias was extremely averse to the attack on Epipolæ: Thucydidês notices nothing of the kind, and the assertion seems improbable.

[450] Thucyd. vii, 42, 43. Καὶ (Demosthenês) ὁρῶν τὸ παρατείχισμα τῶν Συρακοσίων, ᾧ ἐκώλυσαν περιτειχίσαι σφᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἁπλοῦν τε ὂν, καὶ εἰ ἐπικρατήσειέ τις τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν τῆς ἀναβάσεως, καὶ αὖθις τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου, ῥᾳδίως ἂν αὐτὸ ληφθέν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπομεῖναι ἂν σφᾶς οὐδένα) ἠπείγετο ἐπιθέσθαι τῇ πείρᾳ.

vii, 43. καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν ἀδύνατα ἐδόκει εἶναι λαθεῖν προσελθόντας καὶ ἀναβάντας, etc.

Dr. Arnold and Göller both interpret this description of Thucydidês (see their notes on this chapter, and Dr. Arnold's Appendix, p. 275) as if Nikias, immediately that the Syracusan counter-wall had crossed his blockading line, had evacuated his circle and works on the slope of Epipolæ, and had retired down exclusively into the lower ground below. Dr. Thirlwall too is of the same opinion (Hist. Gr. vol. iii, ch. xxvi, pp. 432-434).

This appears to me unauthorized and incorrect. What conceivable motive can be assigned to induce Nikias to yield up to the enemy so important an advantage? If he had once relinquished the slope of Epipolæ, to occupy exclusively the marsh beneath the southern cliff, Gylippus and the Syracusans would have taken good care that he should never again have mounted that cliff; nor could he ever have got near to the παρατείχισμα. The moment when the Athenians did at last abandon their fortifications on the slope of Epipolæ (τὰ ἀνω τειχη) is spe-

cially marked by Thucydidês afterwards, vii, 60: it was at the last moment of desperation, when the service of all was needed for the final maritime battle in the Great Harbor. Dr. Arnold (p. 275) misinterprets this passage, in my judgment, evading the direct sense of it.

The words of Thucydidês, vii, 42—εἰ ἐπικρατήσειέ τις τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν τῆς ἀναβάσεως, καὶ αὖθις τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου—are more correctly conceived by M. Firmin Didot, in the note to his translation, than by Arnold and Göller. The στρατόπεδον here indicated does *not* mean the Athenian circle, and their partially completed line of circumvallation on the slope of Epipolæ. It means the ground higher up than this, which they had partially occupied at first while building the fort of Labdalum, and of which they had been substantially masters until the arrival of Gylippus who had now converted it into a camp or στρατόπεδον of the Syracusans.

[451] Diodor. xiii, 11.

[452] Thucyd. vii, 44, 45.

[453] Thucyd. vii, 46. Plutarch (Nikias, c. 21) states that the number of slain was two thousand. Diodorus gives it at two thousand five hundred (xiii, 11). Thucydidês does not state it at all.

These two authors probably both copied from some common authority, not Thucydidês; perhaps Philistus.

[454] Thucyd. vi, 47.

[455] Thucyd. vii, 48. Ὁ δὲ Νικίας ἐνόμιζε μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς πονηρὰ σφῶν τὰ πράγματα εἶναι, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ οὐκ ἐβούλετο αὐτὰ ἀσθενῆ ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐδ' *ἐμφανῶς* σφᾶς ψηφιζομένους *μετὰ πολλῶν* τὴν ἀναχώρησιν τοῖς πολεμίοις καταγγέλτους γίγνεσθαι· λαθεῖν γὰρ ἂν, ὁπότε βούλοιντο, τοῦτο ποιοῦντες πολλῷ ἧττον.

It seems probable that some of the taxiarchs and trierarchs were present at this deliberation, as we find in another case afterwards, c. 60. Possibly, Demosthenês might even desire that they *should* be present, as witnesses respecting the feeling of the army; and also as supporters, if the matter came afterwards to be debated in the public assembly at Athens. It is to this fact that the words ἐμφανῶς μετὰ πολλῶν seem to allude.

[456] Thucyd. vii, 48. Οὐκοῦν βούλεσθαι αὐτός γε, ἐπιστάμενος τὰς Ἀθηναίων φύσεις, ἐπὶ αἰσχρᾷ γε αἰτίᾳ καὶ ἀδίκως ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων ἀπολέσθαι, μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, εἰ δεῖ, κινδυνεύσας τοῦτο παθεῖν, *ἰδίᾳ*.

The situation of the last word ἰδίᾳ in this sentence is perplexing, because it can hardly be construed except either with ἀπολέσθαι or with αὐτός γε: for Nikias could not run any risk of perishing *separately* by the hands of the enemy, unless we are to ascribe to him an absurd rhodomontade quite foreign to his character. Compare Plutarch Nikias, c. 22.

[457] Thucyd. vii, 48. τρίβειν οὖν ἔφη χρῆναι προσκαθημένους, etc.

[458] Thucyd. vii, 49. Ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης περὶ μὲν τοῦ *προσκαθῆσθαι οὐδ' ὁπωσοῦν ἐνεδέχετο*—τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν, *οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ οἱ ἔφη ἀρέσκειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔτι μένειν*, ἀλλ' *ὅτι τάχιστα ἤδη καὶ μὴ μέλλειν ἐξανίστασθαι*. Καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων αὐτῷ ταῦτα ξυνηγόρευεν.

[459] Thucyd. vii, 69; Diodor. xiii, 12.

[460] Thucyd. vii, 48. *Ἃ ἐπιστάμενος, τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ ἔτι ἐπ' ἀμφότερα ἔχων καὶ διασκοπῶν ἀνεῖχε, τῷ δ' ἐμφανεῖ τότε λόγῳ οὐκ ἔφη ἀπάξειν τὴν στρατιάν.*

The insignificance of the party in Syracuse which corresponded with Nikias may be reasonably inferred from Thucyd. vii, 55. It consisted in part of those Leontines who had been incorporated into the Syracusan citizenship (Diodor. xiii, 18).

Polyænus (i, 43, 1) has a tale respecting a revolt of the slaves or villeins (οἰκέται) at Syracuse during the Athenian siege, under a leader named Sosikratês, a revolt suppressed by the stratagem of Hermokratês. That various attempts of this sort took place at Syracuse during these two trying years, is by no means improbable. In fact, it is difficult to understand how the numerous predial slaves were kept in order during the great pressure and danger, prior to the coming of Gylippus.

[461] Thucyd. vii, 49. Ἀντιλέγοντος δὲ τοῦ Νικίου, ὄκνος τις καὶ μέλλησις ἐνεγένετο, καὶ ἅμα ὑπόνοια μή τι καὶ πλέον εἰδὼς ὁ Νικίας ἰσχυρίζηται.

The language of Justin respecting this proceeding is just and discriminating: "Nicias, seu pudore male actæ rei, seu metu destitutæ spei civium, seu impellente fato, manere contendit." (Justin, iv, 5.)

[462] This interval may be inferred (see Dodwell, Ann. Thucyd. vii, 50) from the state of the moon at the time of the battle of Epipolæ, compared with the subsequent eclipse.

[463] Thucyd. vii, 50. ὡς αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ ὁ Νικίας *ἔτι ὁμοίως ἠναντιοῦτο*, etc. Diodor. xiii, 12. Ὁ Νικίας ἠναγκάσθη συγχωρῆσαι, etc.

[464] Thucyd. vii, 60.

[465] Diodor. xiii, 12. Οἱ στρατιῶται τὰ σκεύη ἐνετίθεντο, etc. Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23.

[466] The moon was totally eclipsed on this night, August 27, 413 B.C., from twenty-seven minutes past nine to thirty-four minutes past ten P.M. (Wurm, De Ponderib. Græcor. sect. xciv, p. 184), speaking with reference to an observer in Sicily.

Thucydidês states that Nikias adopted the injunction of the prophets, to tarry *thrice nine* days (vii, 50). Diodorus says *three* days. Plutarch intimates that Nikias went beyond the injunction of the prophets, who only insisted on *three* days, while he resolved on remaining for an entire lunar period (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23).

I follow the statement of Thucydidês: there is no reason to believe that Nikias would lengthen the time beyond what the prophets prescribed.

The erroneous statement respecting this memorable event, in so respectable an author as Polybius, is not a little surprising (Polyb. ix, 19).

[467] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 22; Diodor. xiii, 12; Thucyd. vii, 50. Stilbidês was eminent in his profession of a prophet: see Aristophan. Pac. 1029, with the citations from Eupolis and Philochorus in the Scholia.

Compare the description of the effect produced by the eclipse of the sun at Thebes, immediately prior to the last expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly (Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 31).

[468] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24.

[469] Thucyd. vii, 52, 53; Diodor. xiii, 13.

[470] Thucyd. vii, 55. Οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν παντὶ δὴ ἀθυμίας ἦσαν, καὶ ὁ παράλογος αὐτοῖς μέγας ἦν, πολὺ δὲ μείζων ἔτι τῆς στρατείας ὁ μετάμελος.

[471] Thucyd. vii, 56. Οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι τόν τε λιμένα εὐθὺς παρέπλεον ἀδεῶς, etc. This elate and visible manifestation of feeling ought not to pass unnoticed, as an evidence of Grecian character.

[472] Thucyd. vii, 56.

[473] Thucyd. vii, 57, 58.

[474] Thucyd. vii, 59; Diodor. xiii, 14.

[475] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24.

[476] Thucyd. vii, 60.

[477] Thucyd. vii, 62. Ἃ δὲ ἀρωγὰ ἐνείδομεν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ λιμένος στενότητι πρὸς τὸν μέλλοντα ὄχλον τῶν νεῶν ἔσεσθαι, etc.

[478] Thucyd. vii, 62. Ἐς τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἠναγκάσμεθα, ὥστε πεζομαχεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν, καὶ τὸ μήτε αὐτοὺς ἀνακρούεσθαι, μήτε ἐκείνους ἐᾷν, ὠφέλιμον φαίνεται.

[479] Thucyd. vii, 63. Τοῖς δὲ ναύταις παραινῶ, καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τῷδε καὶ δέομαι, μὴ ἐκπεπλῆχθαί τι ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς ἄγαν … ἐκείνην τε τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, ὡς ἀξία ἐστὶ διασώσασθαι, *οἱ τέως Ἀθηναῖοι νομιζόμενοι καὶ μὴ ὄντες ὑμῶν*, τῆς τε φωνῆς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τῶν τρόπων τῇ μιμήσει, ἐθαυμάζεσθε κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας οὐκ ἔλασσον κατὰ τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι, ἔς τε τὸ φοβερὸν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι πολὺ πλεῖον, μετείχετε, ὥστε κοινωνοὶ μόνοι ἐλευθέρως ἡμῖν τῆς ἀρχῆς ὄντες, δικαίως αὐτὴν νῦν μὴ καταπροδίδοτε, etc.

Dr. Arnold (together with Göller and Poppo), following the Scholiast, explain these words as having particular reference to the metics in the Athenian naval service. But I cannot think this correct. All persons in that service —who were freemen, but yet not citizens of Athens—are here designated; partly metics, doubtless, but partly also citizens of the islands and dependent allies,—the ξένοι ναυβάται alluded to by the Corinthians and by Perik-

lês at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i, 121-143) as the ὠνητὴ δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία of Athens. Without doubt there were numerous foreign seamen in the warlike navy of Athens, who derived great consideration as well as profit from the service, and often passed themselves off for Athenian citizens when they really were not so.

[480] Thucyd. vii, 64. Ὅτι οἱ ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ὑμῶν νῦν ἐσόμενοι, καὶ πέζοι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις εἰσὶ καὶ νῆες, καὶ ἡ ὑπόλοιπος πόλις, καὶ τὸ μέγα ὄνομα τῶν Ἀθηνῶν….

[481] See the striking chapter of Thucyd. vii, 69. Even the tame style of Diodorus (xiii, 15) becomes animated in describing this scene.

[482] Thucyd. vii, 65.

[483] Thucyd. vii, 66, 67.

[484] Thucyd. vii, 68. πρὸς οὖν ἀταξίαν τε τοιαύτην … ὀργῇ προσμίξωμεν, καὶ νομίσωμεν ἅμα μὲν νομιμώτατον εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους, οἳ ἂν ὡς ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ τοῦ προσπεσόντος δικαιώσωσιν ἀποπλῆσαι τῆς γνώμης τὸ θυμούμενον, ἅμα δὲ ἐχθροὺς ἀμύνασθαι ἐγγενησόμενον ἡμῖν, καὶ (τὸ λεγόμενόν που) ἥδιστον εἶναι.

This plain and undisguised invocation of the angry and revengeful passions should be noticed, as a mark of character and manners.

[485] Diodorus, xiii, 14. Plutarch has a similar statement, in reference to the previous battle: but I think he must have confused one battle with the other, for his account can hardly be made to harmonize with Thucydidês (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24).

It is to be recollected that both Plutarch and Diodorus had probably read the description of the battles in the Great Harbor of Syracuse, contained in Philistus; a better witness, if we had his account before us, even than Thucydidês; since he was probably at this time in Syracuse and was perhaps actually engaged.

[486] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24, 25. Timæus reckoned the aid of Hêraklês as having been one of the great causes of Syracusan victory over the Athenians. He gave several reasons why the god was provoked against the Athenians: see Timæus, Fragm. 104, ed. Didot.

[487] The destructive impact of these metallic masses at the head of the ships of war, as well as the periplus practised by a lighter ship to avoid direct collision against a heavier, is strikingly illustrated by a passage in Plutarch's Life of Lucullus, where a naval engagement between the Roman general, and Neoptolemus the admiral of Mithridates, is described. "Lucullus was on board a Rhodian quinquerime, commanded by Damagoras, a skilful Rhodian pilot; while Neoptolemus was approaching with a ship much heavier, and driving forward to a direct collision: upon which Damagoras evaded the blow, rowed rapidly round, and struck the enemy in the stern." … δείσας ὁ Δαμαγόρας τὸ βάρος τῆς βασιλικῆς, καὶ *τὴν τραχύτητα τοῦ χαλκώματος*, οὐκ ἐτόλμησε συμπεσεῖν ἀντίπρωρος, ἀλλ' ὀξέως ἐκ περιαγωγῆς ἀποστρέψας ἐκέλευσεν ἐπὶ πρύμναν ὥσασθαι· καὶ πιεσθείσης ἐνταῦθα τῆς νεὼς ἐδέξατο τὴν πληγὴν ἀβλαβῆ γενομένην, ἅτε δὴ τοῖς θαλαττεύουσι τῆς νέως μέρεσι προσπεσοῦσαν.—Plutarch, Lucull. c. 3.

[488] Thucyd. vii, 71.

[489] Thucyd. vii, 60. τὰς ναῦς ἁπάσας ὅσαι ἦσαν καὶ δυναταὶ *καὶ ἁπλοώτεραι*.

[490] Thucyd. vii, 60. πάντα τινὰ ἐσβιβάζοντες πληρῶσαι—ἀναγκάσαντες ἐσβαίνειν ὅστις καὶ *ὁπωσοῦν ἐδόκει ἡλικίας μετέχων ἐπιτήδειος* εἶναι. Compare also the speech of Gylippus, c. 67.

[491] The language of Theokritus, in describing the pugilistic contest between Pollux and the Bebrykian Amykus, is not inapplicable to the position of the Athenian ships and seamen when cramped up in this harbor (Idyll. xxii, 91):—

… … … … … … . . ἐκ δ' ἐτέρωθεν

Ἤρωες κρατερὸν Πολυδεύκεα θαρσύνεσκον,

Δειδιότες μή πώς μιν *ἐπιβρίσας δαμάσειεν,*

Χώρῳ ἐνὶ στεινῷ, Τιτύῳ ἐναλίγκιος ἀνήρ.

Compare Virgil's picture of Entellus and Darês, Æneid, v, 430.

[492] Thucyd. vii, 72.

[493] Diodor. xiii, 18.

[494] Thucyd. vii, 73; Diodor. xiii, 18.

[495] Thucyd. vi, 64.

[496] Xenophon, Anab. iv, 5, 15, 19; v, 8, 15.

[497] Thucyd. vii, 77.

[498] Thucyd. vii, 74.

[499] Thucyd. vii, 77. Καίτοι πολλὰ μὲν ἐς θεοὺς νόμιμα δεδιήτημαι, πολλὰ δὲ ἐς ἀνθρώπους δίκαια καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα. *Ἀνθ' ὧν ἡ μὲν ἐλπὶς ὅμως θρασεῖα τοῦ μέλλοντος, αἱ δὲ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν δὴ φοβοῦσι.* Τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ λωφήσειαν· ἱκανὰ γὰρ τοῖς τε πολεμίοις εὐτύχηται, καὶ εἴ τῳ θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι ἐστρατεύσαμεν, ἀρκούντως ἤδη τετιμωρήμεθα.

I have translated the words οὐ κατ' ἀξιαν, and the sentence of which they form a part, differently from what has been hitherto sanctioned by the commentators, who construe κατ' ἀξίαν as meaning "according to our desert," understand the words αἱ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν as bearing the same sense with the words ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξιαν κακοπραγίαις some lines before; and likewise construe οὐ, not with φοβοῦσι, but with κατ' ἀξίαν, assigning to φοβοῦσι an affirmative sense. They translate: "Quare, *quamvis nostra fortuna, prorsus afflicta videatur* (these words have no parallel in the original) rerum tamen futurarum spes est audax: sed clades, quas nullo nostro merito accepimus, *nos* jam terrent. At fortasse cessabunt," etc. M. Didot translates: "Aussi j'ai un ferme espoir dans l'avenir, *malgré l'effroi* que des *malheurs non mérités* nous causent." Dr. Arnold passes the sentence over without notice.

This manner of translating appears to me not less unsuitable in reference to the spirit and thread of the harangue, than awkward as regards the individual words. Looking to the spirit of the harangue, the object of encouraging the dejected soldiers would hardly be much answered by repeating—what in fact had been glanced at in a manner sufficient and becoming, before—that "the unmerited reverses terrified either Nikias or the soldiers." Then as to the words; the expressions ἀνθ' ὧν, ὅμως, μὲν, and δὲ, seem to me to denote, not only that the two halves of the sentence apply both of them to Nikias, but that the first half of the sentence is in harmony, not in opposition, with the second. Matthiæ (in my judgment, erroneously) refers (Gr. Gr. § 623) ὅμως to some words which have preceded; I think that ὅμως contributes to hold together the first and the second affirmation of the sentence. Now the Latin translation refers the first half of the sentence to Nikias, and the last half to the soldiers whom he addresses; while the translation of M. Didot, by means of the word *malgré*, for which there is nothing corresponding in the Greek, puts the second half in antithesis to the first.

I cannot but think that οὐ ought to be construed with φοβοῦσι, and that the words κατ' ἀξιαν do not bear the meaning assigned to them by the translators. Ἀξιαν not only means, "*desert*, merit, the title to that which a man has earned by his conduct," as in the previous phrase παρὰ τὴν ἀξιαν, but it also means, "price, value, title to be cared for, capacity of exciting more or less desire or aversion," in which last sense it is predicated as an attribute, not only of moral beings, but of other objects besides. Thus Aristotle says (Ethic. Nikom. iii, 11): ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας *ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας* ὁ δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιοῦτος, etc. Again, ibid. iii, 5. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα, ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαῤῥῶν, ἀνδρεῖος· *κατ' ἀξίαν* γὰρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. Again, ibid. iv, 2. Διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ γένει, μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν· τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐυπέρβλητον, καὶ ἔχον *κατ' ἀξίαν* τοῦ δαπανήματος. Again, ibid. viii, 14. Ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα οὗ φασι δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν· λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι, καὶ οὐ φιλίαν, εἰ μὴ *κατ' ἀξίαν* τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας. Compare also ib. viii, 13.

Xenophon, Cyrop. viii, 4, 32. τὸ γὰρ πολλὰ δοκοῦντα ἔχειν μὴ *κατ' ἀξίαν* τῆς οὐσίας φαίνεσθαι ὠφελοῦντα τοὺς φίλους, ἀνελευθερίαν ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ περιάπτειν. Compare Xenophon, Memorab. ii, 5, 2. ὥσπερ τῶν οἰκετῶν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φίλων, εἰσὶν *ἀξίαι*; also ibid. i, 6, 11, and Isokratês, cont. Lochit. Or. xx, s. 8.

The words κατ' ἀξίαν in Thucydidês appear to me to bear the same meaning as in these passages of Xenophon and Aristotle, "in proportion to their value," or to their real magnitude. If we so construe them, the words ἀνθ' ὧν, ὅμως, μὲν, and δὲ, all fall into their proper order: the whole sentence after ἀνθ' ὧν applies to Nikias personally, is a corollary from what he had asserted before, and forms a suitable point in an harangue for encouraging his dispirited soldiers: "Look how *I* bear up, who have as much cause for mourning as any of you. I

have behaved well both towards gods and towards men: in return for which, I am comparatively comfortable both as to the future and as to the present: as to the future, I have strong hopes; at the same time that, as to the present, I am not overwhelmed by the present misfortunes in proportion to their prodigious intensity."

This is the precise thing for a man of resolution to say upon so terrible an occasion.

The particle δὴ has its appropriate meaning, αἱ δὲ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν *δὴ* φοβοῦσι; "and the present distresses, though they do appall me, do not appall me *assuredly* in proportion to their actual magnitude." Lastly, the particle καὶ (in the succeeding phrase, τάχα δ' ἂν *καὶ* λωφήσειαν) does not fit on to the preceding passage as usually construed: accordingly the Latin translator, as well as M. Didot, leave it out, and translate: "At fortasse cessabunt." "Mais peut-être vont-ils cesser." It ought to be translated: "And perhaps they may *even* abate," which implies that what had been asserted in the preceding sentence is here intended not to be contradicted, but to be carried forward and strengthened: see Kühner, Griech. Gramm. sects. 725-728. Such would not be the case as the sentence is usually construed.

[500] Thucyd. vii, 77. Ἱκανὰ γὰρ τοῖς τε πολεμίοις εὐτύχηται, καὶ εἴ τῳ θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι ἐστρατεύσαμεν, ἀποχρώντως ἤδη τετιμωρήμεθα· ἦλθον γάρ που καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἤδη ἐφ' ἑτέρους, καὶ ἀνθρώπεια δράσαντες ἀνεκτὰ ἔπαθον. Καὶ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς νῦν τά τε ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐλπίζειν ἠπιώτερα ἕξειν· οἴκτου γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀξιώτεροι ἤδη ἐσμὲν ἢ φθόνου.

This is a remarkable illustration of the doctrine, so frequently set forth in Herodotus, that the gods were jealous of any man or any nation who was preëminently powerful, fortunate, or prosperous. Nikias, recollecting the immense manifestation and promise with which his armament had started from Peiræus, now believed that this had provoked the jealousy of some of the gods, and brought about the misfortunes in Sicily. He comforts his soldiers by saying that the enemy is now at the same dangerous pinnacle of exaltation, whilst *they* have exhausted the sad effects of the divine jealousy.

Compare the story of Amasis and Polykratês in Herodotus (iii, 39), and the striking remarks put into the mouth of Paulus Æmilius by Plutarch (Vit. Paul. Æmil. c. 36).

[501] Thucyd. vii, 77. Ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις, καὶ οὐ τείχη, οὐδὲ νῆες ἀνδρῶν κεναί.

[502] Thucyd. vii, 78.

[503] Thucyd. vii, 79. ἀφ' ὧν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μᾶλλον ἔτι ἠθύμουν, καὶ ἐνόμιζον *ἐπὶ τῷ σφετέρῳ ὀλέθρῳ καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γίγνεσθαι*.

[504] Thucyd. vi, 70.

[505] Thucyd. vii, 80-82.

[506] Dr. Arnold (Thucyd. vol. iii, p. 280, copied by Göller, ad vii, 81) thinks that the division of Demosthenês reached and passed the river Kakyparis; and was captured between the Kakyparis and the Erineus. But the words of Thucyd. vii, 80, 81, do not sustain this. The division of Nikias was in advance of Demosthenês from the beginning, and gained upon it principally during the early part of the march, before daybreak; because it was then that the disorder of the division of Demosthenês was the most inconvenient: see c. 81—ὡς τῆς νυκτὸς τότε ξυνεταράχθησαν, etc. When Thucydidês, therefore, says, that "at daybreak *they* arrived at the sea," (ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἕῳ ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὴν θάλατταν, c. 80,) this cannot be true *both* of Nikias and of Demosthenês. If the former arrived there at daybreak, the latter cannot have come to the same point till some time after daybreak. Nikias must have been beforehand with Demosthenês when he reached the sea, and considerably *more* beforehand when he reached the Kakyparis: moreover, we are expressly told that Nikias did not wait for his colleague, that he thought it for the best to get on as fast as possible with his own division.

It appears to me that the words ἀφικνοῦνται, etc. (c. 80), are not to be understood both of Nikias and Demosthenês, but that they refer back to the word αὐτοῖς, two or three lines behind: "the *Athenians (taken generally)* reached the sea," no attention being at that moment paid to the difference between the front and the rear divisions. The *Athenians* might be said, not improperly, to reach the sea, at the time when the division of Nikias reached it.

[507] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27.

[508] Thucyd. vii, 81. Καὶ τότε γνοὺς (sc. Demosthenês) τοὺς Συρακοσίους διώκοντας οὐ προὐχώρει μᾶλλον ἢ ἐς μάχην ξυνετάσσετο, ἕως ἐνδιατρίβων κυκλοῦται τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐν πολλῷ θορύβῳ αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ μετ'

αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦσαν· ἀνειληθέντες γὰρ ἔς τι χωρίον, ᾧ κύκλῳ μὲν τειχίον περιῆν, *ὁδὸς δὲ ἔνθεν τε καὶ ἔνθεν*, ἐλάας δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγας εἶχεν, ἐβάλλοντο περισταδόν.

I translate ὁδὸς δὲ ἔνθεν τε καὶ ἔνθεν differently from Dr. Arnold, from Mitford, and from others. These words are commonly understood to mean that this walled plantation was bordered by two roads, one on each side. Certainly the words *might* have that signification; but I think they also may have the signification (compare ii, 76) which I have given in the text, and which seems more plausible. It certainly is very improbable that the Athenians should have gone out of the road, in order to shelter themselves in the plantation; since they were fully aware that there was no safety for them except in getting away. If we suppose that the plantation lay exactly in the road, the word ἀνειληθέντες becomes perfectly explicable, on which I do not think that Dr. Arnold's comment is satisfactory. The pressure of the troops from the rear into the hither opening, while those in the front could not get out by the farther opening, would naturally cause this crowd and *huddling* inside. A road which passed right through the walled ground, entering at one side and coming out at the other, might well be called ὁδὸς δὲ ἔνθεν τε καὶ ἔνθεν. Compare Dr. Arnold's Remarks on the Map of Syracuse, vol. iii, p. 281; as well as his note on vii, 81.

I imagine the olive-trees to be here named, not for either of the two reasons mentioned by Dr. Arnold, but because they hindered the Athenians from seeing beforehand distinctly the nature of the inclosure into which they were hastening, and therefore prevented any precautions from being taken, such as that of forbidding too many troops from entering at once, etc.

[509] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27; Thucyd. vii, 82.

[510] This statement depends upon the very good authority of the contemporary Syracusan, Philistus: see Pausanias, i, 29, 9; Philisti Fragm. 46, ed. Didot.

[511] Thucyd. vii, 83.

[512] Plutarch (Nikias. c. 27) says *eight* days, inaccurately.

[513] Thucyd. vii, 85. See Dr. Arnold's note.

[514] Thucyd. vii, 84. … ἔβαλλον ἄνωθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, *πίνοντάς τε τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀσμένους*, καὶ ἐν κοίλῳ ὄντι τῷ ποτάμῳ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ταρασσομένους.

[515] Thucyd. vii, 85, 86; Philistus, Fragm. 46, ed. Didot; Pausanias, i. 29, 9.

[516] Thucyd. vii, 85; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27.

[517] Thucydidês states, roughly, and without pretending to exact means of knowledge, that the total number of captives brought to Syracuse under public supervision, was not less than seven thousand—ἐλήφθησαν δὲ οἱ ξύμπαντες, ἀκριβείᾳ μὲν χαλεπὸν ἐξειπεῖν, ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἐλάσσους ἑπτακισχιλίων (vii, 87). As the number taken with Demosthenês was six thousand (vii, 82), this leaves one thousand as having been obtained from the division of Nikias.

[518] Thucyd. vii, 85. *πολλοὶ* δὲ ὅμως καὶ διέφυγον, οἱ μὲν καὶ παραυτίκα, οἱ δὲ καὶ δουλεύσαντες καὶ διαδιδράσκοντες ὕστερον. The word παραυτίκα means, during the retreat.

[519] Lysias pro Polystrato. Orat. xx, sects. 26-28, c. 6, p. 686 R.

[520] Thucyd. vii, 87. Diodorus (xiii, 20-32) gives two long orations purporting to have been held in the Syracusan assembly, in discussing how the prisoners were to be dealt with. An old citizen, named Nikolaus, who has lost his two sons in the war, is made to advocate the side of humane treatment; while Gylippus is introduced as the orator recommending harshness and revenge.

From whom Diodorus borrowed this, I do not know; but his whole account of the matter appears to me untrustworthy.

One may judge of his accuracy when one finds him stating that the prisoners received each two *chœnikes* of barley-meal, instead of two *kotylæ*; the chœnix being four times as much as the kotylê (Diodor. xiii, 19).

[521] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 29; Diodor. xiii, 33. The reader will see how the Carthaginians treated the Grecian prisoners whom they took in Sicily, in Diodor. xiii, 111.

[522] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28; Diodor. xiii, 19.

[523] Thucyd. vii, 86; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28. The statement which Plutarch here cites from Timæus respecting the intervention of Hermokratês, is not in any substantial contradiction with Philistus and Thucydidês. The word κελευσθέντας seems decidedly preferable to καταλευσθέντας, in the text of Plutarch.

[524] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28. Though Plutarch says that the month Karneius is "that which the Athenians call Metageitnion," yet it is not safe to affirm that the day of the slaughter of the Asinarus was the 16th of the Attic month Metageitnion. We know that the civil months of different cities seldom or never exactly coincided. See the remarks of Franz on this point, in his comment on the valuable Inscriptions of Tauromenium, Corp. Inscr. Gr. No. 5640, part xxxii, sect 3, p. 640.

The surrender of Nikias must have taken place, I think, not less than twenty-four or twenty-five days after the eclipse, which occurred on the 27th of August, that is, about Sept. 21. Mr. Fynes Clinton (F. H. ad ann. 413 B.C.) seems to me to compress too much the interval between the eclipse and the retreat; considering that that interval included two great battles, with a certain delay before, between, and after.

The μετὸπωρον noticed by Thucyd. vii, 79. suits with Sept. 21: compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 22.

[525] Thucyd. vii, 87.

[526] Pausan. i, 29, 9; Philist. Fragm. 46, ed. Didot.

Justin erroneously says that Demosthenês actually did kill himself, rather than submit to surrender, before the surrender of Nikias; who, he says, did not choose to follow the example:—

"Demosthenês, amisso exercitu a captivitate gladio et voluntariâ morte se vindicat: Nicias autem, ne Demosthenis quidem exemplo, ut sibi consuleret, admonitus, cladem suorum auxit dedecore captivitatis." (Justin, iv, 5.)

Philistus, whom Pausanias announces himself as following, is an excellent witness for the actual facts in Sicily; though not so good a witness for the impression at Athens respecting those facts.

It seems certain, even from Thucydidês, that Nikias, in surrendering himself to Gylippus, thought that he had considerable chance of saving his life, Plutarch too so interprets the proceeding, and condemns it as disgraceful, see his comparison of Nikias and Crassus, near the end. Demosthenês could not have thought the same for himself: the fact of his attempted suicide appears to me certain, on the authority of Philistus, though Thucydidês does not notice it.

[527] Thucyd. vii, 86. Καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιαὐτῃ ἢ ὅτι ἐγγὐτατα τοὐτων αἰτίᾳ ἐτεθνήκει, ἥκιστα δὴ ἄξιος ὢν τῶν γε ἐπ' ἐμοῦ Ἑλλήνων ἐς τοῦτο δυστυχίας ἀφικέσθαι, *διὰ τὴν νενομισμένην ἐς τὸ θεῖον ἐπιτήδευσιν*.

So stood the text of Thucydidês, until various recent editors changed the last words, on the authority of some MSS., to *διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν*.

Though Dr. Arnold and some of the best critics prefer and adopt the latter reading, I confess it seems to me that the former is more suitable to the Greek vein of thought, as well as more conformable to truth about Nikias.

A man's good or bad fortune, depending on the favorable or unfavorable disposition of the gods towards him, was understood to be determined more directly by his piety and religious observances, rather than by his virtue, see passages in Isokratês de Permutation. Orat. xv, sect. 301; Lysias, cont. Nikomach. c. 5, p. 854, though undoubtedly the two ideas went to a certain extent together. Men might differ about the virtue of Nikias; but his piety was an incontestable fact; and his "good fortune" also, in times prior to the Sicilian expedition, was recognized by men like Alkibiadês, who most probably had no very lofty opinion of his virtue (Thucyd. vi, 17). The contrast between the remarkable piety of Nikias, and that extremity of ill-fortune which marked the close of his life, was very likely to shock Grecian ideas generally, and was a natural circumstance for the historian to note. Whereas if we read, in the passage, πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν, the panegyric upon Nikias becomes both less special and more disproportionate, beyond what even Thucydidês (as far as we can infer from other expressions, see v, 16) would be inclined to bestow upon him—more, in fact, than he says in commendation even of Periklês.

[528] A good many of the features depicted by Tacitus (Hist. i, 49) in Galba, suit the character of Nikias, much more than those of the rapacious and unprincipled Crassus, with whom Plutarch compares the latter:—

"Vetus in familiâ nobilitas, magnæ opes: ipsi medium ingenium, magis extra vitia, quam cum virtutibus. Sed claritas natalium, et metus temporum, obtentui fuit, ut *quod segnitia fuit, sapientia* vocaretur. Dum vigebat ætas, militari laude apud Germanias floruit: proconsul, Africam moderate; jam senior, citeriorem Hispaniam, pari justitiâ continuit. *Major privato visus dum privatus fuit, et omnium consensu capax imperii, nisi imperasset.*"

[529] Thucyd. i, 122-142; vi, 90.

[530] Thucyd. viii. 4. About the extensive ruin caused by the Lacedæmonians to the olive-grounds in Attica, see Lysias, Or. vii, De Oleâ Sacrâ, sects. 6, 7.

An inscription preserved in M. Boeckh's Corp. Inscr. (part ii, No. 93, p. 132), gives some hint how landlords and tenants met this inevitable damage from the hands of the invaders. The deme Æxôneis lets a farm to a certain tenant for forty years, at a fixed rent of one hundred and forty drachmæ; but if an invading enemy shall drive him out or injure his farm, the deme is to receive one half of the year's produce, in place of the year's rent.

[531] Thucyd. vii, 28, 29.

[532] Thucyd. vii, 27.

[533] Thucyd. vii, 28.

[534] Upon this new assessment on the allies, determined by the Athenians, Mr. Mitford remarks as follows:—

"Thus light, in comparison of what we have laid upon ourselves, was the heaviest tax, as far as we learn from history, at that time known in the world. Yet it caused much discontent among the dependent commonwealths; the arbitrary power by which it was imposed being indeed reasonably execrated, though the burden itself was comparatively a nothing."

This admission is not easily reconciled with the frequent invectives in which Mr. Mitford indulges against the empire of Athens, as practising a system of extortion and oppression ruinous to the subject-allies.

I do not know, however, on what authority he affirms that this was "the heaviest tax then known in the world;" and that "it caused much discontent among the subject commonwealths." The latter assertion would indeed be sufficiently probable, if it be true that the tax ever came into operation; but we are not entitled to affirm it.

Considering how very soon the terrible misfortunes of Athens came on, I cannot but think it a matter of uncertainty whether the new assessment ever became a reality throughout the Athenian empire. And the fact that Thucydidês does not notice it as an additional cause of discontent among the allies, is one reason for such doubts.

[535] Thucyd. vii, 29, 30, 31. I conceive that οὔσῃ *οὐ* μεγάλῃ is the right reading, and not οὔσῃ μεγάλῃ, in reference to Mykalêssus. The words ὡς ἐπὶ μεγέθει, in c. 31, refer to the size of the city.

The reading is, however, disputed among critics. It is evident from the language of Thucydidês that the catastrophe at Mykalêssus made a profound impression throughout Greece.

[536] Thucyd. vii, 30; Pausanias. i, 23, 3. Compare Meineke, ad Aristophanis Fragment. Ἥρωες, vol. ii, p. 1069.

[537] See above, vol. vi, ch. xlix, p. 196 of this History.

[538] See the preceding chapter.

[539] Thucyd. vii, 31. Compare the language of Phormion, ii. 88, 89.

[540] Thucyd. vii, 34.

[541] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 30. He gives the story without much confidence, Ἀθηναίους δὲ *φασι*, etc.

[542] Thucyd. viii, 1.

[543] Thucyd. viii, 1. Πάντα δὲ πανταχόθεν αὐτοὺς ἐλύπει, etc.

[544] Thucyd. viii, 1. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔγνωσαν, χαλεποὶ μὲν ἦσαν τοῖς ξυμπροθυμηθεῖσι τῶν ῥητόρων τὸν ἔκπλουν, *ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ ψηφισάμενοι*, etc.

From these latter words, it would seem that Thucydidês considered the Athenians, after having adopted the expedition by their votes, to have debarred themselves from the right of complaining of those speakers who had stood forward prominently to advise the step. I do not at all concur in his opinion. The adviser of any important measure always makes himself morally responsible for its justice, usefulness, and practicability; and he very

properly incurs disgrace, more or less according to the case, if it turns out to present results totally contrary to those which he had predicted. We know that the Athenian law often imposed upon the mover of a proposition not merely *moral*, but even *legal*, responsibility; a regulation of doubtful propriety under other circumstances, but which I believe to have been useful at Athens.

It must be admitted, however, to have been hard upon the advisers of this expedition, that—from the total destruction of the armament, neither generals nor soldiers returning—they were not enabled to show how much of the ruin had arisen from faults in the execution, not in the plan conceived. The speaker in the Oration of Lysias—περὶ δημεύσεως τοῦ Νικίου ἀδελφοῦ (Or. xviii, sect. 2)—attempts to transfer the blame from Nikias upon the advisers of the expedition, a manifest injustice.

Demosthenês (in the Oration De Coronâ, c. 73) gives an emphatic and noble statement of the responsibility which he cheerfully accepts for himself as a political speaker and adviser; responsibility for seeing the beginnings and understanding the premonitory signs of coming events, and giving his countrymen warning beforehand: ἰδεῖν τὰ πράγματα ἀρχόμενα καὶ προαισθέσθαι καὶ προειπεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις. This is the just view of the subject; and, applying the measure proposed by Demosthenês, the Athenians had ample ground to be displeased with their orators.

[545] Thucyd. viii, 1. πάντα δὲ πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδεὲς, ὅπερ φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν, ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐτακτεῖν; compare Xenoph. Mem. iii, 5, 5.

[546] Thucyd. viii, 1-4. About the functions of this Board of Probûli, much has been said for which there is no warrant in Thucydidês: τῶν τε κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τι ἐς εὐτέλειαν σωφρονίσαι, καὶ ἀρχήν τινα πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν ἑλέσθαι, οἵτινες περὶ τῶν παρόντων ὡς ἂν καιρὸς ᾖ προβουλεύσουσι. Πάντα δὲ πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδεὲς, ὅπερ φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν, ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐτακτεῖν.

Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks: "That is, no measure was to be submitted to the people, till it had first been approved by this council of elders." And such is the general view of the commentators.

No such meaning as this, however, is necessarily contained in the word Πρόβουλοι. It is, indeed, conceivable that persons so denominated might be invested with such a control; but we cannot infer it, or affirm it, simply from the name. Nor will the passages in Aristotle's Politics, wherein the word Πρόβουλοι occurs, authorize any inference with respect to this Board in the special case of Athens (Aristotel. Politic. iv, 11, 9; iv, 12, 8; vi, 5, 10-13).

The Board only seems to have lasted for a short time at Athens, being named for a temporary purpose, at a moment of peculiar pressure and discouragement. During such a state of feeling, there was little necessity for throwing additional obstacles in the way of new propositions to be made to the people. It was rather of importance to *encourage* the suggestion of new measures, from men of sense and experience. A Board destined merely for control and hindrance, would have been mischievous instead of useful under the reigning melancholy at Athens.

The Board was doubtless merged in the Oligarchy of Four Hundred, like all the other magistracies of the state, and was not reconstituted after their deposition.

I cannot think it admissible to draw inferences as to the functions of this Board of Probûli now constituted, from the proceedings of the Probûlus in Aristophanis Lysistrata, as is done by Wachsmuth (Hellenische Alterthumskunde, i, 2, p. 198), and by Wattenbach (De Quadringentorum Athenis Factione, pp. 17-21, Berlin 1842).

Schömann (Ant. Jur. Pub. Græcor. v, xii, p. 181) says of these Πρόβουλοι: "Videtur autem eorum potestas fere annua fuisse." I do not distinctly understand what he means by these words; whether he means that the Board continued permanent, but that the members were annually changed. If this be his meaning, I dissent from it. I think that the Board lasted until the time of the Four Hundred, which would be about a year and a half after its first institution.

[547] Thucyd. viii, 2, 3. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὴν πρόσταξιν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἑκατὸν νεῶν *τῆς ναυπηγίας* ἐποιοῦντο, etc.; compare also c. 4—παρεσκευάζοντο τὴν *ναυπηγίαν*, etc.

[548] Thucyd. viii, 5. ὄντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὥσπερ ἀρχομένων ἐν κατασκευῇ τοῦ πολέμου: compare ii, 7.

[549] Thucyd. viii, 2: compare ii, 7; iii, 86.

[550] Thucyd. viii, 3.

[551] Thucyd. viii, 5.

[552] Thucyd. viii, 7-24.

[553] Thucyd. viii, 5. Ὑπὸ βασιλέως γὰρ *νεωστὶ* ἐτύγχανε πεπραγμένος (Tissaphernes) τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους, οὓς δι' Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐ δυνάμενος πράσσεσθαι ἐπωφείλησε. Τούς τε οὖν φόρους μᾶλλον ἐνόμιζε κομιεῖσθαι κακώσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, etc.

I have already discussed this important passage at some length, in its bearing upon the treaty concluded thirty-seven years before this time between Athens and Persia. See the note to volume v, chap. xlv, pp. 337-339, of this History.

[554] Thucyd. viii, 29. Καὶ μηνὸς μὲν τροφήν, *ὥσπερ ὑπέστη ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι*, ἐς δραχμὴν Ἀττικὴν ἑκάστῳ πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ διέδωκε, τοῦ δὲ λοιποῦ χρόνου ἐβούλετο τριώβολον διδόναι, etc.

[555] The satrapy of Tissaphernes extended as far north as Antandrus and Adramyttium (Thucyd. viii, 108).

[556] Thucyd. viii, 6.

[557] Thucyd. viii, 6-12; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 23, 24; Cornelius Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 3.

[558] Thucyd. viii, 6.

[559] Thucyd. viii, 8.

[560] Thucyd. viii, 10. Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τὰ Ἴσθμια ἐγένετο· καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι (ἐπηγγέλθησαν γὰρ) ἐθεώρουν ἐς αὐτά· καὶ κατάδηλα μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς τὰ τῶν Χίων ἐφάνη.

The language of Thucydidês in this passage deserves notice. The Athenians were now at enmity with Corinth: it was therefore remarkable, and contrary to what would be expected among Greeks, that they should be present with their theôry, or solemn sacrifice, at the Isthmian festival. Accordingly Thucydidês, when he mentions that they went thither, thinks it right to add the explanation—*ἐπηγγέλθησαν γὰρ*—"for they had been invited;" "for the festival truce had been formally signified to them." That the heralds who proclaimed the truce should come and proclaim it to a state in hostility with Corinth, was something unusual, and merited special notice: otherwise, Thucydidês would never have thought it worth while to mention the proclamation, it being the uniform practice.

We must recollect that this was the first Isthmian festival which had taken place since the resumption of the war between Athens and the Peloponnesian alliance. The habit of leaving out Athens from the Corinthian herald's proclamation had not yet been renewed. In regard to the Isthmian festival, there was probably greater reluctance to leave her out, because that festival was in its origin half Athenian; said to have been established, or revived after interruption, by Theseus; and the Athenian theôry enjoyed a προεδρία, or privileged place, at the games (Plutarch, Theseus, c. 25; Argument. ad Pindar. Isthm. Schol.).

[561] Thucyd. viii, 11.

[562] Thucyd. viii, 12.

[563] Thucyd. viii, 14.

[564] Thucyd. viii, 9. Αἴτιον δ' ἐγένετο τῆς ἀποστολῆς τῶν νεῶν, *οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν Χίων οὐκ εἰδότες τὰ πρασσόμενα*, οἱ δὲ ὀλίγοι ξυνειδότες, *τό τε πλῆθος οὐ βουλόμενοί πω πολέμιον ἔχειν*, πρίν τι καὶ ἰσχυρὸν λάβωσι, καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους οὐκέτι προσδεχόμενοι ἥξειν, ὅτι διέτριβον.

Also viii, 14. Ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης καὶ ὁ Χαλκιδεὺς … προξυγγενόμενοι τῶν ξυμπρασσόντων Χίων τισὶ, καὶ κελευόντων καταπλεῖν μὴ προειπόντας ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ἀφικνοῦνται αἰφνίδιοι τοῖς Χίοις. *Καὶ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἐν θαύματι ἦσαν καὶ ἐκπλήξει· τοῖς δ' ὀλίγοις παρεσκεύαστο* ὥστε βουλὴν τε τυχεῖν ξυλλεγομένην, καὶ γενομένων λόγων ἀπό τε τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὡς ἄλλαι τε νῆες πολλαὶ προσπλέουσι, καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς πολιορκίας τῶν ἐν Πειραιῷ νεῶν οὐ δηλωσάντων, ἀφίστανται Χῖοι, καὶ αὖθις Ἐρυθραῖοι, Ἀθηναίων.

[565] See the remarkable passage of Thucyd. viii, 24, about the calculations of the Chian government.

[566] Thucyd. viii, 15.

[567] Thucyd. viii, 16.

[568] Thucyd. viii, 17-19.

[569] Thucyd. viii, 18.

[570] Thucyd. viii, 84-109.

[571] Thucyd. viii, 44.

[572] Thucyd. viii, 21. Ἐγένετο δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐν Σάμῳ *ἐπανάστασις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς*, μετὰ Ἀθηναίων, οἳ ἔτυχον ἐν τρισὶ ναυσὶ παρόντες. Καὶ ὁ δῆμος ὁ Σαμίων ἐς διακοσίους μέν τινας τοὺς πάντας τῶν δυνατῶν ἀπέκτεινε, τετρακοσίους δὲ φυγῇ ζημιώσαντες καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν καὶ οἰκίας νειμάμενοι, Ἀθηναίων τε σφίσιν αὐτονομίαν μετὰ ταῦτα *ὡς βεβαίοις ἤδη* ψηφισαμένων, τὰ λοιπὰ διῴκουν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τοῖς γεωμόροις μετεδίδοσαν οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς, οὔτε ἐκδοῦναι οὐδ' ἀγαγέσθαι παρ' ἐκείνων οὐδ' ἐς ἐκείνους οὐδενὶ ἔτι τοῦ δήμου ἐξῆν.

[573] Thucyd. viii, 21. The dispositions and plans of the "higher people" at Samos, to call in the Peloponnesians and revolt from Athens, are fully admitted even by Mr. Mitford, and implied by Dr. Thirlwall, who argues that the government of Samos cannot have been oligarchical, because, if it had been so, the island would already have revolted from Athens to the Peloponnesians.

Mr. Mitford says (ch. xix, sect. iii, vol. iv, p. 191): "Meanwhile the body of the higher people at Samos, more depressed than all others since their reduction on their former revolt, were *proposing to seize the opportunity that seemed to offer through the prevalence of the Peloponnesian arms, of mending their condition*. The lower people, *having intelligence of their design*, rose upon them, and, with the assistance of the crews of three Athenian ships then at Samos, overpowered them," etc. etc. etc.

"The *massacre and robbery* were rewarded by a decree of the Athenian people, granting to the perpetrators the independent administration of the affairs of their island; which, since the last rebellion, had been kept *under the immediate control of the Athenian government*."

To call this a *massacre* is perversion of language. It was an insurrection and intestine conflict, in which the "higher people" were vanquished, but of which they also were the beginners, by their conspiracy—which Mr. Mitford himself admits as a fact—to introduce a foreign enemy into the island. Does he imagine that the "lower people" were bound to sit still and see this done? And what means had they of preventing it, except by insurrection; which inevitably became bloody, because the "higher people" were a strong party, in possession of the powers of government, with great means of resistance. The loss on the part of the assailants is not made known to us, nor indeed the loss in so far as it fell on the followers of the geômori. Thucydidês specifies only the number of the geômori themselves, who were persons of individual importance.

I do not clearly understand what idea Mr. Mitford forms to himself of the government of Samos at this time. He seems to conceive it as democratical, yet under great immediate control from Athens, and that it kept the "higher people" in a state of severe depression, from which they sought to relieve themselves by the aid of the Peloponnesian arms.

But if he means by the expression, "*under the immediate control of the Athenian government*," that there was any Athenian governor or garrison at Samos, the account here given by Thucydidês distinctly refutes him. The conflict was between two intestine parties, "the higher people and the lower people." The only Athenians who took part in it were the crews of three triremes, and even they were there by accident (οἳ ἔτυχον παρόντες), not as a regular garrison. Samos was under an indigenous government; but it was a subject and tributary ally of Athens, like all the other allies, with the exception of Chios and Methymna (Thucyd. vi, 85). After this resolution, the Athenians raised it to the rank of an autonomous ally, which Mr. Mitford is pleased to call "rewarding massacre and robbery," in the language of a party orator rather than of an historian.

But was the government of Samos, immediately before this intestine contest, oligarchical or democratical? The language of Thucydidês carries to my mind a full conviction that it was oligarchical, under an exclusive aristocracy, called The Geômori. Dr. Thirlwall, however (whose candid and equitable narrative of this event forms a striking contrast to that of Mr. Mitford), is of a different opinion. He thinks it certain that a democratical government had been established at Samos by the Athenians, when it was reconquered by them (B.C. 440) after its revolt. That the government continued democratical during the first years of the Peloponnesian war, he conceives to be proved by the hostility of the Samian exiles at Anæa, whom he looks upon as oligarchical refugees. And though not agreeing in Mr. Mitford's view of the peculiarly depressed condition of the "higher people" at Samos at this later time, he nevertheless thinks that they were not actually in possession of the government. "Still (he

says), as the island gradually recovered its prosperity, the privileged class seems also to have looked upward, perhaps contrived to regain a part of the substance of power under different forms, and probably betrayed a strong inclination to revive its ancient pretensions on the first opportunity. *That it had not yet advanced beyond this point, may be regarded as certain; because otherwise Samos would have been among the foremost to revolt from Athens*: and on the other hand, it is no less clear, that the state of parties there was such as to excite a high degree of mutual jealousy, and great alarm in the Athenians, to whom the loss of the island at this juncture would have been almost irreparable." (Hist. of Gr. ch. xxvii, vol. iii, p. 477 2d edit.) Manso (Sparta, book iv, vol. ii, p. 266) is of the same opinion.

Surely, the conclusion which Dr. Thirlwall here announces as certain, cannot be held to rest on adequate premises. Admitting that there was an oligarchy in power at Samos, it is perfectly possible to explain why this oligarchy had not yet carried into act its disposition to revolt from Athens. We see that none of the allies of Athens—not even Chios, the most powerful of all—revolted without the extraneous pressure and encouragement of a foreign fleet. Alkibiadês, after securing Chios, considered Milêtus to be next in order of importance, and had, moreover, peculiar connections with the leading men there (viii, 17); so that he went next to detach that place from Athens. Milêtus, being on the continent, placed him in immediate communication with Tissaphernês, for which reason he might naturally deem it of importance superior even to Samos in his plans. Moreover, not only no foreign fleet had yet reached Samos, but several Athenian ships had arrived there: for Strombichidês, having come across the Ægean too late to save Chios, made Samos a sort of central station (viii, 16). These circumstances combined with the known reluctance of the Samian demos, or commonalty, are surely sufficient to explain why the Samian oligarchy had not yet consummated its designs to revolt. And hence the fact, that no revolt had yet taken place, cannot be held to warrant Dr. Thirlwall's inference, that the government was *not* oligarchical.

We have no information how or when the oligarchical government at Samos got up. That the Samian refugees at Anæa, so actively hostile to Samos and Athens during the first ten years of the Peloponnesian war, were oligarchical exiles acting against a democratical government at Samos (iv, 75), is not in itself improbable; yet it is not positively stated. The government of Samos might have been, even at that time, oligarchical; yet, if it acted in the Athenian interest, there would doubtless be a body of exiles watching for opportunities of injuring it, by aid of the enemies of Athens.

Moreover, it seems to me, that if we read and put together the passages of Thucydidês, viii, 21, 63, 73, it is impossible without the greatest violence to put any other sense upon them, except as meaning that the government of Samos was now in the hands of the oligarchy, or geômori, and that the Demos rose in insurrection against them, with ultimate triumph. The natural sense of the words ἐπανάστασις, ἐπανίσταμαι, is that of *insurrection against an established government: it does not mean, "a violent attack by one party upon another;" still less does it mean, "an attack made by a party in possession of the government:*" which nevertheless it ought to mean, if Dr. Thirlwall be correct in supposing that the Samian government was now democratical. Thus we have, in the description of the Samian revolt from Athens—Thucyd. i, 115 (after Thucydidês has stated that the Athenians established a democratical government, he next says that the Samian exiles presently came over with a mercenary force)—καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῷ *δήμῳ ἐπανέστησαν*, καὶ ἐκράτησαν τῶν πλείστων, etc. Again, v, 23—about the apprehended insurrection of the Helots against the Spartans—ἦν δὲ ἡ δούλεια *ἐπανίστηται*: compare Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 19; Plato, Republ. iv, 18, p. 444; Herodot. iii, 39-120. So also δυνατοὶ is among the words which Thucydidês uses for an oligarchical party, either in government or in what may be called *opposition* (i, 24; v, 4). But it is not conceivable to me that Thucydidês would have employed the words ἡ ἐπανάστασις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς—if the Demos had at that time been actually in the government.

Again, viii, 63, he says, that the Athenian oligarchical party under Peisander αὐτῶν τῶν Σαμίων προὐτρέψαντο τοὺς δυνατοὺς ὥστε πειρᾶσθαι μετὰ σφῶν ὀλιγαρχηθῆναι, καίπερ *ἐπαναστάντας αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλοις ἵνα μὴ ὀλιγαρχῶνται*. Here the motive of the previous ἐπανάστασις is clearly noted; it was in order that they might *not be under an oligarchical government*: for I agree with Krüger (in opposition to Dr. Thirlwall), that this is the clear meaning of the words, and that the use of the present tense prevents our construing it, "in order that their democratical government might not be subverted, and an oligarchy put upon them," which ought to be the sense, if Dr. Thirlwall's view were just.

Lastly, viii, 73, we have οἱ γὰρ *τότε τῶν Σαμίων ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες δῆμος, μεταβαλλόμενοι αὖθις*—ἐγένοντό τε ἐς τριακοσίους ξυνωμόται, καὶ ἔμελλον τοῖς ἄλλοις *ὡς δήμῳ ὄντι* ἐπιθήσεσθαι. Surely these words—οἱ ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες δῆμος—"those who having risen in arms against the wealthy and powerful, were now a demos, or a democracy," must imply, *that the*

persons against whom the rising had taken place had been a governing oligarchy. Surely, also, the words μεταβαλλόμενοι αὖθις, can mean nothing else except to point out the strange antithesis between the conduct of these same men at two different epochs not far distant from each other. On the first occasion, they rose up against an established oligarchical government, and constituted a democratical government. On the second occasion, they rose up in conspiracy against this very democratical government, in order to subvert it, and constitute themselves an oligarchy in its place. If we suppose that on the first occasion, the established government was already democratical, and that the persons here mentioned were not conspirators against an established oligarchy, but merely persons making use of the powers of a democratical government to do violence to rich citizens, all this antithesis completely vanishes.

On the whole, I feel satisfied that the government of Samos, at the time when Chios revolted from Athens, was oligarchical, like that of Chios itself. Nor do I see any difficulty in believing this to be the fact, though I cannot state when and how the oligarchy became established there. So long as the island performed its duty as a subject ally, Athens did not interfere with the form of its government. And she was least of all likely to interfere during the seven years of peace intervening between the years 421-414 B.C. There was nothing then to excite her apprehensions. The degree to which Athens intermeddled generally with the internal affairs of her subject-allies, seems to me to have been much exaggerated.

The Samian oligarchy, or geômori, dispossessed of the government on this occasion, were restored by Lysander after his victorious close of the Peloponnesian war,—Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 3, 6—where they are called οἱ ἀρχαῖοι πολῖται.

[574] Thucyd. viii, 13.

[575] Thucyd. viii, 20-23.

[576] See the earlier part of this History, vol. vi, ch. l, pp. 257, 258.

[577] Thucyd. viii, 22.

[578] Thucyd. viii, 20.

[579] Thucyd. viii, 23. ἀπεκομίσθη δὲ πάλιν κατὰ πόλεις καὶ ὁ *ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζός*, ὃς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἐμέλλησεν ἰέναι.

Dr. Arnold and Göller suppose that these soldiers had been carried over to Lesbos to coöperate in detaching the island from the Athenians. But this is not implied in the narrative. The land-force *marched along* by land to Klazomenæ and Kymê (ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα Πελοποννησίων τε τῶν παρόντων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων *παρῄει* ἐπὶ Κλαζομένων τε καὶ Κύμης). Thucydidês does not say that they ever crossed to Lesbos: they remained near Kymê, prepared to march forward, after that island should have been conquered, to the Hellespont.

Haacke is right, I think, in referring the words ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζός to what had been stated in c. 17; that Alkibiadês and Chalkideus, on first arriving with the Peloponnesian five triremes at Chios, disembarked on that island their Peloponnesian seamen and armed them as hoplites for land-forces; taking aboard fresh crews of seamen from the island. The motive to make this exchange was, the great superiority of bravery, in heavy armor and stand-up fighting, of Peloponnesians as compared with Chians or Asiatic Greeks (see Xenoph. Hell. iii, 2, 17). These foot-soldiers taken from the Peloponnesian ships are the same as those spoken of in c. 22: ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα Πελοποννησίων τε τῶν παρόντων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων … ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζός.

Farther, these troops are again mentioned in c. 24, as οἱ μετὰ Χαλκιδέως ἐλθόντες Πελοποννήσιοι, where Dr. Arnold again speaks of them in his note incorrectly. He says: "The Peloponnesians who came with Chalkideus must have been too few to offer any effectual resistance to one thousand heavy-armed Athenians, being only *the epibatæ* of five ships." The fact is that they were not merely the epibatæ, but the *entire crews*, of five ships; comprising probably from eight hundred to one thousand men (ἐκ μὲν τῶν *ἐκ Πελοποννήσου νεῶν τοὺς ναύτας ὁπλίσαντες* ἐν Χίῳ καταλιμπάνουσι, c. 17), since there were a remnant of five hundred left of them, after some months' operations and a serious defeat (viii, 32).

[580] Thucyd. viii, 24, with Dr. Arnold's note.

[581] Aristotel. Politic. iv, 4, 1; Athenæus, vi, p. 265.

[582] Thucyd. viii, 24. Καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Χῖοι ἤδη οὐκέτι ἐπεξῆσαν, οἱ δὲ (Ἀθηναῖοι) τὴν χώραν, καλῶς κατεσκευασμένην καὶ ἀπαθῆ οὖσαν ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν μέχρι τότε, διεπόρθησαν. Χῖοι γὰρ μόνοι μετὰ

Λακεδαιμονίους, ὧν ἐγὼ ἠσθόμην, εὐδαιμονήσαντες ἅμα καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἐπεδίδου ἡ πόλις αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον, τόσῳ δὲ καὶ ἐκοσμοῦντο ἐχυρώτερον, etc.

viii. 45. Οἱ Χῖοι … πλουσιώτατοι ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, etc.

[583] Thucyd. viii, 25, 26.

[584] Thucyd. viii, 26, 27.

[585] Phrynichus the Athenian commander was afterwards displaced by the Athenians,—by the recommendation of Peisander, at the time when this displacement suited the purpose of the oligarchical conspirators,—on the charge of having abandoned and betrayed Amorgês on this occasion, and caused the capture of Iasus (Thucyd. viii, 54).

Phrynichus and his colleagues were certainly guilty of grave omission in not sending notice to Amorgês of the sudden retirement of the Athenian fleet from Milêtus, the ignorance of which circumstance was one reason why Amorgês mistook the Peloponnesian ships for Athenian.

[586] Thucyd. viii, 28.

[587] Thucyd. viii, 29. What this new rate of pay was, or by what exact fraction it exceeded the half drachma, is a matter which the words of Thucydidês do not enable us to make out. None of the commentators can explain the text without admitting some alteration or omission of words: nor do any of the explanations given appear to me convincing. On the whole, I incline to consider the conjecture and explanation given by Paulmier and Dobree as more plausible than that of Dr. Arnold and Göller, or of Poppo and Hermann.

[588] Thucyd. viii, 36.

[589] Thucyd. viii, 30; compare Dr. Arnold's note.

[590] Thucyd. viii, 31, 32.

[591] Thucyd. viii, 32, 33.

[592] Thucyd. viii, 33, 34.

[593] Thucyd. viii, 34-38. Δελφίνιον—*λιμένας* ἔχον, etc.

That the Athenians should select Lesbos on this occasion as the base of their operations, and as the immediate scene of last preparations, against Chios,—was only repeating what they had once done before (c. 24), and what they again did afterwards (c. 100). I do not feel the difficulty which strikes Dobree and Dr. Thirlwall. Doubtless Delphinium was to the north of the city of Chios.

[594] Thucyd. viii, 38-40. About the slaves in Chios, see the extracts from Theopompus and Nymphodôrus in Athenæus, vi, p. 265.

That from Nymphodôrus appears to be nothing but a romantic local legend, connected with the Chapel of the *Kind-hearted Hero* (Ἥρωος εὐμένους) at Chios.

Even in antiquity, though the institution of slavery was universal and noway disapproved, yet the slave-trade, or the buying and selling of slaves, was accounted more or less odious.

[595] See the life of Lysias the Rhetor, in Dionysius of Halikarnassus, c. i, p. 453, Reisk., and in Plutarch, Vit. x, Orat. p. 835.

[596] Thucyd. viii, 35-109.

[597] Thucyd. viii, 35, 36. καὶ γὰρ μισθὸς ἐδίδοτο *ἀρκούντως*, etc.

[598] Thucyd. viii, 37. Καὶ ἦν τις τῶν *ἐν τῇ βασιλέως χώρᾳ, ἢ ὅσης βασιλεὺς ἄρχει*, ἐπὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἴῃ ἢ τῶν ξυμμάχων, βασιλεὺς κωλυέτω καὶ ἀμυνέτω κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.

The distinction here drawn between *the king's territory*, and the territory *over which the king holds empire*, deserves notice. By the former phrase, is understood, I presume, the continent of Asia, which the court of Susa looked upon, together with all its inhabitants, as a freehold exceedingly sacred and peculiar (Herodot. i, 4): by the latter, as much as the satrap should find it convenient to lay hands upon, of that which had once belonged to Darius son of Hystaspes or to Xerxes, in the plenitude of their power.

[599] Thucyd. viii, 38. ἀποπλέων ἐν κέλητι ἀφανίζεται.

[600] Thucyd. viii, 39. Καὶ εἴρητο αὐτοῖς, ἐς Μίλητον ἀφικομένους *τῶν τε ἄλλων ξυνεπιμελεῖσθαι*, ᾗ μέλλει ἄριστα ἕξειν, etc.

[601] Thucyd. viii, 42.

[602] Thucyd. viii, 43. This defeat of Charmînus is made the subject of a jest by Aristophanês, Thesmophor. 810, with the note of Paulmier.

[603] Thucyd. viii, 43.

[604] Thucyd. viii, 44. Οἱ δ' ἐς τὴν Ῥόδον, ἐπικηρυκευομένων ἀπὸ τῶν δυνατωτάτων ἀνδρῶν, τὴν γνώμην εἶχον πλεῖν, etc.

… Καὶ προσβαλόντες Καμείρῳ τῆς Ῥοδίας πρώτῃ, ναυσὶ τέσσαρσι καὶ ἐνενήκοντα, *ἐξεφόβησαν μὲν τοὺς πολλούς, οὐκ εἰδότας τὰ πρασσόμενα*, καὶ ἔφυγον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτειχίστου οὔσης τῆς πόλεως, etc.

We have to remark here, as on former occasions of revolts among the dependent allies of Athens, that the general population of the allied city manifests no previous discontent, nor any spontaneous disposition to revolt. The powerful men of the island—those who, if the government was democratical, formed the oligarchical minority, but who formed the government itself, if oligarchical—conspire and bring in the Peloponnesian force, unknown to the body of the citizens, and thus leave to the latter no free choice. The real feeling towards Athens on the part of the body of the citizens is one of simple acquiescence, with little attachment on the one hand, yet no hatred, or sense of practical suffering, on the other.

[605] Thucyd. viii, 44: compare c. 57.

[606] Thucyd. viii, 40-55.

[607] Thucyd. viii, 39.

[608] Thucyd. viii, 45. Suggestions of Alkibiadês to Tissaphernês—Καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν πόλεων ἐδίδασκεν *ὥστε δόντα χρήματα αὐτὸν πεῖσαι*, ὥστε *ξυγχωρῆσαι ταῦτα ἑαυτῷ*, πλὴν τῶν Συρακοσίων· τούτων δὲ, Ἑρμοκράτης ἠναντιοῦτο *μόνος* ὑπὲρ τοῦ ξύμπαντος ξυμμαχικοῦ.

About the bribes to Astyochus himself, see also c. 50.



GEORGE GROTE.

HISTORY OF GREECE.

BY

GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.

VOL. VIII.

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PREFACE TO VOL. VIII.

I HAD hoped to be able, in this Volume, to carry the history of Greece down as far as the battle of Knidus; but I find myself disappointed.

A greater space than I anticipated has been necessary, not merely to do justice to the closing events of the Peloponnesian war, especially the memorable scenes at Athens after the battle of Arginusæ, but also to explain my views both respecting the Sophists and respecting Sokratês.

It has been hitherto common to treat the sophists as corruptors of the Greek mind, and to set forth the fact of such corruption, increasing as we descend downwards from the great invasion of Xerxês, as historically certified. Dissenting as I do from former authors, and believing that Grecian history has been greatly misconceived, on both these points, I have been forced to discuss the evidences, and exhibit the reasons for my own way of thinking, at considerable length.

To Sokratês I have devoted one entire Chapter. No smaller space would have sufficed to lay before the reader any tolerable picture of that illustrious man, the rarest intellectual phenomenon of ancient times, and originator of the most powerful scientific impulse which the Greek mind ever underwent.

G. G.

London, February, 1850.

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Alkibiadês comes to Samos, on the invitation of the armament. — Confidence placed by the armament in his language and promises — they choose him one of their generals. — New position of Alkibiadês — present turn of his ambition. — The envoys of the Four Hundred reach Samos — are indignantly sent back by the armament. — Eagerness of the armament to sail to Peiræus — is discountenanced by Alkibiadês — his answer to the envoys. — Dissuasive advice of Alkibiadês — how far it is to be commended as sagacious. — Envoys sent from Argos to the "Athenian Demos at Samos." — Return of the envoys of the Four Hundred from Samos to Athens — bad prospects of the oligarchy. — Mistrust and discord among the Four Hundred themselves. An opposition party formed under Theramenês. — Theramenês demands that the Five Thousand shall be made a reality. — Measures of Antiphon and the Four Hundred — their solicitations to Sparta — construction of the fort of Ectioneia, for the admission of a Spartan garrison. — Unaccountable backwardness of the Lacedæmonians. — Assassination of Phrynichus — Lacedæmonian fleet hovering near Peiræus. — Rising at Athens against the Four Hundred — demolition of the new fort at Ectioneia. — Decline of the Four Hundred — concessions made by them — renewal of the public assembly. — Lacedæmonian fleet threatens Peiræus — passes by to Eubœa. — Naval battle near Eretria — Athenians defeated — Eubœa revolts. — Dismay at Athens — her ruin inevitable, if the Lacedæmonians had acted with energy. — The Four Hundred are put down — the democracy in substance restored. — Moderation of political antipathies, and patriotic spirit, now prevalent. — The Five Thousand — a number never exactly realized — were soon enlarged into universal citizenship. — Restoration of the complete democracy, all except pay. — Psephism of Demophantus — democratical oath prescribed. — Flight of most of the leaders of the Four Hundred to Dekeleia. — Theramenês stands forward to accuse the remaining leaders of the Four Hundred, especially in reference to the fort at Ectioneia, and the embassy to Sparta. — Antiphon tried, condemned, and executed. — Treatment of the Four Hundred generally. — Favorable judgment of Thucydidês on the conduct of the Athenians. — Oligarchy at Athens, democracy at Samos — contrast.

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CHAPTER LXIII.

THE RESTORED ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, AFTER THE DEPOSITION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED, DOWN TO THE ARRIVAL OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER IN ASIA MINOR.

Embarrassed state of Athens after the Four Hundred. — Peloponnesian fleet — revolt of Abydos from Athens. — Strombichidês goes from Chios to the Hellespont — improved condition of the Chians. — Discontent in the Peloponnesian fleet at Milêtus. — Strombichidês returns from Chios to Samos. — Peloponnesian squadron and force at the Hellespont — revolt of Byzantium from Athens. — Discontent and meeting against Astyochus at Milêtus. — The Spartan commissioner Lichas enjoins the Milesians to obey Tissaphernês — discontent of the Milesians. — Mindarus supersedes Astyochus as admiral. — Phenician fleet at Aspendus — duplicity of Tissaphernês. — Alkibiadês at Aspendus — his double game between Tissaphernês and the Athenians. — Phenicians sent back from Aspendus without action — motives of Tissaphernês. — Mindarus leaves Milêtus with his fleet — goes to Chios — Thrasyllus and the Athenian fleet at Lesbos. — Mindarus eludes Thrasyllus, and reaches the Hellespont. — Athenian Hellespontine squadron escapes from Sestos in the night. — Thrasyllus and the Athenian fleet at the Hellespont. — Battle of Kynossêma — victory of the Athenian fleet. — Rejoicing at Athens for the victory. — Bridge across the Euripus, joining Eubœa with Bœotia. — Revolt of Kyzikus. — Zeal of Pharnabazus against Athens — importance of Persian money. — Tissaphernês again courts the Peloponnesians. — Alkibiadês returns from Aspendus to Samos. — Farther combats at the Hellespont. — Theramenês sent out with reinforcements from Athens. — Renewed troubles at Korkyra. — Alkibiadês is seized by Tissaphernês and confined at Sardis. — Escape of Alkibiadês — concentration of the Athenian fleet — Mindarus besieges Kyzikus. — Battle of Kyzikus — victory of the Athenians — Mindarus is slain, and the whole Peloponnesian fleet taken. — Discouragement of the Spartans — proposition to Athens for peace. — The Lacedæmonian Endius at Athens — his propositions for peace. — Refused by Athens — opposition of Kleophon. — Grounds of the opposition of Kleophon. — Question of policy as it then stood, between war and peace. — Strenuous aid of Pharnabazus to the Peloponnesians — Alkibiadês and the Athenian fleet at the Bosphorus. — The Athenians occupy Chrysopolis, and levy toll on the ships passing through the Bosphorus. — The Lacedæmonians are expelled from Thasus. — Klearchus the Lacedæmonian is sent to Byzantium. — Thrasyllus sent from Athens to Ionia. — Thrasyllus and Alkibiadês at the Hellespont. — Pylos is retaken by the Lacedæmonians — disgrace of the Athenian Anytus for not relieving it. — Capture of Chalkêdon by Alkibiadês and the Athenians. — Convention concluded by the Athenians with Pharnabazus. — Byzantium captured by

the Athenians. — Pharnabazus conveys some Athenian envoys towards Susa, to make terms with the Great King.

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CHAPTER LXIV.

FROM THE ARRIVAL OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER IN ASIA MINOR DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF ARGINUSÆ.

Cyrus the younger — effects of his coming down to Asia Minor. — Pharnabazus detains the Athenian envoys. — Lysander — Lacedæmonian admiral in Asia. — Proceedings of the preceding admiral, Kratesippidas. — Lysander visits Cyrus at Sardis. — His dexterous policy — he acquires the peculiar esteem of Cyrus. — Abundant pay of the Peloponnesian armament, furnished by Cyrus. — Factions organized by Lysander among the Asiatic cities. — Proceedings of Alkibiadês in Thrace and Asia. — His arrival at Athens. — Feelings and details connected with his arrival. — Unanimous welcome with which he is received. — Effect produced upon Alkibiadês. — Sentiment of the Athenians towards him. — Disposition to refrain from dwelling on his previous wrongs, and to give him a new trial. — Mistaken confidence and intoxication of Alkibiadês. — He protects the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries by land, against the garrison of Dekeleia. — Fruitless attempt of Agis to surprise Athens. — Alkibiadês sails with an armament to Asia — ill-success at Andros — entire failure in respect to hopes from Persia. — Lysander at Ephesus — his cautious policy, refusing to fight — disappointment of Alkibiadês. — Alkibiadês goes to Phokæa, leaving his fleet under the command of Antiochus — oppression by Alkibiadês at Kymê. — Complaints of the Kymæans at Athens — defeat of Antiochus at Notium during the absence of Alkibiadês. — Dissatisfaction and complaint in the armament against Alkibiadês. — Murmur and accusation against him transmitted to Athens. — Alteration of sentiment at Athens — displeasure of the Athenians against him. — Reasonable grounds of such alteration and displeasure. — Different behavior towards Nikias and towards Alkibiadês. — Alkibiadês is dismissed from his command — ten generals named to succeed him — he retires to the Chersonese. — Konon and his colleagues — capture and liberation of the Rhodian Dorieus by the Athenians. — Kallikratidas supersedes Lysander — his noble character. — Murmurs and ill-will against Kallikratidas — energy and rectitude whereby he represses them. — His spirited behavior in regard to the Persians. — His appeal to the Milesians — Pan-Hellenic feelings. — He fits out a commanding fleet — his success at Lesbos — he liberates the captives and the Athenian garrison at Methymna. — Noble character of this proceeding — exalted Pan-Hellenic patriotism of Kallikratidas. — He blocks up Konon and the Athenian fleet at Mitylênê. — Triumphant position of Kallikratidas. — Hopeless condition of Konon — his stratagem to send news to Athens and entreat relief. — Kallikratidas defeats the squadron of Diomedon. — Prodigious effort of the Athenians to relieve Konon — large Athenian fleet equipped and sent to Arginusæ — Kallikratidas withdraws most of his fleet from Mitylênê, leaving Eteonikus to continue the blockade. — The two fleets marshalled for battle. — Comparative nautical skill, reversed since the beginning of the war. — Battle of Arginusæ — defeat of the Lacedæmonians — death of Kallikratidas. — It would have been better for Greece, and even for Athens, if Kallikratidas had been victor at Arginusæ. — Safe escape of Eteonikus and his fleet from Mitylênê to Chios. — Joy of Athens for the victory — indignation arising from the fact that the Athenian seamen on the disabled ships had not been picked up after the battle. — State of the facts about the disabled ships, and the men left in them. — Despatch of the generals to Athens, affirming that a storm had prevented them from saving the drowning men. — Justifiable wrath and wounded sympathy of the Athenians — extreme excitement among the relatives of the drowned men. — The generals are superseded, and directed to come home. — Examination of the generals before the senate and the people at Athens. — Debate in the public assembly — Theramenês accuses the generals as guilty of omitting to save the drowning men. — Effect of the accusation by Theramenês upon the assembly. — Defence of the generals — they affirm that they had commissioned Theramenês himself to undertake the duty. — Reason why the generals had not mentioned this commission in their despatch. — Different account given by Diodorus. — Probable version of the way in which the facts really occurred. — Justification of the generals — how far valid? — The alleged storm. Escape of Eteonikus. — Feelings of the Athenian public — how the case stood before them — decision adjourned to a future assembly. — Occurrence of the festival of Apaturia — the great family solemnity of the Ionic race. — Burst of feeling at the Apaturia — misrepresented by Xenophon. — Proposition of Kallixenus in the senate against the generals — adopted and submitted to the public assembly. — Injustice of the resolution — by depriving the generals of the customary securities for judicial trial. Psephism of Kannônus. — Opposition taken by Euryptolemus on the ground of constitutional form. — Graphê Paranomôn. — Excitement of the assembly — constitutional impediment overruled. — The prytanes refuse to put the question — their opposition overruled, all except that of Sokratês. — Altered temper of the assembly when the discussion had begun —

amendment moved and developed by Euryptolemus. — Speech of Euryptolemus. — His amendment is rejected — the proposition of Kallixenus is carried. — The six generals are condemned and executed. — Injustice of the proceeding — violation of the democratical maxims and sentiments. — Earnest repentance of the people soon afterwards — disgrace and end of Kallixenus. — Causes of the popular excitement. — Generals — not innocent men.

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CHAPTER LXV.

FROM THE BATTLE OF ARGINUSÆ TO THE RESTORATION OF THE DEMOCRACY AT ATHENS, AFTER THE EXPULSION OF THE THIRTY.

Alleged propositions of peace from Sparta to Athens — doubtful. — Eteonikus at Chios — distress of his seamen — conspiracy suppressed. — Solicitations from Chios and elsewhere that Lysander should be sent out again. — Arrival of Lysander at Ephesus — zeal of his partisans — Cyrus. — Violent revolution at Milêtus by the partisans of Lysander. — Cyrus goes to visit his dying father — confides his tributes to Lysander. — Inaction of the Athenian fleet after the battle of Arginusæ. — Operations of Lysander. — Both fleets at the Hellespont. — Athenian fleet at Ægospotami. — Battle of Ægospotami — surprise and capture of the entire Athenian fleet. — Capture of the Athenian commanders, all except Konon. — Slaughter of the captive generals and prisoners. — The Athenian fleet supposed to have been betrayed by its own commanders. — Distress and agony at Athens, when the defeat of Ægospotami was made known there. — Proceedings of Lysander. — Miserable condition of the Athenian kleruchs, and of the friends of Athens in the allied dependencies. — Suffering in Athens. — Amnesty proposed by Patrokleidês, and adopted. — Oath of mutual harmony sworn in the acropolis. — Arrival of Lysander. Athens is blocked up by sea and land. — Resolute holding-out of the Athenians — their propositions for capitulating are refused. — Pretences of Theramenês — he is sent as envoy — his studied delay. — Misery and famine in Athens — death of Kleophon. — The famine becomes intolerable — Theramenês is sent to obtain peace on any terms — debate about the terms at Sparta. — Peace is granted by Sparta, against the general sentiment of the allies. — Surrender of Athens — extreme wretchedness — number of deaths from famine. — Lysander enters Athens — return of the exiles — demolition of the Long Walls — dismantling of Peiræus — fleet given up. — The exiles and the oligarchical party in Athens — their triumphant behavior and devotion to Lysander. — Kritias and other exiles — past life of Kritias. — Kritias at the head of the oligarchs at Athens. — Oligarchical leaders named at Athens. — Seizure of Strombichidês and other eminent democrats. — Nomination of the Thirty, under the dictation of Lysander. — Conquest of Samos by Lysander — oligarchy restored there. — Triumphant return of Lysander to Sparta — his prodigious ascendency throughout Greece. — Proceedings of the Thirty at Athens — feelings of oligarchical men like Plato. — The Thirty begin their executions — Strombichidês and the imprisoned generals put to death — other democrats also. — Senate appointed by the Thirty — is only trusted to act under their intimidation. Numerous executions without trial. — The senate began by condemning willingly everyone brought before them. — Discord among the Thirty — dissentient views of Kritias and Theramenês. — Lacedæmonian garrison introduced — multiplied executions by Kritias and the Thirty. — Opposition of Theramenês to these measures — violence and rapacity still farther increased — rich and oligarchical men put to death. — Plan of Kritias to gain adherents by forcing men to become accomplices in deeds of blood — resistance of Sokratês. — Terror and discontent in the city — the Thirty nominate a body of Three Thousand as partisan hoplites. — They disarm the remaining hoplites of the city. — Murders and spoliations by the Thirty. Seizure of the Metics. — Seizure of Lysias the rhetor and his brother Polemarchus. The former escapes — the latter is executed. — Increased exasperation of Kritias and the majority of the Thirty against Theramenês. — Theramenês is denounced by Kritias in the Senate — speech of Kritias. — Reply of Theramenês. — Extreme violence of Kritias and the Thirty. — Condemnation of Theramenês. — Death of Theramenês — remarks on his character. — Increased tyranny of Kritias and the Thirty. — The Thirty forbid intellectual teaching. — Sokratês and the Thirty. — Growing insecurity of the Thirty. — Gradual alteration of feeling in Greece, since the capture of Athens. — Demand by the allies of Sparta to share in the spoils of the war — refused by Sparta. — Unparalleled ascendency of Lysander. — His overweening ambition — oppressive dominion of Sparta. — Disgust excited in Greece by the enormities of the Thirty. — Opposition to Lysander at Sparta — king Pausanias. — Kallikratidas compared with Lysander. — Sympathy at Thebes and elsewhere with the Athenian exiles. — Thrasybulus seizes Phylê — repulses the Thirty in their attack. — Farther success of Thrasybulus — the Thirty retreat to Athens. — Discord among the oligarchy at Athens — seizure of the Eleusinians. — Thrasybulus establishes himself in Peiræus. — The Thirty attack him and are defeated — Kritias is slain. — Colloquy during the burial-truce — language of Kleokritus. — Discouragement of

the oligarchs at Athens — deposition of the Thirty and appointment of the Ten — the Thirty go to Eleusis. — The Ten carry on the war against the exiles. — Increasing strength of Thrasybulus. — Arrival of Lysander in Attica with a Spartan force. — Straightened condition of the exiles in Peiræus. — Spartan king Pausanias conducts an expedition into Attica; opposed to Lysander. — His dispositions unfavorable to the oligarchy; reaction against the Thirty. — Pausanias attacks Peiræus; his partial success. — Peace party in Athens — sustained by Pausanias. — Pacification granted by Pausanias and the Spartan authorities. — The Spartans evacuate Attica — Thrasybulus and the exiles are restored — harangue of Thrasybulus. — Restoration of the democracy. — Capture of Eleusis — entire reunion of Attica — flight of the survivors of the Thirty.

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CHAPTER LXVI.

FROM THE RESTORATION OF THE DEMOCRACY TO THE DEATH OF ALKIBIADES.

Miserable condition of Athens during the two preceding years. — Immediate relief caused by the restoration. — Unanimous sentiment towards the renewed democracy. — Amnesty — treatment of the Thirty and the Ten. — Disfranchising proposition of Phormisius. — The proposition rejected — speech composed by Lysias against it. — Revision of the laws — the Nomothetæ. — Decree, that no criminal inquiries should be carried back beyond the archonship of Eukleidês, B.C. 403. — Oath taken by the senate and the dikasts modified. — Farther precautions to insure the observance of the amnesty. — Absence of harsh reactionary feeling, both after the Thirty and after the Four Hundred. — Generous and reasonable behavior of the demos — contrasted with that of the oligarchy. — Care of the people to preserve the rights of private property. — Repayment to the Lacedæmonians. — The horsemen, or knights. — Revision of the laws — Nikomachus. — Adoption of the fuller Ionic alphabet, in place of the old Attic, for writing up the laws. — Memorable epoch of the archonship of Eukleidês. The rhetor Lysias. — Other changes at Athens — abolition of the Board of Hellenotamiæ — restriction of the right of citizenship. — Honorary reward to Thrasybulus and the exiles. — Position and views of Alkibiadês in Asia. — Artaxerxes Mnêmon, the new king of Persia. Plans of Cyrus — Alkibiadês wishes to reveal them at Susa. — The Lacedæmonians conjointly with Cyrus require Pharnabazus to put him to death. — Assassination of Alkibiadês by order of Pharnabazus. — Character of Alkibiadês.

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CHAPTER LXVII.

THE DRAMA. — RHETORIC AND DIALECTICS. — THE SOPHISTS.

Athens immediately after Eukleidês — political history little known. — Extraordinary development of dramatic genius. — Gradual enlargement of tragedy. — Abundance of new tragedy at Athens. — Accessibility of the theatre to the poorest citizens. — Theôrikon, or festival-pay. — Effect of the tragedies on the public mind of Athens. — Æschylus, Sophoklês, and Euripidês — modifications of tragedy. — Popularity arising from expenditure of money on the festivals. — Growth and development of comedy at Athens. — Comic poets before Aristophanês — Kratinus, etc. — Exposure of citizens by name in comedy — forbidden for a time — then renewed — Kratês and the milder comedy. — Aristophanês. — Comedy in its effect on the Athenian mind. — Mistaken estimate of the comic writers, as good witnesses or just critics. — Aversion of Solon to the drama when nascent. — Dramatic poetry as compared with the former kinds of poetry. — Ethical sentiment, interest, and debate, infused into the drama. — The drama formed the stage of transition to rhetoric, dialectics, and ethical philosophy. — Practical value and necessity of rhetorical accomplishments. — Rhetoric and dialectics. — Empedoklês of Agrigentum — first name in the rhetorical movement. — Zeno of Elea — first name in the dialectical movement. — Eleatic school — Parmenidês. — Zeno and Melissus — their dialectic attacks upon the opponents of Parmenidês. — Zeno at Athens — his conversation both with Periklês and with Sokratês. — Early manifestation, and powerful efficacy, of the negative arm in Grecian philosophy. — Rhetoric and dialectics — men of active life and men of speculation — two separate lines of intellectual activity. — Standing antithesis between these two intellectual classes — vein of ignorance at Athens, hostile to both. — Gradual enlargement of the field of education at Athens — increased knowledge and capacity of the musical teachers. — The sophists — true Greek meaning of that word — invidious sentiment implied in it. — The name sophist applied by Plato in a peculiar sense, in his polemics against the eminent paid teachers. — Misconceptions arising from Plato's peculiar use of the word sophist. — Paid teachers or sophists of the Sokratic age — Protagoras, Gor-

gias, etc. — Plato and the sophists — two different points of view — the reformer and theorist against the practical teacher. — The sophists were professional teachers for active life, like Isokratês and Quintilian. — Misinterpretations of the dialogues of Plato as carrying evidence against the sophists. — The sophists as paid teachers — no proof that they were greedy or exorbitant — proceeding of Protagoras. — The sophists as rhetorical teachers — groundless accusations against them in that capacity, made also against Sokratês, Isokratês, and others. — Thrasymachus — his rhetorical precepts. — Prodikus — his discrimination of words analogous in meaning. — Protagoras — his treatise on Truth — his opinions about the pagan gods. — His view of the cognitive process and its relative nature. — Gorgias — his treatise on physical subjects — misrepresentations of the scope of it. — Unfounded accusations against the sophists. — They were not a sect or school, with common doctrines or method; they were a profession, with strong individual peculiarities. — The Athenian character was not really corrupted, between 480 B.C. and 405 B.C. — Prodikus — The choice of Hercules. — Protagoras — real estimate exhibited of him by Plato. — Hippias of Elis — how he is represented by Plato. — Gorgias, Pôlus, and Kalliklês. — Doctrine advanced by Pôlus. — Doctrine advanced by Kalliklês — anti-social. — Kalliklês is not a sophist. — The doctrine put into his mouth could never have been laid down in any public lecture among the Athenians. — Doctrine of Thrasymachus in the "Republic" of Plato. — Such doctrine not common to all the sophists — what is offensive in it is, the manner in which it is put forward. — Opinion of Thrasymachus afterwards brought out by Glaukon — with less brutality, and much greater force of reason. — Plato against the sophists generally. His category of accusation comprehends all society, with all the poets and statesmen. — It is unjust to try either the sophists or the statesmen of Athens, by the standard of Plato. — Plato distinctly denies that Athenian corruption was to be imputed to the sophists. — The sophists were not teachers of mere words, apart from action. — General good effect of their teaching upon the youth. — Great reputation of the sophists — evidence of respect for intellect and of a good state of public sentiment.

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CHAPTER LXVIII.

SOKRATES.

Different spirit shown towards Sokratês and towards the sophists. — Birth and family of Sokratês. — His physical and moral qualities. — Xenophon and Plato as witnesses. — Their pictures of Sokratês are in the main accordant. — Habits of Sokratês. — Leading peculiarities of Sokratês. — His constant publicity of life and indiscriminate conversation. — Reason why Sokratês was shown up by Aristophanês on the stage. — His persuasion of a special religious mission. — His dæmon, or genius — other inspirations. — Oracle from Delphi declaring that no man was wiser than he. — His mission to test the false conceit of wisdom in others. — Confluence of the religious motive with the inquisitive and intellectual impulse in his mind — numerous enemies whom he made. — Sokratês a religious missionary, doing the work of philosophy. — Intellectual peculiarities of Sokratês. — He opened ethics as a new subject of scientific discussion. — Circumstances which turned the mind of Sokratês towards ethical speculations. — Limits of scientific study as laid down by Sokratês. — He confines study to human affairs, as distinguished from divine — to man and society. — Importance of the innovation — multitude of new and accessible phenomena brought under discussion. — Innovations of Sokratês as to method — dialectic method — inductive discourses — definitions. — Commencement of analytical consciousness of the mental operations — genera and species. — Sokratês compared with previous philosophers. — Great step made by Sokratês in laying the foundation of formal logic, afterwards expanded by Plato, and systematized by Aristotle. — Dialectical process employed by Sokratês — essential connection between method and subject. — Essential connection also between the dialectic process and the logical distribution of subject-matter — one in many and many in one. — Persuasion of religious mission in Sokratês, prompting him to extend his colloquial cross-examination to noted men. — His cross-examining purpose was not confined to noted men, but of universal application. — Leading ideas which directed the scrutiny of Sokratês — contrast between the special professions and the general duties of social life. — Platonic dialogues — discussion whether virtue is teachable. — Conceit of knowledge without real knowledge — universal prevalence of it. — Such confident persuasion, without science, belonged at that time to astronomy and physics, as well as to the subjects of man and society — it is now confined to the latter. — Sokratês first lays down the idea of ethical science, comprising the appropriate ethical end with theory and precepts. — Earnestness with which Sokratês inculcated self-examination — effect of his conversation upon others. — Preceptorial and positive exhortation of Sokratês chiefly brought out by Xenophon. — This was not the peculiarity of Sokratês — his powerful method of stirring up the analytical faculties. — Negative and indirect scrutiny of Sokratês produced strong thirst, and active efforts, for the attainment of positive truth. — Inductive process of scrutiny, and Baconian spirit, of Sokratês. —

Sokratic method tends to create minds capable of forming conclusions for themselves — not to plant conclusions ready-made. — Grecian dialectics — their many-sided handling of subjects — force of the negative arm. — The subjects to which they were applied — man and society — essentially required such handling — reason why. — Real distinction and variance between Sokratês and the sophists. — Prodigious efficacy of Sokratês in forming new philosophical minds. — General theory of Sokratês on ethics — he resolved virtue into knowledge, or wisdom. — This doctrine defective as stating a part for the whole. — He was led to this general doctrine by the analogy of special professions. — Constant reference of Sokratês to duties of practice and detail. — The derivative reasonings of Sokratês were of larger range than his general doctrine. — Political opinions of Sokratês. — Long period during which Sokratês exercised his vocation as a public converser. — Accusation against him by Melêtus, Anytus, and Lykon. — The real ground for surprise is, that that accusation had not been preferred before. — Inevitable unpopularity incurred by Sokratês in his mission. — It was only from the general toleration of the Athenian democracy and population, that he was allowed to go on so long. — Particular circumstances which brought on the trial of Sokratês. — Private offence of Anytus. — Unpopularity arising to Sokratês from his connection with Kritias and Alkibiadês. — Enmity of the poets and rhetors to Sokratês. — Indictment — grounds of the accusers — effects of the "Clouds" of Aristophanês, in creating prejudice against Sokratês. — Accusation of corruption in teaching was partly founded on political grounds. — Perversion of the poets alleged against him. — Remarks of Xenophon upon these accusations. — The charges touch upon the defective point of the Sokratic ethical theory. — His political strictures. — The verdict against Sokratês was brought upon him partly by his own concurrence. — Small majority by which he was condemned. — Sokratês defended himself like one who did not care to be acquitted. — The "Platonic Apology." — Sentiment of Sokratês about death. — Effect of his defence upon the dikasts. — Assertion of Xenophon that Sokratês might have been acquitted if he had chosen it. — The sentence — how passed in Athenian procedure. — Sokratês is called upon to propose some counter-penalty against himself — his behavior. — Aggravation of feeling in the dikasts against him in consequence of his behavior. — Sentence of death — resolute adherence of Sokratês to his own convictions. — Satisfaction of Sokratês with the sentence, on deliberate conviction. — Sokratês in prison for thirty days — he refuses to accept the means of escape — his serene death. — Originality of Sokratês. — Views taken of Sokratês as a moral preacher and as a skeptic — the first inadequate, the second incorrect. — Sokratês, positive and practical in his end; negative only in his means. — Two points on which Sokratês is systematically negative. — Method of Sokratês of universal application. — Condemnation of Sokratês one of the misdeeds of intolerance. — Extenuating circumstances — principle of orthodox enforcement recognized generally in ancient times. — Number of personal enemies made by Sokratês. — His condemnation brought on by himself. — The Athenians did not repent it.

399-496

HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER LXII.

TWENTY-FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR. — OLIGARCHY OF FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS.

About a year elapsed between the catastrophe of the Athenians near Syracuse and the victory which they gained over the Milêsians, on landing near Milêtus (from September 413 B.C., to September 412 B.C.). After the first of those two events, the complete ruin of Athens had appeared both to her enemies and to herself, impending and irreparable. But so astonishing, so rapid, and so energetic had been her rally, that, at the time of the second, she was found again carrying on a tolerable struggle, though with impaired resources and on a purely defensive system, against enemies both bolder and more numerous than ever. Nor is there any reason to doubt that her foreign affairs might have gone on thus improving, had they not been endangered at this critical moment by the treason of a fraction of her own citizens, bringing her again to the brink of ruin, from which she was only rescued by the incompetence of her enemies.

That treason took its first rise from the exile Alkibiadês. I have already recounted how this man, alike unprincipled and energetic, had thrown himself with his characteristic ardor into the service of Sparta, and had indicated to her the best means of aiding Syracuse, of inflicting positive injury upon Athens, and lastly, of provoking revolt among the Ionic allies of the latter. It was by his boldness and personal connections in Ionia that the revolt of Chios and Milêtus had been determined.

In the course of a few months, however, he had greatly lost the confidence of the Spartans. The revolt of the Asiatic dependencies of Athens had not been accomplished so easily and rapidly as he had predicted; Chalkideus, the Spartan commander with whom he had acted was defeated and slain near Milêtus; the ephor Endius, by whom he was chiefly protected, retained his office only for one year, and was succeeded by other ephors,[1] just about the end of September, or beginning of October, when the Athenians gained their second victory near Milêtus, and were on the point of blocking up the town; while his personal enemy king Agis still remained to persecute him. Moreover, there was in the character of this remarkable man something so essentially selfish, vain, and treacherous, that no one could ever rely upon his faithful coöperation. And as soon as any reverse occurred, that very energy and ability, which seldom failed him, made those with whom he acted the more ready to explain the mischance, by supposing that he had betrayed them.

It was thus that, after the defeat of Milêtus, king Agis was enabled to discredit Alkibiadês as a traitor to Sparta; upon which the new ephors sent out at once an order to the general Astyochus, to put him to death.[2] Alkibiadês had now an opportu-

nity of tasting the difference between Spartan and Athenian procedure. Though his enemies at Athens were numerous and virulent, with all the advantage, so unspeakable in political warfare, of being able to raise the cry of irreligion against him, yet the utmost which they could obtain was that he should be summoned home to take his trial before the dikastery. At Sparta, without any positive ground of crimination, and without any idea of judicial trial, his enemies procure an order that he shall be put to death.

Alkibiadês, however, got intimation of the order in time to retire to Tissaphernês. Probably he was forewarned by Astyochus himself, not ignorant that so monstrous a deed would greatly alienate the Chians and Milêsians, nor foreseeing the full mischief which his desertion would bring upon Sparta. With that flexibility of character which enabled him at once to master and take up a new position, Alkibiadês soon found means to insinuate himself into the confidence of the satrap. He began now to play a game neither Spartan nor Athenian, but Persian and anti-Hellenic: a game of duplicity to which Tissaphernês himself was spontaneously disposed, but to which the intervention of a dexterous Grecian negotiator was indispensable. It was by no means the interest of the Great King, Alkibiadês urged, to lend such effective aid to either of the contending parties as would enable it to crush the other: he ought neither to bring up the Phenician fleet to the aid of the Lacedæmonians, nor to furnish that abundant pay which would procure for them indefinite levies of new Grecian force. He ought so to feed and prolong the war, as to make each party an instrument of exhaustion and impoverishment against the other, and thus himself to rise on the ruins of both: first to break down the Athenian empire by means of the Peloponnesians, and afterwards to expel the Peloponnesians themselves; which might be effected with little trouble if they were weakened by a protracted previous struggle.[3]

Thus far Alkibiadês gave advice, as a Persian counsellor, not unsuitable to the policy of the court of Susa. But he seldom gave advice without some view to his own profit, ambition, or antipathies. Cast off unceremoniously by the Lacedæmonians, he was now driven to seek restoration in his own country. To accomplish this object, it was necessary not only that he should preserve her from being altogether ruined, but that he should present himself to the Athenians as one who could, if restored, divert the aid of Tissaphernês from Lacedæmon to Athens. Accordingly, he farther suggested to the satrap, that while it was essential to his interest not to permit land power and maritime power to be united in the same hands, whether Lacedæmonian or Athenian, it would nevertheless be found easier to arrange matters with the empire and pretensions of Athens than with those of Lacedæmon. The former, he argued, neither sought nor professed any other object than the subjection of her own maritime dependencies, in return for which she would willingly leave all the Asiatic Greeks in the hands of the Great King; while the latter, forswearing all idea of empire, and professing ostentatiously to aim at the universal enfranchisement of every Grecian city, could not with the smallest consistency conspire to deprive the Asiatic

Greeks of the same privilege. This view appeared to be countenanced by the objection which Theramenês and many of the Peloponnesian officers had taken to the first convention concluded by Chalkideus and Alkibiadês with Tissaphernês: objections afterwards renewed by Lichas even against the second modified convention of Theramenês, and accompanied with an indignant protest against the idea of surrendering to the Great King all the territory which had been ever possessed by his predecessors.[4]

All these latter arguments, whereby Alkibiadês professed to create in the mind of the satrap a preference for Athens, were either futile or founded on false assumptions. For on the one hand, even Lichas never refused to concur in surrendering the Asiatic Greeks to Persia; while on the other hand, the empire of Athens, so long as she retained any empire, was pretty sure to be more formidable to Persia than any efforts undertaken by Sparta under the disinterested pretence of liberating generally the Grecian cities. Nor did Tissaphernês at all lend himself to any such positive impression; though he felt strongly the force of the negative recommendations of Alkibiadês, that he should do no more for the Peloponnesians than was sufficient to feed the war, without insuring to them either a speedy or a decisive success: or rather, this duplicity was so congenial to his Oriental mind, that there was no need of Alkibiadês to recommend it. The real use of the Athenian exile, was to assist the satrap in carrying it into execution; and to provide for him those plausible pretences and justifications, which he was to issue as a substitute for effective supplies of men and money. Established along with Tissaphernês at Magnesia,—the same place which had been occupied about fifty years before by another Athenian exile, equally unprincipled, and yet abler, Themistoklês,—Alkibiadês served as interpreter of his views in all his conversations with the Greeks, and appeared to be thoroughly in his confidence: an appearance of which he took advantage to pass himself off falsely upon the Athenians at Samos, as having the power of turning Persian wealth to the aid of Athens.

The first payment made by Tissaphernês, immediately after the capture of Iasus and of the revolted Amorgês, to the Peloponnesians at Milêtus, was at the rate of one drachma per head. But notice was given that for the future it would be reduced one half, and for this reduction Alkibiadês undertook to furnish a reason. The Athenians, he urged, gave no more than half a drachma; not because they could not afford more, but because, from their long experience of nautical affairs, they had found that higher pay spoiled the discipline of the seamen by leading them into excesses and over-indulgence, as well as by inducing too ready leave of absence to be granted, in confidence that the high pay would induce them to return when called for.[5] As he probably never expected that such subterfuges, employed at a moment when Athens was so poor that she could not even pay the half drachma per head, would carry conviction to any one, so he induced Tissaphernês to strengthen their effect by individual bribes to the generals and trierarchs: a mode of argument which was found effectual in silencing the complaints of all, with the single exception of the

Syracusan Hermokratês. In regard to other Grecian cities who sent to ask pecuniary aid, and especially Chios, Alkibiadês spoke out with less reserve. They had been hitherto compelled to contribute to Athens, he said, and now that they had shaken off this payment, they must not shrink from imposing upon themselves equal or even greater burdens in their own defence. Nor was it anything less, he added, than sheer impudence in the Chians, the richest people in Greece, if they required a foreign military force for their protection, to require at the same time that others should furnish the means of paying it.[6] At the same time, however, he intimated,—by way of keeping up hopes for the future,—that Tissaphernês was at present carrying on the war at his own cost; but if hereafter remittances should arrive from Susa, the full rate of pay would be resumed, with the addition of aid to the Grecian cities in any other way which could be reasonably asked. To this promise was added an assurance that the Phenician fleet was now under equipment, and would shortly be brought up to their aid, so as to give them a superiority which would render resistance hopeless: an assurance not merely deceitful but mischievous, since it was employed to dissuade them from all immediate action, and to paralyze their navy during its moments of fullest vigor and efficiency. Even the reduced rate of pay was furnished so irregularly, and the Peloponnesian force kept so starved, that the duplicity of the satrap became obvious to every one, and was only carried through by his bribery to the officers.[7]

While Alkibiadês, as the confidential agent and interpreter of Tissaphernês, was carrying on this anti-Peloponnesian policy through the autumn and winter of 412-411 B.C.,—partly during the stay of the Peloponnesian fleet at Milêtus, partly after it had moved to Knidus and Rhodes,—he was at the same time opening correspondence with the Athenian officers at Samos. His breach with the Peloponnesians, as well as his ostensible position in the service of Tissaphernês, were facts well known among the Athenian armament; and his scheme was, to procure both restoration and renewed power in his native city, by representing himself as competent to bring over to her the aid and alliance of Persia, through his ascendency over the mind of the satrap. His hostility to the democracy, however, was so generally known, that he despaired of accomplishing his return, unless he could connect it with an oligarchical revolution; which, moreover, was not less gratifying to his sentiment of vengeance for the past, than to his ambition for the future. Accordingly, he sent over a private message to the officers and trierarchs at Samos, several of them doubtless his personal friends, desiring to be remembered to the "best men" in the armament,[8] such was one of the standing phrases by which oligarchical men knew and described each other; and intimating his anxious wish to come again as a citizen among them, bringing with him Tissaphernês as their ally. But he would do this only on condition of the formation of an oligarchical government; nor would he ever again set foot amidst the odious democracy to whom he owed his banishment.[9]

Such was the first originating germ of that temporary calamity, which so nearly brought Athens to absolute ruin, called the Oligarchy of Four Hundred: a suggestion

from the same exile who had already so deeply wounded his country by sending Gylippus to Syracuse, and the Lacedæmonian garrison to Dekeleia. As yet, no man in Samos had thought of a revolution; but the moment that the idea was thus started, the trierarchs and wealthy men in the armament caught at it with avidity. To subvert the democracy for their own profit, and to be rewarded for doing so with the treasures of Persia as a means of carrying on the war against the Peloponnesians, was an extent of good fortune greater than they could possibly have hoped. Amidst the exhaustion of the public treasure at Athens, and the loss of tribute from her dependencies, it was now the private proprietors, and most of all, the wealthy proprietors, upon whom the cost of military operations fell: from which burden they here saw the prospect of relief, coupled with increased chance of victory. Elate with so tempting a promise, a deputation of them crossed over from Samos to the mainland to converse personally with Alkibiadês, who again renewed his assurances in person, that he would bring not only Tissaphernês, but the Great King himself, into active alliance and coöperation with Athens, provided they would put down the Athenian democracy, which he affirmed that the king could not possibly trust.[10] He doubtless did not omit to set forth the other side of the alternative; that, if the proposition were refused, Persian aid would be thrown heartily into the scale of the Peloponnesians, in which case, there was no longer any hope of safety for Athens.

On the return of the deputation with these fresh assurances, the oligarchical men in Samos came together, both in greater number and with redoubled ardor, to take their measures for subverting the democracy. They even ventured to speak of the project openly among the mass of the armament, who listened to it with nothing but aversion, but who were silenced at least, though not satisfied, by being told that the Persian treasury would be thrown open to them on condition, and only on condition, that they would relinquish their democracy. Such was at this time the indispensable need of foreign money for the purposes of the war, such was the certainty of ruin, if the Persian treasure went to the aid of the enemy, that the most democratical Athenian might well hesitate when the alternative was thus laid before him. The oligarchical conspirators, however, knew well that they had the feeling of the armament altogether against them, that the best which they could expect from it was a reluctant acquiescence, and that they must accomplish the revolution by their own hands and management. They formed themselves into a political confederacy, or hetæria, for the purpose of discussing the best measures towards their end. It was resolved to send a deputation to Athens, with Peisander[11] at the head, to make known the new prospects, and to put the standing oligarchical clubs, or hetæries, into active coöperation for the purpose of violently breaking up the democracy, and farther to establish oligarchical governments in all the remaining dependencies of Athens. They imagined that these dependencies would be thus induced to remain faithful to her, perhaps even that some of those which had already revolted might come back to their allegiance, when once she should be relieved from her democracy, and placed under the rule of her "best and most virtuous citizens."

Hitherto, the bargain tendered for acceptance had been, subversion of the Athenian democracy and restoration of Alkibiadês, on one hand, against hearty coöperation, and a free supply of gold from Persia, on the other. But what security was there that such bargain would be realized, or that when the first part should have been brought to pass, the second would follow? There was absolutely no security except the word of Alkibiadês,—very little to be trusted, even when promising what was in his own power to perform, as we may recollect from his memorable dealing with the Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens,—and on the present occasion, vouching for something in itself extravagant and preposterous. For what reasonable motive could be imagined to make the Great King shape his foreign policy according to the interests of Alkibiadês, or to inspire him with such lively interest in the substitution of oligarchy for democracy at Athens? This was a question which the oligarchical conspirators at Samos not only never troubled themselves to raise, but which they had every motive to suppress. The suggestion of Alkibiadês coincided fully with their political interest and ambition. Their object was to put down the democracy, and get possession of the government for themselves; and the promise of Persian gold, if they could get it accredited, was inestimable as a stepping-stone towards this goal, whether it afterwards turned out to be a delusion or not. The probability is, that having a strong interest in believing it themselves, and a still stronger interest in making others believe it, they talked each other into a sincere persuasion. Without adverting to this fact, we should be at a loss to understand how the word of such a man as Alkibiadês, on such a matter, could be so implicitly accepted as to set in motion a whole train of novel and momentous events.

There was one man, and one man alone, so far as we know, who ventured openly to call it in question. This was Phrynichus, one of the generals of the fleet, who had recently given valuable counsel after the victory of Milêtus; a clear-sighted and sagacious man, but personally hostile to Alkibiadês, and thoroughly seeing through his character and projects. Though Phrynichus was afterwards one of the chief organizers of the oligarchical movement, when it became detached from, and hostile to Alkibiadês, yet under the actual circumstances he discountenanced it altogether.[12] Alkibiadês, he said, had no attachment to oligarchical government rather than to democratical; nor could he be relied on for standing by it after it should have been set up. His only purpose was, to make use of the oligarchical conspiracy now forming, for his own restoration; which, if brought to pass, could not fail to introduce political discord into the camp, the greatest misfortune that could at present happen. As to the Persian king, it was unreasonable to expect that he would put himself out of his way to aid the Athenians, his old enemies, in whom he had no confidence, while he had the Peloponnesians present as allies, with a good naval force and powerful cities in his own territory, from whom he had never experienced either insult or annoyance. Moreover, the dependencies of Athens—upon whom it was now proposed to confer simultaneously with Athens herself, the blessing of oligarchical government—would receive that boon with indifference. Those who had already revolted would

not come back, those who yet remained faithful, would not be the more inclined to remain so longer. Their object would be to obtain autonomy, either under oligarchy or democracy, as the case might be. Assuredly, they would not expect better treatment from an oligarchical government at Athens, than from a democratical; for they knew that those self-styled "good and virtuous" men, who would form the oligarchy, were, as ministers of democracy, the chief advisers and instigators of the people to iniquitous deeds, most commonly for nothing but their own individual profit. From an Athenian oligarchy, the citizens of these dependencies had nothing to expect but violent executions without any judicial trial; but under the democracy, they could obtain shelter and the means of appeal, while their persecutors were liable to restraint and chastisement, from the people and the popular dikasteries. Such, Phrynichus affirmed on his own personal knowledge, was the genuine feeling among the dependencies of Athens.[13] Having thus shown the calculations of the conspirators—as to Alkibiadês, as to Persia, and as to the allied dependencies—to be all illusory, Phrynichus concluded by entering his decided protest against adopting the propositions of Alkibiadês.

But in this protest, borne out afterwards by the result, he stood nearly alone. The tide of opinion, among the oligarchical conspirators, ran so furiously the other way, that it was resolved to despatch Peisander and others immediately to Athens to consummate the oligarchical revolution as well as the recall of Alkibiadês; and at the same time to propose to the people their new intended ally, Tissaphernês.

Phrynichus knew well what would be the consequence to himself—if this consummation were brought about, as he foresaw that it probably would be—from the vengeance of his enemy Alkibiadês against his recent opposition. Satisfied that the latter would destroy him, he took measures for destroying Alkibiadês beforehand, even by a treasonable communication to the Lacedæmonian admiral Astyochus at Milêtus, to whom he sent a secret account of the intrigues which the Athenian exile was carrying on at Samos to the prejudice of the Peloponnesians, prefaced with an awkward apology for this sacrifice of the interests of his country to the necessity of protecting himself against a personal enemy. But Phrynichus was imperfectly informed of the real character of the Spartan commander, or of his relations with Tissaphernês and Alkibiadês. Not merely was the latter now at Magnesia, under the protection of the satrap, and out of the power of the Lacedæmonians, but Astyochus, a traitor to his duty through the gold of Tissaphernês, went up thither to show the letter of Phrynichus to the very person whom it was intended to expose. Alkibiadês forthwith sent intelligence to the generals and officers at Samos, of the step taken by Phrynichus, and pressed them to put him to death.

The life of Phrynichus now hung by a thread, and was probably preserved only by that respect for judicial formalities so deeply rooted in the Athenian character. In the extremity of danger, he resorted to a still more subtle artifice to save himself. He despatched a second letter to Astyochus, complaining of the violation of confidence

in regard to the former, but at the same time intimating that he was now willing to betray to the Lacedæmonians the camp and armament at Samos. He invited Astyochus to come and attack the place, which was as yet unfortified, explaining minutely in what manner the attack could be best conducted. And he concluded by saying that this, as well as every other means of defence, must be pardoned to one whose life was in danger from a personal enemy. Foreseeing that Astyochus would betray this letter as he had betrayed the former, Phrynichus waited a proper time, and then revealed to the camp the intention of the enemy to make an attack, as if it had reached him by private information. He insisted on the necessity of immediate precautions, and himself, as general, superintended the work of fortification, which was soon completed. Presently arrived a letter from Alkibiadês, communicating to the army that Phrynichus had betrayed them, and that the Peloponnesians were on the point of making an attack. But this letter, arriving after the precautions taken by order of Phrynichus himself had been already completed, was construed as a mere trick on the part of Alkibiadês himself, through his acquaintance with the intentions of the Peloponnesians, to raise a charge of treasonable correspondence against his personal enemy. The impression thus made by his second letter effaced the taint which had been left upon Phrynichus by the first, insomuch that the latter stood exculpated on both charges.[14]

But Phrynichus, though successful in extricating himself, failed thoroughly in his manœuvre against the influence and life of Alkibiadês; in whose favor the oligarchical movement not only went on, but was transferred from Samos to Athens. On arriving at the latter place, Peisander and his companions laid before the public assembly the projects which had been conceived by the oligarchs at Samos. The people were invited to restore Alkibiadês and renounce their democratical constitution; in return for which, they were assured of obtaining the Persian king as an ally, and of overcoming the Peloponnesians.[15] Violent was the storm which these propositions raised in the public assembly. Many speakers rose in animated defence of the democracy; few, if any, distinctly against it. The opponents of Alkibiadês indignantly denounced the mischief of restoring him, in violation of the laws, and in reversal of a judicial sentence, while the Eumolpidæ and Kerykes, the sacred families connected with the Eleusinian mysteries which Alkibiadês had violated, entered their solemn protest on religious grounds to the same effect. Against all these vehement opponents, whose impassioned invectives obtained the full sympathy of the assembly, Peisander had but one simple reply. He called them forward successively by name, and put to each the question: "What hope have you of salvation for the city, when the Peloponnesians have a naval force against us fully equal to ours, together with a greater number of allied cities, and when the king as well as Tissaphernês are supplying them with money, while we have no money left? What hope have you of salvation, unless we can persuade the king to come over to our side?" The answer was a melancholy negative, or perhaps not less melancholy silence. "Well, then, rejoined Peisander, that object cannot possibly be attained, unless we conduct our political affairs for the fu-

ture in a more moderate way, and put the powers of government more in the hands of a few, and unless we recall Alkibiadês, the only man now living who is competent to do the business. Under present circumstances, we surely shall not lay greater stress upon our political constitution than upon the salvation of the city; the rather as what we now enact may be hereafter modified, if it be found not to answer."

Against the proposed oligarchical change, the repugnance of the assembly was alike angry and unanimous. But they were silenced by the imperious necessity of the case, as the armament at Samos had been before; and admitting the alternative laid down by Peisander, as I have observed already, the most democratical citizen might be embarrassed as to his vote. Whether any speaker, like Phrynichus at Samos, arraigned the fallacy of the alternative, and called upon Peisander for some guarantee, better than mere asseveration, of the benefits to come, we are not informed. But the general vote of the assembly, reluctant and only passed in the hope of future change, sanctioned his recommendation.[16] He and ten other envoys, invested with full powers of negotiating with Alkibiadês and Tissaphernês, were despatched to Ionia immediately. Peisander at the same time obtained from the assembly a vote deposing Phrynichus from his command; under the accusation of having traitorously caused the loss of Iasus and the capture of Amorgês, after the battle of Milêtus, but from the real certainty that he would prove an insuperable bar to all negotiations with Alkibiadês. Phrynichus, with his colleague Skironidês, being thus displaced, Leon and Diomedon were sent to Samos as commanders in their stead; an appointment of which, as will be presently seen, Peisander was far from anticipating the consequences.

Before his departure for Asia, he took a step yet more important. He was well aware that the recent vote—a result of fear inspired by the war, representing a sentiment utterly at variance with that of the assembly, and only procured as the price of Persian aid against a foreign enemy—would never pass into a reality by the spontaneous act of the people themselves. It was, indeed, indispensable as a first step; partly as an authority to himself, partly also as a confession of the temporary weakness of the democracy, and as a sanction and encouragement for the oligarchical forces to show themselves. But the second step yet remained to be performed; that of calling these forces into energetic action, organizing an amount of violence sufficient to extort from the people actual submission in addition to verbal acquiescence, and thus, as it were, tying down the patient while the process of emasculation was being consummated. Peisander visited all the various political clubs, conspiracies, or hetæries, which were habitual and notorious at Athens; associations, bound together by oath, among the wealthy citizens, partly for purposes of amusement, but chiefly pledging the members to stand by each other in objects of political ambition, in judicial trials, in accusation or defence of official men after the period of office had expired, in carrying points through the public assembly, etc. Among these clubs were distributed most of "the best citizens, the good and honorable men, the elegant men,

the well known, the temperate, the honest and moderate men,"[17] etc., to employ that complimentary phraseology by which wealthy and anti-popular politicians have chosen to designate each other, in ancient as well as in modern times. And though there were doubtless individuals among them who deserved these appellations in their best sense, yet the general character of the clubs was not the less exclusive and oligarchical. In the details of political life, they had different partialities as well as different antipathies, and were oftener in opposition than in coöperation with each other. But they furnished, when taken together, a formidable anti-popular force; generally either in abeyance or disseminated in the accomplishment of smaller political measures and separate personal successes; but capable, at a special crisis, of being evoked, organized, and put in conjoint attack, for the subversion of the democracy. Such was the important movement now initiated by Peisander. He visited separately each of these clubs, put them into communication with each other, and exhorted them all to joint aggressive action against their common enemy the democracy, at a moment when it was already intimidated and might be finally overthrown.[18]

Having taken other necessary measures towards the same purpose, Peisander left Athens with his colleagues to enter upon his negotiation with Tissaphernês. But the coöperation and aggressive movement of the clubs which he had originated was prosecuted with increased ardor during his absence, and even fell into hands more organizing and effective than his own. The rhetorical teacher Antiphon, of the deme Rhamnus, took it in hand especially, acquired the confidence of the clubs, and drew the plan of campaign against the democracy. He was a man estimable in private life, and not open to pecuniary corruption: in other respects, of preëminent ability,—in contrivance, judgment, speech, and action. The profession to which he belonged, generally unpopular among the democracy, excluding him from taking rank as a speaker either in the public assembly or the dikastery: for a rhetorical teacher, contending in either of them against a private speaker, to repeat a remark already once made, was considered to stand at the same unfair advantage, as a fencing-master fighting a duel with a gentleman would be held to stand in modern times. Thus debarred himself from the showy celebrity of Athenian political life, Antiphon became only the more consummate, as a master of advice, calculation, scheming, and rhetorical composition,[19] to assist the celebrity of others; insomuch that his silent assistance in political and judicial debates, as a sort of chamber-counsel, was highly appreciated and largely paid. Now such were precisely the talents required for the present occasion; while Antiphon, who hated the democracy for having hitherto kept him in the shade, gladly bent his full talents towards its subversion.

Such was the man to whom Peisander, in departing, chiefly confided the task of organizing the anti-popular clubs, for the consummation of the revolution already in immediate prospect. His chief auxiliary was Theramenês, another Athenian, now first named, of eminent ability and cunning. His father (either natural or by adoption), Agnon, was one of the probûli, and had formerly been founder of Amphipolis. Even

Phrynichus—whose sagacity we have already had occasion to appreciate, and who, from hatred towards Alkibiadês, had pronounced himself decidedly against the oligarchical movement at Samos—became zealous in forwarding the movement at Athens, after his dismissal from the command. He brought to the side of Antiphon and Theramenês a contriving head not inferior to theirs, coupled with daring and audacity even superior. Under such skilful leaders, the anti-popular force of Athens was organized with a deep skill, and directed with a dexterous wickedness, never before witnessed in Greece.

At the time when Peisander and the other envoys reached Ionia, seemingly about the end of January or beginning of February 411 B.C., the Peloponnesian fleet had already quitted Milêtus and gone to Knidus and Rhodes, on which latter island Leon and Diomedon made some hasty descents, from the neighboring island of Chalkê. At the same time the Athenian armament at Chios was making progress in the siege of that place and the construction of the neighboring fort at Delphinium. Pedaritus, the Lacedæmonian governor of the island, had sent pressing messages to solicit aid from the Peloponnesians at Rhodes, but no aid arrived; and he therefore resolved to attempt a general sally and attack upon the Athenians with his whole force, foreign as well as Chian. Though at first he obtained some success, the battle ended in his complete defeat and death, with great slaughter of the Chian troops, and with the loss of many whose shields were captured in the pursuit.[20] The Chians, now reduced to greater straits than before, and beginning to suffer severely from famine, were only enabled to hold out by a partial reinforcement soon afterwards obtained from the Peloponnesian guardships at Milêtus. A Spartan named Leon, who had come out in the vessel of Antisthenês as one of the epibatæ, or marines, conducted this reinforcing squadron of twelve triremes, chiefly Thurian and Syracusan, succeeding Pedaritus in the general command of the island.[21]

It was while Chios seemed thus likely to be recovered by Athens—and while the superior Peloponnesian fleet was paralyzed at Rhodes by Persian intrigues and bribes—that Peisander arrived in Ionia to open his negotiations with Alkibiadês and Tissaphernês. He was enabled to announce that the subversion of the democracy at Athens was already begun, and would soon be consummated: and he now required the price which had been promised in exchange, Persian alliance and aid to Athens against the Peloponnesians. But Alkibiadês knew well that he had promised what he had not the least chance of being able to perform. The satrap had appeared to follow his advice,—or had rather followed his own inclination, employing Alkibiadês as an instrument and auxiliary,—in the endeavor to wear out both parties, and to keep them nearly on an equality until each should ruin the other. But he was no way disposed to identify himself with the cause of Athens, and to break decidedly with the Peloponnesians, especially at a moment when their fleet was both the greater of the two, and in occupation of an island close to his own satrapy. Accordingly Alkibiadês, when summoned by the Athenian envoys to perform his engagement, found himself

in a dilemma from which he could only escape by one of his characteristic manœuvres.

Receiving the envoys himself in conjunction with Tissaphernês, and speaking on behalf of the latter, he pushed his demands to an extent which he knew that the Athenians would never concede, in order that the rupture might seem to be on their side, and not on his. First, he required the whole of Ionia to be conceded to the Great King; next, all the neighboring islands, with some other items besides.[22] Large as these requisitions were, comprehending the cession of Lesbos and Samos as well as Chios, and replacing the Persian monarchy in the condition in which it had stood in 496 B.C., before the Ionic revolt, Peisander and his colleagues granted them all: so that Alkibiadês was on the point of seeing his deception exposed and frustrated. At last, he bethought himself of a fresh demand, which touched Athenian pride, as well as Athenian safety, in the tenderest place. He required that the Persian king should be held free to build ships of war in unlimited number, and to keep them sailing along the coast as he might think fit, through all these new portions of territory. After the immense concessions already made, the envoys not only rejected this fresh demand at once, but resented it as an insult, which exposed the real drift and purpose of Alkibiadês. Not merely did it cancel the boasted treaty, called the Peace of Kallias, concluded about forty years before between Athens and Persia, and limiting the Persian ships of war to the sea eastward of Phasêlis, but it extinguished the maritime empire of Athens, and compromised the security of all the coasts and islands of the Ægean. To see Lesbos, Chios, and Samos, etc., in possession of Persia, was sufficiently painful; but if there came to be powerful Persian fleets on these islands it would be the certain precursor and means of farther conquests to the westward, and would revive the aggressive dispositions of the Great King, as they had stood at the beginning of the reign of Xerxes. Peisander and his comrades, abruptly breaking off the debate, returned to Samos; indignant at the discovery, which they now made for the first time, that Alkibiadês had juggled them from the outset, and was imposing conditions which he knew to be inadmissible.[23] They still appear, however, to have thought that Alkibiadês acted thus, not because he *could* not, but because he *would* not, bring about the alliance under discussion.[24] They suspected him of playing false with the oligarchical movement which he had himself instigated, and of projecting the accomplishment of his own restoration, coupled with the alliance of Tissaphernês, into the bosom of the democracy which he had begun by denouncing. Such was the light in which they presented his conduct, venting their disappointment in invectives against his duplicity, and in asseverations that he was after all unsuitable for a place in oligarchical society. Such declarations, circulated at Samos, to account for their unexpected failure in realizing the hopes which they had raised, created among the armament an impression that Alkibiadês was really favorable to the democracy, at the same time leaving unabated the prestige of his unbounded ascendency over Tissaphernês and the Great King. We shall presently see the effects resulting from this belief.

Immediately after the rupture of the negotiations, however, the satrap took a step well calculated to destroy the hopes of the Athenians altogether, so far as Persian aid was concerned. Though persisting in his policy of lending no decisive assistance to either party and of merely prolonging the war so as to enfeeble both, he yet began to fear that he was pushing matters too far against the Peloponnesians, who had now been two months inactive at Rhodes, with their large fleet hauled ashore. He had no treaty with them actually in force, since Lichas had disallowed the two previous conventions; nor had he furnished them with pay or maintenance. His bribes to the officers had hitherto kept the armament quiet; yet we do not distinctly see how so large a body of men found subsistence.[25] He was now, however, apprized that they could find subsistence no longer, and that they would probably desert, or commit depredations on the coast of his satrapy, or perhaps be driven to hasten on a general action with the Athenians, under desperate circumstances. Under such apprehensions he felt compelled to put himself again in communication with them, to furnish them with pay, and to conclude with them a third convention, the proposition of which he had refused to entertain at Knidus. He therefore went to Kaunus, invited the Peloponnesian leaders to Milêtus, and concluded with them near that town a treaty to the following effect:—

"In this thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, and in the ephorship of Alexippidas at Lacedæmon, a convention is hereby concluded by the Lacedæmonians and their allies, with Tissaphernês and Hieramenês and the sons of Pharnakês, respecting the affairs of the king and of the Lacedæmonians and their allies. The territory of the king, as much of it as is in Asia, shall belong to the king. Let the king determine as he chooses respecting his own territory. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall not approach the king's territory with any mischievous purpose, nor shall the king approach that of the Lacedæmonians and their allies with any like purpose. If any one among the Lacedæmonians or their allies shall approach the king's territory with mischievous purpose, the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall hinder him: if any one from the king's territory shall approach the Lacedæmonians or their allies with mischievous purpose, the king shall hinder him. Tissaphernês shall provide pay and maintenance, for the fleet now present, at the rate already stipulated, until the king's fleet shall arrive; after that, it shall be at the option of the Lacedæmonians to maintain their own fleet, if they think fit; or, if they prefer, Tissaphernês shall furnish maintenance, and at the close of the war the Lacedæmonians shall repay to him what they have received. After the king's fleet shall have arrived, the two fleets shall carry on war conjointly, in such manner as shall seem good to Tissaphernês and the Lacedæmonians and their allies. If they choose to close the war with the Athenians, they shall close it only by joint consent."[26]

In comparing this third convention with the two preceding, we find that nothing is now stipulated as to any territory except the continent of Asia; which is insured unreservedly to the king, of course with all the Greek residents planted upon it. But by a

diplomatic finesse, the terms of the treaty imply that this is not *all* the territory which the king is entitled to claim, though nothing is covenanted as to any remainder.[27] Next, this third treaty includes Pharnabazus, the son of Pharnakês, with his satrapy of Daskylium, and Hieramenês, with his district, the extent and position of which we do not know; while in the former treaties no other satrap except Tissaphernês had been concerned. We must recollect that the Peloponnesian fleet included those twenty-seven triremes, which had been brought across by Kalligeitus expressly for the aid of Pharnabazus; and therefore that the latter now naturally became a party to the general operations. Thirdly, we here find, for the first time, formal announcement of a Persian fleet about to be brought up as auxiliary to the Peloponnesians. This was a promise which the satrap now set forth more plainly than before, to amuse them, and to abate the mistrust which they had begun to conceive of his sincerity. It served the temporary purpose of restraining them from any immediate act of despair hostile to his interests, which was all that he looked for. While he renewed his payments, therefore, for the moment, he affected to busy himself in orders and preparations for the fleet from Phenicia.[28]

The Peloponnesian fleet was now ordered to move from Rhodes. Before it quitted that island, however, envoys came thither from Eretria and from Orôpus; which latter place, a dependency on the northeastern frontier of Attica, though protected by an Athenian garrison, had recently been surprised and captured by the Bœotians. The loss of Orôpus much increased the facilities for the revolt of Eubœa; and these envoys came to entreat aid from the Peloponnesian fleet, to second that island in that design. The Peloponnesian commanders, however, felt themselves under prior obligation to relieve the sufferers at Chios, towards which island they first bent their course. But they had scarcely passed the Triopian cape, when they saw the Athenian squadron from Chalkê dogging their motions. Though there was no wish on either side for a general battle, yet they saw evidently that the Athenians would not permit them to pass by Samos, and get to the relief of Chios, without one. Renouncing, therefore, the project of relieving Chios, they again concentrated their force at Milêtus, while the Athenian fleet was also again united at Samos.[29] It was about the end of March, 411 B.C., that the two fleets were thus replaced in the stations which they had occupied four months previously.

After the breach with Alkibiadês, and still more after this manifest reconciliation of Tissaphernês with the Peloponnesians, Peisander and the oligarchical conspirators at Samos had to reconsider their plan of action. They would not have begun the movement at first, had they not been instigated by Alkibiadês, and furnished by him with the treacherous delusion of Persian alliance to cheat and paralyze the people. They had, indeed, motives enough, from their own personal ambition, to originate it of themselves, apart from Alkibiadês; but without the hopes—equally useful for their purpose, whether false or true—connected with his name, they would have had no chance of achieving the first step. Now, however, that first step had been achieved,

before the delusive expectation of Persian gold was dissipated. The Athenian people had been familiarized with the idea of a subversion of their constitution, in consideration of a certain price: it remained to extort from them at the point of the sword, without paying the price, what they had thus consented to sell.[30] Moreover, the leaders of the scheme felt themselves already compromised, so that they could not recede with safety. They had set in motion their partisans at Athens, where the system of murderous intimidation, though the news had not as yet reached Samos, was already in full swing: so that they felt constrained to persevere, as the only chance of preservation to themselves. At the same time, all that faint pretence of public benefit, in the shape of Persian alliance, which had been originally attached to it, and which might have been conceived to enlist in the scheme some timid patriots, was now entirely withdrawn; and nothing remained except a naked, selfish, and unscrupulous scheme of ambition, not only ruining the freedom of Athens at home, but crippling and imperiling her before the foreign enemy, at a moment when her entire strength was scarcely adequate to the contest. The conspirators resolved to persevere, at all hazards, both in breaking down the constitution and in carrying on the foreign war. Most of them being rich men, they were content, Thucydidês observes, to defray the cost out of their own purses, now that they were contending, not for their country, but for their own power and profit.[31]

They lost no time in proceeding to execution, immediately after returning to Samos from the abortive conference with Alkibiadês. While they despatched Peisander with five of the envoys back to Athens, to consummate what was already in progress there, and the remaining five to oligarchize the dependent allies, they organized all their partisan force in the armament, and began to take measures for putting down the democracy in Samos itself. That democracy had been the product of a forcible revolution, effected about ten months before, by the aid of three Athenian triremes. It had since preserved Samos from revolting like Chios: it was now the means of preserving the democracy at Athens itself. The partisans of Peisander, finding it an invincible obstacle to their views, contrived to gain over a party of the leading Samians now in authority under it. Three hundred of these latter, a portion of those who ten months before had risen in arms to put down the preëxisting oligarchy, now enlisted as conspirators along with the Athenian oligarchs, to put down the Samian democracy, and get possession of the government for themselves. The new alliance was attested and cemented, according to genuine oligarchical practice, by a murder without judicial trial, or an assassination, for which a suitable victim was at hand. The Athenian Hyperbolus, who had been ostracized some years before by the coalition of Nikias and Alkibiadês, together with their respective partisans,—ostracized as Thucydidês tells us, not from any fear of his power and over-ascendent influence, but from his low character, and from his being a disgrace to the city, and thus ostracized by an abuse of the institution,—was now resident at Samos. As he was not a Samian, and had, moreover, been in banishment during the last five or six years, he could have had no power either in the island or the armament, and there-

fore his death served no prospective purpose. But he represented the demagogic and accusatory eloquence of the democracy, the check upon official delinquency; so that he served as a common object of antipathy to Athenian and Samian oligarchs. Some of the Athenian partisans, headed by Charmînus, one of the generals, in concert with the Samian conspirators, seized Hyperbolus and put him to death, seemingly with some other victims at the same time.[32]

But though these joint assassinations served as a pledge to each section of the conspirators for the fidelity of the other, in respect to farther operations, they at the same time gave warning to opponents. Those leading men at Samos who remained attached to the democracy, looking abroad for defence against the coming attack, made earnest appeal to Leon and Diomedon, the two generals most recently arrived from Athens in substitution for Phrynichus and Skironidês,—men sincerely devoted to the democracy, and adverse to all oligarchical change, as well as to the trierarch Thrasyllus, to Thrasybulus, son of Lykus, then serving as an hoplite, and to many others of the pronounced democrats and patriots in the Athenian armament. They made appeal not simply in behalf of their own personal safety and of their own democracy, now threatened by conspirators of whom a portion were Athenians, but also on grounds of public interest to Athens; since, if Samos became oligarchized, its sympathy with the Athenian democracy and its fidelity to the alliance would be at an end. At this moment the most recent events which had occurred at Athens, presently to be told, were not known, and the democracy was considered as still subsisting there.[33]

To stand by the assailed democracy of Samos, and to preserve the island itself, now the mainstay of the shattered Athenian empire, were motives more than sufficient to awaken the Athenian leaders thus solicited. Commencing a personal canvass among the soldiers and seamen, and invoking their interference to avert the overthrow of the Samian democracy, they found the general sentiment decidedly in their favor, but most of all, among the parali, or crew of the consecrated public trireme, called the paralus. These men were the picked seamen of the state,—each of them not merely a freeman, but a full Athenian citizen, receiving higher pay than the ordinary seamen, and known as devoted to the democratical constitution, with an active repugnance to oligarchy itself as well as to everything which scented of it.[34] The vigilance of Leon and Diomedon on the defensive side, counteracted the machinations of their colleague Charmînus, along with the conspirators, and provided for the Samian democracy faithful auxiliaries constantly ready for action. Presently, the conspirators made a violent attack to overthrow the government; but though they chose their own moment and opportunity, they still found themselves thoroughly worsted in the struggle, especially through the energetic aid of the parali. Thirty of their number were slain in the contest, and three of the most guilty afterwards condemned to banishment. The victorious party took no farther revenge, even upon the remainder of

the three hundred conspirators, granted a general amnesty, and did their best to reëstablish constitutional and harmonious working of the democracy.[35]

Chæreas, an Athenian trierarch, who had been forward in the contest, was sent in the paralus itself to Athens, to make communication of what had occurred. But this democratical crew, on reaching their native city, instead of being received with that welcome which they doubtless expected, found a state of things not less odious than surprising. The democracy of Athens had been subverted: instead of the senate of Five Hundred, and the assembled people, an oligarchy of Four Hundred self-installed persons were enthroned with sovereign authority in the senate-house. The first order of the Four Hundred, on hearing that the paralus had entered Peiræus, was to imprison two or three of the crew, and to remove all the rest from their own privileged trireme aboard a common trireme, with orders to depart forthwith and to cruise near Eubœa. The commander, Chæreas, found means to escape, and returned back to Samos to tell the unwelcome news.[36]

The steps, whereby this oligarchy of Four Hundred had been gradually raised up to their new power, must be taken up from the time when Peisander quitted Athens,—after having obtained the vote of the public assembly authorizing him to treat with Alkibiadês and Tissaphernês,—and after having set on foot a joint organization and conspiracy of all the anti-popular clubs, which fell under the management especially of Antiphon and Theramenês, afterwards aided by Phrynichus. All the members of that Board of Elders called Probûli, who had been named after the defeat in Sicily, with Agnon, father of Theramenês, at their head,[37]—together with many other leading citizens, some of whom had been counted among the firmest friends of the democracy, joined the conspiracy; while the oligarchical and the neutral rich came into it with ardor; so that a body of partisans was formed both numerous and well provided with money. Antiphon did not attempt to bring them together, or to make any public demonstration, armed or unarmed, for the purpose of overawing the actual authorities. He permitted the senate and the public assembly to go on meeting and debating as usual; but his partisans, neither the names nor the numbers of whom were publicly known, received from him instructions both when to speak and what language to hold. The great topic upon which they descanted, was the costliness of democratical institutions in the present distressed state of the finances, the heavy tax imposed upon the state by paying the senators, the dikasts, the ekklesiasts, or citizens who attended the public assembly, etc. The state could now afford to pay only those soldiers who fought in its defence, nor ought any one else to touch the public money. It was essential, they insisted, to exclude from the political franchise all except a select body of Five Thousand, composed of those who were best able to do service to the city by person and by purse.

The extensive disfranchisement involved in this last proposition was quite sufficiently shocking to the ears of an Athenian assembly. But in reality the proposition was itself a juggle, never intended to become reality, and representing something far

short of what Antiphon and his partisans intended. Their design was to appropriate the powers of government to themselves simply, without control or partnership, leaving this body of Five Thousand not merely unconvened, but non-existent, as a mere empty name to impose upon the citizens generally. Of this real intention, however, not a word was as yet spoken. The projected body of Five Thousand was the theme preached upon by all the party orators; yet without submitting any substantive motion for the change, which could not be yet done without illegality.

Even thus indirectly advocated, the project of cutting down the franchise to Five Thousand, and of suppressing all the paid civil functions, was a change sufficiently violent to call forth abundant opponents. For such opponents Antiphon was fully prepared. Of the men who thus stood forward in opposition, either all, or at least all the most prominent, were successively taken off by private assassination. The first of them who thus perished was Androklês, distinguished as a demagogue, or popular speaker, and marked out to vengeance not only by that circumstance, but by the farther fact that he had been among the most vehement accusers of Alkibiadês before his exile. For at this time, the breach of Peisander with Tissaphernês and Alkibiadês had not yet become known at Athens, so that the latter was still supposed to be on the point of returning home as a member of the contemplated oligarchical government. After Androklês, many other speakers of similar sentiments perished in the same way, by unknown hands. A band of Grecian youths, strangers, and got together from different cities,[38] was organized for the business: the victims were all chosen on the same special ground, and the deed was so skilfully perpetrated that neither director nor instrument ever became known. After these assassinations—sure, special, secret, and systematic, emanating from an unknown directory, like a Vehmic tribunal—had continued for some time, the terror which they inspired became intense and universal. No justice could be had, no inquiry could be instituted, even for the death of the nearest and dearest relative. At last, no man dared to demand or even to mention inquiry, looking upon himself as fortunate that he had escaped the same fate in his own person. So finished an organization, and such well-aimed blows, raised a general belief that the conspirators were much more numerous than they were in reality. And as it turned out that there were persons among them who had before been accounted hearty democrats,[39] so at last dismay and mistrust became universally prevalent. Nor did any one dare even to express indignation at the murders going on, much less to talk about redress or revenge, for fear that he might be communicating with one of the unknown conspirators. In the midst of this terrorism, all opposition ceased in the senate and public assembly, so that the speakers of the conspiring oligarchy appeared to carry an unanimous assent.[40]

Such was the condition to which things had been brought in Athens, by Antiphon and the oligarchical conspirators acting under his direction, at the time when Peisander and the five envoys arrived thither returning from Samos. It is probable that they had previously transmitted home from Samos news of the rupture with Alk-

ibiadês, and of the necessity of prosecuting the conspiracy without farther view either to him or to the Persian alliance. Such news would probably be acceptable both to Antiphon and Phrynichus, both of them personal enemies of Alkibiadês; especially Phrynichus, who had pronounced him to be incapable of fraternizing with an oligarchical revolution.[41] At any rate, the plans of Antiphon had been independent of all view to Persian aid, and had been directed to carry the revolution by means of naked, exorbitant, and well-directed fear, without any intermixture of hope or any prospect of public benefit. Peisander found the reign of terror fully matured. He had not come direct from Samos to Athens, but had halted in his voyage at various allied dependencies, while the other five envoys, as well as a partisan named Diotrephês, had been sent to Thasos and elsewhere;[42] all for the same purpose, of putting down democracies in those allied cities where they existed, and establishing oligarchies in their room. Peisander made this change at Tênos, Andros, Karystus, Ægina, and elsewhere; collecting from these several places a regiment of three hundred hoplites, which he brought with him to Athens as a sort of body-guard to his new oligarchy.[43] He could not know until he reached Peiræus the full success of the terrorism organized by Antiphon and the rest; so that he probably came prepared to surmount a greater resistance than he actually found. As the facts stood, so completely had the public opinion and spirit been subdued, that he was enabled to put the finishing stroke at once, and his arrival was the signal for consummating the revolution, first, by an extorted suspension of the tutelary constitutional sanction, next, by the more direct employment of armed force.

First, he convoked a public assembly, in which he proposed a decree, naming ten commissioners with full powers, to prepare propositions for such political reform as they should think advisable, and to be ready by a given day.[44] According to the usual practice, this decree must previously have been approved in the senate of Five Hundred, before it was submitted to the people. Such was doubtless the case in the present instance, and the decree passed without any opposition. On the day fixed, a fresh assembly met, which Peisander and his partisans caused to be held, not in the usual place, called the Pnyx, within the city walls, but at a place called Kolônus, ten stadia, rather more than a mile, without the walls,[45] north of the city. Kolônus was a temple of Poseidon, within the precinct of which the assembly was inclosed for the occasion. Such an assembly was not likely to be numerous, wherever held,[46] since there could be little motive to attend, when freedom of debate was extinguished; but the oligarchical conspirators now transferred it without the walls; selecting a narrow area for the meeting, in order that they might lessen still farther the chance of numerous attendance, an assembly which they fully designed should be the last in the history of Athens. They were thus also more out of the reach of an armed movement in the city, as well as enabled to post their own armed partisans around, under color of protecting the meeting against disturbance by the Lacedæmonians from Dekeleia.

The proposition of the newly-appointed commissioners—probably Peisander, Antiphon, and other partisans themselves—was exceedingly short and simple. They merely moved the abolition of the celebrated Graphê Paranomôn; that is, they proposed that every Athenian citizen should have full liberty of making any anti-constitutional proposition that he chose, and that every other citizen should be interdicted, under heavy penalties, from prosecuting him by graphê paranomôn indictment on the score of informality, illegality, or unconstitutionality, or from doing him any other mischief. This proposition was adopted without a single dissentient. It was thought more formal by the directing chiefs to sever this proposition pointedly from the rest, and to put it, singly and apart, into the mouth of the special commissioners; since it was the legalizing condition of every other positive change which they were about to move afterwards. Full liberty being thus granted to make any motion, however anti-constitutional, and to dispense with all the established formalities, such as preliminary authorization by the senate, Peisander now came forward with his substantive propositions to the following effect:—

1. All the existing democratical magistracies were suppressed at once, and made to cease for the future. 2. No civil functions whatever were hereafter to be salaried. 3. To constitute a new government, a committee of five persons were named forthwith, who were to choose a larger body of one hundred; that is, one hundred including the five choosers themselves. Each individual out of this body of one hundred, was to choose three persons. 4. A body of Four Hundred was thus constituted, who were to take their seat in the senate-house, and to carry on the government with unlimited powers, according to their own discretion. 5. They were to convene the Five Thousand, whenever they might think fit.[47] All was passed without a dissentient voice.

The invention and employment of this imaginary aggregate of Five Thousand was not the least dexterous among the combinations of Antiphon. No one knew who these Five Thousand were: yet the resolution just adopted purported,—not that such a number of citizens should be singled out and constituted, either by choice, or by lot, or in some determinate manner which should exhibit them to the view and knowledge of others,—but that the Four Hundred should convene *The Five Thousand*, whenever they thought proper: thus assuming the latter to be a list already made up and notorious, at least to the Four Hundred themselves. The real fact was, that the Five Thousand existed nowhere except in the talk and proclamations of the conspirators, as a supplement of fictitious auxiliaries. They did not even exist as individual names on paper, but simply as an imposturous nominal aggregate. The Four Hundred, now installed, formed the entire and exclusive rulers of the state.[48] But the mere name of the Five Thousand, though it was nothing more than a name, served two important purposes for Antiphon and his conspiracy. First, it admitted of being falsely produced, especially to the armament at Samos, as proof of a tolerably numerous and popular body of equal, qualified, concurrent citizens, all intended to

take their turn by rotation in exercising the powers of government; thus lightening the odium of extreme usurpation to the Four Hundred, and passing them off merely as the earliest section of the Five Thousand, put into office for a few months, and destined at the end of that period to give place to another equal section.[49] Next, it immensely augmented the means of intimidation possessed by the Four Hundred at home, by exaggerating the impression of their supposed strength. For the citizens generally were made to believe that there were five thousand real and living partners in the conspiracy; while the fact that these partners were not known and could not be individually identified, rather aggravated the reigning terror and mistrust; since every man, suspecting that his neighbor might possibly be among them, was afraid to communicate his discontent or propose means for joint resistance.[50] In both these two ways, the name and assumed existence of the Five Thousand lent strength to the real Four Hundred conspirators. It masked their usurpation, while it increased their hold on the respect and fears of the citizens.

As soon as the public assembly at Kolônus had, with such seeming unanimity, accepted all the propositions of Peisander, they were dismissed; and the new regiment of Four Hundred were chosen and constituted in the form prescribed. It now only remained to install them in the senate-house. But this could not be done without force, since the senators were already within it; having doubtless gone thither immediately from the assembly, where their presence, at least the presence of the prytanes, or senators of the presiding tribe, was essential as legal presidents. They had to deliberate what they would do under the decree just passed, which divested them of all authority. Nor was it impossible that they might organize armed resistance; for which there seemed more than usual facility at the present moment, since the occupation of Dekeleia by the Lacedæmonians kept Athens in a condition like that of a permanent camp, with a large proportion of the citizens day and night under arms.[51] Against this chance the Four Hundred made provision. They selected that hour of the day when the greater number of citizens habitually went home, probably to their morning meal, leaving the military station, with the arms piled and ready, under comparatively thin watch. While the general body of hoplites left the station at this hour, according to the usual practice, the hoplites—Andrian, Tenian, and others—in the immediate confidence of the Four Hundred, were directed, by private order, to hold themselves prepared and in arms, at a little distance off; so that if any symptoms should appear of resistance being contemplated, they might at once interfere and forestall it. Having taken this precaution, the Four Hundred marched in a body to the senate-house, each man with a dagger concealed under his garment, and followed by their special body-guard of one hundred and twenty young men from various Grecian cities, the instruments of the assassinations ordered by Antiphon and his colleagues. In this array they marched into the senate-house, where the senators were assembled, and commanded them to depart; at the same time tendering to them their pay for all the remainder of the year,—seemingly about three months or more down to the beginning of Hecatombæon, the month of new nominations,—dur-

ing which their functions ought to have continued. The senators were no way prepared to resist the decree just passed under the forms of legality with an armed body now arrived to enforce its execution. They obeyed and departed, each man as he passed the door receiving the salary tendered to him. That they should yield obedience to superior force, under the circumstances, can excite neither censure nor surprise; but that they should accept, from the hands of the conspirators, this anticipation of an unearned salary, was a meanness which almost branded them as accomplices, and dishonored the expiring hour of the last democratical authority. The Four Hundred now found themselves triumphantly installed in the senate-house; without the least resistance, either within its walls, or even without, by any portion of the citizens.[52]

Thus perished, or seemed to perish, the democracy of Athens, after an uninterrupted existence of nearly one hundred years since the revolution of Kleisthenês. So incredible did it appear that the numerous, intelligent, and constitutional citizens of Athens should suffer their liberties to be overthrown by a band of four hundred conspirators, while the great mass of them not only loved their democracy, but had arms in their hands to defend it, that even their enemy and neighbor Agis, at Dekeleia, could hardly imagine the revolution to be a fact accomplished. We shall see presently that it did not stand,—nor would it probably have stood, had circumstances even been more favorable,—but the accomplishment of it at all, is an incident too extraordinary to be passed over without some words in explanation.

We must remark that the tremendous catastrophe and loss of blood in Sicily had abated the energy of the Athenian character generally, but especially had made them despair of their foreign relations; of the possibility that they could make head against enemies, increased in number by revolts among their own allies, and farther sustained by Persian gold. Upon this sentiment of despair is brought to bear the treacherous delusion of Alkibiadês, offering them the Persian aid; that is, means of defence and success against foreign enemies, at the price of their democracy. Reluctantly the people are brought, but they *are* brought, to entertain the proposition: and thus the conspirators gain their first capital point, of familiarizing the people with the idea of such a change of constitution. The ulterior success of the conspiracy—when all prospect of Persian gold, or improved foreign position, was at an end—is due to the combinations, alike nefarious and skilful, of Antiphon, wielding and organizing the united strength of the aristocratical classes at Athens; strength always exceedingly great, but under ordinary circumstances working in fractions disunited and even reciprocally hostile to each other,—restrained by the ascendant democratical institutions,—and reduced to corrupt what it could not overthrow. Antiphon, about to employ this anti-popular force in one systematic scheme, and for the accomplishment of a predetermined purpose, keeps still within the same ostensible constitutional limits. He raises no open mutiny: he maintains inviolate the cardinal point of Athenian political morality, respect to the decision of the senate and political assembly, as well as to

constitutional maxims. But he knows well that the value of these meetings, as political securities, depends upon entire freedom of speech; and that, if that freedom be suppressed, the assembly itself becomes a nullity, or rather an instrument of positive imposture and mischief. Accordingly, he causes all the popular orators to be successively assassinated, so that no man dares to open his mouth on that side; while on the other hand, the anti-popular speakers are all loud and confident, cheering one another on, and seeming to represent all the feeling of the persons present. By thus silencing each individual leader, and intimidating every opponent from standing forward as spokesman, he extorts the formal sanction of the assembly and the senate to measures which the large majority of the citizens detest. That majority, however, are bound by their own constitutional forms; and when the decision of these, by whatever means obtained, is against them, they have neither the inclination nor the courage to resist. In no part of the world has this sentiment of constitutional duty, and submission to the vote of a legal majority, been more keenly and universally felt, than it was among the citizens of democratical Athens.[53] Antiphon thus finds means to employ the constitutional sentiment of Athens as a means of killing the constitution: the mere empty form, after its vital and protective efficacy has been abstracted, remains simply as a cheat to paralyze individual patriotism.

It was this cheat which rendered the Athenians indisposed to stand forward with arms in defence of that democracy to which they were attached. Accustomed as they were to unlimited pacific contention within the bounds of their constitution, they were in the highest degree averse to anything like armed intestine contention. This is the natural effect of an established free and equal polity, to substitute the contests of the tongue for those of the sword, and sometimes, even to create so extreme a disinclination to the latter, that if liberty be energetically assailed, the counter-energy necessary for its defence may probably be found wanting. So difficult is it for the same people to have both the qualities requisite for making a free constitution work well in ordinary times, together with those very different qualities requisite for upholding it against exceptional dangers and under trying emergencies. None but an Athenian of extraordinary ability, like Antiphon, would have understood the art of thus making the constitutional feeling of his countrymen subservient to the success of his conspiracy, and of maintaining the forms of legal dealing towards assembled and constitutional bodies, while he violated them in secret and successive stabs directed against individuals. Political assassination had been unknown at Athens, as far as our information reaches, since it was employed, about fifty years before, by the oligarchical party against Ephialtês, the coadjutor of Periklês.[54] But this had been an individual case, and it was reserved for Antiphon and Phrynichus to organize a band of assassins working systematically, and taking off a series of leading victims one after the other. As the Macedonian kings in after-times required the surrender of the popular orators in a body, so the authors of this conspiracy found the same enemies to deal with, and adopted another way of getting rid of them; thus reducing the

assembly into a tame and lifeless mass, capable of being intimidated into giving its collective sanction to measures which its large majority detested.

As Grecian history has been usually written, we are instructed to believe that the misfortunes, and the corruption, and the degradation of the democratical states are brought upon them by the class of demagogues, of whom Kleon, Hyperbolus, Androklês, etc., stand forth as specimens. These men are represented as mischief-makers and revilers, accusing without just cause, and converting innocence into treason. Now the history of this conspiracy of the Four Hundred presents to us the other side of the picture. It shows that the political enemies—against whom the Athenian people were protected by their democratical institutions, and by the demagogues as living organs of those institutions—were not fictitious but dangerously real. It reveals the continued existence of powerful anti-popular combinations, ready to come together for treasonable purposes when the moment appeared safe and tempting. It manifests the character and morality of the leaders, to whom the direction of the anti-popular force naturally fell. It proves that these leaders, men of uncommon ability, required nothing more than the extinction or silence of the demagogues, to be enabled to subvert the popular securities and get possession of the government. We need no better proof to teach us what was the real function and intrinsic necessity of these demagogues in the Athenian system, taking them as a class, and apart from the manner in which individuals among them may have performed their duty. They formed the vital movement of all that was tutelary and public-spirited in democracy. Aggressive in respect to official delinquents, they were defensive in respect to the public and the constitution. If that anti-popular force, which Antiphon found ready-made, had not been efficient, at a much earlier moment, in stifling the democracy, it was because there were demagogues to cry aloud, as well as assemblies to hear and sustain them. If Antiphon's conspiracy was successful, it was because he knew where to aim his blows, so as to strike down the real enemies of the oligarchy and the real defenders of the people. I here employ the term demagogues because it is that commonly used by those who denounce the class of men here under review: the proper neutral phrase, laying aside odious associations, would be to call them popular speakers, or opposition speakers. But, by whatever name they may be called, it is impossible rightly to conceive their position in Athens, without looking at them in contrast and antithesis with those anti-popular forces against which they formed the indispensable barrier, and which come forth into such manifest and melancholy working under the organizing hands of Antiphon and Phrynichus.

As soon as the Four Hundred found themselves formally installed in the senate-house, they divided themselves by lot into separate prytanies,—probably ten in number, consisting of forty members each, like the former senate of Five Hundred, in order that the distribution of the year to which the people were accustomed might not be disturbed,—and then solemnized their installation by prayer and sacrifice. They put to death some political enemies, though not many: they farther imprisoned and

banished others, and made large changes in the administration of affairs, carrying everything with a strictness and rigor unknown under the old constitution.[55] It seems to have been proposed among them to pass a vote of restoration to all persons under sentence of exile. But this was rejected by the majority in order that Alkibiadês might not be among the number; nor did they think it expedient, notwithstanding, to pass the law, reserving him as a special exception.

They farther despatched a messenger to Agis at Dekeleia, intimating their wish to treat for peace; which, they affirmed, he ought to be ready to grant to them, now that "the faithless Demos" was put down. Agis, however, not believing that the Athenian people would thus submit to be deprived of their liberty, anticipated that intestine dissension would certainly break out, or at least that some portion of the Long Walls would be found unguarded, should a foreign army appear. While therefore he declined the overtures for peace, he at the same time sent for reinforcements out of Peloponnesus, and marched with a considerable army, in addition to his own garrison, up to the very walls of Athens. But he found the ramparts carefully manned: no commotion took place within: even a sally was made, in which some advantage was gained over him. He therefore speedily retired, sending back his newly-arrived reinforcements to Peloponnesus; while the Four Hundred, on renewing their advances to him for peace, now found themselves much better received, and were even encouraged to despatch envoys to Sparta itself.[56]

As soon as they had thus got over the first difficulties, and placed matters on a footing which seemed to promise stability, they despatched ten envoys to Samos. Aware beforehand of the danger impending over them in that quarter from the known aversion of the soldiers and seamen to anything in the nature of oligarchy, they had, moreover, just heard, by the arrival of Chæreas and the paralus, of the joint attack made by the Athenian and Samian oligarchs, and of its complete failure. Had this event occurred a little earlier, it might perhaps have deterred even some of their own number from proceeding with the revolution at Athens, which was rendered thereby almost sure of failure, from the first. Their ten envoys were instructed to represent at Samos that the recent oligarchy had been established with no views injurious to the city, but on the contrary for the general benefit; that though the Council now installed consisted of Four Hundred only, yet the total number of partisans who had made the revolution, and were qualified citizens under it, was Five Thousand; a number greater, they added, than had ever been actually assembled in the Pnyx under the democracy, even for the most important debates,[57] in consequence of the unavoidable absences of numerous individuals on military service and foreign travel.

What satisfaction might have been given, by this allusion to the fictitious Five Thousand, or by the fallacious reference to the numbers, real or pretended, of the past democratical assemblies, had these envoys carried to Samos the first tidings of the Athenian revolution, we cannot say. They were forestalled by Chæreas, the offi-

cer of the paralus; who, though the Four Hundred tried to detain him, made his escape and hastened to Samos to communicate the fearful and unexpected change which had occurred at Athens. Instead of hearing that change described under the treacherous extenuations prescribed by Antiphon and Phrynichus, the armament first learned it from the lips of Chæreas, who told them at once the extreme truth, and even more than the truth. He recounted, with indignation, that every Athenian who ventured to say a word against the Four Hundred rulers of the city, was punished with the scourge; that even the wives and children of persons hostile to them were outraged; that there was a design of seizing and imprisoning the relatives of the democrats at Samos, and putting them to death, if the latter refused to obey orders from Athens. The simple narrative of what had really occurred would have been quite sufficient to provoke in the armament a sentiment of detestation against the Four Hundred. But these additional details of Chæreas, partly untrue, filled them with uncontrollable wrath, which they manifested by open menace against the known partisans of the Four Hundred at Samos, as well as against those who had taken part in the recent oligarchical conspiracy in the island. It was not without difficulty that their hands were arrested by the more reflecting citizens present, who remonstrated against the madness of such disorderly proceedings when the enemy was close upon them.

But though violence and aggressive insult were thus seasonably checked, the sentiment of the armament was too ardent and unanimous to be satisfied without some solemn, emphatic, and decisive declaration against the oligarchs at Athens. A great democratical manifestation, of the most earnest and imposing character, was proclaimed, chiefly at the instance of Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. The Athenian armament, brought together in one grand assembly, took an oath by the most stringent sanctions: to maintain their democracy; to keep up friendship and harmony with each other; to carry on the war against the Peloponnesians with energy; to be at enmity with the Four Hundred at Athens, and to enter into no amicable communication with them whatever. The whole armament swore to this compact with enthusiasm, and even those who had before taken part in the oligarchical movements were forced to be forward in the ceremony.[58] What lent double force to this touching scene was, that the entire Samian population, every male of the military age, took the oath along with the friendly armament. Both pledged themselves to mutual fidelity and common suffering or triumph, whatever might be the issue of the contest. Both felt that the Peloponnesians at Milêtus, and the Four Hundred at Athens, were alike their enemies, and that the success of either would be their common ruin.

Pursuant to this resolution,—of upholding their democracy and at the same time sustaining the war against the Peloponnesians, at all cost or peril to themselves,—the soldiers of the armament now took a step unparalleled in Athenian history. Feeling that they could no longer receive orders from Athens under her present oligarchical rulers, with whom Charmînus and others among their own leaders were implicated,

they constituted themselves into a sort of community apart, and held an assembly as citizens to choose anew their generals and trierarchs. Of those already in command, several were deposed as unworthy of trust; others being elected in their places, especially Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. Nor was the assembly held for election alone; it was a scene of effusive sympathy, animating eloquence, and patriotism generous as well as resolute. The united armament felt that *they* were the real Athens; the guardians of her constitution, the upholders of her remaining empire and glory, the protectors of her citizens at home against those conspirators who had intruded themselves wrongfully into the senate-house; the sole barrier, even for those conspirators themselves, against the hostile Peloponnesian fleet. "*The city has revolted from us*," exclaimed Thrasybulus and others in pregnant words, which embodied a whole train of feeling.[59] "But let not this abate our courage: for they are only the lesser force, we are the greater and the self-sufficing. We have here the whole navy of the state, whereby we can insure to ourselves the contributions from our dependencies just as well as if we started from Athens. We have the hearty attachment of Samos, second in power only to Athens herself, and serving us as a military station against the enemy, now as in the past. We are better able to obtain supplies for ourselves, than those in the city for themselves; for it is only through our presence at Samos that they have hitherto kept the mouth of Peiræus open. If they refuse to restore to us our democratical constitution, we shall be better able to exclude them from the sea than they to exclude us. What, indeed, does the city do now for us to second our efforts against the enemy? Little or nothing. We have lost nothing by their separation. They send us no pay, they leave us to provide maintenance for ourselves; they are now out of condition for sending us even good counsel, which is the great superiority of a city over a camp.[60] As counsellors, we here are better than they; for they have just committed the wrong of subverting the constitution of our common country, while we are striving to maintain it, and will do our best to force them into the same track. Alkibiadês, if we insure to him a safe restoration, will cheerfully bring the alliance of Persia to sustain us; and, even if the worst comes to the worst, if all other hopes fail us, our powerful naval force will always enable us to find places of refuge in abundance, with city and territory adequate to our wants."

Such was the encouraging language of Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus, which found full sympathy in the armament, and raised among them a spirit of energetic patriotism and resolution, not unworthy of their forefathers when refugees at Salamis under the invasion of Xerxês. To regain their democracy and to sustain the war against the Peloponnesians, were impulses alike ardent and blended in the same tide of generous enthusiasm; a tide so vehement as to sweep before it the reluctance of that minority who had before been inclined to the oligarchical movement. But besides these two impulses, there was also a third, tending towards the recall of Alkibiadês; a coadjutor, if in many ways useful, yet bringing with him a spirit of selfishness and duplicity uncongenial to the exalted sentiment now all-powerful at Samos.[61]

This exile had been the first to originate the oligarchical conspiracy, whereby Athens, already scarcely adequate to the exigencies of her foreign war, was now paralyzed in courage and torn by civil discord, preserved from absolute ruin only by that counter-enthusiasm which a fortunate turn of circumstances had raised up at Samos. Having at first duped the conspirators themselves, and enabled them to dupe the sincere democrats, by promising Persian aid, and thus floating the plot over its first and greatest difficulties,—Alkibiadês had found himself constrained to break with them as soon as the time came for realizing his promises. But he had broken off with so much address as still to keep up the illusion that he *could* realize them if he chose. His return by means of the oligarchy being now impossible, he naturally became its enemy, and this new antipathy superseded his feeling of revenge against the democracy for having banished him. In fact he was disposed, as Phrynichus had truly said about him,[62] to avail himself indifferently of either, according as the one or the other presented itself as a serviceable agency for his ambitious views. Accordingly, as soon as the turn of affairs at Samos had made itself manifest, he opened communication with Thrasybulus and the democratical leaders,[63] renewing to them the same promises of Persian alliance, on condition of his own restoration, as he had before made to Peisander and the oligarchical party. Thrasybulus and his colleagues either sincerely believed him, or at least thought that his restoration afforded a possibility, not to be neglected, of obtaining Persian aid, without which they despaired of the war. Such possibility would at least infuse spirit into the soldiers; while the restoration was now proposed without the terrible condition which had before accompanied it, of renouncing the democratical constitution.

It was not without difficulty, however, nor until after more than one assembly and discussion,[64] that Thrasybulus prevailed on the armament to pass a vote of security and restoration to Alkibiadês. As Athenian citizens, the soldiers probably were unwilling to take upon them the reversal of a sentence solemnly passed by the democratical tribunal, on the ground of irreligion with suspicion of treason. They were, however, induced to pass the vote, after which Thrasybulus sailed over to the Asiatic coast, brought across Alkibiadês to the island, and introduced him to the assembled armament. The supple exile, who had denounced the democracy so bitterly, both at Sparta, and in his correspondence with the oligarchical conspirators, knew well how to adapt himself to the sympathies of the democratical assembly now before him. He began by deploring the sentence of banishment passed against him, and throwing the blame of it, not upon the injustice of his countrymen, but upon his own unhappy destiny.[65] He then entered upon the public prospects of the moment, pledging himself with entire confidence to realize the hopes of Persian alliance, and boasting, in terms not merely ostentatious but even extravagant, of the ascendant influence which he possessed over Tissaphernês. The satrap had promised him, so the speech went on, never to let the Athenians want for pay, as soon as he once came to trust them, not even if it were necessary to issue out his last daric or to coin his own silver couch into money. Nor would he require any farther condition to induce him to trust

them, except that Alkibiadês should be restored and should become their guarantee. Not only would he furnish the Athenians with pay, but he would, besides, bring up to their aid the Phenician fleet, which was already at Aspendus, instead of placing it at the disposal of the Peloponnesians.

In the communications of Alkibiadês with Peisander and his coadjutors, Alkibiadês had pretended that the Great King could have no confidence in the Athenians unless they not only restored him, but abnegated their democracy. On this occasion, the latter condition was withdrawn, and the confidence of the Great King was said to be more easily accorded. But though Alkibiadês thus presented himself with a new falsehood, as well as with a new vein of political sentiment, his discourse was eminently successful. It answered all the various purposes which he contemplated; partly of intimidating and disuniting the oligarchical conspirators at home, partly of exalting his own grandeur in the eyes of the armament, partly of sowing mistrust between the Spartans and Tissaphernês. It was in such full harmony with both the reigning feelings of the armament,—eagerness to put down the Four Hundred, as well as to get the better of their Peloponnesian enemies in Ionia,—that the hearers were not disposed to scrutinize narrowly the grounds upon which his assurances rested. In the fulness of confidence and enthusiasm, they elected him general along with Thrasybulus and the rest, conceiving redoubled hopes of victory over their enemies both at Athens and at Milêtus. So completely, indeed, were their imaginations filled with the prospect of Persian aid, against their enemies in Ionia, that alarm for the danger of Athens under the government of the Four Hundred became the predominant feeling; and many voices were even raised in favor of sailing to Peiræus for the rescue of the city. But Alkibiadês, knowing well—what the armament did not know—that his own promises of Persian pay and fleet were a mere delusion, strenuously dissuaded such a movement, which would have left the dependencies in Ionia defenceless against the Peloponnesians. As soon as the assembly broke up, he crossed over again to the mainland, under pretence of concerting measures with Tissaphernês to realize his recent engagements.

Relieved substantially, though not in strict form, from the penalties of exile, Alkibiadês was thus launched in a new career. After having first played the game of Athens against Sparta, next, that of Sparta against Athens, thirdly, that of Tissaphernês against both, he now professed to take up again the promotion of Athenian interests. In reality, however, he was and had always been playing his own game, or obeying his own self-interest, ambition, or antipathy. He was at this time eager to make a show of intimate and confidential communication with Tissaphernês, in order that he might thereby impose upon the Athenians at Samos, to communicate to the satrap his recent election as general of the Athenian force, that his importance with the Persians might be enhanced, and lastly, by passing backwards and forwards from Tissaphernês to the Athenian camp, to exhibit an appearance of friendly concert between the two, which might sow mistrust and alarm in the minds of the Peloponnesians. In

this tripartite manœuvring, so suitable to his habitual character, he was more or less successful, especially in regard to the latter purpose. For though he never had any serious chance of inducing Tissaphernês to assist the Athenians, he did, nevertheless, contribute to alienate him from the enemy, as well as the enemy from him.[66]

Without any longer delay in the camp of Tissaphernês than was necessary to keep up the faith of the Athenians in his promise of Persian aid, Alkibiadês returned to Samos, where he was found by the ten envoys sent by the Four Hundred from Athens, on their first arrival. These envoys had been long in their voyage; having made a considerable stay at Delos, under alarm from intelligence of the previous visit of Chæreas, and the furious indignation which his narrative had provoked.[67] At length they reached Samos, and were invited by the generals to make their communication to the assembled armament. They had the utmost difficulty in procuring a hearing, so strong was the antipathy against them, so loud were the cries that the subverters of the democracy ought to be put to death. Silence being at length obtained, they proceeded to state that the late revolution had been brought to pass for the salvation of the city, and especially for the economy of the public treasure, by suppressing the salaried civil functions of the democracy, and thus leaving more pay for the soldiers;[68] that there was no purpose of mischief in the change, still less of betrayal to the enemy, which might already have been effected, had such been the intention of the Four Hundred, when Agis advanced from Dekeleia up to the walls; that the citizens now possessing the political franchise, were not Four Hundred only, but Five Thousand in number, all of whom would take their turn in rotation for the places now occupied by the Four Hundred;[69] that the recitals of Chæreas, affirming ill-usage to have been offered to the relatives of the soldiers at Athens, were utterly false and calumnious.

Such were the topics on which the envoys insisted, in an apologetic strain, at considerable length, but without any effect in conciliating the soldiers who heard them. The general resentment against the Four Hundred was expressed by several persons present in public speech, by others in private manifestation of feeling against the envoys: and so passionately was this sentiment aggravated,—consisting not only of wrath for what the oligarchy had done, but of fear for what they might do,—that the proposition of sailing immediately to the Peiræus was revived with greater ardor than before. Alkibiadês, who had already once discountenanced this design, now stood forward to repel it again. Nevertheless, all the plenitude of his influence, then greater than that of any other officer in the armament, and seconded by the esteemed character as well as the loud voice of Thrasybulus,[70] was required to avert it. But for him, it would have been executed. While he reproved and silenced those who were most clamorous against the envoys, he took upon himself to give to the latter a public answer in the name of the collective armament. "We make no objection (he said) to the power of the Five Thousand: but the Four Hundred must go about their business, and reinstate the senate of Five Hundred as it was before. We

are much obliged for what you have done in the way of economy, so as to increase the pay available for the soldiers. Above all, maintain the war strenuously, without any flinching before the enemy. For if the city be now safely held, there is good hope that we may make up the mutual differences between us by amicable settlement; but if once either of us perish, either we here or you at home, there will be nothing left for the other to make up with."[71]

With this reply he dismissed the envoys; the armament reluctantly abandoning their wish of sailing to Athens. Thucydidês insists much on the capital service which Alkibiadês then rendered to his country, by arresting a project which would have had the effect of leaving all Ionia and the Hellespont defenceless against the Peloponnesians. His advice doubtless turned out well in the result; yet if we contemplate the state of affairs at the moment when he gave it, we shall be inclined to doubt whether prudential calculation was not rather against him, and in favor of the impulse of the armament. For what was to hinder the Four Hundred from patching up a peace with Sparta, and getting a Lacedæmonian garrison into Athens to help them in maintaining their dominion? Even apart from ambition, this was their best chance, if not their only chance, of safety for themselves; and we shall presently see that they tried to do it; being prevented from succeeding, partly, indeed, by the mutiny which arose against them at Athens, but still more by the stupidity of the Lacedæmonians themselves. Alkibiadês could not really imagine that the Four Hundred would obey his mandate delivered to the envoys, and resign their power voluntarily. But if they remained masters of Athens, who could calculate what they would do,—after having received this declaration of hostility from Samos,—not merely in regard to the foreign enemy, but even in regard to the relatives of the absent soldiers? Whether we look to the legitimate apprehensions of the soldiers, inevitable while their relatives were thus exposed, and almost unnerving them as to the hearty prosecution of the war abroad, in their utter uncertainty with regard to matters at home,—or to the chance of irreparable public calamity, greater even than the loss of Ionia, by the betrayal of Athens to the enemy,—we shall be disposed to conclude that the impulse of the armament was not merely natural, but even founded on a more prudent estimate of the actual chances, and that Alkibiadês was nothing more than fortunate in a sanguine venture. And if, instead of the actual chances, we look to the chances as Alkibiadês represented, and as the armament conceived them upon his authority,—namely, that the Phenician fleet was close at hand to act against the Lacedæmonians in Ionia,—we shall sympathize yet more with the defensive movement homeward. Alkibiadês had an advantage over every one else, simply by knowing his own falsehoods.

At the same assembly were introduced envoys from Argos, bearing a mission of recognition and an offer of aid to the Athenian Demos in Samos. They came in an Athenian trireme, navigated by the parali who had brought home Chæreas in the paralus from Samos to Athens, and had been then transferred into a common ship of

war and sent to cruise about Eubœa. Since that time, however, they had been directed to convey Læspodias, Aristophon, and Melêsias,[72] as ambassadors from the Four Hundred to Sparta. But when crossing the Argolic gulf, probably under orders to land at Prasiæ, they declared against the oligarchy, sailed to Argos, and there deposited as prisoners the three ambassadors, who had all been active in the conspiracy of the Four Hundred. Being then about to depart for Samos, they were requested by the Argeians to carry thither their envoys, who were dismissed by Alkibiadês with an expression of gratitude, and with a hope that their aid would be ready when called for.

Meanwhile the envoys returned from Samos to Athens, carrying back to the Four Hundred the unwelcome news of their total failure with the armament. A little before, it appears, some of the trierarchs on service at the Hellespont had returned to Athens also,—Eratosthenês, Iatroklês, and others, who had tried to turn their squadron to the purposes of the oligarchical conspirators, but had been baffled and driven off by the inflexible democracy of their own seamen.[73] If at Athens, the calculations of these conspirators had succeeded more triumphantly than could have been expected beforehand, everywhere else they had completely miscarried; not merely at Samos and in the fleet, but also with the allied dependencies. At the time when Peisander quitted Samos for Athens, to consummate the oligarchical conspiracy even without Alkibiadês, he and others had gone round many of the dependencies and had effected a similar revolution in their internal government, in hopes that they would thus become attached to the new oligarchy at Athens. But this anticipation, as Phrynichus had predicted, was nowhere realized. The newly-created oligarchies only became more anxious for complete autonomy than the democracies had been before. At Thasos, especially, a body of exiles who had for some time dwelt in Peloponnesus were recalled, and active preparations were made for revolt, by new fortifications as well as by new triremes.[74] Instead of strengthening their hold on the maritime empire, the Four Hundred thus found that they had actually weakened it; while the pronounced hostility of the armament at Samos, not only put an end to all their hopes abroad, but rendered their situation at home altogether precarious.

From the moment when the coadjutors of Antiphon first learned, through the arrival of Chæreas at Athens, the proclamation of the democracy at Samos, discord, mistrust, and alarm began to spread even among their own members; together with a conviction that the oligarchy could never stand except through the presence of a Peloponnesian garrison in Athens. While Antiphon and Phrynichus, the leading minds who directed the majority of the Four Hundred, despatched envoys to Sparta for concluding peace,—these envoys never reached Sparta, being seized by the parali and sent prisoners to Argos, as above stated—, and commenced the erection of a special fort at Ectioneia, the projecting mole which contracted and commanded, on the northern side, the narrow entrance of Peiræus, there began to arise even in the bo-

som of the Four Hundred an opposition minority affecting popular sentiment, among whom the most conspicuous persons were Theramenês and Aristokratês.[75]

Though these men had stood forward prominently as contrivers and actors throughout the whole progress of the conspiracy, they now found themselves bitterly disappointed by the result. Individually, their ascendency with their colleagues was inferior to that of Peisander, Kallæschrus, Phrynichus, and others; while, collectively, the ill-gotten power of the Four Hundred was diminished in value, as much as it was aggravated in peril, by the loss of the foreign empire and the alienation of their Samian armament. Now began the workings of jealousy and strife among the successful conspirators, each of whom had entered into the scheme with unbounded expectations of personal ambition for himself, each had counted on stepping at once into the first place among the new oligarchical body. In a democracy, observes Thucydidês, contentions for power and preëminence provoke in the unsuccessful competitors less of fierce antipathy and sense of injustice, than in an oligarchy; for the losing candidates acquiesce with comparatively little repugnance in the unfavorable vote of a large miscellaneous body of unknown citizens; but they are angry at being put aside by a few known comrades, their rivals as well as their equals: moreover, at the moment when an oligarchy of ambitious men has just raised itself on the ruins of a democracy, every man of the conspirators is in exaggerated expectation; every one thinks himself entitled to become at once the first man of the body, and is dissatisfied if he be merely put upon a level with the rest.[76]

Such were the feelings of disappointed ambition, mingled with despondency, which sprung up among a minority of the Four Hundred, immediately after the news of the proclamation of the democracy at Samos among the armament. Theramenês, the leader of this minority,—a man of keen ambition, clever but unsteady and treacherous, not less ready to desert his party than to betray his country, though less prepared for extreme atrocities than many of his oligarchical comrades, began to look out for a good pretence to disconnect himself from a precarious enterprise. Taking advantage of the delusion which the Four Hundred had themselves held out about the fictitious Five Thousand, he insisted that, since the dangers that beset the newly-formed authority were so much more formidable than had been anticipated, it was necessary to popularize the party by enrolling and producing these Five Thousand as a real instead of a fictitious body.[77] Such an opposition, formidable from the very outset, became still bolder and more developed when the envoys returned from Samos, with an account of their reception by the armament, as well as of the answer, delivered in the name of the armament, whereby Alkibiadês directed the Four Hundred to dissolve themselves forthwith, but at the same time approved of the constitution of the Five Thousand, coupled with the restoration of the old senate. To enroll the Five Thousand at once, would be meeting the army half way; and there were hopes that, at that price, a compromise and reconciliation might be effected, of which Alkibiadês had himself spoken as practicable.[78] In addition to the formal an-

swer, the envoys doubtless brought back intimation of the enraged feelings manifested by the armament, and of their eagerness, uncontrollable by every one except Alkibiadês, to sail home forthwith and rescue Athens from the Four Hundred. Hence arose an increased conviction that the dominion of the latter could not last: and an ambition, on the part of others as well as Theramenês, to stand forward as leaders of a popular opposition against it, in the name of the Five Thousand.[79]

Against this popular opposition, Antiphon and Phrynichus exerted themselves, with demagogic assiduity, to caress and keep together the majority of the Four Hundred, as well as to uphold their power without abridgment. They were noway disposed to comply with this requisition that the fiction of the Five Thousand should be converted into a reality. They knew well that the enrollment of so many partners[80] would be tantamount to a democracy, and would be, in substance at least, if not in form, an annihilation of their own power. They had now gone too far to recede with safety; while the menacing attitude of Samos, as well as the opposition growing up against them at home, both within and without their own body, served only as instigation to them to accelerate their measures for peace with Sparta, and to secure the introduction of a Spartan garrison.

With this view, immediately after the return of their envoys from Samos, the two most eminent leaders, Antiphon and Phrynichus, went themselves with ten other colleagues in all haste to Sparta, prepared to purchase peace and the promise of Spartan aid almost at any price. At the same time, the construction of the fortress at Ectioneia was prosecuted with redoubled zeal; under pretence of defending the entrance of Peiræus against the armament from Samos, if the threat of their coming should be executed, but with the real purpose of bringing into it a Lacedæmonian fleet and army. For this latter object every facility was provided. The northwestern corner of the fortification of Peiræus, to the north of the harbor and its mouth, was cut off by a cross wall reaching southward so as to join the harbor: from the southern end of this cross wall, and forming an angle with it, a new wall was built, fronting the harbor and running to the extremity of the mole which narrowed the mouth of the harbor on the northern side, at which mole it met the termination of the northern wall of Peiræus. A separate citadel was thus inclosed, defensible against any attack either from Peiræus or from the harbor; furnished, besides, with distinct broad gates and posterns of its own, as well as with facilities for admitting an enemy within it.[81] The new cross wall was carried so as to traverse a vast portico, or open market-house, the largest in Peiræus: the larger half of this portico thus became inclosed within the new citadel; and orders were issued that all the corn, both actually warehoused and hereafter to be imported into Peiræus, should be deposited therein and sold out from thence for consumption. As Athens was sustained almost exclusively on corn brought from Eubœa and elsewhere, since the permanent occupation of Dekeleia, the Four Hundred rendered themselves masters by this arrangement of

all the subsistence of the citizens, as well as of the entrance into the harbor; either to admit the Spartans or exclude the armament from Samos.[82]

Though Theramenês, himself one of the generals named under the Four Hundred, denounced, in conjunction with his supporters, the treasonable purpose of this new citadel, yet the majority of the Four Hundred stood to their resolution, and the building made rapid progress under the superintendence of the general Alexiklês, one of the most strenuous of the oligarchical faction.[83] Such was the habit of obedience at Athens to an established authority, when once constituted,—and so great the fear and mistrust arising out of the general belief in the reality of the Five Thousand unknown auxiliaries, supposed to be prepared to enforce the orders of the Four Hundred,—that the people, and even armed citizen hoplites, went on working at the building, in spite of their suspicions as to its design. Though not completed, it was so far advanced as to be defensible, when Antiphon and Phrynichus returned from Sparta. They had gone thither prepared to surrender everything,—not merely their naval force, but their city itself,—and to purchase their own personal safety by making the Lacedæmonians masters of Peiræus.[84] Yet we read with astonishment that the latter could not be prevailed on to contract any treaty, and that they manifested nothing but backwardness in seizing this golden opportunity. Had Alkibiadês been now playing their game, as he had been doing a year earlier, immediately before the revolt of Chios,—had they been under any energetic leaders, to impel them into hearty coöperation with the treason of the Four Hundred, who combined at this moment both the will and the power to place Athens in their hands, if seconded by an adequate force,—they might now have overpowered their great enemy at home, before the armament at Samos could have been brought to the rescue.

Considering that Athens was saved from capture only by the slackness and stupidity of the Spartans, we may see that the armament at Samos had reasonable excuse for their eagerness previously manifested to come home; and that Alkibiadês, in combating that intention, braved an extreme danger which nothing but incredible good fortune averted. Why the Lacedæmonians remained idle, both in Peloponnesus and at Dekeleia, while Athens was thus betrayed, and in the very throes of dissolution, we can render no account: possibly, the caution of the ephors may have distrusted Antiphon and Phrynichus, from the mere immensity of their concessions. All that they would promise was, that a Lacedæmonian fleet of forty-two triremes, partly from Tarentum and Lokri, now about to start from Las in the Laconian gulf, and to sail to Eubœa on the invitation of a disaffected party in that island, should so far depart from its straight course as to hover near Ægina and Peiræus, ready to take advantage of any opportunity for attack laid open by the Four Hundred.[85]

Of this squadron, however, even before it rounded Cape Malea, Theramenês obtained intelligence, and denounced it as intended to operate in concert with the Four Hundred for the occupation of Ectioneia. Meanwhile Athens became daily a scene of greater discontent and disorder, after the abortive embassy and return from Sparta

of Antiphon and Phrynichus. The coercive ascendency of the Four Hundred was silently disappearing, while the hatred which their usurpation had inspired, together with the fear of their traitorous concert with the public enemy, became more and more loudly manifested in men's private conversations as well as in gatherings secretly got together within numerous houses; especially the house of the peripolarch, the captain of the peripoli, or youthful hoplites, who formed the chief police of the country. Such hatred was not long in passing from vehement passion into act. Phrynichus, as he left the senate-house, was assassinated by two confederates, one of them a peripolus, or youthful hoplite, in the midst of the crowded market-place and in full daylight. The man who struck the blow made his escape, but his comrade was seized and put to the torture by order of the Four Hundred:[86] he was however a stranger, from Argos, and either could not or would not reveal the name of any directing accomplice. Nothing was obtained from him except general indications of meetings and wide-spread disaffection. Nor did the Four Hundred, being thus left without special evidence, dare to lay hands upon Theramenês, the pronounced leader of the opposition, as we shall find Kritias doing six years afterwards, under the rule of the Thirty. The assassins of Phrynichus remaining undiscovered and unpunished, Theramenês and his associates became bolder in their opposition than before. And the approach of the Lacedæmonian fleet under Agesandridas,—which, having now taken station at Epidaurus, had made a descent on Ægina, and was hovering not far off Peiræus, altogether out of the straight course for Eubœa,—lent double force to all their previous assertions about the imminent dangers connected with the citadel at Ectioneia.

Amidst this exaggerated alarm and discord, the general body of hoplites became penetrated with aversion,[87] every day increasing, against the new citadel. At length the hoplites of the tribe in which Aristokratês, the warmest partisan of Theramenês was taxiarch, being on duty and engaged in the prosecution of the building, broke out into absolute mutiny against it, seized the person of Alexiklês, the general in command, and put him under arrest in a neighboring house; while the peripoli, or youthful military police, stationed at Munychia, under Hermon, abetted them in the proceeding.[88] News of this violence was speedily conveyed to the Four Hundred, who were at that moment holding session in the senate-house, Theramenês himself being present. Their wrath and menace were at first vented against him as the instigator of the revolt, a charge against which he could only vindicate himself by volunteering to go among the foremost for the liberation of the prisoner. He forthwith started in haste for the Peiræus, accompanied by one of the generals, his colleague, who was of the same political sentiment as himself. A third among the generals, Aristarchus, one of the fiercest of the oligarchs, followed him, probably from mistrust, together with some of the younger knights, horsemen, or richest class in the state, identified with the cause of the Four Hundred. The oligarchical partisans ran to marshal themselves in arms, alarming exaggerations being rumored, that Alexiklês had been put to death, and that Peiræus was under armed occupation; while at

Peiræus the insurgents imagined that the hoplites from the city were in full march to attack them. For a time all was confusion and angry sentiment, which the slightest untoward accident might have inflamed into sanguinary civil carnage. Nor was it appeased except by earnest intreaty and remonstrance from the elder citizens, aided by Thucydidês of Pharsalus, proxenus or public guest of Athens, in his native town, on the ruinous madness of such discord when a foreign enemy was almost at their gates.

The perilous excitement of this temporary crisis, which brought into full daylight every man's real political sentiments, proved the oligarchical faction, hitherto exaggerated in number, to be far less powerful than had been imagined by their opponents. And the Four Hundred had found themselves too much embarrassed how to keep up the semblance of their authority even in Athens itself, to be able to send down any considerable force for the protection of their citadel at Ectioneia; though they were reinforced, only eight days before their fall, by at least one supplementary member, probably in substitution for some predecessor who had accidentally died.[89] Theramenês, on reaching Peiræus, began to address the mutinous hoplites in a tone of simulated displeasure, while Aristarchus and his oligarchical companions spoke in the harshest language, and threatened them with the force which they imagined to be presently coming down from the city. But these menaces were met by equal firmness on the part of the hoplites, who even appealed to Theramenês himself, and called upon him to say whether he thought the construction of this citadel was for the good of Athens, or whether it would not be better demolished. His opinion had been fully pronounced beforehand; and he replied, that if they thought proper to demolish it, he cordially concurred. Without farther delay, hoplites and unarmed people mounted pell-mell upon the walls, and commenced the demolition with alacrity; under the general shout, "Whoever is for the Five Thousand in place of the Four Hundred, let him lend a hand in this work." The idea of the old democracy was in every one's mind, but no man uttered the word; the fear of the imaginary Five Thousand still continuing. The work of demolition seems to have been prosecuted all that day, and not to have been completed until the next day; after which the hoplites released Alexiklês from arrest, without doing him any injury.[90]

Two things deserve notice, among these details, as illustrating the Athenian character. Though Alexiklês was vehemently oligarchical as well as unpopular, these mutineers do no harm to his person, but content themselves with putting him under arrest. Next, they do not venture to commence the actual demolition of the citadel, until they have the formal sanction of Theramenês, one of the constituted generals. The strong habit of legality, implanted in all Athenian citizens by their democracy,—and the care, even in departing from it, to depart as little as possible,—stand plainly evidenced in these proceedings.

The events of this day gave a fatal shock to the ascendency of the Four Hundred; yet they assembled on the morrow as usual in the senate-house; and they appear

now, when it was too late, to have directed one of their members to draw up a real list, giving body to the fiction of the Five Thousand.[91] Meanwhile the hoplites in Peiræus, having finished the levelling of the new fortifications, took the still more important step of entering, armed as they were, into the theatre of Dionysus hard by, in Peiræus, but on the verge of Munychia, and there holding a formal assembly; probably under the convocation of the general Theramenês, pursuant to the forms of the anterior democracy. They here took the resolution of adjourning their assembly to the Anakeion, or temple of Castor and Pollux, the Dioskuri, in the city itself and close under the acropolis; whither they immediately marched and established themselves, still retaining their arms. So much was the position of the Four Hundred changed, that they who had on the preceding day been on the aggressive against a spontaneous outburst of mutineers in Peiræus, were now thrown upon the defensive against a formal assembly, all armed, in the city, and close by their own senate-house. Feeling themselves too weak to attempt any force, they sent deputies to the Anakeion to negotiate and offer concessions. They engaged to publish the list of *The* Five Thousand, and to convene them for the purpose of providing for the periodical cessation and renewal of the Four Hundred, by rotation from the Five Thousand, in such order as the latter themselves should determine. But they entreated that time might be allowed for effecting this, and that internal peace might be maintained, without which there was no hope of defence against the enemy without. Many of the hoplites in the city itself joined the assembly in the Anakeion, and took part in the debates. The position of the Four Hundred being no longer such as to inspire fear, the tongues of speakers were now again loosed, and the ears of the multitude again opened, for the first time since the arrival of Peisander from Samos, with the plan of the oligarchical conspiracy. Such renewal of free and fearless public speech, the peculiar life-principle of the democracy, was not less wholesome in tranquillizing intestine discord than in heightening the sentiment of common patriotism against the foreign enemy.[92] The assembly at length dispersed, after naming an early future time for a second assembly, to bring about the reëstablishment of harmony in the theatre of Dionysus.[93]

On the day, and at the hour, when this assembly in the theatre of Dionysus was on the point of coming together, the news ran through Peiræus and Athens, that the forty-two triremes under the Lacedæmonian Agesandridas, having recently quitted the harbor of Megara, were sailing along the coast of Salamis in the direction towards Peiræus. Such an event, while causing universal consternation throughout the city, confirmed all the previous warnings of Theramenês as to the treasonable destination of the citadel recently demolished, and every one rejoiced that the demolition had been accomplished just in time. Foregoing their intended assembly, the citizens rushed with one accord down to Peiræus, where some of them took post to garrison the walls and the mouth of the harbor; others got aboard the triremes lying in the harbor: others, again, launched some fresh triremes from the boat-houses into the water. Agesandridas rowed along the shore, near the mouth of Peiræus; but found

nothing to promise concert within, or tempt him to the intended attack. Accordingly, he passed by and moved onward to Sunium, in a southerly direction. Having doubled the Cape of Sunium, he then turned his course along the coast of Attica northward, halted for a little while between Thorikus and Prasiæ, and presently took station at Orôpus.[94]

Though relieved, when they found that he passed by Peiræus without making any attack, the Athenians knew that his destination must now be against Eubœa; which to them was hardly less important than Peiræus, since their main supplies were derived from that island. Accordingly, they put to sea at once with all the triremes which could be manned and got ready in the harbor. But from the hurry of the occasion, coupled with the mistrust and dissension now reigning, and the absence of their great naval force at Samos, the crews mustered were raw and ill-selected, and the armament inefficient. Polystratus, one of the members of the Four Hundred, perhaps others of them also, were aboard; men who had an interest in defeat rather than victory.[95] Thymocharês, the admiral, conducted them round Cape Sunium to Eretria in Eubœa, where he found a few other triremes, which made up his whole fleet to thirty-six sail.

He had scarcely reached the harbor and disembarked, when, without allowing time for his men to procure refreshment, he found himself compelled to fight a battle with the forty-two ships of Agesandridas, who had just sailed across from Orôpus, and was already approaching the harbor. This surprise had been brought about by the anti-Athenian party in Eretria, who took care, on the arrival of Thymocharês, that no provisions should be found in the market-place, so that his men were compelled to disperse and obtain them from houses at the extremity of the town; while at the same time a signal was hoisted, visible at Orôpus on the opposite side of the strait, less than seven miles broad, indicating to Agesandridas the precise moment for bringing his fleet across to the attack, with their crews fresh after the morning meal. Thymocharês, on seeing the approach of the enemy, ordered his men aboard; but, to his disappointment, many of them were found to be so far off that they could not be brought back in time, so that he was compelled to sail out and meet the Peloponnesians with ships very inadequately manned. In a battle immediately outside of the Eretrian harbor, he was, after a short contest, completely defeated, and his fleet driven back upon the shore. Some of his ships escaped to Chalkis, others to a fortified post garrisoned by the Athenians themselves, not far from Eretria; yet not less than twenty-two triremes, out of the whole thirty-six, fell into the hands of Agesandridas, and a large proportion of the crews were slain or made prisoners. Of those seamen who escaped, too, many found their death from the hands of the Eretrians, into whose city they fled for shelter. On the news of this battle, not merely Eretria, but also all Eubœa,—except Oreus in the north of the island, which was settled by Athenian kleruchs,—declared its revolt from Athens, which had been intended more

than a year before, and took measures for defending itself in concert with Agesandridas and the Bœotians.[96]

Ill could Athens endure a disaster, in itself so immense and aggravated, under the present distressed condition of the city. Her last fleet was destroyed, her nearest and most precious island torn from her side; an island, which of late had yielded more to her wants than Attica itself, but which was now about to become a hostile and aggressive neighbor.[97] The previous revolt of Eubœa, occurring thirty-four years before, during the maximum of Athenian power, had been even then a terrible blow to Athens, and formed one of the main circumstances which forced upon her the humiliation of the Thirty years' truce. But this second revolt took place when she had not only no means of reconquering the island, but no means even of defending Peiræus against the blockade by the enemy's fleet. The dismay and terror excited by the news at Athens was unbounded, even exceeding what had been felt after the Sicilian catastrophe, or the revolt of Chios. Nor was there any second reserve now in the treasury, such as the thousand talents which had rendered such essential service on the last-mentioned occasion. In addition to their foreign dangers, the Athenians were farther weighed down by two intestine calamities in themselves hardly supportable, —alienation of their own fleet at Samos, and the discord, yet unappeased, within their own walls; wherein the Four Hundred still held provisionally the reins of government, with the ablest and most unscrupulous leaders at their head. In the depth of their despair, the Athenians expected nothing less than to see the victorious fleet of Agesandridas—more than sixty triremes strong, including the recent captures—off the Peiræus, forbidding all importation, and threatening them with approaching famine, in combination with Agis and Dekeleia. The enterprise would have been easy for there were neither ships nor seamen to repel him; and his arrival at this critical moment would most probably have enabled the Four Hundred to resume their ascendency, with the means as well as the disposition to introduce a Lacedæmonian garrison into the city.[98] And though the arrival of the Athenian fleet from Samos would have prevented this extremity, yet it could not have arrived in time, except on the supposition of a prolonged blockade: moreover, its mere transfer from Samos to Athens would have left Ionia and the Hellespont defenceless against the Lacedæmonians and Persians, and would have caused the loss of all the Athenian empire. Nothing could have saved Athens, if the Lacedæmonians at this juncture had acted with reasonable vigor, instead of confining their efforts to Eubœa, now an easy and certain conquest. As on the former occasion, when Antiphon and Phrynichus went to Sparta prepared to make any sacrifice for the purpose of obtaining Lacedæmonian aid and accommodation, so now, in a still greater degree, Athens owed her salvation only to the fact that the enemies actually before her were indolent and dull Spartans, not enterprising Syracusans under the conduct of Gylippus.[99] And this is the second occasion, we may add, on which Athens was on the brink of ruin in consequence of the policy of Alkibiadês in retaining the armament at Samos.

Fortunately for the Athenians, no Agesandridas appeared off Peiræus; so that the twenty triremes, which they contrived to man as a remnant for defence, had no enemy to repel.[100] Accordingly, the Athenians were allowed to enjoy an interval of repose which enabled them to recover partially both from consternation and from intestine discord. It was their first proceeding, when the hostile fleet did not appear, to convene a public assembly; and that too in the Pnyx itself, the habitual scene of the democratical assemblies, well calculated to reinspire that patriotism which had now been dumb and smouldering for the four last months. In this assembly, the tide of opinion ran vehemently against the Four Hundred:[101] even those, who, like the Board of elders entitled probûli had originally counselled their appointment, now denounced them along with the rest, though severely taunted by the oligarchical leader Peisander for their inconsistency. Votes were finally passed: 1. To depose the Four Hundred; 2. To place the whole government in the hands of *The Five Thousand*; 3. Every citizen, who furnished a panoply, either for himself or for any one else, was to be of right a member of this body of *The* Five Thousand; 4. No citizen was to receive pay for any political function, on pain of becoming solemnly accursed, or excommunicated.[102] Such were the points determined by the first assembly held in the Pnyx. The archons, the senate of Five Hundred, etc., were renewed: after which many other assemblies were also held, in which nomothetæ, dikasts, and other institutions essential to the working of the democracy, were constituted. Various other votes were also passed; especially one, on the proposition of Kritias, seconded by Theramenês,[103] to restore Alkibiadês and some of his friends from exile; while messages were farther despatched, both to him and to the armament at Samos, doubtless confirming the recent nomination of generals, apprizing them of what had recently occurred at Athens, as well as bespeaking their full concurrence and unabated efforts against the common enemy.

Thucydidês bestows marked eulogy upon the general spirit of moderation and patriotic harmony which now reigned at Athens, and which directed the political proceedings of the people.[104] But he does not countenance the belief, as he has been sometimes understood, nor is it true in point of fact, that they now introduced a new constitution. Putting an end to the oligarchy, and to the rule of the Four Hundred, they restored the old democracy seemingly with only two modifications, first, the partial limitation of the right of suffrage; next, the discontinuance of all payment for political functions. The impeachment against Antiphon, tried immediately afterwards, went before the senate and the dikastery exactly according to the old democratical forms of procedure. But we must presume that the senate, the dikasts, the nomothetæ, the ekklesiasts, or citizens who attended the assembly, the public orators who prosecuted state-criminals, or defended any law when it was impugned, must have worked for the time without pay.

Moreover, the two modifications above mentioned were of little practical effect. The exclusive body of Five Thousand citizens, professedly constituted at this junc-

ture, was neither exactly realized, nor long retained. It was constituted, even now, more as a nominal than as a real limit; a nominal total, yet no longer a mere blank, as the Four Hundred had originally produced it, but containing, indeed, a number of individual names greater than the total, and without any assignable line of demarkation. The mere fact, that every one who furnished a panoply was entitled to be of the Five Thousand,—and not they alone, but others besides,[105]—shows that no care was taken to adhere either to that or to any other precise number. If we may credit a speech composed by Lysias,[106] the Four Hundred had themselves, after the demolition of their intended fortress at Ectioneia, and when power was passing out of their hands, appointed a committee of their number to draw up for the first time a real list of *The* Five Thousand; and Polystratus, a member of that committee, takes credit with the succeeding democracy for having made the list comprise nine thousand names instead of five thousand. As this list of Polystratus—if, indeed, it ever existed —was never either published or adopted, I merely notice the description given of it, to illustrate my position that the number Five Thousand was now understood on all sides as an indefinite expression for a suffrage extensive, but not universal. The number had been first invented by Antiphon and the leaders of the Four Hundred, to cloak their own usurpation and intimidate the democracy: next, it served the purpose of Theramenês and the minority of the Four Hundred, as a basis on which to raise a sort of dynastic opposition, to use modern phraseology, within the limits of the oligarchy; that is, without appearing to overstep principles acknowledged by the oligarchy themselves: lastly, it was employed by the democratical party generally as a convenient middle term to slide back into the old system, with as little dispute as possible; for Alkibiadês and the armament had sent word home that they adhered to the Five Thousand, and to the abolition of salaried civil functions.[107]

But exclusive suffrage of the so-called Five Thousand, especially with the expansive numerical construction now adopted, was of little value either to themselves or to the state;[108] while it was an insulting shock to the feelings of the excluded multitude, especially to brave and active seamen like the parali. Though prudent as a step of momentary transition, it could not stand, nor was any attempt made to preserve it in permanence, amidst a community so long accustomed to universal citizenship, and where the necessities of defence against the enemy called for energetic efforts from all the citizens.

Even as to the gratuitous functions, the members of the Five Thousand themselves would soon become tired, not less than the poorer freemen, of serving without pay, as senators or in other ways; so that nothing but absolute financial deficit would prevent the reëstablishment, entire or partial, of the pay.[109] And that deficit was never so complete as to stop the disbursement of the diobely, or distribution of two oboli to each citizen on occasion of various religious festivals. Such distribution continued without interruption; though perhaps the number of occasions on which it was made may have been lessened.

How far or under what restriction, any reëstablishment of civil pay obtained footing during the seven years between the Four Hundred and the Thirty, we cannot say. But leaving this point undecided, we can show, that within a year after the deposition of the Four Hundred, the suffrage of the so-called Five Thousand expanded into the suffrage of all Athenians without exception, or into the full antecedent democracy. A memorable decree, passed about eleven months after that event,—at the commencement of the archonship of Glaukippus (June 410 B.C.), when the senate of Five Hundred, the dikasts, and other civil functionaries, were renewed for the coming year, pursuant to the ancient democratical practice,—exhibits to us the full democracy not merely in action, but in all the glow of feeling called forth by a recent restoration. It seems to have been thought that this first renewal of archons and other functionaries, under the revived democracy, ought to be stamped by some emphatic proclamation of sentiment, analogous to the solemn and heart-stirring oath taken in the preceding year at Samos. Accordingly, Demophantus proposed and carried a (psephism or) decree,[110] prescribing the form of an oath to be taken by all Athenians to stand by the democratical constitution.

The terms of his psephism and oath are striking. "If any man subvert the democracy at Athens, or hold any magistracy after the democracy has been subverted, he shall be an enemy of the Athenians. Let him be put to death with impunity, and let his property be confiscated to the public, with the reservation of a tithe to Athênê. Let the man who has killed him, and the accomplice privy to the act, be accounted holy and of good religious odor. Let all Athenians swear an oath under the sacrifice of full-grown victims, in their respective tribes and demes, to kill him.[111] Let the oath be as follows: 'I will kill with my own hand, if I am able, any man who shall subvert the democracy at Athens, or who shall hold any office in future after the democracy has been subverted, or shall rise in arms for the purpose of making himself a despot, or shall help the despot to establish himself. And if any one else shall kill him, I will account the slayer to be holy as respects both gods and demons, as having slain an enemy of the Athenians. And I engage by word, by deed, and by vote, to sell his property and make over one-half of the proceeds to the slayer, without withholding anything. If any man shall perish in slaying or in trying to slay the despot, I will be kind both to him and to his children, as to Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and their descendants. And I hereby break and renounce all oaths which have been sworn hostile to the Athenian people, either at Athens or at the camp (at Samos) or elsewhere.[112]' Let all Athenians swear this as the regular oath, immediately before the festival of the Dionysia, with sacrifice and full-grown victims;[113] invoking upon him who keeps it, good things in abundance; but upon him who breaks it, destruction for himself as well as for his family."

Such was the remarkable decree which the Athenians not only passed in senate and public assembly, less than a year after the deposition of the Four Hundred, but also caused to be engraved on a column close to the door of the senate-house. It

plainly indicates, not merely that the democracy had returned, but an unusual intensity of democratical feeling along with it. The constitution which *all* the Athenians thus swore to maintain by the most strenuous measures of defence, must have been a constitution in which *all* Athenians had political rights, not one of Five Thousand privileged persons excluding the rest.[114] This decree became invalid after the expulsion of the Thirty, by the general resolution then passed not to act upon any laws passed before the archonship of Eukleidês, unless specially reënacted. But the column on which it stood engraved still remained, and the words were read upon it, at least down to the time of the orator Lykurgus, eighty years afterwards.[115]

The mere deposition of the Four Hundred, however, and the transfer of political power to the Five Thousand, which took place in the first public assembly held after the defeat off Eretria, was sufficient to induce most of the violent leaders of the Four Hundred forthwith to leave Athens. Peisander, Alexiklês, and others, went off secretly to Dekeleia:[116] Aristarchus alone made his flight the means of inflicting a new wound upon his country. Being among the number of the generals, he availed himself of this authority to march—with some of the rudest among those Scythian archers, who did the police duty of the city—to Œnoê, on the Bœotian frontier, which was at that moment under siege by a body of Corinthians and Bœotians united. Aristarchus, in concert with the besiegers, presented himself to the garrison, and acquainted them that Athens and Sparta had just concluded peace, one of the conditions of which was that Œnoê should be surrendered to the Bœotians. He therefore, as general, ordered them to evacuate the place, under the benefit of a truce to return home. The garrison having been closely blocked up, and kept wholly ignorant of the actual condition of politics, obeyed the order without reserve; so that the Bœotians acquired possession of this very important frontier position, a new thorn in the side of Athens, besides Dekeleia.[117]

Thus was the Athenian democracy again restored, and the divorce between the city and the armament at Samos terminated after an interruption of about four months by the successful conspiracy of the Four Hundred. It was only by a sort of miracle—or rather by the incredible backwardness and stupidity of her foreign enemies—that Athens escaped alive from this nefarious aggression of her own ablest and wealthiest citizens. That the victorious democracy should animadvert upon and punish the principal actors concerned in it,—who had satiated their own selfish ambition at the cost of so much suffering, anxiety, and peril to their country,—was nothing more than rigorous justice. But the circumstances of the case were peculiar: for the counter-revolution had been accomplished partly by the aid of a minority among the Four Hundred themselves,—Theramenês, Aristokratês, and others, together with the Board of Elders called Probûli,—all of whom had been, at the outset, either principals or accomplices in that system of terrorism and assassination, whereby the democracy had been overthrown and the oligarchical rulers established in the senate-house. The earlier operations of the conspiracy, therefore, though among its

worst features, could not be exposed to inquiry and trial without compromising these parties as fellow-criminals. Theramenês evaded this difficulty, by selecting for animadversion a recent act of the majority of the Four Hundred, which he and his partisans had opposed, and on which therefore he had no interests adverse either to justice or to the popular feeling. He stood foremost to impeach the last embassy sent by the Four Hundred to Sparta, sent with instructions to purchase peace and alliance at almost any price, and connected with the construction of the fort at Ectioneia for the reception of an enemy's garrison. This act of manifest treason, in which Antiphon, Phrynichus, and ten other known envoys were concerned, was chosen as the special matter for public trial and punishment, not less on public grounds than with a view to his own favor in the renewed democracy. But the fact that it was Theramenês who thus denounced his old friends and fellow-conspirators, after having lent hand and heart to their earlier and not less guilty deeds, was long remembered as a treacherous betrayal, and employed in after days as an excuse for atrocious injustice against himself.[118]

Of the twelve envoys who went on this mission, all except Phrynichus, Antiphon, Archeptolemus, and Onomaklês, seem to have already escaped to Dekeleia or elsewhere. Phrynichus, as I have mentioned a few pages above, had been assassinated several days before. Respecting his memory, a condemnatory vote had already been just passed by the restored senate of Five Hundred, decreeing that his property should be confiscated and his house razed to the ground, and conferring the gift of citizenship, together with a pecuniary recompense, on two foreigners who claimed to have assassinated him.[119] The other three, Antiphon, Archeptolemus, and Onomaklês,[120] were presented in name to the senate by the generals, of whom probably Theramenês was one, as having gone on a mission to Sparta for purposes of mischief to Athens, partly on board an enemy's ship, partly through the Spartan garrison at Dekeleia. Upon this presentation, doubtless a document of some length and going into particulars, a senator named Andron moved: That the generals, aided by any ten senators whom they may choose, do seize the three persons accused, and hold them in custody for trial; that the thesmothetæ do send to each of the three a formal summons, to prepare themselves for trial on a future day before the dikastery, on the charge of high treason, and do bring them to trial on the day named; assisted by the generals, the ten senators chosen as auxiliaries, and any other citizen who may please to take part, as their accusers. Each of the three was to be tried separately, and, if condemned, was to be dealt with according to the penal law of the city against traitors, or persons guilty of treason.[121]

Though all the three persons thus indicated were at Athens, or at least were supposed to be there, on the day when this resolution was passed by the senate, yet, before it was executed, Onomaklês had fled; so that Antiphon and Archeptolemus only were imprisoned for trial. They too must have had ample opportunity for leaving the city, and we might have presumed that Antiphon would have thought it quite as

necessary to retire as Peisander and Alexiklês. So acute a man as he, at no time very popular, must have known that now at least he had drawn the sword against his fellow-citizens in a manner which could never be forgiven. However, he chose voluntarily to stay: and this man, who had given orders for taking off so many of the democratical speakers by private assassination, received from the democracy, when triumphant, full notice and fair trial on a distinct and specific charge. The speech which he made in his defence, though it did not procure acquittal, was listened to, not merely with patience, but with admiration; as we may judge from the powerful and lasting effect which it produced. Thucydidês describes it as the most magnificent defence against a capital charge which had ever come before him;[122] and the poet Agathon, doubtless a hearer, warmly complimented Antiphon on his eloquence; to which the latter replied, that the approval of one such discerning judge was in his eyes an ample compensation for the unfriendly verdict of the multitude. Both he and Archeptolemus were found guilty by the dikastery and condemned to the penalties of treason. They were handed over to the magistrates called the Eleven, the chiefs of executive justice at Athens, to be put to death by the customary draught of hemlock. Their properties were confiscated, their houses were directed to be razed, and the vacant site to be marked by columns, with the inscription: "The residence of Antiphon the traitor,—of Archeptolemus the traitor." They were not permitted to be buried either in Attica, or in any territory subject to Athenian dominion.[123] Their children, both legitimate and illegitimate, were deprived of the citizenship; and the citizen who should adopt any descendant of either of them, was to be himself in like manner disfranchised.

Such was the sentence passed by the dikastery, pursuant to the Athenian law of treason. It was directed to be engraved on the same brazen column as the decree of honor to the slayers of Phrynichus. From that column it was transcribed, and has thus passed into history.[124]

How many of the Four Hundred oligarchs actually came to trial or were punished, we have no means of knowing; but there is ground for believing that none were put to death except Antiphon and Archeptolemus, perhaps also Aristarchus, the betrayer of Œnoê to the Bœotians. The latter is said to have been formally tried and condemned:[125] though by what accident he afterwards came into the power of the Athenians, after having once effected his escape, we are not informed. The property of Peisander, he himself having escaped, was confiscated, and granted either wholly or in part as a recompense to Apollodorus, one of the assassins of Phrynichus:[126] probably the property of the other conspicuous fugitive oligarchs was confiscated also. Polystratus, another of the Four Hundred, who had only become a member of that body a few days before its fall, was tried during absence, which absence his defenders afterwards accounted for, by saying that he had been wounded in the naval battle of Eretria, and heavily fined. It seems that each of the Four Hundred was called on to go through an audit and a trial of accountability, according to the prac-

tice general at Athens with magistrates going out of office. Such of them as did not appear to this trial were condemned to fine, to exile, or to have their names recorded as traitors: but most of those who did appear seem to have been acquitted; partly, we are told, by bribes to the logistæ, or auditing officers, though some were condemned either to fine or to partial political disability, along with those hoplites who had been the most marked partisans of the Four Hundred.[127]

Indistinctly as we make out the particular proceedings of the Athenian people at this restoration of the democracy, we know from Thucydidês that their prudence and moderation were exemplary. The eulogy, which he bestows in such emphatic terms upon their behavior at this juncture, is indeed doubly remarkable:[128] first, because it comes from an exile, not friendly to the democracy, and a strong admirer of Antiphon; next, because the juncture itself was one eminently trying to the popular morality, and likely to degenerate, by almost natural tendency, into excess of reactionary vengeance and persecution. The democracy was now one hundred years old, dating from Kleisthenês, and fifty years old, even dating from the final reforms of Ephialtês and Periklês; so that self-government and political equality were a part of the habitual sentiment of every man's bosom, heightened in this case by the fact that Athens was not merely a democracy, but an imperial democracy, having dependencies abroad.[129] At a moment when, from unparalleled previous disasters, she is barely able to keep up the struggle against her foreign enemies, a small knot of her own wealthiest citizens, taking advantage of her weakness, contrive, by a tissue of fraud and force not less flagitious than skilfully combined, to concentrate in their own hands the powers of the state, and to tear from their countrymen the security against bad government, the sentiment of equal citizenship, and the long-established freedom of speech. Nor is this all: these conspirators not only plant an oligarchical sovereignty in the senate-house, but also sustain that sovereignty by inviting a foreign garrison from without, and by betraying Athens to her Peloponnesian enemies. Two more deadly injuries it is impossible to imagine; and from neither of them would Athens have escaped, if her foreign enemy had manifested reasonable alacrity. Considering the immense peril, the narrow escape, and the impaired condition in which Athens was left, notwithstanding her escape, we might well have expected in the people a violence of reactionary hostility such as every calm observer, while making allowance for the provocation, must nevertheless have condemned; and perhaps somewhat analogous to that exasperation which, under very similar circumstances, had caused the bloody massacres at Korkyra.[130] And when we find that this is exactly the occasion which Thucydidês, an observer rather less than impartial, selects to eulogize their good conduct and moderation, we are made deeply sensible of the good habits which their previous democracy must have implanted in them, and which now served as a corrective to the impulse of the actual moment. They had become familiar with the cementing force of a common sentiment; they had learned to hold sacred the inviolability of law and justice, even in respect to their worst enemy; and what was of not less moment, the frequency and freedom of political discussion

had taught them not only to substitute the contentions of the tongue for those of the sword, but also to conceive their situation with its present and prospective liabilities, instead of being hurried away by blind retrospective vengeance against the past.

There are few contrasts in Grecian history more memorable or more instructive, than that between this oligarchical conspiracy, conducted by some of the ablest hands at Athens, and the democratical movement going on at the same time in Samos, among the Athenian armament and the Samian citizens. In the former, we have nothing but selfishness and personal ambition, from the beginning: first, a partnership to seize for their own advantage the powers of government; next, after this object has been accomplished, a breach among the partners, arising out of disappointment alike selfish. We find appeal made to nothing but the worst tendencies; either tricks to practise upon the credulity of the people, or extra-judicial murders to work upon their fear. In the latter, on the contrary, the sentiment invoked is that of common patriotism, and equal, public-minded sympathy. That which we read in Thucydidês,—when the soldiers of the armament and the Samian citizens, pledged themselves to each other by solemn oaths to uphold their democracy, to maintain harmony and good feeling with each other, to prosecute energetically the war against the Peloponnesians, and to remain at enmity with the oligarchical conspirators at Athens,—is a scene among the most dramatic and inspiriting which occurs in his history.[131] Moreover, we recognize at Samos the same absence of reactionary vengeance as at Athens, after the attack of the oligarchs, Athenian as well as Samian, has been repelled; although those oligarchs had begun by assassinating Hyperbolus and others. There is throughout this whole democratical movement at Samos a generous exaltation of common sentiment over personal, and at the same time an absence of ferocity against opponents, such as nothing except democracy ever inspired in the Grecian bosom.

It is, indeed, true that this was a special movement of generous enthusiasm, and that the details of a democratical government correspond to it but imperfectly. Neither in the life of an individual, nor in that of a people, does the ordinary and everyday movement appear at all worthy of those particular seasons in which a man is lifted above his own level and becomes capable of extreme devotion and heroism. Yet such emotions, though their complete predominance is never otherwise than transitory, have their foundation in veins of sentiment which are not even at other times wholly extinct, but count among the manifold forces tending to modify and improve, if they cannot govern, human action. Even their moments of transitory predominance leave a luminous track behind, and render the men who have passed through them more apt to conceive again the same generous impulse, though in fainter degree. It is one of the merits of Grecian democracy that it *did* raise this feeling of equal and patriotic communion: sometimes, and on rare occasions, like the scene at Samos, with overwhelming intensity, so as to impassion an unanimous multitude; more frequently, in feebler tide, yet such as gave some chance to an honest

and eloquent orator, of making successful appeal to public feeling against corruption or selfishness. If we follow the movements of Antiphon and his fellow-conspirators at Athens, contemporaneous with the democratical manifestations at Samos, we shall see that not only was no such generous impulse included in it, but the success of their scheme depended upon their being able to strike all common and active patriotism out of the Athenian bosom. Under the "cold shade" of their oligarchy—even if we suppose the absence of cruelty and rapacity, which would probably soon have become rife had their dominion lasted, as we shall presently learn from the history of the second oligarchy of Thirty—no sentiment would have been left to the Athenian multitude except fear, servility, or at best a tame and dumb sequacity to leaders whom they neither chose nor controlled. To those who regard different forms of government as distinguished from each other mainly by the feelings which each tends to inspire in magistrates as well as citizens, the contemporaneous scenes of Athens and Samos will suggest instructive comparisons between Grecian oligarchy and Grecian democracy.

CHAPTER LXIII.

THE RESTORED ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, AFTER THE DEPOSITION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED, DOWN TO THE ARRIVAL OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER IN ASIA MINOR.

THE oligarchy of Four Hundred at Athens, installed in the senate-house about February or March 411 B.C., and deposed about July of the same year, after four or five months of danger and distraction such as to bring her almost within the grasp of her enemies, has now been terminated by the restoration of her democracy; with what attendant circumstances, has been amply detailed. I now revert to the military and naval operations on the Asiatic coast, partly contemporaneous with the political dissensions at Athens, above described.

It has already been stated that the Peloponnesian fleet of ninety-four triremes, [132] having remained not less than eighty days idle at Rhodes, had come back to Milêtus towards the end of March; with the intention of proceeding to the rescue of Chios, which a portion of the Athenian armament under Strombichidês had been for some time besieging, and which was now in the greatest distress. The main Athenian fleet at Samos, however, prevented Astyochus from effecting this object, since he did not think it advisable to hazard a general battle. He was influenced partly by the bribes, partly by the delusions, of Tissaphernês, who sought only to wear out both parties by protracted war, and who now professed to be on the point of bringing up the Phenician fleet to his aid. Astyochus had in his fleet the ships which had been brought over for coöperation with Pharnabazus at the Hellespont, and which were thus equally unable to reach their destination. To meet this difficulty, the Spartan Derkyllidas was sent with a body of troops by land to the Hellespont, there to join Pharnabazus, in acting against Abydos and the neighboring dependencies of Athens. Abydos, connected with Milêtus by colonial ties, set the example of revolting from Athens to Derkyllidas and Pharnabazus; an example followed, two days afterwards, by the neighboring town of Lampsakus.

It does not appear that there was at this time any Athenian force in the Hellespont; and the news of this danger to the empire in a fresh quarter, when conveyed to Chios, alarmed Strombichidês, the commander of the Athenian besieging armament. Though the Chians—driven to despair by increasing famine as well as by want of relief from Astyochus, and having recently increased their fleet to thirty-six triremes against the Athenian thirty-two, by the arrival of twelve ships under Leon, obtained from Milêtus during the absence of Astyochus at Rhodes—had sallied out and fought an obstinate naval battle against the Athenians, with some advantage, [133] yet Strombichidês felt compelled immediately to carry away twenty-four triremes and a body of hoplites for the relief of the Hellespont. Hence the Chians became suf-

ficiently masters of the sea to provision themselves afresh, though the Athenian armament and fortified post still remained on the island. Astyochus also was enabled to recall Leon with the twelve triremes to Milêtus, and thus to strengthen his main fleet.[134]

The present appears to have been the time, when the oligarchical party both in the town and in the camp at Samos, were laying their plan of conspiracy as already recounted, and when the Athenian generals were divided in opinion, Charmînus siding with this party, Leon and Diomedon against it. Apprized of the reigning dissension, Astyochus thought it a favorable opportunity for sailing with his whole fleet up to the harbor of Samos, and offering battle; but the Athenians were in no condition to leave the harbor. He accordingly returned to Milêtus, where he again remained inactive, in expectation, real or pretended, of the arrival of the Phenician ships. But the discontent of his own troops, especially the Syracusan contingent, presently became uncontrollable. They not only murmured at the inaction of the armament during this precious moment of disunion in the Athenian camp, but also detected the insidious policy of Tissaphernês in thus frittering away their strength without result; a policy still more keenly brought home to their feelings by his irregularity in supplying them with pay and provision, which caused serious distress. To appease their clamors, Astyochus was compelled to call together a general assembly, the resolution of which was pronounced in favor of immediate battle. He accordingly sailed from Milêtus with his whole fleet of one hundred and twelve triremes round to the promontory of Mykalê immediately opposite Samos, ordering the Milesian hoplites to cross the promontory by land to the same point. The Athenian fleet, now consisting of only eighty-two sail, in the absence of Strombichidês, was then moored near Glaukê on the mainland of Mykalê; but the public decision just taken by the Peloponnesians to fight becoming known to them, they retired to Samos, not being willing to engage with such inferior numbers.[135]

It seems to have been during this last interval of inaction on the part of Astyochus, that the oligarchical party in Samos made their attempt and miscarried; the reaction from which attempt brought about, with little delay, the great democratical manifestation, and solemn collective oath, of the Athenian armament, coupled with the nomination of new, cordial, and unanimous generals. They were now in high enthusiasm, anxious for battle with the enemy, and Strombichidês had been sent for immediately, that the fleet might be united against the main enemy at Milêtus. That officer had recovered Lampsakus, but had failed in his attempt on Abydos.[136] Having established a central fortified station at Sestos, he now rejoined the fleet at Samos, which by his arrival was increased to one hundred and eight sail. He arrived in the night, when the Peloponnesian fleet was preparing to renew its attack from Mykalê the next morning. It consisted of one hundred and twelve ships, and was therefore still superior in number to the Athenians. But having now learned both the arrival of Strombichidês, and the renewed spirit as well as unanimity of the Atheni-

ans, the Peloponnesian commanders did not venture to persist in their resolution of fighting. They returned back to Milêtus, to the mouth of which harbor the Athenians sailed, and had the satisfaction of offering battle to an unwilling enemy.[137]

Such confession of inferiority was well calculated to embitter still farther the discontents of the Peloponnesian fleet at Milêtus. Tissaphernês had become more and more parsimonious in furnishing pay and supplies; while the recall of Alkibiadês to Samos, which happened just now, combined with the uninterrupted apparent intimacy between him and the satrap, confirmed their belief that the latter was intentionally cheating and starving them in the interest of Athens. At the same time, earnest invitations arrived from Pharnabazus, soliciting the coöperation of the fleet at the Hellespont, with liberal promises of pay and maintenance. Klearchus, who had been sent out with the last squadron from Sparta, for the express purpose of going to aid Pharnabazus, claimed to be allowed to execute his orders; while Astyochus also, having renounced the idea of any united action, thought it now expedient to divide the fleet, which he was at a loss how to support. Accordingly, Klearchus was sent with forty triremes from Milêtus to the Hellespont, yet with instructions to evade the Athenians at Samos, by first stretching out westward into the Ægean. Encountering severe storms, he was forced with the greater part of his squadron to seek shelter at Delos, and even suffered so much damage as to return to Milêtus, from whence he himself marched to the Hellespont by land. Ten of his triremes, however, under the Megarian Helixus, weathered the storm and pursued their voyage to the Hellespont, which was at this moment unguarded, since Strombichidês seems to have brought back all his squadron. Helixus passed on unopposed to Byzantium, a Doric city and Megarian colony, from whence secret invitations had already reached him, and which he now induced to revolt from Athens. This untoward news admonished the Athenian generals at Samos, whose vigilance the circuitous route of Klearchus had eluded, of the necessity of guarding the Hellespont, whither they sent a detachment, and even attempted in vain to recapture Byzantium. Sixteen fresh triremes afterwards proceeded from Milêtus to the Hellespont and Abydos, thus enabling the Peloponnesians to watch that strait as well as the Bosphorus and Byzantium,[138] and even to ravage the Thracian Chersonese.

Meanwhile, the discontents of the fleet at Milêtus broke out into open mutiny against Astyochus and Tissaphernês. Unpaid, and only half-fed, the seamen came together in crowds to talk over their grievances; denouncing Astyochus as having betrayed them for his own profit to the satrap, who was treacherously ruining the armament under the inspirations of Alkibiadês. Even some of the officers, whose silence had been hitherto purchased, began to hold the same language; perceiving that the mischief was becoming irreparable, and that the men were actually on the point of desertion. Above all, the incorruptible Hermokratês of Syracuse, and Dorieus the Thurian commander, zealously espoused the claims of their seamen, who being mostly freemen (in greater proportion than the crews of the Peloponnesian ships),

went in a body to Astyochus, with loud complaints and demand of their arrears of pay. But the Peloponnesian general received them with haughtiness and even with menace, lifting up his stick to strike the commander Dorieus while advocating their cause. Such was the resentment of the seamen that they rushed forward to pelt Astyochus with missiles: he took refuge, however, on a neighboring altar, so that no actual mischief was done.[139]

Nor was the discontent confined to the seamen of the fleet. The Milesians, also, displeased and alarmed at the fort which Tissaphernês had built in their town, watched an opportunity of attacking it by surprise, and expelled his garrison. Though the armament in general, now full of antipathy against the satrap, sympathized in this proceeding, yet the Spartan commissioner Lichas censured it severely, and intimated to the Milesians that they, as well as the other Greeks in the king's territory, were bound to be subservient to Tissaphernês within all reasonable limits, and even to court him by extreme subservience, until the war should be prosperously terminated. It appears that in other matters also, Lichas had enforced instead of mitigating the authority of the satrap over them; so that the Milesians now came to hate him vehemently,[140] and when he shortly afterwards died of sickness, they refused permission to bury him in the spot—probably some place of honor—which his surviving countrymen had fixed upon. Though Lichas in these enforcements only carried out the stipulations of his treaty with Persia, yet it is certain that the Milesians, instead of acquiring autonomy, according to the general promises of Sparta, were now farther from it than ever, and that imperial Athens had protected them against Persia much better than Sparta.

The subordination of the armament, however, was now almost at an end, when Mindarus arrived from Sparta as admiral to supersede Astyochus, who was summoned home and took his departure. Both Hermokratês and some Milesian deputies availed themselves of this opportunity to go to Sparta for the purpose of preferring complaints against Tissaphernês; while the latter on his part sent thither an envoy named Gaulites, a Karian, brought up in equal familiarity with the Greek and Karian languages, both to defend himself against the often-repeated charges of Hermokratês, that he had been treacherously withholding the pay under concert with Alkibiadês and the Athenians, and to denounce the Milesians on his own side, as having wrongfully demolished his fort.[141] At the same time he thought it necessary to put forward a new pretence, for the purpose of strengthening the negotiations of his envoy at Sparta, soothing the impatience of the armament, and conciliating the new admiral Mindarus. He announced that the Phenician fleet was on the point of arriving at Aspendus in Pamphylia, and that he was going thither to meet it, for the purpose of bringing it up to the seat of war to coöperate with the Peloponnesians. He invited Lichas to accompany him, and engaged to leave Tamos at Milêtus, as deputy during his absence, with orders to furnish pay and maintenance to the fleet. [142]

Mindarus, a new commander, without any experience of the mendacity of Tissaphernês, was imposed upon by this plausible assurance, and even captivated by the near prospect of so powerful a reinforcement. He despatched an officer named Philippus with two triremes round the Triopian Cape to Aspendus, while the satrap went thither by land.

Here again was a fresh delay of no inconsiderable length, while Tissaphernês was absent at Aspendus, on this ostensible purpose. Some time elapsed before Mindarus was undeceived, for Philippus found the Phenician fleet at Aspendus, and was therefore at first full of hope that it was really coming onward. But the satrap soon showed that his purpose now, as heretofore, was nothing better than delay and delusion. The Phenician ships were one hundred and forty-seven in number; a fleet more than sufficient for concluding the maritime war, if brought up to act zealously. But Tissaphernês affected to think that this was a small force, unworthy of the majesty of the Great King; who had commanded a fleet of three hundred sail to be fitted out for the service.[143] He waited for some time in pretended expectation that more ships were on their way, disregarding all the remonstrances of the Lacedæmonian officers.

Presently arrived the Athenian Alkibiadês, with thirteen Athenian triremes, exhibiting himself as on the best terms with the satrap. He too had made use of this approaching Phenician fleet to delude his countrymen at Samos, by promising to go and meet Tissaphernês at Aspendus, and to determine him, if possible, to send the fleet to the assistance of Athens, but at the very least, *not* to send it to the aid of Sparta. The latter alternative of the promise was sufficiently safe, for he knew well that Tissaphernês had no intention of applying the fleet to any really efficient purpose. But he was thereby enabled to take credit with his countrymen for having been the means of diverting this formidable reinforcement from the enemy.

Partly the apparent confidence between Tissaphernês and Alkibiadês, partly the impudent shifts of the former, grounded on the incredible pretence that the fleet was insufficient in number, at length satisfied Philippus that the present was only a new manifestation of deceit. After a long and vexatious interval, he apprized Mindarus—not without indignant abuse of the satrap—that nothing was to be hoped from the fleet at Aspendus. Yet the proceeding of Tissaphernês, indeed, in bringing up the Phenicians to that place, and still withholding the order for farther advance and action, was in every one's eyes mysterious and unaccountable. Some fancied that he did it with a view of levying larger bribes from the Phenicians themselves, as a premium for being sent home without fighting, as it appears that they actually were. But Thucydidês supposes that he had no other motive than that which had determined his behavior during the last year, to protract the war and impoverish both Athens and Sparta, by setting up a fresh deception, which would last for some weeks, and thus procure so much delay.[144] The historian is doubtless right: but without his assurance, it would have been difficult to believe, that the maintenance of a fraudulent

pretence, for so inconsiderable a time, should have been held as an adequate motive for bringing this large fleet from Phenicia to Aspendus, and then sending it away unemployed.

Having at length lost all hope of the Phenician ships, Mindarus resolved to break off all dealing with the perfidious Tissaphernês; the more so, as Tamos, the deputy of the latter, though left ostensibly to pay and keep the fleet, performed that duty with greater irregularity than ever, and to conduct his fleet to the Hellespont into coöperation with Pharnabazus, who still continued his promises and invitations. The Peloponnesian fleet[145]—seventy-three triremes strong, after deducting thirteen which had been sent under Dorieus to suppress some disturbances in Rhodes—having been carefully prepared beforehand, was put in motion by sudden order, so that no previous intimation might reach the Athenians at Samos. After having been delayed some days at Ikarus by bad weather, Mindarus reached Chios in safety. But here he was pursued by Thrasyllus, who passed, with fifty-five triremes, to the northward of Chios, and was thus between the Lacedæmonian admiral and the Hellespont. Believing that Mindarus would remain some time at Chios, Thrasyllus placed scouts both on the high lands of Lesbos and on the continent opposite Chios, in order that he might receive instant notice of any movement on the part of the enemy's fleet.[146] Meanwhile he employed his Athenian force in reducing the Lesbian town of Eresus, which had been lately prevailed on to revolt by a body of three hundred assailants from Kymê under the Theban Anaxander, partly Methymnæan exiles, with some political sympathizers, partly mercenary foreigners, who succeeded in carrying Eresus after failing in an attack on Methymna. Thrasyllus found before Eresus a small Athenian squadron of five triremes under Thrasybulus, who had been despatched from Samos to try and forestall the revolt, but had arrived too late. He was farther joined by two triremes from the Hellespont, and by others from Methymna, so that his entire fleet reached the number of sixty-seven triremes, with which he proceeded to lay siege to Eresus; trusting to his scouts for timely warning, in case the enemy's fleet should move northward.

The course which Thrasyllus expected the Peloponnesian fleet to take, was to sail from Chios northward through the strait which separates the northeastern portion of that island from Mount Mimas on the Asiatic mainland: after which it would probably sail past Eresus on the western side of Lesbos, as being the shortest track to the Hellespont, though it might also go round on the eastern side between Lesbos and the continent, by a somewhat longer route. The Athenian scouts were planted so as to descry the Peloponnesian fleet, if it either passed through this strait or neared the island of Lesbos. But Mindarus did neither; thus eluding their watch, and reaching the Hellespont without the knowledge of the Athenians. Having passed two days in provisioning his ships, receiving besides from the Chians three tesserakosts, a Chian coin of unknown value, for each man among his seamen, he departed on the third day from Chios, but took a southerly route and rounded the island in all haste on its

western or sea-side. Having reached and passed the northern latitude of Chios, he took an eastward course, with Lesbos at some distance to his left hand, direct to the mainland; which he touched at a harbor called Karterii, in the Phokæan territory. Here he stopped to give the crew their morning meal: he then crossed the arc of the gulf of Kymê to the little islets called Arginusæ, close on the Asiatic continent opposite Mitylênê, where he again halted for supper. Continuing his voyage onward during most part of the night, he was at Harmatûs, on the continent, directly northward and opposite to Methymna, by the next day's morning meal: then still hastening forward after a short halt, he doubled Cape Lektum, sailed along the Troad and passed Tenedos, and reached the entrance of the Hellespont before midnight; where his ships were distributed at Sigeium, Rhœteium, and other neighboring places.[147]

By this well-laid course and accelerated voyage, the Peloponnesian fleet completely eluded the lookers-out of Thrasyllus, and reached the opening of the Hellespont when that admiral was barely apprized of its departure from Chios. When it arrived at Harmatûs, however, opposite to and almost within sight of the Athenian station at Methymna, its progress could no longer remain a secret. As it advanced still farther along the Troad, the momentous news circulated everywhere, and was promulgated through numerous fire-signals and beacons on the hill, by friend as well as by foe.

These signals were perfectly visible, and perfectly intelligible, to the two hostile squadrons now on guard on each side of the Hellespont: eighteen Athenian triremes at Sestos in Europe, sixteen Peloponnesian triremes at Abydos in Asia. To the former it was destruction, to be caught by this powerful enemy in the narrow channel of the Hellespont. They quitted Sestos in the middle of the night, passing opposite to Abydos, and keeping a southerly course close along the shore of the Chersonese, in the direction towards Elæûs at the southern extremity of that peninsular, so as to have the chance of escape in the open sea and of joining Thrasyllus. But they would not have been allowed to pass even the hostile station at Abydos, had not the Peloponnesian guardships received the strictest orders from Mindarus, transmitted before he left Chios, or perhaps even before he left Milêtus, that, if he should attempt the start, they were to keep a vigilant and special look-out for his coming, and reserve themselves to lend him such assistance as might be needed, in case he were attacked by Thrasyllus. When the signals first announced the arrival of Mindarus, the Peloponnesian guardships at Abydos could not know in what position he was, nor whether the main Athenian fleet might not be near upon him. Accordingly they acted on these previous orders, holding themselves in reserve in their station at Abydos, until daylight should arrive, and they should be better informed. They thus neglected the Athenian Hellespontine squadron in its escape from Sestos to Elæûs.[148]

On arriving about daylight near the southern point of the Chersonese, these Athenians were descried by the fleet of Mindarus, which had come the night before to the opposite stations of Sigeium and Rhœteium. The latter immediately gave chase: but

the Athenians, now in the wide sea, contrived to escape most of them to Imbros, not without the loss, however, of four triremes, one even captured with all the crew on board, near the temple of Protesilaus at Elæûs: the crews of the other three escaped ashore. Mindarus was now joined by the squadron from Abydos, and their united force, eighty-six triremes strong, was employed for one day in trying to storm Elæûs. Failing in this enterprise, the fleet retired to Abydos. Before all could arrive there, Thrasyllus with his fleet arrived in haste from Eresus, much disappointed that his scouts had been eluded and all his calculations baffled. Two Peloponnesian triremes, which had been more adventurous than the rest in pursuing the Athenians, fell into his hands. He waited at Elæûs the return of the fugitive Athenian squadron from Imbros, and then began to prepare his triremes, seventy-six in number, for a general action.

After five days of such preparation, his fleet was brought to battle, sailing northward towards Sestos up the Hellespont, by single ships ahead, along the coast of the Chersonese, or on the European side. The left or most advanced squadron, under Thrasyllus, stretched even beyond the headland called Kynossêma, or the Dog's Tomb, ennobled by the legend and the chapel of the Trojan queen Hecuba: it was thus nearly opposite Abydos, while the right squadron under Thrasybulus was not very far from the southern mouth of the strait, nearly opposite Dardanus. Mindarus on his side brought into action eighty-six triremes, ten more than Thrasyllus in total number, extending from Abydos to Dardanus on the Asiatic shore; the Syracusans under Hermokratês being on the right, opposed to Thrasyllus, while Mindarus with the Peloponnesian ships was on the left opposed to Thrasybulus. The epibatæ or maritime hoplites on board the ships of Mindarus are said to have been superior to the Athenians, but the latter had the advantage in skilful pilots and nautical manœuvring: nevertheless, the description of the battle tells us how much Athenian manœuvring had fallen off since the glories of Phormion at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war; nor would that eminent seaman have selected for the scene of a naval battle the narrow waters of the Hellespont. Mindarus took the aggressive, advancing to attack near the European shore, and trying to outflank his opponents on both sides, as well as to drive them up against the land. Thrasyllus on one wing, and Thrasybulus on the other, by rapid movements, extended themselves so as to frustrate this attempt to outflank them; but in so doing, they stripped and weakened the centre, which was even deprived of the sight of the left wing by means of the projecting headland of Kynossêma. Thus unsupported, the centre was vigorously attacked and roughly handled by the middle division of Mindarus. Its ships were driven up against the land, and the assailants even disembarked to push their victory against the men ashore. But this partial success threw the central Peloponnesian division itself into disorder, while Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus carried on a conflict at first equal, and presently victorious, against the ships on the right and left of the enemy. Having driven back both these two divisions, they easily chased away the disordered ships of the centre, so that the whole Peloponnesian fleet was put to flight,

and found shelter first in the river Meidius, next in Abydos. The narrow breadth of the Hellespont forbade either long pursuit or numerous captures. Nevertheless, eight Chian ships, five Corinthians, two Ambrakian, and as many Bœotian, and from Sparta, Syracuse, Pellênê, and Leukas, one each, fell into the hands of the Athenian admirals; who, however, on their own side lost fifteen ships. They erected a trophy on the headland of Kynossêma, near the tomb or chapel of Hecuba; not omitting the usual duties of burying their own dead, and giving up those of the enemy under the customary request for truce.[149]

A victory so incomplete and indecisive would have been little valued by the Athenians, in the times preceding the Sicilian expedition. But since that overwhelming disaster, followed by so many other misfortunes, and last of all, by the defeat of Thymocharis, with the revolt of Eubœa, their spirit had been so sadly lowered, that the trireme which brought the news of the battle of Kynossêma, seemingly towards the end of August 411 B.C., was welcomed with the utmost delight and triumph. They began to feel as if the ebb-tide had reached its lowest point, and had begun to turn in their favor, holding out some hopes of ultimate success in the war. Another piece of good fortune soon happened, to strengthen this belief. Mindarus was compelled to reinforce himself at the Hellespont by sending Hippokratês and Epiklês to bring the fleet of fifty triremes now acting at Eubœa.[150] This was in itself an important relief to Athens, by withdrawing an annoying enemy near home. But it was still further enhanced by the subsequent misfortunes of this fleet, which, in passing round the headland of Mount Athos to get to Asia, was overtaken by a terrific storm and nearly destroyed, with great loss of life among the crews; so that a remnant only, under Hippokratês, survived to join Mindarus.[151]

But though Athens was thus exempted from all fear of aggression on the side of Eubœa, the consequences of this departure of the fleet were such as to demonstrate how irreparably the island itself had passed out of her supremacy. The inhabitants of Chalkis and the other cities, now left without foreign defence against her, employed themselves jointly with the Bœotians, whose interest in the case was even stronger than their own, in divesting Eubœa of its insular character, by constructing a mole or bridge across the Euripus, the narrowest portion of the Eubœan strait, where Chalkis was divided from Bœotia. From each coast a mole was thrown out, each mole guarded at the extremity by a tower, and leaving only an intermediate opening, broad enough for a single vessel to pass through, covered by a wooden bridge. It was in vain that the Athenian Theramenês, with thirty triremes, presented himself to obstruct the progress of this undertaking. The Eubœans and Bœotians both prosecuted it in such numbers, and with so much zeal, that it was speedily brought to completion. Eubœa, so lately the most important island attached to Athens, is from henceforward a portion of the mainland, altogether independent of her, even though it should please fortune to reëstablish her maritime power.[152]

The battle of Kynossêma produced no very important consequences except that of encouragement to the Athenians. Even just after the action, Kyzikus revolted from them, and on the fourth day after it, the Athenian fleet, hastily refitted at Sestos, sailed to that place to retake it. It was unfortified, so that they succeeded with little difficulty, and imposed upon it a contribution: moreover, in the voyage thither, they gained an additional advantage by capturing, off the southern coast of the Propontis, those eight Peloponnesian triremes which had accomplished, a little while before, the revolt of Byzantium. But, on the other hand, as soon as the Athenian fleet had left Sestos, Mindarus sailed from his station at Abydos to Elæûs, and there recovered all the triremes captured from him at Kynossêma, which the Athenians had there deposited, except some of them which were so much damaged that the inhabitants of Elæûs set them on fire.[153]

But that which now began to constitute a far more important element of the war, was, the difference of character between Tissaphernês and Pharnabazus, and the transfer of the Peloponnesian fleet from the satrapy of the former to that of the latter. Tissaphernês, while furnishing neither aid nor pay to the Peloponnesians, had by his treacherous promises and bribes enervated all their proceedings for the last year, with the deliberate view of wasting both the belligerent parties. Pharnabazus was a brave and earnest man, who set himself to strengthen them strenuously, by men as well as by money, and who labored hard to put down the Athenian power; as we shall find him laboring equally hard, eighteen years afterwards, to bring about its partial renovation. From this time forward, Persian aid becomes a reality in the Grecian war; and in the main—first, through the hands of Pharnabazus, next, through those of the younger Cyrus—the determining reality. For we shall find that while the Peloponnesians are for the most part well paid, out of the Persian treasury, the Athenians, destitute of any such resource, are compelled to rely on the contributions which they can levy here and there, without established or accepted right; and to interrupt for this purpose even the most promising career of success. Twenty-six years after this, at a time when Sparta had lost her Persian allies, the Lacedæmonian Teleutias tried to appease the mutiny of his unpaid seamen, by telling them how much nobler it was to extort pay from the enemy by means of their own swords, than to obtain it by truckling to the foreigner;[154] and probably the Athenian generals, during these previous years of struggle, tried similar appeals to the generosity of their soldiers. But it is not the less certain, that the new constant paymaster now introduced, gave fearful odds to the Spartan cause.

The good pay and hearty coöperation which the Peloponnesians now enjoyed from Pharnabazus, only made them the more indignant at the previous deceit of Tissaphernês. Under the influence of this sentiment, they readily lent aid to the inhabitants of Antandrus in expelling his general Arsakes with the Persian garrison. Arsakes had recently committed an act of murderous perfidy, under the influence of some unexplained pique, against the Delians established at Adramyttium: he had summoned

their principal citizens to take part as allies in an expedition, and had caused them all to be surrounded, shot down, and massacred during the morning meal. Such an act was more than sufficient to excite hatred and alarm among the neighboring Antandrians, who invited a body of Peloponnesian hoplites from Abydos, across the mountain range of Ida, by whose aid Antandrus was liberated from the Persians.[155]

In Milêtus, as well as in Knidus, Tissaphernês had already experienced the like humiliation:[156] Lichas was no longer alive to back his pretensions: nor do we hear that he obtained any result from the complaints of his envoy Gaulites at Sparta. Under these circumstances, he began to fear that he had incurred a weight of enmity which might prove seriously mischievous, nor was he without jealousy of the popularity and possible success of Pharnabazus. The delusion respecting the Phenician fleet, now that Mindarus had openly broken with him and quitted Milêtus, was no longer available to any useful purpose. Accordingly, he dismissed the Phenician fleet to their own homes, pretending to have received tidings that the Phenician towns were endangered by sudden attacks from Arabia and Egypt;[157] while he himself quitted Aspendus to revisit Ionia, as well as to go forward to the Hellespont, for the purpose of renewing personal intercourse with the dissatisfied Peloponnesians. He wished, while trying again to excuse his own treachery about the Phenician fleet, at the same time to protest against their recent proceedings at Antandrus; or, at the least, to obtain some assurance against any repetition of such hostility. His visit to Ionia, however, seems to have occupied some time, and he tried to conciliate the Ionic Greeks by a splendid sacrifice to Artemis at Ephesus.[158] Having quitted Aspendus, as far as we can make out, about the beginning of August (411 B.C.), he did not reach the Hellespont until the month of November.[159]

As soon as the Phenician fleet had disappeared, Alkibiadês returned with his thirteen triremes from Phasêlis to Samos. He too, like Tissaphernês, made the proceeding subservient to deceit of his own: he took credit with his countrymen for having enlisted the good-will of the satrap more strongly than ever in the cause of Athens, and for having induced him to abandon his intention of bringing up the Phenician fleet.[160] At this time Dorieus was at Rhodes with thirteen triremes, having been despatched by Mindarus, before his departure from Milêtus, in order to stifle the growth of a philo-Athenian party in the island. Perhaps the presence of this force may have threatened the Athenian interest in Kos and Halikarnassus; for we now find Alkibiadês going to these places from Samos, with nine fresh triremes in addition to his own thirteen. He erected fortifications at the town of Kos, and planted in it an Athenian officer and garrison: from Halikarnassus he levied large contributions; upon what pretence, or whether from simple want of money, we do not know. It was towards the middle of September that he returned to Samos.[161]

At the Hellespont, Mindarus had been reinforced after the battle of Kynossêma by the squadron from Eubœa, at least by that portion of it which had escaped the storm off Mount Athos. The departure of the Peloponnesian fleet from Eubœa enabled the

Athenians also to send a few more ships to their fleet at Sestos. Thus ranged on the opposite sides of the strait, the two fleets came to a second action, wherein the Peloponnesians, under Agesandridas, had the advantage; yet with little fruit. It was about the month of October, seemingly, that Dorieus with his fourteen triremes came from Rhodes to rejoin Mindarus at the Hellespont. He had hoped probably to get up the strait to Abydos during the night, but he was caught by daylight a little way from the entrance, near Rhœteium; and the Athenian scouts instantly gave signal of his approach. Twenty Athenian triremes were despatched to attack him: upon which Dorieus fled, and sought safety by hauling his vessel ashore in the receding bay near Dardanus. The Athenian squadron here attacked him, but were repulsed and forced to sail back to Madytus. Mindarus was himself a spectator of this scene, from a distance; being engaged in sacrificing to Athênê, on the venerated hill of Ilium. He immediately hastened to Abydos, where he fitted out his whole fleet of eighty-four triremes, Pharnabazus coöperating on the shore with his land-force. Having rescued the ships of Dorieus, his next care was to resist the entire Athenian fleet, which presently came to attack him under Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. An obstinate naval combat took place between the two fleets, which lasted nearly the whole day with doubtful issue; at length, towards the evening, twenty fresh triremes were seen approaching. They proved to be the squadron of Alkibiadês sailing from Samos: having probably heard of the rejunction of the squadron of Dorieus with the main Peloponnesian fleet, he had come with his own counter-balancing reinforcement.[162] As soon as his purple flag or signal was ascertained, the Athenian fleet became animated with redoubled spirit. The new-comers aided them in pressing the action so vigorously, that the Peloponnesian fleet was driven back to Abydos, and there run ashore. Here the Athenians still followed up their success, and endeavored to tow them all off. But the Persian land-force protected them, and Pharnabazus himself was seen foremost in the combat; even pushing into the water in person, as far as his horse could stand. The main Peloponnesian fleet was thus preserved; yet the Athenians retired with an important victory, carrying off thirty triremes as prizes, and retaking those which they had themselves lost in the two preceding actions.[163]

Mindarus kept his defeated fleet unemployed at Abydos during the winter, sending to Peloponnesus as well as among his allies to solicit reinforcements: in the mean time, he engaged jointly with Pharnabazus in operations by land against various Athenian allies on the continent. The Athenian admirals, on their side, instead of keeping their fleet united to prosecute the victory, were compelled to disperse a large portion of it in flying squadrons, for collecting money, retaining only forty sail at Sestos; while Thrasyllus in person went to Athens to proclaim the victory and ask for reinforcements. Pursuant to this request, thirty triremes were sent out under Theramenês; who first endeavored without success to impede the construction of the bridge between Eubœa and Bœotia, and next sailed on a voyage among the islands for the purpose of collecting money. He acquired considerable plunder by descents upon hostile territory, and also extorted money from various parties, either contem-

plating or supposed to contemplate revolt, among the dependencies of Athens. At Paros, where the oligarchy established by Peisander in the conspiracy of the Four Hundred still subsisted, Theramenês deposed and fined the men who had exercised it, establishing a democracy in their room. From hence he passed to Macedonia, to the assistance and probably into the temporary pay of Archelaus, king of Macedonia, whom he aided for some time in the siege of Pydna; blocking up the town by sea while the Macedonians besieged it by land. The blockade having lasted the whole winter, Theramenês was summoned away before its capture, to join the main Athenian fleet in Thrace: Archelaus, however, took Pydna not long afterwards, and transported the town with its residents from the seaboard to a distance more than two miles inland.[164] We trace in all these proceedings the evidence of that terrible want of money which now drove the Athenians to injustice, extortion, and interference with their allies, such as they had never committed during the earlier years of the war.

It is at this period that we find mention made of a fresh intestine commotion in Korkyra, less stained, however, with savage enormities than that recounted in the seventh year of the war. It appears that the oligarchical party in the island, which had been for the moment nearly destroyed at that period, had since gained strength, and was encouraged by the misfortunes of Athens to lay plans for putting the island into the hands of the Lacedæmonians. The democratical leaders, apprized of this conspiracy, sent to Naupaktus for the Athenian admiral Konon. He came, with a detachment of six hundred Messenians, by the aid of whom they seized the oligarchical conspirators in the market-place, putting a few to death, and banishing more than a thousand. The extent of their alarm is attested by the fact, that they liberated the slaves and conferred the right of citizenship upon the foreigners. The exiles, having retired to the opposite continent, came back shortly afterwards, and were admitted, by the connivance of a party within, into the market-place. A serious combat took place within the walls, which was at last made up by a compromise and by the restoration of the exiles.[165] We know nothing about the particulars of this compromise, but it seems to have been wisely drawn up and faithfully observed; for we hear nothing about Korkyra until about thirty-five years after this period, and the island is then presented to us as in the highest perfection of cultivation and prosperity.[166] Doubtless the emancipation of slaves and the admission of so many new foreigners to the citizenship, contributed to this result.

Meanwhile Tissaphernês, having completed his measures in Ionia, arrived at the Hellespont not long after the battle of Abydos, seemingly about November, 411 B.C. He was anxious to regain some credit with the Peloponnesians, for which an opportunity soon presented itself. Alkibiadês, then in command of the Athenian fleet at Sestos, came to visit him in all the pride of victory, bringing the customary presents; but the satrap seized his person and sent him away to Sardis as a prisoner in custody, affirming that he had the Great King’s express orders for carrying on war with

the Athenians.[167] Here was an end of all the delusions of Alkibiadês, respecting pretended power of influencing the Persian counsels. Yet these delusions had already served his purpose by procuring for him a renewed position in the Athenian camp, which his own military energy enabled him to sustain and justify.

Towards the middle of this winter the superiority of the fleet of Mindarus at Abydos, over the Athenian fleet at Sestos, had become so great,—partly, as it would appear, through reinforcements obtained by the former, partly through the dispersion of the latter into flying squadrons from want of pay,—that the Athenians no longer dared to maintain their position in the Hellespont. They sailed round the southern point of the Chersonese, and took station at Kardia, on the western side of the isthmus of that peninsula. Here, about the commencement of spring, they were rejoined by Alkibiadês; who had found means to escape from Sardis, along with Mantitheus, another Athenian prisoner, first to Klazomenæ, and next to Lesbos, where he collected a small squadron of five triremes. The dispersed squadrons of the Athenian fleet being now all summoned to concentrate, Theramenês came to Kardia from Macedonia, and Thrasybulus from Thasos; whereby the Athenian fleet was rendered superior in number to that of Mindarus. News was brought that the latter had moved with his fleet from the Hellespont to Kyzikus, and was now engaged in the siege of that place, jointly with Pharnabazus and the Persian land-force.

His vigorous attacks had in fact already carried the place, when the Athenian admirals resolved to attack him there, and contrived to do it by surprise. Having passed first from Kardia to Elæûs at the south of the Chersonese, they sailed up the Hellespont to Prokonnesus by night, so that their passage escaped the notice of the Peloponnesian guardships at Abydos.[168]

Resting at Prokonnesus one night, and seizing every boat on the island, in order that their movements might be kept secret, Alkibiadês warned the assembled seamen that they must prepare for a sea-fight, a land-fight, and a wall-fight, all at once. "We have no money (said he), while our enemies have plenty from the Great King." Neither zeal in the men nor contrivance in the commanders was wanting. A body of hoplites were landed on the mainland in the territory of Kyzikus, for the purpose of operating a diversion; after which the fleet was distributed into three divisions under Alkibiadês, Theramenês, and Thrasybulus. The former, advancing near to Kyzikus with his single division, challenged the fleet of Mindarus, and contrived to inveigle him by pretended flight to a distance from the harbor; while the other Athenian divisions, assisted by hazy and rainy weather, came up unexpectedly, cut off his retreat, and forced him to run his ships ashore on the neighboring mainland. After a gallant and hard-fought battle, partly on shipboard, partly ashore,—at one time unpromising to the Athenians, in spite of their superiority of number, but not very intelligible in its details, and differently conceived by our two authorities,—both the Peloponnesian fleet by sea and the forces of Pharnabazus on land were completely defeated. Mindarus himself was slain; and the entire fleet, every single trireme, was captured, ex-

cept the triremes of Syracuse, which were burnt by their own crews; while Kyzikus itself surrendered to the Athenians, and submitted to a large contribution, being spared from all other harm. The booty taken by the victors was abundant and valuable. The numbers of the triremes thus captured or destroyed is differently given; the lowest estimate states it at sixty, the highest at eighty.[169]

This capital action, ably planned and bravely executed by Alkibiadês and his two colleagues, about April 410 B.C., changed sensibly the relative position of the belligerents. The Peloponnesians had now no fleet of importance in Asia, though they probably still retained a small squadron at the station of Milêtus; while the Athenian fleet was more powerful and menacing than ever. The dismay of the defeated army is forcibly portrayed in the laconic despatch sent by Hippokratês, secretary of the late admiral Mindarus, to the ephors at Sparta: "All honor and advantage are gone from us: Mindarus is slain: the men are starving: we are in straits what to do.[170]" The ephors doubtless heard the same deplorable tale from more than one witness; for this particular despatch never reached them, having been intercepted and carried to Athens. So discouraging was the view which they entertained of the future, that a Lacedæmonian embassy, with Endius at their head, came to Athens to propose peace; or rather perhaps Endius—ancient friend and guest of Alkibiadês, who had already been at Athens as envoy before—was allowed to come thither now again to sound the temper of the city, in a sort of informal manner, which admitted of being easily disavowed if nothing came of it. For it is remarkable that Xenophon makes no mention of this embassy: and his silence, though not sufficient to warrant us in questioning the reality of the event,—which is stated by Diodorus, perhaps on the authority of Theopompus, and is noway improbable in itself,—nevertheless, leads me to doubt whether the ephors themselves admitted that they had made or sanctioned the proposition. It is to be remembered that Sparta, not to mention her obligation to her confederates generally, was at this moment bound by special convention to Persia to conclude no separate peace with Athens.

According to Diodorus, Endius, having been admitted to speak in the Athenian assembly, invited the Athenians to make peace with Sparta on the following terms: That each party should stand just as they were; that the garrisons on both sides should be withdrawn; that prisoners should be exchanged, one Lacedæmonian against one Athenian. Endius insisted in his speech on the mutual mischief which each was doing to the other by prolonging the war; but he contended that Athens was by far the greater sufferer of the two, and had the deepest interest in accelerating peace. She had no money, while Sparta had the Great King as a paymaster: she was robbed of the produce of Attica by the garrison of Dekeleia, while Peloponnesus was undisturbed: all her power and influence depended upon superiority at sea, which Sparta could dispense with, and yet retain her pre-eminence.[171]

If we may believe Diodorus, all the most intelligent citizens in Athens recommended that this proposition should be accepted. Only the demagogues, the dis-

turbers, those who were accustomed to blow up the flames of war in order to obtain profit for themselves, opposed it. Especially the demagogue Kleophon, now enjoying great influence, enlarged upon the splendor of the recent victory, and upon the new chances of success now opening to them: insomuch that the assembly ultimately rejected the proposition of Endius.[172]

It was easy for those who wrote after the battle of Ægospotamos and the capture of Athens, to be wise after the fact, and to repeat the stock denunciations against an insane people, misled by a corrupt demagogue. But if, abstracting from our knowledge of the final close of the war, we look to the tenor of this proposition, even assuming it to have been formal and authorized, as well as the time at which it was made, we shall hesitate before we pronounce Kleophon to have been foolish, much less corrupt, for recommending its rejection. In reference to the charge of corrupt interest in the continuance of war, I have already made some remarks about Kleon, tending to show that no such interest can fairly be ascribed to demagogues of that character[173]. They were essentially unwarlike men, and had quite as much chance personally of losing, as of gaining, by a state of war. Especially this is true respecting Kleophon, during the last years of the war, since the financial posture of Athens was then so unprosperous, that all her available means were exhausted to provide for ships and men, leaving little or no surplus for political peculators. The admirals, who paid the seamen by raising contributions abroad, might possibly enrich themselves, if so inclined; but the politicians at home had much less chance of such gains than they would have had in time of peace. Besides even if Kleophon were ever so much a gainer by the continuance of war, yet, assuming Athens to be ultimately crushed in the war, he was certain beforehand to be deprived, not only of all his gains and his position, but of his life also.

So much for the charge against him of corrupt interest. The question whether his advice was judicious, is not so easy to dispose of. Looking to the time when the proposition was made, we must recollect that the Peloponnesian fleet in Asia had been just annihilated, and that the brief epistle itself, from Hippokratês to the ephors, divulging in so emphatic a manner the distress of his troops, was at this moment before the Athenian assembly. On the other hand, the despatches of the Athenian generals, announcing their victory, had excited a sentiment of universal triumph, manifested by public thanksgiving, at Athens:[174] nor can we doubt that Alkibiadês and his colleagues promised a large career of coming success, perhaps the recovery of most part of the lost maritime empire. In this temper of the Athenian people and of their generals, justified as it was to a great degree by the reality, what is the proposition which comes from Endius? What he proposes, is, in reality, no concession at all. Both parties to stand in their actual position; to withdraw garrisons; to restore prisoners. There was only one way in which Athens would have been a gainer by accepting these propositions. She would have withdrawn her garrison from Pylos, she would have been relieved from the garrison of Dekeleia; such an exchange would

have been a considerable advantage to her. To this we must add the relief arising from simple cessation of war, doubtless real and important.

Now the question is, whether a statesman like Periklês would have advised his countrymen to be satisfied with such a measure of concession, immediately after the great victory of Kyzikus, and the two smaller victories preceding it? I incline to believe that he would not. It would rather have appeared to him in the light of a diplomatic artifice, calculated to paralyze Athens during the interval while her enemies were defenceless, and to gain time for them to build a new fleet.[175] Sparta could not pledge herself either for Persia, or for her Peloponnesian confederates; indeed, past experience had shown that she could not do so with effect. By accepting the propositions, therefore, Athens would not really have obtained relief from the entire burden of war; but would merely have blunted the ardor and tied up the hands of her own troops, at a moment when they felt themselves in the full current of success. By the armament, most certainly,—and by the generals, Alkibiadês, Theramenês, and Thrasybulus,—the acceptance of such terms at such a moment would have been regarded as a disgrace. It would have balked them of conquests ardently, and at that time not unreasonably, anticipated; conquests tending to restore Athens to that eminence from which she had been so recently deposed. And it would have inflicted this mortification, not merely without compensating gain to her in any other shape, but with a fair probability of imposing upon all her citizens the necessity of redoubled efforts at no very distant future, when the moment favorable to her enemies should have arrived.

If, therefore, passing from the vague accusation that it was the demagogue Kleophon who stood between Athens and the conclusion of peace, we examine what were the specific terms of peace which he induced his countrymen to reject, we shall find that he had very strong reasons, not to say preponderant reasons, for his advice. Whether he made any use of this proposition, in itself inadmissible, to try and invite the conclusion of peace on more suitable and lasting terms, may well be doubted. Probably no such efforts would have succeeded, even if they had been made; yet a statesman like Periklês would have made the trial, in a conviction that Athens was carrying on the war at a disadvantage which must in the long run sink her. A mere opposition speaker, like Kleophon, even when taking what was probably a right measure of the actual proposition before him, did not look so far forward into the future.

Meanwhile the Athenian fleet reigned alone in the Propontis and its two adjacent straits, the Bosphorus and the Hellespont; although the ardor and generosity of Pharnabazus not only supplied maintenance and clothing to the distressed seamen of the vanquished fleet, but also encouraged the construction of fresh ships in the room of those captured. While he armed the seamen, gave them pay for two months, and distributed them as guards along the coast of the satrapy, he at the same time granted an unlimited supply of ship-timber from the abundant forests of Mount Ida,

and assisted the officers in putting new triremes on the stocks at Antandrus; near to which, at a place called Aspaneus, the Idæan wood was chiefly exported.[176]

Having made these arrangements, he proceeded to lend aid at Chalkêdon, which the Athenians had already begun to attack. Their first operation after the victory, had been to sail to Perinthus and Selymbria, both of which had before revolted from Athens: the former, intimidated by the recent events, admitted them and rejoined itself to Athens; the latter resisted such a requisition, but ransomed itself from attack for the present, by the payment of a pecuniary fine. Alkibiadês then conducted them to Chalkêdon, opposite to Byzantium on the southernmost Asiatic border of the Bosphorus. To be masters of these two straits, the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, was a point of first-rate moment to Athens; first, because it enabled her to secure the arrival of the corn ships from the Euxine, for her own consumption; next, because she had it in her power to impose a tithe or due upon all the trading ships passing through, not unlike the dues imposed by the Danes at the Sound, even down to the present time. For the opposite reasons, of course, the importance of the position was equally great to the enemies of Athens. Until the spring of the preceding year, Athens had been undisputed mistress of both the straits. But the revolt of Abydos in the Hellespont (about April, 411 B.C.) and that of Byzantium with Chalkêdon in the Bosphorus (about June, 411 B.C.), had deprived her of this pre-eminence; and her supplies drained during the last few months could only have come through during those intervals when her fleets there stationed had the preponderance, so as to give them convoy. Accordingly, it is highly probable that her supplies of corn from the Euxine during the autumn of 411 B.C., had been comparatively restricted.

Though Chalkêdon itself, assisted by Pharnabazus, still held out against Athens, Alkibiadês now took possession of Chrysopolis, its unfortified seaport, on the eastern coast of the Bosphorus opposite Byzantium. This place he fortified, established in it a squadron with a permanent garrison, and erected it into a regular tithing-port for levying toll on all vessels coming out of the Euxine.[177] The Athenians seem to have habitually levied this toll at Byzantium, until the revolt of that place, among their constant sources of revenue: it was now reëstablished under the auspices of Alkibiadês. In so far as it was levied on ships which brought their produce for sale and consumption at Athens, it was of course ultimately paid in the shape of increased price by Athenian citizens and metics. Thirty triremes under Theramenês, were left at Chrysopolis to enforce this levy, to convoy friendly merchantmen, and in other respects to serve as annoyance to the enemy.

The remaining fleet went partly to the Hellespont, partly to Thrace, where the diminished maritime strength of the Lacedæmonians already told in respect to the adherence of the cities. At Thasus, especially,[178] the citizens, headed by Ekphantus, expelled the Lacedæmonian harmost Eteonikus with his garrison, and admitted Thrasybulus with an Athenian force. It will be recollected that this was one of the cities in which Peisander and the Four Hundred conspirators (early in 411 B.C.) had

put down the democracy and established an oligarchical government, under pretence that the allied cities would be faithful to Athens as soon as she was relieved from her democratical institutions. All the calculations of these oligarchs had been disappointed, as Phrynichus had predicted from the first: the Thasians, as soon as their own oligarchical party had been placed in possession of the government, recalled their disaffected exiles,[179] under whose auspices a Laconian garrison and harmost had since been introduced. Eteonikus, now expelled, accused the Lacedæmonian admiral Pasippidas of being himself a party to the expulsion, under bribes from Tissaphernês; an accusation which seems improbable, but which the Lacedæmonians believed, and accordingly banished Pasippidas, sending Kratesippidas to replace him. The new admiral found at Chios a small fleet which Pasippidas had already begun to collect from the allies, to supply the recent losses.[180]

The tone at Athens since the late naval victories, had become more hopeful and energetic. Agis, with his garrison at Dekeleia, though the Athenians could not hinder him from ravaging Attica, yet on approaching one day near to the city walls, was repelled with spirit and success by Thrasyllus. But that which most mortified the Lacedæmonian king, was to discern from his lofty station at Dekeleia, the abundant influx into the Peiræus of corn-ships from the Euxine, again renewed in the autumn of 410 B.C. since the occupation of the Bosphorus and Hellespont by Alkibiadês. For the safe reception of these vessels, Thorikus was soon after fortified. Agis exclaimed that it was fruitless to shut out the Athenians from the produce of Attica, so long as plenty of imported corn was allowed to reach them. Accordingly, he provided, in conjunction with the Megarians, a small squadron of fifteen triremes, with which he despatched Klearchus to Byzantium and Chalkêdon. That Spartan was a public guest of the Byzantines, and had already been singled out to command auxiliaries intended for that city. He seems to have begun his voyage during the ensuing winter (B.C. 410-409), and reached Byzantium in safety, though with the destruction of three of his squadron by the nine Athenian triremes who guarded the Hellespont.[181]

In the ensuing spring, Thrasyllus was despatched from Athens at the head of a large new force to act in Ionia. He commanded fifty triremes, one thousand of the regular hoplites, one hundred horsemen, and five thousand seamen, with the means of arming these latter as peltasts; also transports for his troops besides the triremes. [182] Having reposed his armament for three days at Samos, he made a descent at Pygela, and next succeeded in making himself master of Kolophon, with its port Notium. He next threatened Ephesus, but that place was defended by a powerful force which Tissaphernês had summoned, under proclamation "to go and succor the goddess Artemis;" as well as by twenty-five fresh Syracusan and two Selinusian triremes recently arrived.[183] From these enemies, Thrasyllus sustained a severe defeat near Ephesus, lost three hundred men, and was compelled to sail off to Notium; from whence, after burying his dead, he proceeded northward towards the Hellespont. On their way thither, while halting for a while at Methymna in the north of

Lesbos, Thrasyllus saw the twenty-five Syracusan triremes passing by on their voyage from Ephesus to Abydos. He immediately attacked them, captured four along with the entire crews, and chased the remainder back to their station at Ephesus. All the prisoners taken were sent to Athens, where they were deposited for custody in the stone-quarries of Peiræus, doubtless in retaliation for the treatment of the Athenian prisoners at Syracuse; they contrived, however, during the ensuing winter, to break a way out and escape to Dekeleia. Among the prisoners taken, was found Alkibiadês, the Athenian, cousin and fellow-exile of the Athenian general of the same name, whom Thrasyllus caused to be set at liberty, while the others were sent to Athens.[184]

After the delay caused by this pursuit, he brought back his armament to the Hellespont and joined the force of Alkibiadês at Sestos. Their joint force was conveyed over, seemingly about the commencement of autumn, to Lampsakus, on the Asiatic side of the strait; which place they fortified and made their head-quarters for the autumn and winter, maintaining themselves by predatory excursions, throughout the neighboring satrapy of Pharnabazus. It is curious to learn, however, that when Alkibiadês was proceeding to marshal them all together,—the hoplites, according to Athenian custom, taking rank according to their tribes,—his own soldiers, never yet beaten, refused to fraternize with those of Thrasyllus, who had been so recently worsted at Ephesus. Nor was this alienation removed until after a joint expedition against Abydos; Pharnabazus presenting himself with a considerable force, especially cavalry, to relieve that place, was encountered and defeated in a battle wherein all the Athenians present took part. The honor of the hoplites of Thrasyllus was now held to be reëstablished, so that the fusion of ranks was admitted without farther difficulty.[185] Even the entire army, however, was not able to accomplish the conquest of Abydos; which the Peloponnesians and Pharnabazus still maintained as their station on the Hellespont.

Meanwhile Athens had so stripped herself of force, by the large armament recently sent with Thrasyllus, that her enemies near home were encouraged to active operations. The Spartans despatched an expedition, both of triremes and of land-force, to attack Pylos, which had remained as an Athenian post and a refuge for revolted Helots ever since its first fortification by Demosthenês, in B.C. 425. The place was vigorously attacked, both by sea and by land, and soon became much pressed. Not unmindful of its distress, the Athenians sent to its relief thirty triremes under Anytus, who, however, came back without even reaching the place, having been prevented by stormy weather or unfavorable winds from doubling Cape Malea. Pylos was soon afterwards obliged to surrender, the garrison departing on terms of capitulation.[186] But Anytus, on his return, encountered great displeasure from his countrymen, and was put on his trial for having betrayed, or for not having done his utmost to fulfil, the trust confided to him. It is said that he only saved himself from condemnation by bribing the dikastery, and that he was the first Athenian who ever

obtained a verdict by corruption.[187] Whether he could really have reached Pylos, and whether the obstacles which baffled him were such as an energetic officer would have overcome, we have no means of determining; still less, whether it be true that he actually escaped by bribery. The story seems to prove, however, that the general Athenian public thought him deserving of condemnation, and were so much surprised by his acquittal, as to account for it by supposing, truly or falsely, the use of means never before attempted.

It was about the same time, also, that the Megarians recovered by surprise their port of Nisæa, which had been held by an Athenian garrison since B.C. 424. The Athenians made an effort to recover it, but failed; though they defeated the Megarians in an action.[188]

Thrasyllus, during the summer of B.C. 409, and even the joint force of Thrasyllus and Alkibiadês during the autumn of the same year, seem to have effected less than might have been expected from so large a force: indeed, it must have been at some period during this year that the Lacedæmonian Klearchus, with his fifteen Megarian ships, penetrated up the Hellespont to Byzantium, finding it guarded only by nine Athenian triremes.[189] But the operations of 408 B.C. were more important. The entire force under Alkibiadês and the other commanders was mustered for the siege of Chalkêdon and Byzantium. The Chalkêdonians, having notice of the project, deposited their movable property for safety in the hand of their neighbors the Bithynian Thracians; a remarkable evidence of the good feeling and confidence between the two, contrasting strongly with the perpetual hostility which subsisted on the other side of the Bosphorus between Byzantium and the Thracian tribes adjoining.[190] But the precaution was frustrated by Alkibiadês, who entered the territory of the Bithynians and compelled them by threats to deliver up the effects confided to them. He then proceeded to block up Chalkêdon by a wooden wall carried across from the Bosphorus to the Propontis; though the continuity of this wall was interrupted by a river, and seemingly by some rough ground on the immediate brink of the river. The blockading wall was already completed, when Pharnabazus appeared with an army for the relief of the place, and advanced as far as the Herakleion, or temple of Heraklês, belonging to the Chalkêdonians. Profiting by his approach, Hippokratês, the Lacedæmonian harmost in the town, made a vigorous sally: but the Athenians repelled all the efforts of Pharnabazus to force a passage through their lines and join him; so that, after an obstinate contest, the sallying force was driven back within the walls of the town, and Hippokratês himself killed.[191]

The blockade of the town was now made so sure, that Alkibiadês departed with a portion of the army to levy money and get together forces for the siege of Byzantium afterwards. During his absence, Theramenês and Thrasybulus came to terms with Pharnabazus for the capitulation of Chalkêdon. It was agreed that the town should again become a tributary dependency of Athens, on the same rate of tribute as before the revolt, and that the arrears during the subsequent period should be paid up.

Moreover, Pharnabazus himself engaged to pay to the Athenians twenty talents on behalf of the town, and also to escort some Athenian envoys up to Susa, enabling them to submit propositions for accommodation to the Great King. Until those envoys should return, the Athenians covenanted to abstain from hostilities against the satrapy of Pharnabazus.[192] Oaths to this effect were mutually exchanged, after the return of Alkibiadês from his expedition. For Pharnabazus positively refused to complete the ratification with the other generals, until Alkibiadês should be there to ratify in person also; a proof at once of the great individual importance of the latter, and of his known facility in finding excuses to evade an agreement. Two envoys were accordingly sent by Pharnabazus to Chrysopolis, to receive the oaths of Alkibiadês, while two relatives of Alkibiadês came to Chalkêdon as witnesses to those of Pharnabazus. Over and above the common oath shared with his colleagues, Alkibiadês took a special covenant of personal friendship and hospitality with the satrap, and received from him the like.

Alkibiadês had employed his period of absence in capturing Selymbria, from whence he obtained a sum of money, and in getting together a large body of Thracians, with whom he marched by land to Byzantium. That place was now besieged, immediately after the capitulation of Chalkêdon, by the united force of the Athenians. A wall of circumvallation was drawn around it, and various attacks were made by missiles and battering engines. These, however, the Lacedæmonian garrison, under the harmost Klearchus, aided by some Megarians under Helixus, and Bœotians under Kœratadas, was perfectly competent to repel. But the ravages of famine were not so easily dealt with. After the blockade had lasted some time, provisions began to fail; so that Klearchus, strict and harsh, even under ordinary circumstances, became inexorable and oppressive, from exclusive anxiety for the subsistence of his soldiers; and even locked up the stock of food while the population of the town were dying of hunger around him. Seeing that his only hope was from external relief, he sallied forth from the city to entreat aid from Pharnabazus; and to get together, if possible, a fleet for some aggressive operation that might divert the attention of the besiegers. He left the defence to Kœratadas and Helixus, in full confidence that the Byzantines were too much compromised by their revolt from Athens to venture to desert Sparta, whatever might be their suffering. But the favorable terms recently granted to Chalkêdon, coupled with the severe and increasing famine, induced Kydon and a Byzantine party to open the gates by night, and admit Alkibiadês with the Athenians into the wide interior square called the Thrakion. Helixus and Kœratadas, apprized of this attack only when the enemy had actually got possession of the town on all sides, vainly attempted resistance, and were compelled to surrender at discretion: they were sent as prisoners to Athens, where Kœratadas contrived to escape during the confusion of the landing at Peiræus. Favorable terms were granted to the town, which was replaced in its position of a dependent ally of Athens, and probably had to pay up its arrears of tribute in the same manner as Chalkêdon.[193]

So slow was the process of siege in ancient times, that the reduction of Chalkêdon and Byzantium occupied nearly the whole year; the latter place surrendering about the beginning of winter.[194] Both of them, however, were acquisitions of capital importance to Athens, making her again undisputed mistress of the Bosphorus, and insuring to her two valuable tributary allies. Nor was this all the improvement which the summer had operated in her position. The accommodation just concluded with Pharnabazus was also a step of great value, and still greater promise. It was plain that the satrap had grown weary of bearing all the brunt of the war for the benefit of the Peloponnesians, and that he was well disposed to assist the Athenians in coming to terms with the Great King. The mere withdrawal of his hearty support from Sparta, even if nothing else followed from it, was of immense moment to Athens; and thus much was really achieved. The envoys, five Athenians and two Argeians,—all, probably, sent for from Athens, which accounts for some delay,—were directed, after the siege of Chalkêdon, to meet Pharnabazus at Kyzikus. Some Lacedæmonian envoys, and even the Syracusan Hermokratês, who had been condemned and banished by sentence at home, took advantage of the same escort, and all proceeded on their journey upward to Susa. Their progress was arrested, during the extreme severity of the winter, at Gordium in Phrygia; and it was while pursuing their track into the interior at the opening of spring, that they met the young prince Cyrus, son of king Darius, coming down in person to govern an important part of Asia Minor. Some Lacedæmonian envoys, Bœotius and others, were travelling down along with him, after having fulfilled their mission at the Persian court.[195]

CHAPTER LXIV.

FROM THE ARRIVAL OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER IN ASIA MINOR, DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF ARGINUSÆ.

THE advent of Cyrus, commonly known as Cyrus the younger, into Asia Minor, was an event of the greatest importance, opening what may be called the last phase in the Peloponnesian war.

He was the younger of the two sons of the Persian king Darius Nothus by the cruel queen Parysatis, and was now sent down by his father as satrap of Lydia, Phrygia the greater, and Kappadokia, as well as general of all that military division of which the muster-place was Kastôlus. His command did not at this time comprise the Greek cities on the coast, which were still left to Tissaphernês and Pharnabazus.[196] But he nevertheless brought down with him a strong interest in the Grecian war, and an intense anti-Athenian feeling, with full authority from his father to carry it out into act. Whatever this young man willed, he willed strongly; his bodily activity, rising superior to those temptations of sensual indulgence which often enervated the Persian grandees, provoked the admiration even of Spartans:[197] and his energetic character was combined with a certain measure of ability. Though he had not as yet conceived that deliberate plan for mounting the Persian throne which afterwards absorbed his whole mind, and was so near succeeding by the help of the Ten Thousand Greeks, yet he seems to have had from the beginning the sentiment and ambition of a king in prospect, not those of a satrap. He came down, well aware that Athens was the efficient enemy by whom the pride of the Persian kings had been humbled, the insular Greeks kept out of the sight of a Persian ship, and even the continental Greeks on the coast practically emancipated, for the last sixty years. He therefore brought down with him a strenuous desire to put down the Athenian power, very different from the treacherous balancing of Tissaphernês, and much more formidable even than the straightforward enmity of Pharnabazus, who had less money, less favor at court, and less of youthful ardor. Moreover, Pharnabazus, after having heartily espoused the cause of the Peloponnesians for the last three years, had now become weary of the allies whom he had so long kept in pay. Instead of expelling Athenian influence from his coasts with little difficulty, as he had expected to do, he found his satrapy plundered, his revenues impaired or absorbed, and an Athenian fleet all-powerful in the Propontis and Hellespont; while the Lacedæmonian fleet, which he had taken so much pains to invite, was destroyed. Decidedly sick of the Peloponnesian cause, he was even leaning towards Athens; and the envoys whom he was escorting to Susa might perhaps have laid the foundation of an altered Persian policy in Asia Minor, when the journey of Cyrus down to the coast overthrew all such calculations. The young prince brought with him a fresh, hearty, and youthful antipathy against

Athens, a power inferior only to that of the Great King himself, and an energetic determination to use it without reserve in insuring victory to the Peloponnesians.

From the moment that Pharnabazus and the Athenian envoys met Cyrus, their farther progress towards Susa became impossible. Bœotius, and the other Lacedæmonian envoys travelling along with the young prince, made extravagant boasts of having obtained all that they asked for at Susa; and Cyrus himself announced his powers as unlimited in extent over the whole coast, all for the purpose of prosecuting vigorous war in conjunction with the Lacedæmonians. Pharnabazus, on hearing this intelligence, and seeing the Great King's seal to the words, "I send down Cyrus, as lord of all those who muster at Kastôlus," not only refused to let the Athenian envoys proceed onward, but was even obliged to obey the orders of the young prince, who insisted that they should either be surrendered to him, or at least detained for some time in the interior, in order that no information might be conveyed to Athens. The satrap resisted the first of these requisitions, having pledged his word for their safety; but he obeyed the second, detaining them in Kappadokia for no less than three years, until Athens was prostrate and on the point of surrender, after which he obtained permission from Cyrus to send them back to the sea-coast.[198]

This arrival of Cyrus, overruling the treachery of Tissaphernês as well as the weariness of Pharnabazus, and supplying the enemies of Athens with a double flow of Persian gold at a moment when the stream would otherwise have dried up, was a paramount item in that sum of causes which concurred to determine the result of the war.[199] But important as the event was in itself, it was rendered still more important by the character of the Lacedæmonian admiral Lysander, with whom the young prince first came into contact on reaching Sardis.

Lysander had come out to supersede Kratesippidas, about December, 408 B.C., or January, 407 B.C.[200] He was the last, after Brasidas and Gylippus, of that trio of eminent Spartans, from whom all the capital wounds of Athens proceeded, during the course of this long war. He was born of poor parents, and is even said to have been of that class called mothakes, being only enabled by the aid of richer men to keep up his contribution to the public mess, and his place in the constant drill and discipline. He was not only an excellent officer,[201] thoroughly competent to the duties of military command, but possessed also great talents for intrigue, and for organizing a political party as well as keeping up its disciplined movements. Though indifferent to the temptations either of money or of pleasure,[202] and willingly acquiescing in the poverty to which he was born, he was altogether unscrupulous in the prosecution of ambitious objects, either for his country or for himself. His family, poor as it was, enjoyed a dignified position at Sparta, belonging to the gens of the Herakleidæ, not connected by any near relationship with the kings: moreover, his personal reputation as a Spartan was excellent, since his observance of the rules of discipline had been rigorous and exemplary. The habits of self-constraint thus acquired, served him in good stead when it became necessary to his ambition to court the favor of the great.

His recklessness about falsehood and perjury is illustrated by various current sayings ascribed to him; such as, that children were to be taken in by means of dice; men, by means of oaths.[203] A selfish ambition—for promoting the power of his country not merely in connection with, but in subservience to, his own—guided him from the beginning to the end of his career. In this main quality, he agreed with Alkibiadês; in reckless immorality of means, he went even beyond him. He seems to have been cruel; an attribute which formed no part of the usual character of Alkibiadês. On the other hand, the love of personal enjoyment, luxury, and ostentation, which counted for so much in Alkibiadês, was quite unknown to Lysander. The basis of his disposition was Spartan, tending to merge appetite, ostentation, and expansion of mind, all in the love of command and influence,—not Athenian, which tended to the development of many and diversified impulses; ambition being one, but only one, among the number.

Kratesippidas, the predecessor of Lysander, seems to have enjoyed the maritime command for more than the usual yearly period, having superseded Pasippidas during the middle of the year of the latter. But the maritime power of Sparta was then so weak, having not yet recovered from the ruinous defeat at Kyzikus, that he achieved little or nothing. We hear of him only as furthering, for his own profit, a political revolution at Chios. Bribed by a party of Chian exiles, he took possession of the acropolis, reinstated them in the island, and aided them in deposing and expelling the party then in office, to the number of six hundred. It is plain that this is not a question between democracy and oligarchy, but between two oligarchical parties, the one of which succeeded in purchasing the factious agency of the Spartan admiral. The exiles whom he expelled took possession of Atarneus, a strong post belonging to the Chians on the mainland opposite Lesbos. From hence they made war, as well as they could, upon their rivals now in possession of the island, and also upon other parts of Ionia; not without some success and profit, as will appear by their condition about ten years afterwards.[204]

The practice of reconstituting the governments of the Asiatic cities, thus begun by Kratesippidas, was extended and brought to a system by Lysander; not indeed for private emolument, which he always despised, but in views of ambition. Having departed from Peloponnesus with a squadron, he reinforced it at Rhodes, and then sailed onward to Kos—an Athenian island, so that he could only have touched there—and Milêtus. He took up his final station at Ephesus, the nearest point to Sardis, where Cyrus was expected to arrive; and while awaiting his coming, augmented his fleet to the number of seventy triremes. As soon as Cyrus reached Sardis, about April or May 407 B.C., Lysander went to pay his court to him, along with some Lacedæmonian envoys, and found himself welcomed with every mark of favor. Preferring bitter complaints against the double-dealing of Tissaphernês,—whom they accused of having frustrated the king's orders, and sacrificed the interests of the empire, under the seductions of Alkibiadês,—they intreated Cyrus to adopt a new policy, and execute

the stipulations of the treaty, by lending the most vigorous aid to put down the common enemy. Cyrus replied, that these were the express orders which he had received from his father, and that he was prepared to fulfil them with all his might. He had brought with him, he said, five hundred talents, which should be at once devoted to the cause: if these were insufficient, he would resort to the private funds which his father had given him; and if more still were needed, he would coin into money the gold and silver throne on which he sat.[205]

Lysander and the envoys returned the warmest thanks for these magnificent promises, which were not likely to prove empty words from the lips of a vehement youth like Cyrus. So sanguine were the hopes which they conceived from his character and proclaimed sentiments, that they ventured to ask him to restore the rate of pay to one full Attic drachma per head for the seamen; which had been the rate promised by Tissaphernês through his envoys at Sparta, when he first invited the Lacedæmonians across the Ægean, and when it was doubtful whether they would come, but actually paid only for the first month, and then reduced to half a drachma, furnished in practice with miserable irregularity. As a motive for granting this increase of pay, Cyrus was assured that it would determine the Athenian seamen to desert so largely, that the war would sooner come to an end, and of course the expenditure also. But he refused compliance, saying that the rate of pay had been fixed both by the king's express orders and by the terms of the treaty, so that he could not depart from it.[206] In this reply Lysander was forced to acquiesce. The envoys were treated with distinction, and feasted at a banquet; after which Cyrus, drinking to the health of Lysander, desired him to declare what favor he could do to gratify him most. "To grant an additional obolus per head for each seaman's pay," replied Lysander. Cyrus immediately complied, having personally bound himself by his manner of putting the question. But the answer impressed him both with astonishment and admiration; for he had expected that Lysander would ask some favor or present for himself, judging him not only according to the analogy of most Persians, but also of Astyochus and the officers of the Peloponnesian armament at Milêtus, whose corrupt subservience to Tissaphernês had probably been made known to him. From such corruption, as well as from the mean carelessness of Theramenês, the Spartan, respecting the condition of the seamen,[207] Lysander's conduct stood out in pointed and honorable contrast.

The incident here described not only procured for the seamen of the Peloponnesian fleet the daily pay of four oboli, instead of three, per man, but also insured to Lysander himself a degree of esteem and confidence from Cyrus which he knew well how to turn to account. I have already remarked,[208] in reference to Periklês and Nikias, that an established reputation for personal incorruptibility, rare as that quality was among Grecian leading politicians, was among the most precious items in the capital stock of an ambitious man, even if looked at only in regard to the durability of his own influence. If the proof of such disinterestedness was of so much value in the

eyes of the Athenian people, yet more powerfully did it work upon the mind of Cyrus. With his Persian and princely ideas of winning adherents by munificence,[209] a man who despised presents was a phenomenon commanding the higher sentiment of wonder and respect. From this time forward he not only trusted Lysander with implicit pecuniary confidence, but consulted him as to the prosecution of the war, and even condescended to second his personal ambition to the detriment of this object. [210]

Returning from Sardis to Ephesus, after such unexampled success in his interview with Cyrus, Lysander was enabled not only to make good to his fleet the full arrear actually due, but also to pay them for a month in advance, at the increased rate of four oboli per man; and to promise that high rate for the future. A spirit of the highest satisfaction and confidence was diffused through the armament. But the ships were in indifferent condition, having been hastily and parsimoniously got up since the late defeat at Kyzikus. Accordingly, Lysander employed his present affluence in putting them into better order, procuring more complete tackle, and inviting picked crews.[211] He took another step pregnant with important results. Summoning to Ephesus a few of the most leading and active men from each of the Asiatic cities, he organized them into disciplined clubs, or factions, in correspondence with himself. He instigated these clubs to the most vigorous prosecution of the war against Athens, promising that, as soon as that war should be concluded, they should be invested and maintained by Spartan influence in the government of their respective cities.[212] His newly established influence with Cyrus, and the abundant supplies of which he was now master, added double force to an invitation in itself but too seducing. And thus, while infusing increased ardor into the joint warlike efforts of these cities, he at the same time procured for himself an ubiquitous correspondence, such as no successor could manage, rendering the continuance of his own command almost essential to success. The fruits of his factious manœuvres will be seen in the subsequent dekadarchies, or oligarchies of Ten, after the complete subjugation of Athens.

While Lysander and Cyrus were thus restoring formidable efficacy to their side of the contest, during the summer of 407 B.C., the victorious exile Alkibiadês had accomplished the important and delicate step of reëntering his native city for the first time. According to the accommodation with Pharnabazus, concluded after the reduction of Chalkêdon, the Athenian fleet was precluded from assailing his satrapy, and was thus forced to seek subsistence elsewhere. Byzantium and Selymbria, with contributions levied in Thrace, maintained them for the winter: in the spring (407 B.C.), Alkibiadês brought them again to Samos; from whence he undertook an expedition against the coast of Karia, levying contributions to the extent of one hundred talents. Thrasybulus, with thirty triremes, went to attack Thrace, where he reduced Thasos, Abdêra, and all those towns which had revolted from Athens; Thasos being now in especial distress from famine as well as from past seditions. A valuable contribution for the support of the fleet was doubtless among the fruits of this success. Thrasyllus

at the same time conducted another division of the army home to Athens, intended by Alkibiadês as precursors of his own return.[213]

Before Thrasyllus arrived, the people had already manifested their favorable disposition towards Alkibiadês by choosing him anew general of the armament, along with Thrasybulus and Konon. Alkibiadês was now tending homeward from Samos with twenty triremes, bringing with him all the contributions recently levied: he first stopped at Paros, then visited the coast of Laconia, and lastly looked into the harbor of Gytheion in Laconia, where he had learned that thirty triremes were preparing. The news which he received of his reëlection as general, strengthened by the pressing invitations and encouragements of his friends, as well as by the recall of his banished kinsmen at length determined him to sail to Athens. He reached Peiræus on a marked day, the festival of the Plyntêria, on the 25th of the month Thargêlion, about the end of May, 407 B.C. This was a day of melancholy solemnity, accounted unpropitious for any action of importance. The statue of the goddess Athênê was stripped of all its ornaments, covered up from every one's gaze, and washed or cleansed under a mysterious ceremonial, by the holy gens, called Praxiergidæ. The goddess thus seemed to turn away her face, and refuse to behold the returning exile. Such at least was the construction of his enemies; and as the subsequent turn of events tended to bear them out, it has been preserved; while the more auspicious counter-interpretation, doubtless suggested by his friends, has been forgotten.

The most extravagant representations, of the pomp and splendor of this return of Alkibiadês to Athens, were given by some authors of antiquity, especially by Duris of Samos, an author about two generations later. It was said that he brought with him two hundred prow-ornaments belonging to captive enemies' ships, or, according to some, even the two hundred captured ships themselves; that his trireme was ornamented with gilt and silvered shields, and sailed by purple sails; that Kallippidês, one of the most distinguished actors of the day, performed the functions of keleustês, pronouncing the chant or word of command to the rowers; that Chrysogonus, a flute-player, who had gained the first prize at the Pythian games, was also on board playing the air of return.[214] All these details, invented with melancholy facility, to illustrate an ideal of ostentation and insolence, are refuted by the more simple and credible narrative of Xenophon. The reëntry of Alkibiadês was not merely unostentatious, but even mistrustful and apprehensive. He had with him only twenty triremes; and though encouraged, not merely by the assurances of his friends, but also by the news that he had just been reëlected general, he was, nevertheless, half afraid to disembark, even at the instant when he made fast his ship to the quay in Peiræus. A vast crowd had assembled there from the city and the port, animated by curiosity, interest, and other emotions of every kind, to see him arrive. But so little did he trust their sentiments that he hesitated at first to step on shore, and stood upon the deck looking about for his friends and kinsmen. Presently, he saw Euryptolemus his cousin, and others, by whom he was heartily welcomed, and in the midst of whom

he landed. But they too were so apprehensive of his numerous enemies, that they formed themselves into a sort of body-guard, to surround and protect him against any possible assault during his march from Peiræus to Athens.[215]

No protection, however, was required. Not merely did his enemies attempt no violence against him, but they said nothing in opposition when he made his defence before the senate and the public assembly. Protesting before the one as well as the other, his innocence of the impiety laid to his charge, he denounced bitterly the injustice of his enemies, and gently, but pathetically, deplored the unkindness of the people. His friends all spoke warmly in the same strain. So strenuous, and so pronounced, was the sentiment in his favor, both of the senate and of the public assembly, that no one dared to address them in the contrary sense.[216] The sentence of condemnation passed against him was cancelled: the Eumolpidæ were directed to revoke the curse which they had pronounced upon his head: the record of the sentence was destroyed, and the plate of lead upon which the curse was engraven, thrown into the sea: his confiscated property was restored: lastly, he was proclaimed general with full powers, and allowed to prepare an expedition of one hundred triremes, fifteen hundred hoplites from the regular muster-roll, and one hundred and fifty horsemen. All this passed, by unopposed vote, amidst silence on the part of enemies and acclamations from friends, amidst unmeasured promises of future achievement from himself, and confident assurances, impressed by his friends on willing hearers, that Alkibiadês was the only man competent to restore the empire and grandeur of Athens. The general expectation, which he and his friends took every possible pains to excite, was, that his victorious career of the last three years was a preparation for yet greater triumphs during the next.

We may be satisfied, when we advert to the apprehensions of Alkibiadês on entering the Peiræus, and to the body-guard organized by his friends, that this overwhelming and uncontradicted triumph greatly surpassed the anticipations of both. It intoxicated him, and led him to make light of enemies whom only just before he had so much dreaded. This mistake, together with the carelessness and insolence arising out of what seemed to be an unbounded ascendency, proved the cause of his future ruin. But the truth is, that these enemies, however they might remain silent, had not ceased to be formidable. Alkibiadês had now been eight years in exile, from about August 415 B.C. to May 407 B.C. Now absence was in many ways a good thing for his reputation, since his overbearing private demeanor had been kept out of sight, and his impieties partially forgotten. There was even a disposition among the majority to accept his own explicit denial of the fact laid to his charge, and to dwell chiefly upon the unworthy manœuvres of his enemies in resisting his demand for instant trial immediately after the accusation was broached, in order that they might calumniate him during his absence. He was characterized as a patriot animated by the noblest motives, who had brought both first-rate endowments and large private wealth to the service of the commonwealth, but had been ruined by a conspiracy of corrupt

and worthless speakers, every way inferior to him; men, whose only chance of success with the people arose from expelling those who were better than themselves, while he, Alkibiadês, far from having any interest adverse to the democracy, was the natural and worthy favorite of a democratical people.[217] So far as the old causes of unpopularity were concerned, therefore, time and absence had done much to weaken their effect, and to assist his friends in countervailing them by pointing to the treacherous political manœuvres employed against him.

But if the old causes of unpopularity had thus, comparatively speaking, passed out of sight, others had since arisen, of a graver and more ineffaceable character. His vindictive hostility to his country had been not merely ostentatiously proclaimed, but actively manifested, by stabs but too effectively aimed at her vitals. The sending of Gylippus to Syracuse, the fortification of Dekeleia, the revolts of Chios and Milêtus, the first origination of the conspiracy of the Four Hundred, had all been emphatically the measures of Alkibiadês. Even for these, the enthusiasm of the moment attempted some excuse: it was affirmed that he had never ceased to love his country, in spite of her wrongs towards him, and that he had been compelled by the necessities of exile to serve men whom he detested, at the daily risk of his life.[218] But such pretences could not really impose upon any one. The treason of Alkibiadês during the period of his exile remained indefensible as well as undeniable, and would have been more than sufficient as a theme for his enemies, had their tongues been free. But his position was one altogether singular: having first inflicted on his country immense mischief, he had since rendered her valuable service, and promised to render still more. It is true, that the subsequent service was by no means adequate to the previous mischief: nor had it indeed been rendered exclusively by him, since the victories of Abydos and Kyzikus belong not less to Theramenês and Thrasybulus than to Alkibiadês:[219] moreover, the peculiar present or capital which he had promised to bring with him,—Persian alliance and pay to Athens,—had proved a complete delusion. Still, the Athenian arms had been eminently successful since his junction, and we may see that not merely common report, but even good judges, such as Thucydidês, ascribed this result to his superior energy and management.

Without touching upon these particulars, it is impossible fully to comprehend the very peculiar position of this returning exile before the Athenian people in the summer of 407 B.C. The more distant past exhibited him as among the worst of criminals; the recent past, as a valuable servant and patriot: the future promised continuance in this last character, so far as there were any positive indications to judge by. Now this was a case in which discussion and recrimination could not possibly answer any useful purpose. There was every reason for reappointing Alkibiadês to his command; but this could only be done under prohibition of censure on his past crimes, and provisional acceptance of his subsequent good deeds, as justifying the hope of yet better deeds to come. The popular instinct felt this situation perfectly, and imposed absolute silence on his enemies.[220] We are not to infer from hence that the people

had forgotten the past deeds of Alkibiadês, or that they entertained for him nothing but unqualified confidence and admiration. In their present very justifiable sentiment of hopefulness, they determined that he should have full scope for prosecuting his new and better career, if he chose; and that his enemies should be precluded from reviving the mention of an irreparable past, so as to shut the door against him. But what was thus interdicted to men's lips as unseasonable, was not effaced from their recollections; nor were the enemies, though silenced for the moment, rendered powerless for the future. All this train of combustible matter lay quiescent, ready to be fired by any future misconduct or negligence, perhaps even by blameless ill-success, on the part of Alkibiadês.

At a juncture when so much depended upon his future behavior, he showed, as we shall see presently, that he completely misinterpreted the temper of the people. Intoxicated by the unexpected triumph of his reception, according to that fatal susceptibility so common among distinguished Greeks, he forgot his own past history, and fancied that the people had forgotten and forgiven it also; construing their studied and well-advised silence into a proof of oblivion. He conceived himself in assured possession of public confidence, and looked upon his numerous enemies as if they no longer existed, because they were not allowed to speak at a most unseasonable hour. Without doubt, his exultation was shared by his friends, and this sense of false security proved his future ruin.

Two colleagues, recommended by Alkibiadês himself, Adeimantus and Aristokratês, were named by the people as generals of the hoplites to go out with him, in case of operations ashore.[221] In less than three months, his armament was ready; but he designedly deferred his departure until that day of the month Boedromion, about the beginning of September, when the Eleusinian mysteries were celebrated, and when the solemn processional march of the crowd of communicants was wont to take place, along the Sacred Way from Athens to Eleusis. For seven successive years, ever since the establishment of Agis at Dekeleia, this march had been of necessity discontinued, and the procession had been transported by sea, to the omission of many of the ceremonial details. Alkibiadês, on this occasion, caused the land-march to be renewed, in full pomp and solemnity; assembling all his troops in arms to protect, in case any attack should be made from Dekeleia. No such attack was hazarded; so that he had the satisfaction of reviving the full regularity of this illustrious scene, and escorting the numerous communicants out and home, without the smallest interruption; an exploit gratifying to the religious feelings of the people, and imparting an acceptable sense of undiminished Athenian power; while in reference to his own reputation, it was especially politic, as serving to make his peace with the Eumolpidæ and the Two Goddesses, on whose account he had been condemned.[222]

Immediately after the mysteries, he departed with his armament. It appears that Agis at Dekeleia, though he had not chosen to come out and attack Alkibiadês when

posted to guard the Eleusinian procession, had nevertheless felt humiliated by the defiance offered to him. He shortly afterwards took advantage of the departure of this large force, to summon reinforcements from Peloponnesus and Bœotia, and attempt to surprise the walls of Athens on a dark night. If he expected any connivance within, the plot miscarried: alarm was given in time, and the eldest and youngest hoplites were found at their posts to defend the walls. The assailants—said to have amounted to twenty-eight thousand men, of whom half were hoplites, with twelve hundred cavalry, nine hundred of them Bœotians—were seen on the ensuing day close under the walls of the city, which were amply manned with the full remaining strength of Athens. In an obstinate cavalry battle which ensued, the Athenians gained the advantage even over the Bœotians. Agis encamped the next night in the garden of Akadêmus; again on the morrow he drew up his troops and offered battle to the Athenians, who are affirmed to have gone forth in order of battle, but to have kept under the protection of the missiles from the walls, so that Agis did not dare to attack them.[223] We may well doubt whether the Athenians went out at all, since they had been for years accustomed to regard themselves as inferior to the Peloponnesians in the field. Agis now withdrew, satisfied apparently with having offered battle, so as to efface the affront which he had received from the march of the Eleusinian communicants in defiance of his neighborhood.

The first exploit of Alkibiadês was to proceed to Andros, now under a Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison. Landing on the island, he plundered the fields, defeated both the native troops and the Lacedæmonians, and forced them to shut themselves up within the town; which he besieged for some days without avail, and then proceeded onward to Samos, leaving Konon in a fortified post, with twenty ships, to prosecute the siege.[224] At Samos, he first ascertained the state of the Peloponnesian fleet at Ephesus, the influence acquired by Lysander over Cyrus, the strong anti-Athenian dispositions of the young prince, and the ample rate of pay, put down even in advance, of which the Peloponnesian seamen were now in actual receipt. He now first became convinced of the failure of those hopes which he had conceived, not without good reason, in the preceding year,—and of which he had doubtless boasted at Athens,—that the alliance of Persia might be neutralized at least, if not won over, through the envoys escorted to Susa by Pharnabazus. It was in vain that he prevailed upon Tissaphernês to mediate with Cyrus, to introduce to him some Athenian envoys, and to inculcate upon him his own views of the true interests of Persia; that is, that the war should be fed and protracted so as to wear out both the Grecian belligerent parties, each by means of the other. Such a policy, uncongenial at all times to the vehement temper of Cyrus, had become yet more repugnant to him since his intercourse with Lysander. He would not consent even to see the envoys, nor was he probably displeased to put a slight upon a neighbor and rival satrap. Deep was the despondency among the Athenians at Samos, when painfully convinced that all hopes from Persia must be abandoned for themselves; and farther,

that Persian pay was both more ample and better assured, to their enemies, than ever it had been before.[225]

Lysander had at Ephesus a fleet of ninety triremes, which he employed himself in repairing and augmenting, being still inferior in number to the Athenians. In vain did Alkibiadês attempt to provoke him out to a general action. This was much to the interest of the Athenians, apart from their superiority of number, since they were badly provided with money, and obliged to levy contributions wherever they could: but Lysander was resolved not to fight unless he could do so with advantage, and Cyrus, not afraid of sustaining the protracted expense of the war, had even enjoined upon him this cautious policy, with additional hopes of a Phenician fleet to his aid, which in his mouth was not intended to delude, as it had been by Tissaphernês.[226] Unable to bring about a general battle, and having no immediate or capital enterprise to constrain his attention, Alkibiadês became careless, and abandoned himself partly to the love of pleasure, partly to reckless predatory enterprises for the purpose of getting money to pay his army. Thrasybulus had come from his post on the Hellespont, and was now engaged in fortifying Phokæa, probably for the purpose of establishing a post, to be enabled to pillage the interior. Here he was joined by Alkibiadês, who sailed across with a squadron, leaving his main fleet at Samos. He left it under the command of his favorite pilot Antiochus, but with express orders on no account to fight until his return.

While employed in this visit to Phokæa and Klazomenæ, Alkibiadês, perhaps hard-pressed for money, conceived the unwarrantable project of enriching his men by the plunder of the neighboring territory of Kymê, an allied dependency of Athens. Landing on this territory unexpectedly, after fabricating some frivolous calumnies against the Kymæans, he at first seized much property and a considerable number of prisoners. But the inhabitants assembled in arms, bravely defended their possessions, and repelled his men to their ships; recovering the plundered property, and lodging it in safety within their walls. Stung with this miscarriage, Alkibiadês sent for a reinforcement of hoplites from Mitylênê, and marched up to the walls of Kymê, where he in vain challenged the citizens to come forth and fight. He then ravaged the territory at pleasure: nor had the Kymæans any other resource, except to send envoys to Athens, to complain of so gross an outrage, inflicted by the Athenian general upon an unoffending Athenian dependency.[227]

This was a grave charge, nor was it the only charge which Alkibiadês had to meet at Athens. During his absence at Phokæa and Kymê, Antiochus the pilot, whom he had left in command, disobeying the express order pronounced against fighting a battle, first sailed across from Samos to Notium, the harbor of Kolophon, and from thence to the mouth of the harbor of Ephesus, where the Peloponnesian fleet lay. Entering that harbor with his own ship and another, he passed close in front of the prows of the Peloponnesian triremes, insulting them scornfully and defying them to combat. Lysander detached some ships to pursue him, and an action gradually en-

sued, which was exactly that which Antiochus desired. But the Athenian ships were all in disorder, and came into battle as each of them separately could; while the Peloponnesian fleet was well marshalled and kept in hand; so that the battle was all to the advantage of the latter. The Athenians, compelled to take flight, were pursued to Notium, losing fifteen triremes, several along with their full crews. Antiochus himself was slain. Before retiring to Ephesus, Lysander had the satisfaction of erecting his trophy on the shore of Notium; while the Athenian fleet was carried back to its station at Samos.[228]

It was in vain that Alkibiadês, hastening back to Samos, mustered the entire Athenian fleet, sailed to the mouth of the harbor of Ephesus, and there ranged his ships in battle order, challenging the enemy to come forth. Lysander would give him no opportunity of wiping out the late dishonor. And as an additional mortification to Athens, the Lacedæmonians shortly afterwards captured both Teos and Delphinium; the latter being a fortified post which the Athenians had held for the last three years in the island of Chios.[229]

Even before the battle of Notium, it appears that complaints and dissatisfactions had been growing up in the armament against Alkibiadês. He had gone out with a splendid force, not inferior, in number of triremes and hoplites, to that which he had conducted against Sicily, and under large promises, both from himself and his friends, of achievements to come. Yet in a space of time which can hardly have been less than three months, not a single success had been accomplished; while on the other side there was to be reckoned the disappointment on the score of Persia, which had great effect on the temper of the armament, and which, though not his fault, was contrary to expectations which he had held out, the disgraceful plunder of Kymê, and the defeat at Notium. It was true that Alkibiadês had given peremptory orders to Antiochus not to fight, and that the battle had been hazarded in flagrant disobedience to his injunctions. But this circumstance only raised new matter for dissatisfaction of a graver character. If Antiochus had been disobedient,—if, besides disobedience, he had displayed a childish vanity and an utter neglect of all military precautions,—who was it that had chosen him for deputy; and that too against all Athenian precedent, putting the pilot, a paid officer of the ship, over the heads of the trierarchs who paid their pilots, and served at their own cost? It was Alkibiadês who placed Antiochus in this grave and responsible situation,—a personal favorite, an excellent convivial companion, but destitute of all qualities befitting a commander. And this turned attention on another point of the character of Alkibiadês, his habits of excessive self-indulgence and dissipation. The loud murmurs of the camp charged him with neglecting the interests of the service for enjoyments with jovial parties and Ionian women, and with admitting to his confidence those who best contributed to the amusement of these chosen hours.[230]

It was in the camp at Samos that this general indignation against Alkibiadês first arose, and was from thence transmitted formally to Athens, by the mouth of Thrasy-

bulus son of Thrason,[231] not the eminent Thrasybulus, son of Lykus, who has been already often spoken of in this history, and will be so again. There came at the same time to Athens the complaints from Kymê, against the unprovoked aggression and plunder of that place by Alkibiadês; and seemingly complaints from other places besides.[232] It was even urged as accusation against him, that he was in guilty collusion to betray the fleet to Pharnabazus and the Lacedæmonians, and that he had already provided three strong forts in the Chersonese to retire to, as soon as this scheme should be ripe for execution.

Such grave and wide-spread accusations, coupled with the disaster at Notium, and the complete disappointment of all the promises of success, were more than sufficient to alter the sentiments of the people of Athens towards Alkibiadês. He had no character to fall back upon; or rather, he had a character worse than none, such as to render the most criminal imputations of treason not intrinsically improbable. The comments of his enemies, which had been forcibly excluded from public discussion during his summer visit to Athens, were now again set free; and all the adverse recollections of his past life doubtless revived. The people had refused to listen to these, in order that he might have a fair trial, and might verify the title, claimed for him by his friends, to be judged only by his subsequent exploits, achieved since the year 411 B.C. He had now had his trial; he had been found wanting; and the popular confidence, which had been provisionally granted to him, was accordingly withdrawn.

It is not just to represent the Athenian people, however Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos may set before us this picture, as having indulged an extravagant and unmeasured confidence in Alkibiadês in the month of July, demanding of him more than man could perform, and as afterwards in the month of December passing, with childish abruptness, from confidence into wrathful displeasure, because their own impossible expectations were not already realized. That the people entertained large expectations, from so very considerable an armament, cannot be doubted: the largest of all, probably, as in the instance of the Sicilian expedition, were those entertained by Alkibiadês himself, and promulgated by his friends. But we are not called upon to determine what the people would have done, had Alkibiadês, after performing all the duties of a faithful, skilful, and enterprising commander, nevertheless failed, from obstacles beyond his own control, in realizing their hopes and his own promises. No such case occurred: that which did occur was materially different. Besides the absence of grand successes, he had farther been negligent and reckless in his primary duties; he had exposed the Athenian arms to defeat, by his disgraceful selection of an unworthy lieutenant;[233] he had violated the territory and property of an allied dependency, at a moment when Athens had a paramount interest in cultivating by every means the attachment of her remaining allies. The truth is, as I have before remarked, that he had really been spoiled by the intoxicating reception given to him so unexpectedly in the city. He had mistaken a hopeful public, determined, even by forced silence as to the past, to give him the full benefit of a meritorious future, but

requiring as condition from him, that that future should really be meritorious, for a public of assured admirers, whose favor he had already earned and might consider as his own. He became an altered man after that visit, like Miltiadês after the battle of Marathon; or, rather, the impulses of a character essentially dissolute and insolent, broke loose from that restraint under which they had before been partially controlled. At the time of the battle of Kyzikus, when Alkibiadês was laboring to regain the favor of his injured countrymen, and was yet uncertain whether he should succeed, he would not have committed the fault of quitting his fleet and leaving it under the command of a lieutenant like Antiochus. If, therefore, Athenian sentiment towards Alkibiadês underwent an entire change during the autumn of 407 B.C., this was in consequence of an alteration in *his* character and behavior; an alteration for the worse, just at the crisis when everything turned upon his good conduct, and upon his deserving at least, if he could not command success.

We may, indeed, observe that the faults of Nikias before Syracuse, and in reference to the coming of Gylippus, were far graver and more mischievous than those of Alkibiadês during this turning season of his career, and the disappointment of antecedent hopes at least equal. Yet while these faults and disappointment brought about the dismissal and disgrace of Alkibiadês, they did not induce the Athenians to dismiss Nikias, though himself desiring it, nor even prevent them from sending him a second armament to be ruined along with the first. The contrast is most instructive, as demonstrating upon what points durable esteem in Athens turned; how long the most melancholy public incompetency could remain overlooked, when covered by piety, decorum, good intentions, and high station;[234] how short-lived was the ascendency of a man far superior in ability and energy, besides an equal station, when his moral qualities and antecedent life were such as to provoke fear and hatred in many, esteem from none. Yet, on the whole, Nikias, looking at him as a public servant, was far more destructive to his country than Alkibiadês. The mischief done to Athens by the latter was done in the avowed service of her enemies.

On hearing the news of the defeat of Notium and the accumulated complaints against Alkibiadês, the Athenians simply voted that he should be dismissed from his command; naming ten new generals to replace him. He was not brought to trial, nor do we know whether any such step was proposed. Yet his proceedings at Kymê, if they happened as we read them, richly deserved judicial animadversion; and the people, had they so dealt with him, would only have acted up to the estimable function ascribed to them by the oligarchical Phrynichus, "of serving as refuge to their dependent allies, and chastising the high-handed oppressions of the optimates against them."[235] In the perilous position of Athens, however, with reference to the foreign war, such a political trial would have been productive of much dissension and mischief. And Alkibiadês avoided the question by not coming to Athens. As soon as he heard of his dismissal, he retired immediately from the army to his own fortified posts on the Chersonese.

The ten new generals named were Konon, Diomedon, Leon, Periklês, Erasinidês, Aristokratês, Archestratus, Protomachus, Thrasyllus, Aristogenês. Of these, Konon was directed to proceed forthwith from Andros with the twenty ships which he had there, to receive the fleet from Alkibiadês; while Phanosthenês proceeded with four triremes to replace Konon at Andros.[236]

In his way thither, Phanosthenês fell in with Dorieus the Rhodian and two Thurian triremes, which he captured, with every man aboard. The captives were sent to Athens, where all were placed in custody, in case of future exchange, except Dorieus himself. The latter had been condemned to death, and banished from his native city of Rhodes, together with his kindred, probably on the score of political disaffection, at the time when Rhodes was a member of the Athenian alliance. Having since then become a citizen of Thurii, he had served with distinction in the fleet of Mindarus, both at Milêtus and the Hellespont. The Athenians now had so much compassion upon him that they released him at once and unconditionally, without even demanding a ransom or an equivalent. By what particular circumstance their compassion was determined, forming a pleasing exception to the melancholy habits which pervaded Grecian warfare in both belligerents, we should never have learned from the meagre narrative of Xenophon. But we ascertain from other sources, that Dorieus, the son of Diagoras of Rhodes, was illustrious beyond all other Greeks for his victories in the pankration at the Olympic, Isthmian, and Nemean festivals; that he had gained the first prize at three Olympic festivals in succession, of which Olympiad 88, or 428 B.C. was the second, a distinction altogether without precedent, besides eight Isthmian and seven Nemean prizes; that his father Diagoras, his brothers, and his cousins, were all celebrated as successful athletes; lastly, that the family were illustrious from old date in their native island of Rhodes, and were even descended from the Messenian hero Aristomenês. When the Athenians saw before them as their prisoner a man doubtless of magnificent stature and presence, as we may conclude from his athletic success, and surrounded by such a halo of glory, impressive in the highest degree to Grecian imagination, the feelings and usages of war were at once overruled. Though Dorieus had been one of their most vehement enemies, they could not bear either to touch his person, or to exact from him any condition. Released by them on this occasion, he lived to be put to death, about thirteen years afterwards, by the Lacedæmonians.[237]

When Konon reached Samos to take the command, he found the armament in a state of great despondency; not merely from the dishonorable affair of Notium, but also from disappointed hopes connected with Alkibiadês, and from difficulties in procuring regular pay. So painfully was the last inconvenience felt, that the first measure of Konon was to contract the numbers of the armament from above one hundred triremes to seventy; and to reserve for the diminished fleet all the ablest seamen of the larger. With this fleet, he and his colleagues roved about the enemies' coasts to collect plunder and pay.[238]

Apparently about the same time that Konon superseded Alkibiadês, that is, about December 407 B.C. or January 406 B.C., the year of Lysander's command expired, and Kallikratidas arrived from Sparta to replace him. His arrival was received with undisguised dissatisfaction by the leading Lacedæmonians in the armament, by the chiefs in the Asiatic cities, and by Cyrus. Now was felt the full influence of those factious correspondences and intrigues which Lysander had established with all of them, for indirectly working out the perpetuity of his own command. While loud complaints were heard of the impolicy of Sparta, in annually changing her admiral, both Cyrus and the rest concurred with Lysander in throwing difficulties in the way of the new successor.

Kallikratidas, unfortunately only shown by the Fates,[239] and not suffered to continue in the Grecian world, was one of the noblest characters of his age. Besides perfect courage, energy, and incorruptibility, he was distinguished for two qualities, both of them very rare among eminent Greeks; entire straightforwardness of dealing, and a Pan-Hellenic patriotism alike comprehensive, exalted, and merciful. Lysander handed over to him nothing but an empty purse; having repaid to Cyrus all the money remaining in his possession, under pretence that it had been confided to himself personally.[240] Moreover, on delivering up the fleet to Kallikratidas at Ephesus, he made boast of delivering to him at the same time the mastery of the sea, through the victory recently gained at Notium. "Conduct the fleet from Ephesus along the coast of Samos, passing by the Athenian station (replied Kallikratidas), and give it up to me at Milêtus: I shall then believe in your mastery of the sea." Lysander had nothing else to say, except that he should give himself no farther trouble, now that his command had been transferred to another.

Kallikratidas soon found that the leading Lacedæmonians in the fleet, gained over to the interests of his predecessor, openly murmured at his arrival, and secretly obstructed all his measures; upon which he summoned them together, and said: "I, for my part, am quite content to remain at home; and if Lysander, or any one else, pretends to be a better admiral than I am, I have nothing to say against it. But sent here as I am by the authorities at Sparta to command the fleet, I have no choice except to execute their orders in the best way that I can. You now know how far my ambition reaches;[241] you know also the murmurs which are abroad against our common city (for her frequent change of admirals). Look to it, and give me your opinion. Shall I stay where I am, or shall I go home, and communicate what has happened here?"

This remonstrance, alike pointed and dignified, produced its full effect. Every one replied, that it was his duty to stay and undertake the command. The murmurs and cabals were from that moment discontinued.

His next embarrassments arose from the manœuvre of Lysander in paying back to Cyrus all the funds from whence the continuous pay of the army was derived. Of

course this step was admirably calculated to make every one regret the alteration of command. Kallikratidas, who had been sent out without funds, in full reliance on the unexhausted supply from Sardis, now found himself compelled to go thither in person and solicit a renewal of the bounty. But Cyrus, eager to manifest in every way his partiality for the last admiral, deferred receiving him, first for two days, then for a farther interval, until the patience of Kallikratidas was wearied out, so that he left Sardis in disgust without an interview. So intolerable to his feelings was the humiliation of thus begging at the palace gates, that he bitterly deplored those miserable dissensions among the Greeks which constrained both parties to truckle to the foreigner for money; swearing that, if he survived the year's campaign, he would use every possible effort to bring about an accommodation between Athens and Sparta. [242]

In the mean time, he put forth all his energy to obtain money in some other way, and thus get the fleet to sea; knowing well, that the way to overcome the reluctance of Cyrus was, to show that he could do without him. Sailing first from Ephesus to Milêtus, he despatched from thence a small squadron to Sparta, disclosing his unexpected poverty, and asking for speedy pecuniary aid. In the mean time he convoked an assembly of the Milesians, communicated to them the mission just sent to Sparta, and asked from them a temporary supply until this money should arrive. He reminded them that the necessity of this demand sprang altogether from the manœuvre of Lysander, in paying back the funds in his hands; that he had already in vain applied to Cyrus for farther money, meeting only with such insulting neglect as could no longer be endured: that they, the Milesians, dwelling amidst the Persians, and having already experienced the maximum of ill-usage at their hands, ought now to be foremost in the war, and to set an example of zeal to the other allies,[243] in order to get clear the sooner from dependence upon such imperious taskmasters. He promised that, when the remittance from Sparta and the hour of success should arrive, he would richly requite their forwardness. "Let us, with the aid of the gods, show these foreigners (he concluded) that we can punish our enemies without worshipping them."

The spectacle of this generous patriot, struggling against a degrading dependence on the foreigner, which was now becoming unhappily familiar to the leading Greeks of both sides, excites our warm sympathy and admiration. We may add, that his language to the Milesians, reminding them of the misery which they had endured from the Persians as a motive to exertion in the war, is full of instruction as to the new situation opened for the Asiatic Greeks since the breaking-up of the Athenian power. No such evils had they suffered while Athens was competent to protect them, and while they were willing to receive protection from her, during the interval of more than fifty years between the complete organization of the confederacy of Delos and the disaster of Nikias before Syracuse.

The single-hearted energy of Kallikratidas imposed upon all who heard him, and even inspired so much alarm to those leading Milesians who were playing underhand the game of Lysander, that they were the first to propose a large grant of money towards the war, and to offer considerable sums from their own purses; an example probably soon followed by other allied cities. Some of the friends of Lysander tried to couple their offers with conditions; demanding a warrant for the destruction of their political enemies, and hoping thus to compromise the new admiral. But he strenuously refused all such guilty compliances.[244] He was soon able to collect at Milêtus fifty fresh triremes in addition to those left by Lysander, making a fleet of one hundred and forty sail in all. The Chians having furnished him with an outfit of five drachmas for each seaman, equal to ten days' pay at the usual rate, he sailed with the whole fleet northward towards Lesbos. Of this numerous fleet, the greatest which had yet been assembled throughout the war, only ten triremes were Lacedæmonian;[245] while a considerable proportion, and among the best equipped, were Bœotian and Eubœan.[246] In his voyage towards Lesbos, Kallikratidas seems to have made himself master of Phokæa and Kymê,[247] perhaps with the greater facility in consequence of the recent ill-treatment of the Kymæans by Alkibiadês. He then sailed to attack Methymna, on the northern coast of Lesbos; a town not only strongly attached to the Athenians, but also defended by an Athenian garrison. Though at first repulsed, he renewed his attacks until at length he took the town by storm. The property in it was all plundered by the soldiers, and the slaves collected and sold for their benefit. It was farther demanded by the allies, and expected pursuant to ordinary custom, that the Methymnæan and Athenian prisoners should be sold also. But Kallikratidas peremptorily refused compliance, and set them all free the next day; declaring that, so long as he was in command, not a single free Greek should be reduced to slavery if he could prevent it.[248]

No one, who has not familiarized himself with the details of Grecian warfare, can feel the full grandeur and sublimity of this proceeding, which stands, so far as I know, unparalleled in Grecian history. It is not merely that the prisoners were spared and set free; as to this point, analogous cases may be found, though not very frequent. It is, that this particular act of generosity was performed in the name and for the recommendation of Pan-Hellenic brotherhood and Pan-Hellenic independence of the foreigner: a comprehensive principle, announced by Kallikratidas on previous occasions as well as on this, but now carried into practice under emphatic circumstances, and coupled with an explicit declaration of his resolution to abide by it in all future cases. It is, lastly, that the step was taken in resistance to formal requisition on the part of his allies, whom he had very imperfect means either of paying or controlling, and whom therefore it was so much the more hazardous for him to offend. There cannot be any doubt that these allies felt personally wronged and indignant at the loss, as well as confounded with the proposition of a rule of duty so new, as respected the relations of belligerents in Greece; against which too, let us add, their murmurs would not be without some foundation: "If *we* should come to be Konon's

prisoners, he will not treat *us* in this manner." Reciprocity of dealing is absolutely essential to constant moral observance, either public or private; and doubtless Kallikratidas felt a well-grounded confidence, that two or three conspicuous examples would sensibly modify the future practice on both sides. But some one must begin by setting such examples, and the man who does begin—having a position which gives reasonable chance that others will follow—is the hero. An admiral like Lysander would not only sympathize heartily with the complaints of the allies, but also condemn the proceeding as a dereliction of duty to Sparta; even men better than Lysander would at first look coldly on it as a sort of Quixotism, in doubt whether the example would be copied: while the Spartan ephors, though probably tolerating it because they interfered very sparingly with their admirals afloat, would certainly have little sympathy with the feelings in which it originated. So much the rather is Kallikratidas to be admired, as bringing out with him not only a Pan-Hellenic patriotism,[249] rare either at Athens or Sparta, but also a force of individual character and conscience yet rarer, enabling him to brave unpopularity and break through routine, in the attempt to make that patriotism fruitful and operative in practice. In his career, so sadly and prematurely closed, there was at least this circumstance to be envied; that the capture of Methymna afforded him the opportunity, which he greedily seized, as if he had known that it would be the last, of putting in act and evidence the full aspirations of his magnanimous soul.

Kallikratidas sent word by the released prisoners to Konon, that he would presently put an end to his adulterous intercourse with the sea;[250] which he now considered as his wife, and lawfully appertaining to him, having one hundred and forty triremes against the seventy triremes of Konon. That admiral, in spite of his inferior numbers, had advanced near to Methymna, to try and relieve it; but finding the place already captured, had retired to the islands called Hekatonnêsoi, off the continent bearing northeast from Lesbos. Thither he was followed by Kallikratidas, who, leaving Methymna at night, found him quitting his moorings at break of day, and immediately made all sail to try and cut him off from the southerly course towards Samos. But Konon, having diminished the number of his triremes from one hundred to seventy, had been able to preserve all the best rowers, so that in speed he outran Kallikratidas and entered first the harbor of Mitylênê. His pursuers, however, were close behind, and even got into the harbor along with him, before it could be closed and put in a state of defence. Constrained to fight a battle at its entrance, he was completely defeated; thirty of his ships were taken, though the crews escaped to land; and he preserved the remaining forty only by hauling them ashore under the wall.[251]

The town of Mitylênê, originally founded on a small islet off Lesbos, had afterwards extended across a narrow strait to Lesbos itself. By this strait, whether bridged over or not we are not informed, the town was divided into two portions, and had two harbors, one opening northward towards the Hellespont, the other southward

towards the promontory of Kanê on the mainland.[252] Both these harbors were undefended, and both now fell into the occupation of the Peloponnesian fleet; at least all the outer portion of each, near to the exit of the harbor, which Kallikratidas kept under strict watch. He at the same time sent for the full forces of Methymna and for hoplites across from Chios, so as to block up Mitylênê by land as well as by sea. As soon as his success was announced, too, money for the fleet, together with separate presents for himself, which he declined receiving,[253] was immediately sent to him by Cyrus; so that his future operations became easy.

No preparations had been made at Mitylênê for a siege: no stock of provisions had been accumulated, and the crowd within the walls was so considerable, that Konon foresaw but too plainly the speedy exhaustion of his means. Nor could he expect succor from Athens, unless he could send intelligence thither of his condition; of which, as he had not been able to do so, the Athenians remained altogether ignorant. All his ingenuity was required to get a trireme safe out of the harbor, in the face of the enemy's guard. Putting afloat two triremes, the best sailers in his fleet, and picking out the best rowers for them out of all the rest, he caused these rowers to go aboard before daylight, concealing the epibatæ, or maritime soldiers, in the interior of the vessel, instead of the deck, which was their usual place, with a moderate stock of provisions, and keeping the vessel still covered with hides or sails, as was customary with vessels hauled ashore, to protect them against the sun.[254] These two triremes were thus made ready to depart at a moment's notice, without giving any indication to the enemy that they were so. They were fully manned before daybreak, the crews remained in their position all day, and after dark were taken out to repose. This went on for four days successively, no favorable opportunity having occurred to give the signal for attempting a start. At length, on the fifth day, about noon, when many of the Peloponnesian crews were ashore for their morning meal, and others were reposing, the moment seemed favorable, the signal was given, and both the triremes started at the same moment with their utmost speed; one to go out at the southern entrance towards the sea, between Lesbos and Chios, the other to depart by the northern entrance towards the Hellespont. Instantly, the alarm was given among the Peloponnesian fleet: the cables were cut, the men hastened aboard, and many triremes were put in motion to overtake the two runaways. That which departed southward, in spite of the most strenuous efforts, was caught towards evening and brought back with all her crew prisoners: that which went towards the Hellespont escaped, rounded the northern coast of Lesbos, and got safe with the news to Athens; sending intelligence also, seemingly, in her way, to the Athenian admiral Diomedon at Samos.

The latter immediately made all haste to the aid of Konon, with the small force which he had with him, no more than twelve triremes. The two harbors being both guarded by a superior force, he tried to get access to Mitylênê through the Euripus, a strait which opens on the southern coast of the island into an interior lake, or bay,

approaching near to the town. But here he was attacked suddenly by Kallikratidas, and his squadron all captured except two triremes, his own and another; he himself had great difficulty in escaping.[255]

Athens was all in consternation at the news of the defeat of Konon and the blockade of Mitylênê. The whole strength and energy of the city was put forth to relieve him, by an effort greater than any which had been made throughout the whole war. We read with surprise that within the short space of thirty days, a fleet of no less than one hundred and ten triremes was fitted out and sent from Peiræus. Every man of age and strength to serve, without distinction, was taken to form a good crew; not only freemen, but slaves, to whom manumission was promised as reward: many also of the horsemen, or knights,[256] and citizens of highest rank, went aboard as epibatæ, hanging up their bridles like Kimon before the battle of Salamis. The levy was in fact as democratical and as equalizing as it had been on that memorable occasion. The fleet proceeded straight to Samos, whither orders had doubtless been sent to get together all the triremes which the allies could furnish as reinforcements, as well as all the scattered Athenian. By this means, forty additional triremes, ten of them Samian, were assembled, and the whole fleet, one hundred and fifty sail, went from Samos to the little islands called Arginusæ, close on the mainland, opposite to Malea, the southeastern cape of Lesbos.

Kallikratidas, apprized of the approach of the new fleet while it was yet at Samos, withdrew the greater portion of his force from Mitylênê, leaving fifty triremes under Eteonikus to continue the blockade. Less than fifty probably would not have been sufficient, inasmuch as two harbors were to be watched; but he was thus reduced to meet the Athenian fleet with inferior numbers, one hundred and twenty triremes against one hundred and fifty. His fleet was off Cape Malea, where the crews took their suppers, on the same evening as the Athenians supped at the opposite islands of Arginusæ. It was his project to sail across the intermediate channel in the night, and attack them in the morning before they were prepared; but violent wind and rain forced him to defer all movement till daylight. On the ensuing morning, both parties prepared for the greatest naval encounter which had taken place throughout the whole war. Kallikratidas was advised by his pilot, the Megarian Hermon, to retire for the present without fighting, inasmuch as the Athenian fleet had the advantage of thirty triremes over him in number. He replied that flight was disgraceful, and that Sparta would be no worse off, even if he should perish.[257] The answer was one congenial to his chivalrous nature; and we may well conceive, that, having for the last two or three months been lord and master of the sea, he recollected his own haughty message to Konon, and thought it dishonor to incur or deserve, by retiring, the like taunt upon himself. We may remark too that the disparity of numbers, though serious, was by no means such as to render the contest hopeless, or to serve as a legitimate ground for retreat, to one who prided himself on a full measure of Spartan courage.

The Athenian fleet was so marshalled, that its great strength was placed in the two wings; in each of which there were sixty Athenian ships, divided into four equal divisions, each division commanded by a general. Of the four squadrons of fifteen ships each, two were placed in front, two to support them in the rear. Aristokratês and Diomedon commanded the two front squadrons of the left division, Periklês and Erasinidês the two squadrons in the rear: on the right division, Protomachus and Thrasyllus commanded the two in front, Lysias and Aristogenês the two in the rear. The centre, wherein were the Samians and other allies, was left weak, and all in single line: it appears to have been exactly in front of one of the isles of Arginusæ, while the two other divisions were to the right and left of that isle. We read with some surprise that the whole Lacedæmonian fleet was arranged by single ships, because it sailed better and manœuvred better than the Athenians; who formed their right and left divisions in deep order, for the express purpose of hindering the enemy from performing the nautical manœuvres of the diekplus and the periplus.[258] It would seem that the Athenian centre, having the land immediately in its rear, was supposed to be better protected against an enemy "sailing through the line out to the rear, and sailing round about," than the other divisions, which were in the open waters; for which reason it was left weak, with the ships in single line. But the fact which strikes us the most is, that, if we turn back to the beginning of the war, we shall find that this diekplus and periplus were the special manœuvres of the Athenian navy, and continued to be so even down to the siege of Syracuse; the Lacedæmonians being at first absolutely unable to perform them at all, and continuing for a long time to perform them far less skilfully than the Athenians. Now, the comparative value of both parties is reversed: the superiority of nautical skill has passed to the Peloponnesians and their allies: the precautions whereby that superiority is neutralized or evaded, are forced as a necessity on the Athenians. How astonished would the Athenian admiral Phormion have been, if he could have witnessed the fleets and the order of battle at Arginusæ!

Kallikratidas himself, with the ten Lacedæmonian ships, was on the right of his fleet: on the left were the Bœotians and Eubœans, under the Bœotian admiral Thrasondas. The battle was long and obstinately contested, first by the two fleets in their original order; afterwards, when all order was broken, by scattered ships mingled together and contending in individual combat. At length the brave Kallikratidas perished. His ship was in the act of driving against the ship of an enemy, and he himself probably, like Brasidas[259] at Pylos, had planted himself on the forecastle, to be the first in boarding the enemy, or in preventing the enemy from boarding him, when the shock arising from impact threw him off his footing, so that he fell overboard and was drowned.[260] In spite of the discouragement springing from his death, the ten Lacedæmonian triremes displayed a courage worthy of his, and nine of them were destroyed or disabled. At length the Athenians were victorious in all parts: the Peloponnesian fleet gave way, and their flight became general, partly to Chios, partly to Phokæa. More than sixty of their ships were destroyed over and above the nine

Lacedæmonian, seventy-seven in all; making a total loss of above the half of the entire fleet. The loss of the Athenians was also severe, amounting to twenty-five triremes. They returned to Arginusæ after the battle.[261]

The victory of Arginusæ afforded the most striking proof how much the democratical energy of Athens could yet accomplish, in spite of so many years of exhausting war. But far better would it have been, if her energy on this occasion had been less efficacious and successful. The defeat of the Peloponnesian fleet, and the death of their admirable leader,—we must take the second as inseparable from the first, since Kallikratidas was not the man to survive a defeat,—were signal misfortunes to the whole Grecian world; and in an especial manner, misfortunes to Athens herself. If Kallikratidas had gained the victory and survived it, he would certainly have been the man to close the Peloponnesian war; for Mitylênê must immediately have surrendered, and Konon, with all the Athenian fleet there blocked up, must have become his prisoners; which circumstance, coming at the back of a defeat, would have rendered Athens disposed to acquiesce in any tolerable terms of peace. Now to have the terms dictated at a moment when her power was not wholly prostrate, by a man like Kallikratidas, free from corrupt personal ambition and of a generous Pan-Hellenic patriotism, would have been the best fate which at this moment could befall her; while to the Grecian world generally, it would have been an unspeakable benefit, that, in the reorganization which it was sure to undergo at the close of the war, the ascendant individual of the moment should be penetrated with devotion to the great ideas of Hellenic brotherhood at home, and Hellenic independence against the foreigner. The near prospect of such a benefit was opened by that rare chance which threw Kallikratidas into the command, enabled him not only to publish his lofty profession of faith but to show that he was prepared to act upon it, and for a time floated him on towards complete success. Nor were the envious gods ever more envious, than when they frustrated, by the disaster of Arginusæ, the consummation which they had thus seemed to promise. The pertinence of these remarks will be better understood in the next chapter, when I come to recount the actual winding-up of the Peloponnesian war under the auspices of the worthless, but able, Lysander. It was into his hands that the command was retransferred, a transfer almost from the best of Greeks to the worst. We shall then see how much the sufferings of the Grecian world, and of Athens especially, were aggravated by his individual temper and tendencies, and we shall then feel by contrast, how much would have been gained if the commander armed with such great power of dictation had been a Pan-Hellenic patriot. To have the sentiment of that patriotism enforced, at a moment of break-up and rearrangement throughout Greece, by the victorious leader of the day, with single-hearted honesty and resolution, would have been a stimulus to all the better feelings of the Grecian mind, such as no other combination of circumstances could have furnished. The defeat and death of Kallikratidas was thus even more deplorable as a loss to Athens and Greece, than to Sparta herself. To his lofty character and patriotism, even in so short a career, we vainly seek a parallel.

The news of the defeat was speedily conveyed to Eteonikus at Mitylênê by the admiral's signal-boat. As soon as he heard it, he desired the crew of the signal-boat to say nothing to any one, but to go again out of the harbor, and then return with wreaths and shouts of triumph, crying out that Kallikratidas had gained the victory and had destroyed or captured all the Athenian ships. All suspicion of the reality was thus kept from Konon and the besieged, while Eteonikus himself, affecting to believe the news, offered the sacrifice of thanksgiving; but gave orders to all the triremes to take their meal and depart afterwards without losing a moment, directing the masters of the trading-ships also to put their property silently aboard, and get off at the same time. And thus, with little or no delay, and without the least obstruction from Konon, all these ships, triremes and merchantmen, sailed out of the harbor and were carried off in safety to Chios, the wind being fair. Eteonikus at the same time withdrew his land-forces to Methymna, burning his camp. Konon, thus finding himself unexpectedly at liberty, put to sea with his ships when the wind had become calmer, and joined the main Athenian fleet, which he found already on its way from Arginusæ to Mitylênê. The latter presently came to Mitylênê, and from thence passed over to make an attack on Chios; which attack proving unsuccessful, they went forward to their ordinary station at Samos.[262]

The news of the victory at Arginusæ diffused joy and triumph at Athens. All the slaves who had served in the armament were manumitted and promoted, according to promise, to the rights of Platæans at Athens, a qualified species of citizenship. Yet the joy was poisoned by another incident, which became known at the same time, raising sentiments of a totally opposite character, and ending in one of the most gloomy and disgraceful proceedings in all Athenian history.

Not only the bodies of the slain warriors floating about on the water had not been picked up for burial, but the wrecks had not been visited to preserve those who were yet living. The first of these two points, even alone, would have sufficed to excite a painful sentiment of wounded piety at Athens. But the second point, here an essential part of the same omission, inflamed that sentiment into shame, grief, and indignation of the sharpest character.

In the descriptions of this event, Diodorus and many other writers take notice of the first point, either exclusively,[263] or at least with slight reference to the second; which latter, nevertheless, stands as far the gravest in the estimate of every impartial critic, and was also the most violent in its effect upon Athenian feelings. Twenty-five Athenian triremes had been ruined, along with most of their crews; that is, lay heeled over or disabled, with their oars destroyed, no masts, nor any means of moving; mere hulls, partially broken by the impact of an enemy's ship, and gradually filling and sinking. The original crew of each was two hundred men. The field of battle, if we may use that word for a space of sea, was strewed with these wrecks; the men remaining on board being helpless and unable to get away, for the ancient trireme carried no boat, nor any aids for escape. And there were, moreover, floating about,

men who had fallen overboard, or were trying to save their lives by means of accidental spars or empty casks. It was one of the privileges of a naval victory, that the party who gained it could sail over the field of battle, and thus assist their own helpless or wounded comrades aboard the disabled ships,[264] taking captive, or sometimes killing, the corresponding persons belonging to the enemy. According even to the speech made in the Athenian public assembly afterwards, by Euryptolemus, the defender of the accused generals, there were twelve triremes with their crews on board lying in the condition just described. This is an admission by the defence, and therefore the minimum of the reality: there cannot possibly have been fewer, but there were probably several more, out of the whole twenty-five stated by Xenophon.[265] No step being taken to preserve them, the surviving portion, wounded as well as unwounded, of these crews, were left to be gradually drowned as each disabled ship went down. If any of them escaped, it was by unusual goodness of swimming, by finding some fortunate plank or spar, at any rate by the disgrace of throwing away their arms, and by some method such as no wounded man would be competent to employ.

The first letter from the generals which communicated the victory, made known at the same time the loss sustained in obtaining it. It announced, doubtless, the fact which we read in Xenophon, that twenty-five Athenian triremes had been lost, with nearly all their crews; specifying, we may be sure, the name of each trireme which had so perished; for each trireme in the Athenian navy, like modern ships, had its own name.[266] It mentioned, at the same time, that no step whatever had been taken by the victorious survivors to save their wounded and drowning countrymen on board the sinking ships. A storm had arisen, such was the reason assigned, so violent as to render all such intervention totally impracticable.[267]

It is so much the custom, in dealing with Grecian history, to presume the Athenian people to be a set of children or madmen, whose feelings it is not worth while to try and account for, that I have been obliged to state these circumstances somewhat at length, in order to show that the mixed sentiment excited at Athens by the news of the battle of Arginusæ was perfectly natural and justifiable. Along with joy for the victory, there was blended horror and remorse at the fact that so many of the brave men who had helped to gain it had been left to perish unheeded. The friends and relatives of the crews of these lost triremes were of course foremost in the expression of such indignant emotion. The narrative of Xenophon, meagre and confused as well as unfair, presents this emotion as if it were something causeless, factitious, pumped up out of the standing irascibility of the multitude by the artifices of Theramenês, Kallixenus, and a few others. But whatever may have been done by these individuals to aggravate the public excitement, or pervert it to bad purposes, assuredly the excitement itself was spontaneous, inevitable, and amply justified. The very thought that so many of the brave partners in the victory had been left to drown miserably on the sinking hulls, without any effort on the part of their generals

and comrades near to rescue them, was enough to stir up all the sensibilities, public as well as private, of the most passive nature, even in citizens who were not related to the deceased, much more in those who were so. To expect that the Athenians would be so absorbed in the delight of the victory, and in gratitude to the generals who had commanded, as to overlook such a desertion of perishing warriors, and such an omission of sympathetic duty, is, in my judgment, altogether preposterous; and would, if it were true, only establish one more vice in the Athenian people, besides those which they really had, and the many more with which they have been unjustly branded.

The generals, in their public letter, accounted for their omission by saying that the violence of the storm was too great to allow them to move. First, was this true as matter of fact? Next, had there been time to discharge the duty, or at the least to try and discharge it, before the storm came on to be so intolerable? These points required examination. The generals, while honored with a vote of thanks for the victory, were superseded, and directed to come home; all except Konon, who having been blocked up at Mitylênê, was not concerned in the question. Two new colleagues, Philoklês and Adeimantus, were named to go out and join him.[268] The generals probably received the notice of their recall at Samos, and came home in consequence; reaching Athens seemingly about the end of September or beginning of October, the battle of Arginusæ having been fought in August 406 B.C. Two of the generals, however, Protomachus and Aristogenês, declined to come: warned of the displeasure of the people, and not confiding in their own case to meet it, they preferred to pay the price of voluntary exile. The other six, Periklês, Lysias, Diomedon, Erasinidês, Aristokratês, and Thrasyllus,—Archestratus, one of the original ten, having died at Mitylênê,[269]—came without their two colleagues; an unpleasant augury for the result.

On their first arrival, Archedêmus, at that time an acceptable popular orator, and exercising some magistracy or high office which we cannot distinctly make out,[270] imposed upon Erasinidês a fine to that limited amount which was within the competence of magistrates without the sanction of the dikastery, and accused him besides before the dikastery; partly for general misconduct in his command, partly on the specific charge of having purloined some public money on its way from the Hellespont. Erasinidês was found guilty, and condemned to be imprisoned, either until the money was made good, or perhaps until farther examination could take place into the other alleged misdeeds.

This trial of Erasinidês took place before the generals were summoned before the senate to give their formal exposition respecting the recent battle, and the subsequent neglect of the drowning men. And it might almost seem as if Archedêmus wished to impute to Erasinidês exclusively, apart from the other generals, the blame of that neglect; a distinction, as will hereafter appear, not wholly unfounded. If, however, any such design was entertained, it did not succeed. When the generals went

to explain their case before the senate, the decision of that body was decidedly unfavorable to all of them, though we have no particulars of the debate which passed. On the proposition of the senator Timokratês,[271] a resolution was passed that the other five generals present should be placed in custody, as well as Erasinidês, and thus handed over to the public assembly for consideration of the case.[272]

The public assembly was accordingly held, and the generals were brought before it. We are here told who it was that appeared as their principal accuser, along with several others; though unfortunately we are left to guess what were the topics on which they insisted. Theramenês was the man who denounced them most vehemently, as guilty of leaving the crews of the disabled triremes to be drowned, and of neglecting all efforts to rescue them. He appealed to their own public letter to the people, officially communicating the victory; in which letter they made no mention of having appointed any one to undertake the duty, nor of having any one to blame for not performing it. The omission, therefore, was wholly their own: they might have performed it, and ought to be punished for so cruel a breach of duty.

The generals could not have a more formidable enemy than Theramenês. We have had occasion to follow him, during the revolution of the Four Hundred, as a long-sighted as well as tortuous politician: he had since been in high military command, a partaker in victory with Alkibiadês at Kyzikus and elsewhere; and he had served as trierarch in the victory of Arginusæ itself. His authority therefore was naturally high, and told for much, when he denied the justification which the generals had set up founded on the severity of the storm. According to him, they might have picked up the drowning men, and ought to have done so: either they might have done so before the storm came on, or there never was any storm of sufficient gravity to prevent them: upon their heads lay the responsibility of omission.[273] Xenophon, in his very meagre narrative, does not tell us, in express words, that Theramenês contradicted the generals as to the storm. But that he did so contradict them, point blank, is implied distinctly in that which Xenophon alleges him to have said. It seems also that Thrasybulus—another trierarch at Arginusæ, and a man not only of equal consequence, but of far more estimable character—concurred with Theramenês in this same accusation of the generals,[274] though not standing forward so prominently in the case. He too therefore must have denied the reality of the storm; or at least, the fact of its being so instant after the battle, or so terrible as to forbid all effort for the relief of these drowning seamen.

The case of the generals, as it stood before the Athenian public, was completely altered when men like Theramenês and Thrasybulus stood forward as their accusers. Doubtless what was said by these two had been said by others before, in the senate and elsewhere; but it was now publicly advanced by men of influence, as well as perfectly cognizant of the fact. And we are thus enabled to gather indirectly, what the narrative of Xenophon, studiously keeping back the case against the generals, does not directly bring forward, that though the generals affirmed the storm, there were

others present who denied it, thus putting in controversy the matter of fact which formed their solitary justification. Moreover, we come—in following the answer made by the generals in the public assembly to Theramenês and Thrasybulus—to a new point in the case, which Xenophon lets out as it were indirectly, in that confused manner which pervades his whole narrative of the transaction. It is, however, a new point of extreme moment. The generals replied that if any one was to blame for not having picked up the drowning men, it was Theramenês and Thrasybulus themselves; for it was they two to whom, together with various other trierarchs and with forty-eight triremes, the generals had expressly confided the performance of this duty; it was they two who were responsible for its omission, not the generals. Nevertheless they, the generals, made no charge against Theramenês and Thrasybulus, well knowing that the storm had rendered the performance of the duty absolutely impossible, and that it was therefore a complete justification for one as well as for the other. They, the generals, at least could do no more than direct competent men like these two trierarchs to perform the task, and assign to them an adequate squadron for the purpose; while they themselves with the main fleet went to attack Eteonikus, and relieve Mitylênê. Diomedon, one of their number, had wished after the battle to employ all the ships in the fleet for the preservation of the drowning men, without thinking of anything else until that was done. Erasinidês, on the contrary, wished that all the fleet should move across at once against Mitylênê; Thrasyllus said that they had ships enough to do both at once. Accordingly, it was agreed that each general should set apart three ships from his division, to make a squadron of forty-eight ships under Thrasybulus and Theramenês. In making these statements, the generals produced pilots and others, men actually in the battle as witnesses in general confirmation.

Here, then, in this debate before the assembly, were two new and important points publicly raised. First, Theramenês and Thrasybulus denounced the generals as guilty of the death of these neglected men; next, the generals affirmed that they had delegated the duty to Theramenês and Thrasybulus themselves. If this latter were really true, how came the generals, in their official despatch first sent home, to say nothing about it? Euryptolemus, an advocate of the generals, speaking in a subsequent stage of the proceedings, though we can hardly doubt that the same topics were also urged in this very assembly, while blaming the generals for such omission, ascribed it to an ill-placed good-nature on their part, and reluctance to bring Theramenês and Thrasybulus under the displeasure of the people. Most of the generals, he said, were disposed to mention the fact in their official despatch, but were dissuaded from doing so by Periklês and Diomedon; an unhappy dissuasion, in his judgment, which Theramenês and Thrasybulus had ungratefully requited by turning round and accusing them all.[275]

This remarkable statement of Euryptolemus, as to the intention of the generals in wording the official despatch, brings us to a closer consideration of what really

passed between them on the one side, and Theramenês and Thrasybulus on the other; which is difficult to make out clearly, but which Diodorus represents in a manner completely different from Xenophon. Diodorus states that the generals were prevented partly by the storm, partly by the fatigue and reluctance and alarm of their own seamen, from taking any steps to pick up, what he calls, the dead bodies for burial; that they suspected Theramenês and Thrasybulus, who went to Athens before them, of intending to accuse them before the people, and that for this reason they sent home intimation to the people that they had given special orders to these two trierarchs to perform the duty. When these letters were read in the public assembly, Diodorus says, the Athenians were excessively indignant against Theramenês; who, however, defended himself effectively and completely, throwing the blame back upon the generals. He was thus forced, against his own will, and in self-defence, to become the accuser of the generals, carrying with him his numerous friends and partisans at Athens. And thus the generals, by trying to ruin Theramenês, finally brought condemnation upon themselves.[276]

Such is the narrative of Diodorus, in which it is implied that the generals never really gave any special orders to Theramenês and Thrasybulus, but falsely asserted afterwards that they had done so, in order to discredit the accusation of Theramenês against themselves. To a certain extent, this coincides with what was asserted by Theramenês himself, two years afterwards, in his defence before the Thirty, that he was not the first to accuse the generals; they were the first to accuse him; affirming that they had ordered him to undertake the duty, and that there was no sufficient reason to hinder him from performing it; they were the persons who distinctly pronounced the performance of the duty to be possible, while he had said, from the beginning, that the violence of the storm was such as even to forbid any movement in the water; much more, to prevent rescue of the drowning men.[277]

Taking the accounts of Xenophon and Diodorus together, in combination with the subsequent accusation and defence of Theramenês at the time of the Thirty, and blending them so as to reject as little as possible of either, I think it probable that the order for picking up the exposed men was really given by the generals to Theramenês, Thrasybulus, and other trierarchs; but that, first, a fatal interval was allowed to elapse between the close of the battle and the giving of such order; next, that the forty-eight triremes talked of for the service, and proposed to be furnished by drafts of three out of each general's division, were probably never assembled; or, if they assembled, were so little zealous in the business as to satisfy themselves very easily that the storm was too dangerous to brave, and that it was now too late. For when we read the version of the transaction, even as given by Euryptolemus, we see plainly that none of the generals, except Diomedon, was eager in the performance of the task. It is a memorable fact, that of all the eight generals, not one of them undertook the business in person, although its purpose was to save more than a thousand drowning comrades from death.[278] In a proceeding where every interval even

of five minutes was precious, they go to work in the most dilatory manner, by determining that each general shall furnish three ships, and no more, from his division. Now we know from the statement of Xenophon, that, towards the close of the battle, the ships on both sides were much dispersed.[279] Such collective direction therefore would not be quickly realized; nor, until all the eight fractions were united, together with the Samians and others, so as to make the force complete, would Theramenês feel bound to go out upon his preserving visitation. He doubtless disliked the service, as we see that most of the generals did; while the crews also, who had just got to land after having gained a victory, were thinking most about rest and refreshment, and mutual congratulations.[280] All were glad to find some excuse for staying in their moorings instead of going out again to buffet what was doubtless unfavorable weather. Partly from this want of zeal, coming in addition to the original delay, partly from the bad weather, the duty remained unexecuted, and the seamen on board the damaged ships were left to perish unassisted.

But presently arose the delicate, yet unavoidable question, "How are we to account for the omission of this sacred duty, in our official despatch to the Athenian people?" Here the generals differed among themselves, as Euryptolemus expressly states: Periklês and Diomedon carried it, against the judgment of their colleagues, that in the official despatch, which was necessarily such as could be agreed to by all, nothing should be said about the delegation to Theramenês and others; the whole omission being referred to the terrors of the storm. But though such was the tenor of the official report, there was nothing to hinder the generals from writing home and communicating individually with their friends in Athens as each might think fit; and in these unofficial communications, from them as well as from others who went home from the armament,—communications not less efficacious than the official despatch, in determining the tone of public feeling at Athens,—they did not disguise their convictions that the blame of not performing the duty belonged to Theramenês. Having thus a man like Theramenês to throw the blame upon, they did not take pains to keep up the story of the intolerable storm, but intimated that there had been nothing to hinder *him* from performing the duty if he had chosen. It is this which he accuses them of having advanced against him, so as to place him as the guilty man before the Athenian public: it was this which made him, in retaliation and self-defence, violent and unscrupulous in denouncing them as the persons really blamable.[281] As they had made light of this alleged storm, in casting the blame upon him, so he again made light of it, and treated it as an insufficient excuse, in his denunciations against them; taking care to make good use of their official despatch, which virtually exonerated him, by its silence, from any concern in the matter.

Such is the way in which I conceive the relations to have stood between the generals on one side and Theramenês on the other, having regard to all that is said both in Xenophon and in Diodorus. But the comparative account of blame and recrimination between these two parties is not the most important feature of the case. The re-

ally serious inquiry is, as to the intensity or instant occurrence of the storm. Was it really so instant and so dangerous, that the duty of visiting the wrecks could not be performed, either before the ships went back to Arginusæ, or afterwards? If we take the circumstances of the case, and apply them to the habits and feelings of the English navy, if we suppose more than one thousand seamen, late comrades in the victory, distributed among twenty damaged and helpless hulls, awaiting the moment when these hulls would fill and consign them all to a watery grave, it must have been a frightful storm indeed, which would force an English admiral even to go back to his moorings leaving these men so exposed, or which would deter him, if he were at his moorings, from sending out the very first and nearest ships at hand to save them. And granting the danger to be such that he hesitated to give the order, there would probably be found officers and men to volunteer, against the most desperate risks, in a cause so profoundly moving all their best sympathies. Now, unfortunately for the character of Athenian generals, officers, and men, at Arginusæ,—for the blame belongs, though in unequal proportions, to all of them,—there exists here strong presumptive proof that the storm on this occasion was not such as would have deterred any Grecian seamen animated by an earnest and courageous sense of duty. We have only to advert to the conduct and escape of Eteonikus and the Peloponnesian fleet from Mitylênê to Chios; recollecting that Mitylênê was separated from the promontory of Kanê on the Asiatic mainland, and from the isles of Arginusæ, by a channel only one hundred and twenty stadia broad,[282] about fourteen English miles. Eteonikus, apprized of the defeat by the Peloponnesian official signal-boat, desired that boat to go out of the harbor, and then to sail into it again with deceptive false news, to the effect that the Peloponnesians had gained a complete victory: he then directed his seamen, after taking their dinners, to depart immediately, and the masters of the merchant vessels silently to put their cargoes aboard, and get to sea also. The whole fleet, triremes and merchant vessels both, thus went out of the harbor of Mitylênê and made straight for Chios, whither they arrived in safety; the merchant vessels carrying their sails, and having what Xenophon calls "a fair wind."[283] Now it is scarcely possible that all this could have taken place, had there blown during this time an intolerable storm between Mitylênê and Arginusæ. If the weather was such as to allow of the safe transit of Eteonikus and all his fleet from Mitylênê to Chios, it was not such as to form a legitimate obstacle capable of deterring any generous Athenian seaman, still less a responsible officer, from saving his comrades exposed on the wrecks near Arginusæ. Least of all was it such as ought to have hindered the attempt to save them, even if such attempt had proved unsuccessful. And here the gravity of the sin consists, in having remained inactive while the brave men on the wrecks were left to be drowned. All this reasoning, too, assumes the fleet to have been already brought back to its moorings at Arginusæ, discussing only how much was practicable to effect after that moment, and leaving untouched the no less important question, why the drowning men were not picked up before the fleet went back.

I have thought it right to go over these considerations, indispensable to the fair appreciation of this memorable event, in order that the reader may understand the feelings of the assembly and the public of Athens, when the generals stood before them, rebutting the accusations of Theramenês and recriminating in their turn against him. The assembly had before them the grave and deplorable fact, that several hundreds of brave seamen had been suffered to drown on the wrecks, without the least effort to rescue them. In explanation of this fact, they had not only no justification, at once undisputed and satisfactory, but not even any straightforward, consistent, and uncontradicted statement of facts. There were discrepancies among the generals themselves, comparing their official with their unofficial, as well as with their present statements, and contradictions between them and Theramenês, each having denied the sufficiency of the storm as a vindication for the neglect imputed to the other. It was impossible that the assembly could be satisfied to acquit the generals on such a presentation of the case; nor could they well know how to apportion the blame between them and Theramenês. The relatives of the men left to perish would be doubtless in a state of violent resentment against one or other of the two, perhaps against both. Under these circumstances, it could hardly have been the sufficiency of their defence,—it must have been rather the apparent generosity of their conduct towards Theramenês, in formally disavowing all charge of neglect against him, though he had advanced a violent charge against them,—which produced the result that we read in Xenophon. The defence of the generals was listened to with favor and seemed likely to prevail with the majority.[284] Many individuals present offered themselves as bail for the generals, in order that the latter might be liberated from custody: but the debate had been so much prolonged—we see from hence that there must have been a great deal of speaking—that it was now dark, so that no vote could be taken, because the show of hands was not distinguishable. It was therefore resolved to adjourn the whole decision until another assembly; but that in the mean time the senate should meet, should consider what would be the proper mode of trying and judging the generals, and should submit a proposition to that effect to the approaching assembly.

It so chanced that immediately after this first assembly, during the interval before the meeting of the senate or the holding of the second assembly, the three days of the solemn annual festival called Apaturia intervened; early days in the month of October. This was the characteristic festival of the Ionic race; handed down from a period anterior to the constitution of Kleisthenês, and to the ten new tribes each containing so many demes, and bringing together the citizens in their primitive unions of family, gens, phratry, etc., the aggregate of which had originally constituted the four Ionic tribes, now superannuated. At the Apaturia, the family ceremonies were gone through; marriages were enrolled, acts of adoption were promulgated and certified, the names of youthful citizens first entered on the gentile and phratric roll; sacrifices were jointly celebrated by these family assemblages to Zeus Phratrius, Athênê, and other deities, accompanied with much festivity and enjoyment. A solemnity like this,

celebrated every year, naturally provoked in each of these little unions, questions of affectionate interest: "Who are those that were with us last year, but are not here now? The absent, where are they? The deceased, where or how did they die?" Now the crews of the twenty-five Athenian triremes, lost at the battle of Arginusæ, at least all those among them who were freemen, had been members of some one of these family unions, and were missed on this occasion. The answer to the above inquiry, in their case, would be one alike melancholy and revolting: "They fought like brave men, and had their full share in the victory: their trireme was broken, disabled, and made a wreck, in the battle: aboard this wreck they were left to perish, while their victorious generals and comrades made not the smallest effort to preserve them." To hear this about fathers, brothers, and friends,—and to hear it in the midst of a sympathizing family circle,—was well calculated to stir up an agony of shame, sorrow, and anger, united; an intolerable sentiment, which required as a satisfaction, and seemed even to impose as a duty, the punishment of those who had left these brave comrades to perish. Many of the gentile unions, in spite of the usually festive and cheerful character of the Apaturia, were so absorbed by this sentiment, that they clothed themselves in black garments and shaved their heads in token of mourning, resolving to present themselves in this guise at the coming assembly, and to appease the manes of their abandoned kinsmen by every possible effort to procure retribution on the generals.[285]

Xenophon in his narrative describes this burst of feeling at the Apaturia as false and factitious, and the men in mourning as a number of hired impostors, got up by the artifices of Theramenês,[286] to destroy the generals. But the case was one in which no artifice was needed. The universal and self-acting stimulants of intense human sympathy stand here so prominently marked, that it is not simply superfluous but even misleading, to look behind for the gold and machinations of a political instigator. Theramenês might do all that he could to turn the public displeasure against the generals, and to prevent it from turning against himself: it is also certain that he did much to annihilate their defence. He may thus have had some influence in directing the sentiment against them, but he could have had little or none in creating it. Nay, it is not too much to say that no factitious agency of this sort could ever have prevailed on the Athenian public to desecrate such a festival as the Apaturia, by all the insignia of mourning. If they did so, it could only have been through some internal emotion alike spontaneous and violent, such as the late event was well calculated to arouse.

Moreover, what can be more improbable than the allegation that a great number of men were hired to personate the fathers or brothers of deceased Athenian citizens, all well known to their really surviving kinsmen? What more improbable, than the story that numbers of men would suffer themselves to be hired, not merely to put on black clothes for the day, which might be taken off in the evening, but also to shave their heads, thus stamping upon themselves an ineffaceable evidence of the

fraud, until the hair had grown again? That a cunning man, like Theramenês, should thus distribute his bribes to a number of persons, all presenting naked heads which testified his guilt, when there were real kinsmen surviving to prove the fact of personation? That having done this, he should never be arraigned or accused for it afterwards,—neither during the prodigious reaction of feeling which took place after the condemnation of the generals, which Xenophon himself so strongly attests, and which fell so heavily upon Kallixenus and others,—nor by his bitter enemy Kritias, under the government of the Thirty? Not only Theramenês is never mentioned as having been afterwards accused, but, for aught that appears, he preserved his political influence and standing, with little if any abatement. This is one forcible reason among many others, for disbelieving the bribes and the all-pervading machinations which Xenophon represents him as having put forth, in order to procure the condemnation of the generals. His speaking in the first public assembly, and his numerous partisans voting in the second, doubtless contributed much to that result, and by his own desire. But to ascribe to his bribes and intrigues the violent and overruling emotion of the Athenian public, is, in my judgment, a supposition alike unnatural and preposterous both with regard to them and with regard to him.

When the senate met, after the Apaturia, to discharge the duty confided to it by the last public assembly, of determining in what manner the generals should be judged, and submitting their opinion for the consideration of the next assembly, the senator Kallixenus—at the instigation of Theramenês, if Xenophon is to be believed—proposed, and the majority of the senate adopted, the following resolution: "The Athenian people having already heard, in the previous assembly, both the accusation and the defence of the generals, shall at once come to a vote on the subject by tribes. For each tribe two urns shall be placed, and the herald of each tribe shall proclaim: All citizens who think the generals guilty, for not having rescued the warriors who had conquered in the battle, shall drop their pebbles into the foremost urn; all who think otherwise, into the hindmost. Should the generals be pronounced guilty, by the result of the voting, they shall be delivered to the Eleven, and punished with death; their property shall be confiscated, the tenth part being set apart for the goddess Athênê."[287] One single vote was to embrace the case of all the eight generals.[288]

The unparalleled burst of mournful and vindictive feeling at the festival of the Apaturia, extending by contagion from the relatives of the deceased to many other citizens,—and the probability thus created that the coming assembly would sanction the most violent measures against the generals,—probably emboldened Kallixenus to propose, and prompted the senate to adopt, this deplorable resolution. As soon as the assembly met, it was read and moved by Kallixenus himself, as coming from the senate in discharge of the commission imposed upon them by the people.

It was heard by a large portion of the assembly with well-merited indignation. Its enormity consisted in breaking through the established constitutional maxims and ju-

dicial practices of the Athenian democracy. It deprived the accused generals of all fair trial; alleging, with a mere faint pretence of truth which was little better than utter falsehood, that their defence as well as their accusation had been heard in the preceding assembly. Now there has been no people, ancient or modern, in whose view the formalities of judicial trial were habitually more sacred and indispensable than in that of the Athenians; formalities including ample notice beforehand to the accused party, with a measured and sufficient space of time for him to make his defence before the dikasts; while those dikasts were men who had been sworn beforehand as a body, yet were selected by lot for each occasion as individuals. From all these securities the generals were now to be debarred; and submitted, for their lives, honors, and fortunes, to a simple vote of the unsworn public assembly, without hearing or defence. Nor was this all. One single vote was to be taken in condemnation or absolution of the eight generals collectively. Now there was a rule in Attic judicial procedure, called the psephism of Kannônus,—originally adopted, we do not know when, on the proposition of a citizen of that name, as a psephism or decree for some particular case, but since generalized into common practice, and grown into great prescriptive reverence,—which peremptorily forbade any such collective trial or sentence, and directed that a separate judicial vote should, in all cases, be taken for or against each accused party. The psephism of Kannônus, together with all the other respected maxims of Athenian criminal justice, was here audaciously trampled under foot.[289]

As soon as the resolution was read in the public assembly, Euryptolemus, an intimate friend of the generals, denounced it as grossly illegal and unconstitutional, presenting a notice of indictment against Kallixenus, under the Graphê Paranomôn, for having proposed a resolution of that tenor. Several other citizens supported the notice of indictment, which, according to the received practice of Athens, would arrest the farther progress of the measure until the trial of its proposer had been consummated. Nor was there ever any proposition made at Athens, to which the Graphê Paranomôn more closely and righteously applied.

But the numerous partisans of Kallixenus—especially the men who stood by in habits of mourning, with shaven heads, agitated with sad recollections and thirst of vengeance—were in no temper to respect this constitutional impediment to the discussion of what had already been passed by the senate. They loudly clamored, that "it was intolerable to see a small knot of citizens thus hindering the assembled people from doing what they chose:" and one of their number, Lykiskus, even went so far as to threaten that those who tendered the indictment against Kallixenus should be judged by the same vote along with the generals, if they would not let the assembly proceed to consider and determine on the motion just read.[290] The excited disposition of the large party thus congregated, farther inflamed by this menace of Lykiskus, was wound up to its highest pitch by various other speakers; especially by one, who stood forward and said: "Athenians! I was myself a wrecked man in the

battle; I escaped only by getting upon an empty meal-tub; but my comrades, perishing on the wrecks near me, implored me, if I should myself be saved, to make known to the Athenian people, that their generals had abandoned to death warriors who had bravely conquered in behalf of their country." Even in the most tranquil state of the public mind, such a communication of the last words of these drowning men, reported by an ear-witness, would have been heard with emotion; but under the actual predisposing excitement, it went to the inmost depth of the hearers' souls, and marked the generals as doomed men.[291] Doubtless there were other similar statements, not expressly mentioned to us, bringing to view the same fact in other ways, and all contributing to aggravate the violence of the public manifestations; which at length reached such a point, that Euryptolemus was forced to withdraw his notice of indictment against Kallixenus.

Now, however, a new form of resistance sprung up, still preventing the proposition from being taken into consideration by the assembly. Some of the prytanes,—or senators of the presiding tribe, on that occasion the tribe Antiochis,—the legal presidents of the assembly, refused to entertain or put the question; which, being illegal and unconstitutional, not only inspired them with aversion, but also rendered them personally open to penalties. Kallixenus employed against them the same menaces which Lykiskus had uttered against Euryptolemus: he threatened, amidst encouraging clamor from many persons in the assembly, to include them in the same accusation with the generals. So intimidated were the prytanes by the incensed manifestations of the assembly, that all of them, except one, relinquished their opposition, and agreed to put the question. The single obstinate prytanis, whose refusal no menace could subdue, was a man whose name we read with peculiar interest, and in whom an impregnable adherence to law and duty was only one among many other titles to reverence. It was the philosopher Sokratês; on this trying occasion, once throughout a life of seventy years, discharging a political office, among the fifty senators taken by lot from the tribe Antiochis. Sokratês could not be induced to withdraw his protest, so that the question was ultimately put by the remaining prytanes without his concurrence.[292] It should be observed that his resistance did not imply any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the generals, but applied simply to the illegal and unconstitutional proposition now submitted for determining their fate; a proposition, which he must already have opposed once before, in his capacity of member of the senate.

The constitutional impediments having been thus violently overthrown, the question was regularly put by the prytanes to the assembly. At once the clamorous outcry ceased, and those who had raised it resumed their behavior of Athenian citizens, patient hearers of speeches and opinions directly opposed to their own. Nothing is more deserving of notice than this change of demeanor. The champions of the men drowned on the wrecks had resolved to employ as much force as was required to eliminate those preliminary constitutional objections, in themselves indisputable,

which precluded the discussion. But so soon as the discussion was once begun, they were careful not to give to the resolution the appearance of being carried by force. Euryptolemus, the personal friend of the generals, was allowed not only to move an amendment negativing the proposition of Kallixenus, but also to develop it in a long speech, which Xenophon sets before us.[293]

His speech is one of great skill and judgment in reference to the case before him and to the temper of the assembly. Beginning with a gentle censure on his friends, the generals Periklês and Diomedon, for having prevailed on their colleagues to abstain from mentioning, in their first official letter, the orders given to Theramenês, he represented them as now in danger of becoming victims to the base conspiracy of the latter, and threw himself upon the justice of the people to grant them a fair trial. He besought the people to take full time to instruct themselves before they pronounced so solemn and irrevocable a sentence; to trust only to their own judgment, but at the same time to take security that judgment should be pronounced after full information and impartial hearing, and thus to escape that bitter and unavailing remorse which would otherwise surely follow. He proposed that the generals should be tried each separately, according to the psephism of Kannônus, with proper notice, and ample time allowed for the defence as well as for the accusation; but that, if found guilty, they should suffer the heaviest and most disgraceful penalties, his own relation Periklês the first. This was the only way of striking the guilty, of saving the innocent, and of preserving Athens from the ingratitude and impiety of condemning to death, without trial as well as contrary to law, generals who had just rendered to her so important a service. And what could the people be afraid of? Did they fear lest the power of trial should slip out of their hands, that they were so impatient to leap over all the delays prescribed by the law?[294] To the worst of public traitors, Aristarchus, they had granted a day with full notice for trial, with all the legal means for making his defence: and would they now show such flagrant contrariety of measure to victorious and faithful officers? "Be not *ye* (he said) the men to act thus, Athenians. The laws are your own work; it is through them that ye chiefly hold your greatness: cherish them, and attempt not any proceeding without their sanction."[295]

Euryptolemus then shortly recapitulated the proceedings after the battle, with the violence of the storm which had prevented approach to the wrecks; adding that one of the generals, now in peril, had himself been on board a broken ship, and had only escaped by a fortunate accident.[296] Gaining courage from his own harangue, he concluded by reminding the Athenians of the brilliancy of the victory, and by telling them that they ought in justice to wreath the brows of the conquerors, instead of following those wicked advisers who pressed for their execution.[297]

It is no small proof of the force of established habits of public discussion, that the men in mourning and with shaven heads, who had been a few minutes before in a state of furious excitement, should patiently hear out a speech so effective and so

conflicting with their strongest sentiments as this of Euryptolemus. Perhaps others may have spoken also; but Xenophon does not mention them. It is remarkable that he does not name Theramenês as taking any part in this last debate.

The substantive amendment proposed by Euryptolemus was that the generals should be tried each separately, according to the psephism of Kannônus; implying notice to be given to each, of the day of trial, and full time for each to defend himself. This proposition, as well as that of the senate moved by Kallixenus, was submitted to the vote of the assembly; hands being separately held up, first for one, next for the other. The prytanes pronounced the amendment of Euryptolemus to be carried. But a citizen named Meneklês impeached their decision as wrong or invalid, alleging seemingly some informality or trick in putting the question, or perhaps erroneous report of the comparative show of hands. We must recollect that in this case the prytanes were declared partisans. Feeling that they were doing wrong in suffering so illegal a proposition as that of Kallixenus to be put at all, and that the adoption of it would be a great public mischief, they would hardly scruple to try and defeat it even by some unfair manœuvre. But the exception taken by Meneklês constrained them to put the question over again, and they were then obliged to pronounce that the majority was in favor of the proposition of Kallixenus.[298]

That proposition was shortly afterwards carried into effect by disposing the two urns for each tribe, and collecting the votes of the citizens individually. The condemnatory vote prevailed, and all the eight generals were thus found guilty; whether by a large or a small majority we should have been glad to learn, but are not told. The majority was composed mostly of those who acted under a feeling of genuine resentment against the generals, but in part also of the friends and partisans of Theramenês,[299] not inconsiderable in number. The six generals then at Athens,—Periklês (son of the great statesman of that name by Aspasia), Diomedon, Erasinidês, Thrasyllus, Lysias, and Aristokratês,—were then delivered to the Eleven, and perished by the usual draught of hemlock; their property being confiscated, as the decree of the senate prescribed.

Respecting the condemnation of these unfortunate men, pronounced without any of the recognized tutelary preliminaries for accused persons, there can be only one opinion. It was an act of violent injustice and illegality, deeply dishonoring the men who passed it, and the Athenian character generally. In either case, whether the generals were guilty or innocent, this censure is deserved, for judicial precautions are not less essential in dealing with the guilty than with the innocent. But it is deserved in an aggravated form, when we consider that the men against whom such injustice was perpetrated, had just come from achieving a glorious victory. Against the democratical constitution of Athens, it furnishes no ground for censure, nor against the habits and feelings which that constitution tended to implant in the individual citizen. Both the one and the other strenuously forbade the deed; nor could the Athenians ever have so dishonored themselves, if they had not, under a momentary ferocious

excitement, risen in insurrection not less against the forms of their own democracy, than against the most sacred restraints of their habitual constitutional morality.

If we wanted proof of this, the facts of the immediate future would abundantly supply it. After a short time had elapsed, every man in Athens became heartily ashamed of the deed.[300] A vote of the public assembly was passed,[301] decreeing that those who had misguided the people on this occasion ought to be brought to judicial trial, that Kallixenus with four others should be among the number, and that bail should be taken for their appearance. This was accordingly done, and the parties were kept under custody of the sureties themselves, who were responsible for their appearance on the day of trial. But presently both foreign misfortunes and internal sedition began to press too heavily on Athens to leave any room for other thoughts, as we shall see in the next chapter. Kallixenus and his accomplices found means to escape before the day of trial arrived, and remained in exile until after the dominion of the Thirty and the restoration of the democracy. Kallixenus then returned under the general amnesty. But the general amnesty protected him only against legal pursuit, not against the hostile memory of the people. "Detested by all, he died of hunger," says Xenophon;[302] a memorable proof how much the condemnation of these six generals shocked the standing democratical sentiment at Athens.

From what cause did this temporary burst of wrong arise, so foreign to the habitual character of the people? Even under the strongest political provocation, and towards the most hated traitors,—as Euryptolemus himself remarked, by citing the case of Aristarchus,—after the Four Hundred as well as after the Thirty, the Athenians never committed the like wrong, never deprived an accused party of the customary judicial securities. How then came they to do it here, where the generals condemned were not only not traitors, but had just signalized themselves by a victorious combat? No Theramenês could have brought about this phenomenon; no deep-laid oligarchical plot is, in my judgment, to be called in as an explanation.[303] The true explanation is different, and of serious moment to state. Political hatred, intense as it might be, was never dissociated, in the mind of a citizen of Athens, from the democratical forms of procedure: but the men, who stood out here as actors, had broken loose from the obligations of citizenship and commonwealth, and surrendered themselves, heart and soul, to the family sympathies and antipathies; feelings first kindled, and justly kindled, by the thought that their friends and relatives had been left to perish unheeded on the wrecks; next, inflamed into preternatural and overwhelming violence by the festival of the Apaturia, where all the religious traditions connected with the ancient family tie, all those associations which imposed upon the relatives of a murdered man the duty of pursuing the murderer, were expanded into detail and worked up by their appropriate renovating solemnity. The garb of mourning and the shaving of the head—phenomena unknown at Athens, either in a political assembly or in a religious festival—were symbols of temporary transformation in the internal man. He could think of nothing but his drowning relatives, together with the

generals as having abandoned them to death, and his own duty as survivor to insure to them vengeance and satisfaction for such abandonment. Under this self-justifying impulse, the shortest and surest proceeding appeared the best, whatever amount of political wrong it might entail:[304] nay, in this case it appeared the only proceeding really sure, since the interposition of the proper judicial delays, coupled with severance of trial on successive days, according to the psephism of Kannônus, would probably have saved the lives of five out of the six generals, if not of all the six. When we reflect that such absorbing sentiment was common, at one and the same time, to a large proportion of the Athenians, we shall see the explanation of that misguided vote, both of the senate and of the ekklesia, which sent the six generals to an illegal ballot, and of the subsequent ballot which condemned them. Such is the natural behavior of those who, having for the moment forgotten their sense of political commonwealth, become degraded into exclusive family men. The family affections, productive as they are of so large an amount of gentle sympathy and mutual happiness in the interior circle, are also liable to generate disregard, malice, sometimes even ferocious vengeance, towards others. Powerful towards good generally, they are not less powerful occasionally towards evil; and require, not less than the selfish propensities, constant subordinating control from that moral reason which contemplates for its end the security and happiness of all. And when a man, either from low civilization, has never known this large moral reason,—or when from some accidental stimulus, righteous in the origin, but wrought up into fanaticism by the conspiring force of religious as well as family sympathies, he comes to place his pride and virtue in discarding its supremacy,—there is scarcely any amount of evil or injustice which he may not be led to perpetrate, by a blind obedience to the narrow instincts of relationship. "Ces pères de famille sont capables de tout," was the satirical remark of Talleyrand upon the gross public jobbing so largely practised by those who sought place or promotion for their sons. The same words understood in a far more awful sense, and generalized for other cases of relationship, sum up the moral of this melancholy proceeding at Athens.

Lastly, it must never be forgotten that the generals themselves were also largely responsible in the case. Through the unjustifiable fury of the movement against them, they perished like innocent men, without trial, "*inauditi et indefensi, tamquam innocentes, perierunt*;" but it does not follow that they were really innocent. I feel persuaded that neither with an English, nor French, nor American fleet, could such events have taken place as those which followed the victory of Arginusæ. Neither admiral nor seamen, after gaining a victory and driving off the enemy, could have endured the thoughts of going back to their anchorage, leaving their own disabled wrecks unmanageable on the waters, with many living comrades aboard, helpless, and depending upon extraneous succor for all their chance of escape. That the generals at Arginusæ did this, stands confessed by their own advocate Euryptolemus, [305] though they must have known well the condition of disabled ships after a naval combat, and some ships even of the victorious fleet were sure to be disabled. If

these generals, after their victory, instead of sailing back to land, had employed themselves first of all in visiting the crippled ships, there would have been ample time to perform this duty, and to save all the living men aboard, before the storm came on. This is the natural inference, even upon their own showing; this is what any English, French, or American naval commander would have thought it an imperative duty to do. What degree of blame is imputable to Theramenês, and how far the generals were discharged by shifting the responsibility to him, is a point which we cannot now determine. But the storm, which is appealed to as a justification of both, rests upon evidence too questionable to serve that purpose, where the neglect of duty was so serious, and cost the lives probably of more than one thousand brave men. At least, the Athenian people at home, when they heard the criminations and recriminations between the generals on one side and Theramenês on the other,—each of them in his character of accuser implying that the storm was no valid obstacle, though each, if pushed for a defence, fell back upon it as a resource in case of need,—the Athenian people could not but look upon the storm more as an afterthought to excuse previous omissions, than as a terrible reality nullifying all the ardor and resolution of men bent on doing their duty. It was in this way that the intervention of Theramenês chiefly contributed to the destruction of the generals, not by those manœuvres ascribed to him in Xenophon: he destroyed all belief in the storm as a real and all-covering hindrance. The general impression of the public at Athens —in my opinion, a natural and unavoidable impression—was, that there had been most culpable negligence in regard to the wrecks, through which negligence alone the seamen on board perished. This negligence dishonors, more or less, the armament at Arginusæ as well as the generals: but the generals were the persons responsible to the public at home, who felt for the fate of the deserted seamen more justly as well as more generously than their comrades in the fleet.

In spite, therefore, of the guilty proceeding to which a furious exaggeration of this sentiment drove the Athenians,—in spite of the sympathy which this has naturally and justly procured for the condemned generals,—the verdict of impartial history will pronounce that the sentiment itself was well founded, and that the generals deserved censure and disgrace. The Athenian people might with justice proclaim to them: "Whatever be the grandeur of your victory, we can neither rejoice in it ourselves, nor allow you to reap honor from it, if we find that you have left many hundreds of those who helped in gaining it to be drowned on board the wrecks without making any effort to save them, when such effort might well have proved successful."

CHAPTER LXV.

FROM THE BATTLE OF ARGINUSÆ TO THE RESTORATION OF THE DEMOCRACY AT ATHENS, AFTER THE EXPULSION OF THE THIRTY.

The victory of Arginusæ gave for the time decisive mastery of the Asiatic seas to the Athenian fleet; and is even said to have so discouraged the Lacedæmonians, as to induce them to send propositions of peace to Athens. But this statement[306] is open to much doubt, and I think it most probable that no such propositions were made. Great as the victory was, we look in vain for any positive results accruing to Athens. After an unsuccessful attempt on Chios, the victorious fleet went to Samos, where it seems to have remained until the following year, without any farther movements than were necessary for the purpose of procuring money.

Meanwhile Eteonikus, who collected the remains of the defeated Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, being left unsupplied with money by Cyrus, found himself much straitened, and was compelled to leave the seamen unpaid. During the later summer and autumn, these men maintained themselves by laboring for hire on the Chian lands; but when winter came, this resource ceased, so that they found themselves unable to procure even clothes or shoes. In such forlorn condition, many of them entered into a conspiracy to assail and plunder the town of Chios; a day was named for the enterprise, and it was agreed that the conspirators should know each other by wearing a straw, or reed. Informed of the design, Eteonikus was at the same time intimidated by the number of these straw-bearers; he saw that if he dealt with the conspirators openly and ostensibly, they might perhaps rush to arms and succeed in plundering the town; at any rate, a conflict would arise in which many of the allies would be slain, which would produce the worst effect upon all future operations. Accordingly, resorting to stratagem, he took with him a guard of fifteen men armed with daggers, and marched through the town of Chios. Meeting presently one of these straw-bearers,—a man with a complaint in his eyes, coming out of a surgeon's house,—he directed his guards to put the man to death on the spot. A crowd gathered round, with astonishment as well as sympathy, and inquired on what ground the man was put to death; upon which Eteonikus ordered his guards to reply, that it was because he wore a straw. The news became diffused, and immediately the remaining persons who wore straws became so alarmed as to throw their straws away. [307]

Eteonikus availed himself of the alarm to demand money from the Chians, as a condition of carrying away this starving and perilous armament. Having obtained from them a month's pay, he immediately put the troops on shipboard, taking pains to encourage them, and make them fancy that he was unacquainted with the recent conspiracy.

The Chians and the other allies of Sparta presently assembled at Ephesus to consult, and resolved, in conjunction with Cyrus, to despatch envoys to the ephors, requesting that Lysander might be sent out a second time as admiral. It was not the habit of Sparta ever to send out the same man as admiral a second time, after his year of service. Nevertheless, the ephors complied with the request substantially, sending out Arakus as admiral, but Lysander along with him, under the title of secretary, invested with all the real powers of command.

Lysander, having reached Ephesus about the beginning of B.C. 405, immediately applied himself with vigor to renovate both Lacedæmonian power and his own influence. The partisans in the various allied cities, whose favor he had assiduously cultivated during his last year's command, the clubs and factious combinations, which he had organized and stimulated into a partnership of mutual ambition, all hailed his return with exultation. Discountenanced and kept down by the generous patriotism of his predecessor Kallikratidas, they now sprang into renewed activity, and became zealous in aiding Lysander to refit and augment his fleet. Nor was Cyrus less hearty in his preference than before. On arriving at Ephesus, Lysander went speedily to visit him at Sardis, and solicited a renewal of the pecuniary aid. The young prince said in reply that all the funds which he had received from Susa had already been expended, with much more besides; in testimony of which he exhibited a specification of the sums furnished to each Peloponnesian officer. Nevertheless, such was his partiality for Lysander, that he complied even with the additional demand now made, so as to send him away satisfied. The latter was thus enabled to return to Ephesus in a state for restoring the effective condition of his fleet. He made good at once all the arrears of pay due to the seamen, constituted new trierarchs, summoned Eteonikus with the fleet from Chios, together with all the other scattered squadrons, and directed that fresh triremes should be immediately put on the stocks at Antandrus.[308]

In none of the Asiatic towns was the effect of Lysander's second advent felt more violently than at Milêtus. He had there a powerful faction or association of friends, who had done their best to hamper and annoy Kallikratidas on his first arrival, but had been put to silence, and even forced to make a show of zeal, by the straightforward resolution of that noble-minded admiral. Eager to reimburse themselves for this humiliation, they now formed a conspiracy, with the privity and concurrence of Lysander, to seize the government for themselves. They determined, if Plutarch and Diodorus are to be credited, to put down the existing democracy, and establish an oligarchy in its place. But we cannot believe that there could have existed a democracy at Milêtus, which had now been for five years in dependence upon Sparta and the Persians jointly. We must rather understand the movement as a conflict between two oligarchical parties; the friends of Lysander being more thoroughly self-seeking and anti-popular than their opponents, and perhaps even crying them down, by comparison, as a democracy. Lysander lent himself to the scheme, fanned the ambition of the conspirators, who were at one time disposed to a compromise, and even be-

trayed the government into a false security, by promises of support which he never intended to fulfil. At the festival of the Dionysia, the conspirators, rising in arms, seized forty of their chief opponents in their houses, and three hundred more in the market-place; while the government—confiding in the promises of Lysander, who affected to reprove, but secretly continued instigating the insurgents—made but a faint resistance. The three hundred and forty leaders thus seized, probably men who had gone heartily along with Kallikratidas, were all put to death; and a still larger number of citizens, not less than one thousand, fled into exile. Milêtus thus passed completely into the hands of the friends and partisans of Lysander.[309]

It would appear that factious movements in other towns, less revolting in respect of bloodshed and perfidy, yet still of similar character to that of Milêtus, marked the reappearance of Lysander in Asia; placing the towns more and more in the hands of his partisans. While thus acquiring greater ascendency among the allies, Lysander received a summons from Cyrus to visit him at Sardis. The young prince had just been sent for to come and visit his father Darius, who was both old and dangerously ill, in Media. About to depart for this purpose, he carried his confidence in Lysander so far as to delegate to him the management of his satrapy and his entire revenues. Besides his admiration for the superior energy and capacity of the Greek character, with which he had only recently contracted acquaintance; and besides his esteem for the personal disinterestedness of Lysander, attested as it had been by the conduct of the latter in the first visit and banquet at Sardis; Cyrus was probably induced to this step by the fear of raising up to himself a rival, if he trusted the like power to any Persian grandee. At the same time that he handed over all his tributes and his reserved funds to Lysander, he assured him of his steady friendship both towards himself and towards the Lacedæmonians; and concluded by entreating that he would by no means engage in any general action with the Athenians, unless at great advantage in point of numbers. The defeat of Arginusæ having strengthened his preference for this dilatory policy, he promised that not only the Persian treasures, but also the Phenician fleet, should be brought into active employment for the purpose of crushing Athens.[310]

Thus armed with an unprecedented command of Persian treasure, and seconded by ascendent factions in all the allied cities, Lysander was more powerful than any Lacedæmonian commander had ever been since the commencement of the war. Having his fleet well paid, he could keep it united, and direct it whither he chose, without the necessity of dispersing it in roving squadrons for the purpose of levying money. It is probably from a corresponding necessity that we are to explain the inaction of the Athenian fleet at Samos; for we hear of no serious operations undertaken by it, during the whole year following the victory of Arginusæ, although under the command of an able and energetic man, Konon, together with Philoklês and Adeimantus; to whom were added, during the spring of 405 B.C., three other generals, Tydeus, Menander, and Kephisodotus. It appears that Theramenês also was put

up and elected one of the generals, but rejected when submitted to the confirmatory examination called the dokimasy.[311] The fleet comprised one hundred and eighty triremes, rather a greater number than that of Lysander; to whom they in vain offered battle near his station at Ephesus. Finding him not disposed to a general action, they seem to have dispersed to plunder Chios, and various portions of the Asiatic coast; while Lysander, keeping his fleet together, first sailed southward from Ephesus, stormed and plundered a semi-Hellenic town in the Kerameikan gulf, named Kedreiæ, which was in alliance with Athens, and thence proceeded to Rhodes.[312] He was even bold enough to make an excursion across the Ægean to the coast of Ægina and Attica, where he had an interview with Agis, who came from Dekeleia to the sea-coast.[313] The Athenians were prepared to follow him thither when they learned that he had recrossed the Ægean, and he soon afterwards appeared with all his fleet at the Hellespont, which important pass they had left unguarded. Lysander went straight to Abydos, still the great Peloponnesian station in the strait, occupied by Thorax as harmost with a land force; and immediately proceeded to attack, both by sea and land, the neighboring town of Lampsakus, which was taken by storm. It was wealthy in every way, and abundantly stocked with bread and wine, so that the soldiers obtained a large booty; but Lysander left the free inhabitants untouched.[314]

The Athenian fleet seems to have been employed in plundering Chios, when it received news that the Lacedæmonian commander was at the Hellespont engaged in the siege of Lampsakus. Either from the want of money, or from other causes which we do not understand, Konon and his colleagues were partly inactive, partly behindhand with Lysander, throughout all this summer. They now followed him to the Hellespont, sailing out on the sea-side of Chios and Lesbos, away from the Asiatic coast, which was all unfriendly to them. They reached Elæus, at the southern extremity of the Chersonese, with their powerful fleet of one hundred and eighty triremes, just in time to hear, while at their morning meal, that Lysander was already master of Lampsakus; upon which they immediately proceeded up the strait to Sestos, and from thence, after stopping only to collect a few provisions, still farther up, to a place called Ægospotami.[315]

Ægospotami, or Goat's River—a name of fatal sound to all subsequent Athenians—was a place which had nothing to recommend it except that it was directly opposite to Lampsakus, separated by a breadth of strait about one mile and three-quarters. But it was an open beach, without harbor, without good anchorage, without either houses or inhabitants or supplies; so that everything necessary for this large army had to be fetched from Sestos, about one mile and three-quarters distant even by land, and yet more distant by sea, since it was necessary to round a headland. Such a station was highly inconvenient and dangerous to an ancient naval armament, without any organized commissariat; since the seamen, being compelled to go to a distance from their ships in order to get their meals, were not easily reassembled. Yet this was the station chosen by the Athenian generals, with the full design of

compelling Lysander to fight a battle. But the Lacedæmonian admiral, who was at Lampsakus, in a good harbor, with a well-furnished town in his rear, and a land-force to coöperate, had no intention of accepting the challenge of his enemies at the moment which suited their convenience. When the Athenians sailed across the strait the next morning, they found all his ships fully manned,—the men having already taken their morning meal,—and ranged in perfect order of battle, with the land-force disposed ashore to lend assistance; but with strict orders to await attack and not to move forward. Not daring to attack him in such a position, yet unable to draw him out by manœuvring all the day, the Athenians were at length obliged to go back to Ægospotami. But Lysander directed a few swift-sailing vessels to follow them, nor would he suffer his own men to disembark until he thus ascertained that their seamen had actually dispersed ashore.[316]

For four successive days this same scene was repeated; the Athenians becoming each day more confident in their own superior strength, and more full of contempt for the apparent cowardice of the enemy. It was in vain that Alkibiadês—who from his own private forts in the Chersonese witnessed what was passing—rode up to the station and remonstrated with the generals on the exposed condition of the fleet on this open shore; urgently advising them to move round to Sestos, where they would be both close to their own supplies and safe from attack, as Lysander was at Lampsakus, and from whence they could go forth to fight whenever they chose. But the Athenian generals, especially Tydeus and Menander, disregarded his advice, and even dismissed him with the insulting taunt, that they were now in command, not he.[317] Continuing thus in their exposed position, the Athenian seamen on each successive day became more and more careless of their enemy, and rash in dispersing the moment they returned back to their own shore. At length, on the fifth day, Lysander ordered the scout-ships, which he sent forth to watch the Athenians on their return, to hoist a bright shield as a signal, as soon as they should see the ships at their anchorage and the crews ashore in quest of their meal. The moment he beheld this welcome signal, he gave orders to his entire fleet to row across as swiftly as possible from Lampsakus to Ægospotami, while Thorax marched along the strand with the land-force in case of need. Nothing could be more complete or decisive than the surprise of the Athenian fleet. All the triremes were caught at their moorings ashore, some entirely deserted, others with one or at most two of the three tiers of rowers which formed their complement. Out of all the total of one hundred and eighty, only twelve were found in tolerable order and preparation;[318] the trireme of Konon himself, together with a squadron of seven under his immediate orders, and the consecrated ship called paralus, always manned by the *élite* of the Athenian seamen, being among them. It was in vain that Konon, on seeing the fleet of Lysander approaching, employed his utmost efforts to get his fleet manned and in some condition for resistance. The attempt was desperate, and the utmost which he could do was to escape himself with the small squadron of twelve, including the paralus. All the remaining triremes, nearly one hundred and seventy in number, were captured by Lysander on

the shore, defenceless, and seemingly without the least attempt on the part of any one to resist. He landed, and made prisoners most of the crews ashore, though some of them fled and found shelter in the neighboring forts. This prodigious and unparalleled victory was obtained, not merely without the loss of a single ship, but almost without that of a single man.[319]

Of the number of prisoners taken by Lysander,—which must have been very great, since the total crews of one hundred and eighty triremes were not less than thirty-six thousand men,[320]—we hear only of three thousand or four thousand native Athenians, though this number cannot represent all the native Athenians in the fleet. The Athenian generals Philoklês and Adeimantus were certainly taken, and seemingly all except Konon. Some of the defeated armament took refuge in Sestos, which, however, surrendered with little resistance to the victor. He admitted them to capitulation, on condition of their going back immediately to Athens, and nowhere else: for he was desirous to multiply as much as possible the numbers assembled in that city, knowing well that the city would be the sooner starved out. Konon too was well aware that, to go back to Athens, after the ruin of the entire fleet, was to become one of the certain prisoners in a doomed city, and to meet, besides, the indignation of his fellow-citizens, so well deserved by the generals collectively. Accordingly, he resolved to take shelter with Evagoras, prince of Salamis in the island of Cyprus, sending the paralus, with some others of the twelve fugitive triremes, to make known the fatal news at Athens. But before he went thither, he crossed the strait—with singular daring, under the circumstances—to Cape Abarnis in the territory of Lampsakus, where the great sails of Lysander's triremes, always taken out when a trireme was made ready for fighting, lay seemingly unguarded. These sails he took away, so as to lessen the enemy's powers of pursuit, and then made the best of his way to Cyprus.[321]

On the very day of the victory, Lysander sent off the Milesian privateer Theopompus to proclaim it at Sparta, who, by a wonderful speed of rowing, arrived there and made it known on the third day after starting. The captured ships were towed off and the prisoners carried across to Lampsakus, where a general assembly of the victorious allies was convened, to determine in what manner the prisoners should be treated. In this assembly, the most bitter inculpations were put forth against the Athenians, as to the manner in which they had recently dealt with their captives. The Athenian general Philoklês, having captured a Corinthian and Andrian trireme, had put the crews to death by hurling them headlong from a precipice. It was not difficult, in Grecian warfare, for each of the belligerents to cite precedents of cruelty against the other; but in this debate, some speakers affirmed that the Athenians had deliberated what they should do with their prisoners, in case they had been victorious at Ægospotami; and that they had determined—chiefly on the motion of Philoklês, but in spite of the opposition of Adeimantus—that they would cut off the right hands of all who were captured. Whatever opinion Philoklês may have expressed

personally, it is highly improbable that any such determination was ever taken by the Athenians.[322] In this assembly of the allies, however, besides all that could be said against Athens with truth, doubtless the most extravagant falsehoods found ready credence. All the Athenian prisoners captured at Ægospotami, three thousand or four thousand in number, were massacred forthwith, Philoklês himself at their head.[323] The latter, taunted by Lysander with his cruel execution of the Corinthian and Andrian crews, disdained to return any answer, but placed himself in conspicuous vestments at the head of the prisoners led out to execution. If we may believe Pausanias, even the bodies of the prisoners were left unburied.

Never was a victory more complete in itself, more overwhelming in its consequences, or more thoroughly disgraceful to the defeated generals, taken collectively, than that of Ægospotami. Whether it was in reality very glorious to Lysander, is doubtful; for it was the general belief afterwards, not merely at Athens, but seemingly in other parts of Greece also, that the Athenian fleet was sold to perdition by the treason of some of its own commanders. Of this suspicion both Konon and Philoklês stand clear. Adeimantus was named as the chief traitor, and Tydeus along with him.[324] Konon even preferred an accusation against Adeimantus to this effect, [325] probably by letter written home from Cyprus, and perhaps by some formal declaration made several years afterwards, when he returned to Athens as victor from the battle of Knidus. The truth of the charge cannot be positively demonstrated, but all the circumstances of the battle tend to render it probable, as well as the fact that Konon alone among all the generals was found in a decent state of preparation. Indeed we may add, that the utter impotence and inertness of the numerous Athenian fleet during the whole summer of 405 B.C. conspire to suggest a similar explanation. Nor could Lysander, master as he was of all the treasures of Cyrus, apply any portion of them more efficaciously than in corrupting the majority of the six Athenian generals, so as to nullify all the energy and ability of Konon.

The great defeat of Ægospotami took place about September 405 B.C. It was made known at Peiræus by the paralus, which arrived there during the night, coming straight from the Hellespont. Such a moment of distress and agony had never been experienced at Athens. The terrible disaster in Sicily had become known to the people by degrees, without any authorized reporter; but here was the official messenger, fresh from the scene, leaving no room to question the magnitude of the disaster or the irreparable ruin impending over the city. The wailing and cries of woe, first beginning in Peiræus, were transmitted by the guards stationed on the Long Walls up to the city. "On that night (says Xenophon) not a man slept; not merely from sorrow for the past calamity, but from terror for the future fate with which they themselves were now menaced, a retribution for what they had themselves inflicted on the Æginetans, Melians, Skionæans, and others." After this night of misery, they met in public assembly on the following day, resolving to make the best preparations they could for a siege, to put the walls in full state of defence, and to block up two out of

the three ports.[326] For Athens thus to renounce her maritime action, the pride and glory of the city ever since the battle of Salamis, and to confine herself to a defensive attitude within her own walls, was a humiliation which left nothing worse to be endured except actual famine and surrender.

Lysander was in no hurry to pass from the Hellespont to Athens. He knew that no farther corn-ships from the Euxine, and few supplies from other quarters, could now reach Athens; and that the power of the city to hold out against blockade must necessarily be very limited; the more limited, the greater the numbers accumulated within it. Accordingly, he permitted the Athenian garrisons which capitulated, to go only to Athens, and nowhere else.[327] His first measure was to make himself master of Chalkêdon and Byzantium, where he placed the Lacedæmonian Sthenelaus as harmost, with a garrison. Next, he passed to Lesbos, where he made similar arrangements at Mitylênê and other cities. In them, as well as in the other cities which now came under his power, he constituted an oligarchy of ten native citizens, chosen from among his most daring and unscrupulous partisans, and called a dekarchy, or dekadarchy, to govern in conjunction with the Lacedæmonian harmost. Eteonikus was sent to the Thracian cities which had been in dependence on Athens, to introduce similar changes. In Thasus, however, this change was stained by much bloodshed: there was a numerous philo-Athenian party whom Lysander caused to be allured out of their place of concealment into the temple of Heraklês, under the false assurance of an amnesty: when assembled under this pledge, they were all put to death.[328] Sanguinary proceedings of the like character, many in the presence of Lysander himself, together with large expulsions of citizens obnoxious to his new dekarchies, signalized everywhere the substitution of Spartan for Athenian ascendency.[329] But nowhere, except at Samos, did the citizens or the philo-Athenian party in the cities continue any open hostility, or resist by force Lysander's entrance and his revolutionary changes. At Samos, they still held out: the people had too much dread of that oligarchy, whom they had expelled in the insurrection of 412 B.C., to yield without a farther struggle.[330] With this single reserve, every city in alliance or dependence upon Athens submitted without resistance both to the supremacy and the subversive measures of the Lacedæmonian admiral.

The Athenian empire was thus annihilated, and Athens left altogether alone. What was hardly less painful, all her kleruchs, or out-citizens, whom she had formerly planted in Ægina, Melos, and elsewhere throughout the islands, as well as in the Chersonese, were now deprived of their properties and driven home.[331] The leading philo-Athenians, too, at Thasus, Byzantium, and other dependent cities,[332] were forced to abandon their homes in the like state of destitution, and to seek shelter at Athens. Everything thus contributed to aggravate the impoverishment, and the manifold suffering, physical as well as moral, within her walls. Notwithstanding the pressure of present calamity, however, and yet worse prospects for the future, the Athenians prepared, as best they could, for an honorable resistance.

It was one of their first measures to provide for the restoration of harmony, and to interest all in the defence of the city, by removing every sort of disability under which individual citizens might now be suffering. Accordingly, Patrokleidês—having first obtained special permission from the people, without which it would have been unconstitutional to make any proposition for abrogating sentences judicially passed, or releasing debtors regularly inscribed in the public registers—submitted a decree such as had never been mooted since the period when Athens was in a condition equally desperate, during the advancing march of Xerxes. All debtors to the state, either recent or of long standing; all official persons now under investigation by the Logistæ, or about to be brought before the dikastery on the usual accountability after office; all persons who were liquidating by instalment debts due to the public, or had given bail for sums thus owing; all persons who had been condemned either to total disfranchisement, or to some specific disqualification or disability; nay, even all those who, having been either members or auxiliaries of the Four Hundred, had stood trial afterwards, and had been condemned to any one of the above-mentioned penalties, all these persons were pardoned and released; every register of the penalty or condemnation being directed to be destroyed. From this comprehensive pardon were excepted: Those among the Four Hundred who had fled from Athens without standing their trial; those who had been condemned either to exile or to death by the Areopagus, or any of the other constituted tribunals for homicide, or for subversion of the public liberty. Not merely the public registers of all the condemnations thus released were ordered to be destroyed, but it was forbidden, under severe penalties, to any private citizen to keep a copy of them, or to make any allusion to such misfortunes. [333]

Pursuant to the comprehensive amnesty and forgiveness adopted by the people in this decree of Patrokleidês, the general body of citizens swore to each other a solemn pledge of mutual harmony in the acropolis.[334] The reconciliation thus introduced enabled them the better to bear up under their distress;[335] especially as the persons relieved by the amnesty were, for the most part, not men politically disaffected, like the exiles. To restore the latter, was a measure which no one thought of: indeed, a large proportion of them had been and were still at Dekeleia, assisting the Lacedæmonians in their warfare against Athens.[336] But even the most prudent internal measures could do little for Athens in reference to her capital difficulty, that of procuring subsistence for the numerous population within her walls, augmented every day by outlying garrisons and citizens. She had long been shut out from the produce of Attica by the garrison at Dekeleia; she obtained nothing from Eubœa, and since the late defeat of Ægospotami, nothing from the Euxine, from Thrace, or from the islands. Perhaps some corn may still have reached her from Cyprus, and her small remaining navy did what was possible to keep Peiræus supplied,[337] in spite of the menacing prohibitions of Lysander, preceding his arrival to block it up effectually; but to accumulate any stock for a siege, was utterly impossible.

At length, about November, 405 B.C., Lysander reached the Saronic gulf, having sent intimation beforehand, both to Agis and to the Lacedæmonians, that he was approaching with a fleet of two hundred triremes. The full Lacedæmonian and Peloponnesian force (all except the Argeians), under king Pausanias, was marched into Attica to meet him, and encamped in the precinct of Acadêmus, at the gates of Athens; while Lysander, first coming to Ægina with his overwhelming fleet of one hundred and fifty sail; next, ravaging Salamis, blocked up completely the harbor of Peiræus. It was one of his first measures to collect together the remnant which he could find of the Æginetan and Melian populations, whom Athens had expelled and destroyed; and to restore to them the possession of their ancient islands.[338]

Though all hope had now fled, the pride, the resolution, and the despair of Athens, still enabled her citizens to bear up; nor was it until some men actually began to die of hunger, that they sent propositions to entreat peace. Even then their propositions were not without dignity. They proposed to Agis to become allies of Sparta, retaining their walls entire and their fortified harbor of Peiræus. Agis referred the envoys to the ephors at Sparta, to whom he at the same time transmitted a statement of their propositions. But the ephors did not even deign to admit the envoys to an interview, but sent messengers to meet them at Sellasia on the frontier of Laconia, desiring that they would go back and come again prepared with something more admissible, and acquainting them at the same time that no proposition could be received which did not include the demolition of the Long Walls, for a continuous length of ten stadia. With this gloomy reply the envoys returned. Notwithstanding all the suffering in the city, the senate and people would not consent even to take such humiliating terms into consideration. A senator named Archestratus, who advised that they should be accepted, was placed in custody, and a general vote was passed, [339] on the proposition of Kleophon, forbidding any such motion in future.

Such a vote demonstrates the courageous patience both of the senate and the people; but unhappily it supplied no improved prospects, while the suffering within the walls continued to become more and more aggravated. Under these circumstances, Theramenês offered himself to the people to go as envoy to Lysander and Sparta, affirming that he should be able to detect what the real intention of the ephors was in regard to Athens, whether they really intended to root out the population and sell them as slaves. He pretended, farther, to possess personal influence, founded on circumstances which he could not divulge, such as would very probably insure a mitigation of the doom. He was accordingly sent, in spite of strong protest from the senate of Areopagus and others,—but with no express powers to conclude,—simply to inquire and report. We hear with astonishment that he remained more than three months as companion of Lysander, who, he alleged, had detained him thus long, and had only acquainted him, after the fourth month had begun, that no one but the ephors had any power to grant peace. It seems to have been the object of Theramenês, by this long delay, to wear out the patience of the Athenians, and to

bring them into such a state of intolerable suffering, that they would submit to any terms of peace which would only bring provisions into the town. In this scheme he completely succeeded; and considering how great were the privations of the people even at the moment of his departure, it is not easy to understand how they could have been able to sustain protracted and increasing famine for three months longer. [340]

We make out little that is distinct respecting these last moments of imperial Athens. We find only an heroic endurance displayed, to such a point that numbers actually died of starvation, without any offer to surrender on humiliating conditions. [341] Amidst the general acrimony, and exasperated special antipathies, arising out of such a state of misery, the leading men who stood out most earnestly for prolonged resistance became successively victims to the prosecutions of their enemies. The demagogue Kleophon was condemned and put to death, on the accusation of having evaded his military duty; the senate, whose temper and proceedings he had denounced, constituting itself a portion of the dikastery which tried him, contrary both to the forms and the spirit of Athenian judicatures.[342] Such proceedings, however, though denounced by orators in subsequent years as having contributed to betray the city into the hands of the enemy, appear to have been without any serious influence on the result, which was brought about purely by famine.

By the time that Theramenês returned after his long absence, so terrible had the pressure become, that he was sent forth again with instructions to conclude peace upon any terms. On reaching Sellasia, and acquainting the ephors that he had come with unlimited powers for peace, he was permitted to come to Sparta, where the assembly of the Peloponnesian confederacy was convened, to settle on what terms peace should be granted. The leading allies, especially Corinthians and Thebans, recommended that no agreement should be entered into, nor any farther measure kept, with this hated enemy now in their power; but that the name of Athens should be rooted out, and the population sold for slaves. Many of the other allies seconded the same views, which would have probably commanded a majority, had it not been for the resolute opposition of the Lacedæmonians themselves; who declared unequivocally that they would never consent to annihilate or enslave a city which had rendered such capital service to all Greece at the time of the great common danger from the Persians.[343] Lysander farther calculated on so dealing with Athens, as to make her into a dependency, and an instrument of increased power to Sparta, apart from her allies. Peace was accordingly granted on the following conditions: that the Long Walls and the fortifications of the Peiræus should be destroyed; that the Athenians should evacuate all their foreign possessions, and confine themselves to their own territory; that they should surrender all their ships of war; that they should readmit all their exiles; that they should become allies of Sparta, following her leadership both by sea and land, and recognizing the same enemies and friends.[344]

With this document, written according to Lacedæmonian practice on a skytalê,—or roll intended to go round a stick, of which the Lacedæmonian commander had always one, and the ephors another, corresponding,—Theramenês went back to Athens. As he entered the city, a miserable crowd flocked round him, in distress and terror lest he should have failed altogether in his mission. The dead and the dying had now become so numerous, that peace at any price was a boon; nevertheless, when he announced in the assembly the terms of which he was bearer, strongly recommending submission to the Lacedæmonians as the only course now open, there was still a high-spirited minority who entered their protest, and preferred death by famine to such insupportable disgrace. The large majority, however, accepted them, and the acceptance was made known to Lysander.[345]

It was on the 16th day of the Attic month Munychion,[346]—about the middle or end of March,—that this victorious commander sailed into the Peiræus, twenty-seven years, almost exactly, after that surprise of Platæa by the Thebans, which opened the Peloponnesian war. Along with him came the Athenian exiles, several of whom appear to have been serving with his army,[347] and assisting him with their counsel. To the population of Athens generally, his entry was an immediate relief, in spite of the cruel degradation, or indeed political extinction, with which it was accompanied. At least it averted the sufferings and horrors of famine, and permitted a decent interment of the many unhappy victims who had already perished. The Lacedæmonians, both naval and military force, under Lysander and Agis, continued in occupation of Athens until the conditions of the peace had been fulfilled. All the triremes in Peiræus were carried away by Lysander, except twelve, which he permitted the Athenians to retain: the ephors, in their skytalê, had left it to his discretion what number he would thus allow.[348] The unfinished ships in the dockyards were burnt, and the arsenals themselves ruined.[349] To demolish the Long Walls and the fortifications of Peiræus, was however, a work of some time; and a certain number of days were granted to the Athenians, within which it was required to be completed. In the beginning of the work, the Lacedæmonians and their allies all lent a hand, with the full pride and exultation of conquerors; amidst women playing the flute and dancers crowned with wreaths; mingled with joyful exclamations from the Peloponnesian allies, that this was the first day of Grecian freedom.[350] How many days were allowed for this humiliating duty imposed upon Athenian hands, of demolishing the elaborate, tutelary, and commanding works of their forefathers, we are not told. But the business was not completed within the interval named, so that the Athenians did not come up to the letter of the conditions, and had therefore, by strict construction, forfeited their title to the peace granted.[351] The interval seems, however, to have been prolonged; probably considering that for the real labor, as well as the melancholy character of the work to be done, too short a time had been allowed at first.

It appears that Lysander, after assisting at the solemn ceremony of beginning to demolish the walls, and making such a breach as left Athens without any substantial

means of resistance, did not remain to complete the work, but withdrew with a portion of his fleet to undertake the siege of Samos which still held out, leaving the remainder to see that the conditions imposed were fulfilled.[352] After so long an endurance of extreme misery, doubtless the general population thought of little except relief from famine and its accompaniments, without any disposition to contend against the fiat of their conquerors. If some high-spirited men formed an exception to the pervading depression, and still kept up their courage against better days, there was at the same time a party of totally opposite character, to whom the prostrate condition of Athens was a source of revenge for the past, exultation for the present, and ambitious projects for the future. These were partly the remnant of that faction which had set up, seven years before, the oligarchy of Four Hundred, and still more, the exiles, including several members of the Four Hundred,[353] who now flocked in from all quarters. Many of them had been long serving at Dekeleia, and had formed a part of the force blockading Athens. These exiles now revisited the acropolis as conquerors, and saw with delight the full accomplishment of that foreign occupation at which many of them had aimed seven years before, when they constructed the fortress of Ecteioneia, as a means of insuring their own power. Though the conditions imposed extinguished at once the imperial character, the maritime power, the honor, and the independence of Athens, these men were as eager as Lysander to carry them all into execution; because the continuance of the Athenian democracy was now entirely at his mercy, and because his establishment of oligarchies in the other subdued cities plainly intimated what he would do in this great focus of Grecian democratical impulse.

Among these exiles were comprised Aristodemus and Aristotelês, both seemingly persons of importance, the former having at one time been one of the Hellenotamiæ, the first financial office of the imperial democracy, and the latter an active member of the Four Hundred;[354] also Chariklês, who had been so distinguished for his violence in the investigation respecting the Hermæ, and another man, of whom we now for the first time obtain historical knowledge in detail, Kritias, son of Kallæschrus. He had been among the persons accused as having been concerned in the mutilation of the Hermæ, and seems to have been for a long time important in the political, the literary, and the philosophical world of Athens. To all three, his abilities qualified him to do honor. Both his poetry, in the Solonian or moralizing vein, and his eloquence, published specimens of which remained in the Augustan age, were of no ordinary merit. His wealth was large, and his family among the most ancient and conspicuous in Athens: one of his ancestors had been friend and companion of the lawgiver Solon. He was himself maternal uncle of the philosopher Plato,[355] and had frequented the society of Sokratês so much as to have his name intimately associated in the public mind with that remarkable man. We know neither the cause, nor even the date of his exile, except so far, as that he was not in banishment immediately after the revolution of the Four Hundred, and that he *was* in banishment at the time when the generals were condemned after the battle of Arginusæ.[356] He had passed

the time, or a part of the time, of his exile in Thessaly, where he took an active part in the sanguinary feuds carried on among the oligarchical parties of that lawless country. He is said to have embraced, along with a leader named, or surnamed, Prometheus, what passed for the democratical side in Thessaly; arming the penestæ, or serfs, against their masters.[357] What the conduct and dispositions of Kritias had been before this period we are unable to say; but he brought with him now, on returning from exile, not merely an unmeasured and unprincipled lust of power, but also a rancorous impulse towards spoliation and bloodshed[358] which outran even his ambition, and ultimately ruined both his party and himself.

Of all these returning exiles, animated with mingled vengeance and ambition, Kritias was decidedly the leading man, like Antiphon among the Four Hundred; partly from his abilities, partly from the superior violence with which he carried out the common sentiment. At the present juncture, he and his fellow-exiles became the most important persons in the city, as enjoying most the friendship and confidence of the conquerors. But the oligarchical party at home were noway behind them, either in servility or in revolutionary fervor, and an understanding was soon established between the two. Probably the old faction of the Four Hundred, though put down, had never wholly died out: at any rate, the political hetæries, or clubs, out of which it was composed, still remained, prepared for fresh coöperation when a favorable moment should arrive; and the catastrophe of Ægospotami had made it plain to every one that such moment could not be far distant. Accordingly, a large portion, if not the majority, of the senators, became ready to lend themselves to the destruction of the democracy, and only anxious to insure places among the oligarchy in prospect; [359] while the supple Theramenês—resuming his place as oligarchical leader, and abusing his mission as envoy to wear out the patience of his half-famished countrymen—had, during his three months' absence in the tent of Lysander, concerted arrangements with the exiles for future proceedings.[360]

As soon as the city surrendered, and while the work of demolition was yet going on, the oligarchical party began to organize itself. The members of the political clubs again came together, and named a managing committee of five, called ephors in compliment to the Lacedæmonians, to direct the general proceedings of the party; to convene meetings when needful, to appoint subordinate managers for the various tribes, and to determine what propositions were to be submitted to the public assembly.[361] Among these five ephors were Kritias and Eratosthenês; probably Theramenês also.

But the oligarchical party, though thus organized and ascendant, with a compliant senate and a dispirited people, and with an auxiliary enemy actually in possession, still thought themselves not powerful enough to carry their intended changes without seizing the most resolute of the democratical leaders. Accordingly, a citizen named Theokritus tendered an accusation to the senate against the general Strombichidês, together with several others of the democratical generals and taxiarchs; supported

by the deposition of a slave, or lowborn man, named Agoratus. Although Nikias and several other citizens tried to prevail upon Agoratus to leave Athens, furnished him with the means of escape, and offered to go away with him themselves from Munychia, until the political state of Athens should come into a more assured condition, [362] yet he refused to retire, appeared before the senate, and accused the generals of being concerned in a conspiracy to break up the peace; pretending to be himself their accomplice. Upon his information, given both before the senate and before an assembly at Munychia, the generals, the taxiarchs, and several other citizens, men of high worth and courageous patriots, were put into prison, as well as Agoratus himself, to stand their trial afterwards before a dikastery consisting of two thousand members. One of the parties thus accused, Menestratus, being admitted by the public assembly, on the proposition of Hagnodôrus, the brother-in-law of Kritias, to become accusing witness, named several additional accomplices, who were also forthwith placed in custody.[363]

Though the most determined defenders of the democratical constitution were thus eliminated, Kritias and Theramenês still farther insured the success of their propositions by invoking the presence of Lysander from Samos. The demolition of the walls had been completed, the main blockading army had disbanded, and the immediate pressure of famine had been removed, when an assembly was held to determine on future modifications of the constitution. A citizen named Drakontidês,[364] moved that a Board of Thirty should be named, to draw up laws for the future government of the city, and to manage provisionally the public affairs, until that task should be completed. Among the thirty persons proposed, prearranged by Theramenês and the oligarchical five ephors, the most prominent names were those of Kritias and Theramenês: there were, besides, Drakontidês himself,—Onomaklês, one of the Four Hundred who had escaped,—Aristotelês and Chariklês, both exiles newly returned, Eratosthenês, and others whom we do not know, but of whom probably several had also been exiles or members of the Four Hundred.[365] Though this was a complete abrogation of the constitution, yet so conscious were the conspirators of their own strength, that they did not deem it necessary to propose the formal suspension of the graphê paranomôn, as had been done prior to the installation of the former oligarchy. Still, notwithstanding the seizure of the leaders and the general intimidation prevalent, a loud murmur of repugnance was heard in the assembly at the motion of Drakontidês. But Theramenês rose up to defy the murmur, telling the assembly that the proposition numbered many partisans even among the citizens themselves, and that it had, besides, the approbation of Lysander and the Lacedæmonians. This was presently confirmed by Lysander himself, who addressed the assembly in person. He told them, in a menacing and contemptuous tone, that Athens was now at his mercy, since the walls had not been demolished before the day specified, and consequently the conditions of the promised peace had been violated. He added that, if they did not adopt the recommendation of Theramenês, they would be forced to take thought for their personal safety instead of for their political constitu-

tion. After a notice at once so plain and so crushing, farther resistance was vain. The dissentients all quitted the assembly in sadness and indignation; while a remnant—according to Lysias, inconsiderable in number as well as worthless in character—stayed to vote acceptance of the motion.[366]

Seven years before, Theramenês had carried, in conjunction with Antiphon and Phrynichus, a similar motion for the installation of the Four Hundred; extorting acquiescence by domestic terrorism as well as by multiplied assassinations. He now, in conjunction with Kritias and the rest, a second time extinguished the constitution of his country, by the still greater humiliation of a foreign conqueror dictating terms to the Athenian people assembled in their own Pnyx. Having seen the Thirty regularly constituted, Lysander retired from Athens to finish the siege of Samos, which still held out. Though blocked up both by land and sea, the Samians obstinately defended themselves for some months longer, until the close of the summer. Nor was it until the last extremity that they capitulated; obtaining permission for every freeman to depart in safety, but with no other property except a single garment. Lysander handed over the city and the properties to the ancient citizens, that is, to the oligarchy and their partisans, who had been partly expelled, partly disfranchised, in the revolution eight years before. But he placed the government of Samos, as he had dealt with the other cities, in the hands of one of his dekadarchies, or oligarchy of Ten Samians, chosen by himself; leaving Thorax as Lacedæmonian harmost, and doubtless a force under him.[367]

Having thus finished the war, and trodden out the last spark of resistance, Lysander returned in triumph to Sparta. So imposing a triumph never fell to the lot of any Greek, either before or afterwards. He brought with him every trireme out of the harbor of Peiræus, except twelve, left to the Athenians as a concession; he brought the prow-ornaments of all the ships captured at Ægospotami and elsewhere; he was loaded with golden crowns, voted to him by the various cities; and he farther exhibited a sum of money not less than four hundred and seventy talents, the remnant of those treasures which Cyrus had handed over to him for the prosecution of the war.[368] That sum had been greater, but is said to have been diminished by the treachery of Gylippus, to whose custody it had been committed, and who sullied by such mean peculation the laurels which he had so gloriously earned at Syracuse.[369] Nor was it merely the triumphant evidences of past exploits which now decorated this returning admiral. He wielded besides an extent of real power greater than any individual Greek either before or after. Imperial Sparta, as she had now become, was as it were personified in Lysander, who was master of almost all the insular, Asiatic, and Thracian cities, by means of the harmost and the native dekadarchies named by himself and selected from his creatures. To this state of things we shall presently return, when we have followed the eventful history of the Thirty at Athens.

These thirty men—the parallel of the dekarchies whom Lysander had constituted in the other cities—were intended for the same purpose, to maintain the city in a

state of humiliation and dependence upon Lacedæmon, and upon Lysander, as the representative of Lacedæmon. Though appointed, in the pretended view of drawing up a scheme of laws and constitution for Athens, they were in no hurry to commence this duty. They appointed a new senate, composed of compliant, assured, and oligarchical persons; including many of the returned exiles who had been formerly in the Four Hundred, and many also of the preceding senators who were willing to serve their designs.[370] They farther named new magistrates and officers; a new Board of Eleven, to manage the business of police and the public force, with Satyrus, one of their most violent partisans, as chief; a Board of Ten, to govern in Peiræus; [371] an archon, to give name to the year, Pythodôrus, and a second, or king-archon, Patroklês,[372] to offer the customary sacrifices on behalf of the city. While thus securing their own ascendency, and placing all power in the hands of the most violent oligarchical partisans, they began by professing reforming principles of the strictest virtue; denouncing the abuses of the past democracy, and announcing their determination to purge the city of evil-doers.[373] The philosopher Plato—then a young man about twenty-four years old, of anti-democratical politics, and nephew of Kritias—was at first misled, together with various others, by these splendid professions; he conceived hopes, and even received encouragement from his relations, that he might play an active part under the new oligarchy.[374] Though he soon came to discern how little congenial his feelings were with theirs, yet in the beginning doubtless such honest illusions contributed materially to strengthen their hands.

In execution of their design to root out evil-doers, the Thirty first laid hands on some of the most obnoxious politicians under the former democracy; "men (says Xenophon) whom every one knew to live by making calumnious accusations, called sycophancy, and who were pronounced in their enmity to the oligarchical citizens." How far most of these men had been honest or dishonest in their previous political conduct under the democracy, we have no means of determining. But among them were comprised Strombichidês and the other democratical officers who had been imprisoned under the information of Agoratus, men whose chief crime consisted in a strenuous and inflexible attachment to the democracy. The persons thus seized were brought to trial before the new senate appointed by the Thirty, contrary to the vote of the people, which had decreed that Strombichidês and his companions should be tried before a dikastery of two thousand citizens.[375] But the dikastery, as well as all the other democratical institutions, were now abrogated, and no judicial body was left except the newly constituted senate. Even to that senate, though composed of their own partisans, the Thirty did not choose to intrust the trial of the prisoners, with that secrecy of voting which was well known at Athens to be essential to the free and genuine expression of sentiment. Whenever prisoners were tried, the Thirty were themselves present in the senate-house, sitting on the benches previously occupied by the prytanes: two tables were placed before them, one signifying condemnation, the other, acquittal; and each senator was required to deposit his pebble openly before them, either on one or on the other.[376] It was not merely judgment

by the senate, but judgment by the senate under pressure and intimidation by the all-powerful Thirty. It seems probable that neither any semblance of defence, nor any exculpatory witnesses, were allowed; but even if such formalities were not wholly dispensed with, it is certain that there was no real trial, and that condemnation was assured beforehand. Among the great numbers whom the Thirty brought before the senate, not a single man was acquitted except the informer Agoratus, who was brought to trial as an accomplice along with Strombichidês and his companions, but was liberated in recompense for the information which he had given against them.[377] The statement of Isokratês, Lysias, and others—that the victims of the Thirty, even when brought before the senate, were put to death untried—is authentic and trustworthy: many were even put to death by simple order from the Thirty themselves, without any cognizance of the senate.[378]

In regard to the persons first brought to trial, however,—whether we consider them, as Xenophon intimates, to have been notorious evil-doers, or to have been innocent sufferers by the reactionary vengeance of returning oligarchical exiles, as was the case certainly with Strombichidês and the officers accused along with him,—there was little necessity for any constraint on the part of the Thirty over the senate. That body itself partook of the sentiment which dictated the condemnation, and acted as a willing instrument; while the Thirty themselves were unanimous, Theramenês being even more zealous than Kritias in these executions, to demonstrate his sincere antipathy towards the extinct democracy.[379] As yet too, since all the persons condemned, justly or unjustly, had been marked politicians, so, all other citizens who had taken no conspicuous part in politics, even if they disapproved of the condemnations, had not been led to conceive any apprehension of the like fate for themselves. Here, then, Theramenês, and along with him a portion of the Thirty as well as of the senate, were inclined to pause. While enough had been done to satiate their antipathies, by the death of the most obnoxious leaders of the democracy, they at the same time conceived the oligarchical government to be securely established, and contended that farther bloodshed would only endanger its stability, by spreading alarm, multiplying enemies, and alienating friends as well as neutrals.

But these were not the views either of Kritias or of the Thirty generally, who surveyed their position with eyes very different from the unstable and cunning Theramenês, and who had brought with them from exile a long arrear of vengeance yet to be appeased. Kritias knew well that the numerous population of Athens were devotedly attached, and had good reason to be attached, to their democracy; that the existing government had been imposed upon them by force, and could only be upheld by force; that its friends were a narrow minority, incapable of sustaining it against the multitude around them, all armed; that there were still many formidable enemies to be got rid of, so that it was indispensable to invoke the aid of a permanent Lacedæmonian garrison in Athens, as the only condition not only of their stability as a government, but even of their personal safety. In spite of the opposition of Thera-

menês, Æschinês and Aristotelês, two among the Thirty, were despatched to Sparta to solicit aid from Lysander; who procured for them a Lacedæmonian garrison under Kallibius as harmost, which they engaged to maintain without any cost to Sparta, until their government should be confirmed by putting the evil-doers out of the way.[380] Kallibius was not only installed as master of the acropolis,—full as it was of the mementos of Athenian glory,—but was farther so caressed and won over by the Thirty, that he lent himself to everything which they asked. They had thus a Lacedæmonian military force constantly at their command, besides an organized band of youthful satellites and assassins, ready for any deeds of violence; and they proceeded to seize and put to death many citizens, who were so distinguished for their courage and patriotism, as to be likely to serve as leaders to the public discontent. Several of the best men in Athens thus successively perished, while Thrasybulus, Anytus, and many others, fearing a similar fate, fled out of Attica, leaving their property to be confiscated and appropriated by the oligarchs;[381] who passed a decree of exile against them in their absence, as well as against Alkibiadês.[382]

These successive acts of vengeance and violence were warmly opposed by Theramenês, both in the council of Thirty and in the senate. The persons hitherto executed, he said, had deserved their death, because they were not merely noted politicians under the democracy, but also persons of marked hostility to oligarchical men. But to inflict the same fate on others, who had manifested no such hostility, simply because they had enjoyed influence under the democracy, would be unjust: "Even you and I (he reminded Kritias) have both said and done many things for the sake of popularity." But Kritias replied: "We cannot afford to be scrupulous; we are engaged in a scheme of aggressive ambition, and must get rid of those who are best able to hinder us. Though we are Thirty in number, and not one, our government is not the less a despotism, and must be guarded by the same jealous precautions. If you think otherwise, you must be simple-minded indeed." Such were the sentiments which animated the majority of the Thirty, not less than Kritias, and which prompted them to an endless string of seizures and executions. It was not merely the less obnoxious democratical politicians who became their victims, but men of courage, wealth, and station, in every vein of political feeling: even oligarchical men, the best and most high-principled of that party, shared the same fate. Among the most distinguished sufferers were, Lykurgus,[383] belonging to one of the most eminent sacred gentes in the state; a wealthy man named Antiphon, who had devoted his fortune to the public service with exemplary patriotism during the last years of the war, and had furnished two well-equipped triremes at his own cost; Leon, of Salamis; and even Nikêratus, son of Nikias, who had perished at Syracuse; a man who inherited from his father not only a large fortune, but a known repugnance to democratical politics, together with his uncle Eukratês, brother of the same Nikias.[384] These were only a few among the numerous victims, who were seized, pronounced to be guilty by the senate or by the Thirty themselves, handed over to Satyrus and the Eleven, and condemned to perish by the customary draught of hemlock.

The circumstances accompanying the seizure of Leon deserve particular notice. In putting to death him and the other victims, the Thirty had several objects in view, all tending to the stability of their dominion. First, they thus got rid of citizens generally known and esteemed, whose abhorrence they knew themselves to deserve, and whom they feared as likely to head the public sentiment against them. Secondly, the property of these victims, all of whom were rich, was seized along with their persons, and was employed to pay the satellites whose agency was indispensable for such violences, especially Kallibius and the Lacedæmonian hoplites in the acropolis. But, besides murder and spoliation, the Thirty had a farther purpose, if possible, yet more nefarious. In the work of seizing their victims, they not only employed the hands of these paid satellites, but also sent along with them citizens of station and respectability, whom they constrained by threats and intimidation to lend their personal aid in a service so thoroughly odious. By such participation, these citizens became compromised and imbrued in crime, and as it were, consenting parties in the public eye to all the projects of the Thirty;[385] exposed to the same general hatred as the latter, and interested for their own safety in maintaining the existing dominion. Pursuant to their general plan of implicating unwilling citizens in their misdeeds, the Thirty sent for five citizens to the tholus, or government-house, and ordered them, with terrible menaces, to cross over to Salamis and bring back Leon as prisoner. Four out of the five obeyed; the fifth was the philosopher Sokratês, who refused all concurrence and returned to his own house, while the other four went to Salamis and took part in the seizure of Leon. Though he thus braved all the wrath of the Thirty, it appears that they thought it expedient to leave him untouched. But the fact that they singled him out for such an atrocity,—an old man of tried virtue, both private and public, and intellectually commanding, though at the same time intellectually unpopular,—shows to what an extent they carried their system of forcing unwilling participants; while the farther circumstance, that he was the only person who had the courage to refuse, among four others who yielded to intimidation, shows that the policy was for the most part successful.[386] The inflexible resistance of Sokratês on this occasion, stands as a worthy parallel to his conduct as prytanis in the public assembly held on the conduct of the generals after the battle of Arginusæ, described in the preceding chapter, wherein he obstinately refused to concur in putting an illegal question.

Such multiplied cases of execution and spoliation naturally filled the city with surprise, indignation, and terror. Groups of malcontents got together, and exiles became more and more numerous. All these circumstances furnished ample material for the vehement opposition of Theramenês, and tended to increase his party: not indeed among the Thirty themselves, but to a certain extent in the senate, and still more among the body of the citizens. He warned his colleagues that they were incurring daily an increased amount of public odium, and that their government could not possibly stand, unless they admitted into partnership an adequate number of citizens, with a direct interest in its maintenance. He proposed that all those competent, by

their property, to serve the state either on horseback or with heavy armor, should be constituted citizens; leaving all the poorer freemen, a far larger number, still disfranchised.[387] Kritias and the Thirty rejected this proposition; being doubtless convinced —as the Four Hundred had felt seven years before, when Theramenês demanded of them to convert their fictitious total of Five Thousand into a real list of as many living persons—that "to enroll so great a number of partners, was tantamount to a downright democracy."[388] But they were at the same time not insensible to the soundness of his advice: moreover, they began to be afraid of him personally, and to suspect that he was likely to take the lead in a popular opposition against them, as he had previously done against his colleagues of the Four Hundred. They therefore resolved to comply in part with his recommendations, and accordingly prepared a list of three thousand persons to be invested with the political franchise; chosen, as much as possible, from their own known partisans and from oligarchical citizens. Besides this body, they also counted on the adherence of the horsemen, among the wealthiest citizens of the state. These horsemen, or knights, taking them as a class, —the thousand good men of Athens, whose virtues Aristophanês sets forth in hostile antithesis to the alleged demagogic vices of Kleon,—remained steady supporters of the Thirty, throughout all the enormities of their career.[389] What privileges or functions were assigned to the chosen three thousand, we do not hear, except that they could not be condemned without the warrant of the senate, while any other Athenian might be put to death by the simple fiat of the Thirty.[390]

A body of partners thus chosen—not merely of fixed number, but of picked oligarchical sentiments—was by no means the addition which Theramenês desired. While he commented on the folly of supposing that there was any charm in the number three thousand, as if it embodied all the merit of the city, and nothing else but merit, he admonished them that it was still insufficient for their defence; their rule was one of pure force, and yet inferior in force to those over whom it was exercised. Again the Thirty acted upon his admonition, but in a way very different from that which he contemplated. They proclaimed a general muster and examination of arms to all the hoplites in Athens. The Three Thousand were drawn up in arms all together in the market-place; but the remaining hoplites were disseminated in small scattered companies and in different places. After the review was over, these scattered companies went home to their meal, leaving their arms piled at the various places of muster. But the adherents of the Thirty, having been forewarned and kept together, were sent at the proper moment, along with the Lacedæmonian mercenaries, to seize the deserted arms, which were deposited under the custody of Kallibius in the acropolis. All the hoplites in Athens, except the Three Thousand and the remaining adherents of the Thirty, were disarmed by this crafty manœuvre, in spite of the fruitless remonstrance of Theramenês.[391]

Kritias and his colleagues, now relieved from all fear either of Theramenês, or of any other internal opposition, gave loose, more unsparingly than ever, to their malev-

olence and rapacity, putting to death both many of their private enemies, and many rich victims for the purpose of spoliation. A list of suspected persons was drawn up, in which each of their adherents was allowed to insert such names as he chose, and from which the victims were generally taken.[392] Among informers, who thus gave in names for destruction, Batrachus and Æschylidês[393] stood conspicuous. The thirst of Kritias for plunder, as well as for bloodshed, only increased by gratification;[394] and it was not merely to pay their mercenaries, but also to enrich themselves separately, that the Thirty stretched everywhere their murderous agency, which now mowed down metics as well as citizens. Theognis and Peison, two of the Thirty, affirmed that many of these metics were hostile to the oligarchy, besides being opulent men; and the resolution was adopted that each of the rulers should single out any of these victims that he pleased, for execution and pillage; care being taken to include a few poor persons in the seizure, so that the real purpose of the spoilers might be faintly disguised.

It was in execution of this scheme that the orator Lysias and his brother Polemarchus were both taken into custody. Both were metics, wealthy men, and engaged in a manufactory of shields, wherein they employed a hundred and twenty slaves. Theognis and Peison, with some others, seized Lysias in his house, while entertaining some friends at dinner; and having driven away his guests, left him under the guard of Peison, while the attendants went off to register and appropriate his valuable slaves. Lysias tried to prevail on Peison to accept a bribe and let him escape; which the latter at first promised to do, and having thus obtained access to the money-chest of the prisoner, laid hands upon all its contents, amounting to between three and four talents. In vain did Lysias implore that a trifle might be left for his necessary subsistence; the only answer vouchsafed was, that he might think himself fortunate if he escaped with life. He was then conveyed to the house of a person named Damnippus, where Theognis already was, having other prisoners in charge. At the earnest entreaty of Lysias, Damnippus tried to induce Theognis to connive at his escape, on consideration of a handsome bribe; but while this conversation was going on, the prisoner availed himself of an unguarded moment to get off through the back door, which fortunately was open, together with two other doors through which it was necessary to pass. Having first obtained refuge in the house of a friend in Peiræus, he took boat during the ensuing night for Megara. Polemarchus, less fortunate, was seized in the street by Eratosthenês, one of the Thirty, and immediately lodged in the prison, where the fatal draught of hemlock was administered to him, without delay, without trial, and without liberty of defence. While his house was plundered of a large stock of gold, silver, furniture, and rich ornaments; while the golden earrings were torn from the ears of his wife; and while seven hundred shields, with a hundred and twenty slaves, were confiscated, together with the workshop and the two dwelling-houses; the Thirty would not allow even a decent funeral to the deceased, but caused his body to be carried away on a hired bier from the prison, with

covering and a few scanty appurtenances supplied by the sympathy of private friends.[395]

Amidst such atrocities, increasing in number and turned more and more to shameless robbery, the party of Theramenês daily gained ground, even in the senate; many of whose members profited nothing by satiating the private cupidity of the Thirty, and began to be weary of so revolting a system, as well as alarmed at the host of enemies which they were raising up. In proposing the late seizure of the metics, the Thirty had desired Theramenês to make choice of any victim among that class, to be destroyed and plundered for his own personal benefit. But he rejected the suggestion emphatically, denouncing the enormity of the measure in the indignant terms which it deserved. So much was the antipathy of Kritias and the majority of the Thirty against him, already acrimonious from the effects of a long course of opposition, exasperated by this refusal; so much did they fear the consequences of incurring the obloquy of such measures for themselves, while Theramenês enjoyed all the credit of opposing them; so satisfied were they that their government could not stand with this dissension among its own members; that they resolved to destroy him at all cost. Having canvassed as many of the senators as they could, to persuade them that Theramenês was conspiring against the oligarchy, they caused the most daring of their satellites to attend one day in the senate-house, close to the railing which fenced in the senators, with daggers concealed under their garments. So soon as Theramenês appeared, Kritias rose and denounced him to the senate as a public enemy, in an harangue which Xenophon gives at considerable length, and which is so full of instructive evidence, as to Greek political feeling, that I here extract the main points in abridgment:—

"If any of you imagine, senators, that more people are perishing than the occasion requires, reflect, that this happens everywhere in a time of revolution, and that it must especially happen in the establishment of an oligarchy at Athens, the most populous city in Greece, and where the population has been longest accustomed to freedom. You know as well as we do, that democracy is to both of us an intolerable government, as well as incompatible with all steady adherence to our protectors, the Lacedæmonians. It is under their auspices that we are establishing the present oligarchy, and that we destroy, as far as we can, every man who stands in the way of it; which becomes most of all indispensable, if such a man be found among our own body. Here stands the man, Theramenês, whom we now denounce to you as your foe not less than ours. That such is the fact, is plain from his unmeasured censures on our proceedings, from the difficulties which he throws in our way whenever we want to despatch any of the demagogues. Had such been his policy from the beginning, he would indeed have been our enemy, yet we could not with justice have proclaimed him a villain. But it is he who first originated the alliance which binds us to Sparta, who struck the first blow at the democracy, who chiefly instigated us to put to death the first batch of accused persons; and now, when you as well as we have

thus incurred the manifest hatred of the people, he turns round and quarrels with our proceedings in order to insure his own safety, and leave us to pay the penalty. He must be dealt with not only as an enemy, but as a traitor, to you as well as to us; a traitor in the grain, as his whole life proves. Though he enjoyed, through his father Agnon, a station of honor under the democracy, he was foremost in subverting it, and setting up the Four Hundred; the moment he saw that oligarchy beset with difficulties, he was the first to put himself at the head of the people against them; always ready for change in both directions, and a willing accomplice in those executions which changes of government bring with them. It is he, too, who—having been ordered by the generals after the battle of Arginusæ to pick up the men on the disabled ships, and having neglected the task—accused and brought to execution his superiors, in order to get himself out of danger. He has well earned his surname of The Buskin, fitting both legs, but constant to neither; he has shown himself reckless both of honor and friendship, looking to nothing but his own selfish advancement; and it is for us now to guard against his doublings, in order that he may not play us the same trick. We cite him before you as a conspirator and a traitor, against you as well as against us. Look to your own safety, and not to his. For depend upon it, that if you let him off, you will hold out powerful encouragement to your worst enemies; while if you condemn him, you will crush their best hopes, both within and without the city."

Theramenês was probably not wholly unprepared for some such attack as this. At any rate, he rose up to reply to it at once:—

"First of all, senators, I shall touch upon the charge against me which Kritias mentioned last, the charge of having accused and brought to execution the generals. It was not I who began the accusation against them, but they who began it against me. They said, that they had ordered me upon the duty, and that I had neglected it; my defence was, that the duty could not be executed, in consequence of the storm; the people believed and exonerated me, but the generals were rightfully condemned on their own accusation, because *they* said that the duty might have been performed, while yet it had remained unperformed. I do not wonder, indeed, that Kritias has told these falsehoods against me; for at the time when this affair happened, he was an exile in Thessaly, employed in raising up a democracy, and arming the penestæ against their masters. Heaven grant that nothing of what he perpetrated *there* may occur at Athens! I agree with Kritias, indeed, that, whoever wishes to cut short your government, and strengthens those who conspire against you, deserves justly the severest punishment. But to whom does this charge best apply? To him, or to me? Look at the behavior of each of us, and then judge for yourselves. At first, we were all agreed, so far as the condemnation of the known and obnoxious demagogues. But when Kritias and his friends began to seize men of station and dignity, then it was that I began to oppose them. I knew that the seizure of men like Leon, Nikias, and Antiphon, would make the best men in the city your enemies. I opposed

the execution of the metics, well aware that all that body would be alienated. I opposed the disarming of the citizens, and the hiring of foreign guards. And when I saw that enemies at home and exiles abroad were multiplying against you, I dissuaded you from banishing Thrasybulus and Anytus, whereby you only furnished the exiles with competent leaders. The man who gives you this advice, and gives it you openly, is he a traitor, or is he not rather a genuine friend? It is you and your supporters, Kritias, who, by your murders and robberies, strengthen the enemies of the government and betray your friends. Depend upon it, that Thrasybulus and Anytus are much better pleased with your policy than they would be with mine. You accuse me of having betrayed the Four Hundred; but I did not desert them until they were themselves on the point of betraying Athens to her enemies. You call me The Buskin, as trying to fit both parties. But what am I to call *you*, who fit neither of them? who, under the democracy, were the most violent hater of the people, and who, under the oligarchy, have become equally violent as a hater of oligarchical merit? I am, and always have been, Kritias, an enemy both to extreme democracy and to oligarchical tyranny. I desire to constitute our political community out of those who can serve it on horseback and with heavy armor; I have proposed this once, and I still stand to it. I side not either with democrats or despots, to the exclusion of the dignified citizens. Prove that I am now, or ever have been, guilty of such crime, and I shall confess myself deserving of ignominious death."

This reply of Theramenês was received with such a shout of applause by the majority of the senate, as showed that they were resolved to acquit him. To the fierce antipathies of the mortified Kritias, the idea of failure was intolerable; indeed, he had now carried his hostility to such a point, that the acquittal of his enemy would have been his own ruin. After exchanging a few words with the Thirty, he retired for a few moments, and directed the Eleven with the body of armed satellites to press close on the railing whereby the senators were fenced round,—while the court before the senate-house was filled with the mercenary hoplites. Having thus got his force in hand, Kritias returned and again addressed the senate: "Senators (said he), I think it the duty of a good president, when he sees his friends around him duped, not to let them follow their own counsel. This is what I am now going to do; indeed, these men, whom you see pressing upon us from without, tell us plainly that they will not tolerate the acquittal of one manifestly working to the ruin of the oligarchy. It is an article of our new constitution, that no man of the select Three Thousand shall be condemned without your vote; but that any man not included in that list may be condemned by the Thirty. Now I take upon me, with the concurrence of all my colleagues, to strike this Theramenês out of that list; and we, by our authority, condemn him to death."

Though Theramenês had already been twice concerned in putting down the democracy, yet such was the habit of all Athenians to look for protection from constitutional forms, that he probably accounted himself safe under the favorable verdict

of the senate, and was not prepared for the monstrous and despotic sentence which he now heard from his enemy. He sprang at once to the senatorial hearth,—the altar and sanctuary in the interior of the senate-house,—and exclaimed: "I too, senators, stand as your suppliant, asking only for bare justice. Let it be not in the power of Kritias to strike out me or any other man whom he chooses; let my sentence as well as yours be passed according to the law which these Thirty have themselves prepared. I know but too well, that this altar will be of no avail to me as a defence; but I shall at least make it plain, that these men are as impious towards the gods as they are nefarious towards men. As for you, worthy senators, I wonder that you will not stand forward for your own personal safety; since you must be well aware, that your own names may be struck out of the Three Thousand just as easily as mine."

But the senate remained passive and stupefied by fear, in spite of these moving words, which perhaps were not perfectly heard, since it could not be the design of Kritias to permit his enemy to speak a second time. It was probably while Theramenês was yet speaking, that the loud voice of the herald was heard, calling the Eleven to come forward and take him into custody. The Eleven advanced into the senate, headed by their brutal chief Satyrus, and followed by their usual attendants. They went straight up to the altar, from whence Satyrus, aided by the attendants, dragged him by main force, while Kritias said to them: "We hand over to you this man Theramenês, condemned according to the law. Seize him, carry him off to prison, and there do the needful." Upon this, Theramenês was dragged out of the senate-house and carried in custody through the market-place, exclaiming with a loud voice against the atrocious treatment which he was suffering. "Hold your tongue (said Satyrus to him), or you will suffer for it." "And if I *do* hold my tongue (replied Theramenês), shall not I suffer for it also?"

He was conveyed to prison, where the usual draught of hemlock was speedily administered. After he had swallowed it, there remained a drop at the bottom of the cup, which he jerked out on the floor (according to the playful convivial practice called the Kottabus, which was supposed to furnish an omen by its sound in falling, and after which the person who had just drank handed the goblet to the guest whose turn came next): "Let this (said he) be for the gentle Kritias."[396]

The scene just described, which ended in the execution of Theramenês, is one of the most striking and tragical in ancient history; in spite of the bald and meagre way in which it is recounted by Xenophon, who has thrown all the interest into the two speeches. The atrocious injustice by which Theramenês perished, as well as the courage and self-possession which he displayed at the moment of danger, and his cheerfulness even in the prison, not inferior to that of Sokratês three years afterwards, naturally enlist the warmest sympathies of the reader in his favor, and have tended to exalt the positive estimation of his character. During the years immediately succeeding the restoration of the democracy,[397] he was extolled and pitied as one of the first martyrs to oligarchical violence: later authors went so far as to number

him among the chosen pupils of Sokratês.[398] But though Theramenês here became the victim of a much worse man than himself, it will not for that reason be proper to accord to him our admiration, which his own conduct will not at all be found to deserve. The reproaches of Kritias against him, founded on his conduct during the previous conspiracy of the Four Hundred, were in the main well founded. After having been one of the foremost originators of that conspiracy, he deserted his comrades as soon as he saw that it was likely to fail; and Kritias had doubtless present to his mind the fate of Antiphon, who had been condemned and executed under the accusation of Theramenês, together with a reasonable conviction that the latter would again turn against his colleagues in the same manner, if circumstances should encourage him to do so. Nor was Kritias wrong in denouncing the perfidy of Theramenês with regard to the generals after the battle of Arginusæ, the death of whom he was partly instrumental in bringing about, though only as an auxiliary cause, and not with that extreme stretch of nefarious stratagem, which Xenophon and others have imputed to him. He was a selfish, cunning, and faithless man,—ready to enter into conspiracies, yet never foreseeing their consequences,—and breaking faith to the ruin of colleagues whom he had first encouraged, when he found them more consistent and thoroughgoing in crime than himself.[399]

Such high-handed violence, by Kritias and the majority of the Thirty,—carried though, even against a member of their own Board, by intimidation of the senate,—left a feeling of disgust and dissension among their own partisans from which their power never recovered. Its immediate effect, however, was to render them, apparently, and in their own estimation, more powerful than ever. All open manifestation of dissent being now silenced, they proceeded to the uttermost limits of cruel and licentious tyranny. They made proclamation, that every one not included in the list of Three Thousand, should depart without the walls, in order that they might be undisturbed masters within the city, a policy before resorted to by Periander of Corinth and other Grecian despots.[400] The numerous fugitives expelled by this order, distributed themselves partly in Peiræus, partly in the various demes of Attica. Both in one and the other, however, they were seized by order of the Thirty, and many of them put to death, in order that their substance and lands might be appropriated either by the Thirty themselves, or by some favored partisan.[401] The denunciations of Batrachus, Æschylidês, and other delators, became more numerous than ever, in order to obtain the seizure and execution of their private enemies; and the oligarchy were willing to purchase any new adherent by thus gratifying his antipathies or his rapacity.[402] The subsequent orators affirmed that more than fifteen hundred victims were put to death without trial by the Thirty;[403] on this numerical estimate little stress is to be laid, but the total was doubtless prodigious. It became more and more plain that no man was safe in Attica; so that Athenian emigrants, many in great poverty and destitution, were multiplied throughout the neighboring territories,—in Megara, Thebes, Orôpus, Chalkis, Argos, etc.[404] It was not everywhere that these distressed persons could obtain reception; for the Lacedæmonian government, at the

instance of the Thirty, issued an edict prohibiting all the members of their confederacy from harboring fugitive Athenians; an edict which these cities generously disobeyed,[405] though probably the smaller Peloponnesian cities complied. Without doubt, this decree was procured by Lysander, while his influence still continued unimpaired.

But it was not only against the lives, properties, and liberties of Athenian citizens that the Thirty made war. They were not less solicitous to extinguish the intellectual force and education of the city; a project so perfectly in harmony both with the sentiment and practice of Sparta, that they counted on the support of their foreign allies. Among the ordinances which they promulgated was one, expressly forbidding every one[406] "to teach the art of words," if I may be allowed to translate literally the Greek expression, which bore a most comprehensive signification, and denoted every intentional communication of logical, rhetorical, or argumentative improvement,—of literary criticism and composition,—and of command over those political and moral topics which formed the ordinary theme of discussion. Such was the species of instruction which Sokratês and other sophists, each in his own way, communicated to the Athenian youth. The great foreign sophists, not Athenian, such as Prodikus and Protagoras had been,—though perhaps neither of these two was now alive,—were doubtless no longer in the city, under the calamitous circumstances which had been weighing upon every citizen since the defeat of Ægospotami. But there were abundance of native teachers, or sophists, inferior in merit to these distinguished names, yet still habitually employed, with more or less success, in communicating a species of instruction held indispensable to every liberal Athenian. The edict of the Thirty was in fact a general suppression of the higher class of teachers or professors, above the rank of the elementary teacher of letters, or grammatist. If such an edict could have been maintained in force for a generation, combined with the other mandates of the Thirty, the city out of which Sophoklês and Euripidês had just died, and in which Plato and Isokratês were in vigorous age, the former twenty-five, the latter twenty-nine, would have been degraded to the intellectual level of the meanest community in Greece. It was not uncommon for a Grecian despot to suppress all those assemblies wherein youths came together for the purpose of common training, either intellectual or gymnastic; as well as the public banquets and clubs, or associations, as being dangerous to his authority, and tending to elevation of courage, and to a consciousness of political rights among the citizens.[407]

The enormities of the Thirty had provoked severe comments from the philosopher Sokratês, whose life was spent in conversation on instructive subjects with those young men who sought his society, though he never took money from any pupil. These comments had been made known to Kritias and Chariklês, who sent for him, reminded him of the prohibitive law, and peremptorily commanded him to abstain for the future from all conversation with youths. Sokratês met this order by putting some questions to those who gave it, in his usual style of puzzling scrutiny, destined to ex-

pose the vagueness of the terms; and to draw the line, or rather to show that no definite line could be drawn, between that which was permitted and that which was forbidden. But he soon perceived that his interrogations produced only a feeling of disgust and wrath, menacing to his own safety. The tyrants ended by repeating their interdict in yet more peremptory terms, and by giving Sokratês to understand, that they were not ignorant of the censures which he had cast upon them.[408]

Though our evidence does not enable us to make out the precise dates of these various oppressions of the Thirty, yet it seems probable that this prohibition of teaching must have been among their earlier enactments; at any rate, considerably anterior to the death of Theramenês, and the general expulsion out of the walls of all except the privileged Three Thousand. Their dominion continued, without any armed opposition made to it, for about eight months from the capture of Athens by Lysander, that is, from about April to December 404 B.C. The measure of their iniquity then became full. They had accumulated against themselves, both in Attica and among the exiles in the circumjacent territories, suffering and exasperated enemies, while they had lost the sympathy of Thebes, Megara, and Corinth, and were less heartily supported by Sparta.

During these important eight months, the general feeling throughout Greece had become materially different both towards Athens and towards Sparta. At the moment when the long war was first brought to a close, fear, antipathy, and vengeance against Athens, had been the reigning sentiment, both among the confederates of Sparta and among the revolted members of the extinct Athenian empire; a sentiment which prevailed among them indeed to a greater degree than among the Spartans themselves, who resisted it, and granted to Athens a capitulation at a time when many of their allies pressed for the harshest measures. To this resolution they were determined partly by the still remaining force of ancient sympathy; partly by the odium which would have been sure to follow the act of expelling the Athenian population, however it might be talked of beforehand as a meet punishment; partly too by the policy of Lysander, who contemplated the keeping of Athens in the same dependence on Sparta and on himself, and by the same means, as the other outlying cities in which he had planted his dekadarchies.

So soon as Athens was humbled, deprived of her fleet and walled port, and rendered innocuous, the great bond of common fear which had held the allies to Sparta disappeared; and while the paramount antipathy on the part of those allies towards Athens gradually died away, a sentiment of jealousy and apprehension of Sparta sprang up in its place, on the part of the leading states among them. For such a sentiment there was more than one reason. Lysander had brought home not only a large sum of money, but valuable spoils of other kinds, and many captive triremes, at the close of the war. As the success had been achieved by the joint exertions of all the allies, so the fruits of it belonged in equity to all of them jointly, not to Sparta alone. The Thebans and Corinthians preferred a formal claim to be allowed to share;

and if the other allies abstained from openly backing the demand, we may fairly presume that it was not from any different construction of the equity of the case, but from fear of offending Sparta. In the testimonial erected by Lysander at Delphi, commemorative of the triumph, he had included not only his own brazen statue, but that of each commander of the allied contingents; thus formally admitting the allies to share in the honorary results, and tacitly sanctioning their claim to the lucrative results also. Nevertheless, the demand made by the Thebans and Corinthians was not only repelled, but almost resented as an insult; especially by Lysander, whose influence was at that moment almost omnipotent.[409]

That the Lacedæmonians should have withheld from the allies a share in this money, demonstrates still more the great ascendency of Lysander; because there was a considerable party at Sparta itself, who protested altogether against the reception of so much gold and silver, as contrary to the ordinances of Lykurgus, and fatal to the peculiar morality of Sparta. An ancient Spartan, Skiraphidas, or Phlogidas, took the lead in calling for exclusive adherence to the old Spartan money, heavy iron, difficult to carry; nor was it without difficulty that Lysander and his friends obtained admission for the treasure into Sparta; under special proviso, that it should be for the exclusive purposes of the government, and that no private citizen should ever circulate gold or silver.[410] The existence of such traditionary repugnance among the Spartans would have seemed likely to induce them to be just towards their allies, since an equitable distribution of the treasure would have gone far to remove the difficulty; yet they nevertheless kept it all.

But besides this special offence given to the allies, the conduct of Sparta in other ways showed that she intended to turn the victory to her own account. Lysander was at this moment all-powerful, playing his own game under the name of Sparta. His position was far greater than that of the regent Pausanias had been after the victory of Platæa; and his talents for making use of the position incomparably superior. The magnitude of his successes, as well as the eminent ability which he had displayed, justified abundant eulogy; but in his case, the eulogy was carried to the length of something like worship. Altars were erected to him; pæans or hymns were composed in his honor; the Ephesians set up his statue in the temple of their goddess Artemis; and the Samians not only erected a statue to him at Olympia, but even altered the name of their great festival, the Heræa, to *Lysandria*.[411] Several contemporary poets—Antilochus, Chœrilus, Nikêratus, and Antimachus—devoted themselves to sing his glories and profit by his rewards.

Such excess of flattery was calculated to turn the head even of the most virtuous Greek: with Lysander, it had the effect of substituting, in place of that assumed smoothness of manner with which he began his command, an insulting harshness and arrogance corresponding to the really unmeasured ambition which he cherished.[412] His ambition prompted him to aggrandize Sparta separately, without any thought of her allies, in order to exercise dominion in her name. He had already es-

tablished dekadarchies, or oligarchies of Ten, in many of the insular and Asiatic cities, and an oligarchy of Thirty in Athens; all composed of vehement partisans chosen by himself, dependent upon him for support, and devoted to his objects. To the eye of an impartial observer in Greece, it seemed as if all these cities had been converted into dependencies of Sparta, and were intended to be held in that condition; under Spartan authority, exercised by and through Lysander.[413] Instead of that general freedom which had been promised as an incentive to revolt against Athens, a Spartan empire had been constituted in place of the extinct Athenian, with a tribute, amounting to a thousand talents annually, intended to be assessed upon the component cities and islands.[414] Such at least was the scheme of Lysander, though it never reached complete execution.

It is easy to see that under such a state of feeling on the part of the allies of Sparta, the enormities perpetrated by the Thirty at Athens and by the Lysandrian dekadarchies in the other cities, would be heard with sympathy for the sufferers, and without that strong anti-Athenian sentiment which had reigned a few months before. But what was of still greater importance, even at Sparta itself, opposition began to spring up against the measures and the person of Lysander. If the leading men at Sparta had felt jealous even of Brasidas, who offended them only by unparalleled success and merit as a commander,[415] much more would the same feeling be aroused against Lysander, who displayed an overweening insolence, and was worshipped with an ostentatious flattery, not inferior to that of Pausanias after the battle of Platæa. Another Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax, was now king of Sparta, in conjunction with Agis. Upon him the feeling of jealousy against Lysander told with especial force, as it did afterwards upon Agesilaus, the successor of Agis; not unaccompanied probably with suspicion, which subsequent events justified, that Lysander was aiming at some interference with the regal privileges. Nor is it unfair to suppose that Pausanias was animated by motives more patriotic than mere jealousy, and that the rapacious cruelty, which everywhere dishonored the new oligarchies, both shocked his better feelings and inspired him with fears for the stability of the system. A farther circumstance which weakened the influence of Lysander at Sparta was the annual change of ephors, which took place about the end of September or beginning of October. Those ephors under whom his grand success and the capture of Athens had been consummated, and who had lent themselves entirely to his views, passed out of office in September 404 B.C., and gave place to others more disposed to second Pausanias.

I remarked, in the preceding chapter, how much more honorable for Sparta, and how much less unfortunate for Athens and for the rest of Greece, the close of the Peloponnesian war would have been, if Kallikratidas had gained and survived the battle of Arginusæ, so as to close it then, and to acquire for himself that personal ascendency which the victorious general was sure to exercise over the numerous rearrangements consequent on peace. We see how important the personal character of

the general so placed was, when we follow the proceedings of Lysander during the year after the battle of Ægospotami. His personal views were the grand determining circumstance throughout Greece; regulating both the measures of Sparta, and the fate of the conquered cities. Throughout the latter, rapacious and cruel oligarchies were organized,—of Ten in most cities, but of Thirty in Athens,—all acting under the power and protection of Sparta, but in real subordination to his ambition. Because he happened to be under the influence of a selfish thirst for power, the measures of Sparta were divested not merely of all Pan-Hellenic spirit, but even, to a great degree, of reference to her own confederates, and concentrated upon the acquisition of imperial preponderance for herself. Now if Kallikratidas had been the ascendent person at this critical juncture, not only such narrow and baneful impulses would have been comparatively inoperative, but the leading state would have been made to set the example of recommending, of organizing, and if necessary, of enforcing arrangements favorable to Pan-Hellenic brotherhood. Kallikratidas would not only have refused to lend himself to dekadarchies governing by his force and for his purposes, in the subordinate cities, but he would have discountenanced such conspiracies, wherever they tended to arise spontaneously. No ruffian like Kritias, no crafty schemer like Theramenês, would have reckoned upon his aid as they presumed upon the friendship of Lysander. Probably he would have left the government of each city to its own natural tendencies, oligarchical or democratical; interfering only in special cases of actual and pronounced necessity. Now the influence of an ascendent state, employed for such purposes, and emphatically discarding all private ends for the accomplishment of a stable Pan-Hellenic sentiment and fraternity; employed too thus, at a moment when so many of the Greek towns were in the throes of reorganization, having to take up a new political course in reference to the altered circumstances, is an element of which the force could hardly have failed to be prodigious as well as beneficial. What degree of positive good might have been wrought, by a noble-minded victor under such special circumstances, we cannot presume to affirm in detail. But it would have been no mean advantage, to have preserved Greece from beholding and feeling such enormous powers in the hands of a man like Lysander; through whose management the worst tendencies of an imperial city were studiously magnified by the exorbitance of individual ambition. It was to him exclusively that the Thirty in Athens, and the dekadarchies elsewhere, owed both their existence and their means of oppression.

It has been necessary thus to explain the general changes which had gone on in Greece and in Grecian feeling during the eight months succeeding the capture of Athens in March 404 B.C., in order that we may understand the position of the Thirty oligarchs, or Tyrants, at Athens, and of the Athenian population both in Attica and in exile, about the beginning of December in the same year, the period which we have now reached. We see how it was that Thebes, Corinth, and Megara, who in March had been the bitterest enemies of the Athenians, had now become alienated both from Sparta and from the Lysandrian Thirty, whom they viewed as viceroys of Athens

for separate Spartan benefit. We see how the basis was thus laid of sympathy for the suffering exiles who fled from Attica; a feeling which the recital of the endless enormities perpetrated by Kritias and his colleagues inflamed every day more and more. We discern at the same time how the Thirty, while thus incurring enmity both in and out of Attica, were at the same time losing the hearty support of Sparta, from the decline of Lysander's influence, and the growing opposition of his rivals at home.

In spite of formal prohibition from Sparta, obtained doubtless under the influence of Lysander, the Athenian emigrants had obtained shelter in all the states bordering on Attica. It was from Bœotia that they struck the first blow. Thrasybulus, Anytus, and Archinus, starting from Thebes with the sympathy of the Theban public, and with substantial aid from Ismenias and other wealthy citizens,—at the head of a small band of exiles stated variously at thirty, sixty, seventy, or somewhat above one hundred men,[416]—seized Phylê, a frontier fortress in the mountains north of Attica, lying on the direct road between Athens and Thebes. Probably it had no garrison; for the Thirty, acting in the interest of Lacedæmonian predominance, had dismantled all the outlying fortresses in Attica;[417] so that Thrasybulus accomplished his purpose without resistance. The Thirty marched out from Athens to attack him, at the head of a powerful force, comprising the Lacedæmonian hoplites who formed their guard, the Three Thousand privileged citizens, and all the knights, or horsemen. Probably the small company of Thrasybulus was reinforced by fresh accessions of exiles, as soon as he was known to have occupied the fort. For by the time that the Thirty with their assailing force arrived, he was in condition to repel a vigorous assault made by the younger soldiers, with considerable loss to the aggressors.

Disappointed in this direct attack, the Thirty laid plans for blockading Phylê, where they knew that there was no stock of provisions. But hardly had their operations commenced, when a snow-storm fell, so abundant and violent, that they were forced to abandon their position and retire to Athens, leaving much of their baggage in the hands of the garrison at Phylê. In the language of Thrasybulus, this storm was characterized as providential, since the weather had been very fine until the moment preceding, and since it gave time to receive reinforcements which made him seven hundred strong.[418] Though the weather was such that the Thirty did not choose to keep their main force in the neighborhood of Phylê, and perhaps the Three Thousand themselves were not sufficiently hearty in the cause to allow it, yet they sent their Lacedæmonians and two tribes of Athenian horsemen to restrain the excursions of the garrison. This body Thrasybulus contrived to attack by surprise. Descending from Phylê by night, he halted within a quarter of a mile of their position until a little before daybreak, when the night-watch had just broken up,[419] and when the grooms were making a noise in rubbing down the horses. Just at that moment, the hoplites from Phylê rushed upon them at a running pace, found every man unprepared, and some even in their beds, and dispersed them with scarcely any resistance. One hundred and twenty hoplites and a few horsemen were slain, while abun-

dance of arms and stores were captured and carried back to Phylê in triumph.[420] News of the defeat was speedily conveyed to the city, from whence the remaining horsemen immediately came forth to the rescue, but could do nothing more than protect the carrying off of the dead.

This successful engagement sensibly changed the relative situation of parties in Attica; encouraging the exiles as much as it depressed the Thirty. Even among the partisans of the latter at Athens, dissension began to arise; the minority which had sympathized with Theramenês, as well as that portion of the Three Thousand who were least compromised as accomplices in the recent enormities, began to waver so manifestly in their allegiance, that Kritias and his colleagues felt some doubt of being able to maintain themselves in the city. They resolved to secure Eleusis and the island of Salamis, as places of safety and resource in case of being compelled to evacuate Athens. They accordingly went to Eleusis with a considerable number of the Athenian horsemen, under pretence of examining into the strength of the place and the number of its defenders, so as to determine what amount of farther garrison would be necessary. All the Eleusinians disposed and qualified for armed service, were ordered to come in person and give in their names to the Thirty,[421] in a building having its postern opening on to the sea-beach; along which were posted the horsemen and the attendants from Athens. Each Eleusinian hoplite, after having presented himself and returned his name to the Thirty, was ordered to pass out through this exit, where each man successively found himself in the power of the horsemen, and was fettered by the attendants. Lysimachus, the hipparch, or commander of the horsemen, was directed to convey all these prisoners to Athens, and hand them over to the custody of the Eleven.[422] Having thus seized and carried away from Eleusis every citizen whose sentiments or whose energy they suspected, and having left a force of their own adherents in the place, the Thirty returned to Athens. At the same time, it appears, a similar visit and seizure of prisoners was made by some of them in Salamis.[423] On the next day, they convoked at Athens all their Three Thousand privileged hoplites—together with all the remaining horsemen who had not been employed at Eleusis or Salamis—in the Odeon, half of which was occupied by the Lacedæmonian garrison all under arms. "Gentlemen (said Kritias, addressing his countrymen), we keep up the government not less for your benefit than for our own. You must therefore share with us in the danger, as well as in the honor, of our position. Here are these Eleusinian prisoners awaiting sentence; you must pass a vote condemning them all to death, in order that your hopes and fears may be identified with ours." He then pointed to a spot immediately before him and in his view, directing each man to deposit upon it his pebble of condemnation visibly to every one.[424] I have before remarked that at Athens, open voting was well known to be the same thing as voting under constraint; there was no security for free and genuine suffrage except by making it secret as well as numerous. Kritias was obeyed, without reserve or exception; probably any dissentient would have been put to death on the spot. All

the prisoners, seemingly three hundred in number,[425] were condemned by the same vote, and executed forthwith.

Though this atrocity gave additional satisfaction and confidence to the most violent friends of Kritias, it probably alienated a greater number of others, and weakened the Thirty instead of strengthening them. It contributed in part, we can hardly doubt, to the bold and decisive resolution now taken by Thrasybulus, five days after his late success, of marching by night from Phylê to Peiræus.[426] His force, though somewhat increased, was still no more than one thousand men; altogether inadequate by itself to any considerable enterprise, had he not counted on positive support and junction from fresh comrades, together with a still greater amount of negative support from disgust or indifference towards the Thirty. He was indeed speedily joined by many sympathizing countrymen; but few of them, since the general disarming manœuvre of the oligarchs, had heavy armor. Some had light shields and darts, but others were wholly unarmed, and could merely serve as throwers of stones.[427]

Peiræus was at this moment an open town, deprived of its fortifications as well as of those Long Walls which had so long connected it with Athens. It was however of large compass, and required an ampler force to defend it than Thrasybulus could muster. Accordingly, when the Thirty marched out of Athens the next morning to attack him, with their full force of Athenian hoplites and horsemen, and with the Lacedæmonian garrison besides, he in vain attempted to maintain against them the great carriage-road which led down to Peiræus. He was compelled to concentrate his forces in Munychia, the easternmost portion of the aggregate called Peiræus, nearest to the bay of Phalêrum, and comprising one of those three ports which had once sustained the naval power of Athens. Thrasybulus occupied the temple of Artemis Munychia, and the adjoining Bendideion, situated in the midst of Munychia, and accessible only by a street of steep ascent. In the rear of his hoplites, whose files were ten deep, were posted the darters and slingers: the ascent being so steep that these latter could cast their missiles over the heads of the hoplites in their front. Presently Kritias and the Thirty, having first mustered in the market-place of Peiræus, called the Hippodamian agora, were seen approaching with their superior numbers; mounting the hill in close array, with hoplites not less than fifty in depth. Thrasybulus, after an animated exhortation to his soldiers, in which he reminded them of the wrongs which they had to avenge, and dwelt upon the advantages of their position, which exposed the close ranks of the enemy to the destructive effect of missiles, and would force them to crouch under their shields so as to be unable to resist a charge with the spear in front, waited patiently until they came within distance, standing in the foremost rank with the prophet—habitually consulted before a battle—by his side. The latter, a brave and devoted patriot, while promising victory, had exhorted his comrades not to charge until some one on their own side should be slain or wounded: he at the same time predicted his own death in the conflict. When the

troops of the Thirty advanced near enough in ascending the hill, the light-armed in the rear of Thrasybulus poured upon them a shower of darts over the heads of their own hoplites, with considerable effect. As they seemed to waver, seeking to cover themselves with their shields, and thus not seeing well before them, the prophet, himself seemingly in arms, set the example of rushing forward, was the first to close with the enemy, and perished in the onset. Thrasybulus with the main body of hoplites followed him, charged vigorously down the hill, and after a smart resistance, drove them back in disorder, with the loss of seventy men. What was of still greater moment, Kritias and Hippomachus, who headed their troops on the left, were among the slain; together with Charmidês son of Glaukon, one of the ten oligarchs who had been placed to manage Peiræus.[428]

This great and important advantage left the troops of Thrasybulus in possession of seventy of the enemy's dead, whom they stripped of their arms, but not of their clothing, in token of respect for fellow-countrymen.[429] So disheartened, lukewarm, and disunited were the hoplites of the Thirty, in spite of their great superiority of number, that they sent to solicit the usual truce for burying the dead. This was of course granted, and the two contending parties became intermingled with each other in the performance of the funeral duties. Amidst so impressive a scene, their common feelings as Athenians and fellow-countrymen were forcibly brought back, and many friendly observations were interchanged among them. Kleokritus—herald of the mysts, or communicants in the Eleusinian mysteries, belonging to one of the most respected gentes in the state—was among the exiles. His voice was peculiarly loud, and the function which he held enabled him to obtain silence while he addressed to the citizens serving with the Thirty a touching and emphatic remonstrance: "Why are you thus driving us into banishment, fellow-citizens? Why are you seeking to kill us? We have never done you the least harm; we have partaken with you in religious rites and festivals; we have been your companions in chorus, in school, and in army; we have braved a thousand dangers with you, by land and sea, in defence of our common safety and freedom. I adjure you by our common gods, paternal and maternal, by our common kindred and companionship, desist from thus wronging your country in obedience to these nefarious Thirty, who have slain as many citizens in eight months, for their own private gains, as the Peloponnesians in ten years of war. These are the men who have plunged us into wicked and odious war one against another, when we might live together in peace. Be assured that your slain in this battle have cost us as many tears as they have cost you."[430]

Such affecting appeals, proceeding from a man of respected station like Kleokritus, and doubtless from others also, began to work so sensibly on the minds of the citizens from Athens, that the Thirty were obliged to give orders for immediately returning, which Thrasybulus did not attempt to prevent, though it might have been in his power to do so.[431] But their ascendency had received a shock from which it never fully recovered. On the next day they appeared downcast and dispirited in the

senate, which was itself thinly attended; while the privileged Three Thousand, marshalled in different companies on guard, were everywhere in discord and partial mutiny. Those among them who had been most compromised in the crimes of the Thirty, were strenuous in upholding the existing authority; while such as had been less guilty protested against the continuance of such unholy war, and declared that the Thirty should not be permitted to bring Athens to utter ruin. And though the horsemen still continued steadfast partisans, resolutely opposing all accommodation with the exiles,[432] yet the Thirty were farther weakened by the death of Kritias, the ascendent and decisive head, and at the same time the most cruel and unprincipled among them; while that party, both in the senate and out of it, which had formerly adhered to Theramenês, now again raised its head. A public meeting among them was held, in which what may be called the opposition-party among the Thirty, that which had opposed the extreme enormities of Kritias, became predominant. It was determined to depose the Thirty, and to constitute a fresh oligarchy of Ten, one from each tribe.[433] But the members of the Thirty were individually reëligible; so that two of them, Eratosthenês and Pheidon, if not more, adherents of Theramenês and unfriendly to Kritias and Chariklês,[434] with others of the same vein of sentiment, were chosen among the Ten. Chariklês and the more violent members, having thus lost their ascendency, no longer deemed themselves safe at Athens, but retired to Eleusis, which they had had the precaution to occupy beforehand. Probably a number of their partisans, and the Lacedæmonian garrison also, retired thither along with them.

The nomination of this new oligarchy of Ten was plainly a compromise, adopted by some from sincere disgust at the oligarchical system, and desire to come to accommodation with the exiles; by others, from a conviction that the only way of maintaining the oligarchical system, and repelling the exiles, was to constitute a new oligarchical Board, dismissing that which had become obnoxious. The latter was the purpose of the horsemen, the main upholders of the first Board as well as of the second; and such also was soon seen to be the policy of Eratosthenês and his colleagues. Instead of attempting to agree upon terms of accommodation with the exiles in Peiræus generally, they merely tried to corrupt separately Thrasybulus and the leaders, offering to admit ten of them to a share of the oligarchical power at Athens, provided they would betray their party. This offer having been indignantly refused, the war was again resumed between Athens and Peiræus, to the bitter disappointment, not less of the exiles than of that portion of the Athenians who had hoped better things from the new Board of Ten.[435]

But the forces of oligarchy were seriously enfeebled at Athens,[436] as well by the secession of all the more violent spirits to Eleusis, as by the mistrust, discord, and disaffection which now reigned within the city. Far from being able to abuse power like their predecessors, the Ten did not even fully confide in their three thousand hoplites, but were obliged to take measures for the defence of the city in conjunction

with the hipparch and the horsemen, who did double duty,—on horseback in the daytime, and as hoplites with their shields along the walls at night, for fear of surprise,—employing the Odeon as their head-quarters. The Ten sent envoys to Sparta to solicit farther aid; while the Thirty sent envoys thither also, from Eleusis, for the same purpose; both representing that the Athenian people had revolted from Sparta, and required farther force to reconquer them.[437]

Such foreign aid became daily more necessary to them, since the forces of Thrasybulus in Peiræus grew stronger, before their eyes, in numbers, in arms, and in hope of success; exerting themselves, with successful energy, to procure additional arms and shields, though some of the shields, indeed, were no better than woodwork or wicker-work whitened over.[438] Many exiles flocked in to their aid, while others sent donations of money or arms: among the latter, the orator Lysias stood conspicuous, transmitting to Peiræus a present of two hundred shields as well as two thousand drachms in money, and hiring besides three hundred fresh soldiers; while his friend Thrasydæus, the leader of the democratical interest at Elis, was induced to furnish a loan of two talents.[439] Others also lent money; some Bœotians furnished two talents, and a person named Gelarchus contributed the large sum of five talents, repaid in after times by the people.[440] Proclamation was made by Thrasybulus, that all metics who would lend aid should be put on the footing of isotely, or equal payment of taxes with citizens, exempt from the metic-tax and other special burdens. Within a short time he had got together a considerable force both in heavy-armed and light-armed, and even seventy horsemen; so that he was in condition to make excursions out of Peiræus, and to collect wood and provisions. Nor did the Ten venture to make any aggressive movement out of Athens, except so far as to send out the horsemen, who slew or captured stragglers from the force of Thrasybulus. Lysimachus the hipparch, the same who had commanded under the Thirty at the seizure of the Eleusinian citizens, having made prisoners some young Athenians, bringing in provisions from the country for the consumption of the troops in Peiræus, put them to death, in spite of remonstrances from several even of his own men; for which cruelty Thrasybulus retaliated, by putting to death a horseman named Kallistratus, made prisoner in one of their marches to the neighboring villages.[441]

In the established civil war which now raged in Attica, Thrasybulus and the exiles in Peiræus had decidedly the advantage; maintaining the offensive, while the Ten in Athens, and the remainder of the Thirty at Eleusis, were each thrown upon their defence. The division of the oligarchical force into these two sections doubtless weakened both, while the democrats in Peiræus were hearty and united. Presently, however, the arrival of a Spartan auxiliary force altered the balance of parties. Lysander, whom the oligarchical envoys had expressly requested to be sent to them as general, prevailed with the ephors to grant their request. While he himself went to Eleusis and got together a Peloponnesian land-force, his brother Libys conducted a fleet of forty triremes to block up Peiræus, and one hundred talents were lent to the Athe-

nian oligarchs out of the large sum recently brought from Asia into the Spartan treasury.[442]

The arrival of Lysander brought the two sections of oligarchs in Attica again into coöperation, restrained the progress of Thrasybulus, and even reduced Peiræus to great straits by preventing all entry of ships or stores. Nor could anything have prevented it from being reduced to surrender, if Lysander had been allowed free scope in his operations. But the general sentiment of Greece had by this time become disgusted with his ambitious policy, and with the oligarchies which he had everywhere set up as his instruments; a sentiment not without influence on the feelings of the leading Spartans, who, already jealous of his ascendency, were determined not to increase it farther by allowing him to conquer Attica a second time, in order to plant his own creatures as rulers at Athens.[443]

Under the influence of these feelings, king Pausanias obtained the consent of three out of the five ephors to undertake himself an expedition into Attica, at the head of the forces of the confederacy, for which he immediately issued proclamation. Opposed to the political tendencies of Lysander, he was somewhat inclined to sympathize with the democracy, not merely at Athens, but elsewhere also, as at Mantineia. [444] It was probably understood that his intentions towards Athens were lenient and anti-Lysandrian, so that the Peloponnesian allies obeyed the summons generally: yet the Bœotians and Corinthians still declined, on the ground that Athens had done nothing to violate the late convention; a remarkable proof of the altered feelings of Greece during the last year, since, down to the period of that convention, these two states had been more bitterly hostile to Athens than any others in the confederacy. They suspected that even the expedition of Pausanias was projected with selfish Lacedæmonian views, to secure Attica as a separate dependency of Sparta, though detached from Lysander.[445]

On approaching Athens, Pausanias, joined by Lysander and the forces already in Attica, encamped in the garden of the Academy, near the city gates. His sentiments were sufficiently known beforehand to offer encouragement; so that the vehement reaction against the atrocities of the Thirty, which the presence of Lysander had doubtless stifled, burst forth without delay. The surviving relatives of the victims slain beset him even at the Academy in his camp, with prayers for protection and cries of vengeance against the oligarchs. Among those victims, as I have already stated, were Nikêratus the son, and Eukratês the brother, of Nikias who had perished at Syracuse, the friend and proxenus of Sparta at Athens. The orphan children, both of Nikêratus and Eukratês, were taken to Pausanias by their relative Diognêtus, who implored his protection for them, recounting at the same time the unmerited execution of their respective fathers, and setting forth their family claims upon the justice of Sparta. This affecting incident, which has been specially made known to us,[446] doubtless did not stand alone, among so many families suffering from the same cause. Pausanias was furnished at once with ample grounds, not merely for repudiat-

ing the Thirty altogether, and sending back the presents which they tendered to him, [447] but even for refusing to identify himself unreservedly with the new oligarchy of Ten which had risen upon their ruins. The voice of complaint—now for the first time set free, with some hopes of redress—must have been violent and unmeasured, after such a career as that of Kritias and his colleagues; while the fact was now fully manifested, which could not well have come forth into evidence before, that the persons despoiled and murdered had been chiefly opulent men, and very frequently even oligarchical men, not politicians of the former democracy. Both Pausanias, and the Lacedæmonians along with him, on reaching Athens, must have been strongly affected by the facts which they learned, and by the loud cry for sympathy and redress which poured upon them from the most innocent and respected families. The predisposition both of the king and the ephors against the policy of Lysander was materially strengthened, as well as their inclination to bring about an accommodation of parties, instead of upholding by foreign force an anti-popular Few.

Such convictions would become farther confirmed as Pausanias saw and heard more of the real state of affairs. At first, he held a language decidedly adverse to Thrasybulus and the exiles, sending to them a herald, and requiring them to disband and go to their respective homes.[448] The requisition not being obeyed, he made a faint attack upon Peiræus, which had no effect. Next day he marched down with two Lacedæmonian moræ, or large military divisions, and three tribes of the Athenian horsemen, to reconnoitre the place, and see where a line of blockade could be drawn. Some light troops annoyed him, but his troops repulsed them, and pursued them even as far as the theatre of Peiræus, where all the forces of Thrasybulus were mustered, heavy-armed, as well as light-armed. The Lacedæmonians were here in a disadvantageous position, probably in the midst of houses and streets, so that all the light-armed of Thrasybulus were enabled to set upon them furiously from different sides, and drive them out again with loss, two of the Spartan polemarchs being here slain. Pausanias was obliged to retreat to a little eminence about half a mile off, where he mustered his whole force, and formed his hoplites into a very deep phalanx. Thrasybulus on his side was so encouraged by the recent success of his light-armed, that he ventured to bring out his heavy-armed, only eight deep, to an equal conflict on the open ground. But he was here completely worsted, and driven back into Peiræus with the loss of one hundred and fifty men; so that the Spartan king was able to retire to Athens after a victory, and a trophy erected to commemorate it. [449]

The issue of this battle was one extremely fortunate for Thrasybulus and his comrades; since it left the honors of the day with Pausanias, so as to avoid provoking enmity or vengeance on his part, while it showed plainly that the conquest of Peiræus, defended by so much courage and military efficiency, would be no easy matter. It disposed Pausanias still farther towards an accommodation; strengthening also the force of that party in Athens which was favorable to the same object, and adverse to

the Ten oligarchs. This opposition-party found decided favor with the Spartan king, as well as with the ephor Naukleidas, who was present along with him. Numbers of Athenians, even among those Three Thousand by whom the city was now exclusively occupied, came forward to deprecate farther war with Peiræus, and to entreat that Pausanias would settle the quarrel so as to leave them all at amity with Lacedæmon. Xenophon, indeed, according to that narrow and partial spirit which pervades his Hellenica, notices no sentiment in Pausanias except his jealousy of Lysander, and treats the opposition against the Ten at Athens as having been got up by his intrigues.[450] But it seems plain that this is not a correct account. Pausanias did not create the discord, but found it already existing, and had to choose which of the parties he would adopt. The Ten took up the oligarchical game after it had been thoroughly dishonored and ruined by the Thirty: they inspired no confidence, nor had they any hold upon the citizens in Athens, except in so far as these latter dreaded reactionary violence, in case Thrasybulus and his companions should reënter by force; accordingly, when Pausanias was there at the head of a force competent to prevent such dangerous reaction, the citizens at once manifested their dispositions against the Ten, and favorable to peace with Peiræus. To second this pacific party was at once the easiest course for Pausanias to take, and the most likely to popularize Sparta in Greece; whereas, he would surely have entailed upon her still more bitter curses from without, not to mention the loss of men to herself, if he had employed the amount of force requisite to uphold the Ten, and subdue Peiræus. To all this we have to add his jealousy of Lysander, as an important predisposing motive, but only as auxiliary among many others.

Under such a state of facts, it is not surprising to learn that Pausanias encouraged solicitations for peace from Thrasybulus and the exiles, and that he granted them a truce to enable them to send envoys to Sparta. Along with these envoys went Kephisophon and Melitus, sent for the same purpose of entreating peace, by the party opposed to the Ten at Athens, under the sanction both of Pausanias and of the accompanying ephors. On the other hand, the Ten, finding themselves discountenanced by Pausanias, sent envoys of their own to outbid the others. They tendered themselves, their walls, and their city, to be dealt with as the Lacedæmonians chose; requiring that Thrasybulus, if he pretended to be the friend of Sparta, should make the same unqualified surrender of Peiræus and Munychia. All the three sets of envoys were heard before the ephors remaining at Sparta and the Lacedæmonian assembly; who took the best resolution which the case admitted, to bring to pass an amicable settlement between Athens and Peiræus, and to leave the terms to be fixed by fifteen commissioners, who were sent thither forthwith to sit in conjunction with Pausanias. This Board determined, that the exiles in Peiræus should be readmitted to Athens, that an accommodation should take place, and that no man should be molested for past acts, except the Thirty, the Eleven (who had been the instruments of all executions), and the Ten who had governed in Peiræus. But Eleusis was recognized as a government separate from Athens, and left, as it already was, in posses-

sion of the Thirty and their coadjutors, to serve as a refuge for all those who might feel their future safety compromised at Athens in consequence of their past conduct. [451]

As soon as these terms were proclaimed, accepted, and sworn to by all parties, Pausanias with all the Lacedæmonians evacuated Attica. Thrasybulus and the exiles marched up in solemn procession from Peiræus to Athens. Their first act was to go up to the acropolis, now relieved from its Lacedæmonian garrison, and there to offer sacrifice and thanksgiving. On descending from thence, a general assembly was held, in which—unanimously and without opposition, as it should seem—the democracy was restored. The government of the Ten, which could have no basis except the sword of the foreigner, disappeared as a matter of course; but Thrasybulus, while he strenuously enforced upon his comrades from Peiræus a full respect for the oaths which they had sworn, and an unreserved harmony with their newly acquired fellow-citizens, admonished the assembly emphatically as to the past events. "You city-men (he said), I advise you to take just measure of yourselves for the future; and to calculate fairly, what ground of superiority you have, so as to pretend to rule over us? Are you juster than we? Why the demos, though poorer than you, never at any time wronged you for purposes of plunder; while you, the wealthiest of all, have done many base deeds for the sake of gain. Since then you have no justice to boast of, are you superior to us on the score of courage? There cannot be a better trial, than the war which has just ended. Again, can you pretend to be superior in policy? you, who, having a fortified city, an armed force, plenty of money, and the Peloponnesians for your allies, have been overcome by men who had nothing of the kind to aid them? Can you boast of your hold over the Lacedæmonians? Why, they have just handed you over, like a vicious dog with a clog tied to him, to the very demos whom you have wronged, and are now gone out of the country. But you have no cause to be uneasy for the future. I adjure you, my friends from Peiræus, in no point to violate the oaths which we have just sworn. Show, in addition to your other glorious exploits, that you are honest and true to your engagements."[452]

The archons, the senate of Five Hundred, the public assembly, and the dikasteries, appear to have been now revived, as they had stood in the democracy prior to the capture of the city by Lysander. This important restoration seems to have taken place some time in the spring of 403 B.C., though we cannot exactly make out in what month. The first archon now drawn was Eukleidês, who gave his name to this memorable year; a year never afterwards forgotten by Athenians.

Eleusis was at this time, and pursuant to the late convention, a city independent and separate from Athens, under the government of the Thirty, and comprising their warmest partisans. It was not likely that this separation would last; but the Thirty were themselves the parties to give cause for its termination. They were getting together a mercenary force at Eleusis, when the whole force of Athens was marched to forestall their designs. The generals at Eleusis came forth to demand a conference,

but were seized and put to death; the Thirty themselves, and a few of the most obnoxious individuals, fled out of Attica; while the rest of the Eleusinian occupants were persuaded by their friends from Athens to come to an equal and honorable accommodation. Again Eleusis became incorporated in the same community with Athens, oaths of mutual amnesty and harmony being sworn by every one.[453]

We have now passed that short, but bitter and sanguinary interval, occupied by the Thirty, which succeeded so immediately upon the extinction of the empire and independence of Athens as to leave no opportunity for pause or reflection. A few words respecting the rise and fall of that empire are now required, summing up as it were the political moral of the events recorded in my last two volumes, between 477 and 405 B.C.

I related, in the forty-fifth chapter, the steps by which Athens first acquired her empire, raised it to its maximum, including both maritime and inland dominion, then lost the inland portion of it; which loss was ratified by the Thirty Years Truce concluded with Sparta and the Peloponnesian confederacy in 445 B.C. Her maritime empire was based upon the confederacy of Delos, formed by the islands in the Ægean and the towns on the seaboard immediately after the battles of Platæa and Mykalê, for the purpose not merely of expelling the Persians from the Ægean, but of keeping them away permanently. To the accomplishment of this important object, Sparta was altogether inadequate; nor would it ever have been accomplished, if Athens had not displayed a combination of military energy, naval discipline, power of organization, and honorable devotion to a great Pan-Hellenic purpose, such as had never been witnessed in Grecian history.

The confederacy of Delos was formed by the free and spontaneous association of many different towns, all alike independent; towns which met in synod and deliberated by equal vote, took by their majority resolutions binding upon all, and chose Athens as their chief to enforce these resolutions, as well as to superintend generally the war against the common enemy. But it was, from the beginning, a compact which permanently bound each individual state to the remainder. None had liberty either to recede, or to withhold the contingent imposed by authority of the common synod, or to take any separate step inconsistent with its obligations to the confederacy. No union less stringent than this could have prevented the renewal of Persian ascendency in the Ægean. Seceding or disobedient states were thus treated as guilty of treason or revolt, which it was the duty of Athens, as chief, to repress. Her first repressions, against Naxos and other states, were undertaken in prosecution of this duty, in which if she had been wanting, the confederacy would have fallen to pieces, and the common enemy would have reappeared.

Now the only way by which the confederacy was saved from falling to pieces, was by being transformed into an Athenian empire. Such transformation, as Thucydidês plainly intimates,[454] did not arise from the ambition or deep-laid projects of Athens, but from the reluctance of the larger confederates to discharge the obligations imposed by the common synod, and from the unwarlike character of the confederates generally, which made them desirous to commute military service for money-payment, while Athens on her part was not less anxious to perform the service and obtain the money. By gradual and unforeseen stages, Athens thus passed from consulate to empire: in such manner that no one could point out the precise moment of time when the confederacy of Delos ceased, and when the empire began. Even the transfer of the common fund from Delos to Athens, which was the palpable manifestation of a change already realized, was not an act of high-handed injustice in the Athenians, but warranted by prudential views of the existing state of affairs, and even proposed by a leading member of the confederacy.[455]

But the Athenian empire came to include (between 460-446 B.C.) other cities, not parties to the confederacy of Delos. Athens had conquered her ancient enemy the island of Ægina, and had acquired supremacy over Megara, Bœotia, Phocis, and Lokris, and Achaia in Peloponnesus. The Megarians joined her to escape the oppression of their neighbor Corinth: her influence over Bœotia was acquired by allying herself with a democratical party in the Bœotian cities, against Sparta, who had been actively interfering to sustain the opposite party and to renovate the ascendency of Thebes. Athens was, for the time, successful in all these enterprises; but if we follow the details, we shall not find her more open to reproach on the score of aggressive tendencies than Sparta or Corinth. Her empire was now at its maximum; and had she been able to maintain it,—or even to keep possession of the Megarid separately, which gave her the means of barring out all invasions from Peloponnesus,—the future course of Grecian history would have been materially altered. But her empire on land did not rest upon the same footing as her empire at sea. The exiles in Megara and Bœotia, etc., and the anti-Athenian party generally in those places,—combined with the rashness of her general Tolmidês at Korôneia,—deprived her of all her land-dependencies near home, and even threatened her with the loss of Eubœa. The peace concluded in 445 B.C. left her with all her maritime and insular empire, including Eubœa, but with nothing more; while by the loss of Megara she was now open to invasion from Peloponnesus.

On this footing she remained at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war fourteen years afterwards. I have shown that that war did not arise, as has been so often asserted, from aggressive or ambitious schemes on the part of Athens, but that, on the contrary, the aggression was all on the side of her enemies; who were full of hopes that they could put her down with little delay; while she was not merely conservative and defensive, but even discouraged by the certainty of destructive invasion, and only dissuaded from concessions, alike imprudent and inglorious, by the extraordi-

nary influence and resolute wisdom of Periklês. That great man comprehended well both the conditions and the limits of Athenian empire. Athens was now understood, especially since the revolt and reconquest of the powerful island of Samos in 440 B.C., by her subjects and enemies as well as by her own citizens, to be mistress of the sea. It was the care of Periklês to keep that belief within definite boundaries, and to prevent all waste of the force of the city in making new or distant acquisitions which could not be permanently maintained. But it was also his care to enforce upon his countrymen the lesson of maintaining their existing empire unimpaired, and shrinking from no effort requisite for that end. Though their whole empire was now staked upon the chances of a perilous war, he did not hesitate to promise them success, provided that they adhered to this conservative policy.

Following the events of the war, we shall find that Athens did adhere to it for the first seven years; years of suffering and trial, from the destructive annual invasion, the yet more destructive pestilence, and the revolt of Mitylênê, but years which still left her empire unimpaired, and the promises of Periklês in fair chance of being realized. In the seventh year of the war occurred the unexpected victory at Sphakteria and the capture of the Lacedæmonian prisoners. This placed in the hands of the Athenians a capital advantage, imparting to them prodigious confidence of future success, while their enemies were in a proportional degree disheartened. It was in this temper that they first departed from the conservative precept of Periklês, and attempted to recover (in 424 B.C.) both Megara and Bœotia. Had the great statesman been alive,[456] he might have turned this moment of superiority to better account, and might perhaps have contrived even to get possession of Megara—a point of unspeakable importance to Athens, since it protected her against invasion—in exchange for the Spartan captives. But the general feeling of confidence which then animated all parties at Athens, determined them in 424 B.C. to grasp at this and much more by force. They tried to reconquer both Megara and Bœotia: in the former they failed, though succeeding so far as to capture Nisæa; in the latter they not only failed, but suffered the disastrous defeat of Delium.

It was in the autumn of that same year 424 B.C., too, that Brasidas broke into their empire in Thrace, and robbed them of Akanthus, Stageira, and some other towns, including their most precious possession, Amphipolis. Again, it seems that the Athenians, partly from the discouragement caused by the disaster at Delium, partly from the ascendency of Nikias and the peace party, departed from the conservative policy of Periklês; not by ambitious over-action, but by inaction, omitting to do all that might have been done to arrest the progress of Brasidas. We must, however, never forget that their capital loss, Amphipolis, was owing altogether to the improvidence of their officers, and could not have been obviated even by Periklês.

But though that great man could not have prevented the loss, he would assuredly have deemed no efforts too great to recover it; and in this respect his policy was espoused by Kleon, in opposition to Nikias and the peace party. The latter thought it

wise to make the truce for a year; which so utterly failed of its effect, that Nikias was obliged, even in the midst of it, to conduct an armament to Pallênê in order to preserve the empire against yet farther losses. Still, Nikias and his friends would hear of nothing but peace; and after the expedition of Kleon against Amphipolis in the ensuing year, which failed partly through his military incapacity, partly through the want of hearty concurrence in his political opponents, they concluded what is called the Peace of Nikias in the ensuing spring. In this, too, their calculations are not less signally falsified than in the previous truce: they stipulate that Amphipolis shall be restored, but it is as far from being restored as ever. To make the error still graver and more irreparable, Nikias, with the concurrence of Alkibiadês contracts the alliance with Sparta a few months after the peace, and gives up the captives, the possession of whom being the only hold which Athens as yet had upon the Spartans.

We thus have, during the four years succeeding the battle of Delium (424-420 B.C.), a series of departures from the conservative policy of Periklês; departures, not in the way of ambitious over-acquisition, but of languor and unwillingness to make efforts even for the recovery of capital losses. Those who see no defects in the foreign policy of the democracy except those of over-ambition and love of war, pursuant to the jest of Aristophanês, overlook altogether these opposite but serious blunders of Nikias and the peace party.

Next comes the ascendency of Alkibiadês, leading to the two years' campaign in Peloponnesus in conjunction with Elis, Argos, and Mantineia, and ending in the complete reëstablishment of Lacedæmonian supremacy. Here was a diversion of Athenian force from its legitimate purpose of preserving or reëstablishing the empire, for inland projects which Periklês could never have approved. The island of Melos undoubtedly fell within his general conceptions of tenable empire for Athens. But we may regard it as certain that he would have recommended no new projects, exposing Athens to the reproach of injustice, so long as the lost legitimate possessions in Thrace remained unconquered.

We now come to the expedition against Syracuse. Down to that period, the empire of Athens, except the possessions in Thrace, remained undiminished, and her general power nearly as great as it had ever been since 445 B.C. That expedition was the one great and fatal departure from the Periklean policy, bringing upon Athens an amount of disaster from which she never recovered; and it was doubtless an error of over-ambition. Acquisitions in Sicily, even if made, lay out of the conditions of permanent empire for Athens; and however imposing the first effect of success might have been, they would only have disseminated her strength, multiplied her enemies, and weakened her in all quarters. But though the expedition itself was thus indisputably ill-advised, and therefore ought to count to the discredit of the public judgment at Athens, we are not to impute to that public an amount of blame in any way commensurate to the magnitude of the disaster, except in so far as they were guilty of unmeasured and unconquerable esteem for Nikias. Though Periklês would have

strenuously opposed the project, yet he could not possibly have foreseen the enormous ruin in which it would end; nor could such ruin have been brought about by any man existing, save Nikias. Even when the people committed the aggravated imprudence of sending out the second expedition, Demosthenês doubtless assured them that he would speedily either take Syracuse or bring back both armaments, with a fair allowance for the losses inseparable from failure; and so he would have done, if the obstinacy of Nikias had permitted. In measuring therefore the extent of misjudgment fairly imputable to the Athenians for this ruinous undertaking, we must always recollect, that first the failure of the siege, next the ruin of the armament, did not arise from intrinsic difficulties in the case, but from the personal defects of the commander.

After the Syracusan disaster, there is no longer any question about adhering to, or departing from, the Periklean policy. Athens is like Patroklus in the Iliad, after Apollo has stunned him by a blow on the back and loosened his armor. Nothing but the slackness of her enemies allowed her time for a partial recovery, so as to make increased heroism a substitute for impaired force, even against doubled and tripled difficulties. And the years of struggle which she now went through are among the most glorious events in her history. These years present many misfortunes, but no serious misjudgment, not to mention one peculiarly honorable moment, after the overthrow of the Four Hundred. I have in the two preceding chapters examined into the blame imputed to the Athenians for not accepting the overtures of peace after the battle of Kyzikus, and for dismissing Alkibiadês after the battle of Notium. On both points their conduct has been shown to be justifiable. And after all, they were on the point of partially recovering themselves in 408 B.C., when the unexpected advent of Cyrus set the seal to their destiny.

The bloodshed after the recapture of Mitylênê and Skionê, and still more that which succeeded the capture of Melos, are disgraceful to the humanity of Athens, and stand in pointed contrast with the treatment of Samos when reconquered by Periklês. But they did not contribute sensibly to break down her power; though, being recollected with aversion after other incidents were forgotten, they are alluded to in later times as if they had caused the fall of the empire.[457]

I have thought it important to recall, in this short summary, the leading events of the seventy years preceding 405 B.C., in order that it may be understood to what degree Athens was politically or prudentially to blame for the great downfall which she then underwent. That downfall had one great cause—we may almost say, one single cause—the Sicilian expedition. The empire of Athens both was, and appeared to be, in exuberant strength when that expedition was sent forth; strength more than sufficient to bear up against all moderate faults or moderate misfortunes, such as no government ever long escapes. But the catastrophe of Syracuse was something overpassing in terrific calamity all Grecian experience and all power of foresight. It was like the Russian campaign of 1812 to the emperor Napoleon; though by no means

imputable, in an equal degree, to vice in the original project. No Grecian power could bear up against such a death-wound, and the prolonged struggle of Athens after it is not the least wonderful part of the whole war.

Nothing in the political history of Greece is so remarkable as the Athenian empire; taking it as it stood in its completeness, from about 460-413 B.C., the date of the Syracusan catastrophe, or still more, from 460-421 B.C., the date when Brasidas made his conquests in Thrace. After the Syracusan catastrophe, the conditions of the empire were altogether changed; it was irretrievably broken up, though Athens still continued an energetic struggle to retain some of the fragments. But if we view it as it had stood before that event, during the period of its integrity, it is a sight marvellous to contemplate, and its working must be pronounced, in my judgment, to have been highly beneficial to the Grecian world. No Grecian state except Athens could have sufficed to organize such a system, or to hold in partial though regulated, continuous, and specific communion, so many little states, each animated with that force of political repulsion instinctive in the Grecian mind. This was a mighty task, worthy of Athens, and to which no state except Athens was competent. We have already seen in part, and we shall see still farther, how little qualified Sparta was to perform it, and we shall have occasion hereafter to notice a like fruitless essay on the part of Thebes.

As in regard to the democracy of Athens generally, so in regard to her empire, it has been customary with historians to take notice of little except the bad side. But my conviction is, and I have shown grounds for it, in chap. xlvii, that the empire of Athens was not harsh and oppressive, as it is commonly depicted. Under the circumstances of her dominion, at a time when the whole transit and commerce of the Ægean was under one maritime system, which excluded all irregular force; when Persian ships of war were kept out of the waters, and Persian tribute-officers away from the seaboard; when the disputes inevitable among so many little communities could be peaceably redressed by the mutual right of application to the tribunals at Athens, and when these tribunals were also such as to present to sufferers a refuge against wrongs done even by individual citizens of Athens herself, to use the expression of the oligarchical Phrynichus,[458] the condition of the maritime Greeks was materially better than it had been before, or than it will be seen to become afterwards. Her empire, if it did not inspire attachment, certainly provoked no antipathy, among the bulk of the citizens of the subject-communities, as is shown by the party-character of the revolts against her. If in her imperial character she exacted obedience, she also fulfilled duties and insured protection to a degree incomparably greater than was ever realized by Sparta. And even if she had been ever so much disposed to cramp the free play of mind and purpose among her subjects,—a disposition which is no way proved,—the very circumstances of her own democracy, with its open antithesis of political parties, universal liberty of speech, and manifold individual energy,

would do much to prevent the accomplishment of such an end, and would act as a stimulus to the dependent communities, even without her own intention.

Without being insensible either to the faults or to the misdeeds of imperial Athens, I believe that her empire was a great comparative benefit, and its extinction a great loss, to her own subjects. But still more do I believe it to have been a good, looked at with reference to Pan-Hellenic interests. Its maintenance furnished the only possibility of keeping out foreign intervention, and leaving the destinies of Greece to depend upon native, spontaneous, untrammelled Grecian agencies. The downfall of the Athenian empire is the signal for the arms and corruption of Persia again to make themselves felt, and for the reënslavement of the Asiatic Greeks under her tribute-officers. What is still worse, it leaves the Grecian world in a state incapable of repelling any energetic foreign attack, and open to the overruling march of "the man of Macedon," half a century afterwards. For such was the natural tendency of the Grecian world to political non-integration or disintegration, that the rise of the Athenian empire, incorporating so many states into one system, is to be regarded as a most extraordinary accident. Nothing but the genius, energy, discipline, and democracy of Athens, could have brought it about; nor even she, unless favored and pushed on by a very peculiar train of antecedent events. But having once got it, she might perfectly well have kept it; and, had she done so, the Hellenic world would have remained so organized as to be able to repel foreign intervention, either from Susa or from Pella. When we reflect how infinitely superior was the Hellenic mind to that of all surrounding nations and races; how completely its creative agency was stifled, as soon as it came under the Macedonian dictation; and how much more it might perhaps have achieved, if it had enjoyed another century or half-century of freedom, under the stimulating headship of the most progressive and most intellectual of all its separate communities, we shall look with double regret on the ruin of the Athenian empire, as accelerating, without remedy, the universal ruin of Grecian independence, political action, and mental grandeur.

CHAPTER LXVI.

FROM THE RESTORATION OF THE DEMOCRACY TO THE DEATH OF ALKIBIADES.

THE period intervening between the defeat of Ægospotami (October, 405 B.C.) and the reëstablishment of the democracy as sanctioned by the convention concluded with Pausanias, some time in the summer of 403 B.C., presents two years of cruel and multifarious suffering to Athens. For seven years before, indeed ever since the catastrophe at Syracuse, she had been struggling with hardships; contending against augmented hostile force, while her own means were cut down in every way; crippled at home by the garrison of Dekeleia; stripped to a great degree both of her tribute and her foreign trade, and beset by the snares of her own oligarchs. In spite of circumstances so adverse, she had maintained the fight with a resolution not less surprising than admirable; yet not without sinking more and more towards impoverishment and exhaustion. The defeat of Ægospotami closed the war at once, and transferred her from her period of struggle to one of concluding agony. Nor is the last word by any means too strong for the reality. Of these two years, the first portion was marked by severe physical privation, passing by degrees into absolute famine, and accompanied by the intolerable sentiment of despair and helplessness against her enemies, after two generations of imperial grandeur, not without a strong chance of being finally consigned to ruin and individual slavery; while the last portion comprised all the tyranny, murders, robberies, and expulsions perpetrated by the Thirty, overthrown only by heroic efforts of patriotism on the part of the exiles; which a fortunate change of sentiment, on the part of Pausanias, and the leading members of the Peloponnesian confederacy, ultimately crowned with success.

After such years of misery, it was an unspeakable relief to the Athenian population to regain possession of Athens and Attica, to exchange their domestic tyrants for a renovated democratical government, and to see their foreign enemies not merely evacuate the country, but even bind themselves by treaty to future friendly dealing. In respect of power, indeed, Athens was but the shadow of her former self. She had no empire, no tribute, no fleet, no fortifications at Peiræus, no long walls, not a single fortified place in Attica except the city itself. Of all these losses, however, the Athenians probably made little account, at least at the first epoch of their reëstablishment; so intolerable was the pressure which they had just escaped, and so welcome the restitution of comfort, security, property, and independence, at home. The very excess of tyranny committed by the Thirty gave a peculiar zest to the recovery of the democracy. In their hands, the oligarchical principle, to borrow an expression from Mr. Burke,[459] "had produced in fact, and instantly, the grossest of those evils with which it was pregnant in its nature;" realizing the promise of that plain-spoken oli-

garchical oath, which Aristotle mentions as having been taken in various oligarchical cities, to contrive as much evil as possible to the people.[460] So much the more complete was the reaction of sentiment towards the antecedent democracy, even in the minds of those who had been before discontented with it. To all men, rich and poor, citizens and metics, the comparative excellence of the democracy, in respect of all the essentials of good government, was now manifest. With the exception of those who had identified themselves with the Thirty as partners, partisans, or instruments, there was scarcely any one who did not feel that his life and property had been far more secure under the former democracy, and would become so again if that democracy were revived.[461]

It was the first measure of Thrasybulus and his companions, after concluding the treaty with Pausanias, and thus reëntering the city, to exchange solemn oaths, of amnesty for the past, with those against whom they had just been at war. Similar oaths of amnesty were also exchanged with those in Eleusis, as soon as that town came into their power. The only persons excepted from this amnesty were the Thirty, the Eleven who had presided over the execution of all their atrocities, and the Ten who had governed in Peiræus. Even these persons were not peremptorily banished: opportunity was offered to them to come in and take their trial of accountability (universal at Athens in the case of every magistrate on quitting office); so that, if acquitted, they would enjoy the benefit of the amnesty as well as all others.[462] We know that Eratosthenês, one of the Thirty, afterwards returned to Athens; since there remains a powerful harangue of Lysias, invoking justice against him as having brought to death Polemarchus, the brother of Lysias. Eratosthenês was one of the minority of the Thirty who sided generally with Theramenês, and opposed to a considerable degree the extreme violences of Kritias, although personally concerned in that seizure and execution of the rich metics which Theramenês had resisted, and which was one of the grossest misdeeds even of that dark period. He and Pheidon, being among the Ten named to succeed the Thirty after the death of Kritias, when the remaining members of that deposed Board retired to Eleusis, had endeavored to maintain themselves as a new oligarchy, carrying on war at the same time against Eleusis and against the democratical exiles in Peiræus. Failing in this, they had retired from the country, at the time when these exiles returned, and when the democracy was first reëstablished. But after a certain interval, the intense sentiments of the moment having somewhat subsided, they were encouraged by their friends to return, and came back to stand their trial of accountability. It was on that occasion that Lysias preferred his accusation against Eratosthenês, the result of which we do not know, though we see plainly, even from the accusatory speech, that the latter had powerful friends to stand by him, and that the dikasts manifested considerable reluctance to condemn.[463] We learn, moreover, from the same speech, that such was the detestation of the Thirty among several of the states surrounding Attica, as to cause formal decrees for their expulsion, or for prohibiting their coming.[464] The sons, even of such among the Thirty as did not return, were allowed to remain at Athens, and en-

joy their rights of citizens, unmolested;[465] a moderation rare in Grecian political warfare.

The first public vote of the Athenians, after the conclusion of peace with Sparta and the return of the exiles, was to restore the former democracy purely and simply, to choose by lot the nine archons and the senate of Five Hundred, and to elect the generals, all as before. It appears that this restoration of the preceding constitution was partially opposed by a citizen named Phormisius, who, having served with Thrasybulus in Peiræus, now moved that the political franchise should for the future be restricted to the possessors of land in Attica. His proposition was understood to be supported by the Lacedæmonians, and was recommended as calculated to make Athens march in better harmony with them. It was presented as a compromise between oligarchy and democracy, excluding both the poorer freemen and those whose property lay either in movables or in land out of Attica; so that the aggregate number of the disfranchised would have been five thousand persons. Since Athens now had lost her fleet and maritime empire, and since the importance of Peiræus was much curtailed not merely by these losses, but by demolition of its separate walls and of the long walls, Phormisius and others conceived the opportunity favorable for striking out the maritime and trading multitude from the roll of citizens. Many of these men must have been in easy and even opulent circumstances, but the bulk of them were poor; and Phormisius had of course at his command the usual arguments, by which it is attempted to prove that poor men have no business with political judgment or action. But the proposition was rejected; the orator Lysias being among its opponents, and composing a speech against it which was either spoken, or intended to be spoken, by some eminent citizen in the assembly.[466]

Unfortunately, we have only a fragment of the speech remaining, wherein the proposition is justly criticized as mischievous and unseasonable, depriving Athens of a large portion of her legitimate strength, patriotism, and harmony, and even of substantial men competent to serve as hoplites or horsemen, at a moment when she was barely rising from absolute prostration. Never, certainly, was the fallacy which connects political depravity or incapacity with a poor station, and political virtue or judgment with wealth, more conspicuously unmasked, than in reference to the recent experience of Athens. The remark of Thrasybulus was most true,[467] that a greater number of atrocities, both against person and against property, had been committed in a few months by the Thirty, and abetted by the class of horsemen, all rich men, than the poor majority of the Demos had sanctioned during two generations of democracy. Moreover, we know, on the authority of a witness unfriendly to the democracy, that the poor Athenian citizens, who served on shipboard and elsewhere, were exact in obedience to their commanders; while the richer citizens who served as hoplites and horsemen, and who laid claim to higher individual estimation, were far less orderly in the public service.[468]

The motion of Phormisius being rejected, the antecedent democracy was restored without qualification, together with the ordinances of Drako, and the laws, measures, and weights of Solon. But on closer inspection, it was found that this latter part of the resolution was incompatible with the amnesty which had been just sworn. According to the laws of Solon and Drako, the perpetrators of enormities under the Thirty had rendered themselves guilty, and were open to trial. To escape this consequence, a second psephism or decree was passed, on the proposition of Tisamenus, to review the laws of Solon and Drako, and reënact them with such additions and amendments as might be deemed expedient. Five hundred citizens had been just chosen by the people as nomothetæ, or law-makers, at the same time when the senate of Five hundred was taken by lot: out of these nomothetæ, the senate now chose a select few, whose duty it was to consider all propositions for amendment or addition to the laws of the old democracy, and post them up for public inspection before the statues of the eponymous heroes, within the month then running.[469] The senate, and the entire body of five hundred nomothetæ, were then to be convened, in order that each might pass in review, separately, both the old laws and the new propositions; the nomothetæ being previously sworn to decide righteously. While this discussion was going on, every private citizen had liberty to enter the senate, and to tender his opinion with reasons for or against any law. All the laws which should thus be approved, first by the senate, and afterwards by the nomothetæ, but no others, were to be handed to the magistrates, and inscribed on the walls of the portico called Pœkilê, for public notoriety, as the future regulators of the city. After the laws were promulgated by such public inscription, the senate of Areopagus was enjoined to take care that they should be duly observed and enforced by the magistrates. A provisional committee of twenty citizens was named, to be generally responsible for the city during the time occupied in this revision.[470]

As soon as the laws had been revised and publicly inscribed in the pœkilê, pursuant to the above decree, two concluding laws were enacted, which completed the purpose of the citizens.

The first of these laws forbade the magistrates to act upon, or permit to be acted upon, any law not among those inscribed; and declared that no psephism, either of the senate or of the people, should overrule any law.[471] It renewed also the old prohibition, dating from the days of Kleisthenês, and the first origin of the democracy, to enact a special law inflicting direct hardship upon any individual Athenian apart from the rest, unless by the votes of six thousand citizens voting secretly.

The second of the two laws prescribed, that all the legal adjudications and arbitrations which had been passed under the antecedent democracy should be held valid and unimpeached, but formally annulled all which had been passed under the Thirty. It farther provided, that the laws now revised and inscribed should only take effect from the archonship of Eukleidês; that is, from the nomination of archons made after the recent return of Thrasybulus and renovation of the democracy.[472]

By these ever-memorable enactments, all acts done prior to the nomination of the archon Eukleidês and his colleagues, in the summer of 403 B.C., were excluded from serving as grounds for criminal process against any citizen. To insure more fully that this should be carried into effect, a special clause was added to the oath taken annually by the senators, as well as to that taken by the Heliastic dikasts. The senators pledged themselves by oath not to receive any impeachment, or give effect to any arrest, founded on any fact prior to the archonship of Eukleidês, excepting only against the Thirty, and the other individuals expressly shut out from the amnesty, and now in exile.[473] To the oath annually taken by the Heliasts, also, was added the clause: "I will not remember past wrongs, nor will I abet any one else who shall remember them; on the contrary,[474] I will give my vote pursuant to the existing laws;" which laws proclaimed themselves as only taking effect from the archonship of Eukleidês.

A still farther precaution was taken to bar all actions for redress or damages founded on acts done prior to the archonship of Eukleidês. On the motion of Archinus, the principal colleague of Thrasybulus at Phylê, a law was passed, granting leave to any defendant against whom such an action might be brought, to plead an exception in bar, or paragraphê, upon the special ground of the amnesty and the legal prescription connected with it. The legal effect of this paragraphê, or exceptional plea, in Attic procedure, was to increase both the chance of failure, and the pecuniary liabilities in case of failure, on the part of the plaintiff; also, to better considerably the chances of the defendant. This enactment is said to have been moved by Archinus, on seeing that some persons were beginning to institute actions at law, in spite of the amnesty; and for the better prevention of all such claims.[475]

By these additional enactments, security was taken that the proceedings of the courts of justice should be in full conformity with the amnesty recently sworn, and that, neither directly nor indirectly, should any person be molested for wrongs done anterior to Eukleidês. And, in fact, the amnesty was faithfully observed: the reëntering exiles from Peiræus, and the horsemen with other partisans of the Thirty in Athens, blended again together into one harmonious and equal democracy.

Eight years prior to these incidents, we have seen the oligarchical conspiracy of the Four Hundred for a moment successful, and afterwards overthrown; and we have had occasion to notice, in reference to that event, the wonderful absence of all reactionary violence on the part of the victorious people, at a moment of severe provocation for the past and extreme apprehension for the future. We noticed that Thucydidês, no friend to the Athenian democracy, selected precisely that occasion—on which some manifestation of vindictive impulse might have been supposed likely and natural—to bestow the most unqualified eulogies on their moderate and gentle bearing. Had the historian lived to describe the reign of the Thirty and the restoration which followed it, we cannot doubt that his expressions would have been still warmer and more emphatic in the same sense. Few events in history, either ancient or mod-

ern, are more astonishing than the behavior of the Athenian people, on recovering their democracy after the overthrow of the Thirty: and when we view it in conjunction with the like phenomenon after the deposition of the Four Hundred, we see that neither the one nor the other arose from peculiar caprice or accident of the moment; both depended upon permanent attributes of the popular character. If we knew nothing else except the events of these two periods, we should be warranted in dismissing, on that evidence alone, the string of contemptuous predicates,—giddy, irascible, jealous, unjust, greedy, etc., one or other of which Mr. Mitford so frequently pronounces, and insinuates even when he does not pronounce them, respecting the Athenian people.[476] A people, whose habitual temper and morality merited these epithets, could not have acted as the Athenians acted both after the Four Hundred and after the Thirty. Particular acts may be found in their history which justify severe censure; but as to the permanent elements of character, both moral and intellectual, no population in history has ever afforded stronger evidence than the Athenians on these two memorable occasions.

If we follow the acts of the Thirty, we shall see that the horsemen and the privileged three thousand hoplites in the city had made themselves partisans in every species of flagitious crime which could possibly be imagined to exasperate the feelings of the exiles. The latter, on returning, saw before them men who had handed in their relations to be put to death without trial, who had seized upon and enjoyed their property, who had expelled them all from the city, and a large portion of them even from Attica; and who had held themselves in mastery not merely by the overthrow of the constitution, but also by inviting and subsidizing foreign guards. Such atrocities, conceived and ordered by the Thirty, had been executed by the aid, and for the joint benefit, as Kritias justly remarked,[477] of those occupants of the city whom the exiles found on returning. Now Thrasybulus, Anytus, and the rest of these exiles, saw their property all pillaged and appropriated by others during the few months of their absence: we may presume that their lands—which had probably not been sold, but granted to individual members or partisans of the Thirty[478]—were restored to them; but the movable property could not be reclaimed, and the losses to which they remained subject were prodigious. The men who had caused and profited by these losses[479]—often with great brutality towards the wives and families of the exiles, as we know by the case of the orator Lysias—were now at Athens, all individually well known to the sufferers. In like manner, the sons and brothers of Leon and the other victims of the Thirty, saw before them the very citizens by whose hands their innocent relatives had been consigned without trial to prison and execution.[480] The amount of wrong suffered had been infinitely greater than in the time of the Four Hundred, and the provocation, on every ground, public and private, violent to a degree never exceeded in history. Yet with all this sting fresh in their bosoms, we find the victorious multitude, on the latter occasion as well as on the former, burying the past in an indiscriminate amnesty, and anxious only for the future harmonious march of the renovated and all-comprehensive democracy. We see the sentiment of

commonwealth in the Demos, twice contrasted with the sentiment of faction in an ascendent oligarchy;[481] twice triumphant over the strongest counter-motives, over the most bitter recollections of wrongful murder and spoliation, over all that passionate rush of reactionary appetite which characterizes the moment of political restoration. "Bloody will be the reign of that king who comes back to his kingdom from exile," says the Latin poet: bloody, indeed, had been the rule of Kritias and those oligarchs who had just come back from exile: "Harsh is a Demos (observes Æschylus) which has just got clear of misery."[482] But the Athenian Demos, on coming back from Peiræus, exhibited the rare phenomenon of a restoration, after cruel wrong suffered, sacrificing all the strong impulse of retaliation to a generous and deliberate regard for the future march of the commonwealth. Thucydidês remarks that the moderation of political antipathy which prevailed at Athens after the victory of the people over the Four Hundred, was the main cause which revived Athens from her great public depression and danger.[483] Much more forcibly does this remark apply to the restoration after the Thirty, when the public condition of Athens was at the lowest depth of abasement, from which nothing could have rescued her except such exemplary wisdom and patriotism on the part of her victorious Demos. Nothing short of this could have enabled her to accomplish that partial resurrection—into an independent and powerful single state, though shorn of her imperial power—which will furnish material for the subsequent portion of our History.

While we note the memorable resolution of the Athenian people to forget that which could not be remembered without ruin to the future march of the democracy, we must at the same time observe that which they took special pains to preserve from being forgotten. They formally recognized all the adjudged cases and all the rights of property as existing under the democracy anterior to the Thirty. "You pronounced, fellow-citizens (says Andokidês), that all the judicial verdicts and all the decisions of arbitrators passed under the democracy should remain valid, in order that there might be no abolition of debts, no reversal of private rights, but that every man might have the means of enforcing contracts due to him by others."[484] If the Athenian people had been animated by that avidity to despoil the rich, and that subjection to the passion of the moment, which Mr. Mitford imputes to them in so many chapters of his history, neither motive nor opportunity was now wanting for wholesale confiscation, of which the rich themselves, during the dominion of the Thirty, had set abundant example. The amnesty as to political wrong, and the indelible memory as to the rights of property, stand alike conspicuous as evidences of the real character of the Athenian Demos.

If we wanted any farther proof of their capacity of taking the largest and soundest views on a difficult political situation, we should find it in another of their measures at this critical period. The Ten who had succeeded to the oligarchical presidency of Athens after the death of Kritias and the expulsion of the Thirty, had borrowed from Sparta the sum of one hundred talents, for the express purpose of mak-

ing war on the exiles in Peiræus. After the peace, it was necessary that such sum should be repaid, and some persons proposed that recourse should be had to the property of those individuals and that party who had borrowed the money. The apparent equity of the proposition was doubtless felt with peculiar force at a time when the public treasury was in the extreme of poverty. But nevertheless both the democratical leaders and the people decidedly opposed it, resolving to recognize the debt as a public charge; in which capacity it was afterwards liquidated, after some delay arising from an unsupplied treasury.[485]

All that was required from the horsemen, or knights, who had been active in the service of the Thirty, was that they should repay the sums which had been advanced to them by the latter as outfit. Such advance to the horsemen, subject to subsequent repayment, and seemingly distinct from the regular military pay, appears to have been a customary practice under the previous democracy;[486] but we may easily believe that the Thirty had carried it to an abusive excess, in their anxiety to enlist or stimulate partisans, when we recollect that they resorted to means more nefarious for the same end. There were of course great individual differences among these knights, as to the degree in which each had lent himself to the misdeeds of the oligarchy. Even the most guilty of them were not molested, and they were sent, four years afterwards, to serve with Agesilaus in Asia, at a time when the Lacedæmonians required from Athens a contingent of cavalry;[487] the Demos being well pleased to be able to provide for them an honorable foreign service. But the general body of knights suffered so little disadvantage from the recollection of the Thirty, that many of them in after days became senators, generals, hipparchs, and occupants of other considerable posts in the state.[488]

Although the decree of Tisamenus—prescribing a revision of the laws without delay, and directing that the laws, when so revised, should be posted up for public view, to form the sole and exclusive guide of the dikasteries—had been passed immediately after the return from Peiræus and the confirmation of the amnesty, yet it appears that considerable delay took place before such enactment was carried into full effect. A person named Nikomachus was charged with the duty, and stands accused of having performed it tardily as well as corruptly. He, as well as Tisamenus, [489] was a scribe, or secretary; under which name were included a class of paid officers, highly important in the detail of business at Athens, though seemingly men of low birth, and looked upon as filling a subordinate station, open to sneers from unfriendly orators. The boards, the magistrates, and the public bodies were so frequently changed at Athens, that the continuity of public business could only have been maintained by paid secretaries of this character, who devoted themselves constantly to the duty.[490]

Nikomachus had been named, during the democracy anterior to the Thirty, for the purpose of preparing a fair transcript, and of posting up afresh, probably in clearer characters, and in a place more convenient for public view, the old laws of

Solon. We can well understand that the renovated democratical feeling, which burst out after the expulsion of the Four Hundred, and dictated the vehement psephism of Demophantus, might naturally also produce such a commission as this, for which Nikomachus, both as one of the public scribes, or secretaries, and as an able speaker,[491] was a suitable person. His accuser, for whom Lysias composed his thirtieth oration, now remaining, denounces him as having not only designedly lingered in the business, for the purpose of prolonging the period of remuneration, but even as having corruptly tampered with the old laws, by new interpolations, as well as by omissions. How far such charges may have been merited, we have no means of judging; but even assuming Nikomachus to have been both honest and diligent, he would find no small difficulty in properly discharging his duty of anagrapheus,[492] or "writer-up" of all the old laws of Athens, from Solon downward. Both the phraseology of these old laws, and the alphabet in which they were written, were in many cases antiquated and obsolete;[493] while there were doubtless also cases in which one law was at variance, wholly or partially, with another. Now such contradictions and archaisms would be likely to prove offensive, if set up in a fresh place, and with clean, new characters; while Nikomachus had no authority to make the smallest alteration, and might naturally therefore be tardy in a commission which did not promise much credit to him in its result.

These remarks tend to show that the necessity of a fresh collection and publication, if we may use that word, of the laws, had been felt prior to the time of the Thirty. But such a project could hardly be realized without at the same time revising the laws, as a body, removing all flagrant contradictions, and rectifying what might glaringly displease the age, either in substance or in style. Now the psephism of Tisamenus, one of the first measures of the renewed democracy after the Thirty, both prescribed such revision and set in motion a revising body; but an additional decree was now proposed and carried by Archinus, relative to the alphabet in which the revised laws should be drawn up. The Ionic alphabet—that is, the full Greek alphabet of twenty-four letters, as now written and printed—had been in use at Athens universally, for a considerable time, apparently for two generations; but from tenacious adherence to ancient custom, the laws had still continued to be consigned to writing in the old Attic alphabet of only sixteen or eighteen letters. It was now ordained that this scanty alphabet should be discontinued, and that the revised laws, as well as all future public acts, should be written up in the full Ionic alphabet.[494]

Partly through this important reform, partly through the revising body, partly through the agency of Nikomachus, who was still continued as anagrapheus, the revision, inscription, and publication of the laws in their new alphabet was at length completed. But it seems to have taken two years to perform, or at least two years elapsed before Nikomachus went through his trial of accountability.[495] He appears to have made various new propositions of his own, which were among those adopted by the nomothetæ: for these his accuser attacks him, on the trial of accountability,

as well as on the still graver allegation, of having corruptly falsified the decisions of that body; writing up what they had not sanctioned, or suppressing that which they had sanctioned.[496]

The archonship of Eukleidês, succeeding immediately to the anarchy,—as the archonship of Pythodôrus, or the period of the Thirty, was denominated,—became thus a cardinal point or epoch in Athenian history. We cannot doubt that the laws came forth out of this revision considerably modified, though unhappily we possess no particulars on the subject. We learn that the political franchise was, on the proposition of Aristophon, so far restricted for the future, that no person could be a citizen by birth except the son of citizen-parents, on both sides; whereas previously, it had been sufficient if the father alone was a citizen.[497] The rhetor Lysias, by station a metic, had not only suffered great loss, narrowly escaping death from the Thirty, who actually put to death his brother Polemarchus, but had contributed a large sum to assist the armed efforts of the exiles under Thrasybulus in Peiræus. As a reward and compensation for such antecedents, the latter proposed that the franchise of citizen should be conferred upon him; but we are told that this decree, though adopted by the people, was afterwards indicted by Archinus as illegal or informal, and cancelled. Lysias, thus disappointed of the citizenship, passed the remainder of his life as an isoteles, or non-freeman on the best condition, exempt from the peculiar burdens upon the class of metics.[498]

Such refusal of citizenship to an eminent man like Lysias, who had both acted and suffered in the cause of the democracy, when combined with the decree of Aristophon above noticed, implies a degree of augmented strictness which we can only partially explain. It was not merely the renewal of her democracy for which Athens had now to provide. She had also to accommodate her legislation and administration to her future march as an isolated state, without empire or foreign dependencies. For this purpose, material changes must have been required: among others, we know that the Board of Hellenotamiæ—originally named for the collection and management of the tribute at Delos, but attracting to themselves gradually more extended functions, until they became ultimately, immediately before the Thirty, the general paymasters of the state—was discontinued, and such among its duties as did not pass away along with the loss of the foreign empire, were transferred to two new officers, the treasurer at war, and the manager of the theôrikon, or religious festival-fund.[499] Respecting these two new departments, the latter of which especially became so much extended as to comprise most of the disbursements of a peace-establishment, I shall speak more fully hereafter; at present, I only notice them as manifestations of the large change in Athenian administration consequent upon the loss of the empire. There were doubtless many other changes arising from the same cause, though we do not know them in detail; and I incline to number among such the alteration above noticed respecting the right of citizenship. While the Athenian empire lasted, the citizens of Athens were spread over the Ægean in every sort of

capacity, as settlers, merchants, navigators, soldiers, etc.; which must have tended materially to encourage intermarriages between them and the women of other Grecian insular states. Indeed, we are even told that an express permission of connubium with Athenians was granted to the inhabitants of Eubœa,[500] a fact, noticed by Lysias, of some moment in illustrating the tendency of the Athenian empire to multiply family ties between Athens and the allied cities. Now, according to the law which prevailed before Eukleidês, the son of every such marriage was by birth an Athenian citizen, an arrangement at that time useful to Athens, as strengthening the bonds of her empire, and eminently useful in a larger point of view, among the causes of Pan-Hellenic sympathy. But when Athens was deprived both of her empire and her fleet, and confined within the limits of Attica, there no longer remained any motive to continue such a regulation, so that the exclusive city-feeling, instinctive in the Grecian mind, again became predominant. Such is, perhaps, the explanation of the new restrictive law proposed by Aristophon.

Thrasybulus and the gallant handful of exiles who had first seized Phylê, received no larger reward than one thousand drachmæ for a common sacrifice and votive offering, together with wreaths of olive as a token of gratitude from their countrymen. [501] The debt which Athens owed to Thrasybulus was indeed such as could not be liquidated by money. To his individual patriotism, in great degree, we may ascribe not only the restoration of the democracy, but its good behavior when restored. How different would have been the consequences of the restoration and the conduct of the people, had the event been brought about by a man like Alkibiadês, applying great abilities principally to the furtherance of his own cupidity and power!

At the restoration of the democracy, however, Alkibiadês was already no more. Shortly after the catastrophe at Ægospotami, he had sought shelter in the satrapy of Pharnabazus, no longer thinking himself safe from Lacedæmonian persecution in his forts on the Thracian Chersonese. He carried with him a good deal of property, though he left still more behind him, in these forts; how acquired, we do not know. But having crossed apparently to Asia by the Bosphorus, he was plundered by the Thracians in Bithynia, and incurred much loss before he could reach Pharnabazus in Phrygia. Renewing the tie of personal hospitality which he had contracted with Pharnabazus four years before,[502] he now solicited from the satrap a safe-conduct up to Susa. The Athenian envoys—whom Pharnabazus, after his former pacification with Alkibiadês in 408 B.C., had engaged to escort to Susa, but had been compelled by the mandate of Cyrus to detain as prisoners—were just now released from their three years' detention, and enabled to come down to the Propontis;[503] and Alkibiadês, by whom this mission had originally been projected, tried to prevail on the satrap to perform the promise which he had originally given, but had not been able to fulfil. The hopes of the sanguine exile, reverting back to the history of Themistoklês, led him to anticipate the same success at Susa as had fallen to the lot of the lat-

ter; nor was the design impracticable, to one whose ability was universally renowned, and who had already acted as minister to Tissaphernês.

The court of Susa was at this time in a peculiar position. King Darius Nothus, having recently died, had been succeeded by his eldest son Artaxerxes Mnemon;[504] but the younger son Cyrus, whom Darius had sent for during his last illness, tried after the death of the latter to supplant Artaxerxes in the succession, or at least was suspected of so trying. Being seized and about to be slain, the queen-mother Parysatis prevailed upon Artaxerxes to pardon him, and send him again down to his satrapy along the coast of Ionia, where he labored strenuously, though secretly, to acquire the means of dethroning his brother; a memorable attempt, of which I shall speak more fully hereafter. But his schemes, though carefully masked, did not escape the observation of Alkibiadês, who wished to make a merit of revealing them at Susa, and to become the instrument of defeating them. He communicated his suspicions as well as his purpose to Pharnabazus; whom he tried to awaken by alarm of danger to the empire, in order that he might thus get himself forwarded to Susa as informant and auxiliary.

Pharnabazus was already jealous and unfriendly in spirit towards Lysander and the Lacedæmonians, of which we shall soon see plain evidence, and perhaps towards Cyrus also, since such were the habitual relations of neighboring satraps in the Persian empire. But the Lacedæmonians and Cyrus were now all-powerful on the Asiatic coast, so that he probably did not dare to exasperate them, by identifying himself with a mission so hostile and an enemy so dangerous to both. Accordingly, he refused compliance with the request of Alkibiadês; granting him, nevertheless, permission to live in Phrygia, and even assigning to him a revenue. But the objects at which the exile was aiming soon became more or less fully divulged, to those against whom they were intended. His restless character, enterprise, and capacity, were so well known as to raise exaggerated fears as well as exaggerated hopes. Not merely Cyrus, but the Lacedæmonians, closely allied with Cyrus, and the dekadarchies, whom Lysander had set up in the Asiatic Grecian cities, and who held their power only through Lacedæmonian support, all were uneasy at the prospect of seeing Alkibiadês again in action and command, amidst so many unsettled elements. Nor can we doubt that the exiles whom these dekadarchies had banished, and the disaffected citizens who remained at home under their government in fear of banishment or death, kept up correspondence with him, and looked to him as a probable liberator. Moreover, the Spartan king, Agis, still retained the same personal antipathy against him, which had already some years before procured the order to be despatched, from Sparta to Asia, to assassinate him. Here are elements enough, of hostility, vengeance, and apprehension, afloat against Alkibiadês, without believing the story of Plutarch, that Kritias and the Thirty sent to apprize Lysander that the oligarchy at Athens could not stand, so long as Alkibiadês was alive. The truth is, that though the Thirty had included him in the list of exiles,[505] they had much less to dread from his

assaults or plots, in Attica, than the Lysandrian dekadarchies in the cities of Asia. Moreover, his name was not popular even among the Athenian democrats, as will be shown hereafter, when we come to recount the trial of Sokratês. Probably, therefore, the alleged intervention of Kritias and the Thirty, to procure the murder of Alkibiadês, is a fiction of the subsequent encomiasts of the latter at Athens, in order to create for him claims to esteem as a friend and fellow-sufferer with the democracy.

A special despatch, or skytalê, was sent out by the Spartan authorities to Lysander in Asia, enjoining him to procure that Alkibiadês should be put to death. Accordingly, Lysander communicated this order to Pharnabazus, within whose satrapy Alkibiadês was residing, and requested that it might be put in execution. The whole character of Pharnabazus shows that he would not perpetrate such a deed, towards a man with whom he had contracted ties of hospitality, without sincere reluctance and great pressure from without; especially as it would have been easy for him to connive underhand at the escape of the intended victim. We may therefore be sure that it was Cyrus, who, informed of the revelations contemplated by Alkibiadês, enforced the requisition of Lysander; and that the joint demand of the two was too formidable even to be evaded, much less openly disobeyed. Accordingly, Pharnabazus despatched his brother Magæus and his uncle Sisamithres with a band of armed men, to assassinate Alkibiadês in the Phrygian village where he was residing. These men, not daring to force their way into his house, surrounded it and set it on fire; but Alkibiadês, having contrived to extinguish the flames, rushed out upon his assailants with a dagger in his right hand, and a cloak wrapped round his left to serve as a shield. None of them dared to come near him; but they poured upon him showers of darts and arrows until he perished, undefended as he was either by shield or by armor. A female companion with whom he lived, Timandra, wrapped up his body in garments of her own, and performed towards it all the last affectionate solemnities.[506]

Such was the deed which Cyrus and the Lacedæmonians did not scruple to enjoin, nor the uncle and brother of a Persian satrap to execute, and by which this celebrated Athenian perished, before he had attained the age of fifty. Had he lived, we cannot doubt that he would again have played some conspicuous part,—for neither his temper nor his abilities would have allowed him to remain in the shade,—but whether to the advantage of Athens or not, is more questionable. Certain it is, that taking his life throughout, the good which he did to her bore no proportion to the far greater evil. Of the disastrous Sicilian expedition, he was more the cause than any other individual, though that enterprise cannot properly be said to have been caused by any individual, but rather to have emanated from a national impulse. Having first, as a counsellor, contributed more than any other man to plunge the Athenians into this imprudent adventure, he next, as an exile, contributed more than any other man, except Nikias, to turn that adventure into ruin, and the consequences of it into still greater ruin. Without him, Gylippus would not have been sent to Syracuse,

Dekeleia would not have been fortified, Chios and Milêtus would not have revolted, the oligarchical conspiracy of the Four Hundred would not have been originated. Nor can it be said that his first three years of political action as Athenian leader, in a speculation peculiarly his own,—the alliance with Argos, and the campaigns in Peloponnesus,—proved in any way advantageous to his country. On the contrary, by playing an offensive game where he had hardly sufficient force for a defensive, he enabled the Lacedæmonians completely to recover their injured reputation and ascendency through the important victory of Mantineia. The period of his life really serviceable to his country, and really glorious to himself, was that of three years ending with his return to Athens in 407 B.C. The results of these three years of success were frustrated by the unexpected coming down of Cyrus as satrap: but, just at the moment when it behooved Alkibiadês to put forth a higher measure of excellence, in order to realize his own promises in the face of this new obstacle, at that critical moment we find him spoiled by the unexpected welcome which had recently greeted him at Athens, and falling miserably short even of the former merit whereby that welcome had been earned.

If from his achievements we turn to his dispositions, his ends, and his means, there are few characters in Grecian history who present so little to esteem, whether we look at him as a public or as a private man. His ends are those of exorbitant ambition and vanity, his means rapacious as well as reckless, from his first dealing with Sparta and the Spartan envoys, down to the end of his career. The manœuvres whereby his political enemies first procured his exile were indeed base and guilty in a high degree; but we must recollect that if his enemies were more numerous and violent than those of any other politician in Athens, the generating seed was sown by his own overweening insolence, and contempt of restraints, legal as well as social.

On the other hand, he was never once defeated either by land or sea. In courage, in ability, in enterprise, in power of dealing with new men and new situations, he was never wanting; qualities, which, combined with his high birth, wealth, and personal accomplishments, sufficed to render him for the time the first man in every successive party which he espoused; Athenian, Spartan, or Persian; oligarchical or democratical. But to none of them did he ever inspire any lasting confidence; all successively threw him off. On the whole, we shall find few men in whom eminent capacities for action and command are so thoroughly marred by an assemblage of bad moral qualities, as Alkibiadês.[507]

CHAPTER LXVII.

THE DRAMA. — RHETORIC AND DIALECTICS. — THE SOPHISTS.

RESPECTING the political history of Athens during the few years immediately succeeding the restoration of the democracy, we have unfortunately little or no information. But in the spring of 399 B.C., between three and four years after the beginning of the archonship of Eukleidês, an event happened of paramount interest to the intellectual public of Greece as well as to philosophy generally, the trial, condemnation, and execution of Sokratês. Before I recount that memorable incident, it will be proper to say a few words on the literary and philosophical character of the age in which it happened. Though literature and philosophy are now becoming separate departments in Greece, each exercises a marked influence on the other, and the state of dramatic literature will be seen to be one of the causes directly contributing to the fate of Sokratês.

During the century of the Athenian democracy between Kleisthenês and Eukleidês, there had been produced a development of dramatic genius, tragic and comic, never paralleled before or afterwards. Æschylus, the creator of the tragic drama, or at least the first composer who rendered it illustrious, had been a combatant both at Marathon and Salamis; while Sophoklês and Euripidês, his two eminent followers, the former one of the generals of the Athenian armament against Samos in 440 B.C., expired both of them only a year before the battle of Ægospotami, just in time to escape the bitter humiliation and suffering of that mournful period. Out of the once numerous compositions of these poets we possess only a few, yet sufficient to enable us to appreciate in some degree the grandeur of Athenian tragedy; and when we learn that they were frequently beaten, even with the best of their dramas now remaining, in fair competition for the prize against other poets whose names only have reached us, we are warranted in presuming that the best productions of these successful competitors, if not intrinsically finer, could hardly have been inferior in merit to theirs.[508]

The tragic drama belonged essentially to the festivals in honor of the god Dionysus; being originally a chorus sung in his honor, to which were successively superadded, first, an Iambic monologue; next, a dialogue with two actors; lastly, a regular plot with three actors, and the chorus itself interwoven into the scene. Its subjects were from the beginning, and always continued to be, persons either divine or heroic, above the level of historical life, and borrowed from what was called the mythical past: the Persæ of Æschylus forms a splendid exception; but the two analogous dramas of his contemporary, Phrynichus, the Phœnissæ and the capture of Milêtus, were not successful enough to invite subsequent tragedians to meddle with contemporary events. To three serious dramas, or a trilogy, at first connected to-

gether by sequence of subject more or less loose, but afterwards unconnected and on distinct subjects, through an innovation introduced by Sophoklês, if not before, the tragic poet added a fourth or satyrical drama; the characters of which were satyrs, the companions of the god Dionysus, and other heroic or mythical persons exhibited in farce. He thus made up a total of four dramas, or a tetralogy, which he got up and brought forward to contend for the prize at the festival. The expense of training the chorus and actors was chiefly furnished by the chorêgi, wealthy citizens, of whom one was named for each of the ten tribes, and whose honor and vanity were greatly interested in obtaining the prize. At first, these exhibitions took place on a temporary stage, with nothing but wooden supports and scaffolding; but shortly after the year 500 B.C., on an occasion when the poets Æschylus and Pratinas were contending for the prize, this stage gave way during the ceremony, and lamentable mischief was the result. After that misfortune, a permanent theatre of stone was provided. To what extent the project was realized before the invasion of Xerxes, we do not accurately know; but after his destructive occupation of Athens, the theatre, if any existed previously, would have to be rebuilt or renovated along with other injured portions of the city.

It was under that great development of the power of Athens which followed the expulsion of Xerxes, that the theatre with its appurtenances attained full magnitude and elaboration, and Attic tragedy its maximum of excellence. Sophoklês gained his first victory over Æschylus in 468 B.C.: the first exhibition of Euripidês was in 455 B.C. The names, though unhappily the names alone, of many other competitors have reached us: Philoklês, who gained the prize even over the Œdipus Tyrannus of Sophoklês; Euphorion son of Æschylus, Xenoklês, and Nikomachus, all known to have triumphed over Euripidês; Neophron, Achæus, Ion, Agathon, and many more. The continuous stream of new tragedy, poured out year after year, was something new in the history of the Greek mind. If we could suppose all the ten tribes contending for the prize every year, there would be ten tetralogies—or sets of four dramas each, three tragedies and one satyrical farce—at the Dionysiac festival, and as many at the Lenæan. So great a number as sixty new tragedies composed every year,[509] is not to be thought of; yet we do not know what was the usual number of competing tetralogies: it was at least three; since the first, second, and third are specified in the didaskalies, or theatrical records, and probably greater than three. It was rare to repeat the same drama a second time unless after considerable alterations; nor would it be creditable to the liberality of a chorêgus to decline the full cost of getting up a new tetralogy. Without pretending to determine with numerical accuracy how many dramas were composed in each year, the general fact of unexampled abundance in the productions of the tragic muse is both authentic and interesting.

Moreover, what is not less important to notice, all this abundance found its way to the minds of the great body of the citizens, not excepting even the poorest. For the theatre is said to have accommodated thirty thousand persons:[510] here again it is

unsafe to rely upon numerical accuracy, but we cannot doubt that it was sufficiently capacious to give to most of the citizens, poor as well as rich, ample opportunity of profiting by these beautiful compositions. At first, the admission to the theatre was gratuitous; but as the crowd of strangers as well as freemen, was found both excessive and disorderly, the system was adopted of asking a price, seemingly at the time when the permanent theatre was put in complete order after the destruction caused by Xerxes. The theatre was let by contract to a manager, who engaged to defray, either in whole or part, the habitual cost incurred by the state in the representation, and who was allowed to sell tickets of admission. At first, it appears that the price of tickets was not fixed, so that the poor citizens were overbid, and could not get places. Accordingly, Periklês introduced a new system, fixing the price of places at three oboli, or half a drachma, for the better, and one obolus for the less good. As there were two days of representation, tickets covering both days were sold respectively for a drachma and two oboli. But in order that the poor citizens might be enabled to attend, two oboli were given out from the public treasure to each citizen—rich as well as poor, if they chose to receive it—on the occasion of the festival. A poor man was thus furnished with the means of purchasing his place and going to the theatre without cost, on both days, if he chose; or, if he preferred it, he might go on one day only; or might even stay away altogether, and spend both the two oboli in any other manner. The higher price obtained for the better seats purchased by the richer citizens, is here to be set against the sum disbursed to the poorer; but we have no data before us for striking the balance, nor can we tell how the finances of the state were affected by it.[511]

Such was the original theôrikon, or festival-pay, introduced by Periklês at Athens; a system of distributing the public money, gradually extended to other festivals in which there was no theatrical representation, and which in later times reached a mischievous excess; having begun at a time when Athens was full of money from foreign tribute, and continuing, with increased demand at a subsequent time, when she was comparatively poor and without extraneous resources. It is to be remembered that all these festivals were portions of the ancient religion, and that, according to the feelings of that time, cheerful and multitudinous assemblages were essential to the satisfaction of the god in whose honor the festival was celebrated. Such disbursements were a portion of the religious, even more than of the civil establishment. Of the abusive excess which they afterwards reached, however, I shall speak in a future volume: at present, I deal with the theôrikon only in its primitive function and effect, of enabling all Athenians indiscriminately to witness the representation of the tragedies.

We cannot doubt that the effect of these compositions upon the public sympathies, as well as upon the public judgment and intelligence, must have been beneficial and moralizing in a high degree. Though the subjects and persons are legendary, the relations between them are all human and simple, exalted above the level of hu-

manity only in such measure as to present a stronger claim to the hearer's admiration or pity. So powerful a body of poetical influence has probably never been brought to act upon the emotions of any other population; and when we consider the extraordinary beauty of these immortal compositions, which first stamped tragedy as a separate department of poetry, and gave to it a dignity never since reached, we shall be satisfied that the tastes, the sentiments, and the intellectual standard, of the Athenian multitude, must have been sensibly improved and exalted by such lessons. The reception of such pleasures through the eye and the ear, as well as amidst a sympathizing crowd, was a fact of no small importance in the mental history of Athens. It contributed to exalt their imagination, like the grand edifices and ornaments added during the same period to their acropolis. Like them, too, and even more than they, tragedy was the monopoly of Athens; for while tragic composers came thither from other parts of Greece—Achæus from Eretria, and Ion from Chios, at a time when the Athenian empire comprised both those places—to exhibit their genius, nowhere else were original tragedies composed and acted, though hardly any considerable city was without a theatre.[512]

The three great tragedians—Æschylus, Sophoklês, and Euripidês—distinguished above all their competitors, as well by contemporaries as by subsequent critics, are interesting to us, not merely from the positive beauties of each, but also from the differences between them in handling, style, and sentiment, and from the manner in which these differences illustrate the insensible modification of the Athenian mind. Though the subjects, persons, and events of tragedy always continued to be borrowed from the legendary world, and were thus kept above the level of contemporaneous life,[513] yet the dramatic manner of handling them is sensibly modified, even in Sophoklês as compared with Æschylus; and still more in Euripidês, by the atmosphere of democracy, political and judicial contention, and philosophy, encompassing and acting upon the poet.

In Æschylus, the ideality belongs to the handling not less than to the subjects: the passions appealed to are the masculine and violent, to the exclusion of Aphroditê and her inspirations:[514] the figures are vast and majestic, but exhibited only in half-light and in shadowy outline: the speech is replete with bold metaphor and abrupt transition, "grandiloquent even to a fault," as Quintilian remarks, and often approaching nearer to Oriental vagueness than to Grecian perspicuity. In Sophoklês, there is evidently a closer approach to reality and common life: the range of emotions is more varied, the figures are more distinctly seen, and the action more fully and conspicuously worked out. Not only we have a more elaborate dramatic structure, but a more expanded dialogue, and a comparative simplicity of speech like that of living Greeks: and we find too a certain admixture of rhetorical declamation, amidst the greatest poetical beauty which the Grecian drama ever attained. But when we advance to Euripidês, this rhetorical element becomes still more prominent and developed. The ultra-natural sublimity of the legendary characters disappears: love and

compassion are invoked to a degree which Æschylus would have deemed inconsistent with the dignity of the heroic person: moreover, there are appeals to the reason, and argumentative controversies, which that grandiloquent poet would have despised as petty and forensic cavils. And—what was worse still, judging from the Æschylean point of view—there was a certain novelty of speculation, an intimation of doubt on reigning opinions, and an air of scientific refinement, often spoiling the poetical effect.

Such differences between these three great poets are doubtless referable to the working of Athenian politics and Athenian philosophy on the minds of the two later. In Sophoklês, we may trace the companion of Herodotus;[515] in Euripidês, the hearer of Anaxagoras, Sokratês, and Prodikus;[516] in both, the familiarity with that wide-spread popularity of speech, and real, serious debate of politicians and competitors before the dikastery, which both had ever before their eyes, but which the genius of Sophoklês knew how to keep in due subordination to his grand poetical purpose.

The transformation of the tragic muse from Æschylus to Euripidês is the more deserving of notice, as it shows us how Attic tragedy served as the natural prelude and encouragement to the rhetorical and dialectical age which was approaching. But the democracy, which thus insensibly modified the tragic drama, imparted a new life and ampler proportions to the comic; both the one and the other being stimulated by the increasing prosperity and power of Athens during the half century following 480 B.C. Not only was the affluence of strangers and visitors to Athens continually augmenting, but wealthy men were easily found to incur the expense of training the chorus and actors. There was no manner of employing wealth which seemed so appropriate to procure influence and popularity to its possessors, as that of contributing to enhance the magnificence of the national and religious festivals.[517] This was the general sentiment both among rich and among poor; nor is there any criticism more unfounded than that which represents such an obligation as hard and oppressive upon rich men. Most of them spent more than they were legally compelled to spend in this way, from the desire of exalting their popularity. The only real sufferers were the people, considered as interested in a just administration of law; since it was a practice which enabled many rich men to acquire importance who had no personal qualities to deserve it, and which provided them with a stock of factitious merits to be pleaded before the dikastery, as a set-off against substantive accusations.

The full splendor of the comic muse was considerably later than that of the tragic. Even down to 460 B.C. (about the time when Periklês and Ephialtês introduced their constitutional reforms), there was not a single comic poet of eminence at Athens; nor was there apparently a single undisputed Athenian comedy before that date, which survived to the times of the Alexandrine critics. Magnês, Kratês, and Kratinus —probably also Chionidês and Ekphantidês[518]—all belong to the period beginning about (Olympiad 80 or) 460 B.C.; that is, the generation preceding Aristophanês,

whose first composition dates in 427 B.C. The condition and growth of Attic comedy before this period seems to have been unknown even to Aristotle, who intimates that the archon did not begin to grant a chorus for comedy, or to number it among the authoritative solemnities of the festival, until long after the practice had been established for tragedy. Thus the comic chorus in that early time consisted of volunteers, without any chorêgus publicly assigned to bear the expense of teaching them or getting up the piece; so that there was little motive for authors to bestow care or genius in the preparation of their song, dance, and scurrilous monody, or dialogue. The exuberant revelry of the phallic festival and procession, with full license of scoffing at any one present, which the god Dionysus was supposed to enjoy, and with the most plain-spoken grossness as well in language as in ideas, formed the primitive germ, which under Athenian genius ripened into the old comedy.[519] It resembled in many respects the satyric drama of the tragedians, but was distinguished from it by dealing not merely with the ancient mythical stories and persons, but chiefly with contemporary men and subjects of common life; dealing with them often, too, under their real names, and with ridicule the most direct, poignant, and scornful. We see clearly how fair a field Athens would offer for this species of composition, at a time when the bitterness of political contention ran high,—when the city had become a centre for novelties from every part of Greece,—when tragedians, rhetors, and philosophers, were acquiring celebrity and incurring odium,—and when the democratical constitution laid open all the details of political and judicial business, as well as all the first men of the state, not merely to universal criticism, but also to unmeasured libel.

Out of all the once abundant compositions of Attic comedy, nothing has reached us except eleven plays of Aristophanês. That poet himself singles out Magnês, Kratês, and Kratinus, among predecessors whom he describes as numerous, for honorable mention; as having been frequently, though not uniformly, successful. Kratinus appears to have been not only the most copious, but also the most distinguished, among all those who preceded Aristophanês, a list comprising Hermippus, Telekleidês, and the other bitter assailants of Periklês. It was Kratinus who first extended and systematized the license of the phallic festival, and the "careless laughter of the festive crowd,"[520] into a drama of regular structure, with actors three in number, according to the analogy of tragedy. Standing forward, against particular persons exhibited or denounced by their names, with a malignity of personal slander not inferior to the iambist Archilochus, and with an abrupt and dithyrambic style somewhat resembling Æschylus, Kratinus made an epoch in comedy as the latter had made in tragedy; but was surpassed by Aristophanês, as much as Æschylus had been surpassed by Sophoklês. We are told that his compositions were not only more rudely bitter and extensively libellous than those of Aristophanês,[521] but also destitute of that richness of illustration and felicity of expression which pervades all the wit of the latter, whether good-natured or malignant. In Kratinus, too, comedy first made herself felt as a substantive agent and partisan in the political warfare of Athens. He espoused the cause of Kimon against Periklês;[522] eulogizing the former, while he bit-

terly derided and vituperated the latter Hermippus, Telekleidês, and most of the contemporary comic writers followed the same political line in assailing that great man, together with those personally connected with him, Aspasia and Anaxagoras: indeed, Hermippus was the person who indicted Aspasia for impiety before the dikastery. But the testimony of Aristophanês[523] shows that no comic writer, of the time of Periklês, equalled Kratinus, either in vehemence of libel or in popularity.

It is remarkable that, in 440 B.C., a law was passed forbidding comic authors to ridicule any citizen by name in their compositions; which prohibition, however, was rescinded after two years, an interval marked by the rare phenomenon of a lenient comedy from Kratinus.[524] Such enactment denotes a struggle in the Athenian mind, even at that time, against the mischief of making the Dionysiac festival an occasion for unmeasured libel against citizens publicly named and probably themselves present. And there was another style of comedy taken up by Kratês, distinct from the iambic or Archilochian vein worked by Kratinus, in which comic incident was attached to fictitious characters and woven into a story, without recourse to real individual names or direct personality. This species of comedy, analogous to that which Epicharmus had before exhibited at Syracuse, was continued by Pherekratês as the successor of Kratês. Though for a long time less popular and successful than the poignant food served up by Kratinus and others, it became finally predominant after the close of the Peloponnesian war, by the gradual transition of what is called the Old Comedy into the Middle and New Comedy.

But it is in Aristophanês that the genius of the old libellous comedy appears in its culminating perfection. At least we have before us enough of his works to enable us to appreciate his merits; though perhaps Eupolis, Ameipsias, Phrynichus, Plato (Comicus), and others, who contended against him at the festivals with alternate victory and defeat, would be found to deserve similar praise, if we possessed their compositions. Never probably will the full and unshackled force of comedy be so exhibited again. Without having Aristophanês actually before us, it would have been impossible to imagine the unmeasured and unsparing license of attack assumed by the old comedy upon the gods, the institutions, the politicians, philosophers, poets, private citizens specially named, and even the women, whose life was entirely domestic, of Athens. With this universal liberty in respect of subject, there is combined a poignancy of derision and satire, a fecundity of imagination and variety of turns, and a richness of poetical expression, such as cannot be surpassed, and such as fully explains the admiration expressed for him by the philosopher Plato, who in other respects must have regarded him with unquestionable disapprobation. His comedies are popular in the largest sense of the word, addressed to the entire body of male citizens on a day consecrated to festivity, and providing for them amusement or derision with a sort of drunken abundance, out of all persons or things standing in any way prominent before the public eye. The earliest comedy of Aristophanês was exhibited in 427 B.C., and his muse continued for a long time prolific, since two of the

dramas now remaining belong to an epoch eleven years after the Thirty and the renovation of the democracy, about 392 B.C. After that renovation, however, as I have before remarked, the unmeasured sweep and libellous personality of the old comedy was gradually discontinued: the comic chorus was first cut down, and afterwards suppressed, so as to usher in what is commonly termed the Middle Comedy, without any chorus at all. The "Plutus" of Aristophanês indicates some approach to this new phase; but his earlier and more numerous comedies, from the "Acharneis," in 425 B.C. to the "Frogs," in 405 B.C., only a few months before the fatal battle of Ægospotami, exhibit the continuous, unexhausted, untempered flow of the stream first opened by Kratinus.

Such abundance both of tragic and comic poetry, each of first-rate excellence, formed one of the marked features of Athenian life, and became a powerful instrument in popularizing new combinations of thought with variety and elegance of expression. While the tragic muse presented the still higher advantage of inspiring elevated and benevolent sympathies, more was probably lost than gained by the lessons of the comic muse; not only bringing out keenly all that was really ludicrous or contemptible in the phenomena of the day, but manufacturing scornful laughter, quite as often, out of that which was innocent or even meritorious, as well as out of boundless private slander. The "Knights" and the "Wasps" of Aristophanês, however, not to mention other plays, are a standing evidence of one good point in the Athenian character; that they bore with good-natured indulgence the full outpouring of ridicule and even of calumny interwoven with it, upon those democratical institutions to which they were sincerely attached. The democracy was strong enough to tolerate unfriendly tongues either in earnest or in jest: the reputations of men who stood conspicuously forward in politics, on whatever side, might also be considered as a fair mark for attacks; inasmuch as that measure of aggressive criticism which is tutelary and indispensable, cannot be permitted without the accompanying evil, comparatively much smaller, of excess and injustice;[525] though even here we may remark that excess of bitter personality is among the most conspicuous sins of Athenian literature generally. But the warfare of comedy, in the persons of Aristophanês and other composers, against philosophy, literature, and eloquence, in the name of those good old times of ignorance, "when an Athenian seaman knew nothing more than how to call for his barley-cake, and cry, Yo-ho;"[526] and the retrograde spirit which induces them to exhibit moral turpitude as the natural consequence of the intellectual progress of the age, are circumstances going far to prove an unfavorable and degrading influence of comedy on the Athenian mind.

In reference to individual men, and to Sokratês[527] especially, the Athenians seem to have been unfavorably biased by the misapplied wit and genius of Aristophanês, in "The Clouds," aided by other comedies of Eupolis, and Ameipsias and Eupolis; but on the general march of politics, philosophy, or letters, these composers had little influence. Nor were they ever regarded at Athens in the light in which they

are presented to us by modern criticism; as men of exalted morality, stern patriotism, and genuine discernment of the true interests of their country; as animated by large and steady views of improving their fellow-citizens, but compelled, in consequence of prejudice or opposition, to disguise a far-sighted political philosophy under the veil of satire; as good judges of the most debatable questions, such as the prudence of making war or peace, and excellent authority to guide us in appreciating the merits or demerits of their contemporaries, insomuch that the victims of their lampoons are habitually set down as worthless men.[528] There cannot be a greater misconception of the old comedy than to regard it in this point of view; yet it is astonishing how many subsequent writers, from Diodorus and Plutarch down to the present day, have thought themselves entitled to deduce their facts of Grecian history, and their estimate of Grecian men, events, and institutions, from the comedies of Aristophanês. Standing pre-eminent as the latter does in comic genius, his point of view is only so much the more determined by the ludicrous associations suggested to his fancy, so that he thus departs the more widely from the conditions of a faithful witness or candid critic. He presents himself to provoke the laugh, mirthful or spiteful, of the festival crowd, assembled for the gratification of these emotions, and not with any expectation of serious or reasonable impressions.[529] Nor does he at all conceal how much he is mortified by failure; like the professional jester, or "laughter-maker," at the banquets of rich Athenian citizens;[530] the parallel of Aristophanês as to purpose, however unworthy of comparison in every other respect.

This rise and development of dramatic poetry in Greece—so abundant, so varied, and so rich in genius—belongs to the fifth century B.C. It had been in the preceding century nothing more than an unpretending graft upon the primitive chorus, and was then even denounced by Solon, or in the dictum ascribed to Solon, as a vicious novelty, tending—by its simulation of a false character, and by its effusion of sentiments not genuine or sincere—to corrupt the integrity of human dealings;[531] a charge of corruption, not unlike that which Aristophanês worked up, a century afterwards, in his "Clouds," against physics, rhetoric, and dialectics, in the person of Sokratês. But the properties of the graft had overpowered and subordinated those of the original stem; so that dramatic poetry was now a distinct form, subject to laws of its own, and shining with splendor equal, if not superior, to the elegiac, choric, lyric, and epic poetry which constituted the previous stock of the Grecian world.

Such transformations in the poetry, or, to speak more justly, in the literature—for before the year 500 B.C. the two expressions were equivalent—of Greece, were at once products, marks, and auxiliaries, in the expansion of the national mind. Our minds have now become familiar with dramatic combinations, which have ceased to be peculiar to any special form or conditions of political society. But if we compare the fifth century B.C. with that which preceded it, the recently born drama will be seen to have been a most important and impressive novelty: and so assuredly it would have been regarded by Solon, the largest mind of his own age, if he could

have risen again, a century and a quarter after his death, to witness the Antigonê of Sophoklês, the Medea of Euripidês, or the Acharneis of Aristophanês.

Its novelty does not consist merely in the high order of imagination and judgment required for the construction of a drama at once regular and effective. This, indeed, is no small addition to Grecian poetical celebrity as it stood in the days of Solon, Alkæus, Sappho, and Stesichorus: but we must remember that the epical structure of the Odyssey, so ancient and long acquired to the Hellenic world, implies a reach of architectonic talent quite equal to that exhibited in the most symmetrical drama of Sophoklês. The great innovation of the dramatists consisted in the rhetorical, the dialectical, and the ethical spirit which they breathed into their poetry. Of all this, the undeveloped germ doubtless existed in the previous epic, lyric, and gnomic composition; but the drama stood distinguished from all three by bringing it out into conspicuous amplitude, and making it the substantive means of effect. Instead of recounting exploits achieved, or sufferings undergone by the heroes,—instead of pouring out his own single-minded impressions in reference to some given event or juncture,—the tragic poet produces the mythical persons themselves to talk, discuss, accuse, defend, confute, lament, threaten, advise, persuade, or appease; among one another, but before the audience. In the *drama*, a singular misnomer, nothing is actually done: all is talk; assuming what is done, as passing, or as having passed, elsewhere. The dramatic poet, speaking continually, but at each moment through a different character, carries on the purpose of each of his characters by words calculated to influence the other characters, and appropriate to each successive juncture. Here are rhetorical exigencies from beginning to end:[532] while, since the whole interest of the piece turns upon some contention or struggle carried on by speech; since debate, consultation, and retort, never cease; since every character, good or evil, temperate or violent, must be supplied with suitable language to defend his proceedings, to attack or repel opponents, and generally to make good the relative importance assigned to him, here again dialectical skill in no small degree is indispensable.

Lastly, the strength and variety of ethical sentiment infused into the Grecian tragedy, is among the most remarkable characteristics which distinguish it from the anterior forms of poetry. "To do or suffer terrible things," is pronounced by Aristotle to be its proper subject-matter; and the internal mind and motives of the doer or sufferer, on which the ethical interest fastens, are laid open by the Greek tragedians with an impressive minuteness which neither the epic nor the lyric could possibly parallel. Moreover, the appropriate subject-matter of tragedy is pregnant not only with ethical sympathy, but also with ethical debate and speculation. Characters of mixed good and evil; distinct rules of duty, one conflicting with the other; wrong done, and justified to the conscience of the doer, if not to that of the spectator, by previous wrong suffered, all these are the favorite themes of Æschylus and his two great successors. Klytæmnestra kills her husband Agamemnôn on his return from Troy: her defence is, that he had deserved this treatment at her hands for having

sacrificed his own and her daughter, Iphigeneia. Her son Orestês kills her, under a full conviction of the duty of avenging his father, and even under the sanction of Apollo. The retributive Eumenides pursue him for the deed, and Æschylus brings all the parties before the court of Areopagus, with Athênê as president, where the case is fairly argued, with the Eumenides as accusers, and Apollo as counsel for the prisoner, and ends by an equality of votes in the court: upon which Athênê gives her casting-vote to absolve Orestês. Again; let any man note the conflicting obligations which Sophoklês so forcibly brings out in his beautiful drama of the Antigonê. Kreon directs that the body of Polyneikês, as a traitor and recent invader of the country, shall remain unburied: Antigonê, sister of Polyneikês, denounces such interdict as impious, and violates it, under an overruling persuasion of fraternal duty. Kreon having ordered her to be buried alive, his youthful son Hæmon, her betrothed lover, is plunged into a heart-rending conflict between abhorrence of such cruelty on the one side, and submission to his father on the other. Sophoklês sets forth both these contending rules of duty in an elaborate scene of dialogue between the father and the son. Here are two rules both sacred and respectable, but the one of which cannot be observed without violating the other. Since a choice must be made, which of the two ought a good man to obey? This is a point which the great poet is well pleased to leave undetermined. But if there be any among the audience in whom the least impulse of intellectual speculation is alive, he will by no means leave it so, without some mental effort to solve the problem, and to discover some grand and comprehensive principle from whence all the moral rules emanate; a principle such as may instruct his conscience in those cases generally, of not unfrequent occurrence, wherein two obligations conflict with each other. The tragedian not only appeals more powerfully to the ethical sentiment than poetry had ever done before, but also, by raising these grave and touching questions, addresses a stimulus and challenge to the intellect, spurring it on to ethical speculation.

Putting all these points together, we see how much wider was the intellectual range of tragedy, and how considerable is the mental progress which it betokens, as compared with the lyric and gnomic poetry, or with the Seven Wise Men and their authoritative aphorisms, which formed the glory, and marked the limit, of the preceding century. In place of unexpanded results, or the mere communication of single-minded sentiment, we have even in Æschylus, the earliest of the great tragedians, a large latitude of dissent and debate, a shifting point of view, a case better or worse, made out for distinct and contending parties, and a divination of the future advent of sovereign and instructed reason. It was through the intermediate stage of tragedy that Grecian literature passed into the rhetoric, dialectics, and ethical speculation, which marked the fifth century B.C.

Other simultaneous causes, arising directly out of the business of real life, contributed to the generation of these same capacities and studies. The fifth century B.C. is the first century of democracy at Athens, in Sicily, and elsewhere: moreover, at

that period, beginning from the Ionic revolt and the Persian invasions of Greece, the political relations between one Grecian city and another became more complicated, as well as more continuous; requiring a greater measure of talent in the public men who managed them. Without some power of persuading or confuting,—of defending himself against accusation, or in case of need, accusing others,—no man could possibly hold an ascendent position. He had probably not less need of this talent for private, informal, conversations to satisfy his own political partisans, than for addressing the public assembly formally convoked. Even as commanding an army or a fleet, without any laws of war or habits of professional discipline, his power of keeping up the good-humor, confidence, and prompt obedience of his men, depended not a little on his command of speech.[533] Nor was it only to the leaders in political life that such an accomplishment was indispensable. In all the democracies,—and probably in several governments which were not democracies, but oligarchies of an open character,—the courts of justice were more or less numerous, and the procedure oral and public: in Athens, especially, the dikasteries—whose constitution has been explained in a former chapter—were both very numerous, and paid for attendance. Every citizen had to go before them in person, without being able to send a paid advocate in his place, if he either required redress for wrong offered to himself, or was accused of wrong by another.[534] There was no man, therefore, who might not be cast or condemned, or fail in his own suit, even with right on his side, unless he possessed some powers of speech to unfold his case to the dikasts, as well as to confute the falsehoods, and disentangle the sophistry, of an opponent. Moreover, to any man of known family and station, it would be a humiliation hardly less painful than the loss of the cause, to stand before the dikastery with friends and enemies around him, and find himself unable to carry on the thread of a discourse without halting or confusion. To meet such liabilities, from which no citizen, rich or poor, was exempt, a certain training in speech became not less essential than a certain training in arms. Without the latter, he could not do his duty as an hoplite in the ranks for the defence of his country; without the former, he could not escape danger to his fortune or honor, and humiliation in the eyes of his friends, if called before a dikastery, nor lend assistance to any of those friends who might be placed under the like necessity.

Here then were ample motives, arising out of practical prudence not less than from the stimulus of ambition, to cultivate the power both of continuous harangue, and of concise argumentation, or interrogation and reply:[535] motives for all, to acquire a certain moderate aptitude in the use of these weapons; for the ambitious few, to devote much labor and to shine as accomplished orators.

Such political and social motives, it is to be remembered, though acting very forcibly at Athens, were by no means peculiar to Athens, but prevailed more or less throughout a large portion of the Grecian cities, especially in Sicily, when all the governments became popularized after the overthrow of the Gelonian dynasty. And it was in Sicily and Italy, that the first individuals arose, who acquired permanent name

both in rhetoric and dialectics: Empedoklês of Agrigentum in the former; Zeno of Elea, in Italy, in the latter.[536]

Both these distinguished men bore a conspicuous part in politics, and both on the popular side; Empedoklês against an oligarchy, Zeno against a despot. But both also were yet more distinguished as philosophers, and the dialectical impulse in Zeno, if not the rhetorical impulse in Empedoklês, came more from his philosophy than from his politics. Empedoklês (about 470-440 B.C.) appears to have held intercourse at least, if not partial communion of doctrine, with the dispersed philosophers of the Pythagorean league; the violent subversion of which, at Kroton and elsewhere, I have related in a previous chapter.[537] He constructed a system of physics and cosmogony, distinguished for first broaching the doctrine of the Four elements, and set forth in a poem composed by himself: besides which he seems to have had much of the mystical tone and miraculous pretensions of Pythagoras; professing not only to cure pestilence and other distempers, but to teach how old age might be averted and the dead raised from Hades; to prophesy, and to raise and calm the winds at his pleasure. Gorgias, his pupil, deposed to having been present at the magical ceremonies of Empedoklês.[538] The impressive character of his poem is sufficiently attested by the admiration of Lucretius,[539] and the rhetoric ascribed to him may have consisted mainly in oral teaching or exposition of the same doctrines. Tisias and Korax of Syracuse, who are also mentioned as the first teachers of rhetoric, and the first who made known any precepts about the rhetorical practice, were his contemporaries; and the celebrated Gorgias was his pupil.

The dialectical movement emanated at the same time from the Eleatic school of philosophers,—Zeno, and his contemporary the Samian Melissus, 460-440,—if not from their common teacher Parmenidês. Melissus also, as well as Zeno and Empedoklês, was a distinguished citizen as well as a philosopher; having been in command of the Samian fleet at the time of the revolt from Athens, and having in that capacity gained a victory over the Athenians.

All the philosophers of the fifth century B.C., prior to Sokratês, inheriting from their earliest poetical predecessors the vast and unmeasured problems which had once been solved by the supposition of divine or superhuman agents, contemplated the world, physical and moral, all in a mass, and applied their minds to find some hypothesis which would give them an explanation of this totality,[540] or at least appease curiosity by something which looked like an explanation. What were the elements out of which sensible things were made? What was the initial cause or principle of those changes which appeared to our senses? What was change?—was it generation of something integrally new and destruction of something preëxistent,—or was it a decomposition and recombination of elements still continuing. The theories of the various Ionic philosophers, and of Empedoklês after them, admitting one, two, or four elementary substances, with Friendship and Enmity to serve as causes of motion or change; the Homœomeries of Anaxagoras, with Nous, or Intelligence, as the

stirring and regularizing agent; the atoms and void of Leukippus and Demokritus, all these were different hypotheses answering to a similar vein of thought. All of them, though assuming that the sensible appearances of things were delusive and perplexing, nevertheless, were borrowed more or less directly from some of these appearances, which were employed to explain and illustrate the whole theory, and served to render it plausible when stated as well as to defend it against attack. But the philosophers of the Eleatic school—first Xenophanês, and after him Parmenidês—took a distinct path of their own. To find that which was real, and which lay as it were concealed behind or under the delusive phenomena of sense, they had recourse only to mental abstractions. They supposed a Substance or Something not perceivable by sense, but only cogitable or conceivable by reason; a One and All, continuous and finite, which was not only real and self-existent, but was the only reality; eternal, immovable, and unchangeable, and the only matter knowable. The phenomena of sense, which began and ended one after the other, they thought, were essentially delusive, uncertain, contradictory among themselves, and open to endless diversity of opinion.[541] Upon these, nevertheless, they announced an opinion; adopting two elements, heat and cold, or light and darkness.

Parmenidês set forth this doctrine of the One and All in a poem, of which but a few fragments now remain, so that we understand very imperfectly the positive arguments employed to recommend it. The matter of truth and knowledge, such as he alone admitted, was altogether removed from the senses and divested of sensible properties, so as to be conceived only as an Ens Rationis, and described and discussed only in the most general words of the language. The exposition given by Parmenidês in his poem,[542] though complimented by Plato, was vehemently controverted by others, who deduced from it many contradictions and absurdities. As a part of his reply, and doubtless the strongest part, Parmenidês retorted upon his adversaries; an example followed by his pupil Zeno with still greater acuteness and success. Those who controverted his ontological theory, that the real, ultra-phenomenal substance was One, affirmed it to be not One, but Many; divisible, movable, changeable, etc. Zeno attacked this latter theory, and proved that it led to contradictions and absurdities still greater than those involved in the proposition of Parmenidês.[543] He impugned the testimony of sense, affirming that it furnished premises for conclusions which contradicted each other, and that it was unworthy of trust.[544] Parmenidês[545] had denied that there was any such thing as real change either of place or color: Zeno maintained change of place, or motion, to be impossible and self-contradictory; propounding many logical difficulties, derived from the infinite divisibility of matter, against some of the most obvious affirmations respecting sensible phenomena. Melissus appears to have argued in a vein similar to that of Zeno, though with much less acuteness; demonstrating indirectly the doctrine of Parmenidês, by deducing impossible inferences from the contrary hypothesis.[546]

Zeno published a treatise to maintain the thesis above described, which he also upheld by personal conversations and discussions, in a manner doubtless far more efficacious than his writing; the oral teaching of these early philosophers being their really impressive manifestation. His subtle dialectic arguments were not only sufficient to occupy all the philosophers of antiquity, in confuting them more or less successfully, but have even descended to modern times as a fire not yet extinguished. [547] The great effect produced among the speculative minds of Greece by his writing and conversation, is attested both by Plato and Aristotle. He visited Athens, gave instruction to some eminent Athenians, for high pay, and is said to have conversed both with Periklês and with Sokratês, at a time when the latter was very young; probably between 450-440 B.C.[548]

His appearance constitutes a remarkable era in Grecian philosophy, because he first brought out the extraordinary aggressive or negative force of the dialectic method. In this discussion respecting the One and the Many, positive grounds on either side were alike scanty: each party had to set forth the contradictions deducible from the opposite hypothesis, and Zeno professed to show that those of his opponents were the more flagrant. We thus see that, along with the methodized question and answer, or dialectic method, employed from henceforward more and more in philosophical inquiries, comes out at the same time the negative tendency, the probing, testing, and scrutinizing force, of Grecian speculation. The negative side of Grecian speculation stands quite as prominently marked, and occupies as large a measure of the intellectual force of their philosophers, as the positive side. It is not simply to arrive at a conclusion, sustained by a certain measure of plausible premise,—and then to proclaim it as an authoritative dogma, silencing or disparaging all objectors,—that Grecian speculation aspires. To unmask not only positive falsehood, but even affirmation without evidence, exaggerated confidence in what was only doubtful, and show of knowledge without the reality; to look at a problem on all sides, and set forth all the difficulties attending its solution, to take account of deductions from the affirmative evidence, even in the case of conclusions accepted as true upon the balance, all this will be found pervading the march of their greatest thinkers. As a condition of all progressive philosophy, it is not less essential that the grounds of negation should be freely exposed, than the grounds of affirmation. We shall find the two going hand in hand, and the negative vein, indeed, the more impressive and characteristic of the two, from Zeno downwards in our history. In one of the earliest memoranda illustrative of Grecian dialectics,—the sentences in which Plato represents Parmenidês and Zeno as bequeathing their mantle to the youthful Sokratês, and giving him precepts for successfully prosecuting those researches which his marked inquisitive impulse promised,—this large and comprehensive point of view is emphatically inculcated. He is admonished to set before him both sides of every hypothesis, and to follow out both the negative and the affirmative chains of argument with equal perseverance and equal freedom of scrutiny; neither daunted by the adverse opinions around him, nor deterred by sneers against wasting time in fruitless

talk; since the multitude are ignorant that without thus travelling round all sides of a question, no assured comprehension of the truth is attainable.[549]

We thus find ourselves, from the year 450 B.C., downwards, in presence of two important classes of men in Greece, unknown to Solon or even to Kleisthenês, the Rhetoricians, and the Dialecticians; for whom, as has been shown, the ground had been gradually prepared by the politics, the poetry, and the speculation, of the preceding period.

Both these two novelties—like the poetry and other accomplishments of this memorable race—grew up from rude indigenous beginnings, under native stimulus unborrowed and unassisted from without. The rhetorical teaching was an attempt to assist and improve men in the power of continuous speech as addressed to assembled numbers, such as the public assembly or the dikastery; it was therefore a species of training sought for by men of active pursuits and ambition, either that they might succeed in public life, or that they might maintain their rights and dignity if called before the court of justice. On the other hand, the dialectic business had no direct reference to public life, to the judicial pleading, or to any assembled large number. It was a dialogue carried on by two disputants, usually before a few hearers, to unravel some obscurity, to reduce the respondent to silence and contradiction, to exercise both parties in mastery of the subject, or to sift the consequences of some problematical assumption. It was spontaneous conversation[550] systematized and turned into some predetermined channel; furnishing a stimulus to thought, and a means of improvement not attainable in any other manner; furnishing to some, also, a source of profit or display. It opened a line of serious intellectual pursuit to men of a speculative or inquisitive turn, who were deficient in voice, in boldness, in continuous memory, for public speaking; or who desired to keep themselves apart from the political and judicial animosities of the moment.

Although there were numerous Athenians, who combined, in various proportions, speculative with practical study, yet generally speaking, the two veins of intellectual movement—one towards active public business, the other towards enlarged opinions and greater command of speculative truth, with its evidences—continued simultaneous and separate. There subsisted between them a standing polemical controversy and a spirit of mutual detraction. If Plato despised the sophists and the rhetors, Isokratês thinks himself not less entitled to disparage those who employed their time in debating upon the unity or plurality of virtue.[551] Even among different teachers, in the same intellectual walk, also, there prevailed but too often an acrimonious feeling of personal rivalry, which laid them all so much the more open to assault from the common enemy of all mental progress; a feeling of jealous ignorance, stationary or wistfully retrospective, of no mean force at Athens, as in every other society, and of course blended at Athens with the indigenous democratical sentiment. This latter sentiment[552] of antipathy to new ideas, and new mental accomplishments, has been raised into factitious importance by the comic genius of Aristophanês, whose

point of view modern authors have too often accepted; thus allowing some of the worst feelings of Grecian antiquity to influence their manner of conceiving the facts. Moreover, they have rarely made any allowance for that force of literary and philosophical antipathy, which was no less real and constant at Athens than the political; and which made the different literary classes or individuals perpetually unjust one towards another.[553] It was the blessing and the glory of Athens, that every man could speak out his sentiments and his criticisms with a freedom unparalleled in the ancient world, and hardly paralleled even in the modern, in which a vast body of dissent both is, and always has been, condemned to absolute silence. But this known latitude of censure ought to have imposed on modern authors a peremptory necessity of not accepting implicitly the censure of any one, where the party inculpated has left no defence; at the very least, of construing the censure strictly, and allowing for the point of view from which it proceeds. From inattention to this necessity, almost all the things and persons of Grecian history are presented to us on their bad side; the libels of Aristophanês, the sneers of Plato and Xenophon, even the interested generalities of a plaintiff or defendant before the dikastery, are received with little cross-examination as authentic materials for history.

If ever there was need to invoke this rare sentiment of candor, it is when we come to discuss the history of the persons called sophists, who now for the first time appear as of note; the practical teachers of Athens and of Greece, misconceived as well as misesteemed.

The primitive education at Athens consisted of two branches; gymnastics, for the body; music, for the mind. The word *music* is not to be judged according to the limited signification which it now bears. It comprehended, from the beginning, everything appertaining to the province of the Nine Muses; not merely learning the use of the lyre, or how to bear part in a chorus; but also the hearing, learning, and repeating, of poetical compositions, as well as the practice of exact and elegant pronunciation; which latter accomplishment, in a language like the Greek, with long words, measured syllables, and great diversity of accentuation between one word and another, must have been far more difficult to acquire than it is in any modern European language. As the range of ideas enlarged, so the words *music* and musical teachers acquired an expanded meaning, so as to comprehend matter of instruction at once ampler and more diversified. During the middle of the fifth century B.C., at Athens, there came thus to be found, among the musical teachers, men of the most distinguished abilities and eminence; masters of all the learning and accomplishments of the age, teaching what was known of astronomy, geography, and physics, and capable of holding dialectical discussions with their pupils, upon all the various problems then afloat among intellectual men. Of this character were Lamprus, Agathoklês, Pythokleidês, Damon, etc. The two latter were instructors of Periklês; and Damon was even rendered so unpopular at Athens, partly by his large and free speculations, partly through the political enemies of his great pupil, that he was ostracized, or at

least sentenced to banishment.[554] Such men were competent companions for Anaxagoras and Zeno, and employed in part on the same studies; the field of acquired knowledge being not then large enough to be divided into separate, exclusive compartments. While Euripidês frequented the company, and acquainted himself with the opinions, of Anaxagoras, Ion of Chios, his rival as a tragic poet, as well as the friend of Kimon, bestowed so much thought upon physical subjects, as then conceived, that he set up a theory of his own, propounding the doctrine of three elements in nature;[555] air, fire, and earth.

Now such musical teachers as Damon and the others above mentioned, were sophists, not merely in the natural and proper Greek sense of that word, but, to a certain extent, even in the special and restricted meaning which Plato afterwards thought proper to confer upon it.[556] A sophist, in the genuine sense of the word, was a wise man, a clever man; one who stood prominently before the public as distinguished for intellect or talent of some kind. Thus Solon and Pythagoras are both called sophists; Thamyras the skilful bard, is called a sophist:[557] Sokratês is so denominated, not merely by Aristophanês, but by Æschinês:[558] Aristotle himself calls Aristippus, and Xenophon calls Antisthenês, both of them disciples of Sokratês, by that name:[559] Xenophon,[560] in describing a collection of instructive books, calls them "the writings of the old poets and sophists," meaning by the latter word prose-writers generally: Plato is alluded to as a sophist, even by Isokratês:[561] Isokratês himself was harshly criticized as a sophist, and defends both himself and his profession: lastly, Timon, the friend and admirer of Pyrrho, about 300-280 B.C., who bitterly satirized all the philosophers, designated them all, including Plato and Aristotle, by the general name of sophists.[562] In this large and comprehensive sense the word was originally used, and always continued to be so understood among the general public. But along with this idea, the title sophist also carried with it or connoted a certain invidious feeling. The natural temper of a people generally ignorant towards superior intellect,—the same temper which led to those charges of magic so frequent in the Middle Ages,—appears to be a union of admiration with something of an unfavorable sentiment;[563] dislike, or apprehension, as the case may be, unless where the latter element has become neutralized by habitual respect for an established profession or station: at any rate, the unfriendly sentiment is so often intended, that a substantive word, in which it is implied without the necessity of any annexed predicate, is soon found convenient. Timon, who hated the philosophers, thus found the word sophist exactly suitable, in sentiment as well as meaning, to his purpose in addressing them.

Now when (in the period succeeding 450 B.C.) the rhetorical and musical teachers came to stand before the public at Athens in such increased eminence, they of course, as well as other men intellectually celebrated, became designated by the appropriate name of sophists. But there was one characteristic peculiar to themselves, whereby they drew upon themselves a double measure of that invidious sentiment

which lay wrapped up in the name. They taught for pay: of course, therefore, the most eminent among them taught only the rich, and earned large sums; a fact naturally provocative of envy, to some extent, among the many who benefited nothing by them, but still more among the inferior members of their own profession. But even great minds, like Sokratês and Plato, though much superior to any such envy, cherished in that age a genuine and vehement repugnance against receiving pay for teaching. We read in Xenophon,[564] that Sokratês considered such a bargain as nothing less than servitude, robbing the teacher of all free choice as to persons or proceeding; and that he assimilated the relation between teacher and pupil to that between two lovers or two intimate friends; which was thoroughly dishonored, robbed of its charm and reciprocity, and prevented from bringing about its legitimate reward of attachment and devotion, by the intervention of money payment. However little in harmony with modern ideas, such was the conscientious sentiment of Sokratês and Plato; who therefore considered the name sophists, denoting intellectual celebrity combined with an odious association, as preëminently suitable to the leading teachers for pay. The splendid genius, the lasting influence, and the reiterated polemics, of Plato, have stamped it upon the men against whom he wrote as if it were their recognized, legitimate, and peculiar designation: though it is certain, that if, in the middle of the Peloponnesian war, any Athenian had been asked, "Who are the principal sophists in your city?" he would have named Sokratês among the first; for Sokratês was at once eminent as an intellectual teacher and personally unpopular, not because he received pay, but on other grounds, which will be hereafter noticed: and this was the precise combination of qualities which the general public naturally expressed by a sophist. Moreover, Plato not only stole the name out of general circulation, in order to fasten it specially upon his opponents, the paid teachers, but also connected with it express discreditable attributes, which formed no part of its primitive and recognized meaning, and were altogether distinct from, though grafted upon, the vague sentiment of dislike associated with it. Aristotle, following the example of his master, gave to the word sophist a definition substantially the same as that which it bears in the modern languages:[565] "an impostrous pretender to knowledge; a man who employs what he knows to be fallacy, for the purpose of deceit and of getting money." And he did this at a time when he himself, with his estimable contemporary Isokratês, were considered at Athens to come under the designation of sophists, and were called so by every one who disliked either their profession or their persons.[566]

Great thinkers and writers, like Plato and Aristotle, have full right to define and employ words in a sense of their own, provided they give due notice. But it is essential that the reader should keep in mind the consequences of such change, and not mistake a word used in a new sense for a new fact or phenomenon. The age with which we are now dealing, the last half of the fifth century B.C., is commonly distinguished in the history of philosophy as the age of Sokratês and the sophists. The sophists are spoken of as a new class of men, or sometimes in language which im-

plies a new doctrinal sect, or school, as if they then sprang up in Greece for the first time; ostentatious imposters, flattering and duping the rich youth for their own personal gain; undermining the morality of Athens, public and private, and encouraging their pupils to the unscrupulous prosecution of ambition and cupidity. They are even affirmed to have succeeded in corrupting the general morality, so that Athens had become miserably degenerated and vicious in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, as compared with what she was in the time of Miltiadês and Aristeidês. Sokratês, on the contrary, is usually described as a holy man combating and exposing these false prophets, standing up as the champion of morality against their insidious artifices.[567] Now though the appearance of a man so very original as Sokratês was a new fact of unspeakable importance, the appearance of the sophists was no new fact; what was new was the peculiar use of an old word, which Plato took out of its usual meaning, and fastened upon the eminent paid teachers of the Sokratic age.

The paid teachers, with whom, under the name of The Sophists, he brings Sokratês into controversy, were Protagoras of Abdêra, Gorgias of Leontini, Polus of Agrigentum, Hippias of Elis, Prodikus of Keos, Thrasymachus of Chalkêdon, Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus of Chios; to whom Xenophon adds Antiphon of Athens. These men—whom modern writers set down as the sophists, and denounce as the moral pestilence of their age—were not distinguished in any marked or generic way from their predecessors. Their vocation was to train up youth for the duties, the pursuits, and the successes, of active life, both private and public. Others had done this before; but these teachers brought to the task a larger range of knowledge with a greater multiplicity of scientific and other topics; not only more impressive powers of composition and speech, serving as a personal example to the pupil, but also a comprehension of the elements of good speaking, so as to be able to give him precepts conducive to that accomplishment;[568] a considerable treasure of accumulated thought on moral and political subjects, calculated to make their conversation very instructive, and discourse ready prepared, on general heads or *common places*, for their pupils to learn by heart.[569] But this, though a very important extension, was nothing more than an extension, differing merely in degree of that which Damon and others had done before them. It arose from the increased demand which had grown up among the Athenian youth, for a larger measure of education and other accomplishments; from an elevation in the standard of what was required from every man who aspired to occupy a place in the eyes of his fellow-citizens. Protagoras, Gorgias, and the rest, supplied this demand with an ability and success unknown before their time; hence they gained a distinction such as none of their predecessors had attained, were prized all over Greece, travelled from city to city with general admiration, and obtained considerable pay. While such success, among men personally strangers to them, attests unequivocally their talent and personal dignity, of course it also laid them open to increased jealousy, as well from inferior teachers as from the lovers of ignorance generally: such jealousy manifesting itself, as I have before explained, by a greater readiness to stamp them with the obnoxious title of sophists.

The hostility of Plato against these teachers,—for it is he, and not Sokratês, who was peculiarly hostile to them, as may be seen by the absence of any such marked antithesis in the Memorabilia of Xenophon,—may be explained without at all supposing in them that corruption which modern writers have been so ready not only to admit but to magnify. It arose from the radical difference between his point of view and theirs. He was a great reformer and theorist; they undertook to qualify young men for doing themselves credit, and rendering service to others, in active Athenian life. Not only is there room for the concurrent operation of both these veins of thought and action, in every progressive society, but the intellectual outfit of the society can never be complete without the one as well as the other. It was the glory of Athens that both were there adequately represented, at the period which we have now reached. Whoever peruses Plato's immortal work, "The Republic," will see that he dissented from society, both democratical and oligarchical, on some of the most fundamental points of public and private morality; and throughout most of his dialogues his quarrel is not less with the statesmen, past as well as present, than with the paid teachers of Athens. Besides this ardent desire for radical reform of the state, on principles of his own, distinct from every recognized political party or creed, Plato was also unrivalled as a speculative genius and as a dialectician; both which capacities he put forth, to amplify and illustrate the ethical theory and method first struck out by Sokratês, as well as to establish comprehensive generalities of his own.

Now his reforming, as well as his theorizing tendencies, brought him into polemical controversy with all the leading agents by whom the business of practical life at Athens was carried on. In so far as Protagoras or Gorgias talked the language of theory, they were doubtless much inferior to Plato, nor would their doctrines be likely to hold against his acute dialectics. But it was neither their duty, nor their engagement, to reform the state, or discover and vindicate the best theory on ethics. They professed to qualify young Athenians for an active and honorable life, private as well as public, *in Athens*, or in any other given city; they taught them "to think, speak, and act," *in Athens*; they of course accepted, as the basis of their teaching, that type of character which estimable men exhibited and which the public approved, *in Athens*; not undertaking to recast the type, but to arm it with new capacities and adorn it with fresh accomplishments. Their direct business was with ethical precept, not with ethical theory; all that was required of them, as to the latter, was, that their theory should be sufficiently sound to lead to such practical precepts as were accounted virtuous by the most estimable society *in Athens*. It ought never to be forgotten, that those who taught for active life were bound, by the very conditions of their profession, to adapt themselves to the place and the society as it stood. With the theorist Plato, not only there was no such obligation, but the grandeur and instructiveness of his speculations were realized only by his departing from it, and placing himself on a loftier pinnacle of vision; and he himself[570] not only admits, but even exaggerates, the unfitness and repugnance of men, taught in his school, for practical life and duties.

To understand the essential difference between the practical and the theoretical point of view, we need only look to Isokratês, the pupil of Gorgias, and himself a sophist. Though not a man of commanding abilities, Isokratês was one of the most estimable men of Grecian antiquity. He taught for money; and taught young men to "think, speak, and act," all with a view to an honorable life of active citizenship; not concealing his marked disparagement[571] of speculative study and debate, such as the dialogues of Plato and the dialectic exercises generally. He defends his profession much in the same way as his master Gorgias, or Protagoras, would have defended it, if we had before us vindications from their pens. Isokratês at Athens, and Quintilian, a man equally estimable at Rome, are, in their general type of character and professional duty, the fair counterpart of those whom Plato arraigns as the sophists.

We know these latter chiefly from the evidence of Plato, their pronounced enemy; yet even his evidence, when construed candidly and taken as a whole, will not be found to justify the charges of corrupt and immoral teaching, impostrous pretence of knowledge, etc., which the modern historians pour forth in loud chorus against them. I know few characters in history who have been so hardly dealt with as these so-called sophists. They bear the penalty of their name, in its modern sense; a misleading association, from which few modern writers take pains to emancipate either themselves or their readers, though the English or French word sophist is absolutely inapplicable to Protagoras or Gorgias, who ought to be called rather "professors, or public teachers." It is really surprising to read the expositions prefixed by learned men like Stallbaum and others, to the Platonic dialogues entitled Protagoras, Gorgias, Euthydêmus, Theætêtus, etc., where Plato introduces Sokratês either in personal controversy with one or other of these sophists, or as canvassing their opinions. We continually read from the pen of the expositor, such remarks as these: "Mark, how Plato puts down the shallow and worthless sophist;" the obvious reflection, that it is Plato himself who plays both games on the chess-board, being altogether overlooked. And again: "This or that argument, placed in the mouth of Sokratês, is not to be regarded as the real opinion of Plato: he only takes it up and enforces it at this moment, in order to puzzle and humiliate an ostentatious pretender;"[572] a remark which converts Plato into an insincere disputant, and a sophist in the modern sense, at the very moment when the commentator is extolling his pure and lofty morality as an antidote against the alleged corruption of Gorgias and Protagoras.

Plato has devoted a long and interesting dialogue to the inquiry, What is a sophist?[573] and it is curious to observe that the definition which he at last brings out suits Sokratês himself, intellectually speaking, better than any one else whom we know. Cicero defines the sophist to be one who pursues philosophy for the sake of ostentation or of gain;[574] which, if it is to be held as a reproach, will certainly bear hard upon the great body of modern teachers, who are determined to embrace their profession and to discharge its important duties, like other professional men, by the prospect either of deriving an income or of making a figure in it, or both, whether

they have any peculiar relish for the occupation or not. But modern writers, in describing Protagoras or Gorgias, while they adopt the sneering language of Plato against teaching for pay, low purposes, tricks to get money from the rich, etc., use terms which lead the reader to believe that there was something in these sophists peculiarly greedy, exorbitant, and truckling; something beyond the mere fact of asking and receiving remuneration. Now not only there is no proof that any of them were thus dishonest or exorbitant, but in the case of Protagoras, even his enemy Plato furnishes a proof that he was not so. In the Platonic dialogue termed Protagoras, that sophist is introduced as describing the manner in which he proceeded respecting remuneration from his pupils. "I make no stipulation beforehand: when a pupil parts from me, I ask from him such a sum as I think the time and the circumstances warrant; and I add, that if he deems the demand too great, he has only to make up his own mind what is the amount of improvement which my company has procured to him, and what sum he considers an equivalent for it. I am content to accept the sum so named by himself, only requiring him to go into a temple and make oath that it is his sincere belief."[575] It is not easy to imagine a more dignified way of dealing than this, nor one which more thoroughly attests an honorable reliance on the internal consciousness of the scholar, on the grateful sense of improvement realized, which to every teacher constitutes a reward hardly inferior to the payment that proceeds from it, and which, in the opinion of Sokratês, formed the only legitimate reward. Such is not the way in which the corruptors of mankind go to work.

That which stood most prominent in the teaching of Gorgias and the other sophists, was, that they cultivated and improved the powers of public speaking in their pupils; one of the most essential accomplishments to every Athenian of consideration. For this, too, they have been denounced by Ritter, Brandis, and other learned writers on the history of philosophy, as corrupt and immoral. "Teaching their pupils rhetoric (it has been said), they only enabled them to second unjust designs, to make the worse appear the better reason, and to delude their hearers, by trick and artifice, into false persuasion and show of knowledge without reality. Rhetoric (argues Plato, in the dialogue called Gorgias) is no art whatever, but a mere unscientific knack, enslaved to the dominant prejudices, and nothing better than an impostrous parody on the true political art." Now though Aristotle, following the Platonic vein, calls this power of making the worse appear the better reason, "the promise of Protagoras,"[576] the accusation ought never to be urged as if it bore specially against the teachers of the Sokratic age. It is an argument against rhetorical teaching generally; against all the most distinguished teachers of pupils for active life, throughout the ancient world, from Protagoras, Gorgias, Isokratês, etc., down to Quintilian. Not only does the argument bear equally against all, but it was actually urged against all. Isokratês[577] and Quintilian both defend themselves against it: Aristotle replies to it in the beginning of his treatise on rhetoric: nor was there ever any man, indeed, against whom it was pressed with greater bitterness of calumny than Sokratês, by Aristophanês, in his comedy of the "Clouds," as well as by other

comic composers. Sokratês complains of it in his defence before his judges;[578] characterizing such accusations in their true point of view, as being "the stock reproaches against all who pursue philosophy." They are indeed only one of the manifestations, ever varying in form though the same in spirit, of the antipathy of ignorance against dissenting innovation or superior mental accomplishments; which antipathy, intellectual men themselves, when it happens to make on their side in a controversy, are but too ready to invoke. Considering that we have here the materials of defence, as well as of attack, supplied by Sokratês and Plato, it might have been expected that modern writers would have refrained from employing such an argument to discredit Gorgias or Protagoras; the rather, as they have before their eyes, in all the countries of modern Europe, the profession of lawyers and advocates, who lend their powerful eloquence without distinction to the cause of justice or injustice, and who, far from being regarded as the corrupters of society, are usually looked upon, for that very reason among others, as indispensable auxiliaries to a just administration of law.

Though writing was less the business of these sophists than personal teaching, several of them published treatises. Thrasymachus and Theodôrus both set forth written precepts on the art of rhetoric;[579] precepts which have not descended to us, but which appear to have been narrow and special, bearing directly upon practice, and relating chiefly to the proper component parts of an oration. To Aristotle, who had attained that large and comprehensive view of the theory of rhetoric which still remains to instruct us in his splendid treatise, the views of Thrasymachus appeared unimportant, serving to him only as hints and materials. But their effect must have been very different when they first appeared, and when young men were first enabled to analyze the parts of an harangue, to understand the dependence of one upon the other, and call them by their appropriate names; all illustrated, let us recollect, by oral exposition on the part of the master, which was the most impressive portion of the whole.

Prodikus, again, published one or more treatises intended to elucidate the ambiguities of words, and to point out the different significations of terms apparently, but not really, equivalent. For this Plato often ridicules him, and the modern historians of philosophy generally think it right to adopt the same tone. Whether the execution of the work was at all adequate to its purpose, we have no means of judging; but assuredly the purpose was one preëminently calculated to aid Grecian thinkers and dialecticians; for no man can study their philosophy without seeing how lamentably they were hampered by enslavement to the popular phraseology, and by inferences founded on mere verbal analogy. At a time when neither dictionary nor grammar existed, a teacher who took care, even punctilious care, in fixing the meaning of important words of his discourse, must be considered as guiding the minds of his hearers in a salutary direction; salutary, we may add, even to Plato himself, whose specula-

tions would most certainly have been improved by occasional hints from such a monitor.

Protagoras, too, is said to have been the first who discriminated and gave names to the various modes and forms of address, an analysis well calculated to assist his lessons on right speaking:[580] he appears also to have been the first who distinguished the three genders of nouns. We hear further of a treatise which he wrote on wrestling, or most probably on gymnastics generally, as well as a collection of controversial dialogues.[581] But his most celebrated treatise was one entitled "Truth," seemingly on philosophy generally. Of this treatise, we do not even know the general scope or purport. In one of his treatises, he confessed his inability to satisfy himself about the existence of the gods, in these words:[582] "Respecting the gods, I neither know whether they exist, nor what are their attributes: the uncertainty of the subject, the shortness of human life, and many other causes, debar me from this knowledge." That the believing public of Athens were seriously indignant at this passage, and that it caused the author to be threatened with prosecution, and forced to quit Athens, we can perfectly understand; though there seems no sufficient proof of the tale that he was drowned in his outward voyage. But that modern historians of philosophy, who consider the pagan gods to be fictions, and the religion to be repugnant to any reasonable mind, should concur in denouncing Protagoras on this ground as a corrupt man, is to me less intelligible. Xenophanês,[583] and probably many other philosophers, had said the same thing before him. Nor is it easy to see what a superior man was to do, who could not adjust his standard of belief to such fictions; or what he could say, if he said anything, less than the words cited above from Protagoras; which appear, as far as we can appreciate them, standing without the context, to be a brief mention, in modest and circumspect phrases, of the reason why he said nothing about the gods, in a treatise where the reader would expect to find much upon the subject.[584] Certain it is that in the Platonic dialogue, called "Protagoras," that sophist is introduced speaking about the gods exactly in the manner that any orthodox pagan might naturally adopt.

The other fragment preserved of Protagoras, relates to his view of the cognitive process, and of truth generally. He taught, that "Man is the measure of all things; both of that which exists, and of that which does not exist:" a doctrine canvassed and controverted by Plato, who represents that Protagoras affirmed knowledge to consist in sensation, and considered the sensations of each individual man to be, to him, the canon and measure of truth. We know scarce anything of the elucidations or limitations with which Protagoras may have accompanied his general position: and if even Plato, who had good means of knowing them, felt it ungenerous to insult an orphan doctrine whose father was recently dead, and could no longer defend it,[585] much more ought modern authors, who speak with mere scraps of evidence before them, to be cautious how they heap upon the same doctrine insults much beyond those which Plato recognizes. In so far as we can pretend to understand the theory,

it was certainly not more incorrect than several others then afloat, from the Eleatic school and other philosophers; while it had the merit of bringing into forcible relief, though in an erroneous manner, the essentially relative nature of cognition,[586] relative, not indeed to the sensitive faculty alone, but to that reinforced and guided by the other faculties of man, memorial and ratiocinative. And had it been even more incorrect than it really is, there would be no warrant for those imputations which modern authors build upon it, against the morality of Protagoras. No such imputations are countenanced in the discussion which Plato devotes to the doctrine: indeed, if the vindication which he sets forth against himself on behalf of Protagoras be really ascribable to that sophist, it would give an exaggerated importance to the distinction between Good and Evil, into which the distinction between Truth and Falsehood is considered by the Platonic Protagoras as resolvable. The subsequent theories of Plato and Aristotle respecting cognition, were much more systematic and elaborate, the work of men greatly superior in speculative genius to Protagoras: but they would not have been what they were, had not Protagoras, as well as others gone before them, with suggestions more partial and imperfect.

From Gorgias there remains one short essay, preserved in one of the Aristotelian, or Pseudo-Aristotelian treatises,[587] on a metaphysical thesis. He professes to demonstrate that nothing exists: that if anything exist, it is unknowable; and granting it even to exist and to be knowable by any one man, he could never communicate it to others. The modern historians of philosophy here prefer the easier task of denouncing the skepticism of the sophist, instead of performing the duty incumbent on them of explaining his thesis in immediate sequence with the speculations which preceded it. In our sense of the words, it is a monstrous paradox: but construing them in their legitimate filiation from the Eleatic philosophers immediately before him, it is a plausible, not to say conclusive, deduction from principles which they would have acknowledged.[588] The word existence, as they understood it, did not mean phenomenal, but ultra-phenomenal existence. They looked upon the phenomena of sense as always coming and going, as something essentially transitory, fluctuating, incapable of being surely known, and furnishing at best grounds only for conjecture. They searched by cogitation for what they presumed to be the really existent something or substance—the noumenon, to use a Kantian phrase—lying behind or under the phenomena, which noumenon they recognized as the only appropriate subject of knowledge. They discussed much, as I have before remarked, whether it was one or many; noumenon in the singular, or noumena in the plural. Now the thesis of Gorgias related to this ultra-phenomenal existence, and bore closely upon the arguments of Zeno and Melissus, the Eleatic reasoners of his elder contemporaries. He denied that any such ultra-phenomenal something, or noumenon, existed, or could be known, or could be described. Of this tripartite thesis, the first negation was neither more untenable, nor less untenable, than that of those philosophers who before him had argued for the affirmative: on the two last points, his conclusions were neither paradoxical nor improperly skeptical, but perfectly just, and have been rati-

fied by the gradual abandonment, either avowed or implied, of such ultra-phenomenal researches among the major part of philosophers. It may fairly be presumed that these doctrines were urged by Gorgias for the purpose of diverting his disciples from studies which he considered as unpromising and fruitless: just as we shall find his pupil Isokratês afterwards enforcing the same view, discouraging speculations of this nature, and recommending rhetorical exercise as preparation for the duties of an active citizen.[589] Nor must we forget that Sokratês himself discouraged physical speculations even more decidedly than either of them.

If the censures cast upon the alleged skepticism of Gorgias and Protagoras are partly without sufficient warrant, partly without any warrant at all, much more may the same remark be made respecting the graver reproaches heaped upon their teaching on the score of immorality or corruption. It has been common with recent German historians of philosophy to translate from Plato and dress up a fiend called "Die Sophistik," (Sophistic,) whom they assert to have poisoned and demoralized, by corrupt teaching, the Athenian moral character, so that it became degenerate at the end of the Peloponnesian war, compared with what it had been in the time of Miltiadês and Aristeidês.

Now, in the first place, if the abstraction "Die Sophistik" is to have any definite meaning, we ought to have proof that the persons styled sophists had some doctrines, principles, or method, both common to them all and distinguishing them from others. But such a supposition is untrue: there were no such common doctrines, or principles, or method, belonging to them; even the name by which they are known did not belong to them, any more than to Sokratês and others; they had nothing in common except their profession, as paid teachers, qualifying young men "to think, speak, and act," these are the words of Isokratês, and better words it would not be easy to find, with credit to themselves as citizens. Moreover, such community of profession did not at that time imply near so much analogy of character as it does now, when the path of teaching has been beaten into a broad and visible high road, with measured distances and stated intervals: Protagoras and Gorgias found predecessors, indeed, but no binding precedents to copy; so that each struck out more or less a road of his own. And accordingly, we find Plato, in his dialogue called "Protagoras," wherein Protagoras, Prodikus, and Hippias, are all introduced, imparting a distinct type of character and distinct method to each, not without a strong admixture of reciprocal jealousy between them; while Thrasymachus, in the Republic, and Euthydêmus, in the dialogue so called, are again painted each with colors of his own, different from all the three above named. We have not the least reason for presuming that Gorgias agreed in the opinion of Protagoras: "Man is the measure of all things;" and we may infer, even from Plato himself, that Protagoras would have opposed the views expressed by Thrasymachus in the first book of the Republic. It is impossible therefore to predicate anything concerning doctrines, methods, or tendencies, common and peculiar to all the sophists. There were none such; nor has the abstract

word, "Die Sophistik," any real meaning, except such qualities, whatever they may be, as are inseparable from the profession or occupation of public teaching. And if, at present, every candid critic would be ashamed to cast wholesale aspersions on the entire body of professional teachers, much more is such censure unbecoming in reference to the ancient sophists, who were distinguished from each other by stronger individual peculiarities.

If, then, it were true that in the interval between 480 B.C. and the end of the Peloponnesian war, a great moral deterioration had taken place in Athens and in Greece generally, we should have to search for some other cause than this imaginary abstraction called sophistic. But—and this is the second point—the matter of fact here alleged is as untrue, as the cause alleged is unreal. Athens, at the close of the Peloponnesian war, was not more corrupt than Athens in the days of Miltiadês and Aristeidês. If we revert to that earlier period, we shall find that scarcely any acts of the Athenian people have drawn upon them sharper censure—in my judgment, unmerited—than their treatment of these very two statesmen; the condemnation of Miltiadês, and the ostracism of Aristeidês. In writing my history of that time, far from finding previous historians disposed to give the Athenians credit for public virtue, I have been compelled to contend against a body of adverse criticism, imputing to them gross ingratitude and injustice. Thus the contemporaries of Miltiadês and Aristeidês, when described as matter of present history, are presented in anything but flattering colors; except their valor at Marathon and Salamis, which finds one unanimous voice of encomium. But when these same men have become numbered among the mingled recollections and fancies belonging to the past,—when a future generation comes to be present, with its appropriate stock of complaint and denunciation,—then it is that men find pleasure in dressing up the virtues of the past, as a count in the indictment against their own contemporaries. Aristophanês,[590] writing during the Peloponnesian war, denounced the Demos of his day as degenerated from the virtue of that Demos which had surrounded Miltiadês and Aristeidês: while Isokratês, [591] writing as an old man, between 350-340 B.C., complains in like manner of his own time, boasting how much better the state of Athens had been in his youth: which period of his youth fell exactly during the life of Aristophanês, in the last half of the Peloponnesian war.

Such illusions ought to impose on no one without a careful comparison of facts; and most assuredly that comparison will not bear out the allegation of increased corruption and degeneracy, between the age of Miltiadês and the end of the Peloponnesian war. Throughout the whole of Athenian history, there are no acts which attest so large a measure of virtue and judgment pervading the whole people, as the proceedings after the Four Hundred and after the Thirty. Nor do I believe that the contemporaries of Miltiadês would have been capable of such heroism; for that appellation is by no means too large for the case. I doubt whether they would have been competent to the steady self-denial of retaining a large sum in reserve during the

time of peace, both prior to the Peloponnesian war and after the Peace of Nikias; or of keeping back the reserve fund of one thousand talents, while they were forced to pay taxes for the support of the war; or of acting upon the prudent, yet painfully trying, policy recommended by Periklês, so as to sustain an annual invasion without either going out to fight or purchasing peace by ignominious concessions. If bad acts such as Athens committed during the later years of the war, for example, the massacre of the Melian population, were not done equally by the contemporaries of Miltiadês, this did not arise from any superior humanity or principle on their part, but from the fact that they were not exposed to the like temptation, brought upon them by the possession of imperial power. The condemnation of the six generals after the battle of Arginusæ, if we suppose the same conduct on their part to have occurred in 490 B.C., would have been decreed more rapidly and more unceremoniously than it was actually decreed in 406 B.C. For at that earlier date there existed no psephism of Kannônus, surrounded by prescriptive respect; no graphê paranomôn; no such habits of established deference to a dikastery solemnly sworn, with full notice to defendants and full time of defence measured by the clock; none of those securities which a long course of democracy had gradually worked into the public morality of every Athenian, and which, as we saw in a former chapter, interposed a serious barrier to the impulse of the moment, though ultimately overthrown by its fierceness. A far less violent impulse would have sufficed for the same mischief in 490 B.C., when no such barriers existed. Lastly, if we want a measure of the appreciating sentiment of the Athenian public, towards a strict and decorous morality in the narrow sense, in the middle of the Peloponnesian war, we have only to consider the manner in which they dealt with Nikias. I have shown, in describing the Sicilian expedition, that the gravest error which the Athenians ever committed, that which shipwrecked both their armament at Syracuse and their power at home, arose from their unmeasured esteem for the respectable and pious Nikias, which blinded them to the grossest defects of generalship and public conduct. Disastrous as such misjudgment was, it counts at least as a proof that the moral corruption alleged to have been operated in their characters, is a mere fiction. Nor let it be supposed that the nerve and resolution which once animated the combatants of Marathon and Salamis, had disappeared in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war. On the contrary, the energetic and protracted struggle of Athens, after the irreparable calamity at Syracuse, forms a worthy parallel to her resistance in the time of Xerxes, and maintained unabated that distinctive attribute which Periklês had set forth as the main foundation of her glory, that of never giving way before misfortune.[592] Without any disparagement to the armament at Salamis, we may remark that the patriotism of the fleet at Samos, which rescued Athens from the Four Hundred, was equally devoted and more intelligent; and that the burst of effort, which sent a subsequent fleet to victory at Arginusæ, was to the full as strenuous.

If, then, we survey the eighty-seven years of Athenian history, between the battle of Marathon and the renovation of the democracy after the Thirty, we shall see no

ground for the assertion, so often made, of increased and increasing moral and political corruption. It is my belief that the people had become both morally and politically better, and that their democracy had worked to their improvement. The remark made by Thucydidês, on the occasion of the Korkyræan bloodshed,—on the violent and reckless political antipathies, arising out of the confluence of external warfare with internal party-feud,[593]—wherever else it may find its application, has no bearing upon Athens: the proceedings after the Four Hundred and after the Thirty prove the contrary. And while Athens may thus be vindicated on the moral side, it is indisputable that her population had acquired a far larger range of ideas and capacities than they possessed at the time of the battle of Marathon. This, indeed, is the very matter of fact deplored by Aristophanês, and admitted by those writers, who, while denouncing the sophists, connect such enlarged range of ideas with the dissemination of the pretended sophistical poison. In my judgment, not only the charge against the sophists as poisoners, but even the existence of such poison in the Athenian system, deserves nothing less than an emphatic denial.

Let us examine again the names of these professional teachers, beginning with Prodikus, one of the most renowned. Who is there that has not read the well-known fable called "The Choice of Hercules," which is to be found in every book professing to collect impressive illustrations of elementary morality? Who does not know that its express purpose is, to kindle the imaginations of youth in favor of a life of labor for noble objects, and against a life of indulgence? It was the favorite theme on which Prodikus lectured, and on which he obtained the largest audience.[594] If it be of striking simplicity and effect even to a modern reader, how much more powerfully must it have worked upon the audience for whose belief it was specially adapted, when set off by the oral expansions of its author! Xenophon wondered that the Athenian dikasts dealt with Sokratês as a corruptor of youth,—Isokratês wondered that a portion of the public made the like mistake about him,—and I confess my wonder to be not less, that not only Aristophanês,[595] but even the modern writers on Grecian philosophy, should rank Prodikus in the same unenviable catalogue. This is the only composition[596] remaining from him; indeed, the only composition remaining from any one of the sophists, excepting the thesis of Gorgias, above noticed. It served, not merely as a vindication of Prodikus against such reproach, but also as a warning against implicit confidence in the sarcastic remarks of Plato,—which include Prodikus as well as the other sophists,—and in the doctrines which he puts into the mouth of the sophists generally, in order that Sokratês may confute them. The commonest candor would teach us, that if a polemical writer of dialogue chooses to put indefensible doctrine into the mouth of the opponent, we ought to be cautious of condemning the latter upon such very dubious proof.

Welcker and other modern authors treat Prodikus as "the most innocent" of the sophists, and except him from the sentence which they pass upon the class generally. Let us see, therefore, what Plato himself says about the rest of them, and first

about Protagoras. If it were not the established practice with readers of Plato to condemn Protagoras beforehand, and to put upon every passage relating to him not only a sense as bad as it will bear, but much worse than it will fairly bear, they would probably carry away very different inferences from the Platonic dialogue called by that sophist's name, and in which he is made to bear a chief part. That dialogue is itself enough to prove that Plato did not conceive Protagoras either as a corrupt, or unworthy, or incompetent teacher. The course of the dialogue exhibits him as not master of the theory of ethics, and unable to solve various difficulties with which that theory is expected to grapple; moreover, as no match for Sokratês in dialectics, which Plato considered as the only efficient method of philosophical investigation. In so far, therefore, as imperfect acquaintance with the science or theory upon which rules of art, or the precepts bearing on practice, repose, disqualifies a teacher from giving instruction in such art or practice, to that extent Protagoras is exposed as wanting. And if an expert dialectician, like Plato, had passed Isokratês or Quintilian, or the large majority of teachers past or present, through a similar cross-examination as to the theory of their teaching, an ignorance not less manifest than that of Protagoras would be brought out. The antithesis which Plato sets forth, in so many of his dialogues, between precept or practice, accompanied by full knowledge of the scientific principles from which it must be deduced, if its rectitude be disputed,—and unscientific practice, without any such power of deduction or defence, is one of the most valuable portions of his speculations: he exhausts his genius to render it conspicuous in a thousand indirect ways, and to shame his readers, if possible, into the loftier and more rational walk of thought. But it is one thing to say of a man, that he does not know the theory of what he teaches, or of the way in which he teaches; it is another thing to say, that he actually teaches that which scientific theory would not prescribe as the best; it is a third thing, graver than both, to say that his teaching is not only below the exigences of science, but even corrupt and demoralizing. Now of these three points, it is the first only which Plato in his dialogue makes out against Protagoras: even the second, he neither affirms nor insinuates; and as to the third, not only he never glances at it, even indirectly, but the whole tendency of the discourse suggests a directly contrary conclusion. As if sensible that when an eminent opponent was to be depicted as puzzled and irritated by superior dialectics, it was but common fairness to set forth his distinctive merits also, Plato gives a fable, and expository harangue, from the mouth of Protagoras,[597] upon the question whether virtue is teachable. This harangue is, in my judgment, very striking and instructive; and so it would have been probably accounted, if commentators had not read it with a preëstablished persuasion that whatever came from the lips of a sophist must be either ridiculous or immoral.[598] It is the only part of Plato's works wherein any account is rendered of the growth of that floating, uncertified, self-propagating body of opinion, upon which the cross-examining analysis of Sokratês is brought to bear, as will be seen in the following chapter.

Protagoras professes to teach his pupils "good counsel" in their domestic and family relations, as well as how to speak and act in the most effective manner for the weal of the city. Since this comes from Protagoras, the commentators of Plato pronounce it to be miserable morality; but it coincides, almost to the letter, with that which Isokratês describes himself as teaching, a generation afterwards, and substantially even with that which Xenophon represents Sokratês as teaching; nor is it easy to set forth, in a few words, a larger scheme of practical duty.[599] And if the measure of practical duty, which Protagoras devoted himself to teach, was thus serious and extensive, even the fraction of theory assigned to him in his harangue, includes some points better than that of Plato himself. For Plato seems to have conceived the ethical end, to each individual, as comprising nothing more than his own permanent happiness and moral health; and in this very dialogue, he introduces Sokratês as maintaining virtue to consist only in a right calculation of a man's own personal happiness and misery. But here we find Protagoras speaking in a way which implies a larger, and, in my opinion, a juster, appreciation of the ethical end, as including not only reference to a man's own happiness, but also obligations towards the happiness of others. Without at all agreeing in the harsh terms of censure which various critics pronounce upon that theory which Sokratês is made to set forth in the Platonic Protagoras, I consider his conception of the ethical end essentially narrow and imperfect, not capable of being made to serve as basis for deduction of the best ethical precepts. Yet such is the prejudice with which the history of the sophists has been written, that the commentators on Plato accuse the sophists of having originated what they ignorantly term, "the base theory of utility," here propounded by Sokratês himself; complimenting the latter on having set forth those larger views which in this dialogue belong only to Protagoras.[600]

So far as concerns Protagoras, therefore, the evidence of Plato himself may be produced to show that he was not a corrupt teacher, but a worthy companion of Prodikus; worthy also of that which we know him to have enjoyed, the society and conversation of Periklês. Let us now examine what Plato says about a third sophist, Hippias of Elis; who figures both in the dialogue called "Protagoras," and in two distinct dialogues known by the titles of "Hippias Major and Minor." Hippias is represented as distinguished for the wide range of his accomplishments, of which in these dialogues he ostentatiously boasts. He could teach astronomy, geometry, and arithmetic, which subjects Protagoras censured him for enforcing too much upon his pupils; so little did these sophists agree in any one scheme of doctrine or education. Besides this, he was a poet, a musician, an expositor of the poets, and a lecturer with a large stock of composed matter,—on subjects moral, political, and even legendary,—treasured up in a very retentive memory. He was a citizen much employed as envoy by his fellow-citizens: to crown all, his manual dexterity was such that he professed to have made with his own hands all the attire and ornaments which he wore on his person. If, as is sufficiently probable, he was a vain and ostentatious man,—defects not excluding an useful and honorable career,—we must at the same

time give him credit for a variety of acquisitions such as to explain a certain measure of vanity.[601] The style in which Plato handles Hippias is very different from that in which he treats Protagoras. It is full of sneer and contemptuous banter, insomuch that even Stallbaum,[602] after having repeated a great many times that this was a vile sophist, who deserved no better treatment, is forced to admit that the petulance is carried rather too far, and to suggest that the dialogue must have been a juvenile work of Plato. Be this as it may, amidst so much unfriendly handling, not only we find no imputation against Hippias, of having preached a low or corrupt morality, but Plato inserts that which furnishes good, though indirect, proof of the contrary. For Hippias is made to say that he had already delivered, and was about to deliver again, a lecture composed by himself with great care, wherein he enlarged upon the aims and pursuits which a young man ought to follow. The scheme of his discourse was, that after the capture of Troy, the youthful Neoptolemus was introduced as asking the advice of Nestor about his own future conduct; in reply to which, Nestor sets forth to him what was the plan of life incumbent on a young man of honorable aspirations, and unfolds to him the full details of regulated and virtuous conduct by which it ought to be filled up.[603] The selection of two such names, among the most venerated in all Grecian legend, as monitor and pupil, is a stamp clearly attesting the vein of sentiment which animated the composition. Morality preached by Nestor for the edification of Neoptolemus, might possibly be too high for Athenian practice; but most certainly it would not err on the side of corruption, selfishness, or over-indulgence. We may fairly presume that this discourse composed by Hippias would not be unworthy, in spirit and purpose, to be placed by the side of "The Choice of Hercules," nor its author by that of Prodikus as a moral teacher.

The dialogue entitled "Gorgias," in Plato, is carried on by Sokratês with three different persons one after the other,—Gorgias, Pôlus, and Kalliklês. Gorgias of Leontini in Sicily, as a rhetorical teacher, acquired greater celebrity than any man of his time, during the Peloponnesian war: his abundant powers of illustration, his florid ornaments, his artificial structure of sentences distributed into exact antithetical fractions, all spread a new fashion in the art of speaking, which for the time was very popular, but afterwards became discredited. If the line could be clearly drawn between rhetors and sophists, Gorgias ought rather to be ranked with the former.[604] In the conversation with Gorgias, Sokratês exposes the fallacy and imposture of rhetoric and rhetorical teaching, as cheating an ignorant audience into persuasion without knowledge, and as framed to satisfy the passing caprice, without any regard to the permanent welfare and improvement of the people. Whatever real inculpation may be conveyed in these arguments against a rhetorical teacher, Gorgias must bear in common with Isokratês and Quintilian, and under the shield of Aristotle. But save and except rhetorical teaching, no dissemination of corrupt morality is ascribed to him by Plato; who, indeed, treats him with a degree of respect which surprises the commentators.[605]

The tone of the dialogue changes materially when it passes to Pôlus and Kalliklês, the former of whom is described as a writer on rhetoric, and probably a teacher also. [606] There is much insolence in Pôlus, and no small asperity in Sokratês. Yet the former maintains no arguments which justify the charge of immorality against himself or his fellow-teachers. He defends the tastes and sentiments common to every man in Greece, and shared even by the most estimable Athenians, Periklês, Nikias, and Aristokratês;[607] while Sokratês prides himself on standing absolutely alone, and having no support except from his irresistible dialectics, whereby he is sure of extorting reluctant admission from his adversary. How far Sokratês may be right, I do not now inquire: it is sufficient that Pôlus, standing as he does amidst company at once so numerous and so irreproachable, cannot be fairly denounced as a poisoner of the youthful mind.

Pôlus presently hands over the dialogue to Kalliklês, who is here represented, doubtless, as laying down doctrines openly and avowedly anti-social. He distinguishes between the law of nature and the law—both written and unwritten, for the Greek word substantially includes both—of society. According to the law of nature, Kalliklês says, the strong man—the better or more capable man—puts forth his strength to the full for his own advantage, without limit or restraint; overcomes the resistance which weaker men are able to offer; and seizes for himself as much as he pleases of the matter of enjoyment. He has no occasion to restrain any of his appetites or desires; the more numerous and pressing they are, so much the better for him, since his power affords him the means of satiating them all. The many, who have the misfortune to be weak, must be content with that which he leaves them, and submit to it as best they can. This, Kalliklês says, is what actually happens in a state of nature; this is what is accounted just, as is evident by the practice of independent communities, not included in one common political society, towards each other; this is *justice*, by nature, or according to the law of nature. But when men come into society, all this is reversed. The majority of individuals know very well that they are weak, and that their only chance of security or comfort consists in establishing laws to restrain this strong man, reinforced by a moral sanction of praise and blame devoted to the same general end. They catch him, like a young lion, whilst his mind is yet tender, and fascinate him by talk and training into a disposition conformable to that measure and equality which the law enjoins. Here, then, is justice according to the law of society; a factitious system, built up by the many for their own protection and happiness, to the subversion of the law of nature, which arms the strong man with a right to encroachment and license. Let a fair opportunity occur, and the favorite of Nature will be seen to kick off his harness, tread down the laws, break through the magic circle of opinion around him, and stand forth again as lord and master of the many; regaining that glorious position which nature has assigned to him as his right. Justice by nature, and justice by law and society, are thus, according to Kalliklês, not only distinct, but mutually contradictory. He accuses Sokratês of having jumbled the two together in his argument.[608]

It has been contended by many authors that this anti-social reasoning—true enough, in so far as it states simple[609] matter of fact and probability; immoral, in so far as it erects the power of the strong man into a right; and inviting many comments, if I could find a convenient place for them—represents the morality commonly and publicly taught by the persons called sophists at Athens.[610] I deny this assertion emphatically. Even if I had no other evidence to sustain my denial, except what has been already extracted, from the unfriendly writings of Plato himself, respecting Protagoras and Hippias,—with what we know from Xenophon about Prodikus,—I should consider my case made out as vindicating the sophists generally from such an accusation. If refutation to the doctrine of Kalliklês were needed, it would be obtained quite as efficaciously from Prodikus and Protagoras as from Sokratês and Plato.

But this is not the strongest part of the vindication.

First, Kalliklês himself is not a sophist, nor represented by Plato as such. He is a young Athenian citizen, of rank and station, belonging to the deme Acharnæ; he is intimate with other young men of condition in the city, has recently entered into active political life, and bends his whole soul towards it; he disparages philosophy, and speaks with utter contempt about the sophists.[611] If, then, it were even just, which I do not admit, to infer from opinions put into the mouth of one sophist, that the same were held by another or by all of them, it would not be the less unjust to draw the like inference from opinions professed by one who is not a sophist, and who despises the whole profession.

Secondly, if any man will read attentively the course of the dialogue, he will see that the doctrine of Kalliklês is such as no one dared publicly to propound. So it is conceived both by Kalliklês himself, and by Sokratês. The former first takes up the conversation, by saying that his predecessor Pôlus had become entangled in a contradiction, because he had not courage enough openly to announce an unpopular and odious doctrine; but he, Kalliklês, was less shamefaced, and would speak out boldly that doctrine which others kept to themselves for fear of shocking the hearers. "Certainly (says Sokratês to him) your audacity is abundantly shown by the doctrine which you have just laid down; you set forth plainly that which other people think, but do not choose to utter."[612] Now, opinions of which Pôlus, an insolent young man, was afraid to proclaim himself the champion, must have been revolting indeed to the sentiments of hearers. How then can any reasonable man believe, that such opinions were not only openly propounded, but seriously inculcated as truth upon audiences of youthful hearers, by the sophists? We know that the teaching of the latter was public in the highest degree; publicity was pleasing as well as profitable to them; among the many disparaging epithets heaped upon them, ostentation and vanity are two of the most conspicuous. Whatever they taught, they taught publicly; and I contend, with full conviction, that, had they even agreed with Kalliklês in this opinion, they could neither have been sufficiently audacious, nor sufficiently their

own enemies, to make it a part of their public teaching; but would have acted like Pôlus, and kept the doctrine to themselves.

Thirdly, this latter conclusion will be rendered doubly certain, when we consider of what city we are now speaking. Of all places in the world, the democratical Athens is the last in which the doctrine advanced by Kalliklês could possibly have been professed by a public teacher; or even by Kalliklês himself, in any public meeting. It is unnecessary to remind the reader how profoundly democratical was the sentiment and morality of the Athenians,—how much they loved their laws, their constitution, and their political equality,—how jealous their apprehension was of any nascent or threatening despotism. All this is not simply admitted, but even exaggerated, by Mr. Mitford, Wachsmuth, and other anti-democratical writers, who often draw from it materials for their abundant censures. Now the very point which Sokratês, in this dialogue, called "Gorgias," seeks to establish against Kalliklês, against the rhetors, and against the sophists, is, that they courted, flattered, and truckled to the sentiment of the Athenian people, with degrading subservience; that they looked to the immediate gratification simply, and not to permanent moral improvement of the people; that they had not courage to address to them any unpalatable truths, however salutary, but would shift and modify opinions in every way, so as to escape giving offence;[613] that no man who put himself prominently forward at Athens had any chance of success, unless he became moulded and assimilated, from the core, to the people and their type of sentiment[614]. Granting such charges to be true, how is it conceivable that any sophist, or any rhetor, could venture to enforce upon an Athenian public audience the doctrine laid down by Kalliklês? To tell such an audience: "Your laws and institutions are all violations of the law of nature, contrived to disappoint the Alkibiadês or Napoleon among you of his natural right to become your master, and to deal with you petty men as his slaves. All your unnatural precautions, and conventional talk, in favor of legality and equal dealing, will turn out to be nothing better than pitiful impotence[615], as soon as *he* finds a good opportunity of standing forward in his full might and energy, so as to put you into your proper places, and show you what privileges Nature intends for her favorites!" Conceive such a doctrine propounded by a lecturer to assembled Athenians! A doctrine just as revolting to Nikias as to Kleon, and which even Alkibiadês would be forced to affect to disapprove; since it is not simply anti-popular, not simply despotic, but the drunken extravagance of despotism. The Great man, as depicted by Kalliklês, stands in the same relation to ordinary mortals, as Jonathan Wild the Great, in the admirable parody of Fielding.

That sophists, whom Plato accuses of slavish flattery to the democratical ear, should gratuitously insult it by the proposition of such tenets, is an assertion not merely untrue, but utterly absurd. Even as to Sokratês, we know from Xenophon how much the Athenians were offended with him, and how much it was urged by the accusers on his trial, that in his conversations he was wont to cite with peculiar relish the description, in the second book of the Iliad, of Odysseus following the Grecian

crowd, when running away from the agora to get on shipboard, and prevailing upon them to come back, by gentle words addressed to the chiefs, but by blows of his stick, accompanied with contemptuous reprimand, to the common people. The indirect evidence thus afforded, that Sokratês countenanced unequal dealing and ill usage towards the many, told much against him in the minds of the dikasts. What would they have felt then towards a sophist who publicly professed the political morality of Kalliklês? The truth is, not only was it impossible that any such morality, or anything of the same type even much diluted, could find its way into the educational lectures of professors at Athens, but the fear would be in the opposite direction. If the sophist erred in either way, it would be in that which Sokratês imputes, by making his lectures over-democratical. Nay, if we suppose any opportunity to have arisen of discussing the doctrine of Kalliklês, he would hardly omit to flatter the ears of the surrounding democrats by enhancing the beneficent results of legality and equal dealing, and by denouncing this "natural despot," or undisclosed Napoleon, as one who must either take his place under such restraints, or find a place in some other city.

I have thus shown, even from Plato himself, that the doctrine ascribed to Kalliklês neither did enter, nor could have entered, into the lectures of a sophist or professed teacher. The same conclusion may be maintained respecting the doctrine of Thrasymachus in the first book of the "Republic." Thrasymachus was a rhetorical teacher, who had devised precepts respecting the construction of an oration and the training of young men for public speaking. It is most probable that he confined himself, like Gorgias, to this department, and that he did not profess to give moral lectures, like Protagoras and Prodikus. But granting him to have given such, he would not talk about justice in the way in which Plato makes him talk, if he desired to give any satisfaction to an Athenian audience. The mere brutality and ferocious impudence of demeanor even to exaggeration, with which Plato invests him, is in itself a strong proof that the doctrine, ushered in with such a preface, was not that of a popular and acceptable teacher, winning favor in public audiences. He defines justice to be "the interest of the superior power; that rule, which, in every society, the dominant power prescribes, as being for its own advantage." A man is just, he says, for the advantage of another, not for his own: he is weak, cannot help himself, and must submit to that which the stronger authority, whether despot, oligarchy, or commonwealth, commands.

This theory is essentially different from the doctrine of Kalliklês, as set forth a few pages back; for Thrasymachus does not travel out of society to insist upon anterior rights dating from a supposed state of nature; he takes societies as he finds them, recognizing the actual governing authority of each as the canon and constituent of justice or injustice. Stallbaum and other writers have incautiously treated the two theories as if they were the same; and with something even worse than want of caution, while they pronounce the theory of Thrasymachus to be detestably immoral,

announce it as having been propounded not by him only, but by *The Sophists*; thus, in their usual style, dealing with the sophists as if they were a school, sect, or partnership with mutual responsibility. Whoever has followed the evidence which I have produced respecting Protagoras and Prodikus, will know how differently these latter handled the question of justice.

But the truth is, that the theory of Thrasymachus, though incorrect and defective, is not so detestable as these writers represent. What makes it seem detestable, is the style and manner in which he is made to put it forward; which causes the just man to appear petty and contemptible, while it surrounds the unjust man with enviable attributes. Now this is precisely the circumstance which revolts the common sentiments of mankind, as it revolts also the critics who read what is said by Thrasymachus. The moral sentiments exist in men's minds in complex and powerful groups, associated with some large words and emphatic forms of speech. Whether an ethical theory satisfies the exigencies of reason, or commands and answers to all the phenomena, a common audience will seldom give themselves the trouble to consider with attention; but what they imperiously exact, and what is indispensable to give the theory any chance of success, is, that it shall exhibit to their feelings the just man as respectable and dignified, and the unjust man as odious and repulsive. Now that which offends in the language ascribed to Thrasymachus is, not merely the absence, but the reversal, of this condition; the presentation of the just man as weak and silly, and of injustice in all the *prestige* of triumph and dignity. And for this very reason, I venture to infer that such a theory was never propounded by Thrasymachus to any public audience in the form in which it appears in Plato. For Thrasymachus was a rhetor, who had studied the principles of his art: now we know that these common sentiments of an audience, were precisely what the rhetors best understood, and always strove to conciliate. Even from the time of Gorgias, they began the practice of composing beforehand declamations upon the general heads of morality, which were ready to be introduced into actual speeches as occasion presented itself, and in which appeal was made to the moral sentiments foreknown as common, with more or less of modification, to all the Grecian assemblies. The real Thrasymachus, addressing any audience at Athens, would never have wounded these sentiments, as the Platonic Thrasymachus is made to do in the "Republic." Least of all would he have done this, if it be true of him, as Plato asserts of the rhetors and sophists generally, that they thought about nothing but courting popularity, without any sincerity of conviction.

Though Plato thinks fit to bring out the opinion of Thrasymachus with accessories unnecessarily offensive, and thus to enhance the dialectical triumph of Sokratês by the brutal manners of the adversary, he was well aware that he had not done justice to the opinion itself, much less confuted it. The proof of this is, that in the second book of the "Republic," after Thrasymachus has disappeared, the very same opinion is taken up by Glaukon and Adeimantus, and set forth by both of them, though they

disclaim entertaining it as their own, as suggesting grave doubts and difficulties which they desire to hear solved by Sokratês. Those who read attentively the discourses of Glaukon and Adeimantus, will see that the substantive opinion ascribed to Thrasymachus, apart from the brutality with which he is made to state it, does not even countenance the charge of immoral teaching against *him*, much less against the sophists generally. Hardly anything in Plato's compositions is more powerful than those discourses. They present, in a perspicuous and forcible manner, some of the most serious difficulties with which ethical theory is required to grapple. And Plato can answer them only in one way, by taking society to pieces, and reconstructing it in the form of his imaginary republic. The speeches of Glaukon and Adeimantus form the immediate preface to the striking and elaborate description which he goes through, of his new state of society, nor do they receive any other answer than what is implied in that description. Plato indirectly confesses that he cannot answer them, assuming social institutions to continue unreformed: and his reform is sufficiently fundamental.[616]

I call particular attention to this circumstance, without which we cannot fairly estimate the sophists, or practical teachers of Athens, face to face with their accuser-general, Plato. He was a great and systematic theorist, whose opinions on ethics, politics, cognition, religion, etc., were all wrought into harmony by his own mind, and stamped with that peculiarity which is the mark of an original intellect. So splendid an effort of speculative genius is among the marvels of the Grecian world. His dissent from all the societies which he saw around him, not merely democratical, but oligarchical and despotic also, was of the deepest and most radical character. Nor did he delude himself by the belief, that any partial amendment of that which he saw around could bring about the end which he desired: he looked to nothing short of a new genesis of the man and the citizen, with institutions calculated from the beginning to work out the full measure of perfectibility. His fertile scientific imagination realized this idea in the "Republic." But that very systematic and original character, which lends so much value and charm to the substantive speculations of Plato, counts as a deduction from his trustworthiness as critic or witness, in reference to the living agents whom he saw at work in Athens and other cities, as statesmen, generals, or teachers. His criticisms are dictated by his own point of view, according to which the entire society was corrupt, and all the instruments who carried on its functions were of essentially base metal. Whoever will read either the "Gorgias" or the "Republic," will see in how sweeping and indiscriminate a manner he passes his sentence of condemnation. Not only all the sophists and all the rhetors,[617] but all the musicians and dithyrambic or tragic poets; all the statesmen, past as well as present, not excepting even the great Periklês, receive from his hands one common stamp of dishonor. Every one of these men are numbered by Plato among the numerous category of flatterers, who minister to the immediate gratification and to the desires of the people, without looking to their permanent improvement, or making them morally better. "Periklês and Kimon (says Sokratês in the "Gorgias") are nothing

but servants or ministers who supply the immediate appetites and tastes of the people; just as the baker and the confectioner do in their respective departments, without knowing or caring whether the food will do any real good, a point which the physician alone can determine. As ministers, they are clever enough: they have provided the city amply with tribute, walls, docks, ships, and *such other follies*: but I (Sokratês) am the only man in Athens who aim, so far as my strength permits, at the true purpose of politics, the mental improvement of the people."[618] So wholesale a condemnation betrays itself as the offspring, and the consistent offspring, of systematic peculiarity of vision, the prejudice of a great and able mind.

It would be not less unjust to appreciate the sophists or the statesmen of Athens from the point of view of Plato, than the present teachers and politicians of England or France from that of Mr. Owen or Fourier. Both the one and the other class labored for society as it stood at Athens: the statesmen carried on the business of practical politics, the sophist trained up youth for practical life in all its departments, as family men, citizens, and leaders, to obey as well as to command. Both accepted the system as it stood, without contemplating the possibility of a new birth of society: both ministered to certain exigences, held their anchorage upon certain sentiments, and bowed to a certain morality, actually felt among the living men around them. That which Plato says of the statesmen of Athens is perfectly true, that they were only servants or ministers of the people. He, who tried the people and the entire society by comparison with an imaginary standard of his own, might deem all these ministers worthless in the lump, as carrying on a system too bad to be mended; but, nevertheless, the difference between a competent and an incompetent minister, between Periklês and Nikias, was of unspeakable moment to the security and happiness of the Athenians. What the sophists on their part undertook was, to educate young men so as to make them better qualified for statesmen or ministers; and Protagoras would have thought it sufficient honor to himself,—as well as sufficient benefit to Athens, which assuredly it would have been,—if he could have inspired any young Athenian with the soul and the capacities of his friend and companion Periklês.

So far is Plato from considering the sophists as the corruptors of Athenian morality, that he distinctly protests against that supposition, in a remarkable passage of the "Republic." It is, he says, the whole people, or the society, with its established morality, intelligence, and tone of sentiment, which is intrinsically vicious; the teachers of such a society must be vicious also, otherwise their teaching would not be received; and even if their private teaching were ever so good, its effect would be washed away, except in some few privileged natures, by the overwhelming deluge of pernicious social influences.[619] Nor let any one imagine, as modern readers are but too ready to understand it, that this poignant censure is intended for Athens so far forth as a democracy. Plato was not the man to preach king-worship, or wealth-worship, as social or political remedies: he declares emphatically that not one of the societies then existing was such that a truly philosophical nature could be engaged in

active functions under it.[620] These passages would be alone sufficient to repel the assertions of those who denounce the sophists as poisoners of Athenian morality, on the alleged authority of Plato.

Nor is it at all more true that they were men of mere words, and made their pupils no better,—a charge just as vehemently pressed against Sokratês as against the sophists,—and by the same class of enemies, such as Anytus,[621] Aristophanês, Eupolis, etc. It was mainly from sophists like Hippias that the Athenian youth learned what they knew of geometry, astronomy, and arithmetic: but the range of what is called special science, possessed even by the teacher, was at that time very limited; and the matter of instruction communicated was expressed under the general title of "Words, or Discourses," which were always taught by the sophists, in connection with thought, and in reference to a practical use. The capacities of thought, speech, and action, are conceived in conjunction by Greeks generally, and by teachers like Isokratês and Quintilian especially; and when young men in Greece, like the Bœotian Proxenus, put themselves under training by Gorgias or any other sophist, it was with a view of qualifying themselves, not merely to speak, but to act.[622]

Most of the pupils of the sophists, as of Sokratês[623] himself, were young men of wealth; a fact, at which Plato sneers, and others copy him, as if it proved that they cared only about high pay. But I do not hesitate to range myself on the side of Isokratês,[624] and to contend that the sophist himself had much to lose by corrupting his pupils,—an argument used by Sokratês in defending himself before the dikastery, and just as valid in defence of Protagoras or Prodikus,[625]—and strong personal interest in sending them forth accomplished and virtuous; that the best-taught youth were decidedly the most free from crime and the most active towards good; that among the valuable ideas and feelings which a young Athenian had in his mind, as well as among the good pursuits which he followed, those which he learned from the sophists counted nearly as the best; that, if the contrary had been the fact, fathers would not have continued so to send their sons, and pay their money. It was not merely that these teachers countervailed in part the temptations to dissipated enjoyment, but also that they were personally unconcerned in the acrimonious slander and warfare of party in his native city; that the topics with which they familiarized him were, the general interests and duties of men and citizens; that they developed the germs of morality in the ancient legends, as in Prodikus's fable, and amplified in his mind all the undefined cluster of associations connected with the great words of morality; that they vivified in him the sentiment of Pan-Hellenic brotherhood; and that, in teaching him the art of persuasion,[626] they could not but make him feel the dependence in which he stood towards those who were to be persuaded, together with the necessity under which he lay of so conducting himself as to conciliate their good-will.

The intimations given in Plato, of the enthusiastic reception which Protagoras, Prodikus, and other sophists[627] met with in the various cities; the description which

we read, in the dialogue called Protagoras, of the impatience of the youthful Hippokratês, on hearing of the arrival of that sophist, insomuch that he awakens Sokratês before daylight, in order to obtain an introduction to the new-comer and profit by his teaching; the readiness of such rich young men to pay money, and to devote time and trouble, for the purpose of acquiring a personal superiority apart from their wealth and station; the ardor with which Kallias is represented as employing his house for the hospitable entertainment, and his fortune for the aid, of the sophists; all this makes upon my mind an impression directly the reverse of that ironical and contemptuous phraseology with which it is set forth by Plato. Such sophists had nothing to recommend them except superior knowledge and intellectual force, combined with an imposing personality, making itself felt in their lectures and conversation. It is to this that the admiration was shown; and the fact that it was so shown, brings to view the best attributes of the Greek, especially the Athenian mind. It exhibits those qualities of which Periklês made emphatic boast in his celebrated funeral oration;[628] conception of public speech as a practical thing, not meant as an excuse for inaction, but combined with energetic action, and turning it to good account by full and open discussion beforehand; profound sensibility to the charm of manifested intellect, without enervating the powers of execution or endurance. Assuredly, a man like Protagoras, arriving in a city with all this train of admiration laid before him, must have known very little of his own interest or position, if he began to preach a low or corrupt morality. If it be true generally, as Voltaire has remarked, that "any man who should come to preach a relaxed morality would be pelted," much more would it be true of a sophist like Protagoras, arriving in a foreign city with all the prestige of a great intellectual name, and with the imagination of youths on fire to hear and converse with him, that any similar doctrine would destroy his reputation at once. Numbers of teachers have made their reputation by inculcating overstrained asceticism; it will be hard to find an example of success in the opposite vein.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

SOKRATES.

THAT the professional teachers called sophists, in Greece, were intellectual and moral corruptors, and that much corruption grew up under their teaching in the Athenian mind, are common statements, which I have endeavored to show to be erroneous. Corresponding to these statements is another, which represents Sokratês as one whose special merit it was to have rescued the Athenian mind from such demoralizing influences; a reputation which he neither deserves nor requires. In general, the favorable interpretation of evidence, as exhibited towards Sokratês, has been scarcely less marked than the harshness of presumption against the sophists. Of late, however, some authors have treated his history in an altered spirit, and have manifested a disposition to lower him down to that which they regard as the sophistical level. M. Forchhammer's treatise: "The Athenians and Sokratês, or Lawful Dealing against Revolution," goes even further, and maintains confidently that Sokratês was most justly condemned as an heretic, a traitor, and a corrupter of youth. His book, the conclusions of which I altogether reject, is a sort of retribution to the sophists, as extending to their alleged opponent the same bitter and unfair spirit of construction with that under which they have so long unjustly suffered. But when we impartially consider the evidence, it will appear that Sokratês deserves our admiration and esteem; not, indeed, as an anti-sophist, but as combining with the qualities of a good man, a force of character and an originality of speculation as well as of method, and a power of intellectually working on others, generically different from that of any professional teacher, without parallel either among contemporaries or successors.

The life of Sokratês comprises seventy years, from 469 to 399 B.C. His father, Sophroniskus, being a sculptor, the son began by following the same profession, in which he attained sufficient proficiency to have executed various works; especially a draped group of the Charites, or Graces, preserved in the acropolis, and shown as his work down to the time of Pausanias.[629] His mother, Phænaretê, was a midwife, and he had a brother by the mother's side named Patroklês.[630] Respecting his wife Xanthippê, and his three sons, all that has passed into history is the violent temper of the former, and the patience of her husband in enduring it. The position and family of Sokratês, without being absolutely poor, were humble and unimportant but he was of genuine Attic breed, belonging to the ancient gens Dædalidæ, which took its name from Dædalus, the mythical artist as progenitor.

The personal qualities of Sokratês, on the other hand, were marked and distinguishing, not less in body than in mind. His physical constitution was healthy, robust, and enduring, to an extraordinary degree. He was not merely strong and active as an

hoplite on military service, but capable of bearing fatigue or hardship, and indifferent to heat or cold, in a measure which astonished all his companions. He went barefoot in all seasons of the year, even during the winter campaign at Potidæa, under the severe frosts of Thrace; and the same homely clothing sufficed to him for winter as well as for summer. Though his diet was habitually simple as well as abstemious, yet there were occasions, of religious festival or friendly congratulation, on which every Greek considered joviality and indulgence to be becoming. On such occasions, Sokratês could drink more wine than any guest present, yet without being overcome or intoxicated.[631] He abstained, on principle, from all extreme gymnastic training, which required, as necessary condition, extraordinary abundance of food.[632] It was his professed purpose to limit, as much as possible, the number of his wants, as a distant approach to the perfection of the gods, who wanted nothing, to control such as were natural, and prevent the multiplication of any that were artificial.[633] Nor can there be any doubt that his admirable bodily temperament contributed materially to facilitate such a purpose, and assist him in the maintenance of that self-mastery, contented self-sufficiency, and independence of the favor[634] as well as of the enmity of others, which were essential to his plan of intellectual life. His friends, who communicate to us his great bodily strength and endurance, are at the same time full of jests upon his ugly physiognomy; his flat nose, thick lips, and prominent eyes, like a satyr, or silenus.[635] Nor can we implicitly trust the evidence of such very admiring witnesses, as to the philosopher's exemption from infirmities of temper; for there seems good proof that he was by natural temperament violently irascible; a defect which he generally kept under severe control, but which occasionally betrayed him into great improprieties of language and demeanor.[636]

Of those friends, the best known to us are Xenophon and Plato, though there existed in antiquity various dialogues composed, and memoranda put together, by other hearers of Sokratês, respecting his conversations and teaching, which are all now lost.[637] The "Memorabilia" of Xenophon profess to record actual conversations held by Sokratês, and are prepared with the announced purpose of vindicating him against the accusations of Melêtus and his other accusers on the trial, as well as against unfavorable opinions, seemingly much circulated respecting his character and purposes. We thus have in it a sort of partial biography, subject to such deductions from its evidentiary value as may be requisite for imperfection of memory, intentional decoration, and partiality. On the other hand, the purpose of Plato, in the numerous dialogues wherein he introduces Sokratês, is not so clear, and is explained very differently by different commentators. Plato was a great speculative genius, who came to form opinions of his own distinct from those of Sokratês, and employed the name of the latter as spokesman for these opinions in various dialogues. How much, in the Platonic Sokratês, can be safely accepted either as a picture of the man or as a record of his opinions,—how much, on the other hand, is to be treated as Platonism; or in what proportions the two are intermingled,—is a point not to be decided with certainty or rigor. The "Apology of Sokratês," the "Kriton," and the "Phædon,"—in so

far as it is a moral picture, and apart from the doctrines advocated in it,—appear to belong to the first category; while the political and social views of the "Republic" and of the treatise "De Legibus," the cosmic theories in the "Timæus," and the hypothesis of Ideas, as substantive existences apart from the phenomenal world, in the various dialogues wherever it is stated, certainly belong to the second. Of the ethical dialogues, much may be probably taken to represent Sokratês, more or less Platonized.

But though the opinions put by Plato into the mouth of Sokratês are liable to thus much of uncertainty, we find, to our great satisfaction, that the pictures given by Plato and Xenophon of their common master are in the main accordant; differing only as drawn from the same original by two authors radically different in spirit and character. Xenophon, the man of action, brings out at length those conversations of Sokratês which had a bearing on practical conduct, and were calculated to correct vice or infirmity in particular individuals; such being the matter which served his purpose as an apologist, at the same time that it suited his intellectual taste. But he intimates, nevertheless, very plainly, that the conversation of Sokratês was often, indeed usually, of a more negative, analytical, and generalizing tendency;[638] not destined for the reproof of positive or special defect, but to awaken the inquisitive faculties and lead to the rational comprehension of vice and virtue as referable to determinate general principles. Now this latter side of the master's physiognomy, which Xenophon records distinctly, though without emphasis or development, acquires almost exclusive prominence in the Platonic picture. Plato leaves out the practical, and consecrates himself to the theoretical, Sokratês; whom he divests in part of his identity, in order to enrol him as chief speaker in certain larger theoretical views of his own. The two pictures, therefore, do not contradict each other, but mutually supply each other's defects, and admit of being blended into one consistent whole. And respecting the method of Sokratês, a point more characteristic than either his precepts or his theory,—as well as respecting the effect of that method on the minds of hearers,—both Xenophon and Plato are witnesses substantially in unison: though, here again, the latter has made the method his own, worked it out on a scale of enlargement and perfection, and given to it a permanence which it could never have derived from its original author, who only talked and never wrote. It is fortunate that our two main witnesses about him, both speaking from personal knowledge, agree to so great an extent.

Both describe in the same manner his private life and habits; his contented poverty, justice, temperance in the largest sense of the word, and self-sufficing independence of character. On most of these points too, Aristophanês and the other comic writers, so far as their testimony counts for anything, appear as confirmatory witnesses; for they abound in jests on the coarse fare, shabby and scanty clothing, bare feet, pale face, poor and joyless life, of Sokratês.[639] Of the circumstances of his life we are almost wholly ignorant: he served as an hoplite at Potidæa, at Delium, and at Amphipolis; with credit apparently in all, though exaggerated encomiums on

the part of his friends provoked an equally exaggerated skepticism on the part of Athenæus and others. He seems never to have filled any political office until the year (B.C. 406) in which the battle of Arginusæ occurred, in which year he was member of the senate of Five Hundred, and one of the prytanes on that memorable day when the proposition of Kallixenus against the six generals was submitted to the public assembly: his determined refusal, in spite of all personal hazard, to put an unconstitutional question to the vote, has been already recounted. That during his long life he strictly obeyed the laws,[640] is proved by the fact that none of his numerous enemies ever arraigned him before a court of justice: that he discharged all the duties of an upright man and a brave as well as pious citizen, may also be confidently asserted. His friends lay especial stress upon his piety; that is, upon his exact discharge of all the religious duties considered as incumbent upon an Athenian.[641]

Though these points are requisite to be established, in order that we may rightly interpret the character of Sokratês, it is not from them that he has derived his eminent place in history. Three peculiarities distinguish the man. 1. His long life passed in contented poverty, and in public, apostolic dialectics. 2. His strong religious persuasion, or belief, of acting under a mission and signs from the gods; especially his dæmon, or genius; the special religious warning of which he believed himself to be frequently the subject. 3. His great intellectual originality, both of subject and of method, and his power of stirring and forcing the germ of inquiry and ratiocination in others. Though these three characteristics were so blended in Sokratês that it is not easy to consider them separately; yet, in each respect, he stood distinguished from all Greek philosophers before or after him.

At what time Sokratês relinquished his profession as a statuary we do not know; but it is certain that all the middle and later part of his life, at least, was devoted exclusively to the self-imposed task of teaching; excluding all other business, public or private, and to the neglect of all means of fortune. We can hardly avoid speaking of him as a teacher, though he himself disclaimed the appellation:[642] his practice was to talk or converse, or *to prattle without end*,[643] if we translate the derisory word by which the enemies of philosophy described dialectic conversation. Early in the morning he frequented the public walks, the gymnasia for bodily training, and the schools where youths were receiving instruction: he was to be seen in the market-place at the hour when it was most crowded, among the booths and tables where goods were exposed for sale: his whole day was usually spent in this public manner.[644] He talked with any one, young or old, rich or poor, who sought to address him, and in the hearing of all who chose to stand by: not only he never either asked or received any reward, but he made no distinction of persons, never withheld his conversation from any one, and talked upon the same general topics to all. He conversed with politicians, sophists, military men, artisans, ambitious or studious youths, etc. He visited all persons of interest in the city, male or female: his friendship with Aspasia is well known, and one of the most interesting chapters[645] of Xenophon's Memorabilia

recounts his visit to and dialogue with Theodotê, a beautiful hetæra, or female companion. Nothing could be more public, perpetual, and indiscriminate as to persons than his conversation. But as it was engaging, curious, and instructive to hear, certain persons made it their habit to attend him in public as companions and listeners. These men, a fluctuating body, were commonly known as his disciples, or scholars; though neither he nor his personal friends ever employed the terms *teacher* and *disciple* to describe the relation between them.[646] Many of them came, attracted by his reputation, during the later years of his life, from other Grecian cities; Megara, Thebes, Elis, Kyrênê, etc.

Now no other person in Athens, or in any other Grecian city, appears ever to have manifested himself in this perpetual and indiscriminate manner as a public talker for instruction. All teachers either took money for their lessons, or at least gave them apart from the multitude in a private house or garden, to special pupils, with admissions and rejections at their own pleasure. By the peculiar mode of life which Sokratês pursued, not only his conversation reached the minds of a much wider circle, but he became more abundantly known as a person. While acquiring a few attached friends and admirers, and raising a certain intellectual interest in others, he at the same time provoked a large number of personal enemies. This was probably the reason why he was selected by Aristophanês and the other comic writers, to be attacked as a general representative of philosophical and rhetorical teaching; the more so, as his marked and repulsive physiognomy admitted so well of being imitated in the mask which the actor wore. The audience at the theatre would more readily recognize the peculiar figure which they were accustomed to see every day in the market-place, than if Prodikus or Protagoras, whom most of them did not know by sight, had been brought on the stage; nor was it of much importance, either to them or to Aristophanês, whether Sokratês was represented as teaching what he did really teach, or something utterly different.

This extreme publicity of life and conversation was one among the characteristics of Sokratês, distinguishing him from all teachers either before or after him. Next, was his persuasion of a special religious mission, restraints, impulses, and communications, sent to him by the gods. Taking the belief in such supernatural intervention generally, it was indeed noway peculiar to Sokratês: it was the ordinary faith of the ancient world; insomuch that the attempts to resolve phenomena into general laws were looked upon with a certain disapprobation, as indirectly setting it aside. And Xenophon[647] accordingly avails himself of this general fact, in replying to the indictment for religious innovation, of which his master was found guilty, to affirm that the latter pretended to nothing beyond what was included in the creed of every pious man. But this is not an exact statement of the matter in debate; for it slurs over at least, if it does not deny, that speciality of inspiration from the gods, which those who talked with Sokratês—as we learn even from Xenophon—believed, and which Sokratês himself believed also.[648] Very different is his own representation, as put

forth in the defence before the dikastery. He had been accustomed constantly to hear, even from his childhood, a divine voice, interfering, at moments when he was about to act, in the way of restraint, but never in the way of instigation. Such prohibitory warning was wont to come upon him very frequently, not merely on great, but even on small occasions, intercepting what he was about to do or to say.[649] Though later writers speak of this as the dæmon or genius of Sokratês, he himself does not personify it, but treats it merely as a "divine sign, a prophetic or supernatural voice."[650] He was accustomed not only to obey it implicitly, but to speak of it publicly and familiarly to others, so that the fact was well known both to his friends and to his enemies. It had always forbidden him to enter on public life; it forbade him, when the indictment was hanging over him, to take any thought for a prepared defence;[651] and so completely did he march with a consciousness of this bridle in his mouth, that when he felt no check, he assumed that the turning which he was about to take was the right one. Though his persuasion on the subject was unquestionably sincere, and his obedience constant, yet he never dwelt upon it himself as anything grand, or awful, or entitling him to peculiar deference; but spoke of it often in his usual strain of familiar playfulness. To his friends generally, it seems to have constituted one of his titles to reverence, though neither Plato nor Xenophon scruple to talk of it in that jesting way which doubtless they caught from himself.[652] But to his enemies and to the Athenian public, it appeared in the light of an offensive heresy; an impious innovation on the orthodox creed, and a desertion of the recognized gods of Athens.

Such was the dæmon or genius of Sokratês, as described by himself and as conceived in the genuine Platonic dialogues; a voice always prohibitory, and bearing exclusively upon his own personal conduct.[653] That which Plutarch and other admirers of Sokratês conceived as a dæmon, or intermediate being between gods and men, was looked upon by the fathers of the Christian church as a devil; by LeClerc, as one of the fallen angels; by some other modern commentators, as mere ironical phraseology on the part of Sokratês himself.[654] Without presuming to determine the question raised in the former hypotheses, I believe the last to be untrue, and that the conviction of Sokratês on the point was quite sincere. A circumstance little attended to, but deserving peculiar notice, and stated by himself, is, that the restraining voice began when he was a child, and continued even down to the end of his life: it had thus become an established persuasion, long before his philosophical habits began. But though this peculiar form of inspiration belonged exclusively to him, there were also other ways in which he believed himself to have received the special mandates of the gods, not simply checking him when he was about to take a wrong turn, but spurring him on, directing, and peremptorily exacting from him, a positive course of proceeding. Such distinct mission had been imposed upon him by dreams, by oracular intimations, and by every other means which the gods employed for signifying their special will.[655]

Of these intimations from the oracle, he specifies particularly one, in reply to a question put at Delphi, by his intimate friend, and enthusiastic admirer, Chærephon. The question put was, whether any other man was wiser than Sokratês; to which the Pythian priestess replied, that no other man was wiser.[656] Sokratês affirms that he was greatly perplexed on hearing this declaration from so infallible an authority, being conscious to himself that he possessed no wisdom on any subject, great or small. At length, after much meditation and a distressing mental struggle, he resolved to test the accuracy of the infallible priestess, by taking measure of the wisdom of others as compared with his own. Selecting a leading politician, accounted wise both by others and by himself, he proceeded to converse with him and put scrutinizing questions; the answers to which satisfied him that this man's supposed wisdom was really no wisdom at all. Having made such a discovery, Sokratês next tried to demonstrate to the politician himself how much he wanted of being wise; but this was impossible; the latter still remained as fully persuaded of his own wisdom as before. "The result which I acquired (says Sokratês) was, that I was a wiser man than he, for neither he nor I knew anything of what was truly good and honorable; but the difference between us was, that he fancied he knew them, while I was fully conscious of my own ignorance; I was thus wiser than he, inasmuch as I was exempt from that capital error." So far, therefore, the oracle was proved to be right. Sokratês repeated the same experiment successively upon a great number of different persons, especially those in reputation for distinguished abilities; first, upon political men and rhetors, next upon poets of every variety, and upon artists as well as artisans. The result of his trial was substantially the same in all cases. The poets, indeed, composed splendid verses, but when questioned even about the words, the topics, and the purpose, of their own compositions, they could give no consistent or satisfactory explanations; so that it became evident that they spoke or wrote, like prophets, as unconscious subjects under the promptings of inspiration. Moreover, their success as poets filled them with a lofty opinion of their own wisdom on other points also. The case was similar with artists and artisans; who, while highly instructed, and giving satisfactory answers, each in his own particular employment, were for that reason only the more convinced that they also knew well other great and noble subjects. This great general mistake more than countervailed their special capacities, and left them, on the whole, less wise than Sokratês.[657]

"In this research and scrutiny (said Sokratês, on his defence) I have been long engaged, and am still engaged. I interrogate every man of reputation; I prove him to be defective in wisdom; but I cannot prove it so as to make him sensible of the defect. Fulfilling the mission imposed upon me, I have thus established the veracity of the god, who meant to pronounce that human wisdom was of little reach or worth; and that he who, like Sokratês, felt most convinced of his own worthlessness, as to wisdom, was really the wisest of men.[658] My service to the god has not only constrained me to live in constant poverty[659] and neglect of political estimation, but has brought upon me a host of bitter enemies in those whom I have examined and

exposed while the bystanders talk of me as a wise man, because they give me credit for wisdom respecting all the points on which my exposure of others turns."—"Whatever be the danger and obloquy which I may incur, it would be monstrous indeed, if, having maintained my place in the ranks as an hoplite under your generals at Delium and Potidæa, I were now, from fear of death or anything else, to disobey the oracle and desert the post which the god has assigned to me, the duty of living for philosophy and cross-questioning both myself and others.[660] And should you even now offer to acquit me, on condition of my renouncing this duty, I should tell you, with all respect and affection, that I will obey the god rather than you, and that I will persist, until my dying day, in cross-questioning you, exposing your want of wisdom and virtue, and reproaching you until the defect be remedied.[661] My mission as your monitor is a mark of the special favor of the god to you; and if you condemn me, it will be your loss; for you will find none other such.[662] Perhaps you will ask me, Why cannot you go away, Sokratês, and live among us in peace and silence? This is the hardest of all questions for me to answer to your satisfaction. If I tell you that silence on my part would be disobedience to the god, you will think me in jest, and not believe me. You will believe me still less, if I tell you that the greatest blessing which can happen to man is, to carry on discussions every day about virtue and those other matters which you hear me canvassing when I cross-examine myself as well as others; and that life, without such examination, is no life at all. Nevertheless, so stands the fact, incredible as it may seem to you."[663]

I have given rather ample extracts from the Platonic Apology, because no one can conceive fairly the character of Sokratês who does not enter into the spirit of that impressive discourse. We see in it plain evidence of the marked supernatural mission which he believed himself to be executing, and which would not allow him to rest or employ himself in other ways. The oracular answer brought by Chærephon from Delphi, was a fact of far more importance in his history than his so-called dæmon, about which so much more has been said. That answer, together with the dreams and other divine mandates concurrent to the same end, came upon him in the middle of his life, when the intellectual man was formed, and when he had already acquired a reputation for wisdom among those who knew him. It supplied a stimulus which brought into the most pronounced action a pre-existing train of generalizing dialectics and Zenonian negation, an intellectual vein with which the religious impulse rarely comes into confluence. Without such a motive, to which his mind was peculiarly susceptible, his conversation would probably have taken the same general turn, but would assuredly have been restricted within much narrower and more cautious limits. For nothing could well be more unpopular and obnoxious than the task which he undertook of cross-examining, and convicting of ignorance, every distinguished man whom he could approach. So violent, indeed, was the enmity which he occasionally provoked, that there were instances, we are told, in which he was struck or maltreated,[664] and very frequently laughed to scorn. Though he acquired much admiration from auditors, especially youthful auditors, and from a few devoted adher-

ents, yet the philosophical motive alone would not have sufficed to prompt him to that systematic, and even obtrusive, cross-examination which he adopted as the business of his life.

This, then, is the second peculiarity which distinguishes Sokratês, in addition to his extreme publicity of life and indiscriminate conversation. He was not simply a philosopher, but a religious missionary doing the work of philosophy; "an elenchtic,—or cross-examining god,—to use an expression which Plato puts into his mouth respecting an Eleatic philosopher going about to examine and convict the infirm in reason."[665] Nothing of this character belonged either to Parmenidês and Anaxagoras before him, or to Plato and Aristotle after him. Both Pythagoras and Empedoklês did, indeed, lay claim to supernatural communications, mingled with their philosophical teaching. But though there be thus far a general analogy between them and Sokratês, the modes of manifestation were so utterly different, that no fair comparison can be instituted.

The third and most important characteristic of Sokratês—that, through which the first and second became operative—was his intellectual peculiarity. His influence on the speculative mind of his age was marked and important; as to subject, as to method, and as to doctrine.

He was the first who turned his thoughts and discussions distinctly to the subject of ethics. With the philosophers who preceded him, the subject of examination had been Nature, or the Kosmos,[666] as one undistinguishable whole, blending together cosmogony, astronomy, geometry, physics, metaphysics, etc. The Ionic as well as the Eleatic philosophers, Pythagoras as well as Empedoklês, all set before themselves this vast and undefined problem; each framing some system suited to his own vein of imagination; religious, poetical, scientific, or skeptical. According to that honorable ambition for enlarged knowledge, however, which marked the century following 480 B.C., and of which the professional men called sophists were at once the products and the instruments, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, as much as was then known, were becoming so far detached sciences as to be taught separately to youth. Such appears to have been the state of science when Sokratês received his education. He received at least the ordinary amount of instruction in all:[667] he devoted himself as a young man to the society and lessons of the physical philosopher Archelaus,[668] the disciple of Anaxagoras, whom he accompanied from Athens to Samos; and there is even reason to believe that, during the earlier part of his life, he was much devoted to what was then understood as the general study of Nature.[669] A man of his earnest and active intellect was likely first to manifest his curiosity as a learner: "to run after and track the various discourses of others, like a Laconian hound," if I may borrow an expression applied to him by Plato,[670] before he struck out any novelties of his own. And in Plato's dialogue called "Parmenidês," Sokratês appears as a young man full of ardor for the discussion of the Parmenidean theory, looking up with reverence to Parmenidês and Zeno, and receiving from them instructions in the process of

dialectical investigation. I have already, in the preceding chapter,[671] noted the tenor of that dialogue, as illustrating the way in which Grecian philosophy presents itself, even at the first dawn of dialectics, as at once negative and positive, recognizing the former branch of method no less than the latter as essential to the attainment of truth. I construe it as an indication respecting the early mind of Sokratês, imbibing this conviction from the ancient Parmenidês and the mature and practised Zeno, and imposing upon himself, as a condition of assent to any hypothesis or doctrine, the obligation of setting forth conscientiously all that could be said against it, not less than all that could be said in its favor: however laborious such a process might be, and however little appreciated by the multitude.[672] Little as we know the circumstances which went to form the remarkable mind of Sokratês, we may infer from this dialogue that he owes in part his powerful negative vein of dialectics to "the double-tongued and all-objecting Zeno."[673]

To a mind at all exigent on the score of proof, physical science as handled in that day was indeed likely to appear not only unsatisfactory, but hopeless; and Sokratês, in the maturity of his life, deserted it altogether. The contradictory hypotheses which he heard, with the impenetrable confusion which overhung the subject, brought him even to the conviction, that the gods intended the machinery by which they brought about astronomical and physical results to remain unknown, and that it was impious, as well as useless, to pry into their secrets.[674] His master Archelaus, though mainly occupied with physics, also speculated more or less concerning moral subjects; concerning justice and injustice, the laws, etc.; and is said to have maintained the tenet, that justice and injustice were determined by law or convention, not by nature. From him, perhaps, Sokratês may have been partly led to turn his mind in this direction. But to a man disappointed with physics, and having in his bosom a dialectical impulse powerful, unemployed, and restless, the mere realities of Athenian life, even without Archelaus, would suggest human relations, duties, action and suffering, as the most interesting materials for contemplation and discourse. Sokratês could not go into the public assembly, the dikastery, or even the theatre, without hearing discussions about what was just or unjust, honorable or base, expedient or hurtful, etc., nor without having his mind conducted to the inquiry, what was the meaning of these large words which opposing disputants often invoked with equal reverential confidence. Along with the dialectic and generalizing power of Sokratês, which formed his bond of connection with such minds as Plato, there was at the same time a vigorous practicality, a large stock of positive Athenian experience, with which Xenophon chiefly sympathized, and which he has brought out in his "Memorabilia." Of these two intellectual tendencies, combined with a strong religious sentiment, the character of Sokratês is composed; and all of them were gratified at once, when he devoted himself to admonitory interrogation on the rules and purposes of human life; from which there was the less to divert him, as he had neither talents nor taste for public speaking.

That "the proper study of mankind is man,"[675] Sokratês was the first to proclaim: he recognized the security and happiness of man both as the single end of study, and as the limiting principle whereby it ought to be circumscribed. In the present state to which science has attained, nothing is more curious than to look back at the rules which this eminent man laid down. Astronomy—now exhibiting the maximum of perfection, with the largest and most exact power of predicting future phenomena which human science has ever attained—was pronounced by him to be among the divine mysteries which it was impossible to understand, and madness to investigate, as Anaxagoras had foolishly pretended to do. He admitted, indeed, that there was advantage in knowing enough of the movements of the heavenly bodies to serve as an index to the change of seasons, and as guides for voyages, journeys by land, or night-watches: but thus much, he said, might easily be obtained from pilots and watchmen, while all beyond was nothing but waste of valuable time, exhausting that mental effort which ought to be employed in profitable acquisitions. He reduced geometry to its literal meaning of land-measuring, necessary so far as to enable any one to proceed correctly in the purchase, sale, or division of land, which any man of common attention might do almost without a teacher; but silly and worthless, if carried beyond, to the study of complicated diagrams.[676] Respecting arithmetic, he gave the same qualified permission of study; but as to general physics, or the study of Nature, he discarded it altogether: "Do these inquirers (he asked) think that they already know *human affairs* well enough, that they thus begin to meddle with *divine*? Do they think that they shall be able to excite or calm the winds and the rain at pleasure, or have they no other view than to gratify an idle curiosity? Surely, they must see that such matters are beyond human investigation. Let them only recollect how much the greatest men, who have attempted the investigation, differ in their pretended results, holding opinions extreme and opposite to each other, like those of madmen!" Such was the view which Sokratês took of physical science and its prospects.[677] It is the very same skepticism in substance, and carried farther in degree, though here invested with a religious coloring, for which Ritter and others so severely denounce Gorgias. But looking at matters as they stood in 440-430 B.C., it ought not to be accounted even surprising, much less blamable. To an acute man of that day, physical science as then studied may well be conceived to have promised no result; and even to have seemed worse than barren, if, like Sokratês, he had an acute perception how much of human happiness was forfeited by immorality, and by corrigible ignorance; how much might be gained by devoting the same amount of earnest study to this latter object. Nor ought we to omit remarking, that the objection of Sokratês: "You may judge how unprofitable are these studies, by observing how widely the students differ among themselves," remains in high favor down to the present day, and may constantly be seen employed against theoretical men, or theoretical arguments, in every department.

Sokratês desired to confine the studies of his hearers to *human* matters as distinguished from *divine*, the latter comprehending astronomy and physics. He looked at

all knowledge from the point of view of human practice, which had been assigned by the gods to man as his proper subject for study and learning, and with reference to which, therefore, they managed all the current phenomena upon principles of constant and intelligible sequence, so that every one who chose to learn, might learn, while those who took no such pains suffered for their neglect. Even in these, however, the most careful study was not by itself completely sufficient; for the gods did not condescend to submit *all* the phenomena to constant antecedence and consequence, but reserved to themselves the capital turns and junctures for special sentence.[678] Yet here again, if a man had been diligent in learning all that the gods permitted to be learned; and if, besides, he was assiduous in pious court to them, and in soliciting special information by way of prophecy, they would be gracious to him, and signify beforehand how they intended to act in putting the final hand and in settling the undecipherable portions of the problem.[679] The kindness of the gods in replying through their oracles, or sending information by sacrificial signs or prodigies, in cases of grave difficulty, was, in the view of Sokratês, one of the most signal evidences of their care for the human race.[680] To seek access to these prophecies, or indications of special divine intervention to come, was the proper supplementary business of any one who had done as much for himself as could be done by patient study.[681] But as it was madness in a man to solicit special information from the gods on matters which they allowed him to learn by his own diligence, so it was not less madness in him to investigate as a learner that which they chose to keep back for their own specialty of will.[682]

Such was the capital innovation made by Sokratês in regard to the subject of Athenian study, bringing down philosophy, to use the expression of Cicero,[683] from the heavens to the earth; and such his attempt to draw the line between that which was, and was not, scientifically discoverable; an attempt remarkable, inasmuch as it shows his conviction that the scientific and the religious point of view mutually excluded one another, so that where the latter began, the former ended. It was an innovation, inestimable, in respect to the new matter which it let in; of little import, as regards that which it professed to exclude. For in point of fact, physical science, though partially discouraged, was never absolutely excluded, through any prevalence of that systematic disapproval which he, in common with the multitude of his day, entertained: if it became comparatively neglected, this arose rather from the greater popularity, and the more abundant and accessible matter, of that which he introduced. Physical or astronomical science was narrow in amount, known only to few, and even with those few it did not admit of being expanded, enlivened, or turned to much profitable account in discussion. But the moral and political phenomena on which Sokratês turned the light of speculation were abundant, varied, familiar, and interesting to every one; comprising—to translate a Greek line which he was fond of quoting—"all the good and evil which has befallen you in your home;"[684] connected too, not merely with the realities of the present, but also with the literature of the past, through the gnomic and other poets.

The motives which determined this important innovation, as to the subject of study, exhibits Sokratês chiefly as a religious man and a practical, philanthropic preceptor, the Xenophontic hero. His innovations, not less important, as to method and doctrine, place before us the philosopher and dialectician; the other side of his character, or the Platonic hero; faintly traced, indeed, yet still recognized and identified by Xenophon.

"Sokratês," says the latter,[685] "continued incessantly discussing *human* affairs (the sense of this word will be understood by what has been said above, page 420); investigating: What is piety? What is impiety? What is the honorable and the base? What is the just and the unjust? What is temperance or unsound mind? What is courage or cowardice? What is a city? What is the character fit for a citizen? What is authority over men? What is the character befitting the exercise of such authority? and other similar questions. Men who knew these matters he accounted good and honorable; men who were ignorant of them he assimilated to slaves."

Sokratês, says Xenophon again, in another passage, considered that the *dialectic process* consisted in coming together and taking common counsel, to distinguish and distribute things into genera, or families, so as to learn what each separate thing really was. To go through this process carefully was indispensable, as the only way of enabling a man to regulate his own conduct, aiming at good objects and avoiding bad. To be so practised as to be able to do it readily, was essential to make a man a good leader or adviser of others. Every man who had gone through the process, and come to know what each thing was, could also of course define it and explain it to others; but if he did not know, it was no wonder that he went wrong himself, and put others wrong besides.[686] Moreover, Aristotle says: "To Sokratês we may unquestionably assign two novelties; inductive discourses, and the definitions of general terms."[687]

I borrow here intentionally from Xenophon in preference to Plato; since the former, tamely describing a process which he imperfectly appreciated, identifies it so much the more completely with the real Sokratês, and is thus a better witness than Plato, whose genius not only conceived but greatly enlarged it, for didactic purposes of his own. In our present state of knowledge, some mental effort is required to see anything important in the words of Xenophon; so familiar has every student been rendered with the ordinary terms and gradations of logic and classification,—such as genus, definition, individual things as comprehended in a genus; what each thing is, and to what genus it belongs, etc. But familiar as these words have now become, they denote a mental process, of which, in 440-430 B.C., few men besides Sokratês had any conscious perception. Of course, men conceived and described things in classes, as is implied in the very form of language, and in the habitual junction of predicates with subjects in common speech. They explained their meaning clearly and forcibly in particular cases: they laid down maxims, argued questions, stated premises, and drew conclusions, on trials in the dikastery, or debates in the assem-

bly: they had an abundant poetical literature, which appealed to every variety of emotion: they were beginning to compile historical narrative, intermixed with reflection and criticism. But though all this was done, and often admirably well done, it was wanting in that analytical consciousness which would have enabled any one to describe, explain, or vindicate what he was doing. The ideas of men—speakers as well as hearers, the productive minds as well as the recipient multitude—were associated together in groups favorable rather to emotional results, or to poetical, rhetorical narrative and descriptive effect, than to methodical generalization, to scientific conception, or to proof either inductive or deductive. That reflex act of attention which enables men to understand, compare, and rectify their own mental process, was only just beginning. It was a recent novelty on the part of the rhetorical teachers, to analyze the component parts of a public harangue, and to propound some precepts for making men tolerable speakers. Protagoras was just setting forth various grammatical distinctions, while Prodikus discriminated the significations of words nearly equivalent and liable to be confounded. All these proceedings appeared then so new[688] as to incur the ridicule even of Plato: yet they were branches of that same analytical tendency which Sokratês now carried into scientific inquiry. It may be doubted whether any one before him ever used the words genus and species, originally meaning family and form, in the philosophical sense now exclusively appropriated to them. Not one of those many names—called by logicians *names of the second intention*—which imply distinct attention to various parts of the logical process, and enable us to consider and criticize it in detail, then existed. All of them grew out of the schools of Plato, Aristotle, and the subsequent philosophers, so that we can thus trace them in their beginning to the common root and father, Sokratês.

To comprehend the full value of the improvements struck out by Sokratês, we have only to examine the intellectual paths pursued by his predecessors or contemporaries. He set to himself distinct and specific problems: "What is justice? What is piety, courage, political government? What is it which is really denoted by such great and important names, bearing upon the conduct or happiness of man?" Now it has been already remarked that Anaxagoras, Empedoklês, Demokritus, the Pythagoreans, all had still present to their minds those vast and undivided problems which had been transmitted down from the old poets; bending their minds to the invention of some system which would explain them all at once, or assist the imagination in conceiving both how the Kosmos first began, and how it continued to move on.[689] Ethics and physics, man and nature, were all blended together; and the Pythagoreans, who explained all nature by numbers and numerical relations, applied the same explanation to moral attributes, considering justice to be symbolized by a perfect equation, or by four, the first of all square numbers.[690] These early philosophers endeavored to find out the beginnings, the component elements, the moving cause or causes, of things in the mass;[691] but the logical distribution into genus, species, and individuals, does not seem to have suggested itself to them, or to have been made a subject of distinct attention by any one before Sokratês. To study ethics, or

human dispositions and ends, apart from the physical world, and according to a theory of their own, referring to human good and happiness as the sovereign and comprehensive end;[692] to treat each of the great and familiar words designating moral attributes, as logical aggregates comprehending many judgments in particular cases, and connoting a certain harmony or consistency of purpose among the separate judgments, to bring many of these latter into comparison, by a scrutinizing dialectical process, so as to test the consistency and completeness of the logical aggregate or general notion, as it stood in every man's mind: all these were parts of the same forward movement which Sokratês originated.

It was at that time a great progress to break down the unwieldy mass conceived by former philosophers as science; and to study ethics apart, with a reference, more or less distinct, to their own appropriate end. Nay, we see, if we may trust the "Phædon" of Plato,[693] that Sokratês, before he resolved on such pronounced severance, had tried to construct, or had at least yearned after, an undivided and reformed system, including physics also under the ethical end; a scheme of optimistic physics, applying the general idea, "*What was best*," as the commanding principle, from whence physical explanations were to be deduced; which he hoped to find, but did not find, in Anaxagoras. But it was a still greater advance to seize, and push out in conscious application, the essential features of that logical process, upon the correct performance of which all our security for general truth depends. The notions of genus, subordinate genera, and individuals as comprehended under them,—we need not here notice the points on which Plato and Aristotle differed from each other and from the modern conceptions on that subject,—were at that time newly brought into clear consciousness in the human mind. The profusion of logical distribution employed in some of the dialogues of Plato, such as the Sophistês and the Politicus, seems partly traceable to his wish to familiarize hearers with that which was then a novelty, as well as to enlarge its development, and diversify its mode of application. He takes numerous indirect opportunities of bringing it out into broad light, by putting into the mouths of his dialogists answers implying complete inattention to it, exposed afterwards in the course of the dialogue by Sokratês.[694] What was now begun by Sokratês, and improved by Plato, was embodied as part in a comprehensive system of formal logic by the genius of Aristotle; a system which was not only of extraordinary value in reference to the processes and controversies of its time, but which also, having become insensibly worked into the minds of instructed men, has contributed much to form what is correct in the habits of modern thinking. Though it has been now enlarged and recast, by some modern authors—especially by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his admirable System of Logic—into a structure commensurate with the vast increase of knowledge and extension of positive method belonging to the present day, we must recollect that the distance, between the best modern logic and that of Aristotle, is hardly so great as that between Aristotle and those who preceded him by a century, Empedoklês, Anaxagoras, and the Pythagoreans; and that the movement in advance of these latter commences with Sokratês.

By Xenophon, by Plato, and by Aristotle, the growth as well as the habitual use of logical classification is represented as concurrent with and dependent upon dialectics. In this methodized discussion, so much in harmony with the marked sociability of the Greek character, the quick recurrence of short question and answer was needful as a stimulus to the attention, at a time when the habit of close and accurate reflection on abstract subjects had been so little cultivated. But the dialectics of Sokratês had far greater and more important peculiarities than this. We must always consider his method in conjunction with the subjects to which he applied it. As those subjects were not recondite or special, but bore on the practical life of the house, the market-place, the city, the dikastery, the gymnasium, or the temple, with which every one was familiar, so Sokratês never presented himself as a teacher, nor as a man having new knowledge to communicate. On the contrary, he disclaimed such pretensions, uniformly and even ostentatiously. But the subjects on which he talked were just those which every one professed to know perfectly and thoroughly, and on which every one believed himself in a condition to instruct others, rather than to require instruction for himself. On such questions as these: What is justice? What is piety? What is a democracy? What is a law? every man fancied that he could give a confident opinion, and even wondered that any other person should feel a difficulty. When Sokratês, professing ignorance, put any such question, he found no difficulty in obtaining an answer, given off-hand, and with very little reflection. The answer purported to be the explanation or definition of a term—familiar, indeed, but of wide and comprehensive import—given by one who had never before tried to render to himself an account of what it meant. Having got this answer, Sokratês put fresh questions, applying it to specific cases, to which the respondent was compelled to give answers inconsistent with the first; thus showing that the definition was either too narrow, or too wide, or defective in some essential condition. The respondent then amended his answer; but this was a prelude to other questions, which could only be answered in ways inconsistent with the amendment; and the respondent, after many attempts to disentangle himself, was obliged to plead guilty to the inconsistencies, with an admission that he could make no satisfactory answer to the original query, which had at first appeared so easy and familiar. Or, if he did not himself admit this, the hearers at least felt it forcibly. The dialogue, as given to us, commonly ends with a result purely negative, proving that the respondent was incompetent to answer the question proposed to him, in a manner consistent and satisfactory even to himself. Sokratês, as he professed from the beginning to have no positive theory to support, so he maintains to the end the same air of a learner, who would be glad to solve the difficulty if he could, but regrets to find himself disappointed of that instruction which the respondent had promised.

We see by this description of the cross-examining path of this remarkable man, how intimate was the bond of connection between the dialectic method and the logical distribution of particulars into species and genera. The discussion first raised by Sokratês turns upon the meaning of some large generic term, the queries whereby

he follows it up, bring the answer given into collision with various particulars which it ought not to comprehend, yet does; or with others, which it ought to comprehend, but does not. It is in this manner that the latent and undefined cluster of association, which has grown up round a familiar term, is as it were penetrated by a fermenting leaven, forcing it to expand into discernible portions, and bringing the appropriate function which the term ought to fulfil, to become a subject of distinct consciousness. The inconsistencies into which the hearer is betrayed in his various answers, proclaim to him the fact that he has not yet acquired anything like a clear and full conception of the common attribute which binds together the various particulars embraced under some term which is ever upon his lips; or perhaps enable him to detect a different fact, not less important, that there is no such common attribute, and that the generalization is merely nominal and fallacious. In either case, he is put upon the train of thought which leads to a correction of the generalization, and lights him on to that which Plato[695] calls, seeing the one in the many, and the many in the one. Without any predecessor to copy, Sokratês, fell as it were instinctively into that which Aristotle[696] describes as the double track of the dialectic process; breaking up the one into many, and recombining the many into one; the former duty, at once the first and the most essential, Sokratês performed directly by his analytical string of questions; the latter, or synthetical process, was one which he did not often directly undertake, but strove so to arm and stimulate the hearer's mind, as to enable him to do it for himself. This one and many denote the logical distribution of a multifarious subject-matter under generic terms, with clear understanding of the attributes implied or connoted by each term, so as to discriminate those particulars to which it really applies. At a moment when such logical distribution was as yet novel as a subject of consciousness, it could hardly have been probed and laid out in the mind by any less stringent process than the cross-examining dialectics of Sokratês, applied to the analysis of some attempts at definition hastily given by respondents; that "inductive discourse and search for (clear general notions or) definitions of general terms," which Aristotle so justly points out as his peculiar innovation.

I have already adverted to the persuasion of religious mission under which Sokratês acted in pursuing this system of conversation and interrogation. He probably began it in a tentative way,[697] upon a modest scale, and under the pressure of logical embarrassment weighing on his own mind. But as he proceeded, and found himself successful, as well as acquiring reputation among a certain circle of friends, his earnest soul became more and more penetrated with devotion to that which he regarded as a duty. It was at this time probably, that his friend Chærephon came back with the oracular answer from Delphi, noticed a few pages above, to which Sokratês himself alludes as having prompted him to extend the range of his conversation, and to question a class of persons whom he had not before ventured to approach, the noted politicians, poets, and artisans. He found them more confident than humbler individuals in their own wisdom, but quite as unable to reply to his queries without being driven to contradictory answers.

Such scrutiny of the noted men in Athens is made to stand prominent in the "Platonic Apology," because it was the principal cause of that unpopularity which Sokratês at once laments and accounts for before the dikasts. Nor can we doubt that it was the most impressive portion of his proceedings, in the eyes both of enemies and admirers, as well as the most flattering to his own natural temper. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to present this part of the general purpose of Sokratês—or of his divine mission, if we adopt his own language—as if it were the whole; and to describe him as one standing forward merely to unmask select leading men, politicians, sophists, poets, or others, who had acquired unmerited reputation, and were puffed up with foolish conceit of their own abilities, being in reality shallow and incompetent. Such an idea of Sokratês is at once inadequate and erroneous. His conversation, as I have before remarked, was absolutely universal and indiscriminate; while the mental defect which he strove to rectify was one not at all peculiar to leading men, but common to them with the mass of mankind, though seeming to be exaggerated in them, partly because more is expected from them, partly because the general feeling of self-estimation stands at a higher level, naturally and reasonably, in their bosoms, than in those of ordinary persons. That defect was, the "seeming and conceit of knowledge without the reality," on human life with its duties, purposes, and conditions; the knowledge of which Sokratês called emphatically "human wisdom," and regarded as essential to the dignity of a freeman; while he treated other branches of science as above the level of man,[698] and as a stretch of curiosity, not merely superfluous, but reprehensible. His warfare against such false persuasion of knowledge, in one man as well as another, upon those subjects—for with him, I repeat, we must never disconnect the method from the subjects—clearly marked even in Xenophon, is abundantly and strikingly illustrated by the fertile genius of Plato, and constituted the true missionary scheme which pervaded the last half of his long life; a scheme far more comprehensive, as well as more generous, than those anti-sophistic polemics which are assigned to him by so many authors as his prominent object.[699]

In pursuing the thread of his examination, there was no topic upon which Sokratês more frequently insisted, than the contrast between the state of men's knowledge on the general topics of man and society, and that which artists or professional men possessed in their respective special crafts. So perpetually did he reproduce this comparison, that his enemies accused him of wearing it threadbare.[700] Take a man of special vocation—a carpenter, a brazier, a pilot, a musician, a surgeon—and examine him on the state of his professional knowledge, you will find him able to indicate the persons from whom and the steps by which he first acquired it: he can describe to you his general aim, with the particular means which he employs to realize the aim, as well as the reason why such means must be employed and why precautions must be taken to combat such and such particular obstructions: he can teach his profession to others: in matters relating to his profession, he counts as an authority, so that no extra-professional person thinks of contesting the decision of a

surgeon in case of disease, or of a pilot at sea. But while such is the fact in regard to every special art, how great is the contrast in reference to the art of righteous, social, and useful living, which forms, or ought to form, the common business alike important to each and to all! On this subject, Sokratês[701] remarked that every one felt perfectly well-informed, and confident in his own knowledge; yet no one knew from whom, or by what steps, he had learned: no one had ever devoted any special reflection either to ends, or means, or obstructions: no one could explain or give a consistent account of the notions in his own mind, when pertinent questions were put to him: no one could teach another, as might be inferred, he thought, from the fact that there were no professed teachers, and that the sons of the best men were often destitute of merit: every one knew for himself, and laid down general propositions confidently, without looking up to any other man as knowing better; yet there was no end of dissension and dispute on particular cases.[702]

Such was the general contrast which Sokratês sought to impress upon his hearers by a variety of questions bearing on it, directly or indirectly. One way of presenting it, which Plato devoted much of his genius to expand in dialogue, was, to discuss, Whether virtue be really teachable. How was it that superior men, like Aristeidês and Periklês,[703] acquired the eminent qualities essential for guiding and governing Athens, since they neither learned them under any known master, as they had studied music and gymnastics, nor could insure the same excellences to their sons, either through their own agency or through that of any master? Was it not rather the fact that virtue, as it was never expressly taught, so it was not really teachable; but was vouchsafed or withheld according to the special volition and grace of the gods? If a man has a young horse to be broken, or trained, he finds without difficulty a professed trainer, thoroughly conversant with the habits of the race,[704] to communicate to the animal the excellence required; but whom can he find to teach virtue to his sons, with the like preliminary knowledge and assured result? Nay, how can any one either teach virtue, or affirm virtue to be teachable, unless he be prepared to explain what virtue is, and what are the points of analogy and difference between its various branches; justice, temperance, fortitude, prudence, etc.? In several of the Platonic dialogues, the discussion turns on the analysis of these last-mentioned words: the "Lachês" and "Protagoras" on courage, the "Charmidês" on temperance, the "Euthyphrôn" on holiness.

By these and similar discussions did Sokratês, and Plato amplifying upon his master, raise indirectly all the important questions respecting society, human aspirations and duties, and the principal moral qualities which were accounted virtuous in individual men. As the general terms, on which his conversation turned, were among the most current and familiar in the language, so also the abundant instances of detail, whereby he tested the hearer's rational comprehension and consistent application of such large terms, were selected from the best known phenomena of daily life;[705] bringing home the inconsistency, if inconsistency there was, in a manner obvious to

every one. The answers made to him,—not merely by ordinary citizens, but by men of talent and genius, such as the poets or the rhetors, when called upon for an explanation of the moral terms and ideas set forth in their own compositions,[706]—revealed alike that state of mind against which his crusade, enjoined and consecrated by the Delphian oracle, was directed, the semblance and conceit of knowledge without real knowledge. They proclaimed confident, unhesitating persuasion, on the greatest and gravest questions concerning man and society, in the bosoms of persons who had never bestowed upon them sufficient reflection to be aware that they involved any difficulty. Such persuasion had grown up gradually and unconsciously, partly by authoritative communication, partly by insensible transfusion, from others; the process beginning antecedent to reason as a capacity, continuing itself with little aid and no control from reason, and never being finally revised. With the great terms and current propositions concerning human life and society, a complex body of association had become accumulated from countless particulars, each separately trivial and lost to the memory, knit together by a powerful sentiment, and imbibed as it were by each man from the atmosphere of authority and example around him. Upon this basis the fancied knowledge really rested; and reason, when invoked at all, was called in simply as an handmaid, expositor, or apologist of the preëxisting sentiment; as an accessory after the fact, not as a test or verification. Every man found these persuasions in his own mind, without knowing how they became established there; and witnessed them in others, as portions of a general fund of unexamined commonplace and credence. Because the words were at once of large meaning, embodied in old and familiar mental processes, and surrounded by a strong body of sentiment, the general assertions in which they were embodied appeared self-evident and imposing to every one: so that, in spite of continual dispute in particular cases, no one thought himself obliged to analyze the general propositions themselves, or to reflect whether he had verified their import, and could apply them rationally and consistently.[707]

The phenomenon here adverted to is too obvious, even at the present day, to need further elucidation as matter of fact. In morals, in politics, in political economy, on all subjects relating to man and society, the like confident persuasion of knowledge without the reality is sufficiently prevalent: the like generation and propagation, by authority and example, of unverified convictions, resting upon strong sentiment, without consciousness of the steps or conditions of their growth; the like enlistment of reason as the one-sided advocate of a preëstablished sentiment; the like illusion, because every man is familiar with the language, that therefore every man is master of the complex facts, judgments, and tendencies, involved in its signification, and competent both to apply comprehensive words and to assume the truth or falsehood of large propositions, without any special analysis or study.[708]

There is one important difference, however, to note, between our time and that of Sokratês. In his day, the impressions not only respecting man and society, but also

respecting the physical world, were of this same self-sown, self-propagating, and unscientific character. The popular astronomy of the Sokratic age was an aggregate of primitive, superficial observations and imaginative inferences, passing unexamined from elder men to younger, accepted with unsuspecting faith, and consecrated by intense sentiment. Not only men like Nikias, or Anytus and Melêtus, but even Sokratês himself, protested against the impudence of Anaxagoras, when he degraded the divine Helios and Selênê into a sun and moon of calculable motions and magnitudes. But now, the development of the scientific point of view, with the vast increase of methodized physical and mathematical knowledge, has taught every one that such primitive astronomical and physical convictions were nothing better than "a fancy of knowledge without the reality."[709] Every one renounces them without hesitation, seeks his conclusions from the scientific teacher, and looks to the proofs alone for his guarantee. A man who has never bestowed special study on astronomy, knows that he is ignorant of it: to fancy that he knows it, without such preparation, would be held an absurdity. While the scientific point of view has thus acquired complete predominance in reference to the physical world, it has made little way comparatively on topics regarding man and society, wherein "fancy of knowledge without the reality" continues to reign, not without criticism and opposition, yet still as a paramount force. And if a new Sokratês were now to put the same questions in the marketplace to men of all ranks and professions, he would find the like confident persuasion and unsuspecting dogmatism as to generalities; the like faltering, blindness, and contradiction, when tested by cross-examining details.

In the time of Sokratês, this last comparison was not open; since there did not exist, in any department, a body of doctrine scientifically constituted: but the comparison which he actually took, borrowed from the special trades and professions, brought him to an important result. He was the first to see, and the idea pervades all his speculations, that as in each art or profession there is an end to be attained, a theory laying down the means and conditions whereby it is attainable, and precepts deduced from that theory, such precepts collectively taken directing and covering nearly the entire field of practice, but each precept separately taken liable to conflict with others, and therefore liable to cases of exception; so all this is not less true, or admits not less of being realized, respecting the general art of human living and society. There is a grand and all-comprehensive End,—the security and happiness, as far as practicable, of each and all persons in the society:[710] there may be a theory, laying down those means and conditions under which the nearest approach can be made to that end: there may also be precepts, prescribing to every man the conduct and character which best enables him to become an auxiliary towards its attainment, and imperatively restraining him from acts which tend to hinder it; precepts deduced from the theory, each one of them separately taken being subject to exceptions, but all of them taken collectively governing practice, as in each particular art.[711] Sokratês and Plato talk of "the art of dealing with human beings," "the art of behaving in society," "that science which has for its object to make men happy:" and they

draw a marked distinction between art, or rules of practice deduced from a theoretical survey of the subject-matter and taught with precognition of the end, and mere artless, irrational knack, or dexterity, acquired by simple copying, or assimilation, through a process of which no one could render account.[712]

Plato, with that variety of indirect allusion which is his characteristic, continually constrains the reader to look upon human and social life as having its own ends and purposes no less than each separate profession or craft; and impels him to transfer to the former that conscious analysis as a science, and intelligent practice as an art, which are known as conditions of success in the latter.[713] It was in furtherance of these rational conceptions, "Science and Art," that Sokratês carried on his crusade against "that conceit of knowledge without reality," which reigned undisturbed in the moral world around him, and was only beginning to be slightly disturbed even as to the physical world. To him the precept, inscribed in the Delphian temple, "Know Thyself," was the holiest of all texts, which he constantly cited, and strenuously enforced upon his hearers; interpreting it to mean, Know what sort of a man thou art, and what are thy capacities, in reference to human use.[714] His manner of enforcing it was alike original and effective, and though he was dexterous in varying his topics[715] and queries according to the individual person with whom he had to deal, it was his first object to bring the hearer to take just measure of his own real knowledge or real ignorance. To preach, to exhort, even to confute particular errors, appeared to Sokratês useless, so long as the mind lay wrapped up in its habitual mist or illusion of wisdom: such mist must be dissipated before any new light could enter. Accordingly, the hearer being usually forward in announcing positive declarations on those general doctrines, and explanations of those terms, to which he was most attached and in which he had the most implicit confidence, Sokratês took them to pieces, and showed that they involved contradiction and inconsistency; professing himself to be without any positive opinion, nor ever advancing any until the hearer's mind had undergone the proper purifying cross-examination.[716]

It was this indirect and negative proceeding, which, though only a part of the whole, stood out as his most original and most conspicuous characteristic, and determined his reputation with a large number of persons who took no trouble to know anything else about him. It was an exposure no less painful than surprising to the person questioned, and produced upon several of them an effect of permanent alienation, so that they never came near him again,[717] but reverted to their former state of mind without any permanent change. But on the other hand, the ingenuity and novelty of the process was highly interesting to hearers, especially youthful hearers, sons of rich men, and enjoying leisure; who not only carried away with them a lofty admiration of Sokratês, but were fond of trying to copy his negative polemics.[718] Probably men like Alkibiadês and Kritias frequented his society chiefly for the purpose of acquiring a quality which they might turn to some account in their political career. His constant habit of never suffering a general term to remain undetermined, but ap-

plying it at once to particulars; the homely and effective instances of which he made choice; the string of interrogatories each advancing towards a result, yet a result not foreseen by any one; the indirect and circuitous manner whereby the subject was turned round, and at last approached and laid open by a totally different face, all this constituted a sort of prerogative in Sokratês, which no one else seems to have approached. Its effect was enhanced by a voice and manner highly plausible and captivating, and to a certain extent by the very eccentricity of his silenic physiognomy. [719] What is termed "his irony," or assumption of the character of an ignorant learner, asking information from one who knew better than himself, while it was essential[720] as an excuse for his practice as a questioner, contributed also to add zest and novelty to his conversation; and totally banished from it both didactic pedantry and seeming bias as an advocate; which, to one who talked so much, was of no small advantage. After he had acquired celebrity, this uniform profession of ignorance in debate was usually construed as mere affectation; and those who merely heard him occasionally, without penetrating into his intimacy, often suspected that he was amusing himself with ingenious paradox.[721] Timon the Satirist, and Zeno the Epicurean, accordingly described him as a buffoon, who turned every one into ridicule, especially men of eminence.[722]

It is by Plato that the negative and indirect vein of Sokratês has been worked out and immortalized; while Xenophon, who sympathized little in it, complains that others looked at his master too exclusively on this side, and that they could not conceive him as a guide to virtue, but only as a stirring and propulsive force.[723] One of the principal objects of his "Memorabilia" is, to show that Sokratês, after having worked upon novices sufficiently with the negative line of questions, altered his tone, desisted from embarrassing them, and addressed to them precepts not less plain and simple than directly useful in practice.[724] I do not at all doubt that this was often the fact, and that the various dialogues in which Xenophon presents to us the philosopher inculcating self-control, temperance, piety, duty to parents, brotherly love, fidelity in friendship, diligence, benevolence, etc., on positive grounds, are a faithful picture of one valuable side of his character, and an essential part of the whole. Such direct admonitory influence was common to Sokratês with Prodikus and the best of the sophists.

It is, however, neither from the virtue of his life, nor from the goodness of his precepts—though both were essential features in his character—that he derives his peculiar title to fame, but from his originality and prolific efficacy in the line of speculative philosophy. Of that originality, the first portion, as has been just stated, consisted in his having been the first to conceive the idea of an ethical science with its appropriate end, and with precepts capable of being tested and improved; but the second point, and not the least important, was, his peculiar method, and extraordinary power of exciting scientific impulse and capacity in the minds of others. It was not by positive teaching that this effect was produced. Both Sokratês and Plato

thought that little mental improvement could be produced by expositions directly communicated, or by new written matter lodged in the memory.[725] It was necessary that mind should work upon mind, by short question and answer, or an expert employment of the dialectic process,[726] in order to generate new thoughts and powers; a process which Plato, with his exuberant fancy, compares to copulation and pregnancy, representing it as the true way, and the only effectual way, of propagating the philosophic spirit.

We should greatly misunderstand the negative and indirect vein of Sokratês, if we suppose that it ended in nothing more than simple negation. On busy or ungifted minds, among the indiscriminate public who heard him, it probably left little permanent effect of any kind, and ended in a mere feeling of admiration for ingenuity, or perhaps dislike of paradox: on practical minds like Xenophon, its effect was merged in that of the preceptorial exhortation: but where the seed fell upon an intellect having the least predisposition or capacity for systematic thought, the negation had only the effect of driving the hearer back at first, giving him a new impetus for afterwards springing forward. The Sokratic dialectics, clearing away from the mind its mist of fancied knowledge, and laying bare the real ignorance, produced an immediate effect like the touch of the torpedo:[727] the newly-created consciousness of ignorance was alike unexpected, painful, and humiliating,—a season of doubt and discomfort; yet combined with an internal working and yearning after truth, never before experienced. Such intellectual quickening, which could never commence until the mind had been disabused of its original illusion of false knowledge, was considered by Sokratês not merely as the index and precursor, but as the indispensable condition, of future progress. It was the middle point in the ascending mental scale; the lowest point being ignorance unconscious, self-satisfied, and mistaking itself for knowledge; the next above, ignorance conscious, unmasked, ashamed of itself, and thirsting after knowledge as yet unpossessed; while actual knowledge, the third and highest stage, was only attainable after passing through the second as a preliminary.[728] This second, was a sort of pregnancy; and every mind either by nature incapable of it, or in which, from want of the necessary conjunction, it had never arisen, was barren for all purposes of original or self-appropriated thought. Sokratês regarded it as his peculiar vocation and skill, employing another Platonic metaphor, while he had himself no power of reproduction, to deal with such pregnant and troubled minds in the capacity of a midwife; to assist them in that mental parturition whereby they were to be relieved, but at the same time to scrutinize narrowly the offspring which they brought forth; and if it should prove distorted or unpromising, to cast it away with the rigor of a Lykurgean nurse, whatever might be the reluctance of the mother-mind to part with its new-born.[729] There is nothing which Plato is more fertile in illustrating, than this relation between the teacher and the scholar, operating not by what it put into the latter, but by what it evolved out of him; by creating an uneasy longing after truth, aiding in the elaboration necessary for obtaining relief, and test-

ing whether the doctrine elaborated possessed the real lineaments, or merely the delusive semblance, of truth.

There are few things more remarkable than the description given of the colloquial magic of Sokratês and its vehement effects, by those who had themselves heard it and felt its force. Its suggestive and stimulating power was a gift so extraordinary, as well to justify any abundance of imagery on the part of Plato to illustrate it.[730] On the subjects to which he applied himself, man and society, his hearers had done little but feel and affirm: Sokratês undertook to make them think, weigh, and examine themselves and their own judgments, until the latter were brought into consistency with each other, as well as with a known and venerable end. The generalizations embodied in their judgments had grown together and coalesced in a manner at once so intimate, so familiar, yet so unverified, that the particulars implied in them had passed out of notice: so that Sokratês, when he recalled these particulars out of a forgotten experience, presented to the hearer his own opinions under a totally new point of view. His conversations—even as they appear in the reproduction of Xenophon, which presents but a mere skeleton of the reality—exhibit the main features of a genuine inductive method, struggling against the deep-lying, but unheeded, errors of the early intellect acting by itself, without conscious march or scientific guidance,—of the *intellectus sibi permissus*,—upon which Bacon so emphatically dwells. Amidst abundance of *instantiæ negativæ*, the scientific value of which is dwelt upon in the "Novum Organon,"[731] and negative instances, too, so dexterously chosen as generally to show the way to new truth, in place of that error which they set aside,—there is a close pressure on the hearer's mind, to keep it in the distinct tract of particulars, as conditions of every just and consistent generalization; and to divert it from becoming enslaved to unexamined formulæ, or from delivering mere intensity of persuasion under the authoritative phrase of reason. Instead of anxiety to plant in the hearer a conclusion ready-made and accepted on trust, the questioner keeps up a prolonged suspense with special emphasis laid upon the particulars tending both affirmatively and negatively; nor is his purpose answered, until that state of knowledge and apprehended evidence is created, out of which the conclusion starts as a living product, with its own root and self-sustaining power consciously linked with its premises. If this conclusion so generated be not the same as that which the questioner himself adopts, it will at least be some other, worthy of a competent and examining mind taking its own independent view of the appropriate evidence. And amidst all the variety and divergence of particulars which we find enforced in the language of Sokratês, the end, towards which all of them point, is one and the same, emphatically signified, the good and happiness of social man.

It is not, then, to multiply proselytes, or to procure authoritative assent, but to create earnest seekers, analytical intellects, foreknowing and consistent agents, capable of forming conclusions for themselves and of teaching others, as well as to force them into that path of inductive generalization whereby alone trustworthy con-

clusions can be formed, that the Sokratic method aspires. In many of the Platonic dialogues, wherein Sokratês is brought forward as the principal disputant, we read a series of discussions and arguments, distinct, though having reference to the same subject, but terminating either in a result purely negative, or without any definite result at all. The commentators often attempt, but in my judgment with little success, either by arranging the dialogues in a supposed sequence or by various other hypotheses, to assign some positive doctrinal conclusion as having been indirectly contemplated by the author. But if Plato had aimed at any substantive demonstration of this sort, we cannot well imagine that he would have left his purpose thus in the dark, visible only by the microscope of a critic. The didactic value of these dialogues —that wherein the genuine Sokratic spirit stands most manifest—consists, not in the positive conclusion proved, but in the argumentative process itself, coupled with the general importance of the subject, upon which evidence negative and affirmative is brought to bear.

This connects itself with that which I remarked in the preceding chapter, when mentioning Zeno and the first manifestations of dialectics, respecting the large sweep, the many-sided argumentation, and the strength as well as forwardness of the negative arm, in Grecian speculative philosophy. Through Sokratês, this amplitude of dialectic range was transmitted from Zeno, first to Plato and next to Aristotle. It was a proceeding natural to men who were not merely interested in establishing, or refuting some given particular conclusion, but who also—like expert mathematicians in their own science—loved, esteemed, and sought to improve the dialectic process itself, with the means of verification which it afforded; a feeling, of which abundant evidence is to be found in the Platonic writings.[732] Such pleasure in the scientific operation,—though not merely innocent, but valuable both as a stimulant and as a guarantee against error, and though the corresponding taste among mathematicians is always treated with the sympathy which it deserves,—incurs much unmerited reprobation from modern historians of philosophy, under the name of love of disputation, cavilling, or skeptical subtlety.

But over and above any love of the process, the subjects to which dialectics were applied, from Sokratês downwards,—man and society, ethics, politics, metaphysics, etc., were such as particularly called for this many-sided handling. On topics like these, relating to sequences of fact which depend upon a multitude of coöperating or conflicting causes, it is impossible to arrive, by any one thread of positive reasoning or induction, at absolute doctrine, which a man may reckon upon finding always true, whether he remembers the proof or not; as is the case with mathematical, astronomical, or physical truth. The utmost which science can ascertain, on subjects thus complicated, is an aggregate, not of peremptory theorems and predictions, but of tendencies;[733] by studying the action of each separate cause, and combining them together as well as our means admit. The knowledge of tendencies thus obtained, though falling much short of certainty, is highly important for guidance: but it

is plain that conclusions of this nature, resulting from multifarious threads of evidence, true only on a balance, and always liable to limitation, can never be safely detached from the proofs on which they rest, or taught as absolute and consecrated formulæ.[734] They require to be kept in perpetual and conscious association with the evidences, affirmative and negative, by the joint consideration of which their truth is established; nor can this object be attained by any other means than by ever-renovated discussion, instituted from new and distinct points of view, and with free play to that negative arm which is indispensable as stimulus not less than as control. To ask for nothing but results, to decline the labor of verification, to be satisfied with a ready-made stock of established positive arguments as proof, and to decry the doubter or negative reasoner, who starts new difficulties, as a common enemy, this is a proceeding sufficiently common, in ancient as well as in modern times. But it is, nevertheless, an abnegation of the dignity, and even of the functions, of speculative philosophy. It is the direct reverse of the method both of Sokratês and Plato, who, as inquirers, felt that, for the great subjects which they treated, multiplied threads of reasoning, coupled with the constant presence of the cross-examining elenchus, were indispensable. Nor is it less at variance with the views of Aristotle,—though a man very different from either of them,—who goes round his subject on all sides, states and considers all its difficulties, and insists emphatically on the necessity of having all these difficulties brought out in full force, as the incitement and guide to positive philosophy, as well as the test of its sufficiency.[735]

Understanding thus the method of Sokratês, we shall be at no loss to account for a certain variance on his part—and a still greater variance on the part of Plato, who expanded the method in writing so much more—with the sophists, without supposing the latter to be corrupt teachers. As they aimed at qualifying young men for active life, they accepted the current ethical and political sentiment, with its unexamined commonplaces and inconsistencies, merely seeking to shape it into what was accounted a meritorious character at Athens. They were thus exposed, along with others—and more than others, in consequence of their reputation—to the analytical cross-examination of Sokratês, and were quite as little able to defend themselves against it.

Whatever may have been the success of Protagoras or any other among these sophists, the mighty originality of Sokratês achieved results not only equal at the time, but incomparably grander and more lasting in reference to the future. Out of his intellectual school sprang not merely Plato, himself a host, but all the other leaders of Grecian speculation for the next half-century, and all those who continued the great line of speculative philosophy down to later times. Eukleidês and the Megaric school of philosophers,—Aristippus and the Kyrenaic,—Antisthenês and Diogenês, the first of those called the Cynics, all emanated more or less directly from the stimulus imparted by Sokratês, though each followed a different vein of thought.[736] Ethics continue to be what Sokratês had first made them, a distinct branch of philosophy,

alongside of which politics, rhetoric, logic, and other speculations relating to man and society, gradually arranged themselves; all of them more popular, as well as more keenly controverted, than physics, which at that time presented comparatively little charm, and still less of attainable certainty. There can be no doubt that the individual influence of Sokratês permanently enlarged the horizon, improved the method, and multiplied the ascendent minds, of the Grecian speculative world, in a manner never since paralleled. Subsequent philosophers may have had a more elaborate doctrine, and a larger number of disciples who imbibed their ideas; but none of them applied the same stimulating method with the same efficacy; none of them struck out of other minds that fire which sets light to original thought; none of them either produced in others the pains of intellectual pregnancy, or extracted from others the fresh and unborrowed offspring of a really parturient mind.

Having thus touched upon Sokratês, both as first opener of the field of ethics to scientific study, and as author of a method, little copied and never paralleled since his time, for stimulating in other men's minds earnest analytical inquiry, I speak last about his theoretical doctrine. Considering the fanciful, far-fetched ideas, upon which alone the Pythagoreans and other predecessors had shaped their theories respecting virtues and vices, the wonder is that Sokratês, who had no better guides to follow, should have laid down an ethical doctrine which has the double merit of being true, as far as it goes, legitimate, and of comprehensive generality: though it errs, mainly by stating a part of the essential conditions of virtue[737]—sometimes also a part of the ethical end—as if it were the whole. Sokratês resolved all virtue into knowledge or wisdom; all vice, into ignorance or folly. To do right was the only way to impart happiness, or the least degree of unhappiness compatible with any given situation: now this was precisely what every one wished for and aimed at; only that many persons, from ignorance, took the wrong road; and no man was wise enough always to take the right. But as no man was willingly his own enemy, so no man ever did wrong willingly; it was because he was not fully or correctly informed of the consequences of his own actions; so that the proper remedy to apply was enlarged teaching of consequences and improved judgment.[738] To make him willing to be taught, the only condition required was to make him conscious of his own ignorance; the want of which consciousness was the real cause both of indocility and of vice.

That this doctrine sets forth one portion of the essential conditions of virtue, is certain; and that too the most commanding portion, since there can be no assured moral conduct except under the supremacy of reason. But that it omits to notice, what is not less essential to virtue, the proper condition of the emotions, desires, etc., taking account only of the intellect, is also certain; and has been remarked by Aristotle[739] as well as by many others. It is fruitless, in my judgment, to attempt by any refined explanation to make out that Sokratês meant, by "knowledge," something more than what is directly implied in the word. He had present to his mind, as the grand depravation of the human being, not so much vice, as madness; that state

in which a man does not know what he is doing. Against the vicious man, securities both public and private may be taken, with considerable effect; against the madman there is no security except perpetual restraint. He is incapable of any of the duties incumbent on social man, nor can he, even if he wishes, do good either to himself or to others. The sentiment which we feel towards such an unhappy being is, indeed, something totally different from moral reprobation, such as we feel for the vicious man who does wrong knowingly. But Sokratês took measure of both with reference to the purposes of human life and society, and pronounced that the latter was less completely spoiled for those purposes than the former. Madness was ignorance at its extreme pitch, accompanied, too, by the circumstance that the madman himself was unconscious of his own ignorance, acting under a sincere persuasion that he knew what he was doing. But short of this extremity, there were many varieties and gradations in the scale of ignorance, which, if accompanied by false conceit of knowledge, differed from madness only in degree, and each of which disqualified a man from doing right, in proportion to the ground which it covered. The worst of all ignorance—that which stood nearest to madness—was when a man was ignorant of himself, fancying that he knew what he did not really know, and that he could do, or avoid, or endure, what was quite beyond his capacity; when, for example, intending to speak the same truth, he sometimes said one thing, sometimes another; or, casting up the same arithmetical figures, made sometimes a greater sum, sometimes a less. A person who knows his letters, or an arithmetician, may doubtless write bad orthography or cast-up incorrectly, by design, but can also perform the operations correctly, if he chooses; while one ignorant of writing or of arithmetic, *cannot* do it correctly, even though he should be anxious to do so. The former, therefore, comes nearer to the good orthographer or arithmetician than the latter. So, if a man knows what is just, honorable, and good, but commits acts of a contrary character, he is juster, or comes nearer to being a just man, than one who does not know what just acts are, and does not distinguish them from unjust; for this latter *cannot* conduct himself justly, even if he desires it ever so much.[740]

The opinion here maintained illustrates forcibly the general doctrine of Sokratês. I have already observed that the fundamental idea which governed his train of reasoning, was, the analogy of each man's social life and duty to a special profession or trade. Now what is principally inquired after in regard to these special men, is their professional capacity; without this, no person would ever think of employing them, let their dispositions be ever so good; with it, good dispositions and diligence are presumed, unless there be positive grounds for suspecting the contrary. But why do we indulge such presumption? Because their pecuniary interest, their professional credit, and their place among competitors, are staked upon success, so that we reckon upon their best efforts. But in regard to that manifold and indefinite series of acts which constitute the sum total of social duty, a man has no such special interest to guide and impel him, nor can we presume in him those dispositions which will insure his doing right, wherever he knows what right is. Mankind are obliged to give

premiums for these dispositions, and to attach penalties to the contrary, by means of praise and censure; moreover, the natural sympathies and antipathies of ordinary minds, which determine so powerfully the application of moral terms, run spontaneously in this direction, and even overshoot the limit which reason would prescribe. The analogy between the paid special duty and the general social duty, fails in this particular. Even if Sokratês were correct as to the former,—and this would be noway true,—in making the intellectual conditions of good conduct stand for the whole, no such inference could safely be extended to the latter.

Sokratês affirmed that "well-doing" was the noblest pursuit of man. "Well-doing" consisted in doing a thing well after having learned it and practised it, by the rational and proper means; it was altogether disparate from good fortune, or success without rational scheme and preparation. "The best man (he said), and the most beloved by the gods, is he who, as an husbandman, performs well the duties of husbandry; as a surgeon, those of medical art; in political life, his duty towards the commonwealth. But the man who does nothing well, is neither useful, nor agreeable to the gods."[741] This is the Sokratic view of human life; to look at it as an assemblage of realities and practical details; to translate the large words of the moral vocabulary into those homely particulars to which at bottom they refer; to take account of acts, not of dispositions apart from act (in contradiction to the ordinary flow of the moral sympathies); to enforce upon every one, that what he chiefly required was teaching and practice, as preparations for act; and that therefore ignorance, especially ignorance mistaking itself for knowledge, was his capital deficiency. The religion of Sokratês, as well as his ethics, had reference to practical human ends; nor had any man ever less of that transcendentalism in his mind, which his scholar Plato exhibits in such abundance.

It is indisputable, then, that Sokratês laid down a general ethical theory which is too narrow, and which states a part of the truth as if it were the whole. But, as it frequently happens with philosophers who make the like mistake, we find that he did not confine his deductive reasonings within the limits of the theory, but escaped the erroneous consequences by a partial inconsistency. For example; no man ever insisted more emphatically than he, on the necessity of control over the passions and appetites, of enforcing good habits, and on the value of that state of the sentiments and emotions which such a course tended to form.[742] In truth, this is one particular characteristic of his admonitions. He exhorted men to limit their external wants, to be sparing in indulgence, and to cultivate, even in preference to honors and advancement, those pleasures which would surely arise from a performance of duty, as well as from self-examination and the consciousness of internal improvement. This earnest attention, in measuring the elements and conditions of happiness, to the state of the internal associations as contrasted with the effect of external causes, as well as the pains taken to make it appear how much the latter depend upon the former for their power of conferring happiness, and how sufficient is moderate good

fortune in respect to externals, provided the internal man be properly disciplined, is a vein of thought which pervades both Sokratês and Plato, and which passed from them, under various modifications, to most of the subsequent schools of ethical philosophy. It is probable that Protagoras or Prodikus, training rich youth for active life, without altogether leaving out such internal element of happiness, would yet dwell upon it less; a point of decided superiority in Sokratês.

The political opinions of Sokratês were much akin to his ethical, and deserve especial notice, as having in part contributed to his condemnation by the dikastery. He thought that the functions of government belonged legitimately to those who knew best how to exercise them for the advantage of the governed. "The legitimate king or governor was not the man who held the sceptre, nor the man elected by some vulgar persons, nor he who had got the post by lot, nor he who had thrust himself in by force or by fraud, but he alone who knew how to govern well."[743] Just as the pilot governed on shipboard, the surgeon in a sick man's house, the trainer in a palæstra; every one else being eager to obey these professional superiors, and even thanking and recompensing them for their directions, simply because their greater knowledge was an admitted fact. It was absurd, Sokratês used to contend, to choose public officers by lot, when no one would trust himself on shipboard under the care of a pilot selected by hazard,[744] nor would any one pick out a carpenter or a musician in like manner.

We do not know what provision Sokratês suggested for applying his principle to practice, for discovering who was the fittest man in point of knowledge, or for superseding him in case of his becoming unfit, or in case another fitter than he should arise. The analogies of the pilot, the surgeon, and professional men generally, would naturally conduct him to election by the people, renewable after temporary periods; since no one of these professional persons, whatever may be his positive knowledge, is ever trusted or obeyed except by the free choice of those who confide in him, and who may at any time make choice of another. But it does not appear that Sokratês followed out this part of the analogy. His companions remarked to him that his first-rate intellectual ruler would be a despot, who might, if he pleased, either refuse to listen to good advice, or even put to death those who gave it. "He will not act thus," replied Sokratês, "for if he does, he will himself be the greatest loser."[745]

We may notice in this doctrine of Sokratês the same imperfection as that which is involved in the ethical doctrine; a disposition to make the intellectual conditions of political fitness stand for the whole. His negative political doctrine is not to be mistaken: he approved neither of democracy, nor of oligarchy. As he was not attached, either by sentiment or by conviction, to the constitution of Athens, so neither had he the least sympathy with oligarchical usurpers, such as the Four Hundred and the Thirty. His positive ideal state, as far as we can divine it, would have been something like that which is worked out in the "Cyropædia" of Xenophon.

In describing the persevering activity of Sokratês, as a religious and intellectual missionary, we have really described his life; for he had no other occupation than this continual intercourse with the Athenian public; his indiscriminate conversation, and invincible dialectics. Discharging faithfully and bravely his duties as an hoplite on military service,—but keeping aloof from official duty in the dikastery, the public assembly, or the senate-house, except in that one memorable year of the battle of Arginusæ,—he incurred none of those party animosities which an active public life at Athens often provoked. His life was legally blameless, nor had he ever been brought up before the dikastery until his one final trial, when he was seventy years of age. That he stood conspicuous before the public eye in 423 B.C., at the time when the "Clouds" of Aristophanês were brought on the stage, is certain: he may have been, and probably was, conspicuous even earlier: so that we can hardly allow him less than thirty years of public, notorious, and efficacious discoursing, down to his trial in 399 B.C.

It was in that year that Melêtus, seconded by two auxiliaries, Anytus and Lykon, presented against him, and hung up in the appointed place, the portico before the office of the second or king-archon, an indictment against him in the following terms: "Sokratês is guilty of crime: first, for not worshipping the gods whom the city worships, but introducing new divinities of his own; next, for corrupting the youth. The penalty due is—death."

It is certain that neither the conduct nor the conversation of Sokratês had undergone any alteration for many years past; since the sameness of his manner of talking is both derided by his enemies and confessed by himself. Our first sentiment, therefore, apart from the question of guilt or innocence, is one of astonishment, that he should have been prosecuted, at seventy years of age, for persevering in an occupation which he had publicly followed during twenty-five or thirty years preceding. Xenophon, full of reverence for his master, takes up the matter on much higher ground, and expresses himself in a feeling of indignant amazement that the Athenians could find anything to condemn in a man every way so admirable. But whoever attentively considers the picture which I have presented of the purpose, the working, and the extreme publicity of Sokratês, will rather be inclined to wonder, not that the indictment was presented at last, but that some such indictment had not been presented long before. Such certainly is the impression suggested by the language of Sokratês himself, in the "Platonic Apology." He there proclaims, emphatically, that though his present accusers were men of consideration, it was neither *their* enmity, nor *their* eloquence, which he had now principally to fear; but the accumulated force of antipathy,—the numerous and important personal enemies, each with sympathizing partisans,—the long-standing and uncontradicted calumnies,[746] raised against him throughout his cross-examining career.

In truth, the mission of Sokratês, as he himself describes it, could not but prove eminently unpopular and obnoxious. To convince a man that, of matters which he

felt confident of knowing, and had never thought of questioning or even of studying, he is really profoundly ignorant, insomuch that he cannot reply to a few pertinent queries without involving himself in flagrant contradictions, is an operation highly salutary, often necessary, to his future improvement; but an operation of painful surgery, in which, indeed, the temporary pain experienced is one of the conditions almost indispensable to the future beneficial results. It is one which few men can endure without hating the operator at the time; although doubtless such hatred would not only disappear, but be exchanged for esteem and admiration, if they persevered until the full ulterior consequences of the operation developed themselves. But we know, from the express statement of Xenophon, that many, who underwent this first pungent thrust of his dialectics, never came near him again: he disregarded them as laggards,[747] but their voices did not the less count in the hostile chorus. What made that chorus the more formidable, was the high quality and position of its leaders. For Sokratês himself tells us, that the men whom he chiefly and expressly sought out to cross-examine, were the men of celebrity as statesmen, rhetors, poets, or artisans; those at once most sensitive to such humiliation, and most capable of making their enmity effective.

When we reflect upon this great body of antipathy, so terrible both from number and from constituent items, we shall wonder only that Sokratês could have gone on so long standing in the market-place to aggravate it, and that the indictment of Melêtus could have been so long postponed; since it was just as applicable earlier as later, and since the sensitive temper of the people, as to charges of irreligion, was a well-known fact.[748] The truth is, that as history presents to us only one man who ever devoted his life to prosecute this duty of an elenchic, or cross-examining missionary, so there was but one city, in the ancient world at least, wherein he would have been allowed to prosecute it for twenty-five years with safety and impunity; and that city was Athens. I have in a previous volume noted the respect for individual dissent of opinion, taste, and behavior, among one another, which characterized the Athenian population, and which Periklês puts in emphatic relief as a part of his funeral discourse. It was this established liberality of the democratical sentiment at Athens which so long protected the noble eccentricity of Sokratês from being disturbed by the numerous enemies which he provoked: at Sparta, at Thebes, at Argos, Milêtus, or Syracuse, his blameless life would have been insufficient as a shield, and his irresistible dialectic power would have caused him to be only the more speedily silenced. Intolerance is the natural weed of the human bosom, though its growth or development may be counteracted by liberalizing causes; of these, at Athens, the most powerful was, the democratical constitution as there worked, in combination with diffused intellectual and æsthetical sensibility, and keen relish for discourse. Liberty of speech was consecrated, in every man's estimation, among the first of privileges; every man was accustomed to hear opinions, opposite to his own, constantly expressed, and to believe that others had a right to their opinions as well as himself. And though men would not, as a general principle, have extended such toleration to

religious subjects, yet the established habit in reference to other matters greatly influenced their practice, and rendered them more averse to any positive severity against avowed dissenters from the received religious belief. It is certain that there was at Athens both a keener intellectual stimulus, and greater freedom as well of thought as of speech, than in any other city of Greece. The long toleration of Sokratês is one example of this general fact, while his trial proves little, and his execution nothing, against it, as will presently appear.

There must doubtless have been particular circumstances, of which we are scarcely at all informed, which induced his accusers to prefer their indictment at the actual moment, in spite of the advanced age of Sokratês.

In the first place, Anytus, one of the accusers of Sokratês, appears to have become incensed against him on private grounds. The son of Anytus had manifested interest in his conversation, and Sokratês, observing in the young man intellectual impulse and promise, endeavored to dissuade his father from bringing him up to his own trade of a leather-seller.[749] It was in this general way that a great proportion of the antipathy against Sokratês was excited, as he himself tells us in the "Platonic Apology." The young men were those to whom he chiefly addressed himself, and who, keenly relishing his conversation, often carried home new ideas which displeased their fathers;[750] hence the general charge against Sokratês, of corrupting the youth. Now this circumstance had recently happened in the peculiar case of Anytus, a rich tradesman, a leading man in politics, and just now of peculiar influence in the city, because he had been one of the leading fellow-laborers with Thrasybulus in the expulsion of the Thirty, manifesting an energetic and meritorious patriotism. He, like Thrasybulus and many others, had sustained great loss of property[751] during the oligarchical dominion; which perhaps made him the more strenuous in requiring that his son should pursue trade with assiduity, in order to restore the family fortunes. He seems, moreover, to have been an enemy of all teaching which went beyond the narrowest practicality, hating alike Sokratês and the sophists.[752]

While we can thus point out a recent occurrence, which had brought one of the most ascendent politicians in the city into special exasperation against Sokratês, another circumstance which weighed him down was, his past connection with the deceased Kritias and Alkibiadês. Of these two men, the latter, though he had some great admirers, was on the whole odious; still more from his private insolence and enormities than from his public treason as an exile. But the name of Kritias was detested, and deservedly detested, beyond that of any other man in Athenian history, as the chief director of the unmeasured spoliation and atrocities committed by the Thirty. That Sokratês had educated both Kritias and Alkibiadês, was affirmed by the accusers, and seemingly believed by the general public, both at the time and afterwards.[753] That both of them had been among those who conversed with him, when young men, is an unquestionable fact; to what extent, or down to what period, the conversation was carried, we cannot distinctly ascertain. Xenophon affirms that both

of them frequented his society when young, to catch from him an argumentative facility which might be serviceable to their political ambition; that he curbed their violent and licentious propensities, so long as they continued to come to him; that both of them manifested a respectful obedience to him, which seemed in little consonance with their natural tempers; but that they soon quitted him, weary of such restraint, after having acquired as much as they thought convenient of his peculiar accomplishment. The writings of Plato, on the contrary, impress us with the idea that the association of both of them with Sokratês must have been more continued and intimate; for both of them are made to take great part in the Platonic dialogues, while the attachment of Sokratês to Alkibiadês is represented as stronger than that which he ever felt towards any other man; a fact not difficult to explain, since the latter, notwithstanding his ungovernable dispositions, was distinguished in his youth not less for capacity and forward impulse, than for beauty; and since youthful beauty fired the imagination of the Greeks, especially that of Sokratês, more than the charms of the other sex.[754] From the year 420 B.C., in which the activity of Alkibiadês as a political leader commenced, it seems unlikely that he could have seen much of Sokratês, and after the year 415 B.C. the fact is impossible; since in that year he became a permanent exile, with the exception of three or four months in the year 407 B.C. At the moment of the trial of Sokratês, therefore, his connection with Alkibiadês must at least have been a fact long past and gone. Respecting Kritias, we make out less; and as he was a kinsman of Plato, one of the well-known companions of Sokratês, and present at his trial, and himself an accomplished and literary man, his association with Sokratês may have continued longer; at least a color was given for so asserting. Though the supposition that any of the vices either of Kritias or Alkibiadês were encouraged, or even tolerated, by Sokratês, can have arisen in none but prejudiced or ill-informed minds, yet it is certain that such a supposition was entertained; and that it placed him before the public in an altered position after the enormities of the Thirty. Anytus, incensed with him already on the subject of his son, would be doubly incensed against him as the reputed tutor of Kritias.

Of Melêtus, the primary, though not the most important accuser, we know only that he was a poet; of Lykon, that he was a rhetor. Both these classes had been alienated by the cross-examining dialectics to which many of their number had been exposed by Sokratês. They were the last men to bear such an exposure with patience, and their enmity, taken as a class rarely unanimous, was truly formidable when it bore upon any single individual.

We know nothing of the speeches of either of the accusers before the dikastery, except what can be picked out from the remarks in Xenophon and the defence of Plato. Of the three counts of the indictment, the second was the easiest for them to support, on plausible grounds. That Sokratês was a religious innovator, would be considered as proved by the peculiar divine sign, of which he was wont to speak freely and publicly, and which visited no one except himself. Accordingly, in the "Pla-

tonic Defence," he never really replies to this second charge. He questions Melêtus before the dikastery, and the latter is represented as answering, that he meant to accuse Sokratês of not believing in the gods at all;[755] to which imputed disbelief Sokratês answers with an emphatic negative. In support of the first count, however, —the charge of general disbelief in the gods recognized by the city,—nothing in his conduct could be cited; for he was exact in his legal worship like other citizens, and even more than others, if Xenophon is correct.[756] But it would appear that the old calumnies of the Aristophanic "Clouds" were revived, and that the effect of that witty drama, together with similar efforts of Eupolis and others, perhaps hardly less witty, was still enduring; a striking proof that these comedians were no impotent libellers. Sokratês manifests greater apprehension of the effect of the ancient impressions, than of the speeches which had been just delivered against him: but these latter speeches would of course tell, by refreshing the sentiments of the past, and reviving the Aristophanic picture of Sokratês, as a speculator on physics as well as a rhetorical teacher for pleading, making the worse appear the better reason.[757] Sokratês, in the "Platonic Defence," appeals to the number of persons who had heard him discourse, whether any of them had ever heard him say one word on the subject of physical studies;[758] while Xenophon goes further, and represents him as having positively discountenanced them, on the ground of impiety.[759]

As there were three distinct accusers to speak against Sokratês, so we may reasonably suppose that they would concert beforehand on what topics each should insist; Melêtus undertaking that which related to religion, while Anytus and Lykon would dwell on the political grounds of attack. In the "Platonic Apology," Sokratês comments emphatically on the allegations of Melêtus, questions him publicly before the dikasts, and criticizes his replies: he makes little allusion to Anytus, or to anything except what is formally embodied in the indictment; and treats the last count, the charge of corrupting youth, in connection with the first, as if the corruption alleged consisted in irreligious teaching. But Xenophon intimates that the accusers, in enforcing this allegation of pernicious teaching, went into other matters quite distinct from the religious tenets of Sokratês, and denounced him as having taught them lawlessness and disrespect, as well towards their parents as towards their country. We find mention made in Xenophon of accusatory grounds similar to those in the "Clouds;" similar also to those which modern authors usually advance against the sophists.

Sokratês, said Anytus and the other accusers, taught young men to despise the existing political constitution, by remarking that the Athenian practice of naming archons by lot was silly, and that no man of sense would ever choose in this way a pilot or a carpenter, though the mischief arising from bad qualification, was in these cases far less than in the case of the archons.[760] Such teaching, it was urged, destroyed in the minds of the hearers respect for the laws and constitution, and rendered them violent and licentious. As examples of the way in which it had worked,

his two pupils Kritias and Alkibiadês might be cited, both formed in his school; one, the most violent and rapacious of the Thirty recent oligarchs; the other, a disgrace to the democracy, by his outrageous insolence and licentiousness;[761] both of them authors of ruinous mischief to the city.

Moreover, the youth learned from him conceit of their own superior wisdom, and the habit of insulting their fathers as well as of slighting their other kinsmen. Sokratês told them, it was urged, that even their fathers, in case of madness, might be lawfully put under restraint; and that when a man needed service, those whom he had to look to, were not his kinsmen, as such, but the persons best qualified to render it: thus, if he was sick, he must consult a surgeon; if involved in a lawsuit, those who were most conversant with such a situation. Between friends also, mere good feeling and affection was of little use; the important circumstance was, that they should acquire the capacity of rendering mutual service to each other. No one was worthy of esteem except the man who knew what was proper to be done, and could explain it to others: which meant, urged the accuser, that Sokratês was not only the wisest of men, but the only person capable of making his pupils wise; other advisers being worthless compared with him.[762]

He was in the habit too, the accusation proceeded, of citing the worst passages out of distinguished poets, and of perverting them to the mischievous purpose of spoiling the dispositions of youth, planting in them criminal and despotic tendencies. Thus he quoted a line of Hesiod: "No work is disgraceful; but indolence is disgraceful:" explaining it to mean, that a man might without scruple do any sort of work, base or unjust as it might be, for the sake of profit. Next, Sokratês was particularly fond of quoting those lines of Homer, in the second book of the Iliad, wherein Odysseus is described as bringing back the Greeks, who had just dispersed from the public agora in compliance with the exhortation of Agamemnôn, and were hastening to their ships. Odysseus caresses and flatters the chiefs, while he chides and even strikes the common men; though both were doing the same thing, and guilty of the same fault; if fault it was, to obey what the commander-in-chief had himself just suggested. Sokratês interpreted this passage, the accuser affirmed, as if Homer praised the application of stripes to poor men and the common people.[763]

Nothing could be easier than for an accuser to find matter for inculpation of Sokratês, by partial citations from his continual discourses, given without the context or explanations which had accompanied them; by bold invention, where even this partial basis was wanting; sometimes also by taking up real error, since no man who is continually talking, especially extempore, can always talk correctly. Few teachers would escape, if penal sentences were permitted to tell against them, founded upon evidence such as this. Xenophon, in noticing the imputations, comments upon them all, denies some, and explains others. As to the passages out of Hesiod and Homer, he affirms that Sokratês drew from them inferences quite contrary to those alleged; [764] which latter seem, indeed, altogether unreasonable, invented to call forth the

deep-seated democratical sentiment of the Athenians, after the accuser had laid his preliminary ground by connecting Sokratês with Kritias and Alkibiadês. That Sokratês improperly depreciated either filial duty or the domestic affections, is in like manner highly improbable. We may much more reasonably believe the assertion of Xenophon, who represents him to have exhorted the hearer "to make himself as wise, and as capable of rendering service, as possible; so that, when he wished to acquire esteem from father or brother or friend, he might not sit still, in reliance on the simple fact of relationship, but might earn such feeling by doing them positive good."[765] To tell a young man that mere good feeling would be totally insufficient, unless he were prepared and competent to carry it into action, is a lesson which few parents would wish to discourage. Nor would any generous parent make it a crime against the teaching of Sokratês, that it rendered his son wiser than himself, which probably it would do. To restrict the range of teaching for a young man, because it may make him think himself wiser than his father, is only one of the thousand shapes in which the pleading of ignorance against knowledge was then, and still continues occasionally to be, presented.

Nevertheless, it is not to be denied that these attacks of Anytus bear upon the vulnerable side of the Sokratic general theory of ethics, according to which virtue was asserted to depend upon knowledge. I have already remarked that this is true, but not the whole truth; a certain state of the affections and dispositions being not less indispensable, as conditions of virtue, than a certain state of the intelligence. An enemy, therefore, had some pretence for making it appear that Sokratês, stating a part of the truth as the whole, denied or degraded all that remained. But though this would be a criticism not entirely unfounded against his general theory, it would not hold against his precepts or practical teaching, as we find them in Xenophon; for these, as I have remarked, reach much wider than his general theory, and inculcate the cultivation of habits and dispositions not less strenuously than the acquisition of knowledge.

The censures affirmed to have been cast by Sokratês against the choice of archons by lot at Athens, are not denied by Xenophon. The accuser urged that "by such censures Sokratês excited the young men to despise the established constitution, and to become lawless and violent in their conduct."[766] This is just the same pretence, of tendency to bring the government into hatred and contempt, on which in former days prosecutions for public libel were instituted against writers in England, and on which they still continue to be abundantly instituted in France, under the first President of the Republic. There can hardly be a more serious political mischief than such confusion of the disapproving critic with a conspirator, and imposition of silence upon dissentient minorities. Nor has there ever been any case in which such an imputation was more destitute of color than that of Sokratês, who appealed always to men's reason and very little to their feelings; so little, indeed, that modern authors make his coldness a matter of charge against him; who never omitted to inculcate

rigid observance of the law, and set the example of such observance himself. Whatever may have been his sentiments about democracy, he always obeyed the democratical government, nor is there any pretence for charging him with participation in oligarchical schemes. It was the Thirty who, for the first time in his long life, interdicted his teaching altogether, and were on the point almost of taking his life; while his intimate friend Chærephon was actually in exile with the democrats.[767]

Xenophon lays great emphasis on two points, when defending Sokratês against his accusers. First, that his own conduct was virtuous, self-denying, and strict in obedience to the law. Next, that he accustomed his hearers to hear nothing except appeals to their reason, and impressed on them obedience only to their rational convictions. That such a man, with so great a weight of presumption in his favor, should be tried and found guilty as a corruptor of youth,—the most undefined of all imaginable charges,—is a grave and melancholy fact in the history of mankind. Yet when we see upon what light evidence modern authors are willing to admit the same charge against the sophists, we have no right to wonder that the Athenians when addressed, not through that calm reason to which Sokratês appealed, but through all their antipathies, religious as well as political, public as well as private—were exasperated into dealing with him as the type and precursor of Kritias and Alkibiadês.

After all, the exasperation, and the consequent verdict of guilty, were not wholly the fault of the dikasts, nor wholly brought about by his accusers and his numerous private enemies. No such verdict would have been given, unless by what we must call the consent and concurrence of Sokratês himself. This is one of the most important facts of the case, in reference both to himself and to the Athenians.

We learn from his own statement in the "Platonic Defence," that the verdict of guilty was only pronounced by a majority of five or six, amidst a body so numerous as an Athenian dikastery; probably five hundred and fifty-seven in total number,[768] if a confused statement in Diogenes Laërtius can be trusted. Now any one who reads that defence, and considers it in conjunction with the circumstances of the case and the feelings of the dikasts, will see that its tenor is such as must have turned a much greater number of votes than six against him. And we are informed by the distinct testimony of Xenophon,[769] that Sokratês approached his trial with the feelings of one who hardly wished to be acquitted. He took no thought whatever for the preparation of his defence; and when his friend Hermogenês remonstrated with him on the serious consequences of such an omission, he replied, first, that the just and blameless life, which he was conscious of having passed, was the best of all preparations for defence; next, that having once begun to meditate on what it would be proper for him to say, the divine sign had interposed to forbid him from proceeding. He went on to say, that it was no wonder that the gods should deem it better for him to die now, than to live longer. He had hitherto lived in perfect satisfaction, with a consciousness of progressive moral improvement, and with esteem, marked and unabated, from his friends. If his life were prolonged, old age would soon overpower

him; he would lose in part his sight, his hearing, or his intelligence; and life with such abated efficacy and dignity would be intolerable to him. Whereas, if he were condemned now, he should be condemned unjustly, which would be a great disgrace to his judges, but none to him; nay, it would even procure for him increase of sympathy and admiration, and a more willing acknowledgment from every one that he had been both a just man and an improving preceptor.[770]

These words, spoken before his trial, intimate a state of belief which explains the tenor of the defence, and formed one essential condition of the final result. They prove that Sokratês not only cared little for being acquitted, but even thought that the approaching trial was marked out by the gods as the term of his life, and that there were good reasons why he should prefer such a consummation as best for himself. Nor is it wonderful that he should entertain that opinion, when we recollect the entire ascendency within him of strong internal conscience and intelligent reflection, built upon an originally fearless temperament, and silencing what Plato[771] calls "the child within us, who trembles before death;" his great love of colloquial influence, and incapacity of living without it; his old age, now seventy years, rendering it impossible that such influence could much longer continue, and the opportunity afforded to him, by now towering above ordinary men under the like circumstances, to read an impressive lesson, as well as to leave behind him a reputation yet more exalted than that which he had hitherto acquired. It was in this frame of mind that Sokratês came to his trial, and undertook his unpremeditated defence, the substance of which we now read in the "Platonic Apology." His calculations, alike high-minded and well-balanced, were completely realized. Had he been acquitted after such a defence, it would have been not only a triumph over his personal enemies, but would have been a sanction on the part of the people and the popular dikastery to his teaching, which, indeed, had been enforced by Anytus,[772] in his accusing argument, in reference to acquittal generally, even before he heard the defence: whereas his condemnation, and the feelings with which he met it, have shed double and triple lustre over his whole life and character.

Prefaced by this exposition of the feelings of Sokratês, the "Platonic Defence" becomes not merely sublime and impressive, but also the manifestation of a rational and consistent purpose. It does, indeed, include a vindication of himself against two out of the three counts of the indictment; against the charge of not believing in the recognized gods of Athens, and that of corrupting the youth; respecting the second of the three, whereby he was charged with religious innovation, he says little or nothing. But it bears no resemblance to the speech of one standing on his trial, with the written indictment concluding "Penalty, Death," hanging up in open court before him. On the contrary, it is an emphatic lesson to the hearers, embodied in the frank outpouring of a fearless and self-confiding conscience. It is undertaken, from the beginning, because the law commands; with a faint wish, and even not an unqualified wish, but no hope, that it may succeed.[773] Sokratês first replies to the standing an-

tipathies against him without, arising from the number of enemies whom his cross-examining elenchus had aroused against him, and from those false reports which the Aristophanic "Clouds" had contributed so much to circulate. In accounting for the rise of these antipathies, he impresses upon the dikasts the divine mission under which he was acting, not without considerable doubts whether they will believe him to be in earnest;[774] and gives that interesting exposition of his intellectual campaign, against "the conceit of knowledge without the reality," of which I have already spoken. He then goes into the indictment, questions Melêtus in open court, and dissects his answers. Having rebutted the charge of irreligion, he reverts again to the imperative mandate of the gods under which he is acting, "to spend his life in the search for wisdom, and in examining himself as well as others;" a mandate, which if he were to disobey, he would be then justly amenable to the charge of irreligion;[775] and he announces to the dikasts distinctly, that, even if they were now to acquit him, he neither could nor would relax in the course which he had been pursuing.[776] He considers that the mission imposed upon him is among the greatest blessings ever conferred by the gods upon Athens.[777] He deprecates those murmurs of surprise or displeasure, which his discourse evidently called forth more than once,[778] though not so much on his own account as on that of the dikasts, who will be benefited by hearing him, and who will hurt themselves and their city much more than him, if they should now pronounce condemnation.[779] It was not on his own account that he sought to defend himself, but on account of the Athenians, lest they by condemning him should sin against the gracious blessing of the god; they would not easily find such another, if they should put him to death.[780] Though his mission had spurred him on to indefatigable activity in individual colloquy, yet the divine sign had always forbidden him from taking active part in public proceedings; on the two exceptional occasions when he had stood publicly forward,—once under the democracy, once under the oligarchy,—he had shown the same resolution as at present; not to be deterred by any terrors from that course which he believed to be just.[781] Young men were delighted as well as improved by listening to his cross-examinations; in proof of the charge that he had corrupted them, no evidence had been produced; neither any of themselves, who, having been once young when they enjoyed his conversation, had since grown elderly; nor any of their relatives; while he on his part could produce abundant testimony to the improving effect of his society, from the relatives of those who had profited by it.[782]

"No man (says he) knows what death is; yet men fear it as if they knew well that it was the greatest of all evils, which is just a case of that worst of all ignorance, the conceit of knowing what you do not really know. For my part, this is the exact point on which I differ from most other men, if there be any one thing in which I am wiser than they; as I know nothing about Hades, so I do not pretend to any knowledge; but I do know well, that disobedience to a person better than myself, either god or man, is both an evil and a shame; nor will I ever embrace evil certain, in order to escape evil which may for aught I know be a good.[783] Perhaps you may feel indignant

at the resolute tone of my defence; you may have expected that I should do as most others do in less dangerous trials than mine; that I should weep, beg and entreat for my life, and bring forward my children and relatives to do the same. I have relatives like other men, and three children; but not one of them shall appear before you for any such purpose. Not from any insolent dispositions on my part, nor any wish to put a slight upon you, but because I hold such conduct to be degrading to the reputation which I enjoy; for I *have* a reputation for superiority among you, deserved or undeserved as it may be. It is a disgrace to Athens, when her esteemed men lower themselves, as they do but too often, by such mean and cowardly supplications; and you dikasts, instead of being prompted thereby to spare them, ought rather to condemn them the more for so dishonoring the city.[784] Apart from any reputation of mine, too, I should be a guilty man, if I sought to bias you by supplications. My duty is to instruct and persuade you, if I can; but you have sworn to follow your convictions in judging according to the laws, not to make the laws bend to your partiality; and it is your duty so to do. Far be it from me to habituate you to perjury; far be it from you to contract any such habit. Do not, therefore, require of me proceedings dishonorable in reference to myself, as well as criminal and impious in regard to you, especially at a moment when I am myself rebutting an accusation of impiety advanced by Melêtus. I leave to you and to the god, to decide as may turn out best both for me and for you."[785]

No one who reads the "Platonic Apology" of Sokratês will ever wish that he had made any other defence. But it is the speech of one who deliberately foregoes the immediate purpose of a defence, persuasion of his judges; who speaks for posterity, without regard to his own life: "solâ posteritatis curâ, et abruptis vitæ blandimentis."[786] The effect produced upon the dikasts was such as Sokratês anticipated beforehand, and heard afterwards without surprise as without discomposure, in the verdict of guilty. His only surprise was, at the extreme smallness of the majority whereby that verdict was passed.[787] And this is the true matter for astonishment. Never before had the Athenian dikasts heard such a speech addressed to them. While all of them, doubtless, knew Sokratês as a very able and very eccentric man, respecting his purposes and character they would differ; some regarding him with unqualified hostility, a few others with respectful admiration, and a still larger number with simple admiration for ability, without any decisive sentiment either of antipathy or esteem. But by all these three categories, hardly excepting even his admirers, the speech would be felt to carry one sting which never misses its way to the angry feelings of the judicial bosom, whether the judges in session be one or a few or many, the sting of "affront to the court." The Athenian dikasts were always accustomed to be addressed with deference, often with subservience: they now heard themselves lectured by a philosopher who stood before them like a fearless and invulnerable superior, beyond their power, though awaiting their verdict; one who laid claim to a divine mission, which probably many of them believed to be an imposture, and who declared himself the inspired uprooter of "conceit of knowledge without the

reality," which purpose many would not understand, and some would not like. To many, his demeanor would appear to betray an insolence not without analogy to Alkibiadês or Kritias, with whom his accuser had compared him. I have already remarked, in reference to his trial, that, considering the number of personal enemies whom he made, the wonder is, not that he was tried at all, but that he was not tried until so late in his life: I now remark in reference to the verdict, that, considering his speech before the dikastery, we cannot be surprised that he was found guilty, but only that such verdict passed by so small a majority as five or six.

That the condemnation of Sokratês was brought on distinctly by the tone and tenor of his defence, is the express testimony of Xenophon. "Other persons on trial (he says) defended themselves in such manner as to conciliate the favor of the dikasts, or flatter, or entreat them, contrary to the laws, and thus obtained acquittal. But Sokratês would resort to nothing of this customary practice of the dikastery contrary to the laws. Though *he might easily have been let off by the dikasts, if he would have done anything of the kind even moderately*, he preferred rather to adhere to the laws and die, than to save his life by violating them."[788] Now no one in Athens except Sokratês, probably, would have construed the laws as requiring the tone of oration which he adopted; nor would he himself have so construed them, if he had been twenty years younger, with less of acquired dignity, and more years of possible usefulness open before him. Without debasing himself by unbecoming flattery or supplication, he would have avoided lecturing them as a master and superior, [789] or ostentatiously asserting a divine mission for purposes which they would hardly understand, or an independence of their verdict which they might construe as defiance. The rhetor Lysias is said to have sent to him a composed speech for his defence, which he declined to use, not thinking it suitable to his dignity. But such a man as Lysias would hardly compose what would lower the dignity even of the loftiest client, though he would look to the result also; nor is there any doubt that if Sokratês had pronounced it,—or even a much less able speech, if inoffensive,—he would have been acquitted. Quintilian,[790] indeed, expresses his satisfaction that Sokratês maintained that towering dignity which brought out the rarest and most exalted of his attributes, but which at the same time renounced all chance of acquittal. Few persons will dissent from this criticism: but when we look at the sentence, as we ought in fairness to do, from the point of view of the dikasts, justice will compel us to admit that Sokratês deliberately brought it upon himself.

If the verdict of guilty was thus brought upon Sokratês by his own consent and coöperation, much more may the same remark be made respecting the capital sentence which followed it. In Athenian procedure, the penalty inflicted was determined by a separate vote of the dikasts, taken after the verdict of guilty. The accuser having named the penalty which he thought suitable, the accused party on his side named some lighter penalty upon himself; and between these two the dikasts were called on to make their option, no third proposition being admissible. The prudence

of an accused party always induced him to propose, even against himself, some measure of punishment which the dikasts might be satisfied to accept, in preference to the heavier sentence invoked by his antagonist.

Now Melêtus, in his indictment and speech against Sokratês, had called for the infliction of capital punishment. It was for Sokratês to make his own counter-proposition, and the very small majority, by which the verdict had been pronounced, afforded sufficient proof that the dikasts were no way inclined to sanction the extreme penalty against him. They doubtless anticipated, according to the uniform practice before the Athenian courts of justice, that he would suggest some lesser penalty; fine, imprisonment, exile, disfranchisement, etc. And had he done this purely and simply, there can be little doubt that the proposition would have passed. But the language of Sokratês, after the verdict, was in a strain yet higher than before it; and his resolution to adhere to his own point of view, disdaining the smallest abatement or concession, only the more emphatically pronounced. "What counter proposition shall I make to you (he said) as a substitute for the penalty of Melêtus? Shall I name to you the treatment which I think I deserve at your hands? In that case, my proposition would be that I should be rewarded with a subsistence at the public expense in the prytaneum; for that is what I really deserve as a public benefactor; one who has neglected all thought of his own affairs, and embraced voluntary poverty, in order to devote himself to your best interests, and to admonish you individually on the serious necessity of mental and moral improvement. Assuredly, I cannot admit that I have deserved from you any evil whatever; nor would it be reasonable in me to propose exile or imprisonment, which I know to be certain and considerable evils, in place of death, which may perhaps be not an evil, but a good. I might, indeed, propose to you a pecuniary fine; for the payment of *that* would be no evil. But I am poor, and have no money: all that I could muster might perhaps amount to a mina: and I therefore propose to you a fine of one mina, as punishment on myself. Plato, and my other friends near me, desire me to increase this sum to thirty minæ, and they engage to pay it for me. A fine of thirty minæ, therefore, is the counter penalty which I submit for your judgment."[791]

Subsistence in the prytaneum at the public expense, was one of the greatest honorary distinctions which the citizens of Athens ever conferred; an emphatic token of public gratitude. That Sokratês, therefore, should proclaim himself worthy of such an honor, and talk of assessing it upon himself in lieu of a punishment, before the very dikasts who had just passed against him a verdict of guilty, would be received by them as nothing less than a deliberate insult; a defiance of judicial authority, which it was their duty to prove, to an opinionated and haughty citizen, that he could not commit with impunity. The persons who heard his language with the greatest distress, were doubtless Plato, Krito, and his other friends around him; who, though sympathizing with him fully, knew well that he was assuring the success of the proposition of Melêtus,[792] and would regret that he should thus throw away his life

by what they would think an ill-placed and unnecessary self-exaltation. Had he proposed, with little or no preface, the substitute-fine of thirty minæ with which this part of his speech concluded, there is every reason for believing that the majority of dikasts would have voted for it.

The sentence of death passed against him, by what majority we do not know. But Sokratês neither altered his tone, nor manifested any regret for the language by which he had himself seconded the purpose of his accusers. On the contrary, he told the dikasts, in a short address prior to his departure for the prison, that he was satisfied both with his own conduct and with the result. The divine sign, he said, which was wont to restrain him, often on very small occasions, both in deeds and in words, had never manifested itself once to him throughout the whole day, neither when he came thither at first, nor at any one point throughout his whole discourse. The tacit acquiescence of this infallible monitor satisfied him not only that he had spoken rightly, but that the sentence passed was in reality no evil to him; that to die now was the best thing which could befall him.[793] Either death was tantamount to a sound, perpetual, and dreamless sleep, which in his judgment would be no loss, but rather a gain, compared with the present life; or else, if the common mythes were true, death would transfer him to a second life in Hades, where he would find all the heroes of the Trojan war, and of the past generally, so as to pursue in conjunction with them the business of mutual cross-examination, and debate on ethical progress and perfection.[794]

There can be no doubt that the sentence really appeared to Sokratês in this point of view, and to his friends also, after the event had happened, though doubtless not at the time when they were about to lose him. He took his line of defence advisedly, and with full knowledge of the result. It supplied him with the fittest of all opportunities for manifesting, in an impressive manner, both his personal ascendency over human fears and weakness, and the dignity of what he believed to be his divine mission. It took him away in his full grandeur and glory, like the setting of the tropical sun, at a moment when senile decay might be looked upon as close at hand. He calculated that his defence and bearing on the trial would be the most emphatic lesson which he could possibly read to the youth of Athens; more emphatic, probably, than the sum total of those lessons which his remaining life might suffice to give, if he shaped his defence otherwise. This anticipation of the effect of the concluding scene of his life, setting the seal on all his prior discourses, manifests itself in portions of his concluding words to the dikasts, wherein he tells them that they will not, by putting him to death, rid themselves of the importunity of the cross-examining elenchus; that numbers of young men, more restless and obtrusive than he, already carried within them that impulse, which they would now proceed to apply; his superiority having hitherto kept them back.[795] It was thus the persuasion of Sokratês, that his removal would be the signal for numerous apostles, putting forth with increased energy that process of interrogatory test and spur to which he had devoted

his life, and which doubtless was to him far dearer and more sacred than his life. Nothing could be more effective than his lofty bearing on his trial, for inflaming the enthusiasm of young men thus predisposed; and the loss of life was to him compensated by the missionary successors whom he calculated on leaving behind.

Under ordinary circumstances, Sokratês would have drunk the cup of hemlock in the prison, on the day after his trial. But it so happened that the day of his sentence was immediately after that on which the sacred ship started on its yearly ceremonial pilgrimage from Athens to Delos, for the festival of Apollo. Until the return of this vessel to Athens, it was accounted unholy to put any person to death by public authority. Accordingly, Sokratês remained in prison,—and we are pained to read, actually with chains on his legs,—during the interval that this ship was absent, thirty days altogether. His friends and companions had free access to him, passing nearly all their time with him in the prison; and Krito had even arranged a scheme for procuring his escape, by a bribe to the jailer. This scheme was only prevented from taking effect by the decided refusal of Sokratês to become a party in any breach of the law; [796] a resolution, which we should expect as a matter of course, after the line which he had taken in his defence. His days were spent in the prison, in discourse respecting ethical and human subjects, which had formed the charm and occupation of his previous life: it is to the last of these days that his conversation with Simmias, Kebês, and Phædon, on the immortality of the soul is referred, in the Platonic dialogue called "Phædon." Of that conversation the main topics and doctrines are Platonic rather than Sokratic. But the picture which the dialogue presents of the temper and state of mind of Sokratês, during the last hours of his life, is one of immortal beauty and interest, exhibiting his serene and even playful equanimity, amidst the uncontrollable emotions of his surrounding friends,—the genuine, unforced persuasion, governing both his words and his acts, of what he had pronounced before the dikasts, that the sentence of death was no calamity to him,[797]—and the unabated maintenance of that earnest interest in the improvement of man and society, which had for so many years formed both his paramount motive and his active occupation. The details of the last scene are given with minute fidelity, even down to the moment of his dissolution; and it is consoling to remark that the cup of hemlock—the means employed for executions by public order at Athens—produced its effect by steps far more exempt from suffering than any natural death which was likely to befall him. Those who have read what has been observed above respecting the strong religious persuasions of Sokratês, will not be surprised to hear that his last words, addressed to Krito immediately before he passed into a state of insensibility, were: "Krito, we owe a cock to Æsculapius: discharge the debt, and by no means omit it."[798]

Thus perished the "parens philosophiæ," the first of ethical philosophers; a man who opened to science both new matter, alike copious and valuable; and a new method, memorable not less for its originality and efficacy, than for the profound philosophical basis on which it rests. Though Greece produced great poets, orators,

speculative philosophers, historians, etc., yet other countries having the benefit of Grecian literature to begin with, have nearly equalled her in all these lines, and surpassed her in some. But where are we to look for a parallel to Sokratês, either in or out of the Grecian world? The cross-examining elenchus, which he not only first struck out, but wielded with such matchless effect and to such noble purposes, has been mute ever since his last conversation in the prison; for even his great successor Plato was a writer and lecturer, not a colloquial dialectician. No man has ever been found strong enough to bend his bow; much less, sure enough to use it as he did. His life remains as the only evidence, but a very satisfactory evidence, how much can be done by this sort of intelligent interrogation; how powerful is the interest which it can be made to inspire; how energetic the stimulus which it can apply in awakening dormant reason and generating new mental power.

It has been often customary to exhibit Sokratês as a moral preacher, in which character probably he has acquired to himself the general reverence attached to his name. This is, indeed, a true attribute, but not the characteristic or salient attribute, nor that by which he permanently worked on mankind. On the other hand, Arkesilaus, and the New Academy,[799] a century and more afterwards, thought that they were following the example of Sokratês—and Cicero seems to have thought so too—when they reasoned against everything; and when they laid it down as a system, that, against every affirmative position, an equal force of negative argument might be brought up as counterpoise. Now this view of Sokratês is, in my judgment, not merely partial, but incorrect. He entertained no such systematic distrust of the powers of the mind to attain certainty. He laid down a clear, though erroneous line of distinction between the knowable and the unknowable. About physics, he was more than a skeptic; he thought that man could know nothing; the gods did not intend that man should acquire any such information, and therefore managed matters in such a way as to be beyond his ken, for all except the simplest phenomena of daily wants; moreover, not only man could not acquire such information, but ought not to labor after it. But respecting the topics which concern man and society, the views of Sokratês were completely the reverse. This was the field which the gods had expressly assigned, not merely to human practice, but to human study and acquisition of knowledge; a field, wherein, with that view, they managed phenomena on principles of constant and observable sequence, so that every man who took the requisite pains might know them. Nay, Sokratês went a step further; and this forward step is the fundamental conviction upon which all his missionary impulse hinges. He thought that every man not only might know these things but ought to know them; that he could not possibly act well, unless he did know them; and that it was his imperious duty to learn them as he would learn a profession; otherwise, he was nothing better than a slave, unfit to be trusted as a free and accountable being. Sokratês felt persuaded that no man could behave as a just, temperate, courageous, pious, patriotic agent, unless he taught himself to know correctly what justice, temperance, courage, piety, and patriotism, etc., really were. He was possessed with the truly Baconian

idea, that the power of steady moral action depended upon, and was limited by, the rational comprehension of moral ends and means. But when he looked at the minds around him, he perceived that few or none either had any such comprehension, or had ever studied to acquire it; yet at the same time every man felt persuaded that he did possess it, and acted confidently upon such persuasion. Here, then, Sokratês found that the first outwork for him to surmount, was, that universal "conceit of knowledge without the reality," against which he declares such emphatic war; and against which, also, though under another form of words and in reference to other subjects, Bacon declares war not less emphatically, two thousand years afterwards: "Opinio copiæ inter causas inopiæ est." Sokratês found that those notions respecting human and social affairs, on which each man relied and acted, were nothing but spontaneous products of the "intellectus sibi permissus," of the intellect left to itself either without any guidance, or with only the blind guidance of sympathies, antipathies, authority, or silent assimilation. They were products got together, to use Bacon's language, "from much faith and much chance, and from the primitive suggestions of boyhood," not merely without care or study, but without even consciousness of the process, and without any subsequent revision. Upon this basis the sophists, or professed teachers for active life, sought to erect a superstructure of virtue and ability; but to Sokratês, such an attempt appeared hopeless and contradictory—not less impracticable than Bacon in his time pronounced it to be, to carry up the tree of science into majesty and fruit-bearing, without first clearing away those fundamental vices which lay unmolested and in poisonous influence round its root. Sokratês went to work in the Baconian manner and spirit; bringing his cross-examining process to bear, as the first condition to all further improvement, upon these rude, self-begotten, incoherent generalizations, which passed in men's minds for competent and directing knowledge. But he, not less than Bacon, performs this analysis, not with a view to finality in the negative, but as the first stage towards an ulterior profit; as the preliminary purification, indispensable to future positive result. In the physical sciences, to which Bacon's attention was chiefly turned, no such result could be obtained without improved experimental research, bringing to light facts new and yet unknown; but on those topics which Sokratês discussed, the elementary data of the inquiry were all within the hearer's experience, requiring only to be pressed upon his notice, affirmatively as well as negatively, together with the appropriate ethical and political end; in such manner as to stimulate within him the rational effort requisite for combining them anew upon consistent principles.

If, then, the philosophers of the New Academy considered Sokratês either as a skeptic, or as a partisan of systematic negation, they misinterpreted his character, and mistook the first stage of his process—that which Plato, Bacon, and Herschel call the purification of the intellect—for the ultimate goal. The elenchus, as Sokratês used it, was animated by the truest spirit of positive science, and formed an indispensable precursor to its attainment.[800]

There are two points, and two points only, in topics concerning man and society, with regard to which Sokratês is a skeptic; or rather, which he denies; and on the negation of which, his whole method and purpose turn. He denies, first, that men can know that on which they have bestowed no conscious effort, no deliberate pains, no systematic study, in learning. He denies, next, that men can practise what they do not know;[801] that they can be just, or temperate, or virtuous generally, without knowing what justice, or temperance, or virtue is. To imprint upon the minds of his hearers his own negative conviction, on these two points is, indeed, his first object, and the primary purpose of his multiform dialectical manœuvring. But though negative in his means, Sokratês is strictly positive in his ends; his attack is undertaken only with distinct view to a positive result; in order to shame them out of the illusion of knowledge, and to spur them on and arm them for the acquisition of real, assured, comprehensive, self-explanatory knowledge, as the condition and guarantee of virtuous practice. Sokratês was, indeed, the reverse of a skeptic; no man ever looked upon life with a more positive and practical eye; no man ever pursued his mark with a clearer perception of the road which he was travelling; no man ever combined, in like manner, the absorbing enthusiasm of a missionary,[802] with the acuteness, the originality, the inventive resource, and the generalizing comprehension, of a philosopher.

His method yet survives, as far as such method can survive, in some of the dialogues of Plato. It is a process of eternal value and of universal application. That purification of the intellect, which Bacon signalized as indispensable for rational or scientific progress, the Sokratic elenchus affords the only known instrument for at least partially accomplishing. However little that instrument may have been applied since the death of its inventor, the necessity and use of it neither have disappeared, nor ever can disappear. There are few men whose minds are not more or less in that state of sham knowledge against which Sokratês made war: there is no man whose notions have not been first got together by spontaneous, unexamined, unconscious, uncertified association, resting upon forgotten particulars, blending together disparates or inconsistencies, and leaving in his mind old and familiar phrases, and oracular propositions, of which he has never rendered to himself account: there is no man, who, if he be destined for vigorous and profitable scientific effort, has not found it a necessary branch of self-education, to break up, disentangle, analyze, and reconstruct, these ancient mental compounds; and who has not been driven to do it by his own lame and solitary efforts, since the giant of the colloquial elenchus no longer stands in the market-place to lend him help and stimulus.

To hear of any man,[803] especially of so illustrious a man, being condemned to death on such accusations as that of heresy and alleged corruption of youth, inspires at the present day a sentiment of indignant reprobation, the force of which I have no desire to enfeeble. The fact stands eternally recorded as one among the thousand misdeeds of intolerance, religious and political. But since amidst this catalogue each

item has its own peculiar character, grave or light, we are bound to consider at what point of the scale the condemnation of Sokratês is to be placed, and what inferences it justifies in regard to the character of the Athenians. Now if we examine the circumstances of the case, we shall find them all extenuating; and so powerful, indeed, as to reduce such inferences to their minimum, consistent with the general class to which the incident belongs.

First, the sentiment now prevalent is founded upon a conviction that such matters as heresy and heretical teaching of youth are not proper for judicial cognizance. Even in the modern world, such a conviction is of recent date; and in the fifth century B.C. it was unknown. Sokratês himself would not have agreed in it; and all Grecian governments, oligarchical and democratical alike, recognized the opposite. The testimony furnished by Plato is on this point decisive. When we examine the two positive communities which he constructs, in the treatises "De Republicâ" and "De Legibus," we find that there is nothing about which he is more anxious, than to establish an unresisted orthodoxy of doctrine, opinion, and education. A dissenting and free-spoken teacher, such as Sokratês was at Athens, would not have been allowed to pursue his vocation for a week, in the Platonic Republic. Plato would not, indeed, condemn him to death; but he would put him to silence, and in case of need send him away. This, in fact, is the consistent deduction, if you assume that the state is to determine what *is* orthodoxy and orthodox teaching, and to repress what contradicts its own views. Now all the Grecian states, including Athens, held this principle[804] of interference against the dissenting teacher. But at Athens, though the principle was recognized, yet the application of it was counteracted by resisting forces which it did not find elsewhere; by the democratical constitution, with its liberty of speech and love of speech, by the more active spring of individual intellect, and by the toleration, greater there than anywhere else, shown to each man's peculiarities of every sort. In any other government of Greece, as well as in the Platonic Republic, Sokratês would have been quickly arrested in his career, even if not severely punished; in Athens, he was allowed to talk and teach publicly for twenty-five or thirty years, and then condemned when an old man. Of these two applications of the same mischievous principle, assuredly the latter is at once the more moderate and the less noxious.

Secondly, the force of this last consideration, as an extenuating circumstance in regard to the Athenians, is much increased, when we reflect upon the number of individual enemies whom Sokratês made to himself in the prosecution of his cross-examining process. Here were a multitude of individuals, including men personally the most eminent and effective in the city, prompted by special antipathies, over and above general convictions, to call into action the dormant state-principle of intolerance against an obnoxious teacher. If, under such provocation, he was allowed to reach the age of seventy, and to talk publicly for so many years, before any real Melêtus stood forward, this attests conspicuously the efficacy of the restraining dis-

positions among the people, which made their practical habits more liberal than their professed principles.

Thirdly, whoever has read the account of the trial and defence of Sokratês, will see that he himself contributed quite as much to the result as all the three accusers united. Not only he omitted to do all that might have been done without dishonor, to insure acquittal, but he held positive language very nearly such as Melêtus himself would have sought to put in his mouth. He did this deliberately,—having an exalted opinion both of himself and his own mission,—and accounting the cup of hemlock, at his age, to be no calamity. It was only by such marked and offensive self-exaltation that he brought on the first vote of the dikastery, even then the narrowest majority, by which he was found guilty: it was only by a still more aggravated manifestation of the same kind, even to the pitch of something like insult, that he brought on the second vote, which pronounced the capital sentence. Now it would be uncandid not to allow for the effect of such a proceeding on the minds of the dikastery. They were not at all disposed, of their own accord, to put in force the recognized principle of intolerance against him. But when they found that the man who stood before them charged with this offence, addressed them in a tone such as dikasts had never heard before and could hardly hear with calmness, they could not but feel disposed to credit all the worst inferences which his accusers had suggested, and to regard Sokratês as a dangerous man both religiously and politically, against whom it was requisite to uphold the majesty of the court and constitution.

In appreciating this memorable incident, therefore, though the mischievous principle of intolerance cannot be denied, yet all the circumstances show that that principle was neither irritable nor predominant in the Athenian bosom; that even a large body of collateral antipathies did not readily call it forth against any individual; that the more liberal and generous dispositions, which deadened its malignity, were of steady efficacy, not easily overborne; and that the condemnation ought to count as one of the least gloomy items in an essentially gloomy catalogue.

Let us add, that as Sokratês himself did not account his own condemnation and death, at his age, to be any misfortune, but rather a favorable dispensation of the gods, who removed him just in time to escape that painful consciousness of intellectual decline which induced Demokritus to prepare the poison for himself, so his friend Xenophon goes a step further, and while protesting against the verdict of guilty, extols the manner of death as a subject of triumph; as the happiest, most honorable, and most gracious way, in which the gods could set the seal upon a useful and exalted life.[805]

It is asserted by Diodorus, and repeated with exaggerations by other later authors, that after the death of Sokratês the Athenians bitterly repented of the manner in which they had treated him, and that they even went so far as to put his accusers to death without trial.[806] I know not upon what authority this statement is made,

and I disbelieve it altogether. From the tone of Xenophon's "Memorabilia," there is every reason to presume that the memory of Sokratês still continued to be unpopular at Athens when that collection was composed. Plato, too, left Athens immediately after the death of his master, and remained absent for a long series of years: indirectly, I think, this affords a presumption that no such reaction took place in Athenian sentiment as that which Diodorus alleges; and the same presumption is countenanced by the manner in which the orator Æschinês speaks of the condemnation, half a century afterwards. I see no reason to believe that the Athenian dikasts, who doubtless felt themselves justified, and more than justified, in condemning Sokratês after his own speech, retracted that sentiment after his decease.

FOOTNOTES

[1] See Thucyd. v, 36.

[2] Thucyd. viii, 45. Καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀφικομένης ἐπιστολῆς πρὸς Ἀστύοχον ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος ὥστ᾽ ἀποκτεῖναι (ἦν γὰρ καὶ τῷ Ἀγιδι ἐχθρὸς *καὶ ἄλλως ἄπιστος* ἐφαίνετο), etc.

[3] Thucyd. viii, 45, 46.

[4] Thucyd. viii, 46-52.

[5] Thucyd. viii, 45. Οἱ δὲ τὰς ναῦς ἀπολείπωσιν, οὐχ ὑπολιπόντες ἐς ὁμήρειαν τὸν προσοφειλόμενον μισθόν.

This passage is both doubtful in the text and difficult in the translation. Among the many different explanations given by the commentators, I adopt that of Dr. Arnold as the least unsatisfactory, though without any confidence that it is right.

[6] Thucyd. viii, 45. Τὰς τε πόλεις δεομένας χρημάτων ἀπήλασεν, αὐτὸς ἀντιλέγων ὑπὲρ τοῦ Τισσαφέρνους, ὡς οἱ μὲν Χῖοι ἀναίσχυντοι εἶεν, πλουσιώτατοι ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἐπικουρίᾳ δὲ ὅμως σωζόμενοι ἀξιοῦσι καὶ τοῖς σώμασι καὶ τοῖς χρήμασιν ἄλλους ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνων ἐλευθερίας κινδυνεύειν.

[7] Thucyd. viii, 46. Τήν τε τροφὴν κακῶς ἐπόριζε τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις καὶ ναυμαχεῖν οὐκ εἴα· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς Φοινίσσας ναῦς φάσκων ἥξειν καὶ ἐκ περιόντος ἀγωνιεῖσθαι ἔφθειρε τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὴν ἀκμὴν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ αὐτῶν ἀφείλετο, γενομένην καὶ πάνυ ἰσχυρὰν, τά τε ἄλλα, καταφανέστερον ἢ ὥστε λανθάνειν, οὐ προθύμως ξυνεπολέμει.

[8] Thucyd. viii, 47. Τὰ μὲν καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου προσπέμψαντος λόγους ἐς τοὺς δυνατωτάτους αὐτῶν (Ἀθηναίων) ἄνδρας, ὥστε μνησθῆναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐς *τοὺς βελτίστους* τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἐπ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ βούλεται, καὶ οὐ πονηρίᾳ οὐδὲ δημοκρατίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτὸν ἐκβαλούσῃ, κατελθὼν, etc.

[9] Thucyd. viii, 47.

[10] Thucyd. viii, 48.

[11] It is asserted in an Oration of Lysias (Orat. xxv, Δήμου Καταλύσεως Ἀπολογία, c. 3, p. 766, Reisk.) that Phrynichus and Peisander embarked in this oligarchical conspiracy for the purpose of getting clear of previous crimes committed under the democracy. But there is nothing to countenance this assertion, and the narrative of Thucydidês gives quite a different color to their behavior.

Peisander was now serving with the armament at Samos; moreover, his forwardness and energy—presently to be described—in taking the formidable initiative of putting down the Athenian democracy, is to me quite sufficient evidence that the taunts of the comic writers against his cowardice are unfounded. Xenophon in the Symposion repeats this taunt (ii, 14) which also appears in Aristophanês, Eupolis, Plato Comicus, and others: see the passages collected in Meineke, Histor. Critic. Comicor. Græcorum, vol. i, p. 178, etc.

Modern writers on Grecian history often repeat such bitter jests as if they were so much genuine and trustworthy evidence against the person libelled.

[12] Phrynichus is affirmed, in an Oration of Lysias, to have been originally poor, keeping sheep in the country part of Attica; then, to have resided in the city, and practised what was called *sycophancy*, or false and vexatious accusation before the dikastery and the public assembly, (Lysias, Orat. xx. pro Polystrato, c. 3, p. 674, Reisk.)

[13] Thucyd. viii, 48. Τάς τε ξυμμαχίδας πόλεις, αἷς ὑπεσχῆσθαι δὴ σφᾶς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅτι δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δημοκρατήσονται, εὖ εἰδέναι ἔφη ὅτι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον σφίσιν οὔθ᾽ αἱ ἀφεστηκυῖαι προσχωρήσονται, οὔθ᾽ αἱ ὑπάρχουσαι βεβαιότεραι ἔσονται· οὐ γὰρ βουλήσεσθαι αὐτοὺς μετ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ δημοκρατίας δουλεύειν μᾶλλον, ἢ μεθ᾽ ὁποτέρου ἂν τύχωσι τούτων ἐλευθέρους εἶναι. Τοὺς *τε καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ὀνομαζομένους* οὐκ ἐλάσσω αὐτοὺς νομίζειν σφίσι πράγματα παρέξειν τοῦ *δήμου, πορισταὶς ὄντας καὶ ἐσηγητὰς τῶν*

κακῶν τῷ δήμῳ, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πλείω αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, καὶ ἄκριτοι ἂν καὶ βιαιότερον ἀποθνήσκειν, τὸν τε *δῆμον σφῶν τε καταφυγὴν εἶναι καὶ ἐκείνων σωφρονιστήν*. Καὶ ταῦτα *παρ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἐπισταμένας* τὰς πόλεις σαφῶς αὐτὸς εἰδέναι, ὅτι οὕτω νομίζουσι.

In taking the comparison between oligarchy and democracy in Greece, there is hardly any evidence more important than this passage: a testimony to the comparative merit of democracy, pronounced by an oligarchical conspirator, and sanctioned by an historian himself unfriendly to the democracy.

[14] Thucyd. viii, 50, 51.

[15] In the speech made by Theramenês (the Athenian) during the oligarchy of Thirty, seven years afterwards, it is affirmed that the Athenian people voted the adoption of the oligarchy of Four Hundred, from being told that the *Lacedæmonians* would never trust a democracy (Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 45).

This is thoroughly incorrect, a specimen of the loose assertion of speakers in regard to facts even not very long past. At the moment when Theramenês said this, the question, what political constitution at Athens the Lacedæmonians would please to tolerate, was all-important to the Athenians. Theramenês transfers the feelings of the present to the incidents of the past.

[16] Thucyd. viii, 54. Ὁ δὲ δῆμος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀκούων χαλεπῶς ἔφερε τὸ περὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας· σαφῶς δὲ διδασκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου μὴ εἶναι ἄλλην σωτηρίαν, *δείσας, καὶ ἅμα ἐλπίζων ὡς καὶ μεταβαλεῖται, ἐνέδωκε*.

"Atheniensibus, imminente periculo belli, major salutis quam dignitatis cura fuit. Itaque, permittente populo, imperium ad Senatum transfertur," (Justin, v, 3).

Justin is correct, so far as this vote goes: but he takes no notice of the change of matters afterwards, when the establishment of the Four Hundred was consummated *without* the promised benefit of Persian alliance, and by simple terrorism.

[17] Οἱ βέλτιστοι, οἱ καλοκἀγαθοὶ, οἱ χαριέντες, οἱ γνώριμοι, οἱ σώφρονες, etc.: le parti honnête et modéré, etc.

[18] About these ξυνωμοσίαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς, political and judicial associations, see above, in this History, vol. iv, ch. xxxvii, pp. 399, 400; vol. vi, ch. li. pp. 290, 291: see also Hermann Büttner, Geschichte der politischen Hetærieen zu Athen. pp. 75, 79, Leipsic, 1840.

There seem to have been similar political clubs or associations at Carthage, exercising much influence, and holding perpetual banquets as a means of largess to the poor, Aristotel. Polit. ii, 8, 2; Livy, xxxiii, 46; xxxiv, 61; compare Kluge, ad Aristotel. De Polit. Carthag. pp. 46-127, Wratisl. 1824.

The like political associations were both of long duration among the nobility of Rome, and of much influence for political objects as well as judicial success: "coitiones (compare Cicero pro Cluentio, c. 54, s. 148) honorum adipiscendorum causâ factæ, factiones, sodalitates." The incident described in Livy (ix. 26) is remarkable. The senate, suspecting the character and proceedings of these clubs, appointed the dictator Mænius (in 312 B.C.) as commissioner with full power to investigate and deal with them. But such was the power of the clubs, in a case where they had a common interest and acted in coöperation (as was equally the fact under Peisander at Athens), that they completely frustrated the inquiry, and went on as before. "Nec diutius, *ut fit, quam dum recens erat, quæstio per clara nomina reorum viguit*: inde labi cœpit ad viliora capita, *donec coitionibus factionibusque, adversus quas comparata erat, oppressa est*." (Livy. ix, 26.) Compare Dio. Cass. xxxvii, 57, about the ἑταιρικὰ of the Triumvirs at Rome. Quintus Cicero (de Petition. Consulat. c. 5) says to his brother, the orator: "Quod si satis grati homines essent, hæc omnia (*i.e.* all the *subsidia* necessary for success in his coming election) tibi parata esse debebant, sicut parata esse confido. Nam hoc biennio quatuor *sodalitates* civium ad ambitionem gratiosissimorum tibi obligasti…. Horum in causis ad te deferundis *quidnam eorum sodales tibi receperint et confirmarint*, scio; nam interfui."

See Th. Mommsen, De Collegiis et Sodaliciis Romanorum, Kiel, 1843, ch. iii, sects. 5, 6, 7; also the Dissertation of Wunder, inserted in the Onomasticon Tullianum of Orelli and Baiter, in the last volume of their edition of Cicero, pp. 200-210, ad Ind. Legum; *Lex Licinia de Sodalitiis*.

As an example of these clubs or conspiracies for mutual support in ξυνωμοσίαι ἐπὶ δίκαις (not including ἀρχαῖς, so far as we can make out), we may cite the association called οἱ Εἰκαδεῖς, made known to us by an Inscription recently discovered in Attica, and published first in Dr. Wordsworth's Athens and Attica, p. 223; next in

Ross, Die Demen von Attica, Preface, p. v. These Εἰκαδεῖς are an association, the members of which are bound to each other by a common oath, as well as by a curse which the mythical hero of the association, Eikadeus, is supposed to have imprecated (ἐνάντιον τῇ ἄρᾳ ἣν Εἰκαδεὺς ἐπηράσατο); they possess common property, and it was held contrary to the oath for any of the members to enter into a pecuniary process against the κοινόν: compare analogous obligations among the Roman Sodales, Mommsen, p. 4. Some members had violated their obligation upon this point: Polyxenus had attacked them at law for false witness: and the general body of the Eikadeis pass a vote of thanks to him for so doing, and choose three of their members to assist him in the cause before the dikastery (οἵτινες συναγωνιοῦνται τῷ ἐπεσκημμένῳ τοῖς μάρτυσι): compare the ἑταιρίαι alluded to in Demosthenês (cont. Theokrin. c. 11, p. 1335) as assisting Theokrinês before the dikastery, and intimidating the witnesses.

The Guilds in the European cities during the Middle Ages, usually sworn to by every member, and called *conjurationes Amicitiæ*, bear in many respects a resemblance to these ξυνωμοσίαι; though the judicial proceedings in the mediæval cities, being so much less popular than at Athens, narrowed their range of interference in this direction: their political importance, however, was quite equal. (See Wilda, Das Gilden Wesen des Mittelalters, Abschn. ii, p. 167, etc.)

"Omnes autem ad Amicitiam pertinentes villæ per *fidem et sacramentum* firmaverunt, quod unus subveniat alteri tanquam fratri suo in utili et honesto," (ib. p. 148.)

[19] The person described by Krito, in the Euthydêmus of Plato (c. 31, p. 305, C.), as having censured Sokratês for conversing with Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus, is presented exactly like Antiphon in Thucydidês: ἥκιστα νὴ τὸν Δία ῥήτωρ· οὐδὲ οἶμαι πώποτε αὐτὸν ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβεβηκέναι· ἀλλ᾽ ἐπαΐειν αὐτόν φασι περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, νὴ τὸν Δία, καὶ δεινὸν εἶναι καὶ δεινοὺς λόγους ξυντιθέναι.

Heindorf thinks that Isokratês is here meant: Groen van Prinsterer talks of Lysias; Winkelmann, of Thrasymachus. The description would fit Antiphon as well as either of these three: though Stallbaum may perhaps be right in supposing no particular individual to have been in the mind of Plato.

Οἱ συνδικεῖν ἐπιστάμενοι, whom Xenophon specifies as being so eminently useful to a person engaged in a lawsuit, are probably the persons who knew how to address the dikastery effectively in support of his case (Xenoph. Memorab. i, 2, 51).

[20] Thucyd. viii, 55, 56.

[21] Thucyd. viii, 61. ἔτυχον δὲ ἔτι ἐν Ῥόδῳ ὄντος Ἀστυόχου ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου Λεοντά τε ἄνδρα Σπαρτιάτην, *ὃς Ἀντισθένει ἐπιβάτης* ξυνέπλει, τοῦτον κεκομισμένοι μετὰ τὸν Πεδαρίτου θάνατον ἄρχοντα, etc.

I do not see why the word ἐπιβάτης should not be construed here, as elsewhere, in its ordinary sense of *miles classiarius*. The commentators, see the notes of Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Göller start difficulties which seem to me of little importance; and they imagine divers new meanings, for none of which any authority is produced. We ought not to wonder that a common *miles classiarius*, or marine, being a Spartan citizen, should be appointed commander at Chios, when, a few chapters afterwards, we find Thrasybulus at Samos promoted, from being a common hoplite in the ranks, to be one of the Athenian generals (viii. 73).

The like remark may be made on the passage cited from Xenophon (Hellenic. i. 3, 17), about Hegesandridas —ἐπιβάτης ὢν Μινδάρου, where also the commentators reject the common meaning (see Schneider's note in the Addenda to his edition of 1791, p. 97). The participle ὢν in that passage must be considered as an inaccurate substitute for γεγενημένος, since Mindarus was dead at the time. Hegesandridas *had been* among the epibatæ of Mindarus, and was *now* in command of a squadron on the coast of Thrace.

[22] Thucyd. viii, 56. Ἰωνίαν τε γὰρ πᾶσαν ἠξίουν δίδοσθαι, καὶ αὖθις νήσους τε ἐπικειμένας *καὶ ἄλλα*, οἷς οὐκ ἐναντιουμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων, etc.

What this *et cetera* comprehended, we cannot divine. The demand was certainly ample enough without it.

[23] Thucyd. viii, 56. ναῦς ἠξίου ἐᾷν βασιλέα ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ παραπλεῖν τὴν *ἑαυτοῦ* γῆν, ὅπη ἂν καὶ ὅσαις ἂν βούληται.

In my judgment ἑαυτοῦ is decidedly the proper reading here, not ἑαυτῶν. I agree in this respect with Dr. Arnold, Bekker, and Göller.

In a former volume of this History, I have shown reasons for believing, in opposition to Mitford, Dahlmann, and others, that the treaty called by the name of Kallias, and sometimes miscalled by the name of Kimon, was a real fact and not a boastful fiction: see vol. v, ch. xlv, p. 340.

The note of Dr. Arnold, though generally just, gives an inadequate representation of the strong reasons of Athens for rejecting and resenting this third demand.

[24] Thucyd. viii, 63. Καὶ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἅμα οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κοινολογούμενοι ἐσκέψαντο, Ἀλκιβιάδην μέν, *ἐπειδήπερ οὐ βούλεται*, ἐᾷν (καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιτήδειον αὐτὸν εἶναι *ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν* ἐλθεῖν), etc.

[25] Thucyd. viii, 44-57. In two parallel cases, one in Chios, the other in Korkyra, the seamen of an unpaid armament found subsistence by hiring themselves out for agricultural labor. But this was only during the summer (see Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 1; vi, 2, 37), while the stay of the Peloponnesians at Rhodes was from January to March.

[26] Thucyd. viii, 58.

[27] Thucyd. viii, 58. χώραν τὴν βασιλέως, *ὅση τῆς Ἀσίας ἐστί*, βασιλέως εἶναι· καὶ περὶ τῆς χώρας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ βουλευέτω βασιλεὺς ὅπως βούλεται.

[28] Thucyd. viii, 59.

[29] Thucyd. viii, 60.

[30] See Aristotel. Politic. v, 3, 8. He cites this revolution as an instance of one begun by deceit and afterwards consummated by force: οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων τὸν δῆμον ἐξηπάτησαν, φάσκοντες τὸν βασιλέα χρήματα παρέξειν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους· ψευσάμενοι δὲ, κατέχειν ἐπειρῶντο τὴν πολιτείαν.

[31] Thucyd. viii, 63. Αὐτοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν, *ὡς ἤδη καὶ κινδυνεύοντας*, ὁρᾷν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ μὴ ἀνεθήσεται τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἅμα ἀντέχειν, καὶ ἐσφέρειν αὐτοὺς προθύμως χρήματα καὶ ἤν τι ἄλλο δέῃ, ὡς οὐκέτι *ἄλλοις ἢ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς* ταλαιπωροῦντας.

[32] Thucyd. viii, 73. Καὶ Ὑπέρβολόν τέ τινα τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μοχθηρὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὠστρακισμένον οὐ διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀξιώματος φόβον, ἀλλὰ διὰ πονηρίαν καὶ αἰσχύνην τῆς πόλεως, ἀποκτείνουσι μετὰ Χαρμίνου τε ἑνὸς τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ τινων τῶν παρὰ σφίσιν Ἀθηναίων, πίστιν διδόντες αὐτοῖς, *καὶ ἄλλα μετ᾽ αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα ξυνέπραξαν*, τοῖς τε πλείοσιν ὥρμηντο ἐπιτίθεσθαι.

I presume that the words, ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ξυνέπραξαν, must mean that other persons were assassinated along with Hyperbolus.

The incorrect manner in which Mr. Mitford recounts these proceedings at Samos has been properly commented on by Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. ch. xxviii, vol. iv, p. 30). It is the more surprising, since the phrase μετὰ Χαρμίνου, which Mr. Mitford has misunderstood, is explained in a special note of Duker.

[33] Thucyd. viii, 73, 74. οὐκ ἠξίουν περιϊδεῖν αὐτοὺς σφᾶς τε διαφθαρέντας, καὶ Σάμον Ἀθηναίοις ἀλλοτριωθεῖσαν, etc.

… οὐ γὰρ ᾔδεσάν πω τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἄρχοντας, etc.

[34] Thucyd. viii, 73. καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τοὺς Παράλους, ἄνδρας Ἀθηναίους τε καὶ ἐλευθέρους πάντας ἐν τῇ νηῒ πλέοντας, καὶ *ἀεί δήποτε ὀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ μὴ παρούσῃ ἐπικειμένους*.

Peitholaus called the paralus ῥόπαλον τοῦ δήμου, "the club, staff, or mace of the people." (Aristotel. Rhetoric, iii, 3.)

[35] Thucyd. viii, 73. Καὶ τριάκοντα μέν τινας ἀπέκτειναν τῶν τριακοσίων, τρεῖς δὲ τοὺς αἰτιωτάτους φυγῇ ἐζημίωσαν· τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις οὐ μνησικακοῦντες δημοκρατούμενοι τὸ λοιπὸν ξυνεπολίτευον.

[36] Thucyd. viii. 74.

[37] Thucyd. viii, 1. About the countenance which *all* these probûli lent to the conspiracy, see Aristotle, Rhetoric, iii, 18, 2.

Respecting the activity of Agnon, as one of the probûli, in the same cause, see Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosthen. c. 11, p. 426, Reisk. sect. 66.

[38] Thucyd. viii, 69. Οἱ εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν μετ᾽ αὐτῶν (that is, along with the Four Hundred) Ἕλληνες νεανίσκοι, οἷς ἐχρῶντο εἴ τι που δέοι χειρουργεῖν.

Dr. Arnold explains the words Ἕλληνες νεανίσκοι to mean some of the members of the aristocratical clubs, or unions, formerly spoken of. But I cannot think that Thucydidês would use such an expression to designate Athenian citizens: neither is it probable that Athenian citizens would be employed in repeated acts of such a character.

[39] Even Peisander himself had professed the strongest attachment to the democracy, coupled with exaggerated violence against parties suspected of oligarchical plots, four years before, in the investigations which followed on the mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens (Andokidês de Myster. c. 9, 10, sects. 36-43).

It is a fact that Peisander was one of the prominent movers on both these two occasions, four years apart. And if we could believe Isokratês (de Bigis, sects. 4-7, p. 347), the second of the two occasions was merely the continuance and consummation of a plot which had been projected and begun on the first, and in which the conspirators had endeavored to enlist Alkibiadês. The latter refused, so his son, the speaker in the above-mentioned oration, contends, in consequence of his attachment to the democracy; upon which the oligarchical conspirators, incensed at his refusal, got up the charge of irreligion against him and procured his banishment.

Though Droysen and Wattenbach (De Quadringentorum Athenis Factione, pp. 7, 8, Berlin, 1842) place confidence, to a considerable extent, in this manner of putting the facts, I consider it to be nothing better than complete perversion; irreconcilable with Thucydidês, confounding together facts unconnected in themselves as well as separated by a long interval of time, and introducing unreal causes, for the purpose of making out, what was certainly not true, that Alkibiadês was a faithful friend of the democracy, and even a sufferer in its behalf.

[40] Thucyd. viii, 66.

[41] Thucyd. viii. 68. νομίζων οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸν (Alkibiadês) κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ὑπ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίας κατελθεῖν, etc.

[42] Thucyd. viii, 64.

[43] Thucyd. viii, 65. Οἱ δὲ ἀμφὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον *παραπλέοντές* τε, ὥσπερ ἐδέδοκτο, *τοὺς δήμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι κατέλυον*, καὶ ἅμα *ἔστιν ἀφ᾽ ὧν χωρίων* καὶ ὁπλίτας ἔχοντες σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ξυμμάχους ἦλθον ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας. Καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι τὰ πλεῖστα τοῖς ἑταίροις προειργασμένα.

We may gather from c. 69 that the places which I have named in the text were among those visited by Peisander: all of them lay very much in his way from Samos to Athens.

[44] Thucyd. viii, 67. Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὸν δῆμον ξυλλέξαντες εἶπον γνώμην, δέκα ἄνδρας ἑλέσθαι *ξυγγραφέας αὐτοκράτορας*, τούτους δὲ ξυγγράψαντας γνώμην ἐσενεγκεῖν ἐς τὸν δῆμον ἐς ἡμέραν ῥητὴν, καθ᾽ ὅτι ἄριστα ἡ πόλις οἰκήσεται.

In spite of certain passages found in Suidas and Harpokration (see K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Griechischen Staats Alterthümer, sect. 167, note 12: compare also Wattenbach, De Quadringentor. Factione, p. 38), I cannot think that there was any connection between these ten ξυγγραφεῖς, and the Board of πρόβουλοι mentioned as having been before named (Thucyd. viii, 1). Nor has the passage in Lysias, to which Hermann makes allusion, anything to do with these ξυγγραφεῖς. The mention of Thirty persons by Androtion and Philochorus, seems to imply that they, or Harpokration, confounded the proceedings ushering in this oligarchy of Four Hundred, with those before the subsequent oligarchy of Thirty. The σύνεδροι, or ξυγγραφεῖς, mentioned by Isokratês (Areopagit. Or. vii, sect. 67) might refer either to the case of the Four Hundred or to that of the Thirty.

[45] Thucyd. viii, 67. Ἔπειτα, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἡμέρα ἐφῆκε, *ξυνέκλῃσαν* τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐς τὸν Κόλωνον (ἔστι δ᾽ ἱερὸν Ποσειδῶνος ἔξω πόλεως, ἀπέχον σταδίους μάλιστα δέκα), etc.

The very remarkable word ξυνέκλῃσαν, here used respecting the assembly, appears to me to refer (not, as Dr. Arnold supposes in his note, to any existing practice observed even in the usual assemblies which met in the Pnyx, but rather) to a departure from the usual practice, and the employment of a stratagem in reference to this particular meeting.

Kolônus was one of the Attic demes: indeed, there seems reason to imagine that two distinct demes bore this same name (see Boeckh, in the Commentary appended to his translation of the Antigonê of Sophoklês, pp.

190, 191: and Ross, Die Demen von Attika, pp. 10, 11). It is in the grove of the Eumenides, hard by this temple of Poseidon, that Sophoklês has laid the scene of his immortal drama, the Œdipus Koloneus.

[46] Compare the statement in Lysias (Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 76, p. 127) respecting the small numbers who attended and voted at the assembly by which the subsequent oligarchy of Thirty was named.

[47] Thucyd. viii, 68. Ἐλθόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς τετρακοσίους ὄντας ἐς τὸ βουλευτήριον, ἄρχειν ὅπῃ ἂν ἄριστα γιγνώσκωσιν, *αὐτοκράτορας*, καὶ *τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους* δὲ ξυλλέγειν, ὁπόταν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ.

[48] Thucyd. viii, 66. ἦν δὲ τοῦτο εὐπρεπὲς πρὸς τοὺς πλείους, ἐπεὶ ἔξειν γε τὴν πόλιν οἵπερ καὶ μεθιστάναι ἔμελλον.

Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 26.

[49] Thucyd. viii, 72. Πέμπουσι δὲ ἐς τὴν Σάμον δέκα ἄνδρας … διδάξοντας—*πεντακισχίλιοι δὲ ὅτι εἶεν*, καὶ οὐ τετρακόσιοι μόνον, οἱ πράσσοντες.

viii, 86. Οἱ δ᾽ ἀπήγγελλον ὡς οὔτε ἐπὶ διαφθορᾷ *τῆς πόλεως* ἡ μετάστασις γένοιτο, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ … *τῶν δὲ πεντακισχιλίων ὅτε πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μεθέξουσιν*, etc.

viii, 89. ἀλλὰ *τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους* ἔργῳ καὶ μὴ ὀνόματι χρῆναι ἀποδεικνύναι, καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἰσαιτέραν καθιστάναι.

viii, 92. (After the Four Hundred had already been much opposed and humbled, and were on the point of being put down)—ἦν δὲ πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον ἡ παράκλησις ὡς χρὴ, ὅστις *τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους* βούλεται ἄρχειν ἀντὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων, ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἔργον. Ἐπεκρύπτοντο γὰρ ὅμως ἔτι *τῶν πεντακισχιλίων* τῷ ὀνόματι, μὴ ἄντικρυς δῆμον ὅστις βούλεται ἄρχειν ὀνομάζειν—*φοβούμενοι μὴ τῷ ὄντι ὦσι, καὶ πρός τινα εἰπών τίς τι δι᾽ ἀγνοίαν σφαλῇ*. Καὶ οἱ τετρακόσιοι διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἤθελον *τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους οὔτε εἶναι, οὔτε μὴ ὄντας δήλους εἶναι*· τὸ μὲν καταστῆσαι μετόχους τοσούτους, ἄντικρυς ἂν δῆμον ἡγούμενοι, *τὸ δ᾽ αὖ ἀφανὲς φόβον ἐς ἀλλήλους παρέξειν*.

viii, 93. λέγοντες *τούς τε πεντακισχιλίους* ἀποφανεῖν, καὶ ἐκ *τούτων ἐν μέρει*, ᾗ ἂν τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις δοκῇ, τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἔσεσθαι, τέως δὲ τὴν πόλιν μηδενὶ τρόπῳ διαφθείρειν, etc.

Compare also c. 97.

[50] Compare the striking passage (Thucyd. viii, 92) cited in my previous note.

[51] See the jests of Aristophanês, about the citizens all in armor, buying their provisions in the marketplace and carrying them home, in the Lysistrata, 560: a comedy represented about December 412 or January 411 B.C., three months earlier than the events here narrated.

[52] Thucyd. viii, 69, 70.

[53] This striking and deep-seated regard of the Athenians for all the forms of an established constitution, makes itself felt even by Mr. Mitford (Hist. Gr. ch. xix. sect. v, vol. iv, p. 235).

[54] See Plutarch, Periklês, c. 10; Diodor. xi, 77; and vol. v, of this History chap. xlvi, p. 370.

[55] Thucyd. viii, 70. I imagine that this must be the meaning of the words τὰ τε ἄλλα ἔνεμον κατὰ κράτος τὴν πόλιν.

[56] Thucyd. viii, 71.

[57] Thucyd. viii, 72. This allegation, respecting the number of citizens who attended in the Athenian democratical assemblies, has been sometimes cited as if it carried with it the authority of Thucydidês; which is a great mistake, duly pointed out by all the best recent critics. It is simply the allegation of the Four Hundred, whose testimony, as a guarantee for truth, is worth little enough.

That *no* assembly had ever been attended by so many as five thousand (οὐδεπώποτε) I certainly am far from believing. It is not improbable, however, that five thousand was an unusually large number of citizens to attend.

Dr. Arnold, in his note, opposes the allegation in part, by remarking that "the law required not only the presence but the sanction of at least six thousand citizens to some particular decrees of the assembly." It seems to me, however, quite possible that, in cases where this large number of votes was required, as in the ostracism, and where there was no discussion carried on immediately before the voting, the process of voting may have

lasted some hours, like our keeping open of a poll. So that though more than six thousand citizens must have *voted*, altogether, it was not necessary that all should have been present in the same assembly.

[58] Thucyd. viii, 75. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, λαμπρῶς ἤδη ἐς δημοκρατίαν βουλόμενοι μεταστῆσαι τὰ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ ὅ τε Θρασύβουλος καὶ Θράσυλλος, ὥρκωσαν πάντας τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς μεγίστους ὅρκους, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας μάλιστα, ἢ μὴν δημοκρατήσεσθαι τε καὶ ὁμονοήσειν, καὶ τὸν πρὸς Πελοποννησίους πόλεμον προθύμως διοίσειν, καὶ τοῖς τετρακοσίοις πολέμιοί τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι. Ξυνώμνυσαν δὲ καὶ Σαμίων πάντες τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρκον οἱ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, καὶ τὰ πράγματα πάντα καὶ τὰ ἀποβησόμενα ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων ξυνεκοινώσαντο οἱ στρατιῶται τοῖς Σαμίοις, νομίζοντες οὔτε ἐκείνοις ἀποστροφὴν σωτηρίας οὔτε σφίσιν εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐάν τε οἱ τετρακόσιοι κρατήσωσιν ἐάν τε οἱ ἐκ Μιλήτου πολέμιοι, διαφθαρήσεσθαι.

[59] Thucyd. viii, 76. Καὶ παραινέσεις ἄλλας τε ἐποιοῦντο ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἀνιστάμενοι, καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἀθυμεῖν ὅτι *ἡ πόλις αὐτῶν ἀφέστηκε*· τοὺς γὰρ ἐλάσσους *ἀπὸ σφῶν τῶν* πλεόνων καὶ ἐς πάντα ποριμωτέρων *μεθεστάναι*.

[60] Thucyd. viii, 76. Βραχὺ δέ τι εἶναι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιον, ᾧ πρὸς τὸ περιγίγνεσθαι τῶν πολεμίων ἡ πόλις χρήσιμος ἦν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀπολωλεκέναι, οἵ γε μήτε ἀργύριον ἔτι εἶχον πέμπειν, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοὶ ἐπορίζοντο οἱ στρατιῶται, μήτε βούλευμα χρηστὸν, οὗπερ ἕνεκα πόλις στρατοπέδων κρατεῖ· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τούτοις τοὺς μὲν ἡμαρτηκέναι, τοὺς πατρίους νόμους καταλύσαντας, αὐτοὶ δὲ σώζειν καὶ ἐκείνους πειράσεσθαι προσαναγκάζειν. Ὥστε οὐδὲ τούτους, οἵπερ ἂν βουλεύοιέν τι χρηστὸν, παρὰ σφίσι χείρους εἶναι.

[61] The application of the Athenians at Samos to Alkibiadês, reminds us of the emphatic language in which Tacitus characterizes an incident in some respects similar. The Roman army, fighting in the cause of Vitellius against Vespasian, had been betrayed by their general Cæcina, who endeavored to carry them over to the latter: his army, however, refused to follow him, adhered to their own cause, and put him under arrest. Being afterwards defeated by the troops of Vespasian, and obliged to capitulate in Cremona, they released Cæcina, and solicited his intercession to obtain favorable terms. "Primores castrorum nomen atque imagines Vitellii amoliuntur; catenas Cæcinæ (nam etiam tum vinctus erat) exsolvunt, orantque, ut causæ suæ deprecator adsistat: aspernantem tumentemque lacrymis fatigant. *Extremum malorum, tot fortissimi viri, proditoris opem invocantes.*" (Tacitus, Histor. iii, 31.)

[62] Thucyd. viii, 48.

[63] Thucydidês does not expressly mention this communication, but it is implied in the words Ἀλκιβιάδην—*ἄσμενον παρέξειν*, etc. (viii, 76.)

[64] Thucyd. viii, 81. Θρασύβουλος, *ἀεί τε τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἐχόμενος*, ἐπειδὴ μετέστησε τὰ πράγματα, ὥστε κατάγειν Ἀλκιβιάδην, καὶ *τέλος* ἐπ᾽ ἐκκλησίας ἔπεισε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν στρατιωτῶν, etc.

[65] Thucyd. viii, 81. γενομένης δὲ ἐκκλησίας τήν *τε ἰδίαν ξυμφορὰν τῆς φυγῆς ἐπῃτιάσατο καὶ ἀνωλοφύρατο* ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, etc.

Contrast the different language of Alkibiadês, vi, 92: viii, 47.

For the word ξυμφορὰν, compare i, 127.

Nothing can be more false and perverted than the manner in which the proceedings of Alkibiadês, during this period, are presented in the Oration of Isokratês de Bigis, sects. 18-23.

[66] Thucyd. viii, 82, 83, 87.

[67] Thucyd. viii, 77-86.

[68] Thucyd. viii, 86. Εἰ δὲ ἐς εὐτέλειάν τι ξυντέτμηται, ὥστε τοὺς στρατιώτας ἔχειν τροφὴν, πάνυ ἐπαινεῖν.

This is a part of the answer of Alkibiadês to the envoys, and therefore indicates what they had urged.

[69] Thucyd. viii, 86. τῶν τε πεντακισχιλίων ὅτι πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μεθέξουσιν, etc. I dissent from Dr. Arnold's construction of this passage, which is followed both by Poppo and by Göller. He says, in his note: "The sense must clearly be, 'that all the citizens should be of the five thousand in their turn,' however strange the expression may seem, μεθέξουσι τῶν πεντακισχιλίων. But without referring to the absurdity of the meaning, that all the Five Thousand should partake of the government *in their turn*,—for they *all* partook of it as being the sovereign assembly,—yet μετέχειν, in this sense, would require τῶν πραγμάτων after it, and would be at least as harsh, standing alone, as in the construction of μεθέξουσι τῶν πεντακισχιλίων."

Upon this remark, 1. Μετέχειν may be construed with a genitive case not actually expressed, but understood out of the words preceding; as we may see by Thucyd. ii, 16, where I agree with the interpretation suggested by Matthiæ (Gr. Gr. § 325), rather than with Dr. Arnold's note.

2. In the present instance, we are not reduced to the necessity of gathering a genitive case for μετέχειν by implication out of previous phraseology: for the express genitive case stands there a line or two before—*τῆς πόλεως*, the idea of which is carried down without being ever dropped: οἱ δ᾽ ἀπήγγελλον, ὡς οὔτε ἐπὶ διαφθορᾷ *τῆς πόλεως* ἡ μετάστασις γένοιτο, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ, οὗθ᾽ ἵνα τοῖς πολεμίοις παραδοθῇ (i. e., ἡ πόλις) … τῶν τε πεντακισχιλίων ὅτι πάντες *ἐν τῷ μέρει μεθέξουσιν* (i. e., τῆς πόλεως).

There is therefore no harshness of expression; nor is there any absurdity of meaning, as we may see by the repetition of the very same in viii, 93, λέγοντες τούς τε πεντακισχιλίους ἀποφανεῖν, καὶ *ἐκ τούτων ἐν μέρει*, ᾗ ἂν τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις δοκῇ, *τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἔσεσθαι*, etc.

Dr. Arnold's designation of these Five Thousand as "the sovereign assembly," is not very accurate. They were not an assembly at all: they had never been called together, nor had anything been said about an intention of calling them together: in reality, they were but a fiction and a name; but even the Four Hundred themselves pretended only to talk of them as partners in the conspiracy and revolution, not as *an assembly* to be convoked—πεντακισχίλιοι—*οἱ πράσσοντες* (viii, 72).

As to the idea of bringing all the remaining citizens to equal privileges, in rotation, with the Five Thousand, we shall see that it was never broached until considerably after the Four Hundred had been put down.

[70] Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 26.

[71] Thucyd. viii. 86. Καὶ τἆλλα ἐκέλευεν ἀντέχειν, καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδιδόναι τοῖς πολεμίοις· πρὸς μὲν γὰρ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς σωζομένης τῆς πόλεως πολλὴν ἐλπίδα εἶναι καὶ ξυμβῆναι, εἰ δὲ ἅπαξ τὸ ἕτερον σφαλήσεται ἢ τὸ ἐν Σάμῳ ἢ ἐκεῖνοι, οὐδὲ ὅτῳ διαλλαγήσεταί τις ἔτι ἔσεσθαι.

[72] Thucyd. viii. 86. It is very probable that the Melêsias here mentioned was the son of that Thucydidês who was the leading political opponent of Periklês. Melêsias appears as one of the *dramatis personæ* in Plato's dialogue called Lachês.

[73] Lysias cont. Eratosthen. sect. 43, c. 9, p. 411, Reisk. οὐ γὰρ νῦν πρῶτον (Eratosthenês) τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλήθει τὰ ἐναντία ἔπραξεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν Τετρακοσίων ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ὀλιγαρχίαν καθιστὰς ἔφευγεν ἐξ Ἑλλησπόντου τριηράρχος καταλιπὼν τὴν ναῦν, μετὰ Ἰατροκλέους καὶ ἑτέρων … ἀφικόμενος δὲ δεῦρο τἀναντία τοῖς βουλομένοις δημοκρατίαν εἶναι ἔπραττε.

[74] Thucyd. viii, 64.

[75] Thucyd. viii, 89, 90. The representation of the character and motives of Theramenês, as given by Lysias in the Oration contra Eratosthenem (Orat. xii, sects. 66, 67, 79; Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. sects. 12-17), is quite in harmony with that of Thucydidês (viii, 89): compare Aristophan. Ran. 541-966; Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 27-30.

[76] Thucyd. viii, 89. ἦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν σχῆμα πολιτικὸν τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῖς, κατ᾽ ἰδίας δὲ φιλοτιμίας οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν τῷ τοιούτῳ προσέκειντο, ἐν ᾧπερ καὶ μάλιστα ὀλιγαρχία ἐκ δημοκρατίας γενομένη ἀπόλλυται. Πάντες γὰρ αὐθημερὸν ἀξιοῦσιν οὐχ ὅπως ἴσοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἕκαστος εἶναι· ἐκ δὲ δημοκρατίας αἱρέσεως γιγνομένης, ῥᾷον τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἐλασσούμενός τις φέρει.

I give in the text what appears to me the proper sense of this passage, the last words of which are obscure: see the long notes of the commentators, especially Dr. Arnold and Poppo. Dr. Arnold considers τῶν ὁμοίων as a neuter, and gives the paraphrase of the last clause as follows: "Whereas under an old-established government, they (ambitious men of talent) are prepared to fail: they know that the weight of the government is against them, and are thus spared the peculiar pain of being beaten in a fair race, when they and their competitors start with equal advantages, and there is nothing to lessen the mortification of defeat. Ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐλασσούμενος, is, *being beaten when the game is equal, when the terms of the match are fair*."

I cannot concur in Dr. Arnold's explanation of these words, or of the general sense of the passage. He thinks that Thucydidês means to affirm what applies generally "to an opposition minority when it succeeds in revolutionizing the established government, whether the government be a democracy or a monarchy; whether the minority be an aristocratical party or a popular one." It seems to me, on the contrary, that the affirmation bears

only on the special case of an oligarchical conspiracy subverting a democracy, and that the comparison taken is applicable only to the state of things as it stood under the preceding democracy.

Next, the explanation given of the words by Dr. Arnold, assumes that "to be beaten in a fair race, or when the terms of the match are fair," causes to the loser *the maximum* of pain and offence. This is surely not the fact: or rather, the reverse is the fact. The man who loses his cause or his election through unjust favor, jealousy, or antipathy, is *more* hurt than if he had lost it under circumstances where he could find no injustice to complain of. In both cases, he is doubtless mortified; but if there be injustice, he is offended and angry as well as mortified: he is disposed to take vengeance on men whom he looks upon as his personal enemies. It is important to distinguish the mortification of simple failure, from the discontent and anger arising out of belief that the failure has been unjustly brought about: it is this discontent, tending to break out in active opposition, which Thucydidês has present to his mind in the comparison which he takes between the state of feeling which precedes and follows the subversion of the democracy.

It appears to me that the words τῶν ὁμοίων are masculine, and that they have reference, like πάντες and ἴσοι, in the preceding line, to the privileged minority of equal confederates who are supposed to have just got possession of the government. At Sparta, the word οἱ ὅμοιοι acquired a sort of technical sense, to designate the small ascendent minority of wealthy Spartan citizens, who monopolized in their own hands political power, to the practical exclusion of the remainder (see Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 3, 5; Xenoph. Resp. Lac. x, 7; xiii, 1; Demosth. cont. Lept. s. 88). Now these ὅμοιοι, or peers, here indicated by Thucydidês as the peers of a recently-formed oligarchy, are not merely equal among themselves, but rivals one with another, and personally known to each other. It is important to bear in mind all these attributes as tacitly implied, though not literally designated or *connoted* by the word ὅμοιοι, or peers; because the comparison instituted by Thucydidês is founded on all the attributes taken together; just as Aristotle (Rhetoric, ii, 8; ii, 13, 4), in speaking of the envy and jealousy apt to arise towards τοὺς ὁμοίους, considers them as ἀντεράστας and ἀνταγωνίστας.

The Four Hundred at Athens were all peers,—equals, rivals, and personally known among one another,—who had just raised themselves by joint conspiracy to supreme power. Theramenês, one of the number, conceives himself entitled to preëminence, but finds that he is shut out from it, the men who shut him out being this small body of known equals and rivals. He is inclined to impute the exclusion to personal motives on the part of this small knot; to selfish ambition on the part of each; to ill-will, to jealousy, to wrongful partiality; so that he thinks himself injured, and the sentiment of injury is embittered by the circumstance that those from whom it proceeds are a narrow, known, and definite body of colleagues. Whereas, if his exclusion had taken place under the democracy, by the suffrage of a large, miscellaneous, and personally unknown collection of citizens, he would have been far less likely to carry off with him a sense of injury. Doubtless he would have been mortified; but he would not have looked upon the electors in the light of jealous or selfish rivals, nor would they form a definite body before him for his indignation to concentrate itself upon. Thus Nikomachidês—whom Sokratês (see Xenophon, Memor. iii, 4) meets returning mortified because the people had chosen another person and not him as general—would have been not only mortified, but angry and vindictive besides, if he had been excluded by a few peers and rivals.

Such, in my judgment, is the comparison which Thucydidês wishes to draw between the effect of disappointment inflicted by the suffrage of a numerous and miscellaneous body of citizens, compared with disappointment inflicted by a small knot of oligarchical peers upon a competitor among their own number, especially at a moment when the expectations of all these peers are exaggerated, in consequence of the recent acquisition of their power. I believe the remark of the historian to be quite just; and that the disappointment in the first case is less intense, less connected with the sentiment of injury, and less likely to lead to active manifestation of enmity. This is one among the advantages of a numerous suffrage.

I cannot better illustrate the jealousies pretty sure to break out among a small number of ὅμοιοι, or rival peers, than by the description which Justin gives of the leading officers of Alexander the Great, immediately after that monarch's death (Justin, xii, 2):—

"Cæterum, occiso Alexandro, non, ut læti, ita et securi fuere, omnibus unum locum competentibus: nec minus milites invicem se timebant, quorum et libertas solutior et favor incertus erat. *Inter ipsos vero æqualitas discordiam augebat*, nemine tantum cæteros excedente, ut ei aliquis se submitteret."

Compare Plutarch, Lysander, c. 23.

Haack and Poppo think that ὁμοίων cannot be masculine, because *ἀπὸ* τῶν ὁμοίων ἐλασσούμενος would not then be correct, but ought to be *ὑπὸ* τῶν ὁμοίων ἐλασσούμενος. I should dispute, under all circumstances, the correctness of this criticism: for there are quite enough parallel cases to defend the use of ἀπὸ here, (see Thucyd. i, 17; iii, 82; iv, 115; vi, 28, etc.) But we need not enter into the debate; for the genitive τῶν ὁμοίων depends rather upon τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα which precedes, than upon ἐλασσούμενος which follows; and the preposition ἀπὸ is what we should naturally expect. To mark this, I have put a comma after ἀποβαίνοντα as well as after ὁμοίων.

To show that an opinion is not correct, indeed, does not afford *certain* evidence that Thucydidês may not have advanced it: for he might be mistaken. But it ought to count as good presumptive evidence, unless the words peremptorily bind us to the contrary, which in this case they do not.

[77] Thucyd. viii, 86, 2. Of this sentence, from φοβούμενοι down to καθιστάναι, I only profess to understand the last clause. It is useless to discuss the many conjectural amendments of a corrupt text, none of them satisfactory.

[78] Thucyd. viii, 86-89. It is alleged by Andokidês (in an oration delivered many years afterwards before the people of Athens, De Reditu suo, sects. 10-15), that during this spring he furnished the armament at Samos with wood proper for the construction of oars, only obtained by the special favor of Archelaus king of Macedonia, and of which the armament then stood in great need. He farther alleges, that he afterwards visited Athens, while the Four Hundred were in full dominion; and that Peisander, at the head of this oligarchical body, threatened his life for having furnished such valuable aid to the armament, then at enmity with Athens. Though he saved his life by clinging to the altar, yet he had to endure bonds and manifold hard treatment.

Of these claims, which Andokidês prefers to the favor of the subsequent democracy, I do not know how much is true.

[79] Thucyd. viii, 89. σαφέστατα δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐπῆρε τὰ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἰσχυρὰ ὄντα, καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐδόκει μόνιμον τὸ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ἔσεσθαι. ἠγωνίζετο οὖν εἷς ἕκαστος *προστάτης τοῦ δήμου ἔσεσθαι*.

This is a remarkable passage, as indicating what is really meant by προστάτης τοῦ δήμου: "the leader of a popular opposition." Theramenês, and the other persons here spoken of, did not even mention the name of the democracy,—they took up simply the name of the Five Thousand,—yet they are still called πρόσταται τοῦ δήμου, inasmuch as the Five Thousand were a sort of qualified democracy, compared to the Four Hundred.

The words denote the leader of a popular party, as opposed to an oligarchical party (see Thucyd. iii, 70; iv, 66; vi, 35), in a form of government either entirely democratical, or at least, in which the public assembly is frequently convoked and decides on many matters of importance. Thucydidês does not apply the words to any Athenian except in the case now before us respecting Theramenês: he does not use the words even with respect to Kleon, though he employs expressions which seem equivalent to it (iii, 36; iv, 21)—ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὢν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος, etc. This is very different from the words which he applies to Periklês—ὢν γὰρ *δυνατώτατος* τῶν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν καὶ *ἄγων τὴν πολιτείαν* (i, 127). Even in respect to Nikias, he puts him in conjunction with Pleistoanax at Sparta, and talks of both of them as σπεύδοντες τὰ μάλιστα *τὴν ἡγεμονίαν* (v, 16).

Compare the note of Dr. Arnold on vi, 35.

[80] Thucyd. viii, 92. τὸ μὲν καταστῆσαι μετόχους τοσούτους, ἄντικρυς ἂν δῆμον ἡγούμενοι, etc.

Aristotle (Polit. v, 5, 4) calls Phrynichus the *demagogue* of the Four Hundred; that is, the person who most strenuously served *their* interests and struggled for *their* favor.

[81] Thucyd. viii, 90-92. τὸ τεῖχος τοῦτο, καὶ πυλίδας ἔχον, καὶ ἐσόδους, καὶ ἐπεισαγωγὰς τῶν πολεμίων, etc.

I presume that the last expression refers to facilities for admitting the enemy either from the sea-side, or from the land-side; that is to say, from the northwestern corner of the old wall of Peiræus, which formed one side of the new citadel.

See Leake's Topographie Athens, pp. 269, 270, Germ. transl.

[82] Thucyd. viii, 90. διῳκοδόμησαν δὲ καὶ στοὰν, etc.

I agree with the note in M. Didot's translation, that this portico, or *halle*, open on three sides, must he considered as preëxisting; not as having been first built now; which seems to be the supposition of Colonel Leake, and the commentators generally.

[83] Thucyd. viii, 91, 92. Ἀλεξικλέα, στρατηγὸν ὄντα ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ μάλιστα πρὸς τοὺς ἑταίρους τετραμμένον, etc.

[84] Thucyd. viii, 91. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ἐσαγαγόμενοι ἄνευ τειχῶν καὶ νεῶν ξυμβῆναι, καὶ ὁπωσοῦν τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἔχειν, εἰ τοῖς γε σώμασι σφῶν ἄδεια ἔσται.

Ibid. ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος πρέσβεις οὐδὲν πράξαντες ἀνεχώρησαν τοῖς πᾶσι ξυμβατικὸν, etc.

[85] Thucyd. viii, 91. ἦν δέ τι καὶ τοιοῦτον ἀπὸ τῶν τὴν κατηγορίαν ἐχόντων, καὶ *οὐ πάνυ διαβολὴ μόνον* τοῦ λόγου.

The reluctant language, in which Thucydidês admits the treasonable concert of Antiphon and his colleagues with the Lacedæmonians, deserves notice; also c. 94. *τάχα μέν τι καὶ* ἀπὸ ξυγκειμένου λόγου, etc.

[86] Thucyd. viii, 91. The statement of Plutarch is in many respects different (Alkibiadês, c. 25).

[87] Thucyd. viii, 92. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, τῶν ὁπλιτῶν τὸ στῖφος ταῦτα ἐβούλετο.

[88] Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 26, represents Hermon as one of the assassins of Phrynichus.

[89] See Lysias, Orat. xx, pro Polystrato. The fact that Polystratus was only eight days a member of the Four Hundred, before their fall, is repeated three distinct times in this Oration (c. 2, 4, 5, pp. 672, 674, 679, Reisk.), and has all the air of truth.

[90] Thucyd. viii, 92, 93. In the Oration of Demosthenês, or Deinarchus, against Theokrinês (c. 17, p. 1343), the speaker, Epicharês, makes allusion to this destruction of the fort at Ectioneia by Aristokratês uncle of his grandfather. The allusion chiefly deserves notice from its erroneous mention of Kritias and the return of the Demos from exile, betraying a complete confusion between the events in the time of the Four Hundred and those in the time of the Thirty.

[91] Lysias, Orat. xx, pro Polystrato, c. 4, p. 675, Reisk.

This task was confided to Polystratus, a very recent member of the Four Hundred, and therefore probably less unpopular than the rest. In his defence after the restoration of the democracy, he pretended to have undertaken the task much against his will, and to have drawn up a list containing nine thousand names instead of five thousand.

It may probably have been in this meeting of the Four Hundred, that Antiphon delivered his oration strongly recommending concord, Περὶ ὁμονοίας. All his eloquence was required just now, to bring back the oligarchical party, if possible, into united action. Philostratus (Vit. Sophistar. c. xv, p. 500, ed. Olear.) expresses great admiration for this oration, which is several times alluded to both by Harpokration and Suidas. See Westermann, Gesch. der Griech. Beredsamkeit, Beilage ii, p. 276.

[92] Thucyd. viii, 93. Τὸ δὲ πᾶν πλῆθος τῶν ὁπλιτῶν, *ἀπὸ πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς λόγων γιγνομένων, ἠπιώτερον ἦν ἢ πρότερον, καὶ ἐφοβεῖτο μάλιστα περὶ τοῦ παντὸς πολιτικοῦ*.

[93] Thucyd. viii, 93. ξυνεχώρησαν δὲ ὥστ᾽ *ἐς ἡμέραν ῥητὴν* ἐκκλησίαν ποιῆσαι ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ *περὶ ὁμονοίας*.

The definition of time must here allude to the morrow, or to the day following the morrow; at least it seems impossible that the city could be left longer than this interval without a government.

[94] Thucyd. viii, 94.

[95] Lysias, Orat. xx, pro Polystrato, c. 4, p. 676, Reisk.

From another passage in this oration, it would seem that Polystratus was in command of the fleet, possibly enough, in conjunction with Thymocharês, according to a common Athenian practice (c. 5, p. 679). His son, who defends him, affirms that he was wounded in the battle.

Diodorus (xiii, 34) mentions the discord among the crews on board these ships under Thymocharês, almost the only point which we learn from his meagre notice of this interesting period.

[96] Thucyd. viii, 5; viii, 95.

[97] Thucyd. viii, 95. To show what Eubœa became at a later period, see Demosthenês, De Fals. Legat. c. 64, p. 409: τὰ ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ κατασκευασθησόμενα ὁρμητήρια ἐφ᾽ ὑμᾶς, etc.; and Demosthenês, De Coronâ, c. 71; ἅπλους δ᾽ ἡ θάλασσα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Εὐβοίας ὁρμωμένων λῃστῶν γέγονε, etc.

[98] Thucyd. viii, 96. Μάλιστα δ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ δι᾽ ἐγγυτάτου ἐθορύβει, εἰ οἱ πολέμιοι τολμήσουσι νενικηκότες εὐθὺς σφῶν ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ ἔρημον ὄντα νεῶν πλεῖν· καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη ἐνόμιζον αὐτοὺς παρεῖναι. *Ὅπερ ἄν, εἰ τολμηρότεροι ἦσαν, ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἐποίησαν*· καὶ ἢ διέστησαν ἂν ἔτι μᾶλλον τὴν πόλιν ἐφορμοῦντες, ἢ εἰ ἐπολιόρκουν μένοντες, καὶ τὰς ἀπ᾽ Ἰωνίας ναῦς ἠνάγκασαν ἂν βοηθῆσαι, etc.

[99] Thucyd. viii, 96; vii, 21-55.

[100] Thucyd. viii, 97.

[101] It is to this assembly that I refer, with confidence, the remarkable dialogue of contention between Peisander and Sophoklês, one of the Athenian probûli, mentioned in Aristotel. Rhetoric. iii, 18, 2. There was no other occasion on which the Four Hundred were ever publicly thrown upon their defence at Athens.

This was not Sophoklês the tragic poet, but another person of the same name, who appears afterwards as one of the oligarchy of Thirty.

[102] Thucyd. viii, 97. Καὶ ἐκκλησίαν ξυνέλεγον, μίαν μὲν εὐθὺς τότε πρῶτον ἐς τὴν Πνύκα καλουμένην, οὗπερ καὶ ἄλλοτε εἰώθεσαν, ἐν ᾗπερ καὶ τοὺς τετρακοσίους καταπαύσαντες *τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις* ἐψηφίσαντο τὰ πράγματα παραδοῦναι· *εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν, ὁπόσοι καὶ ὅπλα παρέχονται*· καὶ μισθὸν μηδένα φέρειν, μηδεμιᾷ ἀρχῇ, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπάρατον ἐποιήσαντο. Ἐγίγνοντο δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι ὕστερον πυκναὶ ἐκκλησίαι, ἀφ᾽ ὧν καὶ *νομοθέτας καὶ τἆλλα ἐψηφίσαντο ἐς τὴν πολιτείαν*.

In this passage I dissent from the commentators on two points. First, they understand this number Five Thousand as a real definite list of citizens, containing five thousand names, neither more nor less. Secondly, they construe νομοθέτας, not in the ordinary meaning which it bears in Athenian constitutional language, but in the sense of ξυγγραφεῖς (c. 67), "persons to model the constitution, corresponding to the ξυγγραφεῖς appointed by the aristocratical party a little before," to use the words of Dr. Arnold.

As to the first point, which is sustained also by Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. ch. xxviii, vol. iv, p. 51, 2d ed.), Dr. Arnold really admits what is the ground of my opinion, when he says: "Of course the number of citizens capable of providing themselves with heavy arms must *have much exceeded five thousand*: and it is said in the defence of Polystratus, one of the Four Hundred (Lysias, p. 675, Reisk.), that he drew up a list of nine thousand. But we must suppose that all who could furnish heavy arms *were eligible into the number of the Five Thousand*, whether the members were fixed on by lot, by election, or by rotation; as it had been proposed to appoint the Four Hundred by rotation out of the Five Thousand (viii, 93)."

Dr. Arnold here throws out a supposition which by no means conforms to the exact sense of the words of Thucydidês—εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν, ὁπόσοι καὶ ὅπλα παρέχονται. These words distinctly signify, that all who furnished heavy arms *should be of the Five Thousand, should belong of right to that body*, which is something different from *being eligible* into the number of the Five Thousand, either by lot, rotation, or otherwise. The language of Thucydidês, when he describes, in the passage referred to by Dr. Arnold, c. 93, the projected formation of the Four Hundred by rotation out of the Five Thousand, is very different: καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐν μέρει τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἔσεσθαι, etc. M. Boeckh (Public Economy of Athens, bk. ii, ch. 21, p. 268, Eng. Tr.) is not satisfactory in his description of this event.

The idea which I conceive of the Five Thousand, as a number existing from the commencement only in talk and imagination, neither realized nor intended to be realized, coincides with the full meaning of this passage of Thucydidês, as well as with everything which he had before said about them.

I will here add that ὁπόσοι ὅπλα παρέχονται means persons furnishing arms, not for themselves alone, but for others also (Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 4, 15.)

As to the second point, the signification of νομοθέτας, I stand upon the general use of that word in Athenian political language: see the explanation earlier in this History, vol. v, ch. xlvi, p. 373. It is for the commentators to

produce some justification of the unusual meaning which they assign to it: "persons to model the constitution; commissioners who drew up the new constitution," as Dr. Arnold, in concurrence with the rest, translates it. Until some justification is produced, I venture to believe that νομοθέται, is a word which would not be used in that sense with reference to nominees chosen by the democracy, and intended to act with the democracy; for it implies a final, decisive, authoritative determination; whereas the ξυγγραφεῖς, or "commissioners to draw up a constitution," were only invested with the function of submitting something for approbation to the public assembly or competent authority; that is, assuming that the public assembly remained an efficient reality.

Moreover, the words καὶ τἆλλα would hardly be used in immediate sequence to νομοθέτας, if the latter word meant that which the commentators suppose: "Commissioners for framing a constitution, *and the other things towards the constitution*." Such commissioners are surely far too prominent and initiative in their function to be named in this way. Let us add, that the most material items in the new constitution, if we are so to call it, have already been distinctly specified as settled by public vote, before these νομοθέται are even named.

It is important to notice, that even the Thirty, who were named six years afterwards to draw up a constitution, at the moment when Sparta was mistress of Athens, and when the people were thoroughly put down, are not called Νομοθέται, but are named by a circumlocution equivalent to Ἔδοξε τῷ δήμῳ, τριάκοντα ἄνδρας ἑλέσθαι, οἳ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους συγγράψουσι, καθ᾽ οὓς πολιτεύσουσι.—Αἱρεθέντες δὲ, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τε συγγράψαι νόμους καθ᾽ οὕστινας πολιτεύσοιντο, τούτους μὲν ἀεὶ ἔμελλον ξυγγράφειν τε καὶ ἀποδεικνύναι, etc. (Xenophon, Hellen. ii, 3, 2-11.) Xenophon calls Kritias and Chariklês the nomothetæ of the Thirty (Memor. i, 2, 30), but this is not democracy.

For the signification of Νομοθέτης (applied most generally to Solon, sometimes to others, either by rhetorical looseness or by ironical taunt), or Νομοθέται, a numerous body of persons chosen and sworn, see Lysias cont. Nikomach. sects. 3, 33, 37; Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 81-85, c. 14, p. 38, where the nomothetæ are a sworn body of Five Hundred, exercising, conjointly with the senate, the function of accepting or rejecting laws proposed to them.

[103] Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 33. Cornelius Nepos (Alkibiad. c. 5, and Diodorus, xiii, 38-42) mentions Theramenês as the principal author of the decree for restoring Alkibiadês from exile. But the precise words of the elegy composed by Kritias, wherein the latter vindicates this proceeding to himself, are cited by Plutarch, and are very good evidence. Doubtless many of the leading men supported, and none opposed, the proposition.

[104] Thucyd. viii, 97. Καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες· μετρία γὰρ ἥ τε ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς ξύγκρασις ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐκ πονηρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένων τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀνήνεγκε τὴν πόλιν.

I refer the reader to a note on this passage in one of my former volumes, and on the explanation given of it by Dr. Arnold (see vol. v, ch. xlv, p. 330.)

[105] The words of Thucydidês (viii, 97), εἶναι δὲ *αὐτῶν*, ὁπόσοι καὶ ὅπλα παρέχονται, show that this body was not composed *exclusively* of those who furnished panoplies. It could never have been intended, for example, to exclude the hippeis, or knights.

[106] Lysias, Orat. xx, pro Polystrato, c. 4, p. 675, Reisk.

[107] Thucyd. viii, 86.

[108] Thucyd. viii, 92. τὸ μὲν καταστῆσαι μετόχους τοσούτους, ἄντικρυς ἂν δῆμον ἡγούμενοι, etc.

[109] See the valuable financial inscriptions in M. Boeckh's Corpus Inscriptionum, part i, nos. 147, 148, which attest considerable disbursements for the diobely in 410-409 B.C.

Nor does it seem that there was much diminution during these same years in the private expenditure and ostentation of the Chorêgi at the festivals and other exhibitions: see the Oration xxi, of Lysias—Ἀπολογία Δωροδοκίας, c. 1, 2, pp. 698-700, Reiske.

[110] About the date of this psephism, or decree, see Boeckh, Staatshaushaltung der Athener, vol. ii, p. 168, in the comment upon sundry inscriptions appended to his work, not included in the English translation by Mr Lewis; also Meier, De Bonis Damnatorum, sect. ii, pp. 6-10. Wachsmuth erroneously places the date of it after the Thirty; see Hellen. Alterth. ii, ix, p. 267.

[111] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 95-99. (c. 16, p. 48, R.)—Ὁ δ᾽ ἀποκτείνας τὸν ταῦτα ποιήσαντα, καὶ ὁ συμβουλεύσας, ὅσιος ἔστω καὶ εὐαγής. Ὀμόσαι δ᾽ *Ἀθηναίους ἅπαντας* καθ᾽ ἱερῶν τελείων, *κατὰ φυλὰς καὶ κατὰ δήμους*, ἀποκτείνειν τὸν ταῦτα ποιήσαντα.

The comment of Sievers (Commentationes De Xenophontis Hellenicis, Berlin, 1833, pp. 18, 19) on the events of this time, is not clear.

[112] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 95-99. (c. 16, p. 48, R.) Ὁπόσοι δ᾽ ὅρκοι ὀμώμονται Ἀθήνῃσιν ἢ *ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ* ἢ ἄλλοθί που ἐναντίοι τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, λύω καὶ ἀφίημι.

To what particular anti-constitutional oaths allusion is here made, we cannot tell. All those of the oligarchical conspirators, both at Samos and at Athens, are doubtless intended to be abrogated: and this oath, like that of the armament at Samos (Thucyd. viii, 75), is intended to be sworn by every one, including those who had before been members of the oligarchical conspiracy. Perhaps it may also be intended to abrogate the covenant sworn by the members of the political clubs or ξυνωμοσίαι among themselves, in so far as it pledged them to anti-constitutional acts (Thucyd. viii, 54-81).

[113] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 95-99, (c. 16, p. 48, R.) Ταῦτα δὲ ὀμοσάντων *Ἀθηναῖοι πάντες* καθ᾽ ἱερῶν τελείων, τὸν νόμιμον ὅρκον, πρὸ Διονυσίων, etc.

[114] Those who think that a new constitution was established, after the deposition of the Four Hundred, are perplexed to fix the period at which the old democracy was restored. K. F. Hermann and others suppose, without any special proof, that it was restored at the time when Alkibiadês returned to Athens in 407 B.C. See K. F. Hermann, Griech. Staats Alterthümer, s. 167, note 13.

[115] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. sect. 131, c. 31, p. 225: compare Demosthen. adv. Leptin. sect. 138, c. 34, p. 506.

If we wanted any proof, how perfectly reckless and unmeaning is the mention of the name of *Solon* by the orators, we should find it in this passage of Andokidês. He calls this psephism of Demophantus *a law of Solon* (sect. 96): see above in this History, vol. iii, ch. xi, p. 122.

[116] Thucyd. viii, 98. Most of these fugitives returned six years afterwards, after the battle of Ægospotami, when the Athenian people again became subject to an oligarchy in the persons of the Thirty. Several of them became members of the senate which worked under the Thirty (Lysias cont. Agorat. sect. 80, c. 18, p. 495).

Whether Aristotelês and Chariklês were among the number of the Four Hundred who now went into exile, as Wattenbach affirms (De Quadringent. Ath. Factione, p. 66), seems not clearly made out.

[117] Thucyd. viii, 89, 90. Ἀρίσταρχος, ἀνὴρ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα καὶ ἐκ πλείστου ἐναντίος τῷ δήμῳ, etc.

[118] Lysias cont. Eratosthen., c. 11, p. 427, sects. 66-68. Βουλόμενος δὲ (Theramenês) τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλήθει πιστὸς δοκεῖν εἶναι, Ἀντιφῶντα καὶ Ἀρχεπτόλεμον, φιλτάτους ὄντας αὐτῷ, κατηγορῶν ἀπέκτεινεν· εἰς τοσοῦτον δὲ κακίας ἦλθεν, ὥστε ἅμα μὲν διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἐκείνους πίστιν ὑμᾶς κατεδουλώσατο, διὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοὺς φίλους ἀπώλεσεν.

Compare Xenophon, Hellen., ii, 3, 30-33.

[119] That these votes, respecting the memory and the death of Phrynichus, preceded the trial of Antiphon, we may gather from the concluding words of the sentence passed upon Antiphon: see Plutarch, Vit. x, Oratt. p. 834, B: compare Schol. Aristoph. Lysistr. 313.

Both Lysias and Lykurgus, the orators, contain statements about the death of Phrynichus which are not in harmony with Thucydidês. Both these orators agree in reporting the names of the two foreigners who claimed to have slain Phrynichus, and whose claim was allowed by the people afterwards, in a formal reward and vote of citizenship, Thrasybulus of Kalydon, Apollodorus of Megara (Lysias cont. Agorat. c. 18, 492; Lykurg. cont. Leokrat. c. 29, p. 217).

Lykurgus says that Phrynichus was assassinated by night, "near the fountain, hard by the willow-trees:" which is quite contradictory to Thucydidês, who states that the deed was done in daylight, and in the market-place. Agoratus, against whom the speech of Lysias is directed, pretended to have been one of the assassins, and claimed reward on that score.

The story of Lykurgus, that the Athenian people, on the proposition of Kritias, exhumed and brought to trial the dead body of Phrynichus, and that Aristarchus and Alexiklês were put to death for undertaking its defence, is certainly in part false, and probably wholly false. Aristarchus was then at Œnoê, Alexiklês at Dekeleia.

[120] Onomaklês had been one of the colleagues of Phrynichus, as general of the armament in Ionia, in the preceding autumn (Thucyd. viii, 25).

In one of the Biographies of Thucydidês (p. xxii, in Dr. Arnold's edition), it is stated that Onomaklês was executed along with the other two; but the document cited in the Pseudo-Plutarch contradicts this.

[121] Plutarch, Vit. x, Oratt. p. 834; compare Xenophon, Hellenic. i, 7, 22.

Apolêxis was one of the accusers of Antiphon: see Harpokration, v. Στασιώτης.

[122] Thucyd. viii, 68; Aristotel. Ethic. Eudem. iii, 5.

Rühnken seems quite right (Dissertat. De Antiphont. p. 818, Reisk.) in considering the oration περὶ μεταστάσεως to be Antiphon's defence of himself; though Westermann (Geschichte der Griech. Beredsamkeit, p. 277) controverts this opinion. This oration is alluded to in several of the articles in Harpokration.

[123] So, Themistoklês, as a traitor, was not allowed to be buried in Attica (Thucyd. i, 138; Cornel. Nepos, Vit. Themistocl. ii, 10). His friends are said to have brought his bones thither secretly.

[124] It is given at length in Pseudo-Plutarch, Vit. x, Oratt. pp. 833, 834. It was preserved by Cæcilius, a Sicilian and rhetorical teacher, of the Augustan age; who possessed sixty orations ascribed to Antiphon, twenty-five of which he considered spurious.

Antiphon left a daughter, whom Kallæschrus sued for in marriage, pursuant to the forms of law, being entitled to do so on the score of near relationship (ἐπεδικάσατο). Kallæschrus was himself one of the Four Hundred, perhaps a brother of Kritias. It seems singular that the legal power of suing at law for a female in marriage, by right of near kin (τοῦ ἐπιδικάζεσθαι), could extend to a female disfranchised and debarred from all rights of citizenship.

If we may believe Harpokration, Andron, who made the motion in the senate for sending Antiphon and Archeptolemus to trial, had been himself a member of the Four Hundred oligarchs, as well as Theramenês (Harp. v. Ἄνδρων).

The note of Dr. Arnold upon that passage (viii, 68) wherein Thucydidês calls Antiphon ἀρετῇ οὐδενὸς ὕστερος, "inferior to no man in virtue," well deserves to be consulted. This passage shows, in a remarkable manner, what were the political and private qualities which determined the esteem of Thucydidês. It shows that his sympathies went along with the oligarchical party; and that, while the exaggerations of opposition-speakers, or demagogues, such as those which he imputes to Kleon and Hyperbolus, provoked his bitter hatred, exaggerations of the oligarchical warfare, or multiplied assassinations, did not make him like a man the worse. But it shows, at the same time, his great candor in the narration of facts: for he gives an undisguised revelation both of the assassinations, and of the treason, of Antiphon.

[125] Xenoph. Hellenic. i, 7, 28. This is the natural meaning of the passage; though it *may* also mean that a day for trial was named, but that Aristarchus did not appear. Aristarchus may possibly have been made prisoner in one of the engagements which took place between the garrison of Dekeleia and the Athenians. The Athenian exiles in a body established themselves at Dekeleia, and carried on constant war with the citizens at Athens: see Lysias, De Bonis Niciæ Fratris, Or. xviii, ch. 4, p. 604: Pro Polystrato, Orat. xx, c. 7, p. 688; Andokidês de Mysteriis, c. 17, p. 50.

[126] Lysias, De Oleâ Sacrâ, Or. vii, ch. ii, p. 263, Reisk.

[127] "Quadringentis ipsa dominatio fraudi non fuit; imo qui cum Theramene et Aristocrate steterant, in magno honore habiti sunt: omnibus autem rationes reddendæ fuerunt; qui solum vertissent, proditores judicati sunt, nomina in publico proposita." (Wattenbach, De Quadringentorum Athenis Factione, p. 65.)

From the psephism of Patrokleidês, passed six years subsequently, after the battle of Ægospotamos, we learn that the names of such among the Four Hundred as did not stay to take their trial, were engraved on pillars distinct from those who were tried and condemned either to fine or to various disabilities; Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 75-78: Καὶ ὅσα ὀνόματα τῶν τετρακοσίων τινὸς ἐγγέγραπται, ἢ ἄλλο τι περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ

πραχθέντων ἔστι που γεγραμμένον, *πλὴν ὁπόσα ἐν στήλαις γέγραπται τῶν μὴ ἐνθάδε μεινάντων*, etc. These last names, as the most criminal, were excepted from the amnesty of Patrokleidês.

We here see that there were two categories among the condemned Four Hundred: 1. Those who remained to stand the trial of accountability, and were condemned either to a fine which they could not pay, or to some positive disability. 2. Those who did not remain to stand their trial, and were condemned *par contumace*.

Along with the first category we find other names besides those of the Four Hundred, found guilty as their partisans: ἄλλο τι (ὄνομα) περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πραχθέντων. Among these partisans we may rank the soldiers mentioned a little before, sect. 75: οἱ στρατιῶται, οἷς ὅτι *ἐπέμειναν ἐπὶ τῶν τυράννων* ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἦν ἅπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, εἰπεῖν δ᾽ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ οὐκ ἐξῆν αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ βουλεῦσαι, where the preposition ἐπὶ seems to signify not simply contemporaneousness, but a sort of intimate connection, like the phrase ἐπὶ προστάτου οἰκεῖν (see Matthiæ, Gr. Gr. sect. 584; Kühner, Gr. Gr. sect. 611).

The oration of Lysias pro Polystrato is on several points obscure: but we make out that Polystratus was one of the Four Hundred who did not come to stand his trial of accountability, and was therefore condemned in his absence. Severe accusations were made against him, and he was falsely asserted to be the cousin, whereas he was in reality only fellow-demot, of Phrynichus (sects. 20, 24, 11). The defence explains his non-appearance, by saying that he had been wounded at the battle of Eretria, and that the trial took place immediately after the deposition of the Four Hundred (sects. 14, 24). He was heavily fined, and deprived of his citizenship (sects. 15, 33, 38). It would appear that the fine was greater than his property could discharge; accordingly this fine, remaining unpaid, would become chargeable upon his sons after his death, and unless they could pay it, they would come into the situation of insolvent public debtors to the state, which would debar them from the exercise of the rights of citizenship, so long as the debt remained unpaid. But while Polystratus was alive, his sons were not liable to the state for the payment of his fine; and *they* therefore still remained citizens, and in the full exercise of their rights, though *he* was disfranchised. They were three sons, all of whom had served with credit as hoplites, and even as horsemen, in Sicily and elsewhere. In the speech before us, one of them prefers a petition to the dikastery, that the sentence passed against his father may be mitigated; partly on the ground that it was unmerited, being passed while his father was afraid to stand forward in his own defence, partly as recompense for distinguished military services of all the three sons. The speech was delivered at a time later than the battle of Kynossêma, in the autumn of this year (sect. 31), but not very long after the overthrow of the Four Hundred, and certainly, I think, long before the Thirty; so that the assertion of Taylor (Vit. Lysiæ, p. 55) that *all* the extant orations of Lysias bear date after the Thirty, must be received with this exception.

[128] This testimony of Thucydidês is amply sufficient to refute the vague assertions in the Oration xxv, of Lysias (Δήμου Καταλυσ. Ἀπολ. sects. 34, 35), about great enormities now committed by the Athenians; though Mr. Mitford copies these assertions as if they were real history, referring them to a time four years afterwards (History of Greece, ch. xx, s. 1, vol. iv, p. 327).

[129] Thucyd. viii, 68.

[130] See about the events in Korkyra, vol. vi, ch. 1, p. 283.

[131] Thucyd. viii, 75.

[132] Thucyd. viii, 44, 45.

[133] Thucyd. viii, 61, 62 οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔχοντες means a certain success, not very decisive.

[134] Thucyd. viii, 63.

[135] Thucyd. viii, 78, 79.

[136] Thucyd. viii, 62.

[137] Thucyd. viii, 79.

[138] Thucyd. viii, 80-99.

[139] Thucyd. viii, 83, 84.

[140] Thucyd. viii, 84. Ὁ μέντοι Λίχας οὔτε ἠρέσκετο αὐτοῖς, ἔφη τε χρῆναι Τισσαφέρνει καὶ δουλεύειν Μιλησίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν τῇ βασιλέως τὰ μέτρια, καὶ ἐπιθεραπεύειν ἕως ἂν τὸν πόλεμον εὖ θῶνται. Οἱ δὲ Μιλήσιοι ὠργίζοντό τε αὐτῷ καὶ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ δι᾽ ἄλλα τοιουτότροπα, etc.

[141] Thucyd. viii, 85.

[142] Thucyd. viii, 87.

[143] Thucyd. viii, 87. This greater total, which Tissaphernês pretended that the Great King purposed to send, is specified by Diodorus at three hundred sail. Thucydidês does not assign any precise number (Diodor. xiii, 38, 42, 46).

On a subsequent occasion, too, we hear of the Phenician fleet as intended to be augmented to a total of three hundred sail (Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 4, 1). It seems to have been the sort of standing number for a fleet worthy of the Persian king.

[144] Thucyd. viii, 87, 88, 99.

[145] Diodor. xiii, 38.

[146] Thucyd. viii, 100. Αἰσθόμενος δὲ ὅτι ἐν *τῇ Χίῳ* εἴη, καὶ νομίσας αὐτὸν καθέξειν *αὐτοῦ*, σκοποὺς μὲν κατεστήσατο καὶ ἐν τῇ Λέσβῳ, καὶ *ἐν τῇ ἀντιπέρας ἠπείρῳ*, εἰ ἄρα ποι κινοῖντο αἱ νῆες, ὅπως μὴ λάθοιεν, etc.

I construe τῇ ἀντιπέρας ἠπείρῳ, as meaning the mainland opposite *Chios*, not opposite *Lesbos*. The words may admit either sense, since Χίῳ and αὐτοῦ follow so immediately before: and the situation for the scouts was much more suitable, opposite the northern portion of *Chios*.

[147] Thucyd. viii, 101. The latter portion of this voyage is sufficiently distinct; the earlier portion less so. I describe it in the text differently from all the best and most recent editors of Thucydidês; from whom I dissent with the less reluctance, as they all here take the gravest liberty with his text, inserting the negative οὐ *on pure conjecture*, without the authority of a single MS. Niebuhr has laid it down as almost a canon of criticism that this is never to be done: yet here we have Krüger recommending it, and Haack, Göller, Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and M. Didot, all adopting it as a part of the text of Thucydidês; without even following the caution of Bekker in his small edition, who admonishes the reader, by inclosing the word in brackets. Nay, Dr. Arnold goes so far as to say in note, "*This correction is so certain and so necessary, that it only shows the inattention of the earlier editors that it was not made long since.*"

The words of Thucydidês, *without* this correction, and as they stood universally before Haack's edition (even in Bekker's edition of 1821), are:—

Ὁ δὲ Μίνδαρος ἐν τούτῳ καὶ αἱ ἐκ τῆς Χίου τῶν Πελοποννησίων νῆες ἐπισιτισάμεναι δυσῖν ἡμέραις, καὶ λαβόντες παρὰ τῶν Χίων τρεῖς τεσσαρακοστὰς ἕκαστος Χίας τῇ τρίτῃ διὰ ταχέων *ἀπαίρουσιν ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγιαι, ἵνα μὴ περιτύχωσι ταῖς ἐν τῇ Ἐρέσῳ ναυσίν, ἀλλὰ ἐν ἀριστερᾷ τὴν Λέσβον ἔχοντες ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἤπειρον*. Καὶ προσβαλόντες τῆς Φωκαΐδος ἐς τὸν ἐν Καρτερίοις λιμένα, καὶ ἀριστοποιησάμενοι, παραπλεύσαντες τὴν Κυμαίαν δειπνοποιοῦνται ἐν Ἀργενούσαις τῆς ἠπείρου, ἐν τῷ ἀντιπέρας τῆς Μιτυλήνης, etc.

Haack and the other eminent critics just mentioned, all insist that these words as they stand are absurd and contradictory, and that it is indispensable to insert οὐ before πελάγιαι; so that the sentence stands in their editions *ἀπαίρουσιν ἐκ τῆς Χίου οὐ πελάγιαι*. They all picture to themselves the fleet of Mindarus as sailing from the town of Chios *northward*, and going out at the northern strait. Admitting this, they say, plausibly enough, that the words of the old text involve a contradiction, because Mindarus would be going in the direction towards Eresus, and not away from it; though even then, the propriety of their correction would be disputable. But the word πελάγιος, when applied to ships departing from Chios,—though it may perhaps mean that they round the northeastern corner of the island and then strike west round Lesbos,—yet means also as naturally, and more naturally, to announce them as *departing by the outer sea*, or sailing *on the sea-side* (round the southern and western coast) *of the island*. Accept *this meaning*, and the old words construe perfectly well. Ἀπαίρειν ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγιος is the natural and proper phrase for describing the circuit of Mindarus round the south and west coast of Chios. This, too, was the only way by which he could have escaped the scouts and the ships of Thrasyllus: for which same purpose of avoiding Athenian ships, we find (viii, 80) the squadron of Klearchus, on another occasion, making a long circuit out to sea. If it be supposed, which those who read *οὐ* πελάγιαι must suppose, that Mindarus sailed first up the northern strait between Chios and the mainland, and then turned his course east towards Phokæa, this would have been the course which Thrasyllus expected that he would take; and it is hardly possible to explain why he was not seen both by the Athenian scouts as well as by the Athenian garrison at their station of Delphinium on Chios itself. Whereas, by taking the circuitous route

round the southern and western coast, he never came in sight either of one or the other: and he was enabled, when he got round to the latitude north of the island, to turn to the right and take a straight easterly course, *with Lesbos on his left hand*, but at a sufficient distance from land to be out of sight of all scouts. Ἀνάγεσθαι ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγιος (Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 17), means to strike into the open sea, quite clear of the coast of Asia: that passage does not decisively indicate whether the ships rounded the southeast or the northeast corner of the island.

We are here told that the seamen of Mindarus received from the Chians per head *three Chian tessarakostæ*. Now this is a small Chian coin, nowhere else mentioned; and it is surprising to find so petty and local a denomination of money here specified by Thucydidês, contrasted with the different manner in which Xenophon describes Chian payments to the Peloponnesian seamen (Hellen. i, 6, 12; ii, 1, 5). But the voyage of Mindarus round the south and west of the island explains the circumstance. He must have landed twice on the island during this circumnavigation (perhaps starting in the evening), for dinner and supper: and this Chian coin, which probably had no circulation out of the island, served each man to buy provisions at the Chian landing-places. It was not convenient to Mindarus to take aboard *more* provisions in kind, at the town of Chios; because he had already aboard a stock of provisions for two days, the subsequent portion of his voyage, along the coast of Asia to Sigeium, during which he could not afford time to halt and buy them, and where indeed the territory was not friendly.

It is enough if I can show that the old text of Thucydidês will construe very well, without the violent intrusion of this conjectural *οὐ*. But I can show more: for this negative actually renders even the construction of the sentence awkward at least, if not inadmissible. Surely, ἀπαίρουσιν οὐ πελάγιαι, ἀλλὰ, ought to be followed by a correlative adjective or participle belonging to the same verb ἀπαίρουσιν: yet if we take ἔχοντες as such correlative participle, how are we to construe ἔπλεον? In order to express the sense which Haack brings out, we ought surely to have different words, such as: οὐκ ἄπῃραν ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγιαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἀριστέρᾳ τὴν Λέσβον ἔχοντες ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἤπειρον. Even the change of tense from present to past, when we follow the construction of Haack, is awkward; while if we understand the words in the sense which I propose, the change of tense is perfectly admissible, since the two verbs do not both refer to the same movement or to the same portion of the voyage. "*The fleet starts from Chios out by the sea-side of the island; but when it came to have Lesbos on the left hand, it sailed straight to the continent.*"

I hope that I am not too late to make good my γραφὴν ξενίας, or protest, against the unwarranted right of Thucydidean citizenship which the recent editors have conferred upon this word *οὐ*, in c. 101. The old text ought certainly to be restored; or, if these editors maintain their views, they ought at least to inclose the word in brackets. In the edition of Thucydidês, published at Leipsic, 1845, by C. A. Koth, I observe that the text is still correctly printed, without the negative.

[148] Thucyd. viii, 102. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν τῇ Σηστῷ, … ὡς αὐτοῖς οἵ τε φρυκτωροὶ ἐσήμαινον, καὶ ᾐσθάνοντο τὰ πυρὰ ἐξαίφνης πολλὰ ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ φανέντα, ἔγνωσαν ὅτι ἐσπλέουσιν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι. Καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ταύτης νυκτὸς, ὡς εἶχον τάχους, ὑπομίξαντες τῇ Χερσονήσῳ, παρέπλεον ἐπ᾽ Ἐλαιοῦντος, βουλόμενοι ἐκπλεῦσαι ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ναῦς. *Καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐν Ἀβύδῳ ἑκκαίδεκα ναῦς ἔλαθον, προειρημένης φυλακῆς τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἔξουσιν, ἢν ἐκπλέωσι·* τὰς δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Μινδάρου ἅμα ἕῳ κατιδόντες, etc.

Here, again, we have a difficult text, which has much perplexed the commentators, and which I venture to translate, as it stands in my text, differently from all of them. The words, προειρημένης φυλακῆς τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἔξουσιν, ἢν ἐκπλέωσι, are explained by the Scholiast to mean: "Although watch had been enjoined to them (i.e. to the Peloponnesian guard-squadron at Abydos) by the friendly approaching fleet (of Mindarus), that they should keep strict guard on the Athenians at Sestos, in case the latter should sail out."

Dr. Arnold, Göller, Poppo, and M. Didot, all accept this construction, though all agree that it is most harsh and confused. The former says: "This again is most strangely intended to mean, προειρημένου αὐτοῖς *ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων φίλων* φυλάσσειν τοὺς πολεμίους."

To construe τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ as equivalent to ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων φίλων, is certainly such a harshness as we ought to be very glad to escape. And the construction of the Scholiast involves another liberty which I cannot but consider as objectionable. He supplies, in his paraphrase, the word *καίτοι*, *although*, from his own imagination. There is no indication of *although*, either express or implied, in the text of Thucydidês; and it appears to me hazardous to assume into the meaning so decisive a particle without any authority. The genitive absolute, when annexed to the main predication affirmed in the verb, usually denotes something naturally con-

nected with it in the way of cause, concomitancy, explanation, or modification, not something opposed to it, requiring to be prefaced by an *although*; if this latter be intended, then the word *although* is expressed, not left to be understood. After Thucydidês has told us that the Athenians at Sestos escaped their opposite enemies at Abydos, when he next goes on to add something under the genitive absolute, we expect that it should be a new fact which explains why or how they escaped: but if the new fact which he tells us, far from explaining the escape, renders it more extraordinary (such as, that the Peloponnesians had received strict orders to watch them), he would surely prepare the reader for this new fact by an express particle, such as *although* or *notwithstanding*: "The Athenians escaped, *although* the Peloponnesians had received the strictest orders to watch them and block them up." As nothing equivalent to, or implying, the adversative particle *although* is to be found in the Greek words, so I infer, as a high probability, that it is not to be sought in the meaning.

Differing from the commentators, I think that these words, προειρημένης φυλακῆς τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἔξουσιν, ἦν ἐκπλέωσι, *do* assign the reason for the fact which had been immediately before announced, and which was really extraordinary; namely, that the Athenian squadron was allowed to pass by Abydos, and escape from Sestos to Elæûs. That reason was, that the Peloponnesian guard-squadron had before received special orders from Mindarus, *to concentrate its attention and watchfulness upon his approaching squadron*; hence it arose that they left the Athenians at Sestos unnoticed.

The words τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ are equivalent to τῷ τῶν φίλων ἐπίπλῳ, and the pronoun *αὐτῶν*, which immediately follows, refers to *φίλων* (*the approaching fleet of Mindarus*), not to the Athenians at Sestos, as the Scholiast and the commentators construe it. This mistake about the reference of αὐτῶν seems to me to have put them all wrong.

That τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ must be construed as equivalent to τῷ τῶν φίλων ἐπίπλῳ is certain; but it is not equivalent to ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων φίλων; nor is it possible to construe the words as the Scholiast would understand them: "*orders had been previously given by the approach (or arrival) of their friends*;" whereby we should turn ὁ ἐπίπλους into an acting and commanding personality. The "approach of their friends" is an event, which may properly be said "to have produced an effect," but which cannot be said "to have given previous orders." It appears to me that τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ is the dative case, governed by φυλακῆς; "*a look-out for the arrival of the Peloponnesians*," having been enjoined upon these guardships at Abydos: "*They had been ordered to watch for the approaching voyage of their friends.*" The English preposition *for*, expresses here exactly the sense of the Greek dative; that is, the *object, purpose, or persons whose benefit is referred to*.

The words immediately succeeding, ὅπως αὐτῶν (τῶν φίλων) ἀνακῶς ἔξουσιν, ἦν ἐκπλέωσι, are an expansion of consequences intended to follow from φυλακῆς τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ. "They shall watch for the approach of the main fleet, in order that they may devote special and paramount regard to its safety, in case it makes a start." For the phrase ἀνακῶς ἔχειν, compare Herodot. i, 24; viii, 109. Plutarch, Theseus, c. 33: *ἀνακῶς*, φυλακτῶς, προνοητικῶς, ἐπιμελῶς, the notes of Arnold and Göller here; and Kühner, Gr. Gr. sect. 533, ἀνακῶς ἔχειν τινός, for ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. The words ἀνακῶς ἔχειν express the anxious and special vigilance which the Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos was directed to keep for the arrival of Mindarus and his fleet, which was a matter of doubt and danger: but they would not be properly applicable to the duty of that squadron as respects the opposite Athenian squadron at Sestos, which was hardly of superior force to themselves, and was besides an avowed enemy, in sight of their own port.

Lastly, the words ἦν ἐκπλέωσι refer *to Mindarus and his fleet about to start from Chios, as their subject*, not to the Athenians at Sestos.

The whole sentence would stand thus, if we dismiss the peculiarities of Thucydidês, and express the meaning in common Greek: Καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐν Ἀβύδῳ ἐκκαίδεκα ναῦς (Ἀθηναῖοι) ἔλαθον· προείρητο γὰρ (ἐκείναις ταῖς ναυσὶν) φυλάσσειν τὸν ἐπίπλουν τῶν φίλων, ὅπως *αὐτῶν* (τῶν φίλων) ἀνακῶς ἔξουσιν, ἦν ἐκπλέωσι. The verb φυλάσσειν here, and of course the abstract substantive φυλακὴ which represents it, signifies to *watch* for, or *wait* for: like Thucyd. ii, 3. φυλάξαντες ἔτι νύκτα, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ περίορθρον; also viii, 41, ἐφύλασσε.

If we construe the words in this way, they will appear in perfect harmony with the general scheme and purpose of Mindarus. That admiral is bent upon carrying his fleet to the Hellespont, but to avoid an action with Thrasyllus in doing so. This is difficult to accomplish, and can only be done by great secrecy of proceeding, as well as by an unusual route. He sends orders beforehand from Chios, perhaps even from Milêtus, before he quitted that place, to the Peloponnesian squadron guarding the Hellespont at Abydos. He contemplates the possible case that Thrasyllus may detect his plan, intercept him on the passage, and perhaps block him up or compel him to fight in some roadstead or bay on the coast opposite Lesbos, or on the Troad, which would indeed have come

to pass, had he been seen by a single hostile fishing-boat in rounding the island of Chios. Now the orders sent forward, direct the Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos what they are to do in this contingency; since without such orders, the captain of the squadron would not have known what to do, assuming Mindarus to be intercepted by Thrasyllus; whether to remain on guard at the Hellespont, which was his special duty; or to leave the Hellespont unguarded, keep his attention concentrated on Mindarus, and come forth to help him. "Let your first thought be to insure the safe arrival of the main fleet at the Hellespont, and to come out and render help to it, if it be attacked in its route; even though it be necessary for that purpose to leave the Hellespont for a time unguarded." Mindarus could not tell beforehand the exact moment when he would start from Chios, nor was it, indeed, absolutely certain that he would start at all, if the enemy were watching him: his orders were therefore sent, *conditional* upon his being able to get off (*ἢν ἐκπλέωσι*). But he was lucky enough, by the well-laid plan of his voyage, to get to the Hellespont without encountering an enemy. The Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos, however, having received his special orders, when the fire-signals acquainted them that he was approaching, thought only of keeping themselves in reserve to lend him assistance if he needed it, and neglected the Athenians opposite. As it was night, probably the best thing which they could do, was to wait in Abydos for daylight, until they could learn particulars of his position, and how or where they could render aid.

We thus see both the general purpose of Mindarus, and in what manner the orders which he had transmitted to the Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos, brought about indirectly the escape of the Athenian squadron without interruption from Sestos.

[149] Thucyd. viii, 105, 106; Diodor. xiii, 39, 40.

The general account which Diodorus gives of this battle, is, even in its most essential features, not reconcilable with Thucydidês. It is vain to try to blend them. I have been able to borrow from Diodorus hardly anything except his statement of the superiority of the Athenian pilots and the Peloponnesian epibatæ. He states that twenty-five fresh ships arrived to join the Athenians in the middle of the battle, and determined the victory in their favor: this circumstance is evidently borrowed from the subsequent conflict a few months afterwards.

We owe to him, however, the mention of the chapel or tomb of Hecuba on the headland of Kynossêma.

[150] Thucyd. viii, 107; Diodor. xiii, 41.

[151] Diodor. xiii, 41. It is probable that this fleet was in great part Bœotian; and twelve seamen who escaped from the wreck commemorated their rescue by an inscription in the temple of Athênê at Korôneia; which inscription was read and copied by Ephorus. By an exaggerated and over-literal confidence in the words of it, Diodorus is led to affirm that these twelve men were the only persons saved, and that every other person perished. But we know perfectly that Hippokratês himself survived, and that he was alive at the subsequent battle of Kyzikus (Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 23).

[152] Diodor. xiii, 47. He places this event a year later, but I agree with Sievers in conceiving it as following with little delay on the withdrawal of the protecting fleet (Sievers, Comment. in Xenoph. Hellen. p. 9; note, p. 66).

See Colonel Leake's Travels in Northern Greece, for a description of the Euripus, and the adjoining ground, with a plan, vol. ii, ch. xiv, pp. 259-265.

I cannot make out from Colonel Leake what is the exact breadth of the channel. Strabo talks in his time of a bridge reaching two hundred feet (x, p. 400). But there must have been material alterations made by the inhabitants of Chalkis during the time of Alexander the Great (Strabo, x, p. 447). The bridge here described by Diodorus, covering an open space broad enough for one ship, could scarcely have been more than twenty feet broad; for it was not at all designed to render the passage easy. The ancient ships could all lower their masts. I cannot but think that Colonel Leake (p. 259) must have read, in Diodorus, xiii, 47, οὐ in place of ὀ.

[153] Thucyd. viii, 107.

[154] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 1, 17. Compare a like exclamation, under nobler circumstances, from the Spartan Kallikratidas, Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 7; Plutarch, Lysander, c. 6.

[155] Thucyd. viii, 108; Diodor. xiii, 42.

[156] Thucyd. viii, 109.

[157] Diodor. xiii, 46. This is the statement of Diodorus, and seems probable enough, though he makes a strange confusion in the Persian affairs of this year, leaving out the name of Tissaphernês, and jumbling the acts of Tissaphernês with the name of Pharnabazus.

[158] Thucyd. viii, 109. It is at this point that we have to part company with the historian Thucydidês, whose work not only closes without reaching any definite epoch or limit, but even breaks off, as we possess it, in the middle of a sentence.

The full extent of this irreparable loss can hardly be conceived, except by those who have been called upon to study his work with the profound and minute attention required from an historian of Greece. To pass from Thucydidês to the Hellenica of Xenophon, is a descent truly mournful; and yet, when we look at Grecian history as a whole, we have great reason to rejoice that even so inferior a work as the latter has reached us. The historical purposes and conceptions of Thucydidês, as set forth by himself in his preface, are exalted and philosophical to a degree altogether wonderful, when we consider that he had no preëxisting models before him from which to derive them; nor are the eight books of his work, in spite of the unfinished condition of the last, unworthy of these large promises, either in spirit or in execution. Even the peculiarity, the condensation, and the harshness, of his style, though it sometimes hides from us his full meaning, has the general effect of lending great additional force and of impressing his thoughts much more deeply upon every attentive reader.

During the course of my two last volumes, I have had frequent occasion to notice the criticisms of Dr. Arnold in his edition of Thucydidês, most generally on points where I dissented from him. I have done this, partly because I believe that Dr. Arnold's edition is in most frequent use among all English readers of Thucydidês, partly because of the high esteem which I entertain for the liberal spirit, the erudition, and the judgment, which pervade his criticisms generally throughout the book. Dr. Arnold deserves, especially, the high commendation, not often to be bestowed even upon learned and exact commentators, of conceiving and appreciating antiquity as a living whole, and not merely as an aggregate of words and abstractions. His criticisms are continually adopted by Göller in the second edition of his Thucydidês, and to a great degree also by Poppo. Desiring, as I do sincerely, that his edition may long maintain its preëminence among English students of Thucydidês, I have thought it my duty at the same time to indicate many of the points on which his remarks either advance or imply views of Grecian history different from my own.

[159] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 9.

[160] Thucyd. viii, 108. Diodorus (xiii, 38) talks of this influence of Alkibiadês over the satrap as if it were real. Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 26) speaks in more qualified language.

[161] Thucyd. viii, 108. πρὸς τὸ μετόπωρον. Haack and Sievers (see Sievers, Comment. ad Xenoph. Hellen. p. 103) construe this as indicating the middle of August, which I think too early in the year.

[162] Diodorus (xiii, 46) and Plutarch (Alkib. c. 27) speak of his coming to the Hellespont by accident, κατὰ τύχην, which is certainly very improbable.

[163] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 6, 7.

[164] Diodor. xiii, 47-49.

[165] Diodor. xiii, 48. Sievers (Commentat. ad Xenoph. Hellen. p. 12; and p. 65, note 58) controverts the reality of these tumults in Korkyra, here mentioned by Diodorus, but not mentioned in the Hellenika of Xenophon, and contradicted, as he thinks, by the negative inference derivable from Thucyd. iv, 48, ὅσα γε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε. But it appears to me that F. W. Ullrich (Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thukydides, pp. 95-99), has properly explained this phrase of Thucydidês as meaning, in the place here cited, the first ten years of the Peloponnesian war, between the surprise of Platæa and the Peace of Nikias.

I see no reason to call in question the truth of these disturbances in Korkyra, here alluded to by Diodorus.

[166] Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 2, 25.

[167] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 9; Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 27.

[168] Diodor. xiii, 49. Diodorus specially notices this fact, which must obviously be correct. Without it, the surprise of Mindarus could not have been accomplished.

[169] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 14-20; Diodor. xiii, 50, 51.

The numerous discrepancies between Diodorus and Xenophon, in the events of these few years, are collected by Sievers, Commentat. in Xenoph. Hellen. note, 62, pp. 65, 66, *seq.*

[170] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 23. Ἔῤῥει τὰ κᾶλα· Μίνδαρος ἀπεσσούα· πεινῶντι τῶνδρες· ἀπορέομες τἰ χρὴ δρᾷν.

Plutarch, Alkib. c. 28.

[171] Diodor. xiii, 52.

[172] Diodor. xiii, 53.

[173] See the preceding vol. vi, ch. liv, p. 455.

[174] Diodor. xiii, 52.

[175] Philochorus (ap. Schol. ad Eurip. Orest. 371) appears to have said that the Athenians rejected the proposition as insincerely meant: Λακεδαιμονίων πρεσβευσαμένων περὶ εἰρήνης *ἀπιστήσαντες* οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ προσήκαντο; compare also Schol. ad Eurip. Orest. 772, Philochori Fragment.

[176] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 24-26; Strabo, xiii, p. 606.

[177] See Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 71; and Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 22. καὶ δεκατευτήριον κατεσκεύασαν ἐν αὐτῇ (Χρυσοπόλει), καὶ *τὴν δεκάτην* ἐξέλεγοντο τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλοίων: compare iv, 8, 27; and v, 1, 28; also Diodor. xiii, 64.

The expression, τὴν δεκάτην, implies that this tithe was something known and preëstablished.

Polybius (iv, 44) gives credit to Alkibiadês for having been the first to suggest this method of gain to Athens. But there is evidence that it was practised long before, even anterior to the Athenian empire, during the times of Persian preponderance (see Herodot. vi, 5).

See a striking passage, illustrating the importance to Athens of the possession of Byzantium, in Lysias, Orat. xxviii, cont. Ergokl. sect. 6.

[178] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 32; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. s. 48, c. 14, p. 474.

[179] Thucyd. viii, 64.

[180] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 32.

[181] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 35-36. He says that the ships of Klearchus, on being attacked by the Athenians in the Hellespont, fled first to *Sestos*, and afterwards to Byzantium. But *Sestos* was the *Athenian* station. The name must surely be put by inadvertence for *Abydos*, the Peloponnesian station.

[182] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 34; i, 2, 1. Diodorus (xiii, 64) confounds Thrasybulus with Thrasyllus.

[183] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 5-11. Xenophon distinguishes these twenty-five Syracusan triremes into τῶν προτέρων εἴκοσι νεῶν, and then αἱ ἕτεραι πέντε, αἱ νεωστὶ ἥκουσαι. But it appears to me that the twenty triremes, as well as the five, must have come to Asia since the battle of Kyzikus, though the five may have been somewhat later in their period of arrival. All the Syracusan ships in the fleet of Mindarus were destroyed; and it seems impossible to imagine that that admiral can have left twenty Syracusan ships at Ephesus or Milêtus in addition to those which he took with him to the Hellespont.

[184] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 8-15.

[185] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 13-17; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 29.

[186] Diodor. xiii, 64. The slighting way in which Xenophon (Hellen. i, 2, 18) dismisses this capture of Pylos, as a mere retreat of some runaway Helots from Malea, as well as his employment of the name *Koryphasion*, and not of *Pylos*, prove how much he wrote after Lacedæmonian informants.

[187] Diodor. xiii, 64; Plutarch, Coriolan. c. 14.

Aristotle, Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία, ap. Harpokration, v. Δεκάζων, and in the Collection of Fragment. Aristotel. no. 72, ed. Didot (Fragment. Historic. Græc. vol. ii, p. 127).

[188] Diodor. xiii, 65.

[189] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 36.

[190] Polyb. iv, 44-45.

[191] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 5-7; Diodor. xiii, 66.

[192] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 9. Ὑποτελεῖν τὸν φόρον Καλχηδονίους Ἀθηναίοις ὅσονπερ εἰώθεσαν, καὶ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα χρήματα ἀποδοῦναι· Ἀθηναίους δὲ μὴ πολεμεῖν *Καλχηδονίοις*, ἕως ἂν οἱ παρὰ βασιλέα πρέσβεις

ἔλθωσιν.

This passage strengthens the doubts which I threw out in a former chapter, whether the Athenians ever did or could realize their project of commuting the tribute, imposed upon the dependent allies, for an *ad valorem* duty of five per cent. on imports and exports, which project is mentioned by Thucydidês (vii, 28) as having been resolved upon at least, if not carried out, in the summer of 413 B.C. In the bargain here made with the Chalkêdonians, it seems implied that the payment of tribute was the last arrangement subsisting between Athens and Chalkêdon, at the time of the revolt of the latter.

Next, I agree with the remark made by Schneider, in his note upon the passage, Ἀθηναίους δὲ μὴ πολεμεῖν *Καλχηδονίοις*. He notices the tenor of the covenant as it stands in Plutarch, τὴν Φαρναβάζου δὲ χώραν μὴ ἀδικεῖν (Alkib. c. 31), which is certainly far more suitable to the circumstances. Instead of Καλχηδονίοις, he proposes to read Φαρναβάζῳ. At any rate, this is the meaning.

[193] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 15-22; Diodor. xiii, 67; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 31.

The account given by Xenophon of the surrender of Byzantium, which I have followed in the text, is perfectly plain and probable. It does not consist with the complicated stratagem described in Diodorus and Plutarch, as well as in Frontinus, iii, xi, 3; alluded to also in Polyænus, i, 48, 2.

[194] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 1.

[195] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 2-3.

[196] The Anabasis of Xenophon (i, 1, 6-8; i, 9, 7-9) is better authority, and speaks more exactly, than the Hellenica, i, 4, 3.

[197] See the anecdote of Cyrus and Lysander in Xenoph. Œconom. iv, 21-23.

[198] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 3-8. The words here employed respecting the envoys, when returning after their three years' detention, ὅθεν πρὸς τὸ ἄλλο στρατόπεδον ἀπέπλευσαν, appear to me an inadvertence. The return of the envoys must have been in the spring of 404 B.C., at a time when Athens had no camp: the surrender of the city took place in April 404 B.C. Xenophon incautiously speaks as if that state of things which existed when the envoys departed, still continued at their return.

[199] The words of Thucydidês (ii, 65) imply this as his opinion, Κύρῳ τε ὕστερον βασιλέως παιδὶ προσγενομένῳ, etc.

[200] The commencement of Lysander's navarchy, or year of maritime command, appears to me established for this winter. He had been some time actually in his command before Cyrus arrived at Sardis: Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, *πρότερον τούτων οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ* Κρατησιππίδᾳ τῆς ναυαρχίας παρεληλυθυίας, Λύσανδρον ἐξέπεμψαν ναύαρχον. Ὁ δὲ ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ῥόδον καὶ ναῦς ἐκεῖθεν λαβών, ἐς Κῶ καὶ Μίλητον ἔπλευσεν· ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ἐς Ἔφεσον· καὶ *ἐκεῖ ἔμεινε*, ναῦς ἔχων ἑβδομήκοντα, *μέχρις οὗ Κῦρος ἐς Σάρδεις ἀφίκετο* (Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 1).

Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. H. ad ann. 407 B.C.) has, I presume, been misled by the first words of this passage, πρότερον τούτων οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, when he says: "During the stay of Alcibiadês at Athens, Lysander is sent as ναύαρχος, Xen. Hell. i, 5, 1. Then followed the defeat of Antiochus, the deposition of Alcibiadês, and the substitution of ἄλλους δέκα, between September 407 *and September* 406, *when Callicratidas succeeded Lysander*."

Now Alkibiadês came to Athens in the month of Thargelion, or about the end of May, 407, and stayed there till the beginning of September, 407. Cyrus arrived at Sardis before Alkibiadês reached Athens, and Lysander had been some time at his post before Cyrus arrived; so that Lysander was not sent out "during the stay of Alcibiadês at Athens," but some months before. Still less is it correct to say that Kallikratidas succeeded Lysander in September, 406. The battle of Arginusæ, wherein Kallikratidas perished, was fought about August, 406, after he had been admiral for several months. The words πρότερον τούτων, when construed along with the context which succeeds, must evidently be understood in a large sense; "*these events*," mean the general series of events which begins i, 4, 8; the proceedings of Alkibiadês, from the beginning of the spring of 407.

[201] Ælian, V. H. xii, 43; Athenæus, vi, p. 271. The assertion that Lysander belonged to the class of mothakes is given by Athenæus as coming from Phylarchus, and I see no reason for calling it in question. Ælian states the same thing respecting Gylippus and Kallikratidas, also; I do not know on what authority.

[202] Theopompus, Fragm. 21, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 30.

[203] Plutarch, Lysander, c. 8.

[204] Diodor. xiii, 65; Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 2, 11. I presume that this conduct of Kratesippidas is the fact glanced at by Isokratês de Pace, sect. 128, p. 240, ed. Bekk.

[205] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 3-4; Diodor. xiii, 70; Plutarch, Lysander, c. 4. This seems to have been a favorite metaphor, either used by, or at least ascribed to, the Persian grandees; we have already had it, a little before, from the mouth of Tissaphernês.

[206] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 5. εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὰς συνθήκας οὕτως ἐχούσας, τριάκοντα μνᾶς ἑκάστῃ νηῒ τοῦ μηνὸς διδόναι, ὁπόσας ἂν βούλοιντο τρέφειν Λακεδαιμόνιοι.

This is not strictly correct. The rate of pay is not specified in either of the three conventions, as they stand in Thucyd. viii, 18, 37, 58. It seems to have been, from the beginning, matter of verbal understanding and promise; first, a drachma per day was promised by the envoys of Tissaphernês at Sparta; next, the satrap himself, at Milêtus, cut down this drachma to half a drachma, and promised this lower rate for the future (viii, 29).

Mr. Mitford says: "Lysander proposed that an Attic drachma, *which was eight oboli*, nearly tenpence sterling, should be allowed for daily pay to every seaman."

Mr. Mitford had in the previous sentence stated *three oboli* as equal to not quite *fourpence* sterling. Of course, therefore, it is plain that he did not consider three oboli as the half of a drachma (Hist. Greece, ch. xx, sect. i. vol. iv, p. 317, oct. ed. 1814).

That a drachma was equivalent to *six* oboli, that is, an Æginæan drachma to six Æginæan oboli, and an Attic drachma to six Attic oboli, is so familiarly known, that I should almost have imagined the word *eight*, in the first sentence here cited, to be a misprint for *six*, if the sentence cited next had not clearly demonstrated that Mr. Mitford really believed a drachma to he equal to *eight* oboli. It is certainly a mistake surprising to find.

[207] Thucyd. viii, 29.

[208] See the former volume vi, ch. li, p. 287.

[209] See the remarkable character of Cyrus the younger, given in the Anabasis of Xenophon, i, 9, 22-28.

[210] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 13; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 4-9.

[211] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 10.

[212] Diodor. xiii, 70; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 5.

[213] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 8-10; Diodor. xiii, 72. The chronology of Xenophon, though not so clear as we could wish, deserves unquestionable preference over that of Diodorus.

[214] Diodor. xiii, 68; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 31; Athenæ. xii, p. 535.

[215] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 18, 19. Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ, πρὸς τὴν γῆν ὁρμισθεὶς, ἀπέβαινε μὲν οὐκ εὐθέως, φοβούμενος τοὺς ἐχθρούς· ἐπαναστὰς δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ καταστρώματος, ἐσκόπει τοὺς αὐτοῦ ἐπιτηδείους, εἰ παρείησαν. Κατιδὼν δὲ Εὐρυπτόλεμον τὸν Πεισιάνακτος, ἑαυτοῦ δὲ ἀνεψιὸν, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἰκείους καὶ φίλους μετ᾽ αὐτῶν, τότε ἀποβὰς ἀναβαίνει ἐς τὴν πόλιν, μετὰ τῶν παρεσκευασμένων, εἴ τις ἅπτοιτο, μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν.

[216] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 20; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 33; Diodor. xiii, 69.

[217] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 14-16.

[218] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 15.

[219] This point is justly touched upon, more than once, by Cornelius Nepos, Vit. Alcibiad. c. 6: "Quanquam Theramenês et Thrasybulus eisdem rebus præfuerant." And again, in the life of Thrasybulus (c. 1). "Primum Peloponnesiaco bello multa hic (Thrasybulus) sine Alcibiade gessit; ille nullam rem sine hoc."

[220] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 20. λεχθέντων δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων, καὶ *οὐδενὸς ἀντειπόντος, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀνασχέσθαι ἂν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν*, etc.

[221] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 21. Both Diodorus (xiii, 69) and Cornelius Nepos (Vit. Alcib. c. 7) state Thrasybulus and Adeimantus as his colleagues: both state also that his colleagues were chosen on his recommendation. I follow Xenophon as to the names, and also as to the fact, that they were named as κατὰ γῆν στρατηγοί.

[222] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 20; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 34. Neither Diodorus nor Cornelius Nepos mentions this remarkable incident about the escort of the Eleusinian procession.

[223] Diodor. xiii, 72, 73.

[224] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 22; i, 5, 18; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 35; Diodor. xiii, 69. The latter says that Thrasybulus was left at Andros, which cannot be true.

[225] Xenophon, Hellen. i, 5, 9; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 4. The latter tells us that the Athenian ships were presently emptied by the desertion of the seamen; a careless exaggeration.

[226] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9. I venture to antedate the statements which he there makes, as to the encouragements from Cyrus to Lysander.

[227] Diodor. xiii, 73. I follow Diodorus in respect to this story about Kymê which he probably copied from the Kymæan historian Ephorus. Cornelius Nepos (Alcib. c. 7) briefly glances at it.

Xenophon (Hellen. i, 5, 11) as well as Plutarch (Lysand. c. 5) mention the visit of Alkibiadês to Thrasybulus at Phokæa. They do not name Kymê, however: according to them, the visit to Phokæa has no assignable purpose or consequences. But the plunder of Kymê is a circumstance both sufficiently probable in itself, and suitable to the occasion.

[228] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 12-15: Diodor. xiii, 71: Plutarch, Alkib. c. 35; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 5.

[229] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 15; Diodor. xiii, 76.

I copy Diodorus, in putting Teos, pursuant to Weiske's note, in place of Eion, which appears in Xenophon. I copy the latter, however, in ascribing these captures to the year of Lysander, instead of to the year of Kallikratidas.

[230] Plutarch. Alkib. c. 36. He recounts, in the tenth chapter of the same biography, an anecdote, describing the manner in which Antiochus first won the favor of Alkibiadês, then a young man, by catching a tame quail, which had escaped from his bosom.

[231] A person named *Thrason* is mentioned in the Choiseul Inscription (No. 147, pp. 221, 222, of the Corp. Inscr. of Boeckh) as one of the Hellenotamiæ in the year 410 B.C. He is described by his Deme as *Butades*; he is probably enough the father of this Thrasybulus.

[232] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 16-17. Ἀλκιβιάδης μὲν οὖν, πονηρῶς καὶ ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ φερόμενος, etc. Diodor. xiii, 73. ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ διαβολαὶ κατ᾽ αὐτοῦ, etc.

Plutarch Alkib. c. 36.

One of the remaining speeches of Lysias (Orat. xxi, Ἀπολογία Δωροδοκίας) is delivered by the trierarch in this fleet, on board of whose ship Alkibiadês himself chose to sail. This trierarch complains of Alkibiadês as having been a most uncomfortable and troublesome companion (sect. 7). His testimony on the point is valuable; for there seems no disposition here to make out any case against Alkibiadês. The trierarch notices the fact, that Alkibiadês preferred *his* trireme, simply as a proof that it was the best equipped, or among the best equipped, of the whole fleet. Archestratus and Erasinidês preferred it afterwards, for the same reason.

[233] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 16. Οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ἠγγέλθη ἡ ναυμαχία, χαλεπῶς εἶχον τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, οἰόμενοι *δι᾽ ἀμέλειάν τε καὶ ἀκράτειαν* ἀπολωλεκέναι τὰς ναῦς.

The expression which Thucydidês employs in reference to Alkibiadês requires a few words of comment: (vi, 15) *καὶ δημοσίᾳ κράτιστα διαθέντα τὰ τοῦ πολέμου*, ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστοι τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀχθεσθέντες, καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες (the Athenians), οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἔσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν.

The "strenuous and effective prosecution of warlike business" here ascribed to Alkibiadês, is true of all the period between his exile and his last visit to Athens (about September B.C. 415 to September B.C. 407). During the first four years of that time, he was very effective against Athens; during the last four, very effective in her service.

But the assertion is certainly not true of his last command, which ended with the battle of Notium; nor is it more than partially true, at least, it is an exaggeration of the truth, for the period before his exile.

[234] To meet the case of Nikias, it would be necessary to take the converse of the judgment of Thucydidês respecting Alkibiadês, cited in my last note, and to say: καὶ δημοσίᾳ *κάκιστα* διαθέντα τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστοι *τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα αὐτοῦ ἀγασθέντες*, καὶ *αὐτῷ* ἐπιτρέψαντες, οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἔσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν.

The reader will of course understand that these last Greek words are *not* an actual citation, but a transformation of the actual words of Thucydidês, for the purpose of illustrating the contrast between Alkibiadês and Nikias.

[235] Thucyd. viii, 48. τὸν δὲ δῆμον, σφῶν τε, of the allied dependencies, καταφυγὴν, καὶ ἐκείνων, *i.e.* of the high persons called καλοκἀγαθοὶ, or optimates σωφρονιστήν.

[236] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 18; Diodor. xiii, 74.

[237] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 19; Pausan. vi, 7, 2.

[238] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 20; compare i, 6, 16; Diodor. xiii, 77.

[239] Virgil, Æneid, vi, 870.

Ostendent terris hunc tantum fata, neque ultra

Esse sinent.

[240] How completely this repayment was a manœuvre for the purpose of crippling his successor,—and not an act of genuine and conscientious obligation to Cyrus, as Mr. Mitford represents it,—we may see by the conduct of Lysander at the close of the war. He then carried away with him to Sparta all the residue of the tributes from Cyrus which he had in his possession, instead of giving them back to Cyrus (Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 8). This obligation to give them back to Cyrus was greater at the end of the war than it was at the time when Kallikratidas came out, and when war was still going on; for the war was a joint business, which the Persians and the Spartans had sworn to prosecute by common efforts.

[241] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 5. ὑμεῖς δὲ, πρὸς ἃ ἐγὼ τε φιλοτιμοῦμαι, καὶ ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν αἰτιάζεται (ἴστε γὰρ αὐτὰ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐγὼ), ξυμβουλεύετε, etc.

[242] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 7; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 6.

[243] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 9. ὑμᾶς δὲ ἐγὼ ἀξιῶ προθυμοτάτους εἶναι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, διὰ τὸ οἰκοῦντας ἐν βαρβάροις πλεῖστα κακὰ ἤδη ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν πεπονθέναι.

[244] Plutarch, Apophthegm. Laconic. p. 222, C, Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 12.

[245] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 34.

[246] Diodor. xiii, 99.

[247] I infer this from the fact, that at the period of the battle of Arginusæ, both these towns appear as adhering to the Peloponnesians; whereas during the command of Alkibiadês they had been both Athenian (Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 11; i, 6, 33; Diodor. xiii, 73-99).

[248] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 14. Καὶ κελευόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων ἀποδόσθαι καὶ τοὺς Μηθυμναίους, οὐκ ἔφη ἑαυτοῦ γε ἄρχοντος οὐδένα Ἑλλήνων ἐς τοὐκείνου δυνατὸν ἀνδραποδισθῆναι.

Compare a later declaration of Agesilaus, substantially to the same purpose, yet delivered under circumstances far less emphatic, in Xenophon, Agesilaus, vii, 6.

[249] The sentiment of Kallikratidas deserved the designation of Ἑλληνικώτατον πολίτευμα, far more than that of Nikias, to which Plutarch applies those words (Compar. of Nikias and Crassus, c. 2).

[250] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 15. Κόνωνι δὲ εἶπεν, ὅτι παύσει αὐτὸν μοιχῶντα τὴν θάλασσαν, etc. He could hardly *say this* to Konon, in any other way than through the Athenian prisoners.

[251] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 17; Diodor. xiii, 78, 79.

Here, as on so many other occasions, it is impossible to blend these two narratives together. Diodorus conceives the facts in a manner quite different from Xenophon, and much less probable. He tells us that Konon practised a stratagem during his flight (the same in Polyænus, i, 482), whereby he was enabled to fight with and defeat the foremost Peloponnesian ships before the rest came up: also, that he got into the harbor in time to put it into a state of defence before Kallikratidas came up. Diodorus then gives a prolix description of the battle by which Kallikratidas forced his way in.

The narrative of Xenophon, which I have followed, plainly implies that Konon could have had no time to make preparations for defending the harbor.

[252] Thucyd. viii, 6. τοὺς ἐφόρμους ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς λιμέσιν ἐποιοῦντο (Strabo, xiii, p. 617). Xenophon talks only of *the* harbor, as if it were *one*; and possibly, in very inaccurate language, it might be described as one harbor with two entrances. It seems to me, however, that Xenophon had no clear idea of the locality.

Strabo speaks of the northern harbor as defended by a mole, the southern harbor, as defended by triremes chained together. Such defences did not exist in the year 406 B.C. Probably, after the revolt of Mitylênê in 427 B.C., the Athenians had removed what defences might have been before provided for the harbor.

[253] Plutarch, Apophth. Laconic. p. 222, E.

[254] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 19. Καθελκύσας (Konon) τῶν νεῶν τὰς ἄριστα πλεούσας δύο, ἐπλήρωσε πρὸ ἡμέρας, ἐξ ἁπασῶν τῶν νεῶν τοὺς ἀρίστους ἐρέτας ἐκλέξας, καὶ τοὺς ἐπιβάτας εἰς κοίλην ναῦν μεταβιβάσας, καὶ τὰ *παραῤῥύματα παραβαλών*.

The meaning of παραῤῥύματα is very uncertain. The commentators give little instruction; nor can we be sure that the same thing is meant as is expressed by παραβλήματα (*infra*, ii, 1, 22). We may be quite sure that the matters meant by παραῤῥύματα were something which, if visible at all to a spectator without, would at least afford no indication that the trireme was intended for a speedy start; otherwise, they would defeat the whole contrivance of Konon, whose aim was secrecy. It was essential that this trireme, though afloat, should be made to look as much as possible like to the other triremes which still remained hauled ashore; in order that the Peloponnesians might not suspect any purpose of departure. I have endeavored in the text to give a meaning which answers this purpose, without forsaking the explanations given by the commentators: see Boeckh, Ueber das Attische Seewesen, ch. x, p. 159.

[255] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 22. Διομέδων δὲ βοηθῶν Κόνωνι πολιορκουμένῳ δώδεκα ναυσὶν ὡρμίσατο ἐς τὸν εὔριπον τὸν τῶν Μυτιληναίων.

The reader should look at a map of Lesbos, to see what is meant by the Euripus of Mitylênê, and the other Euripus of the neighboring town of Pyrrha.

Diodorus (xiii, 79) confounds the Euripus of Mitylênê with the harbor of Mitylênê, with which it is quite unconnected. Schneider and Plehn seem to make the same confusion (see Plehn, Lesbiaca, p. 15).

[256] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 24-25; Diodor. xiii, 97.

[257] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 32; Diodor. xiii, 97, 98; the latter reports terrific omens beforehand for the generals.

The answer has been a memorable one, more than once adverted to, Plutarch, Laconic. Apophthegm. p. 832; Cicero, De Offic. i, 24.

[258] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 31. Οὕτω δ᾽ ἐτάχθησαν (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι) ἵνα μὴ διέκπλουν διδοῖεν· χεῖρον γὰρ ἔπλεον. Αἱ δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀντιτεταγμέναι ἦσαν ἅπασαι ἐπὶ μιᾶς, ὡς πρὸς διέκπλουν καὶ περίπλουν παρεσκευασμέναι, διὰ τὸ βέλτιον πλεῖν.

Contrast this with Thucyd. ii, 84-89 (the speech of Phormion), iv, 12; vii, 36.

[259] See Thucyd. iv, 11.

[260] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 33. *ἐπεὶ* δὲ Καλλικρατίδας τε ἐμβαλούσης τῆς νεὼς ἀποπεσὼν ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν ἠφανίσθη, etc.

The details given by Diodorus about this battle and the exploits of Kallikratidas are at once prolix and unworthy of confidence. See an excellent note of Dr. Arnold on Thucyd. iv, 12, respecting the description given by Diodorus of the conduct of Brasidas at Pylos.

[261] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 34; Diodor. xiii, 99, 100.

[262] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 38; Diodor. xiii, 100.

[263] See the narrative of Diodorus (xiii, 100, 101, 102), where nothing is mentioned except about picking up the floating *dead* bodies; about the crime, and offence in the eyes of the people, of omitting to secure burial to so many *dead* bodies. He does not seem to have fancied that there were any *living bodies*, or that it was a question between life and death to so many of the crews. Whereas, if we follow the narrative of Xenophon (Hellen. i, 7), we shall see that the question is put throughout about picking up the *living men*, the *shipwrecked men*, or the men belonging to, and still living aboard of, the broken ships, ἀνελέσθαι τοὺς ναυαγοὺς, τοὺς δυστυχοῦντας, τοὺς καταδύντας (Hellen. ii, 3, 32): compare, especially, ii, 3, 35, πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὰς καταδεδυκυίας ναῦς καὶ τοὺς ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπους (i, 6, 36). The word ναυαγὸς does not mean a dead body, but a *living man* who has suffered shipwreck: *Ναυαγὸς* ἥκω, ξένος, ἀσύλητον γένος (says Menelaus, Eurip. Helen. 457); also 407, Καὶ νῦν τάλας *ναυαγὸς*, ἀπολέσας φίλους Ἐξέπεσον ἐς γῆν τήνδε etc.; again, 538. It corresponds with the Latin *naufragus*: "mersâ rate naufragus assem Dum rogat, et pictâ se tempestate tuetur," (Juvenal, xiv, 301.) Thucydidês does not use the word ναυαγοὺς, but speaks of τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ τὰ ναυαγία, meaning by the latter word the damaged ships, with every person and thing on board.

It is remarkable that Schneider and most other commentators on Xenophon, Sturz in his Lexicon Xenophonteum (v. ἀναίρεσις), Stallbaum ad Platon. Apol. Socrat. c. 20, p. 32, Sievers, Comment. ad Xenoph. Hellen. p. 31, Forchhammer, Die Athener und Sokratês, pp. 30-31, Berlin, 1837, and others, all treat this event as if it were nothing but a question of picking up dead bodies for sepulture. This is a complete misinterpretation of Xenophon; not merely because the word ναυαγὸς, which he uses four several times, means *a living person*, but because there are two other passages, which leave absolutely no doubt about the matter: Παρῆλθε δὲ τις ἐς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, φάσκων ἐπὶ τεύχους ἀλφίτων σωθῆναι· *ἐπιστέλλειν δ᾽ αὐτῷ τοὺς ἀπολλυμένους, ἐὰν σωθῇ, ἀπαγγεῖλαι τῷ δήμῳ, ὅτι οἱ στρατηγοὶ οὐκ ἀνείλοντο τοὺς ἀρίστους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος γενομένους*. Again (ii, 3, 35), Theramenês, when vindicating himself before the oligarchy of Thirty, two years afterwards, for his conduct in accusing the generals, says that the generals brought their own destruction upon themselves by accusing him first, and by saying that the men on the disabled ships might have been saved with proper diligence: φάσκοντες γὰρ (the generals) *οἷόν τε εἶναι σῶσαι τοὺς ἄνδρας, προέμενοι αὐτοὺς ἀπολέσθαι*, ἀποπλέοντες ᾤχοντο. These passages place the point beyond dispute, that the generals were accused of having neglected to save the lives of men on the point of being drowned, and who by their neglect afterwards were drowned, not of having neglected to pick up dead bodies for sepulture. The misinterpretation of the commentators is here of the gravest import. It alters completely the criticisms on the proceedings at Athens.

[264] See Thucyd. i, 50, 51.

[265] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 34. Ἀπώλοντο δὲ τῶν μὲν Ἀθηναίων νῆες πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων τῶν πρὸς τὴν γῆν προσενεχθέντων.

Schneider in his note, and Mr. Mitford in his History, express surprise at the discrepancy between the number *twelve*, which appears in the speech of Euryptolemus, and the number *twenty-five*, given by Xenophon.

But, first, we are not to suppose Xenophon to guarantee those assertions, as to matters of fact which he gives, as coming from Euryptolemus; who as an advocate, speaking in the assembly, might take great liberties with the truth.

Next, Xenophon speaks of the total number of ships ruined or disabled in the action: Euryptolemus speaks of the total number of wrecks afloat and capable of being visited so as to rescue the sufferers, *at the subsequent moment*, when the generals directed the squadron under Theramenês to go out for the rescue. It is to be remembered that the generals went back to Arginusæ from the battle, and there determined, according to their own statement, to send out from thence a squadron for visiting the wrecks. A certain interval of time must therefore have elapsed between the close of the action and the order given to Theramenês. During that interval, undoubtedly, *some* of the disabled ships went down, or came to pieces: if we are to believe Euryptolemus, thirteen out of the twenty-five must have thus disappeared, so that their crews were already drowned, and no more than twelve remained floating for Theramenês to visit, even had he been ever so active and ever so much favored by weather.

I distrust the statement of Euryptolemus, and believe that he most probably underrated the number. But assuming him to be correct, this will only show how much the generals were to blame, as we shall hereafter re-

mark, for not having seen to the visitation of the wrecks *before* they went back to their moorings at Arginusæ.

[266] Boeckh, in his instructive volume, Urkunden über das Attische See-Wesen (vii, p. 84, *seq.*), gives, from inscriptions, a long list of the names of Athenian triremes, between B.C. 356 and 322. All the names are feminine: some curious. We have a long list also of the Athenian ship-builders; since the name of the builder is commonly stated in the inscription along with that of the ship: *Ἐυχάρις*, Ἀλεξιμάου ἔργον; *Σειρήν*, Ἀριστοκράτους ἔργον; *Ἐλευθερία*, Ἀρχενέω ἔργον; *Ἐπίδειξις*, Λυσιστράτου ἔργον; *Δημοκρατία*, Χαιρεστράτου ἔργον, etc.

[267] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 4. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου καθήπτοντο (οἱ στρατηγοὶ) ἐπιστολὴν ἐπεδείκνυε (Theramenês) μαρτύριον· ἣν ἔπεμψαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ εἰς τὴν βουλὴν καὶ εἰς τὸν δῆμον, ἄλλο οὐδὲν αἰτιώμενοι ἢ τὸν χειμῶνα.

[268] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 1; Diodor. xiii, 101: ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ νίκῃ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἐπῄνουν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ περιϊδεῖν ἀτάφους τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡγεμονίας τετελευτηκότας χαλεπῶς διετέθησαν.

I have before remarked that Diodorus makes the mistake of talking about nothing but *dead bodies*, in place of the living ναυαγοὶ spoken of by Xenophon.

[269] Lysias, Orat. xxi (Ἀπολογία Δωροδοκίας), sect. vii.

[270] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 2. Archedêmus is described as τῆς Δεκελείας ἐπιμελούμενος. What is meant by these words, none of the commentators can explain in a satisfactory manner. The text must be corrupt. Some conjecture like that of Dobree seems plausible; some word like τῆς δεκάτης or τῆς δεκατεύσεως, having reference to the levying of the tithe in the Hellespont; which would furnish reasonable ground for the proceeding of Archedêmus against Erasinidês.

The office held by Archedêmus, whatever it was, must have been sufficiently exalted to confer upon him the power of imposing the fine of limited amount called ἐπιβολή.

I hesitate to identify this Archedêmus with the person of that name mentioned in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, ii, 9. There seems no similarity at all in the points of character noticed.

The popular orator Archedêmus was derided by Eupolis and Aristophanês as having sore eyes, and as having got his citizenship without a proper title to it (see Aristophan. Ran. 419-588, with the Scholia). He is also charged, in a line of an oration of Lysias, with having embezzled the public money (Lysias cont. Alkibiad. sect. 25, Orat. xiv).

[271] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 3. Τιμοκράτους δ᾽ εἰπόντος, ὅτι *καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους χρὴ δεθέντας ἐς τὸν δῆμον παραδοθῆναι*, ἡ βουλὴ ἔδησε.

[272] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 4.

[273] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 4. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἐκκλησία ἐγένετο, ἐν ᾗ τῶν στρατηγῶν *κατηγόρουν ἄλλοι τε καὶ Θηραμένης μάλιστα, δικαίους εἶναι λέγων λόγον ὑποσχεῖν, διότι οὐκ ἀνείλοντο τοὺς ναυαγούς*. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ *οὐδενὸς ἄλλου* καθήπτοντο, ἐπιστολὴν ἐπεδείκνυε μαρτύριον· καὶ ἔπεμψαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἐς τὴν βουλὴν καὶ ἐς τὸν δῆμον, ἄλλο οὐδὲν αἰτιώμενοι ἢ τὸν χειμῶνα.

[274] That Thrasybulus concurred with Theramenês in accusing the generals, is intimated in the reply which Xenophon represents the generals to have made (i, 7, 6): Καὶ οὐχ, *ὅτι γε κατηγοροῦσιν ἡμῶν*, ἔφασαν, ψευσόμεθα φάσκοντες *αὐτοὺς αἰτίους* εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ χειμῶνος εἶναι τὸ κωλῦσαν τὴν ἀναίρεσιν.

The plural κατηγοροῦσιν shows that Thrasybulus as well as Theramenês stood forward to accuse the generals, though the latter was the most prominent and violent.

[275] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 17. Euryptolemus says: Κατηγορῶ μὲν οὖν αὐτῶν ὅτι *ἔπεισαν τοὺς ξυνάρχοντας*, βουλομένους πέμπειν γράμματα τῇ τε βουλῇ καὶ ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐπέταξαν τῷ Θηραμένει καὶ Θρασυβούλῳ τετταράκοντα καὶ ἑπτὰ τριήρεσιν ἀνελέσθαι τοὺς ναυαγούς, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἀνείλοντο. Εἶτα νῦν τὴν αἰτίαν κοινὴν ἔχουσιν, ἐκείνων ἰδίᾳ ἁμαρτόντων· καὶ ἀντὶ τῆς τότε φιλανθρωπίας, νῦν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων τε καὶ τινων ἄλλων ἐπιβουλευόμενοι κινδυνεύουσιν ἀπολέσθαι.

We must here construe ἔπεισαν as equivalent to ἀνέπεισαν or μετέπεισαν placing a comma after ξυνάρχοντας. This is unusual, but not inadmissible. To persuade a man to alter his opinion or his conduct, might

be expressed by πείθειν, though it would more properly be expressed by ἀναπείθειν; see ἐπείσθη, Thucyd. iii, 32.

[276] Diodor. xiii, 100, 101.

[277] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 35. If Theramenês really did say, in the actual discussions at Athens on the conduct of the generals, that which he here asserts himself to have said, namely, that the violence of the storm rendered it impossible for any one to put to sea, his accusation against the generals must have been grounded upon alleging that they might have performed the duty at an earlier moment; before they came back from the battle; before the storm arose; before they gave the order to him. But I think it most probable that he misrepresented at the later period what he had said at the earlier, and that he did not, during the actual discussions, admit the sufficiency of the storm as fact and justification.

[278] The total number of ships lost with all their crews was twenty-five, of which the aggregate crews, speaking in round numbers, would be five thousand men. Now we may fairly calculate that each one of the disabled ships would have on board half her crew, or one hundred men, after the action; not more than half would have been slain or drowned in the combat. Even ten disabled ships would thus contain one thousand living men, wounded and unwounded. It will be seen, therefore, that I have understated the number of lives in danger.

[279] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 33.

[280] We read in Thucydidês (vii, 73) how impossible it was to prevail on the Syracusans to make any military movement after their last maritime victory in the Great Harbor, when they were full of triumph, felicitation, and enjoyment.

They had visited the wrecks and picked up both the living men on board and the floating bodies *before* they went ashore. It is remarkable that the Athenians on that occasion were so completely overpowered by the immensity of their disaster, that they never even thought of asking permission, always granted by the victors when asked, to pick up their dead or visit their wrecks (viii, 72).

[281] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 32. The light in which I here place the conduct of Theramenês is not only coincident with Diodorus, but with the representations of Kritias, the violent enemy of Theramenês under the government of the Thirty, just before he was going to put Theramenês to death: Οὗτος δέ τοι ἐστὶν, ὃς ταχθεὶς ἀνελέσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν τοὺς καταδύντας Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ περὶ Λέσβον ναυμαχίᾳ, *αὐτὸς οὐκ ἀνελόμενος* ὅμως τῶν στρατηγῶν κατηγορῶν ἀπέκτεινεν αὐτοὺς, *ἵνα αὐτὸς περισωθείη*. (Xen. ut sup.)

Here it stands admitted that the first impression at Athens was, as Diodorus states expressly, that Theramenês was ordered to pick up the men on the wrecks, might have done it if he had taken proper pains, and was to blame for not doing it. Now how did this impression arise? Of course, through communications received from the armament itself. And when Theramenês, in his reply, says that the generals themselves made communications in the same tenor, there is no reason why we should not believe him, in spite of their joint official despatch, wherein they made no mention of him, and in spite of their speech in the public assembly afterwards, where the previous official letter fettered them, and prevented them from accusing him, forcing them to adhere to the statement first made, of the all-sufficiency of the storm.

The main facts which we here find established, even by the enemies of Theramenês, are: 1. That Theramenês accused the generals because he found himself in danger of being punished for the neglect. 2. That his enemies, who charged him with the breach of duty, did not admit the storm as an excuse for *him*.

[282] Strabo, xiii, p. 617.

[283] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 37. Ἐτεόνικος δὲ, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνοι (the signal-boat, with news of the pretended victory) κατέπλεον, ἔθυε τὰ εὐαγγέλια, καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις παρήγγειλε δειπνοποιεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῖς ἐμπόροις, τὰ χρήματα σιωπῇ ἐνθεμένους ἐς τὰ πλοῖα ἀποπλεῖν ἐς Χίον, ἦν δὲ τὸ *πνεῦμα οὔριον*, καὶ τὰς τριήρεις τὴν ταχίστην. Αὐτὸς δὲ τὸ πεζὸν ἀπῆγεν ἐς τὴν Μήθυμνην, τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐμπρήσας. Κόνων δὲ καθελκύσας τὰς ναῦς, ἐπεὶ οἵ τε πολέμιοι ἀπεδεδράκεσαν, *καὶ ὁ ἄνεμος εὐδιαίτερος ἦν*, ἀπαντήσας τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἤδη ἀνηγμένοις ἐκ τῶν Ἀργινουσῶν, ἔφρασε τὰ περὶ τοῦ Ἐτεονίκου.

One sees, by the expression used by Xenophon respecting the proceedings of Konon, that he went out of the harbor "as soon as the wind became calmer;" that it blew a strong wind, though in a direction favorable to carry the fleet of Eteonikus to Chios. Konon was under no particular motive to go out immediately: he could afford to

wait until the wind became quite calm. The important fact is, that wind and weather were perfectly compatible with, indeed even favorable to, the escape of the Peloponnesian fleet from Mitylênê to Chios.

[284] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 5-7. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οἱ στρατηγοὶ βραχέα ἕκαστος ἀπελογήσατο, οὐ γὰρ προὐτέθη σφίσι λόγος κατὰ τὸν νόμον….

Τοιαῦτα λέγοντες *ἔπειθον* τὸν δῆμον. The imperfect tense *ἔπειθον* must be noticed: "they *were persuading*," or, *seemed in the way to persuade*, the people; not ἔπεισαν the aorist, which would mean that they actually did satisfy the people.

The first words here cited from Xenophon, do not imply that the generals were checked or abridged in their liberty of speaking before the public assembly, but merely that no judicial trial and defence were granted to them. In judicial defence, the person accused had a measured time for defence—by the clepsydra, or water-clock—allotted to him, during which no one could interrupt him; a time doubtless much longer than any single speaker would be permitted to occupy in the public assembly.

[285] Lysias puts into one of his orations a similar expression respecting the feeling at Athens towards these generals; ἡγούμενοι χρῆναι τῇ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἀρετῇ παρ᾽ ἐκείνων δίκην λαβεῖν; Lysias cont. Eratosth. s. 37.

[286] Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 8. Οἱ οὖν περὶ τὸν Θηραμένην παρεσκεύασαν ἀνθρώπους *μέλανα ἱμάτια ἔχοντας, καὶ ἐν χρῷ κεκαρμένους πολλοὺς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἑορτῇ*, ἵνα πρὸς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἥκοιεν, *ὡς δὴ ξυγγενεῖς ὄντες τῶν ἀπολωλότων*.

Here I adopt substantially the statement of Diodorus, who gives a juster and more natural description of the proceeding; representing it as a spontaneous action of mournful and vindictive feeling on the part of the kinsmen of the deceased (xiii, 101).

Other historians of Greece, Dr. Thirlwall not excepted (Hist. of Greece, ch. xxx, vol. iv, pp. 117-125), follow Xenophon on this point. They treat the intense sentiment against the generals at Athens as "popular prejudices;" "excitement produced by the artifices of Theramenês," (Dr. Thirlwall, pp. 117-124.) "Theramenês (he says) hired a great number of persons to attend the festival, dressed in black, and with their heads shaven, as mourning for kinsmen whom they had lost in the sea-fight."

Yet Dr. Thirlwall speaks of the narrative of Xenophon in the most unfavorable terms; and certainly in terms no worse than it deserves (see p. 116, the note): "It looks as if Xenophon had *purposely involved the whole affair in obscurity*." Compare also p. 123, where his criticism is equally severe.

I have little scruple in deserting the narrative of Xenophon, of which I think as meanly as Dr. Thirlwall, so far as to supply, without contradicting any of his main allegations, an omission which I consider capital and preponderant. I accept his account of what actually passed at the festival of the Apaturia, but I deny his statement of the manœuvres of Theramenês as the producing cause.

Most of the obscurity which surrounds these proceedings at Athens arises from the fact, that no notice has been taken of the intense and spontaneous emotion which the desertion of the men on the wrecks was naturally calculated to produce on the public mind. It would, in my judgment, have been unaccountable if such an effect had not been produced, quite apart from all instigations of Theramenês. The moment that we recognize this capital fact, the series of transactions becomes comparatively perspicuous and explicable.

Dr. Thirlwall, as well as Sievers (Commentat. de Xenophontis Hellen. pp. 25-30), suppose Theramenês to have acted in concert with the oligarchical party, in making use of this incident to bring about the ruin of generals odious to them, several of whom were connected with Alkibiadês. I confess, that I see nothing to countenance this idea: but at all events, the cause here named is only secondary, not the grand and dominant fact of the period.

[287] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 8, 9.

[288] Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 34.

[289] I cannot concur with the opinion expressed by Dr. Thirlwall in Appendix iii. vol. iv, p. 501, of his History, on the subject of the psephism of Kannônus. The view which I give in the text coincides with that of the expositors generally, from whom Dr. Thirlwall dissents.

The psephism of Kannônus was the only enactment at Athens which made it illegal to vote upon the case of two accused persons at once. This had now grown into a practice in the judicial proceedings at Athens; so that

two or more prisoners, who were ostensibly tried under some other law, and not under the psephism of Kannônus, with its various provisions, would yet have the benefit of this its particular provision, namely, severance of trial.

In the particular case before us, Euryptolemus was thrown back to appeal to the psephism itself; which the senate, by a proposition unheard of at Athens, proposed to contravene. The proposition of the senate offended against the law in several different ways. It deprived the generals of trial before a sworn dikastery; it also deprived them of the liberty of full defence during a measured time: but farther, it prescribed that they should all be condemned or absolved by one and the same vote; and, in this last respect, it sinned against the psephism of Kannônus. Euryptolemus in his speech, endeavoring to persuade an exasperated assembly to reject the proposition of the senate and adopt the psephism of Kannônus as the basis of the trial, very prudently dwells upon the severe provisions of the psephism, and artfully slurs over what he principally aims at, the severance of the trials, by offering his relative Periklês to be tried *first*. The words δίχα ἕκαστον (sect. 37) appear to me to be naturally construed with κατὰ τὸ Καννώνου ψήφισμα, as they are by most commentators, though Dr. Thirlwall dissents from it. It is certain that this was the capital feature of illegality, among many, which the proposition of the senate presented, I mean the judging and condemning all the generals by *one* vote. It was upon this point that the amendment of Euryptolemus was taken, and that the obstinate resistance of Sokratês turned (Plato, Apol. 20; Xenoph. Memor. i, 1, 18).

Farther, Dr. Thirlwall, in assigning what he believes to have been the real tenor of the psephism of Kannônus, appears to me to have been misled by the Scholiast in his interpretation of the much-discussed passage of Aristophanês, Ekklezias. 1089:—

Τουτὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα κατὰ τὸ Καννώνου σαφῶς
Ψήφισμα, βινεῖν δεῖ με διαλελημμένον,
Πῶς οὖν δικωπεῖν ἀμφοτέρας δυνήσομαι;

Upon which Dr. Thirlwall observes, "that the young man is comparing his plight to that of a culprit, who, under the decree of Cannônus, was placed at the bar held by a person on each side. In this sense the Greek Scholiast, though his words are corrupted, clearly understood the passage."

I cannot but think that the Scholiast understood the words completely wrong. The young man in Aristophanês does not compare his situation *with that of the culprit*, but *with that of the dikastery which tried culprits*. The psephism of Kannônus directed that each defendant should be tried separately: accordingly, if it happened that two defendants were presented for trial, and were both to be tried without a moment's delay, the dikastery could only effect this object by dividing itself into two halves, or portions; which was perfectly practicable, whether often practised or not, as it was a numerous body. By doing this, κρίνειν διαλελημμένον, it could *try both the defendants at once*: but in no other way.

Now the young man in Aristophanês compares himself to the dikastery thus circumstanced; which comparison is signified by the pun of βινεῖν διαλελημμένον in place of κρίνειν διαλελημμένον. He is assailed by two obtrusive and importunate customers, neither of whom will wait until the other has been served. Accordingly he says: "Clearly, I ought to be divided into two parts, like a dikastery acting under the psephism of Kannônus, to deal with this matter: yet how *shall* I be *able* to serve both at once?"

This I conceive to be the proper explanation of the passage in Aristophanês; and it affords a striking confirmation of the truth of that which is generally received as purport of the psephism of Kannônus. The Scholiast appears to me to have puzzled himself, and to have misled every one else.

[290] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7. Τὸν δὲ Καλλίξενον προσεκαλέσαντο παράνομα φάσκοντες ξυγγεγραφέναι Εὐρυπτόλεμός τε καὶ ἄλλοι τινες· τοῦ δὲ δήμου ἔνιοι ταῦτα ἐπῄνουν· τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐβόα *δεινὸν εἶναι, εἰ μή τις ἐάσει τὸν δῆμον πράττειν, ὃ ἂν βούληται*. Καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις εἰπόντος Λυκίσκου, καὶ τούτους τῇ αὐτῇ ψήφῳ κρίνεσθαι, ᾗπερ καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς, *ἐὰν μὴ ἀφῶσι τὴν ἐκκλησίαν*, ἐπεθορύβησε πάλιν ὁ δῆμος, καὶ ἠναγκάσθησαν ἀφιέναι τὰς κλήσεις.

All this violence is directed to the special object of getting the proposition discussed and decided on by the assembly, in spite of constitutional obstacles.

[291] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 11. Παρῆλθε δέ τις ἐς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν φάσκων, ἐπὶ τεύχους ἀλφίτων σωθῆναι· ἐπιστέλλειν δ᾽ αὐτῷ τοὺς ἀπολλυμένους, ἐὰν σωθῇ, ἀπαγγεῖλαι τῷ δήμῳ, ὅτι οἱ στρατηγοὶ οὐκ ἀνείλοντο τοὺς ἀρίστους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος γενομένους.

I venture to say that there is nothing in the whole compass of ancient oratory, more full of genuine pathos and more profoundly impressive, than this simple incident and speech; though recounted in the most bald manner, by an unfriendly and contemptuous advocate.

Yet the whole effect of it is lost, because the habit is to dismiss everything which goes to inculpate the generals, and to justify the vehement emotion of the Athenian public, as if it was mere stage-trick and falsehood. Dr. Thirlwall goes even beyond Xenophon, when he says (p. 119, vol. iv): "A man was *brought forward*, who *pretended* he had been preserved by clinging to a meal-barrel, and that his comrades," etc. So Mr. Mitford: "A man was produced," etc. (p. 347).

Now παρῆλθε does not mean, "*he was brought forward*:" it is a common word employed to signify one who *comes forward* to speak in the public assembly (see Thucyd. iii, 44, and the participle παρελθὼν, in numerous places).

Next, φάσκων while it sometimes means *pretending*, sometimes also means simply *affirming*: Xenophon does not guarantee the matter affirmed, but neither does he pronounce it to be false. He uses φάσκων in various cases where he himself agrees with the fact affirmed (see Hellen. i, 7, 12; Memorab. i, 2, 29; Cyropæd. viii, 3, 41; Plato, Ap. Socr. c. 6, p. 21).

The people of Athens heard and fully believed this deposition; nor do I see any reason why an historian of Greece should disbelieve it. There is nothing in the assertion of this man which is at all improbable; nay, more, it is plain that several such incidents must have happened. If we take the smallest pains to expand in our imaginations the details connected with this painfully interesting crisis at Athens, we shall see that numerous stories of the same affecting character must have been in circulation; doubtless many false, but many also perfectly true.

[292] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 14, 15; Plato, Apol. Socr. c. 20; Xenoph. Memor. i, 1, 18; iv, 4, 2.

In the passage of the Memorabilia, Xenophon says that Sokratês was epistatês, or presiding prytanis, for that actual day. In the Hellenica, he only reckons him as one among the prytanes. It can hardly be accounted certain that he *was* epistatês, the rather as this same passage of the Memorabilia is inaccurate on another point: it names *nine* generals as having been condemned, instead of *eight*.

[293] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 16. *Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα*, that is, after the cries and threats above recounted, ἀναβὰς Εὐρυπτόλεμος ἔλεξεν ὑπὲρ τῶν στρατηγῶν τάδε, etc.

[294] It is this accusation of "reckless hurry," προπέτεια, which Pausanias brings against the Athenians in reference to their behavior toward the six generals (vi, 7, 2).

[295] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 30. Μὴ ὑμεῖς γε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἑαυτῶν ὄντας τοὺς νόμους, δι᾽ οὓς μάλιστα μέγιστοι ἐστε, φυλάττοντες, ἄνευ τούτων μηδὲν πράττειν πειρᾶσθε.

[296] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 35. τούτων δὲ μάρτυρες οἱ σωθέντες ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ὧν εἷς τῶν ὑμετέρων στρατηγῶν ἐπὶ καταδύσης νεὼς σωθεὶς, etc.

[297] The speech is contained in Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 16-36.

[298] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 38. Τούτων δὲ διαχειροτονουμένων, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔκριναν τὴν Εὐρυπτολέμου· ὑπομοσαμένου δὲ Μενεκλέους, καὶ πάλιν διαχειροτονίας γενομένης, ἔκριναν τὴν τῆς βουλῆς.

I cannot think that the explanations of this passage given either by Schömann (De Comitiis Athen. part ii, 1, p. 160, *seq.*) or by Meier and Schömann (Der Attische Prozess, b. iii, p. 295; b. iv, p. 696) are satisfactory. The idea of Schömann, that, in consequence of the unconquerable resistance of Sokratês, the voting upon this question was postponed until the next day, appears to me completely inconsistent with the account of Xenophon; and, though countenanced by a passage in the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue called Axiochus (c. 12), altogether loose and untrustworthy. It is plain to me that the question was put without Sokratês, and could be legally put by the remaining prytanes, in spite of his resistance. The word ὑπομοσία must doubtless bear a meaning somewhat different here to its technical sense before the dikastery; and different also, I think, to the other sense which Meier and Schömann ascribe to it, of *a formal engagement to prefer at some future time an indictment, or γραφὴ παρανόμων*. It seems to me here to denote, an *objection taken on formal grounds, and sustained*

by oath either tendered or actually taken, to the decision of the prytanes, or presidents. These latter had to declare on which side the show of hands in the assembly preponderated: but there surely must have been *some* power of calling in question their decision, if they declared falsely, or if they put the question in a treacherous, perplexing, or obscure manner. The Athenian assembly did not admit of an appeal to a division, like the Spartan assembly or like the English House of Commons; though there were many cases in which the votes at Athens were taken by pebbles in an urn, and not by show of hands.

Now it seems to me that Meneklês here exercised the privilege of calling in question the decision of the prytanes, and constraining them to take the vote over again. He may have alleged that they did not make it clearly understood which of the two propositions was to be put to the vote first; that they put the proposition of Kallixenus first, without giving due notice; or perhaps that they misreported the numbers. By what followed, we see that he had good grounds for his objection.

[299] Diodor. xiii, 101. In regard to these two component elements of the majority, I doubt not that the statement of Diodorus is correct. But he represents, quite erroneously, that the generals were condemned by the vote of the assembly, and led off from the assembly to execution. The assembly only decreed that the subsequent urn-voting should take place, the result of which was necessarily uncertain beforehand. Accordingly, the speech which Diodorus represents Diomedon to have made in the assembly, after the vote of the assembly had been declared, cannot be true history: "Athenians, I wish that the vote which you have just passed may prove beneficial to the city. Do you take care to fulfil those vows to Zeus Soter, Apollo, and the Venerable Goddesses, under which we gained our victory since fortune has prevented us from fulfilling them ourselves." It is impossible that Diomedon can have made a speech of this nature, since he was not then a condemned man; and after the condemnatory vote, no assembly was held.

[300] I translate here literally the language of Sokratês in his Defence (Plato, Apol. c. 20), παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ *πᾶσιν ὑμῖν* ἔδοξε.

[301] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 39. This vote of the public assembly was known at Athens by the name of Probolê. The assembled people discharged on this occasion an ante-judicial function, something like that of a Grand Jury.

[302] Xenophon. Hellen. i, 7, 40. μισούμενος ὑπὸ πάντων, λιμῳ ἀπέθανεν.

[303] This is the supposition of Sievers, Forchhammer, and some other learned men; but, in my opinion, it is neither proved nor probable.

[304] If Thucydidês had lived to continue his history so far down as to include this memorable event, he would have found occasion to notice τὸ ξυγγενὲς, kinship, as being not less capable of ἀπροφάσιστος τόλμα, unscrupulous daring, than τὸ ἑταιρικόν, faction. In his reflections on the Korkyræan disturbances (iii, 82), he is led to dwell chiefly on the latter, the antipathies of faction, of narrow political brotherhood or conspiracy for the attainment and maintenance of power, as most powerful in generating evil deeds: had he described the proceedings after the battle of Arginusæ, he would have seen that the sentiment of kinship, looked at on its antipathetic or vindictive side, is pregnant with the like tendencies.

[305] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 31. *Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ κρατήσαντες τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ πρὸς τὴν γῆν κατέπλευσαν*, Διομέδων μὲν ἐκέλευεν, ἀναχθέντας ἐπὶ κέρως ἅπαντας ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὰ ναυάγια καὶ τοὺς ναυαγοὺς, Ἐρασινίδης δὲ, ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐς Μυτιλήνην πολεμίους τὴν ταχίστην πλεῖν ἅπαντας· Θράσυλλος δ' ἀμφότερα ἔφη γενέσθαι, ἂν τὰς μὲν αὐτοῦ καταλίπωσι, ταῖς δὲ ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους πλέωσι· καὶ δοξάντων τούτων, etc.

I remarked, a few pages before, that the case of Erasinidês stood in some measure apart from that of the other generals. He proposed, according to this speech of Euryptolemus, that all the fleet should at once go again to Mitylênê; which would of course have left the men on the wrecks to their fate.

[306] The statement rests on the authority of Aristotle, as referred to by the Scholiast on the last verse of the Ranæ of Aristophanês. And this, so far as I know, is the only authority: for when Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. ad ann. 406) says that Æschinês (De Fals. Legat. p. 38, c. 24) mentions the overtures of peace, I think that no one who looks at that passage will be inclined to found any inference upon it.

Against it, we may observe:—

1. Xenophon does not mention it. This is something, though far from being conclusive when standing alone.

2. Diodorus does not mention it.

3. The terms alleged to have been proposed by the Lacedæmonians, are exactly the same as those said to have been proposed by them after the death of Mindarus at Kyzikus, namely:—

To evacuate Dekeleia, and each party to stand as they were. Not only the terms are the same, but also the person who stood prominent in opposition is in both cases the same, *Kleophon*. The overtures after Arginusæ are in fact a second edition of those after the battle of Kyzikus.

Now, the supposition that on two several occasions the Lacedæmonians made propositions of peace, and that both are left unnoticed by Xenophon, appears to me highly improbable. In reference to the propositions after the battle of Kyzikus, the testimony of Diodorus outweighed, in my judgment, the silence of Xenophon; but here Diodorus is silent also.

In addition to this, the exact sameness of the two alleged events makes me think that the second is only a duplication of the first, and that the Scholiast, in citing from Aristotle, mistook the battle of Arginusæ for that of Kyzikus, which latter was by far the more decisive of the two.

[307] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 1-4.

[308] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 10-12.

[309] Diodor. xiii, 104; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 8.

[310] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 14; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9.

[311] Lysias, Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. sect. 13.

[312] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 15, 16.

[313] This flying visit of Lysander across the Ægean to the coasts of Attica and Ægina is not noticed by Xenophon, but it appears both in Diodorus and in Plutarch (Diodor. xiii, 104: Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9).

[314] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 18, 19; Diodor. xiii, 104; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9.

[315] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 20, 21.

[316] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 22-24; Plutarch. Lysand. c. 10; Diodor. xiii, 105.

[317] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 25; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 10; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 36.

Diodorus (xiii, 105) and Cornelius Nepos (Alkib. c. 8) represent Alkibiadês as wishing to be readmitted to a share in the command of the fleet, and as promising, if that were granted, that he would assemble a body of Thracians, attack Lysander by land, and compel him to fight a battle or retire. Plutarch (Alkib. c. 37) alludes also to promises of this sort held out by Alkibiadês.

Yet it is not likely that Alkibiadês should have talked of anything so obviously impossible. How could he bring a Thracian land-force to attack Lysander, who was on the opposite side of the Hellespont? How could he carry a land-force across in the face of Lysander's fleet?

The representation of Xenophon (followed in my text) is clear and intelligible.

[318] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 29; Lysias, Orat. xxi, (Ἀπολ. Δωροδ.) s. 12.

[319] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 28; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 11; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 36; Cornel. Nepos, Lysand. c. 8; Polyæn. i, 45, 2.

Diodorus (xiii, 106) gives a different representation of this important military operation; far less clear and trustworthy than that of Xenophon.

[320] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 28. τὰς δ᾽ ἄλλας πάσας (ναῦς) Λύσανδρος ἔλαβε πρὸς τῇ γῇ· τοὺς δὲ πλείστους ἄνδρας ἐν τῇ γῇ *ξυνέλεξεν*· οἱ δὲ καὶ ἔφυγον ἐς τὰ τειχύδρια.

[321] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 29; Diodor. xiii, 106: the latter is discordant, however, on many points.

[322] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 31. This story is given with variations in Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9. and by Cicero de Offic. iii, 11. It is there the right thumb which is to be cut off, and the determination is alleged to have been taken in reference to the Æginetans.

[323] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 32; Pausan. ix, 32, 6; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13.

[324] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1. 32; Lysias cont. Alkib. A. s. 38; Pausan. iv, 17, 2; x, 9, 5; Isokratês ad Philipp. Or. v, sect. 70. Lysias, in his Λόγος Ἐπιτάφιος (s. 58), speaks of the treason, yet not as a matter of certainty.

Cornelius Nepos (Lysand. c. 1; Alcib. c. 8) notices only the disorder of the Athenian armament, not the corruption of the generals, as having caused the defeat. Nor does Diodorus notice the corruption (xiii, 105).

Both these authors seem to have copied from Theopompus, in describing the battle of Ægospotami. His description differs on many points from that of Xenophon (Theopomp. Fragm. 8, ed. Didot).

[325] Demosthen. de Fals. Legat. p. 401, c. 57.

[326] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 3; Diodor. xiii, 107.

[327] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 2; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13.

[328] Cornelius Nepos, Lysand. c. 2; Polyæn. i, 45, 4. It would appear that this is the same incident which Plutarch (Lysand. c. 19) recounts as if the Milesians, not the Thasians, were the parties suffering. It cannot well be the Milesians, however, it we compare chapter 8 of Plutarch's Life of Lysander.

[329] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13. πολλαῖς δὲ παραγινόμενος αὐτὸς σφαγαῖς καὶ συνεκβάλλων τοὺς τῶν φίλων ἐχθροὺς, etc.

[330] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 6. εὐθὺς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς ἀφειστήκει Ἀθηναίων, πλὴν Σαμίων· οὗτοι δὲ, σφαγὰς τῶν γνωρίμων ποιήσαντες, κατεῖχον τὴν πόλιν.

I interpret the words σφαγὰς τῶν γνωρίμων ποιήσαντες to refer to the violent revolution at Samos, described in Thucyd. viii, 21, whereby the oligarchy were dispossessed and a democratical government established. The word σφαγὰς is used by Xenophon (Hellen. v, 4, 14), in a subsequent passage, to describe the conspiracy and revolution effected by Pelopidas and his friends at Thebes. It is true that we might rather have expected the preterite participle πεποιηκότες than the aorist ποιήσαντες. But this employment of the aorist participle in a preterite sense is not uncommon with Xenophon: see κατηγορήσας, δόξας, i, 1, 31; γενομένους, i, 7, 11; ii, 2, 20.

It appears to me highly improbable that the Samians should have chosen this occasion to make a fresh massacre of their oligarchical citizens, as Mr. Mitford represents. The democratical Samians must have been now humbled and intimidated, seeing their subjugation approaching; and only determined to hold out by finding themselves already so deeply compromised though the former revolution. Nor would Lysander have spared them personally afterwards, as we shall find that he did, when he had them substantially in his power (ii, 3, 6), if they had now committed any fresh political massacre.

[331] Xenoph. Memorab. ii, 8, 1; ii, 10, 4; Xenoph. Sympos. iv, 31. Compare Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 24, p. 491.

A great number of new proprietors acquired land in the Chersonese through the Lacedæmonian sway, doubtless in place of these dispossessed Athenians; perhaps by purchase at a low price, but most probably by appropriation without purchase (Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 5).

[332] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 1; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 14, p. 474. Ekphantus and the other Thasian exiles received the grant of ἀτέλεια, or immunity from the peculiar charges imposed upon metics at Athens.

[333] This interesting decree or psephism of Patrokleidês is given at length in the Oration of Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 76-80: Ἃ δ᾽ εἴρηται ἐξαλεῖψαι, μὴ κεκτῆσθαι ἰδίᾳ μηδενὶ ἐξεῖναι, μηδὲ μνησικακῆσαι μηδέποτε.

[334] Andokid. de Myst. s. 76. καὶ πίστιν ἀλλήλοις περὶ ὁμονοίας δοῦναι ἐν ἀκροπόλει.

[335] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 11. τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους ποιήσαντες ἐκαρτέρουν.

[336] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 80-101; Lysias, Orat. xviii, De Bonis Niciæ Fratr. sect. 9.

At what particular moment the severe condemnatory decree had been passed by the Athenian assembly against the exiles serving with the Lacedæmonian garrison at Dekeleia, we do not know. The decree is mentioned by Lykurgus, cont. Leokrat. sects. 122, 123, p. 164.

[337] Isokratês adv. Kallimachum, sect. 71; compare Andokidês de Reditu suo, sect. 21, and Lysias cont. Diogeiton. Or. xxxii, sect. 22, about Cyprus and the Chersonese, as ordinary sources of supply of corn to Athens.

[338] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 9; Diodor. xiii, 107.

[339] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 12-15; Lysias cont. Agorat. sects. 10-12.

[340] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 16; Lysias, Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. sect. 12; Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosthen. sects. 65-71.

See an illustration of the great suffering during the siege, in Xenophon Apolog. Socrat. s. 18.

[341] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 15-21; compare Isokratês, Areopagit. Or. vii, sect. 73.

[342] Lysias, Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. sects. 15, 16, 17; Orat. xxx, cont. Nikomach. sects. 13-17.

This seems the most probable story as to the death of Kleophon, though the accounts are not all consistent, and the statement of Xenophon, especially (Hellen. i, 7, 35), is not to be reconciled with Lysias. Xenophon conceived Kleophon as having perished earlier than this period, in a sedition (στάσεως τινος γενομένης ἐν ᾗ Κλεοφῶν ἀπέθανε), before the flight of Kallixenus from his recognizances. It is scarcely possible that Kallixenus could have been still under recognizance, during this period of suffering between the battle of Ægospotami and the capture of Athens. He must have escaped before that battle. Neither long detention of an accused party in prison before trial, nor long postponement of trial when he was under recognizance were at all in Athenian habits.

[343] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 19; vi, 5, 35-46; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15.

The Thebans, a few years afterwards, when they were soliciting aid from the Athenians against Sparta, disavowed this proposition of their delegate Erianthus, who had been the leader of the Bœotian contingent serving under Lysander at Ægospotami, honored in that character by having his statue erected at Delphi, along with the other allied leaders who took part in the battle, and along with Lysander and Eteonikus (Pausan. x, 9, 4).

It is one of the exaggerations so habitual with Isokratês, to serve a present purpose, when he says that the Thebans were the *only* parties, among all the Peloponnesian confederates, who gave this harsh anti-Athenian vote (Isokratês, Orat. Plataic. Or. xiv, sect. 34).

Demosthenês says that the Phocians gave their vote, in the same synod, against the Theban proposition (Demosth. de Fals. Legat. c. 22, p. 361).

It seems from Diodor. xv, 63, and Polyæn. i, 45, 5, as well as from some passages in Xenophon himself, that the motives of the Lacedæmonians, in thus resisting the proposition of the Thebans against Athens, were founded in policy more than in generosity.

[344] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 20; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14; Diodor. xiii, 107. Plutarch gives the express words of the Lacedæmonian decree, some of which words are very perplexing. The conjecture of G. Hermann, αἱ χρήδοιτε instead of ἃ χρὴ δόντες, has been adopted into the text of Plutarch by Sintenis, though it seems very uncertain.

[345] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 23. Lysias (Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 71) lays the blame of this wretched and humiliating peace upon Theramenês, who plainly ought not to be required to bear it; compare Lysias, Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. sects. 12-20.

[346] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15. He says, however, that this was also the day on which the Athenians gained the battle of Salamis. This is incorrect: that victory was gained in the month Boedromion.

[347] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 18.

[348] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 20; ii, 3, 8; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14. He gives the contents of the skytalê *verbatim*.

[349] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15; Lysias cont. Agorat. sect. 50. ἔτι δὲ τὰ τείχη ὡς κατεσκάφη, καὶ αἱ νῆες τοῖς πολεμίοις παρεδόθησαν, καὶ τὰ νεώρια καθῃρέθη, etc.

[350] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 23. Καὶ τὰ τείχη κατέσκαπτον ὑπ᾽ αὐλητρίδων πολλῇ προθυμίᾳ, νομίζοντες ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἄρχειν τῆς ἐλευθερίας.

Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15.

[351] Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii, sect. 75, p. 431, R.; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15; Diodor. xiv, 3.

[352] Lysander dedicated a golden crown to Athênê in the acropolis, which is recorded in the inscriptions among the articles belonging to the goddess.

See Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. Attic. Nos. 150-152, p. 235.

[353] Lysias. Or. xiii, cont. Agorat. s. 80.

[354] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 18; ii, 3, 46; Plutarch, Vit. x, Orator. Vit. Lycurg. init.

M. E. Meier, in his Commentary on Lykurgus, construes this passage of Plutarch differently, so that the person therein specified as exile would be, not Aristodemus, but the grandfather of Lykurgus. But I do not think this construction justified: see Meier, Comm. de Lykurg. Vitâ, p. iv, (Halle, 1847).

Respecting Chariklês, see Isokratês, Orat. xvi, De Bigis, s. 52.

[355] See Stallbaum's Preface to the Charmidês of Plato, his note on the Timæus of Plato, p. 20, E, and the Scholia on the same passage.

Kritias is introduced as taking a conspicuous part in four of the Platonic dialogues; Protagoras, Charmidês, Timæus and Kritias; the last only a fragment, not to mention the Eryxias.

The small remains of the elegiac poetry of Kritias are to be found in Schneidewin, Delect. Poet. Græc. p. 136, *seq.* Both Cicero (De Orat. ii, 22, 93) and Dionys. Hal. (Judic. de Lysiâ, c. 2, p. 454; Jud. de Isæo, p. 627) notice his historical compositions.

About the concern of Kritias in the mutilation of the Hermæ, as affirmed by Diognêtus, see Andokidês de Mysteriis, s. 47. He was first cousin of Andokidês, by the mother's side.

[356] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 35.

[357] Xenoph. Hellen ii, 3, 35; Memorab. i, 2, 24.

[358] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2. ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν (Kritias) προπετὴς ἦν ἐπὶ τὸ πολλοὺς ἀποκτεῖναι, ἅτε καὶ φυγὼν ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου, etc.

[359] Lysias cont. Agorat. Or. xiii, s. 23, p. 132.

[360] Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii, s. 78, p. 128. Theramenês is described, in his subsequent defence, ὀνειδίζων μὲν τοῖς φεύγουσιν ὅτι δι᾽ αὐτὸν κατέλθοιεν, etc.

The general narrative of Xenophon, meagre as it is, harmonizes with this.

[361] Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii, s. 44, p. 124. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ ναυμαχία καὶ ἡ συμφορὰ τῇ πόλει ἐγένετο, δημοκρατίας ἔτι οὔσης, ὅθεν τῆς στάσεως ἦρξαν, πέντε ἄνδρες *ἔφοροι κατέστησαν ὑπὸ τῶν καλουμένων ἑταίρων*, συναγωγεῖς μὲν τῶν πολιτῶν, ἄρχοντες δὲ τῶν συνωμοτῶν, ἐναντία δὲ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλήθει πράττοντες.

[362] Lysias cont. Agorat. Or. xiii, s. 28 (p. 132); s. 35, p. 133. Καὶ παρορμίσαντες δύο πλοῖα Μουνυχίασιν, ἐδέοντο αὐτοῦ (Ἀγοράτου) παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀπελθεῖν Ἀθήνηθεν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔφασαν συνεκπλευσεῖσθαι, *ἕως τὰ πράγματα κατασταίη*, etc.

Lysias represents this accusation of the generals, and this behavior of Agoratus, as having occurred *before* the surrender of the city, but *after* the return of Theramenês, bringing back the final terms imposed by the Lacedæmonians. He thus so colors it, that Agoratus, by getting the generals out of the way, was the real cause why the degrading peace brought by Theramenês was accepted. Had the generals remained at large, he affirms, they would have prevented the acceptance of this degrading peace, and would have been able to obtain better terms from the Lacedæmonians (see Lysias cont. Agor. sects. 16-20).

Without questioning generally the matters of fact set forth by Lysias in this oration (delivered a long time afterwards, see s. 90), I believe that he *misdates* them, and represents them as having occurred *before* the surrender, whereas they really occurred *after* it. We know from Xenophon, that when Theramenês came back the second time with the real peace, the people were in such a state of famine, that farther waiting was impossible: the peace was accepted immediately that it was proposed; cruel as it was, the people were glad to get it

(Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 22). Besides, how could Agoratus be conveyed with two vessels out of Munychia, when the harbor was closely blocked up? and what is the meaning of ἕως τὰ πράγματα κατασταίη, referred to a moment just *before* the surrender?

[363] Lysias cont. Agorat. Or. xiii, sects. 38, 60, 68.

[364] Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii, s. 74: compare Aristotle ap. Schol. ad Aristophan. Vesp. 157.

[365] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 2.

[366] Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii, sects. 74-77.

[367] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 6-8.

[368] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 8.

[369] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 16; Diodor. xiii, 106.

[370] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 11: Lysias cont. Agorat. Orat. xiii, sects. 23-80.

Tisias, the brother-in-law of Chariklês, was a member of this senate (Isokratês, Or. xvi, De Bigis, s. 53).

[371] Plato, Epist. vii, p. 324, B.; Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 54.

[372] Isokratês cont. Kallimach. Or. xviii, s. 6, p. 372.

[373] Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 5, p. 121. Ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ οἱ τριάκοντα πονηροὶ μὲν καὶ *συκοφάνται* ὄντες εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν κατέστησαν, φάσκοντες χρῆναι τῶν ἀδίκων καθαρὰν ποιῆσαι τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς πολίτας ἐπ᾽ ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην τραπέσθαι, etc.

[374] Plato, Epist. vii, p. 324, B.C.

[375] Lysias cont. Agorat. s. 38.

[376] Lysias cont. Agorat. s. 40.

[377] Lysias cont. Agorat. s. 41.

[378] Lysias cont. Eratosth. s. 18; Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 51; Isokrat. Orat. xx, cont. Lochit. s. 15, p. 397.

[379] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 12, 28, 38. *Αὐτὸς* (Theramenês) *μάλιστα ἐξορμήσας* ἡμᾶς, τοῖς πρώτοις ὑπαγομένοις ἐς ἡμᾶς δίκην ἐπιτιθέναι, etc.

[380] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 13. ἕως δὴ τοὺς πονηροὺς ἐκποδὼν ποιησάμενοι καταστήσαιντο τὴν πολιτείαν.

[381] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 15, 23, 42; Isokrat. cont. Kallimach. Or. xviii, s. 30, p. 375.

[382] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 42; ii, 4, 14. οἱ δὲ καὶ οὐχ ὅπως ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐπιδημοῦντες ἐφυγαδευόμεθα, etc.

Isokratês, Orat. xvi, De Bigis, s. 46, p. 355.

[383] Plutarch, Vit. x, Orator. p. 838.

[384] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 39-41; Lysias, Orat. xviii, De Bonis Niciæ Fratris, sects. 5-8.

[385] Plato, Apol. Sokratês, c. 20, p. 32. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκοντα αὖ μεταπεμψάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον, ἵν᾽ ἀποθάνοι· *οἷα δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν.*

Isokrat. cont. Kallimach. Or. xviii, sect. 23, p. 374. ἐνίοις καὶ προσέταττον ἐξαμαρτάνειν. Compare also Lysias, Or. xii, cont. Eratosth. sect. 32.

We learn, from Andokidês de Myster. sect. 94, that Melêtus was one of the parties who actually arrested Leon, and brought him up for condemnation. It is not probable that this was the same person who afterwards accused Sokratês. It may possibly have been his father, who bore the same name; but there is nothing to determine the point.

[386] Plato, Apol. Sokrat. *ut sup.*; Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 9-23.

[387] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 17, 19, 48. From sect. 48, we see that Theramenês actually made this proposition: τὸ μέντοι σὺν τοῖς δυναμένοις καὶ μεθ᾽ ἵππων καὶ μετ᾽ ἀσπίδων ὠφελεῖν διὰ τούτων τὴν πολιτείαν, *πρόσθεν ἄριστον ἡγούμην εἶναι* καὶ νῦν οὐ μεταβάλλομαι.

This proposition, made by Theramenês and rejected by the Thirty, explains the comment which he afterwards made, when they drew up their special catalogue or roll of three thousand; which comment otherwise appears unsuitable.

[388] Thucyd. viii, 89-92. τὸ μὲν καταστῆσαι μετόχους τοσούτους, ἀντικρὺς ἂν δῆμον ἡγούμενοι.

[389] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 8, 19; ii, 4, 2, 8, 24.

[390] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 51.

[391] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 20, 41: compare Lysias. Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. sect. 41.

[392] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 21; Isokratês adv. Euthynum, sect. 5, p. 401; Isokratês cont. Kallimach. sect. 23, p. 375; Lysias, Or. xxv, Δημ. Καταλ. Ἀπολ. sect. 21, p. 173.

The two passages of Isokratês sufficiently designate what this list, or κατάλογος, must have been; but the name by which he calls it—ὁ μετὰ Λυσάνδρου (or Πεισάνδρου) κατάλογος—is not easy to explain.

[393] Lysias, Orat. vi, cont. Andok. sect. 46; Or. xii, cont. Eratosth. sect 49.

[394] Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 12. Κριτίας μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πάντων κλεπτίστατός τε καὶ βιαιότατος ἐγένετο, etc.

[395] Lysias, Or. xii. cont. Eratosthen. sects. 8, 21. Lysias prosecuted Eratosthenês before the dikastery some years afterwards, as having caused the death of Polemarchus. The foregoing details are found in the oration, spoken as well as composed by himself.

[396] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 56.

[397] See Lysias, Or. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 66.

[398] Diodor. xiv, 5. Diodorus tells us that Sokratês and two of his friends were the only persons who stood forward to protect Theramenês, when Satyrus was dragging him from the altar. Plutarch (Vit. x, Orat. p. 836) ascribes the same act of generous forwardness to *Isokratês*. There is no good ground for believing it, either of one or of the other. None but senators were present; and as this senate had been chosen by the Thirty, it is not likely that either Sokratês or Isokratês were among its members. If Sokratês had been a member of it, the fact would have been noticed and brought out in connection with his subsequent trial.

The manner in which Plutarch (Consolat. ad Apollon. c. 6, p. 105) states the death of Theramenês, that he was "tortured to death" by the Thirty is an instance of his loose speaking.

Compare Cicero about the death of Theramenês (Tuscul. Disp. i, 40, 96). His admiration for the manner of death of Theramenês doubtless contributed to make him rank that Athenian with Themistoklês and Periklês (De Orat. iii. 16, 59).

[399] The epithets applied by Aristophanês to Theramenês (Ran. 541-966) coincide pretty exactly with those in the speech just noticed, which Xenophon ascribes to Kritias against him.

[400] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 1; Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 97; Orat. xxxi, cont. Philon. s. 8, 9; Herakleid. Pontic. c. 5; Diogen. Laërt. i, 98.

[401] Xenoph. Hellen. l. c. ἦγον δὲ ἐκ τῶν χωρίων, ἵν᾽ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ φίλοι τοὺς τούτων ἀγροὺς ἔχοιεν· φευγόντων δὲ ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν πολλοὺς ἄγοντες, ἐνέπλησαν Μέγαρα καὶ Θήβας τῶν ὑποχωρούντων.

[402] Lysias, Or. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 49; Or. xxv, Democrat. Subvers. Apolog. s. 20; Or. xxvi, cont. Evandr. s. 23.

[403] Æschinês, Fals. Legat. c. 24, p. 266, and cont. Ktesiph. c. 86, p. 455; Isokratês, Or. iv, Panegyr. s. 131; Or. vii, Areopag. s. 76.

[404] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 1; Diodor. xiv, 6; Lysias, Or. xxiv, s. 28; Or. xxxi, cont. Philon. s. 10.

[405] Lysias, Or. xii, cont. Eratosth. sects. 98, 99: παντάχοθεν ἐκκηρυττόμενοι; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 99; Diodor xiv, 6; Demosth. de Rhod. Libert. c. 10.

[406] Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 31. Καὶ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἔγραψε, λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν.—Isokratês, cont. Sophist. Or. xiii, s. 12. τὴν παιδευσιν τὴν τῶν λόγων.

Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 19) affirms that the Thirty oligarchs, during their rule, altered the position of the rostrum in the Pnyx, the place where the democratical public assemblies were held: the rostrum had before looked towards the sea, but they turned it so as to make it look towards the land, because the maritime service and the associations connected with it were the chief stimulants of democratical sentiment. This story has been often copied and reasserted, as if it were an undoubted fact; but M. Forchhammer (Topographie von Athen, p. 289, in Kieler Philol. Studien. 1841) has shown it to be untrue and even absurd.

[407] Aristot. Polit. v, 9, 2.

[408] Xenoph. Memorab. i, 2, 33-39.

[409] Justin (vi, 10) mentions the demand thus made and refused. Plutarch (Lysand. c. 27) states the demand as having been made by the Thebans *alone*, which I disbelieve. Xenophon, according to the general disorderly arrangement of facts in his Hellenika, does not mention the circumstance in its proper place, but alludes to it on a subsequent occasion as having before occurred (Hellen. iii, 5, 5). He also specifies by name no one but the Thebans as having actually made the demand; but there is a subsequent passage, which shows that not only the Corinthians, but other allies also, sympathized in it (iii, 5, 12).

[410] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 17; Plutarch, Institut. Lacon. p. 239.

[411] Pausan. vi, 3, 6. The Samian oligarchical party owed their recent restoration to Lysander.

[412] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 18, 19.

[413] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 30. Οὕτω δὲ προχωρούντων, Παυσανίας ὁ βασιλεὺς (of Sparta), φθονήσας Λυσάνδρῳ εἰ κατειργασμένος ταῦτα ἅμα μὲν εὐδοκιμήσοι, ἅμα *δὲ ἰδίας ποιήσοιτο τὰς Ἀθήνας*, πείσας τῶν Ἐφόρων τρεῖς, ἐξάγει φρουράν. Ξυνείποντο δὲ καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πάντες, πλὴν Βοιωτῶν καὶ Κορινθίων. Οὗτοι δ᾽ ἔλεγον μὲν ὅτι οὐ νομίζοιεν εὐορκεῖν ἂν στρατευόμενοι ἐπ᾽ Ἀθηναίους, μηδὲν παράσπονδον ποιοῦντας· *ἔπραττον δὲ ταῦτα, ὅτι ἐγίγνωσκον Λακεδαιμονίους βουλομένους τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων χώραν οἰκείαν καὶ πιστὴν ποιήσασθαι*. Compare also iii, 5, 12, 13, respecting the sentiments entertained in Greece about the conduct of the Lacedæmonians.

[414] Diodor. xiv, 10-13.

[415] Thucyd. iv.

[416] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 2; Diodor. xiv, 32; Pausan. i, 29, 3; Lysias, Or. xiii, cont. Agorat. sect. 84; Justin, v, 9; Æschinês, cont. Ktesiphon, c. 62, p. 437; Demosth. cont. Timokrat. c. 34, p. 742. Æschinês allots more than one hundred followers to the captors of Phylê.

The sympathy which the Athenian exiles found at Thebes is attested in a fragment of Lysias, ap. Dionys. Hal. Jud. de Lysiâ, p. 594 (Fragm. 47, ed. Bekker).

[417] Lysias, Or. xii, cont. Eratosth. sect. 41, p. 124.

[418] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 2, 5, 14.

[419] See an analogous case of a Lacedæmonian army surprised by the Thebans at this dangerous hour, Xenoph. Hellen. vii, i, 16; compare Xenoph. Magistr. Equit. vii, 12.

[420] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 5, 7. Diodorus (xiv, 32, 33) represents the occasion of this battle somewhat differently. I follow the account of Xenophon.

[421] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 8. I apprehend that ἀπογράφεσθαι here refers to prospective military service; as in vi, 5, 29, and in Cyropæd. ii, 1, 18, 19. The words in the context, πόσης *φυλακῆς προσδεήσοιντο*, attest that such is the meaning; though the commentators, and Sturz in his Lexicon Xenophonteum, interpret differently.

[422] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 8.

[423] Both Lysias (Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 53; Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. s. 47) and Diodorus (xiv, 32) connect together these two similar proceedings at Eleusis and at Salamis. Xenophon mentions only the affair at Eleusis.

[424] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 9. Δείξας δέ τι χωρίον, ἐς τοῦτο ἐκέλευσε *φανερὰν φέρειν τὴν ψῆφον*. Compare Lysias, Or. xiii, cont. Agorat. s. 40, and Thucyd. iv, 74, about the conduct of the Megarian oligarchical leaders: καὶ τούτων περὶ ἀναγκάσαντες τὸν δῆμον ψῆφον φανερὰν διενεγκεῖν, etc.

[425] Lysias (Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 53) gives this number.

[426] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 10, 13. ἡμέραν πέμπτην, etc.

[427] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 12.

[428] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 12, 20.

[429] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 19; Cornel. Nepos, Thrasybul. c. 2.

[430] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 22.

[431] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 22; Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 55: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ Πειραιέως κρείττους ὄντες εἴασαν αὐτοὺς ἀπελθεῖν, etc.

[432] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 24.

[433] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 23.

[434] Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. sects. 55, 56: οἱ δοκοῦντες εἶναι ἐναντιώτατοι Χαρικλεῖ καὶ Κριτίᾳ καὶ τῇ τούτων ἑταιρείᾳ, etc.

[435] The facts which I have here set down, result from a comparison of Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. sects. 53, 59, 94: Φείδων, αἱρεθεὶς ὑμᾶς διαλλάξαι καὶ καταγαγεῖν. Diodor. xiv, 32; Justin, v, 9.

[436] Isokratês, Or. xviii, cont. Kallimach. s. 25.

[437] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 24, 28.

[438] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 25.

[439] Plutarch, Vit. x, Orator, p. 835; Lysias, Or. xxxi, cont. Philon. sects. 19-34.

Lysias and his brother had carried on a manufactory of shields at Athens. The Thirty had plundered it; but some of the stock probably escaped.

[440] Demosth. cont. Leptin. c. 32, p. 502; Lysias cont. Nikomach. Or. xxx, s. 29.

[441] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 27.

[442] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 28; Diodor. xiv, 33; Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 60.

[443] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 29. Οὕτω δὲ προχωρούντων, Παυσανίας ὁ βασιλεὺς, φθονήσας Λυσάνδρῳ, εἰ κατειργασμένος ταῦτα ἅμα μὲν εὐδοκιμήσοι, ἅμα δὲ ἰδίας ποιήσοιτο τὰς Ἀθήνας, πείσας τῶν Ἐφόρων τρεῖς, ἐξάγει φρουράν.

Diodor. xiv, 33. Παυσανίας δὲ…, φθονῶν μὲν τῷ Λυσάνδρῳ, θεωρῶν δὲ τὴν Σπάρτην ἀδοξοῦσαν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι, etc.

Plutarch, Lysand. c. 21.

[444] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 3.

[445] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 30.

[446] Lysias, Or. xviii, De Bonis Niciæ Frat. sects. 8-10.

[447] Lysias, *ut sup.* sects. 11, 12. ὅθεν Παυσανίας ἤρξατο εὔνους εἶναι τῷ δήμῳ, παράδειγμα ποιούμενος πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους Λακεδαιμονίους τὰς ἡμετέρας συμφορὰς τῆς τῶν τριάκοντα πονηρίας….

Οὕτω δ᾽ ἠλεούμεθα, καὶ πᾶσι δεινὰ ἐδοκοῦμεν πεπονθέναι, ὥστε Παυσανίας τὰ μὲν παρὰ τῶν τριάκοντα ξένια οὐκ ἠθέλησε λαβεῖν, τὰ δὲ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐδέξατο.

[448] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 31. This seems the meaning of the phrase ἀπιέναι ἐπὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν; as we may see by s. 38.

[449] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 31-34.

[450] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 35. Διΐστη δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἄστει (Pausanias) καὶ ἐκέλευε πρὸς σφᾶς προσιέναι ὡς πλείστους ξυλλεγομένους, λέγοντας, etc.

[451] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 39; Diodor. xiv, 33.

[452] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 40-42.

[453] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 43; Justin, v, 11. I do not comprehend the allusion in Lysias, Orat. xxv, Δημ. Καταλ. Ἀπολ. sect. 11: εἰσὶ δὲ οἵτινες τῶν Ἐλευσῖνάδε ἀπογραψαμένων, ἐξελθόντες μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν, ἐπολιορκοῦντο μετ᾽ αὐτῶν.

[454] Thucyd. i, 97.

[455] See vol. v, of this History, ch. xlv, p 343.

[456] See vol. vi, ch. lii, p. 353 of this History.

[457] This I apprehend to have been in the mind of Xenophon, De Reditibus, v, 6. Ἔπειτ᾽, ἐπεὶ *ὡμῶς ἄγαν δόξασα προστατεύειν* ἡ πόλις ἐστερήθη τῆς ἀρχῆς, etc.

[458] Thucyd. viii, 48.

[459] "I confess, gentlemen, that this appears to me as bad in the principle, and far worse in the consequences, than an universal suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act…. Far from softening the features of such a principle, and thereby removing any part of the popular odium or natural terrors attending it, I should be sorry *that anything framed in contradiction to the spirit of our constitution did not instantly produce, in fact, the grossest of the evils with which it was pregnant in its nature*. It is by lying dormant a long time, or being at first very rarely exercised, that arbitrary power steals upon a people. On the next unconstitutional act, all the fashionable world will be ready to say: Your prophecies are ridiculous, your fears are vain; you see how little of the misfortunes which you formerly foreboded is come to pass. Thus, by degrees, that artful softening of all arbitrary power, the alleged infrequency or narrow extent of its operation, will be received as a sort of aphorism; and Mr. Hume will not be singular in telling us that the felicity of mankind is no more disturbed by it, than by earthquakes or thunder, or the other more unusual accidents of nature." (Burke, Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, 1777: Burke's Works, vol. iii, pp. 146-150 oct. edit.)

[460] Aristot. Polit. v, 7, 19. Καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσομαι, καὶ βουλεύσω ὅ,τι ἂν ἔχω κακόν.

The complimentary epitaph upon the Thirty, cited in the Schol. on Æschinês,—praising them as having curbed, for a short time, the insolence of the accursed Demos of Athens,—is in the same spirit: see K. F. Hermann, Staats-Alterthümer der Griechen, s. 70, note 9.

[461] Plato, Epistol. vii, p. 324. Καὶ ὁρῶν δή που τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ χρυσὸν ἀποδείξαντας τὴν ἔμπροσθεν πολιτείαν, etc.

[462] Andokidês de Mysteriis, s. 90.

[463] All this may be collected from various passages of the Orat. xii, of Lysias. Eratosthenês did not stand alone on his trial, but in conjunction with other colleagues; though of course, pursuant to the psephism of Kannônus, the vote of the dikasts would be taken about each separately: ἀλλὰ παρὰ Ἐρατοσθένους καὶ τῶν τουτουῖ συναρχόντων δίκην λαμβάνειν…. μηδ᾽ ἀποῦσι μὲν τοῖς τριάκοντα ἐπιβουλεύετε, παρόντας δ᾽ ἀφῆτε· μηδὲ τῆς τύχης, ἣ τούτους παρέδωκε τῇ πόλει, κάκιον ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς βοηθήσητε (sects. 80, 81): compare s. 36.

The number of friends prepared to back the defence of Eratosthenês, and to obtain his acquittal, chiefly by representing that he had done the least mischief of all the Thirty; that all that he had done had been under fear of his own life; that he had been the partisan and supporter of Theramenês, whose memory was at that time popular, may be seen in sections 51, 56, 65, 87, 88, 91.

There are evidences also of other accusations brought against the Thirty before the senate of Areopagus (Lysias, Or. xi, cont. Theomnest. A. s. 31, B. s. 12).

[464] Lysias, Or. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 36.

[465] Demosth. adv. Bœotum de Dote Matern. c. 6, p. 1018.

[466] Dionys. Hal. Jud. de Lysiâ, c. 32, p. 526; Lysias, Orat. xxxiv, Bekk.

[467] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 41.

[468] Xenoph. Memor. iii, 5, 19.

[469] Andokidês de Mysteriis, s. 83. Ὁπόσων δ᾽ ἂν προσδέῃ (νόμων), *οἵδε ἠρημένοι νομοθέται ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς* ἀναγράφοντες ἐν σάνισιν ἐκτιθέντων πρὸς τοὺς ἐπωνύμους, σκοπεῖν τῷ βουλομένῳ, καὶ παραδιδόντων ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐν τῷδε τῷ μηνί. Τοὺς δὲ παραδιδομένους νόμους δοκιμασάτω *πρότερον ἡ βουλὴ καὶ οἱ νομοθέται οἱ πεντακόσιοι, οὓς οἱ δημόται εἵλοντο*, ἐπειδὴ ὁμωμόκασιν.

Putting together the two sentences in which the nomothetæ are here mentioned, Reiske and F. A. Wolf (Prolegom. ad Demosthen. cont. Leptin. p. cxxix), think that there were two classes of nomothetæ; one class chosen by the senate, the other by the people. This appears to me very improbable. The persons chosen by the senate were invested with no final or decisive function whatever; they were simply chosen to consider what new propositions were fit to be submitted for discussion, and to provide that such propositions should be publicly made known. Now any persons simply invested with this character of a preliminary committee, would not, in my judgment, be called nomothetæ. The reason why the persons here mentioned were so called, was, that they were a portion of the five hundred nomothetæ, in whom the power of peremptory decision ultimately rested. A small committee would naturally be intrusted with this preliminary duty; and the members of that small committee were to be chosen *by* one of the bodies with whom ultimate decision rested, but chosen *out of* the other.

[470] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sections 81-85.

[471] Andokidês de Myster. s. 87. ψήφισμα δὲ μηδὲν μήτε βουλῆς μήτε δήμου (νόμου), κυριώτερον εἶναι.

It seems that the word νόμου ought properly to be inserted here: see Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. c. 23, p. 649.

Compare a similar use of the phrase, μηδὲν κυριώτερον εἶναι, in Demosthen. cont. Lakrit. c. 9, p. 937.

[472] Andokidês de Myster. s. 87. We see (from Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 15, p. 718) that Andokidês has not cited the law fully. He has omitted the words, ὁπόσα δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα ἐπράχθη, ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ, ἄκυρα εἶναι, these words not having any material connection with the point at which he was aiming. Compare Æschinês cont. Timarch. c. 9, p. 25, καὶ ἔστω ταῦτα ἄκυρα, ὥσπερ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα, ἢ τὰ πρὸ Εὐκλείδου, ἢ εἴ τις ἄλλη πώποτε τοιαύτη ἐγένετο προθεσμία….

Tisamenus is probably the same person of whom Lysias speaks contemptuously, Or. xxx, cont. Nikomach. s. 36.

Meier (De Bonis Damnatorum, p. 71) thinks that there is a contradiction between the decree proposed by Tisamenus (Andok. de Myst. s. 83), and another decree proposed by Dioklês, cited in the Oration of Demosth. cont. Timokr. c. 11, p. 713. But there is no real contradiction between the two, and the only semblance of contradiction that is to be found, arises from the fact that the law of Dioklês is not correctly given as it now stands. It ought to be read thus:—

Διοκλῆς εἶπε, Τοὺς νόμους τοὺς πρὸ Εὐκλείδου τεθέντας ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ, καὶ ὅσοι *ἐπ᾽ Εὐκλείδου* ἐτέθησαν, καὶ εἰσὶν ἀναγεγραμμένοι, [*ἀπ᾽ Εὐκλείδου*] κυρίους εἶναι· τοὺς δὲ μετ᾽ Εὐκλείδην τεθέντας καὶ τολοιπὸν τιθεμένους κυρίους εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ἧς ἕκαστος ἐτέθη, πλὴν εἴ τῳ προσγέγραπται χρόνος ὅντινα δεῖ ἄρχειν. Ἐπιγράψαι δὲ, τοῖς μὲν νῦν κειμένοις, τὸν γραμματέα τῆς βουλῆς, τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν, ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ γραμματεύων, προσγραφέτω παραχρῆμα τὸν νόμον κύριον εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ἧς ἐτέθη.

The words ἀπ᾽ *Εὐκλείδου*, which stand between brackets in the second line, are inserted on my own conjecture; and I venture to think that any one who will read the whole law through, and the comments of the orator upon it, will see that they are imperatively required to make the sense complete. The entire scope and purpose of the law is, to regulate clearly the time *from which* each law shall begin to be valid.

As the first part of the law reads now, without these words, it has no pertinence, no bearing on the main purpose contemplated by Dioklês in the second part, nor on the reasonings of Demosthenês afterwards. It is easy to understand how the words ἀπ᾽ Εὐκλείδου should have dropped out, seeing that ἐπ᾽ Εὐκλείδου immediately precedes: another error has been in fact introduced, by putting *ἀπ᾽* Εὐκλείδου in the former case instead of *ἐπ᾽* Εὐκλείδου, which error has been corrected by various recent editors, on the authority of some MSS.

The law of Dioklês, when properly read, fully harmonizes with that of Tisamenus. Meier wonders that there is no mention made of the δοκιμασία νόμων by the nomothetæ, which is prescribed in the decree of Tisamenus. But it was not necessary to mention this expressly, since the words ὅσοι εἰσὶν ἀναγεγραμμένοι presuppose the foregone δοκιμασία.

[473] Andokidês de Mysteriis, s. 91. καὶ οὐ δέξομαι ἔνδειξιν οὐδὲ ἀπαγωγὴν ἕνεκα τῶν πρότερον γεγενημένων, πλὴν τῶν φευγόντων.

[474] Andokid. de Mysteriis, s. 91. καὶ οὐ μνησικακήσω, οὐδὲ ἄλλῳ (sc. ἄλλῳ μνησικακοῦντι) πείσομαι, ψηφιοῦμαι δὲ κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους.

This clause does not appear as part of the Heliastic oath given in Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 36, p. 746. It was extremely significant and valuable for the few years immediately succeeding the renovation of the democracy. But its value was essentially temporary, and it was doubtless dropped within twenty or thirty years after the period to which it specially applied.

[475] The Orat. xviii, of Isokratês, Paragraphê cont. Kallimachum, informs us on these points, especially sections 1-4.

Kallimachus had entered an action against the client of Isokratês for ten thousand drachmæ (sects. 15-17), charging him as an accomplice of Patroklês,—the king-archon under the Ten, who immediately succeeded the Thirty, prior to the return of the exiles,—in seizing and confiscating a sum of money belonging to Kallimachus. The latter, in commencing this action, was under the necessity of paying the fees called *prytaneia*; a sum proportional to what was claimed, and amounting to thirty drachmæ, when the sum claimed was between one thousand and ten thousand drachmæ. Suppose that action had gone to trial directly, Kallimachus, if he lost his cause, would have to forfeit his prytaneia, but he would forfeit no more. Now according to the paragraphê permitted by the law of Archinus, the defendant is allowed to make oath that the action against him is founded upon a fact prior to the archonship of Eukleidês; and a cause is then tried first, upon that special issue, upon which the defendant is allowed to speak first, before the plaintiff. If the verdict, on this special issue, is given in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff is not only disabled from proceeding further with his action, but is condemned besides to pay to the defendant the forfeit called epobely: that is, one-sixth part of the sum claimed. But if, on the contrary, the verdict on the special issue be in favor of the plaintiff, he is held entitled to proceed farther with his original action, and to receive besides at once, from the defendant, the like forfeit or epobely. Information on these regulations of procedure in the Attic dikasteries may be found in Meier and Schömann, Attischer Prozess, p. 647; Platner, Prozess und Klagen, vol. i, pp. 156-162.

[476] Wachsmuth—who admits into his work, with little or no criticism, everything which has ever been said against the Athenian people, and indeed against the Greeks generally—affirms, contrary to all evidence and probability, that the amnesty was not really observed at Athens. (Wachsm. Hellen. Alterth. ch. ix. sect. 71, vol. ii, p. 267.)

The simple and distinct words of Xenophon, coming as they do from the mouth of so very hostile a witness, are sufficient to refute him: καὶ ὀμόσαντες ὅρκους ᾗ μὴν μὴ μνησικακήσειν, ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὁμοῦ γε πολιτεύονται, καὶ *τοῖς ὅρκοις ἐμμένει ὁ δῆμος*, (Hellen. ii, 4, 43).

The passages to which Wachsmuth makes reference, do not in the least establish his point. Even if actions at law or accusations had been brought, in violation of the amnesty, this would not prove that the people violated it; unless we also knew that the dikastery had affirmed those actions. But he does not refer to any actions or accusations preferred on any such ground. He only notices some cases in which, accusation being preferred on grounds subsequent to Eukleidês, the accuser makes allusion in his speech to other matters anterior to Eukleidês. Now every speaker before the Athenian dikastery thinks himself entitled to call up before the dikasts the whole past life of his opponent, in the way of analogous evidence going to attest the general character of the latter, good or bad. For example, the accuser of Sokratês mentions, as a point going to impeach the general character of Sokratês, that he had been the teacher of Kritias; while the philosopher, in his defence, alludes to

his own resolution and virtue as prytanis in the assembly by which the generals were condemned after the battle of Arginusæ. Both these allusions come out as evidences to general character.

[477] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 9.

[478] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 1. ἦγον δὲ ἐκ τῶν χωρίων (οἱ τριάκοντα) ἵν᾽ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ φίλοι τοὺς τούτων ἀγροὺς ἔχοιεν.

[479] Isokratês cont. Kallimach. Or. xviii, sect. 30.

Θρασύβουλος μὲν καὶ Ἄνυτος, μέγιστον μὲν δυνάμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, πολλῶν δ᾽ ἀπεστερημένοι χρημάτων, εἰδότες δὲ τοὺς ἀπογράψαντας, ὅμως οὐ τολμῶσιν αὐτοῖς δίκας λαγχάνειν οὐδὲ μνησικακεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μᾶλλον ἐτέρων δύνανται διαπράττεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ οὖν περί γε τῶν ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις ἴσον ἔχειν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀξιοῦσιν.

On the other hand, the young Alkibiadês (in the Orat. xvi, of Isokratês, De Bigis, sect. 56) is made to talk about others recovering their property: τῶν ἄλλων κομιζομένων τὰς οὐσίας. My statement in the text reconciles these two. The young Alkibiadês goes on to state that the people had passed a vote to grant compensation to him for the confiscation of his father's property, but that the power of his enemies had disappointed him of it. We may well doubt whether such vote ever really passed.

It appears, however, that Batrachus, one of the chief informers who brought in victims for the Thirty, thought it prudent to live afterwards out of Attica (Lysias cont. Andokid. Or. vi, sect. 46), though he would have been legally protected by the amnesty.

[480] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sect. 94. Μέλητος δ᾽ αὖ οὑτοσὶ ἀπήγαγεν ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα Λέοντα, ὡς ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες ἴστε, καὶ ἀπέθανεν ἐκεῖνος ἄκριτος…. Μέλητον τοίνυν τοῖς παισὶ τοῖς τοῦ Λέοντος οὐκ ἔστι φόνου διώκειν, ὅτι τοῖς νόμοις δεῖ χρῆσθαι ἀπ᾽ Εὐκλείδου ἄρχοντος· ἐπεὶ ὥς γε οὐκ ἀπήγαγεν, οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸς ἀντιλέγει.

[481] Thucyd. vi, 39. δῆμον, ξύμπαν ὠνομάσθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ, μέρος.

[482] Æschylus, Sept. ad Thebas, v, 1047.

Τραχύς γε μέντοι δῆμος ἐκφυγὼν κακά.

[483] Thucyd. viii, 97.

[484] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sect. 88. Τὰς μὲν δίκας, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ τὰς διαίτας ἐποιήσατε κυρίας εἶναι, ὁπόσαι ἐν δημοκρατουμένῃ τῇ πόλει ἐγένοντο, ὅπως μήτε χρεῶν ἀποκοπαὶ εἶεν μήτε δίκαι ἀνάδικοι γένοιντο, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἰδίων συμβολαίων αἱ πράξεις εἶεν.

[485] Isokratês, Areopagit. Or. vii, sect. 77; Demosth. cont. Leptin. c. 5, p. 460.

[486] Lysias pro Mantitheo, Or. xvi, sects. 6-8. I accept substantially the explanation which Harpokration and Photius give of the word κατάστασις, in spite of the objections taken to it by M. Boeckh, which appear to me not founded upon any adequate ground. I cannot but think that Reiske is right in distinguishing κατάστασις from the pay, μισθὸς.

See Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, b. ii, sect. 19, p. 250. In the Appendix to this work, which is not translated into English along with the work itself, he farther gives the Fragment of an inscription, which he considers to bear upon this resumption of κατάστασις from the horsemen, or knights, after the Thirty. But the Fragment is so very imperfect, that nothing can be affirmed with any certainty concerning it: see the Staatshaush. der Athener, Appendix, vol. ii, pp. 207, 208.

[487] Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 1, 4.

[488] Lysias, Or. xvi, pro Mantitheo, sects. 9, 10; Lysias, cont. Evandr. Or. xxvi, sects. 21-25.

We see from this latter oration (sect. 26) that Thrasybulus helped some of the chief persons, who had been in the city, and had resisted the return of the exiles, to get over the difficulties of the dokimasy, or examination into character, previously to being admitted to take possession of any office, to which a man had been either elected or drawn by lot, in after years. He spoke in favor of Evander, in order that the latter might be accepted as king-archon.

[489] I presume confidently that Tisamenus the scribe, mentioned in Lysias cont. Nikomach. sect. 37, is the same person as Tisamenus named in Andokidês de Mysteriis (sect. 83) as the proposer of the memorable psephism.

[490] See M. Boeckh's Public Economy of Athens, b. ii, c. 8, p. 186, Eng. Tr., for a summary of all that is known respecting these γραμματεῖς, or secretaries.

The expression in Lysias cont. Nikomach. sect. 38, ὅτι ὑπογραμματεῦσαι οὐκ ἔξεστι δὶς τὸν αὐτὸν τῇ ἀρχῇ τῇ αὐτῇ, is correctly explained by M. Boeckh as having a very restricted meaning, and as only applying to two successive years. And I think we may doubt whether, in practice, it was rigidly adhered to; though it is possible to suppose that these secretaries alternated, among themselves, from one board or office to another. Their great usefulness consisted in the fact that they were constantly in the service, and thus kept up the continuous march of the details.

[491] Lysias, Or. xxx, cont. Nikomach. sect. 32.

[492] Lysias, Or. xxx, cont. Nikomach. sect. 33. Wachsmuth calls him erroneously antigrapheus instead of anagrapheus (Hellen. Alterth. vol. ii, ix, p. 269).

It seems by Orat. vii, of Lysias (sects. 20, 36, 39) that Nikomachus was at enmity with various persons who employed Lysias as their logograph, or speech-writer.

[493] Lysias, Or. x, cont. Theomnest. A. sects. 16-20.

[494] See Taylor, Vit. Lysiæ, pp. 53, 54; Franz, Element Epigraphicê Græc. Introd. pp. 18-24.

[495] Lysias cont. Nikom. sect. 3. His employment had lasted six years altogether: four years before the Thirty, two years after them, sect. 7. At least this seems the sense of the orator.

[496] I presume this to be the sense of sect. 21 of the Oration of Lysias against him: εἰ μὲν νόμους ἐτίθην περὶ τῆς ἀναγραφῆς, etc.; also sects. 33-45: παρακαλοῦμεν ἐν τῇ κρίσει τιμωρεῖσθαι τοὺς τὴν ὑμετέραν νομοθεσίαν ἀφανίζοντας, etc.

The tenor of the oration, however, is unfortunately obscure.

[497] Isæus, Or. viii, De Kiron. Sort. sect. 61; Demosthen. cont. Eubulid. c. 10, p. 1307.

[498] Plutarch, Vit. x, Orat. (Lysias) p. 836; Taylor, Vit. Lysiæ, p. 53.

[499] See respecting this change Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, ii, 7, p. 180, *seq.*, Eng. Tr.

[500] Lysias, Fragm. Or. xxxiv, De non dissolvendâ Republicâ, sect. 3: ἀλλὰ καὶ Εὐβοεῦσιν ἐπιγαμίαν ἐποιούμεθα, etc.

[501] Æschinês, cont. Ktesiphon. c. 62, p. 437; Cornel. Nepos, Thrasybul. c. 4.

[502] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 12. τόν τε κοινὸν ὅρκον καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἀλλήλοις πίστεις ἐποιοῦντο.

[503] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 7.

[504] Xenoph. Anab. i, 1; Diodor. xiii, 108.

[505] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 42; Isokratês, Or. xvi, De Bigis, s. 46.

[506] I put together what seems to me the most probable account of the death of Alkibiadês from Plutarch, Alkib. c. 38, 39; Diodorus, xiv, 11 (who cites Ephorus, compare Ephor. Fragm. 126, ed. Didot); Cornelius Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 10; Justin, v, 8; Isokratês, Or. xvi, De Bigis, s. 50.

There were evidently different stories, about the antecedent causes and circumstances, among which a selection must be made. The extreme perfidy ascribed by Ephorus to Pharnabazus appears to me not at all in the character of that satrap.

[507] Cornelius Nepos says (Alcib. c. 11) of Alkibiadês: "Hunc infamatum a plerisque tres gravissimi historici summis laudibus extulerunt: Thucydides, qui ejusdem ætatis fuit; Theopompus, qui fuit post aliquando natus, et Timæus: qui quidem duo maledicentissimi, nescio quo modo, in illo uno laudando conscierunt."

We have no means of appreciating what was said by Theopompus and Timæus. But as to Thucydidês, it is to be recollected that he extols only the capacity and warlike enterprise of Alkibiadês, nothing beyond; and he had

good reason for doing so. His picture of the dispositions and conduct of Alkibiadês is the reverse of eulogy.

The Oration xvi, of Isokratês, De Bigis, spoken by the son of Alkibiadês, goes into a labored panegyric of his father's character, but is prodigiously inaccurate, if we compare it with the facts stated in Thucydidês and Xenophon. But he is justified in saying: οὐδέποτε τοῦ πατρὸς ἡγουμένου τρόπαιον ὑμῶν ἔστησαν οἱ πολέμιοι (s. 23).

[508] The Œdipus Tyrannus of Sophoklês was surpassed by the rival composition of Philoklês. The Medea of Euripidês stood only third for the prize; Euphorion, son of Æschylus, being first, Sophoklês second. Yet these two tragedies are the masterpieces now remaining of Sophoklês and Euripidês.

[509] The careful examination of Welcker (Griech. Tragödie. vol. i, p. 76) makes out the titles of eighty tragedies unquestionably belonging to Sophoklês, over and above the satyrical dramas in his tetralogies. Welcker has considerably cut down the number admitted by previous authors, carried by Fabricius as high as one hundred and seventy-eight, and even, by Boeckh, as high as one hundred and nine (Welcker, *ut sup.* p. 62).

The number of dramas ascribed to Euripidês is sometimes ninety-two, sometimes seventy-five. Elmsley, in his remarks on the Argument to the Medea, p. 72, thinks that even the larger of these numbers is smaller than what Euripidês probably composed; since the poet continued composing for fifty years, from 455 to 405 B.C., and was likely during each year to have composed one, if not two, tetralogies; if he could prevail upon the archon to grant him a chorus, that is, the opportunity of representing. The didaskalies took no account of any except such as gained the first, second, or third prize. Welcker gives the titles, and an approximative guess at the contents, of fifty-one lost tragedies of the poet, besides the seventeen remaining (p. 443).

Aristarchus the tragedian is affirmed by Suidas to have composed seventy tragedies, of which only two gained the prize. As many as a hundred and twenty compositions are ascribed to Neophron, forty-four to Achæus, forty to Ion (Welcker, ib. p. 889).

[510] Plato, Symposion, c. 3, p. 175.

[511] For these particulars, see chiefly a learned and valuable compilation—G. C. Schneider, *Das Attische Theater-Wesen*, Weimar, 1835—furnished with copious notes; though I do not fully concur in all his details, and have differed from him on some points. I cannot think that more than two oboli were given to any one citizen at the same festival; at least, not until the distribution became extended, in times posterior to the Thirty; see M. Schneider's book, p. 17; also Notes, 29-196.

[512] See Plato, Lachês, c. 6, p. 183, B.; and Welcker, Griech. Tragöd. p. 930.

[513] Upon the point, compare Welcker, Griech. Tragöd. vol. ii, p. 1102.

[514] See Aristophan. Ran. 1046. The Antigonê (780, *seq.*) and the Trachiniæ (498) are sufficient evidence that Sophoklês did not agree with Æschylus in this renunciation of Aphroditê.

[515] The comparison of Herodot. iii, 119 with Soph. Antig. 905, proves a community of thought which seems to me hardly explicable in any other way. Which of the two obtained the thought from the other, we cannot determine.

The reason given, by a woman whose father and mother were dead, for preferring a brother either to husband or child,—that she might find another husband and have another child, but could not possibly have another brother,—is certainly not a little far-fetched.

[516] See Valckenaer, Diatribe in Eurip. Frag. c. 23. Quintilian, who had before him many more tragedies than those which we now possess, remarks how much more useful was the study of Euripidês, than that of Æschylus or Sophoklês, to a young man preparing himself for forensic oratory:—

"Illud quidem nemo non fateatur, iis qui se ad agendum comparaverint, utiliorem longe Euripidem fore. Namque is et vi et sermone (quo ipsum reprehendunt quibus gravitas et cothurnus et sonus Sophoclis videtur esse sublimior) magis accedit oratorio generi: et sententiis densus, et rebus ipsis; et in iis quæ a sapientibus tradita sunt, pæne ipsis par; et in dicendo et respondendo cuilibet eorum, qui fuerunt in foro diserti, comparandus. In affectibus vero tum omnibus mirus, tum in iis qui miseratione constant, facile præcipuus." (Quintil. Inst. Orat. x, 1.)

[517] Aristophan. Plutus, 1160:—

Πλούτῳ γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦτο συμφορώτατον,

Ποιεῖν ἀγῶνας γυμνικοὺς καὶ μουσικούς.

Compare the speech of Alkibiadês, Thuc. vi, 16, and Theophrastus ap. Cic. de Officiis, ii, 16.

[518] See Meineke, Hist. Critic. Comicor. Græcor. vol. i, p. 26, *seq.*

Grysar and Mr. Clinton, following Suidas, place Chionidês before the Persian invasion; but the words of Aristotle rather countenance the later date (Poetic. c. 3).

[519] See respecting these licentious processions, in connection with the iambus and Archilochus, vol. iv, of this History, ch. xxix, p. 81.

Aristotle (Poetic, c. 4) tells us that these phallic processions, with liberty to the leaders (οἱ ἐξάρχοντες) of scoffing at every one, still continued in many cities of Greece in his time: see Herod. v, 83, and Sêmus apud Athenæum, xiv, p. 622; also the striking description of the rural Dionysia in the Acharneis of Aristophanês, 235, 255, 1115. The scoffing was a part of the festival, and supposed to be agreeable to Dionysus: ἐν τοῖς Διονυσίοις ἐφειμένον αὐτὸ δρᾶν· καὶ τὸ σκῶμμα μέρος τι ἐδόκει τῆς ἑορτῆς· καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἴσως χαίρει, φιλογέλως τις ὤν (Lucian, Piscator. c. 25). Compare Aristophanês, Ranæ, 367, where the poet seems to imply that no one has a right to complain of being ridiculed in the πατρίοις τελεταῖς Διονύσου.

The Greek word for comedy—κωμῳδία, τὸ κωμῳδεῖν—at least in its early sense, had reference to a bitter, insulting, criminative ridicule: κωμῳδεῖν καὶ κακῶς λέγειν (Xenophon, Repub. Ath. ii, 23)—κακηγοροῦντάς τε καὶ κωμῳδοῦντας ἀλλήλους καὶ αἰσχρολογοῦντας (Plato de Repub. iii, 8, p. 332). A remarkable definition of κωμῳδία appears in Bekker's Anecdota Græca, ii, 747, 10: Κωμῳδία ἐστιν ἡ ἐν μέσῳ λάου κατηγορία, ἤγουν δημοσίευσις; "public exposure to scorn before the assembled people:" and this idea of it as a penal visitation of evil-doers is preserved in Platonius and the anonymous writers on comedy, prefixed to Aristophanês. The definition which Aristotle (Poetic. c. 11) gives of it, is too mild for the primitive comedy: for he tells us himself that Kratês, immediately preceding Aristophanês, was the first author who departed from the ἰαμβικὴ ἰδέα: this "iambic vein" was originally the common character. It doubtless included every variety of ridicule, from innocent mirth to scornful contempt and odium; but the predominant character tended decidedly to the latter.

Compare Will. Schneider, Attisches Theater-Wesen, Notes, pp. 22-25; Bernhardy, Griechische Litteratur, sect. 67, p. 292.

[520]

Χαῖρ᾽, ὦ μέγ᾽ ἀρχειογέλως ὅμιλε ταῖς ἐπίβδαις,

Τῆς ἡμετέρας σοφίας κριτὴς ἄριστε πάντων, etc.

Kratini Fragm. Incert. 51; Meineke, Fr. Com. Græcor. ii, p. 193.

[521] Respecting Kratinus, see Platonius and the other writers on the Attic comedy, prefixed to Aristophanês in Bekker's edition, pp. vi, ix, xi, xiii, etc.; also Meineke, Historia Comic. Græc. vol. i, p. 50, *seq.*

… Οὐ γὰρ, ὥσπερ Ἀριστοφάνης, ἐπιτρέχειν τὴν χάριν τοῖς σκώμμασι ποιεῖ (Κρατῖνος), ἀλλ᾽ *ἁπλῶς*, καὶ, κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν, *γυμνῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ τίθησι τὰς βλασφημίας* κατὰ τῶν ἁμαρτανόντων.

[522] See Kratinus—Ἀρχίλοχοι—Frag. 1, and Plutarch, Kimon, 10, Ἡ κωμῳδία πολιτεύεται ἐν τοῖς δράμασι καὶ φιλοσοφεῖ, ἡ τῶν περὶ τὸν Κρατῖνον καὶ Ἀριστοφάνην καὶ Εὔπολιν, etc. (Dionys. Halikarn. Ars Rhetoric. c. 11.)

[523] Aristophan. Equit. 525. *seq.*

[524] A comedy called Ὀδυσσεῖς (plur. numb. corresponding to the title of another of his comedies, Ἀρχίλοχοι). It had a chorus, as one of the Fragments shows, but few or no choric songs; nor any parabasis, or address by the chorus, assuming the person of the poet, to the spectators.

See Bergk, De Reliquiis Comœd. Antiq. p. 142, *seq.*; Meineke, Frag. Cratini, vol. ii, p. 93, Ὀδυσσεῖς: compare also the first volume of the same work, p. 43: also Runkel, Cratini Fragm. p. 38 (Leips. 1827).

[525] Aristophanês boasts that *he* was the first comic composer who selected great and powerful men for his objects of attack: his predecessors, he affirms, had meddled only with small vermin and rags: ἐς τὰ ῥάκια σκώπτοντας ἀεὶ, καὶ τοῖς φθειρσὶν πολεμοῦντας (Pac. 724-736; Vesp. 1030).

But this cannot be true in point of fact, since we know that no man was more bitterly assailed by the comic authors of his day than Periklês. It ought to be added, that though Aristophanês doubtless attacked the powerful men, he did not leave the smaller persons unmolested.

[526] Aristoph. Ran. 1067; also Vesp. 1095. Æschylus reproaches Euripidês:—

> Εἶτ᾽ αὖ λαλίαν ἐπιτηδεῦσαι καὶ στωμυλίαν ἐδίδαξας,
>
> Ἣ ᾽ξεκένωσεν τάς τε παλαίστρας, καὶ τὰς πυγὰς ἐνέτριψε
>
> Τῶν μειρακίων στωμυλλομένων, καὶ τοὺς παράλους ἀνέπεισεν
>
> Ἀνταγορεύειν τοῖς ἄρχουσιν. Καίτοι τότε γ᾽, ἡνίκ᾽ ἐγὼ ᾽ζων,
>
> *Οὐκ ἠπίστανθ᾽ ἁλλ᾽ ἢ μᾶζαν καλέσαι καὶ ῥυππαπαὶ εἰπεῖν.*

Τὸ *ῥυππαπαὶ* seems to have been the peculiar cry or chorus of the seamen on shipboard, probably when some joint pull or effort of force was required: compare Vespæ, 909.

[527] See about the effect on the estimation of Sokratês, Ranke, Commentat. de Vitâ Aristophanis, p. cdxli.

Compare also the remarks of Cicero (De Repub. iv, 11; vol. iv, p. 476, ed. Orell.) upon the old Athenian comedy and its unrestrained license. The laws of the Twelve Tables at Rome condemned to death any one who composed and published libellous verses against the reputation of another citizen.

Among the constant butts of Aristophanês and the other comic composers, was the dithyrambic poet Kinesias, upon whom they discharged their wit and bitterness, not simply as an indifferent poet, but also on the ground of his alleged impiety, his thin and feeble bodily frame, and his wretched health. We see the effect of such denunciations in a speech of the orator Lysias; composed on behalf of Phanias, against whom Kinesias had brought an indictment, or graphê paranomôn. Phanias treats these abundant lampoons as if they were good evidence against the character of Kinesias: Θαυμάζω δ᾽ εἰ μὴ βαρέως φέρετε ὅτι Κινησίας ἐστὶν ὁ τοῖς νόμοις βοηθὸς, ὃν ὑμεῖς πάντες ἐπίστασθε ἀσεβέστατον ἁπάντων καὶ παρανομώτατον γεγονέναι. Οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τοιαῦτα περὶ θεοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνων, ἃ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ λέγειν, τῶν *κωμῳδιδασκάλον δ᾽ ἀκούετε καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτόν*; see Lysias, Fragm. 31, ed. Bekker; Athenæus, xii, p. 551.

Dr. Thirlwall estimates more lightly than I do the effect of these abundant libels of the old comedy: see his review of the Attic tragedy and comedy, in a very excellent chapter of his History of Greece, ch. xviii, vol. iii, p. 42.

[528] The view which I am here combating, is very general among the German writers; in proof of which, I may point to three of the ablest recent critics on the old comedy, Bergk, Meineke, and Ranke; all most useful writers for the understanding of Aristophanês.

Respecting Kratinus, Bergk observes: "Erat enim Cratinus, *pariter atque ceteri principes antiquæ comœdiæ, vir egregie moratus*, idemque antiqui moris tenax…. Cum Cratinus *quasi divinitus videret* ex hac libertate mox tanquam ex stirpe aliquâ nimiam licentiam existere et nasci, statim his initiis graviter adversatus est, videturque Cimonem tanquam exemplum boni et honesti civis proposuisse," etc.

"Nam Cratinus cum esset magno ingenio et *eximiâ morum gravitate*, ægerrime tulit rem publicam præceps in perniciem ruere: omnem igitur operam atque omne studium eo contulit, ut *imagine ipsius vitæ ante oculos positâ omnes et res divinæ et humanæ emendarentur, hominumque animi ad honestatem colendam incenderentur*. Hoc sibi primus et proposuit Cratinus, et propositum strenue persecutus est. *Sed si ipsam Veritatem, cujus imago oculis obversabatur, oculis subjecisset, verendum erat ne tædio obrueret eos qui spectarent*, nihilque prorsus eorum, quæ summo studio persequebatur, obtineret. Quare eximiâ quâdam arte pulchram effigiem hilaremque formam finxit, ita tamen ut ad veritatem sublimemque ejus speciem referret omnia: sic cum ludicris

miscet seria, ut et vulgus haberet quî delectaretur; et qui plus ingenio valerent, ipsam veritatem, quæ ex omnibus fabularum partibus perluceret, mente et cogitatione comprehenderent." … "Jam vero Cratinum in fabulis componendis id *unice spectavisse quod esset verum*, ne veteres quidem latuit…. Aristophanes autem *idem et secutus semper est* et sæpe professus." (Bergk, De Reliquiis Comœd. Antiq. pp. 1, 10, 20, 233, etc.)

The criticism of Ranke (Commentatio de Vitâ Aristophanis, pp. ccxli, cccxiv, cccxlii, ccclxix, ccclxxiii, cdxxxiv, etc.) adopts the same strain of eulogy as to the lofty and virtuous purposes of Aristophanês. Compare also the eulogy bestowed by Meineke on the monitorial value of the old comedy (Historia Comic. Græc. pp. 39, 50, 165, etc.), and similar praises by Westermann; Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland und Rom. sect. 36.

In one of the arguments prefixed to the "Pax" of Aristophanês, the author is so full of the conception of these poets as public instructors or advisers, that he tells us, absurdly enough, they were for that reason called *διδάσκαλοι*: οὐδὲν γὰρ συμβούλων διέφερον· ὅθεν αὐτοὺς καὶ *διδασκάλους* ὠνόμαζον· ὅτι πάντα τὰ *πρόσφορα διὰ δραμάτων αὐτοὺς ἐδίδασκον* (p. 244, ed. Bekk.).

"Eupolis, atque Cratinus, Aristophanesque poetæ,
Atque alii, quorum Comœdia prisca virorum est,
Si quis erat dignus describi, quod malus, aut fur,
Aut mœchus foret, aut sicarius, aut alioqui
Famosus, multâ cum libertate notabant."

This is the early judgment of Horace (Serm. i, 4, 1): his later opinion on the *Fescennina licentia*, which was the same in spirit as the old Grecian comedy, is much more judicious (Epistol. ii, 1, 145): compare Art. Poetic. 224. To assume that the persons derided or vilified by these comic authors must always have deserved what was said of them, is indeed a striking evidence of the value of the maxim: "Fortiter calumniare; semper aliquid restat." Without doubt, their indiscriminate libel sometimes wounded a suitable subject; in what proportion of cases, we have no means of determining: but the perusal of Aristophanês tends to justify the epithets which Lucian puts into the mouth of *Dialogus* respecting Aristophanês and Eupolis—not to favor the opinions of the authors whom I have cited above (Lucian, Jov. Accus. vol. ii, p. 832). He calls Eupolis and Aristophanês δεινοὺς ἄνδρας ἐπικερτομῆσαι τὰ σεμνὰ καὶ χλευάσαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα.

When we notice what Aristophanês himself says respecting the other comic poets, his predecessors and contemporaries, we shall find it far from countenancing the exalted censorial function which Bergk and others ascribe to them (see the Parabasis in the Nubes, 530, *seq.*, and in the Pax, 723). It seems especially preposterous to conceive Kratinus in that character; of whom what we chiefly know, is his habit of drunkenness, and the downright, unadorned vituperation in which he indulged: see the Fragments and story of his last play, Πυτίνη (in Meineke, vol. ii, p. 116; also Meineke, vol. i, p. 48, *seq.*).

Meineke copies (p. 46) from Suidas a statement (v. Ἐπείου δειλότερος) to the effect that Kratinus was *ταξίαρχος τῆς Οἰνηΐδος φυλῆς*. He construes this as a real fact: but there can hardly be a doubt that it is only a joke made by his contemporary comedians upon his fondness for wine; and not one of the worst among the many such jests which seem to have been then current. Runkel also, another editor of the Fragments of Kratinus (Cratini Fragment., Leips. 1827, p. 2, M. M. Runkel), construes this ταξίαρχος τῆς Οἰνηΐδος φυλῆς, as if it were a serious function; though he tells us about the general character of Kratinus: "De vitâ ipsâ et moribus pæne nihil dicere possumus: *hoc solum constat, Cratinum poculis et puerorum amori valde deditum fuisse*."

Great numbers of Aristophanic jests have been transcribed as serious matter-of-fact, and have found their way into Grecian history. Whoever follows chapter vii of K. F. Hermann's Griechische Staats-Alterthümer, containing the *Innere Geschichte* of the Athenian democracy, will see the most sweeping assertions made against the democratical institutions, on the authority of passages of Aristophanês: the same is the case with several of the other most learned German manuals of Grecian affairs.

[529] Horat. de Art. Poetic. 212-224.

"Indoctus quid enim saperet, liberque laborum,

Rusticus urbano confusus, turpis honesto?…

Illecebris erat et gratâ novitate morandus

Spectator, functusque sacris, et potus, et exlex."

[530] See the Parabasis of Aristophanês in the Nubes (535, *seq.*) and in the Vespæ (1015-1045).

Compare also the description of Philippus the γελωτοποῖος, or Jester, in the Symposion of Xenophon; most of which is extremely Aristophanic, ii, 10, 14. The comic point of view is assumed throughout that piece; and Sokratês is introduced on one occasion as apologizing for the intrusion of a serious reflection (τὸ σπουδαιολογεῖν, viii, 41). The same is the case throughout much of the Symposion of Plato; though the scheme and purpose of this latter are very difficult to follow.

[531] Plutarch, Solon, c. 29. See the previous volumes of this History, ch. xxi, vol. ii, p. 145; ch. xxix, vol. iv, pp. 83, 84.

[532] Respecting the rhetorical cast of tragedy, see Plato, Gorgias, c. 57, p. 502, D.

Plato disapproves of tragedy on the same grounds as of rhetoric.

[533] See the discourse of Sokratês, insisting upon this point, as part of the duties of a commander (Xen. Mem. iii, 3, 11).

[534] This necessity of some rhetorical accomplishments, is enforced not less emphatically by Aristotle (Rhetoric. i, 1, 3) than by Kalliklês in the Gorgias of Plato, c. 91, p. 486, B.

[535] See the description which Cicero gives, of his own laborious oratorical training:—

"Ego hoc tempore omni, noctes et dies, in omnium doctrinarum meditatione versabar. Eram cum Stoico Diodoto, qui cum habitavisset apud me mecumque vixisset, nuper est domi meæ mortuus. A quo quum in aliis rebus, tum studiosissime in dialecticâ versabar; *quæ quasi contracta et astricta eloquentia putanda est*; sine quâ etiam tu, Brute, judicavisti, te illam justam eloquentiam, quam *dialecticam dilatatam* esse putant, consequi non posse. Huic ego doctori, et ejus artibus variis et multis, ita eram tamen deditus, ut ab exercitationibus oratoriis nullus dies vacaret." (Cicero, Brutus, 90, 309.)

[536] Aristotel. ap. Diog. Laërt. viii, 57.

[537] See my preceding vol. iv, ch. xxxvii.

[538] Diogen. Laërt. viii, 58, 59, who gives a remarkable extract from the poem of Empedoklês, attesting these large pretensions.

See Brandis, Handbuch der Gr. Röm. Philos. part i. sects. 47, 48, p. 192; Sturz. ad Empedoclis Frag. p. 36.

[539] De Rerum Naturâ, i, 719.

[540] Some striking lines of Empedoklês are preserved by Sextus Empiricus, adv. Mathemat. vii, 115; to the effect that every individual man gets through his short life, with no more knowledge than is comprised in his own slender fraction of observation and experience: he struggles in vain to find out and explain the totality; but neither eye, nor ear, nor reason can assist him:—

Παῦρον δὲ ζωῆς ἀβίον μέρος ἀθρήσαντες,

Ὠκύμοροι, καπνοῖο δίκην ἀρθέντες, ἀπέπταν

Αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες, ὅτῳ προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος

Πάντοσ᾽ ἐλαυνόμενοι. Τὸ δὲ οὖλον ἐπεύχεται εὑρεῖν

Αὔτως· οὔτ᾽ ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾽ ἀνδράσιν, οὔτ᾽ ἐπακουστὰ,

Οὔτε νόῳ περιληπτά.

[541] See Parmenidis Fragmenta, ed. Karsten, v, 30, 55, 60: also the Dissertation annexed by Karsten, sects. 3, 4, p. 148, *seq.*; sect. 19, p. 221, *seq.*

Compare also Mullach's edition of the same Fragments, annexed to his edition of the Aristotelian treatise, De Melisso, Xenophane, et Gorgiâ, p. 144.

[542] Plato, Parmenidês, p. 128, B. σὺ μὲν (Parmenidês) γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἓν φῂς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τούτων τεκμήρια παρέχεις καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ, etc.

[543] See the remarkable passage in the Parmenidês of Plato, p. 128, B, C, D.

Ἐστὶ δὲ τό γε ἀληθὲς βοήθειά τις ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα τῷ Παρμενίδου λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας αὐτὸν κωμῳδεῖν, ὡς εἰ ἕν ἐστι, πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα συμβαίνει πάσχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐναντία αὐτῷ. Ἀντιλέγει δὴ οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ πολλὰ λέγοντας, *καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταῦτα καὶ πλείω*, τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὡς *ἔτι γελοιότερα πάσχοι ἂν αὐτῶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις—ἡ εἰ πολλά ἐστίν—ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι, εἴ τις ἱκανῶς ἐπεξίοι*.

[544] Plato, Phædrus, c. 44, p. 261, D. See the citations in Brandis, Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philosophie, part i, p. 417, *seq.*

[545] Parmenid. Fragm. v, 101, ed. Mullach.

[546] See the Fragments of Melissus collected by Mullach, in his publication cited in a previous note, p. 81. *seq.*

[547] The reader will see this in Bayle's Dictionary, article, Zeno of Elea.

Simplicius (in his commentary on Aristot. Physic. p. 255) says that Zeno first composed written dialogues, which cannot be believed without more certain evidence. He also particularizes a puzzling question addressed by Zeno to Protagoras. See Brandis, Gesch. der Griech. Röm. Philos. i, p. 409. Zeno ἴδιον μὲν οὐδὲν ἐξέθετο (sc. περὶ τῶν πάντων·), διηπόρησε δὲ περὶ τούτων ἐπὶ πλεῖον. Plutarch. ap. Eusebium, Præpar. Evangel. i, 23, D.

[548] Compare Plutarch, Periklês, c. 3; Plato, Parmenidês, pp. 126, 127; Plato, Alkibiad. i. ch. 14, p. 119, A.

That Sokratês had in his youth conversed with Parmenidês, when the latter was an old man, is stated by Plato more than once, over and above his dialogue called Parmenidês, which professes to give a conversation between the two, as well as with Zeno. I agree with Mr. Fynes Clinton, Brandis, and Karsten, in thinking that this is better evidence, about the date of Parmenidês than any of the vague indications which appear to contradict it, in Diogenes Laërtius and elsewhere. But it will be hardly proper to place the conversation between Parmenidês and Sokratês—as Mr. Clinton places it, Fast. H. vol. ii, App. c. 21, p. 364—at a time when Sokratês was only fifteen years of age. The ideas which the ancients had about youthful propriety, would not permit him to take part in conversation with an eminent philosopher at so early an age as fifteen, when he would not yet be entered on the roll of citizens, or be qualified for the smallest function, military or civil. I cannot but think that Sokratês must have been more than twenty years of age when he thus conversed with Parmenidês.

Sokratês was born in 469 B.C. (perhaps 468 B.C.); he would therefore be twenty years of age in 449: assuming the visit of Parmenidês to Athens to have been in 448 B.C., since he was then sixty-five years of age, he would be born in 513 B.C. It is objected that, if this date be admitted, Parmenidês could not have been a pupil of Xenophanês: we should thus he compelled to admit, which perhaps is the truth, that he learned the doctrine of Xenophanês at second-hand.

[549] Plato, Parmenid. pp. 135, 136.

Parmenidês speaks to Sokratês: Καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὖ ἴσθι, ἡ ὁρμὴ, ἣν ὁρμᾷς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἔλκυσον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γυμνάσαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἕως ἔτι νέος εἶ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἡ ἀλήθεια. Τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος, φάναι (τὸν Σωκράτη), ὦ Παρμενίδη, τῆς γυμνασίας; Οὗτος, εἰπεῖν (τὸν Παρμενίδην) ὅνπερ ἤκουσας Ζήνωνος.... Χρὴ δὲ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ σκοπεῖν, *μὴ μόνον, εἰ ἔστιν ἕκαστον, ὑποτιθέμενον, σκοπεῖν τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως —ἀλλὰ καὶ, εἰ μὴ ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὑποτίθεσθαι*—εἰ βούλει μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι.... Ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου καὶ πλάνης, ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν. See also Plato's Kratylus, p. 428, E, about the necessity of the investigator looking both before and behind—ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω.

See also the Parmenidês, p. 130, E,—in which Sokratês is warned respecting the ἀνθρώπων δόξας, against enslaving himself to the opinions of men: compare Plato, Sophistes, p. 227, B, C.

[550] See Aristotel. De Sophist. Elenchis, c. 11, p. 172, ed. Bekker; and his Topica, ix, 5, p. 154; where the different purposes of dialogue are enumerated and distinguished.

[551] See Isokratês, Orat. x; Helenæ Encomium, sects. 2-7; compare Orat. xv, De Permutatione, of the same author, s. 90.

I hold it for certain, that the first of these passages is intended as a criticism upon the Platonic dialogues (as in Or. v, ad Philip. s. 84), probably the second passage also. Isokratês, evidently a cautious and timid man, avoids mentioning the names of contemporaries, that he may provoke the less animosity.

[552] Isokratês alludes much to this sentiment, and to the men who looked upon gymnastic training with greater favor than upon philosophy, in the Orat. xv, De Permutatione, s. 267, *et seq.* A large portion of this oration is in fact a reply to accusations, the same as those preferred against mental cultivation by the Δίκαιος Λόγος in the Nubes of Aristophanês, 947, *seq.*; favorite topics in the mouths of the pugilists "with smashed ears." (Plato, Gorgias, c. 71, p. 515, E; τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγότων.)

[553] There is but too much evidence of the abundance of such jealousies and antipathies during the times of Plato, Aristotle, and Isokratês; see Stahr's Aristotelia, ch. iii, vol. i, pp. 37, 68.

Aristotle was extremely jealous of the success of Isokratês, and was himself much assailed by pupils of the latter, Kephisodôrus and others, as well as by Dikæarchus, Eubulidês, and a numerous host of writers in the same tone: στρατὸν ὅλον τῶν ἐπιθεμένων Ἀριστοτέλει; see the Fragments of Dikæarchus, vol. ii, p. 225, ed. Didot. "De ingenio ejus (observes Cicero, in reference to Epicurus, de Finibus, ii, 25, 80) in his disputationibus, non de moribus, quæritur. Sit ista in Græcorum levitate perversitas, qui maledictis insectantur eos, a quibus de veritate dissentiunt." This is a taint no way peculiar to *Grecian* philosophical controversy; but it has nowhere been more infectious than among the Greeks, and modern historians cannot be too much on their guard against it.

[554] See Plato (Protagoras, c. 8, p. 316, D.; Lachês, c. 3, p. 180, D.; Menexenus, c. 3, p. 236, A; Alkibiad. i, c. 14, p. 118, C); Plutarch, Periklês, c. 4.

Periklês had gone through dialectic practice in his youth (Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 46).

[555] Isokratês, Or. xv, De Permutat. sect. 287.

Compare Brandis, Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philosophie, part i, sect. 48, p. 196.

[556] Isokratês calls both Anaxagoras and Damon, sophists (Or. xv, De Perm. sect. 251), Plutarch, Periklês, c. 4. Ὁ δὲ Δάμων ἐοικεν, ἄκρος ὢν σοφιστὴς, καταδύεσθαι μὲν εἰς τὸ τῆς μουσικῆς ὄνομα, ἐπικρυπτόμενος πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς τὴν δεινότητα.

So Protagoras too (in the speech put into his mouth by Plato, Protag. c. 8, p. 316) says, very truly, that there had been sophists from the earliest times of Greece. But he says also, what Plutarch says in the citation just above, that these earlier men refused, intentionally and deliberately, to call themselves sophists, for fear of the odium attached to the name; and that he, Protagoras, was the first person to call himself openly a sophist.

The denomination by which a man is known, however, seldom depends upon himself, but upon the general public, and upon his critics, friendly or hostile. The unfriendly spirit of Plato did much more to attach the title of sophists specially to these teachers, than any assumption of their own.

[557] Herodot. i, 29; ii, 49; iv, 95. Diogenês of Apollonia, contemporary of Herodotus, called the Ionic philosophers or physiologists by the name sophists: see Brandis, Geschich. der Griech. Röm. Philosoph. c. lvii,

note *O*. About Thamyras, see Welcker, Griech. Tragöd., Sophoklês, p. 421:—

Εἰτ᾽ οὖν σοφιστὴς καλὰ παραπαίων χέλυν, etc.

The comic poet Kratinus called all the poets, including Homer and Hesiod, σοφισταί: see the Fragments of his drama Ἀρχίλοχοι in Meineke, Fragm. Comicor. Græcor. vol. ii, p. 16.

[558] Æschinês cont. Timarch. c. 34. Æschinês calls Demosthenês also a sophist, c. 27.

We see plainly from the terms in Plato's Politicus, c. 38, p. 299 B, μετεωρολόγον, ἀδολεσχήν τινα σοφιστὴν, that both Sokratês and Plato himself were designated as sophists by the Athenian public.

[559] Aristotel. Metaphysic. iii, 2, p. 996; Xenophon, Sympos. iv, 1.

Aristippus is said to have been the first of the disciples of Sokratês who took money for instruction (Diogen. Laërt. ii, 65).

[560] Xenoph. Memor. iv, 2, 1. γράμματα πολλὰ συνειλεγμένον ποιητῶν τε καὶ σοφιστῶν τῶν εὐδοκιμωτάτων….

The word σοφιστῶν is here used just in the same sense as τοὺς θησαυροὺς *τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν*, οὓς ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες, etc. (Memor. i, 6, 14.) It is used in a different sense in another passage (i, 1, 11), to signify teachers who gave instruction on physical and astronomical subjects, which Sokratês and Xenophon both disapproved.

[561] Isokratês, Orat. v, ad Philipp. sect. 14: see Heindorf's note on the Euthydemus of Plato, p. 305, C. sect. 79.

[562] Diogen. Laërt. ix, 65. Ἔσπετε νῦν μοι, ὅσοι πολυπράγμονές ἐστε σοφισταί (Diogen. Laërt. viii, 74).

Demetrius of Trœzen numbered Empedoklês as a sophist. Isokratês speaks of Empedoklês, Ion, Alkmæon, Parmenidês, Melissus, Gorgias, all as οἱ παλαιοὶ σοφισταί; all as having taught different περιττολογίας about the elements of the physical world (Isok. de Permut. sect. 288).

[563] Eurip. Med. 289:—

Χρὴ δ᾽ οὔποθ᾽ ὅστις ἀρτίφρων πέφυκ᾽ ἀνὴρ,
Παῖδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι σοφούς.
Χωρὶς γὰρ ἄλλης, ἧς ἔχουσιν, ἀργίας,
Φθόνον πρὸς ἀστῶν ἀλφάνουσι δυσμενῆ.

The words ὁ περισσῶς σοφὸς seem to convey the same unfriendly sentiment as the word σοφιστής.

[564] Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 6. In another passage, the sophist Antiphon—whether this is the celebrated Antiphon of the deme Rhamnus, is uncertain; the commentators lean to the negative—is described as conversing with Sokratês, and saying that Sokratês of course must imagine his own conversation to be worth nothing, since he asked no price from his scholars. To which Sokratês replies:—

Ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, παρ᾽ ἡμῖν νομίζεται, τὴν ὥραν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμοίως μὲν καλὸν, ὁμοίως δὲ αἰσχρὸν, διατίθεσθαι εἶναι. Τήν τε γὰρ ὥραν, ἐὰν μέν τις ἀργυρίου πωλῇ τῷ βουλομένῳ, πόρνον αὐτὸν ἀποκαλοῦσιν· ἐὰν δέ τις, ὃν ἂν γνῷ καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν ἐραστὴν ὄντα, τοῦτον φίλον ἑαυτῷ ποιῆται, σώφρονα νομίζομεν. Καὶ *τὴν σοφίαν* ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν *ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας, σοφιστὰς ὥσπερ πόρνους* ἀποκαλοῦσιν· ὅστις δὲ, ὃν ἂν γνῷ εὐφυᾶ ὄντα, διδάσκων ὅ,τι ἂν ἔχῃ ἀγαθὸν, φίλον ποιεῖται, τοῦτον νομίζομεν, ἃ τῷ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ πολίτῃ προσήκει, ταῦτα ποιεῖν (Xenoph. Memor. i, 6, 13).

As an evidence of the manners and sentiment of the age, this passage is extremely remarkable. Various parts of the oration of Æschinês against Timarchus, and the Symposion of Plato, pp. 217, 218, both receive and give light to it.

Among the numerous passages in which Plato expresses his dislike and contempt of teaching for money, see his Sophistes, c. 9, p. 223. Plato, indeed, thought that it was unworthy of a virtuous man to accept salary for the discharge of any public duty: see the Republic, i, 19, p. 347.

[565] Aristot. Rhetoric. i, 1, 4; where he explains the sophist to be a person who has the same powers as the dialectician, but abuses them for a bad purpose: ἡ γὰρ σοφιστικὴ, οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει…. Ἐκεῖ δὲ, σοφιστὴς μὲν, κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, διαλεκτικὸς δὲ, οὐ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν. Again, in the first chapter of the treatise de Sophisticis Elenchis: ὁ σοφιστὴς, χρηματιστὴς ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ οὔσης, etc.

[566] Respecting Isokratês, see his Orat. xv, De Permutatione, wherein it is evident that he was not only ranked as a sophist by others, but also considered himself as such, though the appellation was one which he did not like. He considers himself as such, as well as Gorgias: οἱ καλούμενοι σοφισταὶ; sects. 166, 169, 213, 231.

Respecting Aristotle, we have only to read not merely the passage of Timon cited in a previous note, but also the bitter slander of Timæus (Frag. 70. ed. Didot, Polybius, xii, 8), who called him *σοφιστὴν ὀψιμαθῆ καὶ μισητὸν ὑπάρχοντα*, καὶ τὸ πολυτίμητον ἰατρεῖον ἀρτίως ἀποκεκλεικότα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰς πᾶσαν αὐλὴν καὶ σκήνην ἐμπεπηδηκότα· πρὸς δὲ, γαστρίμαργον, ὀψαρτύτην, ἐπὶ στόμα φερόμενον ἐν πᾶσι.

[567] In the general point of view here described, the sophists are presented by *Ritter*, Geschichte der Griech. Philosophie, vol. i, book vi, chaps. 1-3, p. 577, *seq.*, 629, *seq.*; by *Brandis*, Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philos. sects, lxxxiv-lxxxvii, vol. i, p. 516, *seq.*; by *Zeller*, Geschichte der Philosoph. ii. pp. 65, 69, 165, etc.: and, indeed, by almost all who treat of the sophists.

[568] Compare Isokratês, Orat. xiii. cont. Sophistas, sects. 19-21.

[569] Aristot. Sophist. Elench. c. 33; Cicero, Brut. c. 12.

[570] See a striking passage in Plato, Theætet. c. 24, pp. 173, 174.

[571] Isokratês, Orat. v (ad. Philip.), sect. 14; Orat. x (Enc. Hel.), sect. 2; Orat. xiii (adv. Sophist.), sect. 9 (compare Heindorf's note ad Platon. Euthydem. sect. 79); Orat. xii (Panath.), sect. 126; Orat. xv (Perm.), sect. 90.

Isokratês, in the beginning of his Orat. x, Encom. Helenæ, censures all the speculative teachers; first, Antisthenês and Plato (without naming them, but identifying them sufficiently by their doctrines); next, Protagoras, Gorgias, Melissus, Zeno, etc., by name, as having wasted their time and teaching on fruitless paradox and controversy. He insists upon the necessity of teaching with a view to political life and to the course of actual public events, abandoning these useless studies (sect. 6).

It is remarkable that what Isokratês recommends is just what Protagoras and Gorgias are represented as actually doing—each doubtless in his own way—in the dialogues of Plato, who censures them for being too practical, while Isokratês, commenting on them from various publications which they left, treats them only as teachers of useless speculations.

In the Oration De Permutatione, composed when he was eighty-two years of age (sect. 10, the orations above cited are earlier compositions, especially Orat. xiii, against the sophists, see sect. 206), Isokratês stands upon the defensive, and vindicates his profession against manifold aspersions. It is a most interesting oration, as a defence of the educators of Athens generally, and would serve perfectly well as a vindication of the teaching of Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, etc., against the reproaches of Plato.

This oration should be read, if only to get at the genuine Athenian sense of the word sophists, as distinguished from the technical sense which Plato and Aristotle fasten upon it. The word is here used in its largest sense, as distinguished from ἰδιώταις (sect. 159): it meant, literary men or philosophers generally, but especially the professional teachers: it carried, however, an obnoxious sense, and was therefore used as little as possible by themselves; as much as possible by those who disliked them.

Isokratês, though he does not willingly call himself by this unpleasant name, yet is obliged to acknowledge himself unreservedly as one of the profession, in the same category as Gorgias (sects. 165, 179, 211, 213, 231, 256), and defends the general body as well as himself; distinguishing himself of course from the bad members of the profession, those who pretended to be sophists, but devoted themselves to something different in reality (sect. 230).

This professional teaching, and the teachers, are signified indiscriminately by these words: οἱ σοφισταὶ—οἱ περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν διατρίβοντες—τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἀδίκως διαβεβλημένην (sects. 44, 157, 159, 179, 211, 217, 219)—ἡ τῶν λόγων παιδεία—ἡ τῶν λόγων μελέτη—ἡ φιλοσοφία—ἡ τῆς φρονήσεως ἄσκησις—τῆς ἐμῆς, εἴτε βούλεσθε καλεῖν δυνάμεως, εἴτε φιλοσοφίας, εἴτε διατρίβης (sects. 53, 187, 189, 193, 196). All these expressions mean the same process of training; that is, general mental training as opposed to bodily (sects. 194, 199), and intended to cultivate the powers of thought, speech, and action: πρὸς τὸ λέγειν καὶ φρονεῖν—τοῦ φρονεῖν εὖ καὶ λέγειν—τὸ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν (sects. 221, 261, 285, 296, 330).

Isokratês does not admit any such distinction between the philosopher and dialectician on the one side, and the sophist on the other, as Plato and Aristotle contend for. He does not like dialectical exercises: yet he admits them to be useful for youth, as a part of intellectual training, on condition that all such speculations shall be dropped, when the youth come into active life (sects. 280, 287).

This is the same language as that of Kalliklês in the Gorgias of Plato, c. 40, p. 484.

[572] Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Platon. Protagor. p. 23: "Hoc vero ejus judicio ita utitur Socrates, ut eum dehinc dialecticâ subtilitate in summam consilii inopiam conjiciat. Colligit enim inde *satis captiose* rebus ita comparatis justitiam, quippe quæ a sanctitate diversa sit, plane nihil sanctitatis habituram, ac vicissim sanctitati nihil fore commune cum justitiâ. Respondet quidem ad hæc Protagoras, justitiam ac sanctitatem non per omnia sibi similes esse, nec tamen etiam prorsus dissimiles videri. Sed etsi *verissima est hæc ejus sententia*, tamen comparatione illâ a partibus faciei repetitâ, *in fraudem inductus*, et quid sit, in quo omnis virtutis natura contineatur, ignarus, sese ex his difficultatibus adeo non potest expedire," etc.

Again, p. 24: "Itaque Socrates, missâ hujus rei disputatione, *repente ad alia progreditur*, scilicet *similibus laqueis hominem deinceps denuo irretiturus*." … "Nemini facile obscurum erit, hoc quoque loco, Protagoram *argutis conclusiunculis deludi atque callide eo permoveri*," etc. … p. 25: "Quanquam nemo erit, quin videat *callide deludi Protagoram*," etc. … p. 34: "Quod si autem ea, quæ in Protagorâ *Sophistæ ridendi causâ* e vulgi atque sophistarum ratione disputantur, in Gorgiâ ex ipsius philosophi mente et sententiâ vel brevius proponuntur vel copiosius disputantur," etc.

Compare similar observations of Stallbaum, in his Prolegom. ad Theætet. pp. 12, 22; ad Menon. p. 16; ad Euthydemum, pp. 26, 30; ad Lachetem, p. 11; ad Lysidem, pp. 79, 80, 87; ad Hippiam Major. pp. 154-156.

"Facile apparet Socratem *argutâ*, quæ verbo φαίνεσθαι inest, *diologiâ interlocutorem* (Hippiam Sophistam) *in fraudem inducere*." … "Illud quidem pro certo et explorato habemus, non serio sed *ridendi verandique Sophistæ gratiâ gravissimam illam sententiam in dubitationem vocari*, ideoque iis conclusiunculis labefactari, quas quilibet paulo attentior facile intelligat non ad fidem faciendam, sed ad lusum jocumque, esse comparatas."

[573] Plato, Sophistes, c. 52, p. 268.

[574] Cicero, Academ. iv, 23. Xenophon, at the close of his treatise De Venatione (c. 13), introduces a sharp censure upon the sophists, with very little that is specific or distinct. He accuses them of teaching command and artifice of words, instead of communicating useful maxims; of speaking for purposes of deceit, or for their own profit, and addressing themselves to rich pupils for pay; while the *philosopher* gives his lessons to every one gratuitously, without distinction of persons. This is the same distinction as that taken by Sokratês and Plato, between the sophist and the philosopher: compare Xenoph. De Vectigal. v, 4.

[575] Plato, Protagoras, c. 16, p. 328, B. Diogenes Laërtius (ix, 58) says that Protagoras demanded one hundred minæ as pay: little stress is to be laid upon such a statement, nor is it possible that he could have had one fixed rate of pay. The story told by Aulus Gellius (v, 10) about the suit at law between Protagoras and his disciple Euathlus, is at least amusing and ingenious. Compare the story of the rhetor Skopelianus, in Philostratus, Vit. Sophist. i, 21, 4.

Isokratês (Or. xv, de Perm. sect. 166) affirms that the gains made by Gorgias, or by any of the eminent sophists, had never been very high; that they had been greatly and maliciously exaggerated; that they were very inferior to those of the great dramatic actors (sect. 168).

[576] Aristot. Rhetoric. ii, 26. Ritter (p. 582) and Brandis (p. 521) quote very unfairly the evidence of the "Clouds" of Aristophanês, as establishing this charge, and that of corrupt teaching generally, against the sophists as a body. If Aristophanês is a witness against any one, he is a witness against Sokratês, who is the person singled out for attack in the "Clouds." But these authors, not admitting Aristophanês as an evidence against

Sokratês, whom he *does* attack, nevertheless quote him as an evidence against men like Protagoras and Gorgias, whom he *does not* attack.

[577] Isokratês, Or. xv, (De Permut.) sect. 16, νῦν δὲ λέγει μὲν (the accuser) ὡς ἐγὼ τοὺς ἥττους λόγους κρείττους δύναμαι ποιεῖν, etc.

Ibid. sect. 32. πειρᾶταί με διαβάλλειν, ὡς διαφθείρω τοὺς νεωτέρους, λέγειν διδάσκων καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι πλεονεκτεῖν, etc.

Again, sects. 59, 65, 95, 98, 187 (where he represents himself, like Sokratês in his Defence, as vindicating philosophy generally against the accusation of corrupting youth), 233, 256.

[578] Plato, Sok. Apolog. c. 10, p. 23, D. τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν (διδάσκω). Compare a similar expression in Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 31. τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον, etc.

The same unfairness, in making this point tell against the sophists exclusively, is to be found in Westermann, Geschichte der Griech. Beredsamkeit sects. 30, 64.

[579] See the last chapter of Aristotle De Sophisticis Elenchis. He notices these early rhetorical teachers, also, in various parts of the treatise on rhetoric.

Quintilian, however, still thought the precepts of Theodôrus and Thrasymachus worthy of his attention (Inst. Orat. iii, 3).

[580] Quintilian, Inst. Orat. iii. 4, 10; Aristot. Rhetor. iii, 5. See the passages cited in Preller, Histor. Philos. ch. iv, p. 132, note *d*, who affirms respecting Protagoras: "alia inani grammaticorum principiorum ostentatione novare conabatur," which the passages cited do not prove.

[581] Isokratês, Or. x, Encom. Helen. sect. 3; Diogen. Laërt. ix, 54.

[582] Diogen. Laërt. ix. 51; Sext. Empir. adv. Math. ix. 56. Περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν, οὔτε εἴ εἰσιν, οὐθ᾽ ὁποῖοι τινές εἰσι· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι, ἥ τε ἀδηλότης, καὶ βραχὺς ὢν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

I give the words partly from Diogenes, partly from Sextus, as I think they would be most likely to stand.

[583] Xenophanês ap. Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. vii, 49.

[584] The satyrical writer Timon (ap. Sext. Emp. ix, 57), speaking in very respectful terms about Protagoras, notices particularly the guarded language which he used in this sentence about the gods; though this precaution did not enable him to avoid the necessity of flight. Protagoras spoke:—

Πᾶσαν ἔχων φυλακὴν ἐπιεικείης· τὰ μὲν οὐ οἱ

Χραίσμησ᾽, ἀλλὰ φυγῆς ἐπεμαίετο ὄφρα μὴ οὕτως

Σωκρατικὸν πίνων ψυχρὸν πότον Ἄϊδα δύῃ.

It would seem, by the last line as if Protagoras had survived Sokratês.

[585] Plato, Theætet. 18, p. 164, E. Οὔτι ἄν, οἶμαι, ὦ φίλε, εἴπερ γε ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ ἑτέρου μύθου ἔζη—ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἂν ἤμυνε· νῦν δὲ ὄρφανον αὐτὸν ὄντα ἡμεῖς προπηλακίζομεν … ἀλλὰ δὴ *αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἕνεκ᾽* αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν.

This theory of Protagoras is discussed in the dialogue called Theætetus, p. 152, *seq.*, in a long but desultory way.

See Sextus Empiric. Pyrrhonic. Hypol. i. 216-219, et contra Mathematicos, vii, 60-64. The explanation which Sextus gives of the Protagorean doctrine, in the former passage, cannot be derived from the treatise of Protagoras himself; since he makes use of the word ὕλη in the philosophical sense, which was not adopted until the days of Plato and Aristotle.

It is difficult to make out what Diogenes Laërtius states about other tenets of Protagoras, and to reconcile them with the doctrine of "man being the measure of all things," as explained by Plato (Diog. Laërt. ix, 51, 57).

[586] Aristotle (in one of the passages of his Metaphysica, wherein he discusses the Protagorean doctrine, x, i, p. 1053, B.) says that this doctrine comes to nothing more than saying, that man, so far as cognizant, or so far as percipient, is the measure of all things; in other words, that knowledge, or perception, is the measure of all things. This, Aristotle says, is trivial, and of no value, though it sounds like something of importance: Πρωταγόρας δ᾽ ἄνθρωπόν φησι πάντων εἶναι μέτρον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὸν ἐπιστήμονα εἰπὼν ἢ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον· τούτους δ᾽ ὅτι ἔχουσιν ὁ μὲν αἴσθησιν ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμην· ἃ φαμεν εἶναι μέτρα τῶν ὑποκειμένων. Οὐθὲν δὴ λέγων περιττὸν φαίνεταί τι λέγειν.

It appears to me, that to insist upon the essentially relative nature of cognizable truth, was by no means a trivial or unimportant doctrine, as Aristotle pronounces it to be; especially when we compare it with the unmeasured conceptions of the objects and methods of scientific research which were so common in the days of Protagoras.

Compare Metaphysic. iii, 5, pp. 1008, 1009, where it will be seen how many other thinkers of that day carried the same doctrine, seemingly, further than Protagoras.

Protagoras remarked that the observed movements of the heavenly bodies did not coincide with that which the astronomers represented them to be, and to which they applied their mathematical reasonings. This remark was a criticism on the mathematical astronomers of his day—ἐλέγχων τοὺς γεωμέτρας (Aristot. Metaph. iii, 2, p. 998, A). We know too little how far his criticism may have been deserved, to assent to the general strictures of Ritter, Gesch. der Phil. vol. i, p. 633.

[587] See the treatise entitled De Melisso, Xenophane et Gorgiâ in Bekker's edition of Aristotle's Works, vol. i, p. 979, *seq.*; also the same treatise, with a good preface and comments, by Mullach, p. 62 *seq.*: compare Sextus Emp. adv. Mathemat. vii, 65, 87.

[588] See the note of Mullach, on the treatise mentioned in the preceding note, p. 72. He shows that Gorgias followed in the steps of Zeno and Melissus.

[589] Isokratês De Permutatione, Or. xv, s. 287; Xenoph. Memorab. i, 1, 14.

[590] Aristophan. Equit. 1316-1321.

[591] Isokratês, Or. xv, De Permutation. s. 170.

[592] Thucyd. ii, 64. γνῶτε δ᾽ ὄνομα μέγιστον αὐτὴν (τὴν πόλιν) ἔχουσαν ἐν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, διὰ τὸ ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς μὴ εἴκειν.

[593] Thucydidês (iii, 82) specifies very distinctly the cause to which he ascribes the bad consequences which he depicts. He makes no allusion to sophists or sophistical teaching; though Brandis (Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philos. i, p. 518, not. f.) drags in "the sophistical spirit of the statesmen of that time," as if it were the cause of the mischief, and as if it were to be found in the speeches of Thucydidês, i, 76, v, 105.

There cannot be a more unwarranted assertion; nor can a learned man like Brandis be ignorant, that such words as "the sophistical spirit," (Der sophistische Geist,) are understood by a modern reader in a sense totally different from its true Athenian sense.

[594] Xenoph. Memor. ii, 1, 21-34. Καὶ Πρόδικος δὲ ὁ σοφὸς ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι τῷ περὶ Ἡρακλέους, *ὅπερ δὴ καὶ πλείστοις ἐπιδείκνυται*, ὡσαύτως περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀποφαίνεται, etc.

Xenophon here introduces Sokratês himself as bestowing much praise on the moral teaching of Prodikus.

[595] See Fragment iii, of the Ταγηνισταὶ of Aristophanês, Meineke, Fragment. Aristoph. p. 1140.

[596] Xenophon gives only the substance of Prodikus's lecture, not his exact words. But he gives what may be called the whole substance, so that we can appreciate the scope as well as the handling of the author. We cannot say the same of an extract given (in the Pseudo-Platonic Dialogue Axiochus, c. 7, 8) from a lecture said to have been delivered by Prodikus, respecting the miseries of human life, pervading all the various professions and occupations. It is impossible to make out distinctly, either how much really belongs to Prodikus, or what was his scope and purpose, if any such lecture was really delivered.

[597] Plato, Protagoras, p. 320, D. c. 11, *et seq.*, especially p. 322, D, where Protagoras lays it down that no man is fit to be a member of a social community, who has not in his bosom both δίκη and αἰδὼς,—that is, a sense of reciprocal obligation and right between himself and others,—and a sensibility to esteem or reproach

from others. He lays these fundamental attributes down as what a good ethical theory must assume or exact in every man.

[598] Of the unjust asperity and contempt with which the Platonic commentators treat the sophists, see a specimen in Ast, Ueber Platons Leben und Schriften, pp. 70, 71, where he comments on Protagoras and this fable.

[599] Protagoras says: Τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν, εὐβουλία περὶ τε τῶν οἰκείων ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν. (Plato, Protagoras, c. 9, p. 318, E.)

A similar description of the moral teaching of Protagoras and the other sophists, yet comprising a still larger range of duties, towards parents, friends, and fellow-citizens in their private capacities, is given in Plato, Meno. p. 91, B, E.

Isokratês describes the education which he wished to convey, almost in the same words: Τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα μανθάνοντας καὶ μελετῶντας ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τὰ τῆς πόλεως καλῶς διοικήσουσιν, ὥνπερ ἕνεκα καὶ πονητέον καὶ φιλοσοφητέον καὶ πάντα πρακτέον ἐστί (Or. xv, De Permutat. s. 304; compare 289).

Xenophon also describes, almost in the same words, the teaching of Sokratês. Kriton and others sought the society of Sokratês: οὐκ ἵνα δημηγορικοὶ ἢ δικανικοὶ γένοιντο, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα καλοί τε κἀγαθοὶ γενόμενοι, καὶ οἴκῳ καὶ οἰκέταις καὶ οἰκείοις καὶ φίλοις καὶ πόλει καὶ πολίταις δύναιντο καλῶς χρῆσθαι (Memor. i, 2, 48). Again, i, 2, 64: Φανερὸς ἦν Σωκράτης τῶν συνόντων τοὺς πονηρὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχοντας, τούτων μὲν παύων, *τῆς δὲ καλλίστης καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεστάτης ἀρετῆς, ᾗ πόλεις τε καὶ οἴκοι εὖ οἰκοῦσι*, προτρέπων ἐπιθυμεῖν. Compare also i, 6, 15; ii, 1, 19; iv, 1, 2; iv, 5, 10.

When we perceive how much analogy Xenophon establishes—so far as regards practical precept, apart from theory or method—between Sokratês, Protagoras, Prodikus, etc., it is difficult to justify the representations of the commentators respecting the sophists; see Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Platon Menon. p. 8. "Etenim virtutis nomen, cum propter ambitûs magnitudinem valde esset ambiguum et obscurum, sophistæ interpretabantur sic, ut, missâ veræ honestatis et probitatis vi, unice de prudentiâ civili ac domesticâ cogitari vellent, eoque modo totam virtutem *ad callidum quoddam utilitatis vel privatim vel publice consequendæ artificium* revocarent." … "Pervidit hanc *opinionis istius perversitatem, ejusque turpitudinem* intimo sensit pectore, vir sanctissimi animi, Socratês, etc." Stallbaum speaks to the same purpose in his Prolegomena to the Protagoras, pp. 10, 11; and to the Euthydemus, pp. 21, 22.

Those who, like these censors on the sophists, think it *base* to recommend virtuous conduct by the mutual security and comfort which it procures to all parties, must be prepared to condemn on the same ground a large portion of what is said by Sokratês throughout the Memorabilia of Xenophon, Μὴ καταφρόνει τῶν οἰκονομικῶν ἀνδρῶν, etc. (ii, 4, 12); see also his Œconomic. xi, 10.

[600] Stallbaum, Prolegomena ad Platonis Menonem, p. 9: "Etenim sophistæ, quum virtutis exercitationem et ad utilitates externas referent, et facultate quâdam atque consuetudine ejus, quod utile videretur, reperiendi, absolvi statuerent,—Socrates ipse, rejectâ *utilitatis turpitudine*, vim naturamque virtutis unice ad id quod bonum honestumque est, revocavit; voluitque esse in eo, ut quis recti bonique sensu ac scientâ polleret, ad quam tanquam ad certissimam normam atque regulam actiones suas omnes dirigeret atque poneret."

Whoever will compare this criticism with the Protagoras of Plato, c. 36, 37, especially p. 357, B, wherein Sokratês identifies good with pleasure and evil with pain, and wherein he considers right conduct to consist in justly calculating the items of pleasure and pain one against the other, ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη, will be astonished how a critic on Plato could write what is above cited. I am aware that there are other parts of Plato's dialogues in which he maintains a doctrine different from that just alluded to. Accordingly, Stallbaum (in his Prolegomena to the Protagoras, p. 30) contends that Plato is here setting forth a doctrine not his own, but is reasoning on the principles of Protagoras, for the purpose of entrapping and confounding him: "Quæ hic de fortitudine disseruntur, ea item cavendum est ne protenus pro decretis mere Platonicis habeantur. Disputat enim Socrates pleraque omnia ad mentem ipsius Protagoræ, ita quidem ut eum per suam ipsius rationem in fraudem et errorem inducat."

I am happy to be able to vindicate Plato against the disgrace of so dishonest a spirit of argumentation as that which Stallbaum ascribes to him. Plato most certainly does not reason here upon the doctrines or principles of Protagoras; for the latter begins by positively denying the doctrine, and is only brought to admit it in a very

qualified manner, c. 35, p. 351, D. He says, in reply to the question of Sokratês: Οὐκ οἶδα ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ὡς σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, εἰ ἐμοὶ ἀποκριτέον ἐστὶν, ὡς τὰ ἡδέα τε ἀγαθά ἐστιν ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ κακά· ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρισιν ἐμοὶ ἀσφαλέστερον εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, *ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς πάντα τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν ἐμόν*, ὅτι ἐστὶ μὲν ἃ τῶν ἡδέων οὔκ ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ, ἐστὶ δὲ αὖ καὶ ἃ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν οὐκ ἐστι κακὰ, ἐστὶ δὲ ἃ ἐστι, καὶ τρίτον ἃ οὐδέτερα, οὔτε κακὰ οὔτ᾽ ἀγαθά.

There is something peculiarly striking in this appeal of Protagoras to his whole past life, as rendering it impossible for him to admit what he evidently looked upon as a *base theory*, as Stallbaum pronounces it to be. Yet the latter actually ventures to take it away from Sokratês, who not only propounds it confidently, but reasons it out in a clear and forcible manner, and of fastening it on Protagoras, who first disclaims it and then only admits it under reserve! I deny the theory to be *base*, though I think it an imperfect theory of ethics. But Stallbaum, who calls it so, was bound to be doubly careful in looking into his proof before he ascribed it to any one. What makes the case worse is, that he fastens it not only on Protagoras, but on the sophists collectively, by that monstrous fiction which treats them as a doctrinal sect.

[601] See about Hippias, Plato, Protagoras, c. 9, p. 318, E.; Stallbaum, Prolegom. ad Platon. Hipp. Maj. p. 147, *seq.*; Cicero, de Orator. iii, 33; Plato, Hipp. Minor, c. 10, p. 368, B.

[602] Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Plat. Hipp. Maj. p. 150.

[603] Plato, Hippias Major, p. 286, A, B.

[604] Plato, Menon, p. 95, A.; Foss, De Gorgiâ Leontino, p. 27, *seq.*

[605] See the observations of Groen van Prinsterer and Stallbaum, Stallbaum ad Platon. Gorg. c. 1.

[606] Plato, Gorgias, c. 17, p. 462, B.

[607] Plato, Gorgias, c. 27, p. 472, A. Καὶ νῦν (say Sokratês) περὶ ὧν σὺ λέγεις ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσι ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ξένοι—μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, ἐὰν μὲν βούλῃ, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ—ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Σκελλίου—ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ἡ Περικλέους ὅλη οἰκία, ἢ ἄλλη συγγένεια, ἥντινα ἂν βούλῃ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἐκλέξασθαι. *Ἀλλ᾽ ἐγώ σοι εἷς ὢν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ…. Ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν ἕνα ὄντα* μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾖ.

[608] This doctrine asserted by Kalliklês will be found in Plato, Gorgias, c. 39, 40, pp. 483, 484.

[609] See the same matter of fact strongly stated by Sokratês in the Memorab. of Xenophon, ii, 1, 13.

[610] Schleiermacher (in the Prolegomena to his translation of the Theætetus, p. 183) represents that Plato intended to refute Aristippus in the person of Kalliklês; which supposition he sustains, by remarking that Aristippus affirmed that there was *no such thing as justice by nature*, but only by law and convention. But the affirmation of Kalliklês is the direct contrary of that which Schleiermacher ascribes to Aristippus. Kalliklês not only does not deny justice by nature, but affirms it in the most direct manner,—explains what it is, that it consists in the right of the strongest man to make use of his strength without any regard to others,—and puts it above the justice of law and society, in respect to authority.

Ritter and Brandis are yet more incorrect in their accusations of the sophists, founded upon this same doctrine. The former says (p. 581): "It is affirmed as a common tenet of the sophists, there is no right by nature, but only by convention;" compare Brandis, p. 521. The very passages to which these writers refer, as far as they prove anything, prove the contrary of what they assert; and Preller actually imputes the contrary tenet to the sophists (Histor. Philosoph. c. 4, p. 130, Hamburg, 1838) with just as little authority. Both Ritter and Brandis charge the sophists with wickedness for this alleged tenet; for denying that there was any right by nature, and allowing no right except by convention; a doctrine which had been maintained before them by Archelaus (Diogen. Laërt. ii, 16). Now Plato (Legg. x, p. 889), whom these writers refer to, charges certain wise men—σοφοὺς ἰδιώτας τε καὶ ποιητὰς (he does not mention sophists)—with wickedness, but on the ground directly opposite; because *they did acknowledge a right by* nature, *of greater authority than the right laid down by* the legislator; and because they encouraged pupils to follow this supposed right of nature, disobeying the law; interpreting the right of nature as Kalliklês does in the Gorgias!

Teachers are thus branded as wicked men by Ritter and Brandis, for the negative, and by Plato, if he here means the sophists, for the affirmative doctrine.

[611] Plato, Gorgias, c. 37, p. 481, D; c. 41, p. 485, B, D; c. 42, p. 487, C; c. 50, p. 495, B; c. 70, p. 515, A. σὺ μὲν αὐτὸς ἄρτι ἄρχει πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα; compare c. 55, p. 500, C. His contempt for the sophists, c. 75, p. 519, E, with the note of Heindorf.

[612] Plato, Gorgias, c. 38, p. 482, E. ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ αὖ τῆς ὁμολογίας αὐτὸς ὑπὸ σοῦ συμποδισθεὶς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη (Polus), *αἰσχυνθεὶς ἃ ἑνόει εἰπεῖν*· σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικὰ καὶ δημηγορικά, φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν … ἐὰν οὖν τις *αἰσχύνηται καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν ἅπερ νοεῖ*, ἀναγκάζεται ἐναντία λέγειν.

Καὶ μὴν (says Sokratês to Kalliklês, c. 42, p. 487, D.) ὅτι γε οἷος *παῤῥησιάζεσθαι* καὶ μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι, αὐτός τε φῂς, καὶ ὁ λόγος, ὃν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες, ὁμολογεῖ σοι. Again, c. 47, p. 492, D. Οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε, ὦ Καλλικλεῖς, ἐπεξέρχει τῷ λόγῳ παῤῥησιαζόμενος· *σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μέν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσι*.

Again, from Kalliklês, ὃ ἐγὼ σοι νῦν *παῤῥησιαζόμενος* λέγω, c. 46, p. 491, E.

[613] This quality is imputed by Sokratês to Kalliklês in a remarkable passage of the Gorgias, c. 37, p. 481, D, E, the substance of which is thus stated by Stallbaum in his note: "Carpit Socrates Calliclis levitatem, mobili populi turbæ nunquam non blandientis et adulantis."

It is one of the main points of Sokratês in the dialogue, to make out that the practice, for he will not call it an art, of sophists, as well as rhetors, aims at nothing but the immediate gratification of the people, without any regard to their ultimate or durable benefit; that they are branches of the widely-extended knack of flattery (Gorgias, c. 19, p. 464, D; c. 20, p. 465, C; c. 56, p. 501, C; c. 75, p. 520, B).

[614] Plato, Gorgias, c. 68, p. 513. Οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν δεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοφυῶς ὅμοιον τούτοις, εἰ μέλλεις τι γνήσιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλίαν τῷ Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ…. Ὅστις οὖν σε τούτοις ὁμοιότατον ἀπεργάσεται, οὗτός σε ποιήσει, ὡς ἐπιθυμεῖς πολιτικὸς εἶναι, πολιτικὸν καὶ ῥητορικόν· τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἤθει λεγομένων τῶν λόγων ἕκαστοι χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἄχθονται.

[615] Plato, Gorgias, c. 46, p. 492, C (the words of Kalliklês). Τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν ξυνθήματα, ἀνθρώπων φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια.

[616] I omitted to notice the Dialogue of Plato entitled Euthydemus, wherein Sokratês is introduced in conversation with the two persons called sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, who are represented as propounding a number of verbal quibbles, assertions of double sense, arising from equivocal grammar or syntax,—fallacies of mere diction, without the least plausibility as to the sense,—specimens of jests and hoax, p. 278, B. They are described as extravagantly conceited, while Sokratês is painted with his usual affectation of deference and modesty. He himself, during a part of the dialogue, carries on conversation in his own dialectical manner with the youthful Kleinias; who is then handed over to be taught by Euthydemus and Dionysodorus; so that the contrast between their style of questioning, and that of Sokratês, is forcibly brought out.

To bring out this contrast, appears to me the main purpose of the dialogue, as has already been remarked by Socher and others (see Stallbaum, Prolegom. ad Euthydem. pp. 15-65): but its construction, its manner, and its result, previous to the concluding conversation between Sokratês and Kriton separately, is so thoroughly comic, that Ast, on this and other grounds, rejects it as spurious and unworthy of Plato (see Ast, über Platons Leben und Schriften, pp. 414-418).

Without agreeing in Ast's inference, I recognize the violence of the caricature which Plato has here presented under the characters of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. And it is for this reason, among many others, that I protest the more emphatically against the injustice of Stallbaum and the commentators generally, who consider these two persons as disciples of Protagoras, and samples of what is called "Sophistica," the sophistical practice, the sophists generally. There is not the smallest ground for considering these two men as disciples of Protagoras, who is presented to us, even by Plato himself, under an aspect as totally different from them as it is possible to imagine. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are described, by Plato himself in this very dialogue, as old men who had been fencing-masters, and who had only within the last two years applied themselves to the eristic or controversial dialogue (Euthyd. c. 1, p. 272, C.; c. 3, p. 273, E). Schleiermacher himself accounts their personal importance so mean, that he thinks Plato could not have intended to attack them, but meant to attack Antisthenês and the Megaric school of philosophers (Prolegom. ad Euthydem. vol. iii, pp. 403, 404, of his translation of Plato). So contemptible does Plato esteem them, that Krito blames Sokratês for having so far degraded himself as to be seen talking with them before many persons (p. 305, B, c. 30).

The name of Protagoras occurs only once in the dialogue, in reference to the doctrine, started by Euthydemus, that false propositions or contradictory propositions were impossible, because no one could either think about or talk about *that which was not*, or *the non-existent* (p. 284, A; 286, C). This doctrine is said by Sokratês to have been much talked of "by Protagoras, and by men yet earlier than he." It is idle to infer from such a passage, any connection or analogy between these men and Protagoras, as Stallbaum labors to do throughout his Prolegomena; affirming (in his note on p. 286, C,) most incorrectly, that Protagoras maintained this doctrine about τὸ μὴ ὄν, or the non-existent, because he had *too great faith* in the evidence of the senses; whereas we know from Plato that it had its rise with Parmenidês, who rejected the evidence of the senses entirely (see Plato, Sophist. 24, p. 237, A, with Heindorf and Stallbaum's notes). Diogenes Laërtius (ix, 8, 53) falsely asserts that Protagoras was the *first* to broach the doctrine, and even cites as his witness Plato in the Euthydemus, where the exact contrary is stated. Whoever broached it first, it was a doctrine following plausibly from the then received Realism, and Plato was long perplexed before he could solve the difficulty to his own satisfaction (Theætet. p. 187, D).

I do not doubt that there were in Athens persons who abused the dialectical exercise for frivolous puzzles, and it was well for Plato to compose a dialogue exhibiting the contrast between these men and Sokratês. But to treat Euthydemus and Dionysodorus as samples of "The Sophists," is altogether unwarranted.

[617] Plato, Gorgias, c. 57, 58; pp. 502, 503.

[618] Plato, Gorgias, c. 72, 73, p. 517 (Sokratês speaks): Ἀληθεῖς ἄρα οἱ ἔμπροσθεν λόγοι ἦσαν, ὅτι οὐδένα ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα τὰ πολιτικὰ ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει.

Ὦ δαιμόνιε, οὐδ᾽ ἐγὼ ψέγω τούτους (Periklês and Kimon) ὡς γε *διακόνους* εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλά μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν γε νῦν *διακονικώτεροι* γεγονέναι καὶ μᾶλλον οἷοί τε ἐκπορίζειν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐπεθύμει. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο, ὅθεν ἔμελλον ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν τούτων διέφερον ἐκεῖνοι· ὅπερ μόνον ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου.

Ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ *τοιούτων φλυαριῶν* ἐμπεπλήκασι τὴν πόλιν (c. 74, p. 519, A).

Οἶμαι (says Sokratês, c. 77, p. 521, D.) μετ᾽ ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν, ἅτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους οὓς λέγω ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον, etc.

[619] This passage is in Republ. vi, 6, p. 492, *seq.* I put the first words of the passage (which is too long to be cited, but which richly deserves to be read, entire) in the translation given by Stallbaum in his note.

Sokratês says to Adeimantus: "An tu quoque putas esse quidem sophistas, homines privatos, qui corrumpunt juventutem in quâcunque re mentione dignâ; nec illud tamen animadvertisti et tibi persuasisti, quod multo magis debebas, ipsos Athenienses turpissimos esse aliorum corruptores?"

Yet the commentator who translates this passage, does not scruple (in his Prolegomena to the Republic, pp. xliv, xlv, as well as to the Dialogues) to heap upon the sophists aggravated charges, as the actual corruptors of Athenian morality.

[620] Plato, Repub. vi, 11, p. 497, B. μηδεμίαν ἀξίαν εἶναι τῶν νῦν κατάστασιν πόλεως φιλοσόφου φύσεως, etc.

Compare Plato, Epistol. vii, p. 325, A.

[621] Anytus was the accuser of Sokratês: his enmity to the sophists may be seen in Plato, Meno. p. 91, C.

[622] Xenoph. Anabas. ii, 6. Πρόξενος—εὐθὺς μὲν μειράκιον ὢν ἐπεθύμει γενέσθαι ἀνὴρ *τὰ μεγάλα πράττειν ἱκανός* καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔδωκε Γοργίᾳ ἀργύριον τῷ Λεοντίνῳ…. Τοσούτων δ' ἐπιθυμῶν, σφόδρα ἔνδηλον αὖ καὶ τοῦτο εἶχεν, ὅτι τούτων οὐδὲν ἂν θέλοι κτᾶσθαι μετὰ ἀδικίας, ἀλλὰ σὺν τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ καλῷ ᾤετο δεῖν τούτων τυγχάνειν, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων μή.

Proxenus, as described by his friend Xenophon, was certainly a man who did no dishonor to the moral teaching of Gorgias.

The connection between thought, speech, and action, is seen even in the jests of Aristophanês upon the purposes of Sokratês and the sophists:—

Νικᾷν πράττων καὶ βουλεύων καὶ τῇ γλώττῃ πολεμίζων (Nubes, 418).

[623] Plato, Apol. Sokr. c. 10, p. 23, C; Protagoras, p. 328, C.

[624] See Isokr. Or. xv, De Perm. sects. 218, 233, 235, 245, 254, 257.

[625] Plato, Apol. Sokrat. c. 13, p. 25, D.

[626] See these points strikingly put by Isokratês, in the Orat. xv, De Permutatione, throughout, especially in sects. 294, 297, 305, 307; and again by Xenoph. Memorab. i, 2. 10, in reference to the teaching of Sokratês.

[627] See a striking passage in Plato's Republic, x, c, 4, p. 600, C.

[628] Thucyd. ii. 40. φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας—οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλαβὴν ἡγούμενοι—διαφερόντως δὲ καὶ τόδε ἔχομεν, ὥστε τολμᾷν τε οἱ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι.

[629] Pausanias, i, 22, 8; ix, 35, 2.

[630] Plato, Euthydem. c. 24, p. 297, D.

[631] See the Symposion of Plato as well as that of Xenophon, both of which profess to depict Sokratês at one of these jovial moments. Plato, Symposion, c. 31, p. 214, A; c. 35, etc., 39, *ad finem*; Xenoph. Symp. ii, 26, where Sokratês requests that the wine may he handed round in small glasses, but that they may succeed each other quickly, like drops of rain in a shower.

The view which Plato takes of indulgence in wine, as affording a sort of test of the comparative self-command of individuals, and measuring the facility with which any man may be betrayed into folly and extravagance, and the regulation to which he proposes to submit the practice, may be seen in his treatise De Legibus, i, p. 649; ii, pp. 671-674. Compare Xenoph. Memorab. i, 2, 1; i, 6, 10.

[632] Xenoph. Memorab. i, 2, 4. τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑπερεσθίοντα ὑπερπονεῖν ἀπεδοκίμαζε, etc.

[633] Xenoph. Mem. i, 6, 10. Even Antisthenês (disciple of Sokratês, and the originator of what was called the Cynic philosophy), while he pronounced virtue to be self-sufficient for conferring happiness, was obliged to add that the strength and vigor of Sokratês were required as a farther condition: αὐτάρκη τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς

εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ τῆς Σωκρατικῆς ἴσχυος; Winckelman, Antisthen. Fragment. p. 47; Diog. Laërt. vi, 11.

[634] See his reply to the invitation of Archelaus, king of Macedonia, indicating the repugnance to accept favors which he could not return (Aristot. Rhetor. ii, 24).

[635] Plato, Sympos. c. 32, p. 215, A; Xenoph. Sympos. c. 5; Plato, Theætet. p. 143, D.

[636] This is one of the traditions which Aristoxenus, the disciple of Aristotle, heard from his father Spintharus, who had been in personal communication with Sokratês. See the Fragments of Aristoxenus, Fragm. 27, 28; ap. Frag. Hist. Græc. p. 280, ed. Didot.

It appears to me that Frag. 28 contains the statement of what Aristoxenus really said about the irascibility of Sokratês; while the expressions of Fragm. 27, ascribed to that author by Plutarch, are unmeasured.

Fragm. 28 also substantially contradicts Fragm. 26, in which Diogenes asserts, on the authority of Aristoxenus,—what is not to be believed, even if Aristoxenus had asserted it,—that Sokratês made a regular trade of his teaching, and collected perpetual contributions: see Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 6; i, 5, 6.

I see no reason for the mistrust with which Preller (Hist. Philosophie, c. v, p. 139) and Ritter (Geschich. d. Philos. vol. ii, ch. 2, p. 19) regard the general testimony of Aristoxenus about Sokratês.

[637] Xenophon (Mem. i, 4, 1) alludes to several such biographers, or collectors of anecdotes about Sokratês. Yet it would seem that most of these *Socratici viri* (Cicer. ad Attic. xiv, 9, 1) did not collect anecdotes or conversations of the master, after the manner of Xenophon; but composed dialogues, manifesting more or less of his method and ἦθος, after the type of Plato. Simon the leather-cutter, however, took memoranda of conversations held by Sokratês in his shop, and published several dialogues purporting to be such. (Diog. Laërt. ii, 123.) The *Socratici viri* are generally praised by Cicero (Tus. D. ii, 3, 8) for the elegance of their style.

[638] Xenophon, Memor. i, 1, 16. Αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο, *σκοπῶν, τί εὐσεβές, τί ἀσεβές* τί καλὸν, τί αἰσχρόν· τί δίκαιον, τί ἄδικον· τί ἀνδρία, τί δειλία· τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός· τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, etc.

Compare i, 2, 50; iii, 8, 3, 4; iii, 9; iv, 4, 5; iv, 6, 1. σκοπῶν σὺν τοῖς συνοῦσι, *τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων, οὐδέποτ᾽ ἔλεγε*.

[639] Aristoph. Nubes, 105, 121, 362, 414; Aves, 1282; Eupolis, Fragment. Incert. ix, x, xi. ap. Meineke, p. 552; Ameipsias, Fragmenta, Konnus, p. 703, Meineke; Diogen. Laërt. ii, 28.

The later comic writers ridiculed the Pythagoreans, as well as Zeno the Stoic, on grounds very similar: see Diogenes Laërt. vii, 1, 24.

[640] Plato, Apol. Sokr. c. 1. Νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγονὼς πλείω ἑβδομήκοντα.

[641] Xenoph. Memor. i, 1, 2-20; i, 3, 1-3.

[642] Plato, Apol. Sokr. c. 21, p. 33, A. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτε ἐγενόμην: compare c. 4, p. 19, E.

Xenoph. Memor. iii, 11, 16. Sokratês: ἐπισκώπτων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀπραφμοσύνην; Plat. Ap. Sok. c. 18, p. 31, B.

[643] Ἀδολεσχεῖν; see Ruhnken's Animadversiones in Xenoph. Memor. p. 293, of Schneider's edition of that treatise. Compare Plato, Sophistês, c. 23, p. 225, E.

[644] Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 10; Plato, Apol. Sok. I, p. 17, D; 18, p. 31. A. οἷον δή μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων, καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον, οὐδὲν παύομαι, *τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων*.

[645] Xen. Mem. iii, 11.

[646] Xenophon in his Memorabilia speaks always of the companions of Sokratês, not of his *disciples*: οἱ συνόντες αὐτῷ—οἱ συνουσίασται (i, 6, 1)—οἱ συνδιατρίβοντες—οἱ συγγιγνόμενοι—οἱ ἑταῖροι—οἱ ὁμιλοῦντες αὐτῷ—οἱ συνήθεις (iv, 8, 2)—οἱ μεθ᾽ αὐτοῦ (iv, 2, 1)—οἱ ἐπιθύμηται (i, 2, 60). Aristippus also, in speaking to Plato, talked of Sokratês as ὁ ἑταῖρος ἡμῶν; Aristot. Rhetor. ii. 24. His enemies spoke of his *disciples*, in an invidious sense; Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 21, p. 33, A.

It is not to be believed that any companions can have made frequent visits, either from Megara and Thebes, to Sokratês at Athens, during the last years of the war, before the capture of Athens in 404 B.C. And in point of fact, the passage of the Platonic Theætetus represents Eukleidês of Megara as alluding to his conversations with Sokratês only a short time before the death of the latter (Plato, Theætetus. c. 2. p. 142, E). The story given by Aulus Gellius—that Eukleidês came to visit Sokratês by night, in women's clothes, from Megara to Athens—seems to me an absurdity, though Deycks (De Megaricarum Doctrinâ, p. 5) is inclined to believe it.

[647] Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 2, 3.

[648] See the conversation of Sokratês (reported by Xenophon, Mem. i, 4, 15) with Aristodemus, respecting the gods: "What *will* be sufficient to persuade you (asks Sokratês) that the gods care about you?" "When they *send me special monitors, as you say that they do to you* (replies Aristodemus); to tell me what to do, and what not to do." To which Sokratês replied, that they answer the questions of the Athenians, by replies of the oracle, and that they send prodigies (τέρατα) by way of information to the Greeks generally. He further advises Aristodemus to pay assiduous court (θεραπεύειν) to the gods, in order to see whether they will not send him monitory information about doubtful events (i, 4, 18).

So again in his conversation with Euthydemus, the latter says to him: Σοὶ δὲ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐοίκασιν *ἔτι φιλικώτερον ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι*, οἵγε μηδὲ ἐπερωτώμενοι ὑπὸ σοῦ προσημαίνουσιν, ἅτε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ μὴ (iv, 3, 12).

Compare i, 1, 19; and iv, 8, 11, where this perpetual communication and advice from the gods is employed as an evidence to prove the superior piety of Sokratês.

[649] Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 19, p. 31, D. Τούτου δὲ αἴτιόν ἐστιν (that is, the reason why Sokratês had never entered on public life) *ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος*, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῳδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο. Ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν *ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον*, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τούτου ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὔποτε. Τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ὅ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν.

Again, c. 31, p. 40, A, he tells the dikasts, after his condemnation: Ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου *ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν*. Νυνὶ δὲ συμβέβηκέ μοι, ἅπερ ὁρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ, ταυτὶ, ἃ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἄν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι. Ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξιόντι ἕωθεν οἴκοθεν ἠναντιώθη *τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον*, οὔτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτ᾽ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν· *καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δή με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ*.

He goes on to infer that his line of defence has been right, and that his condemnation is no misfortune to him, but a benefit, seeing that the sign has not manifested itself.

I agree in the opinion of Schleiermacher (in his Preface to his translation of the Apology of Sokratês, part i, vol. ii, p. 185, of his general translation of Plato's works), that this defence may be reasonably taken as a reproduction by Plato of what Sokratês actually said to the dikasts on his trial. In addition to the reasons given by Schleiermacher there is one which may be noticed. Sokratês predicts to the dikasts that, if they put him to death, a great number of young men will forthwith put themselves forward to take up the vocation of cross-questioning, who will give them more trouble than he has ever done (Plat. Ap. Sok. c. 30, p. 39, D). Now there is no reason to believe that this prediction was realized. If, therefore, Plato puts an erroneous prophecy into the mouth of Sokratês, this is probably because Sokratês really made one.

[650] The words of Sokratês plainly indicate this meaning: see also a good note of Schleiermacher, appended to his translation of the Platonic Apology, Platons Werke, part i, vol ii, p. 432.

[651] Xenoph. Mem. iv, 8, 5.

[652] Xenoph. Sympos. viii, 5; Plato, Euthydem. c. 5, p. 272, E.

[653] See Plato (Theætet. c. 7, p. 151, A; Phædrus, c. 20, p. 242. C; Republic, vi, 10, p. 496, C)—in addition to the above citations from the Apology.

The passage in the Euthyphron (c. 2, p. 3, B) is somewhat less specific. The Pseudo-Platonic dialogue, Theagês, retains the strictly prohibitory attribute of the voice, as never in any case impelling; but extends the range of the warning, as if it was heard in cases not simply personal to Sokratês himself, but referring to the conduct of his friends also (Theagês, c. 11, 12, pp. 128, 129).

Xenophon also neglects the specific attributes, and conceives the voice generally as a divine communication with instruction and advice to Sokratês, so that he often prophesied to his friends, and was always right (Memor. i, 1, 2-4; iv, 8, 1).

[654] See Dr. Forster's note on the Euthyphron of Plato, c. 2, p. 3.

The treatise of Plutarch (De Genio Socratis) is full of speculation on the subject, but contains nothing about it which can be relied upon as matter of fact. There are various stories about prophecies made by Sokratês, and verified by the event, c. 11, p. 582.

See also this matter discussed, with abundant references, in Zeller Philosophie der Griechen, v. ii, pp. 25-28.

[655] Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 22, p. 33, C. Ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ *ἐκ μαντείων* καὶ *ἐξ ἐνυπνίων*, καὶ *παντὶ τρόπῳ, ᾧπέρ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν*.

[656] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 5, p. 21, A. Sokratês offers to produce the testimony of the brother of Chærephon, the latter himself being dead, to attest the reality of this question and answer.

[657] Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 7, 8, p. 22.

[658] Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 9, p. 23. I give here the sense rather than the exact words: Οὗτος ὑμῶν σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν.

Ταῦτ᾽ ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιῒὼν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεὸν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων ἄν τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, *τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν* ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός.

[659] Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 9, p. 23, A-C.

… ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ εἰμὶ, διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

[660] Plato. Ap. Sok. c. 17, p. 29. Τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ ᾠήθην καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν, καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν.

[661] Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 17, p. 29, C.

[662] Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 18, p. 30, D.

[663] Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 28, p. 38, A. Ἐάν τε γὰρ λέγω, ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ· ἐάν τ᾽ αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἑκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντοσ—ὁ δὲ ἀνεξεταστὸς βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ (these last striking words are selected by Dr. Hutcheson, as the motto for his Synopsis Philosophiæ Moralis)—ταῦτα δὲ ἔτι ἧττον πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι.

[664] Diogen. Laërt. ii, 21.

[665] Plato. Sophistês, c. 1, p. 216; the expression is applied to the Eleatic stranger, who sustains the chief part in that dialogue: Τάχ᾽ ἂν οὖν καὶ σοί τις οὗτος τῶν κρειττόνων συνέποιτο, φαύλους ἡμᾶς ὄντας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐποψόμενος καὶ ἐλέγξων, *θεὸς ὤν τις ἐλεγκτικός*.

[666] Xenoph Mem. i, 1, 11. Οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως, ἥπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι, διελέγετο, σκοπῶν ὅπως ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν Κόσμος ἔχει, etc.

Plato, Phædon, c. 45, p. 96. B. ταύτης τῆς σοφίας, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι *περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν*.

[667] Xenoph. Memor. iv, 7, 3-5.

[668] Ion, Chius, Fragm. 9. ap. Didot. Fragm. Historic. Græcor. Diogen. Laërt. ii, 16-19.

Ritter (Gesch. der Philos. vol, ii, ch. 2, p. 19) calls in question the assertion that Sokratês received instruction from Archelaus; in my judgment, without the least reason, since Ion of Chios is a good contemporary witness. He even denies that Sokratês received any instruction in philosophy at all, on the authority of a passage in the Symposion of Xenophon, where Sokratês is made to speak of himself as ἡμᾶς δὲ ὁρᾶς αὐτουργοὺς τινας τῆς

φιλοσοφίας ὄντας (1, 5). But it appears to me that that expression implies nothing more than a sneering antithesis, so frequent both in Plato and Xenophon, with the costly lessons given by Protagoras, Gorgias, and Prodikus. It cannot be understood to deny instruction given to Sokratês in the earlier portion of his life.

[669] I think that the expression in Plato's Phædo, c. 102, p. 96, A, applies to Sokratês himself, and not to Plato: τὰ γε ἐμὰ πάθη, means the mental tendencies of Sokratês when a young man.

Respecting the physical studies probably sought and cultivated by Sokratês in the earlier years of his life, see the instructive Dissertation of Tychsen, Ueber den Prozess des Sokratês, in the Bibliothek der Alten Literatur und Kunst; Erstes Stück, p. 43.

[670] Plato, Parmenid. p. 128, C. καίτοι ὥσπερ γε αἱ Λάκαιναι σκύλακες, εὖ μεταθεῖς καὶ ἰχνεύεις τὰ λεχθέντα, etc.

Whether Sokratês can be properly said to have been the pupil of Anaxagoras and Archelaus, is a question of little moment, which hardly merited the skepticism of Bayle (Anaxagoras, note R; Archelaus, note A: compare Schanbach, Anaxagoræ Fragmenta, pp. 23, 27). That he would seek to acquaint himself with their doctrines, and improve himself by communicating personally with them, is a matter so probable, that the slenderest testimony suffices to make us believe it. Moreover, as I have before remarked, we have here a good contemporary witness, Ion of Chios, to the fact of his intimacy with Archelaus. In no other sense than this could a man like Sokratês be said to be the *pupil* of any one.

[671] See the chapter immediately preceding, p. 472.

[672] See the remarkable passage in Plato's Parmenidês, p. 135 C to 136 E, of which a portion has already been cited in my note to the preceding chapter, referred to in the note above.

[673] Timon the Sillographer ap. Diogen. Laërt. ix, 25.

Ἀμφοτερογλώσσου δὲ μέγα σθένος οὐκ ἀλαπαδνὸν

Ζήνωνος, πάντων ἐπιλήπτορος, etc.

[674] Xenoph. Mem. iv, 7, 6. Ὅλως δὲ τῶν οὐρανίων, ᾗ ἕκαστα ὁ θεὸς μηχανᾶται, φροντιστὴν γίγνεσθαι ἀπέτρεπεν· οὔτε γὰρ εὑρετὰ ἀνθρώποις αὐτὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι, οὔτε χαρίζεσθαι θεοῖς ἂν ἡγεῖτο τὸν ζητοῦντα, ἃ ἐκεῖνοι σαφηνίσαι οὐκ ἐβουλήθησαν. Κινδυνεῦσαι δ᾽ ἂν ἔφη καὶ παραφρονῆσαι τὸν ταῦτα μεριμνῶντα, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ Ἀναξαγόρας παρεφρόνησεν, ὁ τὰ μέγιστα φρονήσας *ἐπὶ τῷ τὰς τῶν θεῶν μηχανὰς ἐξηγεῖσθαι*.

[675] Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 16. Αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ *τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο*, etc. Compare the whole of this chapter.

[676] Xenoph. Mem. iv, 7, 5.

[677] Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 12-15. Plato entertained much larger views on the subject of physical and astronomical studies than either Sokratês or Xenophon: see Plato, Phædrus, c. 120, p. 270, A; and Republic, vii, c. 6-11, p. 522, *seq.*

His treatise De Legibus, however, written in his old age, falls below this tone.

[678] Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 7. Καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας οἴκους τε καὶ πόλεις καλῶς οἰκήσειν, μαντικῆς ἔφη *προσδεῖσθαι*. Τεκτονικὸν μὲν γὰρ, ἢ χαλκευτικὸν, ἢ γεωργικὸν, ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχικὸν, ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἔργων ἐξεταστικὸν, ἢ λογιστικὸν, ἢ οἰκονομικὸν, ἢ στρατηγικὸν γενέσθαι—*πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθήματα καὶ ἀνθρώπου γνώμῃ αἱρετέα* ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι. Τὰ δὲ *μέγιστα* τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἔφη τοὺς *θεοὺς ἑαυτοῖς καταλείπεσθαι, ὧν οὐδὲν δῆλον εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*, etc.

[679] Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 9-19. Ἔφη δὲ δεῖν, ἃ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ, μανθάνειν· ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι· τοὺς γὰρ θεοὺς, οἷς ἂν ἵλεῳ ὦσι, σημαίνειν.

[680] Xenoph. Mem. i, 4, 15; iv, 3, 12. When Xenophon was deliberating whether he should take military service under Cyrus the younger, he consulted Sokratês, who advised him to go to Delphi and submit the case to the oracle (Xen. Anabas. iii, 1, 5).

[681] Xenoph. Mem. iv, 7, 10.

[682] Xenoph. Mem. 1, 9; iv, 7, 6.

[683] Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v, 4, 10.

[684] Ὅττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακὸν τ᾽ ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται.

[685] Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 16.

[686] Xenoph. Mem. iv, 5, 11, 12. Ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐγκρατέσι μόνοις ἔξεστι σκοπεῖν τὰ κράτιστα τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ *λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη*, τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ προαιρεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀπέχεσθαι. Καὶ οὕτως ἔφη ἀρίστους τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεστάτους ἄνδρας γίγνεσθαι, καὶ *διαλέγεσθαι* δυνατωτάτους. Ἔφη δὲ καὶ *τὸ διαλέγεσθαι* ὀνομασθῆναι, ἐκ *τοῦ συνιόντας κοινῇ βουλεύεσθαι διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα*· δεῖν οὖν πειρᾶσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸς τοῦτο ἕτοιμον ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν, καὶ τούτου μάλιστα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ἐκ τούτου γὰρ γίγνεσθαι ἄνδρας ἀρίστους τε καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτους καὶ διαλεκτικωτάτους.

Surely, the etymology here given by Xenophon or Sokratês, of the word διαλέγεσθαι, cannot be considered as satisfactory.

Again, iv, 6, 1. Σωκράτης δὲ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων, ἐνόμιζε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἐξηγεῖσθαι δύνασθαι· τοὺς δὲ μὴ εἰδότας, οὐδὲν ἔφη θαυμαστὸν εἶναι, αὐτούς τε σφάλλεσθαι καὶ ἄλλους σφάλλειν. Ὧν ἕνεκα σκοπῶν σὺν τοῖς συνοῦσι, τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων, οὐδέποτ᾽ ἔληγε. Πάντα μὲν οὖν, ᾗ *διωρίζετο*, πολὺ ἂν ἔργον εἴη διεξελθεῖν· ἐν ὅσοις δὲ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπισκέψεως δηλώσειν οἶμαι, τοσαῦτα λέξω.

[687] Aristot. Metaphys. i, 6, 3, p. 987, b. Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου, περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐδέν—ἐν μέντοι τούτοις τὸ καθόλου ζητοῦντος καὶ περὶ ὁρισμῶν ἐπιστήσαντος πρώτου τὴν διάνοιαν, etc. Again, xiii, 4, 6-8, p. 1078, b. Δύο γάρ ἐστιν ἃ τις ἂν ἀποδοίη Σωκράτει δικαίως, *τοὺς τ᾽ ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους* καὶ *τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου*: compare xiii, 9, 35, p. 1086, b; Cicero, Topic. x, 42.

These two attributes, of the discussions carried on by Sokratês, explain the epithet attached to him by Timon the Sillographer, that he was the leader and originator of the *accurate talkers*:—

> Ἐκ δ᾽ ἄρα τῶν ἀπέκλινεν ὁ λιθοξόος, ἐννομολέσχης,
>
> Ἑλλήνων ἐπαοιδὸς *ἀκριβολόγους ἀποφήνας*,
>
> Μυκτὴρ, ῥητορόμυκτος, ὑπαττικὸς εἰρωνεύτης.

(ap. Diog. Laërt. ii, 19.)

To a large proportion of hearers of that time, as of other times, *accurate thinking and talking* appeared petty and in bad taste: ἡ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπές (Aristot. Ethic. Nikomach. iv, 4, p. 1122, b; also Aristot. Metaphys. ii, 3, p. 995, a). Even Plato thinks himself obliged to make a sort of apology for it (Theætet. c. 102, p. 184, C). No doubt Timon used the word ἀκριβολόγους in a sneering sense.

[688] How slowly grammatical analysis proceeded among the Greeks, and how long it was before they got at what are now elementary ideas in every instructed man's mind, may be seen in Gräfenhahn, Geschichte der Klassischen Philologie im Alterthum, sects. 89-92, etc. On this point, these sophists seem to have been decidedly in advance of their age.

[689] This same tendency, to break off from the vague aggregate then conceived as physics, is discernible in the Hippokratic treatises, and even in the treatise De Antiquâ Medicinâ, which M. Littré places first in his edition, and considers to be the production of Hippokratês himself, in which case it would be contemporary with Sokratês. On this subject of authorship, however, other critics do not agree with him: see the question examined in his vol. i, ch. xii, p. 295, *seq.*

Hippokratês, if he be the author, begins by deprecating the attempt to connect the study of medicine with physical or astronomical hypothesis (c. 2), and he farther protests against the procedure of various medical writers and sophists, or philosophers, such as Empedoklês, who set themselves to make out "what man was from the beginning, how he began first to exist, and in what manner he was constructed," (c. 20). This does not belong, he says, to medicine, which ought indeed to be studied as a comprehensive whole, but as a whole determined by and bearing reference to its own end: "You ought to study the nature of man; what he is with refer-

ence to that which he eats and drinks, and to all his other occupations or habits, and to the consequences resulting from each:" ὅ,τι ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος πρὸς τὰ ἐσθιόμενα καὶ πινόμενα, καὶ ὅ,τι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ὅ,τι ἀφ᾽ ἑκάστου ἑκάστῳ συμβήσεται.

The spirit, in which Hippokratês here approaches the study of medicine, is exceedingly analogous to that which dictated the innovation of Sokratês in respect to the study of ethics. The same character pervades the treatise, De Aëre, Locis et Aquis, a definite and predetermined field of inquiry, and the Hippokratic treatises generally.

[690] Aristotel. Metaphys. i, 5, p. 985, 986. τὸ μὲν τοιόνδε τῶν ἀριθμῶν πάθος δικαιοσύνη, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε ψυχὴ καὶ νοῦς, ἕτερον δὲ καιρὸς, etc. Ethica Magna, i. 1. ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀριθμὸς ἰσάκις ἴσος: see Brandis, Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philos. lxxxii, lxxxiii, p. 492.

[691] Aristotel. Metaphys. iii, 3, p. 998, A. Οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ μετὰ τούτων, *στοιχεῖά* φησιν εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα ἐνυπαρχόντων, *ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς γένη* λέγει ταῦτα τῶν ὄντων. That generic division and subdivision was unknown or unpractised by these early men, is noticed by Plato (Sophist. c. 114, p. 267, D).

Aristotle thinks that the Pythagoreans had some faint and obscure notion of the logical genus, περὶ τοῦ *τί ἐστιν* ἤρξαντο μὲν λέγειν καὶ ὁρίζεσθαι, λίαν δὲ ἁπλῶς ἐπραγματεύθησαν (Metaphys. i, 5, 29, p. 986, B). But we see by comparing two other passages in that treatise (xiii, 4, 6, p. 1078, b, with i, 5, 2, p. 985, b) that the Pythagorean definitions of καιρὸς, τὸ δίκαιον, etc., were nothing more than certain numerical fancies; so that these words cannot fairly be said to have designated, in their view, logical *genera*. Nor can the ten Pythagorean συστοιχίαι, or parallel series of contraries, be called by that name; arranged in order to gratify a fancy about the perfection of the number ten, which fancy afterwards seems to have passed to Aristotle himself, when drawing up his ten predicaments.

See a valuable Excursus upon the Aristotelian expressions τί ἐστι—τί ἦν εἶναι, etc., appended to Schwegler's edition of Aristotle's Metaphysica, vol. ii, p. 369, p. 378.

About the few and imperfect definitions which Aristotle seems also to ascribe to Demokritus, see Trendeleuburg, Comment. ad Aristot. De Animâ, p. 212.

[692] Aristotle remarks about the Pythagoreans, that they referred the virtues to number and numerical relations, not giving to them a theory of their own: τὰς γὰρ ἀρετὰς εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀνάγων *οὐκ οἰκείαν τῶν ἀρετῶν τὴν θεωρίαν* ἐποιεῖτο (Ethic. Magn. i, 1).

[693] Plato, Phædon, c. 102, seq., pp. 96, 97.

[694] As one specimen among many, see Plato, Theætet. c. 11, p. 146, D. It is maintained by Brandis, and in part by C. Heyder (see Heyder, Kritische Darstellung und Vergleichung der Aristotelischen und Hegelschen Dialektik, part i, pp. 85, 129), that the logical process, called division, is not to be considered as having been employed by Sokratês along with definition, but begins with Plato: in proof of which they remark that, in the two Platonic dialogues called Sophistês and Politicus, wherein this process is most abundantly employed, Sokratês is not the conductor of the conversation.

Little stress is to be laid on this circumstance, I think; and the terms in which Xenophon describes the method of Sokratês (διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα, Mem. iv, 5, 12) seem to imply the one process as well as the other: indeed, it was scarcely possible to keep them apart, with so abundant a talker as Sokratês. Plato doubtless both enlarged and systematized the method in every way, and especially made greater use of the process of division, because he pushed the dialogue further into positive scientific research than Sokratês.

[695] Plato, Phædrus, c. 109, p. 265, D; Sophistês, c. 83, p. 253, E.

[696] Aristot. Topic. viii, 14, p. 164, b. 2. Ἐστὶ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν διαλεκτικὸς, ὁ προτατικὸς καὶ ἐνταστικός. Ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν προτείνεισθαι, *ἓν ποιεῖν τὰ πλείω* (δεῖ γὰρ ἓν ὅλως ληφθῆναι πρὸς ὃ ὁ λόγος) τὸ δ᾽ ἐνίστασθαι, *τὸ ἓν πολλά*· ἢ γὰρ διαιρεῖ ἢ ἀναιρεῖ, τὸ μὲν διδοὺς, το δ᾽ οὐ, τῶν προτεινομένων.

It was from Sokratês that dialectic skill derived its great extension and development (Aristot. Metaphys. xiii, 4, p. 1078, b).

[697] What Plato makes Sokratês say in the Euthyphron, c. 12, p. 11, D, Ἄκων εἰμὶ σοφός, etc., may be accounted as true at least in the beginning of the active career of Sokratês; compare the Hippias Minor, c. 18, p.

376, B; Lachês, c. 33, p. 200, E.

[698] Xenoph. Memor. i, 1, 12-16. Πότερόν ποτε νομίσαντες ἱκανῶς ἤδη τἀνθρώπεια εἰδέναι ἔρχονται (the physical philosophers) ἐπὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φροντίζειν· ἢ τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπεια παρέντες, τὰ δὲ δαιμόνια σκοποῦντες, ἡγοῦνται τὰ προσήκοντα πράττειν…. Αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν *ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο* σκοπῶν, τί εὐσεβὲς, τί ἀσεβὲς καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας ἡγεῖτο καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ *ἀγνοοῦντας ἀνδραποδώδεις* ἂν δικαίως κεκλῆσθαι.

Plato, Apolog. Sok. c. 5, p. 20, D. ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός· οὗτοι δὲ τάχ᾽ ἄν, οὓς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, etc. Compare c. 9, p. 23, A.

[699] It is this narrow purpose that Plutarch ascribes to Sokratês, Quæstiones Platonicæ, p. 999, E; compare also Tennemann, Geschicht. der Philos. part ii, art. i, vol. ii, p. 81.

Amidst the customary outpouring of groundless censure against the sophists, which Tennemann here gives, one assertion is remarkable. He tells us that it was the more easy for Sokratês to put down the sophists, since their shallowness and worthlessness, after a short period of vogue, had already been detected by intelligent men, and was becoming discredited.

It is strange to find such an assertion made, for a period between 420-399 B.C., the era when Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias, etc., reached the maximum of celebrity.

And what are we to say about the statement, that Sokratês put down the sophists, when we recollect that the Megaric school and Antisthenês, both emanating from Sokratês, are more frequently attacked than any one else in the dialogues of Plato, as having all those skeptical and disputatious propensities with which the sophists are reproached?

[700] Plato, Gorgias, c. 101, p. 491, A.

Kalliklês. Ὡς ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. Sokratês. Οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ Καλλικλεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. Kalliklês. Νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀτεχνῶς γε *ἀεὶ σκυτέας* καὶ *κναφέας* καὶ *μαγείρους λέγων* καὶ *ἰατροὺς, οὐδὲν παύῃ*. Compare Plato, Symposion, p. 221, E, also Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 37; iv, 5, 5.

[701] It is not easy to refer to specific passages in manifestation of the contrast set forth in the text, which, however, runs through large portions of many Platonic dialogues, under one form or another: see the Menon, c. 27-33, pp. 90-94; Protagoras, c. 28, 29, pp. 319, 320; Politicus, c. 38, p. 299, D; Lachês, c. 11, 12, pp. 185, 186; Gorgias, c. 121, p. 501, A; Alkibiadês, i, c. 12-14, pp. 108, 109, 110; c. 20, p. 113, C, D.

Xenoph. Mem. iii, 5, 21, 22; iv, 2, 20-23; iv, 4, 5; iv, 6, 1. Of these passages, iv, 2, 20, 23 is among the most remarkable.

It is remarkable that Sokratês (in the Platonic Apology, c. 7, p. 22), when he is describing his wanderings (πλάνην) to test supposed knowledge, first in the statesmen, next in the poets, lastly in the artisans and craftsmen, finds satisfaction only in the answers which these latter made to him on matters concerning their respective trades or professions. They would have been wise men, had it not been for the circumstance that, because they knew those particular things, they fancied that they knew other things also.

[702] Plato, Euthyphrôn, c. 8, p. 7, D; Xen. Mem. iv, 4, 8.

[703] Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 2; Plato, Meno, c. 33, p. 94.

[704] Compare Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 4, p. 20, A; Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 25.

[705] Xenoph. Memor. iv, 6, 15. Ὅποτε δὲ αὐτός τι τῷ λόγῳ διεξίοι, διὰ τῶν μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένων ἐπορεύετο, νομίζων ταύτην τὴν ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι λόγου· τοιγαροῦν πολὺ μάλιστα ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα, ὅτε λέγοι, τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὁμολογοῦντας παρεῖχε.

[706] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 7. p. 22, C: compare Plato, Ion. pp. 533, 534.

[707] Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν (says Sokratês to Euthydêmus) ἴσως διὰ τὸ σφόδρα πιστεύειν εἰδέναι, οὐδ᾽ ἐσκέψω (Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 36): compare Plato, Alkibiad. i, c. 14, p. 110. A.

[708] "Moins une science est avancée, moins elle a été bien traitée, et plus elle a besoin d'être enseignée. C'est ce qui me fait beaucoup désirer qu'on ne renonce pas en France à l'enseignement des sciences

idéologiques, morales, et politiques; qui, après tout, sont des sciences comme les autres—*à la difference près, que ceux qui ne les ont pas étudiées sont persuadés de si bonne foi de les savoir, qu'ils se croient en état d'en décider*." (Destutt de Tracy, Elémens d'Idéologie, Préface, p. xxxiv, ed. Paris, 1827.)

[709] "There is no science which, more than astronomy, stands in need of such a preparation, or draws more largely on that intellectual liberality which is ready to adopt whatever is demonstrated, or concede whatever is rendered highly probable, however new and uncommon the points of view may be, in which objects the most familiar may thereby become placed. Almost all *its conclusions stand in open and striking contradiction with those of superficial and vulgar observation*, and with what appears to every one, until he has understood and weighed the proofs to the contrary, the *most positive evidence of his senses*. Thus the earth on which he stands, and which has served for ages as the unshaken foundation of the firmest structures either of art or nature, is divested by the astronomer of its attribute of fixity, and conceived by him as turning swiftly on its centre, and at the same time moving onward through space with great rapidity, etc." (Sir John Herschel, Astronomy, Introduction, sect. 2.)

[710] Xenoph. Memor. iv, 1, 2. Ἐτεκμαίρετο (Sokratês) δὲ τὰς ἀγαθὰς φύσεις, ἐκ τοῦ ταχύ τε μανθάνειν οἷς προσέχοιεν, καὶ μνημονεύειν ἃ ἂν μάθοιεν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν μαθημάτων πάντων, δι᾽ ὧν ἔστιν οἰκίαν τε καλῶς οἰκεῖν καὶ πόλιν, καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις πράγμασιν εὖ χρῆσθαι. Τοὺς γὰρ τοιούτους ἡγεῖτο παιδευθέντας οὐκ ἂν μόνον αὐτούς τε εὐδαίμονας εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν οἴκους καλῶς οἰκεῖν, ἀλλὰ *καὶ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους καὶ πόλεις δύνασθαι εὐδαίμονας ποιῆσαι*.

Ib. iii, 2, 4. Καὶ οὕτως ἐπισκοπῶν, τίς εἴη ἀγαθοῦ ἡγεμόνος ἀρετὴ, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα περιῄρει, κατέλειπε δὲ, *τὸ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν, ὧν ἂν ἡγῆται*.

Ib. iii, 8, 3, 4, 5; iv, 6, 8. He explains τὸ ἀγαθὸν to mean τὸ ὠφέλιμον—μέχρι δὲ τοῦ ὠφελίμου πάντα καὶ αὐτὸς συνεπεσκόπει καὶ συνδιεξῄει τοῖς συνοῦσι (iv, 7, 8). Compare Plato, Gorgias, c. 66, 67, p. 474, D; 475, A.

Things are called ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ on the one hand, and κακὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ on the other, in reference each to its distinct end, of averting or mitigating in the one case, of bringing on or increasing in the other, different modes of human suffering. So again, iii, 9, 4, we find the phrases: ἃ δεῖ πράττειν—ὀρθῶς πράττειν—τὰ συμφορώτατα αὐτοῖς πράττειν, all used as equivalents.

Plato, Symposion, p. 205. A. Κτήσει γὰρ ἀγαθῶν εὐδαίμονες ἔσονται—καὶ οὐκέτι προσδεῖ ἐρέσθαι, ἵνατι δὲ βούλεται εὐδαίμων εἶναι; ἀλλὰ τέλος δοκεῖ ἔχειν ἡ ἀπόκρισις: compare Euthydem. c. 20, p. 279, A; c. 25, p. 281, D.

Plato, Alkibiadês, ii, c. 13, p. 145, C. Ὅστις ἄρα τι τῶν τοιούτων οἶδεν, ἐὰν μὲν παρέπηται αὐτῷ ἡ *τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμη—αὐτὴ δ᾽ ἦν ἡ αὐτὴ δήπου ἥπερ καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὠφελίμου*—φρόνιμόν γε αὐτὸν φήσομεν καὶ ἀποχρῶντα σύμβουλον, καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ· τὸν δὲ μὴ ποιοῦντα, τἀναντία τούτων: compare Plato, Republic, vi, p. 504, E. The fact that this dialogue, called Alkibiadês II, was considered by some as belonging not to Plato, but to Xenophon or Æschinês Socraticus, does not detract from its value as evidence about the speculations of Sokratês (see Diogen. Laërt. ii, 61, 62; Athenæus, v, p. 220).

Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 30, A. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων περιέρχομαι, ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους, μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα, ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται· λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, *ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τἆλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ*.

Zeller (Die Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii, pp. 61-64) admits as a fact this reference of the Sokratic ethics to human security and happiness as their end; while Brandis (Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philosoph. ii, p. 40, *seq.*) resorts to inadmissible suppositions, in order to avoid admitting it, and to explain away the direct testimony of Xenophon. Both of these authors consider this doctrine as a great taint in the philosophical character of Sokratês. Zeller even says, what he intends for strong censure, that "the eudæmonistic basis of the Sokratic ethics differs from the *sophistical moral philosophy*, not in principle, but only in result" (p. 61).

I protest against this allusion to a *sophistical moral philosophy*, and have shown my grounds for the protest in the preceding chapter. There was no such thing as *sophistical moral philosophy*. Not only the sophists were no sect or school, but farther, not one of them ever aimed, so far as we know, at establishing any ethical theory: this was the great innovation of Sokratês. But it is perfectly true that, between the preceptorial exhortation of Sokratês, and that of Protagoras or Prodikus, there was no great or material difference; and this Zeller seems to admit.

[711] The existence of cases forming exceptions to each separate moral precept, is brought to view by Sokratês in Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 15-19; Plato, Republic, i, 6, p. 331, C, D, E; ii, p. 382, C.

[712] Plato, Phædon, c. 88, p. 89, E. ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τἀνθρώπεια ὁ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπεχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· εἰ γάρ που μετὰ τέχνης ἔχρητο, ὥσπερ ἔχει, οὕτως ἂν ἡγήσατο, etc. ἡ πολιτικὴ τέχνη, Protagor. c. 27, p. 319, A; Gorgias, c. 163, p. 521, D.

Compare Apol. Sok. c. 4, p. 20, A, B; Euthydêmus, c. 50, p. 292, E: τίς ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἐκείνη, ἢ ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας ποιήσειεν;...

The marked distinction between τέχνη, as distinguished from ἄτεχνος τριβὴ—ἄλογος τριβὴ or ἐμπειρία, is noted in the Phædrus, c. 95, p. 260, E, and in Gorgias, c. 42, p. 463, B; c. 45, p. 465, A; c. 121, p. 501, A, a remarkable passage. That there is in every art some assignable end, to which its precepts and conditions have reference, is again laid down in the Sophistês, c. 37, p. 232, A.

[713] This fundamental analogy, which governed the reasoning of Sokratês, between the special professions and social living generally,—transferring to the latter the idea of a preconceived end, a theory, and a regulated practice, or art, which are observed in the former,—is strikingly stated in one of the aphorisms of the emperor Marcus Antoninus, vi, 35: Οὐχ ὁρᾷς, πῶς οἱ βάναυσοι τεχνῖται ἁρμόζονται μὲν ἄχρι τινὸς πρὸς τοὺς ἰδιώτας, οὐδὲν ἧσσον μέντοι *ἀντέχονται τοῦ λόγου τῆς τέχνης, καὶ τούτου ἀποστῆναι οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν*; Οὐ δεινὸν, εἰ ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς μᾶλλον αἰδέσονται *τὸν τῆς ἰδίας τέχνης λόγον, ἢ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸν ἑαυτοῦ*, ὃς αὐτῷ κοινός ἐστι πρὸς τοὺς θεούς;

[714] Plato (Phædr. c. 8, p. 229, E; Charmidês, c. 26, p. 164, E; Alkibiad. i, p. 124, A; 129, A; 131, A).

Xenoph. Mem. iv, 2, 24-26. οὕτως ἑαυτὸν ἐπισκεψάμενος, ὁποῖός ἐστι πρὸς *τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην χρείαν*, ἔγνωκε τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν. Cicero (de Legib. i, 22, 59) gives a paraphrase of this well-known text, far more vague and tumid than the conception of Sokratês.

[715] See the striking conversations of Sokratês with Glaukon and Charmidês especially that with the former, in Xen. Mem. iii, c. 6, 7.

[716] There is no part of Plato in which this doxosophy, or false conceit of wisdom, is more earnestly reprobated than in the Sophistês, with notice of the elenchus, or cross-examining exposure, as the only effectual cure for such fundamental vice of the mind; as the true purifying process (Sophistês, c. 33-35, pp. 230, 231).

See the same process illustrated by Sokratês, after his questions put to the slave of Menon (Plato, Menon, c. 18. p. 84, B; Charmidês, c. 30, p. 166, D).

As the Platonic Sokratês, even in the Defence, where his own personality stands most manifest, denounces as the worst and deepest of all mental defects, this conceit of knowledge without reality, ἡ ἀμαθία αὐτὴ ἡ ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ *οὐκ* οἶδεν, c. 17, p. 29, B,—so the Xenophontic Sokratês, in the same manner, treats this same mental infirmity as being near to madness, and distinguishes it carefully from simple want of knowledge, or conscious ignorance: Μανίαν γε μὴν ἐναντίον μὲν ἔφη εἶναι σοφίᾳ, οὐ μέντοι γε τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην μανίαν ἐνόμιζεν. Τὸ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν, καὶ ἃ μή τις οἶδε δοξάζειν, καὶ οἴεσθαι γιγνώσκειν, ἐγγυτάτω μανίας ἐλογίζετο εἶναι (Mem. iii, 9, 6). This conviction thus stands foremost in the mental character of Sokratês, and on the best evidence, Plato and Xenophon united.

[717] Xenoph. Mem. iv, 2, 40. Πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν οὕτω διατεθέντων ὑπὸ Σωκράτους οὐκέτι αὐτῷ προσῄεσαν, οὓς καὶ βλακωτέρους ἐνόμιζεν.

[718] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 9, p. 23, A. Οἴονται γάρ με ἑκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφὸν, ἃ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω.

Ibid. c. 10, p. 23, C. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, οἱ νέοι μοι ἑπακολουθοῦντες, οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἶτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν, etc.

Compare also ibid. c. 22, p. 33, C; c. 27, p. 37, D.

[719] This is an interesting testimony preserved by Aristoxenus, on the testimony of his father Spintharus, who heard Sokratês (Aristox. Frag. 28, ed. Didot). Spintharus said, respecting Sokratês: ὅτι οὐ πολλοῖς αὐτός γε πιθανωτέροις ἐντετυχηκὼς εἴη· τοιαύτην εἶναι τήν τε φωνὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα καὶ τὸ ἐπιφαινόμενον ἦθος, καὶ πρὸς πᾶσί τε τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν τοῦ εἴδους ἰδιότητα.

It seems evident also, from the remarkable passage in Plato's Symposion, c. 39, p. 215, A, that he too must have been much affected by the singular physiognomy of Sokratês: compare Xenoph. Sympos. iv. 19.

[720] Aristot. de Sophist. Elench. c. 32, p. 183, b. 6. Compare also Plutarch, Quæst. Platonic. p. 999, E. Τὸν οὖν ἐλεγκτικὸν λόγον ὥσπερ καθαρτικὸν ἔχων φάρμακον, ὁ Σωκράτης ἀξιόπιστος ἦν ἑτέρους ἐλέγχων, τῷ μηδὲν ἀποφαίνεσθαι· καὶ μᾶλλον ἥπτετο, δοκῶν ζητεῖν κοινῇ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, οὐκ αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ δόξῃ βοηθεῖν.

[721] Xenoph. Mem. iv, 4, 9.

Plato, Gorgias, c. 81, p. 481, B. σπουδάζει ταῦτα Σωκράτης ἢ παίζει; Republic, i, c. 11, p. 337, A. αὐτὴ ἐκείνη ἡ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους, etc (Apol. Sok. c. 28, p. 38, A.)

[722] Diog. Laërt. ii, 16; Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i, 34, 93. Cicero (Brutus, 85, 292) also treats the irony of Sokratês as intended to mock and humiliate his fellow-dialogists, and it sometimes appears so in the dialogues of Plato. Yet I doubt whether the real Sokratês could have had any pronounced purpose of this kind.

[723] The beginning of Xen. Mem. i, 4, 1, is particularly striking on this head: Εἰ δέ τινες Σωκράτην νομίζουσιν (ὡς ἔνιοι γράφουσί τε καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτοῦ τεκμαιρόμενοι) *προτρέψασθαι* μὲν ἀνθρώπους ἐπ᾽ ἀρετὴν κράτιστον γεγονέναι, *προαγαγεῖν* δὲ ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανόν—σκεψάμενοι μὴ *μόνον ἃ ἐκεῖνος κολαστηρίου ἕνεκα τοὺς πάντ᾽ οἰομένους εἰδέναι ἐρωτῶν ἤλεγχεν*, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἃ λέγων συνδιημέρευε τοῖς συνδιατρίβουσιν, δοκιμαζόντων, εἰ ἱκανὸς ἦν βελτίους ποιεῖν τοὺς συνόντας.

[724] Xenophon, after describing the dialogue wherein Sokratês cross-examines and humiliates Euthydêmus, says at the end: Ὁ δὲ (Sokratês) ὡς ἔγνω αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, *ἥκιστα μὲν αὐτὸν διετάραττεν, ἁπλούστατα δὲ καὶ σαφέστατα* ἐξηγεῖτο ἅ τε ἐνόμιζεν εἰδέναι δεῖν, καὶ ἃ ἐπιτηδεύειν κράτιστα εἶναι.

Again, iv, 7, 1. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν *ἁπλῶς* τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀπεφαίνετο Σωκράτης πρὸς τοὺς ὁμιλοῦντας αὐτῷ, δοκεῖ μοι δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων εἶναι, etc.

His readers were evidently likely to doubt, and required proof, that Sokratês could speak *plainly*, *directly*, and *positively:* so much better known was the other side of his character.

[725] Plato, Sophistês, c. 17, p. 230, A. μετὰ δὲ πολλοῦ πόνου τὸ νουθετητικὸν εἶδος τῆς παιδείας σμικρὸν ἀνύτειν, etc. Compare a fragment of Demokritus, in Mullach's edition of the Fragm. Demokrit. p. 175. Fr. Moral 59. Τὸν οἰόμενον νόον ἔχειν ὁ νουθετέων ματαιοπονέει.

Compare Plato, Epistol. vii, pp. 343, 344.

[726] Compare two passages in Plato's Protagoras, c. 49, p. 329, A, and c. 94, p. 348, D; and the Phædrus, c. 138-140, p. 276, A, E.

[727] Plato, Men. c. 13. p. 80, A. ὁμοιότατος τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκῃ τῇ θαλασσίᾳ.

[728] This tripartite graduation of the intellectual scale is brought out by Plato in the Symposion, c. 29, p. 204, A, and in the Lysis, c. 33, p. 218, A.

The intermediate point of the scale is what Plato here, though not always, expresses by the word φιλόσοφος, in its strict etymological sense, "a lover of knowledge;" one who is not yet wise, but who, having learned to know and feel his own ignorance, is anxious to become wise,—and has thus made what Plato thought the greatest and most difficult step towards really becoming so.

[729] The effect of the interrogatory procedure of Sokratês, in forcing on the minds of youth a humiliating consciousness of ignorance and an eager anxiety to be relieved from it, is not less powerfully attested in the simpler language of Xenophon, than in the metaphorical variety of Plato. See the conversation with Euthydêmus, in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, iv, 2; a long dialogue which ends by the confession of the latter (c. 39): Ἀναγκάζει με καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολογεῖν δηλονότι ἡ ἐμὴ φαυλότης· καὶ φροντίζω μὴ κράτιστον ᾖ μοι σιγᾶν· κινδυνεύω γὰρ ἁπλῶς οὐδὲν εἰδέναι. Καὶ πάνυ ἀθύμως ἔχων ἀπῆλθε· καὶ *νομίσας τῷ ὄντι ἀνδράποδον εἶναι*: compare i, 1, 16.

This same expression, "thinking himself no better than a slave," is also put by Plato into the mouth of Alkibiadês, when he is describing the powerful effect wrought on his mind by the conversation of Sokratês (Symposion, c. 39, p. 215, 216): Περικλέους δὲ ἀκούων καὶ ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν ῥητόρων εὖ μὲν ἡγούμην, τοιοῦτον δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἔπασχον, οὐδὲ τεθορύβητό μου ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδ᾽ ἠγανάκτει ὡς *ἀνδραποδωδῶς διακειμένου*. Ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ Μαρσύου πολλάκις δὴ οὕτω διετέθην, ὥστε μοι δόξαι μὴ βιωτὸν εἶναι ἔχοντι ὡς ἔχω.

Compare also the Meno, c. 13, p. 79, E, and Theætet. c. 17, 22, p. 148, E, 151, C, where the metaphor of pregnancy, and of the obstetric art of Sokratês, is expanded: πάσχουσι δὲ δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ ξυγγιγνόμενοι καὶ τοῦτο ταὐτὸν ταῖς τικτούσαις· ὠδίνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπορίας ἐμπίμπλανται νυκτάς τε καὶ ἡμέρας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκεῖναι. Ταύτην δὲ τὴν ὠδῖνα ἐγείρειν τε καὶ ἀποπαύειν ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται.—Ἐνίοτε δὲ, οἳ ἄν *μή μοι δόξωσιν πως ἐγκύμονες εἶναι, γνοὺς ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ δέονται*, πάνυ εὐμενῶς προμνῶμαι, etc.

[730] There is a striking expression of Xenophon, in the Memorabilia, about Sokratês and his conversation (i, 2, 14):—

"He dealt with every one just as he pleased in his discussions," says Xenophon: τοῖς δὲ διαλεγομένοις αὐτῷ πᾶσι χρώμενον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὅπως ἐβούλετο.

[731] I know nothing so clearly illustrating both the subjects and the method chosen by Sokratês, as various passages of the immortal criticisms in the Novum Organon. When Sokratês, as Xenophon tells us, devoted his time to questioning others: "What is piety? What is justice? What is temperance, courage, political government?" etc., we best understand the spirit of his procedure by comparing the sentence which Bacon pronounces upon the *first notions of the intellect,—as radically vicious, confused, badly abstracted from things, and needing complete reexamination and revision*,—without which, he says, not one of them could be trusted:—

"Quod vero attinet ad notiones primas intellectûs, nihil est *eorum, quas intellectus sibi permissus congessit, quin nobis pro suspecto sit*, nec ullo modo ratum nisi novo judicio se stiterit, et secundum illud pronuntiatum fuerit." (Distributio Operis, prefixed to the N. O. p. 168, of Mr. Montagu's edition.) "Serum sane rebus perditis adhibetur remedium, postquam mens ex quotidianâ vitæ consuetudine, et auditionibus, et doctrinis inquinatis occupata, et vanissimis idolis obsessa fuerit…. Restat unica salus ac sanitas, ut *opus mentis universum de integro resumatur; ac mens, jam ab ipso principio, nullo modo sibi permittatur*, sed perpetuo regatur." (Ib. Præfatio, p. 186.) "Syllogismus ex propositionibus constat, propositiones ex verbis, verba notionum tesseræ sunt. Itaque si notiones ipsæ (id quod basis rei est) confusæ sint et temere a rebus abstractæ, nihil in iis quæ superstruuntur est firmitudinis. Itaque spes est una in inductione verâ. *In notionibus nihil sani est*, nec in logicis, nec in physicis. *Non Substantia, non Qualitas, Agere, Pati, ipsum Esse, bonæ, notiones sunt;* multo minus Grave, Leve, Der sum, Tenue, Humidum, Siccum, Generatio, Corruptio, Attrahere, Fugare, Elementum, Materia, Forma, et id Genus; sed omnes phantasticæ et male terminatæ. Notiones infimarum specierum, Hominis, Canis, et prehensionum immediatarum sensus, Albi, Nigri, non fallunt magnopere: *reliquæ omnes (quibus homines hactenus usi sunt) aberrationes sunt*, nec debitis modis a rebus abstractæ et excitatæ." (Aphor. 14, 15, 16.) "Nemo adhuc tantâ mentis constantiâ et rigore inventus est, ut decreverit et sibi imposuerit, *theorias et notiones communes penitus abolere, et intellectum abrasum et æquum ad particularia de integro applicare. Itaque ratio illa quam habemus, ex multâ fide et multo etiam casu, necnon ex puerilibus, quas primo hausimus, notionibus, farrago quædam est et congeries*." (Aphor. 97.) "Nil magis philosophiæ offecisse deprehendimus, quam quod res quæ familiares sunt et frequenter occurrunt, contemplationem hominum non morentur et detineant, sed recipiantur obiter, neque earum causæ quasi soleant; ut non sæpius requiratur informatio de rebus ignotis, quam attentio in notis." (Aphor. 119.)

These passages, and many others to the same effect which might be extracted from the Novum Organon, afford a clear illustration and an interesting parallel to the spirit and purpose of Sokratês. He sought to test the fundamental notions and generalizations respecting man and society, in the same spirit in which Bacon approached those of physics: he suspected the unconscious process of the growing intellect, and desired to revise it, by comparison with particulars; and from particulars too the most clear and certain, but which, from being of vulgar occurrence, were least attended to. And that which Sokratês described in his language as "conceit of knowledge without the reality," is identical with what Bacon designates as the *primary notions*, the *puerile notions*, the *aberrations*, of the intellect left to itself, which have become so familiar and appear so certainly known, that the mind cannot shake them off, and has lost all habit, we might almost say all power, of examining them.

The stringent process—or electric shock, to use the simile in Plato's Menon—of the Sokratic elenchus, afforded the best means of resuscitating this lost power. And the manner in which Plato speaks of this cross-examining elenchus, as "the great and sovereign purification, without which every man, be he the great king himself, is unschooled, dirty, and fall of uncleanness in respect to the main conditions of happiness,"—καὶ τὸν ἔλεγχον λεκτέον ὡς ἄρα μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθάρσεων ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸν ἀνέλεγκτον αὖ νομιστέον, ἂν καὶ τυγχάνῃ μέγας βασιλεὺς ὤν, τὰ μέγιστα ἀκάθαρτον ὄντα· ἀπαίδευτόν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν γεγονέναι ταῦτα, ἃ καθαρώτατον καὶ κάλλιστον ἔπρεπε τὸν ὄντως ἐσόμενον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι; Plato, Sophist. c. 34, p. 230, E,—precisely corresponds to that "*cross-examination of human reason in its native or spontaneous process*," which Ba-

con specifies as one of the three things essential to the expurgation of the intellect, so as to qualify it for the attainment of truth: "Itaque doctrina ista de expurgatione intellectûs, ut ipse ad veritatem habilis sit, tribus redargutionibus absolvitur; redargutione philosophiarum, redargutione demonstrationum, et *redargutione rationis humanæ nativæ*." (Nov. Organ. Distributio Operis, p. 170, ed. Montagu.)

To show further how essential it is in the opinion of the best judges, that the native intellect should be purged or purified, before it can properly apprehend the truths of physical philosophy, I transcribe the introductory passage of Sir John Herschel's "Astronomy:"—

"In entering upon any scientific pursuit, one of the student's first endeavors ought to be to prepare his mind for the reception of truth, by dismissing, or at least loosening his hold on, all such crude and hastily adopted notions respecting the objects and relations he is about to examine, as may tend to embarrass or mislead him; and to strengthen himself, by *something of an effort and a resolve*, for the unprejudiced admission of any conclusion which shall appear to be supported by careful observation and logical argument; even should it prove adverse to notions he may have previously formed for himself, or taken up, without examination on the credit of others. *Such an effort is, in fact, a commencement of that intellectual discipline which forms one of the most important ends of all science.* It is the first movement of approach towards that state of mental purity which alone can fit us for a full and steady perception of moral beauty as well as physical adaptation. It is the "euphrasy and rue," with *which we must purge our sight before we can receive, and contemplate as they are, the lineaments of truth and nature*." (Sir John Herschel, Astronomy; Introduction.)

I could easily multiply citations from other eminent writers on physical philosophy, to the same purpose. All of them prescribe this intellectual purification: Sokratês not only prescribed it, but actually administered it, by means of his elenchus, in reference to the subjects on which he talked.

[732] See particularly the remarkable passage in the Philêbus, c. 18, p. 16, *seq.*

[733] See this point instructively set forth in Mr. John Stuart Mill's System of Logic, vol. ii, book vi, p. 565, 1st edition.

[734] Lord Bacon remarks, in the Novum Organon (Aph. 71):—

"Erat autem sapientia Græcorum professoria, et in disputationes effusa, quod genus inquisitioni veritatis adversissimum est. Itaque nomen illud Sophistarum—quod per contemptum ab iis, qui se philosophos haberi voluerunt, in antiquos rhetores rejectum et traductum est, Gorgiam, Protagoram, Hippiam, Polum—etiam universo generi competit, Platoni, Aristoteli, Zenoni, Epicuro, Theophrasto, et eorum successoribus, Chrysippo, Carneadi, reliquis."

Bacon is quite right in effacing the distinction between the two lists of persons whom he compares; and in saying that the latter were just as much sophists as the former, in the sense which he here gives to the word, as well as in every other legitimate sense. But he is not justified in imputing to either of them this many-sided argumentation as a fault, looking to the subjects upon which they brought it to bear. His remark has application to the simpler physical sciences, but none to the moral. It had great pertinence and value, at the time when he brought it forward, and with reference to the important reforms which he was seeking to accomplish in physical science. In so far as Plato, Aristotle, or the other Greek philosophers, apply their deductive method to physical subjects, they come justly under Bacon's censure. But here again, the fault consisted less in disputing too much, than in too hastily admitting false or inaccurate axioms without dispute.

[735] Aristotel. Metaphysic. iii, 1, 2-5, p. 995, *a*.

The indispensable necessity, to a philosopher, of having before him all the difficulties and doubts of the problem which he tries to solve, and of looking at a philosophical question with the same alternate attention to its affirmative and negative side, as is shown by a judge to two litigants, is strikingly set forth in this passage. I transcribes portion of it: Ἐστὶ δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι βουλομένοις προὔργου τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς· ἡ γὰρ ὕστερον εὐπορία λύσις τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστὶ, λύειν δ᾽ οὐκ ἐστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν…. Διὸ δεῖ τὰς δυσχερείας τεθεωρηκέναι πάσας πρότερον, τούτων τε χάριν, καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ζητοῦντας ἄνευ τοῦ διαπορῆσαι πρῶτον, ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς ποῖ δεῖ βαδίζειν ἀγνοοῦσι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδ᾽ εἴ ποτε τὸ ζητούμενον εὕρηκεν, ἢ μὴ, γιγνώσκειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλος τούτῳ μὲν οὐ δῆλον, τῷ δὲ προηπορηκότι δῆλον. Ἔτι δὲ βέλτιον ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν, τὸν ὥσπερ ἀντιδίκων καὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων λόγων ἀκηκοότα πάντων.

A little further on, in the same chapter (iii, 1, 19, p. 996, *a*), he makes a remarkable observation. Not merely it is difficult, on these philosophical subjects, to get at the truth, but it is not easy to perform well even the pre-

liminary task of discerning and setting forth the ratiocinative difficulties which are to be dealt with: Περὶ γὰρ τούτων ἁπάντων οὐ μόνον χαλεπὸν τὸ εὐπορῆσαι τῆς ἀληθείας, ἀλλ᾽ *οὐδὲ τὸ διαπορῆσαι τῷ λόγῳ ῥᾴδιον καλῶς*. Διαπορῆσαι means the same as διεξελθεῖν τὰς ἀπορίας (Bonitz. not. *ad loc.*), "to go through the various points of difficulty."

This last passage illustrates well the characteristic gift of Sokratês, which was exactly what Aristotle calls τὸ διαπορῆσαι λόγῳ καλῶς; to force on the hearer's mind those ratiocinative difficulties which served both as spur and as guide towards solution and positive truth; towards comprehensive and correct generalization, with clear consciousness of the common attribute binding together the various particulars included.

The same care to admit and even invite the development of the negative side of a question, to accept the obligation of grappling with all the difficulties, to assimilate the process of inquiry to a judicial pleading, is to be seen in other passages of Aristotle; see Ethic. Nikomach. vii, 1, 5; De Animâ, i, 2. p. 403, *b*; De Cœlo, i, 10, p. 279, *b*; Topica, i, 2, p. 101, *a*: (Χρήσιμος δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ) πρὸς τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας, ὅτι δυνάμενοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα διαπορῆσαι, ῥᾷον ἐν ἑκάστοις κατοψόμεθα τἀληθές τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος. Compare also Cicero, Tusc. Disput. ii, 3, 9.

[736] Cicero (de Orator. iii, 16, 61; Tuscul. Disput. v, 4, 11): "Cujus (Socratis) multiplex ratio disputandi, rerumque varietas, et ingenii magnitudo, Platonis ingenio et literis consecrata, plura genera effecit dissentientium philosophorum." Ten distinct varieties of Sokratic philosophers are enumerated; but I lay little stress on the exact number.

[737] In setting forth the ethical end, the language of Sokratês, as far as we can judge from Xenophon and Plato, seems to have been not always consistent with itself. He sometimes stated it as if it included a reference to the happiness, not merely of the agent himself, but of others besides; both as coördinate elements; at other times, he seems to speak as if the end was nothing more than the happiness of the agent himself, though the happiness of others was among the greatest and most essential means. The former view is rather countenanced by Xenophon, the best witness about his master, so that I have given it as belonging to Sokratês, though it is not always adhered to. The latter view appears most in Plato, who assimilates the health of the soul to the health of the body, an end essentially self-regarding.

[738] Cicero, de Orator. i, 47, 204.

[739] Xenoph. Mem. iii, 9, 4; Aristot. Ethic. Nikomach. vi, 13, 3-5; Ethic. Eudem. i, 5; Ethic. Magn. i, 35.

[740] Xenoph. Mem. iii, 9, 6; iv, 2, 19-22. δικαιότερον δὲ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον τὰ δίκαια τοῦ μὴ ἐπισταμένου. To call him the juster man of the two, when neither are just, can hardly be meant: I translate it according to what seems to me the meaning intended. So γραμματικώτερον, in the sentence before, means, comes nearer to a good orthographer. The Greek derivative adjectives in -ικὸς are very difficult to render precisely.

Compare Plato, Hippias Minor, c. 15, p. 372, D, where the same opinion is maintained. Hippias tells Sokratês, in that dialogue (c. 11, p. 369, B), that he fixes his mind on a part of the truth, and omits to notice the rest.

[741] Xenoph. Memor. iii, 9, 14, 15.

[742] Xenoph. Mem. ii, 6, 39. ὅσαι δ᾽ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀρεταὶ λέγονται ταύτας πάσας σκοπούμενος εὑρήσεις μαθήσει τε καὶ *μελέτῃ* αὐξανομένας. Again, the necessity of practise or discipline is inculcated, iii, 9, 1. When Sokratês enumerates the qualities requisite in a good friend, it is not merely superior knowledge which he talks of, but of moral excellence; continence, a self-sufficing temper, mildness, a grateful disposition (c. ii, 6, 1-5).

Moreover, Sokratês laid it down that continence, or self-control, was the very basis of virtue: τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀρετῆς κρηπῖδα (i, 5, 4). Also, that *continence* was indispensable in order to enable a man to acquire knowledge (iv, 5, 10, 11).

Sokratês here plainly treats ἐγκράτειαν (continence, or self-control) as not being a state of the intellectual man, and yet as being the very basis of virtue. He therefore does not seem to have applied consistently his general doctrine, that virtue consisted in knowledge, or in the excellence of the intellectual man, alone. Perhaps he might have said: Knowledge alone will be sufficient to make you virtuous; but before you can acquire knowledge, you must previously have disciplined your emotions and appetites. This merely eludes the objection, without saving the sufficiency of the general doctrine.

I cannot concur with Ritter (Gesch. der Philos. vol. ii, ch. 2, p. 78) in thinking that Sokratês meant by *knowledge*, or *wisdom*, a transcendental attribute, above humanity, and such as is possessed only by a god. This is by

no means consistent with that practical conception of human life and its ends, which stands so plainly marked in his character.

Why should we think it wonderful that Sokratês should propose a defective theory, which embraces only one side of a large and complicated question? Considering that his was the first theory derived from data really belonging to the subject, the wonder is, that it was so near an approach to the truth.

[743] Xen. Mem. iii, 9, 10, 11.

[744] Xen. Mem. i, 2, 9.

[745] Xen. Mem. iii, 9, 12: compare Plato, Gorgias, c. 56. pp. 469, 470.

[746] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 2, p. 18, B; c. 16, p. 28, A. Ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονεν καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστιν. Καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ὃ ἐμὲ αἱρήσει, ἐάνπερ αἱρῇ—οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολὴ καὶ φθόνος.

The expression τῶν πολλῶν in this last line is not used in its most common signification, but is equivalent to τούτων τῶν πολλῶν.

[747] Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 40. Πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν οὕτω διατεθέντων ὑπὸ Σωκράτους οὐκέτι αὐτῷ προσῄεσαν, οὓς καὶ βλακωτέρους ἐνόμιζεν.

[748] Plato, Euthyphron, c. 2, p. 3, C. εἰδὼς ὅτι εὐδιάβολα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς.

[749] See Xenoph. Apol. Sok. sects. 29, 30. This little piece bears a very erroneous title, and may possibly not be the composition of Xenophon, as the commentators generally affirm; but it has every appearance of being a work of the time.

[750] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 10, p. 23, C; c. 27, p. 37, E.

[751] Isokrat. Or. xviii, cont. Kallimach. s. 30.

[752] See Plato, Menon, c. 27, 28, pp. 90, 91.

[753] Æschinês, cont. Timarch. c. 34, p. 74. ὑμεῖς Σωκράτη τὸν σοφιστὴν ἀπεκτείνατε, ὅτι Κριτίαν ἐφάνη πεπαιδευκὼς, etc. Xenoph. Mem. i, 2, 12.

[754] See Plato (Charmidês, c. 3, p. 154, C; Lysis, c. 2, p. 201, B; Protagoras, c. 1, p. 309, A), etc.

[755] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 14, p. 26, C.

[756] Xen. Mem. i. 2, 64; i, 3, 1.

[757] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 3, p. 19, B.

[758] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 3, p. 19, C.

[759] Xen. Mem. i. 1, 13.

[760] Xen. Mem. i, 2, 9.

[761] Xen. Mem. i, 2, 12.

[762] Xen. Mem. i, 2, 49-53.

[763] Xen. Mem. i, 2, 56-59.

[764] Xen. Mem. i, 2, 59.

[765] Xen. Mem. i, 2, 55. Καὶ παρεκάλει ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ ὡς φρονιμώτατον εἶναι καὶ ὠφελιμώτατον, ὅπως, ἐάν τε ὑπὸ πατρὸς ἐάν τε ὑπὸ ἀδελφοῦ ἐάν τε ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου τινὸς βούληται τιμᾶσθαι, μὴ τῷ οἰκεῖος εἶναι πιστεύων ἀμελῇ, ἀλλὰ πειρᾶται, ὑφ᾽ ὧν ἂν βούληται τιμᾶσθαι, τούτοις ὠφέλιμος εἶναι.

[766] Xen. Mem. i, 2, 9. τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους λόγους ἐπαίρειν ἔφη τοὺς νέους καταφρονεῖν τῆς καθεστώσης πολιτείας, καὶ ποιεῖν βιαίους.

[767] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 5, p. 21. A; c. 20, p. 32, E; Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 31.

[768] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 25, p. 36, A; Diog. Laërt. ii, 41. Diogenes says that he was condemned by two hundred and eighty-one ψήφοις πλείοσι τῶν ἀπολυούσων. If he meant to assert that the verdict was found by a *majority* of two hundred and eighty-one above the acquitting votes, this would be contradicted by the "Platonic Apology," which assures us beyond any doubt that the majority was not greater than five or six, so that the turning of three votes would have altered the verdict. But as the number two hundred and eighty-one seems precise, and is not in itself untrustworthy, some commentators construe it, though the words as they now stand are perplexing, as the aggregate of the majority. Since the "Platonic Apology" proves that it was a majority of five or six, the minority would consequently be two hundred and seventy-six, and the total five hundred and fifty-seven.

[769] Xen. Mem. iv, 8, 4, *seq.* He learned the fact from Hermogenês, who heard it from Sokratês himself.

[770] Xen. Mem. iv, 8, 9, 10.

[771] Plato, Phædon, c. 60, p. 77, E. ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ἔνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς, ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται. Τοῦτον οὖν πειρώμεθα πείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον, ὥσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια.

[772] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 29, C.

[773] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 2, p. 19, A. Βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτω γενέσθαι, εἴτι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοὶ, καὶ πλέον τί με ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον· οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἷόν ἐστι. Ὅμως δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

[774] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 5, p. 20, D. Καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειν—εὖ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ. Again, c. 28, p. 37, E. Ἐάν τε γὰρ λέγω, ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ.

[775] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 20, A.

[776] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 30, B.

[777] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 30, A, B. οἴομαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν.

[778] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 18, p. 30, B.

[779] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 18, p. 30, B. καὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες—ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς.

[780] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 18, p. 30, E. πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὥς τις ἂν οἴοιτο, ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν μή τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι· ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὑρήσετε, etc.

[781] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 20, 21, p. 33.

[782] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 22.

[783] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 29, B. Contrast this striking and truly Sokratic sentiment about the fear of death, with the common-place way in which Sokratês is represented as handling the same subject in Xenoph. Memor. i, 4, 7.

[784] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 23, pp. 34, 35. I translate the substance and not the words.

[785] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 24, p. 35.

[786] These are the striking words of Tacitus (Hist. ii, 54) respecting the last hours of the emperor Otho, after his suicide had been fully resolved upon, but before it had been consummated: an interval spent in the most careful and provident arrangements for the security and welfare of those around him: "ipsum viventem quidem relictum, sed solâ posteritatis curâ, et abruptis vitæ blandimentis."

[787] Plato. Apol. Sok. c. 25, p. 36, A. Οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονεν τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἑκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν. Οὐ γὰρ ᾤμην ἔγωγε οὕτω παρ᾽ ὀλίγον ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺ, etc.

[788] Xenoph. Mem. iv, 4, 4. Ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν ἠθέλησε τῶν εἰωθότων ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ποιῆσαι· ἀλλὰ ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἀφεθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν, εἰ καὶ μετρίως τι τούτων ἐποίησε, προείλετο μᾶλλον τοῖς νόμοις ἐμμένων ἀποθανεῖν, ἢ παρανομῶν ζῆν.

[789] Cicero (de Orat. i, 54, 231): "Socrates ita in judicio capitis pro se ipse dixit, ut non supplex aut reus, sed *magister aut dominus videretur esse judicum*." So Epiktêtus also remarked, in reference to the defence of Sokratês: "By all means, abstain from supplication for mercy; but do not put it specially forward, that you *will* abstain, unless you intend, like Sokratês, purposely to provoke the judges." (Arrian, Epiktêt. Diss. ii, 2, 18.)

[790] Quintilian, Inst. Or. ii, 15, 30; xi, 1, 10; Diog. Laërt. ii, 40.

[791] Plato. Apol. Sok. c. 26, 27, 28, pp. 37, 38. I give, as well as I can, the substantive propositions, apart from the emphatic language of the original.

[792] See Plato, Krito, c. 5, p. 45, B.

[793] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 31, p. 40, B; c. 33, p. 41, D.

[794] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 32, p. 40, C; p. 41, B.

[795] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 30, p. 39, C.

[796] Plato, Krito, c. 2, 3, *seq.*

[797] Plato, Phædon, c. 77, p. 84, E.

[798] Plato, Phædon, c. 155, p. 118, A.

[799] Cicero, Academ. Post. i, 12, 44. "Cum Zenone Arcesilas sibi omne certamen instituit, non pertinaciâ aut studio vincendi (ut mihi quidem videtur), sed earum rerum obscuritate, quæ ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant Socratem, et jam ante Socratem, Democritum, Anaxagoram, Empedoclem, omnes pene veteres; qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri, posse, dixerunt…. Itaque Arcesilas negabat, esse quidquam, quod sciri posset, no illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: sic omnia latere in occulto." Compare Academ. Prior. ii, 23, 74; de Nat. Deor. i, 5, 11.

In another passage (Academ. Post. i, 4, 17) Cicero speaks (or rather introduces Varro as speaking) rather confusedly. He talks of "illam Socraticam dubitationem de omnibus rebus, et nullâ affirmatione adhibitâ, consuetudinem disserendi;" but a few lines before, he had said what implies that men might, in the opinion of Sokratês, come to learn and know what belonged to human conduct and human duties.

Again (in Tusc. Disp. i, 4, 8), he admits that Sokratês had a positive ulterior purpose in his negative questioning: "vetus et Socratica ratio contra alterius opinionem disserendi: nam ita facillime, quid veri simillimum esset, inveniri posse Socrates arbitrabatur."

Tennemann (Gesch. der Philos. ii, 5, vol. ii, pp. 169-175) seeks to make out considerable analogy between Sokratês and Pyrrho. But it seems to me that the analogy only goes thus far, that both agreed in repudiating all speculations not ethical (see the verses of Timon upon Pyrrho, Diog. Laërt. ix, 65). But in regard to ethics, the two differed materially. Sokratês maintained that ethics were matter of science, and the proper subject of study. Pyrrho, on the other hand, seems to have thought that speculation was just as useless, and science just as unattainable, upon ethics as upon physics; that nothing was to be attended to except feelings, and nothing cultivated except good dispositions.

[800] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 7, p. 22, A. δεῖ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδεῖξαι, ὥσπερ τινὰς πόνους πονοῦντος, etc.

[801] So Demokritus, Fragm. ed. Mullach, p. 185, Fr. 131. οὔτε τέχνη, οὔτε σοφίη, ἐφιστὸν, ἢν μὴ μάθῃ τις….

[802] Aristotle (Problem. c. 30, p. 953, Bek.) numbers both Sokratês and Plato (compare Plutarch, Lysand. c. 2) among those to whom he ascribes φύσιν μελανχολικὴν, the black bile and ecstatic temperament. I do not know how to reconcile this with a passage in his Rhetoric (ii, 17), in which he ranks Sokratês among the *sedate* persons (στάσιμον). The first of the two assertions seems countenanced by the anecdotes respecting Sokratês (in Plato, Symposion, p. 175, B; p. 220, C), that he stood in the same posture, quite unmoved, even for several hours continuously, absorbed in meditation upon some idea which had seized his mind.

[803] Dr. Thirlwall has given, in an Appendix to his fourth volume (Append. vii, p. 526, *seq.*), an interesting and instructive review of the recent sentiments expressed by Hegel, and by some other eminent German authors, on Sokratês and his condemnation. It affords me much satisfaction to see that he has bestowed such just

animadversions on the unmeasured bitterness, as well as upon the untenable views, of M. Forchhammer's treatise respecting Sokratês.

I dissent, however, altogether, from the manner in which Dr. Thirlwall speaks about the sophists, both in this Appendix and elsewhere. My opinion, respecting the persons so called, has been given at length in the preceding chapter.

[804] See Plato, Euthyphron, c. 3, p. 3, D.

[805] Xen. Mem. iv, 8, 3:—

> "Denique Democritum postquam matura vetustas
>
> Admonuit memores motus languescere mentis,
>
> Sponte suâ letho sese obvius obtulit ipse."
>
> (Lucretius, iii, 1052.)

[806] Diodor. xiv. 37, with Wesseling's note; Diog. Laërt. ii. 43; Argument ad Isokrat. Or. xi, Busiris.



GEORGE GROTE.

HISTORY OF GREECE

BY

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CHAPTER LXX.

RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.

Dismay of the Greeks on learning the death of Cyrus. Klearchus offers the throne to Ariæus. — Artaxerxes summons the Greeks to surrender — their reply — language of Phalinus. — Ariæus refuses the throne, but invites the Greeks to join him for retreat. — The Greeks rejoin Ariæus — interchange of oaths — resolution to retreat together. — Position of the Greeks — to all appearance hopeless. — Commencement of the retreat, along with Ariæus — disorder of the army. — Heralds from the Persians to treat about a truce. — The heralds conduct the Greeks to villages furnished with provisions. March over the canals. — Abundant supplies obtained in the vil-

lages. — Visit of Tissaphernes — negotiations. — Convention concluded with Tissaphernes, who engages to conduct the Greeks home. — Motives of the Persians — favorable dispositions of Parysatis towards Cyrus. — Long halt of the Greeks — their quarrel with Ariæus. — Secret despair of Klearchus. — Retreating march begun, under Tissaphernes — they enter within the Wall of Media — march to Sittakê. — Alarm and suspicions of the Greeks — they cross the Tigris. — Retreating march up the left bank of the Tigris — to the Great Zab. — Suspicions between the Greeks and Tissaphernes. — Klearchus converses with Tissaphernes — and is talked over. — Klearchus, with the other Grecian generals, visits Tissaphernes in his tent. — Tissaphernes seizes the Greek generals. They are sent prisoners to the Persian court, and there put to death. — Menon is reserved to perish in torture — sentiments of queen Parysatis. — How Klearchus came to be imposed upon. — Plans of Tissaphernes — impotence and timidity of the Persians. — The Persians summon the Grecian army to surrender. — Indignant refusal of the Greeks — distress and despair prevalent among them. — First appearance of Xenophon — his dream. — He stimulates the other captains to take the lead and appoint new officers. — Address of Xenophon to the officers. New generals are named, Xenophon being one. — The army is convened in general assembly — speech of Xenophon. — Favorable augury from a man sneezing. — Encouraging topics insisted on by Xenophon. — Great impression produced by his speech — the army confirm the new generals proposed. — Great ascendency acquired over the army at once by Xenophon — qualities whereby he obtained it. — Combination of eloquence and confidence, with soldier-like resource and bravery. — Approach of the Persian Mithridates — the Greeks refuse all parley. — The Greeks cross the Zab and resume their march, harassed by the Persian cavalry. — Sufferings of the Greeks from marching under the attacks of the cavalry. Successful precautions taken. — Tissaphernes renews the attack, with some effect. — Comfortable quarters of the Greeks. They halt to repel the cavalry, and then march fast onward. — Victory of the Greeks — prowess of Xenophon. — The Greeks embarrassed as to their route — impossibility either of following the Tigris farther, or of crossing it. — The strike into the mountains of the Karduchians. — They burn much of their baggage — their sufferings from the activity and energy of the Karduchians. — Extreme danger of their situation. — Xenophon finds out another road to turn the enemy's position. — The Karduchians are defeated and the road cleared. — Danger of Xenophon with the rear division and baggage. — Anxiety of the Greeks to recover the bodies of the slain. — They reach the river Kentritês, the northern boundary of Karduchia. — Difficulties of passing the Kentritês — dream of Xenophon. — They discover a ford and pass the river. — Xenophon with the rear-guard repels the Karduchians and effects his passage. — March through Armenia. Heavy snow and severe cold. — They ford the Eastern Euphrates or Murad. — Distressing marches — extreme misery from cold and hunger. — Rest in good quarters — subterranean villages well stocked with provisions. — After a week's rest, they march onward — their guide runs away. — They reach a difficult pass occupied by the Chalybes — raillery exchanged between Xenophon and Cheirisophus about stealing. — They turn the pass by a flank-march, and force their way over the mountain. — March through the country of the Taochi — exhaustion of provisions — capture of a hill-fort. — Through the Chalybes, the bravest fighters whom they had yet seen — the Skythini. — They reach the flourishing city of Gymnias. — First sight of the sea from the mountain-top Thêchê — extreme delight of the soldiers. — Passage through the Makrônes. — Through the Kolchians — who oppose them and are defeated. — Kolchian villages — unwholesome honey. — Arrival at Trapezus on the Euxine (Trebizond). — Joy of the Greeks — their discharge of vows to their gods — their festivals and games. — Appendix.

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CHAPTER LXXI.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS, FROM THE TIME THAT THEY REACHED TRAPEZUS, TO THEIR JUNCTION WITH THE LACEDÆMONIAN ARMY IN ASIA MINOR.

Greek cities on the Euxine — Sinôpê with her colonies Kerasus, Kotyôra, and Trapezus. — Indigenous inhabitants — their relations with the Greek colonists. — Feelings of the Greeks on the Euxine when the Ten Thousand descended among them. — Uncertainty and danger of what they might do. — Plans of the army — Cheirisophus is sent to Byzantium to procure vessels for transporting them. — Regulations for the army proposed by Xenophon during his absence. — Adopted by the army — their intense repugnance to farther marching. — Measures for procuring transports. Marauding expeditions for supplies, against the Colchians and the Drilæ. — The army leave Trapezus, and march westward along the coast to Kerasus. — Acts of disorder and outrage committed by various soldiers near Kerasus. — March to Kotyôra — hostilities with the Mosynœki. — Long halt at Kotyôra — remonstrance from the Sinopians. — Speech of Hekatonymus of Sinôpê to the army — reply of Xenophon. — Success of the reply — good understanding established with Sinôpê. — Consultation of the army with Hekatonymus, who advises going home by sea. — Envoys sent by the army to Sinôpê to procure vessels. — Poverty and increasing disorganization or the army. — Ideas of Xenophon about founding a new city in the

Euxine, with the army. — Sacrifice of Xenophon to ascertain the will of the gods — treachery of the prophet Silanus. — Silanus, Timasion, and others raise calumnies against Xenophon. General assembly of the army. — Accusations against Xenophon — his speech in defence. — He carries the soldiers with him — discontent and flight of Silanus. — Fresh manœuvres of Timasion — fresh calumnies circulated against Xenophon — renewed discontent of the army. — Xenophon convenes the assembly again. — his address in defence of himself. — His remonstrance against the disorders in the army. — Vote of the army unanimously favorable to Xenophon — disapproving the disorders, and directing trial. — Xenophon's appeal to universal suffrage, as the legitimate political authority. Success of his appeal. — Xenophon recommends trial of the generals before a tribunal formed of the lochages or captains. Satisfaction of the army with Xenophon. — Manner in which discipline was upheld by the officers. — Complete triumph of Xenophon. His influence over the army, derived from his courage, his frankness, and his oratory. — Improved feeling of the army — peace with the Paphlagonian Korylas. — The army pass by sea to Sinôpê. — Return of Cheirisophus — resolution of the army to elect a single general — they wish to elect Xenophon, who declines — Cheirisophus is chosen. — The army pass by sea to Herakleia — they wish to extort money from the Herakleots — opposition of Cheirisophus and Xenophon. — Dissatisfaction of the army — they divide into three factions. 1. The Arcadians and Achæans. 2. A division under Cheirisophus. 3. A division under Xenophon. — Arcadian division start first and act for themselves — they get into great danger, and are rescued by Xenophon — the army reünited at Kalpê — old board of generals reëlected, with Neon in place of Cheirisophus. — Distress for provisions at Kalpê — unwillingness to move in the face of unfavorable sacrifices — ultimate victory over the troops of the country. — Halt at Kalpê — comfortable quarters — idea that they were about to settle there as a colony. — Arrival of Kleander, the Spartan harmost, from Byzantium, together with Dexippus. — Disorder in the army: mutiny against Kleander, arising from the treachery of Dexippus. — Indignation and threats of Kleander — Xenophon persuades the army to submit — fear of Sparta. — Satisfaction given to Kleander, by the voluntary surrender of Agasias with the mutinous soldier. — Appeal to the mercy of Kleander, who is completely soothed. — Kleander takes the command, expressing the utmost friendship both towards the army and towards Xenophon. — Unfavorable sacrifices make Kleander throw up the command and sail away. — March of the army across the country from Kalpê to Chalkêdon. — Pharnabazus bribes Anaxibius to carry the army across the Bosphorus into Europe — false promises of Anaxibius to the army. — Intention of Xenophon to leave the army immediately and go home — first proposition addressed to him by Seuthes of Thrace. — The army cross over to Byzantium — fraud and harsh dealing of Anaxibius, who sends the army at once out of the town. — Last orders of Anaxibius as the soldiers were going out of the gates. — Wrath and mutiny of the soldiers, in going away — they rush again into the gates, and muster within the town. — Terror of Anaxibius and all within the town. — The exasperated soldiers masters of Byzantium — danger of all within it — conduct of Xenophon. — Xenophon musters the soldiers in military order and harangues them. — Xenophon calms the army, and persuades them to refrain from assaulting the town — message sent by them to Anaxibius — they go out of Byzantium, and agree to accept Kœratadas as their commander. — Remarkable effect produced by Xenophon — evidence which it affords of the susceptibility of the Greek mind to persuasive influences. Xenophon leaves the army, and goes into Byzantium with the view of sailing home. Kœratadas is dismissed from the command. — Dissension among the commanders left. — Distress of the army — Aristarchus arrives from Sparta to supersede Kleander — Polus on his way to supersede Anaxibius. — Pharnabazus defrauds Anaxibius, who now employs Xenophon to convey the Cyreians across back to Asia. — Aristarchus hinders the crossing — his cruel dealing towards the sick Cyreians left in Byzantium. — His treacherous scheme for entrapping Xenophon. — Xenophon is again implicated in the conduct of the army — he opens negotiations with Seuthes. — Position of Seuthes — his liberal offers to the army. — Xenophon introduces him to the army, who accept the offers. — Service of the army with Seuthes, who cheats them of most of their pay. — The army suspect the probity of Xenophon — unjust calumnies against him — he exposes it in a public harangue, and regains their confidence. — Change of interest in the Lacedæmonians, who become anxious to convey the Cyreians across into Asia, in order to make war against the satraps. — Xenophon crosses over with the army to Asia — his poverty — he is advised to sacrifice to Zeus Meilichios — beneficial effects. — He conducts the army across Mount Ida to Pergamus. — His unsuccessful attempt to surprise and capture the rich Persian Asidates. — In a second attempt he captures Asidates — valuable booty secured. — General sympathy expressed for Xenophon — large share personally allotted to him. — The Cyreians are incorporated in the army of the Lacedæmonian general Thimbron — Xenophon leaves the army, depositing his money in the temple at Ephesus. — His subsequent return to Asia, to take command of Cyreians as a part of the Lacedæmonian army. — Xenophon in the Spartan service, with Agesilaus against Athens — he is banished. — He settles at Skillus near Olympia, on an estate consecrated to Artemis. — Charms of the residence — good hunting — annual public sacrifice offered by Xenophon. — Later life of Xenophon — expelled from Skillus after the battle of

Leuktra — afterwards restored at Athens. — Great impression produced by the retreat of the Ten Thousand upon the Greek mind.

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CHAPTER LXXII.

GREECE UNDER THE LACEDÆMONIAN EMPIRE.

Sequel of Grecian affairs generally — resumed. — Spartan empire — how and when it commenced. — Oppression and suffering of Athens under the Thirty. — Alteration of Grecian feeling towards Athens — the Thirty are put down and the democracy restored. — The Knights or Horsemen, the richest proprietors at Athens, were the great supporters of the Thirty in their tyranny. — The state of Athens, under the Thirty, is a sample of that which occurred in a large number of other Grecian cities, at the commencement of the Spartan empire. — Great power of Lysander — he establishes in most of the cities Dekarchies, along with a Spartan harmost. — Intimidation exercised everywhere by Lysander in favor of his own partisans. — Oppressive action of these Dekarchies. — In some points, probably worse than the Thirty at Athens. — Bad conduct of the Spartan harmosts — harsh as well as corrupt. No justice to be obtained against them at Sparta. — Contrast of the actual empire of Sparta, with the promises of freedom which she had previously held out. — Numerous promises of general autonomy made by Sparta — by the Spartan general Brasidas, especially. — Gradual change in the language and plans of Sparta towards the close of the Peloponnesian war. — Language of Brasidas contrasted with the acts of Lysander. — Extreme suddenness and completeness of the victory of Ægospotami left Lysander almost omnipotent. — The dekarchies became partly modified by the jealousy at Sparta against Lysander. The harmosts lasted much longer. — The Thirty at Athens were put down by the Athenians themselves, not by any reformatory interference of Sparta. — The empire of Sparta much worse and more oppressive than that of Athens. — Imperial Athens deprived her subject-allies of their autonomy, but was guilty of little or no oppression. — Imperial Sparta did this, and much worse — her harmosts and decemvirs are more complained of than the fact of her empire. — This more to be regretted, as Sparta had now an admirable opportunity for organizing a good and stable confederacy throughout Greece. — Sparta might have reörganized the confederacy of Delos, which might now have been made to work well. — Insupportable arrogance of Lysander — bitter complaints against him, as well as against the dekarchies. — Lysander offends Pharnabazus, who procures his recall. His disgust and temporary expatriation. — Surrender of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia, according to the treaty concluded with Sparta. — Their condition is affected by the position and ambitious schemes of Cyrus, whose protection they seek against Tissaphernes. — After the death of Cyrus, Tissaphernes returns as victor and satrap to the coast of Asia Minor. — Alarm of the Asiatic Greeks, who send to ask aid from Sparta. The Spartans send Thimbron with an army to Asia. His ill-success and recall — he is superseded by Derkyllidas. — Conduct of the Cyreians loose as to pillage. — Derkyllidas makes a truce with Tissaphernes, and attacks Pharnabazus in the Troad and Æolis. — Distribution of the Persian empire; relation of king, satrap, sub-satrap. — Mania, widow of Zênis, holds the subsatrapy of Æolis under Pharnabazus. Her regular payment and vigorous government. — Military force, personal conquests, and large treasures, of Mania. — Assassination of Mania, and of her son, by her son-in-law Meidias, who solicits the satrapy from Pharnabazus, but is indignantly refused. — Invasion and conquest of Æolis by Derkyllidas, who gets possession of the person of Meidias. — Derkyllidas acquires and liberates Skêpsis and Gergis, deposing Meidias, and seizing the treasures of Mania. — Derkyllidas concludes a truce with Pharnabazus, and takes winter quarters in Bithynia. — Command of Derkyllidas — satisfaction of Sparta with the improved conduct of the Cyreians. — Derkyllidas crosses into Europe, and employs his troops in fortifying the Chersonesus against the Thracians. — He captures and garrisons Atarneus. — He makes war upon Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, upon the Mæander. — Timidity of Tissaphernes — he concludes a truce with Derkyllidas. — Derkyllidas is superseded by Agesilaus. — Alienation towards Sparta had grown up among her allies in Central Greece. — Great energy imparted to Spartan action by Lysander immediately after the victory of Ægospotami; an energy very unusual with Sparta. — The Spartans had kept all the advantages of victory to themselves — their allies were allowed nothing. — Great power of the Spartans — they take revenge upon those who had displeased them — their invasion of Elis. — The Spartan king Agis invades the Eleian territory. He retires from it immediately in consequence of an earthquake. — Second invasion of Elis by Agis — he marches through Triphylia and Olympia; victorious march, with much booty. — Insurrection of the oligarchical party in Elis — they are put down. — The Eleians are obliged to submit to hard terms of peace. — Sparta refuses to restore the Pisatans to the Olympic presidency. — Triumphant position of Sparta — she expels the Messenians from Peloponnesus and its neighborhood.

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CHAPTER LXXIII.

AGESILAUS KING OF SPARTA. — THE CORINTHIAN WAR.

Triumphant position of Sparta at the close of the war — introduction of a large sum of gold and silver by Lysander — opposed by some of the Ephors. — The introduction of money was only one among a large train of corrupting circumstances which then became operative on Sparta. — Contrast between Sparta in 432 B.C., and Sparta after 404 B.C. — Increase of peculation, inequality, and discontent at Sparta. — Testimonies of Isokrates and Xenophon to the change of character and habits at Sparta. — Power of Lysander — his arrogance and ambitious projects — flattery lavished upon him by sophists and poets. — Real position of the kings at Sparta. — His intrigues to make himself king at Sparta — he tries in vain to move the oracles in his favor — scheme laid for the production of sacred documents, as yet lying hidden, by a son of Apollo. — His aim at the kingship fails — nevertheless he still retains prodigious influence at Sparta. — Death of Agis, king of Sparta — doubt as to the legitimacy of his son Leotychides. Agesilaus, seconded by Lysander, aspires to the throne. — Character of Agesilaus. — Conflicting pretensions of Agesilaus and Leotychides. — Objection taken against Agesilaus on the ground of his lameness, — oracle produced by Diopeithes — eluded by the interpretation of Lysander. — Agesilaus is preferred as king — suspicions which always remained attached to Lysander's interpretation. — Popular conduct of Agesilaus — he conciliates the ephors — his great influence at Sparta — his energy, combined with unscrupulous partisanship. — Dangerous conspiracy at Sparta — terror-striking sacrifices. — Character and position of the chief conspirator Kinadon — state of parties at Sparta — increasing number of malcontents. — Police of the ephors — information laid before them. — Wide-spread discontent reckoned upon by the conspirators. — Alarm of the ephors — their manœuvres for apprehending Kinadon privately. — Kinadon is seized, interrogated, and executed — his accomplices are arrested, and the conspiracy broken up. — Dangerous discontent indicated at Sparta. — Proceedings of Derkyllidas and Pharnabazus in Asia. — Persian preparations for reviving the maritime war against Sparta — renewed activity of Konon. — Agesilaus is sent with a land-force to Asia, accompanied by Lysander. — Large plans of Agesilaus, for conquest in the interior of Asia. — General willingness of the Spartan allies to serve in the expedition, but refusal from Thebes, Corinth, and Athens. — Agesilaus compares himself with Agamemnon — goes to sacrifice at Aulis — is contemptuously hindered by the Thebans. — Arrival of Agesilaus at Ephesus — he concludes a fresh armistice with Tissaphernes. — Arrogant behavior and overweening ascendency of Lysander — offensive to the army and to Agesilaus. — Agesilaus humbles and degrades Lysander, who asks to be sent away. — Lysander is sent to command at the Hellespont — his valuable service there. — Tissaphernes breaks the truce with Agesilaus, who makes war upon him and Pharnabazus — he retires for the purpose of organizing a force of cavalry. — Agesilaus indifferent to money for himself, but eager in enriching his friends. — His humanity towards captives and deserted children. — Spartan side of his character — exposure of naked prisoners — different practice of Asiatics and Greeks. — Efforts of Agesilaus to train his army, and to procure cavalry. — Agesilaus renews the war against Tissaphernes, and gains a victory near Sardis. — Artaxerxes causes Tissaphernes to be put to death and superseded by Tithraustes. — Negotiations between the new satrap and Agesilaus — the satraps in Asia Minor hostile to each other. — Commencement of action at sea against Sparta — the Athenian Konon, assisted by Persian ships and money, commands a fleet of eighty sail on the coast of Karia. — Rhodes revolts from the Spartan empire — Konon captures an Egyptian corn-fleet at Rhodes. — Anxiety of the Lacedæmonians — Agesilaus is appointed to command at sea as well as on land. — Severity of the Lacedæmonians towards the Rhodian Dorieus — contrast of the former treatment of the same man by Athens. — Sentiment of a multitude compared with that of individuals. — Efforts of Agesilaus to augment the fleet — he names Peisander admiral. — Operations of Agesilaus against Pharnabazus. — He lays waste the residence of the satrap, and surprises his camp — offence given to Spithridates. — Personal conference between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus. — Friendship established between Agesilaus and the son of Pharnabazus — character of Agesilaus. — Promising position and large preparations for Asiatic land-warfare, of Agesilaus — he is recalled with his army to Peloponnesus. — Efforts and proceedings of Konon in command of the Persian fleet — his personal visit to the Persian court. — Pharnabazus is named admiral jointly with Konon. — Battle of Knidus — complete defeat of the Lacedæmonian fleet — death of Peisander the admiral.

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CHAPTER LXXIV.

FROM THE BATTLE OF KNIDUS TO THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS.

War in Central Greece against Sparta — called the Corinthian war. — Relations of Sparta with the neighboring states and with her allies after the accession of Agesilaus. Discontent among the allies. — Great power of

Sparta, stretching even to Northern Greece — state of Herakleia. — Growing disposition in Greece to hostility against Sparta, when she becomes engaged in the war against Persia. — The satrap Tithraustes sends an envoy with money into Greece, to light up war against Sparta — his success at Thebes, Corinth, and Argos. — The Persian money did not create hostility against Sparta, but merely brought out hostile tendencies pre-existing. Philo-Laconian sentiment of Xenophon. — War between Sparta and Thebes — the Bœotian war. — Active operations of Sparta against Bœotia — Lysander is sent to act from Herakleia on the northward — Pausanias conducts an army from Peloponnesus. — The Thebans apply to Athens for aid — remarkable proof of the altered sentiment in Greece. — Speech of the Theban envoy at Athens. — Political feeling at Athens — good effects of the amnesty after the expulsion of the Thirty. — Unanimous vote of the Athenians to assist Thebes against Sparta. — State of the Bœotian confederacy — Orchomenus revolts and joins Lysander, who invades Bœotia with his army and attacks Haliartus. — Lysander is repulsed and slain before Haliartus. — Pausanias arrives in Bœotia after the death of Lysander — Thrasybulus and an Athenian army come to the aid of the Thebans. — Pausanias evacuates Bœotia, on receiving the dead bodies of Lysander and the rest for burial. — Anger against Pausanias at Sparta; he escapes into voluntary exile; he is condemned in his absence. — Condemnation of Pausanias not deserved. — Sparta not less unjust in condemning unsuccessful generals than Athens. — Character of Lysander — his mischievous influence, as well for Sparta as for Greece generally. — His plans to make himself king at Sparta — discourse of the sophist Kleon. — Encouragement to the enemies of Sparta, from the death of Lysander — alliance against her between Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos — the Eubœans and others join the alliance. — Increased importance of Thebes — she now rises to the rank of a primary power — the Theban leader Ismenias. — Successful operations of Ismenias to the north of Bœotia — capture of Herakleia from Sparta. — Synod of anti-Spartan allies at Corinth — their confident hopes — the Lacedæmonians send to recall Agesilaus from Asia. — Large muster near Corinth of Spartans and Peloponnesians on one side, of anti-Spartan allies on the other. — Boldness of the language against Sparta — speech of the Corinthian Timolaus. — The anti-Spartan allies take up a defensive position near Corinth — advance of the Lacedæmonians to attack them. — Battle of Corinth — victory of the Lacedæmonians in their part of the battle; their allies in the other parts being worsted. — Lacedæmonian ascendency within Peloponnesus is secured, but no farther result gained. — Agesilaus — his vexation on being recalled from Asia — his large plans of Asiatic conquest. — Regret of the Asiatic allies when he quits Asia — he leaves Euxenus in Asia with four thousand men. — Agesilaus crosses the Hellespont and marches homeward through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly. — Agesilaus and his army on the northern frontier of Bœotia — eclipse of the sun — news of the naval defeat at Knidus. — Bœotians and their allies mustered at Korôneia. — Battle of Korôneia — Agesilaus with most of his army is victorious; while the Thebans on their side are also victorious. — Terrible combat between the Thebans and Spartans; on the whole, the result is favorable to the Thebans. — Victory of Agesilaus, not without severe wounds — yet not very decisive — his conduct after the battle. — Army of Agesilaus withdraws from Bœotia — he goes to the Pythian games — sails homeward across the Corinthian Gulf — his honorable reception at Sparta. — Results of the battles of Corinth and Korôneia. Sparta had gained nothing by the former, and had rather lost by the latter. — Reverses of Sparta after the defeat of Knidus. Loss of the insular empire of Sparta. Nearly all her maritime allies revolt to join Pharnabazus and Konon. — Abydos holds faithfully to Sparta, under Derkyllidas. — Derkyllidas holds both Abydos and the Chersonesus opposite, in spite of Pharnabazus — anger of the latter. — Pharnabazus and Konon sail with their fleet to Peloponnesus and Corinth. — Assistance and encouragement given by Pharnabazus to the allies at Corinth — Remarkable fact of the Persian satrap and fleet at Corinth. — Pharnabazus leaves the fleet with Konon in the Saronic Gulf, and aids him, with money, to rebuild the Long Walls of Athens. — Konon rebuilds the Long Walls — hearty coöperation of the allies. — Great importance of this restoration — how much it depended upon accident — Maintenance of the lines of Corinth against Sparta, was one essential condition to the power of rebuilding the Long Walls. The lines were not maintained longer than the ensuing year.

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CHAPTER LXXV.

FROM THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS TO THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS.

Large plans of Konon — organization of a mercenary force at Corinth. — Naval conflicts of the Corinthians and Lacedæmonians, in the Corinthian Gulf. — Land-warfare — the Lacedæmonians established at Sikyon — the anti-Spartan allies occupying the lines of Corinth from sea to sea. — Sufferings of the Corinthians from the war being carried on in their territory. Many Corinthian proprietors become averse to the war. — Growth and manifestation of the philo-Laconian party in Corinth. Oligarchical form of the government left open nothing but an appeal to force. — The Corinthian government forestall the conspiracy by a *coup d'état*. — Numerous persons

of the philo-Laconian party are banished; nevertheless Pasimêlus the leader is spared, and remains at Corinth. — Intimate political union and consolidation between Corinth and Argos. — Pasimêlus admits the Lacedæmonians within the Long Walls of Corinth. Battle within those walls. — The Lacedæmonians are victorious — severe loss of the Argeians. — The Lacedæmonians pull down a portion of the Long Walls between Corinth and Lechæum, so as to open a free passage across. They capture Krommyon and Sidus. — Effective warfare carried on by the light troops under Iphikrates at Corinth — Military genius and improvements of Iphikrates. — The Athenians restore the Long Walls between Corinth and Lechæum — expedition of the Spartan king Agesilaus, who, in concert with Teleutias, retakes the Long Walls and captures Lechæum. — Alarm of Athens and Thebes at the capture of the Long Walls of Corinth. Propositions sent to Sparta to solicit peace. The discussions come to no result. — Advantages derived by the Corinthians from possession of Peiræum. At the instigation of the exiles, Agesilaus marches forth with an army to attack it. — Isthmian festival — Agesilaus disturbs the celebration. The Corinthian exiles, under his protection, celebrate it; then, when he is gone, the Corinthians from the city perform the ceremony over again. — Agesilaus attacks Peiræum, which he captures, together with the Heræum, many prisoners, and much booty. — Triumphant position of Agesilaus. Danger of Corinth. The Thebans send fresh envoys to solicit peace — contemptuously treated by Agesilaus. — Sudden arrival of bad news, which spoils the triumph. — Destruction of a Lacedæmonian mora by the light troops under Iphikrates. — Daring and well-planned manœuvres of Iphikrates. — Few of the mora escape to Lechæum. — The Lacedæmonians bury the bodies of the slain, under truce asked and obtained. Trophy erected by Iphikrates. — Great effect produced upon the Grecian mind by this event. Peculiar feelings of Spartans; pride of the relatives of the slain. — Mortification of Agesilaus — he marches up to the walls of Corinth and defies Iphikrates — he then goes back humiliated to Sparta. — Success of Iphikrates — he retakes Krommyon, Sidus, and Peiræum — Corinth remains pretty well undisturbed by enemies. The Athenians recall Iphikrates. — Expedition of Agesilaus against Akarnania — successful, after some delay — the Akarnanians submit, and enrol themselves in the Lacedæmonian confederacy. — The Lacedæmonians under Agesipolis invade Argos. — Manœuvre of the Argeians respecting the season of the holy truce. Agesipolis consults the oracles at Olympia and Delphi. — Earthquake in Argos after the invasion of Agesipolis — he disregards it. — He marches up near to Argos — much plunder taken — he retires. — Transactions in Asia — efforts of Sparta to detach the Great King from Athens. — The Spartan Antalkidas is sent as envoy to Tiribazus. Konon and other envoys sent also, from Athens and the anti-Spartan allies. — Antalkidas offers to surrender the Asiatic Greeks, and demands universal autonomy throughout the Grecian world — the anti-Spartan allies refuse to accede to those terms. — Hostility of Sparta to all the partial confederacies of Greece, now first proclaimed under the name of universal autonomy. — Antalkidas gains the favor of Tiribazus, who espouses privately the cause of Sparta, though the propositions for peace fail. Tiribazus seizes Konon — Konon's career is now closed, either by death or imprisonment. — Tiribazus cannot prevail with the Persian court, which still continues hostile to Sparta. Struthas is sent down to act against the Lacedæmonians in Ionia. — Victory of Struthas over Thimbron and the Lacedæmonian army. Thimbron is slain. — Diphridas is sent to succeed Thimbron. — Lacedæmonian fleet at Rhodes — intestine disputes in the island. — The Athenians send aid to Evagoras at Cyprus. Fidelity with which they adhered to him, though his alliance had now become inconvenient. — Thrasybulus is sent with a fleet from Athens to the Asiatic coast — his acquisitions in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. — Victory of Thrasybulus in Lesbos — he levies contributions along the Asiatic coast — he is slain near Aspendus. — Character of Thrasybulus. — Agyrrhius succeeds Thrasybulus — Rhodes still holds out against the Lacedæmonians. — Anaxibius is sent to command at the Hellespont in place of Derkyllidas — his vigorous proceedings — he deprives Athens of the tolls of the strait. — The Athenians send Iphikrates with his peltasts and a fleet to the Hellespont. His stratagem to surprise Anaxibius. — Defeat and death of Anaxibius. — The Athenians are again masters of the Hellespont and the strait dues. — The island of Ægina — its past history. — The Æginetans are constrained by Sparta into war with Athens. The Lacedæmonian admiral Teleutias at Ægina. He is superseded by Hierax. His remarkable popularity among the seamen. — Hierax proceeds to Rhodes, leaving Gorgôpas at Ægina. Passage of the Lacedæmonian Antalkidas to Asia. — Gorgôpas is surprised in Ægina, defeated, and slain, by the Athenian Chabrias; who goes to assist Evagoras in Cyprus. — The Lacedæmonian seamen at Ægina unpaid and discontented. Teleutias is sent thither to conciliate them. — Sudden and successful attack of Teleutias upon the Peiræus. — Unprepared and unguarded condition of Peiræus — Teleutias gains rich plunder, and sails away in safety. — He is enabled to pay his seamen — activity of the fleet — great loss inflicted upon Athenian commerce. — Financial condition of Athens. The Theôrikon. — Direct property-taxes. — Antalkidas goes up with Tiribazus to Susa — his success at the Persian court — he brings down the terms of peace asked for by Sparta, ratified by the Great King, to be enforced by Sparta in his name. — Antalkidas in command of the Lacedæmonian and Syracusan fleets in the Hellespont, with Persian aid. His successes against the Athenians. — Distress and discouragement of Athens — anxiety of the anti-Spartan allies for peace. — Tiribazus summons them all to Sardis, to hear the convention which had been sent

down by the Great King. — Terms of the convention, called the peace of Antalkidas. — Congress at Sparta for acceptance or rejection. All parties accept. The Thebans at first accept under reserve for the Bœotian cities. — Agesilaus refuses to allow the Theban reserve, and requires unconditional acceptance. His eagerness, from hatred of Thebes, to get into a war with them single-handed. The Thebans are obliged to accept unconditionally. — Agesilaus forces the Corinthians to send away their Argeian auxiliaries. The philo-Argeian Corinthians go into exile; the philo-Laconian Corinthians are restored.

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CHAPTER LXIX.

CYRUS THE YOUNGER AND THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.

In my last volume, I brought down the History of Grecian affairs to the close of the Peloponnesian war, including a description of the permanent loss of imperial power, the severe temporary oppression, the enfranchisement and renewed democracy, which marked the lot of defeated Athens. The defeat of that once powerful city, accomplished by the Spartan confederacy,—with large pecuniary aid from the young Persian prince Cyrus, satrap of most of the Ionian seaboard,—left Sparta mistress, for the time, of the Grecian world. Lysander, her victorious admiral, employed his vast temporary power for the purpose of setting up, in most of the cities, Dekarchies or ruling Councils of Ten, composed of his own partisans; with a Lacedæmonian Harmost and garrison to enforce their oligarchical rule. Before I proceed, however, to recount, as well as it can be made out, the unexpected calamities thus brought upon the Grecian world, with their eventual consequences,—it will be convenient to introduce here the narrative of the Ten Thousand Greeks, with their march into the heart of the Persian empire and their still more celebrated Retreat. This incident, lying apart from the main stream of Grecian affairs, would form an item, strictly speaking, in Persian history rather than in Grecian. But its effects on the Greek mind, and upon the future course of Grecian affairs, were numerous and important; while as an illustration of Hellenic character and competence measured against that of the contemporary Asiatics, it stands preeminent and full of instruction.

This march from Sardis up to the neighborhood of Babylon, conducted by Cyrus the younger and undertaken for the purpose of placing him on the Persian throne in the room of his elder brother Artaxerxes Mnemon,—was commenced about March or April in the year 401 B.C. It was about six months afterwards, in the month of September or October of the same year, that the battle of Kunaxa was fought, in which, though the Greeks were victorious, Cyrus himself lost his life. They were then obliged to commence their retreat, which occupied about one year, and ultimately brought them across the Bosphorus of Thrace to Byzantium, in October or November, 400 B.C.

The death of king Darius Nothus, father both of Artaxerxes and Cyrus, occurred about the beginning of 404 B.C., a short time after the entire ruin of the force of Athens at Ægospotami. His reign of nineteen years, with that of his father Artaxerxes Longimanus which lasted nearly forty years, fill up almost all the interval from the death of Xerxes in 465 B.C. The close of the reigns both of Xerxes and of his son Artaxerxes had indeed been marked by those phenomena of conspiracy, assassination, fratricide, and family tragedy, so common in the transmission of an Oriental sceptre. Xerxes was assassinated by the chief officer of the palace, named Artabanus,—who had received from him at a banquet the order to execute his eldest son Darius, but

had not fulfilled it. Artabanus, laying the blame of the assassination upon Darius, prevailed upon Artaxerxes to avenge it by slaying the latter; he then attempted the life of Artaxerxes himself, but failed, and was himself killed, after carrying on the government a few months. Artaxerxes Longimanus, after reigning about forty years, left the sceptre to his son Xerxes the second, who was slain after a few months by his brother Sogdianus; who again was put to death after seven months, by a third brother Darius Nothus mentioned above.[1]

The wars between the Persian empire, and Athens as the head of the confederacy of Delos (477-449 B.C.), have been already related in one of my earlier volumes. But the internal history of the Persian empire during these reigns is scarcely at all known to us; except a formidable revolt of the satrap Megabyzus, obscurely noticed in the Fragments of Ktesias.[2] About 414 B.C. the Egyptians revolted. Their native prince Amyrtæus maintained his independence,—though probably in a part only, and not the whole, of that country,[3]—and was succeeded by a native Egyptian dynasty for the space of sixty years. A revolt of the Medes, which took place in 408 B.C., was put down by Darius, and subsequently a like revolt of the Kadusians.[4] The peace concluded in 449 B.C., between Athens and the Persian empire, continued without open violation, until the ruinous catastrophe which befel the former near Syracuse, in 413 B.C. Yet there had been various communications and envoys from Sparta to the Persian court, endeavoring to procure aid from the Great King during the early years of the war; communications so confused and contradictory, that Artaxerxes (in a letter addressed to the Spartans, in 425 B.C., and carried by his envoy Artaphernes who was captured by the Athenians), complained of being unable to understand what they meant,—no two Spartans telling the same story.[5] It appears that Pissuthnes, satrap of Sardis, revolted from the Persian king, shortly after this period, and that Tissaphernes was sent by the Great King to suppress this revolt; in which having succeeded, by bribing the Grecian commander of the satrap's mercenary troops, he was rewarded by the possession of the satrapy.[6] We find Tissaphernes satrap in the year 413 B.C., commencing operations jointly with the Spartans, for detaching the Asiatic allies from Athens, after her reverses in Sicily; and employing the Spartans successfully against Amorges, the revolted son of Pissuthnes, who occupied the strong maritime town of Iasus.[7]

The increased vigor of Persian operations against Athens, after Cyrus, the younger son of Darius Nothus, came down to the Ionic coast in 407 B.C., has been recounted in my preceding volume; together with the complete prostration of Athenian power, accomplished during the ensuing three years. Residing at Sardis and placed in active coöperation with Greeks, this ambitious and energetic young prince soon became penetrated with their superior military and political efficiency, as compared with the native Asiatics. For the abilities and character of Lysander, the Peloponnesian admiral, he contracted so much admiration, that, when summoned to court during the last illness of his father Darius in 405 B.C., he even confided to that officer

the whole of his tribute and treasure, to be administered in furtherance of the war;[8] which during his absence was brought to a victorious close.

Cyrus, born after the accession of his father to the throne, was not more than eighteen years of age when first sent down to Sardis (in 407 B.C.) as satrap of Lydia, Phrygia, and Kappadokia, and as commander of that Persian military division which mustered at the plain of Kastôlus; a command not including the Ionic Greeks on the seaboard, who were under the satrapy of Tissaphernes.[9] We cannot place much confidence in the account which Xenophon gives of his education; that he had been brought up with his brother and many noble Persian youths in the royal palace,—under the strictest discipline and restraint, enforcing modest habits, with the reciprocal duties of obedience and command, upon all of them, and upon him with peculiar success.[10] It is contradicted by all the realities which we read about the Persian court, and is a patch of Grecian rather than of Oriental sentiment, better suited to the romance of the Cyropædia that to the history of the Anabasis. But in the Persian accomplishments of horsemanship, mastery of the bow and of the javelin, bravery in the field, daring as well as endurance in hunting wild beasts, and power of drinking much wine without being intoxicated,—Cyrus stood preeminent; and especially so when compared with his elder brother Artaxerxes, who was at least unwarlike, if not lazy and timid.[11] And although the peculiar virtue of the Hellenic citizen,—competence for alternate command and obedience,—formed no part of the character of Cyrus, yet it appears that Hellenic affairs and ideas became early impressed upon his mind; insomuch that on first coming down to Sardis as satrap, he brought down with him strong interest for the Peloponnesian cause, and strenuous antipathy to that ancient enemy by whom the Persian arms had been so signally humbled and repressed. How zealously he coöperated with Lysander and the Peloponnesians in putting down Athens, has been shown in my last preceding volume.[12]

An energetic and ambitious youth like Cyrus, having once learnt from personal experience to appreciate the Greeks, was not slow in divining the value of such auxiliaries as instruments of power to himself. To coöperate effectively in the war, it was necessary that he should act to a certain extent upon Grecian ideas, and conciliate the good will of the Ionic Greeks; so that he came to combine the imperious and unsparing despotism of a Persian prince, with something of the regularity and system belonging to a Grecian administrator. Though younger than Artaxerxes, he seems to have calculated from the first upon succeeding to the Persian crown at the death of his father. So undetermined was the law of succession in the Persian royal family, and so constant the dispute and fratricide on each vacancy of the throne, that such ambitious schemes would appear feasible to a young man of much less ardor than Cyrus. Moreover he was the favorite son of queen Parysatis,[13] who greatly preferred him to his elder brother Artaxerxes. He was born after the accession of Darius to the throne, while Artaxerxes had been born prior to that event; and, as this latter consideration had been employed seventy years earlier by queen Atossa[14] in determining

her husband Darius son of Hystaspes to declare (even during his lifetime) her son Xerxes as his intended successor, to the exclusion of an elder son by a different wife, and born before his accession,—so Cyrus, perhaps, anticipated the like effective preference to himself from the solicitations of Parysatis. Probably his hopes were farther inflamed by the fact that he bore the name of the great founder of the monarchy; whose memory every Persian reverenced. How completely he reckoned on becoming king, is shown by a cruel act performed about the early part of 405 B.C. It was required as a part of Persian etiquette that every man who came into the presence of the king should immerse his hands in certain pockets or large sleeves, which rendered them for the moment inapplicable to active use; but such deference was shown to no one except the king. Two first cousins of Cyrus,—sons of Hieramenês, (seemingly one of the satraps or high Persian dignitaries in Asia Minor), by a sister of Darius,—appeared in his presence without thus concealing their hands;[15] upon which Cyrus ordered them both to be put to death. The father and mother preferred bitter complaints of this atrocity to Darius; who was induced to send for Cyrus to visit him in Media, on the ground, not at all fictitious, that his own health was rapidly declining.

If Cyrus expected to succeed to the crown, it was important that he should be on the spot when his father died. He accordingly went up from Sardis to Media, along with his body guard of three hundred Greeks, under the Arcadian Xenias; who were so highly remunerated for this distant march, that the rate of pay was long celebrated.[16] He also took with him Tissaphernes as an ostensible friend; though there seems to have been a real enmity between them. Not long after his arrival, Darius died; but without complying with the request of Parysatis that he should declare in favor of Cyrus as his successor. Accordingly Artaxerxes, being proclaimed king, went to Pasargadæ, the religious capital of the Persians, to perform the customary solemnities. Thus disappointed, Cyrus was farther accused by Tissaphernes of conspiring the death of his brother; who caused him to be seized, and was even on the point of putting him to death, when the all-powerful intercession of Parysatis saved his life. [17] He was sent down to his former satrapy at Sardis, whither he returned with insupportable feelings of anger and wounded pride, and with a determined resolution to leave nothing untried for the purpose of dethroning his brother. This statement, given to us by Xenophon, represents doubtless the story of Cyrus and his friends, current among the Cyreian army. But if we look at the probabilities of the case, we shall be led to suspect that the charge of Tissaphernes may well have been true, and the conspiracy of the disappointed Cyrus against his brother, a reality instead of a fiction.[18]

The moment when Cyrus returned to Sardis was highly favorable to his plans and preparations. The long war had just been concluded by the capture of Athens and the extinction of her power. Many Greeks, after having acquired military tastes and habits, were now thrown out of employment; many others were driven into exile, by

the establishment of the Lysandrian Dekarchies throughout all the cities at once. Hence competent recruits, for a well-paid service like that of Cyrus, were now unusually abundant. Having already a certain number of Greek mercenaries, distributed throughout the various garrisons in his satrapy, he directed the officers in command to strengthen their garrisons by as many additional Peloponnesian soldiers as they could obtain. His pretext was,—first, defence against Tissaphernes, with whom, since the denunciation by the latter, he was at open war,—next, protection of the Ionic cities on the seaboard, who had been hitherto comprised under the government of Tissaphernes, but had now revolted of their own accord, since the enmity of Cyrus against him had been declared. Miletus alone had been prevented from executing this resolution, for Tissaphernes, reinforcing his garrison in that place, had adopted violent measures of repression, killing or banishing several of the leading men. Cyrus, receiving these exiled Milesians with every demonstration of sympathy, immediately got together both an army and a fleet, under the Egyptian Tamos,[19] to besiege Miletus by land and sea. He at the same time transmitted to court the regular tribute due from these maritime cities, and attempted, through the interest of his mother Parysatis, to procure that they should be transferred from Tissaphernes to himself. Hence the Great King was deluded into a belief that the new levies of Cyrus were only intended for private war between him and Tissaphernes; an event not uncommon between two neighboring satraps. Nor was it displeasing to the court that a suspected prince should be thus occupied at a distance.[20]

Besides the army thus collected around Miletus, Cyrus found means to keep other troops within his call, though at a distance and unsuspected. A Lacedæmonian officer named Klearchus, of considerable military ability and experience, presented himself as an exile at Sardis. He appears to have been banished, (as far as we can judge amidst contradictory statements,) for gross abuse of authority, and extreme tyranny, as Lacedæmonian Harmost at Byzantium, and even for having tried to maintain himself in that place after the Ephors had formally dismissed him. The known efficiency, and restless warlike appetite of Klearchus,[21] procured for him the confidence of Cyrus, who gave him the large sum of ten thousand Darics, (about £7600), which he employed in levying an army of mercenary Greeks for the defence of the Grecian cities in the Chersonese against the Thracian tribes in their neighborhood; thus maintaining the troops until they were required by Cyrus. Again, Aristippus and Menon,—Thessalians of the great family of the Aleuadæ at Larissa, who had maintained their tie of personal hospitality with the Persian royal family ever since the time of Xerxes, and were now in connection with Cyrus,[22]—received from him funds to maintain a force of two thousand mercenaries for their political purposes in Thessaly, subject to his call whenever he should require them. Other Greeks, too, who had probably contracted similar ties of hospitality with Cyrus by service during the late war,—Proxenus, a Bœotian; Agias and Sophænetus, Arcadians; Sokrates, an Achæan, etc.,—were also empowered by him to collect mercenary soldiers. His pretended objects were, partly the siege of Miletus; partly an ostensible expedition against the Pisidi-

ans,—warlike and predatory mountaineers who did much mischief from their fastnesses in the south-east of Asia Minor.

Besides these unavowed Grecian levies, Cyrus sent envoys to the Lacedæmonians to invoke their aid, in requital for the strenuous manner in which he had seconded their operations against Athens,—and received a favorable answer. He farther got together a considerable native force, taking great pains to conciliate friends as well as to inspire confidence. "He was straightforward and just, like a candidate for command,"—to use the expression of Herodotus respecting the Median Dëiokês;[23] maintaining order and security throughout his satrapy, and punishing evil doers in great numbers, with the utmost extremity of rigor; of which the public roads exhibited abundant living testimony, in the persons of mutilated men, deprived of their hands, feet, or eyesight.[24] But he was also exact in rewarding faithful service, both civil and military. He not only made various expeditions against the hostile Mysians and Pisidians, but was forward in exposing his own person, and munificent, rewarding the zeal of all soldiers who distinguished themselves. He attached men to his person both by a winning demeanor and by seasonable gifts. As it was the uniform custom, (and is still the custom in the East), for every one who approached Cyrus to come with a present in his hand,[25] so he usually gave away again these presents as marks of distinction to others. Hence he not only acquired the attachment of all in his own service, but also of those Persians whom Artaxerxes sent down on various pretences for the purpose of observing his motions. Of these emissaries from Susa, some were even sent to obstruct and enfeeble him. It was under such orders that a Persian named Orontes, governor of Sardis, acted, in levying open war against Cyrus; who twice subdued him, and twice pardoned him, on solemn assurance of fidelity for the future.[26] In all agreements, even with avowed enemies, Cyrus kept faith exactly; so that his word was trusted by every one.

Of such virtues, (rare in an Oriental ruler, either ancient or modern,)—and of such secret preparations,—Cyrus sought to reap the fruits at the beginning of 401 B.C. Xenias, his general at home, brought together all the garrisons, leaving a bare sufficiency for defence of the towns. Klearchus, Menon, and the other Greek generals were recalled, and the siege of Miletus was relinquished; so that there was concentrated at Sardis a body of seven thousand seven hundred Grecian hoplites, with five hundred light armed.[27] Others afterwards joined on the march, and there was, besides, a native army of about one hundred thousand men. With such means Cyrus set forth, (March or April, 401 B.C.), from Sardis. His real purpose was kept secret; his ostensible purpose, as proclaimed and understood by every one except himself and Klearchus, was to conquer and root out the Pisidian mountaineers. A joint Lacedæmonian and Persian fleet, under the Lacedæmonian admiral Samius, at the same time coasted round the south of Asia Minor, in order to lend coöperation from the sea-side.[28] This Lacedæmonian coöperation passed for a private levy effected by

Cyrus himself; for the ephors would not formally avow hostility against the Great King.[29]

The body of Greeks, immortalized under the name of the Ten Thousand, who were thus preparing to plunge into so many unexpected perils,—though embarking on a foreign mercenary service, were by no means outcasts, or even men of extreme poverty. They were for the most part persons of established position, and not a few even opulent. Half of them were Acadians or Achæans.

Such was the reputation of Cyrus for honorable and munificent dealing, that many young men of good family had run away from their fathers and mothers; others of mature age had been tempted to leave their wives and children; and there were even some who had embarked their own money in advance of outfit for other poorer men, as well as for themselves.[30] All calculated on a year's campaign in Pisidia; which might perhaps be hard, but would certainly be lucrative, and would enable them to return with a well-furnished purse. So the Greek commanders at Sardis all confidently assured them; extolling, with the emphasis and eloquence suitable to recruiting officers, both the liberality of Cyrus[31] and the abundant promise of all men of enterprise.

Among others, the Bœotian Proxenus wrote to his friend Xenophon, at Athens, pressing him strongly to come to Sardis, and offering to present him to Cyrus, whom he, (Proxenus,) "considered as a better friend to him than his own country;[32]" a striking evidence of the manner in which such foreign mercenary service overlaid Grecian patriotism, which we shall recognize more and more as we advance forward. This able and accomplished Athenian,—entitled to respectful gratitude, not indeed from Athens his country, but from the Cyreian army and the intellectual world generally,—was one of the class of Knights or Horsemen, and is said to have served in that capacity at the battle of Delium.[33] Of his previous life we know little or nothing, except that he was an attached friend and diligent hearer of Sokrates; the memorials of whose conversation we chiefly derive from his pen, as we also derive the narrative of the Cyreian march. In my last preceding chapter on Sokrates, I have made ample use of the Memorabilia of Xenophon; and I am now about to draw from his Anabasis (a model of perspicuous and interesting narrative) the account of the adventures of the Cyreian army, which we are fortunate in knowing from so authentic a source.

On receiving the invitation from Proxenus, Xenophon felt much inclined to comply. To a member of that class of Knights, which three years before had been the mainstay of the atrocities of the Thirty, (how far he was personally concerned, we cannot say,) it is probable that residence in Athens was in those times not peculiarly agreeable to him. He asked the opinion of Sokrates; who, apprehensive lest service under Cyrus, the bitter enemy of Athens, might expose him to unpopularity with his countrymen, recommended an application to the Delphian oracle. Thither Xenophon went; but in truth he had already made up his mind beforehand. So that instead of

asking, "whether he ought to go or refuse,"—he simply put the question, "To which of the gods must I sacrifice, in order to obtain safety and success in a journey which I am now meditating?" The reply of the oracle,—indicating Zeus Basileus as the god to whom sacrifice was proper,—was brought back by Xenophon; upon which Sokrates, though displeased that the question had not been fairly put as to the whole project, nevertheless advised, since an answer had now been given, that it should be literally obeyed. Accordingly Xenophon, having offered the sacrifices prescribed, took his departure first to Ephesus and thence to Sardis, where he found the army about to set forth. Proxenus presented him to Cyrus, who entreated him earnestly to take service, promising to dismiss him as soon as the campaign against the Pisidians should be finished.[34] He was thus induced to stay, yet only as a volunteer or friend of Proxenus, without accepting any special post in the army, either as officer or soldier. There is no reason to believe that his service under Cyrus had actually the effect apprehended by Sokrates, of rendering him unpopular at Athens. For though he was afterwards banished, this sentence was not passed against him until after the battle of Korôneia in 394 B.C., where he was in arms as a conspicuous officer under Agesilaus, against his own countrymen and their Theban allies,—nor need we look farther back for the grounds of the sentence.

Though Artaxerxes, entertaining general suspicions of his brother's ambitious views, had sent down various persons to watch him, yet Cyrus had contrived to gain or neutralize these spies, and had masked his preparations so skilfully, that no intimation was conveyed to Susa until the march was about to commence. It was only then that Tissaphernes, seeing the siege of Miletus relinquished, and the vast force mustering at Sardis, divined that something more was meant than the mere conquest of Pisidian freebooters, and went up in person to warn the king; who began his preparations forthwith.[35] That which Tissaphernes had divined was yet a secret to every man in the army, to Proxenus as well as the rest,—when Cyrus, having confided the provisional management of his satrapy to some Persian kinsmen, and to his admiral the Egyptian Tamos, commenced his march in a south-easterly direction from Sardis, through Lydia and Phrygia.[36] Three days' march, a distance stated at twenty-two parasangs,[37] brought him to the Mæander; one additional march of eight parasangs, after crossing that river, forwarded him to Kolossæ, a flourishing city in Phrygia, where Menon overtook him with a reinforcement of one thousand hoplites, and five hundred peltasts,—Dolopes, Ænianes, and Olynthians. He then marched three days onward to Kelænæ, another Phrygian city, "great and flourishing," with a citadel very strong both by nature and art. Here he halted no less than thirty days, in order to await the arrival of Klearchus, with his division of one thousand hoplites, eight hundred Thracian peltasts, and two hundred Kretan bowmen; at the same time Sophænetus arrived with one thousand farther hoplites, and Sosias with three hundred. This total of Greeks was reviewed by Cyrus in one united body at Kelænæ; eleven thousand hoplites and two thousand peltasts.[38]

As far as Kelænæ, his march had been directed straight towards Pisidia, near the borders of which territory that city is situated. So far, therefore, the fiction with which he started was kept up. But on leaving Kelænæ, he turned his march away from Pisidia, in a direction nearly northward; first in two days, ten parasangs, to the town of Peltæ; next in two days farther, twelve parasangs, to Keramôn-Agora, the last city in the district adjoining Mysia. At Peltæ, in a halt of three days, the Arcadian general Xenias celebrated the great festival of his country, the Lykæa, with its usual games and matches, in the presence of Cyrus. From Keramôn-Agora, Cyrus marched in three days the unusual distance of thirty parasangs,[39] to a city called Käystru-Pedion, (the plain of Käystrus), where he halted for five days. Here his repose was disturbed by the murmurs of the Greek soldiers, who had received no pay for three months, (Xenophon had before told us that they were mostly men who had some means of their own), and who now flocked around his tent to press for their arrears. So impoverished was Cyrus by previous disbursements,—perhaps also by remissions of tribute for the purpose of popularizing himself,—that he was utterly without money, and was obliged to put them off again with promises. And his march might well have ended here, had he not been rescued from embarrassment by the arrival of Epyaxa, wife of the Kilikian prince Syennesis, who brought to him a large sum of money, and enabled him to give to the Greek soldiers four months' pay at once. As to the Asiatic soldiers, it is probable that they received little beyond their maintenance.

Two ensuing days of march, still through Phrygia, brought the army to Thymbrium; two more to Tyriæum. Each day's march is called five parasangs[40]. It was here that Cyrus, halting three days, passed the army in review, to gratify the Kilikian princess Epyaxa, who was still accompanying the march. His Asiatic troops were first made to march in order before him, cavalry and infantry in their separate divisions; after which he himself in a chariot, and Epyaxa in a Harmamaxa, (a sort of carriage or litter covered with an awning which opened or shut at pleasure), passed all along the front of the Greek line, drawn up separately. The hoplites were marshalled four deep, all in their best trim; brazen helmets, purple tunics, greaves or leggings, and the shields rubbed bright, just taken out of the wrappers in which they were carried during a mere march.[41] Klearchus commanded on the left, and Menon on the right; the other generals being distributed in the centre. Having completed his review along the whole line, and taken a station with the Kilikian princess at a certain distance in front of it, Cyrus sent his interpreter to the generals, and desired that he might see them charge. Accordingly, the orders were given, the spears were protended, the trumpets sounded, and the whole Greek force moved forward in battle array with the usual shouts. As they advanced, the pace became accelerated, and they made straight against the victualling portion of the Asiatic encampment. Such was the terror occasioned by the sight, that all the Asiatics fled forthwith, abandoning their property,—Epyaxa herself among the first, quitting her palanquin. Though she had among her personal guards some Greeks from Aspendus, she had never before seen

a Grecian army, and was amazed as well as terrified; much to the satisfaction of Cyrus, who saw in the scene an augury of his coming success.[42]

Three days of farther march, (called twenty parasangs in all) brought the army to Ikonium, (now Konieh), the extreme city of Phrygia; where Cyrus halted three days. He then marched for five days (thirty parasangs) through Lykaonia; which country, as being out of his own satrapy, and even hostile, he allowed the Greeks to plunder. Lykaonia being immediately on the borders of Pisidia, its inhabitants were probably reckoned as Pisidians, since they were of the like predatory character:[43] so that Cyrus would be partially realizing the pretended purpose of his expedition. He thus, too, approached near to Mount Taurus, which separated him from Kilikia; and he here sent the Kilikian princess, together with Menon and his division, over the mountain, by a pass shorter and more direct, but seemingly little frequented, and too difficult for the whole army; in order that they might thus get straight into Kilikia,[44] in the rear of Syennesis, who was occupying the regular pass more to the northward. Intending to enter with his main body through this latter pass, Cyrus first proceeded through Kappadokia (four days' march, twenty-five parasangs) to Dana or Tyana, a flourishing city of Kappadokia; where he halted three days, and where he put to death two Persian officers, on a charge of conspiring against him.[45]

This regular pass over Taurus, the celebrated Tauri-Pylæ or Kilikian Gates, was occupied by Syennesis. Though a road fit for vehicles, it was yet three thousand six hundred feet above the level of the sea, narrow, steep, bordered by high ground on each side, and crossed by a wall with gates, so that it could not be forced if ever so moderately defended.[46] But the Kilikian prince, alarmed at the news that Menon had already crossed the mountains by the less frequented pass to his rear, and that the fleet of Cyrus was sailing along the coast, evacuated his own impregnable position, and fell back to Tarsus; from whence he again retired, accompanied by most of the inhabitants, to an inaccessible fastness on the mountains. Accordingly Cyrus, ascending without opposition the great pass thus abandoned, reached Tarsus after a march of four days, there rejoining Menon and Epyaxa. Two lochi or companies of the division of Menon, having dispersed on their march for pillage, had been cut off by the natives; for which the main body of Greeks now took their revenge, plundering both the city and the palace of Syennesis. That prince, though invited by Cyrus to come back to Tarsus, at first refused, but was at length prevailed upon by the persuasions of his wife, to return under a safe conduct. He was induced to contract an alliance, to exchange presents with Cyrus, and to give him a large sum of money towards his expedition, together with a contingent of troops; in return for which it was stipulated that Kilikia should be no farther plundered, and that the slaves taken away might be recovered wherever they were found.[47]

It seems evident, though Xenophon does not directly tell us so, that the resistance of Syennesis, (this was a standing name or title of the hereditary princes of Kilikia under the Persian crown), was a mere feint; that the visit of Epyaxa with a sup-

ply of money to Cyrus, and the admission of Menon and his division over Mount Taurus, were manœuvres in collusion with him; and that, thinking Cyrus would be successful, he was disposed to support his cause, yet careful at the same time to give himself the air of having been overpowered, in case Artaxerxes should prove victorious.[48]

At first, however, it appeared as if the march of Cyrus was destined to finish at Tarsus, where he was obliged to remain twenty days. The army had already passed by Pisidia, the ostensible purpose of the expedition, for which the Grecian troops had been engaged; not one of them, either officer or soldier, suspecting anything to the contrary, except Klearchus, who was in the secret. But all now saw that they had been imposed upon, and found out that they were to be conducted against the Persian king. Besides the resentment at such delusion, they shrunk from the risk altogether; not from any fear of Persian armies, but from the terrors of a march of three months inward from the coast, and the impossibility of return, which had so powerfully affected the Spartan King Kleomenes,[49] a century before; most of them being (as I have before remarked) men of decent position and family in their respective cities. Accordingly they proclaimed their determination to advance no farther, as they had not been engaged to fight against the Great King.[50]

Among the Grecian officers, each (Klearchus, Proxenus, Menon, Xenias, etc.) commanded his own separate division, without any generalissimo except Cyrus himself. Each of them probably sympathized more or less in the resentment as well as in the repugnance of the soldiers. But Klearchus, an exile and a mercenary by profession, was doubtless prepared for this mutiny, and had assured Cyrus that it might be overcome. That such a man as Klearchus could be tolerated as a commander of free and non-professional soldiers, is a proof of the great susceptibility of the Greek hoplites for military discipline. For though he had great military merits, being brave, resolute, and full of resource in the hour of danger, provident for the subsistence of his soldiers, and unshrinking against fatigue and hardship,—yet his look and manner were harsh, his punishments were perpetual as well as cruel, and he neither tried nor cared to conciliate his soldiers; who accordingly stayed with him, and were remarkable for exactness of discipline, so long as political orders required them,—but preferred service under other commanders, when they could obtain it.[51] Finding his orders to march forward disobeyed, Klearchus proceeded at once in his usual manner to enforce and punish. But he found resistance universal; he himself with the cattle who carried his baggage, was pelted when he began to move forward, and narrowly escaped with his life. Thus disappointed in his attempt at coercion, he was compelled to convene the soldiers in a regular assembly, and to essay persuasion.

On first appearing before the assembled soldiers, this harsh and imperious officer stood for a long time silent, and even weeping; a remarkable point in Grecian manners,—and exceedingly impressive to the soldiers, who looked on him with surprise and in silence. At length he addressed them: "Be not astonished, soldiers, to see me

deeply mortified. Cyrus has been my friend and benefactor. It was he who sheltered me as an exile, and gave me ten thousand Darics, which I expended not on my own profit or pleasure, but upon you, and in defence of Grecian interests in the Chersonese against Thracian depredators. When Cyrus invited me, I came to him along with you, in order to make him the best return in my power for his past kindness. But now, since you will no longer march along with me, I am under the necessity either of renouncing you or of breaking faith with him. Whether I am doing right or not, I cannot say; but I shall stand by you, and share your fate. No one shall say of me that, having conducted Greek troops into a foreign land, I betrayed the Greeks and chose the foreigner. You are to me country, friends, allies; while you are with me, I can help a friend, and repel an enemy. Understand me well; I shall go wherever you go, and partake your fortune."[52]

This speech, and the distinct declaration of Klearchus that he would not march forward against the King, was heard by the soldiers with much delight; in which those of the other Greek divisions sympathized, especially as none of the other Greek commanders had yet announced a similar resolution. So strong was this feeling among the soldiers of Xenias and Pasion, that two thousand of them left their commanders, coming over forthwith, with arms and baggage, to the encampment of Klearchus.

Meanwhile Cyrus himself, dismayed at the resistance encountered, sent to desire an interview with Klearchus. But the latter, knowing well the game that he was playing, refused to obey the summons. He, however, at the same time despatched a secret message to encourage Cyrus with the assurance that everything would come right at last,—and to desire farther that fresh invitations might be sent, in order that he (Klearchus) might answer by fresh refusals. He then again convened in assembly both his own soldiers and those who had recently deserted Xenias to join him. "Soldiers (said he), we must recollect that we have now broken with Cyrus. We are no longer his soldiers, nor he our paymaster; moreover, I know that he thinks we have wronged him,—so that I am both afraid and ashamed to go near him. He is a good friend,—but a formidable enemy; and has a powerful force of his own, which all of you see near at hand. This is no time for us to slumber. We must take careful counsel whether to stay or go; and if we go, how to get away in safety, as well as to obtain provisions. I shall be glad to hear what any man has to suggest."

Instead of the peremptory tone habitual with Klearchus, the troops found themselves now, for the first time, not merely released from his command, but deprived of his advice. Some soldiers addressed the assembly, proposing various measures suitable to the emergency; but their propositions were opposed by other speakers, who, privately instigated by Klearchus himself, set forth the difficulties either of staying or departing. One among these secret partisans of the commander even affected to take the opposite side, and to be impatient for immediate departure. "If Klearchus does not choose to conduct us back (said this speaker) let us immediately elect other

generals, buy provisions, get ready to depart, and then send to ask Cyrus for merchant-vessels,—or at any rate for guides in our return march by land. If he refuses both these requests, we must put ourselves in marching order, to fight our way back; sending forward a detachment without delay to occupy the passes." Klearchus here interposed to say, that as for himself, it was impossible for him to continue in command; but he would faithfully obey any other commander who might be elected. He was followed by another speaker, who demonstrated the absurdity of going and asking Cyrus, either for a guide, or for ships, at the very moment when they were frustrating his projects. How could he be expected to assist them in getting away? Who could trust either his ships or his guides? On the other hand, to depart without his knowledge or concurrence was impossible. The proper course would be to send a deputation to him, consisting of others along with Klearchus, to ask what it was that he really wanted; which no one yet knew. His answer to the question should be reported to the meeting, in order that they might take their resolution accordingly.

To this proposition the soldiers acceded; for it was but too plain that retreat was no easy matter. The deputation went to put the question to Cyrus; who replied that his real purpose was to attack his enemy Abrokomas, who was on the river Euphrates, twelve days' march onward. If he found Abrokomas there, he would punish him as he deserved. If, on the other hand, Abrokomas had fled, they might again consult what step was fit to be taken.

The soldiers, on hearing this, suspected it to be a deception, but nevertheless acquiesced, not knowing what else to do. They required only an increase of pay. Not a word was said about the Great King, or the expedition against him. Cyrus granted increased pay of fifty per cent. upon the previous rate. Instead of one daric per month to each soldier, he agreed to give a daric and a half.[53]

This remarkable scene at Tarsus illustrates the character of the Greek citizen-soldier. What is chiefly to be noted, is, the appeal made to their reason and judgment,—the habit, established more or less throughout so large a portion of the Grecian world, and attaining its maximum at Athens, of hearing both sides and deciding afterwards. The soldiers are indignant, justly and naturally, at the fraud practised upon them. But instead of surrendering themselves to this impulse arising out of the past, they are brought to look at the actualities of the present, and take measure of what is best to be done for the future. To return back from the place where they stood, against the wish of Cyrus, was an enterprise so full of difficulty and danger, that the decision to which they came was recommended by the best considerations of reason. To go on was the least dangerous course of the two, besides its chances of unmeasured reward.

As the remaining Greek officers and soldiers followed the example of Klearchus and his division, the whole army marched forward from Tarsus, and reached Issus, the extreme city of Kilikia, in five days' march,—crossing the rivers Sarus[54] and

Pyramus. At Issus, a flourishing and commercial port in the angle of the Gulf so called, Cyrus was joined by his fleet of fifty triremes,—thirty-five Lacedæmonian and twenty-five Persian triremes; bringing a reinforcement of seven hundred hoplites, under the command of the Lacedæmonian Cheirisophus, said to have been despatched by the Spartan Ephors.[55] He also received a farther reinforcement of four hundred Grecian soldiers; making the total of Greeks in his army fourteen thousand, from which are to be deducted the one hundred soldiers of Menon's division, slain in Kilikia.

The arrival of this last body of four hundred men was a fact of some importance. They had hitherto been in the service of Abrokomas (the Persian general commanding a vast force, said to be three hundred thousand men, for the king, in Phœnicia and Syria), from whom they now deserted to Cyrus. Such desertion was at once the proof of their reluctance to fight against the great body of their countrymen marching upwards, and of the general discouragement reigning amidst the king's army. So great, indeed, was that discouragement, that Abrokomas now fled from the Syrian coast into the interior; abandoning three defensible positions in succession—1. The Gates of Kilikia and Syria. 2. The pass of Beilan over Mount Amanus. 3. The passage of the Euphrates.—He appears to have been alarmed by the easy passage of Cyrus from Kappadokia into Kilikia, and still more, probably, by the evident collusion of Syennesis with the invader.[56]

Cyrus had expected to find the gates of Kilikia and Syria stoutly defended, and had provided for this emergency by bringing up his fleet to Issus, in order that he might be able to transport a division by sea to the rear of the defenders. The pass was at one day's march from Issus. It was a narrow road for the length of near half a mile, between the sea on one side and the steep cliffs terminating mount Amanus on the other. The two entrances, on the side of Kilikia as well as on that of Syria, were both closed by walls and gates; midway between the two the river Kersus broke out from the mountains and flowed into the sea. No army could force this pass against defenders; but the possession of the fleet doubtless enabled an assailant to turn it. Cyrus was overjoyed to find it undefended.[57] And here we cannot but notice the superior ability and forethought of Cyrus as compared with the other Persians opposed to him. He had looked at this as well as at the other difficulties of his march, beforehand, and had provided the means of meeting them; whereas, on the king's side, all the numerous means and opportunities of defence are successively abandoned; the Persians have no confidence, except in vast numbers,—or when numbers fail, in treachery.

Five parasangs, or one day's march from this pass, Cyrus reached the Phœnician maritime town of Myriandrus; a place of great commerce, with its harbor full of merchantmen. While he rested here seven days, his two generals Xenias and Pasion deserted him; privately engaging a merchant vessel to carry them away with their property. They could not brook the wrong which Cyrus had done them in permitting

Klearchus to retain under his command those soldiers who had deserted them at Tarsus, at the time when the latter played off his deceitful manœuvre. Perhaps the men who had thus deserted may have been unwilling to return to their original commanders, after having taken so offensive a step. And this may partly account for the policy of Cyrus in sanctioning what Xenias and Pasion could not but feel as a great wrong, in which a large portion of the army sympathized. The general belief among the soldiers was, that Cyrus would immediately despatch some triremes to overtake and bring back the fugitives. But instead of this, he summoned the remaining generals, and after communicating to them the fact that Xenias and Pasion were gone, added,—"I have plenty of triremes to overtake their merchantmen if I chose, and to bring them back. But I will do no such thing. No one shall say of me, that I make use of a man while he is with me,—and afterwards seize, rob, or ill-use him, when he wishes to depart. Nay, I have their wives and children under guard as hostages, at Tralles;[58] but even these shall be given up to them, in consideration of their good behavior down to the present day. Let them go if they choose, with the full knowledge that they behave worse towards me than I towards them." This behavior, alike judicious and conciliating, was universally admired, and produced the best possible effect upon the spirits of the army; imparting a confidence in Cyrus which did much to outweigh the prevailing discouragement, in the unknown march upon which they were entering.[59]

At Myriandrus Cyrus finally quitted the sea, sending back his fleet,[60] and striking with his land-force eastward into the interior. For this purpose it was necessary first to cross mount Amanus, by the pass of Beilan; an eminently difficult road, which he was fortunate enough to find open, though Abrokomas might easily have defended it, if he had chosen.[61] Four days' march brought the army to the Chalus (perhaps the river of Aleppo), full of fish held sacred by the neighboring inhabitants; five more days, to the sources of the river Daradax, with the palace and park of the Syrian satrap Belesys; three days farther, to Thapsakus on the Euphrates. This was a great and flourishing town, a centre of commerce enriched by the important ford or transit of the river Euphrates close to it, in latitude about 35° 40′ N.[62] The river, when the Cyreians arrived, was four stadia, or somewhat less than half an English mile, in breadth.

Cyrus remained at Thapsakus five days. He was now compelled formally to make known to his soldiers the real object of the march, hitherto, in name at least, disguised. He accordingly sent for the Greek generals, and desired them to communicate publicly the fact, that he was on the advance to Babylon against his brother,—which to themselves, probably, had been for some time well known. Among the soldiers, however, the first announcement excited loud murmurs, accompanied by accusation against the generals, of having betrayed them, in privity with Cyrus. But this outburst was very different to the strenuous repugnance which they had before manifested at Tarsus. Evidently they suspected, and had almost made up their minds to,

the real truth; so that their complaint was soon converted into a demand for a donation to each man, as soon as they should reach Babylon; as much as that which Cyrus had given to his Grecian detachment on going up thither before. Cyrus willingly promised them five minæ per head (about £19 5*s.*), equal to more than a year's pay, at the rate recently stipulated of a daric and a half per month. He engaged to give them, besides, the full rate of pay until they should have been sent back to the Ionian coast. Such ample offers satisfied the Greeks, and served to counterbalance at least, if not to efface, the terrors of that unknown region which they were about to tread.

But before the general body of Greek soldiers had pronounced their formal acquiescence, Menon with his separate division was already in the water, crossing. For Menon had instigated his men to decide separately for themselves, and to execute their decision, before the others had given any answer. "By acting thus (said he) you will confer special obligation on Cyrus, and earn corresponding reward. If the others follow you across, he will suppose that they do so because you have set the example. If, on the contrary, the others should refuse, we shall all be obliged to retreat: but he will never forget that you, separately taken, have done all that you could for him." Such breach of communion, and avidity for separate gain, at a time when it vitally concerned all the Greek soldiers to act in harmony with each other, was a step suitable to the selfish and treacherous character of Menon. He gained his point, however, completely; for Cyrus, on learning that the Greek troops had actually crossed, despatched Glus the interpreter to express to them his warmest thanks, and to assure them that he would never forget the obligation; while at the same time, he sent underhand large presents to Menon separately.[63] He passed with his whole army immediately afterwards; no man being wet above the breast.

What had become of Abrokomas and his army, and why did he not defend this passage, where Cyrus might so easily have been arrested? We are told that he had been there a little before, and that he had thought it sufficient to burn all the vessels at Thapsakus, in the belief that the invaders could not cross the river on foot. And Xenophon informs us that the Thapsakenes affirmed the Euphrates to have been never before fordable,—always passed by means of boats; insomuch that they treated the actual low state of the water as a providential interposition of the gods in favor of Cyrus; "the river made way for him to come and take the sceptre." When we find that Abrokomas came too late afterwards for the battle of Kunaxa, we shall be led to suspect that he too, like Syennesis in Kilikia, was playing a double game between the two royal brothers, and that he was content with destroying those vessels which formed the ordinary means of communication between the banks, without taking any means to inquire whether the passage was practicable without them. The assertion of the Thapsakenes, in so far as it was not a mere piece of flattery to Cyrus, could hardly have had any other foundation than the fact, that they had never seen

the river crossed on foot (whether practicable or not), so long as there were regular ferry-boats.[64]

After crossing the Euphrates, Cyrus proceeded, for nine days' march,[65] southward along its left bank, until he came to its affluent, the river Araxes or Chaboras, which divided Syria from Arabia. From the numerous and well-supplied villages there situated, he supplied himself with a large stock of provisions, to confront the desolate march through Arabia on which they were about to enter, following the banks of the Euphrates still further southward. It was now that he entered on what may be called the Desert,—an endless breadth or succession of undulations, "like the sea," without any cultivation or even any tree; nothing but wormwood and various aromatic shrubs.[66] Here too the astonished Greeks saw, for the first time, wild asses, antelopes, ostriches, bustards, some of which afforded sport, and occasionally food, to the horsemen who amused themselves by chasing them; though the wild ass was swifter than any horse, and the ostrich altogether unapproachable. Five days' march brought them to Korsôtê, a town which had been abandoned by its inhabitants,—probably, however, leaving the provision dealers behind, as had before happened at Tarsus, in Kilikia;[67] since the army here increased their supplies for the onward march. All that they could obtain was required, and was indeed insufficient, for the trying journey which awaited them. For thirteen successive days, and ninety computed parasangs, did they march along the left bank of the Euphrates, without provisions, and even without herbage except in some few places. Their flour was exhausted, so that the soldiers lived for some days altogether upon meat, while many baggage-animals perished of hunger. Moreover the ground was often heavy and difficult, full of hills and narrow valleys, requiring the personal efforts of every man to push the cars and waggons at particular junctures; efforts in which the Persian courtiers of Cyrus, under his express orders, took zealous part, toiling in the dirt with their ornamented attire.[68] After these thirteen days of hardship, they reached Pylæ; near the entrance of the cultivated territory of Babylonia, where they seem to have halted five or six days to rest and refresh.[69] There was on the opposite side of the river, at or near this point, a flourishing city named Charmandê; to which many of the soldiers crossed over (by means of skins stuffed with hay), and procured plentiful supplies, especially of date-wine and millet.[70]

It was during this halt opposite Charmandê that a dispute occurred among the Greeks themselves, menacing to the safety of all. I have already mentioned that Klearchus, Menon, Proxenus, and each of the Greek chiefs, enjoyed a separate command over his own division, subject only to the superior control of Cyrus himself. Some of the soldiers of Menon becoming involved in a quarrel with those of Klearchus, the latter examined into the case, pronounced one of Menon's soldiers to have misbehaved, and caused him to be flogged. The comrades of the man thus punished resented the proceeding to such a degree, that as Klearchus was riding away from the banks of the river to his own tent, attended by a few followers only

through the encampment of Menon,—one of the soldiers who happened to be cutting wood, flung the hatchet at him, while others hooted and began to pelt him with stones. Klearchus, after escaping unhurt from this danger to his own division, immediately ordered his soldiers to take arms and put themselves in battle order. He himself advanced at the head of his Thracian peltasts, and his forty horsemen, in hostile attitude against Menon's division; who on their side ran to arms, with Menon himself at their head, and placed themselves in order of defence. A slight accident might have now brought on irreparable disorder and bloodshed, had not Proxenus, coming up at the moment with a company of his hoplites, planted himself in military array between the two disputing parties, and entreated Klearchus to desist from farther assault. The latter at first refused. Indignant that his recent insult and narrow escape from death should be treated so lightly, he desired Proxenus to retire. His wrath was not appeased, until Cyrus himself, apprised of the gravity of the danger, came galloping up with his personal attendants and his two javelins in hand. "Klearchus, Proxenus, and all you Greeks (said he), you know not what you are doing. Be assured that if you now come to blows, it will be the hour of my destruction,—and of your own also, shortly after me. For if *your* force be ruined, all these natives whom you see around, will become more hostile to us even than the men now serving with the King." On hearing this (says Xenophon) Klearchus came to his senses, and the troops dispersed without any encounter.[71]

After passing Pylæ, the territory called Babylonia began. The hills flanking the Euphrates, over which the army had hitherto been passing, soon ceased, and low alluvial plains commenced.[72] Traces were now discovered, the first throughout their long march, of a hostile force moving in their front, ravaging the country and burning the herbage. It was here that Cyrus detected the treason of a Persian nobleman named Orontes, whom he examined in his tent, in the presence of various Persians possessing his intimate confidence, as well as of Klearchus with a guard of three thousand hoplites. Orontes was examined, found guilty, and privately put to death. [73]

After three days' march, estimated by Xenophon at twelve parasangs, Cyrus was induced by the evidences before him, or by the reports of deserters, to believe that the opposing army was close at hand, and that a battle was impending. Accordingly, in the middle of the night, he mustered his whole army, Greeks as well as barbarians; but the enemy did not appear as had been expected. His numbers were counted at this spot, and it was found that there were, of Greeks ten thousand four hundred hoplites, and two thousand five hundred peltasts; of the barbarian or Asiatic force of Cyrus, one hundred thousand men with twenty scythed chariots. The numbers of the Greeks had been somewhat diminished during the march, from sickness, desertion, or other causes. The reports of deserters described the army of Artaxerxes at one million two hundred thousand men, besides the six thousand horse-guards commanded by Artagerses, and two hundred scythed chariots, under the command

of Abrokomas, Tissaphernes, and two others. It was ascertained afterwards, however, that the force of Abrokomas had not yet joined, and later accounts represented the numerical estimation as too great by one-fourth.

In expectation of an action, Cyrus here convened the generals as well as the Lochages (or captains) of the Greeks; as well to consult about suitable arrangements, as to stimulate their zeal in his cause. Few points in this narrative are more striking than the language addressed by the Persian prince to the Greeks, on this as well as on other occasions.

"It is not from want of native forces, men of Hellas, that I have brought you hither, but because I account you better and braver than any number of natives. Prove yourselves now worthy of the freedom which you enjoy; that freedom for which I envy you, and which I would choose, be assured, in preference to all my possessions a thousand times multiplied. Learn now from me, who know it well, all that you will have to encounter,—vast numbers and plenty of noise; but if you despise these, I am ashamed to tell you what worthless stuff you will find in these native men. Behave well,—like brave men, and trust me for sending you back in such condition as to make your friends at home envy you; though I hope to prevail on many of you to prefer my service to your own homes."

"Some of us are remarking, Cyrus, (said a Samian exile named Gaulitês), that you are full of promises at this hour of danger, but will forget them, or perhaps will be unable to perform them, when danger is over…. As to ability, (replied Cyrus), my father's empire reaches northward to the region of intolerable cold, southward to that of intolerable heat. All in the middle is now apportioned in satrapies among my brother's friends; all, if we are victorious, will come to be distributed among mine. I have no fear of not having enough to give away, but rather of not having friends enough to receive it from me. To each of you Greeks, moreover, I shall present a wreath of gold."

Declarations like these, repeated by Cyrus to many of the Greek soldiers, and circulated among the remainder, filled all of them with confidence and enthusiasm in his cause. Such was the sense of force and superiority inspired, that Klearchus asked him,—"Do you really think, Cyrus, that your brother will fight you?… Yes, by Zeus, (was the reply); assuredly, if he be the son of Darius and Parysatis, and my brother, I shall not win this prize without a battle." All the Greeks were earnest with him at the same time not to expose his own person, but to take post in the rear of their body. [74] We shall see presently how this advice was followed.

The declarations here reported, as well as the expressions employed before during the dispute between Klearchus and the soldiers of Menon near Charmandê—being, as they are, genuine and authentic, and not dramatic composition such as those of Æschylus in the Persæ, nor historic amplification like the speeches ascribed to Xerxes in Herodotus,—are among the most valuable evidences respecting the Hel-

lenic character generally. It is not merely the superior courage and military discipline of the Greeks which Cyrus attests, compared with the cowardice of Asiatics,—but also their fidelity and sense of obligation which he contrasts with the time-serving treachery of the latter;[75] connecting these superior qualities with the political freedom which they enjoy. To hear this young prince expressing such strong admiration and envy for Grecian freedom, and such ardent personal preference for it above all the splendor of his own position,—was doubtless the most flattering of all compliments which he could pay to the listening citizen-soldiers. That a young Persian prince should be capable of conceiving such a sentiment, is no slight proof of his mental elevation above the level both of his family and of his nation. The natural Persian opinion is expressed by the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus[76] in Herodotus. To Xerxes, the conception of free citizenship,—and of orderly, self-sufficing courage planted by a public discipline, patriotic as well as equalizing,—was not merely repugnant, but incomprehensible. He understood only a master issuing orders to obedient subjects, and stimulating soldiers to bravery by means of the whip. His descendant Cyrus, on the contrary, had learnt by personal observation to enter into the feeling of personal dignity prevalent in the Greeks around him, based as it was on the conviction that they governed themselves and that there was no man who had any rights of his own over them,—that the law was their only master, and that in rendering obedience to it they were working for no one else but for themselves.[77] Cyrus knew where to touch the sentiment of Hellenic honor, so fatally extinguished after the Greeks lost their political freedom by the hands of the Macedonians, and exchanged for that intellectual quickness, combined with moral degeneracy, which Cicero and his contemporaries remark as the characteristic of these once high-toned communities.

Having concerted the order of battle with the generals, Cyrus marched forward in cautious array during the next day, anticipating the appearance of the king's forces. Nothing of the kind was seen, however, though abundant marks of their retiring footsteps were evident. The day's march, (called three parasangs) having been concluded without a battle, Cyrus called to him the Ambrakiotic prophet Silanus, and presented him with three thousand darics or ten Attic talents. Silanus had assured him, on the eleventh day preceding, that there would be no action in ten days from that time; upon which Cyrus had told him,—"If your prophecy comes true, I will give you three thousand darics. My brother will not fight at all, if he does not fight within ten days."[78]

In spite of the strong opinion which he had expressed in reply to Klearchus, Cyrus now really began to conceive that no battle would be hazarded by his enemies; especially as in the course of this last day's march, he came to a broad and deep trench (thirty feet broad and eighteen feet deep), approaching so near to the Euphrates as to leave an interval of only twenty feet for passage. This trench had been dug by order of Artaxerxes across the plain, for a length said to be of twelve

parasangs (about forty-two English miles, if the parasang be reckoned at thirty stadia), so as to touch at its other extremity what was called the walls of Media.[79] It had been dug as a special measure of defence against the approaching invaders. Yet we hear with surprise, and the invaders themselves found with equal surprise, that not a man was on the spot to defend it; so that the whole Cyreian army and baggage passed without resistance through the narrow breadth of twenty feet. This is the first notice of any defensive measures taken to repel the invasion,—except the precaution of Abrokomas in burning the boats at Thapsakus. Cyrus had been allowed to traverse all this immense space, and to pass through so many defensible positions, without having yet struck a blow. And now Artaxerxes, after having cut a prodigious extent of trench at the cost of so much labor,—provided a valuable means of resistance, especially against Grecian heavy-armed soldiers,—and occupied it seemingly until the very last moment,—throws it up from some unaccountable panic, and suffers a whole army to pass unopposed through this very narrow gut. Having surmounted unexpectedly so formidable an obstacle, Cyrus as well as the Greeks imagined that Artaxerxes would never think of fighting in the open plain. All began to relax in that careful array which had been observed since the midnight review, insomuch that he himself proceeded in his chariot instead of on horseback, while many of the Greek soldiers lodged their arms on the waggons or beasts of burden.[80]

On the next day but one after passing the undefended trench, they were surprised, at a spot called Kunaxa,[81] just when they were about to halt for the mid-day meal and repose, by the sudden intimation that the king's army was approaching in order of battle on the open plain. Instantly Cyrus hastened to mount on horseback, to arm himself, and to put his forces in order, while the Greeks on their side halted and formed their line with all possible speed.[82] They were on the right wing of the army, adjoining the river Euphrates; Ariæus with the Asiatic forces being on the left, and Cyrus himself, surrounded by a body-guard of six hundred well-armed Persian horsemen, in the centre. Among the Greeks, Klearchus commanded the right division of hoplites, with Paphlagonian horsemen and the Grecian peltasts on the extreme right, close to the river; Proxenus with his division stood next; Menon commanded on the left. All the Persian horsemen around Cyrus had breastplates, helmets, short Grecian swords, and two javelins in their right hands; the horses also were defended by facings both over the breast and head. Cyrus himself, armed generally like the rest, stood distinguished by having an upright tiara instead of the helmet. Though the first news had come upon them by surprise, the Cyreians had ample time to put themselves in complete order; for the enemy did not appear until the afternoon was advanced. First, was seen dust, like a white cloud,—next, an undefined dark spot, gradually nearing, until the armor began to shine, and the component divisions of troops, arranged in dense masses, became discernible. Tissaphernes was on the left, opposite to the Greeks, at the head of the Persian horsemen, with white cuirasses; on his right, stood the Persian bowmen, with their gerrha, or wicker shields, spiked so as to be fastened in the ground while arrows were shot from behind them; next,

the Egyptian infantry with long wooden shields covering the whole body and legs. In front of all was a row of chariots with scythes attached to the wheels, destined to begin the charge against the Grecian phalanx.[83]

As the Greeks were completing their array, Cyrus rode to the front, and desired Klearchus to make his attack with the Greeks upon the centre of the enemy; since it was there that the king in person would be posted, and if that were once beaten, the victory was gained. But such was the superiority of Artaxerxes in numbers, that his centre extended beyond the left of Cyrus. Accordingly Klearchus, afraid of withdrawing his right from the river, lest he should be taken both in flank and rear, chose to keep his position on the right,—and merely replied to Cyrus, that he would manage everything for the best. I have before remarked[84] how often the fear of being attacked on the unshielded side and on the rear, led the Greek soldier into movements inconsistent with military expediency; and it will be seen presently that Klearchus, blindly obeying this habitual rule of precaution, was induced here to commit the capital mistake of keeping on the right flank, contrary to the more judicious direction of Cyrus.[85] The latter continued for a short time riding slowly in front of the lines, looking alternately at the two armies, when Xenophon, one of the small total of Grecian horsemen, and attached to the division of Proxenus, rode forth from the line to accost him, asking if he had any orders to give. Cyrus desired him to proclaim to every one that the sacrifices were favorable. Hearing a murmur going through the Grecian ranks, he inquired from Xenophon what it was; and received for answer, that the watchword was now being passed along for the second time. He asked, with some surprise, who gave the watchword? and what it was? Xenophon replied that it was "Zeus the Preserver, and Victory."—"I accept it," replied Cyrus; "let that be the word;" and immediately rode away to his own post in the centre, among the Asiatics.

The vast host of Artaxerxes, advancing steadily and without noise, were now within less than half a mile of the Cyreians, when the Greek troops raised the pæan or usual war-cry, and began to move forward. As they advanced, the shout became more vehement, the pace accelerated, and at last the whole body got into a run.[86] This might have proved unfortunate, had their opponents been other than Grecian hoplites; but the Persians did not stand to await the charge. They turned and fled, when the assailants were yet hardly within bow-shot. Such was their panic, that even the drivers of the scythed chariots in front, deserting their teams, ran away along with the rest; while the horses, left to themselves, rushed apart in all directions, some turning round to follow the fugitives, others coming against the advancing Greeks, who made open order to let them pass. The left division of the king's army was thus routed without a blow, and seemingly without a man killed on either side; one Greek only being wounded by an arrow, and another by not getting out of the way of one of the chariots.[87] Tissaphernes alone,—who, with the body of horse immediately around him, was at the extreme Persian left, close to the river,—formed an exception to this universal flight. He charged and penetrated through the Grecian

peltasts, who stood opposite to him between the hoplites and the river. These peltasts, commanded by Episthenes of Amphipolis, opened their ranks to let him pass, darting at the men as they rode by, yet without losing any one themselves. Tissaphernes thus got into the rear of the Greeks, who continued, on their side, to pursue the flying Persians before them.[88]

Matters proceeded differently in the other parts of the field. Artaxerxes, though in the centre of his own army, yet from his superior numbers outflanked Ariæus, who commanded the extreme left of the Cyreians.[89] Finding no one directly opposed to him, he began to wheel round his right wing, to encompass his enemies; not noticing the flight of his left division. Cyrus, on the other hand, when he saw the easy victory of the Greeks on their side, was overjoyed; and received from every one around him salutations, as if he were already king. Nevertheless, he had self-command enough not yet to rush forward as if the victory was already gained,[90] but remained unmoved, with his regiment of six hundred horse around him, watching the movements of Artaxerxes. As soon as he saw the latter wheeling round his right division to get upon the rear of the Cyreians, he hastened to check this movement by an impetuous charge upon the centre, where Artaxerxes was in person, surrounded by the body-guard of six thousand horse, under Artagerses. So vigorous was the attack of Cyrus, that with his six hundred horse, he broke and dispersed this body-guard, killing Artagerses with his own hand. His own six hundred horse rushed forward in pursuit of the fugitives, leaving Cyrus himself nearly alone, with only the select few, called his "Table-Companions," around him. It was under these circumstances that he first saw his brother Artaxerxes, whose person had been exposed to view by the flight of the body-guards. The sight filled him with such a paroxysm of rage and jealous ambition,[91] that he lost all thought of safety or prudence,—cried out, "I see the man,"—and rushed forward with his mere handful of companions to attack Artaxerxes, in spite of the numerous host behind him. Cyrus made directly at his brother, darting his javelin with so true an aim as to strike him in the breast, and wound him through the cuirass; though the wound (afterwards cured by the Greek surgeon Ktesias) could not have been very severe, since Artaxerxes did not quit the field, but, on the contrary, engaged in personal combat, he and those around him, against this handful of assailants. So unequal a combat did not last long. Cyrus, being severely wounded under the eye by the javelin of a Karian soldier, was cast from his horse and slain. The small number of faithful companions around him all perished in his defence. Artasyras, who stood first among them in his confidence and attachment, seeing him mortally wounded and fallen, cast himself down upon him, clasped him in his arms, and in this position either slew himself, or was slain by order of the king.[92]

The head and the right hand of the deceased prince were immediately cut off by order of Artaxerxes, and doubtless exhibited conspicuously to view. This was a proclamation to every one that the entire contest was at an end; and so it was understood by Ariæus, who, together with all the Asiatic troops of Cyrus, deserted the

field and fled back to the camp. Not even there did they defend themselves, when the king and his forces pursued them; but fled yet farther back to the resting-place of the previous night. The troops of Artaxerxes got into the camp and began to plunder it without resistance. Even the harem of Cyrus fell into their power. It included two Grecian women,—of free condition, good family, and education,—one from Phokæa, the other from Miletus, brought to him, by force, from their parents to Sardis. The elder of these two, the Phokæan, named Milto, distinguished alike for beauty and accomplished intelligence, was made prisoner and transferred to the harem of Artaxerxes; the other, a younger person, found means to save herself, though without her upper garments,[93] and sought shelter among some Greeks who were left in the camp on guard of the Grecian baggage. These Greeks repelled the Persian assailants with considerable slaughter; preserving their own baggage, as well as the persons of all who fled to them for shelter. But the Asiatic camp of the Cyreians was completely pillaged, not excepting those reserved waggons of provisions which Cyrus had provided in order that his Grecian auxiliaries might be certain, under all circumstances, of a supply.[94]

While Artaxerxes was thus stripping the Cyreian camp, he was joined by Tissaphernes and his division of horse, who had charged through between the Grecian division and the river. At this time, there was a distance of no less than thirty stadia or three and a half miles between him and Klearchus with the Grecian division; so far had the latter advanced forward in pursuit of the Persian fugitives. Apprised, after some time, that the king's troops had been victorious on the left and centre, and were masters of the camp,—but not yet knowing of the death of Cyrus,—Klearchus marched back his troops, and met the enemy's forces also returning. He was apprehensive of being surrounded by superior numbers, and therefore took post with his rear upon the river. In this position, Artaxerxes again marshalled his troops in front, as if to attack him, but the Greeks, anticipating his movement, were first in making the attack themselves, and forced the Persians to take flight even more terror-stricken than before. Klearchus, thus relieved from all enemies, waited awhile in hopes of hearing news of Cyrus. He then returned to the camp, which was found stripped of all its stores; so that the Greeks were compelled to pass the night without supper, while most of them also had had no dinner, from the early hour at which the battle had commenced.[95] It was only on the next morning that they learnt, through Proklês (descendant of the Spartan king Demaratus, formerly companion of Xerxes in the invasion of Greece), that Cyrus had been slain; news which converted their satisfaction at their own triumph into sorrow and dismay.[96]

Thus terminated the battle of Kunaxa, and along with it the ambitious hopes as well as the life of this young prince. His character and proceedings suggest instructive remarks. Both in the conduct of this expedition, and in the two or three years of administration in Asia Minor which preceded it, he displayed qualities such as are not seen in Cyrus called the Great, nor in any other member of the Persian regal family,

nor indeed in any other Persian general throughout the history of the monarchy. We observe a large and long-sighted combination,—a power of foreseeing difficulties, and providing means beforehand for overcoming them,—a dexterity in meeting variable exigencies, and dealing with different parties, Greeks or Asiatics, officers or soldiers,—a conviction of the necessity, not merely of purchasing men's service by lavish presents, but of acquiring their confidence by straightforward dealing and systematic good faith,—a power of repressing displeasure when policy commanded, as at the desertion of Xenias and Pasion, and the first conspiracies of Orontes; although usually the punishments which he inflicted were full of Oriental barbarity. How rare were the merits and accomplishments of Cyrus, as a Persian, will be best felt when we contrast this portrait, by Xenophon, with the description of the Persian satraps by Isokrates.[97] That many persons deserted from Artaxerxes to Cyrus,—none, except Orontes, from Cyrus to Artaxerxes,—has been remarked by Xenophon. Not merely throughout the march, but even as to the manner of fighting at Kunaxa, the judgment of Cyrus was sounder than that of Klearchus. The two matters of supreme importance to the Greeks, were, to take care of the person of Cyrus, and to strike straight at that of Artaxerxes with the central division around him. Now it was the fault of Klearchus, and not of Cyrus, that both these matters were omitted; and that the Greeks gained only a victory comparatively insignificant on the right. Yet in spite of such mistake, not his own, it appears that Cyrus would have been victorious, had he been able to repress that passionate burst of antipathy which drove him, like a madman, against his brother. The same insatiable ambition, and jealous fierceness when power was concerned, which had before led him to put to death two first cousins, because they omitted, in his presence, an act of deference never paid except to the king in person,—this same impulse, exasperated by the actual sight of his rival brother, and by that standing force of fraternal antipathy so frequent in regal families,[98] blinded him, for the moment, to all rational calculation.

We may however remark that Hellas, as a whole, had no cause to regret the fall of Cyrus at Kunaxa. Had he dethroned his brother and become king, the Persian empire would have acquired under his hand such a degree of strength as might probably have enabled him to forestall the work afterwards performed by the Macedonian kings, and to make the Greeks in Europe as well as those in Asia his dependents. He would have employed Grecian military organization against Grecian independence, as Philip and Alexander did after him. His money would have enabled him to hire an overwhelming force of Grecian officers and soldiers, who would (to use the expression of Proxenus as recorded by Xenophon[99]) have thought him a better friend to them than their own country. It would have enabled him also to take advantage of dissension and venality in the interior of each Grecian city, and thus to weaken their means of defence while he strengthened his own means of attack. This was a policy which none of the Persian kings, from Darius son of Hystaspes down to Darius Codomanus, had ability or perseverance enough to follow out; none of them knew either the true value of Grecian instruments, or how to employ them with effect. The

whole conduct of Cyrus, in reference to this memorable expedition, manifests a superior intelligence, competent to use the resources which victory would have put in his hands,—and an ambition likely to use them against the Greeks, in avenging the humiliations of Marathon, Salamis, and the peace of Kallias.

CHAPTER LXX.

RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.

THE first triumphant feeling of the Greek troops at Kunaxa was exchanged, as soon as they learnt the death of Cyrus, for dismay and sorrow; accompanied by unavailing repentance for the venture into which he and Klearchus had seduced them. Probably Klearchus himself too repented, and with good reason, of having displayed, in his manner of fighting the battle, so little foresight, and so little regard either to the injunctions or to the safety of Cyrus. Nevertheless he still maintained the tone of a victor in the field, and after expressions of grief for the fate of the young prince, desired Proklês and Glus to return to Ariæus, with the reply, that the Greeks on their side were conquerors without any enemy remaining; that they were about to march onward against Artaxerxes; and that if Ariæus would join them, they would place him on the throne which had been intended for Cyrus. While this reply was conveyed to Ariæus by his particular friend Menon along with the messengers, the Greeks procured a meal as well as they could, having no bread, by killing some of the baggage animals; and by kindling fire, to cook their meat, from the arrows, the wooden Egyptian shields which had been thrown away on the field, and the baggage carts.[100]

Before any answer could be received from Ariæus, heralds appeared coming from Artaxerxes; among them being Phalinus, a Greek from Zakynthus, and the Greek surgeon Ktesias of Knidus, who was in the service of the Persian king.[101] Phalinus, an officer of some military experience and in the confidence of Tissaphernes, addressed himself to the Greek commanders; requiring them on the part of the king, since he was now victor and had slain Cyrus, to surrender their arms and appeal to his mercy. To this summons, painful in the extreme to a Grecian ear, Klearchus replied that it was not the practice for victorious men to lay down their arms. Being then called away to examine the sacrifice which was going on, he left the interview to the other officers, who met the summons of Phalinus by an emphatic negative. "If the king thinks himself strong enough to ask for our arms unconditionally, let him come and try to seize them." "The king (rejoined Phalinus) thinks that you are in his power, being in the midst of his territory, hemmed in by impassable rivers, and encompassed by his innumerable subjects."—"Our arms and our valor are all that remain to us (replied a young Athenian); we shall not be fools enough to hand over to you our only remaining treasure, but shall employ them still to have a fight for your treasure."[102] But though several spoke in this resolute tone, there were not wanting others disposed to encourage a negotiation; saying that they had been faithful to Cyrus as long as he lived, and would now be faithful to Artaxerxes, if he wanted their services in Egypt or anywhere else. In the midst of this parley Klearchus returned, and was requested by Phalinus to return a final answer on behalf of all. He at first

asked the advice of Phalinus himself; appealing to the common feeling of Hellenic patriotism, and anticipating, with very little judgment, that the latter would encourage the Greeks in holding out. "If (replied Phalinus) I saw one chance out of ten thousand in your favor, in the event of a contest with the king, I should advise you to refuse the surrender of your arms. But as there is no chance of safety for you against the king's consent, I recommend you to look out for safety in the only quarter where it presents itself." Sensible of the mistake which he had made in asking the question, Klearchus rejoined,—"That is *your* opinion; now report our answer: We think we shall be better friends to the king, if we are to be his friends,—or more effective enemies, if we are to be his enemies,—with our arms, than without them." Phalinus, in retiring, said that the king proclaimed a truce so long as they remained in their present position,—but war, if they moved, either onward or backward. And to this Klearchus acceded, without declaring which he intended to do.[103]

Shortly after the departure of Phalinus, the envoys despatched to Ariæus returned; communicating his reply, that the Persian grandees would never tolerate any pretensions on his part to the crown, and that he intended to depart early the next morning on his return; if the Greeks wished to accompany him, they must join him during the night. In the evening, Klearchus, convening the generals and the lochages (or captains of lochi), acquainted them that the morning sacrifice had been of a nature to forbid their marching against the king,—a prohibition of which he now understood the reason, from having since learnt that the king was on the other side of the Tigris, and therefore out of their reach,—but that it was favorable for rejoining Ariæus. He gave directions accordingly for a night-march back along the Euphrates, to the station where they had passed the last night but one prior to the battle. The other Grecian generals, without any formal choice of Klearchus as chief, tacitly acquiesced in his orders, from a sense of his superior decision and experience, in an emergency when no one knew what to propose. The night-march was successfully accomplished, so that they joined Ariæus at the preceding station about midnight; not without the alarming symptom, however, that Miltokythês the Thracian deserted to the king, at the head of three hundred and forty of his countrymen, partly horse, partly foot.

The first proceeding of the Grecian generals was to exchange solemn oaths of reciprocal fidelity and fraternity with Ariæus. According to an ancient and impressive practice, a bull, a wolf, a boar, and a ram, were all slain, and their blood allowed to run into the hollow of a shield; in which the Greek generals dipped a sword, and Ariæus, with his chief companions, a spear.[104] The latter, besides the promise of alliance, engaged also to guide the Greeks, in good faith, down to the Asiatic coast. Klearchus immediately began to ask what route he proposed to take; whether to return by that along which they had come up, or by any other. To this Ariæus replied, that the road along which they had marched was impracticable for retreat, from the utter want of provisions through seventeen days of desert; but that he intended to

choose another road, which, though longer, would be sufficiently productive to furnish them with provisions. There was, however, a necessity (he added), that the first two or three days' marches should be of extreme length, in order that they might get out of the reach of the king's forces, who would hardly be able to overtake them afterwards with any considerable numbers.

They had now come ninety-three days' march[105] from Ephesus, or ninety from Sardis.[106] The distance from Sardis to Kunaxa is, according to Colonel Chesney, about twelve hundred and sixty-five geographical miles, or fourteen hundred and sixty-four English miles. There had been at least ninety-six days of rest, enjoyed at various places, so that the total of time elapsed must have at least been one hundred and eighty-nine days, or a little more than half a year;[107] but it was probably greater, since some intervals of rest are not specified in number of days.

How to retrace their steps, was now the problem, apparently insoluble. As to the military force of Persia in the field, indeed, not merely the easy victory at Kunaxa, but still more the undisputed march throughout so long a space, left them no serious apprehensions.[108] In spite of this great extent, population, and riches, they had been allowed to pass through the most difficult and defensible country, and to ford the broad Euphrates, without a blow; nay, the king had shrunk from defending the long trench which he had specially caused to be dug for the protection of Babylonia. But the difficulties which stood between them and their homes were of a very different character. How were they to find their way back, or obtain provisions, in defiance of a numerous hostile cavalry, which, not without efficiency even in a pitched battle would be most formidable in opposing their retreat? The line of their upward march had all been planned, with supplies furnished, by Cyrus;—yet even under such advantages, supplies had been on the point of failing, in one part of the march. They were now, for the first time, called upon to think and provide for themselves; without knowledge of either roads or distances,—without trustworthy guides,—without any one to furnish or even to indicate supplies,—and with a territory all hostile, traversed by rivers which they had no means of crossing. Klearchus himself knew nothing of the country, nor of any other river except the Euphrates; nor does he indeed, in his heart, seem to have conceived retreat as practicable without the consent of the king.[109] The reader who casts his eye on a map of Asia, and imagines the situation of this Greek division on the left bank of the Euphrates, near the parallel of latitude 33° 30'—will hardly be surprised at any measure of despair, on the part either of general or soldiers. And we may add that Klearchus had not even the advantage of such a map, or probably of any map at all, to enable him to shape his course.

In this dilemma, the first and most natural impulse was to consult Ariæus who (as has been already stated) pronounced, with good reason, that return by the same road was impracticable; and promised to conduct them home by another road,—longer indeed, yet better supplied. At daybreak on the ensuing morning, they began their march in an easterly direction, anticipating that before night they should reach

some villages of the Babylonian territory, as in fact they did;[110] yet not before they had been alarmed in the afternoon by the supposed approach of some of the enemy's horse, and by evidences that the enemy were not far off, which induced them to slacken their march for the purpose of more cautious array. Hence they did not reach the first villages before dark; and these too had been pillaged by the enemy while retreating before them, so that only the first-comers under Klearchus could obtain accommodation, while the succeeding troops, coming up in the dark, pitched as they could without any order. The whole camp was a scene of clamor, dispute, and even alarm, throughout the night. No provisions could be obtained. Early the next morning Klearchus ordered them under arms; and desiring to expose the groundless nature of the alarm, caused the herald to proclaim, that whoever would denounce the person who had let the ass into the camp on the preceding night, should be rewarded with a talent of silver.[111]

What was the project of route entertained by Ariæus, we cannot ascertain;[112] since it was not farther pursued. For the effect of the unexpected arrival of the Greeks as if to attack the enemy,—and even the clamor and shouting of the camp during the night—so intimidated the Persian commanders, that they sent heralds the next morning to treat about a truce. The contrast between this message, and the haughty summons of the preceding day to lay down their arms, was sensibly felt by the Grecian officers, and taught them that the proper way of dealing with the Persians was by a bold and aggressive demeanor. When Klearchus was apprised of the arrival of the heralds, he desired them at first to wait at the outposts until he was at leisure; then, having put his troops into the best possible order, with a phalanx compact on every side to the eye, and the unarmed persons out of sight, he desired the heralds to be admitted. He marched out to meet them with the most showy and best-armed soldiers immediately around him, and when they informed him that they had come from the king with instructions to propose a truce, and to report on what conditions the Greeks would agree to it, Klearchus replied abruptly,—"Well then,—go and tell the king, that our first business must be to fight; for we have nothing to eat, nor will any man presume to talk to Greeks about a truce, without first providing dinner for them." With this reply the heralds rode off, but returned very speedily; thus making it plain that the king, or the commanding officer, was near at hand. They brought word that the king thought their answer reasonable, and had sent guides to conduct them to a place where they would obtain provisions, if the truce should be concluded.

After an affected delay and hesitation, in order to impose upon the Persians, Klearchus concluded the truce, and desired that the guides would conduct the army to those quarters where provisions could be had. He was most circumspect in maintaining exact order during the march, himself taking charge of the rear guard. The guides led them over many ditches and channels, full of water, and cut for the purpose of irrigation; some so broad and deep that they could not be crossed without

bridges. The army had to put together bridges for the occasion, from palm trees either already fallen, or expressly cut down. This was a troublesome business, which Klearchus himself superintended with peculiar strictness. He carried his spear in the left hand, his stick in the right; employing the latter to chastise any soldier who seemed remiss,—and even plunging into the mud and lending his own hands in aid wherever it was necessary.[113] As it was not the usual season of irrigation for crops, he suspected that the canals had been filled on this occasion expressly to intimidate the Greeks, by impressing them with the difficulties of their prospective march; and he was anxious to demonstrate to the Persians that these difficulties were no more than Grecian energy could easily surmount.

At length they reached certain villages indicated by their guides for quarters and provision; and here for the first time they had a sample of that unparalleled abundance of the Babylonian territory, which Herodotus is afraid to describe with numerical precision. Large quantities of corn,—dates not only in great numbers, but of such beauty, freshness, size and flavor, as no Greek had ever seen or tasted, insomuch that fruit like what was imported into Greece, was disregarded and left for the slaves, —wine and vinegar, both also made from the date-palm: these are the luxuries which Xenophon is eloquent in describing, after his recent period of scanty fare and anxious apprehension; not without also noticing the headaches which such new and luscious food, in unlimited quanity, brought upon himself and others.[114]

After three days passed in these restorative quarters, they were visited by Tissaphernes, accompanied by four Persian grandees and a suite of slaves. The satrap began to open a negotiation with Klearchus and the other generals. Speaking through an interpreter, he stated to them that the vicinity of his satrapy to Greece impressed him with a strong interest in favor of the Cyreian Greeks, and made him anxious to rescue them out of their present desperate situation; that he had solicited the king's permission to save them, as a personal recompense to himself for having been the first to forewarn him of the schemes of Cyrus, and for having been the only Persian who had not fled before the Greeks at Kunaxa; that the King had promised to consider this point, and had sent him in the meantime to ask the Greeks what their purpose was in coming up to attack him; and that he trusted the Greeks would give him a conciliatory answer to carry back, in order that he might have less difficulty in realizing what he desired for their benefit. To this Klearchus, after first deliberating apart with the other officers, replied, that the army had come together, and had even commenced their march, without any purpose of hostility to the King; that Cyrus had brought them up the country under false pretences, but that they had been ashamed to desert him in the midst of danger, since he had always treated them generously; that since Cyrus was now dead, they had no purpose of hostility against the King, but were only anxious to return home; that they were prepared to repel hostility from all quarters, but would be not less prompt in requiting favor or assistance. With this answer Tissaphernes departed, and returned on the next day but one, informing

them that he had obtained the King's permission to save the Grecian army,—though not without great opposition, since many Persian counsellors contended that it was unworthy of the King's dignity, to suffer those who had assailed him to escape. "I am now ready (said he) to conclude a covenant and exchange oaths with you; engaging to conduct you safely back into Greece, with the country friendly, and with a regular market for you to purchase provisions. You must stipulate on your part always to pay for your provisions, and to do no damage to the country. If I do not furnish you with provisions to buy, you are then at liberty to take them where you can find them." Well were the Greeks content to enter into such a covenant, which was sworn, with hands given upon it, by Klearchus, the other generals, and the lochages, on their side,—and by Tissaphernes with the King's brother-in-law on the other. Tissaphernes then left them, saying that he would go back to the King, make preparations, and return to reconduct the Greeks home; going himself to his own satrapy.[115]

The statements of Ktesias, though known to us only indirectly and not to be received without caution, afford ground for believing that Queen Parysatis decidedly wished success to her son Cyrus in his contest for the throne,—that the first report conveyed to her of the battle of Kunaxa, announcing the victory of Cyrus, filled her with joy, which was exchanged for bitter sorrow when she was informed of his death,—that she caused to be slain with horrible tortures all those, who though acting in the Persian army and for the defence of Artaxerxes, had any participation in the death of Cyrus—and that she showed favorable dispositions towards the Cyreian Greeks.[116] It seems probable, farther, that her influence may have been exerted to procure for them an unimpeded retreat, without anticipating the use afterwards made by Tissaphernes (as will soon appear) of the present convention. And in one point of view, the Persian king had an interest in facilitating their retreat. For the very circumstance which rendered retreat difficult, also rendered the Greeks dangerous to him in their actual position. They were in the heart of the Persian empire, within seventy miles of Babylon; in a country not only teeming with fertility, but also extremely defensible; especially against cavalry, from the multiplicity of canals, as Herodotus observed respecting Lower Egypt.[117] And Klearchus might say to his Grecian soldiers,—what Xenophon was afterwards preparing to say to them at Kalpê on the Euxine Sea, and what Nikias also affirmed to the unhappy Athenian army whom he conducted away from Syracuse[118]—that wherever they sat down, they were sufficiently numerous and well-organized to become at once a city. A body of such troops might effectually assist, and would perhaps encourage, the Babylonian population to throw off the Persian yoke, and to exonerate themselves from the prodigious tribute which they now paid to the satrap. For these reasons, the advisers of Artaxerxes thought it advantageous to convey the Greeks across the Tigris out of Babylonia, beyond all possibility of returning thither. This was at any rate the primary object of the convention. And it was the more necessary to conciliate the good-will of the Greeks, because there seems to have been but one bridge over the Tigris; which

bridge could only be reached by inviting them to advance considerably farther into the interior of Babylonia.

Such was the state of fears and hopes on both sides, at the time when Tissaphernes left the Greeks, after concluding his convention. For twenty days did they await his return, without receiving from him any communication; the Cyreian Persians under Ariæus being encamped near them. Such prolonged and unexplained delay became, after a few days, the source of much uneasiness to the Greeks; the more so as Ariæus received during this interval several visits from his Persian kinsmen, and friendly messages from the king, promising amnesty for his recent services under Cyrus. Of these messages the effects were painfully felt in manifest coldness of demeanor on the part of his Persian troops towards the Greeks. Impatient and suspicious, the Greek soldiers impressed upon Klearchus their fears, that the king had concluded the recent convention only to arrest their movements, until he should have assembled a larger army and blocked up more effectually the roads against their return. To this Klearchus replied,—"I am aware of all that you say. Yet if we now strike our tents, it will be a breach of the convention and a declaration of war. No one will furnish us with provisions; we shall have no guides; Ariæus will desert us forthwith, so that we shall have his troops as enemies instead of friends. Whether there be any other river for us to cross, I know not; but we know that the Euphrates itself can never be crossed, if there be an enemy to resist us. Nor have we any cavalry,—while cavalry is the best and most numerous force of our enemies. If the king, having all these advantages, really wishes to destroy us, I do not know why he should falsely exchange all these oaths and solemnities, and thus make his own word worthless in the eyes both of Greeks and barbarians."[119]

Such words from Klearchus are remarkable, as they testify his own complete despair of the situation,—certainly a very natural despair,—except by amicable dealing with the Persians; and also his ignorance of geography and the country to be traversed. This feeling helps to explain his imprudent confidence afterwards in Tissaphernes.

That satrap, however, after twenty days, at last came back, with his army prepared to return to Ionia,—with the king's daughter whom he had just received in marriage,—and with another grandee named Orontas. Tissaphernes took the conduct of the march, providing supplies for the Greek troops to purchase; while Ariæus and his division now separated themselves altogether from the Greeks, and became intermingled with the other Persians. Klearchus and the Greeks followed them, at the distance of about three miles in the rear, with a separate guide for themselves; not without jealousy and mistrust, sometimes shown in individual conflicts, while collecting wood or forage, between them and the Persians of Ariæus. After three days' march (that is, apparently, three days, calculated from the moment when they began their retreat with Ariæus) they came to the Wall of Media, and passed through it,[120] prosecuting their march onward through the country on its other or interior side. It

was of bricks cemented with bitumen, one hundred feet high, and twenty feet broad; it was said to extend a length of twenty parasangs (or about seventy miles, if we reckon the parasang at thirty stadia), and to be not far distant from Babylon. Two days of farther march, computed as eight parasangs, brought them to the Tigris. During these two days they crossed two great ship canals, one of them over a permanent bridge, the other over a temporary bridge laid on seven boats. Canals of such magnitude must probably have been two among the four stated by Xenophon to be drawn from the river Tigris, each of them a parasang distant from the other. They were one hundred feet broad, and deep enough even for heavy vessels; they were distributed by means of numerous smaller channels and ditches for the irrigation of the soil; and they were said to fall into the Euphrates; or rather, perhaps, they terminated in one main larger canal cut directly from the Euphrates to the Tigris, each of them joining this larger canal at a different point of its course. Within less than two miles of the Tigris was a large and populous city named Sittakê, near which the Greeks pitched their camp, on the verge of a beautiful park or thick grove full of all kinds of trees; while the Persians all crossed the Tigris, at the neighboring bridge.

As Proxenus and Xenophon were here walking in front of the camp after supper, a man was brought up who had asked for the former at the advanced posts. This man said that he came with instructions from Ariæus. He advised the Greeks to be on their guard, as there were troops concealed in the adjoining grove, for the purpose of attacking them during the night,—and also to send and occupy the bridge over the Tigris, since Tissaphernes intended to break it down, in order that the Greeks might be caught without possibility of escape between the river and the canal. On discussing this information with Klearchus, who was much alarmed by it, a young Greek present remarked that the two matters stated by the informant contradicted each other; for that if Tissaphernes intended to attack the Greeks during the night, he would not break down the bridge, so as both to prevent his own troops on the other side from crossing to aid, and to deprive those on this side of all retreat if they were beaten,—while, if the Greeks were beaten, there was no escape open to them, whether the bridge continued or not. This remark induced Klearchus to ask the messenger, what was the extent of ground between the Tigris and the canal. The messenger replied, that it was a great extent of country, comprising many large cities and villages. Reflecting on this communication, the Greek officers came to the conclusion that the message was a stratagem on the part of Tissaphernes to frighten them and accelerate their passage across the Tigris; under the apprehension that they might conceive the plan of seizing or breaking the bridge and occupying a permanent position in the spot where they were; which was an island, fortified on one side by the Tigris,—on the other sides, by intersecting canals between the Euphrates and the Tigris.[121] Such an island was a defensible position, having a most productive territory with numerous cultivators, so as to furnish shelter and means of hostility for all the king’s enemies. Tissaphernes calculated that the message now delivered would induce the Greeks to become alarmed with their actual position and to

cross the Tigris with as little delay as possible. At least this was the interpretation which the Greek officers put upon his proceeding; an interpretation highly plausible, since, in order to reach the bridge over the Tigris, he had been obliged to conduct the Greek troops into a position sufficiently tempting for them to hold,—and since he knew that his own purposes were purely treacherous. But the Greeks, officers as well as soldiers, were animated only by the wish of reaching home. They trusted, though not without misgivings, in the promise of Tissaphernes to conduct them; and never for a moment thought of taking permanent post in this fertile island. They did not, however, neglect the precaution of sending a guard during the night to the bridge over the Tigris, which no enemy came to assail. On the next morning they passed over it in a body, in cautious and mistrustful array, and found themselves on the eastern bank of the Tigris,—not only without attack, but even without sight of a single Persian, except Glus, the interpreter, and a few others watching their motions.

After having crossed by a bridge laid upon thirty-seven pontoons, the Greeks continued their march to the northward upon the eastern side of the Tigris, for four days, to the river Physkus; said to be twenty parasangs.[122] The Physkus was one hundred feet wide, with a bridge, and the large city of Opis near it. Here, at the frontier of Assyria and Media, the road from the eastern regions to Babylon joined the road northerly on which the Greeks were marching. An illegitimate brother of Artaxerxes was seen at the head of a numerous force, which he was conducting from Susa and Ekbatana as a reinforcement to the royal army. This great host halted to see the Greeks pass by; and Klearchus ordered the march in column of two abreast, employing himself actively to maintain an excellent array, and halting more than once. The army thus occupied so long a time in passing by the Persian host, that their numbers appeared greater than the reality, even to themselves; while the effect upon the Persian spectators was very imposing.[123] Here Assyria ended and Media began. They marched, still in a northerly direction, for six days through a portion of Media almost unpeopled, until they came to some flourishing villages which formed a portion of the domain of queen Parysatis; probably these villages, forming so marked an exception to the desert character of the remaining march, were situated on the Lesser Zab, which flows into the Tigris, and which Xenophon must have crossed, though he makes no mention of it. According to the order of march stipulated between the Greeks and Tissaphernes, the latter only provided a supply of provisions for the former to purchase; but on the present halt, he allowed the Greeks to plunder the villages, which were rich and full of all sorts of subsistence,—yet without carrying off the slaves. The wish of the satrap to put an insult on Cyrus, as his personal enemy,[124] through Parysatis, thus proved a sentence of ruin to these unhappy villagers. Five more days' march, called twenty parasangs, brought them to the banks of the river Zabatus, or the Greater Zab, which flows into the Tigris near a town now called Senn. During the first of these five days, they saw on the opposite side of the Tigris a large town called Kænæ, from whence they received supplies of provisions, brought across by the inhabitants upon rafts supported by inflated skins.[125]

On the banks of the Great Zab they halted three days,—days of serious and tragical moment. Having been under feelings of mistrust, ever since the convention with Tissaphernes, they had followed throughout the whole march, with separate guides of their own, in the rear of his army, always maintaining their encampment apart. During their halt on the Zab, so many various manifestations occurred to aggravate the mistrust, that hostilities seemed on the point of breaking out between the two camps. To obviate this danger Klearchus demanded an interview with Tissaphernes, represented to him the threatening attitude of affairs, and insisted on the necessity of coming to a clear understanding. He impressed upon the satrap that, over and above the solemn oaths which had been interchanged, the Greeks on their side could have no conceivable motive to quarrel with him; that they had everything to hope from his friendship, and everything to fear, even to the loss of all chance of safe return, from his hostility; that Tissaphernes, also, could gain nothing by destroying them, but would find them, if he chose, the best and most faithful instruments for his own aggrandizement and for conquering the Mysians and the Pisidians,—as Cyrus had experienced while he was alive. Klearchus concluded his protest by requesting to be informed, what malicious reporter had been filling the mind of Tissaphernes with causeless suspicions against the Greeks.[126]

"Klearchus (replied the satrap), I rejoice to hear such excellent sense from your lips. You remark truly, that if you were to meditate evil against me, it would recoil upon yourselves. I shall prove to you, in my turn, that you have no cause to mistrust either the king or me. If we had wished to destroy you, nothing would be easier. We have superabundant forces for the purpose; there are wide plains in which you would be starved,—besides mountains and rivers which you would be unable to pass, without our help. Having thus the means of destroying you in our hands, and having nevertheless bound ourselves by solemn oaths to save you, we shall not be fools and knaves enough to attempt it now, when we should draw upon ourselves the just indignation of the gods. It is my peculiar affection for my neighbors, the Greeks,—and my wish to attach to my own person, by ties of gratitude, the Greek soldiers of Cyrus,—which have made me eager to conduct you to Ionia in safety. For I know that when you are in my service, though the king is the only man who can wear his tiara erect *upon his head*, I shall be able to wear mine erect upon *my heart*, in full pride and confidence."[127]

So powerful was the impression made upon Klearchus by these assurances, that he exclaimed,—"Surely those informers deserve the severest punishment, who try to put us at enmity, when we are such good friends to each other, and have so much reason to be so." "Yes (replied Tissaphernes), they deserve nothing less; and if you, with the other generals and lochages, will come into my tent to-morrow, I will tell you who the calumniators are." "To-be-sure I will (rejoined Klearchus), and bring the other generals with me. I shall tell you at the same time, who are the parties that

seek to prejudice us against you." The conversation then ended, the satrap detaining Klearchus to dinner, and treating him in the most hospitable and confidential manner.

On the next morning, Klearchus communicated what had passed to the Greeks, insisting on the necessity that all the generals should go to Tissaphernes pursuant to his invitation; in order to reëstablish that confidence which unworthy calumniators had shaken, and to punish such of the calumniators as might be Greeks. So emphatically did he pledge himself for the good faith and philhellenic dispositions of the satrap, that he overruled the opposition of many among the soldiers; who, still continuing to entertain their former suspicions, remonstrated especially against the extreme imprudence of putting all the generals at once into the power of Tissaphernes. The urgency of Klearchus prevailed. Himself with four other generals,—Proxenus, Menon, Agias, and Sokrates,—and twenty lochages or captains,—went to visit the satrap in his tent; about two hundred of the soldiers going along with them, to make purchases for their own account in the Persian camp-market.[128]

On reaching the quarters of Tissaphernes,—distant nearly three miles from the Grecian camp, according to habit,—the five generals were admitted into the interior, while the lochages remained at the entrance. A purple flag, hoisted from the top of the tent, betrayed too late the purpose for which they had been invited to come. The lochages and the Grecian soldiers who had accompanied them were surprised and cut down, while the generals in the interior were detained, put in chains, and carried up as prisoners to the Persian court. Here Klearchus, Proxenus, Agias, and Sokrates were beheaded after a short imprisonment. Queen Parysatis, indeed, from affection to Cyrus, not only furnished many comforts to Klearchus in the prison, by the hands of her surgeon, Ktesias, but used all her influence with her son Artaxerxes to save his life; though her efforts were counteracted, on this occasion, by the superior influence of queen Stateira, his wife. The rivalry between these two royal women, doubtless arising out of many other circumstances besides the death of Klearchus, became soon afterwards so furious, that Parysatis caused Stateira to be poisoned.[129]

Menon was not put to death along with the other generals. He appears to have taken credit at the Persian court for the treason of entrapping his colleagues into the hands of Tissaphernes. But his life was only prolonged to perish a year afterwards in disgrace and torture,—probably by the requisition of Parysatis, who thus avenged the death of Klearchus. The queen-mother had always power enough to perpetrate cruelties, though not always to avert them.[130] She had already brought to a miserable end every one, even faithful defenders of Artaxerxes, concerned in the death of her son Cyrus.

Though Menon thought it convenient, when brought up to Babylon, to boast of having been the instrument through whom the generals were entrapped into the fatal tent, this boast is not to be treated as matter of fact. For not only does Xenophon explain the catastrophe differently, but in the delineation which he gives of Menon,

dark and odious as it is in the extreme, he does not advance any such imputation; indirectly, indeed, he sets it aside.[131] Unfortunately for the reputation of Klearchus, no such reasonable excuse can be offered for his credulity, which brought himself as well as his colleagues to so melancholy an end, and his whole army to the brink of ruin. It appears that the general sentiment of the Grecian army, taking just measure of the character of Tissaphernes, was disposed to greater circumspection in dealing with him. Upon that system Klearchus himself had hitherto acted; and the necessity of it might have been especially present to *his* mind, since he had served with the Lacedæmonian fleet at Miletus in 411 B.C., and had, therefore, had fuller experience than other men in the army, of the satrap's real character.[132] On a sudden he now turns round, and on the faith of a few verbal declarations, puts all the military chiefs into the most defenceless posture and the most obvious peril, such as hardly the strongest grounds for confidence could have justified. Though the remark of Machiavel is justified by large experience,—that from the short-sightedness of men and their obedience to present impulse, the most notorious deceiver will always find new persons to trust him,—still such misjudgment on the part of an officer of age and experience is difficult to explain.[133] Polyænus intimates that beautiful women, exhibited by the satrap at his first banquet to Klearchus alone, served as a lure to attract him with all his colleagues to the second; while Xenophon imputes the error to continuance of a jealous rivalry with Menon. The latter,[134] it appears, having always been intimate with Ariæus, had been thus brought into previous communication with Tissaphernes, by whom he had been well received, and by whom he was also encouraged to lay plans for detaching the whole Grecian army from Klearchus, so as to bring it all under his (Menon's) command, into the service of the satrap. Such at least was the suspicion of Klearchus; who, jealous in the extreme of his own military authority, tried to defeat the scheme by bidding still higher himself for the favor of Tissaphernes. Imagining that Menon was the unknown calumniator who prejudiced the satrap against him, he hoped to prevail on the satrap to disclose his name and dismiss him.[135] Such jealousy seems to have robbed Klearchus of his customary prudence. We must also allow for another impression deeply fixed in his mind; that the salvation of the army was hopeless without the consent of Tissaphernes, and, therefore, since the latter had conducted them thus far in safety, when he might have destroyed them before, that his designs at the bottom could not be hostile.[136]

Notwithstanding these two great mistakes,—one on the present occasion, one previously, at the battle of Kunaxa, in keeping the Greeks on the right contrary to the order of Cyrus,—both committed by Klearchus, the loss of that officer was doubtless a great misfortune to the army; while, on the contrary, the removal of Menon was a signal benefit,—perhaps a condition of ultimate safety. A man so treacherous and unprincipled as Xenophon depicts Menon, would probably have ended by really committing towards the army that treason, for which he falsely took credit at the Persian court in reference to the seizure of the generals.

The impression entertained by Klearchus, respecting the hopeless position of the Greeks in the heart of the Persian territory after the death of Cyrus, was perfectly natural in a military man who could appreciate all the means of attack and obstruction which the enemy had it in their power to employ. Nothing is so unaccountable in this expedition as the manner in which such means were thrown away,—the spectacle of Persian impotence. First, the whole line of upward march, including the passage of the Euphrates, left undefended; next, the long trench dug across the frontier of Babylonia, with only a passage of twenty feet wide left near the Euphrates, abandoned without a guard; lastly, the line of the Wall of Media and the canals which offered such favorable positions for keeping the Greeks out of the cultivated territory of Babylonia, neglected in like manner, and a convention concluded, whereby the Persians engaged to escort the invaders safe to the Ionian coast, beginning by conducting them through the heart of Babylonia, amidst canals affording inexpugnable defences if the Greeks had chosen to take up a position among them. The plan of Tissaphernes, as far as we can understand it, seems to have been, to draw the Greeks to some considerable distance from the heart of the Persian empire, and then to open his schemes of treasonable hostility, which the imprudence of Klearchus enabled him to do, on the banks of the Great Zab, with chances of success such as he could hardly have contemplated. We have here a fresh example of the wonderful impotence of the Persians. We should have expected that, after having committed so flagrant an act of perfidy, Tissaphernes would at least have tried to turn it to account; that he would have poured, with all his forces and all his vigor, on the Grecian camp, at the moment when it was unprepared, disorganized, and without commanders. Instead of which, when the generals (with those who accompanied them to the Persian camp) had been seized or slain, no attack whatever was made except by small detachments of Persian cavalry upon individual Greek stragglers in the plain. One of the companions of the generals, an Arcadian named Nikarchus, ran wounded into the Grecian camp, where the soldiers were looking from afar at the horsemen scouring the plain without knowing what they were about,—exclaiming that the Persians were massacring all the Greeks, officers as well as soldiers. Immediately the Greek soldiers hastened to put themselves in defence, expecting a general attack to be made upon their camp; but no more Persians came near than a body of about three hundred horse, under Ariæus and Mithridates (the confidential companions of the deceased Cyrus), accompanied by the brother of Tissaphernes. These men, approaching the Greek lines as friends, called for the Greek officers to come forth, as they had a message to deliver from the king. Accordingly, Kleanor and Sophænetus, with an adequate guard, came to the front, accompanied by Xenophon, who was anxious to hear news about Proxenus. Ariæus then acquainted them that Klearchus, having been detected in a breach of the convention to which he had sworn, had been put to death; that Proxenus and Menon, who had divulged his treason, were in high honor at the Persian quarters. He concluded by saying,—the king calls upon you to surrender your

arms, which now (he says) belong to him, since they formerly belonged to his slave Cyrus.[137]

The step here taken seems to testify a belief on the part of these Persians, that the generals being now in their power, the Grecian soldiers had become defenceless, and might be required to surrender their arms, even to men who had just been guilty of the most deadly fraud and injury towards them. If Ariæus entertained such an expectation, he was at once undeceived by the language of Kleanor and Xenophon, who breathed nothing but indignant reproach; so that he soon retired and left the Greeks to their own reflections.

While their camp thus remained unmolested, every man within it was a prey to the most agonizing apprehensions. Ruin appeared impending and inevitable, though no one could tell in what precise form it would come. The Greeks were in the midst of a hostile country, ten thousand stadia from home, surrounded by enemies, blocked up by impassable mountains and rivers, without guides, without provisions, without cavalry to aid their retreat, without generals to give orders. A stupor of sorrow and conscious helplessness seized upon all. Few came to the evening muster; few lighted fires to cook their suppers; every man lay down to rest where he was; yet no man could sleep, for fear, anguish, and yearning after relatives whom he was never again to behold.[138]

Amidst the many causes of despondency which weighed down this forlorn army, there was none more serious than the fact, that not a single man among them had now either authority to command, or obligation to take the initiative. Nor was any ambitious candidate likely to volunteer his pretensions, at a moment when the post promised nothing but the maximum of difficulty as well as of hazard. A new, self-kindled, light—and self-originated stimulus—was required, to vivify the embers of suspended hope and action, in a mass paralyzed for the moment, but every way capable of effort. And the inspiration now fell, happily for the army, upon one in whom a full measure of soldierly strength and courage was combined with the education of an Athenian, a democrat, and a philosopher.

It is in true Homeric vein, and in something like Homeric language, that Xenophon (to whom we owe the whole narrative of the expedition) describes his dream, or the intervention of Oneirus, sent by Zeus, from which this renovating impulse took its rise.[139] Lying mournful and restless, like his comrades, he caught a short repose; when he dreamt that he heard thunder, and saw the burning thunderbolt fall upon his paternal house, which became forthwith encircled by flames. Awaking, full of terror, he instantly sprang up; upon which the dream began to fit on and blend itself with his waking thoughts, and with the cruel realities of his position. His pious and excited fancy generated a series of shadowy analogies. The dream was sent by Zeus[140] the King, since it was from him that thunder and lightning proceeded. In one respect, the sign was auspicious,—that a great light had appeared to

him from Zeus, in the midst of peril and suffering. But on the other hand, it was alarming, that the house had appeared to be completely encircled by flames, preventing all egress, because this seemed to indicate that he would remain confined where he was in the Persian dominions, without being able to overcome the difficulties which hedged him in. Yet doubtful as the promise was, it was still the message of Zeus addressed to himself, serving as a stimulus to him to break through the common stupor and take the initiative movement.[141] "Why am I lying here? Night is advancing; at daybreak the enemy will be on us, and we shall be put to death with tortures. Not a man is stirring to take measures of defence. Why do I wait for any man older than myself, or for any man of a different city, to begin?"

With these reflections, interesting in themselves and given with Homeric vivacity, he instantly went to convene the lochagi or captains who had served under his late friend Proxenus; and impressed upon them emphatically the necessity of standing forward to put the army in a posture of defence. "I cannot sleep, gentlemen; neither, I presume, can you, under our present perils. The enemy will be upon us at daybreak,—prepared to kill us all with tortures, as his worst enemies. For my part, I rejoice that his flagitious perjury has put an end to a truce by which we were the great losers; a truce under which we, mindful of our oaths, have passed through all the rich possessions of the king, without touching anything except what we could purchase with our own scanty means. Now, we have our hands free; all these rich spoils stand between us and him, as prizes for the better man. The gods, who preside over the match, will assuredly be on the side of us, who have kept our oaths in spite of strong temptations, against these perjurers. Moreover, our bodies are more enduring, and our spirits more gallant, than theirs. They are easier to wound, and easier to kill, than we are, under the same favor of the gods as we experienced at Kunaxa.

"Probably others also are feeling just as we feel. But let us not wait for any one else to come as monitors to us; let us take the lead, and communicate the stimulus of honor to others. Do you show yourselves now the best among the lochages,—more worthy of being generals than the generals themselves. Begin at once, and I desire only to follow you. But if you order me into the front rank, I shall obey without pleading my youth as an excuse,—accounting myself of complete maturity, when the purpose is to save myself from ruin."[142]

All the captains who heard Xenophon cordially concurred in his suggestion, and desired him to take the lead in executing it. One captain alone,—Apollonides, speaking in the Bœotian dialect,—protested against it as insane; enlarging upon their desperate position, and insisting upon submission to the king, as the only chance of safety. "How (replied Xenophon)? Have you forgotten the courteous treatment which we received from the Persians in Babylonia, when we replied to their demand for the surrender of our arms by showing a bold front? Do not you see the miserable fate which has befallen Klearchus, when he trusted himself unarmed in their hands, in reliance on their oaths? And yet you scout our exhortations to resistance, again advis-

ing us to go and plead for indulgence! My friends, such a Greek as this man, disgraces not only his own city, but all Greece besides. Let us banish him from our counsels, cashier him, and make a slave of him to carry baggage."—"Nay (observed Agasias of Stymphalus), the man has nothing to do with Greece; I myself have seen his ears bored, like a true Lydian." Apollonides was degraded accordingly.[143]

Xenophon with the rest then distributed themselves in order to bring together the chief remaining officers in the army, who were presently convened, to the number of about one hundred. The senior captain of the earlier body next desired Xenophon to repeat to this larger body the topics upon which he had just before been insisting. Xenophon obeyed, enlarging yet more emphatically on the situation, perilous, yet not without hope,—on the proper measures to be taken,—and especially on the necessity that they, the chief officers remaining, should put themselves forward prominently, first fix upon effective commanders, then afterwards submit the names to be confirmed by the army, accompanied with suitable exhortations and encouragement. His speech was applauded and welcomed, especially by the Lacedæmonian general Cheirisophus, who had joined Cyrus with a body of seven hundred hoplites at Issus in Kilikia. Cheirisophus urged the captains to retire forthwith, and agree upon other commanders instead of the four who had been seized; after which the herald must be summoned, and the entire body of soldiers convened without delay. Accordingly Timasion of Dardanus was chosen instead of Klearchus; Xanthiklês in place of Sokrates; Kleanor in place of Agias; Philesius in place of Menon; and Xenophon instead of Proxenus.[144] The captains, who had served under each of the departed generals, separately chose a successor to the captain thus promoted. It is to be recollected that the five now chosen were not the only generals in the camp; thus for example, Cheirisophus had the command of his own separate division, and there may have been one or two others similarly placed. But it was now necessary for all the generals to form a Board and act in concert.

At daybreak the newly constituted Board of generals placed proper outposts in advance, and then convened the army in general assembly, in order that the new appointments might be submitted and confirmed. As soon as this had been done, probably on the proposition of Cheirisophus (who had been in command before), that general addressed a few words of exhortation and encouragement to the soldiers. He was followed by Kleanor, who delivered, with the like brevity, an earnest protest against the perfidy of Tissaphernes and Ariæus. Both of them left to Xenophon the task, alike important and arduous at this moment of despondency, of setting forth the case at length,—working up the feelings of the soldiers to that pitch of resolution which the emergency required,—and above all, extinguishing all those inclinations to acquiesce in new treacherous proposals from the enemy, which the perils of the situation would be likely to suggest.

Xenophon had equipped himself in his finest military costume at this his first official appearance before the army, when the scales seemed to tremble between life

and death. Taking up the protest of Kleanor against the treachery of the Persians, he insisted that any attempt to enter into convention or trust with such liars, would be utter ruin,—but that if energetic resolution were taken to deal with them only at the point of the sword, and punish their misdeeds, there was good hope of the favor of the gods and of ultimate preservation. As he pronounced this last word, one of the soldiers near him happened to sneeze. Immediately the whole army around shouted with one accord the accustomed invocation to Zeus the Preserver; and Xenophon, taking up the accident, continued,—"Since, gentlemen, this omen from Zeus the Preserver has appeared at the instant when we were talking about preservation, let us here vow to offer the preserving sacrifice to that god, and at the same time to sacrifice to the remaining gods as well as we can, in the first friendly country which we may reach. Let every man who agrees with me, hold up his hand." All held up their hands; all then joined in the vow, and shouted the pæan.

This accident, so dexterously turned to profit by the rhetorical skill of Xenophon, was eminently beneficial in raising the army out of the depression which weighed them down, and in disposing them to listen to his animating appeal. Repeating his assurances that the gods were on their side, and hostile to their perjured enemy, he recalled to their memory the great invasions of Greece by Darius and Xerxes,—how the vast hosts of Persia had been disgracefully repelled. The army had shown themselves on the field of Kunaxa worthy of such forefathers; and they would for the future be yet bolder, knowing by that battle of what stuff the Persians were made. As for Ariæus and his troops, alike traitors and cowards, their desertion was rather a gain than a loss. The enemy were superior in horsemen; but men on horseback were, after all, only men, half-occupied in the fear of losing their seats,—incapable of prevailing against infantry firm on the ground,—and only better able to run away. Now that the satrap refused to furnish them with provisions to buy, they on their side were released from their covenant, and would take provisions without buying. Then as to the rivers; those were indeed difficult to be crossed in the middle of their course; but the army would march up to their sources, and could then pass them without wetting the knee. Or indeed, the Greeks might renounce the idea of retreat, and establish themselves permanently in the king's own country, defying all his force, like the Mysians and Pisidians. "If (said Xenophon) we plant ourselves here at our ease in a rich country, with these tall, stately, and beautiful Median and Persian women for our companions,[145]—we shall be only too ready, like the Lotophagi, to forget our way home. We ought first to go back to Greece, and tell our countrymen that if they remain poor, it is their own fault, when there are rich settlements in this country awaiting all who choose to come, and who have courage to seize them. Let us burn our baggage-waggons and tents, and carry with us nothing but what is of the strictest necessity. Above all things, let us maintain order, discipline, and obedience to the commanders, upon which our entire hope of safety depends. Let every man promise to lend his hand to the commanders in punishing any disobedient individuals; and let us thus show the enemy that we have ten thousand persons like

Klearchus, instead of that one whom they have so perfidiously seized. Now is the time for action. If any man, however obscure, has anything better to suggest, let him come forward and state it; for we have all but one object,—the common safety."

It appears that no one else desired to say a word, and that the speech of Xenophon gave unqualified satisfaction; for when Cheirisophus put the question, that the meeting should sanction his recommendations, and finally elect the new generals proposed,—every man held up his hand. Xenophon then moved that the army should break up immediately, and march to some well-stored villages, rather more than two miles distant; that the march should be in a hollow oblong, with the baggage in the centre; that Cheirisophus, as a Lacedæmonian, should lead the van; while Kleanor, and the other senior officers, would command on each flank,—and himself with Timasion, as the two youngest of the generals, would lead the rear-guard.

This proposition was at once adopted, and the assembly broke up, proceeding forthwith to destroy, or distribute among one another, every man's superfluous baggage,—and then to take their morning meal previous to the march.

The scene just described is interesting and illustrative in more than one point of view.[146] It exhibits that susceptibility to the influence of persuasive discourse which formed so marked a feature in the Grecian character,—a resurrection of the collective body out of the depth of despair, under the exhortation of one who had no established ascendency, nor anything to recommend him, except his intelligence, his oratorical power, and his community of interest with themselves. Next, it manifests, still more strikingly, the superiority of Athenian training as compared with that of other parts of Greece. Cheirisophus had not only been before in office as one of the generals, but was also a native of Sparta, whose supremacy and name was at that moment all-powerful. Kleanor had been before, not indeed a general, but a lochage, or one in the second rank of officers;—he was an elderly man,—and he was an Arcadian, while more than the numerical half of the army consisted of Arcadians and Achæans. Either of these two, therefore, and various others besides, enjoyed a sort of prerogative, or established starting-point, for taking the initiative in reference to the dispirited army. But Xenophon was comparatively a young man, with little military experience;—he was not an officer at all, either in the first or second grade, but simply a volunteer, companion of Proxenus;—he was, moreover, a native of Athens, a city at that time unpopular among the great body of Greeks, and especially of Peloponnesians, with whom her recent long war had been carried on. Not only, therefore, he had no advantages compared with others, but he was under positive disadvantages. He had nothing to start with except his personal qualities and previous training; in spite of which we find him not merely the prime mover, but also the ascendent person for whom the others make way. In him are exemplified those peculiarities of Athens, attested not less by the denunciation of her enemies than by the panegyric of her own citizens,[147]—spontaneous and forward impulse, as well in conception as in execution,—confidence under circumstances which made others despair,—

persuasive discourse and publicity of discussion, made subservient to practical business, so as at once to appeal to the intelligence, and stimulate the active zeal, of the multitude. Such peculiarities stood out more remarkably from being contrasted with the opposite qualities in Spartans,—mistrust in conception, slackness in execution, secrecy in counsel, silent and passive obedience. Though Spartans and Athenians formed the two extremities of the scale, other Greeks stood nearer on this point to the former than to the latter.

If, even in that encouraging autumn which followed immediately upon the great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, the inertia of Sparta could not be stirred into vigorous action without the vehemence of the Athenian Alkibiades,—much more was it necessary under the depressing circumstances which now overclouded the unofficered Grecian army, that an Athenian bosom should be found as the source of new life and impulse. Nor would any one, probably, except an Athenian, either have felt or obeyed the promptings to stand forward as a volunteer at that moment, when there was every motive to decline responsibility, and no special duty to impel him. But if by chance, a Spartan or an Arcadian had been found thus forward, he would have been destitute of such talents as would enable him to work on the minds of others[148]—of that flexibility, resource, familiarity with the temper and movements of an assembled crowd, power of enforcing the essential views and touching the opportune chords, which Athenian democratical training imparted. Even Brasidas and Gylippus, individual Spartans of splendid merit, and equal or superior to Xenophon in military resource, would not have combined with it that political and rhetorical accomplishment which the position of the latter demanded. Obvious as the wisdom of his propositions appears, each of them is left to him not only to imitate, but to enforce;—Cheirisophus and Kleanor, after a few words of introduction, consign to him the duty of working up the minds of the army to the proper pitch. How well he performed this, may be seen by his speech to the army, which bears in its general tenor a remarkable resemblance to that of Perikles addressed to the Athenian public in the second year of the war, at the moment when the miseries of the epidemic, combined with those of invasion, had driven them almost to despair. It breathes a strain of exaggerated confidence, and an undervaluing of real dangers, highly suitable for the occasion, but which neither Perikles nor Xenophon would have employed at any other moment.[149] Throughout the whole of his speech, and especially in regard to the accidental sneeze near at hand which interrupted the beginning of it, Xenophon displayed that skill and practice in dealing with a numerous audience and a given situation, which characterized more or less every educated Athenian. Other Greeks, Lacedæmonians or Arcadians, could act, with bravery and in concert; but the Athenian Xenophon was among the few who could think, speak, and act, with equal efficiency.[150] It was this tripartite accomplishment which an aspiring youth was compelled to set before himself as an aim, in the democracy of Athens, and which the sophists as well as the democratical institutions, both of them so hardly depreciated, helped and encouraged him to acquire. It was this tripartite accomplishment, the ex-

clusive possession of which, in spite of constant jealousy on the part of Bœotian officers and comrades of Proxenus,[151] elevated Xenophon into the most ascendent person of the Cyreian army, from the present moment until the time when it broke up,—as will be seen in the subsequent history.

I think it the more necessary to notice this fact,—that the accomplishments whereby Xenophon leaped on a sudden into such extraordinary ascendency, and rendered such eminent service to his army, were accomplishments belonging in an especial manner to the Athenian democracy and education,—because Xenophon himself has throughout his writings treated Athens not merely without the attachment of a citizen, but with feelings more like the positive antipathy of an exile. His sympathies are all in favor of the perpetual drill, the mechanical obedience, the secret government proceedings, the narrow and prescribed range of ideas, the silent and deferential demeanor, the methodical, though tardy, action—of Sparta. Whatever may be the justice of his preference, certain it is, that the qualities whereby he was himself enabled to contribute so much both to the rescue of the Cyreian army, and to his own reputation,—were Athenian far more than Spartan.

While the Grecian army, after sanctioning the propositions of Xenophon, were taking their morning meal before they commenced their march, Mithridates, one of the Persians previously attached to Cyrus, appeared with a few horsemen on a mission of pretended friendship. But it was soon found out that his purposes were treacherous, and that he came merely to seduce individual soldiers to desertion,—with a few of whom he succeeded. Accordingly, the resolution was taken to admit no more heralds or envoys.

Disembarrassed of superfluous baggage, and refreshed, the army now crossed the Great Zab River, and pursued their march on the other side, having their baggage and attendants in the centre, and Cheirisophus leading the van, with a select body of three hundred hoplites.[152] As no mention is made of a bridge, we are to presume that they forded the river,—which furnishes a ford (according to Mr. Ainsworth), still commonly used, at a place between thirty and forty miles from its junction with the Tigris. When they had got a little way forward, Mithridates again appeared with a few hundred cavalry and bowmen. He approached them like a friend; but as soon as he was near enough, suddenly began to harass the rear with a shower of missiles. What surprises us most, is, that the Persians, with their very numerous force, made no attempt to hinder them from crossing so very considerable a river; for Xenophon estimates the Zab at four hundred feet broad,—and this seems below the statement of modern travellers, who inform us that it contains not much less water than the Tigris; and though usually deeper and narrower, cannot be much narrower at any fordable place.[153] It is to be recollected that the Persians, habitually marching in advance of the Greeks, must have reached the river first, and were, therefore, in possession of the crossing, whether bridge or ford. Though on the watch for every opportunity of perfidy, Tissaphernes did not dare to resist the Greeks

even in the most advantageous position, and ventured only upon sending Mithridates to harass the rear; which he executed with considerable effect. The bowmen and darters of the Greeks, few in number, were at the same time inferior to those of the Persians; and when Xenophon employed his rear guard, hoplites and peltasts, to charge and repel them, he not only could never overtake any one, but suffered much in getting back to rejoin his own main body. Even when retiring, the Persian horseman could discharge his arrow or cast his javelin behind him with effect; a dexterity which the Parthians exhibited afterwards still more signally, and which the Persian horsemen of the present day parallel with their carbines. This was the first experience which the Greeks had of marching under the harassing attack of cavalry. Even the small detachment of Mithridates greatly delayed their progress; so that they accomplished little more than two miles, reaching the villages in the evening, with many wounded, and much discouragement.[154]

"Thank Heaven," (said Xenophon in the evening, when Cheirisophus reproached him for imprudence in quitting the main body to charge cavalry, whom yet he could not reach.) "Thank Heaven, that our enemies attacked us with a small detachment only, and not with their great numbers. They have given us a valuable lesson, without doing us any serious harm." Profiting by the lesson, the Greek leaders organized during the night and during the halt of the next day, a small body of fifty cavalry; with two hundred Rhodian slingers, whose slings, furnished with leaden bullets, both carried farther and struck harder than those of the Persians hurling large stones. On the ensuing morning, they started before daybreak, since there lay in their way a ravine difficult to pass. They found the ravine undefended (according to the usual stupidity of Persian proceedings), but when they had got nearly a mile beyond it, Mithridates reappeared in pursuit with a body of four thousand horsemen and darters. Confident from his achievement of the preceding day, he had promised, with a body of that force, to deliver the Greeks into the hands of the satrap. But the latter were now better prepared. As soon as he began to attack them, the trumpet sounded,—and forthwith the horsemen, slingers, and darters, issued forth to charge the Persians, sustained by the hoplites in the rear. So effective was the charge, that the Persians fled in dismay, notwithstanding their superiority in number; while the ravine so impeded their flight that many of them were slain, and eighteen prisoners made. The Greek soldiers of their own accord mutilated the dead bodies, in order to strike terror into the enemy.[155] At the end of the day's march they reached the Tigris, near the deserted city of Larissa, the vast, massive, and lofty brick walls of which (twenty-five feet in thickness, one hundred feet high, seven miles in circumference) attested its former grandeur. Near this place was a stone pyramid, one hundred feet in breadth, and two hundred feet high; the summit of which was crowded with fugitives out of the neighboring villages. Another day's march up the course of the Tigris brought the army to a second deserted city called Mespila, nearly opposite to the modern city of Mosul. Although these two cities, which seem to have formed the continuation or the substitute of the once colossal Nineveh or Ninus, were com-

pletely deserted,—yet the country around them was so well furnished with villages and population, that the Greeks not only obtained provisions, but also strings for the making of new bows, and lead for bullets to be used for the slingers.[156]

During the next day's march, in a course generally parallel with the Tigris, and ascending the stream, Tissaphernes, coming up along with some other grandees, and with a numerous army, enveloped the Greeks both in flanks and rear. In spite of his advantage of numbers, he did not venture upon any actual charge, but kept up a fire of arrows, darts, and stones. He was, however, so well answered by the newly-trained archers and slingers of the Greeks, that on the whole they had the advantage, in spite of the superior size of the Persian bows, many of which were taken and effectively employed on the Grecian side. Having passed the night in a well-stocked village, they halted there the next day in order to stock themselves with provisions, and then pursued their march for four successive days along a level country, until, on the fifth day, they reached hilly ground with the prospect of still higher hills beyond. All this march was made under unremitting annoyance from the enemy, insomuch that though the order of the Greeks was never broken, a considerable number of their men were wounded. Experience taught them, that it was inconvenient for the whole army to march in one inflexible, undivided, hollow square; and they accordingly constituted six lochi or regiments of one hundred men each, subdivided into companies of fifty, and enômoties or smaller companies of twenty-five, each with a special officer (conformably to the Spartan practice) to move separately on each flank, and either to fall back, or fall in, as might suit the fluctuations of the central mass, arising from impediments in the road or menaces of the enemy.[157] On reaching the hills, in sight of an elevated citadel or palace, with several villages around it, the Greeks anticipated some remission of the Persian attack. But after having passed over one hill, they were proceeding to ascend the second, when they found themselves assailed with unwonted vigor by the Persian cavalry from the summit of it, whose leaders were seen flogging on the men to the attack.[158] This charge was so efficacious, that the Greek light troops were driven in with loss, and forced to take shelter within the ranks of the hoplites. After a march both slow and full of suffering, they could only reach their night-quarters by sending a detachment to get possession of some ground above the Persians, who thus became afraid of a double attack.

The villages which they now reached (supposed by Mr. Ainsworth to have been in the fertile country under the modern town called Zakhu),[159] were unusually rich in provisions; magazines of flour, barley, and wine, having been collected there for the Persian satrap. They reposed here three days, chiefly in order to tend the numerous wounded, for whose necessities, eight of the most competent persons were singled out to act as surgeons. On the fourth day they resumed their march, descending into the plain. But experience had now satisfied them that it was imprudent to continue in march under the attack of cavalry, so that when Tissaphernes appeared and began to harass them, they halted at the first village, and when thus in station, easily re-

pelled him. As the afternoon advanced, the Persian assailants began to retire; for they were always in the habit of taking up their night-post at a distance of near seven miles from the Grecian position; being very apprehensive of nocturnal attack in their camp, when their horses were tied by the leg and without either saddle or bridle.[160] As soon as they had departed, the Greeks resumed their march, and made so much advance during the night, that the Persians did not overtake them either on the next day or the day after.

On the ensuing day, however, the Persians, having made a forced march by night, were seen not only in advance of the Greeks, but in occupation of a spur of high and precipitous ground overhanging immediately the road whereby the Greeks were to descend into the plain. When Cheirisophus approached, he at once saw that descent was impracticable in the face of an enemy thus posted. He therefore halted, sent for Xenophon from the rear, and desired him to bring forward the peltasts to the van. But Xenophon, though he obeyed the summons in person and galloped his horse to the front, did not think it prudent to move the peltasts from the rear, because he saw Tissaphernes, with another portion of the army, just coming up; so that the Grecian army was at once impeded in front, and threatened by the enemy closing upon them behind. The Persians on the high ground in front could not be directly assailed. But Xenophon observed, that on the right of the Grecian army, there was an accessible mountain-summit yet higher, from whence a descent might be made for a flank attack upon the Persian position. Pointing out this summit to Cheirisophus, as affording the only means of dislodging the troops in front, he urged that one of them should immediately hasten with a detachment to take possession of it, and offered to Cheirisophus the choice either of going, or staying with the army. "Choose yourself," said Cheirisophus. "Well, then, (said Xenophon), I will go; since I am the younger of the two." Accordingly, at the head of a select detachment from the van and centre of the army, he immediately commenced his flank march up the steep ascent to this highest summit. So soon as the enemy saw their purpose, they also detached troops on their side, hoping to get to the summit first; and the two detachments were seen mounting at the same time, each struggling with the utmost efforts to get before the other,—each being encouraged by shouts and clamor from the two armies respectively.

As Xenophon was riding by the side of his soldiers, cheering them on and reminding them that their chance of seeing their country and their families all depended upon success in the effort before them, a Sikyonian hoplite in the ranks, named Sotêridas, said to him,—"You and I are not on an equal footing, Xenophon. You are on horseback; I am painfully struggling up on foot, with my shield to carry." Stung with this taunt, Xenophon sprang from his horse, pushed Sotêridas out of his place in the ranks, took his shield as well as his place, and began to march forward afoot along with the rest. Though thus weighed down at once by the shield belonging to an hoplite, and by the heavy cuirass of a horseman (who carried no shield), he nev-

ertheless put forth all his strength to advance, under such double incumbrance, and to continue his incitement to the rest. But the soldiers around him were so indignant at the proceeding of Sotêridas, that they reproached and even struck him, until they compelled him to resume his shield as well as his place in the ranks. Xenophon then remounted and ascended the hill on horseback as far as the ground permitted; but was obliged again to dismount presently, in consequence of the steepness of the uppermost portion. Such energetic efforts enabled him and his detachment to reach the summit first. As soon as the enemy saw this, they desisted from their ascent, and dispersed in all directions; leaving the forward march open to the main Grecian army, which Cheirisophus accordingly conducted safely down into the plain. Here he was rejoined by Xenophon on descending from the summit. All found themselves in comfortable quarters, amidst several well-stocked villages on the banks of the Tigris. They acquired moreover an additional booty of large droves of cattle, intercepted when on the point of being transported across the river; where a considerable body of horse were seen assembled on the opposite bank.[161]

Though here disturbed only by some desultory attacks on the part of the Persians, who burnt several of the villages which lay in their forward line of march, the Greeks became seriously embarrassed whither to direct their steps; for on their left flank was the Tigris, so deep that their spears found no bottom,—and on their right, mountains of exceeding height. As the generals and the lochages were taking counsel, a Rhodian soldier came to them with a proposition for transporting the whole army across to the other bank of the river by means of inflated skins, which could be furnished in abundance by the animals in their possession. But this ingenious scheme, in itself feasible, was put out of the question by the view of the Persian cavalry on the opposite bank; and as the villages in their front had been burnt, the army had no choice except to return back one day's march to those in which they had before halted. Here the generals again deliberated, questioning all their prisoners as to the different bearings of the country. The road from the south was that in which they had already marched from Babylon and Media; that to the westward, going to Lydia and Ionia, was barred to them by the interposing Tigris; eastward (they were informed) was the way to Ekbatana and Susa; northward, lay the rugged and inhospitable mountains of the Karduchians,—fierce freemen who despised the Great King, and defied all his efforts to conquer them; having once destroyed a Persian invading army of one hundred and twenty thousand men. On the other side of Karduchia, however, lay the rich Persian satrapy of Armenia, wherein both the Euphrates and the Tigris could be crossed near their sources, and from whence could choose their farther course easily towards Greece. Like Mysia, Pisidia, and other mountainous regions, Karduchia was a free territory surrounded on all sides by the dominions of the Great King, who reigned only in the cities and on the plains.[162]

Determining to fight their way across these difficult mountains into Armenia, but refraining from any public announcement, for fear that the passes should be occu-

pied beforehand,—the generals sacrificed forthwith, in order that they might be ready for breaking up at a moment's notice. They then began their march a little after midnight, so that soon after daybreak they reached the first of the Karduchian mountain-passes, which they found undefended. Cheirisophus, with his front division and all the light troops, made haste to ascend the pass, and having got over the first mountain, descended on the other side to some villages in the valley or nooks beneath; while Xenophon with the heavy-armed and the baggage, followed at a slower pace,—not reaching the villages until dark, as the road was both steep and narrow. The Karduchians, taken completely by surprise, abandoned the villages as the Greeks approached, and took refuge on the mountains; leaving to the intruders plenty of provisions, comfortable houses, and especially, abundance of copper vessels. At first the Greeks were careful to do no damage, trying to invite the natives to amicable colloquy. But none of the latter would come near, and at length necessity drove the Greeks to take what was necessary for refreshment. It was just when Xenophon and the rear guard were coming in at night, that some few Karduchians first set upon them; by surprise and with considerable success,—so that if their numbers had been greater, serious mischief might have ensued.[163]

Many fires were discovered burning on the mountains,—an earnest of resistance during the next day; which satisfied the Greek generals that they must lighten the army, in order to ensure greater expedition as well as a fuller complement of available hands during the coming march. They therefore gave orders to burn all the baggage except what was indispensable, and to dismiss all the prisoners; planting themselves in a narrow strait, through which the army had to pass, in order to see that their directions were executed. The women, however, of whom there were many with the army, could not be abandoned; and it seems farther that a considerable stock of baggage was still retained;[164] nor could the army make more than slow advance, from the narrowness of the road and the harassing attack of the Karduchians, who were now assembled in considerable numbers. Their attack was renewed with double vigor on the ensuing day, when the Greeks were forced, from want of provisions, to hasten forward their march, though in the midst of a terrible snow-storm. Both Cheirisophus in the front and Xenophon in the rear, were hard pressed by the Karduchian slingers and bowmen; the latter, men of consummate skill, having bows three cubits in length, and arrows of more than two cubits, so strong that the Greeks when they took them could dart them as javelins. These archers, amidst the rugged ground and narrow paths, approached so near and drew the bow with such surprising force, resting one extremity of it on the ground, that several Greek warriors were mortally wounded even through both shield and corslet into the reins, and through the brazen helmet into their heads; among them especially, two distinguished men, a Lacedæmonian named Kleonymus, and an Arcadian named Basias.[165] The rear division, more roughly handled than the rest, was obliged continually to halt to repel the enemy, under all the difficulties of the ground, which made it scarcely possible to act against nimble mountaineers. On one occasion, however, a body of these latter were

entrapped into an ambush, driven back with loss, and (what was still more fortunate) two of their number were made prisoners.

Thus impeded, Xenophon sent frequent messages entreating Cheirisophus to slacken the march of the van division; but instead of obeying, Cheirisophus only hastened the faster, urging Xenophon to follow him. The march of the army became little better than a rout, so that the rear division reached the halting-place in extreme confusion; upon which Xenophon proceeded to remonstrate with Cheirisophus for prematurely hurrying forward and neglecting his comrades behind. But the other,—pointing out to his attention the hill before them, and the steep path ascending it, forming their future line of march, which was beset with numerous Karduchians,—defended himself by saying that he had hastened forward in hopes of being able to reach this pass before the enemy, in which attempt however he had not succeeded. [166]

To advance farther on this road appeared hopeless; yet the guides declared that no other could be taken. Xenophon then bethought him of the two prisoners whom he had just captured, and proposed that these two should be questioned also. They were accordingly interrogated apart; and the first of them,—having persisted in denying, notwithstanding all menaces, that there was any road except that before them,—was put to death under the eyes of the second prisoner. This latter, on being then questioned, gave more comfortable intelligence; saying that he knew of a different road, more circuitous, but easier and practicable even for beasts of burden, whereby the pass before them and the occupying enemy might be turned; but that there was one particular high position commanding the road, which it was necessary to master beforehand by surprise, as the Karduchians were already on guard there. Two thousand Greeks, having the guide bound along with them, were accordingly despatched late in the afternoon, to surprise this post by a night-march; while Xenophon, in order to distract the attention of the Karduchians in front, made a feint of advancing as if about to force the direct pass. As soon as he was seen crossing the ravine which led to this mountain, the Karduchians on the top immediately began to roll down vast masses of rock, which bounded and dashed down the roadway, in such manner as to render it unapproachable. They continued to do this all night, and the Greeks heard the noise of the descending masses long after they had returned to their camp for supper and rest.[167]

Meanwhile the detachment of two thousand, marching by the circuitous road, and reaching in the night the elevated position, (though there was another above yet more commanding), held by the Karduchians, surprised and dispersed them, passing the night by their fires. At daybreak, and under favor of a mist, they stole silently towards the position occupied by the other Karduchians in front of the main Grecian army. On coming near they suddenly sounded their trumpets, shouted aloud, and commenced the attack, which proved completely successful. The defenders, taken unprepared, fled with little resistance, and scarcely any loss, from their activity and

knowledge of the country; while Cheirisophus and the main Grecian force, on hearing the trumpet which had been previously concerted as the signal, rushed forward and stormed the height in front; some along the regular path, others climbing up as they could and pulling each other up by means of their spears. The two bodies of Greeks thus joined each other on the summit, so that the road became open for farther advance.

Xenophon, however, with the rear guard, marched on the circuitous road taken by the two thousand, as the most practicable for the baggage animals, whom he placed in the centre of his division,—the whole array covering a great length of ground, since the road was very narrow. During this interval, the dispersed Karduchians had rallied, and reoccupied two or three high peaks, commanding the road,—from whence it was necessary to drive them. Xenophon's troops stormed successively these three positions, the Karduchians not daring to affront close combat, yet making destructive use of their missiles. A Grecian guard was left on the hindermost of the three peaks, until all the baggage train should have passed by. But the Karduchians, by a sudden and well-timed movement, contrived to surprise this guard, slew two out of the three leaders, with several soldiers, and forced the rest to jump down the crags as they could, in order to join their comrades in the road. Encouraged by such success, the assailants pressed nearer to the marching army, occupying a crag over against that lofty summit on which Xenophon was posted. As it was within speaking distance, he endeavored to open a negotiation with them in order to get back the dead bodies of the slain. To this demand the Karduchians at first acceded, on condition that their villages should not be burnt; but finding their numbers every moment increasing, they resumed the offensive. When Xenophon with the army had begun his descent from the last summit, they hurried onward in crowds to occupy it; beginning again to roll down masses of rock, and renew their fire of missiles, upon the Greeks. Xenophon himself was here in some danger, having been deserted by his shield-bearer; but he was rescued by an Arcadian hoplite named Eurylochus, who ran to give him the benefit of his own shield as a protection for both in the retreat. [168]

After a march thus painful and perilous, the rear division at length found themselves in safety among their comrades in villages with well-stocked houses and abundance of corn and wine. So eager, however, were Xenophon and Cheirisophus to obtain the bodies of the slain for burial, that they consented to purchase them by surrendering the guide, and to march onward without any guide;—a heavy sacrifice in this unknown country, attesting their great anxiety about the burial.[169]

For three more days did they struggle and fight their way through the narrow and rugged paths of the Karduchian mountains, beset throughout by these formidable bowmen and slingers; whom they had to dislodge at every difficult turn, and against whom their own Kretan bowmen were found inferior, indeed, but still highly useful. Their seven days' march through this country, with its free and warlike inhabitants,

were days of the utmost fatigue, suffering and peril; far more intolerable than anything which they had experienced from Tissaphernes and the Persians. Right glad were they once more to see a plain, and to find themselves near the banks of the river Kentritês, which divided these mountains from the hillocks and plains of Armenia,—enjoying comfortable quarters in villages, with the satisfaction of talking over past miseries.[170]

Such were the apprehensions of Karduchian invasion, that the Armenian side of the Kentritês, for a breadth of fifteen miles, was unpeopled and destitute of villages.[171] But the approach of the Greeks having become known to Tiribazus, satrap of Armenia, the banks of the river were lined with his cavalry and infantry to oppose their passage; a precaution, which if Tissaphernes had taken at the Great Zab at the moment when he perfidiously seized Klearchus and his colleagues, the Greeks would hardly have reached the northern bank of that river. In the face of such obstacles, the Greeks, nevertheless, attempted the passage of the Kentritês, seeing a regular road on the other side. But the river was two hundred feet in breadth (only half the breadth of the Zab), above their breasts in depth, extremely rapid, and with a bottom full of slippery stones; insomuch that they could not hold their shields in the proper position, from the force of the stream, while if they lifted the shields above their heads, they were exposed defenceless to the arrows of the satrap's troops. After various trials, the passage was found impracticable, and they were obliged to resume their encampment on the left bank. To their great alarm they saw the Karduchians assembling on the hills in their rear, so that their situation, during this day and night, appeared nearly desperate. In the night, Xenophon had a dream,—the first, which he has told us, since his dream on the terrific night after the seizure of the generals,—but on this occasion, of augury more unequivocally good. He dreamed that he was bound in chains, but that his chains on a sudden dropped off spontaneously; on the faith of which, he told Cheirisophus at daybreak that he had good hopes of preservation; and when the generals offered sacrifice, the victims were at once favorable. As the army were taking their morning meal, two young Greeks ran to Xenophon with the auspicious news that they had accidentally found another ford near half a mile up the river, where the water was not even up to their middle, and where the rocks came so close on the right bank that the enemy's horse could offer no opposition. Xenophon, starting from his meal in delight, immediately offered libations to those gods who had revealed both the dream to himself in the night, and the unexpected ford afterwards to these youths; two revelations which he ascribed to the same gods.[172]

Presently they marched in their usual order, Cheirisophus commanding the van and Xenophon the rear, along the river to the newly-discovered ford; the enemy marching parallel with them on the opposite bank. Having reached the ford, halted, and grounded arms, Cheirisophus placed a wreath on his head, took it off again, and then resumed his arms, ordering all the rest to follow his example.[173] Each lochus

(company of one hundred men) was then arranged in column or single file, with Cheirisophus himself in the centre. Meanwhile the prophets were offering sacrifice to the river. So soon as the signs were pronounced to be favorable, all the soldiers shouted the pæan, and all the women joined in chorus with their feminine yell. Cheirisophus then at the head of the army, entered the river and began to ford it; while Xenophon, with a large portion of the rear division, made a feint of hastening back to the original ford, as if he were about to attempt the passage there. This distracted the attention of the enemy's horse; who became afraid of being attacked on both sides, galloped off to guard the passage at the other point, and opposed no serious resistance to Cheirisophus. As soon as the latter had reached the other side, and put his division into order, he marched up to attack the Armenian infantry, who were on the high banks a little way above; but this infantry, deserted by its cavalry, dispersed without awaiting his approach. The handful of Grecian cavalry, attached to the division of Cheirisophus, pursued and took some valuable spoils.[174]

As soon as Xenophon saw his colleague successfully established on the opposite bank, he brought back his detachment to the ford over which the baggage and attendants were still passing, and proceeded to take precautions against the Karduchians on his own side, who were assembling in the rear. He found some difficulty in keeping his rear division together, for many of them, in spite of orders, quitted their ranks, and went to look after their mistresses or their baggage in the crossing of the water.[175] The peltasts and bowmen, who had gone over with Cheirisophus, but whom that general now no longer needed, were directed to hold themselves prepared on both flanks of the army crossing, and to advance a little way into the water, in the attitude of men just about to recross. When Xenophon was left with only the diminished rear-guard, the rest having got over,—the Karduchians rushed upon him, and began to shoot and sling. But on a sudden, the Grecian hoplites charged with their accustomed pæan, upon which the Karduchians took to flight,—having no arms for close combat on the plain. The trumpet now being heard to sound, they ran away so much the faster; while this was the signal, according to orders before given by Xenophon, for the Greeks to suspend their charge, to turn back, and to cross the river as speedily as possible. By favor of this able manœuvre, the passage was accomplished by the whole army, with little or no loss, about mid-day.[176]

They now found themselves in Armenia; a country of even, undulating surface, but very high above the level of the sea, and extremely cold at the season when they entered it,—December. Though the strip of land bordering on Karduchia furnished no supplies, one long march brought them to a village, containing abundance of provisions, together with a residence of the satrap Tiribazus; after which, in two farther marches, they reached the river Teleboas, with many villages on its banks. Here Tiribazus himself, appearing with a division of cavalry, sent forward his interpreter to request a conference with the leaders; which being held, it was agreed that the Greeks should proceed unmolested through his territory, taking such supplies as they

required,—but should neither burn nor damage the villages. They accordingly advanced onward for three days, computed at fifteen parasangs, or three pretty full days' march; without any hostility from the satrap, though he was hovering within less than two miles of them. They then found themselves amidst several villages, wherein were regal or satrapical residences, with a plentiful stock of bread, meat, wine, and all sorts of vegetables. Here, during their nightly bivouac, they were overtaken by so heavy a fall of snow, that the generals, on the next day, distributed the troops into separate quarters among the villages. No enemy appeared near, while the snow seemed to forbid any rapid surprise. Yet at night, the scouts reported that many fires were discernible, together with traces of military movements around; insomuch that the generals thought it prudent to put themselves on their guard, and again collected the army into one bivouac. Here, in the night, they were overwhelmed by a second fall of snow, still heavier than the preceding; sufficient to cover over the sleeping men and their arms, and to benumb the cattle. The men, however, lay warm under the snow and were unwilling to rise, until Xenophon himself set the example of rising, and employing himself, without his arms, in cutting wood and kindling a fire.[177] Others followed his example, and great comfort was found in rubbing themselves with pork-fat, oil of almonds, or of sesame, or turpentine. Having sent out a clever scout named Demokrates, who captured a native prisoner, they learned that Tiribazus was laying plans to intercept them in a lofty mountain-pass lying farther on in their route; upon which they immediately set forth, and by two days of forced march, surprising in their way the camp of Tiribazus, got over the difficult pass in safety. Three days of additional march brought them to the Euphrates river, [178]—that is, to the eastern branch, now called Murad. They found a ford and crossed it, without having the water higher than the navel; and they were informed that its sources were not far off.

Their four days of march, next on the other side of the Euphrates, were toilsome and distressing in the extreme; through a plain covered with deep snow (in some places six feet deep), and at times in the face of a north wind so intolerably chilling and piercing, that at length one of the prophets urged the necessity of offering sacrifices to Boreas; upon which (says Xenophon[179]) the severity of the wind abated conspicuously, to the evident consciousness of all. Many of the slaves and beasts of burden, and a few even of the soldiers, perished; some had their feet frost-bitten, others became blinded by the snow, others again were exhausted by hunger. Several of these unhappy men were unavoidably left behind; others lay down to perish, near a warm spring which had melted the snow around, from extremity of fatigue and sheer wretchedness, though the enemy were close upon the rear. It was in vain that Xenophon, who commanded the rear-guard, employed his earnest exhortations, prayers, and threats, to induce them to move forward. The sufferers, miserable and motionless, answered only by entreating him to kill them at once. So greatly was the army disorganized by wretchedness, that we hear of one case in which a soldier, ordered to carry a disabled comrade, disobeyed the order, and was about to bury him

alive.[180] Xenophon made a sally, with loud shouts and clatter of spear with shield, in which even the exhausted men joined,—against the pursuing enemy. He was fortunate enough to frighten them away, and drive them to take shelter in a neighboring wood. He then left the sufferers lying down, with assurance that relief should be sent to them on the next day,—and went forward, seeing all along the line of march the exhausted soldiers lying on the snow, without even the protection of a watch. He and his rear-guard, as well as the rest, were obliged thus to pass the night without either food or fire, distributing scouts in the best way the case admitted. Meanwhile, Cheirisophus with the van division had got into a village, which they reached so unexpectedly, that they found the women fetching water from a fountain outside the wall, and the headman of the village in his house within. This division here obtained rest and refreshment, and at daybreak some of their soldiers were sent to look after the rear. It was with delight that Xenophon saw them approach, and sent them back to bring up in their arms, into the neighboring village, those exhausted soldiers who had been left behind.[181]

Repose was now indispensable after the recent sufferings. There were several villages near at hand, and the generals, thinking it no longer dangerous to divide the army, quartered the different divisions among them according to lot. Polykrates, an Athenian, one of the captains in the division of Xenophon, requested his permission to go at once and take possession of the village assigned to him, before any of the inhabitants could escape. Accordingly, running at speed with a few of the swiftest soldiers, he came upon the village so suddenly as to seize the headman, with his newly-married daughter, and several young horses intended as a tribute for the king. This village, as well as the rest, was found to consist of houses excavated in the ground (as the Armenian villages are at the present day), spacious within, but with a narrow mouth like a well, entered by a descending ladder. A separate entrance was dug for conveniently admitting the cattle. All of them were found amply stocked with live cattle of every kind, wintered upon hay; as well as with wheat, barley, vegetables, and a sort of barley-wine or beer, in tubs, with the grains of barley on the surface. Reeds or straws, without any joint in them, were lying near, through which they sucked the liquid.[182] Xenophon did his utmost to conciliate the headman (who spoke Persian, and with whom he communicated through the Perso-Grecian interpreter of the army), promising him that not one of his relations should be maltreated, and that he should be fully remunerated if he would conduct the army safely out of the country, into that of the Chalybes which he described as being adjacent. By such treatment the headman was won over, promised his aid, and even revealed to the Greeks the subterranean cellars wherein the wine was deposited; while Xenophon, though he kept him constantly under watch, and placed his youthful son as a hostage under the care of Episthenes, yet continued to treat him with studied attention and kindness. For seven days did the fatigued soldiers remain in these comfortable quarters, refreshing themselves and regaining strength. They were waited upon by the native youths, with whom they communicated by means of

signs. The uncommon happiness which all of them enjoyed after their recent sufferings, stands depicted in the lively details given by Xenophon; who left here his own exhausted horse, and took young horses in exchange, for himself and the other officers.[183]

After this week of repose, the army resumed its march through the snow. The headman, whose house they had replenished as well as they could, accompanied Cheirisophus in the van as guide, but was not put in chains or under guard; his son remained as an hostage with Episthenes, but his other relations were left unmolested at home. As they marched for three days without reaching a village, Cheirisophus began to suspect his fidelity, and even became so out of humor, though the man affirmed that there were no villages in the track, as to beat him,—yet without the precaution of putting him afterwards in fetters. The next night, accordingly, this headman made his escape; much to the displeasure of Xenophon, who severely reproached Cheirisophus, first for his harshness, and next for his neglect. This was the only point of difference between the two (says Xenophon), during the whole march; a fact very honorable to both, considering the numberless difficulties against which they had to contend. Episthenes retained the headman's youthful son, carried him home in safety, and became much attached to him.[184]

Condemned thus to march without a guide, they could do no better than march up the course of a river; and thus, from the villages which had proved so cheering and restorative, they proceeded seven days' march all through snow, up the river Phasis; a river not verifiable, but certainly not the same as is commonly known under that name by Grecian geographers; it was one hundred feet in breadth.[185] Two more days' march brought them from this river to the foot of a range of mountains; near a pass occupied by an armed body of Chalybes, Taochi, and Phasiani.

Observing the enemy in possession of this lofty ground, Cheirisophus halted until all the army came up; in order that the generals might take counsel. Here Kleanor began by advising that they should storm the pass with no greater delay than was necessary to refresh the soldiers. But Xenophon suggested that it was far better to avoid the loss of life which must thus be incurred, and to amuse the enemy by feigned attack, while a detachment should be sent by stealth, at night, to ascend the mountain at another point and turn the position. "However (continued he, turning to Cheirisophus), stealing a march upon the enemy is more your trade than mine. For I understand that you, the full citizens and peers at Sparta, practise stealing from your boyhood upward;[186] and that it is held no way base, but even honorable, to steal such things as the law does not distinctly forbid. And to the end that you may steal with the greatest effect, and take pains to do it in secret, the custom is, to flog you if you are found out. Here, then, you have an excellent opportunity for displaying your training. Take good care that we be not found out in stealing an occupation of the mountain now before us; for if we *are* found out, we shall be well beaten.

"Why, as for that (replied Cheirisophus), you Athenians, also, as I learn, are capital hands at stealing the public money, and that too in spite of prodigious peril to the thief; nay, your most powerful men steal most of all,—at least, if it be the most powerful men among you who are raised to official command. So that this is a time for *you* to exhibit *your* training as well as for me to exhibit mine."[187]

We have here an interchange of raillery between the two Grecian officers, which is not an uninteresting feature in the history of the expedition. The remark of Cheirisophus, especially illustrates that which I noted in a former chapter as true both of Sparta and Athens[188],—the readiness to take bribes, so general in individuals clothed with official power; and the readiness, in official Athenians, to commit such peculation, in spite of serious risk of punishment. Now this chance of punishment proceeded altogether from those accusing orators commonly called demagogues, and from the popular judicature whom they addressed. The joint working of both greatly abated the evil, yet was incompetent to suppress it. But according to the pictures commonly drawn of Athens, we are instructed to believe that the crying public evil was,—too great a license of accusation, and too much judicial trial. Assuredly, such was not the conception of Cheirisophus; nor shall we find it borne out by any fair appreciation of the general evidence. When the peculation of official persons was thus notorious in spite of serious risks, what would it have become if the door had been barred to accusing demagogues, and if the numerous popular dikasts had been exchanged for a few select judges of the same stamp and class as the official men themselves?

Enforcing his proposition, Xenophon now informed his colleagues that he had just captured a few guides by laying an ambush for certain native plunderers who beset the rear; and that these guides acquainted him that the mountain was not inaccessible, but pastured by goats and oxen. He farther offered himself to take command of the marching detachment. But this being overruled by Cheirisophus, some of the best among the captains, Aristonymus, Aristeas, and Nichomachus, volunteered their services and were accepted. After refreshing the soldiers, the generals marched with the main army near to the foot of the pass, and there took up their night-station, making demonstrations of a purpose to storm it the next morning. But as soon as it was dark, Aristonymus and his detachment started, and ascending the mountain at another point, obtained without resistance a high position on the flank of the enemy, who soon, however, saw them and despatched a force to keep guard on that side. At daybreak these two detachments came to a conflict on the heights, in which the Greeks were completely victorious, while Cheirisophus was marching up the pass to attack the main body. His light troops, encouraged by seeing this victory of their comrades, hastened on to the charge faster than their hoplites could follow. But the enemy was so dispirited by seeing themselves turned, that they fled with little or no resistance. Though only a few were slain, many threw away their light shields of wicker or wood-work, which became the prey of the conquerors.[189]

Thus masters of the pass, the Greeks descended to the level ground on the other side, where they found themselves in some villages well-stocked with provisions and comforts; the first in the country of the Taochi. Probably they halted here some days; for they had seen no villages, either for rest or for refreshment, during the last nine days' march, since leaving those Armenian villages in which they had passed a week so eminently restorative, and which apparently had furnished them with a stock of provisions for the onward journey. Such halt gave time to the Taochi to carry up their families and provisions into inaccessible strongholds, so that the Greeks found no supplies, during five days' march through the territory. Their provisions were completely exhausted, when they arrived before one of these strongholds, a rock on which were seen the families and the cattle of the Taochi; without houses or fortification, but nearly surrounded by a river, so as to leave only one narrow ascent, rendered unapproachable by vast rocks which the defenders hurled or rolled from the summit. By an ingenious combination of bravery and stratagem, in which some of the captains much distinguished themselves, the Greeks overcame this difficulty, and took the height. The scene which then ensued was awful. The Taochian women seized their children, flung them over the precipice, and then cast themselves headlong also, followed by the men. Almost every soul thus perished, very few surviving to become prisoners. An Arcadian captain named Æneas, seeing one of them in a fine dress about to precipitate himself with the rest, seized him with a view to prevent it. But the man in return grasped him firmly, dragged him to the edge of the rock, and leaped down to the destruction of both. Though scarcely any prisoners were taken, however, the Greeks obtained abundance of oxen, asses, and sheep, which fully supplied their wants.[190]

They now entered into the territory of the Chalybes, which they were seven days in passing through. These were the bravest warriors whom they had seen in Asia. Their equipment was a spear of fifteen cubits long, with only one end pointed,—a helmet, greaves, stuffed corselet, with a kilt or dependent flaps,—a short sword which they employed to cut off the head of a slain enemy, displaying the head in sight of their surviving enemies with triumphant dance and song. They carried no shield; perhaps because the excessive length of the spear required the constant employment of both hands,—yet they did not shrink from meeting the Greeks occasionally in regular, stand-up fight. As they had carried off all their provisions into hill-forts, the Greeks could obtain no supplies, but lived all the time upon the cattle which they had acquired from the Taochi. After seven days of march and combat,—the Chalybes perpetually attacking their rear,—they reached the river Harpasus (four hundred feet broad), where they passed into the territory of the Skythini. It rather seems that the territory of the Chalybes was mountainous; that of the Skythini was level, and containing villages, wherein they remained three days, refreshing themselves, and stocking themselves with provisions.[191]

Four days of additional march brought them to a sight, the like of which they had not seen since Opis and Sittakê on the Tigris in Babylonia,—a large and flourishing city called Gymnias; an earnest of the neighborhood of the sea, of commerce, and of civilization. The chief of this city received them in a friendly manner, and furnished them with a guide who engaged to conduct them, after five days' march, to a hill from whence they would have a view of the sea. This was by no means their nearest way to the sea, for the chief of Gymnias wished to send them through the territory of some neighbors to whom he was hostile; which territory, as soon as they reached it, the guide desired them to burn and destroy. However, the promise was kept, and on the fifth day, marching still apparently through the territory of the Skythini, they reached the summit of a mountain called Thêchê, from whence the Euxine Sea was visible.[192]

An animated shout from the soldiers who formed the van-guard testified the impressive effect of this long-deferred spectacle, assuring as it seemed to do, their safety and their return home. To Xenophon and to the rear-guard,—engaged in repelling the attack of natives who had come forward to revenge the plunder of their territory,—the shout was unintelligible. They at first imagined that the natives had commenced attack in front as well as in the rear, and that the van-guard was engaged in battle. But every moment the shout became louder, as fresh men came to the summit and gave vent to their feelings; so that Xenophon grew anxious, and galloped up to the van with his handful of cavalry to see what had happened. As he approached, the voice of the overjoyed crowd was heard distinctly crying out, *Thalatta, Thalatta* (The sea, the sea), and congratulating each other in ecstasy. The main body, the rear-guard, the baggage-soldiers driving up their horses and cattle before them, became all excited by the sound, and hurried up breathless to the summit. The whole army, officers and soldiers, were thus assembled, manifesting their joyous emotions by tears, embraces, and outpourings of enthusiastic sympathy. With spontaneous impulse they heaped up stones to decorate the spot by a monument and commemorative trophy; putting on the stones such homely offerings as their means afforded,—sticks, hides, and a few of the wicker shields just taken from the natives. To the guide, who had performed his engagement of bringing them in five days within sight of the sea, their gratitude was unbounded. They presented him with a horse, a silver bowl, a Persian costume, and ten darics in money; besides several of the soldiers' rings, which he especially asked for. Thus loaded with presents, he left them, having first shown them a village wherein they could find quarters,—as well as the road which they were to take through the territory of the Makrônes.[193]

When they reached the river which divided the land of the Makrônes from that of the Skythini, they perceived the former assembled in arms on the opposite side to resist their passage. The river not being fordable, they cut down some neighboring trees to provide the means of crossing. While these Makrônes were shouting and encouraging each other aloud, a peltast in the Grecian army came to Xenophon, saying

that he knew their language, and that he believed this to be his country. He had been a slave at Athens, exported from home during his boyhood,—he had then made his escape (probably during the Peloponnesian war, to the garrison of Dekeleia), and afterwards taken military service. By this fortunate accident, the generals were enabled to open negotiations with the Makrônes, and to assure them that the army would do them no harm, desiring nothing more than a free passage and a market to buy provisions. The Makrônes, on receiving such assurance in their own language from a countryman, exchanged pledges of friendship with the Greeks, assisted them to pass the river, and furnished the best market in their power during the three days' march across their territory.[194]

The army now reached the borders of the Kolchians, who were found in hostile array, occupying the summit of a considerable mountain which formed their frontier. Here Xenophon, having marshalled the soldiers for attack, with each lochus (company of one hundred men) in single file, instead of marching up the hill in phalanx, or continuous front with only a scanty depth,—addressed to them the following pithy encouragement,—"Now, gentlemen, these enemies before us are the only impediment that keeps us away from reaching the point at which we have been so long aiming. We must even eat them raw, if in any way we can do so."

Eighty of these formidable companies of hoplites, each in single file, now began to ascend the hill; the peltasts and bowmen being partly distributed among them, partly placed on the flanks. Cheirisophus and Xenophon, each commanding on one wing, spread their peltasts in such a way as to outflank the Kolchians, who accordingly weakened their centre in order to strengthen their wings. Hence the Arcadian peltasts and hoplites in the Greek centre were enabled to attack and disperse the centre with little resistance; and all the Kolchians presently fled, leaving the Greeks in possession of their camp, as well as of several well-stocked villages in their rear. Amidst these villages the army remained to refresh themselves for several days. It was here that they tasted the grateful, but unwholesome honey, which this region still continues to produce,—unaware of its peculiar properties. Those soldiers who ate little of it were like men greatly intoxicated with wine; those who ate much, were seized with the most violent vomiting and diarrhœa, lying down like madmen in a state of delirium. From this terrible distemper some recovered on the ensuing day, others two or three days afterwards. It does not appear that any one actually died. [195]

Two more days' march brought them to the sea, at the Greek maritime city of Trapezus or Trebizond, founded by the inhabitants of Sinôpê on the coast of the Kolchian territory. Here the Trapezuntines received them with kindness and hospitality, sending them presents of bullocks, barley-meal, and wine. Taking up their quarters in some Kolchian villages near the town, they now enjoyed, for the first time since leaving Tarsus, a safe and undisturbed repose during thirty days, and were enabled to recover in some degree from the severe hardships which they had under-

gone. While the Trapezuntines brought produce for sale into the camp, the Greeks provided the means of purchasing it by predatory incursions against the Kolchians on the hills. Those Kolchians who dwelt under the hills and on the plain were in a state of semi-dependence upon Trapezus; so that the Trapezuntines mediated on their behalf and prevailed on the Greeks to leave them unmolested, on condition of a contribution of bullocks.

These bullocks enabled the Greeks to discharge the vow which they had made, on the proposition of Xenophon, to Zeus the Preserver, during that moment of dismay and despair which succeeded immediately on the massacre of their generals by Tissaphernes. To Zeus the Preserver, to Hêraklês the Conductor, and to various other gods, they offered an abundant sacrifice on their mountain camp overhanging the sea; and after the festival ensuing, the skins of the victims were given as prizes to competitors in running, wrestling, boxing, and the pankration. The superintendence of such festival games, so fully accordant with Grecian usage and highly interesting to the army, was committed to a Spartan named Drakontius; a man whose destiny recalls that of Patroklus and other Homeric heroes,—for he had been exiled as a boy, having unintentionally killed another boy with a short sword. Various departures from Grecian custom, however, were admitted. The matches took place on the steep and stony hill-side overhanging the sea, instead of on a smooth plain; and the numerous hard falls of the competitors afforded increased interest to the bystanders. The captive non-Hellenic boys were admitted to run for the prize, since otherwise a boy-race could not have been obtained. Lastly, the animation of the scene, as well as the ardor of the competitors, was much enhanced by the number of their mistresses present.[196]

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER LXX.

ON THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND AFTER THEY QUITTED THE TIGRIS AND ENTERED THE KARDUCHIAN MOUNTAINS.

It would be injustice to this gallant and long-suffering body of men not to present the reader with a minute description of the full length of their stupendous march. Up to the moment when the Greeks enter Karduchia, the line of march may be indicated upon evidence which, though not identifying special halting-places or localities, makes us certain that we cannot be far wrong on the whole. But after that moment, the evidence gradually disappears, and we are left with nothing more than a knowledge of the terminus, the general course, and a few negative conditions.

Mr. Ainsworth has given, in his Book IV. (Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 155 seq.) an interesting topographical comment on the march through Karduchia, and on the difficulties which the Greeks would have to surmount. He has farther shown what may have been their probable line of march through Karduchia; but the most important point which he has established here, seems to be the identity of the river Kentritês with the Buhtan-Chai, an eastern affluent of the Tigris—distinguishing it from the river of Bitlis on the west and the river Khabur on the south-east, with both of which it had been previously confounded (p. 167). The Buhtan-Chai falls into the Tigris at a village called Til, and "constitutes at the present day, a natural barrier between Kurdistan and Armenia" (p. 166). In this identification of the Kentritês with the Buhtan-Chai, Professor Koch agrees (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 78).

If the Greeks crossed the Kentritês near its confluence with the Tigris, they would march up its right bank in one day to a situation near the modern town of Sert (Mr. Ainsworth thinks), though Xenophon takes no notice of the river of Bitlis, which nevertheless they must have passed. Their next two days of march, assuming a direction nearly north, would carry them (as Xenophon states, iv. 4, 2) beyond the sources of the Tigris; that is, "beyond the headwaters of the eastern tributaries to the Tigris."

Three days of additional march brought them to the river Teleboas—"of no great size, but beautiful" (iv. 4, 4). There appear sufficient reasons to identify this river with the Kara-Su or Black River, which flows through the valley or plain of Mush into the Murad or Eastern Euphrates (Ainsworth, p. 172; Ritter, Erdkunde, part x. s. 37. p. 682). Though Kinneir (Journey through Asia Minor and Kurdistan, 1818, p. 484), Rennell (Illustrations of the Expedition of Cyrus, p. 207) and Bell (System of Geography, iv. p. 140) identify it with the Ak-Su or river of Mush—this, according to Ainsworth, "is only a small tributary to the Kara-Su, which is the great river of the plain and district."

Professor Koch, whose personal researches in and around Armenia give to his opinion the highest authority, follows Mr. Ainsworth in identifying the Teleboas with the Kara-Su. He supposes, however, that the Greeks crossed the Kentritês, not near its confluence with the Tigris, but considerably higher up, near the town of Sert or Sort. From hence he supposes that they marched nearly north-east in the modern road from Sert to Bitlis, thus getting round the head or near the head of the river called Bitlis-Su, which is one of the eastern affluents to the Tigris (falling first into the Buhtan-Chai), and which Xenophon took for the Tigris itself. They then marched farther, in a line not far distant from the Lake of Van, over the saddle which separates that lake from the lofty mountain Ali-Dagh. This saddle is the water-shed which separates the affluents to the Tigris from those to the Eastern Euphrates, of which latter the Teleboas or Kara-Su is one (Koch, Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 82-84).

After the river Teleboas, there seems no one point in the march which can be identified with anything approaching to certainty. Nor have we any means even of determining the general line of route, apart from specific places, which they followed from the river Teleboas to Trebizond.

Their first object was to reach and cross the Eastern Euphrates. They would of course cross at the nearest point where they could find a ford. But how low down its course does the river continue to be fordable, in mid-winter, with snow on the ground? Here professor Koch differs from Mr. Ainsworth and colonel Chesney. He affirms that the river would be fordable a little above its confluence with the Tscharbahur, about latitude 39° 3′. According to Mr. Ainsworth, it would not be fordable below the confluence with the river of Khanus (Khinnis). Koch's authority, as the most recent and systematic investigator of these regions, seems preferable, especially as it puts the Greeks nearly in the road now travelled over from Mush to Erzerum, which is said to be the only pass over the mountains open throughout all the winter, passing by Khinnis and Koili; see Ritter, Erdkunde, x. p. 387. Xenophon mentions a warm spring, which the army passed by during the third or fourth day after crossing the Euphrates (Anab. iv, 5, 15). Professor Koch believes himself to have identified this warm spring—the only one, as he states (p. 90-93), south of the range of mountains called the Bingöldagh—in the district called Wardo, near the village of Bashkan.

To lay down, with any certainty, the line which the Greeks followed from the Euphrates to Trebizond, appears altogether impossible. I cannot admit the hypothesis of Mr. Ainsworth, who conducts the army across the Araxes to its northern bank, carries them up northward to the latitude of Teflis in Georgia, then brings them back again across the Harpa Chai (a northern affluent of the Araxes, which he identifies with the Harpasus mentioned by Xenophon) and the Araxes itself, to Gymnias, which he places near the site of Erzerum. Professor Koch (p. 104-108), who dissents with good reason from Mr. Ainsworth, proposes (though with hesitation and uncertainty) a line of his own which appears to me open greatly to the same objection as that of Mr. Ainsworth. It carries the Greeks too much to the northward of Erzerum, more out

of their line of march from the place where they crossed the Eastern Euphrates, than can be justified by any probability. The Greeks knew well that, in order to get home they must take a westerly direction (see Anab. iii. 5, 15).

Their great and constant purpose would be to make way to the westward, as soon as they had crossed the Euphrates; and the road from that river, passing near the site of Erzerum to Trebizond, would thus coincide, in the main, with their spontaneous tendency. They had no motive to go northward of Erzerum, nor ought we to suppose it without some proof. I trace out, therefore, a line of march much less circuitous; not meaning it to be understood as the real road which the army can be proved to have taken, but simply because it seems a possible line, and because it serves as a sort of approximation to complete the reader's idea of the entire ground travelled over by the Ten Thousand.

Koch hardly makes sufficient account of the overwhelming hardships with which the Greeks had to contend, when he states (p. 96) that if they had taken a line as straight, or nearly as straight as was practicable, they might have marched from the Euphrates to Trebizond in sixteen or twenty days, even allowing for the bad time of year. Considering that it was mid-winter, in that very high and cold country, with deep snow throughout; that they had absolutely no advantages or assistance of any kind; that their sick and disabled men, together with their arms, were to be carried by the stronger; that there were a great many women accompanying them; that they had beasts to drive along, carrying baggage and plunder,—the prophet Silanus, for example, having preserved his three thousand darics in coin from the field of Kunaxa until his return; that there was much resistance from the Chalybes and Taochi; that they had to take provisions where provisions were discoverable; that even a small stream must have impeded them, and probably driven them out of their course to find a ford,—considering the intolerable accumulation of these and other hardships, we need not wonder at any degree of slowness in their progress. It rarely happens that modern travellers go over these regions in mid-winter; but we may see what travelling is at that season, by the dreadful description which Mr. Baillie Fraser gives of his journey from Tauris to Erzerum in the month of March (Travels in Koordhistan, Letter XV). Mr. Kinneir says (Travels, p. 353)—"The winters are so severe that all communication between Baiburt and the circumjacent villages is cut off for four months in the year, in consequence of the depth of the snow."

Now if we measure on Kiepert's map the rectilinear distance,—the air-line—from Trebizond to the place where Koch represents the Greeks to have crossed the Eastern Euphrates,—we shall find it one hundred and seventy English miles. The number of days' journey-marches which Xenophon mentions are fifty-four; even if we include the five days of march undertaken from Gymnias (Anab. iv. 7, 20), which, properly speaking, were directed against the enemies of the governor of Gymnias, more than for the promotion of their retreat. In each of those fifty-four days, therefore, they must have made 3.14 miles of rectilinear progress. This surely is not an unreason-

ably slow progress to suppose, under all the disadvantages of their situation; nor does it imply any very great actual departure from the straightest line practicable. Indeed Koch himself (in his Introduction, p. 4) suggests various embarrassments which must have occurred on the march, but which Xenophon has not distinctly stated.

The river which Xenophon calls the Harpasus seems to be probably the Tchoruk-su, as colonel Chesney and Prof. Koch suppose. At least it is difficult to assign any other river with which the Harpasus can be identified.

I cannot but think it probable that the city which Xenophon calls *Gymnias* (Diodorus, xiv. 29, calls it Gymnasia) was the same as that which is now called Gumisch-Khana (Hamilton), Gumush-Kaneh (Ainsworth), Gemisch-Khaneh (Kinneir). "Gumisch-Khana (says Mr. Hamilton, Travels in Asia Minor, vol. i. ch. xi. p. 168; ch. xiv. p. 234) is celebrated as the site of the most ancient and considerable silver-mines in the Ottoman dominions." Both Mr. Kinneir and Mr. Hamilton passed through Gumisch-Khana on the road from Trebizond to Erzerum.

Now here is not only great similarity of name, and likelihood of situation,—but the existence of the silver mines furnishes a plausible explanation of that which would otherwise be very strange; the existence of this "great, flourishing, inhabited, city," inland, in the midst of such barbarians,—the Chalybes, the Skythini, the Makrônes, etc.

Mr. Kinneir reached Gumisch-Khana at the end of the third day after quitting Trebizond; the two last days having been very long and fatiguing. Mr. Hamilton, who also passed through Gumisch-Khana, reached it at the end of two long days. Both these travellers represent the road near Gumisch-Khana as extremely difficult. Mr. Ainsworth, who did not himself pass through Gumisch-Khana, tells us (what is of some importance in this discussion) that it lies in the *winter-road* from Erzerum to Trebizond (Travels in Asia Minor, vol. ii. p. 394). "The winter-road, which is the longest, passes by Gumisch-Khana, and takes the longer portion of valley; all the others cross over the mountain at various points, to the east of the road by the mines. But whether going by the mountains or the valley, the muleteers often go indifferently to the west as far as Ash Kaleh, and at other times turn off by the villages of Bey Mausour and Kodjah Bunar, where they take to the mountains."

Mr. Hamilton makes the distance from Trebizond to Gumisch-Khana eighteen hours, or fifty-four calculated post miles; that is, about forty English miles (Appendix to Travels in Asia Minor, vol. ii. p. 389).

Now we are not to suppose that the Greeks marched in any direct road from Gymnias to Trebizond. On the contrary, the five days' march which they undertook immediately from Gymnias were conducted by a guide sent from that town, who led them over the territories of people hostile to Gymnias, in order that they might lay waste the lands (iv. 7, 20). What progress they made, during these marches, towards

Trebizond, is altogether doubtful. The guide promised that on the fifth day he would bring them to a spot from whence they could view the sea, and he performed his promise by leading them to the top of the sacred mountain Thêchê.

Thêchê was a summit (ἄκρον, iv. 7, 25), as might be expected. But unfortunately it seems impossible to verify the particular summit on which the interesting scene described by Xenophon took place. Mr. Ainsworth presumes it to be the mountain called Kop-Dagh; from whence, however, according to Koch, the sea cannot be discerned. D'Anville and some other geographers identify it with the ridge called Tekieh-Dagh, to the east of Gumisch-Khana; nearer to the sea than that place. This mountain, I think, would suit pretty well for the narrative in respect to position; but Koch and other modern travellers affirm that it is neither high enough, nor near enough to the sea, to permit any such view as that which Xenophon relates. It stands on Kiepert's map at a distance of full thirty-five English miles from the sea, the view of which, moreover, seems intercepted by the still higher mountain-chain now called Kolath-Dagh, a portion of the ancient Paryadres, which runs along parallel to the coast. It is to be recollected that in the first half of February, the time of Xenophon's visit, the highest peaks would certainly be all covered with snow, and therefore very difficult to ascend.

There is a striking view obtained of the sea from the mountain called Karakaban. This mountain, more than four thousand feet high, lies rather above twenty miles from the sea, to the south of Trebizond, and immediately north of the still higher chain of Kolath-Dagh. From the Kolath-Dagh chain, which runs east and west, there strike out three or four parallel ridges to the northward, formed of primitive slate, and cut down precipitously so as to leave deep and narrow valleys between. On leaving Trebizond, the traveller ascends the hill immediately above the town, and then descends into the valley on the other side. His road to Karakaban lies partly along the valley, partly along the crest of one of the four ridges just mentioned. But throughout all this road, the sea is never seen; being hidden by the hills immediately above Trebizond. He does not again see the sea until he reaches Karakaban, which is sufficiently high to enable him to see over those hills. The guides (as I am informed by Dr. Holland, who twice went over the spot) point out with great animation this view of the sea, as particularly deserving of notice. It is enjoyed for a short space while the road winds round the mountain, and then again lost.

Here is a view of the sea at once distant, sudden, impressive, and enjoyed from an eminence not too high to be accessible to the Cyreian army. In so far, it would be suitable to the description of Xenophon. Yet again it appears that a person coming to this point from the land-side (as Xenophon of course did), would find it in his descending route, not in his ascending; and this can hardly be reconciled with the description which we read in the Greek historian. Moreover, the subsequent marches which Xenophon mentions after quitting the mountain summit Thêchê, can hardly be reconciled with the supposition that it was the same as what is now called Karaka-

ban. It is, indeed, quite possible, (as Mr. Hamilton suggests), that Thêchê may have been a peak apart from any road, and that the guide may have conducted the soldiers thither for the express purpose of showing the sea, guiding them back again into the road afterwards. This increases the difficulty of identifying the spot. However, the whole region is as yet very imperfectly known, and perhaps it is not impossible that there may be some particular locality even on Tekiah-Dagh, whence, through an accidental gap in the intervening mountains, the sea might become visible.

CHAPTER LXXI.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS, FROM THE TIME THAT THEY REACHED TRAPEZUS, TO THEIR JUNCTION WITH THE LACEDÆMONIAN ARMY IN ASIA MINOR.

We now commence a third act in the history of this memorable body of men. After having followed them from Sardis to Kunaxa as mercenaries to procure the throne for Cyrus,—then from Kunaxa to Trapezus as men anxious only for escape, and purchasing their safety by marvellous bravery, endurance, and organization, we shall now track their proceedings among the Greek colonies on the Euxine and at the Bosphorus of Thrace, succeeded by their struggles against the meanness of the Thracian prince Seuthes, as well as against the treachery and arbitrary harshness of the Lacedæmonian commanders Anaxibius and Aristarchus.

Trapezus, now Trebizond, where the army had recently found repose, was a colony from Sinôpê, as were also Kerasus and Kotyôra, farther westward; each of them receiving an harmost or governor from the mother-city, and paying to her an annual tribute. All these three cities were planted on the narrow strip of land dividing the Euxine from the elevated mountain range which so closely borders on its southern coast. At Sinôpê itself, the land stretches out into a defensible peninsula, with a secure harbor, and a large breadth of adjacent fertile soil. So tempting a site invited the Milesians, even before the year 600 B.C., to plant a colony there, and enabled Sinôpê to attain much prosperity and power. Farther westward, not more than a long day's journey for a rowing vessel from Byzantium, was situated the Megarian colony of Herakleia, in the territory of the Mariandyni.

The native tenants of this line of coast, upon whom the Greek settlers intruded themselves (reckoning from the westward), were the Bithynian Thracians, the Mariandyni, the Paphlagonians, the Tibarêni, Chalybes, Mosynœki, Drilæ, and Kolchians. Here, as elsewhere, these natives found the Greek seaports useful, in giving a new value to inland produce, and in furnishing the great men with ornaments and luxuries to which they would otherwise have had no access. The citizens of Herakleia had reduced into dependence a considerable portion of the neighboring Mariandyni, and held them in a relation resembling that of the natives of Esthonia and Livonia to the German colonies in the Baltic. Some of the Kolchian villages were also subject, in the same manner, to the Trapezuntines;[197] and Sinôpê doubtless possessed a similar inland dominion of greater or less extent. But the principal wealth of this important city arose from her navy and maritime commerce; from the rich thunny fishery attached to her promontory; from the olives in her immediate neighborhood, which was a cultivation not indigenous, but only naturalized by the Greeks on the seaboard; from the varied produce of the interior, comprising abundant herds of cattle, mines of silver,

iron, and copper in the neighboring mountains, wood for ship-building, as well as for house furniture, and native slaves.[198] The case was similar with the three colonies of Sinôpê, more to the eastward,—Kotyôra, Kerasus, and Trapezus; except that the mountains which border on the Euxine, gradually approaching nearer and nearer to the shore, left to each of them a more confined strip of cultivable land. For these cities the time had not yet arrived, to be conquered and absorbed by the inland monarchies around them, as Miletus and the cities on the eastern coast of Asia Minor had been. The Paphlagonians were at this time the only indigenous people in those regions who formed a considerable aggregated force, under a prince named Korylas; a prince tributary to Persia, yet half independent,—since he had disobeyed the summons of Artaxerxes to come up and help in repelling Cyrus[199]—and now on terms of established alliance with Sinôpê, though not without secret designs, which he wanted only force to execute, against that city.[200] The other native tribes to the eastward were mountaineers both ruder and more divided; warlike on their own heights, but little capable of any aggressive combinations.

Though we are told that Perikles had once despatched a detachment of Athenian colonists to Sinôpê,[201] and had expelled from thence the despot Timesilaus,—yet neither that city nor any of their neighbors appear to have taken a part in the Peloponnesian war, either for or against Athens; nor were they among the number of tributaries to Persia. They doubtless were acquainted with the upward march of Cyrus, which had disturbed all Asia; and probably were not ignorant of the perils and critical state of his Grecian army. But it was with a feeling of mingled surprise, admiration, and alarm, that they saw that army descend from the mountainous region, hitherto only recognized as the abode of Kolchians, Makrônes, and other analogous tribes, among whom was perched the mining city of Gymnias.

Even after all the losses and extreme sufferings of the retreat, the Greeks still numbered, when mustered at Kerasus,[202] eight thousand six hundred hoplites, with peltasts or targeteers, bowmen, slingers, etc., making a total of above ten thousand military persons. Such a force had never before been seen in the Euxine. Considering both the numbers and the now-acquired discipline and self-confidence of the Cyreians, even Sinôpê herself could have raised no force capable of meeting them in the field. Yet they did not belong to any city, nor receive orders from any established government. They were like those mercenary armies which marched about in Italy during the fourteenth century, under the generals called Condottieri, taking service sometimes with one city, sometimes with another. No one could predict what schemes they might conceive, or in what manner they might deal with the established communities on the shores of the Euxine. If we imagine that such an army had suddenly appeared in Sicily, a little time before the Athenian expedition against Syracuse, it would have been probably enlisted by Leontini and Katana in their war against Syracuse. If the inhabitants of Trapezus had wished to throw off the dominion of Sinôpê,—or if Korylas, the Paphlagonian, were meditating war against that city,

—here were formidable auxiliaries to second their wishes. Moreover there were various tempting sites, open to the formation of a new colony, which, with so numerous a body of original Greek settlers, would probably have overtopped Sinôpê herself. There was no restraining cause to reckon upon, except the general Hellenic sympathies and education of the Cyreian army; and what was of not less importance, the fact that they were not mercenary soldiers by permanent profession, such as became so formidably multiplied in Greece during the next generation,—but established citizens who had come out on a special service under Cyrus, with the full intention, after a year of lucrative enterprise, to return to their homes and families.[203] We shall find such gravitation towards home steadily operative throughout the future proceedings of the army. But at the moment when they first emerged from the mountains, no one could be sure that it would be so. There was ample ground for uneasiness among the Euxine Greeks, especially the Sinopians, whose supremacy had never before been endangered.

An undisturbed repose of thirty days enabled the Cyreians to recover from their fatigues, to talk over their past dangers, and to take pride in the anticipated effect which their unparalleled achievement could not fail to produce in Greece. Having discharged their vows and celebrated their festival to the gods, they held an assembly to discuss their future proceedings; when a Thurian soldier, named Antileon, exclaimed,—"Comrades, I am already tired of packing up, marching, running, carrying arms, falling into line, keeping watch, and fighting. Now that we have the sea here before us, I desire to be relieved from all these toils, to sail the rest of the way, and to arrive in Greece outstretched and asleep, like Odysseus." This pithy address being received with vehement acclamations, and warmly responded to by all,—Cheirisophus offered, if the army chose to empower him, to sail forthwith to Byzantium, where he thought he could obtain from his friend the Lacedæmonian admiral, Anaxibius, sufficient vessels for transport. His proposition was gladly accepted; and he departed to execute the project.

Xenophon then urged upon the army various resolutions and measures, proper for the regulation of affairs during the absence of Cheirisophus. The army would be forced to maintain itself by marauding expeditions among the hostile tribes in the mountains. Such expeditions, accordingly, must be put under regulation; neither individual soldiers, nor small companies, must be allowed to go out at pleasure, without giving notice to the generals; moreover, the camp must be kept under constant guard and scouts, in the event of surprise from a retaliating enemy. It was prudent also to take the best measures in their power for procuring vessels; since, after all, Cheirisophus might possibly fail in bringing an adequate number. They ought to borrow a few ships of war from the Trapezuntines, and detain all the merchant ships which they saw; unshipping the rudders, placing the cargoes under guard, and maintaining the crew during all the time that the ships might be required for transport of the army. Many such merchant vessels were often sailing by;[204] so that they would

thus acquire the means of transport, even though Cheirisophus should bring few or none from Byzantium. Lastly, Xenophon proposed to require the Grecian cities to repair and put in order the road along the coast, for a land-march; since, perhaps, with all their efforts, it would be found impossible to get together a sufficient stock of transports.

All the propositions of Xenophon were readily adopted by the army, except the last. But the mere mention of a renewed land-march excited such universal murmurs of repugnance, that he did not venture to put that question to the vote. He took upon himself, however, to send messages to the Grecian cities, on his own responsibility; urging them to repair the roads, in order that the departure of the army might be facilitated. And he found the cities ready enough to carry his wishes into effect, as far as Kotyôra.[205]

The wisdom of these precautionary suggestions of Xenophon soon appeared; for Cheirisophus not only failed in his object, but was compelled to stay away for a considerable time. A pentekonter (or armed ship with fifty oars) was borrowed from the Trapezuntines, and committed to the charge of a Lacedæmonian Periœkus, named Dexippus, for the purpose of detaining the merchant vessels passing by. This man having violated his trust, and employed the ship to make his own escape out of the Euxine, a second was obtained and confided to an Athenian, Polykrates; who brought in successively several merchant vessels. These the Greeks did not plunder, but secured the cargoes under adequate guard, and only reserved the vessels for transports. It became, however, gradually more and more difficult to supply the camp with provisions. Though the army was distributed into suitable detachments for plundering the Kolchian villages on the hills, and seizing cattle and prisoners for sale, yet these expeditions did not always succeed; indeed on one occasion, two Grecian lochi or companies got entangled in such difficult ground, that they were destroyed, to a man. The Kolchians united on the hills in increased and menacing numbers, insomuch that a larger guard became necessary for the camp; while the Trapezuntines,—tired of the protracted stay of the army, as well as desirous of exempting from pillage the natives in their own immediate neighborhood,—conducted the detachments only to villages alike remote and difficult of access. It was in this manner that a large force under Xenophon himself, attacked the lofty and rugged stronghold of the Drilæ,—the most warlike nation of mountaineers in the neighborhood of the Euxine; well armed, and troublesome to Trapezus by their incursions. After a difficult march and attack which Xenophon describes in interesting detail, and wherein the Greeks encountered no small hazard of ruinous defeat,—they returned in the end completely successful, and with a plentiful booty.[206]

At length, after long awaiting in vain the reappearance of Cheirisophus, increasing scarcity and weariness determined them to leave Trapezus. A sufficient number of vessels had been collected to serve for the transport of the women, of the sick and wounded, and of the baggage. All these were accordingly placed on board, under the

command of Philesius and Sophænetus, the two oldest generals; while the remaining army marched by land, along a road which had been just made good under the representations of Xenophon. In three days they reached Kerasus, another maritime colony of the Sinopeans, still in the territory called Kolchian; there they halted ten days, mustered and numbered the army, and divided the money acquired by the sale of their prisoners. Eight thousand six hundred hoplites, out of a total probably greater than eleven thousand, were found still remaining; besides targeteers and various light troops.[207]

During the halt at Kerasus, the declining discipline of the army became manifest as they approached home. Various acts of outrage occurred, originating now, as afterwards, in the intrigues of treacherous officers. A captain named Klearetus persuaded his company to attempt the plunder of a Kolchian village near Kerasus, which had furnished a friendly market to the Greeks, and which rested secure on the faith of peaceful relations. He intended to make off separately with the booty in one of the vessels; but his attack was repelled, and he himself slain. The injured villagers despatched three elders, as heralds, to remonstrate with the Grecian authorities; but these heralds being seen in Kerasus by some of the repulsed plunderers, were slain. A partial tumult then ensued, in which even the magistrates of Kerasus were in great danger, and only escaped the pursuing soldiers by running into the sea. This enormity, though it occurred under the eyes of the generals, immediately before their departure from Kerasus, remained without inquiry or punishment, from the numbers concerned in it.

Between Kerasus and Kotyôra, there was not then (nor is there now) any regular road.[208] This march cost the Cyreian army not less than ten days, by an inland track departing from the sea-shore, and through the mountains inhabited by the indigenous tribes Mosynœki and Chalybes. The latter, celebrated for their iron works, were under dependence to the former. As the Mosynœki refused to grant a friendly passage across their territory, the army were compelled to fight their way through it as enemies, with the aid of one section of these people themselves; which alliance was procured for them by the Trapezuntine Timesitheos, who was proxenus of the Mosynœki, and understood their language. The Greeks took the mountain fastnesses of this people, and plundered the wooden turrets which formed their abodes. Of their peculiar fashions Xenophon gives an interesting description, which I have not space to copy.[209] The territory of the Tibarêni was more easy and accessible. This people met the Greeks with presents, and tendered a friendly passage. But the generals at first declined the presents,—preferring to treat them as enemies and plunder them; which in fact they would have done, had they not been deterred by inauspicious sacrifices.[210]

Near Kotyôra, which was situated on the coast of the Tibarêni, yet on the borders of Paphlagonia, they remained forty-five days, still awaiting the appearance of Cheirisophus with the transports to carry them away by sea. The Sinopian harmost

or governor, did not permit them to be welcomed in so friendly a manner as at Trapezus. No market was provided for them, nor were their sick admitted within the walls. But the fortifications of the town were not so constructed as to resist a Greek force, the like of which had never before been seen in those regions. The Greek generals found a weak point, made their way in, and took possession of a few houses for the accommodation of their sick; keeping a guard at the gate to secure free egress, but doing no farther violence to the citizens. They obtained their victuals partly from the Kotyôrite villages, partly from the neighboring territory of Paphlagonia, until at length envoys arrived from Sinôpê to remonstrate against their proceedings.

These envoys presented themselves before the assembled soldiers in the camp, when Hekatonymus, the chief and the most eloquent among them, began by complimenting the army upon their gallant exploits and retreat. He then complained of the injury which Kotyôra and Sinôpê, as the mother city of Kotyôra, had suffered at their hands, in violation of common Hellenic kinship. If such proceedings were continued, he intimated that Sinôpê would be compelled in her own defence to seek alliance with the Paphlagonian prince Korylas, or any other barbaric auxiliary who would lend them aid against the Greeks.[211] Xenophon replied that if the Kotyôrites had sustained any damage, it was owing to their own ill-will and to the Sinopian harmost in the place; that the generals were under the necessity of procuring subsistence for the soldiers, with house-room for the sick, and that they had taken nothing more; that the sick men were lying within the town, but at their own cost, while the other soldiers were all encamped without; that they had maintained cordial friendship with the Trapezuntines, and requited all their good offices; that they sought no enemies except through necessity, being anxious only again to reach Greece; and that as for the threat respecting Korylas, they knew well enough that that prince was eager to become master of the wealthy city of Sinôpê, and would speedily attempt some such enterprise if he could obtain the Cyreian army as his auxiliaries.[212]

This judicious reply shamed the colleagues of Hekatonymus so much, that they went the length of protesting against what he had said, and of affirming that they had come with propositions of sympathy and friendship to the army, as well as with promises to give them an hospitable reception at Sinôpê, if they should visit that town on their way home. Presents were at once sent to the army by the inhabitants of Kotyôra, and a good understanding established.

Such an interchange of good will with the powerful city of Sinôpê was an unspeakable advantage to the army,—indeed, an essential condition to their power of reaching home. If they continued their march by land, it was only through Sinopian guidance and mediation that they could obtain or force a passage through Paphlagonia; while for a voyage by sea, there was no chance of procuring a sufficient number of vessels except from Sinôpê, since no news had been received of Cheirisophus. On the other hand, that city had also a strong interest in facilitating their transit home-

ward, and thus removing formidable neighbors for whose ulterior purposes there could be no guarantee. After some preliminary conversation with the Sinopian envoys, the generals convoked the army in assembly, and entreated Hekatonymus and his companions to advise them as to the best mode of proceeding westward to the Bosphorus. Hekatonymus, after apologizing for the menacing insinuations of his former speech, and protesting that he had no other object in view except to point out the safest and easiest plan of route for the army, began to unfold the insuperable difficulties of a march through Paphlagonia. The very entrance into the country must be achieved through a narrow aperture in the mountains, which it was impossible to force if occupied by the enemy. Even assuming this difficulty to be surmounted, there were spacious plains to be passed over, wherein the Paphlagonian horse, the most numerous and bravest in Asia, would be found almost irresistible. There were also three or four great rivers, which the army would be unable to pass,—the Thermodon and the Iris, each three hundred feet in breadth,—the Halys, two stadia or nearly a quarter of a mile in breadth,—the Parthenius, also very considerable. Such an array of obstacles (he affirmed) rendered the project of marching through Paphlagonia impracticable; whereas the voyage by sea from Kotyôra to Sinôpê, and from Sinôpê to Herakleia, was easy; and the transit from the latter place, either by sea to Byzantium, or by land across Thrace, yet easier.[213]

Difficulties like these, apparently quite real, were more than sufficient to determine the vote of the army, already sick of marching and fighting, in favor of the sea-voyage; though there were not wanting suspicions of the sincerity of Hekatonymus. But Xenophon, in communicating to the latter the decision of the army, distinctly apprised him that they would on no account permit themselves to be divided; that they would either depart or remain all in a body, and that vessels must be provided sufficient for the transport of all. Hekatonymus desired them to send envoys of their own to Sinôpê to make the necessary arrangements. Three envoys were accordingly sent, —Ariston, an Athenian, Kalimachus, an Arcadian, and Samolas, an Achæan; the Athenian, probably, as possessing the talent of speaking in the Sinopian senate or assembly.[214]

During the absence of these envoys, the army still continued near Kotyôra with a market provided by the town, and with traders from Sinôpê and Herakleia in the camp. Such soldiers as had no money wherewith to purchase, subsisted by pillaging the neighboring frontier of Paphlagonia.[215] But they were receiving no pay; every man was living on his own resources; and instead of carrying back a handsome purse to Greece, as each soldier had hoped when he first took service under Cyrus, there seemed every prospect of their returning poorer than when they left home.[216] Moreover, the army was now moving onward without any definite purpose, with increasing dissatisfaction and decreasing discipline; insomuch that Xenophon foresaw the difficulties which would beset the responsible commanders when they should come within the stricter restraints and obligations of the Grecian world.

It was these considerations which helped to suggest to him the idea of employing the army on some enterprise of conquest and colonization in the Euxine itself; an idea highly flattering to his personal ambition, especially as the army was of unrivalled efficiency against an enemy, and no such second force could ever be got together in those distant regions. His patriotism as a Greek was inflamed with the thoughts of procuring for Hellas a new autonomous city, occupied by a considerable Hellenic population, possessing a spacious territory, and exercising dominion over many indigenous neighbors. He seems to have thought first of attacking and conquering some established non-Hellenic city; an act which his ideas of international morality did not forbid, in a case where he had contracted no special convention with the inhabitants,—though he (as well as Cheirisophus) strenuously protested against doing wrong to any innocent Hellenic community.[217] He contemplated the employment of the entire force in capturing Phasis or some other native city; after which, when the establishment was once safely effected, those soldiers who preferred going home to remaining as settlers, might do so without emperiling those who stayed, and probably with their own purses filled by plunder and conquest in the neighborhood. To settle as one of the richest proprietors and chiefs,—perhaps even the recognized Œkist, like Agnon at Amphipolis,—of a new Hellenic city such as could hardly fail to become rich, powerful, and important,—was a tempting prospect for one who had now acquired the habits of command. Moreover, the sequel will prove, how correctly Xenophon appreciated the discomfort of leading the army back to Greece without pay and without certain employment.

It was the practice of Xenophon, and the advice of his master Sokrates,[218] in grave and doubtful cases, where the most careful reflection was at fault, to recur to the inspired authority of an oracle or a prophet, and to offer sacrifice, in full confidence that the gods would vouchsafe to communicate a special revelation to any person whom they favored. Accordingly Xenophon, previous to any communication with the soldiers respecting his new project, was anxious to ascertain the will of the gods by a special sacrifice; for which he invoked the presence of the Ambrakiot Silanus, the chief prophet in the army. This prophet (as I have already mentioned), before the battle of Kunaxa, had assured Cyrus that Artaxerxes would not fight for ten days,—and the prophecy came to pass; which made such an impression on Cyrus that he rewarded him with the prodigious present of three thousand darics or ten Attic talents. While others were returning poor, Silanus, having contrived to preserve this sum throughout all the hardships of the retreat, was extremely rich, and anxious only to hasten home with his treasure in safety. He heard with strong repugnance the project of remaining in the Euxine, and determined to traverse it by intrigue. As far as concerned the sacrifices, indeed, which he offered apart with Xenophon, he was obliged to admit that the indications of the victims were favorable;[219] Xenophon himself being too familiar with the process to be imposed upon. But he at the same time tried to create alarm by declaring that a nice inspection disclosed evidence of treacherous snares laid for Xenophon; which latter indications he himself

began to realize, by spreading reports among the army that the Athenian general was laying clandestine plans for keeping them away from Greece without their own concurrence.[220]

Thus prematurely and insidiously divulged, the scheme found some supporters, but a far larger number of opponents; especially among those officers who were jealous of the ascendency of Xenophon. Timasion and Thorax employed it as a means of alarming the Herakleotic and Sinopian traders in the camp; telling them that unless they provided not merely transports, but also pay for the soldiers, Xenophon would find means to detain the army in the Euxine, and would employ the transports when they arrived, not for the homeward voyage, but for his own projects of acquisition This news spread so much terror both at Sinôpê and Herakleia, that large offers of money were made from both cities to Timasion, on condition that he would ensure the departure of the army, as soon as the vessels should be assembled at Kotyôra. Accordingly these officers, convening an assembly of the soldiers, protested against the duplicity of Xenophon in thus preparing momentous schemes without any public debate or decision. And Timasion, seconded by Thorax, not only strenuously urged the army to return, but went so far as to promise to them, on the faith of the assurances from Herakleia and Sinôpê, future pay on a liberal scale, to commence from the first new moon after their departure; together with a hospitable reception in his native city of Dardanus on the Hellespont, from whence they could make incursions on the rich neighboring satrapy of Pharnabazus.[221]

It was not, however, until these attacks were repeated from more than one quarter,—until the Achæans Philesius and Lykon had loudly accused Xenophon of underhand manœuvring to cheat the army into remaining against their will,—that the latter rose to repel the imputation; saying, that all that he had done was, to consult the gods whether it would be better to lay his project before the army or to keep it in his own bosom. The encouraging answer of the gods, as conveyed through the victims and testified even by Silanus himself, proved that the scheme was not ill-conceived; nevertheless, (he remarked) Silanus had begun to lay snares for him, realizing by his own proceedings a collateral indication which he had announced to be visible in the victims. "If (added Xenophon) you had continued as destitute and unprovided as you were just now,—I should still have looked out for a resource in the capture of some city which would have enabled such of you as chose, to return at once; while the rest stay behind to enrich themselves. But now there is no longer any necessity; since Herakleia and Sinôpê are sending transports, and Timasion promises pay to you from the next new moon. Nothing can be better; you will go back safely to Greece, and will receive pay for going thither. I desist at once from my scheme, and call upon all who were favorable to it to desist also. Only let us all keep together until we are on safe ground; and let the man who lags behind or runs off, be condemned as a wrong-doer."[222]

Xenophon immediately put this question to the vote, and every hand was held up in its favor. There was no man more disconcerted with the vote than the prophet Silanus, who loudly exclaimed against the injustice of detaining any one desirous to depart. But the soldiers put him down with vehement disapprobation, threatening that they would assuredly punish him if they caught him running off. His intrigue against Xenophon thus recoiled upon himself, for the moment. But shortly afterwards, when the army reached Herakleia, he took his opportunity for clandestine flight, and found his way back to Greece with the three thousand darics.[223]

If Silanus gained little by his manœuvre, Timasion and his partners gained still less. For so soon as it became known that the army had taken a formal resolution to go back to Greece, and that Xenophon himself had made the proposition, the Sinopians and the Herakleots felt at their ease. They sent the transport vessels, but withheld the money which they had promised to Timasion and Thorax. Hence these officers were exposed to dishonor and peril; for, having positively engaged to find pay for the army, they were now unable to keep their word. So keen were their apprehensions, that they came to Xenophon and told him that they had altered their views, and that they now thought it best to employ the newly-arrived transports in conveying the army, not to Greece, but against the town and territory of Phasis at the eastern extremity of the Euxine.[224] Xenophon replied, that they might convene the soldiers and make the proposition, if they chose; but that he would have nothing to say to it. To make the very proposition themselves, for which they had so much inveighed against Xenophon, was impossible without some preparation; so that each of them began individually to sound his captains, and get the scheme suggested by them. During this interval, the soldiery obtained information of the manœuvre, much to their discontent and indignation; of which Neon (the lieutenant of the absent Cheirisophus) took advantage, to throw the whole blame upon Xenophon; alleging that it was he who had converted the other officers to his original project, and that he intended as soon as the soldiers were on shipboard, to convey them fraudulently to Phasis instead of to Greece. There was something so plausible in this glaring falsehood, which represented Xenophon as the author of the renewed project, once his own,—and something so improbable in the fact that the other officers should spontaneously have renounced their own strong opinions to take up his,—that we can hardly be surprised at the ready credence which Neon's calumny found among the army. Their exasperation against Xenophon became so intense, that they collected in fierce groups; and there was even a fear that they would break out into mutinous violence, as they had before done against the magistrates of Kerasus.

Well knowing the danger of such spontaneous and informal assemblages, and the importance of the habitual solemnities of convocation and arrangement, to ensure either discussion or legitimate defence,[225]—Xenophon immediately sent round the herald to summon the army into the regular agora, with customary method and ceremony. The summons was obeyed with unusual alacrity, and Xenophon then ad-

dressed them,—refraining, with equal generosity and prudence, from saying anything about the last proposition which Timasion and others had made to him. Had he mentioned it, the question would have become one of life and death between him and those other officers.

"Soldiers (said he), I understand that there are some men here calumniating me, as if I were intending to cheat you and carry you to Phasis. Hear me, then, in the name of the gods. If I am shown to be doing wrong, let me not go from hence unpunished; but if, on the contrary, my calumniators are proved to be the wrong-doers, deal with them as they deserve. You surely well know where the sun rises and where he sets; you know that if a man wishes to reach Greece, he must go westward,—if to the barbaric territories, he must go eastward. Can any one hope to deceive you on this point, and persuade you that the sun rises on *this* side, and sets on *that*? Can any one cheat you into going on shipboard with a wind which blows you away from Greece? Suppose even that I put you aboard when there is no wind at all. How am I to force you to sail with me against your own consent,—I being only in one ship, you in a hundred and more? Imagine, however, that I could even succeed in deluding you to Phasis. When we land there, you will know at once that we are not in Greece; and what fate can I then expect,—a detected impostor in the midst of ten thousand men with arms in their hands? No,—these stories all proceed from foolish men, who are jealous of my influence with you; jealous, too, without reason,—for I neither hinder *them* from outstripping me in your favor, if they can render you greater service, —nor *you* from electing them commanders, if you think fit. Enough of this, now; I challenge any one to come forward and say how it is possible either to cheat, or to be cheated, in the manner laid to my charge."[226]

Having thus grappled directly with the calumnies of his enemies, and dissipated them in such manner as doubtless to create a reaction in his own favor, Xenophon made use of the opportunity to denounce the growing disorders in the army; which he depicted as such that, if no corrective were applied, disgrace and contempt must fall upon all. As he paused after this general remonstrance, the soldiers loudly called upon him to go into particulars; upon which he proceeded to recall, with lucid and impressive simplicity, the outrages which had been committed at and near Kerasus,—the unauthorized and unprovoked attack made by Klearetus and his company on a neighboring village which was in friendly commerce with the army,—the murder of the three elders of the village, who had come as heralds to complain to the generals about such wrong,—the mutinous attack made by disorderly soldiers even upon the magistrates of Kerasus, at the very moment when they were remonstrating with the generals on what had occurred; exposing these magistrates to the utmost peril, and putting the generals themselves to ignominy.[227] "If such are to be our proceedings, (continued Xenophon), look you well into what condition the army will fall. You, the aggregate body,[228] will no longer be the sovereign authority to make war or peace with whom you please; each individual among you will conduct the army against any

point which he may choose. And even if men should come to you as envoys, either for peace or for other purposes, they may be slain by any single enemy; so that you will be debarred from all public communications whatever. Next, those whom your universal suffrage shall have chosen commanders, will have no authority; while any self-elected general who chooses to give the word, Cast! Cast! (i. e. darts or stones), may put to death, without trial, either officer or soldier, as it suits him; that is, if he finds you ready to obey him, as it happened near Kerasus. Look, now, what these self-elected leaders have done for you. The magistrate of Kerasus, if he was really guilty of wrong towards you, has been enabled to escape with impunity; if he was innocent, he has been obliged to run away from you, as the only means of avoiding death without pretence or trial. Those who stoned the heralds to death, have brought matters to such a pass, that you alone, among all Greeks, cannot enter the town of Kerasus in safety, unless in commanding force; and that we cannot even send in a herald to take up our dead (Klearetus and those who were slain in the attack on the Kerasuntine village) for burial; though at first those who had slain them in self-defence were anxious to give up the bodies to us. For who will take the risk of going in as herald, from those who have set the example of putting heralds to death? We generals were obliged to entreat the Kerasuntines to bury the bodies for us."[229]

Continuing in this emphatic protest against the recent disorders and outrages, Xenophon at length succeeded in impressing his own sentiment, heartily and unanimously, upon the soldiers. They passed a vote that the ringleaders of the mutiny at Kerasus should be punished; that if any one was guilty of similar outrages in future, he should be put upon his trial by the generals, before the lochages or captains as judges, and if condemned by them, put to death; and that trial should be had before the same persons, for any other wrong committed since the death of Cyrus. A suitable religious ceremony was also directed to be performed, at the instance of Xenophon and the prophets, to purify the army.[230]

This speech affords an interesting specimen of the political morality universal throughout the Grecian world, though deeper and more predominant among its better sections. In the miscellaneous aggregate, and temporary society, now mustered at Kotyôra, Xenophon insists on the universal suffrage of the whole body, as the legitimate sovereign authority for the guidance of every individual will; the decision of the majority, fairly and formally collected, as carrying a title to prevail over every dissentient minority; the generals chosen by the majority of votes, as the only persons entitled to obedience. This is the cardinal principle to which he appeals, as the anchorage of political obligation in the mind of each separate man or fraction; as the condition of all success, all safety, and all conjoint action; as the only condition either for punishing wrong or protecting right; as indispensable to keep up their sympathies with the Hellenic communities, and their dignity either as soldiers or as citizens. The complete success of his speech proves that he knew how to touch the right chord of Grecian feeling. No serious acts of individual insubordination occurred afterwards,

though the army collectively went wrong on more than one occasion. And what is not less important to notice,—the influence of Xenophon himself, after his unreserved and courageous remonstrance, seems to have been sensibly augmented,—certainly no way diminished.

The circumstances which immediately followed were indeed well calculated to augment it. For it was resolved, on the proposition of Xenophon himself[231] that the generals themselves should be tried before the newly-constituted tribunal of the lochages or captains, in case any one had complaint to make against them for past matters; agreeably to the Athenian habit of subjecting every magistrate to a trial of accountability on laying down his office. In the course of this investigation, Philesius and Xanthiklês were fined twenty minæ, to make good an assignable deficiency of that amount, in the cargoes of those merchantmen which had been detained at Trapezus for the transport of the army; Sophænetus, who had the general superintendence of this property, but had been negligent in that duty, was fined ten minæ. Next, the name of Xenophon was put up, when various persons stood forward to accuse him of having beaten and ill-used them. As commander of the rear-guard, his duty was by far the severest and most difficult, especially during the intense cold and deep snow; since the sick and wounded, as well as the laggards and plunderers, all fell under his inspection. One man especially was loud in complaints against him, and Xenophon questioned him, as to the details of his case, before the assembled army. It turned out that he had given him blows, because the man, having been intrusted with the task of carrying a sick soldier, was about to evade the duty by burying the dying man alive.[232] This interesting debate (given in the Anabasis at length) ended by full approbation, on the part of the army, of Xenophon's conduct, accompanied with regret that he had not handled the man yet more severely.

The statements of Xenophon himself give us a vivid idea of the internal discipline of the army, even as managed by a discreet and well-tempered officer. "I acknowledge (said he to the soldiers) to have struck many men for disorderly conduct; men who were content to owe their preservation to your orderly march and constant fighting, while they themselves ran about to plunder and enrich themselves at your cost. Had we all acted as they did, we should have perished to a man. Sometimes, too, I struck men who were lagging behind with cold and fatigue, or were stopping the way so as to hinder others from getting forward; I struck them with my fist,[233] in order to save them from the spear of the enemy. You yourselves stood by, and saw me; you had arms in your hands, yet none of you interfered to prevent me. I did it for their good as well as for yours, not from any insolence of disposition; for it was a time when we were all alike suffering from cold, hunger, and fatigue; whereas I now live comparatively well, drink more wine, and pass easy days,—and yet I strike no one. You will find that the men who failed most in those times of hardship, are now the most outrageous offenders in the army. There is Boïskus,[234] the Thessalian pugilist, who pretended sickness during the march, in order to evade the burthen of

carrying his shield,—and now, as I am informed, he has stripped several citizens of Kotyôra of their clothes. If (he concluded) the blows which I have occasionally given, in cases of necessity, are now brought in evidence,—I call upon those among you also, to whom I have rendered aid and protection, to stand up and testify in my favor."[235]

Many individuals responded to this appeal, insomuch that Xenophon was not merely acquitted, but stood higher than before in the opinion of the army. We learn from his defence that for a commanding officer to strike a soldier with his fist, if wanting in duty, was not considered improper; at least under such circumstances as those of the retreat. But what deserves notice still more, is, the extraordinary influence which Xenophon's powers of speaking gave him over the minds of the army. He stood distinguished from the other generals, Lacedæmonian, Arcadian, Achæan, etc., by having the power of working on the minds of the soldiers collectively; and we see that he had the good sense, as well as the spirit, not to shrink from telling them unpleasant truths. In spite of such frankness—or rather, partly by means of such frankness,—his ascendency as commander not only remained unabated, as compared with that of the others, but went on increasing. For whatever may be said about the flattery of orators as a means of influence over the people,—it will be found that though particular points may be gained in this way, yet wherever the influence of an orator has been steady and long-continued (like that of Perikles[236] or Demosthenes) it is owing in part to the fact that he has an opinion of his own, and is not willing to accommodate himself constantly to the prepossessions of his hearers. Without the oratory of Xenophon, there would have existed no engine for kindling or sustaining the *sensus communis* of the ten thousand Cyreians assembled at Kotyôra, or for keeping up the moral authority of the aggregate over the individual members and fractions. The other officers could doubtless speak well enough to address short encouragements, or give simple explanations, to the soldiers; without this faculty, no man was fit for military command over Greeks. But the oratory of Xenophon was something of a higher order. Whoever will study the discourse pronounced by him at Kotyôra, will perceive a dexterity in dealing with assembled multitudes,—a discriminating use sometimes of the plainest and most direct appeal, sometimes of indirect insinuation or circuitous transitions to work round the minds of the hearers,—a command of those fundamental political convictions which lay deep in the Grecian mind, but were often so overlaid by the fresh impulses arising out of each successive situation, as to require some positive friction to draw them out from their latent state—lastly, a power of expansion and varied repetition—such as would be naturally imparted both by the education and the practice of an intelligent Athenian, but would rarely be found in any other Grecian city. The energy and judgment displayed by Xenophon in the retreat were doubtless not less essential to his influence than his power of speaking; but in these points we may be sure that other officers were more nearly his equals.

The important public proceedings above described not only restored the influence of Xenophon, but also cleared off a great amount of bad feeling, and sensibly abated the bad habits, which had grown up in the army. A scene which speedily followed was not without effect in promoting cheerful and amicable sympathies. The Paphlagonian prince Korylas, weary of the desultory warfare carried on between the Greeks and the border inhabitants, sent envoys to the Greek camp with presents of horses and fine robes,[237] and with expressions of a wish to conclude peace. The Greek generals accepted the presents, and promised to submit the proposition to the army. But first they entertained the envoys at a banquet, providing at the same time games and dances, with other recreations amusing not only to them but also to the soldiers generally. The various dances, warlike and pantomimic, of Thracians, Mysians, Ænianes, Magnêtes, etc., are described by Xenophon in a lively and interesting manner. They were followed on the next day by an amicable convention concluded between the army and the Paphlagonians.[238]

Not long afterwards,—a number of transports, sufficient for the whole army, having been assembled from Herakleia and Sinôpê,—all the soldiers were conveyed by sea to the latter place, passing by the mouth of the rivers Thermodon, Iris, and Halys, which they would have found impracticable to cross in a land-march through Paphlagonia. Having reached Sinôpê after a day and a night of sailing with a fair wind, they were hospitably received, and lodged in the neighboring seaport of Armênê, where the Sinopians sent to them a large present of barley-meal and wine, and where they remained for five days.

It was here that they were joined by Cheirisophus, whose absence had been so unexpectedly prolonged. But he came with only a single trireme, bringing nothing except a message from Anaxibius, the Lacedæmonian admiral in the Bosphorus; who complimented the army, and promised that they should be taken into pay as soon as they were out of the Euxine. The soldiers, severely disappointed on seeing him arrive thus empty-handed, became the more strongly bent on striking some blow to fill their own purses before they reached Greece. Feeling that it was necessary to the success of any such project that it should be prepared not only skilfully, but secretly, they resolved to elect a single general in place of that board of six (or perhaps more) who were still in function. Such was now the ascendency of Xenophon, that the general sentiment of the army at once turned towards him; and the lochages or captains, communicating to him what was in contemplation, intimated to him their own anxious hopes that he would not decline the offer. Tempted by so flattering a proposition, he hesitated at first what answer he should give. But at length the uncertainty of being able to satisfy the exigencies of the army, and the fear of thus compromising the reputation which he had already realized, outweighed the opposite inducements. As in other cases of doubt, so in this,—he offered sacrifice to Zeus Basileus; and the answer returned by the victims was such as to determine him to refusal. Accordingly, when the army assembled, with predetermination to choose a single chief,

and proceeded to nominate him,—he respectfully and thankfully declined, on the ground that Cheirisophus was a Lacedæmonian, and that he himself was not; adding that he should cheerfully serve under any one whom they might name. His excuse, however, was repudiated by the army; and especially by the lochages. Several of these latter were Arcadians; and one of them, Agasias, cried out, with full sympathy of the soldiers, that if that principle were admitted, he, as an Arcadian, ought to resign his command. Finding that his former reason was not approved, Xenophon acquainted the army that he had sacrificed to know whether he ought to accept the command, and that the gods had peremptorily forbidden him to do so.[239]

Cheirisophus was then elected sole commander, and undertook the duty; saying that he would have willingly served under Xenophon, if the latter had accepted the office, but that it was a good thing for Xenophon himself to have declined,—since Dexippus had already poisoned the mind of Anaxibius against him, although he (Cheirisophus) had emphatically contradicted the calumnies.[240]

On the next day, the army sailed forward, under the command of Cheirisophus, to Herakleia; near which town they were hospitably entertained, and gratified with a present of meal, wine, and bullocks, even greater than they had received at Sinôpê. It now appeared that Xenophon had acted wisely in declining the sole command; and also that Cheirisophus, though elected commander, yet having been very long absent, was not really of so much importance in the eyes of the soldiers as Xenophon. In the camp near Herakleia, the soldiers became impatient that their generals (for the habit of looking upon Xenophon as one of them still continued) took no measures to procure money for them. The Achæan Lykon proposed that they should extort a contribution of no less than three thousand staters of Kyzikus (about sixty thousand Attic drachmæ, or ten talents, equal to two thousand three hundred pounds) from the inhabitants of Herakleia; another man immediately outbid this proposition, and proposed that they should require ten thousand staters—a full month's pay for the army. It was moved that Cheirisophus and Xenophon should go to the Herakleots as envoys with this demand. But both of them indignantly refused to be concerned in so unjust an extortion from a Grecian city which had just received the army kindly, and sent handsome presents. Accordingly, Lykon with two Arcadian officers undertook the mission, and intimated the demand, not without threats in case of non-compliance, to the Herakleots. The latter replied that they would take it into consideration. But they waited only for the departure of the envoys, and then immediately closed their gates, manned their walls, and brought in their outlying property.

The project being thus baffled, Lykon and the rest turned their displeasure upon Cheirisophus and Xenophon, whom they accused of having occasioned its miscarriage. And they now began to exclaim, that it was disgraceful to the Arcadians and Achæans; who formed more than one numerical half of the army and endured all the toil—to obey as well as to enrich generals from other Hellenic cities; especially a single Athenian who furnished no contingent to the army. Here again it is remarkable

that the personal importance of Xenophon caused him to be still regarded as a general, though the sole command had been vested, by formal vote, in Cheirisophus. So vehement was the dissatisfaction, that all the Arcadian and Achæan soldiers in the army, more than four thousand and five hundred hoplites in number, renounced the authority of Cheirisophus, formed themselves into a distinct division, and chose ten commanders from out of their own numbers. The whole army thus became divided into three portions—first, the Arcadians and Achæans; secondly, one thousand and four hundred hoplites and seven hundred peltasts, who adhered to Cheirisophus; lastly, one thousand seven hundred hoplites, three hundred peltasts, and forty horsemen, (all the horsemen in the army) attaching themselves to Xenophon; who however was taking measures to sail away individually from Herakleia and quit the army altogether, which he would have done had he not been restrained by unfavorable sacrifices.[241]

The Arcadian division, departing first, in vessels from Herakleia, landed at the harbor of Kalpê; an untenanted promontory of the Bithynian or Asiatic Thrace, midway between Herakleia and Byzantium. From thence they marched at once into the interior of Bithynia, with the view of surprising the villages, and acquiring plunder. But through rashness and bad management, they first sustained several partial losses, and ultimately became surrounded upon an eminence, by a large muster of the indigenous Bithynians from all the territory around. They were only rescued from destruction by the unexpected appearance of Xenophon with his division; who had left Herakleia somewhat later, but heard by accident, during their march, of the danger of their comrades. The whole army thus became re-assembled at Kalpê, where the Arcadians and Achæans, disgusted at the ill-success of their separate expedition, again established the old union and the old generals. They chose Neon in place of Cheirisophus, who,—afflicted by the humiliation put upon him, in having been first named sole commander and next deposed within a week,—had fallen sick of a fever and died. The elder Arcadian captains farther moved a resolution, that if any one henceforward should propose to separate the army into fractions, he should be put to death.[242]

The locality of Kalpê was well suited for the foundation of a colony, which Xenophon evidently would have been glad to bring about, though he took no direct measures tending towards it; while the soldiers were so bent on returning to Greece, and so jealous lest Xenophon should entrap them into remaining, that they almost shunned the encampment. It so happened that they were detained there for some days without being able to march forth even in quest of provisions, because the sacrifices were not favorable. Xenophon refused to lead them out, against the warning of the sacrifices—although the army suspected him of a deliberate manœuvre for the purpose of detention. Neon, however, less scrupulous, led out a body of two thousand men who chose to follow him, under severe distress for want of provisions. But being surprised by the native Bithynians, with the aid of some troops of the Persian

satrap Pharnabazus, he was defeated with the loss of no less than five hundred men; a misfortune which Xenophon regards as the natural retribution for contempt of the sacrificial warning. The dangerous position of Neon with the remainder of the detachment was rapidly made known at the camp; upon which Xenophon, unharnessing a waggon-bullock as the only animal near at hand, immediately offered sacrifice. On this occasion, the victim was at once favorable; so that he led out without delay the greater part of the force, to the rescue of the exposed detachment, which was brought back in safety to the camp. So bold had the enemy become, that in the night the camp was attacked. The Greeks were obliged on the next day to retreat into stronger ground, surrounding themselves with a ditch and palisade. Fortunately a vessel arrived from Herakleia, bringing to the camp at Kalpê a supply of barley-meal, cattle, and wine; which restored the spirits of the army, enabling them to go forth on the ensuing morning, and assume the aggressive against the Bithynians and the troops of Pharnabazus. These troops were completely defeated and dispersed, so that the Greeks returned to their camp at Kalpê in the evening, both safe and masters of the country.[243]

At Kalpê they remained some time, awaiting the arrival of Kleander from Byzantium, who was said to be about to bring vessels for their transport. They were now abundantly provided with supplies, not merely from the undisturbed plunder of the neighboring villages, but also from the visits of traders who came with cargoes. Indeed the impression—that they were preparing, at the instance of Xenophon, to found a new city at Kalpê—became so strong, that several of the neighboring native villages sent envoys to ask on what terms alliance would be granted to them. At length Kleander came, but with two triremes only.[244]

Kleander was the Lacedæmonian harmost or governor of Byzantium. His appearance opens to us a new phase in the eventful history of this gallant army, as well as an insight into the state of the Grecian world under the Lacedæmonian empire. He came attended by Dexippus, who had served in the Cyreian army until their arrival at Trapezus, and who had there been entrusted with an armed vessel for the purpose of detaining transports to convey the troops home, but had abused the confidence reposed in him by running away with the ship to Byzantium.

It so happened that at the moment when Kleander arrived, the whole army was out on a marauding excursion. Orders had been already promulgated, that whatever was captured by every one when the whole army was out, should be brought in and dealt with as public property; though on days when the army was collectively at rest, any soldier might go out individually and take to himself whatever he could pillage. On the day when Kleander arrived, and found the whole army out, some soldiers were just coming back with a lot of sheep which they had seized. By right, the sheep ought to have been handed into the public store. But these soldiers, desirous to appropriate them wrongfully, addressed themselves to Dexippus, and promised him a portion if he would enable them to retain the rest. Accordingly the latter interfered,

drove away those who claimed the sheep as public property, and denounced them as thieves to Kleander; who desired him to bring them before him. Dexippus arrested one of them, a soldier belonging to the lochus or company of one of the best friends of Xenophon,—the Arcadian Agasias. The latter took the man under his protection; while the soldiers around, incensed not less at the past than at the present conduct of Dexippus, broke out into violent manifestations, called him a traitor and pelted him with stones. Such was their wrath that not Dexippus alone, but the crew of the triremes also, and even Kleander himself, fled in alarm; in spite of the intervention of Xenophon and the other generals, who on the one hand explained to Kleander, that it was an established army-order which these soldiers were seeking to enforce—and on the other hand controlled the mutineers. But the Lacedæmonian harmost was so incensed as well by his own fright as by the calumnies of Dexippus, that he threatened to sail away at once, and proclaim the Cyreian army enemies to Sparta, so that every Hellenic city should be interdicted from giving them reception.[245] It was in vain that the generals, well knowing the formidable consequences of such an interdict, entreated him to relent. He would consent only on condition that the soldier who had begun to throw stones, as well as Agasias the interfering officer, should be delivered up to him. This latter demand was especially insisted upon by Dexippus, who, hating Xenophon, had already tried to prejudice Anaxibius against him, and believed that Agasias had acted by his order.[246]

The situation became now extremely critical; since the soldiers would not easily be brought to surrender their comrades,—who had a perfectly righteous cause, though they had supported it by undue violence,—to the vengeance of a traitor like Dexippus. When the army was convened in assembly, several of them went so far as to treat the menace of Kleander with contempt. But Xenophon took pains to set them right upon this point. "Soldiers (said he), it will be no slight misfortune if Kleander shall depart as he threatens to do, in his present temper towards us. We are here close upon the cities of Greece; now the Lacedæmonians are the imperial power in Greece, and not merely their authorized officers, but even each one of their individual citizens, can accomplish what he pleases in the various cities. If then Kleander begins by shutting us out from Byzantium, and next enjoins the Lacedæmonian harmosts in the other cities to do the same, proclaiming us lawless and disobedient to Sparta,—if, besides, the same representation should be conveyed to the Lacedæmonian admiral of the fleet, Anaxibius,—we shall be hard pressed either to remain or to sail away; for the Lacedæmonians are at present masters, both on land and at sea.[247] We must not, for the sake of any one or two men, suffer the whole army to be excluded from Greece. We must obey whatever the Lacedæmonians command, especially as our cities, to which we respectively belong, now obey them. As to what concerns myself, I understand that Dexippus has told Kleander that Agasias would never have taken such a step except by my orders. Now, if Agasias himself states this, I am ready to exonerate both him and all of you, and to give myself up to any extremity of punishment. I maintain too, that any other man whom

Kleander arraigns, ought in like manner to give himself up for trial, in order that you collectively may be discharged from the imputation. It will be hard indeed, if just as we are reaching Greece, we should not only be debarred from the praise and honor which we anticipated, but should be degraded even below the level of others, and shut out from the Grecian cities."[248]

After this speech from the philo-Laconian Xenophon,—so significant a testimony of the unmeasured ascendency and interference of the Lacedæmonians throughout Greece,—Agasias rose and proclaimed, that what he had done was neither under the orders, nor with the privity, of Xenophon; that he had acted on a personal impulse of wrath, at seeing his own honest and innocent soldier dragged away by the traitor Dexippus; but that he now willingly gave himself up as a victim, to avert from the army the displeasure of the Lacedæmonians. This generous self-sacrifice, which at the moment promised nothing less than a fatal result to Agasias, was accepted by the army; and the generals conducted both him and the soldier whom he had rescued, as prisoners to Kleander. Presenting himself as the responsible party, Agasias at the same time explained to Kleander the infamous behavior of Dexippus to the army, and said that towards no one else would he have acted in the same manner; while the soldier whom he had rescued and who was given up at the same time, also affirmed that he had interfered merely to prevent Dexippus and some others from overruling, for their own individual benefit, a proclaimed order of the entire army. Kleander, having observed that if Dexippus had done what was affirmed, he would be the last to defend him, but that no one ought to have been stoned without trial,—desired that the persons surrendered might be left for his consideration, and at the same time retracted his expressions of displeasure as regarded all the others.[249]

The generals then retired, leaving Kleander in possession of the prisoners, and on the point of taking his dinner. But they retired with mournful feelings, and Xenophon presently convened the army to propose that a general deputation should be sent to Kleander to implore his lenity towards their two comrades. This being cordially adopted, Xenophon, at the head of a deputation comprising Drakontius, the Spartan, as well as the chief officers, addressed an earnest appeal to Kleander, representing that his honor had been satisfied with the unconditional surrender of the two persons required; that the army, deeply concerned for two meritorious comrades, entreated him now to show mercy and spare their lives; that they promised him in return the most implicit obedience, and entreated him to take the command of them, in order that he might have personal cognizance of their exact discipline, and compare their worth with that of Dexippus. Kleander was not merely soothed, but completely won over by this address; and said in reply that the conduct of the generals belied altogether the representations made to him, (doubtless by Dexippus) that they were seeking to alienate the army from the Lacedæmonians. He not only restored the two men in his power, but also accepted the command of the army, and promised to conduct them back into Greece.[250]

The prospects of the army appeared thus greatly improved; the more so, as Kleander, on entering upon his new functions as commander, found the soldiers so cheerful and orderly, that he was highly gratified, and exchanged personal tokens of friendship and hospitality with Xenophon. But when sacrifices came to be offered, for beginning the march homeward, the signs were so unpropitious, for three successive days, that Kleander could not bring himself to brave such auguries at the outset of his career. Accordingly, he told the generals, that the gods plainly forbade him, and reserved it for them, to conduct the army into Greece; that he should therefore sail back to Byzantium, and would receive the army in the best way he could, when they reached the Bosphorus. After an interchange of presents with the soldiers, he then departed with his two triremes.[251]

The favorable sentiment now established in the bosom of Kleander will be found very serviceable hereafter to the Cyreians at Byzantium; but they had cause for deeply regretting the unpropitious sacrifices which had deterred him from assuming the actual command at Kalpê. In the request preferred to him by them that he would march as their commander to the Bosphorus, we may recognize a scheme, and a very well-contrived scheme, of Xenophon; who had before desired to leave the army at Herakleia, and who saw plainly that the difficulties of a commander, unless he were a Lacedæmonian of station and influence, would increase with every step of their approach to Greece. Had Kleander accepted the command, the soldiers would have been better treated, while Xenophon himself might either have remained as his adviser, or might have gone home. He probably would have chosen the latter course.

Under the command of their own officers, the Cyreians now marched from Kalpê across Bithynia to Chrysopolis,[252] (in the territory of Chalkêdon on the Asiatic edge of the Bosphorus, immediately opposite to Byzantium, as Scutari now is to Constantinople), where they remained seven days, turning into money the slaves and plunder which they had collected. Unhappily for them, the Lacedæmonian admiral Anaxibius was now at Byzantium, so that their friend Kleander was under his superior command. And Pharnabazus, the Persian satrap of the north-western regions of Asia Minor, becoming much alarmed lest they should invade his satrapy, despatched a private message to Anaxibius; whom he prevailed upon, by promise of large presents, to transport the army forthwith across to the European side of the Bosphorus.[253] Accordingly, Anaxibius, sending for the generals and the lochages across to Byzantium, invited the army to cross, and gave them his assurance that as soon as the soldiers should be in Europe, he would provide pay for them. The other officers told him that they would return with this message and take the sense of the army; but Xenophon, on his own account, said that he should not return; that he should now retire from the army, and sail away from Byzantium. It was only on the pressing instance of Anaxibius that he was induced to go back to Chrysopolis and conduct the army across; on the understanding that he should depart immediately afterwards.

Here at Byzantium, he received his first communication from the Thracian prince Seuthes; who sent Medosadês to offer him a reward if he would bring the army across. Xenophon replied that the army would cross; that no reward from Seuthes was needful to bring about that movement; but that he himself was about to depart, leaving the command in other hands. In point of fact, the whole army crossed with little delay, landed in Europe, and found themselves within the walls of Byzantium. [254] Xenophon, who had come along with them, paid a visit shortly afterwards to his friend the harmost Kleander, and took leave of him as about to depart immediately. But Kleander told him that he must not think of departing until the army was out of the city, and that he would be held responsible if they stayed. In truth Kleander was very uneasy so long as the soldiers were within the walls, and was well aware that it might be no easy matter to induce them to go away. For Anaxibius had practised a gross fraud in promising them pay, which he had neither the ability nor the inclination to provide. Without handing to them either pay or even means of purchasing supplies, he issued orders that they must go forth with arms and baggage, and muster outside of the gates, there to be numbered for an immediate march; any one who stayed behind being held as punishable. This proclamation was alike unexpected and offensive to the soldiers, who felt that they had been deluded, and were very backward in obeying. Hence Kleander, while urgent with Xenophon to defer his departure until he had conducted the army outside of the walls, added—"Go forth as if you were about to march along with them; when you are once outside, you may depart as soon as you please."[255] Xenophon replied that this matter must be settled with Anaxibius, to whom accordingly both of them went, and who repeated the same directions, in a manner yet more peremptory. Though it was plain to Xenophon that he was here making himself a sort of instrument to the fraud which Anaxibius had practised upon the army, yet he had no choice but to obey. Accordingly, he as well as the other generals put themselves at the head of the troops, who followed, however reluctantly, and arrived most of them outside of the gates. Eteonikus (a Lacedæmonian officer of consideration, noticed more than once in my last preceding volume) commanding at the gate, stood close to it in person; in order that when all the Cyreians had gone forth, he might immediately shut it and fasten it with the bar.[256]

Anaxibius knew well what he was doing. He fully anticipated that the communication of the final orders would occasion an outbreak among the Cyreians, and was anxious to defer it until they were outside. But when there remained only the rearmost companies still in the inside and on their march, all the rest having got out—he thought the danger was over, and summoned to him the generals and captains, all of whom were probably near the gates superintending the march through. It seems that Xenophon, having given notice that he intended to depart, did not answer to this summons as one of the generals, but remained outside among the soldiers. "Take what supplies you want (said Anaxibius) from the neighboring Thracian villages, which are well furnished with wheat, barley, and other necessaries. After thus

providing yourselves, march forward to the Chersonesus, and there Kyniskus will give you pay."[257]

This was the first distinct intimation given by Anaxibius that he did not intend to perform his promise of finding pay for the soldiers. Who Kyniskus was, we do not know, nor was he probably known to the Cyreians; but the march here enjoined was at least one hundred and fifty English miles, and might be much longer. The route was not indicated, and the generals had to inquire from Anaxibius whether they were to go by what was called the Holy Mountain (that is, by the shorter line, skirting the northern coast of the Propontis), or by a more inland and circuitous road through Thrace;—also whether they were to regard the Thracian prince, Seuthes, as a friend or an enemy.[258]

Instead of the pay which had been formally promised to them by Anaxibius if they would cross over from Asia to Byzantium, the Cyreians thus found themselves sent away empty-handed, to a long march,—through another barbarous country, with chance supplies to be ravished only by their own efforts,—and at the end of it a lot unknown and uncertain; while, had they remained in Asia, they would have had at any rate the rich satrapy of Pharnabazus within their reach. To perfidy of dealing was now added a brutal ejectment from Byzantium, without even the commonest manifestations of hospitality; contrasting pointedly with the treatment which the army had recently experienced at Trapezus, Sinôpê, and Herakleia; where they had been welcomed not only by compliments on their past achievements, but also by an ample present of flour, meat, and wine. Such behavior could not fail to provoke the most violent indignation in the bosoms of the soldiery; and Anaxibius had therefore delayed giving the order until the last soldiers were marching out, thinking that the army would hear nothing of it until the generals came out of the gates to inform them; so that the gates would be closed, and the walls manned to resist any assault from without. But his calculations were not realized. Either one of the soldiers passing by heard him give the order, or one of the captains forming his audience stole away from the rest, and hastened forward to acquaint his comrades on the outside. The bulk of the army, already irritated by the inhospitable way in which they had been thrust out, needed nothing farther to inflame them into spontaneous mutiny and aggression. While the generals within (who either took the communication more patiently, or at least, looking farther forward, felt that any attempt to resent or resist the ill usage of the Spartan admiral would only make their position worse) were discussing with Anaxibius the details of the march just enjoined, the soldiers without, bursting into spontaneous movement, with a simultaneous and fiery impulse, made a rush back to get possession of the gate. But Eteonikus, seeing their movement, closed it without a moment's delay, and fastened the bar. The soldiers on reaching the gate and finding it barred, clamored loudly to get it opened, threatened to break it down, and even began to knock violently against it. Some ran down to the sea-coast, and made their way into the city round the line of stones at the base of the

city wall, which protected it against the sea; while the rearmost soldiers who had not yet marched out, seeing what was passing, and fearful of being cut off from their comrades, assaulted the gate from the inside, severed the fastenings with axes, and threw it wide open to the army.[259] All the soldiers then rushed up, and were soon again in Byzantium.

Nothing could exceed the terror of the Lacedæmonians as well as of the native Byzantines, when they saw the excited Cyreians again within the walls. The town seemed already taken and on the point of being plundered. Neither Anaxibius nor Eteonikus took the smallest means of resistance, nor stayed to brave the approach of the soldiers, whose wrath they were fully conscious of having deserved. Both fled to the citadel—the former first running to the sea-shore, and jumping into a fishing-boat to go thither by sea. He even thought the citadel not tenable with its existing garrison, and sent over to Chalkêdon for a reinforcement. Still more terrified were the citizens of the town. Every man in the market-place instantly fled; some to their houses, others to the merchant vessels in the harbor, others to the triremes or ships of war, which they hauled down to the water, and thus put to sea.[260]

To the deception and harshness of the Spartan admiral, there was thus added a want of precaution in the manner of execution, which threatened to prove the utter ruin of Byzantium. For it was but too probable that the Cyreian soldiers, under the keen sense of recent injury, would satiate their revenge, and reimburse themselves for the want of hospitality towards them, without distinguishing the Lacedæmonian garrison from the Byzantine citizens; and that too from mere impulse, not merely without orders, but in spite of prohibitions, from their generals. Such was the aspect of the case, when they became again assembled in a mass within the gates; and such would probably have been the reality, had Xenophon executed his design of retiring earlier, so as to leave the other generals acting without him. Being on the outside along with the soldiers, Xenophon felt at once, as soon as he saw the gates forced open and the army again within the town, the terrific emergency which was impending; first, the sack of Byzantium,—next, horror and antipathy, throughout all Greece, towards the Cyreian officers and soldiers indiscriminately,—lastly, unsparing retribution inflicted upon all by the power of Sparta. Overwhelmed with these anxieties, he rushed into the town along with the multitude, using every effort to pacify them and bring them into order. They on their parts, delighted to see him along with them, and conscious of their own force, were eager to excite him to the same pitch as themselves, and to prevail on him to second and methodize their present triumph. "Now is your time, Xenophon, (they exclaimed), to make yourself a man. You have here a city,—you have triremes,—you have money,—you have plenty of soldiers. Now then, if you choose, you can enrich us; and we in return can make you powerful."—"You speak well (replied he); I shall do as you propose; but if you want to accomplish anything, you must fall into military array forthwith." He knew that this was the first condition of returning to anything like tranquillity; and by great good for-

tune, the space called the Thrakion, immediately adjoining the gate inside, was level, open, and clear of houses; presenting an excellent place of arms or locality for a review. The whole army,—partly from their long military practice,—partly under the impression that Xenophon was really about to second their wishes and direct some aggressive operation,—threw themselves almost of their own accord into regular array on the Thrakion; the hoplites eight deep, the peltasts on each flank. It was in this position that Xenophon addressed them as follows:—

"Soldiers! I am not surprised that you are incensed, and that you think yourselves scandalously cheated and ill-used. But if we give way to our wrath, if we punish these Lacedæmonians now before us for their treachery, and plunder this innocent city,—reflect what will be the consequence. We shall stand proclaimed forthwith as enemies to the Lacedæmonians and their allies; and what sort of a war that will be, those who have witnessed and who still recollect recent matters of history may easily fancy. We Athenians entered into the war against Sparta with a powerful army and fleet, an abundant revenue, and numerous tributary cities in Asia as well as Europe,—among them this very Byzantium in which we now stand. We have been vanquished in the way that all of you know. And what then will be the fate of us soldiers, when we shall have as united enemies, Sparta with all her old allies and Athens besides,—Tissaphernes and the barbaric forces on the coast,—and most of all, the Great King whom we marched up to dethrone and slay, if we were able? Is any man fool enough to think that we have a chance of making head against so many combined enemies? Let us not plunge madly into dishonor and ruin, nor incur the enmity of our own fathers and friends; who are in the cities which will take arms against us,—and will take arms justly, if we, who abstained from seizing any barbaric city, even when we were in force sufficient, shall nevertheless now plunder the first Grecian city into which we have been admitted. As far as I am concerned, may I be buried ten thousand fathoms deep in the earth, rather than see you do such things; and I exhort *you*, too, as Greeks, to obey the leaders of Greece. Endeavor, while thus obedient, to obtain your just rights; but if you should fail in this, rather submit to injustice than cut yourselves off from the Grecian world. Send to inform Anaxibius that we have entered the city, not with a view to commit any violence, but in the hope, if possible, of obtaining from him the advantages which he promised us. If we fail, we shall at least prove to him that we quit the city, not under his fraudulent manœuvres, but under our own sense of the duty of obedience."[261]

This speech completely arrested the impetuous impulse of the army, brought them to a true sense of their situation, and induced them to adopt the proposition of Xenophon. They remained unmoved in their position on the Thrakion, while three of the captains were sent to communicate with Anaxibius. While they were thus waiting, a Theban named Kœratadas approached, who had once commanded in Byzantium under the Lacedæmonians, during the previous war. He had now become a sort of professional Condottiero or general, looking out for an army to command, wher-

ever he could find one, and offering his services to any city which would engage him. He addressed the assembled Cyreians, and offered, if they would accept him for their general, to conduct them against the Delta of Thrace (the space included between the north-west corner of the Propontis and the south-west corner of the Euxine), which he asserted to be a rich territory presenting great opportunity to plunder; he farther promised to furnish them with ample subsistence during the march. Presently the envoys returned, bearing the reply of Anaxibius, who received the message favorably, promising that not only the army should have no cause to regret their obedience, but that he would both report their good conduct to the authorities at home, and do everything in his own power to promote their comfort.[262] He said nothing farther about taking them into pay; that delusion having now answered its purpose. The soldiers, on hearing his communication, adopted a resolution to accept Kœratadas as their future commander, and then marched out of the town. As soon as they were on the outside, Anaxibius, not content with closing the gates against them, made public proclamation that if any one of them were found in the town, he should be sold forthwith into slavery.

There are few cases throughout Grecian history in which an able discourse has been the means of averting so much evil, as was averted by this speech of Xenophon to the army in Byzantium. Nor did he ever, throughout the whole period of his command, render to them a more signal service. The miserable consequences, which would have ensued, had the army persisted in their aggressive impulse,—first, to the citizens of the town, ultimately to themselves, while Anaxibius, the only guilty person, had the means of escaping by sea, even under the worst circumstances,—are stated by Xenophon rather under than above the reality. At the same time no orator ever undertook a more difficult case, or achieved a fuller triumph over unpromising conditions. If we consider the feelings and position of the army at the instant of their breaking into the town, we shall be astonished that any commander could have arrested their movements. Though fresh from all the glory of their retreat, they had been first treacherously entrapped over from Asia, next roughly ejected, by Anaxibius; and although it may be said truly that the citizens of Byzantium had no concern either in the one or the other, yet little heed is commonly taken, in military operations, to the distinction between garrison and citizens in an assailed town. Having arms in their hands, with consciousness of force arising out of their exploits in Asia, the Cyreians were at the same time inflamed by the opportunity both of avenging a gross recent injury, and enriching themselves in the process of execution; to which we may add, the excitement of that rush whereby they had obtained the reëntry, and the farther fact, that without the gates they had nothing to expect except poor, hard, uninviting service in Thrace. With soldiers already possessed by an overpowering impulse of this nature, what chance was there that a retiring general, on the point of quitting the army, could so work upon their minds as to induce them to renounce the prey before them? Xenophon had nothing to invoke except distant considerations, partly of Hellenic reputation, chiefly of prudence; considerations indeed

of unquestionable reality and prodigious magnitude, yet belonging all to a distant future, and therefore of little comparative force, except when set forth in magnified characters by the orator. How powerfully he worked upon the minds of his hearers, so as to draw forth these far-removed dangers from the cloud of present sentiment by which they were overlaid,—how skilfully he employed in illustration the example of his own native city,—will be seen by all who study his speech. Never did his Athenian accomplishments,—his talent for giving words to important thoughts,—his promptitude in seizing a present situation and managing the sentiments of an impetuous multitude,—appear to greater advantage than when he was thus suddenly called forth to meet a terrible emergency. His pre-established reputation and the habit of obeying his orders, were doubtless essential conditions of success. But none of his colleagues in command would have been able to accomplish the like memorable change on the minds of the soldiers, or to procure obedience for any simple authoritative restraint; nay, it is probable, that if Xenophon had not been at hand, the other generals would have followed the passionate movement, even though they had been reluctant,—from simple inability to repress it.[263] Again,—whatever might have been the accomplishments of Xenophon, it is certain that even *he* would not have been able to work upon the minds of these excited soldiers, had they not been Greeks and citizens as well as soldiers,—bred in Hellenic sympathies and accustomed to Hellenic order, with authority operating in part through voice and persuasion, and not through the Persian whip and instruments of torture. The memorable discourse on the Thrakion at Byzantium illustrates the working of that persuasive agency which formed one of the permanent forces and conspicuous charms of Hellenism. It teaches us that if the orator could sometimes accuse innocent defendants and pervert well-disposed assemblies,—a part of the case which historians of Greece often present as if it were the whole,—he could also, and that in the most trying emergencies, combat the strongest force of present passion, and bring into vivid presence the half-obscured lineaments of long-sighted reason and duty.

After conducting the army out of the city, Xenophon sent, through Kleander, a message to Anaxibius, requesting that he himself might be allowed to come in again singly, in order to take his departure by sea. His request was granted, though not without much difficulty; upon which he took leave of the army, under the strongest expressions of affection and gratitude on their part,[264] and went into Byzantium along with Kleander; while on the next day Kœratadas came to assume the command according to agreement, bringing with him a prophet, and beasts to be offered in sacrifice. There followed in his train twenty men carrying sacks of barley-meal, twenty more with jars of wine, three bearing olives, and one man with a bundle of garlic and onions. All these provisions being laid down, Kœratadas proceeded to offer sacrifice, as a preliminary to the distribution of them among the soldiers. On the first day, the sacrifices being unfavorable, no distribution took place; on the second day, Kœratadas was standing with the wreath on his head at the altar, and with the victims beside him, about to renew his sacrifice,—when Timasion and the other officers

interfered, desired him to abstain, and dismissed him from the command. Perhaps the first unfavorable sacrifices may have partly impelled them to this proceeding. But the main reason was, the scanty store, inadequate even to one day's subsistence for the army, brought by Kœratadas,—and the obvious insufficiency of his means.[265]

On the departure of Kœratadas, the army marched to take up its quarters in some Thracian villages not far from Byzantium, under its former officers; who however could not agree as to their future order of march. Kleanor and Phryniskus, who had received presents from Seuthes, urged the expediency of accepting the service of that Thracian prince; Neon insisted on going to the Chersonese under the Lacedæmonian officers in that peninsula (as Anaxibius had projected); in the idea that he, as a Lacedæmonian, would there obtain the command of the whole army; while Timasion, with the view of re-establishing himself in his native city of Dardanus, proposed returning to the Asiatic side of the strait.

Though this last plan met with decided favor among the army, it could not be executed without vessels. These Timasion had little or no means of procuring; so that considerable delay took place, during which the soldiers, receiving no pay, fell into much distress. Many of them were even compelled to sell their arms in order to get subsistence; while others got permission to settle in some of the neighboring towns, on condition of being disarmed. The whole army was thus gradually melting away, much to the satisfaction of Anaxibius, who was anxious to see the purposes of Pharnabazus accomplished. By degrees, it would probably have been dissolved altogether, had not a change of interest on the part of Anaxibius induced him to promote its reorganization. He sailed from Byzantium to the Asiatic coast, to acquaint Pharnabazus that the Cyreians could no longer cause uneasiness, and to require his own promised reward. It seems moreover that Xenophon himself departed from Byzantium by the same opportunity. When they reached Kyzikus, they met the Lacedæmonian Aristarchus; who was coming out as newly-appointed harmost of Byzantium, to supersede Kleander, and who acquainted Anaxibius that Polus was on the point of arriving to supersede him as admiral. Anxious to meet Pharnabazus and make sure of his bribe, Anaxibius impressed his parting injunction upon Aristarchus to sell for slaves all the Cyreians whom he might find at Byzantium on his arrival, and then pursued his voyage along the southern coast of the Propontis to Parium. But Pharnabazus, having already received intimation of the change of admirals, knew that the friendship of Anaxibius was no longer of any value, and took no farther heed of him; while he at the same time sent to Byzantium to make the like compact with Aristarchus against the Cyreian army.[266]

Anaxibius was stung to the quick at this combination of disappointment and insult on the part of the satrap. To avenge it, he resolved to employ those very soldiers whom he had first corrupted and fraudulently brought across to Europe, next cast out from Byzantium, and lastly, ordered to be sold into slavery, so far as any might yet be found in that town; bringing them back into Asia for the purpose of acting

against Pharnabazus. Accordingly he addressed himself to Xenophon, and ordered him without a moment's delay to rejoin the army, for the purpose of keeping it together, of recalling the soldiers who had departed, and transporting the whole body across into Asia. He provided him with an armed vessel of thirty oars to cross over from Parium to Perinthus, sending over a peremptory order to the Perinthians to furnish him with horses in order that he might reach the army with the greatest speed. [267] Perhaps it would not have been safe for Xenophon to disobey this order, under any circumstances. But the idea of acting with the army in Asia against Pharnabazus, under Lacedæmonian sanction, was probably very acceptable to him. He hastened across to the army, who welcomed his return with joy, and gladly embraced the proposal of crossing to Asia, which was a great improvement upon their forlorn and destitute condition. He accordingly conducted them to Perinthus, and encamped under the walls of the town; refusing, in his way through Selymbria, a second proposition from Seuthes to engage the services of the army.

While Xenophon was exerting himself to procure transports for the passage of the army at Perinthus, Aristarchus the new harmost arrived there with two triremes from Byzantium. It seems that not only Byzantium, but also both Perinthus and Selymbria, were comprised in his government as harmost. On first reaching Byzantium to supersede Kleander, he found there no less than four hundred of the Cyreians, chiefly sick and wounded; whom Kleander, in spite of the ill-will of Anaxibius, had not only refused to sell into slavery, but had billeted upon the citizens, and tended with solicitude; so much did his good feeling towards Xenophon and towards the army now come into play. We read with indignation that Aristarchus, immediately on reaching Byzantium to supersede him, was not even contented with sending these four hundred men out of the town; but seized them,—Greeks, citizens, and soldiers as they were,—and sold them all into slavery.[268] Apprised of the movements of Xenophon with the army, he now came to Perinthus to prevent their transit into Asia; laying an embargo on the transports in the harbor, and presenting himself personally before the assembled army to prohibit the soldiers from crossing. When Xenophon informed him that Anaxibius had given them orders to cross, and had sent him expressly to conduct them,—Aristarchus replied, "Anaxibius is no longer in functions as admiral, and I am harmost in this town. If I catch any of you at sea, I will sink you." On the next day, he sent to invite the generals and the captains (lochages) to a conference within the walls. They were just about to enter the gates, when Xenophon, who was among them, received a private warning, that if he went in, Aristarchus would seize him, and either put him to death or send him prisoner to Pharnabazus. Accordingly Xenophon sent forward the others, and remained himself with the army, alleging the obligation of sacrificing. The behavior of Aristarchus,—who, when he saw the others without Xenophon, sent them away, and desired that they would all come again in the afternoon,—confirmed the justice of his suspicions, as to the imminent danger from which he had been preserved by this accidental warning.[269] It need hardly be

added that Xenophon disregarded the second invitation no less than the first; moreover a third invitation, which Aristarchus afterwards sent, was disregarded by all.

We have here a Lacedæmonian harmost, not scrupling to lay a snare of treachery as flagrant as that which Tissaphernes had practised on the banks of the Zab to entrap Klearchus and his colleagues,—and that too against a Greek, and an officer of the highest station and merit, who had just saved Byzantium from pillage, and was now actually in execution of orders received from the Lacedæmonian admiral Anaxibius. Had the accidental warning been withheld, Xenophon would assuredly have fallen into this snare, nor could we reasonably have charged him with imprudence,—so fully was he entitled to count upon straightforward conduct under the circumstances. But the same cannot be said of Klearchus, who undoubtedly manifested lamentable credulity, nefarious as was the fraud to which he fell a victim.

At the second interview with the other officers, Aristarchus, while he forbade the army to cross the water, directed them to force their way by land through the Thracians who occupied the Holy mountain, and thus to arrive at the Chersonese; where (he said) they should receive pay. Neon the Lacedæmonian, with about eight hundred hoplites who adhered to his separate command, advocated this plan as the best. To be set against it, however, there was the proposition of Seuthes to take the army into pay; which Xenophon was inclined to prefer, uneasy at the thoughts of being cooped up in the narrow peninsula of the Chersonese, under the absolute command of the Lacedæmonian harmost, with great uncertainty both as to pay and as to provisions.[270] Moreover it was imperiously necessary for these disappointed troops to make some immediate movement; for they had been brought to the gates of Perinthus in hopes of passing immediately on shipboard; it was mid-winter,—they were encamped in the open field, under the severe cold of Thrace,—they had neither assured supplies, nor even money to purchase, if a market had been near.[271] Xenophon, who had brought them to the neighborhood of Perinthus, was now again responsible for extricating them from this untenable situation, and began to offer sacrifices, according to his wont, to ascertain whether the gods would encourage him to recommend a covenant with Seuthes. The sacrifices were so favorable, that he himself, together with a confidential officer from each of the generals, went by night and paid a visit to Seuthes, for the purpose of understanding distinctly his offers and purposes.

Mæsadês, the father of Seuthes, had been apparently a dependent prince under the great monarchy of the Odrysian Thracians; so formidable in the early years of the Peloponnesian war. But intestine commotions had robbed him of his principality over three Thracian tribes; which it was now the ambition of Seuthes to recover, by the aid of the Cyreian army. He offered to each soldier one stater of Kyzikus (about twenty Attic drachmæ, or nearly the same as that which they originally received from Cyrus) as pay per month; twice as much to each lochage or captain,—four times as much to each of the generals. In case they should incur the enmity of the Lacedæ-

monians by joining him, he guaranteed to them all the right of settlement and fraternal protection in his territory. To each of the generals, over and above pay, he engaged to assign a fort on the sea-coast, with a lot of land around it, and oxen for cultivation. And to Xenophon in particular, he offered the possession of Bisanthê, his best point on the coast. "I will also (he added, addressing Xenophon) give you my daughter in marriage; and if you have any daughter, I will buy her from you in marriage according to the custom of Thrace."[272] Seuthes farther engaged never on any occasion to lead them more than seven days' journey from the sea, at farthest.

These offers were as liberal as the army could possibly expect; and Xenophon himself, mistrusting the Lacedæmonians, as well as mistrusted by them, seems to have looked forward to the acquisition of a Thracian coast-fortress and territory (such as Miltiades, Alkibiades, and other Athenian leaders had obtained before him) as a valuable refuge in case of need.[273] But even if the promise had been less favorable, the Cyreians had no alternative; for they had not even present supplies,—still less any means of subsistence throughout the winter; while departure by sea was rendered impossible by the Lacedæmonians. On the next day, Seuthes was introduced by Xenophon and the other generals to the army, who accepted his offers and concluded the bargain.

They remained for two months in his service, engaged in warfare against various Thracian tribes, whom they enabled him to conquer and despoil; so that at the end of that period, he was in possession of an extensive dominion, a large native force, and a considerable tribute. Though the sufferings of the army from cold were extreme, during these two months of full winter and amidst the snowy mountains of Thrace, they were nevertheless enabled by their expeditions along with Seuthes to procure plentiful subsistence; which they could hardly have done in any other manner. But the pay which he had offered was never liquidated; at least, in requital of their two months of service, they received pay only for twenty days and a little more. And Xenophon himself, far from obtaining fulfilment of those splendid promises which Seuthes had made to him personally, seems not even to have received his pay as one of the generals. For him, the result was singularly unhappy; since he forfeited the good-will of Seuthes by importunate demand and complaint for the purpose of obtaining the pay due to the soldiers; while they on their side, imputing to his connivance the non-fulfilment of the promise, became thus in part alienated from him. Much of this mischief was brought about by the treacherous intrigues and calumny of a corrupt Greek from Maroneia, named Herakleides; who acted as minister and treasurer to Seuthes.

Want of space compels me to omit the narrative given by Xenophon, both of the relations of the army with Seuthes, and of the warfare carried on against the hostile Thracian tribes,—interesting as it is from the juxtaposition of Greek and Thracian manners. It seems to have been composed by Xenophon under feelings of acute personal disappointment, and probably in refutation of calumnies against himself as if

he had wronged the army. Hence we may trace in it a tone of exaggerated querulousness, and complaint that the soldiers were ungrateful to him. It is true that a portion of the army, under the belief that he had been richly rewarded by Seuthes while they had not obtained their stipulated pay, expressed virulent sentiments and falsehoods against him.[274] Until such suspicions were refuted, it is no wonder that the army were alienated; but they were perfectly willing to hear both sides,—and Xenophon triumphantly disproved the accusation. That in the end, their feelings towards him were those of esteem and favor, stands confessed in his own words,[275] proving that the ingratitude of which he complains was the feeling of some indeed, but not of all.

It is hard to say, however, what would have been the fate of this gallant army, when Seuthes, having obtained from their arms in two months all that he desired, had become only anxious to send them off without pay,—had they not been extricated by a change of interest and policy on the part of all-powerful Sparta. The Lacedæmonians had just declared war against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus,—sending Thimbron into Asia to commence military operations. They then became extremely anxious to transport the Cyreians across to Asia, which their harmost, Aristarchus had hitherto prohibited,—and to take them into permanent pay; for which purpose two Lacedæmonians, Charmînus and Polynîkus were commissioned by Thimbron to offer to the army the same pay as had been promised, though not paid, by Seuthes; and as had been originally paid by Cyrus. Seuthes and Herakleides, eager to hasten the departure of the soldiers, endeavored to take credit with the Lacedæmonians for assisting their views.[276] Joyfully did the army accept this offer, though complaining loudly of the fraud practised upon them by Seuthes; which Charmînus, at the instance of Xenophon, vainly pressed the Thracian prince to redress. [277] He even sent Xenophon to demand the arrear of pay in the name of the Lacedæmonians, which afforded to the Athenian an opportunity of administering a severe lecture to Seuthes.[278] But the latter was found less accessible to the workings of eloquence than the Cyreian assembled soldiers; nor did Xenophon obtain anything beyond a miserable dividend upon the sum due;—together with civil expressions towards himself personally,—an invitation to remain in his service with one thousand hoplites instead of going to Asia with the army,—and renewed promises, not likely now to find much credit, of a fort and grant of lands.

When the army, now reduced by losses and dispersions to six thousand men,[279] was prepared to cross into Asia, Xenophon was desirous of going back to Athens, but was persuaded to remain with them until the junction with Thimbron. He was at this time so poor, having scarcely enough to pay for his journey home, that he was obliged to sell his horse at Lampsakus, the Asiatic town where the army landed. Here he found Eukleides, a Phliasian prophet with whom he had been wont to hold intercourse and offer sacrifice at Athens. This man, having asked Xenophon how much he had acquired in the expedition, could not believe him when he affirmed his poverty.

But when they proceeded to offer sacrifice together, from some animals sent by the Lampsakenes as a present to Xenophon, Eukleides had no sooner inspected the entrails of the victims, than he told Xenophon that he fully credited the statement. "I see (he said) that even if money shall be ever on its way to come to you, you yourself will be a hindrance to it, even if there be no other (here Xenophon acquiesced); Zeus Meilichios (the Gracious)[280] is the real bar. Have you ever sacrificed to him, with entire burnt-offerings, as we used to do together at Athens?" "Never (replied Xenophon), throughout the whole march." "Do so now, then (said Eukleides), and it will be for your advantage." The next day, on reaching Ophrynium, Xenophon obeyed the injunction; sacrificing little pigs entire to Zeus Meilichios, as was the custom at Athens during the public festival called Diasia. And on the very same day he felt the beneficial effects of the proceeding; for Biton and another envoy came from the Lacedæmonians with an advance of pay to the army, and with dispositions so favorable to himself, that they bought back for him his horse, which he had just sold at Lampsakus for fifty darics. This was equivalent to giving him more than one year's pay in hand (the pay which he would have received as general being four darics per month, or four times that of the soldier), at a time when he was known to be on the point of departure, and therefore would not stay to earn it. The short-comings of Seuthes were now made up with immense interest, so that Xenophon became better off than any man in the army; though he himself slurs over the magnitude of the present, by representing it as a delicate compliment to restore to him a favorite horse.

Thus gratefully and instantaneously did Zeus the Gracious respond to the sacrifice which Xenophon, after a long omission, had been admonished by Eukleides to offer. And doubtless Xenophon was more than ever confirmed in the belief, which manifests itself throughout all his writings, that sacrifice not only indicates, by the interior aspect of the immolated victims, the tenor of coming events,—but also, according as it is rendered to the right god and at the right season, determines his will, and therefore the course of events, for dispensations favorable or unfavorable.

But the favors of Zeus the Gracious, though begun, were not yet ended. Xenophon conducted the army through the Troad, and across mount Ida, to Antandrus; from thence along the coast to Lydia, through the plain of Thêbê and the town of Adramyttium, leaving Atarneus on the right hand, to Pergamus in Mysia, a hill-town overhanging the river and plain of Käikus. This district was occupied by the descendants of the Eretrian Gongylus, who, having been banished for embracing the cause of the Persians when Xerxes invaded Greece, had been rewarded (like the Spartan king Demaratus) with this sort of principality under the Persian empire. His descendant, another Gongylus, now occupied Pergamus, with his wife Hellas and his sons Gorgion and Gongylus. Xenophon was here received with great hospitality. Hellas acquainted him that a powerful Persian, named Asidates, was now dwelling, with his wife, family, and property, in a tower not far off, on the plain; and that a sudden

night-march, with three hundred men, would suffice for the capture of this valuable booty, to which her own cousin should guide him. Accordingly, having sacrificed and ascertained that the victims were favorable, Xenophon communicated his plan after the evening meal to those captains who had been most attached to him throughout the expedition, wishing to make them partners in the profit. As soon as it became known, many volunteers, to the number of six hundred, pressed to be allowed to join. But the captains repelled them, declining to take more than three hundred, in order that the booty might afford an ampler dividend to each partner.

Beginning their march in the evening, Xenophon and his detachment of three hundred reached about midnight the tower of Asidates; it was large, lofty, thickly built, and contained a considerable garrison. It served for protection to his cattle and cultivating slaves around, like a baronial castle in the middle ages; but the assailants neglected this outlying plunder, in order to be more sure of taking the castle itself. Its walls however were found much stronger than was expected; and although a breach was made by force about daybreak, yet so vigorous was the defence of the garrison, that no entrance could be effected. Signals and shouts of every kind were made by Asidates to procure aid from the Persian forces in the neighborhood; numbers of whom soon began to arrive, so that Xenophon and his company were obliged to retreat. And their retreat was at last only accomplished, after severe suffering and wounds to nearly half of them, through the aid of Gongylus with his forces from Pergamus, and of Proklês (the descendant of Demaratus) from Halisarna, a little farther off seaward.[281]

Though his first enterprise thus miscarried, Xenophon soon laid plans for a second, employing the whole army; and succeeded in bringing Asidates prisoner to Pergamus, with his wife, children, horses, and all his personal property. Thus (says he, anxious above all things for the credit of sacrificial prophecy) the "previous sacrifices (those which had promised favorably before the first unsuccessful attempt) now came true."[282] The persons of this family were doubtless redeemed by their Persian friends for a large ransom;[283] which, together with the booty brought in, made up a prodigious total to be divided.

In making the division, a general tribute of sympathy and admiration was paid to Xenophon, to which all the army,—generals, captains, and soldiers,—and the Lacedæmonians besides,—unanimously concurred. Like Agamemnon at Troy, he was allowed to select for himself the picked lots of horses, mules, oxen, and other items of booty; insomuch that he became possessor of a share valuable enough to enrich him at once, in addition to the fifty darics which he had before received. "Here then Xenophon (to use his own language[284]) had no reason to complain of the god" (Zeus Meilichios). We may add,—what he ought to have added, considering the accusations which he had before put forth,—that neither had he any reason to complain of the ingratitude of the army.

As soon as Thimbron arrived with his own forces, and the Cyreians became a part of his army, Xenophon took his leave of them. Having deposited in the temple at Ephesus that portion which had been confided to him as general, of the tithe set apart by the army at Kerasus for the Ephesian Artemis,[285] he seems to have executed his intention of returning to Athens.[286] He must have arrived there, after an absence of about two years and a half, within a few weeks, at farthest, after the death of his friend and preceptor Sokrates, whose trial and condemnation have been recorded in my last volume. That melancholy event certainly occurred during his absence from Athens;[287] but whether it had come to his knowledge before he reached the city, we do not know. How much grief and indignation it excited in his mind, we may see by his collection of memoranda respecting the life and conversations of Sokrates, known by the name of Memorabilia, and probably put together shortly after his arrival.

That he was again in Asia, three years afterwards, on military service under the Lacedæmonian king Agesilaus, is a fact attested by himself; but at what precise moment he quitted Athens for his second visit to Asia, we are left to conjecture. I incline to believe that he did not remain many months at home, but that he went out again in the next spring to rejoin the Cyreians in Asia,—became again their commander,—and served for two years under the Spartan general Derkyllidas before the arrival of Agesilaus. Such military service would doubtless be very much to his taste; while a residence at Athens, then subject and quiescent, would probably be distasteful to him; both from the habits of command which he had contracted during the previous two years, and from feelings arising out of the death of Sokrates. After a certain interval of repose, he would be disposed to enter again upon the war against his old enemy Tissaphernes; and his service went on when Agesilaus arrived to take the command.[288]

But during the two years after this latter event, Athens became a party to the war against Sparta, and entered into conjunction with the king of Persia as well as with the Thebans and others; while Xenophon, continuing his service as commander of the Cyreians, and accompanying Agesilaus from Asia back into Greece, became engaged against the Athenian troops and their Bœotian allies at the bloody battle of Korôneia. Under these circumstances, we cannot wonder that the Athenians passed sentence of banishment against him; not because he had originally taken part in aid of Cyrus against Artaxerxes,—nor because his political sentiments were unfriendly to democracy, as has been sometimes erroneously affirmed,—but because he was now openly in arms, and in conspicuous command, against his own country.[289] Having thus become an exile, Xenophon was allowed by the Lacedæmonians to settle at Skillus, one of the villages of Triphylia, near Olympia in Peloponnesus, which they had recently emancipated from the Eleians. At one of the ensuing Olympic festivals, Megabyzus, the superintendent of the temple of Artemis at Ephesus, came over as a spectator; bringing with him the money which Xenophon had dedicated therein to

the Ephesian Artemis. This money Xenophon invested in the purchase of lands at Skillus, to be consecrated in permanence to the goddess; having previously consulted her by sacrifice to ascertain her approval of the site contemplated, which site was recommended to him by its resemblance in certain points to that of the Ephesian temple. Thus, there was near each of them a river called by the same name Selinus, having in it fish and a shelly bottom. Xenophon constructed a chapel, an altar, and a statue of the goddess made of cypress-wood: all exact copies, on a reduced scale, of the temple and golden statue at Ephesus. A column near them was inscribed with the following words,—"This spot is sacred to Artemis. Whoever possesses the property and gathers its fruits, must sacrifice to her the tithe every year, and keep the chapel in repair out of the remainder. Should any one omit this duty the goddess herself will take the omission in hand."[290]

Immediately near the chapel was an orchard of every description of fruit-trees, while the estate around comprised an extensive range of meadow, woodland, and mountain,—with the still loftier mountain called Pholoê adjoining. There was thus abundant pasture for horses, oxen, sheep, etc., and excellent hunting-ground near for deer and other game; advantages not to be found near the Artemision at Ephesus. Residing hard by on his own property, allotted to him by the Lacedæmonians, Xenophon superintended this estate as steward for the goddess; looking perhaps to the sanctity of her name for protection from disturbance by the Eleians, who viewed with a jealous eye the Lacedæmonian[291] settlers at Skillus, and protested against the peace and convention promoted by Athens after the battle of Leuktra, because it recognized that place, along with the townships of Triphylia, as autonomous. Every year he made a splendid sacrifice, from the tithe of all the fruits of the property; to which solemnity not only all the Skilluntines, but also all the neighboring villages, were invited. Booths were erected for the visitors, to whom the goddess furnished (this is the language of Xenophon) an ample dinner of barley-meal, wheaten loaves, meat, game, and sweetmeats;[292] the game being provided by a general hunt, which the sons of Xenophon conducted, and in which all the neighbors took part if they chose. The produce of the estate, saving this tithe and subject to the obligation of keeping the holy building in repair, was enjoyed by Xenophon himself. He had a keen relish for both hunting and horsemanship, and was among the first authors, so far as we know, who ever made these pursuits, with the management of horses and dogs, the subject of rational study and description.

Such was the use to which Xenophon applied the tithe voted by the army at Kerasus to the Ephesian Artemis; the other tithe, voted at the same time to Apollo, he dedicated at Delphi in the treasure-chamber of the Athenians, inscribing upon the offering his own name and that of Proxenus. His residence being only at a distance of twenty stadia from the great temple of Olympia, he was enabled to enjoy society with every variety of Greeks,—and to obtain copious information about Grecian politics, chiefly from philo-Laconian informants, and with the Lacedæmonian point of

view predominant in his own mind; while he had also leisure for the composition of his various works. The interesting description which he himself gives of his residence at Skillus, implies a state of things not present and continuing,[293] but past and gone; other testimonies too, though confused and contradictory, seem to show that the Lacedæmonian settlement at Skillus lasted no longer than the power of Lacedæmon was adequate to maintain it. During the misfortunes which befel that city after the battle of Leuktra (371 B.C.), Xenophon, with his family and his fellow-settlers, was expelled by the Eleians, and is then said to have found shelter at Corinth. But as Athens soon came to be not only at peace, but in intimate alliance, with Sparta,—the sentence of banishment against Xenophon was revoked; so that the latter part of his life was again passed in the enjoyment of his birthright as an Athenian citizen and Knight.[294] Two of his sons, Gryllus and Diodorus, fought among the Athenian horsemen at the cavalry combat which preceded the battle of Mantineia, where the former was slain, after manifesting distinguished bravery; while his grandson Xenophon became in the next generation the subject of a pleading before the Athenian Dikastery, composed by the orator Deinarchus.[295]

On bringing this accomplished and eminent leader to the close of that arduous retreat which he had conducted with so much honor, I have thought it necessary to anticipate a little on the future, in order to take a glance at his subsequent destiny. To his exile (in this point of view not less useful than that of Thucydides) we probably owe many of those compositions from which so much of our knowledge of Grecian affairs is derived. But to the contemporary world, the retreat, which Xenophon so successfully conducted, afforded a far more impressive lesson than any of his literary compositions. It taught in the most striking manner the impotence of the Persian land-force, manifested not less in the generals than in the soldiers. It proved that the Persian leaders were unfit for any systematic operations, even under the greatest possible advantages, against a small number of disciplined warriors resolutely bent on resistance; that they were too stupid and reckless even to obstruct the passage of rivers, or destroy roads, or cut off supplies. It more than confirmed the contemptuous language applied to them by Cyrus himself, before the battle of Kunaxa; when he proclaimed that he envied the Greeks their freedom, and that he was ashamed of the worthlessness of his own countrymen.[296] Against such perfect weakness and disorganization, nothing prevented the success of the Greeks along with Cyrus, except his own paroxysm of fraternal antipathy.[297] And we shall perceive hereafter the military and political leaders of Greece,—Agesilaus, Jason of Pheræ,[298] and others down to Philip and Alexander[299]—firmly persuaded that with a tolerably numerous and well-appointed Grecian force, combined with exemption from Grecian enemies, they could succeed in overthrowing or dismembering the Persian empire. This conviction, so important in the subsequent history of Greece, takes its date from the retreat of the Ten Thousand. We shall indeed find Persia exercising an important influence, for two generations to come,—and at the peace of Antalkidas an influence stronger than ever,—over the destinies of Greece. But this will be seen to arise from

the treason of Sparta, the chief of the Hellenic world, who abandons the Asiatic Greeks, and even arms herself with the name and the force of Persia, for purposes of aggrandizement and dominion to herself. Persia is strong by being enabled to employ Hellenic strength against the Hellenic cause; by lending money or a fleet to one side of the Grecian intestine parties, and thus becoming artificially strengthened against both. But the Xenophontic Anabasis betrays her real weakness against any vigorous attack; while it at the same time exemplifies the discipline, the endurance, the power of self-action and adaptation, the susceptibility of influence from speech and discussion, the combination of the reflecting obedience of citizens with the mechanical regularity of soldiers,—which confer such immortal distinction on the Hellenic character. The importance of this expedition and retreat, as an illustration of the Hellenic qualities and excellence, will justify the large space which has been devoted to it in this History.

CHAPTER LXXII.

GREECE UNDER THE LACEDÆMONIAN EMPIRE.

THE three preceding Chapters have been devoted exclusively to the narrative of the Expedition and Retreat, immortalized by Xenophon, occupying the two years intervening between about April 401 B.C. and June 399 B.C. That event, replete as it is with interest and pregnant with important consequences, stands apart from the general sequence of Grecian affairs,—which sequence I now resume.

It will be recollected that as soon as Xenophon with his Ten Thousand warriors descended from the rugged mountains between Armenia and the Euxine to the hospitable shelter of Trapezus, and began to lay their plans for returning to Central Greece,—they found themselves within the Lacedæmonian empire, unable to advance a step without consulting Lacedæmonian dictation, and obliged, when they reached the Bosphorus, to endure without redress the harsh and treacherous usage of the Spartan officers, Anaxibius and Aristarchus.

Of that empire the first origin has been set forth in my last preceding volume. It began with the decisive victory of Ægospotami in the Hellespont (September or October 405 B.C.), where the Lacedæmonian Lysander, without the loss of a man, got possession of the entire Athenian fleet and a large portion of their crews,—with the exception of eight or nine triremes with which the Athenian admiral Konon effected his escape to Euagoras at Cyprus. The whole power of Athens was thus annihilated, and nothing remained for the Lacedæmonians to master except the city itself and Peiræus; a consummation certain to happen, and actually brought to pass in April 404 B.C., when Lysander entered Athens in triumph, dismantled Peiræus, and demolished a large portion of the Long Walls. With the exception of Athens herself,—whose citizens deferred the moment of subjection by an heroic, though unavailing, struggle against the horrors of famine,—and of Samos,—no other Grecian city offered any resistance to Lysander after the battle of Ægospotami; which in fact not only took away from Athens her whole naval force, but transferred it all over to him, and rendered him admiral of a larger Grecian fleet than had ever been seen together since the battle of Salamis.

I have recounted in my sixty-fifth chapter, the sixteen months of bitter suffering undergone by Athens immediately after her surrender. The loss of her fleet and power was aggravated by an extremity of internal oppression. Her oligarchical party and her exiles, returning after having served with the enemy against her, extorted from the public assembly, under the dictation of Lysander who attended it in person, the appointment of an omnipotent council of thirty for the ostensible purpose of framing a new constitution. These thirty rulers,—among whom Kritias was the most

violent, and Theramenes (seemingly) the most moderate, or at least the soonest satiated,—perpetrated cruelty and spoliation on the largest scale, being protected against all resistance by a Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison established in the acropolis. Besides numbers of citizens put to death, so many others were driven into exile with the loss of their property, that Thebes and the neighboring cities became crowded with them. After about eight months of unopposed tyranny, the Thirty found themselves for the first time attacked by Thrasybulus at the head of a small party of these exiles coming out of Bœotia. His bravery and good conduct,—combined with the enormities of the Thirty, which became continually more nefarious, and to which even numerous oligarchical citizens, as well as Theramenes himself, successively became victims,—enabled him soon to strengthen himself, to seize the Peiræus, and to carry on a civil war which ultimately put down the tyrants.

These latter were obliged to invoke the aid of a new Lacedæmonian force. And had that force still continued at the disposal of Lysander, all resistance on the part of Athens would have been unavailing. But fortunately for the Athenians, the last few months had wrought material change in the dispositions both of the allies of Sparta and of many among her leading men. The allies, especially Thebes and Corinth, not only relented in their hatred and fear of Athens, now that she had lost her power,—but even sympathized with her suffering exiles, and became disgusted with the self-willed encroachments of Sparta; while the Spartan king Pausanias, together with some of the ephors, were also jealous of the arbitrary and oppressive conduct of Lysander. Instead of conducting the Lacedæmonian force to uphold at all price the Lysandrian oligarchy, Pausanias appeared rather as an equitable mediator to terminate the civil war. He refused to concur in any measure for obstructing the natural tendency towards a revival of the democracy. It was in this manner that Athens, rescued from that sanguinary and rapacious *regime* which has passed into history under the name of the Thirty Tyrants, was enabled to reappear as a humble and dependent member of the Spartan alliance,—with nothing but the recollection of her former power, yet with her democracy again in vigorous and tutelary action for internal government. The just and gentle bearing of her democratical citizens, and the absence of reactionary antipathies, after such cruel ill-treatment,—are among the most honorable features in her history.

The reader will find in my last volume, what I can only rapidly glance at here, the details of that system of bloodshed, spoliation, extinction of free speech and even of intellectual teaching, efforts to implicate innocent citizens as agents in judicial assassination, etc.,—which stained the year of Anarchy (as it was termed in Athenian annals[300]) immediately following the surrender of the city. These details depend on evidence perfectly satisfactory; for they are conveyed to us chiefly by Xenophon, whose sympathies are decidedly oligarchical. From him too we learn another fact, not less pregnant with instruction; that the knights or horsemen, the body of richest

proprietors at Athens, were the mainstay of the Thirty from first to last, notwithstanding all the enormities of their career.

We learn from these dark, but well-attested details, to appreciate the auspices under which that period of history called the Lacedæmonian empire was inaugurated. Such phenomena were by no means confined within the walls of Athens. On the contrary, the year of Anarchy (using that term in the sense in which it was employed by the Athenians) arising out of the same combination of causes and agents, was common to a very large proportion of the cities throughout Greece. The Lacedæmonian admiral Lysander, during his first year of naval command, had organized in most of the allied cities factious combinations of some of the principal citizens, corresponding with himself personally; by whose efforts in their respective cities he was enabled to prosecute the war vigorously, and whom he repaid, partly by seconding as much as he could their injustices in their respective cities,—partly by promising to strengthen their hands still farther as soon as victory should be made sure.[301] This policy, while it served as a stimulus against the common enemy, contributed still more directly to aggrandize Lysander himself; creating for him an ascendency of his own, and imposing upon him personal obligations towards adherents, apart from what was required by the interests of Sparta.

The victory of Ægospotami, complete and decisive beyond all expectations either of friend or foe, enabled him to discharge these obligations with interest. All Greece at once made submission to the Lacedæmonians,[302] except Athens and Samos,—and these two only held out a few months. It was now the first business of the victorious commander to remunerate his adherents, and to take permanent security for Spartan dominion as well as for his own. In the greater number of cities, he established an oligarchy of ten citizens, or a dekarchy,[303] composed of his own partisans; while he at the same time planted in each a Lacedæmonian harmost or governor, with a garrison to uphold the new oligarchy. The dekarchy of ten Lysandrian partisans, with the Lacedæmonian harmost to sustain them, became the general scheme of Hellenic government throughout the Ægean, from Eubœa to the Thracian coast-towns, and from Myletus to Byzantium. Lysander sailed round in person, with his victorious fleet, to Byzantium and Chalkêdon, to the cities of Lesbos, to Thasos, and other places,—while he sent Eteonikus to Thrace, for the purpose of thus recasting the governments everywhere. Not merely those cities which had hitherto been on the Athenian side, but also those which had acted as allies of Sparta, were subjected to the same intestine revolution and the same foreign constraint.[304] Everywhere the new Lysandrian dekarchy superseded the previous governments, whether oligarchical or democratical.

At Thasus, as well as in other places, this revolution was not accomplished without much bloodshed as well as treacherous stratagem, nor did Lysander himself scruple to enforce, personally and by his own presence, the execution and expulsion of suspected citizens.[305] In many places, however, simple terrorism probably sufficed.

The new Lysandrian Ten overawed resistance and procured recognition of their usurpation by the menace of inviting the victorious admiral with his fleet of two hundred sail, and by the simple arrival of the Lacedæmonian harmost. Not only was each town obliged to provide a fortified citadel and maintenance for this governor with his garrison, but a scheme of tribute, amounting to one thousand talents annually, was imposed for the future, and assessed ratably upon each city by Lysander. [306]

In what spirit these new dekarchies would govern, consisting as they did of picked oligarchical partisans distinguished for audacity and ambition,[307]—who, to all the unscrupulous lust of power which characterized Lysander himself, added a thirst for personal gain, from which he was exempt, and were now about to reimburse themselves for services already rendered to him,—the general analogy of Grecian history would sufficiently teach us, though we are without special details. But in reference to this point, we have not merely general analogy to guide us; we have farther the parallel case of the Thirty at Athens, the particulars of whose rule are well known and have already been alluded to. These Thirty, with the exception of the difference of number, were to all intents and purposes a Lysandrian dekarchy; created by the same originating force, placed under the like circumstances, and animated by the like spirit and interests. Every subject town would produce its Kritias and Theramenes, and its body of wealthy citizens like the knights or horsemen at Athens to abet their oppressions, under Lacedæmonian patronage and the covering guard of the Lacedæmonian harmost. Moreover, Kritias, with all his vices, was likely to be better rather than worse, as compared with his oligarchical parallel in any other less cultivated city. He was a man of letters and philosophy, accustomed to the conversation of Sokrates, and to the discussion of ethical and social questions. We may say the same of the knights or horsemen at Athens. Undoubtedly they had been better educated, and had been exposed to more liberalizing and improving influences, than the corresponding class elsewhere. If, then, these knights at Athens had no shame in serving as accomplices to the Thirty throughout all their enormities, we need not fear to presume that other cities would furnish a body of wealthy men yet more unscrupulous, and a leader at least as sanguinary, rapacious, and full of antipathies, as Kritias. As at Athens, so elsewhere; the dekarchs would begin by putting to death notorious political opponents, under the name of "the wicked men;"[308] they would next proceed to deal in the same manner with men of known probity and courage, likely to take a lead in resisting oppression.[309] Their career of blood would continue,—in spite of remonstrances from more moderate persons among their own number, like Theramenes,—until they contrived some stratagem for disarming the citizens, which would enable them to gratify both their antipathies and their rapacity by victims still more numerous,—many of such victims being wealthy men, selected for purposes of pure spoliation.[310] They would next despatch by force any obtrusive monitor from their own number, like Theramenes; probably with far less ceremony than accompanied the perpetration of this crime at Athens, where we may trace the

effect of those judicial forms and habits to which the Athenian public had been habituated,—overruled indeed, yet still not forgotten. There would hardly remain any fresh enormity still to commit, over and above the multiplied executions, except to banish from the city all but their own immediate partisans, and to reward these latter with choice estates confiscated from the victims.[311] If called upon to excuse such tyranny, the leader of a dekarchy would have sufficient invention to employ the plea of Kritias,—that all changes of government were unavoidably death-dealing, and that nothing less than such stringent measures would suffice to maintain his city in suitable dependence upon Sparta.[312]

Of course, it is not my purpose to affirm that in any other city, precisely the same phenomena took place as those which occurred in Athens. But we are nevertheless perfectly warranted in regarding the history of the Athenian Thirty as a fair sample, from whence to derive our idea of those Lysandrian dekarchies which now overspread the Grecian world. Doubtless, each had its own peculiar march; some were less tyrannical; but, perhaps, some even more tyrannical, regard being had to the size of the city. And in point of fact, Isokrates, who speaks with indignant horror of these dekarchies, while he denounces those features which they had in common with the triakontarchy at Athens,—extrajudicial murders, spoliations, and banishments,—notices one enormity besides, which we do not find in the latter, violent outrages upon boys and women.[313] Nothing of this kind is ascribed to Kritias and his companions;[314] and it is a considerable proof of the restraining force of Athenian manners, that men who inflicted so much evil in gratification of other violent impulses, should have stopped short here. The decemvirs named by Lysander, like the decemvir Appius Claudius at Rome, would find themselves armed with power to satiate their lusts as well as their antipathies, and would not be more likely to set bounds to the former than to the latter. Lysander, in all the overweening insolence of victory, while rewarding his most devoted partisans with an exaltation comprising every sort of license and tyranny, stained the dependent cities with countless murders, perpetrated on private as well as on public grounds.[315] No individual Greek had ever before wielded so prodigious a power of enriching friends or destroying enemies, in this universal reorganization of Greece;[316] nor was there ever any power more deplorably abused.

It was thus that the Lacedæmonian empire imposed upon each of the subject cities a double oppression;[317] the native decemvirs, and the foreign harmost; each abetting the other, and forming together an aggravated pressure upon the citizens, from which scarce any escape was left. The Thirty at Athens paid the greatest possible court to the harmost Kallibius,[318] and put to death individual Athenians offensive to him, in order to purchase his coöperation in their own violences. The few details which we possess respecting these harmosts (who continued throughout the insular and maritime cities for about ten years, until the battle of Knidus, or as long as the maritime empire of Sparta lasted,—but in various continental dependencies con-

siderably longer, that is, until the defeat of Leuktra in 371 B.C.), are all for the most part discreditable. We have seen in the last chapter the description given by the philo-Laconian Xenophon, of the harsh and treacherous manner in which they acted towards the returning Cyreian soldiers, combined with their corrupt subservience to Pharnabazus. We learn from him that it depended upon the fiat of a Lacedæmonian harmost whether these soldiers should be proclaimed enemies and excluded forever from their native cities; and Kleander, the harmost of Byzantium, who at first threatened them with this treatment, was only induced by the most unlimited submission, combined with very delicate management, to withdraw his menace. The cruel proceeding of Anaxibius and Aristarchus, who went so far as to sell four hundred of these soldiers into slavery, has been recounted a few pages above. Nothing can be more arbitrary or reckless than their proceedings. If they could behave thus towards a body of Greek soldiers full of acquired glory, effective either as friends or as enemies, and having generals capable of prosecuting their collective interests and making their complaints heard,—what protection would a private citizen of any subject city, Byzantium or Perinthus, be likely to enjoy against their oppression?

The story of Aristodemus, the harmost of Oreus in Eubœa, evinces that no justice could be obtained against any of their enormities from the ephors of Sparta. That harmost, among many other acts of brutal violence, seized a beautiful youth, son of a free citizen at Oreus, out of the palæstra,—carried him off,—and after vainly endeavoring to overcome his resistance, put him to death. The father of the youth went to Sparta, made known the atrocities, and appealed to the ephors and Senate for redress. But a deaf ear was turned to his complaints, and in anguish of mind he slew himself. Indeed, we know that these Spartan authorities would grant no redress, not merely against harmosts, but even against private Spartan citizens, who had been guilty of gross crime out of their own country. A Bœotian near Leuktra, named Skedasus, preferred complaint that two Spartans, on their way from Delphi, after having been hospitably entertained in his house, had first violated, and afterwards killed, his two daughters; but even for so flagitious an outrage as this, no redress could be obtained.[319] Doubtless, when a powerful foreign ally, like the Persian satrap Pharnabazus,[320] complained to the ephors of the conduct of a Lacedæmonian harmost or admiral, his representations would receive attention; and we learn that the ephors were thus induced not merely to recall Lysander from the Hellespont, but to put to death another officer, Thorax, for corrupt appropriation of money. But for a private citizen in any subject city, the superintending authority of Sparta would be not merely remote but deaf and immovable, so as to afford him no protection whatever, and to leave him altogether at the mercy of the harmost. It seems, too, that the rigor of Spartan training, and peculiarity of habits, rendered individual Lacedæmonians on foreign service more self-willed, more incapable of entering into the customs or feelings of others, and more liable to degenerate when set free from the strict watch of home,—than other Greeks generally.[321]

Taking all these causes of evil together,—the dekarchies, the harmosts, and the overwhelming dictatorship of Lysander,—and construing other parts of the Grecian world by the analogy of Athens under the Thirty,—we shall be warranted in affirming that the first years of the Spartan Empire, which followed upon the victory of Ægospotami, were years of all-pervading tyranny and multifarious intestine calamity, such as Greece had never before endured. The hardships of war, severe in many ways, were now at an end, but they were replaced by a state of suffering not the less difficult to bear because it was called peace. And what made the suffering yet more intolerable was, that it was a bitter disappointment, and a flagrant violation of promises proclaimed, repeatedly and explicitly, by the Lacedæmonians themselves.

For more than thirty years preceding,—from times earlier than the commencement of the Peloponnesian war,—the Spartans had professed to interfere only for the purpose of liberating Greece, and of putting down the usurped ascendency of Athens. All the allies of Sparta had been invited into strenuous action,—all those of Athens had been urged to revolt,—under the soul-stirring cry of "Freedom to Greece." The earliest incitements addressed by the Corinthians to Sparta in 432 B.C., immediately after the Korkyræan dispute, called upon her to stand forward in fulfilment of her recognized function as "Liberator of Greece," and denounced her as guilty of connivance with Athens if she held back.[322] Athens was branded as the "despot city;" which had already absorbed the independence of many Greeks, and menaced that of all the rest. The last formal requisition borne by the Lacedæmonian envoys to Athens in the winter immediately preceding the war, ran thus,—"If you desire the continuance of peace with Sparta, restore to the Greeks their autonomy."[323] When Archidamus, king of Sparta, approached at the head of his army to besiege Platæa, the Platæans laid claim to autonomy as having been solemnly guaranteed to them by King Pausanias after the great victory near their town. Upon which Archidamus replied,—"Your demand is just; we are prepared to confirm *your* autonomy,—but we call upon you to aid us in securing the like for those other Greeks who have been enslaved by Athens. This is the sole purpose of our great present effort."[324] And the banner of general enfranchisement, which the Lacedæmonians thus held up at the outset of the war, enlisted in their cause encouraging sympathy and good wishes throughout Greece.[325]

But the most striking illustration by far, of the seductive promises held out by the Lacedæmonians, was afforded by the conduct of Brasidas in Thrace, when he first came into the neighborhood of the Athenian allies during the eighth year of the war (424 B.C.). In his memorable discourse addressed to the public assembly at Akanthus, he takes the greatest pains to satisfy them that he came only for the purpose of realizing the promise of enfranchisement proclaimed by the Lacedæmonians at the beginning of the war.[326] Having expected, when acting in such a cause, nothing less than a hearty welcome, he is astonished to find their gates closed against him. "I am come (said he) not to injure, but to liberate the Greeks; after binding the Lacedæ-

monian authorities by the most solemn oaths, that all whom I may bring over shall be dealt with as autonomous allies. We do not wish to obtain you as allies either by force or fraud, but to act as your allies at a time when you are enslaved by the Athenians. You ought not to suspect my purposes, in the face of these solemn assurances; least of all ought any man to hold back through apprehension of private enmities, and through fear lest I should put the city into the hands of a few chosen partisans. I am not come to identify myself with local faction: I am not the man to offer you an unreal liberty by breaking down your established constitution, for the purpose of enslaving either the Many to the Few, or the Few to the Many. That would be more intolerable even than foreign dominion; and we Lacedæmonians should incur nothing but reproach, instead of reaping thanks and honor for our trouble. We should draw upon ourselves those very censures, upon the strength of which we are trying to put down Athens; and that, too, in aggravated measure, worse than those who have never made honorable professions; since to men in high position, specious trick is more disgraceful than open violence.[327]—If (continued Brasidas) in spite of my assurances, you still withhold from me your coöperation, I shall think myself authorized to constrain you by force. We should not be warranted in forcing freedom on any unwilling parties, except with a view to some common good. But as we seek not empire for ourselves,—as we struggle only to put down the empire of others,—as we offer autonomy to each and all,—so we should do wrong to the majority if we allowed you to persist in your opposition."[328]

Like the allied sovereigns of Europe in 1813, who, requiring the most strenuous efforts on the part of the people to contend against the Emperor Napoleon, promised free constitutions and granted nothing after the victory had been assured,—the Lacedæmonians thus held out the most emphatic and repeated assurances of general autonomy in order to enlist allies against Athens; disavowing, even ostentatiously, any aim at empire for themselves. It is true, that after the great catastrophe before Syracuse, when the ruin of Athens appeared imminent, and when the alliance with the Persian satraps against her was first brought to pass, the Lacedæmonians began to think more of empire,[329] and less of Grecian freedom; which, indeed, so far as concerned the Greeks on the continent of Asia, was surrendered to Persia. Nevertheless the old watchword still continued. It was still currently believed, though less studiously professed, that the destruction of the Athenian empire was aimed at as a means to the liberation of Greece.[330]

The victory of Ægospotami with its consequences cruelly undeceived every one. The language of Brasidas, sanctioned by the solemn oaths of the Lacedæmonian ephors, in 424 B.C.—and the proceedings of the Lacedæmonian Lysander in 405-404 B.C., the commencing hour of Spartan omnipotence,—stand in such literal and flagrant contradiction, that we might almost imagine the former to have foreseen the possibility of such a successor, and to have tried to disgrace and disarm him beforehand. The dekarchies of Lysander realized that precise ascendency of a few chosen

partisans which Brasidas repudiates as an abomination worse than foreign dominion; while the harmosts and garrison, installed in the dependent cities along with the native decemvirs, planted the second variety of mischief as well as the first, each aggravating the other. Had the noble-minded Kallikratidas gained a victory at Arginusæ, and lived to close the war, he would probably have tried, with more or less of success, to make some approach to the promises of Brasidas. But it was the double misfortune of Greece, first that the closing victory was gained by such an admiral as Lysander, the most unscrupulous of all power-seekers, partly for his country, and still more for himself,—next, that the victory was so decisive, sudden and imposing, as to leave no enemy standing, or in a position to insist upon terms. The fiat of Lysander, acting in the name of Sparta, became omnipotent, not merely over enemies, but over allies; and to a certain degree even over the Spartan authorities themselves. There was no present necessity for conciliating allies,—still less for acting up to former engagements; so that nothing remained to oppose the naturally ambitious inspirations of the Spartan ephors, who allowed the admiral to carry out the details in his own way. But former assurances, though Sparta was in a condition to disregard them, were not forgotten by others; and the recollection of them imparted additional bitterness to the oppressions of the decemvirs and harmosts.[331] In perfect consistency with her misrule throughout Eastern Greece,[332] too, Sparta identified herself with the energetic tyranny of Dionysius at Syracuse, assisting both to erect and to uphold it; a contradiction to her former maxims of action which would have astounded the historian Herodotus.

The empire of Sparta thus constituted at the end of 405 B.C., maintained itself in full grandeur for somewhat above ten years, until the naval battle of Knidus,[333] in 394 B.C. That defeat destroyed her fleet and maritime ascendency, yet left her in undiminished power on land, which she still maintained until her defeat by the Thebans[334] at Leuktra in 371 B.C. Throughout all this time, it was her established system to keep up Spartan harmosts and garrisons in the dependent cities on the continent as well as in the islands. Even the Chians, who had been her most active allies during the last eight years of the war, were compelled to submit to this hardship; besides having all their fleet taken away from them.[335] But the native dekarchies, though at first established by Lysander universally throughout the maritime dependencies, did not last as a system so long as the harmosts. Composed as they were to a great degree of the personal nominees and confederates of Lysander, they suffered in part by the reactionary jealousy which in time made itself felt against his overweening ascendency. After continuing for some time, they lost the countenance of the Spartan ephors, who proclaimed permission to the cities (we do not precisely know when) to resume their preëxisting governments.[336] Some of the dekarchies thus became dissolved, or modified in various ways, but several probably still continued to subsist, if they had force enough to maintain themselves; for it does not appear that the ephors ever systematically put them down, as Lysander had systematically set them up.

The government of the Thirty at Athens would never have been overthrown if the oppressed Athenians had been obliged to rely on a tutelary interference of the Spartan ephors to help them in overthrowing it. My last volume has shown that this nefarious oligarchy came to its end by the unassisted efforts of Thrasybulus and the Athenian democrats themselves. It is true, indeed, that the arrogance and selfishness of Sparta and of Lysander had alienated the Thebans, Corinthians, Megarians, and other neighboring allies, and induced them to sympathize with the Athenian exiles against the atrocities of the Thirty,—but they never rendered any positive assistance of moment. The inordinate personal ambition of Lysander had also offended King Pausanias and the Spartan ephors, so that they too became indifferent to the Thirty, who were his creatures. But this merely deprived the Thirty of that foreign support which Lysander, had he still continued in the ascendent, would have extended to them in full measure. It was not the positive cause of their downfall. That crisis was brought about altogether by the energy of Thrasybulus and his companions, who manifested such force and determination as could not have been put down without an extraordinary display of Spartan military power; a display not entirely safe when the sympathies of the chief allies were with the other side,—and at any rate adverse to the inclinations of Pausanias. As it was with the Thirty at Athens, so it probably was also with the dekarchies in the dependent cities. The Spartan ephors took no steps to put them down; but where the resistance of the citizens was strenuous enough to overthrow them, no Spartan intervention came to prop them up, and the harmost perhaps received orders not to consider his authority as indissolubly linked with theirs. The native forces of each dependent city being thus left to find their own level, the decemvirs, once installed, would doubtless maintain themselves in a great number; while in other cases they would be overthrown,—or, perhaps, would contrive to perpetuate their dominion by compromise and alliance with other oligarchical sections. This confused and unsettled state of the dekarchies,—some still existing, others half-existing, others again defunct,—prevailed in 396 B.C., when Lysander accompanied Agesilaus into Asia, in the full hope that he should have influence enough to reorganize them all.[337] We must recollect that no other dependent city would possess the same means of offering energetic resistance to its local decemvirs, as Athens offered to the Thirty; and that the insular Grecian cities were not only feeble individually, but naturally helpless against the lords of the sea.[338]

Such then was the result throughout Greece, when that long war, which had been undertaken in the name of universal autonomy, was terminated by the battle of Ægospotami. In place of imperial Athens was substituted, not the promised autonomy, but yet more imperial Sparta. An awful picture is given by the philo-Laconian Xenophon, in 399 B.C., of the ascendency exercised throughout all the Grecian cities, not merely by the ephors and the public officers, but even by the private citizens, of Sparta. "The Lacedæmonians (says he in addressing the Cyreian army) are now the presidents of Greece; and even any single private Lacedæmonian can accomplish what he pleases."[339] "All the cities (he says in another place) then obeyed whatever

order they might receive from a Lacedæmonian citizen."[340] Not merely was the general ascendency thus omnipresent and irresistible, but it was enforced with a stringency of detail, and darkened by a thousand accompaniments of tyranny and individual abuse, such as had never been known under the much-decried empire of Athens.

We have more than one picture of the Athenian empire, in speeches made by hostile orators who had every motive to work up the strongest antipathies in the bosoms of their audience against it. We have the addresses of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta when stimulating the Spartan allies to the Peloponnesian war,[341]—that of the envoys from Mitylênê delivered at Olympia to the Spartan confederates, when the city had revolted from Athens and stood in pressing need of support,—the discourse of Brasidas in the public assembly at Akanthus,—and more than one speech also from Hermokrates, impressing upon his Sicilian countrymen hatred as well as fear of Athens.[342] Whoever reads these discourses, will see that they dwell almost exclusively on the great political wrong inherent in the very fact of her empire, robbing so many Grecian communities of their legitimate autonomy, over and above the tribute imposed. That Athens had thus already enslaved many cities, and was only watching for opportunities to enslave many more, is the theme upon which they expatiate. But of practical grievances,—of cruelty, oppression, spoliation, multiplied exiles, etc., of high-handed wrong committed by individual Athenians,—not one word is spoken. Had there been the smallest pretext for introducing such inflammatory topics, how much more impressive would have been the appeal of Brasidas to the sympathies of the Akanthians! How vehement would have been the denunciations of the Mitylenæan envoys, in place of the tame and almost apologetic language which we now read in Thucydides! Athens extinguished the autonomy of her subject-allies, and punished revolters with severity, sometimes even with cruelty. But as to other points of wrong, the silence of accusers, such as those just noticed, counts as a powerful exculpation.

The case is altered when we come to the period succeeding the battle of Ægospotami. Here indeed also, we find the Spartan empire complained of (as the Athenian empire had been before), in contrast with that state of autonomy to which each city laid claim, and which Sparta had not merely promised to ensure, but set forth as her only ground of war. Yet this is not the prominent grievance,—other topics stand more emphatically forward. The decemvirs and the harmosts (some of the latter being Helots), the standing instruments of Spartan empire, are felt as more sorely painful than the empire itself; as the language held by Brasidas at Akanthus admits them to be beforehand. At the time when Athens was a subject-city under Sparta, governed by the Lysandrian Thirty and by the Lacedæmonian harmost in the acropolis,—the sense of indignity arising from the fact of subjection was absorbed in the still more terrible suffering arising from the enormities of those individual rulers whom the imperial state had set up. Now Athens set up no local rulers,—no native Ten or native Thirty,—no resident Athenian harmosts or garrisons. This was of itself

an unspeakable exemption, when compared with the condition of cities subject, not only to the Spartan empire, but also under that empire to native decemvirs like Kritias, and Spartan harmosts like Aristarchus or Aristodemus. A city subject to Athens had to bear definite burdens enforced by its own government, which was liable in case of default or delinquency to be tried before the popular Athenian Dikastery. But this same dikastery (as I have shown in a former volume, and as is distinctly stated by Thucydides)[343] was the harbor of refuge to each subject-city; not less against individual Athenian wrong-doers than against misconduct from other cities. Those who complained of the hardship suffered by a subject-city, from the obligation of bringing causes to be tried in the dikastery of Athens,—even if we take the case as they state it, and overlook the unfairness of omitting those numerous instances wherein the city was thus enabled to avert or redress wrong done to its own citizens,—would have complained both more loudly and with greater justice of an ever-present Athenian harmost; especially if there were coexistent a native government of Ten oligarchs, exchanging with him guilty connivances, like the partnership of the Thirty at Athens with the Lacedæmonian harmost Kallibius.[344]

In no one point can it be shown that the substitution of Spartan empire in place of Athenian was a gain, either for the subject-cities or for Greece generally; while in many points, it was a great and serious aggravation of suffering. And this abuse of power is the more deeply to be regretted, as Sparta enjoyed after the battle of Ægospotami a precious opportunity,—such as Athens had never had, and such as never again recurred,—of reorganizing the Grecian world on wise principles, and with a view to Pan-hellenic stability and harmony. It is not her greatest sin to have refused to grant universal autonomy. She had indeed promised it; but we might pardon a departure from specific performance, had she exchanged the boon for one far greater, which it was within her reasonable power, at the end of 405 B.C., to confer. That universal town autonomy, towards which the Grecian instinct tended, though immeasurably better than universal subjection, was yet accompanied by much internal discord, and by the still more formidable evil of helplessness against any efficient foreign enemy. To ensure to the Hellenic world external safety as well as internal concord, it was not a new empire which was wanted, but a new political combination on equitable and comprehensive principles; divesting each town of a portion of its autonomy, and creating a common authority, responsible to all, for certain definite controlling purposes. If ever a tolerable federative system would have been practicable in Greece, it was after the battle of Ægospotami. The Athenian empire,—which, with all its defects, I believe to have been much better for the subject-cities than universal autonomy would have been,—had already removed many difficulties, and shown that combined and systematic action of the maritime Grecian world was no impossibility. Sparta might now have substituted herself for Athens, not as heir to the imperial power, but as president and executive agent of a new Confederacy of Delos,—reviving the equal, comprehensive, and liberal principles, on which that confederacy had first been organized.

It is true that sixty years before, the constituent members of the original synod at Delos had shown themselves insensible to its value. As soon as the pressing alarm from Persia had passed over, some had discontinued sending deputies, others had disobeyed requisitions, others again had bought off their obligations, and forfeited their rights as autonomous and voting members, by pecuniary bargain with Athens; who, being obliged by the duties of her presidency to enforce obedience to the Synod against all reluctant members, made successively many enemies, and was gradually converted, almost without her own seeking, from President into Emperor, as the only means of obviating the total dissolution of the Confederacy. But though such untoward circumstances had happened before, it does not follow that they would now have happened again, assuming the same experiment to have been re-tried by Sparta, with manifest sincerity of purpose and tolerable wisdom. The Grecian world, especially the maritime portion of it, had passed through trials not less painful than instructive, during this important interval. Nor does it seem rash to suppose, that the bulk of its members might now have been disposed to perform steady confederate duties, at the call and under the presidency of Sparta, had she really attempted to reorganize a liberal confederacy, treating every city as autonomous and equal, except in so far as each was bound to obey the resolutions of the general synod. However impracticable such a scheme may appear, we must recollect that even Utopian schemes have their transient moments, if not of certain success, at least of commencement not merely possible but promising. And my belief is, that had Kallikratidas, with his ardent Pan-hellenic sentiment and force of resolution, been the final victor over imperial Athens, he would not have let the moment of pride and omnipotence pass over without essaying some noble project like that sketched above. It is to be remembered that Athens had never had the power of organizing any such generous Pan-hellenic combination. She had become depopularized in the legitimate execution of her trust, as president of the Confederacy of Delos, against refractory members;[345] and had been obliged to choose between breaking up the Confederacy, and keeping it together under the strong compression of an imperial chief. But Sparta had not yet become depopularized. She now stood without competitor as leader of the Grecian world, and might at that moment have reasonably hoped to carry the members of it along with her to any liberal and Pan-hellenic organization, had she attempted it with proper earnestness. Unfortunately she took the opposite course, under the influence of Lysander; founding a new empire far more oppressive and odious than that of Athens, with few of the advantages, and none of the excuses, attached to the latter. As she soon became even more unpopular than Athens, her moment of high tide, for beneficent Pan-hellenic combination, passed away also,—never to return.

Having thus brought all the maritime Greeks under her empire, with a tribute of more than one thousand talents imposed upon them,—and continuing to be chief of her landed alliance in Central Greece, which now included Athens as a simple unit,—Sparta was the all-pervading imperial power in Greece.[346] Her new empire was or-

ganized by the victorious Lysander; but with so much arrogance, and so much personal ambition to govern all Greece by means of nominees of his own, decemvirs and harmosts,—that he raised numerous rivals and enemies, as well at Sparta itself as elsewhere. The jealousy entertained by king Pausanias, the offended feelings of Thebes and Corinth, and the manner in which these new phenomena brought about (in spite of the opposition of Lysander) the admission of Athens as a revived democracy into the Lacedæmonian confederacy,—has been already related.

In the early months of 403 B.C., Lysander was partly at home, partly in Attica, exerting himself to sustain the falling oligarchy of Athens against the increasing force of Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in Peiræus. In this purpose he was directly thwarted by the opposing views of king Pausanias, and three out of the five ephors.[347] But though the ephors thus checked Lysander in regard to Athens, they softened the humiliation by sending him abroad to a fresh command on the Asiatic coast and the Hellespont; a step which had the farther advantage of putting asunder two such marked rivals as he and Pausanias had now become. That which Lysander had tried in vain to do at Athens, he was doubtless better able to do in Asia, where he had neither Pausanias nor the ephors along with him. He could lend effective aid to the dekarchies and harmosts in the Asiatic cities, against any internal opposition with which they might be threatened. Bitter were the complaints which reached Sparta, both against him and against his ruling partisans. At length the ephors were prevailed upon to disavow the dekarchies; and to proclaim that they would not hinder the cities from resuming their former governments at pleasure.[348]

But all the crying oppressions set forth in the complaints of the maritime cities would have been insufficient to procure the recall of Lysander from his command in the Hellespont, had not Pharnabazus joined his remonstrances to the rest. These last representations so strengthened the enemies of Lysander at Sparta, that a peremptory order was sent to recall him. Constrained to obey, he came back to Sparta; but the comparative disgrace, and the loss of that boundless power which he had enjoyed on his command was so insupportable to him, that he obtained permission to go on a pilgrimage to the temple of Zeus Ammon in Libya, under the plea that he had a vow to discharge.[349] He appears also to have visited the temples of Delphi and Dodona,[350] with secret ambitious projects which will be mentioned presently. This politic withdrawal softened the jealousy against him, so that we shall find him, after a year or two, reëstablished in great influence and ascendency. He was sent as Spartan envoy, at what precise moment we do not know, to Syracuse, where he lent countenance and aid to the recently established despotism of Dionysius.[351]

The position of the Asiatic Greeks, along the coast of Ionia, Æolis, and the Hellespont, became very peculiar after the triumph of Sparta at Ægospotami. I have already recounted how, immediately after the great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, the Persian king had renewed his grasp upon those cities, from which the vigorous hand of Athens had kept him excluded for more than fifty years; how Sparta,

bidding for his aid, had consented by three formal conventions to surrender them to him, while her commissioner Lichas even reproved the Milesians for their aversion to this bargain; how Athens also, in the days of her weakness, competing for the same advantage, had expressed her willingness to pay the same price for it.[352] After the battle of Ægospotami, this convention was carried into effect; though seemingly not without disputes between the satrap Pharnabazus on one side, and Lysander and Derkyllidas on the other.[353] The latter was Lacedæmonian harmost at Abydos, which town, so important as a station on the Hellespont, the Lacedæmonians seem still to have retained. But Pharnabazus and his subordinates acquired more complete command of the Hellespontine Æolis and of the Troad, than ever they had enjoyed before, both along the coast and in the interior.[354]

Another element, however, soon became operative. The condition of the Greek cities on the coast of Ionia, though according to Persian regulations they belonged to the satrapy of Tissaphernes, was now materially determined,—first, by the competing claims of Cyrus, who wished to take them away from him, and tried to get such transfer ordered at court,—next, by the aspirations of that young prince to the Persian throne. As Cyrus rested his hope of success on Grecian coöperation, it was highly important to him to render himself popular among the Greeks, especially on his own side of the Ægean. Partly his own manifestations of just and conciliatory temper, partly the bad name and known perfidy of Tissaphernes, induced the Grecian cities with one accord to revolt from the latter. All threw themselves into the arms of Cyrus, except Miletus, where Tissaphernes interposed in time, slew the leaders of the intended revolt, and banished many of their partisans. Cyrus, receiving the exiles with distinguished favor, levied an army to besiege Miletus and procure their restoration; while he at the same time threw strong Grecian garrisons into the other cities to protect them against attack.[355]

This local quarrel was, however, soon merged in the more comprehensive dispute respecting the Persian succession. Both parties were found on the field of Kunaxa; Cyrus with the Greek soldiers and Milesian exiles on one side,—Tissaphernes on the other. How that attempt, upon which so much hinged in the future history both of Asia Minor and of Greece, terminated, I have already recounted. Probably the impression brought back by the Lacedæmonian fleet which left Cyrus on the coast of Syria, after he had surmounted the most difficult country without any resistance, was highly favorable to his success. So much the more painful would be the disappointment among the Ionian Greeks when the news of his death was afterwards brought; so much the greater their alarm, when Tissaphernes, having relinquished the pursuit of the Ten Thousand Greeks at the moment when they entered the mountains of Karduchia, came down as victor to the seaboard; more powerful than ever,—rewarded[356] by the Great King, for the services which he had rendered against Cyrus, with all the territory which had been governed by the latter, as well as with the title of commander-in-chief over all the neighboring satraps,—and prepared not only to

reconquer, but to punish, the revolted maritime cities. He began by attacking Kymê; [357] ravaging the territory, with great loss to the citizens, and exacting from them a still larger contribution, when the approach of winter rendered it inconvenient to besiege their city.

In such a state of apprehension, these cities sent to Sparta, as the great imperial power of Greece, to entreat her protection against the aggravated slavery impending over them.[358] The Lacedæmonians had nothing farther to expect from the king of Persia, with whom they had already broken the peace by lending aid to Cyrus. Moreover, the fame of the Ten Thousand Greeks, who were now coming home along the Euxine towards Byzantium, had become diffused throughout Greece, inspiring signal contempt for Persian military efficiency, and hopes of enrichment by war against the Asiatic satraps. Accordingly, the Spartan ephors were induced to comply with the petition of their Asiatic countrymen, and to send over to Asia Thimbron at the head of a considerable force: two thousand Neodamodes (or Helots who had been enfranchised) and four thousand Peloponnesians heavy-armed, accompanied by three hundred Athenian horsemen, out of the number of those who had been adherents of the Thirty, four years before; an aid granted by Athens at the special request of Thimbron. Arriving in Asia during the winter of 400-399 B.C., Thimbron was reinforced in the spring of 399 B.C. by the Cyreian army, who were brought across from Thrace as described in my last chapter, and taken into Lacedæmonian pay. With this large force he became more than a match for the satraps, even on the plains where they could employ their numerous cavalry. The petty Grecian princes of Pergamus and Teuthrania, holding that territory by ancient grants from Xerxes to their ancestors, joined their troops to his, contributing much to enrich Xenophon at the moment of his departure from the Cyreians. Yet Thimbron achieved nothing worthy of so large an army. He not only miscarried in the siege of Larissa, but was even unable to maintain order among his own soldiers, who pillaged indiscriminately both friends and foes. [359] Such loud complaints were transmitted to Sparta of his irregularities and inefficiency, that the ephors first sent him order to march into Karia, where Tissaphernes resided,—and next, before that order was executed, despatched Derkyllidas to supersede him; seemingly in the winter 399-398 B.C. Thimbron on returning to Sparta was fined and banished.[360]

It is highly probable that the Cyreian soldiers, though excellent in the field, yet having been disappointed of reward for the prodigious toils which they had gone through in their long march, and having been kept on short allowance in Thrace, as well as cheated by Seuthes,—were greedy, unscrupulous, and hard to be restrained, in the matter of pillage; especially as Xenophon, their most influential general, had now left them. Their conduct greatly improved under Derkyllidas. And though such improvement was doubtless owing partly to the superiority of the latter over Thimbron, yet it seems also partly ascribable to the fact that Xenophon, after a few

months of residence at Athens, accompanied him to Asia, and resumed the command of his old comrades.[361]

Derkyllidas was a man of so much resource and cunning, as to have acquired the surname of Sisyphus.[362] He had served throughout all the concluding years of the war, and had been harmost at Abydus during the naval command of Lysander, who condemned him, on the complaint of Pharnabazus, to the disgrace of public exposure with his shield on his arm;[363] this was (I presume) a disgrace, because an officer of rank always had his shield carried for him by an attendant, except in the actual encounter of battle. Having never forgiven Pharnabazus for thus dishonoring him, Derkyllidas now took advantage of a misunderstanding between that satrap and Tissaphernes, to make a truce with the latter, and conduct his army, eight thousand strong, into the territory of the former.[364] The mountainous region of Ida generally known as the Troad,—inhabited by a population of Æolic Greeks (who had gradually Hellenized the indigenous inhabitants), and therefore known as the Æolis of Pharnabazus,—was laid open to him by a recent event, important in itself as well as instructive to read.

The entire Persian empire was parcelled into so many satrapies; each satrap being bound to send a fixed amount of annual tribute, and to hold a certain amount of military force ready, for the court at Susa. Provided he was punctual in fulfilling these obligations, little inquiry was made as to his other proceedings, unless in the rare case of his maltreating some individual Persian of high rank. In like manner, it appears, each satrapy was divided into sub-satrapies or districts; each of these held by a deputy, who paid to the satrap a fixed tribute and maintained for him a certain military force,—having liberty to govern in other respects as he pleased. Besides the tribute, however, presents of undefined amount were of constant occurrence, both from the satrap to the king, and from the deputy to the satrap. Nevertheless, enough was extorted from the people (we need hardly add), to leave an ample profit both to the one and to the other.[365]

This region, called Æolis, had been entrusted by Pharnabazus to a native of Dardanus named Zênis, who, after holding the post for some time and giving full satisfaction, died of illness, leaving a widow with a son and daughter still minors. The satrap was on the point of giving the district to another person, when Mania, the widow of Zênis, herself a native of Dardanus, preferred her petition to be allowed to succeed her husband. Visiting Pharnabazus with money in hand, sufficient not only to satisfy himself, but also to gain over his mistresses and his ministers,[366]—she said to him, —"My husband was faithful to you, and paid his tribute so regularly as to obtain your thanks. If I serve you no worse than he, why should you name any other deputy? If I fail in giving you satisfaction, you can always remove me, and give the place to another." Pharnabazus granted her petition, and had no cause to repent it. Mania was regular in her payment of tribute,—frequent in bringing him presents,—and splendid,

beyond any of his other deputies, in her manner of receiving him whenever he visited the district.

Her chief residence was at Skêpsis, Gergis, and Kebrên,—inland towns, strong both by position and by fortification, amidst the mountainous region once belonging to the Teukri Gergithes. It was here too that she kept her treasures, which, partly left by her husband, partly accumulated by herself, had gradually reached an enormous sum. But her district also reached down to the coast, comprising among other towns the classical name of Ilium, and probably her own native city, the neighboring Dardanus. She maintained, besides, a large military force of Grecian mercenaries in regular pay and excellent condition, which she employed both as garrison for each of her dependent towns, and as means for conquest in the neighborhood. She had thus reduced the maritime towns of Larissa, Hamaxitus, and Kolônæ, in the southern part of the Troad; commanding her troops in person, sitting in her chariot to witness the attack, and rewarding every one who distinguished himself. Moreover, when Pharnabazus undertook an expedition against the predatory Mysians or Pisidians, she accompanied him, and her military force formed so much the best part of his army, that he paid her the highest compliments, and sometimes condescended to ask her advice.[367] So, when Xerxes invaded Greece, Artemisia, queen of Halikarnassus, not only furnished ships among the best appointed in his fleet, and fought bravely at Salamis, but also, when he chose to call a council, stood alone, in daring to give him sound opinions contrary to his own leanings; opinions which, fortunately for the Grecian world, he could bring himself only to tolerate, not to follow.[368]

Under an energetic woman like Mania, thus victorious and well-provided, Æolis was the most defensible part of the satrapy of Pharnabazus, and might probably have defied Derkyllidas, had not a domestic traitor put an end to her life. Her son-in-law, Meidias, a Greek of Skêpsis, with whom she lived on terms of intimate confidence—"though she was scrupulously mistrustful of every one else, as it is proper for a despot to be,"[369]—was so inflamed by his own ambition and by the suggestions of evil counsellors, who told him it was a shame that a woman should thus be ruler while he was only a private man, that he strangled her in her chamber. Following up his nefarious scheme, he also assassinated her son, a beautiful youth of seventeen. He succeeded in getting possession of the three strongest places in the district, Kebrên, Skêpsis, and Gergis, together with the accumulated treasure of Mania; but the commanders in the other towns refused obedience to his summons, until they should receive orders from Pharnabazus. To that satrap Meidias instantly sent envoys, bearing ample presents, with a petition that the satrap would grant to him the district which had been enjoyed by Mania. Pharnabazus, repudiating the presents, sent an indignant reply to Meidias,—"Keep them until I come to seize them, and seize you, too, along with them. I would not consent to live, if I were not to avenge the death of Mania."[370]

At that critical moment, prior to the coming of the satrap, Derkyllidas presented himself with his army, and found Æolis almost defenceless. The three recent conquests of Mania,—Larissa, Hamaxitus, and Kolônæ, surrendered to him as soon as he appeared; while the garrisons of Ilium and some other places, who had taken special service under Mania, and found themselves worse off now that they had lost her, accepted his invitation to renounce Persian dependence, declare themselves allies of Sparta, and hold their cities for him. He thus became master of most part of the district, with the exception of Kebrên, Skêpsis, and Gergis, which he was anxious to secure before the arrival of Pharnabazus. On arriving before Kebrên, however, in spite of this necessity for haste, he remained inactive for four days,[371] because the sacrifices were unpropitious; while a rash, subordinate officer, hazarding an unwarranted attack during this interval, was repulsed and wounded. The sacrifices at length became favorable, and Derkyllidas was rewarded for his patience. The garrison, affected by the example of those at Ilium and the other towns, disobeyed their commander, who tried to earn the satrap's favor by holding out and assuring to him this very strong place. Sending out heralds to proclaim that they would go with Greeks and not with Persians, they admitted the Lacedæmonians at once within the gates. Having thus fortunately captured, and duly secured this important town, Derkyllidas marched against Skêpsis and Gergis, the former of which was held by Meidias himself; who, dreading the arrival of Pharnabazus, and mistrusting the citizens within, thought it best to open negotiations with Derkyllidas. He sent to solicit a conference, demanding hostages for his safety. When he came forth from the town, and demanded from the Lacedæmonian commander on what terms alliance would be granted to him, the latter replied,—"On condition that the citizens shall be left free and autonomous;" at the same time marching on, without waiting either for acquiescence or refusal, straight up to the gates of the town. Meidias, taken by surprise, in the power of the assailants, and aware that the citizens were unfriendly to him, was obliged to give orders that the gates should be opened; so that Derkyllidas found himself by this manœuvre in possession of the strongest place in the district without either loss or delay,—to the great delight of the Skepsians themselves.[372]

Derkyllidas, having ascended the acropolis of Skêpsis to offer a sacrifice of thanks to Athênê, the great patron goddess of Ilium and most of the Teukrian towns,—caused the garrison of Meidias to evacuate the town forthwith, and consigned it to the citizens themselves, exhorting them to conduct their political affairs as became Greeks and freemen. This proceeding, which reminds us of Brasidas in contrast with Lysander, was not less politic than generous; since Derkyllidas could hardly hope to hold an inland town in the midst of the Persian satrapy except by the attachments of the citizens themselves. He then marched away to Gergis, still conducting along with him Meidias, who urgently entreated to be allowed to retain that town, the last of his remaining fortresses. Without giving any decided answer, Derkyllidas took him by his side, and marched with him at the head of his army, arrayed only in double file, so as to carry the appearance of peace, to the foot of the lofty towers of Gergis. The garri-

son on the walls, seeing Meidias along with him, allowed him to approach without discharging a single missile. "Now, Meidias (said he), order the gates to be opened, and show me the way in, to the temple of Athênê, in order that I may there offer sacrifice." Again Meidias was forced, from fear of being at once seized as a prisoner, to give the order; and the Lacedæmonian forces found themselves in possession of the town. Derkyllidas, distributing his troops around the walls, in order to make sure of his conquest, ascended to the acropolis to offer his intended sacrifice; after which he proceeded to dictate the fate of Meidias, whom he divested of his character of prince and of his military force,—incorporating the latter in the Lacedæmonian army. He then called upon Meidias to specify all his paternal property, and restored to him the whole of what he claimed as such, though the bystanders protested against the statement given in as a flagrant exaggeration. But he laid hands on all the property, and all the treasures of Mania,—and caused her house, which Meidias had taken for himself, to be put under seal,—as lawful prey; since Mania had belonged to Pharnabazus,[373] against whom the Lacedæmonians were making war. On coming out after examining and verifying the contents of the house, he said to his officers, "Now, my friends, we have here already worked out pay for the whole army, eight thousand men, for nearly a year. Whatever we acquire besides, shall come to you also." He well knew the favorable effect which this intelligence would produce upon the temper, as well as upon the discipline, of the army—especially upon the Cyreians, who had tasted the discomfort of irregular pay and poverty.

"And where am I to live?" asked Meidias, who found himself turned out of the house of Mania. "In your rightful place of abode, to be sure (replied Derkyllidas); in your native town Skêpsis, and in your paternal house.[374]" What became of the assassin afterwards, we do not hear. But it is satisfactory to find that he did not reap the anticipated reward of his crime; the fruits of which were an important advantage to Derkyllidas and his army,—and a still more important blessing to the Greek cities which had been governed by Mania,—enfranchisement and autonomy.

This rapid, easy, and skilfully managed exploit,—the capture of nine towns in eight days,—is all which Xenophon mentions as achieved by Derkyllidas during the summer. Having acquired pay for so many months, perhaps the soldiers may have been disposed to rest until it was spent. But as winter approached, it became necessary to find winter quarters, without incurring the reproach which had fallen upon Thimbron of consuming the substance of allies. Fearing, however, that if he changed his position, Pharnabazus would employ the numerous Persian cavalry to harass the Grecian cities, he tendered a truce, which the latter willingly accepted. For the occupation of Æolis by the Lacedæmonian general was a sort of watch-post (like Dekeleia to Athens,) exposing the whole of Phrygia near the Propontis (in which was Daskylium the residence of Pharnabazus) to constant attack.[375] Derkyllidas accordingly only marched through Phrygia, to take up his winter quarters in Bithynia, the north-western corner of Asia Minor, between the Propontis and the Euxine; the same

territory through which Xenophon and the Ten Thousand had marched, on their road from Kalpê to Chalkêdon. He procured abundant provisions and booty, slaves as well as cattle, by plundering the Bithynian villages; not without occasional losses on his own side, by the carelessness of marauding parties.[376]

One of these losses was of considerable magnitude. Derkyllidas had obtained from Seuthes in European Thrace (the same prince of whom Xenophon had so much reason to complain) a reinforcement of three hundred cavalry and two hundred peltasts,—Odrysian Thracians. These Odrysians established themselves in a separate camp, nearly two miles and a half from Derkyllidas, which they surrounded with a palisade about man's height. Being indefatigable plunderers, they prevailed upon Derkyllidas to send them a guard of two hundred hoplites, for the purpose of guarding their separate camp with the booty accumulated within it. Presently the camp became richly stocked, especially with Bithynian captives. The hostile Bithynians, however, watching their opportunity when the Odrysians were out marauding, suddenly attacked at daybreak the two hundred Grecian hoplites in the camp. Shooting at them over the palisade with darts and arrows, they killed and wounded some, while the Greeks with their spears were utterly helpless, and could only reach their enemies by pulling up the palisade and charging out upon them; but the light-armed assailants, easily evading the charge of warriors with shield and spear, turned round upon them when they began to retire, and slew several before they could get back. In each successive sally the same phenomena recurred, until at length all the Greeks were overpowered and slain, except fifteen of them, who charged through the Bithynians in the first sally, and marched onward to join Derkyllidas, instead of returning with their comrades to the palisade. Derkyllidas lost no time in sending a reinforcement, which, however, came too late, and found only the naked bodies of the slain. The victorious Bithynians carried away all their own captives.[377]

At the beginning of spring the Spartan general returned to Lampsakus, where he found Arakus and two other Spartans, just arrived out as commissioners sent by the ephors. Arakus came with instructions to prolong the command of Derkyllidas for another year; as well as to communicate the satisfaction of the ephors with the Cyreian army, in consequence of the great improvement in their conduct, compared with the year of Thimbron. He accordingly assembled the soldiers, and addressed them in a mingled strain of praise and admonition; expressing his hope that they would continue the forbearance which they had now begun to practise towards all Asiatic allies. The commander of the Cyreians (probably Xenophon himself), in his reply, availed himself of the occasion to pay a compliment to Derkyllidas. "We (said he) are the same men now as we were in the previous year; but we are under a different general; you need not look farther for the explanation.[378]" Without denying the superiority of Derkyllidas over his predecessor, we may remark that the abundant wealth of Mania, thrown into his hands by accident (though he showed great ability in turning

the accident to account), was an auxiliary circumstance, not less unexpected than weighty, for ensuring the good behavior of the soldiers.

It was among the farther instructions of Arakus to visit all the principal Asiatic Greeks, and report their condition at Sparta; and Derkyllidas was pleased to see them entering on this survey at a moment when they would find the cities in undisturbed peace and tranquillity.[379] So long as the truce continued both with Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, these cities were secure from aggression, and paid no tribute; the land-force of Derkyllidas affording to them a protection[380] analogous to that which had been conferred by Athens and her powerful fleet, during the interval between the formation of the Confederacy of Delos and the Athenian catastrophe at Syracuse. At the same time, during the truce, the army had neither occupation nor subsistence. To keep it together and near at hand, yet without living at the cost of friends, was the problem. It was accordingly with great satisfaction that Derkyllidas noticed an intimation accidentally dropped by Arakus. Some envoys (the latter said) were now at Sparta from the Thracian Chersonesus (the long tongue of land bordering westward on the Hellespont), soliciting aid against their marauding Thracian neighbors. That fertile peninsula, first hellenized a century and a half before by the Athenian Miltiades, had been a favorite resort for Athenian citizens, many of whom had acquired property there during the naval power of Athens. The battle of Ægospotami dispossessed and drove home these proprietors, at the same time depriving the peninsula of its protection against the Thracians. It now contained eleven distinct cities, of which Sestos was the most important; and its inhabitants combined to send envoys to Sparta, entreating the ephors to send out a force for the purpose of building a wall across the isthmus from Kardia to Paktyê; in recompense for which (they said) there was fertile land enough open to as many settlers as chose to come, with coast and harbors for export close at hand. Miltiades, on first going out to the Chersonese, had secured it by constructing a cross-wall on the same spot, which had since become neglected during the period of Persian supremacy; Perikles had afterwards sent fresh colonists, and caused the wall to be repaired. But it seems to have been unnecessary while the Athenian empire was in full vigor,—since the Thracian princes had been generally either conciliated, or kept off, by Athens, even without any such bulwark.[381] Informed that the request of the Chersonesites had been favorably listened to at Sparta, Derkyllidas resolved to execute their project with his own army. Having prolonged his truce with Pharnabazus, he crossed the Hellespont into Europe, and employed his army during the whole summer in constructing this cross-wall, about four and a quarter miles in length. The work was distributed in portions to different sections of the army, competition being excited by rewards for the most rapid and workmanlike execution; while the Chersonesites were glad to provide pay and subsistence for the army, during an operation which provided security for all the eleven cities, and gave additional value to their lands and harbors. Numerous settlers seem to have now come in, under Lacedæmonian auspices,—who were

again disturbed, wholly or partially, when the Lacedæmonian maritime empire was broken up a few years afterwards.[382]

On returning to Asia in the autumn, after the completion of this work, which had kept his army usefully employed and amply provided during six months, Derkyllidas undertook the siege of Artaneus, a strong post (on the continental coast eastward of Mitylênê) occupied by some Chian exiles, whom the Lacedæmonian admiral Kratesippidas had lent corrupt aid in expelling from their native island a few years before.[383] These men, living by predatory expeditions against Chios and Ionia, were so well supplied with provisions that it cost Derkyllidas a blockade of eight months before he could reduce it. He placed in it a strong garrison well supplied, that it might serve him as a retreat in case of need,—under an Achæan named Drako, whose name remained long terrible from his ravages on the neighboring plain of Mysia.[384]

Derkyllidas next proceeded to Ephesus, where orders presently reached him from the ephors, directing him to march into Karia and attack Tissaphernes. The temporary truce which had hitherto provisionally kept off Persian soldiers and tribute-gatherers from the Asiatic Greeks, was now renounced by mutual consent. These Greeks had sent envoys to Sparta, assuring the ephors that Tissaphernes would be constrained to renounce formally the sovereign rights of Persia, and grant to them full autonomy, if his residence in Karia were vigorously attacked. Accordingly Derkyllidas marched southward across the Mæander into Karia, while the Lacedæmonian fleet under Pharax coöperated along the shore. At the same time Tissaphernes, on his side, had received reinforcements from Susa, together with the appointment of generalissimo over all the Persian force in Asia Minor; upon which Pharnabazus (who had gone up to court in the interval to concert more vigorous means of prosecuting the war, but had now returned)[385] joined him in Karia, prepared to commence vigorous operations for the expulsion of Derkyllidas and his army. Having properly garrisoned the strong places, the two satraps crossed the Mæander at the head of a powerful Grecian and Karian force, with numerous Persian cavalry, to attack the Ionian cities. As soon as he heard this news, Derkyllidas came back with his army from Karia, to cover the towns menaced. Having recrossed the Mæander, he was marching with his army in disorder, not suspecting the enemy to be near, when on a sudden he came upon their scouts, planted on some sepulchral monuments in the road. He also sent some scouts up to the neighboring monuments and towers, who apprised him that the two satraps, with their joint force in good order, were planted here to intercept him. He immediately gave orders for his hoplites to form in battle array of eight deep, with the peltasts, and his handful of horsemen, on each flank. But such was the alarm caused among his troops by this surprise, that none could be relied upon except the Cyreians and the Peloponnesians. Of the insular and Ionian hoplites, from Priênê and other cities, some actually hid their arms in the thick standing corn, and fled; others, who took their places in the line, manifested dispositions which left little hope that they would stand a charge; so that the Persians had the opportunity of

fighting a battle not merely with superiority of number, but also with advantage of position and circumstances. Pharnabazus was anxious to attack without delay. But Tissaphernes, who recollected well the valor of the Cyreian troops, and concluded that all the remaining Greeks were like them, forbade it; sending forward heralds to demand a conference. As they approached, Derkyllidas, surrounding himself with a body-guard of the finest and best-equipped soldiers,[386] advanced to the front of the line to meet them; saying that he, for his part, was prepared to fight,—but since a conference was demanded, he had no objection to grant it, provided hostages were exchanged. This having been assented to, and a place named for conference on the ensuing day, both armies were simultaneously withdrawn; the Persians to Tralles, the Greeks to Leukophrys, celebrated for its temple of Artemis Leukophryne.[387]

This backwardness on the part of Tissaphernes even at a time when he was encouraged by a brother satrap braver than himself, occasioned to the Persians the loss of a very promising moment, and rescued the Grecian army out of a position of much peril. It helps to explain to us the escape of the Cyreians, and the manner in which they were allowed to cross rivers and pass over the most difficult ground without any serious opposition; while at the same time it tended to confirm in the Greek mind the same impressions of Persian imbecility as that escape so forcibly suggested.

The conference, as might be expected, ended in nothing. Derkyllidas required on behalf of the Asiatic Greeks complete autonomy,—exemption from Persian interference and tribute; while the two satraps on their side insisted that the Lacedæmonian army should be withdrawn from Asia, and the Lacedæmonian harmosts from all the Greco-Asiatic cities. An armistice was concluded, to allow time for reference to the authorities at home; thus replacing matters in the condition in which they had been at the beginning of the year.[388]

Shortly after the conclusion of this truce, Agesilaus, king of Sparta, arrived with a large force, and the war in all respects began to assume larger proportions,—of which more in the next chapter.

But it was not in Asia alone that Sparta had been engaged in war. The prostration of the Athenian power had removed that common bond of hatred and alarm which attached the allies to her headship; while her subsequent conduct had given positive offence, and had even excited against herself the same fear of unmeasured imperial ambition which had before run so powerfully against Athens. She had appropriated to herself nearly the whole of the Athenian maritime empire, with a tribute scarcely inferior, if at all inferior, in amount. How far the total of one thousand talents was actually realised during each successive year, we are not in a condition to say; but such was the assessment imposed and the scheme laid down by Sparta for her maritime dependencies,—enforced too by omnipresent instruments of rapacity and oppression, decemvirs and harmosts, such as Athens had never paralleled. When we add to this great maritime empire the prodigious ascendency on land which Sparta had enjoyed

before, we shall find a total of material power far superior to that which Athens had enjoyed, even in her day of greatest exaltation, prior to the truce of 445 B.C.

This was not all. From the general dulness of character pervading Spartan citizens, the full resources of the state were hardly ever put forth. Her habitual shortcomings at the moment of action are keenly criticised by her own friends, in contrast with the ardor and forwardness which animated her enemies. But at and after the battle of Ægospotami, the entire management of Spartan foreign affairs was found in the hands of Lysander; a man not only exempt from the inertia usual in his countrymen, but of the most unwearied activity and grasping ambition, as well for his country as for himself. Under his direction the immense advantages which Sparta enjoyed from her new position were at once systematized and turned to the fullest account. Now there was enough in the new ascendency of Sparta, had it been ever so modestly handled, to spread apprehension through the Grecian world. But apprehension became redoubled, when it was seen that her ascendency was organized and likely to be worked by her most aggressive leader for the purposes of an insatiable ambition. Fortunately for the Grecian world, indeed, the power of Sparta did not long continue to be thus absolutely wielded by Lysander, whose arrogance and overweening position raised enemies against him at home. Yet the first impressions received by the allies respecting Spartan empire, were derived from his proceedings and his plans of dominion, manifested with ostentatious insolence; and such impressions continued, even after the influence of Lysander himself had been much abated by the counterworking rivalry of Pausanias and others.

While Sparta separately had thus gained so much by the close of the war, not one of her allies had received the smallest remuneration or compensation, except such as might be considered to be involved in the destruction of a formidable enemy. Even the pecuniary result or residue which Lysander had brought home with him (four hundred and seventy talents remaining out of the advances made by Cyrus), together with the booty acquired at Dekeleia, was all detained by the Lacedæmonians themselves. Thebes and Corinth indeed presented demands, in which the other allies did not (probably durst not) join, to be allowed to share. But though all the efforts and sufferings of the war had fallen upon these allies no less than upon Sparta, the demands were refused, and almost resented as insults.[389] Hence there arose among the allies not merely a fear of the grasping dominion, but a hatred of the monopolizing rapacity, of Sparta. Of this new feeling, an early manifestation, alike glaring and important, was made by the Thebans and Corinthians, when they refused to join Pausanias in his march against Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in Peiræus, [390]—less than a year after the surrender of Athens, the enemy whom these two cities had hated with such extreme bitterness down to the very moment of surrender. Even Arcadians and Achæans too, habitually obedient as they were to Lacedæmon, keenly felt the different way in which she treated them, as compared with the previ-

ous years of war, when she had been forced to keep alive their zeal against the common enemy.[391]

The Lacedæmonians were however strong enough not merely to despise this growing alienation of their allies, but even to take revenge upon such of the Peloponnesians as had incurred their displeasure. Among these stood conspicuous the Eleians; now under a government called democratical, of which the leading man was Thrasydæus,—a man who had lent considerable aid in 404 B.C. to Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in Peiræus. The Eleians, in the year 420 B.C., had been engaged in a controversy with Sparta,—had employed their privileges as administrators of the Olympic festival to exclude her from attendance on that occasion,—and had subsequently been in arms against her along with Argos and Mantineia. To these grounds of quarrel, now of rather ancient date, had been added afterwards, a refusal to furnish aid in the war against Athens since the resumption of hostilities in 414 B.C., and a recent exclusion of king Agis, who had come in person to offer sacrifice and consult the oracle of Zeus Olympius; such exclusion being grounded on the fact that he was about to pray for victory in the war then pending against Athens, contrary to the ancient canon of the Olympic temple, which admitted no sacrifice or consultation respecting hostilities of Greek against Greek.[392] These were considered by Sparta as affronts; and the season was now favorable for resenting them, as well as for chastising and humbling Elis.[393] Accordingly Sparta sent an embassy, requiring the Eleians to make good the unpaid arrears of the quota assessed upon them for the cost of the war against Athens; and farther,—to relinquish their authority over their dependent townships or Periœki, leaving the latter autonomous.[394] Of these dependencies there were several, no one very considerable individually, in the region called Triphylia, south of the river Alpheus, and north of the Neda. One of them was Lepreum, the autonomy of which the Lacedæmonians had vindicated against Elis in 420 B.C., though during the subsequent period it had again become subject.

The Eleians refused compliance with the demand thus sent, alleging that their dependent cities were held by the right of conquest. They even retorted upon the Lacedæmonians the charge of enslaving Greeks;[395] upon which Agis marched with an army to invade their territory, entering it from the north side where it joined Achaia. Hardly had he crossed the frontier river Larissus and begun his ravages, when an earthquake occurred. Such an event, usually construed in Greece as a divine warning, acted on this occasion so strongly on the religious susceptibilities of Agis, that he not only withdrew from the Eleian territory, but disbanded his army. His retreat gave so much additional courage to the Eleians, that they sent envoys and tried to establish alliances among those cities which they knew to be alienated from Sparta. Not even Thebes and Corinth, however, could be induced to assist them; nor did they obtain any other aid except one thousand men from Ætolia.

In the next summer Agis undertook a second expedition, accompanied on this occasion by all the allies of Sparta; even by the Athenians, now enrolled upon the list.

Thebes and Corinth alone stood aloof. On this occasion he approached from the opposite or southern side, that of the territory once called Messenia; passing through Aulon, and crossing the river Neda. He marched through Triphylia to the river Alpheius, which he crossed, and then proceeded to Olympia, where he consummated the sacrifice from which the Eleians had before excluded him. In his march he was joined by the inhabitants of Lepreum, Makistus, and other dependent towns, which now threw off their subjection to Elis. Thus reinforced, Agis proceeded onward towards the city of Elis, through a productive country under flourishing agriculture, enriched by the crowds and sacrifices at the neighboring Olympic temple, and for a long period unassailed. After attacking, not very vigorously, the half-fortified city,—and being repelled by the Ætolian auxiliaries,—he marched onward to the harbor called Kyllênê, still plundering the territory. So ample was the stock of slaves, cattle, and rural wealth generally, that his troops not only acquired riches for themselves by plunder, but were also joined by many Arcadian and Achæan volunteers, who crowded in to partake of the golden harvest.[396]

The opposition or wealthy oligarchical party in Elis availed themselves of this juncture to take arms against the government; hoping to get possession of the city, and to maintain themselves in power by the aid of Sparta. Xenias their leader, a man of immense wealth, with several of his adherents, rushed out armed, and assailed the government-house, in which it appears that Thrasydæus and his colleagues had been banqueting. They slew several persons, and among them one, whom, from great personal resemblance, they mistook for Thrasydæus. The latter was however at that moment intoxicated, and asleep in a separate chamber.[397] They then assembled in arms in the market-place, believing themselves to be masters of the city; while the people, under the like impression that Thrasydæus was dead, were too much dismayed to offer resistance. But presently it became known that he was yet alive; the people crowded to the government-house "like a swarm of bees,"[398] and arrayed themselves for his protection as well as under his guidance. Leading them forth at once to battle, he completely defeated the oligarchical insurgents, and forced them to flee for protection to the Lacedæmonian army.

Agis presently evacuated the Eleian territory, yet not without planting a Lacedæmonian harmost and a garrison, together with Xenias and the oligarchical exiles, at Epitalium, a little way south of the river Alpheius. Occupying this fort (analogous to Dekeleia in Attica), they spread ravage and ruin all around throughout the autumn and winter, to such a degree, that in the early spring, Thrasydæus and the Eleian government were compelled to send to Sparta and solicit peace. They consented to raze the imperfect fortifications of their city, so as to leave it quite open. They farther surrendered their harbor of Kyllênê with their ships of war, and relinquished all authority over the Triphylian townships, as well as over Lasion, which was claimed as an Arcadian town.[399] Though they pressed strenuously their claim to preserve the town of Epeium (between the Arcadian town of Heræa and the Triphylian town of

Makistus), on the plea that they had bought it from its previous inhabitants at the price of thirty talents paid down,—the Lacedæmonians, pronouncing this to be a compulsory bargain imposed upon weaker parties by force, refused to recognize it. The town was taken away from them, seemingly without any reimbursement of the purchase money either in part or in whole. On these terms the Eleians were admitted to peace, and enrolled again among the members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy.[400]

The time of the Olympic festival seems to have been now approaching, and the Eleians were probably the more anxious to obtain peace from Sparta, as they feared to be deprived of their privilege as superintendents. The Pisatans,—inhabitants of the district immediately around Olympia,—availed themselves of the Spartan invasion of Elis to petition for restoration of their original privilege, as administrators of the temple of Zeus at Olympia with its great periodical solemnity,—by the dispossession of the Eleians as usurpers of that privilege. But their request met with no success. It was true indeed that such right had belonged to the Pisatans in early days, before the Olympic festival had acquired its actual Pan-hellenic importance and grandeur; and that the Eleians had only appropriated it to themselves after conquering the territory of Pisa. But taking the festival as it then stood, the Pisatans, mere villagers without any considerable city, were incompetent to do justice to it, and would have lowered its dignity in the eyes of all Greece.

Accordingly the Lacedæmonians, on this ground, dismissed the claimants, and left the superintendence of the Olympic games still in the hands of the Eleians.[401]

This triumphant dictation of terms to Elis, placed the Lacedæmonians in a condition of overruling ascendency throughout Peloponnesus, such as they had never attained before. To complete their victory, they rooted out all the remnants of their ancient enemies the Messenians, some of whom had been planted by the Athenians at Naupaktus, others in the island of Kephallenia. All of this persecuted race were now expelled, in the hour of Lacedæmonian omnipotence, from the neighborhood of Peloponnesus, and forced to take shelter, some in Sicily, others at Kyrênê.[402] We shall in a future chapter have to commemorate the turn of fortune in their favor.

CHAPTER LXXIII.

AGESILAUS KING OF SPARTA. — THE CORINTHIAN WAR.

THE close of the Peloponnesian war, with the victorious organization of the Lacedæmonian empire by Lysander, has already been described as a period carrying with it increased sufferings to those towns which had formerly belonged to the Athenian empire, as compared with what they had endured under Athens,—and harder dependence, unaccompanied by any species of advantage, even to those Peloponnesians and inland cities which had always been dependent allies of Sparta. To complete the melancholy picture of the Grecian world during these years, we may add (what will be hereafter more fully detailed) that calamities of a still more deplorable character overtook the Sicilian Greeks; first, from the invasion of the Carthaginians, who sacked Himera, Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina,—next from the overruling despotism of Dionysius at Syracuse.

Sparta alone had been the gainer; and that to a prodigious extent, both in revenue and power. It is from this time, and from the proceedings of Lysander, that various ancient authors dated the commencement of her degeneracy, which they ascribe mainly to her departure from the institutions of Lykurgus by admitting gold and silver money. These metals had before been strictly prohibited; no money being tolerated except heavy pieces of iron, not portable except to a very trifling amount. That such was the ancient institution of Sparta, under which any Spartan having in his possession gold and silver money, was liable, if detected, to punishment, appears certain. How far the regulation may have been in practice evaded, we have no means of determining. Some of the ephors strenuously opposed the admission of the large sum brought home by Lysander as remnant of what he had received from Cyrus towards the prosecution of the war. They contended that the admission of so much gold and silver into the public treasury was a flagrant transgression of the Lykurgean ordinances. But their resistance was unavailing and the new acquisitions were received; though it still continued to be a penal offence (and was even made a capital offence, if we may trust Plutarch) for any individual to be found with gold and silver in his possession.[403] To enforce such a prohibition, however, even if practicable before, ceased to be practicable so soon as these metals were recognized and tolerated in the possession, and for the purposes of the government.

There can be no doubt that the introduction of a large sum of coined gold and silver into Sparta was in itself a striking and important phenomenon, when viewed in conjunction with the peculiar customs and discipline of the state. It was likely to raise strong antipathies in the bosom of an old fashioned Spartan, and probably king Archidamus, had he been alive, would have taken part with the opposing ephors. But Plutarch and others have criticised it too much as a phenomenon by itself; whereas,

it was really one characteristic mark and portion of a new assemblage of circumstances, into which Sparta had been gradually arriving during the last years of the war, and which were brought into the most effective action by the decisive success at Ægospotami. The institutions of Lykurgus, though excluding all Spartan citizens, by an unremitting drill and public mess, from trade and industry, from ostentation, and from luxury,—did not by any means extinguish in their bosoms the love of money; [404] while it had a positive tendency to exaggerate, rather than to abate, the love of power. The Spartan kings, Leotychides and Pleistoanax, had both been guilty of receiving bribes; Tissaphernes had found means (during the twentieth year of the Peloponnesian war) to corrupt not merely the Spartan admiral Astyochus, but also nearly all the captains of the Peloponnesian fleet, except the Syracusan Hermokrates; Gylippus, as well as his father Kleandrides, had degraded himself by the like fraud; and Anaxibius at Byzantium was not at all purer. Lysander, enslaved only by his appetite for dominion, and himself a remarkable instance of superiority to pecuniary corruption, was thus not the first to engraft that vice on the minds of his countrymen. But though he found it already diffused among them, he did much to impart to it a still more decided predominance, by the immense increase of opportunities, and enlarged booty for peculation, which his newly-organized Spartan empire furnished. Not merely did he bring home a large residue in gold and silver, but there was a much larger annual tribute imposed by him on the dependent cities, combined with numerous appointments of harmosts to govern these cities. Such appointments presented abundant illicit profits, easy to acquire, and even difficult to avoid, since the decemvirs in each city were eager thus to purchase forbearance or connivance for their own misdeeds. So many new sources of corruption were sufficient to operate most unfavorably on the Spartan character, if not by implanting any fresh vices, at least by stimulating all its inherent bad tendencies.

To understand the material change thus wrought in it, we have only to contrast the speeches of king Archidamus and of the Corinthians, made in 432 B.C. at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, with the state of facts at the end of the war,—during the eleven years between the victory of Ægospotami and the defeat of Knidus (405-394 B.C.). At the former of the two epochs, Sparta had no tributary subjects, nor any funds in her treasury, while her citizens were very reluctant to pay imposts.[405] About 334 B.C., thirty-seven years after her defeat at Leuktra and her loss of Messenia, Aristotle remarks the like fact, which had then again become true;[406] but during the continuance of her empire between 405 and 394 B.C., she possessed a large public revenue, derived from the tribute of the dependent cities. In 432 B.C., Sparta is not merely cautious but backward; especially averse to any action at a distance from home.[407] In 404 B.C., after the close of the war, she becomes aggressive, intermeddling, and ready for dealing with enemies, or making acquisitions remote as well as near.[408] In 432 B.C., her unsocial and exclusive manners, against the rest of Greece, with her constant expulsion of other Greeks from her own city, stand prominent among her attributes;[409] while at the end of the war, her foreign relations had ac-

quired such great development as to become the principal matter of attention for her leading citizens as well as for her magistrates; so that the influx of strangers into Sparta, and the efflux of Spartans into other parts of Greece became constant and inevitable. Hence the strictness of the Lykurgean discipline gave way on many points, and the principal Spartans especially struggled by various shifts to evade its obligations. It was to these leading men that the great prizes fell, enabling them to enrich themselves at the expense either of foreign subjects or of the public treasury, and tending more and more to aggravate that inequality of wealth among the Spartans which Aristotle so emphatically notices in his time;[410] since the smaller citizens had no similar opportunities opened to them, nor any industry of their own, to guard their properties against gradual subdivision and absorption, and to keep them in a permanent state of ability to furnish that contribution to the mess-table, for themselves and their sons, which formed the groundwork of Spartan political franchise. Moreover, the spectacle of such newly-opened lucrative prizes,—accessible only to that particular section of influential Spartan families who gradually became known apart from the rest under the title of the Equals or Peers,—embittered the discontent of the energetic citizens beneath that privileged position, in such a manner as to menace the tranquillity of the state,—as will presently be seen. That sameness of life, habits, attainments, aptitudes, enjoyments, fatigues, and restraints, which the Lykurgean regulations had so long enforced, and still continued to prescribe,—divesting wealth of its principal advantages, and thus keeping up the sentiment of personal equality among the poorer citizens,—became more and more eluded by the richer, through the venality as well as the example of ephors and senators;[411] while for those who had no means of corruption, it continued unrelaxed, except in so far as many of them fell into a still more degraded condition by the loss of their citizenship.

It is not merely Isokrates,[412] who attests the corruption wrought in the character of the Spartans by the possession of that foreign empire which followed the victory of Ægospotami,—but also their earnest panegyrist Xenophon. After having warmly extolled the laws of Lykurgus or the Spartan institutions, he is constrained to admit that his eulogies, though merited by the past, have become lamentably inapplicable to that present which he himself witnessed. "Formerly (says he,[413]) the Lacedæmonians used to prefer their own society and moderate way of life at home, to appointments as harmosts in foreign towns, with all the flattery and all the corruption attending them. Formerly, they were afraid to be seen with gold in their possession; now, there are some who make even an ostentatious display of it. Formerly, they enforced their (Xenêlasy or) expulsion of strangers, and forbade foreign travel, in order that their citizens might not be filled with relaxed habits of life from contact with foreigners; but now, those who stand first in point of influence among them, study above all things to be in perpetual employment as harmosts abroad. There was a time when they took pains to be worthy of headship; but now they strive much rather to get and keep the command, than to be properly qualified for it. Accordingly, the Greeks used in former days to come and solicit, that the Spartans would act as

their leaders against wrong-doers; but now they are exhorting each other to concert measures for shutting out Sparta from renewed empire. Nor can we wonder that the Spartans have fallen into this discredit, when they have manifestly renounced obedience both to the Delphian god, and to the institutions of Lykurgus!"

This criticism (written at some period between 394-371 B.C.) from the strenuous eulogist of Sparta is highly instructive. We know from other evidences how badly the Spartan empire worked for the subject cities; we here learn how badly it worked for the character of the Spartans themselves, and for those internal institutions which even an enemy of Sparta, who detested her foreign policy, still felt constrained to admire.[414] All the vices, here insisted upon by Xenophon, arise from various incidents connected with her empire. The moderate, home-keeping, old-fashioned, backward disposition,—of which the Corinthians complain,[415] but for which king Archidamus takes credit, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war,—is found exchanged, at the close of the war, for a spirit of aggression and conquest, for ambition public as well as private, and for emancipation of the great men from the subduing[416] equality of the discipline enacted by Lykurgus.

Agis the son of Archidamus (426-399 B.C.), and Pausanias son of Pleistoanax (408-394 B.C.), were the two kings of Sparta at the end of the war. But Lysander, the admiral or commander of the fleet, was for the time[417] greater than either of the two kings, who had the right of commanding only the troops on land. I have already mentioned how his overweening dictation and insolence offended not only Pausanias, but also several of the ephors and leading men at Sparta, as well as Pharnabazus the Persian satrap; thus indirectly bringing about the emancipation of Athens from the Thirty, the partial discouragement of the dekarchies throughout Greece, and the recall of Lysander himself from his command. It was not without reluctance that the conqueror of Athens submitted to descend again to a private station. Amidst the crowd of flatterers who heaped incense on him at the moment of his omnipotence, there were not wanting those who suggested that he was much more worthy to reign than either Agis or Pausanias; that the kings ought to be taken, not from the first-born of the lineage of Eurysthenês and Proklês, but by selection out of all the Herakleids, of whom Lysander himself was one;[418] and that the person elected ought to be not merely a descendant of Hêraklês, but a worthy parallel of Hêraklês himself, while pæans were sung to the honor of Lysander at Samos,[419]—while Chœrilus and Antilochus composed poems in his praise,—while Antimachus (a poet highly esteemed by Plato) entered into a formal competition of recited epic verses called *Lysandria*, and was surpassed by Nikêratus, there was another warm admirer, a rhetor or sophist of Halikarnassus, named Kleon,[420] who wrote a discourse proving that Lysander had well earned the regal dignity,—that personal excellence ought to prevail over legitimate descent, and that the crown ought to be laid open to election from the most worthy among the Herakleids. Considering that rhetoric was neither employed nor esteemed at Sparta, we cannot reasonably believe that Lysander

really ordered the composition of this discourse as an instrument of execution for projects preconceived by himself, in the same manner as an Athenian prosecutor or defendant before the dikastery used to arm himself with a speech from Lysias or Demosthenes. Kleon would make his court professionally through such a prose composition, whether the project were first recommended by himself, or currently discussed among a circle of admirers; while Lysander would probably requite the compliment by a reward not less munificent than that which he gave to the indifferent poet Antilochus.[421] And the composition would be put into the form of an harangue from the admiral to his countrymen, without any definite purpose that it should be ever so delivered. Such hypothesis of a speaker and an audience was frequent with the rhetors in their writings, as we may see in Isokrates,—especially in his sixth discourse, called Archidamus.

Either from his own ambition, or from the suggestions of others, Lysander came now to conceive the idea of breaking the succession of the two regal families, and opening for himself a door to reach the crown. His projects have been characterized as revolutionary; but there seems nothing in them which fairly merits the appellation, in the sense which that word now bears, if we consider accurately what the Spartan kings were in the year 400 B.C. In this view the associations connected with the title of king, are to a modern reader misleading. The Spartan kings were not kings at all, in any modern sense of the term; not only they were not absolute, but they were not even constitutional kings. They were not sovereigns, nor was any Spartan their subject; every Spartan was the member of a free Grecian community. The Spartan king did not govern; nor did he reign, in the sense of having government carried on in his name and by his delegates. The government of Sparta was carried on by the ephors, with frequent consultation of the senate, and occasional, though rare appeals, to the public assembly of citizens. The Spartan king was not legally inviolable. He might be, and occasionally was, arrested, tried, and punished for misbehavior in the discharge of his functions. He was a self-acting person, a great officer of state; enjoying certain definite privileges, and exercising certain military and judicial functions, which passed as an *universitas* by hereditary transmission in his family; but subject to the control of the ephors as to the way in which he performed these duties.[422] Thus, for example, it was his privilege to command the army when sent on foreign service; yet a law was made, requiring him to take deputies along with him, as a council of war, without whom nothing was to be done. The ephors recalled Agesilaus when they thought fit; and they brought Pausanias to trial and punishment, for alleged misconduct in his command.[423] The only way in which the Spartan kings formed part of the sovereign power in the state, or shared in the exercise of government properly so called, was that they had votes *ex officio* in the Senate, and could vote there by proxy when they were not present. In ancient times, very imperfectly known, the Spartan kings seem really to have been sovereigns; the government having then been really carried on by them, or by their orders. But in the year 400 B.C., Agis and Pausanias had become nothing more than great and dignified hereditary officers of

state, still bearing the old title of their ancestors. To throw open these hereditary functions to all the members of the Herakleid Gens, by election from their number, might be a change better or worse; it was a startling novelty (just as it would have been to propose, that any of the various priesthoods, which were hereditary in particular families, should be made elective), because of the extreme attachment of the Spartans to old and sanctified customs; but it cannot properly be styled revolutionary. The ephors, the senate, and the public assembly, might have made such a change in full legal form, without any appeal to violence; the kings might vote against it, but they would have been outvoted. And if the change had been made, the Spartan government would have remained, in form as well as in principle, just what it was before; although the Eurystheneid and Prokleid families would have lost their privileges. It is not meant here to deny that the Spartan kings were men of great importance in the state, especially when (like Agesilaus) they combined with their official station a marked personal energy. But it is not the less true, that the associations, connected with the title of *king* in the modern mind, do not properly apply to them.

To carry his point at Sparta, Lysander was well aware that agencies of an unusual character must be employed. Quitting Sparta soon after his recall, he visited the oracles of Delphi, Dodona, and Zeus Ammon in Libya,[424] in order to procure, by persuasion or corruption, injunctions to the Spartans, countenancing his projects. So great was the general effect of oracular injunctions on the Spartan mind, that Kleomenes had thus obtained the deposition of king Demaratus, and the exiled Pleistoanax, his own return;[425] bribery having been in both cases the moving impulse. But Lysander was not equally fortunate. None of these oracles could be induced, by any offers, to venture upon so grave a sentence as that of repealing the established law of succession to the Spartan throne. It is even said that the priests of Ammon, not content with refusing his offers, came over to Sparta to denounce his proceeding; upon which accusation Lysander was put on his trial, but acquitted. The statement that he was thus tried and acquitted, I think untrue. But his schemes so far miscarried,—and he was compelled to resort to another stratagem, yet still appealing to the religious susceptibilities of his countrymen. There had been born some time before, in one of the cities of the Euxine, a youth named Silenus, whose mother affirmed that he was the son of Apollo; an assertion which found extensive credence, notwithstanding various difficulties raised by the sceptics. While making at Sparta this new birth of a son to the god, the partisans of Lysander also spread abroad the news that there existed sacred manuscripts and inspired records, of great antiquity, hidden and yet unread, in the custody of the Delphian priests; not to be touched or consulted until some genuine son of Apollo should come forward to claim them. With the connivance of some among the priests, certain oracles were fabricated agreeable to the views of Lysander. The plan was concerted that Silenus should present himself at Delphi, tender the proofs of his divine parentage, and then claim the inspection of these hidden records; which the priests, after an apparently rigid scrutiny, were pre-

pared to grant. Silenus would then read them aloud in the presence of all the spectators; and one would be found among them, recommending to the Spartans to choose their kings out of all the best citizens.[426]

So nearly did this project approach to consummation, that Silenus actually presented himself at Delphi, and put in his claim. But one of the confederates either failed in his courage, or broke down, at the critical moment; so that the hidden records still remained hidden. Yet though Lysander was thus compelled to abandon his plan, nothing was made public about it until after his death. It might probably have succeeded, had he found temple-confederates of proper courage and cunning,—when we consider the profound and habitual deference of the Spartans to Delphi; upon the sanction of which oracle the Lykurgean institutions themselves were mainly understood to rest. And an occasion presently arose, on which the proposed change might have been tried with unusual facility and pertinence; though Lysander himself, having once miscarried, renounced his enterprise, and employed his influence, which continued unabated, in giving the sceptre to another instead of acquiring it for himself,[427]—like Mucian in reference to the emperor Vespasian.

It was apparently about a year after the campaigns in Elis, that king Agis, now an old man, was taken ill at Heræa in Arcadia, and carried back to Sparta, where he shortly afterwards expired. His wife Mimæa had given birth to a son named Leotychides, now a youth about fifteen years of age.[428] But the legitimacy of this youth had always been suspected by Agis, who had pronounced, when the birth of the child was first made known to him, that it could not be his. He had been frightened out of his wife's bed by the shock of an earthquake, which was construed as a warning from Poseidon, and was held to be a prohibition of intercourse for a certain time; during which interval Leotychides was born. This was one story; another was, that the young prince was the son of Alkibiades, born during the absence of Agis in his command at Dekeleia. On the other hand, it was alleged that Agis, though originally doubtful of the legitimacy of Leotychides, had afterwards retracted his suspicions, and fully recognized him; especially, and with peculiar solemnity, during his last illness.[429] As in the case of Demaratus about a century earlier,[430]—advantage was taken of these doubts by Agesilaus, the younger brother of Agis, powerfully seconded by Lysander, to exclude Leotychides, and occupy the throne himself.

Agesilaus was the son of king Archidamus, not by Lampito the mother of Agis, but by a second wife named Eupolia. He was now at the mature age of forty,[431] and having been brought up without any prospect of becoming king,—at least until very recent times,—had passed through the unmitigated rigor of Spartan drill and training. He was distinguished for all Spartan virtues; exemplary obedience to authority, in the performance of his trying exercises, military as well as civil,—intense emulation, in trying to surpass every competitor,—extraordinary courage, unremitting energy, as well as facility in enduring hardship,—perfect simplicity and frugality in all his personal habits,—extreme sensibility to the opinion of his fellow-citizens. Towards his

personal friends or adherents, he was remarkable for fervor of attachment, even for unscrupulous partisanship, with a readiness to use all his influence in screening their injustices or short-comings; while he was comparatively placable and generous in dealing with rivals at home, notwithstanding his eagerness to be first in every sort of competition.[432] His manners were cheerful and popular, and his physiognomy pleasing; though in stature he was not only small but mean, and though he labored under the additional defect of lameness on one leg,[433] which accounts for his constant refusal to suffer his statue to be taken.[434] He was indifferent to money, and exempt from excess of selfish feeling, except in his passion for superiority and power.

In spite of his rank as brother of Agis, Agesilaus had never yet been tried in any military command, though he had probably served in the army either at Dekeleia or in Asia. Much of his character, therefore, lay as yet undisclosed. And his popularity may perhaps have been the greater at the moment when the throne became vacant, inasmuch as, having never been put in a position to excite jealousy, he stood distinguished only for accomplishments, efforts, endurances, and punctual obedience, wherein even the poorest citizens were his competitors on equal terms. Nay, so complete was the self-constraint, and the habit of smothering emotions, generated by a Spartan training, that even the cunning Lysander himself did not at this time know him. He and Agesilaus had been early and intimate friends,[435] both having been placed as boys in the same herd or troop for the purposes of discipline; a strong illustration of the equalizing character of this discipline, since we know that Lysander was of poor parents and condition.[436] He made the mistake of supposing Agesilaus to be of a disposition particularly gentle and manageable; and this was his main inducement for espousing the pretensions of the latter to the throne, after the decease of Agis. Lysander reckoned, if by his means Agesilaus became king, on a great increase of his own influence, and especially on a renewed mission to Asia, if not as ostensible general, at least as real chief under the tutelar headship of the new king.

Accordingly, when the imposing solemnities which always marked the funeral of a king of Sparta were terminated,[437] and the day arrived for installation of a new king, Agesilaus, under the promptings of Lysander, stood forward to contest the legitimacy and the title of Leotychides, and to claim the sceptre for himself,—a true Herakleid, brother of the late king Agis. In the debate, which probably took place not merely before the ephors and the senate but before the assembled citizens besides, Lysander warmly seconded his pretensions. Of this debate unfortunately we are not permitted to know much. We cannot doubt that the mature age and excellent reputation of Agesilaus would count as a great recommendation, when set against an untried youth; and this was probably the real point (since the relationship of both was so near) upon which decision turned;[438] for the legitimacy of Leotychides was positively asseverated by his mother Timæa,[439] and we do not find that the question of paternity was referred to the Delphian oracle, as in the case of Demaratus.

There was, however, one circumstance which stood much in the way of Agesilaus,—his personal deformity. A lame king of Sparta had never yet been known. And if we turn back more than a century to the occurrence of a similar deformity in one of the Battiad princes at Kyrênê,[440] we see the Kyrenians taking it so deeply to heart, that they sent to ask advice from Delphi, and invited over the Mantineian reformer Demônax. Over and above this sentiment of repugnance, too, the gods had specially forewarned Sparta to beware of "a lame reign." Deiopeithes, a prophet and religious adviser of high reputation, advocated the cause of Leotychides. He produced an ancient oracle, telling Sparta, that "with all her pride she must not suffer a lame reign to impair her stable footing;[441] for if she did so, unexampled suffering and ruinous wars would long beset her." This prophecy had already been once invoked, about eighty years earlier,[442] but with a very different interpretation. To Grecian leaders, like Themistokles or Lysander, it was an accomplishment of no small value to be able to elude inconvenient texts or intractable religious feelings, by expository ingenuity. And Lysander here raised his voice (as Themistokles had done on the momentous occasion before the battle of Salamis),[443] to combat the professional expositors; contending that by "a lame reign," the god meant, not a bodily defect in the king,—which might not even be congenital, but might arise from some positive hurt,[444]—but the reign of any king who was not a genuine descendant of Hêraklês.

The influence of Lysander,[445] combined doubtless with a preponderance of sentiment already tending towards Agesilaus, caused this effort of interpretative subtlety to be welcomed as convincing, and led to the nomination of the lame candidate as king. There was, however, a considerable minority, to whom this decision appeared a sin against the gods and a mockery of the oracle. And though the murmurs of such dissentients were kept down by the ability and success of Agesilaus during the first years of his reign; yet when, in his ten last years, calamity and humiliation were poured thickly upon this proud city, the public sentiment came decidedly round to their view. Many a pious Spartan then exclaimed, with feelings of bitter repentance, that the divine word never failed to come true at last,[446] and that Sparta was justly punished for having wilfully shut her eyes to the distinct and merciful warning vouchsafed to her, about the mischiefs of a "lame reign."[447]

Besides the crown, Agesilaus at the same time acquired the large property left by the late king Agis; an acquisition which enabled him to display his generosity by transferring half of it at once to his maternal relatives,—for the most part poor persons.[448] The popularity acquired by this step was still farther increased by his manner of conducting himself towards the ephors and senate. Between these magistrates and the kings, there was generally a bad understanding. The kings, not having lost the tradition of the plenary power once enjoyed by their ancestors, displayed as much haughty reserve as they dared, towards an authority now become essentially superior to their own. But Agesilaus,—not less from his own preëstablished habits, than from anxiety to make up for the defects of his title,—adopted a line of conduct

studiously opposite. He not only took pains to avoid collision with the ephors, but showed marked deference both to their orders and to their persons. He rose from his seat whenever they appeared; he conciliated both ephors and senators by timely presents.[449] By such judicious proceeding, as well as by his exact observance of the laws and customs,[450] he was himself the greatest gainer. Combined with that ability and energy in which he was never deficient, it ensured to him more real power than had ever fallen to the lot of any king of Sparta; power not merely over the military operations abroad which usually fell to the kings,—but also over the policy of the state at home. On the increase and maintenance of that real power, his chief thoughts were concentrated; new dispositions generated by kingship, which had never shown themselves in him before. Despising, like Lysander, both money, luxury, and all the outward show of power,—he exhibited, as a king, an ultra-Spartan simplicity, carried almost to affectation, in diet, clothing, and general habits. But like Lysander also, he delighted in the exercise of dominion through the medium of knots or factions of devoted partisans, whom he rarely scrupled to uphold in all their career of injustice and oppression. Though an amiable man, with no disposition to tyranny, and still less to plunder, for his own benefit,—Agesilaus thus made himself the willing instrument of both, for the benefit of his various coadjutors and friends, whose power and consequence he identified with his own.[451]

At the moment when Agesilaus became king, Sparta was at the maximum of her power, holding nearly all the Grecian towns as subject allies, with or without tribute. She was engaged in the task (as has already been mentioned) of protecting the Asiatic Greeks against the Persian satraps in their neighborhood. And the most interesting portion of the life of Agesilaus consists in the earnestness with which he espoused, and the vigor and ability with which he conducted, this great Pan-hellenic duty. It will be seen that success in his very promising career was intercepted[452] by his bad, factious subservience to partisans, at home and abroad,—by his unmeasured thirst for Spartan omnipotence,—and his indifference or aversion to any generous scheme of combination with the cities dependent on Sparta.

His attention, however, was first called to a dangerous internal conspiracy with which Sparta was threatened. The "lame reign" was as yet less than twelve months old, when Agesilaus, being engaged in sacrificing at one of the established state solemnities, was apprised by the officiating prophet, that the victims exhibited menacing symptoms, portending a conspiracy of the most formidable character. A second sacrifice gave yet worse promise; and on the third, the terrified prophet exclaimed, "Agesilaus, the revelation before us imports that we are actually in the midst of our enemies." They still continued to sacrifice, but victims were now offered to the averting and preserving gods, with prayers that these latter, by tutelary interposition, would keep off the impending peril. At length, after much repetition, and great difficulty, favorable victims were obtained; the meaning of which was soon made clear. Five days afterwards, an informer came before the ephors, communicating the se-

cret, that a dangerous conspiracy was preparing, organized by a citizen named Kinadon.[453]

The conspirator thus named was a Spartan citizen, but not one of that select number called The Equals or The Peers. It has already been mentioned that inequalities had been gradually growing up among qualified citizens of Sparta, tending tacitly to set apart a certain number of them under the name of The Peers, and all the rest under the correlative name of The Inferiors. Besides this, since the qualification of every family lasted only so long as the citizen could furnish a given contribution for himself and his sons to the public mess-table, and since industry of every kind was inconsistent with the rigid personal drilling imposed upon all of them,—the natural consequence was, that in each generation a certain number of citizens became disfranchised and dropped off. But these disfranchised men did not become Perioeki or Helots. They were still citizens, whose qualification, though in abeyance, might be at any time renewed by the munificence of a rich man;[454] so that they too, along with the lesser citizens, were known under the denomination of The Inferiors. It was to this class that Kinadon belonged. He was a young man of remarkable strength and courage, who had discharged with honor his duties in the Lykurgean discipline,[455] and had imbibed from it that sense of personal equality, and that contempt of privilege, which its theory as well as its practice suggested. Notwithstanding all exactness of duty performed, he found that the constitution, as practically worked, excluded him from the honors and distinctions of the state; reserving them for the select citizens known under the name of Peers. And this exclusion had become more marked and galling since the formation of the Spartan empire after the victory of Ægospotami; whereby the number of lucrative posts (harmosties and others) all monopolized by the Peers, had been so much multiplied. Debarred from the great political prizes, Kinadon was still employed by the ephors, in consequence of his high spirit and military sufficiency, in that standing force which they kept for maintaining order at home.[456] He had been the agent ordered on several of those arbitrary seizures which they never scrupled to employ towards persons whom they regarded as dangerous. But this was no satisfaction to his mind; nay, probably, by bringing him into close contact with the men in authority, it contributed to lessen his respect for them. He desired "to be inferior to no man in Sparta,"[457] and his conspiracy was undertaken to realize this object by breaking up the constitution.

It has already been mentioned that amidst the general insecurity which pervaded the political society of Laconia, the ephors maintained a secret police and system of espionage which reached its height of unscrupulous efficiency under the title of the Krypteia. Such precautions were now more than ever requisite; for the changes in the practical working of Spartan politics tended to multiply the number of malcontents, and to throw the Inferiors as well as the Perioeki and the Neodamodes (manumitted Helots), into one common antipathy with the Helots, against the exclusive partnership of the Peers. Informers were thus sure of encouragement and reward,

and the man who now came to the ephors either was really an intimate friend of Kinadon, or had professed himself such in order to elicit the secret. "Kinadon (said he to the ephors) brought me to the extremity of the market-place, and bade me count how many Spartans there were therein. I reckoned up about forty, besides the king, the ephors and the senators. Upon my asking him why he desired me to count them, he replied,—Because these are the men, and the only men, whom you have to look upon as enemies;[458] all others in the market-place, more than four thousand in number, are friends and comrades. Kinadon also pointed out to me the one or two Spartans whom we met in the roads, or who were lords in the country districts, as our only enemies; every one else around them being friendly to our purpose." "How many did he tell you were the accomplices actually privy to the scheme?"—asked the ephors. "Only a few (was the reply); but those thoroughly trustworthy; these confidants themselves, however, said that all around them were accomplices,—Inferiors, Periœki, Neodamodes, and Helots, all alike; for whenever any one among the classes talked about a Spartan, he could not disguise his intense antipathy,—he talked as if he could eat the Spartans raw."[459]

"But how (continued the ephors) did Kinadon reckon upon getting arms?" "His language was (replied the witness)—We of the standing force have our own arms all ready; and here are plenty of knives, swords, spits, hatchets, axes and scythes—on sale in this market-place, to suit an insurgent multitude; besides, every man who tills the earth, or cuts wood and stone, has tools by him which will serve as weapons in case of need; especially in a struggle with enemies themselves unarmed." On being asked what was the moment fixed for execution, the witness could not tell; he had been instructed only to remain on the spot, and be ready.[460]

It does not appear that this man knew the name of any person concerned, except Kinadon himself. So deeply were the ephors alarmed, that they refrained from any formal convocation even of what was called the Lesser Assembly,—including the senate, of which the kings were members *ex officio*, and, perhaps, a few other principal persons besides. But the members of this assembly were privately brought together to deliberate on the emergency; Agesilaus, probably, among them. To arrest Kinadon at once in Sparta appeared imprudent; since his accomplices, of number as yet unknown, would be thus admonished either to break out in insurrection, or at least to make their escape. But an elaborate stratagem was laid for arresting him out of Sparta, without the knowledge of his accomplices. The ephors, calling him before them, professed to confide to him (as they had done occasionally before) a mission to go to Aulon (a Laconian town on the frontier towards Arcadia and Triphylia) and there to seize some parties designated by name in a formal skytalê or warrant; including some of the Aulonite Periœki,—some Helots,—and one other person by name, a woman of peculiar beauty, resident at the place, whose influence was understood to spread disaffection among all the Lacedæmonians who came thither, old as well as young.[461] When Kinadon inquired what force he was to take with him on

the mission, the ephors, to obviate all suspicion that they were picking out companions with views hostile to him, desired him to go to the Hippagretês (or commander of the three hundred youthful guards called horsemen, though they were not really mounted) and ask for the first six or seven men of the guard[462] who might happen to be in the way. But they (the ephors) had already held secret communication with the Hippagretês, and had informed him both whom they wished to be sent, and what the persons sent were to do. They then despatched Kinadon on his pretended mission telling him that they should place at his disposal three carts, in order that he might more easily bring home the prisoners.

Kinadon began his journey to Aulon, without the smallest suspicion of the plot laid for him by the ephors; who, to make their purpose sure, sent an additional body of the guards after him, to quell any resistance which might possibly arise. But their stratagem succeeded as completely as they could desire. He was seized on the road, by those who accompanied him ostensibly for his pretended mission. These men interrogated him, put him to the torture,[463] and heard from his lips the names of his accomplices; the list of whom they wrote down, and forwarded by one of the guards to Sparta. The ephors, on receiving it, immediately arrested the parties principally concerned, especially the prophet Tisamenus; and examined them along with Kinadon, as soon as he was brought prisoner. They asked the latter, among other questions, what was his purpose in setting on foot the conspiracy; to which he replied,—"I wanted to be inferior to no man at Sparta." His punishment was not long deferred. Having been manacled with a clog round his neck to which his hands were made fast,—he was in this condition conducted round the city, with men scourging and pricking him during the progress. His accomplices were treated in like manner, and at length all of them were put to death.[464]

Such is the curious narrative, given by Xenophon, of this unsuccessful conspiracy. He probably derived his information from Agesilaus himself; since we cannot easily explain how he could have otherwise learnt so much about the most secret manœuvres of the ephors, in a government proverbial for constant secrecy, like that of Sparta. The narrative opens to us a glimpse, though sadly transient and imperfect, of the internal dangers of the Spartan government. We were aware, from earlier evidences, of great discontent prevailing among the Helots, and to a certain extent among the Perioeki. But the incident here described presents to us the first manifestation of a body of malcontents among the Spartans themselves; malcontents formidable both from energy and position, like Kinadon and the prophet Tisamenus. Of the state of disaffected feeling in the provincial townships of Laconia, an impressive proof is afforded by the case of that beautiful woman who was alleged to be so active in political proselytism at Aulon; not less than by the passionate expressions of hatred revealed in the deposition of the informer himself. Though little is known about the details, yet it seems that the tendency of affairs at Sparta was to concentrate both power and property in the hands of an oligarchy ever narrowing among

the citizens; thus aggravating the dangers at home, even at the time when the power of the state was greatest abroad, and preparing the way for that irreparable humiliation which began with the defeat of Leuktra.

It can hardly be doubted that much more wide-spread discontent came to the knowledge of the ephors than that which is specially indicated in Xenophon. And such discovery may probably have been one of the motives (as had happened in 424 B.C. on occasion of the expedition of Brasidas into Thrace) which helped to bring about the Asiatic expedition of Agesilaus, as an outlet for brave malcontents on distant and lucrative military service.

Derkyllidas had now been carrying on war in Asia Minor for near three years, against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, with so much efficiency and success, as both to protect the Asiatic Greeks on the coast, and to intercept all the revenues which those satraps either transmitted to court or enjoyed themselves. Pharnabazus had already gone up to Susa (during his truce with Derkyllidas in 397 B.C.), and besides obtaining a reinforcement which acted under himself and Tissaphernes in 396 B.C. against Derkyllidas in Lydia, had laid schemes for renewing the maritime war against Sparta.[465]

It is now that we hear again mentioned the name of Konon, who, having saved himself with nine triremes from the defeat of Ægospotami, had remained for the last seven years under the protection of Evagoras, prince of Salamis, in Cyprus. Konon, having married at Salamis, and having a son[466] born to him there, indulged but faint hopes of ever returning to his native city, when, fortunately for him as well as for Athens, the Persians again became eager for an efficient admiral and fleet on the coast of Asia Minor. Through representations from Pharnabazus, as well as from Evagoras in Cyprus,—and through correspondence of the latter with the Greek physician Ktesias, who wished to become personally employed in the negotiation, and who seems to have had considerable influence with queen Parysatis,[467]—orders were obtained, and funds provided, to equip in Phœnicia and Kilikia a numerous fleet, under the command of Konon. While that officer began to show himself, and to act with such triremes as he found in readiness (about forty in number) along the southern coast of Asia Minor from Kilikia to Kaunus,[468]—further preparations were vigorously prosecuted in the Phœnician ports, in order to make up the fleet to three hundred sail.[469]

It was by a sort of accident that news of such equipment reached Sparta,—in an age of the world when diplomatic residents were as yet unknown. A Syracusan merchant named Herodas, having visited the Phœnician ports for trading purposes, brought back to Sparta intelligence of the preparations which he had seen, sufficient to excite much uneasiness. The Spartans were taking counsel among themselves, and communicating with their neighboring allies, when Agesilaus, at the instance of Lysander, stood forward as a volunteer to solicit the command of a land-force for the

purpose of attacking the Persians in Asia. He proposed to take with him only thirty full Spartan citizens or peers, as a sort of Board or Council of Officers; two thousand Neodamodes or enfranchised Helots, whom the ephors were probably glad to send away, and who would be selected from the bravest and most formidable; and six thousand hoplites from the land-allies, to whom the prospect of a rich service against Asiatic enemies would be tempting. Of these thirty Spartans, Lysander intended to be the leader; and thus, reckoning on his preëstablished influence over Agesilaus, to exercise the real command himself, without the name. He had no serious fear of the Persian arms, either by land or sea. He looked upon the announcement of the Phœnician fleet to be an empty threat, as it had so often proved in the mouth of Tissaphernes during the late war; while the Cyreian expedition had inspired him further with ardent hopes of another successful Anabasis, or conquering invasion of Persia from the sea-coast inwards. But he had still more at heart to employ his newly-acquired ascendency in reëstablishing everywhere the dekarchies, which had excited such intolerable hatred and exercised so much oppression, that even the ephors had refused to lend positive aid in upholding them, so that they had been in several places broken up or modified.[470] If the ambition of Agesilaus was comparatively less stained by personal and factious antipathies, and more Pan-hellenic in its aim, than that of Lysander,—it was at the same time yet more unmeasured in respect to victory over the Great King, whom he dreamed of dethroning, or at least of expelling from Asia Minor and the coast.[471] So powerful was the influence exercised by the Cyreian expedition over the schemes and imagination of energetic Greeks: so sudden was the outburst of ambition in the mind of Agesilaus, for which no one before had given him credit.

Though this plan was laid by two of the ablest men in Greece, it turned out to be rash and improvident, so far as the stability of the Lacedæmonian empire was concerned. That empire ought to have been made sure by sea, where its real danger lay, before attempts were made to extend it by new inland acquisitions. And except for purposes of conquest, there was no need of farther reinforcements in Asia Minor; since Derkyllidas was already there with a force competent to make head against the satraps. Nevertheless, the Lacedæmonians embraced the plan eagerly; the more so, as envoys were sent from many of the subject cities, by the partisans of Lysander and in concert with him, to entreat that Agesilaus might be placed at the head of the expedition, with as large a force as he required.[472]

No difficulty probably was found in levying the proposed number of men from the allies, since there was great promise of plunder for the soldiers in Asia. But the altered position of Sparta with respect to her most powerful allies was betrayed by the refusal of Thebes, Corinth, and Athens to take any part in the expedition. The refusal of Corinth, indeed, was excused professedly on the ground of a recent inauspicious conflagration of one of the temples in the city; and that of Athens, on the plea of

weakness and exhaustion not yet repaired. But the latter, at least, had already begun to conceive some hope from the projects of Konon.[473]

The mere fact that a king of Sparta was about to take the command and pass into Asia, lent peculiar importance to the enterprise. The Spartan kings, in their function of leaders of Greece, conceived themselves to have inherited the sceptre of Agamemnon and Orestes;[474] and Agesilaus, especially, assimilated his expedition to a new Trojan war,—an effort of united Greece, for the purpose of taking vengeance on the common Asiatic enemy of the Hellenic name. The sacrifices having been found favorable, Agesilaus took measures for the transit of the troops from various ports to Ephesus. But he himself, with one division, touched in his way at Geræstus, the southern point of Eubœa; wishing to cross from thence and sacrifice at Aulis, (the port of Bœotia nearly opposite to Geræstus on the other side of the strait) where Agamemnon had offered his memorable sacrifice immediately previous to departure for Troy. It appears that he both went to the spot, and began the sacrifice, without asking permission from the Thebans; moreover, he was accompanied by his own prophet, who conducted the solemnities in a manner not consistent with the habitual practice of the temple or chapel of Artemis at Aulis. On both these grounds, the Thebans, resenting the proceeding as an insult, sent a body of armed men, and compelled him to desist from the sacrifice.[475] Not taking part themselves in the expedition, they probably considered that the Spartan king was presumptuous in assuming to himself the Pan-hellenic character of a second Agamemnon; and they thus inflicted a humiliation which Agesilaus never forgave.

Agesilaus seems to have reached Asia about the time when Derkyllidas had recently concluded his last armistice with Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus; an armistice, intended to allow time for mutual communication both with Sparta and the Persian court. On being asked by the satrap what was his purpose in coming, Agesilaus merely renewed the demand which had before been made by Derkyllidas—of autonomy for the Asiatic Greeks. Tissaphernes replied by proposing a continuation of the same armistice, until he could communicate with the Persian court,—adding that he hoped to be empowered to grant the demand. A fresh armistice was accordingly sworn to on both sides, for three months; Derkyllidas (who with his army came now under the command of Agesilaus) and Herippidas being sent to the satrap to receive his oath, and take oaths to him in return.[476]

While the army was thus condemned to temporary inaction at Ephesus, the conduct and position of Lysander began to excite intolerable jealousy in the superior officers; and most of all Agesilaus. So great and established was the reputation of Lysander,—whose statue had been erected at Ephesus itself in the temple of Artemis, [477] as well as in many other cities,—that all the Asiatic Greeks looked upon him as the real chief of the expedition. That he should be real chief, under the nominal command of another, was nothing more than what had happened before, in the year wherein he gained the great victory of Ægospotami,—the Lacedæmonians having

then also sent him out in the ostensible capacity of secretary to the admiral Arakus, in order to save the inviolability of their own rule, that the same man should not serve twice as admiral.[478] It was through the instigation of Lysander, and with a view to his presence, that the decemvirs and other partisans in the subject cities had sent to Sparta to petition for Agesilaus; a prince as yet untried and unknown. So that Lysander,—taking credit, with truth, for having ensured to Agesilaus first the crown, next this important appointment,—intended for himself, and was expected by others, to exercise a fresh turn of command, and to renovate in every town the discomfited or enfeebled dekarchies. Numbers of his partisans came to Ephesus to greet his arrival, and a crowd of petitioners were seen following his steps everywhere; while Agesilaus himself appeared comparatively neglected. Moreover, Lysander resumed all that insolence of manner which he had contracted during his former commands, and which on this occasion gave the greater offence, since the manner of Agesilaus was both courteous and simple in a peculiar degree.[479]

The thirty Spartan counsellors, over whom Lysander had been named to preside, finding themselves neither consulted by him, nor solicited by others, were deeply dissatisfied. Their complaints helped to encourage Agesilaus, who was still more keenly wounded in his own personal dignity, to put forth a resolute and imperious strength of will, such as he had not before been known to possess. He successively rejected every petition preferred to him by or through Lysander; a systematic purpose which, though never formally announced,[480] was presently discerned by the petitioners, by the Thirty, and by Lysander himself. The latter thus found himself not merely disappointed in all his calculations, but humiliated to excess, though without any tangible ground of complaint. He was forced to warn his partisans, that his intervention was an injury and not a benefit to them; that they must desist from obsequious attentions to him, and must address themselves directly to Agesilaus. With that prince he also remonstrated on his own account,—"Truly, Agesilaus, you know how to degrade your friends."—"Ay, to be sure (was the reply), those among them who want to appear greater than I am; but such as seek to uphold me, I should be ashamed if I did not know how to repay with due honor."—Lysander was constrained to admit the force of this reply, and to request, as the only means of escape from present and palpable humiliation, that he might be sent on some mission apart; engaging to serve faithfully in whatever duty he might be employed.[481]

This proposition, doubtless even more agreeable to Agesilaus than to himself, being readily assented to, he was despatched on a mission to the Hellespont. Faithful to his engagement of forgetting past offences and serving with zeal, he found means to gain over a Persian grandee named Spithridates, who had received some offence from Pharnabazus. Spithridates revolted openly, carrying a regiment of two hundred horse to join Agesilaus; who was thus enabled to inform himself fully about the satrapy of Pharnabazus, comprising the territory called Phrygia, in the neighborhood of the Propontis and the Hellespont.[482]

The army under Tissaphernes had been already powerful at the moment when his timidity induced him to conclude the first armistice with Derkyllidas. But additional reinforcements, received since the conclusion of the second and more recent armistice, had raised him to such an excess of confidence, that even before the stipulated three months had expired, he sent to insist on the immediate departure of Agesilaus from Asia, and to proclaim war forthwith, if such departure were delayed. While this message, accompanied by formidable reports of the satrap's force, filled the army at Ephesus with mingled alarm and indignation, Agesilaus accepted the challenge with cheerful readiness; sending word back that he thanked the satrap for perjuring himself in so flagrant a manner, as to set the gods against him and ensure their favor to the Greek side.[483] Orders were forthwith given, and contingents summoned from the Asiatic Greeks, for a forward movement southward, to cross the Mæander, and attack Tissaphernes in Karia, where he usually resided. The cities on the route were required to provide magazines, so that Tissaphernes, fully anticipating attack in this direction, caused his infantry to cross into Karia, for the purpose of acting on the defensive; while he kept his numerous cavalry in the plain of the Mæander, with a view to overwhelm Agesilaus, who had no cavalry, in his march over that level territory towards the Karian hills and rugged ground. But the Lacedæmonian king, having put the enemy on this false scent, suddenly turned his march northward towards Phrygia and the satrapy of Pharnabazus. Tissaphernes took no pains to aid his brother satrap, who on his side had made few preparations for defence. Accordingly Agesilaus, finding little or no resistance, took many towns and villages, and collected abundance of provisions, plunder, and slaves. Profiting by the guidance of the revolted Spithridates, and marching as little as possible over the plains, he carried on lucrative and unopposed incursions as far as the neighborhood of Daskylium, the residence of the satrap himself, near the Propontis. Near the satrapic residence, however, his small body of cavalry, ascending an eminence, came suddenly upon an equal detachment of Persian cavalry, under Rhathines and Bagæus; who attacked them vigorously, and drove them back with some loss, until they were protected by Agesilaus himself coming up with the hoplites. The effect of such a check (and there were probably others of the same kind, though Xenophon does not specify them) on the spirits of the army was discouraging. On the next morning, the sacrifices being found unfavorable for farther advance, Agesilaus gave orders for retreating towards the sea. He reached Ephesus about the close of autumn; resolved to employ the winter in organizing a more powerful cavalry, which experience proved to be indispensable.[484]

This autumnal march through Phrygia was more lucrative than glorious. Yet it enables Xenophon to bring to view different merits of his hero Agesilaus; in doing which he exhibits to us ancient warfare and Asiatic habits on a very painful side. In common both with Kallikratidas and Lysander, though not with the ordinary Spartan commanders, Agesilaus was indifferent to the acquisition of money for himself. But he was not the less anxious to enrich his friends, and would sometimes connive at

unwarrantable modes of acquisition for their benefit. Deserters often came in to give information of rich prizes or valuable prisoners; which advantages, if he had chosen, he might have appropriated to himself. But he made it a practice to throw both the booty and the honor in the way of some favorite officer; just as we have seen (in a former chapter) that Xenophon himself was allowed by the army to capture Asidates and enjoy a large portion of his ransom.[485] Again, when the army in the course of its march was at a considerable distance from the sea, and appeared to be advancing farther inland, the authorized auctioneers, whose province it was to sell the booty, found the buyers extremely slack. It was difficult to keep or carry what was bought, and opportunity for resale did not seem at hand. Agesilaus, while he instructed the auctioneers to sell upon credit, without insisting on ready money,—at the same time gave private hints to a few friends that he was very shortly about to return to the sea. The friends thus warned, bidding for the plunder on credit and purchasing at low prices, were speedily enabled to dispose of it again at a seaport, with large profits.[486]

We are not surprised to hear that such lucrative graces procured for Agesilaus many warm admirers; though the eulogies of Xenophon ought to have been confined to another point in his conduct, now to be mentioned. Agesilaus, while securing for his army the plunder of the country over which he carried his victorious arms, took great pains to prevent both cruelty and destruction of property. When any town surrendered to him on terms, his exactions were neither ruinous nor grossly humiliating.[487] Amidst all the plunder realized, too, the most valuable portion was the adult natives of both sexes, hunted down and brought in by the predatory light troops of the army, to be sold as slaves. Agesilaus was vigilant in protecting these poor victims from ill-usage; inculcating upon his soldiers the duty, "not of punishing them like wrong-doers, but simply of keeping them under guard as men.[488]" It was the practice of the poorer part of the native population often to sell their little children for exportation to travelling slave-merchants, from inability to maintain them. The children thus purchased, if they promised to be handsome, were often mutilated, and fetched large prices as eunuchs, to supply the large demand for the harems and religious worship of many Asiatic towns. But in their haste to get out of the way of a plundering army, these slave-merchants were forced often to leave by the way-side the little children whom they had purchased, exposed to the wolves, the dogs, or starvation. In this wretched condition, they were found by Agesilaus on his march. His humane disposition prompted him to see them carried to a place of safety, where he gave them in charge of those old natives whom age and feebleness had caused to be left behind as not worth carrying off. By such active kindness, rare, indeed, in a Grecian general, towards the conquered, he earned the gratitude of the captives, and the sympathies of every one around.[489]

This interesting anecdote, imparting a glimpse of the ancient world in reference to details which Grecian historians rarely condescend to unveil, demonstrates the

compassionate disposition of Agesilaus. We find in conjunction with it another anecdote, illustrating the Spartan side of his character. The prisoners who had been captured during the expedition were brought to Ephesus, and sold during the winter as slaves for the profit of the army. Agesilaus,—being then busily employed in training his troops to military efficiency, especially for the cavalry service during the ensuing campaign,—thought it advisable to impress them with contempt for the bodily capacity and prowess of the natives. He therefore directed the heralds who conducted the auction, to put the prisoners up to sale in a state of perfect nudity. To have the body thus exposed, was a thing never done, and even held disgraceful by the native Asiatics; while among the Greeks the practice was universal for purposes of exercise,—or at least, had become universal during the last two or three centuries,—for we are told that originally the Asiatic feeling on this point had prevailed throughout Greece. It was one of the obvious differences between Grecian and Asiatic customs,[490]—that in the former, both the exercises of the palæstra, as well as the matches in the solemn games, required competitors of every rank to contend naked. Agesilaus himself stripped thus habitually; Alexander, prince of Macedon, had done so, when he ran at the Olympic stadium,[491]—also the combatants out of the great family of the Diagorids of Rhodes, when they gained their victories in the Olympic pankratium,—and all those other noble pugilists, wrestlers, and runners, descended from gods and heroes, upon whom Pindar pours forth his complimentary odes.

On this occasion at Ephesus, Agesilaus gave special orders to put up the Asiatic prisoners to auction naked; not at all by way of insult, but in order to exhibit to the eye of the Greek soldier, as he contemplated them, how much he gained by his own bodily training and frequent exposure, and how inferior was the condition of men whose bodies never felt the sun or wind. They displayed a white skin, plump and soft limbs, weak and undeveloped muscles, like men accustomed to be borne in carriages instead of walking or running; from whence we indirectly learn that many of them were men in wealthy circumstances. And the purpose of Agesilaus was completely answered; since his soldiers, when they witnessed such evidences of bodily incompetence, thought that "the enemies against whom they had to contend were not more formidable than women."[492] Such a method of illustrating the difference between good and bad physical training, would hardly have occurred to any one except a Spartan, brought up under the Lykurgean rules.

While Agesilaus thus brought home to the vision of his soldiers the inefficiency of untrained bodies, he kept them throughout the winter under hard work and drill, as well in the palæstra as in arms. A force of cavalry was still wanting. To procure it, he enrolled all the richest Greeks in the various Asiatic towns, as conscripts to serve on horseback; giving each of them leave to exempt himself, however, by providing a competent substitute and equipment,—man, horse, and arms.[493] Before the commencement of spring, an adequate force of cavalry was thus assembled at Ephesus, and put into tolerable exercise. Throughout the whole winter, that city became a

place of arms, consecrated to drilling and gymnastic exercises. On parade as well as in the palæstra, Agesilaus himself was foremost in setting the example of obedience and hard work. Prizes were given to the diligent and improving among hoplites, horsemen, and light troops; while the armorers, braziers, leather-cutters, etc.,—all the various artisans, whose trade lay in muniments of war, were in the fullest employment. "It was a sight full of encouragement (says Xenophon, who was doubtless present and took part in it), to see Agesilaus and the soldiers leaving the gymnasium, all with wreaths on their heads, and marching to the temple of Artemis to dedicate their wreaths to the goddess."[494]

Before Agesilaus was in condition to begin his military operations for the spring, the first year of his command had passed over. Thirty fresh counsellors reached Ephesus from Sparta, superseding the first thirty under Lysander, who forthwith returned home. The army was now not only more numerous, but better trained, and more systematically arranged than in the preceding campaign. Agesilaus distributed the various divisions under the command of different members of the new Thirty; the cavalry being assigned to Xenoklês, the Neodamode hoplites to Skythês, the Cyreians to Herippidas, the Asiatic contingents to Migdon. He then gave out that he should march straight against Sardis. Nevertheless, Tissaphernes, who was in that place, construing this proclamation as a feint, and believing that the real march would be directed against Karia, disposed his cavalry in the plain of the Mæander as he had done in the preceding campaign; while his infantry were sent still farther southward within the Karian frontier. On this occasion, however, Agesilaus marched as he had announced, in the direction of Sardis. For three days he plundered the country without seeing an enemy; nor was it until the fourth day that the cavalry of Tissaphernes could be summoned back to oppose him; the infantry being even yet at a distance. On reaching the banks of the river Paktôlus, this Persian cavalry found the Greek light troops dispersed for the purpose of plunder, attacked them by surprise, and drove them in with considerable loss. Presently, however, Agesilaus came up, and ordered his cavalry to charge, anxious to bring on a battle before the Persian infantry could arrive in the field. In efficiency, it appears, the Persian cavalry was a full match for his cavalry, and in number apparently superior. But when he brought up his infantry, and caused his peltasts and younger hoplites to join the cavalry in a vigorous attack,—victory soon declared on his side. The Persians were put to flight and many of them drowned in the Paktôlus. Their camp, too, was taken, with a valuable booty; including several camels, which Agesilaus afterwards took with him into Greece. This success ensured to him the unopposed mastery of all the territory around Sardis. He carried his ravages to the very gates of that city, plundering the gardens and ornamented ground, proclaiming liberty to those within, and defying Tissaphernes to come out and fight.[495]

The career of that timid and treacherous satrap now approached its close. The Persians in or near Sardis loudly complained of him as leaving them undefended,

from cowardice and anxiety for his own residence in Karia; while the court of Susa was now aware that the powerful reinforcement which had been sent to him last year, intended to drive Agesilaus out of Asia, had been made to achieve absolutely nothing. To these grounds of just dissatisfaction was added a court intrigue; to which, and to the agency of a person yet more worthless and cruel than himself, Tissaphernes fell a victim. The queen mother, Parysatis, had never forgiven him for having been one of the principal agents in the defeat and death of her son Cyrus. Her influence being now reëstablished over the mind of Artaxerxes, she took advantage of the existing discredit of the satrap to get an order sent down for his deposition and death. Tithraustes, the bearer of this order, seized him by stratagem at Kolossæ in Phrygia, while he was in the bath, and caused him to be beheaded.[496]

The mission of Tithraustes to Asia Minor was accompanied by increased efforts on the part of Persia for prosecuting the war against Sparta with vigor, by sea as well as by land; and also for fomenting the anti-Spartan movement which burst out into hostilities this year in Greece. At first, however, immediately after the death of Tissaphernes, Tithraustes endeavored to open negotiations with Agesilaus, who was in military possession of the country around Sardis, while that city itself appears to have been occupied by Ariæus, probably the same Persian who had formerly been general under Cyrus, and who had now again revolted from Artaxerxes.[497] Tithraustes took credit to the justice of the king for having punished the late satrap; out of whose perfidy (he affirmed) the war had arisen. He then summoned Agesilaus, in the king's name, to evacuate Asia, leaving the Asiatic Greeks to pay their original tribute to Persia, but to enjoy complete autonomy, subject to that one condition. Had this proposition been accepted and executed, it would have secured these Greeks against Persian occupation or governors; a much milder fate for them than that to which the Lacedæmonians had consented in their conventions with Tissaphernes sixteen years before,[498] and analogous to the position in which the Chalkidians of Thrace had been placed with regard to Athens, under the peace of Nikias;[499] subject to a fixed tribute, yet autonomous,—with no other obligation or interference. Agesilaus replied that he had no power to entertain such a proposition without the authorities at home, whom he accordingly sent to consult. But in the interim he was prevailed upon by Tithraustes to conclude an armistice for six months, and to move out of his satrapy into that of Pharnabazus; receiving a contribution of thirty talents towards the temporary maintenance of the army.[500] These satraps generally acted more like independent or even hostile princes, than coöperating colleagues; one of the many causes of the weakness of the Persian empire.

When Agesilaus had reached the neighborhood of Kymê, on his march northward to the Hellespontine Phrygia, he received a despatch from home, placing the Spartan naval force in the Asiatic seas under his command, as well as the land-force, and empowering him to name whomsoever he chose as acting admiral.[501] For the first time since the battle of Ægospotami, the maritime empire of Sparta was beginning to

be threatened, and increased efforts on her part were becoming requisite. Pharnabazus, going up in person to the court of Artaxerxes, had by pressing representations obtained a large subsidy for fitting out a fleet in Cyprus and Phœnicia, to act under the Athenian admiral Konon against the Lacedæmonians.[502] That officer,—with a fleet of forty triremes, before the equipment of the remainder was yet complete,—had advanced along the southern coast of Asia Minor to Kaunus, at the south-western corner of the peninsula, on the frontier of Karia and Lykia. In this port he was besieged by the Lacedæmonian fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes under Pharax. But a Persian reinforcement strengthened the fleet of Konon to eighty sail, and put the place out of danger; so that Pharax, desisting from the siege, retired to Rhodes.

The neighborhood of Konon, however, who was now with his fleet of eighty sail near the Chersonesus of Knidus, emboldened the Rhodians to revolt from Sparta. It was at Rhodes that the general detestation of the Lacedæmonian empire, disgraced in so many different cities by the local dekarchies and by the Spartan harmosts, first manifested itself. And such was the ardor of the Rhodian population, that their revolt took place while the fleet of Pharax was (in part at least) actually in the harbor, and they drove him out of it.[503] Konon, whose secret encouragements had helped to excite this insurrection, presently sailed to Rhodes with his fleet, and made the island his main station. It threw into his hands an unexpected advantage; for a numerous fleet of vessels arrived there shortly afterwards, sent by Nephareus, the native king of Egypt (which was in revolt against the Persians), with marine stores and grain to the aid of the Lacedæmonians. Not having been apprized of the recent revolt, these vessels entered the harbor of Rhodes as if it were still a Lacedæmonian island; and their cargoes were thus appropriated by Konon and the Rhodians.[504]

In recounting the various revolts of the dependencies of Athens which took place during the Peloponnesian war, I had occasion to point out more than once that all of them took place not merely in the absence of any Athenian force, but even at the instigation (in most cases) of a present hostile force,—by the contrivance of a local party,—and without privity or previous consent of the bulk of the citizens. The present revolt of Rhodes, forming a remarkable contrast on all these points, occasioned the utmost surprise and indignation among the Lacedæmonians. They saw themselves about to enter upon a renewed maritime war, without that aid which they had reckoned on receiving from Egypt, and with aggravated uncertainty in respect to their dependencies and tribute. It was under this prospective anxiety that they took the step of nominating Agesilaus to the command of the fleet as well as of the army, in order to ensure unity of operations;[505] though a distinction of functions, which they had hitherto set great value upon maintaining, was thus broken down,—and, though the two commands had never been united in any king before Agesilaus.[506] Pharax, the previous admiral, was recalled.[507]

But the violent displeasure of the Lacedæmonians against the revolted Rhodians was still better attested by another proceeding. Among all the great families at Rhodes, none were more distinguished than the Diagoridæ. Its members were not only generals and high political functionaries in their native island, but had attained even Pan-hellenic celebrity by an unparalleled series of victories at the Olympic and other great solemnities. Dorieus, a member of this family, had gained the victory in the pankration at Olympia on three successive solemnities. He had obtained seven prizes in the Nemean, and eight in the Isthmian games. He had carried off the prize at one Pythian solemnity without a contest,—no one daring to stand up against him in the fearful struggle of the pankration. As a Rhodian, while Rhodes was a subject ally of Athens during the Peloponnesian war, he had been so pronounced in his attachment to Sparta as to draw on himself a sentence of banishment; upon which he had retired to Thurii, and had been active in hostility to Athens after the Syracusan catastrophe. Serving against her in ships fitted out at his own cost, he had been captured in 407 B.C. by the Athenians, and brought in as prisoner to Athens. By the received practice of war in that day, his life was forfeited; and over and above such practice, the name of Dorieus was peculiarly odious to the Athenians. But when they saw before the public assembly a captive enemy, of heroic lineage, as well as of unrivalled athletic majesty and renown, their previous hatred was so overpowered by sympathy and admiration, that they liberated him by public vote, and dismissed him unconditionally.[508]

This interesting anecdote, which has already been related in my eighth volume, [509] is here again noticed as a contrast to the treatment which the same Dorieus now underwent from the Lacedæmonians. What he had been doing since, we do not know; but at the time when Rhodes now revolted from Sparta, he was not only absent from the island, but actually in or near Peloponnesus. Such, however, was the wrath of the Lacedæmonians against Rhodians generally, that Dorieus was seized by their order, brought to Sparta, and there condemned and executed.[510] It seems hardly possible that he can have had any personal concern in the revolt. Had such been the fact, he would have been in the island,—or would at least have taken care not to be within the reach of the Lacedæmonians when the revolt happened. Perhaps, however, other members of the Diagoridæ, his family, once so much attached to Sparta, may have taken part in it; for we know, by the example of the Thirty at Athens, that the Lysandrian dekarchies and Spartan harmosts made themselves quite as formidable to oligarchical as to democratical politicians, and it is very conceivable that the Diagoridæ may have become less philo-Laconian in their politics.

This extreme difference in the treatment of the same man by Athens and by Sparta raises instructive reflections. It exhibits the difference both between Athenian and Spartan sentiment, and between the sentiment of a multitude and that of a few. The grand and sacred personality of the Hieronike Dorieus, when exhibited to the senses of the Athenian multitude,—the spectacle of a man in chains before them,

who had been proclaimed victor and crowned on so many solemn occasions before the largest assemblages of Greeks ever brought together,—produced an overwhelming effect upon their emotions; sufficient not only to efface a strong preëstablished antipathy founded on active past hostility, but to countervail a just cause of revenge, speaking in the language of that day. But the same appearance produced no effect at all on the Spartan ephors and senate; not sufficient even to hinder them from putting Dorieus to death, though he had given them no cause for antipathy or revenge, simply as a sort of retribution for the revolt of the island. Now this difference depended partly upon the difference between the sentiment of Athenians and Spartans, but partly also upon the difference between the sentiment of a multitude and that of a few. Had Dorieus been brought before a select judicial tribunal at Athens, instead of before the Athenian public assembly,—or, had the case been discussed before the assembly in his absence,—he would have been probably condemned, conformably to usage, under the circumstances; but the vehement emotion worked by his presence upon the multitudinous spectators of the assembly, rendered such a course intolerable to them. It has been common with historians of Athens to dwell upon the passions of the public assembly as if it were susceptible of excitement only in an angry or vindictive direction; whereas, the truth is, and the example before us illustrates, that they were open-minded in one direction as well as in another, and that the present emotion, whatever it might be, merciful or sympathetic as well as resentful, was intensified by the mere fact of multitude. And thus, where the established rule of procedure happened to be cruel, there was some chance of moving an Athenian assembly to mitigate it in a particular case, though the Spartan ephors or senate would be inexorable in carrying it out,—if, indeed, they did not, as seems probable in the case of Dorieus, actually go beyond it in rigor.

While Konon and the Rhodians were thus raising hostilities against Sparta by sea, Agesilaus, on receiving at Kymê the news of his nomination to the double command, immediately despatched orders to the dependent maritime cities and islands, requiring the construction and equipment of new triremes. Such was the influence of Sparta, and so much did the local governments rest upon its continuance, that these requisitions were zealously obeyed. Many leading men incurred considerable expense, from desire to acquire his favor; so that a fleet of one hundred and twenty new triremes was ready by the ensuing year. Agesilaus, naming his brother-in-law, Peisander, to act as admiral, sent him to superintend the preparations; a brave young man, but destitute both of skill and experience.[511]

Meanwhile, he himself pursued his march (about the beginning of autumn) towards the satrapy of Pharnabazus,—Phrygia south and south-east of the Propontis. Under the active guidance of his new auxiliary, Spithridates, he plundered the country, capturing some towns, and reducing others to capitulate; with considerable advantage to his soldiers. Pharnabazus, having no sufficient army to hazard a battle in defence of his satrapy, concentrated all his force near his own residence at

Daskylium, offering no opposition to the march of Agesilaus; who was induced by Spithridates to traverse Phrygia and enter Paphlagonia, in hopes of concluding an alliance with the Paphlagonian prince Otys. That prince, in nominal dependence on Persia, could muster the best cavalry in the Persian empire. But he had recently refused to obey an invitation from the court at Susa, and he now not only welcomed the appearance of Agesilaus, but concluded an alliance with him, strengthening him with an auxiliary body of cavalry and peltasts. Anxious to requite Spithridates for his services, and vehemently attached to his son, the beautiful youth Megabates,—Agesilaus persuaded Otys to marry the daughter of Spithridates. He even caused her to be conveyed by sea in a Lacedæmonian trireme,—probably from Abydos to Sinôpê. [512]

Reinforced by the Paphlagonian auxiliaries, Agesilaus prosecuted the war with augmented vigor against the satrapy of Pharnabazus. He now approached the neighborhood of Daskylium, the residence of the satrap himself, inherited from his father Pharnakês, who had been satrap before him. This was a well-supplied country, full of rich villages, embellished with parks and gardens for the satrap's hunting and gratification: the sporting tastes of Xenophon lead him also to remark that there were plenty of birds for the fowler, with rivers full of fish.[513] In this agreeable region Agesilaus passed the winter. His soldiers, abundantly supplied with provisions, became so careless, and straggled with so much contempt of their enemy, that Pharnabazus, with a body of four hundred cavalry and two scythed chariots, found an opportunity of attacking seven hundred of them by surprise; driving them back with considerable loss, until Agesilaus came up to protect them with the hoplites.

This partial misfortune, however, was speedily avenged. Fearful of being surrounded and captured, Pharnabazus refrained from occupying any fixed position. He hovered about the country, carrying his valuable property along with him, and keeping his place of encampment as secret as he could. The watchful Spithridates, nevertheless, having obtained information that he was encamped for the night in the village of Kanê, about eighteen miles distant, Herippidas (one of the thirty Spartans) undertook a night-march with a detachment to surprise him. Two thousand Grecian hoplites, the like number of light-armed peltasts, and Spithridates with the Paphlagonian horse, were appointed to accompany him. Though many of these soldiers took advantage of the darkness to evade attendance, the enterprise proved completely successful. The camp of Pharnabazus was surprised at break of day; his Mysian advanced guards were put to the sword, and he himself, with all his troops, was compelled to take flight with scarcely any resistance. All his stores, plate, and personal furniture, together with a large baggage-train and abundance of prisoners, fell into the hands of the victors. As the Paphlagonians under Spithridates formed the cavalry of the victorious detachment, they naturally took more spoil and more prisoners than the infantry. They were proceeding to carry off their acquisitions, when Herippidas interfered and took everything away from them; placing the entire spoil of every de-

scription, under the charge of Grecian officers, to be sold by formal auction in a Grecian city; after which the proceeds were to be distributed or applied by public authority. The orders of Herippidas were conformable to the regular and systematic proceeding of Grecian officers; but Spithridates and the Paphlagonians were probably justified by Asiatic practice in appropriating that which they had themselves captured. Moreover, the order, disagreeable in itself, was enforced against them with Lacedæmonian harshness of manner,[514] unaccompanied by any guarantee that they would be allowed, even at last, a fair share of the proceeds. Resenting the conduct of Herippidas as combining injury with insult, they deserted in the night and fled to Sardis, where the Persian Ariæus was in actual revolt against the court of Susa. This was a serious loss, and still more serious chagrin, to Agesilaus. He was not only deprived of valuable auxiliary cavalry, and of an enterprizing Asiatic informant; but the report would be spread that he defrauded his Asiatic allies of their legitimate plunder, and others would thus be deterred from joining him. His personal sorrow too was aggravated by the departure of the youth Megabazus, who accompanied his father Spithridates to Sardis.[515]

It was towards the close of this winter that a personal conference took place between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus, managed by the intervention of a Greek of Kyzikus named Apollophanês; who was connected by ties of hospitality with both, and served to each as guarantee for the good faith of the other. We have from Xenophon, himself probably present, an interesting detail of this interview. Agesilaus, accompanied by his thirty Spartan counsellors, being the first to arrive at the place of appointment, all of them sat down upon the grass to wait. Presently came Pharnabazus, with splendid clothing and retinue. His attendants were beginning to spread fine carpets for him, when the satrap, observing how the Spartans were seated, felt ashamed of such a luxury for himself, and sat down on the grass by the side of Agesilaus. Having exchanged salutes, they next shook hands; after which Pharnabazus, who as the older of the two had been the first to tender his right hand, was also the first to open the conversation. Whether he spoke Greek well enough to dispense with the necessity of an interpreter, we are not informed. "Agesilaus (said he), I was the friend and ally of you Lacedæmonians while you were at war with Athens; I furnished you with money to strengthen your fleet, and fought with you myself ashore on horseback, chasing your enemies into the sea. You cannot charge me with having ever played you false, like Tissaphernes, either by word or deed. Yet, after this behavior, I am now reduced by you to such a condition, that I have not a dinner in my own territory, except by picking up your leavings, like the beasts of the field. I see the fine residences, parks, and hunting-grounds, bequeathed to me by my father, which formed the charm of my life, cut up or burnt down by you. Is this the conduct of men mindful of favors received, and eager to requite them? Pray answer me this question; for, perhaps, I have yet to learn what is holy and just."

The thirty Spartan counsellors were covered with shame by this emphatic appeal. They all held their peace; while Agesilaus, after a long pause, at length replied,—"You are aware, Pharnabazus, that in Grecian cities, individuals become private friends and guests of each other. Such guests, if the cities to which they belong go to war, fight with each other, and sometimes by accident even kill each other, each in behalf of his respective city. So then it is that we, being at war with your king, are compelled to hold all his dominions as enemy's land. But in regard to you, we would pay any price to become your friends. I do not invite you to accept us as masters, in place of your present master; I ask you to become our ally, and to enjoy your own property as a freeman—bowing before no man and acknowledging no master. Now freedom is in itself a possession of the highest value. But this is not all. We do not call upon you to be a freeman, and yet poor. We offer you our alliance, to acquire fresh territory, not for the king, but for yourself; by reducing those who are now your fellow-slaves to become your subjects. Now tell me,—if you thus continue a freeman and become rich, what can you want farther to make you a thoroughly prosperous man?"

"I will speak frankly to you in reply (said Pharnabazus). If the king shall send any other general, and put me under him, I shall willingly become your friend and ally. But if he imposes the duty of command on me, so strong is the point of honor, that I shall continue to make war upon you to the best of my power. Expect nothing else."[516]

Agesilaus, struck with this answer, took his hand and said,—"Would that with such high-minded sentiments you *could* become our friend! At any rate, let me assure you of this,—that I will immediately quit your territory; and for the future, even should the war continue, I will respect both you and all your property, as long as I can turn my arms against any other Persians."

Here the conversation closed; Pharnabazus mounted his horse, and rode away. His son by Parapita, however,—at that time still a handsome youth,—lingered behind, ran up to Agesilaus, and exclaimed,—"Agesilaus, I make you my guest."—"I accept it with all my heart,"—was the answer. "Remember me by this,"—rejoined the young Persian,—putting into the hands of Agesilaus the fine javelin which he carried. The latter immediately took off the ornamental trappings from the horse of his secretary Idæus, and gave them as a return present; upon which the young man rode away with them, and rejoined his father.[517]

There is a touching interest and emphasis in this interview as described by Xenophon, who here breathes into his tame Hellenic chronicle something of the romantic spirit of the Cyropædia. The pledges exchanged between Agesilaus and the son of Pharnabazus were not forgotten by either. The latter,—being in after days impoverished and driven into exile by his brother, during the absence of Pharnabazus in Egypt,—was compelled to take refuge in Greece; where Agesilaus provided him with

protection and a home, and even went so far as to employ influence in favor of an Athenian youth, to whom the son of Pharnabazus was attached. This Athenian youth had outgrown the age and size of the boy-runners in the Olympic stadium; nevertheless Agesilaus, by strenuous personal interference, overruled the reluctance of the Eleian judges, and prevailed upon them to admit him as a competitor with the other boys.[518] The stress laid by Xenophon upon this favor illustrates the tone of Grecian sentiment, and shows us the variety of objects which personal ascendency was used to compass. Disinterested in regard to himself, Agesilaus was unscrupulous both in promoting the encroachments, and screening the injustices, of his friends.[519] The unfair privilege which he procured for this youth, though a small thing in itself, could hardly fail to offend a crowd of spectators familiar with the established conditions of the stadium, and to expose the judges to severe censure.

Quitting the satrapy of Pharnabazus,—which was now pretty well exhausted, while the armistice concluded with Tithraustes must have expired,—Agesilaus took up his camp near the temple of Artemis, at Astyra in the plain of Thêbê (in the region commonly known as Æolis), near the Gulf of Elæus. He here employed himself in bringing together an increased number of troops, with a view to penetrate farther into the interior of Asia Minor during the summer. Recent events had greatly increased the belief entertained by the Asiatics in his superior strength; so that he received propositions from various districts in the interior, inviting his presence, and expressing anxiety to throw off the Persian yoke. He sought also to compose the dissensions and misrule which had arisen out of the Lysandrian dekarchies in the Greco-Asiatic cities, avoiding as much as possible sharp inflictions of death or exile. How much he achieved in this direction, we cannot tell,[520] nor can it have been possible, indeed, to achieve much, without dismissing the Spartan harmosts and lessening the political power of his own partisans; neither of which he did.

His plans were now all laid for penetrating farther than ever into the interior, and for permanent conquest, if possible, of the western portion of Persian Asia. What he would have permanently accomplished towards this scheme, cannot be determined; for his aggressive march was suspended by a summons home, the reason of which will appear in the next chapter.

Meanwhile, Pharnabazus had been called from his satrapy to go and take the command of the Persian fleet in Kilikia and the south of Asia Minor, in conjunction with Konon. Since the revolt of Rhodes from the Lacedæmonians, (in the summer of the preceding year, 395 B.C.) that active Athenian had achieved nothing. The burst of activity, produced by the first visit of Pharnabazus at the Persian court, had been paralyzed by the jealousies of the Persian commanders, reluctant to serve under a Greek,—by peculation of officers who embezzled the pay destined for the troops,—by mutiny in the fleet from absence of pay,—and by the many delays arising while the satraps, unwilling to spend their own revenues in the war, waited for orders and remittances from court.[521] Hence Konon had been unable to make any efficient use of

his fleet, during those months when the Lacedæmonian fleet was increased to nearly double its former number. At length he resolved,—seemingly at the instigation of his countrymen at home[522] as well as of Euagoras prince of Salamis in Cyprus, and through the encouragement of Ktesias, one of the Grecian physicians resident at the Persian court,—on going himself into the interior to communicate personally with Artaxerxes. Landing on the Kilikian coast, he crossed by land to Thapsakus on the Euphrates (as the Cyreian army had marched), from whence he sailed down the river in a boat to Babylon. It appears that he did not see Artaxerxes, from repugnance to that ceremony of prostration which was required from all who approached the royal person. But his messages, transmitted through Ktesias and others,—with his confident engagement to put down the maritime empire of Sparta and counteract the projects of Agesilaus, if the Persian forces and money were put into efficient action,—produced a powerful effect on the mind of the monarch; who doubtless was not merely alarmed at the formidable position of Agesilaus in Asia Minor, but also hated the Lacedæmonians as main agents in the aggressive enterprise of Cyrus. Artaxerxes not only approved his views, but made to him a large grant of money, and transmitted peremptory orders to the coast that his officers should be active in prosecuting the maritime war.

What was of still greater moment, Konon was permitted to name any person whom he chose, as admiral jointly with himself. It was by his choice that Pharnabazus was called from his satrapy, and ordered to act jointly as commander of the fleet. This satrap, the bravest and most straightforward among all the Persian grandees, and just now smarting with resentment at the devastation of his satrapy[523] by Agesilaus, coöperated heartily with Konon. A powerful fleet, partly Phœnician, partly Athenian or Grecian, was soon equipped, superior in number even to the newly-organized Lacedæmonian fleet under Peisander.[524] Euagoras, prince of Salamis in Cyprus,[525] not only provided many triremes, but served himself, personally, on board.

It was about the month of July, 394 B.C., that Pharnabazus and Konon brought their united fleet to the south-western corner of Asia Minor; first, probably, to the friendly island of Rhodes, next, off Loryma[526] and the mountain called Dorion on the peninsula of Knidus.[527] Peisander, with the fleet of Sparta and her allies, sailed out from Knidus to meet them, and both parties prepared for a battle. The numbers of the Lacedæmonians are reported by Diodorus at eighty-five triremes; those of Konon and Pharnabazus at above ninety. But Xenophon, without particularizing the number on either side, seems to intimate the disparity as far greater; stating that the entire fleet of Peisander was considerably inferior even to the Grecian division under Konon, without reckoning the Phœnician ships under Pharnabazus.[528] In spite of such inferiority, Peisander did not shrink from the encounter. Though a young man without military skill, he possessed a full measure of Spartan courage and pride; moreover,—since the Spartan maritime empire was only maintained by the assumed

superiority of his fleet,—had he confessed himself too weak to fight, his enemies would have gone unopposed around the islands to excite revolt. Accordingly, he sailed forth from the harbor of Knidus. But when the two fleets were ranged opposite to each other, and the battle was about to commence,—so manifest and alarming was the superiority of the Athenians and Persians, that his Asiatic allies on the left division, noway hearty in the cause, fled almost without striking a blow. Under such discouraging circumstances, he nevertheless led his fleet into action with the greatest valor. But his trireme was overwhelmed by numbers, broken in various places by the beaks of the enemy's ships, and forced back upon the land, together with a large portion of his fleet. Many of the crews jumped out and got to land, abandoning their triremes to the conquerors. Peisander, too, might have escaped in the same way; but disdaining either to survive his defeat or to quit his ship, fell gallantly fighting aboard. The victory of Konon and Pharnabazus was complete. More than half of the Spartan ships were either captured or destroyed, though the neighborhood of the land enabled a large proportion of the crews to escape to Knidus, so that no great number of prisoners were taken.[529] Among the allies of Sparta, the chief loss of course fell upon those who were most attached to her cause; the disaffected or lukewarm were those who escaped by flight at the beginning.

Such was the memorable triumph of Konon at Knidus; the reversal of that of Lysander at Ægospotami eleven years before. Its important effects will be recounted in the coming chapter.

CHAPTER LXXIV.

FROM THE BATTLE OF KNIDUS TO THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS.

HAVING in my last chapter carried the series of Asiatic events down to the battle of Knidus, in the beginning of August, B.C. 394, at which period war was already raging on the other side of the Ægean, in Greece Proper,—I now take up the thread of events from a period somewhat earlier, to show how this last-mentioned war, commonly called the Corinthian war, began.

At the accession of Agesilaus to the throne, in 398 B.C., the power of Sparta throughout all Greece from Laconia to Thessaly, was greater than it had ever been, and greater than any Grecian state had ever enjoyed before. The burden of the long war against Athens she had borne in far less proportion than her allies; its fruits she had reaped exclusively for herself. There prevailed consequently among her allies a general discontent, which Thebes as well as Corinth manifested by refusing to take part in the recent expeditions; either of Pausanias against Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in Peiræus,—or of Agis against the Eleians,—or of Agesilaus against the Persians in Asia Minor. The Eleians were completely humbled by the invasions of Agis; all the other cities in Peloponnesus, from apprehension, from ancient habit, and from being governed by oligarchies who leaned on Sparta for support, were obedient to her authority,—with the single exception of Argos, which remained, as before, neutral and quiet, though in sentiment unfriendly. Athens was a simple unit in the catalogue of Spartan allies, furnishing her contingent, like the rest, to be commanded by the xenâgus,—or officer sent from Sparta for the special purpose of commanding such foreign contingents.

In the northern regions of Greece, the advance of Spartan power is yet more remarkable. Looking back to the year 419 B.C. (about two years after the peace of Nikias), Sparta had been so unable to protect her colony of Herakleia, in Trachis on the Maliac Gulf, near the strait of Thermopylæ, that the Bœotians were obliged to send a garrison thither, in order to prevent it from falling into the hands of Athens. They even went so far as to dismiss the Lacedæmonian harmost.[530] In the winter of 409-408 B.C., another disaster had happened at Herakleia, in which the Lacedæmonian harmost was slain.[531] But about 399 B.C., we find Sparta exercising an energetic ascendency at Herakleia, and even making that place a central post for keeping down the people in the neighborhood of Mount Œta and a portion of Thessaly. Herippidas, the Lacedæmonian, was sent thither to repress some factious movements, with a force sufficient to enable him to overawe the public assembly, to seize the obnoxious party in the place, and to put them to death, five hundred in number, outside of the gates.[532] Carrying his arms farther against the Œtæans and Trachinians

in the neighborhood, who had been long at variance with the Laconian colonists at Herakleia, he expelled them from their abodes, and forced them to migrate with their wives and children into Thessaly.[533] Hence, the Lacedæmonians were enabled to extend their influence into parts of Thessaly, and to place a harmost with a garrison in Pharsalus, resting upon Herakleia as a basis,—which thus became a position of extraordinary importance for their dominion over the northern regions.

With the real power of Sparta thus greatly augmented on land, in addition to her vast empire at sea, bringing its ample influx of tribute,—and among cities who had not merely long recognized her as leader, but had never recognized any one else,—it required an unusual stimulus to raise any formidable hostile combination against her, notwithstanding a large spread of disaffection and antipathy. The stimulus came from Persia, from whose treasures the means had been before furnished to Sparta herself for subduing Athens. The news that a formidable navy was fitting out in Phœnicia, which had prompted the expedition of Agesilaus in the spring of 396 B.C., was doubtless circulated and heard with satisfaction among the Grecian cities unfriendly to Sparta; and the refusal of Thebes, Corinth, and Athens, to take service under that prince,—aggravated in the case of the Thebans by a positive offence given to him on the occasion of his sacrifice at Aulis,—was enough to warn Sparta of the dangerous sentiments and tendencies by which she was surrounded near home.

It was upon these tendencies that the positive instigation and promises of Persia were brought to bear, in the course of the following year; and not merely promises, but pecuniary supplies, with news of revived naval warfare threatening the insular dominion of Sparta. Tithraustes, the new satrap, who had put to death and succeeded Tissaphernes, had no sooner concluded the armistice mentioned above, and prevailed upon Agesilaus to remove his army into the satrapy of Pharnabazus, than he employed active measures for kindling war against Sparta in Greece, in order to create a necessity for the recall of Agesilaus out of Asia. He sent a Rhodian named Timokrates into Greece, as envoy to the cities most unfriendly to the Lacedæmonians, with a sum of fifty talents;[534] directing him to employ this money in gaining over the leading men in these cities, and to exchange solemn oaths of alliance and aid with Persia, for common hostility against Sparta. The island of Rhodes having just revolted from the Spartan dominion, had admitted Konon with the Persian fleet (as I have mentioned in the last chapter), so that probably the Rhodian envoy was on a mission to Tithraustes on behalf of his countrymen. He was an appropriate envoy on this occasion, as having an animated interest in raising up new enemies to Sparta, and as being hearty in stirring up among the Thebans and Corinthians the same spirit which had led to the revolt of Rhodes. The effect which that revolt produced in alarming and exasperating the Spartans, has been already noticed; and we may fairly presume that its effect on the other side, in encouraging their Grecian enemies, was considerable. Timokrates visited Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, distributing his funds. He concluded engagements on behalf of the satrap, with various leading men

in each, putting them into communication with each other; Ismenias, Androkleidas, and others in Thebes,—Timolaus and Polyanthes at Corinth,—Kylon and others at Argos. It appears that he did not visit Athens; at least, Xenophon expressly says that none of his money went there. The working of this mission,—coupled, we must recollect, with the renewed naval warfare on the coast of Asia, and the promise of a Persian fleet against that of Sparta,—was soon felt in the more pronounced manifestation of anti-Laconian sentiments in these various cities, and in the commencement of attempts to establish alliance between them.[535]

With that Laconian bias which pervades his Hellenica, Xenophon represents the coming war against Sparta, as if it had been brought about mainly by these bribes from Persia to the leading men in these various cities. I have stated on more than one occasion, that the average public morality of Grecian individual politicians in Sparta, Athens, and other cities, was not such as to exclude personal corruption; that it required a morality higher than the average, when such temptation was resisted,—and a morality considerably higher than the average, if it were systematically resisted, and for a long life, as by Perikles and Nikias. There would be nothing therefore surprising, if Ismenias and the rest had received bribes under the circumstances here mentioned. But it appears highly improbable that the money given by Timokrates could have been a bribe; that is, given privately, and for the separate use of these leaders. It was furnished for the promotion of a certain public object, which could not be accomplished without heavy disbursements; it was analogous to that sum of thirty talents which (as Xenophon himself tells us) Tithraustes had just given to Agesilaus, as an inducement to carry away his army into the satrapy of Pharnabazus (not as a present for the private purse of the Spartan king, but as a contribution to the wants of the army),[536] or to that which the satrap Tiribazus gave to Antalkidas afterwards,[537] also for public objects. Xenophon affirms, that Ismenias and the rest, having received these presents from Timokrates, accused the Lacedæmonians and rendered them odious,—each in his respective city.[538] But it is certain, from his own showing, that the hatred towards them existed in these cities, before the arrival of Timokrates. In Argos, such hatred was of old standing; in Corinth and Thebes, though kindled only since the close of the war, it was not the less pronounced. Moreover, Xenophon himself informs us, that the Athenians, though they received none of the money,[539] were quite as ready for war as the other cities. If we therefore admit his statement as a matter of fact, that Timokrates gave private presents to various leading politicians, which is by no means improbable,—we must dissent from the explanatory use which he makes of this fact by setting it out prominently as the cause of the war. What these leading men would find it difficult to raise was, not hatred to Sparta, but confidence and courage to brave the power of Sparta. And for this purpose the mission of Timokrates would be a valuable aid, by conveying assurances of Persian coöperation and support against Sparta. He must have been produced publicly either before the people, the senate, or at least the great body of the anti-Laconian party in each city. And the money which he brought with

him, though a portion of it may have gone in private presents, would serve to this party as the best warrant for the sincerity of the satrap.

Whatever negotiations may have been in progress between the cities visited by Timokrates, no union had been brought about between them when the war, kindled by an accident, broke out as a "Bœotian war,"[540] between Thebes and Sparta separately. Between the Opuntian Lokrians and the Phokians, north of Bœotia, there was a strip of disputed border land; respecting which the Phokians, imputing wrongful encroachment to the Lokrians, invaded their territory. The Lokrians, allied with Thebes, entreated her protection; upon which a body of Bœotians invaded Phokis; while the Phokians on their side threw themselves upon Lacedæmon, invoking her aid against Thebes.[541] "The Lacedæmonians (says Xenophon) were delighted to get a pretence for making war against the Thebans,—having been long angry with them on several different grounds. They thought that the present was an excellent time for marching against them, and putting down their insolence; since Agesilaus was in full success in Asia, and there was no other war to embarrass them in Greece."[542] The various grounds on which the Lacedæmonians rested their displeasure against Thebes, begin from a time immediately succeeding the close of the war against Athens, and the sentiment was now both established and vehement. It was they who now began the Bœotian war; not the Thebans, nor the bribes brought by Timokrates.

The energetic and ambitious Lysander, who had before instigated the expedition of Agesilaus across the Ægean, and who had long hated the Thebans,—was among the foremost advisers of the expedition now decreed by the ephors against Thebes, [543] as well as the chief commander appointed to carry it into execution. He was despatched with a small force to act on the north of Bœotia. He was directed to start from Herakleia, the centre of Lacedæmonian influence in those regions,—to muster the Herakleots, together with the various dependent populations in the neighborhood of Œta, Œtæans, Malians, Ænianes, etc.—to march towards Bœotia, taking up the Phokians in his way,—and to attack Haliartus. Under the walls of this town king Pausanias engaged to meet him on a given day, with the native Lacedæmonian force and the Peloponnesian allies. For this purpose, having obtained favorable border sacrifices, he marched forth to Tegea, and there employed himself in collecting the allied contingents from Peloponnesus.[544] But the allies generally were tardy and reluctant in the cause; while the Corinthians withheld all concurrence and support,[545]—though neither did they make any manifestation in favor of Thebes.

Finding themselves thus exposed to a formidable attack on two sides, from Sparta at the height of her power, and from a Spartan officer of known ability,—being, moreover, at the same time without a single ally,—the Thebans resolved to entreat succor from Athens. A Theban embassy to Athens for any purpose, and especially for this purpose, was itself among the strongest marks of the revolution which had taken place in Grecian politics. The antipathy between the two cities had been

so long and virulent, that the Thebans, at the close of the war, had endeavored to induce Sparta to root out the Athenian population. Their conduct subsequently had been favorable and sympathizing towards Thrasybulus in his struggle against the Thirty, and that leader had testified his gratitude by dedicating statues in the Theban Herakleion.[546] But it was by no means clear that Athens would feel herself called upon, either by policy or by sentiment, to assist them in the present emergency; at a moment when she had no Long Walls, no fortifications at Peiræus, no ships, nor any protection against the Spartan maritime power.

It was not until Pausanias and Lysander were both actually engaged in mustering their forces, that the Thebans sent to address the Athenian assembly. The speech of the Theban envoy sets forth strikingly the case against Sparta as it then stood. Disclaiming all concurrence with that former Theban deputy, who, without any instructions, had taken on himself to propose, in the Spartan assembly of allies, extreme severity towards the conquered Athenians,—he reminded the Athenians that Thebes had by unanimous voice declined obeying the summons of the Spartans, to aid in the march against Thrasybulus and the Peiræus; and that this was the first cause of the anger of the Spartans against her. On that ground, then, he appealed to the gratitude of democratical Athens against the Lacedæmonians. But he likewise invoked against them, with yet greater confidence, the aid of oligarchical Athens,—or of those who at that time had stood opposed to Thrasybulus and the Peiræus; for it was Sparta who, having first set up the oligarchy at Athens, had afterwards refused to sustain it, and left its partisans to the generosity of their democratical opponents, by whom alone they were saved harmless.[547] Of course Athens was eager, if possible (so he presumed), to regain her lost empire; and in this enterprise he tendered the cordial aid of Thebes as an ally. He pointed out that it was by no means an impracticable enterprise; looking to the universal hatred which Sparta had now drawn upon herself, not less on the part of ancient allies than of prior enemies. The Athenians knew by experience that Thebes could be formidable as a foe; she would now show that she could be yet more effective as a friend, if the Athenians would interfere to rescue her. Moreover, she was now about to fight, not for Syracusans or Asiatics, but for her own preservation and dignity. "We hesitate not to affirm, men of Athens (concluded the Theban speaker), that what we are now invoking at your hands is a greater benefit to you than it is to ourselves."[548]

Eight years had now elapsed since the archonship of Eukleides and the renovation of the democracy after the crushing visitation of the Thirty. Yet we may see, from the important and well-turned allusion of the Theban speaker to the oligarchical portion of the assembly, that the two parties still stood in a certain measure distinguished. Enfeebled as Athens had been left by the war, she had never since been called upon to take any decisive and emphatic vote on a question of foreign policy; and much now turned upon the temper of the oligarchical minority, which might well be conceived likely to play a party game and speculate upon Spartan countenance.

But the comprehensive amnesty decreed on the reëstablishment of the democratical constitution,—and the wise and generous forbearance with which it had been carried out, in spite of the most torturing recollections,—were now found to have produced their fruits. Majority and minority,—democrats and oligarchs,—were seen confounded in one unanimous and hearty vote to lend assistance to Thebes, in spite of all risk from hostility with Sparta. We cannot indeed doubt that this vote was considerably influenced also by the revolt of Rhodes, by the reappearance of Konon with a fleet in the Asiatic seas, and by private communications from that commander intimating his hope of acting triumphantly against the maritime power of Sparta, through enlarged aid from Persia. The vote had thus a double meaning. It proclaimed not merely the restored harmony between democrats and oligarchs at Athens, but also their common resolution to break the chain by which they were held as mere satellites and units in the regiment of Spartan allies, and to work out anew the old traditions of Athens as a self-acting and primary power, at least,—if not once again an imperial power. The vote proclaimed a renovated life in Athens, and its boldness under the existing weakness of the city, is extolled two generations afterwards by Demosthenes.[549]

After having heard the Theban orator (we are told even by the philo-Laconian Xenophon),[550] "very many Athenian citizens rose and spoke in support of his prayer, and the whole assembly with one accord voted to grant it." Thrasybulus proposed the resolution, and communicated it to the Theban envoys.

He told them that Athens knew well the risk which she was incurring while Peiræus was undefended; but nevertheless she was prepared to show her gratitude by giving more in requital than she had received; for she was prepared to give the Thebans positive aid, in case they were attacked—while the Thebans had done nothing more for *her* than to refuse to join in an aggressive march against her.[551]

Without such assurance of succor from Athens, it is highly probable that the Thebans might have been afraid to face, single-handed, Lysander and the full force of Sparta. But they now prepared for a strenuous defence. The first approach of Lysander with his army of Herakleots, Phokians, and others, from the north, was truly menacing; the more so, as Orchomenus, the second city next to Thebes in the Bœotian confederacy, broke off its allegiance and joined him. The supremacy of Thebes over the cities composing the Bœotian confederacy appears to have been often harsh and oppressive, though probably not equally oppressive towards all, and certainly not equally odious to all. To Platæa on the extreme south of Bœotia, it had been long intolerable, and the unhappy fate of that little town has saddened many pages of my preceding volumes; to Orchomenus, on the extreme north, it was also unpalatable,—partly because that town stood next in power and importance to Thebes,—partly because it had an imposing legendary antiquity, and claimed to have been once the ascendant city receiving tribute from Thebes. The Orchomenians now joined Lysander, threw open to him the way into Bœotia, and conducted him with his

army, after first ravaging the fields of Lebadeia, into the district belonging to Haliartus.[552]

Before Lysander quitted Sparta, the plan of operations concerted between him and Pausanias, was that they should meet on a given day in the territory of Haliartus. And in execution of this plan Pausanias had already advanced with his Peloponnesian army as far as Platæa in Bœotia. Whether the day fixed between them had yet arrived, when Lysander reached Haliartus, we cannot determine with certainty. In the imperfection of the Grecian calendar, a mistake on this point would be very conceivable,—as had happened between the Athenian generals Hippokrates and Demosthenes in those measures which preceded the battle of Delium in 424 B.C.[553] But the engagement must have been taken by both parties, subject to obstructions in the way,—since each would have to march through a hostile country to reach the place of meeting. The words of Xenophon, however, rather indicate that the day fixed had not arrived; nevertheless, Lysander resolved at once to act against Haliartus, without waiting for Pausanias. There were as yet only a few Thebans in the town, and he, probably, had good reasons for judging that he would better succeed by rapid measures, before any more Thebans could arrive, than by delaying until the other Spartan army should join him; not to mention anxiety that the conquest should belong to himself exclusively, and confidence arising from his previous success at Orchomenus. Accordingly, he sent in an invitation to the Haliartians to follow the example of the Orchomenians, to revolt from Thebes, and to stand upon their autonomy under Lacedæmonian protection. Perhaps there may have been a party in the town disposed to comply. But the majority, encouraged too by the Thebans within, refused the proposition; upon which Lysander marched up to the walls and assaulted the town. He was here engaged, close by the gates, in examining where he could best effect an entrance, when a fresh division of Thebans, apprised of his proceedings, was seen approaching from Thebes, at their fastest pace,—cavalry, as well as hoplites. They were probably seen from the watch-towers in the city earlier than they became visible to the assailants without; so that the Haliartians, encouraged by the sight, threw open their gates, and made a sudden sally. Lysander, seemingly taken by surprise, was himself slain among the first, with his prophet by his side, by a Haliartian hoplite named Neochôrus. His troops stood some time, against both the Haliartians from the town, and the fresh Thebans who now came up. But they were at length driven back with considerable loss, and compelled to retreat to rugged and difficult ground at some distance in their rear. Here, however, they made good their position, repelling their assailants with the loss of more than two hundred hoplites.[554]

The success here gained, though highly valuable as an encouragement to the Thebans, would have been counterbalanced by the speedy arrival of Pausanias, had not Lysander himself been among the slain. But the death of so eminent a man was an irreparable loss to Sparta. His army, composed of heterogeneous masses, both

collected and held together by his personal ascendency, lost confidence and dispersed in the ensuing night.[555] When Pausanias arrived soon afterwards, he found no second army to join with him. Yet his own force was more than sufficient to impress terror on the Thebans, had not Thrasybulus, faithful to the recent promise, arrived with an imposing body of Athenian hoplites, together with cavalry under Orthobulus[556]—and imparted fresh courage as well as adequate strength to the Theban cause.

Pausanias had first to consider what steps he would take to recover the bodies of the slain,—that of Lysander among them; whether he would fight a battle and thus take his chance of becoming master of the field,—or send the usual petition for burial-truce, which always implied confession of inferiority. On submitting the point to a council of officers and Spartan elders, their decision as well as his own was against fighting; not, however, without an indignant protest from some of the Spartan elders. He considered that the whole original plan of operations was broken up, since not only the great name and genius of Lysander had perished, but his whole army had spontaneously disbanded; that the Peloponnesian allies were generally lukewarm and reluctant, not to be counted upon for energetic behavior in case of pressing danger; that he had little or no cavalry,[557] while the Theban cavalry was numerous and excellent; lastly, that the dead body of Lysander himself lay so close to the walls of Haliartus, that even if the Lacedæmonians were victorious, they could not carry it off without serious loss from the armed defenders in their towers.[558] Such were the reasons which determined Pausanias and the major part of the council to send and solicit a truce. But the Thebans refused to grant it except on condition that they should immediately evacuate Bœotia. Though such a requisition was contrary to the received practice of Greece,[559] which imposed on the victor the duty of granting the burial-truce unconditionally, whenever it was asked and inferiority thus publicly confessed,—nevertheless, such was the reluctant temper of the army, that they heard not merely with acquiescence, but with joy,[560] the proposition of departing. The bodies were duly buried,—that of Lysander in the territory of Panopê, immediately across the Phokian border, but not far from Haliartus. And no sooner were these solemnities completed, than the Lacedæmonian army was led back to Peloponnesus; their dejection forming a mournful contrast to the triumphant insolence of the Thebans, who watched their march and restrained them, not without occasional blows, from straggling out of the road into the cultivated fields.[561]

The death of Lysander produced the most profound sorrow and resentment at Sparta. On returning thither, Pausanias found himself the subject of such virulent accusation, that he thought it prudent to make his escape, and take sanctuary in the temple of Athênê Alea, at Tegea. He was impeached, and put on trial during his absence, on two counts; first, for having been behind the time covenanted, in meeting Lysander at Haliartus; next for having submitted to ask a truce from the Thebans, instead of fighting a battle for the purpose of obtaining the bodies of the slain.

As far as there is evidence to form a judgment, it does not appear that Pausanias was guilty upon either of the two counts. The first is a question of fact; and it seems quite as likely that Lysander was before his time, as that Pausanias was behind his time, in arriving at Haliartus. Besides, Lysander, arriving there first, would have been quite safe, had he not resolved to attack without delay; in which the chances of war turned out against him; though the resolution in itself may have been well conceived. Next, as to the truce solicited for burying the dead bodies,—it does not appear that Pausanias could with any prudence have braved the chances of a battle. The facts of the case,—even as summed up by Xenophon, who always exaggerates everything in favor of the Spartans,—lead us to this conclusion. A few of the Spartan elders would doubtless prefer perishing on the field of battle, to the humiliation of sending in the herald to ask for a truce. But the mischief of fighting a battle under the influence of such a point of honor, to the exclusion of a rational estimate of consequences, will be seen when we come to the battle of Leuktra, where Kleombrotus, son of Pausanias was thus piqued into an imprudence (at least this is alleged as one of the motives) to which his own life and the dominion of Sparta became forfeit.[562] Moreover, the army of Pausanias, comprising very few Spartans, consisted chiefly of allies who had no heart in the cause, and who were glad to be required by the Thebans to depart. If he had fought a battle and lost it, the detriment to Sparta would have been most serious in every way; whereas, if he had gained a victory, no result would have followed except the acquisition of the bodies for burial; since the execution of the original plan had become impracticable through the dispersion of the army of Lysander.

Though a careful examination of the facts leads us (and seems also to have led Xenophon[563]) to the conclusion that Pausanias was innocent, he was nevertheless found guilty in his absence. He was in great part borne down by the grief felt at Sparta for the loss of Lysander, with whom he had been before in political rivalry, and for whose death he was made responsible. Moreover, the old accusation was now revived against him,[564]—for which he had been tried, and barely acquitted, eight years before,—of having tolerated the reëstablishment of the Athenian democracy at a time when he might have put it down. Without doubt this argument told prodigiously against him at the present juncture, when the Athenians had just now, for the first time since the surrender of their city, renounced their subjection to Sparta and sent an army to assist the Thebans in their defence. So violent was the sentiment against Pausanias, that he was condemned to death in his absence, and passed the remainder of his life as an exile in sanctuary at Tegea. His son, Agesipolis, was invested with the sceptre in his place.

A brief remark will not be here misplaced. On no topic have Grecian historians been more profuse in their reproaches, than upon the violence and injustice of democracy, at Athens and elsewhere, in condemning unsuccessful, but innocent generals. Out of the many cases in which this reproach is advanced, there are very few wherein it has been made good; but even if we grant it to be valid against Athens

and her democracy, the fate of Pausanias will show us that the ephors and senate of anti-democratical Sparta were capable of the like unjust misjudgment. Hardly a single instance of Athenian condemnation occurs, which we can so clearly prove to be undeserved, as this of a Spartan king.

Turning from the banished king to Lysander,—the Spartans had indeed valid reasons for deploring the fall of the latter. He had procured for them their greatest and most decisive victories, and the time was coming when they needed his services to procure them more; for he left behind him no man of equal warlike resource, cunning, and power of command. But if he possessed those abilities which powerfully helped Sparta to triumph over her enemies, he at the same time did more than any man to bring her empire into dishonor, and to render its tenure precarious. His decemviral governments or dekarchies, diffused through the subject cities, and each sustained by a Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison, were aggravations of local tyranny such as the Grecian world had never before undergone. And though the Spartan authorities presently saw that he was abusing the imperial name of the city for unmeasured personal aggrandizement of his own, and partially withdrew their countenance from his dekarchies,—yet the general character of their empire still continued to retain the impress of partisanship and subjugation which he had originally stamped upon it. Instead of that autonomy which Sparta had so repeatedly promised, it became subjection every way embittered. Such an empire was pretty sure to be short-lived; but the loss to Sparta herself, when her empire fell away, is not the only fault which the historian of Greece has to impute to Lysander. His far deeper sin consists in his having thrown away an opportunity,—such as never occurred either before or afterwards,—for organizing some permanent, honorable, self-maintaining, Pan-hellenic combination under the headship of Sparta. This is (as I have before remarked) what a man like Kallikratidas would have attempted, if not with far-sighted wisdom, at least with generous sincerity, and by an appeal to the best veins of political sentiment in the chief city as well as in the subordinates. It is possible that with the best intentions even he might have failed; so strong was the centrifugal instinct in the Grecian political mind. But what we have to reproach in Lysander is, that he never tried; that he abused the critical moment of cure for the purpose of infusing new poison into the system; that he not only sacrificed the interests of Greece to the narrow gains of Sparta, but even the interests of Sparta to the still narrower monopoly of dominion in his own hands. That his measures worked mischievously not merely for Greece, but for Sparta herself, aggravating all her bad tendencies,—has been already remarked in the preceding pages.

That Lysander, with unbounded opportunities of gain, both lived and died poor, exhibits the honorable side of his character. Yet his personal indifference to money seems only to have left the greater space in his bosom for that thirst of power which made him unscrupulous in satiating the rapacity, as well as in upholding the oppressions, of coadjutors like the Thirty at Athens and the decemvirs in other cities. In

spite of his great success and ability in closing the Peloponnesian war, we shall agree with Pausanias[565] that he was more mischievous than profitable even to Sparta,—even if we take no thought of Greece generally. What would have been the effect produced by his projects in regard to the regal succession, had he been able to bring them to bear, we have no means of measuring. We are told that the discourse composed and addressed to him by the Halicarnassian rhetor Kleon, was found after his death among his papers by Agesilaus; who first learnt from it, with astonishment and alarm, the point to which the ambition of Lysander had tended, and was desirous of exposing his real character by making the discourse public,—but was deterred by dissuasive counsel of the ephor Lakratidas. But this story (attested by Ephorus[566]) looks more like an anecdote of the rhetorical schools than like a reality. Agesilaus was not the man to set much value on sophists or their compositions; nor is it easy to believe that he remained so long ignorant of those projects which Lysander had once entertained but subsequently dropped. Moreover the probability is, that Kleon himself would make the discourse public as a sample of his own talents, even in the lifetime of Lysander; not only without shame, but as representing the feelings of a considerable section of readers throughout the Grecian world.

Most important were the consequences which ensued from the death of Lysander and the retreat of Pausanias out of Bœotia. Fresh hope and spirits were infused into all the enemies of Sparta. An alliance was immediately concluded against her by Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos. Deputies from these four cities were appointed to meet at Corinth, and to take active measures for inviting the coöperation of fresh allies; so that the war which had begun as a Bœotian war, now acquired the larger denomination of Corinthian war, under which it lasted until the peace of Antalkidas. The alliance was immediately strengthened by the junction of the Eubœans,—the Akarnanians,—the Ozolian Lokrians,—Ambrakia and Leukas (both particularly attached to Corinth),—and the Chalkidians of Thrace.[567]

We now enter upon the period when, for the first time, Thebes begins to step out of the rank of secondary powers, and gradually raises herself into a primary and ascendant city in Grecian politics. Throughout the Peloponnesian war, the Thebans had shown themselves excellent soldiers, both on horseback and on foot, as auxiliaries to Sparta. But now the city begins to have a policy of its own, and individual citizens of ability become conspicuous. While waiting for Pelopidas and Epaminondas, with whom we shall presently become acquainted, we have at the present moment Ismenias; a wealthy Theban, a sympathizer with Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles eight years before, and one of the great organizers of the present anti-Spartan movement; a man, too, honored by his political enemies,[568] when they put him to death fourteen years afterwards, with the title of "a great wicked man,"—the same combination of epithets which Clarendon applies to Oliver Cromwell.

It was Ismenias, who, at the head of a body of Bœotians and Argeians, undertook an expedition to put down the Spartan influence in the regions north of Bœotia.

At Pharsalus in Thessaly, the Lacedæmonians had an harmost and garrison; at Pheræ, Lykophron the despot was their ally; while Larissa, with Medius the despot, was their principal enemy. By the aid of the Bœotians, Medius was now enabled to capture Pharsalus; Larissa, with Krannon and Skotusa, was received into the Theban alliance,[569] and Ismenias obtained also the more important advantage of expelling the Lacedæmonians from Herakleia. Some malcontents, left after the violent interference of the Spartan Herippidas two years before, opened the gates of Herakleia by night to the Bœotians and Argeians. The Lacedæmonians in the town were put to the sword, but the other Peloponnesian colonists were permitted to retire in safety; while the old Trachinian inhabitants, whom the Lacedæmonians had expelled to make room for their new settlers, together with the Œtæans, whom they had driven out of the districts in the neighborhood,—were now called back to repossess their original homes.[570] The loss of Herakleia was a serious blow to the Spartans in those regions,—protecting Eubœa in its recent revolt from them, and enabling Ismenias to draw into his alliance the neighboring Malians, Ænianes, and Athamanes,—tribes stretching along the valley of the Spercheius westward to the vicinity of Pindus. Assembling additional troops from these districts (which, only a few months before, had supplied an army to Lysander[571]), Ismenias marched against the Phokians, among whom the Spartan Lakisthenes had been left as harmost in command. After a severe battle, this officer with his Phokians was defeated near the Lokrian town of Naryx; and Ismenias came back victorious to the synod at Corinth.[572]

By such important advantages, accomplished during the winter of 395-394 B.C., the prospects of Grecian affairs as they stood in the ensuing spring became materially altered. The allies assembled at Corinth, full of hope, and resolved to levy a large combined force to act against Sparta; who on her side seemed to be threatened with the loss of all her extra-Peloponnesian land-empire. Accordingly, the ephors determined to recall without delay Agesilaus with his army from Asia, and sent Epikydidas with orders to that effect. But even before this reinforcement could arrive, they thought it expedient to muster their full Peloponnesian force and to act with vigor against the allies at Corinth, who were now assembling in considerable numbers. Aristodemus,—guardian of the youthful king Agesipolis son of Pausanias, and himself of the Eurystheneid race,—marched at the head of a body of six thousand Lacedæmonian hoplites;[573] the Spartan xenâgi (or officers sent on purpose to conduct the contingents from the outlying allies), successively brought in three thousand hoplites from Elis, Triphylia, Akroreia, and Lasion,—fifteen hundred from Sikyon,—three thousand from Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis. None were sent from Phlias, on the plea (true or false[574]) that in that city the moment was one of solemnity and holy truce. There were also hoplites from Tegea, Mantineia, and the Achæan towns, but their number is not given; so that we do not know the full muster-roll on the Lacedæmonian side. The cavalry, six hundred in number, were all Lacedæmonian; there were, moreover, three hundred Kretan bowmen,—and four hundred slingers from different rural districts of Triphylia.[575]

The allied force of the enemy was already mustered near Corinth; six thousand Athenian hoplites,—seven thousand Argeian,—five thousand Bœotian, those from Orchomenus being absent,—three thousand Corinthian,—three thousand from the different towns of Eubœa; making twenty-four thousand in all. The total of cavalry was fifteen hundred and fifty; composed of eight hundred Bœotian, six hundred Athenian, one hundred from Chalkis in Eubœa, and fifty from the Lokrians. The light troops also were numerous,—partly Corinthian, drawn probably from the serf-population which tilled the fields,[576]—partly Lokrians, Malians, and Akarnanians.

The allied leaders, holding a council of war to arrange their plans, came to a resolution that the hoplites should not be drawn up in deeper files than sixteen men, [577] in order that there might be no chance of their being surrounded; and that the right wing, carrying with it command for the time, should be alternated from day to day between the different cities. The confidence which the events of the last few months had infused into these leaders, now for the first time acting against their old leader Sparta, is surprising. "There is nothing like marching to Sparta (said the Corinthian Timolaus) and fighting the Lacedæmonians at or near their own home. We must burn out the wasps in their nest, without letting them come forth to sting us. The Lacedæmonian force is like that of a river; small at its source, and becoming formidable only by the affluents which it receives, in proportion to the length of its course."[578] The wisdom of this advice was remarkable; but its boldness was yet more remarkable, when viewed in conjunction with the established feeling of awe towards Sparta. It was adopted by the general council of the allies; but unfortunately the time for executing it had already passed; for the Lacedæmonians were already in march and had crossed their own border. They took the line of road by Tegea and Mantineia (whose troops joined the march), and advanced as far as Sikyon, where probably all the Arcadian and Achæan contingents were ordered to rendezvous.

The troops of the confederacy had advanced as far as Nemea when they learnt that the Lacedæmonian army was at Sikyon; but they then altered their plan, and confined themselves to the defensive. The Lacedæmonians on their side crossed over the mountainous post called Epieikia, under considerable annoyance from the enemy's light troops, who poured missiles upon them from the high ground. But when they had reached the level country, on the other side, along the shore of the Saronic Gulf, where they probably received the contingents from Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis,—the whole army thus reinforced marched forward without resistance, burning and ravaging the cultivated lands. The confederates retreated before them, and at length took up a position close to Corinth, amidst some rough ground with a ravine in their front.[579] The Lacedæmonians advanced forward until they were little more than a mile distant from this position, and there encamped.

After an interval seemingly of a few days, the Bœotians, on the day when their turn came to occupy the right wing and to take the lead, gave the signal for battle. [580] The Lacedæmonians, prevented by the wooded ground from seeing clearly,

were only made aware of the coming attack by hearing the hostile pæan. Taking order of battle immediately, they advanced forward to meet the assailants when within a furlong of their line. In each army, the right division took the lead,—slanting to the right, or keeping the left shoulder forward, according to the tendency habitual with Grecian hoplites, through anxiety to keep the right or unshielded side from being exposed to the enemy, and at the same time to be protected by the shield of a right-hand neighbor.[581] The Lacedæmonians in the one army, and the Thebans in the other, each inclined themselves, and caused their respective armies to incline also, in a direction slanting to the right, so that the Lacedæmonians on their side considerably outflanked the Athenians on the opposite left. Out of the ten tribes of Athenian hoplites, it was only the six on the extreme left who came into conflict with the Lacedæmonians; while the remaining four contended with the Tegeans who stood next to the Lacedæmonians on their own line. But the six extreme Athenian tribes were completely beaten, and severely handled, being taken in flank as well as in front by the Lacedæmonians. On the other hand, the remaining four Athenian tribes vanquished and drove before them the Tegeans; and generally, along all the rest of the line, the Thebans, Argeians, and Corinthians were victorious,—except where the troops of the Achæan Pellênê stood opposed to those of the Bœotian Thespiæ, where the battle was equal and the loss severe on both sides. The victorious confederates, however, were so ardent and incautious in pursuit, as to advance a considerable distance and return with disordered ranks; while the Lacedæmonians, who were habitually self-restraining in this particular, kept their order perfectly, attacking the Thebans, Argeians, and Corinthians to great advantage when returning to their camp. Several of the Athenian fugitives obtained shelter within the walls of Corinth; in spite of the opposition of the philo-Laconian Corinthians, who insisted upon shutting the gates against them, and opening negotiations with Sparta. The Lacedæmonians however came so near that it was at last thought impossible to keep the gates open longer. Many of the remaining confederates were therefore obliged to be satisfied with the protection of their ancient camp;[582] which seems, however, to have been situated in such defensible ground,[583] that the Lacedæmonians did not molest them in it.

So far as the Lacedæmonians separately were concerned, the battle of Corinth was an important victory, gained (as they affirmed) with the loss of only eight men, and inflicting heavy loss upon the Athenians in the battle, as well as upon the remaining confederates in their return from pursuit. Though the Athenian hoplites suffered thus severely, yet Thrasybulus their commander,[584] who kept the field until the last, with strenuous efforts to rally them, was not satisfied with their behavior. But on the other hand, all the allies of Sparta were worsted, and a considerable number of them slain. According to Diodorus, the total loss on the Lacedæmonian side was eleven hundred; on the side of the confederates twenty-eight hundred.[585] On the whole, the victory of the Lacedæmonians was not sufficiently decisive to lead to important results, though it completely secured their ascendency within Pelopon-

nesus. We observe here, as we shall have occasion to observe elsewhere, that the Peloponnesian allies do not fight heartily in the cause of Sparta. They seem bound to her more by fear than by affection.

The battle of Corinth took place about July 394 B.C., seemingly about the same time as the naval battle near Knidus (or perhaps a little earlier), and while Agesilaus was on his homeward march after being recalled from Asia. Had the Lacedæmonians been able to defer the battle until Agesilaus had come up so as to threaten Bœotia on the northern side, their campaign would probably have been much more successful. As it is, their defeated allies doubtless went home in disgust from the field of Corinth, so that the confederates were now enabled to turn their whole attention to Agesilaus.

That prince had received in Asia his summons of recall from the ephors with profound vexation and disappointment, yet at the same time with patriotic submission. He had augmented his army, and was contemplating more extensive schemes of operations against the Persian satrapies in Asia Minor. He had established such a reputation for military force and skill, that numerous messages reached him from different inland districts, expressing their anxiety to be emancipated from Persian dominion; and inviting him to come to their aid. His ascendency was also established over the Grecian cities on the coast, whom he still kept under the government of partisan oligarchies and Spartan harmosts,—yet seemingly with greater practical moderation, and less license of oppression, than had marked the conduct of these men when they could count upon so unprincipled a chief as Lysander. He was thus just now not only at a high pitch of actual glory and ascendency, but nourishing yet brighter hopes of farther conquests for the future. And what filled up the measure of his aspirations, —all the conquests were to be made at the expense, not of Greeks, but of the Persians. He was treading in the footsteps of Agamemnon, as Pan-hellenic leader against a Pan-hellenic enemy.

All these glorious dreams were dissipated by Epikydidas, with his sad message, and peremptory summons, from the ephors. In the chagrin and disappointment of Agesilaus we can sincerely sympathize; but the panegyric which Xenophon and others pronounce upon him for his ready obedience is altogether unreasonable.[586] There was no merit in renouncing his projects of conquest at the bidding of the ephors; because, if any serious misfortune had befallen Sparta at home, none of those projects could have been executed. Nor is it out of place to remark, that even if Agesilaus had not been recalled, the extinction of the Lacedæmonian naval superiority by the defeat of Knidus, would have rendered all large plans of inland conquest impracticable. On receiving his orders of recall, he convened an assembly both of his allies and of his army, to make known the painful necessity of his departure; which was heard with open and sincere manifestations of sorrow. He assured them that as soon as he had dissipated the clouds which hung over Sparta at home, he should come back to Asia without delay, and resume his efforts against the Persian satraps;

in the interim he left Euxenus, with a force of four thousand men for their protection. Such was the sympathy excited by his communication, combined with esteem for his character, that the cities passed a general vote to furnish him with contingents of troops for his march to Sparta. But this first burst of zeal abated, when they came to reflect that it was a service against Greeks; not merely unpopular in itself, but presenting a certainty of hard fighting with little plunder. Agesilaus tried every means to keep up their spirits, by proclaiming prizes both to the civic soldiers and to the mercenaries, to be distributed at Sestus in the Chersonesus, as soon as they should have crossed into Europe,—prizes for the best equipment, and best disciplined soldiers in every different arm.[587] By these means he prevailed upon the bravest and most effective soldiers in his army to undertake the march along with him; among them many of the Cyreians, with Xenophon himself at their head.

Though Agesilaus, in leaving Greece, had prided himself on hoisting the flag of Agamemnon, he was now destined against his will to tread in the footsteps of the Persian Xerxes in his march from the Thracian Chersonese through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, to Thermopylæ and Bœotia. Never, since the time of Xerxes, had any army undertaken this march; which now bore an Oriental impress, from the fact that Agesilaus brought with him some camels, taken in the battle of Sardis.[588] Overawing or defeating the various Thracian tribes, he reached Amphipolis on the Strymon where he was met by Derkyllidas, who had come fresh from the battle of Corinth and informed him of the victory. Full as his heart was of Pan-hellenic projects against Persia, he burst into exclamations of regret on hearing of the death of so many Greeks in battle, who could have sufficed, if united, to emancipate Asia Minor. [589] Sending Derkyllidas forward to Asia to make known the victory to the Grecian cities in his alliance, he pursued his march through Macedonia and Thessaly. In the latter country, Larissa, Krannon, and other cities in alliance with Thebes, raised opposition to bar his passage. But in the disunited condition of this country, no systematic resistance could be organized against him. Nothing more appeared than detached bodies of cavalry, whom he beat and dispersed, with the death of Polycharmus, their leader. As the Thessalian cavalry, however, was the best in Greece, he took great pride in having defeated them with cavalry disciplined by himself in Asia; backed, however, it must be observed, by skilful and effective support from his hoplites.[590] After having passed the Achæan mountains or the line of Mount Othrys, he marched the rest of the way without opposition, through the strait of Thermopylæ to the frontier of Phokis and Bœotia.

In this latter part of his march, Agesilaus was met by the ephor Diphridas in person, who urged him to hasten his march as much as possible, and attack the Bœotians. He was further joined by two Lacedæmonian regiments[591] from Corinth, and by fifty young Spartan volunteers as a body-guard, who crossed by sea from Sikyon. He was reinforced also by the Phokians and the Orchomenians,—in addition to the Peloponnesian troops who had accompanied him to Asia, the Asiatic hoplites, the

Cyreians, the peltasts, and the cavalry, whom he had brought with him from the Hellespont, and some fresh troops collected in the march. His army was thus in imposing force when he reached the neighborhood of Chæroneia on the Bœotian border. It was here that they were alarmed by an eclipse of the sun, on the fourteenth of August, 394 B.C.; a fatal presage, the meaning of which was soon interpreted for them by the arrival of a messenger bearing news of the naval defeat of Knidus, with the death of Peisander, brother-in-law of Agesilaus. Deeply was the latter affected by this irreparable blow. He foresaw that, when known, it would spread dismay and dejection among his soldiers, most of whom would remain attached to him only so long as they believed the cause of Sparta to be ascendant and profitable.[592] Accordingly, he resolved, being now within a day's march of his enemies, to hasten on a battle without making known the bad news. Proclaiming that intelligence had been received of a sea-fight having taken place, in which the Lacedæmonians had been victorious, though Peisander himself was slain,—he offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving and sent round presents of congratulation,—which produced an encouraging effect, and made the skirmishers especially both forward and victorious.

To his enemies, now assembled in force on the plain of Korôneia, the real issue of the battle of Knidus was doubtless made known, spreading hope and cheerfulness through their ranks; though we are not informed what interpretation they put upon the solar eclipse. The army was composed of nearly the same contingents as those who had recently fought at Corinth, except that we hear of the Ænianes in place of the Malians; but probably each contingent was less numerous, since there was still a necessity for occupying and defending the camp near Corinth. Among the Athenian hoplites, who had just been so roughly handled in the preceding battle, and who were now drafted off by lot to march into Bœotia, against both a general and an army of high reputation,—there prevailed much apprehension and some reluctance; as we learn from one of them, Mantitheus, who stood forward to volunteer his services, and who afterwards makes just boast of it before an Athenian dikastery.[593] The Thebans and Bœotians were probably in full force, and more numerous than at Corinth, since it was their own country which was to be defended. The camp was established in the territory of Korôneia, not far from the great temple of Itonian Athênê, where the Pambœotia, or general Bœotian assemblies were held, and where there also stood the trophy erected for the great victory over Tolmides and the Athenians, about fifty years before.[594] Between the two armies there was no great difference of numbers, except as to the peltasts, who were more numerous in the army of Agesilaus, though they do not seem to have taken much part in the battle.

Having marched from Chæroneia, Agesilaus approached the plain of Korôneia from the river Kephissus, while the Thebans met him from the direction of Mount Helikon. He occupied the right wing of his army, the Orchomenians being on the left, and the Cyreians with the Asiatic allies in the centre. In the opposite line, the Thebans were on the right, and the Argeians on the left. Both armies approached slowly

and in silence until they were separated only by an interval of a furlong, at which moment the Thebans on the right began the war-shout, and accelerated their march to a run,—the rest of the line following their example. When they got within half a furlong of the Lacedæmonians, the centre division of the latter, under the command of Herippidas (comprising the Cyreians, with Xenophon himself, and the Asiatic allies) started forward on their side, and advanced at a run to meet them; seemingly, getting beyond their own line,[595] and coming first to cross spears with the enemy's centre. After a sharp struggle, the division of Herippidas was here victorious, and drove back its opponents. Agesilaus, on his right, was yet more victorious, for the Argeians opposed to him, fled without even crossing spears. These fugitives found safety on the high ground of Mount Helikon. But on the other hand, the Thebans on their own right completely beat back the Orchomenians, and pursued them so far as to get to the baggage in the rear of the army. Agesilaus, while his friends around were congratulating him as conqueror, immediately wheeled round to complete his victory by attacking the Thebans; who, on their side also faced about, and prepared to fight their way, in close and deep order, to rejoin their comrades on Helikon. Though Agesilaus might have let them pass, and assailed them in the rear with greater safety and equal effect, he preferred the more honorable victory of a conflict face to face. Such is the coloring which his panegyrist, Xenophon,[596] puts upon his manœuvre. Yet we may remark that if he had let the Thebans pass, he could not have pursued them far, seeing that their own comrades were at hand to sustain them,—and also that having never yet fought against the Thebans, he had probably no adequate appreciation of their prowess.

The crash which now took place was something terrific beyond all Grecian military experience,[597] leaving an indelible impression upon Xenophon, who was personally engaged in it. The hoplites on both sides came to the fiercest and closest bodily struggle, pushing shields against each other, with all the weight of the incumbent mass behind impelling forward the foremost ranks,—especially in the deep order of the Thebans. The shields of the foremost combatants were thus stove in, their spears broken, and each man was engaged in such close embrace with his enemy, that the dagger was the only weapon which he could use. There was no systematic shout, such as usually marked the charge of a Grecian army; the silence was only broken by a medley of furious exclamations and murmurs.[598] Agesilaus himself, who was among the front ranks, and whose size and strength were by no means on a level with his personal courage, had his body covered with wounds from different weapons,[599]—was trodden down,—and only escaped by the devoted courage of those fifty Spartan volunteers who formed his body-guard. Partly from his wounds, partly from the irresistible courage and stronger pressure of the Thebans, the Spartans were at length compelled to give way, so far as to afford a free passage to the former, who were thus enabled to march onward and rejoin their comrades; not without sustaining some loss by attacks on their rear.[600]

Agesilaus thus remained master of the field of battle, having gained a victory over his opponents taken collectively. But so far as concerns the Thebans separately, he had not only gained no victory, but had failed in his purpose of stopping their progress, and had had the worst of the combat. His wounds having been dressed, he was brought back on men's shoulders to give his final orders, and was then informed that a detachment of eighty Theban hoplites, left behind by the rest, had taken refuge in the temple of Itonian Athênê as suppliants. From generosity mingled with respect to the sanctity of the spot, he commanded that they should be dismissed unhurt, and then proceeded to give directions for the night-watch, as it was already late. The field of battle presented a terrible spectacle; Spartan and Theban dead lying intermingled, some yet grasping their naked daggers, others pierced with the daggers of their enemies; around, on the blood-stained ground, were seen broken spears, smashed shields, swords and daggers scattered apart from their owners.[601] He directed the Spartan and Theban dead to be collected in separate heaps, and placed in safe custody for the night, in the interior of his phalanx; the troops then took their supper, and rested for the night. On the next morning, Gylis the Polemarch was ordered to draw up the army in battle-array, to erect a trophy, and to offer sacrifices of cheerfulness and thanksgiving, with the pipers solemnly playing, according to Spartan fashion. Agesilaus was anxious to make these demonstrations of victory as ostentatious as possible, because he really doubted whether he had gained a victory. It was very possible that the Thebans might feel confidence enough to renew the attack, and try to recover the field of battle, with their own dead upon it; which Agesilaus had, for that reason, caused to be collected in a separate heap and placed within the Lacedæmonian line.[602] He was, however, soon relieved from doubt by a herald coming from the Thebans to solicit the customary truce for the burial of their dead; the understood confession of defeat. The request was immediately granted; each party paid the last solemnities to its own dead, and the Spartan force was then withdrawn from Bœotia. Xenophon does not state the loss on either side, but Diodorus gives it at six hundred on the side of the confederates, three hundred and fifty on that of the Lacedæmonians.[603]

Disqualified as he was by his wounds for immediate action, Agesilaus caused himself to be carried to Delphi, where the Pythian games were at that moment going on. He here offered to Apollo the tithe of the booty acquired during his two years' campaigns in Asia; a tithe equal to one hundred talents.[604] Meanwhile the polemarch Gylis conducted the army first into Phokis, next on a predatory excursion into the Lokrian territory, where the nimble attack of the Lokrian light troops, amidst hilly ground, inflicted upon his troops a severe check, and cost him his life. After this the contingents in the army were dismissed to their respective homes, and Agesilaus himself, when tolerably recovered, sailed with the Peloponnesians homeward from Delphi across the Corinthian Gulf.[605] He was received at Sparta with every demonstration of esteem and gratitude, which was still farther strengthened by his exemplary simplicity and exact observance of the public discipline; an exactness not dimin-

ished either by long absence or enjoyment of uncontrolled ascendency. From this time forward he was the effective leader of Spartan policy, enjoying an influence greater than had ever fallen to the lot of any king before. His colleague, Agesipolis, both young and of feeble character, was won over by his judicious and conciliatory behavior, into the most respectful deference.[606]

Three great battles had thus been fought in the space of little more than a month (July and August)—those of Corinth, Knidus, and Korôneia; the first and third on land, the second at sea, as described in my last chapter. In each of the two land-battles the Lacedæmonians had gained a victory; they remained masters of the field, and were solicited by the enemy to grant the burial-truce. But if we inquire what results these victories had produced, the answer must be that both were totally barren. The position of Sparta in Greece as against her enemies had undergone no improvement. In the battle of Corinth, her soldiers had indeed manifested signal superiority, and acquired much honor. But at the field of Korôneia, the honor of the day was rather on the side of the Thebans, who broke through the most strenuous opposition, and carried their point of joining their allies. And the purpose of Agesilaus (ordered by the ephor Diphridas) to invade Bœotia, completely failed.[607] Instead of advancing, he withdrew from Korôneia, and returned to Peloponnesus across the gulf from Delphi; which he might have done just as well without fighting this murderous and hardly contested battle. Even the narrative of Xenophon, deeply colored as it is both by his sympathies and his antipathies, indicates to us that the predominant impression carried off by every one from the field of Korôneia was that of the tremendous force and obstinacy of the Theban hoplites,—a foretaste of what was to come at Leuktra!

If the two land-victories of Sparta were barren of results, the case was far otherwise with her naval defeat at Knidus. That defeat was pregnant with consequences following in rapid succession, and of the most disastrous character. As with Athens at Ægospotami,—the loss of her fleet, serious as that was, served only as the signal for countless following losses. Pharnabazus and Konon, with their victorious fleet, sailed from island to island, and from one continental seaport to another, in the Ægean, to expel the Lacedæmonian harmosts, and terminate the empire of Sparta. So universal was the odium which it had inspired, that the task was found easy beyond expectation. Conscious of their unpopularity, the harmosts in almost all the towns, on both sides of the Hellespont, deserted their posts and fled, on the mere news of the battle of Knidus.[608] Everywhere Pharnabazus and Konon found themselves received as liberators, and welcomed with presents of hospitality. They pledged themselves not to introduce any foreign force or governor, nor to fortify any separate citadel, but to guarantee to each city its own genuine autonomy. This policy was adopted by Pharnabazus at the urgent representation of Konon, who warned him that if he manifested any design of reducing the cities to subjection, he would find them all his enemies; that each of them severally would cost him a long siege; and that a combination

would ultimately be formed against him. Such liberal and judicious ideas, when seen to be sincerely acted upon, produced a strong feeling of friendship and even of gratitude, so that the Lacedæmonian maritime empire was dissolved without a blow, by the almost spontaneous movements of the cities themselves. Though the victorious fleet presented itself in many different places, it was nowhere called upon to put down resistance, or to undertake a single siege. Kos, Nisyra, Teos, Chios, Erythræ, Ephesus, Mitylênê, Samos, all declared themselves independent, under the protection of the new conquerors.[609] Pharnabazus presently disembarked at Ephesus and marched by land northward to his own satrapy; leaving a fleet of forty triremes under the command of Konon.

To this general burst of anti-Spartan feeling, Abydos, on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, formed the solitary exception. That town, steady in hostility to Athens, [610] had been the great military station of Sparta for her northern Asiatic warfare, during the last twenty years. It was in the satrapy of Pharnabazus, and had been made the chief place of arms by Derkyllidas and Agesilaus, for their warfare against that satrap as well as for the command of the strait. Accordingly, while it was a main object with Pharnabazus to acquire possession of Abydos,—there was nothing which the Abydenes dreaded so much as to become subject to him. In this view they were decidedly disposed to cling to Lacedæmonian protection; and it happened by a fortunate accident for Sparta, that the able and experienced Derkyllidas was harmost in the town at the moment of the battle of Knidus. Having fought in the battle of Corinth, he had been sent to announce the news to Agesilaus, whom he had met on his march at Amphipolis, and who had sent him forward into Asia to communicate the victory to the allied cities;[611] neither of them at that moment anticipating the great maritime defeat then impending. The presence in Abydos of such an officer, who had already acquired a high military reputation in that region, and was at marked enmity with Pharnabazus,—combined with the standing apprehensions of the Abydenes,—was now the means of saving a remnant at least of maritime ascendency to Sparta. During the general alarm which succeeded the battle of Knidus, when the harmosts were everywhere taking flight, and when anti-Spartan manifestations often combined with internal revolutions to overthrow the dekarchs or their substitutes, were spreading from city to city,—Derkyllidas assembled the Abydenes, heartened them up against the reigning contagion, and exhorted them to earn the gratitude of Sparta by remaining faithful to her while others were falling off; assuring them that she would still be found capable of giving them protection. His exhortations were listened to with favor. Abydos remained attached to Sparta, was put in a good state of defence, and became the only harbor of safety for the fugitive harmosts out of the other cities, Asiatic and European.

Having secured his hold upon Abydos, Derkyllidas crossed the strait to make sure also of the strong place of Sestos, on the European side, in the Thracian Chersonese. [612] In that fertile peninsula there had been many new settlers, who had come in

and acquired land under the Lacedæmonian supremacy, especially since the building of the cross-wall by Derkyllidas to defend the isthmus against Thracian invasion. By means of these settlers, dependent on Sparta for the security of their tenures,—and of the refugees from various cities all concentrated under his protection,—Derkyllidas maintained his position effectively both at Abydos and at Sestos; defying the requisition of Pharnabazus that he should forthwith evacuate them. The satrap threatened war, and actually ravaged the lands around Abydos,—but without any result. His wrath against the Lacedæmonians, already considerable, was so aggravated by disappointment when he found that he could not yet expel them from his satrapy, that he resolved to act against them with increased energy, and even to strike a blow at them near their own home. For this purpose he transmitted orders to Konon to prepare a commanding naval force for the ensuing spring, and in the mean time to keep both Abydos and Sestos under blockade.[613]

As soon as spring arrived, Pharnabazus embarked on board a powerful fleet equipped by Konon; directing his course to Melos, to various islands among the Cyclades, and lastly to the coast of Peloponnesus. They here spent some time on the coast of Laconia and Messenia, disembarking at several points to ravage the country. They next landed on the island of Kythêra, which they captured, granting safe retirement to the Lacedæmonian garrison, and leaving in the island a garrison under the Athenian Nikophêmus. Quitting then the harborless, dangerous, and ill-provided coast of Laconia, they sailed up the Saronic gulf to the isthmus of Corinth. Here they found the confederates,—Corinthian, Bœotian, Athenian, etc., carrying on war with Corinth as their central post, against the Lacedæmonians at Sikyon. The line across the isthmus from Lechæum to Kenchreæ (the two ports of Corinth) was now made good by a defensive system of operations, so as to confine the Lacedæmonians within Peloponnesus; just as Athens, prior to her great losses in 446 B.C., while possessing both Megara and Pegæ, had been able to maintain the inland road midway between them, where it crosses the high and difficult crest of Mount Geraneia, thus occupying the only three roads by which a Lacedæmonian army could march from the isthmus of Corinth into Attica or Bœotia.[614] Pharnabazus communicated in the most friendly manner with the allies, assured them of his strenuous support against Sparta, and left with them a considerable sum of money.[615]

The appearance of a Persian satrap with a Persian fleet, as master of the Peloponnesian sea and the Saronic Gulf, was a phenomenon astounding to Grecian eyes. And if it was not equally offensive to Grecian sentiment, this was in itself a melancholy proof of the degree to which Pan-hellenic patriotism had been stifled by the Peloponnesian war and the Spartan empire. No Persian tiara had been seen near the Saronic Gulf since the battle of Salamis; nor could anything short of the intense personal wrath of Pharnabazus against the Lacedæmonians, and his desire to revenge upon them the damage inflicted by Derkyllidas and Agesilaus, have brought him now

so far away from his own satrapy. It was this wrathful feeling of which Konon took advantage to procure from him a still more important boon.

Since 404 B.C., a space of eleven years, Athens had continued without any walls around her seaport town Peiræus, and without any Long Walls to connect her city with Peiræus. To this state she had been condemned by the sentence of her enemies, in the full knowledge that she could have little trade,—few ships either armed or mercantile,—poor defence even against pirates, and no defence at all against aggression from the mistress of the sea. Konon now entreated Pharnabazus, who was about to go home, to leave the fleet under his command, and to permit him to use it in rebuilding the fortifications of Peiræus as well as the Long Walls of Athens. While he engaged to maintain the fleet by contributions from the islands, he assured the satrap that no blow could be inflicted upon Sparta so destructive or so mortifying, as the renovation of Athens and Peiræus with their complete and connected fortifications. Sparta would thus be deprived of the most important harvest which she had reaped from the long struggle of the Peloponnesian war. Indignant as he now was against the Lacedæmonians, Pharnabazus sympathized cordially with these plans, and on departing not only left the fleet under the command of Konon, but also furnished him with a considerable sum of money towards the expense of the fortifications.[616]

Konon betook himself to the work energetically and without delay. He had quitted Athens in 407 B.C., as one of the joint admirals nominated after the disgrace of Alkibiades. He had parted with his countrymen finally at the catastrophe of Ægospotami in 405 B.C., preserving the miserable fraction of eight or nine ships out of that noble fleet which otherwise would have passed entire into the hands of Lysander. He now returned, in 393 B.C., as a second Themistokles, the deliverer of his country, and the restorer of her lost strength and independence. All hands were set to work; carpenters and masons being hired with the funds furnished by Pharnabazus, to complete the fortifications as quickly as possible. The Bœotians and other neighbors lent their aid zealously as volunteers,[617]—the same who eleven years before had danced to the sound of joyful music when the former walls were demolished; so completely had the feelings of Greece altered since that period. By such hearty coöperation the work was finished during the course of the present summer and autumn without any opposition; and Athens enjoyed again her fortified Peiræus and harbor, with a pair of Long Walls, straight and parallel, joining it securely to the city. The third, or Phalêric Wall (a single wall stretching from Athens to Phalêrum), which had existed down to the capture of the city by Lysander, was not restored; nor was it indeed by any means necessary to the security either of the city or of the port. Having thus given renewed life and security to Peiræus, Konon commemorated his great naval victory by a golden wreath in the acropolis, as well as by the erection of a temple in Peiræus to the honor of the Knidian Aphroditê, who was worshipped at Knidus with peculiar devotion by the local population.[618] He farther celebrated the completion of the

walls by a splendid sacrifice and festival banquet. And the Athenian people not only inscribed on a pillar a public vote gratefully recording the exploits of Konon, but also erected a statue to his honor.[619]

The importance of this event in reference to the future history of Athens was unspeakable. Though it did not restore to her either her former navy, or her former empire, it reconstituted her as a city, not only self-determining, but even partially ascendant. It reanimated her, if not into the Athens of Perikles, at least into that of Isokrates and Demosthenes; it imparted to her a second fill of strength, dignity, and commercial importance, during the half century destined to elapse before she was finally overwhelmed by the superior military force of Macedon. Those who recollect the extraordinary stratagem whereby Themistokles had contrived (eighty-five years before) to accomplish the fortification of Athens, in spite of the base but formidable jealousy of Sparta and her Peloponnesian allies, will be aware how much the consummation of the Themistoklean project had depended upon accident. Now, also, Konon in his restoration was favored by unusual combinations, such as no one could have predicted. That Pharnabazus should conceive the idea of coming over himself to Peloponnesus with a fleet of the largest force, was a most unexpected contingency. He was influenced neither by attachment to Athens, nor seemingly by considerations of policy, though the proceeding was one really conducive to the interests of Persian power,—but simply by his own violent personal wrath against the Lacedæmonians. And this wrath probably would have been satisfied, if, after the battle of Knidus, he could have cleared his own satrapy of them completely. It was his vehement impatience, when he found himself unable to expel his old enemy, Derkyllidas, from the important position of Abydos, which chiefly spurred him on to take revenge on Sparta in her own waters. Nothing less than the satrap's personal presence would have placed at the disposal of Konon either a sufficient naval force, or sufficient funds for the erection of the new walls, and the defiance of all impediment from Sparta. So strangely did events thus run, that the energy, by which Derkyllidas preserved Abydos, brought upon Sparta, indirectly, the greater mischief of the new Kononian walls. It would have been better for Sparta that Pharnabazus should at once have recovered Abydos as well as the rest of his satrapy; in which case he would have had no wrongs remaining unavenged to incense him, and would have kept on his own side of the Ægean; feeding Konon with a modest squadron sufficient to keep the Lacedæmonian navy from again becoming formidable on the Asiatic side, but leaving the walls of Peiræus (if we may borrow an expression of Plato) "to continue asleep in the bosom of the earth."[620]

But the presence of Konon with his powerful fleet was not the only condition indispensable to the accomplishment of this work. It was requisite further, that the interposition of Sparta should be kept off, not merely by sea, but by land, and that, too, during all the number of months that the walls were in progress. Now the barrier against her on land was constituted by the fact, that the confederate force held

the cross line within the isthmus from Lechæum to Kenchreæ, with Corinth as a centre.[621] But they were unable to sustain this line even through the ensuing year,—during which Sparta, aided by dissensions at Corinth, broke through it, as will appear in the next chapter. Had she been able to break through it while the fortifications of Athens were yet incomplete, she would have deemed no effort too great to effect an entrance into Attica and interrupt the work, in which she might very probably have succeeded. Here, then, was the second condition, which was realized during the summer and autumn of 393 B.C., but which did not continue to be realized longer. So fortunate was it for Athens, that the two conditions were fulfilled both together during this particular year!

CHAPTER LXXV.

FROM THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS TO THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS.

THE presence of Pharnabazus and Konon with their commanding force in the Saronic Gulf, and the liberality with which the former furnished pecuniary aid to the latter for rebuilding the full fortifications of Athens, as well as to the Corinthians for the prosecution of the war,—seem to have given preponderance to the confederates over Sparta for that year. The plans of Konon[622] were extensive. He was the first to organize for the defence of Corinth, a mercenary force which was afterwards improved and conducted with greater efficiency by Iphikrates; and after he had finished the fortifications of Peiræus with the Long Walls, he employed himself in showing his force among the islands, for the purpose of laying the foundations of renewed maritime power for Athens. We even hear that he caused an Athenian envoy to be despatched to Dionysius at Syracuse, with the view of detaching that despot from Sparta, and bringing him into connection with Athens. Evagoras, despot of Salamis in Cyprus, the steady friend of Konon, was a party to this proposition, which he sought to strengthen by offering to Dionysius his sister in marriage.[623] There was a basis of sympathy between them arising from the fact that Evagoras was at variance with the Phœnicians both in Phœnicia and Cyprus, while Dionysius was in active hostilities with the Carthaginians (their kinsmen and Colonists) in Sicily. Nevertheless, the proposition met with little or no success. We find Dionysius afterwards still continuing to act as an ally of Sparta.

Profiting by the aid received from Pharnabazus, the Corinthians strengthened their fleet at Lechæum (their harbor in the Corinthian Gulf) so considerably, as to become masters of the Gulf, and to occupy Rhium, one of the two opposite capes which bound its narrow entrance. To oppose them, the Lacedæmonians on their side were driven to greater maritime effort. More than one naval action seems to have taken place, in those waters where the prowess and skill of the Athenian admiral Phormion had been so signally displayed at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. At length the Lacedæmonian admiral Herippidas, who succeeded to the command of the fleet after his predecessor Polemarchus had been slain in battle, compelled the Corinthians to abandon Rhium, and gradually recovered his ascendency in the Corinthian Gulf; which his successor Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus, still farther completed.[624]

While these transactions were going on (seemingly during the last half of 393 B.C. and the full year of 392 B.C.), so as to put an end to the temporary naval preponderance of the Corinthians,—the latter were at the same time bearing the brunt of a desultory, but continued, land-warfare against the garrison of Lacedæmonians and

Peloponnesians established at Sikyon. Both Corinth and Lechæum were partly defended by the presence of confederate troops, Bœotians, Argeians, Athenians, or mercenaries paid by Athens. But this did not protect the Corinthians against suffering great damage, in their lands and outlying properties, from the incursions of the enemy.

The plain between Corinth and Sikyon,—fertile and extensive (speaking by comparison with Peloponnesus generally), and constituting a large part of the landed property of both cities, was rendered uncultivable during 393 and 392 B.C.; so that the Corinthian proprietors were obliged to withdraw their servants and cattle to Peiræum[625] (a portion of the Corinthian territory without the Isthmus properly so called, north-east of the Akrokorinthus, in a line between that eminence and the Megarian harbor of Pegæ). Here the Sikyonian assailants could not reach them, because of the Long Walls of Corinth, which connected that city by a continuous fortification of twelve stadia (somewhat less than a mile and a half) with its harbor of Lechæum. Nevertheless, the loss to the proprietors of the deserted plain was still so great, that two successive seasons of it were quite enough to inspire them with a strong aversion to the war;[626] the more so, as the damage fell exclusively upon them—their allies in Bœotia, Athens, and Argos, having as yet suffered nothing. Constant military service for defence, with the conversion of the city into a sort of besieged post, aggravated their discomfort. There was another circumstance also, doubtless not without influence. The consequences of the battle of Knidus had been, first, to put down the maritime empire of Sparta, and thus to diminish the fear which she inspired to the Corinthians; next, to rebuild the fortifications, and renovate the shipping, commercial as well as warlike, of Athens;—a revival well calculated to bring back a portion of that anti-Athenian jealousy and apprehension which the Corinthians had felt so strongly a few years before. Perhaps some of the trade at Corinth may have been actually driven away by the disturbance of the war, to the renewed fortifications and greater security of Peiræus.

Fostered by this pressure of circumstances, the discontented philo-Laconian or peace-party which had always existed at Corinth, presently acquired sufficient strength, and manifested itself with sufficient publicity to give much alarm to the government. The Corinthian government had always been, and still was, oligarchical. In what manner the administrators or the council were renovated, or how long individuals continued in office, indeed, we do not know. But of democracy, with its legal, popular assemblies, open discussions and authoritative resolves, there was nothing. [627] Now the oligarchical persons actually in power were vehemently anti-Laconian, consisting of men who had partaken of the Persian funds and contracted alliance with Persia, besides compromising themselves irrevocably (like Timolaus) by the most bitter manifestations of hostile sentiment towards Sparta. These men found themselves menaced by a powerful opposition party, which had no constitutional means for making its sentiments predominant, and for accomplishing peaceably ei-

ther a change of administrators or a change of public policy. It was only by an appeal to arms and violence that such a consummation could be brought about; a fact notorious to both parties,—so that the oligarchical administrators, informed of the meetings and conversations going on, knew well that they had to expect nothing less than the breaking out of a conspiracy. That such anticipations were well-founded, we gather even from the partial recital of Xenophon; who states that Pasimêlus, the philo-Laconian leader, was on his guard and in preparation,[628]—and counts it to him as a virtue that shortly afterwards he opened the gates to the Lacedæmonians.

Anticipating such conspiracy, the government resolved to prevent it by a *coup d'état*. They threw themselves upon the assistance of their allies, invited in a body of Argeians, and made their blow the more sure by striking it on the last day of the festival called Eukleia, when it was least expected. Their proceeding, though dictated by precaution, was executed with the extreme of brutal ferocity aggravated by sacrilege; in a manner very different from the deep-laid artifices recently practised by the Spartan ephors when they were in like manner afraid of the conspiracy of Kinadon,—and more like the oligarchical conspirators at Korkyra (in the third year of the Peloponnesian war) when they broke into the assembled Senate, and massacred Peithias, with sixty others in the senate-house.[629] While the choice performers at Corinth were contending for the prize in the theatre, with judges formally named to decide,—and while the market-place around was crowded with festive spectators,—a number of armed men were introduced, probably Argeians, with leaders designating the victims whom they were to strike. Some of these select victims were massacred in the market-place, others in the theatre, and one even while sitting as a judge in the theatre. Others again fled in terror to embrace the altars or statues in the market-place,—which sanctuary, nevertheless, did not save their lives. Nor was such sacrilege arrested,—repugnant as it was to the feelings of the assembled spectators and to Grecian feelings generally,—until one hundred and twenty persons had perished. [630] But the persons slain were chiefly elderly men; for the younger portion of the philo-Laconian party, suspecting some mischief, had declined attending the festival, and kept themselves separately assembled under their leader Pasimêlus in the gymnasium and cyprus-grove called Kranium, just without the city-gates. We find, too, that they were not only assembled, but actually in arms. For the moment that they heard the clamor in the market-place, and learned from some fugitives what was going on, they rushed up at once to the Akrokorinthus (or eminence and acropolis overhanging the city) and got possession of the citadel,—which they maintained with such force and courage that the Argeians and the Corinthians, who took part with the government, were repulsed in the attempt to dislodge them. This circumstance, indirectly revealed in the one-sided narrative of Xenophon, lets us into the real state of the city, and affords good ground for believing that Pasimêlus and his friends were prepared beforehand for an armed outbreak, but waited to execute it, until the festival was over,—a scruple which the government, in their eagerness to forestall the

plot, disregarded,—employing the hands and weapons of Argeians who were comparatively unimpressed by solemnities peculiar to Corinth.[631]

Though Pasimêlus and his friends were masters of the citadel, and had repulsed the assault of their enemies, yet the *coup d'état* had been completely successful in overawing their party in the city, and depriving them of all means of communicating with the Lacedæmonians at Sikyon. Feeling unable to maintain themselves, they were besides frightened by menacing omens, when they came to offer sacrifice, in order that they might learn whether the gods encouraged them to fight or not. The victims were found so alarming, as to drive them to evacuate the post and prepare for voluntary exile. Many of them (according to Diodorus five hundred)[632] actually went into exile; while others, and among them Pasimêlus himself, were restrained by the entreaties of their friends and relatives, combined with solemn assurances of peace and security from the government; who now, probably, felt themselves victorious, and were anxious to mitigate the antipathies which their recent violence had inspired. These pacific assurances were faithfully kept, and no farther mischief was done to any citizen.

But the political condition of Corinth was materially altered, by an extreme intimacy of alliance and communion now formed with Argos; perhaps combined with reciprocal rights of intermarriage, and of purchase and sale. The boundary pillars or hedges which separated the two territories, were pulled up, and the city was entitled *Argos* instead of *Corinth* (says Xenophon); such was probably the invidious phrase in which the opposition party described the very close political union now formed between the two cities; upheld by a strong Argeian force in the city and acropolis, together with some Athenian mercenaries under Iphikrates, and some Bœotians as a garrison in the port of Lechæum. Most probably the government remained still Corinthian, and still oligarchical, as before. But it now rested upon Argeian aid, and was therefore dependent chiefly upon Argos, though partly also upon the other two allies.

To Pasimêlus and his friends such a state of things was intolerable. Though personally they had no ill-usage to complain of, yet the complete predominance of their political enemies was quite sufficient to excite their most vehement antipathies. They entered into secret correspondence with Praxitas, the Lacedæmonian commander at Sikyon, engaging to betray to him one of the gates in the western Long Wall between Corinth and Lechæum. The scheme being concerted, Pasimêlus and his partisans got themselves placed,[633] partly by contrivance and partly by accident, on the night-watch at this gate; an imprudence, which shows that the government not only did not maltreat them, but even admitted them to trust. At the moment fixed, Praxitas,—presenting himself with a Lacedæmonian *mora* or regiment, a Sikyonian force, and the Corinthian exiles,—found the treacherous sentinels prepared to open the gates. Having first sent in a trusty soldier to satisfy him that there was no deceit,[634] he then conducted all his force within the gates, into the mid-space between the two

Long Walls. So broad was this space, and so inadequate did his numbers appear to maintain it, that he took the precaution of digging a cross-ditch with a palisade to defend himself on the side towards the city; which he was enabled to do undisturbed, since the enemy (we are not told why) did not attack him all the next day. On the ensuing day, however, Argeians, Corinthians, and Athenian mercenaries under Iphikrates, all came down from the city in full force; the latter stood on the right of the line, along the eastern wall, opposed to the Corinthian exiles on the Lacedæmonian left; while the Lacedæmonians themselves were on their own right, opposed to the Corinthians from the city; and the Argeians, opposed to the Sikyonians, in the centre.

It was here that the battle began; the Argeians, bold from superior numbers, attacked and broke the Sikyonians, tearing up the palisade, and pursuing them down to the sea with much slaughter;[635] upon which Pasimachus the Lacedæmonian commander of cavalry, coming to their aid, caused his small body of horsemen to dismount and tie their horses to trees, and then armed them with shields taken from the Sikyonians, inscribed on the outside with the letter Sigma (Σ). With these he approached on foot to attack the Argeians, who, mistaking them for Sikyonians, rushed to the charge with alacrity; upon which Pasimachus exclaimed,—"By the two gods, Argeians, these Sigmas which you see here will deceive you;" he then closed with them resolutely, but his number was so inferior that he was soon overpowered and slain. Meanwhile, the Corinthian exiles on the left had driven back Iphikrates with his mercenaries (doubtless chiefly light troops) and pursued them even to the city gates; while the Lacedæmonians, easily repelling the Corinthians opposed to them, came out of their palisade, and planted themselves with their faces towards the eastern wall, but at a little distance from it, to intercept the Argeians on their return. The latter were forced to run back as they could, huddling close along the eastern wall, with their right or unshielded side exposed, as they passed, to the spears of the Lacedæmonians. Before they could get to the walls of Corinth, they were met and roughly handled by the victorious Corinthian exiles. And even when they came to the walls, those within, unwilling to throw open the gates for fear of admitting the enemy, contented themselves with handing down ladders, over which the defeated Argeians clambered with distress and difficulty. Altogether, their loss in this disastrous retreat was frightful. Their dead (says Xenophon) lay piled up like heaps of stones or wood. [636]

This victory of Praxitas and the Lacedæmonians, though it did not yet make them masters of Lechæum,[637] was, nevertheless, of considerable importance. Shortly afterwards they received reinforcements which enabled them to turn it to still better account. The first measure of Praxitas was to pull down a considerable breadth of the two walls, leaving a breach which opened a free passage for any Lacedæmonian army from Sikyon to reach and pass the isthmus. He then marched his troops through the breach, forward on the road to Megara, capturing the two Corinthian de-

pendencies of Krommyon and Sidus on the Saronic gulf, in which he placed garrisons. Returning back by the road south of Corinth, he occupied Epieikia on the frontier of Epidaurus, as a protection to the territory of the latter against incursions from Corinth,—and then disbanded his army.

A desultory warfare was carried on during the ensuing winter and spring between the opposite garrisons in Corinth and Sikyon. It was now that the Athenian Iphikrates, in the former place, began to distinguish himself at the head of his mercenary peltasts whom, after their first organization by Konon, he had trained to effective tactics under the strictest discipline, and whose movements he conducted with consummate skill. His genius introduced improvements both in their armor and in their clothing. He lengthened by one half both the light javelin and the short sword, which the Thracian peltasts habitually carried; he devised a species of leggings, known afterwards by the name of Iphikratides; and he thus combined, better than had ever been done before, rapid motion,—power of acting in difficult ground and open order,—effective attack, either by missiles or hand to hand, and dexterous retreat in case of need.[638] As yet, he was but a young officer, in the beginning of his military career.[639] We must therefore presume that these improvements were chiefly of later date, the suggestions of his personal experience; but even now, the successes of his light troops were remarkable. Attacking Phlius, he entrapped the Phliasians into an ambuscade, and inflicted on them a defeat so destructive that they were obliged to invoke the aid of a Lacedæmonian garrison for the protection of their city. He gained a victory near Sikyon, and carried his incursions over all Arcadia, to the very gates of the cities; damaging the Arcadian hoplites so severely, that they became afraid to meet him in the field. His own peltasts, however, though full of confidence against these Peloponnesian hoplites, still retained their awe and their reluctance to fight against Lacedæmonians;[640] who, on their side, despised them, but despised their own allies still more. "Our friends fear these peltasts, as children fear hobgoblins,"—said the Lacedæmonians, sarcastically, endeavoring to set the example of courage by ostentatious demonstrations of their own around the walls of Corinth. [641]

The breach made in the Long Walls of Corinth by Praxitas had laid open the road for a Peloponnesian army to march either into Attica or Bœotia.[642] Fortunately for the Athenians, they had already completed the rebuilding of their own Long Walls; but they were so much alarmed by the new danger, that they marched with their full force, and with masons and carpenters accompanying,[643] to Corinth. Here, with that celerity of work for which they were distinguished,[644] they in a few days reëstablished completely the western wall; the more important of the two, since it formed the barrier against the incursions of the Lacedæmonians from Sikyon. They had then a secure position, and could finish the eastern wall at their leisure; which they accordingly did, and then retired, leaving it to the confederate troops in Corinth to defend.

This advantage, however,—a very material one,—was again overthrown by the expedition of the Lacedæmonian king, Agesilaus, during the same summer. At the head of a full Lacedæmonian and Peloponnesian force, he first marched into the territory of Argos, and there spent some time in ravaging all the cultivated plain. From hence he passed over the mountain-road, by Tenea,[645] into the plain of Corinth, to the foot of the newly-repaired Long Walls. Here his brother Teleutias, who had recently superseded Herippidas as admiral in the Corinthian Gulf, came to coöperate with him in a joint attack, by sea and land, on the new walls and on Lechæum.[646] The presence of this naval force rendered the Long Walls difficult to maintain, since troops could be disembarked in the interval between them, where the Sikyonians in the previous battle had been beaten and pursued down to the sea. Agesilaus and Teleutias were strong enough to defeat the joint force of the four confederated armies, and to master not only the Long Walls, but also the port of Lechæum,[647] with its docks, and the ships within them; thus breaking up the naval power of Corinth in the Krissæan Gulf. Lechæum now became a permanent post of hostility against Corinth, occupied by a Lacedæmonian garrison, and occasionally by the Corinthian exiles, while any second rebuilding of the Corinthian Long Walls by the Athenians became impossible. After this important success, Agesilaus returned to Sparta. Neither he nor his Lacedæmonian hoplites, especially the Amyklæans, were ever willingly absent from the festival of the Hyakinthia; nor did he now disdain to take his station in the chorus,[648] under the orders of the choric conductor, for the pæan in honor of Apollo.

It was thus that the Long Walls, though rebuilt by the Athenians in the preceding year, were again permanently overthrown, and the road for Lacedæmonian armies to march beyond the isthmus once more laid open. So much were the Athenians and the Bœotians alarmed at this new success, that both appear to have become desirous of peace, and to have sent envoys to Sparta. The Thebans are said to have offered to recognize Orchomenus (which was now occupied by a Lacedæmonian garrison) as autonomous and disconnected from the Bœotian federation; while the Athenian envoys seem to have been favorably received at Sparta, and to have found the Lacedæmonians disposed to make peace on better terms than those which had been proposed during the late discussions with Tiribazus (hereafter to be noticed;) recognizing the newly built Athenian walls, restoring Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros to Athens, and guaranteeing autonomy to each separate city in the Grecian world. The Athenian envoys at Sparta having provisionally accepted these terms, forty days were allowed for reference to the people of Athens; to which place Lacedæmonian envoys were sent as formal bearers of the propositions. The Argeians and Corinthians, however, strenuously opposed the thoughts of peace, urging the Athenians to continue the war; besides which, it appears that many Athenian citizens thought that large restitution ought to have been made of Athenian property forfeited at the end of the late war, and that the Thracian Chersonese ought to have been given back as well as the three islands. On these and other grounds, the Athenian people refused

to sanction the recommendation of their envoys; though Andokides, one of those envoys, in a discourse still extant, earnestly advised that they should accept the peace. [649]

The war being thus continued, Corinth, though defended by a considerable confederate force, including Athenian hoplites under Kallias, and peltasts under Iphikrates, became much pressed by the hostile posts at Lechæum as well as at Krommyon and Sidus,—and by its own exiles as the most active of all enemies. Still, however, there remained the peninsula and the fortification of Peiræum as an undisturbed shelter for the Corinthian servants and cattle, and a source of subsistence for the city. Peiræum was an inland post north-east of Corinth, in the centre of that peninsula which separates the two innermost recesses of the Krissæan Gulf,—the bay of Lechæum on its south-west, the bay called Alkyonis, between Kreusis and Olmiæ (now Psatho Bay), on its north-east. Across this latter bay Corinth communicated easily, through Peiræum and the fortified port of Œnoê, with Kreusis the port of Thespiæ in Bœotia.[650] The Corinthian exiles now prevailed upon Agesilaus to repeat his invasion of the territory, partly in order that they might deprive the city of the benefits which it derived from Peiræum,—partly in order that they might also appropriate to themselves the honor of celebrating the Isthmian games, which were just approaching. The Spartan king accordingly marched forth, at the head of a force composed of Lacedæmonians and of the Peloponnesian allies, first to Lechæum, and thence to the Isthmus, specially so called; that is, the sacred precinct of Poseidon near Schœnus on the Saronic Gulf, at the narrowest breadth of the Isthmus, where the biennial Isthmian festival was celebrated.

It was the month of April, or beginning of May, and the festival had actually begun, under the presidency of the Corinthians from the city who were in alliance with Argos; a body of Argeians being present as guards.[651] But on the approach of Agesilaus, they immediately retired to the city by the road to Kenchreæ, leaving their sacrifices half-finished. Not thinking fit to disturb their retreat, Agesilaus proceeded first to offer sacrifice himself, and then took a position close at hand, in the sacred ground of Poseidon, while the Corinthian exiles went through the solemnities in due form, and distributed the parsley wreaths to the victors. After remaining three days, Agesilaus marched away to attack Peiræum. He had no sooner departed, than the Corinthians from the city came forth, celebrated the festival and distributed the wreaths a second time.

Peiræum was occupied by so numerous a guard, comprising Iphikrates and his peltasts, that Agesilaus, instead of directly attacking it, resorted to the stratagem of making a sudden retrograde march directly towards Corinth. Probably, many of the citizens were at that moment absent for the second celebration of the festival; so that those remaining within, on hearing of the approach of Agesilaus, apprehended a plot to betray the city to him, and sent in haste to Peiræum to summon back Iphikrates with his peltasts. Having learned that these troops had passed by in the

night, Agesilaus forthwith again turned his course and marched back to Peiræum, which he himself approached by the ordinary road, coasting round along the bay of Lechæum, near the Therma, or warm springs, which are still discernible;[652] while he sent a mora or division of troops to get round the place by a mountain-road more in the interior, ascending some woody heights commanding the town, and crowned by a temple of Poseidon.[653] The movement was quite effectual. The garrison and inhabitants of Peiræum, seeing that the place had become indefensible, abandoned it the next day with all their cattle and property, to take refuge in the Heræum, or sacred ground of Hêrê Akræa near the western cape of the peninsula. While Agesilaus marched thither towards the coast in pursuit of them, the troops descending from the heights attacked and captured Œnoê,[654]—the Corinthian town of that name situated near the Alkyonian bay over against Kreusis in Bœotia. A large booty here fell into their hands, which was still farther augmented by the speedy surrender of all in the Heræum to Agesilaus, without conditions. Called upon to determine the fate of the prisoners, among whom were included men, women, and children,—freemen and slaves,—with cattle and other property,—Agesilaus ordered that all those who had taken part in the massacre at Corinth, in the market-place, should be handed over to the vengeance of the exiles; and that all the rest should be sold as slaves.[655] Though he did not here inflict any harder measure than was usual in Grecian warfare, the reader who reflects that this sentence, pronounced by one on the whole more generous than most contemporary commanders, condemned numbers of free Corinthian men and women to a life of degradation, if not of misery,—will understand by contrast the encomiums with which in my last volume I set forth the magnanimity of Kallikratidas after the capture of Methymna; when he refused, in spite of the importunity of his allies, to sell either the Methymnæan or the Athenian captives,—and when he proclaimed the exalted principle, that no free Greek should be sold into slavery by any permission of his.[656]

As the Lacedæmonians had been before masters of Lechæum, Krommyon, and Sidus, this last success shut up Corinth on its other side, and cut off its communication with Bœotia. The city not being in condition to hold out much longer, the exiles already began to lay their plans for surprising it by aid of friends within.[657] So triumphant was the position of Agesilaus, that his enemies were all in alarm, and the Thebans, as well as others, sent fresh envoys to him to solicit peace. His antipathy towards the Thebans was so vehement, that it was a great personal satisfaction to him to see them thus humiliated. He even treated their envoys with marked contempt, affecting not to notice them when they stood close by, though Pharax, the proxenus of Thebes at Sparta, was preparing to introduce them.

Absorbed in this overweening pride and exultation over conquered enemies, Agesilaus was sitting in a round pavilion, on the banks of the lake adjoining the Heræum,[658]—with his eyes fixed on the long train of captives brought out under the guard of armed Lacedæmonian hoplites, themselves the object of admiration to

a crowd of spectators,[659]—when news arrived, as if under the special intervention of retributive Nemesis, which changed unexpectedly the prospect of affairs.[660] A horseman was seen galloping up, his horse foaming with sweat. To the many inquiries addressed, he returned no answer, nor did he stop until he sprang from his horse at the feet of Agesilaus; to whom, with sorrowful tone and features, he made his communication. Immediately Agesilaus started up, seized his spear, and desired the herald to summon his principal officers. On their coming near, he directed them, together with the guards around, to accompany him without a moment's delay; leaving orders with the general body of the troops to follow as soon as they should have snatched some rapid refreshment. He then immediately put himself in march; but he had not gone far when three fresh horsemen met and informed him, that the task which he was hastening to perform had already been accomplished. Upon this he ordered a halt and returned to the Heræum; where on the ensuing day, to countervail the bad news, he sold all his captives by auction.[661]

This bad news,—the arrival of which has been so graphically described by Xenophon, himself probably among the bystanders and companions of Agesilaus,—was nothing less than the defeat and destruction of a Lacedæmonian *mora* or military division by the light troops under Iphikrates. As it was an understood privilege of the Amyklæan hoplites in the Lacedæmonian army always to go home, even when on actual service, to the festival of the Hyakinthia, Agesilaus had left all of them at Lechæum. The festival day being now at hand, they set off to return. But the road from Lechæum to Sikyon lay immediately under the walls of Corinth, so that their march was not safe without an escort. Accordingly the polemarch commanding at Lechæum, leaving that place for the time under watch by the Peloponnesian allies, put himself at the head of the Lacedæmonian *mora* which formed the habitual garrison, consisting of six hundred hoplites, and of a *mora* of cavalry (number unknown)—to protect the Amyklæans until they were out of danger from the enemy at Corinth. Having passed by Corinth, and reached a point within about three miles of the friendly town of Sikyon, he thought the danger over, and turned back with his *mora* of hoplites to Lechæum; still, however, leaving the officer of cavalry with orders to accompany the Amyklæans as much farther as they might choose, and afterwards to follow him on the return march.[662]

Though the Amyklæans (probably not very numerous) were presumed to be in danger of attack from Corinth in their march, and though the force in that town was known to be considerable, it never occurred to the Lacedæmonian polemarch that there was any similar danger for his own *mora* of six hundred hoplites; so contemptuous was his estimate of the peltasts, and so strong was the apprehension which these peltasts were known to entertain of the Lacedæmonians. But Iphikrates, who had let the whole body march by undisturbed, when he now saw from the walls of Corinth the six hundred hoplites returning separately, without either cavalry or light troops, conceived the idea,—perhaps, in the existing state of men's minds, no one

else would have conceived it,—of attacking them with his peltasts as they repassed near the town. Kallias, the general of the Athenian hoplites in Corinth, warmly seconding the project, marched out his troops, and arrayed them in battle order not far from the gates; while Iphikrates with his peltasts began his attack upon the Lacedæmonian *mora* in flanks and rear. Approaching within missile distance, he poured upon them a shower of darts and arrows, which killed or wounded several, especially on the unshielded side. Upon this the polemarch ordered a halt, directed the youngest soldiers to drive off the assailants, and confided the wounded to the care of attendants to be carried forward to Lechæum.[663] But even the youngest soldiers, encumbered by their heavy shields, could not reach their nimbler enemies, who were trained to recede before them. And when, after an unavailing pursuit, they sought to resume their places in the ranks, the attack was renewed, so that nine or ten of them were slain before they could get back. Again did the polemarch give orders to march forward; again the peltasts renewed their attack, forcing him to halt; again he ordered the younger soldiers (this time, all those between eighteen and thirty-three years of age, whereas on the former occasion, it had been those between eighteen and twenty-eight) to rush out and drive them off.[664] But the result was just the same: the pursuers accomplished nothing, and only suffered increased loss of their bravest and most forward soldiers, when they tried to rejoin the main body. Whenever the Lacedæmonians attempted to make progress, these circumstances were again repeated, to their great loss and discouragement; while the peltasts became every moment more confident and vigorous.

Some relief was now afforded to the distressed *mora* by the coming up of their cavalry, which had finished the escort of the Amyklæans. Had this cavalry been with them at the beginning, the result might have been different; but it was now insufficient to repress the animated assaults of the peltasts. Moreover, the Lacedæmonian horsemen were at no time very good, nor did they on this occasion venture to push their pursuit to a greater range than the younger hoplites could keep up with them. At length, after much loss in killed and wounded, and great distress to all, the polemarch contrived to get his detachment as far as an eminence about a quarter of a mile from the sea and about two miles from Lechæum. Here, while Iphikrates still continued to harass them with his peltasts, Kallias also was marching up with his hoplites to charge them hand to hand,—when the Lacedæmonians, enfeebled in numbers, exhausted in strength, and too much dispirited for close fight with a new enemy, broke and fled in all directions. Some took the road to Lechæum, which place a few of them reached, along with the cavalry; the rest ran towards the sea at the nearest point, and observing that some of their friends were rowing in boats from Lechæum along the shore to rescue them, threw themselves into the sea, to wade or swim towards this new succor. But the active peltasts, irresistible in the pursuit of broken hoplites, put the last hand to the destruction of the unfortunate *mora*. Out of its full muster of six hundred, a very small proportion survived to reënter Lechæum.[665]

The horseman who first communicated the disaster to Agesilaus, had started off express immediately from Lechæum, even before the bodies of the slain had been picked up for burial. The hurried movement of Agesilaus had been dictated by the desire of reaching the field in time to contend for the possession of the bodies, and to escape the shame of soliciting the burial-truce. But the three horsemen who met him afterwards, arrested his course by informing him that the bodies had already been buried, under truce asked and obtained; which authorized Iphikrates to erect his well-earned trophy on the spot where he had first made the attack.[666]

Such a destruction of an entire division of Lacedæmonian hoplites, by light troops who stood in awe of them and whom they despised, was an incident, not indeed of great political importance, but striking in respect of military effect and impression upon the Grecian mind. Nothing at all like it had occurred since the memorable capture of Sphakteria, thirty-five years before; a disaster less considerable in one respect, that the number of hoplites beaten was inferior by one-third,—but far more important in another respect, that half the division had surrendered as prisoners; whereas in the battle near Corinth, though the whole mora (except a few fugitives) perished, it does not seem that a single prisoner was taken. Upon the Corinthians, Bœotians, and other enemies of Sparta, the event operated as a joyous encouragement, reviving them out of all their previous despondency. Even by the allies of Sparta, jealous of her superiority and bound to her by fear more than by attachment, it was welcomed with ill-suppressed satisfaction. But upon the army of Agesilaus (and doubtless upon the Lacedæmonians at home) it fell like a sudden thunderbolt, causing the strongest manifestations of sorrow and sympathy. To these manifestations there was only one exception,—the fathers, brothers, or sons of the slain warriors; who not only showed no sorrow, but strutted about publicly with cheerful and triumphant countenances, like victorious athletes.[667] We shall find the like phenomenon at Sparta a few years subsequently, after the far more terrible defeat at Leuktra; the relatives of the slain were joyous and elate,—those of the survivors, downcast and mortified;[668] a fact strikingly characteristic both of the intense mental effect of the Spartan training, and of the peculiar associations which it generated. We may understand how terrible was the contempt which awaited a Spartan who survived defeat, when we find fathers positively rejoicing that their sons had escaped such treatment by death.

Sorely was Agesilaus requited for his supercilious insult towards the Theban envoys. When he at last consented to see them, after the news of the battle, their tone was completely altered. They said not a word about peace, but merely asked permission to pass through and communicate with their countrymen in Corinth. "I understand your purpose (said Agesilaus, smiling),—you want to witness the triumph of your friends, and see what it is worth. Come along with me, and I will teach you." Accordingly, on the next day, he caused them to accompany him while he marched his army up to the very gates of Corinth,—defying those within to come out and

fight. The lands had been so ravaged, that there remained little to destroy. But wherever there were any fruit-trees yet standing, the Lacedæmonians now cut them down. Iphikrates was too prudent to compromise his recent advantage by hazarding a second battle; so that Agesilaus had only the satisfaction of showing that he was master of the field, and then retired to encamp at Lechæum; from whence he sent back the Theban envoys by sea to Kreusis. Having then left a fresh mora or division at Lechæum, in place of that which had been defeated, he marched back to Sparta. But the circumstances of the march betrayed his real feelings, thinly disguised by the recent bravado of marching up to the gates of Corinth. He feared to expose his Lacedæmonian troops even to the view of those allies through whose territory he was to pass; so well was he aware that the latter (especially the Mantineians) would manifest their satisfaction at the recent defeat. Accordingly, he commenced his day's march before dawn, and did not halt for the night till after dark; at Mantineia, he not only did not halt at all, but passed by, outside of the walls, before day had broken. [669] There cannot be a more convincing proof of the real dispositions of the allies towards Sparta, and of the sentiment of compulsion which dictated their continued adherence; a fact which we shall see abundantly illustrated as we advance in the stream of the history.

The retirement of Agesilaus was the signal for renewed enterprise on the part of Iphikrates; who retook Sidus and Krommyon, which had been garrisoned by Praxitas, —as well as Peiræum and Œnoê, which had been left under occupation by Agesilaus. Corinth was thus cleared of enemies on its eastern and north-eastern sides. And though the Lacedæmonians still carried on a desultory warfare from Lechæum, yet such was the terror impressed by the late destruction of their mora, that the Corinthian exiles at Sikyon did not venture to march by land from that place to Lechæum, under the walls of Corinth,—but communicated with Lechæum only by sea.[670] In truth, we hear of no farther serious military operations undertaken by Sparta against Corinth, before the peace of Antalkidas. And the place became so secure, that the Corinthian leaders and their Argeian allies were glad to dispense with the presence of Iphikrates. That officer had gained so much glory by his recent successes, which the Athenian orators[671] even in the next generation never ceased to extol, that his temper, naturally haughty, became domineering; and he tried to procure, either for Athens or for himself, the mastery of Corinth,—putting to death some of the philo-Argeian leaders. We know these circumstances only by brief and meagre allusion; but they caused the Athenians to recall Iphikrates with a large portion of his peltasts, and to send Chabrias to Corinth in his place.[672]

It was either in the ensuing summer,—or perhaps immediately afterwards during the same summer,—390 B.C., that Agesilaus undertook an expedition into Akarnania; at the instance of the Achæans, who threatened, if this were not done, to forsake the Lacedæmonian alliance. They had acquired possession of the Ætolian district of Kalydon, had brought the neighboring villagers into a city residence, and garrisoned

it as a dependence of the Achæan confederacy. But the Akarnanians,—allies of Athens as well as Thebes, and aided by an Athenian squadron at Œniadæ,—attacked them there, probably at the invitation of a portion of the inhabitants, and pressed them so hard, that they employed the most urgent instances to obtain aid from Sparta. Agesilaus crossed the Gulf at Rhium with a considerable force of Spartans and allies, and the full muster of the Achæans. On his arrival the Akarnanians all took refuge in their cities, sending their cattle up into the interior highlands, to the borders of a remote lake. Agesilaus, having sent to Stratus to require them not merely to forbear hostilities against the Achæans, but to relinquish their alliance with Athens and Thebes, and to become allies of Sparta,—found his demands resisted, and began to lay waste the country. Two or three days of operations designedly slack, were employed to lull the Akarnanians into security; after which, by a rapid forced march, Agesilaus suddenly surprised the remote spot in which their cattle and slaves had been deposited for safety. He spent a day here to sell this booty; merchants, probably, accompanying his army. But he had considerable difficulty in his return march, from the narrow paths and high mountains through which he had to thread his way. By a series of brave and well-combined hill-movements,—which, probably, reminded Xenophon of his own operations against the Karduchians in the retreat of the Ten-Thousand,—he defeated and dispersed the Akarnanians, though not without suffering considerably from the excellence of their light troops. Yet he was not successful in his attack upon any one of their cities, nor would he consent to prolong the war until seed-time, notwithstanding earnest solicitation from the Achæans, whom he pacified by engaging to return the next spring. He was, indeed, in a difficult and dangerous country, had not his retreat been facilitated by the compliance of the Ætolians; who calculated (though vainly) on obtaining from him the recovery of Naupaktus, then held (as well as Kalydon) by the Achæans.[673] Partial as the success of this expedition had been, however, it inflicted sufficient damage on the Akarnanians to accomplish its purpose. On learning that it was about to be repeated in the ensuing spring, they sent envoys to Sparta to solicit peace; consenting to abstain from hostilities against the Achæans, and to enrol themselves as members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy.[674]

It was in this same year that the Spartan authorities resolved on an expedition against Argos, of which Agesipolis, the other king, took the command. Having found the border sacrifices favorable, and crossed the frontier, he sent forward his army to Phlius, where the Peloponnesian allies were ordered to assemble; but he himself first turned aside to Olympia, to consult the oracle of Zeus.

It had been the practice of the Argeians, seemingly on more than one previous occasion,[675] when an invading Lacedæmonian army was approaching their territory, to meet them by a solemn message, intimating that it was the time of some festival (the Karneian, or other) held sacred by both parties, and warning them not to violate the frontier during the holy truce. This was in point of fact nothing better than a

fraud; for the notice was sent, not at the moment when the Karneian festival (or other, as the case might be) ought to come on according to the due course of seasons, but at any time when it might serve the purpose of arresting a Lacedæmonian invasion. But though the duplicity of the Argeians was thus manifest, so strong were the pious scruples of the Spartan king, that he could hardly make up his mind to disregard the warning. Moreover, in the existing confusion of the calendar, there was always room for some uncertainty as to the question, which was the true Karneian moon; no Dorian state having any right to fix it imperatively for the others, as the Eleians fixed the Olympic truce, and the Corinthians the Isthmian. It was with a view to satisfy his conscience on this subject that Agesipolis now went to Olympia, and put the question to the oracle of Zeus,—whether he might with a safe religious conscience refuse to accept the holy truce, if the Argeians should now tender it. The oracle, habitually dexterous in meeting a specific question with a general reply, informed him, that he might with a safe conscience decline a truce demanded wrongfully and for underhand purposes.[676] This was accepted by Agesipolis as a satisfactory affirmative. Nevertheless, to make assurance doubly sure, he went directly forward to Delphi, to put the same question to Apollo. As it would have been truly embarrassing, however, if the two holy replies had turned out such as to contradict each other, he availed himself of the *præjudicium* which he had already received at Olympia, and submitted the question to Apollo at Delphi in this form: "Is thine opinion on the question of the holy truce, the same as that of thy father (Zeus)?" "Most decidedly the same," replied the god. Such double warranty, though the appeal was so drawn up as scarcely to leave to Apollo freedom of speech,[677] enabled Agesipolis to return with full confidence to Phlius, where his army was already mustered; and to march immediately into the Argeian territory by the road of Nemea. Being met on the frontier by two heralds with wreaths and in solemn attire, who warned him that it was a season of holy truce, he informed them that the gods authorized his disobedience to their summons, and marched on into the Argeian plain.

It happened that on the first evening after he had crossed the border, the supper and the consequent libation having been just concluded, an earthquake occurred; or, to translate the Greek phrase, "the god (Poseidon) shook." To all Greeks, and to Lacedæmonians especially, this was a solemn event, and the personal companions of Agesipolis immediately began to sing the pæan in honor of Poseidon; the general impression among the soldiers being, that he would give orders for quitting the territory immediately, as Agis had acted in the invasion of Elis a few years before. Perhaps Agesipolis would have done the same here, construing the earthquake as a warning that he had done wrong, in neglecting the summons of the heralds,—had he not been fortified by the recent oracles. He now replied, that if the earthquake had occurred before he crossed the frontier, he should have considered it as a prohibition; but as it came after his crossing, he looked upon it as an encouragement to go forward.

So fully had the Argeians counted on the success of their warning transmitted by the heralds, that they had made little preparation for defence. Their dismay and confusion were very great; their property was still outlying, not yet removed into secure places, so that Agesipolis found much both to destroy and to appropriate. He carried his ravages even to the gates of the city, piquing himself on advancing a little farther than Agesilaus had gone in his invasion two years before. He was at last driven to retreat by the terror of a flash of lightning in his camp, which killed several persons. And a project which he had formed, of erecting a permanent fort on the Argeian frontier, was abandoned in consequence of unfavorable sacrifices.[678]

Besides these transactions in and near the isthmus of Corinth, the war between Sparta and her enemies was prosecuted during the same years both in the islands and on the coast of Asia Minor; though our information is so imperfect that we can scarcely trace the thread of events. The defeat near Knidus (394 B.C.),—the triumphant maritime force of Pharnabazus and Konon at the Isthmus of Corinth in the ensuing year (393 B.C.),—the restoration of the Athenian Long Walls and fortified port,—and the activity of Konon with the fleet among the islands,[679]—so alarmed the Spartans with the idea of a second Athenian maritime empire, that they made every effort to detach the Persian force from the side of their enemies.

The Spartan Antalkidas, a dexterous, winning and artful man,[680] not unlike Lysander, was sent as envoy to Tiribazus (392 B.C.); whom we now find as satrap of Ionia in the room of Tithraustes, after having been satrap of Armenia during the retreat of the Ten Thousand. As Tiribazus was newly arrived in Asia Minor, he had not acquired that personal enmity against the Spartans, which the active hostilities of Derkyllidas and Agesilaus had inspired to Pharnabazus and other Persians. Moreover, jealousy between neighboring satraps was an ordinary feeling, which Antalkidas now hoped to turn to the advantage of Sparta. To counteract his projects, envoys were also sent to Tiribazus, by the confederate enemies of Sparta, Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Argos; and Konon, as the envoy of Athens, was incautiously despatched among the number. On the part of Sparta, Antalkidas offered, first, to abandon to the king of Persia all the Greeks on the continent of Asia; next, as to all the other Greeks, insular as well as continental, he required nothing more than absolute autonomy for each separate city, great and small.[681] The Persian king (he said) could neither desire anything more for himself, nor have any motive for continuing the war against Sparta, when he should once be placed in possession of all the towns on the Asiatic coast, and when he should find both Sparta and Athens rendered incapable of annoying him, through the autonomy and disunion of the Hellenic world. But to neither of the two propositions of Antalkidas would Athens, Thebes, or Argos, accede. As to the first, they repudiated the disgrace of thus formally abandoning the Asiatic Greeks;[682] as to the second proposition, guaranteeing autonomy to every distinct city of Greece, they would admit it only under special reserves, which it did not suit the purpose of Antalkidas to grant. In truth the proposition went to break up (and

was framed with that view) both the Bœotian confederacy under the presidency of Thebes, and the union between Argos and Corinth; while it also deprived Athens of the chance of recovering Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros,[683]—islands which had been possessed and recognized by her since the first commencement of the confederacy of Delos; indeed the two former, even from the time of Miltiades the conqueror of Marathon.

Here commences a new era in the policy of Sparta. That she should abnegate all pretension to maritime empire, is noway difficult to understand—seeing that it had already been irrevocably overthrown by the defeat of Knidus. Nor can we wonder that she should abandon the Greeks on the Asiatic continent to Persian sway; since this was nothing more than she had already consented to do in her conventions with Tissaphernes and Cyrus during the latter years of the Peloponnesian war,[684]—and consented, let us add, not under any of that stringent necessity which at the same time pressed upon Athens, but simply with a view to the maximum of victory over an enemy already enfeebled. The events which followed the close of that war (recounted in a former chapter) had indeed induced her to alter her determination, and again to espouse their cause. But the real novelty now first exhibited in her policy, is, the full development of what had before existed in manifest tendency,—hostility against all the partial land-confederacies of Greece, disguised under the plausible demand of universal autonomy for every town, great or small. How this autonomy was construed and carried into act, we shall see hereafter; at present, we have only to note the first proclamation of it by Antalkidas in the name of Sparta.

On this occasion, indeed, his mission came to nothing, from the peremptory opposition of Athens and the others. But he was fortunate enough to gain the approbation and confidence of Tiribazus; who saw so clearly how much both propositions tended to promote the interests and power of Persia, that he resolved to go up in person to court, and prevail on Artaxerxes to act in concert with Sparta. Though not daring to support Antalkidas openly, Tiribazus secretly gave him money to reinforce the Spartan fleet. He at the same time rendered to Sparta the more signal service of arresting and detaining Konon, pretending that the latter was acting contrary to the interests of the king.[685] This arrest was a gross act of perfidy, since Konon not only commanded respect in his character of envoy,—but had been acting with the full confidence, and almost under the orders, of Pharnabazus. But the removal of an officer of so much ability,—the only man who possessed the confidence of Pharnabazus,—was the most fatal of all impediments to the naval renovation of Athens. It was fortunate that Konon had had time to rebuild the Long Walls, before his means of action were thus abruptly intercepted. Respecting his subsequent fate, there exist contradictory stories. According to one, he was put to death by the Persians in prison; according to another, he found means to escape and again took refuge with Evagoras in Cyprus, in which island he afterwards died of sickness.[686] The latter story appears undoubtedly to be the true one. But it is certain that he never afterwards had

the means of performing any public service, and that his career was cut short by this treacherous detention, just at the moment when its promise was the most splendid for his country.

Tiribazus, on going up to the Persian court, teems to have been detained there for the purpose of concerting measures against Evagoras, prince of Salamis in Cyprus, whose revolt from Persia was now on the point of breaking out. But the Persian court could not yet be prevailed upon to show any countenance to the propositions of Sparta or of Antalkidas. On the contrary, Struthas, who was sent down to Ionia as temporary substitute for Tiribazus, full of anxiety to avenge the ravages of Agesilaus, acted with vigorous hostility against the Lacedæmonians, and manifested friendly dispositions towards Athens.

Thimbron (of whom we have before heard as first taking the command of the Cyreian army in Asia Minor, after their return from Thrace) received orders again to act as head of the Lacedæmonian forces in Asia against Struthas. The new commander, with an army estimated by Diodorus at eight thousand men,[687] marched from Ephesus into the interior, and began his devastation of the territory dependent on Persia. But his previous command, though he was personally amiable,[688] had been irregular and disorderly, and it was soon observed that the same defects were now yet more prominent, aggravated by too liberal indulgence in convivial pleasures. Aware of his rash, contemptuous, and improvident mode of attack, Struthas laid a snare for him by sending a detachment of cavalry to menace the camp, just when Thimbron had concluded his morning meal in company with the flute-player Thersander,—the latter not merely an excellent musician, but possessed of a full measure of Spartan courage. Starting from his tent at the news, Thimbron, with Thersander, waited only to collect the few troops immediately at hand, without even leaving any orders for the remainder, and hastened to repel the assailants; who gave way easily, and seduced him into a pursuit. Presently Struthas himself, appearing with a numerous and well-arrayed body of cavalry, charged with vigor the disorderly detachment of Thimbron. Both that general and Thersander, bravely fighting, fell among the first; while the army, deprived of their commander as well as ill-prepared for a battle, made but an ineffective resistance. They were broken, warmly pursued, and the greater number slain. A few who contrived to escape the active Persian cavalry, found shelter in the neighboring cities.[689]

This victory of Struthas, gained by the Persian cavalry, displays a degree of vigor and ability which, fortunately for the Greeks, was rarely seen in Persian operations. Our scanty information does not enable us to trace its consequences. We find Diphridas sent out soon after by the Lacedæmonians, along with the admiral Ekdikus, as successor of Thimbron to bring together the remnant of the defeated army, and to protect those cities which had contributed to form it. Diphridas,—a man with all the popular qualities of his predecessor, but a better and more careful officer,—is said to have succeeded to some extent in this difficult mission. Being fortunate enough to

take captive the son-in-law of Struthas, with his wife, (as Xenophon had captured Asidates,) he obtained a sufficiently large ransom to enable him to pay his troops for some time.[690] But it is evident that his achievements were not considerable, and that the Ionian Greeks on the continent are now left to make good their position, as they can, against the satrap at Sardis.

The forces of Sparta were much required at Rhodes; which island (as has been mentioned already) had revolted from Sparta about five years before (a few months anterior to the battle of Knidus), dispossessed the Lysandrian oligarchy, and established a democratical government. But since that period, an opposition-party in the island had gradually risen up, acquired strength, and come into correspondence with the oligarchical exiles; who on their side warmly solicited aid from Sparta, representing that Rhodes would otherwise become thoroughly dependent on Athens. Accordingly, the Lacedæmonians sent eight triremes across the Ægean under the command of Ekdikus; the first of their ships of war which had crossed since the defeat of Knidus.[691] Though the Perso-Athenian naval force in the Ægean had been either dismissed or paralyzed since the seizure of Konon, yet the Rhodian government possessed a fleet of about twenty triremes, besides considerable force of other kinds; so that Ekdikus could not even land on the island, but was compelled to halt at Knidus. Fortunately, Teleutias the Lacedæmonian was now in the Corinthian Gulf with a fleet of twelve triremes, which were no longer required there; since Agesilaus and he had captured Lechæum a few months before, and destroyed the maritime force of the Corinthians in those waters. He was now directed to sail with his squadron out of the Corinthian Gulf across to Asia, to supersede Ekdikus, and take the command of the whole fleet for operations off Rhodes. On passing by Samos, he persuaded the inhabitants to embrace the cause of Sparta, and to furnish him with a few ships; after which he went onward to Knidus, where, superseding Ekdikus, he found himself at the head of twenty-seven triremes.[692] In his way from Knidus to Rhodes, he accidentally fell in with the Athenian admiral Philokrates, conducting ten triremes to Cyprus to the aid of Evagoras in his struggle against the Persians. He was fortunate enough to carry them all as prisoners into Knidus, where he sold the whole booty, and then proceeded with his fleet, thus augmented to thirty-seven sail, to Rhodes. Here he established a fortified post, enabling the oligarchical party to carry on an active civil war. But he was defeated in a battle,—his enemies being decidedly the stronger force in the island, and masters of all the cities.[693]

The alliance with Evagoras of Cyprus, in his contention against Artaxerxes, was at this moment an unfortunate and perplexing circumstance for Athens, since she was relying upon Persian aid against Sparta, and since Sparta was bidding against her for it. But the alliance was one which she could not lightly throw off. For Evagoras had not only harbored Konon with the remnant of the Athenian fleet after the disaster of Ægospotami, but had earned a grant of citizenship and the honor of a statue at Athens, as a strenuous auxiliary in procuring that Persian aid which gained the battle

of Knidus, and as a personal combatant in that battle, before the commencement of his dissension with Artaxerxes.[694] It would have been every way advantageous to Athens at this moment to decline assisting Evagoras, since (not to mention the probability of offending the Persian court) she had more than enough to employ all her maritime force nearer home and for purposes more essential to herself. Yet in spite of these very serious considerations of prudence, the paramount feelings of prior obligation and gratitude, enforced by influential citizens who had formed connections in Cyprus, determined the Athenians to identify themselves with his gallant struggles[695] (of which I shall speak more fully presently). So little was fickleness, or instability, or the easy oblivion of past feelings, a part of their real nature,—though historians have commonly denounced it as among their prominent qualities.

The capture of their squadron under Philokrates, however, and the consequent increase of the Lacedæmonian naval force at Rhodes, compelled the Athenians to postpone further aid to Evagoras, and to arm forty triremes under Thrasybulus for the Asiatic coast; no inconsiderable effort, when we recollect that four years before there was scarcely a single trireme in Peiræus, and not even a wall of defence around the place. Though sent immediately for the assistance of Rhodes, Thrasybulus judged it expedient to go first to the Hellespont; probably from extreme want of money to pay his men. Derkyllidas was still in occupation of Abydos, yet there was no Lacedæmonian fleet in the strait; so that Thrasybulus was enabled to extend the alliances of Athens both on the European and the Asiatic side,—the latter being under the friendly satrap, Pharnabazus. Reconciling the two Thracian princes, Seuthes and Amadokus, whom he found at war, he brought both of them into amicable relations with Athens, and then moved forward to Byzantium. That city was already in alliance with Athens; but on the arrival of Thrasybulus, the alliance was still further cemented by the change of its government into a democracy. Having established friendship with the opposite city of Chalkêdon, and being thus master of the Bosphorus, he sold the tithe of the commercial ships sailing out of the Euxine;[696] leaving doubtless an adequate force to exact it. This was a striking evidence of revived Athenian maritime power, which seems also to have been now extended more or less to Samothrace, Thasus, and the coast of Thrace.[697]

From Byzantium, Thrasybulus sailed to Mitylênê, which was already in friendship with Athens,—though Methymna and the other cities in the island were still maintained by a force under the Lacedæmonian harmost, Therimachus. With the aid of the Mitylenæans, and of the exiles from other Lesbian cities, Thrasybulus marched to the borders of Methymna, where he was met by Therimachus; who had also brought together his utmost force, but was now completely defeated and slain. The Athenians thus became masters of Antissa and Eresus, where they were enabled to levy a valuable contribution, as well as to plunder the refractory territory of Methymna. Nevertheless, Thrasybulus, in spite of farther help from Chios and Mitylênê, still thought himself not in a situation to go to Rhodes with advantage. Perhaps he was

not sure of pay in advance, and the presence of unpaid troops in an exhausted island might be a doubtful benefit. Accordingly, he sailed from Lesbos along the western and southern coast of Asia Minor, levying contributions at Halikarnassus[698] and other places, until he came to Aspendus in Pamphylia; where he also obtained money and was about to depart with it, when some misdeeds committed by his soldiers so exasperated the inhabitants, that they attacked him by night unprepared in his tent, and slew him.[699]

Thus perished the citizen to whom, more than to any one else, Athens owed not only her renovated democracy, but its wise, generous, and harmonious working, after renovation. Even the philo-Laconian and oligarchical Xenophon bestows upon him a marked and unaffected eulogy.[700] His devoted patriotism in commencing and prosecuting the struggle against the Thirty, at a time when they not only were at the height of their power, but had plausible ground for calculating on the full auxiliary strength of Sparta, deserves high admiration. But the feature which stands yet more eminent in his character,—a feature infinitely rare in the Grecian character, generally,—is, that the energy of a successful leader was combined with complete absence both of vindictive antipathies for the past, and of overbearing ambition for himself. Content to live himself as a simple citizen under the restored democracy, he taught his countrymen to forgive an oligarchical party from whom they had suffered atrocious wrongs, and set the example himself of acquiescing, in the loss of his own large property. The generosity of such a proceeding ought not to count for less, because it was at the same time dictated by the highest political prudence. We find in an oration of Lysias against Ergokles (a citizen who served in the Athenian fleet on this last expedition), in which the latter is accused of gross peculation,—insinuations against Thrasybulus, of having countenanced the delinquency, though coupled with praise of his general character. Even the words as they now stand are so vague as to carry little evidence; but when we reflect that the oration was spoken after the death of Thrasybulus, they are entitled to no weight at all.[701]

The Athenians sent Agyrrhius to succeed Thrasybulus. After the death of the latter, we may conclude that the fleet went to Rhodes, its original destination,—though Xenophon does not expressly say so,—the rather, as neither Teleutias nor any subsequent Lacedæmonian commander appears to have become master of the island, in spite of the considerable force which they had there assembled.[702] The Lacedæmonians, however, on their side, being also much in want of money, Teleutias was obliged (in the same manner as the Athenians), to move from island to island, levying contributions as he could.[703]

When the news of the successful proceedings of Thrasybulus at Byzantium and the Hellespont, again establishing a toll for the profit of Athens, reached Sparta, it excited so much anxiety, that Anaxibius, having great influence with the ephors of the time, prevailed on them to send him out as harmost to Abydos, in the room of Derkyllidas, who had now been in that post for several years. Having been the officer

originally employed to procure the revolt of the place from Athens (in 411 B.C.),[704] Derkyllidas had since rendered service not less essential in preserving it to Sparta, during the extensive desertion which followed the battle of Knidus. But it was supposed that he ought to have checked the aggressive plans of Thrasybulus; moreover, Anaxibius promised, if a small force were entrusted to him, to put down effectually the newly-revived Athenian influence. He was supposed to know well, those regions in which he had once already been admiral, at the moment when Xenophon and the Cyreian army first returned; the harshness, treachery, and corruption, which he displayed in his dealing with that gallant body of men, have been already recounted in a former chapter.[705] With three triremes, and funds for the pay of a thousand mercenary troops, Anaxibius accordingly went to Abydos. He began his operations with considerable vigor, both against Athens and Pharnabazus. While he armed a land-force, which he employed in making incursions on the neighboring cities in the territory of that satrap,—he at the same time reinforced his little squadron by three triremes out of the harbor of Abydos, so that he became strong enough to seize the merchant vessels passing along the Hellespont to Athens or to her allies.[706] The force which Thrasybulus had left at Byzantium to secure the strait revenues, was thus inadequate to its object without farther addition.

Fortunately, Iphikrates was at this moment disengaged at Athens, having recently returned from Corinth with his body of peltasts, for whom doubtless employment was wanted. He was accordingly sent with twelve hundred peltasts and eight triremes, to combat Anaxibius in the Hellespont; which now became again the scene of conflict, as it had been in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war; the Athenians from the European side, the Lacedæmonians from the Asiatic. At first the warfare consisted of desultory privateering, and money-levying excursions, on both sides.[707] But at length, the watchful genius of Iphikrates discovered opportunity for a successful stratagem. Anaxibius, having just drawn the town of Antandrus into his alliance, had marched thither for the purpose of leaving a garrison in it, with his Lacedæmonian and mercenary forces, as well as two hundred hoplites from Abydos itself. His way lay across the mountainous region of Ida, southward to the coast of the gulf of Adramyttium. Accordingly, Iphikrates, foreseeing that he would speedily return, crossed over in the night from the Chersonese, and planted himself in ambush on the line of return march; at a point where it traversed the desert and mountainous extremities of the Abydene territory, near the gold mines of Kremastê. The triremes which carried him across were ordered to sail up the strait on the next day, in order that Anaxibius must be apprised of it, and might suppose Iphikrates to be employed on his ordinary money-levying excursion.

The stratagem was completely successful. Anaxibius returned on the next day, without the least suspicion of any enemy at hand, marching in careless order and with long-stretched files, as well from the narrowness of the mountain path as from the circumstance that he was in the friendly territory of Abydos. Not expecting to

fight, he had unfortunately either omitted the morning sacrifice, or taken no pains to ascertain that the victims were favorable; so Xenophon informs us,[708] with that constant regard to the divine judgments and divine warnings which pervades both the Hellenica and the Anabasis. Iphikrates having suffered the Abydenes who were in the van to pass, suddenly sprang from his ambush, to assault Anaxibius with the Lacedæmonians and the mercenaries, as they descended the mountain-pass into the plain of Kremastê. His appearance struck terror and confusion into the whole army; unprepared in its disorderly array for stedfast resistance,—even if the minds of the soldiers had been ever so well strung,—against well-trained peltasts, who were sure to prevail over hoplites not in steady rank. To Anaxibius himself, the truth stood plain at once. Defeat was inevitable, and there remained no other resource for him except to die like a brave man. Accordingly, desiring his shield-bearer to hand to him his shield, he said to those around him,—"Friends, my honor commands me to die here; but do you hasten away, and save yourselves, before the enemy close with us." Such order was hardly required to determine his panic-stricken troops, who fled with one accord towards Abydos; while Anaxibius himself awaited firmly the approach of the enemy, and fell gallantly fighting on the spot. No less than twelve Spartan harmosts, those who had been expelled from their various governments by the defeat of Knidus, and who had remained ever since under Derkyllidas at Abydos, stood with the like courage and shared his fate. Such disdain of life hardly surprises us in conspicuous Spartan citizens, to whom preservation by flight was "no true preservation" (in the language of Xenophon),[709] but simply prolongation of life under intolerable disgrace at home. But what deserves greater remark is, that the youth to whom Anaxibius was tenderly attached and who was his constant companion, could not endure to leave him, stayed fighting by his side, and perished by the same honorable death.[710] So strong was the mutual devotion which this relation between persons of the male sex inspired in the ancient Greek mind. With these exceptions, no one else made any attempt to stand. All fled, and were pursued by Iphikrates as far as the gates of Abydos, with the slaughter of fifty out of the two hundred Abydene hoplites, and two hundred of the remaining troops.

This well-planned and successful exploit, while it added to the reputation of Iphikrates, rendered the Athenians again masters of the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, ensuring both the levy of the dues and the transit of their trading vessels. But while the Athenians were thus carrying on naval war at Rhodes and the Hellespont, they began to experience annoyance nearer home, from Ægina.

That island (within sight as the eyesore of Peiræus, as Perikles was wont to call it) had been occupied fifty years before by a population eminently hostile to Athens, afterwards conquered and expelled by her,—at last again captured in the new abode which they had obtained in Laconia,—and put to death by her order. During the Peloponnesian war, Ægina had been tenanted by Athenian citizens as outsettlers or kleruchs; all of whom had been driven in after the battle of Ægospotami. The island

was then restored by Lysander to the remnant of the former population,—as many of them at least as he could find.

These new Æginetans, though doubtless animated by associations highly unfavorable to Athens, had nevertheless remained not only at peace, but also in reciprocal commerce, with her, until a considerable time after the battle of Knidus and the rebuilding of her Long Walls. And so they would have continued, of their own accord,—since they could gain but little, and were likely to lose all the security of their traffic, by her hostility,—had they not been forced to commence the war by Eteonikus, the Lacedæmonian harmost in the island;[711] one amidst many examples of the manner in which the smaller Grecian states were dragged into war, without any motive of their own, by the ambition of the greater,—by Sparta as well as by Athens.[712] With the concurrence of the ephors, Eteonikus authorized and encouraged all Æginetans to fit out privateers for depredation on Attica; which aggression the Athenians resented, after suffering considerable inconvenience by sending a force of ten triremes to block up Ægina from the sea, with a body of hoplites under Pamphilus to construct and occupy a permanent fort in the island. This squadron, however, was soon driven off (though Pamphilus still continued to occupy the fort) by Teleutias, who came to Ægina on hearing of the blockade; having been engaged, with the fleet which he commanded at Rhodes, in an expedition among the Cyclades, for the purpose of levying contributions. He seems to have been now at the term of his year of command, and while he was at Ægina, his successor, Hierax, arrived from Sparta, on his way to Rhodes, to supersede him. The fleet was, accordingly, handed over to Hierax at Ægina, while Teleutias went directly home to Sparta. So remarkable was his popularity among the seamen, that numbers of them accompanied him down to the water-edge, testifying their regret and attachment by crowning him with wreaths, or pressing his hand. Some, who came down too late, when he was already under weigh, cast their wreaths on the sea, uttering prayers for his health and happiness.[713]

Hierax, while carrying back to Rhodes the remaining fleet which Teleutias had brought from that island, left his subordinate Gorgôpas as harmost at Ægina with twelve triremes; a force which protected the island completely, and caused the fortified post occupied by the Athenians under Pamphilus to be itself blocked up, insomuch that after an interval of four months, a special decree was passed at Athens to send a numerous squadron and fetch away the garrison. As the Æginetan privateers, aided by the squadron of Gorgôpas, now recommenced their annoyances against Attica, thirteen Athenian triremes were put in equipment under Eunomus as a guard-squadron against Ægina. But Gorgôpas and his squadron were now for the time withdrawn, to escort Antalkidas, the new Lacedæmonian admiral sent to Asia chiefly for the purpose of again negotiating with Tiribazus. On returning back, after landing Antalkidas at Ephesus, Gorgôpas fell in with Eunomus, whose pursuit, however, he escaped, landing at Ægina just before sunset. The Athenian admiral, after watching

for a short time until he saw the Lacedæmonian seamen out of their vessels and ashore, departed as it grew dark to Attica, carrying a light to prevent his ships from parting company. But Gorgôpas, causing his men to take a hasty meal, immediately reëmbarked and pursued; keeping on the track by means of the light, and taking care not to betray himself either by the noise of oars or by the chant of the Keleustês. Eunomus had no suspicion of the accompanying enemy. Just after he had touched land near cape Zostêr in Attica, when his men were in the act of disembarking, Gorgôpas gave signal by trumpet to attack. After a short action by moonlight, four of the Athenian squadrons were captured, and carried off to Ægina; with the remainder, Eunomus escaped to Peiræus.[714]

This victory, rendering both Gorgôpas and the Æginetans confident, laid them open to a stratagem skilfully planned by the Athenian Chabrias. That officer, who seems to have been dismissed from Corinth as Iphikrates had been before him, was now about to conduct a force of ten triremes and eight hundred peltasts to the aid of Evagoras; to whom the Athenians were thus paying their debt of gratitude, though they could ill-spare any of their forces from home. Chabrias, passing over from Peiræus at night, landed without being perceived in a desert place of the coast of Ægina, and planted himself in ambush with his peltasts at some little distance inland of the Herakleion or temple of Hêraklês, amidst hollow ground suitable for concealment. He had before made agreement with another squadron and a body of hoplites under Demænetus; who arrived at daybreak and landed at Ægina at a point called Tripyrgia, about two miles distant from the Herakleion, but farther removed from the city. As soon as their arrival became known, Gorgôpas hastened out of the city to repel them, with all the troops he could collect, Æginetans as well as marines out of the ships of war,—and eight Spartans who happened to be his companions in the island. In their march from the city to attack the new comers, they had to pass near the Herakleion, and therefore near the troops in ambush; who, as soon as Gorgôpas and those about him had gone by, rose up suddenly and attacked them in the rear. The stratagem succeeded not less completely than that of Iphikrates at Abydos against Anaxibius. Gorgôpas and the Spartans near him were slain, the rest were defeated, and compelled to flee with considerable loss back to the city.[715]

After this brilliant success, Chabrias pursued his voyage to Cyprus, and matters appeared so secure on the side of Ægina, that Demænetus also was sent to the Hellespont to reinforce Iphikrates. For some time indeed, the Lacedæmonian ships at Ægina did nothing. Eteonikus, who was sent as successor to Gorgôpas,[716] could neither persuade nor constrain the seamen to go aboard, since he had no funds, while their pay was in arrears; so that Athens with her coast and her trading-vessels remained altogether unmolested. At length the Lacedæmonians were obliged to send again to Ægina Teleutias, the most popular and best-beloved of all their commanders, whom the seamen welcomed with the utmost delight. Addressing them under the influence of this first impression, immediately after he had offered sacrifice, he

told them plainly that he had brought with him no money, but that he had come to put them in the way of procuring it; that he should himself touch nothing until they were amply provided, and should require of them to bear no more hardship or fatigue than he went through himself; that the power and prosperity of Sparta had all been purchased by willingly braving danger, as well as toil, in the cause of duty; that it became valiant men to seek their pay, not by cringing to any one, but by their own swords at the cost of enemies. And he engaged to find them the means of doing this, provided they would now again manifest the excellent qualities which he knew them by experience to possess.[717]

This address completely won over the seamen, who received it with shouts of applause; desiring Teleutias to give his orders forthwith, and promising ready obedience. "Well, (said he), now go and get your suppers, as you were intending to do; and then come immediately on shipboard, bringing with you provisions for one day. Advance me thus much out of your own means, that we may, by the will of the gods, make an opportune voyage."[718]

In spite of the eminent popularity of Teleutias, the men would probably have refused to go on board, had he told them beforehand his intention of sailing with his twelve triremes straight into the harbor of Peiræus. At first sight, the enterprise seemed insane, for there were triremes in it more than sufficient to overwhelm him. But he calculated on finding them all unprepared, with seamen as well as officers in their lodgings ashore, so that he could not only strike terror and do damage, but even realize half an hour's plunder before preparations could be made to resist him. Such was the security which now reigned there, especially since the death of Gorgôpas, that no one dreamt of an attack. The harbor was open, as it had been forty years before, when Brasidas (in the third year of the Peloponnesian war) attempted the like enterprise from the port of Megara.[719] Even then, at the maximum of the Athenian naval power, it was an enterprise possible, simply because every one considered it to be impossible; and it only failed because the assailants became terrified, and flinched in the execution.

A little after dark, Teleutias quitted the harbor of Ægina, without telling any one whither he was going. Rowing leisurely, and allowing his men alternate repose on their oars, he found himself before morning within half a mile of Peiræus, where he waited until day was just dawning, and then led his squadron straight into the harbor. Everything turned out as he expected; there was not the least idea of being attacked, nor the least preparation for defence. Not a single trireme was manned or in fighting condition, but several were moored without their crews, together with merchant-vessels, loaded as well as empty. Teleutias directed the captains of his squadron to drive against the triremes, and disable them; but by no means to damage the beaks of their own ships by trying to disable the merchant-ships. Even at that early hour, many Athenians were abroad, and the arrival of the unexpected assailants struck every one with surprise and consternation. Loud and vague cries

transmitted the news through all Peiræus, and from Peiræus up to Athens, where it was believed that their harbor was actually taken. Every man having run home for his arms, the whole force of the city rushed impetuously down thither, with one accord,—hoplites as well as horsemen. But before such succors could arrive, Teleutias had full time to do considerable mischief. His seamen boarded the larger merchant-ships, seizing both the men and the portable goods which they found aboard. Some even jumped ashore on the quay (called the Deigma), laid hands on the tradesmen, ship-masters, and pilots, whom they saw near, and carried them away captive. Various smaller vessels with their entire cargoes were also towed away; and even three or four triremes. With all these Teleutias sailed safely out of Peiræus, sending some of his squadron to escort the prizes to Ægina, while he himself with the remainder sailed southward along the coast. As he was seen to come out of Peiræus, his triremes were mistaken for Athenian, and excited no alarm; so that he thus captured several fishing-boats, and passage-boats coming with passengers from the islands to Athens,—together with some merchantmen carrying corn and other goods, at Sunium. All were carried safely into Ægina.[720]

The enterprise of Teleutias, thus admirably concerted and executed without the loss of a man, procured for him a plentiful booty, of which, probably not the least valuable portion consisted in the men seized as captives. When sold at Ægina, it yielded so large a return that he was enabled to pay down at once a month's pay to his seamen; who became more attached to him than ever, and kept the triremes in animated and active service under his orders.[721] Admonished by painful experience, indeed, the Athenians were now, doubtless, careful both in guarding and in closing Peiræus; as they had become forty years before after the unsuccessful attack of Brasidas. But in spite of the utmost vigilance, they suffered an extent of damage from the indefatigable Teleutias, and from the Æginetan privateers, quite sufficient to make them weary of the war.[722]

We cannot doubt, indeed, that the prosecution of the war must have been a heavy financial burthen upon the Athenians, from 395 B.C. downward to 387 B.C. How they made good the cost, without any contributory allies, or any foreign support, except what Konon obtained during one year from Pharnabazus,—we are not informed. On the revival of the democracy in 403 B.C., the poverty of the city, both public and private, had been very great, owing to the long previous war, ending with the loss of all Athenian property abroad. At a period about three years afterwards, it seems that the Athenians were in arrears, not merely for the tribute-money which they then owed to Sparta as her subject allies, but also for debts due to the Bœotians on account of damage done; that they were too poor to perform in full the religious sacrifices prescribed for the year, and were obliged to omit some even of the more ancient; that the docks as well as the walls were in sad want of repair.[723] Even the pay to those citizens who attended the public assemblies and sat as dikasts in the dikasteries,—pay essential to the working of the democracy,—was restored only by

degrees; beginning first at one obolus, and not restored to three oboli, at which it had stood before the capture, until after an interval of some years.[724] It was at this time too that the Theôric Board, or Paymasters for the general expenses of public worship and sacrifice, was first established; and when we read how much the Athenians were embarrassed for the means of celebrating the prescribed sacrifices, there was, probably, great necessity for the formation of some such office. The disbursements connected with this object had been effected, before 403 B.C., not by any special Board, but by the Hellenotamiæ, or treasurers of the tribute collected from the allies, who were not renewed after 403 B.C. as the Athenian empire had ceased to exist.[725] A portion of the money disbursed by the Theôric Board for the religious festivals, was employed in the distribution of two oboli per head, called the diobely, to all present citizens, and actually received by all,—not merely by the poor, but by persons in easy circumstances also.[726] This distribution was made at several festivals, having originally begun at the Dionysia, for the purpose of enabling the citizens to obtain places at the theatrical representations in honor of Dionysus; but we do not know either the number of the festivals, or the amount of the total sum. It was, in principle, a natural corollary of the religious idea connected with the festival; not simply because the comfort and recreation of each citizen, individually taken, was promoted by his being enabled to attend the festival,—but because the collective effect of the ceremony, in honoring and propitiating the god, was believed to depend in part upon a multitudinous attendance and lively manifestations.[727] Gradually, however, this distribution of Theôric or festival-money came to be pushed to an abusive and mischievous excess, which is brought before our notice forty years afterwards, during the political career of Demosthenes. Until that time, we have no materials for speaking of it; and what I here notice is simply the first creation of the Theôric Board.

The means of Athens for prosecuting the war, and for paying her troops sent as well to Bœotia as to Corinth, must have been derived mainly from direct assessments on property, called eisphoræ. And some such assessments we find alluded to generally as having taken place during these years; though we know no details either as to frequency or amount.[728] But the restitution of the Long Walls and of the fortifications of Peiræus by Konon, was an assistance not less valuable to the finances of Athens than to her political power. That excellent harbor, commodious as a mercantile centre, and now again safe for the residence of metics and the importations of merchants, became speedily a scene of animated commerce, as we have seen it when surprised by Teleutias. The number of metics, or free resident non-citizens, became also again large, as it had been before the time of her reverses, and including a number of miscellaneous non-Hellenic persons, from Lydia, Phrygia, and Syria.[729] Both the port-duties, and the value of fixed property at Athens, was thus augmented so as in part to countervail the costs of war. Nevertheless these costs, continued from year to year, and combined with the damage done by Æginetan privateers, were seriously felt, and contributed to dispose the Athenians to peace.

In the Hellespont also, their prospects were not only on the decline, but had become seriously menacing. After going from Ægina to Ephesus in the preceding year, and sending back Gorgôpas with the Æginetan squadron, Antalkidas had placed the remainder of his fleet under his secretary, Nikolochus, with orders to proceed to the Hellespont for the relief of Abydos. He himself landed, and repaired to Tiribazus, by whom he was conducted up to the court of Susa. Here he renewed the propositions for the pacification of Greece,—on principles of universal autonomy, abandoning all the Asiatic Greeks as subject absolutely to the Persian king,—which he had tried in vain to carry through two years before. Though the Spartans generally were odious to Artaxerxes, Antalkidas behaved with so much dexterity[730] as to gain the royal favor personally, while all the influence of Tiribazus was employed to second his political views. At length they succeeded in prevailing upon the king formally to adopt the peace, and to proclaim war against any Greeks who should refuse to accede to it, empowering the Spartans to enforce it everywhere as his allies and under his sanction. In order to remove one who would have proved a great impediment to this measure, the king was farther induced to invite the satrap Pharnabazus up to court, and to honor him with his daughter in marriage; leaving the satrapy of Daskylium under the temporary administration of Ariobarzanes, a personal friend and guest of Antalkidas.[731] Thus armed against all contingencies, Antalkidas and Tiribazus returned from Susa to the coast of Asia Minor in the spring of 387 B.C., not only bearing the formal diploma ratified by the king's seal, but commanding ample means to carry it into effect; since, in addition to the full forces of Persia, twenty additional triremes were on their way from Syracuse and the Greco-Italian towns, sent by the despot Dionysius to the aid of the Lacedæmonians.[732]

On reaching the coast, Antalkidas found Nikolochus with his fleet of twenty-five sail blocked up in Abydos by the Athenians under Iphikrates; who with thirty-two sail were occupying the European side of the Hellespont. He immediately repaired to Abydos by land, and took an early opportunity of stealing out by night with his fleet up the strait towards the Propontis; spreading the rumor that he was about to attack Chalkêdon, in concert with a party in the town. But he stopped at Perkôtê, and lay hid in that harbor until he saw the Athenian fleet (which had gone in pursuit of him upon the false scent laid out) pass by towards Prokonnêsus. The strait being now clear, Antalkidas sailed down it again to meet the Syracusan and Italian ships, whom he safely joined. Such junction, with a view to which his recent manœuvre had been devised, rendered him more than a match for his enemies. He had further the good fortune to capture a detached Athenian squadron of eight triremes, which Thrasybulus (a second Athenian citizen of that name) was conducting from Thrace to join the main Athenian fleet in the Hellespont. Lastly, additional reinforcements also reached Antalkidas from the zealous aid of Tiribazus and Ariobarzanes, insomuch that he found himself at the head of no less than eighty triremes, besides a still greater number which were under preparation in the various ports of Ionia.[733]

Such a fleet, the greatest which had been seen in the Hellespont since the battle of Ægospotami, was so much superior to anything which could be brought to meet it, and indicated so strongly the full force of Persia operating in the interests of Sparta,—that the Athenians began to fear a repetition of the same calamitous suffering which they had already undergone from Lysander. A portion of such hardship they at once began to taste. Not a single merchant-ship reached them from the Euxine, all being seized and detained by Antalkidas; so that their main supply of imported corn was thus cut off. Moreover, in the present encouraging state of affairs, the Æginetan privateers became doubly active in harassing the coasting trade of Attica; and this combination, of actual hardship with prospective alarm, created a paramount anxiety at Athens to terminate the war. Without Athens, the other allies would have no chance of success through their own forces; while the Argeians also, hitherto the most obstinate, had become on their own account desirous of peace, being afraid of repeated Lacedæmonian invasions of their territory. That Sparta should press for a peace, when the terms of it were suggested by herself, is not wonderful. Even to her, triumphant as her position now seemed, the war was a heavy burden. [734]

Such was the general state of feeling in the Grecian world, when Tiribazus summoned the contending parties into his presence, probably at Sardis, to hear the terms of the convention which had just come down from Susa. He produced the original edict, and having first publicly exhibited the regal seal, read aloud as follows:—

"King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia, and the islands of Klazomenæ and Cyprus, shall belong to him. He thinks it just also, to leave all the other Hellenic cities autonomous, both small and great,—except Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, which are to belong to Athens, as they did originally. Should any parties refuse to accept this peace, I will make war upon them, along with those who are of the same mind, by land as well as by sea, with ships and with money."[735]

Instructions were given to all the deputies to report the terms of this edict to their respective cities, and to meet again at Sparta for acceptance or rejection. When the time of meeting arrived,[736] all the cities, in spite of their repugnance to the abandonment of the Asiatic Greeks, and partly also to the second condition, nevertheless felt themselves overruled by superior force, and gave a reluctant consent. On taking the oaths, however, the Thebans tried indirectly to make good an exception in their own case, by claiming to take the oath not only on behalf of themselves, but on behalf of the Bœotian cities generally; a demand which Agesilaus in the name of Sparta repudiated, as virtually cancelling that item in the pacification whereby the small cities were pronounced to be autonomous as well as the great. When the Theban deputy replied that he could not relinquish his claim without fresh instructions from home, Agesilaus desired him to go at once and consult his countrymen. "You may tell them (said he) that if they do not comply, they will be shut out from the treaty."

It was with much delight that Agesilaus pronounced this peremptory sentence, which placed Thebes in so humiliating a dilemma. Antipathy towards the Thebans was one of his strongest sentiments, and he exulted in the hope that they would persist in their refusal so that he would thus be enabled to bring an overwhelming force to crush their isolated city. So eagerly did he thirst for the expected triumph, that immediately on the departure of the Theban deputies, and before their answer could possibly have been obtained, he procured the consent of the ephors, offered the border-sacrifice, and led the Spartan force out as far as Tegea. From that city he not only despatched messengers in all directions to hasten the arrival of the Periœki, but also sent forth the officers called xenâgi to the cities of the Peloponnesian allies, to muster and bring together the respective contingents. But in spite of all injunctions to despatch, his wishes were disappointed. Before he started from Tegea, the Theban deputies returned with the intimation that they were prepared to take the oath for Thebes alone, recognizing the other Bœotian cities as autonomous. Agesilaus and the Spartans were thus obliged to be satisfied with the minor triumph, in itself very serious and considerable, of having degraded Thebes from her federal headship, and isolated her from the Bœotian cities.[737]

The unmeasured and impatient miso-Theban bitterness of Agesilaus, attested here by his friend and panegyrist, deserves especial notice; for it will be found to explain much of the misconduct of Sparta and her officers during the ensuing years.

There yet remained one compliance for Agesilaus to exact. The Argeian auxiliaries were not yet withdrawn from Corinth; and the Corinthian government might probably think that the terms of the peace, leaving their city autonomous, permitted them to retain or dismiss these auxiliaries at their own discretion. But it was not so that Agesilaus construed the peace; and his construction, right or wrong, was backed by the power of enforcement. He sent to inform both Argeians and Corinthians, that if the auxiliaries were not withdrawn, he would march his army forthwith into both territories. No resistance could be offered to his peremptory mandate. The Argeians retired from Corinth; and the vehement philo-Argeian Corinthians,—especially those who had been concerned in the massacre at the festival of the Eukleia,—retired at the same time into voluntary exile, thinking themselves no longer safe in the town. They found a home partly at Argos, partly at Athens,[738] where they were most hospitably received. Those Corinthians who had before been in exile, and who, in concert with the Lacedæmonian garrison at Lechæum and Sikyon, had been engaged in bitter hostility against their countrymen in Corinth,—were immediately readmitted into the city. According to Xenophon, their readmission was pronounced by the spontaneous voice of the Corinthian citizens.[739] But we shall be more correct in affirming, that it was procured by the same intimidating summons from Agesilaus which had extorted the dismissal of the Argeians.[740] The restoration of the exiles from Lechæum on the present occasion was no more voluntary than that of the Athenian exiles had been

eighteen years before, at the Peloponnesian war,—or than that of the Phliasian exiles was, two or three years afterwards.[741]

FOOTNOTES

[1] See Diodor. xi, 69; xii, 64-71; Ktesias, Persica, c. 29-45; Aristotel. Polit. v, 14, 8. This last passage of Aristotle is not very clear. Compare Justin, x, 1.

For the chronology of these Persian kings, see a valuable Appendix in Mr. Fynes Clinton's Fasti Hellenici, App. 18, vol. ii, p. 313-316.

[2] Ktesias, Persica, c. 38-40.

[3] See the Appendix of Mr. Fynes Clinton, mentioned in the preceding note, p. 317.

There were some Egyptian troops in the army of Artaxerxes at the battle of Kunaxa; on the other hand, there were other Egyptians in a state of pronounced revolt. Compare two passages of Xenophon's Anabasis, i, 8, 9; ii, 5, 13; Diodor. xiii, 46; and the Dissertation of F. Ley, Fata et Conditio Ægypti sub imperio Persarum, p. 20-56 (Cologne, 1830).

[4] Xen. Hellen. i, 2, 19; ii, 1, 13.

[5] Thucyd. iv, 50. πολλῶν γὰρ ἐλθόντων πρεσβέων οὐδένα ταὐτὰ λέγειν.

This incompetence, or duplicity, on the part of the Spartan envoys, helps to explain the facility with which Alkibiades duped them at Athens (Thucyd. v, 45). See above, in this History, Vol. VII. ch. lv, p. 47.

[6] Ktesias, Persic. c. 52.

[7] Thucyd. viii, 28. See Vol. VII, ch. lxi, p. 389 of this History.

[8] Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 14. Compare Xen. Œconom. iv, 20.

[9] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 2; i, 9, 7; Xen. Hellen. i, 4, 3.

[10] Xen. Anab. i, 9, 3-5. Compare Cyropædia, i, 2, 4-6; viii, 1, 16, etc.

[11] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 2-6; Xen. Anab. *ut sup.*

[12] See Vol. VIII. ch. lxiv, p. 135.

[13] Darius had had thirteen children by Parysatis; but all except Artaxerxes and Cyrus died young. Ktesias asserts that he heard this statement from Parysatis herself (Ktesias, Persica, c. 49).

[14] Herodot. vii, 4.

[15] Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 8, 9; Thucyd. viii, 58.

Compare Xen. Cyropæd. viii, 3, 10; and Lucian, Navigium seu Vota, c. 30. vol. iii, p. 267, ed. Hemsterhuys with Du Soul's note.

It is remarkable that, in this passage of the Hellenica, either Xenophon, or the copyist, makes the mistake of calling Xerxes (instead of Artaxerxes) father of Darius. Some of the editors, without any authority from MSS., wish to alter the text from Ξέρξου to Ἀρταξέρξου.

[16] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 12.

[17] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 4.

[18] So it is presented by Justin, v, 11.

[19] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 6; i, 4, 2.

[20] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 7, 8, ὥστε οὐδὲν ἤχθετο (the king) αὐτῶν πολεμοῦντων.

[21] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 9; ii, 6, 3. The statements here contained do not agree with Diodor. xiv, 12; while both of them differ from Isokrates (Orat. viii, De Pace, s. 121; Or. xii, Panath. s. 111), and Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 6.

I follow partially the narrative of Diodorus, so far as to suppose that the tyranny which he mentions was committed by Klearchus as Harmost of Byzantium. We know that there was a Lacedæmonian Harmost in that town, named as soon as the town was taken, by Lysander, after the battle of Ægospotami (Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 2). This was towards the end of 405 B.C. We know farther, from the Anabasis, that Kleander was Harmost there in 400 B.C. Klearchus may have been Harmost there in 404 B.C.

[22] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 10; Herodot. vii, 6; ix, 1; Plato, Menon, c. 1, p. 70; c. 11, p. 78 C.

[23] Herodot. i. 96. Ὁ δὲ (Dëiokês) οἷα μνώμενος ἀρχὴν, ἰθύς τε καὶ δίκαιος ἦν.

Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 1, 1; Diodor. xiv, 19.

[24] Xen. Anab. 1, 9, 8. Πολλάκις δ᾽ ἰδεῖν ἦν ἀνὰ τὰς στειβομένας ὁδοὺς, καὶ ποδῶν καὶ χειρῶν καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν στερουμένους ἀνθρώπους.

For other samples of mutilation inflicted by Persians, not merely on malefactors, but on prisoners by wholesale, see Quintus Curtius, v. 5, 6. Alexander the Great was approaching near to Persepolis, "quum miserabile agmen, inter pauca fortunæ exempla memorandum, regi occurrit. Captivi erant Græci ad quatuor millia ferè, quos Persæ vario suppliciorum modo affecerunt. Alios pedibus, quosdam manibus auribusque, amputatis, inustisque barbararum literarum notis, in longum sui ludibrium reservaverant," etc. Compare Diodorus, xvii, 69; and the prodigious tales of cruelty recounted in Herodot. ix, 112; Ktesias, Persic. c. 54-59; Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 14, 16, 17.

It is not unworthy of remark, that while there was nothing in which the Persian rulers displayed greater invention than in exaggerating bodily suffering upon a malefactor or an enemy,—at Athens, whenever any man was put to death by public sentence, the execution took place within the prison by administering a cup of hemlock, without even public exposure. It was the minimum of pain, as well as the minimum of indignity; as any one may see who reads the account of the death of Sokrates, given by Plato at the end of the Phædon.

It is certain, that, on the whole, the public sentiment in England is more humane now than it was in that day at Athens. Yet an Athenian public could not have borne the sight of a citizen publicly hanged or beheaded in the market-place. Much less could they have borne the sight of the prolonged tortures inflicted on Damiens at Paris in 1757 (a fair parallel to the Persian σκάφευσις described in Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 16), in the presence of an immense crowd of spectators, when every window commanding a view of the Place de Grève was let at a high price, and filled by the best company in Paris.

[25] Xen. Anab. i, 9, 13.

[26] Xen. Anab. i, 6, 6.

[27] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 2-3.

[28] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 1.

[29] Diodor. xiv, 21.

[30] Xen. Anab. vi, 4, 8. Τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἦσαν οὐ σπάνει βίου ἐκπεπλευκότες ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν μισθοφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τὴν Κύρου ἀρετὴν ἀκούοντες, οἱ μὲν καὶ ἄνδρας ἄγοντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ προσανελωκότες χρήματα, καὶ τούτων ἕτεροι ἀποδεδρακότες πατέρας καὶ μητέρας, οἱ δὲ καὶ τέκνα καταλιπόντες, ὡς χρήματα αὐτοῖς κτησάμενοι ἥξοντες πάλιν, ἀκούοντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς παρὰ Κύρῳ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ πράττειν. Τοιοῦτοι οὖν ὄντες, ἐπόθουν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα σώζεσθαι. Compare v. 10, 10.

[31] Compare similar praises of Ptolemy Philadelphus, in order to attract Greek mercenaries from Sicily to Egypt (Theokrit. xiv, 50-59).

[32] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4. Ὑπισχνεῖτο δὲ αὐτῷ (Proxenus to Xenophon) εἰ ἔλθοι, φίλον Κύρῳ ποιήσειν· ὃν αὐτος ἔφη κρείττω ἑαυτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος.

[33] Strabo, ix, p. 403. The story that Sokrates carried off Xenophon, wounded and thrown from his horse, on his shoulders, and thus saved his life,—seems too doubtful to enter into the narrative.

Among the proofs that Xenophon was among the Horsemen or Ἱππεῖς of Athens, we may remark, not only his own strong interest, and great skill in horsemanship, in the cavalry service and the duties of its commander, and in all that relates to horses, as manifested in his published works,—but also the fact, that his son Gryllus

served afterwards among the Athenian horsemen at the combat of cavalry which preceded the great battle of Mantineia (Diogen. Laërt. ii, 54).

[34] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4-9; v. 9, 22-24.

[35] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 4; ii, 3, 19.

Diodorus (xiv, 11) citing from Ephorus affirms that the first revelation to Artaxerxes was made by Pharnabazus, who had learnt it from the acuteness of the Athenian exile Alkibiades. That the latter should have had any concern in it, appears improbable. But Diodorus on more than one occasion, confounds Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes.

[36] Diodor. xiv, 19.

[37] The parasang was a Persian measurement of length, but according to Strabo, not of uniform value in all parts of Asia; in some parts, held equivalent to thirty stadia, in others to forty, in others to sixty (Strabo, xi, p. 518; Forbiger, Handbuch der Alten Geograph. vol. i, p. 555). This variability of meaning is no way extraordinary, when we recollect the difference between English, Irish, and German miles, etc.

Herodotus tells us distinctly what *he* meant by a parasang, and what the Persian government of his day recognized as such in their measurement of the great road from Sardis to Susa, as well as in their measurements of territory for purposes of tribute (Herod. v, 53; vi, 43). It was thirty Greek stadia = nearly three and a half English miles, or nearly three geographical miles. The distance between every two successive stations, on the road from Sardis to Susa, (which was "all inhabited and all secure," διὰ οἰκεομένης τε ἅπασα καὶ ἀσφολέος), would seem to have been measured and marked in parasangs and fractions of a parasang. It seems probable, from the account which Herodotus gives of the march of Xerxes (vii, 26), that this road passed from Kappadokia and across the river Halys, through Kelænæ and Kolossæ to Sardis; and therefore that the road which Cyrus took for his march, from Sardis at least as far as Kelænæ, must have been so measured and marked.

Xenophon also in his summing up of the route, (ii, 2, 6; vii, 8, 26) implies the parasang as equivalent to thirty stadia, while he gives for the most part, each day's journey measured in parasangs. Now even at the outset of the march, we have no reason to believe that there was any official measurer of road-progress accompanying the army, like Bæton, ὁ Βηματιστὴς Ἀλεξάνδρου, in Alexander's invasion; see Athenæus, x, p. 442, and Geier, Alexandri Magni Histor. Scriptt. p. 357. Yet Xenophon, throughout the whole march, even as far as Trebizond, states the day's march of the army in parasangs; not merely in Asia Minor, where there were roads, but through the Arabian desert between Thapsakus and Pylæ,—through the snows of Armenia,—and through the territory of the barbarous Chalybes. He tells us that in the desert of Arabia they marched ninety parasangs in thirteen days, or very nearly seven parasangs per day,—and that too under the extreme heat of summer. He tells us, farther, that in the deep snows of Armenia, and in the extremity of winter, they marched fifteen parasangs in three days; and through the territory (also covered with snow) of the pugnacious Chalybes, fifty parasangs in seven days, or more than seven parasangs per day. Such marches, at thirty stadia for the parasang, are impossible. And how did Xenophon measure the distance marched over?

The most intelligent modern investigators and travellers,—Major Rennell, Mr. Ainsworth, Mr. Hamilton, Colonel Chesney, Professor Koch, etc., offer no satisfactory solution of the difficulty. Major Rennell reckons the parasangs as equal to 2.25 geogr. miles; Mr. Ainsworth at three geogr. miles; Mr. Hamilton (travels in Asia Minor, c. 42, p. 200), at something less than two and a half geogr. miles; Colonel Chesney (Euphrat. and Tigris, ch. 8, p. 207) at 2.608 geogr. miles between Sardis and Thapsakus—at 1.98 geogr. miles, between Thapsakus and Kunaxa,—at something less than this, without specifying how much, during the retreat. It is evident that there is no certain basis to proceed upon, even for the earlier portion of the route; much more, for the retreat. The distance between Ikonium and Dana (or Tyana), is one of the quantities on which Mr. Hamilton rests his calculation; but we are by no means certain that Cyrus took the direct route of march; he rather seems to have turned out of his way, partly to plunder Lykaonia, partly to conduct the Kilikian princess homeward. The other item, insisted upon by Mr. Hamilton, is the distance between Kelænæ and Kolossæ, two places the site of which seems well ascertained, and which are by the best modern maps, fifty-two geographical miles apart. Xenophon calls the distance twenty parasangs. Assuming the road by which he marched to have been the same with that now travelled, it would make the parasang of Xenophon = 2.6 geographical miles. I have before remarked that the road between Kolossæ and Kelænæ was probably measured and numbered according to parasangs; so that Xenophon, in giving the number of parasangs between these two places, would be speaking upon official authority.

Even a century and a half afterwards, the geographer Eratosthenes found it not possible to obtain accurate measurements, in much of the country traversed by Cyrus (Strabo, ii, p. 73.)

Colonel Chesney remarks,—"From Sardis to Cunaxa, or the mounds of Mohammed, cannot be much under or over twelve hundred and sixty-five geographical miles; making 2.364 geographical miles for each of the five hundred and thirty-five parasangs given by Xenophon between those two places."

As a measure of distance, the parasang of Xenophon is evidently untrustworthy. Is it admissible to consider, in the description of this march, that the parasangs and stadia of Xenophon are measurements rather of time than of space? From Sardis to Kelænæ, he had a measured road and numbered parasangs of distance; it is probable that the same mensuration and numeration continued for four days farther, as far as Keramôn-Agora, (since I imagine that the road from Kelænæ to the Halys and Kappadokia must have gone through these two places,)—and possibly it may have continued even as far as Ikonium or Dana. Hence, by these early marches, Xenophon had the opportunity of forming to himself roughly an idea of the time (measured by the course of the sun) which it took for the army to march one, two, or three parasangs; and when he came to the ulterior portions of the road, he called *that length of time* by the name of one, two, or three parasangs. Five parasangs seem to have meant with him a full day's march; three or four, a short day; six, seven, or eight, a long, or very long day.

We must recollect that the Greeks in the time of Xenophon had no portable means of measuring hours, and did not habitually divide the day into hours, or into any other recognized fraction. The Alexandrine astronomers, near two centuries afterwards, were the first to use ὥρη in the sense of hour (Ideler, Handbuch der Chronologie, vol. i, p. 239.)

This may perhaps help to explain Xenophon's meaning, when he talks about marching five or seven parasangs amidst the deep snows of Armenia; I do not however suppose that he had this meaning uniformly or steadily present to his mind. Sometimes, it would seem, he must have used the word in its usual meaning of distance.

[38] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 8, 9. About Kelænæ, Arrian, Exp. Al. i, 29, 2; Quint. Curt. iii, 1, 6.

[39] These three marches, each of ten parasangs, from Keramôn-Agora to Käystru-Pedion,—are the longest recorded in the Anabasis. It is rather surprising to find them so; for there seems no motive for Cyrus to have hurried forward. When he reached Käystru-Pedion, he halted five days. Koch (Zug der Zehn Tausend, Leipsic, 1850, p. 19) remarks that the three days' march, which seem to have dropped out of Xenophon's calculation, comparing the items with the total, might conveniently be let in here; so that these thirty parasangs should have occupied six days' march instead of three; five parasangs per day. The whole march which Cyrus had hitherto made from Sardis, including the road from Keramôn-Agora to Käystru-Pedion, lay in the great road from Sardis to the river Halys, Kappadokia, and Susa. That road (as we see by the March of Xerxes, Herodot. vii, 26; v, 52) passed through both Kelænæ and Kolossæ; though this is a prodigious departure from the straight line. At Käystru-Pedion, Cyrus seems to have left this great road; taking a different route, in a direction nearly south-east towards Ikonium. About the point, somewhere near Synnada, where these different roads crossed, see Mr. Ainsworth, Trav. in the Track, p. 28.

I do not share the doubts which have been raised about Xenophon's accuracy, in his description of the route from Sardis to Ikonium; though the names of several of the places which he mentions are not known to us, and their sites cannot be exactly identified. There is a great departure from the straight line of bearing. But we at the present day assign more weight to that circumstance than is suited to the days of Xenophon. Straight roads, stretching systematically over a large region of country, are not of that age; the communications were probably all originally made, between one neighboring town and another, without much reference to saving of distance, and with no reference to any promotion of traffic between distant places.

It was just about this time that King Archelaus began to "cut straight roads" in Macedonia,—which Thucydides seems to note as a remarkable thing (ii, 100).

[40] Neither Thymbrium, nor Tyriæum, can be identified. But it seems that both must have been situated on the line of road now followed by the caravans from Smyrna to Konieh (Ikonium,) which line of road follows a direction between the mountains called Emir Dagh on the north-east, and those called Sultan Dagh on the south-west (Koch, Der Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 21, 22).

[41] Εἶχον δὲ πάντες κράνη χαλκᾶ, καὶ χιτῶνας φοινικοῦς, καὶ κνημῖδας, καὶ *τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐκκεκαθαρμένας*.

When the hoplite was on march, without expectation of an enemy, the shield seems to have been carried behind him, with his blanket attached to it (see Aristoph. Acharn. 1085, 1089-1149); it was slung by the strap round his neck and shoulder. Sometimes indeed he had an opportunity of relieving himself from the burden, by putting the shield in a baggage-wagon (Xen. Anab. i, 7, 20). The officers generally, and doubtless some soldiers, could command attendants to carry their shields for them (iv, 2, 20; Aristoph. 1, c.).

On occasion of this review, the shields were unpacked, rubbed, and brightened, as before a battle (Xen. Hell. vii, 5, 20); then fastened round the neck or shoulders, and held out upon the left arm, which was passed through the rings or straps attached to its concave or interior side.

Respecting the cases or wrappers of the shields, see a curious stratagem of the Syracusan Agathokles (Diodor. xx, 11). The Roman soldiers also carried their shields in leathern wrappers, when on march (Plutarch, Lucull. c. 27).

It is to be remarked that Xenophon, in enumerating the arms of the Cyreians, does not mention *breastplates*; which (though sometimes worn, see Plutarch, Dion. c. 30) were not usually worn by hoplites, who carried heavy shields. It is quite possible that *some* of the Cyreian infantry may have had breastplates as well as shields, since every soldier provided his own arms; but Xenophon states only what was common to all.

Grecian cavalry commonly wore a heavy breastplate, but had no shield.

[42] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 16-19.

[43] Xen. Anab. iii, 2, 25.

[44] This shorter and more direct pass crosses the Taurus by Kizil-Chesmeh, Alan Buzuk, and Mizetli; it led directly to the Kilikian seaport-town Soli, afterwards called Pompeiopolis. It is laid down in the Peutinger Tables as the road from Iconium to Pompeiopolis (Ainsworth, p. 40 *seq.*; Chesney, Euph. and Tigr. ii, p. 209).

[45] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 20.

[46] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 21; Diodor. xiv, 20. See Mr. Kinneir, Travels in Asia Minor, p. 116; Col. Chesney, Euphrates and Tigris, vol. i, p. 293-354; and Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 40 *seq.*; also his other work, Travels in Asia Minor, vol. ii. ch. 30, p. 70-77; and Koch, Der Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 26-172, for a description of this memorable pass.

Alexander the Great, as well as Cyrus, was fortunate enough to find this impregnable pass abandoned; as it appears, through sheer stupidity or recklessness of the satrap who ought to have defended it, and who had not even the same excuse for abandoning it as Syennesis had on the approach of Cyrus (Arrian. E. A. ii. 4; Curtius, iii, 9, 10, 11).

[47] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 23-27.

[48] Diodorus (xiv, 20) represents Syennesis as playing a double game, though reluctantly. He takes no notice of the proceeding of Epyaxa.

So Livy says, about the conduct of the Macedonian courtiers in regard to the enmity between Perseus and Demetrius, the two sons of Philip II. of Macedon: "Crescente in dies Philippi odio in Romanos, cui Perseus indulgeret, Demetrius summâ ope adversaretur, prospicientes animo exitum incauti a fraude fraternâ juvenis—*adjuvandum, quod futurum erat, rati, fovendamque spem potentioris, Perseo se adjungunt*," *etc.* (Livy, xl, 5).

[49] See Herodot. v. 49.

[50] Xen. Anab. i, 3, 1.

[51] Xen. Anab. ii, 6, 5-15.

[52] Xen. Anab. i, 3, 2-7. Here, as on other occasions, I translate the sense rather than the words.

[53] Xen. Anab. i, 3, 16-21.

[54] The breadth of the river Sarus (Scihun) is given by Xenophon at three hundred feet; which agrees nearly with the statements of modern travellers (Koch, Der Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 34).

Compare, for the description of this country, Kinneir's Journey through Asia Minor, p. 135; Col. Chesney, Euphrates and Tigris, ii, p. 211; Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 54.

Colonel Chesney affirms that neither the Sarus nor the Pyramus is fordable. There must have been bridges; which, in the then flourishing state of Kilikia, is by no means improbable. He and Mr. Ainsworth, however, differ as to the route which they suppose Cyrus to have taken between Tarsus and Issus.

Xenophon mentions nothing about the Amanian Gates, which afterwards appear noticed both in Arrian (ii, 6; ii, 7) and in Strabo (xiv, p. 676). The various data of ancient history and geography about this region are by no means easy to reconcile; see a valuable note of Mützel on Quintus Curtius, iii, 17, 7. An inspection of the best recent maps, either Colonel Chesney's or Kiepert's, clears up some of these better than any verbal description. We see by these maps that Mount Amanus bifurcates into two branches, one of them flanking the Gulf of Issus on its western, the other on its eastern side. There are thus two different passes, each called Pylæ Amanides or Amanian Gates; one having reference to the Western Amanus, the other to the Eastern. The former was crossed by Alexander, the latter by Darius, before the battle of Issus; and Arrian (ii, 6; ii, 7) is equally correct in saying of both of them that they passed the Amanian Gates; though both did not pass the same gates.

[55] Diodor. xiv. 21.

[56] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 3-5. Ἀβροκόμας δ᾽ οὐ τοῦτο ἐποίησεν ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ ἤκουσε Κῦρον ἐν Κιλικίᾳ ὄντα, ἀναστρέψας ἐκ Φοινίκης, παρὰ βασιλέα ἀπήλαυνεν, etc.

[57] Diodor. xiv.

[58] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 6. To require the wives or children of generals in service, as hostages for fidelity, appears to have been not unfrequent with Persian kings. On the other hand, it was remarked as a piece of gross obsequiousness in the Argeian Nikostratus, who commanded the contingent of his countrymen serving under Artaxerxes Ochus in Egypt, that he volunteered to bring up his son to the king as a hostage, without being demanded (Theopompus, Frag. 135 [ed. Wichers] ap. Athenæ. vi, p. 252).

[59] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 7-9.

[60] Diodor. xiv, 21.

[61] See the remarks of Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 58-61; and other citations respecting the difficult road through the pass of Beilan, in Mützel's valuable notes on Quintus Curtius, iii, 20, 13, p. 101.

[62] Neither the Chalus, nor the Daradax, nor indeed the road followed by Cyrus in crossing Syria from the sea to the Euphrates, can be satisfactorily made out (Koch, Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 36, 37).

Respecting the situation of Thapsakus,—placed erroneously by Rennell lower down the river at Deir, where it stands marked even in the map annexed to Col. Chesney's Report on the Euphrates, and by Reichard higher up the river, near Bir—see Ritter, Erdkunde, part x, B. iii; West Asien, p. 14-17, with the elaborate discussion, p. 972-978, in the same volume; also the work of Mr. Ainsworth above cited, p. 70. The situation of Thapsakus is correctly placed in Colonel Chesney's last work (Euphr. and Tigr. p. 213), and in the excellent map accompanying that work; though I dissent from his view of the march of Cyrus between the pass of Beilan and Thapsakus.

Thapsakus appears to have been the most frequented and best-known passage over the Euphrates, throughout the duration of the Seleukid kings, down to 100 B.C. It was selected as a noted point, to which observations and calculations might be conveniently referred, by Eratosthenes and other geographers (see Strabo, ii, p. 79-87). After the time when the Roman empire became extended to the Euphrates, the new Zeugma, higher up the river near Bir or Bihrejik (about the 37th parallel of latitude) became more used and better known, at least to the Roman writers.

The passage at Thapsakus was in the line of road from Palmyra to Karrhæ in Northern Mesopotamia; also from Seleukeia (on the Tigris below Bagdad) to the other cities founded in Northern Syria by Seleukus Nikator and his successors, Antioch on the Orontes, Seleukeia in Pieria, Laodikeia, Antioch ad Taurum, etc.

The ford at Thapsakus (says Mr. Ainsworth, p. 69, 70) "is celebrated to this day as the ford of the Anezeh or Beduins. On the right bank of the Euphrates there are the remains of a paved causeway leading to the very banks of the river, and continued on the opposite side."

[63] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 12-18.

[64] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 18. Compare (Plutarch, Alexand. 17) analogous expressions of flattery—from the historians of Alexander, affirming that the sea near Pamphylia providentially made way for him—from the inhabitants on the banks of the Euphrates, when the river was passed by the Roman legions and the Parthian prince Tiridates, in the reign of the Emperor Tiberius (Tacitus, Annal. vi. 37); and by Lucullus still earlier (Plutarch, Lucull. c. 24).

The time when Cyrus crossed the Euphrates, must probably have been about the end of July or beginning of August. Now the period of greatest height, in the waters of the Euphrates near this part of its course, is from the 21st to the 28th of May; the period when they are lowest, is about the middle of November (see Colonel Chesney's Report on the Euphrates, p. 5). Rennell erroneously states that they are lowest in August and September (Expedit, of Xenophon, p. 277). The waters would thus be at a sort of mean height, when Cyrus passed.

Mr. Ainsworth states that there were only twenty inches of water in the ford at Thapsakus, from October 1841 to February 1842; the steamers Nimrod and Nitocris then struck upon it (p. 72), though the steamers Euphrates and Tigris had passed over it without difficulty in the month of May.

[65] Xenophon gives these nine days of march as covering fifty parasangs (Anab. i, 4, 19). But Koch remarks that the distance is not half so great as that from the sea to Thapsakus; which latter Xenophon gives at sixty-five parasangs. There is here some confusion; together with the usual difficulty in assigning any given distance as the equivalent of the parasang (Koch, Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 38).

[66] See the remarkable testimony of Mr. Ainsworth, from personal observation, to the accuracy of Xenophon's description of the country, even at the present day.

[67] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 24.

[68] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 4-8.

[69] I infer that the army halted here five or six days, from the story afterwards told respecting the Ambrakiot Silanus, the prophet of the army; who, on sacrificing, had told Cyrus that his brother would not fight for ten days (i, 7, 16). This sacrifice must have been offered, I imagine, during the halt—not during the distressing march which preceded. The ten days named by Silanus, expired on the fourth day after they left Pylæ.

It is in reference to this portion of the course of the Euphrates, from the Chaboras southward down by Anah and Hit (the ancient Is, noticed by Herodotus, and still celebrated from its unexhausted supply of bitumen), between latitude 35½° and 34°—that Colonel Chesney, in his Report on the Navigation of the Euphrates (p. 2), has the following remarks:—

"The scenery above Hit, in itself very picturesque, is greatly heightened, as one is carried along the current, by the frequent recurrence, at very short intervals, of ancient irrigating aqueducts; these beautiful specimens of art and durability are attributed by the Arabs to the times of the ignorant, meaning (as is expressly understood) the Persians, when fire-worshippers, and in possession of the world. They literally cover both banks, and prove that the borders of the Euphrates were once thickly inhabited by a people far advanced indeed in the application of hydraulics to domestic purposes, of the first and greatest utility—the transport of water. The greater portion is now more or less in ruins, but some have been repaired, and kept up for use either to grind corn or to irrigate. The aqueducts are of stone, firmly cemented, narrowing to about two feet or twenty inches at top, placed at right angles to the current, and carried various distances towards the interior, from two hundred to one thousand two hundred yards.

"But what most concerns the subject of this memoir is, the existence of a parapet wall or stone rampart in the river, just above the several aqueducts. In general, there is one of the former attached to each of the latter. And almost invariably, between two mills on the opposite banks, one of them crosses the stream from side to side, with the exception of a passage left in the centre for boats to pass up and down. The object of these subaqueous walls would appear to be exclusively, to raise the water sufficiently at low seasons, to give it impetus, as well as a more abundant supply to the wheels. And their effect at those times is, to create a fall in every part of the width, save the opening left for commerce, through which the water rushes with a moderately irregular surface. These dams were probably from four to eight feet high originally; but they are now frequently a bank of stones disturbing the evenness of the current, but always affording a sufficient passage for large boats at low seasons."

The marks which Colonel Chesney points out, of previous population and industry on the banks of the Euphrates at this part of its course, are extremely interesting and curious, when contrasted with the desolation de-

picted by Xenophon; who mentions that there were no other inhabitants than some who lived by cutting millstones from the stone quarries near, and sending them to Babylon in exchange for grain. It is plain that the population, of which Colonel Chesney saw the remaining tokens, either had already long ceased, or did not begin to exist, or to construct their dams and aqueducts, until a period later than Xenophon. They probably began during the period of the Seleukid kings, after the year 300 B.C. For this line of road along the Euphrates began then to acquire great importance as the means of communication between the great city of Seleukeia (on the Tigris, below Bagdad) and the other cities founded by Seleukus Nikator and his successors in the North of Syria and Asia Minor—Seleukeia in Pieria, Antioch, Laodikeia, Apameia, etc. This route coincides mainly with the present route from Bagdad to Aleppo, crossing the Euphrates at Thapsakus. It can hardly be doubted that the course of the Euphrates was better protected during the two centuries of the Seleukid kings (B.C. 300-100, speaking in round numbers), than it came to be afterwards, when that river became the boundary line between the Romans and the Parthians. Even at the time of the Emperor Julian's invasion, however, Ammianus Marcellinus describes the left bank of the Euphrates, north of Babylonia, as being in several parts well cultivated, and furnishing ample subsistence, (Ammian. Marc. xxiv, 1). At the time of Xenophon's Anabasis, there was nothing to give much importance to the banks of the Euphrates north of Babylonia.

Mr. Ainsworth describes the country on the left bank of the Euphrates, before reaching Pylæ, as being now in the same condition as it was when Xenophon and his comrades marched through it,—"full of hills and narrow valleys, and presenting many difficulties to the movement of an army. The illustrator was, by a curious accident, left by the Euphrates steamer on this very portion of the river, and on the same side as the Perso-Greek army, and he had to walk a day and a night across these inhospitable regions; so that he can speak feelingly of the difficulties which the Greeks had to encounter." (Travels in the Track, etc. p. 81.)

[70] I incline to think that Charmandê must have been nearly opposite Pylæ, lower down than Hit. But Major Rennell (p. 107) and Mr. Ainsworth (p. 84) suppose Charmandê to be the same place as the modern Hit (the Is of Herodotus). There is no other known town with which we can identify it.

[71] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 11-17.

[72] The commentators agree in thinking that we are to understand by Pylæ a sort of gate or pass, marking the spot where the desert country north of Babylonia—with its undulations of land, and its steep banks along the river—was exchanged for the flat and fertile alluvium constituting Babylonia proper. Perhaps there was a town near the pass, and named after it.

Now it appears from Col. Chesney's survey that this alteration in the nature of the country takes place a few miles below Hit. He observes—(Euphrates and Tigris, vol. i, p. 54)—"Three miles below Hit, the remains of aqueducts disappear, and the windings become shorter and more frequent, as the river flows through a tract of country almost level." Thereabouts it is that I am inclined to place Pylæ.

Colonel Chesney places it lower down, twenty-five miles from Hit. Professor Koch (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 44), lower down still. Mr. Ainsworth places it as much as seventy geographical miles lower than Hit (Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 81); compare Ritter, Erdkunde, West Asien, x. p. 16; xi, pp. 755-763.

[73] The description given of this scene (known to the Greeks through the communications of Klearchus) by Xenophon, is extremely interesting (Anab. i, 6). I omit it from regard to space.

[74] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 2-9.

[75] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 16.

[76] See Herodot. vii, 102, 103, 209. Compare the observations of the Persian Achæmenês, c. 236.

[77] Herod. vii, 104. Demaratus says to Xerxes, respecting the Lacedæmonians—Ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ἐόντες, οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσι· ἔπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης, νόμος, τὸν ὑποδειμαίνουσι πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ σοὶ σέ.

Again, the historian observes about the Athenians, and their extraordinary increase of prowess after having shaken off the despotism of Hippias (v. 78)—Δηλοῖ δ᾽ οὐ καθ᾽ ἓν μόνον ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ, ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὡς ἐστι χρῆμα σπουδαῖον· εἰ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννευόμενοι μὲν, οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφέας περιοικεόντων ἦσαν τὰ πολέμια ἀμείνους, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων, μακρῷ πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο. Δηλοῖ ὧν ταῦτα, ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν ἐθελοκακεέον, ὡς δεσπότῃ ἐργαζόμενοι· ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ, αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἑωϋτῷ προθυμέετο ἐργάζεσθαι.

Compare Menander, Fragm. Incert. CL. ap. Meineke, Fragm. Comm. Græc. vol. iv. p. 268—

Ἐλεύθερος πᾶς ἐνὶ δεδούλωται, νόμῳ·

Δυσὶν δὲ δοῦλος, καὶ νόμῳ καὶ δεσπότῃ.

[78] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 14-17.

[79] From Pylæ to the undefended trench, there intervened three entire days of march, and one part of a day; for it occurred in the fourth day's march.

Xenophon calls the three entire days, twelve parasangs in all. This argues short marches, not full marches. And it does not seem that the space of ground traversed during any one of them can have been considerable. For they were all undertaken with visible evidences of an enemy immediately in front of them; which circumstance was the occasion of the treason of Orontes, who asked Cyrus for a body of cavalry, under pretence of attacking the light troops of the enemy in front, and then wrote a letter to inform Artaxerxes that he was about to desert with his division. The letter was delivered to Cyrus, who thus discovered the treason.

Marching with a known enemy not far off in front, Cyrus must have kept his army in something like battle order, and therefore must have moved slowly. Moreover the discovery of the treason of Orontes must itself have been an alarming fact, well calculated to render both Cyrus and Klearchus doubly cautious for the time. And the very trial of Orontes appears to have been conducted under such solemnities as must have occasioned a halt of the army.

Taking these circumstances, we can hardly suppose the Greeks to have got over so much as thirty English miles of ground in the three entire days of march. The fourth day they must have got over very little ground indeed; not merely because Cyrus was in momentary expectation of the King's main army, and of a general battle (i, 7, 14), but because of the great delay necessary for passing the trench. His whole army (more than one hundred thousand men), with baggage, chariots, etc., had to pass through the narrow gut of twenty feet wide between the trench and the Euphrates. He can hardly have made more than five miles in this whole day's march, getting at night so far as to encamp two or three miles beyond the trench. We may therefore reckon the distance marched over between Pylæ and the trench as about thirty-two miles in all; and two or three miles farther to the encampment of the next night. Probably Cyrus would keep near the river, yet not following its bends with absolute precision; so that in estimating distance, we ought to take a mean between the straight line and the full windings of the river.

I conceive the trench to have cut the Wall of Media at a much wider angle than appears in Col. Chesney's map; so that the triangular space included between the trench, the Wall, and the river, was much more extensive. The reason, we may presume, why the trench was cut, was, to defend that portion of the well-cultivated and watered country of Babylonia which lay outside of the Wall of Media—which portion (as we shall see hereafter in the marches of the Greeks after the battle) was very considerable.

[80] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 20. The account given by Xenophon of this long line of trench, first dug by order of Artaxerxes, and then left useless and undefended, differs from the narrative of Diodorus (xiv, 22), which seems to be borrowed from Ephorus. Diodorus says that the king caused a long trench to be dug, and lined with carriages and waggons as a defence for his baggage; and that he afterwards marched forth from this entrenchment, with his soldiers free and unincumbered, to give battle to Cyrus. This is a statement more plausible than that of Xenophon, in this point of view, that it makes out the king to have acted upon a rational scheme; whereas in Xenophon he appears at first to have adopted a plan of defence, and then to have renounced it, after immense labor and cost, without any reason, so far as we can see. Yet I have no doubt that the account of Xenophon is the true one. The narrow passage, and the undefended trench, were both facts of the most obvious and impressive character to an observing soldier.

[81] Xenophon does not mention the name Kunaxa, which comes to us from Plutarch (Artaxerx. c. 8), who states that it was five hundred stadia (about fifty-eight miles) from Babylon; while Xenophon was informed that the field of battle was distant from Babylon only three hundred and sixty stadia. Now, according to Colonel Chesney (Euphrates and Tigris, vol. i, p. 57), Hillah (Babylon) is distant ninety-one miles by the river, or sixty-one and a half miles direct, from Felujah. Following therefore the distance given by Plutarch (probably copied from Ktesias), we should place Kunaxa a little lower down the river than Felujah. This seems the most probable supposition.

Rennell and Mr. Baillie Fraser so place it (Mesopotamia and Assyria, p. 186, Edin. 1842), I think rightly; moreover the latter remarks, what most of the commentators overlook, that the Greeks did not pass through the Wall of Media until long after the battle. See a note a little below, near the beginning of my next chapter, in reference to that Wall.

[82] The distance of the undefended trench from the battle-field of Kunaxa would be about twenty-two miles. First, three miles beyond the trench, to the first night-station; next, a full day's march, say twelve miles; thirdly, a half day's march, to the time of the mid-day halt, say seven miles.

The distance from Pylæ to the trench having before been stated at thirty-two miles, the whole distance from Pylæ to Kunaxa will be about fifty-four miles.

Now Colonel Chesney has stated the distance from Hit to Felujah Castle (two known points) at forty-eight miles of straight line, and seventy-seven miles, if following the line of the river. Deduct four miles for the distance from Hit to Pylæ, and we shall then have between Pylæ and Felujah, a rectilinear distance of forty-four miles. The marching route of the Greeks (as explained in the previous note, the Greeks following generally, but not exactly, the windings of the river) will give fifty miles from Pylæ to Felujah, and fifty-three or fifty-four from Pylæ to Kunaxa.

[83] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 8-11.

[84] Thucyd. v. 70. See Vol. VII, ch. lvi, p. 84 of this History.

[85] Plutarch (Artaxerx. c. 8) makes this criticism upon Klearchus; and it seems quite just.

[86] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 17; Diodor. xiv, 23.

[87] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 17-20.

[88] Xen. Anab i, 10, 4-8.

[89] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 23; i, 9, 31.

[90] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 21.

Κῦρος δὲ, ὁρῶν τοὺς Ἕλληνας νικῶντας τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς καὶ διώκοντας, ἡδόμενος καὶ προσκυνούμενος ἤδη ὡς βασιλεὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφ᾽ αὐτὸν, *οὐδ᾽ ὡς ἐξήχθη διώκειν*, etc.

The last words are remarkable, as indicating that no other stimulus except that of ambitious rivalry and fraternal antipathy, had force enough to overthrow the self-command of Cyrus.

[91] Compare the account of the transport of rage which seized the Theban Pelopidas, when he saw Alexander the despot of Pheræ in the opposite army; which led to the same fatal consequences (Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 32; Cornel. Nepos, Pelop. c. 5). See also the reflections of Xenophon on the conduct of Teleutas before Olynthus.—Hellenic. v. 3, 7.

[92] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 22-29. The account of this battle and of the death of Cyrus by Ktesias (as far as we can make it out from the brief abstract in Photius—Ktesias, Fragm. c. 58, 59, ed. Bähr) does not differ materially from Xenophon. Ktesias mentions the Karian soldier (not noticed by Xenophon) who hurled the javelin; and adds that this soldier was afterwards tortured and put to death by Queen Parysatis, in savage revenge for the death of Cyrus. He also informs us that Bagapatês, the person who by order of Artaxerxes cut off the head and hand of Cyrus, was destroyed by her in the same way.

Diodorus (xiv, 23) dresses up a much fuller picture of the conflict between Cyrus and his brother, which differs on many points, partly direct and partly implied, from Xenophon.

Plutarch (Artaxerxes, c. 11, 12, 13) gives an account of the battle, and of the death of Cyrus, which he professes to have derived from Ktesias, but which differs still more materially from the narrative in Xenophon. Compare also the few words of Justin, v, 11.

Diodorus (xiv, 24) says that twelve thousand men were slain of the king's army at Kunaxa; the greater part of them by the Greeks under Klearchus, who did not lose a single man. He estimates the loss of Cyrus's Asiatic army at three thousand men. But as the Greeks did not lose a man, so they can hardly have killed many in the pursuit; for they had scarcely any cavalry, and no great number of peltasts,—while hoplites could not have overtaken the flying Persians.

[93] Xen. Anab. i, 10, 3. The accomplishments and fascinations of this Phokæan lady, and the great esteem in which she was held first by Cyrus and afterwards by Artaxerxes, have been exaggerated into a romantic story, in which we cannot tell what may be the proportion of truth (see Ælian, V. H. xii, 1; Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 26, 27; Justin, x, 2). Both Plutarch and Justin state that the subsequent enmity between Artaxerxes and his son Darius, which led to the conspiracy of the latter against his father, and to his destruction when the conspiracy was discovered, arose out of the passion of Darius for her. But as that transaction certainly happened at the close of the long life and reign of Artaxerxes, who reigned forty-six years—and as she must have been then sixty years old, if not more—we may fairly presume that the cause of the family tragedy must have been something different.

Compare the description of the fate of Berenikê of Chios, and Monimê of Miletus, wives of Mithridates king of Pontus, during the last misfortunes of that prince (Plutarch, Lucullus, c. 18).

[94] Xen. Anab. i, 10, 17. This provision must probably have been made during the recent halt at Pylæ.

[95] Xen. Anab. i, 10, 18, 19.

[96] Xen. Anab. ii. 1, 3, 4.

[97] Isokrates, Orat. iv, (Panegyric.) s. 175-182; a striking passage, as describing the way in which political institutions work themselves into the individual character and habits.

[98] Diodorus (xiv, 23) notices the legendary pair of hostile brothers, Eteokles and Polyneikes, as a parallel. Compare Tacitus, Annal. iv, 60. "Atrox Drusi ingenium, super cupidinem potentiæ, et *solita fratribus odia*, accendebatur invidia, quod mater Agrippina promptior Neroni erat," etc.; and Justin, xlii, 4.

Compare also the interesting narrative of M. Prosper Mérimée, in his life of Don Pedro of Castile; a prince commonly known by the name of Peter the Cruel. Don Pedro was dethroned, and slain in personal conflict, by the hand of his bastard brother, Henri of Transtamare.

At the battle of Navarrete, in 1367, says M. Mérimée, "Don Pèdre, qui, pendant le combat, s'était jété au plus fort de la mêlée, s'acharna long temps à la poursuite des fuyards. On le voyait galoper dans la plaine, monté sur un cheval noir, sa bannière armoriée de Castille devant lui, cherchant son frère partout où l'on combattait encore, et criant, échauffé par le carnage—'Où est ce bâtard, qui se nomme roi de Castille?'" (Histoire de Don Pèdre, p. 504.)

Ultimately Don Pedro, blocked up and almost starved out in the castle of Montiel, was entrapped by simulated negotiations into the power of his enemies. He was slain in personal conflict by the dagger of his brother Henri, after a desperate struggle, in which he seemed likely to prevail, if Henri had not been partially aided by a bystander.

This tragical scene (on the night of the 23d of March, 1369) is graphically described by M. Mérimée (p. 564-566).

[99] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4. Ὑπισχνεῖτο δὲ αὐτῷ (Ξενοφῶντα Πρόξενος) εἰ ἔλθοι, φίλον Κύρῳ ποιήσειν· *ὃν αὐτός ἔφη κρείττω ἑαυτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος.*

[100] Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 5-7.

[101] We know from Plutarch (Artaxer. c. 13) that Ktesias distinctly asserted himself to have been present at this interview, and I see no reason why we should not believe him. Plutarch indeed rejects his testimony as false, affirming that Xenophon would certainly have mentioned him, had he been there; but such an objection seems to me insufficient. Nor is it necessary to construe the words of Xenophon, ἦν δ' αὐτῶν Φαλῖνος *εἷς Ἕλλην,* (ii, 1, 7) so strictly as to negative the presence of one or two other Greeks. Phalinus is thus specified because he was the spokesman of the party—a military man.

[102] Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 12 μὴ οὖν οἷου τὰ μόνα ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα ὑμῖν παραδώσειν· ἀλλὰ σὺν τούτοις καὶ περὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων ἀγαθῶν μαχούμεθα.

[103] Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 14-22. Diodorus (xiv, 25) is somewhat copious in his account of the interview with Phalinus. But he certainly followed other authorities besides Xenophon, if even it be true that he had Xenophon before him. The allusion to the past heroism of Leonidas seems rather in the style of Ephorus.

[104] Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 7-9. Koch remarks, however, with good reason, that it is difficult to see how they could get a wolf in Babylonia, for the sacrifice (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 51).

[105] Such is the sum total stated by Xenophon himself (Anab. ii, 1, 6). It is greater, by nine days, than the sum total which we should obtain by adding together the separate days' march specified by Xenophon from Sardis. But the distance from Sardis to Ephesus, as we know from Herodotus, was three days' journey (Herod. v, 55); and therefore the discrepancy is really only to the amount of six, not of nine. See Krüger ad Anabas. p. 556; Koch, Zug der Z. p. 141.

[106] Colonel Chesney (Euphrates and Tigris, c. ii, p. 208) calculates twelve hundred and sixty-five geographical miles from Sardis to Kunaxa or the Mounds of Mohammed.

[107] For example, we are not told how long they rested at Pylæ, or opposite to Charmandê. I have given some grounds (in the preceding chapter) for believing that it cannot have been less than five days. The army must have been in the utmost need of repose, as well as of provisions.

[108] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 9.

[109] Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 6, 7.

[110] Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 13. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, *ἐπορεύοντο ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχοντες τὸν ἥλιον*, λογιζόμενοι ἥξειν ἅμα ἡλίῳ δύνοντι εἰς κώμας τῆς Βαβυλωνίας χώρας· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθησαν.

Schneider, in his note on this passage, as well as Ritter, (Erdkunde, part. x, 3, p. 17), Mr. Ainsworth (Travels in the Track, p. 103) and Colonel Chesney (Euph. and Tigr. p. 219), understand the words here used by Xenophon in a sense from which I dissent. "When it was day, the army proceeded onward on their march, having the sun on their right hand,"—these words they understand as meaning that the army marched *northward*; whereas, in my judgment, the words intimate that the army marched *eastward*. *To have the sun on the right hand*, does not so much refer either to the precise point where, or to the precise instant when, the sun rises,—but to his diurnal path through the heavens, and to the general direction of the day's march. This may be seen by comparing the remarkable passage in Herodotus, iv, 42, in reference to the alleged circumnavigation of Africa, from the Red Sea round the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Gibraltar, by the Phœnicians under the order of Nekos. These Phœnicians said, "that in sailing round Africa (from the Red Sea) they had the sun on their right hand"—ὡς τὴν Λιβύην περιπλώοντες *τὸν ἡέλιον ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ*. Herodotus rejects this statement as incredible. Not knowing the phenomena of a southern latitude beyond the tropic of Capricorn, he could not imagine that men in sailing from East to West could possibly have the sun on their right hand; any man journeying from the Red Sea to the Straits of Gibraltar must, in his judgment, have the sun on the *left* hand, as he himself had always experienced in the north latitude of the Mediterranean or the African coast. See Vol. III. of this History, ch. xviii, p. 282.

In addition to this reason, we may remark, that Ariæus and the Greeks, starting from their camp on the banks of the Euphrates (the place where they had passed the last night but one before the battle of Kunaxa) and marching *northward*, could not expect to arrive, and could not really arrive, at villages of the Babylonian territory. But they might naturally expect to do so, if they marched *eastward*, towards the Tigris. Nor would they have hit upon the enemy in a northerly march, which would in fact have been something near to a return upon their own previous steps. They would moreover have been stopped by the undefended Trench, which could only be passed at the narrow opening close to the Euphrates.

[111] Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 20. This seems to have been a standing military jest, to make the soldiers laugh at their past panic. See the references in Krüger and Schneider's notes.

[112] Diodorus (xvi, 24) tells us that Ariæus intended to guide them towards Paphlagonia; a very loose indication.

[113] Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 7, 13.

[114] Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 14, 17.

[115] Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 18-27.

[116] Ktesiæ Persica, Fragm. c. 59, ed. Bähr; compared with the remarkable Fragment. 18, preserved by the so-called Demetrius Phalêreus: see also Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 17.

[117] Herodot. i, 193; ii, 108; Strabo, xvii. p. 788.

[118] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 16; Thucyd. vii.

[119] Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 3-8.

[120] Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 12. Διελθόντες δὲ *τρεῖς σταθμοὺς*, ἀφίκοντο πρὸς τὸ Μηδίας καλούμενον τεῖχος, καὶ *παρῆλθον αὐτοῦ εἴσω*. It appears to me that these three days' march or σταθμοὶ can hardly be computed from the moment when they commenced their march under the conduct of Tissaphernes. On the other hand, if we begin from the moment when the Greeks started under conduct of Ariæus, we can plainly trace three distinct *resting places* (σταθμοὺς) before they reached the Wall of Media. First, at the villages where the confusion and alarm arose (ii, 13-21). Secondly, at the villages of abundant supply, where they concluded the truce with Tissaphernes, and waited twenty days for his return (ii, 3, 14; ii, 4, 9). Thirdly, one night's halt under the conduct of Tissaphernes, before they reached the Wall of Media. This makes three distinct stations or halting places, between the station (the first station after passing the undefended trench) from whence they started to begin their retreat under the conduct of Ariæus,—and the point where they traversed the Wall of Media.

[121] I reserve for this place the consideration of that which Xenophon states, in two or three passages, about the Wall of Media and about different canals in connection with the Tigris,—the result of which, as far as I can make it out, stands in my text.

I have already stated, in the preceding chapter, that in the march of the day next but one preceding the battle of Kunaxa, the army came to a deep and broad trench dug for defence across their line of way, with the exception of a narrow gut of twenty feet broad close by the Euphrates; through which gut the whole army passed. Xenophon says, "This trench had been carried upwards across the plain as far as the Wall of Media, where indeed, the canals are situated, flowing from the river Tigris; four canals, one hundred feet in breadth, and extremely deep, so that corn-bearing vessels sail along them. They strike into the Euphrates, they are distant each from the other by one parasang, and there are bridges over them—Παρετέτατο δ᾽ ἡ τάφρος ἄνω διὰ τοῦ πεδίου ἐπὶ δώδεκα παράσαγγας, μέχρι τοῦ Μηδίας τείχους, ἔνθα δὴ (the books print a full stop between τείχους and ἔνθα, which appears to me incorrect, as the sense goes on without interruption) εἰσιν αἱ διωρύχες, ἀπὸ τοῦ Τίγρητος ποταμοῦ ῥέουσαι· εἰσὶ δὲ τέτταρες, τὸ μὲν εὖρος πλεθριαῖαι, βαθεῖαι δὲ ἰσχυρῶς, καὶ πλοῖα πλεῖ ἐν αὐταῖς σιταγωγά· εἰσβάλλουσι δὲ εἰς τὸν Εὐφράτην, διαλείπουσι δ᾽ ἑκάστη παρασάγγην, γέφυραι δ᾽ ἔπεισιν. The present tense—εἰσιν αἱ διώρυχες—seems to mark the local reference of ἔνθα to the Wall of Media, and not to the actual march of the army.

Major Rennell (Illustrations of the Expedition of Cyrus, pp. 79-87, etc.), Ritter, (Erdkunde, x, p. 16), Koch, (Zug der Zehn Tausend, pp. 46, 47), and Mr. Ainsworth (Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 88) consider Xenophon to state that the Cyreian army on this day's march (the day but one before the battle) passed through the Wall of Media and over the four distinct canals reaching from the Tigris to the Euphrates. They all, indeed, contest the accuracy of this latter statement; Rennell remarking that the level of the Tigris, in this part of its course, is lower than that of the Euphrates; and that it could not supply water for so many broad canals so near to each other. Col. Chesney also conceives the army to have passed through the Wall of Media before the battle of Kunaxa.

It seems to me, however, that they do not correctly interpret the words of Xenophon, who does not say that Cyrus ever passed either the Wall of Media, or these four canals *before* the battle of Kunaxa, but who says (as Krüger, De Authentiâ Anabaseos, p. 12, prefixed to his edition of the Anabasis, rightly explains him), that these four canals flowing from the Tigris are at, or near, the Wall of Media, which the Greeks did not pass through until long *after* the battle, when Tissaphernes was conducting them towards the Tigris, two days' march before they reached Sittakê (Anab. ii, 4, 12).

It has been supposed, during the last few years, that the direction of the Wall of Media could be verified by actual ruins still subsisting on the spot. Dr. Ross and Captain Lynch (see journal of the Geographical Society, vol. ix. pp. 447-473, with Captain Lynch's map annexed) discovered a line of embankment which they considered to be the remnant of it. It begins on the western bank of the Tigris, in latitude 34° 3′, and stretches towards the Euphrates in a direction from N. N. E. to S. S. W. "It is a solitary straight single mound, twenty-five long paces thick, with a bastion on its western face at every fifty-five paces; and on the same side it has a deep ditch, twenty-seven paces broad. The wall is here built of the small pebbles of the country, imbedded in cement of lime of great tenacity; it is from thirty-five to forty feet in height, and runs in a straight line as far as the eye can trace it. The Bedouins tell me that it goes in the same straight line to two mounds called Ramelah on the Euphrates, some hours above Felujah; that it is, in places far inland, built of brick, and in some parts worn down to a level with the desert." (Dr. Ross, l. c. p. 446).

Upon the faith of these observations, the supposed wall (now called Sidd Nimrud by the natives) has been laid down as the Wall of Media reaching from the Tigris to the Euphrates, in the best recent maps, especially that of Colonel Chesney; and accepted as such by recent inquirers.

Nevertheless, subsequent observations, recently made known by Colonel Rawlinson to the Geographical Society, have contradicted the views of Dr. Ross as stated above, and shown that the Wall of Media, in the line here assigned to it, has no evidence to rest upon. Captain Jones, commander of the steamer at Bagdad, undertook, at the request of Colonel Rawlinson a minute examination of the locality, and ascertained that what had been laid down as the Wall of Media was merely a line of mounds; no wall at all, but a mere embankment, extending seven or eight miles from the Tigris, and designed to arrest the winter torrents and drain off the rain water of the desert into a large reservoir, which served to irrigate an extensive valley between the rivers.

From this important communication it results, that there is as yet no evidence now remaining for determining what was the line or position of the Wall of Media; which had been supposed to be a datum positively established, serving as premises from whence to deduce other positions mentioned by Xenophon. As our knowledge now stands, there is not a single point mentioned by Xenophon in Babylonia which can be positively verified, except Babylon itself,—and Pylæ, which is known pretty nearly, as the spot where Babylonia proper commences.

The description which Xenophon gives of the Wall of Media is very plain and specific. I see no reason to doubt that he actually saw it, passed through it, and correctly describes it in height as well as breadth. Its entire length he of course only gives from what he was told. His statement appears to me good evidence that there was a Wall of Media, which reached from the Tigris to the Euphrates, or perhaps to some canal cut from the Euphrates, though there exists no mark to show what was the precise locality and direction of the Wall. Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiv, 2), in the expedition of the emperor Julian, saw near Macepracta, on the left bank of the Euphrates, the ruins of a wall, "which in ancient times had stretched to a great distance for the defence of Assyria against foreign invasion." It is fair to presume that this was the Wall of Media; but the position of Macepracta cannot be assigned.

It is important, however, to remember,—what I have already stated in this note,—that Xenophon did not see, and did not cross either the Wall of Media, or the two canals here mentioned, until many days after the battle of Kunaxa.

We know from Herodotus that all the territory of Babylonia was intersected by canals, and that there was one canal greater than the rest and navigable, which flowed from the Euphrates to the Tigris, in a direction to the south of east. This coincides pretty well with the direction assigned in Colonel Chesney's map to the Nahr-Malcha or Regium Flumen, into which the four great canals, described by Xenophon as drawn from the Tigris to the Euphrates, might naturally discharge themselves, and still be said to fall into the Euphrates, of which the Nahr-Malcha was as it were a branch. How the level of the two rivers would adjust itself, when the space between them was covered with a network of canals great and small, and when a vast quantity of the water of both was exhausted in fertilizing the earth, is difficult to say.

The *island* wherein the Greeks stood, at their position near Sittakê, before crossing the Tigris, would be a parallelogram formed by the Tigris, the Nahr-Malcha, and the two parallel canals joining them. It might well be called a large island, containing many cities and villages, with a large population.

[122] There seems reason to believe that in ancient times the Tigris, above Bagdad, followed a course more to the westward, and less winding, than it does now. The situation of Opis cannot be verified. The ruins of a large city were seen by Captain Lynch near the confluence of the river Adhem with the Tigris, which he supposed to be Opis, in lat. 34°.

[123] Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 26.

[124] Ktesias, Fragm. 18, ed. Bähr.

[125] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 26-28.

Mannert, Rennell, Mr. Ainsworth, and most modern commentators, identify this town of Καινὰι or Kænæ with the modern town Senn; which latter place Mannert (Geogr. der Röm. v. p. 333) and Rennell (Illustrations p. 129) represent to be near the Lesser Zab instead of the Greater Zab.

To me it appears that the locality assigned by Xenophon to Καινὰι, does not at all suit the modern town of Senn. Nor is there much real similarity of name between the two; although our erroneous way of pronouncing

the Latin name *Caenae*, creates a delusive appearance of similarity. Mr. Ainsworth shows that some modern writers have been misled in the same manner by identifying the modern town of Sert with Tigrano-*certa*.

It is a perplexing circumstance in the geography of Xenophon's work, that he makes no mention of the Lesser Zab, which yet he must have crossed. Herodotus notices them both, and remarks on the fact that though distinct rivers, both bore the same name (v, 52). Perhaps in drawing up his narrative after the expedition, Xenophon may have so far forgotten, as to fancy that two synonymous rivers mentioned as distinct in his memoranda, were only one.

[126] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 2-15.

[127] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 17-23. This last comparison is curious, and in all probability the genuine words of the satrap—τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ τιάραν βασιλεῖ μόνῳ ἔξεστιν ὀρθὴν ἔχειν, τὴν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ ἴσως ἂν ὑμῶν παρόντων καὶ ἕτερος εὐπετῶς ἔχοι.

[128] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 30.

[129] Xen. Anab. ii, 6, 1. Ktesiæ Frag. Persica, c. 60, ed. Bähr; Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 19, 20; Diodor. xiv, 27.

[130] Tacit. Histor. i, 45. "Othoni nondum auctoritas inerat ad *prohibendum* scelus; *jubere* jam poterat. Ita, simulatione iræ, vinciri jussum (Marium Celsum) et majores pœnas daturum, affirmans, præsenti exitio subtraxit."

Ktesias (Persica, c. 60; compare Plutarch and Diodorus as referred to in the preceding note) attests the treason of Menon, which he probably derived from the story of Menon himself. Xenophon mentions the ignominious death of Menon, and he probably derived his information from Ktesias (see Anabasis, ii, 6, 29).

The supposition that it was Parysatis who procured the death of Menon, in itself highly probable, renders all the different statements consistent and harmonious.

[131] Xenophon seems to intimate that there were various stories current, which he does not credit, to the disparagement of Menon,—καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἀφανῆ ἔξεστι περὶ αὐτοῦ ψεύδεσθαι, etc. (Anab. ii, 6, 28).

Athenæus (xi, p. 505) erroneously states that Xenophon affirmed Menon to be the person who caused the destruction of Klearchus by Tissaphernes.

[132] Xenophon in the Cyropædia (viii, 8, 3) gives a strange explanation of the imprudent confidence reposed by Klearchus in the assurance of the Persian satrap. It arose (he says) from the high reputation for good faith which the Persians had acquired by the undeviating and scrupulous honor of the first Cyrus (or Cyrus the Great), but which they had since ceased to deserve, though the corruption of their character had not before publicly manifested itself.

This is a curious perversion of history to serve the purpose of his romance.

[133] Macciavelli, Principe, c. 18, p. 65.

[134] Polyæn. vii, 18.

[135] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 27, 28.

[136] Compare Anab. ii, 4, 6, 7; ii, 5, 9.

[137] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 37, 38.

[138] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 2, 3.

[139] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4-11. Ἦν δέ τις ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ Ξενοφῶν Ἀθηναῖος, ὃς οὔτε στρατηγὸς, etc.

Homer, Iliad, v, 9—

Ἦν δέ τις ἐν Τρώεσσι Δάρης, ἀφνεῖος, ἀμύμων,

Ἱρεὺς Ἡφαίστοιο, etc.

Compare the description of Zeus sending Oneirus to the sleeping Agamemnon, at the beginning of the second book of the Iliad.

[140] Respecting the value of a sign from Zeus Basileus, and the necessity of conciliating him, compare various passages in the Cyropædia, ii, 4, 19; iii, 3, 21; vii, 5, 57.

[141] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 12, 13. Περίφοβος δ᾽ εὐθὺς ἀνηγέρθη, καὶ τὸ ὄναρ τῇ μὲν ἔκρινεν ἀγαθόν, ὅτι ἐν πόνοις ὢν καὶ κινδύνοις φῶς μέγα ἐκ Διὸς ἰδεῖν ἔδοξε, etc. … Ὁποῖόν τι μὲν δή ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, ἔξεστι σκοπεῖν ἐκ τῶν συμβάντων μετὰ τὸ ὄναρ. Γίγνεται γὰρ τάδε. Εὐθὺς ἐπειδὴ ἀνηγέρθη, πρῶτον μὲν ἔννοια αὐτῷ ἐμπίπτει· Τί κατάκειμαι; ἡ δὲ νὺξ προβαίνει· ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ εἰκὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἥξειν, etc.

The reader of Homer will readily recall various passages in the Iliad and Odyssey, wherein the like mental talk is put into language and expanded,—such as Iliad, xi, 403—and several other passages cited or referred to in Colonel Mure's History of the Language and Literature of Greece, ch. xiv, vol. ii, p. 25 *seq.*

A vision of light shining brightly out of a friendly house, counts for a favorable sign (Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, p. 587 C.).

[142] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 16, 25.

"Vel imperatore, vel milite, me utemini." (Sallust, Bellum Catilinar. c. 20).

[143] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 26-30. It would appear from the words of Xenophon, that Apollonides had been one of those who had held faint-hearted language (ὑπομαλακιζόμενοι, ii, 1, 14) in the conversation with Phalinus shortly after the death of Cyrus. Hence Xenophon tells him, that this is the second time of his offering such advice—Ἃ σὺ πάντα εἰδὼς, τοὺς μὲν ἀμύνασθαι κελεύοντας φλυαρεῖν φῄς, *πείθειν δὲ πάλιν κελεύεις ἰόντας*;

This helps to explain the contempt and rigor with which Xenophon here treats him. Nothing indeed could be more deplorable, under the actual circumstances, than for a man "to show his acuteness by summing up the perils around." See the remarkable speech of Demosthenes at Pylos (Thucyd. iv, 10).

[144] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 36-46.

[145] Xen. Anab. iii, 2, 25.

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ δέδοικα μή ἂν ἅπαξ μάθωμεν ἀργοὶ ζῆν καὶ ἐν ἀφθόνοις βιοτεύειν, καὶ Μήδων δὲ καὶ Περσῶν *καλαῖς καὶ μεγάλαις γυναιξὶ καὶ παρθένοις ὁμιλεῖν*, μὴ ὥσπερ οἱ λωτοφάγοι, ἐπιλαθώμεθα τῆς οἴκαδε ὁδοῦ.

Hippokrates (De Aëre, Locis, et Aquis, c. 12) compares the physical characteristics of Asiatics and Europeans, noticing the ample, full-grown, rounded, voluptuous, but inactive forms of the first,—as contrasted with the more compact, muscular, and vigorous type of the second, trained for movement, action, and endurance.

Dio Chrysostom has a curious passage, in reference to the Persian preference for eunuchs as slaves, remarking that they admired even in males an approach to the type of feminine beauty,—their eyes and tastes being under the influence only of aphrodisiac ideas; whereas the Greeks, accustomed to the constant training and naked exercises of the palæstra, boys competing with boys and youths with youths, had their associations of the male beauty attracted towards active power and graceful motion.

Οὐ γὰρ φανερὸν, ὅτι οἱ Πέρσαι εὐνούχους ἐποίουν τοὺς καλοὺς, ὅπως αὐτοῖς ὡς κάλλιστοι ὦσι; Τοσοῦτον διαφέρειν ᾤοντο πρὸς κάλλος τὸ θῆλυ· σχεδὸν καὶ πάντες οἱ βάρβαροι, διὰ τὸ μόνον τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἐννοεῖν. Κἀκεῖνοι γυναικός εἶδος περιτιθέασι τοῖς ἄῤῥεσιν, ἄλλως δ᾽ οὐκ ἐπίστανται ἐῤᾷν· ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἡ τροφὴ αἰτία τοῖς Πέρσαις, τῷ μέχρι πολλοῦ τρέφεσθαι ὑπό τε γυναικῶν καὶ εὐνούχων τῶν πρεσβυτέρων· παῖδας δὲ μετὰ παιδῶν, καὶ μειράκια μετὰ μειρακίων μὴ πάνυ συνεῖναι, μηδὲ γυμνοῦσθαι ἐν παλαίστραις καὶ γυμνασίοις, etc. (Orat. xxi, p. 270).

Compare Euripides, Bacchæ, 447 *seq.*; and the Epigram of Strato in the Anthologia, xxxiv, vol. ii, p. 367 Brunck.

[146] A very meagre abstract is given by Diodorus, of that which passed after the seizure of the generals (xiv, 27). He does not mention the name of Xenophon on this occasion, nor indeed throughout all his account of the march.

[147] Compare the hostile speech of the Corinthian envoy at Sparta, prior to the Peloponnesian war, with the eulogistic funeral oration of Perikles, in the second year of that war (Thucyd. i, 70, 71; ii, 39, 40).

Οἱ μέν γε (εἰσὶ), νεωτεροποιοὶ (description of the Athenians by the Corinthian speaker) *καὶ ἐπινοῆσαι ὀξεῖς καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργῳ ἃ ἂν γνῶσιν*· ὑμεῖς δὲ (Lacedæmonians), τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σώζειν καὶ ἐπιγνῶναι μηδὲν, καὶ ἔργῳ οὐδὲ τἀναγκαῖα ἐξικέσθαι. Αὖθις δὲ, οἱ μὲν, καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταὶ καὶ παρὰ γνώμην κινδυνευταὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες· τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον, τῆς τε δυνάμεως ἐνδεᾶ πρᾶξαι, τῆς τε γνώμης μηδὲ τοῖς βεβαίοις πιστεῦσαι, τῶν τε δεινῶν μηδέποτε οἴεσθαι ἀπολυθήσεσθαι. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς μελλήτας, καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους, etc.

Again, in the oration of Perikles—Καὶ αὐτοὶ ἤτοι κρίνομεν ἢ ἐνθυμούμεθα ὀρθῶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἡγούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ προδιδαχθῆναι μᾶλλον λόγῳ, πρότερον ἢ ἐπὶ ἃ δεῖ ἔργῳ ἐλθεῖν. Διαφερόντως μὲν δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔχομεν, *ὥστε τολμᾶν τε οἱ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι*· ὃ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκνον, φέρει.

[148] Compare the observations of Perikles, in his last speech to the Athenians about the inefficiency of the best thoughts, if a man had not the power of setting them forth in an impressive manner (Thucyd. ii, 60). Καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιούτῳ ἀνδρὶ ὀργίζεσθε, ὃς οὐδενὸς οἴομαι ἧσσων εἶναι *γνῶναί τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι ταῦτα*, φιλόπολίς τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείττων· ὅ τε γὰρ γνοὺς καὶ μὴ σαφῶς διδάξας, ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐνεθυμήθη, etc.

The philosopher and the statesman at Athens here hold the same language. It was the opinion of Sokrates—μόνους ἀξίους εἶναι τιμῆς *τοὺς εἰδότας τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι δυναμένους* (Xenoph. Mem. i, 2, 52).

A striking passage in the funeral harangue of Lysias (Orat. ii, Epitaph. s. 19) sets forth the prevalent idea of the Athenian democracy—authoritative law, with persuasive and instructive speech, as superseding mutual violence (νόμος and λόγος, as the antithesis of βία). Compare a similar sentiment in Isokrates (Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 53-56).

[149] See the speech of Perikles (Thuc. ii, 60-64). He justifies the boastful tone of it, by the unwonted depression against which he had to contend on the part of his hearers—Δελώσω δὲ καὶ τόδε ὅ μοι δοκεῖτε οὔτ᾽ αὐτοὶ πώποτε ἐνθυμηθῆναι ὑπάρχον ὑμῖν μεγέθους περὶ ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὔτ᾽ ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς πρὶν λόγοις, *οὐδ᾽ ἂν νῦν ἐχρησάμην κομπωδεστέραν ἔχοντι τὴν προσποίησιν, εἰ μὴ καταπεπληγμένους ὑμᾶς παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἑώρων*.

This is also the proper explanation of Xenophon's tone.

[150] In a passage of the Cyropædia (v. 5, 46), Xenophon sets forth in a striking manner the combination of the λεκτικὸς καὶ πρακτικός—Ὥσπερ καὶ ὅταν μάχεσθαι δέῃ, ὁ πλείστους χειρωσάμενος ἀλκιμώτατος δοξάζεται εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ ὅταν πεῖσαι δέῃ, ὁ πλείστους ὁμογνώμονας ἡμῖν ποιήσας οὗτος δικαίως ἂν *λεκτικώτατος καὶ πρακτικώτατος* κρίνοιτο ἂν εἶναι. Μὴ μέντοι ὡς *λόγον ἡμῖν ἐπιδειξόμενοι, οἷον ἂν εἴποιτε πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, τοῦτο μελετᾶτε—ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τοὺς πεπεισμένους ὑφ᾽ ἑκάστου δήλους ἐσομένους οἷς ἂν πράττωσιν, ὕτω παρασκευάζεσθε*.

In describing the duties of a Hipparch or commander of the cavalry, Xenophon also insists upon the importance of persuasive speech, as a means of keeping up the active obedience of the soldiers—Εἷς γε μὴν τὸ εὐπειθεῖς εἶναι τοὺς ἀρχομένους, μέγα μὲν καὶ τὸ λόγῳ διδάσκειν, ὅσα ἀγαθὰ ἔνι ἐν τῷ πειθαρχεῖν, etc. (Xen. Mag. Eq. i, 24).

[151] See Xenoph. Anab. v, 6, 25.

[152] Xen. Anab. iii, 3, 6; iii, 5, 43.

[153] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 1. Ainsworth. Travels and Researches in Asia Minor, etc. vol. ii, ch. 44, p. 327; also his Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 119-134.

Professor Koch, who speaks with personal knowledge both of Armenia and of the region east of the Tigris, observes truly that the Great Zab is the only point (east of the Tigris) which Xenophon assigns in such a manner as to be capable of distinct local identification. He also observes, here as elsewhere, that the number of parasangs specified by Xenophon is essentially delusive as a measure of distance (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 64).

[154] Xen. Anab. iii, 3, 9.

[155] Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 1-5.

[156] Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 17, 18. It is here, on the site of the ancient Nineveh, that the recent investigations of Mr. Layard have brought to light so many curious and valuable Assyrian remains. The legend which Xenophon heard on the spot, respecting the way in which these cities were captured and ruined, is of a truly Oriental character.

[157] Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 19-23.

I incline to believe that there were six lochi upon *each* flank—that is, twelve lochi in all; though the words of Xenophon are not quite clear.

[158] Xen. Anab. iii, 4-25. Compare Herodot. vii, 21, 56, 103.

[159] Professor Koch (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 68) is of the same opinion.

[160] Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 35; see also Cyropædia, iii, 3, 37.

The Thracian prince Seuthes was so apprehensive of night attack, that he and his troops kept their horses bridled all night (Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 21.)

Mr. Kinneir (Travels in Asia Minor, etc., p. 481) states that the horses of Oriental cavalry, and even of the English cavalry in Hindostan, are still kept tied and shackled at night, in the same way as Xenophon describes to have been practised by the Persians.

[161] Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 36-49; iii, 5, 3.

[162] Xen. Anab. iii, 5; iv, 1, 3. Probably the place where the Greeks quitted the Tigris to strike into the Karduchian mountains, was the neighborhood of Jezireh ibn Omar, the ancient Bezabde. It is here that farther march, up the eastern side of the Tigris, is rendered impracticable by the mountains closing in. Here the modern road crosses the Tigris by a bridge, from the eastern bank to the western (Koch, Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 72).

[163] Xen. Anab. iv, 1, 12.

[164] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 19-30.

[165] Xen. Anab. iv, 1, 18; iv, 2, 28.

[166] Xen. Anab. iv, 1, 21.

[167] Xen. Anab. iv, 2, 4.

[168] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 17-21.

[169] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 23.

[170] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 2. His expressions have a simple emphasis which marks how unfading was the recollection of what he had suffered in Karduchia.

Καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐνταῦθα ἀνεπαύσαντο ἄσμενοι ἰδόντες πεδίον· ἀπεῖχε δὲ τῶν ὀρέων ὁ ποταμὸς ἓξ ἢ ἕπτα στάδια τῶν Καρδούχων. Τότε μὲν οὖν ηὐλίσθησαν μάλα ἡδέως, καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔχοντες καὶ πολλὰ τῶν παρεληλυθότων πόνων μνημονεύοντες. Ἕπτα γὰρ ἡμέρας, ὅσασπερ ἐπορεύθησαν διὰ τῶν Καρδούχων, πάσας μαχόμενοι διετέλεσαν, καὶ ἔπαθον κακὰ ὅσα οὐδὲ τὰ σύμπαντα ὑπὸ βασιλέως καὶ Τισσαφέρνους. Ὡς οὖν ἀπηλλαγμένοι τούτων ἡδέως ἐκοιμήθησαν.

[171] Xen. Anab. iv, 4, 1.

[172] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 6-13.

[173] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 17.

… ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ αὐτὸς πρῶτος Χειρίσοφος, στεφανωσάμενος καὶ ἀποδὺς, ἐλάμβανε τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι παρήγγελλε.

I apprehend that the words τὸν στέφανον are here to be understood after ἀποδὺς—not the words τὰ ὅπλα, as Krüger in his note seems to imagine. It is surely incredible, that in the actual situation of the Grecian army, the soldiers should be ordered first to disarm, and then to resume their arms. I conceive the matter thus:—First, the order is given, to ground arms; so that the shield is let down and drops upon the ground, sustained by the left hand of the soldier upon its upper rim; while the spear, also resting on the ground, is sustained by the shield

and by the same left hand. The right hand of the soldier being thus free, he is ordered first to wreath himself (the costume usual in offering sacrifice)—next, to take off his wreath—lastly, to resume his arms.

Probably the operations of wreathing and unwreathing, must here have been performed by the soldiers symbolically, or by gesture, raising the hand to the head, as if to crown it. For it seems impossible that they could have been provided generally with actual wreaths, on the banks of the Kentritês, and just after their painful march through the Karduchian mountains. Cheirisophus himself, however, had doubtless a real wreath, which he put on and took off; so probably had the prophets and certain select officiating persons.

[174] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 20-25.

[175] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 30.

[176] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 31-34; iv, 4, 1.

[177] Xen. Anab. iv, 4, 11.

[178] Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 2.

The recent editors, Schneider and Krüger, on the authority of various MSS., read here ἐπορεύθησαν—*ἐπὶ* τὸν Εὐφράτην ποταμόν. The old reading was, as it stands in Hutchinson's edition, *παρὰ* τὸν Εὐφράτην ποταμόν.

This change may be right, but the geographical data are here too vague to admit of any certainty. See my Appendix annexed to this chapter.

[179] Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 4.

Ἔνθα δὴ τῶν μάντεων τις εἶπε σφαγιάσασθαι τῷ Ἀνέμῳ· καὶ πᾶσι δὴ περιφανῶς ἔδοξε λῆξαι τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦ πνεύματος.

The suffering of the army from the terrible snow and cold of Armenia are set forth in Diodorus, xiv, 28.

[180] Xen. Anab. v, 8, 8-11.

[181] Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 8-22.

[182] Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 26. Κάλαμοι γόνατα οὐκ ἔχοντες.

This Armenian practice of sucking the beer through a reed, to which the observation of modern travellers supplies analogies (see Krüger's note), illustrates the Fragment of Archilochus (No. 28, ed. Schneidewin, Poetæ Græc. Minor).

ὥσπερ αὐλῷ βρύτον ἢ Θρῆιξ ἀνὴρ

ἢ Φρὺξ ἔβρυζε, etc.

The similarity of Armenian customs to those of the Thracians and Phrygians, is not surprising.

[183] Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 26-36.

[184] Xen. Anab. iv. 6, 1-3.

[185] Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 4.

[186] Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 10-14.

Καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ *καλὸν* κλέπτειν, etc. The reading *καλὸν* is preferred by Schneider to *ἀναγκαῖον*, which has been the vulgar reading, and is still retained by Krüger. Both are sanctioned by authority of MSS., and either would be admissible; on the whole, I incline to side with Schneider.

[187] Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 16.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Χειρίσοφος, κἀγὼ ὑμᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀκούω δεινοὺς εἶναι κλέπτειν τὰ δημόσια, καὶ μάλα ὄντος δεινοῦ τοῦ κινδύνου τῷ κλέπτοντι, καὶ τοὺς κρατίστους μέντοι μάλιστα, εἴπερ ὑμῖν οἱ κράτιστοι ἄρχειν ἀξιοῦνται· ὥστε ὥρα καὶ σοὶ ἐπιδείκνυσθαι τὴν παίδειαν.

[188] See Vol. VII, ch. lxi, p. 401 *seq.*

[189] Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 20-27.

[190] Xen. Anab. iv, 7, 2-15.

[191] Xen. Anab. iv, 7, 18.

[192] Diodorus (xiv, 29) calls the mountain Χήνοιν—Chenium. He seems to have had Xenophon before him in his brief description of this interesting scene.

[193] Xen. Anab. iv, 7, 23-27.

[194] Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 4-7.

[195] Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 15-22. Most modern travellers attest the existence, in these regions, of honey intoxicating and poisonous, such as Xenophon describes. They point out the *Azalea Pontica*, as the flower from which the bees imbibe this peculiar quality. Professor Koch, however, calls in question the existence of any honey thus naturally unwholesome near the Black Sea. He states (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 111) that after careful inquiries he could find no trace of any such. Not contradicting Xenophon, he thinks that the honey which the Greeks ate must have been stale or tainted.

[196] Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 23-27.

A curious and interesting anecdote in Plutarch's Life of Alexander, (c. 41) attests how much these Hetæræ accompanying the soldiers (women for the most part free), were esteemed in the Macedonian army, and by Alexander himself among the rest. A Macedonian of Ægæ named Eurylochus, had got himself improperly put on a list of veterans and invalids, who were on the point of being sent back from Asia to Europe. The imposition was detected, and on being questioned he informed Alexander that he had practised it in order to be able to follow a free Hetæra named Telesippa, who was about to accompany the departing division. "I sympathize with your attachment, Eurylochus (replied Alexander); let us see whether we cannot prevail upon Telesippa either by persuasion or by presents, since she is of free condition, to stay behind" (Ἡμᾶς μὲν, ὦ Εὐρύλοχε, συνερῶντας ἔχεις· ὅρα δὲ ὅπως πείθωμεν ἢ λόγοις ἢ δώροις τὴν Τελεσίππαν, ἐπειδήπερ ἐξ ἐλευθέρας ἐστί).

[197] Strabo, xii, p. 542; Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 24.

[198] Strabo. xii, p. 545, 546.

[199] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 8.

[200] Xen. Anab. v, 5, 23.

[201] Plutarch, Perikles, c. 20.

[202] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 3; v, 7, 9. The maximum of the Grecian force, when mustered at Issus after the junction of those three hundred men who deserted from Abrokomas, was thirteen thousand nine hundred men. At the review in Babylonia, three days before the battle of Kunaxa, there were mustered, however, only twelve thousand nine hundred (Anab. i, 7, 10).

[203] Xen. Anab. vi, 2, 8.

Τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἦσαν οὐ σπάνει βίου ἐκπεπλευκότες ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν μισθοφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τὴν Κύρου ἀρετὴν ἀκούοντες, οἱ μὲν καὶ ἄνδρας ἄγοντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ προσανηλωκότες χρήματα, καὶ τούτων ἕτεροι ἀποδεδρακότες πατέρας καὶ μητέρας, οἱ δὲ καὶ τέκνα καταλιπόντες, ὡς χρήματα αὐτοῖς κτησάμενοι ἥξοντες πάλιν, ἀκούοντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς παρὰ Κύρῳ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ πράττειν. Τοιοῦτοι οὖν ὄντες ἐπόθουν εἷς τὴν Ἑλλάδα σώζεσθαι.

This statement respecting the position of most of the soldiers is more authentic, as well as less disparaging, than that of Isokrates (Orat. iv, Panegyr. s. 170).

In another oration, composed about fifty years after the Cyreian expedition, Isokrates notices the large premiums which it had been formerly necessary to give to those who brought together mercenary soldiers, over and above the pay to the soldiers themselves (Isokrates, Orat. v. ad Philipp. s. 112); as contrasted with the over-multiplication of unemployed mercenaries during his own later time (Ibid. s. 142 *seq.*)

[204] Xen. Anab. v, 1, 3-13.

Ὁρῶ δ᾽ ἐγὼ πλοῖα πολλάκις παραπλέοντα, etc. This is a forcible proof how extensive was the Grecian commerce with the town and region of Phasis, at the eastern extremity of the Euxine.

[205] Xen. Anab v. 1, 15.

[206] Xen. Anab. v. 2.

[207] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 3. Mr. Kinneir (Travels in Asia Minor, p. 327) and many other authors, have naturally presumed from the analogy of name that the modern town Kerasoun (about long. 38° 40′) corresponds to the Kerasus of Xenophon; which Arrian in his Periplus conceives to be identical with what was afterwards called Pharnakia.

But it is remarked both by Dr. Cramer (Asia Minor, vol. i, p. 281) and by Mr. Hamilton (Travels in Asia Minor, ch. xv, p. 250), that Kerasoun is too far from Trebizond to admit of Xenophon having marched with the army from the one place to the other in three days; or even in less than ten days, in the judgment of Mr. Hamilton. Accordingly Mr. Hamilton places the site of the Kerasus of Xenophon much nearer to Trebizond (about long. 39° 20′, as it stands in Kiepert's map of Asia Minor,) near a river now called the Kerasoun Dere Sú.

[208] It was not without great difficulty that Mr. Kinneir obtained horses to travel from Kotyôra to Kerasoun by land. The aga of the place told him that it was madness to think of travelling by land, and ordered a felucca for him; but was at last prevailed on to furnish horses. There seems, indeed, to have been no regular or trodden road at all; the hills approach close to the sea, and Mr. Kinneir "travelled the whole of the way along the shore alternately over a sandy beach and a high wooded bank. The hills at intervals jutting out into the sea, form capes and numerous little bays along the coast; but the nature of the country was still the same, that is to say, studded with fine timber, flowers, and groves of cherry trees" (Travels in Asia Minor, p. 324).

Kerasus is the indigenous country of the cherry tree, and the origin of its name.

Professor Koch thinks, that the number of days' march given by Xenophon (ten days) between Kerasus and Kotyôra, is more than consists with the real distance, even if Kerasus be placed where Mr. Hamilton supposes. If the number be correctly stated, he supposes that the Greeks must have halted somewhere (Zug der Zehn Tausend. p. 115. 116).

[209] Xen. Anab. v, 5, 3.

[210] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 18-25.

[211] Xen. Anab. v, 5, 7-12.

[212] Xen. Anab. v, 5, 13-22.

[213] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 4-11.

[214] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 14.

[215] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 19; vi, 1, 2.

[216] Xen. Anab. vi, 4, 8; vi, 2, 4.

[217] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 15-30; vi, 2, 6; vii, 1, 25, 29.

Haken and other commentators do injustice to Xenophon when they ascribe to him the design of seizing the Greek city of Kotyôra.

[218] Xen. Memorab. i, 1, 8, 9. Ἔφη δὲ (Sokrates) δεῖν, ἃ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ, μανθάνειν· ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι· τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ, οἷς ἂν ὦσιν ἱλέω, σημαίνειν.

Compare passages in his Cyropædia, i, 6, 3; De Officio Magistr. Equit. ix, 9.

"The gods (says Euripides, in the Sokratic vein) have given us wisdom to understand and appropriate to ourselves the ordinary comforts of life; in obscure or unintelligible cases, we are enabled to inform ourselves by looking at the blaze of the fire, or by consulting prophets who understand the livers of sacrificial victims and the flight of birds. When they have thus furnished so excellent a provision for life, who but spoilt children can be discontented, and ask for more? Yet still human prudence, full of self-conceit, will struggle to be more powerful, and will presume itself to be wiser, than the gods."

Ἃ δ᾽ ἔστ᾽ ἄσημα, κοὐ σαφῆ, γιγνώσκομεν

Εἰς πῦρ βλέποντες, καὶ κατὰ σπλάγχνων πτύχας

Μάντεις προσημαίνουσιν οἰωνῶν τ᾽ ἄπο.

Ἆρ᾽ οὐ τρυφῶμεν, θεοῦ κατασκευὴν βίου

Δόντος τοιαύτην, οἷσιν οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τάδε;

Ἀλλ᾽ ἡ φρόνησις τοῦ θεοῦ μεῖζον σθένειν

Ζητεῖ· τὸ γαῦρον δ᾽ ἐν χεροῖν κεκτημένοι

Δοκοῦμεν εἶναι δαιμόνων σοφώτεροι (Supplices, 211).

It will be observed that this constant outpouring of special revelations, through prophets, omens, etc., was (in the view of these Sokratic thinkers) an essential part of the divine government; indispensable to satisfy their ideas of the benevolence of the gods; since rational and scientific prediction was so habitually at fault and unable to fathom the phenomena of the future.

[219] Xen. Anab. v. 6, 29.

[220] Though Xenophon accounted sacrifice to be an essential preliminary to any action of dubious result, and placed great faith in the indications which the victims offered, as signs of the future purposes of the gods,—he nevertheless had very little confidence in the professional prophets. He thought them quite capable of gross deceit (See Xen. Cyrop. i, 6, 2, 3; compare Sophokles, Antigone, 1035, 1060; and Œdip. Tyrann. 387).

[221] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 19-26.

[222] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 30-33.

[223] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 34; vi, 4, 13.

[224] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 36.

I may here note that this *Phasis* in the Euxine means the town of that name, not the river.

[225] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 1-3.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἠσθάνετο ὁ Ξενοφῶν, ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ὡς τάχιστα συναγαγεῖν αὐτῶν ἀγοράν, καὶ μὴ ἐᾶσαι συλλεγῆναι αὐτομάτους· καὶ ἐκέλευε τὸν κήρυκα συλλέξαι ἀγοράν.

The prudence of Xenophon in convoking the assembly at once is incontestable. He could not otherwise have hindered the soldiers from getting together, and exciting one another to action, without any formal summons.

The reader should contrast with this the scene at Athens (described in Thucydides, ii, 22; and in Vol. VI, Ch. xlviii, p. 133 of this History) during the first year of the Peloponnesian war, and the first invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians; when the invaders were at Acharnæ, within sight of the walls of Athens, burning and destroying the country. In spite of the most violent excitement among the Athenian people, and the strongest impatience to go out and fight, Perikles steadily refused to call an assembly, for fear that the people should take the resolution of going out. And what was much more remarkable—the people even in that state of excitement though all united within the walls, did not meet in any informal assembly, nor come to any resolution, or to any active proceeding; which the Cyreians would certainly have done, had they not been convened in a regular assembly.

The contrast with the Cyreian army here illustrates the extraordinary empire exercised by constitutional forms over the minds of the Athenian citizens.

[226] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 7-11.

[227] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 13-26.

[228] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 26-27. Εἰ οὖν ταῦτα τοιαῦτα ἔσται, θεάσασθε οἵα ἡ κατάστασις ἡμῖν ἔσται τῆς στρατιᾶς. Ὑμεῖς μὲν οἱ πάντες οὐκ ἔσεσθε κύριοι, οὔτ᾽ ἀνελέσθαι πόλεμον ᾧ ἂν βούλησθε, οὔτε καταλῦσαι· ἰδίᾳ δὲ ὁ βουλόμενος ἄξει στράτευμα ἐφ᾽ ὅ,τι ἂν ἐθέλῃ. Κἄν τινες πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἴωσι πρέσβεις, ἢ εἰρήνης δεόμενοι ἢ ἄλλου τινός, κατακαίνοντες τούτους οἱ βουλόμενοι, ποιήσουσιν ὑμᾶς τῶν λόγων μὴ ἀκοῦσαι τῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἰόντων. Ἔπειτα δὲ, οὓς μὲν ἂν ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες ἕλησθε ἄρχοντας, ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ χώρᾳ ἔσονται· ὅστις δ᾽ ἂν ἑαυτὸν ἕληται στρατηγὸν, καὶ ἐθέλῃ λέγειν, Βάλλε, Βάλλε, οὗτος ἔσται ἱκανὸς καὶ ἄρχοντα κατακαίνειν καὶ ἰδιώτην ὃν ἂν ὑμῶν ἐθέλῃ ἄκριτον—ἂν ὦσιν οἱ πεισόμενοι αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἐγένετο.

[229] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 27-30.

[230] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 34, 35.

[231] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 35.

Παραινοῦντος δὲ Ξενοφῶντος, καὶ τῶν μάντεων συμβουλευόντων, ἔδοξε καὶ καθᾶραι τὸ στράτευμα· καὶ ἐγένετο καθαρμός· ἔδοξε δὲ καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς δίκην ὑποσχεῖν τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου.

In the distribution of chapters as made by the editors, chapter the eighth is made to begin at the second ἔδοξε, which seems to me not convenient for comprehending the full sense. I think that the second ἔδοξε, as well as the first, is connected with the words παραινοῦντος Ξενοφῶντος, and ought to be included not only in the same chapter with them, but also in the same sentence, without an intervening full stop.

[232] Xen. Anab. v, 8, 3-12.

[233] Xen. Anab. v, 8, 16. ἔπαισα πὺξ, ὅπως μὴ λόγχῃ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων παίοιτο.

[234] The idea that great pugilists were not good soldiers in battle, is as old among the Greeks as the Iliad. The unrivalled pugilist of the Homeric Grecian army, Epeius, confesses his own inferiority as a soldier (Iliad, xxiii 667).

Ἄσσον ἴτω, ὅστις δέπας οἴσεται ἀμφικύπελλον·

Ἡμίονον δ᾽ οὔ φημί τιν᾽ ἄξεμεν ἄλλον Ἀχαιῶν,

Πυγμῇ νικήσαντ᾽· ἐπεὶ εὔχομαι εἶναι ἄριστος.

Ἦ οὐχ ἅλις, ὅ,τι μάχης ἐπιδεύομαι; οὐδ᾽ ἄρα πως ἦν

Ἐν πάντεσσ᾽ ἔργοισι δαήμονα φῶτα γενέσθαι.

[235] Xen. Anab. v, 8, 13-25.

[236] See the striking remarks of Thucydides (ii, 65) upon Perikles.

[237] Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 2. Πέμπει παρὰ τοὺς Ἕλληνας πρέσβεις, ἔχοντας ἵππους καὶ στολὰς καλάς, etc.

The horses sent were doubtless native Paphlagonian; the robes sent were probably the produce of the looms of Sinôpê and Kotyôra; just as the Thracian princes used to receive fine woven and metallic fabrics from Abdêra and the other Grecian colonies on their coast—ὑφαντὰ καὶ λεῖα, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κατασκευὴ, etc. (Thucyd. ii, 96). From the like industry probably proceeded the splendid "regia textilia" and abundance of gold and silver vessels, captured by the Roman general Paulus Emilius along with Perseus the last king of Macedonia (Livy, xlv, 33-35).

[238] Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 10-14.

[239] Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 22-31.

[240] Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 32.

[241] Xen. Anab. vi, 2, 11-16.

[242] Xenoph. Anab. vi. 3, 10-25; vi, 4, 11.

[243] Xen. Anab. vi, 5.

[244] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 1-5.

[245] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 5-9.

[246] Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 32; vi, 4, 11-15.

[247] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 12, 13.

Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἐγγὺς αἱ Ἑλληνίδες πόλεις· τῆς δ᾽ Ἑλλάδος Λακεδαιμόνιοι προεστήκασιν· *ἱκανοὶ δέ εἰσι καὶ εἷς ἕκαστος Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅ,τι βούλονται διαπράττεσθαι*. Εἰ οὖν οὗτος πρῶτον μὲν ἡμᾶς Βυζαντίου ἀποκλείσει, ἔπειτα δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἁρμοσταῖς παραγγελεῖ εἰς τὰς πόλεις μὴ δέχεσθαι, ὡς ἀπιστοῦντας Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ ἀνόμους ὄντας—ἔτι δὲ πρὸς Ἀναξίβιον τὸν ναύαρχον οὗτος ὁ λόγος περὶ ἡμῶν ἥξει—χαλεπὸν ἔσται καὶ μένειν καὶ αποπλεῖν· *καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ γῇ ἄρχουσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ τὸν νῦν χρόνον*.

[248] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 12-16.

[249] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 22-28.

[250] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 31-36.

[251] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 36, 37.

[252] Nearly the same cross march was made by the Athenian general Lamachus, in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war, after he had lost his triremes by a sudden rise of the water at the mouth of the river Kalex, in the territory of Herakleia (Thucyd. iv, 75).

[253] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 2. Πέμψας πρὸς Ἀναξίβιον τὸν ναύαρχον, ἐδεῖτο διαβιβάσαι τὸ στράτευμα ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, καὶ ὑπισχνεῖτο πάντα ποιήσειν αὐτῷ ὅσα δέοι.

Compare vii, 2, 7, when Anaxibius demanded in vain the fulfilment of this promise.

[254] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 5-7.

[255] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 7-10. Ἀλλ᾽ ὁμῶς (ἔφη), ἐγώ σοι συμβουλεύω ἐξελθεῖν ὡς πορευσόμενον· ἐπειδὰν δ᾽ ἔξω γένηται τὸ στράτευμα, τότε ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.

[256] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 12.

[257] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 13.

[258] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 14.

[259] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 15-17.

[260] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 18, 19.

[261] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 30-31.

[262] Xen. Anab. viii, 1, 32-35.

[263] So Tacitus says about the Roman general Spurinna (governor of Placentia for Otho against Vitellius), and his mutinous army who marched out to fight the Vitellian generals against his strenuous remonstrance—"Fit *temeritatis alienæ comes* Spurinna, primo coactus, mox *velle simulans*, quo plus auctoritatis inesset consiliis, si seditio mitesceret" (Tacitus, Hist. ii, 18).

[264] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 33.

[265] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 34-40.

[266] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 7. Φαρνάβαζος δὲ, ἐπεὶ ᾔσθετο Ἀρίσταρχόν τε ἥκοντα εἰς Βυζάντιον ἁρμοστὴν καὶ Ἀναξίβιον οὐκέτι ναυαρχοῦντα, Ἀναξιβίου μὲν ἠμέλησε, πρὸς Ἀρίσταρχον δὲ διεπράττετο τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τοῦ Κυρείου στρατεύματος ἅπερ καὶ πρὸς Ἀναξίβιον.

[267] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 8-25.

Ἐκ τούτου δὴ ὁ Ἀναξίβιος, καλέσας Ξενοφῶντα, *κελεύει πάσῃ τέχνῃ καὶ μηχανῇ πλεῦσαι ἐπὶ τὸ στράτευμα ὡς τάχιστα*, καὶ συνέχειν τε τὸ στράτευμα καὶ συναθροίζειν τῶν διεσπαρμένων ὡς ἂν πλείστους δύνηται, καὶ παραγαγόντα εἰς τὴν Πέρινθον διαβιβάζειν εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν *ὅτι τάχιστα*· καὶ δίδωσιν αὐτῷ

τριακόντορον, καὶ ἐπιστολὴν καὶ ἄνδρα συμπέμπει κελεύσοντα τοὺς Περινθίους *ὡς τάχιστα* Ξενοφῶντα προπέμψαι τοῖς ἵπποις ἐπὶ τὸ στράτευμα.

The vehement interest which Anaxibius took in this new project is marked by the strength of Xenophon's language; extreme celerity is enjoined three several times.

[268] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 6. Καὶ ὁ Ἀναξίβιος τῷ μὲν Ἀριστάρχῳ ἐπιστέλλει ὁπόσους ἂν εὕροι ἐν Βυζαντίῳ τῶν Κύρου στρατιωτῶν ὑπολελειμμένους, ἀποδόσθαι· ὁ δὲ Κλέανδρος οὐδένα ἐπεπράκει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας ἐθεράπευεν οἰκτείρων, καὶ ἀναγκάζων οἰκίᾳ δέχεσθαι. Ἀρίσταρχος δ᾽ ἐπεὶ ἦλθε τάχιστα, οὐκ ἐλάττους τετρακοσίων ἀπέδοτο.

[269] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 14-16.

Ἤδη δὲ ὄντων πρὸς τῷ τείχει, ἐξαγγέλλει τις τῷ Ξενοφῶντι ὅτι, εἰ εἴσεισι, συλληφθήσεται· καὶ ἃ αὐτοῦ τι πείσεται, ἃ καὶ Φαρναβάζῳ, παραδοθήσεται. Ὁ δὲ, ἀκούσας ταῦτα, τοὺς μὲν προπέμπεται, αὐτὸς δ᾽ εἶπεν, ὅτι θῦσαί τι βούλοιτο…. Οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ λοχαγοὶ ἥκοντες παρὰ τοῦ Ἀριστάρχου, ἀπήγγελλον ὅτι νῦν μὲν ἀπιέναι σφᾶς κελεύει, τῆς δείλης δὲ ἥκειν· ἔνθα καὶ δήλη μᾶλλον ἐδόκει [εἶναι] ἡ ἐπιβουλή. Compare vii, 3, 2.

[270] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 15; vii, 3, 3; vii, 6, 13.

[271] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 24. μέσος δὲ χείμων ἦν, etc. Probably the month of December.

[272] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 17-38.

[273] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 34.

[274] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 9, 10.

[275] Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 55-57.

[276] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 1-7.

[277] Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 15.

[278] Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 21-47.

The lecture is of unsuitable prolixity, when we consider the person to whom, and the circumstances under which, it purports to have been spoken.

[279] Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 23.

[280] It appears that the epithet *Meilichios* (the Gracious) is here applied to Zeus in the same euphemistic sense as the denomination *Eumenides* to the avenging goddesses. Zeus is conceived as having actually inflicted, or being in a disposition to inflict, evil; the sacrifice to him under this surname represents a sentiment of fear, and is one of atonement, expiation or purification, destined to avert his displeasure; but the surname itself is to be interpreted *proleptice*, to use the word of the critics—it designates, not the actual disposition of Zeus (or of other gods), but that disposition which the sacrifice is intended to bring about in him.

See Pausan. i, 37, 3; ii, 20, 3. K. F. Herrmann, Gottesdienstl. Alterthümer der Griechen, s. 58; Van Stegeren, De Græcorum Diebus Festis, p. 5 (Utrecht, 1849).

[281] Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 10-19.

[282] Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 22. Ἐνταῦθα οἱ περὶ Ξενοφῶντα συμπεριτυγχάνουσιν αὐτῷ καὶ λαμβάνουσιν αὐτὸν (Ἀσιδάτην) καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ παῖδας καὶ τοὺς ἵππους καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα· *καὶ οὕτω τὰ πρότερα ἱερὰ ἀπέβη*.

[283] Compare Plutarch, Kimon, c. 9; and Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21.

[284] Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 23.

Ἐνταῦθα τὸν θεὸν οὐκ ᾐτιάσατο ὁ Ξενοφῶν· συνέπραττον γὰρ καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες καὶ οἱ λοχαγοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται, ὥστε ἐξαίρετα λαβεῖν καὶ ἵππους καὶ ζεύγη καὶ ἄλλα, ὥστε ἱκανὸν εἶναι καὶ ἄλλον ἤδη εὖ ποιεῖν.

[285] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 6. It seems plain that this deposit must have been first made on the present occasion.

[286] Compare Anabasis, vii, 7, 57; vii, 8, 2.

[287] Xenoph. Memorab. iv, 8, 4—as well as the opening sentence of the work.

[288] See Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 2, 7—a passage which Morus refers, I think with much probability, to Xenophon himself.

The very circumstantial details, which Xenophon gives (iii, 1, 11-28) about the proceedings of Derkyllidas against Meidias in the Troad, seem also to indicate that he was serving there in person.

[289] That the sentence of banishment on Xenophon was not passed by the Athenians until after the battle of Korôneia, appears plainly from Anabasis, v. 3, 7. This battle took place in August 394 B.C.

Pausanias also will be found in harmony with this statement, as to the time of the banishment. Ἐδιώχθη δὲ ὁ Ξενοφῶν ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων, ὡς ἐπὶ βασιλέα τῶν Περσῶν, *σφίσιν εὖνουν ὄντα*, στρατείας μετασχὼν Κύρῳ πολεμιωτάτῳ τοῦ δήμου (iv, 6, 4). Now it was not until 396 or 395 B.C., that the Persian king began to manifest the least symptoms of good-will towards Athens; and not until the battle of Knidus (a little before the battle of Korôneia in the same year), that he testified his good-will by conspicuous and effective service. If, therefore, the motive of the Athenians to banish Xenophon arose out of the good feeling on the part of the king of Persia toward them, the banishment could not have taken place before 395 B.C., and is not likely to have taken place until after 394 B.C.; which is the intimation of Xenophon himself as above.

Lastly, Diogenes Laërtius (ii, 52) states, what I believe to be the main truth, that the sentence of banishment was passed against Xenophon by the Athenians on the ground of his attachment to the Lacedæmonians—ἐπὶ Λακωνισμῷ.

Krüger and others seem to think that Xenophon was banished because he took service under Cyrus, who had been the bitter enemy of Athens. It is true that Sokrates, when first consulted, was apprehensive beforehand that this might bring upon him the displeasure of Athens (Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 5). But it is to be remembered that *at this time*, the king of Persia was just as much the enemy of Athens as Cyrus was; and that Cyrus in fact had made war upon her with the forces and treasures of the king. Artaxerxes and Cyrus being thus, at that time, both enemies of Athens, it was of little consequence to the Athenians whether Cyrus succeeded or failed in his enterprise. But when Artaxerxes, six years afterwards, became their friend, their feelings towards his enemies were altered.

The passage of Pausanias as above cited, if understood as asserting the main cause of Xenophon's banishment, is in my judgment inaccurate. Xenophon was banished *for Laconism*, or attachment to Sparta against his country; the fact of his having served under Cyrus against Artaxerxes counted at best only as a secondary motive.

[290] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 13. Καὶ στήλη ἕστηκε παρὰ τὸν ναὸν, γράμματα ἔχουσα—Ἱερὸς ὁ Χῶρος τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος· τὸν δὲ ἔχοντα καὶ καρπούμενον τὴν μὲν δεκάτην καταθύειν ἑκάστου ἔτους, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ περίττου τὸν ναὸν ἐπισκευάζειν· ἐὰν δέ τις μὴ ποιῇ ταῦτα, τῇ θεῷ μελήσει.

[291] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.

[292] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 9. Παρεῖχε δ᾽ ἡ θεὸς τοῖς σκηνοῦσιν ἄλφιτα ἄρτους, οἶνον, τραγήματα, etc.

[293] Xen. Anab. v. 3, 9.

[294] Diogen. Laërt. ii, 53, 54, 59. Pausanias (v, 6, 4) attests the reconquest of Skillus by the Eleians, but adds (on the authority of the Eleian ἐξηγηταὶ or show guides) that they permitted Xenophon, after a judicial examination before the Olympic Senate, to go on living there in peace. The latter point I apprehend to be incorrect.

The latter works of Xenophon (De Vectigalibus, De Officio Magistri Equitum, etc.), seem plainly to imply that he had been restored to citizenship, and had come again to take cognizance of politics at Athens.

[295] Diogen. Laërt. ut sup. Dionys. Halic. De Dinarcho, p. 664, ed. Reiska. Dionysius mentions this oration under the title of Ἀποστασίου ἀπολογία Αἰσχύλου πρὸς Ξενοφῶντα. And Diogenes also alludes to it—ὥς φησι Δείναρχος ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ξενοφῶντα ἀποστασίου.

Schneider in his Epimetrum (ad calcem Anabaseos, p. 573), respecting the exile of Xenophon, argues as if the person against whom the oration of Deinarchus was directed, was Xenophon himself, the Cyreian comman-

der and author. But this, I think, is chronologically all but impossible; for Deinarchus was not born till 361 B.C., and composed his first oration in 336 B.C.

Yet Deinarchus, in his speech against Xenophon, undoubtedly mentioned several facts respecting the Cyreian Xenophon, which implies that the latter was a relative of the person against whom the oration was directed. I venture to set him down as grandson, on that evidence, combined with the identity of name and the suitableness in point of time. He might well be the son of Gryllus, who was slain fighting at the battle of Mantineia in 362 B.C.

Nothing is more likely than that an orator, composing an oration against Xenophon the grandson, should touch upon the acts and character of Xenophon the grandfather; see for analogy, the oration of Isokrates, de Bigis; among others.

[296] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 4. Compare Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 20; and Isokrates, Panegyr. Or. iv, s. 168, 169 *seq.*

The last chapter of the Cyropædia of Xenophon (viii, 20, 21-26) expresses strenuously the like conviction, of the military feebleness and disorganization of the Persian empire, not defensible without Grecian aid.

[297] Isokrates, Orat. v, (Philipp.) s. 104-106. ἤδη δ᾽ ἐγκρατεῖς δοκοῦντας εἶναι (*i. e.* the Greeks under Klearchus) διὰ τὴν Κύρου *προπέτειαν* ἀτυχῆσαι, etc.

[298] Isokrates. Orat. v. (Philipp.) s. 141: Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 12.

[299] See the stress laid by Alexander the Great upon the adventures of the Ten Thousand, in his speech to encourage his soldiers before the battle of Issus (Arrian, E. A. ii, 7, 8).

[300] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 1.

[301] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 5.

[302] Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 6.

[303] These Councils of Ten, organized by Lysander, are sometimes called *Dekarchies*—sometimes *Dekadarchies*. I use the former word by preference; since the word *Dekadarch* is also employed by Xenophon in another and very different sense—as meaning an officer who commands a *dekad*.

[304] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13.

Καταλυών δὲ τοὺς δήμους καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας, ἕνα μὲν ἁρμοστὴν ἑκάστῃ Λακεδαιμόνιον κατέλιπε, δέκα δὲ ἄρχοντας ἐκ τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ συγκεκροτημένων κατὰ πόλιν ἑταιρειῶν. Καὶ ταῦτα πράττων *ὁμοίως ἔν τε ταῖς πολεμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμάχοις γεγενημέναις πόλεσι*, παρέπλει σχολαίως τρόπον τινα κατασκευαζόμενος ἑαυτῷ τὴν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡγεμονίαν. Compare Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 2-5; Diodor. xiii, 3, 10, 13.

[305] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13. πολλαῖς παραγινόμενος αὐτὸς σφαγαῖς καὶ συνεκβάλλων τοὺς τῶν φίλων ἐχθροὺς, οὐκ ἐπιεικὲς ἐδίδου τοῖς Ἕλλησι δεῖγμα τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων ἀρχῆς, etc.

Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14. Καὶ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων πόλεων ὁμαλῶς ἁπασῶν κατέλυε τὰς πολιτείας καὶ καθίστη δεκαδαρχίας· πολλῶν μὲν ἐν ἑκάστῃ σφαττομένων, πολλῶν δὲ φευγόντων, etc.

About the massacre at Thasus, see Cornelius Nepos, Lysand. c. 2; Polyæn. i, 45, 4. Compare Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19; and see Vol. VIII, Ch. lxv, p. 220 of this History.

[306] Diodor. xiv, 10. Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 151; Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 1.

[307] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13. τοῦ Λυσάνδρου τῶν ὀλίγων τοῖς θρασυτάτοις καὶ φιλονεικοτάτοις τὰς πόλεις ἐγχειρίζοντος.

[308] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 13.

… ἔπεισαν Λύσανδρον φρουροὺς σφίσι ξυμπρᾶξαι ἐλθεῖν, ἕως δὴ *τοὺς πονηροὺς* ἐκποδὼν ποιησάμενοι καταστήσαιντο τὴν πολιτείαν, etc.

[309] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 14. Τῶν δὲ φρουρῶν τούτου (the harmost) συμπέμποντος αὐτοῖς οὓς ἐβούλοντο συνελάμβανον οὐκέτι τοὺς πονηροὺς καὶ ὀλίγου ἀξίους, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη οὓς ἐνόμιζον ἥκιστα μὲν παρωθουμένους ἀνέχεσθαι, ἀντιπράττειν δέ τι ἐπιχειροῦντας πλείστους τοὺς συνεθέλοντας λαμβάνειν.

[310] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 21.

[311] Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 1.

[312] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 24-32. Καὶ εἰσὶ μὲν δήπου πᾶσαι μεταβολαὶ πολιτειῶν θανατήφοροι, etc.

[313] Isokrates Orat. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 127-132 (c. 32).

He has been speaking, at some length, and in terms of energetic denunciation, against the enormities of the dekarchies. He concludes by saying—Φυγὰς δὲ καὶ στάσεις καὶ νόμων συγχύσεις καὶ πολιτειῶν μεταβολὰς, *ἔτι δὲ παιδῶν ὕβρεις καὶ γυναικῶν αἰσχύνας καὶ χρημάτων ἁρπαγάς*, τίς ἂν δύναιτο διεξελθεῖν· πλὴν τοσοῦτον εἰπεῖν ἔχω καθ᾽ ἁπάντων, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν δεινὰ ῥᾳδίως ἄν τις ἐνὶ ψηφίσματι διέλυσε, τὰς δὲ σφαγὰς καὶ τὰς ἀνομίας τὰς ἐπὶ τούτων γενομένας οὐδεὶς ἂν ἰάσασθαι δύναιτο.

See also, of the same author, Isokrates, Orat. v, (Philipp.) s. 110; Orat. viii, (de Pace) s. 119-124; Or. xii, (Panath.) s. 58, 60, 106.

[314] We may infer that if Xenophon had heard anything of the sort respecting Kritias, he would hardly have been averse to mention it; when we read what he says (Memorab. i, 2, 29.) Compare a curious passage about Kritias in Dion. Chrysostom. Or. xxi, p. 270.

[315] Plutarch Lysand. c. 19. Ἦν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι δημοτικῶν φόνος οὐκ ἀριθμητὸς, ἅτε δὴ μὴ κατ᾽ ἰδίας μόνον αἰτίας αὐτοῦ κτείνοντος, ἀλλὰ πολλαῖς μὲν ἔχθραις, πολλαῖς δὲ πλεονεξίαις, τῶν ἑκασταχόθι φίλων χαριζομένου τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ συνεργοῦντος; also Pausanias, vii, 10, 1; ix, 32, 6.

[316] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7.

[317] See the speech of the Theban envoys at Athens, about eight years after the surrender of Athens (Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 13).

… Οὐδὲ γὰρ φυγεῖν ἐξῆν (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19).

[318] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 13.

τὸν μὲν Καλλίβιον ἐθεράπευον πάσῃ θεραπείᾳ, ὡς πάντα ἐπαινοίη, ἃ πράττοιεν, etc. (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15).

The Thirty seem to have outdone Lysander himself. A young Athenian of rank, distinguished as a victor in the pankratium, Autolykus,—having been insulted by Kallibius, resented it, tripped him up, and threw him down. Lysander, on being appealed to, justified Autolykus, and censured Kallibius, telling him that he did not know how to govern freemen. The Thirty, however, afterwards put Autolykus to death, as a means of courting Kallibius (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15). Pausanius mentions Eteonikus (not Kallibius) as the person who struck Autolykus; but he ascribes the same decision to Lysander (ix, 32, 3).

[319] Plutarch, Amator. Narration, p. 773; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 20. In Diodorus (xv, 54) and Pausanias, (ix, 13, 2), the damsels thus outraged are stated to have slain themselves. Compare another story in Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 56, 57.

[320] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19.

[321] This seems to have been the impression not merely of the enemies of Sparta, but even of the Spartan authorities themselves. Compare two remarkable passages of Thucydides, i, 77, and i, 95. Ἄμικτα γὰρ (says the Athenian envoy at Sparta) τά τε καθ᾽ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς νόμιμα τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχετε, καὶ προσέτι εἷς ἕκαστος ἐξιὼν οὔτε τούτοις χρῆται, οὐθ᾽ οἷς ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς νομίζει.

After the recall of the regent Pausanias and of Dorkis from the Hellespont (in 477 B.C.), the Lacedæmonians refuse to send out any successor, φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσιν οἱ ἐξιόντες χείρους γίγνωνται, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ Παυσανίᾳ ἐνεῖδον, etc. (i, 95.)

Compare Plutarch, Apophtheg. Laconic. p. 220 F.

[322] Thucyd. i, 69. οὐ γὰρ ὁ δουλωσάμενος, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ δυνάμενος μὲν παῦσαι, περιορῶν δὲ, ἀληθέστερον αὐτὸ δρᾷ, εἴπερ καὶ τὴν ἀξίωσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς ὡς ἐλευθερῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα φέρεται.

To the like purpose the second speech of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta, c. 122-124—μὴ μέλλετε Ποτιδαιάταις τε ποιεῖσθαι τιμωρίαν. … καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μετελθεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, etc.

[323] Thucyd. i, 139. Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, Panegyr. c. 34, s. 140; Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 121; Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 43.

[324] Thucyd. ii, 72. Παρασκευὴ δὲ τόσηδε καὶ πόλεμος γεγένηται αὐτῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐλευθερώσεως.

Read also the speech of the Theban orator, in reply to the Platæan, after the capture of the town by the Lacedæmonians (iii, 63).

[325] Thucyd. ii, 8. ἡ δὲ εὔνοια παρὰ πολὺ ἐποίει τῶν ἀνθρώπων μᾶλλον ἐς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ἄλλως τε καὶ προειπόντων ὅτι τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦσιν.

See also iii, 13, 14—the speech of the envoys from the revolted Mitylênê, to the Lacedæmonians.

The Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas with his fleet, is announced as crossing over the Ægean to Ionia for the purpose of "liberating Greece;" accordingly, the Samian exiles remonstrate with him for killing his prisoners, as in contradiction with that object (iii, 32)—ἔλεγον οὐ καλῶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦν αὐτὸν, εἰ ἄνδρας διέφθειρεν, etc.

[326] Thucyd. iv, 85. Ἡ μὲν ἔκπεμψίς μου καὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, ὦ Ἀκάνθιοι, γεγένηται τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπαληθεύουσα ἣν ἀρχόμενοι τοῦ πολέμου προείπομεν, *Ἀθηναίοις ἐλευθεροῦντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα πολεμήσειν*.

[327] Thucyd. iv, 85. Αὐτός τε οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ, ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερώσει δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων παρελήλυθα, ὅρκοις τε Λακεδαιμονίων καταλαβὼν τὰ τέλη τοῖς μεγίστοις, ἢ μὴν οὓς ἂν ἔγωγε προσαγάγωμαι ξυμμάχους ἔσεσθαι αὐτονόμους.... Καὶ εἴ τις ἰδίᾳ τινὰ δεδιὼς ἄρα, μὴ ἐγὼ τισι προσθῶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀπρόθυμός ἐστι, *πάντων μάλιστα πιστευσάτω. Οὐ γὰρ συστασιάσων ἥκω*, οὐδὲ ἀσαφῆ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν νομίζω ἐπιφέρειν, εἰ, *τὸ πάτριον παρεὶς, τὸ πλέον τοῖς ὀλίγοις*, ἢ τὸ ἔλασσον τοῖς πᾶσι, δουλώσαιμι. *Χαλεπώτερα γὰρ ἂν τῆς ἀλλοφύλου ἀρχῆς εἴη*, καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις οὐκ ἂν ἀντὶ πόνων χάρις καθίσταιτο, ἀντὶ δὲ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης αἰτία μᾶλλον· *οἷς τε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐγκλήμασι καταπολεμοῦμεν, αὐτοὶ ἂν φαινοίμεθα ἐχθίονα ἢ ὁ μὴ ὑποδείξας ἀρετὴν κατακτώμενοι*.

[328] Thucyd. iv, 87. Οὐδὲ ὀφείλομεν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὴ *κοινοῦ τινος ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίᾳ τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους ἐλευθεροῦν. Οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἀρχῆς ἐφιέμεθα*, παῦσαι δὲ μᾶλλον ἑτέρους σπεύδοντες τοὺς πλείους ἂν ἀδικοῖμεν, *εἰ ξύμπασιν αὐτονομίαν ἐπιφέροντες* ὑμᾶς τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους περιΐδοιμεν. Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 140, 141.

[329] Feelings of the Lacedæmonians during the winter immediately succeeding the great Syracusan catastrophe (Thuc. viii. 2)—καὶ καθελόντες ἐκείνους (the Athenians) αὐτοὶ τῆς πάσης Ἑλλάδος ἤδη ἀσφαλῶς ἡγήσεσθαι.

[330] Compare Thucyd. viii, 43, 3; viii, 46, 3.

[331] This is emphatically set forth in a fragment of Theopompus the historian, preserved by Theodorus Metochita, and printed at the end of the collection of the Fragments of Theopompus the historian, both by Wichers and by M. Didot. Both these editors, however, insert it only as Fragmentum Spurium, on the authority of Plutarch (Lysander, c. 13), who quotes the same sentiment from the comic writer Theopompus. But the passage of Theodorus Metochita presents the express words Θεόπομπος ὁ ἱστορικός. We have, therefore, his distinct affirmation against that of Plutarch; and the question is, which of the two we are to believe.

Now if any one will read attentively the so-called Fragmentum Spurium as it stands at the end of the collections above referred to, he will see (I think) that it belongs much more naturally to the historian than to the comic writer. It is a strictly historical statement, illustrated by a telling, though coarse, comparison. The Fragment is thus presented by Theodorus Metochita (Fragm. Theopomp. 344, ed. Didot).

Θεόπομπος ὁ ἱστορικὸς ἀποσκώπτων εἰς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, εἴκαζεν αὐτοὺς ταῖς φαύλαις καπηλίσιν, αἳ τοῖς χρωμένοις ἐγχέουσαι τὴν ἀρχὴν οἶνον ἡδύν τε καὶ εὔχρηστον σοφιστικῶς ἐπὶ τῇ λήψει τοῦ ἀργυρίου, μεθύστερον φαυλόν τινα καὶ ἐκτροπίαν καὶ ὀξίνην κατακρινῶσι καὶ παρέχονται· καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους τοίνυν ἔλεγε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκείναις τρόπον, ἐν τῷ κατὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πολέμῳ, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἡδίστῳ πόματι τῆς ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἐλευθερίας καὶ προγράμματι καὶ κηρύγματι τοὺς Ἕλληνας δελεάσαντας, ὕστερον πικρότατα σφίσιν ἐγχέαι καὶ ἀηδέστατα κράματα βιοτῆς ἐπωδύνου καὶ χρήσεως πραγμάτων ἀλγεινῶν, πάνυ τοι κατατυραννοῦντας τὰς πόλεις δεκαρχίαις καὶ ἁρμοσταῖς βαρυτάτοις, καὶ πραττομένους, ἃ δυσχερὲς εἶναι σφόδρα καὶ ἀνύποιστον φέρειν, καὶ ἀποκτιννύναι.

Plutarch, ascribing the statement to the comic Theopompus, affirms him to be silly (ἔοικε ληρεῖν) in saying that the Lacedæmonian empire began by being sweet and pleasant, and afterwards was corrupted and turned

into bitterness and oppression; whereas the fact was, that it was bitterness and oppression from the very first.

Now if we read the above citation from Theodorus, we shall see that Theopompus did not really put forth that assertion which Plutarch contradicts as silly and untrue.

What Theopompus stated was, that the first Lacedæmonians, *during the war against Athens*, tempted the Greeks with a most delicious draught and *programme* and *proclamation* of freedom from the rule of Athens,—and that they afterwards poured in the most bitter and repulsive mixtures of hard oppression and tyranny, etc.

The sweet draught is asserted to consist—not, as Plutarch supposes, in the first taste of the actual Lacedæmonian empire after the war, but—in the seductive promises of freedom held out by them to the allies *during the war*. Plutarch's charge of ἔοικε ληρεῖν has thus no foundation. I have written δελεάσαντας instead of δελεάσοντας which stands in Didot's Fragment, because it struck me that this correction was required to construe the passage.

[332] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegr.) s. 145; Or. viii, (de Pace) s. 122; Diodor. xiv, 10-44; xv, 23. Compare Herodot. v, 92; Thucyd. i, 18; Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 144.

[333] Isokrates, Panathen. s. 61. Σπαρτιᾶται μὲν γὰρ ἔτη δέκα μόλις ἐπεστάτησαν αὐτῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ πέντε καὶ ἑξήκοντα συνεχῶς κατέσχομεν τὴν ἀρχήν. I do not hold myself bound to make out the exactness of the chronology of Isokrates. But here we may remark that his "hardly ten years" is a term, though less than the truth by some months, if we may take the battle of Ægospotami as the beginning, is very near the truth if we take the surrender of Athens as the beginning, down to the battle of Knidus.

[334] Pausanias, viii, 52, 2; ix, 6, 1.

[335] Diodor. xiv, 84; Isokrates, Orat. viii, (de Pace) s. 121.

[336] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 2.

Lysander accompanied King Agesilaus (when the latter was going to his Asiatic command in 396 B.C.). His purpose was—ὅπως τὰς δεκαρχίας τὰς κατασταθείσας ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐκπεπτωκυίας δὲ διὰ τοὺς ἐφόρους, οἱ τὰς πατρίους πολιτείας παρήγγειλαν, πάλιν καταστήσειε μετ᾽ Ἀγησιλάου.

It shows the careless construction of Xenophon's Hellenica, or perhaps his reluctance to set forth the discreditable points of the Lacedæmonian rule, that this is the first mention which he makes (and that too, indirectly) of the dekarchies, nine years after they had been first set up by Lysander.

[337] Compare the two passages of Xenophon's Hellenica, iii, 4, 7; iii, 5, 13.

Ἅτε συντεταραγμένων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ οὔτε δημοκρατίας ἔτι οὔσης, ὥσπερ ἐπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων, οὔτε δεκαρχίας, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ Λυσάνδρου.

But that some of these dekarchies still continued, we know from the subsequent passage. The Theban envoys say to the public assembly at Athens, respecting the Spartans:—

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οὓς ὑμῶν ἀπέστησαν φανεροί εἰσιν ἐξηπατηκότες· ὑπό τε γὰρ τῶν ἁρμοστῶν *τυραννοῦνται*, καὶ ὑπὸ δέκα ἀνδρῶν, οὓς Λύσανδρος κατέστησεν ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει—where the decemvirs are noted as still subsisting, in 395 B.C. See also Xen. Agesilaus, i, 37.

[338] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 15.

[339] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 12. Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἐγγὺς αἱ Ἑλληνίδες πόλεις· (this was spoken at Kalpê in Bithynia) τῆς δὲ Ἑλλάδος Λακεδαιμόνιοι προεστήκασιν· *ἱκανοὶ δέ εἰσι καὶ εἷς ἕκαστος Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅ,τι βούλονται διαπράττεσθαι*.

[340] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 5. Πᾶσαι γὰρ τότε αἱ πόλεις ἐπείθοντο, ὅ,τι Λακεδαιμόνιος ἀνὴρ ἐπιτάττοι.

[341] Thucyd. i, 68-120.

[342] Thucyd. iii, 9; iv, 59-85; vi, 76.

[343] See the remarkable speech of Phrynichus in Thucyd. viii, 48, 5, which I have before referred to.

[344] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 14. Compare the analogous case of Thebes, after the Lacedæmonians had got possession of the Kadmeia (v. 2, 34-36).

[345] Such is the justification offered by the Athenian envoy at Sparta, immediately before the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i, 75, 76). And it is borne out in the main by the narrative of Thucydides himself (i, 99).

[346] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 3. πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος προστάται, etc.

[347] Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 28-30.

[348] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 2.

[349] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19, 20, 21.

The facts, which Plutarch states respecting Lysander, cannot be reconciled with the chronology which he adopts. He represents the recall of Lysander at the instance of Pharnabazus, with all the facts which preceded it, as having occurred prior to the reconstitution of the Athenian democracy, which event we know to have taken place in the summer of 403 B.C.

Lysander captured Samos in the latter half of 404 B.C., after the surrender of Athens. After the capture of Samos, he came home in triumph, in the autumn of 404 B.C. (Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9). He was at home, or serving in Attica, in the beginning of 403 B.C. (Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 30).

Now when Lysander came home at the end of 404 B.C., it was his triumphant return; it was not a recall provoked by complaints of Pharnabazus. Yet there can have been no other return before the restoration of the democracy at Athens.

The recall of Lysander must have been the termination, not of this command, but of a subsequent command. Moreover, it seems to me necessary, in order to make room for the facts stated respecting Lysander as well as about the dekarchies, that we should suppose him to have been again sent out (after his quarrel with Pausanias in Attica) in 403 B.C., to command in Asia. This is nowhere positively stated, but I find nothing to contradict it, and I see no other way of making room for the facts stated about Lysander.

It is to be noted that Diodorus has a decided error in chronology as to the date of the restoration of the Athenian democracy. He places it in 401 B.C. (Diod. xiv, 33), two years later than its real date, which is 403 B.C.; thus lengthening by two years the interval between the surrender of Athens and the reëstablishment of the democracy. Plutarch also seems to have conceived that interval as much longer than it really was.

[350] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 25.

[351] Plutarch, Lysander, c. 2.

[352] Thucyd. viii, 5, 18-37, 56-58, 84.

[353] Plutarch, Lysander, c. 19, 20; Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 9.

[354] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 13.

[355] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 8.

[356] Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 19; ii, 4, 8; Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 3; iii, 3, 13.

[357] Diodor. xiv, 35.

[358] Diodor. *ut sup.*

[359] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 5-8; Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 8-16.

[360] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 8; Diodor. xiv, 38.

[361] There is no positive testimony to this; yet such is my belief, as I have stated at the close of the last chapter. It is certain that Xenophon was serving under Agesilaus in Asia three years after this time; the only matter left for conjecture is, at what precise moment he went out the second time. The marked improvement in the Cyreian soldiers, is one reason for the statement in the text; another reason is, the great detail with which the military operations of Derkyllidas are described, rendering it probable that the narrative is from an eye-witness.

[362] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 8; Ephorus, ap. Athenæ. xi, p. 500.

[363] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 9. ἐστάθη τὴν ἀσπίδα ἔχων.

[364] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 10; iii, 2, 28.

[365] See the description of the satrapy of Cyrus (Xenoph. Anab. i, 9, 19, 21, 22). In the main, this division and subdivision of the entire empire into revenue-districts, each held by a nominee responsible for payment of the rent or tribute, to the government or to some higher officer of the government—is the system prevalent throughout a large portion of Asia to the present day.

[366] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 10. Ἀναζεύξασα τὸν στόλον, καὶ χρήματα λαβοῦσα, ὥστε καὶ αὐτῷ Φαρναβάζῳ δοῦναι, καὶ ταῖς παλλακίσιν αὐτοῦ χαρίσασθαι καὶ τοῖς δυναμένοις μάλιστα παρὰ Φαρναβάζῳ, ἐπορεύετο.

[367] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 15.

[368] Herod. viii, 69.

[369] Such is the emphatic language of Xenophon (Hellen. iii, 1, 14)—Μειδίας, θυγατρὸς ἀνὴρ αὐτῆς ὤν, ἀναπτερωθεὶς ὑπό τινων, ὡς αἰσχρὸν εἴη, γυναῖκα μὲν ἄρχειν, αὐτὸν δ᾽ ἰδιώτην εἶναι, *τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους μάλα φυλαττομένης αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ ἐν τυραννίδι προσήκει*, ἐκείνῳ δὲ πιστευούσης καὶ ἀσπαζομένης, ὥσπερ ἂν γυνὴ γαμβρὸν ἀσπάζοιτο,—εἰσελθὼν ἀποπνῖξαι αὐτὴν λέγεται.

For the illustration of this habitual insecurity in which the Grecian despot lived, see the dialogue of Xenophon called Hieron (i, 12; ii, 8-10; vii, 10). He particularly dwells upon the multitude of family crimes which stained the houses of the Grecian despots; murders by fathers, sons, brothers, wives, etc. (iii, 8).

[370] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 13.

[371] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 18; Diodor. xiv, 38.

The reader will remark here how Xenophon shapes the narrative in such a manner as to inculcate the pious duty in a general of obeying the warnings furnished by the sacrifice,—either for action or for inaction. I have already noticed (in my preceding chapters) how often he does this in the Anabasis.

Such an inference is never (I believe) to be found suggested in Thucydides.

[372] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 20-23.

[373] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 26. Εἶπέ μοι, ἔφη, Μανία δὲ τίνος ἦν; Οἱ δὲ πάντες εἶπον, ὅτι Φαρναβάζου. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ἐκείνης, ἔφη, Φαρναβάζου; Μάλιστα, ἔφασαν. Ἡμέτερ᾽ ἂν εἴη, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ κρατοῦμεν· πολέμιος γὰρ ἡμῖν Φαρνάβαζος.

Two points are remarkable here. 1. The manner in which Mania, the administratrix of a large district, with a prodigious treasure and a large army in pay, is treated as *belonging* to Pharnabazus—as the servant or slave of Pharnabazus. 2. The distinction here taken between public property and private property, in reference to the laws of war and the rights of the conqueror. Derkyllidas lays claim to that which had belonged to Mania (or to Pharnabazus); but *not* to that which had belonged to Meidias.

According to the modern rules of international law, this distinction is one allowed and respected, everywhere except at sea. But in the ancient world, it by no means stood out so clearly or prominently; and the observance of it here deserves notice.

[374] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 28.

Thus finishes the interesting narrative about Mania, Meidias, and Derkyllidas. The abundance of detail, and the dramatic manner, in which Xenophon has worked it out, impress me with a belief that he was actually present at the scene.

[375] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 1. νομίζων τὴν Αἰολίδα ἐπιτετειχίσθαι τῇ ἑαυτοῦ οἰκήσει Φρυγίᾳ.

The word ἐπιτειχίζειν is capital and significant, in Grecian warfare.

[376] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 2-5.

[377] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 4.

[378] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 6, 7.

Morus supposes (I think, with much probability) that ὁ τῶν Κυρείων προεστηκὼς here means Xenophon himself.

He could not with propriety advert to the fact that he himself had not been with the army during the year of Thimbron.

[379] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 9. ἔπεμψεν αὐτοὺς ἀπ᾽ *Ἐφέσου* διὰ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων, ἡδόμενος ὅτι ἔμελλον ὄψεσθαι τὰς πόλεις ἐν εἰρήνῃ εὐδαιμονικῶς διαγούσας. I cannot but think that we ought here to read ἐπ᾽ Ἐφέσου, not ἀπ᾽ Ἐφέσου; or else ἀπὸ Λαμψάκου.

It was at Lampsakus that this interview and conversation between Derkyllidas and the commissioners took place. The commissioners were to be sent from Lampsakus to Ephesus through the Grecian cities.

The expression ἐν εἰρήνῃ εὐδαιμονικῶς διαγούσας has reference to the foreign relations of the cities, and to their exemption from annoyance by Persian arms,—without implying any internal freedom or good condition. There were Lacedæmonian harmosts in most of them, and dekarchies half broken up or modified in many; see the subsequent passages (iii, 2, 20; iii, 4, 7; iv, 8, 1)

[380] Compare Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 5.

[381] Herodot. vi, 36; Plutarch, Perikles, c. 19; Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 7.

[382] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 10; iv, 8, 5. Diodor. xiv, 38.

[383] Diodor. xiii, 65.

[384] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 11; Isokrates, Or. iv. (Panegyr.) s. 167.

[385] Diodor. xiv, 39.

[386] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 18.

In the Anabasis (ii, 3, 3) Xenophon mentions the like care on the part of Klearchus, to have the best armed and most imposing soldiers around him, when he went to his interview with Tissaphernes.

Xenophon gladly avails himself of the opportunity, to pay an indirect compliment to the Cyreian army.

[387] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 19; Diodor. xiv, 39.

[388] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 20.

[389] Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 5, 5; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 27; Justin, v, 10.

[390] Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 30.

[391] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 12. Κορινθίους δὲ καὶ Ἄρκαδας καὶ Ἀχαίους τί φῶμεν; οἱ ἐν μὲν τῷ πρὸς ὑμᾶς (it is the Theban envoys who are addressing the public assembly at Athens) πολέμῳ *μάλα λιπαρούμενοι ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων* (the Lacedæmonians), πάντων καὶ πόνων καὶ κινδύνων καὶ δαπανημάτων μετεῖχον· ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔπραξαν ἃ ἐβούλοντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ποίας ἢ ἀρχῆς ἢ τιμῆς ἢ ποίων χρημάτων μεταδεδώκασιν αὐτοῖς; ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν εἰλώτας ἁρμοστὰς καθιστάναι, τῶν δὲ ξυμμάχων ἐλευθέρων ὄντων, ἐπεὶ εὐτύχησαν, δεσπόται ἀναπεφήνασιν.

[392] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 22.

Τούτων δ᾽ ὕστερον, καὶ Ἄγιδος πεμφθέντος θῦσαι τῷ Διΐ κατὰ μαντείαν τινά, ἐκώλυον οἱ Ἠλεῖοι μὴ προσεύχεσθαι νίκην πολέμου, λέγοντες, ὡς καὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εἴη οὕτω νόμιμον, μὴ χρηστηριάζεσθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐφ᾽ Ἑλλήνων πολέμῳ· ὥστε ἄθυτος ἀπῆλθεν.

This canon seems not unnatural, for one of the greatest Pan-hellenic temples and establishments. Yet it was not constantly observed at Olympia (compare another example—Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 2); nor yet at Delphi, which was not less Pan-hellenic than Olympia (see Thucyd. i, 118). We are therefore led to imagine that it was a canon which the Eleians invoked only when they were prompted by some special sentiment or aversion.

[393] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 23. Ἐκ τούτων οὖν πάντων ὀργιζομένοις, ἔδοξε τοῖς ἐφόροις καὶ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, *σωφρονίσαι αὐτούς*.

[394] Diodorus (xiv, 17) mentions this demand for the arrears; which appears very probable. It is not directly noticed by Xenophon, who however mentions (see the passage cited in the note of page preceding) the general assessment levied by Sparta upon all her Peloponnesian allies during the war.

[395] Diodor. xiv, 17.

Diodorus introduces in these transactions King Pausanias, not King Agis, as the acting person.

Pausanias states (iii, 8, 2) that the Eleians, in returning a negative answer to the requisition of Sparta, added that they would enfranchise their Perioeki, when they saw Sparta enfranchise her own. This answer appears to me highly improbable, under the existing circumstances of Sparta and her relations to the other Grecian states. Allusion to the relations between Sparta and her Perioeki was a novelty, even in 371 B.C., at the congress which preceded the battle of Leuktra.

[396] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 23, 26; Diodor. xiv, 17.

[397] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 27; Pausanias, iii, 8, 2; v, 4, 5.

The words of Xenophon are not very clear—Βουλόμενοι δὲ οἱ περὶ Ξενίαν τὸν λεγόμενον μεδίμνῳ ἀπομετρήσασθαι τὸ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀργύριον (τὴν πόλιν) δι᾽ αὐτῶν προσχωρῆσαι Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἐκπεσόντες ἐξ οἰκίας ξίφη ἔχοντες σφαγὰς ποιοῦσι, καὶ ἄλλους τέ τινας κτείνουσι, καὶ ὅμοιόν τινα Θρασυδαίῳ ἀποκτείναντες, τῷ τοῦ δήμου προστάτῃ, ᾤοντο Θρασυδαῖον ἀπεκτονέναι…. Ὁ δὲ Θρασυδαῖος ἔτι καθεύδων ἐτύγχανεν, οὗπερ ἐμεθύσθη.

Both the words and the narrative are here very obscure. It seems as if a sentence had dropped out, when we come suddenly upon the mention of the drunken state of Thrasydæus, without having before been told of any circumstance either leading to or implying this condition.

[398] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 28.

[399] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30. There is something perplexing in Xenophon's description of the Triphylian townships which the Eleians surrendered. First, he does not name Lepreum or Makistus, both of which nevertheless had joined Agis on his invasion, and were the most important places in Triphylia (iii, 2, 25). Next, he names Letrini, Amphidoli, and Marganeis, as Triphylian; which yet were on the north of the Alpheius, and are elsewhere distinguished from Triphylian. I incline to believe that the words in his text, καὶ τὰς Τριφυλίδας πόλεις ἀφεῖναι, must be taken to mean Lepreum and Makistus, perhaps with some other places which we do not know; but that a καὶ after ἀφεῖναι, has fallen out of the text, and that the cities, whose names follow, are to be taken as *not* Triphylian. Phrixa and Epitalium were both south, but only just south, of the Alpheius; they were not on the borders of Triphylia,—and it seems doubtful whether they were properly Triphylian.

[400] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30; Diodor. xiv, 34; Pausan. iii, 8, 2.

This war between Sparta and Elis reaches over three different years; it began in the first, occupied the whole of the second, and was finished in the third. Which years these three were (out of the seven which separate B.C. 403-396), critics have not been unanimous.

Following the chronology of Diodorus, who places the beginning of the war in 402 B.C., I differ from Mr. Clinton, who places it in 401 B.C. (Fasti Hellen. ad ann.), and from Sievers (Geschichte von Griechenland bis zur Schlacht von Mantinea, p. 382), who places it in 398 B.C.

According to Mr. Clinton's view, the principal year of the war would have been 400 B.C., the year of the Olympic festival. But surely, had such been the fact, the coincidence of war in the country with the Olympic festival, must have raised so many complications, and acted so powerfully on the sentiments of all parties, as to be specifically mentioned. In my judgment, the war was brought to a close in the early part of 400 B.C., before the time of the Olympic festival arrived. Probably the Eleians were anxious, on this very ground, to bring it to a close before the festival did arrive.

Sievers, in his discussion of the point, admits that the date assigned by Diodorus to the Eleian war, squares both with the date which Diodorus gives for the death of Agis, and with that which Plutarch states about the duration of the reign of Agesilaus,—better than the chronology which he himself (Sievers) prefers. He founds his conclusion on Xenophon, Hell. iii, 2, 21. Τούτων δὲ πραττομένων ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ ὑπὸ Δερκυλλίδα, Λακεδαιμόνιοι κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον πάλαι ὀργιζόμενοι τοῖς Ἠλείοις, etc.

This passage is certainly of some weight; yet I think in the present case it is not to be pressed with rigid accuracy as to date. The whole third Book down to these very words, has been occupied entirely with the course of Asiatic affairs. Not a single proceeding of the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus, since the amnesty at Athens, has yet been mentioned. The command of Derkyllidas included only the last portion of the Asiatic exploits, and Xenophon has here loosely referred to it as if it comprehended the whole. Sievers moreover compresses the

whole Eleian war into one year and a fraction; an interval, shorter, I think, than that which is implied in the statements of Xenophon.

[401] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31.

[402] Diodor. xiv, 34; Pausan. iv, 26, 2. 2.

[403] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 17. Compare Xen. Rep. Laced. vii, 6.

Both Ephorus and Theopompus recounted the opposition to the introduction of gold and silver into Sparta, each mentioning the name of one of the ephors as taking the lead in it.

There was a considerable body of ancient sentiment, and that too among high-minded and intelligent men, which regarded gold and silver as a cause of mischief and corruption, and of which the stanza of Horace (Od. iii, 3) is an echo:—

Aurum irrepertum, et sic melius situm

Cum terra celat, spernere fortior

Quam cogere humanos in usus,

Omne sacrum rapiente dextrâ.

[404] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 23.

Ἀποβέβηκε δὲ τοὐνάντιον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τοῦ συμφέροντος· τὴν μὲν γὰρ πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἀχρήματον, τοὺς δ᾽ ἰδιώτας φιλοχρημάτους.

[405] Thucyd. i, 80. ἀλλὰ πολλῷ ἔτι πλέον τούτου (χρημάτων) ἐλλείπομεν, καὶ οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ ἔχομεν, οὔτε ἑτοίμως ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων φέρομεν.

[406] Aristotel. Polit. ii, 6, 23. Φαύλως δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰ κοινὰ κρήματα τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ τῆς πόλεώς ἐστιν οὐδὲν, πολέμους μεγάλους ἀναγκαζομένους φέρειν· εἰσφέρουσί τε κακῶς, etc.

Contrast what Plato says in his dialogue of Alkibiades, i, c. 39, p. 122 E. about the great quantity of gold and silver then at Sparta. The dialogue must bear date at some period between 400-371 B.C.

[407] See the speeches of the Corinthian envoys and of King Archidamus at Sparta (Thucyd. i, 70-84; compare also viii, 24-96).

[408] See the criticisms upon Sparta, about 395 B.C. and 372 B.C. (Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 5, 11-15; vi, 3, 8-11).

[409] Thucyd. i, 77. Ἄμικτα γὰρ τά τε καθ᾽ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς νόμιμα τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχετε, etc. About the ξενηλασίαι of the Spartans—see the speech of Perikles in Thucyd. i, 138.

[410] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 10.

[411] Aristot. Politic. ii, 6, 16-18; ii, 7, 3.

[412] Isokrates, de Pace, s. 118-127.

[413] Xen. de Republ. Laced. c. 14.

Οἶδα γὰρ πρότερον μὲν Λακεδαιμονίους αἱρουμένους, οἴκοι τὰ μέτρια ἔχοντας ἀλλήλοις συνεῖναι μᾶλλον, ἢ ἁρμόζοντας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ κολακευομένους διαφθείρεσθαι. Καὶ πρόσθεν μὲν οἶδα αὐτοὺς φοβουμένους, χρύσιον ἔχοντας φαίνεσθαι· νῦν δ᾽ ἔστιν οὓς καὶ καλλωπιζομένους ἐπὶ τῷ κεκτῆσθαι. Ἐπίσταμαι δὲ καὶ πρόσθεν τούτου ἕνεκα ξενηλασίας γιγνομένας, καὶ ἀποδημεῖν οὐκ ἐξόν, ὅπως μὴ ῥᾳδιουργίας οἱ πολῖται ἀπὸ τῶν ξένων ἐμπίμπλαιντο· νῦν δ᾽ ἐπίσταμαι τοὺς δοκοῦντας πρώτους εἶναι ἐσπουδακότας ὡς μηδεπότε παύωνται ἁρμόζοντες ἐπὶ ξένης. Καὶ ἦν μὲν, ὅτε ἐπεμελοῦντο, ὅπως ἄξιοι εἶεν ἡγεῖσθαι· νῦν δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον πραγματεύονται, ὅπως ἄρξουσιν, ἢ ὅπως ἄξιοι τούτου ἔσονται. Τοιγαροῦν οἱ Ἕλληνες πρότερον μὲν ἰόντες εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐδέοντο αὐτῶν, ἡγεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἀδικεῖν· νῦν δὲ πολλοὶ παρακαλοῦσιν ἀλλήλους *ἐπὶ τὸ διακωλύειν ἄρξαι πάλιν αὐτούς*. Οὐδὲν μέντοι δεῖ θαυμάζειν τούτων τῶν ἐπιῴγων αὐτοῖς γιγνομένων, ἐπειδὴ φανεροί εἰσιν οὔτε τῷ θεῷ πειθόμενοι οὔτε τοῖς Λυκούργου νόμοις.

The expression, "taking measures to hinder the Lacedæmonians from again exercising empire,"—marks this treatise as probably composed some time between their naval defeat at Knidus, and their land-defeat at Leuktra. The former put an end to their maritime empire,—the latter excluded them from all possibility of recovering it; but during the interval between the two, such recovery was by no means impossible.

[414] The Athenian envoy at Melos says,—Λακεδαιμόνιοι γὰρ πρὸς μὲν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἐπιχώρια νόμιμα, πλεῖστα ἀρετῇ χρῶνται· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀλλους—ἐπιφανέστατα ὧν ἴσμεν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα καλὰ νομίζουσι, τὰ δὲ ξυμφέροντα δίκαια (Thucyd. v. 105). A judgment almost exactly the same, is pronounced by Polybius (vi, 48).

[415] Thucyd. i, 69, 70, 71, 84. ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα—ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς μελλητὰς καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους: also viii, 24.

[416] Σπάρτην δαμασίμβροτον (Simonides ap. Plutarch. Agesilaum, c. 1).

[417] See an expression of Aristotle (Polit. ii, 6, 22) about the function of admiral among the Lacedæmonians,—ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν, οὖσι στρατηγοῖς ἀϊδίοις, ἡ ναυαρχία σχεδόν ἑτέρα βασιλεία καθέστηκε.

This reflection,—which Aristotle intimates that he has borrowed from some one else, though without saying from whom,—must in all probability have been founded upon the case of Lysander; for never after Lysander, was there any Lacedæmonian admiral enjoying a power which could by possibility be termed exorbitant or dangerous. We know that during the later years of the Peloponnesian war, much censure was cast upon the Lacedæmonian practice of annually changing the admiral (Xen. Hellen. i, 6, 4).

The Lacedæmonians seem to have been impressed with these criticisms, for in the year 395 B.C. (the year before the battle of Knidus) they conferred upon King Agesilaus, who was then commanding the land army in Asia Minor, the command of the fleet also—in order to secure unity of operations. This had never been done before (Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 28).

[418] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 24. Perhaps he may have been simply a member of the tribe called Hylleis, who, probably, called themselves Herakleids. Some affirmed that Lysander wished to cause the kings to be elected out of all the Spartans, not simply out of the Herakleids. This is less probable.

[419] Duris ap. Athenæum, xv, p. 696.

[420] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 18; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 20.

[421] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 17.

[422] Aristotle (Polit. v, 1, 5) represents justly the schemes of Lysander as going πρὸς τὸ μέρος τι κινῆσαι τῆς πολιτείας· οἷον ἀρχήν τινα καταστῆσαι ἢ ἀνελεῖν. The Spartan kingship is here regarded as ἀρχή τις—one office of state, among others. But Aristotle regards Lysander as having intended to destroy the kingship—καταλῦσαι τὴν βασιλείαν—which does not appear to have been the fact. The plan of Lysander was to retain the kingship, but to render it elective instead of hereditary. He wished to place the Spartan kingship substantially on the same footing, as that on which the office of the kings or suffetes of Carthage stood; who were not hereditary, nor confined to members of the same family or Gens, but chosen out of the principal families or Gentes. Aristotle, while comparing the βασιλεῖς at Sparta with those at Carthage, as being generally analogous, pronounces in favor of the Carthaginian election as better than the Spartan hereditary transmission. (Arist. Polit. ii, 8, 2.)

[423] Thucyd. v, 63; Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 25; iv, 2, 1.

[424] Diodor. xiv, 13; Cicero, de Divinat. i, 43, 96; Cornel. Nepos, Lysand. c. 3.

[425] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 25, from Ephorus. Compare Herodot. vi, 66; Thucyd. v, 12.

[426] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 26.

[427] Tacit. Histor. i, 10. "Cui expeditius fuerit tradere imperium, quam obtinere."

The general fact of the conspiracy of Lysander to open for himself a way to the throne, appears to rest on very sufficient testimony,—that of Ephorus; to whom perhaps the words φασί τινες in Aristotle may allude, where he mentions this conspiracy as having been narrated (Polit. v, 1, 5). But Plutarch, as well as K. O. Müller (Hist. of Dorians, iv, 9, 5) and others, erroneously represent the intrigues with the oracle as being resorted to after Lysander returned from accompanying Agesilaus to Asia; which is certainly impossible, since Lysander accompanied Agesilaus out, in the spring of 396 B.C.—did not return to Greece until the spring of 395 B.C.—and

was then employed, with an interval not greater than four or five months, on that expedition against Bœotia wherein he was slain.

The tampering of Lysander with the oracle must undoubtedly have taken place prior to the death of Agis,—at some time between 403 B.C. and 399 B.C. The humiliation which he received in 396 B.C. from Agesilaus might indeed have led him to revolve in his mind the renewal of his former plans; but he can have had no time to do anything towards them. Aristotle (Polit. v, 6, 2) alludes to the humiliation of Lysander by the kings as an example of incidents *tending* to raise disturbance in an aristocratical government; but this humiliation, probably, alludes to the manner in which he was thwarted in Attica by Pausanias in 403 B.C.—which proceeding is ascribed by Plutarch to both kings, as well as to their jealousy of Lysander (see Plutarch, Lysand. c. 21)—not to the treatment of Lysander by Agesilaus in 396 B.C. The mission of Lysander to the despot Dionysius at Syracuse (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 2) must also have taken place prior to the death of Agis in 399 B.C.; whether before or after the failure of the stratagem at Delphi, is uncertain; perhaps after it.

[428] The age of Leotychides is approximately marked by the date of the presence of Alkibiades at Sparta 414-413 B.C. The mere rumor, true or false, that this young man was the son of Alkibiades, may be held sufficient as chronological evidence to certify his age.

[429] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2; Pausanias, iii, 8, 4; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 3.

[430] Herodot. v, 66.

[431] I confess I do not understand how Xenophon can say, in his Agesilaus, i, 6, Ἀγησίλαος τοίνυν ἔτι μὲν νέος ὢν ἔτυχε τῆς βασιλείας. For he himself says (ii, 28), and it seems well established, that Agesilaus died at the age of above 80 (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 40); and his death must have been about 360 B.C.

[432] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 2-5; Xenoph. Agesil. vii, 3; Plutarch, Apophth. Laconic. p. 212 D.

[433] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2; Xenoph. Agesil. viii, 1.

It appears that the mother of Agesilaus was a very small woman, and that Archidamus had incurred the censure of the ephors, on that especial ground, for marrying her.

[434] Xenoph. Agesil. xi, 7; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2.

[435] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2.

[436] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 2.

[437] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 1.

[438] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2; Xen. Agesil. 1, 5—κρίνασα ἡ πόλις ἀνεπικλητότερον εἶναι Ἀγησίλαον καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ, etc.

[439] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2. This statement contradicts the talk imputed to Timæa by Duris (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 23).

[440] Herodot. iv, 161. Διεδέξατο δὲ τὴν βασιληΐην τοῦ Ἀρκεσίλεω ὁ παῖς Βάττος, χωλός τε ἐὼν καὶ οὐκ ἀρτίπους. Οἱ δὲ Κυρηναῖοι *πρὸς τὴν καταλαβοῦσαν συμφορὴν* ἔπεμπον ἐς Δελφοὺς, ἐπειρησομένους ὅντινα τρόπον καταστησάμενοι κάλλιστα ἂν οἰκέοιεν.

[441] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Pausanias, iii, 8, 5.

[442] Diodor. xi, 50.

[443] Herodot. vii, 143.

[444] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 3. ὡς οὐκ οἴοιτο τὸν θεὸν τοῦτο κελεύειν φυλάξασθαι, *μὴ προσπταίσας τις χωλεύσῃ*, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, μὴ οὐκ ὢν τοῦ γένους βασιλεύσῃ.

Congenital lameness would be regarded as a mark of divine displeasure, and therefore a disqualification from the throne, as in the case of Battus of Kyrênê above noticed. But the words χωλὴ βασίλεια were general enough to cover both the cases,—superinduced as well as congenital lameness. It is upon this that Lysander founds his inference—that the god did not mean to allude to bodily lameness at all.

[445] Pausanias, iii, 8, 5; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 22; Justin, vi, 2.

[446]

Ἴδ᾽ οἷον, ὦ παῖδες, προσέμιξεν ἄφαρ

Τοὔπος τὸ θεοπρόπον ἡμῖν

Τῆς παλαιφάτου προνοίας,

Ὅ τ᾽ ἔλακεν, etc.

This is a splendid chorus of the Trachiniæ of Sophokles (822) proclaiming their sentiments on the awful death of Hêraklês, in the tunic of Nessus, which has just been announced as about to happen.

[447] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30; Plutarch, Compar. Agesil. and Pomp. c. 1. Ἀγησίλαος δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν ἔδοξε λαβεῖν, οὔτε τὰ πρὸς θεοὺς ἄμεμπτος, οὔτε τὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, κρίνας νοθείας Λεωτυχίδην, ὃν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἀπέδειξεν ὁ ἀδελφὸς γνήσιον, τὸν δὲ χρησμὸν κατειρωνευσάμενος τὸν περὶ τῆς χωλότητος. Again, ib. c. 2. δι᾽ Ἀγησίλαον ἐπεσκότησε τῷ χρησμῷ Λύσανδρος.

[448] Xen. Agesil. iv, 5; Plutarch, Ages. c. 4.

[449] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 4.

[450] Xen. Agesil. vii, 2.

[451] Isokrates, Orat. v, (Philipp.) s. 100; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 3, 13-23; Plutarch, Apophthegm. Laconica, p. 209 F—212 D.

See the incident alluded to by Theopompus ap. Athenæum, xiii, p. 609.

[452] Isokrates (Orat. v, *ut sup.*) makes a remark in substance the same.

[453] Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 3, 4.

[454] See Vol. II, Ch. vi, p. 359 of this History.

[455] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 5. Οὗτος (Kinadon) δ᾽ ἦν νεανίσκος καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εὔρωστος, οὐ μέντοι τῶν ὁμοίων.

The meaning of the term Οἱ ὅμοιοι fluctuates in Xenophon; it sometimes, as here, is used to signify the privileged Peers—again De Repub. Laced. xiii, 1; and Anab. iv, 6, 14. Sometimes again it is used agreeably to the Lykurgean theory; whereby every citizen, who rigorously discharged his duty in the public drill, belonged to the number (De Rep. Lac. x, 7).

There was a variance between the theory and the practice.

[456] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9. Ὑπηρετήκει δὲ καὶ ἄλλ᾽ ἤδη ὁ Κινάδων τοῖς Ἐφόροις τοιαῦτα. iii, 3, 7. Οἱ συντεταγμένοι ἡμῶν (Kinadon says) αὐτοὶ ὅπλα κεκτήμεθα.

[457] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 11. μηδενὸς ἥττων εἶναι τῶν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι—was the declaration of Kinadon when seized and questioned by the ephors concerning his purposes. Substantially it coincides with Aristotle (Polit. v, 6, 2)—ἢ ὅταν ἀνδρώδης τις ὢν μὴ μετέχῃ τῶν τιμῶν, οἷον Κινάδων ὁ τὴν ἐπ᾽ Ἀγησιλάου συστήσας ἐπίθεσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας.

[458] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 5.

[459] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 6. Αὐτοὶ μέντοι πᾶσιν ἔφασαν συνειδέναι καὶ εἴλωσι καὶ νεοδαμώδεσι, καὶ τοῖς ὑπομείοσι καὶ τοῖς περιοίκοις· ὅπου γὰρ ἐν τούτοις τις λόγος γένοιτο περὶ Σπαρτιατῶν, οὐδένα δύνασθαι κρύπτειν τὸ μὴ οὐχ ἡδέως ἂν *καὶ ὠμῶν ἐσθίειν αὐτῶν.*

The expression is Homeric—ὠμὸν βεβρώθοις Πρίαμον, etc. (Iliad. iv, 35). The Greeks did not think themselves obliged to restrain the full expression of vindictive feeling. The poet Theognis wishes, "that he may one day come to drink the blood of those who had ill-used him" (v. 349 Gaisf.).

[460] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 7. ὅτι ἐπιδημεῖν οἱ παρηγγελμένον εἴη.

[461] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 8. Ἀγαγεῖν δὲ ἐκέλευον καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα, ἣ καλλίστη μὲν ἐλέγετο αὐτόθι εἶναι, λυμαίνεσθαι δ᾽ ἐώκει τοὺς ἀφικνουμένους Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ νεωτέρους.

[462] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9, 10.

The persons called Hippeis at Sparta, were not mounted; they were a select body of three hundred youthful citizens, employed either on home police or on foreign service.

See Herodot. viii, 124; Strabo, x, p. 481; K. O. Müller, History of the Dorians, B. iii, ch. 12, s. 5, 6.

[463] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9.

Ἔμελλον δὲ οἱ συλλαβόντες αὐτὸν μὲν κατέχειν, τοὺς δὲ ξυνειδότας *πυθόμενοι αὐτοῦ γράψαντες ἀποπέμπειν* τὴν ταχίστην τοῖς ἐφόροις. Οὕτω δ᾽ εἶχον οἱ ἔφοροι πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥστε καὶ μοραν ἱππέων ἔπεμψαν τοῖς ἐπ᾽ Αὐλῶνος. Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ εἰλημμένου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἦκεν ἱππεὺς, *φέρων τὰ ὀνόματα ὧν Κινάδων ἀπέγραψε*, παραχρῆμα τόν τε μάντιν Τισάμενον καὶ τοὺς ἐπικαιριωτάτους ξυνελάμβανον. Ὡς δ᾽ ἀνήχθη ὁ Κινάδων, καὶ ἠλέγχετο, καὶ ὡμολόγει πάντα, καὶ *τοὺς ξυνειδότας ἔλεγε*, τέλος αὐτὸν ἤροντο, τί καὶ βουλόμενος ταῦτα πράττοι;

Polyænus (ii, 14, 1) in his account of this transaction, expressly mentions that the Hippeis or guards who accompanied Kinadon, put him to the torture (στρεβλώσαντες) when they seized him, in order to extort the names of his accomplices. Even without express testimony, we might pretty confidently have assumed this. From a man of spirit like Kinadon, they were not likely to obtain such betrayal without torture.

I had affirmed that in the description of this transaction given by Xenophon, it did not appear whether Kinadon was able to write or not. My assertion was controverted by Colonel Mure (in his Reply to my Appendix), who cited the words φέρων τὰ ὀνόματα ὧν Κινάδων *ἀπέγραψε*, as containing an affirmation from Xenophon that Kinadon could write.

In my judgment, these words, taken in conjunction with what precedes, and with the probabilities of the fact described, do not contain such an affirmation.

The guards were instructed to seize Kinadon, and after *having heard from Kinadon who his accomplices were, to write the names down and send them to the ephors*. It is to be presumed that they executed these instructions as given; the more so, as what they were commanded to do, was at once the safest and the most natural proceeding. For Kinadon was a man distinguished for personal *stature and courage* (τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εὔρωστος, iii, 3, 5) so that those who seized him would find it an indispensable precaution to pinion his arms. Assuming even that Kinadon could write,—yet, if he were to write, he must have his right arm free. And why should the guards take this risk, when all which the ephors required was, that Kinadon should *pronounce* the names, to be written down by others? With a man of the qualities of Kinadon, it probably required the most intense pressure to force him to betray his comrades, even by word of mouth; it would probably be more difficult still, to force him to betray them by the more deliberate act of writing.

I conceive that ἦκεν ἱππεὺς, φέρων τὰ ὀνόματα ὧν ὁ Κινάδων ἀπέγραψε is to be construed with reference to the preceding sentence, and announces the carrying into effect of the instructions then reported as given by the ephors. "A guard came, bearing the names of those whom Kinadon had given in." It is not necessary to suppose that Kinadon had written down these names with his own hand.

In the beginning of the Oration of Andokides (De Mysteriis), Pythonikus gives information of a mock celebration of the mysteries, committed by Alkibiades and others; citing as his witness the slave Andromachus; who is accordingly produced, and states to the assembly *vivâ voce* what he had seen and who were the persons present—Πρῶτος μὲν οὗτος (Andromachus) ταῦτα εμήνυσε, καὶ *ἀπέγραψε τούτους* (s. 13). It is not here meant to affirm that the slave Andromachus wrote down the names of these persons, which he had the moment before publicly announced to the assembly. It is by the words ἀπέγραψε τούτους that the orator describes the public oral announcement made by Andromachus, which was formally taken note of by a secretary, and which led to legal consequences against the persons whose names were given in.

So again, in the old law quoted by Demosthenes (adv. Makast. p. 1068), Ἀπογραφέτω δὲ τὸν μὴ ποιοῦντα ταῦτα ὁ βουλόμενος πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα; and in Demosthenes adv. Nikostrat. p. 1247. Ἃ ἐκ τῶν νόμων τῷ ἰδιώτῃ τῷ ἀπογράφαντι γίγνεται, τῇ πόλει ἀφίημι: compare also Lysias, De Bonis Aristophanis, Or. xix, s. 53; it is not meant to affirm that ὁ ἀπογράφων was required to perform his process in writing, or was necessarily able to write. A citizen who could not write might do this, as well as one who could. He *informed against* a certain per-

son as delinquent; he *informed of* certain articles of property, as belonging to the estate of one whose property had been confiscated to the city. The information, as well as the name of the informer, was taken down by the official person,—whether the informer could himself write or not.

It appears to me that Kinadon, having been interrogated, *told* to the guards who first seized him, the names of his accomplices,—just as he *told* these names afterwards to the ephors (καὶ τοῦς ξυνειδότας *ἔλεγε*); and this, whether he was, or was not, able to write; a point, which the passage of Xenophon noway determines.

[464] Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 3, 11.

[465] Diodor. xiv, 39; Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 13.

[466] Lysias, Orat. xix, (De Bonis Aristophanis) s. 38.

[467] See Ktesias, Fragmenta, Persica, c. 63, ed. Bähr; Plutarch, Artax. c. 21.

We cannot make out these circumstances with any distinctness; but the general fact is plainly testified, and is besides very probable. Another Grecian surgeon (besides Ktesias) is mentioned as concerned,—Polykritus of Mendê; and a Kretan dancer named Zeno,—both established at the Persian court.

There is no part of the narrative of Ktesias, the loss of which is so much to be regretted as this; relating transactions, in which he was himself concerned, and seemingly giving original letters.

[468] Diodor. xiv, 39-79.

[469] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 1.

[470] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 2.

[471] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 1. ἐλπίδας ἔχοντα μεγάλας αἱρήσειν βασιλέα, etc. Compare iv, 2, 3.

Xen. Agesilaus, i, 36. ἐπινοῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων καταλύσειν τὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα στρατεύσασαν πρότερον ἀρχήν, etc.

[472] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 5.

[473] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 5; Pausan. iii, 9, 1.

[474] Herodot. i, 68; vii, 159; Pausan. iii, 16, 6.

[475] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 3, 4; iii, 5, 5; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 6; Pausan. iii, 9, 2.

[476] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 5, 6; Xen. Agesilaus, i, 10.

The term of three months is specified only in the latter passage. The former armistice of Derkyllidas had probably not expired when Agesilaus first arrived.

[477] Pausan. vi, 3, 6.

[478] Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 7. This rule does not seem to have been adhered to afterwards. Lysander was sent out again as commander in 403 B.C. It is possible, indeed, that he may have been again sent out as nominal secretary to some other person named as commander.

[479] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7.

[480] The sarcastic remarks which Plutarch ascribes to Agesilaus, calling Lysander "my meat-distributor" (κρεοδαίτην), are not warranted by Xenophon, and seem not to be probable under the circumstances (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 23; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 8).

[481] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 7-10; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7-8; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 23.

It is remarkable that in the Opusculum of Xenophon, a special Panegyric called *Agesilaus*, not a word is said about this highly characteristic proceeding between Agesilaus and Lysander at Ephesus; nor indeed is the name of Lysander once mentioned.

[482] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 10.

[483] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 11, 12; Xen. Agesil. i, 12-14; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 9.

[484] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 13-15; Xen. Agesil. i, 23. Ἐπεὶ μέντοι οὐδὲ ἐν τῇ Φρυγίᾳ ἀνὰ τὰ πεδία ἐδύνατο στρατεύεσθαι, διὰ τὴν Φαρναβάζου ἱππείαν, etc.

Plutarch, Agesil. c. 9.

These military operations of Agesilaus are loosely adverted to in the early part of c. 79 of the fourteenth Book of Diodorus.

[485] Xen. Agesil. i, 19; Xen. Anabas. vii, 8, 20-23; Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p 809, B. See above, Chapter lxxii, of this History.

[486] Xen. Agesil. i, 18. πάντες παμπλήθη χρήματα ἔλαβον.

[487] Xen. Agesil. i, 20-22.

[488] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 19; Xen. Agesil. i, 28. τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν λῃστῶν ἁλισκομένους βαρβάρους.

So the word λῃστὴς, used in reference to the fleet, means the commander of a predatory vessel or privateer (Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 30).

[489] Xen. Agesil. i, 21. Καὶ πολλάκις μὲν προηγόρευε τοῖς στρατιώταις *τοὺς ἁλισκομένους μὴ ὡς ἀδίκους τιμωρεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀνθρώπους ὄντας φυλάσσειν.* Πολλάκις δὲ, ὅποτε μεταστρατοπεδεύοιτο, *εἰ αἴσθοιτο καταλελειμμένα παιδάρια μικρὰ ἐμπόρων, (ἃ πολλοὶ ἐπώλουν, διὰ τὸ νομίζειν μὴ δύνασθαι ἂν φέρειν αὐτὰ καὶ τρέφειν)* ἐπεμέλετο καὶ τούτων, ὅπως συγκομίζοιτό ποι· τοῖς δ᾽ αὖ διὰ γῆρας καταλελειμμένοις αἰχμαλώτοις προσέταττεν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτῶν, ὡς μήτε ὑπὸ κυνῶν, μήθ᾽ ὑπὸ λύκων, διαφθείροιντο. Ὥστε οὐ μόνον οἱ πυνθανόμενοι ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ ἁλισκόμενοι εὐμενεῖς αὐτῷ ἐγίγνοντο.

Herodotus affirms that the Thracians also sold their children for exportation,—πωλεῦσι τὰ τέχνα ἐπ᾽ ἐξαγωγῇ (Herod. v, 6): compare Philostratus, Vit. Apollon. viii, 7-12, p. 346; and Ch. xvi, Vol. III, p. 216 of this History.

Herodotus mentions the Chian merchant Panionius (like the "*Mitylenæus mango*" in Martial,—"Sed Mitylenæi roseus mangonis ephebus" Martial, vii, 79)—as having conducted on a large scale the trade of purchasing boys, looking out for such as were handsome, to supply the great demand in the East for eunuchs, who were supposed to make better and more attached servants. Herodot. viii, 105. ὅκως γὰρ κτήσαιτο (Panionius) παῖδας εἴδεος ἐπαμμένους, ἐκτάμνων ἀγινέων ἐπώλεε ἐς Σάρδις τε καὶ Ἔφεσον χρημάτων μεγάλων· παρὰ γὰρ τοῖσι βαρβάροισι τιμιώτεροί εἰσι οἱ εὐνοῦχοι, πίστιος εἵνεκα τῆς πάσης, τῶν ἐνορχίων. Boys were necessary, as the operation was performed in childhood or youth,—παῖδες ἐκτομίαι (Herodot. vi, 6-32: compare iii, 48). The Babylonians, in addition to their large pecuniary tribute, had to furnish to the Persian court annually five hundred παῖδας ἐκτομίας (Herodot. iii, 92). For some farther remarks on the preference of the Persians both for the persons and the services of εὐνοῦχοι, see Dio Chrysostom, Orat. xxi, p. 270; Xenoph. Cyropæd. vii, 5, 61-65. Hellanikus (Fr. 169, ed. Didot) affirmed that the Persians had derived both the persons so employed, and the habit of employing them, from the Babylonians.

When Mr. Hanway was travelling near the Caspian, among the Kalmucks, little children of two or three vears of age, were often tendered to him for sale, at two rubles per head (Hanway's Travels, ch. xvi, pp. 65, 66).

[490] Herodot. i, 10. παρὰ γὰρ τοῖσι Λυδοῖσι, σχεδὸν δὲ παρὰ τοῖσι ἄλλοισι βαρβάροισι, καὶ ἄνδρα ὀφθῆναι γυμνόν, ἐς αἰσχύνην μεγάλην φέρει. Compare Thucyd. i, 6; Plato, Republic, v, 3, p. 452, D.

[491] Herodot. v, 22.

[492] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 19. Ἡγούμενος δὲ, καὶ τὸ καταφρονεῖν τῶν πολεμίων ῥώμην τινὰ ἐμβάλλειν πρὸς τὸ μάχεσθαι, προεῖπε τοῖς κήρυξι, τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν λῃστῶν ἁλισκομένους βαρβάρους γυμνοὺς πωλεῖν. Ὁρῶντες οὖν οἱ στρατιῶται λευκοὺς μὲν, *διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ἐκδύεσθαι*, μαλακοὺς δὲ καὶ ἀπόνους, διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ἐπ᾽ ὀχημάτων εἶναι, ἐνόμισαν, οὐδὲν διοίσειν τὸν πόλεμον ἢ εἰ γυναιξὶ δέοι μάχεσθαι.

Xen. Agesil. i, 28—where he has it—πίονας δὲ καὶ ἀπόνους, διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ἐπ᾽ ὀχημάτων εἶναι (Polyænus, ii, 1, 5; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 9).

Frontinus (i, 18) recounts a proceeding somewhat similar on the part of Gelon, after his great victory over the Carthaginians at Himera in Sicily:—"Gelo Syracusarum tyrannus, bello adversus Pœnos suscepto, cum multos cepisset, infirmissimum quemque præcipue ex auxiliaribus, qui nigerrimi erant, nudatum in conspectu suorum produxit, ut persuaderet contemnendos."

[493] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 15; Xen. Agesil. i, 23. Compare what is related about Scipio Africanus—Livy, xxix, 1.

[494] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 17, 18; Xen. Agesil. i, 26, 27.

[495] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 21-24; Xen. Agesil. i, 32, 33; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10.

Diodorus (xiv, 80) professes to describe this battle; but his description is hardly to be reconciled with that of Xenophon, which is better authority. Among other points of difference, Diodorus affirms that the Persians had fifty thousand infantry; and Pausanias also states (iii, 9, 3) that the number of Persian infantry in this battle was greater than had ever been got together since the times of Darius and Xerxes Whereas, Xenophon expressly states that the Persian infantry had not come up, and took no part in the battle.

[496] Plutarch. Artaxerx. c. 23; Diodor. xiv, 80; Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 25.

[497] Xen. Hellen. iii, 14, 25; iv, 1, 27.

[498] Thucyd. viii, 18, 37, 58.

[499] Thucyd. v, 18, 5.

[500] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 26; Diodor. xiv, 80. ἑξαμηνιαίους ἀνοχάς.

[501] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 27.

[502] Diodor. xiv, 39, Justin, vi, 1.

[503] Diodor. xiv, 79. Ῥόδιοι δὲ ἐκβαλόντες τὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων στόλον, ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ τὸν Κόνωνα προσεδέξαντο μετὰ τοῦ στόλου παντὸς εἰς τὴν πόλιν.

Compare Androtion apud Pausaniam, vi, 7, 2.

[504] Diodor. xiv, 79; Justin (vi, 2) calls this native Egyptian king *Hercynion*.

It seems to have been the uniform practice, for the corn-ships coming from Egypt to Greece to halt at Rhodes (Demosthen. cont. Dionysodor p. 1285: compare Herodot. ii, 182).

[505] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 27.

[506] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10; Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 22.

[507] The Lacedæmonian named Pharax, mentioned by Theopompus (Fragm. 218, ed. Didot: compare Athenæus, xii, p. 536) as a profligate and extravagant person, is more probably an officer who served under Dionysius in Sicily and Italy, about forty years after the revolt of Rhodes. The difference of time appears so great, that we must probably suppose two different men bearing the same name.

[508] Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 19.

Compare a similar instance of merciful dealing, on the part of the Syracusan assembly, towards the Sikel prince Duketius (Diodor. xi, 92).

[509] Hist. of Greece, Vol. VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 159.

[510] Pausanias, vi, 7, 2.

[511] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 28, 29; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10.

[512] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 1-15.

The negotiation of this marriage by Agesilaus is detailed in a curious and interesting manner by Xenophon. His conversation with Otys took place in the presence of the thirty Spartan counsellors, and probably in the presence of Xenophon himself.

The attachment of Agesilaus to the youth Megabazus or Megabates, is marked in the Hellenica (iv, 1, 6-28)—but is more strongly brought out in the Agesilaus of Xenophon (v, 6), and in Plutarch, Agesil. c. 11.

In the retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks (five years before) along the southern coast of the Euxine, a Paphlagonian prince named Korylas is mentioned (Xen. Anab. v, 5, 22; v, 6, 8). Whether there was more than one Paphlagonian prince—or whether Otys was successor of Korylas—we cannot tell.

[513] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 16-33.

[514] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 11. πικρὸς ὢν ἐξεταστὴς τῶν κλαπέντων, etc.

[515] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 27; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 11.

Since the flight of Spithridates took place secretly by night, the scene which Plutarch asserts to have taken place between Agesilaus and Megabazus cannot have occurred on the departure of the latter, but must belong to some other occasion; as, indeed, it seems to be represented by Xenophon (Agesil. v, 4).

[516] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 38. Ἐὰν μέντοι μοι τὴν ἀρχὴν προστάττῃ, τοιοῦτόν τι, ὡς ἔοικε, φιλοτιμία ἐστὶ, εὖ χρὴ εἰδέναι, ὅτι πολεμήσω ὑμῖν ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι ἄριστα.

Compare about φιλοτιμία, Herodot. iii, 53.

[517] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 29-41; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 13, 14; Xen. Agesil. iii, 5.

[518] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 40. πάντ᾽ ἐποίησεν, ὅπως ἂν δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον ἐγκριθείη εἰς τὸ στάδιον ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ, μέγιστος ὢν παίδων.

[519] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 5-13.

[520] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 41; Xen. Agesil. i, 35-38; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 14, 15; Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 100.

[521] Compare Diodor. xv, 41 *ad fin.*; and Thucyd. viii, 45.

[522] Isokrates (Or. viii, De Pace, s. 82) alludes to "many embassies" as having been sent by Athens to the king of Persia, to protest against the Lacedæmonian dominion. But this mission of Konon is the only one which we can verify, prior to the battle of Knidus.

Probably Dennis, the son of Pyrilampês, an eminent citizen and trierarch of Athens, must have been one of the companions of Konon in this mission. He is mentioned in an oration of Lysias as having received from the Great King a present of a golden drinking-bowl or φιάλη; and I do not know on what other occasion he can have received it, except in this embassy (Lysias, Or. xix, De Bonis Aristoph. s. 27).

[523] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 6.

[524] The measures of Konon and the transactions preceding the battle of Knidus, are very imperfectly known to us; but we may gather them generally from Diodorus, xiv, 81; Justin, vi, 3, 4; Cornelius Nepos, Vit. Conon. c. 2, 3; Ktesiæ Fragment, c. 62, 63, ed. Bähr.

Isokrates (Orat. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 165; compare Orat. ix, (Euagor.) s. 77) speaks loosely as to the duration of time that the Persian fleet remained blocked up by the Lacedæmonians before Konon obtained his final and vigorous orders from Artaxerxes, unless we are to understand his *three years* as referring to the first news of outfit of ships of war in Phœnicia, brought to Sparta by Herodas, as Schneider understands them; and even then the statement that the Persian fleet remained πολιορκούμενον for all this time, would be much exaggerated. Allowing for exaggeration, however, Isokrates coincides generally with the authorities above noticed.

It would appear that Ktesias the physician obtained about this time permission to quit the court of Persia and come back to Greece. Perhaps he may have been induced (like Demokêdes of Kroton, one hundred and twenty years before) to promote the views of Konon in order to get for himself this permission.

In the meagre abstract of Ktesias given by Photius (c. 63) mention is made of some Lacedæmonian envoys who were now going up to the Persian court, and were watched or detained on the way. This mission can hardly have taken place before the battle of Knidus; for then Agesilaus was in the full tide of success, and contemplating the largest plans of aggression against Persia. It must have taken place, I presume, after the battle.

[525] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Euagoras) s. 67. Εὐαγόρου δὲ *αὐτόν τε παρασχόντος*, καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως τὴν πλείστην παρασκευάσαντος. Compare s. 83 of the same oration. Compare Pausanias, i, 3, 1.

[526] Diodor. xiv, 83. διέτριβον περὶ Λώρυμα τῆς Χερσονήσου.

It is hardly necessary to remark, that the word *Chersonesus* here (and in xiv, 89) does not mean the peninsula of Thrace commonly known by that name, forming the European side of the Hellespont,—but the peninsula on which Knidus is situated.

[527] Pausan. vi, 3, 6. περὶ Κνίδον καὶ ὄρος τὸ Δώριον ὀνομαζόμενον.

[528] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 12. Φαρνάβαζον, ναύαρχον ὄντα, ξὺν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις εἶναι. Κόνωνα δὲ, τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἔχοντα, τετάχθαι ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ. Ἀντιπαραταξαμένου δὲ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου, καὶ *πολὺ ἐλαττόνων αὐτῷ τῶν νεῶν φανεισῶν τῶν αὐτοῦ τοῦ μετὰ Κόνωνος Ἑλληνικοῦ*, etc.

[529] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 10-14; Diodor. xiv, 83; Cornelius Nepos, Conon, c. 4; Justin, vi, 3.

[530] Thucyd. v, 52.

[531] Xen. Hellen. i, 2, 18.

[532] Diodor. xiv, 38; Polyæn. ii, 21.

[533] Diodorus, *ut sup.*; compare xiv, 81. τοὺς Τραχινίους φεύγοντας ἐκ τῶν πατρίδων ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, etc.

[534] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 1. Πέμπει Τιμοκράτην Ῥόδιον εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, δοὺς χρυσίον ἐς πεντήκοντα τάλαντα ἀργυρίου, καὶ κελεύει πειρᾶσθαι, πιστὰ τὰ μέγιστα λαμβάνοντα, διδόναι τοῖς προεστηκόσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τε πόλεμον ἐξοίσειν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους.

Timokrates is ordered to give the money; yet not absolutely, but only on a certain condition, in case he should find that such condition could be realized; that is, if by giving it he could procure from various leading Greeks sufficient assurances and guarantees that they would raise war against Sparta. As this was a matter more or less doubtful, Timokrates is ordered to *try to give the money for this purpose*. Though the construction of πειρᾶσθαι couples it with διδόναι, the sense of the word more properly belongs to ἐξοίσειν—which designates the purpose to be accomplished.

[535] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 2; Pausan. iii, 9, 4; Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 20.

[536] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 26.

[537] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 16.

[538] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 2. Οἱ μὲν δὴ δεξάμενοι τὰ χρήματα ἐς τὰς οἰκείας πόλεις διέβαλλον τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους· ἐπεὶ δὲ ταύτας ἐς μῖσος αὐτῶν προήγαγον, συνίστασαν καὶ τὰς μεγίστας πόλεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας.

[539] Xenophon, *ut sup.*

Pausanias (iii, 9, 4) names some Athenians as having received part of the money. So Plutarch also, in general terms (Agesil. c. 15).

Diodorus mentions nothing respecting either the mission or the presents of Timokrates.

[540] Πόλεμος Βοιωτικός (Diodor. xiv, 81).

[541] Xenophon (Hellen. iii, 5, 3) says,—and Pausanias (iii, 9, 4) follows him,—That the Theban leaders, wishing to bring about a war with Sparta, and knowing that Sparta would not begin it, purposely incited the Lokrians to encroach upon this disputed border, in order that the Phokians might resent it, and that thus a war might be lighted up. I have little hesitation in rejecting this version, which I conceive to have arisen from Xenophon's philo-Laconian and miso-Theban tendency, and in believing that the fight between the Lokrians and Phokians, as well as that between the Phokians and Thebans, arose without any design on the part of the latter to provoke Sparta. So Diodorus recounts it, in reference to the war between the Phokians and the Thebans; for about the Lokrians he says nothing (xiv, 81).

The subsequent events, as recounted by Xenophon himself, show that the Spartans were not only ready in point of force, but eager in regard to will, to go to war with the Thebans; while the latter were not at all ready to go to war with Sparta. They had not a single ally; for their application to Athens, in itself doubtful, was not made until after Sparta had declared war against them.

[542] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 5. Οἱ μέντοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι *ἄσμενοι ἔλαβον πρόφασιν στρατεύειν ἐπὶ τοὺς Θηβαίους, πάλαι ὀργιζόμενοι* αὐτοῖς, τῆς τε ἀντιλήψεως τῆς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος δεκάτης ἐν Δεκελείᾳ, καὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ μὴ ἐθελῆσαι ἀκολουθῆσαι· ᾐτιῶντο δ᾽ αὐτοὺς, καὶ Κορινθίους πεῖσαι μὴ συστρατεύειν. Ἀνεμιμνήσκοντο δὲ καὶ, ὡς θύοντ᾽ ἐν Αὐλίδι τὸν Ἀγησίλαον οὐκ εἴων, καὶ τὰ τεθυμένα ἱερὰ ὡς ἔῤῥιψαν ἀπὸ τοῦ βωμοῦ· καὶ ὅτι οὐδ᾽ εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν συνεστράτευον Ἀγησιλάῳ. Ἐλογίζοντο δὲ καὶ καλὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἐξάγειν στρατιὰν

ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς, καὶ παῦσαι τῆς ἐς αὐτοὺς ὕβρεως· τά τε γὰρ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ καλῶς σφίσιν ἔχειν, κρατοῦντος Ἀγησιλάου, καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι οὐδένα ἄλλον πόλεμον ἐμποδὼν σφίσιν εἶναι. Compare vii, 1, 34.

The description here given by Xenophon himself,—of the past dealing and established sentiment between Sparta and Thebes,—refutes his allegation, that it was the bribes brought by Timokrates to the leading Thebans which first blew up the hatred against Sparta; and shows farther, that Sparta did not need any circuitous manœuvres of the Thebans, to furnish her with a pretext for going to war.

[543] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 28.

[544] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 6, 7.

[545] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 23.

The conduct of the Corinthians here contributes again to refute the assertion of Xenophon about the effect of the bribes of Timokrates.

[546] Pausanias, ix, 11, 4.

[547] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 9.

Πολὺ δ᾽ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦμεν, ὅσοι τῶν ἐν ἄστει ἐγένεσθε, προθύμως ἐπὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἰέναι. Ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ, καταστήσαντες ὑμᾶς ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ ἐς ἔχθραν τῷ δήμῳ, ἀφικόμενοι πολλῇ δυνάμει, ὡς ὑμῖν σύμμαχοι, παρέδοσαν ὑμᾶς τῷ πλήθει· ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, ἀπολώλατε, ὁ δὲ δῆμος οὑτοσὶ ὑμᾶς ἔσωσε.

[548] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 9, 16.

[549] Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 28, p. 258; also Philipp. i, c. 7, p. 44. Compare also Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo, s. 15).

[550] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 16. Τῶν δ᾽ Ἀθηναίων παμπολλοὶ μὲν ξυνηγόρευον, πάντες δ᾽ ἐψηφίσαντο βοηθεῖν αὐτοῖς.

[551] Xen. Hellen. *ut sup.*

Pausanias (iii, 9, 6) says that the Athenians sent envoys to the Spartans to entreat them not to act aggressively against Thebes, but to submit their complaint to equitable adjustment. This seems to me improbable. Diodorus (xiv, 81) briefly states the general fact in conformity with Xenophon.

[552] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 17; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 28.

[553] Thucyd. iv, 89. γενομένης διαμαρτίας τῶν ἡμερῶν, etc.

[554] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 18, 19, 20; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 28, 29; Pausan. iii, 5, 4.

The two last differ in various matters from Xenophon, whose account, however, though brief, seems to me to deserve the preference.

[555] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 21. ἀπελθόντας ἐν νυκτὶ τούς τε Φωκέας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας οἴκαδε ἑκάστους, etc.

[556] Lysias, Or. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 15, 16.

[557] Accordingly we learn from an oration of Lysias, that the service of the Athenian horsemen in this expedition, who were commanded by Orthobulus, was judged to be extremely safe and easy; while that of the hoplites was dangerous (Lysias, Orat. xvi, pro Mantith. s. 15).

[558] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 23. Κορίνθιοι μὲν παντάπασιν οὐκ ἠκολούθουν αὐτοῖς, οἱ δὲ παρόντες οὐ προθύμως στρατεύοιντο, etc.

[559] See the conduct of the Thebans on this very point (of giving up the slain at the solicitation of the conquered Athenians for burial) after the battle of Delium, and the discussion thereupon,—in this History, Vol. VI, ch. liii, p. 393 *seq.*

[560] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 24. Οἱ δὲ ἄσμενοί τε ταῦτα ἤκουσαν, etc.

[561] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 24.

[562] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5.

[563] The traveller Pausanias justifies the prudence of his regal namesake in avoiding a battle, by saying that the Athenians were in his rear, and the Thebans in his front; and that he was afraid of being assailed on both sides at once, like Leonidas at Thermopylæ and like the troops enclosed in Sphakteria (Paus. iii, 5, 5).

But the matter of fact, on which this justification rests, is contradicted by Xenophon, who says that the Athenians had actually joined the Thebans, and were in the same ranks—ἐλθόντες ξυμπαρετάξαντο (Hellen. iii, 5, 22).

[564] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 25. Καὶ ὅτι τὸν δῆμον τῶν Ἀθηναίων λαβὼν ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ ἀνῆκε, etc. Compare Pausanias, iii, 5, 3.

[565] Pausanias, ix, 32, 6.

[566] Ephorus, Fr. 127, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Lysander, c. 30.

[567] Diodor. xiv, 81, 82; Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 17.

[568] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 36. Ὁ δ᾽ (Ismenias) ἀπελογεῖτο μὲν πρὸς πάντα ταῦτα, οὐ μέντοι ἔπειθέ γε τὸ μὴ οὐ μεγαλοπράγμων τε καὶ κακοπράγμων εἶναι.

It is difficult to make out anything from the two allusions in Plato, except that Ismenias was a wealthy and powerful man (Plato, Menon, p. 90 B; Republ. i. p. 336 A.).

[569] Diodor. xiv, 82; Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 3; Xen. Agesil. ii, 2.

[570] Diodor. xiv, 38-82.

[571] Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 5, 6.

[572] Diodor. xiv, 82.

[573] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 16. Xenophon gives this total of six thousand as if it were of Lacedæmonians *alone*. But if we follow his narrative, we shall see that there were unquestionably in the army troops of Tegea, Mantineia, and the Achæan towns (probably also some of other Arcadian towns,) present in the battle (iv, 2, 13, 18, 20). Can we suppose that Xenophon meant to include *these* allies in the total of six thousand, along with the Lacedæmonians,—which is doubtless a large total for Lacedæmonians alone? Unless this supposition be admitted, there is no resource except to assume an omission, either of Xenophon himself, or of the copyist; which omission in fact Gail and others do suppose. On the whole, I think they are right; for the number of hoplites on both sides would otherwise be prodigiously unequal; while Xenophon says nothing to imply that the Lacedæmonian victory was gained in spite of great inferiority of number, and something which even implies that it must have been nearly equal (iv, 2, 13),—though he is always disposed to compliment Sparta wherever he can.

[574] From a passage which occurs somewhat later (iv, 4, 15), we may suspect that this was an excuse, and that the Phliasians were not very well affected to Sparta. Compare a similar case of excuse ascribed to the Mantineians (v, 2, 2).

[575] Diodorus (xiv, 83) gives a total of twenty-three thousand foot and five hundred horse, on the Lacedæmonian side, but without enumerating items. On the side of the confederacy he states a total of more than fifteen thousand foot and five hundred horse (c. 82).

[576] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 17. Καὶ ψιλὸν δὲ, ξὺν τοῖς τῶν Κορινθίων, πλέον ἦν, etc. Compare Hesychius, v, Κυνόφαλοι; Welcker, Præfat. ad. Theognidem, p. xxxv; K. O. Müller, History of the Dorians, iii, 4, 3.

[577] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 13; compare iv, 2, 18,—where he says of the Thebans—*ἀμελήσαντες* τοῦ ἐς ἑκκαίδεκα, βαθεῖαν παντελῶς ἐποιήσαντο τὴν φάλαγγα, etc., which implies and alludes to the resolution previously taken.

[578] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 11, 12.

[579] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 14, 15.

In the passage,—καὶ οἱ ἕτεροι μέντοι *ἐλθόντες* κατεστρατοπεδεύσαντο, ἔμπροσθεν ποιησάμενοι τὴν χαράδραν,—I apprehend that ἀπελθόντες (which is sanctioned by four MSS., and preferred by Leunclavius) is the proper reading, in place of *ἐλθόντες*. For it seems certain that the march of the confederates was one of retreat, and that the battle was fought very near to the walls of Corinth; since the defeated troops sought shelter within the town, and the Lacedæmonian pursuers were so close upon them, that the Corinthians within were

afraid to keep open the gates. Hence we must reject the statement of Diodorus,—that the battle was fought on the banks of the river Nemea (xiv, 83) as erroneous.

There are some difficulties and obscurities in the description which Xenophon gives of the Lacedæmonian march. His words run—ἐν τούτῳ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ δὴ Τεγεάτας παρειληφότες καὶ Μαντινέας, *ἐξῄεσαν τὴν ἀμφίαλον*. These last three words are not satisfactorily explained. Weiske and Schneider construe τὴν ἀμφίαλον (very justly) as indicating the region lying immediately on the Peloponnesian side of the isthmus of Corinth and having the Saronic Gulf on one side, and the Corinthian Gulf on the other; in which was included Sikyon. But then it would not be correct to say, that "the Lacedæmonians had gone out by the bimarine way." On the contrary, the truth is, that "they had gone out into the bimarine road or region,—which meaning however would require a preposition—ἐξῄεσαν *εἰς* τὴν ἀμφίαλον. Sturz in his Lexicon (v. ἐξιέναι) renders τὴν ἀμφίαλον—*viam ad mare*—which seems an extraordinary sense of the word, unless instances were produced to support it; and even if instances were produced, we do not see why the way from Sparta to Sikyon should be called by that name; which would more properly belong to the road from Sparta down the Eurotas to Helos.

Again, we do not know distinctly the situation of the point or district called τὴν Ἐπιεικίαν (mentioned again, iv, 4, 13). But it is certain from the map, that when the confederates were at Nemea, and the Lacedæmonians at Sikyon,—the former must have been exactly placed so as to intercept the junction of the contingents from Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Hermionê, with the Lacedæmonian army. To secure this junction, the Lacedæmonians were obliged to force their way across that mountainous region which lies near Kleônæ and Nemea, and to march in a line pointing from Sikyon down to the Saronic Gulf. Having reached the other side of these mountains near the sea, they would be in communication with Epidaurus and the other towns of the Argolic peninsula.

The line of march which the Lacedæmonians would naturally take from Sparta to Sikyon and Lechæum, by Tegea, Mantineia, Orchomenus, etc., is described two years afterwards in the case of Agesilaus (iv, 5, 19).

[580] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 18. The coloring which Xenophon puts upon this step is hardly fair to the Thebans, as is so constantly the case throughout his history. He says that "they were in no hurry to fight" (οὐδέν τι κατήπειγον τὴν μάχην ξυνάπτειν) so long as they were on the left, opposed to the Lacedæmonians on the opposite right; but that as soon as they were on the right (opposed to the Achæans on the opposite left), they forthwith gave the word. Now it does not appear that the Thebans had any greater privilege on the day when they were on the right, than the Argeians or Athenians had when each were on the right respectively. The command had been determined to reside in the right division, which post alternated from one to the other; why the Athenians or Argeians did not make use of this post to order the attack, we cannot explain.

So again, Xenophon says, that in spite of the resolution taken by the Council of War to have files sixteen deep, and no more,—the Thebans made their files much deeper. Yet it is plain, from his own account, that no mischievous consequences turned upon this greater depth.

[581] See the instructive description of the battle of Mantineia—in Thucyd. v, 71.

[582] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 20-23.

The allusion to this incident in Demosthenes (adv. Leptinem, c. 13, p. 472) is interesting, though indistinct.

[583] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 19. καὶ γὰρ ἦν λάσιον τὸ χωρίον—which illustrates the expression in Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 20. ἐν Κορίνθῳ χωρίων ἰσχυρῶν κατειλημμένων.

[584] Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 19.

Plato in his panegyrical discourse (Menexenus, c. 17, p. 245 E.) ascribes the defeat and loss of the Athenians to "bad ground"—χρησαμένων δυσχωρίᾳ.

[585] Diodor. xiv, 83.

The statement in Xenophon (Agesil. vii, 5) that near ten thousand men were slain on the side of the confederates, is a manifest exaggeration; if indeed the reading be correct.

[586] Xen. Agesil. i, 37; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 15. Cornelius Nepos (Agesilaus, c. 4) almost translates the Agesilaus of Xenophon; but we can better feel the force of *his* panegyric, when we recollect that he had had personal cognizance of the disobedience of Julius Cæsar in his province to the orders of the Senate, and that the omnipotence of Sylla and Pompey in their provinces were then matter of recent history. "Cujus exemplum (says Cornelius Nepos about Agesilaus) utinam imperatores nostri sequi voluissent!"

[587] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 2-5; Xen. Agesil. i, 38; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 16.

[588] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 24.

[589] Xenoph. Agesil. vii, 5; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 16.

[590] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 4-9; Diodor. xiv, 83.

[591] Plutarch (Agesil. c. 17; compare also Plutarch, Apophth. p. 795, as corrected by Morus ad Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 15) states two moræ or regiments as having joined Agesilaus from Corinth; Xenophon alludes only to one, besides that mora which was in garrison at Orchomenus (Hellen. iv, 3, 15; Agesil. ii, 6).

[592] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 13.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀγησίλαος πυθόμενος ταῦτα, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον χαλεπῶς ἔφερεν· ἐπεὶ μέντοι ἐνεθυμήθη, ὅτι τοῦ στρατεύματος τὸ πλεῖστον εἴη αὐτῷ, οἷον ἀγαθῶν μὲν γιγνομένων ἡδέως μετέχειν, εἰ δέ τι χαλεπὸν ὁρῷεν, οὐκ ἀνάγκην εἶναι κοινωνεῖν αὐτοῖς, etc.

These indirect intimations of the real temper even of the philo-Spartan allies towards Sparta are very valuable when coming from Xenophon, as they contradict all his partialities, and are dropped here almost reluctantly, from the necessity of justifying the conduct of Agesilaus in publishing a false proclamation to his army.

[593] Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 20. φοβουμένων ἁπάντων εἰκότως, etc.

[594] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19.

[595] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 17. ἀντεξέδραμον ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀγησιλάου φάλαγγος, etc.

[596] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 19; Xen. Agesil. ii, 12.

[597] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 16; Xen. Agesil. ii, 9.

Διηγήσομαι δὲ καὶ τὴν μάχην· καὶ γὰρ ἐγένετο οἵα οὐκ ἄλλη τῶν γ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν.

[598] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 19; Xen. Agesil. ii, 12.

Καὶ συμβαλόντες τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐωθοῦντο, ἐμάχοντο, ἀπέκτεινον, ἀπέθνησκον. Καὶ κραυγὴ μὲν οὐδεμία παρῆν, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ σιγή· φωνὴ δέ τις ἦν τοιαύτη, οἵαν ὀργή τε καὶ μάχη παράσχοιτ᾽ ἄν.

[599] Xen. Agesil. ii, 13. Ὁ δὲ, καίπερ πολλὰ τραύματα ἔχων πάντοσε καὶ παντοίοις ὅπλοις, etc.

Plutarch, Agesil. c. 18.

[600] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 19; Xen. Agesil. ii, 12.

[601] Xen. Agesil. ii, 14. Ἐπεί γε μὴν ἔληξεν ἡ μάχη, παρῆν δὴ θεάσασθαι ἔνθα συνέπεσον ἀλλήλοις, τὴν μὲν γῆν αἵματι πεφυρμένην, νεκροὺς δὲ κειμένους φιλίους καὶ πολεμίους μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων, ἀσπίδας δὲ διατεθρυμμένας, δόρατα συντεθραυσμένα, ἐγχειρίδια γυμνὰ κουλεῶν τὰ μὲν χαμαί, τὰ δ᾽ ἐν σώμασι, τὰ δ᾽ ἔτι μετὰ χειρός.

[602] Xen. Agesil. ii, 15. Τότε μὲν οὖν (καὶ γὰρ ἦν ἤδη ὀψὲ) συνελκύσαντες *τοὺς τῶν πολεμίων νεκροὺς* εἴσω φάλαγγος, ἐδειπνοποιήσαντο καὶ ἐκοιμήθησαν.

Schneider in his note on this passage, as well as ad. Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 21—condemns the expression τῶν πολεμίων as spurious and unintelligible. But in my judgment, these words hear a plain and appropriate meaning, which I have endeavored to give in the text. Compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19.

[603] Diodor. xiv, 84.

[604] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 21; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19. The latter says—εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀπεκομίσθη *Πυθίων ἀγομένων*, etc. Manso, Dr. Arnold, and others, contest the accuracy of Plutarch in this assertion respecting the time of year at which the Pythian games were celebrated, upon grounds which seem to me very insufficient.

[605] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 22, 23; iv. 4, 1.

[606] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 17, 20; Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 20.

[607] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 17. Cornelius Nepos, Agesil. c. 4. "Obsistere ei conati sunt Athenienses et Bœoti," etc. They *succeeded* in barring his way, and compelling him to retreat.

[608] Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-5.

[609] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-3; Diodor. xiv, 84. About Samos, xiv, 97.

Compare also the speech of Derkyllidas to the Abydenes (Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 4)—Ὅσῳ δὲ μᾶλλον αἱ ἄλλαι πόλεις ξὺν τῇ τύχῃ ἀπεστράφησαν ἡμῶν, τοσούτῳ ὄντως ἡ ὑμετέρα πιστότης μείζων φανείη ἄν, etc.

[610] Ἐκ γὰρ Ἀβύδου, τῆς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ὑμῖν ἔχθρας—says Demosthenes in the Athenian assembly (cont. Aristokrat. c. 39, p. 672; compare c. 52, p. 688).

[611] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 2.

[612] Lysander, after the victory of Ægospotami and the expulsion of the Athenians from Sestos, had assigned the town and district as a settlement for the pilots and Keleustæ aboard his fleet. But the ephors are said to have reversed the assignment, and restored the town to the Sestians (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14). Probably, however, the new settlers would remain in part upon the lands vacated by the expelled Athenians.

[613] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 4-6.

[614] See Sir William Gell's Itinerary of Greece, p. 4. Ernst Curtius—Peloponnesos—p. 25, 26, and Thucyd. i, 108.

[615] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 7, 8; Diodor. xiv, 84.

[616] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 9, 10.

[617] Xen. Hellen. iv. 8, 10; Diodor. xiv. 85.

Cornelius Nepos (Conon, c. 4) mentions fifty talents as a sum received by Konon from Pharnabazus as a present, and devoted by him to this public work. This is not improbable; but the total sum contributed by the satrap towards the fortifications must, probably, have been much greater.

[618] Demosthen. cont. Androtion. p. 616. c. 21. Pausanias (i, 1, 3) still saw this temple in Peiræus—very near to the sea; five hundred and fifty years afterwards.

[619] Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 16. p. 477, 478; Athenæus, i, 3; Cornelius Nepos, Conon, c. 4.

[620] Plato, Legg. vi, p. 778; καθεύδειν ἐᾷν ἐν τῇ γῇ κατακείμενα τὰ τείχη, etc.

[621] The importance of maintaining these lines, as a protection to Athens against invasion from Sparta, is illustrated in Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 19, and Andokides, Or. iii, De Pace, s. 26.

[622] Harpokration, v. ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ. Philochorus, Fragm. 150, ed. Didot.

[623] Lysias, Orat. xix, (De Bonis Aristophanis) s. 21.

[624] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 11.

[625] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 1; iv, 5, 1.

[626] I dissent from Mr. Fynes Clinton as well as from M. Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, etc., c. 4, who in the main agrees with Dodwell's Annales Xenophontei) in their chronological arrangement of these events.

They place the battle fought by Praxitas within the Long Walls of Corinth in 393 B.C., and the destruction of the Lacedæmonian *mora* or division by Iphikrates (the monthly date of which is marked by its having immediately succeeded the Isthmian games), in 392 B.C. I place the former event in 392 B.C.; the latter in 390 B.C., immediately after the Isthmian games of 390 B.C.

If we study the narrative of Xenophon, we shall find, that after describing (iv, 3) the battle of Korôneia (August 394 B.C.) with its immediate consequences, and the return of Agesilaus home,—he goes on in the next chapter to narrate the land-war about or near Corinth, which he carries down without interruption (through Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, of Book iv.) to 389 B.C.

But in Chapter 8 of Book iv, he leaves the land-war, and takes up the naval operations, from and after the battle of Knidus (Aug. 394 B.C.). He recounts how Pharnabazus and Konon came across the Ægean with a powerful fleet in the spring of 393 B.C., and how after various proceedings, they brought the fleet to the Saronic Gulf and the Isthmus of Corinth, where they must have arrived at or near midsummer 393 B.C.

Now it appears to me certain, that these proceedings of Pharnabazus with the fleet, recounted in the eighth chapter, come, in point of date, *before* the seditious movements and the *coup d'état* at Corinth, which are re-

counted in the fourth chapter. At the time when Pharnabazus was at Corinth in midsummer 393 B.C., the narrative of Xenophon (iv, 8, 8-10) leads us to believe that the Corinthians were prosecuting the war zealously, and without discontent: the money and encouragement which Pharnabazus gave them was calculated to strengthen such ardor. It was by aid of this money that the Corinthians fitted out their fleet under Agathinus, and acquired for a time the maritime command of the Gulf.

The discontents against the war (recounted in chap. 4 *seq.*) could not have commenced until a considerable time after the departure of Pharnabazus. They arose out of causes which only took effect after a long continuance,—the hardships of the land-war, the losses of property and slaves, the jealousy towards Attica and Bœotia as being undisturbed, etc. The Lacedæmonian and Peloponnesian aggressive force at Sikyon cannot possibly have been established before the autumn of 394 B.C., and was most probably placed there early in the spring of 393 B.C. Its effects were brought about, not by one great blow, but by repetition of ravages and destructive annoyance; and all the effects which it produced previous to midsummer 393 B.C. would be more than compensated by the presence, the gifts, and the encouragement of Pharnabazus with his powerful fleet. Moreover, after his departure, too, the Corinthians were at first successful at sea, and acquired the command of the Gulf, which, however, they did not retain for more than a year, if so much. Hence, it is not likely that any strong discontent against the war began before the early part of 392 B.C.

Considering all these circumstances, I think it reasonable to believe that the *coup d'état* and massacre at Corinth took place (not in 393 B.C., as Mr. Clinton and M. Rehdantz place it, but) in 392 B.C.; and the battle within the Long Walls rather later in the same year.

Next, the opinion of the same two authors, as well as of Dodwell,—that the destruction of the Lacedæmonian *mora* by Iphicrates took place in the spring of 392 B.C.,—is also, in my view, erroneous. If this were true, it would be necessary to pack all the events mentioned in Xenophon, iv, 4, into the year 393 B.C.; which I hold to be impossible. If the destruction of the mora did not occur in the spring of 393 B.C., we know that it could not have occurred until the spring of 390 B.C.; that is, the next ensuing Isthmian games, two years afterwards. And this last will be found to be its true date; thus leaving full time, but not too much time, for the antecedent occurrences.

[627] Plutarch, Dion. c. 53.

[628] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 2. Γνόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Βοιωτοὶ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Κορινθίων οἵ τε τῶν παρὰ βασιλέως χρημάτων μετεσχηκότες, καὶ οἱ τοῦ πολέμου αἰτιώτατοι γεγενημένοι, ὡς, εἰ μὴ ἐκποδὼν ποιήσαιντο τοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν εἰρήνην τετραμμένους, κινδυνεύσει πάλιν ἡ πόλις λακωνίσαι—οὕτω δὴ καὶ σφαγὰς ἐπεχείρουν ποιεῖσθαι.

iv, 4, 4. Οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι, ὑποπτεύσαντος Πασιμήλου τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι, ἡσυχίαν ἔσχον ἐν τῷ Κρανίῳ· ὡς δὲ τῆς κραυγῆς ἤσθοντο, καὶ φεύγοντές τινες ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος ἀφίκοντο πρὸς αὐτούς, ἐκ τούτου ἀναδραμόντες κατὰ τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον, προσβαλόντας μὲν Ἀργείους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπεκρούσαντο, etc.

[629] Thucyd. iii, 70.

[630] Diodorus (xiv, 86) gives this number, which seems very credible. Xenophon (iv, 4, 4) only says πολλοί.

[631] In recounting this alternation of violence projected, violence perpetrated, recourse on the one side to a foreign ally, treason on the other by admitting an avowed enemy,—which formed the *modus operandi* of opposing parties in the oligarchical Corinth,—I invite the reader to contrast it with the democratical Athens.

At Athens, in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, there were precisely the same causes at work, and precisely the same marked antithesis of parties, as those which here disturbed Corinth. There was first, a considerable Athenian minority who opposed the war with Sparta from the first; next, when the war began, the proprietors of Attica saw their lands ruined, and were compelled either to carry away, or to lose, their servants and cattle, so that they obtained no returns. The intense discontent, the angry complaints, the bitter conflict of parties, which these circumstances raised among the Athenian citizens,—not to mention the aggravation of all these symptoms by the terrible epidemic,—are marked out in Thucydides, and have been recorded in the fifth volume of this history. Not only the positive loss and suffering, but all other causes of exasperation, stood at a higher pitch at Athens in the early part of the Peloponnesian war, than at Corinth in 392 B.C.

Yet what were the effects which they produced? Did the minority resort to a conspiracy,—or the majority to a *coup d'état*—or either of them to invitation of foreign aid against the other? Nothing of the kind. The minority had always open to them the road of pacific opposition, and the chance of obtaining a majority in the Senate or

in the public assembly, which was practically identical with the totality of the citizens. Their opposition, though pacific as to acts, was sufficiently animated and violent in words and propositions, to serve as a real discharge for imprisoned angry passion. If they could not carry the adoption of their general policy, they had the opportunity of gaining partial victories which took off the edge of a fierce discontent; witness the fine imposed upon Perikles (Thucyd. ii, 65) in the year before his death, which both gratified and mollified the antipathy against him, and brought about shortly afterwards a strong reaction in his favor. The majority, on the other hand, knew that the predominance of its policy depended upon its maintaining its hold on a fluctuating public assembly, against the utmost freedom of debate and attack, within certain forms and rules prescribed by the constitution; attachment to the latter being the cardinal principle of political morality in both parties. It was this system which excluded on both sides the thought of armed violence. It produced among the democratical citizens of Athens that characteristic insisted upon by Kleon in Thucydides,—"constant and fearless security and absence of treacherous hostility among one another" (διὰ γὰρ τὸ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἀδεὲς καὶ ἀνεπιβούλευτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχετε—Thuc. iii, 37), the entire absence of which stands so prominently forward in these deplorable proceedings of the oligarchical Corinth. Pasimêlus and his Corinthian minority had no assemblies, dikasteries, annual Senate, or constant habit of free debate and accusation, to appeal to; their only available weapon was armed violence, or treacherous correspondence with a foreign enemy. On the part of the Corinthian government, superior or more skilfully used force, or superior alliance abroad, was the only weapon of defence, in like manner.

I shall return to this subject in a future chapter, where I enter more at large into the character of the Athenians.

[632] Diodor. xiv, 86; Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 5.

[633] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 8. καὶ κατὰ τύχην καὶ κατ᾽ ἐπιμέλειαν, etc.

[634] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 8. Nothing can show more forcibly the Laconian bias of Xenophon, than the credit which he gives to Pasimêlus for his good faith towards the Lacedæmonians whom he was letting in; overlooking or approving his treacherous betrayal towards his own countrymen, in thus opening a gate which he had been trusted to watch. τὼ δ᾽ εἰσηγαγέτην, καὶ *οὕτως ἁπλῶς ἀπεδειξάτην*, ὥστε ὁ εἰσελθὼν ἐξήγγειλε, πάντα εἶναι ἀδόλως, οἷάπερ ἐλεγέτην.

[635] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4. 10. Καὶ τοὺς μὲν Σικυωνίους ἐκράτησαν καὶ διασπάσαντες τὸ σταύρωμα ἐδίωκον ἐπὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ ἐκεῖ πολλοὺς αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν.

It would appear from hence that there must have been an open portion of Lechæum, or a space apart from (but adjoining to) the wall which encircled Lechæum, yet still within the Long Walls. Otherwise the fugitive Sikyonians could hardly have got down to the sea.

[636] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 12. Οὕτως ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολλοὶ ἔπεσον, ὥστε εἰθισμένοι ὁρᾷν οἱ ἄνθρωποι σωροὺς σίτου, ξύλων, λίθου, τότε ἐθεάσαντο σωροὺς νεκρῶν.

A singular form of speech.

[637] Diodorus (xiv, 87) represents that the Lacedæmonians on this occasion surprised and held Lechæum, defeating the general body of the confederates who came out from Corinth to retake it. But his narrative of all these circumstances differs materially from that of Xenophon; whom I here follow in preference, making allowance for great partiality, and for much confusion and obscurity.

Xenophon gives us plainly to understand, that Lechæum was *not* captured by the Lacedæmonians until the following year, by Agesilaus and Teleutias.

It is to be recollected that Xenophon had particular means of knowing what was done by Agesilaus, and therefore deserves credit on that head,—always allowing for partiality. Diodorus does not mention Agesilaus in connection with the proceedings at Lechæum.

[638] Diodor. xv, 44; Cornelius Nepos, Vit. Iphicrat. c. 2; Polyæn. iii, 9, 10. Compare Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, c. 2, 7 (Berlin, 1845)—a very useful and instructive publication.

In describing the improvements made by Iphikrates in the armature of his peltasts, I have not exactly copied either Nepos or Diodorus, who both appear to me confused in their statements. You would imagine, in reading their account (and so it has been stated by Weber, Prolegg. ad Demosth. cont. Aristokr. p. xxxv.), that there were no peltasts in Greece prior to Iphikrates; that he was the first to transform heavy-armed hoplites into light-

armed peltasts, and to introduce from Thrace the light shield or *pelta*, not only smaller in size than the round ἀσπὶς carried by the hoplite, but also without the ἴτυς (or surrounding metallic rim of the ἀσπὶς) seemingly connected by outside bars or spokes of metal with the exterior central knob or projection (*umbo*) which the hoplite pushed before him in close combat. The *pelta*, smaller and lighter than the ἀσπὶς, was seemingly square or oblong and not round; though it had no ἴτυς, it often had thin plates of brass, as we may see by Xenophon, Anab. v, 2, 29, so that the explanation of it given in the Scholia ad Platon. Legg. vii, p. 813 must be taken with reserve.

But Grecian peltasts existed before the time of Iphikrates (Xen. Hellen. i, 2, 1 and elsewhere); he did not first introduce them; he found them already there, and improved their armature. Both Diodorus and Nepos affirm that he lengthened the *spears* of the peltasts to a measure half as long again as those of the hoplites (or twice as long, if we believe Nepos), and the swords in proportion—"ηὔξησε μὲν τὰ δόρατα ἡμιολίῳ μεγέθει—hastæ modum duplicavit." Now this I apprehend to be not exact; nor is it true (as Nepos asserts) that the Grecian hoplites carried "short spears"—"brevibus hastis." The spear of the Grecian hoplite was long (though not so long as that of the heavy and compact Macedonian phalanx afterwards became), and it appears to me incredible that Iphikrates should have given to his light and active peltast a spear twice as long, or half as long again, as that of the hoplite. Both Diodorus and Nepos have mistaken by making their comparison with the arms *of the hoplite*, to which the changes of Iphikrates had no reference. The peltast both before and after Iphikrates did not carry a *spear*, but a *javelin*, which he employed as a missile, to hurl, not to thrust; he was essentially an ἀκοντιστὴς or javelin-shooter (See Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 5, 14; vi, 1, 9). Of course the javelin might, in case of need, serve to thrust, but this was not its appropriate employment; *e converso*, the spear might be hurled (under advantageous circumstances, from the higher ground against an enemy below—Xen. Hellen. ii. 4, 15; v, 4, 52), but its proper employment was, to be held and thrust forward.

What Iphikrates really did, was, to lengthen both the two offensive weapons which the peltast carried, before his time,—the javelin, and the sword. He made the javelin a longer and heavier weapon, requiring a more practised hand to throw—but also competent to inflict more serious wounds, and capable of being used with more deadly effect if the peltasts saw an opportunity of coming to close fight on advantageous terms. Possibly Iphikrates not only lengthened the weapon, but also improved its point and efficacy in other ways; making it more analogous to the formidable Roman *pilum*. Whether he made any alteration in the *pelta* itself, we do not know.

The name *Iphikratides*, given to these new-fashioned leggings or boots, proves to us that Wellington and Blucher are not the first eminent generals who have lent an honorable denomination to boots and shoes.

[639] Justin, vi, 5.

[640] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 16; Diodor. xiv, 91.

Τοὺς μέντοι Λακεδαιμονίους οὕτως αὖ οἱ πελτασταὶ ἐδέδισαν, ὡς ἐντὸς ἀκοντίσματος οὐ προσήεσαν τοῖς ὁπλίταις, etc.

Compare the sentiment of the light troops in the attack of Sphakteria, when they were awe-struck and afraid at first to approach the Lacedæmonian hoplites—τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένοι ὡς ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, etc. (Thucyd. iv, 34).

[641] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 17. ὥστε οἱ μὲν Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ἐπισκώπτειν ἐτόλμων, ὡς οἱ σύμμαχοι φοβοῖντο τοὺς πελταστὰς, ὥσπερ μορμῶνας παιδάρια, etc.

This is a camp-jest of the time, which we have to thank Xenophon for preserving.

[642] Xenoph. Agesil. ii, 17. ἀναπετάσας τῆς Πελοποννήσου τὰς πύλας, etc.

Respecting the Long Walls of Corinth, as part of a line of defence which barred ingress to, or egress from, Peloponnesus,—Colonel Leake remarks,—"The narrative of Xenophon shows the great importance of the Corinthian Long Walls in time of war. They completed a line of fortification from the summit of the Acro-Corinthus to the sea, and thus intercepted the most direct and easy communication from the Isthmus into Peloponnesus. For the rugged mountain, which borders the southern side of the Isthmian plain, has only two passes,—one, by the opening on the eastern side of Acro-Corinthus, which obliged an enemy to pass under the eastern side of Corinth, and was, moreover, defended by a particular kind of fortification, as some remains of walls still testify,—the other, along the shore at Cenchreiæ, which was also a fortified place in the hands of the Corinthians. Hence the importance of the pass of Cenchreiæ, in all operations between the Peloponnesians, and an enemy without the Isthmus." (Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. iii, ch. xxviii, p. 254).

Compare Plutarch, Aratus, c. 16; and the operations of Epaminondas as described by Diodorus, xv, 68.

[643] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 18. ἐλθόντες *πανδημεὶ* μετὰ λιθολόγων καὶ τεκτόνων, etc. The word πανδημεὶ shows how much they were alarmed.

[644] Thucyd. vi, 98.

[645] The words stand in the text of Xenophon,—εὐθὺς ἐκεῖθεν ὑπερβαλὼν κατὰ *Τεγέαν* εἰς Κόρινθον. A straight march from the Argeian territory to Corinth could not possibly carry Agesilaus by *Tegea*; Kœppen proposes *Τενέαν*, which I accept, as geographically suitable. I am not certain, however, that it is right; the *Agesilaus* of Xenophon has the words κατὰ τὰ στενά.

About the probable situation of Tenea, see Colonel Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. iii, p. 321; also his Peloponnesiaca, p. 400.

[646] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 19—iv, 8, 10, 11.

It was rather late in the autumn of 393 B.C. that the Lacedæmonian maritime operations in the Corinthian Gulf began, against the fleet recently equipped by the Corinthians out of the funds lent by Pharnabazus. First, the Lacedæmonian Polemarchus was named admiral; he was slain,—and his secretary Pollis, who succeeded to his command, retired afterwards wounded. Next came Herippidas to the command, who was succeeded by Teleutias. Now if we allow to Herippidas a year of command (the ordinary duration of a Lacedæmonian admiral's appointment), and to the other two something less than a year, since their time was brought to an end by accidents,—we shall find that the appointment of Teleutias will fall in the spring or early summer of 391 B.C., the year of this expedition of Agesilaus.

[647] Andokides de Pace, s. 18; Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 19. Παρεγένετο δὲ αὐτῷ (Ἀγησιλάῳ) καὶ ὁ ἀδελφὸς Τελευτίας κατὰ θάλασσαν, ἔχων τριήρεις περὶ δώδεκα· ὥστε μακαρίζεσθαι αὐτῶν τὴν μητέρα, ὅτι τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὧν *ἔτεκεν ὁ μὲν κατὰ γῆν τὰ τείχη τῶν πολεμίων, ὁ δὲ κατὰ θάλασσαν τὰς ναῦς καὶ τὰ νεώρια ἦρηκε*.

This last passage indicates decidedly that Lechæum was not taken until this joint attack by Agesilaus and Teleutias. And the authority of Xenophon on the point is superior, in my judgment, to that of Diodorus (xiv, 86), who represents Lechæum to have been taken in the year before, on the occasion when the Lacedæmonians were first admitted by treachery within the Long Walls.

The passage from Aristeides the rhetor, referred to by Wesseling, Mr. Clinton, and others, only mentions the *battle* at Lechæum—*not the capture* of the port. Xenophon also mentions a *battle* as having taken place close to Lechæum, between the two long walls, on the occasion when Diodorus talks of the *capture* of Lechæum; so that Aristeides is more in harmony with Xenophon than with Diodorus.

A few months prior to this joint attack of Agesilaus and Teleutias, the Athenians had come with an army, and with masons and carpenters, for the express purpose of rebuilding the Long Walls which Praxitas had in part broken down. This step would have been both impracticable and useless, if the Lacedæmonians had stood then in possession of Lechæum.

There is one passage of Xenophon, indeed, which looks as if the Lacedæmonians had been in possession of Lechæum *before* this expedition of the Athenians to reëstablish the Long Walls,—Αὐτοὶ (the Lacedæmonians) *δ' ἐκ τοῦ Λεχαίου ὁρμώμενοι* σὺν μόρᾳ καὶ τοῖς τῶν Κορινθίων φυγάσι, κύκλῳ περὶ τὸ ἄστυ τῶν Κορινθίων ἐστρατεύοντο (iv, 4, 17). But whoever reads attentively the sections from 15 to 19 inclusive, will see (I think) that this affirmation may well refer to a period after, and not before, the capture of Lechæum by Agesilaus; for it has reference to the general contempt shown by the Lacedæmonians for the peltasts of Iphikrates, as contrasted with the terror displayed by the Mantineians and others, of these same peltasts. Even if this were otherwise, however, I should still say that the passages which I have produced above from Xenophon show plainly that *he* represents Lechæum to have been captured by Agesilaus and Teleutias; and that the other words, ἐκ τοῦ Λεχαίου ὁρμώμενοι, if they really implied anything inconsistent with this, must be regarded as an inaccuracy.

I will add that the chapter of Diodorus, xiv, 86, puts into one year events which cannot all be supposed to have taken place in that same year.

Had Lechæum been in possession and occupation by the Lacedæmonians in the year preceding the joint attack by Agesilaus and Teleutias, Xenophon would surely have mentioned it in iv, 4, 14; for it was a more important post than Sikyon, for acting against Corinth.

[648] Xen. Agesilaus, ii, 17.

[649] Our knowledge of the abortive negotiations adverted to in the text, is derived, partly from the third Oration of Andokides called de Pace,—partly from a statement contained in the Argument of that Oration, and purporting to be borrowed from Philochorus—Φιλόχορος μὲν οὖν λέγει καὶ ελθεῖν τοὺς πρέσβεις ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος, καὶ ἀπράκτους ἀνελθεῖν, μὴ πείσαντος τοῦ Ἀνδοκίδου.

Whether Philochorus had any additional grounds to rest upon, other than this very oration itself, may appear doubtful. But at any rate, this important fragment (which I do not see noticed among the fragments of Philochorus in M. Didot's collection) counts for some farther evidence as to the reality of the peace proposed and discussed, but not concluded.

Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus make any mention of such mission to Sparta, or discussion at Athens, as that which forms the subject of the Andokidean oration. But on the other hand, neither of them says anything which goes to contradict the reality of the event; nor can we in this case found any strong negative inference on the mere silence of Xenophon, in the case of a pacific proposition which ultimately came to nothing.

If indeed we could be certain that the oration of Andokides was genuine it would of itself be sufficient to establish the reality of the mission to which it relates. It would be sufficient evidence, not only without corroboration from Xenophon, but even against any contradictory statement proceeding from Xenophon. But unfortunately, the rhetor Dionysius pronounced this oration to be spurious; which introduces a doubt and throws us upon the investigation of collateral probabilities. I have myself a decided opinion (already stated more than once), that another out of the four orations ascribed to Andokides (I mean the fourth oration, entitled against Alkibiades) is spurious; and I was inclined to the same suspicion with respect to this present oration De Pace; a suspicion which I expressed in a former volume (Vol. V, Ch. xlv, p. 334). But on studying over again with attention this oration De Pace, I find reason to retract my suspicion, and to believe that the oration may be genuine. It has plenty of erroneous allegations as to matter of fact, especially in reference to times prior to the battle of Ægospotami; but not one, so far as I can detect, which conflicts with *the situation* to which the orator addresses himself,—nor which requires us to pronounce it spurious.

Indeed, in considering *this situation* (which is the most important point to be studied when we are examining the genuineness of an oration), we find a partial coincidence in Xenophon, which goes to strengthen our affirmative confidence. One point much insisted upon in the oration is, that the Bœotians were anxious to make peace with Sparta, and were willing to relinquish Orchomenus (s. 13-20). Now Xenophon also mentions, three or four months afterwards, the Bœotians as being anxious for peace, and as sending envoys to Agesilaus to ask on what terms it would be granted to them (Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 6). This coincidence is of some value in reference to the authenticity of the oration.

Assuming the oration to be genuine, its date is pretty clearly marked, and is rightly placed by Mr. Fynes Clinton in 391 B.C. It was in the autumn or winter of that year, four years after the commencement of the war in Bœotia which began in 395 B.C. (s. 20). It was *after* the capture of Lechæum, which took place in the summer of 391 B.C.—and *before* the destruction of the Lacedæmonian *mora* by Iphikrates, which took place in the spring of 390 *B.C.* For Andokides emphatically intimates, that at the moment when he spoke, *not one military success* had yet been obtained against the Lacedæmonians—καίτοι ποίας τινος ἂν ἐκεῖνοι παρ᾽ ἡμῶν εἰρήνης ἔτυχον, *εἰ μίαν μόνον μάχην ἡττήθησαν*; (s. 19). This could never have been said *after* the destruction of the Lacedæmonian *mora*, which made so profound a sensation throughout Greece, and so greatly altered the temper of the contending parties. And it seems to me one proof (among others) that Mr. Fynes Clinton has not placed correctly the events subsequent to the battle of Corinth, when I observe that he assigns the destruction of the *mora* to the year 392 B.C., a year *before* the date which he rightly allots to the Andokidean oration. I have placed (though upon other grounds) the destruction of the *mora* in the spring of 390 *B.C.*, which receives additional confirmation from this passage of Andokides.

Both Valckenaer and Sluiter (Lect. Andocid. c. x,) consider the oration of Andokides de Pace as genuine; Taylor and other critics hold the contrary opinion.

[650] Xen. Agesil. ii, 18.

[651] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 1; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 21.

Xenophon, who writes his history in the style and language of a partisan, says that "*the Argeians* celebrated the festival, Corinth having now become Argos." But it seems plain that the truth was as I have stated in the

text,—and that the Argeians stood by (with others of the confederates probably also) to protect the Corinthians of the city in the exercise of their usual privilege; just as Agesilaus, immediately afterwards, stood by to protect the Corinthian exiles while they were doing the same thing.

The Isthmian games were *trietêric*, that is, celebrated in every alternate year; in one of the spring months, about April or perhaps the beginning of May (the Greek months being lunar, no one of them would coincide regularly with any one of our calendar months, year after year); and in the *second* and *fourth* Olympic years. From Thucydides, viii, 9, 10, we know that this festival was celebrated in April 412 B.C.; that is, towards the end of the *fourth* year of Olympiad 91, about two or three months before the festival of Olympiad 92.

Dodwell (De Cyclis Diss. vi, 2, just cited), Corsini, (Diss. Agonistic. iv, 3), and Schneider in his note to this passage of Xenophon,—all state the Isthmian games to have been celebrated in the *first* and *third* Olympic years; which is, in my judgment, a mistake. Dodwell erroneously states the Isthmian games mentioned in Thucydides, viii, 9, to have been celebrated at the beginning of Olympiad 92, instead of the fourth quarter of the fourth year of Olympiad 91; a mistake pointed out by Krüger (*ad loc.*) as well as by Poppo and Dr. Arnold; although the argumentation of the latter, founded upon the time of the Lacedæmonian festival of the Hyakinthia, is extremely uncertain. It is a still more strange idea of Dodwell, that the Isthmian games were celebrated at the same time as the Olympic games (Annal. Xenoph. ad ann. 392).

[652] See Ulrichs, Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland, chap. i, p. 3. The modern village and port of Lutráki derives its name from these warm springs, which are quite close to it and close to the sea, at the foot of the mountain of Perachora or Peiræum; on the side of the bay opposite to Lechæum, but near the point where the level ground constituting the Isthmus (properly so-called), ends,—and where the rocky or mountainous region, forming the westernmost portion of Geraneia (or the peninsula of Peiræum), begins. The language of Xenophon, therefore, when he comes to describe the back-march of Agesilaus is perfectly accurate,—ἤδη δ' ἐκπεπερακότος αὐτοῦ τὰ θερμὰ ἐς τὸ πλατὺ τοῦ Λεχαίου, etc. (iv, 5, 8).

[653] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 4.

Xenophon here recounts how Agesilaus sent up ten men with fire in pans, to enable those on the heights to make fires and warm themselves; the night being very cold and rainy, the situation very high, and the troops not having come out with blankets or warm covering to protect them. They kindled large fires, and the neighboring temple of Poseidon was accidentally burnt.

[654] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 5.

This Œnoê must not be confounded with the Athenian town of that name, which lay on the frontiers of Attica towards Bœotia.

So also the town of Peiræum here noticed must not be confounded with another Peiræum, which was also in the Corinthian territory, but on the Saronic Gulf, and on the frontiers of Epidaurus (Thucyd. viii, 10).

[655] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 5-8.

[656] Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 14. See Vol. VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 165 of this History.

The sale of prisoners here directed by Agesilaus belies the encomiums of his biographers (Xen. Agesil. vii, 6; Cornel. Nep. Agesil. c. 5).

[657] Xen. Agesil. vii, 6; Cornelius Nepos, Ages. c. 5.

The story of Polyænus (iii, 9, 45) may perhaps refer to this point of time. But it is rare that we can verify his anecdotes or those of the other Tactic writers. M. Rehdantz strives in vain to find proper places for the sixty-three different stratagems which Polyænus ascribes to Iphikrates.

[658] This Lake is now called Lake Vuliasmeni. Considerable ruins were noticed by M. Dutroyat, in the recent French survey, near its western extremity; on which side it adjoins the temple of Hêrê Akræa, or the Heræum. See M. Boblaye, Recherches Géographiques sur les Ruines de la Morée, p. 36; and Colonel Leake's Peloponnesiaca, p. 399.

[659] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 6.

Τῶν δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων ἀπὸ τῶν ὅπλων σὺν τοῖς δόρασι παρηκολούθουν φύλακες τῶν αἰχμαλώτων, μάλα ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων θεωρούμενοι· οἱ γὰρ εὐτυχοῦντες καὶ κρατοῦντες ἀεί πως ἀξιοθέατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. Ἔτι δὲ

καθημένου τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου, καὶ ἐοικότος ἀγαλλομένῳ τοῖς πεπραγμένοις, ἱππεύς τις προσήλαυνε, καὶ μάλα ἰσχυρῶς ἰδρῶντι τῷ ἵππῳ· ὑπὸ πολλῶν δὲ ἐρωτώμενος ὅ,τι ἀγγέλλοι, οὐδενὶ ἀπεκρίνατο, etc.

It is interesting to mark in Xenophon the mixture of Philo-Laconian complacency,—of philosophical reflection,—and of that care in bringing out the contrast of good fortune, with sudden reverse instantly following upon it, which forms so constant a point of effect with Grecian poets and historians.

[660] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 22. ἔπαθε δὲ πρᾶγμα νεμεσητὸν, etc.

[661] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 7-9.

[662] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 11, 12.

[663] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 14. Τούτους μὲν ἐκέλευον τοὺς ὑπασπιστὰς ἀραμένους ἀποφέρειν ἐς Λέχαιον· *οὗτοι καὶ μόνοι τῆς μόρας τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐσώθησαν*.

We have here a remarkable expression of Xenophon,—"These were the only men in the mora who were *really and truly saved*." He means, I presume, that they were the only men who were saved without the smallest loss of honor; being carried off wounded from the field of battle, and not having fled or deserted their posts. The others who survived, preserved themselves by flight; and we know that the treatment of those Lacedæmonians who ran away from the field (οἱ τρέσαντες), on their return to Sparta, was insupportably humiliating. See Xenoph. Rep. Laced. ix, 4; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30. We may gather from these words of Xenophon, that a distinction was really made at Sparta between the treatment of these wounded men here carried off, and that of the other survivors of the beaten mora.

The ὑπασπισταὶ, or shield-bearers, were, probably, a certain number of attendants, who habitually carried the shields of the officers (compare Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 39; Anab. iv, 2, 20), persons of importance, and rich hoplites. It seems hardly to be presumed that every hoplite had an ὑπασπιστὴς, in spite of what we read about the attendant Helots at the battle of Platæa (Herod. ix, 10-29) and in other places.

[664] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5,15, 16. τὰ δέκα ἀφ᾽ ἥβης—τὰ πεντεκαίδεκα ἀφ᾽ ἥβης.

[665] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 17.

Xenophon affirms the number of slain to have been about two hundred and fifty—ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς μάχαις καὶ τῇ φυγῇ ἀπέθανον περὶ πεντήκοντα καὶ διακοσίους. But he had before distinctly stated that the whole *mora* marching back to Lechæum under the polemarch, was six hundred in number—ὁ μὲν πολέμαρχος σὺν τοῖς ὁπλίταις, οὗσιν ὡς ἑξακοσίοις, ἀπῄει πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ Λέχαιον (iv, 5, 12). And it is plain, from several different expressions, that all of them were slain, excepting a very few survivors.

I think it certain, therefore, that one or other of these two numbers is erroneous; either the original aggregate of six hundred is *above* the truth,—or the total of slain, two hundred and fifty, is *below* the truth. Now the latter supposition appears to me by far the more probable of the two. The Lacedæmonians, habitually secret and misleading in their returns of their own numbers (see Thucyd. v, 74), probably did not choose to admit publicly a greater total of slain than two hundred and fifty. Xenophon has inserted this in his history, forgetting that his own details of the battle refuted the numerical statement. The total of six hundred is more probable, than any smaller number, for the entire mora; and it is impossible to assign any reasons why Xenophon should overstate it.

[666] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 8-10.

[667] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 10. Ἅτε δὲ ἀήθους τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις γεγενημένης τῆς τοιαύτης συμφορᾶς, πολὺ πένθος ἦν κατὰ τὸ Λακωνικὸν στράτευμα, πλὴν ὅσων ἐτέθνασαν ἐν χώρᾳ ἢ υἱοὶ ἢ πατέρες ἢ ἀδελφοί· *οὗτοι δὲ, ὥσπερ νικηφόροι, λαμπροὶ καὶ ἀγαλλόμενοι τῷ οἰκείῳ πάθει περιῆσαν*.

If any reader objects to the words which I have used in the text I request him to compare them with the Greek of Xenophon.

[668] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 16.

[669] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 16.

[670] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 19.

[671] Demosthenes—περὶ Συντάξεως—c. 8, p. 172.

[672] Diodor. xiv, 92; Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 34.

Aristeides (Panathen. p. 168) boasts that the Athenians were masters of the Acro-Corinthus, and might have kept the city as their own, but that they generously refused to do so.

[673] Diodor. xv, 73.

[674] Xen. Hellen. iv, 6, 1-14; iv, 7, 1.

[675] Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 3. Οἱ δ᾽ Ἀργεῖοι, ἐπεὶ ἔγνωσαν οὐ δυνησόμενοι κωλύειν, ἔπεμψαν, *ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν*, ἐστεφανωμένους δύο κήρυκας, ὑποφέροντας σπονδάς.

[676] Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 2. Ὁ δὲ Ἀγησίπολις—ἐλθὼν εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν καὶ χρηστηριαζόμενος, ἐπηρώτα τὸν θεὸν, εἰ ὁσίως ἂν ἔχοι αὐτῷ, μὴ δεχομένῳ τὰς σπονδὰς τῶν Ἀργείων· *ὅτι οὐχ ὁπότε καθήκοι ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ᾽ ὁπότε ἐμβάλλειν μέλλοιεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τότε ὑπέφερον τοὺς μῆνας*. Ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἐπεσήμαινεν αὐτῷ, ὅσιον εἶναι μὴ δεχομένῳ σπονδὰς ἀδίκως ἐπιφερομένας. Ἐκεῖθεν δ᾽ εὐθὺς πορευθεὶς εἰς Δελφοὺς, ἐπήρετο αὖ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, εἰ κἀκείνῳ δοκοίη περὶ τῶν σπονδῶν, καθάπερ τῷ πατρί. Ὁ δ᾽ ἀπεκρίνατο, *καὶ μάλα κατὰ ταὐτά*.

I have given in the text what I believe to be the meaning of the words ὑποφέρειν τοὺς μῆνας,—upon which Schneider has a long and not very instructive note, adopting an untenable hypothesis of Dodwell, that the Argeians on this occasion appealed to the sanctity of the Isthmian truce; which is not countenanced by anything in Xenophon, and which it belonged to the Corinthians to announce, not to the Argeians. The plural τοὺς μῆνας indicates (as Weiske and Manso understand it) that the Argeians sometimes put forward the name of one festival, sometimes of another. We may be pretty sure that the Karneian festival was one of them; but what the others were, we cannot tell. It is very probable that there were several festivals of common obligation either among all the Dorians, or between Sparta and Argos—πατρώους τινας σπονδὰς ἐκ παλαιοῦ καθεστώσας τοῖς Δωριεῦσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους,—to use the language of Pausanias (iii, 5, 6). The language of Xenophon implies that the demand made by the Argeians, for observance of the Holy Truce, was in itself rightful, or rather, that it would have been rightful at a different season; but that they put themselves in the wrong by making it at an improper season and for a fraudulent political purpose.

For some remarks on other fraudulent manœuvres of the Argeians, respecting the season of the Karneian truce, see Vol. VII. of this History, Ch. lvi, p. 66. The compound verb *ὑποφέρειν* τοὺς μῆνας seems to imply the *underhand purpose* with which the Argeians preferred their demand of the truce. What were the previous occasions on which they had preferred a similar demand, we are not informed. Two years before, Agesilaus had invaded and laid waste Argos; perhaps they may have tried, but without success, to arrest his march by a similar pious fraud.

It is to this proceeding, perhaps, that Andokides alludes (Or. iii, De Pace, s. 27), where he says that the Argeians, though strenuous in insisting that Athens should help them to carry on the war for the possession of Corinth against the Lacedæmonians, had nevertheless made a separate peace with the latter, covering their own Argeian territory from invasion—αὐτοὶ δ᾽ ἰδίᾳ εἰρήνην ποιησάμενοι τὴν χώραν οὐ παρέχουσιν ἐμπολεμεῖν. Of this obscure passage I can give no better explanation.

[677] Aristotel. Rhetoric, ii, 23. Ἡγήσιππος ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐπηρώτα τὸν θεόν, κεχρημένος πρότερον Ὀλυμπιάσιν, εἰ αὐτῷ ταὐτὰ δοκεῖ, ἅπερ τῷ πατρί, *ὡς αἰσχρὸν ὂν τάναντία εἰπεῖν*.

A similar story about the manner of putting the question to Apollo at Delphi, after it had already been put to Zeus at Dodona, is told about Agesilaus on another occasion (Plutarch, Apophth. Lacon. p. 208 F.).

[678] Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 7; Pausan. iii, 5, 6.

It rather seems, by the language of these two writers, that they look upon the menacing signs, by which Agesipolis was induced to depart, as marks of some displeasure of the gods against his expedition.

[679] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 12. Compare Isokrates, Or. vii, (Areopag.) s. 13. ἁπάσης γὰρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑπὸ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν ὑποπεσούσης καὶ μετὰ τὴν Κόνωνος ναυμαχίαν καὶ μετὰ τὴν Τιμοθέου στρατηγίαν, etc. This oration, however, was composed a long while after the events (about B.C. 353—see Mr. Clinton's Fast. H., in that year); and Isokrates exaggerates; mistaking the break-up of the Lacedæmonian empire for a resumption of the Athenian. Demosthenes also (cont. Leptin. c. 16, p. 477) confounds the same two ideas, and even the Athenian vote of thanks to Konon, perpetuated on a commemorative column, countenanced the same impression,—ἐπειδὴ Κόνων ἠλευθέρωσε τοὺς Ἀθηναίων συμμάχους, etc.

[680] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

[681] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 12-14.

[682] Diodor. xiv, 110. He affirms that these cities strongly objected to this concession, five years afterwards, when the peace of Antalkidas was actually concluded; but that they were forced to give up their scruples and accept the peace including the concession, because they had not force to resist Persia and Sparta acting in hearty alliance.

Hence we may infer with certainty, that they also objected to it during the earlier discussions, when it was first broached by Antalkidas; and that their objections to it were in part the cause why the discussions reported in the text broke off without result.

It is true that Athens, during her desperate struggles in the last years of the Peloponnesian war, had consented to this concession, and even to greater, without doing herself any good (Thucyd. viii, 56). But she was not now placed in circumstances so imperious as to force her to be equally yielding.

Plato, in the Menexenus (c. 17, p. 245), asserts that all the allies of Athens—Bœotians, Corinthians, Argeians, etc., were willing to surrender the Asiatic Greeks at the requisition of Artaxerxes; but that the Athenians alone resolutely stood out, and were in consequence left without any allies. The latter part of this assertion, as to the isolation of Athens from her allies, is certainly not true; nor do I believe that the allies took essentially different views from Athens on the point. The Menexenus, eloquent and complimentary to Athens, must be followed cautiously as to matters of fact. Plato goes the length of denying that the Athenians subscribed the convention of Antalkidas. Aristeides (Panathen. p. 172) says that they were forced to subscribe it, because all their allies abandoned them.

[683] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 15.

[684] See a striking passage in the Or. xii, (Panathen.) of Isokrates, s. 110.

[685] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 16; Diodor. xiv, 85.

[686] Lysias, Or. xix, (De Bon. Aristoph.) s. 41, 42, 44; Cornelius Nepos, Conon, c. 5; Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 180.

[687] Diodor. xiv. 99.

[688] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 22. Ἦν δὲ οὗτος ἀνὴρ (Diphridas) *εὖχαρίς τε οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ Θίμβρωνος*, μᾶλλόν τε συντεταγμένος, καὶ ἐγχειρητικώτερος, στρατηγός. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκράτουν αὐτοῦ αἱ τοῦ σώματος ἡδοναὶ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ, πρὸς ᾧ εἶη ἔργῳ, τοῦτο ἔπραττεν.

[689] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 18, 19.

[690] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21, 22.

[691] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21.

[692] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 23.

Diodorus (xiv, 97) agrees in this number of twenty-seven triremes, and in the fact of aid having been obtained from Samos, which island was persuaded to detach itself from Athens. But he recounts the circumstances in a very different manner. He represents the oligarchical party in Rhodes as having risen in insurrection, and become masters of the island; he does not name Teleutias, but Eudokimus (Ekdikus?), Diphilus (Diphridas?), and Philodikus, as commanders.

The statement of Xenophon deserves the greater credence, in my judgment. His means of information, as well as his interest, about Teleutias (the brother of Agesilaus) were considerable.

[693] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 24-26.

Although the three ancient Rhodian cities (Lindus, Ialysus, and Kameirus) had coalesced (see Diodor. xiii, 75) a few years before into the great city of Rhodes, afterwards so powerful and celebrated,—yet they still continued to exist, and apparently as fortified places. For Xenophon speaks of the democrats in Rhodes as *τάς τε πόλεις* ἔχοντας, etc.

Whether the Philokrates here named as *Philokrates son of Ephialtes*, is the same person as the Philokrates accused in the Thirtieth oration of Lysias—cannot be certainly made out. It is possible enough that there might be two contemporary Athenians bearing this name, which would explain the circumstance that Xenophon here names the father Ephialtes—a practice occasional with him, but not common.

[694] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 67, 68, 82; Epistola Philippi ap. Demosthen. Orat. p. 161, c. 4.

[695] Lysias, Orat. xix, (De Bonis Aristoph.) s. 27-44.

[696] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 25-27.

Polybius (iv, 38-47) gives instructive remarks and information about the importance of Byzantium and its very peculiar position, in the ancient world,—as well as about the dues charged on the merchant vessels going into, or coming out of, the Euxine,—and the manner in which these dues pressed upon general trade.

[697] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 7.

[698] Lysias, Or. xxviii, cont. Erg. s. 1-20.

[699] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 28-30; Diodor. xiv, 94.

The latter states that Thrasybulus lost twenty-three triremes by a storm near Lesbos,—which Xenophon does not notice, and which seems improbable.

[700] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 31. Καὶ Θρασύβουλος μὲν δὴ, μάλα δοκῶν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν.

[701] Lysias, cont. Ergo. Or. xxviii, s. 9.

Ergokles is charged in this oration with gross abuse of power, oppression towards allies and citizens of Athens, and peculation for his own profit, during the course of the expedition of Thrasybulus; who is indirectly accused of conniving at such misconduct. It appears that the Athenians, as soon as they were informed that Thrasybulus had established the toll in the Bosphorus, passed a decree that an account should be sent home of all moneys exacted from the various cities, and that the colleagues of Thrasybulus should come home to go through the audit (s. 5); implying (so far as we can understand what is thus briefly noticed) that Thrasybulus himself should *not* be obliged to come home, but might stay on his Hellespontine or Asiatic command. Ergokles, however, probably one of these colleagues, resented this decree as an insult, and advised Thrasybulus to seize Byzantium, to retain the fleet, and to marry the daughter of the Thracian prince Seuthes. It is also affirmed in the oration that the fleet had come home in very bad condition (s. 2-4), and that the money, levied with so much criminal abuse, had been either squandered or fraudulently appropriated.

We learn from another oration that Ergokles was condemned to death. His property was confiscated, and was said to amount to thirty talents, though he had been poor before the expedition; but nothing like that amount was discovered after the sentence of confiscation (Lysias, Or. xxx, cont. Philokrat. s. 3).

[702] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 31.

[703] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 2.

[704] Thucyd. viii, 61; compare Xenoph. Anab. v, 6, 24.

[705] See above, Chapter lxxi, p. 156 of the present volume.

[706] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 32, 83.

[707] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 35, 36. τὸ μὲν πρῶτον λῃστὰς διαπέμποντες ἐπολέμουν ἀλλήλοις … Ὅπως δοκοίη, ὥσπερ εἰώθει, ἐπ᾽ ἀργυρολογίαν ἐπαναπεπλευκέναι.

[708] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 36. Ὁ Ἀναξίβιος ἀπεπορεύετο, ὡς μὲν ἐλέγετο, *οὐδὲ τῶν ἱερῶν γεγενημένων αὐτῷ ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ*, ἀλλὰ καταφρονήσας, ὅτι διὰ φιλίας τε ἐπορεύετο καὶ ἐς πόλιν φιλίαν, καὶ ὅτι ἥκουε τῶν ἀπαντώντων, τὸν Ἰφικράτην ἀναπεπλευκέναι τῆς ἐπὶ Προικοννήσου, ἀμελέστερον ἐπορεύετο.

[709] See the remarks a few pages back, upon the defeat and destruction of the Lacedæmonian mora by Iphikrates, near Lechæum, page 350.

[710] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 39. Καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ μέντοι αὐτῷ παρέμεινε, καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ τῶν συνεληλυθότων ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἁρμοστήρων ὡς δώδεκα μαχόμενοι συναπέθανον· οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι φεύγοντες

ἔπιπτον.

[711] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 1. ὧν δὲ *πάλιν* ὁ Ἐτεόνικος ἐν τῇ Αἰγίνῃ, καὶ ἐπιμιξίᾳ χρωμένων τὸν πρόσθεν χρόνον τῶν Αἰγινητῶν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἐπεὶ φανερῶς κατὰ θάλατταν ἐπολεμεῖτο ὁ πόλεμος, ξυνδόξαν καὶ τοῖς ἐφόροις, ἐφίησι λῃΐζεσθαι τὸν βουλόμενον ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς.

The meaning of the word πάλιν here is not easy to determine, since (as Schneider remarks) not a word had been said before about the presence of Eteonikus at Ægina. Perhaps we may explain it by supposing that Eteonikus found the Æginetans reluctant to engage in the war, and that he did not like to involve them in it without first going to Sparta to consult the ephors. It was on *coming back* to Ægina (πάλιν) from Sparta, after having obtained the consent of the ephors (ξυνδόξαν καὶ τοῖς ἐφόροις), that he issued the letters of marque.

Schneider's note explains τὸν πρόσθεν χρόνον incorrectly, in my judgment.

[712] Compare Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 8; Thucyd. iii, 13. The old Æginetan antipathy against Athens, when thus again instigated, continued for a considerable time. A year or two afterwards, when the philosopher Plato was taken to Ægina to be sold as a slave, it was death to any Athenian to land in the island (Aristides, Or. xlvi, p. 384; p. 306 Dindorf; Diogenes Laërt. iii, 19; Plutarch. Dion. c. 5).

[713] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 3. Ὁ δὲ Τελευτίας, μακαριώτατα δὴ ἀπέπλευσεν οἴκαδε, etc.

This description of the scene at the departure of Teleutias (for whom, as well as for his brother Agesilaus, Xenophon always manifests a marked sympathy) is extremely interesting. The reflection, too, with which Xenophon follows it up, deserves notice,—"I know well that in these incidents I am not recounting any outlay of money, or danger incurred, or memorable stratagem. But by Zeus, it *does* seem to me worth a man's while to reflect, by what sort of conduct Teleutias created such dispositions in his soldiers. This is a true man's achievement, more precious than any outlay or any danger."

What Xenophon here glances at in the case of Teleutias, is the scheme worked out in detail in the romance of the Cyropædia (τὸ ἐθελοντῶν ἄρχειν—the exercising command in such manner as to have willing and obedient subjects)—and touched upon indirectly in various of his other compositions,—the Hiero, the Œconomicus, and portions of the Memorabilia. The *idéal* of government, as it presented itself to Xenophon, was the paternal despotism, or something like it.

[714] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 6-10.

[715] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 12, 13.

[716] So we may conclude from Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 13; Demænetus is found at the Hellespont v, 1, 26.

[717] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 14-17.

[718] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 18. Ἄγετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, δειπνήσατε μὲν, ἅπερ καὶ ὡς ἐμέλλετε· προπαράσχετε δέ μοι μιᾶς ἡμέρας σῖτον· ἔπειτα δὲ ἥκετε ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς αὖτικα μάλα, ὅπως πλεύσωμεν, ἔνθα θεὸς ἐθέλει, ἐν καιρῷ ἀφιξόμενοι.

Schneider doubts whether the words προπαράσχετε δέ μοι are correct. But they seem to me to bear a very pertinent meaning. Teleutias had no money; yet it was necessary for his purpose that the seamen should come furnished with one day's provision beforehand. Accordingly he is obliged to ask *them* to get provision for themselves, or to *lend it*, as it were, *to him*; though they were already so dissatisfied from not having received their pay.

[719] Thucyd. ii, 94.

[720] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 18-22.

[721] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 24.

[722] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 29.

Even ten years after this, however, when the Lacedæmonian harmost Sphodrias marched from Thespiæ by night to surprise Peiræus, it was without gates on the land-side—ἀπύλωτος—or at least without any such gates as would resist an assault (Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 20).

[723] Lysias, Orat. xxx, cont. Nikomachum, s. 21-30.

I trust this Oration so far as the matter of fact, that in the preceding year, some ancient sacrifices had been omitted from state-poverty; but the manner in which the speaker makes this fact tell against Nikomachus, may or may not be just.

[724] Aristophan. Ecclesias. 300-310.

[725] See the Inscription No. 147, in Boeckh's Corpus Inscriptt. Græcor.—Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, ii, 7, p. 179, 180, Eng. transl.—and Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Publ. Græc. s. 77, p. 320.

[726] Demosthenes, Philippic. iv, p. 141, s. 43; Demosth. Orat. xliv, cont. Leocharem, p. 1091, s. 48.

[727] It is common to represent the festivals at Athens as if they were so many stratagems for feeding poor citizens at the public expense. But the primitive idea and sentiment of the Grecian religious festival—the satisfaction to the god dependent upon multitudinous spectators sympathizing and enjoying themselves together (ἄμμιγα πάντας)—is much anterior to the development of democracy at Athens. See the old oracles in Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 531, s. 66; Homer, Hymn. Apollin. 147; K. F. Herrmann, Gottesdienstlich. Alterthümer der Griechen, s. 8.

[728] See such direct assessments on property alluded to in various speeches of Lysias, Orat. xix. De Bonis Aristoph. s. 31, 45, 63; Orat. xxvii. cont. Epikratem, s. 11; Orat. xxix. cont. Philokrat. s. 14.

Boeckh (in his Public Econ. of Athens, iv, 4, p. 493, Engl. transl., which passage stands unaltered in the second edition of the German original recently published, p. 642) affirms that a proposition for the assessment of a direct property-tax of one-fortieth, or two and a half per cent., was made about this time by a citizen named Euripides, who announced it as intended to produce five hundred talents; that the proposition was at first enthusiastically welcomed by the Athenians, and procured for its author unbounded popularity; but that he was presently cried down and disgraced, because on farther examination the measure proved unsatisfactory and empty talk.

Sievers also (Geschichte von Griech. bis zur Schlacht von Mantineia, pp. 100, 101) adopts the same view as Boeckh, that this was a real proposition of a property tax of two and a half per cent., made by Euripides. After having alleged that the Athenians in these times supplied their treasury by the most unscrupulous injustice in confiscating the property of rich citizens,—referring as proof to passages in the orators, none of which establishes his conclusion,—Sievers goes on to say,—"But that these violences did not suffice, is shown by the fact that the people caught with greedy impatience at other measures. Thus a new scheme of finance, which however was presently discovered to be insufficient or inapplicable, excited at first the most extravagant joy." He adds in a note: "The scheme proceeded from Euripides; it was a property-tax of two and a half per cent. See Aristoph. Ecclesiaz. 823; Boeckh, Staatshaush. ii, p. 27."

In my judgment, the assertion here made by Boeckh and Sievers rests upon no sufficient ground. The passage of Aristophanes does not warrant us in concluding anything at all about a proposition for a property-tax. It is as follows:—

Τὸ δ᾽ ἔναγχος οὐχ ἅπαντες ἡμεῖς ὤμνυμεν
Τάλαντ᾽ ἔσεσθαι πεντακόσια τῇ πόλει
Τῆς τεσσαρακοστῆς, ἣν ἐπόρισ᾽ Εὐριπίδης;
Κεὐθὺς κατεχρύσου πᾶς ἀνὴρ Εὐριπίδην·
Ὅτε δὴ δ᾽ ἀνασκοπουμένοις ἐφαίνετο
Ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος, καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμ᾽ οὐκ ἤρκεσεν,
Πάλιν κατεπίττου πᾶς ἀνὴρ Εὐριπίδην.

What this "new financial scheme" (so Sievers properly calls it) was, which the poet here alludes to,—we have no means of determining. But I venture to express my decided conviction that it cannot have been a property-tax. The terms in which it is described forbid that supposition. It was a scheme which seemed at first sight exceedingly promising and gainful to the city, and procured for its author very great popularity; but which, on farther examination, proved to be mere empty boasting (ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος) How can this be said about any motion

for a property-tax? That any financier should ever have gained extraordinary popularity by proposing a property-tax, is altogether inconceivable. And a proposition to raise the immense sum of five hundred talents (which Schömann estimates as the probable aggregate charge of the whole peace-establishment of Athens, Antiq. Jur. Public. Græc. s. 73, p. 313) at one blow by an assessment upon property! It would be as much as any financier could do to bear up against the tremendous *unpopularity* of such a proposition; and to induce the assembly even to listen to him, were the necessity ever so pressing. How odious are propositions for direct taxation, we may know without recurring to the specific evidence respecting Athens; but if any man requires such specific evidence, he may find it abundantly in the Philippics and Olynthiacs of Demosthenes. On one occasion (De Symmoriis, Or. xiv. s. 33, p. 185) that orator alludes to a proposition for raising five hundred talents by direct property-tax as something extravagant, which the Athenians would not endure to hear mentioned.

Moreover,—unpopularity apart,—the motion for a property-tax could scarcely procure credit for a financier, because it is of all ideas the most simple and obvious. Any man can suggest such a scheme. But to pass for an acceptable financier, you must propose some measure which promises gain to the state without such undisguised pressure upon individuals.

Lastly, there is nothing *delusive* in a property-tax,—nothing which looks gainful at first sight, and then turns out on farther examination (ἀνασκοπουμένοις) to be false or uncertain. It may, indeed, be more or less evaded; but this can only be known after it has been assessed, and when payment is actually called for.

Upon these grounds I maintain that the τεσσαρακοστὴ proposed by Euripides was not a property-tax. What it was I do not pretend to say; but τεσσαρακοστὴ may have many other meanings; it might mean a duty of two and a half per cent. upon imports or exports, or upon the produce of the mines of Laureion; or it might mean a cheap coinage or base money, something in the nature of the Chian τεσσαρακοσταὶ (Thucyd. viii, 100). All that the passage really teaches us is, that some financial proposition was made by Euripides which at first seemed likely to be lucrative, but would not stand an attentive examination. It is not even certain that Euripides promised a receipt of five hundred talents; this sum is only given to us as a comic exaggeration of that which foolish men at first fancied. Boeckh in more than one place reasons (erroneously, in my judgment) as if this five hundred talents was a real and trustworthy estimate, and equal to two and a half per cent. upon the taxable property of the Athenians. He says (iv, 8, p. 520, Engl. transl.) that "Euripides assumed as the basis of his proposal for levying a property-tax, a taxable capital of twenty thousand talents,"—and that "his proposition of one-fortieth was *calculated* to produce five hundred talents." No such conclusion can be fairly drawn from Aristophanes.

Again, Boeckh infers from another passage in the same play of the same author, that a small direct property-tax of one five-hundredth part had been recently imposed. After a speech from one of the old women, calling upon a young man to follow her, he replies (v. 1006):—

Ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη μοῦστίν, εἰ μὴ τῶν ἐμῶν

Τὴν πεντακοσιόστην κατέθηκας τῇ πόλει.

Boeckh himself admits (iv, 8, p. 520) that this passage is very obscure, and so I think every one will find it. Tyrwhitt was so perplexed by it that he altered ἐμῶν into ἑτῶν. Without presuming to assign the meaning of the passage, I merely contend that it cannot be held to justify the affirmation, as a matter of historical fact, that a property-tax of one-five-hundredth had been levied at Athens, shortly before the representation of Ekklesiazusæ.

I cannot refrain here from noticing another inference drawn by Sievers from a third passage in this same play,—the Ekklesiazusæ (Geschichte Griechenlands vom Ende des Pelop. Kriegs bis zur Schlacht von Mantineia, p. 101.) He says,—"How melancholy is the picture of Athenian popular life, which is presented to us by the Ekklesiazusæ and the second Plutus, ten or twelve years after the restoration of the democracy! What an *impressive seriousness* (welch ein erschütternder Ernst) is expressed in the speech of Praxagora!" (v. 174 *seqq.*).

I confess that I find neither seriousness, nor genuine and trustworthy coloring, in this speech of Praxagora. It was a comic case made out for the purpose of showing that the women were more fit to govern Athens than the men, and setting forth the alleged follies of the men in terms of broad and general disparagement. The whole play is, throughout, thorough farce and full of Aristophanic humor. And it is surely preposterous to treat what is put into the mouth of Praxagora, the leading feminine character, as if it were historical evidence as to

the actual condition or management of Athens. Let any one follow the speech of Praxagora into the proposition of reform which she is made to submit, and he will then see the absurdity of citing her discourse as if it were an harangue in Thucydides. History is indeed strangely transformed by thus turning comic wit into serious matter of evidence; and no history has suffered so much from the proceeding as that of Athens.

[729] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 1, 19-24: compare vii, 1, 3, 4; Xenoph. De Vectigalibus, chapters i, ii, iii, etc.; Xenoph. De Repub. Athen. i, 17.

[730] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

[731] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 28.

[732] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 25-27.

[733] Diodor. xv, 2. These triremes were employed in the ensuing year for the prosecution of the war against Evagoras.

[734] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 28, 29.

[735] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 31.

In this document there is the same introduction of the first person immediately following the third, as in the correspondence between Pausanias and Xerxes (Thucyd. i, 128, 129).

[736] Diodor. xiv, 110.

[737] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 32, 33.

[738] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 34; Demosthen. adv. Leptin. c. 13, p. 473.

[739] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 34. Οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι πολῖται ἔκοντες κατεδέχοντο τοὺς πρόσθεν φεύγοντας.

[740] Such is in fact the version of the story in Xenophon's Encomium upon Agesilaus (ii, 21), where it is made a matter of honor to the latter, that he would not consent to peace, except with a compulsory clause (ἠνάγκασε) that the Corinthian and Theban exiles should be restored. The Corinthian exiles had been actively coöperating with Agesilaus against Corinth. Of Theban exiles we have heard nothing; but it is very probable that there were several serving with Agesilaus,—and also pretty certain that he would insist upon their restoration.

[741] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 8.



GEORGE GROTE.

HISTORY OF GREECE

BY

GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.

VOL. X.

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PREFACE TO VOL. X.

THE present Volume is already extended to an unusual number of pages; yet I have been compelled to close it at an inconvenient moment, midway in the reign of the Syracusan despot Dionysius. To carry that reign to its close, one more chapter will be required, which must be reserved for the succeeding volume.

The history of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, forming as it does a stream essentially distinct from that of the Peloponnesians, Athenians, etc., is peculiarly interesting during the interval between 409 B.C. (the date of the second Carthaginian invasion) and the death of Timoleon in 336 B.C. It is, moreover, reported to us by authors (Diodorus and Plutarch), who, though not themselves very judicious as selectors, had before them good contemporary witnesses. And it includes some of the most prominent and impressive characters of the Hellenic world,—Dionysius I., Dion with Plato as instructor, and Timoleon.

I thought it indispensable to give adequate development to this important period of Grecian history, even at the cost of that inconvenient break which terminates my tenth volume. At one time I had hoped to comprise in that volume not only the full history of Dionysius I., but also that of Dionysius II. and Dion—and that of Timoleon besides. Three new chapters, including all this additional matter, are already composed and ready. But the bulk of the present volume compels me to reserve them for the commencement of my next, which will carry Grecian history down to the battle of Chæroneia and the death of Philip of Macedon—and which will, I trust, appear without any long interval of time.

G. G.

LONDON, FEB. 15, 1852.

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and Bura are destroyed by an earthquake. — The Spartans again send Antalkidas to Persia, to sue for a fresh intervention — the Persian satraps send down an order that the Grecian belligerents shall make up their differences. — Athens disposed towards peace. — Athens had ceased to be afraid of Sparta, and had become again jealous of Thebes. — Equivocal position of the restored Platæa now that the Lacedæmonians had been expelled from Bœotia. — The Thebans forestall a negotiation by seizing Platæa, and expelling the inhabitants, who again take refuge at Athens. — Strong feeling excited in Athens against the Thebans, on account of their dealings with Platæa and Thespiæ. The Plataic discourse of Isokrates. — Increased tendency of the Athenians towards peace with Sparta — Athens and the Athenian confederacy give notice to Thebes. General congress for peace at Sparta. — Speeches of the Athenian envoys Kallias, Autokles, Kallistratus. — Kallistratus and his policy. — He proposes that Sparta and Athens shall divide between them the headship of Greece — Sparta on land, Athens at sea — recognizing general autonomy. — Peace is concluded. Autonomy of each city to be recognized: Sparta to withdraw her harmosts and garrisons. — Oaths exchanged. Sparta takes the oath for herself and her allies. Athens takes it for herself: her allies take it after her, successively. — The oath proposed to the Thebans. Epaminondas, the Theban envoy, insists upon taking the oath in the name of the Bœotian federation. Agesilaus and the Spartans require that he shall take it for Thebes alone. — Daring and emphatic speeches delivered by Epaminondas in the congress — protesting against the overweening pretensions of Sparta. He claims recognition of the ancient institutions of Bœotia, with Thebes as president of the federation. — Indignation of the Spartans, and especially of Agesilaus — brief questions exchanged — Thebes is excluded from the treaty. — General peace sworn, including Athens, Sparta, and the rest — Thebes alone is excluded. — Terms of peace — compulsory and indefeasible confederacies are renounced — voluntary alliances alone maintained. — Real point in debate between Agesilaus and Epaminondas.

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CHAPTER LXXVIII.

BATTLE OF LEUKTRA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

Measures for executing the stipulations made at the congress of Sparta. — Violent impulse of the Spartans against Thebes. — King Kleombrotus is ordered to march into Bœotia, and encamps at Leuktra. — New order of battle adopted by Epaminondas. — Confidence of the Spartans and of Kleombrotus. — Battle of Leuktra. — Defeat of the Spartans and death of Kleombrotus. — Faint adherence of the Spartan allies. — Spartan camp after the defeat — confession of defeat by sending to solicit the burial-truce. — Great surprise, and immense alteration of feeling, produced throughout Greece by the Theban victory. — Effect of the news at Sparta — heroic self-command. — Reinforcements sent from Sparta. — Proceedings in Bœotia after the battle of Leuktra. The Theban victory not well received at Athens. — Jason of Pheræ arrives at Leuktra — the Spartan army retires from Bœotia under capitulation. — Treatment of the defeated citizens on reaching Sparta — suspension of the law. — Lowered estimation of Sparta in Greece — prestige of military superiority lost. — Extension of the power of Thebes. Treatment of Orchomenus and Thespiæ. — Power and ambition of Jason. — Plans of Jason — Pythian festival. — Assassination of Jason at Pheræ. — Relief to Thebes by the death of Jason — satisfaction in Greece. — Proceedings in Peloponnesus after the defeat of Leuktra. Expulsion of the Spartan harmosts and dekarchies. — Skytalism at Argos — violent intestine feud. — Discouragement and helplessness of Sparta. — Athens places herself at the head of a new Peloponnesian land-confederacy. — Accusation preferred in the Amphyctionic assembly, by Thebes against Sparta. — The Spartans are condemned to a fine — importance of this fact as an indication. — Proceedings in Arcadia. — Reëstablishment of the city of Mantinea by its own citizens. — Humiliating refusal experienced by Agesilaus from the Mantineans — keenly painful to a Spartan. — Feeling against Agesilaus at Sparta. — Impulse among the Arcadians towards Pan-Arcadian union. Opposition from Orchomenus and Tegea. — Revolution at Tegea — the philo-Spartan party are put down or expelled. — Tegea becomes anti-Spartan, and favorable to the Pan-Arcadian union. — Pan-Arcadian union is formed. — March of Agesilaus against Mantinea. Evidence of lowered sentiment in Sparta. — Application by the Arcadians to Athens for aid against Sparta; it is refused: they then apply to the Thebans. — Proceedings and views of Epaminondas since the battle of Leuktra. — Plans of Epaminondas for restoring the Messenians in Peloponnesus. — Also, for consolidating the Arcadians against Sparta. — Epaminondas and the Theban army arrive in Arcadia. Great allied force assembled there. The allies entreat him to invade Laconia. — Reluctance of Epaminondas to invade Laconia — reasonable grounds for it. — He marches into Laconia — four lines of invasion. — He crosses the Eurotas and approaches close to Sparta. — Alarm at Sparta — arrival of various allies to her aid by sea. — Discontent in Laconia among the Periœki and Helots — danger to Sparta from that cause. — Vigilant defence of Sparta by Agesilaus. — Violent emotion of the Spartans, especially the women. Partial attack upon Sparta by Epaminondas. — He retires without attempting to storm Sparta: ravages Laconia down to Gythium. He returns

into Arcadia. — Great effect of this invasion upon Grecian opinion — Epaminondas is exalted, and Sparta farther lowered. — Foundation of the Arcadian Megalopolis. — Foundation of Messênê. — Abstraction of Western Laconia from Sparta. — Periœki and Helots established as freemen along with the Messenians on the Lacedæmonian border. — The details of this reorganizing process unhappily unknown. — Megalopolis — the Pan-Arcadian Ten Thousand. — Epaminondas and his army evacuate Peloponnesus. — The Spartans solicit aid from Athens — language of their envoys, as well as those from Corinth and Phlius, at Athens. — Reception of the envoys — the Athenians grant the prayer. — Vote passed to aid Sparta — Iphikrates is named general. — March of Iphikrates and his army to the Isthmus. — Trial of Epaminondas at Thebes for retaining his command beyond the legal time — his honorable and easy acquittal.

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CHAPTER LXXIX.

FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND MEGALOPOLIS TO THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS.

Changes in Peloponnesus since the battle of Leuktra. — Changes out of Peloponnesus. — Amyntas prince of Macedonia. — Ambitious views of Athens after the battle of Leuktra. — Her aspirations to maritime empire, and to the partial recovery of kleruchies. — She wishes to recover Amphipolis — Amyntas recognizes her right to the place. — Athens and Amphipolis. — Death of Jason and Amyntas — state of Thessaly and Macedonia. — Alexander of Pheræ — he is opposed by Pelopidas — influence of Thebes in Thessaly. — State of Macedonia — Alexander son of Amyntas — Euridikê — Ptolemy. — Assistance rendered by the Athenian Iphikrates to the family of Amyntas. — Iphikrates and Timotheus. — The Spartan allied army defends the line of Mount Oneium — Epaminondas breaks through it, and marches into Peloponnesus. — Sikyon joins the Thebans — Phlius remains faithful to Sparta. — Reinforcement from Syracuse to Peloponnesus, in aid of Sparta. — Forbearance and mildness of Epaminondas. — Energetic action and insolence of the Arcadians — Lykomedes animates and leads them on. — Great influence of Lykomedes. — Elis tries to recover her supremacy over the Triphylian towns, which are admitted into the Arcadian union, to the great offence of Elis. — Mission of Philiskus to Greece by Ariobarzanes. — Political importance of the reconstitution of Messênê, which now becomes the great subject of discord. Messenian victor proclaimed at Olympia. — Expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly. — The Tearless Battle — victory of the Spartan Archidamus over the Arcadians. — Third expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus — his treatment of the Achæan cities. — The Thebans reverse the policy of Epaminondas, on complaint of the Arcadians and others. They do not reëlect him Bœotarch. — Disturbed state of Sikyon. Euphron makes himself despot — his rapacious and sanguinary conduct. — Sufferings of the Phliasians — their steady adherence to Sparta. — Assistance rendered to Phlius by the Athenian Chares — surprise of the fort of Thyamia. — Euphron is expelled from Sikyon by the Arcadians and Thebans — he retires to the harbor, which he surrenders to the Spartans. — Euphron returns to Sikyon — he goes to Thebes, and is there assassinated. — The assassins are put upon their trial at Thebes — their defence. — They are acquitted by the Theban Senate. — Sentiment among the Many of Sikyon, favorable to Euphron — honors shown to his body and memory. — The Sikyonians recapture their harbor from the Spartans. — Application of Thebes for Persian countenance to her headship — mission of Pelopidas and other envoys to Susa. — Pelopidas obtains from Persia a favorable rescript. — Protest of the Athenians and Arcadians against the rescript. — Pelopidas brings back the rescript. It is read publicly before the Greek states convoked at Thebes. — The states convoked at Thebes refuse to receive the rescript. The Arcadian deputies protest against the headship of Thebes. — The Thebans send the rescript to be received at Corinth; the Corinthians refuse: failure of the Theban object. — Mission of Pelopidas to Thessaly. He is seized and detained prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ. — The Thebans despatch an army to rescue Pelopidas. The army, defeated and retreating, is only saved by Epaminondas, then a private man. — Triumph of Alexander in Thessaly and discredit of Thebes. Harsh treatment of Pelopidas. — Second Theban army sent into Thessaly, under Epaminondas, for the rescue of Pelopidas, who is at length released by Alexander under a truce. — Oropus is taken from Athens and placed in the hands of the Thebans. The Athenians recall Chares from Corinth. — Athens discontented with her Peloponnesian allies; she enters into alliance with Lykomedes and the Arcadians. Death of Lykomedes. — Epaminondas is sent as envoy into Arcadia; he speaks against Kallistratus. — Project of the Athenians to seize Corinth; they are disappointed. — They apply to Sparta. — Refusal of the Spartans to acknowledge the independence of Messênê; they reproach their allies with consenting. — Corinth, Epidaurus, Phlius, etc., conclude peace with Thebes, but without Sparta — recognizing the independence of Messênê. — Athens sends a fresh embassy to the Persian king — altered rescript from him, pronouncing Amphipolis to be an Athenian possession. — Timotheus sent with a fleet to Asia — Agesilaus — revolt of Ariobarzanes. — Conquest of Samos by Timotheus. — Partial readmission to the Chersonese obtained by Timotheus. — Athenian kleruchs or settlers sent thither as proprietors. — Difficulties of Athens in establishing

kleruchs in the Chersonese. — Kotys of Thrace. — Timotheus supersedes Iphikrates. — Timotheus acts with success on the coast of Macedonia and Chalkidikê. He fails at Amphipolis. — Timotheus acts against Kotys and near the Chersonese. — Measures of the Thebans in Thessaly — Pelopidas is sent with an army against Alexander of Pheræ. — Epaminondas exhorts the Thebans to equip a fleet against Athens. — Discussion between him and Menekleidas in the Theban assembly. — Menekleidas seemingly right in dissuading naval preparations. — Epaminondas in command of a Theban fleet in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. Pelopidas attacks Alexander of Pheræ — his success in battle — his rashness — he is slain. — Excessive grief of the Thebans and Thessalians for his death. — The Thebans completely subdue Alexander of Pheræ.

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CHAPTER LXXX.

FROM THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA.

Conspiracy of the knights of Orchomenus against Thebes — destruction of Orchomenus by the Thebans. — Repugnance excited against the Thebans — regret and displeasure of Epaminondas. — Return of Epaminondas from his cruise — renewed complications in Peloponnesus. — State of Peloponnesus — Eleians and Achæans in alliance with Sparta. — The Eleians aim at recovering Triphylia — the Spartans, at recovering Messênê. — War between the Eleians and Arcadians; the latter occupy Olympia. — Second invasion of Elis by the Arcadians. Distress of the Eleians. Archidamus and the Spartans invade Arcadia. — Archidamus establishes a Spartan garrison at Kromnus. The Arcadians gain advantages over him — armistice. — The Arcadians blockade Kromnus, and capture the Spartan garrison. — The Arcadians celebrate the Olympic festival along with the Pisatans — excluding the Eleians. — The Eleians invade the festival by arms — conflict on the plain of Olympia — bravery of the Eleians. — Feelings of the spectators at Olympia. — The Arcadians take the treasures of Olympia to pay their militia. — Violent dissensions arising among the members of the Arcadian communion, in consequence of this appropriation. The Arcadian assembly pronounces against it. — Farther dissensions in Arcadia — invitation sent to the Thebans — peace concluded with Elis. — The peace generally popular — celebrated at Tegea — seizure of many oligarchical members at Tegea by the Theban harmost. — Conduct of the Theban harmost. — View taken by Epaminondas. — His view is more consistent with the facts recounted by Xenophon, than the view of Xenophon himself. — Policy of Epaminondas and the Thebans. — Epaminondas marches with a Theban army into Peloponnesus, to muster at Tegea. — Agesilaus and the Spartans are sent for. — Night-march of Epaminondas to surprise Sparta. Agesilaus is informed in time to prevent surprise. — Epaminondas comes up to Sparta, but finds it defended. — He marches back to Tegea — despatches his cavalry from thence to surprise Mantinea. — The surprise is baffled, by the accidental arrival of the Athenian cavalry — battle of cavalry near Mantinea, in which the Athenians have the advantage. — Epaminondas resolves to attack the enemy near Mantinea. — View of Xenophon — that this resolution was forced upon him by despair — examined. — Alacrity of the army of Epaminondas, when the order for fighting is given. — Mantinico-Tegeatic plain — position of the Lacedæmonians and Mantineans. — March of Epaminondas from Tegea. — False impression produced upon the enemy by his manœuvres. — Theban order of battle — plans of the commander. — Disposition of the cavalry on both sides. — Unprepared state of the Lacedæmonian army. — Battle of Mantinea — complete success of the dispositions of Epaminondas. — Victory of the Thebans — Epaminondas is mortally wounded. — Extreme discouragement caused by his death among the troops, even when in full victory and pursuit. — Victory claimed by both sides — nevertheless the Lacedæmonians are obliged to solicit the burial-truce. — Dying moments of Epaminondas. — The two other best Theban officers are slain also in the battle. — Who slew Epaminondas? Different persons honored for it. — Peace concluded — *statu quo* recognized, including the independence of Messênê — Sparta alone stands out — the Thebans return home. — Results of the battle of Mantinea, as appreciated by Xenophon — unfair to the Thebans. — Character of Epaminondas. — Disputes among the inhabitants of Megalopolis. The Thebans send thither a force under Pammenes, which maintains the incorporation. — Agesilaus and Archidamus. — State of Persia — revolted satraps and provinces — Datames. — Formidable revolt of the satraps in Asia Minor — it is suppressed by the Persian court, through treachery. — Agesilaus goes as commander to Egypt — Chabrias is there also. — Death and character of Agesilaus. — State of Egypt and Persia. — Death of Artaxerxes Mnemon. Murders in the royal family. — Athenian maritime operations — Timotheus makes war against Amphipolis and against Kotys. — Ergophilus succeeds Timotheus at the Chersonese — Kallisthenes succeeds him against Amphipolis — war at sea against Alexander of Pheræ. — Ergophilus and Kallisthenes both unsuccessful — both tried. — Autokles in the Hellespont and Bosphorus — convoy for the corn-ships out of the Euxine. — Miltokythes revolts from Kotys in Thrace — ill-success of the Athenians. — Menon — Timomachus — as commanders in the Chersonese. The Athenians lose Sestos. — Kephisodotus in the Chersonese. Charidemus crosses thither from Abydos. — Assassination of Kotys. — Ker-

sobleptes succeeds Kotys. Berisades and Amadokus, his rivals — ill-success of Athens — Kephisodotus. — Improved prospects of Athens in the Chersonese — Athenodorus — Charidemus. — Charidemus is forced to accept the convention of Athenodorus — his evasions — the Chersonese with Sestos is restored to Athens. — The transmarine empire of Athens now at its maximum. Mischievous effects of her conquests made against Olynthus. — Maximum of second Athenian empire — accession of Philip of Macedon.

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CHAPTER LXXXI.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT BEFORE SYRACUSE.

Syracuse after the destruction of the Athenian armament. — Anticipation of the impending ruin of Athens — revolution at Thurii. — Syracusan squadron under Hermokrates goes to act against Athens in the Ægean. — Disappointed hopes — defeat at Kynossema — second ruinous defeat at Kyzikus. — Sufferings of the Syracusan seamen — disappointment and displeasure at Syracuse. — Banishment of Hermokrates and his colleagues. Sentence communicated by Hermokrates to the armament. — Internal state of Syracuse — constitution of Diokles. — Difficulty of determining what that constitution was. — Invasion from Carthage. — State of the Carthaginians. — Extent of Carthaginian empire — power, and population — Liby-Phœnicians. — Harsh dealing of Carthage towards her subjects. Colonies sent out from Carthage. — Military force of Carthage. — Political constitution of Carthage. — Oligarchical system and sentiment at Carthage. — Powerful families at Carthage — Mago, Hamilkar, Hasdrubal. — Quarrel between Egesta and Selinus in Sicily. — Application of Egesta to Carthage for aid — application granted — eagerness of Hannibal. — Carthaginian envoys sent to Sicily. — Hannibal crosses over to Sicily with a very large armament. He lays siege to Selinus. — Vigorous assault on Selinus — gallant resistance — the town is at length stormed. — Selinus is sacked and plundered — merciless slaughter. — Delay of the Syracusans and others in sending aid. Answer of Hannibal to their embassy. — Hannibal marches to Himera and besieges it. Aid from Syracuse under Diokles — sally from Himera. Hannibal destroys Himera, and slaughters three thousand prisoners, as an expiation to the memory of his grandfather. — Alarm throughout the Greeks of Sicily — Hannibal dismisses his army, and returns to Carthage. — New intestine discord in Syracuse — Hermokrates comes to Sicily. — He levies troops to effect his return by force. — He is obliged to retire — he establishes himself in the ruins of Selinus, and acts against the Carthaginians. — His father attempts to reënter Syracuse, with the bones of the Syracusans slain near Himera. Banishment of Diokles. — Hermokrates tries again to penetrate into Syracuse with an armed force. — He is defeated and slain. — First appearance of Dionysius at Syracuse. — Weakness of Syracuse, arising out of this political discord — party of Hermokrates. Danger from Carthage. — Fresh invasion of Sicily, by the Carthaginians. Immense host under Hannibal and Imilkon. — Great alarm in Sicily — active preparations for defence at Agrigentum. — Grandeur, wealth, and population of Agrigentum. — The Carthaginians attack Agrigentum. They demolish the tombs near its walls. Distemper among their army. Religious terrors — sacrifice. — Syracusan reinforcement to Agrigentum, under Daphnæus. His victory over the Iberians. He declines to pursue them. — Daphnæus enters Agrigentum. Discontent against the Agrigentine generals, for having been backward in attack. They are put to death. — Privations in both armies — Hamilkar captures the provision-ships of the Syracusans — Agrigentum is evacuated. — Agrigentum taken and plundered by the Carthagians. — Terror throughout Sicily. — Bitter complaints against the Syracusan generals. — The Hermokratean party at Syracuse comes forward to subvert the government and elevate Dionysius. — Harangue of Dionysius in the Syracusan assembly against the generals, who are deposed by vote of the people, and Dionysius with others appointed in their room. — Ambitious arts of Dionysius — he intrigues against his colleagues, and frustrates all their proceedings. He procures a vote for restoring the Hermokratean exiles. — Dionysius is sent with a Syracusan reinforcement to Gela. He procures the execution or banishment of the Geloan oligarchy. — He returns to Syracuse with an increased force — he accuses his colleagues of gross treason. — Dionysius is named general, single-handed, with full powers. — Apparent repentance of the people after the vote. Stratagem of Dionysius to obtain a vote ensuring to him a body of paid guards. — March of Dionysius to Leontini. — Dionysius establishes himself at Syracuse as despot. — Dionysius as despot — the means whereby he attained the power.

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CHAPTER LXXXII.

SICILY DURING THE DESPOTISM OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS AT SYRACUSE.

Imilkon with the Carthaginian army marches from Agrigentum to attack Gela. — Brave defence of the Geloans — Dionysius arrives with an army to relieve them. — Plan of Dionysius for a general attack on the Carthaginian army. — He is defeated and obliged to retreat. — He evacuates Gela and Kamarina — flight of the population of both places, which are taken and sacked by the Carthaginians. — Indignation and charges of treachery against Dionysius. — Mutiny of the Syracusan horsemen — they ride off to Syracuse, and declare against Dionysius. — Their imprudence. Dionysius master of Syracuse. — Propositions of peace come from Imilkon. Terms of peace. — Collusion of Dionysius with the Carthaginians, who confirm his dominion over Syracuse. Pestilence in the Carthaginian army. — Near coincidence, in time, of this peace, with the victory of Lysander at Ægospotami — sympathy of Sparta with Dionysius. — Depressed condition of the towns of Southern Sicily, from Cape Pachynus to Lilybæum. — Strong position of Dionysius. — Strong fortifications and other buildings erected by Dionysius, in and about Ortygia. — He assigns houses in Ortygia to his soldiers and partisans — he distributes the lands of Syracuse anew. — Exorbitant exactions of Dionysius — discontent at Syracuse. — Dionysius marches out of Syracuse against the Sikels — mutiny of the Syracusan soldiers at Herbesa — Dorikus the commander is slain. — The Syracusan insurgents, with assistance from Rhegium and Messênê, besiege Dionysius in Ortygia. — Despair of Dionysius — he applies to a body of Campanians in the Carthaginian service, for aid. — He amuses the assailants with feigned submission — arrival of the Campanians — victory of Dionysius. — Dionysius strengthens his despotism more than before — assistance lent to him by the Spartan Aristus — Nikoteles the Corinthian is put to death. — He disarms the Syracusan citizens — strengthens the fortifications of Ortygia — augments his mercenary force. — Dionysius conquers Naxus, Katana, and Leontini. — Great power of Dionysius. Foundation of Alæsa by Archonides. — Resolution of Dionysius to make war upon Carthage. — Locality of Syracuse — danger to which the town had been exposed, in the Athenian siege. — Additional fortifications made by Dionysius along the northern ridge of the cliffs of Epipolæ, up the Euryalus. — Popularity of the work — efforts made by all the Syracusans as well as by Dionysius himself. — Preparations of Dionysius for aggressive war against the Carthaginians. — Improvement in the behavior of Dionysius towards the Syracusans. — His conciliatory offers to other Grecian cities in Sicily. Hostile sentiment of the Rhegines towards him. Their application to Messênê. — He makes peace with Messênê and Rhegium. — He desires to marry a Rhegine wife. His proposition is declined by the city. He is greatly incensed. — He makes a proposition to marry a wife from Lokri — his wish is granted — he marries a Lokrian maiden named Doris. — Immense warlike equipment of Dionysius at Syracuse — arms, engines, etc. — Naval preparations in the harbor of Syracuse. Enlargement of the bulk of ships of war — quadriremes and quinqueremes. — General sympathy of the Syracusans in his projects against Carthage. — He hires soldiers from all quarters. — He celebrates his nuptials with two wives on the same day — Doris and Aristomachê. Temporary good feeling at Syracuse towards him. — He convokes the Syracusan assembly, and exhorts them to war against Carthage. — He desires to arrest the emigration of those who were less afraid of the Carthaginian dominion than of his. — He grants permission to plunder the Carthaginian residents and ships at Syracuse. Alarm at Carthage — suffering in Africa from the pestilence. — Dionysius marches out from Syracuse with a prodigious army against the Carthaginians in Sicily. — Insurrection against Carthage, among the Sicilian Greeks subject to her. Terrible tortures inflicted on the Carthaginians. — Dionysius besieges the Carthaginian seaport Motyê. — Situation of Motyê — operations of the siege — vigorous defence. — Dionysius overruns the neighboring dependencies of Carthage — doubtful result of the siege of Motyê — appearance of Imilkon with a Carthaginian fleet — he is obliged to return. — Desperate defence of Motyê. It is at length taken by a nocturnal attack. — Plunder of Motyê — the inhabitants either slaughtered or sold for slaves. — Farther operations of Dionysius. — Arrival of Imilkon with a Carthaginian armament — his successful operations — he retakes Motyê. — Dionysius retires to Syracuse. — Imilkon captures Messênê. — Revolt of the Sikels from Dionysius. Commencement of Tauromenium. — Provisions of Dionysius for the defence of Syracuse — he strengthens Leontini — he advances to Katana with his land-army as well as his fleet. — Naval battle off Katana — great victory of the Carthaginian fleet under Magon. — Arrival of Imilkon to join the fleet of Magon near Katana — fruitless invitation to the Campanians of Ætna. — Dionysius retreats to Syracuse — discontent of his army. — Imilkon marches close up to Syracuse — the Carthaginian fleet come up to occupy the Great Harbor — their imposing entry. Fortified position of Imilkon near the Harbor. — Imilkon plunders the suburb of Achradina — blockades Syracuse by sea. — Naval victory gained by the Syracusan fleet during the absence of Dionysius. — Effect of this victory in exalting the spirits of the Syracusans. — Public meeting convened by Dionysius — mutinous spirit against him — vehement speech by Thedorus. — Sympathy excited by the speech in the Syracusan assembly. — The Spartan Pharakidas upholds Dionysius — who finally dismisses the assembly, and silences the adverse movement. — Alliance of Sparta with Dionysius — suitable to her general policy at the time. The emancipation of Syracuse depended upon Pharakidas. — Dionysius tries to gain popularity. — Terrific pestilence among the Carthaginian army before Syracuse. — Dionysius attacks the Carthaginian camp. He deliberately sacrifices a detachment of his mercenaries. — Success of Dionysius, both

by sea and by land, against the Syracusan position. — Conflagration of the Carthaginian camp — exultation at Syracuse. — Imilkon concludes a secret treaty with Dionysius, to be allowed to escape with the Carthaginians, on condition of abandoning his remaining army. Destruction of the remaining Carthaginian army, except Sikels and Iberians. — Distress at Carthage — miserable end of Imilkon. — Danger of Carthage — anger and revolt of her African subjects — at length put down.

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CHAPTER LXXVI.

FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS DOWN TO THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY SPARTA.

THE peace or convention[1] which bears the name of Antalkidas, was an incident of serious and mournful import in Grecian history. Its true character cannot be better described than in a brief remark and reply which we find cited in Plutarch. "Alas for Hellas (observed some one to Agesilaus) when we see our Laconians *medising*!"—"Nay (replied the Spartan king), say rather the Medes (Persians) *laconising*."[2]

These two propositions do not exclude each other. Both were perfectly true. The convention emanated from a separate partnership between Spartan and Persian interests. It was solicited by the Spartan Antalkidas, and propounded by him to Tiribazus on the express ground, that it was exactly calculated to meet the Persian king's purposes and wishes,—as we learn even from the philo-Laconian Xenophon.[3] While Sparta and Persia were both great gainers, no other Grecian state gained anything, as the convention was originally framed. But after the first rejection, Antalkidas saw the necessity of conciliating Athens by the addition of a special article providing that Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros should be restored to her.[4] This addition seems to have been first made in the abortive negotiations which form the subject of the discourse already mentioned, pronounced by Andokides. It was continued afterwards and inserted in the final decree which Antalkidas and Tiribazus brought down in the king's name from Susa; and it doubtless somewhat contributed to facilitate the adherence of Athens, though the united forces of Sparta and Persia had become so overwhelming, that she could hardly have had the means of standing out, even if the supplementary article had been omitted. Nevertheless, this condition undoubtedly did secure to Athens a certain share in the gain, conjointly with the far larger shares both of Sparta and Persia. It is, however, not less true, that Athens, as well as Thebes,[5] assented to the peace only under fear and compulsion. As to the other states of Greece, they were interested merely in the melancholy capacity of partners in the general loss and degradation.

That degradation stood evidently marked in the form, origin, and transmission, of the convention, even apart from its substance. It was a fiat issued from the court of Susa; as such it was ostentatiously proclaimed and "sent down" from thence to Greece. Its authority was derived from the king's seal, and its sanction from his concluding threat, that he would make war against all recusants. It was brought down by the satrap Tiribazus (along with Antalkidas), read by him aloud, and heard with submission by the assembled Grecian envoys, after he had called their special attention to the regal seal.[6] Such was the convention which Sparta, the ancient president of the Grecian world had been the first to solicit at the hands of the Persian king, and

which she now not only set the example of sanctioning by her own spontaneous obedience, but even avouched as guarantee and champion against all opponents; preparing to enforce it at the point of the sword against any recusant state, whether party to it or not. Such was the convention which was now inscribed on stone, and placed as a permanent record in the temples of the Grecian cities;[7] nay, even in the common sanctuaries,—the Olympic, Pythian, and others,—the great *foci* and rallying points of Pan-hellenic sentiment. Though called by the name of a convention, it was on the very face of it a peremptory mandate proceeding from the ancient enemy of Greece, an acceptance of which was nothing less than an act of obedience. While to him it was a glorious trophy, to all Pan-hellenic patriots it was the deepest disgrace and insult.[8] Effacing altogether the idea of an independent Hellenic world, bound together and regulated by the self-acting forces and common sympathies of its own members,—even the words of the convention proclaimed it as an act of intrusive foreign power, and erected the barbarian king into a dictatorial settler of Grecian differences; a guardian[9] who cared for the peace of Greece more than the Greeks themselves. And thus, looking to the form alone, it was tantamount to that symbol of submission—the cession of earth and water—which had been demanded a century before by the ancestor of Artaxerxes from the ancestors of the Spartans and Athenians; a demand, which both Sparta and Athens then not only repudiated, but resented so cruelly, as to put to death the heralds by whom it was brought,—stigmatizing the Æginetans and others as traitors to Hellas for complying with it.[10] Yet nothing more would have been implied in such cession than what stood embodied in the inscription on that "colonna infame," which placed the peace of Antalkidas side by side with the Pan-hellenic glories and ornaments at Olympia.[11]

Great must have been the change wrought by the intermediate events, when Sparta, the ostensible president of Greece,—in her own estimation even more than in that of others,[12]—had so lost all Pan-hellenic conscience and dignity, as to descend into an obsequious minister, procuring and enforcing a Persian mandate for political objects of her own. How insane would such an anticipation have appeared to Æschylus, or the audience who heard the Persæ! to Herodotus or Thucydides! to Perikles and Archidamus! nay, even to Kallikratidas or Lysander! It was the last consummation of a series of previous political sins, invoking more and more the intervention of Persia to aid her against her Grecian enemies.

Her first application to the Great King for this purpose dates from the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, and is prefaced by an apology, little less than humiliating, from king Archidamus; who, not unconscious of the sort of treason which he was meditating, pleads that Sparta, when the Athenians are conspiring against her, ought not to be blamed for asking from foreigners as well as from Greeks aid for her own preservation.[13] From the earliest commencement to the seventh year of the war, many separate and successive envoys were despatched by the Spartans to Susa; two of whom were seized in Thrace, brought to Athens, and there put to

death. The rest reached their destination, but talked in so confused a way, and contradicted each other so much, that the Persian court, unable to understand what they meant,[14] sent Artaphernes with letters to Sparta (in the seventh year of the war) complaining of such stupidity, and asking for clearer information. Artaphernes fell into the hands of an Athenian squadron at Eion on the Strymon, and was conveyed to Athens; where he was treated with great politeness, and sent back (after the letters which he carried had been examined) to Ephesus. What is more important to note is, that Athenian envoys were sent along with him, with a view of bringing Athens into friendly communication with the Great King; which was only prevented by the fact that Artaxerxes Longimanus just then died. Here we see the fatal practice, generated by intestine war, of invoking Persian aid; begun by Sparta as an importunate solicitor,—and partially imitated by Athens, though we do not know what her envoys were instructed to say, had they been able to reach Susa.

Nothing more is heard about Persian intervention until the year of the great Athenian disasters before Syracuse. Elate with the hopes arising out of that event, the Persians required no solicitation, but were quite as eager to tender interference for their own purposes, as Sparta was to invite them for hers. How ready Sparta was to purchase their aid by the surrender of the Asiatic Greeks, and that too without any stipulations in their favor,—has been recounted in my last volume.[15] She had not now the excuse,—for it stands only as an excuse and not as a justification—of self-defence against aggression from Athens, which Archidamus had produced at the beginning of the war. Even then it was only a colorable excuse, not borne out by the reality of the case; but now, the avowed as well as the real object was something quite different,—not to repel, but to crush, Athens. Yet to accomplish that object, not even of pretended safety, but of pure ambition, Sparta sacrificed unconditionally the liberty of her Asiatic kinsmen; a price which Archidamus at the beginning of the war would certainly never have endured the thoughts of paying, notwithstanding the then formidable power of Athens. Here, too, we find Athens following the example; and consenting, in hopes of procuring Persian aid, to the like sacrifice, though the bargain was never consummated. It is true that she was then contending for her existence. Nevertheless, the facts afford melancholy proof how much the sentiment of Pan-hellenic independence became enfeebled in both the leaders, amidst the fierce intestine conflict terminated by the battle of Ægospotami.[16]

After that battle, the bargain between Sparta and Persia would doubtless have been fulfilled, and the Asiatic Greeks would have passed at once under the dominion of the latter,—had not an entirely new train of circumstances arisen out of the very peculiar position and designs of Cyrus. That young prince did all in his power to gain the affections of the Greeks, as auxiliaries for his ambitious speculations; in which speculations both Sparta and the Asiatic Greeks took part, compromising themselves irrevocably against Artaxerxes, and still more against Tissaphernes. Sparta thus became unintentionally the enemy of Persia, and found herself compelled to protect the

Asiatic Greeks against his hostility, with which they were threatened; a protection easy for her to confer, not merely from the unbounded empire which she then enjoyed over the Grecian world, but from the presence of the renowned Cyreian Ten Thousand, and the contempt for Persian military strength which they brought home from their retreat. She thus finds herself in the exercise of a Pan-hellenic protectorate or presidency, first through the ministry of Derkyllidas, next of Agesilaus, who even sacrifices at Aulis, takes up the sceptre of Agamemnon, and contemplates large schemes of aggression against the Great King. Here, however, the Persians play against her the same game which she had invoked them to assist in playing against Athens. Their fleet, which fifteen years before she had invited for her own purposes, is now brought in against herself, and with far more effect, since her empire was more odious as well as more oppressive than the Athenian. It is now Athens and her allies who call in Persian aid; without any direct engagement, indeed, to surrender the Asiatic Greeks, for we are told that after the battle of Knidus, Konon incurred the displeasure of the Persians by his supposed plans for reuniting them with Athens,[17] and Athenian aid was still continued to Evagoras,—yet, nevertheless, indirectly paving the way for that consummation. If Athens and her allies here render themselves culpable of an abnegation of Pan-hellenic sentiment, we may remark, as before, that they act under the pressure of stronger necessities than could ever be pleaded by Sparta; and that they might employ on their own behalf, with much greater truth, the excuse of self-preservation preferred by king Archidamus.

But never on any occasion did that excuse find less real place than in regard to the mission of Antalkidas. Sparta was at that time so powerful, even after the loss of her maritime empire, that the allies at the Isthmus of Corinth, jealous of each other and held together only by common terror, could hardly stand on the defensive against her, and would probably have been disunited by reasonable offers on her part; nor would she have needed even to recall Agesilaus from Asia. Nevertheless, the mission was probably dictated in great measure by a groundless panic, arising from the sight of the revived Long Walls and refortified Piræus, and springing at once to the fancy, that a new Athenian empire, such as had existed forty years before, was about to start into life; a fancy little likely to be realized, since the very peculiar circumstances which had created the first Athenian empire were now totally reversed. Debarred from maritime empire herself, the first object with Sparta was, to shut out Athens from the like; the next, to put down all partial federations or political combinations, and to enforce universal autonomy, or the maximum of political isolation; in order that there might nowhere exist a power capable of resisting herself, the strongest of all individual states. As a means to this end, which was no less in the interest of Persia than in hers, she outbid all prior subserviences to the Great King, betrayed to him not only one entire division of her Hellenic kinsmen, but also the general honor of the Hellenic name in the most flagrant manner,—and volunteered to *medise* in order that the Persians might repay her by *laconising*.[18] To ensure fully the obedience of all the satraps, who had more than once manifested dissentient

views of their own, Antalkidas procured and brought down a formal order signed and sealed at Susa; and Sparta undertook, without shame or scruple, to enforce the same order,—"the convention sent down by the king,"—upon all her countrymen; thus converting them into the subjects, and herself into a sort of viceroy or satrap, of Artaxerxes. Such an act of treason to the Pan-hellenic cause was far more flagrant and destructive than that alleged confederacy with the Persian king, for which the Theban Ismenias was afterwards put to death, and that, too, by the Spartans themselves.[19] Unhappily it formed a precedent for the future, and was closely copied afterwards by Thebes;[20] foreboding but too clearly the short career which Grecian political independence had to run.

That large patriotic sentiment, which dictated the magnanimous answer sent by the Athenians[21] to the offers of Mardonius in 479 B.C., refusing in the midst of ruin present and prospective, all temptation to betray the sanctity of Pan-hellenic fellowship,—that sentiment which had been during the two following generations the predominant inspiration of Athens, and had also been powerful, though always less powerful, at Sparta,—was now, in the former, overlaid by more pressing apprehensions, and in the latter completely extinguished. Now it was to the leading states that Greece had to look, for holding up the great banner of Pan-hellenic independence; from the smaller states nothing more could be required than that they should adhere to and defend it, when upheld.[22] But so soon as Sparta was seen to solicit and enforce, and Athens to accept (even under constraint), the proclamation under the king's hand and seal brought down by Antalkidas,—that banner was no longer a part of the public emblems of Grecian political life. The grand idea represented by it,—of collective self-determining Hellenism,—was left to dwell in the bosoms of individual patriots.

If we look at the convention of Antalkidas apart from its form and warranty, and with reference to its substance, we shall find that though its first article was unequivocally disgraceful, its last was at least popular as a promise to the ear. Universal autonomy, to each city, small or great, was dear to Grecian political instinct. I have already remarked more than once that the exaggerated force of this desire was the chief cause of the short duration of Grecian freedom. Absorbing all the powers of life to the separate parts, it left no vital force or integrity to the whole; especially, it robbed both each and all of the power of self-defence against foreign assailants. Though indispensable up to a certain point and under certain modifications, yet beyond these modifications, which Grecian political instinct was far from recognizing, it produced a great preponderance of mischief. Although, therefore, this item of the convention was in its promise acceptable and popular,—and although we shall find it hereafter invoked as a protection in various individual cases of injustice,—we must inquire how it was carried into execution, before we can pronounce whether it was good or evil, the present of a friend or of an enemy.

The succeeding pages will furnish an answer to this inquiry. The Lacedæmonians, as "presidents (guarantees or executors) of the peace, sent down by the king,"[23] undertook the duty of execution; and we shall see that from the beginning they meant nothing sincerely. They did not even attempt any sincere and steady compliance with the honest, though undistinguishing, political instinct of the Greek mind; much less did they seek to grant as much as was really good, and to withhold the remainder. They defined autonomy in such manner, and meted it out in such portions, as suited their own political interests and purposes. The promise made by the convention, except in so far as it enabled them to increase their own power by dismemberment or party intervention, proved altogether false and hollow. For if we look back to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when they sent to Athens to require general autonomy throughout Greece, we shall find that the word had then a distinct and serious import; demanding that the cities held in dependence by Athens should be left free, which freedom Sparta might have ensured for them herself at the close of the war, had she not preferred to convert it into a far harsher empire. But in 387 (the date of the peace of Antalkidas) there were no large body of subjects to be emancipated, except the allies of Sparta herself, to whom it was by no means intended to apply. So that in fact, what was promised, as well as what was realized, even by the most specious item of this disgraceful convention, was—"that cities should enjoy autonomy, not for their own comfort and in their own way, but for Lacedæmonian convenience;" a significant phrase (employed by Perikles,[24] in the debates preceding the Peloponnesian war) which forms a sort of running text for Grecian history during the sixteen years between the peace of Antalkidas and the battle of Leuktra.

I have already mentioned that the first two applications of the newly-proclaimed autonomy, made by the Lacedæmonians, were to extort from the Corinthian government the dismissal of its Argeian auxiliaries, and to compel Thebes to renounce her ancient presidency of the Bœotian federation. The latter especially was an object which they had long had at heart;[25] and by both, their ascendency in Greece was much increased. Athens, too, terrified by the new development of Persian force as well as partially bribed by the restoration of her three islands, into an acceptance of the peace,—was thus robbed of her Theban and Corinthian allies, and disabled from opposing the Spartan projects. But before we enter upon these projects, it will be convenient to turn for a short time to the proceedings of the Persians.

Even before the death of Darius Nothus (father of Artaxerxes and Cyrus) Egypt had revolted from the Persians, under a native prince named Amyrtæus. To the Grecian leaders who accompanied Cyrus in his expedition against his brother, this revolt was well known to have much incensed the Persians; so that Klearchus, in the conversation which took place after the death of Cyrus about accommodation with Artaxerxes, intimated that the Ten Thousand could lend him effectual aid in reconquering Egypt.[26] It was not merely these Greeks who were exposed to danger by the

death of Cyrus, but also the various Persians and other subjects who had lent assistance to him; all of whom made submission and tried to conciliate Artaxerxes, except Tamos, who had commanded the fleet of Cyrus on the coasts both of Ionia and Kilikia. Such was the alarm of Tamos when Tissaphernes came down in full power to the coast, that he fled with his fleet and treasures to Egypt, to seek protection from king Psammetichus, to whom he had rendered valuable service. This traitor, however, having so valuable a deposit brought to him, forgot every thing else in his avidity to make it sure, and put to death Tamos with all his children.[27] About 395 B.C., we find Nephereus king of Egypt lending aid to the Lacedæmonian fleet against Artaxerxes.[28] Two years afterwards (392-390 B.C.), during the years immediately succeeding the victory of Knidus, and the voyage of Pharnabazus across the Ægean to Peloponnesus,—we hear of that satrap as employed with Abrokomas and Tithraustes in strenuous but unavailing efforts to reconquer Egypt.[29] Having thus repulsed the Persians, the Egyptian king Akoras is found between 390-380 B.C.,[30] sending aid to Evagoras in Cyprus against the same enemy. And in spite of farther efforts made afterwards by Artaxerxes to reconquer Egypt, the native kings in that country maintained their independence for about sixty years in all, until the reign of his successor Ochus.

But it was a Grecian enemy,—of means inferior, yet of qualities much superior, to any of these Egyptians,—who occupied the chief attention of the Persians immediately after the peace of Antalkidas: Evagoras, despot of Salamis in Cyprus. Respecting that prince we possess a discourse of the most glowing and superabundant eulogy, composed after his death for the satisfaction (and probably paid for with the money) of his son and successor Nikoklês, by the contemporary Isokrates. Allowing as we must do for exaggeration and partiality, even the trustworthy features of the picture are sufficiently interesting.

Evagoras belonged to a Salaminian stock or Gens called the Teukridæ, which numbered among its ancestors the splendid legendary names of Teukrus, Telamon, and Æakus; taking its departure, through them, from the divine name of Zeus. It was believed that the archer Teukrus, after returning from the siege of Troy to (the Athenian) Salamis, had emigrated under a harsh order from his father Telamon, and given commencement to the city of that name on the eastern coast of Cyprus.[31] As in Sicily, so in Cyprus, the Greek and Phœnician elements were found in near contact, though in very different proportions. Of the nine or ten separate city communities, which divided among them the whole sea-coast, the inferior towns being all dependent upon one or other of them,—seven pass for Hellenic, the two most considerable being Salamis and Soli; three for Phœnician,—Paphos, Amathus, and Kitium. Probably, however, there was in each a mixture of Greek and Phœnician population, in different proportions.[32] Each was ruled by its own separate prince or despot, Greek or Phœnician. The Greek immigrations (though their exact date cannot be assigned) appear to have been later in date than the Phœnician. At the time of the

Ionic revolt (B.C. 496), the preponderance was on the side of Hellenism; yet with considerable intermixture of Oriental custom. Hellenism was, however, greatly crushed by the Persian reconquest of the revolters, accomplished through the aid of the Phœnicians[33] on the opposite continent. And though doubtless the victories of Kimon and the Athenians (470-450 B.C.) partially revived it, yet Perikles, in his pacification with the Persians, had prudently relinquished Cyprus as well as Egypt;[34] so that the Grecian element in the former, receiving little extraneous encouragement, became more and more subordinate to the Phœnician.

It was somewhere about this time that the reigning princes of Salamis, who at the time of the Ionic revolt had been Greeks of the Teukrid Gens,[35] were supplanted and dethroned by a Phœnician exile who gained their confidence and made himself despot in their place.[36] To insure his own sceptre, this usurper did everything in his power to multiply and strengthen the Phœnician population, as well as to discourage and degrade the Hellenic. The same policy was not only continued by his successor at Salamis, but seems also to have been imitated in several of the other towns; insomuch that during most part of the Peloponnesian war, Cyprus became sensibly dis-hellenized. The Greeks in the island were harshly oppressed; new Greek visitors and merchants were kept off by the most repulsive treatment, as well as by threats of those cruel mutilations of the body which were habitually employed as penalties by the Orientals; while Grecian arts, education, music, poetry, and intelligence, were rapidly on the decline.[37]

Notwithstanding such untoward circumstances, in which the youth of the Teukrid Evagoras at Salamis was passed, he manifested at an early age so much energy both of mind and body, and so much power of winning popularity, that he became at once a marked man both among Greeks and Phœnicians. It was about this time that the Phœnician despot was slain, through a conspiracy formed by a Kitian or Tyrian named Abdêmon, who got possession of his sceptre.[38] The usurper, mistrustful of his position, and anxious to lay hands upon all conspicuous persons who might be capable of doing him mischief, tried to seize Evagoras; but the latter escaped and passed over to Soli and Kilikia. Though thus to all appearance a helpless exile, he found means to strike a decisive blow, while the new usurpation, stained by its first violences and rapacity, was surrounded by enemies, doubters, or neutrals, without having yet established any firm footing. He crossed over from Soli in Kilikia, with a small but determined band of about fifty followers,—obtained secret admission by a postern gate of Salamis,—and assaulted Abdêmon by night in his palace. In spite of a vastly superior number of guards, this enterprise was conducted with such extraordinary daring and judgment, that Abdêmon perished, and Evagoras became despot in his place.[39]

The splendor of this exploit was quite sufficient to seat Evagoras unopposed on the throne, amidst a population always accustomed to princely government; while among the Salaminian Greeks he was still farther endeared by his Teukrid descent.

[40] His conduct fully justified the expectations entertained. Not merely did he refrain from bloodshed, or spoliation, or violence for the gratification of personal appetite; abstinences remarkable enough in any Grecian despot to stamp his reign with letters of gold, and the more remarkable in Evagoras, since he had the susceptible temperament of a Greek, though his great mental force always kept it under due control.[41] But he was also careful in inquiring into, and strict in punishing crime, yet without those demonstrations of cruel infliction by which an Oriental prince displayed his energy.[42] His government was at the same time highly popular and conciliating, as well towards the multitude as towards individuals. Indefatigable in his own personal supervision, he examined everything for himself, shaped out his own line of policy, and kept watch over its execution.[43] He was foremost in all effort and in all danger. Maintaining undisturbed security, he gradually doubled the wealth, commerce, industry, and military force, of the city, while his own popularity and renown went on increasing.

Above all, it was his first wish to renovate, both in Salamis and in Cyprus, that Hellenism which the Phœnician despots of the last fifty years had done so much to extinguish or corrupt. For aid in this scheme, he seems to have turned his thoughts to Athens, with which city he was connected as a Teukrid, by gentile and legendary sympathies,—and which was then only just ceasing to be the great naval power of the Ægean. For though we cannot exactly make out the date at which Evagoras began to reign, we may conclude it to have been about 411 or 410 B.C. It seems to have been shortly after that period that he was visited by Andokides the Athenian; [44] moreover, he must have been a prince not merely established, but powerful, when he ventured to harbor Konon in 405 B.C., after the battle of Ægospotami. He invited to Salamis fresh immigrants from Attica and other parts of Greece, as the prince Philokyprus of Soli had done under the auspices of Solon,[45] a century and a half before. He took especial pains to revive and improve Grecian letters, arts, teaching, music, and intellectual tendencies. Such encouragement was so successfully administered, that in a few years, without constraint or violence, the face of Salamis was changed. The gentleness and sociability, the fashions and pursuits, of Hellenism, became again predominant; with great influence of example over all the other towns of the island.

Had the rise of Evagoras taken place a few years earlier, Athens might perhaps have availed herself of the opening to turn her ambition eastward, in preference to that disastrous impulse which led her westward to Sicily. But coming as he did only at that later moment when she was hard pressed to keep up even a defensive war, he profited rather by her weakness than by her strength. During those closing years of the war, when the Athenian empire was partially broken up, and when the Ægean, instead of the tranquillity which it had enjoyed for fifty years under Athens, became a scene of contest between two rival money-levying fleets,—many out-settlers from Athens, who had acquired property in the islands, the Chersonesus, or elsewhere,

under her guarantee, found themselves insecure in every way, and were tempted to change their abodes. Finally, by the defeat of Ægospotami (B.C. 405), all such outsettlers as then remained were expelled, and forced to seek shelter either at Athens (at that moment the least attractive place in Greece), or in some other locality. To such persons, not less than to the Athenian admiral Konon with his small remnant of Athenian triremes saved out of the great defeat, the proclaimed invitations of Evagoras would present a harbor of refuge nowhere else to be found. Accordingly, we learn that numerous settlers of the best character, from different parts of Greece, crowded to Salamis.[46] Many Athenian women, during the years of destitution and suffering which preceded as well as followed the battle of Ægospotami, were well pleased to emigrate and find husbands in that city;[47] while throughout the wide range of the Lacedæmonian empire, the numerous victims exiled by the harmosts and dekarchies had no other retreat on the whole so safe and tempting. The extensive plain of Salamis afforded lands for many colonists. On what conditions, indeed, they were admitted, we do not know; but the conduct of Evagoras as a ruler, gave universal satisfaction.

During the first years of his reign, Evagoras doubtless paid his tribute regularly, and took no steps calculated to offend the Persian king. But as his power increased, his ambition increased also. We find him towards the year 390 B.C., engaged in a struggle not merely with the Persian king, but with Amathus and Kitium in his own island, and with the great Phœnician cities on the mainland. By what steps, or at what precise period, this war began, we cannot determine. At the time of the battle of Knidus (394 B.C.) Evagoras had not only paid his tribute, but was mainly instrumental in getting the Persian fleet placed under Konon to act against the Lacedæmonians, himself serving aboard.[48] It was in fact (if we may believe Isokrates) to the extraordinary energy, ability, and power, displayed by him on that occasion in the service of Artaxerxes himself, that the jealousy and alarm of the latter against him are to be ascribed. Without any provocation, and at the very moment when he was profiting by the zealous services of Evagoras, the Great King treacherously began to manœuvre against him, and forced him into the war in self-defence.[49] Evagoras accepted the challenge, in spite of the disparity of strength, with such courage and efficiency, that he at first gained marked successes. Seconded by his son Pnytagoras, he not only worsted and humbled Amathus, Kitium, and Soli, which cities, under the prince Agyris, adhered to Artaxerxes,—but also equipped a large fleet, attacked the Phœnicians on the mainland with so much vigor as even to take the great city of Tyre; prevailing, moreover, upon some of the Kilikian towns to declare against the Persians.[50] He received powerful aid from Akoris, the native and independent king in Egypt, as well as from Chabrias and the force sent out by the Athenians.[51] Beginning apparently about 390 B.C., the war against Evagoras lasted something more than ten years, costing the Persians great efforts and an immense expenditure of money. Twice did Athens send a squadron to his assistance, from gratitude for his long protection to

Konon and his energetic efforts before and in the battle of Knidus,—though she thereby ran every risk of making the Persians her enemies.

The satrap Tiribazus saw that so long as he had on his hands a war in Greece, it was impossible for him to concentrate his force against the prince of Salamis and the Egyptians. Hence, in part, the extraordinary effort made by the Persians to dictate, in conjunction with Sparta, the peace of Antalkidas, and to get together such a fleet in Ionia as should overawe Athens and Thebes into submission. It was one of the conditions of that peace that Evagoras should be abandoned;[52] the whole island of Cyprus being acknowledged as belonging to the Persian king. Though thus cut off from Athens, and reduced to no other Grecian aid than such mercenaries as he could pay, Evagoras was still assisted by Akoris of Egypt, and even by Hekatomnus prince of Karia with a secret present of money.[53] But the peace of Antalkidas being now executed in Asia, the Persian satraps were completely masters of the Grecian cities on the Asiatic sea-board, and were enabled to convey round to Kilikia and Cyprus not only their whole fleet from Ionia, but also additional contingents from these very Grecian cities. A large portion of the Persian force acting against Cyprus was thus Greek, yet seemingly acting by constraint, neither well paid nor well used,[54] and therefore not very efficient.

The satraps Tiribazus and Orontes commanded the land force, a large portion of which was transported across to Cyprus; the admiral Gaos was at the head of the fleet, which held its station at Kitium in the south of the island. It was here that Evagoras, having previously gained a battle on land, attacked them. By extraordinary efforts he had got together a fleet of two hundred triremes, nearly equal in number to theirs; but after a hard-fought contest, in which he at first seemed likely to be victorious, he underwent a complete naval defeat, which disqualified him from keeping the sea, and enabled the Persians to block up Salamis as well by sea as by land.[55] Though thus reduced to his own single city, however, Evagoras defended himself with unshaken resolution, still sustained by aid from Akoris in Egypt; while Tyre and several towns in Kilikia also continued in revolt against Artaxerxes; so that the efforts of the Persians were distracted, and the war was not concluded until ten years after its commencement.[56] It cost them on the whole (if we may believe Isokrates)[57] fifteen thousand talents in money, and such severe losses in men, that Tiribazus acceded to the propositions of Evagoras for peace, consenting to leave him in full possession of Salamis, under payment of a stipulated tribute, "like a slave to his master." These last words were required by the satrap to be literally inserted in the convention; but Evagoras peremptorily refused his consent, demanding that the tribute should be recognized as paid by "one king to another." Rather than concede this point of honor, he even broke off the negotiation, and resolved again to defend himself to the uttermost. He was rescued, after the siege had been yet farther prolonged, by a dispute which broke out between the two commanders of the Persian army. Orontes, accusing Tiribazus of projected treason and rebellion against the

king, in conjunction with Sparta, caused him to be sent for as prisoner to Susa, and thus became sole commander. But as the besieging army was already wearied out by the obstinate resistance of Salamis, he consented to grant the capitulation, stipulating only for the tribute, and exchanging the offensive phrase enforced by Tiribazus, for the amendment of the other side.[58]

It was thus that Evagoras was relieved from his besieging enemies, and continued for the remainder of his life as tributary prince of Salamis under the Persians. He was no farther engaged in war, nor was his general popularity among the Salaminians diminished by the hardships which they had gone through along with him.[59] His prudence calmed the rankling antipathy of the Great King, who would gladly have found a pretext for breaking the treaty. His children were numerous, and lived in harmony as well with him as with each other. Isokrates specially notices this fact, standing as it did in marked contrast with the family-relations of most of the Grecian despots, usually stained with jealousies, antipathies, and conflict, often with actual bloodshed.[60] But he omits to notice the incident whereby Evagoras perished; an incident not in keeping with that superhuman good fortune and favor from the gods, of which the Panegyrical Oration boasts as having been vouchsafed to the hero throughout his life.[61] It was seemingly not very long after the peace, that a Salaminian named Nikokreon formed a conspiracy against his life and dominion, but was detected, by a singular accident, before the moment of execution, and forced to seek safety in flight. He left behind him a youthful daughter in his harem, under the care of an eunuch (a Greek, born in Elis) named Thrasydæus; who, full of vindictive sympathy in his master's cause, made known the beauty of the young lady both to Evagoras himself and to Pnytagoras, the most distinguished of his sons, partner in the gallant defence of Salamis against the Persians. Both of them were tempted, each unknown to the other, to make a secret assignation for being conducted to her chamber by the eunuch; both of them were there assassinated by his hand.[62]

Thus perished a Greek of preëminent vigor and intelligence, remarkably free from the vices usual in Grecian despots, and forming a strong contrast in this respect with his contemporary Dionysius, whose military energy is so deeply stained by crime and violence. Nikoklês, the son of Evagoras, reigned at Salamis after him, and showed much regard, accompanied by munificent presents, to the Athenian Isokrates; who compliments him as a pacific and well-disposed prince, attached to Greek pursuits and arts, conversant by personal study with Greek philosophy, and above all, copying his father in that just dealing and absence of wrong towards person or property, which had so much promoted the comfort as well as the prosperity of the city.[63]

We now revert from the episode respecting Evagoras,—interesting not less from the eminent qualities of that prince than from the glimpse of Hellenism struggling with the Phœnician element in Cyprus,—to the general consequences of the peace of Antalkidas in Central Greece. For the first time since the battle of Mykalê in 479 B.C., the Persians were now really masters of all the Greeks on the Asiatic coast. The

satraps lost no time in confirming their dominion. In all the cities which they suspected, they built citadels and planted permanent garrisons. In some cases, their mistrust or displeasure was carried so far as to raze the town altogether.[64] And thus these cities, having already once changed their position greatly for the worse, by passing from easy subjection under Athens to the harsh rule of Lacedæmonian harmosts and native decemvirs,—were now transferred to masters yet more oppressive and more completely without the pale of Hellenic sympathy. Both in public extortion, and in wrong doing towards individuals, the commandant and his mercenaries, whom the satrap maintained, were probably more rapacious, and certainly more unrestrained, than even the harmosts of Sparta. Moreover, the Persian grandees required beautiful boys as eunuchs for their service, and beautiful women as inmates of their harems.[65] What was taken for their convenience admitted neither of recovery nor redress; and Grecian women, if not more beautiful than many of the native Asiatics, were at least more intelligent, lively, and seductive,—as we may read in the history of that Phokæan lady, the companion of Cyrus, who was taken captive at Kunaxa. Moreover, these Asiatic Greeks, when passing into the hands of Oriental masters, came under the maxims and sentiment of Orientals, respecting the infliction of pain or torture,—maxims not only more cruel than those of the Greeks, but also making little distinction between freemen and slaves.[66] The difference between the Greeks and Phœnicians in Cyprus, on this point, has been just noticed; and doubtless the difference between Greeks and Persians was still more marked. While the Asiatic Greeks were thus made over by Sparta and the Perso-Spartan convention of Antalkidas, to a condition in every respect worse, they were at the same time thrown in, as reluctant auxiliaries, to strengthen the hands of the Great King against other Greeks, —against Evagoras in Cyprus,—and above all, against the islands adjoining the coast of Asia,—Chios, Samos, Rhodes, etc.[67] These islands were now exposed to the same hazard, from their overwhelming Persian neighbors, as that from which they had been rescued nearly a century before by the Confederacy of Delos, and by the Athenian empire into which that Confederacy was transformed. All the tutelary combination that the genius, the energy, and the Pan-hellenic ardor, of Athens had first organized, and so long kept up,—was now broken up; while Sparta, to whom its extinction was owing, in surrendering the Asiatic Greeks, had destroyed the security even of the islanders.

It soon appeared, however, how much Sparta herself had gained by this surrender in respect to dominion nearer home. The government of Corinth,—wrested from the party friendly to Argos, deprived of Argeian auxiliaries, and now in the hands of the restored Corinthian exiles who were the most devoted partisans of Sparta,—looked to her for support, and made her mistress of the Isthmus, either for offence or for defence. She thus gained the means of free action against Thebes, the enemy upon whom her attention was first directed. Thebes was now the object of Spartan antipathy, not less than Athens had formerly been; especially on the part of King Agesilaus, who had to avenge the insult offered to himself at the sacrifice near Aulis,

as well as the strenuous resistance on the field of Koroneia. He was at the zenith of his political influence; so that his intense miso-Theban sentiment made Sparta, now becoming aggressive on all sides, doubly aggressive against Thebes. More prudent Spartans, like Antalkidas, warned him[68] that his persevering hostility would ultimately kindle in the Thebans a fatal energy of military resistance and organization. But the warning was despised until it was too fully realized in the development of the great military genius of Epaminondas, and in the defeat of Leuktra.

I have already mentioned that in the solemnity of exchanging oaths to the peace of Antalkidas, the Thebans had hesitated at first to recognize the autonomy of the other Bœotian cities; upon which Agesilaus had manifested a fierce impatience to exclude them from the treaty, and attack them single-handed.[69] Their timely accession balked him in this impulse; but it enabled him to enter upon a series of measures highly humiliating to the dignity as well as to the power of Thebes. All the Bœotian cities were now proclaimed autonomous under the convention. As solicitor, guarantee, and interpreter, of that convention, Sparta either had, or professed to have, the right of guarding their autonomy against dangers, actual or contingent, from their previous Vorort or presiding city. For this purpose she availed herself of this moment of change to organize in each of them a local oligarchy, composed of partisans adverse to Thebes as well as devoted to herself, and upheld in case of need by a Spartan harmost and garrison.[70] Such an internal revolution grew almost naturally out of the situation; since the previous leaders, and the predominant sentiment in most of the towns, seem to have been favorable to Bœotian unity, and to the continued presidency of Thebes. These leaders would therefore find themselves hampered, intimidated, and disqualified, under the new system, while those who had before been an opposition minority would come forward with a bold and decided policy, like Kritias and Theramenes at Athens after the surrender of the city to Lysander. The new leaders doubtless would rather invite than repel the establishment of a Spartan harmost in their town, as a security to themselves against resistance from their own citizens as well as against attacks from Thebes, and as a means of placing them under the assured conditions of a Lysandrian dekarchy. Though most of the Bœotian cities were thus, on the whole, favorable to Thebes,—and though Sparta thrust upon them the boon, which she called autonomy, from motives of her own, and not from their solicitation,—yet, Orchomenus and Thespiæ, over whom the presidency of Thebes appears to have been harshly exercised, were adverse to her, and favorable to the Spartan alliance.[71] These two cities were strongly garrisoned by Sparta, and formed her main stations in Bœotia.[72]

The presence of such garrisons, one on each side of Thebes,—the discontinuance of the Bœotarchs, with the breaking up of all symbols and proceedings of the Bœotian federation,—and the establishment of oligarchies devoted to Sparta in the other cities,—was doubtless a deep wound to the pride of the Thebans. But there was an-

other wound still deeper, and this the Lacedæmonians forthwith proceeded to inflict, —the restoration of Platæa.

A melancholy interest attaches both to the locality of this town, as one of the brightest scenes of Grecian glory,—and to its brave and faithful population, victims of an exposed position combined with numerical feebleness. Especially, we follow with a sort of repugnance the capricious turns of policy which dictated the Spartan behavior towards them. One hundred and twenty years before, the Platæans had thrown themselves upon Sparta, to entreat her protection against Thebes. The Spartan king Kleomenes had then declined the obligation as too distant, and had recommended them to ally themselves with Athens.[73] This recommendation, though dictated chiefly by a wish to raise contention between Athens and Thebes, was complied with; and the alliance, severing Platæa altogether from the Bœotian confederacy, turned out both advantageous and honorable to her until the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. At that time, it suited the policy of the Spartans to uphold and strengthen in every way the supremacy of Thebes over the Bœotian cities; it was altogether by Spartan intervention, indeed, that the power of Thebes was reëstablished, after the great prostration as well as disgrace which she had undergone, as traitor to Hellas and zealous in the service of Mardonius.[74] Athens, on the other hand, was at that time doing her best to break up the Bœotian federation, and to enrol its various cities as her allies; in which project, though doubtless suggested by and conducive to her own ambition, she was at that time (460-445 B.C.) perfectly justifiable on Pan-hellenic grounds; seeing that Thebes as their former chief had so recently enlisted them all in the service of Xerxes, and might be expected to do the same again if a second Persian invasion should be attempted. Though for a time successful, Athens was expelled from Bœotia by the defeat of Korôneia; and at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the whole Bœotian federation (except Platæa, was united under Thebes, in bitter hostility against her. The first blow of the war, even prior to any declaration, was struck by Thebes in her abortive nocturnal attempt to surprise Platæa. In the third year of the war, king Archidamus, at the head of the full Lacedæmonian force, laid siege to the latter town; which, after an heroic defence and a long blockade, at length surrendered under the extreme pressure of famine; yet not before one half its brave defenders had forced their way out over the blockading wall, and escaped to Athens, where all the Platæan old men, women, and children, had been safely lodged before the siege. By a cruel act which stands among the capital iniquities of Grecian warfare, the Lacedæmonians had put to death all the Platæan captives, two hundred in number, who fell into their hands; the town of Platæa had been razed, and its whole territory, joined to Thebes, had remained ever since cultivated on Theban account.[75] The surviving Platæans had been dealt with kindly and hospitably by the Athenians. A qualified right of citizenship was conceded to them at Athens, and when Skionê was recaptured in 420 B.C., that town (vacant by the slaughter of its captive citizens) was handed over to the Platæans as a residence.[76] Compelled to evacuate Skionê, they were obliged at the close of the Pelopon-

nesian war,[77] to return to Athens, where the remainder of them were residing at the time of the peace of Antalkidas; little dreaming that those who had destroyed their town and their fathers forty years before, would now turn round and restore it. [78]

Such restoration, whatever might be the ostensible grounds on which the Spartans pretended to rest it, was not really undertaken either to carry out the convention of Antalkidas, which guaranteed only the autonomy of *existing* towns,—or to repair previous injustice, since the prior destruction had been the deliberate act of themselves, and of King Archidamus the father of Agesilaus,—but simply as a step conducive to the present political views of Sparta. And towards this object it was skilfully devised. It weakened the Thebans, not only by wresting from them what had been, for about forty years, a part of their territory and property; but also by establishing upon it a permanent stronghold in the occupation of their bitter enemies, assisted by a Spartan garrison. It furnished an additional station for such a garrison in Bœotia, with the full consent of the newly-established inhabitants. And more than all, it introduced a subject of contention between Athens and Thebes, calculated to prevent the two from hearty coöperation afterwards against Sparta. As the sympathy of the Platæans with Athens was no less ancient and cordial than their antipathy against Thebes, we may probably conclude that the restoration of the town was an act acceptable to the Athenians; at least, at first, until they saw the use made of it, and the position which Sparta came to occupy in reference to Greece generally. Many of the Platæans, during their residence at Athens, had intermarried with Athenian women,[79] who now, probably, accompanied their husbands to the restored little town on the north of Kithæron, near the southern bank of the river Asôpus.

Had the Platæans been restored to a real and honorable autonomy, such as they enjoyed in alliance with Athens before the Peloponnesian war, we should have cordially sympathized with the event. But the sequel will prove—and their own subsequent statement emphatically sets forth—that they were a mere dependency of Sparta, and an outpost of Spartan operations against Thebes.[80] They were a part of the great revolution which the Spartans now brought about in Bœotia; whereby Thebes was degraded from the president of a federation into an isolated autonomous city, while the other Bœotian cities, who had been before members of the federation, were elevated each for itself into the like autonomy; or rather (to substitute the real truth[81] in place of Spartan professions) they became enrolled and sworn in as dependent allies of Sparta, under oligarchical factions devoted to her purposes and resting upon her for support. That the Thebans should submit to such a revolution, and, above all, to the sight of Platæa as an independent neighbor with a territory abstracted from themselves,—proves how much they felt their own weakness, and how irresistible at this moment was the ascendency of their great enemy, in perverting to her own ambition the popular lure of universal autonomy held out by the peace of Antalkidas. Though compelled to acquiesce, the Thebans waited in hopes of some

turn of fortune which would enable them to reörganize the Bœotian federation; while their hostile sentiment towards Sparta was not the less bitter for being suppressed. Sparta on her part kept constant watch to prevent the reunion of Bœotia;[82] an object in which she was for a time completely successful, and was even enabled, beyond her hopes, to become possessed of Thebes itself,[83] through a party of traitors within,—as will presently appear.

In these measures regarding Bœotia, we recognize the vigorous hand, and the miso-Theban spirit, of Agesilaus. He was at this time the great director of Spartan foreign policy, though opposed by his more just and moderate colleague king Agesipolis,[84] as well as by a section of the leading Spartans, who reproached Agesilaus with his project of ruling Greece by means of subservient local despots or oligarchies in the various cities,[85] and who contended that the autonomy promised by the peace of Antalkidas ought to be left to develop itself freely, without any coërcive intervention on the part of Sparta.[86]

Far from any wish thus to realize the terms of peace which they had themselves imposed, the Lacedæmonians took advantage of an early moment after becoming free from their enemies in Bœotia and Corinth, to strain their authority over their allies beyond its previous limits. Passing in review[87] the conduct of each during the war, they resolved to make an example of the city of Mantinea. Some acts, not of positive hostility, but of equivocal fidelity, were imputed to the Mantineans. They were accused of having been slack in performance of their military obligations, sometimes even to the length of withholding their contingent altogether, under pretence of a season of religious truce; of furnishing corn in time of war to the hostile Argeians; and of plainly manifesting their disaffected feeling towards Sparta,—chagrin at every success which she obtained,—satisfaction, when she chanced to experience a reverse.[88] The Spartan ephors now sent an envoy to Mantinea, denouncing all such past behavior, and peremptorily requiring that the walls of the city should be demolished, as the only security for future penitence and amendment. As compliance was refused, they despatched an army, summoning the allied contingents generally for the purpose of enforcing the sentence. They intrusted the command to king Agesipolis, since Agesilaus excused himself from the duty, on the ground that the Mantineans had rendered material service to his father Archidamus in the dangerous Messenian war which had beset Sparta during the early part of his reign.[89]

Having first attempted to intimidate the Mantineans by ravaging their lands, Agesipolis commenced the work of blockade by digging a ditch around the town; half of his soldiers being kept on guard, while the rest worked with the spade. The ditch being completed, he prepared to erect a wall of circumvallation. But being apprised that the preceding harvest had been so good, as to leave a large stock of provision in the town, and to render the process of starving it out tedious both for Sparta and for her allies,—he tried a more rapid method of accomplishing his object. As the river Ophis, of considerable breadth for a Grecian stream, passed through the middle of the

town, he dammed up its efflux on the lower side;[90] thus causing it to inundate the interior of the city and threaten the stability of the walls; which seem to have been of no great height, and built of sun-burnt bricks. Disappointed in their application to Athens for aid,[91] and unable to provide extraneous support for their tottering towers, the Mantineans were compelled to solicit a capitulation. But Agesipolis now refused to grant the request, except on condition that not only the fortifications of their city, but the city itself, should be in great part demolished; and that the inhabitants should be re-distributed into those five villages, which had been brought together, many years before, to form the aggregate city of Mantinea. To this also the Mantineans were obliged to submit, and the capitulation was ratified.

Though nothing was said in the terms of it about the chiefs of the Mantinean democratical government, yet these latter, conscious that they were detested both by their own oligarchical opposition and by the Lacedæmonians, accounted themselves certain of being put to death. And such would assuredly have been their fate, had not Pausanias (the late king of Sparta, now in exile at Tegea), whose good opinion they had always enjoyed, obtained as a personal favor from his son Agesipolis the lives of the most obnoxious, sixty in number, on condition that they should depart into exile. Agesipolis had much difficulty in accomplishing the wishes of his father. His Lacedæmonian soldiers were ranged in arms on both sides of the gate by which the obnoxious men went out; and Xenophon notices it as a signal mark of Lacedæmonian discipline, that they could keep their spears unemployed when disarmed enemies were thus within their reach; especially as the oligarchical Mantineans manifested the most murderous propensities, and were exceedingly difficult to control.[92] As at Peiræus before, so here at Mantinea again,—the liberal, but unfortunate, king Pausanias is found interfering in the character of mediator to soften the ferocity of political antipathies.

The city of Mantinea was now broken up, and the inhabitants were distributed again into the five constituent villages. Out of four-fifths of the population, each man pulled down his house in the city, and rebuilt it in the village near to which his property lay. The remaining fifth continued to occupy Mantinea as a village. Each village was placed under oligarchical government, and left unfortified. Though at first (says Xenophon) the change proved troublesome and odious, yet presently, when men found themselves resident upon their landed properties,—and still more, when they felt themselves delivered from the vexatious demagogues,—the new situation became more popular than the old. The Lacedæmonians were still better satisfied. Instead of one city of Mantinea, five distinct Arcadian villages now stood enrolled in their catalogue of allies. They assigned to each a separate xenâgus (Spartan officer destined to the command of each allied contingent), and the military service of all was henceforward performed with the utmost regularity.[93]

Such was the dissection or cutting into parts of the ancient city Mantinea; one of the most odious acts of high-handed Spartan despotism. Its true character is veiled

by the partiality of the historian, who recounts it with a confident assurance, that after the trouble of moving was over, the population felt themselves decidedly bettered by the change. Such an assurance is only to be credited, on the ground that, being captives under the Grecian laws of war, they may have been thankful to escape the more terrible liabilities of death or personal slavery, at the price of forfeiting their civic community. That their feelings towards the change were those of genuine aversion, is shown by their subsequent conduct after the battle of Leuktra. As soon as the fear of Sparta was removed, they flocked together, with unanimous impulse, to reconstitute and refortify their dismantled city.[94] It would have been strange indeed had the fact been otherwise; for attachment to a civic community was the strongest political instinct of the Greek mind. The citizen of a town was averse—often most unhappily averse—to compromise the separate and autonomous working of his community by joining in any larger political combination, however equitably framed, and however it might promise on the whole an increase of Hellenic dignity. But still more vehemently did he shrink from the idea of breaking up his town into separate villages, and exchanging the character of a citizen for that of a villager, which was nothing less than great social degradation, in the eyes of Greeks generally, Spartans not excepted.[95]

In truth the sentence executed by the Spartans against Mantinea was in point of dishonor, as well as of privation, one of the severest which could be inflicted on free Greeks. All the distinctive glory and superiority of Hellenism,—all the intellectual and artistic manifestations,—all that there was of literature and philosophy, or of refined and rational sociality,—depended upon the city-life of the people. And the influence of Sparta, during the period of her empire, was peculiarly mischievous and retrograde, as tending not only to decompose the federations such as Bœotia into isolated towns, but even to decompose suspected towns such as Mantinea into villages; all for the purpose of rendering each of them exclusively dependent upon herself. Athens, during her period of empire, had exercised no such disuniting influence; still less Thebes, whom we shall hereafter find coming forward actively to found the new and great cities of Megalopolis and Messênê. The imperial tendencies of Sparta are worse than those of either Athens or Thebes; including less of improving or Pan-hellenic sympathies, and leaning the most systematically upon subservient factions in each subordinate city. In the very treatment of Mantinea just recounted, it is clear that the attack of Sparta was welcomed at least, if not originally invited, by the oligarchical party of the place, who sought to grasp the power into their own hands and to massacre their political opponents. In the first object they completely succeeded, and their government probably was more assured in the five villages than it would have been in the entire town. In the second, nothing prevented them from succeeding except the accidental intervention of the exile Pausanias; an accident, which alone rescued the Spartan name from the additional disgrace of a political massacre, over and above the lasting odium incurred by the act itself; by breaking up an ancient autonomous city, which had shown no act of overt enmity, and which

was so moderate in its democratical manifestations as to receive the favorable criticism of judges rather disinclined towards democracy generally.[96] Thirty years before, when Mantinea had conquered certain neighboring Arcadian districts, and had been at actual war with Sparta to preserve them, the victorious Spartans exacted nothing more than the reduction of the city to its original district;[97] now they are satisfied with nothing less than the partition of the city into unfortified villages, though there had been no actual war preceding. So much had Spartan power, as well as Spartan despotic propensity, progressed during this interval.

The general language of Isokrates, Xenophon, and Diodorus,[98] indicates that this severity towards Mantinea was only the most stringent among a series of severities, extended by the Lacedæmonians through their whole confederacy, and operating upon all such of its members as gave them ground for dissatisfaction or mistrust. During the ten years after the surrender of Athens, they had been lords of the Grecian world both by land and sea, with a power never before possessed by any Grecian state; until the battle of Knidus, and the combination of Athens, Thebes, Argos, and Corinth, seconded by Persia, had broken up their empire at sea, and much endangered it on land. At length the peace of Antalkidas, enlisting Persia on their side (at the price of the liberty of the Asiatic Greeks), had enabled them to dissolve the hostile combination against them. The general autonomy, of which they were the authorized interpreters, meant nothing more than a separation of the Bœotian cities from Thebes,[99] and of Corinth from Argos,—being noway intended to apply to the relation between Sparta and her allies. Having thus their hands free, the Lacedæmonians applied themselves to raise their ascendency on land to the point where it had stood before the battle of Knidus, and even to regain as much as possible of their empire at sea. To bring back a dominion such as that of the Lysandrian harmosts and dekarchies, and to reconstitute a local oligarchy of their most devoted partisans, in each of those cities where the government had been somewhat liberalized during the recent period of war,—was their systematic policy.

Those exiles who had incurred the condemnation of their fellow-citizens for subservience to Sparta, now found the season convenient for soliciting Spartan intervention to procure their return. It was in this manner that a body of exiled political leaders from Phlius,—whose great merit it was that the city when under their government had been zealous in service to Sparta, but had now become lukewarm or even disaffected in the hands of their opponents,—obtained from the ephors a message, polite in form but authoritative in substance, addressed to the Phliasians, requiring that the exiles should be restored, as friends of Sparta banished without just cause. [100]

While the Spartan power, for the few years succeeding the peace of Antalkidas, was thus decidedly in ascending movement on land, efforts were also made to reëstablish it at sea. Several of the Cyclades and other smaller islands were again rendered tributary. In this latter sphere, however, Athens became her competitor.

Since the peace, and the restoration of Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, combined with the refortified Peiræus and its Long Walls,—Athenian commerce and naval power had been reviving, though by slow and humble steps. Like the naval force of England compared with France, the warlike marine of Athens rested upon a considerable commercial marine, which latter hardly existed at all in Laconia. Sparta had no seamen except constrained Helots or paid foreigners;[101] while the commerce of Peiræus had both required and maintained a numerous population of this character. The harbor of Peiræus was convenient in respect of accommodation, and well-stocked with artisans,—while Laconia had few artisans, and was notoriously destitute of harbors.[102] Accordingly, in this maritime competition, Athens, though but the shadow of her former self, started at an advantage as compared with Sparta, and in spite of the superiority of the latter on land, was enabled to compete with her in acquiring tributary dependencies among the smaller islands of the Ægean. To these latter, who had no marine of their own, and who (like Athens herself) required habitual supplies of imported corn, it was important to obtain both access to Peiræus and protection from the Athenian triremes against that swarm of pirates, who showed themselves after the peace of Antalkidas, when there was no predominant maritime state; besides which, the market of Peiræus was often supplied with foreign corn from the Crimea, through the preference shown by the princes of Bosphorus to Athens, at a time when vessels from other places could obtain no cargo.[103] A moderate tribute paid to Athens would secure to the tributary island greater advantages than if paid to Sparta,—with at least equal protection. Probably, the influence of Athens over these islanders was farther aided by the fact, that she administered the festivals, and lent out the funds, of the holy temple at Delos. We know by inscriptions remaining, that large sums were borrowed at interest from the temple-treasure, not merely by individual islanders, but also by the island-cities collectively,—Naxos, Andros, Tenos, Siphnos, Seriphos. The Amphiktyonic council who dispensed these loans (or at least the presiding members) were Athenians named annually at Athens.[104] Moreover, these islanders rendered religious homage and attendance at the Delian festivals, and were thus brought within the range of a central Athenian influence, capable, under favorable circumstances, of being strengthened and rendered even politically important.

By such helps, Athens was slowly acquiring to herself a second maritime confederacy, which we shall presently find to be of considerable moment, though never approaching the grandeur of her former empire; so that in the year 380 B.C., when Isokrates published his Panegyrical Discourse (seven years after the peace of Antalkidas), though her general power was still slender compared with the overruling might of Sparta,[105] yet her navy had already made such progress, that he claims for her the right of taking the command by sea, in that crusade which he strenuously enforces, of Athens and Sparta in harmonious unity at the head of all Greece, against the Asiatic barbarians.[106]

It would seem that a few years after the peace of Antalkidas, Sparta became somewhat ashamed of having surrendered the Asiatic Greeks to Persia; and that king Agesipolis and other leading Spartans encouraged the scheme of a fresh Grecian expedition against Asia, in compliance with propositions from some disaffected subjects of Artaxerxes.[107] Upon some such project, currently discussed though never realized, Isokrates probably built his Panegyrical Oration, composed in a lofty strain of patriotic eloquence (380 B.C.) to stimulate both Sparta and Athens in the cause, and calling on both, as joint chiefs of Greece, to suspend dissensions at home for a great Pan-hellenic manifestation against the common enemy abroad. But whatever ideas of this kind the Spartan leaders may have entertained, their attention was taken off, about 382 B.C. by movements in a more remote region of the Grecian world, which led to important consequences.

Since the year 414 B.C. (when the Athenians were engaged in the siege of Syracuse), we have heard nothing either of the kings of Macedonia, or of the Chalkidic Grecian cities in the peninsula of Thrace adjoining Macedonia. Down to that year, Athens still retained a portion of her maritime empire in those regions. The Platæans were still in possession of Skiônê (on the isthmus of Pallênê) which she had assigned to them; while the Athenian admiral Euetion, seconded by many hired Thracians, and even by Perdikkas king of Macedonia, undertook a fruitless siege to reconquer Amphipolis on the Strymon.[108] But the fatal disaster at Syracuse having disabled Athens from maintaining such distant interests, they were lost to her along with her remaining empire,—perhaps earlier; though we do not know how. At the same time, during the last years of the Peloponnesian war, the kingdom of Macedonia greatly increased in power; partly, we may conceive, from the helpless condition of Athens,—but still more from the abilities and energy of Archelaus, son and successor of Perdikkas.

The course of succession among the Macedonian princes seems not to have been settled, so that disputes and bloodshed took place at the death of several of them. Moreover, there were distinct tribes of Macedonians, who, though forming part, really or nominally, of the dominion of the Temenid princes, nevertheless were immediately subject to separate but subordinate princes of their own. The reign of Perdikkas had been troubled in this manner. In the first instance, he had stripped his own brother Alketas of the crown,[109] who appears (so far as we can make out) to have had the better right to it; next he had also expelled his younger brother Philippus from his subordinate principality. To restore Amyntas the son of Philippus, was one of the purposes of the Thrakian prince Sitalkês, in the expedition undertaken conjointly with Athens, during the second year of the Peloponnesian war.[110] On the death of Perdikkas (about 413 B.C.), his eldest or only legitimate son was a child of seven years old; but his natural son[111] Archelaus was of mature age and unscrupulous ambition. The dethroned Alketas was yet alive, and had now considerable chance of reëstablishing himself on the throne; Archelaus, inviting him and his son under pre-

tence that he would himself bring about their reëstablishment, slew them both amidst the intoxication of a banquet. He next despatched the boy, his legitimate brother, by suffocating him in a well; and through these crimes made himself king. His government, however, was so energetic and able, that Macedonia reached a degree of military power such as none of his predecessors had ever possessed. His troops, military equipments, and fortified places, were much increased in numbers; while he also cut straight roads of communication between the various portions of his territory,—a novelty seemingly everywhere, at that time.[112] Besides such improved organization (which unfortunately we are not permitted to know in detail), Archelaus founded a splendid periodical Olympic festival, in honor of the Olympian Zeus and the Muses,[113] and maintained correspondence with the poets and philosophers of Athens. He prevailed upon the tragic poets Euripides and Agathon, as well as the epic poet Chœrilus, to visit him in Macedonia, where Euripides especially was treated with distinguished favor and munificence,[114] remaining there until his death in 406 or 405 B.C. Archelaus also invited Sokrates, who declined the invitation,—and appears to have shown some favor to Plato.[115] He perished in the same year as Sokrates (399 B.C.), by a violent death; two Thessalian youths, Krateuas and Hellanokrates, together with a Macedonian named Dekamnichus, being his assassins during a hunting-party. The first two were youths to whom he was strongly attached, but whose dignity he had wounded by insulting treatment and non-performance of promises; the third was a Macedonian, who, for having made an offensive remark upon the bad breath of Euripides, had been given up by the order of Archelaus to the poet, in order that he might be flogged for it. Euripides actually caused the sentence to be inflicted; but it was not till six years after his death that Dekamnichus, who had neither forgotten nor forgiven the affront, found the opportunity of taking revenge by instigating and aiding the assassins of Archelaus.[116]

These incidents, recounted on the authority of Aristotle, and relating as well to the Macedonian king Archelaus as to the Athenian citizen and poet Euripides, illustrate the political contrast between Macedonia and Athens. The government of the former is one wholly personal,—dependent on the passions, tastes, appetites, and capacities, of the king. The ambition of Archelaus leads both to his crimes for acquiring the throne, and to his improved organization of the military force of the state afterwards; his admiration for the poets and philosophers of Athens makes him sympathize warmly with Euripides, and ensure to the latter personal satisfaction for an offensive remark; his appetites, mingling license with insult, end by drawing upon him personal enemies of a formidable character. *L'Etat, c'est moi*—stands marked in the whole series of proceedings; the personality of the monarch is the determining element. Now at Athens, no such element exists. There is, on the one hand, no easy way of bringing to bear the ascendency of an energetic chief to improve the military organization,—as Athens found to her cost, when she was afterwards assailed by Philip, the successor after some interval, and in many respects the parallel, of Archelaus. But on the other hand, neither the personal tastes nor the appetites, of

any individual Athenian, count as active causes in the march of public affairs, which is determined by the established law and by the pronounced sentiments of the body of citizens. However gross an insult might have been offered to Euripides at Athens, the dikasts would never have sentenced that the offender should be handed over to him to be flogged. They would have inflicted such measure of punishment as the nature of the wrong, and the preëxisting law appeared to them to require. Political measures, or judicial sentences, at Athens, might be well or ill-judged; but at any rate, they were always dictated by regard to a known law and to the public conceptions entertained of state-interests, state-dignity, and state-obligations, without the avowed intrusion of any man's personality. To Euripides,—who had throughout his whole life been the butt of Aristophanes and other comic writers, and who had been compelled to hear, in the crowded theatre, taunts far more galling than what is ascribed to Dekamnichus,—the contrast must have been indeed striking, to have the offender made over to him, and the whip placed at his disposal, by order of his new patron. And it is little to his honor, that he should have availed himself of the privilege, by causing the punishment to be really administered; a punishment which he could never have seen inflicted, during the fifty years of his past life, upon any free Athenian citizen.

Krateuas did not survive the deed more than three or four days, after which Orestes, son of Archelaus, a child, was placed on the throne, under the guardianship of Æropus. The latter, however, after about four years, made away with his ward, and reigned in his stead for two years. He then died of sickness, and was succeeded by his son Pausanias; who, after a reign of only one year, was assassinated and succeeded by Amyntas.[117] This Amyntas (chiefly celebrated as the father of Philip and the grandfather of Alexander the Great), though akin to the royal family, had been nothing more than an attendant of Æropus,[118] until he made himself king by putting to death Pausanias.[119] He reigned, though with interruptions, twenty-four years (393-369 B.C.); years, for the most part, of trouble and humiliation for Macedonia, and of occasional exile for himself. The vigorous military organization introduced by Archelaus appears to have declined; while the frequent dethronements and assassinations of kings, beginning even with Perdikkas the father of Archelaus, and continued down to Amyntas, unhinged the central authority and disunited the various portions of the Macedonian name; which naturally tended to separation, and could only be held together by a firm hand.

The interior regions of Macedonia were bordered, to the north, north-east, and north-west, by warlike barbarian tribes, Thracian and Illyrian, whose invasions were not unfrequent and often formidable. Tempted, probably, by the unsettled position of the government, the Illyrians poured in upon Amyntas during the first year of his reign; perhaps they may have been invited by other princes of the interior,[120] and at all events their coming would operate as a signal for malcontents to declare themselves. Amyntas,—having only acquired the sceptre a few months before by assassi-

nating his predecessor, and having little hold on the people,—was not only unable to repel them, but found himself obliged to evacuate Pella, and even to retire from Macedonia altogether. Despairing of his position, he made over to the Olynthians a large portion of the neighboring territory,—Lower Macedonia or the coast and cities round the Thermaic Gulf.[121] As this cession is represented to have been made at the moment of his distress and expatriation, we may fairly suspect that it was made for some reciprocal benefit or valuable equivalent; of which Amyntas might well stand in need, at a moment of so much exigency.

It is upon this occasion that we begin to hear again of the Chalkidians of Olynthus, and the confederacy which they gradually aggregated around their city as a centre. The confederacy seems to have taken its start from this cession of Amyntas,—or rather, to speak more properly, from his abdication; for the cession of what he could not keep was of comparatively little moment, and we shall see that he tried to resume it as soon as he acquired strength. The effect of his flight was, to break up the government of Lower or maritime Macedonia, and to leave the cities therein situated defenceless against the Illyrians or other invaders from the interior. To these cities, the only chance of security, was to throw themselves upon the Greek cities on the coast, and to organize in conjunction with the latter a confederacy for mutual support. Among all the Greeks on that coast, the most strenuous and persevering (so they had proved themselves in their former contentions against Athens when at the summit of her power) as well as the nearest, were the Chalkidians of Olynthus. These Olynthians now put themselves forward,—took into their alliance and under their protection the smaller towns of maritime Macedonia immediately near them,—and soon extended their confederacy so as to comprehend all the larger towns in this region,—including even Pella, the most considerable city of the country.[122] As they began this enterprise at a time when the Illyrians were masters of the country so as to drive Amyntas to despair and flight, we may be sure that it must have cost them serious efforts, not without great danger if they failed. We may also be sure that the cities themselves must have been willing, not to say eager, coadjutors; just as the islanders and Asiatic Greeks clung to Athens at the first formation of the confederacy of Delos. The Olynthians could have had no means of conquering even the less considerable Macedonian cities, much less Pella, by force and against the will of the inhabitants.

How the Illyrians were compelled to retire, and by what steps the confederacy was got together, we are not permitted to know. Our information (unhappily very brief) comes from the Akanthian envoy Kleigenês, speaking at Sparta about ten years afterwards (B.C. 383), and describing in a few words the confederacy as it then stood. But there is one circumstance which this witness,—himself hostile to Olynthus and coming to solicit Spartan aid against her,—attests emphatically; the equal, generous, and brotherly principles, upon which the Olynthians framed their scheme from the beginning. They did not present themselves as an imperial city enrolling a body

of dependent allies, but invited each separate city to adopt common laws and reciprocal citizenship with Olynthus, with full liberty of intermarriage, commercial dealing, and landed proprietorship. That the Macedonian cities near the sea should welcome so liberal a proposition as this, coming from the most powerful of their Grecian neighbors, cannot at all surprise us; especially at a time when they were exposed to the Illyrian invaders, and when Amyntas had fled the country. They had hitherto always been subjects;[123] their cities had not (like the Greek cities) enjoyed each its own separate autonomy within its own walls; the offer, now made to them by the Olynthians, was one of freedom in exchange for their past subjection under the Macedonian kings, combined with a force adequate to protect them against Illyrian and other invaders. Perhaps also these various cities,—Anthemus, Therma, Chalastra, Pella, Alôrus, Pydna, etc.,—may have contained, among the indigenous population, a certain proportion of domiciliated Grecian inhabitants, to whom the proposition of the Olynthians would be especially acceptable.

We may thus understand why the offer of Olynthus was gladly welcomed by the Macedonian maritime cities. They were the first who fraternized as voluntary partners in the confederacy; which the Olynthians, having established this basis, proceeded to enlarge farther, by making the like liberal propositions to the Greek cities in their neighborhood. Several of these latter joined voluntarily; others were afraid to refuse; insomuch that the confederacy came to include a considerable number of Greeks,—especially, Potidæa, situated on the Isthmus of Pallênê, and commanding the road of communication between the cities within Pallênê and the continent. The Olynthians carried out with scrupulous sincerity their professed principles of equal and intimate partnership, avoiding all encroachment or offensive preëminence in favor of their own city. But in spite of this liberal procedure, they found among their Grecian neighbors obstructions which they had not experienced from the Macedonian. Each of the Grecian cities had been accustomed to its own town-autonomy and separate citizenship, with its peculiar laws and customs. All of them were attached to this kind of distinct political life, by one of the most tenacious and universal instincts of the Greek mind; all of them would renounce it with reluctance, even on consenting to enter the Olynthian confederacy, with its generous promise, its enlarged security, and its manifest advantages; and there were even some who, disdaining every prospective consideration, refused to change their condition at all except at the point of the sword.

Among these last were Akanthus and Apollonia, the largest cities (next to Olynthus) in the Chalkidic peninsula, and, therefore, the least unable to stand alone. To these the Olynthians did not make application, until they had already attracted within their confederacy a considerable number of other Grecian as well as Macedonian cities. They then invited Akanthus and Apollonia to come in, upon the same terms of equal union and fellow-citizenship. The proposition being declined, they sent a second message intimating that, unless it were accepted within a certain time, they

would enforce it by compulsory measures. So powerful already was the military force of the Olynthian confederacy, that Akanthus and Apollonia, incompetent to resist without foreign aid, despatched envoys to Sparta to set forth the position of affairs in the Chalkidic peninsula, and to solicit intervention against Olynthus.

Their embassy reached Sparta about B.C. 383, when the Spartans, having broken up the city of Mantinea into villages, and coërced Phlius, were in the full swing of power over Peloponnesus,—and when they had also dissolved the Bœotian federation, placing harmosts in Platæa and Thespiæ as checks upon any movement of Thebes. The Akanthian Kleigenês, addressing himself to the Assembly of Spartans and their allies, drew an alarming picture of the recent growth and prospective tendencies of Olynthus, invoking the interference of Sparta against that city. The Olynthian confederacy (he said) already comprised many cities, small and great, Greek as well as Macedonian,—Amyntas having lost his kingdom. Its military power, even at present great, was growing every day.[124] The territory, comprising a large breadth of fertile corn-land, could sustain a numerous population. Wood for ship-building was close at hand, while the numerous harbors of the confederate cities ensured a thriving trade as well as a steady revenue from custom-duties. The neighboring Thracian tribes would be easily kept in willing dependence, and would thus augment the military force of Olynthus; even the gold mines of Mount Pangæus would speedily come within her assured reach. "All that I now tell you (such was the substance of his speech) is matter of public talk among the Olynthian people, who are full of hope and confidence. How can you Spartans, who are taking anxious pains to prevent the union of the Bœotian cities,[125] permit the aggregation of so much more formidable a power, both by land and by sea, as this of Olynthus? Envoys have already been sent thither from Athens and Thebes,—and the Olynthians have decreed to send an embassy in return for contracting alliance with those cities; hence, your enemies will derive a large additional force. We of Akanthus and Apollonia, having declined the proposition to join the confederacy voluntarily, have received notice that, if we persist, they will constrain us. Now we are anxious to retain our paternal laws and customs, continuing as a city by ourselves.[126] But if we cannot obtain aid from you, we shall be under the necessity of joining them,—as several other cities have already done, from not daring to refuse; cities, who would have sent envoys along with us, had they not been afraid of offending the Olynthians. These cities, if you interfere forthwith, and with a powerful force, will now revolt from the new confederacy. But if you postpone your interference, and allow time for the confederacy to work, their sentiments will soon alter. They will come to be knit together in attached unity, by the co-burgership, the intermarriage, and the reciprocity of landed possessions, which have already been enacted prospectively. All of them will become convinced that they have a common interest both in belonging to, and in strengthening the confederacy,—just as the Arcadians, when they follow you, Spartans, as allies, are not only enabled to preserve their own property, but also to plunder others. If, by

your delay, the attractive tendencies of the confederacy should come into real operation, you will presently find it not so much within your power to dissolve.[127]"

This speech of the Akanthian envoy is remarkable in more than one respect. Coming from the lips of an enemy, it is the best of all testimonies to the liberal and comprehensive spirit in which the Olynthians were acting. They are accused,—not of injustice, nor of selfish ambition, nor of degrading those around them,—but literally, of organizing a new partnership on principles too generous and too seductive; of gently superseding, instead of violently breaking down, the barriers between the various cities, by reciprocal ties of property and family among the citizens of each; of uniting them all into a new political aggregate, in which not only all would enjoy equal rights, but all without exception would be gainers. The advantage, both in security and in power, accruing prospectively to all, is not only admitted by the orator, but stands in the front of his argument. "Make haste and break up the confederacy (he impresses upon Sparta) before its fruit is ripe, so that the confederates may never taste it nor find out how good it is; for if they do, you will not prevail on them to forego it." By implication, he also admits,—and he says nothing tending even to raise a doubt,—that the cities which he represents, Akanthus and Apollonia, would share along with the rest in this same benefit. But the Grecian political instinct was nevertheless predominant,—"We wish to preserve our paternal laws, and to be a city by ourselves." Thus nakedly is the objection stated; when the question was, not whether Akanthus should lose its freedom and become subject to an imperial city like Athens,—but whether it should become a free and equal member of a larger political aggregate, cemented by every tie which could make union secure, profitable, and dignified. It is curious to observe how perfectly the orator is conscious that this repugnance, though at the moment preponderant, was nevertheless essentially transitory, and would give place to attachment when the union came to be felt as a reality; and how eagerly he appeals to Sparta to lose no time in clenching the repugnance, while it lasted. He appeals to her, not for any beneficial or Pan-hellenic objects, but in the interests of her own dominion, which required that the Grecian world should be as it were pulverized into minute, self-acting, atoms without cohesion,—so that each city, or each village, while protected against subjection to any other, should farther be prevented from equal political union or fusion with any other; being thus more completely helpless and dependent in reference to Sparta.

It was not merely from Akanthus and Apollonia, but also from the dispossessed Macedonian king Amyntas, that envoys reached Sparta to ask for aid against Olynthus. It seems that Amyntas, after having abandoned the kingdom and made his cession to the Olynthians, had obtained some aid from Thessaly and tried to reinstate himself by force. In this scheme he had failed, being defeated by the Olynthians. Indeed we find another person named Argæus, mentioned as competitor for the Macedonian sceptre, and possessing it for two years.[128]

After hearing these petitioners, the Lacedæmonians first declared their own readiness to comply with the prayer, and to put down Olynthus; next, they submitted the same point to the vote of the assembled allies.[129] Among these latter, there was no genuine antipathy against the Olynthians, such as that which had prevailed against Athens before the Peloponnesian war, in the synod then held at Sparta. But the power of Sparta over her allies was now far greater than it had been then. Most of their cities were under oligarchies, dependent upon her support for authority over their fellow-citizens; moreover, the recent events in Bœotia and at Mantinea had operated as a serious intimidation. Anxiety to keep the favor of Sparta was accordingly paramount, so that most of the speakers as well as most of the votes, declared for war,[130] and a combined army of ten thousand men was voted to be raised. To make up such total, a proportional contingent was assessed upon each confederate; combined with the proviso now added for the first time, that each might furnish money instead of men, at the rate of three Æginæan oboli (half an Æginæan drachma) for each hoplite. A cavalry-soldier, to those cities which furnished such, was reckoned as equivalent to four hoplites; a hoplite, as equivalent to two peltasts; or pecuniary contribution on the same scale. All cities in default were made liable to a forfeit of one stater (four drachmæ) per day, for every soldier not sent; the forfeit to be enforced by Sparta.[131] Such licensed substitution of pecuniary payment for personal service, is the same as I have already described to have taken place nearly a century before in the confederacy of Delos under the presidency of Athens.[132] It was a system not likely to be extensively acted upon among the Spartan allies, who were at once poorer and more warlike than those of Athens. But in both cases it was favorable to the ambition of the leading state; and the tendency becomes here manifest, to sanction, by the formality of a public resolution, that increased Lacedæmonian ascendency which had already grown up in practice.

The Akanthian envoys, while expressing their satisfaction with the vote just passed, intimated that the muster of these numerous contingents would occupy some time, and again insisted on the necessity of instant intervention, even with a small force; before the Olynthians could find time to get their plans actually in work or appreciated by the surrounding cities. A moderate Lacedæmonian force (they said), if despatched forthwith, would not only keep those who had refused to join Olynthus, steady to their refusal, but also induce others, who had joined reluctantly, to revolt. Accordingly the ephors appointed Eudamidas at once, assigning to him two thousand hoplites,—Neodamodes (or enfranchised Helots), Periœki, and Skiritæ or Arcadian borderers. Such was the anxiety of the Akanthians for haste, that they would not let him delay even to get together the whole of this moderate force. He was put in march immediately, with such as were ready; while his brother Phœbidas was left behind to collect the remainder and follow him. And it seems that the Akanthians judged correctly. For Eudamidas, arriving in Thrace after a rapid march, though he was unable to contend against the Olynthians in the field, yet induced Potidæa to revolt from them, and was able to defend those cities, such as Akanthus

and Apollonia, which resolutely stood aloof.[133] Amyntas brought a force to coöperate with him.

The delay in the march of Phœbidas was productive of consequences no less momentous than unexpected. The direct line from Peloponnesus to Olynthus lay through the Theban territory; a passage which the Thebans, whatever might have been their wishes, were not powerful enough to refuse, though they had contracted an alliance with Olynthus,[134] and though proclamation was made that no Theban citizens should join the Lacedæmonian force. Eudamidas, having departed at a moment's notice, passed through Bœotia without a halt, in his way to Thrace. But it was known that his brother Phœbidas was presently to follow; and upon this fact the philo-Laconian party in Thebes organized a conspiracy.

They obtained from the ephors, and from the miso-Theban feelings of Agesilaus, secret orders to Phœbidas, that he should coöperate with them in any party movement which they might find opportunity of executing;[135] and when he halted with his detachment near the gymnasium a little way without the walls, they concerted matters as well with him as among themselves. Leontiades, Hypatês, and Archias, were the chiefs of the party in Thebes favorable to Sparta; a party decidedly in minority, yet still powerful, and at this moment so strengthened by the unbounded ascendency of the Spartan name, that Leontiades himself was one of the polemarchs of the city. Of the anti-Spartan, or predominant sentiment in Thebes,—which included most of the wealthy and active citizens, those who came successively into office as hipparchs or generals of the cavalry,[136]—the leaders were Ismenias and Androkleides. The former, especially, the foremost as well as ablest conductor of the late war against Sparta, was now in office as Polemarch, conjointly with his rival Leontiades.

While Ismenias, detesting the Spartans, kept aloof from Phœbidas, Leontiades assiduously courted him and gained his confidence. On the day of the Thesmophoria, [137] a religious festival celebrated by the women apart from the men, during which the acropolis or Kadmeia was consecrated to their exclusive use,—Phœbidas, affecting to have concluded his halt, put himself in march to proceed as if towards Thrace; seemingly rounding the walls of Thebes, but not going into it. The Senate was actually assembled in the portico of the agora, and the heat of a summer's noon had driven every one out of the streets, when Leontiades, stealing away from the Senate, hastened on horseback to overtake Phœbidas, caused him to face about, and conducted the Lacedæmonians straight up to the Kadmeia; the gates of which, as well as those of the town, were opened by his order as polemarch. There were not only no citizens in the streets, but none even in the Kadmeia; no male person being permitted to be present at the feminine Thesmophoria; so that Phœbidas and his army became possessed of the Kadmeia without the smallest opposition. At the same time they became possessed of an acquisition of hardly less importance,—the persons of all the assembled Theban women; who served as hostages for the quiet submission,

however reluctant, of the citizens in the town below. Leontiades handed to Phœbidas the key of the gates, and then descended into the town, giving orders that no man should go up without his order.[138]

The assembled Senate heard with consternation the occupation of the acropolis by Phœbidas. Before any deliberation could be taken among the senators, Leontiades came down to resume his seat. The lochages and armed citizens of his party, to whom he had previously given orders, stood close at hand. "Senators (said he), be not intimidated by the news that the Spartans are in the Kadmeia; for they assure us that they have no hostile purpose against any one who does not court war against them. But I, as polemarch, am empowered by law to seize any one whose behavior is manifestly and capitally criminal. Accordingly, I seize this man Ismenias, as the great inflamer of war. Come forward, captains and soldiers, lay hold of him, and carry him off where your orders direct." Ismenias was accordingly seized and hurried off as a prisoner to the Kadmeia; while the senators, thunderstruck and overawed, offered no resistance. Such of them as were partisans of the arrested polemarch, and many even of the more neutral members, left the Senate and went home, thankful to escape with their lives. Three hundred of them, including Androkleidas, Pelopidas, Mellon, and others, sought safety by voluntary exile to Athens; after which, the remainder of the Senate, now composed of few or none except philo-Spartan partisans, passed a vote formally dismissing Ismenias, and appointing a new polemarch in his place.[139]

This blow of high-handed violence against Ismenias forms a worthy counterpart to the seizure of Theramenes by Kritias,[140] twenty-two years before, in the Senate of Athens under the Thirty. Terror-striking in itself, it was probably accompanied by similar deeds of force against others of the same party. The sudden explosion and complete success of the conspiracy, plotted by the Executive Chief himself, the most irresistible of all conspirators,—the presence of Phœbidas in the Kadmeia, and of a compliant Senate in the town,—the seizure or flight of Ismenias and all his leading partisans,—were more than sufficient to crush all spirit of resistance on the part of the citizens; whose first anxiety probably was, to extricate their wives and daughters from the custody of the Lacedæmonians in the Kadmeia. Having such a price to offer, Leontiades would extort submission the more easily, and would probably procure a vote of the people ratifying the new *régime*, the Spartan alliance, and the continued occupation of the acropolis. Having accomplished the first settlement of his authority, he proceeded without delay to Sparta, to make known the fact that "order reigned" at Thebes.

The news of the seizure of the Kadmeia and of the revolution at Thebes had been received at Sparta with the greatest surprise, as well as with a mixed feeling of shame and satisfaction. Everywhere throughout Greece, probably, it excited a greater sensation than any event since the battle of Ægospotami. Tried by the recognized public law of Greece, it was a flagitious iniquity, for which Sparta had not the shadow

of a pretence. It was even worse than the surprise of Platæa by the Thebans before the Peloponnesian war, which admitted of the partial excuse that war was at any rate impending; whereas in this case, the Thebans had neither done nor threatened anything to violate the peace of Antalkidas. It stood condemned by the indignant sentiment of all Greece, unwillingly testified even by the philo-Laconian Xenophon[141] himself. But it was at the same time an immense accession to Spartan power. It had been achieved with preëminent skill and success; and Phœbidas might well claim to have struck for Sparta the most important blow since Ægospotami, relieving her from one of her two really formidable enemies.[142]

Nevertheless, far from receiving thanks at Sparta, he became the object of wrath and condemnation, both with the ephors and the citizens generally. Every one was glad to throw upon him the odium of the proceeding, and to denounce him as having acted without orders. Even the ephors, who had secretly authorized him beforehand to coöperate generally with the faction at Thebes, having doubtless never given any specific instructions, now indignantly disavowed him. Agesilaus alone stood forward in his defence, contending that the only question was, whether his proceeding at Thebes had been injurious or beneficial to Sparta. If the former, he merited punishment; if the latter, it was always lawful to render service, even *impromptu* and without previous orders.

Tried by this standard, the verdict was not doubtful. For every man at Sparta felt how advantageous the act was in itself; and felt it still more, when Leontiades reached the city, humble in solicitation as well as profuse in promise. In his speech addressed to the assembled ephors and Senate, he first reminded them how hostile Thebes had hitherto been to them, under Ismenias and the party just put down,—and how constantly they had been in jealous alarm, lest Thebes should reconstitute by force the Bœotian federation. "Now (added he) your fears may be at an end; only take as good care to uphold our government, as we shall take to obey your orders. For the future, you will have nothing to do but to send us a short despatch, to get every service which you require.[143]" It was resolved by the Lacedæmonians, at the instance of Agesilaus, to retain their garrison now in the Kadmeia, to uphold Leontiades with his colleagues in the government of Thebes, and to put Ismenias upon his trial. Yet they at the same time, as a sort of atonement to the opinion of Greece, passed a vote of censure on Phœbidas, dismissed him from his command, and even condemned him to a fine. The fine, however, most probably was never exacted; for we shall see by the conduct of Sphodrias afterwards that the displeasure against Phœbidas, if at first genuine, was certainly of no long continuance.

That the Lacedæmonians should at the same time condemn Phœbidas and retain the Kadmeia—has been noted as a gross contradiction. Nevertheless, we ought not to forget, that had they evacuated the Kadmeia, the party of Leontiades at Thebes, which had compromised itself for Sparta as well as for its own aggrandizement, would have been irretrievably sacrificed. The like excuse, if excuse it be, cannot be

urged in respect to their treatment of Ismenias; whom they put upon his trial at Thebes, before a court consisting of three Lacedæmonian commissioners, and one from each allied city. He was accused, probably by Leontiades and his other enemies, of having entered into friendship and conspiracy with the Persian king to the detriment of Greece,[144]—of having partaken in the Persian funds brought into Greece by Timokrates the Rhodian,—and of being the real author of that war which had disturbed Greece from 395 B.C. down to the peace of Antalkidas. After an unavailing defence, he was condemned and executed. Had this doom been inflicted upon him by his political antagonists as a consequence of their intestine victory, it would have been too much in the analogy of Grecian party-warfare to call for any special remark. But there is something peculiarly revolting in the prostitution of judicial solemnity and Pan-hellenic pretence, which the Lacedæmonians here committed. They could have no possible right to try Ismenias as a criminal at all; still less to try him as a criminal on the charge of confederacy with the Persian king,—when they had themselves, only five years before, acted not merely as allies, but even as instruments, of that monarch, in enforcing the peace of Antalkidas. If Ismenias had received money from one Persian satrap, the Spartan Antalkidas had profited in like manner by another,—and for the like purpose too of carrying on Grecian war. The real motive of the Spartans was doubtless to revenge themselves upon this distinguished Theban for having raised against them the war which began in 395 B.C. But the mockery of justice by which that revenge was masked, and the impudence of punishing in him as treason that same foreign alliance with which they had ostentatiously identified themselves, lends a deeper enormity to the whole proceeding.

Leontiades and his partisans were now established as rulers in Thebes, with a Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia to sustain them and execute their orders. The once-haughty Thebes was enrolled as a member of Lacedæmonian confederacy. Sparta was now enabled to prosecute her Olynthian expedition with redoubled vigor. Eudamidas and Amyntas, though they repressed the growth of the Olynthian confederacy, had not been strong enough to put it down; so that a larger force was necessary, and the aggregate of ten thousand men, which had been previously decreed, was put into instant requisition, to be commanded by Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus. The new general, a man of very popular manners, was soon on his march at the head of this large army, which comprised many Theban hoplites as well as horsemen, furnished by the new rulers in their unqualified devotion to Sparta. He sent forward envoys to Amyntas in Macedonia, urging upon him the most strenuous efforts for the purpose of recovering the Macedonian cities which had joined the Olynthians,—and also to Derdas, prince of the district of Upper Macedonia called Elimeia, inviting his coöperation against that insolent city, which would speedily extend her dominion (he contended) from the maritime region to the interior, unless she were put down.[145]

Though the Lacedæmonians were masters everywhere and had their hands free,—though Teleutias was a competent officer with powerful forces,—and though Derdas joined with four hundred excellent Macedonian horse,—yet the conquest of Olynthus was found no easy enterprise.[146] The Olynthian cavalry, in particular, was numerous and efficient. Unable as they were to make head against Teleutias in the field or repress his advance, nevertheless in a desultory engagement which took place near the city gates, they defeated the Lacedæmonian and Theban cavalry, threw even the infantry into confusion, and were on the point of gaining a complete victory, had not Derdas with his cavalry on the other wing, made a diversion which forced them to come back for the protection of the city. Teleutias, remaining master of the field, continued to ravage the Olynthian territory during the summer, for which, however, the Olynthians retaliated by frequent marauding expeditions against the cities in alliance with him.[147]

In the ensuing spring, the Olynthians sustained various partial defeats, especially one near Apollonia, from Derdas. They were more and more confined to their walls; insomuch that Teleutias became confident and began to despise them. Under these dispositions on his part, a body of Olynthian cavalry showed themselves one morning, passed the river near their city, and advanced in calm array towards the Lacedæmonian camp. Indignant at such an appearance of daring, Teleutias directed Tlemonidas with the peltasts to disperse them; upon which the Olynthians slowly retreated, while the peltasts rushed impatiently to pursue them, even when they recrossed the river. No sooner did the Olynthians see that half the peltasts had crossed it, than they suddenly turned, charged them vigorously, and put them to flight with the loss of their commander Tlemonidas and a hundred others. All this passed in sight of Teleutias, who completely lost his temper. Seizing his arms, he hurried forward to cover the fugitives with the hoplites around him, sending orders to all his troops, hoplites, peltasts, and horsemen, to advance also. But the Olynthians, again retreating, drew him on towards the city, with such inconsiderate forwardness, that many of his soldiers ascending the eminence on which the city was situated, rushed close up to the walls.[148] Here, however, they were received by a shower of missiles which forced them to recede in disorder; upon which the Olynthians again sallied forth, probably, from more than one gate at once, and charged them first with cavalry and peltasts, next with hoplites. The Lacedæmonians and their allies, disturbed and distressed by the first, were unable to stand against the compact charge of the last; Teleutias himself, fighting in the foremost ranks, was slain, and his death was a signal for the flight of all around. The whole besieging force dispersed and fled in different directions,—to Akanthus, to Spartôlus, to Potidæa, to Apollonia. So vigorous and effective was the pursuit of the Olynthians, that the loss of the fugitives was immense. The whole army was in fact ruined;[149] for probably many of the allies who escaped became discouraged and went home.

At another time, probably, a victory so decisive might have deterred the Lacedæmonians from farther proceedings, and saved Olynthus. But now, they were so completely masters everywhere else, that they thought only of repairing the dishonor by a still more imposing demonstration. Their king Agesipolis was placed at the head of an expedition on the largest scale; and his name called forth eager coöperation, both in men and money, from the allies. He marched with thirty Spartan counsellors, as Agesilaus had gone to Asia; besides a select body of energetic youth as volunteers, from the Periœki, from the illegitimate sons of Spartans, and from strangers or citizens who had lost their franchise through poverty, introduced as friends of richer Spartan citizens to go through the arduous Lykurgean training.[150] Amyntas and Derdas also were instigated to greater exertions than before, so that Agesipolis was enabled, after receiving their reinforcements in his march through Macedonia, to present himself before Olynthus with an overwhelming force, and to confine the citizens within their walls. He then completed the ravage of their territory, which had been begun by Teleutias; and even took Torônê by storm. But the extreme heat of the summer weather presently brought upon him a fever, which proved fatal in a week's time; although he had caused himself to be carried for repose to the shady grove, and clear waters, near the temple of Dionysus at Aphytis. His body was immersed in honey and transported to Sparta, where it was buried with the customary solemnities.[151]

Polybiades, who succeeded Agesipolis in the command, prosecuted the war with undiminished vigor; and the Olynthians, debarred from their home produce as well as from importation, were speedily reduced to such straits as to be compelled to solicit peace. They were obliged to break up their own federation, and to enrol themselves as sworn members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, with its obligations of service to Sparta.[152] The Olynthian union being dissolved, the component Grecian cities were enrolled severally as allies of Sparta, while the maritime cities of Macedonia were deprived of their neighboring Grecian protector, and passed again under the dominion of Amyntas.

Both the dissolution of this growing confederacy, and the reconstitution of maritime Macedonia, were signal misfortunes to the Grecian world. Never were the arms of Sparta more mischievously or more unwarrantably employed. That a powerful Grecian confederacy should be formed in the Chalkidic peninsula, in the border region where Hellas joined the non-Hellenic tribes,—was an incident of signal benefit to the Hellenic world generally. It would have served as a bulwark to Greece against the neighboring Macedonians and Thracians, at whose expense its conquests, if it made any, would have been achieved. That Olynthus did not oppress her Grecian neighbors—that the principles of her confederacy were of the most equal, generous, and seducing character,—that she employed no greater compulsion than was requisite to surmount an unreflecting instinct of town-autonomy,—and that the very towns who obeyed this instinct would have become sensible themselves, in a very short time, of

the benefits conferred by the confederacy on each and every one,—these are facts certified by the urgency of the reluctant Akanthians, when they entreat Sparta to leave no interval for the confederacy to make its workings felt. Nothing but the intervention of Sparta could have crushed this liberal and beneficent promise; nothing but the accident, that during the three years from 382 to 379 B.C., she was at the maximum of her power and had her hands quite free, with Thebes and its Kadmeia under her garrison. Such prosperity did not long continue unabated. Only a few months after the submission of Olynthus, the Kadmeia was retaken by the Theban exiles, who raised so vigorous a war against Sparta, that she would have been disabled from meddling with Olynthus,—as we shall find illustrated by the fact (hereafter to be recounted), that she declined interfering in Thessaly to protect the Thessalian cities against Jason of Pheræ. Had the Olynthian confederacy been left to its natural working, it might well have united all the Hellenic cities around it in harmonious action, so as to keep the sea coast in possession of a confederacy of free and self-determining communities, confining the Macedonian princes to the interior. But Sparta threw in her extraneous force, alike irresistible and inauspicious, to defeat these tendencies; and to frustrate that salutary change,—from fractional autonomy and isolated action into integral and equal autonomy with collective action,—which Olynthus was laboring to bring about. She gave the victory to Amyntas, and prepared the indispensable basis upon which his son Philip afterwards rose, to reduce not only Olynthus, but Akanthus, Apollonia, and the major part of the Grecian world, to one common level of subjection. Many of those Akanthians, who spurned the boon of equal partnership and free communion with Greeks and neighbors, lived to discover how impotent were their own separate walls as a bulwark against Macedonian neighbors; and to see themselves confounded in that common servitude which the imprudence of their fathers had entailed upon them. By the peace of Antalkidas, Sparta had surrendered the Asiatic Greeks to Persia; by crushing the Olynthian confederacy, she virtually surrendered the Thracian Greeks to the Macedonian princes. Never again did the opportunity occur of placing Hellenism on a firm, consolidated, and self-supporting basis, round the coast of the Thermaic Gulf.

While the Olynthian expedition was going on, the Lacedæmonians were carrying on, under Agesilaus, another intervention within Peloponnesus, against the city of Phlius. It has already been mentioned that certain exiles of this city had recently been recalled, at the express command of Sparta. The ruling party in Phlius had at the same time passed a vote to restore the confiscated property of these exiles; reimbursing out of the public treasury, to those who had purchased it, the price which they had paid,—and reserving all disputed points for judicial decision.[153] The returned exiles now again came to Sparta, to prefer complaint that they could obtain no just restitution of their property; that the tribunals of the city were in the hands of their opponents, many of them directly interested as purchasers, who refused them the right of appealing to any extraneous and impartial authority; and that there were even in the city itself many who thought them wronged. Such allegations were, prob-

ably, more or less founded in truth. At the same time, the appeal to Sparta, abrogating the independence of Phlius, so incensed the ruling Phliasians that they passed a sentence of fine against all the appellants. The latter insisted on this sentence as a fresh count for strengthening their complaints at Sparta; and as a farther proof of anti-Spartan feeling, as well as of high-handed injustice, in the Phliasian rulers.[154] Their cause was warmly espoused by Agesilaus, who had personal relations of hospitality with some of the exiles; while it appears that his colleague, King Agesipolis, was on good terms with the ruling party at Phlius,—had received from them zealous aid, both in men and money, for his Olynthian expedition,—and had publicly thanked them for their devotion to Sparta.[155] The Phliasian government, emboldened by the proclaimed testimonial of Agesipolis, certifying their fidelity, had fancied that they stood upon firm ground, and that no Spartan coërcion would be enforced against them. But the marked favor of Agesipolis, now absent in Thrace, told rather against them in the mind of Agesilaus; pursuant to that jealousy which usually prevailed between the two Spartan kings. In spite of much remonstrance at Sparta, from many who deprecated hostilities against a city of five thousand citizens, for the profit of a handful of exiles,—he not only seconded the proclamation of war against Phlius by the ephors, but also took the command of the army.[156]

The army being mustered, and the border sacrifices favorable, Agesilaus marched with his usual rapidity towards Phlius; dismissing those Phliasian envoys, who met him on the road and bribed or entreated him to desist, with the harsh reply that the government had already deceived Sparta once, and that he would be satisfied with nothing less than the surrender of the acropolis. This being refused, he marched to the city, and blocked it up by a wall of circumvallation. The besieged defended themselves with resolute bravery and endurance, under a citizen named Delphion; who, with a select troop of three hundred, maintained constant guard at every point, and even annoyed the besiegers by frequent sallies. By public decree, every citizen was put upon half-allowance of bread, so that the siege was prolonged to double the time which Agesilaus, from the information of the exiles as to the existing stock of provisions, had supposed to be possible. Gradually, however, famine made itself felt; desertions from within increased, among those who were favorable, or not decidedly averse, to the exiles; desertions, which Agesilaus took care to encourage by an ample supply of food, and by enrolment as Phliasian emigrants on the Spartan side. At length, after about a year's blockade,[157] the provisions within were exhausted, so that the besieged were forced to entreat permission from Agesilaus to despatch envoys to Sparta and beg for terms. Agesilaus granted their request. But being at the same time indignant that they submitted to Sparta rather than to him, he sent to ask the ephors that the terms might be referred to his dictation. Meanwhile he redoubled his watch over the city; in spite of which, Delphion, with one of his most active subordinates, contrived to escape at this last hour. Phlius was now compelled to surrender at discretion to Agesilaus, who named a Council of One Hundred (half from the exiles, half from those within the city) vested with absolute powers of life and death

over all the citizens, and authorized to frame a constitution for the future government of the city. Until this should be done, he left a garrison in the acropolis, with assured pay for six months.[158]

Had Agesipolis been alive, perhaps the Phliasians might have obtained better terms. How the omnipotent Hekatontarchy named by the partisan feelings of Agesilaus,[159] conducted themselves, we do not know. But the presumptions are all unfavorable, seeing that their situation as well as their power was analogous to that of the Thirty at Athens and the Lysandrian Dekarchies elsewhere.

The surrender of Olynthus to Polybiades, and of Phlius to Agesilaus, seem to have taken place nearly at the same time.

CHAPTER LXXVII.

FROM THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY THE LACEDÆMONIANS DOWN TO THE CONGRESS AT SPARTA, AND PARTIAL PEACE, IN 371 B.C.

At the beginning of 379 B.C., the empire of the Lacedæmonians on land had reached a pitch never before paralleled. On the sea, their fleet was but moderately powerful, and they seem to have held divided empire with Athens over the smaller islands; while the larger islands (so far as we can make out) were independent of both. But the whole of inland Greece, both within and without Peloponnesus,—except Argos, Attica, and perhaps the more powerful Thessalian cities,—was now enrolled in the confederacy dependent on Sparta. Her occupation of Thebes, by a Spartan garrison and an oligarchy of local partisans, appeared to place her empire beyond all chance of successful attack; while the victorious close of the war against Olynthus carried everywhere an intimidating sense of her far-reaching power. Her allies, too,—governed as they were in many cases by Spartan harmosts, and by oligarchies whose power rested on Sparta,—were much more dependent upon her than they had been during the time of the Peloponnesian war.

Such a position of affairs rendered Sparta an object of the same mingled fear and hatred (the first preponderant) as had been felt towards imperial Athens fifty years before, when she was designated as the "despot city.[160]" And this sentiment was farther aggravated by the recent peace of Antalkidas, in every sense the work of Sparta; which she had first procured, and afterwards carried into execution. That peace was disgraceful enough, as being dictated by the king of Persia, enforced in his name, and surrendering to him all the Asiatic Greeks. But it became yet more disgraceful when the universal autonomy which it promised was seen to be so executed, as to mean nothing better than subjection to Sparta. Of all the acts yet committed by Sparta, not only in perversion of the autonomy promised to every city, but in violation of all the acknowledged canons of right dealing between city and city,—the most flagrant was, her recent seizure and occupation of the Kadmeia at Thebes. Her subversion (in alliance with, and partly for the benefit of, Amyntas king of Macedonia) of the free Olynthian confederacy was hardly less offensive to every Greek of large or Pan-hellenic patriotism. She appeared as the confederate of the Persian king on one side, of Amyntas the Macedonian, on another, of the Syracusan despot Dionysius on a third,—as betraying the independence of Greece to the foreigner, and seeking to put down, everywhere within it, that free spirit which stood in the way of her own harmosts and partisan oligarchies.

Unpopular as Sparta was, however, she stood out incontestably as the head of Greece. No man dared to call into question her headship, or to provoke resistance against it. The tone of patriotic and free-spoken Greeks at this moment is manifested

in two eminent residents at Athens,—Lysias and Isokrates. Of these two rhetors, the former composed an oration which he publicly read at Olympia during the celebration of the 99th Olympiad, B.C. 384, three years after the peace of Antalkidas. In this oration (of which unhappily only a fragment remains, preserved by Dionysius of Halikarnassus), Lysias raises the cry of danger to Greece, partly from the Persian king, partly from the despot Dionysius of Syracuse.[161] He calls upon all Greeks to lay aside hostility and jealousies one with the other, and to unite in making head against these two really formidable enemies, as their ancestors had previously done, with equal zeal for putting down despots and for repelling the foreigner. He notes the number of Greeks (in Asia) handed over to the Persian king, whose great wealth would enable him to hire an indefinite number of Grecian soldiers, and whose naval force was superior to anything which the Greeks could muster; while the strongest naval force in Greece was that of the Syracusan Dionysius. Recognizing the Lacedæmonians as chiefs of Greece, Lysias expresses his astonishment that they should quietly permit the fire to extend itself from one city to another. They ought to look upon the misfortunes of those cities which had been destroyed, both by the Persians and by Dionysius, as coming home to themselves; not to wait patiently, until the two hostile powers had united their forces to attack the centre of Greece, which yet remained independent.

Of the two common enemies,—Artaxerxes and Dionysius,—whom Lysias thus denounces, the latter had sent to this very Olympic festival a splendid Theôry, or legation to offer solemn sacrifice in his name; together with several chariots to contend in the race, and some excellent rhapsodes to recite poems composed by himself. The Syracusan legation, headed by Thearides, brother of Dionysius, were clothed with rich vestments, and lodged in a tent of extraordinary magnificence, decorated with gold and purple; such, probably, as had not been seen since the ostentatious display made by Alkibiades[162] in the ninetieth Olympiad (B.C. 420). While instigating the spectators present to exert themselves as Greeks for the liberation of their fellow-Greeks enslaved by Dionysius, Lysias exhorted them to begin forthwith their hostile demonstration against the latter, by plundering the splendid tent before them, which insulted the sacred plain of Olympia with the spectacle of wealth extorted from Grecian sufferers. It appears that this exhortation was partially, but only partially, acted upon.[163] Some persons assailed the tents, but were, probably, restrained by the Eleian superintendents without difficulty. Yet the incident, taken in conjunction with the speech of Lysias, helps us to understand the apprehensions and sympathies which agitated the Olympic crowd in B.C. 384. This was the first Olympic festival after the peace of Antalkidas; a festival memorable, not only because it again brought thither Athenians, Bœotians, Corinthians, and Argeians, who must have been prevented by the preceding war from coming either in B.C. 388 or in B.C. 392,—but also as it exhibited the visitors and Theôries from the Asiatic Greeks, for the first time since they had been handed over by Sparta to the Persians,—and the like also from those numerous Italians and Sicilian Greeks whom Dionysius had enslaved. All these

sufferers, especially the Asiatics, would doubtless be full of complaints respecting the hardships of their new lot, and against Sparta as having betrayed them; complaints, which would call forth genuine sympathy in the Athenians, Thebans, and all others who had submitted reluctantly to the peace of Antalkidas. There was thus a large body of sentiment prepared to respond to the declamations of Lysias. And many a Grecian patriot, who would be ashamed to lay hands on the Syracusan tents or envoys, would yet yield a mournful assent to the orator's remark, that the free Grecian world was on fire[164] at both sides; that Asiatics, Italians, and Sicilians, had already passed into the hands of Artaxerxes and Dionysius; and that, if these two formidable enemies should coalesce, the liberties even of central Greece would be in great danger.

It is easy to see how much such feeling of grief and shame would tend to raise antipathy against Sparta. Lysias, in that portion of his speech which we possess, disguises his censure against her under the forms of surprise. But Isokrates, who composed an analogous discourse four years afterwards (which may perhaps have been read at the next Olympic festival of B.C. 380), speaks out more plainly. He denounces the Lacedæmonians as traitors to the general security and freedom of Greece, and as seconding foreign kings as well as Grecian despots to aggrandize themselves at the cost of autonomous Grecian cities,—all in the interest of their own selfish ambition. No wonder (he says) that the free and self-acting Hellenic world was every day becoming contracted into a narrower space, when the presiding city Sparta assisted Artaxerxes, Amyntas, and Dionysius to absorb it,—and herself undertook unjust aggressions against Thebes, Olynthus, Phlius, and Mantinea.[165]

The preceding citations, from Lysias and Isokrates, would be sufficient to show the measure which intelligent contemporaries took, both of the state of Greece and of the conduct of Sparta, during the eight years succeeding the peace of Antalkidas (387-379 B.C.). But the philo-Laconian Xenophon is still more emphatic in his condemnation of Sparta. Having described her triumphant and seemingly unassailable position after the subjugation of Olynthus and Phlius, he proceeds to say,[166]—"I could produce numerous other incidents, both in and out of Greece, to prove that the gods take careful note of impious men and of evil-doers; but the events which I am now about to relate are quite sufficient. The Lacedæmonians, who had sworn to leave each city autonomous, having violated their oaths by seizing the citadel of Thebes, were punished by the very men whom they had wronged,—though no one on earth had ever before triumphed over them. And the Theban faction who had introduced them into the citadel, with the deliberate purpose that their city should be enslaved to Sparta in order that they might rule despotically themselves,—were put down by no more than seven assailants, among the exiles whom they had banished."

What must have been the hatred, and sense of abused ascendency, entertained towards Sparta by neutral or unfriendly Greeks, when Xenophon, alike conspicuous for his partiality to her and for his dislike of Thebes, could employ these decisive

words in ushering in the coming phase of Spartan humiliation, representing it as a well-merited judgment from the gods? The sentence which I have just translated marks, in the commonplace manner of the Xenophontic Hellenica, the same moment of pointed contrast and transition,—past glory suddenly and unexpectedly darkened by supervening misfortune,—which is foreshadowed in the narrative of Thucydides by the dialogue between the Athenian envoys and the Melian[167] council; or in the Œdipus and Antigonê of Sophokles,[168] by the warnings of the prophet Teiresias.

The government of Thebes had now been for three years (since the blow struck by Phœbidas) in the hands of Leontiades and his oligarchical partisans, upheld by the Spartan garrison in the Kadmeia. Respecting the details of its proceedings we have scarce any information. We can only (as above remarked) judge of it by the analogy of the Thirty tyrants at Athens, and of the Lysandrian Dekarchies, to which it was exactly similar in origin, position, and interests. That the general spirit of it must have been cruel, oppressive, and rapacious,—we cannot doubt; though in what degree we have no means of knowing. The appetites of uncontrolled rulers, as well as those of a large foreign garrison, would ensure such a result; besides which, those rulers must have been in constant fear of risings or conspiracies amidst a body of high-spirited citizens who saw their city degraded, from being the chief of the Bœotian federation, into nothing better than a captive dependency of Sparta. Such fear was aggravated by the vicinity of a numerous body of Theban exiles, belonging to the opposite or anti-Spartan party; three or four hundred of whom had fled to Athens at the first seizure of their leader Ismenias, and had been doubtless joined subsequently by others. So strongly did the Theban rulers apprehend mischief from these exiles, that they hired assassins to take them off by private murder at Athens; and actually succeeded in thus killing Androkleidas, chief of the band and chief successor of the deceased Ismenias,—though they missed their blows at the rest.[169] And we may be sure that they made the prison in Thebes subservient to multiplied enormities and executions, when we read not only that one hundred and fifty prisoners were found in it when the government was put down,[170] but also that in the fervor of that revolutionary movement, the slain gaoler was an object of such fierce antipathy, that his corpse was trodden and spit upon by a crowd of Theban women.[171] In Thebes, as in other Grecian cities, the women not only took no part in political disputes, but rarely even showed themselves in public;[172] so that this furious demonstration of vindictive sentiment must have been generated by the loss or maltreatment of sons, husbands, and brothers.

The Theban exiles found at Athens not only secure shelter, but genuine sympathy with their complaints against Lacedæmonian injustice. The generous countenance which had been shown by the Thebans, twenty-four years before, to Thrasybulus and the other Athenian refugees, during the omnipotence of the Thirty, was now gratefully requited under this reversal of fortune to both cities;[173] and requited too in defiance of the menaces of Sparta, who demanded that the exiles should be ex-

pelled,—as she had in the earlier occasion demanded that the Athenian refugees should be dismissed from Thebes. To protect these Theban exiles, however, was all that Athens could do. Their restoration was a task beyond her power,—and seemingly yet more beyond their own. For the existing government of Thebes was firmly seated, and had the citizens completely under control. Administered by a small faction, Archias, Philippus, Hypatês, and Leontiades (among whom the first two were at this moment polemarchs, though the last was the most energetic and resolute)—it was at the same time sustained by the large garrison of fifteen hundred Lacedæmonians and allies,[174] under Lysanoridas and two other harmosts, in the Kadmeia,—as well as by the Lacedæmonian posts in the other Bœotian cities around,—Orchomenus, Thespiæ, Platæa, Tanagra, etc. Though the general body of Theban sentiment in the city was decidedly adverse to the government, and though the young men while exercising in the palæstra (gymnastic exercises being more strenuously prosecuted at Thebes than anywhere else except at Sparta) kept up by private communication the ardor of an earnest, but compressed, patriotism,—yet all manifestation or assemblage was forcibly kept down, and the commanding posts of the lower town, as well as the citadel, were held in vigilant occupation by the ruling minority.[175]

For a certain time the Theban exiles at Athens waited in hopes of some rising at home, or some positive aid from the Athenians. At length, in the third winter after their flight, they began to despair of encouragement from either quarter, and resolved to take the initiative upon themselves. Among them were numbered several men of the richest and highest families at Thebes, proprietors of chariots, jockeys, and training establishments, for contending at the various festivals: Pelopidas, Mellon, Damokleidas, Theopompus, Pherenikus, and others.[176]

Of these the most forward in originating aggressive measures, though almost the youngest, was Pelopidas; whose daring and self-devotion, in an enterprise which seemed utterly desperate, soon communicated itself to a handful of his comrades. The exiles, keeping up constant private correspondence with their friends in Thebes, felt assured of the sympathy of the citizens generally, if they could once strike a blow. Yet nothing less would be sufficient than the destruction of the four rulers, Leontiades and his colleagues,—nor would any one within the city devote himself to so hopeless a danger. It was this conspiracy which Pelopidas, Mellon, and five or ten other exiles (the entire band is differently numbered, by some as seven, by others, twelve[177]) undertook to execute. Many of their friends in Thebes came in as auxiliaries to them, who would not have embarked in the design as primary actors. Of all auxiliaries, the most effective and indispensable was Phyllidas, the secretary of the polemarchs; next to him, Charon, an eminent and earnest patriot. Phyllidas, having been despatched to Athens on official business, entered into secret conference with the conspirators, concerted with them the day for their coming to Thebes, and even engaged to provide for them access to the persons of the polemarchs. Charon not only promised them concealment in his house, from their first coming within the

gates until the moment of striking their blow should have arrived,—but also entered his name to share in the armed attack. Nevertheless, in spite of such partial encouragements, the plan still appeared desperate to many who wished heartily for its success. Epaminondas, for example,—who now for the first time comes before us,—resident at Thebes, and not merely sympathizing with the political views of Pelopidas, but also bound to him by intimate friendship,—dissuaded others from the attempt, and declined participating in it. He announced distinctly that he would not become an accomplice in civil bloodshed. It appears that there were men among the exiles whose violence made him fear that they would not, like Pelopidas, draw the sword exclusively against Leontiades and his colleagues, but would avail themselves of success to perpetrate unmeasured violence against other political enemies.[178]

The day for the enterprise was determined by Phyllidas the secretary, who had prepared an evening banquet for Archias and Philippus, in celebration of the period when they were going out of office as polemarchs,—and who had promised on that occasion to bring into their company some women remarkable for beauty, as well as of the best families in Thebes.[179] In concert with the general body of Theban exiles at Athens, who held themselves ready on the borders of Attica, together with some Athenian sympathizers, to march to Thebes the instant that they should receive intimation,—and in concert also with two out of the ten Stratêgi of Athens, who took on themselves privately to countenance the enterprise, without any public vote,—Pelopidas and Mellon, and their five companions,[180] crossed Kithæron from Athens to Thebes. It was wet weather, about December B.C. 379; they were disguised as rustics or hunters, with no other arms than a concealed dagger; and they got within the gates of Thebes one by one at nightfall, just when the latest farming men were coming home from their fields. All of them arrived safe at the house of Charon, the appointed rendezvous.

It was, however, by mere accident that they had not been turned back, and the whole scheme frustrated. For a Theban named Hipposthenidas, friendly to the conspiracy, but faint-hearted, who had been let into the secret against the will of Phyllidas,—became so frightened as the moment of execution approached, that he took upon himself, without the knowledge of the rest, to despatch Chlidon, a faithful slave of Mellon, ordering him to go forth on horseback from Thebes, to meet his master on the road, and to desire that he and his comrades would go back to Attica, since circumstances had happened to render the project for the moment impracticable. Chlidon, going home to fetch his bridle, but not finding it in its usual place, asked his wife where it was. The woman, at first pretending to look for it, at last confessed that she had lent it to a neighbor. Chlidon became so irritated with this delay, that he got into a loud altercation with his wife, who on her part wished him ill luck with his journey. He at last beat her, until neighbors ran in to interpose. His departure was thus accidentally frustrated, so that the intended message of countermand never reached the conspirators on their way.[181]

In the house of Charon they remained concealed all the ensuing day, on the evening of which the banquet of Archias and Philippus was to take place. Phyllidas had laid his plan for introducing them at that banquet, at the moment when the two polemarchs had become full of wine, in female attire, as being the women whose visit was expected. The hour had nearly arrived, and they were preparing to play their parts, when an unexpected messenger knocked at the door, summoning Charon instantly into the presence of the polemarchs. All within were thunderstruck with the summons, which seemed to imply that the plot had been divulged, perhaps by the timid Hipposthenidas. It was agreed among them that Charon must obey at once. Nevertheless, he himself, even in the perilous uncertainty which beset him, was most of all apprehensive lest the friends whom he had sheltered should suspect him of treachery towards themselves and their cause. Before departing, therefore, he sent for his only son, a youth of fifteen, and of conspicuous promise in every way. This youth he placed in the hands of Pelopidas, as a hostage for his own fidelity. But Pelopidas and the rest, vehemently disclaiming all suspicion, entreated Charon to put his son away, out of the reach of that danger in which all were now involved. Charon, however, could not be prevailed on to comply, and left his son among them to share the fate of the rest. He went into the presence of Archias and Philippus; whom he found already half-intoxicated, but informed, by intelligence from Athens, that some plot, they knew not by whom, was afloat. They had sent for him to question him, as a known friend of the exiles; but he had little difficulty, aided by the collusion of Phyllidas, in blinding the vague suspicions of drunken men, anxious only to resume their conviviality.[182] He was allowed to retire and rejoin his friends. Nevertheless, soon after his departure,—so many were the favorable chances which befel these improvident men,—a fresh message was delivered to Archias the polemarch, from his namesake Archias the Athenian Hierophant, giving an exact account of the names and scheme of the conspirators, which had become known to the philo-Laconian party at Athens. The messenger who bore this despatch delivered it to Archias with an intimation, that it related to very serious matters. "Serious matters for to-morrow," said the polemarch, as he put the despatch, unopened and unread, under the pillow of the couch on which he was reclining.[183]

Returning to their carousal, Archias and Philippus impatiently called upon Phyllidas to introduce the women according to his promise. Upon this the secretary retired, and brought the conspirators, clothed in female attire, into an adjoining chamber; then going back to the polemarchs, he informed them that the women would not come in unless all the domestics were first dismissed. An order was forthwith given that these latter should depart, while Phyllidas took care that they should be well provided with wine at the lodging of one among their number. The polemarchs were thus left only with one or two friends at table, half-intoxicated as well as themselves; among them Kabeirichus, the archon of the year, who always throughout his term kept the consecrated spear of office in actual possession, and had it at that moment close to his person. Phyllidas now conducted the pretended women into the

banqueting-room; three of them attired as ladies of distinction, the four others following as female attendants. Their long veils, and ample folds of clothing, were quite sufficient as disguise,—even had the guests at table been sober,—until they sat down by the side of the polemarchs; and the instant of lifting their veils was the signal for using their daggers. Archias and Philippus were slain at once and with little resistance; but Kabeirichus with his spear tried to defend himself, and thus perished with the others, though the conspirators had not originally intended to take his life.[184]

Having been thus far successful, Phyllidas conducted three of the conspirators,—Pelopidas, Kephisodôrus, and Damokleidas,—to the house of Leontiades, into which he obtained admittance by announcing himself as the bearer of an order from the polemarchs. Leontiades was reclining after supper, with his wife sitting spinning wool by his side, when they entered his chamber. Being a brave and powerful man, he started up, seized his sword, and mortally wounded Kephisodôrus in the throat; a desperate struggle then ensued between him and Pelopidas in the narrow doorway, where there was no room for a third to approach. At length, however, Pelopidas overthrew and killed him, after which they retired, enjoining the wife with threats to remain silent, and closing the door after them with peremptory commands that it should not be again opened. They then went to the house of Hypatês, whom they slew while he attempted to escape over the roof.[185]

The four great rulers of the philo-Laconian party in Thebes having been now put to death, Phyllidas proceeded with the conspirators to the prison. Here the gaoler, a confidential agent in the oppressions of the deceased governors, hesitated to admit him; but was slain by a sudden thrust with his spear, so as to ensure free admission to all. To liberate the prisoners, probably, for the most part men of kindred politics with the conspirators,—to furnish them with arms taken from the battle-spoils hanging up in the neighboring porticos,—and to range them in battle order near the temple of Amphion,—were the next proceedings; after which they began to feel some assurance of safety and triumph.[186] Epaminondas and Gorgidas, apprised of what had occurred, were the first who appeared in arms with a few friends to sustain the cause; while proclamation was everywhere made aloud, through heralds, that the despots were slain,—that Thebes was free,—and that all Thebans who valued freedom should muster in arms in the market-place. There were at that moment in Thebes many trumpeters who had come to contend for the prize at the approaching festival of the Herakleia. Hipposthenidas engaged these men to blow their trumpets in different parts of the city, and thus everywhere to excite the citizens to arms.[187]

Although during the darkness surprise was the prevalent feeling, and no one knew what to do,—yet so soon as day dawned, and the truth became known, there was but one feeling of joy and patriotic enthusiasm among the majority of the citizens.[188] Both horsemen and hoplites hastened in arms to the agora. Here for the first time since the seizure of the Kadmeia by Phœbidas, a formal assembly of the Theban people was convened, before which Pelopidas and his fellow-conspirators

presented themselves. The priests of the city crowned them with wreaths, and thanked them in the name of the local gods; while the assembly hailed them with acclamations of delight and gratitude, nominating with one voice Pelopidas, Mellon, and Charon, as the first renewed Bœotarchs.[189] The revival of this title, which had been dropped since the peace of Antalkidas, was in itself an event of no mean significance; implying not merely that Thebes had waked up again into freedom, but that the Bœotian confederacy also had been, or would be, restored.

Messengers had been forthwith despatched by the conspirators to Attica to communicate their success; upon which all the remaining exiles, with the two Athenian generals privy to the plot, and a body of Athenian volunteers, or *corps francs*, all of whom were ready on the borders awaiting the summons,—flocked to Thebes to complete the work. The Spartan generals, on their side also, sent to Platæa and Thespiæ for aid. During the whole night, they had been distracted and alarmed by the disturbance in the city; lights showing themselves here and there, with trumpets sounding and shouts for the recent success.[190] Apprised speedily of the slaughter of the polemarchs, from whom they had been accustomed to receive orders, they knew not whom to trust or to consult, while they were doubtless beset by affrighted fugitives of the now defeated party, who would hurry up the Kadmeia for safety. They reckoned at first on a diversion in their favor from the forces at Platæa and Thespiæ. But these forces were not permitted even to approach the city gate; being vigorously charged, as soon as they came in sight, by the newly-mustered Theban cavalry, and forced to retreat with loss. The Lacedæmonians in the citadel were thus not only left without support, but saw their enemies in the city reinforced by the other exiles, and by the auxiliary volunteers.[191]

Meanwhile, Pelopidas and the other new Bœotarchs found themselves at the head of a body of armed citizens, full of devoted patriotism and unanimous in hailing the recent revolution. They availed themselves of this first burst of fervor to prepare for storming the Kadmeia without delay, knowing the importance of forestalling all aid from Sparta. And the citizens were already rushing up to the assault,—proclamation being made of large rewards to those who should first force their way in,—when the Lacedæmonian commander sent proposals for a capitulation.[192] Undisturbed egress from Thebes, with the honors of war, being readily guaranteed to him by oath, the Kadmeia was then surrendered. As the Spartans were marching out of the gates, many Thebans of the defeated party came forth also. But against these latter the exasperation of the victors was so ungovernable, that several of the most odious were seized as they passed, and put to death; in some cases, even their children along with them. And more of them would have been thus despatched, had not the Athenian auxiliaries, with generous anxiety, exerted every effort to get them out of sight and put them into safety.[193] We are not told,—nor is it certain,—that these Thebans were protected under the capitulation. Even had they been so, however, the wrathful impulse might still have prevailed against them. Of the three harmosts who

thus evacuated the Kadmeia without a blow, two were put to death, the third was heavily fined and banished, by the authorities at Sparta.[194] We do not know what the fortifications of the Kadmeia were, nor how far it was provisioned. But we can hardly wonder that these officers were considered to have dishonored the Lacedæmonian arms, by making no attempt to defend it; when we recollect that hardly more than four or five days would be required to procure adequate relief from home,—and that forty-three years afterwards, the Macedonian garrison in the same place maintained itself against the Thebans in the city for more than fourteen days, until the return of Alexander from Illyria.[195] The first messenger who brought news to Sparta of the conspiracy and revolution at Thebes, appears to have communicated at the same time that the garrison had evacuated the Kadmeia and was in full retreat, with a train of Theban exiles from the defeated party.[196]

This revolution at Thebes came like an electric shock upon the Grecian world. With a modern reader, the assassination of the four leaders, in their houses and at the banquet, raises a sentiment of repugnance which withdraws his attention from the other features of this memorable deed. Now an ancient Greek not only had no such repugnance, but sympathized with the complete revenge for the seizure of the Kadmeia and the death of Ismenias; while he admired, besides, the extraordinary personal daring of Pelopidas and Mellon,—the skilful forecast of the plot,—and the sudden overthrow, by a force so contemptibly small, of a government which the day before seemed unassailable.[197] It deserves note that we here see the richest men in Thebes undertaking a risk, single-handed and with their own persons, which must have appeared on a reasonable estimate little less than desperate. From the Homeric Odysseus and Achilles down to the end of free Hellenism, the rich Greek strips in the Palæstra,[198] and exposes his person in the ranks as a soldier like the poorest citizens; being generally superior to them in strength and bodily efficiency.

As the revolution in Thebes acted forcibly on the Grecian mind from the manner in which it was accomplished, so by its positive effects it altered forthwith the balance of power in Greece. The empire of Sparta, far from being undisputed and nearly universal over Greece, is from henceforward only maintained by more or less effort, until at length it is completely overthrown.[199]

The exiles from Thebes, arriving at Sparta, inflamed both the ephors, and the miso-Theban Agesilaus, to the highest pitch. Though it was then the depth of winter, [200] an expedition was decreed forthwith against Thebes, and the allied contingents were summoned. Agesilaus declined to take the command of it, on the ground that he was above sixty years of age, and therefore no longer liable to compulsory foreign service. But this (says Xenophon[201]) was not his real reason. He was afraid that his enemies at Sparta would say,—"Here is Agesilaus again putting us to expense, in order that he may uphold despots in other cities,"—as he had just done, and had been reproached with doing, at Phlius; a second proof that the reproaches against Sparta (which I have cited a few pages above from Lysias and Isokrates) of allying herself

with Greek despots as well as with foreigners to put down Grecian freedom, found an echo even in Sparta herself. Accordingly Kleombrotus, the other king of Sparta, took the command. He had recently succeeded his brother Agesipolis, and had never commanded before.

Kleombrotus conducted his army along the Isthmus of Corinth through Megara to Platæa, cutting to pieces an outpost of Thebans, composed chiefly of the prisoners set free by the recent revolution, who had been placed for the defence of the intervening mountain-pass. From Platæa he went forward to Thespiæ, and from thence to Kynoskephalæ in the Theban territory, where he lay encamped for sixteen days; after which he retreated to Thespiæ. It appears that he did nothing, and that his inaction was the subject of much wonder in his army, who are said to have even doubted whether he was really and earnestly hostile to Thebes. Perhaps the exiles, with customary exaggeration, may have led him to hope that they could provoke a rising in Thebes, if he would only come near. At any rate the bad weather must have been a serious impediment to action; since in his march back to Peloponnesus through Kreusis and Ægosthenæ the wind blew a hurricane, so that his soldiers could not proceed without leaving their shields and coming back afterwards to fetch them. Kleombrotus did not quit Bœotia, however, without leaving Sphodrias as harmost at Thespiæ, with one third of the entire army, and with a considerable sum of money to employ in hiring mercenaries and acting vigorously against the Thebans. [202]

The army of Kleombrotus, in its march from Megara to Platæa, had passed by the skirts of Attica; causing so much alarm to the Athenians, that they placed Chabrias with a body of peltasts, to guard their frontier and the neighboring road through Eleutheræ into Bœotia. This was the first time that a Lacedæmonian army had touched Attica (now no longer guarded by the lines of Corinth, as in the war between 394 and 388 B.C.) since the retirement of king Pausanias in 404 B.C.; furnishing a proof of the exposure of the country, such as to revive in the Athenian mind all the terrible recollections of Dekeleia and the Peloponnesian war. It was during the first prevalence of this alarm,—and seemingly while Kleombrotus was still with his army at Thespiæ or Kynoskephalæ, close on the Athenian frontier,—that three Lacedæmonian envoys, Etymoklês and two others, arrived at Athens to demand satisfaction for the part taken by the two Athenian generals and the Athenian volunteers, in concerting and aiding the enterprise of Pelopidas and his comrades. So overpowering was the anxiety in the public mind to avoid giving offence to Sparta, that these two generals were both of them accused before the dikastery. The first of them was condemned and executed; the second, profiting by this warning (since, pursuant to the psephism of Kannônus,[203] the two would be put on trial separately), escaped, and a sentence of banishment was passed against him.[204] These two generals had been unquestionably guilty of a grave abuse of their official functions. They had brought the state into public hazard, not merely without consulting the senate or assembly,

but even without taking the sense of their own board of Ten. Nevertheless the severity of the sentence pronounced indicates the alarm, as well as the displeasure, of the general body of Athenians; while it served as a disclaimer in fact, if not in form, of all political connection with Thebes.[205]

Even before the Lacedæmonian envoys had quitted Athens, however, an incident, alike sudden and memorable, completely altered the Athenian temper. The Lacedæmonian harmost Sphodrias (whom Kleombrotus had left at Thespiæ to prosecute the war against Thebes), being informed that Peiræus on its land side was without gates or night watch,—since there was no suspicion of attack,—conceived the idea of surprising it by a night-march from Thespiæ, and thus of mastering at one stroke the commerce, the wealth, and the naval resources of Athens. Putting his troops under march one evening after an early supper, he calculated on reaching the Peiræus the next morning before daylight. But his reckoning proved erroneous. Morning overtook him when he had advanced no farther than the Thriasian plain near Eleusis; from whence, as it was useless to proceed farther, he turned back and retreated to Thespiæ; not, however, without committing various acts of plunder against the neighboring Athenian residents.

This plan against Peiræus appears to have been not ill conceived. Had Sphodrias been a man competent to organize and execute movements as rapid as those of Brasidas, there is no reason why it might not have succeeded; in which case the whole face of the war would have been changed, since the Lacedæmonians, if once masters of Peiræus, both could and would have maintained the place. But it was one of those injustices, which no one ever commends until it has been successfully consummated,—"consilium quod non potest laudari nisi peractum.[206]" As it failed, it has been considered, by critics as well as by contemporaries, not merely as a crime but as a fault, and its author Sphodrias as a brave man, but singularly weak and hotheaded.[207] Without admitting the full extent of this censure, we may see that his present aggression grew out of an untoward emulation of the glory which Phœbidas, in spite of the simulated or transient displeasure of his countrymen, had acquired by seizing the Kadmeia. That Sphodrias received private instructions from Kleombrotus (as Diodorus states) is not sufficiently proved; while the suspicion, intimated by Xenophon as being abroad, that he was wrought upon by secret emissaries and bribes from his enemies the Thebans, for the purpose of plunging Athens into war with Sparta, is altogether improbable;[208] and seems merely an hypothesis suggested by the consequences of the act,—which were such, that if his enemies had bribed him, he could not have served them better.

The presence of Sphodrias and his army in the Thriasian plain was communicated shortly after daybreak at Athens, where it excited no less terror than surprise. Every man instantly put himself under arms for defence; but news soon arrived that the invader had retired. When thus reassured, the Athenians passed from fear to indignation. The Lacedæmonian envoys, who were lodging at the house of Kallias the prox-

enus of Sparta, were immediately put under arrest and interrogated. But all three affirmed that they were not less astonished, and not less exasperated, by the march of Sphodrias, than the Athenians themselves; adding, by way of confirmation, that had they been really privy to any design of seizing the Peiræus, they would have taken care not to let themselves be found in the city, and in their ordinary lodging at the house of the proxenus, where of course their persons would be at once seized. They concluded by assuring the Athenians, that Sphodrias would not only be indignantly disavowed, but punished capitally, at Sparta. And their reply was deemed so satisfactory, that they were allowed to depart; while an Athenian embassy was sent to Sparta, to demand the punishment of the offending general.[209]

The Ephors immediately summoned Sphodrias home to Sparta, to take his trial on a capital charge. So much did he himself despair of his case, that he durst not make his appearance; while the general impression was, both at Sparta and elsewhere, that he would certainly be condemned. Nevertheless, though thus absent and undefended, he was acquitted, purely through private favor and esteem for his general character. He was of the party of Kleombrotus, so that all the friends of that prince espoused his cause, as a matter of course. But as he was of the party opposed to Agesilaus, his friends dreaded that the latter would declare against him, and bring about his condemnation. Nothing saved Sphodrias except the peculiar intimacy between his son Kleonymus and Archidamus son of Agesilaus. The mournful importunity of Archidamus induced Agesilaus, when this important cause was brought before the Senate of Sparta, to put aside his judicial conviction, and give his vote in the following manner: "To be sure, Sphodrias is guilty; upon that there cannot be two opinions. Nevertheless, we cannot put to death a man like him, who, as boy, youth, and man, has stood unblemished in all Spartan honor. Sparta cannot part with soldiers like Sphodrias.[210]" The friends of Agesilaus, following this opinion and coinciding with those of Kleombrotus, ensured a favorable verdict. And it is remarkable, that Etymoklês himself, who as envoy at Athens had announced as a certainty that Sphodrias would be put to death,—as senator and friend of Agesilaus voted for his acquittal.[211]

This remarkable incident (which comes to us from a witness not merely philo-Laconian, but also personally intimate with Agesilaus) shows how powerfully the course of justice at Sparta was overruled by private sympathy and interests,—especially, those of the two kings. It especially illustrates what has been stated in a former chapter respecting the oppressions exercised by the Spartan harmosts and the dekadarchies, for which no redress was attainable at Sparta. Here was a case where not only the guilt of Sphodrias stood confessed, but in which also his acquittal was sure to be followed by a war with Athens. If, under such circumstances, the Athenian demand for redress was overruled by the favor of the two kings, what chance was there of any justice to the complaint of a dependent city, or an injured individual, against the harmost? The contrast between Spartan and Athenian proceeding is also

instructive. Only a few days before, the Athenians condemned, at the instance of Sparta, their two generals who had without authority lent aid to the Theban exiles. In so doing, the Athenian dikastery enforced the law against clear official misconduct,—and that, too, in a case where their sympathies went along with the act, though their fear of a war with Sparta was stronger. But the most important circumstance to note is, that at Athens there is neither private influence, nor kingly influence, capable of overruling the sincere judicial conscience of a numerous and independent dikastery.

The result of the acquittal of Sphodrias must have been well known beforehand to all parties at Sparta. Even by the general voice of Greece, the sentence was denounced as iniquitous.[212] But the Athenians, who had so recently given strenuous effect to the remonstrances of Sparta against their own generals, were stung by it to the quick; and only the more stung, in consequence of the extraordinary compliments to Sphodrias on which the acquittal was made to turn. They immediately contracted hearty alliance with Thebes, and made vigorous preparations for war against Sparta both by land and sea. After completing the fortifications of Peiræus, so as to place it beyond the reach of any future attempt, they applied themselves to the building of new ships of war, and to the extension of their naval ascendency, at the expense of Sparta.[213]

From this moment, a new combination began in Grecian politics. The Athenians thought the moment favorable to attempt the construction of a new confederacy, analogous to the Confederacy of Delos, formed a century before; the basis on which had been reared the formidable Athenian empire, lost at the close of the Peloponnesian war. Towards such construction there was so far a tendency, that Athens had already a small body of maritime allies; while rhetors like Isokrates (in his Panegyrical Discourse, published two years before) had been familiarizing the public mind with larger ideas. But the enterprise was now pressed with the determination and vehemence of men smarting under recent insult. The Athenians had good ground to build upon; since, while the discontent against the ascendency of Sparta was widely spread, the late revolution in Thebes had done much to lessen that sentiment of fear upon which such ascendency chiefly rested. To Thebes, the junction with Athens was preëminently welcome, and her leaders gladly enrolled their city as a constituent member of the new confederacy.[214] They cheerfully acknowledged the presidency of Athens,—reserving, however, tacitly or expressly, their own rights as presidents of the Bœotian federation, as soon as that could be reconstituted; which reconstitution was at this moment desirable even for Athens, seeing that the Bœotian towns were now dependent allies of Sparta under harmosts and oligarchies.

The Athenians next sent envoys round to the principal islands and maritime cities in the Ægean, inviting all of them to an alliance on equal and honorable terms. The principles were in the main the same as those upon which the confederacy of Delos had been formed against the Persians, almost a century before. It was proposed that

a congress of deputies should meet at Athens, one from each city, small as well as great, each with one vote; that Athens should be president, yet each individual city autonomous; that a common fund should be raised, with a common naval force, through assessment imposed by this congress upon each, and applied as the same authority might prescribe; the general purpose being defined to be, maintenance of freedom and security from foreign aggression, to each confederate, by the common force of all. Care was taken to banish as much as possible those associations of tribute and subjection which rendered the recollection of the former Athenian empire unpopular.[215] And as there were many Athenian citizens, who, during those times of supremacy, had been planted out as kleruchs or out-settlers in various dependencies, but had been deprived of their properties at the close of the war,—it was thought necessary to pass a formal decree,[216] renouncing and barring all revival of these suspended rights. It was farther decreed that henceforward no Athenian should on any pretence hold property, either in house or land, in the territory of any one of the confederates; neither by purchase, nor as security for money lent, nor by any other mode of acquisition. Any Athenian infringing this law, was rendered liable to be informed against before the synod; who, on proof of the fact, were to deprive him of the property,—half of it going to the informer, half to the general purposes of the confederacy.

Such were the liberal principles of confederacy now proposed by Athens,—who, as a candidate for power, was straightforward and just, like the Herodotean Deiokês, [217]—and formally ratified, as well by the Athenians as by the general voice of the confederate deputies assembled within their walls. The formal decree and compact of alliance was inscribed on a stone column and placed by the side of the statue of Zeus Eleutherius or the Liberator; a symbol, of enfranchisement from Sparta accomplished, as well as of freedom to be maintained against Persia and other enemies. [218] Periodical meetings of the confederate deputies were provided to be held (how often, we do not know) at Athens, and the synod was recognized as competent judge of all persons, even Athenian citizens, charged with treason against the confederacy. To give fuller security to the confederates generally, it was provided in the original compact, that if any Athenian citizen should either speak, or put any question to the vote, in the Athenian assembly, contrary to the tenor of that document,—he should be tried before the synod for treason; and that, if found guilty, he might be condemned by them to the severest punishment.

Three Athenian leaders stood prominent as commissioners in the first organization of the confederacy, and in the dealings with those numerous cities whose junction was to be won by amicable inducement,—Chabrias, Timotheus son of Konon, and Kallistratus.[219]

The first of the three is already known to the reader. He and Iphikrates were the most distinguished warriors whom Athens numbered among her citizens. But not having been engaged in any war, since the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B.C., she had

had no need of their services; hence both of them had been absent from the city during much of the last nine years, and Iphikrates seems still to have been absent. At the time when that peace was concluded, Iphikrates was serving in the Hellespont and Thrace, Chabrias with Evagoras in Cyprus; each having been sent thither by Athens at the head of a body of mercenary peltasts. Instead of dismissing their troops, and returning to Athens as peaceful citizens, it was not less agreeable to the military tastes of these generals, than conducive to their importance and their profit, to keep together their bands, and to take foreign service. Accordingly, Chabrias had continued in service first in Cyprus, next with the native Egyptian king Akoris. The Persians, against whom he served, found his hostility so inconvenient, that Pharnabazus demanded of the Athenians to recall him, on pain of the Great King's displeasure; and requested at the same time that Iphikrates might be sent to aid the Persian satraps in organizing a great expedition against Egypt. The Athenians, to whom the goodwill of Persia was now of peculiar importance, complied on both points; recalled Chabrias, who thus became disposable for the Athenian service,[220] and despatched Iphikrates to take command along with the Persians.

Iphikrates, since the peace of Antalkidas, had employed his peltasts in the service of the kings of Thrace: first of Seuthes, near the shores of the Propontis, whom he aided in the recovery of certain lost dominions,—next of Kotys, whose favor he acquired, and whose daughter he presently married.[221] Not only did he enjoy great scope for warlike operations and plunder, among the "butter-eating Thracians,"[222]—but he also acquired, as dowry, a large stock of such produce as Thracian princes had at their disposal, together with a boon even more important,—a seaport village not far from the mouth of the Hebrus, called Drys, where he established a fortified post, and got together a Grecian colony dependent on himself.[223] Miltiades, Alkibiades, and other eminent Athenians had done the same thing before him; though Xenophon had refused a similar proposition when made to him by the earlier Seuthes.[224] Iphikrates thus became a great man in Thrace, yet by no means abandoning his connection with Athens, but making his position in each subservient to his importance in the other. While he was in a situation to favor the projects of Athenian citizens for mercantile and territorial acquisitions in the Chersonese and other parts of Thrace,—he could also lend the aid of Athenian naval and military art, not merely to princes in Thrace, but to others even beyond those limits,—since we learn that Amyntas king of Macedonia became so attached or indebted to him as to adopt him for his son.[225] When sent by the Athenians to Persia, at the request of Pharnabazus (about 378 B.C. apparently), Iphikrates had fair ground for anticipating that a career yet more lucrative was opening before him.[226]

Iphikrates being thus abroad, the Athenians joined with Chabrias, in the mission and measures for organizing their new confederacy, two other colleagues, of whom we now hear for the first time—Timotheus son of Konon, and Kallistratus the most celebrated orator of his time.[227] The abilities of Kallistratus were not military at all;

while Timotheus and Chabrias were men of distinguished military merit. But in acquiring new allies and attracting deputies to her proposed congress, Athens stood in need of persuasive appeal, conciliatory dealing, and substantial fairness in all her propositions, not less than of generalship. We are told that Timotheus, doubtless as son of the liberator Konon, from the recollections of the battle of Knidus—was especially successful in procuring new adhesions; and probably Kallistratus,[228] going round with him to the different islands, contributed by his eloquence not a little to the same result. On their invitation, many cities entered as confederates.[229] At this time (as in the earlier confederacy of Delos) all who joined must have been unconstrained members. And we may understand the motives of their junction, when we read the picture drawn by Isokrates (in 380 B.C.) of the tyranny of the Persians on the Asiatic mainland, threatening, to absorb the neighboring islands. Not only was there now a new basis of imposing force, presented by Athens and Thebes in union—but there was also a wide-spread hatred of imperial Sparta, aggravated since her perversion of the pretended boon of autonomy, promised by the peace of Antalkidas; and the conjunction of these sentiments caused the Athenian mission of invitation to be extremely successful. All the cities in Eubœa (except Histiæa, at the north of the island)—as well as Chios, Mitylênê, Byzantium, and Rhodes—the three former of whom had continued favorably inclined to Athens ever since the peace of Antalkidas, [230]—all entered into the confederacy. An Athenian fleet under Chabrias, sailing among the Cyclades and the other islands of the Ægean, aided in the expulsion of the Lacedæmonian harmosts,[231] together with their devoted local oligarchies, wherever they still subsisted; and all the cities thus liberated became equal members of the newly-constituted congress at Athens. After a certain interval, there came to be not less than seventy cities, many of them separately powerful, which sent deputies to it;[232] an aggregate sufficient to intimidate Sparta, and even to flatter Athens with the hope of restoration to something like her former lustre.

The first votes both of Athens herself, and of the newly-assembled congress, threatened war upon the largest scale. A resolution was passed to equip twenty thousand hoplites, five hundred horsemen, and two hundred triremes.[233] Probably the insular and Ionic deputies promised each a certain contribution of money, but nothing beyond. We do not, however, know how much,—nor how far the engagements, large or small, were realized,—nor whether Athens was authorized to enforce execution against defaulters,—or was in circumstances to act upon such authority, if granted to her by the congress. It was in this way (as the reader will recollect from my fifth volume) that Athens had first rendered herself unpopular in the confederacy of Delos,—by enforcing the resolutions of the confederate synod against evasive or seceding members. It was in this way that what was at first a voluntary association had ultimately slid into an empire by constraint. Under the new circumstances of 378 B.C., we may presume that the confederates, though ardent and full of promises on first assembling at Athens, were even at the outset not exact, and became afterwards still less exact, in performance; yet that Athens was forced to be reserved in

claiming, or in exercising, the right of enforcement. To obtain a vote of contribution by the majority of deputies present, was only the first step in the process; to obtain punctual payment, when the Athenian fleet was sent round for the purpose of collecting,—yet without incurring dangerous unpopularity,—was the second step, but by far the most doubtful and difficult.

It must, however, be borne in mind that at this moment, when the confederacy was first formed, both Athens and the other cities came together from a spontaneous impulse of hearty mutuality and coöperation. A few years afterwards, we shall find this changed; Athens selfish, and the confederates reluctant.[234] Inflamed, as well by their position of renovated headship, as by fresh animosity against Sparta, the Athenians made important efforts of their own, both financial and military. Equipping a fleet, which for the time was superior in the Ægean, they ravaged the hostile territory of Histiæa in Eubœa, and annexed to their confederacy the islands of Peparêthus and Skiathus. They imposed upon themselves also a direct property-tax; to what amount, however, we do not know.

It was on the occasion of this tax that they introduced a great change in the financial arrangements and constitution of the city; a change conferring note upon the archonship of Nausinikus, (B.C. 378-377). The great body of substantial Athenian citizens as well as metics were now classified anew for purposes of taxation. It will be remembered that even from the time of Solon[235] the citizens of Athens had been distributed into four classes,—Pentakosiomedimni, Hippeis, Zeugitæ, Thêtes,—distinguished from each other by the amount of their respective properties. Of these Solonian classes, the fourth, or poorest, paid no direct taxes; while the three former were taxed according to assessments representing a certain proportion of their actual property. The taxable property of the richest (or Pentakosiomedimni, including all at or above the minimum income of five hundred medimni of corn per annum) was entered in the tax-book at a sum equal to twelve times their income; that of the Hippeis (comprising all who possessed between three hundred and five hundred medimni of annual income) at ten times their income; that of the Zeugitæ (or possessors of an annual income between two hundred and three hundred medimni) at five times their income. A medimnus of corn was counted as equivalent to a drachma; which permitted the application of this same class-system to movable property as well as to land. So that, when an actual property-tax (or *eisphora*) was imposed, it operated as an equal or proportional tax, so far as regarded all the members of the same class; but as a graduated or progressive tax, upon all the members of the richer class as compared with those of the poorer.

The three Solonian property-classes above named appear to have lasted, though probably not without modifications, down to the close of the Peloponnesian war; and to have been in great part preserved, after the renovation of the democracy in B.C. 403, during the archonship of Eukleides.[236] Though eligibility to the great offices of state had before that time ceased to be dependent on pecuniary qualification, it was

still necessary to possess some means of distinguishing the wealthier citizens, not merely in case of direct taxation being imposed, but also because the liability to serve in liturgies or burdensome offices was consequent on a man's enrolment as possessor of more than a given minimum of property. It seems, therefore, that the Solonian census, in its main principles of classification and graduation, was retained. Each man's property being valued, he was ranged in one of three or more classes according to its amount. For each of the classes, a fixed proportion of taxable capital to each man's property was assumed, and each was entered in the schedule, not for his whole property, but for the sum of taxable capital corresponding to his property, according to the proportion assumed. In the first or richest class, the taxable capital bore a greater ratio to the actual property than in the less rich; in the second, a greater ratio than in the third. The sum of all these items of taxable capital, in all the different classes, set opposite to each man's name in the schedule, constituted the aggregate census of Attica; upon which all direct property-tax was imposed, in equal proportion upon every man.

Respecting the previous modifications in the register of taxable property, or the particulars of its distribution into classes, which had been introduced in 403 B.C. at the archonship of Eukleides, we have no information. Nor can we make out how large or how numerous were the assessments of direct property-tax, imposed at Athens between that archonship and the archonship of Nausinikus in 378 B.C. But at this latter epoch the register was again considerably modified, at the moment when Athens was bracing herself up for increased exertions. A new valuation was made of the property of every man possessing property to the amount of twenty-five minæ (or twenty-five hundred drachmæ) and upwards. Proceeding upon this valuation, every one was entered in the schedule for a sum of taxable capital equal to a given fraction of what he possessed. But this fraction was different in each of the different classes. How many classes there were, we do not certainly know; nor can we tell, except in reference to the lowest class taxed, what sum was taken as the minimum for any one of them. There could hardly have been less, however, than three classes, and there may probably have been four. But respecting the first or richest class, we know that each man was entered in the schedule for a taxable capital equal to one-fifth of his estimated property; and that possessors of fifteen talents were included in it. The father of Demosthenes died in this year, and the boy Demosthenes was returned by his guardians to the first class, as possessor of fifteen talents; upon which his name was entered on the schedule with a taxable capital of three talents set against him; being one-fifth of his actual property. The taxable capital of the second class was entered at a fraction less than one-fifth of their actual property (probably enough, one-sixth, the same as all the registered metics); that of the third, at a fraction still smaller; of the fourth (if there was a fourth), even smaller than the third. This last class descended down to the minimum of twenty-five minæ, or twenty-five hundred drachmæ; below which no account was taken.[237]

Besides the taxable capitals of the citizens, thus graduated, the schedule also included those of the metics or resident aliens; who were each enrolled (without any difference of greater or smaller property, above twenty-five minæ) at a taxable capital equal to one-sixth of his actual property;[238] being a proportion less than the richest class of citizens, and probably equal to the second class in order of wealth. All these items summed up amounted to five thousand seven hundred and fifty or six thousand talents,[239] forming the aggregate schedule of taxable property; that is, something near about six thousand talents. A property-tax was no part of the regular ways and means of the state. It was imposed only on special occasions; and whenever it was imposed, it was assessed upon this schedule,—every man, rich or poor, being rated equally according to his taxable capital as there entered. A property-tax of one per cent. would thus produce sixty talents; two per cent., one hundred and twenty talents, etc. It is highly probable that the exertions of Athens during the archonship of Nausinikus, when this new schedule was first prepared, may have caused a property-tax to be then imposed, but we do not know to what amount.[240]

Along with this new schedule of taxable capital, a new distribution of the citizens now took place into certain bodies called Symmories. As far as we can make out, on a very obscure subject, it seems that these Symmories were twenty in number, two to each tribe; that each contained sixty citizens, thus making one thousand two hundred in all; that these one thousand two hundred were the wealthiest citizens of the schedule,—containing, perhaps, the two first out of the four classes enrolled. Among these one thousand two hundred, however, the three hundred wealthiest stood out as a separate body; thirty from each tribe. These three hundred were the wealthiest men in the city, and were called "the leaders or chiefs of the Symmories." The three hundred and the twelve hundred corresponded, speaking roughly, to the old Solonian classes of Pentakosiomedimni and Hippeis; of which latter class there had also been twelve hundred, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.[241] The liturgies, or burdensome and costly offices, were discharged principally by the Three Hundred, but partly also by the Twelve Hundred. It would seem that the former was a body essentially fluctuating, and that after a man had been in it for some time, discharging the burdens belonging to it, the Stratêgi or Generals suffered him to be mingled with the Twelve Hundred, and promoted one of the latter body to take his place in the Three Hundred. As between man and man, too, the Attic law always admitted the process called Antidosis, or Exchange of Property. Any citizen who believed himself to have been overcharged with costly liturgies, and that another citizen, as rich or richer than himself, had not borne his fair share,—might, if saddled with a new liturgy, require the other to undertake it in his place; and in case of refusal, might tender to him an exchange of properties, under an engagement that he would undertake the new charge, if the property of the other were made over to him.

It is to be observed, that besides the twelve hundred wealthiest citizens who composed the Symmories, there were a more considerable number of less wealthy

citizens not included in them, yet still liable to the property-tax; persons who possessed property from the minimum of twenty-five minæ, up to some maximum that we do not know, at which point the Symmories began,—and who corresponded, speaking loosely, to the third class or Zeugitæ of the Solonian census. The two Symmories of each tribe (comprising its one hundred and twenty richest members) superintended the property-register of each tribe, and collected the contributions due from its less wealthy registered members. Occasionally, when the state required immediate payment, the thirty richest men in each tribe (making up altogether the three hundred) advanced the whole sum of tax chargeable upon the tribe, having their legal remedy of enforcement against the other members for the recovery of the sum chargeable upon each. The richest citizens were thus both armed with rights and charged with duties, such as had not belonged to them before the archonship of Nausinikus. By their intervention (it was supposed) the schedule would be kept nearer to the truth as respects the assessment on each individual, while the sums actually imposed would be more immediately forthcoming, than if the state directly interfered by officers of its own. Soon after, the system of the Symmories was extended to the trierarchy; a change which had not at first been contemplated. Each Symmory had its chiefs, its curators, its assessors, acting under the general presidency of the Stratêgi. Twenty-five years afterwards, we also find Demosthenes (then about thirty years of age) recommending a still more comprehensive application of the same principle, so that men, money, ships, and all the means and forces of the state, might thus be parcelled into distinct fractions, and consigned to distinct Symmories, each with known duties of limited extent for the component persons to perform, and each exposed not merely to legal process, but also to loss of esteem, in the event of non-performance. It will rather appear, however, that, in practice, the system of Symmories came to be greatly abused, and to produce pernicious effects never anticipated.

At present, however, I only notice this new financial and political classification introduced in 378 B.C., as one evidence of the ardor with which Athens embarked in her projected war against Sparta. The feeling among her allies, the Thebans, was no less determined. The government of Leontiades and the Spartan garrison had left behind it so strong an antipathy, that the large majority of citizens, embarking heartily in the revolution against them, lent themselves to all the orders of Pelopidas and his colleagues; who, on their part, had no other thought but to repel the common enemy. The Theban government now became probably democratical in form; and still more democratical in spirit, from the unanimous ardor pervading the whole mass. Its military force was put under the best training; the most fertile portion of the plain north of Thebes, from which the chief subsistence of the city came, was surrounded by a ditch and a palisade,[242] to repel the expected Spartan invasion; and the memorable Sacred Band was now for the first time organized. This was a brigade of three hundred hoplites, called the Lochus, or regiment of the city, as being consecrated to the defence of the Kadmeia, or acropolis.[243] It was put under

constant arms and training, at the public expense, like the Thousand at Argos, of whom mention was made in my seventh volume.[244] It consisted of youthful citizens from the best families, distinguished for their strength and courage amidst the severe trials of the palæstra in Thebes, and was marshalled in such manner, that each pair of neighboring soldiers were at the same time intimate friends; so that the whole band were thus kept together by ties which no dangers could sever. At first its destination, under Gorgidas its commander (as we see by the select Three Hundred who fought in 424 B.C. at the battle of Delium),[245] was to serve as front rank men, for the general body of hoplites to follow. But from a circumstance to be mentioned presently, it came to be employed by Pelopidas and Epaminondas as a regiment by itself, and in a charge was then found irresistible.[246]

We must remark that the Thebans had always been good soldiers, both as hoplites and as cavalry. The existing enthusiasm, therefore, with the more sustained training, only raised good soldiers into much better. But Thebes was now blessed with another good fortune, such as had never yet befallen her. She found among her citizens a leader of the rarest excellence. It is now for the first time that Epaminondas, the son of Polymnis, begins to stand out in the public life of Greece. His family, poor rather than rich, was among the most ancient in Thebes, belonging to those Gentes called Sparti, whose heroic progenitors were said to have sprung from the dragon's teeth sown by Kadmus.[247] He seems to have been now of middle age; Pelopidas was younger, and of a very rich family; yet the relations between the two were those of equal and intimate friendship, tested in a day of battle, wherein the two were ranged side by side as hoplites, and where Epaminondas had saved the life of his wounded friend, at the cost of several wounds, and the greatest possible danger, to himself.[248]

Epaminondas had discharged, with punctuality, those military and gymnastic duties which were incumbent on every Theban citizen. But we are told that in the gymnasia he studied to acquire the maximum of activity rather than of strength; the nimble movements of a runner and wrestler,—not the heavy muscularity, purchased in part by excessive nutriment, of the Bœotian pugilist.[249] He also learned music, vocal and instrumental, and dancing; by which, in those days, was meant, not simply the power of striking the lyre or blowing the flute, but all that belonged to the graceful, expressive, and emphatic management, either of the voice or of the body; rhythmical pronunciation, exercised by repetition of the poets,—and disciplined movements, for taking part in a choric festival with becoming consonance amidst a crowd of citizen performers. Of such gymnastic and musical training, the combination of which constituted an accomplished Grecian citizen, the former predominated at Thebes, the latter at Athens. Moreover, at Thebes the musical training was based more upon the flute (for the construction of which, excellent reeds grew near the Lake Kopaïs); at Athens more upon the lyre, which admitted of vocal accompaniment by the player. The Athenian Alkibiades[250] was heard to remark, when he threw

away his flute in disgust, that flute-playing was a fit occupation for the Thebans, since they did not know how to speak; and in regard to the countrymen of Pindar[251] generally, the remark was hardly less true than contemptuous. On this capital point, Epaminondas formed a splendid exception. Not only had he learnt the lyre[252] as well as the flute from the best masters, but also, dissenting from his brother Kapheisias and his friend Pelopidas, he manifested from his earliest years an ardent intellectual impulse, which would have been remarkable even in an Athenian. He sought with eagerness the conversation of the philosophers within his reach, among whom were the Theban Simmias and the Tarentine Spintharus, both of them once companions of Sokrates; so that the stirring influence of the Sokratic method would thus find its way, partially and at second-hand, to the bosom of Epaminondas. As the relations between Thebes and Athens, ever since the close of the Peloponnesian war, had become more and more friendly, growing at length into alliance and joint war against the Spartans,—we may reasonably presume that he profited by teachers at the latter city as well as at the former. But the person to whom he particularly devoted himself, and whom he not only heard as a pupil, but tended almost as a son, during the close of an aged life,—was a Tarentine exile, named Lysis; a member of the Pythagorean brotherhood, who, from causes which we cannot make out, had sought shelter at Thebes, and dwelt there until his death.[253] With him, as well as with other philosophers, Epaminondas discussed all the subjects of study and inquiry then afloat. By perseverance in this course for some years, he not only acquired considerable positive instruction, but also became practised in new and enlarged intellectual combinations; and was, like Perikles,[254] emancipated from that timorous interpretation of nature, which rendered so many Grecian commanders the slaves of signs and omens. His patience as a listener, and his indifference to showy talk on his own account, were so remarkable, that Spintharus (the father of Aristoxenus), after numerous conversations with him, affirmed that he had never met with any one who understood more, or talked less.[255]

Nor did such reserve proceed from any want of ready powers of expression. On the contrary, the eloquence of Epaminondas, when he entered upon his public career, was shown to be not merely preëminent among Thebans, but effective even against the best Athenian opponents.[256] But his disposition was essentially modest and unambitious, combined with a strong intellectual curiosity and a great capacity; a rare combination amidst a race usually erring on the side of forwardness and self-esteem. Little moved by personal ambition, and never cultivating popularity by unworthy means, Epaminondas was still more indifferent on the score of money. He remained in contented poverty to the end of his life, not leaving enough to pay his funeral expenses, yet repudiating not merely the corrupting propositions of foreigners, but also the solicitous tenders of personal friends;[257] though we are told that, when once serving the costly office of choregus, he permitted his friend Pelopidas to bear a portion of the expense.[258] As he thus stood exempt from two of the besetting infirmities which most frequently misguided eminent Greek statesmen, so there was a

third characteristic not less estimable in his moral character; the gentleness of his political antipathies,—his repugnance to harsh treatment of conquered enemies,—and his refusal to mingle in intestine bloodshed. If ever there were men whose conduct seemed to justify unmeasured retaliation, it was Leontiades and his fellow-traitors. They had opened the doors of the Kadmeia to the Spartan Phœbidas, and had put to death the Theban leader Ismenias. Yet Epaminondas disapproved of the scheme of Pelopidas and the other exiles to assassinate them, and declined to take part in it; partly on prudential grounds, but partly, also, on conscientious scruples.[259] None of his virtues was found so difficult to imitate by his subsequent admirers, as this mastery over the resentful and vindictive passions.[260]

Before Epaminondas could have full credit for these virtues, however, it was necessary that he should give proof of the extraordinary capacities for action with which they were combined, and that he should achieve something to earn that exclamation of praise which we shall find his enemy Agesilaus afterwards pronouncing, on seeing him at the head of the invading Theban army near Sparta,—"Oh! thou man of great deeds!"[261] In the year B.C. 379, when the Kadmeia was emancipated, he was as yet undistinguished in public life, and known only to Pelopidas with his other friends; among whom, too, his unambitious and inquisitive disposition was a subject of complaint as keeping him unduly in the background.[262] But the unparalleled phenomena of that year supplied a spur which overruled all backwardness, and smothered all rival inclinations. The Thebans, having just recovered their city by an incredible turn of fortune, found themselves exposed single-handed to the full attack of Sparta and her extensive confederacy. Not even Athens had yet declared in their favor, nor had they a single other ally. Under such circumstances, Thebes could only be saved by the energy of all her citizens,—the unambitious and philosophical as well as the rest. As the necessities of the case required such simultaneous devotion, so the electric shock of the recent revolution was sufficient to awaken enthusiasm in minds much less patriotic than that of Epaminondas. He was among the first to join the victorious exiles in arms, after the contest had been transferred from the houses of Archias and Leontiades to the open market-place; and he would probably have been among the first to mount the walls of the Kadmeia, had the Spartan harmost awaited an assault. Pelopidas being named Bœotarch, his friend Epaminondas was naturally placed among the earliest and most forward organizers of the necessary military resistance against the common enemy; in which employment his capacities speedily became manifest. Though at this moment almost an unknown man, he had acquired, in B.C. 371, seven years afterwards, so much reputation both as speaker and as general, that he was chosen as the expositor of Theban policy at Sparta, and trusted with the conduct of the battle of Leuktra, upon which the fate of Thebes hinged. Hence we may fairly conclude, that the well-planned and successful system of defence, together with the steady advance of Thebes against Sparta, during the intermediate years, was felt to have been in the main his work.[263]

The turn of politics at Athens which followed the acquittal of Sphodrias was an unspeakable benefit to the Thebans, in seconding as well as encouraging their defence; and the Spartans, not unmoved at the new enemies raised up by their treatment of Sphodrias, thought it necessary to make some efforts on their side. They organized on a more systematic scale the military force of their confederacy, and even took some conciliatory steps with the view of effacing the odium of their past misrule.[264] The full force of their confederacy,—including, as a striking mark of present Spartan power, even the distant Olynthians,[265]—was placed in motion against Thebes in the course of the summer under Agesilaus; who contrived, by putting in sudden requisition a body of mercenaries acting in the service of the Arcadian town Kleitor against its neighbor the Arcadian Orchomenus, to make himself master of the passes of Kithæron, before the Thebans and Athenians could have notice of his passing the Lacedæmonian border.[266] Then crossing Kithæron into Bœotia, he established his head-quarters at Thespiæ, a post already under Spartan occupation. From thence he commenced his attacks upon the Theban territory, which he found defended partly by a considerable length of ditch and palisade—partly by the main force of Thebes, assisted by a division of mixed Athenians and mercenaries, sent from Athens under Chabrias. Keeping on their own side of the palisade, the Thebans suddenly sent out their cavalry, and attacked Agesilaus by surprise, occasioning some loss. Such sallies were frequently repeated, until, by a rapid march at break of day, he forced his way through an opening in the breastwork into their inner country, which he laid waste nearly to the city walls.[267] The Thebans and Athenians, though not offering him battle on equal terms, nevertheless kept the field against him, taking care to hold positions advantageous for defence. Agesilaus on his side did not feel confident enough to attack them against such odds. Yet on one occasion he had made up his mind to do so; and was marching up to the charge, when he was daunted by the firm attitude and excellent array of the troops of Chabrias. They had received orders to await his approach, on a high and advantageous ground, without moving until signal should be given; with their shields resting on the knee, and their spears protended. So imposing was their appearance, that Agesilaus called off his troops without daring to complete the charge.[268] After a month or more of devastations on the lands of Thebes, and a string of desultory skirmishes in which he seems to have lost rather than gained, Agesilaus withdrew to Thespiæ; the fortifications of which he strengthened, leaving Phœbidas with a considerable force in occupation, and then leading back his army to Peloponnesus.

Phœbidas,—the former captor of the Kadmeia,—thus stationed at Thespiæ, carried on vigorous warfare against Thebes; partly with his own Spartan division, partly with the Thespian hoplites, who promised him unshrinking support. His incursions soon brought on reprisals from the Thebans; who invaded Thespiæ, but were repulsed by Phœbidas with the loss of all their plunder. In the pursuit, however, hurrying incautiously forward, he was slain by a sudden turn of the Theban cavalry;[269] upon which all his troops fled, chased by the Thebans to the very gates of Thespiæ.

Though the Spartans, in consequence of this misfortune, despatched by sea another general and division to replace Phœbidas, the cause of the Thebans was greatly strengthened by their recent victory. They pushed their success not only against Thespiæ, but against the other Bœotian cities, still held by local oligarchies in dependence on Sparta. At the same time, these oligarchies were threatened by the growing strength of their own popular or philo-Theban citizens, who crowded in considerable numbers as exiles to Thebes.[270]

A second expedition against Thebes, undertaken by Agesilaus in the ensuing summer with the main army of the confederacy, was neither more decisive nor more profitable than the preceding. Though he contrived, by a well-planned stratagem, to surprize the Theban palisade, and lay waste the plain, he gained no serious victory; and even showed, more clearly than before, his reluctance to engage except upon perfectly equal terms.[271] It became evident that the Thebans were not only strengthening their position in Bœotia, but also acquiring practice in warfare and confidence against the Spartans; insomuch that Antalkidas and some other companions remonstrated with Agesilaus, against carrying on the war so as only to give improving lessons to his enemies in military practice,—and called upon him to strike some decisive blow. He quitted Bœotia, however, after the summer's campaign, without any such step.[272] In his way he appeased an intestine conflict which was about to break out in Thespiæ. Afterwards, on passing to Megara, he experienced a strain or hurt, which grievously injured his sound leg, (it has been mentioned already that he was lame of one leg,) and induced his surgeon to open a vein in the limb for reducing the inflammation. When this was done, however, the blood could not be stopped until he swooned. Having been conveyed home to Sparta in great suffering, he was confined to his couch for several months; and he remained during a much longer time unfit for active command.[273]

The functions of general now devolved upon the other king Kleombrotus, who in the next spring conducted the army of the confederacy to invade Bœotia anew. But on this occasion, the Athenians and Thebans had occupied the passes of Kithæron, so that he was unable even to enter the country, and was obliged to dismiss his troops without achieving anything.[274]

His inglorious retreat excited such murmurs among the allies when they met at Sparta, that they resolved to fit out a large naval force, sufficient both to intercept the supplies of imported corn to Athens, and to forward an invading army by sea against Thebes, to the Bœotian port of Kreusis in the Krissæan Gulf. The former object was attempted first. Towards midsummer, a fleet of sixty triremes, fitted out under the Spartan admiral Pollis, was cruising in the Ægean; especially round the coast of Attica, near Ægina, Keos, and Andros. The Athenians, who, since their recently renewed confederacy, had been undisturbed by any enemies at sea, found themselves thus threatened, not merely with loss of power, but also with loss of trade and even famine; since their corn-ships from the Euxine, though safely reaching Geræstus (the

southern extremity of Eubœa), were prevented from doubling Cape Sunium. Feeling severely this interruption, they fitted out at Peiræus a fleet of eighty triremes,[275] with crews mainly composed of citizens; who, under the admiral Chabrias, in a sharply contested action near Naxos, completely defeated the fleet of Pollis, and regained for Athens the mastery of the sea. Forty-nine Lacedæmonian triremes were disabled or captured, eight with their entire crews.[276] Moreover, Chabrias might have destroyed all or most of the rest, had he not suspended his attack, having eighteen of his own ships disabled, to pick up both the living men and the dead bodies on board, as well as all Athenians who were swimming for their lives. He did this (we are told[277]), from distinct recollection of the fierce displeasure of the people against the victorious generals after the battle of Arginusæ. And we may thus see, that though the proceedings on that memorable occasion were stained both by illegality and by violence, they produced a salutary effect upon the public conduct of subsequent commanders. Many a brave Athenian (the crews consisting principally of citizens) owed his life, after the battle of Naxos, to the terrible lesson administered by the people to their generals in 406 B.C., thirty years before.

This was the first great victory (in September, 376 B.C.[278]) which the Athenians had gained at sea since the Peloponnesian war; and while it thus filled them with joy and confidence, it led to a material enlargement of their maritime confederacy. The fleet of Chabrias,—of which a squadron was detached under the orders of Phokion, a young Athenian now distinguishing himself for the first time and often hereafter to be mentioned,—sailed victorious round the Ægean, made prize of twenty other triremes in single ships, brought in three thousand prisoners with one hundred and ten talents in money, and annexed seventeen new cities to the confederacy, as sending deputies to the synod and furnishing contributions. The discreet and conciliatory behavior of Phokion, especially obtained much favor among the islanders, and determined several new adhesions to Athens.[279] To the inhabitants of Abdêra in Thrace, Chabrias rendered an inestimable service, by aiding them to repulse a barbarous horde of Triballi, who quitting their abode from famine, had poured upon the sea-coast, defeating the Abderites and plundering their territory. The citizens, grateful for a force left to defend their town, willingly allied themselves with Athens, whose confederacy thus extended itself to the coast of Thrace.[280]

Having prosperously enlarged their confederacy to the east of Peloponnesus, the Athenians began to aim at the acquisition of new allies in the west. The fleet of sixty triremes, which had recently served under Chabrias, was sent, under the command of Timotheus, the son of Konon, to circumnavigate Peloponnesus and alarm the coast of Laconia; partly at the instance of the Thebans, who were eager to keep the naval force of Sparta occupied, so as to prevent her from conveying troops across the Krissæan Gulf from Corinth to the Bœotian port of Kreusis.[281] This Periplus of Peloponnesus,—the first which the fleet of Athens had attempted since her humiliation at Ægospotami,—coupled with the ensuing successes, was long remembered by

the countrymen of Timotheus. His large force, just dealing, and conciliatory professions, won new and valuable allies. Not only Kephallenia, but the still more important island of Korkyra, voluntarily accepted his propositions; and as he took care to avoid all violence or interference with the political constitution, his popularity all around augmented every day. Alketas, prince of the Molossi,—the Chaonians with other Epirotic tribes,—and the Akarnanians on the coast,—all embraced his alliance.[282] While near Alyzia and Leukas on this coast, he was assailed by the Peloponnesian ships under Nikolochus, rather inferior in number to his fleet. He defeated them, and being shortly afterwards reinforced by other triremes from Korkyra, he became so superior in those waters, that the hostile fleet did not dare to show itself. Having received only thirteen talents on quitting Athens, we are told that he had great difficulty in paying his fleet; that he procured an advance of money, from each of the sixty trierarchs in his fleet, of seven minæ towards the pay of their respective ships; and that he also sent home requests for large remittances from the public treasury; [283] measures which go to bear out that honorable repugnance to the plunder of friends or neutrals, and care to avoid even the suspicion of plunder, which his panegyrist Isokrates ascribes to him.[284] This was a feature unhappily rare among the Grecian generals on both sides, and tending to become still rarer, from the increased employment of mercenary bands.

The demands of Timotheus on the treasury of Athens were not favorably received. Though her naval position was now more brilliant and commanding than it had been since the battle of Ægospotami,—though no Lacedæmonian fleet showed itself to disturb her in the Ægean,[285]—yet the cost of the war began to be seriously felt. Privateers from the neighboring island of Ægina annoyed her commerce, requiring a perpetual coast-guard; while the contributions from the deputies to the confederate synod were not sufficient to dispense with the necessity of a heavy direct property tax at home.[286]

In this synod the Thebans, as members of the confederacy, were represented. [287] Application was made to them to contribute towards the cost of the naval war; the rather, as it was partly at their instance that the fleet had been sent round to the Ionian Sea. But the Thebans declined compliance,[288] nor were they probably in any condition to furnish pecuniary aid. Their refusal occasioned much displeasure at Athens, embittered by jealousy at the strides which they had been making during the two last years, partly through the indirect effect of the naval successes of Athens. At the end of the year 377 B.C., after the two successive invasions of Agesilaus, the ruin of two home crops had so straitened the Thebans, that they were forced to import corn from Pagasæ in Thessaly; in which enterprise their ships and seamen were at first captured by the Lacedæmonian harmost at Oreus in Eubœa, Alketas. His negligence, however, soon led not only to an outbreak of their seamen who had been taken prisoners, but also to the revolt of the town from Sparta, so that the communication of Thebes with Pagasæ became quite unimpeded. For the two succeeding

years, there had been no Spartan invasion of Bœotia; since, in 376 B.C., Kleombrotus could not surmount the heights of Kithæron,—while in 375 B.C., the attention of Sparta had been occupied by the naval operations of Timotheus in the Ionian Sea. During these two years, the Thebans had exerted themselves vigorously against the neighboring cities of Bœotia, in most of which a strong party, if not the majority of the population, was favorable to them, though the government was in the hands of the philo-Spartan oligarchy, seconded by Spartan harmosts and garrison.[289] We hear of one victory gained by the Theban cavalry near Platæa, under Charon; and of another near Tanagra, in which Panthöides, the Lacedæmonian harmost in that town, was slain.[290]

But the most important of all their successes was that of Pelopidas near Tegyra. That commander, hearing that the Spartan harmost, with his two (moræ or) divisions in garrison at Orchomenus, had gone away on an excursion into the Lokrian territory, made a dash from Thebes with the Sacred Band and a few cavalry, to surprise the place. It was the season in which the waters of the Lake Kopaïs were at the fullest, so that he was obliged to take a wide circuit to the north-west, and to pass by Tegyra, on the road between Orchomenus and the Opuntian Lokris. On arriving near Orchomenus, he ascertained that there were still some Lacedæmonians in the town, and that no surprise could be effected; upon which he retraced his steps. But on reaching Tegyra, he fell in with the Lacedæmonian commanders, Gorgoleon and Theopompus, returning with their troops from the Lokrian excursion. As his numbers were inferior to theirs by half, they rejoiced in the encounter; while the troops of Pelopidas were at first dismayed, and required all his encouragement to work them up. But in the fight that ensued, closely and obstinately contested in a narrow pass, the strength, valor, and compact charge of the Sacred Band proved irresistible. The two Lacedæmonian commanders were both slain; their troops opened, to allow the Thebans an undisturbed retreat; but Pelopidas, disdaining this opportunity, persisted in the combat until all his enemies dispersed and fled. The neighborhood of Orchomenus forbade any long pursuit, so that Pelopidas could only erect his trophy, and strip the dead, before returning to Thebes.[291]

This combat, in which the Lacedæmonians were for the first time beaten in fair field by numbers inferior to their own, produced a strong sensation in the minds of both the contending parties. The confidence of the Thebans, as well as their exertion, was redoubled; so that by the year 374 B.C., they had cleared Bœotia of the Lacedæmonians, as well as of the local oligarchies which sustained them; persuading or constraining the cities again to come into union with Thebes, and reviving the Bœotian confederacy. Haliartus, Korôneia, Lebadeia, Tanagra, Thespiæ, Platæa, and the rest, thus became again Bœotian;[292] leaving out Orchomenus alone, (with its dependency Chæroneia,) which was on the borders of Phokis, and still continued under Lacedæmonian occupation. In most of these cities, the party friendly to Thebes was numerous, and the change, on the whole, popular; though in some the prevail-

ing sentiment was such, that adherence was only obtained by intimidation. The change here made by Thebes, was not to absorb these cities into herself, but to bring them back to the old federative system of Bœotia; a policy which she had publicly proclaimed on surprising Platæa in 431 B.C.[293] While resuming her own ancient rights and privileges as head of the Bœotian federation, she at the same time guaranteed to the other cities,—by convention, probably express, but certainly implied,—their ancient rights, their security, and their qualified autonomy, as members; the system which had existed down to the peace of Antalkidas.

The position of the Thebans was materially improved by this reconquest or reconfederation of Bœotia. Becoming masters of Kreusis, the port of Thespiæ,[294] they fortified it, and built some triremes to repel any invasion from Peloponnesus by sea across the Krissæan Gulf. Feeling thus secure against invasion, they began to retaliate upon their neighbors and enemies the Phokians, allies of Sparta, and auxiliaries in the recent attacks on Thebes,—yet also, from ancient times, on friendly terms with Athens.[295] So hard pressed were the Phokians,—especially as Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly was at the same time their bitter enemy,[296]—that unless assisted, they would have been compelled to submit to the Thebans, and along with them Orchomenus, including the Lacedæmonian garrison then occupying it; while the treasures of the Delphian Temple would also have been laid open, in case the Thebans should think fit to seize them. Intimation being sent by the Phokians to Sparta, King Kleombrotus was sent to their aid, by sea across the Gulf, with four Lacedæmonian divisions of troops, and an auxiliary body of allies.[297] This reinforcement, compelling the Thebans to retire, placed both Phokis and Orchomenus in safety. While Sparta thus sustained them, even Athens looked upon the Phokian cause with sympathy. When she saw that the Thebans had passed from the defensive to the offensive,—partly by her help, yet nevertheless refusing to contribute to the cost of her navy,—her ancient jealousy of them became again so powerful, that she sent envoys to Sparta, to propose terms of peace. What these terms were, we are not told; nor does it appear that the Thebans even received notice of the proceeding. But the peace was accepted at Sparta, and two of the Athenian envoys were despatched at once from thence, without even going home, to Korkyra, for the purpose of notifying the peace to Timotheus, and ordering him forthwith to conduct his fleet back to Athens.[298]

This proposition of the Athenians, made seemingly in a moment of impetuous dissatisfaction, was made to the advantage of Sparta, and served somewhat to countervail a mortifying revelation which had reached the Spartans a little before from a different quarter.

Polydamas, an eminent citizen of Pharsalus in Thessaly, came to Sparta to ask for aid. He had long been on terms of hospitality with the Lacedæmonians; while Pharsalus had not merely been in alliance with them, but was for some time occupied by one of their garrisons.[299] In the usual state of Thessaly, the great cities

Larissa, Pheræ, Pharsalus, and others, each holding some smaller cities in a state of dependent alliance, were in disagreement with each other,—often even in actual war. It was rare that they could be brought to concur in a common vote for the election of a supreme chief or Tagus. At his own city of Pharsalus, Polydamas was now in the ascendant, enjoying the confidence of all the great family factions who usually contended for predominance; to such a degree, indeed, that he was entrusted with the custody of the citadel and the entire management of the revenues, receipts as well as disbursements. Being a wealthy man, "hospitable and ostentatious in the Thessalian fashion," he advanced money from his own purse to the treasury whenever it was low, and repaid himself when public funds came in.[300]

But a greater man than Polydamas had now arisen in Thessaly,—Jason, despot of Pheræ; whose formidable power, threatening the independence of Pharsalus, he now came to Sparta to denounce. Though the force of Jason can hardly have been very considerable when the Spartans passed through Thessaly, six years before, in their repeated expeditions against Olynthus, he was now not only despot of Pheræ, but master of nearly all the Thessalian cities (as Lykophron of Pheræ had partially succeeded in becoming thirty years before),[301] as well as of a large area of tributary circumjacent territory. The great instrument of his dominion was, a standing and well-appointed force of six thousand mercenary troops, from all parts of Greece. He possessed all the personal qualities requisite for conducting soldiers with the greatest effect. His bodily strength was great; his activity indefatigable; his self-command, both as to hardship and as to temptation, alike conspicuous. Always personally sharing both in the drill and in the gymnastics of the soldiers, and encouraging military merits with the utmost munificence, he had not only disciplined them, but inspired them with extreme warlike ardor and devotion to his person. Several of the neighboring tribes, together with Alketas, prince of the Molossi in Epirus, had been reduced to the footing of his dependent allies. Moreover, he had already defeated the Pharsalians, and stripped them of many of the towns which had once been connected with them, so that it only remained for him now to carry his arms against their city. But Jason was prudent, as well as daring. Though certain of success, he wished to avoid the odium of employing force, and the danger of having malcontents for subjects. He therefore proposed to Polydamas, in a private interview, that he (Polydamas) should bring Pharsalus under Jason's dominion, accepting for himself the second place in Thessaly, under Jason installed as Tagus or president. The whole force of Thessaly thus united, with its array of tributary nations around, would be decidedly the first power in Greece, superior on land either to Sparta or Thebes, and at sea to Athens. And as to the Persian king, with his multitudes of unwarlike slaves, Jason regarded him as an enemy yet easier to overthrow; considering what had been achieved first by the Cyreians, and afterwards by Agesilaus.

Such were the propositions, and such the ambitious hopes, which the energetic despot of Pheræ had laid before Polydamas; who replied, that he himself had long

been allied with Sparta, and that he could take no resolution hostile to her interests. "Go to Sparta, then (rejoined Jason), and give notice there, that I intend to attack Pharsalus, and that it is for them to afford you protection. If they cannot comply with the demand, you will be unfaithful to the interests of your city if you do not embrace my offers." It was on this mission that Polydamas was now come to Sparta, to announce that unless aid could be sent to him, he should be compelled unwillingly to sever himself from her. "Recollect (he concluded) that the enemy against whom you will have to contend is formidable in every way, both from personal qualities and from power; so that nothing short of a first-rate force and commander will suffice. Consider, and tell me what you can do."

The Spartans, having deliberated on the point, returned a reply in the negative. Already a large force had been sent under Kleombrotus as essential to the defence of Phokis; moreover, the Athenians were now the stronger power at sea. Lastly, Jason had hitherto lent no active assistance to Thebes and Athens—which he would assuredly be provoked to do, if a Spartan army interfered against him in Thessaly. Accordingly the ephors told Polydamas plainly, that they were unable to satisfy his demands, recommending him to make the best terms that he could, both for Pharsalus and for himself. Returning to Thessaly, he resumed his negotiation with Jason, and promised substantial compliance with what was required. But he entreated to be spared the dishonor of admitting a foreign garrison into the citadel which had been confidentially entrusted to his care; engaging at the same time to bring his fellow-citizens into voluntary union with Jason, and tendering his two sons as hostages for faithful performance. All this was actually brought to pass. The politics of the Pharsalians were gently brought round, so that Jason, by their votes as well as the rest, was unanimously elected Tagus of Thessaly.[302]

The dismissal of Polydamas implied a mortifying confession of weakness on the part of Sparta. It marks, too, an important stage in the real decline of her power. Eight years before, at the instance of the Akanthian envoys, backed by the Macedonian Amyntas, she had sent three powerful armies in succession to crush the liberal and promising confederacy of Olynthus, and to re-transfer the Grecian cities on the sea-coast to the Macedonian crown. The region to which her armies had been sent, was the extreme verge of Hellas. The parties in whose favor she acted, had scarcely the shadow of a claim, as friends or allies; while those *against* whom she acted, had neither done nor threatened any wrong to her: moreover, the main ground on which her interference was invoked, was to hinder the free and equal confederation of Grecian cities. *Now*, a claim, and a strong claim, is made upon her by Polydamas of Pharsalus, an old friend and ally. It comes from a region much less distant; lastly, her political interest would naturally bid her arrest the menacing increase of an aggressive power already so formidable as that of Jason. Yet so seriously has the position of Sparta altered in the last eight years (382-374 B.C.), that she is now compelled to decline a demand which justice, sympathy, and political policy alike prompted her to

grant. So unfortunate was it for the Olynthian confederacy, that their honorable and well-combined aspirations fell exactly during those few years in which Sparta was at her maximum of power! So unfortunate was such coincidence of time, not only for Olynthus, but for Greece generally:—since nothing but Spartan interference restored the Macedonian kings to the sea-coast, while the Olynthian confederacy, had it been allowed to expand, might probably have confined them to the interior, and averted the death-blow which came upon Grecian freedom in the next generation from their hands.

The Lacedæmonians found some compensation for their reluctant abandonment of Polydamas, in the pacific propositions from Athens which liberated them from one of their chief enemies. But the peace thus concluded was scarcely even brought to execution. Timotheus, being ordered home from Korkyra, obeyed and set sail with his fleet. He had serving along with him some exiles from Zakynthus; and as he passed by that island in his homeward voyage, he disembarked these exiles upon it, aiding them in establishing a fortified post. Against this proceeding the Zakynthian government laid complaints at Sparta, where it was so deeply resented, that redress having been in vain demanded at Athens, the peace was at once broken off, and war again declared. A Lacedæmonian squadron of twenty-five sail was despatched to assist the Zakynthians,[303] while plans were formed for the acquisition of the more important island of Korkyra. The fleet of Timotheus having now been removed home, a malcontent Korkyræan party formed a conspiracy to introduce the Lacedæmonians as friends, and betray the island to them. A Lacedæmonian fleet of twenty-two triremes accordingly sailed thither, under color of a voyage to Sicily. But the Korkyræan government, having detected the plot, refused to receive them, took precautions for defence, and sent envoys to Athens to entreat assistance.

The Lacedæmonians now resolved to attack Korkyra openly, with the full naval force of their confederacy. By the joint efforts of Sparta, Corinth, Leukas, Ambrakia, Elis, Zakynthus, Achaia, Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis,—strengthened by pecuniary payments from other confederates, who preferred commuting their obligation to serve beyond sea,—a fleet of sixty triremes and a body of one thousand five hundred mercenary hoplites were assembled; besides some Lacedæmonians, probably Helots or Neodamodes.[304] At the same time, application was sent to Dionysius the Syracusan despot, for his coöperation against Korkyra, on the ground that the connection of that island with Athens had proved once, and might prove again, dangerous to his city.

It was in the spring of 373 B.C. that this force proceeded against Korkyra, under the command of the Lacedæmonian Mnasippus; who, having driven in the Korkyræan fleet with the loss of four triremes, landed on the island, gained a victory, and confined the inhabitants within the walls of the city. He next carried his ravages round the adjacent lands, which were found in the highest state of cultivation, and full of the richest produce; fields admirably tilled,—vineyards in surpassing condition,

—with splendid farm-buildings, well-appointed wine-cellars, and abundance of cattle as well as laboring-slaves. The invading soldiers, while enriching themselves by depredations on cattle and slaves, became so pampered with the plentiful stock around, that they refused to drink any wine that was not of the first quality.[305] Such is the picture given by Xenophon, an unfriendly witness, of the democratical Korkyra, in respect of its lauded economy, at the time when it was invaded by Mnasippus; a picture not less memorable than that presented by Thucydides (in the speech of Archidamus), of the flourishing agriculture surrounding democratical Athens, at the moment when the hand of the Peloponnesian devastator was first felt there in 431 B.C.[306]

With such plentiful quarters for his soldiers, Mnasippus encamped on a hill near the city walls, cutting off those within from supplies out of the country, while he at the same time blocked up the harbor with his fleet. The Korkyræans soon began to be in want. Yet they seemed to have no chance of safety except through aid from the Athenians; to whom they had sent envoys with pressing entreaties,[307] and who had now reason to regret their hasty consent (in the preceding year) to summon home the fleet of Timotheus from the island. However, Timotheus was again appointed admiral of a new fleet to be sent thither; while a division of six hundred peltasts, under Stesiklês, was directed to be despatched by the quickest route, to meet the immediate necessities of the Korkyræans, during the delays unavoidable in the preparation of the main fleet and its circumnavigation of Peloponnesus. These peltasts were conveyed by land across Thessaly and Epirus, to the coast opposite Korkyra; upon which island they were enabled to land through the intervention of Alketas solicited by the Athenians. They were fortunate enough to get into the town; where they not only brought the news that a large Athenian fleet might be speedily expected, but also contributed much to the defence. Without such encouragement and aid, the Korkyræans would hardly have held out; for the famine within the walls increased daily; and at length became so severe, that many of the citizens deserted, and numbers of slaves were thrust out. Mnasippus refused to receive them, making public proclamation that every one who deserted should be sold into slavery; and since deserters nevertheless continued to come, he caused them to be scourged back to the city-gates. As for the unfortunate slaves, being neither received by him, nor re-admitted within, many perished outside of the gates from sheer hunger.[308]

Such spectacles of misery portended so visibly the approaching hour of surrender, that the besieging army became careless, and the general insolent. Though his military chest was well-filled, through the numerous pecuniary payments which he had received from allies in commutation of personal service,—yet he had dismissed several of his mercenaries without pay, and had kept all of them unpaid for the last two months. His present temper made him not only more harsh towards his own soldiers, [309] but also less vigilant in the conduct of the siege. Accordingly the besieged, detecting from their watch-towers the negligence of the guards, chose a favorable op-

portunity and made a vigorous sally. Mnasippus, on seeing his outposts driven in, armed himself and hastened forward with the Lacedæmonians around him to sustain them; giving orders to the officers of the mercenaries to bring their men forward also. But these officers replied, that they could not answer for the obedience of soldiers without pay; upon which Mnasippus was so incensed, that he struck them with his stick and with the shaft of his spear. Such an insult inflamed still farther the existing discontent. Both officers and soldiers came to the combat discouraged and heartless, while the Athenian peltasts and the Korkyræan hoplites, rushing out of several gates at once, pressed their attack with desperate energy. Mnasippus, after displaying great personal valor, was at length slain, and all his troops, being completely routed, fled back to the fortified camp in which their stores were preserved. Even this too might have been taken, and the whole armament destroyed, had the besieged attacked it at once. But they were astonished at their own success. Mistaking the numerous camp-followers for soldiers in reserve, they retired back to the city.

Their victory was however so complete, as to reopen easy communication with the country, to procure sufficient temporary supplies, and to afford a certainty of holding out until reinforcement from Athens should arrive. Such reinforcement, indeed, was already on its way, and had been announced as approaching to Hypermenês (second under the deceased Mnasippus), who had now succeeded to the command. Terrified at the news, he hastened to sail round from his station,—which he had occupied with the fleet to block up the harbor,—to the fortified camp. Here he first put the slaves, as well as the property, aboard of his transports, and sent them away; remaining himself to defend the camp with the soldiers and marines,—but remaining only a short time, and then taking these latter also aboard the triremes. He thus completely evacuated the island, making off for Leukas. But such had been the hurry,—and so great the terror lest the Athenian fleet should arrive,—that much corn and wine, many slaves, and even many sick and wounded soldiers, were left behind. To the victorious Korkyræans, these acquisitions were not needed to enhance the value of a triumph which rescued them from capture, slavery, or starvation.[310]

The Athenian fleet had not only been tardy in arriving, so as to incur much risk of finding the island already taken,—but when it did come, it was commanded by Iphikrates, Chabrias, and the orator Kallistratus,[311]—not by Timotheus, whom the original vote of the people had nominated. It appears that Timotheus,—who (in April 373 B.C.), when the Athenians first learned that the formidable Lacedæmonian fleet had begun to attack Korkyra, had been directed to proceed thither forthwith with a fleet of sixty triremes,—found a difficulty in manning his ships at Athens, and therefore undertook a preliminary cruise to procure both seamen and contributory funds, from the maritime allies. His first act was to transport the six hundred peltasts under Stesiklês to Thessaly, where he entered into relations with Jason of Pheræ. He persuaded the latter to become the ally of Athens, and to further the march of Stesiklês with his division by land across Thessaly over the passes of Pindus, to Epirus; where

Alketas, who was at once the ally of Athens, and the dependent of Jason, conveyed them by night across the strait from Epirus to Korkyra. Having thus opened important connection with the powerful Thessalian despot, and obtained from him a very seasonable service, together (perhaps) with some seamen from Pagasæ to man his fleet,—Timotheus proceeded onward to the ports of Macedonia, where he also entered into relations with Amyntas, receiving from him signal marks of private favor,—and then to Thrace as well as the neighboring islands. His voyage procured for him valuable subsidies in money and supplies of seamen, besides some new adhesions and deputies to the Athenian confederacy.

This preliminary cruise of Timotheus, undertaken with the general purpose of collecting means for the expedition to Korkyra, began in the month of April or commencement of May 373 B.C.[312] On departing, it appears, he had given orders to such of the allies as were intended to form part of the expedition, to assemble at Kalauria (an island off Trœzen, consecrated to Poseidon) where he would himself come and take them up to proceed onward. Pursuant to such order, several contingents mustered at this island,—among them the Bœotians, who sent several triremes, though in the preceding year it had been alleged against them that they contributed nothing to sustain the naval exertions of Athens. But Timotheus stayed out a long time. Reliance was placed upon him, and upon the money which he was to bring home, for the pay of the fleet; and the unpaid triremes accordingly fell into distress and disorganization at Kalauria, awaiting his return.[313] In the mean time fresh news reached Athens that Korkyra was much pressed; so that great indignation was felt against the absent admiral, for employing in his present cruise a precious interval essential to enable him to reach the island in time. Iphikrates (who had recently come back from serving with Pharnabazus, in an unavailing attempt to reconquer Egypt for the Persian king) and the orator Kallistratus, were especially loud in their accusations against him. And as the very salvation of Korkyra required pressing haste, the Athenians cancelled the appointment of Timotheus even during his absence,—naming Iphikrates, Kallistratus, and Chabrias, to equip a fleet and go round to Korkyra without delay.[314]

Before they could get ready, Timotheus returned; bringing several new adhesions to the confederacy, with a flourishing account of general success.[315] He went down to Kalauria to supply the deficiencies of funds, and make up for the embarrassments which his absence had occasioned. But he could not pay the Bœotian trierarchs without borrowing money for the purpose on his own credit; for though the sum brought home from his voyage was considerable, it would appear that the demands upon him had been greater still. At first an accusation, called for in consequence of the pronounced displeasure of the public, was entered against him by Iphikrates and Kallistratus. But as these two had been named joint admirals for the expedition to Korkyra, which admitted of no delay,—his trial was postponed until the autumn; a postponement advantageous to the accused, and doubtless seconded by his friends.[316]

Meanwhile Iphikrates adopted the most strenuous measures for accelerating the equipment of his fleet. In the present temper of the public, and in the known danger of Korkyra, he was allowed (though perhaps Timotheus, a few weeks earlier, would not have been allowed) not only to impress seamen in the port, but even to coërce the trierarchs with severity,[317] and to employ all the triremes reserved for the coast-guard of Attica, as well as the two sacred triremes called Paralus and Salaminia. He thus completed a fleet of seventy sail, promising to send back a large portion of it directly, if matters took a favorable turn at Korkyra. Expecting to find on the watch for him a Lacedæmonian fleet fully equal to his own, he arranged his voyage so as to combine the maximum of speed with training to his seamen, and with preparation for naval combat. The larger sails of an ancient trireme were habitually taken out of the ship previous to a battle, as being inconvenient aboard: Iphikrates left such sails at Athens,—employed even the smaller sails sparingly,—and kept his seamen constantly at the oar; which greatly accelerated his progress, at the same time that it kept the men in excellent training. Every day he had to stop, for meals and rest, on an enemy's shore; and these halts were conducted with such extreme dexterity as well as precision, that the least possible time was consumed, not enough for any local hostile force to get together. On reaching Sphakteria, Iphikrates learnt for the first time the defeat and death of Mnasippus. Yet not fully trusting the correctness of his information, he still persevered both in his celerity and his precautions, until he reached Kephallenia, where he first fully satisfied himself that the danger of Korkyra was past. The excellent management of Iphikrates throughout this expedition is spoken of in terms of admiration by Xenophon.[318]

Having no longer any fear of the Lacedæmonian fleet, the Athenian commander probably now sent back the home-squadron of Attica which he had been allowed to take, but which could ill be spared from the defence of the coast.[319] After making himself master of some of the Kephallenian cities, he then proceeded onward to Korkyra; where the squadron of ten triremes from Syracuse was now on the point of arriving; sent by Dionysius to aid the Lacedæmonians, but as yet uninformed of their flight. Iphikrates, posting scouts on the hills to give notice of their approach, set apart twenty triremes to be ready for moving at the first signal. So excellent was his discipline, (says Xenophon,) that "the moment the signal was made, the ardor of all the crews was a fine thing to see; there was not a man who did not hasten at a run to take his place aboard."[320] The ten Syracusan triremes, after their voyage across from the Iapygian cape, had halted to rest their men on one of the northern points of Korkyra; where they were found by Iphikrates and captured, with all their crews and the admiral Anippus; one alone escaping, through the strenuous efforts of her captain, the Rhodian Melanôpus. Iphikrates returned in triumph, towing his nine prizes into the harbor of Korkyra. The crews, being sold or ransomed, yielded to him a sum of sixty talents; the admiral Anippus was retained in expectation of a higher ransom, but slew himself shortly afterwards from mortification.[321]

Though the sum thus realized enabled Iphikrates for the time to pay his men, yet the suicide of Anippus was a pecuniary disappointment to him, and he soon began to need money. This consideration induced him to consent to the return of his colleague Kallistratus; who,—an orator by profession, and not on friendly terms with Iphikrates,—had come out against his own consent. Iphikrates had himself singled out both Kallistratus and Chabrias as his colleagues. He was not indifferent to the value of their advice, nor did he fear the criticisms, even of rivals, on what they really saw in his proceedings. But he had accepted the command under hazardous circumstances; not only from the insulting displacement of Timotheus, and the provocation consequently given to a powerful party attached to the son of Konon,—but also in great doubts whether he could succeed in relieving Korkyra, in spite of the rigorous coërcion which he applied to man his fleet. Had the island been taken and had Iphikrates failed, he would have found himself exposed to severe crimination, and multiplied enemies, at Athens. Perhaps Kallistratus and Chabrias, if left at home, might in that case have been among his assailants,—so that it was important to him to identify both of them with his good or ill success, and to profit by the military ability of the latter, as well as by the oratorical talent of the former.[322] As the result of the expedition, however, was altogether favorable, all such anxieties were removed. Iphikrates could well afford to part with both his colleagues; and Kallistratus engaged, that if permitted to go home, he would employ all his efforts to keep the fleet well paid from the public treasury; or if this were impracticable, that he would labor to procure peace.[323] So terrible are the difficulties which the Grecian generals now experience in procuring money from Athens, (or from other cities in whose service they are acting,) for payment of their troops! Iphikrates suffered the same embarrassment which Timotheus had experienced the year before,—and which will be found yet more painfully felt as we advance forward in the history. For the present, he subsisted his seamen by finding work for them on the farms of the Korkyræans, where there must doubtless have been ample necessity for repairs after the devastations of Mnasippus, while he crossed over to Akarnania with his peltasts and hoplites, and there obtained service with the townships friendly to Athens against such others as were friendly to Sparta; especially against the warlike inhabitants of the strong town called Thyrieis.[324]

The happy result of the Korkyræan expedition, imparting universal satisfaction at Athens, was not less beneficial to Timotheus than to Iphikrates. It was in November, 373 B.C., that the former, as well as his quæstor or military treasurer Antimachus, underwent each his trial. Kallistratus, having returned home, pleaded against the quæstor, perhaps against Timotheus also, as one of the accusers;[325] though probably in a spirit of greater gentleness and moderation, in consequence of his recent joint success and of the general good temper prevalent in the city. And while the edge of the accusation against Timotheus was thus blunted, the defence was strengthened not merely by numerous citizen friends speaking in his favor with increased confidence, but also by the unusual phenomenon of two powerful foreign supporters. At the re-

quest of Timotheus, both Alketas of Epirus, and Jason of Pheræ, came to Athens a little before the trial, to appear as witnesses in his favor. They were received and lodged by him in his house in the Hippodamian Agora, the principal square of the Peiræus. And as he was then in some embarrassment for want of money, he found it necessary to borrow various articles of finery in order to do them honor,—clothes, bedding, and two silver drinking bowls,—from Pasion, a wealthy banker near at hand. These two important witnesses would depose to the zealous service and estimable qualities of Timotheus; who had inspired them with warm interest, and had been the means of bringing them into alliance with Athens; an alliance, which they had sealed at once by conveying Stesikles and his division across Thessaly and Epirus to Korkyra. The minds of the dikastery would be powerfully affected by seeing before them such a man as Jason of Pheræ, at that moment the most powerful individual in Greece; and we are not surprised to learn that Timotheus was acquitted. His treasurer Antimachus, not tried by the same dikastery, and doubtless not so powerfully befriended, was less fortunate. He was condemned to death, and his property confiscated; the dikastery doubtless believing (on what evidence we do not know) that he had been guilty of fraud in dealing with the public money, which had caused serious injury at a most important crisis. Under the circumstances of the case, he was held responsible as treasurer, for the pecuniary department of the money-levying command confided to Timotheus by the people.

As to the military conduct, for which Timotheus himself would be personally accountable, we can only remark that having been invested with the command for the special purpose of relieving the besieged Korkyra, he appears to have devoted an unreasonable length of time to his own self-originated cruise elsewhere; though such cruise was in itself beneficial to Athens; insomuch that if Korkyra had really been taken, the people would have had good reason for imputing the misfortune to his delay.[326] And although he was now acquitted, his reputation suffered so much by the whole affair, that in the ensuing spring he was glad to accept an invitation of the Persian satraps, who offered him the command of the Grecian mercenaries in their service for the Egyptian war; the same command from which Iphikrates had retired a little time before.[327]

That admiral, whose naval force had been reinforced by a large number of Korkyræan triremes, was committing without opposition incursions against Akarnania, and the western coast of Peloponnesus; insomuch that the expelled Messenians, in their distant exile at Hesperides in Libya, began to conceive hopes of being restored by Athens to Naupaktus, which they had occupied under her protection during the Peloponnesian war.[328] And while the Athenians were thus masters at sea both east and west of Peloponnesus,[329] Sparta and her confederates, discouraged by the ruinous failure of their expedition against Korkyra in the preceding year, appear to have remained inactive. With such mental predispositions, they were powerfully affected by religious alarm arising from certain frightful earthquakes and inundations with

which Peloponnesus was visited during this year, and which were regarded as marks of the wrath of the god Poseidon. More of these formidable visitations occurred this year in Peloponnesus than had ever before been known; especially one, the worst of all, whereby the two towns of Helikê and Bura in Achaia were destroyed, together with a large portion of their population. Ten Lacedæmonian triremes, which happened to be moored on this shore on the night when the calamity occurred, were destroyed by the rush of the waters.[330]

Under these depressing circumstances, the Lacedæmonians had recourse to the same manœuvre which had so well served their purpose fifteen years before, in 388-387 B.C. They sent Antalkidas again as envoy to Persia, to entreat both pecuniary aid, [331] and a fresh Persian intervention enforcing anew the peace which bore his name; which peace had now been infringed (according to Lacedæmonian construction) by the reconstitution of the Bœotian confederacy under Thebes as president. And it appears that in the course of the autumn or winter, Persian envoys actually did come to Greece, requiring that the belligerents should all desist from war, and wind up their dissensions on the principles of the peace of Antalkidas.[332] The Persian satraps, at this time renewing their efforts against Egypt, were anxious for the cessation of hostilities in Greece, as a means of enlarging their numbers of Grecian mercenaries; of which troops Timotheus had left Athens a few months before to take the command.

Apart, however, from this prospect of Persian intervention, which doubtless was not without effect,—Athens herself was becoming more and more disposed towards peace. That common fear and hatred of the Lacedæmonians, which had brought her into alliance with Thebes in 378 B.C., was now no longer predominant. She was actually at the head of a considerable maritime confederacy; and this she could hardly hope to increase by continuing the war, since the Lacedæmonian naval power had already been humbled. Moreover, she found the expense of warlike operations very burdensome, nowise defrayed either by the contributions of her allies or by the results of victory. The orator Kallistratus,—who had promised either to procure remittances from Athens to Iphikrates, or to recommend the conclusion of peace,—was obliged to confine himself to the latter alternative, and contributed much to promote the pacific dispositions of his countrymen.[333]

Moreover, the Athenians had become more and more alienated from Thebes. The ancient antipathy between these two neighbors had for a time been overlaid by common fear of Sparta. But as soon as Thebes had reëstablished her authority in Bœotia, the jealousies of Athens again began to arise. In 374 B.C., she had concluded a peace with the Spartans, without the concurrence of Thebes; which peace was broken almost as soon as made, by the Spartans themselves, in consequence of the proceedings of Timotheus at Zakynthus. The Phokians,—against whom, as having been active allies of Sparta in her invasions of Bœotia, Thebes was now making war, —had also been ancient friends of Athens, who sympathized with their sufferings. [334] Moreover, the Thebans on their side probably resented the unpaid and destitute

condition in which their seamen had been left by Timotheus at Kalauria, during the expedition for the relief of Korkyra in the preceding year;[335] an expedition of which Athens alone reaped both the glory and the advantage. Though they remained members of the confederacy, sending deputies to the congress at Athens, the unfriendly spirit on both sides continued on the increase, and was farther exasperated by their violent proceeding against Platæa in the first half of 372 B.C.

During the last three or four years, Platæa, like the other towns of Bœotia, had been again brought into the confederacy under Thebes. Reëstablished by Sparta after the peace of Antalkidas as a so-called autonomous town, it had been garrisoned by her as a post against Thebes, and was no longer able to maintain a real autonomy after the Spartans had been excluded from Bœotia in 376 B.C. While other Bœotian cities were glad to find themselves emancipated from their philo-Laconian oligarchies and rejoined to the federation under Thebes, Platæa,—as well as Thespiæ,—submitted to the union only by constraint; awaiting any favorable opportunity for breaking off, either by means of Sparta or of Athens. Aware probably of the growing coldness between the Athenians and Thebans, the Platæans were secretly trying to persuade Athens to accept and occupy their town, annexing Platæa to Attica;[336] a project hazardous both to Thebes and Athens, since it would place them at open war with each other, while neither was yet at peace with Sparta.

This intrigue, coming to the knowledge of the Thebans, determined them to strike a decisive blow. Their presidency, over more than one of the minor Bœotian cities, had always been ungentle, suitable to the roughness of their dispositions. Towards Platæa, especially, they not only bore an ancient antipathy, but regarded the reëstablished town as little better than a Lacedæmonian encroachment, abstracting from themselves a portion of territory which had become Theban, by prescriptive enjoyment lasting for forty years from the surrender of Platæa in 427 B.C. As it would have been to them a loss as well as embarrassment, if Athens should resolve to close with the tender of Platæa,—they forestalled the contingency by seizing the town for themselves. Since the reconquest of Bœotia by Thebes, the Platæans had come again, though reluctantly, under the ancient constitution of Bœotia; they were living at peace with Thebes, acknowledging her rights as president of the federation, and having their own rights as members guaranteed in return by her, probably under positive engagement,—that is, their security, their territory, and their qualified autonomy, subject to the federal restrictions and obligations. But though thus at peace with Thebes,[337] the Platæans knew well what was her real sentiment towards them, and their own towards her. If we are to believe, what seems very probable, that they were secretly negotiating with Athens to help them in breaking off from the federation,—the consciousness of such an intrigue tended still farther to keep them in anxiety and suspicion. Accordingly, being apprehensive of some aggression from Thebes, they kept themselves habitually on their guard. But their vigilance was somewhat relaxed and most of them went out of the city to their farms in the coun-

try, on the days, well known beforehand, when the public assemblies in Thebes were held. Of this relaxation the Bœotarch Neokles took advantage.[338] He conducted a Theban armed force, immediately from the assembly, by a circuitous route through Hysiæ to Platæa; which town he found deserted by most of its male adults, and unable to make resistance. The Platæans,—dispersed in the fields, finding their walls, their wives, and their families, all in possession of the victor,—were under the necessity of accepting the terms proposed to them. They were allowed to depart in safety, and to carry away all their movable property; but their town was destroyed, and its territory again annexed to Thebes. The unhappy fugitives were constrained for the second time to seek refuge at Athens, where they were again kindly received, and restored to the same qualified right of citizenship as they had enjoyed prior to the peace of Antalkidas.[339]

It was not merely with Platæa, but also with Thespiæ, that Thebes was now meddling. Mistrusting the dispositions of the Thespians, she constrained them to demolish the fortifications of their town;[340] as she had caused to be done fifty-two years before, after the victory of Delium,[341] on suspicion of leanings favorable to Athens.

Such proceedings on the part of the Thebans in Bœotia excited strong emotion at Athens; where the Platæans not only appeared as suppliants, with the tokens of misery conspicuously displayed, but also laid their case pathetically before the assembly, and invoked aid to regain their town, of which they had been just bereft. On a question at once so touching and so full of political consequences, many speeches were doubtless composed and delivered, one of which has fortunately reached us; composed by Isokrates, and perhaps actually delivered by a Platæan speaker before the public assembly. The hard fate of this interesting little community is here impressively set forth; including the bitterest reproaches, stated with not a little of rhetorical exaggeration, against the multiplied wrongs done by Thebes, as well towards Athens as towards Platæa. Much of his invective is more vehement than conclusive. Thus when the orator repeatedly claims for Platæa her title to autonomous existence, under the guarantee of universal autonomy sworn at the peace of Antalkidas, [342]—the Thebans would doubtless reply, that at the time of that peace, Platæa was no longer in existence; but had been extinct for forty years, and was only renovated afterwards by the Lacedæmonians for their own political purposes. And the orator intimates plainly, that the Thebans were noway ashamed of their proceeding, but came to Athens to justify it, openly and avowedly; moreover, several of the most distinguished Athenian speakers espoused the same side.[343] That the Platæans had coöperated with Sparta in her recent operations in Bœotia against both Athens and Thebes, was an undeniable fact; which the orator himself can only extenuate by saying that they acted under constraint from a present Spartan force,—but which was cited on the opposite side as a proof of their philo-Spartan dispositions, and of their readiness again to join the common enemy as soon as he presented himself.[344] The

Thebans would accuse Platæa of subsequent treason to the confederacy; and they even seem to have contended, that they had rendered a positive service to the general Athenian confederacy of which they were members,[345] by expelling the inhabitants of Platæa and dismantling Thespiæ; both towns being not merely devoted to Sparta, but also adjoining Kithæron, the frontier line whereby a Spartan army would invade Bœotia. Both in the public assembly of Athens, and in the general congress of the confederates at that city, animated discussions were raised upon the whole subject;[346] discussions, wherein, as it appears, Epaminondas, as the orator and representative of Thebes, was found a competent advocate against Kallistratus, the most distinguished speaker in Athens; sustaining the Theban cause with an ability which greatly enhanced his growing reputation.[347]

But though the Thebans and their Athenian supporters, having all the prudential arguments on their side, carried the point so that no step was taken to restore the Platæans, nor any hostile declaration made against those to whom they owed their expulsion,—yet the general result of the debates, animated by keen sympathy with the Platæan sufferers, tended decidedly to poison the good feeling, and loosen the ties, between Athens and Thebes. This change showed itself by an increased gravitation towards peace with Sparta; strongly advocated by the orator Kallistratus, and now promoted not merely by the announced Persian intervention, but by the heavy cost of war, and the absence of all prospective gain from its continuance. The resolution was at length taken,—first by Athens, and next, probably, by the majority of the confederates assembled at Athens,—to make propositions of peace to Sparta, where it was well known that similar dispositions prevailed towards peace. Notice of this intention was given to the Thebans, who were invited to send envoys thither also, if they chose to become parties. In the spring of 371 B.C., at the time when the members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy were assembled at Sparta, both the Athenian and Theban envoys, and those from the various members of the Athenian confederacy, arrived there. Among the Athenian envoys, two at least,—Kallias (the hereditary daduch or torchbearer of the Eleusinian ceremonies) and Autoklês,—were men of great family at Athens; and they were accompanied by Kallistratus the orator.[348] From the Thebans, the only man of note was Epaminondas, then one of the Bœotarchs.

Of the debates which took place at this important congress, we have very imperfect knowledge; and of the more private diplomatic conversations, not less important than the debates, we have no knowledge at all. Xenophon gives us a speech from each of the three Athenians, and from no one else. That of Kallias, who announces himself as hereditary proxenus of Sparta at Athens, is boastful and empty, but eminently philo-Laconian in spirit;[349] that of Autoklês is in the opposite tone, full of severe censure on the past conduct of Sparta; that of Kallistratus, delivered after the other two,—while the enemies of Sparta were elate, her friends humiliated, and both parties silent from the fresh effect of the reproaches of Autoklês,[350]—is framed in a

spirit of conciliation; admitting faults on both sides, but deprecating the continuance of war, as injurious to both, and showing how much the joint interests of both pointed towards peace.[351]

This orator, representing the Athenian diplomacy of the time, recognizes distinctly the peace of Antalkidas as the basis upon which Athens was prepared to treat,—autonomy to each city, small as well as great; and in this way, coinciding with the views of the Persian king, he dismisses with indifference the menace that Antalkidas was on his way back from Persia with money to aid the Lacedæmonians in the war. It was not from fear of the Persian treasures (he urged),—as the enemies of peace asserted,—that Athens sought peace.[352] Her affairs were now so prosperous, both by sea and land, as to prove that she only did so on consideration of the general evils of prolonged war, and on a prudent abnegation of that rash confidence which was always ready to contend for extreme stakes,[353] like a gamester playing double or quits. The time had come for both Sparta and Athens now to desist from hostilities. The former had the strength on land, the latter was predominant at sea; so that each could guard the other; while the reconciliation of the two would produce peace throughout the Hellenic world, since in each separate city, one of the two opposing local parties rested on Athens, the other on Sparta.[354] But it was indispensably necessary that Sparta should renounce that system of aggression (already pointedly denounced by the Athenian, Autoklês) on which she had acted since the peace of Antalkidas; a system, from which she had at last reaped bitter fruits, since her unjust seizure of the Kadmeia had ended by throwing into the arms of the Thebans all those Bœotian cities, whose separate autonomy she had bent her whole policy to ensure.[355]

Two points stand out in this remarkable speech, which takes a judicious measure of the actual position of affairs;—first, autonomy to every city; and autonomy in the genuine sense, not construed and enforced by the separate interests of Sparta, as it had been at the peace of Antalkidas; next, the distribution of such preëminence or headship, as was consistent with this universal autonomy, between Sparta and Athens; the former on land, the latter at sea,—as the means of ensuring tranquillity in Greece. That "autonomy perverted to Lacedæmonian purposes,"—which Perikles had denounced before the Peloponnesian war as the condition of Peloponnesus, and which had been made the political canon of Greece by the peace of Antalkidas,—was now at an end. On the other hand, Athens and Sparta were to become mutual partners and guarantees; dividing the headship of Greece by an ascertained line of demarcation, yet neither of them interfering with the principle of universal autonomy. Thebes, and her claim to the presidency of Bœotia, were thus to be set aside by mutual consent.

It was upon this basis that the peace was concluded. The armaments on both sides were to be disbanded; the harmosts and garrisons everywhere withdrawn, in order that each city might enjoy full autonomy. If any city should fail in observance

of these conditions, and continue in a career of force against any other, all were at liberty to take arms for the support of the injured party; but no one who did not feel disposed, was bound so to take arms. This last stipulation exonerated the Lacedæmonian allies from one of their most vexatious chains.

To the conditions here mentioned, all parties agreed; and on the ensuing day the oaths were exchanged. Sparta took the oath for herself and her allies; Athens took the oath for herself only; her allies afterwards took it severally, each city for itself. Why such difference was made, we are not told; for it would seem that the principle of severance applied to both confederacies alike.

Next came the turn of the Thebans to swear; and here the fatal hitch was disclosed. Epaminondas, the Theban envoy, insisted on taking the oath, not for Thebes separately, but for Thebes as president of the Bœotian federation, including all the Bœotian cities. The Spartan authorities on the other hand, and Agesilaus as the foremost of all, strenuously opposed him. They required that he should swear for Thebes alone, leaving the Bœotian cities to take the oath each for itself.

Already in the course of the preliminary debates, Epaminondas had spoken out boldly against the ascendency of Sparta. While most of the deputies stood overawed by her dignity, represented by the energetic Agesilaus as spokesman,—he, like the Athenian Autoklês, and with strong sympathy from many of the deputies present, had proclaimed that nothing kept alive the war except her unjust pretensions, and that no peace could be durable unless such pretensions were put aside.[356] Accepting the conditions of peace as finally determined, he presented himself to swear to them in the name of the Bœotian federation. But Agesilaus, requiring that each of the Bœotian cities should take the oath for itself, appealed to those same principles of liberty which Epaminondas himself had just invoked, and asked him whether each of the Bœotian cities had not as good a title to autonomy as Thebes. Epaminondas might have replied by asking, why Sparta had just been permitted to take the oath for her allies as well as for herself. But he took a higher ground. He contended that the presidency of Bœotia was held by Thebes on as good a title as the sovereignty of Laconia by Sparta.[357] He would remind the assembly that when Bœotia was first conquered and settled by its present inhabitants, the other towns had all been planted out from Thebes as their chief and mother-city; that the federal union of all, administered by Bœotarchs chosen by and from all, with Thebes as president, was coeval with the first settlement of the country; that the separate autonomy of each was qualified by an established institution, devolving on the Bœotarchs and councils sitting at Thebes the management of the foreign relations of all jointly. All this had been already pleaded by the Theban orator fifty-six years earlier, before the five Spartan commissioners, assembled to determine the fate of the captives after the surrender of Platæa; when he required the condemnation of the Platæans as guilty of treason to the ancestral institutions of Bœotia;[358] and the Spartan commissioners had recognized the legitimacy of these institutions by a sweeping sentence of death

against the transgressors. Moreover, at a time when the ascendency of Thebes over the Bœotian cities had been greatly impaired by her anti-Hellenic coöperation with the invading Persians, the Spartans themselves had assisted her with all their power to reëstablish it, as a countervailing force against Athens.[359] Epaminondas could show, that the presidency of Thebes over the Bœotian cities was the keystone of the federation; a right not only of immemorial antiquity, but pointedly recognized and strenuously vindicated by the Spartans themselves. He could show farther that it was as old, and as good, as their own right to govern the Laconian townships; which latter was acquired and held (as one of the best among their own warriors had boastfully proclaimed)[360] by nothing but Spartan valor and the sharpness of the Spartan sword.

An emphatic speech of this tenor, delivered amidst the deputies assembled at Sparta, and arraigning the Spartans not merely in their supremacy over Greece, but even in their dominion at home,—was as it were the shadow cast before, by coming events. It opened a question such as no Greek had ever ventured to raise. It was a novelty startling to all,—extravagant probably in the eyes of Kallistratus and the Athenians,—but to the Spartans themselves, intolerably poignant and insulting.[361] They had already a long account of antipathy to clear off with Thebes; their own wrong-doing in seizing the Kadmeia,—their subsequent humiliation in losing it and being unable to recover it,—their recent short-comings and failures, in the last seven years of war against Athens and Thebes jointly. To aggravate this deep-seated train of hostile associations, their pride was now wounded in an unforeseen point, the tenderest of all. Agesilaus, full to overflowing of the national sentiment, which in the mind of a Spartan passed for the first of virtues, was stung to the quick. Had he been an Athenian orator like Kallistratus, his wrath would have found vent in an animated harangue. But a king of Sparta was anxious only to close these offensive discussions with scornful abruptness, thus leaving to the presumptuous Theban no middle ground between humble retraction and acknowledged hostility. Indignantly starting from his seat, he said to Epaminondas,—"Speak plainly,—will you, or will you not, leave to each of the Bœotian cities its separate autonomy?" To which the other replied—"Will *you* leave each of the Laconian towns autonomous?" Without saying another word, Agesilaus immediately caused the name of the Thebans to be struck out of the roll, and proclaimed them excluded from the treaty.[362]

Such was the close of this memorable congress at Sparta in June, 371 B.C. Between the Spartans and Athenians, and their respective allies, peace was sworn. But the Thebans were excluded, and their deputies returned home (if we may believe Xenophon[363]) discouraged and mournful. Yet such a man as Epaminondas must have been well aware that neither his claims nor his arguments would be admitted by Sparta. If therefore he was disappointed with the result, this must be because he had counted upon, but did not obtain, support from the Athenians or others.

The leaning of the Athenian deputies had been adverse rather than favorable to Thebes throughout the congress. They were disinclined, from their sympathies with the Platæans, to advocate the presidential claims of Thebes, though on the whole it was the political interest of Athens that the Bœotian federation should be maintained, as a bulwark to herself against Sparta. Yet the relations of Athens with Thebes, after the congress as before it, were still those of friendship, nominal rather than sincere. It was only with Sparta, and her allies, that Thebes was at war, without a single ally attached to her. On the whole, Kallistratus and his colleagues had managed the interests of Athens in this congress with great prudence and success. They had disengaged her from the alliance with Thebes, which had been dictated seven years before by common fear and dislike of Sparta, but which had no longer any adequate motive to countervail the cost of continuing the war; at the same time, the disengagement had been accomplished without bad faith. The gains of Athens, during the last seven years of war, had been considerable. She had acquired a great naval power, and a body of maritime confederates; while her enemies the Spartans had lost their naval power in the like proportion. Athens was now the ascendent leader of maritime and insular Greece,—while Sparta still continued to be the leading power on land, but only on land; and a tacit partnership was now established between the two, each recognizing the other in their respective halves of the Hellenic hegemony.[364] Moreover, Athens had the prudence to draw her stake, and quit the game, when at the maximum of her acquisitions, without taking the risk of future contingencies.

On both sides, the system of compulsory and indefeasable confederacies was renounced; a renunciation which had already been once sworn to, sixteen years before, at the peace of Antalkidas, but treacherously perverted by Sparta in the execution. Under this new engagement, the allies of Sparta or Athens ceased to constitute an organized permanent body, voting by its majority, passing resolutions permanently binding upon dissentients, arming the chief state with more or less power of enforcement against all, and forbidding voluntary secessions of individual members. They became a mere uncemented aggregate of individuals, each acting for himself; taking counsel together as long as they chose, and coöperating so far as all were in harmony; but no one being bound by any decision of the others, nor recognizing any right in the others to compel him even to performance of what he had specially promised, if it became irksome. By such change, therefore, both Athens and Sparta were losers in power; yet the latter to a much greater extent than the former, inasmuch as her reach of power over her allies had been more comprehensive and stringent.

We here see the exact point upon which the requisition addressed by Sparta to Thebes, and the controversy between Epaminondas and Agesilaus, really turned. Agesilaus contended that the relation between Thebes and the other Bœotian cities was the same as what subsisted between Sparta and her allies; that accordingly,

when Sparta renounced the indefeasible and compulsory character of her confederacy, and agreed to deal with each of its members as a self-acting and independent unit, she was entitled to demand that Thebes should do the same in reference to the Bœotian towns. Epaminondas, on the contrary, denied the justice of this parallel. He maintained that the proper subject of comparison to be taken, was the relation of Sparta, not to her extra-Laconian allies, but to the Laconian townships; that the federal union of the Bœotian towns under Thebes was coeval with the Bœotian settlement, and among the most ancient phenomena of Greece; that in reference to other states, Bœotia, like Laconia or Attica, was the compound and organized whole, of which each separate city was only a fraction; that other Greeks had no more right to meddle with the internal constitution of these fractions, and convert each of them into an integer,—than to insist on separate independence for each of the townships of Laconia. Epaminondas did not mean to contend that the power of Thebes over the Bœotian cities was as complete and absolute in degree, as that of Sparta over the Laconian townships; but merely that her presidential power, and the federal system of which it formed a part, were established, indefeasible, and beyond the interference of any Hellenic convention,—quite as much as the internal government of Sparta in Laconia.

Once already this question had been disputed between Sparta and Thebes at the peace of Antalkidas; and already decided once by the superior power of the former, extorting submission from the latter. The last sixteen years had reversed the previous decision, and enabled the Thebans to reconquer those presidential rights of which the former peace had deprived them. Again, therefore, the question stood for decision, with keener antipathy on both sides,—with diminished power in Sparta,—but with increased force, increased confidence, and a new leader whose inestimable worth was even yet but half-known,—in Thebes. The Athenians,—friendly with both, yet allies of neither,—suffered the dispute to be fought out without interfering. How it was settled will appear in the next chapter.

CHAPTER LXXVIII.

BATTLE OF LEUKTRA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

IMMEDIATELY after the congress at Sparta in June 371 B.C., the Athenians and Lacedæmonians both took steps to perform the covenants sworn respectively to each other as well as to the allies generally. The Athenians despatched orders to Iphikrates, who was still at Korkyra or in the Ionian Sea, engaged in incursions against the Lacedæmonian or Peloponnesian coasts,—that he should forthwith conduct his fleet home, and that if he had made any captures subsequent to the exchange of oaths at Sparta, they should all be restored;[365] so as to prevent the misunderstanding which had occurred fifty-two years before with Brasidas,[366] in the peninsula of Pallênê. The Lacedæmonians on their side sent to withdraw their harmosts and their garrisons from every city still under occupation. Since they had already made such promise once before, at the peace of Antalkidas, but had never performed it,—commissioners,[367] not Spartans, were now named from the general congress, to enforce the execution of the agreement.

No great haste, however, was probably shown in executing this part of the conditions; for the whole soul and sentiment of the Spartans were absorbed by their quarrel with Thebes. The miso-Theban impulse now drove them on with a fury which overcame all other thoughts; and which, though doubtless Agesilaus and others considered it at the time as legitimate patriotic resentment for the recent insult, appeared to the philo-Laconian Xenophon, when he looked back upon it from the subsequent season of Spartan humiliation, to be a misguiding inspiration sent by the gods,[368]—like that of the Homeric Atê. Now that Thebes stood isolated from Athens and all other allies out of Bœotia, Agesilaus had full confidence of being able to subdue her thoroughly. The same impression of the superiority of Spartan force was also entertained both by the Athenians and by other Greeks; to a great degree even by the Thebans themselves. It was anticipated that the Spartans would break up the city of Thebes into villages (as they had done at Mantinea) or perhaps retaliate upon her the fate which she had inflicted upon Platæa—or even decimate her citizens and her property to the profit of the Delphian god, pursuant to the vow that had been taken more than a century before, in consequence of the assistance lent by the Thebans to Xerxes.[369] Few persons out of Bœotia doubted of the success of Sparta.

To attack Thebes, however, an army was wanted; and as Sparta, by the peace just sworn, had renounced everything like imperial ascendency over her allies, leaving each of them free to send or withhold assistance as they chose,—to raise an army was no easy task; for the allies, generally speaking, being not at all inflamed with the Spartan antipathy against Thebes, desired only to be left to enjoy their newly-acquired liberty. But it so happened, that at the moment when peace was

sworn, the Spartan king Kleombrotus was actually at the head of an army, of Lacedæmonians and allies, in Phokis, on the north-western frontier of Bœotia. Immediately on hearing of the peace, Kleombrotus sent home to ask for instructions as to his future proceedings. By the unanimous voice of the Spartan authorities and assembly, with Agesilaus as the most vehement of all,[370] he was directed to march against the Thebans, unless they should flinch at the last moment (as they had done at the peace of Antalkidas), and relinquish their presidency over the other Bœotian cities. One citizen alone, named Prothöus, interrupted this unanimity. He protested against the order, first, as a violation of their oaths, which required them to disband the army and reconstitute it on the voluntary principle,—next, as imprudent in regard to the allies, who now looked upon such liberty as their right, and would never serve with cordiality unless it were granted to them. But Prothöus was treated with disdain as a silly alarmist,[371] and the peremptory order was despatched to Kleombrotus; accompanied, probably, by a reinforcement of Spartans and Lacedæmonians, the number of whom, in the ensuing battle, seems to have been greater than can reasonably be imagined to have been before serving in Phokis.

Meanwhile no symptoms of concession were manifested at Thebes.[372] Epaminondas, on his return, had found cordial sympathy with the resolute tone which he had adopted both in defence of the Bœotian federation and against Sparta. Though every one felt the magnitude of the danger, it was still hoped that the enemy might be prevented from penetrating out of Phokis into Bœotia. Epaminondas accordingly occupied with a strong force the narrow pass near Koroneia, lying between a spur of Mount Helikon on one side and the Lake Kopaïs on the other; the same position as had been taken by the Bœotians, and forced by the army returning from Asia under Agesilaus, twenty-three years before. Orchomenus lay northward (that is, on the Phokian side) of this position; and its citizens, as well as its Lacedæmonian garrison, now doubtless formed part of the invading army of Kleombrotus. That prince, with a degree of military skill rare in the Spartan commanders, baffled all the Theban calculations. Instead of marching by the regular road from Phokis into Bœotia, he turned southward by a mountain-road scarcely deemed practicable, defeated the Theban division under Chæreas which guarded it, and crossed the ridge of Helikon to the Bœotian port of Kreusis on the Crissæan Gulf. Coming upon this place by surprise, he stormed it, capturing twelve Theban triremes which lay in the harbor. He then left a garrison to occupy the port, and marched without delay over the mountainous ground into the territory of Thespiæ on the eastern declivity of Helikon; where he encamped on the high ground, at a place of ever-memorable name, called Leuktra.[373]

Here was an important success, skilfully gained; not only placing Kleombrotus within an easy march of Thebes, but also opening a sure communication by sea with Sparta, through the port of Kreusis, and thus eluding the difficulties of Mount Kithæron. Both the king and the Lacedæmonians around him were full of joy and

confidence; while the Thebans on their side were struck with dismay as well as surprise. It required all the ability of Epaminondas, and all the daring of Pelopidas, to uphold the resolution of their countrymen, and to explain away or neutralize the terrific signs and portents, which a dispirited Greek was sure to see in every accident of the road. At length, however, they succeeded in this, and the Thebans with their allied Bœotians were marched out from Thebes to Leuktra, where they were posted on a declivity opposite to the Spartan camp. They were commanded by the seven Bœotarchs, of whom Epaminondas was one. But such was the prevalent apprehension of joining battle with the Spartans on equal terms, that even when actually on the ground, three of these Bœotarchs refused to concur in the order for fighting, and proposed to shut themselves up in Thebes for a siege, sending their wives and families away to Athens. Epaminondas was vainly combatting their determination, when the seventh Bœotarch, Branchylides, arrived from the passes of Kithæron, where he had been on guard, and was prevailed upon to vote in favor of the bolder course. Though a majority was thus secured for fighting, yet the feeling throughout the Theban camp was more that of brave despair than of cheering hope; a conviction that it was better to perish in the field, than to live in exile with the Lacedæmonians masters of the Kadmeia. Some encouraging omens, however, were transmitted to the camp, from the temples in Thebes as well as from that of Trophonius at Lebadeia: [374] and a Spartan exile named Leandrias, serving in the Theban ranks, ventured to assure them that they were now on the very spot foredoomed for the overthrow of the Lacedæmonian empire. Here stood the tomb of two females (daughters of a Leuktrian named Skedasus) who had been violated by two Lacedæmonians and had afterwards slain themselves. Skedasus, after having in vain attempted to obtain justice from the Spartans for this outrage, came back, imprecating curses on them, and slew himself also. The vengeance of these departed sufferers would now be sure to pour itself out on Sparta, when her army was in their own district and near their own tomb. And the Theban leaders, to whom the tale was full of opportune encouragement, crowned the tomb with wreaths, invoking the aid of its inmates against the common enemy now present.[375]

While others were thus comforted by the hope of superhuman aid, Epaminondas, to whom the order of the coming battle had been confided, took care that no human precautions should be wanting. His task was arduous; for not only were his troops dispirited, while those of the enemy were confident,—but their numbers were inferior, and some of the Bœotians present were hardly even trustworthy. What the exact numbers were on either side, we are not permitted to know. Diodorus assigns about six thousand men to the Thebans; Plutarch states the numbers of Kleombrotus at eleven thousand.[376] Without placing faith in these figures, we see good reason for believing that the Theban total was decidedly inferior. For such inferiority Epaminondas strove to make up by skilful tactics, and by a combination at that time novel as well as ingenious. In all former Grecian battles, the opposite armies had been drawn up in line, and had fought along the whole line; or at least such had

been the intention of the generals,—and if it was not realized, the cause was to be sought in accidents of the ground, or backwardness or disorder on the part of some division of the soldiers. Departing from this habit, Epaminondas now arrayed his troops so as to bring his own left to bear with irresistible force upon the Spartan right, and to keep back the rest of his army comparatively out of action. Knowing that Kleombrotus, with the Spartans and all the official persons, would be on the right of their own line, he calculated that, if successful on this point against the best troops, he should find little resistance from the remainder. Accordingly he placed on his own left wing chosen Theban hoplites, to the prodigious depth of fifty shields, with Pelopidas and the Sacred Band in front. His order of advance was disposed obliquely or in echelon, so that the deep column on the left should join battle first, while the centre and right kept comparatively back and held themselves more in a defensive attitude.

In 371 B.C., such a combination was absolutely new, and betokened high military genius. It is therefore no disgrace to Kleombrotus that he was not prepared for it, and that he adhered to the ordinary Grecian tactics of joining battle at once along the whole line. But so unbounded was the confidence reigning among the Spartans, that there never was any occasion on which peculiar precautions were less thought of. When, from their entrenched camp on the Leuktrian eminence, they saw the Thebans encamped on an opposite eminence, separated from them by a small breadth of low ground and moderate declivities,—their only impatience was to hurry on the decisive moment, so as to prevent the enemy from escaping. Both the partisans and the opponents of Kleombrotus united in provoking the order for battle, each in their own language. The former urged him, since he had never yet done anything against the Thebans, to strike a blow, and clear himself from the disparaging comparisons which rumor instituted between him and Agesilaus; the latter gave it to be understood, that if Kleombrotus were now backward, their suspicions would be confirmed that he leaned in his heart towards the Thebans.[377] Probably the king was himself sufficiently eager to fight, and so would any other Spartan general have been, under the same circumstances, before the battle of Leuktra. But even had he been otherwise, the impatience, prevalent among the Lacedæmonian portion of his army, left him no option. Accordingly, the decided resolution to fight was taken. The last council was held, and the final orders issued by Kleombrotus, after his morning meal, where copious libations of wine both attested and increased the confident temper of every man. The army was marched out of the camp, and arrayed on the lower portion of the declivity; Kleombrotus with the Spartans and most of the Lacedæmonians being on the right, in an order of twelve deep. Some Lacedæmonians were also on the left, but respecting the order of the other parts of the line, we have no information. The cavalry was chiefly posted along the front.

Meanwhile, Epaminondas also marched down his declivity, in his own chosen order of battle: his left wing being both forward, and strengthened into very deep or-

der, for desperate attack. His cavalry too were posted in front of his line. But before he commenced his march, he sent away his baggage and attendants home to Thebes; while at the same time he made proclamation that any of his Bœotian hoplites, who were not hearty in the cause, might also retire, if they chose. Of such permission the Thespians immediately availed themselves;[378] so many were there, in the Theban camp, who estimated the chances to be all in favor of Lacedæmonian victory. But when these men, a large portion of them unarmed, were seen retiring, a considerable detachment from the army of Kleombrotus, either with or without orders, ran after to prevent their escape, and forced them to return for safety to the main Theban army. The most zealous among the allies of Sparta present,—the Phokians, the Phliasians, and the Herakleots, together with a body of mercenaries,—executed this movement; which seems to have weakened the Lacedæmonians in the main battle, without doing any mischief to the Thebans.

The cavalry first engaged, in front of both lines; and here the superiority of the Thebans soon became manifest. The Lacedæmonian cavalry,—at no time very good, but at this moment unusually bad, composed of raw and feeble novices, mounted on horses provided by the rich,—was soon broken and driven back upon the infantry, whose ranks were disturbed by the fugitives. To reëstablish the battle, Kleombrotus gave the word for the infantry to advance, himself personally leading the right. The victorious Theban cavalry probably hung upon the Lacedæmonian infantry of the centre and left, and prevented them from making much forward movement; while Epaminondas and Pelopidas with their left, advanced according to their intention to bear down Kleombrotus and his right wing. The shock here was terrible; on both sides victory was resolutely and desperately disputed, in a close hand-combat, with pushing of opposite shields and opposite masses. But such was the overwhelming force of the Theban charge,—with the sacred band or chosen warriors in front, composed of men highly trained in the palæstra,[379] and the deep column of fifty shields propelling behind,—that even the Spartans, with all their courage, obstinacy, and discipline, were unable to stand up against it. Kleombrotus, himself either in or near the front, was mortally wounded, apparently early in the battle; and it was only by heroic and unexampled efforts, on the part of his comrades around, that he was carried off yet alive, so as to preserve him from falling into the hands of the enemy. Around him also fell the most eminent members of the Spartan official staff; Deinon the polemarch, Sphodrias, with his son Kleonymus, and several others. After an obstinate resistance and a fearful slaughter, the right wing of the Spartans was completely beaten, and driven back to their camp on the higher ground.

It was upon this Spartan right wing, where the Theban left was irresistibly strong, that all the stress of the battle fell,—as Epaminondas had intended that it should. In no other part of the line does there appear to have been any serious fighting; partly through his deliberate scheme of not pushing forward either his centre or his right,—partly through the preliminary victory of the Theban cavalry, which probably checked

a part of the forward march of the enemy's line,—and partly also through the lukewarm adherence, or even suppressed hostility, of the allies marshalled under the command of Kleombrotus.[380] The Phokians and Herakleots,—zealous in the cause from hatred of Thebes,—had quitted the line to strike a blow at the retiring baggage and attendants; while the remaining allies, after mere nominal fighting and little or no loss, retired to the camp as soon as they saw the Spartan right defeated and driven back to it. Moreover, even some Lacedæmonians on the left wing, probably astounded by the lukewarmness of those around them, and by the unexpected calamity on their own right, fell back in the same manner. The whole Lacedæmonian force, with the dying king, was thus again assembled and formed behind the entrenchment on the higher ground, where the victorious Thebans did not attempt to molest them.[381]

But very different were their feelings as they now stood arrayed in the camp, from that exulting boastfulness with which they had quitted it an hour or two before; and fearful was the loss when it came to be verified. Of seven hundred Spartans who had marched forth from the camp, only three hundred returned to it.[382] One thousand Lacedæmonians, besides, had been left on the field, even by the admission of Xenophon; probably the real number was even larger. Apart from this, the death of Kleombrotus was of itself an event impressive to every one, the like of which had never occurred since the fatal day of Thermopylæ. But this was not all. The allies who stood alongside of them in arms were now altered men. All were sick of their cause, and averse to farther exertion; some scarcely concealed a positive satisfaction at the defeat. And when the surviving polemarchs, now commanders, took counsel with the principal officers as to the steps proper in the emergency, there were a few, but very few, Spartans who pressed for renewal of the battle, and for recovering by force their slain brethren in the field, or perishing in the attempt. All the rest felt like beaten men; so that the polemarchs, giving effect to the general sentiment, sent a herald to solicit the regular truce for burial of their dead. This the Thebans granted, after erecting their own trophy.[383] But Epaminondas, aware that the Spartans would practise every stratagem to conceal the magnitude of their losses, coupled the grant with a condition that the allies should bury their dead first. It was found that the allies had scarce any dead to pick up, and that nearly every slain warrior on the field was a Lacedæmonian.[384] And thus the Theban general, while he placed the loss beyond possibility of concealment, proclaimed at the same time such public evidence of Spartan courage, as to rescue the misfortune of Leuktra from all aggravation on the score of dishonor. What the Theban loss was, Xenophon does not tell us. Pausanias states it at forty-seven men,[385] Diodorus at three hundred. The former number is preposterously small, and even the latter is doubtless under the truth; for a victory in close fight, over soldiers like the Spartans, must have been dearly purchased. Though the bodies of the Spartans were given up to burial, their arms were retained; and the shields of the principal officers were seen by the traveller Pausanias at Thebes five hundred years afterwards.[386]

Twenty days only had elapsed, from the time when Epaminondas quitted Sparta after Thebes had been excluded from the general peace, to the day when he stood victorious on the field of Leuktra.[387] The event came like a thunderclap upon every one in Greece, upon victors as well as vanquished,—upon allies and neutrals, near and distant, alike. The general expectation had been that Thebes would be speedily overthrown and dismantled; instead of which, not only she had escaped, but had inflicted a crushing blow on the military majesty of Sparta. It is in vain that Xenophon,—whose account of the battle is obscure, partial, and imprinted with that chagrin which the event occasioned to him,[388]—ascribes the defeat to untoward accidents,[389] or to the rashness and convivial carelessness of Kleombrotus; upon whose generalship Agesilaus and his party at Sparta did not scruple to cast ungenerous reproach,[390] while others faintly exculpated him by saying that he had fought contrary to his better judgment, under fear of unpopularity. Such criticisms, coming from men wise after the fact, and consoling themselves for the public calamity by censuring the unfortunate commander, will not stand examination. Kleombrotus represented on this occasion the feeling universal among his countrymen. He was ordered to march against Thebes with the full belief, entertained by Agesilaus and all the Spartan leaders, that her unassisted force could not resist him. To fight the Thebans on open ground was exactly what he and every other Spartan desired. While his manner of forcing the entrance of Bœotia, and his capture of Kreusis, was a creditable manœuvre, he seems to have arranged his order of battle in the manner usual with Grecian generals at the time. There appears no reason to censure his generalship, except in so far as he was unable to divine,—what no one else divined,—the superior combinations of his adversary, then for the first time applied to practice. To the discredit of Xenophon, Epaminondas is never named in his narrative of the battle, though he recognizes in substance that the battle was decided by the irresistible Theban force brought to bear upon one point of the enemy's phalanx; a fact which both Plutarch and Diodorus[391] expressly refer to the genius of the general. All the calculations of Epaminondas turned out successful. The bravery of the Thebans, cavalry as well as infantry, seconded by the training which they had received during the last few years, was found sufficient to carry his plans into full execution. To this circumstance, principally, was owing the great revolution of opinion throughout Greece which followed the battle. Every one felt that a new military power had arisen, and that the Theban training, under the generalship of Epaminondas, had proved itself more than a match on a fair field, with shield and spear, and with numbers on the whole inferior,—for the ancient Lykurgean discipline; which last had hitherto stood without a parallel as turning out artists and craftsmen in war, against mere citizens in the opposite ranks, armed but without the like training.[392] Essentially stationary and old-fashioned, the Lykurgean discipline was now overborne by the progressive military improvement of other states, handled by a preëminent tactician; a misfortune predicted by the Corinthians[393] at Sparta sixty years before, and now realised, to the conviction of all Greece, on the field of Leuktra.

But if the Spartan system was thus invaded and overpassed in its privilege of training soldiers, there was another species of teaching wherein it neither was nor could be overpassed,—the hard lesson of enduring pain and suppressing emotion. Memorable indeed was the manner in which the news of this fatal catastrophe was received at Sparta. To prepare the reader by an appropriate contrast, we may turn to the manifestation at Athens twenty-seven years before, when the trireme called Paralus arrived from Ægospotami, bearing tidings of the capture of the entire Athenian fleet. "The moan of distress (says the historian)[394] reached all up the Long Walls from Peiræus to Athens, as each man communicated the news to his neighbor: on that night, not a man slept, from bewailing for his lost fellow-citizens and for his own impending ruin." Not such was the scene at Sparta, when the messenger arrived from the field of Leuktra, although there was everything calculated to render the shock violent. For not only was the defeat calamitous and humiliating beyond all former parallel, but it came at a moment when every man reckoned on victory. As soon as Kleombrotus, having forced his way into Bœotia, saw the unassisted Thebans on plain ground before him, no Spartan entertained any doubt of the result. Under this state of feeling, a messenger arrived with the astounding revelation, that the army was totally defeated, with the loss of the king, of four hundred Spartans, and more than a thousand Lacedæmonians; and that defeat stood confessed by having solicited the truce for interment of the slain. At the moment when he arrived, the festival called the Gymnopædia was actually being celebrated, on its last day; and the chorus of grown men was going through its usual solemnity in the theatre. In spite of all the poignancy of the intelligence, the ephors would not permit the solemnity to be either interrupted or abridged. "*Of necessity, I suppose, they were grieved*,—but they went through the whole as if nothing had happened, only communicating the names of the slain to their relations, and issuing a general order to the women, to make no noise or wailing, but to bear the misfortune in silence." That such an order should be issued, is sufficiently remarkable; that it should be issued and obeyed, is what could not be expected; that it should not only be issued and obeyed, but overpassed, is what no man could believe, if it were not expressly attested by the contemporary historian. "On the morrow (says he) you might see those whose relations had been slain, walking about in public with bright and cheerful countenances; but of those whose relatives survived, scarce one showed himself; and the few who were abroad, looked mournful and humbled."[395]

In comparing this extraordinary self-constraint and obedience to orders, at Sparta, under the most trying circumstances,—with the sensitive and demonstrative temper, and spontaneous outburst of feeling at Athens, so much more nearly approaching to the Homeric type of Greeks,—we must at the same time remark, that in reference to active and heroic efforts for the purpose of repairing past calamities and making head against preponderant odds, the Athenians were decidedly the better of the two. I have already recounted the prodigious and unexpected energy displayed by Athens, after the ruinous loss of her two armaments before Syracuse, when no

one expected that she could have held out for six months: I am now about to recount the proceedings of Sparta, after the calamity at Leuktra,—a calamity great and serious indeed, yet in positive amount inferior to what had befallen the Athenians at Syracuse. The reader will find that, looking to the intensity of active effort in both cases, the comparison is all to the advantage of Athens; excusing at least, if not justifying, the boast of Perikles[396] in his memorable funeral harangue,—that his countrymen, without the rigorous drill of Spartans, were yet found noway inferior to Spartans in daring exertion, when the hour of actual trial arrived.

It was the first obligation of the ephors to provide for the safety of their defeated army in Bœotia; for which purpose they put in march nearly the whole remaining force of Sparta. Of the Lacedæmonian moræ, or military divisions (seemingly six in the aggregate), two or three had been sent with Kleombrotus; all the remainder were now despatched, even including elderly citizens up to near sixty years of age, and all who had been left behind in consequence of other public offices. Archidamus took the command (Agesilaus still continuing to be disabled), and employed himself in getting together the aid promised from Tegea,—from the villages representing the disintegrated Mantinea,—from Corinth, Sikyon, Phlius, and Achaia; all these places being still under the same oligarchies which had held them under Lacedæmonian patronage, and still adhering to Sparta. Triremes were equipped at Corinth, as a means of transporting the new army across to Kreusis, and thus joining the defeated troops at Leuktra; the port of Kreusis, the recent acquisition of Kleombrotus, being now found inestimable, as the only means of access into Bœotia.[397]

Meanwhile the defeated army still continued in its entrenched camp at Leuktra, where the Thebans were at first in no hurry to disturb it. Besides that this was a very arduous enterprise, even after the recent victory,—we must recollect the actual feeling of the Thebans themselves, upon whom their own victory had come by surprise, at a moment when they were animated more by despair than by hope. They were doubtless absorbed in the intoxicating triumph and exultation of the moment, with the embraces and felicitations of their families in Thebes, rescued from impending destruction by their valor. Like the Syracusans after their last great victory[398] over the Athenian fleet in the Great Harbor, they probably required an interval to give loose to their feelings of ecstasy, before they would resume action. Epaminondas and the other leaders, aware how much the value of Theban alliance was now enhanced, endeavored to obtain reinforcement from without, before they proceeded to follow up the blow. To Athens they sent a herald, crowned with wreaths of triumph, proclaiming their recent victory. They invited the Athenians to employ the present opportunity for taking full revenge on Sparta, by joining their hands with those of Thebes. But the sympathies of the Athenians were now rather hostile than friendly to Thebes, besides that they had sworn peace with Sparta, not a month before. The Senate, who were assembled in the acropolis when the herald arrived, heard his news with evident chagrin, and dismissed him without even a word of courtesy;

while the unfortunate Platæans, who were doubtless waiting in the city in expectation of the victory of Kleombrotus, and of their own speedy reëstablishment, found themselves again struck down and doomed to indefinite exile.

To Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly, another Theban herald was sent for the same purpose, and very differently received. The despot sent back word that he would come forthwith by sea, and ordered triremes to be equipped for the purpose. But this was a mere deception; for at the same time, he collected the mercenaries and cavalry immediately near to him, and began his march by land. So rapid were his movements, that he forestalled all opposition,—though he had to traverse the territory of the Herakleots and Phokians, who were his bitter enemies,—and joined the Thebans safely in Bœotia.[399] But when the Theban leaders proposed that he should attack the Lacedæmonian camp in flank, from the high ground, while they would march straight up the hill and attack it in front,—Jason strongly dissuaded the enterprise as too perilous; recommending that they should permit the enemy's departure under capitulation. "Be content (said he) with the great victory which you have already gained. Do not compromise it by attempting something yet more hazardous, against Lacedæmonians driven to despair in their camp. Recollect that a few days ago, *you* yourselves were in despair, and that your recent victory is the fruit of that very feeling. Remember that the gods take pleasure in bringing about these sudden changes of fortune."[400] Having by such representations convinced the Thebans, he addressed a friendly message to the Lacedæmonians, reminding them of their dangerous position, as well as of the little trust to be reposed in their allies,—and offering himself as mediator to negotiate for their safe retreat. Their acquiescence was readily given; and at his instance, a truce was agreed to by both parties, assuring to the Lacedæmonians the liberty of quitting Bœotia. In spite of the agreement, however, the Lacedæmonian commander placed little faith either in the Thebans or in Jason, apprehending a fraud for the purpose of inducing him to quit the camp and of attacking him on the march. Accordingly, he issued public orders in the camp for every man to be ready for departure after the evening meal, and to march in the night to Kithæron, with a view of passing that mountain on the next morning. Having put the enemy on this false scent, he directed his real night-march by a different and not very easy way, first to Kreusis, next to Ægosthena in the Megarian territory.[401] The Thebans offered no opposition; nor is it at all probable that they intended any fraud, considering that Jason was here the guarantee, and that he had at least no motive to break his word.

It was at Ægosthena that the retreating Lacedæmonians met Archidamus, who had advanced to that point with the Laconian forces, and was awaiting the junction of his Peloponnesian allies. The purpose of his march being now completed, he advanced no farther. The armament was disbanded, and Lacedæmonians as well as allies returned home.[402]

In all communities, the return of so many defeated soldiers, liberated under a capitulation by the enemy, would have been a scene of mourning. But in Sparta it was pregnant with grave and dangerous consequences. So terrible was the scorn and ignominy heaped upon the Spartan citizen who survived a defeat, that life became utterly intolerable to him. The mere fact sufficed for his condemnation, without any inquiry into justifying or extenuating circumstances. No citizen at home would speak to him, or be seen consorting with him in tent, game, or chorus; no other family would intermarry with his; if he was seen walking about with an air of cheerfulness, he was struck and ill-used by the passers-by, until he assumed that visible humility which was supposed to become his degraded position. Such rigorous treatment (which we learn from the panegyrist Xenophon)[403] helps to explain the satisfaction of the Spartan father and mother, when they learned that their son was among the slain and not among the survivors. Defeat of Spartan troops had hitherto been rare. But in the case of the prisoners at Sphakteria, when released from captivity and brought back to a degraded existence at Sparta, some uneasiness had been felt, and some precautions deemed necessary to prevent them from becoming dangerous malcontents.[404] Here was another case yet more formidable. The vanquished returning from Leuktra were numerous, while the severe loss sustained in the battle amply attested their bravery. Aware of the danger of enforcing against them the established custom, the ephors referred the case to Agesilaus; who proposed that for that time and case the customary penalties should be allowed to sleep; but should be revived afterwards and come into force as before. Such was the step accordingly taken;[405] so that the survivors from this fatal battle-field were enabled to mingle with the remaining citizens without dishonor or degradation. The step was indeed doubly necessary, considering the small aggregate number of fully qualified citizens; which number always tended to decline,—from the nature of the Spartan political franchise combined with the exigencies of Spartan training,[406]—and could not bear even so great a diminution as that of the four hundred slain at Leuktra. "Sparta (says Aristotle) could not stand up against a single defeat, but was ruined through the small number of her citizens."[407]

The cause here adverted to by Aristotle, as explaining the utter loss of ascendency abroad, and the capital diminution both of power and of inviolability at home, which will now be found to come thick upon Sparta, was undoubtedly real and important. But a fact still more important was, the alteration of opinion produced everywhere in Greece with regard to Sparta, by the sudden shock of the battle of Leuktra. All the prestige and old associations connected with her long-established power vanished; while the hostility and fears, inspired both by herself and by her partisans, but hitherto reluctantly held back in silence,—now burst forth into open manifestation.

The ascendency, exercised down to this time by Sparta north of the Corinthian Gulf, in Phokis and elsewhere, passed away from her, and became divided between the victorious Thebans and Jason of Pheræ. The Thebans, and the Bœotian confed-

erates who were now in cordial sympathy with them, excited to enthusiasm by their recent success, were eager for fresh glories, and readily submitted to the full exigencies of military training; while under a leader like Epaminondas, their ardor was turned to such good account, that they became better soldiers every month.[408] The Phokians, unable to defend themselves single-handed, were glad to come under the protection of the Thebans, as less bitterly hostile to them than the Thessalian Jason,—and concluded with them obligations of mutual defence and alliance.[409] The cities of Eubœa, together with the Lokrians (both Epiknemidian and Opuntian,) the Malians and the town of Heraklea, followed the example. The latter town was now defenceless; for Jason, in returning from Bœotia to Thessaly, had assaulted it and destroyed its fortifications; since by its important site near the pass of Thermopylæ, it might easily be held as a position to bar his entrance into Southern Greece.[410] The Bœotian town of Orchomenus, which had held with the Lacedæmonians even until the late battle, was now quite defenceless; and the Thebans, highly exasperated against its inhabitants, were disposed to destroy the city, reducing the inhabitants to slavery. Severe as this proposition was, it would not have exceeded the customary rigors of war, nor even what might have befallen Thebes herself, had Kleombrotus been victorious at Leuktra. But the strenuous remonstrance of Epaminondas prevented it from being carried into execution. Alike distinguished for mild temper and for long-sighted views, he reminded his countrymen that in their present aspiring hopes towards ascendency in Greece, it was essential to establish a character for moderation of dealing[411] not inferior to their military courage, as attested by the recent victory. Accordingly, the Orchomenians were pardoned upon submission, and re-admitted as members of the Bœotian confederacy. To the Thespians, however, the same lenity was not extended. They were expelled from Bœotia, and their territory annexed to Thebes. It will be recollected, that immediately before the battle of Leuktra, when Epaminondas caused proclamation to be made that such of the Bœotians as were disaffected to the Theban cause might march away, the Thespians had availed themselves of the permission and departed.[412] The fugitive Thespians found shelter, like the Platæans, at Athens.[413]

While Thebes was commemorating her recent victory by the erection of a treasury chamber,[414] and the dedication of pious offerings at Delphi,—while the military organization of Bœotia was receiving such marked improvement, and the cluster of dependent states attached to Thebes was thus becoming larger, under the able management of Epaminondas,—Jason in Thessaly was also growing more powerful every day. He was tagus of all Thessaly; with its tributary neighbors under complete obedience,—with Macedonia partly dependent on him,—and with a mercenary force, well paid and trained, greater than had ever been assembled in Greece. By dismantling Heraklea, in his return home from Bœotia, he had laid open the strait of Thermopylæ, so as to be sure of access into southern Greece whenever he chose. His personal ability and ambition, combined with his great power, inspired universal alarm; for no man knew whither he would direct his arms; whether to Asia, against

the Persian king, as he was fond of boasting,[415]—or northward against the cities in Chalkidikê—or southward against Greece.

The last-mentioned plan seemed the most probable, at the beginning of 370 B.C., half a year after the battle of Leuktra: for Jason proclaimed distinctly his intention of being present at the Pythian festival (the season for which was about August 1, 370 B.C., near Delphi), not only with splendid presents and sacrifices to Apollo, but also at the head of a numerous army. Orders had been given that his troops should hold themselves ready for military service,[416]—about the time when the festival was to be celebrated; and requisitions had been sent round, demanding from all his tributaries victims for the Pythian sacrifice, to a total of not less than one thousand bulls, and ten thousand sheep, goats, and swine; besides a prize-bull to take the lead in the procession, for which a wreath of gold was to be given. Never before had such honor been done to the god; for those who came to offer sacrifice were usually content with one or more beasts bred on the neighboring plain of Kirrha.[417] We must recollect, however, that this Pythian festival of 370 B.C. occurred under peculiar circumstances; for the two previous festivals in 374 B.C. and 378 B.C. must have been comparatively unfrequented; in consequence of the war between Sparta and her allies on one side, and Athens and Thebes on the other,—and also of the occupation of Phokis by Kleombrotus. Hence the festival of 370 B.C., following immediately after the peace, appeared to justify an extraordinary burst of pious magnificence, to make up for the niggardly tributes to the god during the two former; while the hostile dispositions of the Phokians would be alleged as an excuse for the military force intended to accompany Jason.

But there were other intentions, generally believed though not formally announced, which no Greek could imagine without uneasiness. It was affirmed that Jason was about to arrogate to himself the presidency and celebration of the festival, which belonged of right to the Amphiktyonic assembly. It was feared, moreover, that he would lay hands on the rich treasures of the Delphian temple; a scheme said to have been conceived by the Syracusan despot Dionysius fifteen years before, in conjunction with the epirot Alketas, who was now dependent upon Jason.[418] As there were no visible means of warding off this blow, the Delphians consulted the god to know what they were to do if Jason approached the treasury; upon which the god replied, that he would himself take care of it,—and he kept his word. This enterprising despot, in the flower of his age and at the summit of his power, perished most unexpectedly before the day of the festival arrived.[419] He had been reviewing his cavalry near Pheræ, and was sitting to receive and answer petitioners, when seven young men approached, apparently in hot dispute with each other, and appealing to him for a settlement. As soon as they got near, they set upon him and slew him.[420] One was killed on the spot by the guards, and another also as he was mounting on horseback; but the remaining five contrived to reach horses ready prepared for them and to gallop away out of the reach of pursuit. In most of the Grecian cities which

these fugitives visited, they were received with distinguished honor, as having relieved the Grecian world from one who inspired universal alarm,[421] now that Sparta was unable to resist him, while no other power had as yet taken her place.

Jason was succeeded in his dignity, but neither in his power, nor ability, by two brothers,—Polyphron and Polydorus. Had he lived longer, he would have influenced most seriously the subsequent destinies of Greece. What else he would have done, we cannot say; but he would have interfered materially with the development of Theban power. Thebes was a great gainer by his death, though perfectly innocent of it, and though in alliance with him to the last; insomuch that his widow went to reside there for security.[422] Epaminondas was relieved from a most formidable rival, while the body of Theban allies north of Bœotia became much more dependent than they would have remained, if there had been a competing power like that of Jason in Thessaly. The treasures of the god were preserved a few years longer, to be rifled by another hand.

While these proceedings were going on in Northern Greece, during the months immediately succeeding the battle of Leuktra, events not less serious and stirring had occurred in Peloponnesus. The treaty sworn at Sparta twenty days before that battle, bound the Lacedæmonians to disband their forces, remove all their harmosts and garrisons, and leave every subordinate city to its own liberty of action. As they did not scruple to violate the treaty by the orders sent to Kleombrotus, so they probably were not zealous in executing the remaining conditions; though officers were named, for the express purpose of going round to see that the evacuation of the cities was really carried into effect.[423] But it probably was not accomplished in twenty days; nor would it perhaps have been ever more than nominally accomplished, if Kleombrotus had been successful in Bœotia. But after these twenty days came the portentous intelligence of the fate of that prince and his army. The invincible arm of Sparta was broken; she had not a man to spare for the maintenance of foreign ascendency. Her harmosts disappeared at once, (as they had disappeared from the Asiatic and insular cities twenty-three years before, immediately after the battle of Knidus,[424]) and returned home. Nor was this all. The Lacedæmonian ascendency had been maintained everywhere by local oligarchies or dekarchies, which had been for the most part violent and oppressive. Against these governments, now deprived of their foreign support, the long-accumulated flood of internal discontent burst with irresistible force, stimulated probably by returning exiles. Their past misgovernment was avenged by severe sentences and proscription, to the length of great reactionary injustice; and the parties banished by this anti-Spartan revolution became so numerous, as to harass and alarm seriously the newly-established governments. Such were the commotions which, during the latter half of 371 B.C., disturbed many of the Peloponnesian towns,—Phigaleia, Phlius, Corinth, Sikyon, Megara, etc., though with great local difference, both of detail and of result.[425]

But the city where intestine commotion took place in its most violent form was Argos. We do not know how this fact was connected with the general state of Grecian politics at the time, for Argos had not been in any way subject to Sparta, nor a member of the Spartan confederacy, nor (so far as we know) concerned in the recent war, since the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B.C. The Argeian government was a democracy, and the popular leaders were vehement in their denunciations against the oligarchical opposition party—who were men of wealth and great family position. These last, thus denounced, formed a conspiracy for the forcible overthrow of the government. But the conspiracy was discovered prior to execution, and some of the suspected conspirators were interrogated under the torture, to make them reveal their accomplices; under which interrogation one of them deposed against thirty conspicuous citizens. The people, after a hasty trial, put these thirty men to death, and confiscated their property, while others slew themselves to escape the same fate. So furious did the fear and wrath of the people become, exasperated by the popular leaders, that they continued their executions until they had put to death twelve hundred (or, as some say, fifteen hundred) of the principal citizens. At length the popular leaders became themselves tired and afraid of what they had done; upon which the people were animated to fury against them, and put them to death also.[426]

This gloomy series of events was termed the Skytalism, or Cudgelling, from the instrument (as we are told) by which these multiplied executions were consummated; though the name seems more to indicate an impetuous popular insurrection than deliberate executions. We know the facts too imperfectly to be able to infer anything more than the brutal working of angry political passion amidst a population like that of Argos or Korkyra, where there was not (as at Athens) either a taste for speech, or the habit of being guided by speech, and of hearing both sides of every question fully discussed. Cicero remarks that he had never heard of an Argeian orator. The acrimony of Demosthenes and Æschines was discharged by mutual eloquence of vituperation, while the assembly or the dikastery afterwards decided between them. We are told that the assembled Athenian people, when they heard the news of the Skytalism at Argos, were so shocked at it, that they caused the solemnity of purification to be performed round the assembly.[427]

Though Sparta thus saw her confidential partisans deposed, expelled, or maltreated, throughout so many of the Peloponnesian cities,—and though as yet there was no Theban interference within the isthmus, either actual or prospective,—yet she was profoundly discouraged, and incapable of any effort either to afford protection or to uphold ascendency. One single defeat had driven her to the necessity of contending for home and family;[428] probably too the dispositions of her own Periœki and Helots in Laconia, were such as to require all her force as well as all her watchfulness. At any rate, her empire and her influence over the sentiments of Greeks out of Laconia, became suddenly extinct, to a degree which astonishes us, when we recollect that it had become a sort of tradition in the Greek mind, and that,

only nine years before, it had reached as far as Olynthus. How completely her ascendency had passed away, is shown in a remarkable step taken by Athens, seemingly towards the close of 371 B.C., about four months after the battle of Leuktra. Many of the Peloponnesian cities, though they had lost both their fear and their reverence for Sparta, were still anxious to continue members of a voluntary alliance under the presidency of some considerable city. Of this feeling the Athenians took advantage, to send envoys and invite them to enter into a common league at Athens, on the basis of the peace of Antalkidas, and of the peace recently sworn at Sparta.[429] Many of them, obeying the summons, entered into an engagement to the following effect: "I will adhere to the peace sent down by the Persian king, and to the resolutions of the Athenians and the allies generally. If any of the cities who have sworn this oath shall be attacked, I will assist her with all my might." What cities, or how many, swore to this engagement, we are not told; we make out indirectly that Corinth was one;[430] but the Eleians refused it, on the ground that their right of sovereignty over the Marganeis, the Triphylians, and the Skilluntians, was not recognized. The formation of the league itself, however, with Athens as president, is a striking fact, as evidence of the sudden dethronement of Sparta, and as a warning that she would henceforward have to move in her own separate orbit, like Athens after the Peloponnesian war. Athens stepped into the place of Sparta, as president of the Peloponnesian confederacy, and guarantee of the sworn peace; though the cities which entered into this new compact were not for that reason understood to break with their ancient president.[431]

Another incident too, apparently occurring about the present time, though we cannot mark its exact date,—serves to mark the altered position of Sparta. The Thebans preferred in the assembly of Amphiktyons an accusation against her, for the unlawful capture of their citadel the Kadmeia by Phœbidas, while under a sworn peace; and for the sanction conferred by the Spartan authorities on this act, in detaining and occupying the place. The Amphiktyonic assembly found the Spartans guilty, and condemned them to a fine of five hundred talents. As the fine was not paid, the assembly, after a certain interval, doubled it; but the second sentence remained unexecuted as well as the first, since there were no means of enforcement.[432] Probably neither those who preferred the charge, nor those who passed the vote, expected that the Lacedæmonians would really submit to pay the fine. The utmost which could be done, by way of punishment for such contumacy, would be to exclude them from the Pythian games, which were celebrated under the presidency of the Amphiktyons; and we may perhaps presume that they really were thus excluded.

The incident however deserves peculiar notice, in more than one point of view. First, as indicating the lessened dignity of Sparta. Since the victory of Leuktra and the death of Jason, Thebes had become preponderant, especially in Northern Greece, where the majority of the nations or races voting in the Amphiktyonic assembly were situated. It is plainly through the ascendency of Thebes, that this con-

demnatory vote was passed. Next, as indicating the incipient tendency, which we shall hereafter observe still farther developed, to extend the functions of the Amphiktyonic assembly beyond its special sphere of religious solemnities, and to make it the instrument of political coërcion or revenge in the hands of the predominant state. In the previous course of this history, an entire century has passed without giving occasion to mention the Amphiktyonic assembly as taking part in political affairs. Neither Thucydides nor Xenophon, though their united histories cover seventy years, chiefly of Hellenic conflict, ever speak of that assembly. The latter, indeed, does not even notice this fine imposed upon the Lacedæmonians, although it falls within the period of his history. We know the fact only from Diodorus and Justin; and unfortunately merely as a naked fact, without any collateral or preliminary details. During the sixty or seventy years preceding the battle of Leuktra, Sparta had always had her regular political confederacy and synod of allies convened by herself: her political ascendency was exercised over them, *eo nomine*, by a method more direct and easy than that of perverting the religious authority of the Amphiktyonic assembly, even if such a proceeding were open to her.[433] But when Thebes, after the battle of Leuktra, became the more powerful state individually, she had no such established confederacy and synod of allies, to sanction her propositions, and to share or abet her antipathies. The Amphiktyonic assembly, meeting alternately at Delphi and at Thermopylæ, and composed of twelve ancient races, principally belonging to Northern Greece, as well as most of them inconsiderable in power,—presented itself as a convenient instrument for her purposes. There was a certain show of reason for considering the seizure of the Kadmeia by Phœbidas as a religious offence; since it was not only executed during the Pythian festival, but was in itself a glaring violation of the public law and interpolitical obligations recognized between Grecian cities; which, like other obligations, were believed to be under the sanction of the gods; though probably, if the Athenians and Platæans had preferred a similar complaint to the Amphiktyons against Thebes for her equally unjust attempt to surprise Platæa under full peace in the spring of 431 B.C.,—both Spartans and Thebans would have resisted it. In the present case, however, the Thebans had a case against Sparta sufficiently plausible, when combined with their overruling ascendency, to carry a majority in the Amphiktyonic assembly, and to procure the imposition of this enormous fine. In itself the sentence produced no direct effect,—which will explain the silence of Xenophon. But it is the first of a series of proceedings, connected with the Amphiktyons, which will be found hereafter pregnant with serious results for Grecian stability and independence.

Among all the inhabitants of Peloponnesus, none were more powerfully affected, by the recent Spartan overthrow at Leuktra, than the Arcadians. Tegea, their most important city, situated on the border of Laconia, was governed by an oligarchy wholly in the interest of Sparta: Orchomenus was of like sentiment; and Mantinea had been broken up into separate villages (about fifteen years before) by the Lacedæmonians themselves—an act of high-handed injustice committed at the

zenith of their power after the peace of Antalkidas. The remaining Arcadian population were in great proportion villagers; rude men, but excellent soldiers, and always ready to follow the Lacedæmonian banners, as well from old habit and military deference, as from the love of plunder.[434]

The defeat of Leuktra effaced this ancient sentiment. The Arcadians not only ceased to count upon victory and plunder in the service of Sparta, but began to fancy that their own military prowess was not inferior to that of the Spartans; while the disappearance of the harmosts left them free to follow their own inclinations. It was by the Mantineans that the movement was first commenced. Divested of Grecian city-life, and condemned to live in separate villages, each under its own philo-Spartan oligarchy, they had nourished a profound animosity, which manifested itself on the first opportunity of deposing these oligarchies and coming again together. The resolution was unanimously adopted, to re-establish Mantinea with its walls, and resume their political consolidation; while the leaders banished by the Spartans at their former intervention, now doubtless returned to become foremost in the work.[435] As the breaking up of Mantinea had been one of the most obnoxious acts of Spartan omnipotence, so there was now a strong sympathy in favor of its re-establishment. Many Arcadians from other quarters came to lend auxiliary labor, while the Eleians sent three talents as a contribution towards the cost. Deeply mortified by this proceeding, yet too weak to prevent it by force, the Spartans sent Agesilaus with a friendly remonstrance. Having been connected with the city by paternal ties of hospitality, he had declined the command of the army of coërcion previously employed against it; nevertheless, on this occasion, the Mantinean leaders refused to convene their public assembly to hear his communication, desiring that he would make known his purpose to them. Accordingly, he intimated that he had come with no view of hindering the re-establishment of the city, but simply to request that they would defer it until the consent of Sparta could be formally given; which (he promised) should soon be forthcoming, together with a handsome subscription to lighten the cost. But the Mantinean leaders answered, that compliance was impossible, since a public resolution had already been taken to prosecute the work forthwith. Enraged at such a rebuff, yet without power to resent it, Agesilaus was compelled to return home.[436] The Mantineans persevered and completed the rebuilding of their city, on a level site, and in an elliptical form, surrounded with elaborate walls and towers.

The affront here offered, probably studiously offered, by Mantinean leaders who had either been exiles themselves, or sympathized with the exiles,—was only the prelude to a series of others (presently to be recounted) yet more galling and intolerable. But it was doubtless felt to the quick both by the ephors and by Agesilaus, as a public symptom of that prostration into which they had so suddenly fallen. To appreciate fully such painful sentiment, we must recollect that an exaggerated pride and sense of dignity, individual as well as collective, founded upon military excellence and earned by incredible rigor of training,—was the chief mental result imbibed by every

pupil of Lykurgus, and hitherto ratified as legitimate by the general testimony of Greece. This was his principal recompense for the severe fatigue, the intense self-suppression, the narrow, monotonous, and unlettered routine, wherein he was born and died. As an individual, the Spartan citizen was pointed out by the finger of admiration at the Olympic and other festivals;[437] while he saw his city supplicated from the most distant regions of Greece, and obeyed almost everywhere near her own border, as Pan-hellenic president. On a sudden, with scarce any preparatory series of events, he now felt this proud prerogative sentiment not only robbed of its former tribute, but stung in the most mortifying manner. Agesilaus, especially, was the more open to such humiliation, since he was not only a Spartan to the core, but loaded with the consciousness of having exercised more influence than any other king before him,—of having succeeded to the throne at a moment when Sparta was at the maximum of her power,—and of having now in his old age accompanied her, in part brought her by his misjudgments, into her present degradation.

Agesilaus had, moreover, incurred unpopularity among the Spartans themselves, whose chagrin took the form of religious scruple and uneasiness. It has been already stated that he was, and had been from childhood, lame; which deformity had been vehemently insisted on by his opponents (during the dispute between him and Leotychides in 398 B.C. for the vacant throne) as disqualifying him for the regal dignity, and as being the precise calamity against which an ancient oracle—"Beware of a lame reign"—had given warning. Ingenious interpretation by Lysander, combined with superior personal merit in Agesilaus, and suspicions about the legitimacy of Leotychides, had caused the objection to be then overruled. But there had always been a party, even during the palmy days of Agesilaus, who thought that he had obtained the crown under no good auspices. And when the humiliation of Sparta arrived, every man's religion suggested to him readily the cause of it,[438]—"See what comes of having set at nought the gracious warning of the gods, and put upon ourselves a lame reign!" In spite of such untoward impression, however, the real energy and bravery of Agesilaus, which had not deserted even an infirm body and an age of seventy years, was more than ever indispensable to his country. He was still the chief leader of her affairs, condemned to the sad necessity of submitting to this Mantinean affront, and much worse that followed it, without the least power of hindrance.

The reëstablishment of Mantinea was probably completed during the autumn and winter of B.C. 371-370. Such coalescence of villages into a town, coupled with the predominance of feelings hostile to Sparta, appears to have suggested the idea of a larger political union among all who bore the Arcadian name. As yet, no such union had ever existed; the fractions of the Arcadian name had nothing in common, apart from other Greeks, except many legendary and religious sympathies, with a belief in the same heroic lineage and indigenous antiquity.[439] But now the idea and aspiration, espoused with peculiar ardor by a leading Mantinean named Lykomedes, spread itself rapidly over the country, to form a "commune Arcadum," or central Arcadian au-

thority, composed in certain proportions out of all the sections now autonomous,—and invested with peremptory power of determining by the vote of its majority. Such central power, however, was not intended to absorb or set aside the separate governments, but only to be exercised for certain definite purposes; in maintaining unanimity at home, together with concurrent, independent action, as to foreign states.[440] This plan of Pan-Arcadian federation was warmly promoted by the Mantineans, who looked to it as a protection to themselves in case the Spartan power should revive; as well as by the Thebans and Argeians, from whom aid was expected in case of need. It found great favor in most parts of Arcadia, especially in the small districts bordering on Laconia, which stood most in need of union to protect themselves against the Spartans,—the Mænalians, Parrhasians, Eutresians, Ægytes,[441] etc. But the jealousies among the more considerable cities made some of them adverse to any scheme emanating from Mantinea. Among these unfriendly opponents were Heræa, on the west of Arcadia bordering on Elis,—Orchomenus,[442] conterminous with Mantinea to the north—and Tegea, conterminous to the south. The hold of the Spartans on Arcadia had been always maintained chiefly through Orchomenus and Tegea. The former was the place where they deposited their hostages taken from other suspected towns; the latter was ruled by Stasippus and an oligarchy devoted to their interests.[443]

Among the population of Tegea, however, a large proportion were ardent partisans of the new Pan-Arcadian movement, and desirous of breaking off their connection with Sparta. At the head of this party were Proxenus and Kallibius; while Stasippus and his friends, supported by a senate composed chiefly of their partisans, vehemently opposed any alteration of the existing system. Proxenus and his partisans resolved to appeal to the assembled people, whom accordingly they convoked in arms; pacific popular assemblies, with free discussion, forming seemingly no part of the constitution of the city. Stasippus and his friends appeared in armed numbers also; and a conflict ensued, in which each party charged the other with bad faith and with striking the first blow.[444] At first Stasippus had the advantage. Proxenus with a few of the opposite party were slain, while Kallibius with the remainder maintained himself near the town-wall, and in possession of the gate on the side towards Mantinea. To that city he had before despatched an express, entreating aid, while he opened a parley with the opponents. Presently the Mantinean force arrived, and was admitted within the gates; upon which Stasippus, seeing that he could no longer maintain himself, escaped by another gate towards Pallantium. He took sanctuary with a few friends in a neighboring temple of Artemis, whither he was pursued by his adversaries, who removed the roof, and began to cast the tiles down upon them. The unfortunate men were obliged to surrender. Fettered and placed on a cart, they were carried back to Tegea, and put on their trial before the united Tegeans and Mantineans, who condemned them and put them to death. Eight hundred Tegeans, of the defeated party, fled as exiles to Sparta.[445]

Such was the important revolution which now took place at Tegea; a struggle of force on both sides, and not of discussion,—as was in the nature of the Greek oligarchical governments, where scarce any serious change of policy in the state could be brought about without violence. It decided the success of the Pan-Arcadian movement, which now proceeded with redoubled enthusiasm. Both Mantinea and Tegea were cordially united in its favor; though Orchomenus, still strenuous in opposing it, hired for that purpose, as well as for her own defence, a body of mercenaries from Corinth under Polytropus. A full assembly of the Arcadian name was convoked at a small town called Asea, in the mountainous district west of Tegea. It appears to have been numerously attended; for we hear of one place, Eutæa (in the district of Mount Mænalus,[446] and near the borders of Laconia), from whence every single male adult went to the assembly. It was here that the consummation of the Pan-Arcadian confederacy was finally determined; though Orchomenus and Heræa still stood aloof. [447]

There could hardly be a more fatal blow to Sparta than this loss to herself, and transfer to her enemies, of Tegea, the most powerful of her remaining allies.[448] To assist the exiles and avenge Stasippus, as well as to arrest the Arcadian movement, she resolved on a march into the country, in spite of her present dispirited condition; while Heræa and Lepreum, but no other places, sent contingents to her aid. From Elis and Argos, on the other hand, reinforcements came to Mantinea and Tegea. Proclaiming that the Mantineans had violated the recent peace by their entry into Tegea, Agesilaus marched across the border against them. The first Arcadian town which he reached was Eutæa,[449] where he found that all the male adults had gone to the great Arcadian assembly. Though the feebler population, remaining behind, were completely in his power, he took scrupulous care to respect both person and property, and even lent aid to rebuild a decayed portion of the wall. At Eutæa he halted a day or two, thinking it prudent to wait for the junction of the mercenary force and the Bœotian exiles under Polytropus, now at Orchomenus. Against the latter place, however, the Mantineans had marched under Lykomêdes, while Polytropus, coming forth from the walls to meet them, had been defeated with loss, and slain.[450] Hence Agesilaus was compelled to advance onward with his own unassisted forces, through the territory of Tegea up to the neighborhood of Mantinea. His onward march left the way from Asea to Tegea free, upon which the Arcadians assembled at Asea broke up, and marched by night to Tegea; from whence, on the next day, they proceeded to Mantinea, along the mountain range eastward of the Tegeatic plain; so that the whole Arcadian force thus became united. Agesilaus on his side, having ravaged the fields and encamped within little more than two miles from the walls of Mantinea, was agreeably surprised by the junction of his allies from Orchomenus, who had eluded by a night-march the vigilance of the enemy. Both on one side and on the other, the forces were thus concentrated. Agesilaus found himself on the first night, without intending it, embosomed in a recess of the mountains near Mantinea, where the Mantineans gathered on the high ground around, in order to attack him from

above, the next morning. By a well-managed retreat, he extricated himself from this inconvenient position, and regained the plain; where he remained three days, prepared to give battle if the enemy came forth, in order that he might "not seem (says Xenophon) to hasten his departure through fear."[451] As the enemy kept within their walls, he marched homeward, on the fourth day, to his former camp in the Tegean territory. The enemy did not pursue, and he then pushed on his march, though it was late in the evening, to Eutæa; "wishing (says Xenophon) to get his troops off before even the enemies' fires could be seen, in order that no one might say that his return was a flight. He thought that he had raised the spirit of Sparta out of the previous discouragement, by invading Arcadia and ravaging the country without any enemy coming forth to fight him."[452] The army was then brought back to Sparta and disbanded.

It had now become a matter of boast for Agesilaus (according to his own friendly historian) to keep the field for three or four days, without showing fear of Arcadians and Eleians! So fatally had Spartan pride broken down, since the day (less than eighteen months before) when the peremptory order had been sent to Kleombrotus, to march out of Phokis straight against Thebes!

Nevertheless it was not from fear of Agesilaus, but from a wise discretion, that the Arcadians and Eleians had kept within the walls of Mantinea. Epaminondas with the Theban army was approaching to their aid, and daily expected; a sum of ten talents having been lent by the Eleians to defray the cost.[453] He had been invited by them and by others of the smaller Peloponnesian states, who felt the necessity of some external protector against Sparta,—and who even before they applied to Thebes for aid, had solicited the like interference from Athens (probably under the general presidency accepted by Athens, and the oaths interchanged by her with various inferior cities, since the battle of Leuktra), but had experienced a refusal.[454]

Epaminondas had been preparing for this contingency ever since the battle of Leuktra. The first use made of his victory had been to establish or confirm the ascendency of Thebes both over the recusant Bœotian cities and over the neighboring Phokians and Lokrians, etc. After this had been accomplished, he must have been occupied (during the early part of 370 B.C.) in anxiously watching the movements of Jason of Pheræ,—who had already announced his design of marching with an imposing force to Delphi for the celebration of the Pythian games (about August 1.) Though this despot was the ally of Thebes, yet as both his power, and his aspirations towards the headship of Greece,[455] were well known, no Theban general, even of prudence inferior to Epaminondas, could venture in the face of such liabilities to conduct away the Theban force into Peloponnesus, leaving Bœotia uncovered. The assassination of Jason relieved Thebes from such apprehensions, and a few weeks sufficed to show that his successors were far less formidable in power as well as in ability. Accordingly, in the autumn of 370 B.C. Epaminondas had his attention free to turn to Peloponnesus, for the purpose both of maintaining the anti-Spartan revolution

which had taken place in Tegea, and of seconding the pronounced impulse among the Arcadians towards federative coalition.

But the purposes of this distinguished man went farther still; embracing long-sighted and permanent arrangements, such as should forever disable Sparta from recovering her prominent station in the Grecian world. While with one hand he organized Arcadia, with the other he took measures for replacing the exiled Messenians on their ancient territory. To achieve this, it was necessary to dispossess the Spartans of the region once known as independent Messenia, under its own line of kings, but now, for near three centuries, the best portion of Laconia, tilled by Helots for the profit of proprietors at Sparta. While converting these Helots into free Messenians, as their forefathers had once been, Epaminondas proposed to invite back all the wanderers of the same race who were dispersed in various portions of Greece; so as at once to impoverish Sparta by loss of territory, and to plant upon her flank a neighbor bitterly hostile. It has been already mentioned, that during the Peloponnesian war, the exiled Messenians had been among the most active allies of Athens and Sparta,—at Naupaktus, at Sphakteria, at Pylus, in Kephallenia, and elsewhere. Expelled at the close of that war by the triumphant Spartans,[456] not only from Peloponnesus, but also from Naupaktus and Kephallenia, these exiles had since been dispersed among various Hellenic colonies; at Rhegium in Italy, at Messênê in Sicily, at Hesperides in Libya. From 404 B.C. (the close of the war) to 373 B.C., they had remained thus without a home. At length, about the latter year (when the Athenian confederate navy again became equal or superior to the Lacedæmonian on the west coast of Peloponnesus), they began to indulge the hope of being restored to Naupaktus.[457] Probably their request may have been preferred and discussed in the synod of Athenian allies, where the Thebans sat as members. Nothing however had been done towards it by the Athenians,—who soon became fatigued with the war, and at length made peace with Sparta,—when the momentous battle of Leuktra altered, both completely and suddenly, the balance of power in Greece. A chance of protection was now opened to the Messenians from Thebes, far more promising than they had ever had from Athens. Epaminondas, well aware of the loss as well as humiliation that he should inflict upon Sparta by restoring them to their ancient territory, entered into communication with them, and caused them to be invited to Peloponnesus from all their distant places of emigration.[458] By the time of his march into Arcadia, in the late autumn of 370 B.C., many of them had already joined him, burning with all their ancient hatred of Sparta, and contributing to aggravate the same sentiment among Thebans and allies.

With the scheme of restoring the Messenians, was combined in the mind of Epaminondas another, for the political consolidation of the Arcadians; both being intended as parts of one strong and self-supporting organization against Sparta on her own border. Of course he could have accomplished nothing of the kind, if there had not been a powerful spontaneous movement towards consolidation among the Arca-

dians themselves. But without his guidance and protection, the movement would have proved abortive, through the force of local jealousies within the country, fomented and seconded by Spartan aid from without. Though the general vote for federative coalition had been passed with enthusiasm, yet to carry out such a vote to the satisfaction of all, without quarrelling on points of detail, would have required far more of public-minded sentiment, as well as of intelligence, than what could be reckoned upon among the Arcadians. It was necessary to establish a new city; since the standing jealousy between Mantinea and Tegea, now for the first time embarked in one common cause, would never have permitted that either should be preferred as the centre of the new consolidation.[459] Besides fixing upon the new site required, it was indispensable also to choose between conflicting exigencies, and to break up ancient habits, in a way such as could hardly have been enforced by any majority purely Arcadian. The authority here deficient was precisely supplied by Epaminondas; who brought with him a victorious army and a splendid personal name, combined with impartiality as to the local politics of Arcadia, and single-minded hostility to Sparta.

It was with a view to these two great foundations, as well as to expel Agesilaus, that Epaminondas now marched the Theban army into Arcadia; the command being voluntarily intrusted to him by Pelopidas and the other Bœotarchs present. He arrived shortly after the retirement of Agesilaus, while the Arcadians and Eleians were ravaging the lands of the recusant town of Heræa. As they speedily came back to greet his arrival, the aggregate confederate body,—Argeians, Arcadians, and Eleians, united with the Thebans and their accompanying allies,—is said to have amounted to forty thousand, or according to some, even to seventy thousand men.[460] Not merely had Epaminondas brought with him a choice body of auxiliaries,—Phokians, Lokrians, Eubœans, Akarnanians, Herakleots, Malians, and Thessalian cavalry and peltasts,—but the Bœotian bands themselves were so brilliant and imposing, as to excite universal admiration. The victory of Leuktra had awakened among them an enthusiastic military ardor, turned to account by the genius of Epaminondas, and made to produce a finished discipline which even the unwilling Xenophon cannot refuse to acknowledge.[461] Conscious of the might of their assembled force, within a day's march of Laconia, the Arcadians, Argeians, and Eleians pressed Epaminondas to invade that country, now that no allies could approach the frontier to its aid. At first he was unwilling to comply. He had not come prepared for the enterprise; being well aware, from his own journey to Sparta (when the peace-congress was held there prior to the battle of Leuktra), of the impracticable nature of the intervening country, so easy to be defended, especially during the winter-season, by troops like the Lacedæmonians, whom he believed to be in occupation of all the passes. Nor was his reluctance overcome until the instances of his allies were backed by assurances from the Arcadians on the frontier, that the passes were not all guarded; as well as by invitations from some of the discontented Periœki, in Laconia. These Periœki engaged to revolt openly, if he would only show himself in the country. They

told him that there was a general slackness throughout Laconia in obeying the military requisitions from Sparta; and tendered their lives as atonement if they should be found to speak falsely. By such encouragements, as well as by the general impatience of all around him to revenge upon Sparta her long career of pride and abused ascendency, Epaminondas was at length induced to give the order of invasion.[462]

That he should have hesitated in taking this responsibility, will not surprise us, if we recollect, that over and above the real difficulties of the country, invasion of Laconia by land was an unparalleled phenomenon,—that the force of Sparta was most imperfectly known,—that no such thought had been entertained when he left Thebes,—that the legal duration of command, for himself and his colleagues, would not permit it,—and that though his Peloponnesian allies were forward in the scheme, the rest of his troops and his countrymen might well censure him, if the unknown force of resistance turned out as formidable as their associations from old time led them to apprehend.

The invading army was distributed into four portions, all penetrating by different passes. The Eleians had the westernmost and easiest road, the Argeians the easternmost;[463] while the Thebans themselves and the Arcadians formed the two central divisions. The latter alone experienced any serious resistance. More daring even than the Thebans, they encountered Ischolaus the Spartan at Ium or Oeum in the district called Skiritis, attacked him in the village, and overpowered him by vehemence of assault, by superior numbers, and seemingly also by some favor or collusion[464] on the part of the inhabitants. After a desperate resistance, this brave Spartan with nearly all his division perished. At Karyæ, the Thebans also found and surmounted some resistance; but the victory of the Arcadians over Ischolaus operated as an encouragement to all, so that the four divisions reached Sellasia[465] and were again united in safety. Undefended and deserted (seemingly) by the Spartans, Sellasia was now burnt and destroyed by the invaders, who, continuing their march along the plain or valley towards the Eurotas, encamped in the sacred grove of Apollo. On the next day they reached the Eurotas, at the foot of the bridge which crossed that river and led to the city of Sparta.

Epaminondas found the bridge too well-guarded to attempt forcing it; a strong body of Spartan hoplites being also discernible on the other side, in the sacred ground of Athênê Alea. He therefore marched down the left bank of the river, burning and plundering the houses in his way, as far as Amyklæ, between two and three miles below Sparta. Here he found a ford, though the river was full, from the winter season; and accomplished the passage, defeating, after a severe contest, a body of Spartans who tried to oppose it. He was now on the same side of the river as Sparta, to which city he slowly and cautiously made his approach; taking care to keep his Theban troops always in the best battle order, and protecting them, when encamped, by felled trees; while the Arcadians and other Peloponnesian allies dispersed around to plunder the neighboring houses and property.[466]

Great was the consternation which reigned in the city; destitute of fortifications, yet hitherto inviolate in fact and unassailable even in idea. Besides their own native force, the Spartans had no auxiliaries except those mercenaries from Orchomenus who had come back with Agesilaus; nor was it certain beforehand that even these troops would remain with them, if the invasion became formidable.[467] On the first assemblage of the irresistible army on their frontier, they had despatched one of their commanders of foreign contingents (called Xenâgi) to press the instant coming of such Peloponnesian allies as remained faithful to them; and also envoys to Athens, entreating assistance from that city. Auxiliaries were obtained, and rapidly put under march, from Pellênê, Sikyon, Phlius, Corinth, Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis.[468] But the ordinary line of march into Laconia was now impracticable to them; the whole frontier being barred by Argeians and Arcadians. Accordingly they were obliged to proceed first to the Argolic peninsula, and from thence to cross by sea (embarking probably at Halieis on the south-western coast of the peninsula) to Prasiæ on the eastern coast of Laconia; from whence they made their way over the Laconian mountains to Sparta. Being poorly provided with vessels, they were forced to cross in separate detachments, and to draw lots for priority.[469] By this chance the Phliasian contingent did not come over until the last; while the xenagus, eager to reach Sparta, left them behind, and conducted the rest thither, arriving only just before the confederate enemies debouched from Sellasia. The Phliasians, on crossing to Prasiæ, found neither their comrades nor the xenagus, but were obliged to hire a guide to Sparta. Fortunately they arrived there both safely and in time, eluding the vigilance of the enemy, who were then near Amyklæ.

These reinforcements were no less seasonable to Sparta, than creditable to the fidelity of the allies. For the bad feeling which habitually reigned in Laconia, between the Spartan citizens on one side, and the Periœki and Helots on the other, produced in this hour of danger its natural fruits of desertion, alarm, and weakness. Not only were the Periœki and Helots in standing discontent, but even among the Spartan citizens themselves, a privileged fraction called Peers had come to monopolize political honors; while the remainder,—poorer men, yet ambitious and active, and known under the ordinary name of the Inferiors,—were subject to a degrading exclusion, and rendered bitterly hostile. The account given in a previous chapter of the conspiracy of Kinadon, will have disclosed the fearful insecurity of the Spartan citizen, surrounded by so many disaffected companions; Periœki and Helots in Laconia, inferior citizens at Sparta. On the appearance of the invading enemy, indeed, a certain feeling of common interest arose, since even the disaffected might reasonably imagine that a plundering soldiery, if not repelled at the point of the sword, would make their condition worse instead of better. And accordingly, when the ephors made public proclamation, that any Helot who would take heavy armor and serve in the ranks as an hoplite, should be manumitted,—not less than six thousand Helots gave in their names to serve. But a body thus numerous, when seen in arms, became itself the object of mistrust to the Spartans; so that the arrival of their new allies from Prasiæ

was welcomed as a security, not less against the armed Helots within the city, than against the Thebans without.[470] Open enmity, however, was not wanting. A considerable number both of Perioeki and Helots actually took arms on behalf of the Thebans; others remained inactive, disregarding the urgent summons from the ephors, which could not now be enforced.[471]

Under such wide-spread feelings of disaffection the defence even of Sparta itself against the assailing enemy was a task requiring all the energy of Agesilaus. After having vainly tried to hinder the Thebans from crossing the Eurotas, he was forced to abandon Amyklæ and to throw himself back upon the city of Sparta, towards which they immediately advanced. More than one conspiracy was on the point of breaking out, had not his vigilance forestalled the projects. Two hundred young soldiers of doubtful fidelity were marching, without orders, to occupy a strong post (sacred to Artemis) called the Issorium. Those around him were about to attack them, but Agesilaus, repressing their zeal, went up alone to the band, addressed them in language betokening no suspicion, yet warning them that they had mistaken his orders: their services were needed, not at the Issorium, but in another part of the city. They obeyed his orders, and moved to the spot indicated; upon which he immediately occupied the Issorium with troops whom he could trust. In the ensuing night, he seized and put to death fifteen of the leaders of the two hundred. Another conspiracy, said to have been on the point of breaking out, was repressed by seizing the conspirators in the house where they were assembled, and putting them to death untried; the first occasion (observes Plutarch) on which any Spartan was ever put to death untried,[472]—a statement which I hesitate to believe without knowing from whom he borrowed it, but which, if true, proves that the Spartan kings and ephors did not apply to Spartan citizens the same measure as to Perioeki and Helots.

By such severe proceedings, disaffection was kept under; while the strong posts of the city were effectively occupied, and the wider approaches barricaded by heaps of stones and earth.[473] Though destitute of walls, Sparta was extremely defensible by position. Epaminondas marched slowly up to it from Amyklæ; the Arcadians and others in his army spreading themselves to burn and plunder the neighborhood. On the third or fourth day his cavalry occupied the Hippodrome (probably a space of level ground near the river, under the hilly site of the town), where the Spartan cavalry, though inferior both in number and in goodness, gained an advantage over them, through the help of three hundred chosen hoplites whom Agesilaus had planted in ambush hard by, in a precinct sacred to the Dioskuri. Though this action was probably of little consequence, yet Epaminondas did not dare to attempt the city by storm. Satisfied with having defied the Spartans and manifested his mastery of the field even to their own doors, he marched away southward down to Eurotas. To them, in their present depression, it was matter of consolation and even of boasting, [474] that he had not dared to assail them in their last stronghold. The agony of their feelings,—grief, resentment, and wounded honor,—was intolerable. Many wished to

go out and fight, at all hazard; but Agesilaus resisted them with the same firmness as Perikles had shown at Athens, when the Peloponnesians first invaded Attica at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Especially the Spartan women, who had never before beheld an enemy, are said to have manifested emotions so furious and distressing, as to increase much the difficulty of defence.[475] We are even told that Antalkidas, at that time one of the ephors, sent his children for safety away from Sparta to the island of Kythêra. Epaminondas knew well how desperate the resistance of the Spartans would be if their city were attacked; while to himself, in the midst of a hostile and impracticable country, repulse would be absolute ruin.[476]

On leaving Sparta, Epaminondas carried his march as far as Helos and Gythium on the sea-coast; burning and plundering the country, and trying for three days to capture Gythium, which contained the Lacedæmonian arsenal and ships. Many of the Laconian Periœki joined and took service in his army; nevertheless his attempt on Gythium did not succeed; upon which he turned back and retraced his steps to the Arcadian frontier. It was the more necessary for him to think of quitting Laconia, since his Peloponnesian allies, the Arcadians and others, were daily stealing home with the rich plunder which they had acquired, while his supplies were also becoming deficient.[477]

Epaminondas had thus accomplished far more than he had projected when quitting Thebes; for the effect of the expedition on Grecian opinion was immense. The reputation of his army, as well as his own, was prodigiously exalted; and even the narrative of Xenophon, unfriendly as well as obscure, bears involuntary testimony both to the excellence of his generalship and to the good discipline of his troops. He made his Thebans keep in rank and hold front against the enemy, even while their Arcadian allies were dispersing around for plunder. Moreover, the insult and humiliation to Sparta were still greater than that inflicted by the battle of Leuktra; which had indeed shown that she was no longer invincible in the field, but had still left her with the admitted supposition of an inviolable territory and an unapproachable city.

The resistance of the Spartans indeed (except in so far as regards their city) had been far less than either friends or enemies expected; the belief in their power was thus proportionally abridged. It now remained for Epaminondas to complete their humiliation by executing those two enterprises which had formed the special purpose of his expedition: the reëstablishment of Messênê, and the consolidation of the Arcadians.

The recent invasion of Laconia, victorious as well as lucrative, had inspired the Arcadians with increased confidence and antipathy against Sparta, and increased disposition to listen to Epaminondas. When that eminent man proclaimed the necessity of establishing a strong frontier against Sparta on the side of Arcadia, and when he announced his intention of farther weakening Sparta by the restoration of the exiled Messenians,—the general feeling of the small Arcadian communities, already tending

in the direction of coalescence, became strong enough to overbear all such impediments of detail as the breaking up of ancient abode and habit involves. Respecting early Athenian history, we are told by Thucydides,[478] that the legendary Theseus, "having become powerful, in addition to his great capacity," had effected the discontinuance of those numerous independent governments which once divided Attica, and had consolidated them all into one common government at Athens. Just such was the revolution now operated by Epaminondas, through the like combination of intelligence and power. A Board of Œkists or Founders was named to carry out the resolution taken by the Arcadian assemblies at Asea and Tegea, for the establishment of a Pan-Arcadian city and centre. Of this Board, two were from Tegea, two from Mantinea, two from Kleitor, two from the district of Menalus, two from that of the Parrhasians. A convenient site being chosen upon the river Helisson (which flowed through and divided the town in two), about twenty miles west of Tegea, well-fitted to block up the marches of Sparta in a north-westerly direction,—the foundation of the new Great City (Megalopolis) was laid by the Œkists jointly with Epaminondas. Forty distinct Arcadian townships,[479] from all sides of this centre, were persuaded to join the new community. Ten were from the Mænalii, eight from the Parrhasii, six from the Eutresii, three great sections of the Arcadian name, each an aggregate of villages. Four little townships, occupying a portion of the area intended for the new territory, yet being averse to the scheme, were constrained to join; but in one of them, Trapezus, the aversion was so strong, that most of the inhabitants preferred to emigrate, and went to join the Trapezuntines in the Euxine Sea (Trebizond), who received them kindly. Some of the leading Trapezuntines were even slain by the violent temper of the Arcadian majority. The walls of the new city enclosed an area of fifty stadia in circumference (more than five miles and a half); while an ample rural territory was also gathered around it, extending northward as much as twenty-four miles from the city, and conterminous on the east with Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenus, and Kaphyæ,—on the west with Messênê,[480] Phigalia, and Heræa.

The other new city,—Messênê,—was founded under the joint auspices of the Thebans and their allies, Argeians and others; Epitelês being especially chosen by the Argeians for that purpose.[481] The Messenian exiles, though eager and joyful at the thought of regaining their name and nationality, were averse to fix their new city either at Œchalia or Andania, which had been the scenes of their calamities in the early wars with Sparta. Moreover the site of Mount Ithômê is said to have been pointed out by the hero Kaukon, in a dream, to the Ageian general Epitelês. The local circumstances of this mountain (on which the last gallant resistance of the revolted Messenians against Sparta had been carried on, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars) were such, that the indications of dreams, prophets, and religious signs coincided fully with the deliberate choice of a judge like Epaminondas. In after days, this hill Ithômê (then bearing the town and citadel of Messênê), together with the Akrocorinthus, were marked out by Demetrius of Pharus as the two horns of Pelo-

ponnesus: whoever held these two horns, was master of the bull.[482] Ithômê was near two thousand five hundred feet above the level of the sea, having upon its summit an abundant spring of water, called Klepsydra. Upon this summit the citadel or acropolis of the new town of Messênê was built; while the town itself was situated lower down on the slope, though connected by a continuous wall with its acropolis. First, solemn sacrifices were offered, by Epaminondas, who was recognized as Œkist or Founder,[483] to Dionysius and Apollo Ismenius,—by the Argeians, to the Argeian Hêrê and Zeus Nemeius,—by the Messenians, to Zeus Ithomatês and the Dioskuri. Next, prayer was made to the ancient Heroes and Heroines of the Messenian nation, especially to the invincible warrior Aristomenes, that they would now come back and again take up their residence as inmates in enfranchised Messênê. After this, the ground was marked out and the building was begun, under the sound of Argeian and Bœotian flutes, playing the strains of Pronomus and Sakadas. The best masons and architects were invited from all Greece, to lay out the streets with regularity, as well as to ensure a proper distribution and construction of the sacred edifices.[484] In respect of the fortifications, too, Epaminondas was studiously provident. Such was their excellence and solidity, that they exhibited matter for admiration even in the after-days of the traveller Pausanias.[485]

From their newly-established city on the hill of Ithômê, the Messenians enjoyed a territory extending fifteen miles southward down to the Messenian Gulf, across a plain, then as well as now, the richest and most fertile in Peloponnesus; while to the eastward, their territory was conterminous with that of Arcadia and the contemporary establishment of Megalopolis. All the newly-appropriated space was land cut off from the Spartan dominion. How much was cut off in the direction south-east of Ithômê (along the north-eastern coast of the Messenian Gulf), we cannot exactly say. But it would appear that the Perioeki of Thuria, situated in that neighborhood, were converted into an independent community and protected by the vicinity of Messênê.[486] What is of more importance to notice, however, is,—that all the extensive district westward and south-westward of Ithômê,—all the south-western corner of Peloponnesus, from the river Neda southward to Cape Akritas,—was now also subtracted from Sparta. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the Spartan Brasidas had been in garrison near Methônê[487] (not far from Cape Akritas); Pylus,—where the Athenian Demosthenes erected his hostile fort, near which the important capture at Sphakteria was effected,—had been a maritime point belonging to Sparta, about forty-six miles from the city;[488] Aulon (rather farther north, near the river Neda) had been at the time of the conspiracy of Kinadon a township of Spartan Perioeki, of very doubtful fidelity.[489] Now all this wide area, from the north-eastern corner of the Messenian Gulf westward, the best half of the Spartan territory, was severed from Sparta to become the property of Perioeki and Helots, converted into freemen; not only sending no rent or tribute to Sparta, as before, but bitterly hostile to her from the very nature of their tenure. It was in the ensuing year that the Arcadian army cut to pieces the Lacedæmonian garrison at Asinê,[490] killing the Spartan pole-

march Geranor; and probably about the same time the other Lacedæmonian garrisons in the south-western peninsula must have been expelled. Thus liberated, the Periœki of the region welcomed the new Messênê as the guarantee of their independence. Epaminondas, besides confirming the independence of Methônê and Asinê, reconstituted some other towns,[491] which under Lacedæmonian dominion had probably been kept unfortified and had dwindled away.

In the spring of 425 B.C., when Demosthenes landed at Pylus, Thucydides considers it a valuable acquisition for Athens, and a serious injury to Sparta, to have lodged a small garrison of Messenians in that insignificant post, as plunderers of Spartan territory and instigators of Helots to desertion,[492]—especially as their dialect could not be distinguished from that of the Spartans themselves. How prodigious must have been the impression throughout Greece, when Epaminondas, by planting the Messenian exiles and others on the strong frontier city and position of Ithômê, deprived Sparta in a short time of all the wide space between that mountain and the western sea, enfranchising the Periœki and Helots contained in it! We must recollect that the name Messênê had been from old times applied generally to this region, and that it was never bestowed upon any city before the time of Epaminondas. When therefore the Spartans complained of "the liberation of Messênê,"—"the loss of Messênê,"—they included in the word, not simply the city on Mount Ithômê, but all this territory besides; though it was not all comprised in the domain of the new city.

They complained yet more indignantly, that along with the genuine Messenians, now brought back from exile,—a rabble of their own emancipated Periœki and Helots had been domiciled on their border.[493] Herein were included, not only such of these two classes as, having before dwelt in servitude throughout the territory westward of Ithômê, now remained there in a state of freedom—but also doubtless a number of others who deserted from other parts of Laconia. For as we know that such desertions had been not inconsiderable, even when there was no better shelter than the outlying posts of Pylus and Kythêra—so we may be sure that they became much more numerous, when the neighboring city of Messênê was founded under adequate protection, and when there was a chance of obtaining, westward of the Messenian Gulf, free lands with a new home. Moreover, such Periœki and Helots as had actually joined the invading army of Epaminondas in Laconia, would be forced from simple insecurity to quit the country when he retired, and would be supplied with fresh residences in the newly-enfranchised territory. All these men would pass at once, out of a state of peculiarly harsh servitude, into the dignity of free and equal Hellens,[494] sending again a solemn Messenian legation or Theôry to the Olympic festival, after an interval of more than three centuries,[495]—outdoing their former masters in the magnitude of their offerings from the same soil,—and requiting them for previous ill-usage by words of defiance and insult, instead of that universal deference and admiration which a Spartan had hitherto been accustomed to look upon as his due.

The enfranchisement and reörganization of all Western Laconia, the renovation of the Messenian name, the foundation of the two new cities (Messênê and Megalopolis) in immediate neighborhood and sympathy,—while they completed the degradation of Sparta, constituted in all respects the most interesting political phenomena that Greece had witnessed for many years. To the profound mortification of the historian,—he is able to recount nothing more than the bare facts, with such inferences as these facts themselves warrant. Xenophon, under whose eyes all must have passed, designedly omits to notice them;[496] Pausanias, whom we have to thank for most of what we know, is prompted by his religious imagination to relate many divine signs and warnings, but little matter of actual occurrence. Details are altogether withheld from us. We know neither how long a time was occupied in the building of the two cities, nor who furnished the cost; though both the one and the other must have been considerable. Of the thousand new arrangements, incident to the winding up of many small townships, and the commencement of two large cities, we are unable to render any account. Yet there is no point of time wherein social phenomena are either so interesting or so instructive. In describing societies already established and ancient, we find the force of traditional routine almost omnipotent in its influence both on men's actions and on their feelings; bad as well as good is preserved in one concrete, since the dead weight of the past stifles all constructive intelligence, and leaves little room even for improving aspirations. But the forty small communities which coalesced into Megalopolis, and the Messenians and other settlers who came for the first time together on the hill of Ithômê, were in a state in which new exigencies of every kind pressed for immediate satisfaction. There was no file to afford a precedent, nor any resource left except to submit all the problems to discussion by those whose character and judgment was most esteemed. Whether the problems were well- or ill-solved, there must have been now a genuine and earnest attempt to strike out as good a solution as the lights of the time and place permitted, with a certain latitude for conflicting views. Arrangements must have been made for the apportionment of houses and lands among the citizens, by purchase, or grant, or both together; for the political and judicial constitution; for religious and recreative ceremonies, for military defence, for markets, for the security and transmission of property, etc. All these and many other social wants of a nascent community must now have been provided for, and it would have been highly interesting to know how. Unhappily the means are denied to us. We can record little more than the bare fact that these two youngest members of the Hellenic brotherhood of cities were born at the same time, and under the auspices of the same presiding genius, Epaminondas; destined to sustain each other in neighborly sympathy and in repelling all common danger from the attacks of Sparta; a purpose, which, even two centuries afterwards, remained engraven on the mind of a Megalopolitan patriot like Polybius.[497]

Megalopolis was intended not merely as a great city in itself, but as the centre of the new confederacy; which appears to have comprised all Arcadia, except Orchomenus and Heræa. It was enacted that a synod or assembly, from all the separate

members of the Arcadian name, and in which probably every Arcadian citizen from the constituent communities had the right of attending, should be periodically convoked there. This assembly was called the Ten Thousand, or the Great Number. A body of Arcadian troops, called the Epariti, destined to uphold the federation, and receiving pay when on service, was also provided. Assessments were levied upon each city for their support, and a Pan-Arcadian general (probably also other officers) was named. The Ten Thousand, on behalf of all Arcadia, received foreign envoys,—concluded war, or peace, or alliance,—and tried all officers or other Arcadians brought before them on accusations of public misconduct.[498] The great Athenian orators, Kallistratus, Demosthenes, Æschines, on various occasions pleaded before it.[499] What were its times of meeting, we are unable to say. It contributed seriously, for a certain time, to sustain a Pan-Arcadian communion of action and sentiment which had never before existed;[500] and to prevent, or soften, those dissensions which had always a tendency to break out among the separate Arcadian cities. The patriotic enthusiasm, however, out of which Megalopolis had first arisen, gradually became enfeebled. The city never attained that preëminence or power which its founders contemplated, and which had caused the city to be laid out on a scale too large for the population actually inhabiting it.[501]

Not only was the portion of Laconia west of the Messenian Gulf now rendered independent of Sparta, but also much of the territory which lies north of Sparta, between that city and Arcadia. Thus the Skiritæ (hardy mountaineers of Arcadian race, heretofore dependent upon Sparta, and constituting a valuable contingent to her armies),[502] with their territory forming the northern frontier of Laconia towards Arcadia, became from this time independent of and hostile to Sparta.[503] The same is the case even with a place much nearer to Sparta,—Sellasia; though this latter was retaken by the Lacedæmonians four or five years afterwards.[504]

Epaminondas remained about four months beyond the legal duration of his command in Arcadia and Laconia.[505] The sufferings of a severe mid-winter were greatly mitigated to his soldiers by the Arcadians, who, full of devoted friendship, pressed upon them an excess of hospitality which he could not permit consistently with his military duties.[506] He stayed long enough to settle all the preliminary debates and difficulties, and to put in train of serious execution the establishment of Messênê and Megalopolis. For the completion of a work thus comprehensive, which changed the face and character of Peloponnesus, much time was of course necessary. Accordingly, a Theban division under Pamenes was left to repel all obstruction from Sparta; [507] while Tegea also, from this time forward, for some years, was occupied as a post by a Theban harmost and garrison.[508]

Meanwhile the Athenians were profoundly affected by these proceedings of Epaminondas in Peloponnesus. The accumulation of force against Sparta was so powerful, that under a chief like him, it seemed sufficient to crush her; and though the Athenians were now neutral in the contest, such a prospect was not at all agree-

able to them,[509] involving the aggrandizement of Thebes to a point inconsistent with their security. It was in the midst of the successes of Epaminondas that envoys came to Athens from Sparta, Corinth, and Phlius, to entreat her aid. The message was one not merely humiliating to the Lacedæmonians, who had never previously sent the like request to any Grecian city,—but also difficult to handle in reference to Athens. History showed abundant acts of jealousy and hostility, little either of good feeling or consentient interest, on the part of the Lacedæmonians towards her. What little was to be found, the envoys dexterously brought forward; going back to the dethronement of the Peisistratids from Athens by Spartan help, the glorious expulsion of Xerxes from Greece by the joint efforts of both cities,—and the auxiliaries sent by Athens into Laconia in 465 B.C., to assist the Spartans against the revolted Messenians on Mount Ithômê. In these times (he reminded the Athenian assembly) Thebes had betrayed the Hellenic cause by joining Xerxes, and had been an object of common hatred to both. Moreover the maritime forces of Greece had been arrayed under Athens in the Confederacy of Delos, with full sanction and recommendation from Sparta; while the headship of the latter by land had in like manner been accepted by the Athenians. He called on the assembly, in the name of these former glories, to concur with Sparta in forgetting all the deplorable hostilities which had since intervened, and to afford to her a generous relief against the old common enemy. The Thebans might even now be decimated (according to the vow said to have been taken after the repulse of Xerxes), in spite of their present menacing ascendency,—if Athens and Sparta could be brought heartily to coöperate; and might be dealt with as Thebes herself had wished to deal with Athens after the Peloponnesian war, when Sparta refused to concur in pronouncing the sentence of utter ruin.[510]

This appeal from Sparta was earnestly seconded by the envoys from Corinth and Phlius. The Corinthian speaker contended, that Epaminondas and his army, passing through the territory of Corinth and inflicting damage upon it in their passage into Peloponnesus, had committed a glaring violation of the general peace, sworn in 371 B.C., first at Sparta and afterwards at Athens, guaranteeing universal autonomy to every Grecian city. The envoy from Phlius,—while complimenting Athens on the proud position which she now held, having the fate of Sparta in her hands,—dwelt on the meed of honor which she would earn in Greece, if she now generously interfered to rescue her ancient rival, forgetting past injuries and remembering only past benefits. In adopting such policy, too, she would act in accordance with her own true interests; since, should Sparta be crushed, the Thebans would become undisputed heads of Greece, and more formidable still to Athens.[511]

It was not among the least marks of the prostration of Sparta, that she should be compelled to send such an embassy to Athens, and to entreat an amnesty for so many untoward realities during the past. The contrast is indeed striking, when we set her present language against that which she had held respecting Athens, before and through the Peloponnesian war.

At first, her envoys were heard with doubtful favor; the sentiment of the assembly being apparently rather against than for them. "Such language from the Spartans (murmured the assembled citizens) is intelligible enough during their present distress; but so long as they were in good circumstances, we received nothing but ill-usage from them."[512] Nor was the complaint of the Spartans, that the invasion of Laconia was contrary to the sworn peace guaranteeing universal autonomy, admitted without opposition. Some said that the Lacedæmonians had drawn the invasion upon themselves, by their previous interference with Tegea and in Arcadia; and that the intervention of the Mantineans at Tegea had been justifiable, since Stasippus and the philo-Laconian party in that city had been the first to begin unjust violence. On the other hand, the appeal made by the envoys to the congress of Peloponnesian allies held in 404 B.C., after the surrender of Athens,—when the Theban deputy had proposed that Athens should be totally destroyed, while the Spartans had strenuously protested against so cruel a sentence—made a powerful impression on the assembly, and contributed more than anything else to determine them in favor of the proposition.[513] "As Athens was then, so Sparta is now, on the brink of ruin, from the fiat of the same enemy: Athens was then rescued by Sparta, and shall she now leave the rescue unrequited?" Such was the broad and simple issue which told upon the feelings of the assembled Athenians, disposing them to listen with increasing favor both to the envoys from Corinth and Phlius, and to their own speakers on the same side.

To rescue Sparta, indeed, was prudent as well as generous. A counterpoise would thus be maintained against the excessive aggrandizement of Thebes, which at this moment doubtless caused serious alarm and jealousy to the Athenians. And thus, after the first ebullition of resentment against Sparta, naturally suggested by the history of the past, the philo-Spartan view of the situation gradually became more and more predominant in the assembly. Kallistratus[514] the orator spoke eloquently in support of the Lacedæmonians; while the adverse speakers were badly listened to, as pleading in favor of Thebes, whom no one wished to aggrandize farther. A vote, decisive and enthusiastic, was passed for assisting the Spartans with the full force of Athens; under the command of Iphikrates, then residing as a private citizen[515] at Athens, since the peace of the preceding year, which had caused him to be recalled from Korkyra.

As soon as the sacrifices, offered in contemplation of this enterprise were announced to be favorable, Iphikrates made proclamation that the citizens destined for service should equip themselves and muster in arms in the grove of Akadêmus (outside the gates), there to take their evening meal, and to march the next morning at daybreak. Such was the general ardor, that many citizens went forth from the gates even in advance of Iphikrates himself; and the total force which followed him is said to have been twelve thousand men,—not named under conscription by the general, but volunteers.[516] He first marched to Corinth, where he halted some days; much to the discontent of his soldiers, who were impatient to accomplish their project of

carrying rescue to Sparta. But Iphikrates was well aware that all beyond Corinth was hostile ground, and that he had formidable enemies to deal with. After having established his position at Corinth, and obtained information regarding the enemy, he marched into Arcadia, and there made war without any important result. Epaminondas and his army had quitted Laconia, while many of the Arcadians and Eleians had gone home with the plunder acquired; so that Sparta was, for the time, out of danger. Impelled in part by the recent manifestation of Athens,[517] the Theban general himself soon commenced his march of return into Bœotia, in which it was necessary for him to pass the line of Mount Oneium between Corinth and Kenchreæ. This line was composed of difficult ground, and afforded good means of resistance to the passage of an army; nevertheless Iphikrates, though he occupied its two extremities, did not attempt directly to bar the passage of the Thebans. He contented himself with sending out from Corinth all his cavalry, both Athenian and Corinthian, to harass them in their march. But Epaminondas beat them back with some loss, and pursued them to the gates of Corinth. Excited by this spectacle, the Athenian main body within the town were eager to march out and engage in general battle. Their ardor was however repressed by Iphikrates; who, refusing to go forth, suffered the Thebans to continue their retreat unmolested.[518]

On returning to Thebes, Epaminondas with Pelopidas and the other Bœotarchs, resigned the command. They had already retained it for four months longer than the legal expiration of their term. Although, by the constitutional law of Thebes, any general who retained his functions longer than the period fixed by law was pronounced worthy of death, yet Epaminondas, while employed in his great projects for humiliating Sparta and founding the two hostile cities on her border, had taken upon himself to brave this illegality, persuading all his colleagues to concur with him. On resigning the command, all of them had to undergo that trial of accountability which awaited every retiring magistrate, as a matter of course,—but which, in the present case, was required on special ground, since all had committed an act notoriously punishable as well as of dangerous precedent. Epaminondas undertook the duty of defending his colleagues as well as himself. That he as well as Pelopidas had political enemies, likely to avail themselves of any fair pretext for accusing him,—is not to be doubted. But we may well doubt, whether on the present occasion any of these enemies actually came forward to propose that the penalty legally incurred should be inflicted; not merely because this proposition, in the face of a victorious army, returning elate with their achievements and proud of their commanders, was full of danger to the mover himself,—but also for another reason,—because Epaminondas would hardly be imprudent enough to wait for the case to be stated by his enemies. Knowing that the illegality committed was flagrant and of hazardous example,—having also the reputation of his colleagues as well as his own to protect,—he would forestall accusation by coming forward himself to explain and justify the proceeding. He set forth the glorious results of the expedition just finished; the invasion and devastation of Laconia, hitherto unvisited by any enemy,—the confinement of the Spartans within their walls,

—the liberation of all Western Laconia, and the establishment of Messênê as a city,—the constitution of a strong new Arcadian city, forming, with Tegea on one flank and Messênê on the other, a line of defence on the Spartan frontier, so as to ensure the permanent depression of the great enemy of Thebes,—the emancipation of Greece generally, from Spartan ascendency, now consummated.

Such justification,—whether delivered in reply to a substantive accuser, or (which is more probable) tendered spontaneously by Epaminondas himself,—was not merely satisfactory, but triumphant. He and the other generals were acquitted by acclamation; without even going through the formality of collecting the votes.[519] And it appears that both Epaminondas and Pelopidas were immediately re-appointed among the Bœotarchs of the year.[520]

CHAPTER LXXIX.

FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND MEGALOPOLIS TO THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS.

PRODIGIOUS was the change operated throughout the Grecian world during the eighteen months between June 371 B.C. (when the general peace, including all except Thebes, was sworn at Sparta, twenty days before the battle of Leuktra), and the spring of 369 B.C., when the Thebans, after a victorious expedition into Peloponnesus, were reconducted home by Epaminondas.

How that change worked in Peloponnesus, amounting to a partial reconstitution of the peninsula, has been sketched in the preceding chapter. Among most of the cities and districts hitherto dependent allies of Sparta, the local oligarchies, whereby Spartan influence had been maintained, were overthrown, not without harsh and violent reaction. Laconia had been invaded and laid waste, while the Spartans were obliged to content themselves with guarding their central hearth and their families from assault. The western and best half of Laconia had been wrested from them; Messênê had been constituted as a free city on their frontier; a large proportion of their Periœki and Helots had been converted into independent Greeks bitterly hostile to them; moreover the Arcadian population had been emancipated from their dependence, and organized into self-acting jealous neighbors in the new city of Megalopolis, as well as in Tegea and Mantinea. The once philo-Laconian Tegea was now among the chief enemies of Sparta; and the Skiritæ, so long numbered as the bravest of the auxiliary troops of the latter, were now identified in sentiment with Arcadians and Thebans against her.

Out of Peloponnesus, the change wrought had also been considerable; partly, in the circumstances of Thessaly and Macedonia, partly in the position and policy of Athens.

At the moment of the battle of Leuktra (July, 371 B.C.) Jason was tagus of Thessaly, and Amyntas king of Macedonia. Amyntas was dependent on, if not tributary to, Jason, whose dominion, military force, and revenue, combined with extraordinary personal energy and ability, rendered him decidedly the first potentate in Greece, and whose aspirations were known to be unbounded; so that he inspired more or less alarm everywhere, especially to weaker neighbors like the Macedonian prince. Throughout a reign of twenty-three years, full of trouble and peril, Amyntas had cultivated the friendship both of Sparta and of Athens,[521] especially the former. It was by Spartan aid only that he had been enabled to prevail over the Olynthian confederacy, which would otherwise have proved an overmatch for him. At the time when Sparta aided him to crush that promising and liberal confederacy, she was at the

maximum of her power (382-379 B.C.), holding even Thebes under garrison among her subject allies. But the revolution of Thebes, and the war against Thebes and Athens (from 378 B.C. downward) had sensibly diminished her power on land; while the newly-organized naval force and maritime confederacy of the Athenians, had overthrown her empire at sea. Moreover, the great power of Jason in Thessaly had so grown up (combined with the resistance of the Thebans) as to cut off the communication of Sparta with Macedonia, and even to forbid her (in 374 B.C.) from assisting her faithful ally, the Pharsalian Polydamas, against him.[522] To Amyntas, accordingly, the friendship of Athens, now again the greatest maritime potentate in Greece, had become more important than that of Sparta. We know that he tried to conciliate the powerful Athenian generals, Iphikrates and Timotheus. He adopted the former as his son;[523] at what exact period, cannot be discovered; but I have already stated that Iphikrates had married the daughter of Kotys king of Thrace, and had acquired a maritime settlement called Drys, on the Thracian coast. In the years 373-372 B.C., we find Timotheus also in great favor with Amyntas, testified by a valuable present sent to him at Athens; a cargo of timber, the best produce of Macedonia.[524] Amyntas was at this period on the best footing with Athens, sent his deputies as a confederate to the regular synod there assembled, and was treated with considerable favor.[525]

The battle of Leuktra (July 371 B.C.) tended to knit more closely the connection between Amyntas and the Athenians, who were now the auxiliaries most likely to sustain him against the ascendency of Jason. It produced at the same time the more important effect of stimulating the ambition of Athens in every direction. Not only her ancient rival, Sparta, beaten in the field and driven from one humiliation to another, was disabled from opposing her, and even compelled to solicit her aid,—but new rivals, the Thebans, were suddenly lifted into an ascendency inspiring her with mingled jealousy and apprehension. Hence fresh hopes as well as fresh jealousies conspired to push Athens in a career of aspiration such as had never appeared open to her since the disasters of 404 B.C. Such enlargement of her views was manifested conspicuously by the step taken two or three months after the battle of Leuktra (mentioned in my preceding chapter),—of causing the peace, which had already been sworn at Sparta in the preceding month of June, to be resworn under the presidency and guarantee of Athens, by cities binding themselves mutually to each other as defensive allies of Athens;[526] thus silently disenthroning Sparta and taking her place.

On land, however, Athens had never held, and could hardly expect to hold, anything above the second rank, serving as a bulwark against Theban aggrandizement. At sea she already occupied the first place, at the head of an extensive confederacy; and it was to farther maritime aggrandizement that her present chances, as well as her past traditions, pointed. Such is the new path upon which we now find her entering. At the first formation of her new confederacy, in 378 B.C., she had distinctly renounced all idea of resuming the large amount of possessions, public and private,

which had been snatched from her along with her empire at the close of the Peloponnesian war; and had formally proclaimed that no Athenian citizen should for the future possess or cultivate land out of Attica—a guarantee against renovation of the previous kleruchies or out-possessions. This prudent self-restraint, which had contributed so much during the last seven years to raise her again into naval preëminence, is now gradually thrown aside, under the tempting circumstances of the moment. Henceforward, the Athenian maritime force becomes employed for the recovery of lost possessions as well as for protection or enlargement of the confederacy. The prohibition against kleruchies out of Attica will soon appear to be forgotten. Offence is given to the prominent members of the maritime confederacy; so that the force of Athens, misemployed and broken into fragments, is found twelve or thirteen years afterwards unable to repel a new aggressor, who starts up, alike able and unexpected, in the Macedonian prince Philip, son of Amyntas.

Very different was the position of Amyntas himself towards Athens, in 371 B.C. He was an unpretending ally, looking for help in case of need against Jason, and sending his envoy to the meeting at Athens about September or October 371 B.C., when the general peace was resworn under Athenian auspices. It was at this meeting that Athens seems to have first put forth her new maritime pretensions. While guaranteeing to every Grecian city, great and small, the enjoyment of autonomy, she made exception of some cities which she claimed as belonging to herself. Among these was certainly Amphipolis; probably also the towns in the Thracian Chersonesus and Potidæa; all which we find, a few years afterwards, occupied by Athenians.[527] How much of their lost possessions the Athenians thought it prudent now to reclaim, we cannot distinctly make out. But we know that their aspirations grasped much more than Amphipolis;[528] and the moment was probably thought propitious for making other demands besides. Amyntas through his envoy, together with the rest of the assembled envoys, recognized without opposition the right of the Athenians to Amphipolis.[529]

Such recognition was not indeed in itself either any loss to Amyntas, or any gain to Athens; for Amphipolis, though bordering on his kingdom, had never belonged to him, nor had he any power of transferring it. Originally an Athenian colony,[530] next taken from Athens in 424-423 B.C. by Brasidas, through the improvidence of the Athenian officers Euklês and Thucydides, then recolonized under Lacedæmonian auspices,—it had ever since remained an independent city; though Sparta had covenanted to restore it by the peace of Nikias (421 B.C.), but had never performed her covenant. Its unparalleled situation, near to both the bridge and mouth of the Strymon, in the midst of a fertile territory, within reach of the mining district of Pangæus,—rendered it a tempting prize; and the right of Athens to it was indisputable; so far as original colonization before the capture by Brasidas, and formal treaty of cession by Sparta after the capture, could confer a right. But this treaty, not fulfilled at the time, was now fifty years old. The repugnance of the Amphipolitan

population, which had originally prevented its fulfilment, was strengthened by all the sanction of a long prescription; while the tomb and chapel of Brasidas their second founder, consecrated in the agora, served as an imperishable admonition to repel all pretensions on the part of Athens. Such pretensions, whatever might be the right, were deplorably impolitic unless Athens was prepared to back them by strenuous efforts of men and money; from which we shall find her shrinking now as she had done (under the unwise advice of Nikias) in 421 B.C., and the years immediately succeeding. In fact, the large renovated pretensions of Athens both to Amphipolis and to other places on the Macedonian and Chalkidic coast, combined with her languor and inertness in military action,—will be found henceforward among the greatest mischiefs to the general cause of Hellenic independence, and among the most effective helps to the well-conducted aggressions of Philip of Macedon.

Though the claim of Athens to the recovery of a portion of her lost transmarine possessions was thus advanced and recognized in the congress of autumn 371 B.C., she does not seem to have been able to take any immediate steps for prosecuting it. Six months afterwards, the state of northern Greece was again completely altered by the death, nearly at the same time, of Jason in Thessaly, and of Amyntas in Macedonia.[531] The former was cut off (as has been mentioned in the preceding chapter) by assassination, while in the plenitude of his vigor; and his great power could not be held together by an inferior hand. His two brothers, Polyphron and Polydorus, succeeded him in the post of tagus of Thessaly. Polyphron, having put to death his brother, enjoyed the dignity for a short time; after which he too was slain by a third brother, Alexander of Pheræ; but not before he had committed gross enormities by killing and banishing many of the most eminent citizens of Larissa and Pharsalus; among them the estimable Polydamas.[532] The Larissæan exiles, many belonging to the great family of the Aleuadæ, took refuge in Macedonia, where Amyntas (having died in 370 B.C.) had been succeeded in the throne by his youthful son Alexander. The latter, being persuaded to invade Thessaly for the purpose of restoring them, succeeded in getting possession of Larissa and Krannon; both which cities he kept under his own garrisons, in spite of unavailing resistance from Polyphron and Alexander of Pheræ.[533]

This Alexander, who succeeded to Jason's despotism in Pheræ, and to a considerable portion of his military power, was nevertheless unable to keep together the whole of it, or to retain Thessaly and its circumjacent tributaries in one united dominion. The Thessalian cities hostile to him invited assistance, not merely from Alexander of Macedon, but also from the Thebans; who despatched Pelopidas into the country, seemingly in 369 B.C., soon after the return of the army under Epaminondas from its victorious progress in Laconia and Arcadia. Pelopidas entered Thessaly at the head of an army, and took Larissa with various other cities into Theban protection; apparently under the acquiescence of Alexander of Macedon, with whom he contracted an alliance.[534] A large portion of Thessaly thus came under the

protection of Thebes in hostility to the dynasty of Pheræ, and to the brutal tyrant Alexander who now ruled in that city.

Alexander of Macedon found that he had difficulty enough in maintaining his own dominion at home, without holding Thessalian towns in garrison. He was harassed by intestine dissensions, and after a reign of scarcely two years, was assassinated (368 B.C.) by some conspirators of Alôrus and Pydna, two cities (half Macedonian, half Hellenic) near the western coast of the Thermaic Gulf. Ptolemæus (or Ptolemy) of Alôrus is mentioned as leader of the enterprise, and Apollophanês of Pydna as one of the agents.[535] But besides these conspirators, there was also another enemy, Pausanias,—a man of the royal lineage and a pretender to the throne;[536] who, having been hitherto in banishment, was now returning at the head of a considerable body of Greeks, supported by numerous partisans in Macedonia,—and was already master of Anthemus, Thermê, Strepsa, and other places in or near the Thermaic Gulf. He was making war both against Ptolemy and against the remaining family of Amyntas. Eurydikê, the widow of that prince, was now left with her two younger children, Perdikkas, a young man, and Philip, yet a youth. She was in the same interest with Ptolemy, the successful conspirator against her son Alexander, and there was even a tale which represented her as his accomplice in the deed. Ptolemy was regent, administering her affairs and those of her minor children, against Pausanias.[537]

Deserted by many of their most powerful friends, Eurydikê and Ptolemy would have been forced to yield the country to Pausanias, had they not found by accident a foreign auxiliary near at hand. The Athenian admiral Iphikrates, with a squadron of moderate force, was then on the coast of Macedonia. He had been sent thither by his countrymen (369 B.C.) (soon after his partial conflict near Corinth with the retreating army of Epaminondas, on its way from Peloponnesus to Bœotia), for the purpose of generally surveying the maritime region of Macedonia and Thrace, opening negotiations with parties in the country, and laying his plans for future military operations. At the period when Alexander was slain, and when Pausanias was carrying on his invasion, Iphikrates happened to be on the Macedonian coast. He was there visited by Eurydikê with her two sons Perdikkas and Philip; the latter seemingly about thirteen or fourteen years of age, the former somewhat older. She urgently implored him to assist the family in their present emergency, reminding him that Amyntas had not only throughout his life been a faithful ally of Athens, but had also adopted him (Iphikrates) as his son, and had thus constituted him brother to the two young princes. Placing Perdikkas in his hands, and causing Philip to embrace his knees, she appealed to his generous sympathies, and invoked his aid as the only chance of restoration, or even of personal safety, to the family. Iphikrates, moved by this affecting supplication, declared in her favor, acted so vigorously against Pausanias as to expel him from Macedonia, and secured the sceptre to the family of Amyntas; under Ptolemy of Alôrus as regent for the time.

This striking incident is described by the orator Æschines[538] in an oration delivered many years afterwards at Athens. The boy, who then clasped the knees of Iphikrates, lived afterwards to overthrow the independence, not of Athens alone, but of Greece generally. The Athenian general had not been sent to meddle in the disputes of succession to the Macedonian crown. Nevertheless, looking at the circumstances of the time, his interference may really have promised beneficial consequences to Athens; so that we have no right to blame him for the unforeseen ruin which it was afterwards found to occasion.

Though the interference of Iphikrates maintained the family of Amyntas, and established Ptolemy of Alôrus as regent, it did not procure to Athens the possession of Amphipolis; which was not in the power of the Macedonian kings to bestow. Amphipolis was at that time a free Greek city, inhabited by a population in the main seemingly Chalkidic, and in confederacy with Olynthus.[539] Iphikrates prosecuted his naval operations on the coast of Thrace and Macedonia for a period of three years (368-365 B.C.). We make out very imperfectly what he achieved. He took into his service a general named Charidemus, a native of Oreus in Eubœa; one of those Condottieri (to use an Italian word familiar in the fourteenth century), who, having a band of mercenaries under his command, hired himself to the best bidder and to the most promising cause. These mercenaries served under Iphikrates for three years,[540] until he was dismissed by the Athenians from his command and superseded by Timotheus. What successes they enabled him to obtain for Athens, is not clear; but it is certain that he did not succeed in taking Amphipolis. He seems to have directed one or two attempts against the town by other officers, which proved abortive; but he got possession of some Amphipolitan prisoners or hostages,[541] which opened a prospect of accomplishing the surrender of the town.

It seems evident, however, in spite of our great dearth of information, that Iphikrates during his command between 369-365 B.C. did not satisfy the expectations of his countrymen. At that time, those expectations were large, as testified by sending out not only Iphikrates to Macedonia and Thrace, but also Timotheus (who had returned from his service with the Persians in 372-371 B.C.) to Ionia and the Hellespont, in conjunction with Ariobarzanes the satrap of Phrygia.[542] That satrap was in possession of Sestos, as well as of various other towns in the Thracian Chersonesus, towards which Athenian ambition now tended, according to that new turn, towards more special and separate acquisitions for Athens, which it had taken since the battle of Leuktra. But before we advert to the achievements of Timotheus (366-365 B.C.) in these regions, we must notice the main course of political conflict in Greece Proper, down to the partial pacification of 366 B.C.

Though the Athenians had sent Iphikrates (in the winter of 370-369 B.C.) to rescue Sparta from the grasp of Epaminondas, the terms of a permanent alliance had not yet been settled between them; envoys from Sparta and her allies visited Athens shortly afterwards for that purpose.[543] All pretensions to exclusive headship on the

part of Sparta were now at an end. Amidst abundant discussion in the public assembly, all the speakers, Lacedæmonian and others as well as Athenian, unanimously pronounced that the headship must be vested jointly and equally in Sparta and Athens; and the only point in debate was, how such an arrangement could be most suitably carried out. It was at first proposed that the former should command on land, the latter at sea; a distribution, which, on first hearing, found favor both as equitable and convenient, until an Athenian named Kephisodotus reminded his countrymen, that the Lacedæmonians had few ships of war, and those manned chiefly by Helots; while the land-force of Athens consisted of her horsemen and hoplites, the choice citizens of the state. Accordingly, on the distribution now pointed out, Athenians, in great numbers and of the best quality, would be placed under Spartan command; while few Lacedæmonians, and those of little dignity, would go under Athenian command; which would be, not equality, but the reverse. Kephisodotus proposed that both on land and at sea, the command should alternate between Athens and Sparta, in periods of five days; and his amendment was adopted.[544]

Though such amendment had the merit of perfect equality between the two competitors for headship, it was by no means well-calculated for success in joint operations against a general like Epaminondas. The allies determined to occupy Corinth as a main station, and to guard the line of Mount Oneium between that city and Kenchreæ,[545] so as to prevent the Thebans from again penetrating into Peloponnesus. It is one mark of the depression in the fortunes of Sparta, that this very station, now selected for the purpose of keeping a Theban invader away from her frontier, had been held, during the war from 394-387 B.C., by the Athenians and Thebans against herself, to prevent her from breaking out of Peloponnesus into Attica and Bœotia. Never since the invasion of Xerxes had there been any necessity for defending the Isthmus of Corinth against an extra-Peloponnesian assailant. But now, even to send a force from Sparta to Corinth, recourse must have been had to transport by sea, either across the Argolic Gulf from Prasiæ to Halieis, or round Cape Skyllæum to the Saronic Gulf and Kenchreæ; for no Spartan troops could march by land across Arcadia or Argos. This difficulty however was surmounted, and a large allied force (not less than twenty thousand men according to Diodorus),—consisting of Athenians with auxiliary mercenaries under Chabrias, Lacedæmonians, Pellenians, Epidaurians, Megarians, Corinthians, and all the other allies still adhering to Sparta,—was established in defensive position along the line of Oneium.

It was essential for Thebes to reopen communication with her Peloponnesian allies. Accordingly Epaminondas, at the head of the Thebans and their northern allies, arrived during the same summer in front of this position, on his march into Peloponnesus. His numbers were inferior to those of his assembled enemies, whose position prevented him from joining his Arcadian, Argeian, and Eleian allies, already assembled in Peloponnesus. After having vainly challenged the enemy to come down and fight in the plain, Epaminondas laid his plan for attacking the position. Moving from

his camp a little before daybreak, so as to reach the enemy just when the night-guards were retiring, but before the general body had yet risen and got under arms, [546]—he directed an assault along the whole line. But his principal effort, at the head of the chosen Theban troops, was made against the Lacedæmonians and Pellenians, who were posted in the most assailable part of the line.[547] So skilfully was his movement conducted, that he completely succeeded in surprising them. The Lacedæmonian polemarch, taken unprepared, was driven from his position, and forced to retire to another point of the hilly ground. He presently sent to solicit a truce for burying his dead; agreeing to abandon the line of Oneium, which had now become indefensible. The other parts of the Theban army made no impression by their attack, nor were they probably intended to do more than occupy attention, while Epaminondas himself vigorously assailed the weak point of the position. Yet Xenophon censures the Lacedæmonian polemarch as faint-hearted, for having evacuated the whole line as soon as his own position was forced; alleging, that he might easily have found another good position on one of the neighboring eminences, and might have summoned reinforcements from his allies,—and that the Thebans, in spite of their partial success, were so embarrassed how to descend on the Peloponnesian side of Oneium, that they were half disposed to retreat. The criticism of Xenophon indicates doubtless an unfavorable judgment pronounced by many persons in the army; the justice of which we are not in a condition to appreciate. But whether the Lacedæmonian commander was to blame or not, Epaminondas, by his skilful and victorious attack upon this strong position, enhanced his already high military renown.[548]

Having joined his Peloponnesian allies, Arcadians, Eleians, and Argeians, he was more than a match for the Spartan and Athenian force, which appears now to have confined itself to Corinth, Lechæum, and Kenchreæ. He ravaged the territories of Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Phlius; and obtained possession of Sikyon as well as of Pellênê. [549] At Sikyon, a vote of the people being taken, it was resolved to desert Sparta, to form alliance with Thebes, and to admit a Theban harmost and garrison into the acropolis; Euphron, a citizen hitherto preponderant in the city by means of Sparta and devoted to her interest, now altered his politics and went along with the stronger tide.[550] We cannot doubt also that Epaminondas went into Arcadia to encourage and regulate the progress of his two great enterprises,—the foundation of Messênê and Megalopolis; nor does the silence of Xenophon on such a matter amount to any disproof. These new towns having been commenced less than a year before, cannot have been yet finished, and may probably have required the reappearance of his victorious army. The little town of Phlius,—situated south of Sikyon and west of Corinth,—which was one of the most faithful allies of Sparta, was also in great hazard of being captured by the Phliasian exiles. When the Arcadians and Eleians were marching through Nemea to join Epaminondas at Oneium, these exiles entreated them only to show themselves near Phlius; with the assurance that such demonstration would suffice to bring about the capture of the town. The exiles then

stole by night to the foot of the town walls with scaling-ladders, and there lay hid, until, as day began to break, the scouts from the neighboring hill Trikaranum announced that the allied enemies were in sight. While the attention of the citizens within was thus engaged on the other side, the concealed exiles planted their ladders, overpowered the few unprepared guards, and got possession of the acropolis. Instead of contenting themselves with this position until the allied force came up, they strove also to capture the town; but in this they were defeated by the citizens, who, by desperate efforts of bravery, repulsed both the intruders within and the enemy without; thus preserving their town.[551] The fidelity of the Phliasians to Sparta entailed upon them severe hardships through the superiority of their enemies in the field, and through perpetual ravage of their territory from multiplied hostile neighbors (Argos, Arcadia, and Sikyon), who had established fortified posts on their borders; for it was only on the side of Corinth that the Phliasians had a friendly neighbor to afford them the means of purchasing provisions.[552]

Amidst general success, the Thebans experienced partial reverses. Their march carrying them near to Corinth, a party of them had the boldness to rush at the gates, and to attempt a surprise of the town. But the Athenian Chabrias, then commanding within it, disposed his troops so skilfully, and made so good a resistance, that he defeated them with loss and reduced them to the necessity of asking for the ordinary truce to bury their dead, which were lying very near to the walls.[553] This advantage over the victorious Thebans somewhat raised the spirits of the Spartan allies; who were still farther encouraged by the arrival in Lechæum of a squadron from Syracuse, bringing a body of two thousand mercenary Gauls and Iberians, with fifty horsemen, as a succor from the despot Dionysius. Such foreigners had never before been seen in Peloponnesus. Their bravery, and singular nimbleness of movement, gave them the advantage in several partial skirmishes, and disconcerted the Thebans. But the Spartans and Athenians were not bold enough to hazard a general battle, and the Syracusan detachment returned home after no very long stay,[554] while the Thebans also went back to Bœotia.

One proceeding of Epaminondas during this expedition merits especial notice. It was the general practice of the Thebans to put to death all the Bœotian exiles who fell into their hands as prisoners, while they released under ransom all other Greek prisoners. At the capture of a village named Phœbias in the Sikyonian territory, Epaminondas took captive a considerable body of Bœotian exiles. With the least possible delay, he let them depart under ransom, professing to regard them as belonging to other cities.[555] We find him always trying to mitigate the rigorous dealing then customary towards political opponents.

Throughout this campaign of 369 B.C., all the Peloponnesian allies had acted against Sparta cheerfully under Epaminondas and the Thebans. But in the ensuing year the spirit of the Arcadians had been so raised, by the formation of the new Pan-Arcadian communion, by the progress of Messênê and Megalopolis, and the conspic-

uous depression of Sparta,—that they fancied themselves not only capable of maintaining their independence by themselves, but also entitled to divide headship with Thebes, as Athens divided it with Sparta. Lykomedes the Mantinean, wealthy, energetic, and able, stood forward as the exponent of this new aspiration, and as the champion of Arcadian dignity. He reminded the Ten Thousand (the Pan-Arcadian synod),—that while all other residents in Peloponnesus were originally immigrants, they alone were the indigenous occupants of the peninsula; that they were the most numerous section, as well as the bravest and hardiest men, who bore the Hellenic name,—of which proof was afforded by the fact, that Arcadian mercenary soldiers were preferred to all others; that the Lacedæmonians had never ventured to invade Attica, nor the Thebans to invade Laconia, without Arcadian auxiliaries. "Let us follow no man's lead (he concluded), but stand up for ourselves. In former days, we built up the power of Sparta by serving in her armies; and now, if we submit quietly to follow the Thebans, without demanding alternate headship for ourselves, we shall presently find them to be Spartans under another name."[556]

Such exhortations were heard with enthusiasm by the assembled Arcadians, to whom political discussion and the sentiment of collective dignity was a novelty. Impressed with admiration for Lykomedes, they chose as officers every man whom he recommended calling upon him to lead them into active service, so as to justify their new pretensions. He conducted them into the territory of Epidaurus, now under invasion by the Argeians; who were however in the greatest danger of being cut off, having their retreat intercepted by a body of troops from Corinth under Chabrias,—Athenians and Corinthians. Lykomêdês with his Arcadians, fighting his way through enemies as well as through a difficult country, repelled the division of Chabrias, and extricated the embarrassed Argeians. He next invaded the territory south of the new city of Messene and west of the Messenian Gulf, part of which was still held by Spartan garrisons. He penetrated as far as Asinê, where the Spartan commander, Geranor, drew out his garrison to resist them, but was defeated with loss, and slain, while the suburbs of Asinê were destroyed.[557] Probably the Spartan mastery of the south-western corner of the Peloponnesus was terminated by this expedition. The indefatigable activity which these Arcadians now displayed under their new commander, overpowering all enemies, and defying all hardships and difficulties of marching over the most rugged mountains, by night as well as by day, throughout the winter season,—excited everywhere astonishment and alarm; not without considerable jealousy even on the part of their allies the Thebans.[558]

While such jealousy tended to loosen the union between the Arcadians and Thebes, other causes tended at the same time to disunite them from Elis. The Eleians claimed rights of supremacy over Lepreon and the other towns of Triphylia, which rights they had been compelled by the Spartan arms to forego thirty years before.[559] Ever since that period, these towns had ranked as separate communities, each for itself as a dependent ally of Sparta. Now that the power of the latter was

broken, the Eleians aimed at resumption of their lost supremacy. But the formation of the new "commune Arcadum" at Megalopolis, interposed an obstacle never before thought of. The Tryphilian towns, affirming themselves to be of Arcadian origin, and setting forth as their eponymous Hero Triphylus son of Arkas,[560] solicited to be admitted as fully qualified members of the incipient Pan-Arcadian communion. They were cordially welcomed by the general Arcadian body (with a degree of sympathy similar to that recently shown by the Germans towards Sleswick-Holstein), received as political brethren, and guaranteed as independent against Elis.[561] The Eleians, thus finding themselves disappointed of the benefits which they had anticipated from the humiliation of Sparta, became greatly alienated from the Arcadians.

Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Phrygia, with whom the Athenians had just established a correspondence, now endeavored (perhaps at their instance) to mediate for peace in Greece, sending over a citizen of Abydus named Philiskus, furnished with a large sum of money. Choosing Delphi as a centre, Philiskus convoked thither, in the name of the Persian king, deputies from all the belligerent parties, Theban, Lacedæmonian, Athenian, etc., to meet him. These envoys never consulted the god as to the best means of attaining peace (says Xenophon), but merely took counsel among themselves; hence, he observes, little progress was made towards peace; since the Spartans[562] peremptorily insisted that Messênê should again be restored to them, while the Thebans were not less firm in resisting the proposition. It rather seems that the allies of Sparta were willing to concede the point, and even tried, though in vain, to overcome her reluctance. The congress accordingly broke up; while Philiskus, declaring himself in favor of Sparta and Athens, employed his money in levying mercenaries for the professed purpose of aiding them in the war.[563] We do not find, however, that he really lent them any aid. It would appear that his mercenaries were intended for the service of the satrap himself, who was then organizing his revolt from Artaxerxes; and that his probable purpose in trying to close the war was, that he might procure Grecian soldiers more easily and abundantly. Though the threats of Philiskus produced no immediate result, however, they so alarmed the Thebans as to determine them to send an embassy up to the Great King; the rather, as they learnt that the Lacedæmonian Euthykles had already gone up to the Persian court, to solicit on behalf of Sparta.[564]

How important had been the move made by Epaminondas in reconstituting the autonomous Messenians, was shown, among other evidences, by the recent abortive congress at Delphi. Already this formed the capital article in Grecian political discussion; an article, too, on which Sparta stood nearly alone. For not only the Thebans (whom Xenophon[565] specifies as if there were no others of the same sentiment), but all the allies of Thebes, felt hearty sympathy and identity of interest with the newly-enfranchised residents in Mount Ithômê and in Western Laconia; while the allies even of Sparta were, at most, only lukewarm against them, if not positively inclined in their favor.[566] A new phenomenon soon presented itself, which served as a

sort of recognition of the new-born, or newly-revived, Messenian community, by the public voice of Greece. At the one hundred and third Olympic festival (Midsummer 368 B.C.),—which occurred within less than two years after Epaminondas laid the foundation-stone of Messênê,—a Messenian boy named Damiskus gained the wreath as victor in the foot-race of boys. Since the first Messenian war, whereby the nation became subject to Sparta,[567] no Messenian victor had ever been enrolled; though before that war, in the earliest half-century of recorded Olympiads, several Messenian victors are found on the register. No competitor was admitted to enter the lists, except as a free Greek from a free community; accordingly so long as these Messenians had been either enslaved, or in exile, they would never have been allowed to contend for the prize under that designation. So much the stronger was the impression produced, when, in 368 B.C., after an interval of more than three centuries, Damiscus the Messenian was proclaimed victor. No Theôry (or public legation for sacrifice) could have come to Olympia from Sparta, since she was then at war both with Eleians and Arcadians; probably few individual Lacedæmonians were present; so that the spectators, composed generally of Greeks unfriendly to Sparta, would hail the proclamation of the new name as being an evidence of her degradation, as well as from sympathy with the long and severe oppression of the Messenians.[568] This Olympic festival,—the first after the great revolution occasioned by the battle of Leuktra,—was doubtless a scene of earnest anti-Spartan emotion.

During this year 368 B.C., the Thebans undertook no march into Peloponnesus; the peace-congress at Delphi probably occupied their attention, while the Arcadians neither desired nor needed their aid. But Pelopidas conducted in this year a Theban force into Thessaly, in order to protect Larissa and the other cities against Alexander of Pheræ, and to counter-work the ambitious projects of that despot, who was soliciting reinforcement from Athens. In his first object he succeeded. Alexander was compelled to visit him at Larissa, and solicit peace. This despot, however, alarmed at the complaints which came from all sides against his cruelty,—and at the language, first, admonitory, afterwards, menacing, of Pelopidas—soon ceased to think himself in safety, and fled home to Pheræ. Pelopidas established a defensive union against him among the other Thessalian cities, and then marched onward into Macedonia, where the regent Ptolemy, not strong enough to resist, entered into alliance with the Thebans; surrendering to them thirty hostages from the most distinguished families in Macedonia, as a guarantee for his faithful adherence. Among the hostages was the youthful Philip, son of Amyntas, who remained in this character at Thebes for some years, under the care of Pammenês.[569] It was thus that Ptolemy and the family of Amyntas, though they had been maintained in Macedonia by the active intervention of Iphikrates and the Athenians not many months before, nevertheless now connected themselves by alliance with the Thebans, the enemies of Athens. Æschines the Athenian orator denounces them for ingratitude; but possibly the superior force of the Thebans left them no option. Both the Theban and Macedonian force became thus enlisted for the protection of the freedom of Amphipolis against Athens.[570] And

Pelopidas returned to Thebes, having extended the ascendency of Thebes not only over Thessaly, but also over Macedonia, assured by the acquisition of the thirty hostages.

Such extension of the Theban power, in Northern Greece, disconcerted the maritime projects of Athens on the coast of Macedonia, at the same time that it laid the foundation of an alliance between her and Alexander of Pheræ. While she was thus opposing the Thebans in Thessaly, a second squadron and reinforcement arrived at Corinth from Syracuse, under Kissidas, despatched by the despot Dionysius. Among the synod of allies assembled at Corinth, debate being held as to the best manner of employing them, the Athenians strenuously urged that they should be sent to act in Thessaly. But the Spartans took an opposite view, and prevailed to have them sent round to the southern coast of Laconia, in order that they might coöperate in repelling or invading the Arcadians.[571] Reinforced by these Gauls and other mercenaries, Archidamus led out the Lacedæmonian forces against Arcadia. He took Karyæ by assault, putting to death every man whom he captured in the place; and he farther ravaged all the Arcadian territory, in the district named after the Parrhasii, until the joint Arcadian and Argeian forces arrived to oppose him; upon which he retreated to an eminence near Midea.[572] Here Kissidas, the Syracusan commander, gave notice that he must retire, as the period to which his orders reached had expired. He accordingly marched back to Sparta; but midway in the march, in a narrow pass, the Messenian troops arrested his advance, and so hampered him, that he was forced to send to Archidamus for aid. The latter soon appeared, while the main body of Arcadians and Argeians followed also; and Archidamus resolved to attack them in general battle near Midea. Imploring his soldiers, in an emphatic appeal, to rescue the great name of Sparta from the disgrace into which it had fallen, he found them full of responsive ardor. They rushed with such fierceness to the charge, that the Arcadians and Argeians were thoroughly daunted, and fled with scarce any resistance. The pursuit was vehement, especially by the Gallic mercenaries, and the slaughter frightful. Ten thousand men (if we are to believe Diodorus) were slain, without the loss of a single Lacedæmonian. Of this easy and important victory,—or, as it came to be called, "the tearless battle,"—news was forthwith transmitted by the herald Demotelês to Sparta. So powerful was the emotion produced by his tale, that all the Spartans who heard it burst into tears; Agesilaus, the Senators, and the ephors, setting the example;[573]—a striking proof how humbled, and disaccustomed to the idea of victory, their minds had recently become!—a striking proof also, when we compare it with the inflexible self-control which marked their reception of the disastrous tidings from Leuktra, how much more irresistible is unexpected joy than unexpected grief, in working on these minds of iron temper!

So offensive had been the insolence of the Arcadians, that the news of their defeat was not unwelcome even to their allies the Thebans and Eleians. It made them feel that they were not independent of Theban aid, and determined Epaminondas

again to show himself in Peloponnesus, with the special view of enrolling the Achæans in his alliance. The defensive line of Oneium was still under occupation by the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, who had their head-quarters at Corinth. Yet having remained unattacked all the preceding year, it was now so negligently guarded, that Peisias, the general of Argos, instigated by a private request of Epaminondas, was enabled suddenly to seize the heights above Kenchreæ, with a force of two thousand men and seven days' provision. The Theban commander, hastening his march, thus found the line of Oneium open near Kenchreæ, and entered Peloponnesus without resistance; after which he proceeded, joined by his Peloponnesian allies, against the cities in Achaia.[574] Until the battle of Leuktra, these cities had been among the dependent allies of Sparta, governed by local oligarchies in her interest. Since that event, they had broken off from her, but were still under oligarchical governments (though doubtless not the same men), and had remained neutral without placing themselves in connection either with Arcadians or Thebans.[575] Not being in a condition to resist so formidable an invading force, they opened negotiations with Epaminondas, and solicited to be enrolled as allies of Thebes; engaging to follow her lead whenever summoned, and to do their duty as members of her synod. They tendered securities which Epaminondas deemed sufficient for the fulfilment of their promise. Accordingly, by virtue of his own personal ascendency, he agreed to accept them as they stood, without requiring either the banishment of the existing rulers or substitution of democratical forms in place of the oligarchical.[576] Such a proceeding was not only suitable to the moderation of dealing so remarkable in Epaminondas, but also calculated to strengthen the interests of Thebes in Peloponnesus, in the present jealous and unsatisfactory temper of the Arcadians, by attaching to her on peculiar grounds Achæans as well as Eleians; the latter being themselves half-alienated from the Arcadians. Epaminondas farther liberated Naupaktus and Kalydon,[577] which were held by Achæan garrisons, and which he enrolled as separate allies of Thebes; whither he then returned, without any other achievements (so far as we are informed) in Peloponnesus.

But the generous calculations of this eminent man found little favor with his countrymen. Both the Arcadians, and the opposition-party in the Achæan cities, preferred accusations against him, alleging that he had discouraged and humiliated all the real friends of Thebes; leaving power in the hands of men who would join Sparta on the first opportunity. The accusation was farther pressed by Menekleidas, a Theban speaker of ability, strongly adverse to Epaminondas, as well as to Pelopidas. So pronounced was the displeasure of the Thebans,—partly perhaps from reluctance to offend the Arcadians,—that they not only reversed the policy of Epaminondas in Achaia, but also refrained from reëlecting him as Bœotarch during the ensuing year.[578] They sent harmosts of their own to each of the Achæan cities,—put down the existing oligarchies,—sent the chief oligarchical members and partisans into exile,—and established democratical governments in each. Hence a great body of exiles soon became accumulated; who, watching for a favorable opportunity and combining

their united forces against each city successively, were strong enough to overthrow the newly-created democracies, and to expel the Theban harmosts. Thus restored, the Achæan oligarchs took decided and active part with Sparta;[579] vigorously pressing the Arcadians on one side, while the Lacedæmonians, encouraged by the recent Tearless Battle, exerted themselves actively on the other.

The town of Sikyon, closely adjoining to Achaia, was at this time in alliance with Thebes, having a Theban harmost and garrison in its acropolis. But its government, which had always been oligarchical, still remained unaltered. The recent counter-revolution in the Achæan cities, followed closely by their junction with Sparta, alarmed the Arcadians and Argeians, lest Sikyon also should follow the example. Of this alarm a leading Sikyonian citizen named Euphron, took advantage. He warned them that if the oligarchy were left in power, they would certainly procure aid from the garrison at Corinth, and embrace the interests of Sparta. To prevent such defection (he said) it was indispensable that Sikyon should be democratized. He then offered himself, with their aid, to accomplish the revolution, seasoning his offer with strong protestations of disgust against the intolerable arrogance and oppression of Sparta: protestations not unnecessary, since he had himself, prior to the battle of Leuktra, carried on the government of his native city as local agent for her purposes and interest. The Arcadians and Argeians, entering into the views of Euphron, sent to Sikyon a large force, under whose presence and countenance he summoned a general assembly in the market-place, proclaimed the oligarchy to be deposed, and proposed an equal democracy for the future. His proposition being adopted, he next invited the people to choose generals; and the persons chosen were, as might naturally be expected, himself with five partisans. The prior oligarchy had not been without a previous mercenary force in their service, under the command of Lysimenês; but these men were overawed by the new foreign force introduced. Euphron now proceeded to reorganize them, to place them under the command of his son Adeas instead of Lysimenês, and to increase their numerical strength. Selecting from them a special body-guard for his own personal safety, and being thus master of the city under the ostensible color of chief of the new democracy, he commenced a career of the most rapacious and sanguinary tyranny.[580] He caused several of his colleagues to be assassinated, and banished others. He expelled also by wholesale the wealthiest and most eminent citizens, on suspicion of Laconism; confiscating their properties to supply himself with money, pillaging the public treasure, and even stripping the temples of all their rich stock of consecrated gold and silver ornaments. He farther procured for himself adherents by liberating numerous slaves, exalting them to the citizenship, and probably enrolling them among his paid force.[581] The power which he thus acquired became very great. The money seized enabled him not only to keep in regular pay his numerous mercenaries, but also to bribe the leading Arcadians and Argeians, so that they connived at his enormities; while he was farther ready and active in the field to lend them military support. The Theban harmost still held the acropolis with his garrison, though Euphron was master of the town and harbor.

During the height of Euphron's power at Sikyon, the neighboring city of Phlius was severely pressed. The Phliasians had remained steadily attached to Sparta throughout all her misfortunes; notwithstanding incessant hostilities from Argos, Arcadia, Pellênê, and Sikyon, which destroyed their crops and inflicted upon them serious hardships. I have already recounted, that in the year 369 B.C., a little before the line of Oneium was forced by Epaminondas, the town of Phlius, having been surprised by its own exiles with the aid of Eleians and Arcadians, had only been saved by the desperate bravery and resistance of its citizens.[582] In the ensuing year, 368 B.C., the Argeian and Arcadian force again ravaged the Phliasian plain, doing great damage; yet not without some loss to themselves in their departure, from the attack of the chosen Phliasian hoplites and of some Athenian horsemen from Corinth.[583] In the ensuing year 367 B.C., a second invasion of the Phliasian territory was attempted by Euphron, with his own mercenaries to the number of two thousand,—the armed force of Sikyon and Pellênê,—and the Theban harmost and garrison from the acropolis of Sikyon. On arriving near Phlius, the Sikyonians and Pellenians were posted near the gate of the city which looked towards Corinth, in order to resist any sally from within; while the remaining invaders made a circuit round, over an elevated line of ground called the *Trikaranum* (which had been fortified by the Argeians and was held by their garrison), to approach and ravage the Phliasian plain. But the Phliasian cavalry and hoplites so bravely resisted them, as to prevent them from spreading over the plain to do damage, until at the end of the day they retreated to rejoin the Sikyonians and Pellenians. From these last, however, they happened to be separated by a ravine which forced them to take a long circuit; while the Phliasians, passing by a shorter road close under their own walls, were beforehand in reaching the Sikyonians and Pellenians, whom they vigorously attacked and defeated with loss. Euphron with his mercenaries, and the Theban division, arrived too late to prevent the calamity, which they made no effort to repair.[584]

An eminent Pellenian citizen, named Proxenus having been here made prisoner, the Phliasians, in spite of all their sufferings, released him without ransom. This act of generosity—coupled with the loss sustained by the Pellenians in the recent engagement, as well as with the recent oligarchical counter-revolutions which had disjoined the other Achæan cities from Thebes—altered the politics of Pellênê, bringing about a peace between that city and Phlius.[585] Such an accession afforded sensible relief,—it might almost be said, salvation,—to the Phliasians, in the midst of cruel impoverishment; since even their necessary subsistence, except what was obtained by marauding excursions from the enemy, being derived by purchase from Corinth, was found difficult to pay for, and still more difficult to bring home, in the face of an enemy. They were now enabled, by the aid of the Athenian general Charês and his mercenary troops from Corinth, to escort their families and their non-military population to Pellênê, where a kindly shelter was provided by the citizens. The military Phliasians, while escorting back a stock of supplies to Phlius, broke through and defeated an ambuscade of the enemy in their way; and afterwards, in conjunction with

Charês, surprised the fort of Thyamia, which the Sikyonians were fortifying as an aggressive post on their borders. The fort became not only a defence for Phlius, but a means of aggression against the enemy, affording also great facility for the introduction of provisions from Corinth.[586]

Another cause, both of these successes and of general relief to the Phliasians, arose out of the distracted state of affairs in Sikyon. So intolerable had the tyranny of Euphron become, that the Arcadians, who had helped to raise him up, became disgusted. Æneas of Stymphalus, general of the collective Arcadian force, marched with a body of troops to Sikyon, joined the Theban harmost in the Acropolis, and there summoned the Sikyonian *notables* to an assembly. Under his protection, the intense sentiment against Euphron was freely manifested, and it was resolved to recall the numerous exiles, whom he had banished without either trial or public sentence. Dreading the wrath of these numerous and bitter enemies, Euphron thought it prudent to retire with his mercenaries to the harbor; where he invited Pasimêlus the Lacedæmonian to come, with a portion of the garrison of Corinth, and immediately declared himself an open partisan of Sparta. The harbor, a separate town and fortification at some little distance from the city (as Lechæum was from Corinth), was thus held by and for the Spartans; while Sikyon adhered to the Thebans and Arcadians. In Sikyon itself however, though evacuated by Euphron, there still remained violent dissensions. The returning exiles were probably bitter in reactionary measures; the humbler citizens were fearful of losing their newly-acquired political privileges; and the liberated slaves, yet more fearful of forfeiting that freedom, which the recent revolution had conferred upon them.

Hence Euphron still retained so many partisans, that having procured from Athens a reinforcement of mercenary troops, he was enabled to return to Sikyon, and again to establish himself as master of the town in conjunction with the popular party. But as his opponents, the principal men in the place, found shelter along with the Theban garrison in the acropolis, which he vainly tried to take by assault,[587]—his possession even of the town was altogether precarious, until such formidable neighbors could be removed. Accordingly he resolved to visit Thebes, in hopes of obtaining from the authorities an order for expelling his opponents and handing over Sikyon a second time to his rule. On what grounds, after so recent a defection to the Spartans, he rested his hopes of success, we do not know; except that he took with him a large sum of money for the purpose of bribery.[588] His Sikyonian opponents, alarmed lest he should really carry his point, followed him to Thebes, where their alarm was still farther increased by seeing him in familiar converse with the magistrates. Under the first impulse of terror and despair, they assassinated Euphron in broad daylight,—on the Kadmeia, and even before the doors of the Theban Senate-house, wherein both magistrates and Senate were sitting.

For an act of violence thus patent, they were of course seized forthwith, and put upon their trial, before the Senate. The magistrates invoked upon their heads the ex-

treme penalty of death, insisting upon the enormity and even impudence of the outrage, committed almost under the eyes of the authorities,—as well as upon the sacred duty of vindicating not merely the majesty, but even the security of the city, by exemplary punishment upon offenders who had despised its laws. How many in number were the persons implicated, we do not know. All, except one, denied actual hand-participation; but that one avowed it frankly, and stood up to justify it before the Theban Senate. He spoke in substance nearly as follows,—taking up the language of the accusing magistrates:—

"Despise you I cannot, men of Thebes; for you are masters of my person and life. It was on other grounds of confidence that I slew this man: first, I had the conviction of acting justly; next, I trusted in your righteous judgment. I knew that *you* did not wait for trial and sentence to slay Archias and Hypatês,[589] whom you caught after a career similar to that of Euphron,—but punished them at the earliest practicable opportunity, under the conviction that men manifest in sacrilege, treason, and despotism, were already under sentence by all men. Well! and was not Euphron, too, guilty of all these crimes? Did not he find the temples full of gold and silver offerings, and strip them until they were empty? How can there be a traitor more palpable than the man, who, favored and upheld by Sparta, first betrayed her to you; and then again, after having received every mark of confidence from you, betrayed you to her,—handing over the harbor of Sikyon to your enemies? Was not he a despot without reserve, the man who exalted slaves, not only into freemen, but into citizens? the man who despoiled, banished, or slew, not criminals, but all whom he chose, and most of all, the chief citizens? And now, after having vainly attempted, in conjunction with your enemies the Athenians, to expel your harmost by force from Sikyon, he has collected a great stock of money, and come hither to turn it to account. Had he assembled arms and soldiers against you, you would have thanked me for killing him. How then can you punish me for giving him his due, when he has come with money to corrupt you, and to purchase from you again the mastery of Sikyon, to your own disgrace as well as mischief? Had he been my enemy and your friend, I should undoubtedly have done wrong to kill him in your city; but as he is a traitor, playing you false, how is he more my enemy than yours? I shall be told that he came hither of his own accord, confiding in the laws of the city. Well! you would have thanked me for killing him anywhere out of Thebes; why not *in* Thebes also, when he has come hither only for the purpose of doing you new wrong in addition to the past? Where among Greeks has impunity ever been assured to traitors, deserters, or despots? Recollect, that you have passed a vote that exiles from any one of your allied cities might be seized as outlaws in any other. Now Euphron is a condemned exile, who has ventured to come back to Sikyon without any vote of the general body of allies. How can any one affirm that he has not justly incurred death? I tell you in conclusion, men of Thebes,—if you put me to death, you will have made yourselves the avengers of your very worst enemy,—if you adjudge me to have done right, you will

manifest yourselves publicly as just avengers, both on your own behalf and on that of your whole body of allies."[590]

This impressive discourse induced the Theban Senate to pronounce that Euphron had met with his due. It probably came from one of the principal citizens of Sikyon, among whom were most of the enemies as well as the victims of the deceased despot. It appeals, in a characteristic manner, to that portion of Grecian morality which bore upon men, who by their very crimes procured for themselves the means of impunity; against whom there was no legal force to protect others, and who were therefore considered as not being entitled to protection themselves, if the daggers of others could ever be made to reach them. The tyrannicide appeals to this sentiment with confidence, as diffused throughout all the free Grecian cities. It found responsive assent in the Theban Senate, and would probably have found the like assent, if set forth with equal emphasis, in most Grecian senates or assemblies elsewhere.

Very different, however, was the sentiment in Sikyon. The body of Euphron was carried thither, and enjoyed the distinguished preëminence of being buried in the market-place.[591] There, along with his tomb, a chapel was erected, in which he was worshipped as Archêgetês, or Patron-hero and Second Founder, of the city. He received the same honors as had been paid to Brasidas at Amphipolis. The humbler citizens and the slaves, upon whom he had conferred liberty and political franchise,—or at least the name of a political franchise,—remembered him with grateful admiration as their benefactor, forgetting or excusing the atrocities which he had wreaked upon their political opponents. Such is the retributive Nemesis which always menaces, and sometimes overtakes, an oligarchy who keep the mass of the citizens excluded from political privileges. A situation is thus created, enabling some ambitious and energetic citizen to confer favors and earn popularity among the many, and thus to acquire power, which, whether employed or not for the benefit of the many, goes along with their antipathies when it humbles or crushes the previously monopolizing few.

We may presume from these statements that the government of Sikyon became democratical. But the provoking brevity of Xenophon does not inform us of the subsequent arrangements made with the Theban harmost in the acropolis,—nor how the intestine dissensions, between the democracy in the town and the refugees in the citadel, were composed,—nor what became of those citizens who slew Euphron. We learn only that not long afterwards, the harbor of Sikyon, which Euphron had held in conjunction with the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, was left imperfectly defended by the recall of the latter to Athens; and that it was accordingly retaken by the forces from the town, aided by the Arcadians.[592]

It appears that these proceedings of Euphron (from his first proclamation of the democracy at Sikyon and real acquisition of despotism to himself, down to his death and the recovery of the harbor) took place throughout the year 367 B.C. and the earlier half of 366 B.C. No such enemy, probably, would have arisen to embarrass

Thebes, unless the policy recommended by Epaminondas in Achaia had been reversed, and unless he himself had fallen under the displeasure of his countrymen. His influence too was probably impaired, and the policy of Thebes affected for the worse, by the accidental absence of his friend Pelopidas, who was then on his mission to the Persian court at Susa. Such a journey and return, with the transaction of the business in hand, must have occupied the greater part of the year 367 B.C., being terminated probably by the return of the envoys in the beginning of 366 B.C.

The leading Thebans had been alarmed by the language of Philiskus,—who had come over a few months before as envoy from the satrap Ariobarzanes and had threatened to employ Asiatic money in the interest of Athens and Sparta against Thebes, though his threats seem never to have been realized, as well as by the presence of the Lacedæmonian Euthyklês (after the failure of Antalkidas[593]) at the Persian court, soliciting aid. Moreover Thebes had now pretensions to the headship of Greece, at least as good as either of her two rivals; while since the fatal example set by Sparta at the peace called by the name of Antalkidas in 387 B.C., and copied by Athens after the battle of Leuktra in 371 B.C.,—it had become a sort of recognized fashion that the leading Grecian state should sue out its title from the terror-striking rescript of the Great King, and proclaim itself as enforcing terms which he had dictated. On this ground of borrowed elevation Thebes now sought to place herself. There was in her case a peculiar reason which might partly excuse the value set upon it by her leaders. It had been almost the capital act of her policy to establish the two new cities, Megalopolis and Messênê. The vitality and chance for duration, of both,—especially that of the latter, which had the inextinguishable hostility of Sparta to contend with,—would be materially improved, in the existing state of the Greek mind, if they were recognized as autonomous under a Persian rescript. To attain this object,[594] Pelopidas and Ismenias now proceeded as envoys to Susa; doubtless under a formal vote of the allied synod, since the Arcadian Antiochus, a celebrated pankratiast, the Eleian Archidamus, and a citizen from Argos, accompanied them. Informed of the proceeding, the Athenians also sent Timagoras and Leon to Susa; and we read with some surprise that these hostile envoys all went up thither in the same company.[595]

Pelopidas, though he declined to perform the usual ceremony of prostration,[596] was favorably received by the Persian court. Xenophon,—who recounts the whole proceeding in a manner unfairly invidious towards the Thebans, forgetting that they were now only copying the example of Sparta in courting Persian aid,—affirms that his application was greatly furthered by the recollection of the ancient alliance of Thebes with Xerxes, against Athens and Sparta, at the time of the battle of Platæa; and by the fact that Thebes had not only refused to second, but had actually discountenanced, the expedition of Agesilaus against Asia. We may perhaps doubt, whether this plea counted for much; or the straightforward eloquence of Pelopidas, so much extolled by Plutarch,[597] which could only reach Persian ears through an in-

terpreter. But the main fact for the Great King to know was, that the Thebans had been victorious at Leuktra; that they had subsequently trodden down still farther the glory of Sparta, by carrying their arms over Laconia, and emancipating the conquered half of the country; that when they were no longer in Peloponnesus, their allies the Arcadians and Argeians had been shamefully defeated by the Lacedæmonians (in the Tearless Battle). Such boasts on the part of Pelopidas,—confirmed as matters of fact even by the Athenian Timagoras,—would convince the Persian ministers that it was their interest to exercise ascendency over Greece through Thebes in preference to Sparta. Accordingly Pelopidas being asked by the Great King what sort of rescript he wished, obtained his own terms. Messênê was declared autonomous and independent of Sparta: Amphipolis also was pronounced to be a free and autonomous city: the Athenians were directed to order home and lay up their ships of war now in active service, on pain of Persian intervention against them, in case of disobedience. Moreover Thebes was declared the head city of Greece, and any city refusing to follow her headship was menaced with instant compulsion by Persian force.[598] In reference to the points in dispute between Elis and Arcadia (the former claiming sovereignty over Triphylia, which professed itself Arcadian and had been admitted into the Arcadian communion), the rescript pronounced in favor of the Eleians;[599] probably at the instance of Pelopidas, since there now subsisted much coldness between the Thebans and Arcadians.

Leon the Athenian protested against the Persian rescript, observing aloud when he heard it read,—"By Zeus, Athenians, I think it is time for you to look out for some other friend than the Great King." This remark, made in the King's hearing and interpreted to him, produced the following addition to the rescript: "If the Athenians have anything juster to propose, let them come to the King and inform him." So vague a modification, however, did little to appease the murmurs of the Athenians. On the return of their two envoys to Athens, Leon accused his colleague Timagoras of having not only declined to associate with him during the journey, but also of having lent himself to the purposes of Pelopidas, of being implicated in treasonable promises, and of receiving large bribes from the Persian King. On these charges Timagoras was condemned and executed.[600] The Arcadian envoy Antiochus was equally indignant at the rescript; refusing even to receive such presents of formal courtesy as were tendered to all, and accepted by Pelopidas himself, who however strictly declined everything beyond. The conduct of this eminent Theban thus exhibited a strong contrast with the large acquisitions of the Athenian Timagoras.[601] Antiochus, on returning to Arcadia, made report of his mission to the Pan-Arcadian synod, called the Ten Thousand, at Megalopolis. He spoke in the most contemptuous terms of all that he had seen at the Persian court. There were (he said) plenty of bakers, cooks, wine-pourers, porters, etc., but as for men competent to fight against Greeks, though he looked out for them with care, he could see none; and even the vaunted golden plane-tree was not large enough to furnish shade for a grasshopper.[602]

On the other hand, the Eleian envoy returned with feelings of satisfaction, and the Thebans with triumph. Deputies from each of their allied cities were invited to Thebes, to hear the Persian rescript. It was produced by a native Persian, their official companion from Susa,—the first Persian probably ever seen in Thebes since the times immediately preceding the battle of Platæa,—who, after exhibiting publicly the regal seal, read the document aloud; as the satrap Tiribazus had done on the occasion of the peace of Antalkidas.[603]

But though the Theban leaders thus closely copied the conduct of Sparta both as to means and as to end, they by no means found the like ready acquiescence, when they called on the deputies present to take an oath to the rescript, to the Great King, and to Thebes. All replied that they had come with instructions, authorizing them to hear and report, but no more; and that acceptance or rejection must be decided in their respective cities. Nor was this the worst. Lykomedes and the other deputies from Arcadia, already jealous of Thebes, and doubtless farther alienated by the angry report of their envoy Antiochus, went yet farther, and entered a general protest against the headship of Thebes; affirming that the synod ought not to be held constantly in that city, but in the seat of war, wherever that might be. Incensed at such language, the Thebans accused Lykomedes of violating the cardinal principle of the confederacy; upon which he and his Arcadian comrades forthwith retired and went home, declaring that they would no longer sit in the synod. The other deputies appear to have followed his example. Indeed, as they had refused to take the oath submitted to them, the special purpose of the synod was defeated.

Having thus failed in carrying their point with the allies collectively, the Thebans resolved to try the efficacy of applications individually. They accordingly despatched envoys, with the Persian rescript in hand, to visit the cities successively, calling upon each for acceptance with an oath of adhesion. Each city separately (they thought) would be afraid to refuse, under peril of united hostility from the Great King and from Thebes. So confident were they in the terrors of the king’s name and seal, that they addressed this appeal not merely to the cities in alliance with them, but even to several among their enemies. Their envoys first set forth the proposition at Corinth; a city, not only at variance with them, but even serving as a centre of operation for the Athenian and Lacedæmonian forces to guard the line of Oneium, and prevent the entrance of a Theban army into Peloponnesus. But the Corinthians rejected the proposition altogether, declining formally to bind themselves by any common oaths towards the Persian king. The like refusal was experienced by the envoys as they passed on to Peloponnesus, if not from all the cities visited, at least from so large a proportion, that the mission was completely frustrated. And thus the rescript, which Thebes had been at such pains to procure, was found practically inoperative in confirming or enforcing her headship;[604] though doubtless the mere fact, that it comprised and recognized Messênê, contributed to strengthen the vitality, and exalt the dignity, of that new-born city.

In their efforts to make the Persian rescript available towards the recognition of their headship throughout Greece, the Thebans would naturally visit Thessaly and the northern districts as well as Peloponnesus. It appears that Pelopidas and Ismenias themselves undertook this mission; and that in the execution of it they were seized and detained as prisoners by Alexander of Pheræ. That despot seems to have come to meet them, under pacific appearances, at Pharsalus. They indulged hopes of prevailing on him as well as the other Thessalians to accept the Persian rescript; for we see by the example of Corinth, that they had tried their powers of persuasion on enemies as well as friends. But the Corinthians, while refusing the application, had nevertheless respected the public morality held sacred even between enemies in Greece, and had dismissed the envoys (whether Pelopidas was among them, we cannot assert) inviolate. Not so the tyrant of Pheræ. Perceiving that Pelopidas and Ismenias were unaccompanied by any military force, he seized their persons, and carried them off to Pheræ as prisoners.

Treacherous as this proceeding was, it proved highly profitable to Alexander. Such was the personal importance of Pelopidas, that his imprisonment struck terror among the partisans of Thebes in Thessaly, and induced several of them to submit to the despot of Pheræ; who moreover sent to apprise the Athenians of his capture, and to solicit their aid against the impending vengeance of Thebes. Greatly impressed with the news, the Athenians looked upon Alexander as a second Jason, likely to arrest the menacing ascendency of their neighbor and rival.[605] They immediately despatched to his aid thirty triremes and one thousand hoplites under Autoklês; who, unable to get through the Euripus, when Bœotia and Eubœa were both hostile to Athens, were forced to circumnavigate the latter island. He reached Pheræ just in time; for the Thebans, incensed beyond measure at the seizure of Pelopidas, had despatched without delay eight thousand hoplites and six hundred cavalry to recover or avenge him. Unfortunately for them, Epaminondas had not been rechosen commander since his last year's proceedings in Achaia. He was now serving as an hoplite in the ranks, while Kleomenes with other Bœotarchs had the command. On entering Thessaly, they were joined by various allies in the country. But the army of Alexander, aided by the Athenians, and placed under the command of Autoklês, was found exceedingly formidable, especially in cavalry. The Thessalian allies of Thebes, acting with their habitual treachery, deserted in the hour of danger; and the enterprise, thus difficult and perilous, was rendered impracticable by the incompetence of the Bœotarchs. Unable to make head against Alexander and the Athenians, they were forced to retreat homeward. But their generalship was so unskilful, and the enemy's cavalry so active, that the whole army was in imminent danger of being starved or destroyed. Nothing saved them now, but the presence of Epaminondas as a common soldier in the ranks. Indignant as well as dismayed, the whole army united to depose their generals, and with one voice called upon him to extricate them from their perils. Epaminondas accepted the duty,—marshalled the retreat in consummate order,—

took for himself the command of the rear-guard, beating off all the attacks of the enemy,—and conducted the army safely back to Thebes.[606]

This memorable exploit, while it disgraced the unsuccessful Bœotarchs, who were condemned to fine and deposition from their office, raised higher than ever the reputation of Epaminondas among his countrymen. But the failure of the expedition was for the time a fatal blow to the influence of Thebes in Thessaly; where Alexander now reigned victorious and irresistible, with Pelopidas still in his dungeon. The cruelties and oppressions, at all times habitual to the despot of Pheræ, were pushed to an excess beyond all former parallel. Besides other brutal deeds of which we read with horror, he is said to have surrounded by his military force the unarmed citizens of Melibœa and Skotussa, and slaughtered them all in mass. In such hands, the life of Pelopidas hung by a thread; yet he himself, with that personal courage which never forsook him, held the language of unsubdued defiance and provocation against the tyrant. Great sympathy was manifested by many Thessalians, and even by Thêbê the wife of Alexander, for so illustrious a prisoner; and Alexander, fearful of incurring the implacable enmity of Thebes, was induced to spare his life, though retaining him as a prisoner. His confinement, too, appears to have lasted some time before the Thebans, discouraged by their late ill-success, were prepared to undertake a second expedition.

At length they sent a force for the purpose; which was placed, on this occasion, under the command of Epaminondas. The renown of his name rallied many adherents in the country; and his prudence, no less than his military skill, was conspicuously exhibited, in defeating and intimidating Alexander, yet without reducing him to such despair as might prove fatal to the prisoner. The despot was at length compelled to send an embassy excusing his recent violence, offering to restore Pelopidas, and soliciting to be admitted to peace and alliance with Thebes. But Epaminondas would grant nothing more than a temporary truce,[607] coupled with the engagement of evacuating Thessaly; while he required in exchange the release of Pelopidas and Ismenias. His terms were acceded to, so that he had the delight of conveying his liberated friend in safety to Thebes. Though this primary object was thus effected, however, it is plain that he did not restore Thebes to the same influence in Thessaly which she had enjoyed prior to the seizure of Pelopidas.[608] That event with its consequences still remained a blow to Thebes and a profit to Alexander; who again became master of all or most part of Thessaly, together with the Magnêtes, the Phthiot Achæans, and other tributary nations dependent on Thessaly—maintaining unimpaired his influence and connection at Athens.[609]

While the Theban arms were thus losing ground in Thessaly, an important point was gained in their favor on the other side of Bœotia. Orôpus, on the north-eastern frontier of Attica adjoining Bœotia, was captured and wrested from Athens by a party of exiles who crossed over from Eretria in Eubœa, with the aid of Themison, despot of the last-mentioned town. It had been more than once lost and regained between

Athens and Thebes; being seemingly in its origin Bœotian, and never incorporated as a Deme or equal constituent member of the Athenian commonwealth, but only recognized as a dependency of Athens; though, as it was close on the frontier, many of its inhabitants were also citizens of Athens, demots of the neighboring Deme Græa.[610] So recently before as the period immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra, angry remonstrances had been exchanged between Athens and Thebes respecting a portion of the Oropian territory. At that time, it appears, the Thebans were forced to yield, and their partisans in Oropus were banished.[611] It was these partisans who, through the aid of Themison and the Eretrians, now effected their return, so as to repossess themselves of Oropus, and doubtless to banish the principal citizens friendly to Athens.[612] So great was the sensation produced among the Athenians, that they not only marched with all their force to recover the place, but also recalled their general, Chares, with that mercenary force which he commanded in the territories of Corinth and Phlius. They farther requested aid from the Corinthians and their other allies in Peloponnesus. These allies did not obey the summons; but the Athenian force alone would have sufficed to retake Oropus, had not the Thebans occupied it so as to place it beyond their attack. Athens was obliged to acquiesce in their occupation of it; though under protest, and with the understanding that the disputed right should be referred to impartial arbitration.[613]

This seizure of Oropus produced more than one material consequence. Owing to the recall of Chares from Corinth, the harbor of Sikyon could no longer be maintained against the Sikyonians in the town; who, with the aid of the Arcadians, recaptured it, so that both town and harbor again came into the league of Thebans and Arcadians. Moreover, Athens became discontented with her Peloponnesian allies, for having neglected her summons on the emergency at Oropus, although Athenian troops had been constantly in service for the protection of Peloponnesus against the Thebans. The growth of such dispositions at Athens became known to the Mantinean Lykomedes; the ablest and most ambitious leader in Arcadia, who was not only jealous of the predominance of the Thebans, but had come to a formal rupture with them at the synod held for the reception of the Persian rescript.[614] Anxious to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes as well as from Sparta, Lykomedes now took advantage of the discontent of Athens to open negotiations with that city; persuading the majority of the Arcadian Ten Thousand to send him thither as ambassador. There was difficulty among the Athenians in entertaining his proposition, from the alliance subsisting between them and Sparta. But they were reminded, that to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes, was no less in the interest of Sparta than of Athens; and a favorable answer was then given to Lykomedes. The latter took ship at Peiræus for his return, but never reached Arcadia; for he happened to land at the spot where the Arcadian exiles of the opposite party were assembled, and these men put him to death at once.[615] In spite of his death, however, the alliance between Arcadia and Athens was still brought to pass, though not without opposition.

Thebes was during this year engaged in her unsuccessful campaign in Thessaly (alluded to already) for the rescue of Pelopidas, which disabled her from effective efforts in Peloponnesus. But as soon as that rescue had been accomplished, Epaminondas, her greatest man, and her only conspicuous orator, was despatched into Arcadia to offer, in conjunction with an envoy from Argos, diplomatic obstruction to the proposed Athenian alliance. He had to speak against Kallistratus, the most distinguished orator at Athens, who had been sent by his countrymen to plead their cause amidst the Arcadian Ten Thousand, and who, among other arguments, denounced the enormities which darkened the heroic legends both of Thebes and Argos. "Were not Orestes and Alkmæon, both murderers of their mothers (asked Kallistratus), natives of Argos? Was not Œdipus, who slew his father and married his mother, a native of Thebes?"—"Yes (said Epaminondas, in his reply) they were. But Kallistratus has forgotten to tell you, that these persons, while they lived at home were innocent, or reputed to be so. As soon as their crimes became known, Argos and Thebes banished them; and then it was that Athens received them, stained with confessed guilt."[616] This clever retort told much to the credit of the rhetorical skill of Epaminondas; but his speech as a whole, was not successful. The Arcadians concluded alliance with Athens; yet without formally renouncing friendship with Thebes.

As soon as such new alliance had been ratified, it became important to Athens to secure a free and assured entrance into Peloponnesus; while at the same time the recent slackness of the Corinthians, in regard to the summons to Oropus, rendered her mistrustful of their fidelity. Accordingly it was resolved in the Athenian assembly, on the motion of a citizen named Demotion, to seize and occupy Corinth; there being already some scattered Athenian garrisons, on various points of the Corinthian territory, ready to be concentrated and rendered useful for such a purpose. A fleet and land-force under Chares was made ready and despatched. But on reaching the Corinthian port of Kenchreæ, Chares found himself shut out even from admittance. The proposition of Demotion, and the resolution of the Athenians had become known to the Corinthians; who forthwith stood upon their guard, sent soldiers of their own to relieve the various Athenian outposts on their territory, and called upon these latter to give in any complaints for which they might have ground, as their services were no longer needed. Chares pretended to have learnt that Corinth was in danger. But both he and the remaining Athenians were dismissed, though with every expression of thanks and politeness.[617]

The treacherous purpose of Athens was thus baffled, and the Corinthians were for the moment safe. Yet their position was precarious and uncomfortable; for their enemies, Thebes and Argos, were already their masters by land, and Athens had now been converted from an ally into an enemy. Hence they resolved to assemble a sufficient mercenary force in their own pay;[618] but while thus providing for military security, they sent envoys to Thebes to open negotiations for peace. Permission was granted to them by the Thebans to go and consult their allies, and to treat for peace

in conjunction with as many as could be brought to share their views. Accordingly the Corinthians went to Sparta and laid their case before the full synod of allies, convoked for the occasion. "We are on the point of ruin (said the Corinthian envoy), and must make peace. We shall rejoice to make it in conjunction with you, if you will consent; but if you think proper to persevere in the war, be not displeased if we make peace without you." The Epidaurians and Phliasians, reduced to the like distress, held the same language of weariness and impatience for peace.[619]

It had been ascertained at Thebes, that no propositions for peace could be entertained, which did not contain a formal recognition of the independence of Messênê. To this the Corinthians and other allies of Sparta had no difficulty in agreeing. But they vainly endeavored to prevail upon Sparta herself to submit to the same concession. The Spartans resolutely refused to relinquish a territory inherited from victorious forefathers, and held under so long a prescription. They repudiated yet more indignantly the idea of recognizing as free Greeks and equal neighbors, those who had so long been their slaves; and they proclaimed their determination of continuing the war, even single-handed and with all its hazards, to regain what they had lost;[620] and although they could not directly prohibit the Corinthians and other allies, whose sickness of the war had become intolerable, from negotiating a separate peace for themselves,—yet they gave only a reluctant consent. Archidamus son of Agesilaus even reproached the allies with timorous selfishness, partly in deserting their benefactress Sparta at her hour of need, partly in recommending her to submit to a sacrifice ruinous to her honor.[621] The Spartan prince conjured his countrymen, in the name of all their ancient dignity, to spurn the mandates of Thebes; to shrink neither from effort nor from peril for the reconquest of Messênê, even if they had to fight alone against all Greece; and to convert their military population into a permanent camp, sending away their women and children to an asylum in friendly foreign cities.

Though the Spartans were not inclined to adopt the desperate suggestions of Archidamus, yet this important congress ended by a scission between them and their allies. The Corinthians, Phliasians, Epidaurians, and others, went to Thebes, and concluded peace; recognizing the independence of Messênê, and affirming the independence of each separate city within its own territory, without either obligatory alliance, or headship on the part of any city. Yet when the Thebans invited them to contract an alliance, they declined, saying that this would be only embarking in war on the other side; whereas that which they sighed for was peace. Peace was accordingly sworn, upon the terms indicated in the Persian rescript, so far as regarded the general autonomy of each separate town, and specially that of Messênê; but not including any sanction, direct or indirect, of Theban headship.[622]

This treaty removed out of the war, and placed in a position of neutrality, a considerable number of Grecian states; chiefly those near the Isthmus,—Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus; probably Trœzen and Hermionê, since we do not find them again mentioned among the contending parties. But it left the more powerful states, Thebes

and Argos,—Sparta and Athens,[623]—still at war; as well as Arcadia, Achaia, and Elis. The relations between these states, however, were now somewhat complicated; for Thebes was at war with Sparta, and in alliance, though not altogether hearty alliance, with the Arcadians; while Athens was at war with Thebes, yet in alliance with Sparta as well as with Arcadia. The Argeians were in alliance with Thebes and Arcadia, and at war with Sparta; the Eleians were on unfriendly terms, though not yet at actual war, with Arcadia—yet still (it would appear) in alliance with Thebes. Lastly, the Arcadians themselves were losing their internal coöperation and harmony one with another, which had only so recently begun. Two parties were forming among them, under the old conflicting auspices of Mantinea and Tegea. Tegea, occupied by a Theban harmost and garrison, held strenuously with Megalopolis and Messênê as well as with Thebes, thus constituting a strong and united frontier against Sparta.

As the Spartans complained of their Peloponnesian allies, for urging the recognition of Messênê as an independent state,—so they were no less indignant with the Persian king; who, though still calling himself their ally, had inserted the same recognition in the rescript granted to Pelopidas.[624] The Athenians also were dissatisfied with this rescript. They had (as has been already stated) condemned to death Timagoras, one of their envoys who had accompanied Pelopidas, for having received bribes. They now availed themselves of the opening left for them in the very words of the rescript, to send a fresh embassy up to the Persian court, and solicit more favorable terms. Their new envoys, communicating the fact that Timagoras had betrayed his trust and had been punished for it, obtained from the Great King a fresh rescript, pronouncing Amphipolis to be an Athenian possession instead of a free city. [625] Whether that other article also in the former rescript, which commanded Athens to call in all her armed ships, was now revoked, we cannot say; but it seems probable.

At the same time that the Athenians sent this second embassy, they also despatched an armament under Timotheus to the coast of Asia Minor, yet with express instructions not to violate the peace with the Persian king. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, went to the same scene, though without any public force; availing himself only of his long-established military reputation to promote the interests of his country as negotiator. Both Spartan and Athenian attention was now turned, directly and specially, towards Ariobarzanes the satrap of Phrygia; who (as has been already related) had sent over to Greece, two years before, Philiskus of Abydus, with the view either of obtaining from the Thebans peace on terms favorable to Sparta, or of aiding the latter against them.[626] Ariobarzanes was then preparing, and apparently had since openly consummated, his revolt from the Persian king, which Agesilaus employed all his influence in fomenting. The Athenians, however, still wishing to avoid a distinct breach with Persia, instructed Timotheus to assist Ariobarzanes,—yet with a formal proviso, that he should not break truce with the Great King. They also conferred both upon Ariobarzanes (with his three sons), and upon Philiskus, the gift

of Athenian citizenship.[627] That satrap seems now to have had a large mercenary force, and to have been in possession of both sides of the Hellespont, as well as of Perinthus on the Propontis; while Philiskus, as his chief officer, exercised extensive ascendency, disgraced by much tyranny and brutality, over the Grecian cities in that region.

Precluded by his instructions from openly aiding the revolted Ariobarzanes, Timotheus turned his force against the island of Samos; which was now held by Kyprothemis, a Grecian chief with a military force in the service of Tigranes, Persian satrap on the opposite mainland. How or when Tigranes had acquired it we do not know; but the Persians, when once left by the peace of Antalkidas in quiet possession of the continental Asiatic Greeks, naturally tended to push their dominion over the neighboring islands. After carrying on his military operations in Samos, with eight thousand peltasts and thirty triremes, for ten or eleven months, Timotheus became master of it. His success was the more gratifying, as he had found means to pay and maintain his troops during the whole time at the cost of enemies; without either drawing upon the Athenian treasury, or extorting contributions from allies.[628] An important possession was thus acquired for Athens, while a considerable number of Samians of the opposite party went into banishment, with the loss of their properties. Since Samos was not among the legitimate possessions of the king of Persia, this conquest was not understood to import war between him and Athens. Indeed it appears that the revolt of Ariobarzanes, and the uncertain fidelity of various neighboring satraps, shook for some time the king's authority, and absorbed his revenues in these regions. Autophradates, the satrap of Lydia,—and Mausôlus, native prince of Karia under Persian supremacy,—attacked Ariobarzanes, with the view, real or pretended, of quelling his revolt; and laid siege to Assus and Adramyttium. But they are said to have been induced to desist by the personal influence of Agesilaus.[629] As the latter had no army, nor any means of allurement (except perhaps some money derived from Ariobarzanes), we may fairly presume that the two besiegers were not very earnest in the cause. Moreover, we shall find both of them, a few years afterwards, in joint revolt with Ariobarzanes himself against the Persian king.[630] Agesilaus obtained, from all three, pecuniary aid for Sparta.[631]

The acquisition of Samos, while it exalted the reputation of Timotheus, materially enlarged the maritime dominion of Athens. It seems also to have weakened the hold of the Great King on Asia Minor,—to have disposed the residents, both satraps and Grecian cities, to revolt,—and thus to have helped Ariobarzanes, who rewarded both Agesilaus and Timotheus. Agesilaus was enabled to carry home a sum of money to his embarrassed countrymen; but Timotheus, declining pecuniary aid, obtained for Athens the more valuable boon of readmission to the Thracian Chersonese. Ariobarzanes made over to him Sestus and Krithôtê in that peninsula; possessions doubly precious, as they secured to the Athenians a partial mastery of the passage of the Hellespont; with a large circumjacent territory for occupation.[632]

Samos and the Chersonese were not simply new tributary confederates aggregated to the Athenian synod. They were, in large proportion, new territories acquired to Athens, open to be occupied by Athenian citizens as out-settlers or kleruchs. Much of the Chersonese had been possessed by Athenian citizens, even from the time of the first Miltiades and afterwards down to the destruction of the Athenian empire in 405 B.C. Though all these proprietors had been then driven home and expropriated, they had never lost the hope of a favorable turn of fortune and eventual reëntry.[633] That moment had now arrived. The formal renunciation of all private appropriations of land out of Attica, which Athens had proclaimed at the formation of her second confederacy in 378 B.C., as a means of conciliating maritime allies—was forgotten, now that she stood no longer in fear of Sparta. The same system of kleruchies, which had so much discredited her former empire, was again partially commenced. Many kleruchs, or lot-holders, were sent out to occupy lands both at Samos and in the Chersonese. These men were Athenian citizens, who still remained citizens of Athens even in their foreign domicile, and whose properties formed part of the taxable schedule of Athens. The particulars of this important measure are unknown to us. At Samos the emigrants must have been new men; for there had never been any kleruchs there before.[634] But in the Chersonese, the old Athenian proprietors, who had been expropriated forty years before (or their descendants), doubtless now went back, and tried, with more or less of success, to regain their previous lands; reinforced by bands of new emigrants. And Timotheus, having once got footing at Sestus and Krithôtê, soon extended his acquisitions to Elæus and other places; whereby Athens was emboldened publicly to claim the whole Chersonese, or at least most part of it, as her own ancient possession,—from its extreme northern boundary at a line drawn across the isthmus north of Kardia, down to Elæus at its southern extremity.[635]

This transfer of lands in Samos to Athenian proprietors, combined with the resumption of the Chersonese, appears to have excited a strong sensation throughout Greece, as a revival of ambitious tendencies on the part of Athens, and a manifest departure from those disinterested professions which she had set forth in 378 B.C. Even in the Athenian assembly, a citizen named Kydias pronounced an emphatic protest against the emigration of the kleruchs to Samos.[636] However, obnoxious as the measure was to criticism, yet having been preceded by a conquering siege and the expulsion of many native proprietors, it does not seem to have involved Athens in so much real difficulty as the resumption of her old rights in the Chersonese. Not only did she here come into conflict with independent towns, like Kardia,[637] which resisted her pretensions,—and with resident proprietors whom she was to aid her citizens in dispossessing,—but also with a new enemy, Kotys, king of Thrace. That prince, claiming the Chersonese as Thracian territory, was himself on the point of seizing Sestus, when Agesilaus or Ariobarzanes drove him away,[638] to make room for Timotheus and the Athenians.

It has been already mentioned, that Kotys,[639]—the new Thracian enemy, but previously the friend and adopted citizen, of Athens,—was father-in-law of the Athenian general Iphikrates, whom he had enabled to establish and people the town and settlement called Drys, on the coast of Thrace. Iphikrates had been employed by the Athenians for the last three or four years on the coasts of Macedonia and Chalkidikê, and especially against Amphipolis; but he had neither taken the latter place, nor obtained (so far as we know) any other success; though he had incurred the expense for three years of a mercenary general named Charidemus with a body of troops. How so unprofitable a result, on the part of an energetic man like Iphikrates, is to be explained,—we cannot tell. But it naturally placed him before the eyes of his countrymen in disadvantageous contrast with Timotheus, who had just acquired Samos and the Chersonese. An additional reason for mistrusting Iphikrates, too, was presented by the fact, that Athens was now at war with his father-in-law Kotys. Hence it was now resolved by the Athenians to recall him, and appoint Timotheus[640] to an extensive command, including Thrace and Macedonia as well as the Chersonese. Perhaps party enmities between the two Athenian chiefs, with their respective friends, may have contributed to the change. As Iphikrates had been the accuser of Timotheus a few years before, so the latter may have seized this opportunity of retaliating.[641] At all events the dismissed general conducted himself in such a manner as to justify the mistrust of his countrymen; taking part with his father-in-law Kotys in the war, and actually fighting against Athens.[642] He had got into his possession some hostages of Amphipolis, surrendered to him by Harpalus; which gave great hopes of extorting the surrender of the town. These hostages he had consigned to the custody of the mercenary general Charidemus, though a vote had been passed in the Athenian assembly that they should be sent to Athens.[643] As soon as the appointment of Iphikrates was cancelled, Charidemus forthwith surrendered the hostages to the Amphipolitans themselves, thus depriving Athens of a material advantage. And this was not all. Though Charidemus had been three years with his band in the service of Athens under Iphikrates, yet when the new general Timotheus wished to reëngage him, he declined the proposition; conveying away his troops in Athenian transports, to enter into the pay of a decided enemy of Athens—Kotys; and in conjunction with Iphikrates himself.[644] He was subsequently coming by sea from Kardia to take service under her other enemies, Olynthus and Amphipolis, when he was captured by the Athenian fleet. Under these circumstances, he was again prevailed on to serve Athens.

It was against these two cities, and to the general coast of Macedonia and the Chalkidic Thrace, that Timotheus devoted his first attention, postponing for the moment Kotys and the Chersonese. In this enterprise he found means to obtain the alliance of Macedonia, which had been hostile to his predecessor Iphikrates. Ptolemy of Alôrus, regent of that country, who had assassinated the preceding king, Alexander son of Amyntas, was himself assassinated (365 B.C.) by Perdikkas, brother of Alexander.[645] Perdikkas, during the first year or two of his reign, seems to have

been friendly and not hostile to Athens. He lent aid to Timotheus, who turned his force against Olynthus and other towns both in the Chalkidic Thrace and on the coast of Macedonia.[646] Probably the Olynthian confederacy may have been again acquiring strength during the years of recent Spartan humiliation; so that Perdikkas now found his account in assisting Athens to subdue or enfeeble it, just as his father Amyntas had invoked Sparta for the like purpose. Timotheus, with the assistance of Perdikkas, was very successful in these parts; making himself master of Torônê, Potidæa, Pydna, Methônê, and various other places. As he mastered many of the Chalkidic towns allied with Olynthus, the means and adherents still retained by that city became so much diminished, that Timotheus is spoken of loosely as having conquered it.[647] Here, as at Samos, he obtained his successes not only without cost to Athens, but also (as we are told) without severities upon the allies, simply from the regular contributions of the Thracian confederates of Athens, assisted by the employment of a temporary coinage of base metal.[648] Yet though Timotheus was thus victorious in and near the Thermaic Gulf, he was not more fortunate than his predecessor in his attempt to achieve that which Athens had most at heart,—the capture of Amphipolis; although, by the accidental capture of Charidemus at sea, he was enabled again to enlist that chief with his band, whose services seem to have been gratefully appreciated at Athens.[649] Timotheus first despatched Alkimachus, who was repulsed,—then landed himself and attacked the city. But the Amphipolitans, aided by the neighboring Thracians, in large numbers (and perhaps by the Thracian Kotys), made so strenuous a resistance, that he was forced to retire with loss; and even to burn some triremes, which, having been carried across to assail the city from the wide part of the river Strymon above, could not be brought off in the face of the enemy.[650]

Timotheus next turned his attention to the war against Kotys in Thrace, and to the defence of the newly-acquired Athenian possessions in the Chersonese, now menaced by the appearance of a new and unexpected enemy to Athens in the eastern waters of the Ægean,—a Theban fleet.

I have already mentioned that in 366 B.C., Thebes had sustained great misfortunes in Thessaly. Pelopidas had been fraudulently seized and detained as prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ; a Theban army had been sent to rescue him, but had been dishonorably repulsed, and had only been enabled to effect its retreat by the genius of Epaminondas, then serving as a private, and called upon by the soldiers to take the command. Afterwards, Epaminondas himself had been sent at the head of a second army to extricate his captive friend, which he had accomplished, but not without relinquishing Thessaly and leaving Alexander more powerful than ever. For a certain time after this defeat, the Thebans remained comparatively humbled and quiet. At length, the aggravated oppressions of the tyrant Alexander occasioned such suffering, and provoked such missions of complaint on the part of the Thessalians to Thebes, that Pelopidas, burning with ardor to revenge both his city and himself, pre-

vailed on the Thebans to place him at the head of a fresh army for the purpose of invading Thessaly.[651]

At the same time, probably, the remarkable successes of the Athenians under Timotheus, at Samos and the Chersonese, had excited uneasiness throughout Greece, and jealousy on the part of the Thebans. Epaminondas ventured to propose to his countrymen that they should grapple with Athens on her own element, and compete for the headship of Greece not only on land but at sea. In fact the rescript brought down by Pelopidas from the Persian court sanctioned this pretension, by commanding Athens to lay up her ships of war, on pain of incurring the chastisement of the Great King;[652] a mandate, which she had so completely defied as to push her maritime efforts more energetically than before. Epaminondas employed all his eloquence to impress upon his countrymen, that, Sparta being now humbled, Athens was their actual and prominent enemy. He reminded them,—in language such as had been used by Brasidas in the early years of the Peloponnesian war, and by Hermokrates at Syracuse,[653]—that men such as the Thebans, brave and trained soldiers on land, could soon acquire the like qualities on shipboard; and that the Athenians themselves had once been mere landsmen, until the exigencies of the Persian war forced them to take to the sea.[654] "We must put down this haughty rival (he exhorted his countrymen); we must transfer to our own citadel, the Kadmeia, those magnificent Propylæa which adorn the entrance of the acropolis at Athens."[655]

Such emphatic language, as it long lived in the hostile recollection of Athenian orators, so it excited at the moment extreme ardor on the part of the Theban hearers. They resolved to build and equip one hundred triremes, and to construct docks with ship-houses fit for the constant maintenance of such a number. Epaminondas himself was named commander, to sail with the first fleet, as soon as it should be ready, to the Hellespont and the islands near Ionia; while invitations were at the same time despatched to Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, encouraging them to prepare for breaking with Athens.[656] Some opposition however was made in the assembly to the new undertaking; especially by Menekleidas, an opposition speaker, who, being frequent and severe in his criticisms upon the leading men such as Pelopidas and Epaminondas, has been handed down by Nepos and Plutarch in odious colors. Demagogues like him, whose power resided in the public assembly, are commonly represented as if they had a natural interest in plunging their cities into war, in order that there might be more matter of accusation against the leading men. This representation is founded mainly on the picture which Thucydides gives of Kleon in the first half of the Peloponnesian war: I have endeavored in my sixth volume to show,[657] that it is not a fair estimate even of Kleon separately, much less of the demagogues generally, unwarlike men both in tastes and aptitudes. Menekleidas at Thebes, far from promoting warlike expeditions in order that he might denounce the generals when they came back, advocated the prudence of continued peace, and accused Epaminondas of involving his country in distant and dangerous schemes, with a view

to emulate the glories of Agamemnon by sailing from Aulis in Bœotia, as commander of an imposing fleet to make conquests in the Hellespont. "By the help of Thebes (replied Epaminondas) I have already done more than Agamemnon. He, with the forces of Sparta and all Greece besides, was ten years in taking a single city; while *I*, with the single force of Thebes and at the single day of Leuktra, have crushed the power of the Agamemnonian Sparta."[658] While repelling the charge of personal motives, Epaminondas contended that peace would be equivalent to an abnegation of the headship of Greece; and that, if Thebes wished to maintain that ascendant station, she must keep her citizens in constant warlike training and action.

To err with Epaminondas may be considered, by some readers, as better than being right with Menekleidas. But on the main point of this debate, Menekleidas appears to have been really right. For the general exhortations ascribed to Epaminondas resemble but too closely those feverish stimulants, which Alkibiades administered at Athens to wind up his countrymen for the fatal expedition against Syracuse.[659] If we should even grant his advice to be wise, in reference to land-warfare, we must recollect that he was here impelling Thebes into a new and untried maritime career, for which she had neither aptitude nor facilities. To maintain ascendency on land alone, would require all her force, and perhaps prove too hard for her; to maintain ascendency by land and sea at once would be still more impracticable. By grasping at both she would probably keep neither. Such considerations warrant us in suspecting, that the project of stretching across the Ægean for ultramarine dependencies was suggested to this great man not so much by a sound appreciation of the permanent interests of Thebes, as by jealousy of Athens,—especially since the recent conquests of Timotheus.[660]

The project however was really executed, and a large Theban fleet under Epaminondas crossed the Ægean in 363 B.C. In the same year, apparently, Pelopidas marched into Thessaly, at the head of a Theban land-force, against Alexander of Pheræ. What the fleet achieved, we are scarcely permitted to know. It appears that Epaminondas visited Byzantium; and we are told that he drove off the Athenian guard-squadron under Laches, prevailing upon several of the allies of Athens to declare in his favor.[661] Both he and Timotheus appear to have been in these seas, if not at the same time, at least with no great interval of time between. Both were solicited by the oligarchy of the Pontic Herakleia against the people; and both declined to furnish aid.[662] Timotheus is said to have liberated the besieged town of Kyzikus: by whom it was besieged, we do not certainly know, but probably by the Theban fleet.[663] Epaminondas brought back his fleet at the end of the year, without having gained any splendid victory or acquired any tenable possession for Thebes; yet not without weakening Athens, unsettling her hold upon her dependencies, and seconding indirectly the hostilities carried on by Kotys; insomuch that the Athenian affairs in the Chersonese and Thrace were much less prosperous in 362 B.C. than they had been in 364 B.C. Probably Epaminondas intended to return with his fleet in the next

year (362 B.C.), and to push his maritime enterprises still farther;[664] but we shall find him imperatively called elsewhere, to another and a fatal battle-field. And thus the first naval expedition of Thebes was likewise the last.

Meanwhile his friend and colleague Pelopidas had marched into Thessaly against the despot Alexander; who was now at the height of his power, holding in dependence a large portion of Thessaly together with the Phthiot Achæans and the Magnetes, and having Athens as his ally. Nevertheless, so revolting had been his cruelties, and so numerous were the malcontents who had sent to invite aid from Thebes, that Pelopidas did not despair of overpowering him. Nor was he daunted even by an eclipse of the sun, which is said to have occurred just as he was commencing his march, nor by the gloomy warnings which the prophets founded upon it; though this event intimidated many of his fellow-citizens, so that his force was rendered less numerous as well as less confident. Arriving at Pharsalus, and strengthening himself by the junction of his Thessalian allies, he found Alexander approaching to meet him at the head of a well-appointed mercenary force, greatly superior in number. The two chiefs contended who should occupy first the hills called Kynos Kephalæ, or the Dog's Heads. Pelopidas arrived there first with his cavalry, beat the cavalry of the enemy, and pursued them to some distance; but he thus left the hills open to be occupied by the numerous infantry of the enemy, while his own infantry, coming up later, were repulsed with loss in their attempt to carry the position. Thus unpromising did the battle appear, when Pelopidas returned from the pursuit. Ordering his victorious cavalry to charge the infantry on the hill in flank, he immediately dismounted, seized his shield, and put himself at the head of his own discouraged infantry, whom he again led up the hill to attack the position. His presence infused so much fresh ardor, that his troops, in spite of being twice repulsed, succeeded in a third attempt to drive the enemy from the summit of the hill. Thus master of the hill, Pelopidas saw before him the whole army of the enemy, retiring in some disorder, though not yet beaten; while Alexander in person was on the right wing, exerting himself to rally and encourage them. When Pelopidas beheld, as it were within his reach, this detested enemy,—whose treacherous arrest and dungeon he had himself experienced, and whose cruelties filled every one's mouth,—he was seized with a transport of rage and madness, like Cyrus the younger on the field of Kunaxa at the sight of his brother Artaxerxes. Without thinking of his duties as a general, or even looking to see by whom he was followed, he rushed impetuously forward, with loud cries and challenges to Alexander to come forth and fight. The latter, declining the challenge, retired among his guards, into the midst of whom Pelopidas plunged, with the few who followed him; and there, while fighting with desperate bravery, met his death. So rapidly had this rash proceeding been consummated, that his army behind did not at first perceive it. But they presently hastened forward to rescue or avenge him, vigorously charged the troops of Alexander, and put them to flight with severe loss.[665]

Yet this victory, though important to the Thebans, and still more important to the Thessalians, was to both of them robbed of all its sensible value by the death of Pelopidas. The demonstrations of grief throughout the army were unbounded and universal. The soldiers yet warm from their victory, the wounded men with wounds yet untended, flocked around the corpse, piling up near to it as a trophy the arms of the slain enemies. Many, refusing either to kindle fire, or to touch their evening meal, testified their affliction by cutting off their own hair as well as the manes of their horses. The Thessalian cities vied with each other in tokens of affectionate respect, and obtained from the Thebans permission to take the chief share in his funeral, as their lost guardian and protector. At Thebes, the emotion was no less strikingly manifested. Endeared to his countrymen first as the head of that devoted handful of exiles who braved every peril to rescue the city from the Lacedæmonians, Pelopidas had been reëlected without interruption to the annual office of Bœotarch during all the years that had since elapsed[666] (378-364 B.C.). He had taken a leading part in all their struggles, and all their glories; he had been foremost to cheer them in the hour of despondency; he had lent himself, with the wisdom of a patriot and the generosity of a friend, to second the guiding ascendency of Epaminondas, and his moderation of dealing towards conquered enemies.[667]

All that Thebes could do, was, to avenge the death of Pelopidas. The Theban generals, Malkitas and Diogeiton,[668] conducted a powerful force of seven thousand hoplites into Thessaly, and put themselves at the head of their partisans in that country. With this united army, they pressed Alexander hard, completely worsted him, and reduced him to submit to their own terms. He was compelled to relinquish all his dependencies in Thessaly; to confine himself to Pheræ, with its territory near the Gulf of Pagasæ; and to swear adherence to Thebes as a leader. All Thessaly, together with the Phthiot Achæans and the Magnêtes, became annexed to the headship of the Thebans, who thus acquired greater ascendency in Northern Greece than they had ever enjoyed before.[669] The power of Alexander was effectually put down on land; but he still continued both powerful and predatory at sea, as will be seen in the ensuing year.

CHAPTER LXXX.

FROM THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA.

It was during this period,—while Epaminondas was absent with the fleet, and while Pelopidas was engaged in that Thessalian campaign from whence he never returned,—that the Thebans destroyed Orchomenus. That city, the second in the Bœotian federation, had always been disaffected towards Thebes; and the absence of the two great leaders, as well as of a large Theban force in Thessaly, seems to have been regarded by the Orchomenian Knights or Horsemen (the first and richest among the citizens, three hundred in number) as a favorable moment for attack. Some Theban exiles took part in this scheme, with a view to overthrow the existing government; and a day, appointed for a military review near Thebes, was fixed for execution. A large number of conspirators joined, with apparent ardor. But before the day arrived, several of them repented and betrayed the plot to the Bœotarchs; upon which the Orchomenian horsemen were seized, brought before the Theban assembly, condemned to death, and executed. But besides this, the resolution was taken to destroy the town, to kill the male adults, and to sell the women and children into slavery.[670] This barbarous decree was executed, though probably a certain fraction found means to escape, forming the kernel of that population which was afterwards restored. The full measure of ancient Theban hatred was thus satiated; a hatred, tracing its origin even to those mythical times when Thebes was said to have paid tribute to Orchomenus. But the erasure of this venerable city from the list of autonomous units in Hellas, with the wholesale execution and sale of so many free kinsmen into slavery, excited strong sympathy throughout the neighbors, as well as repugnance against Theban cruelty;[671] a sentiment probably aggravated by the fact, which we must presume to have been concurrent,—that the Thebans appropriated the territory among their own citizens. It would seem that the neighboring town of Koroneia shared the same fate; at least the two are afterwards spoken of together in such manner as to make us suppose so.[672] Thebes thus absorbed into herself these two towns and territories to the north of her own city, as well as Platæa and Thespiæ to the south.

We must recollect that during the supremacy of Sparta and the period of Theban struggle and humiliation, before the battle of Leuktra, Orchomenus had actively embraced the Spartan cause. Shortly after that victory, the Thebans had been anxious under their first impulse of resentment to destroy the city, but had been restrained by the lenient recommendations of Epaminondas.[673] All their half-suppressed wrath was revived by the conspiracy of the Orchomenian Knights; yet the extreme severity of the proceeding would never have been consummated, but for the absence of Epaminondas, who was deeply chagrined on his return.[674] He well knew the bitter

censures which Thebes would draw upon herself by punishing the entire city for the conspiracy of the wealthy Knights, and in a manner even more rigorous than Platæa and Thespiæ; since the inhabitants of these two latter were expelled with their families out of Bœotia, while the Orchomenian male adults were slain, and the women and children sold into slavery.

On returning from his maritime expedition at the end of 363 B.C., Epaminondas was reëlected one of the Bœotarchs. He had probably intended to renew his cruise during the coming year. But his chagrin for the Orchomenian affair, and his grief for the death of Pelopidas,—an intimate friend, as well as a political colleague whom he could trust,—might deter him from a second absence; while the affairs of Peloponnesus also were now becoming so complicated, as to render the necessity of renewed Theban interference again probable.

Since the peace concluded in 366 B.C. with Corinth, Phlius, etc., Thebes had sent no army into that peninsula; though her harmost and garrison still continued at Tegea, perhaps at Megalopolis and Messênê also. The Arcadians, jealous of her as well as disunited among themselves, had even gone so far as to contract an alliance with her enemy Athens. The main conflict however now was, between the Arcadians and the Eleians, respecting the possession of Triphylia and the Pisatid. The Eleians about this time (365 B.C.) came into alliance again with Sparta,[675] relinquishing their alliance with Thebes; while the Achæans, having come into vigorous coöperation with Sparta[676] ever since 367 B.C. (by reaction against the Thebans, who, reserving the judicious and moderate policy of Epaminondas, violently changed the Achæan governments), allied themselves with Elis also, in or before 365 B.C.[677] And thus Sparta, though robbed by the pacification of 366 B.C. of the aid of Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus, etc., had now acquired in exchange Elis and Achaia,—confederates not less valuable.

Triphylia, the territory touching the western coast of Peloponnesus, immediately north of the river Neda,—and the Pisatid (including the lower course of the river Alpheius and the plain of Olympia), immediately north of Triphylia,—both of them between Messenia and Elis,—had been in former times conquered and long held by the Eleians, but always as discontented subjects. Sparta, in the days of her unquestioned supremacy, had found it politic to vindicate their independence, and had compelled the Eleians, after a war of two or three years, to renounce formally all dominion over them.[678] No sooner, however, had the battle of Leuktra disarmed Sparta, than the Eleians reclaimed their lost dominion;[679] while the subjects on their side found new protectors in the Arcadians, and were even admitted, under pretence of kindred race, into the Pan-Arcadian confederacy.[680] The Persian rescript brought down by Pelopidas (367-366 B.C.) seems to have reversed this arrangement, recognizing the imperial rights of the Eleians.[681] But as the Arcadians had repudiated the rescript, it remained for the Eleians to enforce their imperial rights by arms, if they could. They found Sparta in the same interest as themselves; not only equally hostile to the Arca-

dians, but also complaining that she had been robbed of Messênê, as they complained of the loss of Triphylia. Sparta had just gained a slight advantage over the Arcadians, in the recapture of Sellasia; chiefly through the aid of a Syracusan reinforcement of twelve triremes, sent to them by the younger Dionysius, but with orders speedily to return.[682]

Besides the imperial claims over Triphylia and the Pisatid, which thus placed Elis in alliance with Sparta and in conflict with Arcadia,—there was also a territory lying north of the Alpheius (on the hilly ground forming the western or Eleian side of Mount Erymanthus, between Elis and the north-western portion of Arcadia), which included Lasion and the highland townships called Akroreii, and which was disputed between Elis and Arcadia. At this moment, it was included as a portion of the Pan-Arcadian aggregate;[683] but the Eleians, claiming it as their own and suddenly marching in along with a body of Arcadian exiles, seized and occupied Lasion as well as some of the neighboring Akroreii. The Arcadians were not slow in avenging the affront. A body of their Pan-Arcadian militia called the epariti, collected from the various cities and districts, marched to Lasion, defeated the Eleian hoplites with considerable loss both of men and arms, and drove them out of the district. The victors recovered both Lasion and all the Akroreii, except Thraustus; after which they proceeded to the sacred ground of Olympia, and took formal possession of it, planting a garrison, protected by a regular stockaded circle, on the hill called Kronion. Having made good this position, they marched on even to the city of Elis itself, which was unfortified (though it had a tenable acropolis), so that they were enabled to enter it, finding no resistance until they reached the agora. Here they found mustered the Eleian horsemen and the chosen hoplites, who repulsed them with some loss. But Elis was in great consternation; while a democratical opposition now manifested itself against the ruling oligarchy,—seizing the acropolis in hopes of admitting the Arcadians. The bravery of the horsemen and hoplites, however, put down this internal movement, recovered the acropolis, and forced the malcontents, to the number of four hundred, to evacuate the city. Thus expelled, the latter seized and established themselves at Pylus (in the Eleian territory, about nine miles from Elis towards the Arcadian border[684]), where they were reinforced not only by a body of Arcadians, but also by many of their partisans who came from the city to join them. From this fortified post, planted in the country like Dekeleia in Attica, they carried on harassing war against the Eleians in the city, and reduced them after some time to great straits. There were even hopes of compelling the city to surrender, and a fresh invasion of the Arcadians was invited to complete the enterprise. The Eleians were only rescued by a reinforcement from their allies in Achaia, who came in large force and placed the city in safety; so that the Arcadians could do nothing more than lay waste the territory around.[685]

Retiring on this occasion, the Arcadians renewed their invasion not long afterwards; their garrison still occupying Olympia, and the exiles continuing at Pylus.

They now marched all across the country, even approaching Kyllênê, the harbor of Elis on the western sea. Between the harbor and the city, the Eleians ventured to attack them, but were defeated with such loss, that their general Andromachus (who had prompted the attack) fell upon his sword in despair. The distress of the Eleians became greater than ever. In hopes of drawing off the Arcadian invaders, they sent an envoy to Sparta, entreating that the Lacedæmonians would make a diversion on their side of Arcadia. Accordingly, the Spartan prince Archidamus (son of king Agesilaus), invading the south-western portion of Arcadia, occupied a hill-town or post called Kromnus (seemingly in the territory of Megalopolis, and cutting off the communication between that city and Messênê), which he fortified and garrisoned with about two hundred Spartans and Periœki. The effect which the Eleians contemplated was produced. The Arcadian army (except the garrison of Olympia) being withdrawn home, they had leisure to act against Pylus. The Pylian exiles had recently made an abortive attempt upon Thalamæ, on their return from which they were overtaken and worsted by the Eleians, with severe loss in killed, and two hundred of their number ultimately made prisoners. Among these latter, all the Eleian exiles were at once put to death; all the remainder sold for slaves.[686]

Meanwhile the main Arcadian force, which had returned from Elis, was joined by allies,—Thebans,[687] Argeians, and Messenians,—and marched at once to Kromnus. They there blocked up the Lacedæmonian garrison by a double palisade carried all around, which they kept a numerous force to occupy. In vain did Archidamus attempt to draw them off, by carrying his devastations into the Skiritis and other portions of Arcadia; for the Skiritæ, in former days dependents of Sparta and among the most valuable constituents of the Lacedæmonian armies,[688] had now become independent Arcadians. The blockade was still continued without interruption. Archidamus next tried to get possession of a hill-top which commanded the Arcadian position. But in marching along the road up, he encountered the enemy in great force, and was repulsed with some loss; himself being thrust through the thigh with a spear, and his relatives Polyænidas and Chilon slain.[689] The Lacedæmonian troops retreated for some space into a wider breadth of ground, where they were again formed in battle order, yet greatly discouraged both by the repulse and by the communication of the names of the slain, who were among the most distinguished soldiers of Sparta. The Arcadians on the contrary were advancing to the charge in high spirits, when an ancient Spartan, stepping forth from the ranks, shouted with a loud voice "What need to fight, gentlemen? Is it not better to conclude a truce and separate?" Both armies accepted the proposition joyfully. The truce was concluded; the Lacedæmonians took up their dead and retired: the Arcadians also retreated to the spot where they had gained their advantage, and there erected their trophy.[690]

Under the graphic description here given by Xenophon, seems to be concealed a defeat of the Lacedæmonians more serious than he likes to enunciate. The Arcadians completely gained their point, by continuing the blockade without interruption. One

more attempt was made by the Lacedæmonians for the relief of their countrymen. Suddenly assailing the palisade at night, they succeeded in mastering the portion of it guarded by the Argeians.[691] They broke down an opening, and called to the besieged to hasten out. But the relief had come unexpected, so that only a few of those near at hand could profit by it to escape. The Arcadians, hurrying to the spot in large force, drove off the assailants and reënclosed the besieged, who were soon compelled to surrender for want of provisions. More than a hundred prisoners, Spartans and Periœki together, were distributed among the captors,—Argeians, Thebans, Arcadians, and Messenians,—one share to each.[692] Sixty years before, the capture of two hundred and twenty Spartans and Lacedæmonians in Sphakteria, by Kleon and Demosthenes, had excited the extreme of incredulous wonder throughout all Greece; emphatically noted by the impartial Thucydides.[693] Now, not a trace of such sentiment appears, even in the philo-Laconian Xenophon. So sadly had Spartan glory declined!

Having thus put an end to the Spartan attack, the Arcadians resumed their aggression against Elis, in conjunction with a new project of considerable moment. It was now the spring immediately preceding the celebration of the great quadrennial Olympic festival, which came about midsummer. The presidency over this sacred ceremony had long been the cherished privilege of the Eleians, who had acquired it when they conquered the Pisatans—the inhabitants of the region immediately around Olympia, and the first curators of the festival in its most primitive state. These Pisatans, always reluctant subjects of Elis, had never lost the conviction that the presidency of the festival belonged to them of right; and had entreated Sparta to restore to them their right, thirty-five years before, when Agis as conqueror imposed terms of peace upon the Eleians.[694] Their request had been then declined, on the ground that they were too poor and rude to do worthy honor to the ceremony. But on now renewing it, they found the Arcadians more compliant than the Spartans had been. The Arcadian garrison, which had occupied the sacred plain of Olympia for more than a year, being strongly reinforced, preparation was made for celebrating the festival by the Pisatans under Arcadian protection.[695] The Grecian states would receive with surprise, on this occasion, two distinct notices from official heralds, announcing to them the commencement of the hieromenia or sacred season, and the precise day when the ceremonies would begin: for doubtless the Eleians, though expelled by force from Olympia, still asserted their rights and sent round their notices as usual.

It was evident that this memorable plain, consecrated as it was to Hellenic brotherhood and communion, would on the present occasion be dishonored by dispute and perhaps by bloodshed: for the Arcadians summoned to the spot, besides their own military strength, a considerable body of allies: two thousand hoplites from Argos, and four hundred horsemen from Athens. So imposing a force being considered sufficient to deter the unwarlike Eleians from any idea of asserting their rights by arms, the Arcadians and Pisatans began the festival with its ordinary routine of sacri-

fice and matches. Having gone through the chariot-race, they entered upon the pentathlon, or quintuple contest, wherein the running match and the wrestling-match came first in order. The running-match had already been completed, and those who had been successful enough in it to go on contending for the prize in the other four points, had begun to wrestle in the space between the stadium and the great altar, [696]—when suddenly the Eleians were seen entering the sacred ground in arms, accompanied by their allies the Achæans, and marching up to the opposite bank of the little river Kladeus,—which flowed at a little distance to the westward of the Altis, or interior enclosed precinct of Zeus, falling afterwards into the Alpheius. Upon this the Arcadians drew up in armed order, on their own side of the Kladeus, to resist the farther approach of the Eleians.[697] The latter, with a boldness for which no one gave them credit, forded the rivulet, headed by Stratolas with his chosen band of three hundred, and vigorously charged first the Arcadians, next the Argeians; both of whom were defeated and driven back. The victorious Eleians forced their way into the Altis, and pressed forward to reach the great altar. But at every step of their advance the resistance became stronger, aided as it was by numerous buildings,—the senate-house, the temple of Zeus, and various porticos,—which both deranged their ranks, and furnished excellent positions of defence for darters and archers on the roofs. Stratolas was here slain; while his troops, driven out of the sacred ground, were compelled to recross the Kladeus. The festival was then resumed and prosecuted in its usual order. But the Arcadians were so afraid of a renewed attack on the following day, that they not only occupied the roofs of all the buildings more completely than before, but passed the night in erecting a palisade of defence; tearing down for that purpose the temporary booths which had been carefully put up to accommodate the crowd of visitors.[698] Such precautions rendered the place unassailable, so that the Eleians were obliged to return home on the next day; not without sympathy and admiration among many of the Greeks, for the unwonted boldness which they had displayed. They revenged themselves by pronouncing the 104th Olympiad to be no Olympiad at all, and by registering it as such in their catalogue, when they regained power; preserving however the names of those who had been proclaimed victors, which appeared in the lists like the rest.[699]

Such was the unholy combat which dishonored the sanctuary of Pan-hellenic brotherhood, and in which the great temple, with its enthroned inmate the majestic Zeus of Pheidias, was for the first time turned into a fortress against its habitual presidents the Eleians. It was a combat wherein, though both Thebes and Sparta, the competing leaders of Greece, stand clear, Athens as well as most of the Peloponnesian chief states were implicated. It had been brought on by the rapacious ambition of the Arcadians, and its result seemed to confirm them, under color of Pisatan presidency, in the permanent mastery of Olympia. But in spite of such apparent promise, it was an event which carried in itself the seeds of violent reaction. We cannot doubt that the crowd of Grecian spectators present were not merely annoyed by the interruption of the proceedings and by the demolition of their tents, but also

deeply shocked by the outrage to the sacred ground,—"imminentium templorum religio."[700] Most of them probably believed the Eleians to be the rightful presidents, having never either seen or heard of any one else in that capacity. And they could hardly help feeling strong sympathy for the unexpected courage of these dispossessed presidents; which appeared so striking to Xenophon (himself perhaps a spectator) that he ascribes it to a special inspiration of the gods.[701]

If they disapproved of the conduct of the Arcadians and Pisatans as an unjust intrusion, they would disapprove yet more of that spoliation of the rich temples at Olympia, whereby the intruders rewarded themselves. The Arcadians, always on the look-out for plunder and pay as mercenary soldiers, found themselves supplied with both, in abundant measure, from this war: the one from the farms, the stock, and the field-laborers, of the Eleian neighborhood generally, more plentiful than in any part of Peloponnesus;[702] the other from the ample accumulation, both of money and of precious offerings, distributed over the numerous temples at Olympia. The Pisatans, now installed as administrators, would readily consent to appropriate these treasures to the pay of their own defenders, whom they doubtless considered as acting in the service of the Olympian Zeus. Accordingly the Epariti, the militia of joint Arcadia, were better paid than ever they had been before so that the service attracted numerous volunteers of the poorer class.[703]

At the outset of the Peloponnesian war, the Corinthians and Spartans had talked of prosecuting it in part by borrowed money from the treasuries of Delphi and Olympia.[704] How far the project had ever been executed, we have no information. But at least, it had not been realized in any such way as to form a precedent for the large sums now appropriated by the Pisatans and Arcadians; which appropriation accordingly excited much outcry, as flagrant rapacity and sacrilege. This sentiment was felt with peculiar force among many even of the Arcadians themselves, the guilty parties. Moreover some of the leaders employed had made important private acquisitions for themselves, so as to provoke both resentment and jealousy among their rivals. The Pan-Arcadian communion, recently brought together and ill-cemented, was little calculated to resist the effect of any strong special cause of dissension. It was composed of cities which had before been accustomed to act apart and even in hostility to each other; especially Mantinea and Tegea. These two cities now resumed their ancient rivalry.[705] The Mantineans, jealous both of Tegea and Megalopolis, began to labor underhand against Arcadian unity and the Theban alliance,—with a view to renewed connection with Sparta; though only five years before, they had owed to Thebes the reëstablishment of their own city, after it had been broken up into villages by Spartan force. The appropriation of the sacred funds, offensive as it was to much of sincere sentiment, supplied them with a convenient ground for commencing opposition. In the Mantinean assembly, a resolution was passed, renouncing all participation in the Olympic treasures; while at the same time an adequate sum was raised among the citizens, to furnish pay for all members of the Epariti who came

from their city. This sum was forwarded to the officers in command; who however not only refused to receive it; but even summoned the authors of the proceeding to take their trial before the Pan-Arcadian assembly,—the Ten Thousand at Megalopolis,—on the charge of breaking up the integrity of Arcadia.[706] The Mantinean leaders thus summoned, having refused to appear, and being condemned in their absence by the Ten Thousand,—a detachment of the epariti was sent to Mantinea to secure their persons. But the gates were found shut, and the order was set at defiance. So much sympathy was manifested in Arcadia towards the Mantineans, that many other towns copied their protest. Nay, even the majority of the Ten Thousand themselves, moved by repeated appeals made to them in the name of the offended gods, were gradually induced to adopt it also, publicly renouncing and interdicting all farther participation in the Olympian treasures.

Here was a just point carried, and an important advantage gained, in desisting from a scandalous misappropriation. The party which had gained it immediately sought to push it farther. Beginning as the advocates of justice and of the Olympian Zeus, the Mantineans speedily pronounced themselves more clearly as the champions of oligarchy; friendly to Sparta and adverse to Thebes. Supplies from Olympia being no longer obtained, the means presently failed, of paying the epariti or public militia. Accordingly, such members of that corps as were too poor to continue without pay, gradually relinquished the service; while on the other hand, the more wealthy and powerful citizens, by preconcerted understanding with each other, enrolled themselves in large numbers, for the purpose of getting the national force out of the hands of the opposite party and into their own.[707] The leaders of that opposite party saw plainly, that this oligarchical movement would not only bring them to severe account for the appropriation of the sacred treasure, but would also throw Arcadia again into alliance with Sparta. Accordingly they sent intimation to the Thebans of the impending change of policy, inviting them to prevent it by an immediate expedition into Arcadia. Informed of this proceeding,[708] the opposite leaders brought it before the Pan-Arcadian assembly; in which they obtained a resolution, that envoys should be despatched to Thebes, desiring that no Theban army might enter into Arcadia until formally summoned,—and cancelling the preceding invitation as unauthorized. At the same time, the assembly determined to conclude peace with the Eleians, and to restore to them the locality of Olympia with all their previous rights. The Eleians gladly consented, and peace was accordingly concluded.[709]

The transactions just recounted occupied about one year and nine or ten months, from Midsummer 364 B.C. (the time of the battle at Olympia) to about April 362 B.C. The peace was generally popular throughout Arcadia, seemingly even among the cities which adhered to Thebes, though it had been concluded without consulting the Thebans. Even at Tegea, the centre of Theban influence, satisfaction was felt at the abandonment of the mischievous aggression and spoliation of Olympia, wherein the Thebans had had no concern. Accordingly when the peace, having been first proba-

bly sworn in other Arcadian cities, came to be sworn also at Tegea,—not only the city authorities, but also the Theban harmost, who occupied the town with a garrison of three hundred Bœotians, were present and took part in the ceremony. After it had been finished, most of the Mantineans went home; their city being both unfriendly to Tegea and not far distant. But many other Arcadians passed the evening in the town, celebrating the peace by libations, pæans, and feasting. On a sudden the gates were shut by order, and the most prominent of the oligarchical party were arrested as they sat at the feast, by the Bœotian garrison and the Arcadian Epariti of the opposite party. The leaders seized were in such considerable number, as to fill both the prison and the government-house; though there were few Mantineans among them, since most of these last had gone home. Among the rest the consternation was extreme. Some let themselves down from the walls, others escaped surreptitiously by the gates. Great was the indignation excited at Mantinea on the following morning, when the news of this violent arrest was brought thither. The authorities,—while they sent round the intelligence to the remaining Arcadian cities, inviting them at once to arms,—despatched heralds to Tegea, demanding all the Mantinean prisoners there detained. They at the same time protested emphatically against the arrest or the execution of any Arcadian, without previous trial before the Pan-Arcadian community; and they pledged themselves in the name of Mantinea, to answer for the appearance of any Arcadian against whom charges might be preferred.[710]

Upon receiving this requisition, the Theban harmost forthwith released all his prisoners. He then called together an assembly,—seemingly attended by only a few persons, from feelings of mistrust,[711]—wherein he explained that he had been misled, and that he had ordered the arrest upon a false report that a Lacedæmonian force was on the borders, prepared to seize the city in concert with treacherous correspondents within. A vote was passed accepting the explanation, though (according to Xenophon) no one believed it. Yet envoys were immediately sent to Thebes probably from the Mantineans and other Arcadians, complaining loudly of his conduct, and insisting that he should be punished with death.

On a review of the circumstances, there seems reason for believing that the Theban officer gave a true explanation of the motives under which he had acted. The fact of his releasing the prisoners at the first summons, is more consistent with this supposition than with any other. Xenophon indeed says that his main object was to get possession of the Mantineans, and that, when he found but few of the latter among the persons seized, he was indifferent to the detention of the rest. But if such had been his purpose, he would hardly have set about it in so blind and clumsy a manner. He would have done it while the Mantineans were still in the town, instead of waiting until after their departure. He would not have perpetrated an act offensive as well as iniquitous, without assuring himself that it was done at a time when the determining purpose was yet attainable. On the other hand, nothing can be more natural than the supposition that the more violent among the Arcadian epariti be-

lieved in the existence of a plot to betray Tegea to the Lacedæmonians, and impressed the Theban with a persuasion of the like impending danger. To cause a revolution in Tegea, would be a great point gained for the oligarchical party, and would be rendered comparatively practicable by the congregation of a miscellaneous body of Arcadians in the town. It is indeed not impossible, that the idea of such a plot may really have been conceived; but it is at least highly probable, that the likelihood of such an occurrence was sincerely believed in by opponents.[712]

The explanation of the Theban governor, affirming that his order for arrest had either really averted, or appeared to him indispensable to avert, a projected treacherous betrayal,—reached Thebes at the same time as the complaints against him. It was not only received as perfectly satisfactory, but Epaminondas even replied to the complainants by counter-complaints of his own,—"The arrest (he said) was an act more justifiable than the release of those arrested. You Arcadians have already committed treason against us. It was on your account, and at your request, that we carried the war into Peloponnesus,—and you now conclude peace without consulting us! Be assured that we shall presently come in arms into Arcadia, and make war to support our partisans in the country."[713]

Such was the peremptory reply which the Arcadian envoy brought back from Thebes, announcing to his countrymen that they must prepare for war forthwith. They accordingly concerted measures for resistance with the Eleians and Achæans. They sent an invitation to the Lacedæmonians to march into Arcadia, and assist in repelling any enemy who should approach for the purpose of subjugating Peloponnesus,—yet with the proviso, as to headship, that each state should take the lead when the war was in its own territory; and they farther sent to solicit aid from Athens. Such were the measures taken by the Mantineans and their partisans, now forming the majority in the Pan-Arcadian aggregate, who (to use the language of Xenophon) "were really solicitous for Peloponnesus."[714] "Why do these Thebans (said they) march into our country when we desire them not to come? For what other purpose, except to do us mischief? to make us do mischief to each other, in order that both parties may stand in need of *them*? to enfeeble Peloponnesus as much as possible, in order that they may hold it the more easily in slavery?"[715] Such is the language which Xenophon repeats, with a sympathy plainly evincing his philo-Laconian bias. For when we follow the facts as he himself narrates them, we shall find them much more in harmony with the reproaches which he puts into the mouth of Epaminondas. Epaminondas had first marched into Peloponnesus (in 369 B.C.) at the request of both Arcadians and Eleians, for the purpose of protecting them against Sparta. He had been the first to give strength and dignity to the Arcadians, by organizing them into a political aggregate, and by forming a strong frontier for them against Sparta, in Messênê and Megalopolis. When thus organized, the Arcadians had manifested both jealousy of Thebes, and incompetence to act wisely for themselves. They had caused the reversal of the gentle and politic measures adopted by

Epaminondas towards the Achæan cities, whom they had thus thrown again into the arms of Sparta. They had, of their own accord, taken up the war against Elis and the mischievous encroachment at Olympia. On the other hand, the Thebans had not marched into Peloponnesus since 367 B.C.—an interval now of nearly five years. They had tried to persuade the Arcadians to accept the Persian rescript, and to desist from the idea of alliance with Athens; but when refused, they had made no attempt to carry either of these points by force. Epaminondas had a fair right now to complain of them for having made peace with Elis and Achaia, the friends and allies of Sparta, without any consultation with Thebes. He probably believed that there had been a real plot to betray Tegea to the Lacedæmonians, as one fruit of this treacherous peace; and he saw plainly that the maintenance of the frontier line against Sparta,—Tegea, Megalopolis, and Messênê,—could no longer be assured without a new Theban invasion.

This appears to me the reasonable estimate of the situation in Peloponnesus, in June 362 B.C.—immediately before the last invasion of Epaminondas. We cannot trust the unfavorable judgment of Xenophon with regard either to this great man or to the Thebans. It will not stand good, even if compared with the facts related by himself; still less probably would it stand, if we had the facts from an impartial witness.

I have already recounted as much as can be made out of the proceedings of the Thebans, between the return of Pelopidas from Persia with the rescript (in the winter 367-366 B.C.) to the close of 363 B.C. In 366-365 B.C., they had experienced great loss and humiliation in Thessaly connected with the detention of Pelopidas, whom they had with difficulty rescued from the dungeon of Pheræ. In 364-363 B.C., Pelopidas had been invested with a fresh command in Thessaly, and though he was slain, the Theban arms had been eminently successful, acquiring more complete mastery of the country than ever they possessed before; while Epaminondas, having persuaded his countrymen to aim at naval supremacy, had spent the summer of 363 B.C. as admiral of a powerful Theban fleet on the coast of Asia. Returning to Thebes at the close of 363 B.C., he found his friend Pelopidas slain; while the relations of Thebes, both in Peloponnesus and in Thessaly, were becoming sufficiently complicated to absorb his whole attention on land, without admitting farther aspirations towards maritime empire. He had doubtless watched, as it went on, the gradual change of politics in Arcadia (in the winter and spring of 363-362 B.C.), whereby the Mantinean and oligarchical party, profiting by the reaction of sentiment against the proceedings at Olympia, had made itself a majority in the Pan-Arcadian assembly and militia, so as to conclude peace with Elis, and to present the prospect of probable alliance with Sparta, Elis, and Achaia. This political tendency was doubtless kept before Epaminondas by the Tegean party in Arcadia, opposed to the party of Mantinea; being communicated to him with partisan exaggerations even beyond the reality. The danger, actual or presumed, of Tegea, with the arrest which had been there operated, satisfied him that a powerful Theban intervention could be no longer deferred. As Bœotarch,

he obtained the consent of his countrymen to assemble a Bœotian force, to summon the allied contingents, and to conduct this joint expedition into Peloponnesus.

The army with which he began his march was numerous and imposing. It comprised all the Bœotians and Eubœans, with a large number of Thessalians (some even sent by Alexander of Pheræ, who had now become a dependent ally of Thebes), the Lokrians, Malians, Ænianes, and probably various other allies from Northern Greece; though the Phokians declined to join, alleging that their agreement with Thebes was for alliance purely defensive.[716] Having passed the line of Mount Oneium,—which was no longer defended, as it had been at his former entrance,—he reached Nemea, where he was probably joined by the Sikyonian contingent,[717] and where he halted, in hopes of intercepting the Athenian contingent in their way to join his enemies. He probably had information which induced him to expect them;[718] but the information turned out false. The Athenians never appeared, and it was understood that they were preparing to cross by sea to the eastern coast of Laconia. After a fruitless halt, he proceeded onward to Tegea, where his Peloponnesian allies all presently joined him: the Arcadians of Tegea, Pallantium, Asea, and Megalopolis, the Messenians—(all these forming the line of frontier against Laconia)—and the Argeians.

The halt at Nemea, since Epaminondas missed its direct purpose, was injurious in another way, as it enabled the main body of his Peloponnesian enemies to concentrate at Mantinea; which junction might probably have been prevented, had he entered Arcadia without delay. A powerful Peloponnesian army was there united, consisting of the Mantineans with the major part of the other Arcadians,—the Eleians,—and the Achæans. Invitation had been sent to the Spartans; and old Agesilaus, now in his eightieth year, was in full march with the Lacedæmonian forces to Mantinea. Besides this, the Athenian contingent was immediately expected; especially valuable from its cavalry, since the Peloponnesians were not strong in that description of force,—some of them indeed having none at all.

Epaminondas established his camp and place of arms within the walls of Tegea; a precaution which Xenophon praises, as making his troops more secure and comfortable, and his motions less observable by the enemy.[719] He next marched to Mantinea, to provoke the enemy to an action before the Spartans and Athenians joined; but they kept carefully on their guard, close to Mantinea, too strongly posted to be forced.[720] On returning to his camp in Tegea, he was apprised that Agesilaus with the Spartan force, having quitted Sparta on the march to Mantinea, had already made some progress and reached Pellênê. Upon this he resolved to attempt the surprise of Sparta by a sudden night-march from Tegea, which lay in the direct road from Sparta to Mantinea, while Agesilaus in getting from Sparta to Mantinea had to pursue a more circuitous route to the westward. Moving shortly after the evening meal, Epaminondas led the Theban force with all speed towards Sparta; and he had well-nigh come upon that town, "like a nest of unprotected young birds," at a mo-

ment when no resistance could have been made. Neither Agesilaus, nor any one else, expected so daring and well-aimed a blow, the success of which would have changed the face of Greece. Nothing saved Sparta except the providential interposition of the gods,[721] signified by the accident that a Kretan runner hurried to Agesilaus, with the news that the Thebans were in full march southward from Tegea, and happened to arrest in time his farther progress towards Mantinea. Agesilaus instantly returned back with the troops around him to Sparta, which was thus put in a sufficient posture of defence before the Thebans arrived. Though sufficient for the emergency, however, his troops were not numerous; for the Spartan cavalry and mercenary forces were still absent, having been sent forward to Mantinea. Orders were sent for the main army at that city to hasten immediately to the relief of Sparta.[722]

The march of Epaminondas had been undertaken only on the probability, well-nigh realized, of finding Sparta undefended. He was in no condition to assault the city, if tolerably occupied,—still less to spend time before it; for he knew that the enemy from Mantinea would immediately follow him into Laconia, within which he did not choose to hazard a general action. He found it impracticable to take this unfortified, yet unassailable city, Sparta, even at his former invasion of 370-369 B.C.; when he had most part of Peloponnesus in active coöperation with him, and when the Lacedæmonians had no army in the field. Accordingly, though he crossed the Eurotas and actually entered into the city of Sparta[723] (which had no walls to keep him out), yet as soon as he perceived the roofs manned with soldiers and other preparations for resistance, he advanced with great caution, not adventuring into the streets and amidst the occupied houses. He only tried to get possession of various points of high ground commanding the city, from whence it might be possible to charge down upon the defenders with advantage. But even here, though inferior in number they prevented him from making any impression. And Archidamus son of Agesilaus, sallying forth unexpectedly beyond the line of defence, with a small company of one hundred hoplites, scrambled over some difficult ground in his front, and charged the Thebans even up the hill, with such gallantry, that he actually beat them back with some loss; pursuing them for a space, until he was himself repulsed and forced to retreat.[724] The bravery of the Spartan Isidas, too, son of Phœbidas the captor of the Theban Kadmeia, did signal honor to Sparta, in this day of her comparative decline. Distinguished for beauty and stature, this youth sallied forth naked and unshielded, with his body oiled as in the palæstra. Wielding in his right hand a spear and in his left a sword, he rushed among the enemy, dealing death and destruction; in spite of which he was suffered to come back unwounded: so great was the awe inspired by his singular appearance and desperate hardihood. The ephors decorated him afterwards with a wreath of honor, but at the same time fined him for exposing himself without defensive armor.[725]

Though the Spartans displayed here an honorable gallantry, yet these successes, in themselves trifling, are magnified into importance only by the partiality of

Xenophon. The capital fact was, that Agesilaus had been accidentally forewarned so as to get back to Sparta and put it in defence before the Thebans arrived. As soon as Epaminondas ascertained this, he saw that his project was no longer practicable; nor did he do more than try the city round, to see if he could detect any vulnerable point, without involving himself in a hazardous assault. Baffled in his first scheme, he applied himself, with equal readiness of resource and celerity of motion, to the execution of a second. He knew that the hostile army from Mantinea would be immediately put in march for Sparta, to ward off all danger from that city. Now the straight road from Mantinea to Sparta (a course nearly due south all the way) lying through Tegea, was open to Epaminondas, but not to the enemy, who would be forced to take another and more circuitous route, probably by Asea and Pallantion; so that he was actually nearer to Mantinea than they. He determined to return to Tegea forthwith, while they were on their march towards Sparta, and before they could be apprised of his change of purpose. Breaking up accordingly, with scarce any interval of rest, he marched back to Tegea; where it became absolutely indispensable to give repose to his hoplites, after such severe fatigue. But he sent forward his cavalry without any delay, to surprise Mantinea, which would be now (he well knew) unprepared and undefended; with its military force absent on the march to Sparta, and its remaining population, free as well as slave, largely engaged in the fields upon the carrying of harvest. Nothing less than the extraordinary ascendency of Epaminondas, —coupled with his earnestness in setting forth the importance of the purpose, as well as the probable plunder,—could have prevailed upon the tired horsemen to submit to such additional toil, while their comrades were enjoying refreshment and repose at Tegea.[726]

Everything near Mantinea was found in the state which Epaminondas anticipated. Yet the town was preserved, and his well-laid scheme defeated, by an unexpected contingency which the Mantineans doubtless ascribed to the providence of the gods, —as Xenophon regards the previous warning given to Agesilaus. The Athenian cavalry had arrived, not an hour before, and had just dismounted from their horses within the walls of Mantinea. Having departed from Eleusis (probably after ascertaining that Epaminondas no longer occupied Nemea), they took their evening meal and rested at the isthmus of Corinth, where they seem to have experienced some loss or annoyance.[727] They then passed forward through Kleonæ to Mantinea, arriving thither without having broken fast, either themselves or their horses, on that day. It was just after they reached Mantinea, and when they had yet taken no refreshment, —that the Theban and Thessalian cavalry suddenly made their appearance, having advanced even to the temple of Poseidon, within less than a mile of the gates.[728]

The Mantineans were terror-struck at this event. Their military citizens were absent on the march to Sparta, while the remainder were dispersed about the fields. In this helpless condition, they implored aid from the newly-arrived Athenian cavalry; who, though hungry and tired, immediately went forth,—and indeed were obliged to

do so, since their own safety depended upon it. The assailants were excellent cavalry, Thebans and Thessalians, and more numerous than the Athenians. Yet such was the gallantry with which the latter fought, in a close and bloody action, that on the whole they gained the advantage, forced the assailants to retire, and had the satisfaction to preserve Mantinea with all its citizens and property. Xenophon extols[729] (and doubtless with good reason) the generous energy of the Athenians, in going forth hungry and fatigued. But we must recollect that the Theban cavalry had undergone yet more severe hunger and fatigue,—that Epaminondas would never have sent them forward in such condition, had he expected any serious resistance; and that they probably dispersed to some extent, for the purpose of plundering and seizing subsistence in the fields through which they passed, so that they were found in disorder when the Athenians sallied out upon them. The Athenian cavalry-commander Kephisodôrus,[730] together with Gryllus (son of the historian Xenophon), then serving with his brother Diodorus among the Athenian horse, were both slain in the battle. A memorable picture at Athens by the contemporary painter Euphranor, commemorated both the battle and the personal gallantry of Gryllus, to whose memory the Mantineans also paid distinguished honors.

Here were two successive movements of Epaminondas, both well-conceived, yet both disappointed by accident, without any omission of his own. He had his forces concentrated at Tegea, while his enemies on their side, returning from Sparta, formed a united camp in the neighborhood of Mantinea. They comprised Lacedæmonians, Eleians, Arcadians, Achæans, and Athenians; to the number, in all, of twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse, if we could trust the assertion of Diodorus; [731] who also gives the numbers of Epaminondas as thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse. Little value can be assigned to either of these estimates; nor is it certain which of the two armies was the more numerous. But Epaminondas saw that he had now no chance left for striking a blow except through a pitched battle, nor did he at all despair of the result.[732] He had brought out his northern allies for a limited time; which time they were probably not disposed to prolong, as the season of harvest was now approaching. Moreover, his stock of provisions was barely sufficient;[733] the new crop being not yet gathered in, while the crop of the former year was probably almost exhausted. He took his resolution therefore to attack the enemy forthwith.

But I cannot adopt the view of Xenophon, that such resolution was forced upon Epaminondas, against his own will, by a desperate position, rendering it impossible for him to get away without fighting,—by the disappointment of finding so few allies on his own side, and so many assembled against him,—and by the necessity of wiping off the shame of his two recent failures (at Sparta and at Mantinea) or perishing in the attempt.[734] This is an estimate of the position of Epaminondas, not consistent with the facts narrated by Xenophon himself. It could have been no surprise to the Theban general that the time had arrived for ordering a battle. With what other

view had he come into Peloponnesus? Or for what other purpose could he have brought so numerous an army? Granting that he expected greater support in Peloponnesus than he actually found, we cannot imagine him to have hoped that his mere presence, without fighting, would suffice to put down enemies courageous as well as powerful. Xenophon exaggerates the importance of the recent defeats (as he terms them) before Sparta and Mantinea. These were checks or disappointments rather than defeats. On arriving at Tegea, Epaminondas had found it practicable (which he could not have known beforehand) to attempt a *coup de main*, first against Sparta, next against Mantinea. Here were accidental opportunities which his genius discerned and turned to account. Their success, so near to actual attainment, would have been a prodigious point gained;[735] but their accidental failure left him not worse off than he was before. It remained for him then, having the enemy before him in the field, and no farther opportunities of striking at them unawares by side-blows, to fight them openly; which he and all around him must have contemplated, from their first entrance into Peloponnesus, as the only probable way of deciding the contest.

The army of Epaminondas, far from feeling that sentiment of disappointed hope and stern necessity which Xenophon ascribes to their commander, were impatient to fight under his orders, and full of enthusiastic alacrity when he at last proclaimed his intention. He had kept them within the walls of Tegea, thus not only giving them better quarters and fuller repose, but also concealing his proceedings from the enemy; who on their side were encamped on the border of the Mantinean territory. Rejoicing in the prospect of going forth to battle, the horsemen and hoplites of Epaminondas all put themselves in their best equipment. The horsemen whitened their helmets,—the hoplites burnished up their shields, and sharpened their spears and swords. Even the rustic and half-armed Arcadian villagers, who had nothing but clubs in place of sword or spear, were eager to share the dangers of the Thebans, and inscribed upon their shields (probably nothing but miserable squares of wood) the Theban ensign. [736] The best spirit and confidence animated all the allies, as they quitted the gates of Tegea, and disposed themselves in the order of march commanded by Epaminondas.

The lofty Mantinico-Tegeatic plain, two thousand feet above the level of the sea (now known as the plain of Tripolitza)—"is the greatest of that cluster of valleys in the centre of Peloponnesus, each of which is so closely shut in by the intersecting mountains that no outlet is afforded to the waters except through the mountains themselves."[737] Its length stretches from north to south, bordered by the mountain range of Mænalus on the west, and of Artemisium and Parthenion on the east. It has a breadth of about eight miles in the broadest part, and of one mile in the narrowest. Mantinea is situated near its northern extremity, Tegea near its southern; the direct distance between the two cities, in a line not much different from north and south, being about ten English miles. The frontier line between their two domains was

formed by a peculiarly narrow part of the valley, where a low ridge projecting from the range of Mænalus on the one side, and another from Artemisium on the opposite, contract the space and make a sort of defensible pass near four miles south of Mantinea;[738] thus about six miles distant from Tegea. It was at this position, covering the whole Mantinean territory, that the army opposed to Epaminondas was concentrated; the main Lacedæmonian force as well as the rest having now returned from Sparta.[739]

Epaminondas, having marched out from Tegea by the northern gate, arrayed his army in columns proper for advancing towards the enemy; himself with the Theban columns forming the van. His array being completed, he at first began his forward march in a direction straight towards the enemy. But presently he changed his course, turning to the left towards the Mænalian range of mountains which forms the western border of the plain, and which he probably reached somewhere near the site of the present Tripolitza. From thence he pursued his march northward, skirting the flank of the mountain on the side which lies over against or fronts towards Tegea; [740] until at length he neared the enemy's position, upon their right flank. He here halted, and caused his columns to face to the right; thus forming a line, or phalanx of moderate depth, fronting towards the enemy. During the march, each lochus or company had marched in single file with the lochage or captain (usually the strongest and best soldier in it), at the head; though we do not know how many of these lochages marched abreast, or what was the breadth of the column. When the phalanx or front towards the enemy was formed, each lochage was of course in line with his company, and at its left hand; while the Thebans and Epaminondas himself were at the left of the whole line. In this position, Epaminondas gave the order to ground arms.[741]

The enemy, having watched him ever since he had left Tegea and formed his marching array, had supposed at first that he was coming straight up to the front of their position, and thus expected speedy battle. But when he turned to the left towards the mountains, so that for some time he did not approach sensibly nearer to their position, they began to fancy that he had no intention of fighting on that day. Such belief, having been once raised, still continued, even though, by advancing along the skirts of the mountain, he gradually arrived very close upon their right flank. They were farther confirmed in the same supposition, when they saw his phalanx ground arms; which they construed as an indication that he was about to encamp on the spot where he stood. It is probable that Epaminondas may have designedly simulated some other preliminaries of encampment, since his march from Tegea seems to have been arranged for the purpose partly of raising such false impression in his enemies, partly of getting upon their right flank instead of their front. He completely succeeded in his object. The soldiers on the Lacedæmonian side, believing that there would be no battle until the next day, suffered their ranks to fall into disorder, and scattered about the field. Many of the horsemen even took off their

breast-plates and unbridled their horses. And what was of hardly less consequence,—that mental preparation of the soldier, whereby he was wound up for the moment of action, and which provident commanders never omitted, if possible, to inflame by a special harangue at the moment,—was allowed to slacken and run down.[742] So strongly was the whole army persuaded of the intention of Epaminondas to encamp, that they suffered him not only without hindrance, but even without suspicion, to make all his movements and dispositions preparatory to immediate attack.

Such improvidence is surprising, when we recollect that the ablest commander and the best troops in Greece were so close upon the right of their position. It is to be in part explained, probably, by the fact that the Spartan headship was now at an end, and that there was no supreme chief to whom the whole body of Lacedæmonian allies paid deference. If either of the kings of Sparta was present,—a point not distinctly ascertainable,—he would have no command except over the Lacedæmonian troops. In the entire allied army, the Mantineans occupied the extreme right (as on a former occasion, because the battle was in their territory,[743] and because the Lacedæmonians had lost their once-recognized privilege), together with the other Arcadians. On the right-centre and centre were the Lacedæmonians, Eleians, and Achæans; on the extreme left, the Athenians.[744] There was cavalry on both the wings; Athenian on the left,—Eleian on the right; spread out with no more than the ordinary depth, and without any intermixture of light infantry along with the horsemen.[745]

In the phalanx of Epaminondas, he himself with the Thebans and Bœotians was on the left; the Argeians on the right; the Arcadians, Messenians, Eubœans, Sikyonians and other allies in the centre.[746] It was his purpose to repeat the same general plan of attack which had succeeded so perfectly at Leuktra; to head the charge himself with his Bœotians on the left against the opposing right or right-centre, and to bear down the enemy on that side with irresistible force, both of infantry and cavalry; while he kept back his right and centre, composed of less trustworthy troops, until the battle should have been thus wholly or partially decided. Accordingly, he caused the Bœotian hoplites,—occupying the left of his line in lochi or companies, with the lochage or captain at the left extremity of each,—to wheel to the right and form in column fronting the enemy, in advance of his remaining line. The Theban lochages thus became placed immediately in face of the enemy, as the heads of a column of extraordinary depth; all the hoplites of each lochus, and perhaps of more than one lochus, being ranged in file behind them.[747] What the actual depth was, or what was the exact number of the lochus, we do not know. At Leuktra, Epaminondas had attacked with fifty shields of depth; at Mantinea, the depth of his column was probably not less. Himself, with the chosen Theban warriors, were at the head of it, and he relied upon breaking through the enemy's phalanx at whatever point he charged; since their files would hardly be more than eight deep, and very inadequate to resist so overwhelming a shock. His column would cut through the phalanx of the

enemy, like the prow of a trireme impelled in sea-fight against the midships of her antagonist.

It was apparently only the Bœotian hoplites who were thus formed in column, projecting forward in advance; while the remaining allies were still left in their ordinary phalanx or lines.[748] Epaminondas calculated, that when he should have once broken through the enemy's phalanx at a single point, the rest would either take flight, or become so dispirited, that his allies coming up in phalanx could easily deal with them.

Against the cavalry on the enemy's right, which was marshaled only with the ordinary depth of a phalanx of hoplites (four, six, or perhaps eight deep),[749] and without any light infantry intermingled with the ranks—the Theban general opposed on his left his own excellent cavalry, Theban and Thessalian, but in strong and deep column, so as to ensure to them also a superior weight of attack. He farther mingled in their ranks some active footmen, darters and slingers, of whom he had many from Thessaly and the Maliac Gulf.[750]

There remained one other precaution to take. His deep Theban and Bœotian column, in advancing to the charge, would be exposed on its right or unshielded side to the attack of the Athenians, especially the Athenian cavalry, from the enemy's left. To guard against any such movement, he posted, upon some rising ground near his right, a special body of reserve, both horse and foot, in order to take the Athenians in the rear if they should attempt it.

All these fresh dispositions for attack, made on the spot, must have occupied time, and caused much apparent movement. To constitute both the column of infantry, and the column of cavalry, for attack on his left—and to post the body of reserve on the rising ground at his right against the Athenians—were operations which the enemy from their neighboring position could not help seeing. Yet they either did not heed, or did not understand, what was going on.[751] Nor was it until Epaminondas, perceiving all to be completed, actually gave the word of command to "take up arms," that they had any suspicion of the impending danger. As soon as they saw him in full march moving rapidly towards them, surprise and tumultuous movement pervaded their body. The scattered hoplites ran to their places; the officers exerted every effort to establish regular array; the horsemen hastened to bridle their horses and resume their breast-plates.[752] And though the space dividing the two armies was large enough to allow such mischief to be partially corrected,—yet soldiers thus taken unawares, hurried, and troubled, were not in condition to stand the terrific shock of chosen Theban hoplites in deep column.

The grand force of attack, both of cavalry and infantry, which Epaminondas organized on his left, was triumphant in both its portions. His cavalry, powerfully aided by the intermingled darters and light troops from Thessaly, broke and routed the enemy's cavalry opposed to them, and then restraining themselves from pursuit, turned

to fall upon the phalanx of infantry. Epaminondas, on his part, with his Theban column, came into close conflict with the Mantinean and Lacedæmonian line of infantry, whom, after a desperate struggle of shield, spear, and sword, he bore down by superior force and weight. He broke through the enemy's line of infantry at this point, compelling the Lacedæmonians opposed to him, after a brave and murderous resistance, to turn their backs and take to flight. The remaining troops of the enemy's line, seeing the best portion of their army defeated and in flight, turned and fled also. The centre and right of Epaminondas, being on a less advanced front, hardly came into conflict with the enemy until the impression of his charge had been felt, and therefore found the troops opposed to them already wavering and disheartened. The Achæan, Eleian, and other infantry on that side, gave way after a short resistance; chiefly as it would appear, from contagion and alarm, when they saw the Lacedæmonians broken. The Athenians however, especially the cavalry, on the left wing of their own army, seem to have been engaged in serious encounter with the cavalry opposite to them. Diodorus affirms them to have been beaten, after a gallant fight,[753] until the Eleian cavalry from the right came to their aid. Here, as on many other points, it is difficult to reconcile his narrative with Xenophon, who plainly intimates that the stress of the action fell on the Theban left and Lacedæmonian right and centre,—and from whose narrative we should rather have gathered, that the Eleian cavalry, beaten on their own right, may have been aided by the Athenian cavalry from the left; reversing the statement of Diodorus.

In regard to this important battle, however, we cannot grasp with confidence anything beyond the capital determining feature and the ultimate result.[754] The calculations of Epaminondas were completely realized. The irresistible charge, both of infantry and cavalry, made by himself with his left wing, not only defeated the troops immediately opposed, but caused the enemy's whole army to take flight. It was under these victorious circumstances, and while he was pressing on the retiring enemy at the head of his Theban column of infantry, that he received a mortal wound with a spear in the breast. He was by habit and temper, always foremost in braving danger, and on this day probably exposed himself preëminently, as a means of encouraging those around him, and ensuring the success of his own charge, on which so much depended; moreover, a Grecian general fought on foot in the ranks, and carried the same arms (spear, shield, etc.) as a private soldier. Diodorus tells us that the Lacedæmonian infantry were making a prolonged resistance, when Epaminondas put himself at the head of the Thebans for a fresh and desperate effort; that he stepped forward, darted his javelin, and slew the Lacedæmonian commander; that having killed several warriors, and intimidated others, he forced them to give way; that the Lacedæmonians, seeing him in advance of his comrades, turned upon him and overwhelmed him with darts, some of which he avoided, others he turned off with his shield, while others, after they had actually entered his body and wounded him, he plucked out and employed them in repelling the enemy. At length he received a mortal wound in his breast with a spear.[755] I cannot altogether admit to notice these

details; which once passed as a portion of Grecian history, though they seem rather the offspring of an imagination fresh from the perusal of the Iliad than a recital of an actual combat of Thebans and Lacedæmonians, both eminent for close-rank fighting, with long spear and heavy shield. The mortal wound of Epaminondas, with a spear in the breast, is the only part of the case which we really know. The handle of the spear broke, and the point was left sticking in his breast. He immediately fell, and as the enemy were at that moment in retreat, fell into the arms of his own comrades. There was no dispute for the possession of his body, as there had been for Kleombrotus at Leuktra.

The news of his mortal wound spread like wild-fire through his army; and the effect produced is among the most extraordinary phenomena in all Grecian military history. I give it in the words of the contemporary historian. "It was thus (says Xenophon) that Epaminondas arranged his order of attack; and he was not disappointed in his expectation. For having been victorious, on the point where he himself charged, he caused the whole army of the enemy to take flight. But so soon as he fell, those who remained had no longer any power even of rightly using the victory. Though the phalanx of the enemy's infantry was in full flight, the Theban hoplites neither killed a single man more, nor advanced a step beyond the actual ground of conflict. Though the enemy's cavalry was also in full flight, yet neither did the Theban horsemen continue their pursuit, nor kill any more either of horsemen or of hoplites, but fell back through the receding enemies with the timidity of beaten men. The light troops and peltasts, who had been mingled with the Theban cavalry and had aided in their victory, spread themselves over towards the enemy's left with the security of conquerors; but there (being unsupported by their own horsemen) they were mostly cut to pieces by the Athenians."[756]

Astonishing as this recital is, we cannot doubt that it is literally true, since it contradicts the sympathies of the reciting witness. Nothing but the pressure of undeniable evidence could have constrained Xenophon to record a scene so painful to him as the Lacedæmonian army beaten, in full flight, and rescued from destruction only by the untimely wound of the Theban general. That Epaminondas would leave no successor either equal or second to himself, now that Pelopidas was no more,—that the army which he commanded should be incapable of executing new movements or of completing an unfinished campaign,—we can readily conceive. But that on the actual battle-field, when the moment of dangerous and doubtful struggle has been already gone through, and when the soldier's blood is up, to reap his reward in pursuit of an enemy whom he sees fleeing before him—that at this crisis of exuberant impatience, when Epaminondas, had he been unwounded, would have found it difficult to restrain his soldiers from excessive forwardness, they should have become at once paralyzed and disarmed on hearing of his fall,—this is what we could not have believed, had we not found it attested by a witness at once contemporary and hostile. So striking a proof has hardly ever been rendered, on the part of soldiers towards

their general, of devoted and absorbing sentiment. All the hopes of this army, composed of such diverse elements, were centred in Epaminondas; all their confidence of success, all their security against defeat, were derived from the idea of acting under his orders; all their power, even of striking down a defeated enemy, appeared to vanish when those orders were withdrawn. We are not indeed to speak of such a proceeding with commendation. Thebes and her allied cities had great reason to complain of their soldiers, for a grave dereliction of military duty, and a capital disappointment of well-earned triumph,—whatever may be our feelings about the motive. Assuredly the man who would be most chagrined of all, and whose dying moments must have been embittered if he lived to hear it,—was Epaminondas himself. But when we look at the fact simply as a mark and measure of the ascendency established by him over the minds of his soldiers, it will be found hardly paralleled in history. I have recounted, a few pages ago, the intense grief displayed by the Thebans and their allies in Thessaly over the dead body of Pelopidas[757] on the hill of Kynoskephalæ. But all direct and deliberate testimonies of attachment to a dead or dying chief (and doubtless these too were abundant on the field of Mantinea) fall short of the involuntary suspension of arms in the tempting hour of victory.

That the real victory, the honors of the day, belonged to Epaminondas and the Thebans, we know from the conclusive evidence of Xenophon. But as the vanquished, being allowed to retire unpursued, were only separated by a short distance from the walls of Mantinea, and perhaps rallied even before reaching the town,—as the Athenian cavalry had cut to pieces some of the straggling light troops,—they too pretended to have gained a victory. Trophies were erected on both sides. Nevertheless the Thebans were masters of the field of battle; so that the Lacedæmonians, after some hesitation, were forced to send a herald to solicit truce for the burial of the slain, and to grant for burial such Theban bodies as they had in their possession.[758] This was the understood confession of defeat.

The surgeons, on examining the wound of Epaminondas, with the spear-head yet sticking in it, pronounced that he must die as soon as that was withdrawn. He first inquired whether his shield was safe; and his shield-bearer, answering in the affirmative, produced it before his eyes. He next asked about the issue of the battle, and was informed that his own army was victorious.[759] He then desired to see Iolaidas and Daiphantus, whom he intended to succeed him as commanders; but received the mournful reply, that both of them had been slain.[760] "Then (said he) you must make peace with the enemy." He ordered the spear-head to be withdrawn, when the efflux of blood speedily terminated his life.

Of the three questions here ascribed to the dying chief, the third is the gravest and most significant. The death of these two other citizens, the only men in the camp whom Epaminondas could trust, shows how aggravated and irreparable was the Theban loss, not indeed as to number, but as to quality. Not merely Epaminondas himself, but the only two men qualified in some measure to replace him, perished in

the same field; and Pelopidas had fallen in the preceding year. Such accumulation of individual losses must be borne in mind when we come to note the total suspension of Theban glory and dignity, after this dearly-bought victory. It affords emphatic evidence of the extreme forwardness with which their leaders exposed themselves, as well as of the gallant resistance which they experienced.

The death of Epaminondas spread rejoicing in the Lacedæmonian camp proportioned to the sorrow of the Theban. To more than one warrior was assigned the honor of having struck the blow. The Mantineans gave it to their citizen Machærion; the Athenians, to Gryllus son of Xenophon; the Spartans, to their countryman Antikrates.[761] At Sparta, distinguished honor was shown, even in the days of Plutarch, to the posterity of Antikrates, who was believed to have rescued the city from her most formidable enemy. Such tokens afford precious testimony, from witnesses beyond all suspicion, to the memory of Epaminondas.

How the news of his death was received at Thebes, we have no positive account. But there can be no doubt that the sorrow, so paralysing to the victorious soldiers on the field of Mantinea, was felt with equal acuteness, and with an effect not less depressing, in the senate-house and market-place of Thebes. The city, the citizen-soldiers, and the allies, would be alike impressed with the mournful conviction, that the dying injunction of Epaminondas must be executed. Accordingly, negotiations were opened, and peace was concluded,—probably at once, before the army left Peloponnesus. The Thebans and their Arcadian allies exacted nothing more than the recognition of the *statu quo;* to leave everything exactly as it was, without any change or reactionary measure, yet admitting Megalopolis, with the Pan-Arcadian constitution attached to it,—and admitting also Messênê as an independent city. Against this last article Sparta loudly and peremptorily protested. But not one of her allies sympathized with her feelings. Some, indeed, were decidedly against her; to such a degree, that we find the maintenance of independent Messênê against Sparta ranking shortly afterwards as an admitted principle in Athenian foreign politics.[762] Neither Athenians, nor Eleians, nor Arcadians, desired to see Sparta strengthened. None had any interest in prolonging the war, with prospects doubtful to every one; while all wished to see the large armies now in Arcadia dismissed. Accordingly, the peace was sworn to on these conditions, and the autonomy of Messênê guaranteed, by all, except the Spartans; who alone stood out, keeping themselves without friends or auxiliaries, in the hope for better times,—rather than submit to what they considered as an intolerable degradation.[763]

Under these conditions, the armies on both sides retired. Xenophon is right in saying, that neither party gained anything, either city, territory, or dominion; though before the battle, considering the magnitude of the two contending armies, every one had expected that the victors, whichever they were, would become masters, and the vanquished, subjects. But his assertion,—that "there was more disturbance, and more matter of dispute, in Greece, after the battle than before it,"—must be inter-

preted, partly as the inspiration of a philo-Laconian sentiment, which regards a peace not accepted by Sparta as no peace at all,—partly as based on the circumstance, that no definite headship was recognized as possessed by any state. Sparta had once enjoyed it, and had set the disgraceful example of suing out a confirmation of it from the Persian king at the peace of Antalkidas. Both Thebes and Athens had aspired to the same dignity, and both by the like means, since the battle of Leuktra; neither of them had succeeded. Greece was thus left without a head, and to this extent the affirmation of Xenophon is true. But it would not be correct to suppose that the last expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus was unproductive of any results,—though it was disappointed of its great and brilliant fruits by his untimely death. Before he marched in, the Theban party in Arcadia, (Tegea, Megalopolis, etc.), was on the point of being crushed by the Mantineans and their allies. His expedition, though ending in an indecisive victory, nevertheless broke up the confederacy enlisted in support of Mantinea; enabling Tegea and Megalopolis to maintain themselves against their Arcadian opponents, and thus leaving the frontier against Sparta unimpaired. While therefore we admit the affirmation of Xenophon,—that Thebes did not gain by the battle either city, or territory, or dominion,—we must at the same time add, that she gained the preservation of her Arcadian allies, and of her anti-Spartan frontier, including Messênê.

This was a gain of considerable importance. But dearly, indeed, was it purchased, by the blood of her first hero, shed on the field of Mantinea; not to mention his two seconds, whom we know only from his verdict,—Daiphantus and Iolaidas.[764] He was buried on the field of battle, and a monumental column was erected on his tomb.

Scarcely any character in Grecian history has been judged with so much unanimity as Epaminondas. He has obtained a meed of admiration,—from all, sincere and hearty,—from some, enthusiastic. Cicero pronounces him to be the first man of Greece.[765] The judgment of Polybius, though not summed up so emphatically in a single epithet, is delivered in a manner hardly less significant and laudatory. Nor was it merely historians or critics who formed this judgment. The best men of action, combining the soldier and the patriot, such as Timoleon and Philopœmen,[766] set before them Epaminondas as their model to copy. The remark has been often made, and suggests itself whenever we speak of Epaminondas, though its full force will be felt only when we come to follow the subsequent history,—that with him the dignity and commanding influence of Thebes both began and ended. His period of active political life comprehends sixteen years, from the resurrection of Thebes into a free community, by the expulsion of the Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison, and the subversion of the ruling oligarchy,—to the fatal day of Mantinea (379-362 B.C.). His prominent and unparalleled ascendency belongs to the last eight years, from the victory of Leuktra (371 B.C.). Throughout this whole period, both all that we know and all that we can reasonably divine, fully bears out the judgment of Polybius and Ci-

cero, who had the means of knowing much more. And this too,—let it be observed,—though Epaminondas is tried by a severe canon: for the chief contemporary witness remaining is one decidedly hostile. Even the philo-Laconian Xenophon finds neither misdeeds nor omissions to reveal in the capital enemy of Sparta,—mentions him only to record what is honorable,—and manifests the perverting bias mainly by suppressing or slurring over his triumphs. The man whose eloquence bearded Agesilaus at the congress immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra,[767]—who in that battle stripped Sparta of her glory, and transferred the wreath to Thebes,—who a few months afterwards, not only ravaged all the virgin territory of Laconia, but cut off the best half of it for the restitution of independent Messênê, and erected the hostile Arcadian community of Megalopolis on its frontier,—the author of these fatal disasters inspires to Xenophon such intolerable chagrin and antipathy, that in the two first he keeps back the name, and in the third, suppresses the thing done. But in the last campaign, preceding the battle of Mantinea (whereby Sparta incurred no positive loss, and where the death of Epaminondas softened every predisposition against him), there was no such violent pressure upon the fidelity of the historian. Accordingly, the concluding chapter of Xenophon's 'Hellenica' contains a panegyric,[768] ample and unqualified, upon the military merits of the Theban general; upon his daring enterprise, his comprehensive foresight, his care to avoid unnecessary exposure of soldiers, his excellent discipline, his well-combined tactics, his fertility of aggressive resource in striking at the weak points of the enemy, who content themselves with following and parrying his blows (to use a simile of Demosthenes[769]) like an unskilful pugilist, and only succeed in doing so by signal aid from accident. The effort of strategic genius, then for the first time devised and applied, of bringing an irresistible force of attack to bear on one point of the hostile line, while the rest of his army was kept comparatively back until the action had been thus decided,—is clearly noted by Xenophon, together with its triumphant effect, at the battle of Mantinea; though the very same combination on the field of Leuktra is slurred over in his description, as if it were so commonplace as not to require any mention of the chief with whom it originated. Compare Epaminondas with Agesilaus,—how great is the superiority of the first,—even in the narrative of Xenophon, the earnest panegyrist of the other! How manifestly are we made to see that nothing except the fatal spear-wound at Mantinea, prevented him from reaping the fruit of a series of admirable arrangements, and from becoming arbiter of Peloponnesus, including Sparta herself!

The military merits alone of Epaminondas, had they merely belonged to a general of mercenaries, combined with nothing praiseworthy in other ways,—would have stamped him as a man of high and original genius, above every other Greek, antecedent or contemporary. But it is the peculiar excellence of this great man that we are not compelled to borrow from one side of his character in order to compensate deficiencies in another.[770] His splendid military capacity was never prostituted to personal ends: neither to avarice, nor ambition, nor overweening vanity. Poor at the beginning of his life, he left at the end of it not enough to pay his funeral expenses;

having despised the many opportunities for enrichment which his position afforded, as well as the richest offers from foreigners.[771] Of ambition he had so little, by natural temperament, that his friends accused him of torpor. But as soon as the perilous exposure of Thebes required it, he displayed as much energy in her defence as the most ambitious of her citizens, without any of that captious exigence, frequent in ambitious men, as to the amount of glorification or deference due to him from his countrymen. And his personal vanity was so faintly kindled, even after the prodigious success at Leuktra, that we find him serving in Thessaly as a private hoplite in the ranks, and in the city as an ædile or inferior street-magistrate, under the title of Telearchus. An illustrious specimen of that capacity and goodwill, both to command and to be commanded, which Aristotle pronounces to form in their combination the characteristic feature of the worthy citizen.[772] He once incurred the displeasure of his fellow-citizens, for his wise and moderate policy in Achaia, which they were ill-judged enough to reverse. We cannot doubt also that he was frequently attacked by political censors and enemies,—the condition of eminence in every free state; but neither of these causes ruffled the dignified calmness of his political course. As he never courted popularity by unworthy arts, so he bore unpopularity without murmurs, and without angry renunciation of patriotic duty.[773]

The mildness of his antipathies against political opponents at home was undeviating; and, what is even more remarkable, amidst the precedence and practice of the Grecian world, his hostility against foreign enemies, Bœotian dissentients, and Theban exiles, was uniformly free from reactionary vengeance. Sufficient proofs have been adduced in the preceding pages of this rare union of attributes in the same individual; of lofty disinterestedness, not merely as to corrupt gains, but as to the more seductive irritabilities of ambition, combined with a just measure of attachment towards partisans, and unparalleled gentleness towards enemies. His friendship with Pelopidas was never disturbed during the fifteen years of their joint political career; an absence of jealousy signal and creditable to both, though most creditable to Pelopidas, the richer, as well as the inferior, man of the two. To both, and to the harmonious coöperation of both, Thebes owed her short-lived splendor and ascendency. Yet when we compare the one with the other, we not only miss in Pelopidas the transcendent strategic genius and conspicuous eloquence, but even the constant vigilance and prudence, which never deserted his friend. If Pelopidas had had Epaminondas as his companion in Thessaly, he would hardly have trusted himself to the good faith, nor tasted the dungeon, of the Pheræan Alexander; nor would he have rushed forward to certain destruction, in a transport of phrensy, at the view of that hated tyrant in the subsequent battle.

In eloquence, Epaminondas would doubtless have found superiors at Athens; but at Thebes, he had neither equal, nor predecessor, nor successor. Under the new phase into which Thebes passed by the expulsion of the Lacedæmonians out of the Kadmeia, such a gift was second in importance only to the great strategic qualities;

while the combination of both elevated their possessor into the envoy, the counsellor, the debater, of his country,[774] as well as her minister at war and commander-in-chief. The shame of acknowledging Thebes as leading state in Greece, embodied in the current phrases about Bœotian stupidity, would be sensibly mitigated, when her representative in an assembled congress spoke with the flowing abundance of the Homeric Odysseus, instead of the loud, brief, and hurried bluster of Menelaus.[775] The possession of such eloquence, amidst the uninspiring atmosphere of Thebes, implied far greater mental force than a similar accomplishment would have betokened at Athens. In Epaminondas, it was steadily associated with thought and action,—that triple combination of thinking, speaking, and acting, which Isokrates and other Athenian sophists[776] set before their hearers as the stock and qualification for meritorious civic life. To the bodily training and soldier-like practice, common to all Thebans, Epaminondas added an ardent intellectual impulse and a range of discussion with the philosophical men around, peculiar to himself. He was not floated into public life by the accident of birth or wealth,—nor hoisted and propped up by oligarchical clubs,—nor even determined to it originally by any spontaneous ambition of his own. But the great revolution of 379 B.C., which expelled from Thebes both the Lacedæmonian garrison and the local oligarchy who ruled by its aid, forced him forward by the strongest obligations both of duty and interest; since nothing but an energetic defence could rescue both him and every other free Theban from slavery. It was by the like necessity that the American revolution, and the first French revolution, thrust into the front rank the most instructed and capable men of the country, whether ambitious by temperament or not. As the pressure of the time impelled Epaminondas forward, so it also disposed his countrymen to look out for a competent leader wherever he was to be found; and in no other living man could they obtain the same union of the soldier, the general, the orator, and the patriot. Looking through all Grecian history, it is only in Perikles that we find the like many-sided excellence; for though much inferior to Epaminondas as a general, Perikles must be held superior to him as a statesman. But it is alike true of both,—and the remark tends much to illustrate the sources of Grecian excellence,—that neither sprang exclusively from the school of practice and experience. They both brought to that school minds exercised in the conversation of the most instructed philosophers and sophists accessible to them,—trained to varied intellectual combinations and to a larger range of subjects than those that came before the public assembly,—familiarized with reasonings which the scrupulous piety of Nikias forswore, and which the devoted military patriotism of Pelopidas disdained.

On one point, as I have already noticed, the policy recommended by Epaminondas to his countrymen appears of questionable wisdom,—his advice to compete with Athens for transmarine and naval power. One cannot recognize in this advice the same accurate estimate of permanent causes,—the same long-sighted view, of the conditions of strength to Thebes and of weakness to her enemies, which dictated the foundation of Messênê and Megalopolis. These two towns, when once founded, took

such firm root, that Sparta could not persuade even her own allies to aid in effacing them; a clear proof of the sound reasoning on which their founder had proceeded. What Epaminondas would have done,—whether he would have followed out maxims equally prudent and penetrating,—if he had survived the victory of Mantinea,—is a point which we cannot pretend to divine. He would have found himself then on a pinnacle of glory, and invested with a plenitude of power, such as no Greek ever held without abusing. But all that we know of Epaminondas justifies the conjecture that he would have been found equal, more than any other Greek, even to this great trial; and that his untimely death shut him out from a future not less honorable to himself, than beneficial to Thebes and to Greece generally.

Of the private life and habits of Epaminondas we know scarcely anything. We are told that he never married; and we find brief allusions, without any details, to attachments in which he is said to have indulged.[777] Among the countrymen of Pindar, [778] devoted attachment between mature men and beautiful youths was more frequent than in other parts of Greece. It was confirmed by interchange of mutual oaths at the tomb of Iolaus, and was reckoned upon as the firmest tie of military fidelity in the hour of battle. Asopichus and Kaphisodorus are named as youths to whom Epaminondas was much devoted. The first fought with desperate bravery at the battle of Leuktra, and after the victory caused an image of the Leuktrian trophy to be carved on his shield, which he dedicated at Delphi;[779] the second perished along with his illustrious friend and chief on the field of Mantinea, and was buried in a grave closely adjacent to him.[780]

It rather appears that the Spartans, deeply incensed against their allies for having abandoned them in reference to Messênê, began to turn their attention away from the affairs of Greece to those of Asia and Egypt. But the dissensions in Arcadia were not wholly appeased even by the recent peace. The city of Megalopolis had been founded only eight years before by the coalescence of many smaller townships, all previously enjoying a separate autonomy more or less perfect. The vehement anti-Spartan impulse, which marked the two years immediately succeeding the battle of Leuktra, had overruled to so great a degree the prior instincts of these townships, that they had lent themselves to the plans of Lykomedes and Epaminondas for an enlarged community in the new city. But since that period, reaction had taken place. The Mantineans had come to be at the head of an anti-Megalopolitan party in Arcadia; and several of the communities which had been merged in Megalopolis, counting upon aid from them and from the Eleians, insisted on seceding, and returning to their original autonomy. But for foreign aid, Megalopolis would now have been in great difficulty. A pressing request was sent to the Thebans, who despatched into Arcadia three thousand hoplites under Pammenes. This force enabled the Megalopolitans, though not without measures of considerable rigor, to uphold the integrity of their city, and keep the refractory members in communion.[781] And it appears that

the interference thus obtained was permanently efficacious, so that the integrity of this recent Pan-Arcadian community was no farther disturbed.

The old king Agesilaus was compelled, at the age of eighty, to see the dominion of Sparta thus irrevocably narrowed, her influence in Arcadia overthrown, and the loss of Messênê formally sanctioned even by her own allies. All his protests, and those of his son Archidamus, so strenuously set forth by Isokrates, had only ended by isolating Sparta more than ever from Grecian support and sympathy. Archidamus probably never seriously attempted to execute the desperate scheme which he had held out as a threat some two or three years before the battle of Mantinea; that the Lacedæmonians would send away their wives and families, and convert their military population into a perpetual camp, never to lay down arms until they should have reconquered Messênê or perished in the attempt.[782] Yet he and his father, though deserted by all Grecian allies, had not yet abandoned the hope that they might obtain aid, in the shape of money for levying mercenary troops, from the native princes in Egypt and the revolted Persian satraps in Asia, with whom they seem to have been for some time in a sort of correspondence.[783]

About the time of the battle of Mantinea,—and as it would seem, for some years before,—a large portion of the western dominions of the Great King were in a state partly of revolt, partly of dubious obedience. Egypt had been for some years in actual revolt, and under native princes, whom the Persians had vainly endeavored to subdue (employing for that purpose the aid of the Athenian generals Iphikrates and Timotheus) both in 374 and 371 B.C. Ariobarzanes, satrap of the region near the Propontis and the Hellespont, appears to have revolted about the year 367-366 B.C. In other parts of Asia Minor, too,—Paphlagonia, Pisidia, etc.,—the subordinate princes or governors became disaffected to Artaxerxes. But their disaffection was for a certain time kept down by the extraordinary ability and vigor of a Karian named Datames, commander for the king in a part of Kappadokia, who gained several important victories over them by rapidity of movement and well-combined stratagem. At length the services of Datames became so distinguished as to excite the jealousy of many of the Persian grandees; who poisoned the royal mind against him, and thus drove him to raise the standard of revolt in his own district of Kappadokia, under alliance and concert with Ariobarzanes. It was in vain that Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, was sent by Artaxerxes with a powerful force to subdue Datames. The latter resisted all the open force of Persia, and was at length overcome only by the treacherous conspiracy of Mithridates (son of Ariobarzanes), who, corrupted by the Persian court and becoming a traitor both to his father Ariobarzanes and to Datames, simulated zealous coöperation, tempted the latter to a confidential interview, and there assassinated him.[784]

Still, however, there remained powerful princes and satraps in Asia Minor, disaffected to the court; Mausôlus, prince of Karia; Orontes, satrap of Mysia, and Autophradates, satrap of Lydia,—the last having now apparently joined the revolters,

though he had before been active in upholding the authority of the king. It seems too that the revolt extended to Syria and Phœnicia, so that all the western coast with its large revenues, as well as Egypt, was at once subtracted from the empire. Tachos, native king of Egypt, was prepared to lend assistance to this formidable combination of disaffected commanders, who selected Orontes as their chief; confiding to him their united forces, and sending Rheomithres to Egypt to procure pecuniary aid. But the Persian court broke the force of this combination by corrupting both Orontes and Rheomithres, who betrayed their confederates, and caused the enterprise to fail. Of the particulars we know little or nothing.[785]

Both the Spartan king Agesilaus, with a thousand Lacedæmonian or Peloponnesian hoplites,—and the Athenian general Chabrias, were invited to Egypt to command the forces of Tachos; the former on land, the latter at sea. Chabrias came simply as a volunteer, without any public sanction or order from Athens. But the service of Agesilaus was undertaken for the purposes and with the consent of the authorities at home, attested by the presence of thirty Spartans who came out as his counsellors. The Spartans were displeased with the Persian king for having sanctioned the independence of Messênê; and as the prospect of overthrowing or enfeebling his empire appeared at this moment considerable, they calculated on reaping a large reward for their services to the Egyptian prince, who would in return lend them assistance towards their views in Greece. But dissension and bad judgment marred all the combinations against the Persian king. Agesilaus, on reaching Egypt,[786] was received with little respect. The Egyptians saw with astonishment, that one, whom they had invited as a formidable warrior, was a little deformed old man, of mean attire, and sitting on the grass with his troops, careless of show or luxury. They not only vented their disappointment in sarcastic remarks, but also declined to invest him with the supreme command, as he had anticipated. He was only recognized as general of the mercenary land force, while Tachos himself commanded in chief, and Chabrias was at the head of the fleet. Great efforts were made to assemble a force competent to act against the Great King; and Chabrias is said to have suggested various stratagems for obtaining money from the Egyptians.[787] The army having been thus strengthened, Agesilaus, though discontented and indignant, nevertheless accompanied Tachos on an expedition against the Persian forces in Phœnicia; from whence they were forced to return by the revolt of Nektanebis, cousin of Tachos, who caused himself to be proclaimed king of Egypt. Tachos was now full of supplications to Agesilaus to sustain him against his competitor for the Egyptian throne; while Nektanebis, also on his side, began to bid high for the favor of the Spartans. With the sanction of the authorities at home, but in spite of the opposition of Chabrias, Agesilaus decided in favor of Nektanebis, withdrawing the mercenaries from the camp of Tachos,[788] who was accordingly obliged to take flight. Chabrias returned home to Athens; either not choosing to abandon Tachos, whom he had come to serve,—or recalled by special order of his countrymen, in consequence of the remonstrance of the Persian king. A competitor for the throne presently arose in

the Mendesian division of Egypt. Agesilaus, vigorously maintaining the cause of Nektanebis, defeated all the efforts of his opponent. Yet his great schemes against the Persian empire were abandoned, and nothing was effected as the result of his Egyptian expedition except the establishment of Nektanebis; who, having in vain tried to prevail upon him to stay longer, dismissed him in the winter season with large presents, and with a public donation to Sparta of two hundred and thirty talents. Agesilaus marched from the Nile towards Kyrênê, in order to obtain from that town and its ports ships for the passage home. But he died on the march, without reaching Kyrênê. His body was conveyed home by his troops, for burial, in a preparation of wax, since honey was not to be obtained.[789]

Thus expired, at an age somewhat above eighty, the ablest and most energetic of the Spartan kings. He has enjoyed the advantage, denied to every other eminent Grecian leader, that his character and exploits have been set out in the most favorable point of view by a friend and companion,—Xenophon. Making every allowance for partiality in this picture, there will still remain a really great and distinguished character. We find the virtues of a soldier, and the abilities of a commander, combined with strenuous personal will and decision, in such measure as to ensure for Agesilaus constant ascendency over the minds of others far beyond what was naturally incident to his station; and that, too, in spite of conspicuous bodily deformity, amidst a nation eminently sensitive on that point. Of the merits which Xenophon ascribes to him, some are the fair results of a Spartan education;—his courage, simplicity of life, and indifference to indulgences,—his cheerful endurance of hardship under every form. But his fidelity to engagements, his uniform superiority to pecuniary corruption, and those winning and hearty manners which attached to him all around—were virtues not Spartan but personal to himself. We find in him, however, more analogy to Lysander—a man equally above reproach on the score of pecuniary gain—than to Brasidas or Kallikratidas. Agesilaus succeeded to the throne, with a disputed title, under the auspices and through the intrigues of Lysander; whose influence, at that time predominant both at Sparta and in Greece, had planted everywhere dekarchies and harmosts as instruments of ascendency for imperial Sparta—and under the name of Sparta, for himself. Agesilaus, too high-spirited to comport himself as second to any one, speedily broke through so much of the system as had been constructed to promote the personal dominion of Lysander; yet without following out the same selfish aspirations, or seeking to build up the like individual dictatorship, on his own account. His ambition was indeed unbounded, but it was for Sparta in the first place, and for himself only in the second. The misfortune was, that in his measures for upholding and administering the imperial authority of Sparta, he still continued that mixture of domestic and foreign coërcion (represented by the dekarchy and the harmost) which had been introduced by Lysander; a sad contrast with the dignified equality, and emphatic repudiation of partisan interference, proclaimed by Brasidas, as the watchword of Sparta, at Akanthus and Torônê—and with the still nobler Pan-hellenic aims of Kallikratidas.

The most glorious portion of the life of Agesilaus was that spent in his three Asiatic campaigns, when acting under the miso-Persian impulse for which his panegyrist gives him so much credit.[790]

He was here employed in a Pan-hellenic purpose, to protect the Asiatic Greeks against that subjection to Persia which Sparta herself had imposed upon them a few years before, as the price of Persian aid against Athens.

The Persians presently succeeded in applying the lessons of Sparta against herself, and in finding Grecian allies to make war upon her near home. Here was an end of the Pan-hellenic sentiment, and of the truly honorable ambition, in the bosom of Agesilaus. He was recalled to make war nearer home. His obedience to the order of recall is greatly praised by Plutarch and Xenophon—in my judgment, with little reason, since he had no choice but to come back. But he came back an altered man. His miso-Persian feeling had disappeared, and had been exchanged for a miso-Theban sentiment which gradually acquired the force of a passion. As principal conductor of the war between 394-387 B.C., he displayed that vigor and ability which never forsook him in military operations. But when he found that the empire of Sparta near home could not be enforced except by making her the ally of Persia and the executor of a Persian rescript, he was content to purchase such aid, in itself dishonorable, by the still greater dishonor of sacrificing the Asiatic Greeks. For the time, his policy seemed to succeed. From 387-379 B.C. (that is, down to the time of the revolution at Thebes, effected by Pelopidas and his small band), the ascendency of Sparta on land, in Central Greece, was continually rising. But her injustice and oppression stand confessed even by her panegyrist Xenophon; and this is just the period when the influence of Agesilaus was at its maximum. Afterwards we find him personally forward in sheltering Sphodrias from punishment, and thus bringing upon his countrymen a war with Athens as well as with Thebes. In the conduct of that war his military operations were, as usual, strenuous and able, with a certain measure of success. But on the whole, the war turns out unfavorably for Sparta. In 371 B.C., she is obliged to accept peace on terms very humiliating, as compared with her position in 387 B.C.; and the only compensation which she receives, is, the opportunity of striking the Thebans out of the treaty, thus leaving them to contend single-handed against what seemed overwhelming odds. Of this intense miso-Theban impulse, which so speedily brought about the unexpected and crushing disaster at Leuktra, Agesilaus stands out as the prominent spokesman. In the days of Spartan misfortune which followed, we find his conduct creditable and energetic, so far as the defensive position, in which Sparta then found herself, allowed; and though Plutarch seems displeased with him[791] for obstinacy in refusing to acknowledge the autonomy of Messênê (at the peace concluded after the battle of Mantinea), when acknowledged by all the other Greeks,—yet it cannot be shown that this refusal brought any actual mischief to Sparta; and circumstances might well have so turned out, that it would have been a gain.

On the whole, in spite of the many military and personal merits of Agesilaus, as an adviser and politician he deserves little esteem. We are compelled to remark the melancholy contrast between the state in which he found Sparta at his accession, and that wherein he left her at his death—"Marmoream invenit, lateritiam reliquit." Nothing but the death of Epaminondas at Mantinea saved her from something yet worse; though it would be unfair to Agesilaus, while we are considering the misfortunes of Sparta during his reign, not to recollect that Epaminondas was an enemy more formidable than she had ever before encountered.

The efficient service rendered by Agesilaus during his last expedition to Egypt, had the effect of establishing firmly the dominion of Nektanebis the native king, and of protecting that country for the time from being reconquered by the Persians; an event that did not happen until a few years afterwards, during the reign of the next Persian king. Of the extensive revolt, however, which at one time threatened to wrest from the Persian crown Asia Minor as well as Egypt, no permanent consequence remained. The treachery of Orontes and Rheomithres so completely broke up the schemes of the revolters, that Artaxerxes Mnemon still maintained the Persian empire (with the exception of Egypt), unimpaired.

He died not long after the suppression of the revolt (apparently about a year after it, in 359-358 B.C.), having reigned forty-five or forty-six years.[792] His death was preceded by one of those bloody tragedies which so frequently stained the transmission of a Persian sceptre. Darius, the eldest son of Artaxerxes, had been declared by his father successor to the throne. According to Persian custom, the successor thus declared was entitled to prefer any petition which he pleased; the monarch being held bound to grant it. Darius availed himself of the privilege to ask for one of the favorite inmates of his father's harem, for whom he had contracted a passion. The request so displeased Artaxerxes, that he seemed likely to make a new appointment as to the succession; discarding Darius and preferring his younger son Ochus, whose interests were warmly espoused by Atossa, wife as well as daughter of the monarch. Alarmed at this prospect, Darius was persuaded by a discontented courtier, named Teribazus, to lay a plot for assassinating Artaxerxes; but the plot was betrayed, and the king caused both Darius and Teribazus to be put to death. By this catastrophe the chance of Ochus was improved, and his ambition yet farther stimulated. But there still remained two princes, older than he—Arsames and Ariaspes. Both these brothers he contrived to put out of the way; the one by a treacherous deceit, entrapping him to take poison,—the other by assassination. Ochus thus stood next as successor to the crown, which was not long denied to him,—for Artaxerxes, now very old and already struck down by the fatal consummation respecting his eldest son, Darius, did not survive the additional sorrow of seeing his two other sons die so speedily afterwards.[793] He expired, and his son Ochus, taking the name of Artaxerxes, succeeded to him without opposition; manifesting as king the same sanguinary dispositions as those by which he had placed himself on the throne.

During the two years following the battle of Mantinea, Athens, though relieved by the general peace from land-war, appears to have been entangled in serious maritime contests and difficulties. She had been considerably embarrassed by two events; by the Theban naval armament under Epaminondas, and by the submission of Alexander of Pheræ to Thebes,—both events belonging to 364-363 B.C. It was in 363-362 B.C. that the Athenian Timotheus,—having carried on war with eminent success against Olynthus and the neighboring cities in the Thermaic Gulf, but with very bad success against Amphipolis,—transferred his forces to the war against Kotys king of Thrace near the Thracian Chersonese. The arrival of the Theban fleet in the Hellespont greatly distracted the Athenian general, and served as a powerful assistance to Kotys; who was moreover aided by the Athenian general Iphikrates, on this occasion serving his father-in-law against his country.[794] Timotheus is said to have carried on war against Kotys with advantage, and to have acquired for Athens a large plunder.[795] It would appear that his operations were of an aggressive character, and that during his command in those regions the Athenian possessions in the Chersonese were safe from Kotys; for Iphikrates would only lend his aid to Kotys towards defensive warfare; retiring from his service when he began to attack the Athenian possessions in the Chersonese.[796]

We do not know what circumstances brought about the dismissal or retirement of Timotheus from the command. But in the next year, we find Ergophilus as Athenian commander in the Chersonese, and Kallisthenes (seemingly) as Athenian commander against Amphipolis.[797] The transmarine affairs of Athens, however, were far from improving. Besides that under the new general she seems to have been losing strength near the Chersonese, she had now upon her hands a new maritime enemy —Alexander of Pheræ. A short time previously, he had been her ally against Thebes, but the victories of the Thebans during the preceding year had so completely humbled him, that he now identified his cause with theirs; sending troops to join the expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus,[798] and equipping a fleet to attack the maritime allies of Athens. His fleet captured the island of Tenos, ravaged several of the other Cyclades, and laid siege to Peparethos. Great alarm prevailed in Athens, and about the end of August (362 B.C.),[799] two months after the battle of Mantinea, a fleet was equipped with the utmost activity, for the purpose of defending the insular allies, as well as of acting in the Hellespont. Vigorous efforts were required from all the trierarchs, and really exerted by some, to accelerate the departure of this fleet. But that portion of it, which, while the rest went to the Hellespont, was sent under Leosthenes to defend Peparethos,—met with a defeat from the ships of Alexander, with the loss of five triremes and six hundred prisoners.[800] We are even told that soon after this naval advantage, the victors were bold enough to make a dash into the Peiræus itself (as Teleutias had done twenty-seven years before), where they seized both property on shipboard and men on the quay, before there was any force ready to repel them.[801] The Thessalian marauders were ultimately driven back to their harbor of Pegasæ; yet not without much annoyance to the insu-

lar confederates, and some disgrace to Athens. The defeated admiral Leosthenes was condemned to death; while several trierarchs,—who, instead of serving in person, had performed the duties incumbent on them by deputy and by contract, were censured or put upon trial.[802]

Not only had the affairs of Athens in the Hellespont become worse under Ergophilus than under Timotheus, but Kallisthenes also, who had succeeded Timotheus in the operations against Amphipolis, achieved no permanent result. It would appear that the Amphipolitans, to defend themselves against Athens, had invoked the aid of the Macedonian king Perdikkas; and placed their city in his hands. That prince had before acted in conjunction with the Athenian force under Timotheus against Olynthus; and their joint invasion had so much weakened the Olynthians as to disable them from affording aid to Amphipolis. At least, this hypothesis explains how Amphipolis came now, for the first time, to be no longer a free city; but to be disjoined from Olynthus, and joined with (probably garrisoned by) Perdikkas, as a possession of Macedonia.[803] Kallisthenes thus found himself at war under greater disadvantages than Timotheus; having Perdikkas as his enemy, together with Amphipolis. Nevertheless, it would appear, he gained at first great advantages, and reduced Perdikkas to the necessity of purchasing a truce by the promise to abandon the Amphipolitans. The Macedonian prince, however, having gained time during the truce to recover his strength, no longer thought of performing his promise, but held Amphipolis against the Athenians as obstinately as before. Kallisthenes had let slip an opportunity which never again returned. After having announced at Athens the victorious truce and the approaching surrender, he seems to have been compelled, on his return, to admit that he had been cheated into suspending operations, at a moment when (as it seemed) Amphipolis might have been conquered. For this misjudgment or misconduct he was put upon trial at Athens, on returning to his disappointed countrymen; and at the same time Ergophilus also, who had been summoned home from the Chersonesus for his ill-success or bad management of the war against Kotys.[804] The people were much incensed against both; but most against Ergophilus. Nevertheless it happened that Kallisthenes was tried first, and condemned to death. On the next day, Ergophilus was tried. But the verdict of the preceding day had discharged the wrath of the dikasts, and rendered them so much more indulgent, that they acquitted him.[805]

Autokles was sent in place of Ergophilus to carry on war for Athens in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. It was not merely against Kotys that his operations were necessary. The Prokonnesians, allies of Athens, required protection against the attacks of Kyzikus; besides which, there was another necessity yet more urgent. The stock of corn was becoming short, and the price rising, not merely at Athens, but at many of the islands in the Ægean, and at Byzantium and other places. There prevailed therefore unusual anxiety, coupled with keen competition, for the corn in course of importation from the Euxine. The Byzantines, Chalkedonians, and Kyzikenes, had already

begun to detain the passing corn-ships, for the supply of their own markets; and nothing less than a powerful Athenian fleet could ensure the safe transit of such supplies to Athens herself.[806] The Athenian fleet, guarding the Bosphorus even from the Hieron inwards (the chapel near the junction of the Bosphorus with the Euxine), provided safe convoy for the autumnal exports of this essential article.

In carrying on operations against Kotys, Autokles was favored with an unexpected advantage by the recent revolt of a powerful Thracian named Miltokythes against that prince. This revolt so alarmed Kotys, that he wrote a letter to Athens in a submissive tone, and sent envoys to purchase peace by various concessions. At the same time Miltokythes also first sent envoys—next, went in person—to Athens, to present his own case and solicit aid. He was however coldly received. The vote of the Athenian assembly, passed on hearing the case (and probably procured in part through the friends of Iphikrates), was so unfavorable,[807] as to send him away not merely in discouragement, but in alarm; while Kotys recovered all his power in Thrace, and even became master of the Sacred Mountain with its abundance of wealthy deposits. Nevertheless, in spite of this imprudent vote, the Athenians really intended to sustain Miltokythes against Kotys. Their general Autokles was recalled after a few months, and put upon his trial for having suffered Kotys to put down this enemy unassisted.[808] How the trial ended or how the justice of the case stood, we are unable to make out from the passing allusions of Demosthenes.

Menon was sent as commander to the Hellespont to supersede Autokles; and was himself again superseded after a few months, by Timomachus. Convoy for the corn-vessels out of the Euxine became necessary anew, as in the preceding year; and was furnished a second time during the autumn of 361 B.C. by the Athenian ships of war; [809] not merely for provisions under transport to Athens, but also for those going to Maroneia, Thasos, and other places in or near Thrace. But affairs in the Chersonese became yet more unfavorable to Athens. In the winter of 361-360 B.C., Kotys, with the coöperation of a body of Abydene citizens and Sestian exiles, who crossed the Hellespont from Abydos, contrived to surprise Sestos;[810] the most important place in the Chersonese, and the guard-post of the Hellespont on its European side, for all vessels passing in or out. The whole Chersonese was now thrown open to his aggressions. He made preparations for attacking Elæus and Krithôtê, the two other chief possessions of Athens, and endeavored to prevail on Iphikrates to take part in his projects. But that general, though he had assisted Kotys in defence against Athens, refused to commit the more patent treason involved in aggressive hostility against her. He even quitted Thrace, but not daring at once to visit Athens, retired to Lesbos.[811] In spite of his refusal, however, the settlers and possessions of Athens in the Chersonese were attacked and imperiled by Kotys, who claimed the whole peninsula as his own, and established toll-gatherers at Sestos to levy the dues both of strait and harbor.[812]

The fortune of Athens in these regions was still unpropitious. All her late commanders, Ergophilus, Autokles, Menon, Timomachus, had been successively deficient in means, in skill, or in fidelity, and had undergone accusation at home.[813] Timomachus was now superseded by Kephisodotus, a man of known enmity towards both Iphikrates and Kotys.[814] But Kephisodotus achieved no more than his predecessors, and had even to contend against a new enemy, who crossed over from Abydos to Sestos to reinforce Kotys—Charidemus with the mercenary division under his command. That officer, since his service three years before under Timotheus against Amphipolis, had been for some time in Asia, especially in the Troad. He hired himself to the satrap Artabazus; of whose embarrassments he took advantage to seize by fraud the towns of Skepsis, Kebren, and Ilium; intending to hold them as a little principality.[815] Finding his position, however, ultimately untenable against the probable force of the satrap, he sent a letter across to the Chersonese, to the Athenian commander Kephisodotus, asking for Athenian triremes to transport his division across to Europe; in return for which, if granted, he engaged to crush Kotys and reconquer the Chersonese for Athens. This proposition, whether accepted or not, was never realized; for Charidemus was enabled, through a truce unexpectedly granted to him by the satrap, to cross over from Abydos to Sestos without any Athenian ships. But as soon as he found himself in the Chersonese, far from aiding Athens to recover that peninsula, he actually took service with Kotys against her; so that Elæeus and Krithôtê, her chief remaining posts, were in greater peril than ever.[816]

The victorious prospects of Kotys, however, were now unexpectedly arrested. After a reign of twenty-four years he was assassinated by two brothers, Python and Herakleides, Greeks from the city of Ænus in Thrace, and formerly students under Plato at Athens. They committed the act to avenge their father; upon whom, as it would appear, Kotys had inflicted some brutal insult, under the influence of that violent and licentious temper which was in him combined with an energetic military character.[817] Having made their escape, Python and his brother retired to Athens, where they were received with every demonstration of honor, and presented with the citizenship as well as with golden wreaths; partly as tyrannicides, partly as having relieved the Athenians from an odious and formidable enemy.[818] Disclaiming the warm eulogies heaped upon him by various speakers in the assembly, Python is said to have replied—"It was a god who did the deed; we only lent our hands:"[819] an anecdote, which, whether it be truth or fiction, illustrates powerfully the Greek admiration of tyrannicide.

The death of Kotys gave some relief to Athenian affairs in the Chersonese. Of his children, even the eldest, Kersobleptes, was only a youth:[820] moreover two other Thracian chiefs, Berisades and Amadokus, now started up as pretenders to shares in the kingdom of Thrace. Kersobleptes employed as his main support and minister the mercenary general Charidemus, who either had already married, or did now marry, his sister; a nuptial connection had been formed in like manner by Amadokus with

two Greeks named Simon and Bianor—and by Berisades with an Athenian citizen named Athenodorus, who (like Iphikrates and others) had founded a city, and possessed a certain independent dominion, in or near the Chersonese.[821] These Grecian mercenary chiefs thus united themselves by nuptial ties to the princes whom they served, as Seuthes had proposed to Xenophon, and as the Italian Condottieri of the fifteenth century ennobled themselves by similar alliance with princely families—for example, Sforza with the Visconti of Milan. All these three Thracian competitors were now represented by Grecian agents. But at first, it seems, Charidemus on behalf of Kersobleptes was the strongest. He and his army were near Perinthus on the north coast of the Propontis, where the Athenian commander, Kephisodotus, visited him, with a small squadron of ten triremes, in order to ask for the fulfilment of those fair promises which Charidemus had made in his letter from Asia. But Charidemus treated the Athenians as enemies, attacked by surprise the seamen on shore, and inflicted upon them great damage. He then pressed the Chersonese severely for several months, and marched even into the midst of it, to protect a nest of pirates whom the Athenians were besieging at the neighboring islet on its western coast—Alopekonnesus. At length, after seven months of unprofitable warfare (dating from the death of Kotys), he forced Kephisodotus to conclude with him a convention so disastrous and dishonorable, that as soon as known at Athens, it was indignantly repudiated.[822] Kephisodotus, being recalled in disgrace, was put upon his trial, and fined; the orator Demosthenes (we are told), who had served as one of the trierarchs in the fleet, being among his accusers.[823]

Among the articles of this unfavorable convention, one was that the Greek city of Kardia should be specially reserved to Charidemus himself. That city—eminently convenient from its situation on the isthmus connecting the Chersonese with Thrace—claimed by the Athenians as within the Chersonese, yet at the same time intensely hostile to Athens—became his principal station.[824] He was fortunate enough to seize, through treachery, the person of the Thracian Miltokythes, who had been the pronounced enemy of Kotys, and had coöperated with Athens. But he did not choose to hand over this important prisoner to Kersobleptes, because the life of Miltokythes would thus have been saved: it not being the custom of Thracians, in their intestine disputes, to put each other to death.[825] We remark with surprise a practice milder than that of Greece, amidst a people decidedly more barbarous and blood-thirsty than the Greeks. Charidemus accordingly surrendered Miltokythes to the Kardians, who put the prisoner with his son into a boat, took them a little way out to sea, slew the son before the eyes of the father, and then drowned the father himself.[826] It is not improbable that there may have been some special antecedent causes, occasioning intense antipathy on the part of the Kardians towards Miltokythes, and inducing Charidemus to hand him over to them as an acceptable subject for revenge. However this may be, their savage deed kindled violent indignation among all the Thracians, and did much injury to the cause of Kersobleptes and Charidemus. Though Kephisodotus had been recalled, and though a considerable interval elapsed before

any successor came from Athens, yet Berisades and Amadokus joined their forces in one common accord, and sent to the Athenians propositions of alliance, with request for pecuniary aid. Athenodorus, the general of Berisades, putting himself at the head of Thracians and Athenians together, found himself superior in the field to Kersobleptes and Charidemus; whom he constrained to accept a fresh convention dictated by himself. Herein it was provided, that the kingdom of Thrace should be divided in equal portions between the three competitors; that all three should concur in surrendering the Chersonese to Athens; and that the son of a leading man named Iphiades at Sestos, held by Charidemus as hostage for the adherence of that city, should be surrendered to Athens also.[827]

This new convention, sworn on both sides, promised to Athens the full acquisition which she desired. Considering the thing as done, the Athenians sent Chabrias as commander in one trireme to receive the surrender, but omitted to send the money requested by Athenodorus; who was accordingly constrained to disband his army for want of pay. Upon this Kersobleptes and Charidemus at once threw up their engagement, refused to execute the convention just sworn, and constrained Chabrias, who had come without any force, to revert to the former convention concluded with Kephisodotus. Disappointed and indignant, the Athenians disavowed the act of Chabrias, in spite of his high reputation. They sent ten envoys to the Chersonese, insisting that the convention of Athenodorus should be resworn by all the three Thracian competitors—Berisades, Amadokus, Kersobleptes; if the third declined, the envoys were instructed to take measures for making war upon him, while they received the engagements of the other two. But such a mission, without arms, obtained nothing from Charidemus and Kersobleptes, except delay or refusal; while Berisades and Amadokus sent to Athens bitter complaints respecting the breach of faith. At length, after some months—just after the triumphant conclusion of the expedition of Athens against Eubœa (358 B.C.)—the Athenian Chares arrived in the Chersonese, at the head of a considerable mercenary force. Then at length the two recusants were compelled to swear anew to the convention of Athenodorus, in the presence of the latter as well as of Berisades and Amadokus.[828] And it would appear that before long, its conditions were realized. Charidemus surrendered the Chersonese, of course including its principal town Sestos, to Athens;[829] yet he retained for himself Kardia,[830] which was affirmed (though the Athenians denied it) not to be included in the boundaries of that peninsula. The kingdom of Thrace was also divided between Kersobleptes, Berisades, and Amadokus; which triple division, diminishing the strength of each, was regarded by Athens as a great additional guarantee for her secure possession of the Chersonese.[831]

It was thus that Athens at length made good her possession of the Chersonese against the neighboring Thracian potentates. And it would seem that her transmarine power, with its dependencies and confederates, now stood at a greater height than it had ever reached since the terrible reverses of 405 B.C. Among them were numbered

not only a great number of the Ægean islands (even the largest, Eubœa, Chios, Samos, and Rhodes), but also the continental possessions of Byzantium—the Chersonese—Maroneia[832] with other places on the southern coast of Thrace—and Pydna, Methônê, and Potidæa, with most of the region surrounding the Thermaic Gulf.[833] This last portion of empire had been acquired at the cost of the Olynthian fraternal alliance of neighboring cities, against which Athens too, as well as Sparta, by an impulse most disastrous for the future independence of Greece, had made war with inauspicious success. The Macedonian king Perdikkas, with a just instinct towards the future aggrandizement of his dynasty, had assisted her in thus weakening Olynthus; feeling that the towns on the Thermaic Gulf, if they formed parts of a strong Olynthian confederacy of brothers and neighbors, reciprocally attached and self-sustaining, would resist Macedonia more effectively, than if they were half-reluctant dependencies of Athens, even with the chances of Athenian aid by sea. The aggressive hand of Athens against Olynthus, indeed, between 368-363 B.C., was hardly less mischievous, to Greece generally, than that of Sparta had been between 382-380 B.C. Sparta had crushed the Olynthian confederacy in its first brilliant promise—Athens prevented it from rearing its head anew. Both conspired to break down the most effective barrier against Macedonian aggrandizement; neither were found competent to provide any adequate protection to Greece in its room.

The maximum of her second empire, which I have remarked that Athens attained by the recovery of the Chersonese,[834] lasted but for a moment. During the very same year, there occurred that revolt among her principal allies, known by the name of the Social War, which gave to her power a fatal shock, and left the field comparatively clear for the early aggressions of her yet more formidable enemy—Philip of Macedon. That prince had already emerged from his obscurity as a hostage in Thebes, and had succeeded his brother Perdikkas, slain in a battle with the Illyrians, as king (360-359 B.C.). At first, his situation appeared not merely difficult, but almost hopeless. Not the most prescient eye in Greece could have recognized, in the inexperienced youth struggling at his first accession against rivals at home, enemies abroad, and embarrassments of every kind—the future conqueror of Chæroneia, and destroyer of Grecian independence. How, by his own genius, energy, and perseverance, assisted by the faults and dissensions of his Grecian enemies, he attained his inauspicious eminence—will be recounted in my subsequent volume.

At the opening of my ninth volume, after the surrender of Athens, Greece was under the Spartan empire. Its numerous independent city-communities were more completely regimented under one chief than they had ever been before, Athens and Thebes being both numbered among the followers of Sparta.

But the conflicts recounted in these two volumes (during an interval of forty-four years—404-403 B.C. to 360-359 B.C.) have wrought the melancholy change of leaving Greece more disunited, and more destitute of presiding Hellenic authority, than she had been at any time since the Persian invasion. Thebes, Sparta, and Athens, had all been engaged in weakening each other; in which, unhappily, each has been far more successful than in strengthening herself. The maritime power of Athens is now indeed considerable, and may be called very great, if compared with the state of degradation to which she had been brought in 403 B.C. But it will presently be seen how unsubstantial is the foundation of her authority, and how fearfully she has fallen off from that imperial feeling and energy which ennobled her ancestors under the advice of Perikles.

It is under these circumstances, so untoward for defence, that the aggressor from Macedonia arises.

CHAPTER LXXXI.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT BEFORE SYRACUSE.

In the sixtieth chapter of this work, I brought down the history of the Grecian communities in Sicily to the close of the Athenian siege of Syracuse, where Nikias and Demosthenes with nearly their entire armament perished by so lamentable a fate. I now resume from that point the thread of Sicilian events, which still continues so distinct from those of Peloponnesus and Eastern Greece, that it is inconvenient to include both in the same chapters.

If the destruction of the great Athenian armament (in September 413 B.C.) excited the strongest sensation throughout every part of the Grecian world, we may imagine the intoxication of triumph with which it must have been hailed in Sicily. It had been achieved (Gylippus and the Peloponnesian allies aiding) by the united efforts of nearly all the Grecian cities in the island,—for all of them had joined Syracuse as soon as her prospects became decidedly encouraging; except Naxos and Katana, which were allied with the Athenians,—and Agrigentum, which remained neutral.[835] Unfortunately we know little or nothing of the proceedings of the Syracusans, immediately following upon circumstances of so much excitement and interest. They appear to have carried on war against Katana, where some fugitives from the vanquished Athenian army contributed to the resistance against them.[836] But both this city and Naxos, though exposed to humiliation and danger as allies of the defeated Athenians, contrived to escape without the loss of their independence. The allies of Syracuse were probably not eager to attack them, and thereby to aggrandize that city farther; while the Syracusans themselves also would be sensible of great exhaustion, arising from the immense efforts through which alone their triumph had been achieved. The pecuniary burdens to which they had been obliged to submit—known to Nikias during the last months of the siege,[837] and fatally misleading his judgment,—were so heavy as to task severely their powers of endurance. After paying, and dismissing with appropriate gratitude, the numerous auxiliaries whom they had been obliged to hire,—after celebrating the recent triumph, and decorating the temples, in a manner satisfactory to the exuberant joy of the citizens[838]—there would probably be a general disposition to repose rather than to aggressive warfare. There would be much destruction to be repaired throughout their territory, poorly watched or cultivated during the year of the siege.

In spite of such exhaustion, however, the sentiment of exasperation and vengeance against Athens, combined with gratitude towards the Lacedæmonians, was too powerful to be balked. A confident persuasion reigned throughout Greece that Athens[839] could not hold out for one single summer after her late terrific disas-

ter; a persuasion, founded greatly on the hope of a large auxiliary squadron to act against her from Syracuse and her other enemies in Sicily and Italy. In this day of Athenian distress, such enemies of course became more numerous. Especially the city of Thurii in Italy,[840] which had been friendly to Athens and had furnished aid to Demosthenes in his expedition to Sicily, now underwent a change, banished three hundred of the leading philo-Athenian citizens (among them the rhetor Lysias), and espoused the Peloponnesian cause with ardor. The feeling of reaction at Thurii, and of vengeance at Syracuse, stimulated the citizens of both places to take active part in an effort promising to be easy and glorious, for the destruction of Athens and her empire. And volunteers were doubtless the more forward, as the Persian satraps of the sea-board were now competing with each other in invitations to the Greeks, with offers of abundant pay.

Accordingly, in the summer of the year 412 B.C. (the year following the catastrophe of the Athenian armament,) a Sicilian squadron of twenty triremes from Syracuse and two from Selinus, under the command of Hermokrates, reached Peloponnesus and joined the Lacedæmonian fleet in its expedition across the Ægean to Miletus. Another squadron of ten triremes from Thurii, under the Rhodian Dorieus, and a farther reinforcement from Tarentum, and Lokri, followed soon after. It was Hermokrates who chiefly instigated his countrymen to this effort.[841] Throughout the trying months of the siege, he had taken a leading part in the defence of Syracuse, seconding the plans of Gylippus with equal valor and discretion. As commander of the Syracusan squadron in the main fleet now acting against Athens in the Ægean (events already described in my sixty-first chapter), his conduct was not less distinguished. He was energetic in action, and popular in his behavior towards those under his command; but what stood out most conspicuously as well as most honorably, was his personal incorruptibility. While the Peloponnesian admiral and trierarchs accepted the bribes of Tissaphernes, conniving at his betrayal of the common cause and breach of engagement towards the armament, with indifference to the privations of their own unpaid seamen,—Hermokrates and Dorieus were strenuous in remonstrance, even to the extent of drawing upon themselves the indignant displeasure of the Peloponnesian admiral Astyochus, as well as of the satrap himself.[842] They were the more earnest in performing this duty, because the Syracusan and Thurian triremes were manned by freemen in larger proportion than the remaining fleet.[843]

The sanguine expectation, however, entertained by Hermokrates and his companions in crossing the sea from Sicily,—that one single effort would gloriously close the war,—was far from being realized. Athens resisted with unexpected energy; the Lacedæmonians were so slack and faint-hearted, that they even let slip the golden opportunity presented to them by the usurpation of the Athenian Four Hundred. Tissaphernes was discovered to be studiously starving and protracting the war for purposes of his own, which Hermokrates vainly tried to counter-work by a personal visit and protest at Sparta.[844] Accordingly, the war trailed on with fluctuating success,

and even renovated efficiency on the part of Athens; so that the Syracusans at home, far from hearing announced the accomplishment of those splendid anticipations under which their squadron had departed, received news generally unfavorable, and at length positively disastrous. They were informed that their seamen were ill-paid and distressed; while Athens, far from striking her colors, had found means to assemble a fleet at Samos competent still to dispute the mastery of the Ægean. They heard of two successive naval defeats, which the Peloponnesian and Syracusan fleets sustained in the Hellespont[845] (one at Kynossema,—411 B.C.,—a second between Abydos and Dardanus,—410 B.C.); and at length of a third, more decisive and calamitous than the preceding,—the battle of Kyzikus (409 B.C.), wherein the Lacedæmonian admiral Mindarus was slain, and the whole of his fleet captured or destroyed. In this defeat the Syracusan squadron were joint sufferers. Their seamen were compelled to burn all their triremes without exception, in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy; and were left destitute, without clothing or subsistence, on the shores of the Propontis amidst the satrapy of Pharnabazus.[846] That satrap, with generous forwardness, took them into his pay, advanced to them clothing and provision for two months, and furnished them with timber from the woods of Mount Ida to build fresh ships. At Antandrus (in the Gulf of Adramyttium, one great place of export for Idæan timber), where the reconstruction took place, the Syracusans made themselves so acceptable and useful to the citizens, that a vote of thanks and a grant of citizenship was passed to all of them who chose to accept it.[847]

In recounting this battle, I cited the brief and rude despatch, addressed to the Lacedæmonians by Hippokrates, surviving second officer of the slain Mindarus, describing the wretched condition of the defeated armament—"Our honor is gone. Mindarus is slain. The men are hungry. We know not what to do."[848] This curious despatch has passed into history, because it was intercepted by the Athenians, and never reached its destination. But without doubt the calamitous state of facts, which it was intended to make known, flew rapidly, under many different forms of words, both to Peloponnesus and to Syracuse. Sad as the reality was, the first impression made by the news would probably be yet sadder; since the intervention of Pharnabazus, whereby the sufferers were so much relieved, would hardly be felt or authenticated until after some interval. At Syracuse, the event on being made known excited not only powerful sympathy with the sufferers, but also indignant displeasure against Hermokrates and his colleagues; who, having instigated their countrymen three years before, by sanguine hopes and assurances, to commence a foreign expedition for the purpose of finally putting down Athens, had not only achieved nothing, but had sustained a series of reverses, ending at length in utter ruin, from the very enemy whom they had pronounced to be incapable of farther resistance.

It was under such sentiment of displeasure, shortly after the defeat of Kyzikus, that a sentence of banishment was passed at Syracuse against Hermokrates and his colleagues. The sentence was transmitted to Asia, and made known by Hermokrates

himself to the armament, convoked in public meeting. While lamenting and protesting against its alleged injustice and illegality, he entreated the armament to maintain unabated good behavior for the future, and to choose new admirals for the time, until the successors nominated at Syracuse should arrive. The news was heard with deep regret by the trierarchs, the pilots, and the maritime soldiers or marines; who, attached to Hermokrates from his popular manner, his constant openness of communication with them, and his anxiety to collect their opinions, loudly proclaimed that they would neither choose, nor serve under, any other leaders.[849] But the admirals repressed this disposition, deprecating any resistance to the decree of the city. They laid down their command, inviting any man dissatisfied with them to prefer his complaint at once publicly, and reminding the soldiers of the many victories and glorious conflicts, both by land and sea, which had knit them together by the ties of honorable fellowship. No man stood forward to accuse them; and they consented, on the continued request of the armament, to remain in command, until their three successors arrived—Demarchus, Myskon, and Potamis. They then retired amidst universal regret; many of the trierarchs even binding themselves by oath, that on returning to Syracuse they would procure their restoration. The change of commanders took place at Miletus.[850]

Though Hermokrates, in his address to the soldiers, would doubtless find response when he invoked the remembrance of past victories, yet he would hardly have found the like response in a Syracusan assembly. For if we review the proceedings of the armament since he conducted it from Syracuse to join the Peloponnesian fleet, we shall find that on the whole his expedition had been a complete failure, and that his assurances of success against Athens had ended in nothing but disappointment. There was therefore ample cause for the discontent of his countrymen. But on the other hand, as far as our limited means of information enable us to judge, the sentence of banishment against him appears to have been undeserved and unjust. For we cannot trace the ill-success of Hermokrates to any misconduct or omission on his part; while in regard to personal incorruptibility, and strenuous resistance to the duplicity of Tissaphernes, he stood out as an honorable exception among a body of venal colleagues. That satrap, indeed, as soon as Hermokrates had fallen into disgrace, circulated a version of his own, pretending that the latter, having asked money from him and been refused, had sought by calumnious means to revenge such refusal.[851] But this story, whether believed elsewhere or not, found no credit with the other satrap Pharnabazus; who warmly espoused the cause of the banished general, presenting him with a sum of money even unsolicited. This money Hermokrates immediately employed in getting together triremes and mercenary soldiers to accomplish his restoration to Syracuse by force.[852] We shall presently see how he fared in this attempt. Meanwhile we may remark that the sentence of banishment, though in itself unjust, would appear amply justified in the eyes of his countrymen by his own subsequent resort to hostile measures against them.

The party opposed to Hermokrates had now the preponderance in Syracuse, and by their influence probably the sentence against him was passed, under the grief and wrath occasioned by the defeat of Kyzikus. Unfortunately we have only the most scanty information as to the internal state of Syracuse during the period immediately succeeding the Athenian siege; a period of marked popular sentiment and peculiar interest. As at Athens under the pressure of the Xerxeian invasion—the energies of all the citizens, rich and poor, young and old, had been called forth for repulse of the common enemy, and had been not more than enough to achieve it. As at Athens after the battles of Salamis and Platæa, so at Syracuse after the destruction of the Athenian besiegers—the people, elate with the plenitude of recent effort, and conscious that the late successful defence had been the joint work of all, were in a state of animated democratical impulse, eager for the utmost extension and equality of political rights. Even before the Athenian siege, the government had been democratical; a fact, which Thucydides notices as among the causes of the successful defence, by rendering the citizens unanimous in resistance, and by preventing the besiegers from exciting intestine discontent.[853] But in the period immediately after the siege, it underwent changes which are said to have rendered it still more democratical. On the proposition of an influential citizen named Dioklês, a commission of Ten was named, of which he was president, for the purpose of revising both the constitution and the legislation of the city. Some organic alterations were adopted, one of which was, that the lot should be adopted, instead of the principle of election, in the nomination of magistrates. Furthermore, a new code, or collection of criminal and civil enactments, was drawn up and sanctioned. We know nothing of its details, but we are told that its penalties were extremely severe, its determination of offences minute and special, and its language often obscure as well as brief. It was known by the name of the Laws of Dioklês, the chief of the Committee who had prepared it. Though now adopted at Syracuse, it did not last long; for we shall find in five or six years the despotism of Dionysius extinguishing it, just as Peisistratus had put down the Solonian legislation at Athens. But it was again revived at the extinction of the Dionysian dynasty, after the lapse of more than sixty years; with comments and modifications by a committee, among whose members were the Corinthians Kephalus and Timoleon. It is also said to have been copied in various other Sicilian cities, and to have remained in force until the absorption of all Sicily under the dominion of the Romans. [854]

We have the austere character of Dioklês illustrated by a story (of more than dubious credit,[855] and of which the like is recounted respecting other Grecian legislators), that having inadvertently violated one of his own enactments, he enforced the duty of obedience by falling on his own sword. But unfortunately we are not permitted to know the substance of his laws, which would have thrown so much light on the sentiments and position of the Sicilian Greeks. Nor can we distinctly make out to what extent the political constitution of Syracuse was now changed. For though Diodorus tells us that the lot was now applied to the nomination of magistrates, yet

he does not state whether it was applied to all magistrates, or under what reserves and exceptions—such, for example, as those adopted at Athens. Aristotle too states that the Syracusan people, after the Athenian siege, changed their constitution from a partial democracy into an entire democracy. Yet he describes Dionysius, five or six years afterwards, as pushing himself up to the despotism, by the most violent demagogic opposition; and as having accused, disgraced, and overthrown certain rich leaders then in possession of the functions of government.[856] If the constitutional forms were rendered more democratical, it would seem that the practice cannot have materially changed, and that the persons actually in leading function still continued to be rich men.

The war carried on by the Syracusans against Naxos and Katana, after continuing more than three years,[857] was brought to a close by an enemy from without, even more formidable than Athens. This time, the invader was not Hellenic, but Phœnician —the ancient foe of Hellas, Carthage.

It has been already recounted, how in the same eventful year (480 B.C.) which transported Xerxes across the Hellespont to meet his defeat at Salamis, the Carthaginians had poured into Sicily a vast mercenary host under Hamilkar, for the purpose of reinstating in Himera the despot Terillus, who had been expelled by Theron of Agrigentum. On that occasion, Hamilkar had been slain, and his large army defeated, by the Syracusan despot Gelon, in the memorable battle of Himera. So deep had been the impression left by this defeat, that for the seventy years which intervened between 480-410 B.C., the Carthaginians had never again invaded the island. They resumed their aggressions shortly after the destruction of the Athenian power before Syracuse; which same event had also stimulated the Persians, who had been kept in restraint while the Athenian empire remained unimpaired, again to act offensively for the recovery of their dominion over the Asiatic Greeks. The great naval power of Athens, inspiring not merely reserve but even alarm to Carthage,[858] had been a safeguard to the Hellenic world both at its eastern and its western extremity. No sooner was that safeguard overthrown, than the hostile pressure of the foreigner began to be felt, as well upon Western Sicily as on the eastern coast of the Ægean.

From this time forward for two centuries, down to the conclusion of the second Punic war, the Carthaginians will be found frequent in their aggressive interventions in Sicily, and upon an extensive scale, so as to act powerfully on the destinies of the Sicilian Greeks. Whether any internal causes had occurred to make them abstain from intervention during the preceding generations, we are unable to say. The history of this powerful and wealthy city is very little known. We make out a few facts, which impart a general idea both of her oligarchical government and of her extensive colonial possessions, but which leave us in the dark as to her continuous history. Her possessions were most extensive, along the coast of Africa both eastward and westward from her city; comprehending also Sardinia and the Balearic isles, but (at this

time, probably) few settlements in Spain. She had quite enough to occupy her attention elsewhere, without meddling in Sicilian affairs; the more so, as her province in Sicily was rather a dependent ally than a colonial possession. In the early treaties made with Rome, the Carthaginians restrict and even interdict the traffic of the Romans both with Sardinia and Africa (except Carthage itself), but they grant the amplest license of intercourse with the Carthaginian province of Sicily; which they consider as standing in the same relation to Carthage as the cities of Latium stood in to Rome.[859] While the connection of Carthage with Sicily was thus less close, it would appear that her other dependencies gave her much trouble, chiefly in consequence of her own harsh and extortionate dominion.

All our positive information, scanty as it is, about Carthage and her institutions, relates to the fourth, third, or second centuries B.C., yet it may be held to justify presumptive conclusions as to the fifth century B.C., especially in reference to the general system pursued. The maximum of her power was attained before her first war with Rome, which began in 264 B.C.; the first and second Punic wars both of them greatly reduced her strength and dominion. Yet in spite of such reduction we learn that about 150 B.C., shortly before the third Punic war, which ended in the capture and depopulation of the city, not less than seven hundred thousand souls[860] were computed in it, as occupants of a fortified circumference of above twenty miles, covering a peninsula with its isthmus. Upon this isthmus its citadel Byrsa was situated, surrounded by a triple wall of its own, and crowned at its summit by a magnificent temple of Æsculapius. The numerous population is the more remarkable, since Utica (a considerable city, colonized from Phœnicia more anciently than even Carthage itself, and always independent of the Carthaginians, though in the condition of an inferior and discontented ally), was within the distance of seven miles from Carthage[861] on the one side, and Tunis seemingly not much farther off on the other. Even at that time, too, the Carthaginians are said to have possessed three hundred tributary cities in Libya.[862] Yet this was but a small fraction of the prodigious empire which had belonged to them certainly in the fourth century B.C., and in all probability also between 480-410 B.C. That empire extended eastward as far as the Altars of the Philæni, near the Great Syrtis,—westward, all along the coast to the Pillars of Herakles and the western coast of Morocco. The line of coast south-east of Carthage, as far as the bay called the Lesser Syrtis, was proverbial (under the name of Byzacium and the Emporia) for its fertility. Along this extensive line were distributed indigenous Libyan tribes, living by agriculture; and a mixed population called Liby-Phœnicians, formed by intermarriage and coalition of some of these tribes either with colonists from Tyre and Sidon, or perhaps with a Canaanitish population akin in race to the Phœnicians, yet of still earlier settlement in the country.[863] These Liby-Phœnicians dwelt in towns, seemingly of moderate size and unfortified, but each surrounded by a territory ample and fertile, yielding large produce. They were assiduous cultivators, but generally unwarlike, which latter quality was ascribed by ancient theory to the extreme richness of their soil.[864] Of the Liby-Phœnician towns the number is not known to us, but it

must have been prodigiously great, since we are told that both Agathokles and Regulus in their respective invasions captured no less than two hundred. A single district, called Tuska, is also spoken of as having fifty towns.[865]

A few of the towns along the coast,—Hippo, Utica, Adrumetum, Thapsus, Leptis, etc.,—were colonies from Tyre, like Carthage herself. With respect to Carthage, therefore, they stood upon a different footing from the Liby-Phœnician towns, either maritime or in the interior. Yet the Carthaginians contrived in time to render every town tributary, with the exception of Utica. They thus derived revenue from all the inhabitants of this fertile region, Tyrian, Liby-Phœnician, and indigenous Libyan; and the amount which they imposed appears to have been exorbitant. At one time, immediately after the first Punic war, they took from the rural cultivators as much as one-half of their produce,[866] and doubled at one stroke the tribute levied upon the towns. The town and district of Leptis paid to them a tribute of one talent per day, or three hundred and sixty-five talents annually. Such exactions were not collected without extreme harshness of enforcement, sometimes stripping the tax-payer of all that he possessed, and even tearing him from his family to be sold in person for a slave. [867] Accordingly the general sentiment among the dependencies towards Carthage was one of mingled fear and hatred, which rendered them eager to revolt on the landing of any foreign invader. In some cases the Carthaginians seem to have guarded against such contingencies by paid garrisons; but they also provided a species of garrison from among their own citizens; by sending out from Carthage poor men, and assigning to them lots of land with the cultivators attached. This provision for poor citizens as emigrants (mainly analogous to the Roman colonies), was a standing feature in the Carthaginian political system, serving the double purpose of obviating discontent among their own town population at home, and of keeping watch over their dependencies abroad.[868]

In the fifth century B.C., the Carthaginians had no apprehension of any foreign enemy invading them from seaward; an enterprise first attempted in 316 B.C., to the surprise of every one, by the boldness of the Syracusan Agathokles. Nor were their enemies on the land side formidable as conquerors, though they were extremely annoying as plunderers. The Numidians and other native tribes, half-naked and predatory horsemen, distinguished for speed as well as for indefatigable activity, so harassed the individual cultivators of the soil, that the Carthaginians dug a long line of ditch to keep them off.[869] But these barbarians did not acquire sufficient organization to act for permanent objects, until the reign of Masinissa and the second Punic war with Rome. During the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., therefore (prior to the invasion of Agathokles), the warfare carried on by the Carthaginians was constantly aggressive and in foreign parts. For these purposes they chiefly employed foreign mercenaries, hired for the occasion from Italy, Gaul, Spain, and the islands of the Western Mediterranean, together with conscripts from their Libyan dependencies. The native Carthaginians,[870] though encouraged by honorary marks to undertake this mili-

tary service, were generally averse to it, and sparingly employed. But these citizens, though not often sent on foreign service, constituted a most formidable force when called upon. No less then forty thousand hoplites went forth from the gates of Carthage to resist Agathokles, together with one thousand cavalry, and two thousand war-chariots.[871] An immense public magazine,—of arms, muniments of war of all kinds, and provisions,—appears to have been kept in the walls of Byrsa, the citadel of Carthage.[872] A chosen division of two thousand five hundred citizens, men of wealth and family, formed what was called the Sacred Band of Carthage,[873] distinguished for their bravery in the field as well as for the splendor of their arms, and the gold and silver plate which formed part of their baggage. We shall find these citizen-troops occasionally employed on service in Sicily: but most part of the Carthaginian armies consists of Gauls, Iberians, Libyans, etc., a mingled host got together for the occasion, discordant in language as well as in customs. Such men had never any attachment to the cause in which they fought,—seldom, to the commanders under whom they served; while they were often treated by Carthage with bad faith, and recklessly abandoned to destruction.[874] A military system such as this was pregnant with danger, if ever the mercenary soldiers got footing in Africa; as happened after the first Punic war, when the city was brought to the brink of ruin. But on foreign service in Sicily, these mercenaries often enabled Carthage to make conquest at the cost only of her money, without any waste of the blood of her own citizens. The Carthaginian generals seem generally to have relied, like Persians, upon numbers,—manifesting little or no military skill; until we come to the Punic wars with Rome, conducted under Hamilkar Barca and his illustrious son Hannibal.

Respecting the political constitution of Carthage, the facts known are too few, and too indistinct, to enable us to comprehend its real working. The magistrates most conspicuous in rank and precedence were, the two kings or suffetes, who presided over the Senate.[875] They seem to have been renewed annually, though how far the same persons were reëligible, or actually rechosen, we do not know, but they were always selected out of some few principal families or Gentes. There is reason for believing that the genuine Carthaginian citizens were distributed into three tribes, thirty curiæ, and three hundred gentes—something in the manner of the Roman patricians. From these gentes emanated a Senate of three hundred, out of which again was formed a smaller council or committee of thirty *principes* representing the curiæ;[876] sometimes a still smaller, of only ten *principes*. These little councils are both frequently mentioned in the political proceedings of Carthage; and perhaps the Thirty may coincide with what Polybius calls the Gerusia, or Council of Ancients,—the Three Hundred, with that which he calls the Senate.[877] Aristotle assimilates the two kings (suffetes) of Carthage to the two kings of Sparta—and the Gerusia of Carthage also to that of Sparta;[878] which latter consisted of thirty members, including the kings who sat in it. But Aristotle does not allude to any assembly at Carthage analogous to what Polybius calls the Senate. He mentions two Councils, one of one hundred members, the other of one hundred and four; and certain

Boards of Five,—the pentarchies. He compares the Council of one hundred and four to the Spartan ephors; yet again he talks of the pentarchies as invested with extensive functions, and terms the Council of one hundred the greatest authority in the state. Perhaps this last Council was identical with the assembly of one hundred Judges (said to have been chosen from the Senate as a check upon the generals employed), or Ordo Judicum; of which Livy speaks after the second Punic war, as existing with its members perpetual and so powerful that it overruled all the other assemblies and magistracies of the state. Through the influence of Hannibal, a law was passed to lessen the overweening power of this Order of Judges; causing them to be elected only for one year, instead of being perpetual.[879]

These statements, though coming from valuable authors, convey so little information and are withal so difficult to reconcile, that both the structure and working of the political machine at Carthage may be said to be unknown.[880] But it seems clear that the general spirit of the government was highly oligarchical; that a few rich, old, and powerful families, divided among themselves the great offices and influence of the state; that they maintained themselves in pointed and even insolent distinction from the multitude;[881] that they stood opposed to each other in bitter feuds, often stained by gross perfidy and bloodshed; and that the treatment with which, through these violent party-antipathies, unsuccessful generals were visited, was cruel in the extreme.[882] It appears that wealth was one indispensable qualification, and that magistrates and generals procured their appointments in a great measure by corrupt means. Of such corruption, one variety was, the habit of constantly regaling the citizens in collective banquets of the *curiæ* or the political associations; a habit so continual, and embracing so wide a circle of citizens, that Aristotle compares these banquets to the *phiditia* or public mess of Sparta.[883] There was a demos or people at Carthage, who were consulted on particular occasions, and before whom propositions were publicly debated, in cases where the suffetes and the small Council were not all of one mind.[884] How numerous this demos was, or what proportion of the whole population it comprised, we have no means of knowing. But it is plain, that whether more or less considerable, its multitude was kept under dependence to the rich families by stratagems such as the banquets, the lucrative appointments with lots of land in foreign dependencies, etc. The purposes of government were determined, its powers wielded and the great offices held—suffetes, senators, generals, or judges,—by the members of a small number of wealthy families; and the chief opposition which they encountered, was from their feuds against each other. In the main, the government was conducted with skill and steadiness, as well for internal tranquillity as for systematic foreign and commercial aggrandizement. Within the knowledge of Aristotle, Carthage had never suffered either the successful usurpation of a despot, or any violent intestine commotion.[885]

The first eminent Carthaginian leader brought to our notice, is Mago (seemingly about 530-500 B.C.), who is said to have mainly contributed to organize the forces,

and extend the dominion, of Carthage. Of his two sons, one, Hasdrubal, perished after a victorious career in Sardinia;[886] the other, Hamilkar, commanding at the battle of Himera in Sicily, was there defeated and slain by Gelon, as has been already recounted. After the death of Hamilkar, his son Giskon was condemned to perpetual exile, and passed his life in Sicily at the Greek city of Selinus.[887] But the sons of Hasdrubal still remained at Carthage, the most powerful citizens in the state; carrying on hostilities against the Moors and other indigenous Africans, whom they compelled to relinquish the tribute which Carthage had paid, down to that time, for the ground whereon the city was situated. This family are said indeed to have been so powerful, that a check upon their ascendency was supposed to be necessary; and for that purpose the select One Hundred Senators sitting as judges were now nominated for the first time.[888] Such wars in Africa doubtless tended to prevent the Carthaginians from farther interference in Sicily, during the interval between 480-410 B.C. There were probably other causes also, not known to us,—and down to the year 413 B.C., the formidable naval power of Athens (as has been already remarked) kept them on the watch even for themselves. But now, after the great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, apprehensions from that quarter were dissipated; so that Carthage again found leisure, as well as inclination, to seek in Sicily both aggrandizement and revenge.

It is remarkable that the same persons, acting in the same quarrel, who furnished the pretext or the motive for the recent invasion by Athens, now served in the like capacity as prompters to Carthage. The inhabitants of Egesta, engaged in an unequal war with rival neighbors at Selinus, were in both cases the soliciting parties. They had applied to Carthage first, without success,[889] before they thought of sending to invoke aid from Athens. This war indeed had been for the time merged and forgotten in the larger Athenian enterprise against Syracuse; but it revived after that catastrophe, wherein Athens and her armament were shipwrecked. The Egestæans had not only lost their protectors, but had incurred aggravated hostility from their neighbors, for having brought upon Sicily so formidable an ultramarine enemy. Their original quarrel with Selinus had related to a disputed portion of border territory. This point they no longer felt competent to maintain, under their present disadvantageous circumstances. But the Selinuntines, confident as well as angry, were now not satisfied with success in their original claim. They proceeded to strip the Egestæans of other lands indisputably belonging to them, and seriously menaced the integrity as well as the independence of the city. To no other quarter could the Egestæans turn, with any chance of finding both will and power to protect them, except to Carthage.[890]

The town of Egesta (non-Hellenic or at least only semi-Hellenic) was situated on or near the northern line of Sicilian coast, not far from the western cape of the island, and in the immediate neighborhood of the Carthaginian settlements,—Motyê, Panormus (now Palermo), and Soloeis or Soluntum. Selinus also was near the west-

ern cape, but on the southern coast of Sicily, with its territory conterminous to the southern portion of Egesta. When therefore the Egestæan envoys presented their urgent supplications at Carthage for aid, proclaiming that unless assisted they must be subjugated and become a dependency of Selinus,—the Carthaginians would not unreasonably conceive, that their own Sicilian settlements would be endangered, if their closest Hellenic neighbor were allowed thus to aggrandize herself. Accordingly they agreed to grant the aid solicited; yet not without much debate and hesitation. They were uneasy at the idea of resuming military operations in Sicily,—which had been laid aside for seventy years, and had moreover left such disastrous recollections[891]—at a moment when Syracusan courage stood in high renown, from the recent destruction of the Athenian armament. But the recollections of the Gelonian victory at Himera, while they suggested apprehension, also kindled the appetite of revenge; especially in the bosom of Hannibal, the grandson of that general Hamilkar who had there met his death. Hannibal was at this moment king, or rather first of the two suffetes, chief executive magistrates of Carthage, as his grandfather had been seventy years before. So violent had been the impression made upon the Carthaginians by the defeat of Himera, that they had banished Giskon, son of the slain general Hamilkar and father of Hannibal, and had condemned him to pass his whole life in exile. He had chosen the Greek city of Selinus; where probably Hannibal also had spent his youth, though restored since to his country and to his family consequence,—and from whence he brought back an intense antipathy to the Greek name, as well as an impatience to wipe off by a signal revenge the dishonor both of his country and of his family. Accordingly, espousing with warmth the request of the Egestæans, he obtained from the Senate authority to take effective measures for their protection.[892]

His first proceeding was to send envoys to Egesta and Selinus, to remonstrate against the encroachments of the Selinuntines; with farther instructions, in case remonstrance proved ineffectual, to proceed with the Egestæans to Syracuse, and there submit the whole dispute to the arbitration of the Syracusans. He foresaw that the Selinuntines, having superiority of force on their side, would refuse to acknowledge any arbitration; and that the Syracusans, respectfully invoked by one party but rejected by the other, would stand aside from the quarrel altogether. It turned out as he had expected. The Selinuntines sent envoys to Syracuse, to protest against the representations from Egesta and Carthage; but declined to refer their case to arbitration. Accordingly, the Syracusans passed a vote that they would maintain their alliance with Selinus, yet without impeachment of their pacific relations with Carthage: thus leaving the latter free to act without obstruction. Hannibal immediately sent over a body of troops to the aid of Egesta: five thousand Libyans or Africans; and eight hundred Campanian mercenaries, who had been formerly in the pay and service of the Athenians before Syracuse, but had quitted that camp before the final catastrophe occurred.[893]

In spite of the reinforcement and the imposing countenance of Carthage, the Selinuntines, at this time in full power and prosperity, still believed themselves strong enough to subdue Egesta. Under such persuasion, they invaded the territory with their full force. They began to ravage the country, yet at first with order and precaution; but presently, finding no enemy in the field to oppose them, they became careless, and spread themselves about for disorderly plunder. This was the moment for which the Egestæans and Carthaginians were watching. They attacked the Selinuntines by surprise, defeated them with the loss of a thousand men, and recaptured the whole booty.[894]

The war, as hitherto carried on, was one offensive on the part of the Selinuntines, for the purpose of punishing or despoiling their ancient enemy Egesta. Only so far as was necessary for the defence of the latter, had the Carthaginians yet interfered. But against such an interference the Selinuntines, if they had taken a prudent measure of their own force, would have seen that they were not likely to achieve any conquest. Moreover, they might perhaps have obtained peace now, had they sought it; as a considerable minority among them, headed by a citizen named Empedion,[895] urgently recommended: for Selinus appears always to have been on more friendly terms with Carthage than any other Grecian city in Sicily. Even at the great battle of Himera, the Selinuntine troops had not only not assisted Gelon, but had actually fought in the Carthaginian army under Hamilkar;[896] a plea, which, had it been pressed, might probably have had weight with Hannibal. But this claim upon the goodwill of Carthage appears only to have rendered them more confident and passionate in braving her force and in prosecuting the war. They sent to Syracuse to ask for aid, which the Syracusans, under present circumstances, promised to send them. But the promise was given with little cordiality, as appears by the manner in which they fulfilled it, as well as from the neutrality which they had professed so recently before; for the contest seemed to be aggressive on the part of Selinus, so that Syracuse had little interest in helping her to conquer Egesta. Neither Syracusans nor Selinuntines were prepared for the immense preparations, and energetic rapidity of movement by which Hannibal at once altered the character, and enlarged the purposes, of the war. He employed all the ensuing autumn and winter in collecting a numerous host of mercenary troops from Africa, Spain, and Campania, with various Greeks who were willing to take service.[897]

In the spring of the memorable year 409 B.C., through the exuberant wealth of Carthage, he was in a condition to leave Africa with a great fleet of sixty triremes, and fifteen hundred transports or vessels of burthen;[898] conveying an army, which, according to the comparatively low estimate of Timæus, amounted to more than one hundred thousand men; while Ephorus extended the number to two hundred thousand infantry, and four thousand cavalry, together with muniments of war and battering machines for siege. With these he steered directly for the western Cape of Sicily, Lilybæum; taking care, however, to land his troops and to keep his fleet on the

northern side of that cape, in the bay near Motyê,—and not to approach the southern shore, lest he should alarm the Syracusans with the idea that he was about to prosecute his voyage farther eastward along the southern coast towards their city. By this precaution, he took the best means for prolonging the period of Syracusan inaction. The Selinuntines, panic-struck at the advent of an enemy so much more overwhelming than they had expected, sent pressing messengers to Syracuse to accelerate the promised help. They had made no provision for standing on the defensive against a really formidable aggressor. Their walls, though strong enough to hold out against Sicilian neighbors, had been neglected during the long-continued absence of any foreign besieger, and were now in many places out of repair. Hannibal left them no time to make good past deficiencies. Instead of wasting his powerful armament (as the unfortunate Nikias had done five years before) by months of empty flourish and real inaction, he waited only until he was joined by the troops from Egesta and the neighboring Carthaginian dependencies, and then marched his whole force straight from Lilybæum to Selinus. Crossing the river Mazara in his way, and storming the fort which lay near its mouth, he soon found himself under the Selinuntine walls. He distributed his army into two parts, each provided with battering machines and movable wooden towers; and then assailed the walls on many points at once, choosing the points where they were most accessible or most dilapidated. Archers and slingers in great numbers were posted near the walls, to keep up a discharge of missiles and chase away the defenders from the battlements. Under cover of such discharge, six wooden towers were rolled up to the foot of the wall, to which they were equal or nearly equal in height, so that the armed men in their interior were prepared to contend with the defenders almost on a level. Against other portions of the wall, battering-rams with iron heads were driven by the combined strength of multitudes, shaking or breaking through its substance, especially where it showed symptoms of neglect or decay. Such were the methods of attack which Hannibal now brought to bear upon the unprepared Selinuntines. He was eager to forestal the arrival of auxiliaries, by the impetuous movements of his innumerable barbaric host, the largest seen in Sicily since his grandfather Hamilkar had been defeated before Himera. Collected from all the shores of the western Mediterranean, it presented soldiers heterogeneous in race, in arms, in language,—in everything, except bravery and common appetite for blood as well as plunder.[899]

The dismay of the Selinuntines, when they suddenly found themselves under the sweep of this destroying hurricane, is not to be described. It was no part of the scheme of Hannibal to impose conditions or grant capitulation; for he had promised the plunder of their town to his soldiers. The only chance of the besieged was, to hold out with the courage of desperation, until they could receive aid from their Hellenic brethren on the southern coast,—Agrigentum, Gela, and especially Syracuse,—all of whom they had sent to warn and to supplicate. Their armed population crowded to man the walls, with a resolution worthy of Greeks and citizens; while the old men and the females, though oppressed with agony from the fate which seemed

to menace them, lent all the aid and encouragement in their power. Under the sound of trumpets, and every variety of war-cry, the assailants approached the walls, encountering everywhere a valiant resistance. They were repulsed again and again, with the severest loss. But fresh troops came up to relieve those who were slain or fatigued; and at length, after a murderous struggle, a body of Campanians forced their way over the walls into the town. Yet in spite of such temporary advantage, the heroic efforts of the besieged drove them out again or slew them, so that night arrived without the capture being accomplished. For nine successive days was the assault thus renewed with undiminished fury; for nine successive days did this heroic population maintain a successful resistance, though their enemies were numerous enough to relieve each other perpetually,—though their own strength was every day failing,—and though not a single friend arrived to their aid. At length, on the tenth day, and after terrible loss to the besiegers, a sufficient breach was made in the weak part of the wall, for the Iberians to force their way into the city. Still however the Selinuntines, even after their walls were carried, continued with unabated resolution to barricade and defend their narrow streets, in which their women also assisted, by throwing down stones and tiles upon the assailants from the house-tops. All these barriers were successively overthrown, by the unexhausted numbers, and increasing passion, of the barbaric host; so that the defenders were driven back from all sides into the agora, where most of them closed their gallant defence by an honorable death. A small minority, among whom was Empedion, escaped to Agrigentum, where they received the warmest sympathy and the most hospitable treatment.[900]

Resistance being thus at an end, the assailants spread themselves through the town in all the fury of insatiate appetites,—murderous, lustful, and rapacious. They slaughtered indiscriminately elders and children, preserving only the grown women as captives. The sad details of a town taken by storm are to a great degree the same in every age and nation; but the destroying barbarians at Selinus manifested one peculiarity, which marks them as lying without the pale of Hellenic sympathy and sentiment. They mutilated the bodies of the slain; some were seen with amputated hands strung together in a row and fastened round their girdles; while others brandished heads on the points of their spears and javelins.[901] The Greeks (seemingly not numerous) who served under Hannibal, far from sharing in these ferocious manifestations, contributed somewhat to mitigate the deplorable fate of the sufferers. Sixteen thousand Selinuntines are said to have been slain, five thousand to have been taken captive; while two thousand six hundred escaped to Agrigentum.[902] These figures are probably under, rather than above, the truth. Yet they do not seem entitled to any confidence; nor do they give us any account of the entire population in its different categories,—old and young,—men and women,—freemen and slaves,—citizens and metics. We can only pretend to appreciate this mournful event in the gross. All exact knowledge of its details is denied to us.

It does little honor either to the generosity or to the prudence of the Hellenic neighbors of Selinus, that this unfortunate city should have been left to its fate unassisted. In vain was messenger after messenger despatched, as the defence became more and more critical, to Agrigentum, Gela, and Syracuse. The military force of the two former was indeed made ready, but postponed its march until joined by that of the last; so formidable was the account given of the invading host. Meanwhile the Syracusans were not ready. They thought it requisite, first, to close the war which they were prosecuting against Katana and Naxos,—next, to muster a large and carefully-appointed force. Before these preliminaries were finished, the nine days of siege were past, and the death-hour of Selinus had sounded. Probably the Syracusans were misled by the Sicilian operations of Nikias, who, beginning with a long interval of inaction, had then approached their town by slow blockade, such as the circumstances of his case required. Expecting in the case of Selinus that Hannibal would enter upon the like elaborate siege,—and not reflecting that he was at the head of a vast host of miscellaneous foreigners hired for the occasion, of whose lives he could afford to be prodigal, while Nikias commanded citizens of Athens and other Grecian states, whom he could not expose to the murderous but thorough-going process of ever-renewed assault against strong walls recently erected,—they were thunderstruck on being informed that nine days of carnage had sufficed for the capture. The Syracusan soldiers, a select body of three thousand, who at length joined the Geloans and Agrigentines at Agrigentum, only arrived in time to partake in the general dismay everywhere diffused. A joint embassy was sent by three cities to Hannibal, entreating him to permit the ransom of the captives, and to spare the temples of the gods; while Empedion went at the same time to sue for compassion on behalf of his own fugitive fellow-citizens. To the former demand the victorious Carthaginian returned an answer at once haughty and characteristic,—"The Selinuntines have not been able to preserve their freedom, and must now submit to a trial of slavery. The gods have become offended with them, and have taken their departure from the town."[903] To Empedion, an ancient friend and pronounced partisan of the Carthaginians, his reply was more indulgent. All the relatives of Empedion, found alive among the captives, were at once given up; moreover permission was granted to the fugitive Selinuntines to return, if they pleased, and reoccupy the town with its lands, as tributary subjects of Carthage. At the same time that he granted such permission, however, Hannibal at once caused the walls to be razed, and even the town with its temples to be destroyed.[904] What was done about the proposed ransom, we do not hear.

Having satiated his troops with this rich plunder Hannibal now quitted the scene of bloodshed and desolation, and marched across the island to Himera on its northern coast. Though Selinus, as the enemy of Egesta, had received the first shock of his arms, yet it was against Himera that the grand purpose of his soul was directed. Here it was that Hamilkar had lost both his army and his life, entailing inexpiable disgrace upon the whole life of his son Giskon: here it was that his grandson intended

to exact full vengeance and requital from the grandchildren of those who then occupied the fated spot. Not only was the Carthaginian army elate with the past success, but a number of fresh Sikels and Sikans, eager to share in plunder as well as to gratify the antipathies of their races against the Grecian intruders, flocked to join it; thus making up the losses sustained in the recent assault. Having reached Himera, and disposed his army in appropriate positions around, Hannibal proceeded to instant attack, as at Selinus; pushing up his battering machines and towers against the vulnerable portions of the walls, and trying at the same time to undermine them. The Himeræans defended themselves with desperate bravery; and on this occasion the defence was not unassisted; for four thousand allies, chiefly Syracusans, and headed by the Syracusan Dioklês, had come to the city as a reinforcement. For a whole day they repelled with slaughter repeated assaults. No impression being made upon the city, the besieged became so confident in their own valor, that they resolved not to copy the Selinuntines in confining themselves to defence, but to sally out at daybreak the next morning and attack the besiegers in the field. Ten thousand gallant men,—Himeræans, Syracusans, and other Grecian allies,—accordingly marched out with the dawn; while the battlements were lined with old men and women as anxious spectators of their exploits. The Carthaginians near the walls, who, preparing to renew the assault, looked for nothing less than for a sally, were taken by surprise. In spite of their great superiority of number, and in spite of great personal bravery, they fell into confusion, and were incapable of long resisting the gallant and orderly charge of the Greeks. At length they gave way and fled towards the neighboring hill, where Hannibal himself with his body of reserve was posted to cover the operations of assault. The Greeks pursued them fiercely and slaughtered great numbers (six thousand according to Timæus, but not less than twenty thousand, if we are to accept the broad statement of Ephorus), exhorting each other not to think of making prisoners. But in the haste and exultation of pursuit, they became out of breath, and their ranks fell into disorder. In this untoward condition, they found themselves face to face with the fresh body of reserve brought up by Hannibal, who marched down the hill to receive and succor his own defeated fugitives. The fortune of the battle was now so completely turned, that the Himeræans, after bravely contending for some time against these new enemies, found themselves overpowered and driven back to their own gates. Three thousand of their bravest warriors, however, despairing of their city and mindful of the fate of Selinus, disdained to turn their backs, and perished to a man in obstinate conflict with the overwhelming numbers of the Carthaginians.[905]

Violent was the sorrow and dismay in Himera, when the flower of her troops were thus driven in as beaten men, with the loss of half their numbers. At this moment there chanced to arrive at the port a fleet of twenty-five triremes, belonging to Syracuse and other Grecian cities in Sicily; which triremes had been sent to aid the Peloponnesians in the Ægean, but had since come back, and were now got together for the special purpose of relieving the besieged city. So important a reinforcement

ought to have revived the spirit of the Himeræans. It announced that the Syracusans were in full march across the island, with the main force of the city, to the relief of Himera. But this good news was more than countervailed by the statement, that Hannibal was ordering out the Carthaginian fleet in the bay of Motyê, in order that it might sail round cape Lilybæum and along the southern coast into the harbor of Syracuse, now defenceless through the absence of its main force. Apparently the Syracusan fleet, in sailing from Syracuse to Himera, had passed by the bay of Motyê, observed maritime movement among the Carthaginians there, and picked up these tidings in explanation. Here was intelligence more than sufficient to excite alarm for home, in the bosom of Dioklês and the Syracusans at Himera; especially under the despondency now reigning. Dioklês not only enjoined the captains of the fleet to sail back immediately to Syracuse, in order to guard against the apprehended surprise, but also insisted upon marching back thither himself by land with the Syracusan forces, and abandoning the farther defence of Himera. He would in his march home meet his fellow-citizens on their march outward, and conduct them back along with him. To the Himeræans, this was a sentence of death, or worse than death. It plunged them into an agony of fright and despair. But there was no safer counsel to suggest, nor could they prevail upon Dioklês to grant anything more than means of transport for carrying off the Himeræan population, when the city was relinquished to the besiegers. It was agreed that the fleet, instead of sailing straight to Syracuse, should employ itself in carrying off as much of the population as could be put on board, and in depositing them safely at Messênê; after which it would return to fetch the remainder, who would in the mean time defend the city with their utmost force.

Such was the frail chance of refuge now alone open to these unhappy Greeks, against the devouring enemy without. Immediately the feebler part of the population,—elders, women, and children,—crowding on board until the triremes could hold no more, sailed away along the northern coast to Messênê. On the same night, Dioklês also marched out of the city with his Syracusan soldiers; in such haste to get home, that he could not even tarry to bury the numerous Syracusan soldiers who had been just slain in the recent disastrous sally. Many of the Himeræans, with their wives and children, took their departure along with Dioklês, as their only chance of escape; since it was but too plain that the triremes could not carry away all. The bravest and most devoted portion of the Himeræan warriors still remained, to defend their city until the triremes came back. After keeping armed watch on the walls all night, they were again assailed on the next morning by the Carthaginians, elate with their triumph of the preceding day and with the flight of so many defenders. Yet notwithstanding all the pressure of numbers, ferocity, and battering machines, the resistance was still successfully maintained; so that night found Himera still a Grecian city. On the next day, the triremes came back, having probably deposited their unfortunate cargo in some place of safety not so far off as Messênê. If the defenders could have maintained their walls until another sunset, many of them might yet have escaped. But the good fortune, and probably the physical force, of these brave men,

was now at an end. The gods were quitting Himera, as they had before quitted Selinus. At the moment when the triremes were seen coming near to the port, the Iberian assailants broke down a wide space of the fortification with their battering-rams, poured in through the breach, and overcame all opposition. Encouraged by their shouts, the barbaric host now on all sides forced the walls, and spread themselves over the city, which became one scene of wholesale slaughter and plunder. It was no part of the scheme of Hannibal to interrupt the plunder, which he made over as a recompense to his soldiers. But he speedily checked the slaughter, being anxious to take as many prisoners as possible, and increasing the number by dragging away all who had taken sanctuary in the temples. A few among this wretched population may have contrived to reach the approaching triremes; all the rest either perished or fell into the hands of the victor.[906]

It was a proud day for the Carthaginian general when he stood as master on the ground of Himera; enabled to fulfil the duty, and satisfy the exigencies, of revenge for his slain grandfather. Tragical indeed was the consummation of this long-cherished purpose. Not merely the walls and temples (as at Selinus), but all the houses in Himera, were razed to the ground. Its temples, having been first stripped of their ornaments and valuables, were burnt. The women and children taken captive were distributed as prizes among the soldiers. But all the male captives, three thousand in number, were conveyed to the precise spot where Hamilkar had been slain, and there put to death with indignity,[907] as an expiatory satisfaction to his lost honor. Lastly, in order that even the hated name of Himera might pass into oblivion, a new town called Therma (so designated because of some warm springs) was shortly afterwards founded by the Carthaginians in the neighborhood.[908]

No man can now read the account of this wholesale massacre without horror and repugnance. Yet we cannot doubt, that among all the acts of Hannibal's life, this was the one in which he most gloried; that it realized, in the most complete and emphatic manner, his concurrent inspirations of filial sentiment, religious obligation, and honor as a patriot; that to show mercy would have been regarded as a mean dereliction of these esteemed impulses; and that if the prisoners had been even more numerous, all of them would have been equally slain, rendering the expiatory fulfilment only so much the more honorable and efficacious. In the Carthaginian religion, human sacrifices were not merely admitted, but passed for the strongest manifestation of devotional fervor, and were especially resorted to in times of distress, when the necessity for propitiating the gods was accounted most pressing. Doubtless the feelings of Hannibal were cordially shared, and the plenitude of his revenge envied, by the army around him. So different, sometimes so totally contrary, is the tone and direction of the moral sentiments, among different ages and nations.

In the numerous wars of Greeks against Greeks, which we have been unfortunately called upon to study, we have found few or no examples of any considerable town taken by storm. So much the more terrible was the shock throughout the Gre-

cian world, of the events just recounted; Selinus and Himera, two Grecian cities of ancient standing and uninterrupted prosperity,—had both of them been stormed, ruined, and depopulated, by a barbaric host, within the space of three months.[909] No event at all parallel had occurred since the sack of Miletus by the Persians after the Ionic revolt (495 B.C.),[910] which raised such powerful sympathy and mourning in Athens. The war now raging in the Ægean, between Athens and Sparta with their respective allies, doubtless contributed to deaden, throughout Central Greece, the impression of calamities sustained by Greeks at the western extremity of Sicily. But within that island, the sympathy with the sufferers was most acute, and aggravated by terror for the future. The Carthaginian general had displayed a degree of energy equal to any Grecian officer throughout the war, with a command of besieging and battering machinery surpassing even the best equipped Grecian cities. The mercenaries whom he had got together were alike terrible from their bravery and ferocity; encouraging Carthaginian ambition to follow up its late rapid successes by attacks against the other cities of the island. No such prospects indeed were at once realized. Hannibal, having completed his revenge at Himera, and extended the Carthaginian dominion all across the north-west corner of Sicily (from Selinus on the southern sea to the site of Himera or Therma on the northern), dismissed his mercenary troops and returned home. Most of them were satiated with plunder as well as pay, though the Campanians, who had been foremost at the capture of Selinus, thought themselves unfairly stinted, and retired in disgust.[911] Hannibal carried back a rich spoil, with glorious trophies, to Carthage, where he was greeted with enthusiastic welcome and admiration.[912]

Never was there a time when the Greek cities in Sicily,—and Syracuse especially, upon whom the others would greatly rest in the event of a second Carthaginian invasion,—had stronger motives for keeping themselves in a condition of efficacious defence. Unfortunately, it was just at this moment that a new cause of intestine discord burst upon Syracuse; fatally impairing her strength, and proving in its consequences destructive to her liberty. The banished Syracusan general Hermokrates had recently arrived at Messênê in Sicily; where he appears to have been, at the time when the fugitives came from Himera. It has already been mentioned that he, with two colleagues, had commanded the Syracusan contingent serving with the Peloponnesians under Mindarus in Asia. After the disastrous defeat of Kyzikus, in which Mindarus was slain and every ship in the fleet taken or destroyed, sentence of banishment was passed at Syracuse against the three admirals. Hermokrates was exceedingly popular among the trierarchs and the officers; he had stood conspicuous for incorruptibility, and had conducted himself (so far as we have means of judging) with energy and ability in his command. The sentence, unmerited by his behavior, was dictated by acute vexation for the loss of the fleet, and for the disappointment of those expectations which Hermokrates had held out; combined with the fact that Diokles and the opposite party were now in the ascendant at Syracuse. When the banished general, in making it known to the armament, complained of its injustice and illegality, he ob-

tained warm sympathy, and even exhortations still to retain the command, in spite of orders from home. He forbade them earnestly to think of raising sedition against their common city and country;[913] upon which the trierarchs, when they took their last and affectionate leave of him, bound themselves by oath, as soon as they should return to Syracuse, to leave no means untried for procuring his restoration.

The admonitory words addressed by Hermokrates to the forwardness of the trierarchs, would have been honorable to his patriotism, had not his own conduct at the same time been worthy of the worst enemies of his country. For immediately on being superseded by the new admirals, he went to the satrap Pharnabazus, in whose favor he stood high; and obtained from him a considerable present of money, which he employed in collecting mercenary troops and building ships, to levy war against his opponents in Syracuse and procure his own restoration.[914] Thus strengthened, he returned from Asia to Sicily, and reached the Sicilian Messênê rather before the capture of Himera by the Carthaginians. At Messênê he caused five fresh triremes to be built, besides taking into his pay one thousand of the expelled Himeræans. At the head of these troops, he attempted to force his way into Syracuse, under concert with his friends in the city, who engaged to assist his admission by arms. Possibly some of the trierarchs of his armament, who had before sworn to lend him their aid, had now returned and were among this body of interior partisans.

The moment was well chosen for such an enterprise. As the disaster at Kyzikus had exasperated the Syracusans against Hermokrates, so we cannot doubt that there must have been a strong reaction against Diokles and his partisans, in consequence of the fall of Selinus unaided, and the subsequent abandonment of Himera. What degree of blame may fairly attach to Diokles for these misfortunes, we are not in a condition to judge. But such reverses in themselves were sure to discredit him more or less, and to lend increased strength and stimulus to the partisans of the banished Hermokrates. Nevertheless that leader, though he came to the gates of Syracuse, failed in his attempt to obtain admission, and was compelled to retire; upon which he marched his little army across the interior of the island, and took possession of the dismantled Selinus. Here he established himself as the chief of a new settlement, got together as many as he could of the expelled inhabitants (among whom probably some had already come back along with Empedion), and invited many fresh colonists from other quarters. Reëstablishing a portion of the demolished fortifications, he found himself gradually strengthened by so many new-comers, as to place at his command a body of six thousand chosen hoplites,—probably independent of other soldiers of inferior merit. With these troops he began to invade the Carthaginian settlements in the neighborhood, Motyê and Panormus.[915] Having defeated the forces of both in the field, he carried his ravages successfully over their territories, with large acquisitions of plunder. The Carthaginians had now no army remaining in Sicily; for their immense host of the preceding year had consisted only of mercenaries levied for the occasion, and then disbanded.

These events excited strong sensation throughout Sicily. The valor of Hermokrates, who had restored Selinus and conquered the Carthaginians on the very ground where they had stood so recently in terrific force, was contrasted with the inglorious proceeding of Diokles at Himera. In the public assemblies of Syracuse, this topic, coupled with the unjust sentence whereby Hermokrates had been banished, was emphatically set forth by his partisans; producing some reaction in his favor, and a still greater effect in disgracing his rival Diokles. Apprised that the tide of Syracusan opinion was turning towards him, Hermokrates made renewed preparations for his return, and resorted to a new stratagem for the purpose of smoothing the difficulty. He marched from Selinus to the ruined site of Himera, informed himself of the spot where the Syracusan troops had undergone their murderous defeat, and collected together the bones of his slain fellow-citizens; which (or rather the unburied bodies) must have lain upon the field unheeded for about two years. Having placed these bones on cars richly decorated, he marched with his forces and conveyed them across the island from Himera to the Syracusan border. Here as an exile he halted; thinking it suitable now to display respect for the law,—though in his previous attempt he had gone up to the very gates of the city, without any similar scruples. But he sent forward some friends with the cars and the bones, tendering them to the citizens for the purpose of being honored with due funeral solemnities. Their arrival was the signal for a violent party discussion, and for an outburst of aggravated displeasure against Diokles, who had left the bodies unburied on the field of battle. "It was to Hermokrates (so his partisans urged) and to his valiant efforts against the Carthaginians, that the recovery of these remnants of the slain, and the opportunity of administering to them the funeral solemnities, was now owing. Let the Syracusans, after duly performing such obsequies, testify their gratitude to Hermokrates by a vote of restoration, and their displeasure against Diokles by a sentence of banishment."[916] Diokles with his partisans was thus placed at great disadvantage. In opposing the restoration of Hermokrates, he thought it necessary also to oppose the proposition for welcoming and burying the bones of the slain citizens. Here the feelings of the people went vehemently against him; the bones were received and interred, amidst the respectful attendance of all; and so strong was the reactionary sentiment generally, that the partisans of Hermokrates carried their proposition for sentencing Diokles to banishment. But on the other hand, they could not so far prevail as to obtain the restoration of Hermokrates himself. The purposes of the latter had been so palpably manifested, in trying a few months before to force his way into the city by surprise, and in now presenting himself at the frontier with an armed force under his command,—that his readmission would have been nothing less than a deliberate surrender of the freedom of the city to a despot.[917]

Having failed in this well-laid stratagem for obtaining a vote of consent, Hermokrates saw that his return could not at that moment be consummated by open force. He therefore retired from the Syracusan frontier; yet only postponing his purposes of armed attack until his friends in the city could provide for him a convenient

opportunity. We see plainly that his own party within had been much strengthened, and his opponents enfeebled, by the recent manœuvre. Of this a proof is to be found in the banishment of Diokles, who probably was not succeeded by any other leader of equal influence. After a certain interval, the partisans of Hermokrates contrived a plan which they thought practicable, for admitting him into the city by night. Forewarned by them, he marched from Selinus at the head of three thousand soldiers, crossed the territory of Gela,[918] and reached the concerted spot near the gate of Achradina during the night. From the rapidity of his advance, he had only a few troops along with him; the main body not having been able to keep up. With these few, however, he hastened to the gate, which he found already in possession of his friends, who had probably (like Pasimêlus at Corinth[919]) awaited a night on which they were posted to act as sentinels. Master of the gate, Hermokrates, though joined by his partisans within in arms, thought it prudent to postpone decisive attack until his own main force came up. But during this interval, the Syracusan authorities in the city, apprised of what had happened, mustered their full military strength in the agora, and lost no time in falling upon the band of aggressors. After a sharply contested combat, these aggressors were completely worsted, and Hermokrates himself slain with a considerable proportion of his followers. The remainder having fled, sentence of banishment was passed upon them. Several among the wounded, however, were reported by their relatives as slain, in order that they might escape being comprised in such a condemnation.[920]

Thus perished one of the most energetic of the Syracusan citizens; a man not less effective as a defender of his country against foreign enemies, than himself dangerous as a formidable enemy to her internal liberties. It would seem, as far as we can make out, that his attempt to make himself master of his country was powerfully seconded, and might well have succeeded. But it lacked that adventitious support arising from present embarrassment and danger in the foreign relations of the city, which we shall find so efficacious two years afterwards in promoting the ambitious projects of Dionysius.

Dionysius,—for the next coming generation the most formidable name in the Grecian world,—now appears for the first time in history. He was a young Syracusan of no consideration from family or position, described as even of low birth and low occupation; as a scribe or secretary, which was looked upon as a subordinate, though essential, function.[921] He was the son of Hermokrates,—not that eminent person whose death has been just described, but another person of the same name, whether related or not, we do not know.[922] It is highly probable that he was a man of literary ability and instruction, since we read of him in after-days as a composer of odes and tragedies; and it is certain that he stood distinguished in all the talents for military action,—bravery, force of will, and quickness of discernment. On the present occasion, he espoused strenuously the party of Hermokrates, and was one of those who took arms in the city on his behalf. Having distinguished himself in the battle,

and received several wounds, he was among those given out for dead by his relations.[923] In this manner he escaped the sentence of banishment passed against the survivors. And when, in the course of a certain time, after recovering from his wounds, he was produced as unexpectedly living,—we may presume that his opponents and the leading men in the city left him unmolested, not thinking it worth while to reopen political inquisition in reference to matters already passed and finished. He thus remained in the city, marked out by his daring and address to the Hermokratæan party, as the person most fit to take up the mantle, and resume the anti-popular designs, of their late leader. It will presently be seen how the chiefs of this party lent their aid to exalt him.

Meanwhile the internal condition of Syracuse was greatly enfeebled by this division. Though the three several attempts of Hermokrates to penetrate by force or fraud into the city had all failed, yet they had left a formidable body of malcontents behind; while the opponents also, the popular government and its leaders, had been materially reduced in power and consideration by the banishment of Diokles. This magistrate was succeeded by Daphnæus and others, of whom we know nothing, except that they are spoken of as rich men and representing the sentiments of the rich, —and that they seem to have manifested but little ability. Nothing could be more unfortunate than the weakness of Syracuse at this particular juncture: for the Carthaginians, elate with their successes at Selinus and Himera, and doubtless also piqued by the subsequent retaliation of Hermokrates upon their dependencies at Motyê and Panormus, were just now meditating a second invasion of Sicily on a still larger scale. Not uninformed of their projects, the Syracusan leaders sent envoys to Carthage to remonstrate against them, and to make propositions for peace. But no satisfactory answer could be obtained, nor were the preparations discontinued.[924]

In the ensuing spring, the storm gathering from Africa burst with destructive violence upon this fated island. A mercenary force had been got together during the winter, greater than that which had sacked Selinus and Himera; three hundred thousand men, according to Ephorus,—one hundred and twenty thousand, according to Xenophon and Timæus. Hannibal was again placed in command; but his predominant impulses of family and religion having been satiated by the great sacrifice of Himera, he excused himself on the score of old age, and was only induced to accept the duty by having his relative Imilkon named as colleague. By their joint efforts, the immense host of Iberians, Mediterranean islanders, Campanians, Libyans, and Numidians, was united at Carthage, and made ready to be conveyed across, in a fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes, with no less than one thousand five hundred transports.[925] To protect the landing, forty Carthaginian triremes were previously sent over to the Bay of Motyê. The Syracusan leaders, with commendable energy and watchfulness, immediately despatched the like number of triremes to attack them, in hopes of thereby checking the farther arrival of the grand armament. They were victorious, destroying fifteen of the Carthaginian triremes, and driving the rest

back to Africa; yet their object was not attained; for Hannibal himself, coming forth immediately with fifty fresh triremes, constrained the Syracusans to retire. Presently afterwards the grand armament appeared, disembarking its motley crowd of barbaric warriors near the western cape of Sicily.

Great was the alarm caused throughout Sicily by their arrival. All the Greek cities either now began to prepare for war, or pushed with a more vigorous hand equipments previously begun, since they seem to have had some previous knowledge of the purpose of the enemy. The Syracusans sent to entreat assistance both from the Italian Greeks and from Sparta. From the latter city, however, little was to be expected, since her whole efforts were now devoted to the prosecution of the war against Athens; this being the year wherein Kallikratidas commanded, and when the battle of Arginusæ was fought.

Of all Sicilian Greeks, the Agrigentines were both the most frightened and the most busily employed. Conterminous as they were with Selinus on their western frontier, and foreseeing that the first shock of the invasion would fall upon them, they immediately began to carry in their outlying property within the walls, as well as to accumulate a stock of provisions for enduring blockade. Sending for Dexippus, a Lacedæmonian then in Gela as commander of a body of mercenaries for the defence of that town, they engaged him in their service, with one thousand five hundred hoplites; reinforced by eight hundred of those Campanians who had served with Hannibal at Himera, but had quitted him in disgust.[926]

Agrigentum was at this time in the highest state of prosperity and magnificence; a tempting prize for any invader. Its population was very great; comprising, according to one account, twenty thousand citizens among an aggregate total of two hundred thousand males,—citizens, metics, and slaves; according to another account, an aggregate total of no less than eight hundred thousand persons;[927] numbers unauthenticated, and not to be trusted farther than as indicating a very populous city. Situated a little more than two miles from the sea, and possessing a spacious territory highly cultivated, especially with vines and olives, Agrigentum carried on a lucrative trade with the opposite coast of Africa, where at that time no such plantations flourished. Its temples and porticos, especially the spacious temple of Zeus Olympius,—its statues and pictures,—its abundance of chariots and horses,—its fortifications,—its sewers,—its artificial lake of near a mile in circumference, abundantly stocked with fish,—all these placed it on a par with the most splendid cities of the Hellenic world.[928] Of the numerous prisoners taken at the defeat of the Carthaginians near Himera seventy years before, a very large proportion had fallen to the lot of the Agrigentines, and had been employed by them in public works contributing to the advantage or ornament of the city.[929] The hospitality of the wealthy citizens,—Gellias, Antisthenes, and others,—was carried even to profusion. The surrounding territory was celebrated for its breed of horses,[930] which the rich Agrigentines vied with each other in training and equipping for the chariot-race. At the last Olympic games imme-

diately preceding this fatal Carthaginian invasion (that is at the 93rd Olympiad,—408 B.C.), the Agrigentine Exænetus gained the prize in a chariot-race. On returning to Sicily after his victory, he was welcomed by many of his friends, who escorted him home in procession with three hundred chariots, each drawn by a pair of white horses, and all belonging to native Agrigentines. Of the festival by which the wealthy Antisthenes celebrated the nuptials of his daughter, we read an account almost fabulous. Amidst all this wealth and luxury, it is not surprising to hear that the rough duties of military exercise were imperfectly kept up, and that indulgences, not very consistent with soldier-like efficiency, were allowed to the citizens on guard.

Such was Agrigentum in May 406 B.C., when Hannibal and Imilkon approached it with their powerful army. Their first propositions, however, were not of a hostile character. They invited the Agrigentines to enter into alliance with Carthage; or if this were not acceptable, at any rate to remain neutral and at peace. Both propositions were declined.[931]

Besides having taken engagements with Gela and Syracuse, the Agrigentines also felt a confidence, not unreasonable, in the strength of their own walls and situation. Agrigentum with its citadel was placed on an aggregate of limestone hills, immediately above the confluence of two rivers, both flowing from the north; the river Akragas on the eastern and southern sides of the city, and the Hypsas on its western side. Of this aggregate of hills, separated from each other by clefts and valleys, the northern half is the loftiest, being about eleven hundred feet above the level of the sea—the southern half is less lofty. But on all sides, except on the south-west, it rises by a precipitous ascent; on the side towards the sea, it springs immediately out of the plain, thus presenting a fine prospect to ships passing along the coast. The whole of this aggregate of hills was encompassed by a continuous wall, built round the declivity, and in some parts hewn out of the solid rock. The town of Agrigentum was situated in the southern half of the walled enclosure. The citadel, separated from it by a ravine, and accessible only by one narrow ascent, stood on the north-eastern hill; it was the most conspicuous feature in the place, called the Athenæum, and decorated by temples of Athênê and of Zeus Atabyrius. In the plain under the southern wall of the city stood the Agrigentine sepulchres.[932]—Reinforced by eight hundred Campanian mercenaries, with the fifteen hundred other mercenaries brought by Dexippus from Gela,—the Agrigentines awaited confidently the attack upon their walls, which were not only in far better condition than those of Selinus, but also unapproachable by battering-machines or movable towers, except on one part of the south-western side. It was here that Hannibal, after reconnoitering the town all round, began his attack. But after hard fighting without success for one day, he was forced to retire at nightfall; and even lost his battering train, which was burnt during the night by a sally of the besieged.[933] Desisting from farther attempts on that point, Hannibal now ordered his troops to pull down the tombs; which were numerous on the lower or southern side of the city, and many of which, especially that

of the despot Theron, were of conspicuous grandeur. By this measure he calculated on providing materials adequate to the erection of immense mounds, equal in height to the southern wall, and sufficiently close to it for the purpose of assault. His numerous host had made considerable progress in demolishing these tombs, and were engaged in breaking down the monument of Theron, when their progress was arrested by a thunderbolt falling upon it. This event was followed by religious terrors, suddenly overspreading the camp. The prophets declared that the violation of the tombs was an act of criminal sacrilege. Every night the spectres of those whose tombs had been profaned manifested themselves, to the affright of the soldiers on guard; while the judgment of the gods was manifested in a violent pestilential distemper. Numbers of the army perished, Hannibal himself among them; and even of those who escaped death, many were disabled from active duty by distress and suffering. Imilkon was compelled to appease the gods, and to calm the agony of the troops, by a solemn supplication according to the Carthaginian rites. He sacrificed a child, considered as the most propitiatory of all offerings, to Kronus; and cast into the sea a number of animal victims as offerings to Poseidon.[934]

These religious rites calmed the terrors of the army, and mitigated, or were supposed to have mitigated, the distemper; so that Imilkon, while desisting from all farther meddling with the tombs, was enabled to resume his batteries and assaults against the walls, though without any considerable success. He also dammed up the western river Hypsas, so as to turn the stream against the wall; but this manœuvre produced no effect. His operations were presently interrupted by the arrival of a powerful army which marched from Syracuse, under Daphnæus, to the relief of Agrigentum. Reinforced in its road by the military strength of Kamarina and Gela, it amounted to thirty thousand foot and five thousand horse, on reaching the river Himera, the eastern frontier of the Agrigentine territory; while a fleet of thirty Syracusan triremes sailed along the coast to second its efforts. As these troops neared the town, Imilkon despatched against them a body of Iberians and Campanians;[935] who however, after a strenuous combat, were completely defeated, and driven back to the Carthaginian camp near the city, where they found themselves under the protection of the main army. Daphnæus, having secured the victory and inflicted severe loss upon the enemy, was careful to prevent his troops from disordering their ranks in the ardor of pursuit, in the apprehension that Imilkon with the main body might take advantage of that disorder to turn the fortune of the day,—as had happened in the terrible defeat before Himera, three years before. The routed Iberians were thus allowed to get back to the camp. At the same time the Agrigentines, witnessing from the walls, with joyous excitement, the flight of their enemies, vehemently urged their generals to lead them forth for an immediate sally, in order that the destruction of the fugitives might thus be consummated. But the generals were inflexible in resisting such demand; conceiving that the city itself would thus be stripped of its defenders, and that Imilkon might seize the occasion for assaulting it with his main body, when there was not sufficient force to repel them. The defeated Iberians thus es-

caped to the main camp; neither pursued by the Syracusans, nor impeded, as they passed near the Agrigentine walls, by the population within.

Presently Daphnæus with his victorious army reached Agrigentum, and joined the citizens; who flocked in crowds, along with the Lacedæmonian Dexippus, to meet and welcome them. But the joy of meeting, and the reciprocal congratulations on the recent victory, were fatally poisoned by general indignation for the unmolested escape of the defeated Iberians; occasioned by nothing less than remissness, cowardice, or corruption, (so it was contended), on the part of the generals,—first the Syracusan generals, and next the Agrigentine. Against the former, little was now said, though much was held in reserve, as we shall soon hear. But against the latter, the discontent of the Agrigentine population burst forth instantly and impetuously. A public assembly being held on the spot, the Agrigentine generals, five in number, were put under accusation. Among many speakers who denounced them as guilty of treason, the most violent of all was the Kamarinæan Menês,—himself one of the leaders, seemingly of the Kamarinæan contingent in the army of Daphnæus. The concurrence of Menês, carrying to the Agrigentines a full sanction of their sentiments, wrought them up to such a pitch of fury, that the generals, when they came to defend themselves, found neither sympathy nor even common fairness of hearing. Four out of the five were stoned and put to death on the spot; the fifth, Argeius, was spared only on the ground of his youth; and even the Lacedæmonian Dexippus was severely censured.[936]

How far, in regard to these proceedings, the generals were really guilty, or how far their defence, had it been fairly heard, would have been valid,—is a point which our scanty information does not enable us to determine. But it is certain that the arrival of the victorious Syracusans at Agrigentum completely altered the relative position of affairs. Instead of farther assaulting the walls, Imilkon was attacked in his camp by Daphnæus. The camp, however, was so fortified as to repel all attempts, and the siege from this time forward became only a blockade; a contest of patience and privation between the city and the besiegers, lasting seven or eight months from the commencement of the siege. At first Daphnæus, with his own force united to the Agrigentines, was strong enough to harass the Carthaginians and intercept their supplies, so that the greatest distress began to prevail among their army. The Campanian mercenaries even broke out into mutiny, crowding, with clamorous demands for provision and with menace of deserting, around the tent of Imilkon; who barely pacified them by pledging to them the gold and silver drinking-cups of the chief Carthaginians around him,[937] coupled with entreaties that they would wait yet a few days. During that short interval, he meditated and executed a bold stroke of relief. The Syracusans and Agrigentines were mainly supplied by sea from Syracuse; from whence a large transport of provision-ships was now expected, under convoy of some Syracusan triremes. Apprised of their approach, Imilkon silently brought out forty Carthaginian triremes from Motyê and Panormus, with which he suddenly at-

tacked the Syracusan convoy, no way expecting such a surprise. Eight Syracusan triremes were destroyed; the remainder were driven ashore, and the whole fleet of transports fell into the hands of Imilkon. Abundance and satisfaction now reigned in the camp of the Carthaginians, while the distress, and with it the discontent, was transferred to Agrigentum. The Campanian mercenaries in the service of Dexippus began the mutiny, complaining to him of their condition. Perhaps he had been alarmed and disgusted at the violent manifestation of the Agrigentines against their generals, extending partly to himself also. At any rate, he manifested no zeal in the defence, and was even suspected of having received a bribe of fifteen talents from the Carthaginians. He told the Campanians that Agrigentum was no longer tenable, for want of supplies; upon which they immediately retired, and marched away to Messênê, affirming that the time stipulated for their stay had expired. Such a secession struck every one with discouragement. The Agrigentine generals immediately instituted an examination, to ascertain the quantity of provision still remaining in the city. Having made the painful discovery that there remained but very little, they took the resolution of causing the city to be evacuated by its population during the coming night.[938]

A night followed, even more replete with woe and desolation than that which had witnessed the flight of Diokles with the inhabitants of Himera from their native city. Few scenes can be imagined more deplorable than the vast population of Agrigentum obliged to hurry out of their gates during a December night, as their only chance of escape from famine or the sword of a merciless enemy. The road to Gela was beset by a distracted crowd, of both sexes and of every age and condition, confounded in one indiscriminate lot of suffering. No thought could be bestowed on the preservation of property or cherished possessions. Happy were they who could save their lives; for not a few, through personal weakness or the immobility of despair, were left behind. Perhaps here and there a citizen, combining the personal strength with the filial piety of Æneas, might carry away his aged father with the household gods on his shoulders; but for the most part, the old, the sick, and the impotent, all whose years were either too tender or too decrepit to keep up with a hurried flight, were of necessity abandoned. Some remained and slew themselves, refusing even to survive the loss of their homes and the destruction of their city; others, among whom was the wealthy Gellias, consigned themselves to the protection of the temples, but with little hope that it would procure them safety. The morning's dawn exhibited to Imilkon unguarded walls, a deserted city, and a miserable population of exiles huddled together in disorderly flight on the road to Gela.

For these fugitives, however, the Syracusan and Agrigentine soldiers formed a rear-guard sufficient to keep off the aggravated torture of a pursuit. But the Carthaginian army found enough to occupy them in the undefended prey which was before their eyes. They rushed upon the town with the fury of men who had been struggling and suffering before it for eight months. They ransacked the houses, slew

every living person that was left, and found plunder enough to satiate even a ravenous appetite. Temples as well as private dwellings were alike stripped, so that those who had taken sanctuary in them became victims like the rest: a fate which Gellius only avoided by setting fire to the temple in which he stood and perishing in its ruins. The great public ornaments and trophies of the city,—the bull of Phalaris, together with the most precious statues and pictures,—were preserved by Imilkon and sent home as decorations to Carthage.[939] While he gave up the houses of Agrigentum to be thus gutted, he still kept them standing, and caused them to serve as winter-quarters for the repose of his soldiers, after the hardships of an eight months' siege. The unhappy Agrigentine fugitives first found shelter and kind hospitality at Gela; from whence they were afterwards, by permission of the Syracusans, transferred to Leontini.

I have described, as far as the narrative of Diodorus permits us to know, this momentous and tragical portion of Sicilian history; a suitable preface to the long despotism of Dionysius. It is evident that the seven or eight months (the former of these numbers is authenticated by Xenophon, while the latter is given by Diodorus) of the siege or blockade must have contained matters of the greatest importance which are not mentioned, and that even of the main circumstances which brought about the capture, we are most imperfectly informed. But though we cannot fully comprehend its causes, its effects are easy to understand. They were terror-striking and harrowing in the extreme. When the storm which had beaten down Selinus and Himera was now perceived to have extended its desolation to a city so much more conspicuous, among the wealthiest and most populous in the Grecian world,—when the surviving Agrigentine population, including women and children, and the great proprietors of chariots whose names stood recorded as victors at Olympia, were seen all confounded in one common fate of homeless flight and nakedness—when the victorious host and its commanders took up their quarters in the deserted houses, ready to spread their conquests farther after a winter of repose,—there was hardly a Greek in Sicily who did not tremble for his life and property.[940] Several of them sought shelter at Syracuse, while others even quitted the island altogether, emigrating to Italy.

Amidst so much anguish, humiliation, and terror, there were loud complaints against the conduct of the Syracusan generals under whose command the disaster had occurred. The censure which had been cast upon them before, for not having vigorously pursued the defeated Iberians, was now revived, and aggravated tenfold by the subsequent misfortune. To their inefficiency the capture of Agrigentum was ascribed, and apparently not without substantial cause; for the town was so strongly placed as to defy assault, and could only be taken by blockade; now we discern no impediments adequate to hinder the Syracusan generals from procuring supplies of provisions; and it seems clear that the surprise of the Syracusan store-ships might have been prevented by proper precautions; upon which surprise the whole question turned, between famine in the Carthaginian camp and famine in Agrigentum.[941]

The efficiency of Dexippus and the other generals, in defending Agrigentum (as depicted by Diodorus), stands sadly inferior to the vigor and ability displayed by Gylippus before Syracuse, as described by Thucydides: and we can hardly wonder that by men in the depth of misery, like the Agrigentines,—or in extreme alarm, like the other Sicilian Greeks—these generals, incompetent or treasonable, should be regarded as the cause of the ruin.

Such a state of sentiment, under ordinary circumstances, would have led to the condemnation of the generals and to the nomination of others, with little farther result. But it became of far graver import, when combined with the actual situation of parties in Syracuse. The Hermokratean opposition party,—repelled during the preceding year with the loss of its leader, yet nowise crushed,—now re-appeared more formidable than ever, under a new leader more aggressive even than Hermokrates himself. Throughout ancient as well as modern history, defeat and embarrassment in the foreign relations have proved fruitful causes of change in the internal government. Such auxiliaries had been wanting to the success of Hermokrates in the preceding year; but alarms of every kind now overhung the city in terrific magnitude, and when the first Syracusan assembly was convoked on returning from Agrigentum, a mournful silence reigned;[942] as in the memorable description given by Demosthenes of the Athenian assembly held immediately after the taking of Elateia.[943] The generals had lost the confidence of their fellow-citizens; yet no one else was forward, at a juncture so full of peril, to assume their duty, by proffering fit counsel for the future conduct of the war. Now was the time for the Hermokratean party to lay their train for putting down the government. Dionysius, though both young and of mean family, was adopted as leader in consequence of that audacity and bravery which even already he had displayed, both in the fight along with Hermokrates and in the battles against the Carthaginians. Hipparinus, a Syracusan of rich family, who had ruined himself by dissolute expenses, was eager to renovate his fortunes by seconding the elevation of Dionysius to the despotism;[944] Philistus (the subsequent historian of Syracuse), rich, young, and able, threw himself ardently into the same cause; and doubtless other leading persons, ancient Hermokrateans and others, stood forward as partisans in the conspiracy. But it either was, from the beginning, or speedily became, a movement organized for the purpose of putting the sceptre into the hands of Dionysius, to whom all the rest, though several among them were of far greater wealth and importance, served but as satellites and auxiliaries.

Amidst the silence and disquietude which reigned in the Syracusan assembly, Dionysius was the first who rose to address them. He enlarged upon a topic suitable alike to the temper of his auditors and to his own views. He vehemently denounced the generals as having betrayed the security of Syracuse to the Carthaginians,—and as the persons to whom the ruin of Agrigentum, together with the impending peril of every man around, was owing. He set forth their misdeeds, real or alleged, not merely with fulness and acrimony, but with a ferocious violence outstripping all the

limits of admissible debate, and intended to bring upon them a lawless murder, like the death of the generals recently at Agrigentum. "There they sit, the traitors! Do not wait for legal trial or verdict; but lay hands upon them at once, and inflict upon them summary justice."[945] Such a brutal exhortation, not unlike that of the Athenian Kritias, when he caused the execution of Theramenes in the oligarchical senate, was an offence against law as well as against parliamentary order. The presiding magistrates reproved Dionysius as a disturber of order, and fined him, as they were empowered by law.[946] But his partisans were loud in his support. Philistus not only paid down the fine for him on the spot, but publicly proclaimed that he would go on for the whole day paying all similar fines which might be imposed,—and incited Dionysius to persist in such language as he thought proper. That which had begun as illegality, was now aggravated into open defiance of the law. Yet so enfeebled was the authority of the magistrates, and so vehement the cry against them, in the actual position of the city, that they were unable either to punish or to repress the speaker. Dionysius pursued his harangue in a tone yet more inflammatory, not only accusing the generals of having corruptly betrayed Agrigentum, but also denouncing the conspicuous and wealthy citizens generally, as oligarchs who held tyrannical sway,—who treated the many with scorn, and made their own profit out of the misfortunes of the city. Syracuse (he contended) could never be saved, unless men of a totally different character were invested with authority; men, not chosen from wealth and station, but of humble birth, belonging to the people by position, and kind in their deportment from consciousness of their own weakness.[947] His bitter invective against generals already discredited, together with the impetuous warmth of his apparent sympathy for the people against the rich, were both alike favorably received. Plato states that the assembly became so furiously exasperated, as to follow literally the lawless and blood-thirsty inspirations of Dionysius, and to stone all these generals, ten in number, on the spot, without any form of trial. But Diodorus simply tells us, that a vote was passed to cashier the generals, and to name in their places Dionysius, Hipparinus, and others.[948] This latter statement is, in my opinion, the more probable.

Such was the first stage of what we may term the despot's progress, successfully consummated. The pseudo-demagogue Dionysius outdoes, in fierce professions of antipathy against the rich, anything that we read as coming from the real demagogues, Athenagoras at Syracuse, or Kleon at Athens. Behold him now sitting as a member of the new Board of generals, at a moment when the most assiduous care and energy, combined with the greatest unanimity, were required to put the Syracusan military force into an adequate state of efficiency. It suited the policy of Dionysius not only to bestow no care or energy himself, but to nullify all that was bestowed by his colleagues, and to frustrate deliberately all chance of unanimity. He immediately began a systematic opposition and warfare against his colleagues. He refused to attend at their Board, or to hold any communication with them. At the frequent assemblies held during this agitated state of the public mind, he openly denounced them as engaged in treasonable correspondence with the enemy. It is obvi-

ous that his colleagues, men newly chosen in the same spirit with himself, could not as yet have committed any such treason in favor of the Carthaginians. But among them was his accomplice Hipparinus;[949] while probably the rest also, nominated by a party devoted to him personally, were selected in a spirit of collusion, as either thorough-going partisans, or worthless and incompetent men, easy for him to set aside. At any rate, his calumnies, though received with great repugnance by the leading and more intelligent citizens, found favor with the bulk of the assembly, predisposed at that moment from the terrors of the situation to suspect every one. The new Board of generals being thus discredited, Dionysius alone was listened to as an adviser. His first and most strenuous recommendation was, that a vote should be passed for restoring the exiles; men (he affirmed) attached to their country, and burning to serve her, having already refused the offers of her enemies; men who had been thrown into banishment by previous political dispute, but who, if now generously recalled, would manifest their gratitude by devoted patriotism, and serve Syracuse far more warmly than the allies invoked from Italy and Peloponnesus. His discredited colleagues either could not, or would not, oppose the proposition; which, being warmly pressed by Dionysius and all his party, was at length adopted by the assembly. The exiles accordingly returned, comprising all the most violent men who had been in arms with Hermokrates when he was slain. They returned glowing with party-antipathy and revenge, prepared to retaliate upon others the confiscation under which themselves had suffered, and looking to the despotism of Dionysius as their only means of success.[950]

The second step of the despot's progress was now accomplished. Dionysius had filled up the ranks of the Hermokratean party, and obtained an energetic band of satellites, whose hopes and interests were thoroughly identified with his own. Meanwhile letters arrived from Gela, entreating reinforcements, as Imilkon was understood to be about to march thither. Dionysius being empowered to march thither a body of two thousand hoplites, with four hundred horsemen, turned the occasion to profitable account. A regiment of mercenaries, under the Lacedæmonian Dexippus, was in garrison at Gela; while the government of the town is said to have been oligarchical, in the hands of the rich, though with a strong and discontented popular opposition. On reaching Gela, Dionysius immediately took part with the latter; originating the most violent propositions against the governing rich, as he had done at Syracuse. Accusing them of treason in the public assembly, he obtained a condemnatory vote under which they were put to death and their properties confiscated. With the funds so acquired, he paid the arrears due to the soldiers of Dexippus, and doubled the pay of his own Syracusan division. These measures procured for him immense popularity, not merely with all the soldiers, but also with the Geloan Demos, whom he had relieved from the dominion of their wealthy oligarchy. Accordingly, after passing a public vote testifying their gratitude, and bestowing upon him large rewards, they despatched envoys to carry the formal expression of their sentiments to Syracuse. Dionysius resolved to go back thither at the same time, with his Syracusan

soldiers; and tried to prevail on Dexippus to accompany him with his own division. This being refused, he went thither with his Syracusans alone. To the Geloans, who earnestly entreated that they might not be forsaken when the enemy was daily expected, he contented himself with replying that he would presently return with a larger force.[951]

A third step was thus obtained. Dionysius was going back to Syracuse with a testimonial of admiration and gratitude from Gela,—with increased attachment on the part of his own soldiers, on account of the double pay,—and with the means of coining and circulating a new delusion. It was on the day of a solemn festival that he reached the town, just as the citizens were coming in crowds out of the theatre. Amidst the bustle of such a scene as well as of the return of the soldiers, many citizens flocked around him to inquire, What news about the Carthaginians? "Do not ask about your foreign enemies (was the reply of Dionysius); you have much worse enemies within among you. Your magistrates,—these very men upon whose watch you rely during the indulgence of the festival,—they are the traitors who are pillaging the public money, leaving the soldiers unpaid, and neglecting all necessary preparation, at a moment when the enemy with an immense host is on the point of assailing you. I knew their treachery long ago, but I have now positive proof of it. For Imilkon sent to me an envoy, under pretence of treating about the prisoners, but in reality to purchase my silence and connivance; he tendered to me a larger bribe than he had given to them, if I would consent to refrain from hindering them, since I could not be induced to take part in their intrigues. This is too much. I am come home now to throw up my command. While my colleagues are corruptly bartering away their country, I am willing to take my share as a citizen in the common risk, but I cannot endure to incur shame as an accomplice in their treachery."

Such bold allegations, scattered by Dionysius among the crowd pressing round him,—renewed at length, with emphatic formality in the regular assembly held the next day,—and concluding with actual resignation,—struck deep terror into the Syracusan mind. He spoke with authority, not merely as one fresh from the frontier exposed, but also as bearing the grateful testimonial of the Geloans, echoed by the soldiers whose pay he had recently doubled. His assertion of the special message from Imilkon, probably an impudent falsehood, was confidently accepted and backed by all these men, as well as by his other partisans, the Hermokratean party, and most of all by the restored exiles. What defence the accused generals made, or tried to make, we are not told. It was not likely to prevail, nor did it prevail, against the positive deposition of a witness so powerfully seconded. The people, persuaded of their treason, were incensed against them, and trembled at the thought of being left, by the resignation of Dionysius, to the protection of such treacherous guardians against the impending invasion. Now was the time for his partisans to come forward with their main proposition: "Why not get rid of these traitors, and keep Dionysius alone? Leave them to be tried and punished at a more convenient season; but elect him at

once general with full powers, to make head against the pressing emergency from without. Do not wait until the enemy is actually assaulting our walls. Dionysius is the man for our purpose, the only one with whom we have a chance of safety. Recollect that our glorious victory over the three hundred thousand Carthaginians at Himera was achieved by Gelon acting as general with full powers." Such rhetoric was irresistible in the present temper of the assembly,—when the partisans of Dionysius were full of audacity and acclamation,—when his opponents were discomfited, suspicious of each other, and without any positive scheme to propose,—and when the storm, which had already overwhelmed Selinus, Himera, and Agrigentum, was about to burst on Gela and Syracuse. A vote of the assembly was passed, appointing Dionysius general of the city, alone, and with full powers;[952] by what majority we do not know.

The first use which the new general-plenipotentiary made of his dignity was to propose, in the same assembly, that the pay of the soldiers should be doubled. Such liberality (he said) would be the best means of stimulating their zeal; while in regard to expense, there need be no hesitation; the money might easily be provided.

Thus was consummated the fourth, and most important, act of the despot's progress. A vote of the assembly had been obtained, passed in constitutional forms, vesting in Dionysius a single-handed power unknown to and above the laws,—unlimited and unresponsible. But he was well aware that the majority of those who thus voted had no intention of permanently abnegating their freedom,—that they meant only to create a temporary dictatorship, under the pressing danger of the moment, for the express purpose of preserving that freedom against a foreign enemy,—and that even thus much had been obtained by impudent delusion and calumny, which subsequent reflection would speedily dissipate. No sooner had the vote passed, than symptoms of regret and alarm became manifest among the people. What one assembly had conferred, a second repentant assembly might revoke.[953] It therefore now remained for Dionysius to ensure the perpetuity of his power by some organized means; so as to prevent the repentance, of which he already discerned the commencement, from realizing itself in any actual revocation. For this purpose he required a military force extra-popular and anti-popular; bound to himself and not to the city. He had indeed acquired popularity with the Syracusan as well as with the mercenary soldiers, by doubling and ensuring their pay. He had energetic adherents, prepared to go all lengths on his behalf, especially among the restored exiles. This was an important basis, but not sufficient for his objects without the presence of a special body of guards, constantly and immediately available, chosen as well as controlled by himself, yet acting in such vocation under the express mandate and sanction of the people. He required a farther vote of the people, legalizing for his use such a body of guards.

But with all his powers of delusion, and all the zeal of his partisans, he despaired of getting any such vote from an assembly held at Syracuse. Accordingly, he resorted

to a manœuvre, proclaiming that he had resolved on a march to Leontini, and summoning the full military force of Syracuse (up to the age of forty) to march along with him, with orders for each man to bring with him thirty days' provision. Leontini had been, a few years before, an independent city; but was now an outlying fortified post, belonging to the Syracusans; wherein various foreign settlers, and exiles from the captured Sicilian cities, had obtained permission to reside. Such men, thrown out of their position and expectations as citizens, were likely to lend either their votes or their swords willingly to the purposes of Dionysius. While he thus found many new adherents there, besides those whom he brought with him, he foresaw that the general body of the Syracusans, and especially those most disaffected to him, would not be disposed to obey his summons or accompany him.[954] For nothing could be more preposterous, in a public point of view, than an out-march of the whole Syracusan force for thirty days to Leontini, where there was neither danger to be averted nor profit to be reaped; at a moment too when the danger on the side of Gela was most serious, from the formidable Carthaginian host at Agrigentum.

Dionysius accordingly set out with a force which purported, ostensibly and according to summons, to be the full military manifestation of Syracuse; but which, in reality, comprised mainly his own adherents. On encamping for the night near to Leontini, he caused a factitious clamor and disturbance to be raised during the darkness, around his own tent,—ordered fires to be kindled,—summoned on a sudden his most intimate friends,—and affected to retire under their escort to the citadel. On the morrow an assembly was convened, of the Syracusans and residents present, purporting to be a Syracusan assembly; Syracuse in military guise, or as it were in Comitia Centuriata,—to employ an ancient phrase belonging to the Roman republic. Before this assembly Dionysius appeared, and threw himself upon their protection; affirming that his life had been assailed during the preceding night,—calling upon them emphatically to stand by him against the incessant snares of his enemies,—and demanding for that purpose a permanent body of guards. His appeal, plausibly and pathetically turned, and doubtless warmly seconded by zealous partisans, met with complete success. The assembly,—Syracusan or quasi-Syracusan, though held at Leontini,—passed a formal decree, granting to Dionysius a body-guard of six hundred men, selected by himself and responsible to him alone.[955] One speaker indeed proposed to limit the guards to such a number as should be sufficient to protect him against any small number of personal enemies, but not to render him independent of, or formidable to, the many.[956] But such precautionary refinement was not likely to be much considered, when the assembly was dishonest or misguided enough to pass the destructive vote here solicited; and even if embodied in the words of the resolution, there were no means of securing its observance in practice. The regiment of guards being once formally sanctioned, Dionysius heeded little the limit of number prescribed to him. He immediately enrolled more than one thousand men, selected as well for their bravery as from their poverty and desperate position. He provided them with the choicest arms, and promised to them the most munificent pay. To this

basis of a certain, permanent, legalized, regiment of household troops, he added farther a sort of standing army, composed of mercenaries hardly less at his devotion than the guards properly so called. In addition to the mercenaries already around him, he invited others from all quarters, by tempting offers; choosing by preference outlaws and profligates, and liberating slaves for the purpose.[957] Next, summoning from Gela Dexippus the Lacedæmonian, with the troops under his command, he sent this officer away to Peloponnesus,—as a man not trustworthy for his purpose and likely to stand forward on behalf of the freedom of Syracuse. He then consolidated all the mercenaries under one organization, officering them anew with men devoted to himself.

This fresh military levy and organization was chiefly accomplished during his stay at Leontini, without the opposition which would probably have arisen if it had been done at Syracuse; to which latter place Dionysius marched back, in an attitude far more imposing than when he left it. He now entered the gates at the head not only of his chosen body-guard, but also of a regular army of mercenaries, hired by and dependent upon himself. He marched them at once into the islet of Ortygia (the interior and strongest part of the city, commanding the harbor), established his camp in that acropolis of Syracuse, and stood forth as despot conspicuously in the eyes of all. Though the general sentiment among the people was one of strong repugnance, yet his powerful military force and strong position rendered all hope of open resistance desperate. And the popular assembly,—convoked under the pressure of this force, and probably composed of none but his partisans,—was found so subservient, as to condemn and execute, upon his requisition, Daphnæus and Demarchus. These two men, both wealthy and powerful in Syracuse, had been his chief opponents, and were seemingly among the very generals whom he had incited the people to massacre on the spot without any form of trial, in one of the previous public assemblies.[958] One step alone remained to decorate the ignoble origin of Dionysius, and to mark the triumph of the Hermokratean party by whom its elevation had been mainly brought about. He immediately married the daughter of Hermokrates; giving his own sister in marriage to Polyxenus, the brother of that deceased chief.[959]

Thus was consummated the fifth or closing act of the despot's progress, rendering Dionysius master of the lives and fortunes of his fellow-countrymen. The successive stages of his rise I have detailed from Diodorus, who (excepting a hint or two from Aristotle) is our only informant. His authority is on this occasion better than usual, since he had before him not merely Ephorus and Timæus, but also Philistus. He is, moreover, throughout this whole narrative at least clear and consistent with himself. We understand enough of the political strategy pursued by Dionysius, to pronounce that it was adapted to his end with a degree of skill that would have greatly struck a critical eye like Machiavel; whose analytical appreciation of means, when he is canvassing men like Dionysius, has been often unfairly construed as if it implied sympathy with and approbation of their end. We see that Dionysius, in putting him-

self forward as the chief and representative of the Hermokratean party, acquired the means of employing a greater measure of fraud and delusion than an exile like Hermokrates, in prosecution of the same ambitious purposes. Favored by the dangers of the state and the agony of the public mind, he was enabled to simulate an ultra-democratical ardor both in defence of the people against the rich, and in denunciation of the unsuccessful or incompetent generals, as if they were corrupt traitors. Though it would seem that the government of Syracuse, in 406 B.C., must have been strongly democratical, yet Dionysius in his ardor for popular rights, treats it as an anti-popular oligarchy; and tries to acquire the favor of the people by placing himself in the most open quarrel and antipathy to the rich. Nine years before, in the debate between Hermokrates and Athenagoras in the Syracusan assembly, the former stood forth, or at least was considered to stand forth, as champion of the rich; while the latter spoke as a conservative democrat, complaining of conspiracies on the part of the rich. In 406 B.C., the leader of the Hermokratean party has reversed this policy, assuming a pretended democratical fervor much more violent than that of Athenagoras. Dionysius, who took up the trade of what is called a demagogue on this one occasion, simply for the purpose of procuring one single vote in his own favor, and then shutting the door by force against all future voting and all correction,—might resort to grosser falsehood than Athenagoras; who, as an habitual speaker, was always before the people, and even if successful by fraud at one meeting, was nevertheless open to exposure at a second.

In order that the voting of any public assembly shall be really available as a protection to the people, its votes must not only be preceded by full and free discussion, but must also be open from time to time to rediscussion and correction. That error will from time to time be committed, as well by the collective people as by particular fractions of the people, is certain; opportunity for amendment is essential. A vote which is understood to be final, and never afterwards to be corrigible, is one which can hardly turn to the benefit of the people themselves, though it may often, as in the case of Dionysius, promote the sinister purposes of some designing protector.

CHAPTER LXXXII.

SICILY DURING THE DESPOTISM OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS AT SYRACUSE.

THE proceedings, recounted at the close of my last chapter, whereby Dionysius erected his despotism, can hardly have occupied less than three months; coinciding nearly with the first months of 405 B.C., inasmuch as Agrigentum was taken about the winter solstice of 406 B.C.[960] He was not molested during this period by the Carthaginians, who were kept inactive in quarters at Agrigentum, to repose after the hardships of the blockade; employed in despoiling the city of its movable ornaments, for transmission to Carthage, and in burning or defacing, with barbarous antipathy, such as could not be carried away.[961] In the spring Imilkon moved forward towards Gela, having provided himself with fresh siege-machines, and ensured his supplies from the Carthaginian territory in his rear. Finding no army to oppose him, he spread his troops over the territory both of Gela and of Kamarina, where much plunder was collected and much property ruined. He then returned to attack Gela, and established a fortified camp by clearing some plantation-ground near the river of the same name, between the city and the sea. On this spot stood, without the walls, a colossal statue of Apollo, which Imilkon caused to be carried off and sent as a present to Tyre.

Gela was at this moment defended only by its own citizens, for Dionysius had called away Dexippus with the mercenary troops. Alarmed at the approach of the formidable enemy who had already mastered Agrigentum, Himera, and Selinus,—the Geloans despatched pressing entreaties to Dionysius for aid; at the same time resolving to send away their women and children for safety to Syracuse. But the women, to whom the idea of separation was intolerable, supplicated so earnestly to be allowed to stay and share the fortunes of their fathers and husbands, that this resolution was abandoned. In expectation of speedy relief from Dionysius, the defence was brave and energetic. While parties of the Geloans, well-acquainted with the country, sallied out and acted with great partial success against the Carthaginian plunderers,—the mass of the citizens repelled the assaults of Imilkon against the walls. His battering-machines and storming-parties were brought to bear on several places at once; the walls themselves,—being neither in so good a condition, nor placed upon so unassailable an eminence, as those of Agrigentum,—gave way on more than one point. Yet still the besieged, with obstinate valor, frustrated every attempt to penetrate within; reëstablishing during the night the breaches which had been made during the day. The feebler part of their population aided, by every means in their power, the warriors on the battlements; so the defence was thus made good until Dionysius appeared with the long-expected reinforcement. It comprised his newly-

levied mercenaries, with the Syracusan citizens, and succors from the Italian as well as from the Sicilian Greeks; amounting in all to fifty thousand men, according to Ephorus,—to thirty thousand foot, and one thousand horse, as Timæus represented. A fleet of fifty ships of war sailed round Cape Pachynus to coöperate with them off Gela.[962]

Dionysius fixed his position between Gela and the sea, opposite to that of the Carthaginians, and in immediate communication with his fleet. His presence having suspended the assaults upon the town, he became in his turn the aggressor; employing both his cavalry and his fleet to harass the Carthaginians and intercept their supplies. The contest now assumed a character nearly the same as had taken place before Agrigentum, and which had ended so unfavorably to the Greeks. At length, after twenty days of such desultory warfare, Dionysius, finding that he had accomplished little, laid his plan for a direct attack upon the Carthaginian camp. On the side towards the sea, as no danger had been expected, that camp was unfortified; it was there, accordingly, that Dionysius resolved to make his principal attack with his left division, consisting principally of Italiot Greeks, sustained by the Syracusan ships, who were to attack simultaneously from seaward. He designed at the same time also to strike blows from two other points. His right division, consisting of Sicilian allies, was ordered to march on the right or western side of the town of Gela, and thus fall upon the left of the Carthaginian camp; while he himself, with the mercenary troops which he kept specially around him, intended to advance through the town itself, and assail the advanced or central portion of their position near the walls, where their battering-machinery was posted. His cavalry were directed to hold themselves in reserve for pursuit, in case the attack proved successful; or for protection to the retreating infantry, in case it failed.[963]

Of this combined scheme, the attack upon the left or seaward side of the Carthaginian camp, by the Italiot division and the fleet in concert, was effectively executed, and promised at first to be successful. The assailants overthrew the bulwarks, forced their way into the camp, and were only driven out by extraordinary efforts on the part of the defenders; chiefly Iberians and Campanians, but reinforced from the other portions of the army, which were as yet unmolested. But of the two other divisions of Dionysius, the right did not attack until long after the moment intended, and the centre never attacked at all. The right had to make a circuitous march, over the Geloan plain round the city, which occupied longer time than had been calculated; while Dionysius with the mercenaries around him, intending to march through the city, found themselves so obstructed and embarrassed that they made very slow progress, and were yet longer before they could emerge on the Carthaginian side. Probably the streets, as in so many other ancient towns, were crooked, narrow, and irregular; perhaps also, farther blocked up by precautions recently taken for defence. And thus the Sicilians on the right, not coming up to the attack until the Italians on the left had been already repulsed, were compelled to re-

treat, after a brave struggle, by the concurrent force of the main Carthaginian army. Dionysius and his mercenaries, coming up later still, found that the moment for attack had passed altogether, and returned back into the city without fighting at all.

Whether the plan or the execution was here at fault,—or both the one and the other,—we are unable certainly to determine. There will appear reasons for suspecting, that Dionysius was not displeased at a repulse which should discourage his army, and furnish an excuse for abandoning Gela. After retiring again within the walls, he called together his principal friends to consult what was best to be done. All were of opinion that it was imprudent to incur farther hazard for the preservation of the town. Dionysius now found himself in the same position as Diokles after the defeat near Himera, and as Daphnæus and the other Syracusan generals before Agrigentum, after the capture of their provision-fleet by the Carthaginians. He felt constrained to abandon Gela, taking the best means in his power for protecting the escape of the inhabitants. Accordingly, to keep the intention of flight secret, he sent a herald to Imilkon to solicit a burial-truce for the ensuing day; he also set apart a body of two thousand light troops, with orders to make noises in front of the enemy throughout the whole night, and to keep the lights and fires burning, so as to prevent any suspicion on the part of the Carthaginians.[964] Under cover of these precautions, he caused the Geloan population to evacuate their city in mass at the commencement of night, while he himself with his main army followed at midnight to protect them. All hurried forward on their march to Syracuse, turning to best account the hours of darkness. On their way thither lay Kamarina,—Kamarina the immovable, [965] as it was pronounced by an ancient oracle or legend, yet on that fatal night seeming to falsify the epithet. Not thinking himself competent to defend this city, Dionysius forced all the Kamarinæan population to become partners in the flight of the Geloans. The same heart-rending scene, which has already been recounted at Agrigentum and Himera, was now seen repeated on the road from Gela to Syracuse: a fugitive multitude, of all ages and of both sexes, free as well as slave, destitute and terror-stricken, hurrying they knew not whither, to get beyond the reach of a merciless enemy. The flight to Syracuse, however, was fortunately not molested by any pursuit. At daybreak the Carthaginians, discovering the abandonment of the city, immediately rushed in and took possession of it. As very little of the valuable property within it had been removed, a rich plunder fell into the hands of the conquering host, whose barbarous hands massacred indiscriminately the miserable remnant left behind: old men, sick, and children, unable to accompany a flight so sudden and so rapid. Some of the conquerors farther satiated their ferocious instincts by crucifying or mutilating these unhappy prisoners.[966]

Amidst the sufferings of this distressed multitude, however, and the compassion of the protecting army, other feelings also were powerfully aroused. Dionysius, who had been so unmeasured and so effective in calumniating unsuccessful generals before, was now himself exposed to the same arrows. Fierce were the bursts of wrath

and hatred against him, both among the fugitives and among the army. He was accused of having betrayed to the Carthaginians, not only the army, but also Gela and Kamarina, in order that the Syracusans, intimidated by these formidable neighbors so close to their borders, might remain in patient servitude under his dominion. It was remarked that his achievements for the relief of Gela had been unworthy of the large force which he brought with him; that the loss sustained in the recent battle had been nowise sufficient to compel, or even to excuse, a disgraceful flight; that the mercenaries, especially, the force upon which he most relied, had not only sustained no loss, but had never been brought into action; that while his measures taken against the enemy had thus been partial and inefficient, they on their side had manifested no disposition to pursue him in his flight,—thus affording a strong presumption of connivance between them. Dionysius was denounced as a traitor by all,—except his own mercenaries, whom he always kept near him for security. The Italiot allies, who had made the attack and sustained the main loss during the recent battle, were so incensed against him for having left them thus unsupported, that they retired in a body, and marched across the centre of the island home to Italy.

But the Syracusans in the army, especially the horsemen, the principal persons in the city, had a double ground of anger against Dionysius; partly from his misconduct or supposed treachery in this recent enterprise, but still more from the despotism which he had just erected over his fellow-citizens. This despotism, having been commenced in gross fraud and consummated by violence, was now deprived of the only plausible color which it had ever worn, since Dionysius had been just as disgracefully unsuccessful against the Carthaginians as those other generals whom he had denounced and superseded. Determined to rid themselves of one whom they hated at once as a despot and as a traitor, the Syracusan horsemen watched for an opportunity of setting upon Dionysius during the retreat, and killing him. But finding him too carefully guarded by the mercenaries who always surrounded his person, they went off in a body, and rode at their best speed to Syracuse, with the full purpose of reëstablishing the freedom of the city, and keeping out Dionysius. As they arrived before any tidings had been received of the defeat and flight at Gela, they obtained admission without impediment into the islet of Ortygia; the primitive interior city, commanding the docks and harbor, set apart by the despot for his own residence and power. They immediately assaulted and plundered the house of Dionysius, which they found richly stocked with gold, silver, and valuables of every kind. He had been despot but a few weeks; so that he must have begun betimes to despoil others, since it seems ascertained that his own private property was by no means large. The assailants not only plundered his house with all its interior wealth, but also maltreated his wife so brutally that she afterwards died of the outrage.[967] Against this unfortunate woman they probably cherished a double antipathy, not only as the wife of Dionysius, but also as the daughter of Hermokrates. They at the same time spread abroad the news that Dionysius had fled never to return; for they fully confided in the disruption which they had witnessed among the retiring army, and in the fierce

wrath which they had heard universally expressed against him.[968] After having betrayed his army, together with Gela and Kamarina, to the Carthaginians, by a flight without any real ground of necessity (they asserted),—he had been exposed, disgraced, and forced to flee in reality, before the just displeasure of his own awakened fellow-citizens. Syracuse was now free; and might, on the morrow, reconstitute formally her popular government.

Had these Syracusans taken any reasonable precautions against adverse possibilities, their assurances would probably have proved correct. The career of Dionysius would here have ended. But while they abandoned themselves to the plunder of his house and brutal outrage against his wife, they were so rashly confident in his supposed irretrievable ruin, and in their own mastery of the insular portion of the city, that they neglected to guard the gate of Achradina (the outer city) against his reëntry. The energy and promptitude of Dionysius proved too much for them. Informed of their secession from the army, and well knowing their sentiments, he immediately divined their projects, and saw that he could only defeat them by audacity and suddenness of attack. Accordingly, putting himself at the head of his best and most devoted soldiers,—one hundred horsemen and six hundred foot,—he left his army and proceeded by a forced march to Syracuse; a distance of about four hundred stadia, or about forty-five English miles. He arrived there about midnight, and presented himself, not at the gate of Ortygia, which he had probably ascertained to be in possession of his enemies, but at that of Achradina; which latter (as has been already mentioned) formed a separate fortification from Ortygia, with the Nekropolis between them.[969] Though the gate was shut, he presently discovered it to be unguarded, and was enabled to apply to it some reeds gathered in the marshes on his road, so as to set it on fire and burn it. So eager had he been for celerity of progress, that at the moment when he reached the gate, a part only of his division were with him. But as the rest arrived while the flames were doing their work, he entered, with the whole body, into Achradina or the outer city. Marching rapidly through the streets, he became master, without resistance, of all this portion of the city, and of the agora, or market-place, which formed its chief open space. His principal enemies, astounded by this alarming news, hastened out of Ortygia into Achradina, and tried to occupy the agora. But they found it already in possession of Dionysius; and being themselves very few in number, having taken no time to get together any considerable armed body, they were overpowered and slain by his mercenaries. Dionysius was thus strong enough to vanquish all his enemies, who entered Achradina in small and successive parties, without any order, as they came out of Ortygia. He then proceeded to attack the houses of those whom he knew to be unfriendly to his dominion, slew such as he could find within, and forced the rest to seek shelter in exile. The great body of the Syracusan horsemen,—who but the evening before were masters of the city, and might with common prudence have maintained themselves in it, were thus either destroyed or driven into banishment. As exiles they established themselves in the town of Ætna.[970]

Thus master of the city, Dionysius was joined on the ensuing day by the main body of his mercenaries, and also by the Sicilian allies, who had now completed their march. The miserable sufferers from Gela and Kamarina, who looked upon him with indignation as their betrayer,—went to reside at Leontini; seemingly as companions of the original Leontine citizens, who had been for some time domiciliated at Syracuse, but who no longer chose to remain there under Dionysius. Leontini thus became again an independent city.[971]

Though the disasters at Gela had threatened to ruin Dionysius, yet he was now, through his recent victory, more master of Syracuse than ever; and had more completely trodden down his opponents. The horsemen, whom he had just destroyed and chased away, were for the most part the rich and powerful citizens of Syracuse. To have put down such formidable enemies, almost indispensable as leaders to any party which sought to rise against him, was the strongest of all negative securities for the prolongation of his reign. There was no public assembly any longer at Syracuse, to which he had to render account of his proceedings at Gela and Kamarina, and before which he was liable to be arraigned,—as he himself had arraigned his predecessors who had commanded at Himera and Agrigentum. All such popular securities he had already overridden or subverted. The superiority of force, and intimidation of opponents, upon which his rule rested, were now more manifest and more decisive than ever.

Notwithstanding such confirmed position, however, Dionysius might still have found defence difficult, if Imilkon had marched on with his victorious army, fresh from the plunder of Gela and Kamarina, and had laid energetic siege to Syracuse. From all hazard and alarm of this sort he was speedily relieved, by propositions for peace, which came spontaneously tendered by the Carthaginian general. Peace was concluded between them, on the following terms:—

1. The Carthaginians shall retain all their previous possessions, and all their Sikanian dependencies, in Sicily. They shall keep, besides, Selinus, Himera, Agrigentum. The towns of Gela and Kamarina may be reoccupied by their present fugitive inhabitants; but on condition of paying tribute to Carthage, and destroying their walls and fortifications.

2. The inhabitants of Leontini and Messênê, as well as all the Sikel inhabitants, shall be independent and autonomous.

3. The Syracusans shall be subject to Dionysius.[972]

4. All the captives, and all the ships, taken on both sides, shall be mutually restored.

Such were the conditions upon which peace was now concluded. Though they were extremely advantageous to Carthage, assigning to her, either as subject or as tributary, the whole of the southern shore of Sicily,—yet as Syracuse was, after all,

the great prize to be obtained, the conquest of which was essential to the security of all the remainder, we are astonished that Imilkon did not push forward to attack it, at a moment so obviously promising. It appears that immediately after the conquest of Gela and Kamarina, the Carthaginian army was visited by a pestilential distemper, which is said to have destroyed nearly the half of it, and to have forbidden future operations. The announcement of this event however, though doubtless substantially exact, comes to us in a way somewhat confused.[973] And when we read, as one of the articles in the treaty, the express and formal provision that "The Syracusans shall be subject to Dionysius,"—we discern plainly, that there was also an additional cause for this timely overture, so suitable to his interests. There was real ground for those bitter complaints against Dionysius, which charged him with having betrayed Gela and Kamarina to the Carthaginians in order to assure his own dominion at Syracuse. The Carthaginians, in renouncing all pretensions to Syracuse and recognizing its autonomy, could have no interest in dictating its internal government. If they determined to recognize by formal treaty the sovereignty as vested in Dionysius, we may fairly conclude that he had purchased the favor from them by some underhand service previously rendered. In like manner both Hiketas and Agathoklês,—the latter being the successor, and in so many points the parallel of Dionysius, ninety years afterwards,—availed themselves of Carthaginian support as one stepping-stone to the despotism of Syracuse.[974]

The pestilence, however, among the Carthaginian army is said to have been so terrible as to destroy nearly the half of their numbers. The remaining half, on returning to Africa, either found it already there, or carried it with them; for the mortality at and around Carthage was not less deplorable than in Sicily.[975]

It was in the summer of 405 B.C., that this treaty was concluded, which consigned all the Hellenic ground on the south of Sicily to the Carthaginian dominion, and Syracuse with its population to that of Dionysius. It was in September or October of the same year that Lysander effected his capture of the entire Athenian fleet at Ægospotami, destroyed the maritime ascendency and power of Athens, and gave commencement to the Lacedæmonian empire, completed by the actual surrender of Athens during the ensuing year. The dekarchies and harmosts, planted by Lysander in so many cities of the central Hellenic world, commenced their disastrous working nearly at the same time as the despotism of Dionysius in Syracuse. This is a point to be borne in mind, in reference to the coming period. The new position and policy wherein Sparta now became involved, imparted to her a sympathy with Dionysius such as in earlier times she probably would not have felt; and which contributed materially, in a secondary way, to the durability of his dominion, as well by positive intrigues of Lacedæmonian agents, as by depriving the oppressed Syracusans of effective aid or countenance from Corinth or other parts of Greece.[976]

The period immediately succeeding this peace was one of distress, depression, and alarm, throughout all the south of Sicily. According to the terms of the treaty,

Gela and Kamarina might be reoccupied by their fugitive population; yet with demolished walls,—with all traces of previous opulence and comfort effaced by the plunderers,—and under the necessity of paying tribute to Carthage. The condition of Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera, now actually portions of Carthaginian territory, was worse; especially Agrigentum, hurled at one blow from the loftiest pinnacle of prosperous independence. No free Hellenic territory was any longer to be found between Cape Pachynus and Cape Lilybæum, beyond the Syracusan frontier.

Amidst the profound discouragement of the Syracusan mind, the withdrawal from Sicily of the terror-striking Carthaginian army would be felt as a relief, and would procure credit for Dionysius.[977] It had been brought about under him, though not as a consequence of his exploits; for his military operations against Imilkon at Gela had been completely unsuccessful (and even worse); and the Carthaginians had suffered no harm except from the pestilence. While his partisans had thus a plea for extolling him as the savior of the city, he also gathered strength in other ways out of the recent events. He had obtained a formal recognition of his government from the Carthaginians; he had destroyed or banished the chief Syracusan citizens opposed to his dominion, and struck terror into the rest; he had brought back all his mercenary troops and guards, without loss or dissatisfaction. He now availed himself of his temporary strength to provide precautions for perpetuity, before the Syracusans should recover spirit, or obtain a favorable opportunity, to resist.

His first measure was to increase the fortifications of the islet called Ortygia, strengthening it as a position to be held separately from Achradina and the remaining city. He constructed a new wall, provided with lofty turrets and elaborate defences of every kind, immediately outside of the mole which connected this islet with Sicily. On the outside of this new wall, he provided convenient places for transacting business, porticos spacious enough to shelter a considerable multitude, and seemingly a distinct strong fort, destined for a public magazine of corn.[978] It suited his purpose that the trade of the town should be carried on, and the persons of the traders congregated, under or near the outer walls of his peculiar fortress. As a farther means of security, he also erected a distinct citadel or acropolis within the islet and behind the new wall. The citadel was close to the Lesser Harbor or Portus Lakkius. Its walls were so extended as to embrace the whole of this harbor, closing it up in such a way as to admit only one ship at a time, though there was room for sixty ships within. He was thus provided with an almost impregnable stronghold, not only securing him against attack from the more numerous population in the outer city, but enabling him to attack them whenever he chose,—and making him master, at the same time, of the grand means of war and defence against foreign enemies.

To provide a fortress in the islet of Ortygia, was one step towards perpetual dominion at Syracuse; to fill it with devoted adherents, was another. For Dionysius, the instruments of dominion were his mercenary troops and body-guards; men chosen by himself from their aptitude to his views, identified with him in interest, and con-

sisting in large proportion not merely of foreigners, but even of liberated slaves. To these men he now proceeded to assign a permanent support and residence. He distributed among them the houses in the islet or inferior stronghold, expelling the previous proprietors, and permitting no one to reside there except his own intimate partisans and soldiers. Their quarters were in the islet, while he dwelt in the citadel,—a fortress within a fortress, sheltering his own person against the very garrison or standing army, by means of which he kept Syracuse in subjection.[979] Having provided houses for his soldiers, by extruding the residents in Ortygia,—he proceeded to assign to them a comfortable maintenance, by the like wholesale dispossession of proprietors, and reappropriation of lands, without. He distributed anew the entire Syracusan territory; reserving the best lands, and the best shares, for his own friends and for the officers in command of his mercenaries,—and apportioning the remaining territory in equal shares to all the inhabitants, citizens as well as non-citizens. By this distribution the latter became henceforward citizens as well as the former; so far at least, as any man could be properly called a citizen under his despotism. Even the recently enfranchised slaves became new citizens and proprietors as well as the rest. [980]

Respecting this sweeping change of property, it is mortifying to have no farther information than is contained in two or three brief sentences of Diodorus. As a basis for entire redivision of lands, Dionysius would find himself already possessed of the property of those Syracusan Horsemen or Knights whom he had recently put down or banished. As a matter of course, their property would be confiscated, and would fall into his possession for reassignment. It would doubtless be considerable, inasmuch as these Horsemen were for the most part wealthy men. From this basis, Dionysius enlarged his scheme to the more comprehensive idea of a general spoliation and reappropriation, for the benefit of his partisans and his mercenary soldiers. The number of these last we do not know; but on an occasion not very long afterwards, the mercenaries under him are mentioned as amounting to about ten thousand.[981] To ensure landed properties to each of these men, together with the monopoly of residence in Ortygia, nothing less than a sweeping confiscation would suffice. How far the equality of share, set forth in principle, was or could be adhered to in practice, we cannot say. The maxim of allowing residence in Ortygia to none but friends and partisans, passed from Dionysius into a traditional observance for future anti-popular governments of Syracuse. The Roman consul Marcellus, when he subdued the city near two centuries afterwards, prescribed the rule of admitting into the islet none but Romans, and of excluding all native Syracusan residents.[982]

Such mighty works of fortification, combined with so extensive a revolution both in property and in domicile, cannot have been accomplished in less than a considerable time, nor without provoking considerable resistance in detail. Nor is it to be forgotten that the pecuniary cost of such fortifications must have been very heavy. How Dionysius contrived to levy the money, we do not know. Aristotle informs us that the

contributions which he exacted from the Syracusans were so exorbitant, that within the space of five years, the citizens had paid into his hands their entire property; that is, twenty per cent. per annum upon their whole property.[983] To what years this statement refers, we do not know; nor what was the amount of contribution exacted on the special occasion now before us. But we may justly infer from it that Dionysius would not scruple to lay his hand heavily upon the Syracusans for the purpose of defraying the cost of his fortifications; and that the simultaneous burthen of large contributions would thus come to aggravate the painful spoliation and transfers of property, and the still more intolerable mischiefs of a numerous standing army domiciled as masters in the heart of the city. Under such circumstances, we are not surprised to learn that the discontent among the Syracusans was extreme, and that numbers of them were greatly mortified at having let slip the favorable opportunity of excluding Dionysius, when the Horsemen were actually for a moment masters of Syracuse, before he suddenly came back from Gela.[984]

Whatever might be the extent of indignation actually felt, there could be no concert or manifestation in Syracuse, under a watchful despot with the overwhelming force assembled in Ortygia. But a suitable moment speedily occurred. Having completed his fortress and new appropriation for the assured maintenance of the mercenaries, Dionysius resolved to attempt a conquest of the autonomous Sikel tribes in the interior of the island, some of whom had sided with Carthage in the recent war. He accordingly marched out with a military force, consisting partly of his mercenary troops, partly of armed Syracusan citizens under a commander named Dorikus. While he was laying siege to the town of Erbessus, the Syracusan troops, finding themselves assembled in arms and animated with one common sentiment, began to concert measures for open resistance to Dionysius. The commander Dorikus, in striving to repress these manifestations, lifted up his hand to chastise one of the most mutinous speakers;[985] upon which the soldiers rushed forward in a body to defend him. They slew Dorikus, and proclaimed themselves again, with loud shouts, free Syracusan citizens; calling upon all their comrades in the camp to unite against the despot. They also sent a message forthwith to the town of Ætna, inviting the immediate junction of the Syracusan Horsemen, who had sought shelter there in their exile from Dionysius. Their appeal found the warmest sympathy among the Syracusan soldiers in the camp, all of whom declared themselves decisively against the despot, and prepared for every effort to recover their liberty.

So rapidly did this sentiment break out into vehement and unanimous action, that Dionysius was too much intimidated to attempt to put it down at once by means of his mercenaries. Profiting by the lesson which he had received, after the return march from Gela, he raised the siege of Erbessus forthwith, and returned to Syracuse to make sure of his position in Ortygia, before his Syracusan enemies could arrive there. Meanwhile the latter, thus left full of joy and confidence, as well as masters of the camp, chose for their leaders those soldiers who had slain Dorikus, and found

themselves speedily reinforced by the Horsemen, or returning exiles from Ætna. Resolved to spare no effort for liberating Syracuse, they sent envoys to Messênê and Rhegium, as well as to Corinth, for aid; while they at the same time marched with all their force to Syracuse, and encamped on the heights of Epipolæ. It is not clear whether they remained in this position, or whether they were enabled, through the sympathy of the population, to possess themselves farther of the outer city Achradina, and with its appendages Tycha and Neapolis. Dionysius was certainly cut off from all communication with the country; but he maintained himself in his impregnable position in Ortygia, now exclusively occupied by his chosen partisans and mercenaries. If he even continued master of Achradina, he must have been prevented from easy communication with it. The assailants extended themselves under the walls of Ortygia, from Epipolæ to the Greater as well as the Lesser Harbor.[986] A considerable naval force was sent to their aid from Messênê and Rhegium, giving to them the means of blocking him up on the seaside; while the Corinthians, though they could grant no farther assistance, testified their sympathy by sending Nikoteles as adviser.[987] The leaders of the movement proclaimed Syracuse again a free city, offered large rewards for the head of Dionysius, and promised equal citizenship to all the mercenaries who should desert him.

Several of the mercenaries, attracted by such offers, as well as intimidated by that appearance of irresistible force which characterizes the first burst of a popular movement, actually came over and were well received. Everything seemed to promise success to the insurgents, who, not content with the slow process of blockade, brought up battering-machines, and vehemently assaulted the walls of Ortygia. Nothing now saved Dionysius except those elaborate fortifications which he had so recently erected, defying all attack. And even though sheltered by them, his position appeared to be so desperate, that desertion from Ortygia every day increased. He himself began to abandon the hope of maintaining his dominion; discussing with his intimate friends the alternative, between death under a valiant but hopeless resistance, and safety purchased by a dishonorable flight. There remained but one means of rescue: to purchase the immediate aid of a body of twelve hundred mercenary Campanian cavalry, now in the Carthaginian service, and stationed probably at Gela or Agrigentum. His brother-in-law Polyxenus advised him to mount his swiftest horse, to visit in person the Campanians, and bring them to the relief of Ortygia. But this counsel was strenuously resisted by two intimate friends,—Helôris and Megaklês,—who both impressed upon him, that the royal robe was the only honorable funeral garment, and that, instead of quitting his post at full speed, he ought to cling to it until he was dragged away by the leg.[988] Accordingly, Dionysius determined to hold out, without quitting Ortygia; sending private envoys to the Campanians, with promises of large pay if they would march immediately to his defence. The Carthaginians were probably under obligation not to oppose this, having ensured to Dionysius by special article of treaty the possession of Syracuse.

To gain time for their arrival, by deluding and disarming the assailants, Dionysius affected to abandon all hope of prolonged defence, and sent to request permission to quit the city, along with his private friends and effects. Permission was readily granted to him to depart with five triremes. But as soon as this evidence of success had been acquired, the assailants without abandoned themselves to extravagant joy and confidence, considering Dionysius as already subdued, and the siege as concluded. Not merely was all farther attack suspended, but the forces were in a great measure broken up. The Horsemen were disbanded, by a proceeding alike unjust and ungrateful, to be sent back to Ætna; while the hoplites dispersed about the country to their various lands and properties. The same difficulty of keeping a popular force long together for any military operation requiring time, which had been felt when the Athenians besieged their usurpers Kylon and Peisistratus in the acropolis, [989] was now experienced in regard to the siege of Ortygia. Tired with the length of the siege, the Syracusans blindly abandoned themselves to the delusive assurance held out by Dionysius; without taking heed to maintain their force and efficiency undiminished, until his promised departure should be converted into a reality. In this unprepared and disorderly condition, they were surprised by the sudden arrival of the Campanians,[990] who, attacking and defeating them with considerable loss, forced their way through to join Dionysius in Ortygia. At the same time, a reinforcement of three hundred fresh mercenaries reached him by sea. The face of affairs was now completely changed. The recent defeat produced among the assailants not only discouragement, but also mutual recrimination and quarrel. Some insisted upon still prosecuting the siege of Ortygia, while others, probably the friends of the recently dismissed Horsemen, declared in favor of throwing it up altogether and joining the Horsemen at Ætna; a resolution, which they seem at once to have executed. Observing his opponents thus enfeebled and torn by dissension, Dionysius sallied out and attacked them, near the suburb called Neapolis or Newtown, on the south-west of Achradina. He was victorious, and forced them to disperse. But he took great pains to prevent slaughter of the fugitives, riding up himself to restrain his own troops; and he subsequently buried the slain with due solemnity. He was anxious by these proceedings to conciliate the remainder; for the most warlike portion of his opponents had retired to Ætna, where no less than seven thousand hoplites were now assembled along with the Horsemen. Dionysius sent thither envoys to invite them to return to Syracuse, promising the largest amnesty for the past. But it was in vain that his envoys expatiated upon his recent forbearance towards the fugitives and decent interment of the slain. Few could be induced to come back, except such as had left their wives and families at Syracuse in his power. The larger proportion, refusing all trust in his word and all submission to his command, remained in exile at Ætna. Such as did return were well treated, in hopes of inducing the rest gradually to follow their example.[991]

Thus was Dionysius rescued from a situation apparently desperate, and reëstablished in his dominion; chiefly through the rash presumption (as on the former occa-

sion after the retreat from Gela), the want of persevering union, and the absence of any commanding leader, on the part of his antagonists. His first proceeding was to dismiss the newly-arrived Campanians. For though he had to thank them mainly for his restoration, he was well aware that they were utterly faithless, and that on the first temptation they were likely to turn against him.[992] But he adopted more efficient means for strengthening his dominion in Syracuse, and for guarding against a repetition of that danger from which he had so recently escaped. He was assisted in his proceedings by a Lacedæmonian envoy named Aristus, recently despatched by the Spartans for the ostensible purpose of bringing about an amicable adjustment of parties at Syracuse. While Nikoteles, who had been sent from Corinth, espoused the cause of the Syracusan people, and put himself at their head to obtain for them more or less of free government,—Aristus, on the contrary, lent himself to the schemes of Dionysius. He seduced the people away from Nikoteles, whom he impeached and caused to be slain. Next, pretending himself to act along with the people, and to employ the great ascendency of Sparta in defence of their freedom,[993] he gained their confidence and then betrayed them. The despot was thus enabled to strengthen himself more decisively than before, and probably to take off the effective popular leaders thus made known to him; while the mass of the citizens were profoundly discouraged by finding Sparta enlisted in the conspiracy against their liberties.

Of this renovated tide of success Dionysius took advantage, to strike another important blow. During the season of harvest, while the citizens were busy in the fields, he caused the houses to be searched, and seized all the arms found therein. Not satisfied with thus robbing his opponents of the means of attack, he farther proceeded to construct additional fortifications around the islet of Ortygia, to augment his standing army of mercenaries, and to build fresh ships. Feeling more than ever that his dominion was repugnant to the Syracusans, and rested only on naked force, he thus surrounded himself with precautions probably stronger than any other Grecian despot had ever accumulated. He was yet farther strengthened by the pronounced and active support of Sparta, now at the maximum of her imperial ascendency;[994] and by the presence of the mighty Lysander at Syracuse as her ambassador to countenance and exalt him.[995] The Spartan alliance, however, did not prevent him from enrolling among his mercenaries a considerable fraction of the Messenians, the bitter enemies of Sparta; who were now driven out of Naupaktus and Kephallenia, with no other possession left except their arms[996]—and whose restoration to Peloponnesus by Epaminondas, about thirty years afterwards, has been described in a preceding chapter.

So large a mercenary force, while the people in Syracuse were prostrate and in no condition for resistance, naturally tempted Dionysius to seek conquest as well as plunder beyond the border. Not choosing as yet to provoke a war with Carthage, he turned his arms to the north and north-west of the Syracusan territory; the Grecian

(Chalkidic or Ionic) cities, Naxus, Katana, and Leontini—and the Sikels, towards the centre of Sicily. The three Chalkidic cities were the old enemies of Syracuse, but Leontini had been conquered by the Syracusans even before the Athenian expedition, and remained as a Syracusan possession until the last peace with the Carthaginians, when it had been declared independent. Naxus and Katana had contrived to retain their independence against Syracuse, even after the ruin of the Athenian armament under Nikias. At the head of a powerful force, Dionysius marched out from Syracuse first against the town of Ætna, occupied by a considerable body of Syracusan exiles hostile to his dominion. Though the place was strong by situation, [997] yet these men, too feeble to resist, were obliged to evacuate it; upon which he proceeded to attack Leontini. But on summoning the inhabitants to surrender, he found his propositions rejected, and every preparation made for a strenuous defence; so that he could do nothing more than plunder the territory around, and then advanced onward into the interior Sikel territory, towards Enna and Erbita. But his march in this direction was little more than a feint, for the purpose of masking his real views upon Naxus and Katana, with both which cities he had already opened intrigues. Arkesilaus, general of Katana, and Prokles, general of Naxus, were both carrying on corrupt negotiations for the purpose of selling to him the liberty of their native cities. Until the negotiations were completed, Dionysius wished to appear as if turning his arms elsewhere, and therefore marched against Enna. Here he entered into conspiracy with an Ennæan citizen named Aeimnestus, whom he instigated to seize the sceptre of his native town,—by promises of assistance, on condition of being himself admitted afterwards. Aeimnestus made the attempt and succeeded, but did not fulfil his engagement to Dionysius; who resented this proceeding so vehemently, that he assisted the Ennæans in putting down Aeimnestus, delivered him as prisoner into their hands, and then retired, satisfied with such revenge, without farther meddling. He next marched against Erbita, before which he passed his time with little or no result, until the bribes promised at Naxus and Katana had taken effect. At length the terms were fully settled. Dionysius was admitted at night by Arkesilaus into Katana, seized the city, disarmed the inhabitants, and planted there a powerful garrison. Naxus was next put into his hands, by the like corruption on the part of Prokles; who was rewarded with a large bribe, and with the privilege of preserving his kinsmen. Both cities were given up to be plundered by his soldiers; after which the walls as well as the houses were demolished, and the inhabitants sold as slaves. The dismantled site of Katana was then assigned to a body of Campanian mercenaries in the service of Dionysius, who however retained in his possession hostages for their fidelity;[998] the site of Naxus to the indigenous Sikels in the neighborhood. These captures struck so much terror into the Leontines, that when Dionysius renewed his attack upon them, they no longer felt competent to resist. He required them to surrender their city, to remove to Syracuse, and there to reside for the future as citizens; which term meant, at the actual time, as subjects of his despotism.

The Leontines obeyed the requisition, and their city thus again became an appendage of Syracuse.[999]

These conquests of Dionysius, achieved mainly by corrupting the generals of Naxos and Katana, were of serious moment, and spread so much alarm among the Sikels of the interior, that Archonides, the Sikel prince of Erbita, thought it prudent to renounce his town and soil; withdrawing to a new site beyond the Nebrode mountains, on the northern coast of the island, more out of the reach of Syracusan attack. Here, with his mercenary soldiers and with a large portion of his people who voluntarily accompanied him, he founded the town of Alæsa.[1000]

Strengthened at home by these successes abroad, the sanguine despot of Syracuse was stimulated to still greater enterprises. He resolved to commence aggressive war with the Carthaginians. But against such formidable enemies, large preparations were indispensable, defensive as well as offensive, before his design could be proclaimed. First, he took measures to ensure the defensibility of Syracuse against all contingencies. Five Grecian cities on the south of the island, one of them the second in Sicily, had already undergone the deplorable fate of being sacked by a Carthaginian host; a calamity, which might possibly be in reserve for Syracuse also, especially if she herself provoked a war, unless the most elaborate precautions were taken to render a successful blockade impossible.

Now the Athenian blockade under Nikias had impressed valuable lessons on the mind of every Syracusan. The city had then been well-nigh blocked up by a wall of circumvallation carried from sea to sea; which was actually more than half completed, and would have been entirely completed, had the original commander been Demosthenes instead of Nikias. The prodigious importance of the slope of Epipolæ to the safety of the city had been demonstrated by the most unequivocal evidence. In my seventh volume, I have already described the site of Syracuse and the relation of this slope to the outer city called Achradina. Epipolæ was a gentle ascent west of Achradina. It was bordered, along both the north side and the south side, by lines of descending cliff, cut down precipitously, about twenty feet deep in their lowest part. These lines of cliff nearly converged at the summit of the slope, called Euryalus; leaving a narrow pass or road between elevated banks, which communicated with the country both north and west of Syracuse. Epipolæ thus formed a triangle upon an inclined plane, sloping upward from its base, the outer wall of Achradina, to its apex at Euryalus; and having its two sides formed, the one by the northern, the other by the southern, line of cliffs. This apex formed a post of the highest importance, commanding the narrow road which approached Epipolæ from its western extremity or summit, and through which alone it was easy for an army to get on the declivity of Epipolæ, since the cliffs on each side were steep, though less steep on the northern side than on the southern.[1001] Unless an enemy acquired possession of this slope, Syracuse could never be blocked up from the northern sea at Trogilus to the Great Harbor; an enterprise, which Nikias and the Athenians were near ac-

complishing, because they first surprised from the northward the position of Euryalus, and from thence poured down upon the slope of Epipolæ. I have already described, in my seventh volume, how the arrival of Gylippus deprived them of superiority in the field, at a time when their line of circumvallation was already half finished,—having been carried from the centre of Epipolæ southward down to Great Harbor, and being partially completed from the same point across the northern half of Epipolæ to the sea at Trogilus; how he next intercepted their farther progress, by carrying out, from the outer wall of Achradina, a cross wall traversing their intended line of circumvallation and ending at the northern cliff; how he finally erected a fort or guard-post on the summit of Euryalus, which he connected with the cross-wall just mentioned by a single wall of junction carried down the slope of Epipolæ.[1002]

Both the danger which Syracuse had then incurred, and the means whereby it had been obviated, were fresh in the recollection of Dionysius. Since the Athenian siege, the Syracusans may perhaps have preserved the fort erected by Gylippus near Euryalus; but they had pulled down the wall of junction, the cross-wall, and the outer wall of protection constructed between the arrival of Nikias in Sicily and his commencement of the siege, enclosing the sacred precinct of Apollo Temenites. The outer city of Syracuse was thus left with nothing but the wall of Achradina, with its two suburbs or excrescences, Tychê and Neapolis. Dionysius now resolved to provide for Syracuse a protection substantially similar to that contrived by Gylippus, yet more comprehensive, elaborate, and permanent. He carried out an outer line of defence, starting from the sea near the port called Trogilus, enclosing the suburb called Tychê (which adjoined Achradina to the north-west), and then ascending westward, along the brink of the northern cliff of Epipolæ, to the summit of that slope at Euryalus. The two extremities thus became connected together,—not as in the time of Gylippus,[1003] by a single cross-wall carried out from the city-wall to the northern cliff, and then joined at an angle by another single wall descending the slope of Epipolæ from Euryalus, but,—by one continuous new line bordering the northern cliff down to the sea. And the new line, instead of being a mere single wall, was now built under the advice of the best engineers, with lofty and frequent towers interspersed throughout its length, to serve both as means of defence and as permanent quarters for soldiers. Its length was thirty stadia (about three and a half English miles); it was constructed of large stones carefully hewn, some of them four feet in length.[1004] The quarries at hand supplied abundant materials, and for the labor necessary, Dionysius brought together all the population of the city and its neighborhood, out of whom he selected sixty thousand of the most effective hands, to work on the wall. Others were ordered to cut the stones in the quarry, while six thousand teams of oxen were put in harness to draw them to the spot. The work was set out by furlongs and by smaller spaces of one hundred feet each, to regiments of suitable number, each under the direction of an overseer.[1005]

As yet, we have heard little about Dionysius except acts of fraud, violence, and spoliation, for the purpose of establishing his own dominion over Syracuse, and aggrandizing himself by new conquests on the borders. But this new fortification was a work of different import. Instead of being, like his forts and walls in Ortygia, a guard-house both of defence and aggression merely for himself against the people of Syracuse,—it was a valuable protection to the people, and to himself along with them, against foreign besiegers. It tended much to guarantee Syracuse from those disasters which had so recently befallen Agrigentum and the other cities. Accordingly, it was exceeding popular among the Syracusans, and produced between them and Dionysius a sentiment of friendship and harmony such as had not before been seen. Every man labored at the work not merely with good will, but with enthusiasm; while the despot himself displayed unwearied zeal, passing whole days on the spot, and taking part in all the hardship and difficulty. He showed himself everywhere amidst the mass, as an unguarded citizen, without suspicion or reserve, in marked contrast with the harshness of his previous demeanor,[1006] proclaiming rewards for the best and most rapid workmen; he also provided attendance or relief for those whose strength gave way. Such was the emulation thus inspired, that the numbers assembled, often toiling by night as well as by day, completed the whole wall in the space of twenty days. The fort at Euryalus, which formed the termination of this newly-constructed line of wall, is probably not to be understood as comprised within so short a period of execution; at least in its complete consummation. For the defences provided at this fort (either now or at a later period) were prodigious in extent as well as elaborate in workmanship; and the remains of them exhibit, even to modern observers, the most complete specimen preserved to us of ancient fortification.[1007] To bring them into such a condition must have occupied a longer time than twenty days. Even as to the wall, perhaps, twenty days is rather to be understood as indicating the time required for the essential continuity of its line, leaving towers, gates, etc., to be added afterwards.

To provide defence for Syracuse against a besieging army, however, was only a small part of the extensive schemes of Dionysius. What he meditated was aggressive war against the Carthaginians; for which purpose, he not only began to accumulate preparations of every kind on the most extensive scale, but also modified his policy both towards the Syracusans and towards the other Sicilian Greeks.

Towards the Syracusans his conduct underwent a material change. The cruelty and oppression which had hitherto marked his dominion was discontinued; he no longer put men to death, or sent them into banishment, with the same merciless hand as before. In place of such tyranny, he now substituted comparative mildness, forbearance, and conciliation.[1008] Where the system had before been so fraught with positive maltreatment to many and alarm to all, the mitigation of it must have been sensibly as well as immediately felt. And when we make present to our minds the relative position of Dionysius and the Syracusans, we shall see that the evil in-

flicted by his express order by no means represented the whole amount of evil which they suffered. He occupied the impregnable fortress of Ortygia, with the entire harbor, docks, and maritime means of the city. The numerous garrison in his pay, and devoted to him, consisted in great part of barbaric or non-Hellenic soldiers and of liberated slaves, probably also non-Hellenic. The Syracusans resident in the outer city and around were not only destitute of the means of defensive concert and organization, but were also disarmed. For these mercenaries either pay was to be provided from the contributions of the citizens, or lands from their properties; for them, and for other partisans also, Dionysius had enforced spoliations and transfers of land and house-property by wholesale.[1009] Now, while the despot himself was inflicting tyrannical sentences for his own purposes, we may be sure that these men, the indispensable instruments of his tyranny, would neither of themselves be disposed to respect the tranquillity of the other citizens, nor be easily constrained to do so. It was not, therefore, merely from the systematic misrule of the chief that the Syracusans had to suffer, but also from the insolence and unruly appetites of the subordinates. And accordingly they would be doubly gainers, when Dionysius, from anxiety to attack the Carthaginians, thought it prudent to soften the rigor of his own proceedings; since his example, and in case of need his interference, would restrict the license of his own partisans. The desire for foreign conquest made it now his interest to conciliate some measure of goodwill from the Syracusans; or at least to silence antipathies which might become embarrassing if they broke out in the midst of a war. And he had in this case the advantage of resting on another antipathy, powerful and genuine in their minds. Hating as well as fearing Carthage, the Syracusans cordially sympathized in the aggressive schemes of Dionysius against her; which held out a prospect of relief from the tyranny under which they groaned, and some chance of procuring a restoration of the arms snatched from them.[1010]

Towards the Sicilian Greeks, also, the conduct of Dionysius was mainly influenced by his anti-Carthaginian projects, which made him eager to put aside, or at least to defer, all possibilities of war in other quarters. The inhabitants of Rhegium, on the Italian side of the Strait of Messina, had recently manifested a disposition to attack him. They were of common Chalkidic origin with Naxos and Katana, the two cities which Dionysius had recently conquered and enslaved. Sixteen years before, when the powerful Athenian armament visited Sicily with the ostensible view of protecting the Chalkidic cities against Syracuse, the Rhegines in spite of their fellowship of race, had refused the invitation of Nikias[1011] to lend assistance, being then afraid of Athens. But subsequent painful experience had taught them, that to residents in or near Sicily, Syracuse was the more formidable enemy of the two. The ruin of Naxus and Katana, with the great extension of Syracusan dominion northward, had filled them with apprehension from Dionysius, similar to the fears of Carthage, inspired to the Syracusans themselves by the disasters of Agrigentum and Gela. Anxious to revenge their enslaved kinsmen, the Rhegines projected an attack upon Dionysius before his power should become yet more formidable; a resolution, in which they were

greatly confirmed by the instigations of the Syracusan exiles (now driven from Ætna and the other neighboring cities to Rhegium), confident in their assurances that insurrection would break out against Dionysius at Syracuse, so soon as any foreign succor should be announced as approaching. Envoys were sent across the strait to Messênê, soliciting coöperation against Dionysius, upon the urgent plea that the ruin of Naxus and Katana could not be passed over, either in generosity or in prudence, by neighbors on either side of the strait. These representations made so much impression on the generals of Messênê, that without consulting the public assembly, they forthwith summoned the military force of the city, and marched along with the Rhegines towards the Syracusan frontier,—six thousand Rhegine and four thousand Messenian hoplites,—six hundred Rhegine and four hundred Messenian horsemen,—with fifty Rhegine triremes. But when they reached the frontiers of the Messenian territory, a large portion of the soldiers refused to follow their generals farther. A citizen named Laomedon headed the opposition, contending that the generals had no authority to declare war without a public vote of the city, and that it was imprudent to attack Dionysius unprovoked. Such was the effect of these remonstrances, that the Messenian soldiers returned back to their city; while the Rhegines, believing themselves to be inadequate to the enterprise single handed, went home also.[1012]

Apprised of the attack meditated, Dionysius had already led his troops to defend the Syracusan frontier. But he now reconducted them back to Syracuse, and listened favorably to propositions for peace which speedily reached him, from Rhegium and Messênê.[1013] He was anxious to conciliate them for the present, at all price, in order that the Carthaginians, when he came to execute his plans, might find no Grecian allies to coöperate with them in Sicily. He acquired an influence in Messênê, by making to the city large concessions of conterminous territory; on which side of the border, or how acquired, we do not know. He farther endeavored to open an intimate connection with Rhegium by marrying a Rhegine wife; with which view he sent a formal message to the citizens, asking permission to contract such an alliance, accompanied with a promise to confer upon them important benefits, both in territorial aggrandizement and in other ways. After a public debate, the Rhegines declined his proposition. The feeling in their city was decidedly hostile to Dionysius, as the recent destroyer of Naxus and Katana; and it appears that some of the speakers expressed themselves with contemptuous asperity, remarking that the daughter of the public executioner was the only fit wife for him.[1014] Taken by itself, the refusal would be sufficiently galling to Dionysius. But when coupled with such insulting remarks (probably made in public debate in the presence of his own envoys, for it seems not credible that the words should have been embodied in the formal reply or resolution of the assembly[1015]), it left the bitterest animosity; a feeling, which we shall hereafter find in full operation.

Refused at Rhegium, Dionysius sent to prefer a similar request, with similar offers, at the neighboring city of Lokri; where it was favorably entertained. It is re-

markable that Aristotle comments upon this acquiescence of the Lokrians as an act of grave imprudence, and as dictated only by the anxiety of the principal citizens, in an oligarchical government, to seek for aggrandizement to themselves out of such an alliance. The request would not have been granted (Aristotle observes) either in a democracy or in a well-regulated aristocracy. The marital connection now contracted by Dionysius with a Lokrian female, Doris, the daughter of a citizen of distinction named Xenetus, produced as an ultimate consequence the overthrow of the oligarchy of Lokri.[1016] And even among the Lokrians, the request was not granted without opposition. A citizen named Aristeides (one of the companions of Plato), whose daughter Dionysius had solicited in marriage, returned for answer that he would rather see her dead than united to a despot. In revenge for this bitter reply, Dionysius caused the sons of Aristeides to be put to death.[1017]

But the amicable relations which Dionysius was at so much pains to establish with the Greek cities near the Strait of Messênê, were destined chiefly to leave him free for preparations against Carthage; which preparations he now commenced on a gigantic scale. Efforts so great and varied, combined not merely with forecast but with all the scientific appliances then available, have not hitherto come before us throughout this history. The terrible effect with which Hannibal had recently employed his battering-machines against Selinus and Himera, stimulated Dionysius to provide himself with the like implements in greater abundance than any Greek general had ever before possessed. He collected at Syracuse, partly by constraint, partly by allurement, all the best engineers, mechanists, armorers, artisans, etc., whom Sicily or Italy could furnish. He set them upon the construction of machines and other muniments of war, and upon the manufacture of arms offensive as well as defensive, with the greatest possible assiduity. The arms provided were of great variety; not merely such as were suitable for Grecian soldiers, heavy or light, but also such as were in use among the different barbaric tribes around the Mediterranean, Gauls, Iberians, Tyrrhenians, etc., from whom Dionysius intended to hire mercenaries; so that every different soldier would be furnished, on arriving, with the sort of weapon which had become habitual to him. All Syracuse became a bustling military workshop,—not only the market-places, porticos, palæstræ, and large private houses, but also the forechambers and back-chambers of the various temples. Dionysius distributed the busy multitude into convenient divisions, each with some eminent citizen as superintendent. Visiting them in person frequently, and reviewing their progress, he recompensed largely, and invited to his table, those who produced the greatest amount of finished work. As he farther offered premiums for inventive skill, the competition of ingenious mechanists originated several valuable warlike novelties; especially the great projectile engine for stones and darts, called Catapulta, which was now for the first time devised. We are told that the shields fabricated during this season of assiduous preparation were not less than one hundred and forty thousand in number, and the breast-plates fourteen thousand, many of them unrivalled in workmanship, destined for the body-guard and the officers. Helmets, spears, daggers, etc., with other

arms and weapons in indefinite variety, were multiplied in corresponding proportion. [1018] The magazines of arms, missiles, machines, and muniments of war in every variety, accumulated in Ortygia, continued stupendous in amount through the whole life of Dionysius, and even down to the downfall of his son.[1019]

If the preparations for land-warfare were thus stupendous, those for sea-warfare were fully equal, if not superior. The docks of Syracuse were filled with the best ship-builders, carpenters, and artisans; numerous wood-cutters were sent to cut ship-timber on the well-clothed slopes of Ætna and the Calabrian Apennines; teams of oxen were then provided to drag it to the coast, from whence it was towed in rafts to Syracuse. The existing naval establishment of Syracuse comprised one hundred and ten triremes; the existing docks contained one hundred and fifty ship-houses, or covered slips for the purpose either of building or housing a trireme. But this was very inadequate to the conceptions of Dionysius, who forthwith undertook the construction of one hundred and sixty new ship-houses, each competent to hold two vessels,—and then commenced the building of new ships of war to the number of two hundred; while he at the same time put all the existing vessels and docks into the best state of repair. Here too, as in the case of the catapulta, the ingenuity of his architects enabled him to stand forth as a maritime inventor. As yet, the largest ship of war which had ever moved on the Grecian or Mediterranean waters, was the trireme, which was rowed by three banks or tiers of oars. It was now three centuries since the first trireme had been constructed at Corinth and Samos by the inventive skill of the Corinthian Ameinokles:[1020] it was not until the period succeeding the Persian invasion that even triremes had become extensively employed; nor had any larger vessels ever been thought of. The Athenians, who during the interval between the Persian invasion and their great disaster at Syracuse had stood preëminent and set the fashion in all nautical matters, were under no inducement to build above the size of the trireme. As their style of manœuvring consisted of rapid evolutions and changes in the ship's direction, for the purpose of striking the weak parts of an enemy's ship with the beak of their own,—so, if the size of their ship had been increased, her capacity for such nimble turns and movements would have been diminished. But the Syracusans had made no attempt to copy the rapid evolutions of the Athenian navy. On the contrary, when fighting against the latter in the confined harbor of Syracuse, [1021] they had found every advantage in their massive build of ships, and straightforward impact of bow driven against bow. For them, the larger ships were the more suitable and efficient; so that Dionysius or his naval architects, full of ambitious aspirations, now struck out the plan of building ships of war with four or five banks of oars instead of three; that is, quadriremes, or quinqueremes, instead of triremes. [1022] Not only did the Syracusan despot thus equip a naval force equal in number of ships to Athens in her best days; but he also exhibited ships larger than Athens had ever possessed, or than Greece had ever conceived.

In all these offensive preparations against Carthage, as in the previous defences on Epipolæ, the spontaneous impulse of the Syracusans generally went hand in hand with Dionysius.[1023] Their sympathy and concurrence greatly promoted the success of his efforts, for this immense equipment against the common enemy. Even with all this sympathy, indeed, we are at a loss to understand, nor are we at all informed, how he found money to meet so prodigious an outlay.

After the material means for war had thus been completed,—an operation which can hardly have occupied less than two or three years,—it remained to levy men. On this point, the ideas of Dionysius were not less aspiring. Besides his own numerous standing force, he enlisted all the most effective among the Syracusan citizens, as well as from the cities in his dependency. He sent friendly addresses, and tried to acquire popularity, among the general body of Greeks throughout the island. Of his large fleet, one-half was manned with Syracusan rowers, marines, and officers; the other half with seamen enlisted from abroad. He farther sent envoys both to Italy and to Peloponnesus to obtain auxiliaries, with offers of the most liberal pay. From Sparta, now at the height of her power, and courting his alliance as a means of perpetuity to her own empire, he received such warm encouragement, that he was enabled to enlist no inconsiderable numbers in Peloponnesus; while many barbaric or non-Hellenic soldiers from the western regions near the Mediterranean were hired also.[1024] He at length succeeded, to his satisfaction, in collecting an aggregate army, formidable not less from numbers and bravery, than from elaborate and diversified equipment. His large and well-stocked armory (already noticed) enabled him to furnish each newly-arrived soldier, from all the different nations, with native and appropriate weapons.[1025]

When all his preparations were thus complete, his last step was to celebrate his nuptials, a few days previous to the active commencement of the war. He married, at one and the same time, two wives,—the Lokrian Doris (already mentioned), and a Syracusan woman named Aristomachê, daughter of his partisan Hipparinus (and sister of Dion, respecting whom much will occur hereafter). The first use made of one among his newly-invented quinquereme vessels, was to sail to Lokri, decked out in the richest ornaments of gold and silver, for the purpose of conveying Doris in state to Ortygia. Aristomachê was also brought to his house in a splendid chariot with four white horses.[1026] He celebrated his nuptials with both of them in his house on the same day; no one knew which bedchamber he visited first; and both of them continued constantly to live with him at the same table, with equal dignity, for many years. He had three children by Doris, the eldest of whom was Dionysius the Younger; and four by Aristomachê; but the latter was for a considerable time childless; which greatly chagrined Dionysius. Ascribing her barrenness to magical incantations, he put to death the mother of his other wife Doris, as the alleged worker of these mischievous influences.[1027] It was the rumor at Syracuse that Aristomachê was the most beloved of the two. But Dionysius treated both of them well, and both of them

equally; moreover his son by Doris succeeded him, though he had two sons by the other. His nuptials were celebrated with banquets and festive recreations, wherein all the Syracusan citizens as well as the soldiers partook. The scene was probably the more grateful to Dionysius, as he seems at this moment, when every man's mind was full of vindictive impulse and expected victory against Carthage, to have enjoyed a real short-lived popularity, and to have been able to move freely among the people; without that fear of assassination which habitually tormented his life even in his inmost privacy and bedchamber—and that extremity of suspicion which did not except either his wives or his daughters.[1028]

After a few days devoted to such fellowship and festivity, Dionysius convoked a public assembly, for the purpose of formally announcing the intended war. He reminded the Syracusans that the Carthaginians were common enemies to Greeks in general, but most of all to the Sicilian Greeks—as recent events but too plainly testified. He appealed to their generous sympathies on behalf of the five Hellenic cities, in the southern part of the island, which had lately undergone the miseries of capture by the generals of Carthage, and were still groaning under her yoke. Nothing prevented Carthage (he added) from attempting to extend her dominion over the rest of the island, except the pestilence under which she had herself been suffering in Africa. To the Syracusans this ought to be an imperative stimulus for attacking her at once, and rescuing their Hellenic brethren, before she had time to recover.[1029]

These motives were really popular and impressive. There was besides another inducement, which weighed with Dionysius to hasten the war, though he probably did not dwell upon it in his public address to the Syracusans. He perceived that various Sicilian Greeks were migrating voluntarily with their properties into the territory of Carthage; whose dominion, though hateful and oppressive, was, at least while untried, regarded by many with less terror than his dominion when actually suffered. By commencing hostilities at once, he expected not only to arrest such emigration, but to induce such Greeks as were actually subjects of Carthage to throw off her yoke and join him.[1030]

Loud acclamations from the Syracusan assembly hailed the proposition for war with Carthage; a proposition, which only converted into reality what had been long the familiar expectation of every man. And the war was rendered still more popular by the permission, which Dionysius granted forthwith, to plunder all the Carthaginian residents and mercantile property either in Syracuse or in any of his dependent cities. We are told that there were not only several domiciliated Carthaginians at Syracuse, but also many loaded vessels belonging to Carthage in the harbor, so that the plunder was lucrative.[1031] But though such may have been the case in ordinary times, it seems hardly credible, that under the actual circumstances, any Carthaginian (person or property) can have been at Syracuse except by accident; for war with Carthage had been long announced, not merely in current talk, but in the more unequivocal language of overwhelming preparation. Nor is it easy to under-

stand how the prudent Carthaginian Senate (who probably were not less provided with spies at Syracuse than Dionysius was at Carthage)[1032] can have been so uninformed as to be taken by surprise at the last moment, when Dionysius sent thither a herald formally declaring war; which herald was not sent until after the license for private plunder had been previously granted. He peremptorily required the Carthaginians to relinquish their dominion over the Greek cities in Sicily,[1033] as the only means of avoiding war. To such a proposition no answer was returned, nor probably expected. But the Carthaginians were now so much prostrated (like Athens in the second or third years of the Peloponnesian war) by depopulation, suffering, terrors, and despondency, arising out of the pestilence which beset them in Africa, that they felt incompetent to any serious effort, and heard with alarm the letter read from Dionysius. There was, however, no alternative, so that they forthwith despatched some of their ablest citizens to levy troops for the defence of their Sicilian possessions.[1034]

The first news that reached them was indeed appalling. Dionysius had marched forth with his full power, Syracusan as well as foreign, accumulated by so long a preparation. It was a power, the like of which had never been beheld in Greece; greater even than that wielded by his predecessor Gelon eighty years before. If the contemporaries of Gelon had been struck with awe[1035] at the superiority of his force to anything that Hellas could show elsewhere, as much or more would the same sentiment be felt by those who surrounded Dionysius. More intimately still was a similar comparison, with the mighty victor of Himera, present to Dionysius himself. He exulted in setting out with an army yet more imposing, against the same enemy, and for the same purpose of liberating the maritime cities of Sicily subject to Carthage;[1036] cities, whose number and importance had since fearfully augmented.

These subject-cities, from Kamarina on one side of the island to Selinus and Himera on the other, though there were a certain number of Carthaginian residents established there, had no effective standing force to occupy or defend them on the part of Carthage; whose habit it was to levy large mercenary hosts for the special occasion and then to disband them afterwards. Accordingly, as soon as Dionysius with his powerful army passed the Syracusan border, and entered upon his march westward along the southern coast of the island, proclaiming himself as liberator—the most intense anti-Carthaginian manifestations burst forth at once, at Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera. These Greeks did not merely copy the Syracusans in plundering the property of all Carthaginians found among them, but also seized their persons, and put them to death with every species of indignity and torture. A frightful retaliation now took place for the cruelties recently committed by the Carthaginian armies, in the sacking of Selinus, Agrigentum, and the other conquered cities.[1037] The Hellenic war-practice, in itself sufficiently rigorous, was aggravated into a merciless and studied barbarity, analogous to that which had disfigured the late proceedings of Carthage and her western mercenaries. These “Sicilian vespers,”

which burst out throughout all the south of Sicily against the Carthaginian residents, surpassed even the memorable massacre known under that name in the thirteenth century, wherein the Angevine knights and soldiers were indeed assassinated, but not tortured. Diodorus tells us that the Carthaginians learnt from the retaliation thus suffered, a lesson of forbearance. It will not appear however, from their future conduct, that the lesson was much laid to heart; while it is unhappily certain, that such interchange of cruelties with less humanized neighbors, contributed to lower in the Sicilian Greeks that measure of comparative forbearance which characterized the Hellenic race in its own home.

Elate with this fury of revenge, the citizens of Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, and Selinus joined Dionysius on his march along the coast. He was enabled, from his abundant stock of recently fabricated arms, to furnish them with panoplies and weapons; for it is probable that as subjects of Carthage they had been disarmed. Strengthened by all these reinforcements, he mustered a force of eighty thousand men, besides more than three thousand cavalry; while the ships of war which accompanied him along the coast were nearly two hundred, and the transports, with stores and battering machines, not less than five hundred. With this prodigious army, the most powerful hitherto assembled under Grecian command, he appeared before the Carthaginian settlement of Motyê, a fortified seaport in a little bay immediately north of Cape Lilybæum.[1038]

Of the three principal establishments of Carthage in Sicily,—Motyê, Panormus (Palermo), and Soloeis,—Motyê was at once the nearest to the mother-city,[1039] the most important, and the most devoted. It was situated (like the original Syracuse in Ortygia) upon a little islet, separated from Sicily by a narrow strait about two-thirds of a mile in breadth, which its citizens had bridged over by means of a mole, so as to form a regular, though narrow, footpath. It was populous, wealthy, flourishing, and distinguished for the excellence both of its private houses and its fortifications. Perceiving the approach of Dionysius, and not intimidated by the surrender of their neighbors and allies, the Elymi at Eryx, who did not dare to resist so powerful a force,—the Motyênes put themselves in the best condition of defence. They broke up their mole, and again insulated themselves from Sicily, in the hope of holding out until relief should be sent from Carthage. Resolved to avenge upon Motyê the sufferings of Agrigentum and Selinus, Dionysius took a survey of the place in conjunction with his principal engineers. It deserves notice, that this is among the earliest sieges recorded in Grecian history wherein we read of a professed engineer as being directly and deliberately called on to advise the best mode of proceeding.[1040]

Having formed his plans, he left his admiral Leptines with a portion of the army to begin the necessary works, while he himself with the remainder laid waste the neighboring territory dependent on or allied with Carthage. The Sikani and others submitted to him; but Ankyræ, Soloeis, Panormus, Egesta, and Entella, all held out, though the citizens were confined to their walls, and obliged to witness, without being able

to prevent, the destruction of their lands.[1041] Returning from this march, Dionysius pressed the siege of Motyê with the utmost ardor, and with all the appliances which his engineers could devise. Having moored his transports along the beach, and hauled his ships of war ashore in the harbor, he undertook the laborious task of filling up the strait (probably of no great depth) which divided Motyê from the main island;[1042]—or at least as much of the length of the strait as was sufficient to march across both with soldiers and with battering engines, and to bring them up close against the walls of the city. The numbers under his command enabled him to achieve this enterprise, though not without a long period of effort, during which the Carthaginians tried more than once to interrupt his proceedings. Not having a fleet capable of contending in pitched battle against the besiegers, the Carthaginian general Imilkon tried two successive manœuvres. He first sent a squadron of ten ships of war to sail suddenly into the harbor of Syracuse, in hopes that the diversion thus operated would constrain Dionysius to detach a portion of his fleet from Motyê. Though the attack, however, was so far successful as to destroy many merchantmen in the harbor, yet the assailants were beaten off without making any more serious impression, or creating the diversion intended.[1043] Imilkon next made an attempt to surprise the armed ships of Dionysius, as they lay hauled ashore in the harbor near Motyê. Crossing over from Carthage by night, with one hundred ships of war, to the Selinuntine coast, he sailed round Cape Lilybæum, and appeared at daybreak off Motyê. His appearance took every man by surprise. He destroyed or put to flight the ships on guard, and sailed into the harbor prepared for attack while as yet only a few of the Syracusan ships had been got afloat. As the harbor was too confined to enable Dionysius to profit by his great superiority in number and size of ships, a great portion of his fleet would have been now destroyed, had it not been saved by his numerous land force and artillery on the beach. Showers of missiles, from this assembled crowd as well as from the decks of the Syracusan ships, prevented Imilkon from advancing far enough to attack with effect. The newly-invented engine called the catapulta, of which the Carthaginians had as yet had no experience, was especially effective; projecting large masses to a great distance, it filled them with astonishment and dismay. While their progress was thus arrested, Dionysius employed a new expedient to rescue his fleet from the dilemma in which it had been caught. His numerous soldiers were directed to haul the ships, not down to the harbor, but landward, across a level tongue of land, more than two miles in breadth, which separated the harbor of Motyê from the outer sea. Wooden planks were laid so as to form a pathway for the ships; and in spite of the great size of the newly-constructed quadriremes and quinqueremes, the strength and ardor of the army sufficed for this toilsome effort of transporting eighty ships across in one day. The entire fleet, double in number to that of the Carthaginians, being at length got afloat, Imilkon did not venture on a pitched battle, but returned at once back to Africa.[1044]

Though the citizens of Motyê saw from the walls the mournful spectacle of their friends retiring, their courage was nowise abated. They knew well that they had no

mercy to expect; that the general ferocity of the Carthaginians in their hour of victory, and especially the cruel treatment of Greek captives even in Motyê itself, would now be retaliated; and that their only chance lay in a brave despair. The road across the strait having been at length completed, Dionysius brought up his engines and began his assault. While the catapulta with its missiles prevented defenders from showing themselves on the battlements, battering-rams were driven up to shake or overthrow the walls. At the same time large towers on wheels were rolled up, with six different stories in them one above the other, and in height equal to the houses. Against these means of attack the besieged on their side elevated lofty masts above the walls, with yards projecting outwards. Upon these yards stood men protected from the missiles by a sort of breastwork, and holding burning torches, pitch, and other combustibles, which they cast down upon the machines of the assailants. Many machines took fire in the woodwork, and it was not without difficulty that the conflagration was extinguished. After a long and obstinate resistance, however, the walls were at length overthrown or carried by assault, and the besiegers rushed in, imagining the town to be in their power. But the indefatigable energy of the besieged had already put the houses behind into a state of defence, and barricaded the streets, so that a fresh assault, more difficult than the first, remained to be undertaken. The towers on wheels were rolled near, but probably could not be pushed into immediate contact with the houses in consequence of the ruins of the overthrown wall which impeded their approach. Accordingly the assailants were compelled to throw out wooden platforms or bridges from the towers to the houses, and to march along these to the attack. But here they were at great disadvantage, and suffered severe loss. The Motyenes, resisting desperately, prevented them from setting firm foot on the houses, slew many of them in hand-combat, and precipitated whole companies to the ground, by severing or oversetting the platform. For several days this desperate combat was renewed. Not a step was gained by the besiegers, yet the unfortunate Motyenes became each day more exhausted, while portions of the foremost houses were also overthrown. Every evening Dionysius recalled his troops to their night's repose, renewing the assault next morning. Having thus brought the enemy into an expectation that the night would be undisturbed, he on one fatal night took them by surprise, sending the Thurian Archylus with a chosen body of troops to attack the foremost defences. This detachment, planting ladders and climbing up by means of the half-demolished houses, established themselves firmly in a position within the town before resistance could be organized. In vain did the Motyenes, discovering the stratagem too late, endeavor to dislodge them. The main force of Dionysius was speedily brought up across the artificial earth-way to confirm their success, and the town was thus carried, in spite of the most gallant resistance, which continued even after it had become hopeless.[1045]

The victorious host who now poured into Motyê, incensed not merely by the length and obstinacy of the defence, but also by antecedent Carthaginian atrocities at Agrigentum and elsewhere, gave full loose to the sanguinary impulses of retalia-

tion. They butchered indiscriminately men and women, the aged and the children, without mercy to any one. The streets were thus strewed with the slain, in spite of all efforts on the part of Dionysius, who desired to preserve the captives that they might be sold as slaves, and thus bring in a profitable return. But his orders to abstain from slaughter were not obeyed, nor could he do anything more than invite the sufferers by proclamation to take refuge in the temples; a step, which most of them would probably resort to uninvited. Restrained from farther slaughter by the sanctuary of the temples, the victors now turned to pillage. Abundance of gold, silver, precious vestments, and other marks of opulence, the accumulations of a long period of active prosperity, fell into their hands; and Dionysius allowed to them the full plunder of the town, as a recompense for the toils of the siege. He farther distributed special recompenses to those who had distinguished themselves; one hundred minæ being given to Archylus, the leader of the successful night-surprise. All the surviving Motyenes he sold into slavery; but he reserved for a more cruel fate Daimenês and various other Greeks who had been taken among them. These Greeks he caused to be crucified;[1046] a specimen of the Phœnician penalties transferred by example to their Hellenic neighbors and enemies.

The siege of Motyê having occupied nearly all the summer, Dionysius now reconducted his army homeward. He left at the place a Sikel garrison under the command of the Syracusan Biton, as well as a large portion of his fleet, one hundred and twenty ships, under the command of his brother Leptines; who was instructed to watch for the arrival of any force from Carthage, and to employ himself in besieging the neighboring towns of Egesta and Entella. The operations against these two towns however had little success. The inhabitants defended themselves bravely, and the Egestæans were even successful, through a well-planned nocturnal sally, in burning the enemy's camp, with many horses, and stores of all kinds in the tents. Neither of the two towns was yet reduced, when, in the ensuing spring, Dionysius himself returned with his main force from Syracuse. He reduced the inhabitants of Halikyæ to submission, but effected no other permanent conquest, nor anything more than devastation of the neighboring territory dependent upon Carthage.[1047]

Presently the face of the war was changed by the arrival of Imilkon from Carthage. Having been elevated to the chief magistracy of the city, he now brought with him an overwhelming force, collected as well from the subjects in Africa as from Iberia and the Western Mediterranean. It amounted, even in the low estimate of Timæus, to one hundred thousand men, reinforced afterwards in Sicily by thirty thousand more,—and in the more ample computations of Ephorus, to three hundred thousand foot, four thousand horse, four hundred chariots of war, four hundred ships of war, and six hundred transports carrying stores and engines. Dionysius had his spies at Carthage,[1048] even among men of rank and politicians, to apprise him of all movements or public orders. But Imilkon, to obviate knowledge of the precise point in Sicily where he intended to land, gave to the pilots sealed instructions, to be

opened only when they were out at sea, indicating Panormus (Palermo) as the place of rendezvous.[1049] The transports made directly for that port, without nearing the land elsewhere; while Imilkon with the ships of war approached the harbor of Motyê and sailed from thence along the coast to Panormus. He probably entertained the hope of intercepting some portion of the Syracusan fleet. But nothing of the kind was found practicable; while Leptines on his side was even fortunate enough to be able to attack, with thirty triremes, the foremost vessels of the large transport-fleet on their voyage to Panormus. He destroyed no less than fifty of them, with five thousand men, and two hundred chariots of war; but the remaining fleet reached the port in safety, and were there joined by Imilkon with the ships of war. The land force being disembarked, the Carthaginian general led them to Motyê, ordering his ships of war to accompany him along the coast. In his way he regained Eryx, which was at heart Carthaginian, having only been intimidated into submission to Dionysius during the preceding year. He then attacked Motyê, which he retook, seemingly after very little resistance. It had held out obstinately against the Syracusans a few months before, while in the hands of its own Carthaginian inhabitants, with their families and properties around them; but the Sikel garrison had far less motive for stout defence. [1050]

Thus was Dionysius deprived of the conquest which had cost him so much blood and toil during the preceding summer. We are surprised to learn that he made no effort to prevent its recapture, though he was then not far off, besieging Egesta,—and though his soldiers, elate with the successes of the preceding year were eager for a general battle. But Dionysius, deeming this measure too adventurous, resolved to retreat to Syracuse. His provisions were failing, and he was at a great distance from allies, so that defeat would have been ruinous. He therefore returned to Syracuse, carrying with him some of the Sikanians, whom he persuaded to evacuate their abode in the Carthaginian neighborhood, promising to provide them with better homes elsewhere. Most of them, however, declined his offers; some (among them, the Halikyæans) preferring to resume their alliance with Carthage. Of the recent acquisitions nothing now remained to Dionysius beyond the Selinuntine boundary; but Gela, Kamarina, Agrigentum, and Selinus had been emancipated from Carthage, and were still in a state of dependent alliance with him; a result of moment,—yet seemingly very inadequate to the immense warlike preparations whereby it had been attained. Whether he exercised a wise discretion in declining to fight the Carthaginians, we have not sufficient information to determine. But his army appear to have been dissatisfied with it, and it was among the causes of the outbreak against him shortly afterwards at Syracuse.[1051]

Thus left master of the country, Imilkon, instead of trying to reconquer Selinus and Himera, which had probably been impoverished by recent misfortunes,—resolved to turn his arms against Messênê in the north-east of the island; a city as yet fresh and untouched,—so little prepared for attack that its walls were not in good repair,—

and moreover at the present moment yet farther enfeebled by the absence of its horsemen in the army of Dionysius.[1052] Accordingly, he marched along the northern coast of Sicily, with his fleet coasting in the same direction to coöperate with him. He made terms with Kephalœdium and Therma, captured the island of Lipara, and at length reached Cape Pelôrus, a few miles from Messênê. His rapid march and unexpected arrival struck the Messenians with dismay. Many of them, conceiving defence to be impossible against so numerous a host, sent away their families and their valuable property to Rhegium or elsewhere. On the whole, however, a spirit of greater confidence prevailed, arising in part from an ancient prophecy preserved among the traditions of the town, purporting that the Carthaginians should one day carry water in Messênê. The interpreters affirmed that "to carry water" meant, of course, "to be a slave,"—and the Messenians, persuading themselves that this portended defeat to Imilkon, sent out their chosen military force to meet him at Pelôrus, and oppose his disembarkation. The Carthaginian commander, seeing these troops on their march, ordered his fleet to sail forward into the harbor of the city, and attack it from seaward during the absence of the defenders. A north wind so favored the advance of the ships, that they entered the harbor full sail, and found the city on that side almost unguarded. The troops who had marched out towards Pelôrus hastened back, but were too late;[1053] while Imilkon himself also, pushing forward by land, forced his way into the town over the neglected parts of the wall. Messênê was taken; and its unhappy population fled in all directions for their lives. Some found refuge in the neighboring cities; others ran to the hill-forts of the Messenian territory, planted as a protection against the indigenous Sikels; while about two hundred of them near the harbor, cast themselves into the sea, and undertook the arduous task of swimming across to the Italian coast, in which fifty of them succeeded.[1054]

Though Imilkon tried in vain to carry by assault some of the Messenian hill-forts, which were both strongly placed and gallantly defended,—yet his capture of Messênê itself was an event both imposing and profitable. It deprived Dionysius of an important ally, and lessened his facilities for obtaining succor from Italy. But most of all, it gratified the anti-Hellenic sentiment of the Punic general and his army, counterbalancing the capture of Motyê in the preceding year. Having taken scarce any captives, Imilkon had nothing but unconscious stone and wood upon which to vent his antipathy. He ordered the town, the walls, and all the buildings, to be utterly burnt and demolished; a task which his numerous host are said to have executed so effectually, that there remained hardly anything but ruins, without a trace of human residence.[1055] He received adhesion and reinforcements from most of the Sikels[1056] of the interior, who had been forced to submit to Dionysius a year or two before, but detested his dominion. To some of these Sikels, the Syracusan despot had assigned the territory of the conquered Naxians, with their city probably unwalled. But anxious as they were to escape from him, many had migrated to a point somewhat north of Naxus,—to the hill of Taurus, immediately over the sea, unfavorably celebrated among the Sikel population as being the spot where the first Greek colonists had

touched on arriving in the island. Their migration was encouraged, multiplied, and organized, under the auspices of Imilkon, who prevailed upon them to construct, upon the strong eminence of Taurus, a fortified post, which formed the beginning of the city afterwards known as Tauromenium.[1057] Magon was sent with the Carthaginian fleet to assist in the enterprise.

Meanwhile Dionysius, greatly disquieted at the capture of Messênê, exerted himself to put Syracuse in an effective position of defence on her northern frontier. Naxus and Katana being both unfortified, he was forced to abandon them, and he induced the Campanians whom he had planted in Katana to change their quarters to the strong town called Ætna, on the skirt of the mountain so named. He made Leontini his chief position; strengthening as much as possible the fortifications of the city as well as those of the neighboring country forts, wherein he accumulated magazines of provisions from the fertile plains around. He had still a force of thirty thousand foot and more than three thousand horse; he had also a fleet of one hundred and eighty ships of war,—triremes and others. During the year preceding, he had brought out both a land force and a naval force much superior to this, even for purposes of aggression; how it happened that he could now command no more, even for defence and at home,—or what had become of the difference,—we are not told. Of the one hundred and eighty ships of war, sixty only were manned by the extraordinary proceeding of liberating slaves. Such sudden and serious changes in the amount of military force from year to year, are perceptible among Carthaginians as well as Greeks, —indeed throughout most part of Grecian history;—the armies being got together chiefly for special occasions, and then dismissed. Dionysius farther despatched envoys to Sparta, soliciting a reinforcement of a thousand mercenary auxiliaries. Having thus provided the best defence that he could through the territory, he advanced forward with his main land-force to Katana, having his fleet also moving in coöperation, immediately off shore.

Towards this same point of Katana the Carthaginians were now moving, in their march against Syracuse. Magon was directed to coast along with the fleet from Taurus (Tauromenium) to Katana, while Imilkon intended himself to march with the land force on shore, keeping constantly near the fleet for the purpose of mutual support. But his scheme was defeated by a remarkable accident. A sudden eruption took place from Ætna; so that the stream of lava from the mountain to the sea forbade all possibility of marching along the shore to Katana, and constrained him to make a considerable circuit with his army on the land-side of the mountain. Though he accelerated his march as much as possible, yet for two days or more he was unavoidably cut off from the fleet; which under the command of Magon was sailing southward towards Katana. Dionysius availed himself of this circumstance to advance beyond Katana along the beach stretching northward, to meet Magon in his approach, and attack him separately. The Carthaginian fleet was much superior in number, consisting of five hundred sail in all; a portion of which, however, were not strictly ships of

war, but armed merchantmen,—that is, furnished with brazen bows for impact against an enemy, and rowed with oars. But on the other hand, Dionysius had a land-force close at hand to coöperate with his fleet; an advantage which in ancient naval warfare counted for much, serving in case of defeat as a refuge to the ships, and in case of victory as intercepting or abridging the enemy's means of escape. Magon, alarmed when he came in sight of the Grecian land-force mustered on the beach, and the Grecian fleet rowing up to attack him,—was nevertheless constrained unwillingly to accept the battle. Leptines, the Syracusan admiral,—though ordered by Dionysius to concentrate his ships as much as possible, in consequence of his inferior numbers,—attacked with boldness, and even with temerity; advancing himself with thirty ships greatly before the rest, and being apparently farther out to sea than the enemy. His bravery at first appeared successful, destroying or damaging the head-most ships of the enemy. But their superior numbers presently closed around him, and after a desperate combat, fought in the closest manner, ship to ship and hand to hand, he was forced to sheer off, and to seek escape seaward. His main fleet, coming up in disorder, and witnessing his defeat, were beaten also, after a strenuous contest. All of them fled, either landward or seaward as they could, under vigorous pursuit by the Carthaginian vessels; and in the end, no less than a hundred of the Syracusan ships, with twenty thousand men, were numbered as taken, or destroyed. Many of the crews, swimming or floating in the water on spars, strove to get to land to the protection of their comrades. But the Carthaginian small craft, sailing very near to the shore, slew or drowned these unfortunate men, even under the eyes of friends ashore who could render no assistance. The neighboring water became strewed, both with dead bodies and with fragments of broken ships. As victors, the Carthaginians were enabled to save many of their own seamen, either on board of damaged ships, or swimming for their lives. Yet their own loss too was severe; and their victory, complete as it proved, was dearly purchased.

Though the land-force of Dionysius had not been at all engaged, yet the awful defeat of his fleet induced him to give immediate orders for retreating, first to Katana and afterwards yet farther to Syracuse. As soon as the Syracusan army had evacuated the adjoining shore, Magon towed all his prizes to land, and there hauled them up on the beach; partly for repair, wherever practicable,—partly as visible proofs of the magnitude of the triumph, for encouragement to his own armament. Stormy weather just then supervening, he was forced to haul his own ships ashore also for safety, and remained there for several days refreshing the crews. To keep the sea under such weather would have been scarcely practicable; so that if Dionysius, instead of retreating, had continued to occupy the shore with his unimpaired land-force, it appears that the Carthaginian ships would have been in the greatest danger; constrained either to face the storm, to run back a considerable distance northward, or to make good their landing against a formidable enemy, without being able to wait for the arrival of Imilkon.[1058] The latter, after no very long interval, came up, so that the land-force and the navy of the Carthaginians were now again in coöperation.

While allowing his troops some days of repose and enjoyment of the victory, he sent envoys to the town of Ætna, inviting the Campanian mercenary soldiers to break with Dionysius and join him. Reminding them that their countrymen at Entella were living in satisfaction as a dependency of Carthage (which they had recently testified by resisting the Syracusan invasion), he promised to them an accession of territory, and a share in the spoils of the war, to be wrested from Greeks who were enemies of Campanians not less than of Carthaginians.[1059] The Campanians of Ætna would gladly have complied with his invitation, and were only restrained from joining him by the circumstance that they had given hostages to the despot of Syracuse, in whose army also their best soldiers were now serving.

Meanwhile Dionysius, in marching back to Syracuse, found his army grievously discontented. Withdrawn from the scene of action without even using their arms, they looked forward to nothing better than a blockade at Syracuse, full of hardship and privation. Accordingly many of them protested against retreat, conjuring him to lead them again to the scene of action, that they might either assail the Carthaginian fleet in the confusion of landing, or join battle with the advancing land-force under Imilkon. At first, Dionysius consented to such change of scheme. But he was presently reminded that unless he hastened back to Syracuse, Magon with the victorious fleet might sail thither, enter the harbor, and possess himself of the city; in the same manner as Imilkon had recently succeeded at Messênê. Under these apprehensions he renewed his original order for retreat, in spite of the vehement protest of his Sicilian allies; who were indeed so incensed that most of them quitted him at once. Which of the two was the wiser plan, we have no sufficient means to determine. But the circumstances seem not to have been the same as those preceding the capture of Messênê; for Magon was not in a condition to move forward at once with the fleet, partly from his loss in the recent action, partly from the stormy weather; and might perhaps have been intercepted in the very act of landing, if Dionysius had moved rapidly back to the shore. As far as we can judge, it would appear that the complaints of the army against the hasty retreat of Dionysius rested on highly plausible grounds. He nevertheless persisted, and reached Syracuse with his army not only much discouraged, but greatly diminished by the desertion of allies. He lost no time in sending forth envoys to the Italian Greeks and to Peloponnesus, with ample funds for engaging soldiers, and urgent supplications to Sparta as well as to Corinth.[1060] Polyxenus, his brother-in-law, employed on this mission, discharged his duty with such diligence, that he came back in a comparatively short space of time, with thirty-two ships of war under the command of the Lacedæmonian Pharakidas.[1061]

Meanwhile Imilkon, having sufficiently refreshed his troops after the naval victory off Katana, moved forward towards Syracuse both with the fleet and the land-force. The entry of his fleet into the Great Harbor was ostentatious and imposing; far above even that of the second Athenian armament, when Demosthenes first exhibited its brilliant but short-lived force.[1062] Two hundred and eight ships of war first rowed in,

marshalled in the best order, and adorned with the spoils of the captured Syracusan ships. These were followed by transports, five hundred of them carrying soldiers, and one thousand others either empty or bringing stores and machines. The total number of vessels, we are told, reached almost two thousand, covering a large portion of the Great Harbor.[1063] The numerous land-force marched up about the same time; Imilkon establishing his head quarters in the temple of Zeus Olympius, nearly one English mile and a half from the city. He presently drew up his forces in order of battle, and advanced nearly to the city walls; while his ships of war also, being divided into two fleets of one hundred ships each, showed themselves in face of the two interior harbors or docks (on each side of the connecting strait between Ortygia and the main land) wherein the Syracusan ships were safely lodged. He thus challenged the Syracusans to combat on both elements; but neither challenge was accepted.

Having by such defiance farther raised the confidence of his own troops, he first spread them over the Syracusan territory, and allowed them for thirty days to enrich themselves by unlimited plunder. Next, he proceeded to establish fortified posts, as essential to the prosecution of a blockade which he foresaw would be tedious. Besides fortifying the temple of the Olympian Zeus, he constructed two other forts; one at Cape Plemmyrium (on the southern entrance of the harbor, immediately opposite to Ortygia, where Nikias had erected a post also), the other on the Great Harbor, midway between Plemmyrium and the temple of the Olympian Zeus, at the little bay called Daskon. He farther encircled his whole camp, near the last-mentioned temple, with a wall; the materials of which were derived in part from the demolition of the numerous tombs around; especially one tomb, spacious and magnificent, commemorating Gelon and his wife Damaretê. In these various fortified posts he was able to store up the bread, wine, and other provisions which his transports were employed in procuring from Africa and Sardinia, for the continuous subsistence of so mighty an host.

It would appear as if Imilkon had first hoped to take the city by assault; for he pushed up his army as far as the very walls of Achradina (the outer city). He even occupied the open suburb of that city, afterwards separately fortified under the name of Neapolis, wherein were situated the temples of Demeter and Persephonê, which he stripped of their rich treasures.[1064] But if such was his plan, he soon abandoned it, and confined himself to the slower process of reducing the city by famine. His progress in this enterprise, however, was by no means encouraging. We must recollect that he was not, like Nikias, master of the centre of Epipolæ; able from thence to stretch his right arm southward to the Great Harbor, and his left arm northward to the sea at Trogilus. As far as we are able to make out, he never ascended the southern cliff, nor got upon the slope of Epipolæ; though it seems that at this time there was no line of wall along the southern cliff, as Dionysius had recently built along the northern. The position of Imilkon was confined to the Great Harbor and to the low lands adjoining, southward of the cliff of Epipolæ; so that the communications of

Syracuse with the country around remained partially open on two sides,—westward, through the Euryalus at the upper extremity of Epipolæ,—and northward towards Thapsus and Megara, through the Hexapylon, or the principal gate in the new fortification constructed by Dionysius along the northern cliff of Epipolæ. The full value was now felt of that recent fortification, which, protecting Syracuse both to the north and west, and guarding the precious position of Euryalus, materially impeded the operations of Imilkon. The city was thus open, partially at least, on two sides, to receive supplies by land. And even by sea means were found to introduce provisions. Though Imilkon had a fleet so much stronger that the Syracusans did not dare to offer pitched battle, yet he found it difficult to keep such constant watch as to exclude their store-ships, and ensure the arrival of his own. Dionysius and Leptines went forth themselves from the harbor with armed squadrons to accelerate and protect the approach of their supplies; while several desultory encounters took place, both of land-force and of shipping, which proved advantageous to the Syracusans, and greatly raised their spirits.

One naval conflict especially, which occurred while Dionysius was absent on his cruise, was of serious moment. A corn-ship belonging to Imilkon's fleet being seen entering the Great Harbor, the Syracusans suddenly manned five ships of war, mastered it, and hauled it into their own dock. To prevent such capture, the Carthaginians from their station sent out forty ships of war; upon which the Syracusans equipped their whole naval force, bore down upon the forty with numbers decidedly superior, and completely defeated them. They captured the admiral's ship, damaged twenty-four others, and pursued the rest to the naval station; in front of which they paraded, challenging the enemy to battle. As the challenge was not accepted, they returned to their own dock, towing in their prizes in triumph.

This naval victory indicated, and contributed much to occasion, that turn in the fortune of the siege which each future day still farther accelerated. Its immediate effect was to fill the Syracusan public with unbounded exultation. "Without Dionysius we conquer our enemies; under his command we are beaten; why submit to slavery under him any longer?" Such was the burst of indignant sentiment which largely pervaded the groups and circles in the city; strengthened by the consciousness that they were now all armed and competent to extort freedom,—since Dionysius, when the besieging enemy actually appeared before the city, had been obliged, as the less of two hazards, to produce and redistribute the arms which he had previously taken from them. In the midst of this discontent, Dionysius himself returned from his cruise. To soothe the prevalent temper, he was forced to convene a public assembly; wherein he warmly extolled the recent exploit of the Syracusans, and exhorted them to strenuous confidence, promising that he would speedily bring the war to a close.

It is possible that Dionysius, throughout his despotism, may have occasionally permitted what were called public assemblies; but we may be very sure, that, if ever convened, they were mere matters of form, and that no free discussion or opposition

to his will was ever tolerated. On the present occasion, he anticipated the like passive acquiescence; and after having delivered a speech, doubtless much applauded by his own partisans, he was about to dismiss the assembly, when a citizen named Theodôrus unexpectedly rose. He was a Horseman or Knight,—a person of wealth and station in the city, of high character and established reputation for courage. Gathering boldness from the time and circumstances, he now stood forward to proclaim publicly that hatred of Dionysius, and anxiety for freedom, which so many of his fellow-citizens around had been heard to utter privately and were well known to feel.[1065]

Diodorus in his history gives us a long harangue (whether composed by himself, or copied from others, we cannot tell) as pronounced by Theodôrus. The main topics of it are such as we should naturally expect, and are probably, on the whole, genuine. It is a full review, and an emphatic denunciation, of the past conduct of Dionysius, concluding with an appeal to the Syracusans to emancipate themselves from his dominion. "Dionysius (the speaker contends, in substance) is a worse enemy than the Carthaginians: who, if victorious, would be satisfied with a regular tribute, leaving us to enjoy our properties and our paternal polity. Dionysius has robbed us of both. He has pillaged our temples of their sacred deposits. He has slain or banished our wealthy citizens, and then seized their properties by wholesale, to be transferred to his own satellites. He has given the wives of these exiles in marriage to his barbarian soldiers. He has liberated our slaves, and taken them into his pay, in order to keep their masters in slavery. He has garrisoned our own citadel against us, by means of these slaves, together with a host of other mercenaries. He has put to death every citizen who ventured to raise his voice in defence of the laws and constitution. He has abused our confidence,—once, unfortunately, carried so far as to nominate him general,—by employing his powers to subvert our freedom, and rule us according to his own selfish rapacity in place of justice. He has farther stripped us of our arms; these, recent necessity has compelled him to restore,—and these, if we are men, we shall now employ for the recovery of our own freedom."[1066]

"If the conduct of Dionysius towards Syracuse has been thus infamous, it has been no better towards the Sicilian Greeks generally. He betrayed Gela and Kamarina, for his own purposes, to the Carthaginians. He suffered Messênê to fall into their hands without the least help. He reduced to slavery, by gross treachery, our Grecian brethren and neighbors of Naxus and Katana; transferring the latter to the non-Hellenic Campanians, and destroying the former. He might have attacked the Carthaginians immediately after their landing from Africa at Panormus, before they had recovered from the fatigue of the voyage. He might have fought the recent naval combat near the port of Katana, instead of near the beach north of that town; so as to ensure to our fleet, if worsted, an easy and sure retreat. Had he chosen to keep his land-force on the spot, he might have prevented the victorious Carthaginian fleet from approaching land, when the storm came on shortly after the battle; or he might

have attacked them, if they tried to land, at the greatest advantage. He has conducted the war, altogether, with disgraceful incompetence; not wishing sincerely, indeed, to get rid of them as enemies, but preserving the terrors of Carthage, as an indirect engine to keep Syracuse in subjection to himself. As long as we fought with him, we have been constantly unsuccessful; now that we have come to fight without him, recent experience tells us that we can beat the Carthaginians, even with inferior numbers.

"Let us look out for another leader (concluded Theodôrus), in place of a sacrilegious temple-robber whom the gods have now abandoned. If Dionysius will consent to relinquish his dominion, let him retire from the city with his property unmolested; if he will not, we are here all assembled, we are possessed of our arms, and we have both Italian and Peloponnesian allies by our side. The assembly will determine whether it will choose leaders from our own citizens,—or from our metropolis Corinth,—or from the Spartans, the presidents of all Greece."

Such are the main points of the long harangue ascribed to Theodôrus; the first occasion, for many years, on which the voice of free speech had been heard publicly in Syracuse. Among the charges advanced against Dionysius, which go to impeach his manner of carrying on the war against the Carthaginians, there are several which we can neither admit nor reject, from our insufficient knowledge of the facts. But the enormities ascribed to him in his dealing with the Syracusans,—the fraud, violence, spoliation, and bloodshed, whereby he had first acquired, and afterwards upheld, his dominion over them,—these are assertions of matters of fact, which coincide in the main with the previous narrative of Diodorus, and which we have no ground for contesting.

Hailed by the assembly with great sympathy and acclamation, this harangue seriously alarmed Dionysius. In his concluding words, Theodôrus had invoked the protection of Corinth as well as of Sparta, against the despot, whom with such signal courage he had thus ventured publicly to arraign. Corinthians as well as Spartans were now lending aid in the defence, under the command of Pharakidas. That Spartan officer came forward to speak next after Theodôrus. Among various other sentiments of traditional respect towards Sparta, there still prevailed a remnant of the belief that she was adverse to despots; as she really had once been, at an earlier period of her history.[1067] Hence the Syracusans hoped, and even expected, that Pharakidas would second the protest of Theodôrus, and stand forward as champion of freedom to the first Grecian city in Sicily.[1068] Bitterly indeed were they disappointed. Dionysius had established with Pharakidas relations as friendly as those of the Thirty tyrants at Athens with Kallibius the Lacedæmonian harmost in the acropolis.[1069] Accordingly Pharakidas in his speech not only discountenanced the proposition just made, but declared himself emphatically in favor of the despot; intimating that he had been sent to aid the Syracusans and Dionysius against the Carthaginians,—not to put down the dominion of Dionysius. To the Syracusans this declaration

was a denial of all hope. They saw plainly that in any attempt to emancipate themselves, they would have against them not merely the mercenaries of Dionysius, but also the whole force of Sparta, then imperial and omnipotent; represented on the present occasion by Pharakidas, as it had been in a previous year by Aristus. They were condemned to bear their chains in silence, not without unavailing curses against Sparta. Meanwhile Dionysius, thus powerfully sustained, was enabled to ride over the perilous and critical juncture. His mercenaries crowded in haste around his person,—having probably been sent for, as soon as the voice of a free spokesman was heard.[1070] And he was thus enabled to dismiss an assembly, which had seemed for one short instant to threaten the perpetuity of his dominion, and to promise emancipation for Syracuse.

During this interesting and momentous scene, the fate of Syracuse had hung upon the decision of Pharakidas: for Theodôrus, well aware that with a besieging enemy before the gates, the city could not be left without a supreme authority, had conjured the Spartan commander, with his Lacedæmonian and Corinthian allies, to take into his own hands the control and organization of the popular force. There can be little doubt that Pharakidas could have done this, if he had been so disposed, so as at once to make head against the Carthaginians without, and to restrain, if not to put down, the despotism within. Instead of undertaking the tutelary intervention solicited by the people, he threw himself into the opposite scale, and strengthened Dionysius more than ever, at the moment of his greatest peril. The proceeding of Pharakidas was doubtless conformable to his instructions from home, as well as to the oppressive and crushing policy which Sparta, in these days of her unresisted empire (between the victory of Ægospotami and the defeat of Knidus), pursued throughout the Grecian world.

Dionysius was fully sensible of the danger which he had thus been assisted to escape. Under the first impressions of alarm, he strove to gain something like popularity; by a conciliatory language and demeanor, by presents adroitly distributed, and by invitations to his table. Whatever may have been the success of such artifices, the lucky turn, which the siege was now taking, was the most powerful of all aids for building up his full power anew.

It was not the arms of the Syracusans, but the wrath of Demeter and Persephonê, whose temple (in the suburb of Achradina) Imilkon had pillaged, that ruined the besieging army before Syracuse. So the piety of the citizens interpreted that terrific pestilence which now began to rage among the multitude of their enemies without. The divine wrath was indeed seconded (as the historian informs us[1071]) by physical causes of no ordinary severity. The vast numbers of the host were closely packed together; it was now the beginning of autumn, the most unhealthy period of the year; moreover this summer had been preternaturally hot, and the low marshy ground near the Great Harbor, under the chill of morning contrasted with the burning sun of noon, was the constant source of fever and pestilence.

These unseen and irresistible enemies fell with appalling force upon the troops of Imilkon; especially upon the Libyans, or native Africans, who were found the most susceptible. The intense and varied bodily sufferings of this distemper,—the rapidity with which it spread from man to man,—and the countless victims which it speedily accumulated,—appear to have equalled, if not surpassed, the worst days of the pestilence of Athens in 429 B.C. Care and attendance upon the sick, or even interment of the dead, became impracticable; so that the whole camp presented a scene of deplorable agony, aggravated by the horrors and stench of one hundred and fifty thousand unburied bodies.[1072] The military strength of the Carthaginians was completely prostrated by such a visitation. Far from being able to make progress in the siege, they were not even able to defend themselves against moderate energy on the part of the Syracusans; who (like the Peloponnesians during the great plague of Athens) were themselves untouched by the distemper.[1073]

Such was the wretched spectacle of the Carthaginian army, clearly visible from the walls of Syracuse. To overthrow it by a vigorous attack, was an enterprise not difficult; indeed, so sure, in the opinion of Dionysius, that in organizing his plan of operation, he made it the means of deliberately getting rid of some troops in the city who had become inconvenient to him. Concerting measures for a simultaneous assault upon the Carthaginian station both by sea and land, he entrusted eighty ships of war to Pharakidas and Leptines, with orders to move at daybreak; while he himself conducted a body of troops out of the city, during the darkness of night; issuing forth by Epipolæ and Euryalus (as Gylippus had formerly done when he surprised Plemmyrium[1074]), and making a circuit until he came, on the other side of the Anapus, to the temple of Kyanê; thus getting on the land-side or south-west of the Carthaginian position. He first despatched his horsemen, together with a regiment of one thousand mercenary foot-soldiers, to commence the attack. These latter troops had become peculiarly obnoxious to him, having several times engaged in revolt and disturbance. Accordingly, while he now ordered them up to the assault in conjunction with the horse, he at the same time gave secret directions to the horse, to desert their comrades and take flight. Both his orders were obeyed. The onset having been made jointly, in the heat of combat the horsemen fled, leaving their comrades all to be cut to pieces by the Carthaginians.[1075] We have as yet heard nothing about difficulties arising to Dionysius from his mercenary troops, on whose arms his dominion rested; and what we are here told is enough merely to raise curiosity without satisfying it. These men are said to have been mutinous and disaffected; a fact, which explains, if it does not extenuate, the gross perfidy of deliberately inveigling them to destruction, while he still professed to keep them under his command.

In the actual state of the Carthaginian army, Dionysius could afford to make them a present of this obnoxious division. His own attack, first upon the fort of Polichnê, next upon that near the naval station at Daskon, was conducted with spirit and success. While the defenders, thinned and enfeebled by the pestilence, were striving to

repel him on the land-side, the Syracusan fleet came forth from its docks in excellent spirits and order to attack the ships at the station. These Carthaginian ships, though afloat and moored, were very imperfectly manned. Before the crews could get aboard to put them on their defence, the Syracusan triremes and quinqueremes, ably rowed and with their brazen beaks well directed, drove against them on the quarter or midships, and broke through the line of their timbers. The crash of such impact was heard afar off, and the best ships were thus speedily disabled.[1076] Following up their success, the Syracusans jumped aboard, overpowered the crews, or forced them to seek safety as they could in flight. The distracted Carthaginians being thus pressed at the same time by sea and by land, the soldiers of Dionysius from the land-side forced their way through the entrenchment to the shore, where forty pentekonters were hauled up, while immediately near them were moored both merchantmen and triremes. The assailants set fire to the pentekonters; upon which the flames, rapidly spreading under a strong wind, communicated presently to all the merchantmen and triremes adjacent. Unable to arrest this terrific conflagration, the crews were obliged to leap overboard; while the vessels, severed from their moorings by the burning of the cables, drifted against each other under the wind, until the naval station at Daskon became one scene of ruin.

Such a volume of flame, though destroying the naval resources of the Carthaginians, must at the same time have driven off the assailing Syracusan ships of war, and probably also the assailants by land. But to those who contemplated it from the city of Syracuse, across the breadth of the Great Harbor, it presented a spectacle grand and stimulating in the highest degree; especially when the fire was seen towering aloft amidst the masts, yards, and sails of the merchantmen. The walls of the city were crowded with spectators, women, children, and aged men, testifying their exultation by loud shouts, and stretching their hands to heaven,—as on the memorable day, near twenty years before, when they gained their final victory in the same harbor, over the Athenian fleet. Many lads and elders, too much excited to remain stationary, rushed into such small craft as they could find, and rowed across the harbor to the scene of action, where they rendered much service by preserving part of the cargoes, and towing away some of the enemy’s vessels deserted but not yet on fire. The evening of this memorable day left Dionysius and the Syracusans victorious by land as well as by sea; encamped near the temple of Olympian Zeus which had so recently been occupied by Imilkon. Though they had succeeded in forcing the defences of the latter both at Polichnê and at Daskon, and in inflicting upon him a destructive defeat, yet they would not aim at occupying his camp, in its infected and deplorable condition.

On two former occasions during the last few years, we have seen the Carthaginian armies decimated by pestilence,—near Agrigentum and near Gela,—previous to this last and worst calamity. Imilkon, copying the weakness of Nikias rather than the resolute prudence of Demosthenes, had clung to his insalubrious

camp near the Great Harbor, long after all hope of reducing Syracuse had ceased, and while suffering and death to the most awful extent were daily accumulating around him. But the recent defeat satisfied even him that his position was no longer tenable. Retreat was indispensable; yet nowise impracticable,—with the brave men, Iberians and others, in his army, and with the Sikels of the interior on his side,—had he possessed the good qualities as well as the defects of Nikias, or been capable of anything like that unconquerable energy which ennobled the closing days of the latter. Instead of taking the best measures available for a retiring march, Imilkon despatched a secret envoy to Dionysius, unknown to the Syracusans generally; tendering to him the sum of three hundred talents which yet remained in the camp, on condition of the fleet and army being allowed to sail to Africa unmolested. Dionysius would not consent, nor would the Syracusans have confirmed any such consent, to let them all escape; but he engaged to permit the departure of Imilkon himself with the native Carthaginians. The sum of three hundred talents was accordingly sent across by night to Ortygia; and the fourth night ensuing was fixed for the departure of Imilkon and his Carthaginians, without opposition from Dionysius. During that night forty of their ships, filled with Carthaginians, put to sea and sailed in silence out of the harbor. Their stealthy flight, however, did not altogether escape the notice of the Corinthian seamen in Syracuse; who not only apprised Dionysius, but also manned some of their own ships and started in pursuit. They overtook and destroyed one or two of the slowest sailers; but all the rest with Imilkon himself, accomplished their flight to Carthage.

Dionysius,—while he affected to obey the warning of the Corinthians, with movements intentionally tardy and unavailing,—applied himself with earnest activity to act against the forsaken army remaining. During the same night he led out his troops from the city to the vicinity of their camp. The flight of Imilkon speedily promulgated, had filled the whole army with astonishment and consternation. No command,—no common cause,—no bond of union,—now remained among this miscellaneous host, already prostrated by previous misfortune. The Sikels in the army, being near to their own territory and knowing the roads, retired at once, before daybreak, and reached their homes. Scarcely had they passed, when the Syracusan soldiers occupied the roads, and barred the like escape to others. Amidst the general dispersion of the abandoned soldiers, some perished in vain attempts to force the passes, others threw down their arms and solicited mercy. The Iberians alone, maintaining their arms and order with unshaken resolution, sent to Dionysius propositions to transfer to him their service; which he thought proper to accept, enrolling them among his mercenaries. All the remaining host, principally Libyans, being stripped and plundered by his soldiers, became his captives, and were probably sold as slaves.[1077]

The heroic efforts of Nikias, to open for his army a retreat in the face of desperate obstacles, had ended in a speedy death as prisoner at Syracuse,—yet without anything worse than the usual fate of prisoners of war. But the base treason of Im-

ilkon, though he insured a safe retreat home by betraying the larger portion of his army, earned for him only a short prolongation of life amidst the extreme of ignominy and remorse. When he landed at Carthage with the fraction of his army preserved, the city was in the deepest distress. Countless family losses, inflicted by the pestilence, added a keener sting to the unexampled public loss and humiliation now fully made known. Universal mourning prevailed; all public and private business was suspended, all the temples were shut, while the authorities and the citizens met Imilkon in sad procession on the shore. The defeated commander strove to disarm their wrath, by every demonstration of a broken and prostrate spirit. Clothed in the sordid garment of a slave, he acknowledged himself as the cause of all the ruin, by his impiety towards the gods; for it was they, and not the Syracusans, who had been his real enemies and conquerors. He visited all the temples, with words of atonement and supplication,—replied to all the inquiries about relatives who had perished under the distemper,—and then retiring, blocked up the doors of his house, where he starved himself to death.

But the season of misfortune to Carthage was not closed by his decease. Her dominion over her Libyan subjects was always harsh and unpopular, rendering them disposed to rise against her at any moment of calamity. Her recent disaster in Sicily would have been in itself perhaps sufficient to stimulate them into insurrection; but its effect was aggravated by their resentment for the deliberate betrayal of their troops serving under Imilkon, not one of whom lived to come back. All the various Libyan subject towns had on this matter one common feeling of indignation; all came together in congress, agreed to unite their forces, and formed an army which is said to have reached one hundred and twenty thousand men. They established their head-quarters at Tunês (Tunis), a town within a short distance of Carthage itself, and were for a certain time so much stronger in the field, that the Carthaginians were obliged to remain within their walls. For a moment it seemed as if the star of this great commercial city was about to set for ever. The Carthaginians themselves were in the depth of despondency, believing themselves to be under the wrath of the goddesses Demeter and her daughter Persephonê; who, not content with the terrible revenge already taken in Sicily, for the sacrilege committed by Imilkon, were still pursuing them into Africa. Under the extreme religious terror which beset the city, every means were tried to appease the offended goddesses. Had it been supposed that the Carthaginian gods had been insulted, expiation would have been offered by the sacrifice of human victims,—and those too the most precious, such as beautiful captives, or children of conspicuous citizens. But on this occasion, the insult had been offered to Grecian gods, and atonement was to be made according to the milder ceremonies of Greece. The Carthaginians had never yet instituted in their city any worship of Demeter or Persephonê; they now established temples in honor of these goddesses, appointed several of their most eminent citizens to be priests, and consulted the Greeks resident among them, as to the form of worship most suitable to be offered. After having done this, and cleared their own consciences, they devoted themselves

to the preparation of ships and men for the purpose of carrying on the war. It was soon found that Demeter and Persephonê were not implacable, and that the fortune of Carthage was returning. The insurgents, though at first irresistible, presently fell into discord among themselves about the command. Having no fleet, they became straitened for want of provisions, while Carthage was well supplied by sea from Sardinia. From these and similar causes, their numerous host gradually melted away, and rescued the Carthaginians from alarm at the point where they were always weakest. The relations of command and submission, between Carthage and her Libyan subjects, were established as they had previously stood, leaving her to recover slowly from her disastrous reverses.[1078]

But though the power of Carthage in Africa was thus restored, in Sicily it was reduced to the lowest ebb. It was long before she could again make head with effect against Dionysius, who was left at liberty to push his conquests in another direction, against the Italiot Greeks. The remaining operations of his reign,—successful against the Italiots, unsuccessful against Carthage,—will come to be recounted in my next succeeding chapter and volume.

FOOTNOTES

[1] It goes by both names; Xenophon more commonly speaks of ἡ εἰρήνη—Isokrates, of αἱ συνθῆκαι.

Though we say, the peace *of* Antalkidas, the Greek authors say ἡ ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνη; I do not observe that they ever phrase it with the genitive case Ἀνταλκίδου simply, without a preposition.

[2] Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 22 (compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 23; and his Apophtheg. Lacon. p. 213 B). Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀγησίλαος, πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα—Φεῦ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ὅπου μηδίζουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ Λάκωνες!… Μᾶλλον, εἶπεν, οἱ Μῆδοι λακωνίζουσι.

[3] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 14.

[4] The restoration of these three islands forms the basis of historical truth in the assertion of Isokrates, that the Lacedæmonians were so subdued by the defeat of Knidus, as to come and tender maritime empire to Athens—(ἐλθεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν δώσοντας) Orat. vii, (Areopagit.) s. 74; Or. ix, (Evagor.); s. 83. But the assertion is true respecting a later time; for the Lacedæmonians really did make this proposition to Athens after they had been enfeebled and humiliated by the battle of Leuktra; but not before (Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 1, 3).

[5] Diodor. xiv, 111.

[6] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 30, 31. Ὥστ' ἐπεὶ παρήγγειλεν ὁ Τιρίβαζος παρεῖναι *τοὺς βουλομένους ὑπακοῦσαι*, ἢν βασιλεὺς εἰρήνην καταπέμποι, ταχέως πάντες παρεγένοντο. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ξυνῆλθον, *ἐπιδείξας ὁ Τιρίβαζος τὰ βασιλέως σημεῖα*, ἀνεγίνωσκε τὰ γεγραμμένα, εἶχε δὲ ὧδε·

Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς *νομίζει δίκαιον*, τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζομένας καὶ Κύπρον· τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας, αὐτονόμους εἶναι, πλὴν Λήμνου, καὶ Ἴμβρου καὶ Σκύρου, ταύτας δὲ, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον, εἶναι Ἀθηναίων. Ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται, *τούτοις ἐγὼ πολεμήσω*, μετὰ τῶν ταὐτα βουλομένων, καὶ πεζῇ καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν, καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ χρήμασιν.

[7] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 211. Καὶ ταύτας ἡμᾶς ἠνάγκασεν (the Persian king) ἐν στήλαις λιθίναις ἀναγράψαντας ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς τῶν ἱερῶν ἀναθεῖναι, πολὺ κάλλιον τρόπαιον τῶν ἐν ταῖς μάχαις γιγνομένων.

The Oratio Panegyrica of Isokrates (published about 380 B.C., seven years afterwards) from which I here copy, is the best evidence of the feelings with which an intelligent and patriotic Greek looked upon this treaty at the time; when it was yet recent, but when there had been full time to see how the Lacedæmonians carried it out. His other orations, though valuable and instructive, were published later, and represent the feelings of after-time.

Another contemporary, Plato in his Menexenus (c. 17, p. 245 D), stigmatizes severely "the base and unholy act (αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀνόσιον ἔργον) of surrendering Greeks to the foreigner," and asserts that the Athenians resolutely refused to sanction it. This is a sufficient mark of his opinion respecting the peace of Antalkidas.

[8] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 207. Ἃ χρῆν ἀναιρεῖν, καὶ μηδεμίαν ἐᾷν ἡμέραν, νομίζοντες, *προστάγματα καὶ οὐ συνθήκας* εἶναι, etc. (s. 213). Αἰσχρὸν ἡμᾶς *ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑβριζομένης*, μηδεμίαν ποιήσασθαι κοινὴν τιμωρίαν, etc.

The word προστάγματα exactly corresponds with an expression of Xenophon (put in the mouth of Autokles the Athenian envoy at Sparta), respecting the dictation of the peace of Antalkidas by Artaxerxes—Καὶ ὅτε μὲν *Βασιλεὺς προσέταττεν* αὐτονόμους τὰς πόλεις εἶναι, etc. (Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 9).

[9] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 205. Καίτοι πῶς οὐ χρὴ διαλύειν ταύτας τὰς ὁμολογίας, ἐξ ὧν τοιαύτη δόξα γέγονεν, ὥστε ὁ μὲν Βάρβαρος κήδεται τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης ἐστὶν, ἡμῶν δὲ τινές εἰσιν οἱ λυμαινόμενοι καὶ κακῶς ποιοῦντες αὐτήν;

The word employed by Photius in his abstract of Theopompus (whether it be the expression of Theopompus himself, we cannot be certain—see Fragm. 111, ed. Didot), to designate the position taken by Artaxerxes in reference to this peace, is—τὴν εἰρήνην ἣν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐβράβευσεν—which implies the peremptory decision of an

official judge, analogous to another passage (139) of the Panegyr. Orat. of Isokrates—Νῦν δ' ἐκεῖνός (Artaxerxes) ἐστιν, ὁ διοικῶν τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ μόνον οὐκ ἐπιστάθμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθιστάς. Πλὴν γὰρ τούτου τί τῶν ἄλλων ὑπόλοιπόν ἐστιν; Οὐ καὶ τοῦ πολέμου κύριος ἐγένετο, καὶ *τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπρυτάνευσε*, καὶ τῶν παρόντων πραγμάτων ἐπιστάτης καθέστηκεν;

[10] Herodot. vi, 49. κατηγόρεον Αἰγινητέων τὰ πεποιήκοιεν, προδόντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

[11] Isokrates, Orat. xii, (Panathen.) s. 112-114.

Plutarch (Agesil. c. 23; Artaxerxes, c. 21, 22) expresses himself in terms of bitter and well-merited indignation of this peace,—"if indeed (says he) we are to call this ignominy and betrayal of Greece by the name of *peace*, which brought with it as much infamy as the most disastrous war." Sparta (he says) lost her headship by her defeat at Leuktra, but her honor had been lost before, by the convention of Antalkidas.

It is in vain, however, that Plutarch tries to exonerate Agesilaus from any share in the peace. From the narrative (in Xenophon's Hellenica, v. i, 33) of his conduct at the taking of the oaths, we see that he espoused it most warmly. Xenophon (in the Encomium of Agesilaus, vii, 7) takes credit to Agesilaus for being μισοπέρσης, which was true, from the year B.C. 396 to B.C. 394. But in B.C. 387, at the time of the peace of Antalkidas, he had become μισοθηβαῖος; his hatred of Persia had given place to hatred of Thebes.

See also a vigorous passage of Justin (viii, 4), denouncing the disgraceful position of the Greek cities at a later time in calling in Philip of Macedon as arbiter; a passage not less applicable to the peace of Antalkidas; and perhaps borrowed from Theopompus.

[12] Compare the language in which the Ionians, on their revolt from Darius king of Persia about 500 B.C., had implored the aid of Sparta (Herodot. v, 49). Τὰ κατήκοντα γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα· Ἰώνων παῖδας δούλους εἶναι ἀντ' ἐλευθέρων—ὄνειδος καὶ ἄλγος μέγιστον μὲν αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν, *ἔτι δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑμῖν, ὅσῳ προεστέατε τῆς Ἑλλάδος*.

How striking is the contrast between these words and the peace of Antalkidas! and what would have been the feelings of Herodotus himself if he could have heard of the latter event!

[13] Thucyd. i, 82. Κἀν τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν ἐξαρτύεσθαι ξυμμάχων τε προσαγωγῇ καὶ Ἑλλήνων *καὶ βαρβάρων*, εἴ ποθέν τινα *ἢ ναυτικοῦ ἢ χρημάτων* δύναμιν προσληψόμεθα, (*ἀνεπίφθονον* δὲ, ὅσοι ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων ἐπιβουλευόμεθα, μὴ Ἕλληνας μόνον *ἀλλὰ καὶ βαρβάρους* προσλαβόντας διασωθῆναι), etc. Compare also Plato, Menexenus, c. 14, p. 243 B.

[14] Thucyd. ii, 7, 67; iv, 50.

[15] See Vol. IX, Ch. LXXV, p. 360.

Compare the expressions of Demosthenes (cont. Aristokrat. c. 33, p. 666) attesting the prevalent indignation among the Athenians of his time, about this surrender of the Asiatic Greeks by Sparta,—and his oration De Rhodior. Libertate, c. 13, p. 199, where he sets the peace of Kallias, made by Athens with Persia in 449 B.C., in contrast with the peace of Antalkidas, contracted under the auspices of Sparta.

[16] This is strikingly set forth by Isokrates, Or. xii, (Panathen.) s. 167-173. In this passage, however, he distributes his blame too equally between Sparta and Athens, whereas the blame belongs of right to the former, in far greater proportion. Sparta not only began the practice of invoking the Great King, and invoking his aid by disgraceful concessions,—but she also carried it, at the peace of Antalkidas, to a more extreme point of selfishness and subservience. Athens is guilty of following the bad example of her rival, but to a less extent, and under greater excuse on the plea of necessity.

Isokrates says in another place of this discourse, respecting the various acts of wrong-doing towards the general interest of Hellas—ἐπιδεικτέον τοὺς μὲν ἡμετέρους *ὀψιμαθεῖς* αὐτῶν γεγενημένους, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ *τὰ μὲν πρώτους, τὰ δὲ μόνους*, ἐξαμαρτόντας (Panath. s. 103). Which is much nearer the truth than the passage before referred to.

[17] Cornelius Nepos, Conon. c. 5.

[18] Isok. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 145. Καὶ τῷ βαρβάρῳ τῷ τῆς Ἀσίας κρατοῦντι συμπράττουσι (the Lacedæmonians) ὅπως ὡς μεγίστην ἀρχὴν ἕξουσιν.

[19] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 35.

[20] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33-39.

[21] Herodot. viii, 143.

The explanation which the Athenians give to the Spartan envoys, of the reasons and feelings which dictated their answer of refusal to Alexander (viii, 144), are not less impressive than the answer itself.

But whoever would duly feel and appreciate the treason of the Spartans in soliciting the convention of Antalkidas, should read in contrast with it that speech which their envoys address to the Athenians, in order to induce the latter to stand out against the temptations of Mardonius (viii, 142).

[22] The sixth oration (called Archidamus) of Isokrates sets forth emphatically the magnanimous sentiments, and comprehensive principles, on which it becomes Sparta to model her public conduct,—as altogether different from the simple considerations of prudence and security which are suitable to humbler states like Corinth, Epidaurus, or Phlius (Archidamus, s. 105, 106, 110).

Contrast these lofty pretensions with the dishonorable realities of the convention of Antalkidas,—not thrust upon Sparta by superior force, but both originally sued out, and finally enforced by her, for her own political ends.

Compare also Isokrates, Or. xii. (Panathen.) s. 169-172, about the dissension of the leading Grecian states, and its baneful effects.

[23] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 36.

Ἐν δὲ τῷ πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἀντιῤῥόπως τοῖς ἐναντίοις πράττοντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, *πολὺ ἐπικυδέστεροι ἐγένοντο* ἐκ τῆς ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνης καλουμένης· *προστάται γὰρ γενόμενοι τῆς ὑπὸ βασιλέως καταπεμφθείσης εἰρήνης* καὶ τὴν αὐτονομίαν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττοντες, etc.

[24] Thucyd. i, 144. Νῦν δὲ τούτοις (to the Lacedæmonian envoys) ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀποπέμψωμεν … τὰς δὲ πόλεις ὅτι αὐτονόμους ἀφήσομεν, εἰ καὶ αὐτονόμους ἔχοντες ἐσπεισάμεθα, καὶ ὅταν κἀκεῖνοι ταῖς αὑτῶν ἀποδῶσι πόλεσι *μὴ σφίσι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ αὑτοῖς ἑκάστοις, ὡς βούλονται*.

[25] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 36. οὗπερ πάλαι ἐπεθύμουν.

[26] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 13.

It would appear that the revolt of Egypt from Persia must date between 414-411 B.C.; but this point is obscure. See Boeckh, Manetho und die Hundsstern-Periode, pp. 358, 363, Berlin 1845; and Ley, Fata et Conditio Ægypti sub Imperio Persarum, p. 55.

M. Rehdautz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Timothei, et Chabriæ, p. 240, places the revolt rather earlier, about 414 B.C.; and Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellen. Appendix, ch. 18, p. 317) countenances the same date.

[27] Diodor. xiv, 35.

This Psammetichus is presumed by Ley (in his Dissertation above cited, p. 20) to be the same person as Amyrtæus the Saite in the list of Manetho, under a different name. It is also possible, however, that he may have been king over a part of Egypt, contemporaneous with Amyrtæus.

[28] Diodor. xiv, 79.

[29] This is the chronology laid down by M. Rehdautz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, Epimetr. ii, pp. 241, 242) on very probable grounds, principally from Isokrates, Orat. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 161, 162.

[30] Diodor. xv, 2, 3.

[31] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokl.) s. 50; Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 21; Pausanias, ii, 29, 4; Diodor. xiv, 98.

The historian Theopompus, when entering upon the history of Evagoras, seems to have related many legendary tales respecting the Greek Gentes in Cyprus, and to have represented Agamemnon himself as ultimately migrating to it (Theopompus, Frag. 111, ed. Wichers; and ed. Didot. ap. Photium).

The tomb of the archer Teukrus was shown at Salamis in Cyprus. See the Epigram of Aristotle, Antholog. i, 8, 112.

[32] Movers, in his very learned investigations respecting the Phœnicians (vol. iii, ch. 5, p. 203-221 *seq.*), attempts to establish the existence of an ancient population in Cyprus, called Kitians; once extended over the island, and of which the town called Kitium was the remnant. He supposes them to have been a portion of the Canaanitish population, anterior to the Jewish occupation of Palestine. The Phœnician colonies in Cyprus he reckons as of later date, superadded to, and depressing these natives. He supposes the Kilikian population to have been in early times Canaanitish also. Engel (Kypros, vol. i, p. 166) inclines to admit the same hypothesis as highly probable.

The sixth century B.C. (from 600 downwards) appears to have been very unfavorable to the Phœnicians, bringing upon Tyre severe pressure from the Chaldeans, as it brought captivity upon the Jews. During the same period, the Grecian commerce with Egypt was greatly extended, especially by the reign of the Phil-hellenic Amasis, who acquired possession of Cyprus. Much of the Grecian immigration into Cyprus probably took place at this time; we know of one body of settlers invited by Philokyprus to Soli, under the assistance of the Athenian Solon (Movers, p. 244 *seq.*).

[33] Herodot. v, 109.

Compare the description given by Herodotus of the costume and arms of the Cypriots in the armament of Xerxes,—half Oriental (vii, 90). The Salaminians used chariots of war in battle (v, 113); as the Carthaginians did, before they learnt the art of training elephants (Diodor. xvi, 80; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27).

[34] See Vol. V. of this History, Ch. xlv, p. 335.

[35] One of these princes, however, is mentioned as bearing the Phœnician name of Siromus (Herod. v, 104).

[36] We may gather this by putting together Herodot. iv, 102; v, 104-114, with Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 22.

[37] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 23, 55, 58.

Παραλαβὼν γὰρ (Evagoras) *τὴν πόλιν ἐκβεβαρβαρωμένην*, καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν Φοινίκων ἀρχὴν οὔτε τοὺς Ἕλληνας προσδεχομένην, οὔτε τέχνας ἐπισταμένην, οὔτ' ἐμπορίῳ χρωμένην, οὔτε λιμένα κεκτημένην, etc.

Πρὶν μὲν γὰρ λαβεῖν Εὐαγόραν τὴν ἀρχὴν, οὕτως ἀπροσοίστως καὶ χαλεπῶς εἶχον, ὥστε καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων τούτους ἐνόμιζον εἶναι βελτίστους οἵ *τινες ὠμότατα πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας διακείμενοι* τυγχάνοιεν, etc.

This last passage receives remarkable illustration from the oration of Lysias against Andokides, in which he alludes to the visit of the latter to Cyprus—μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἔπλευσεν ὡς τὸν Κιτιέων βασιλέα, καὶ προδιδοὺς ληφθεὶς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐδέθη, καὶ οὐ μόνον τὸν θάνατον ἐφοβεῖτο ἀλλὰ τὰ καθ' ἡμέραν αἰκίσματα, *οἰόμενος τὰ ἀκρωτήρια ζῶντος* ἀποτμηθήσεσθαι (s. 26).

Engel (Kypros, vol. i, p. 286) impugns the general correctness of this narrative of Isokrates. He produces no adequate reasons, nor do I myself see any, for this contradiction.

Not only Konon, but also his friend Nikophemus, had a wife and family at Cyprus, besides another family in Athens (Lysias, De Bonis Aristophanis, Or. xix, s. 38).

[38] Theopompus (Fr. 111) calls Abdêmon a Kitian; Diodorus (xiv, 98) calls him a Tyrian. Movers (p. 206) thinks that both are correct, and that he was a Kitian living at Tyre, who had migrated from Salamis during the Athenian preponderance there. There were Kitians, not natives of the town of Kition, but belonging to the ancient population of the island, living in the various towns of Cyprus; and there were also Kitians mentioned as resident at Sidon (Diogen. Laert. Vit. Zenon. s. 6).

[39] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 29-35; also Or. iii, (Nikokl.) s. 33; Theopomp. Fragm. 111, ed. Wichers and ed. Didot. Diodor. xiv, 98.

The two latter mention the name, Audymon or Abdêmon, which Isokrates does not specify.

[40] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokles) s. 33.

[41] Isokrat. Or. ix, s. 53. ἡγούμενος τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀγόμενος ὑπ' αὐτῶν, etc.

[42] Isokr. Or. ix, 51. οὐδένα μὲν ἀδικῶν, τοὺς δὲ χρηστοὺς τιμῶν, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἁπάντων ἄρχων, *νομίμως δὲ τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας* κολάζων (s. 58)—ὃς οὐ μόνον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πόλιν πλείονος ἀξίαν ἐποίησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν τόπον ὅλον, τὸν περιέχοντα τὴν νῆσον, *ἐπὶ πρᾳότητα καὶ μετριότητα* προήγαγεν, etc.; compare s. 81.

These epithets, *lawful* punishment, *mild* dealing, etc., cannot be fully understood except in contrast with the mutilations alluded to by Lysias, in the passage cited in a note on page 16, above; also with exactly similar mutilations, mentioned by Xenophon as systematically inflicted upon offenders by Cyrus the younger (Xenoph. Anabas. i, 9, 13). Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν (says Isokrates about the Persians) οὕτως αἰκίζεται τοὺς οἰκέτας, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους κολάζουσιν—Or. iv, (Paneg.) 142.

[43] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 50-56.

The language of the encomiast, though exaggerated, must doubtless be founded in truth, as the result shows.

[44] Lysias cont. Andokid. s. 28.

[45] Plutarch, Solon, c. 26.

[46] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 59-61; compare Lysias, Or. xix, (De Aristoph. Bon.) s. 38-46; and Diodor. xiv, 98.

[47] Isokrates, *l. c.* παιδοποιεῖσθαι δὲ τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν γυναῖκας λαμβάνοντες παρ' ἡμῶν, etc.

For the extreme distress of Athenian women during these trying times consult the statement in Xenophon, Memorab. ii, 7, 2-4.

The Athenian Andokides is accused of having carried out a young woman of citizen family,—his own cousin, and daughter of an Athenian named Aristeides,—to Cyprus, and there to have sold her to the despot of Kitium for a cargo of wheat. But being threatened with prosecution for this act before the Athenian Dikastery, he stole her away again and brought her back to Athens; in which act, however, he was detected by the prince, and punished with imprisonment from which he had the good fortune to escape. (Plutarch, Vit. X, Orat. p. 834; Photius, Cod. 261; Tzetzes, Chiliad. vi, 367).

How much there may be of truth in this accusation, we have no means of determining. But it illustrates the way in which the Athenian maidens, who had no dowry at home, were provided for by their relatives elsewhere. Probably Andokides took this young woman out, under the engagement to find a Grecian husband for her in Cyprus. Instead of doing this, he sold her for his own profit to the harem of the prince; or at least, is accused of having so sold her.

[48] This much appears even from the meagre abstract of Ktesias, given by Photius (Ktesiæ Persica, c. 63, p. 80, ed. Bähr).

Both Ktesias and Theopompus (Fr. iii, ed. Wichers, and ed. Didot) recounted the causes which brought about the war between the Persian king and Evagoras.

[49] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 71, 73, 74. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτον (Evagoras) οὕτως ἐκ πολλοῦ περιδεῶς ἔσχε (Artaxerxes), *ὥστε μεταξὺ πάσχων εὖ*, πολεμεῖν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπεχείρησε, δίκαια μὲν οὐ ποιῶν, etc.—ἐπειδὴ *ἠναγκάσθη πολεμεῖν* (*i. e.* Evagoras).

[50] Isokr. Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 75, 76; Diodor. xiv, 98; Ephorus, Frag. 134, ed. Didot.

[51] Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 2; Demosthenes adv. Leptinem, p. 479, s. 84.

[52] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 162. Εὐαγόραν—ὃς ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις ἔκδοτός ἐστιν, etc.

We must observe, however, that Cyprus had been secured to the king of Persia, even under the former peace, so glorious to Athens, concluded by Perikles about 449 B.C., and called the peace of Kallias. It was, therefore, neither a new demand on the part of Artaxerxes, nor a new concession on the part of the Greeks, at the peace of Antalkidas.

[53] Diodor. xv, 2.

It appears that Artaxerxes had counted much upon the aid of Hekatomnus for conquering Evagoras (Diodor. xiv, 98).

About 380 B.C., Isokrates reckons Hekatomnus as being merely dependent in name on Persia; and ready to revolt openly on the first opportunity (Isokrates, Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 189).

[54] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 153, 154, 179.

[55] Diodor. xv, 4.

[56] Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 187, 188—with Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 77.

The war was not concluded,—and Tyre as well as much of Kilikia was still in revolt,—when Isokrates published the Panegyrical Oration. At that time, Evagoras had maintained the contest six years, counting either from the peace of Antalkidas (387 B.C.) or from his naval defeat about a year or two afterwards; for Isokrates does not make it quite clear from what point of commencement he reckons the six years.

We know that the war between the king of Persia and Evagoras had begun as early as 390 B.C., in which year an Athenian fleet was sent to assist the latter (Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 24). Both Isokrates and Diodorus state that it lasted ten years; and I therefore place the conclusion of it in 380 or 379 B.C., soon after the date of the Panegyrical Oration of Isokrates. I dissent on this point from Mr. Clinton (see Fasti Hellenici, ad annos 387-376 B.C., and his Appendix, No. 12—where the point is discussed). He supposes the war to have begun after the peace of Antalkidas, and to have ended in 376 B.C. I agree with him in making light of Diodorus, but he appears to me on this occasion to contradict the authority of Xenophon,—or at least only to evade the necessity of contradicting him by resorting to an inconvenient hypothesis, and by representing the two Athenian expeditions sent to assist Evagoras in Cyprus, first in 390 B.C., next in 388 B.C., as relating to "*hostile measures before the war began*" (p. 280). To me it appears more natural and reasonable to include these as a part of the war.

[57] Isokrates, Or. ix, s. 73-76.

[58] Diodor. xv. 8, 9.

This remarkable anecdote, of susceptible Grecian honor on the part of Evagoras, is noway improbable, and seems safe to admit on the authority of Diodorus. Nevertheless, it forms so choice a morsel for a panegyrical discourse such as that of Isokrates, that one cannot but think he would have inserted it had it come to his knowledge. His silence causes great surprise—not without some suspicion as to the truth of the story.

[59] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokles) s. 40,—a passage which must be more true of Evagoras than of Nikokles.

[60] Isokrat. Or. ix, s. 88. Compare his Orat. viii, (De Pace) s. 138.

[61] Isokrates, ib. s. 85. εὐτυχέστερον καὶ θεοφιλέστερον, etc.

[62] I give this incident, in the main, as it is recounted in the fragment of Theopompus, preserved as a portion of the abstract of that author by Photius (Theopom. Fr. 111, ed. Wichers and ed. Didot).

Both Aristotle (Polit. v, 8, 10) and Diodorus (xv, 47) allude to the assassination of Evagoras by the eunuch; but both these authors conceive the story differently from Theopompus. Thus Diodorus says—Nikoklês, the eunuch, assassinated Evagoras, and became "despot of Salamis." This appears to be a confusion of Nikoklês with Nikokreon. Nikoklês was the son of Evagoras, and the manner in which Isokrates addresses him affords the surest proof that *he* had no hand in the death of his father.

The words of Aristotle are—ἡ (ἐπίθεσις) τοῦ εὐνούχου Εὐαγόρᾳ τῷ Κυπρίῳ· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν γυναῖκα παρελέσθαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἀπέκτεινεν ὡς ὑβρισμένος. So perplexing is the passage in its literal sense, that M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, in the note to his translation, conceives ὁ εὐνοῦχος to be a surname or *sobriquet* given to the conspirator, whose real name was Nikoklês. But this supposition is, in my judgment, contradicted by the fact, that Theopompus marks the same fact, of the assassin being an eunuch, by another word—Θρασυδαίου *τοῦ ἡμιάῤῥενος*, ὃς ἦν Ἠλεῖος τὸ γένος, etc.

It is evident that Aristotle had heard the story differently from Theopompus, and we have to choose between the two. I prefer the version of the latter; which is more marked as well as more intelligible, and which furnishes the explanation why Pnytagoras,—who seems to have been the most advanced of the sons, being left in command of the besieged Salamis when Evagoras quitted it to solicit aid in Egypt,—did not succeed his father, but left the succession to Nikoklês, who was evidently (from the representation even of an eulogist like Isokrates) not a man of much energy. The position of this eunuch in the family of Nikokreon seems to mark the partial prevalence of Oriental habits.

[63] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikoklês) s. 38-48; Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 100; Or. xv, (Permut.) s. 43. Diodorus (xv, 47) places the assassination of Evagoras in 374 B.C.

[64] Isokrates. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 142, 156, 190. Τὰς τε πόλεις τὰς Ἑλληνίδας οὕτω κυρίως παρείληφεν, ὥστε τὰς μὲν κατασκάπτειν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀκροπόλεις ἐντειχίζειν.

[65] See Herodot. vi, 9; ix, 76.

[66] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 142.

Οἷς (to the Asiatic Greeks after the peace of Antalkidas) οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ δασμολογεῖσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀκροπόλεις ὁρᾷν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν κατεχομένας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ταῖς κοιναῖς συμφοραῖς δεινότερα πάσχουσι τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀργυρωνήτων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὕτως αἰκίζεται τοὺς οἰκέτας, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους κολάζουσιν.

[67] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 143, 154, 189, 190. How immediately the inland kings, who had acquired possession of the continental Grecian cities, aimed at acquiring the islands also, is seen in Herodot. i, 27. Chios and Samos indeed, surrendered without resisting, to the first Cyrus, when he was master of the continental towns, though he had no naval force (Herod. i, 143-169). Even after the victory of Mykalê, the Spartans deemed it impossible to protect these islanders against the Persian masters of the continent (Herod. ix, 106). Nothing except the energy and organization of the Athenians proved that it was possible to do so.

[68] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 26; Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 13.

[69] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 33.

[70] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46. Ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι καθειστήκεσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις. Respecting the Bœotian city of Tanagra, he says—ἔτι γὰρ τότε καὶ τὴν Τανάγραν οἱ περὶ Ὑπατόδωρον, φίλοι ὄντες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, εἶχον (v, 4, 49).

Schneider, in his note on the former of these two passages, explains the word δυναστεῖαι as follows—"Sunt factiones optimatium qui Lacedæmoniis favebant, cum præsidio et harmostâ Laconico." This is perfectly just; but the words ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις seem also to require an explanation. These words allude to the "factio optimatium" at Thebes, of whom Leontiades was the chief; who betrayed the Kadmeia (the citadel of Thebes) to the Lacedæmonian troops under Phœbidas in 382 B.C.; and who remained masters of Thebes, subservient to Sparta and upheld by a standing Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia, until they were overthrown by the memorable conspiracy of Pelopidas and Mellon in 379 B.C. It is to this oligarchy under Leontiades at Thebes, devoted to Spartan interests and resting on Spartan support,—that Xenophon compares the governments planted by Sparta, after the peace of Antalkidas, in each of the Bœotian cities. What he says, of the government of Leontiades and his colleagues at Thebes, is—"that they deliberately introduced the Lacedæmonians into the acropolis, and enslaved Thebes to them, in order that they might themselves exercise a despotism"—τούς τε τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσαγαγόντας εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ βουληθέντας Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν πόλιν δουλεύειν, ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν (v, 4, 1: compare v, 2, 36). This character—conveying a strong censure in the mouth of the philo-Laconian Xenophon—belongs to all the governments planted by Sparta in the Bœotian cities after the peace of Antalkidas, and, indeed, to the Dekarchies generally which she established throughout her empire.

[71] Xenoph. Memorab. iii, 5, 2; Thucyd. iv, 133; Diodor. xv, 79.

[72] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 15-20; Diodor. xv, 32-37; Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 14. 15.

[73] Herodot. vi, 108.

[74] See Vol. V. Ch. xlv, p. 327 of this History.

[75] Thucyd. iii, 68.

[76] Thucyd. v, 32; Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 126; Or. xii, (Panathen.) s. 101.

[77] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14.

[78] Pausanias, ix, 1, 3.

[79] Isokrates, Or. xiv. (Plataic.) s. 54.

[80] See the Orat. xiv, (called Plataicus) of Isokrates; which is a pleading probably delivered in the Athenian assembly by the Platæans (after the second destruction of their city), and, doubtless, founded upon their own statements. The painful dependence and compulsion under which they were held by Sparta, is proclaimed in the

most unequivocal terms (s. 31, 33, 48); together with the presence of a Spartan harmost and garrison in their town (s. 14).

[81] Xenophon says, truly enough, that Sparta made the Bœotian cities αὐτονόμους ἀπὸ τῶν Θηβαίων (v. 1, 36), which she had long desired to do. Autonomy, in the sense of disconnection from Thebes, was insured to them,—but in no other sense.

[82] To illustrate the relations of Thebes, the other Bœotian cities, and Sparta, between the peace of Antalkidas and the seizure of the Kadmeia by Sparta (387-382 B.C.)—compare the speech of the Akanthian envoys, and that of the Theban Leontiades, at Sparta (Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 16-34). Ὑμᾶς (the Spartans) τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως μὴ καθ' ἓν εἴη, etc. Καὶ ὑμεῖς γε τότε μὲν ἀεὶ προσείχετε τὸν νοῦν, πότε ἀκούσεσθε βιαζομένους αὐτοὺς (the Thebans) τὴν Βοιωτίαν ὑφ' αὑτοῖς εἶναι· νῦν δὲ, ἐπεὶ τάδε πέπρακται, οὐδὲν ὑμᾶς δεῖ Θηβαίους φοβεῖσθαι, etc. Compare Diodor. xv, 20.

[83] In the Orat. (14) Plataic. of Isokrates, s. 30—we find it stated among the accusations against the Thebans, that during this period (*i. e.* between the peace of Antalkidas and the seizure of the Kadmeia) they became sworn in as members of the Spartan alliance and as ready to act with Sparta conjointly against Athens. If we could admit this as true, we might also admit the story of Epaminondas and Pelopidas serving in the Spartan army at Mantinea (Plutarch, Pelop. c. 3). But I do not see how it can be even partially true. If it had been true, I think Xenophon could not have failed to mention it: all that he does say, tends to contradict it.

[84] Diodor. xv. 29.

[85] How currently this reproach was advanced against Agesilaus, may be seen in more than one passage of the Hellenica of Xenophon; whose narrative is both so partial, and so ill-constructed, that the most instructive information is dropped only in the way of unintentional side-wind, where we should not naturally look for it. Xen. Hellen. v. 3, 16. πολλῶν δὲ λεγόντων Λακεδαιμονίων ὡς ὀλίγων ἕνεκεν ἀνθρώπων πόλει (Phlius) ἀπεχθάνοιτο (Agesilaus) πλέον πεντακισχιλίων ἀνδρῶν. Again, v, 4, 13. (Ἀγησίλαος) εὖ εἰδὼς, ὅτι, εἰ στρατηγοίη, λέξειαν οἱ πολῖται, ὡς Ἀγησίλαος, ὅπως βοηθήσειε τοῖς τυράννοις, πράγματα τῇ πόλει παρέχοι, etc. Compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24-26.

[86] Diodorus indeed affirms, that this was really done, for a short time; that the cities which had before been dependent allies of Sparta were now emancipated and left to themselves; that a reaction immediately ensued against those dekarchies or oligarchies which had hitherto managed the cities in the interests of Sparta; that this reaction was so furious, as everywhere to kill, banish, or impoverish, the principal partisans of Spartan supremacy; and that the accumulated complaints and sufferings of these exiles drove the Spartans, after having "endured the peace like a heavy burthen" (ὥσπερ βαρὺ φόρτιον—xv, 5) for a few months, to shake it off, and to reëstablish by force their own supremacy as well as the government of their friends in all the various cities. In this statement there is nothing intrinsically improbable. After what we have heard of the dekarchies under Sparta, no extent of violence in the reaction against them is incredible, nor can we doubt that such reaction would carry with it some new injustice, along with much well-merited retribution. Hardly any but Athenian citizens were capable of the forbearance displayed by Athens both after the Four Hundred and after the Thirty. Nevertheless, I believe that Diodorus is here mistaken, and that he has assigned to the period immediately succeeding the peace of Antalkidas, those reactionary violences which took place in many cities about sixteen years subsequently, *after the battle of Leuktra*. For Xenophon, in recounting what happened after the peace of Antalkidas, mentions nothing about any real autonomy granted by Sparta to her various subject-allies, and subsequently revoked; which he would never have omitted to tell us, had the fact been so, because it would have supplied a plausible apology for the high-handed injustice of the Spartans, and would have thus lent aid to the current of partiality which manifests itself in his history.

[87] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 1-8. Αἰσθόμενοι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπισκοποῦντας τοὺς ξυμμάχους, ὁποῖοί τινες ἕκαστοι ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ αὐτοῖς ἐγεγένηντο, etc.

[88] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 2. He had before stated, that the Mantineans had really shown themselves pleased, when the Lacedæmonian Mora was destroyed near Corinth by Iphikrates (iv, 5, 18).

[89] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 3.

[90] In 1627, during the Thirty years' War, the German town of Wolfenbüttel was constrained to surrender in the same manner, by damming up the river Ocker which flowed through it; a contrivance of General Count Pappenheim, the Austrian besieging commander. See Colonel Mitchell's Life of Wallenstein, p. 107.

The description given by Xenophon of Mantinea as it stood in 385 B.C., with the river Ophis, a considerable stream, passing through the middle of it, is perfectly clear. When the city, after having been now broken up, was rebuilt in 370 B.C., the site was so far changed that the river no longer ran through it. But the present course of the river Ophis, as given by excellent modern topographical examiners, Colonel Leake and Kiepert, is at a very considerable distance from the Mantinea rebuilt in 370 B.C.; the situation of which is accurately known, since the circuit of its walls still remains distinctly marked. The Mantinea of 370 B.C., therefore, as compared with the Mantinea in 385 B.C., must have been removed to a considerable distance—or else the river Ophis must have altered its course. Colonel Leake supposes that the Ophis had been artificially diverted from its course, in order that it might be brought through the town of Mantinea; a supposition, which he founds on the words of Xenophon,—σοφωτέρων γενομένων ταύτῃ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὸ μὴ διὰ τειχῶν ποταμὸν ποιεῖσθαι (Hellen. v, 2, 7). But it is very difficult to agree with him on this point, when we look at his own map (annexed to the Peloponnesiaca) of the Mantinice and Tegeatis, and observe the great distance between the river Ophis and Mantinea; nor do the words of Xenophon seem necessarily to imply any artificial diversion of the river. It appears easier to believe that the river has changed its course. See Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 71; and Peloponnesiaca, p. 380; and Ernst Curtius, Peloponnesos, p. 239—who still, however, leaves the point obscure.

[91] Diodor. xv, 5.

[92] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 6. Οἰομένων δὲ ἀποθανεῖσθαι τῶν ἀργολιζόντων, καὶ τῶν τοῦ δήμου προστατῶν, διεπράξατο ὁ πατὴρ (see before, v, 2, 3) παρὰ τοῦ Ἀγησιπόλιδος, ἀσφάλειαν αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι, ἀπαλλαττομένοις ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἑξήκοντα οὖσι. Καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν μὲν τῆς ὁδοῦ, ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῶν πυλῶν ἔχοντες τὰ δόρατα οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἔστησαν, θεώμενοι τοὺς ἐξιόντας· *καὶ μισοῦντες αὐτοὺς ὅμως ἀπείχοντο αὐτῶν ῥᾷον ἢ οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν Μαντινέων*· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν εἰρήσθω μέγα τεκμήριον πειθαρχίας.

I have remarked more than once, and the reader will here observe a new example, how completely the word βέλτιστοι—which is applied to the wealthy or aristocratical party in politics, as its equivalent is in other languages, by writers who sympathize with them—is divested of all genuine ethical import as to character.

[93] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 7.

He says of this breaking up of the city of Mantinea, διῳκίσθη ἡ Μαντίνεια τετραχῆ, καθάπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ᾤκουν. Ephorus (Fr. 138, ed. Didot) states that it was distributed into the five original villages; and Strabo affirms that there were *five* original constituent villages (viii, p. 337). Hence it is probable that Mantinea the city was still left, after this διοίκισις, to subsist as one of the five unfortified villages; so that Ephorus, Strabo, and Xenophon may be thus made to agree, in substance.

[94] This is mentioned by Xenophon himself (Hellen. vi, 5, 3). The Lacedæmonians, though they remonstrated against it, were at that time too much humiliated to interfere by force and prevent it. The reason why they did not interfere by force (according to Xenophon) was that a general peace had just then been sworn, guaranteeing autonomy to every distinct town, so that the Mantineans under this peace had a right to do what they did—στρατεύειν γε μέντοι ἐπ' αὐτοὺς οὐ δυνατὸν ἐδόκει εἶναι, ἐπ' αὐτονομίᾳ τῆς εἰρήνης γεγενημένης (vi, 5, 5). Of this second peace, Athens was the originator and the voucher; but the autonomy which it guaranteed was only the same as had been professedly guaranteed by the peace of Antalkidas, of which Sparta had been the voucher.

General autonomy, as interpreted by Athens, was a different thing from general autonomy as it had been when interpreted by Sparta. The Spartans, when they had in their own hands both the power of interpretation and the power of enforcement, did not scruple to falsify autonomy so completely as to lay siege to Mantinea and break up the city by force; while, when interpretation and enforcement had passed to Athens, they at once recognized that the treaty precluded them from a much less violent measure of interference.

We may see by this, how thoroughly partial and Laconian is the account given by Xenophon of the διοίκισις of Mantinea; how completely he keeps out of view the odious side of that proceeding.

[95] See the remarkable sentence of the Spartans, in which they reject the claim of the Pisatans to preside over and administer the Olympic festival (which had been their ancient privilege) because they were χωρῖται and not fit for the task (Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31): compare χωριτικῶς (Xen. Cyrop. iv. 5, 54).

[96] Aristot. Polit. vi, 2, 2.

[97] Thucyd. v, 81.

[98] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 133, 134, 146, 206; Or. viii, (De Pace) s. 123; Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 1-8; Diodor. xv, 5, 9-19.

[99] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 35.

[100] Xen. Hellen. v. 2, 8-10.

The consequences of this forced return are difficult to foresee; they will appear in a subsequent page.

[101] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 3-12.

[102] Xen. Hell. iv, 8, 7.

[103] Isokrates, Orat. xvii, (Trapezit.) s. 71.

[104] See the valuable inscription called the Marmor Sandvicense, which contains the accounts rendered by the annual Amphiktyons at Delos, from 377-373 B.C.

Boeckh, Staats-haushaltung der Athener, vol. ii, p. 214, ed. 1; vol. ii, p. 78 *seq.*, ed. 2nd.

The list of cities and individuals who borrowed money from the temple is given in these accounts, together with the amount of interest either paid by them, or remaining in arrear.

[105] This is the description which Isokrates himself gives (Orat. xv, (Permutat.) s. 61) of the state of the Grecian world when he published his Panegyrical Discourse—ὅτε Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν ἦρχον τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταπεινῶς ἐπράττομεν, etc.

[106] The Panegyrical Discourse of Isokrates, the date of it being pretty exactly known, is of great value for enabling us to understand the period immediately succeeding the peace of Antalkidas.

He particularly notices the multiplication of pirates, and the competition between Athens and Sparta about tribute from the islands in the Ægean (s. 133). Τίς γὰρ ἂν τοιαύτης καταστάσεως ἐπιθυμήσειεν, ἐν ᾗ καταποντισταὶ μὲν τὴν θάλασσαν κατέχουσι, πελτασταὶ δὲ τὰς πόλεις καταλαμβάνουσι, etc.

… Καίτοι χρὴ τοὺς φύσει καὶ μὴ διὰ τύχην μέγα φρονοῦντας τοιούτοις ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ *τοὺς νησιώτας δασμολογεῖν*, οὓς ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἐλέειν, ὁρῶντας τούτους μὲν διὰ σπανιότητα τῆς γῆς ὄρη γεωργεῖν ἀναγκαζομένους, τοὺς δ' ἠπειρώτας δι' ἀφθονίαν τῆς χώρας τὴν μὲν πλείστην αὐτῆς ἀργὸν περιορῶντας, etc. (s. 151).

… Ὧν ἡμεῖς (Athenians and Spartans) οὐδεμίαν ποιούμεθα πρόνοιαν, ἀλλὰ *περὶ μὲν τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων ἀμφισβητοῦμεν*, τοσαύτας δὲ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τηλικαύτας τὸ μέγεθος δυνάμεις οὕτως εἰκῇ τῷ βαρβάρῳ παραδεδώκαμεν.

Compare Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 12—μὴ εἰς νησύδρια ἀποβλέποντας, etc.

[107] Diodor. xv, 9, 19.

[108] Thucyd. vii, 9.

[109] This is attested by Plato, Gorgias, c. 26. p. 471 A.

… Ὅς γε (Archelaus son of Perdikkas) πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον (Alketas) μεταπεμψάμενος, *ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣν Περδίκκας αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο*, etc.

This statement of Plato, that Perdikkas expelled his brother Alketas from the throne, appears not to be adverted to by the commentators. Perhaps it may help to explain the chronological embarrassments connected with the reign of Perdikkas, the years of which are assigned by different authors, as 23, 28, 35, 40, 41. See Mr. Clinton, Fasti Hellen. ch. iv, p. 222—where he discusses the chronology of the Macedonian kings: also Krebs, Lection. Diodoreæ, p. 159.

There are no means of determining when the reign of Perdikkas began—nor exactly, when it ended. We know from Thucydides that he was king in 432, and in 414 B.C. But the fact of his acquiring the crown by the expulsion of an elder brother, renders it less wonderful that the beginning of his reign should be differently stated by different authors; though these authors seem mostly to conceive Perdikkas as the immediate successor of Alexander, without any notice of Alketas.

[110] Thucyd. i, 57; ii, 97-100.

[111] The mother of Archelaus was a female slave belonging to Alketas; it is for this reason that Plato calls Alketas *δεσπότην* καὶ θεῖον of Archelaus (Plato, Gorgias, c. 26. p. 471 A.)

[112] Thucyd. ii, 100. ὁδοὺς εὐθείας ἔτεμε, etc. See the note in Ch. lxix, p. 17 of Vol. IX.

[113] Arrian, i, 11; Diodor. xvii, 16.

[114] Plutarch, De Vitioso Pudore, c. 7, p. 531 E.

[115] Aristotel. Rhetoric, ii, 24; Seneca, de Beneficiis, v, 6; Ælian, V. H. xiv, 17.

[116] See the statements, unfortunately very brief, of Aristotle (Politic. v, 8, 10-13). Plato (Alkibiad. ii, c. 5, p. 141 D), while mentioning the assassination of Archelaus by his παιδικὰ represents the motive of the latter differently from Aristotle, as having been an ambitious desire to possess himself of the throne. Diodorus (xiv, 37) represents Krateuas as having killed Archelaus unintentionally in a hunting-party.

Καὶ τῆς Ἀρχελάου δ' ἐπιθέσεως Δεκάμνιχος ἡγεμὼν ἐγένετο, παροξύνων τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους πρῶτος· αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς, ὅτι αὐτὸν ἐξέδωκε μαστιγῶσαι Εὐριπίδῃ τῷ ποιητῇ· ὁ δὲ Εὐριπίδης ἐχαλέπαινεν εἰπόντος τι αὐτοῦ εἰς δυσώδειαν τοῦ στόματος (Arist. Pol. *l. c.*).

Dekamnichus is cited by Aristotle as one among the examples of persons actually scourged; which proves that Euripides availed himself of the privilege accorded by Archelaus.

[117] Diodor. xiv. 84-89.

[118] Ælian, V. H. xii, 43; Dexippus ap. Syncell. p. 263; Justin, vii, 4.

[119] Diodor. xiv, 89. Ἐτελεύτησε δὲ καὶ Παυσανίας ὁ τῶν Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς, ἀναιρεθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἀμύντου δόλῳ, ἄρξας ἐνιαυτόν· τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν κατέσχεν Ἀμύντας, etc.

[120] See in Thucyd. iv, 112—the relations of Arrhibæus, prince of the Macedonians called Lynkestæ in the interior country, with the Illyrian invaders—B.C. 423.

Archelaus had been engaged at a more recent period in war with a prince of the interior named Arrhibæus,—perhaps the same person (Aristot. Polit. v, 8, 11).

[121] Diodor. xiv, 92; xv, 19. Ἀπογνοὺς δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν, Ὀλυνθίοις μὲν τὴν συνεγγὺς χώραν ἐδωρήσατο, etc. Τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ὀλυνθίων δωρησαμένου πολλὴν τῆς ὁμόρου χώρας, διὰ τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δυναστείας, etc.

The flight of Amyntas, after a year's reign, is confirmed by Dexippus ap. Syncell. p. 263.

[122] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 12. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης μεγίστη πόλις Ὄλυνθος σχεδὸν πάντες ἐπίστασθε. Οὗτοι τῶν πόλεων προσηγάγοντο ἔστιν ἃς, ἐφ' ᾧτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι νόμοις καὶ συμπολιτεύειν· ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν μειζόνων προσέλαβόν τινας. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἐπεχείρησαν καὶ τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου, τοῦ βασιλέως Μακεδόνων. Ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰσήκουσαν αἱ ἐγγύτατα αὐτῶν, ταχὺ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς πόῤῥω καὶ μείζους ἐπορεύοντο· καὶ κατελίπομεν ἡμεῖς ἔχοντας ἤδη ἄλλας τε πολλὰς, καὶ Πέλλαν, ἥπερ μεγίστη τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ πόλεων. Καὶ Ἀμύνταν δὲ αἰσθανόμεθα ἀποχωροῦντά τε ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἐκπεπτωκότα ἤδη ἐκ πάσης Μακεδονίας.

We know from Diodorus that Amyntas fled the country in despair, and ceded a large proportion at least of Lower Macedonia to the Olynthians. Accordingly, the struggle between the latter and Amyntas (here alluded to), must have taken place when he came back and tried to resume his dominion.

[123] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 12—τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου, etc.; compare v, 2, 38.

[124] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 14.

The number of Olynthian troops is given in Xenophon as eight hundred hoplites—a far greater number of peltasts—and one thousand horsemen, assuming that Akanthus and Apollonia joined the confederacy. It has been remarked by Mr. Mitford and others, that these numbers, as they here stand, must be decidedly smaller than the reality. But we have no means of correction open to us. Mr. Mitford's suggestion of eight thousand hoplites in place of eight hundred, rests upon no authority.

Demosthenes states that Olynthus by herself, and before she had brought all the Chalkidians into confederacy (οὔπω Χαλκιδέων πάντων εἰς ἓν συνῳκισμένων—De Fals. Leg. c. 75, p. 425) possessed four hundred horse-

men, and a citizen population of 5000; no more than this (he says) at the time when the Lacedæmonians attacked them. The historical statements of the great orator, for a time which nearly coincides with his own birth, are to be received with caution.

[125] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 16. Ἐννοήσατε δὲ καὶ τόδε, πῶς εἰκὸς, ὑμᾶς τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως μὴ καθ' ἓν εἴη, πολὺ δὲ μείζονος ἀθροιζομένης δυνάμεως ἀμελῆσαι, etc.

I translate here the substance of the speech, not the exact words.

[126] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 14. Ἡμεῖς δὲ, ὦ ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι, βουλόμεθα μὲν τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι, καὶ αὐτοπολῖται εἶναι· εἰ μέντοι μὴ βοηθήσει τις, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡμῖν μετ' ἐκείνων γίγνεσθαι.

[127] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 18. Δεῖ γε μὴν ὑμᾶς καὶ τόδε εἰδέναι, ὡς, ἢν εἰρήκαμεν δύναμιν μεγάλην οὖσαν, οὔπω δυσπάλαιστός τις ἐστὶν· αἱ γὰρ ἄκουσαι τῶν πόλεων *τῆς πολιτείας κοινωνοῦσαι*, αὖται, ἄν τι ἴδωσιν ἀντίπαλον, ταχὺ ἀποστήσονται· *εἰ μέντοι συγκλεισθήσονται ταῖς τε ἐπιγαμίαις καὶ ἐγκτήσεσι παρ' ἀλλήλαις, ἃς ἐψηφισμένοι εἰσὶ—καὶ γνώσονται, ὅτι μετὰ τῶν κρατούντων ἕπεσθαι κερδαλέον ἐστὶν*, ὥσπερ Ἀρκαδες, ὅταν μεθ' ὑμῶν ἴωσι, τά τε αὐτῶν σώζουσι καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἁρπάζουσιν—*ἴσως οὔκεθ' ὁμοίως εὔλυτα ἔσται*.

[128] Diodor. xiv, 92; xv, 19.

Demosthenes speaks of Amyntas as having been expelled from his kingdom by the Thessalians (cont. Aristokrat. c. 29, p. 657). If this be historically correct, it must be referred to some subsequent war in which he was engaged with the Thessalians, perhaps to the time when Jason of Pheræ acquired dominion over Macedonia (Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 11).

[129] See above in this History, Vol. VI. Ch. xlviii. p. 79.

[130] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 20. Ἐκ τούτου μέντοι, πολλοὶ μὲν ξυνηγόρευον στρατιὰν ποιεῖν, μάλιστα δὲ οἱ βουλόμενοι Λακεδαιμονίοις χαρίζεσθαι, etc.

[131] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 21, 22.

Diodorus (xv, 31) mentions the fact that an hoplite was reckoned equivalent to two peltasts, in reference to a Lacedæmonian muster-roll of a few years afterwards; but it must have been equally necessary to fix the proportion on the present occasion.

[132] See Vol. V. Ch. xlv, p. 302 of this History.

[133] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 24; Diodor. xv, 21.

[134] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 27-34.

[135] This is the statement of Diodorus (xv, 20), and substantially that of Plutarch (Agesil. c. 24), who intimates that it was the general belief of the time. And it appears to me much more probable than the representation of Xenophon—that the first idea arose when Phœbidas was under the walls of Thebes, and that the Spartan leader was persuaded by Leontiades to act on his own responsibility. The behavior of Agesilaus and of the ephors after the fact is like that of persons who had previously contemplated the possibility of it. But the original suggestion must have come from the Theban faction themselves.

[136] Plutarch (De Genio Socratis, c. 5, p. 578 B.) states that most of these generals of cavalry (τῶν ἱππαρχηκότων νομίμως) were afterwards in exile with Pelopidas at Athens.

We have little or no information respecting the government of Thebes. It would seem to have been at this moment a liberalized oligarchy. There was a Senate, and two Polemarchs (perhaps the Polemarchs may have been more than two in all, though the words of Xenophon rather lead us to suppose *only* two)—and there seems also to have been a civil magistrate, chosen by lot (ὁ κυαμιστὸς ἄρχων) and renewed annually, whose office was marked by his constantly having in his possession the sacred spear of state (τὸ ἱερὸν δόρυ) and the city-seal (Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 31. p. 597—B.—C.).

At this moment, it must be recollected, there were no such officers as Bœotarchs; since the Lacedæmonians, enforcing the peace of Antalkidas, had put an end to the Bœotian federation.

[137] The rhetor Aristeides (Or. xix, Eleusin. p. 452 Cant.; p. 419 Dind.) states that the Kadmeia was seized during the Pythian festival. This festival would take place, July or August 382 B.C.; near the beginning of the

third year of the (99th) Olympiad. See above in this History, Vol. VI. Ch. liv, p. 455, note. Respecting the year and month in which the Pythian festival was held, there is a difference of opinion among commentators. I agree with those who assign it to the first quarter of the third Olympic year. And the date of the march of Phœbidas would perfectly harmonize with this supposition.

Xenophon mentions nothing about the Pythian festival as being in course of celebration when Phœbidas was encamped near Thebes: for it had no particular reference to Thebes.

[138] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 28, 29.

[139] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 30, 31.

[140] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3. See above in this History, Vol. VIII. Ch. lxv. p. 252.

[141] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 1.

[142] It is curious that Xenophon, treating Phœbidas as a man more warm-hearted than wise, speaks of him as if he had rendered no real service to Sparta by the capture of the Kadmeia (v, 2, 28). The explanation of this is, that Xenophon wrote his history at a later period, after the defeat at Leuktra and the downfall of Sparta; which downfall was brought about by the reaction against her overweening and oppressive dominion, especially after the capture of the Kadmeia,—or (in the pious creed of Xenophon) by the displeasure of the gods, which such iniquity drew down upon her (v, 4, 1). In this way, therefore, it is made out that Phœbidas had not acted with true wisdom, and that he had done his country more harm than good; a criticism, which we may be sure that no man advanced, at the time of the capture itself, or during the three years after it.

[143] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 34.

Καὶ ὑμεῖς γε (says Leontiades to the Lacedæmonian ephors) τότε μὲν ἀεὶ προσείχετε τὸν νοῦν, πότε ἀκούσεσθε βιαζομένους αὐτοὺς τὴν Βοιωτίαν ὑφ' αὑτοῖς εἶναι· νῦν δ', ἐπεὶ τάδε πέπρακται, οὐδὲν ὑμᾶς δεῖ Θηβαίους φοβεῖσθαι· ἀλλ' ἀρκέσει ὑμῖν μικρὰ σκυτάλη, ὥστε ἐκεῖθεν πάντα πράττεσθαι, ὅσων ἂν δέησθε—ἐὰν, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς ὑμῶν, οὕτω καὶ ὑμεῖς ἡμῶν, ἐπιμελῆσθε.

Xenophon mentions the displeasure of the ephors and the Spartans generally against Phœbidas (χαλεπῶς ἔχοντας τῷ Φοιβίδᾳ) but not the fine, which is certified by Diodorus (xv, 20), by Plutarch (Pelopidas, c. 6, and De Genio Socratis, p. 576 A), and Cornelius Nepos (Pelopid. c. 1).

[144] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 35; Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, p. 576 A. Plutarch in another place (Pelopid. c. 5) represents Ismenias as having been conveyed to Sparta and tried there.

[145] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 38.

[146] Demosthenes (De Fals. Leg. c. 75, p. 425) speaks with proper commendation of the brave resistance made by the Olynthians against the great force of Sparta. But his expressions are altogether misleading as to the tenor and result of the war. If we had no other information than his, we should be led to imagine that the Olynthians had been victorious, and the Lacedæmonians baffled.

[147] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 40-43.

[148] Thucyd. i, 63—with the Scholiast.

[149] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 4-6. παμπλήθεις ἀπέκτειναν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ὅτι περ ὄφελος ἦν τούτου τοῦ στρατεύματος.

Diodorus (xv, 21) states the loss at twelve hundred men.

[150] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 9. Πολλοὶ δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν περιοίκων ἐθελονταὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἠκολούθουν, καὶ ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων καλουμένων, καὶ νόθοι τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, μάλα εὐειδεῖς τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καλῶν οὐκ ἄπειροι.

The phrase—ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων—is illustrated by a passage from Phylarchus in Athenæus, vi, p. 271 (referred to by Schneider in his note here). I have already stated that the political franchise of a Spartan citizen depended upon his being able to furnish constantly his quota to the public mess-table. Many of the poor families became unable to do this, and thus lost their qualification and their training; but rich citizens sometimes paid their quota for them, and enabled them by such aid to continue their training as ξύντροφοι, τρόφιμοι, μόθακες, etc. as companions of their own sons. The two sons of Xenophon were educated at Sparta (Diog. Laert. ii, 54),

and would thus be ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων καλουμένων. If either of them was now old enough, he might probably have been one among the volunteers to accompany Agesipolis.

[151] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 18; Pausan. iii, 5, 9.

[152] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 26; Diodor. xv, 22, 23.

[153] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 10.

[154] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 10, 11.

[155] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 10. ἡ Φλιασίων πόλις, ἐπαινεθεῖσα μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀγησιπόλιδος, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ ταχέως αὐτῷ χρήματα ἐς τὴν στρατιὰν ἔδοσαν, etc.

[156] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 12, 13; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24; Diodor. xv, 20.

[157] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 25.

Καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ Φλιοῦντα οὕτως αὖ ἐπετετέλεστο ἐν ὀκτὼ μησὶ καὶ ἐνιαυτῷ.

This general expression "the matters relative to Phlius," comprises not merely the blockade, but the preliminary treatment and complaints of the Phliasian exiles. One year, therefore, will be as much as we can allow for the blockade,—perhaps more than we ought to allow.

[158] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 17-26.

[159] The panegyrist of Agesilaus finds little to commend in these Phliasian proceedings, except the φιλεταιρεία or partisan-attachment of his hero (Xenoph. Agesil. ii, 21).

[160] Thucyd. i, 124. πόλιν τύραννον.

[161] Lysias, Frag. Orat. xxxiii, (Olympic.) ed. Bekker ap. Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 520-525, Reisk.

… Ὁρῶν οὕτως αἰσχρῶς διακειμένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν αὐτῆς ὄντα ὑπὸ τῷ βαρβάρῳ, πολλὰς δὲ πόλεις ὑπὸ τυράννων ἀναστάτους γεγενημένας.

… Ὁρῶμεν γὰρ τοὺς κινδύνους καὶ μεγάλους καὶ παντάχοθεν περιεστηκότας. Ἐπίστασθε δὲ, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῶν κρατούντων τῆς θαλάσσης, τῶν δὲ χρημάτων βασιλεὺς ταμίας· *τὰ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων σώματα, τῶν δαπανᾶσθαι δυναμένων·* ναῦς δὲ πολλὰς αὐτὸς κέκτηται, πολλὰς δ' ὁ τύραννος τῆς Σικελίας….

… Ὥστε ἄξιον—τοὺς προγόνους μιμεῖσθαι, οἱ τοὺς μὲν βαρβάρους ἐποίησαν, τῆς ἀλλοτρίας ἐπιθυμοῦντας, τῆς σφετέρας αὐτῶν ἐστερῆσθαι· τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ἐξελάσαντες, κοινὴν ἅπασι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κατέστησαν. Θαυμάζω δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους πάντων μάλιστα, τίνι ποτε γνώμῃ χρώμενοι, *καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν*, ἡγεμόνες ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, etc.

… Οὐ τοίνυν ὁ ἐπιὼν καιρὸς τοῦ παρόντος βελτίων· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλοτρίας δεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς νομίζειν, ἀλλ' οἰκείας· οὐδ' ἀναμεῖναι, ἕως ἂν ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς αἱ δυνάμεις *ἀμφοτέρων* (of Artaxerxes and Dionysius) ἔλθωσιν, ἀλλ' ἕως ἔτι ἔξεστι, τὴν τούτων ὕβριν κωλῦσαι.

Ephorus appears to have affirmed that there was a plan concerted between the Persian king and Dionysius, for attacking Greece in concert and dividing it between them (see Ephori Fragm. 141, ed. Didot). The assertion is made by the rhetor Aristeides, and the allusion to Ephorus is here preserved by the Scholiast on Aristeides (who, however, is mistaken, in referring it to Dionysius *the younger*). Aristeides ascribes the frustration of this attack to the valor of two Athenian generals, Iphikrates, and Timotheus; the former of whom captured the fleet of Dionysius, while the latter defeated the Lacedæmonian fleet at Leukas. But these events happened in 373-372 B.C., when the power of Dionysius was not so formidable or aggressive as it had been between 387-382 B.C.: moreover, the ships of Dionysius taken by Iphikrates were only ten in number, a small squadron. Aristeides appears to me to have misconceived the date to which the assertion of Ephorus really referred.

[162] See Pseudo-Andokides cont. Alkibiad. s. 30; and Vol. VII. of this History, Ch. lv, p. 53.

[163] Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 519; Diodor. xiv, 109. ὥστε τινας τολμῆσαι διαρπάζειν τὰς σκηνάς.

Dionysius does not specify the date of this oration of Lysias; but Diodorus places it at Olympiad 98—B.C. 388—the year before the peace of Antalkidas. On this point I venture to depart from him, and assign it to Olympiad 99, or 384 B.C., three years after the peace; the rather as his Olympic chronology appears not clear, as may be seen by comparing xv, 7 with xiv, 109.

1. The year 388 B.C. was a year of war, in which Sparta with her allies on one side,—and Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos on the other,—were carrying on strenuous hostilities. The war would hinder the four last-mentioned states from sending any public legation to sacrifice at the Olympic festival. Lysias, as an Athenian metic, could hardly have gone there at all; but he certainly could not have gone there to make a public and bold oratorical demonstration.

2. The language of Lysias implies that the speech was delivered after the cession of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia,—ὁρῶν πολλὰ μὲν αὐτῆς (Ἑλλάδος) ὄντα ὑπὸ τῷ Βαρβάρῳ, etc. This is quite pertinent after the peace of Antalkidas; but not at all admissible before that peace. The same may be said about the phrase,—οὐ γὰρ ἀλλοτρίας δεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς νομίζειν, ἀλλ' οἰκείας; which must be referred to the recent subjection of the Asiatic Greeks by Persia, and of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks by Dionysius.

3. In 388 B.C.—when Athens and so large a portion of the greater cities of Greece were at war with Sparta, and therefore contesting her headship,—Lysias would hardly have publicly talked of the Spartans as ἡγεμόνες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐκ ἀδίκως, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον ἀρετὴν καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιστήμην. This remark is made also by Sievers (Geschich. Griech. bis zur Schlacht von Mantinea, p. 138). Nor would he have declaimed so ardently against the Persian king, at a time when Athens was still not despairing of Persian aid against Sparta.

On these grounds (as well as on others which I shall state when I recount the history of Dionysius), it appears to me that this oration of Lysias is unsuitable to B.C. 388—but perfectly suitable to 384 B.C.

[164] Lysias, Orat. Olymp. Frag. καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν, etc.

[165] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 145, 146: compare his Orat. viii, (De Pace) s. 122; and Diodor. xv, 23.

Dionysius of Syracuse had sent twenty triremes to join the Lacedæmonians at the Hellespont, a few months before the peace of Antalkidas (Xenophon, Hellen. v, 1, 26).

[166] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 1. Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἄν τις ἔχοι καὶ ἄλλα λέγειν, καὶ Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ βαρβαρικὰ, ὡς θεοὶ οὔτε τῶν ἀσεβούντων οὔτε τῶν ἀνόσια ποιούντων ἀμελοῦσι· νῦν γε μὴν λέξω τὰ προκείμενα. Λακεδαιμόνιοί τε γὰρ, οἱ ὁμόσαντες αὐτονόμους ἐάσειν τὰς πόλεις, τὴν ἐν Θήβαις ἀκρόπολιν κατασχόντες, ὑπ' αὐτῶν μόνον τῶν ἀδικηθέντων ἐκολάσθησαν, πρῶτον οὐδ' ὑφ' ἑνὸς τῶν πώποτε ἀνθρώπων κρατηθέντες. Τούς τε τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσαγαγόντας εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ βουληθέντας Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν πόλιν δουλεύειν, ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν … τὴν τούτων ἀρχὴν ἑπτὰ μόνον τῶν φυγόντων ἤρκεσαν καταλῦσαι.

This passage is properly characterized by Dr. Peter (in his Commentatio Critica in Xenophontis Hellenica, Hall. 1837, p. 82) as the turning-point in the history:—

"Hoc igitur in loco quasi editiore operis sui Xenophon subsistit, atque uno in conspectu Spartanos, et ad suæ felicitatis fastigium ascendere videt, et rursus ab eo delabi: tantâ autem divinæ justitiæ conscientiâ tangitur in hac Spartanorum fortunâ conspicuæ, ut vix suum judicium, quanquam id solet facere, suppresserit."

[167] See Vol. VII. of this History,—the close of Chapter lvi.

[168] Soph. Œdip. Tyr. 450; Antigon. 1066.

[169] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 6: compare Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 29, p. 596 B.

[170] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 14.

[171] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 33, p. 598 B, C. ᾧ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν ἐπενέβησαν καὶ προσέπτυσαν οὐκ ὀλίγαι γυναῖκες.

Among the prisoners was a distinguished Theban of the democratic party, named Amphitheus. He was about to be shortly executed, and the conspirators, personally attached to him, seem to have accelerated the hour of their plot partly to preserve his life (Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. p. 577 D, p. 586 F.).

[172] The language of Plutarch (De Gen. Socrat. c. 33, p. 598 C.) is illustrated by the description given in the harangue of Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. (c. xi, s. 40)—of the universal alarm prevalent in Athens after the battle of Chæroneia, such that even the women could not stay in their houses—ἀναξίως αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πόλεως ὁρωμένας, etc. Compare also the words of Makaria, in the Herakleidæ of Euripides, 475; and Diodor. xiii, 55, in his description of the capture of Selinus in Sicily.

[173] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 6.

See this sentiment of gratitude on the part of Athenian democrats, towards those Thebans who had sheltered them at Thebes during the exile along with Thrasybulus,—strikingly brought out in an oration of Lysias, of which unfortunately only a fragment remains (Lysias, Frag. 46, 47, Bekk.; Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Isæo, p. 594). The speaker of this oration had been received at Thebes by Kephisodotus the father of Pherenikus; the latter was now in exile at Athens; and the speaker had not only welcomed him (Pherenikus) to his house with brotherly affection, but also delivered this oration on his behalf before the Dikastery; Pherenikus having rightful claims on the property left behind by the assassinated Androkleidas.

[174] Diodor. xv, 25; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 12; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 17, p. 586 E.

In another passage of this treatise (the last sentence but one) he sets down the numbers in the Kadmeia at five thousand: but the smaller number is most likely to be true.

[175] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 4, p. 577 B; c. 17, p. 587 B; c. 25, p. 594 C; c. 27, p. 595 A.

[176] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 7, 8.

Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 17, p. 587 D. Τῶν Μέλλωνος ἁρματηλατῶν ἐπιστάτης.... Ἆρ' οὐ Χλίδωνα λέγεις, τὸν κέλητι τὰ Ἡραῖα νικῶντα πέρυσιν;

[177] Xenophon says *seven* (Hellen. v, 4, 1, 2); Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos say *twelve* (Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 2, p. 576 C.; Plutarch, Pelopidas c. 8-13; Cornel. Nepos, Pelopidas, c. 2).

It is remarkable that Xenophon never mentions the name of Pelopidas in this conspiracy; nor indeed (with one exception) throughout his Hellenica.

[178] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 3, p. 576 E.; p. 577 A.

[179] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 4. τὰς σεμνοτάτας καὶ καλλίστας τῶν ἐν Θήβαις. Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 4, p. 577 C.; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 9.

The Theban women were distinguished for majestic figure and beauty (Dikæarchus, Vit. Græc. p. 144, ed Fuhr.).

[180] Plutarch, (Pelopid. c. 25; De Gen. Socr. c. 26, p. 594 D.) mentions Menekleidês, Damokleidas, and Theopompus among them. Compare Cornel. Nepos, Pelopid. c. 2.

[181] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 8; Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. c. 17, p. 586 B.; c. 18, p. 587 D-E.

[182] Xenophon does not mention this separate summons and visit of Charon to the polemarchs,—nor anything about the scene with his son. He only notices Charon as having harbored the conspirators in his house, and seems even to speak of him as a person of little consequence—παρὰ Χαρωνί τινι, etc. (v, 4, 3).

The anecdote is mentioned in both the compositions of Plutarch (De Gen. Socr. c. 28, p. 595; and Pelopidas, c. 9), and is too interesting to be omitted, being perfectly consistent with what we read in Xenophon; though it has perhaps somewhat of a theatrical air.

[183] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 10; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 30, p. 596 F. Εἰς αὔριον τὰ σπουδαῖα.

This occurrence also finds no place in the narrative of Xenophon. Cornelius Nepos, Pelopidas, c. 3. Æneas (Poliorcetic. c. 31) makes a general reference to the omission of immediate opening of letters arrived, as having caused the capture of the Kadmeia; which was, however, only its remote consequence.

[184] The description given by Xenophon, of this assassination of the polemarchs at Thebes, differs materially from that of Plutarch. I follow Xenophon in the main; introducing, however, several of the details found in Plutarch, which are interesting, and which have the air of being authentic.

Xenophon himself intimates (Hellen. v, 4, 7), that besides the story given in the text, there was also another story told by some,—that Mellon and his companions had got access to the polemarchs in the guise of drunken revellers. It is this latter story which Plutarch has adopted, and which carries him into many details quite inconsistent with the narrative of Xenophon. I think the story, of the conspirators having been introduced in female attire, the more probable of the two. It is borne out by the exact analogy of what Herodotus tells us respecting Alexander son of Amyntas, prince of Macedonia (Herod. v, 20).

Compare Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 10, 11; Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. c. 31, p. 597. Polyænus (ii, 4, 3) gives a story with many different circumstances, yet agreeing in the fact that Pelopidas in female attire killed the Spar-

tan general. The story alluded to by Aristotle (Polit. v, 5, 10), though he names both Thebes and Archias, can hardly refer to this event.

It is Plutarch, however, who mentions the presence of Kabeirichus the archon at the banquet, and the curious Theban custom that the archon during his year of office never left out of his hand the consecrated spear. As a Bœotian born, Plutarch was doubtless familiar with these old customs.

From what other authors Plutarch copied the abundant details of this revolution at Thebes, which he interweaves in the life of Pelopidas and in the treatise called De Genio Socratis—we do not know. Some critics suppose him to have borrowed from Dionysodôrus and Anaxis—Bœotian historians whose work comprised this period, but of whom not a single fragment is preserved (see Fragm. Histor. Græc. ed. Didot, vol. ii, p. 84).

[185] Xen. Hell. v, 4, 9; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 11, 12; and De Gen. Socr. p. 597 D-F. Here again Xenophon and Plutarch differ; the latter represents that Pelopidas got into the house of Leontiades *without* Phyllidas,—which appears to me altogether improbable. On the other hand, Xenophon mentions nothing about the defence of Leontiades and his personal conflict with Pelopidas, which I copy from Plutarch. So brave a man as Leontiades, awake and sober, would not let himself be slain without a defence dangerous to assailants. Plutarch, in another place, singles out the death of Leontiades as the marking circumstance of the whole glorious enterprise, and the most impressive to Pelopidas (Plutarch—Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum—p. 1099 A-E.).

[186] Xenoph. Hell. v, 4, 8; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 12; De Gen. Socr. p. 598 B.

[187] This is a curious piece of detail, which we learn from Plutarch (De Gen. Socr. c. 34. p. 598 D.).

The Orchomenian Inscriptions in Boeckh's Collection record the prizes given to these Σαλπιγκταὶ or trumpeters (see Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. No. 1584, 1585, etc.).

[188] The unanimous joy with which the consummation of the revolution was welcomed in Thebes,—and the ardor with which the citizens turned out to support it by armed force,—is attested by Xenophon, no very willing witness,—Hellen. v, 4, 9. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡμέρα ἦν καὶ φανερὸν ἦν τὸ γεγενημένον, ταχὺ δὴ καὶ οἱ ὁπλῖται καὶ οἱ ἱππεῖς σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐξεβοήθουν.

[189] Plutarch, Pelop. c. 12.

[190] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 598 E.; Pelop. c. 12.

[191] Xenophon expressly mentions that the Athenians who were invited to come, and who actually did come, to Thebes, were the two generals and the volunteers; all of whom were before privy to the plot, and were in readiness on the borders of Attica—τοὺς *πρὸς τοῖς ὁρίοις* Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοὺς δύο τῶν στρατηγῶν—οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι *ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρίων* ἤδη παρῆσαν (Hellen. v, 4, 9, 10).

[192] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 10, 11. προσέβαλον πρὸς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν—τὴν προθυμίαν τῶν προσιόντων ἁπάντων ἑώρων, etc.

Diodorus, xv, 25. ἔπειτα τοὺς πολίτας ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν παρακαλέσαντες (the successful Theban conspirators, Pelopidas, etc.) *συνέργους ἔσχον ἅπαντας τοὺς Θηβαίους*.

[193] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 12.

[194] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 13; Diodor. xv, 27.

Plutarch (Pelopid. c. 13) augments the theatrical effect by saying that the Lacedæmonian garrison on its retreat, actually met at Megara the reinforcements under king Kleombrotus, which had advanced thus far, on their march to relieve the Kadmeia. But this is highly improbable. The account of Xenophon intimates clearly that the Kadmeia was surrounded on the next morning after the nocturnal movement. The commanders capitulated in the first moment of distraction and despair, without even standing an assault.

[195] Arrian, i, 6.

[196] In recounting this revolution at Thebes, and the proceedings of the Athenians in regard to it, I have followed Xenophon almost entirely.

Diodorus (xv, 25, 26) concurs with Xenophon in stating that the Theban exiles got back from Attica to Thebes by night, partly through the concurrence of the Athenians (συνεπιλαβομένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων)—slew the

rulers—called the citizens to freedom next morning, finding all hearty in the cause—and then proceeded to besiege the fifteen hundred Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesians in the Kadmeia.

But after thus much of agreement, Diodorus states what followed, in a manner quite inconsistent with Xenophon; thus (he tells us)—

The Lacedæmonian commander sent instant intelligence to Sparta of what had happened, with request for a reinforcement. The Thebans at once attempted to storm the Kadmeia, but were repulsed with great loss, both of killed and wounded. Fearing that they might not be able to take the fort before reinforcement should come from Sparta, they sent envoys to Athens to ask for aid, reminding the Athenians that they (the Thebans) had helped to emancipate Athens from the Thirty, and to restore the democracy (ὑπομιμνήσκοντες μὲν ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ *συγκατήγαγον τὸν δῆμον* τῶν Ἀθηναίων καθ' ὃν καιρὸν ὑπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα κατεδουλώθησαν). The Athenians, partly from desire to requite this favor, partly from a wish to secure the Thebans as allies against Sparta, passed a public vote to assist them forthwith. Demophon the general got together five thousand hoplites and five hundred horsemen, with whom he hastened to Thebes on the next day; and all the remaining population were prepared to follow, if necessary (πανδημεί). All the other cities in Bœotia also sent aid to Thebes too,—so that there was assembled there a large force of twelve thousand hoplites and two thousand horsemen. This united force, the Athenians being among them, assaulted the Kadmeia day and night, relieving each other; but were repelled with great loss of killed and wounded. At length the garrison found themselves without provisions; the Spartans were tardy in sending reinforcement; and sedition broke out among the Peloponnesian allies who formed the far larger part of the garrison. These Peloponnesians, refusing to fight longer, insisted upon capitulating; which the Lacedæmonian governor was obliged perforce to do, though both he and the Spartans along with him desired to hold out to the death. The Kadmeia was accordingly surrendered, and the garrison went back to Peloponnesus. The Lacedæmonian reinforcement from Sparta arrived only a little too late.

All these circumstances stated by Diodorus are not only completely different from Xenophon, but irreconcilable with his conception of the event. We must reject either the one or the other.

Now Xenophon is not merely the better witness of the two, but is in this case sustained by all the collateral probabilities of the case.

1. Diodorus represents the Athenians as having despatched by public vote, assistance to Thebes, in order to requite the assistance which the Thebans had before sent to restore the Athenian democracy against the Thirty. Now this is incorrect in point of fact. The Thebans had *never sent any assistance*, positive or ostensible, to Thrasybulus and the Athenian democrats against the Thirty. They had assisted Thrasybulus underhand, and without any public government-act; and they had refused to serve along with the Spartans against him. But they never sent any force to help him against the Thirty. Consequently, the Athenians *could not* now have sent any public force to Thebes, *in requital* for a similar favor done before by the Thebans to them.

2. Had the Athenians passed a formal vote, sent a large public army, and taken vigorous part in several bloody assaults on the Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia,—this would have been the most flagrant and unequivocal commencement of hostilities against Sparta. No Spartan envoys could, after that, have gone to Athens, and stayed safely in the house of the Proxenus,—as we know from Xenophon that they did. Besides,—the story of Sphodrias (presently to be recounted) proves distinctly that Athens was at peace with Sparta, and had committed no act of hostility against her, for three or four months at least after the revolution at Thebes. It therefore refutes the narrative of Diodorus about the public vote of the Athenians, and the public Athenian force under Demophon, aiding in the attack of the Kadmeia. Strange to say,—Diodorus himself, three chapters afterwards (xv, 29), relates this story about Sphodrias, just in the same manner (with little difference) as Xenophon; ushering in the story with a declaration, that *the Athenians were still at peace with Sparta*, and forgetting that he had himself recounted a distinct rupture of that peace on the part of the Athenians.

3. The news of the revolution at Thebes must necessarily have taken the Athenian public completely by surprise (though some few Athenians were privy to the scheme), because it was a scheme which had no chance of succeeding except by profound secrecy. Now, that the Athenian public, hearing the news for the first time,—having no positive act to complain of on the part of Sparta, and much reason to fear her power,—having had no previous circumstances to work them up, or prepare them for any dangerous resolve,—should identify themselves at once with Thebes, and provoke war with Sparta in the impetuous manner stated by Diodorus,—this is, in my judgment, eminently improbable, requiring good evidence to induce us to believe it.

4. Assume the statement of Diodorus to be true,—what reasonable explanation can be given of the erroneous version which we read in Xenophon? The facts as he recounts them conflict most pointedly with his philo-Laconian partialities; first, the overthrow of the Lacedæmonian power at Thebes, by a handful of exiles; still more, the whole story of Sphodrias and his acquittal.

But assume the statement of Xenophon to be true,—and we can give a very plausible explanation how the erroneous version in Diodorus arose. A few months later, after the acquittal of Sphodrias at Sparta, the Athenians did enter heartily into the alliance of Thebes, and sent a large public force (indeed five thousand hoplites, the same number as those of Demophon, according to Diodorus, c. 32) to assist her in repelling Agesilaus with the Spartan army. It is by no means unnatural that their public vote and expedition undertaken about July 378 B.C.,—should have been erroneously thrown back to December 379 B.C. The Athenian orators were fond of boasting that Athens had saved the Thebans from Sparta; and this might be said with some truth, in reference to the aid which she really rendered afterwards. Isokrates (Or. Plataic. s. 31) makes this boast in general terms; but Deinarchus (cont. Demosthen. s. 40) is more distinct, and gives in a few words a version the same as that which we find in Diodorus; so also does Aristeides, in two very brief allusions (Panathen. p. 172, and Or. xxxviii, Socialis, p. 486-498). Possibly Aristeides as well as Diodorus may have copied from Ephorus; but however this may be, it is easy to understand the mistake out of which their version grew.

5. Lastly, Plutarch mentions nothing about the public vote of the Athenians, and the regular division of troops under Demophon which Diodorus asserts to have aided in the storming of the Kadmeia. See Plutarch (De Gen. Socrat. ad fin. Agesil. c. 23; Pelopid. 12, 13). He intimates only, as Xenophon does, that there were some Athenian volunteers who assisted the exiles.

M. Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 38-43) discusses this discrepancy at considerable length, and cites the opinion of various German authors in respect to it, with none of whom I altogether concur.

In my judgment, the proper solution is, to reject altogether (as belonging to a later time) the statement of Diodorus, respecting the public vote at Athens, and the army said to have been sent to Thebes under Demophon; and to accept the more credible narrative of Xenophon; which ascribes to Athens a reasonable prudence, and great fear of Sparta,—qualities such as Athenian orators would not be disposed to boast of. According to that narrative, the question about sending Athenians to aid in storming the Kadmeia could hardly have been submitted for public discussion, since that citadel was surrendered at once by the intimidated garrison.

[197] The daring *coup de main* of Pelopidas and Mellon, against the government of Thebes, bears a remarkable analogy to that by which Evagoras got into Salamis and overthrew the previous despot (Isokrates, Or. ix, Evagor. s. 34).

[198] See, in illustration of Greek sentiment on this point, Xenophon, Hellen. iii, 4, 19; and Xenophon, Enc. Ages. i, 28.

[199] If, indeed, we could believe Isokrates, speaking through the mouth of a Platæan, it would seem that the Thebans, immediately after their revolution, sent an humble embassy to Sparta deprecating hostility, entreating to be admitted as allies, and promising service, even against their benefactors the Athenians, just as devoted as the deposed government had rendered; an embassy which the Spartans haughtily answered by desiring them to receive back their exiles, and to cast out the assassins Pelopidas and his comrades. It is possible that the Thebans may have sent to try the possibility of escaping Spartan enmity; but it is highly improbable that they made any such promises as those here mentioned; and it is certain that they speedily began to prepare vigorously for that hostility which they saw to be approaching.

See Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 31.

This oration is put into the mouth of a Platæan, and seems to be an assemblage of nearly all the topics which could possibly be enforced, truly or falsely, against Thebes.

[200] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 14. μάλα χειμῶνος ὄντος.

[201] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 13. εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι, εἰ στρατηγοίη, λέξειαν οἱ πολῖται, ὡς Ἀγησίλαος, ὅπως βοηθήσειε τοῖς τυράννοις, πράγματα τῇ πόλει παρέχοι. Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24.

[202] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 15-18.

[203] See Vol. VIII. of this History, Ch. lxiv, p. 196—about the psephism of Kannônus.

[204] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 19; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 14.

Xenophon mentions the Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens, but does not expressly say that they were sent to demand reparation for the conduct of these two generals or of the volunteers. I cannot doubt, however, that the fact was so; for in those times, there were no resident envoys,—none but envoys sent on special missions.

[205] The trial and condemnation of these two generals has served as the groundwork for harsh reproach against the Athenian democracy. Wachsmuth (Hellen. Alterth. i, p. 654) denounces it as "a judicial horror, or abomination—ein Greul-gericht." Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 44, 45) says,—"Quid? quia invasionem Lacedæmoniorum viderant in Bœotiam factam esse, non puduit eos, damnare imperatores quorum facta suis decretis comprobaverant?" … "Igitur hanc *illius facinoris excusationem* habebimus: Rebus quæ a Thebanis agebantur (*i. e.* by the propositions of the Thebans seeking peace from Sparta, and trying to get enrolled as her allies,—alleged by Isokrates, which I have noticed above as being, in my judgment, very inaccurately recorded) cognitis, Athenienses, quo *enixius subvenerant, eo majore pœnitentiâ perculsi* sunt…. Sed tantum abfuit ut sibimet irascerentur, ut, *e more Atheniensium, punirentur qui perfecerant id quod tum populus exoptaverat*."

The censures of Wachsmuth, Rehdantz, etc. assume as matter of fact,—1. That the Athenians had passed a formal vote in the public assembly to send assistance to Thebes, under two generals, who accordingly went out in command of the army and performed their instructions. 2. That the Athenians, becoming afterwards repentant or terrified, tried and condemned these two generals for having executed the commission entrusted to them.

I have already shown grounds (in a previous note) for believing that the first of these affirmations is incorrect; the second, as dependent on it, will therefore be incorrect also.

These authors here appear to me to single out a portion of each of the two *inconsistent* narratives of Xenophon and Diodorus, and blend them together in a way which contradicts both.

Thus, they take from Diodorus the allegation, that the Athenians sent to Thebes by public vote a large army, which fought along with the Thebans against the Kadmeia,—an allegation which, not only is not to be found in Xenophon, but which his narrative plainly, though indirectly, excludes.

Next, they take from Xenophon the allegation, that the Athenians tried and condemned the two generals who were accomplices in the conspiracy of Mellon against the Theban rulers,—τὼ δύω στρατηγὼ, οἳ συνηπιστάσθην τὴν τοῦ Μέλλωνος ἐπὶ τοὺς περὶ Λεοντιάδην ἐπανάστασιν (v, 4, 19). Now the mention of these two generals follows naturally and consistently in *Xenophon*. He had before told us that there were *two* out of the Athenian generals, who both assisted underhand in organizing the plot, and afterwards went with the volunteers to Thebes. But it cannot be fitted on to the narrative of *Diodorus, who never says a word about this condemnation by the Athenians*—nor even mentions *any two Athenian generals*, at all. He tells us that the Athenian army which went to Thebes was commanded by Demophon; he notices no colleague whatever. He says in general words, that the conspiracy was organized "with the assistance of the Athenians" (συνεπιλαβομένων Ἀθηναίων); not saying a word about any *two generals* as especially active.

Wachsmuth and Rehdantz take it for granted, most gratuitously, that these two condemned generals (mentioned by Xenophon and not by Diodorus) are identical with Demophon and another colleague, commanders of an army which went out by public vote (mentioned by Diodorus and not by Xenophon).

The narratives of Xenophon and Diodorus (as I have before observed) are distinct and inconsistent with each other. We have to make our option between them. I adhere to that of Xenophon, for reasons previously given. But if any one prefers that of Diodorus, he ought then to reject altogether the story of the condemnation of the two Athenian generals (*who nowhere appear in Diodorus*), and to suppose that Xenophon was misinformed upon that point, as upon the other facts of the case.

That the two Athenian generals (assuming the Xenophontic narrative as true) should be tried and punished, when the consequences of their unauthorized proceeding were threatening to come with severity upon Athens, —appears to me neither improbable nor unreasonable. Those who are shocked by the very severity of the sentence, will do well to read the remarks which the Lacedæmonian envoys make (Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 23) on the conduct of Sphodrias.

To turn from one severe sentence to another,—whoever believes the narrative of Diodorus in preference to that of Xenophon, ought to regard the execution of those two Lacedæmonian commanders who surrendered the Kadmeia as exceedingly cruel. According to Diodorus, these officers had done everything which brave men could

do; they had resisted a long time, repelled many attacks, and were only prevented from farther holding out by a mutiny among their garrison.

Here again, we see the superiority of the narrative of Xenophon over that of Diodorus. According to the former, these Lacedæmonian commanders surrendered the Kadmeia without any resistance at all. Their condemnation, like that of the Athenian two generals, becomes a matter easy to understand and explain.

[206] Tacit. Histor. i, 38.

Compare (in Plutarch, Anton. c. 32) the remark of Sextus Pompey to his captain Menas, when the latter asked his permission to cut the cables of the ship, while Octavius and Antony were dining on board, and to seize their persons,—"I cannot permit any such thing; but you ought to have done it without asking my permission." A reply familiar to the readers of Shakspeare's Antony and Cleopatra.

[207] Kallisthenes, Frag. 2, ed. Didot, apud Harpokration, v. Σφοδρίας; Diodor. xv, 29; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 14; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24. The miscalculation of Sphodrias as to the time necessary for his march to Peiræus is not worse than other mistakes which Polybius (in a very instructive discourse, ix, 12, 20, seemingly extracted from his lost commentaries on Tactics) recounts as having been committed by various other able commanders.

[208] Πείθουσι τὸν ἐν ταῖς Θεσπιαῖς ἁρμοστὴν Σφοδρίαν, χρήματα δόντες, ὡς ὑπωπτεύετο—Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 20; Diodor. xv, 29; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 14; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24, 25.

Diodorus affirms private orders from Kleombrotus to Sphodrias.

In rejecting the suspicion mentioned by Xenophon,—that it was the Theban leaders who instigated and bribed Sphodrias,—we may remark—1. That the plan might very possibly have succeeded; and its success would have been ruinous to the Thebans. Had they been the instigators, they would not have failed to give notice of it at Athens at the same time; which they certainly did not do. 2. That if the Lacedæmonians had punished Sphodrias, no war would have ensued. Now every man would have predicted, that assuming the scheme to fail, they certainly would punish him. 3. The strong interest taken by Agesilaus afterwards in the fate of Sphodrias, and the high encomium which he passed on the general character of the latter,—are quite consistent with a belief on his part that Sphodrias (like Phœbidas) may have done wrong towards a foreign city from over-ambition in the service of his country. But if Agesilaus (who detested the Thebans beyond measure) had believed that Sphodrias was acting under the influence of bribes from them, he would not merely have been disposed to let justice take its course, but would have approved and promoted the condemnation.

On a previous occasion (Hellen. iii, 5, 3) Xenophon had imputed to the Thebans a similar refinement of stratagem; seemingly with just as little cause.

[209] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24.

[210] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 32. Ἐκεῖνός γε (Ἀγησίλαος) πρὸς πάντας ὅσοις διείλεκται, ταῦτὰ λέγει· Μὴ ἀδικεῖν μὲν Σφοδρίαν ἀδύνατον εἶναι· ὅστις μέντοι, παῖς τε ὢν καὶ παιδίσκος καὶ ἡβῶν, πάντα τὰ καλὰ ποιῶν διετέλεσε, χαλεπὸν εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἀποκτιννύναι· τὴν γὰρ Σπάρτην τοιούτων δεῖσθαι στρατιωτῶν.

Xenophon explains at some length (v, 4, 25-33) and in a very interesting manner, both the relations between Kleonymus and Archidamus, and the appeal of Archidamus to his father. The statement has all the air of being derived from personal knowledge, and nothing but the fear of prolixity hinders me from giving it in full.

Compare Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 25; Diodor. xv, 29.

[211] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 22-32.

[212] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 24.

[213] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 34-63.

[214] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 34; Xen. de Vectigal. v, 7; Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 20, 23, 37; Diodor. xv, 29.

[215] The contribution was now called σύνταξις, not φόρος; see Isokrates, De Pace, s. 37-46; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7; Harpokration, v. Σύνταξις.

Plutarch, De Fortunâ Athen. p. 351. ἰσόψηφον αὐτοῖς τὴν Ἑλλάδα κατέστησαν.

[216] Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 47. Καὶ *τῶν μὲν κτημάτων τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν ἀπέστητε*, βουλόμενοι τὴν συμμαχίαν ὡς μεγίστην ποιῆσαι, etc.

Diodor. xv, 28, 29. Ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ καὶ *τὰς γενομένας κληρουχίας ἀποκαταστῆσαι τοῖς πρότερον κυρίοις γεγονόσι*, καὶ νόμον ἔθεντο μηδένα τῶν Ἀθηναίων γεωργεῖν ἐκτὸς τῆς Ἀττικῆς. Διὰ δὲ ταύτης τῆς φιλανθρωπίας ἀνακτησάμενοι τὴν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εὔνοιαν, ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ἰδίαν ἡγεμονίαν.

Isokrates and Diodorus speak loosely of this vote, in language which might make us imagine that it was one of distinct restitution, giving back property *actually enjoyed*. But the Athenians had never actually regained the outlying private property lost at the close of the war, though they had much desired it, and had cherished hopes that a favorable turn of circumstances might enable them to effect the recovery. As the recovery, if effected, would be at the cost of those whom they were now soliciting as allies, the public and formal renunciation of such rights was a measure of much policy, and contributed greatly to appease uneasiness in the islands; though in point of fact nothing was given up except rights to property not really enjoyed.

An Inscription has recently been discovered at Athens, recording the original Athenian decree, of which the main provisions are mentioned in my text. It bears date in the archonship of Nausinikus. It stands, with the restorations of M. Boeckh (fortunately a portion of it has been found in tolerably good preservation), in the Appendix to the new edition of his work,—"Über die Staats-haushaltung der Athener—Verbesserungen und Nachträge zu den drei Banden der Staats-haushaltung der Athener," p. xx.

Ἀπὸ δὲ Ναυσινίκου ἄρχοντος μὴ ἐξεῖναι μήτε ἰδίᾳ μήτε δημοσίᾳ Ἀθηναίων μηδενὶ ἐγκτήσασθαι ἐν ταῖς τῶν συμμάχων χώραις μήτε οἰκίαν μήτε χώριον, μήτε πριαμένῳ, μήτε ὑποθεμένῳ, μήτε ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ μηδενί. Ἐὰν δέ τις ὠνῆται ἢ κτᾶται ἢ τίθηται τρόπῳ ὁτῳοῦν, ἐξεῖναι τῷ βουλομένῳ τῶν συμμάχων φῆναι πρὸς τοὺς συνέδρους τῶν συμμάχων. Οἱ δὲ σύνεδροι ἀπο- -μενοι ἀποδόντων [τὸ μὲν ἥ]μισυ τῷ φήναντι, τὸ δὲ ἄ[λλο κοιν]ὸν ἔστω τῶν συνμμάχων. Ἐὰν δέ τις [ἵη] ἐπὶ πολέμῳ ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιησαμένους τὴν συμμαχίαν, ἢ κατὰ γῆν ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν, βοηθεῖν Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τούτοις καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. Ἐὰν δέ τις εἴπῃ ἢ ἐπιψηφίσῃ, ἢ ἄρχων ἢ ἰδιώτης, παρὰ τόδε τὸ ψήφισμα, ὡς λύειν τι δεῖ τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ψηφίσματι εἰρημένων, ὑπαρχέτω μὲν αὐτῷ ἀτίμῳ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δημόσια ἔστω καὶ τῆς θεοῦ τὸ ἐπιδέκατον· καὶ κρινέσθω ἐν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις ὡς διαλύων τὴν συμμαχίαν. Ζημιούντων δὲ αὐτὸν θανάτῳ ἢ φυγῇ ὅπου Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι κρατοῦσι. Ἐὰν δὲ θανάτῳ τιμήθῃ, μὴ ταφήτω ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ μηδὲ ἐν τῇ τῶν συμμάχων.

Then follows a direction, that the Secretary of the Senate of Five Hundred shall inscribe the decree on a column of stone, and place it by the side of the statue of Zeus Eleutherius; with orders to the Treasurers of the goddess to disburse sixty drachmas for the cost of so doing.

It appears that there is annexed to this Inscription a list of such cities as had already joined the confederacy, together with certain other names added afterwards, of cities which joined subsequently. The Inscription itself directs such list to be recorded,—εἰς δὲ τὴν στήλην ταύτην ἀναγράφειν τῶν τε οὐσῶν πόλεων συμμαχίδων τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ ἥτις ἂν ἄλλη σύμμαχος γίγνηται.

Unfortunately M. Boeckh has not annexed this list, which, moreover, he states to have been preserved only in a very partial and fragmentary condition. He notices only, as contained in it, the towns of Poiessa and Korêsus in the island of Keos,—and Antissa and Eresus in Lesbos; all four as autonomous communities.

[217] Herodot. i, 96. Ὁ δὲ, οἷα δὴ μνεώμενος ἀρχὴν, ἰθύς τε καὶ δίκαιος ἦν.

[218] This is the sentiment connected with Ζεὺς Ἐλευθέριος,—Pausanias the victor of Platæa, offers to Zeus Eleutherius a solemn sacrifice and thanksgiving immediately after the battle, in the agora of the town (Thucyd.

ii, 71). So the Syracusans immediately after the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty (Diodor. xi, 72)—and Mæandrius at Samos (Herodot. iii, 142).

[219] Diodor. xv, 29.

[220] Diodor. xv, 29.

[221] Cornel. Nepos, Iphicrates, c. 2; Chabrias, c. 2, 3.

[222] See an interesting Fragment (preserved by Athenæus, iv, p. 131) of the comedy called *Protesilaus*—by the Athenian poet Anaxandrides (Meineke, Comic. Græc. Frag. iii, p. 182). It contains a curious description of the wedding of Iphikrates with the daughter of Kotys in Thrace; enlivened by an abundant banquet and copious draughts of wine given to crowds of Thracians in the market-place:—

δειπνεῖν δ' *ἄνδρας βουτυροφάγα*
ς

αὐχμηροκόμας μυριοπληθεῖς, etc.,

brazen vessels as large as wine vats, full of broth,—Kotys himself girt round, and serving the broth in a golden basin, then going about to taste all the bowls of wine and water ready mixed, until he was himself the first man intoxicated. Iphikrates brought from Athens several of the best players on the harp and flute.

The distinction between the *butter* eaten, or rubbed on the skin, by the Thracians, and the *olive-oil* habitually consumed in Greece, deserves notice. The word αὐχμηροκόμας seems to indicate the absence of those scented unguents which, at the banquet of Greeks, would have been applied to the hair of the guests, giving to it a shining gloss and moisture. It appears that the Lacedæmonian women, however, sometimes anointed themselves with butter, and not with oil; see Plutarch, adv. Koloten, p. 1109 B.

The number of warlike stratagems in Thrace, ascribed to Iphikrates by Polyænus and other Tactic writers, indicates that his exploits there were renowned as well as long-continued.

[223] Theopomp. Fragm. 175, ed. Didot; Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664.

[224] Xenoph. Anab. vii, 2, 38; vii, 5, 8; vii, 6, 43. Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 17; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 36.

See also a striking passage (in Lysias Orat. xxviii, cont. Ergokl. s. 5) about the advice given to Thrasybulus by a discontented fellow-citizen, to seize Byzantium, marry the daughter of Seuthes, and defy Athens.

[225] Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 13. p. 249.

At what time this adoption took place, we cannot distinctly make out; Amyntas died in 370 B.C., while from 378-371 B.C., Iphikrates seems to have been partly on service with the Persian satraps, partly in command of the Athenian fleet in the Ionian Sea (see Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, etc. ch. 4). Therefore, the adoption took place at some time between 387-378 B.C.; perhaps after the restoration of Amyntas to his maritime dominions by the Lacedæmonian expedition against Olynthus—382-380 B.C. Amyntas was so weak and insecure, from the Thessalians, and other land-neighbors (see Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 657. s. 112), that it was much to his advantage to cultivate the favor of a warlike Athenian established on the Thracian coast, like Iphikrates.

[226] From these absences of men like Iphikrates and Chabrias, a conclusion has been drawn severely condemning the Athenian people. They were so envious and ill-tempered (it has been said), that none of their generals could live with comfort at Athens; all lived abroad as they could. Cornelius Nepos (Chabrias, c. 3) makes the remark, borrowed originally from Theopompus (Fr. 117, ed. Didot), and transcribed by many modern commentators as if it were exact and literal truth—"Hoc Chabrias nuntio (i. e. on being recalled from Egypt, in consequence of the remonstrance of Pharnabazus) Athenas rediit neque ibi diutius est moratus quam fuit necesse. Non enim libenter erat ante oculos civium suorum, quod et vivebat laute, et indulgebat sibi liberalius, quam ut invidiam vulgi posset effugere. Est enim hoc commune vitium in magnis liberisque civitatibus, ut invidia gloriæ comes sit, et libenter de his detrahant, quos eminere videant altius; neque animo æquo pauperes alienam opulentium intuentur fortunam. Itaque Chabrias, quoad ei licebat, plurimum aberat. Neque vero solus ille aberat Athenis libenter, sed omnes fere principes fecerunt idem, quod tantum se ab invidiâ putabant abfuturos, quantum a conspectu suorum recessissent. Itaque Conon plurimum Cypri vixit, Iphicrates in Thraciâ, Timotheus Lesbi, Chares in Sigeo."

That the people of Athens, among other human frailties, had their fair share of envy and jealousy, is not to be denied; but that these attributes belonged to them in a marked or peculiar manner, cannot (in my judgment) be shown by any evidence extant,—and most assuredly is not shown by the evidence here alluded to.

"Chabrias was fond of a life of enjoyment and luxurious indulgence." If instead of being an Athenian, he had been a Spartan, he would undoubtedly have been compelled to expatriate in order to gratify this taste; for it was the express drift and purpose of the Spartan discipline, not to equalize property, but to equalize the habits, enjoyments, and personal toils, of the rich and poor. This is a point which the admirers of Lykurgus,—Xenophon and Plutarch,—attest not less clearly than Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, and others. If then it were considered a proof of envy and ill-temper, to debar rich men from spending their money in procuring enjoyments, we might fairly consider the reproach as made out against Lykurgus and Sparta. Not so against Athens. There was no city in Greece where the means of luxurious and comfortable living were more abundantly exhibited for sale, nor where a rich man was more perfectly at liberty to purchase them. Of this the proofs are everywhere to be found. Even the son of this very Chabrias, Ktesippus, who inherited the appetite for enjoyment, without the greater qualities of his father,—found the means of gratifying his appetite so unfortunately easy at Athens, that he wasted his whole substance in such expenses (Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7; Athenæus, iv, p. 165). And Chares was even better liked at Athens in consequence of his love of enjoyment and license,—if we are to believe another Fragment (238) of the same Theopompus.

The allegation of Theopompus and Nepos, therefore, is neither true as matter of fact, nor sufficient, if it had been true, to sustain the hypothesis of a malignant Athenian public, with which they connect it. Iphikrates and Chabrias did not stay away from Athens because they loved enjoyments or feared the envy of their countrymen; but because both of them were large gainers by doing so, in importance, in profit, and in tastes. Both of them were men πολεμικοὶ καὶ φιλοπόλεμοι ἐσχάτως (to use an expression of Xenophon respecting the Lacedæmonian Klearchus—Anab. ii, 6, 1); both of them loved war and had great abilities for war,—qualities quite compatible with strong appetite for enjoyment; while neither of them had either taste or talent for the civil routine and debate of Athens when at peace. Besides, each of them was commander of a body of peltasts, through whose means he could obtain lucrative service as well as foreign distinction; so that we can assign a sufficient reason why both of them preferred to be absent from Athens during most part of the nine years that the peace of Antalkidas continued. Afterwards, Iphikrates was abroad three or four years, in service with the Persian satraps, by order of the Athenians; Chabrias also went a long time afterwards, again on foreign service, to Egypt, at the same time when the Spartan king Agesilaus was there (yet without staying long away, since we find him going out on command from Athens to the Chersonese in 359-358 B.C.—Demosth. cont. Aristokr. p. 677, s. 204); but neither he nor Agesilaus, went there to escape the mischief of envious countrymen. Demosthenes does not talk of Iphikrates as being uncomfortable in Athens, or anxious to get out of it; see Orat. cont. Meidiam, p. 535, s. 83.

Again, as to the case of Konon and his residence in Cyprus; it is truly surprising to see this fact cited as an illustration of Athenian jealousy or ill-temper. Konon went to Cyprus immediately after the disaster of Ægospotami, and remained there, or remained away from Athens, for eleven years (405-393 B.C.) until the year after his victory at Knidus. It will be recollected that he was one of the six Athenian generals who commanded the fleet at Ægospotami. That disaster, while it brought irretrievable ruin upon Athens, was at the same time such as to brand with well-merited infamy the generals commanding. Konon was so far less guilty than his colleagues, as he was in a condition to escape with eight ships when the rest were captured. But he could not expect, and plainly did not expect, to be able to show his face again in Athens, unless he could redeem the disgrace by some signal fresh service. He nobly paid this debt to his country, by the victory of Knidus in 394 B.C.; and then came back the year afterwards, to a grateful and honorable welcome at Athens. About a year or more after this, he went out again as envoy to Persia in the service of his country. He was there seized and imprisoned by the satrap Tiribazus, but contrived to make his escape, and died at Cyprus, as it would appear, about 390 B.C. Nothing therefore can be more unfounded than the allegation of Theopompus, "that Konon lived abroad at Cyprus, because he was afraid of undeserved ill-temper from the public at Athens." For what time Timotheus may have lived at Lesbos, we have no means of saying. But from the year 370 B.C. down to his death, we hear of him so frequently elsewhere, in the service of his country, that his residence cannot have been long.

[227] Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 40, p. 283.

[228] The employment of the new word συντάξεις, instead of the unpopular term φόρους, is expressly ascribed to Kallistratus,—Harpokration in Voce.

[229] Isokrates gives the number twenty-four cities (Or. xv, Permut. s. 120). So also Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. s. 15; cont. Philokl. s. 17. The statement of Æschines, that Timotheus brought seventy-five cities into the confederacy, appears large, and must probably include all that that general either acquired or captured (Æsch. Fals. Leg. c. 24, p. 263). Though I think the number twenty-four probable enough, yet it is difficult to identify what towns they were. For Isokrates, so far as he particularizes, includes Samos, Sestos, and Krithôtê, which were not acquired until many years afterwards,—in 366-365 B.C.

Neither of these orators distinguish between those cities which Timotheus brought or persuaded to come into the confederacy, when it was first formed (among which we may reckon Eubœa, or most part of it—Plutarch, De Glor. Athen. p. 351 A.)—from those others which he afterwards took by siege, like Samos.

[230] Isokrates, Or. xiv, Plataic. s. 30.

[231] Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 20. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑφ' ὑμῶν κατὰ κράτος ἁλόντες εὐθὺς μὲν ἁρμοστοῦ καὶ δουλείας ἀπηλλάγησαν, νῦν δὲ τοῦ συνεδρίου καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσιν, etc.

The adverb of time here used indicates about 372 B.C., about a year before the battle of Leuktra.

[232] Diodor. xv, 30.

[233] Diodor. xv, 29.

Polybius (ii, 62) states that the Athenians *sent out* (not merely, *voted* to send out) ten thousand hoplites, and manned one hundred triremes.

Both these authors treat the resolution as if it were taken by the Athenians alone; but we must regard it in conjunction with the newly-assembled synod of allies.

[234] Xen. De Vectigal. v, 6. οὔκουν καὶ τότ', ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἀπεσχόμεθα, πάλιν *ὑπὸ τῶν νησιωτῶν ἑκόντων προστάται* τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἐγενόμεθα;

In the early years of this confederacy, votive offerings of wreaths or crowns, in token of gratitude to Athens, were decreed by the Eubœans, as well as by the general body of allies. These crowns were still to be seen thirty years afterwards at Athens, with commemorative inscriptions (Demosthen. cont. Androtion. c. 21, p. 616; cont. Timokrat. c. 41, p. 756).

[235] For the description of the Solonian census, see Vol. III, Ch. xi, p. 117, of this History.

[236] This is M. Boeckh's opinion, seemingly correct, as far as can be made out on a subject very imperfectly known (Public Economy of Athens, B, iv, ch. 5).

[237] Demosthen. cont. Aphob. i, p. 815, 816; cont. Aphob. ii, p. 836; cont. Aphob. de Perjur. p. 862. Compare Boeckh, Publ. Econ. Ath. iv, 7.

In the exposition which M. Boeckh gives of the new property-schedule introduced under the archonship of Nausinikus, he inclines to the hypothesis of four distinct Classes, thus distributed (p. 671 of the new edition of his Staats-haushaltung der Athener):—

1. The first class included all persons who possessed property to the value of twelve talents and upwards. They were entered on the schedule, each for one-fifth, or twenty per cent. of his property.

2. The second class comprised all who possessed property to the amount of six talents, but below twelve talents. Each was enrolled in the schedule, for the amount of sixteen per cent. upon his property.

3. The third class included all whose possessions amounted to the value of two talents, but did not reach six talents. Each was entered in the schedule at the figure of twelve per cent. upon his property.

4. The fourth class comprised all, from the minimum of twenty-five minæ, but below the maximum of two talents. Each was entered in the schedule for the amount of eight per cent. upon his property.

This detail rests upon no positive proof; but it serves to illustrate the principle of distribution, and of graduation, then adopted.

[238] Demosthen. cont. Androtion. p. 612, c. 17. τὸ ἑκτὸν μέρος εἰσφέρειν μετὰ τῶν μετοίκων.

[239] Polybius states the former sum (ii, 62), Demosthenes the latter (De Symmoriis, p. 183, c. 6). Boeckh however has shown, that Polybius did not correctly conceive what the sum which he stated really meant.

[240] I am obliged again, upon this point, to dissent from M. Boeckh, who sets it down as positive matter of fact that a property-tax of five per cent., amounting to three hundred talents, was imposed and levied in the archonship of Nausinikus (Publ. Econ. Ath. iv, 7, 8; p. 517-521, Eng. Transl.). The evidence upon which this is asserted, is, a passage of Demosthenes cont. Androtion. (p. 606. c. 14). Ὑμῖν *παρὰ τὰς εἰσφορὰς τὰς ἀπὸ Ναυσινίκου*, παρ' ἴσως τάλαντα τριακόσια ἢ μικρῷ πλείω, ἔλλειμμα τέτταρα καὶ δέκα ἐστὶ τάλαντα· ὧν ἑπτὰ οὗτος (Androtion) εἰσέπραξεν. Now these words imply,—not that a property-tax of about three hundred talents had been levied or called for *during* the archonship of Nausinikus, but—that a total sum of three hundred talents, or thereabouts, had been levied (or called for) by all the various property-taxes imposed *from the archonship of Nausinikus down to the date of the speech*. The oration was spoken about 355 B.C.; the archonship of Nausinikus was in 378 B.C. What the speaker affirms, therefore, is, that a sum of three hundred talents had been levied or called for by all the various property-taxes imposed between these two dates; and that the aggregate sum of arrears due upon all of them, at the time when Androtion entered upon his office, was fourteen talents.

Taylor, indeed, in his note, thinking that the sum of three hundred talents is very small, as the aggregate of all property-taxes imposed for twenty-three years, suggests that it might be proper to read *ἐπὶ* Ναυσινίκου instead of *ἀπὸ* Ναυσινίκου; and I presume that M. Boeckh adopts that reading. But it would be unsafe to found an historical assertion upon such a change of text, even if the existing text were more indefensible than it actually is. And surely the plural number τὰς εἰσφορὰς proves that the orator has in view, not the single property-tax imposed in the archonship of Nausinikus, but two or more property-taxes, imposed at different times. Besides, Androtion devoted himself to the collection of outstanding arrears generally, in whatever year they might have accrued. He would have no motive to single out those which had accrued in the year 378 B.C.; moreover, those arrears would probably have become confounded with others, long before 355 B.C. Demosthenes selects the year of Nausinikus as his initial period, because it was then that the new schedule and a new reckoning, began.

[241] Respecting the Symmories, compare Boeckh, Staats-haushaltung der Athener, iv, 9, 10; Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Publ. Græcor. s. 78; Parreidt, De Symmoriis, p. 18 *seq.*

[242] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 38.

[243] Plutarch. Pelopid. c. 18, 19.

[244] Hist. of Greece. Vol. VII, ch. lv, p. 11.

[245] Diodor. xii, 70.

These pairs of neighbors who fought side by side at Delium, were called Heniochi and Parabatæ,—Charioteers and Side Companions; a name borrowed from the analogy of chariot-fighting, as described in the Iliad and probably in many of the lost epic poems; the charioteer being himself an excellent warrior, though occupied for the moment with other duties,—Diomedes and Sthenelus, Pandarus and Æneas, Patroklus and Automedon, etc.

[246] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18, 19.

Ὁ συνταχθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἐπαμινώνδου ἱερὸς λόχος (Hieronymus apud Athenæum, xiii, p. 602 A.). There was a Carthaginian military division which bore the same title, composed of chosen and wealthy citizens, two thousand five hundred in number (Diodor. xvi, 80).

[247] Pausan. viii, 11, 5.

Dikæarchus, only one generation afterwards, complained that he could not find out the name of the mother of Epaminondas (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19).

[248] Plutarch, Pelop. c. 4; Pausan. ix, 13, 1. According to Plutarch, Epaminondas had attained the age of forty years, before he became publicly known (De Occult. Vivendo, p. 1129 C.).

Plutarch affirms that the battle (in which Pelopidas was desperately wounded, and saved by Epaminondas) took place at Mantinea, when they were fighting on the side of the Lacedæmonians, under king Agesipolis, against the Arcadians; the Thebans being at that time friends of Sparta, and having sent a contingent to her aid.

I do not understand what battle Plutarch can here mean. The Thebans were never so united with Sparta as to send any contingent to her aid, after the capture of Athens (in 404 B.C.). Most critics think that the war referred to by Plutarch, is, the expedition conducted by Agesipolis against Mantinea, whereby the city was broken up into villages—in 385 B.C.; see Mr. Clinton's Fasti Hellenici ad 385 B.C. But, in the first place, there cannot

have been any Theban contingent then assisting Agesipolis; for Thebes was on terms unfriendly with Sparta,—and certainly was not her ally. In the next place, there does not seem to have been any battle, according to Xenophon's account.

I therefore am disposed to question Plutarch's account, as to this alleged battle of Mantinea; though I think it probable that Epaminondas may have saved the life of Pelopidas at some earlier conflict, before the peace of Antalkidas.

[249] Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 2; Plutarch, Apophth. Reg. p. 192 D.; Aristophan. Acharn. 872.

Compare the citations in Athenæus, x, p. 417. The perfection of form required in the runner was also different from that required in the wrestler (Xenoph. Memor. iii, 8, 4; iii, 10, 6).

[250] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 2.

[251] Pindar, Olymp. vi, 90.

ἀρχαῖον ὄνειδος—Βοιώτιον ὖν, etc.

[252] Aristoxenus mentions the flute, Cicero and Cornelius Nepos the lyre (Aristoxen. Fr. 60, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. iv, p. 184; Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i, 2, 4; Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 2).

[253] Aristoxenus, Frag. 11, ed. Didot; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 583, Cicero, De Offic. i, 44, 155; Pausan. ix, 13, 1; Ælian, V. H. iii, 17.

The statement (said to have been given by Aristoxenus, and copied by Plutarch as well as by Jamblichus) that Lysis, who taught Epaminondas, had been one of the persons actually present in the synod of Pythagoreans at Kroton when Kylon burnt down the house, and that he with another had been the only persons who escaped—cannot be reconciled with chronology.

[254] Compare Diodor. xv, 52 with Plutarch, Perikles, c. 6, and Plutarch, Demosthenes, c. 20.

[255] Plutarch, De Gen. Sokrat. p. 576 D. μετείληφε παιδείας διαφόρου καὶ περιττῆς—(p. 585 D.) τὴν ἀρίστην τροφὴν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ—(p. 592 F.) Σπίνθαρος ὁ Ταραντῖνος οὐκ ὀλίγον αὐτῷ (Epaminondas) συνδιατρίψας ἐνταῦθα χρόνον, ἀεὶ δήπου λέγει, μηδενί που τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀνθρώπων ἐντετευχέναι, μήτε πλείονα γιγνώσκοντι μήτε ἐλάττονα φθεγγομένῳ. Compare Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 3—and Plutarch, De Audiend. c. 3, p. 39 F.

We may fairly presume that this judgment of Spintharus was communicated by him to his son Aristoxenus, from whom Plutarch copied it; and we know that Aristoxenus in his writings mentioned other particulars respecting Epaminondas (Athenæus, iv, p. 184). We see thus that Plutarch had access to good sources of information respecting the latter. And as he had composed a life of Epaminondas (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 28), though unfortunately it has not reached us, we may be confident that he had taken some pains to collect materials for the purpose, which materials would naturally be employed in his dramatic dialogue, "De Genio Socratis." This strengthens our confidence in the interesting statements which that dialogue furnishes respecting the character of Epaminondas; as well as in the incidental allusions interspersed among Plutarch's other writings.

[256] Cornel. Nepos, Epaminond. c. 5; Plutarch, Præcept. Reip. Gerend. p. 819 C. Cicero notices him as the only man with any pretensions to oratorical talents, whom Thebes, Corinth, or Argos had ever produced (Brutus, c. 13, 50).

[257] Plutarch (De Gen. Socr. p. 583, 584; Pelopid. c. 3; Fab. Max. c. 27. Compar. Alcibiad. and Coriol. c. 4): Cornel. Nepos. Epamin. c. 4.

[258] Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 1; Justin, vi, 8.

[259] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 576 F. Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ, μὴ πείθων ὡς οἴεται βέλτιον εἶναι ταῦτα μὴ πράσσειν· εἰκότως ἀντιτείνει πρὸς ἃ μὴ πέφυκε, μηδὲ δοκιμάζει, παρακαλούμενος.

… Ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ πείθει τοὺς πολλοὺς, ἀλλὰ ταύτην ὡρμήκαμεν τὴν ὁδὸν, ἐᾷν αὐτὸν κελεύει φόνου καθαρὸν ὄντα καὶ ἀναίτιον ἐφεστᾶναι τοῖς καιροῖς, μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου τῷ συμφέροντι προσοισόμενον.

Compare the same dialogue, p. 594 B.; and Cornelius Nepos, Pelopidas, c. 4.

Isokrates makes a remark upon Evagoras of Salamis, which may be well applied to Epaminondas; that the objectionable means, without which the former could not have got possession of the sceptre, were performed by others and not by him; while all the meritorious and admirable functions of command were reserved for Evagoras (Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 28).

[260] See the striking statements of Plutarch and Pausanias about Philopœmen,—καίπερ Ἐπαμεινώνδου βουλόμενος εἶναι μάλιστα ζηλωτὴς, τὸ δραστήριον καὶ συνετὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ χρημάτων ἀπαθὲς ἰσχυρῶς ἐμιμεῖτο, τῷ δὲ πράῳ καὶ βαθεῖ καὶ φιλανθρώπῳ παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς διαφορὰς ἐμμένειν οὐ δυνάμενος, δι' ὀργὴν καὶ φιλονεικίαν, μᾶλλον ἐδόκει στρατιωτικῆς ἢ πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς οἰκεῖος εἶναι. To the like purpose, Pausanias, viii, 49, 2; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 25: Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 3—"patiens admirandum in modum."

[261] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 32. Ὦ τοῦ μεγαλοπράγμονος ἀνθρώπου!

[262] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 576 E. Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ, Βοιωτῶν ἁπάντων τῷ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀξιῶν διαφέρειν, ἀμβλὺς ἐστι καὶ ἀπρόθυμος.

[263] Bauch, in his instructive biography of Epaminondas (Epaminondas, und Thebens Kampf um die Hegemonie: Breslau, 1834, p. 26), seems to conceive that Epaminondas was never employed in any public official post by his countrymen, until the period immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra. I cannot concur in this opinion. It appears to me that he must have been previously employed in such posts as enabled him to show his military worth. For all the proceedings of 371 B.C. prove that in that year he actually possessed a great and established reputation, which must have been acquired by previous acts in a conspicuous position; and as he had no great family position to start from, his reputation was probably acquired only by slow degrees.

The silence of Xenophon proves nothing in contradiction of this supposition; for he does not mention Epaminondas even at Leuktra.

[264] Diodor. xv, 31.

[265] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 54; Diodor. xv, 31.

[266] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 36-38.

[267] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 41.

[268] Diodor. xv, 32; Polyæn. ii, 1, 2; Cornel. Nepos, Chabrias, c. 1,—"obnixo genu scuto,"—Demosthen. cont. Leptinem, p. 479.

The Athenian public having afterwards voted a statue to the honor of Chabrias, he made choice of this attitude for the design (Diodor. xv, 33).

[269] Xen. Hellen. v, 4. 42-45; Diodor. xv, 33.

[270] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου πάλιν αὖ τὰ τῶν Θηβαίων ἀνεζωπυρεῖτο, καὶ ἐστρατεύοντο εἰς Θεσπιὰς, καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περιοικίδας πόλεις. Ὁ μέντοι δῆμος ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰς τὰς Θήβας ἀπεχώρει· ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι καθειστήκεσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις· ὥστε καὶ οἱ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσι φίλοι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων βοηθείας ἐδέοντο.

[271] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 47, 51.

The anecdotes in Polyænus (ii, 1, 18-20), mentioning faint-heartedness and alarm among the allies of Agesilaus, are likely to apply (certainly in part) to this campaign.

[272] Diodor. xv, 33, 34; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 26.

[273] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 58.

[274] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 59.

[275] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 61. ἐνέβησαν αὐτοὶ εἰς τὰς ναῦς, etc. Boeckh (followed by Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. 38, vol. v, p. 58) connects with this maritime expedition an Inscription (Corp. Insc. No. 84, p. 124) recording a vote of gratitude, passed by the Athenian assembly in favor of Phanokritus, a native of Parium in the Propontis. But I think that the vote can hardly belong to the present expedition. The Athenians could not need to be informed by a native of Parium about the movements of a hostile fleet near Ægina and Keos. The information given by Phanokritus must have related more probably, I think, to some occasion of the transit of hostile ships along the Hellespont, which a native of Parium would be the likely person first to discover and communicate.

[276] Diodor. xv, 35; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 17, p. 480.

I give the number of prize-ships taken in this action, as stated by Demosthenes; in preference to Diodorus, who mentions a smaller number. The orator, in enumerating the exploits of Chabrias in this oration, not only speaks from a written memorandum in his hand, which he afterwards causes to be read by the clerk,—but also seems exact and special as to numbers, so as to inspire greater confidence than usual.

[277] Diodor. xv, 35. Chabrias ἀπέσχετο παντελῶς τοῦ διωγμοῦ, ἀναμνησθεὶς τῆς ἐν Ἀργινούσαις ναυμαχίας, ἐν ᾗ τοὺς νικήσαντας στρατηγοὺς ὁ δῆμος ἀντὶ μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας θανάτῳ περιέβαλεν, *αἰτιασάμενος ὅτι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας κατὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν οὐκ ἔθαψαν*· εὐλαβήθη οὖν (see Wesseling and Stephens's note) μή ποτε τῆς περιστάσεως ὁμοίας γενομένης κινδυνεύσῃ παθεῖν παραπλήσια. Διόπερ *ἀποστὰς τοῦ διώκειν, ἀνελέγετο τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς διανηχομένους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἔτι ζῶντας διέσωσε, τοὺς δὲ τετελευτηκότας ἔθαψεν.* Εἰ δὲ μὴ περὶ ταύτην ἐγένετο τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἅπαντα τὸν πολεμίων στόλον διέφθειρε.

This passage illustrates what I remarked in my preceding volume (Vol. VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 175), respecting the battle of Arginusæ and the proceedings at Athens afterwards. I noticed that Diodorus incorrectly represented the excitement at Athens against the generals as arising from their having neglected to pick up the bodies of the *slain* warriors for burial,—and that he omitted the more important fact, that they left many living and wounded warriors to perish.

It is curious, that in the first of the two sentences above cited, Diodorus repeats his erroneous affirmation about the battle of Arginusæ; while in the second sentence he corrects the error, telling us that Chabrias, profiting by the warning, took care to pick up the *living* men on the wrecks and in the water, as well as the dead bodies.

[278] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 6; Plutarch, Camillus, c. 19.

[279] Demosthen. cont. Leptin. p. 480; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7.

[280] Diodor. xv, 36. He states by mistake, that Chabrias was afterwards assassinated at Abdera.

[281] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 62.

[282] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 64; Diodor. xv, 36.

[283] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 66; Isokrates, De Permutat. s. 116; Cornelius Nepos, Timotheus, c. 2.

The advance of seven minæ respectively, obtained by Timotheus from the sixty trierarchs under his command, is mentioned by Demosthenes cont. Timotheum (c. 3, p. 1187). I agree with M. Boeckh (Public Economy of Athens, ii, 24, p. 294) in referring this advance to his expedition to Korkyra and other places in the Ionian Sea in 375-374 B.C.; not to his subsequent expedition of 373 B.C., to which Rehdantz, Lachmann, Schlosser, and others would refer it (Vitæ Iphicratis, etc. p. 89). In the second expedition, it does not appear that he ever had really sixty triremes, or sixty trierarchs, under him. Xenophon (Hellen. v, 4, 63) tells us that the fleet sent with Timotheus to Korkyra consisted of sixty ships; which is the exact number of trierarchs named by Demosthenes.

[284] Isokrates, Orat. De Permutat. s. 128, 131, 135.

[285] Isokrates, De Permutat. s. 117; Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c. 2.

[286] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1.

[287] See Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 21, 23, 37.

[288] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1. Οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι, αὐξανομένους μὲν ὁρῶντες διὰ σφᾶς τοὺς Θηβαίους, χρήματά δ' οὐ συμβαλλομένους εἰς τὸ ναυτικὸν, αὐτοὶ δ' ἀποκναιόμενοι καὶ χρημάτων εἰσφοραῖς καὶ λῃστείαις ἐξ Αἰγίνης, καὶ φυλακαῖς τῆς χώρας, ἐπεθύμησαν παύσασθαι τοῦ πολέμου.

[289] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46-55.

[290] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 15-25.

[291] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 17; Diodor. xv, 37.

Xenophon does not mention the combat at Tegyra. Diodorus mentions, what is evidently this battle, near Orchomenus; but he does not name Tegyra.

Kallisthenes seems to have described the battle of Tegyra, and to have given various particulars respecting the religious legends connected with that spot (Kallisthenes, Fragm. 3, ed. Didot, ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Τεγύρα).

[292] That the Thebans thus became again presidents of all Bœotia, and revived the Bœotian confederacy,—is clearly stated by Xenophon, Hellen. v, 4, 63; vi, 1, 1.

[293] Thucyd. ii, 2. Ἀνεῖπεν ὁ κήρυξ (the Theban herald after the Theban troops had penetrated by night into the middle of Platæa εἴ τις βούλεται *κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν* ξυμμαχεῖν, τίθεσθαι παρ' αὐτοὺς τὰ ὅπλα, νομίζοντες σφίσι ῥᾳδίως τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ προσχωρήσειν τὴν πόλιν.

Compare the language of the Thebans about τὰ πάτρια τῶν Βοιωτῶν (iii, 61, 65, 66). The description which the Thebans give of their own professions and views, when they attacked Platæa in 431 B.C., may be taken as fair analogy to judge of their professions and views towards the recovered Bœotian towns in 376-375 B.C.

[294] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3; Compare Diodor. xv, 53.

[295] Diodor. xv, 31; Xen. Hellen, vi, 3, 1; iii, 6, 21.

[296] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 21-27.

[297] Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 1; vi, 21.

This expedition of Kleombrotus to Phokis is placed by Mr. Fynes Clinton in 375 B.C. (Fast. Hel. ad 375 B.C.). To me it seems to belong rather to 374 B.C. It was not undertaken until the Thebans had reconquered all the Bœotian cities (Xen. Hell. vi, 1, 1); and this operation seems to have occupied them all the two years,—376 and 375 B.C. See v, 4, 63, where the words οὔτ' ἐν ᾧ Τιμόθεος περιέπλευσε must be understood to include, not simply the time which Timotheus took in *actually circumnavigating* Peloponnesus, but the year which he spent afterwards in the Ionian Sea, and the time which he occupied in performing his exploits near Korkyra, Leukas, and the neighborhood generally. The "Periplus" for which Timotheus was afterwards honored at Athens (see Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. c. 90, p. 458) meant the exploits performed by him during the year and with the fleet of the "Periplus."

It is worth notice that the Pythian games were celebrated in this year 374 B.C.,—ἐπὶ Σωκρατίδου ἄρχοντος; that is, in the first quarter of that archon, or the third Olympic year; about the beginning of August, Chabrias won a prize at these games with a chariot and four; in celebration of which, he afterwards gave a splendid banquet at the point of sea-shore called Kôlias, near Athens (Demosthen. cont. Neæram. c. 11, p. 1356).

[298] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1, 2.

Kallias seems to have been one of the Athenian envoys (Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 4).

[299] Diodor. xiv, 82.

[300] Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 3. Καὶ ὁπότε μὲν ἐνδεὴς εἴη, παρ' ἑαυτοῦ προσετίθει· ὁπότε δὲ περιγένοιτο τῆς προσόδου, ἀπελάμβανεν· ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως φιλόξενός τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τὸν Θετταλικὸν τρόπον.

Such loose dealing of the Thessalians with their public revenues helps us to understand how Philip of Macedon afterwards got into his hands the management of their harbors and customs-duties (Demosthen. Olynth. i, p. 15; ii. p. 20). It forms a striking contrast with the exactness of the Athenian people about their public receipts and disbursements, as testified in the inscriptions yet remaining.

[301] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 4.

The story (told in Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. p. 583 F.) of Jason sending a large sum of money to Thebes, at some period anterior to the recapture of the Kadmeia, for the purpose of corrupting Epaminondas,—appears not entitled to credit. Before that time, Epaminondas was too little known to be worth corrupting; moreover, Jason did not become *tagus* of Thessaly until long after the recapture of the Kadmeia (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 18, 19).

[302] See the interesting account of this mission, and the speech of Polydamas, which I have been compelled greatly to abridge (in Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 4-18).

[303] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 3; Diodor. xv, 45.

The statements of Diodorus are not clear in themselves; besides that on some points, though not in the main, they contradict Xenophon. Diodorus states that those exiles whom Timotheus brought back to Zakynthus, were the philo-Spartan leaders, who had been recently expelled for their misrule under the empire of Sparta.

This statement must doubtless be incorrect. The exiles whom Timotheus restored must have belonged to the anti-Spartan party in the island.

But Diodorus appears to me to have got into confusion by representing that universal and turbulent reaction against the philo-Spartan oligarchies, which really did not take place until after the battle of Leuktra—as if it had taken place some three years earlier. The events recounted in Diodor. xv, 40, seem to me to belong to a period *after* the battle of Leuktra.

Diodorus also seems to have made a mistake in saying that the Athenians sent *Ktesikles* as auxiliary commander to *Zakynthus* (xv, 46); whereas this very commander is announced by himself in the next chapter (as well as by Xenophon, who calls him *Stesikles*) as sent to *Korkyra* (Hellen. v, 2, 10).

I conceive Diodorus to have inadvertently mentioned this Athenian expedition under Stesiklês or Ktesiklês, twice over; once as sent to Zakynthus—then again, as sent to *Korkyra*. The latter is the truth. No Athenian expedition at all appears on this occasion to have gone to Zakynthus; for Xenophon enumerates the Zakynthians among those who helped to fit out the fleet of Mnasippus (v, 2, 3).

On the other hand, I see no reason for calling in question the reality of the two Lacedæmonian expeditions, in the last half of 374 B.C.—one under Aristokrates to Zakynthus, the other under Alkidas to Korkyra—which Diodorus mentions (Diod. xv, 45, 46). It is true that Xenophon does not notice either of them; but they are noway inconsistent with the facts which he does state.

[304] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 3, 5, 16: compare v, 2, 21—about the commutation of personal service for money.

Diodorus (xv, 47) agrees with Xenophon in the main about the expedition of Mnasippus, though differing on several other contemporary points.

[305] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 6. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀπέβη (when Mnasippus landed), ἐκράτει τε τῆς γῆς καὶ ἐδῄου ἐξειργασμένην μὲν παγκαλῶς καὶ πεφυτευμένην τὴν χώραν, μεγαλοπρεπεῖς δὲ οἰκήσεις καὶ οἰνῶνας κατεσκευασμένους ἔχουσαν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν· ὥστ’ ἔφασαν τοὺς στρατιώτας εἰς τοῦτο τρυφῆς ἐλθεῖν, ὥστ’ οὐκ ἐθέλειν πίνειν, εἰ μὴ ἀνθοσμίας εἴη. Καὶ ἀνδράποδα δὲ καὶ βοσκήματα πάμπολλα ἠλίσκετο ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν.

Οἶνον, implied in the antecedent word οἰνῶνας, is understood after πίνειν.

[306] Thucyd. i, 82. (Speech of Archidamus) μὴ γὰρ ἄλλο τι νομίσητε τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν (of the Athenians) ἢ ὅμηρον ἔχειν, καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ἐξείργασται.

Compare the earlier portion of the same speech (c. 80), and the second speech of the same Archidamus (ii, 11).

To the same purpose Thucydides speaks, respecting the properties of the wealthy men established throughout the area of Attica,—οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ καλὰ κτήματα κατὰ τὴν χώραν οἰκοδομίαις τε καὶ πολυτελέσι κατασκευαῖς ἀπολωλεκότες (*i. e.* by the invasion)—Thucyd. ii, 65.

[307] The envoys from Korkyra to Athens (mentioned by Xenophon, v, 2, 9) would probably cross Epirus and Thessaly, through the aid of Alketas. This would be a much quicker way for them than the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus: and it would suggest the same way for the detachment of Stesiklês presently to be mentioned.

[308] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 15.

[309] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 16.

Ὁ δ’ αὖ Μνάσιππος ὁρῶν ταῦτα, ἐνόμιζέ τε ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη ἔχειν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ περὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους, ἐκαινούργει, καὶ τοὺς μέν τινας αὐτῶν ἀπομίσθους ἐπεποιήκει, τοῖς δ’ οὖσι καὶ δυοῖν ἤδη μηνοῖν ὤφειλε τὸν μισθὸν, οὐκ ἀπορῶν, ὡς ἐλέγετο, χρημάτων, etc.

[310] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 18-26; Diodor. xv, 47.

[311] Xen. Hellen. vi. 2, 39.

[312] The manner in which I have described the preliminary cruise of Timotheus, will be found (I think) the only way of uniting into one consistent narrative the scattered fragments of information which we possess respecting his proceedings in this year.

The date of his setting out from Athens is exactly determined by Demosthenes, adv. Timoth. p. 1186—the month Munychion, in the archonship of Sokratidês—April 373 B.C. Diodorus says that he proceeded to Thrace,

and that he acquired several new members for the confederacy (xv, 47); Xenophon states that he sailed towards the islands (Hellen. vi, 2, 12); two statements not directly the same, yet not incompatible with each other. In his way to Thrace, he would naturally pass up the Eubœan strait and along the coast of Thessaly.

We know that Stesikles and his peltasts must have got to Korkyra, not by sea circumnavigating Peloponnesus, but by land across Thessaly and Epirus; a much quicker way. Xenophon tells us that the Athenians "asked Alketas to help them to cross over from the mainland of Epirus to the opposite island of Korkyra: and that they were in consequence carried across by night,"—Ἀλκέτου δὲ ἐδεήθησαν *συνδιαβιβάσαι* τούτους· καὶ οὗτοι μὲν *νυκτὸς διακομισθέντες* που τῆς χώρας, εἰσῆλθον εἰς τὴν πόλιν.

Now these troops could not have got to Epirus without crossing Thessaly; nor could they have crossed Thessaly without the permission and escort of Jason. Moreover, Alketas himself was the dependent of Jason, whose goodwill was therefore doubly necessary (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 7).

We farther know that in the year preceding (374 B.C.), Jason was not yet in alliance with Athens, nor even inclined to become so, though the Athenians were very anxious for it (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 10). But in November 373 B.C., Jason (as well as Alketas) appears as the established ally of Athens; not as then becoming her ally for the first time, but as so completely an established ally, that he comes to Athens for the express purpose of being present at the trial of Timotheus and of deposing in his favor—Ἀφικομένου γὰρ Ἀλκέτου καὶ Ἰάσονος ὡς τοῦτον (Timotheus) ἐν τῷ Μαιμακτηριῶνι μηνὶ τῷ ἐπ' Ἀστείου ἄρχοντος, *ἐπὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τὸν τούτου, βοηθησόντων αὐτῷ* καὶ καταγομένων εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν τὴν ἐν Πειραιεῖ, etc. (Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 5, p. 1190). Again,—Αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτον (Timotheus) *ἐξαιτουμένων μὲν* τῶν ἐπιτηδείων καὶ οἰκείων αὐτῷ ἁπάντων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ *Ἀλκέτου καὶ Ἰάσονος, συμμάχων ὄντων ὑμῖν*, μόλις μὲν ἐπείσθητε ἀφεῖναι (Demosthen. ib. c, 3, p. 1187.) We see from hence, therefore, that the first alliance between Jason and Athens had been contracted in the early part of 373 B.C.; we see farther that it had been contracted by Timotheus in his preliminary cruise, which is the only reasonable way of explaining the strong interest felt by Jason as well as by Alketas in the fate of Timotheus, inducing them to take the remarkable step of coming to Athens to promote his acquittal. It was Timotheus who had first made the alliance of Athens with Alketas (Diodor. xv, 36; Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c. 2), a year or two before.

Combining all the circumstances here stated, I infer with confidence, that Timotheus, in his preliminary cruise, visited Jason, contracted alliance between him and Athens, and prevailed upon him to forward the division of Stesikles across Thessaly to Epirus and Korkyra.

In this oration of Demosthenes, there are three or four exact dates mentioned, which are a great aid to the understanding of the historical events of the time. That oration is spoken by Apollodorus, claiming from Timotheus the repayment of money lent to him by Pasion the banker, father of Apollodorus; and the dates specified are copied from entries made by Pasion at the time in his commercial books (c. 1. p. 1186; c. 9. p. 1197).

[313] Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 3, p. 1188. ἅμισθον μὲν τὸ στράτευμα καταλελύσθαι ἐν Καλαυρίᾳ, etc.—ibid. c. 10, p. 1199. προσῆκε γὰρ τῷ μὲν Βοιωτίῳ ἄρχοντι παρὰ τούτου (Timotheus) τὴν τροφὴν τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ παραλαμβάνειν· *ἐκ γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν συντάξεων ἡ μισθοφορία ἦν τῷ στρατεύματι· τὰ δὲ χρήματα σὺ* (Timotheus) *ἅπαντα ἐξέλεξας ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων*· καὶ σὲ ἔδει αὐτῶν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι.

[314] Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 2, 12, 13, 39; Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 3. p. 1188.

[315] Diodor. xv, 47.

[316] I collect what is here stated from Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 3. p. 1188; c. 10. p. 1199. It is there said that Timotheus was about to sail home from Kalauria to take his trial; yet it is certain that his trial did not take place until the month Mæmakterion or November. Accordingly, the trial must have been postponed, in consequence of the necessity for Iphikrates and Kallistratus going away at once to preserve Korkyra.

[317] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 14. Ὁ δὲ (Iphikrates) ἐπεὶ κατέστη στρατηγὸς, μάλα ὀξέως τὰς ναῦς ἐπληροῦτο, καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους ἠνάγκαζε.

[318] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 27, 32.

[319] Compare vi, 2, 14—with vi, 2, 39.

[320] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 34.

[321] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 35, 38; Diodor. xv, 47.

We find a story recounted by Diodorus (xvi, 57), that the Athenians under Iphikrates captured, off Korkyra, some triremes of Dionysius, carrying sacred ornaments to Delphi and Olympia. They detained and appropriated the valuable cargo, of which Dionysius afterwards loudly complained.

This story (if there be any truth in it) can hardly allude to any other triremes than those under Anippus. Yet Xenophon would probably have mentioned the story, if he had heard it; since it presents the enemies of Sparta as committing sacrilege. And whether the triremes were carrying sacred ornaments or not, it is certain that they were coming to take part in the war, and were therefore legitimate prizes.

[322] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 39. The meaning of Xenophon here is not very clear, nor is even the text perfect.

Ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ ταύτην τὴν στρατηγίαν τῶν Ἰφικράτους οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐπαινῶ· ἔπειτα καὶ τὸ *προσελέσθαι κελεῦσαι ἑαυτῷ* (this shows that Iphikrates himself singled them out) Καλλίστρατόν τε τὸν δημήγορον, οὐ μάλα ἐπιτήδειον ὄντα, καὶ Χαβρίαν, μάλα στρατηγικὸν νομιζόμενον. Εἴτε γὰρ φρονίμους αὐτοὺς ἡγούμενος εἶναι, συμβούλους λαβεῖν ἐβούλετο, σῶφρόν μοι δοκεῖ διαπράξασθαι· *εἴτε ἀντιπάλους νομίζων*, οὕτω θρασέως (some words in the text seem to be wanting) … μήτε καταῤῥᾳθυμῶν μήτε καταμελῶν φαίνεσθαι μηδὲν, μεγαλοφρονοῦντος ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι.

I follow Dr. Thirlwall’s translation of οὐ μάλα ἐπιτήδειον, which appears to me decidedly preferable. The word ἠφίει (vi, 3, 3) shows that Kallistratus was an unwilling colleague.

[323] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3. ὑποσχόμενος γὰρ Ἰφικράτει (Kallistratus) *εἰ αὐτὸν ἠφίει*, ἢ χρήματα πέμψειν τῷ ναυτικῷ, ἢ εἰρήνην ποιήσειν, etc.

[324] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 37, 38.

[325] Demosthen. cont. Timoth. c. 9, p. 1197, 1198.

[326] The narrative here given of the events of 373 B.C., so far as they concern Timotheus and Iphikrates, appears to me the only way of satisfying the exigencies of the case, and following the statements of Xenophon and Demosthenes.

Schneider in his note, indeed, implies, and Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, etc. p. 86) contends, that Iphikrates did not take command of the fleet, nor depart from Athens, until *after* the trial of Timotheus. There are some expressions in the oration of Demosthenes, which might seem to countenance this supposition; but it will be found hardly admissible, if we attentively study the series of facts.

1. Mnasippus arrived with his armament at Korkyra, and began the siege, either before April, or at the first opening of April, 373 B.C. For his arrival there, and the good condition of his fleet, was known at Athens *before* Timotheus received his appointment as admiral of the fleet for the relief of the island (Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 10, 11, 12).

2. Timotheus sailed from Peiræus on this appointed voyage, in April 373 B.C.

3. Timotheus was tried at Athens in November 373 B.C.; Alketas and Jason being then present, as allies of Athens and witnesses in his favor.

Now, if the truth were, that Iphikrates did not depart from Athens with his fleet until after the trial of Timotheus in November, we must suppose that the siege of Korkyra by Mnasippus lasted seven months, and the cruise of Timotheus nearly five months. Both the one and the other are altogether improbable. The Athenians would never have permitted Korkyra to incur so terrible a chance of capture, simply in order to wait for the trial of Timotheus. Xenophon does not expressly say how long the siege of Korkyra lasted; but from his expressions about the mercenaries of Mnasippus (that already pay was owing to them for *as much as two months*,—καὶ δυοῖν *ἤδη* μηνοῖν—vi, 2, 16), we should infer that it could hardly have lasted more than three months in all. Let us say, that it lasted four months; the siege would then be over in August, and we know that the fleet of Iphikrates arrived just after the siege was concluded.

Besides, is it credible, that Timotheus—named as admiral for the express purpose of relieving Korkyra, and knowing that Mnasippus was already besieging the place with a formidable fleet—would have spent so long a time as *five* months in his preliminary cruise?

I presume Timotheus to have stayed out in this cruise about *two* months; and even this length of time would be quite sufficient to raise strong displeasure against him at Athens, when the danger and privations of Korkyra were made known as hourly increasing. At the time when Timotheus came back to Athens, he found all this displeasure actually afloat against him, excited in part by the strong censures of Iphikrates and Kallistratus (Dem. cont. Timoth. p. 1187. c. 3). The adverse orations in the public assembly, besides inflaming the wrath of the Athenians against him, caused a vote to be passed deposing him from his command to Korkyra, and nominating in his place Iphikrates, with Chabrias and Kallistratus. Probably those who proposed this vote would at the same time give notice that they intended to prefer a judicial accusation against Timotheus for breach or neglect of duty. But it would be the interest of all parties to postpone *actual trial* until the fate of Korkyra should be determined, for which purpose the saving of time would be precious. Already too much time had been lost, and Iphikrates was well aware that his whole chance of success depended on celerity; while Timotheus and his friends would look upon postponement as an additional chance of softening the public displeasure, besides enabling them to obtain the attendance of Jason and Alketas. Still, though trial was postponed, Timotheus was from this moment under impeachment. The oration composed by Demosthenes therefore (delivered by Apollodorus as plaintiff, several years afterwards),—though speaking loosely, and not distinguishing the angry speeches against Timotheus *in the public assembly* (in June 373 B.C., or thereabouts, whereby his deposition was obtained), from the accusing speeches against him at his actual trial in November 373 B.C., *before the dikastery*—is nevertheless not incorrect in saying,—ἐπειδὴ δ' ἀπεχειροτονήθη μὲν ὑφ' ὑμῶν στρατηγὸς διὰ τὸ μὴ περιπλεῦσαι Πελοπόννησον, ἐπὶ *κρίσει δὲ παρεδέδοτο εἰς τὸν δῆμον*, αἰτίας τῆς μεγίστης τυχὼν (c. 3, p. 1187)—and again respecting his coming from Kalauria to Athens—μέλλων τοίνυν καταπλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν κρίσιν, ἐν Καλαυρίᾳ δανείζεται, etc. (p. 1188, 1189.) That Timotheus had been handed over to the people for trial—that he was sailing back from Kalauria *for his trial*—might well be asserted respecting his position in the month of June, though his trial did not actually take place until November. I think it cannot be doubted that the triremes at Kalauria would form a part of that fleet which actually went to Korkyra under Iphikrates; not waiting to go thither until after the trial of Timotheus in November, but departing as soon as Iphikrates could get ready, probably about July 373 B.C.

Rehdantz argues that if Iphikrates departed with the fleet in July, he must have returned to Athens in November to the trial of Timotheus, which is contrary to Xenophon's affirmation that he remained in the Ionian sea until 371 B.C. But if we look attentively at the oration of Demosthenes, we shall see that there is no certain ground for affirming Iphikrates to have been present in Athens in November, during the actual trial of Timotheus. The phrases in p. 1187—ἐφειστήκει δ' αὐτῷ Καλλίστρατος καὶ Ἰφικράτης … οὕτω δὲ διέθεσαν ὑμᾶς κατηγοροῦντες τούτου αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ συναγορεύοντες αὐτοῖς, etc., may be well explained, so far as Iphikrates is concerned, by supposing them to allude to those pronounced censures in the public assembly whereby the vote of deposition against Timotheus was obtained, and whereby the general indignation against him was first excited. I therefore see no reason for affirming that Iphikrates was actually present at the trial of Timotheus in November. But Kallistratus was really present at the trial (see c. 9. p. 1197, 1198); which consists well enough with the statement of Xenophon, that this orator obtained permission from Iphikrates to leave him at Korkyra and come back to Athens (vi, 3, 3). Kallistratus directed his accusation mainly against Antimachus, the treasurer of Timotheus. And it appears to me that under the circumstances of the case, Iphikrates, having carried his point of superseding Timotheus in the command and gaining an important success at Korkyra—might be well-pleased to be dispensed from the obligation of formally accusing him before the dikastery, in opposition to Jason and Alketas, as well as to a powerful body of Athenian friends.

Diodorus (xv, 47) makes a statement quite different from Xenophon. He says that Timotheus was at first deposed from his command, but afterwards forgiven and re-appointed by the people (jointly with Iphikrates) in consequence of the great accession of force which he had procured in his preliminary cruise. Accordingly the fleet, one hundred and thirty triremes in number, was despatched to Korkyra under the joint command of Iphikrates and Timotheus. Diodorus makes no mention of the trial of Timotheus. This account is evidently quite distinct from that of Xenophon, which latter is on all grounds to be preferred, especially as its main points are in conformity with the Demosthenic oration.

[327] Demosth. cont. Timoth. c. 6. p. 1191; c. 8. p. 1194.

We see from another passage of the same oration, that the creditors of Timotheus reckoned upon his making a large sum of money in the Persian service (c. 1, p. 1185). This farther illustrates what I have said in a previous note, about the motives of the distinguished Athenian officers to take service in foreign parts away from Athens.

[328] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 38; Pausanias, iv, 26, 3.

[329] See a curious testimony to this fact in Demosthen. cont. Neæram, c. 12, p. 1357.

[330] Diodor. xi, 48, 49; Pausan. vii, 25; Ælian. Hist. Animal. xi, 19.

Kallisthenes seems to have described at large, with appropriate religious comments, numerous physical portents which occurred about this time (see Kallisthen. Fragm. 8, ed. Didot).

[331] This second mission of Antalkidas is sufficiently verified by an indirect allusion of Xenophon (vi, 3, 12). His known philo-Laconian sentiments sufficiently explain why he avoids directly mentioning it.

[332] Diodor. xv, 50.

Diodorus had stated (a few chapters before, xv, 38) that Persian envoys had also come into Greece a little before the peace of 374 B.C., and had been the originators of that previous peace. But this appears to me one of the cases (not a few altogether in his history) in which he repeats himself, or gives the same event twice over under analogous circumstances. The intervention of the Persian envoys bears much more suitably on the period immediately preceding the peace of 371 B.C., than upon that which preceded the peace of 374 B.C., when, in point of fact, no peace was ever fully executed.

Dionysius of Halikarnassus also (Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 479) represents the king of Persia as a party to the peace sworn by Athens and Sparta in 371 B.C.

[333] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3.

[334] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 1.

[335] Demosthen. cont. Timoth. p. 1188, s. 17.

[336] Diodor. xv, 46. I do not know from whom Diodorus copied this statement; but it seems extremely reasonable.

[337] This seems to me what is meant by the Platæan speaker in Isokrates, when he complains more than once that Platæa had been taken by the Thebans in time of peace,—εἰρήνης οὔσης. The speaker, in protesting against the injustice of the Thebans, appeals to two guarantees which they have violated; for the purpose of his argument, however, the two are not clearly distinguished, but run together into one. The first guarantee was, the peace of Antalkidas, under which Platæa had been restored, and to which Thebes, Sparta, and Athens, were all parties. The second guarantee, was that given by Thebes when she conquered the Bœotian cities in 377-370 B.C., and reconstituted the federation; whereby she ensured to the Platæans existence as a city, with so much of autonomy as was consistent with the obligations of a member of the Bœotian federation. When the Platæan speaker accuses the Thebans of having violated "the oaths and the agreement" (ὅρκους καὶ ξυνθήκας), he means the terms of the peace of Antalkidas, subject to the limits afterwards imposed by the submission of Platæa to the federal system of Bœotia. He calls for the tutelary interference of Athens, as a party to the peace of Antalkidas.

Dr. Thirlwall thinks (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 38. p. 70-72) that the Thebans were parties to the peace of 374 B.C. between Sparta and Athens; that they accepted it, intending deliberately to break it; and that under that peace, the Lacedæmonian harmosts and garrisons were withdrawn from Thespiæ and other places in Bœotia. I am unable to acquiesce in this view; which appears to me negatived by Xenophon, and neither affirmed nor implied in the Plataic discourse of Isokrates. In my opinion, there were no Lacedæmonian harmosts in Bœotia (except at Orchomenus in the north) in 374 B.C. Xenophon tells (Hellen. v, 4, 63; vi, 1, 1) that the Thebans "were recovering the Bœotian cities—had subdued the Bœotian cities"—in or before 375 B.C., so that they were able to march out of Bœotia and invade Phokis; which implies the expulsion or retirement of all the Lacedæmonian forces from the southern part of Bœotia.

The reasoning in the Plataic discourse of Isokrates is not very clear or discriminating; nor have we any right to expect that it should be, in the pleading of a suffering and passionate man. But the expression εἰρήνης οὔσης and εἰρήνη may always (in my judgment) be explained, without referring it, as Dr. Thirlwall does, to the peace of 374 B.C., or supposing Thebes to have been a party to that peace.

[338] Pausanias, ix, 1, 3.

[339] Diodor. xv, 47.

Pausanias (ix, 1, 3) places this capture of Platæa in the third year (counting the years from midsummer to midsummer) before the battle of Leuktra; or in the year of the archon Asteius at Athens; which seems to me the true date, though Mr. Clinton supposes it (without ground, I think) to be contradicted by Xenophon. The year of the archon Asteius reaches from midsummer 373 to 372 B.C. It is in the latter half of the year that I suppose Platæa to have been taken.

[340] I infer this from Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 21-38; compare also sect. 10. The Platæan speaker accuses the Thebans of having destroyed the walls of some Bœotian cities (over and above what they had done to Platæa,) and I venture to apply this to Thespiæ. Xenophon indeed states that the Thespians were at this very period treated exactly like the Platæans; that is, driven out of Bœotia, and their town destroyed; except that they had not the same claim on Athens (Hellen. vi, 3, 1—ἀπόλιδας γενομένους: compare also vi, 3, 5). Diodorus also (xv, 46) speaks of the Thebans as having destroyed Thespiæ. But against this, I gather, from the Plataic Oration of Isokrates, that the Thespians were not in the same plight with the Platæans when that oration was delivered; that is, they were not expelled collectively out of Bœotia. Moreover, Pausanias also expressly says that the Thespians were present in Bœotia at the time of the battle of Leuktra, and that they were expelled shortly afterwards. Pausanias at the same time gives a distinct story, about the conduct of the Thespians, which it would not be reasonable to reject (ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1). I believe therefore that Xenophon has spoken inaccurately in saying that the Thespians were ἀπόλιδες *before* the battle of Leuktra. It is quite possible that they might have sent supplications to Athens (ἱκετεύοντας—Xen. Hell. vi, 3, 1) in consequence of the severe mandate to demolish their walls.

[341] Thucyd. iv, 133.

[342] Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 11, 13, 18, 42, 46, 47, 68.

[343] Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 3. Εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ Θηβαίους ἐωρῶμεν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου παρεσκευασμένους πείθειν ὑμᾶς ὡς οὐδὲν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐξημαρτήκασι, διὰ βραχέων ἂν ἐποιησάμεθα τοὺς λόγους· ἐπειδὴ δ' εἰς τοῦτ' ἀτυχίας ἤλθομεν, ὥστε μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀγῶνα πρὸς τούτους ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ῥητόρων τοὺς δυνατωτάτους, οὓς ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων αὐτοῖς οὗτοι παρεσκευάσαντο συνηγόρους, etc.

Compare sect. 36.

[344] Isokr. Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 12, 13, 14, 16, 28, 33, 48.

[345] Isokrat. Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 23-27. λέγουσιν ὡς ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν συμμάχων ταῦτ' ἔπραξαν—φασὶ τὸ Θηβαίους ἔχειν τὴν ἡμετέραν, τοῦτο σύμφερον εἶναι τοῖς συμμάχοις, etc.

[346] Isokrat. Or. 14, (Plat.) s. 23, 24.

[347] Diodorus, (xv, 38) mentions the parliamentary conflict between Epaminondas and *Kallistratus*, assigning it to the period immediately antecedent to the abortive peace concluded between Athens and Sparta three years before. I agree with Wesseling (see his note *ad loc.*) in thinking that these debates more properly belong to the time immediately preceding the peace of 371 B.C. Diodorus has made great confusion between the two; sometimes repeating twice over the same antecedent phenomena, as if they belonged to both,—sometimes assigning to one what properly belongs to the other.

The altercation between Epaminondas and *Kallistratus* (ἐν τῷ κοινῷ συνεδρίῳ) seems to me more properly appertaining to debates in the assembly of the confederacy at Athens,—rather than to debates at Sparta, in the preliminary discussions for peace, where the altercations between Epaminondas and *Agesilaus* occurred.

[348] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3.

It seems doubtful, from the language of Xenophon, whether Kallistratus was one of the envoys appointed, or only a companion.

[349] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 4-6.

[350] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 7-10. Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν, σιωπὴν μὲν παρὰ πάντων ἐποίησεν (Autoklês), ἡδομένους δὲ τοὺς ἀχθομένους τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐποίησε.

[351] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 10-17.

[352] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 12, 13.

[353] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 16.

[354] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 14. Καὶ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ γῆν μὲν τις ἂν, ὑμῶν φίλων ὄντων, ἱκανὸς γένοιτο ἡμᾶς λυπῆσαι; κατὰ θάλαττάν γε μὴν τις ἂν ὑμᾶς βλάψαι τι, ἡμῶν ὑμῖν ἐπιτηδείων ὄντων;

[355] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 11. Καὶ ὑμῖν δὲ ἔγωγε ὁρῶ διὰ τὰ ἀγνωμόνως πραχθέντα ἔστιν ὅτε πολλὰ ἀντίτυπα γιγνόμενα· ὧν ἦν καὶ ἡ καταληφθεῖσα ἐν Θήβαις Καδμεία· νῦν γοῦν, ὡς (?) ἐσπουδάσατε αὐτονόμους τὰς πόλεις γίγνεσθαι, πᾶσαι πάλιν, ἐπεὶ ἠδικήθησαν οἱ Θηβαῖοι, ἐπ' ἐκείνοις γεγένηνται.

[356] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 27.

[357] Plutarch. Agesil. c. 28.

[358] Thucyd. iii, 61. ἡμῶν (the Thebans) κτισάντων Πλάταιαν ὕστερον τῆς ἄλλης Βοιωτίας καὶ ἄλλα χωρία μετ' αὐτῆς, ἃ ξυμμίκτους ἀνθρώπους ἐξελάσαντες ἔσχομεν, οὐκ ἠξίουν οὗτοι (the Platæans), *ὥσπερ ἐτάχθη τὸ πρῶτον*, ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑφ' ἡμῶν, *ἔξω δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Βοιωτῶν παραβαίνοντες τὰ πάτρια*, ἐπειδὴ προσηναγκάζοντο, προσεχώρησαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, etc.

Again (c. 65) he says respecting the oligarchical Platæans who admitted the Theban detachment when it came by night to surprise Platæa,—εἰ δὲ ἄνδρες ὑμῶν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ γένει, βουλόμενοι τῆς μὲν ἔξω ξυμμαχίας ὑμᾶς παῦσαι, *ἐς δὲ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια καταστῆσαι*, ἐπεκαλέσαντο ἔκοντες, etc.

Again (c. 66), κατὰ τὰ πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια, etc. Compare ii, 2.

[359] Diodor. xi, 81.

[360] Thucyd. iv, 126.

Brasidas, addressing his soldiers when serving in Macedonia, on the approach of the Illyrians:—

Ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ εἶναι προσήκει ὑμῖν τὰ πολέμια, οὐ διὰ ξυμμάχων παρουσίαν ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ δι' οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν, καὶ μηδὲν πλῆθος πεφοβῆσθαι ἑτέρων· οἵ γε μηδὲ ἀπὸ πολιτειῶν τοιούτων ἥκετε, ἐν αἷς οὐ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων ἄρχουσιν, ἀλλὰ πλειόνων μᾶλλον ἐλάσσους· *οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ κτησάμενοι τὴν δυναστείαν ἢ τῷ μαχόμενοι κρατεῖν*.

[361] One may judge of the revolting effect produced by such a proposition, before the battle of Leuktra,—by reading the language which Isokrates puts into the mouth of the Spartan prince Archidamus, five or six years after that battle, protesting that all Spartan patriots ought to perish rather than consent to the relinquishment of Messenia,—περὶ μὲν ἄλλων τινῶν ἀμφισβητήσεις, ἐγίγνοντο, περὶ δὲ Μεσσήνης, οὔτε βασιλεὺς, οὐθ' ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλις, οὐδὲ πώποθ' ἡμῖν ἐνεκάλεσεν ὡς ἀδίκως κεκτημένοις αὐτήν (Isok. Arch. s. 32). In the spring of 371 B.C., what had once been Messenia, was only a portion of Laconia, which no one thought of distinguishing from the other portions (see Thucyd. iv, 3, 11).

[362] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 28; Pausanias, ix, 13, 1; compare Diodor. xv, 51. Pausanias erroneously assigns the debate to the congress preceding the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B.C.; at which time Epaminondas was an unknown man.

Plutarch gives this interchange of brief questions, between Agesilaus and Epaminondas, which is in substance the same as that given by Pausanias, and has every appearance of being the truth. But he introduces it in a very bold and abrupt way, such as cannot be conformable to the reality. To raise a question about the right of Sparta to govern Laconia, was a most daring novelty. A courageous and patriotic Theban might venture upon it as a retort against those Spartans who questioned the right of Thebes to her presidency of Bœotia; but he would never do so without assigning his reasons to justify an assertion so startling to a large portion of his hearers. The reasons which I here ascribe to Epaminondas are such as we know to have formed the Theban creed, in reference to the Bœotian cities; such as were actually urged by the Theban orator in 427 B.C., when the fate of the Platæan captives was under discussion. After Epaminondas had once laid out the reasons in support of his assertion, he might then, if the same brief question were angrily put to him a second time, meet it with another equally brief counter-question or retort. It is this final interchange of thrusts which Plutarch has given, omitting the arguments previously stated by Epaminondas, and necessary to warrant the seeming paradox which he advances. We must recollect that Epaminondas does not contend that Thebes was entitled to *as much power* in Bœotia as Sparta in Laconia. He only contends that Bœotia, under the presidency of Thebes, was as much an integral political aggregate, as Laconia under Sparta,—in reference to the Grecian world.

Xenophon differs from Plutarch in his account of the conduct of the Theban envoys. He does not mention Epaminondas at all, nor any envoy by name; but he says that "the Thebans, having entered their name among the cities which had taken the oaths, came on the next day and requested, that the entry might be altered, and that '*the Bœotians*' might be substituted in place of *the Thebans*, as having taken the oath. Agesilaus told them that he could make no change; but he would strike their names out if they chose, and he accordingly did strike them out" (vi, 3, 19). It seems to me that this account is far less probable than that of Plutarch, and bears every mark of being incorrect. Why should such a man as Epaminondas (who doubtless was the envoy) consent at first to waive the presidential pretensions of Thebes, and to swear for her alone? If he did consent, why should he retract the next day? Xenophon is anxious to make out Agesilaus to be as much in the right as may be; since the fatal consequences of his proceedings manifested themselves but too soon.

[363] Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 3, 20.

[364] Diodor. xv, 38-82.

[365] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 1.

[366] Thucyd. iv.

[367] Diodorus, xv, 38. ἐξαγωγεῖς, Xen. Hellen. *l. c.*

Diodorus refers the statements in this chapter to the peace between Athens and Sparta in 374 B.C. I have already remarked that they belong properly to the peace of 371 B.C.; as Wesseling suspects in his note.

[368] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3. ἤδη γὰρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ δαιμόνιον ἦγεν, etc.

[369] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 20; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 20; Diodor. xv, 51.

[370] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 28.

[371] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 2, 3. ἐκεῖνον μὲν φλυαρεῖν ἡγήσατο, etc.

[372] It is stated that either the Lacedæmonians from Sparta, or Kleombrotus from Phokis, sent a new formal requisition to Thebes, that the Bœotian cities should be left autonomous; and the requisition was repudiated (Diodor. xv, 51; Aristeides, Or. (Leuktr.) ii, xxxiv, p. 644, ed. Dindorf). But such mission seems very doubtful.

[373] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3, 4; Diodor. xv, 53; Pausan. ix, 13, 2.

[374] Kallisthenes, apud Cic. de Divinatione, i, 34, Fragm. 9, ed. Didot.

[375] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 7; Diodor. xv, 54; Pausan. ix, 13, 3; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 20, 21; Polyænus, ii, 3, 8.

The latter relates that Pelopidas in a dream saw Skedasus, who directed him to offer on this tomb "an auburn virgin" to the deceased females. Pelopidas and his friends were greatly perplexed about the fulfilment of this command; many urged that it was necessary for some maiden to devote herself, or to be devoted by her parents, as a victim for the safety of the country, like Menœkeus and Makaria in the ancient legends; others denounced the idea as cruel and inadmissible. In the midst of the debate, a mare, with a chestnut filly, galloped up, and stopped not far off; upon which the prophet Theokritus exclaimed,—"Here comes the victim required, sent by the special providence of the gods." The chestnut filly was caught and offered as a sacrifice on the tomb; every one being in high spirits from a conviction that the mandate of the gods had been executed.

The prophet Theokritus figures in the treatise of Plutarch De Genio Socratis (c. 3, p. 576 D.) as one of the companions of Pelopidas in the conspiracy whereby the Theban oligarchy was put down and the Lacedæmonians expelled from the Kadmeia.

[376] Diodor. xv, 52-56; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 20.

[377] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5.

[378] Polyæn. ii, 2, 2; Pausanias, ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1.

[379] Plutarch, Symposiac. ii. 5, p. 639 F.

[380] Pausanias (ix, 13, 4; compare viii, 6, 1) lays great stress upon this indifference or even treachery of the allies. Xenophon says quite enough to authenticate the reality of the fact (Hellen. vi, 4, 15-24); see also Cicero De Offic. ii, 7, 26.

Polyænus has more than one anecdote respecting the dexterity of Agesilaus in dealing with faint-hearted conduct or desertion on the part of the allies of Sparta (Polyæn. ii, 1, 18-20).

[381] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 13, 14.

[382] Xen. Hellen. l. c. Plutarch (Agesil. c. 28) states a thousand Lacedæmonians to have been slain; Pausanias (ix, 13, 4) gives the number as more than a thousand; Diodorus mentions four thousand (xv. 56), which is doubtless above the truth, though the number given by Xenophon may be fairly presumed as somewhat below it. Dionysius of Halikarnassus (Antiq. Roman. ii, 17) states that seventeen hundred Spartans perished.

[383] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 15.

[384] Pausan. ix, 13, 4; Plutarch, Apotheg. Reg. p. 193 B.; Cicero, de officiis, ii, 7.

[385] Pausan. ix, 13, 4; Diodor. xv, 55.

[386] Pausan. ix, 16, 3.

[387] This is an important date, preserved by Plutarch (Agesil. c. 28). The congress was broken up at Sparta on the fourteenth of the Attic month Skirrophorion (June), the last month of the year of the Athenian archon Alkisthenes; the battle was fought on the fifth of the Attic month of Hekatombæon, the first month of the next Attic year, of the archon Phrasikleidês; about the beginning of July.

[388] Diodorus differs from Xenophon on one important matter connected with the battle; affirming that Archidamus son of Agesilaus was present and fought, together with various other circumstances, which I shall discuss presently, in a future note. I follow Xenophon.

[389] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 8. Εἰς δ' οὖν τὴν μάχην τοῖς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίοις πάντα τἀναντία ἐγίγνετο, τοῖς δὲ (to the Thebans) πάντα καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης κατωρθοῦτο.

[390] Isokrates, in the Oration vi, called *Archidamus* (composed about five years after the battle, as if to be spoken by Archidamus son of Agesilaus), puts this statement distinctly into the mouth of Archidamus—μέχρι μὲν ταυτησὶ τῆς ἡμέρας δεδυστυχηκέναι δοκοῦμεν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τῇ πρὸς Θηβαίους, καὶ τοῖς μὲν σώμασι κρατηθῆναι *διὰ τὸν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡγησάμενον*, etc. (s. 9).

I take his statement as good evidence of the real opinion entertained both by Agesilaus and by Archidamus; an opinion the more natural, since the two contemporary kings of Sparta were almost always at variance, and at the head of opposing parties; especially true about Agesilaus and Kleombrotus, during the life of the latter.

Cicero (probably copying Kallisthenes or Ephorus) says, de Officiis, i, 24, 84—"Illa plaga (Lacedæmoniis) pestifera, quâ, quum Cleombrotus invidiam timens temere cum Epaminondâ conflixisset, Lacedæmoniorum opes corruerunt." Polybius remarks (ix. 23, we know not from whom he borrowed) that all the proceedings of Kleombrotus during the empire of Sparta, were marked with a generous regard for the interests and feelings of the allies; while the proceedings of Agesilaus were of the opposite character.

[391] Diodor. xv, 55. Epaminondas, ἰδίᾳ τινι καὶ περιττῇ τάξει χρησάμενος, διὰ τῆς ἰδίας στρατηγίας περιεποιήσατο τὴν περιβόητον νίκην … διὸ καὶ λοξὴν ποιήσας τὴν φάλαγγα, τῷ τοὺς ἐπιλέκτους ἔχοντι κέρατι ἔγνω κρίνειν τὴν μάχην, etc. Compare Plutarch, Pelop. c. 23.

[392] See Aristotel. Politic. viii, 3, 3, 5.

Compare Xenophon, De Repub. Laced. xiii, 5. τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους αὐτοσχεδιαστὰς εἶναι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ μόνους τῷ ὄντι τεχνίτας τῶν πολεμικῶν—and Xenoph. Memorab. iii, 5, 13, 14.

[393] Thucyd. i, 71. ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν (of you Spartans) τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐστιν. *Ἀνάγκη δ' ὥσπερ τέχνης ἀεὶ τὰ ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρατεῖν·* καὶ ἡσυχαζούσῃ μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα ἄριστα, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκαζομένοις ἰέναι, *πολλῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ*, etc.

[394] Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 3.

[395] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 16. Γενομένων δὲ τούτων, ὁ μὲν εἰς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα ἀγγελῶν τὸ πάθος ἀφικνεῖται, Γυμνοπαιδιῶν τε οὐσῶν τῆς τελευταίας, καὶ τοῦ ἀνδρικοῦ χόρου ἔνδον ὄντος· Οἱ δὲ ἔφοροι, ἐπεὶ ἤκουσαν τὸ πάθος, ἐλυποῦντο μὲν, ὥσπερ οἶμαι, ἀνάγκη· τὸν μέντοι χόρον οὐκ ἐξήγαγον, ἀλλὰ διαγωνίσασθαι εἴων. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους ἑκάστου τῶν τεθνηκότων ἀπέδοσαν· προεῖπον δὲ ταῖς γυναιξὶ, μὴ ποιεῖν κραυγὴν, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ τὸ πάθος φέρειν. Τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ ἦν ὁρᾷν, ὧν μὲν ἐτέθνασαν οἱ προσήκοντες, λιπαροὺς καὶ

φαιδροὺς ἐν τῷ φανερῷ ἀναστρεφομένους· ὧν δὲ ζῶντες ἠγγελμένοι ἦσαν, ὀλίγους ἂν εἶδες, τούτους δὲ σκυθρωποὺς καὶ ταπεινοὺς περιϊόντας—and Plutarch, Agesil. c. 29.

See a similar statement of Xenophon, after he has recounted the cutting in pieces of the Lacedæmonian mora near Lechæum, about the satisfaction and even triumph of those of the Lacedæmonians who had lost relations in the battle; while every one else was mournful (Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 10). Compare also Justin, xxviii, 4—the behavior after the defeat of Sellasia.

[396] Thucyd. ii, 39.

[397] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 17-19.

[398] See Thucyd. vii, 73.

[399] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 20, 21.

However, since the Phokians formed part of the beaten army at Leuktra, it must be confessed that Jason had less to fear from them at this moment, than at any other.

[400] Pausanias states that immediately after the battle, Epaminondas gave permission to the allies of Sparta to depart and go home, by which permission they profited, so that the Spartans now stood alone in the camp (Paus. ix, 14, 1). This however is inconsistent with the account of Xenophon (vi, 4, 26), and I think improbable.

Sievers (Geschichte, etc. p. 247) thinks that Jason preserved the Spartans by outwitting and deluding Epaminondas. But it appears to me that the storming of the Spartan camp was an arduous enterprise, wherein more Thebans than Spartans would have been slain: moreover, the Spartans were masters of the port of Kreusis, so that there was little chance of starving out the camp before reinforcements arrived. The capitulation granted by Epaminondas seems to have been really the wisest proceeding.

[401] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 22-25.

The road from Kreusis to Leuktra, however, must have been that by which Kleombrotus arrived.

[402] This is the most convenient place for noticing the discrepancy, as to the battle of Leuktra, between Diodorus and Xenophon. I have followed Xenophon.

Diodorus (xv, 54) states both the arrival of Jason in Bœotia, and the out-march of Archidamus from Sparta, to have taken place, *not after* the battle of Leuktra, but *before* it. Jason (he says) came with a considerable force to the aid of the Thebans. He prevailed upon Kleombrotus, who doubted the sufficiency of his own numbers, to agree to a truce and to evacuate Bœotia. But as Kleombrotus was marching homeward, he met Archidamus with a second Lacedæmonian army, on his way to Bœotia, by order of the ephors, for the purpose of reinforcing him. Accordingly Kleombrotus, finding himself thus unexpectedly strengthened, openly broke the truce just concluded, and marched back with Archidamus to Leuktra. Here they fought the battle, Kleombrotus commanding the right wing, and Archidamus the left. They sustained a complete defeat, in which Kleombrotus was slain; the result being the same on both statements.

We must here make our election between the narrative of Xenophon and that of Diodorus. That the authority of the former is greater, speaking generally, I need hardly remark; nevertheless his philo-Laconian partialities become so glaring and preponderant, during these latter books of the Hellenica (where he is discharging the mournful duty of recounting the humiliation of Sparta), as to afford some color for the suspicions of Palmerius, Morus, and Schneider, who think that Xenophon has concealed the direct violation of truce on the part of the Spartans, and that the facts really occurred as Diodorus has described them. See Schneider ad Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5, 6.

It will be found, however, on examining the facts, that such suspicion ought not to be admitted, and that there are grounds for preferring the narrative of Xenophon.

1. He explains to us how it happened that the remains of the Spartan army, after the defeat of Leuktra, escaped out of Bœotia. Jason arrives after the battle, and prevails upon the Thebans to allow them to retreat under a truce; Archidamus also arrives after the battle to take them up. If the defeat had taken place under the circumstances mentioned by Diodorus,—Archidamus and the survivors would have found it scarcely possible to escape out of Bœotia.

2. If Diodorus relates correctly, there must have been a violation of truce on the part of Kleombrotus and the Lacedæmonians, as glaring as any that occurs in Grecian history. But such violation is never afterwards alluded to by any one, among the misdeeds of the Lacedæmonians.

3. A part, and an essential part, of the story of Diodorus, is, that Archidamus was present and fought at Leuktra. But we have independent evidence rendering it almost certain that he was not there. Whoever reads the Discourse of Isokrates called *Archidamus* (Or. vi, sect. 9, 10, 129), will see that such observations could not have been put into the mouth of Archidamus, if he had been present there, and (of course) in joint command with Kleombrotus.

4. If Diodorus be correct, Sparta must have levied a new army from her allies, just after having sworn the peace, which peace exonerated her allies from everything like obligation to follow her headship; and a new army, not for the purpose of extricating defeated comrades in Bœotia, but for pure aggression against Thebes. This, to say the least, is eminently improbable.

On these grounds, I adhere to Xenophon and depart from Diodorus.

[403] Xenoph. Rep. Lac. c. ix; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.

[404] Thucyd. v, 34.

[405] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30; Plutarch, Apophtheg. Lacon. p. 214 B.; Apophtheg. Reg. p. 191 C.; Polyænus, ii, 1, 13.

A similar suspension of penalties, for the special occasion, was enacted after the great defeat of Agis and the Lacedæmonians by Antipater, B.C. 330. Akrotatus, son of King Kleomenes, was the only person at Sparta who opposed the suspension (Diodor. xix, 70). He incurred the strongest unpopularity for such opposition. Compare also Justin, xxviii, 4—describing the public feeling at Sparta after the defeat at Sellasia.

[406] The explanation of Spartan citizenship will be found in an earlier part of this History, Vol. II, Ch. vi.

[407] Aristotel. Polit. ii, 6, 12. Μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπήνεγκεν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἀπώλετο διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν.

[408] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 24. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ πάντες ἐγυμνάζοντο περὶ τὰ ὅπλα, ἀγαλλόμενοι τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις νίκῃ, etc.

These are remarkable words from the unwilling pen of Xenophon: compare vii, 5, 12.

[409] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 23; vii, 5, 4; Diodor. xv, 57.

[410] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 27; vi, 5, 23.

[411] Diodor. xv, 57.

[412] Pausan. ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1.

[413] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 1.

I have already given my reasons (in a note on the preceding chapter) for believing that the Thespians were not ἀπόλιδες *before* the battle of Leuktra.

[414] Pausanias, x, 11, 4.

[415] Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 141.

[416] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 30. παρήγγειλε δὲ καὶ ὡς στρατευσομένοις εἰς τὸν περὶ τὰ Πύθια χρόνον Θετταλοῖς παρασκευάζεσθαι.

I agree with Dr. Arnold's construction of this passage (see his Appendix ad. Thucyd. v, 1, at the end of the second volume of his edition of Thucydides) as opposed to that of Mr. Fynes Clinton. At the same time, I do not think that the passage proves much either in favor of his view, or against the view of Mr. Clinton, about the month of the Pythian festival; which I incline to conceive as celebrated about August 1; a little later than Dr. Arnold, a little earlier than Mr. Clinton, supposes. Looking to the lunar months of the Greeks, we must recollect that the festival would not always coincide with the same month or week of our year.

I cannot concur with Dr. Arnold in setting aside the statement of Plutarch respecting the coincidence of the Pythian festival with the battle of Koroneia.

[417] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 29, 30. βοῦν ἡγεμόνα, etc.

[418] Diodor. xv, 13.

[419] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 30. ἀποκρίνασθαι τὸν θεὸν, ὅτι αὐτῷ μελήσει. *Ὁ δ' οὖν ἀνὴρ, τηλικοῦτος ὢν, καὶ τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα διανοούμενος*, etc.

Xenophon evidently considers the sudden removal of Jason as a consequence of the previous intention expressed by the god to take care of his own treasure.

[420] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 31, 32.

The cause which provoked these young men is differently stated: compare Diodor. xv, 60; Valer. Maxim. ix, 10, 2.

[421] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 32.

The death of Jason in the spring or early summer of 370 B.C., refutes the compliment which Cornelius Nepos (Timoth. c. 4) pays to Timotheus; who can never have made war upon Jason after 373 B.C., when he received the latter at Athens in his house.

[422] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 37.

[423] Diodor. xv, 38. ἐξαγωγεῖς.

[424] Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-5.

[425] Diodor. xv, 39, 40.

Diodorus mentions these commotions as if they had taken place after the peace concluded in 374 B.C., and not after the peace of 371 B.C. But it is impossible that they can have taken place after the former, which in point of fact, was broken off almost as soon as sworn,—was never carried into effect,—and comprised no one but Athens and Sparta. I have before remarked that Diodorus seems to have confounded, both in his mind and in his history, these two treaties of peace together, and has predicated of the former what really belongs to the latter. The commotions which he mentions come in, most naturally and properly, immediately after the battle of Leuktra.

He affirms the like reaction against Lacedæmonian supremacy and its local representatives in the various cities, to have taken place even after the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B.C. (xv, 5). But if such reaction began at that time, it must have been promptly repressed by Sparta, then in undiminished and even advancing power.

Another occurrence, alleged to have happened after the battle of Leuktra, may be properly noticed here. Polybius (ii, 39), and Strabo seemingly copying him (viii, p. 384), assert that both Sparta and Thebes agreed to leave their disputed questions of power to the arbitration of the Achæans, and to abide by their decision. Though I greatly respect the authority of Polybius, I am unable here to reconcile his assertion either with the facts which unquestionably occurred, or with general probability. If any such arbitration was ever consented to, it must have come to nothing; for the war went on without interruption. But I cannot bring myself to believe that it was even consented to, either by Thebes or by Sparta. The exuberant confidence of the former, the sense of dignity on the part of the latter, must have indisposed both to such a proceeding; especially to the acknowledgment of umpires like the Achæan cities, who enjoyed little estimation in 370 B.C., though they acquired a good deal a century and a half afterwards.

[426] Diodor. xv, 57, 58.

[427] Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. p. 814 B.; Isokrates. Or. v, (Philip.) s. 58.; compare Dionys. Halic. Antiq. Rom. vii, 66.

[428] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 10.

The discouragement of the Spartans is revealed by the unwilling, though indirect, intimations of Xenophon,—not less than by their actual conduct—Hellen. vi, 5, 21; vii, 1, 30-32; compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.

[429] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 1-3.

Ἐνθυμηθέντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὅτι οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἔτι οἴονται, χρῆναι ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ οὔπω διακέοιντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὥσπερ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους διέθεσαν—μεταπέμπονται τὰς πόλεις, ὅσοι βούλονται τῆς εἰρήνης μετέχειν, ἣν βασιλεὺς κατέπεμψεν.

In this passage, Morus and some other critics maintain that we ought to read οὔπω (which seems not to be supported by any MSS.), in place of οὕτω. Zeune and Schneider have admitted the new reading into the text; yet they doubt the propriety of the change, and I confess that I share their doubts. The word οὕτω will construe, and gives a clear sense; a very different sense from οὔπω, indeed,—yet more likely to have been intended by Xenophon.

[430] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 37.

[431] Thus the Corinthians still continued allies of Sparta (Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 8).

[432] Diodor. xvi, 23-29; Justin, viii, 1.

We may fairly suppose that both of them borrow from Theopompus, who treated at large of the memorable Sacred War against the Phokians, which began in 355 B.C., and in which the conduct of Sparta was partly determined by this previous sentence of the Amphiktyons. See Theopompi Fragm. 182-184, ed. Didot.

[433] See Tittmann, Ueber den Bund der Amphiktyonen, pp. 192-197 (Berlin, 1812).

[434] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 19.

[435] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 6; vi, 5, 3.

[436] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 4, 5.

Pausanias (viii, 8, 6: ix, 14, 2) states that the Thebans reëstablished the city of Mantinea. The act emanated from the spontaneous impulse of the Mantineans and other Arcadians, before the Thebans had yet begun to interfere actively in Peloponnesus, which we shall presently find them doing. But it was doubtless done in reliance upon Theban support, and was in all probability made known to, and encouraged by, Epaminondas. It formed the first step to that series of anti-Spartan measures in Arcadia, which I shall presently relate.

Either the city of Mantinea now built was not exactly in the same situation as the one dismantled in 385 B.C., since the river Ophis did not run through it, as it had run through the former,—or else the course of the Ophis has altered. If the former, there would be three successive sites, the oldest of them being on the hill called Ptolis, somewhat north of Gurzuli. Ptolis was perhaps the larger of the primary constituent villages. Ernst Curtius (Peloponnesos, p. 242) makes the hill Gurzuli to be the same as the hill called Ptolis; Colonel Leake distinguishes the two, and places Ptolis on his map northward of Gurzuli (Peloponnesiaca, p. 378-381). The summit of Gurzuli is about one mile distant from the centre of Mantinea (Leake, Peloponnes. p. 383).

The walls of Mantinea, as rebuilt in 370 B.C., form an ellipse of about eighteen stadia, or a little more than two miles in circumference. The greater axis of the ellipse points north and south. It was surrounded with a wet ditch, whose waters join into one course at the west of the town, and form a brook which Sir William Gell calls the Ophis (Itinerary of the Morea, p. 142). The face of the wall is composed of regularly cut square stones; it is about ten feet thick in all,—four feet for an outer wall, two feet for an inner wall, and an intermediate space of four feet filled up with rubbish. There were eight principal double gates, each with a narrow winding approach, defended by a round tower on each side. There were quadrangular towers, eighty feet apart, all around the circumference of the walls (Ernst Curtius, Peloponnesos, p. 236, 237).

These are instructive remains, indicating the ideas of the Greeks respecting fortification in the time of Epaminondas. It appears that Mantinea was not so large as Tegea, to which last Curtius assigns a circumference of more than three miles (p. 253).

[437] Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus) s. 111.

[438] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30, 31, 34.

[439] It seems, however, doubtful whether there were not some common Arcadian coins struck, even before the battle of Leuktra.

Some such are extant; but they are referred by K. O. Müller, as well as by M. Boeckh (Metrologisch. Untersuchungen, p. 92) to a later date subsequent to the foundation of Megalopolis.

On the other hand, Ernst Curtius (Beyträge zur Aeltern Münzkunde, p. 85-90, Berlin, 1851) contends that there is a great difference in the style and execution of these coins, and that several in all probability belong to a date earlier than the battle of Leuktra. He supposes that these older coins were struck in connection with the Pan-Arcadian sanctuary and temple of Zeus Lykæus, and probably out of a common treasury at the temple of that god for religious purposes; perhaps also in connection with the temple of Artemis Hymnia (Pausan. viii, 5, 11) between Mantinea and Orchomenus.

[440] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 6. συνῆγον ἐπὶ τὸ συνιέναι πᾶν τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν, καὶ ὅ,τι νικῴη ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι καὶ τῶν πόλεων, etc.

Compare Diodor. xv, 59-62.

[441] See Pausanias, viii, 27, 2, 3.

[442] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 11.

[443] For the relations of these Arcadian cities, with Sparta and with each other, see Thucyd. iv, 134; v, 61, 64, 77.

[444] Xenophon in his account represents Stasippus and his friends as being quite in the right, and as having behaved not only with justice but with clemency. But we learn from an indirect admission, in another place, that there was also another story, totally different, which represented Stasippus as having begun unjust violence. Compare Hellenic. vi, 5, 7, 8 with vi, 5, 36.

The manifest partiality of Xenophon, in these latter books, greatly diminishes the value of his own belief on such a matter.

[445] Xen. Hellen. vi. 5. 8, 9, 10.

[446] Pausanias, viii, 27, 3.

[447] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 11, 12.

[448] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 2.

See the prodigious anxiety manifested by the Lacedæmonians respecting the sure adhesion of Tegea (Thucyd. v, 64).

[449] I cannot but think that Eutæa stands marked upon the maps of Kiepert at a point too far from the frontier of Laconia, and so situated in reference to Asea, that Agesilaus must have passed very near Asea in order to get to it; which is difficult to suppose, seeing that the Arcadian convocation was assembled at Asea. Xenophon calls Eutæa πόλιν ὅμορον with reference to Laconia (Hellen. vi, 5, 12); this will hardly suit with the position marked by Kiepert.

The district called Mænalia must have reached farther southward than Kiepert indicates on his map. It included Oresteion, which was on the straight road from Sparta to Tegea (Thucyd. v, 64; Herodot. ix, 11). Kiepert has placed Oresteion in his map agreeably to what seems the meaning of Pausanias, viii, 44, 3. But it rather appears that the place mentioned by Pausanias must have been *Oresthasion*, and that *Oresteion* must have been a different place, though Pausanias considers them the same. See the geographical Appendix to K. O. Müller's Dorians, vol. ii, p. 442—Germ. edit.

[450] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 13, 14; Diodor. xv, 62.

[451] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 20. ὅπως μὴ δοκοίη φοβούμενος σπεύδειν τὴν ἔφοδον.

See Leake's Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, c. xxiv, p. 74, 75. The exact spot designated by the words τὸν ὄπισθεν κόλπον τῆς Μαντινικῆς, seems hardly to be identified.

[452] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 21. βουλόμενος ἀπαγαγεῖν τοὺς ὁπλίτας, πρὶν καὶ τὰ πυρὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἰδεῖν, ἵνα μή τις εἴπῃ, ὡς φεύγων ἀπαγάγοι. Ἐκ γὰρ τῆς πρόσθεν ἀθυμίας ἐδόκει τε ἀνειληφέναι τὴν πόλιν, ὅτι καὶ ἐμβεβλήκει εἰς τὴν Ἀρκαδίαν, καὶ δῃοῦντι τὴν χώραν οὐδεὶς ἠθελήκει μάχεσθαι: compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.

[453] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 19.

[454] Diodor. xv, 62. Compare Demosthenes, Orat. pro Megalopolit. pp. 205-207, s. 13-23.

[455] Diodor. xv, 60.

[456] Diodor. xiv, 34.

[457] Pausanias. iv, 26, 3.

[458] Diodor. xv, 66; Pausanias, iv, 26, 3, 4.

[459] To illustrate small things by great—At the first formation of the Federal Constitution of the United States of America, the rival pretensions of New York and Philadelphia were among the principal motives for creating the new federal city of Washington.

[460] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 31; and compare Agesil. and Pomp. c. 4; Diodor. xv, 62. Compare Xenophon, Agesilaus, 2, 24.

[461] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 23. Οἱ δὲ Ἀρκάδες καὶ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Ἠλεῖοι ἔπειθον αὐτοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι ὡς τάχιστα εἰς τὴν Λακωνικήν, ἐπιδείκνυντες μὲν τὸ ἑαυτῶν πλῆθος, ὑπερεπαινοῦντες δὲ τὸ τῶν Θηβαίων στράτευμα. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ ἐγυμνάζοντο πάντες περὶ τὰ ὅπλα, ἀγαλλόμενοι τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις νίκῃ, etc.

[462] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 24, 25.

[463] Diodor. xv, 64.

See Colonel Leake's Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, ch. 23, p. 29.

[464] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 26. When we read that the Arcadians got on the roofs of the houses to attack Ischolaus, this fact seems to imply that they were admitted into the houses by the villagers.

[465] Respecting the site of Sellasia, Colonel Leake thinks, and advances various grounds for supposing, that Sellasia was on the road from Sparta to the north-east, towards the Thyreatis; and that Karyæ was on the road from Sparta northward, towards Tegea. The French investigators of the Morea, as well as Professor Ross and Kiepert, hold a different opinion, and place Sellasia on the road from Sparta northward towards Tegea (Leake, Peloponnesiaca, p. 342-352; Ross, Reisen im Peloponnes. p. 187; Berlin, 1841).

Upon such a point, the authority of Colonel Leake is very high; yet the opposite opinion respecting the site of Sellasia seems to me preferable.

[466] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 30; Diodor. xv, 65.

[467] This I apprehend to be the meaning of the phrase—ἐπεὶ μέντοι ἔμενον μὲν οἱ ἐξ Ὀρχομένου μισθόφοροι, etc.

[468] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 29; vii, 2, 2.

[469] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 2. Καὶ *διαβαίνειν τελευταῖοι λαχόντες* (the Phliasians) εἰς Πρασιὰς τῶν συμβοηθησάντων … οὐ γὰρ πώποτε ἀφέστασαν, ἀλλ' οὐδ', ἐπεὶ ὁ ξεναγὸς *τοὺς προδιαβεβῶτας* λαβὼν ἀπολιπὼν αὐτοὺς ᾤχετο, οὐδ' ὡς ἀπεστράφησαν, ἀλλ' ἡγεμόνα μισθωσάμενοι ἐκ Πρασιῶν, ὄντων τῶν πολεμίων περὶ Ἀμύκλας, ὅπως ἐδύναντο διαδύντες ἐς Σπάρτην ἀφίκοντο.

[470] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 28, 29. ὥστε φόβον αὖ οὗτοι παρεῖχον συντεταγμένοι καὶ λίαν ἐδόκουν πολλοὶ εἶναι, etc.

[471] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 25; vi, 5, 32; vii, 2, 2.

It is evident from the last of these three passages, that the number of Periœki and Helots who actually revolted, was very considerable; and that the contrast between the second and third passages evinces the different feelings with which the two seem to have been composed by Xenophon.

In the second, he is recounting the invasion of Epaminondas, with a wish to soften the magnitude of the Spartan disgrace and calamity as much as he can. Accordingly, he tells us no more than this,—"there were some among the Periœki, who even took active service in the attack of Gythium, and fought along with the Thebans,"—ἦσαν δέ τινες τῶν Περιοίκων, οἳ καὶ ἐπέθεντο καὶ συνεστρατεύοντο τοῖς μετὰ Θηβαίων.

But in the third passage (vii, 2, 2: compare his biography called Agesilaus, ii, 24) Xenophon is extolling the fidelity of the Phliasians to Sparta under adverse circumstances of the latter. Hence it then suits his argument, to

magnify these adverse circumstances, in order to enhance the merit of the Phliasians; and he therefore tells us,—"*Many* of the Periœki, all the Helots, and all the allies except a few, had revolted from Sparta,"—σφαλέντων δ' αὐτῶν τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις μάχῃ, καὶ ἀποστάντων μὲν πολλῶν Περιοίκων, ἀποστάντων δὲ πάντων τῶν Εἱλώτων, ἔτι δὲ τῶν συμμάχων πλὴν πάνυ ὀλίγων, ἐπιστρατευόντων δ' αὐτοῖς, ὡς εἰπεῖν, πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πιστοὶ διέμειναν (the Phliasians).

I apprehend that both statements depart from the reality, though in opposite directions. I have adopted in the text something between the two.

[472] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 32; Polyænus, ii, 1, 14; Ælian, V. H. xiv, 27.

[473] Æneas, Poliorceticus, c. 2, p. 16.

[474] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 32. Καὶ τὸ μὲν μὴ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν προσβαλεῖν ἂν ἔτι αὐτοὺς, ἤδη τι ἐδόκει θαῤῥαλεώτερον, εἶναι.

This passage is not very clear, nor are the commentators unanimous either as to the words or as to the meaning. Some omit μὴ, construe ἐδόκει as if it were ἐδόκει τοῖς Θηβαίοις, and translate θαῤῥαλεώτερον "excessively rash."

I agree with Schneider in dissenting from this alteration and construction. I have given in the text what I believe to be the meaning.

[475] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 28; Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 8; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 32, 33; Plutarch, comp. Agesil. and Pomp. c. 4.

[476] Aristotle (in his Politica, iv, 10, 5), discussing the opinion of those political philosophers who maintained that a city ought to have no walls, but to be defended only by the bravery of its inhabitants,—gives various reasons against such opinion, and adds "that these are old-fashioned thinkers; that the cities which made such ostentatious display of personal courage, have been proved to be wrong by actual results"—λίαν ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσι, καὶ ταῦθ' ὁρῶντες ἐλεγχομένας ἔργῳ τὰς ἐκείνως καλλωπισαμένας.

The commentators say (see the note of M. Barth. St. Hilaire) that Aristotle has in his view Sparta at the moment of this Theban invasion. I do not see what else he can mean; yet at the same time, if such be his meaning, the remark is surely difficult to admit. Epaminondas came close up to Sparta, but did not dare to attempt to carry it by assault. If the city had had walls like those of Babylon, they could not have procured for her any greater protection. To me the fact appears rather to show (contrary to the assertion of Aristotle) that Sparta was so strong by position, combined with the military character of her citizens, that she could dispense with walls.

Polyænus (ii, 2, 5) has an anecdote, I know not from whom borrowed, to the effect that Epaminondas might have taken Sparta, but designedly refrained from doing so, on the ground that the Arcadians and others would then no longer stand in need of Thebes. Neither the alleged matter of fact, nor the reason, appear to me worthy of any credit. Ælian (V. H. iv, 8) has the same story, but with a different reason assigned.

[477] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 50; Diodor. xv, 67.

[478] Thucyd. ii, 15. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ Θησεὺς ἐβασίλευσε, γενόμενος μετὰ τοῦ ξυνετοῦ καὶ δυνατὸς, etc.

[479] Diodor. xv, 72.

[480] Pausan. viii, 27; viii, 35, 5. Diodor. xv, 63.

See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, p. 418, where the facts respecting Megalopolis are brought together and discussed.

It is remarkable that though Xenophon (Hellen. v, 2, 7) observes that the capture of Mantinea by Agesipolis had made the Mantineans see the folly of having a river run through their town,—yet in choosing the site of Megalopolis, this same feature was deliberately reproduced: and in this choice the Mantineans were parties concerned.

[481] Pausan. iv, 26, 6.

[482] Strabo. viii, p. 361: Polybius, vii, 11.

[483] Pausan. ix, 14, 2: compare the inscription on the statue of Epaminondas (ix, 15, 4).

[484] Pausan. iv, 27, 3.

[485] Pausan. iv, 31, 5.

[486] Pausan. iv, 31, 2.

[487] Thucyd. ii, 25.

[488] Thucyd. iv, 3.

[489] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 8.

[490] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 25.

[491] Pausan. iv, 27, 4. ἀνῴκιζον δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πολίσματα, etc. Pausanias, following the line of coast from the mouth of the river Pamisus in the Messenian Gulf, round Cape Akritas to the mouth of the Neda in the Western Sea,—enumerates the following towns and places,—Kôronê, Kolônides, Asinê, the Cape Akritas, the Harbor Phœnikus, Methônê, or Mothônê, Pylus, Aulon (Pausan. iv, 34, 35, 36). The account given by Skylax (Periplus, c. 46, 47) of the coast of these regions, appears to me confused and unintelligible. He reckons Asinê and Mothônê as cities of Laconia; but he seems to have conceived these cities as being in the *central southern* projection of Peloponnesus (whereof Cape Tænarus forms the extremity); and not to have conceived at all the *south-western* projection, whereof Cape Akritas forms the extremity. He recognizes Messene, but he pursues the Paraplus of the Messenian coast from the mouth of the river Neda to the coast of the Messenian Gulf south of Ithômê without interruption. Then after that, he mentions Asinê, Mothônê, Achilleios Limên, and Psamathus, with Cape Tænarus between them. Besides, he introduces in Messenia two different cities,—one called Messênê, the other called Ithômê; whereas there was only one Messênê situated on Mount Ithome.

I cannot agree with Niebuhr, who, resting mainly upon this account of Skylax, considers that the south-western corner of Peloponnesus remained a portion of Laconia and belonging to Sparta, long after the establishment of the city of Messênê. See the Dissertation of Niebuhr on the age of Skylax of Karyanda,—in his Kleine Schriften, p. 119.

[492] Thucyd. iv, 3, 42.

[493] The Oration (vi,) called Archidamus, by Isokrates. exhibits powerfully the Spartan feeling of the time, respecting this abstraction of territory, and emancipation of serfs, for the purpose of restoring Messênê, s. 30. Καὶ εἰ μὲν τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς Μεσσηνίους κατῆγον (the Thebans), ἠδίκουν μὲν ἂν, ὅμως δ' εὐλογωτέρως ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐξημάρτανον· νῦν δὲ τοὺς Εἵλωτας ὁμόρους ἡμῖν παρακατοικίζουσιν, ὥστε μὴ τοῦτ' εἶναι χαλεπώτατον, εἰ τῆς χώρας στερησόμεθα παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' εἰ τοὺς δούλους ἡμετέρους ἐποψόμεθα κυρίους αὐτῆς ὄντας.

Again—s. 101. ἦν γὰρ παρακατοικισώμεθα τοὺς Εἵλωτας, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ταύτην περιΐδωμεν αὐξηθεῖσαν, τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι πάντα τὸν βίον ἐν ταραχαῖς καὶ κινδύνοις διατελοῦμεν ὄντες; compare also sections 8 and 102.

[494] Isokrates, Orat. vi, (Archidam.) s. 111. Ἄξιον δὲ καὶ τὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσχυνθῆναι πανηγύρεις, ἐν αἷς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν (Spartans) ζηλωτότερος ἦν καὶ θαυμαστότερος τῶν ἀθλητῶν τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι τὰς νίκας ἀναιρουμένων. Εἰς ἃς τίς ἂν ἐλθεῖν τολμήσειεν, ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι καταφρονηθησόμενος—ἔτι δὲ πρὸς *τούτοις ὀψόμενος μὲν τοὺς οἰκέτας ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας* ἧς οἱ πατέρες ἡμῖν κατέλιπον ἀπαρχὰς καὶ θυσίας μείζους ἡμῶν ποιουμένους, ἀκουσόμενος δ' *αὐτῶν τοιαύταις βλασφημίαις χρωμένων, οἵαις περ εἰκὸς τοὺς χαλεπώτερον τῶν ἄλλων δεδουλευκότας*, ἐξ ἴσου δὲ νῦν τὰς συνθήκας τοῖς δεσπόταις πεποιημένους.

This oration, composed only five or six years after the battle of Leuktra, is exceedingly valuable as a testimony of the Spartan feeling under such severe humiliations.

[495] The freedom of the Messenians had been put down by the first Messenian war, after which they became subjects of Sparta. The second Messenian war arose from their revolt.

No free Messenian legation could therefore have visited Olympia since the termination of the first war; which is placed by Pausanias (iv, 13, 4) in 723 B.C.; though the date is not to be trusted. Pausanias (iv, 27, 3) gives two hundred and eighty-seven years between the end of the second Messenian war and the foundation of Messênê by Epaminondas. See the note of Siebelis on this passage. Exact dates of these early wars cannot be made out.

[496] The partiality towards Sparta, visible even from the beginning of Xenophon's history, becomes more and more exaggerated throughout the two latter books wherein he recounts her misfortunes; it is moreover intensified by spite against the Thebans and Epaminondas as her conquerors. But there is hardly any instance of this feeling, so glaring or so discreditable, as the case now before us. In describing the expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus in the winter of 370-369 B.C., he totally omits the foundation both of Messênê and Megalopolis; though in the after part of his history, he alludes (briefly) both to one and to the other as facts accomplished. He represents the Thebans to have come into Arcadia with their magnificent army, for the simple purpose of repelling Agesilaus and the Spartans, and to have been desirous of returning to Bœotia, as soon as it was ascertained that the latter had already returned to Sparta (vi, 5, 23). Nor does he once mention the name of Epaminondas as general of the Thebans in the expedition, any more than he mentions him at Leuktra.

Considering the momentous and striking character of these facts, and the eminence of the Theban general by whom they were achieved, such silence on the part of an historian, who professes to recount the events of the time, is an inexcusable dereliction of his duty to state the *whole truth*. It is plain that Messênê and Megalopolis wounded to the quick the philo-Spartan sentiment of Xenophon. They stood as permanent evidences of the degradation of Sparta, even after the hostile armies had withdrawn from Laconia. He prefers to ignore them altogether. Yet he can find space to recount, with disproportionate prolixity, the two applications of the Spartans to Athens for aid, with the favorable reception which they obtained,—also the exploits of the Phliasians in their devoted attachment to Sparta.

[497] See a striking passage in Polybius, iv, 32. Compare also Pausan. v, 29, 3; and viii, 27, 2.

[498] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 38; vii, 4, 2, 33, 34; vii, 3, 1.

[499] Demosthen. Fals. Legat. p. 344, s. 11, p. 403, s. 220, Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 296, c. 49; Cornel. Nepos. Epamin. c. 6.

[500] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 38; vii, 4, 33; Diodor. xv, 59; Aristotle—Ἀρκάδων Πολιτεία—ap. Harpokration, v. Μύριοι, p. 106, ed. Neumann.

[501] Polybius, ii, 55.

[502] Thucyd. v, 66.

[503] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 21.

[504] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 12; Diodor. xv, 64.

[505] The exact number of eighty-five days, given by Diodorus (xv. 67), seems to show that he had copied literally from Ephorus or some other older author.

Plutarch, in one place (Agesil. c. 32), mentions "three entire months," which differs little from eighty-five days. He expresses himself as if Epaminondas spent all this time in ravaging Laconia. Yet again, in the Apophth. Reg. p. 194 B. (compare Ælian, V. H. xiii, 42), and in the life of Pelopidas (c. 25), Plutarch states, that Epaminondas and his colleagues held the command four whole months over and above the legal time, being engaged in their operations in Laconia and Messenia. This seems to me the more probable interpretation of the case; for the operations seem too large to have been accomplished in either three or four months.

[506] See a remarkable passage in Plutarch—An Seni sit gerenda Respublica (c. 8, p. 788 A.).

[507] Pausan. viii, 27, 2. Pammenes is said to have been an earnest friend of Epaminondas, but of older political standing; to whom Epaminondas partly owed his rise (Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præcep. p. 805 F.).

Pausanias places the foundation of Megalopolis in the same Olympic year as the battle of Leuktra, and a few months after that battle, during the archonship of Phrasikleides at Athens; that is, between Midsummer 371 and Midsummer 370 B.C. (Pausan. viii, 27, 6). He places the foundation of Messênê in the next Olympic year, under the archonship of Dyskinêtus at Athens; that is, between Midsummer 370 and Midsummer 369 B.C. (iv, 27, 5).

The foundation of Megalopolis would probably be understood to date from the initial determination taken by the assembled Arcadians, soon after the revolution at Tegea, to found a Pan-Arcadian city and federative league. This was probably taken before Midsummer 370 B.C., and the date of Pausanias would thus be correct.

The foundation of Messênê would doubtless take its æra from the expedition of Epaminondas,—between November and March 370-369 B.C. which would be during the archonship of Dyskinêtus at Athens, as Pausanias

affirms.

What length of time was required to complete the erection and establishment of either city, we are not informed.

Diodorus places the foundation of Megalopolis in 368 B.C. (xv, 72).

[508] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 36.

[509] Isokrates (Archidamus), Or. vi, s. 129.

[510] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 34, 35.

[511] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 38-48.

[512] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 35. Οἱ μέντοι Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ πάνυ ἐδέξαντο, ἀλλὰ θροῦς τις τοιοῦτος διῆλθεν, ὡς νῦν μὲν ταῦτα λέγοιεν· ὅτε δὲ εὖ ἔπραττον, ἐπέκειντο ἡμῖν.

[513] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 35. Μέγιστον δὲ τῶν λεχθέντων παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐδόκει εἶναι, etc.

[514] Demosthenes cont. Neær. p. 1353.

Xenokleides, a poet, spoke in opposition to the vote for supporting Sparta (ib.).

[515] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 49; Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 479.

[516] This number is stated by Diodorus (xv, 63).

[517] To this extent we may believe what is said by Cornelius Nepos (Iphicrates, c. 2).

[518] The account here given in the text coincides as to the matter of fact with Xenophon, as well as with Plutarch; and also (in my belief) with Pausanias (Xen. Hell. vi, 5, 51; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 24; Pausan. ix, 14, 3).

But though I accept the facts of Xenophon, I cannot accept either his suppositions as to the purpose, or his criticisms on the conduct, of Iphikrates. Other modern critics appear to me not to have sufficiently distinguished Xenophon's *facts* from his *suppositions*.

Iphikrates (says Xenophon), while attempting to guard the line of Mount Oneium, in order that the Thebans might not be able to reach Bœotia,—left the excellent road adjoining to Kenchreæ unguarded. Then,—wishing to inform himself, whether the Thebans had as yet passed the Mount Oneium, he sent out as scouts all the Athenian and all the Corinthian cavalry. Now (observes Xenophon) a few scouts can see and report as well as a great number; while the great number find it more difficult to get back in safety. By this foolish conduct of Iphikrates, in sending out so large a body, several horsemen were lost in the retreat; which would not have happened if he had only sent out a few.

The criticism here made by Xenophon appears unfounded. It is plain, from the facts which he himself states, that Iphikrates never intended to bar the passage of the Thebans; and that he sent out his whole body of cavalry, not simply as scouts, but to harass the enemy on ground which he thought advantageous for the purpose. That so able a commander as Iphikrates should have been guilty of the gross blunders with which Xenophon here reproaches him, is in a high degree improbable; it seems to me more probable that Xenophon has misconceived his real purpose. Why indeed should Iphikrates wish to expose the whole Athenian army in a murderous conflict for the purpose of preventing the homeward march of the Thebans? His mission was, to rescue Sparta; but Sparta was now no longer in danger; and it was for the advantage of Athens that the Thebans should go back to Bœotia, rather than remain in Peloponnesus. That he should content himself with harassing the Thebans, instead of barring their retreat directly, is a policy which we should expect from him.

There is another circumstance in this retreat which has excited discussion among the commentators, and on which I dissent from their views. It is connected with the statement of Pausanias, who says,—Ὡς προϊὼν τῷ στρατῷ (Epaminondas) κατὰ Λέχαιον ἐγίνετο, καὶ διεξιέναι τῆς ὁδοῦ τὰ στενὰ καὶ δύσβατα ἔμελλεν, Ἰφικράτης ὁ Τιμοθέου πελταστὰς καὶ ἄλλην Ἀθηναίων ἔχων δύναμιν, ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς Θηβαίοις. Ἐπαμινώνδας δὲ τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους τρέπεται, *καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀφικόμενος Ἀθηναίων τὸ ἄστυ*, ὡς ἐπεξιέναι μαχουμένους τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐκώλυεν Ἰφικράτης, ὁ δὲ αὖθις ἐς τὰς Θήβας ἀπήλαυνε.

In this statement there are some inaccuracies, as that of calling Iphikrates "son of Timotheus;" and speaking of *Lechæum*, where Pausanias ought to have named *Kenchreæ*. For Epaminondas could not have passed Corinth

on the side of Lechæum, since the Long Walls, reaching from one to the other, would prevent him; moreover, the "rugged ground" was between Corinth and Kenchreæ, not between Corinth and Lechæum.

But the words which occasion most perplexity are those which follow: "Epaminondas repulses the assailants, and *having come to the city itself of the Athenians*, when Iphikrates forbade the Athenians to come out and fight, he (Epaminondas) again marched away to Thebes."

What are we to understand *by the city of the Athenians*? The natural sense of the word is certainly Athens; and so most of the commentators relate. But when the battle was fought between Corinth and Kenchreæ, can we reasonably believe that Epaminondas pursued the fugitives to Athens—through the city of Megara, which lay in the way, and which seems then (Diodor. xv, 68) to have been allied with Athens? The station of Iphikrates was *Corinth*; from thence he had marched out,—and thither his cavalry, when repulsed, would go back, as the nearest shelter.

Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Greece, vol. v, ch. 39, p. 141) understands Pausanias to mean, that Iphikrates retired with his defeated cavalry to Corinth,—that Epaminondas then marched straight on to Athens,—and that Iphikrates followed him. "Possibly (he says) the only mistake in this statement is, that it represents the *presence* of Iphikrates, instead of his *absence*, as the cause which prevented the Athenians from fighting. According to Xenophon, Iphikrates must have been in the rear of Epaminondas."

I cannot think that we obtain this from the words of Xenophon. Neither he nor Plutarch countenance the idea that Epaminondas marched to the walls of Athens, which supposition is derived solely from the words of Pausanias. Xenophon and Plutarch intimate only that Iphikrates interposed some opposition, and not very effective opposition, near Corinth, to the retreating march of Epaminondas, from Peloponnesus into Bœotia.

That Epaminondas should have marched to Athens at all, under the circumstances of the case, when he was returning to Bœotia, appears to me in itself improbable, and to be rendered still more improbable by the silence of Xenophon. Nor is it indispensable to put this construction even upon Pausanias; who may surely have meant by the words—πρὸς αὐτὸ Ἀθηναίων τὸ ἄστυ,—not Athens, but *the city then occupied by the Athenians engaged*, —that is, *Corinth*. *The city of the Athenians*, in reference to this battle, was Corinth; it was the city out of which the troops of Iphikrates had just marched, and to which, on being defeated, they naturally retired for safety, pursued by Epaminondas to the gates. The statement of Pausanias,—that Iphikrates would not let the Athenians in the town (Corinth) go out to fight,—then follows naturally. Epaminondas, finding that they would not come out, drew back his troops, and resumed his march to Thebes.

The stratagem of Iphikrates noticed by Polyænus (iii, 9, 29), can hardly be the same incident as this mentioned by Pausanias. It purports to be a nocturnal surprise planned by the Thebans against Athens; which certainly must be quite different (if it be in itself a reality) from this march of Epaminondas. And the stratagem ascribed by Polyænus to Iphikrates is of a strange and highly improbable character.

[519] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 25; Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 194 B.; Pausan. ix, 14, 4; Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 7, 8; Ælian, V. H. xiii, 42.

Pausanias states the fact plainly and clearly; the others, especially Nepos and Ælian, though agreeing in the main fact, surround it with colors exaggerated and false. They represent Epaminondas as in danger of being put to death by ungrateful and malignant fellow-citizens; Cornelius Nepos puts into his mouth a justificatory speech of extreme insolence (compare Arist. Or. xlvi, περὶ τοῦ παραφθέγματος—p. 385 Jebb.; p. 520 Dindorf.); which, had it been really made, would have tended more than anything else to set the public against him,—and which is moreover quite foreign to the character of Epaminondas. To carry the exaggeration still farther, Plutarch (De Vitioso Pudore, p. 540 E.) describes Pelopidas as trembling and begging for his life.

Epaminondas had committed a grave illegality, which could not be passed over without notice in his trial of accountability. But he had a good justification. It was necessary that he should put in the justification; when put in, it passed triumphantly. What more could be required? The facts, when fairly stated, will not serve as an illustration of the alleged ingratitude of the people towards great men.

[520] Diodorus (xv, 81) states that Pelopidas was Bœotarch without interruption, annually re-appointed, from the revolution of Thebes down to his decease. Plutarch also (Pelopid. c. 34) affirms that when Pelopidas died, he was in the thirteenth year of his appointment; which may be understood as the same assertion in other words. Whether Epaminondas was rechosen, does not appear.

Sievers denies the reappointment as well of Pelopidas as of Epaminondas. But I do not see upon what grounds; for, in my judgment, Epaminondas appears again as commander in Peloponnesus during this same year (369 B.C.) Sievers holds Epaminondas to have commanded without being Bœotarch; but no reason is produced for this (Sievers, Geschicht. Griech. bis zur Schlacht von Mantinea, p. 277).

[521] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 249; Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 124. Ὁ γὰρ πατήρ σου (Isokrates to Philip) πρὸς τὰς πόλεις ταύτας (Sparta, Athens, Argos, and Thebes), αἷς σοι παραινῶ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, πρὸς ἁπάσας οἰκείως εἶχε.

The connection of Amyntas with Thebes could hardly have been considerable; that with Argos, was based upon a strong legendary and ancestral sentiment rather than on common political grounds; with Athens, it was both political and serious; with Sparta, it was attested by the most essential military aid and coöperation.

[522] Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 17.

[523] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 249.

[524] Demosthen. cont. Timotheum. c. 8, p. 1194; Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 11.

[525] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 248. τὴν πατρικὴν εὔνοιαν, καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας ἃς ὑμεῖς ὑπήρξατε Ἀμύντᾳ, τῷ Φιλίππου πατρὶ, etc.

Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. c. 30, p. 660. τὴν πατρικὴν φιλίαν ἀνανεοῦθαι (Philip to the Athenians): compare ibid. c. 29, p. 657.

[526] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.

[527] Demosthen. (Philippic. ii, c. 4, p. 71; De Halonneso, c. 3, p. 79; De Rebus Chersones. c. 2, p. 91); also Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosthen. c. 6, p. 163.

[528] Compare the aspirations of Athens, as stated in 391 B.C., when the propositions of peace recommended by Andokides were under consideration, aspirations, which were then regarded as beyond all hope of attainment, and imprudent even to talk about (Andokides, De Pace, s. 15). φέρε, ἀλλὰ Χερρόνησον καὶ τὰς ἀποικίας καὶ τὰ ἐγκτήματα καὶ τὰ χρέα ἵνα ἀπολάβωμεν; Ἀλλ' οὔτε βασιλεὺς, οὔτε οἱ σύμμαχοι, συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν, μεθ' ὧν αὐτὰ δεῖ πολεμοῦντας κτήσασθαι.

[529] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 250.

Συμμαχίας γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων συνελθούσης, εἷς ὢν τούτων Ἀμύντας ὁ Φιλίππου πατὴρ, καὶ πέμπων σύνεδρον, καὶ τῆς καθ' ἑαυτὸν ψήφου κύριος ὢν, *ἐψηφίσατο Ἀμφίπολιν τὴν Ἀθηναίων συνεξαιρεῖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων Ἀθηναίοις*. Καὶ τοῦτο τὸ κοινὸν δόγμα τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ τοὺς ψηφισαμένους, *ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων γραμμάτων* μάρτυρας παρεσχόμην.

The remarkable event to which Æschines here makes allusion, must have taken place either in the congress held at Sparta, in the month preceding the battle of Leuktra, where the general peace was sworn, with universal autonomy guaranteed,—leaving out only Thebes; or else, at the subsequent congress held three or four months afterwards at Athens, where a peace, on similar conditions generally, was again sworn under the auspices of Athens as president.

My conviction is, that it took place on the latter occasion,—at Athens. First, the reference of Æschines to the δημόσια γράμματα leads us to conclude that the affair was transacted in that city; secondly, I do not think that the Athenians would have been in any situation to exact such a reserve in their favor, prior to the battle of Leuktra; thirdly, the congress at Sparta was held, not for the purpose of συμμαχία or alliance, but for that of terminating the war and concluding peace; while the subsequent congress at Athens formed the basis of a defensive alliance, to which, either then or soon afterwards, Sparta acceded.

[530] The pretensions advanced by Philip of Macedon (in his Epistola ad Athenienses, ap. Demosthen. p. 164), that Amphipolis or its locality originally belonged to his ancestor Alexander son of Amyntas, as having expelled the Persians from it,—are unfounded, and contradicted by Thucydides. At least, if (which is barely possible) Alexander ever did acquire the spot, he must have lost it afterwards; for it was occupied by the Edonian Thracians, both in 465 B.C., when Athens made her first unsuccessful attempt to plant a colony there,—and in 437 B.C., when she tried again with better success under Agnon, and established Amphipolis (Thucyd. iv, 102).

The expression of Æschines, that Amyntas in 371 B.C. "gave up or receded from" Amphipolis (ὧν δ' Ἀμύντας ἀπέστη—De Fals. Leg. 1 c.) can at most only be construed as referring to rights which he may have claimed, since he was never in actual possession of it; though we cannot wonder that the orator should use such language in addressing Philip son of Amyntas, who was really master of the town.

[531] Diodor. xv, 60.

[532] Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 4, 33, 34.

Diodorus (xv, 61) calls Alexander of Pheræ brother of Polydorus; Plutarch (Pelopid. c. 29) calls him nephew. Xenophon does not expressly say which; but his narrative seems to countenance the statement of Diodorus rather than that of Plutarch.

[533] Diodor. xv, 61.

[534] Diodor. xv, 67.

The transactions of Macedonia and Thessaly at this period are difficult to make out clearly. What is stated in the text comes from Diodorus; who affirms, however, farther,—that Pelopidas marched into Macedonia, and brought back as a hostage to Thebes the youthful Philip, brother of Alexander. This latter affirmation is incorrect; we know that Philip was in Macedonia, and free, *after* the death of Alexander. And I believe that the march of Pelopidas into Macedonia, with the bringing back of Philip as a hostage, took place in the following year 368 B.C.

Justin also states (vii, 5) erroneously, that Alexander of Macedon gave his brother Philip as a hostage, first to the Illyrians, next to the Thebans.

[535] Demosthen. De Fals. Leg. c. 58, p. 402; Diodorus, xv, 71.

Diodorus makes the mistake of calling this Ptolemy son of Amyntas and brother of Perdikkas; though he at the same time describes him as Πτολεμαῖος Ἀλωρίτης, which description would hardly be applied to one of the royal brothers. Moreover, the passage of Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 250, shows that Ptolemy was not son of Amyntas; and Dexippus (ap. Syncellum, p. 263) confirms the fact.

See these points discussed in Mr. Fynes Clinton's Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, c. 4.

[536] Diodor. xvi, 2.

[537] Æschines, Fals. Legat. c. 13, 14, p. 249, 250; Justin, vii, 6.

Æschines mentions Ptolemy as regent, on behalf of Eurydikê and her younger sons. Æschines also mentions Alexander as having recently died, but says nothing about his assassination. Nevertheless there is no reason to doubt that he was assassinated, which we know both from Demosthenes and Diodorus; and assassinated by Ptolemy, which we know from Plutarch (Pelop. c. 27), Marsyas (ap. Athenæum, xiv. p. 629), and Diodorus. Justin states that Eurydikê conspired both against her husband Amyntas, and against her children, in concert with a paramour. The statements of Æschines rather tend to disprove the charge of her having been concerned in the death of Amyntas, but to support that of her having been accomplice with Ptolemy in the murder of Alexander.

Assassination was a fate which frequently befel the Macedonian kings. When we come to the history of Olympias, mother of Alexander the Great, it will be seen that Macedonian queens were capable of greater crimes than those imputed to Eurydikê.

[538] Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 13, 14, p. 249, 250; Cornelius Nepos, Iphicrates, c. 3.

[539] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 150.

μισθοῖ πάλιν αὐτὸν (Charidemus) τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις, τοῖς ὑμετέροις ἐχθροῖς καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσιν Ἀμφίπολιν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον.

Demosthenes is here speaking of the time when Timotheus superseded Iphikrates in the command, that is, about 365-364 B.C. But we are fairly entitled to presume that the same is true of 369 or 368 B.C.

[540] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 149, c. 37.

[541] Demosthen. cont. Aristokr. p. 669, s. 149, c. 37.

The passage in which the orator alludes to these *hostages* of the Amphipolitans in the hands of Iphikrates, is unfortunately not fully intelligible without farther information.

(Charidemus) Πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς *Ἀμφιπολιτῶν ὁμήρους, οὓς παρ᾽ Ἁρπάλου λαβὼν Ἰφικράτης ἔδωκε φυλάττειν αὐτῷ, ψηφισαμένων ὑμῶν* ὡς ὑμᾶς κομίσαι, παρέδωκεν Ἀμφιπολίταις· καὶ τοῦ μὴ λαβεῖν Ἀμφίπολιν, τοῦτ᾽ ἐμπόδιον κατέστη.

Who Harpalus was,—or what is meant by Iphikrates "obtaining (or capturing) from him the Amphipolitan hostages"—we cannot determine. Possibly Harpalus may have been commander of a body of Macedonians or Thracians acting as auxiliaries to the Amphipolitans, and in this character exacting hostages from them as security. Charidemus, as we see afterwards when acting for Kersobleptes, received hostages from the inhabitants of Sestos (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 679. c. 40 s. 177).

[542] Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libertat. c. 5, p. 193.

[543] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 1.

The words τῷ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει must denote the year beginning in the spring of 369 B.C. On this point I agree with Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 40, p. 145 note); differing from him however (p. 146 note), as well as from Mr. Clinton, in this,—that I place the second expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus (as Sievers places it, p. 278) in 369 B.C.; not in 368 B.C.

The narrative of Xenophon carries to my mind conviction that this is what he meant to affirm. In the beginning of Book VII, he says, τῷ δ᾽ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων πρέσβεις ἦλθον αὐτοκράτορες Ἀθήναζε, βουλευσόμενοι καθ᾽ ὅ,τι ἡ συμμαχία ἔσοιτο Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις.

Now the words τῷ δ᾽ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει denote the spring of 369 B.C.

Xenophon goes on to describe the assembly and the discussion at Athens, respecting the terms of alliance. This description occupies, from vii, 1, 1 to vii, 1, 14, where the final vote and agreement is announced.

Immediately after this vote, Xenophon goes on to say,—Στρατευομένων δ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων (Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and allies) εἰς Κόρινθον, ἔδοξε κοινῇ φυλάττειν τὸ Ὄνειον. Καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐπορεύοντο οἱ Θηβαῖοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι, παραταξάμενοι ἐφύλαττον ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν τοῦ Ὀνείου.

I conceive that the decision of the Athenian assembly,—the march of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians to guard the lines of Oneion,—and the march of the Thebans to enter Peloponnesus,—are here placed by Xenophon as events in immediate sequence, with no long interval of time between them. I see no ground to admit the interval of a year between the vote of the assembly and the march of the Thebans; the more so, as Epaminondas might reasonably presume that the building of Megalopolis and Messene, recently begun, would need to be supported by another Theban army in Peloponnesus during 369 B.C.

It is indeed contended (and admitted even by Sievers) that Epaminondas could not have been reëlected Bœotarch in 369 B.C. But in this point I do not concur. It appears to me that the issue of the trial at Thebes was triumphant for him; thus making it more probable,—not less probable,—that he and Pelopidas were reëlected Bœotarchs immediately.

[544] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 10-14.

[545] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 15, 16; Diodor. xv, 68.

[546] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 16; Polyænus, ii, 2, 9.

This was an hour known to be favorable to sudden assailants, affording a considerable chance that the enemy might be off their guard. It was at the same hour that the Athenian Thrasybulus surprised the troops of the Thirty, near Phylê in Attica (Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 6).

[547] Xen. Hellen. ib.; Pausanias, ix, 15, 2.

Pausanias describes the battle as having been fought περὶ Λέχαιον; not very exact, topographically, since it was on the other side of Corinth, between Corinth and Kenchreæ.

Diodorus (xv, 68) states that the whole space across, from Kenchreæ on one sea to Lechæum on the other, was trenched and palisaded by the Athenians and Spartans. But this cannot be true, because the Long Walls were a sufficient defence between Corinth and Lechæum; and even between Corinth and Kenchreæ, it is not

probable that any such continuous line of defence was drawn, though the assailable points were probably thus guarded. Xenophon does not mention either trench or palisade.

[548] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 14-17; Diodor. xv, 68.

[549] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 18; vii, 2, 11; Diodor. xv, 69.

This march against Sikyon seems alluded to by Pausanias (vi, 3, 1); the Eleian horse were commanded by Stomius, who slew the enemy's commander with his own hand.

The stratagem of the Bœotian Pammenes in attacking the harbor of Sikyon (Polyænus, v, 16, 4) may perhaps belong to this undertaking.

[550] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 18, 22, 44; vii, 3, 2-8.

[551] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 5-9.

This incident may have happened in 369 B.C., just about the time when Epaminondas surprised and broke through the defensive lines of Mount Oneium. In the second chapter of the seventh Book, Xenophon takes up the history of Phlius, and carries it on from the winter of 370-369 B.C., when Epaminondas invaded Laconia, through 369, 368, 367 B.C.

[552] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 17.

[553] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 19; Diodor. xv, 69.

[554] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 22; Diodor. xv, 70.

Diodorus states that these mercenaries had been furnished with pay for five months; if this is correct, I presume that we must understand it as comprehending the time of their voyage from Sicily and back to Sicily. Nevertheless, the language of Xenophon would not lead us to suppose that they remained in Peloponnesus even so long as three months.

I think it certain however that much more must have passed in this campaign than what Xenophon indicates. Epaminondas would hardly have forced the passage of the Oneium for such small objects as we find mentioned in the Hellenica.

An Athenian Inscription, extremely defective, yet partially restored and published by M. Boeckh (Corp. Inscr. No. 85 a. Addenda to vol. i, p. 897), records a vote of the Athenian people and of the synod of Athenian confederates—praising Dionysius of Syracuse,—and recording him with his two sons as benefactors of Athens. It was probably passed somewhere near this time; and we know from Demosthenes that the Athenians granted the freedom of their city to Dionysius and his descendants (Demosthenes ad Philipp. Epistol. p. 161, as well as the Epistle of Philip, on which this is a comment). The Inscription is too defective to warrant any other inferences.

[555] Pausanias, ix, 15, 2.

[556] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 23.

[557] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 25.

Στρατευσάμενοι δὲ καὶ εἰς Ἀσίνην τῆς Λακωνικῆς, ἐνίκησάν τε τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων φρουρὰν, καὶ τὸν Γεράνορα, τὸν πολέμαρχον Σπαρτιάτην γεγενημένον, ἀπέκτειναν, καὶ τὸ προάστειον τῶν Ἀσιναίων ἐπόρθησαν.

Diodorus states that Lykomedes and the Arcadians took Pellênê, which is in a different situation, and can hardly refer to the same expedition (xv, 67).

[558] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 26.

[559] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30, 31.

[560] Polyb. iv, 77.

[561] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 26; vii, 4, 12.

[562] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27. Ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐλθόντες, τῷ μὲν θεῷ οὐδὲν ἐκοινώσαντο, ὅπως ἂν ἡ εἰρήνη γένοιτο, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐβουλεύοντο.

[563] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27; Diodor. xv, 70.

Diodorus states that Philiskus was sent by Artaxerxes; which seems not exact; he was sent by Ariobarzanes in the name of Artaxerxes. Diodorus also says that Philiskus left two thousand mercenaries with pay provided, for the service of the Lacedæmonians; which troops are never afterwards mentioned.

[564] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33.

[565] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27.

[566] See this fact indicated in Isokrates, Archidamus (Or. vi,) s. 2-11.

[567] Pausanias, vi, 2, 5.

Two Messenian victors had been proclaimed during the interval; but they were inhabitants of Messênê in Sicily. And these two were ancient citizens of Zanklê, the name which the Sicilian Messênê bore before Anaxilaus the despot chose to give to it this last-mentioned name.

[568] See the contrary, or Spartan, feeling,—disgust at the idea of persons who had just been their slaves, presenting themselves as spectators and competitors in the plain of Olympia,—set forth in Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus) s. 111, 112.

[569] Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 26.

[570] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 249.

… διδάσκων, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ὑπὲρ Ἀμφιπόλεως ἀντέπραττε (Ptolemy) τῇ πόλει (to Athens), καὶ πρὸς Θηβαίους διαφερομένων Ἀθηναίων, συμμαχίαν ἐποιήσατο, etc.

Neither Plutarch nor Diodorus appear to me precise in specifying and distinguishing the different expeditions of Pelopidas into Thessaly. I cannot but think that he made four different expeditions; two before his embassy to the Persian court (which embassy took place in 367 B.C.; see Mr. Clinton, Fast. Hellen. on that year, who rightly places the date of the embassy), and two after it.

1. The first was, in 369 B.C., after the death of Amyntas, but during the short reign, less than two years, of his son Alexander of Macedon.

Diodorus mentions this fact (xv, 67), but he adds, what is erroneous, that Pelopidas on this occasion brought back Philip as a hostage.

2. The second was in 368 B.C.; also mentioned by Diodorus (xv, 71) and by Plutarch (Pelop. c. 26).

Diodorus (erroneously, as I think) connects this expedition with the seizure and detention of Pelopidas by Alexander of Pheræ. But it was really on this occasion that Pelopidas brought back the hostages.

3. The third (which was rather a mission than an expedition) was in 366 B.C., after the return of Pelopidas from the Persian court, which happened seemingly in the beginning of 366 B.C. In this third march, Pelopidas was seized and made prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ, until he was released by Epaminondas. Plutarch mentions this expedition, clearly distinguishing it from the second (Pelopidas, c. 27—μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν, etc.); but with this mistake, in my judgment, that he places it before the journey of Pelopidas to the Persian court; whereas it really occurred after and in consequence of that journey, which dates in 367 B.C.

4. The fourth and last, in 364-363 B.C.; wherein he was slain (Diodor. xv. 80; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 32).

[571] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28.

[572] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28. The place here called Midea cannot be identified. The only place of that name known, is in the territory of Argos, quite different from what is here mentioned. O. Müller proposes to substitute Malæa for Midea; a conjecture, which there are no means of verifying.

[573] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28-32; Diodor. xv, 72; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 33.

[574] I think that this third expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus belongs to 367 B.C.; being simultaneous with the embassy of Pelopidas to the Persian court. Many chronologers place it in 366 B.C., after the conclusion of that embassy; because the mention of it occurs in Xenophon after he has brought the embassy to a close. But I do not conceive that this proves the fact of subsequent date. For we must recollect that the embassy lasted several months; moreover the expedition was made while Epaminondas was Bœotarch; and he ceased to be so during the year 366 B.C. Besides, if we place the expedition in 366 B.C., there will hardly be

time left for the whole career of Euphron at Sikyon, which intervened before the peace of 366 B.C. between Thebes and Corinth (see Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 44 *seq.*).

The relation of cotemporaneousness between the embassy of Pelopidas to Persia, and the expedition of Epaminondas, seems indicated when we compare vii, 1, 33 with vii, 1, 48—Συνεχῶς δὲ βουλευόμενοι οἱ Θηβαῖοι, ὅπως ἂν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν λάβοιεν τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἐνόμισαν εἰ πέμψειαν πρὸς τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα, etc. Then Xenophon proceeds to recount the whole embassy, together with its unfavorable reception on returning, which takes up the entire space until vii, 2, 41, when he says—Αὖθις δ' Ἐπαμεινώνδας, βουληθεὶς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς προσυπαγαγέσθαι, ὅπως μᾶλλον σφίσι καὶ οἱ Ἀρκάδες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι προσέχοιεν τὸν νοῦν, ἔγνωκε στρατευτέον εἶναι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀχαΐαν.

This fresh expedition of Epaminondas is one of the modes adopted by the Thebans of manifesting their general purpose expressed in the former words,—συνεχῶς βουλευόμενοι, etc.

[575] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 42-44.

The neutrality before observed, is implied in the phrase whereby Xenophon describes their conduct afterwards; ἐπεὶ δὲ κατελθόντες *οὐκέτι ἐμέσευον*, etc.

[576] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 42.

His expression marks how completely these terms were granted by the personal determination of Epaminondas, overruling opposition,—*ἐνδυναστεύει* ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας, ὥστε μὴ φυγαδεῦσαι τοὺς κρατίστους, μηδὲ τὰς πολιτείας μεταστῆσαι, etc.

[577] Diodor. xv, 75.

[578] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 43; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 25.

Diodorus (xv, 72) refers the displeasure of the Thebans against Epaminondas to the events of the preceding year. They believed (according to Diodorus) that Epaminondas had improperly spared the Spartans, and not pushed his victory so far as might have been done, when he forced the lines of Mount Oneium in 369 B.C. But it is scarcely credible that the Thebans should have been displeased on this account; for the forcing of the lines was a capital exploit, and we may see from Xenophon that Epaminondas achieved much more than the Spartans and their friends believed to be possible.

Xenophon tells us that the Thebans were displeased with Epaminondas, on complaint from the Arcadians and others, for his conduct in Achaia two years after the action at Oneium; that is, in 367 B.C. This is much more probable in itself, and much more consistent with the general series of facts, than the cause assigned by Diodorus.

[579] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 23.

For a similar case, in which exiles from many different cities, congregating in a body, became strong enough to carry their restoration in each city successively, see Thucyd. i, 113.

[580] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 44-46; Diodor. xv, 70.

[581] Xen. Hellen, vii, 3, 8.

[582] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 6-9.

[583] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 10.

[584] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 11-15.

[585] This change of politics at Pellênê is not mentioned by Xenophon, at the time, though it is noticed afterwards (vii, 4, 17) as a fact accomplished; but we must suppose it to have occurred now, in order to reconcile sections 11-14 with sections 18-20 of vii, 2.

The strong Laconian partialities of Xenophon induce him to allot not only warm admiration, but a space disproportionate compared with other parts of his history, to the exploits of the brave little Phliasian community. Unfortunately, here, as elsewhere, he is obscure in the description of particular events, and still more perplexing when we try to draw from him a clear idea of the general series.

With all the defects and partiality of Xenophon's narrative, however, we must recollect that it is a description of real events by a contemporary author who had reasonable means of information. This is a precious ingredient, which gives value to all that he says; inasmuch as we are so constantly obliged to borrow our knowledge of Grecian history either from authors who write at second-hand and after the time,—or from orators whose purposes are usually different from those of the historian. Hence I have given a short abridgment of these Phliasian events as described by Xenophon, though they were too slight to exercise influence on the main course of the war.

[586] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 18-23.

[587] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 9.

[588] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 4-6.

[589] This refers to the secret expedition of Pelopidas and the six other Theban conspirators from Athens to Thebes, at the time when the Lacedæmonians were masters of that town and garrisoned the Kadmeia. The conspirators, through the contrivance of the secretary Phyllidas, got access in disguise to the oligarchical leaders of Thebes, who were governing under Lacedæmonian ascendency, and put them to death. This event is described in a former chapter, Ch. lxxvii, p. 85 *seq.*

[590] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 7-11.

To the killing of Euphron, followed by a defence so characteristic and emphatic on the part of the agent,—Schneider and others refer, with great probability, the allusion in the Rhetoric of Aristotle (ii, 24, 2)—καὶ περὶ τοῦ Θήβησιν ἀποθανόντος, περὶ οὗ ἐκέλευε κρῖναι, εἰ δίκαιος ἦν ἀποθανεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἄδικον ὂν ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν δικαίως ἀποθανόντα.

[591] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 12.

[592] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1.

[593] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

[594] It is plain that Messênê was the great purpose with Pelopidas in his mission to the Persian court; we see this not only from Cornelius Nepos (Pelop. c. 4) and Diodorus (xv, 81), but also even from Xenophon, Hellen. vii, 1, 36.

[595] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33-38; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30; Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

The words of Xenophon ἠκολούθει δὲ καὶ Ἀργεῖος must allude to some Argeian envoy; though the name is not mentioned, and must probably have dropped out,—or perhaps the word τις, as Xenophon may not have heard the name.

It would appear that in the mission which Pharnabazus conducted up to the Persian court (or at least undertook to conduct) in 408 B.C., envoys from hostile Greek cities were included in the same company (Xen. Hellen. i, 3, 13), as on the present occasion.

[596] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

His colleague Ismenias, however, is said to have dropped his ring, and then to have stooped to pick it up, immediately before the king; thus going through the prostration.

[597] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30.

[598] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 36. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ βασιλέως ὁ Πελοπίδας τί βούλοιτο ἑαυτῷ γραφῆναι, εἶπεν ὅτι Μεσσήνην τε αὐτόνομον εἶναι ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ Ἀθηναίους ἀνέλκειν τὰς ναῦς: εἰ δὲ ταῦτα μὴ πείθοιντο, στρατεύειν ἐπ' αὐτούς· *εἴ τις δὲ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι ἀκολουθεῖν*, ἐπὶ ταύτην πρῶτον ἰέναι.

It is clear that these are not the exact words of the rescript of 367 B.C., though in the former case of the peace of Antalkidas (387 B.C.) Xenophon seems to have given the rescript in its exact words (v, 1, 31).

What he states afterwards (vii, 1, 38) about Elis and Arcadia proves that other matters were included. Accordingly I do not hesitate to believe that Amphipolis also was recognized as autonomous. This we read in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 383, c. 42. Καὶ γάρ τοι πρῶτον μὲν Ἀμφίπολιν πόλιν ἡμετέραν δούλην κατέστησεν (the king of Persia), *ἣν τότε σύμμαχον αὐτῷ καὶ φίλην* ἔγραψεν. Demosthenes is here alluding to the effect

produced on the mind of the Great King, and to the alteration in his proceedings, when he learnt that Timagoras had been put to death on returning to Athens; the adverb of time τότε alludes to the rescript given when Timagoras was present.

In the words of Xenophon,—εἴ τις δὲ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι *ἀκολουθεῖν*,—the headship of Thebes is declared or implied. Compare the convention imposed by Sparta upon Olynthus, after the latter was subdued (v, 3, 26.)

[599] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38. Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πρέσβεων ὁ μὲν Ἠλεῖος Ἀρχίδαμος, ὅτι *προὐτίμησε τὴν Ἦλιν πρὸ τῶν Ἀρκάδων*, ἐπήνει τὰ τοῦ βασιλέως· ὁ δ' Ἀντίοχος, ὅτι *ἡλαττοῦτο τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν*, οὔτε τὰ δῶρα ἐδέξατο, etc.

[600] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. c. 42, p. 383.

In another passage of the same oration (c. 57, p. 400), Demosthenes says that Leon had been joint envoy with Timagoras *for four years*. Certainly this mission of Pelopidas to the Persian court cannot have lasted four years; and Xenophon states that the Athenians sent the two envoys when they heard that Pelopidas was going thither. I imagine that Leon and Timagoras may have been sent up to the Persian court shortly after the battle of Leuktra, at the time when the Athenians caused the former rescript of the Persian king to be resworn, putting Athens as head into the place of Sparta (Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 1, 2). This was exactly four years before (371-367 B.C.). Leon and Timagoras having jointly undertaken and perhaps recently returned from their first embassy, were now sent *jointly* on a second. Demosthenes has summed up the time of the two as if it were one.

[601] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30.

Demosthenes speaks of the amount received, in money, by Timagoras from the Persian king as having been forty talents, ὡς λέγεται (Fals. Leg. p. 383), besides other presents and conveniences. Compare also Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 22.

[602] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38.

[603] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 30.

[604] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 40. Καὶ αὐτὴ μὲν ἡ Πελοπίδου καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων τῆς ἀρχῆς περιβολὴ οὕτω διελύθη.

[605] The strong expressions of Demosthenes show what a remarkable effect was produced by the news at Athens (cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 142).

Τί δ'; Ἀλέξανδρον ἐκεῖνον τὸν Θετταλὸν, ἡνίκ' εἶχε μὲν αἰχμάλωτον δήσας Πελοπίδαν, ἐχθρὸς δ' ὡς οὐδεὶς ἦν Θηβαίοις, ὑμῖν δ' οἰκείως διέκειτο, οὕτως ὥστε παρ' ὑμῶν στρατηγὸν αἰτεῖν, ἐβοηθεῖτε δ' αὐτῷ καὶ πάντ' ἦν Ἀλέξανδρος, etc.

Alexander is said to have promised to the Athenians so ample a supply of cattle as should keep the price of meat very low at Athens (Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 193 E.)

[606] Diodor. xv, 71; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 28; Pausanias ix, 15, 1.

[607] Plutarch (Pelopidas, c. 29) says, a truce for thirty days; but it is difficult to believe that Alexander would have been satisfied with a term so very short.

[608] The account of the seizure of Pelopidas by Alexander, with its consequences, is contained chiefly in Diodorus, xv, 71-75; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 27-29; Cornel. Nep. Pelop. c. 5; Pausanias, ix, 15, 1. Xenophon does not mention it.

I have placed the seizure in the year 366 B.C., after the return of Pelopidas from his embassy in Persia; which embassy I agree with Mr. Fynes Clinton in referring to the year 367 B.C. Plutarch places the seizure before the embassy; Diodorus places it in the year between Midsummer 368 and Midsummer 367 B.C.; but he does not mention the embassy at all, in its regular chronological order; he only alludes to it in summing up the exploits at the close of the career of Pelopidas.

Assuming the embassy to the Persian court to have occurred in 367 B.C., the seizure cannot well have happened before that time.

The year 368 B.C. seems to have been that wherein Pelopidas made his second expedition into Thessaly, from which he returned victorious, bringing back the hostages. See above, p. 264, note.

The seizure of Pelopidas was accomplished at a time when Epaminondas was not Bœotarch, nor in command of the Theban army. Now it seems to have been not until the close of 367 B.C., after the accusations arising out of his proceedings in Achaia, that Epaminondas missed being rechosen as general.

Xenophon, in describing the embassy of Pelopidas to Persia, mentions his grounds for expecting a favorable reception, and the matters which he had to boast of (Hell. vii, 1, 35). Now if Pelopidas, immediately before, had been seized and detained for some months in prison by Alexander of Pheræ, surely Xenophon would have alluded to it as an item on the other side. I know that this inference from the silence of Xenophon is not always to be trusted. But in this case, we must recollect that he dislikes both the Theban leaders; and we may fairly conclude, that where he is enumerating the trophies of Pelopidas, he would hardly have failed to mention a signal disgrace, if there had been one, immediately preceding.

Pelopidas was taken prisoner by Alexander, not in battle, but when in pacific mission, and under circumstances in which no man less infamous than Alexander would have seized him (παρασπονδηθεὶς—Plutarch, Apoph. p. 194 D.; Pausan. ix, 15, 1; "legationis jure satis tectum se arbitraretur" Corn. Nep.). His imprudence in trusting himself under any circumstances to such a man as Alexander, is blamed by Polybius (viii, 1) and others. But we must suppose such imprudence to be partly justified or explained by some plausible circumstances; and the proclamation of the Persian rescript appears to me to present the most reasonable explanation of his proceeding.

On these grounds, which, in my judgment, outweigh any probabilities on the contrary side, I have placed the seizure of Pelopidas in 366 B.C., after the embassy to Persia; not without feeling, however, that the chronology of this period cannot be rendered absolutely certain.

[609] Plutarch. Pelopid c. 31-35.

[610] See the instructive Inscription and comments published by Professor Ross, in which the Deme Γραῆς, near Oropus, was first distinctly made known (Ross, Die Demen von Attika, p. 6, 7—Halle, 1846).

[611] Isokrates, Orat. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 22-40.

[612] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1; Diodor. xv, 76.

The previous capture of Oropus, when Athens lost it in 411 B.C., was accomplished under circumstances very analogous (Thucyd. viii, 60).

[613] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1; Diodor. xv, 76.

Compare Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 259, s. 123; Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 397, s. 85.

It would seem that we are to refer to this loss of Oropus the trial of Chabrias and Kallistratus in Athens, together with the memorable harangue of the latter which Demosthenes heard as a youth with such strong admiration. But our information is so vague and scanty, that we can make out nothing certainly on the point. Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, p. 109-114) brings together all the scattered testimonies in an instructive chapter.

[614] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 39; vii, 4, 2.

[615] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 3.

Xenophon notices the singularity of the accident. There were plenty of vessels in Peiræus; Lykomedes had only to make his choice, and to determine where he would disembark. He fixed upon the exact spot where the exiles were assembled, not knowing that they were there—δαιμονιώτατα ἀποθνήσκει.

[616] Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 6: Plutarch, Repub. Ger. Præc. p. 810 F.; Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 193 D.

Compare a similar reference, on the part of others, to the crimes embodied in Theban legend (Justin, ix, 3).

Perhaps it may have been during this embassy into Peloponnesus, that Kallistratus addressed the discourse to the public assembly at Mêssenê, to which Aristotle makes allusion (Rhetoric, iii, 17, 3); possibly enough, against Epaminondas also.

[617] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 4-6.

The public debates of the Athenian assembly were not favorable to the success of a scheme, like that proposed by Demotion, to which secrecy was indispensable. Compare another scheme, divulged in like manner, in Thucydides, iii, 3.

[618] It seems probable that these were the mercenaries placed by the Corinthians under the command of Timophanes, and employed by him afterwards as instruments for establishing a despotism.

Plutarch (Timoleon, c. 3, 4) alludes briefly to mercenaries equipped about this time (as far as we can verify his chronology) and to the Corinthian mercenaries now assembled, in connection with Timoleon and Timophanes, of whom I shall have to say much in a future chapter.

[619] Compare Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 8, 9 with Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus), s. 106.

[620] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 9.

[621] This sentiment of dissatisfaction against the allies is strongly and repeatedly set forth in the oration of Isokrates called Archidamus, composed as if to be spoken in this synod,—and good evidence (whether actually spoken or not) of the feelings animating the prince and a large party at Sparta. Archidamus treats those allies who recommended the Spartans to surrender Messênê, as worse enemies even than those who had broken off altogether. He specifies Corinthians, Phliasians, and Epidaurians, sect. 11-13,—εἰς τοῦτο δ' ἥκουσι πλεονεξίας, καὶ τοσαύτην ἡμῶν κατεγνώκασιν ἀνανδρίαν, ὥστε πολλάκις ἡμᾶς ἀξιώσαντες ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτῶν πολεμεῖν, ὑπὲρ Μεσσήνης οὐκ οἴονται δεῖν κινδυνεύειν· ἀλλ' ἵν' αὐτοὶ τὴν σφετέραν αὐτῶν ἀσφαλῶς καρπῶνται, πειρῶνται διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς ὡς χρὴ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς τῆς ἡμετέρας παραχωρῆσαι, καὶ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπαπειλοῦσιν, ὡς, εἰ μὴ ταῦτα συγχωρήσομεν, ποιησόμενοι τὴν εἰρήνην κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτούς. Compare sect. 67, 87, 99, 105, 106, 123.

We may infer from this discourse of Isokrates, that the displeasure of the Spartans against their allies, because the latter advised them to relinquish Messênê,—was much greater than the narrative of Xenophon (Hellen. vii, 4, 8-11) would lead us to believe.

In the argument prefixed to the discourse, it is asserted (among various other inaccuracies), that the Spartans had sent to Thebes to ask for peace, and that the Thebans had said in reply,—peace would be granted, εἰ Μεσσήνην ἀνοικίσωσι καὶ αὐτόνομον ἐάσωσι. Now the Spartans had never sent to Thebes for this purpose; the Corinthians went to Thebes, and there learnt the peremptory condition requiring that Messênê should be recognized. Next, the Thebans would never require Sparta to recolonize or reconstitute (ἀνοικίσαι) Messênê; that had been already done by the Thebans themselves.

[622] Diodorus (xv, 76) states that the Persian king sent envoys to Greece who caused this peace to be concluded. But there seems no ground for believing that any Persian envoys had visited Greece since the return of Pelopidas, whose return with the rescript did in fact constitute a Persian intervention. The peace now concluded was upon the general basis of that rescript; so far, but no farther (as I conceive), the assertion of Diodorus about Persian intervention is exact.

[623] Diodorus (xv, 76) is farther inaccurate in stating the peace as universally accepted, and as being a conclusion of the Bœotian and Lacedæmonian war, which had begun with the battle of Leuktra.

[624] Xenophon, Enc. Agesil. ii, 30. ἐνόμιζε—τῷ Πέρσῃ δίκην ἐπιθήσειν καὶ τῶν πρόσθεν, καὶ ὅτι νῦν, σύμμαχος εἶναι φάσκων, ἐπέταττε Μεσσήνην ἀφιέναι.

[625] This second mission of the Athenians to the Persian court (pursuant to the invitation contained in the rescript given to Pelopidas, Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 37), appears to me implied in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 384, s. 150, p. 420, s. 283; Or. De Halonneso, p. 84, s. 30.

If the king of Persia was informed that Timagoras had been put to death by his countrymen on returning to Athens,—and if he sent down (κατέπεμψεν) a fresh rescript about Amphipolis,—this information can only have been communicated, and the new rescript only obtained, by a second embassy sent to him from Athens.

Perhaps the Lacedæmonian Kallias may have accompanied this second Athenian mission to Susa; we hear of him as having come back with a friendly letter from the Persian king to Agesilaus (Xenophon, Enc. Ages. viii, 3; Plutarch, Apophth. Lacon. p. 1213 E.), brought by a Persian messenger. But the statement is too vague to enable us to verify this as the actual occasion.

[626] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27.

[627] Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libert. p. 193, s. 10, cont. Aristokrat. p. 666, s. 165; p. 687, s. 242.

[628] Demosth. *ut sup.*; Isokrates, Or. xv, (De Permut.) s. 118; Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c. 1.

The stratagems whereby Timotheus procured money for his troops at Samos, are touched upon in the Pseudo-Aristoteles, Œconomic. ii, 23; and in Polyæn. iii, 10, 9; so far as we can understand them, they appear to be only contributions, levied under a thin disguise, upon the inhabitants.

Since Ariobarzanes gave money to Agesilaus, he may perhaps have given some to Timotheus during this siege.

[629] Xenoph. Enc. Ages. ii, 26; Polyænus, vii, 26.

I do not know whether it is to this period that we are to refer the siege of Atarneus by Autophradates, which he was induced to relinquish by an ingenious proposition of Eubulus, who held the place (Aristot. Politic. ii, 4, 10).

[630] It is with the greatest difficulty that we make out anything like a thread of events at this period; so miserably scanty and indistinct are our authorities.

Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, chap, v. p. 118-130) is an instructive auxiliary in putting together the scraps of information; compare also Weissenborn, Hellen. p. 192-194 (Jena, 1844).

[631] Xen. Enc. Ages. ii, 26, 27.

[632] Isokrates, Or. xv, (De Permut.) s. 115-119; Cornelius Nepos, Timotheus, c. 1.

Isokrates particularly dwells upon the fact that the conquests of Timotheus secured to Athens a large circumjacent territory—ὧν ληφθεισῶν ἅπας ὁ τόπος περιέχων οἰκεῖος ἠναγκάσθη τῇ πόλει γενέσθαι, etc. (s. 114).

From the value of the Hellespont to Athens as ensuring a regular supply of corn imported from the Euxine, Sestus was sometimes called "the flour-board of the Peiræus"—ἡ τηλία τοῦ Πειραιῶς (Aristot. Rhetor. iii, 10, 3).

[633] See Andokides de Pace, s. 15.

[634] That the Athenian occupation of Samos (doubtless only in part) by kleruchs, *began* in 366 or 365 B.C.,—is established by Diodorus, xviii, 8-18, when he mentions the restoration of the Samians forty-three years afterwards by the Macedonian Perdikkas. This is not inconsistent with the fact that additional detachments of kleruchs were sent out in 361 and in 352 B.C., as mentioned by the Scholiast on Æschines cont. Timarch. p. 31 c. 12; and by Philochorus, Fr. 131, ed. Didot. See the note of Wesseling, who questions the accuracy of the date in Diodorus. I dissent from his criticism, though he is supported both by Boeckh (Public Econ. of Athens, b. iii, p. 428) and by Mr. Clinton (F. H. ad ann. 352). I think it highly improbable that so long an interval should have elapsed between the capture of the island and the sending of the kleruchs, or that this latter measure, offensive as it was in the eyes of Greece, should have been *first* resorted to by Athens in 352 B.C., when she had been so much weakened both by the Social War, and by the Progress of Philip. Strabo mentions two thousand kleruchs as having been sent to Samos. But whether he means the first batch alone, or altogether, we cannot say (Strabo xiv, p. 638). The father of the philosopher Epikurus was among these kleruchs; compare Diogen. Laert. x, 1.

Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ et Timothei, p. 127) seems to me to take a just view of the very difficult chronology of this period.

Demosthenes mentions the property of the kleruchs, in his general review of the ways and means of Athens; in a speech delivered in Olym. 106, before 352 B.C. (De Symmoriis, p. 182, s. 19).

[635] See Demosthenes, De Halonneso, p. 86, s. 40-42; Æschines, De Fals. Legat. 264, s. 74.

[636] Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii, 8, 4.

[637] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 201; p. 679, s. 209.

[638] Xenophon, Enc. Agesil. ii, 26.

[639] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 141.

[640] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 174. Ἐπειδὴ τὸν μὲν Ἰφικράτην ἀποστράτηγον ἐποιήσατε, Τιμόθεον δ' ἐπ' Ἀμφίπολιν καὶ Χερρόνησον ἐξεπέμψατε στρατηγὸν, etc.

[641] See Demosthen. cont. Timoth. p. 1187, 1188, s. 10-15.

Timotheus swore and pledged himself publicly in the Athenian assembly, on one occasion, to prefer against Iphikrates a γραφὴν ξενίας; but he never realized this engagement, and he even afterwards became so far reconciled with Iphikrates, as to give his daughter in marriage to the son of the latter (ibid. p. 1204, s. 78).

To what precise date, or circumstance, this sworn engagement is to be referred, we cannot determine. Possibly the γραφὴ ξενίας may refer to the connection of Iphikrates with Kotys, which might entail in some manner the forfeiture of his right of citizenship; for it is difficult to understand how γραφὴ ξενίας, in its usual sense (implying the negation of any original right of citizenship), could ever be preferred as a charge against Iphikrates; who not only performed all the active duties of a citizen, but served in the highest post, and received from the people distinguished honors.

[642] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 153. ἐτόλμησεν ὑπὲρ τῶν Κότυος πραγμάτων ἐναντία τοῖς ὑμετέροις στρατηγοῖς ναυμαχεῖν.

[643] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669. s. 174-177. Respecting these hostages, I can do nothing more than repeat the brief and obscure notice of Demosthenes. Of the various conjectures proposed to illustrate it, none appear to me at all satisfactory. Who Harpalus was, I cannot presume to say.

[644] Demosthen. cont. Aristocrat. p. 669. s. 175.

The orator refers to letters written by Iphikrates and Timotheus to the Athenian people, in support of these allegations. Unfortunately these letters are not cited in substance.

[645] Diodorus, xv, 77; Æschines de Fals. Leg. p. 250. c. 14.

[646] Demosthenes (Olynth. 1, p. 21. s. 14) mentions the assistance of the Macedonians to Timotheus against Olynthus. Compare also his oration ad Philippi Epistolam (p. 154. s. 9). This can hardly allude to anything else than the war carried on by Timotheus on those coasts in 364 B.C. See also Polyæn. iii, 10, 14.

[647] Diodor. xv, 81; Cornelius Nepos, Timoth. 1; Isokrates, Or. xv, (De Permut.) s. 115-119; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. s. 14. cont. Philokl. s. 19.

I give in the text what I apprehend to be the real truth contained in the large assertion of Isokrates,—Χαλκιδεῖς ἅπαντας κατεπολέμησεν (s. 119). The orator states that Timotheus acquired twenty-four cities in all; but this total probably comprises his conquests in other times as well as in other places. The expression of Nepos—"Olynthios bello subegit" is vague.

[648] Isokrates, *l. c.*; Aristotel. Œconomic. ii, 22: Polyæn. iii, 10, 14.

[649] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669. s. 177.

[650] Polyænus (iii, 10, 8) mentions this fact, which is explained by comparing (in Thucydides, vii, 9) the description of the attack made by the Athenian Euetion upon Amphipolis in 414 B.C.

These ill-successes of Timotheus stand enumerated, as I conceive, in that catalogue of *nine* defeats, which the Scholiast on Æschines (De Fals. Leg. p. 755, Reiske) specifies as having been undergone by Athens at the territory called *Nine Ways* (Ἐννέα Ὁδοὶ), the previous name of the spot where Amphipolis was built. They form the eighth and ninth items of the catalogue.

The third item, is the capture of Amphipolis by Brasidas. The fourth is, the defeat of Kleon by Brasidas. Then come,—

5. οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες ἐπ' Ἠϊόνα Ἀθηναῖοι ἐξελάθησαν. The only way in which I can make historical fact out of these words, is, by supposing that they allude to the driving in of all the out-resident Athenians to Athens, after the defeat of Ægospotami. We know from Thucydides that when Amphipolis was taken by Brasidas, many of the Athenians who were there settled retired to Eion; where they probably remained until the close of the Peloponnesian war, and were then forced back to Athens. We should then have to construe οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες ἐπ' Ἠϊόνα Ἀθηναῖοι—"the Athenians residing at Eion;" which, though not a usual sense of the preposition ἐπὶ with an accusative case, seems the only definite meaning which can be made out here.

6. οἱ μετὰ Σιμμίχου στρατηγοῦντος διεφθάρησαν.

7. ὅτε Πρωτόμαχος ἀπέτυχεν (Ἀμφιπολιτῶν αὐτοὺς παραδόντων τοῖς ὁμόροις Θρᾳξί, these last words are inserted by Bekker from a MS.). These two last-mentioned occurrences are altogether unknown. We may perhaps

suppose them to refer to the period when Iphikrates was commanding the forces of Athens in these regions, from 368-365 B.C.

8. ἐκπεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Τιμοθέου Ἀλκίμαχος ἀπέτυχεν αὐτοῦ, παραδόντων αὐτοὺς Θρᾳξὶν ἐπὶ Τιμοκράτους Ἀθήνῃσιν ἄρχοντος.

The word Τιμοθέου is here inserted by Bekker from a MS., in place of Τιμοσθένους, which appeared in Reiske's edition.

9. Τιμόθεος ἐπιστρατεύσας ἡττήθη ἐπὶ Καλαμιώνος.

Here are two defeats of Timotheus specified, one in the archonship of Timokrates, which exactly coincides with the command of Timotheus in these regions (Midsummer 364 to Midsummer 363 B.C.). But the other archon Kalamion, is unknown in the Fasti of Athens. Winiewski (Comment. in Demosth. de Corona, p. 39), Böhnecke, and other commentators follow Corsini in representing Kalamion to be a corruption of *Kallimedes*, who was archon from Midsummer 360-359 B.C.; and Mr. Clinton even inserts the fact in his tables for that year. But I agree with Rehdantz (Vit. Iph. Chab. et Tim. p. 153) that such an occurrence after Midsummer 360 B.C., can hardly be reconciled with the proceedings in the Chersonese before and after that period, as reported by Demosthenes in the Oration against Aristokrates. Without being able to explain the mistake about the name of the archon, and without determining whether the real mistake may not consist in having placed ἐπὶ in place of ὑπὸ, —I cannot but think that Timotheus underwent two repulses, one by his lieutenant, and another by himself, near Amphipolis,—both of them occurring in 364 or the early part of 363 B.C. During great part of 363 B.C., the attention of Timotheus seems to have been turned to the Chersonese, Byzantium, Kotys, etc.

My view of the chronology of this period agrees generally with that of Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 42, p. 244-257).

[651] Plutarch Pelopid. c. 31; Diodor. xv, 80.

[652] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 36.

[653] Thucyd ii, 87; vii, 21.

[654] Diodor. xv, 78.

[655] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 276, c. 32, s. 111. Ἐπαμινώνδας, οὐχ ὑποπτήξας τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀξίωμα, εἶπε διαῤῥήδην ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν Θηβαίων, ὡς δεῖ τὰ τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἀκροπόλεως προπύλαια μετενεγκεῖν εἰς τὴν προστασίαν τῆς Καδμείας.

[656] Diodor. xv, 78, 79.

[657] See Vol. VI. Ch. liv. p. 475.

[658] Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 5; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 25; Plutarch, De Sui Laude, p. 542 A.

Neither of these the authors appear to me to conceive rightly either the attack, or the reply, in which the name of Agamemnon is here brought forward. As I have given it in the text, there is a real foundation for the attack, and a real point in the reply; as it appears in Cornelius Nepos, there is neither one nor the other.

That the Spartans regarded themselves as having inherited the leadership of Greece from Agamemnon, may be seen by Herodotus, vii, 159.

[659] Thucyd. vi, 17, 18.

[660] Plutarch (Philopœmen, c. 14) mentions that some authors represented Epaminondas as having consented unwillingly to this maritime expedition. He explains such reluctance by reference to the disparaging opinion expressed by Plato about maritime service. But this opinion of Plato is founded upon reasons foreign to the character of Epaminondas; and it seems to me evident that the authors whom Plutarch here followed, introduced the opinion only as an hypothesis to explain why so great a general on land as Epaminondas had accomplished so little at sea, when he took command of a fleet; putting himself in a function for which he had little capacity, like Philopœmen (Plutarch, Reipublic. Gerend. Præcep. p. 812 E.).

Bauch (in his tract, Epaminondas und Thebens Kampf um die Hegemonie, Breslau, 1834, p. 70, 71) maintains that Epaminondas was constrained against his own better judgment to undertake this maritime enterprise.

I cannot coincide in his opinion. The oracle which Bauch cites from Pausanias (viii, 11, 6) proves as little as the above extract from Plutarch.

[661] Isokrates. Or. v, (Philip.) s. 53; Diodor. xv, 78. ἰδίας τὰς πόλεις τοῖς Θηβαίοις ἐποίησεν. I do not feel assured that these general words apply to Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, which had before been mentioned.

[662] Justin, xvi, 4.

[663] Diodor. xv, 81; Cornel. Nepos, Timotheus, c. 1.

[664] Diodor. xv, 79.

[665] For the description of this memorable scene, see Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 31, 32; Diodor. xv, 80, 81; Cornel. Nepos. Pelopid. c. 5.

[666] Diodor. xv, 81. Plutarch (Pelop. c. 34) states substantially the same.

[667] Plutarch, Compar. Pelopid. and Marcell. c. 1.

[668] Diodor. (xv, 78) places in one and the same year both,—1. The maritime project of Epaminondas, including his recommendation of it, the equipment of the fleet, and the actual expedition. 2. The expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly, with its immediate consequences.—He mentions the former of the two first, but he places both in the first year of Olympiad 104, the year in which Timokrates was archon at Athens; that is, from Midsummer 364 to Midsummer 363 B.C. He passes immediately from the maritime expedition into an allusion to the battle of Mantinea, which (he says) proved fatal to Epaminondas and hindered him from following up his ideas of maritime activity.

The battle of Mantinea took place in June or July 362 B.C. The maritime expedition, immediately preceding that battle, would therefore naturally take place in the summer of 363 B.C.; the year 364 B.C. having been occupied in the requisite naval equipments.

I incline to think that the march of Pelopidas into Thessaly also took place during 363 B.C., and that his death thus occurred while Epaminondas was absent on shipboard. A probable reason is thus supplied why the second Theban army which went to avenge Pelopidas, was commanded, not by his friend and colleague Epaminondas, but by other generals. Had Epaminondas been then at home, this would hardly have been.

The eclipse of the sun, which both Plutarch and Diodorus mention to have immediately preceded the outmarch of Pelopidas, does not seem to have been as yet certainly identified. Dodwell, on the authority of an astronomical friend, places it on the 13th of June, 364 B.C., at five o'clock in the morning. On the other hand, Calvisius places it on the 13th of July in the same Julian year, at a quarter before eleven o'clock in the day (see L'Art de Vérifier les Dates, tom. i, p. 257). We may remark, that the day named by Dodwell (as he himself admits) would not fall within the Olympic year 364-363 B.C., but during the months preceding the commencement of that year. Moreover Dodwell speaks as if there were no other months in the year, except June, July, and August, fit for military expeditions; an hypothesis not reasonable to admit.

Sievers and Dr. Thirlwall both accept the eclipse mentioned by Dodwell, as marking the time when the expedition of Pelopidas commenced—June 364 B.C. But against this, Mr. Clinton takes no notice of it in his tables; which seems to show that he was not satisfied as to the exactness of Dodwell's statement or the chronological identity. If it should turn out, on farther astronomical calculations, that there occurred no eclipse of the sun in the year 363 B.C., visible at Thebes,—I should then fix upon the eclipse mentioned by Calvisius (13 July 364 B.C.) as identifying the time of the expedition of Pelopidas; which would, on that supposition, precede by eight or nine months the commencement of the transmarine cruise of Epaminondas. The eclipse mentioned by Calvisius is preferable to that mentioned by Dodwell, because it falls within the Olympic year indicated by Diodorus.

But it appears to me that farther astronomical information is here required.

[669] Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 35.

[670] Diodor. xv, 79.

[671] See the sentiment expressed by Demosthenes cont. Leptinem, p. 489, s. 121,—an oration delivered in 355 B.C.; eight years after the destruction of Orchomenus.

[672] Demosth. De Pace, p. 62, s. 21; Philippic. II, p. 69, s. 13; s. 15; Fals. Leg. p. 375, s. 122; p. 387, s. 162; p. 445, s. 373.

[673] Diodor. xv, 57.

[674] Pausan. ix, 15, 2.

Diodorus places in the same year all the three facts:—1. The maritime expedition of Epaminondas. 2. The expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly, his death, and the following Theban victories over Alexander of Pheræ. 3. The conspiracy of the Orchomenian Knights, and the destruction of Orchomenus.

The year in which he places them is, the archonship of Timokrates,—from Midsummer 364 to Midsummer 363 B.C.

That the destruction of Orchomenus occurred during the absence of Epaminondas, and that he was greatly distressed at it on his return,—is distinctly stated by Pausanias; who however is (in my judgment) so far mistaken, that he refers the absence of Epaminondas to that previous occasion when he had gone into Thessaly to rescue Pelopidas from the dungeon of Alexander, 366 B.C.

This date is not so probable as the date assigned by Diodorus; nor do the chronological conceptions of Pausanias seem to me exact.

[675] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 19.

[676] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 43.

[677] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 17.

[678] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 30, 31.

[679] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.

[680] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 26.

[681] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38.

[682] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 12.

[683] It had been taken from Elis by Agis, at the peace of 399 B.C. after his victorious war (Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31).

[684] Pausanias, vi, 22, 3.

[685] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 13-18; Diodor. xv, 77.

[686] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 26.

[687] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27.

The Thebans who are here mentioned must have been soldiers in garrison at Tegea, Megalopolis, or Messênê. No fresh Theban troops had come into Peloponnesus.

[688] Thucyd. v, 68; Xen. Rep. Laced, xii, 3; xiii, 6.

[689] The seizure of Kromnus by the Lacedæmonians, and the wound received by Archidamus, are alluded to by Justin, vi, 6.

[690] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 20-25. Ὡς δὲ, πλησίον ὄντων, ἀναβοήσας τις τῶν πρεσβυτέρων εἶπε—Τί δεῖ ἡμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες, μάχεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ σπεισαμένους διαλυθῆναι; ἄσμενοι δὴ ἀμφότεροι ἀκούσαντες, ἐσπείσαντο.

[691] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27. The conjecture of Palmerius,—τοῦ κατὰ τοὺς Ἀργείους,—seems here just and necessary.

[692] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27.

[693] Thucyd. iv, 40.

[694] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31.

[695] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 29. Compare Pausanias, vi, 22, 2.

[696] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 29. Καὶ τὴν μὲν ἱπποδρομίαν ἤδη ἐπεποιήκεσαν, καὶ τὰ δρομικὰ τοῦ πεντάθλου· οἱ δ' εἰς πάλην ἀφικόμενοι *οὐκέτι ἐν τῷ δρόμῳ*, ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ τοῦ δρόμου καὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ ἐπάλαιον. *Οἱ γὰρ Ἠλεῖοι* παρῆσαν ἤδη, etc.

Diodorus erroneously represents (xv, 78) the occurrence as if the Eleians had been engaged in celebrating the festival, and as if the Pisatans and Arcadians had marched up and attacked them while doing so. The Eleians were really the assailants.

[697] Xen. Hellen. *l. c.* Οἱ γὰρ Ἠλεῖοι παρῆσαν σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις *εἰς τὸ τέμενος*. Οἱ δὲ Ἀρκάδες ποῤῥωτέρω μὲν οὐκ ἀπήντησαν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ Κλαδάου ποταμοῦ παρετάξαντο, ὃς παρὰ τὴν Ἄλτιν καταῤῥέων εἰς τὸν Ἄλφειον ἐμβάλλει. Καὶ μὴν *οἱ Ἠλεῖοι τάπὶ θάτερα τοῦ ποτάμου παρετάξαντο*, σφαγιασάμενοι δὲ εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν.

The τέμενος must here be distinguished from the Altis; as meaning the entire breadth of consecrated ground at Olympia, of which the Altis formed a smaller interior portion enclosed with a wall. The Eleians entered into the τέμενος before they crossed the river Kladeus, which flowed *through* the τέμενος, but *alongside* of the Altis. The tomb of Œnomaus, which was doubtless included in the τέμενος, was on the right bank of the Kladeus (Pausan. vi, 21, 3); while the Altis was on the left bank of the river.

Colonel Leake (in his Peloponnesiaca, pp. 6, 107) has given a copious and instructive exposition of the ground of Olympia, as well as of the notices left by Pausanias respecting it. Unfortunately, little can be made out certainly, except the position of the great temple of Zeus in the Altis. Neither the positions assigned to the various buildings, the Stadion, or the Hippodrome, by Colonel Leake,—nor those proposed by Kiepert in the plan comprised in his maps—nor by Ernst Curtius, in the Plan annexed to his recent Dissertation called *Olympia* (Berlin, 1852)—rest upon very sufficient evidence. Perhaps future excavations may hereafter reveal much that is now unknown.

I cannot agree with Colonel Leake however in supposing that Pisa was at any time a *city*, and afterwards deserted.

[698] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4. 32. ὥστε οὐδ' ἀνεπαύσαντο τῆς νυκτὸς ἐκκόπτοντες τὰ διαπεπονημένα σκηνώματα, etc.

[699] Diodor. xv, 78; Pausanias, vi, 8, 2.

[700] Tacitus, Hist. i, 40. He is describing the murder of Galba in the Forum at Rome, by the Othonian soldiers:—

"Igitur milites Romani, quasi Vologesen aut Pacorum avito Arsacidarum solio depulsuri, ac non Imperatorem suum, inermem et senem, trucidare pergerent—disjectâ plebe, proculcato Senatu, truces armis, rapidis equis, forum irrumpunt: nec illos Capitolii aspectus, et imminentium templorum religio, et priores et futuri Principes, terruere, quominus facerent scelus, cujus ultor est quisquis successit."

[701] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 32.

[702] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 20; Polybius, iv, 73.

[703] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33, 34.

[704] Thucyd. i, 121.

Perikles in his speech at Athens alludes to this understood purpose of the Spartans and their confederacy (Thucyd. i, 143).

[705] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33, 34; Diodor. xv, 82; Pausanias, vii, 8, 6.

[706] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33. φάσκοντες αὐτοὺς λυμαίνεσθαι τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν, ἀνεκαλοῦντο εἰς τοὺς μυρίους τοὺς προστάτας αὐτῶν, etc.

[707] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 34.

[708] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 34. *Οἱ δὲ τὰ κράτιστα τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ βουλευόμενοι* ἔπεισαν τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκάδων, πέμψαντας πρέσβεις εἰπεῖν τοῖς Θηβαίοις, etc.

The phrase here used by Xenophon, to describe the oligarchical party, marks his philo-Laconian sentiment. Compare vii, 5, 1. οἱ κηδόμενοι τῆς Πελοποννήσου, etc.

[709] Xen. Hellen. *l. c.*

[710] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 37, 38.

[711] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 39. συγκαλέσας τῶν Ἀρκάδων ὁπόσοι γε δὴ συνελθεῖν ἠθέλησαν, ἀπελογεῖτο, ὡς ἐξαπατηθείη.

[712] The representation of Diodorus (xv, 82), though very loose and vague, gives us to understand that the two opposing parties at Tegea came to an actual conflict of arms, on occasion of the peace.

[713] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 40.

[714] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 1. Οἱ κηδόμενοι τῆς Πελοποννήσου.

[715] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 2, 3.

[716] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 5; Diodor. xv, 85.

[717] Diodor. xv, 85.

[718] The explanation which Xenophon gives of this halt at Nemea,—as if Epaminondas was determined to it by a peculiar hatred of Athens (Hellen. vii, 5, 6)—seems alike fanciful and ill-tempered.

[719] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 8.

[720] Plutarch, De Gloriâ Athen. p. 346 B.

[721] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 10. Καὶ εἰ μὴ Κρὴς, θείᾳ τινὶ μοίρᾳ προσελθὼν, ἐξήγγειλε τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ προσιὸν τὸ στράτευμα, ἔλαβεν ἂν τὴν πόλιν ὥσπερ νεοττιὰν, παντάπασιν ἔρημον τῶν ἀμυνουμένων.

Diodorus coincides in the main fact (xv, 82, 83), though with many inaccuracies of detail. He gives a very imperfect idea of this narrow escape of Sparta, which is fully attested by Xenophon, even against his own partialities.

Kallisthenes asserted that the critical intelligence had been conveyed to Agesilaus by a Thespian named Euthynus (Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 34).

[722] Xenophon (Hellen. vii, 5, 10, 11) describes these facts in a manner different on several points from Polybius (ix, 8), and from Diodorus (xv, 83). Xenophon's authority appears to me better in itself, while his narrative is also more probable. He states distinctly that Agesilaus heard the news of the Theban march while he was yet at Pellênê (on the road to Mantinea, to which place a large portion of the Spartan troops had already gone forward),—that he turned back forthwith, and reached Sparta before Epaminondas, with a division not numerous, yet sufficient to put the town in a state of defence. Whereas Polybius affirms, that Agesilaus heard the news when he was at Mantinea,—that he marched from thence with the whole army to Sparta, but that Epaminondas reached Sparta before him, had already attacked the town and penetrated into the market-place, when Agesilaus arrived and drove him back. Diodorus relates that Agesilaus never left Sparta, but that the other king Agis, who had been sent with the army to Mantinea, divining the plans of Epaminondas, sent word by some swift Kretan runners to Agesilaus and put him upon his guard.

Wesseling remarks justly, that the mention of Agis must be a mistake; that the second king of Sparta at that time was named Kleomenes.

Polyænus (ii, 3, 10) states correctly that Agesilaus reached Sparta before Epaminondas; but he adds many other details which are too uncertain to copy.

[723] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 11. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένετο Ἐπαμινώνδας *ἐν τῇ πόλει* τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, etc.

[724] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 12, 13.

Justin (vi, 7) greatly exaggerates the magnitude and violence of the contest. He erroneously represents that Agesilaus did not reach Sparta till after Epaminondas.

[725] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 34.

[726] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 14. Πάλιν δὲ πορευθεὶς ὡς ἐδύνατο τάχιστα εἰς τὴν Τεγέαν, τοὺς μὲν ὁπλίτας ἀνέπαυσε, τοὺς δὲ ἱππέας ἔπεμψεν εἰς τὴν Μαντίνειαν, δεηθεὶς αὐτῶν προσκαρτερῆσαι, καὶ διδάσκων ὡς πάντα μὲν εἰκὸς ἔξω εἶναι τὰ τῶν Μαντινέων βοσκήματα, πάντας δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἄλλως τε καὶ σίτου συγκομιδῆς οὔσης.

[727] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 15, 16.

The words—δυστυχήματος γεγενημένου ἐν Κορίνθῳ τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν—allude to something which we have no means of making out. It is possible that the Corinthians, who were at peace with Thebes and had been ill-used by Athens (vii, 4, 6-10), may have seen with displeasure, and even molested, the Athenian horsemen while resting on their territory.

[728] Polybius, ix, 8.

[729] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 15, 16, 17.

Plutarch (De Gloriâ Athen. p. 346 D.—E.) recounts the general fact of this battle and the rescue of Mantinea; yet with several inaccuracies which we refute by means of Xenophon.

Diodor. (xv, 84) mentions the rescue of Mantinea by the unexpected arrival of the Athenians; but he states them as being six thousand soldiers, that is hoplites, under Hegelochus; and he says nothing about the cavalry battle. Hegesilaus is named by Ephorus (ap. Diog. Laert. ii, 54,—compare Xenoph. De Vectigal. iii, 7) as the general of the entire force sent out by Athens on this occasion, consisting of infantry as well as cavalry. The infantry must have come up somewhat later.

Polybius also (ix, 8), though concurring in the main with Xenophon, differs in several details. I follow the narrative of Xenophon.

[730] Harpokration v, Κηφισόδωρος, Ephorus ap. Diogen. Laert. ii, 53; Pausan. 1, 3, 4; viii, 9, 8; viii, 11, 5.

There is a confusion, on several points, between this cavalry battle near Mantinea,—and the great or general battle, which speedily followed it, wherein Epaminondas was slain. Gryllus is sometimes said to have been slain in the battle of Mantinea, and even to have killed Epaminondas with his own hand. It would seem as if the picture of Euphranor represented Gryllus in the act of killing the Theban commander; and as if the latter tradition of Athens as well as of Thebes, erroneously bestowed upon that Theban commander the name of Epaminondas.

See this confusion discussed and cleared up, in a good article on the Battle of Mantinea, by Arnold Schäfer, p. 58, 59, in the Rheinisches Museum für Philologie (1846—Fünfter Jahrgang, Erstes Heft).

[731] Diodor. xv, 84.

[732] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 8. καὶ μὴν οἰόμενος κρειττων τῶν ἀντιπάλων εἶναι, etc.

[733] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 19. σπάνια δὲ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔχοντας ὅμως πείθεσθαι ἐθέλειν, etc.

[734] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 18. αὐτὸς δὲ λελυμασμένος παντάπασι τῇ ἑαυτοῦ δόξῃ ἔσοιτο, ἡττημένος μὲν ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι σὺν πολλῷ ὁπλιτικῷ ὑπ' ὀλίγων, ἡττημένος δὲ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ ἱπποµαχίᾳ, αἴτιος δὲ γεγενημένος διὰ τὴν ἐς Πελοπόννησον στράτειαν τοῦ συνεστάναι Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Ἀρκάδας καὶ Ἠλείους καὶ Ἀθηναίους· ὥστε οὐκ ἐδόκει δυνατὸν εἶναι ἁμαχεὶ παρελθεῖν, etc.

[735] Polybius, ix. 8, 2.

[736] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 20. Προθύμως μὲν ἐλευκοῦντο οἱ ἱππεῖς τὰ κράνη, κελεύοντος ἐκείνου· ἐπεγράφοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἀρκάδων ὁπλῖται, ῥόπαλα ἔχοντες, ὡς Θηβαῖοι ὄντες· πάντες δὲ ἠκονῶντο καὶ λόγχας καὶ μαχαίρας, καὶ ἐλαμπρύνοντο τὰς ἀσπίδας.

There seems a sort of sneer in these latter words, both at the Arcadians and Thebans. The Arcadian clubmen are called ὁπλῖται; and are represented as passing themselves off to be as good as Thebans.

Sievers (Geschicht. p. 342) and Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. c. 40, p. 200) follow Eckhel in translating this passage to mean that "the Arcadian hoplites inscribed upon their shields the figure of a club, that being the ensign of the Thebans." I cannot think this interpretation is the best,—at least until some evidence is produced, that the Theban symbol on the shield was a club. Xenophon does not disdain on other occasions to speak sneeringly of the Theban hoplites,—see vii, 5, 12. The mention of λόγχας καὶ μαχαίρας, immediately afterwards, sustains the belief that ῥόπαλα ἔχοντες, immediately before, means "men armed with clubs"; the natural sense of the words.

The horsemen are said to have "whitened their helmets (or head-pieces)." Hence I presume that these head-pieces were not made of metal, but of wood or wicker-work. Compare Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 25.

[737] See Colonel Leake's Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, ch. 24, p. 45.

[738] Three miles from Mantinea (Leake, ib. p. 51-94) "a low ridge of rocks, which, advancing into the plain from a projecting part of the Mænalium, formed a natural division between the districts of Tegea and Mantineia."

Compare the same work, vol. i, ch. 3, p. 100, 112, 114, and the recent valuable work of Ernst Curtius, Peloponnesos (Gotha, 1851), pp. 232-247. Gell says that a wall has once been carried across the plain at this boundary (Itinerary of the Morea, p. 141-143).

[739] See the indications of the locality of the battle in Pausanias, viii, 11, 4, 5; and Colonel Leake—as above referred to.

[740] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 21.

Tripolitza is reckoned by Colonel Leake as about three miles and a half from the site of Tegea; Mr. Dodwell states it as about four miles, and Gell's Itinerary of the Morea much the same.

Colonel Leake reckons about eight miles from Tripolitza to Mantinea. Gell states it as two hours and three minutes, Dodwell as two hours and five minutes,—or seven miles.

Colonel Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. i, p. 88-100; Gell's Itinerary, p. 141; Dodwell's Travels, vol. ii, p. 418-422.

It would seem that Epaminondas, in this latter half of his march, must have followed nearly the road from Mantinea to Pallantium. Pallantium was situated west by south from Tegea.

[741] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22.

[742] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22. Καὶ γὰρ δὴ, ὡς πρὸς τῷ ὄρει ἐγένετο, ἐπεὶ ἐξετάθη αὐτῷ ἡ φάλαγξ, ὑπὸ τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς ἔθετο τὰ ὅπλα· ὥστε εἰκάσθη στρατοπεδευομένῳ. Τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσας, ἔλυσε μὲν τῶν πλείστων πολεμίων τὴν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πρὸς μάχην παρασκευήν, ἔλυσε δὲ τὴν ἐν ταῖς συντάξεσιν.

[743] Thucyd. v, 67; Pausanias, viii, 9, 5; viii. 10, 4.

[744] Diodor. xv. 85.

That the Athenians were on the left, we also know from Xenophon (Hell. vii, 5, 24), though he gives no complete description of the arrangement of the allies on either side.

[745] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 23.

[746] Here again, we know from Xenophon that the Thebans were on the left; but the general arrangement of the other contingents we obtain only from Diodorus (xv, 85).

The Tactica of Arrian, also (xi, 2) inform us that Epaminondas formed his attacking column, at Leuktra, of the Thebans—at Mantinea, of all the Bœotians.

About the practice of the Thebans, both at and after the battle of Leuktra, to make their attack with the left, see Plutarch. Quæst. Roman. p. 282 D.

[747] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22. Ἐπεί γε μὴν, παραγαγὼν τοὺς ἐπὶ κέρως πορευομένους λόχους εἰς μέτωπον, ἰσχυρὸν ἐποιήσατο τὸ περὶ ἑαυτὸν ἔμβολον, τότε δὴ ἀναλαβεῖν παραγγείλας τὰ ὅπλα, ἡγεῖτο· οἱ δ' ἠκολούθουν … Ὁ δὲ τὸ στράτευμα ἀντίπρωρον ὥσπερ τριήρη προσῆγε, νομίζων, ὅπη ἐμβαλὼν διακόψειε, διαφθερεῖν ὅλον τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων στράτευμα, etc.

[748] I agree with Folard (Traité de la Colonne, p. lv-lxi, prefixed to the translation of Polybius) in considering ἔμβολον to be a column,—rather than a wedge tapering towards the front. And I dissent from Schneider's

explanation, who says,—"Epaminondas phalangem contrahit sensim et colligit in frontem, ut cunei seu rostri navalis formam efficeret. Copiæ igitur ex utroque latere explicatæ transeunt in frontem; hoc est, παράγειν εἰς μέτωπον." It appears to me that the troops which Epaminondas caused to wheel into the front and to form the advancing column, consisted only of the left or Theban division, the best troops in the army,—τῷ μὲν ἰσχυροτάτῳ παρεσκευάζετο ἀγωνίζεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀσθενέστατον πόῤῥω ἀπέστησεν. Moreover, the whole account of Xenophon implies that Epaminondas made the attack from his own left against the enemy's right, or right-centre. He was afraid that the Athenians would take him in flank from their own left.

[749] Compare a similar case in Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 13, where the Grecian cavalry, in the Asiatic army of Agesilaus, is said to be drawn up ὥσπερ φάλαγξ ἐπὶ τεσσάρων, etc.

[750] These πέζοι ἅμιπποι—light-armed footmen, intermingled with the ranks of the cavalry,—are numbered as an important item in the military establishment of the Syracusan despot Gelon (Herodot. vii. 158).

[751] Perhaps Epaminondas may have contrived in part to conceal what was going on by means of cavalry-movements in his front. Something of the kind seems alluded to by Polyænus (ii, 3, 14).

[752] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22.

[753] Diodor. xv, 85.

The orator Æschines fought among the Athenian hoplites on this occasion (Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 300. c. 53.)

[754] The remark made by Polybius upon this battle deserves notice. He states that the description given of the battle by Ephorus was extremely incorrect and absurd, arguing great ignorance both of the ground where it was fought and of the possible movements of the armies. He says that Ephorus had displayed the like incompetence also in describing the battle of Leuktra; in which case, however, his narrative was less misleading, because that battle was simple and easily intelligible, involving movements only of one wing of each army. But in regard to the battle of Mantinea (he says), the misdescription of Ephorus was of far more deplorable effect; because that battle exhibited much complication and generalship, which Ephorus did not at all comprehend, as might be seen by any one who measured the ground and studied the movements reported in his narrative (Polybius, xii, 25).

Polybius adds that Theopompus and Timæus were as little to be trusted in the description of land-battles as Ephorus. Whether this remark has special application to the battle of Mantinea, I do not clearly make out. He gives credit however to Ephorus for greater judgment and accuracy, in the description of naval battles.

Unfortunately, Polybius has not given us his own description of this battle of Mantinea. He only says enough to make us feel how imperfectly we know its details. There is too much reason to fear that the account which we now read in Diodorus may be borrowed in large proportion from that very narrative of Ephorus here so much disparaged.

[755] Diodor. xv, 87. Cornelius Nepos (Epam. c. 9) seems to copy the same authority as Diodorus, though more sparing of details. He does not seem to have read Xenophon.

I commend the reader again to an excellent note of Dr. Arnold, on Thucydides, iv, 11; animadverting upon similar exaggerations and embellishments of Diodorus, in the description of the conduct of Brasidas at Pylus.

[756] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 25. Τὴν μὲν δὴ συμβολὴν οὕτως ἐποιήσατο, καὶ οὐκ ἐψεύσθη τῆς ἐλπίδος· *κρατήσας γὰρ ᾗ προσέβαλεν, ὅλον ἐποίησε* φεύγειν τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων. Ἐπεὶ γε μὴν ἐκεῖνος ἔπεσεν, οἱ λοιποὶ οὐδὲ τῇ νίκῃ ὀρθῶς ἔτι ἐδυνάσθησαν χρήσασθαι, ἀλλὰ φυγούσης μὲν αὐτοῖς τῆς ἐναντίας φάλαγγος, οὐδένα ἀπέκτειναν οἱ ὁπλῖται, οὐδὲ προῆλθον ἐκ τοῦ χωρίου ἔνθα ἡ συμβολὴ ἐγένετο· φυγόντων δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν ἱππέων, ἀπέκτειναν μὲν οὐδὲ οἱ ἱππεῖς διώκοντες οὔτε ἱππέας οὔθ' ὁπλίτας, ὥσπερ δὲ ἡττώμενοι πεφοβημένως διὰ τῶν φευγόντων πολεμίων διέπεσον. Καὶ μὴν οἱ ἅμιπποι καὶ οἱ πελτασταὶ, συννενικηκότες τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν, ἀφίκοντο μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ εὐωνύμου, ὡς κρατοῦντες· ἐκεῖ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ πλεῖστοι αὐτῶν ἀπέθανον.

[757] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 33, 34.

[758] The statement of Diodorus (xv, 87) on this point appears to me more probable than that of Xenophon (vii, 5, 26).

The Athenians boasted much of this slight success with their cavalry, enhancing its value by acknowledging that all their allies had been defeated around them (Plutarch, De Gloriâ Athen. p. 350 A.).

[759] Diodor. xv, 88; Cicero, De Finibus, ii, 30, 97; Epistol. ad Familiares, v, 12, 5.

[760] Plutarch, Apophthegm. Regum, p. 194 C.; Ælian, V. H. xii, 3.

Both Plutarch and Diodorus talk of Epaminondas being carried back to the *camp*. But it seems that there could hardly have been any camp. Epaminondas had marched out only a few hours before from Tegea. A tent may have been erected on the field to receive him. Five centuries afterwards, the Mantineans showed to the traveller Pausanias a spot called Skiopê near the field of battle, to which (they affirmed) the wounded Epaminondas had been carried off, in great pain, and with his hand on his wound—from whence he had looked with anxiety on the continuing battle (Pausan. viii, 11, 4).

[761] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 35; Pausanias, i, 3, 3; viii, 9, 2-5; viii, 11, 4; ix, 15, 3.

The reports however which Pausanias gives, and the name of Machærion which he heard both at Mantinea and at Sparta, are confused, and are hardly to be reconciled with the story of Plutarch.

Moreover, it would seem that the subsequent Athenians did not clearly distinguish between the first battle fought by the Athenian cavalry, immediately after their arrival at Mantinea, when they rescued that town from being surprised by the Thebans and Thessalians—and the general action which followed a few days afterwards wherein Epaminondas was slain.

[762] See the oration of Demosthenes on behalf of the Megalopolitans (Orat. xvi, s. 10, p. 204; s. 21, p. 206).

[763] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 35; Diodor. xv, 89; Polybius, iv, 33.

Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellen. B.C. 361) assigns the conclusion of peace to the succeeding year. I do not know however what ground there is for assuming such an interval between the battle and the peace. Diodorus appears to place the latter immediately after the former. This would not count for much, indeed, against any considerable counter-probability; but the probability here (in my judgment) is rather in favor of immediate sequence between the two events.

[764] Pausanias, viii, 11, 4, 5.

[765] Cicero, Tusculan. i, 2, 4; De Orator. iii, 34, 139. "Epaminondas, princeps, meo judicio, Græciæ," etc.

[766] Plutarch, Philopœmen, c. 3; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36.

[767] See the inscription of four lines copied by Pausanias from the statue of Epaminondas at Thebes (Paus. ix, 16, 3):—

Ἠμετέραις βουλαῖς Σπάρτη μὲν ἐκείρατο δόξαν, etc.

[768] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 5, 8, 9.

[769] Demosthenes, Philipp. I, p. 51, s. 46.

[770] The remark of Diodorus (xv, 88) upon Epaminondas is more emphatic than we usually find in him,—Παρὰ μὲν γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἓν ἂν εὕροι προτέρημα τῆς δόξης, παρὰ δὲ τούτῳ πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς ἠθροισμένας.

[771] Polybius, xxxii, 8, 6. Cornelius Nepos (Epaminondas, c. 4) gives one anecdote, among several which he affirms to have found on record, of large pecuniary presents tendered to, and repudiated by, Epaminondas; an anecdote recounted with so much precision of detail, that it appears to deserve credit, though we cannot assign the exact time when the alleged briber Diomedon of Kyzicus, came to Thebes.

Plutarch (De Genio Socratis, p. 583 F.) relates an incident about Jason of Pheræ tendering money in vain to Epaminondas, which cannot well have happened before the liberation of the Kadmeia (the period to which Plutarch's dialogue assigns it), but may have happened afterwards.

Compare Plutarch, Apophthegm. Reg. p. 193 C.; and Plutarch's Life of Fabius Maximus, c. 27.

[772] Aristotel. Politic. iii, 2, 10.

[773] Plutarch, Compar. Alkibiad. and Coriolanus, c. 4. Ἐπεὶ τό γε μὴ λιπαρῆ μηδὲ θεραπευτικὸν ὄχλων εἶναι, καὶ Μέτελλος εἶχε καὶ Ἀριστείδης καὶ Ἐπαμεινώνδας· ἀλλὰ τῷ καταφρονεῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὧν δῆμός ἐστι καὶ δοῦναι καὶ ἀφελέσθαι κύριος, ἐξοστρακιζόμενοι καὶ ἀποχειροτονούμενοι καὶ καταδικαζόμενοι πολλάκις οὐκ ὠργίζοντο τοῖς πολίταις ἀγνωμονοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἠγάπων αὖθις μεταμελομένους καὶ διηλλάττοντο παρακαλούντων.

[774] See an anecdote about Epaminondas as the diplomatist and negotiator on behalf of Thebes against Athens—δικαιολογούμενος, etc. Athenæus, xiv, p. 650 E.

[775] Homer, Iliad, iii, 210-220 (Menelaus and Odysseus)—

Ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ Τρώεσσιν ἀγειρομένοισιν ἔμιχθεν,

Ἤτοι μὲν Μενέλαος ἐπιτροχάδην ἀγόρευε,

Παῦρα μέν, ἀλλὰ μάλα λιγέως· ἐπεὶ οὐ πολύμυθος, etc.

… Ἀλλ' ὅτε δή ῥ' ὄπα τε μεγάλην ἐκ στήθεος ἵει (Odysseus),

Καὶ ἔπεα νιφάδεσσιν ἐοικότα χειμερίῃσιν,

Οὐκέτ' ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆϊ γ' ἐρίσσειε βροτὸς ἄλλος, etc.

[776] See Vol. VIII. of this History, Ch. lxvii, p. 357-397—φρονεῖν, λέγειν, καὶ πράττειν, etc.

[777] Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 192 E. Athenæ. xiii, p. 590 C.

[778] Hieronymus ap. Athenæ. xiii, p. 602 A.; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18; Xen. Rep. Lacedæmon. ii, 12.

See the striking and impassioned fragment of Pindar, addressed by him when old to the youth Theoxenus of Tenedos, Fragm. 2 of the Skolia, in Dissen's edition, and Boeckh's edition of Pindar, vol. iii, p. 611, ap. Athenæum, xiii, p. 605 C.

[779] See Theopompus, Frag. 182, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. xiii, p. 605 A.

[780] Plutarch, Pelopid. *ut sup.*; Plutarch, Amatorius, p. 761 D.; compare Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 39.

[781] Diodor. xv, 94.

I venture here to depart from Diodorus, who states that these three thousand men were *Athenians*, not *Thebans*; that the Megalopolitans sent to ask aid from *Athens*, and that the *Athenians* sent these three thousand men under Pammenes.

That Diodorus (or the copyist) has here mistaken Thebans for Athenians, appears to me, on the following grounds:—

1. Whoever reads attentively the oration delivered by Demosthenes in the Athenian assembly (about ten years after this period) respecting the propriety of sending an armed force to defend Megalopolis against the threats of Sparta—will see, I think, that Athens can never before have sent any military assistance to Megalopolis. Both the arguments which Demosthenes urges, and those which he combats as having been urged by opponents, exclude the reality of any such previous proceeding.

2. Even at the time when the above-mentioned oration was delivered, the Megalopolitans were still (compare Diodorus, xvi, 39) under special alliance with, and guardianship of, Thebes—though the latter had then been so much weakened by the Sacred War and other causes, that it seemed doubtful whether she could give them complete protection against Sparta. But in the year next after the battle of Mantinea, the alliance between Megalopolis and Thebes, as well as the hostility between Megalopolis and Athens, was still fresher and more intimate. The Thebans (then in unimpaired power), who had fought for them in the preceding year,—not the Athenians, who had fought against them,—would be the persons invoked for aid to Megalopolis; nor had any positive reverses as yet occurred to disable the Thebans from furnishing aid.

3. Lastly, Pammenes is a *Theban* general, friend of Epaminondas. He is mentioned as such not only by Diodorus himself in another place (xvi, 34), but also by Pausanias (viii, 27, 2), as the general who had been sent to watch over the building of Megalopolis, by Plutarch (Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 26; Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend.

Præcept. p. 805 F.), and by Polyænus (v, 16, 3). We find a private Athenian citizen named Pammenes, a goldsmith, mentioned in the oration of Demosthenes against Meidias (s. 31. p. 521); but no Athenian officer or public man of that time so named.

Upon these grounds, I cannot but feel convinced that Pammenes and his troops were Thebans, and not Athenians.

I am happy to find myself in concurrence with Dr. Thirlwall on this point (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. xliii, p. 368 note).

[782] See Isokrates, Orat. vi, (Archidamus) s. 85-93.

[783] Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archid.) s. 73.

[784] Cornelius Nepos has given a biography of Datames at some length, recounting his military exploits and stratagems. He places Datames, in point of military talent, above all *barbari*, except Hamilcar Barca and Hannibal (c. 1). Polyænus also (vii, 29) recounts several memorable proceedings of the same chief. Compare too Diodorus, xv, 91; and Xen. Cyropæd. viii, 8, 4.

We cannot make out with any certainty either the history, or the chronology, of Datames. His exploits seem to belong to the last ten years of Artaxerxes Mnemon, and his death seems to have taken place a little before the death of that prince; which last event is to be assigned to 359-358 B.C. See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fast. Hell. ch. 18. p. 316, Appendix.

[785] Diodor. xv, 91, 92; Xenophon, Cyropæd. viii, 8, 4.

Our information about these disturbances in the interior of the Persian empire is so scanty and confused, that few of the facts can be said to be certainly known. Diodorus has evidently introduced into the year 362-361 B.C. a series of events, many of them belonging to years before and after. Rehdantz (Vit. Iphicrat. Chabr. et. Timoth. p. 154-161) brings together all the statements; but unfortunately with little result.

[786] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 36; Athenæus, xiv, p. 616 D.; Cornelius Nepos, Agesil. c. 8.

[787] See Pseudo-Aristotel. Œconomic. ii, 25.

[788] Diodorus (xv, 93) differs from Plutarch and others (whom I follow) in respect to the relations of Tachos and Nektanebis with Agesilaus; affirming that Agesilaus supported Tachos, and supported him with success, against Nektanebis.

Compare Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 2, 3.

We find Chabrias serving Athens in the Chersonese—in 359-358 B.C. (Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 204).

[789] Diodor. xv, 93; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 38-40; Cornelius Nepos, Agesil. 8.

[790] Xenoph. Encom. Ages. vii, 7. Εἰ δ' αὖ καλὸν καὶ μισοπέρσην εἶναι, etc.

[791] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 35.

[792] Diodor. xv, 93.

There is a difference between Diodorus and the Astronomical Canon, in the statements about the length of reign, and date of death, of Artaxerxes Mnemon, of about two years—361 or 359 B.C. See Mr. Clinton's Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, ch. 18. p. 316—where the statements are brought together and discussed. Plutarch states the reign of Artaxerxes Mnemon to have lasted sixty-two years (Plutarch, Artax. c. 33); which cannot be correct, though in what manner the error is to be amended, we cannot determine.

An Inscription of Mylasa in Karia recognizes the forty-fifth year of the reign of Artaxerxes, and thus supports the statement in the Astronomical Canon, which assigns to him forty-six years of reign. See Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. No. 2691, with his comments, p. 470.

This same inscription affords ground of inference respecting the duration of the revolt; for it shows that the Karian Mausolus recognized himself as satrap, and Artaxerxes as his sovereign, in the year beginning November 359 B.C., which corresponds with the forty-fifth year of Artaxerxes Mnemon. The revolt therefore must have

been suppressed before that period: see Sievers, Geschichte von Griechenland bis zur Schlacht von Mantineia, p. 373, note.

[793] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 29, 30; Justin, x, 1-3.

Plutarch states that the lady whom the prince Darius asked for, was, Aspasia of Phokæa—the Greek mistress of Cyrus the younger, who had fallen into the hands of Artaxerxes after the battle of Kunaxa, and had acquired a high place in the monarch's affections.

But if we look at the chronology of the case, it will appear hardly possible that the lady who inspired so strong a passion to Darius, in or about 361 B.C., as to induce him to risk the displeasure of his father—and so decided a reluctance on the part of Artaxerxes to give her up—can have been the person who accompanied Cyrus to Kunaxa *forty years* before; for the battle of Kunaxa was fought in 401 B.C. The chronological improbability would be still greater, if we adopted Plutarch's statement that Artaxerxes reigned sixty-two years; for it is certain that the battle of Kunaxa occurred very near the beginning of his reign, and the death of his son Darius near the end of it.

Justin states the circumstances which preceded the death of Artaxerxes Mnemon in a manner yet more tragical. He affirms that the plot against the life of Artaxerxes was concerted by Darius in conjunction with several of his brothers; and that, on the plot being discovered, all these brothers, together with their wives and children, were put to death. Ochus, on coming to the throne, put to death a great number of his kinsmen and of the principal persons about the court, together with their wives and children—fearing a like conspiracy against himself.

[794] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 153.

[795] The affirmation of Cornelius Nepos (Timotheus, c. 1), that Timotheus made war on Kotys with such success as to bring into the Athenian treasury twelve hundred talents, appears extravagant as to amount; even if we accept it as generally true.

[796] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 155.

[797] See Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, p. 151, and the preceding page.

M. Rehdantz has put together, with great care and sagacity, all the fragments of evidence respecting this obscure period; and has elicited, as it seems to me, the most probable conclusions deducible from such scanty premises.

[798] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 5, 4.

[799] We are fortunate enough to get this date exactly,—the twenty third of the month Metageitnion, in the archonship of Molon,—mentioned by Demosthenes adv. Polyklem, p. 1207, s. 5, 6.

[800] Diodor xvi, 95; Polyænus, vi, 2, 1.

[801] Polyænus, vi, 2, 2.

It must have been about this time (362-361 B.C.) that Alexander of Pheræ sent envoys into Asia to engage the service of Charidemus and his mercenary band, then in or near the troad. His application was not accepted (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 675, s. 192).

[802] Demosthenes, de Coronâ Trierarch. p. 1230, s. 9.

Diodorus farther states that the Athenians placed Chares in command of a fleet for the protection of the Ægean; but that this admiral took himself off to Korkyra, and did nothing but plunder the allies (Diodor. xvi, 95).

[803] Compare Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 174-176; and Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 250, c. 14.

[804] The facts as stated in the text are the most probable result, as it seems to me, derivable from Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 250, c. 14.

[805] Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii, 3, 3.

Ergophilus seems to have been fined (Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 398, s. 200).

[806] Demosthen. adv. Polyklem. p. 1207. s. 6.

[807] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 655, s. 122; cont. Polyklem. p. 1207.

ὅτε Μιλτοκύθης ἀπέστη Κότυος … ἐγράφη τι παρ' ὑμῖν ψήφισμα τοιοῦτον, δι' οὗ Μιλτοκύθης μὲν *ἀπῆλθε* φοβηθεὶς καὶ νομίσας ὑμᾶς οὐ προσέχειν αὐτῷ, Κότυς δὲ ἐγκρατὴς τοῦ τε ὄρους τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ τῶν θησαυρῶν ἐγένετο.

The word ἀπῆλθε implies that Miltokythes was at Athens in person.

The humble letter written by Kotys, in his first alarm at the revolt of Miltokythes, is referred to by the orator, p. 658, s. 136, 137.

[808] Demosthenes adv. Polykl. p. 1210, s. 16; Demosthenes cont. Aristok. p. 655, s. 123.

[809] Demosthen. adv. Polyklem, p. 1212, s. 24-26; p. 1213, s. 27; p. 1225, s. 71.

[810] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 673, s. 187. Ἐκ γὰρ Ἀβύδου, τῆς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ὑμῖν ἐχθρᾶς, καὶ ὅθεν ἦσαν οἱ Σηστὸν καταλαβόντες, εἰς Σηστὸν διέβαινεν, ἣν εἶχε Κότυς. (He is speaking of Charidemus.)

The other oration of Demosthenes (adv. Polykl. p. 1212) contains distinct intimation that Sestos was not lost by the Athenians *until after November 361* B.C. Apollodorus the Athenian trierarch was in the town at that time, as well as various friends whom he mentions; so that Sestos must have been still an Athenian possession in November 361 B.C.

It is lucky for some points of historical investigation, that the purpose of this oration against Polykles (composed by Demosthenes, but spoken by Apollodorus) requires great precision and specification of dates, even to months and days. Apollodorus complains that he has been constrained to bear the expense of a trierarchy, for four months beyond the year in which it was incumbent upon him jointly with a colleague. He sues the person whose duty it was to have relieved him as successor at the end of the year, but who had kept aloof and cheated him. The trierarchy of Apollodorus began in August 362 B.C., and lasted (not merely to Aug. 361 B.C., its legal term, but) to November 361 B.C.

Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 144, note), in the valuable chapters which he devotes to the obscure chronology of the period, has overlooked this exact indication of the time *after which* the Athenians lost Sestos. He supposes the loss to have taken place two or three years earlier.

[811] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 155.

[812] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 658, s. 136; p. 679, s. 211.

What is said in the latter passage about the youthful Kersobleptes, is doubtless not less true of his father Kotys.

[813] Demosthen. pro Phormione, p. 960, s. 64; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 398, s. 200.

[814] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 672, s. 184.

[815] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 671, s. 183. Compare Pseudo-Aristot. Œconomic. ii, 30.

[816] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 672, 673.

The orator reads a letter (not cited however) from the governor of Krithôtê, announcing the formidable increase of force which threatened the place since the arrival of Charidemus.

[817] Aristotle (Politic. v, 8, 12) mentions the act and states that the two young men did it to avenge their father. He does not expressly say what Kotys had done to the father; but he notices the event in illustration of the general category,—Πολλαὶ δ' ἐπιθέσεις γεγένηνται καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχύνεσθαι τῶν μονάρχων τινάς (compare what Tacitus says about *mos regius*—Annal. vi, 1). Aristotle immediately adds another case of cruel mutilation inflicted by Kotys,—Ἀδάμας δ' ἀπέστη Κότυος διὰ τὸ ἐκτμηθῆναι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ παῖς ὤν, ὡς ὑβρισμένος.

Compare, about Kotys, Theopompus, Fragm. 33, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. xii, p. 531, 532.

Böhnecke (Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte, p. 725, 726) places the death of Kotys in 359 B.C.; and seems to infer from Athenæus (vi, p. 248; xii, p. 531) that he had actual communication with Philip of Macedon as king, whose accession took place between Midsummer 360 and Midsummer 359 B.C. But the evidence does not appear to me to bear out such a conclusion.

The story cited by Athenæus from Hegesander, about letters reaching Philip from Kotys, cannot be true about this Kotys; because it seems impossible that Philip, in the first year of his reign, can have had any such

flatterer as Kleisophus; Philip being at that time in the greatest political embarrassments, out of which he was only rescued by his indefatigable energy and ability. And the journey of Philip to Onokarsis, also mentioned by Athenæus out of Theopompus, does not imply any personal communication with Kotys.

My opinion is, that the assassination of Kotys dates more probably in 360 B.C.

[818] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 142; p. 662, s. 150; p. 675, s. 193. Plutarch, De Sui Laude, p. 542 E.; Plutarch, adv. Koloten, p. 1126, B.

[819] Plutarch, De Sui Laude, *ut sup.*

[820] Demosthen. cont. Aristokr. p. 674, s. 193. μειρακύλλιον, etc.

[821] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 623, 624, s. 8-12; p. 664, s. 153 (in which passage κηδεστὴς may be fairly taken to mean any near connection by marriage).

About Athenodorus compare Isokrates, Or. viii, (de Pace) s. 31.

[822] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 674-676, s. 193-199.

In sect. 194, are the words, *ἦκε δὲ Κηφισόδοτος στρατηγῶν*, πρὸς ὃν αὐτὸς (Charidemus) ἔπεμψε τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐκείνην, καὶ αἱ τριήρεις, αἳ, ὅτ' ἦν ἄδηλα τὰ τῆς σωτηρίας αὐτῷ, καὶ μὴ συγχωροῦντος Ἀρταβάζου σώζειν ἔμελλον αὐτόν.

The verb ἦκε, in my judgment—not to the *first coming out* of Kephisodotus from Athens to take the command, as Weber (Comment. ad Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 460) and other commentators think, but—to the coming of Kephisodotus with ten triremes *to Perinthus*, near which place Charidemus was, for the purpose of demanding fulfilment of what the latter had promised; see s. 196. When Kephisodotus came to him at Perinthus (παρόντος τοῦ στρατηγοῦ—πρὸς ὃν τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐπεπόμφει—s. 195) to make this demand, then Charidemus, instead of behaving honestly, acted like a traitor and an enemy. The allusion to this antecedent letter from Charidemus to Kephisodotus, shows that the latter must have been on the spot for some time, and therefore that ἦκε cannot refer to his first coming out.

The term ἑπτὰ μῆνας (s. 196) counts, I presume, from the death of Kotys.

[823] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676, s. 199; Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 384, c. 20.

Demosthenes himself may probably have been among the trierarchs called before the dikastery as witnesses to prove what took place at Perinthus and Alopekonnesus (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676, s. 200); Euthykles, the speaker of the discourse against Aristokrates, had been himself also among the officers serving (p. 675, s. 196; p. 683, s. 223).

[824] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 679, s. 209; p. 681, s. 216. Demosthen. de Halonneso, p. 87, s. 42.

[825] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676, s. 201. οὐκ ὄντος νομίμου τοῖς Θρᾳξὶν ἀλλήλους ἀποκτιννύναι, etc.

[826] Demosthenes, cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 201.

[827] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 202-204.

Aristotle (Politic. v. 5, 9) mentions the association or faction of Iphiades as belonging to Abydos, not to Sestos. Perhaps there may have been an Abydene association now exercising influence at Sestos; at least we are told, that the revolution which deprived the Athenians of Sestos, was accomplished in part by exiles who crossed from Abydos; something like the relation between Argos and Corinth in the years immediately preceding the peace of Antalkidas.

[828] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 678, p. 205, 206; p. 680. s. 211, 212. The arrival of Chares in the Hellespont is marked by Demosthenes as immediately following the expedition of Athens to drive the Thebans out of Eubœa, which took place about the middle of 358 B.C.

[829] We see that Sestos must have been surrendered on this occasion, although Diodorus describes it as having been conquered by Chares five years afterwards, in the year 353 B.C. (Diod. xvi, 34). It is evident from the whole tenor of the oration of Demosthenes, that Charidemus did actually surrender the Chersonese at this time. Had he still refused to surrender Sestos, the orator would not have failed to insist on the fact emphatically against him. Besides, Demosthenes says, comparing the conduct of Philip towards the Olynthians, with that of

Kersobleptes towards Athens—ἐκεῖνος ἐκείνοις Ποτίδαιαν οὐχὶ τηνικαῦτ' ἀπέδωκεν, ἥνικ' ἀποστερεῖν οὐκέθ' οἷός τ' ἦν, ὥσπερ ὑμῖν Κερσοβλέπτης Χερρόνησον (p. 656. s. 128). This distinctly announces that the Chersonese was *given back* to Athens, though reluctantly and tardily, by Kersobleptes. Sestos must have been given up along with it, as the principal and most valuable post upon all accounts. If it be true (as Diodorus states) that Chares in 353 B.C. took Sestos by siege, slew the inhabitants of military age and reduced the rest to slavery—we must suppose the town again to have revolted between 358 and 353 B.C.; that is, during the time of the Social War; which is highly probable. But there is much in the statement of Diodorus which I cannot distinctly make out; for he says that Kersobleptes in 353 B.C., on account of his hatred towards Philip, surrendered to Athens all the cities in the Chersonese except Kardia. That had already been done in 358 B.C., and without any reference to Philip; and if after surrendering the Chersonese in 358 B.C., Kersobleptes had afterwards reconquered it, so as to have it again in his possession in the beginning of 353 B.C.—it seems unaccountable that Demosthenes should say nothing about the reconquest in his oration against Aristokrates, where he is trying to make all points possible against Kersobleptes.

[830] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 681, s. 216.

[831] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 623, s. 8; p. 654, s. 121. The chronology of these events as given by Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 147) appears to me nearly correct, in spite of the strong objection expressed against it by Weber (Prolegg. ad Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. lxxiii.)—and more exact than the chronology of Böhnecke, Forschungen, p. 727, who places the coming out of Kephisodotus as general to the Chersonese in 358 B.C., which is, I think, a full year too late. Rehdantz does not allow, as I think he ought to do, for a certain interval between Kephisodotus and the Ten Envoys, during which Athenodorus acted for Athens.

[832] Demosthen. cont. Polyklem, p. 1212, s. 26.

[833] Demosthen. Philippic. I, p. 41, s. 6. εἴχομέν ποτε ἡμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Πύδναν καὶ Ποτίδαιαν καὶ Μεθώνην *καὶ πάντα τὸν τόπον τοῦτον οἰκεῖον κύκλῳ*, etc.

[834] I have not made any mention of the expedition against Eubœa (whereby Athens drove the Theban invaders out of that island), though it occurred just about the same time as the recovery of the Chersonese.

That expedition will more properly come to be spoken of in my next volume. But the recovery of the Chersonese was the closing event of a series of proceedings which had been going on for four years; so that I could hardly leave that series unfinished.

[835] Thucyd. vii, 50-58.

[836] Lysias, Orat. xx, (pro Polystrato) s. 26, 27.

[837] Thucyd. vii, 48, 49.

[838] Diodor. xiii, 34.

[839] Thucyd. viii, 2; compare vii, 55.

[840] Thucyd. vii, 33-57; Dionysius Halikarn. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 453.

[841] Thucyd. viii, 26, 35, 91.

[842] Thucyd. viii, 29, 45, 78, 84.

[843] Thucyd. viii, 84.

[844] Thucyd. viii, 85.

[845] Thucyd. viii, 105; Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 7.

[846] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 19.

[847] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 23-26.

[848] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 23. Ἔῤῥει τὰ καλά. Μίνδαρος ἀπεσσούα· πεινῶντι τῶνδρες· ἀπορέομες τί χρὴ δρᾷν.

[849] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 27.

[850] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 27-31.

[851] Thucyd. viii, 85.

[852] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 31; Diodor. xiii, 63.

[853] Thucyd. vii, 55.

[854] Diodor. xiii, 33-35.

[855] Compare Diodor. xiii, 75—about the banishment of Dioklês.

[856] Aristotel. Politic. v, 3, 6. Καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ὁ δῆμος, αἴτιος γενόμενος τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐκ πολιτείας εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλε.

v, 4, 4, 5. Καὶ Διονύσιος κατηγορῶν Δαφναίου καὶ τῶν πλουσίων ἠξιώθη τῆς τυραννίδος, διὰ τὴν ἔχθραν πιστευθεὶς ὡς δημοτικὸς ὤν.

[857] Diodor. xiii, 56.

[858] Thucyd. vi, 34. Speech of Hermokrates to his countrymen at Syracuse—δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ ἐς Καρχηδόνα ἄμεινον εἶναι πέμψαι. Οὐ γὰρ ἀνέλπιστον αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ διὰ φόβου εἰσὶ μή ποτε Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔλθωσιν, etc.

[859] Polybius, iii, 22, 23, 24.

He gives three separate treaties (either wholly or in part) between the Carthaginians and Romans. The latest of the three belongs to the days of Pyrrhus, about 278 B.C.; the earliest to 508 B.C. The intermediate treaty is not marked as to date by any specific evidence, but I see no ground for supposing that it is so late as 345 B.C., which is the date assigned to it by Casaubon, identifying it with the treaty alluded to by Livy, vii, 27. I cannot but think that it is more likely to be of earlier date, somewhere between 480-410 B.C. This second treaty is far more restrictive than the first, against the Romans; for it interdicts them from all traffic either with Sardinia or Africa, except the city of Carthage itself; the first treaty permitted such trade under certain limitations and conditions. The second treaty argues a comparative superiority of Carthage to Rome, which would rather seem to belong to the latter half of the fifth century B.C., than to the latter half of the fourth.

[860] Strabo, xvii, p. 832, 833; Livy, Epitome, lib. 51.

Strabo gives the circumference as three hundred and sixty stadia, and the breadth of the isthmus as sixty stadia. But this is noticed by Barth as much exaggerated (Wanderungen auf der Küste des Mittelmeers, p. 85).

[861] Appian. Reb. Punic, viii, 75.

[862] Strabo, *ut sup.*

[863] This is the view of Movers, sustained with much plausibility, in his learned and instructive work—Geschichte der Phœnizier, vol. ii, part ii, p. 435-455. See Diodor. xx, 55.

[864] Livy, xxix, 25. Compare the last chapter of the history of Herodotus.

[865] Diodor. xx, 17; Appian, viii, 3, 68.

[866] Colonel Leake observes, with respect to the modern Greeks, who work on the plains of Turkey, upon the landed property of Turkish proprietors—"The Helots seem to have resembled the Greeks, who labor on the Turkish farms *in the plains* of Turkey, and who are bound to account to their masters for one-half of the produce of the soil, as Tyrtæus says of the Messenians of his time—

Ὥσπερ ὄνοι μεγάλοις ἄχθεσι τειρόμενοι

Δεσποσύνοισι φέροντες, ἀναγκαίης ὑπὸ λυγρῆς,

Ἥμισυ πᾶν, ὅσσον κάρπον ἄρουρα φέροι.

(Tyrtæus, Frag. 5, ed. Schneid.)

The condition of the Greeks in the mountainous regions is not so hard" (Leake, Peloponnesiaca, p. 168).

[867] Polybius, i, 72; Livy, xxxiv, 62.

Movers (Geschichte der Phœnizier, ii, 2, p. 455) assigns this large assessment to Leptis Magna; but the passage of Livy can relate only to Leptis Parva, in the region called Emporia.

Leptis Magna was at a far greater distance from Carthage, near the Great Syrtis.

Dr. Barth (Wanderungen durch die Küstenländer des Mittelländischen Meers, p. 81-146) has given a recent and valuable examination of the site of Carthage and of the neighboring regions. On his map, however, the territory called Emporia is marked near the Lesser Syrtis, two hundred miles from Carthage (Pliny, H. N. v, 3). Yet it seems certain that the name Emporia must have comprised the territory south of Carthage and approaching very near to the city; for Scipio Africanus, in his expedition from Sicily, directed his pilots to steer for Emporia. He intended to land very near Carthage; and he actually did land on the White Cape, near to that city, but on the north side, and still nearer to Utica. This region north of Carthage was probably not included in the name Emporia (Livy, xxix, 25-27).

[868] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 8, 9; vi, 3, 5.

[869] Appian, viii, 32, 54, 59; Phlegon, Trall. de Mirabilibus, c. 18. Εὔμαχος δέ φησιν ἐν Περιηγήσει, Καρχηδονίους περιταφρεύοντας τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπαρχίαν, εὑρεῖν ὀρύσσοντας δύο σκελετοὺς ἐν σόρῳ κειμένους, etc.

The line of trench however was dug apparently at an early stage of the Carthaginian dominion; for the Carthaginians afterwards, as they grew more powerful, extended their possessions beyond the trench; as we see by the passages of Appian above referred to.

Movers (Gesch. der Phœniz. ii, 2, p. 457) identifies this trench with the one which Pliny names near Thenæ on the Lesser Syrtis, as having been dug by order of the second Africanus—to form a boundary between the Roman province of Africa, and the dominion of the native kings (Pliny, H. N. v, 3). But I greatly doubt such identity. It appears to me that this last is distinct from the Carthaginian trench.

[870] A Carthaginian citizen wore as many rings as he had served campaigns (Aristotel. Politic. vii, 2, 6).

[871] Diodor. xx, 10.

[872] Appian, viii, 80. Twenty thousand panoplies, together with an immense stock of weapons and engines of siege, were delivered up to the perfidious manœuvres of the Romans, a little before the last siege of Carthage.

See Bötticher, Geschichte der Carthager, p. 20-25.

[873] Diodor. xvi, 8.

[874] See the striking description in Livy, of the motley composition of the Carthaginian mercenary armies, where he bestows just admiration on the genius of Hannibal, for having always maintained his ascendency over them, and kept them in obedience and harmony (Livy, xxviii, 12). Compare Polybius, i, 65-67, and the manner in which Imilkon abandoned his mercenaries to destruction at Syracuse (Diodor. xiv, 75-77).

[875] There were in like manner two suffetes in Gades and each of the other Phœnician colonies (Livy, xxviii, 37). Cornelius Nepos (Hannibal, c. 7) talks of Hannibal as having been made *king* (rex) when he was invested with his great foreign military command, at twenty-two years of age. So Diodorus (xiv, 54) talks about Imilkon, and Herodotus (vii, 166) about Hamilkar.

[876] See Movers, Die Phönizier, ii, 1, p. 483-499.

[877] Polybius, x, 18; Livy, xxx, 16.

Yet again Polybius in another place speaks of the Gerontion at Carthage as representing the aristocratical force, and as opposed to the πλῆθος or people (vi, 51). It would seem that by Γερόντιον he must mean the same as the assembly called in another passage (x, 18) Σύγκλητος.

[878] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 8, 2.

[879] Livy, xxxiii, 46. Justin (xix, 2) mentions the one hundred select Senators set apart as judges.

[880] Heeren (Ideen über den Verkehr der Alten Welt, part ii, p. 138, 3rd edit.) and Kluge (in his Dissertation, Aristoteles de Politiâ Carthaginiensium, Wratisl. 1824) have discussed all these passages with ability. But their materials do not enable them to reach any certainty.

[881] Valerius Max. ix, 5, 4. "Insolentiæ inter Carthaginiensem et Campanum senatum quasi æmulatio fuit. Ille enim separato à plebe balneo lavabatur, hic diverso foro utebatur."

[882] Diodor. xx, 10; xxiii, 9; Valer. Max. ii, 7, 1.

[883] Aristotel Politic. iii, 5, 6.

These banquets must have been settled, daily proceedings,—as well as multitudinous, in order to furnish even apparent warrant for the comparison which Aristotle makes with the Spartan public mess. But even granting the analogy on these external points,—the intrinsic difference of character and purpose between the two must have been so great, that the comparison seems not happy.

Livy (xxxiv, 61) talks of the *circuli et convivia* at Carthage; but this is probably a general expression, without particular reference to the public banquets mentioned by Aristotle.

[884] Aristotel. Polit. ii, 8, 3.

[885] Aristot. Polit. ii, 8, 1. He briefly alludes to the abortive conspiracy of Hanno (v, 6, 2), which is also mentioned in Justin (xxi, 4). Hanno is said to have formed the plan of putting to death the Senate, and making himself despot. But he was detected, and executed under the severest tortures; all his family being put to death along with him.

Not only is it very difficult to make out Aristotle's statements about the Carthaginian government,—but some of them are even contradictory. One of these (v, 10, 3) has been pointed out by M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, who proposes to read ἐν Χαλκηδόνι instead of ἐν Καρχηδόνι. In another place (v, 10, 4) Aristotle calls Carthage (ἐν Καρχηδόνι δημοκρατουμένῃ) a state democratically governed; which cannot be reconciled with what he says in ii, 8, respecting its government.

Aristotle compares the Council of One Hundred and Four at Carthage to the Spartan ephors. But it is not easy to see how so numerous a body could have transacted the infinite diversity of administrative and other business performed by the five ephors.

[886] Justin. xix, 1.

[887] Diodor. xiii.

[888] Justin, xix, 2.

[889] Diodor. xii, 82.

It seems probable that the war which Diodorus mentions to have taken place in 452 B.C., between the Egestæans and Lilybæans—was really a war between Egesta and Selinus (see Diodor, xi, 86—with Wesseling's note). Lilybæum as a town attained no importance until after the capture of Motyê by the older Dionysius in 393 B.C.

[890] Diodor. xiii, 43.

[891] Diodor. xiii, 43.

[892] Diodor. xiii, 43. Κατέστησαν στρατηγὸν τὸν Ἀννίβαν, κατὰ νόμους τότε βασιλεύοντα. Οὗτος δὲ ἦν υἱωνὸς μὲν τοῦ πρὸς Γέλωνα πολεμήσαντος Ἀμίλκου, καὶ πρὸς Ἱμέρᾳ τελευτήσαντος, υἱὸς δὲ Γέσκωνος, ὃς διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἧτταν ἐφυγαδεύθη, καὶ κατεβίωσεν ἐν τῇ Σελινοῦντι. Ὁ δ' οὖν Ἀννίβας, ὢν μὲν καὶ *φύσει μισέλλην*, ὅμως δὲ τὰς τῶν προγόνων ἀτιμίας διορθώσασθαι βουλόμενος, etc.

The banishment of Giskon, and that too for the whole of his life, deserves notice, as a point of comparison between the Greek republics and Carthage. A defeated general in Greece, if he survived his defeat, was not unfrequently banished, even where there seems neither proof nor probability that he had been guilty of misconduct, or misjudgment, or omission. But I do not recollect any case in which, when a Grecian general thus apparently innocent was not merely defeated but slain in the battle, his son was banished for life, as Giskon was banished by the Carthaginians. In appreciating the manner in which the Grecian states, both democratical and oligarchical, dealt with their officers, the contemporary republic of Carthage is one important standard of comparison. Those who censure the Greeks, will have to find stronger terms of condemnation when they review the proceedings of the Carthaginians.

[893] Diodor. xiii, 43, 44.

[894] Diodor. xiii, 44.

[895] Diodor. xiii, 59.

[896] Diodor. xiii, 55; xi, 21.

[897] Diodor. xiii, 54-58. οἱ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις Ἕλληνες ξυμμαχοῦντες, etc.

It cannot therefore be exact,—that which Plutarch affirms, Timoleon, c. 30,—that the Carthaginians had never employed Greeks in their service, at the time of the battle of the Krimêsus,—B.C. 340.

[898] Thucyd. vi, 34. δυνατοὶ δέ εἰσι (the Carthaginians) μάλιστα τῶν νῦν, βουληθέντες· χρυσὸν γὰρ καὶ ἄργυρον πλεῖστον κέκτηνται, ὅθεν ὅ τε πόλεμος καὶ τἆλλα εὐπορεῖ.

[899] Diodor. xiii, 54, 55.

[900] Diodor. xiii, 56, 57.

[901] Diodor. xiii, 57.

[902] Diodor. xiii, 57, 58.

[903] Diodor. xiii, 59. Ὁ δὲ Ἀννίβας ἀπεκρίθη, τοὺς μὲν Σελινουντίους μὴ δυναμένους τηρεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, πεῖραν τῆς δουλείας λήψεσθαι· τοὺς δὲ θεοὺς ἐκτὸς Σελινοῦντος οἴχεσθαι, προσκόψαντας τοῖς ἐνοικοῦσιν.

[904] Diodor. xiii, 59. The ruins, yet remaining, of the ancient temples of Selinus, are vast and imposing; characteristic as specimens of Doric art, during the fifth and sixth centuries B.C. From the great magnitude of the fallen columns, it has been supposed that they were overthrown by an earthquake. But the ruins afford distinct evidence, that these columns have been first undermined, and then overthrown by crow-bars.

This impressive fact, demonstrating the agency of the Carthaginian destroyers, is stated by Niebuhr, Vorträge über alte Geschichte, vol. iii. p. 207.

[905] Diodor. xiii, 60.

[906] Diodor. xiii, 61, 62.

[907] Diodor. xiii, 62. Τῶν δ' αἰχμαλώτων γυναικάς τε καὶ παῖδας διαδοὺς εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον παρεφύλαττε· τῶν δ' ἀνδρῶν τοὺς ἁλόντας, εἰς τρισχιλίους ὄντας, παρήγαγεν ἐπὶ τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ πρότερον Ἀμίλκας ὁ πάππος αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ Γέλωνος ἀνῃρέθη, καὶ πάντας αἰκισάμενος κατέσφαξε.

The Carthaginians, after their victory over Agathokles in 307 B.C., sacrificed their finest prisoners as offerings of thanks to the gods (Diodor. xx, 65.)

[908] Diodor. xiii, 79.

[909] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 37.

[910] Herodot. vi, 28.

[911] Diodor. xiii, 62-80.

[912] Diodor. xiii, 62.

[913] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 28. Οἱ δ' οὐκ ἔφασαν δεῖν στασιάζειν πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν, etc.

[914] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 31; Diodor. xiii, 63.

[915] Diodor. xiii, 63.

[916] Diodor. xiii, 63, 75.

[917] Diodor. xiii, 75. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Διοκλῆς ἐφυγαδεύθη, τὸν δὲ Ἑρμοκράτην οὐδ' ὡς προσεδέξαντο· ὑπώπτευον γὰρ τὴν τἀνδρὸς τόλμαν, μή ποτε τυχὼν ἡγεμονίας, ἀναδείξῃ ἑαυτὸν τύραννον.

[918] Diodor. xiii, 75. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἑρμοκράτης τότε τὸν καιρὸν οὐχ ὁρῶν εὔθετον εἰς τὸ βιάσασθαι, πάλιν ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς Σελινοῦντα. Μετὰ δέ τινα χρόνον, τῶν φίλων αὐτὸν μεταπεμπομένων, ὥρμησε μετὰ τρισχιλίων στρατιωτῶν, καὶ πορευθεὶς διὰ τῆς Γελώας, ἦκε νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τὸν συντεταγμένον τόπον.

[919] Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 4, 8.

[920] Diodor. xiii, 75.

Xenophon (Hellen. i, 3, 13) states that Hermokrates, ἤδη φεύγων ἐκ Συρακουσῶν, was among those who accompanied Pharnabazus along with the envoys intended to go to Susa, but who only went as far as Gordium in Phrygia, and were detained by Pharnabazus (on the requisition of Cyrus) for three years. This must have been in the year 407 B.C. Now I cannot reconcile this with the proceedings of Hermokrates as described by Diodorus; his coming to the Sicilian Messênê,—his exploits near Selinus,—his various attempts to procure restoration to Syracuse:—all of which must have occurred in 408-407 B.C., ending with the death of Hermokrates.

It seems to me impossible that the person mentioned by Xenophon as accompanying Pharnabazus into the interior can have been the eminent Hermokrates. Whether it was another person of the same name,—or whether Xenophon was altogether misinformed,—I will not take upon me to determine. There were really two contemporary Syracusans bearing that name, for the father of Dionysius the despot was named Hermokrates.

Polybius (xii, 25) states that Hermokrates fought with the Lacedæmonians at Ægospotami. He means the eminent general so called; who however cannot have been at Ægospotami in the summer or autumn of 405 B.C. There is some mistake in the assertion of Polybius, but I do not know how to explain it.

[921] Diodor. xiii, 96; xiv, 66.

Isokrates, Or. v, Philipp. s. 73—Dionysius, πολλοστὸς ὢν Συρακοσίων καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δόξῃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν, etc.

Demosthenes, adv. Leptinem, p. 506, s. 178. γραμματέως, ὥς φασι, etc. Polybius (xv, 35), ἐκ δημοτικῆς καὶ ταπεινῆς ὑποθέσεως ὁρμηθείς, etc. Compare Polyænus, v, 2, 2.

[922] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 24. Διονύσιος ὁ Ἑρμοκράτους. Diodor. xiii, 91.

[923] Diodor. xiii, 75.

[924] Diodor. xiii, 79.

[925] Diodor. xiii, 80; Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 21.

[926] Diodor. xiii, 81-84.

[927] Diogen. Laert. viii, 63.

[928] Diodor. xiii, 81-84; Polyb. ix, 7.

[929] Diodor. xi, 25.

[930] Virgil, Æneid. iii, 704.

[931] Diodor. xiii, 85.

[932] See about the Topography of Agrigentum,—Seyfert, Akragas, p. 21, 23, 40 (Hamburg, 1845).

The modern town of Girgenti stands on one of the hills of this vast aggregate, which is overspread with masses of ruins, and around which the traces of the old walls may be distinctly made out, with considerable remains of them in some particular parts.

Compare Polybius, i, 18; ix, 27.

Pindar calls the town ποταμίᾳ τ’ Ἀκράγαντι—Pyth. vi, 6: ἱερὸν οἴκημα ποταμοῦ—Olymp. ii, 10.

[933] Diodor. xiii, 85.

We read of a stratagem in Polyænus (v, 10, 4), whereby Imilkon is said to have enticed the Agrigentines, in one of their sallies, into incautious pursuit, by a simulated flight; and thus to have inflicted upon them a serious defeat.

[934] Diodor. xiii, 86.

[935] Diodor. xiii, 87.

It appears that an eminence a little way eastward from Agrigentum still bears the name of *Il Campo Cartaginese*, raising some presumption that it was once occupied by the Carthaginians. Evidently, the troops sent out by Imilkon to meet and repel Daphnæus, must have taken post to the eastward of Agrigentum, from which side

the Syracusan army of relief was approaching. Seyfert (Akragas, p. 41) contests this point, and supposes that they must have been on the western side; misled by the analogy of the Roman siege in 262 B.C., when the Carthaginian relieving army under Hanno were coming from the westward,—from Heraklei (Polyb. i, 19).

[936] Diodor. xiii, 87.

The youth of Argeius, combined with the fact of his being in high command, makes us rather imagine that he was of noble birth: compare Thucydid. vi, 38,—the speech of Athenagoras.

[937] Mention is again made, sixty-five years afterwards, in the description of the war of Timoleon against the Carthaginians,—of the abundance of gold and silver drinking cups, and rich personal ornaments, carried by the native Carthaginians on military service (Diodor. xvi, 81; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 28, 29).

There was a select body of Carthaginians,—a Sacred Band,—mentioned in these later times, consisting of two thousand five hundred men of distinguished bravery as well as of conspicuous position in the city (Diodor. xvi, 80; xx, 10).

[938] Diodor. xiii, 88.

[939] Diodor. xiii, 89, 90.

[940] Diodor. xiii, 91.

[941] Diodor. xiii, 88.

Xenophon confirms the statement of Diodorus, that Agrigentum was taken by famine (Hellen. i, 5, 21; ii, 2, 24).

[942] Diodor. xiii, 91.

[943] Demosthenes de Coronâ, p. 286, s. 220.

This comparison is made by M. Brunet de Presle, in his valuable historical work (Recherches sur les Etablissemens des Grecs en Sicile, Part ii, s. 39, p. 219).

[944] Aristotel. Politic. v, 5, 6. Γίνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, καὶ ὅταν ἀναλώσωσι τὰ ἴδια, ζῶντες ἀσελγῶς· καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι καινοτομεῖν ζητοῦσι, καὶ ἢ τυραννίδι ἐπιτίθενται αὐτοὶ, ἢ κατασκευάζουσιν ἕτερον· ὥσπερ Ἱππαρῖνος Διονύσιον ἐν Συρακούσαις.

Hipparinus was the father of Dion, respecting whom more hereafter.

Plato, in his warm sympathy for Dion, assigns to Hipparinus more of an equality of rank and importance with the elder Dionysius, than the subsequent facts justify (Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 353 A.; p. 355 F.).

[945] Diodor. xiii, 91. Ἀπορουμένων δὲ πάντων παρελθὼν Διονύσιος ὁ Ἑρμοκράτους, τῶν μὲν στρατηγῶν κατηγόρησεν, ὡς προδιδόντων τὰ πράγματα τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις· τὰ δὲ πλήθη παρώξυνε πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν τιμωρίαν, παρακαλῶν μὴ περιμεῖναι τὸν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους κλῆρον, ἀλλ' ἐκ χειρὸς εὐθέως ἐπιθεῖναι τὴν δίκην.

[946] Diodor. xiii, 91. Τῶν δ' ἀρχόντων ζημιούντων τὸν Διονύσιον κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, ὡς θορυβοῦντα, Φίλιστος, ὁ τὰς ἱστορίας ὕστερον συγγράψας, οὐσίαν ἔχων μεγάλην, etc.

In the description given by Thucydides (vi, 32-39) of the debate in the Syracusan assembly (prior to the arrival of the Athenian expedition) in which Hermokrates and Athenagoras speak, we find the magistrates interfering to prevent the continuance of a debate which had become very personal and acrimonious; though there was nothing in it at all brutal, nor any exhortation to personal violence or infringement of the law.

[947] Diodor. xiii, 91.

[948] Plato, Epistol. viii, p. 354. Οἱ γὰρ πρὸ Διονυσίου καὶ Ἱππαρίνου ἀρξάντων Σικελιῶται τότε ὡς ᾤοντο εὐδαιμόνως ἔζων, τρυφῶντές τε καὶ ἅμα ἀρχόντων ἄρχοντες· οἱ καὶ τοῦς δέκα στρατηγοὺς κατέλευσαν βάλλοντες τοὺς πρὸ Διονυσίου, κατὰ νόμον οὐδένα κρίναντες, ἵνα δὴ δουλεύοιεν μηδένι μήτε σὺν δίκῃ μήτε νόμῳ δεσπότῃ, ἐλεύθεροι δ' εἶεν πάντῃ πάντως· ὅθεν αἱ τυραννίδες ἐγένοντο αὐτοῖς.

Diodor. xiii, 92. παραυτίκα τοὺς μὲν ἔλυσε τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἑτέρους δὲ εἵλετο στρατηγοὺς, ἐν οἷς καὶ τὸν Διονύσιον. Some little time afterwards, Diodorus farther mentions that Dionysius accused before the public assembly, and caused to be put to death, Daphnæus and Demarchus (xiii, 96); now Daphnæus was one of the generals (xiii, 86-88).

If we assume the fact to have occurred as Plato affirms it, we cannot easily explain how something so impressive and terror-striking came to be transformed into the more commonplace statement of Diodorus, by Ephorus, Theopompus, Hermeias, Timæus, or Philistus, from one of whom probably his narrative is borrowed.

But if we assume Diodorus to be correct, we can easily account for the erroneous belief in the mind of Plato. A very short time before this scene at Syracuse, an analogous circumstance had really occurred at Agrigentum. The assembled Agrigentines, being inflamed against their generals for what they believed to be slackness or treachery in the recent fight with the Carthaginians, had stoned four of them on the spot, and only spared the fifth on the score of his youth (Diodor. xiii, 87).

I cannot but think that Plato confounded in his memory the scene and proceedings at Syracuse with the other events, so recently antecedent, at Agrigentum. His letter (from which the above citation is made) was written in his old age,—fifty years after the event.

This is one inaccuracy as to matter-of-fact, which might be produced in support of the views of those who reject the letters of Plato as spurious, though Ast does not notice it, while going through the letters *seriatim*, and condemning them not only as un-Platonic but as despicable compositions. After attentively studying both the letters themselves, and his reasoning, I dissent entirely from Ast's conclusion. The first letter, that which purports to come not from Plato, but from Dion, is the only one against which he seems to me to have made out a good case (see Ast, Ueber Platon's Leben und Schriften, p. 504-530). Against the others, I cannot think that he has shown any sufficient ground for pronouncing them to be spurious and I therefore continue to treat them as genuine, following the opinion of Cicero and Plutarch. It is admitted by Ast that their authenticity was not suspected in antiquity, as far as our knowledge extends. Without considering the presumption hence arising as conclusive, I think it requires to be countervailed by stronger substantive grounds than those which Ast has urged.

Among the total number of thirteen letters, those relating to Dion and Dionysius (always setting aside the first letter)—that is the second, third, fourth, seventh, eighth, and thirteenth,—are the most full of allusions to fact and details. Some of them go very much into detail. Now had they been the work of a forger, it is fair to contend that he could hardly avoid laying himself more open to contradiction than he has done, on the score of inaccuracy and inconsistency with the supposed situation. I have already mentioned one inaccuracy which I take to be a *fault* of memory, both conceivable and pardonable. Ast mentions another, to disprove the authenticity of the eighth letter, respecting the son of Dion. Plato, in this eighth letter, speaking in the name of the deceased Dion, recommends the Syracusans to name Dion's son as one of the members of a tripartite kingship, along with Hipparinus (son of the elder Dionysius) and the younger Dionysius. This (contends Ast, p. 523) cannot be correct, because Dion's son died before his father. To make the argument of Ast complete, we ought to be sure that Dion had only *one* son; for which there is doubtless the evidence of Plutarch, who after having stated that the son of Dion, a youth nearly grown up, threw himself from the roof of the house and was killed, goes on to say that Kallippus, the political enemy of Dion, founded upon this misfortune a false rumor which he circulated,—ὡς ὁ Δίων *ἅπαις γεγονὼς* ἔγνωκε τὸν Διονυσίου καλεῖν Ἀπολλοκράτην καὶ ποιεῖσθαι διάδοχον (Plutarch, Dion. c. 55, 56: compare also c. 21,—τοῦ παιδίου). But since the rumor was altogether false, we may surely imagine that Kallippus, taking advantage of a notorious accident which had just proved fatal to the eldest son of Dion, may have fabricated a false statement about the family of Dion, though there might be a younger boy at home. It is not certain that the number of Dion's children was familiarly known among the population of Syracuse; nor was Dion himself in the situation of an assured king, able to transfer his succession at once to a boy not yet adult. And when we find in another chapter of Plutarch's Life of Dion (c. 31), that the son of Dion was called by Timæus, *Aretæus*,—and by Timonides, *Hipparinus*,—this surely affords some presumption that there were *two* sons, and not one son called by two different names.

I cannot therefore admit that Ast has proved the eighth Platonic letter to be inaccurate in respect to matter of fact. I will add that the letter does not mention the *name* of Dion's son (though Ast says that it calls him *Hipparinus*); and that it does specify the *three* partners in the tripartite kingship suggested (though Ast says that it only mentioned *two*).

Most of Ast's arguments against the authenticity of the letters, however, are founded, not upon alleged inaccuracies of fact, but upon what he maintains to be impropriety and meanness of thought, childish intrusion of philosophy, unseasonable mysticism and pedantry, etc. In some of his criticisms I coincide, though by no means in all. But I cannot accept them as evidence to prove the point for which he contends,—the spuriousness of the letters. The proper conclusion from his premises appears to me to be, that Plato wrote letters which, when tried by our canons about letter-writing, seem awkward, pedantic, and in bad taste. Dionysius of Halikarnassus (De adm. vi dicend. in Demosth. p. 1025-1044), while emphatically extolling the admirable composition of Plato's di-

alogues, does not scruple to pass an unfavorable criticism upon him as a speech-writer; referring to the speeches in the Symposion as well as to the funeral harangue in the Menexenus. Still less need we be afraid to admit, that Plato was not a graceful letter-writer.

That Plato would feel intensely interested, and even personally involved, in the quarrel between Dionysius II. and Dion, cannot be doubted. That he would write letters to Dionysius on the subject,—that he would anxiously seek to maintain influence over him, on all grounds,—that he would manifest a lofty opinion of himself and his own philosophy,—is perfectly natural and credible. And when we consider both the character and the station of Dionysius, it is difficult to lay down beforehand any assured canon as to the epistolary tone which Plato would think most suitable to address him.

[949] Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.

[950] Diodor. xiii, 93.

[951] Diodor. xiii, 93.

[952] Diodor. xiii, 94.

[953] Diodor. xiii, 95. Διαλυθείσης δὲ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, οὐκ ὀλίγοι τῶν Συρακουσίων κατηγόρουν τῶν πραχθέντων, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ ταῦτα κεκυρωκότες· τοῖς γὰρ λογισμοῖς εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἐρχόμενοι, τὴν ἐσομένην δυναστείαν ἀνεθεώρουν. Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν βεβαιῶσαι βουλόμενοι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ἔλαθον ἑαυτοὺς δεσπότην τῆς πατρίδος καθεστακότες. Ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος, *τὴν μετάνοιαν τῶν ὄχλων φθάσαι βουλόμενος*, ἐπεζήτει δι' οὗ τρόπου δύναιτο φύλακας αἰτήσασθαι τοῦ σώματος· τούτου γὰρ συγχωρηθέντος, ῥᾳδίως ἤμελλε κυριεύσειν τῆς τυραννίδος.

[954] Diodor. xiii, 95. Αὐτὴ δ' ἡ πόλις (Leontini) τότε φρούριον ἦν τοῖς Συρακουσίοις, πλῆρες ὕπαρχον φυγάδων καὶ ξένων ἀνθρώπων. Ἤλπιζε γὰρ τούτους συναγωνιστὰς ἕξειν, ἀνθρώπους δεομένους μεταβολῆς· τῶν δὲ Συρακουσίων τοὺς πλείστους οὐδ' ἥξειν εἰς Λεοντίνους.

Many of the expelled Agrigentines settled at Leontini, by permission of the Syracusans (Diodor. xiii, 89).

[955] Diodor. xiii, 95.

[956] Aristotel. Politic. iii, 10, 10. Καὶ Διονυσίῳ τις, ὅτ' ᾔτει τοὺς φύλακας, συνεβούλευε τοῖς Συρακουσίοις διδόναι τοσούτους τοὺς φύλακας—i. e. τοσαύτην τὴν ἰσχυν, ὥσθ' ἑκάστου μὲν καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ συμπλειόνων κρείττω, τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἥττω, εἶναι.

[957] Diodor. xiv, 7. τοὺς ἠλευθερωμένους δούλους, etc.

[958] Diodor. xiii, 96.

[959] Diodor. 1, c.; Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.

[960] Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 24. Ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς ἔληγεν, ἐν ᾧ μεσοῦντι Διονύσιος ἐτυράννησε, etc.

The year meant here is an Olympic year, from Midsummer to Midsummer; so that the middle months of it would fall in the first quarter of the Julian year.

If we compare however Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 21 with ii, 2, 24, we shall see that the indications of time cannot both be correct; for the acquisition of the despotism by Dionysius followed immediately, and as a consequence directly brought about, upon the capture of Agrigentum by the Carthaginians.

It seems to me that the mark of time is not quite accurate in either one passage or the other. The capture of Agrigentum took place at the close of B.C. 406; the acquisition of the despotism by Dionysius, in the early months of 405 B.C., as Diodorus places them. Both events are in the same Olympic year, between Midsummer 406 B.C. and Midsummer 405 B.C. But this year is exactly the year which falls between the two passages above referred to in Xenophon; not coinciding exactly with either one or the other. Compare Dodwell, Chronolog. Xenoph. ad ann. 407 B.C.

[961] Diodor. xiii, 82, 96, 108. τὰς γλυφὰς καὶ τὰ περιττοτέρως εἰργασμένα κατέσκαψεν, etc.

[962] Diodor. xiii, 109.

[963] Diodor. xiii, 109.

[964] Diodor. xiii, 111.

[965] Μὴ κινεῖ Καμάριναν, ἀκίνητόν περ ἐοῦσαν—

"fatis nunquam concessa moveri

Apparet Camarina procul."—Virgil. Æneid, iii, 701.

[966] Diodor. xiii. 111. Οὐδεμία γὰρ ἦν παρ' αὐτοῖς φειδὼ τῶν ἁλισκομένων, ἀλλ' ἀσυμπαθῶς τῶν ἡτυχηκότων οὓς μὲν ἀνεσταύρουν, οἷς δ' ἀφορήτους ἐπῆγον ὕβρεις.

[967] Diodor. xiii, 112; xiv, 44. Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.

[968] Diodor. xiii, 112.

[969] Diodor. xiii, 113. παρῆν περὶ μέσας νύκτας πρὸς τὴν πύλην τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς … εἰσήλαυνε διὰ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς, etc.

[970] Diodor. xiii, 113. Compare Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 5.

[971] Xenophon (Hellen. ii, 3, 5) states that "the Leontines, co-residents at Syracuse, revolted to their own city from Dionysius and the Syracusans."

This migration to Leontini seems a part of the same transaction as what Diodorus notices (xiii, 113). Leontini, recognized as independent by the peace which speedily followed, is mentioned again shortly afterwards as inde-

pendent (xiv, 14). It had been annexed to Syracuse before the Athenian siege.

[972] Diodor. xiii, 114. καὶ Συρακουσίους μὲν ὑπὸ Διονύσιον τετάχθαι, etc.

[973] Diodor. xiii, 114.

Diodorus begins this chapter with the words,—*Διόπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀναγκαζόμενος* Ἰμίλκων, ἔπεμψεν εἰς Συρακούσας κήρυκα, παρακαλῶν τοὺς ἡττημένους διαλύσασθαι. Ἀσμένως δ' ὑπακούσαντος τοῦ Διονυσίου, τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἔθεντο, etc.

Now there is not the smallest matter of fact either mentioned or indicated before, to which the word διόπερ can have reference. Nothing is mentioned but success on the part of the Carthaginians, and disaster on the part of the Greeks; the repulse of the attack made by Dionysius upon the Carthaginian camp,—his retreat and evacuation of Gela and Kamarina,—the occupation of Gela by the Carthaginians,—the disorder, mutiny, and partial dispersion of the army of Dionysius in its retreat,—the struggle within the walls of Syracuse. There is nothing in all this to which διόπερ can refer. But a few lines farther on, after the conditions of peace have been specified, Diodorus alludes to *the* terrible disease (ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου) which laid waste the Carthaginian army, as if he had mentioned it before.

I find in Niebuhr (Vorträge über alte Geschichte, vol. iii, p. 212, 213) the opinion expressed, that here is a gap in Diodorus "intentionally disguised in the MSS., and not yet noticed by any editor." Some such conclusion seems to me unavoidable. Niebuhr thinks, that in the lost portion of the text, it was stated that Imilkon marched on to Syracuse, formed the siege of the place, and was there visited with the terrific pestilence to which allusion is made in the remaining portion of the text. This also is nowise improbable; yet I do not venture to assert it,—since the pestilence may possibly have broken out while Imilkon was still at Gela.

Niebuhr farther considers, that Dionysius lost the battle of Gela through miserable generalship,—that he lost it by design, as suitable to his political projects,—and that by the terms of the subsequent treaty, he held the territory around Syracuse only under Carthaginian supremacy.

[974] Justin, xxii, 2; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 2, 7, 9.

[975] Diodor. xiii, 114.

[976] Diodor. xiv, 10.

The valuable support lent to Dionysius by the Spartans is emphatically denounced by Isokrates, Orat. iv, (Panegyric.) s. 145; Orat. viii, (De Pace) s. 122.

[977] Plato, while he speaks of Dionysius and Hipparinus on this occasion as the saviors of Syracuse, does not insist upon extraordinary valor and ability on their parts, but assigns the result mainly to fortune and the favor of the gods (Plato, Epistol. viii, p. 353 B.; p. 355 F.).

His letter is written with a view of recommending a compromise at Syracuse, between the party of freedom, and the descendants of Dionysius and Hipparinus; he thus tries to set up as good a case as he can, in favor of the title of both the two latter to the gratitude of the Syracusans.

He reluctantly admits how much Dionysius the elder afterwards abused the confidence placed in him by the Syracusans (p. 353 C.).

[978] That this was the situation of the fortified *horrea publica* at Syracuse, we see from Livy, xxiv, 21. I think we may presume that they were begun at this time by Dionysius, as they form a natural part of his scheme.

[979] Diodor. xiv, 7.

The residence of Dionysius in the acropolis, and the quarters of his mercenaries without the acropolis, but still within Ortygia,—are noticed in Plato's account of his visit to the younger Dionysius (Plato, Epistol. vii, p. 350; Epist. iii, p. 315).

[980] Diodor. xiv, 7. Τῆς δὲ χώρας τὴν μὲν ἀρίστην ἐξελόμενος ἐδωρήσατο τοῖς τε φίλοις καὶ τοῖς ἐφ' ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένοις· *τὴν δ' ἄλλην ἐμέρισεν ἐπίσης ξένῳ τε καὶ πολίτῃ*, συμπεριλαβὼν τῷ τῶν πολιτῶν ὀνόματι τοὺς ἠλευθερωμένους δούλους, οὓς ἐκάλει νεοπολίτας. Διέδωκε δὲ καὶ τὰς οἰκίας τοῖς ὄχλοις, πλὴν τῶν ἐν τῇ Νήσῳ· ταύτας δὲ τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τοῖς μισθοφόροις ἐδωρήσατο. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὴν τυραννίδα καλῶς ἐδόκει διῳκηκέναι, etc.

[981] Diodor. xiv, 78.

So also, after the death of the elder Dionysius, Plutarch speaks of his military force as having been βαρβάρων μυρίανδρον φυλακήν (Plutarch, Dion. c. 10). These expressions however have little pretence to numerical accuracy.

[982] Cicero in Verrem, v. 32, 84; 38, 98.

[983] Aristotel. Politic. v, 9, 4. Καὶ ἡ εἰσφορὰ τῶν τελῶν (τυραννικόν ἐστι) ἐν πέντε γὰρ ἔτεσιν ἐπὶ Διονυσίου τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν εἰσενηνοχέναι συνέβαινε.

[984] Diodorus, xiv, 7.

[985] Diodor. xiv, 7. Compare an occurrence very similar, at Mendê in Thrace (Thucyd. iv, 130).

[986] Diodor. xiv, 8.

[987] Diodor. xiv, 10.

[988] Diodor. xiv, 8; xx, 78. Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus) sect. 49.

It appears that Timæus the historian ascribed this last observation to Philistus; and Diodorus copies Timæus in one of the passages above referred to, though not in the other. But Philistus himself in his history asserted that the observation had been made by another person (Plutarch, Dion. c. 35).

The saying seems to have been remembered and cited long afterwards in Syracuse; but cited as having been delivered by Dionysius himself, not as addressed to him (Livy, xxiv, 22).

Isokrates, while recording the saying, represents it as having been delivered when the Carthaginians were pressing Syracuse hardly by siege; having in mind doubtless the siege or blockade undertaken by Imilkon seven years afterwards. But I apprehend this to be a misconception. The story seems to suit better to the earlier occasion named by Diodorus.

[989] Herodotus, v, 71; Thucydides, i, 112.

[990] It is said that the Campanians, on their way to Syracuse, passed by Agyrium, and deposited their baggage in the care of Agyris the despot of that town (Diodor. xiv, 9). But if we look at the position of Agyrium on the map, it seems difficult to understand how mercenaries coming from the Carthaginian territory, and in great haste to reach Syracuse, can have passed anywhere near to it.

[991] Diodor. xiv, 9.

[992] Diodor. xiv, 9. The subsequent proceedings of the Campanians justified his wisdom in dismissing them. They went to Entella (a town among the dependencies of Carthage, in the south-western portion of Sicily, —Diod. xiv, 48), where they were welcomed and hospitably treated by the inhabitants. In the night, they set upon the Entellan citizens by surprise, put them all to death, married their widows and daughters, and kept possession of the town for themselves.

[993] Diodor. xiv, 10. Ἀπέστειλαν (οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι) Ἄριστον, ἄνδρα τῶν ἐπιφανῶν, εἰς Συρακούσας, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ προσποιούμενοι καταλιπεῖν τὴν δυναστείαν, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ σπεύδοντες αὐξῆσαι τὴν τυραννίδα· ἤλπιζον γὰρ συγκατασκευάζοντες τὴν ἀρχὴν, ὑπήκοον ἕξειν τὸν Διονύσιον διὰ τὰς εὐεργεσίας. Ὁ δ' Ἄριστος καταπλεύσας εἰς Συρακούσας, καὶ τῷ τυράννῳ λάθρα περὶ τούτων διαλεχθεὶς, τούς τε Συρακοσίους ἀνασείων, Νικοτέλην τὸν Κορίνθιον ἀνεῖλεν, ἀφηγούμενον τῶν Συρακοσίων· τοὺς δὲ πιστεύσαντας προδοὺς, τὸν μὲν τύραννον ἰσχυρὸν κατέστησε, διὰ δὲ τῆς πράξεως ταύτης ἀσχημονεῖν ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν ἅμα καὶ τὴν πατρίδα. Compare xiv, 70.

[994] Diodor. xiv, 10. Καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ παρεσκευάζετο πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν τῆς τυραννίδος, ὡς ἂν ἔργοις ἤδη πεῖραν εἰληφὼς, ὅτι πᾶν ὑπομένουσιν οἱ Συρακούσιοι χάριν τοῦ μὴ δουλεύειν.

[995] Plutarch, Lysander, c. 2.

[996] Diodor. xiv, 34.

[997] Diodor. xiv, 58.

[998] Diodor. xiv, 61.

[999] Diodor. xiv, 15.

[1000] Diodor. xiv, 16. This Archonides may probably have been son of the Sikel prince Archonides, who, having taken active part as an ally of Nikias and the Athenian invaders against Syracuse, died just before Gylippus reached Sicily (Thucyd. vii, 1).

[1001] See the Dissertation of Saverio Cavallari,—Zur Topographie von Syrakus (Göttingen, 1845), p. 22.

[1002] See, for a farther exposition of these points, my account of the siege of Syracuse by the Athenians, Vol. VII, ch. lix, lx.

[1003] Thucyd. vi, 75.

[1004] Diodor. xiv, 18. λίθων τετραπόδων. The stones may have been cubes of four feet; but this does not certainly appear.

[1005] Diodor. xiv, 18.

[1006] Diodor. xiv, 18. Καθόλου δὲ ἀποθέμενος τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς βάρος, ἰδιώτην αὐτὸν ἀπεδείκνυε, etc.

Compare cap. 45 and cap. 47—μισοῦντες τὸ βάρος τῆς τῶν Φοινίκων ἐπικρατείας, etc.

[1007] According to the testimony of Saverio Cavallari, the architect under whose directions the excavations were made in 1839, whereby these remains were first fully disclosed (Zur Topographie von Syrakus, p. 21).

[1008] Diodor. xiv, 45. Ἀπετίθετο γὰρ ἤδη τὸ πικρὸν τῆς τυραννίδος, καὶ μεταβαλλόμενος εἰς ἐπιείκειαν, φιλανθρωπότερον ἦρχε τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων, οὔτε φονεύων, οὔτε φυγάδας ποιῶν, *καθάπερ εἰώθει*.

[1009] Diodor. xiv, 7.

[1010] Diodor. xiv, 45.

[1011] Thucyd. vi, 46.

[1012] Diodor. xiv, 40.

[1013] Diodor. xiv, 40.

[1014] Diodor. xiv, 44, 106, 107.

[1015] Diodorus, when he first mentions the answer, does not give this remark as comprised in it; though he afterwards alludes to it as having been *said* to be (φασὶ) so comprised (xix, 44-107).

[1016] Aristot. Politic. v, 6, 7. Ἔτι διὰ τὸ πάσας τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἶναι, μᾶλλον πλεονεκτοῦσιν οἱ γνώριμοι· οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσίαι ἔρχονται, καὶ ἔξεστι ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν θέλωσι τοῖς γνωρίμοις μᾶλλον, καὶ κηδεύειν ὅτῳ θέλουσι. Διὸ καὶ ἡ Λοκρῶν πολιτεία ἀπώλετο ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον κηδείας· ὃ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, οὐδ' ἂν ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ εὖ μεμιγμένῃ.

[1017] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 6.

[1018] Diodor. xiv, 42, 43.

The historian Philistus had described with much minuteness these warlike preparations of Dionysius. Diodorus has probably abridged from him (Philisti Fragment. xxxiv, ed. Marx and ed. Didot.)

[1019] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13.

[1020] Thucyd. i, 13.

[1021] Thucyd. vii, 36-62.

[1022] Diodor. xiv, 42.

[1023] Diodor. xiv, 41. Συμπροθυμουμένων δὲ τῶν Συρακουσίων τῇ τοῦ Διονυσίου προαιρέσει, πολλὴν συνέβαινε γενέσθαι τὴν φιλοτιμίαν περὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων κατασκευήν.

[1024] Diodor. xiv, 43, 44, 45.

[1025] Diodor. xiv, 41.

[1026] Diodor. xiv, 44; xvi, 6.

[1027] Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.

[1028] Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v, 20, 57-63; Valer. Maxim. ix, 13; Diodor. xiv, 2.

[1029] Diodor. xiv, 45.

[1030] Diodor. xiv, 41.

[1031] Diodor. xiv, 46.

There were also Greeks, and seemingly Greeks of some consideration, who resided at Carthage, and seemed to have continued resident there throughout the war between the Carthaginians and Dionysius (Diodor. xiv, 77). We should infer, from their continuing to reside there, that the Carthaginians did not retaliate upon them the plunder now authorized by Dionysius against their countrymen resident at Syracuse; and farther, it affords additional probability that the number of Carthaginians actually plundered at Syracuse was not considerable.

For instances of intermarriage, and inter-residence, between Carthage and Syracuse, see Herodot. vii, 166; Livy, xxiv, 6.

Phœnician coins have been found in Ortygia, bearing a Phœnician inscription signifying *The Island*,—which was the usual denomination of Ortygia (Movers, Die Phönizier, ii, 2, p. 327).

[1032] Diodor. xiv, 55. Τοῦτο δ' ἐμηχανήσατο (Ἰμίλκων) πρὸς τὸ μηδένα τῶν κατασκόπων ἀπαγγεῖλαι τὸν κατάπλουν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, etc.

[1033] Diodor. xiv, 46, 47.

[1034] Diodor. xiv, 47.

[1035] Herodot. vii, 145. Τὰ δὲ Γέλωνος πρήγματα μεγάλα ἐλέγετο εἶναι, οὐδαμῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τῶν οὐ πολλὸν μέζω. Compare c. 160-162.

[1036] Herodot. vii, 158. Gelon's speech to the Lacedæmonians who come to solicit his aid against Xerxes.

Αὐτοὶ δὲ, ἐμεῦ πρότερον δεηθέντος βαρβαρικοῦ στρατοῦ συνεπάψασθαι, ὅτε μοι πρὸς Καρχηδονίους νεῖκος συνῆπτο … *ὑποτείνοντός τε τὰ ἐμπόρια συνελευθεροῦν*, etc.

[1037] Diodor. xiv, 46. Οὐ μόνον γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς οὐσίας διήρπασαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὺς συλλαμβάνοντες, πᾶσαν αἰκίαν καὶ ὕβριν εἰς τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν ἀπετίθεντο, μνημονεύοντες ὧν αὐτοὶ κατὰ τὴν αἰχμαλωσίαν ἔπαθον. Ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὲ τῆς κατὰ τῶν Φοινίκων τιμωρίας προέβησαν, καὶ τότε καὶ κατὰ τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον, ὥστε τοὺς Καρχηδονίους διδαχθῆναι μηκέτι παρανομεῖν εἰς τοὺς ὑποπεσόντας.

[1038] Diodor. xiv, 47.

[1039] Thucyd. vi, 2; Pausan. v, 25, 3.

[1040] Diodor. xiv, 48. Διονύσιος δὲ μετὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτόνων κατασκεψάμενος τοὺς τόπους, etc.

Artemon the engineer was consulted by Perikles at the siege of Samos (Plutarch, Perikles, c. 27).

[1041] Diodor. xiv, 48, 49.

[1042] Diodor. xiv, 49. ἐχώννυε τὸν μεταξὺ πόρον, καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ λόγον ἅμα τῇ τοῦ χώματος αὐξήσει προσήγαγε τοῖς τείχεσι.

[1043] Diodor. xiv, 50.

[1044] Diodor. xiv, 50; Polyænus, v, 2, 6.

[1045] Diodor. xiv, 51, 52, 53.

[1046] Diodor. xiv, 53.

[1047] Diodor. xiv, 54.

Leptines was brother of Dionysius (xiv, 102; xv, 7), though he afterwards married the daughter of Dionysius,—a marriage not condemned by Grecian sentiment.

[1048] Justin, xx, 5. One of these Carthaginians of rank, who, from political enmity to Hanno, wrote letters in Greek to communicate information to Dionysius, was detected and punished as a traitor. On this occasion, the

Carthaginian senate is said to have enacted a law, forbidding all citizens to learn Greek,—either to write it or to speak it.

[1049] Diodor. xiv, 54; Polyænus, v, 10, 1.

[1050] Diodor. xiv, 55.

[1051] Diodor. xiv, 55.

[1052] Diodor. xiv, 56, 57. τῶν ἰδίων ἱππέων ἐν Συρακούσαις ὄντων, etc. διὰ τῶν πεπτωκότων τειχῶν εἰσβιασάμενοι, etc. τὰ τείχη καταπεπτωκότα, etc.

Compare another example of inattention to the state of their walls, on the part of the Messenians (xix, 65).

[1053] Kleon and the Athenians took Torônê by a similar manœuvre (Thucyd. v, 2).

[1054] Diodor. xiv, 57.

[1055] Diodor. xiv, 58. Ἰμίλκων δὲ τῆς Μεσσήνης τὰ τείχη κατασκάψας, προσέταξε τοῖς στρατιώταις καταβαλεῖν τὰς οἰκίας εἰς ἔδαφος, καὶ μήτε κέραμον, μήθ' ὕλην, μήτ' ἄλλο μηδὲν ὑπολιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν κατακαῦσαι, τὰ δὲ συντρίψαι. Ταχὺ δὲ τῇ τῶν στρατιωτῶν πολυχειρίᾳ λαβόντων τῶν ἔργων συντέλειαν, ἡ πόλις ἄγνωστος ἦν, ὅπου πρότερον αὐτὴν οἰκεῖσθαι συνέβαινεν. Ὁρῶν γὰρ τὸν τόπον πόῤῥω μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν συμμαχίδων πόλεων κεχωρισμένον, εὐκαιρότατον δὲ τῶν περὶ Σικελίαν ὄντα, προῄρητο δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ τελέως ἀοίκητον διατηρεῖν, ἢ δυσχερῆ καὶ πολυχρόνιον τὴν κτίσιν αὐτῆς γίνεσθαι.

Ἐναποδειξάμενος οὖν τὸ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας μῖσος ἐν τῇ τῶν Μεσσηνίων ἀτυχίᾳ, etc.

It would appear, however, that the demolition of Messênê can hardly have been carried so far in fact as Imilkon intended; since the city reappears shortly afterwards in renewed dignity.

[1056] Diodor. xiv, 59-76.

[1057] Diodor. xiv, 59.

[1058] Diodor. xiv, 60, 61. Compare the speech of Theodôrus at Syracuse afterwards (c. 68), from which we gather a more complete idea of what passed after the battle.

[1059] Diodor. xiv, 61. Καὶ καθόλου δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος ἀπεδείκνυε πολέμιον ὕπαρχον τῶν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν.

These manifestations of anti-Hellenic sentiment, among the various neighbors of the Sicilian Greeks, are important to notice, though they are not often brought before us.

[1060] Diodor. xiv, 61.

[1061] Diodor. xiv, 63.

Polyænus (v, 8, 2) recounts a manœuvre of *Leptines*, practised in bringing back a Lacedæmonian reinforcement from Sparta to Sicily on his voyage along the Tarentine coast. Perhaps this may be the Lacedæmonian division intended.

[1062] Thucyd. vii, 42; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 21; Diodor. xiii, 11.

[1063] Diodor. xiv, 62.

The text of Diodorus is here so perplexed as to require conjectural alteration, which Rhodomannus has supplied; yet not so as to remove all that is obscure. The word εἰσθεόμεναι still remains to be explained or corrected.

[1064] Diodor. xiv, 63. Κατελάβετο δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς προάστειον, καὶ τοὺς νέως τῆς τε Δήμητρος καὶ Κόρης ἐσύλησεν.

Cicero (in Verrem, iv, 52, 53) distinctly mentions the temples of Demeter and Persephonê, and the statue of Apollo Temenites, among the characteristic features of Neapolis; which proves the identity of Neapolis with what Diodorus calls the suburb of Achradina. This identity, recognized by Serra di Falco, Colonel Leake, and other authors, is disputed by Saverio Cavallari, on grounds which do not appear to me sufficient.

See Colonel Leake, notes on Syracuse, pp. 7-10; Cavallari, Zur Topographie von Syrakus, p. 20.

[1065] Diodor. xiv, 64. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τοιούτων λόγων γινομένων, Διονύσιος κατέπλευσε, καὶ συναγαγὼν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπῄνει τοὺς Συρακουσίους, καὶ παρεκάλει θαῤῥεῖν, ἐπαγγελλόμενος ταχέως καταλύσειν τὸν πόλεμον. Ἤδη δ' αὐτοῦ μέλλοντος διαλύειν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἀναστὰς Θεόδωρος ὁ Συρακούσιος, ἐν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν εὐδοκιμῶν καὶ δοκῶν εἶναι πρακτικὸς, ἀπετόλμησε περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τοιούτοις χρήσασθαι λόγοις.

[1066] Diodor. xiv, 65. Οὗτος δὲ, τὰ μὲν ἱερὰ συλήσας, τοὺς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν πλούτους ἅμα ταῖς τῶν κεκτημένων ψυχαῖς ἀφελόμενος, τοὺς οἰκέτας μισθοδοτεῖ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν δεσποτῶν δουλείας....

c. 66. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρόπολις, δούλων ὅπλοις τηρουμένη, κατὰ τῆς πόλεως ἐπιτετείχισται· τὸ δὲ τῶν μισθοφόρων πλῆθος ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἤθροισται. Καὶ κρατεῖ τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἐπίσης βραβεύων τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ μόναρχος πλεονεξίᾳ κρίνων πράττειν πάντα. Καὶ νῦν μὲν οἱ πολέμιοι βραχὺ μέρος ἔχουσι τῆς χώρας· Διονύσιος δὲ, πᾶσαν ποιήσας ἀνάστατον, τοῖς τὴν τυραννίδα συναὐξουσιν ἐδωρήσατο....

... Καὶ πρὸς μὲν Καρχηδονίους δύο μάχας ἐνστησάμενος ἐν ἑκατέραις ἥττηται· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς πολίταις πιστευθεὶς ἅπαξ στρατηγίαν, εὐθέως ἀφείλετο τὴν ἐλευθερίαν· φονεύων μὲν τοὺς παῤῥησίαν ἄγοντας ὑπὲρ τῶν νόμων, φυγαδεύων δὲ τοὺς ταῖς οὐσίαις προέχοντας· καὶ τὰς μὲν τῶν φυγάδων γυναῖκας οἰκέταις καὶ μιγάσιν ἀνθρώποις συνοικίζων, τῶν δὲ πολιτικῶν ὅπλων βαρβάρους καὶ ξένους ποιῶν κυρίους....

c. 67. Οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα τὸν πολέμιον ἔχοντες ἡγεμόνα, τὸν τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἱερὰ σεσυληκότα;

c. 69. Διόπερ ἕτερον ἡγεμόνα ζητητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὸν σεσυληκότα τοὺς τῶν θεῶν ναοὺς στρατηγὸν ἔχοντες ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ θεομαχῶμεν....

[1067] Thucyd. i, 18; Herodot. v, 92.

[1068] Diodor. xiv, 70. Τοιούτοις τοῦ Θεοδώρου χρησαμένου λόγοις, οἱ μὲν Συρακούσιοι μετέωροι ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγένοντο, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους ἀπέβλεπον. Φαρακίδου δὲ τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίου ναυαρχοῦντος τῶν συμμάχων, καὶ παρελθόντος ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα, πάντες προσεδόκων ἀρχηγὸν ἔσεσθαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας.

[1069] Diodor. xiv, 70. Ὁ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸν τύραννον ἔχων οἰκείως, etc.; compare Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 14.

[1070] Diodor. xiv, 70. Παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσδοκίαν γενομένης τῆς ἀποφάσεως, οἱ μὲν μισθόφοροι συνέδραμον πρὸς τὸν Διονύσιον, οἱ δὲ Συρακούσιοι καταπλαγέντες τὴν ἡσυχίαν, εἶχον, πολλὰ τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις καταρώμενοι. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ πρότερον Ἀρέτης ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος (he is called previously *Aristus*, xiv, 10), ἀντιλαμβανομένων αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας, ἐγένετο προδότης· καὶ τότε Φαρακίδας ἐνέστη ταῖς ὁρμαῖς τῶν Συρακουσίων.

[1071] Diodor. xiv, 70. Συνεπελάβετο δὲ καὶ τῇ τοῦ δαιμονίου συμφορᾷ τὸ μυριάδας εἰς ταὐτὸ συναθροισθῆναι, καὶ τὸ τῆς ὥρας εἶναι πρὸς τὰς νόσους ἐνεργότατον, etc.

[1072] Diodor. xiv, 71-76. πεντεκαίδεκα μυριάδας ἐπεῖδον ἀτάφους διὰ τὸν λοιμὸν σεσωρευμένους.

I give the figure as I find it, without pretending to trust it as anything more than an indication of a great number.

[1073] Thucyd. ii, 54.

When the Roman general Marcellus was besieging Syracuse in 212 B.C., a terrific pestilence, generated by causes similar to that of this year, broke out. All parties, Romans, Syracusans, and Carthaginians, suffered from it considerably; but the Carthaginians worst of all; they are said to have all perished (Livy, xxv, 26).

[1074] Thucyd. vii, 22, 23.

[1075] Diodor. xiv, 72. Οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν οἱ μισθόφοροι τῷ Διονυσίῳ παρὰ πάντας ἀλλοτριώτατοι, καὶ πλεονάκις ἀποστάσεις καὶ ταραχὰς ποιοῦντες. Διόπερ ὁ μὲν Διονύσιος τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν ἦν παρηγγελκὼς, ὅταν ἐξάπτωνται τῶν πολεμίων, φεύγειν, καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους ἐγκαταλιπεῖν· ὧν ποιησάντων τὸ προσταχθὲν, οὗτοι μὲν ἅπαντες κατεκόπησαν.

[1076] Diodor. xiv, 72. Πάντη δὲ τῶν ἐξοχωτάτων νεῶν θραυομένων, αἱ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐμβόλων ἀναῤῥηττόμεναι λακίδες ἐξαίσιον ἐποιοῦντο ψόφον, etc.

[1077] Diodor. xiv, 75.

[1078] Diodor. xiv, 77.



GEORGE GROTE.

HISTORY OF GREECE.

BY

GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.

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PREFACE TO VOL. XI.

THIS History has already occupied a far larger space than I at first intended or anticipated.

Nevertheless, to bring it to the term marked out in my original preface—the close of the generation contemporary with Alexander, on whose reign we are about to enter—one more Volume will yet be required.

That Volume will include a review of Plato and Aristotle, so far as the limits of a general history permit. Plato, indeed, belonging to the period already described, is partially noticed in the present Volume; at an epoch of his life when, as counsellor of Dionysius II., he exercised positive action on the destinies of Syracuse. But I thought it more convenient to reserve the appreciation of his philosophical character and influence, until I could present him in juxtaposition with his pupil Aristotle, whose maturity falls within the generation now opening. These two distinguished thinkers will be found to throw light reciprocally upon each other, in their points both of contrast and similarity.

G. G.

LONDON, APRIL 15, 1853.

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earnest anxiety to ensure freedom of speech against himself. — Uncorrupted moderation and public spirit of Timoleon. — Xenophontic ideal — command over willing free men — qualities, positive as well as negative, of Timoleon. — Freedom and comfort diffused throughout all Sicily for twenty-four years, until the despotism of Agathokles. — Death and obsequies of Timoleon. — Proclamation at his funeral — monument to his honor. — Contrast of Dion and Timoleon.

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CHAPTER LXXXVI.

CENTRAL GREECE: THE ACCESSION OF PHILIP OF MACEDON TO THE BIRTH OF ALEXANDER. 359-356 B. C.

Central Greece resumed. — State of Central Greece in 360-359 B. C. — Degradation of Sparta. — Megalopolis — Messênê — their fear of Sparta — no central action in Peloponnesus. — Corinth, Sikyon, etc. — Comparatively good condition of Athens. — Power of Thebes. — Extinction of the free cities of Bœotia by the Thebans — repugnant to Grecian feeling. — Thessaly — despots of Pheræ. — Alexander of Pheræ — his cruelties — his assassination. — Tisiphonus despot of Pheræ — loss of power in the Pheræan dynasty. — Macedon — reign and death of Perdikkas. — Philip as a youth at Thebes — ideas there acquired — foundation laid of his future military ability. — Condition of Philip at the death of Perdikkas. — Embarrassments and dangers with which he had to contend. — Macedonian government. — Proceedings of Philip against his numerous enemies. His success — Thracians — Athenians. — He evacuates Amphipolis. He defeats Argæus and the Athenians — his mild treatment of Athenian prisoners. — Philip makes peace with Athens — renounces his claim to Amphipolis. — Victories of Philip over the Pæonians and Illyrians. — Amphipolis evacuated by Philip — the Athenians neglect it. — State of Eubœa — the Thebans foment revolt and attack the island — victorious efforts of Athens. — Surrender of the Chersonese to Athens. — Social War — Chios, Kos, Rhodes, and Byzantium revolt from Athens. — Causes of the Social War — conduct of the Athenians. — Synod at Athens. — Athens acts more for her own separate interests, and less for that of her allies — her armaments on service — badly paid mercenaries — their extortions. — The four cities declare themselves independent of Athens — interference of the Karian Mausôlus. — Great force of the revolters — armament despatched by Athens against Chios — repulse of the Athenians, and death of Chabrias. — Farther armaments of Athens — Iphikrates, Timotheus, and Chares — unsuccessful operations in the Hellespont, and quarrel between the generals. — Iphikrates and Timotheus are accused by Chares at Athens — Iphikrates is acquitted, Timotheus is fined and retires from Athens. — Arrogance and unpopularity of Timotheus, attested by his friend Isokrates. — Exile of Timotheus — his death soon afterwards. — Iphikrates no more employed — great loss to Athens in these two generals. — Expedition of Chares — Athens makes peace with her revolted allies, recognizing their full autonomy. — End of the Social War — great loss of power to Athens. — Renewed action of Philip. He lays siege to Amphipolis. — The Amphipolitans send to ask assistance from Athens — manœuvres of Philip to induce Athens not to interfere. — The Athenians determine not to assist Amphipolis — their motives — importance of this resolution. — Capture of Amphipolis by Philip, through the treason of a party in the town. — Importance of Amphipolis to Philip — disappointment of the Athenians at his breach of promise. — Philip amuses the Athenians with false assurances — he induces them to reject advances from the Olynthians — proposed exchange of Pydna for Amphipolis. — Philip acts in a hostile manner against Athens — he conquers Pydna and Potidæa — gives Potidæa to the Olynthians — remissness of the Athenians. — Increase of the power of Philip — he founds Philippi, opens gold mines near Mount Pangæus, and derives large revenues from them. — Marriage of Philip with Olympias — birth of Alexander the Great.

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CHAPTER LXXXVII.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SACRED WAR TO THAT OF THE OLYNTHIAN WAR.

Causes of the Sacred War — the Amphiktyonic assembly. — Political complaint brought before the assembly, first by Thebes against Sparta. — Next, by Thebes against the Phokians. The Phokians are condemned and heavily fined. — The assembly pass a vote consecrating the Phokian territory to Apollo. — Resolution of the Phokians to resist — Philomelus their leader. — Question of right raised as to the presidency of the temple — old right of the Phokians against that of the Delphians and the Amphiktyons. — Active measures taken by Philomelus. He goes to Sparta — obtains aid from king Archidamus. He seizes Delphi — defeats the Lokrians. —

Philomelus fortifies the temple — levies numerous mercenaries — tries to conciliate Grecian sentiment. The Grecian world divided. — Philomelus tries to retain the prophetic agency — conduct of the Pythia. — Battles of Philomelus against the Lokrians — his success. — Exertions of the Thebans to raise a confederacy against the Phokians. — Danger of the Phokians — they take part of the treasures of the temple, in order to pay a mercenary force. — Numerous mercenaries employed by the Phokians — violence and ferocity of the war — defeat and death of Philomelus. — Onomarchus general of the Phokians — he renews the war — his power by means of the mercenaries. — Violent measures of Onomarchus — he employs the treasures of the temple to scatter bribes through the various cities. — Successes of Onomarchus — he advances as far as Thermopylæ — he invades Bœotia — is repulsed by the Thebans. — The Thebans send a force under Pammenes to assist Artabazus in Asia Minor. — Conquest of Sestos by Chares and the Athenians. — Intrigues of Kersobleptes against Athens — he is compelled to cede to her his portion of the Chersonese — Athenian settlers sent thither, as well as to Samos. — Activity and constant progress of Philip — he conquers Methônê — remissness of Athens. — Philip marches into Thessaly against the despots of Pheræ. — Great power of Onomarchus and the Phokians — plans of Athens and Sparta — the Spartans contemplate hostilities against Megalopolis. — First appearance of Demosthenes as a public adviser in the Athenian assembly. — Parentage and early youth of Demosthenes — wealth of his father — dishonesty of his guardians. — Youth of Demosthenes — sickly and feeble constitution — want of physical education and bodily vigor. — Training of Demosthenes for a speaker — his instructors — Isæus — Plato — his devoted study of Thucydides. — Indefatigable efforts of Demosthenes to surmount his natural defects as a speaker. — Value set by Demosthenes upon action in oratory. His mind and thoughts — how formed. — He becomes first known as a logographer or composer of speeches for litigants. — Phokion — his antithesis and rivalry with Demosthenes — his character and position — his bravery and integrity. — Lasting hold acquired by his integrity on the public of Athens. — Number of times that he was elected general. — His manner of speaking — effective brevity — contempt of oratory. — His frankness — his contempt of the Athenian people — his imperturbability — his repulsive manners. — Phokion and Eubulus the leaders of the peace-party, which represented the strongly predominant sentiment at Athens. — Influence of Phokion mischievous during the reign of Philip — at that time Athens might have prevailed over Macedonia. — Change in the military spirit of Greece since the Peloponnesian war. Decline of the citizen soldiership: increased spread of mercenary troops. Contrast between the Periklean and the Demosthenic citizen. — Decline of military readiness also among the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta. — Multiplication of mercenary soldiers — its mischievous consequences — necessity of providing emigration. — Deterioration of the Grecian military force occurred at the same time with the great development of the Macedonian force. — Rudeness and poverty of the Macedonians — excellent material for soldiers — organizing genius of Philip. — First parliamentary harangue of Demosthenes — on the Symmories — alarm felt about Persia. — Positive recommendations in the speech — mature thought and sagacity which they imply. — His proposed preparation and scheme for extending the basis of the Symmories. — Spirit of the Demosthenic exhortations — always impressing the necessity of personal effort and sacrifice as conditions of success. — Affairs of Peloponnesus — projects of Sparta against Megalopolis — her attempt to obtain coöperation from Athens. — Views and recommendations of Demosthenes — he advises that Athens shall uphold Messênê and Megalopolis. — Philip in Thessaly — he attacks Lykophron of Pheræ, who calls in Onomarchus and the Phokians — Onomarchus defeats Philip. — Successes of Onomarchus in Bœotia — maximum of the Phokian power. — Philip repairs his forces and marches again into Thessaly — his complete victory over the Phokians — Onomarchus is slain. — Philip conquers Pheræ and Pagasæ — becomes master of all Thessaly — expulsion of Lykophron. — Philip invades Thermopylæ — the Athenians send a force thither and arrest his progress. Their alarm at this juncture, and unusual rapidity of movement. — Phayllus takes the command of the Phokians — third spoliation of the temple — revived strength of the Phokians — malversation of the leaders. — War in Peloponnesus — the Spartans attack Megalopolis — interference of Thebes. — Hostilities with indecisive result — peace concluded — autonomy of Megalopolis again recognized. — Ill success of the Phokians in Bœotia — death of Phayllus, who is succeeded by Phalækus. — The Thebans obtain money from the Persian king. — Increased power and formidable attitude of Philip. Alarm which he now begins to inspire throughout the Grecian world. — Philip acquires a considerable navy — importance of the Gulf of Pagasæ to him — his flying squadrons annoy the Athenian commerce and coast. — Philip carries on war in Thrace — his intrigues among the Thracian princes. — He besieges Heræon Teichos: alarm at Athens: a decree is passed to send out a fleet: Philip falls sick: the fleet is not sent. — Popularity of the mercenary general Charidemus — vote in his favor proposed by Aristokrates — speech composed by Demosthenes against it. — Languor of the Athenians — the principal peace-leaders, Eubulus, Phokion, etc., propose nothing energetic against Philip — Demosthenes undertakes the duty. — First Philippic of Demosthenes, 352-351 B. C. — remarks and recommendations of the first Philippic. Severe comments on the past apathy of the people. — He insists on the necessity that citizens shall serve in person, and

proposes the formation of an acting fleet and armament. — His financial propositions. — Mischiefs of the past negligence and want of preparation — harm done by the mercenary unpaid armaments, serving without citizens. — Characteristics of the first Philippic — prudent advice and early warnings of Demosthenes. — Advice of Demosthenes not carried into effect: no serious measures adopted by Athens. — Opponents of Demosthenes at Athens — speakers in the pay of Philip — alarm about the Persian king still continues.

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CHAPTER LXXXVIII.

EUBOIC AND OLYNTHIAN WARS.

Change of sentiments at Olynthus — the Olynthians afraid of Philip — they make peace with Athens. — Unfriendly feelings of Philip towards Olynthus — ripening into war in 350 B. C. — Fugitive half-brothers of Philip obtain shelter at Olynthus. — Intrigues of Philip in Olynthus — his means of corruption and of fomenting intestine discord. — Conquest and destruction of the Olynthian confederate towns by Philip, between 350-347 B. C. terrible phenomena. — Philip attacks the Olynthians and Chalkidians — beginning of the Olynthian war, 350 B. C. — The Olynthians conclude alliance with Athens. — The Athenians contract alliance with Olynthus — earliest Olynthiac speech of Demosthenes. — The Second Olynthiac is the earliest — its tone and tenor. — Disposition to magnify the practical effect of the speeches of Demosthenes — his true position — he is an opposition speaker. — Philip continues to press the Olynthian confederacy — increasing danger of Olynthus — fresh applications to Athens. — Demosthenes delivers another Olynthiac oration — that which stands First, in the printed order. Its tenor. — Just appreciation of the situation by Demosthenes. He approaches the question of the Theôric Fund. — Assistance sent by Athens to Olynthus. Partial success against Philip. — Partial and exaggerated confidence at Athens. The Athenians lose sight of the danger of Olynthus. Third Olynthiac of Demosthenes. — Tenor and substance of the third Olynthiac. — Courage of Demosthenes in combating the prevalent sentiment. — Revolt of Eubœa from Athens. — Intrigues of Philip in Eubœa. — Plutarch of Eretria asks aid from Athens. Aid is sent to him under Phokion, though Demosthenes dissuades it — Treachery of Plutarch — danger of Phokion and the Athenians in Eubœa — victory of Phokion at Tamynæ. — Dionysiac festival at Athens in March, 349 B. C. — Insult offered to Demosthenes by Meidias. — Reproaches against Demosthenes for having been absent from the battle of Tamynæ — he goes over on service to Eubœa as a hoplite — he is named senator for 349-348 B. C. — Hostilities in Eubœa, during 349-348 B. C. — Great efforts of Athens in 349 B. C. for the support of Olynthus and the maintenance of Eubœa at the same time. — Financial embarrassments of Athens. Motion of Apollodorus about the Theôric Fund. The assembly appropriate the surplus of revenue to military purposes. — Apollodorus is indicted and fined. — The diversion of the Theôric Fund proves the great anxiety of the moment at Athens. — Three expeditions sent by Athens to Chalkidikê in 349-348 B. C. according to Philochorus. — Final success of Philip — capture of the Chalkidic towns and of Olynthus. — Sale of the Olynthian prisoners — ruin of the Greek cities in Chalkidikê. — Cost incurred by Athens in the Olynthian war. — Theôric Fund — not appropriated to war purposes until a little before the battle of Chæroneia. — Views respecting the Theôric Fund. — It was the general Fund of Athens for religious festivals and worship — distributions were one part of it — character of the ancient religious festivals. — No other branch of the Athenian peace-establishment was impoverished or sacrificed to the Theôric expenditure. — The annual surplus might have been accumulated as a war-fund — how far Athens is blamable for not having done so. — Attempt of the Athenian property-classes to get clear of direct taxation by taking from the Theôric Fund. — Conflict of these two feelings at Athens. Demosthenes tries to mediate between them — calls for sacrifices from all, especially personal military service. — Appendix.

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CHAPTER LXXXIX.

FROM THE CAPTURE OF OLYNTHUS TO THE TERMINATION OF THE SACRED WAR BY PHILIP.

Sufferings of the Olynthians and Chalkidians — triumph and festival of Philip. — Effect produced at Athens by the capture of Olynthus — especially by the number of Athenian captives taken in it. — Energetic language of Eubulus and Æschines against Philip. — Increased importance of Æschines. — Æschines as envoy of Athens in Arcadia. — Increasing despondency and desire for peace at Athens. — Indirect overtures for peace between Athens and Philip, even before the fall of Olynthus — the Eubœans — Phrynon, etc. — First proposition of

Philokrates — granting permission to Philip to send envoys to Athens. — Effect produced upon the minds of the Athenians by their numerous captive citizens taken by Philip at Olynthus. — Mission of the actor Aristodemus from the Athenians to Philip on the subject of the captives. Favorable dispositions reported from Philip. — Course of the Sacred War — gradual decline and impoverishment of the Phokians. Dissensions among themselves. — Party opposed to Phalækus in Phokis — Phalækus is deposed — he continues to hold Thermopylæ with the mercenaries. — The Thebans invoke the aid of Philip to put down the Phokians. — Alarm among the Phokians — one of the Phokian parties invites the Athenians to occupy Thermopylæ — Phalækus repels them. — Increased embarrassment at Athens — uncertainty about Phalækus and the pass of Thermopylæ. — The defence of Greece now turned on Thermopylæ — importance of that pass both to Philip and to Athens. — Motion of Philokrates in the Athenian assembly — to send envoys to Philip for peace. — Ten Athenian envoys sent — Demosthenes and Æschines among them. — Journey of the envoys to Pella. — Statements of Æschines about the conduct of Demosthenes — arrangements of the envoys for speaking before Philip. — Harangue addressed by Æschines to Philip about Amphipolis. Failure of Demosthenes in his speech. — Answer of Philip — return of the envoys. — Review of Æschines and his conduct, as stated by himself. — Philip offers peace on the terms of *uti possidetis* — report made by the Athenian envoys on their return. — Proceedings in the Athenian assembly after the return of the envoys — motions of Demosthenes. — Arrival of the Macedonian envoys at Athens — days fixed for discussing the peace. — Resolution taken by the synod of allies at Athens. — Assemblies held to discuss the peace, in presence of the Macedonian envoys. — Philokrates moves to conclude peace and alliance with Philip. He proposes to exclude the Phokians specially. — Part taken by Æschines and Demosthenes — in reference to this motion. Contradictions between them. — Æschines supported the motion of Philokrates altogether — Demosthenes supported it also, except as to the exclusion of the Phokians — language of Eubulus. — Motion of Philokrates carried in the assembly, for peace and alliance with Philip. — Assembly to provide ratification and swearing of the treaty. — Question, Who were to be received as allies of Athens? — about the Phokians and Kersobleptes. — The envoy of Kersobleptes is admitted, both by the Athenian assembly and by the Macedonian envoys. — The Macedonian envoys formally refuse to admit the Phokians. — Difficulty of Philokrates and Æschines. Their false assurances about the secret good intentions of Philip towards the Phokians. — The Phokians are tacitly excluded — the Athenians and their allies swear to the peace without them. — Ruinous mistake — false step of Athens in abandoning the Phokians — Demosthenes did not protest against it at the time. — The oaths are taken before Antipater, leaving out the Phokians. — Second embassy from Athens to Philip. — Demosthenes urges the envoys to go immediately to Thrace in order to administer the oath to Philip — they refuse — their delay on the journey and at Pella. — Philip completes his conquest of Thrace during the interval. — Embassies from many Grecian states at Pella. — Consultations and dissensions among the Ten Athenian envoys — views taken by Æschines of the ambassadorial duties. — The envoys address Philip — harangue of Æschines. — Position of Demosthenes in this second embassy. — March of Philip to Thermopylæ — he masks his purposes, holding out delusive hopes to the Phokians. Intrigues to gain his favor. — The envoys administer the oaths to Philip at Pheræ, the last thing before their departure. They return to Athens. — Plans of Philip on Thermopylæ — corrupt connivance of the Athenian envoys — letter from Philip which they brought back to Athens. — Æschines and the envoys proclaim the Phokians to be excluded from the oaths with Philip — protest of Demosthenes in the Senate, on arriving at Athens, against the behavior of his colleagues — vote of the Senate approving his protest. — Public assembly at Athens — successful address made to it by Æschines — his false assurances to the people. — The Athenian people believe the promises of Philokrates and Æschines — protest of Demosthenes not listened to. — Letter of Philip favorably received by the assembly — motion of Philokrates carried, decreeing peace and alliance with him forever. Resolution to compel the Phokians to give up Delphi. — Letters of Philip to the Athenians, inviting them to send forces to join him at Thermopylæ — policy of these letters — the Athenians do nothing. — Phokian envoys heard these debates at Athens — position of Phalækus at Thermopylæ. — Dependence of the Phokians upon Athenian aid to hold Thermopylæ. — News received at Thermopylæ of the determination of Athens against the Phokians. — Phalækus surrenders Thermopylæ under convention to Philip. He withdraws all his forces. — All the towns in Phokis surrender at discretion to Philip, who declares his full concurrence with the Thebans. — Third embassy sent by the Athenians to Philip — the envoys return without seeing him, on hearing of the Phokian convention. — Alarm and displeasure at Athens — motion of Kallisthenes for putting the city in a good state of defence — Æschines and other Athenian envoys visit Philip in Phokis — triumphant celebration of Philip's success. — Fair professions of Philip to the Athenians, after his conquest of Thermopylæ: language of his partisans at Athens. — The Amphiktyonic assembly is convoked anew. Rigorous sentence against the Phokians. They are excluded from the assembly, and Philip is admitted in their place. — Ruin and wretchedness of the Phokians. — Irresistible ascendency of Philip. He is named by the Amphiktyons presiding celebrator of the Pythian festival of 346 B. C. — Great change effected by this peace in

Grecian political relations. Demosthenes and Æschines — proof of dishonesty and fraud in Æschines, even from his own admissions. — This disgraceful peace was brought upon Athens by the corruption of her own envoys. — Impeachment and condemnation of Philokrates. — Miserable death of all concerned in the spoliation of the Delphian temple.

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CHAPTER XC.

FROM THE PEACE OF 346 B. C. TO THE BATTLE OF CHÆRONEIA AND THE DEATH OF PHILIP.

Position of Philip after the conclusion of the Sacred War. — Sentiments of Demosthenes — he recommends acquiescence in the peace, and recognition of the new Amphiktyonic dignity of Philip. — Sentiments of Isokrates — his letter to Philip — his abnegation of free Hellenism. — Position of the Persian king Ochus — his measures against revolters in Phenicia and Egypt. — Reconquest of Phenicia by Ochus — perfidy of the Sidonian prince Tennes. — Reconquest of Egypt by the Persian force under Mentor and Bagoas. — Power of Mentor as Persian viceroy of the Asiatic coast — he seizes Hermeias of Atarneus. — Peace between Philip and the Athenians, continued without formal renunciation from 346-340 B. C. — Movements and intrigues of Philip everywhere throughout Greece. — Disunion of the Grecian world — no Grecian city recognized as leader. — Vigilance and renewed warnings of Demosthenes against Philip. — Mission of Python to Athens by Philip — amendments proposed in the recent peace — fruitless discussions upon them. — Dispute about Halonnesus. — The Athenians refuse to accept cession of Halonnesus as a favor, claiming restitution of it as their right. — Halonnesus taken and retaken — reprisals between Philip and the Athenians. — Movements of the philippizing factions at Megara — at Oreus — at Eretria. — Philip in Thrace — disputes about the Bosphorus and Hellespont — Diopeithes commander for Athens in the Chersonese. Philip takes part with the Kardians against Athens. Hostile collisions and complaints against Diopeithes. — Accusations against Diopeithes at Athens by the philippizing orators — Demosthenes defends him — speech on the Chersonese, and third Philippic. — Increased influence of Demosthenes at Athens — Athenian expedition sent, upon his motion, to Eubœa — Oreus and Eretria are liberated, and Eubœa is detached from Philip. — Mission of Demosthenes to the Chersonese and Byzantium — his important services in detaching the Byzantines from Philip, and bringing them into alliance with Athens. — Philip commences the siege of Perinthus — he marches through the Chersonesus — declaration of war by Athens against him. — Manifesto of Philip, declaring war against Athens — Complaints of Philip against the Athenians — his policy towards Athens — his lecture on the advantages of peace. — Open war between Philip and the Athenians. — Siege of Perinthus by Philip. His numerous engines for siege — great scale of operations. Obstinacy of the defence. The town is relieved by the Byzantines, and by Grecian mercenaries from the Persian satraps. — Philip attacks Byzantium — danger of the place — it is relieved by the fleets of Athens, Chios, Rhodes, etc. Success of the Athenian fleet in the Propontis under Phokion. Philip abandons the sieges both of Perinthus and Byzantium. — Votes of thanks from Byzantium and the Chersonesus to Athens for her aid — honors and compliments to Demosthenes. — Philip withdraws from Byzantium, concludes peace with the Byzantines, Chians, and others, and attacks the Scythians. He is defeated by the Triballi, and wounded, on his return. — Important reform effected by Demosthenes in the administration of the Athenian marine. — Abuses which had crept into the trierarchy — unfair apportionment of the burthen — undue exemption which the rich administrators had acquired for themselves. — Individual hardship, and bad public consequences, occasioned by these inequalities. — Opposition offered by the rich citizens and by Æschines to the proposed reform of Demosthenes — difficulties which he had to overcome. — His new reform distributes the burthen of trierarchy equitably. — Its complete success. Improved efficiency of the naval armaments under it. — New Sacred War commences in Greece. — Kirrha and its plain near Delphi consecrated to Apollo, in the first Sacred War under Solon. — Necessity of a port at Kirrha, for the convenience of visitors to Delphi. Kirrha grows up again, and comes into the occupation of the Lokrians of Amphissa. — Relations between the Lokrians of Amphissa and Delphi — they had stood forward earnestly in the former Sacred War to defend Delphi against the Phokians. — Amphiktyonic meeting at Delphi — February, 339 B. C. Æschines one of the legates from Athens. — Language of an Amphissian speaker among the Amphiktyons against Athens — new dedication of an old Athenian donative in the temple. — Speech of Æschines in the Amphiktyonic assembly. — Passion and tumult excited by his speech. — Violent resolution adopted by the Amphiktyons. — The Amphiktyons with the Delphian multitude march down to destroy Kirrha — interference of the Amphissians to rescue their property. They drive off the Amphiktyons. — Farther resolution taken by the Amphiktyons to hold a future special meeting and take measures for punishing the Lokrians. — Unjust violence of the Amphiktyons — public mischief done by Æschines. — Effect of the proceeding of Æschines at Athens. Opposition of Demosthenes at first

fruitless. — Change of feeling at Athens — the Athenians resolve to take no part in the Amphiktyonic proceedings against Amphissa. — Special meeting of the Amphiktyons at Thermopylæ, held without Athens. Vote passed to levy a force for punishing Amphissa. Kottyphus president. The Amphiktyons invoke the intervention of Philip. — Motives which dictated the vote — dependence of most of the Amphiktyonic voters upon Philip — Philip accepts the command — marches southward through Thermopylæ. — Philip enters Phokis. — He suddenly occupies, and begins to re-fortify Elateia. — He sends an embassy to Thebes, announcing his intention to attack Attica, and asking either aid, or a free passage for his own army. — Unfriendly relations subsisting between Athens and Thebes. Hopes of Philip that Thebes would act in concert with him against Athens. — Great alarm at Athens, when the news arrived that Philip was fortifying Elateia. — Athenian public assembly held — general anxiety and silence — no one will speak but Demosthenes. — Advice of Demosthenes to despatch an embassy immediately to Thebes, and to offer alliance on the most liberal terms. — The advice of Demosthenes is adopted — he is despatched with other envoys to Thebes. — Divided state of feeling at Thebes — influence of the philippizing party — effect produced by the Macedonian envoys. — Efficient and successful oratory of Demosthenes — he persuades the Thebans to contract alliance with Athens against Philip. — The Athenian army marches by invitation to Thebes — cordial coöperation of the Thebans and Athenians. — Vigorous resolutions taken at Athens — continuance of the new docks suspended — the Theôric Fund is devoted to military purposes. — Disappointment of Philip — he remains in Phokis, and writes to his Peloponnesian allies to come and join him against Amphissa. — War of the Athenians and Thebans against Philip in Phokis — they gain some advantages over him — honors paid to Demosthenes at Athens. — The Athenians and Thebans reconstitute the Phokians and their towns. — War against Philip in Phokis — great influence of Demosthenes — auxiliaries which he procured. — Increased efforts of Philip in Phokis. — Successes of Philip — he defeats a large body of mercenary troops — he takes Amphissa. — No eminent general on the side of the Greeks — Demosthenes keeps up the spirits of the allies, and holds them together. — Battle of Chæroneia — complete victory of Philip. — Macedonian phalanx — its long pikes — superior in front charge to the Grecian hoplites. — Excellent organization of the Macedonian army by Philip — different sorts of force combined. — loss at the battle of Chæroneia. — Distress and alarm at Athens on the news of the defeat. — Resolutions taken at Athens for energetic defence. Respect and confidence shown to Demosthenes. — Effect produced upon some of the islanders in the Ægean by the defeat — conduct of the Rhodians. — Conduct of Philip after the victory — harshness towards Thebes — greater lenity to Athens. — Conduct of Æschines — Demades is sent as envoy to Philip. — Peace of Demades, concluded between Philip and the Athenians. The Athenians are compelled to recognize him as chief of the Hellenic world. — Remarks of Polybius on the Demadean peace — means of resistance still possessed by Athens. — Honorary votes passed at Athens to Philip. — Impeachment brought against Demosthenes at Athens — the Athenians stand by him. — Expedition of Philip into Peloponnesus. He invades Laconia. — Congress held at Corinth. Philip is chosen chief of the Greeks against Persia. — Mortification to Athenian feelings — degraded position of Athens and of Greece. No genuine feeling in Greece now, towards war against Persia. — Preparations of Philip for the invasion of Persia. — Philip repudiates Olympias at the instance of his recently married wife, Kleopatra — resentment of Olympias and Alexander — dissension at Court. — Great festival in Macedonia — celebrating the birth of a son to Philip by Kleopatra, and the marriage of his daughter with Alexander of Epirus. — Pausanias — outrage inflicted upon him — his resentment against Philip, encouraged by the partisans of Olympias and Alexander. — Assassination of Philip by Pausanias, who is slain by the guards. — Accomplices of Pausanias. — Alexander the great is declared king — first notice given to him by the Lynkestian Alexander, one of the conspirators — Attalus and queen Kleopatra, with her infant son, are put to death. — Satisfaction manifested by Olympias at the death of Philip. — Character of Philip.

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CHAPTER LXXXIII.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS (*continued*). — FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE CARTHAGINIAN ARMY BY PESTILENCE BEFORE SYRACUSE, DOWN TO THE DEATH OF DIONYSIUS THE ELDER. B. C. 394-367.

In my preceding volume, I have described the first eleven years of the reign of Dionysius called the Elder, as despot at Syracuse, down to his first great war against the Carthaginians; which war ended by a sudden turn of fortune in his favor, at a time when he was hard pressed and actually besieged. The victorious Carthaginian army before Syracuse was utterly ruined by a terrible pestilence, followed by ignominious treason on the part of its commander Imilkon.

Within the space of less than thirty years, we read of four distinct epidemic distempers,[1] each of frightful severity, as having afflicted Carthage and her armies in Sicily, without touching either Syracuse or the Sicilian Greeks. Such epidemics were the most irresistible of all enemies to the Carthaginians, and the most effective allies to Dionysius. The second and third,—conspicuous among the many fortunate events of his life,—occurred at the exact juncture necessary for rescuing him from a tide of superiority in the Carthaginian arms, which seemed in a fair way to overwhelm him completely. Upon what physical conditions the frequent repetition of such a calamity depended, together with the remarkable fact that it was confined to Carthage and her armies,—we know partially in respect to the third of the four cases, but not at all in regard to the others.

The flight of Imilkon with his Carthaginians from Syracuse left Dionysius and the Syracusans in the full swing of triumph. The conquests made by Imilkon were altogether lost, and the Carthaginian dominion in Sicily was now cut down to that restricted space in the western corner of the island, which it had occupied prior to the invasion of Hannibal in 409 B. C. So prodigious a success probably enabled Dionysius to put down the opposition recently manifested among the Syracusans to the continuance of his rule. We are told that he was greatly embarrassed by his mercenaries; who, having been for some time without pay, manifested such angry discontent as to threaten his downfall. Dionysius seized the person of their commander, the Spartan Aristoteles: upon which the soldiers mutined and flocked in arms around his residence, demanding in fierce terms both the liberty of their commander and the payment of their arrears. Of these demands, Dionysius eluded the first by saying that he would send away Aristoteles to Sparta, to be tried and dealt with among his own countrymen: as to the second, he pacified the soldiers by assigning to them, in exchange for their pay, the town and territory of Leontini. Willingly accepting this rich bribe, the most fertile soil of the island, the mercenaries quitted Syracuse to the number of ten thousand, to take up their residence in the newly assigned town;

while Dionysius hired new mercenaries in their place. To these (including perhaps the Iberians or Spaniards who had recently passed from the Carthaginian service into his) and to the slaves whom he had liberated, he intrusted the maintenance of his dominion.[2]

These few facts, which are all that we hear, enable us to see that the relations between Dionysius and the mercenaries by whose means he ruled Syracuse, were troubled and difficult to manage. But they do not explain to us the full cause of such discord. We know that a short time before, Dionysius had rid himself of one thousand obnoxious mercenaries by treacherously betraying them to death in a battle with the Carthaginians. Moreover, he would hardly have seized the person of Aristoteles, and sent him away for trial, if the latter had done nothing more than demand pay really due to his soldiers. It seems probable that the discontent of the mercenaries rested upon deeper causes, perhaps connected with that movement in the Syracusan mind against Dionysius, manifested openly in the invective of Theodorus. We should have been glad also to know how Dionysius proposed to pay the new mercenaries, if he had no means of paying the old. The cost of maintaining his standing army, upon whomsoever it fell, must have been burdensome in the extreme. What became of the previous residents and proprietors at Leontini, who must have been dispossessed when this much-coveted site was transferred to the mercenaries? On all these points we are unfortunately left in ignorance.

Dionysius now set forth towards the north of Sicily to reëstablish Messênê; while those other Sicilians, who had been expelled from their abodes by the Carthaginians, got together and returned. In reconstituting Messênê after its demolition by Imilkon, he obtained the means of planting there a population altogether in his interests, suitable to the aggressive designs which he was already contemplating against Rhegium and the other Italian Greeks. He established in it one thousand Lokrians,—four thousand persons from another city the name of which we cannot certainly make out,[3] —and six hundred of the Peloponnesian Messenians. These latter had been expelled by Sparta from Zakynthus and Naupaktus at the close of the Peloponnesian war, and had taken service in Sicily with Dionysius. Even here, the hatred of Sparta followed them. Her remonstrances against his project of establishing them in a city of consideration bearing their own ancient name, obliged him to withdraw them: upon which he planted them on a portion of the Abakene territory on the northern coast. They gave to their new city the name of Tyndaris, admitted many new residents, and conducted their affairs so prudently, as presently to attain a total of five thousand citizens.[4] Neither here, nor at Messênê, do we find any mention made of the reëstablishment of those inhabitants who had fled when Imilkon took Messênê, and who formed nearly all the previous population of the city, for very few are mentioned as having been slain. It seems doubtful whether Dionysius readmitted them, when he reconstituted Messênê. Renewing with care the fortifications of the city, which had been demolished by Imilkon, he placed in it some of his mercenaries as garrison.[5]

Dionysius next undertook several expeditions against the Sikels in the interior of the island, who had joined Imilkon in his recent attack upon Syracuse. He conquered several of their towns, and established alliances with two of their most powerful princes, at Agyrium and Kentoripæ. Enna and Kephalœdium were also betrayed to him, as well as the Carthaginian dependency of Solûs. By these proceedings, which appear to have occupied some time, he acquired powerful ascendency in the central and north-east parts of the island, while his garrison at Messênê; ensured to him the command of the strait between Sicily and Italy.[6]

His acquisition of this important fortified position was well understood to imply ulterior designs against Rhegium and the other Grecian cities in the south of Italy, among whom accordingly a lively alarm prevailed. The numerous exiles whom he had expelled, not merely from Syracuse, but also from Naxus, Katana, and the other conquered towns, having no longer any assured shelter in Sicily, had been forced to cross over into Italy, where they were favorably received both at Kroton and at Rhegium.[7] One of these exiles, Helôris, once the intimate friend of Dionysius, was even appointed general of the forces of Rhegium; forces at that time not only powerful on land, but sustained by a fleet of seventy or eighty triremes.[8] Under his command, a Rhegine force crossed the strait for the purpose partly of besieging Messênê, partly of establishing the Naxian and Katanean exiles at Mylæ on the northern coast of the island, not far from Messênê. Neither scheme succeeded: Helôris was repulsed from Messênê with loss, while the new settlers at Mylæ were speedily expelled. The command of the strait was thus fully maintained to Dionysius; who, on the point of undertaking an aggressive expedition over to Italy, was delayed only by the necessity of capturing the newly established Sikel town on the hill of Taurus—or Tauromenium. The Sikels defended this position, in itself high and strong, with unexpected valor and obstinacy. It was the spot on which the primitive Grecian colonists who first came to Sicily, had originally landed, and from whence, therefore, the successive Hellenic encroachments upon the pre-established Sikel population, had taken their commencement. This fact, well known to both parties, rendered the capture on one side as much a point of honor, as the preservation on the other. Dionysius spent months in the siege, even throughout midwinter, while the snow covered this hill-top. He made reiterated assaults, which were always repulsed. At last, on one moonless winter night, he found means to scramble over some almost inaccessible crags to a portion of the town less defended, and to effect a lodgment in one of the two fortified portions into which it was divided. Having taken the first part, he immediately proceeded to attack the second. But the Sikels, resisting with desperate valor, repulsed him, and compelled the storming party to flee in disorder, amidst the darkness of night, and over the most difficult ground. Six hundred of them were slain on the spot, and scarcely any escaped without throwing away their arms. Even Dionysius himself, being overthrown by the thrust of a spear on his cuirass, was with difficulty picked up and carried off alive; all his arms, except the cuirass, being left behind. He was obliged to raise the siege, and was long in recov-

ering from his wound: the rather as his eyes also had suffered considerably from the snow.[9]

So manifest a reverse, before a town comparatively insignificant, lowered his military reputation, and encouraged his enemies throughout the island. The Agrigentines and others, throwing off their dependence upon him, proclaimed themselves autonomous; banishing those leaders among them who upheld his interest.[10] Many of the Sikels also, elate with the success of their countrymen at Tauromenium, declared openly against him; joining the Carthaginian general Magon, who now, for the first time since the disaster before Syracuse, again exhibited the force of Carthage in the field.

Since the disaster before Syracuse, Magon had remained tranquil in the western or Carthaginian corner of the island, recruiting the strength and courage of his countrymen, and taking unusual pains to conciliate the attachment of the dependent native towns. Reinforced in part by the exiles expelled by Dionysius, he was now in a condition to assume the aggressive, and to espouse the cause of the Sikels after their successful defence of Tauromenium. He even ventured to overrun and ravage the Messenian territory; but Dionysius, being now recovered from his wound, marched against him, defeated him in a battle near Abakæna, and forced him again to retire westward, until fresh troops were sent to him from Carthage.[11]

Without pursuing Magon, Dionysius returned to Syracuse, from whence he presently set forth to execute his projects against Rhegium, with a fleet of one hundred ships of war. So skilfully did he arrange or mask his movements, that he arrived at night at the gates and under the walls of Rhegium, without the least suspicion on the part of the citizens. Applying combustibles to set fire to the gate (as he had once done successfully at the gate of Achradina),[12] he at the same time planted his ladders against the walls, and attempted an escalade. Surprised and in small numbers, the citizens began their defence; but the attack was making progress, had not the general Helôris, instead of trying to extinguish the flames, bethought himself of encouraging them by heaping on dry faggots and other matters. The conflagration became so violent, that even the assailants themselves were kept off until time was given for the citizens to mount the walls in force; and the city was saved from capture by burning a portion of it. Disappointed in his hopes, Dionysius was obliged to content himself with ravaging the neighboring territory; after which, he concluded a truce of one year with the Rhegines, and then returned to Syracuse.[13]

This step was probably determined by news of the movements of Magon, who was in the field anew with a mercenary force reckoned at eighty thousand men—Libyan, Sardinian, and Italian—obtained from Carthage, where hope of Sicilian success was again reviving. Magon directed his march through the Sikel population in the centre of the island, receiving the adhesion of many of their various townships. Agyrium, however, the largest and most important of all, resisted him as an enemy.

Agyris, the despot of the place, who had conquered much of the neighboring territory, and had enriched himself by the murder of several opulent proprietors, maintained strict alliance with Dionysius. The latter speedily came to his aid, with a force stated at twenty thousand men, Syracusans and mercenaries. Admitted into the city, and co-operating with Agyris, who furnished abundant supplies, he soon reduced the Carthaginians to great straits. Magon was encamped near the river Chrysas, between Agyrium and Morgantinê; in an enemy's country, harassed by natives who perfectly knew the ground, and who cut off in detail all his parties sent out to obtain provisions. The Syracusans, indeed, disliking or mistrusting such tardy methods, impatiently demanded leave to make a vigorous attack; and when Dionysius refused, affirming that with a little patience the enemy must be speedily starved out, they left the camp and returned home. Alarmed at their desertion, he forthwith issued a requisition for a large number of slaves to supply their places. But at this very juncture, there arrived a proposition from the Carthaginians to be allowed to make peace and retire; which Dionysius granted, on condition that they should abandon to him the Sikels and their territory—especially Tauromenium. Upon these terms peace was accordingly concluded, and Magon again returned to Carthage.[14]

Relieved from these enemies, Dionysius was enabled to restore those slaves, whom he had levied under the recent requisition, to their masters. Having established his dominion fully among the Sikels, he again marched against Tauromenium, which on this occasion was unable to resist him. The Sikels, who had so valiantly defended it, were driven out, to make room for new inhabitants, chosen from among the mercenaries of Dionysius.[15]

Thus master both of Messênê and Tauromenium, the two most important maritime posts on the Italian side of Sicily, Dionysius prepared to execute his ulterior schemes against the Greeks in the south of Italy. These still powerful, though once far more powerful, cities, were now suffering under a cause of decline common to all the Hellenic colonies on the coast of the continent. The indigenous population of the interior had been reinforced, or enslaved, by more warlike emigrants from behind, who now pressed upon the maritime Grecian cities with encroachment difficult to resist.

It was the Samnites, a branch of the hardy Sabellian race, mountaineers from the central portion of the Apennine range, who had been recently spreading themselves abroad as formidable assailants. About 420 B. C., they had established themselves in Capua and the fertile plains of Campania, expelling or dispossessing the previous Tuscan proprietors. From thence, about 416 B. C., they reduced the neighboring city of Cumæ, the most ancient western colony of the Hellenic race.[16] The neighboring Grecian establishments of Neapolis and Dikæarchia seem also to have come, like Cumæ, under tribute and dominion to the Campanian Samnites, and thus became partially dis-hellenised.[17] These Campanians, of Samnite race, have been frequently mentioned in the two preceding chapters, as employed on mercenary service both in

the armies of the Carthaginians, and in those of Dionysius.[18] But the great migration of this warlike race was farther to the south-east, down the line of the Apennines towards the Tarentine Gulf and the Sicilian strait. Under the name of Lucanians, they established a formidable power in these regions, subjugating the Œnotrian population there settled.[19] The Lucanian power seems to have begun and to have gradually increased from about 430 B. C. At its maximum (about 380-360 B. C.), it comprehended most part of the inland territory, and considerable portions of the coast, especially the southern coast,—bounded by an imaginary line drawn from Metapontum on the Tarentine Gulf, across the breadth of Italy to Poseidonia or Pæstum, near the mouth of the river Silaris, on the Tyrrhenian or Lower sea. It was about 356 B. C., that the rural serfs, called Bruttians,[20] rebelled against the Lucanians, and robbed them of the southern part of this territory; establishing an independent dominion in the inland portion of what is now called the Farther Calabria—extending from a boundary line drawn across Italy between Thurii and Läus, down to near the Sicilian strait. About 332 B. C., commenced the occasional intervention of the Epirotic kings from the one side, and the persevering efforts of Rome from the other, which, after long and valiant struggles, left Samnites, Lucanians, Bruttians, all Roman subjects.

At the period which we have now reached, these Lucanians, having conquered the Greek cities of Poseidonia (or Pæstum) and Läus, with much of the territory lying between the Gulfs of Poseidonia and Tarentum, severely harassed the inhabitants of Thurii, and alarmed all the neighboring Greek cities down to Rhegium. So serious was the alarm of these cities, that several of them contracted an intimate defensive alliance, strengthening for the occasion that feeble synodical band, and sense of Italiot communion,[21] the form and trace of which seems to have subsisted without the reality, even under marked enmity between particular cities. The conditions of the newly-contracted alliance were most stringent; not only binding each city to assist at the first summons any other city invaded by the Lucanians, but also pronouncing, that if this obligation were neglected, the generals of the disobedient city should be condemned to death.[22] However, at this time the Italiot Greeks were not less afraid of Dionysius and his aggressive enterprises from the south, than of the Lucanians from the north; and their defensive alliance was intended against both. To Dionysius, on the contrary, the invasion of the Lucanians from landward was a fortunate incident for the success of his own schemes. Their concurrent designs against the same enemies, speedily led to the formation of a distinct alliance between the two.[23] Among the allies of Dionysius, too, we must number the Epizephyrian Lokrians; who not only did not join the Italiot confederacy, but espoused his cause against it with ardor. The enmity of the Lokrians against their neighbors, the Rhegines, was ancient and bitter; exceeded only by that of Dionysius, who never forgave the refusal of the Rhegines to permit him to marry a wife out of their city, and was always grateful to the Lokrians for having granted to him the privilege which their neighbors had refused.

Wishing as yet, if possible, to avoid provoking the other members of the Italiot confederacy, Dionysius still professed to be revenging himself exclusively upon Rhegium; against which he conducted a powerful force from Syracuse. Twenty thousand foot, one thousand horse, and one hundred and twenty ships of war, are mentioned as the total of his armament. Disembarking near Lokri, he marched across the lower part of the peninsula in a westerly direction, ravaged with fire and sword the Rhegian territory, and then encamped near the strait on the northern side of Rhegium. His fleet followed coastwise round Cape Zephyrium to the same point. While he was pressing the siege, the members of the Italiot synod despatched from Kroton a fleet of sixty sail, to assist in the defence. Their ships, having rounded Cape Zephyrium, were nearing Rhegium from the south, when Dionysius himself approached to attack them, with fifty ships detached from his force. Though inferior in number, his fleet was probably superior in respect to size and equipment; so that the Krotoniate captains, not daring to hazard a battle, ran their ships ashore. Dionysius here attacked them, and would have towed off all the ships (without their crews) as prizes, had not the scene of action lain so near to Rhegium, that the whole force of the city could come forth in reinforcement, while his own army was on the opposite side of the town. The numbers and courage of the Rhegines baffled his efforts, rescued the ships, and hauled them all up upon the shore in safety. Obliged to retire without success, Dionysius was farther overtaken by a terrific storm, which exposed his fleet to the utmost danger. Seven of his ships were driven ashore; their crews, fifteen hundred in number, being either drowned, or falling into the hands of the Rhegines. The rest, after great danger and difficulty, either rejoined the main fleet or got into the harbor of Messênê; where Dionysius himself in his quinquereme also found refuge, but only at midnight, and after imminent risk for several hours. Disheartened by this misfortune as well as by the approach of winter, he withdrew his forces for the present, and returned to Syracuse.[24]

A part of his fleet, however, under Leptines, was despatched northward along the south-western coast of Italy to the Gulf of Elea, to coöperate with the Lucanians; who from that coast and from inland were invading the inhabitants of Thurii on the Tarentine Gulf. Thurii was the successor, though with far inferior power, of the ancient Sybaris; whose dominion had once stretched across from sea to sea, comprehending the town of Läus, now a Lucanian possession.[25] Immediately on the appearance of the Lucanians, the Thurians had despatched an urgent message to their allies, who were making all haste to arrive, pursuant to covenant. But before such junction could possibly take place, the Thurians, confiding in their own native force of fourteen thousand foot, and one thousand horse, marched against the enemy single-handed. The Lucanian invaders retreated, pursued by the Thurians, who followed them even into that mountainous region of the Appenines which stretches between the two seas, and which presents the most formidable danger and difficulty for all military operations.[26] They assailed successfully a fortified post or village of the Lucanians, which fell into their hands with a rich plunder. By such partial advantage

they were so elated, that they ventured to cross over all the mountain passes even to the neighborhood of the southern sea, with the intention of attacking the flourishing town of Läus[27]—once the dependency of their Sybaritan predecessors. But the Lucanians, having allured them into these impracticable paths, closed upon them behind with greatly increased numbers, forbade all retreat, and shut them up in a plain surrounded with high and precipitous cliffs. Attacked in this plain by numbers double their own, the unfortunate Thurians underwent one of the most bloody defeats recorded in Grecian history. Out of their fourteen thousand men, ten thousand were slain, under merciless order from the Lucanians to give no quarter. The remainder contrived to flee to a hill near the sea-shore, from whence they saw a fleet of ships of war coasting along at no great distance. Distracted with terror, they were led to fancy, or to hope, that these were the ships expected from Rhegium to their aid; though the Rhegines would naturally send their ships, when demanded, to Thurii, on the Tarentine Gulf, not to the Lower sea near Läus. Under this impression, one thousand of them swam off from the shore to seek protection on shipboard. But they found themselves, unfortunately, on board the fleet of Leptines, brother and admiral of Dionysius, come for the express purpose of aiding the Lucanians. With a generosity not less unexpected than honorable, this officer saved their lives, and also, as it would appear, the lives of all the other defenceless survivors; persuading or constraining the Lucanians to release them, on receiving one mina of silver per man.[28]

This act of Hellenic sympathy restored three or four thousand citizens on ransom to Thurii, instead of leaving them to be massacred or sold by the barbarous Lucanians, and procured the warmest esteem for Leptines personally among the Thurians and other Italiot Greeks. But it incurred the strong displeasure of Dionysius, who now proclaimed openly his project of subjugating these Greeks, and was anxious to encourage the Lucanians as indispensable allies. Accordingly he dismissed Leptines, and named as admiral his other brother Thearides. He then proceeded to conduct a fresh expedition; no longer intended against Rhegium alone, but against all the Italiot Greeks. He departed from Syracuse with a powerful force—twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse, with which, he marched by land in five days to Messênê; his fleet under Thearides accompanying him—forty ships of war, and three hundred transports with provisions. Having first successfully surprised and captured near the Lipari isles a Rhegian squadron of ten ships, the crews of which he constituted prisoners at Messênê, he transported his army across the strait into Italy, and laid siege to Kaulonia—on the eastern coast of the peninsula, and conterminous with the northern border of his allies the Lokrians. He attacked this place vigorously, with the best siege machines which his arsenal furnished.

The Italiot Greeks, on the other hand, mustered their united force to relieve it. Their chief centre of action was Kroton where most of the Syracusan exiles, the most forward of all champions in the cause, were now assembled. One of these exiles, Helôris (who had before been named general by the Rhegines), was intrusted with

the command of the collective army; an arrangement neutralizing all local jealousies. Under the cordial sentiment prevailing, an army was mustered at Kroton, estimated at twenty-five thousand foot and two thousand horse; by what cities furnished, or in what proportion, we are unable to say.[29] At the head of these troops, Helôris marched southward from Kroton to the river Elleporus not far from Kaulonia; where Dionysius, raising the siege, met him.[30] He was about four miles and a half from the Krotoniate army, when he learnt from his scouts that Helôris with a chosen regiment of five hundred men (perhaps Syracusan exiles like himself), was considerably in advance of the main body. Moving rapidly forward in the night, Dionysius surprised this advanced guard at break of day, completely isolated from the rest. Helôris, while he despatched instant messages to accelerate the coming up of the main body, defended himself with his small band against overwhelming superiority of numbers. But the odds were too great. After an heroic resistance, he was slain, and his companions nearly all cut to pieces, before the main body, though they came up at full speed, could arrive.

The hurried pace of the Italiot army, however, though it did not suffice to save the general, was of fatal efficacy in deranging their own soldierlike army. Confused and disheartened by finding that Helôris was slain, which left them without a general to direct the battle or restore order, the Italiots fought for some time against Dionysius, but were at length defeated with severe loss. They effected their retreat from the field of battle to a neighboring eminence, very difficult to attack, yet destitute of water and provisions. Here Dionysius blocked them up, without attempting an attack, but keeping the strictest guard round the hill during the whole remaining day and the ensuing night. The heat of the next day, with total want of water, so subdued their courage, that they sent to Dionysius a herald with propositions, entreating to be allowed to depart on a stipulated ransom. But the terms were peremptorily refused; they were ordered to lay down their arms, and surrender at discretion. Against this terrible requisition they stood out yet awhile, until the increasing pressure of physical exhaustion and suffering drove them to surrender, about the eighth hour of the day. [31]

More than ten thousand disarmed Greeks descended from the hill and defiled before Dionysius, who numbered the companies as they passed with a stick. As his savage temper was well known, they expected nothing short of the harshest sentence. So much the greater was their astonishment and delight, when they found themselves treated not merely with lenity, but with generosity.[32] Dionysius released them all without even exacting a ransom; and concluded a treaty with most of the cities to which they belonged, leaving their autonomy undisturbed. He received the warmest thanks, accompanied by votes of golden wreaths, from the prisoners as well as from the cities; while among the general public of Greece, the act was hailed as forming the prominent glory of his political life.[33] Such admiration was well deserved, looking to the laws of war then prevalent.

With the Krotoniates and other Italiot Greeks (except Rhegium and Lokri) Dionysius had had no marked previous relations and therefore had not contracted any strong personal sentiment either of antipathy or favor. With Rhegium and Lokri, the case was different. To the Lokrians he was strongly attached: against the Rhegines his animosity was bitter and implacable, manifesting itself in a more conspicuous manner by contrast with his recent dismissal of the Krotoniate prisoners; a proceeding which had been probably dictated, in great part, by his anxiety to have his hands free for the attack of isolated Rhegium. After having finished the arrangements consequent upon his victory, he marched against that city, and prepared to besiege it. The citizens, feeling themselves without hope of succor, and intimidated by the disaster of their Italiot allies, sent out heralds to beg for moderate terms, and imploring him to abstain from extreme or unmeasured rigor.[34] For a moment, Dionysius seemed to comply with their request. He granted them peace, on condition that they should surrender all their ships of war, seventy in number—that they should pay to him three hundred talents in money—and that they should place in his hands one hundred hostages. All these demands were strictly complied with; upon which Dionysius withdrew his army, and agreed to spare the city.[35]

His next proceeding was, to attack Kaulonia and Hipponium; two cities which seem between them to have occupied the whole breadth of the Calabrian peninsula, immediately north of Rhegium and Lokri; Kaulonia on the eastern coast, Hipponium on or near the western. Both these cities he besieged, took, and destroyed: probably neither of them, in the hopeless circumstances of the case, made any strenuous resistance. He then caused the inhabitants of both of them, such at least as did not make their escape, to be transported to Syracuse, where he domiciliated them as citizens, allowing them five years of exemption from taxes.[36] To be a citizen of Syracuse meant at this moment, to be a subject of his despotism, and nothing more: how he made room for these new citizens, or furnished them with lands and houses, we are unfortunately not informed. But the territory of both these towns, evacuated by its free inhabitants (though probably not by its slaves, or serfs), was handed over to the Lokrians and annexed to their city. That favored city, which had accepted his offer of marriage, was thus immensely enriched both in lands and in collective property. Here again it would have been interesting to hear what measures were taken to appropriate or distribute the new lands; but our informant is silent.

Dionysius had thus accumulated into Syracuse, not only all Sicily[37] (to use the language of Plato), but even no inconsiderable portion of Italy. Such wholesale changes of domicile and property must probably have occupied some months; during which time the army of Dionysius seems never to have quitted the Calabrian peninsula, though he himself may probably have gone for a time in person to Syracuse. It was soon seen that the depopulation of Hipponium and Kaulonia was intended only as a prelude to the ruin of Rhegium. Upon this Dionysius had resolved. The recent covenant into which he had entered with the Rhegines, was only a fraudulent device

for the purpose of entrapping them into a surrender of their navy, in order that he might afterwards attack them at greater advantage. Marching his army to the Italian shore of the strait, near Rhegium, he affected to busy himself in preparations for crossing to Sicily. In the mean time, he sent a friendly message to the Rhegines, requesting them to supply him for a short time with provisions, under assurance that what they furnished should speedily be replaced from Syracuse. It was his purpose, if they refused, to resent it as an insult, and attack them; if they consented, to consume their provisions, without performing his engagement to replace the quantity consumed; and then to make his attack after all, when their means of holding out had been diminished. At first the Rhegines complied willingly, furnishing abundant supplies. But the consumption continued, and the departure of the army was deferred—first on pretence of the illness of Dionysius, next on other grounds—so that they at length detected the trick, and declined to furnish any more. Dionysius now threw off the mask, gave back to them their hundred hostages, and laid siege to the town in form.[38]

Regretting too late that they had suffered themselves to be defrauded of their means of defence, the Rhegines nevertheless prepared to hold out with all the energy of despair. Phyton was chosen commander, the whole population was armed, and all the line of wall carefully watched. Dionysius made vigorous assaults, employing all the resources of his battering machinery to effect a breach. But he was repelled at all points obstinately, and with much loss on both sides: several of his machines were also burnt or destroyed by opportune sallies of the besieged. In one of the assaults, Dionysius himself was seriously wounded by a spear thrust in the groin, from which he was long in recovering. He was at length obliged to convert the siege into a blockade, and to rely upon famine alone for subduing these valiant citizens. For eleven months did the Rhegines hold out, against the pressure of want gradually increasing, and at last terminating in the agony and destruction of famine. We are told that a medimnus of wheat came to be sold for the enormous price of five minæ; at the rate of about £14 sterling per bushel: every horse and every beast of burthen was consumed: at length hides were boiled and eaten, and even the grass on parts of the wall. Many perished from absolute hunger, while the survivors lost all strength and energy. In this intolerable condition, they were constrained, at the end of near eleven months, to surrender at discretion.

So numerous were these victims of famine, that Dionysius, on entering Rhegium, found heaps of unburied corpses, besides six thousand citizens in the last stage of emaciation. All these captives were sent to Syracuse, where those who could provide a mina (about £3 17s.) were allowed to ransom themselves, while the rest were sold as slaves. After such a period of suffering, the number of those who retained the means of ransom was probably very small. But the Rhegine general, Phyton, was detained with all his kindred, and reserved for a different fate. First, his son was drowned, by order of Dionysius: next, Phyton himself was chained to one of the lofti-

est siege-machines, as a spectacle to the whole army. While he was thus exhibited to scorn, a messenger was sent to apprise him, that Dionysius had just caused his son to be drowned. "He is more fortunate than his father by one day," was the reply of Phyton. After a certain time, the sufferer was taken down from his pillory, and led round the city, with attendants scourging and insulting him at every step; while a herald proclaimed aloud, "Behold the man who persuaded the Rhegines to war, thus signally punished by Dionysius!" Phyton, enduring all these torments with heroic courage and dignified silence, was provoked to exclaim in reply to the herald, that the punishment was inflicted because he had refused to betray the city to Dionysius, who would himself soon be overtaken by the divine vengeance. At length the prolonged outrages, combined with the noble demeanor and high reputation of the victim, excited compassion even among the soldiers of Dionysius himself. Their murmurs became so pronounced, that he began to apprehend an open mutiny for the purpose of rescuing Phyton. Under this fear he gave orders that the torments should be discontinued, and that Phyton with his entire kindred should be drowned.[39]

The prophetic persuasion under which this unhappy man perished, that divine vengeance would soon overtake his destroyer, was noway borne out by the subsequent reality. The power and prosperity of Dionysius underwent abatement by his war with the Carthaginians in 383 B. C., yet remained very considerable even to his dying day. And the misfortunes which fell thickly upon his son the younger Dionysius, more than thirty years afterwards, though they doubtless received a religious interpretation from contemporary critics, were probably ascribed to acts more recent than the barbarities inflicted on Phyton. But these barbarities, if not avenged, were at least laid to heart with profound sympathy by the contemporary world, and even commemorated with tenderness and pathos by poets. While Dionysius was composing tragedies (of which more presently) in hopes of applause in Greece, he was himself furnishing real matter of history, not less tragical than the sufferings of those legendary heroes and heroines to which he (in common with other poets) resorted for a subject. Among the many acts of cruelty, more or less aggravated, which it is the melancholy duty of an historian of Greece to recount, there are few so revolting as the death of the Rhegine general; who was not a subject, nor a conspirator, nor a rebel, but an enemy in open warfare—of whom the worst that even Dionysius himself could say, was, that he had persuaded his countrymen into the war. And even this could not be said truly; since the antipathy of the Rhegines towards Dionysius was of old standing, traceable to his enslavement of Naxos and Katana, if not to causes yet earlier—though the statement of Phyton may very probably be true, that Dionysius had tried to bribe him to betray Rhegium (as the generals of Naxos and Katana had been bribed to betray their respective cities), and was incensed beyond measure at finding the proposition repelled. The Hellenic war-practice was in itself sufficiently cruel. Both Athenians and Lacedæmonians put to death prisoners of war by wholesale, after the capture of Melos, after the battle of Ægospotami, and elsewhere. But to make death worse than death by a deliberate and protracted tissue of

tortures and indignities, is not Hellenic; it is Carthaginian and Asiatic. Dionysius had shown himself better than a Greek when he released without ransom the Krotoniate prisoners captured at the battle of Kaulonia; but he became far worse than a Greek, and worse even than his own mercenaries, when he heaped aggravated suffering, beyond the simple death-warrant, on the heads of Phyton and his kindred.

Dionysius caused the city of Rhegium to be destroyed[40] or dismantled. Probably he made over the lands to Lokri, like those of Kaulonia and Hipponium. The free Rhegine citizens had all been transported to Syracuse for sale; and those who were fortunate enough to save their liberty by providing the stipulated ransom, would not be allowed to come back to their native soil. If Dionysius was so zealous in enriching the Lokrians, as to transfer to them two other neighboring town-domains, against the inhabitants of which he had no peculiar hatred—much more would he be disposed to make the like transfer of the Rhegine territory, whereby he would gratify at once his antipathy to the one state and his partiality to the other. It is true that Rhegium did not permanently continue incorporated with Lokri; but neither did Kaulonia nor Hipponium. The maintenance of all the three transfers depended on the ascendency of Dionysius and his dynasty; but for the time immediately succeeding the capture of Rhegium, the Lokrians became masters of the Rhegine territory as well as of the two other townships, and thus possessed all the Calabrian peninsula south of the Gulf of Squillace. To the Italiot Greeks generally, these victories of Dionysius were fatally ruinous, because the political union formed among them, for the purpose of resisting the pressure of the Lucanians from the interior, was overthrown, leaving each city to its own weakness and isolation.[41]

The year 387, in which Rhegium surrendered, was also distinguished for two other memorable events; the general peace in Central Greece under the dictation of Persia and Sparta, commonly called the peace of Antalkidas; and the capture of Rome by the Gauls.[42]

The two great ascendant powers in the Grecian world were now, Sparta in Peloponnesus, and Dionysius in Sicily; each respectively fortified by alliance with the other. I have already in a former chapter[43] described the position of Sparta after the peace of Antalkidas; how greatly she gained by making herself the champion of that Persian rescript—and how she purchased, by surrendering the Asiatic Greeks to Artaxerxes, an empire on land equal to that which she had enjoyed before the defeat of Knidus, though without recovering the maritime empire fortified by that defeat.

To this great imperial state, Dionysius in the west formed a suitable counterpart. His recent victories in Southern Italy had already raised his power to a magnitude transcending all the far-famed recollections of Gelon; but he now still farther extended it by sending an expedition against Kroton. This city, the largest in Magna Græcia, fell under his power; and he succeeded in capturing, by surprise or bribery, even its strong citadel; on a rock overhanging the sea.[44] He seems also to have ad-

vanced yet farther with his fleet to attack Thurii; which city owed its preservation solely to the violence of the north winds. He plundered the temple of Hêrê near Cape Lakinium, in the domain of Kroton. Among the ornaments of this temple was one of pre-eminent beauty and celebrity, which at the periodical festivals was exhibited to admiring spectators: a robe wrought with the greatest skill, and decorated in the most costly manner, the votive offering of a Sybarite named Alkimenes. Dionysius sold this robe to the Carthaginians. It long remained as one of the permanent religious ornaments of their city, being probably dedicated to the honor of those Hellenic Deities recently introduced for worship; whom (as I have before stated) the Carthaginians were about this time peculiarly anxious to propitiate, in hopes of averting or alleviating the frightful pestilences wherewith they had been so often smitten. They purchased the robe from Dionysius at the prodigious price of one hundred and twenty talents, or about £27,600 sterling.[45] Incredible as this sum may appear, we must recollect that the honor done to the new gods would be mainly estimated according to the magnitude of the sum laid out. As the Carthaginians would probably think no price too great to transfer an unrivalled vestment from the wardrobe of the Lakinian Hêrê to the newly-established temple and worship of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê in their city—so we may be sure that the loss of such an ornament, and the spoliation of the holy place, would deeply humiliate the Krotoniates, and with them the crowd of Italiot Greeks who frequented the Lakinian festivals.

Thus master of the important city of Kroton, with a citadel near the sea capable of being held by a separate garrison, Dionysius divested the inhabitants of their southern possession of Skylletium, which he made over to aggrandize yet farther the town of Lokri.[46] Whether he pushed his conquests farther along the Tarentine Gulf so as to acquire the like hold on Thurii or Metapontum, we cannot say. But both of them must have been overawed by the rapid extension and near approach of his power; especially Thurii, not yet recovered from her disastrous defeat by the Lucanians.

Profiting by his maritime command of the Gulf, Dionysius was enabled to enlarge his ambitious views even to distant ultramarine enterprises. To escape from his long arm, Syracusan exiles were obliged to flee to a greater distance, and one of their divisions either founded, or was admitted into, the city of Ancona, high up the Adriatic Gulf.[47] On the other side of that Gulf, in vicinity and alliance with the Illyrian tribes, Dionysius on his part sent a fleet, and established more than one settlement. To these schemes he was prompted by a dispossessed prince of the Epirotic Molossians, named Alketas, who, residing at Syracuse as an exile, had gained his confidence. He founded the town of Lissus (now Alessio) on the Illyrian coast, considerably north of Epidamnus; and he assisted the Parians in their plantation of two Grecian settlements, in sites still farther northward up the Adriatic Gulf—the islands of Issa and Pharos. His admiral at Lissus defeated the neighboring Illyrian coast-boats, which harassed these newly-settled Parians; but with the Illyrian tribes near to Lissus, he

maintained an intimate alliance, and even furnished a large number of them with Grecian panoplies. It is affirmed to have been the purpose of Dionysius and Alketas to employ these warlike barbarians, first in invading Epirus and restoring Alketas to his Molossian principality; next in pillaging the wealthy temple of Delphi—a scheme far-reaching, yet not impracticable, and capable of being seconded by a Syracusan fleet, if circumstances favored its execution. The invasion of Epirus was accomplished, and the Molossians were defeated in a bloody battle, wherein fifteen thousand of them are said to have been slain. But the ulterior projects against Delphi were arrested by the intervention of Sparta, who sent a force to the spot and prevented all further march southward.[48] Alketas however seems to have remained prince of a portion of Epirus, in the territory nearly opposite to Korkyra; where we have already recognized him, in a former chapter, as having become the dependent of Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly.

Another enterprise undertaken by Dionysius about this time was a maritime expedition along the coasts of Latium, Etruria, and Corsica; partly under color of repressing the piracies committed from their maritime cities; but partly also, for the purpose of pillaging the rich and holy temple of Leukothea, at Agylla or its seaport Pyrgi. In this he succeeded, stripping it of money and precious ornaments to the amount of one thousand talents. The Agyllæans came forth to defend their temple, but were completely worsted, and lost so much both in plunder and in prisoners, that Dionysius, after returning to Syracuse and selling the prisoners, obtained an additional profit of five hundred talents.[49]

Such was the military celebrity now attained by Dionysius,[50] that the Gauls from Northern Italy, who had recently sacked Rome, sent to proffer their alliance and aid. He accepted the proposition; from whence perhaps the Gallic mercenaries whom we afterwards find in his service as mercenaries, may take their date. His long arms now reached from Lissus on one side to Agylla on the other. Master of most of Sicily and much of Southern Italy, as well as of the most powerful standing army in Greece—the unscrupulous plunderer of the holiest temples everywhere[51]—he inspired much terror and dislike throughout Central Greece. He was the more vulnerable to this sentiment, as he was not only a triumphant prince, but also a tragic poet; competitor, as such, for that applause and admiration which no force can extort. Since none of his tragedies have been preserved, we can form no judgment of our own respecting them. Yet when we learn that he had stood second or third, and that one of his compositions gained even the first prize at the Lenæan festival at Athens,[52] in 368-367 B. C.—the favorable judgment of an Athenian audience affords good reason for presuming that his poetical talents were considerable.

During the years immediately succeeding 387 B. C., however, Dionysius the poet was not likely to receive an impartial hearing anywhere. For while on the one hand his own circle would applaud every word—on the other hand, a large proportion of independent Greeks would be biassed against what they heard by their fear and ha-

tred of the author. If we believed the anecdotes recounted by Diodorus, we should conclude not merely that the tragedies were contemptible compositions, but that the irritability of Dionysius in regard to criticism was exaggerated even to silly weakness. The dithyrambic poet Philoxenus, a resident or visitor at Syracuse, after hearing one of these tragedies privately recited, was asked his opinion. He gave an unfavorable opinion, for which he was sent to prison:[53] on the next day the intercession of friends procured his release, and he contrived afterwards, by delicate wit and double-meaning phrases, to express an inoffensive sentiment without openly compromising truth. At the Olympic festival of 388 B. C., Dionysius had sent some of his compositions to Olympia, together with the best actors and chorists to recite them. But so contemptible were the poems (we are told), that in spite of every advantage of recitation, they were disgracefully hissed and ridiculed; moreover the actors in coming back to Syracuse were shipwrecked, and the crew of the ship ascribed all the suffering of their voyage to the badness of the poems entrusted to them. The flatterers of Dionysius, however (it is said), still continued to extol his genius, and to assure him that his ultimate success as a poet, though for a time interrupted by envy, was infallible; which Dionysius believed, and continued to compose tragedies without being disheartened.[54]

Amidst such malicious jests, circulated by witty men at the expense of the princely poet, we may trace some important matter of fact. Perhaps in the year 388 B. C., but certainly in the year 384 B. C. (both of them Olympic years), Dionysius sent tragedies to be recited, and chariots to run, before the crowd assembled in festival at Olympia. The year 387 B. C. was a memorable year both in Central Greece and in Sicily. In the former, it was signalized by the momentous peace of Antalkidas, which terminated a general war of eight years' standing: in the latter, it marked the close of the Italian campaign of Dionysius, with the defeat and humiliation of Kroton and the other Italiot Greeks, and subversion of three Grecian cities,—Hipponium, Kaulonia, and Rhegium—the fate of the Rhegines having been characterized by incidents most pathetic and impressive. The first Olympic festival which occurred after 387 B. C. was accordingly a distinguished epoch. The two festivals immediately preceding (those of 392 B. C. and 388 B. C.) having been celebrated in the midst of a general war, had not been visited by a large proportion of the Hellenic body; so that the next ensuing festival, the 99th Olympiad in 384 B. C., was stamped with a peculiar character (like the 90th Olympiad[55] in 420 B. C.) as bringing together in religious fraternity those who had long been separated.[56] To every ambitious Greek (as to Alkibiades in 420 B. C.) it was an object of unusual ambition to make individual figure at such a festival. To Dionysius, the temptation was peculiarly seductive, since he was triumphant over all neighboring enemies—at the pinnacle of his power—and disengaged from all war requiring his own personal command. Accordingly he sent thither his Theôre, or solemn legation for sacrifice, decked in the richest garments, furnished with abundant gold and silver plate, and provided with splendid tents to serve for their lodging on the sacred ground of Olympia. He farther sent several chariots-and-four to con-

tend in the regular chariot races: and lastly, he also sent reciters and chorists, skilful as well as highly trained, to exhibit his own poetical compositions before such as were willing to hear them. We must remember that poetical recitation was not included in the formal programme of the festival.

All this prodigious outfit, under the superintendence of Thearides, brother of Dionysius, was exhibited with dazzling effect before the Olympic crowd. No name stood so prominently and ostentatiously before them as that of the despot of Syracuse. Every man, even from the most distant regions of Greece, was stimulated to inquire into his past exploits and character. There were probably many persons present, peculiarly forward in answering such inquiries—the numerous sufferers, from Italian and Sicilian Greece, whom his conquests had thrown into exile; and their answers would be of a nature to raise the strongest antipathy against Dionysius. Besides the numerous depopulations and mutations of inhabitants which he had occasioned in Sicily, we have already seen that he had, within the last three years, extinguished three free Grecian communities—Rhegium, Kaulonia, Hipponium; transporting all the inhabitants of the two latter to Syracuse. In the case of Kaulonia, an accidental circumstance occurred to impress its recent extinction vividly upon the spectators. The runner who gained the great prize in the stadium, in 384 B. C., was Dikon, a native of Kaulonia. He was a man preëminently swift of foot, celebrated as having gained previous victories in the stadium, and always proclaimed (pursuant to custom) along with the title of his native city—"Dikon the Kauloniate." To hear this well-known runner now proclaimed as "Dikon the Syracusan,"[57] gave painful publicity to the fact, that the free community of Kaulonia no longer existed,—and to the absorptions of Grecian freedom effected by Dionysius.

In following the history of affairs in Central Greece, I have already dwelt upon the strong sentiment excited among Grecian patriots by the peace of Antalkidas, wherein Sparta made herself the ostentatious champion and enforcer of a Persian rescript, purchased by surrendering the Asiatic Greeks to the Great King. It was natural that this emotion should manifest itself at the next ensuing Olympic festival in 384 B. C., wherein not only Spartans, Athenians, Thebans, and Corinthians, but also Asiatic and Sicilian Greeks, were reunited after a long separation. The emotion found an eloquent spokesman in the orator Lysias. Descended from Syracusan ancestors, and once a citizen of Thurii,[58] Lysias had peculiar grounds for sympathy with the Sicilian and Italian Greeks. He delivered a public harangue upon the actual state of political affairs, in which he dwelt upon the mournful present and upon the serious dangers of the future. "The Grecian world (he said) is burning away at both extremities. Our eastern brethren have passed into slavery under the Great King, our western under the despotism of Dionysius.[59] These two are the great potentates, both in naval force and in money, the real instruments of dominion:[60] if both of them combine, they will extinguish what remains of freedom in Greece. They have been allowed to consummate all this ruin unopposed, because of the past dissensions among the

leading Grecian cities; but it is now high time that these cities should unite cordially to oppose farther ruin. How can Sparta, our legitimate president, sit still while the Hellenic world is on fire and consuming? The misfortunes of our ruined brethren ought to be to us as our own. Let us not lie idle, waiting until Artaxerxes and Dionysius attack us with their united force: let us check their insolence at once, while it is yet in our power."[61]

Unfortunately we possess but a scanty fragment of this emphatic harangue (a panegyrical harangue, in the ancient sense of the word) delivered at Olympia by Lysias. But we see the alarming picture of the time which he labored to impress: Hellas already enslaved, both in the east and in the west, by the two greatest potentates of the age,[62] Artaxerxes and Dionysius—and now threatened in her centre by their combined efforts. To feel the full probability of so gloomy an anticipation, we must recollect that only in the preceding year Dionysius, already master of Sicily and of a considerable fraction of Italian Greece, had stretched his naval force across to Illyria, armed a host of Illyrian barbarians, and sent them southward under Alketas against the Molossians, with the view of ultimately proceeding farther and pillaging the Delphian temple. The Lacedæmonians had been obliged to send a force to arrest their progress.[63] No wonder then that Lysias should depict the despot of Syracuse as meditating ulterior projects against Central Greece; and as an object not only of hatred for what he had done, but of terror for what he was about to do, in conjunction with the other great enemy from the east.[64]

Of these two enemies, one (the Persian King) was out of reach. But the second—Dionysius—though not present in person, stood forth by his envoys and appurtenances conspicuous even to ostentation, beyond any man on the ground. His Theôry or solemn legation outshone every other by the splendor of its tents and decorations: his chariots to run in the races were magnificent: his horses were of rare excellence, bred from the Venetian stock, imported out of the innermost depths of the Adriatic Gulf:[65] his poems, recited by the best artists in Greece, solicited applause—by excellent delivery and fine choric equipments, if not by superior intrinsic merit. Now the antipathy against Dionysius was not only aggravated by all this display, contrasted with the wretchedness of impoverished exiles whom he had dispossessed—but was also furnished with something to strike at and vent itself upon. Of such opportunity for present action against a visible object, Lysias did not fail to avail himself. While he vehemently preached a crusade to dethrone Dionysius and liberate Sicily, he at the same time pointed to the gold and purple tent before them, rich and proud above all its fellows, which lodged the brother of the despot with his Syracusan legation. He exhorted his hearers to put forth at once an avenging hand, in partial retribution for the sufferings of free Greece, by plundering the tent which insulted them by its showy decorations. He adjured them to interfere and prevent the envoys of this impious despot from sacrificing or entering their chariots in the lists, or taking any part in the holy Pan-hellenic festival.[66]

We cannot doubt that a large proportion of the spectators on the plain of Olympia felt with greater or less intensity the generous Pan-hellenic patriotism and indignation to which Lysias gave utterance. To what extent his hearers acted upon the unbecoming violence of his practical recommendations—how far they actually laid hands on the tents, or tried to hinder the Syracusans from sacrificing, or impeded the bringing out of their chariots for the race—we are unable to say. We are told that some ventured to plunder the tents:[67] how much was effected we do not hear. It is certain that the superintending Eleian authorities would interfere most strenuously to check any such attempt at desecrating the festival, and to protect the Syracusan envoys in their tents, their regular sacrifice, and their chariot-running. And it is farther certain, as far as our account goes, that the Syracusan chariots actually did run on the lists; because they were, though by various accidents, disgracefully unsuccessful, or overturned and broken in pieces.[68]

To any one however who reflects on the Olympic festival, with all its solemnity and its competition for honors of various kinds, it will appear that the mere manifestation of so violent an antipathy, even though restrained from breaking out into act, would be sufficiently galling to the Syracusan envoys. But the case would be far worse, when the poems of Dionysius came to be recited. These were volunteer manifestations, delivered (like the harangue of Lysias) before such persons as chose to come and hear; not comprised in the regular solemnity, nor therefore under any peculiar protection by the Eleian authorities. Dionysius stood forward of his own accord to put himself upon his trial as a poet before the auditors. Here therefore the antipathy against the despot might be manifested by the most unreserved explosions. And when we are told that the badness of the poems[69] caused them to be received with opprobrious ridicule, in spite of the excellence of the recitation, it is easy to see that the hatred intended for the person of Dionysius was discharged upon his verses. Of course the hissers and hooters would make it clearly understood what they really meant, and would indulge in the full license of heaping curses upon his name and acts. Neither the best reciters of Greece, nor the best poems even of Sophokles or Pindar, could have any chance against such predetermined antipathy. And the whole scene would end in the keenest disappointment and humiliation, inflicted upon the Syracusan envoys as well as upon the actors; being the only channel through which the retributive chastisement of Hellas could be made to reach the author.

Though not present in person at Olympia, the despot felt the chastisement in his inmost soul. The mere narrative of what had passed plunged him into an agony of sorrow, which for some time seemed to grow worse by brooding on the scene, and at length drove him nearly mad. He was smitten with intolerable consciousness of the profound hatred borne towards him, even throughout a large portion of the distant and independent Hellenic world. He fancied that this hatred was shared by all around him, and suspected every one as plotting against his life. To such an excess of cruelty did this morbid excitement carry him, that he seized several of his best

friends, under false accusations, or surmises, and caused them to be slain.[70] Even his brother Leptinês, and his ancient partisan Philistus, men who had devoted their lives first to his exaltation, and afterwards to his service, did not escape. Having given umbrage to him by an intermarriage between their families made without his privity, both were banished from Syracuse, and retired to Thurii in Italy, where they received that shelter and welcome which Leptinês had peculiarly merited by his conduct in the Lucanian war. The exile of Leptinês did not last longer than (apparently) about a year, after which Dionysius relented, recalled him, and gave him his daughter in marriage. But Philistus remained in banishment more than sixteen years; not returning to Syracuse until after the death of Dionysius the elder, and the accession of Dionysius the younger.[71]

Such was the memorable scene at the Olympic festival of 384 B. C., together with its effect upon the mind of Dionysius. Diodorus, while noticing all the facts, has cast an air of ridicule over them by recognizing nothing except the vexation of Dionysius, at the ill success of his poem, as the cause of his mental suffering; and by referring to the years 388 B. C. and 386 B. C., that which properly belongs to 384 B. C.[72] Now it is improbable, in the first place, that the poem of Dionysius,—himself a man of ability and having every opportunity of profiting by good critics whom he had purposely assembled around him[73]—should have been so ridiculously bad as to disgust an impartial audience: next, it is still more improbable that a simple poetical failure, though doubtless mortifying to him, should work with such fearful effect as to plunge him into anguish and madness. To unnerve thus violently a person like Dionysius—deeply stained with the great crimes of unscrupulous ambition, but remarkably exempt from infirmities—some more powerful cause is required; and that cause stands out conspicuously, when we conceive the full circumstances of the Olympic festival of 384 B. C. He had accumulated for this occasion all the means of showing himself off, like Krœsus in his interview with Solon, as the most prosperous and powerful man in the Hellenic world;[74] means beyond the reach of any contemporary, and surpassing even Hiero or Thero of former days, whose praises in the odes of Pindar he probably had in his mind. He counted, probably with good reason, that his splendid legation, chariots, and outfit of acting and recitation for the poems, would surpass everything else seen on the holy plain; and he fully expected such reward as the public were always glad to bestow on rich men who exhausted their purses in the recognized vein of Hellenic pious ostentation. In this high wrought state of expectation, what does Dionysius hear, by his messengers returning from the festival? That their mission had proved a total failure, and even worse than a failure; that the display had called forth none of the usual admiration, not because there were rivals on the ground equal or superior, but simply because it came from *him*; that its very magnificence had operated to render the explosion of antipathy against him louder and more violent; that his tents in the sacred ground had been actually assailed, and that access to sacrifice, as well as to the matches, had been secured to him only by the interposition of authority. We learn indeed that his chariots failed in the field by unlucky accidents;

but in the existing temper of the crowd, these very accidents would be seized as occasions for derisory cheering against him. To this we must add explosions of hatred, yet more furious, elicited by his poems, putting the reciters to utter shame. At the moment when Dionysius expected to hear the account of an unparalleled triumph, he is thus informed, not merely of disappointment, but of insults to himself, direct and personal, the most poignant ever offered by Greeks to a Greek, amidst the holiest and most frequented ceremony of the Hellenic world.[75] Never in any other case do we read of public antipathy, against an individual, being carried to the pitch of desecrating by violence the majesty of the Olympic festival.

Here then were the real and sufficient causes—not the mere ill-success of his poem—which penetrated the soul of Dionysius, driving him into anguish and temporary madness. Though he had silenced the Vox Populi at Syracuse, not all his mercenaries, ships, and forts in Ortygia, could save him from feeling its force, when thus emphatically poured forth against him by the free-spoken crowd at Olympia.

It was apparently shortly after the peace of 387 B. C., that Dionysius received at Syracuse the visit of the philosopher Plato.[76] The latter—having come to Sicily on a voyage of inquiry and curiosity, especially to see Mount Ætna—was introduced by his friends, the philosophers of Tarentum, to Dion, then a young man, resident at Syracuse, and brother of Aristomachê, the wife of Dionysius. Of Plato and Dion I shall speak more elsewhere: here I notice the philosopher only as illustrating the history and character of Dionysius. Dion, having been profoundly impressed with the conversation of Plato, prevailed upon Dionysius to invite and talk with him also. Plato discoursed eloquently upon justice and virtue, enforcing his doctrine that wicked men were inevitably miserable—that true happiness belonged only to the virtuous—and that despots could not lay claim to the merit of courage.[77] This meagre abstract does not at all enable us to follow the philosopher's argument. But it is plain that he set forth his general views on social and political subjects with as much freedom and dignity of speech before Dionysius as before any simple citizen; and we are farther told, that the by-standers were greatly captivated by his manner and language. Not so the despot himself. After one or two repetitions of the like discourse, he became not merely averse to the doctrine, but hostile to the person, of Plato. According to the statement of Diodorus, he caused the philosopher to be seized, taken down to the Syracusan slave-market, and there put up for sale as a slave at the price of twenty minæ; which his friends subscribed to pay, and thus released him. According to Plutarch, Plato himself was anxious to depart, and was put by Dion aboard a trireme which was about to convey home the Lacedæmonian envoy Pollis. But Dionysius secretly entreated Pollis to cause him to be slain on the voyage—or at least to sell him as a slave. Plato was accordingly landed at Ægina, and there sold. He was purchased, or repurchased, by Annikeris of Kyrênê, and sent back to Athens. This latter is the more probable story of the two; but it seems to be a certain fact that Plato was really sold, and became for a moment a slave.[78]

That Dionysius should listen to the discourse of Plato with repugnance, not less decided than that which the Emperor Napoleon was wont to show towards ideologists—was an event naturally to be expected. But that, not satisfied with dismissing the philosopher, he should seek to kill, maltreat, or disgrace him, illustrates forcibly the vindictive and irritable elements of his character, and shows how little he was likely to respect the lives of those who stood in his way as political opponents.

Dionysius was at the same time occupied with new constructions, military, civil, and religious, at Syracuse. He enlarged the fortifications of the city by adding a new line of wall, extending along the southern cliff of Epipolæ, from Euryalus to the suburb called Neapolis; which suburb was now, it would appear, surrounded by a separate wall of its own—or perhaps may have been so surrounded a few years earlier, though we know that it was unfortified and open during the attack of Imilkon in 396 B. C.[79] At the time, probably, the fort at the Euryalus was enlarged and completed to the point of grandeur which its present remains indicate. The whole slope of Epipolæ became thus bordered and protected by fortifications, from its base at Achradina to its apex at Euryalus. And Syracuse now comprised five separately fortified portions,—Epipolæ, Neapolis, Tychê, Achradina, and Ortygia; each portion having its own fortification, though the four first were included within the same outer walls. Syracuse thus became the largest fortified city in all Greece; larger even than Athens in its then existing state, though not so large as Athens had been during the Peloponnesian war, while the Phaleric wall was yet standing.

Besides these extensive fortifications, Dionysius also enlarged the docks and arsenals so as to provide accommodation for two hundred men of war. He constructed spacious gymnasia on the banks of the river Anapus, without the city walls; and he further decorated the city with various new temples in honor of different gods.[80]

Such costly novelties added grandeur as well as security to Syracuse, and conferred imposing celebrity on the despot himself. They were dictated by the same aspirations as had prompted his ostentatious legation to Olympia in 384 B. C.; a legation of which the result had been so untoward and intolerable to his feelings. They were intended to console, and doubtless did in part console, the Syracusan people for the loss of their freedom. And they were further designed to serve as fuller preparations for the war against Carthage, which he was now bent upon renewing. He was obliged to look about for a pretext, since the Carthaginians had given him no just cause. But this, though an aggression, was a Pan-hellenic aggression,[81] calculated to win for him the sympathies of all Greeks, philosophers as well as the multitude. And as the war was begun in the year immediately succeeding the insult cast upon him at Olympia, we may ascribe it in part to a wish to perform exploits such as might rescue his name from the like opprobrium in future.

The sum of fifteen hundred talents, recently pillaged from the temple at Agylla, [82] enabled Dionysius to fit out a large army for his projected war. Entering into in-

trigues with some of the disaffected dependencies of Carthage in Sicily, he encouraged them to revolt, and received them into his alliance. The Carthaginians sent envoys to remonstrate, but could obtain no redress; upon which they on their side prepared for war, accumulated a large force of hired foreign mercenaries under Magon, and contracted alliance with some of the Italiot Greeks hostile to Dionysius. Both parties distributed their forces so as to act partly in Sicily, partly in the adjoining peninsula of Italy; but the great stress of war fell on Sicily, where Dionysius and Magon both commanded in person. After several combats partial and indecisive, a general battle was joined at a place called Kabala. The contest was murderous, and the bravery great on both sides; but at length Dionysius gained a complete victory. Magon himself and ten thousand men of his army were slain; five thousand were made prisoners; while the remainder were driven to retreat to a neighboring eminence, strong, but destitute of water. They were forced to send envoys entreating peace; which Dionysius consented to grant, but only on condition that every Carthaginian should be immediately withdrawn from all the cities in the island, and that he should be reimbursed for the costs of the war.[83]

The Carthaginian generals affected to accept the terms offered, but stated (what was probably the truth), that they could not pledge themselves for the execution of such terms, without assent from the authorities at home. They solicited a truce of a few days, to enable them to send thither for instructions. Persuaded that they could not escape, Dionysius granted their request. Accounting the emancipation of Sicily from the Punic yoke to be already a fact accomplished, he triumphantly exalted himself on a pedestal higher even than that of Gelon. But this very confidence threw him off his guard and proved ruinous to him; as it happened frequently in Grecian military proceedings. The defeated Carthaginian army gradually recovered their spirits. In place of the slain general Magon, who was buried with magnificence, his son was named commander; a youth of extraordinary energy and ability, who so contrived to reassure and reorganize his troops, that when the truce expired, he was ready for a second battle. Probably the Syracusans were taken by surprise and not fully prepared. At least the fortune of Dionysius had fled. In this second action, fought at a spot called Kronium, he underwent a terrible and ruinous defeat. His brother Leptinês, who commanded on one wing, was slain gallantly fighting; those around him were defeated; while Dionysius himself, with his select troops on the other wing, had at first some advantage, but was at length beaten and driven back. The whole army fled in disorder to the camp, pursued with merciless vehemence by the Carthaginians, who, incensed by their previous defeat, neither gave quarter nor took prisoners. Fourteen thousand dead bodies, of the defeated Syracusan army, are said to have been picked up for burial; the rest were only preserved by night and by the shelter of their camp.[84]

Such was the signal victory—the salvation of the army, perhaps even of Carthage herself—gained at Kronium by the youthful son of Magon. Immediately after it, he

retired to Panormus. His army probably had been too much enfeebled by the former defeat to undertake farther offensive operations; moreover he himself had as yet no regular appointment as general. The Carthaginian authorities too had the prudence to seize this favorable moment for making peace, and sent to Dionysius envoys with full powers. But Dionysius only obtained peace by large concessions; giving up to Carthage Selinus with its territory, as well as half the Agrigentine territory—all that lay to the west of the river Halykus; and farther covenanting to pay to Carthage the sum of one thousand talents.[85] To these unfavorable conditions Dionysius was constrained to subscribe; after having but a few days before required the Carthaginians to evacuate all Sicily, and pay the costs of the war. As it seems doubtful whether Dionysius would have so large a sum ready to pay down at once, we may reasonably presume that he would undertake to liquidate it by annual instalments. And we thus find confirmation of the memorable statement of Plato, that Dionysius became tributary to the Carthaginians.[86]

Such are the painful gaps in Grecian history as it is transmitted to us, that we hear scarcely anything about Dionysius for thirteen years after the peace of 383-382 B. C. It seems that the Carthaginians (in 379 B. C.) sent an armament to the southern portion of Italy for the purpose of reëstablishing the town of Hipponium and its inhabitants.[87] But their attention appears to have been withdrawn from this enterprise by the recurrence of previous misfortunes—fearful pestilence, and revolt of their Libyan dependencies, which seriously threatened the safety of their city. Again, Dionysius also, during one of these years, undertook some operations, of which a faint echo reaches us, in this same Italian peninsula (now Calabria Ultra). He projected a line of wall across the narrowest portion or isthmus of the peninsula, from the Gulf of Skylletium to that of Hipponium, so as to separate the territory of Lokri from the northern portion of Italy, and secure it completely to his own control. Professedly the wall was destined to repel the incursions of the Lucanians; but in reality (we are told) Dionysius wished to cut off the connection between Lokri and the other Greeks in the Tarentine Gulf. These latter are said to have interposed from without, and prevented the execution of the scheme; but its natural difficulties would be in themselves no small impediment, nor are we sure that the wall was even begun.[88]

During this interval, momentous events (recounted in my previous chapters) had occurred in Central Greece. In 382 B. C., the Spartans made themselves by fraud masters of Thebes, and placed a permanent garrison in the Kadmeia. In 380 B. C., they put down the Olynthian confederacy, thus attaining the maximum of their power. But in 379 B. C., there occurred the revolution at Thebes achieved by the conspiracy of Pelopidas, who expelled the Lacedæmonians from the Kadmeia. Involved in a burdensome war against Thebes and Athens, together with other allies the Lacedæmonians gradually lost ground, and had become much reduced before the peace of 371 B. C., which left them to contend with Thebes alone. Then came the fatal battle of Leuktra which prostrated their military ascendency altogether. These incidents have

been already related at large in former chapters. Two years before the battle of Leuktra, Dionysius sent to the aid of the Lacedæmonians at Korkyra a squadron of ten ships, all of which were captured by Iphikrates; about three years after the battle, when the Thebans and their allies were pressing Sparta in Peloponnesus, he twice sent thither a military force of Gauls and Iberians to reinforce her army. But his troops neither stayed long, nor rendered any very conspicuous service.[89]

In this year we hear of a fresh attack by Dionysius against the Carthaginians. Observing that they had been lately much enfeebled by pestilence and by mutiny of their African subjects, he thought the opportunity favorable for trying to recover what the peace of 383 B. C., had obliged him to relinquish. A false pretence being readily found, he invaded the Carthaginian possessions in the west of Sicily with a large land force of thirty thousand foot, and three thousand horse; together with a fleet of three hundred sail, and store ships in proportion. After ravaging much of the open territory of the Carthaginians, he succeeded in mastering Selinus, Entella, and Eryx—and then laid siege to Lilybæum. This town, close to the western cape of Sicily, [90] appears to have arisen as a substitute for the neighboring town of Motyê (of which we hear little more since its capture by Dionysius in 396 B. C.), and to have become the principal Carthaginian station. He began to attack it by active siege and battering machines. But it was so numerously garrisoned, and so well defended, that he was forced to raise the siege and confine himself to blockade. His fleet kept the harbor guarded, so as to intercept supplies from Africa. Not long afterwards, however, he received intelligence that a fire had taken place in the port of Carthage whereby all her ships had been burnt. Being thus led to conceive that there was no longer any apprehension of naval attack from Carthage, he withdrew his fleet from continuous watch off Lilybæum; keeping one hundred and thirty men-of-war near at hand, in the harbor of Eryx, and sending the remainder home to Syracuse. Of this incautious proceeding the Carthaginians took speedy advantage. The conflagration in their port had been much overstated. There still remained to them two hundred ships of war, which, after being equipped in silence, sailed across in the night to Eryx. Appearing suddenly in the harbor, they attacked the Syracusan fleet completely by surprise; and succeeded, without serious resistance, in capturing and towing off nearly all of them. After so capital an advantage, Lilybæum became open to reinforcement and supplies by sea, so that Dionysius no longer thought it worth while to prosecute the blockade. On the approach of winter, both parties resumed the position which they had occupied before the recent movement.[91]

The despot had thus gained nothing by again taking up arms, nor were the Sicilian dependencies of the Carthaginians at all cut down below that which they acquired by the treaty of 383 B. C. But he received (about January or February 367 B. C.) news of a different species of success, which gave him hardly less satisfaction than a victory by land or sea. In the Lenæan festival of Athens, one of his tragedies had been rewarded with the first prize. A chorist who had been employed in the perfor-

mance—eager to convey the first intelligence of this success to Syracuse and to obtain the recompense which would naturally await the messenger—hastened from Athens to Corinth, found a vessel just starting for Syracuse, and reached Syracuse by a straight course with the advantage of favorable winds. He was the first to communicate the news, and received the full reward of his diligence. Dionysius was overjoyed at the distinction conferred upon him; for though on former occasions he had obtained the second or third place in the Athenian competitions, he had never before been adjudged worthy of the first prize. Offering sacrifice to the gods for the good news, he invited his friends to a splendid banquet, wherein he indulged in an unusual measure of conviviality. But the joyous excitement, coupled with the effects of the wine, brought on an attack of fever, of which he shortly afterwards died, after a reign of thirty-eight years.[92]

Thirty-eight years, of a career so full of effort, adventure, and danger, as that of Dionysius, must have left a constitution sufficiently exhausted to give way easily before acute disease. Throughout this long period he had never spared himself. He was a man of restless energy and activity, bodily as well as mental; always personally at the head of his troops in war—keeping a vigilant eye and a decisive hand upon all the details of his government at home—yet employing spare time (which Philip of Macedon was surprised that he could find[93]) in composing tragedies of his own, to compete for prizes fairly adjudged. His personal bravery was conspicuous, and he was twice severely wounded in leading his soldiers to assault. His effective skill as an ambitious politician—his military resource as a commander—and the long-sighted care with which he provided implements of offence as well as of defence before undertaking war,—are remarkable features in his character. The Roman Scipio Africanus was wont to single out Dionysius and Agathokles (the history of the latter begins about fifty years after the death of the former), both of them despots of Syracuse, as the two Greeks of greatest ability for action known to him—men who combined, in the most memorable degree, daring with sagacity.[94] This criticism, coming from an excellent judge, is borne out by the biography of both, so far as it comes to our knowledge. No other Greek can be pointed out, who, starting from a position humble and unpromising, raised himself to so lofty a pinnacle of dominion at home, achieved such striking military exploits abroad, and preserved his grandeur unimpaired throughout the whole of a long life. Dionysius boasted that he bequeathed to his son an empire fastened by adamantine chains;[95] so powerful was his mercenary force—so firm his position in Ortygia—so completely had the Syracusans been broken into subjection. There cannot be a better test of vigor and ability than the unexampled success with which Dionysius and Agathokles played the game of the despot, and to a certain extent that of the conqueror. Of the two, Dionysius was the most favored by fortune. Both indeed profited by one auxiliary accident, which distinguished Syracuse from other Grecian cities; the local speciality of Ortygia. That islet seemed expressly made to be garrisoned as a separate fortress,—apart from, as well as against, the rest of Syracuse,—having full command of the harbor, docks, naval

force, and naval approach. But Dionysius had, besides, several peculiar interventions of the gods in his favor, sometimes at the most critical moments: such was the interpretation put by his enemies (and doubtless by his friends also) upon those repeated pestilences which smote the Carthaginian armies with a force far more deadly than the spear of the Syracusan hoplite. On four or five distinct occasions, during the life of Dionysius, we read of this unseen foe as destroying the Carthaginians both in Sicily and in Africa, but leaving the Syracusans untouched. Twice did it arrest the progress of Imilkon, when in the full career of victory; once, after the capture of Gela and Kamarina—a second time, when, after his great naval victory off Katana, he had brought his numerous host under the walls of Syracuse, and was actually master of the open suburb of Achradina. On both these occasions the pestilence made a complete revolution in the face of the war; exalting Dionysius from impending ruin, to assured safety in the one, and to unmeasured triumph in the other. We are bound to allow for this good fortune (the like of which never befel Agathokles), when we contemplate the long prosperity of Dionysius[96], and when we adopt, as in justice we must, the panegyric of Scipio Africanus.

The preceding chapter has detailed the means whereby Dionysius attained his prize, and kept it: those employed by Agathokles—analogous in spirit but of still darker coloring in the details—will appear hereafter. That Hermokrates—who had filled with credit the highest offices in the state and whom men had acquired the habit of following—should aspire to become despot, was no unusual phenomenon in Grecian politics; but that Dionysius should aim at mounting the same ladder, seemed absurd or even insane—to use the phrase of Isokrates.[97] If, then, in spite of such disadvantage he succeeded in fastening round his countrymen, accustomed to a free constitution as their birth-right, those "adamantine chains" which they were well known to abhor—we may be sure that his plan of proceeding must have been dexterously chosen, and prosecuted with consummate perseverance and audacity; but we may be also sure that it was nefarious in the extreme. The machinery of fraud whereby the people were to be cheated into a temporary submission, as a prelude to the machinery of force whereby such submission was to be perpetuated against their consent—was the stock in trade of Grecian usurpers. But seldom does it appear prefaced by more impudent calumnies, or worked out with a larger measure of violence and spoliation, than in the case of Dionysius. He was indeed powerfully seconded at the outset by the danger of Syracuse from the Carthaginian arms. But his scheme of usurpation, far from diminishing such danger, tended materially to increase it, by disuniting the city at so critical a moment. Dionysius achieved nothing in his first enterprise for the relief of Gela and Kamarina. He was forced to retire with as much disgrace as those previous generals whom he had so bitterly vituperated; and apparently even with greater disgrace—since there are strong grounds for believing that he entered into traitorous collusion with the Carthaginians. The salvation of Syracuse, at that moment of peril, arose not from the energy or ability of Dionysius, but

from the opportune epidemic which disabled Imilkon in the midst of a victorious career.

Dionysius had not only talents to organize, and boldness to make good, a despotism more formidable than anything known to contemporary Greeks, but also systematic prudence to keep it unimpaired for thirty-eight years. He maintained carefully those two precautions which Thucydides specifies as the causes of permanence to the Athenian Hippias, under similar circumstances—intimidation over the citizens, and careful organization, with liberal pay among his mercenaries.[98] He was temperate in indulgencies; never led by any of his appetites into the commission of violence.[99] This abstinence contributed materially to prolong his life, since many a Grecian despot perished through desperate feelings of individual vengeance provoked by his outrages. With Dionysius, all other appetites were merged in the love of dominion, at home and abroad; and of money as a means of dominion. To the service of this master-passion all his energies were devoted, together with those vast military resources which an unscrupulous ability served both to accumulate and to recruit. How his treasury was supplied, with the large exigencies continually pressing upon it, we are but little informed. We know however that his exactions from the Syracusans were exorbitant;[100] that he did not hesitate to strip the holiest temples; and that he left behind him a great reputation for ingenious tricks in extracting money from his subjects.[101] Besides the large garrison of foreign mercenaries by whom his orders were enforced, he maintained a regular body of spies, seemingly of both sexes, disseminated among the body of the citizens.[102] The vast quarry-prison of Syracuse was his work.[103] Both the vague general picture, and the fragmentary details which come before us, of his conduct towards the Syracusans, present to us nothing but an oppressive and extortionate tyrant, by whose fiat numberless victims perished; more than ten thousand according to the general language of Plutarch.[104] He enriched largely his younger brothers and auxiliaries; among which latter, Hipparinus stood prominent, thus recovering a fortune equal to or larger than that which his profligacy had dissipated.[105] But we hear also of acts of Dionysius, indicating a jealous and cruel temper, even towards near relatives. And it appears certain that he trusted no one, not even them;[106] that though in the field he was a perfectly brave man, yet his suspicion and timorous anxiety as to every one who approached his person, were carried to the most tormenting excess, and extended even to his wives, his brothers, his daughters. Afraid to admit any one with a razor near to his face, he is said to have singed his own beard with a burning coal. Both his brother and his son were searched for concealed weapons, and even forced to change their clothes in the presence of his guards, before they were permitted to see him. An officer of the guards named Marsyas, having dreamt that he was assassinating Dionysius, was put to death for this dream, as proving that his waking thoughts must have been dwelling upon such a project. And it has already been mentioned that Dionysius put to death the mother of one of his wives, on suspicion that she had by incantations brought about the barrenness of the other—as well as the sons of a Lokrian citizen

named Aristeides, who had refused, with indignant expressions, to grant to him his daughter in marriage.[107]

Such were the conditions of existence—perpetual mistrust, danger even from the nearest kindred, enmity both to and from every dignified freeman, and reliance only on armed barbarians or liberated slaves—which beset almost every Grecian despot, and from which the greatest despot of his age enjoyed no exemption. Though philosophers emphatically insisted that such a man must be miserable,[108] yet Dionysius himself, as well as the great mass of admiring spectators, would probably feel that the necessities of his position were more than compensated by its awe-striking grandeur, and by the full satisfaction of ambitious dreams, subject indeed to poignant suffering when wounded in the tender point, and when reaping insult in place of admiration, at the memorable Olympic festival of 384 B. C., above-described. But the Syracusans, over whom he ruled, enjoyed no such compensation for that which they suffered from his tax-gatherers—from his garrison of Gauls, Iberians, and Campanians, in Ortygia—from his spies—his prison—and his executioners.

Nor did Syracuse suffer alone. The reign of the elder Dionysius was desolating for the Hellenic population generally, both of Sicily and Italy. Syracuse became a great fortress, with vast military power in the hands of its governor, "whose policy[109] it was to pack all Sicily into it;" while the remaining free Hellenic communities were degraded, enslaved, and half depopulated. On this topic, the mournful testimonies already cited from Lysias and Isokrates, are borne out by the letters of the eye-witness Plato. In his advice, given to the son and successor of Dionysius, Plato emphatically presses upon him two points: first, as to the Syracusans, to transform his inherited oppressive despotism into the rule of a king, governing gently and by fixed laws; next, to reconstitute and repeople, under free constitutions, the other Hellenic communities in Sicily, which at his accession had become nearly barbarised and half deserted.[110] The elder Dionysius had imported into Sicily large bodies of mercenaries, by means of whom he had gained his conquests, and for whom he had provided settlements at the cost of the subdued Hellenic cities. In Naxos, Katana, Leontini, and Messênê, the previous residents had been dispossessed and others substituted, out of Gallic and Iberian mercenaries. Communities thus transformed, with their former free citizens degraded into dependence or exile, not only ceased to be purely Hellenic, but also became far less populous and flourishing. In like manner Dionysius had suppressed, and absorbed into Syracuse and Lokri, the once autonomous Grecian communities of Rhegium, Hipponium, and Kaulonia, on the Italian side of the strait. In the inland regions of Italy, he had allied himself with the barbarous Lucanians; who, even without his aid, were gaining ground and pressing hard upon the Italiot Greeks on the coast.

If we examine the results of the warfare carried on by Dionysius against the Carthaginians, from the commencement to the end of his career, we shall observe, that he began by losing Gela and Kamarina, and that the peace by which he was en-

abled to preserve Syracuse itself, arose, not from any success of his own, but from the pestilence which ruined his enemies; to say nothing about traitorous collusion with them, which I have already remarked to have been the probable price of their guarantee to his dominion. His war against the Carthaginians in 397 B. C., was undertaken with much vigor, recovered Gela, Kamarina, Agrigentum, and Selinus, and promised the most decisive success. But presently again the tide of fortune turned against him. He sustained capital defeats, and owed the safety of Syracuse, a second time, to nothing but the terrific pestilence which destroyed the army of Imilkon. A third time, in 383 B. C., Dionysius gratuitously renewed the war against Carthage. After brilliant success at first, he was again totally defeated, and forced to cede to Carthage all the territory west of the river Halykus, besides paying a tribute. So that the exact difference between the Sicilian territory of Carthage—as it stood at the beginning of his command and at the end of his reign—amounts to this: that at the earlier period it reached to the river Himera—at the later period only to the river Halykus. The intermediate space between the two comprehends Agrigentum with the greater part of its territory; which represents therefore the extent of Hellenic soil rescued by Dionysius from Carthaginian dominion.

CHAPTER LXXXIV.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DEATH OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS — DIONYSIUS THE YOUNGER — AND DION.

The Elder Dionysius, at the moment of his death, boasted of having left his dominion "fastened by chains of adamant;" that is, sustained by a large body of mercenaries,[111] well trained and well paid—by impregnable fortifications on the islet of Ortygia—by four hundred ships of war—by immense magazines of arms and military stores—and by established intimidation over the minds of the Syracusans. These were really "chains of adamant"—so long as there was a man like Dionysius to keep them in hand. But he left no successor competent to the task; nor indeed an unobstructed succession. He had issue by two wives, whom he had married both at the same time, as has been already mentioned. By the Lokrian wife, Doris, he had his eldest son named Dionysius, and two others; by the Syracusan wife Aristomachê, daughter of Hipparinus, he had two sons, Hipparinus and Nysæus—and two daughters, Sophrosynê and Aretê.[112] Dionysius the younger can hardly have been less than twenty-five years old at the death of his father and namesake. Hipparinus, the eldest son by the other wife, was considerably younger. Aristomachê his mother had long remained childless; a fact which the elder Dionysius ascribed to incantations wrought by the mother of the Lokrian wife, and punished by putting to death the supposed sorceress.[113]

The offspring of Aristomachê, though the younger brood of the two, derived considerable advantage from the presence and countenance of her brother Dion. Hipparinus, father of Dion and Aristomachê, had been the principal abettor of the elder Dionysius in his original usurpation, in order to retrieve his own fortune,[114] ruined by profligate expenditure. So completely had that object been accomplished, that his son Dion was now among the richest men in Syracuse,[115] possessing property estimated at above one hundred talents (about £23,000). Dion was, besides, son-in-law to the elder Dionysius, who had given his daughter Sophrosynê in marriage to his son (by a different mother) the younger Dionysius; and his daughter Aretê, first to his brother Thearides—next, on the death of Thearides, to Dion. As brother of Aristomachê, Dion was thus brother-in-law to the elder Dionysius, and uncle both to Aretê his own wife and to Sophrosynê the wife of the younger Dionysius; as husband of Aretê, he was son-in-law to the elder Dionysius, and brother-in-law (as well as uncle) to the wife of the younger. Marriages between near relatives (excluding any such connection between uterine brother and sister) were usual in Greek manners. We cannot doubt that the despot accounted the harmony likely to be produced by such ties between the members of his two families and Dion, among the "adamantine chains" which held fast his dominion.

Apart from wealth and high position, the personal character of Dion was in itself marked and prominent. He was of an energetic temper, great bravery, and very considerable mental capacities. Though his nature was haughty and disdainful towards individuals, yet as to political communion, his ambition was by no means purely self-seeking and egoistic, like that of the elder Dionysius. Animated with vehement love of power, he was at the same time penetrated with that sense of regulated polity, and submission of individual will to fixed laws, which floated in the atmosphere of Grecian talk and literature, and stood so high in Grecian morality. He was moreover capable of acting with enthusiasm, and braving every hazard in prosecution of his own convictions.

Born about the year 408 B. C.,[116] Dion was twenty-one years of age in 378 B. C., when the elder Dionysius, having dismantled Rhegium and subdued Kroton, attained the maximum of his dominion, as master of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks. Standing high in the favor of his brother-in-law Dionysius, Dion doubtless took part in the wars whereby this large dominion had been acquired; as well as in the life of indulgence and luxury which prevailed generally among wealthy Greeks in Sicily and Italy, and which to the Athenian Plato appeared alike surprising and repulsive.[117] That great philosopher visited Italy and Sicily about 387 B. C., as has been already mentioned. He was in acquaintance and fellowship with the school of philosophers called Pythagoreans; the remnant of that Pythagorean brotherhood, who had once exercised so powerful a political influence over the cities of those regions—and who still enjoyed considerable reputation, even after complete political downfall, through individual ability and rank of the members, combined with habits of recluse study, mysticism, and attachment among themselves. With these Pythagoreans Dion also, a young man of open mind and ardent aspirations, was naturally thrown into communication by the proceedings of the elder Dionysius in Italy.[118] Through them he came into intercourse with Plato, whose conversation made an epoch in his life.

The mystic turn of imagination, the sententious brevity, and the mathematical researches of the Pythagoreans, produced doubtless an imposing effect upon Dion; just as Lysis, a member of that brotherhood, had acquired the attachment and influenced the sentiments of Epaminondas at Thebes. But Plato's power of working upon the minds of young men was far more impressive and irresistible. He possessed a large range of practical experience, a mastery of political and social topics, and a charm of eloquence, to which the Pythagoreans were strangers. The stirring effect of the Sokratic talk, as well as of the democratical atmosphere in which Plato had been brought up, had developed all the communicative aptitude of his mind; and great as that aptitude appears in his remaining dialogues, there is ground for believing that it was far greater in his conversation; greater perhaps in 387 B. C., when he was still mainly the Sokratic Plato—than it became in later days, after he had imbibed to a certain extent the mysticism of these Pythagoreans.[119] Brought up as Dion had been at the court of Dionysius—accustomed to see around him only slavish defer-

ence and luxurious enjoyment—unused to open speech or large philosophical discussion—he found in Plato a new man exhibited, and a new world opened before him.

The conception of a free community—with correlative rights and duties belonging to every citizen, determined by laws and protected or enforced by power emanating from the collective entity called the City—stood in the foreground of ordinary Grecian morality—reigned spontaneously in the bosoms of every Grecian festival crowd—and had been partially imbibed by Dion, though not from his own personal experience, yet from teachers, sophists, and poets. This conception, essential and fundamental with philosophers as well as with the vulgar, was not merely set forth by Plato with commanding powers of speech, but also exalted with improvements and refinements into an ideal perfection. Above all, it was based upon a strict, even an abstemious and ascetic, canon, as to individual enjoyment; and upon a careful training both of mind and body, qualifying each man for the due performance of his duties as a citizen; a subject which Plato (as we see by his dialogues) did not simply propound with the direct enforcement of a preacher, but touched with the quickening and pungent effect, and reinforced with the copious practical illustrations, of Sokratic dialogue.

As the stimulus from the teacher was here put forth with consummate efficacy, so the predisposition of the learner enabled it to take full effect. Dion became an altered man both in public sentiment and in individual behavior. He recollected that twenty years before, his country Syracuse had been as free as Athens. He learnt to abhor the iniquity of the despotism by which her liberty had been overthrown, and by which subsequently the liberties of so many other Greeks in Italy and Sicily had been trodden down also. He was made to remark, that Sicily had been half-barbarized through the foreign mercenaries imported as the despot's instruments. He conceived the sublime idea or dream of rectifying all this accumulation of wrong and suffering. It was his wish first to cleanse Syracuse from the blot of slavery, and to clothe her anew in the brightness and dignity of freedom; yet not with the view of restoring the popular government as it had stood prior to the usurpation, but of establishing an improved constitutional policy, originated by himself, with laws which should not only secure individual rights, but also educate and moralize the citizens.[120] The function which he imagined to himself, and which the conversation of Plato suggested, was not that of a despot like Dionysius, but that of a despotic legislator like Lykurgus,[121] taking advantage of a momentary omnipotence, conferred upon him by grateful citizens in a state of public confusion, to originate a good system; which, when once put in motion, would keep itself alive by fashioning the minds of the citizens to its own intrinsic excellence. After having thus both liberated and reformed Syracuse, Dion promised to himself that he would employ Syracusan force, not in annihilating, but in recreating, other free Hellenic communities throughout the island; expelling from thence all the barbarians—both the imported mercenaries and the Carthaginians.

Such were the hopes and projects which arose in the mind of the youthful Dion as he listened to Plato; hopes pregnant with future results which neither of them

contemplated—and not unworthy of being compared with those enthusiastic aspirations which the young Spartan kings Agis and Kleomenes imbibed, a century afterwards, in part from the conversation of the philosopher Sphærus.[122] Never before had Plato met with a pupil who so quickly apprehended, so profoundly meditated, or so passionately laid to heart, his lessons.[123] Inflamed with his newly communicated impulse towards philosophy, as the supreme guide and directress of virtuous conduct, Dion altered his habits of life; exchanging the splendor and luxury of a Sicilian rich man for the simple fare and regulated application becoming a votary of the Academy. In this course he persisted without faltering throughout all his residence at the court of Dionysius, in spite of the unpopularity contracted among his immediate companions. His enthusiasm even led him to believe, that the despot himself, unable to resist that persuasive tongue by which he had been himself converted, might be gently brought round into an employment of his mighty force for beneficent and reformatory purposes. Accordingly Dion, inviting Plato to Syracuse, procured for him an interview with Dionysius. How miserably the speculation failed, has been recounted in my last chapter. Instead of acquiring a new convert, the philosopher was fortunate in rescuing his own person, and in making good his returning footsteps out of that lion's den, into which the improvident enthusiasm of his young friend had inveigled him.

The harsh treatment of Plato by Dionysius was a painful, though salutary, warning to Dion. Without sacrificing either his own convictions, or the philosophical regularity of life which he had thought fit to adopt—he saw that patience was imperatively necessary, and he so conducted himself as to maintain unabated the favor and confidence of Dionysius. Such a policy would probably be recommended to him even by Plato, in prospect of a better future. But it would be strenuously urged by the Pythagoreans of Southern Italy; among whom was Archytas, distinguished not only as a mathematician and friend of Plato, but also as the chief political magistrate of Tarentum. To these men, who dwelt all within the reach,[124] if not under the dominion, of this formidable Syracusan despot, it would be an unspeakable advantage to have a friend like Dion near him, possessing his confidence, and serving as a shield to them against his displeasure or interference. Dion so far surmounted his own unbending nature as to conduct himself towards Dionysius with skill and prudence. He was employed by the despot in several important affairs, especially in embassies to Carthage, which he fulfilled well, especially with conspicuous credit for eloquence; and also in the execution of various cruel orders, which his humanity secretly mitigated.[125] After the death of Thearides, Dionysius gave to Dion in marriage the widow Aretê (his daughter), and continued until the last to treat him with favor, accepting from him a freedom of censure such as he would tolerate from no other adviser.

During the many years which elapsed before the despot died, we cannot doubt that Dion found opportunities of visiting Peloponnesus and Athens, for the great fes-

tivals and other purposes. He would thus keep up his friendship and philosophical communication with Plato. Being as he was minister and relative, and perhaps successor presumptive, of the most powerful prince in Greece, he would enjoy everywhere great importance, which would be enhanced by his philosophy and eloquence. The Spartans, at that time the allies of Dionysius, conferred upon Dion the rare honor of a vote of citizenship;[126] and he received testimonies of respect from other cities also. Such honors tended to exalt his reputation at Syracuse; while the visits to Athens and the cities of Central Greece enlarged his knowledge both of politicians and philosophers.

At length occurred the death of the elder Dionysius, occasioned by an unexpected attack of fever, after a few days' illness. He had made no special announcement about his succession. Accordingly, as soon as the physicians pronounced him to be in imminent danger, a competition arose between his two families: on the one hand Dionysius the younger, his son by the Lokrian wife Doris; on the other, his wife Aristomachê and her brother Dion, representing her children Hipparinus and Nysæus, then very young. Dion, wishing to obtain for these two youths either a partnership in the future power, or some other beneficial provision, solicited leave to approach the bedside of the sick man. But the physicians refused to grant his request without apprising the younger Dionysius; who, being resolved to prevent it, directed a soporific portion to be administered to his father, from the effects of which the latter never awoke so as to be able to see any one.[127] The interview with Dion being thus frustrated, and the father dying without giving any directions, Dionysius the younger succeeded as eldest son, without opposition. He was presented to that which was called an assembly of the Syracusan people,[128] and delivered some conciliatory phrases, requesting them to continue to him that good-will which they had so long shown to his father. Consent and acclamation were of course not wanting, to the new master of the troops, treasures, magazines, and fortifications in Ortygia; those "adamantine chains" which were well known to dispense with the necessity of any real popular good-will.

Dionysius II. (or the younger), then about twenty-five years of age, was a young man of considerable natural capacity, and of quick and lively impulses;[129] but weak and vain in his character, given to transitory caprices, and eager in his appetite for praise without being capable of any industrious or resolute efforts to earn it. As yet he was wholly unpractised in serious business of any kind. He had neither seen military service nor mingled in the discussion of political measures; having been studiously kept back from both, by the extreme jealousy of his father. His life had been passed in the palace or acropolis of Ortygia, amidst all the indulgences and luxuries belonging to a princely station, diversified with amateur carpenter's work and turnery. However, the tastes of the father introduced among the guests at the palace a certain number of poets, reciters, musicians, etc., so that the younger Dionysius had contracted a relish for poetical literature, which opened his mind to generous senti-

ments, and large conceptions of excellence, more than any portion of his very confined experience. To philosophy, to instructive conversation, to the exercise of reason, he was a stranger.[130] But the very feebleness and indecision of his character presented him as impressible, perhaps improvable, by a strong will and influence brought to bear upon him from that quarter, at least as well as from any other.

Such was the novice who suddenly stept into the place of the most energetic and powerful despot of the Grecian world. Dion—being as he was of mature age, known service and experience, and full enjoyment of the confidence of the elder Dionysius,—might have probably raised material opposition to the younger. But he attempted no such thing. He acknowledged and supported the young prince with cordial sincerity, dropping altogether those views, whatever they were, on behalf of the children of Aristomachê, which had induced him to solicit the last interview with the sick man. While exerting himself to strengthen and facilitate the march of the government, he tried to gain influence and ascendency over the mind of the young Dionysius. At the first meeting of council which took place after the accession, Dion stood conspicuous not less for his earnest adhesion than for his dignified language and intelligent advice. The remaining councillors—accustomed, under the self-determining despot who had just quitted the scene, to the simple function of hearing, applauding, and obeying, his directions—exhausted themselves in phrases and compliments, waiting to catch the tone of the young prince before they ventured to pronounce any decided opinion. But Dion, to whose freedom of speech even the elder Dionysius had partially submitted, disdained all such tampering, entered at once into a full review of the actual situation, and suggested the positive measures proper to be adopted. We cannot doubt that, in the transmission of an authority which had rested so much on the individual spirit of the former possessor, there were many precautions to be taken, especially in regard to the mercenary troops both at Syracuse and in the outlying dependencies. All these necessities of the moment Dion set forth, together with suitable advice. But the most serious of all the difficulties arose out of the war with Carthage still subsisting, which it was foreseen that the Carthaginians were likely to press more vigorously, calculating on the ill-assured tenure and inexperienced management of the new prince. This difficulty Dion took upon himself. If the council should think it wise to make peace, he engaged to go to Carthage and negotiate peace—a task in which he had been more than once employed under the elder Dionysius. If, on the other hand, it were resolved to prosecute the war, he advised that imposing forces should be at once put in equipment, promising to furnish, out of his own large property, a sum sufficient for the outfit of fifty triremes.[131]

The young Dionysius was not only profoundly impressed with the superior wisdom and suggestive resource of Dion, but also grateful for his generous offer of pecuniary as well as personal support.[132] In all probability Dion actually carried the offer into effect, for to a man of his disposition, money had little value except as a means of extending influence and acquiring reputation. The war with Carthage

seems to have lasted at least throughout the next year,[133] and to have been terminated not long afterwards. But it never assumed those perilous proportions which had been contemplated by the council as probable. As a mere contingency, however, it was sufficient to inspire Dionysius with alarm, combined with the other exigencies of his new situation. At first he was painfully conscious of his own inexperience; anxious about hazards which he now saw for the first time, and not merely open to advice, but eager and thankful for suggestions, from any quarter where he could place confidence. Dion, identified by ancient connection as well as by marriage with the Dionysian family—trusted, more than any one else, by the old despot, and surrounded with that accessory dignity which ascetic strictness of life usually confers in excess—presented every title to such confidence. And when he was found not only the most trustworthy, but the most frank and fearless, of councillors, Dionysius gladly yielded both to the measures which he advised and to the impulses which he inspired.

Such was the political atmosphere of Syracuse during the period immediately succeeding the new accession, while the splendid obsequies in honor of the departed Dionysius were being solemnized; coupled with a funeral pile so elaborate as to confer celebrity on Timæus the constructor—and commemorated by architectural monuments, too grand to be permanent,[134] immediately outside of Ortygia, near the Regal Gates leading to that citadel. Among the popular measures, natural at the commencement of a new reign, the historian Philistus was recalled from exile.[135] He had been one of the oldest and most attached partisans of the elder Dionysius; by whom, however, he had at last been banished, and never afterwards forgiven. His recall now seemed to promise a new and valuable assistant to the younger, whom it also presented as softening the rigorous proceedings of his father. In this respect, it would harmonize with the views of Dion, though Philistus afterwards became his great opponent.

Dion was now both the prime minister, and the confidential monitor, of the young Dionysius. He upheld the march of the government with undiminished energy, and was of greater political importance than Dionysius himself. But success in this object was not the end for which Dion labored. He neither wished to serve a despot, nor to become a despot himself. The moment was favorable for resuming that project which he had formerly imbibed from Plato, and which, in spite of contemptuous disparagement by his former master, had ever since clung to him as the dream of his heart and life. To make Syracuse a free city, under a government, not of will, but of good laws, with himself as lawgiver in substance, if not in name—to enfranchise and replant the semi-barbarised Hellenic cities in Sicily—and to expel the Carthaginians—were schemes to which he now again devoted himself with unabated enthusiasm. But he did not look to any other means of achieving them than the consent and initiative of Dionysius himself. The man who had been sanguine enough to think of working upon the iron soul of the father, was not likely to despair of shaping anew

the more malleable metal of which the son was composed. Accordingly, while lending to Dionysius his best service as minister, he also took up the Platonic profession, and tried to persuade him to reform both himself and his government. He endeavored to awaken in him a relish for a better and nobler private conduct than that which prevailed among the luxurious companions around him. He dwelt with enthusiasm on the scientific and soul-stirring conversation of Plato; specimens[136] of which he either read aloud or repeated, exalting the hearer not only to a higher intellectual range, but also to the full majesty of mind requisite for ruling others with honor and improvement. He pointed out the unrivalled glory which Dionysius would acquire in the eyes of Greece, by consenting to employ his vast power, not as a despot working on the fears of subjects, but as a king enforcing temperance and justice, by his own paternal example as well as by good laws. He tried to show that Dionysius, after having liberated Syracuse, and enrolled himself as a king limited and responsible amidst grateful citizens, would have far more real force against the barbarians than at present.[137]

Such were the new convictions which Dion tried to work into the mind of the young Dionysius, as a living faith and sentiment. Penetrated as he was with the Platonic idea—that nothing could be done for the improvement and happiness of mankind,[138] until philosophy and ruling power came together in the same hands; but everything, if the two did so come together—he thought that he saw before him a chance of realizing the conjunction, in the case of the greatest among all Hellenic potentates. He already beheld in fancy his native country and fellow citizens liberated, moralized, ennobled, and conducted to happiness, without murder or persecution,[139] simply by the well-meaning and instructed employment of power already organized. If accident had thrown the despotism into the hands of Dion himself, at this period of his life, the Grecian world would probably have seen an experiment tried, as memorable and generous as any event recorded in its history: what would have been its result, we cannot say. But it was enough to fire his inmost soul, to see himself separated from the experiment only by the necessity of persuading an impressible young man over whom he had much influence; and for himself he was quite satisfied with the humbler position of nominal minister, but real originator and chief, in so noble an enterprise.[140] His persuasive powers, strengthened as they were by intense earnestness as well as by his imposing station and practical capacity, actually wrought a great effect upon Dionysius. The young man appeared animated with a strong desire of self-improvement, and of qualifying himself for such a use of the powers of government as Dion depicted. He gave proof of the sincerity of his feeling by expressing eagerness to see and converse with Plato, to whom he sent several personal messages, warmly requesting him to visit Syracuse.[141]

This was precisely the first step which Dion had been laboring to bring about. He well knew, and had personally felt, the wonderful magic of Plato's conversation when addressed to young men. To bring Plato to Syracuse, and to pour his eloquent lan-

guage into the predisposed ears of Dionysius, appeared like realizing the conjunction of philosophy and power. Accordingly he sent to Athens, along with the invitation from Dionysius, the most pressing and emphatic entreaties from himself. He represented the immense prize to be won—nothing less than the means of directing the action of an organized power, extending over all the Greeks of Italy and Sicily—provided only the mind of Dionysius could be thoroughly gained over. This (he said) was already half done; not only Dionysius himself, but also his youthful half brothers of the other line, had been impressed with earnest mental aspirations, and longed to drink at the pure fountain of true philosophy. Everything presaged complete success, such as would render them hearty and active proselytes, if Plato would only come forthwith—before hostile influences could have time to corrupt them—and devote to the task his unrivalled art of penetrating the youthful mind. These hostile influences were indeed at work, and with great activity; if victorious, they would not only defeat the project of Dion, but might even provoke his expulsion, or threaten his life. Could Plato, by declining the invitation, leave his devoted champion and apostle to fight so great a battle, alone and unassisted? What could Plato say for himself afterwards, if by declining to come, he not only let slip the greatest prospective victory which had ever been opened to philosophy, but also permitted the corruption of Dionysius and the ruin of Dion?[142]

Such appeals, in themselves emphatic and touching, reached Athens reinforced by solicitations, hardly less strenuous, from Archytas of Tarentum and the other Pythagorean philosophers in the south of Italy; to whose personal well-being, over and above the interests of philosophy, the character of the future Syracusan government was of capital importance. Plato was deeply agitated and embarrassed. He was now sixty-one years of age. He enjoyed preëminent estimation, in the grove of Akadêmus near Athens, amidst admiring hearers from all parts of Greece. The Athenian democracy, if it accorded to him no influence on public affairs, neither molested him nor dimmed his intellectual glory. The proposed voyage to Syracuse carried him out of his enviable position into a new field of hazard and speculation; brilliant indeed and flattering, beyond anything which had ever been approached by philosophy, if it succeeded; but fraught with disgrace, and even with danger to all concerned, if it failed. Plato had already seen the elder Dionysius surrounded by his walls and mercenaries in Ortygia, and had learnt by cruel experience the painful consequences of propounding philosophy to an intractable hearer, whose displeasure passed so readily into act. The sight of contemporary despots nearer home, such as Euphron of Sikyon and Alexander of Pheræ, was by no means reassuring; nor could he reasonably stake his person and reputation on the chance, that the younger Dionysius might prove a glorious exception to the general rule. To outweigh such scruples, he had indeed the positive and respectful invitation of Dionysius himself; which however would have passed for a transitory, though vehement caprice on the part of a young prince, had it not been backed by the strong assurances of a mature man and valued friend like Dion. To these assurances, and to the shame which would

be incurred by leaving Dion to fight the battle and incur the danger alone, Plato sacrificed his own grounds for hesitation. He went to Syracuse, less with the hope of succeeding in the intended conversion of Dionysius, than from the fear of hearing both himself and his philosophy taunted with confessed impotence—as fit only for the discussions of the school, shrinking from all application to practice, betraying the interest of his Pythagorean friends, and basely deserting that devoted champion who had half opened the door to him for triumphant admission.[143]

Such is the account which the philosopher gives of his own state of mind in going to Syracuse. At the same time, he intimates that his motives were differently interpreted by others.[144] And as the account which we possess was written fifteen years after the event—when Dion had perished, when the Syracusan enterprise had realized nothing like what was expected, and when Plato looked back upon it with the utmost grief and aversion,[145] which must have poisoned the last three or four years of his life—we may fairly suspect that he partially transfers back to 367 B. C. the feelings of 352 B. C.; and that at the earlier period, he went to Syracuse not merely because he was ashamed to decline, but because he really flattered himself with some hopes of success.

However desponding he may have been before, he could hardly fail to conceive hopes from the warmth of his first reception. One of the royal carriages met him at his landing, and conveyed him to his lodging. Dionysius offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving to the gods for his safe arrival. The banquets at the acropolis became distinguished for their plainness and sobriety. Never had Dionysius been seen so gentle in answering suitors or transacting public business. He began immediately to take lessons in geometry from Plato. Every one around him, of course, was suddenly smitten with a taste for geometry;[146] so that the floors were all spread with sand, and nothing was to be seen except triangles and other figures inscribed upon it, with expositors and a listening crowd around them. To those who had been inmates of the acropolis, under the reign of the former despot, this change was surprising enough. But their surprise was converted into alarm, when, at a periodical sacrifice just then offered, Dionysius himself arrested the herald in pronouncing the customary prayer to the gods—"That the despotism might long remain unshaken." "Stop! (said Dionysius to the herald) imprecate no such curse upon us!"[147] To the ears of Philistus, and the old politicians, these words portended nothing less than revolution to the dynasty, and ruin to Syracusan power. A single Athenian sophist (they exclaimed), with no other force than his tongue and his reputation, had achieved the conquest of Syracuse; an attempt in which thousands of his countrymen had miserably perished half a century before.[148] Ineffably were they disgusted to see Dionysius abdicate in favor of Plato, and exchange the care of his vast force and dominion for geometrical problems and discussions on the *summum bonum*.

For a moment Plato seemed to be despot of Syracuse; so that the noble objects for which Dion had labored were apparently within his reach, either wholly or in part.

And as far as we can judge, they really were to a great degree within his reach—had this situation, so interesting and so fraught with consequences to the people of Sicily, been properly turned to account. With all reverence for the greatest philosopher of antiquity, we are forced to confess that upon his own showing, he not only failed to turn the situation to account, but contributed even to spoil it by an unseasonable rigor. To admire philosophy in its distinguished teachers, is one thing; to learn and appropriate it, is another stage, rarer and more difficult, requiring assiduous labor, and no common endowments; while that which Plato calls "the philosophical life,"[149] or practical predominance of a well-trained intellect and well-chosen ethical purposes, combined with the minimum of personal appetite—is a third stage, higher and rarer still. Now Dionysius had reached the first stage only. He had contracted a warm and profound admiration for Plato. He had imbibed this feeling from the exhortations of Dion; and we shall see by his subsequent conduct that it was really a feeling both sincere and durable. But he admired Plato without having either inclination or talent to ascend higher, and to acquire what Plato called philosophy. Now it was an unexpected good fortune, and highly creditable to the persevering enthusiasm of Dion, that Dionysius should have been wound up so far as to admire Plato, to invoke his presence, and to instal him as a sort of spiritual power by the side of the temporal. Thus much was more than could have been expected; but to demand more, and to insist that Dionysius should go to school and work through a course of mental regeneration—was a purpose hardly possible to attain, and positively mischievous if it failed. Unfortunately, it was exactly this error which Plato, and Dion in deference to Plato, seem to have committed. Instead of taking advantage of the existing ardor of Dionysius to instigate him at once into active political measures beneficial to the people of Syracuse and Sicily, with the full force of an authority which, at that moment, would have been irresistible—instead of heartening him up against groundless fears or difficulties of execution, and seeing that full honor was done to him for all the good which he really accomplished, meditated, or adopted—Plato postponed all these as matters for which his royal pupil was not yet ripe. He and Dion began to deal with Dionysius as a confessor treats his penitent; to probe the interior man[150] —to expose him to his own unworthiness—to show that his life, his training, his companions, had all been vicious—to insist upon repentance and amendment upon these points, before he could receive absolution, and be permitted to enter upon active political life—to tell him that he must reform himself, and become a rational and temperate man, before he was fit to enter seriously on the task of governing others.

Such was the language which Plato and Dion held to Dionysius. They well knew indeed that they were treading on delicate ground—that while irritating a spirited horse in the sensitive part, they had no security against his kicks.[151] Accordingly, they resorted to many circumlocutory and equivocal expressions, so as to soften the offence given. But the effect was not the less produced, of disgusting Dionysius with his velleities towards political good. Not only did Plato decline entering upon political recommendations of his own, but he damped, instead of enforcing, the positive good

resolutions which Dion had already succeeded in infusing. Dionysius announced freely, in the presence of Plato, his wish and intention to transform his despotism at Syracuse into a limited kingship, and to replant the dis-hellenised cities in Sicily. These were the two grand points to which Dion had been laboring so generously to bring him, and which he had invoked Plato for the express purpose of seconding. Yet what does Plato say when this momentous announcement is made? Instead of bestowing any praise or encouragement, he drily remarks to Dionysius,—"First go through your schooling, and then do all these things; otherwise leave them undone."[152] Dionysius afterwards complained, and with good show of reason (when Dion was in exile, menacing attack upon Syracuse, under the favorable sympathies of Plato), that the great philosopher had actually deterred him (Dionysius) from executing the same capital improvements which he was now encouraging Dion to accomplish by an armed invasion. Plato was keenly sensitive to this reproach afterwards; but even his own exculpation proves it to have been in the main not undeserved.

Plutarch observes that Plato felt a proud consciousness of philosophical dignity in disdaining respect to persons, and in refusing to the defects of Dionysius any greater measure of indulgence than he would have shown to an ordinary pupil of the Academy.[153] If we allow him credit for a sentiment in itself honorable, it can only be at the expense of his fitness for dealing with practical life; by admitting (to quote a remarkable phrase from one of his own dialogues) that "he tried to deal with individual men without knowing those rules of art or practice which bear on human affairs. [154]" Dionysius was not a common pupil, nor could Plato reasonably expect the like unmeasured docility from one for whose ear so many hostile influences were competing. Nor were Plato and Dionysius the only parties concerned. There was, besides, in the first place, Dion, whose whole position was at stake—next, and of yet greater moment, the relief of the people of Syracuse and Sicily. For them, and on their behalf, Dion had been laboring with such zeal, that he had inspired Dionysius with readiness to execute the two best resolves which the situation admitted; resolves not only pregnant with benefit to the people, but also insuring the position of Dion—since if Dionysius had once entered upon this course of policy, Dion would have been essential to him as an auxiliary and man of execution.

It is by no means certain, indeed, that such schemes could have been successfully realized, even with full sincerity on the part of Dionysius, and the energy of Dion besides. With all governments, to do evil is easy—to effect beneficial change, difficult; and with a Grecian despot, this was true in a peculiar manner. Those great mercenary forces and other instruments, which had been strong as adamant for the oppressive rule of the elder Dionysius would have been found hardly manageable, perhaps even obstructive, if his son had tried to employ them for more liberal purposes. But still the experiment would have been tried, with a fair chance of success—if only Plato, during his short-lived spiritual authority at Syracuse, had measured more accurately the practical influence which a philosopher might reasonably hope to exercise

over Dionysius. I make these remarks upon him with sincere regret; but I am much mistaken if he did not afterwards hear them in more poignant language from the banished Dion, upon whom the consequences of the mistake mainly fell.

Speedily did the atmosphere at Syracuse become overclouded. The conservative party—friends of the old despotism, with the veteran Philistus at their head—played their game far better than that of the reformers was played by Plato, or by Dion since the arrival of Plato. Philistus saw that Dion, as the man of strong patriotic impulses and of energetic execution, was the real enemy to be aimed at. He left no effort untried to calumniate Dion, and to set Dionysius against him. Whispers and misrepresentations from a thousand different quarters beset the ear of Dionysius, alarming him with the idea that Dion was usurping to himself the real authority in Syracuse, with the view of ultimately handing it over to the children of Aristomachê, and of reigning in their name. Plato had been brought thither (it was said) as an agent in the conspiracy, for the purpose of winning over Dionysius into idle speculations, enervating his active vigor, and ultimately setting him aside; in order that all serious political agency might fall into the hands of Dion.[155] These hostile intrigues were no secret to Plato himself, who, even shortly after his arrival, began to see evidence of their poisonous activity. He tried sincerely to counterwork them;[156] but unfortunately the language which he himself addressed to Dionysius was exactly such as to give them the best chance of success. When Dionysius recounted to Philistus or other courtiers, how Plato and Dion had humiliated him in his own eyes, and told him that he was unworthy to govern until he had undergone a thorough purification—he would be exhorted to resent it as presumption and insult; and would be assured that it could only arise from a design to dispossess him of his authority, in favor of Dion, or perhaps of the children of Aristomachê with Dion as regent.

It must not be forgotten that there was a real foundation for jealousy on the part of Dionysius towards Dion; who was not merely superior to him in age, in dignity, and in ability, but also personally haughty in his bearing, and rigid in his habits, while Dionysius relished conviviality and enjoyments. At first, this jealousy was prevented from breaking out—partly by the consciousness of Dionysius that he needed some one to lean upon—partly by what seems to have been great self-command on the part of Dion, and great care to carry with him the real mind and good will of Dionysius. Even from the beginning, the enemies of Dion were doubtless not sparing in their calumnies, to alienate Dionysius from him; and the wonder only is, how, in spite of such intrigues and in spite of the natural causes of jealousy, Dion could have implanted his political aspirations, and maintained his friendly influence over Dionysius until the arrival of Plato. After that event, the natural causes of antipathy tended to manifest themselves more and more powerfully, while the counteracting circumstances all disappeared.

Three important months thus passed away, during which those precious public inclinations, which Plato found instilled by Dion into the bosom of Dionysius, and which

he might have fanned into life and action—to liberalize the government of Syracuse, and to restore the other free Grecian cities—disappeared never to return. In place of them, Dionysius imbibed an antipathy, more and more rancorous, against the friend and relative with whom these sentiments had originated. The charges against Dion, of conspiracy and dangerous designs, circulated by Philistus and his cabal, became more audacious than ever. At length in the fourth month, Dionysius resolved to get rid of him.

The proceedings of Dion being watched, a letter was detected which he had written to the Carthaginian commanders in Sicily (with whom the war still subsisted, though seemingly not in great activity), inviting them, if they sent any proposition for peace to Syracuse, to send it through him, as he would take care that it should be properly discussed. I have already stated, that even in the reign of the elder Dionysius, Dion had been the person to whom the negotiations with Carthage were habitually intrusted. Such a letter from him, as far as we make out from the general description, implied nothing like a treasonable purpose. But Dionysius, after taking counsel with Philistus, resolved to make use of it as a final pretext. Inviting Dion into the acropolis, under color of seeking to heal their growing differences,—and beginning to enter into an amicable conversation,—he conducted him unsuspectingly down to the adjacent harbor, where lay moored, close in shore, a boat with the rowers aboard, ready for starting. Dionysius then produced the intercepted letter, handed it to Dion, and accused him to his face of treason. The latter protested against the imputation, and eagerly sought to reply. But Dionysius stopped him from proceeding, insisted on his going aboard the boat, and ordered the rowers to carry him off forthwith to Italy.[157]

This abrupt and ignominious expulsion, of so great a person as Dion, caused as much consternation among his numerous friends, as triumph to Philistus and the partisans of the despotism. All consummation of the liberal projects conceived by Dion was now out of the question; not less from the incompetency of Dionysius to execute them alone, than from his indisposition to any such attempt. Aristomachê the sister, and Aretê the wife, of Dion (the latter half-sister of Dionysius himself), gave vent to their sorrow and indignation; while the political associates of Dion, and Plato beyond all others, trembled for their own personal safety. Among the mercenary soldiers, the name of Plato was particularly odious. Many persons instigated Dionysius to kill him, and rumors even gained footing that he had been killed, as the author of the whole confusion.[158] But the despot, having sent away the person whom he most hated and feared, was not disposed to do harm to any one else. While he calmed the anxieties of Aretê by affirming that the departure of her husband was not to be regarded as an exile, but only as a temporary separation, to allow time for abating the animosity which prevailed—he at the same time ordered two triremes to be fitted out, for sending to Dion his slaves and valuable property, and everything necessary to personal dignity as well as to his comfort. Towards Plato—

who was naturally agitated in the extreme, thinking only of the readiest means to escape from so dangerous a situation—his manifestations were yet more remarkable. He soothed the philosopher's apprehensions—entreated him to remain, in a manner gentle indeed but admitting no denial—and conveyed him at once into his own residence the acropolis, under color of doing him honor. From hence there was no possibility of escaping, and Plato remained there for some time. Dionysius treated him well, communicated with him freely and intimately, and proclaimed everywhere that they were on the best terms of friendship. What is yet more curious—he displayed the greatest anxiety to obtain the esteem and approbation of the sage, and to occupy a place in his mind higher than that accorded to Dion; shrinking nevertheless from philosophy, or the Platonic treatment and training, under the impression that there was a purpose to ensnare and paralyze him, under the auspices of Dion.[159] This is a strange account, given by Plato himself; but it reads like a real picture of a vain and weak prince, admiring the philosopher—coquetting with him, as it were—and anxious to captivate his approbation, so far as it could be done without submitting to the genuine Platonic discipline.

During this long and irksome detention, which probably made him fully sensible of the comparative comforts of Athenian liberty, Plato obtained from Dionysius one practical benefit. He prevailed upon him to establish friendly and hospitable relations with Archytas and the Tarentines, which to these latter was a real increase of security and convenience.[160] But in the point which he strove most earnestly to accomplish, he failed. Dionysius resisted all entreaties for the recall of Dion. Finding himself at length occupied with a war (whether the war with Carthage previously mentioned, or some other, we do not know), he consented to let Plato depart; agreeing to send for him again as soon as peace and leisure should return, and promising to recall Dion at the same time; upon which covenant, Plato, on his side, agreed to come back. After a certain interval, peace arrived, and Dionysius re-invited Plato; yet without recalling Dion—whom he required still to wait another year. But Plato, appealing to the terms of the covenant, refused to go without Dion. To himself personally, in spite of the celebrity which his known influence with Dionysius tended to confer, the voyage was nothing less than repugnant, for he had had sufficient experience of Syracuse and its despotism. Nor would he even listen to the request of Dion himself; who, partly in the view of promoting his own future restoration, earnestly exhorted him to go. Dionysius besieged Plato with solicitations to come,[161] promising that all which he might insist upon in favor of Dion should be granted, and putting in motion a second time Archytas and the Tarentines to prevail upon him. These men, through their companion and friend Archedemus, who came to Athens in a Syracusan trireme, assured Plato that Dionysius was now ardent in the study of philosophy, and had even made considerable progress in it. By their earnest entreaties, coupled with those of Dion, Plato was at length induced to go to Syracuse. He was received, as before, with signal tokens of honor. He was complimented with the privilege, enjoyed by no one else, of approaching the despot without having his person searched; and

was affectionately welcomed by the female relatives of Dion. Yet this visit, prolonged much beyond what he himself wished, proved nothing but a second splendid captivity, as the companion of Dionysius in the acropolis at Ortygia.[162]

Dionysius the philosopher obtained abundance of flatterers—as his father Dionysius the poet had obtained before him—and was even emboldened to proclaim himself as the son of Apollo.[163] It is possible that even an impuissant embrace of philosophy, on the part of so great a potentate, may have tended to exalt the reputation of philosophers in the contemporary world. Otherwise the dabblings of Dionysius would have merited no attention; though he seems to have been really a man of some literary talent[164]—retaining to the end a sincere admiration of Plato, and jealously pettish because he could not prevail upon Plato to admire *him*. But the second visit of Plato to him at Syracuse—very different from his first—presented no chance of benefit to the people of Syracuse, and only deserves notice as it bore upon the destiny of Dion. Here, unfortunately Plato could accomplish nothing; though his zeal on behalf of his friend was unwearied. Dionysius broke all his promises of kind dealing, became more rancorous in his hatred, impatient of the respect which Dion enjoyed even as an exile, and fearful of the revenge which he might one day be able to exact.

When expelled from Syracuse, Dion had gone to Peloponnesus and Athens, where he had continued for some years to receive regular remittances of his property. But at length, even while Plato was residing at Syracuse, Dionysius thought fit to withhold one half of the property, on pretence of reserving it for Dion's son. Presently he took steps yet more violent, threw off all disguise, sold the whole of Dion's property, and appropriated or distributed among his friends the large proceeds, not less than one hundred talents.[165] Plato, who had the mortification to hear this intelligence while in the palace of Dionysius, was full of grief and displeasure. He implored permission to depart. But though the mind of Dionysius had now been thoroughly set against him by the multiplied insinuations of the calumniators, [166] it was not without difficulty and tiresome solicitations that he obtained permission; chiefly through the vehement remonstrances of Archytas and his companions, who represented to the despot that they had brought him to Syracuse, and that they were responsible for his safe return. The mercenaries of Dionysius were indeed so ill-disposed to Plato, that considerable precautions were required to bring him away in safety.[167]

It was in the spring of 360 B. C. that the philosopher appears to have returned to Peloponnesus from this, his second visit to the younger Dionysius, and third visit to Syracuse. At the Olympic festival of that year, he met Dion, to whom he recounted the recent proceedings of Dionysius.[168] Incensed at the seizure of the property, and hopeless of any permission to return, Dion was now meditating enforcement of his restoration at the point of the sword. But there occurred yet another insult on the part of Dionysius, which infused a more deadly exasperation into the quarrel. Aretê,

wife of Dion and half-sister of Dionysius, had continued to reside at Syracuse ever since the exile of her husband. She formed a link between the two, the continuance of which Dionysius could no longer tolerate, in his present hatred towards Dion. Accordingly he took upon him to pronounce her divorced, and to remarry her, in spite of her own decided repugnance, with one of his friends named Timokrates.[169] To this he added another cruel injury, by intentionally corrupting and brutalizing Dion's eldest son, a youth just reaching puberty.

Outraged thus in all the tenderest points, Dion took up with passionate resolution the design of avenging himself on Dionysius, and of emancipating Syracuse from despotism into liberty. During the greater part of his exile he had resided at Athens, in the house of his friend Kallippus, enjoying the society of Speusippus and other philosophers of the Academy, and the teaching of Plato himself when returned from Syracuse. Well supplied with money, and strict as to his own personal wants, he was able largely to indulge his liberal spirit towards many persons, and among the rest towards Plato, whom he assisted towards the expense of a choric exhibition at Athens.[170] Dion also visited Sparta and various other cities; enjoying a high reputation, and doing himself credit everywhere; a fact not unknown to Dionysius, and aggravating his displeasure. Yet Dion was long not without hope that that displeasure would mitigate, so as to allow of his return to Syracuse on friendly terms. Nor did he cherish any purposes of hostility, until the last proceedings with respect to his property and his wife at once cut off all hope and awakened vindictive sentiments.[171] He began therefore to lay a train for attacking Dionysius and enfranchising Syracuse by arms, invoking the countenance of Plato; who gave his approbation, yet not without mournful reserves; saying that he was now seventy years of age—that though he admitted the just wrongs of Dion and the bad conduct of Dionysius, armed conflict was nevertheless repugnant to his feelings, and he could anticipate little good from it—that he had labored long in vain to reconcile the two exasperated kinsmen, and could not now labor for any opposite end.[172]

But though Plato was lukewarm, his friends and pupils at the Academy cordially sympathized with Dion. Speusippus especially, the intimate friend and relative, having accompanied Plato to Syracuse, had communicated much with the population in the city, and gave encouraging reports of their readiness to aid Dion, even if he came with ever so small a force against Dionysius. Kallippus, with Eudemus (the friend of Aristotle), Timonides, and Miltas—all three members of the society at the Academy, and the last a prophet also—lent him aid and embarked in his enterprise. There were a numerous body of exiles from Syracuse, not less than one thousand altogether; with most of whom Dion opened communication, inviting their fellowship. He at the same time hired mercenary soldiers in small bands, keeping his measures as secret as he could.[173] Alkimenes, one of the leading Achæans in Peloponnesus, was warm in the cause (probably from sympathy with the Achæan colony Kroton, then under the dependence of Dionysius), conferring upon it additional dignity by his name and

presence. A considerable quantity of spare arms, of every description, was got together, in order to supply new unarmed partisans on reaching Sicily. With all these aids Dion found himself in the island of Zakynthus, a little after Midsummer 357 B. C.; mustering eight hundred soldiers of tried experience and bravery, who had been directed to come thither silently and in small parties, without being informed whither they were going. A little squadron was prepared, of no more than five merchantmen, two of them vessels of thirty oars, with victuals adequate to the direct passage across the sea from Zakynthus to Syracuse; since the ordinary passage, across from Korkyra and along the Tarentine Gulf was impracticable, in the face of the maritime power of Dionysius.[174]

Such was the contemptible force with which Dion ventured to attack the greatest of all Grecian potentates in his own stronghold and island. Dionysius had now reigned as despot at Syracuse between ten and eleven years. Inferior as he personally was to his father, it does not seem that the Syracusan power had yet materially declined in his hands. We know little about the political facts of his reign; but the veteran Philistus, his chief adviser and officer, appears to have kept together the larger part of the great means bequeathed by the elder Dionysius. The disparity of force, therefore, between the assailant and the party assailed, was altogether extravagant. To Dion, personally, indeed, such disparity was a matter of indifference. To a man of his enthusiastic temperament, so great was the heroism and sublimity of the enterprise,—combining liberation of his country from a despot, with revenge for gross outrages to himself,—that he was satisfied if he could only land in Sicily with no matter how small a force, accounting it honor enough to perish in such a cause. [175] Such was the emphatic language of Dion, reported to us by Aristotle; who (being then among the pupils of Plato) may probably have heard it with his own ears. To impartial contemporary spectators, like Demosthenes, the attempt seemed hopeless. [176]

But the intelligent men of the Academy who accompanied Dion, would not have thrown their lives away in contemplation of a glorious martyrdom; nor were either they or he ignorant, that there existed circumstances, not striking the eye of the ordinary spectator, which materially weakened the great apparent security of Dionysius.

First, there was the pronounced and almost unanimous discontent of the people of Syracuse. Though prohibited from all public manifestations, they had been greatly agitated by the original project of Dion to grant liberty to the city—by the inclinations even of Dionysius himself towards the same end, so soon unhappily extinguished—by the dissembling language of Dionysius, the great position of Dion's wife and sister, and the second coming of Plato, all of which favored the hope that Dion might be amicably recalled. At length such chance disappeared, when his property was confiscated and his wife re-married to another. But as his energetic character was well known, the Syracusans now both confidently expected, and ardently wished, that he

would return by force, and help them to put down one who was alike his enemy and theirs. Speusippus, having accompanied Plato to Syracuse and mingled much with the people, brought back decisive testimonies of their disaffection towards Dionysius, and of their eager longing for relief by the hands of Dion. It would be sufficient (they said) if he even came alone; they would flock around him, and arm him at once with an adequate force.[177]

There were doubtless many other messages of similar tenor sent to Peloponnesus; and one Syracusan exile, Herakleides, was in himself a considerable force. Though a friend of Dion,[178] he had continued high in the service of Dionysius, until the second visit of Plato. At that time he was disgraced, and obliged to save his life by flight, on account of a mutiny among the mercenary troops, or rather of the veteran soldiers among them, whose pay Dionysius had cut down. The men so curtailed rose in arms, demanding continuance of the old pay; and when Dionysius shut the gates of the acropolis, refusing attention to their requisitions, they raised the furious barbaric pæan or war shout, and rushed up to scale the walls.[179] Terrible were the voices of these Gauls, Iberians, and Campanians, in the ears of Plato, who knew himself to be the object of their hatred, and who happened to be then in the garden of the acropolis. But Dionysius, no less terrified than Plato, appeased the mutiny, by conceding all that was asked, and even more. The blame of this misadventure was thrown upon Herakleides, towards whom Dionysius conducted himself with mingled injustice and treachery—according to the judgment both of Plato and of all around him.[180] As an exile, he brought word that Dionysius could not even rely upon the mercenary troops, whom he treated with a parsimony the more revolting as they contrasted it with the munificence of his father.[181] Herakleides was eager to coöperate in putting down the despotism at Syracuse. But he waited to equip a squadron of triremes, and was not ready so soon as Dion; perhaps intentionally, as the jealousy between the two soon broke out.[182]

The second source of weakness to Dionysius lay in his own character and habits. The commanding energy of the father, far from being of service to the son, had been combined with a jealousy which intentionally kept him down, and cramped his growth. He had always been weak, petty, destitute of courage or foresight, and unfit for a position like that which his father had acquired and maintained. His personal incompetency was recognized by all, and would probably have manifested itself even more conspicuously, had he not found a minister of so much ability, and so much devotion to the dynasty, as Philistus. But in addition to such known incompetency, he had contracted recently habits which inspired every one around him with contempt. He was perpetually intoxicated and plunged in dissipation. To put down such a chief, even though surrounded by walls, soldiers, and armed ships, appeared to Dion and his confidential companions an enterprise noway impracticable.[183]

Nevertheless, these causes of weakness were known only to close observers; while the great military force of Syracuse was obvious to the eyes of every one.

When the soldiers, mustered by Dion at Zakynthus, were first informed that they were destined to strike straight across the sea against Syracuse, they shrank from the proposition as an act of insanity. They complained of their leaders for not having before told them what was projected; just as the Ten Thousand Greeks in the army of Cyrus, on reaching Tarsus, complained of Klearchus for having kept back the fact that they were marching against the Great King. It required all the eloquence of Dion, with his advanced age,[184] his dignified presence, and the quantity of gold and silver plate in his possession, to remove their apprehensions. How widely these apprehensions were felt, is shown by the circumstance, that out of one thousand Syracusan exiles, only twenty-five or thirty dared to join him.[185]

After a magnificent sacrifice to Apollo, and an ample banquet to the soldiers in the stadium at Zakynthus, Dion gave orders for embarkation in the ensuing morning. On that very night the moon was eclipsed. We have already seen what disastrous consequences turned upon the occurrence of this same phænomenon fifty-six years before, when Nikias was about to conduct the defeated Athenian fleet away from the harbor of Syracuse.[186] Under the existing apprehensions of Dion's band, the eclipse might well have induced them to renounce the enterprise; and so it probably would, under a general like Nikias. But Dion had learnt astronomy; and what was of not less consequence, Miltas, the prophet of the expedition, besides his gift of prophecy, had received instruction in the Academy also. When the affrighted soldiers inquired what new resolution was to be adopted in consequence of so grave a sign from the gods, Miltas arose and assured them that they had mistaken the import of the sign, which promised them good fortune and victory. By the eclipse of the moon, the gods intimated that something very brilliant was about to be darkened over: now there was nothing in Greece so brilliant as the despotism of Dionysius at Syracuse; it was Dionysius who was about to suffer eclipse, to be brought on by the victory of Dion. [187] Reassured by such consoling words the soldiers got on board. They had good reason at first to believe that the favor of the gods waited upon them, for a gentle and steady Etesian breeze carried them across midsea without accident or suffering, in twelve days, from Zakynthus to Cape Pachynus, the south-eastern corner of Sicily and nearest to Syracuse. The pilot Protus, who had steered the course so as exactly to hit the cape, urgently recommended immediate disembarkation, without going farther along the south-western coast of the island; since stormy weather was commencing, which might hinder the fleet from keeping near the shore. But Dion was afraid of landing so near to the main force of the enemy. Accordingly, the squadron proceeded onward, but were driven by a violent wind away from Sicily towards the coast of Africa, narrowly escaping shipwreck. It was not without considerable hardship and danger that they got back to Sicily, after five days; touching the island at Herakleia Minoa westward of Agrigentum, within the Carthaginian supremacy. The Carthaginian governor of Minoa, Synalus (perhaps a Greek in the service of Carthage), was a personal acquaintance of Dion, and received him with all possible

kindness; though knowing nothing beforehand of his approach, and at first resisting his landing through ignorance.

Thus was Dion, after ten years of exile, once more on Sicilian ground. The favorable predictions of Miltas had been completely realized. But even that prophet could hardly have been prepared for the wonderful tidings now heard, which ensured the success of the expedition. Dionysius had recently sailed from Syracuse to Italy, with a fleet of eighty triremes.[188] What induced him to commit so capital a mistake, we cannot make out; for Philistus was already with a fleet in the Gulf of Tarentum, waiting to intercept Dion, and supposing that the invading squadron would naturally sail along the coast of Italy to Syracuse, according to the practice almost universal in that day.[189] Philistus did not commit the same mistake as Nikias had made in reference to Gylippus,[190]—that of despising Dion because of the smallness of his force. He watched in the usual waters, and was only disappointed because Dion, venturing on the bold and unusual straight course, was greatly favored by wind and weather. But while Philistus watched the coast of Italy, it was natural that Dionysius himself should keep guard with his main force at Syracuse. The despot was fully aware of the disaffection which reigned in the town, and of the hopes excited by Dion's project; which was generally well known, though no one could tell how or at what moment the deliverer might be expected. Suspicious now to a greater degree than ever, Dionysius had caused a fresh search to be made in the city for arms, and had taken away all that he could find.[191] We may be sure too that his regiment of habitual spies were more on the alert than ever, and that unusual rigor was the order of the day. Yet, at this critical juncture, he thought proper to quit Syracuse with a very large portion of his force, leaving the command to Timokrates, the husband of Dion's late wife; and at this same critical juncture Dion arrived at Minoa.

Nothing could exceed the joy of the Dionian soldiers on hearing of the departure of Dionysius, which left Syracuse open and easy of access. Eager to avail themselves of the favorable instant, they called upon their leader to march thither without delay, repudiating even that measure of rest which he recommended after the fatigues of the voyage. Accordingly, Dion, after a short refreshment provided by Synalus—with whom he deposited his spare arms, to be transmitted to him when required—set forward on his march towards Syracuse. On entering the Agrigentine territory, he was joined by two hundred horsemen near Eknomon.[192] Farther on, while passing through Gela and Kamarina, many inhabitants of these towns, together with some neighboring Sikans and Sikels, swelled his band. Lastly, when he approached the Syracusan border, a considerable proportion of the rural population came to him also, though without arms; making the reinforcements which joined him altogether about five thousand men.[193] Having armed these volunteers in the best manner he could, Dion continued his progress as far as Akræ, where he made a short evening halt. From thence, receiving good news from Syracuse, he recommenced his march during

the latter half of the night, hastening forward to the passage over the river Anapus; which he had the good fortune to occupy without any opposition, before daybreak.

Dion was now within no more than a mile and a quarter of the walls of Syracuse. The rising sun disclosed his army to the view of the Syracusan population, who were doubtless impatiently watching for him. He was seen offering sacrifice to the river Anapus, and putting up a solemn prayer to the god Helios, then just showing himself above the horizon. He wore the wreath habitual with those who were thus employed; while his soldiers, animated by the confident encouragement of the prophets, had taken wreaths also.[194] Elate and enthusiastic, they passed the Anapus (seemingly at the bridge which formed part of the Helorine way), advanced at a running pace across the low plain which divided the southern cliff of Epipolæ from the Great Harbor, and approached the gates of the quarter of Syracuse called Neapolis—the Temenitid Gates, near the chapel of Apollo Temenites.[195] Dion was at their head, in resplendent armor, with a body-guard near him composed of one hundred of his Peloponnesians. His brother Megaklês was on one side of him, his friend the Athenian Kallippus on the other; all three, and a large proportion of the soldiers also, still crowned with their sacrificial wreaths, as if marching in a joyous festival procession, with victory already assured.[196]

As yet Dion had not met with the smallest resistance. Timokrates (left at Syracuse with the large mercenary force as vicegerent), while he sent an express to apprise Dionysius, kept his chief hold on the two military positions or horns of the city; the island of Ortygia at one extremity, and Epipolæ with Euryalus on the other. It has already been mentioned that Epipolæ was a triangle slope, with walls bordering both the northern and southern cliffs, and forming an angle on the western apex, where stood the strong fort of Euryalus. Between Ortygia and Epipolæ lay the populous quarters of Syracuse, wherein the great body of citizens resided. As the disaffection of the Syracusans was well known, Timokrates thought it unsafe to go out of the city, and meet Dion on the road, for fear of revolt within. But he perhaps might have occupied the important bridge over the Anapus, had not a report reached him that Dion was directing his attack first against Leontini. Many of the Campanian mercenaries under the command of Timokrates, having properties in Leontini, immediately quitted Epipolæ to go thither and defend them.[197] This rumor—false, and perhaps intentionally spread by the invaders—not only carried off much of the garrison elsewhere, but also misled Timokrates; insomuch that Dion was allowed to make his night march, to reach the Anapus, and to find it unoccupied.

It was too late for Timokrates to resist, when the rising sun had once exhibited the army of Dion crossing the Anapus. The effect produced upon the Syracusans in the populous quarters was electric. They rose like one man to welcome their deliverer, and to put down the dynasty which had hung about their necks for forty-eight years. Such of the mercenaries of Dionysius as were in these central portions of the city were forced to seek shelter in Epipolæ, while his police and spies were pursued

and seized, to undergo the full terrors of a popular vengeance.[198] Far from being able to go forth against Dion, Timokrates could not even curb the internal insurrection. So thoroughly was he intimidated by the reports of his terrified police, and by the violent and unanimous burst of wrath among a people whom every Dionysian partisan had long been accustomed to treat as disarmed slaves—that he did not think himself safe even in Epipolæ. But he could not find means of getting to Ortygia, since the intermediate city was in the hands of his enemies, while Dion and his troops were crossing the low plain between Epipolæ and the Great Harbor. It only remained for him therefore to evacuate Syracuse altogether, and to escape from Epipolæ either by the northern or the western side. To justify his hasty flight, he spread the most terrific reports respecting the army of Dion, and thus contributed still farther to paralyze the discouraged partisans of Dionysius.[199]

Already had Dion reached the Temenitid gate, where the principal citizens, clothed in their best attire, and the multitude pouring forth loud and joyous acclamations, were assembled to meet him. Halting at the gate, he caused his trumpet to sound, and entreated silence; after which he formally proclaimed, that he and his brother Megakles were come for the purpose of putting down the Dionysian despotism, and of giving liberty both to the Syracusans and the other Sicilian Greeks. The acclamations redoubled as he and his soldiers entered the city, first through Neapolis, next by the ascent up to Achradina; the main street of which (broad, continuous, and straight, as was rare in a Grecian city[200]) was decorated as on a day of jubilee, with victims under sacrifice to the gods, tables, and bowls of wine ready prepared for festival. As Dion advanced at the head of his soldiers through a lane formed in the midst of this crowd, from each side wreaths were cast upon him as upon an Olympic victor, and grateful prayers addressed to him, as it were to a god.[201] Every house was a scene of clamorous joy, in which men and women, freemen and slaves, took part alike; the outburst of feelings long compressed and relieved from the past despotism with its inquisitorial police and garrison.

It was not yet time for Dion to yield to these pleasing but passive impulses. Having infused courage into his soldiers as well as into the citizens by his triumphant procession through Achradina, he descended to the level ground in front of Ortygia. That strong hold was still occupied by the Dionysian garrison, whom he thus challenged to come forth and fight. But the flight of Timokrates had left them without orders, while the imposing demonstration and unanimous rising of the people in Achradina—which they must partly have witnessed from their walls, and partly learnt through fugitive spies and partisans—struck them with discouragement and terror; so that they were in no disposition to quit the shelter of their fortifications. Their backwardness was hailed as a confession of inferiority by the insurgent citizens, whom Dion now addressed as an assembly of freemen. Hard by, in front of the acropolis with its Pentapyla or five gates, there stood a lofty and magnificent sundial, erected by the elder Dionysius. Mounting on the top of this edifice, with the mu-

niments of the despot on the one side and the now liberated Achradina on the other, Dion addressed[202] an animated harangue to the Syracusans around, exhorting them to strenuous efforts in defence of their newly acquired rights and liberties, and inviting them to elect generals for the command, in order to accomplish the total expulsion of the Dionysian garrison. The Syracusans, with unanimous acclamations, named Dion and his brother Megakles generals with full powers. But both the brothers insisted that colleagues should be elected along with them. Accordingly twenty other persons were chosen besides, ten of them being from that small band of Syracusan exiles who had joined at Zakynthus.

Such was the entry of Dion into Syracuse, on the third day[203] after his landing in Sicily; and such the first public act of renewed Syracusan freedom; the first after that fatal vote which, forty-eight years before, had elected the elder Dionysius general plenipotentiary, and placed in his hands the sword of state, without foresight of the consequences. In the hands of Dion, that sword was vigorously employed against the common enemy. He immediately attacked Epipolæ; and such was the consternation of the garrison left in it by the fugitive Timokrates, that they allowed him to acquire possession of it, together with the strong fort of Euryalus, which a little courage and devotion might long have defended. This acquisition, made suddenly in the tide of success on one side and discouragement on the other, was of supreme importance, and went far to determine the ultimate contest. It not only reduced the partisans of Dionysius within the limits of Ortygia, but also enabled Dion to set free many state prisoners,[204] who became ardent partisans of the revolution. Following up his success, he lost no time in taking measures against Ortygia. To shut it up completely on the land-side, he commenced the erection of a wall of blockade, reaching from the Great Harbor at one extremity, to the sea on the eastern side of the Portus Lakkius, at the other.[205] He at the same time provided arms as well as he could for the citizens, sending for those spare arms which he had deposited with Synalus at Minoa. It does not appear that the garrison of Ortygia made any sally to impede him; so that in the course of seven days, he had not only received his arms from Synalus, but had completed, in a rough way, all or most of the blockading cross-wall.[206]

At the end of these seven days, but not before (having been prevented by accident from receiving the express sent to him), Dionysius returned with his fleet to Ortygia.[207] Fatally indeed was his position changed. The islet was the only portion of the city which he possessed, and that too was shut up on the land-side by a blockading wall nearly completed. All the rest of the city was occupied by bitter enemies instead of by subjects. Leontini also, and probably many of his other dependencies out of Syracuse, had taken the opportunity of revolting.[208] Even with the large fleet which he had brought home, Dionysius did not think himself strong enough to face his enemies in the field, but resorted to stratagem. He first tried to open a private intrigue with Dion; who, however, refused to receive any separate propositions,

and desired him to address them publicly to the freemen, citizens of Syracuse. Accordingly, he sent envoys tendering to the Syracusans what in the present day would be called a constitution. He demanded only moderate taxation, and moderate fulfilments of military service, subject to their own vote of consent. But the Syracusans laughed the offer to scorn, and Dion returned in their name the peremptory reply,—that no proposition from Dionysius could be received, short of total abdication; adding in his own name, that he would himself, on the score of kindred, procure for Dionysius, if he did abdicate, both security and other reasonable concessions. These terms Dionysius affected to approve, desiring that envoys might be sent to him in Ortygia to settle the details. Both Dion and the Syracusans eagerly caught at his offer, without for a moment questioning his sincerity. Some of the most eminent Syracusans, approved by Dion, were despatched as envoys to Dionysius. A general confidence prevailed, that the retirement of the despot was now assured; and the soldiers and citizens employed against him, full of joy and mutual congratulations, became negligent of their guard on the cross-wall of blockade; many of them even retiring to their houses in the city.

This was what Dionysius expected. Contriving to prolong the discussion, so as to detain the envoys in Ortygia all night, he ordered at daybreak a sudden sally of all his soldiers, whom he had previously stimulated both by wine and by immense promises in case of victory.[209] The sally was well-timed and at first completely successful. One half of Dion's soldiers were encamped to guard the cross-wall (the other half being quartered in Achradina), together with a force of Syracusan citizens. But so little were they prepared for hostilities, that the assailants, rushing out with shouts and at a run, carried the wall at the first onset, slew the sentinels, and proceeded to demolish the wall (which was probably a rough and hasty structure) as well as to charge the troops on the outside of it. The Syracusans, surprised and terrified, fled with little or no resistance. Their flight partially disordered the stouter Dionian soldiers, who resisted bravely, but without having had time to form their regular array. Never was Dion more illustrious, both as an officer and as a soldier. He exerted himself to the utmost to form the troops, and to marshal them in ranks essential to the effective fighting of the Grecian hoplite. But his orders were unheard in the clamor, or disregarded in the confusion: his troops lost courage, the assailants gained ground, and the day seemed evidently going against him. Seeing that there was no other resource, he put himself at the head of his best and most attached soldiers, and threw himself, though now an elderly man, into the thickest of the fray. The struggle was the more violent, as it took place in a narrow space between the new blockading wall on one side, and the outer wall of Neapolis on the other. Both the armor and the person of Dion being conspicuous, he was known to enemies as well as friends, and the battle around him was among the most obstinate in Grecian history. [210] Darts rattled against both his shield and his helmet, while his shield was also pierced through by several spears which were kept from his body only by the breastplate. At length he was wounded through the right arm or hand, thrown on the

ground, and in imminent danger of being made prisoner. But this forwardness on his part so stimulated the courage of his own troops, that they both rescued him, and made redoubled efforts against the enemy. Having named Timonides commander in his place, Dion with his disabled hand mounted on horseback, rode into Achradina, and led forth to the battle that portion of his troops which were there in garrison. These men, fresh and good soldiers, restored the battle. The Syracusans came back to the field, all joined in strenuous conflict, and the Dionysian assailants were at length again driven within the walls of Ortygia. The loss on both sides was severe; that of Dionysius eight hundred men; all of whom he caused to be picked up from the field (under a truce granted on his request by Dion), and buried with magnificent obsequies, as a means of popularizing himself with the survivors.[211]

When we consider how doubtful the issue of this battle had proved, it seems evident that had Timokrates maintained himself in Epipolæ, so as to enable Dionysius to remain master of Epipolæ as well as of Ortygia, the success of Dion's whole enterprise in Syracuse would have been seriously endangered.

Great was the joy excited at Syracuse by the victory. The Syracusan people testified their gratitude to the Dionian soldiers by voting a golden wreath to the value of one hundred minæ; while these soldiers, charmed with the prowess of their general, voted a golden wreath to him. Dion immediately began the re-establishment of the damaged cross-wall, which he repaired, completed, and put under effective guard for the future.[212] Dionysius no longer tried to impede it by armed attack. But as he was still superior at sea, he transported parties across the harbor to ravage the country for provisions, and despatched vessels to bring in stores also by sea. His superiority at sea was presently lessened by the arrival of Herakleides from Peloponnesus,[213] with twenty triremes, three smaller vessels, and fifteen hundred soldiers. The Syracusans, now beginning to show themselves actively on shipboard, got together a tolerable naval force. All the docks and wharfs lay concentrated in and around Ortygia, within the grasp of Dionysius, who was master of the naval force belonging to the city. But it would seem that the crews of some of the ships (who were mostly native Syracusans,[214] with an intermixture of Athenians, doubtless of democratical sentiments) must have deserted from the despot to the people, carrying over their ships, since we presently find the Syracusans with a fleet of sixty triremes,[215] which they could hardly have acquired otherwise.

Dionysius was shortly afterwards reinforced by Philistus, who brought to Ortygia, not only his fleet from the Tarentine Gulf, but also a considerable regiment of cavalry. With these latter, and some other troops besides, Philistus undertook an expedition against the revolted Leontini. But though he made his way into the town by night, he was presently expelled by the defenders, seconded by reinforcements from Syracuse. [216]

To keep Ortygia provisioned, however, it was yet more indispensable for Philistus to maintain his superiority at sea against the growing naval power of the Syracusans, now commanded by Herakleides.[217] After several partial engagements, a final battle, desperate and decisive, at length took place between the two admirals. Both fleets were sixty triremes strong. At first Philistus, brave and forward, appeared likely to be victorious. But presently the fortune of the day turned against him. His ship was run ashore, and himself with most part of his fleet, overpowered by the enemy. To escape captivity, he stabbed himself. The wound however was not mortal; so that he fell alive, being now about seventy-eight years of age, into the hands of his enemies,—who stripped him naked, insulted him brutally, and at length cut off his head, after which they dragged his body by the leg through the streets of Syracuse.[218] Revolting as this treatment is, we must recollect that it was less horrible than that which the elder Dionysius had inflicted on the Rhegine general Phyton.

The last hopes of the Dionysian dynasty perished with Philistus, the ablest and most faithful of its servants. He had been an actor in its first day of usurpation—its eighteenth Brumaire: his timely, though miserable death, saved him from sharing in its last day of exile—its St. Helena.

Even after the previous victory of Dion, Dionysius had lost all chance of overcoming the Syracusans by force. But he had now farther lost, through the victory of Herakleides, his superiority at sea, and therefore his power even of maintaining himself permanently in Ortygia. The triumph of Dion seemed assured, and his enemy humbled in the dust. But though thus disarmed, Dionysius was still formidable by his means of raising intrigue and dissension in Syracuse. His ancient antipathy against Dion became more vehement than ever. Obliged to forego empire himself—yet resolved at any rate that Dion should be ruined along with him—he set on foot a tissue of base manœuvres availing himself of the fears and jealousies of the Syracusans, the rivalry of Herakleides, the defects of Dion, and what was more important than all —the relationship of Dion to the Dionysian dynasty.

Dion had displayed devoted courage, and merited the signal gratitude of the Syracusans. But he had been nursed in the despotism, of which his father had been one of the chief founders; he was attached by every tie of relationship to Dionysius, with whom his sister, his former wife, and his children, were still dwelling in the acropolis. The circumstances therefore were such as to suggest to the Syracusans apprehensions, noway unreasonable, that some private bargain might be made by Dion with the acropolis, and that the eminent services which he had just rendered might only be made the stepping-stone to a fresh despotism in his person. Such suspicions received much countenance from the infirmities of Dion, who combined, with a masculine and magnanimous character, manners so haughty as to be painfully felt even by his own companions. The friendly letters from Syracuse, written to Plato or to others at Athens (possibly those from Timonides to Speusippus) shortly after the victory, contained much complaint of the repulsive demeanor of Dion; which defect

the philosopher exhorted his friend to amend.[219] All those, whom Dion's arrogance offended, were confirmed in their suspicion of his despotic designs, and induced to turn for protection to his rival Herakleides. This latter—formerly general in the service of Dionysius, from whose displeasure he had only saved his life by flight—had been unable or unwilling to coöperate with Dion in his expedition from Zakynthus, but had since brought to the aid of the Syracusans a considerable force, including several armed ships. Though not present at the first entry into Syracuse, nor arriving until Ortygia had already been placed under blockade, Herakleides was esteemed the equal of Dion in abilities and in military efficiency; while with regard to ulterior designs, he had the prodigious advantage of being free from connection with the despotism and of raising no mistrust. Moreover his manners were not only popular, but according to Plutarch,[220] more than popular—smooth, insidious, and dexterous in criminatory speech, for the ruin of rivals and for his own exaltation.

As the contest presently came to be carried on rather at sea than on land, the equipment of a fleet became indispensable; so that Herakleides, who had brought the greatest number of triremes, naturally rose in importance. Shortly after his arrival, the Syracusan assembly passed a vote to appoint him admiral. But Dion, who seems only to have heard of this vote after it had passed, protested against it as derogating from the full powers which the Syracusans had by their former vote conferred upon himself. Accordingly the people, though with reluctance, cancelled their vote, and deposed Herakleides. Having then gently rebuked Herakleides for raising discord at a season when the common enemy was still dangerous, Dion convened another assembly; wherein he proposed, from himself, the appointment of Herakleides as admiral, with a guard equal to his own.[221] The right of nomination thus assumed displeased the Syracusans, humiliated Herakleides, and exasperated his partisans as well as the fleet which he commanded. It gave him power—together with provocation to employ that power for the ruin of Dion; who thus laid himself doubly open to genuine mistrust from some, and to intentional calumny from others.

It is necessary to understand this situation, in order to appreciate the means afforded to Dionysius for personal intrigue directed against Dion. Though the vast majority of Syracusans were hostile to Dionysius, yet there were among them many individuals connected with those serving under him in Ortygia, and capable of being put in motion to promote his views. Shortly after the complete defeat of his sally, he renewed his solicitations for peace; to which Dion returned the peremptory answer, that no peace could be concluded until Dionysius abdicated and retired. Next, Dionysius sent out heralds from Ortygia with letters addressed to Dion from his female relatives. All these letters were full of complaints of the misery endured by these poor women; together with prayers that he would relax in his hostility. To avert suspicion, Dion caused the letters to be opened and read publicly before the Syracusan assembly; but their tenor was such, that suspicion, whether expressed or not, unavoidably arose, as to the effect on Dion's sympathies. One letter there was, bearing on its su-

perscription the words "Hipparinus (the son of Dion) to his father." At first many persons present refused to take cognizance of a communication so strictly private; but Dion insisted, and the letter was publicly read. It proved to come, not from the youthful Hipparinus, but from Dionysius himself, and was insidiously worded for the purpose of discrediting Dion in the minds of the Syracusans. It began by reminding him of the long service which he had rendered to the despotism. It implored him not to bury that great power, as well as his own relatives, in one common ruin, for the sake of a people who would turn round and sting him, so soon as he had given them freedom. It offered, on the part of Dionysius himself, immediate retirement, provided Dion would consent to take his place. But it threatened, if Dion refused, the sharpest tortures against his female relatives and his son.[222]

This letter, well-turned as a composition for its own purpose, was met by indignant refusal and protestation on the part of Dion. Without doubt his refusal would be received with cheers by the assembly; but the letter did not the less instil its intended poison into their minds. Plutarch displays[223] (in my judgment) no great knowledge of human nature, when he complains of the Syracusans for suffering the letter to impress them with suspicions of Dion, instead of admiring his magnanimous resistance to such touching appeals. It was precisely the magnanimity required for the situation, which made them mistrustful. Who could assure them that such a feeling, to the requisite pitch, was to be found in the bosom of Dion? or who could foretel which, among painfully conflicting sentiments, would determine his conduct? The position of Dion forbade the possibility of his obtaining full confidence. Moreover his enemies, not content with inflaming the real causes of mistrust, fabricated gross falsehoods against him as well as against the mercenaries under his command. A Syracusan named Sôsis, brother to one of the guards of Dionysius, made a violent speech in the Syracusan assembly, warning his countrymen to beware of Dion, lest they should find themselves saddled with a strict and sober despot in place of one who was always intoxicated. On the next day Sôsis appeared in the Assembly with a wound on the head, which he said that some of the soldiers of Dion had inflicted upon him in revenge for his speech. Many persons present, believing the story, warmly espoused his cause; while Dion had great difficulty in repelling the allegation, and in obtaining time for the investigation of its truth. On inquiry, it was discovered that the wound was a superficial cut inflicted by Sôsis himself with a razor, and that the whole tale was an infamous calumny which he had been bribed to propagate. [224] In this particular instance, it was found practicable to convict the delinquent of shameless falsehood. But there were numerous other attacks and perversions less tangible, generated by the same hostile interests and tending towards the same end. Every day the suspicion and unfriendly sentiment of the Syracusans, towards Dion and his soldiers, became more imbittered.

The naval victory gained by Herakleides and the Syracusan fleet over Philistus, exalting both the spirit of the Syracusans and the glory of the admiral, still further

lowered the influence of Dion. The belief gained ground that even without him and his soldiers, the Syracusans could defend themselves, and gain possession of Ortygia. It was now that the defeated Dionysius sent from thence a fresh embassy to Dion, offering to surrender to him the place with its garrison, magazine of arms, and treasure equivalent to five months' full pay—on condition of being allowed to retire to Italy, and enjoy the revenues of a large and productive portion (called Gyarta) of the Syracusan territory. Dion again refused to reply, desiring him to address the Syracusan public yet advising them to accept the terms.[225] Under the existing mistrust towards Dion, this advice was interpreted as concealing an intended collusion between him and Dionysius. Herakleides promised, that if the war were prosecuted, he would keep Ortygia blocked up until it was surrendered at discretion with all in it as prisoners. But in spite of his promise, Dionysius contrived to elude his vigilance and sail off to Lokri in Italy, with many companions and much property, leaving Ortygia in command of his eldest son Apollokrates.

Though the blockade was immediately resumed and rendered stricter than before, yet this escape of the despot brought considerable discredit on Herakleides. Probably the Dionian partisans were not sparing in their reproach. To create for himself fresh popularity, Herakleides warmly espoused the proposition of a citizen named Hippo, for a fresh division of landed property; a proposition, which, considering the sweeping alteration of landed property made by the Dionysian dynasty, we may well conceive to have been recommended upon specious grounds of retributive justice, as well as upon the necessity of providing for poor citizens. Dion opposed the motion strenuously, but was outvoted. Other suggestions also, yet more repugnant to him, and even pointed directly against him, were adopted. Lastly, Herakleides, enlarging upon his insupportable arrogance, prevailed upon the people to decree that new generals should be appointed, and that the pay due to the Dionian soldiers, now forming a large arrear, should not be liquidated out of the public purse.[226]

It was towards midsummer that Dion was thus divested of his command, about nine months after his arrival at Syracuse.[227] Twenty-five new generals were named, of whom Herakleides was one.

The measure, scandalously ungrateful and unjust, whereby the soldiers were deprived of the pay due to them, was dictated by pure antipathy against Dion: for it does not seem to have been applied to those soldiers who had come with Herakleides; moreover the new generals sent private messages to the Dionian soldiers, inviting them to desert their leader and join the Syracusans, in which case the grant of citizenship was promised to them.[228] Had the soldiers complied, it is obvious, that either the pay due, or some equivalent, must have been assigned to satisfy them. But one and all of them scorned the invitation, adhering to Dion with unshaken fidelity. The purpose of Herakleides was, to expel him alone. This however was prevented by the temper of the soldiers; who, indignant at the treacherous ingratitude of the Syracusans, instigated Dion to take a legitimate revenge upon them, and de-

manded only to be led to the assault. Refusing to employ force, Dion calmed their excitement, and put himself at their head to conduct them out of the city; not without remonstrances addressed to the generals and the people of Syracuse upon their proceedings, imprudent as well as wicked, while the enemy were still masters of Ortygia. Nevertheless, the new generals, chosen as the most violent enemies of Dion, not only turned a deaf ear to his appeal, but inflamed the antipathies of the people, and spurred them on to attack the soldiers on their march out of Syracuse. Their attack, though repeated more than once, was vigorously repulsed by the soldiers—excellent troops, three thousand in number; while Dion, anxious to ensure their safety, and to avoid bloodshed on both sides, confined himself strictly to the defensive. He forbade all pursuit, giving up the prisoners without ransom as well as the bodies of the slain for burial.[229]

In this guise Dion arrived at Leontini, where he found the warmest sympathy towards himself, with indignant disgust at the behavior of the Syracusans. Allied with the newly-enfranchised Syracuse against the Dionysian dynasty, the Leontines not only received the soldiers of Dion into their citizenship, and voted to them a positive remuneration, but sent an embassy to Syracuse insisting that justice should be done to them. The Syracusans, on their side, sent envoys to Leontini, to accuse Dion before an assembly of all the allies there convoked. Who these allies were, our defective information does not enable us to say. Their sentence went in favor of Dion and against the Syracusans; who nevertheless stood out obstinately, refusing all justice or reparation,[230] and fancying themselves competent to reduce Ortygia without Dion's assistance—since the provisions therein were exhausted, and the garrison was already suffering from famine. Despairing of reinforcement, Apollokrates had already resolved to send envoys and propose a capitulation, when Nypsius, a Neapolitan officer, despatched by Dionysius from Lokri, had the good fortune to reach Ortygia at the head of a reinforcing fleet, convoying numerous transports with an abundant stock of provisions. There was now no farther talk of surrender. The garrison of Ortygia was reinforced to ten thousand mercenary troops of considerable merit, and well provisioned for some time.[231]

The Syracusan admirals, either from carelessness or ill-fortune, had not been able to prevent the entry of Nypsius. But they made a sudden attack upon him while his fleet were in the harbor, and while the crews, thinking themselves safe from an enemy, were interchanging salutations or aiding to disembark the stores. This attack was well-timed and successful. Several of the triremes of Nypsius were ruined—others were towed off as prizes, while the victory, gained by Herakleides without Dion, provoked extravagant joy throughout Syracuse. In the belief that Ortygia could not longer hold out, the citizens, the soldiers, and even the generals, gave loose to mad revelry and intoxication, continued into the ensuing night. Nypsius, an able officer, watched his opportunity, and made a vigorous night-sally. His troops, issuing forth in good order, planted their scaling-ladders, mounted the blockading wall, and slew the

sleeping or drunken sentinels without any resistance. Master of this important work, Nypsius employed a part of his men to pull it down, while he pushed the rest forward against the city. At daybreak the affrighted Syracusans saw themselves vigorously attacked even in their own stronghold, when neither generals nor citizens were at all prepared to resist. The troops of Nypsius first forced their way into Neapolis, which lay the nearest to the wall of Ortygia; next into Tycha, the other fortified suburb. Over these they ranged victorious, vanquishing all the detached parties of Syracusans which could be opposed to them. The streets became a scene of bloodshed—the houses of plunder; for as Dionysius had now given up the idea of again permanently ruling at Syracuse, his troops thought of little else except satiating the revenge of their master and their own rapacity. The soldiers of Nypsius stripped the private dwellings in the town, taking away not only the property, but also the women and children, as booty into Ortygia. At last (it appears) they got also into Achradina, the largest and most populous portion of Syracuse. Here the same scene of pillage, destruction, and bloodshed, was continued throughout the whole day, and on a still larger scale; with just enough resistance to pique the fury of the victors, without restraining their progress.

It soon became evident to Herakleides and his colleagues, as well as to the general body of citizens, that there was no hope of safety except in invoking the aid of Dion and his soldiers from Leontini. Yet the appeal to one whom they not only hated and feared, but had ignominiously maltreated, was something so intolerable, that for a long time no one would speak out to propose what every man had in his mind. At length some of the allies present, less concerned in the political parties of the city, ventured to broach the proposition, which ran from man to man, and was adopted under a press of mingled and opposite emotions. Accordingly two officers of the allies, and five Syracusan horsemen set off at full speed to Leontini, to implore the instant presence of Dion. Reaching the place towards evening, they encountered Dion himself immediately on dismounting, and described to him the miserable scenes now going on at Syracuse. Their tears and distress brought around them a crowd of hearers, Leontines as well as Peloponnesians; and a general assembly was speedily convened, before which Dion exhorted them to tell their story. They described, in the tone of men whose all was at stake, the actual sufferings and the impending total ruin of the city; entreating oblivion for their past misdeeds, which were already but too cruelly expiated.

Their discourse, profoundly touching to the audience, was heard in silence. Every one waited for Dion to begin, and to determine the fate of Syracuse. He rose to speak; but for a time tears checked his utterance, while his soldiers around cheered him with encouraging sympathy. At length he found voice to say, "I have convened you, Peloponnesians and allies, to deliberate about your own conduct. For me, deliberation would be a disgrace, while Syracuse is in the hands of the destroyer. If I cannot save my country, I shall go and bury myself in its flaming ruins. For you, if, in

spite of what has happened, you still choose to assist us, misguided and unhappy Syracusans, we shall owe it to you that we still continue a city. But if, in disdainful sense of wrong endured, you shall leave us to our fate, I here thank you for all your past valor and attachment to me, praying that the gods may reward you for it. Remember Dion, as one who neither deserted you when you were wronged, nor his own fellow-citizens when they were in misery."

This address, so replete with pathos and dignity, went home to the hearts of the audience, filling them with passionate emotion and eagerness to follow him. Universal shouts called upon him to put himself at their head instantly and march to Syracuse; while the envoys present fell upon his neck, invoking blessings both upon him and upon the soldiers. As soon as the excitement had subsided, Dion gave orders that every man should take his evening meal forthwith, and return in arms to the spot, prepared for a night-march to Syracuse.

By daybreak, Dion and his band were within a few miles of the northern wall of Epipolæ. Messengers from Syracuse here met him, inducing him to slacken his march and proceed with caution. Herakleides and the other generals had sent a message forbidding his nearer approach, with notice that the gates would be closed against him; yet at the same time, counter-messages arrived from many eminent citizens, entreating him to persevere, and promising him both admittance and support. Nypsius, having permitted his troops to pillage and destroy in Syracuse throughout the preceding day, had thought it prudent to withdraw them back into Ortygia for the night. His retreat raised the courage of Herakleides and his colleagues; who, fancying that the attack was now over, repented of the invitation which they had permitted to be sent to Dion. Under this impression they despatched to him the second message of exclusion; keeping guard at the gate in the northern wall to make their threat good. But the events of the next morning speedily undeceived them. Nypsius renewed his attack with greater ferocity than before, completed the demolition of the wall of blockade before Ortygia, and let loose his soldiers with merciless hand throughout all the streets of Syracuse. There was on this day less of pillage, but more of wholesale slaughter. Men, women, and children perished indiscriminately, and nothing was thought of by these barbarians except to make Syracuse a heap of ruins and dead bodies. To accelerate the process, and to forestall Dion's arrival, which they fully expected—they set fire to the city in several places, with torches and fire-bearing arrows. The miserable inhabitants knew not where to flee, to escape the flames within their houses, or the sword without. The streets were strewed with corpses, while the fire gained ground perpetually, threatening to spread over the greater part of the city. Under such terrible circumstances, neither Herakleides, himself wounded, nor the other generals, could hold out any longer against the admission of Dion; to whom even the brother and uncle of Herakleides were sent, with pressing entreaties to accelerate his march, since the smallest delay would occasion ruin to Syracuse.[232]

Dion was about seven miles from the gates when these last cries of distress reached him. Immediately hurrying forward his soldiers, whose ardor was not inferior to his own, at a running pace, he reached speedily the gates called Hexapyla, in the northern wall of Epipolæ. When once within these gates, he halted in an interior area called the Hekatompedon.[233] His light-armed were sent forward at once to arrest the destroying enemy, while he kept back the hoplites until he could form them into separate columns under proper captains, along with the citizens who crowded round him with demonstrations of great reverence. He distributed them so as to enter the interior portion of Syracuse, and attack the troops of Nypsius, on several points at once.[234] Being now within the exterior fortification formed by the wall of Epipolæ, there lay before him the tripartite interior city—Tycha, Neapolis, Achradina. Each of these parts had its separate fortification; between Tycha and Neapolis lay an unfortified space, but each of them joined on to Achradina, the western wall of which formed their eastern wall. It is probable that these interior fortifications had been partially neglected since the construction of the outer walls along Epipolæ, which comprised them all within, and formed the principal defence against a foreign enemy. Moreover the troops of Nypsius, having been masters of the three towns, and roving as destroyers around them, for several hours, had doubtless broken down the gates and in other ways weakened the defences. The scene was frightful, and the ways everywhere impeded by flame and smoke, by falling houses and fragments, and by the numbers who lay massacred around. It was amidst such horrors that Dion and his soldiers found themselves—while penetrating in different divisions at once into Neapolis, Tycha, and Achradina.

His task would probably have been difficult, had Nypsius been able to control the troops under his command, in themselves brave and good. But these troops had been for some hours dispersed throughout the streets, satiating their licentious and murderous passions, and destroying a town which Dionysius now no longer expected to retain. Recalling as many soldiers as he could from this brutal disorder, Nypsius marshalled them along the interior fortification, occupying the entrances and exposed points where Dion would seek to penetrate into the city.[235] The battle was thus not continuous, but fought between detached parties at separate openings, often very narrow, and on ground sometimes difficult to surmount, amidst the conflagration blazing everywhere around.[236] Disorganized by pillage, the troops of Nypsius could oppose no long resistance to the forward advance of Dion, with soldiers full of ardor and with the Syracusans around him stimulated by despair. Nypsius was overpowered, compelled to abandon his line of defence, and to retreat with his troops into Ortygia, which the greater number of them reached in safety. Dion and his victorious troops, after having forced the entrance into the city, did not attempt to pursue them. The first and most pressing necessity was to extinguish the flames; but no inconsiderable number of the soldiers of Nypsius were found dispersed through the streets and houses, and slain while actually carrying off plunder on their shoulders. Long after the town was cleared of enemies, however, all hands within it

were employed in stopping the conflagration; a task in which they hardly succeeded, even by unremitting efforts throughout the day and the following night.[237]

On the morrow Syracuse was another city; disfigured by the desolating trace of flame and of the hostile soldiery, yet still refreshed in the hearts of its citizens, who felt that they had escaped much worse; and above all, penetrated by a renewed political spirit, and a deep sense of repentant gratitude towards Dion. All those generals, who had been chosen at the last election from their intense opposition to him, fled forthwith; except Herakleides and Theodotes. These two men were his most violent and dangerous enemies; yet it appears that they knew his character better than their colleagues, and therefore did not hesitate to throw themselves upon his mercy. They surrendered, confessed their guilt, and implored his forgiveness. His magnanimity (they said) would derive a new lustre, if he now rose superior to his just resentment over misguided rivals, who stood before him humbled and ashamed of their former opposition, entreating him to deal with them better than they had dealt with him.

If Dion had put their request to the vote, it would have been refused by a large majority. His soldiers, recently defrauded of their pay, were yet burning with indignation against the authors of such an injustice. His friends, reminding him of the bitter and unscrupulous attacks which he as well as they had experienced from Herakleides, exhorted him to purge the city of one who abused the popular forms to purposes hardly less mischievous than despotism itself. The life of Herakleides now hung upon a thread. Without pronouncing any decided opinion, Dion had only to maintain an equivocal silence, and suffer the popular sentiment to manifest itself in a verdict invoked by one party, expected even by the opposite. The more was every one astonished when he took upon himself the responsibility of pardoning Herakleides; adding, by way of explanation and satisfaction[238] to his disappointed friends—

"Other generals have gone through most of their training with a view to arms and war. My long training in the Academy has been devoted to aid me in conquering anger, envy, and all malignant jealousies. To show that I have profited by such lessons, it is not enough that I do my duty towards my friends and towards honest men. The true test is, if, after being wronged, I show myself placable and gentle towards the wrong-doer. My wish is to prove myself superior to Herakleides more in goodness and justice, than in power and intelligence. Successes in war, even when achieved single-handed, are half owing to fortune. If Herakleides has been treacherous and wicked through envy, it is not for Dion to dishonor a virtuous life in obedience to angry sentiment. Nor is human wickedness, great as it often is, ever pushed to such an excess of stubborn brutality, as not to be amended by gentle and gracious treatment, from steady benefactors."[239]

We may reasonably accept this as something near the genuine speech of Dion, reported by his companion Timonides, and thus passing into the biography of

Plutarch. It lends a peculiar interest, as an exposition of motives, to the act which it accompanies. The sincerity of the exposition admits of no doubt, for all the ordinary motives of the case counselled an opposite conduct; and had Dion been in like manner at the feet of his rival, his life would assuredly not have been spared. He took pride (with a sentiment something like that of Kallikratidas[240] on liberating the prisoners taken at Methymna) in realizing by conspicuous act the lofty morality which he had imbibed from the Academy; the rather, as the case presented every temptation to depart from it Persuading himself that he could by an illustrious example put to shame and soften the mutual cruelties so frequent in Grecian party-warfare, and regarding the amnesty towards Herakleides as a proper sequel to the generous impulse which had led him to march from Leontini to Syracuse,—he probably gloried in both, more than in the victory itself. We shall presently have the pain of discovering that his anticipations were totally disappointed. And we may be sure that at the time, the judgment passed on his proceeding towards Herakleides was very different from what it now receives. Among his friends and soldiers, the generosity of the act would be forgotten in its imprudence. Among his enemies, it would excite surprise, perhaps admiration—yet few of them would be conciliated or converted into friends. In the bosom of Herakleides himself, the mere fact of owing his life to Dion would be a new and intolerable humiliation, which the Erinnys within would goad him on to avenge. Dion would be warned, by the criticism of his friends, as well as by the instinct of his soldiers, that in yielding to a magnanimous sentiment, he overlooked the reasonable consequences; and that Herakleides continuing at Syracuse would only be more dangerous both to him and them, than he had been before. Without taking his life, Dion might have required him to depart from Syracuse; which sentence, having regard to the practice of the time, would have been accounted generosity.

It was Dion's next business to renew the wall of blockade constructed against Ortygia, and partially destroyed in the late sally of Nypsius. Every Syracusan citizen was directed to cut a stake, and deposit it near the spot; after which, during the ensuing night, the soldiers planted a stockade so as to restore the broken parts of the line. Protection being thus ensured to the city against Nypsius and his garrison, Dion proceeded to bury the numerous dead who had been slain in the sally, and to ransom the captives, no less than two thousand in number, who had been carried off into Ortygia.[241] A trophy, with sacrifice to the gods for the victory, was not forgotten.[242]

A public assembly was now held to elect new generals in place of those who had fled. Here a motion was made by Herakleides himself, that Dion should be chosen general with full powers both by land and sea. The motion was received with great favor by the principal citizens; but the poorer men were attached to Herakleides, especially the seamen; who preferred serving under his command, and loudly required that he should be named admiral, along with Dion as general on land. Forced to acquiesce in this nomination, Dion contented himself with insisting and obtaining, that

the resolution, which had been previously adopted for redistributing lands and houses, should be rescinded.[243]

The position of affairs at Syracuse was now pregnant with mischief and quarrel. On land, Dion enjoyed a dictatorial authority;—at sea, Herakleides, his enemy not less than ever, was admiral, by separate and independent nomination. The undefined authority of Dion—exercised by one self-willed, though magnanimous, in spirit, and extremely repulsive in manner—was sure to become odious after the feelings arising out of the recent rescue had worn off; and abundant opening would thus be made for the opposition of Herakleides, often on just grounds. That officer indeed was little disposed to wait for just pretences. Conducting the Syracusan fleet to Messênê in order to carry on war against Dionysius at Lokri, he not only tried to raise the seamen in arms against Dion, by charging him with despotic designs, but even entered into a secret treaty with the common enemy Dionysius; through the intervention of the Spartan Pharax, who commanded the Dionysian troops. His intrigues being discovered, a violent opposition was raised against them by the leading Syracusan citizens. It would seem (as far as we can make out from the scanty information of Plutarch) that the military operations were frustrated, and that the armament was forced to return to Syracuse. Here again the quarrel was renewed—the seamen apparently standing with Herakleides, the principal citizens with Dion—and carried so far, that the city suffered not only from disturbance, but even from irregular supply of provisions.[244] Among the mortifications of Dion, not the least was that which he experienced from his own friends or soldiers, who reminded him of their warnings and predictions when he consented to spare Herakleides. Meanwhile Dionysius had sent into Sicily a body of troops under Pharax, who were encamped at Neapolis in the Agrigentine territory. In what scheme of operations this movement forms a part, we cannot make out; for Plutarch tells us nothing except what bears immediately on the quarrel between Dion and Herakleides. To attack Pharax, the forces of Syracuse were brought out; the fleet under Herakleides, the soldiers on land under Dion. The latter, though he thought it imprudent to fight, was constrained to hazard a battle by the insinuations of Herakleides and the clamor of the seamen; who accused him of intentionally eking out the war for the purpose of prolonging his own dictatorship. Dion accordingly attacked Pharax, but was repulsed. Yet the repulse was not a serious defeat, so that he was preparing to renew the attack, when he was apprised that Herakleides with the fleet had departed and were returning at their best speed to Syracuse; with the intention of seizing the city, and barring out Dion with his troops. Nothing but a rapid and decisive movement could defeat this scheme. Leaving the camp immediately with his best horsemen, Dion rode back to Syracuse as fast as possible; completing a distance of seven hundred stadia (about eighty-two miles) in a very short time, and forestalling the arrival of Herakleides.[245]

Thus disappointed and exposed, Herakleides found means to direct another manœuvre against Dion, through the medium of a Spartan named Gæsylus; who

had been sent by the Spartans, informed of the dissensions in Syracuse, to offer himself (like Gylippus) for the command. Herakleides eagerly took advantage of the arrival of this officer; pressing the Syracusans to accept a Spartan as their commander-in-chief. But Dion replied that there were plenty of native Syracusans qualified for command; moreover, if a Spartan was required, he was himself a Spartan, by public grant. Gæsylus, having ascertained the state of affairs, had the virtue and prudence not merely to desist from his own pretensions, but also to employ his best efforts in reconciling Dion and Herakleides. Sensible that the wrong had been on the side of the latter, Gæsylus constrained him to bind himself by the strongest oaths to better conduct in future. He engaged his own guarantee for the observance of the covenant; but the better to ensure such observance, the greater part of the Syracusan fleet (the chief instrument of Herakleides) was disbanded, leaving only enough to keep Ortygia under blockade.[246]

The capture of that islet and fortress, now more strictly watched than ever, was approaching. What had become of Pharax, or why he did not advance, after the retreat of Dion, to harass the Syracusans and succor Ortygia—we know not. But no succor arrived; provisions grew scarce; and the garrison became so discontented, that Apollokrates the son of Dionysius could not hold out any longer. Accordingly, he capitulated with Dion; handing over to him Ortygia with its fort, arms, magazines and everything contained in it—except what he could carry away in five triremes. Aboard of these vessels, he placed his mother, his sisters, his immediate friends, and his chief valuables, leaving everything else behind for Dion and the Syracusans, who crowded to the beach in multitudes to see him depart. To them the moment was one of lively joy, and mutual self-congratulation—promising to commence a new era of freedom.[247]

On entering Ortygia, Dion saw for the first time after a separation of about twelve years, his sister Aristomachê, his wife Aretê, and family. The interview was one of the tenderest emotion and tears of delight to all. Aretê, having been made against her own consent the wife of Timokratês, was at first afraid to approach Dion. But he received and embraced her with unabated affection.[248] He conducted both her and his son away from the Dionysian acropolis, in which they had been living since his absence, into his own house; having himself resolved not to dwell in the acropolis, but to leave it as a public fort or edifice belonging to Syracuse. However, this renewal of his domestic happiness was shortly afterwards imbittered by the death of his son; who having imbibed from Dionysius drunken and dissolute habits, fell from the roof of the house, in a fit of intoxication or frenzy, and perished.[249]

Dion was now at the pinnacle of power as well as of glory. With means altogether disproportionate, he had achieved the expulsion of the greatest despot in Greece, even from an impregnable stronghold. He had combated danger and difficulty with conspicuous resolution, and had displayed almost chivalrous magnanimity. Had he "breathed out his soul"[250] at the instant of triumphant entry in Ortygia, the Acad-

emy would have been glorified by a pupil of first-rate and unsullied merit. But that cup of prosperity, which poisoned so many other eminent Greeks, had now the fatal effect of exaggerating all the worst of Dion's qualities, and damping all the best.

Plutarch indeed boasts, and we may perfectly believe, that he maintained the simplicity of his table, his raiment, and his habits of life, completely unchanged—now that he had become master of Syracuse, and an object of admiration to all Greece. In this respect, Plato and the Academy had reason to be proud of their pupil.[251] But the public mistakes, now to be recounted, were not the less mischievous to his countrymen as well as to himself.

From the first moment of his entry into Syracuse from Peloponnesus, Dion had been suspected and accused of aiming at the expulsion of Dionysius, only in order to transfer the despotism to himself. His haughty and repulsive manners, raising against him personal antipathies everywhere, were cited as confirming the charge. Even at moments when Dion was laboring for the genuine good of the Syracusans, this suspicion had always more or less crossed his path; robbing him of well-merited gratitude—and at the same time discrediting his opponents, and the people of Syracuse, as guilty of mean jealousy towards a benefactor.

The time had now come when Dion was obliged to act in such a manner as either to confirm, or to belie, such unfavorable auguries. Unfortunately both his words and his deeds confirmed them in the strongest manner. The proud and repulsive external demeanor, for which he had always been notorious, was rather aggravated than softened. He took pride in showing, more plainly than ever, that he despised everything which looked like courting popularity.[252]

If the words and manner of Dion were thus significant, both what he did, and what he left undone, was more significant still. Of that great boon of freedom, which he had so loudly promised to the Syracusans, and which he had directed his herald to proclaim on first entering their walls, he conferred absolutely nothing. He retained his dictatorial power unabated, and his military force certainly without reduction, if not actually reinforced; for as Apollokrates did not convey away with him the soldiers in Ortygia, we may reasonably presume that a part of them at least remained to embrace the service of Dion. He preserved the acropolis and fortifications of Ortygia just as they were, only garrisoned by troops obeying his command instead of that of Dionysius. His victory made itself felt in abundant presents to his own friends and soldiers;[253] but to the people of Syracuse, it produced nothing better than a change of masters.

It was not indeed the plan of Dion to constitute a permanent despotism. He intended to establish himself king, but to grant to the Syracusans what in modern times would be called a constitution. Having imbibed from Plato and the Academy as well as from his own convictions and tastes, aversion to a pure democracy, he had resolved to introduce a Lacedæmonian scheme of mixed government, combining

king, aristocracy, and people, under certain provisions and limitations. Of this general tenor are the recommendations addressed both to him, and to the Syracusans after his death, by Plato; who however seems to contemplate, along with the political scheme, a Lykurgean reform of manners and practice. To aid in framing and realizing his scheme, Dion sent to Corinth to invite counsellors and auxiliaries; for Corinth was suitable to his views, not simply as mother city of Syracuse, but also as a city thoroughly oligarchical.[254]

That these intentions on the part of Dion were sincere, we need not question. They had been originally conceived without any views of acquiring the first place for himself, during the life of the elder Dionysius, and were substantially the same as those which he had exhorted the younger Dionysius to realize, immediately after the death of the father. They are the same as he had intended to further by calling in Plato,—with what success, has been already recounted. But Dion made the fatal mistake of not remarking, that the state of things, both as to himself and as to Syracuse, was totally altered during the interval between 367 B. C. and 354 B. C. If at the former period, when the Dionysian dynasty was at the zenith of power, and Syracuse completely prostrated, the younger Dionysius could have been persuaded spontaneously and without contest or constraint to merge his own despotism in a more liberal system, even dictated by himself—it is certain that such a free, though moderate concession, would at first have provoked unbounded gratitude, and would have had a chance (though that is more doubtful) of giving long-continued satisfaction. But the situation was totally different in 354 B. C., when Dion, after the expulsion of Apollokrates, had become master in Ortygia; and it was his mistake that he still insisted on applying the old plans when they had become not merely unsuitable, but mischievous. Dion was not in the position of an established despot, who consents to renounce, for the public good, powers which every one knows he can retain, if he chooses; nor were the Syracusans any longer passive, prostrate, and hopeless. They had received a solemn promise of liberty, and had been thereby inflamed into vehement action, by Dion himself; who had been armed by them with delegated powers, for the special purpose of putting down Dionysius. That under these circumstances Dion, instead of laying down his trust, should constitute himself king—even limited king—and determine how much liberty he would consent to allot to the Syracusans who had appointed him—this was a proceeding which they could not but resent as a flagrant usurpation, and which he could only hope to maintain by force.

The real conduct of Dion, however, was worse even than this. He manifested no visible evidence of realizing even that fraction of popular liberty which had entered into his original scheme. What exact promises he made, we do not know. But he maintained his own power, the military force, and the despotic fortifications, provisionally undiminished. And who could tell how long he intended to maintain them? That he really had in his mind purposes such as Plato[255] gives him credit for, I believe to be true. But he took no practical step towards them. He had resolved to ac-

complish them, not through persuasion of the Syracusans, but through his own power. This was the excuse which he probably made to himself, and which pushed him down that inclined plane from whence there was afterwards no escape.

It was not likely that Dion's conduct would pass without a protest. That protest came loudest from Herakleides; who, so long as Dion had been acting in the real service of Syracuse, had opposed him in a culpable and traitorous manner—and who now again found himself in opposition to Dion, when opposition had become the side of patriotism as well as of danger. Invited by Dion to attend the council, he declined, saying that he was now nothing more than a private citizen, and would attend the public assembly along with the rest; a hint which implied, plainly as well as reasonably, that Dion also ought to lay down his power, now that the common enemy was put down.[256] The surrender of Ortygia had produced strong excitement among the Syracusans. They were impatient to demolish the dangerous stronghold erected in that islet by the elder Dionysius; they both hoped and expected, moreover, to see the destruction of that splendid funeral monument which his son had built in his honor, and the urn with its ashes cast out. Now of these two measures, the first was one of pressing and undeniable necessity, which Dion ought to have consummated without a moment's delay; the second was compliance with a popular antipathy at that time natural, which would have served as an evidence that the old despotism stood condemned. Yet Dion did neither. It was Herakleides who censured him, and moved for the demolition of the Dionysian Bastile; thus having the glory of attaching his name to the measure eagerly performed by Timoleon eleven years afterwards, the moment that he found himself master of Syracuse. Not only Dion did not originate the overthrow of this dangerous stronghold, but when Herakleides proposed it, he resisted him and prevented it from being done.[257] We shall find the same den serving for successive despots—preserved by Dion for them as well as for himself, and only removed by the real liberator Timoleon.

Herakleides gained extraordinary popularity among the Syracusans by his courageous and patriotic conduct. But Dion saw plainly that he could not, consistently with his own designs, permit such free opposition any longer. Many of his adherents, looking upon Herakleides as one who ought not to have been spared on the previous occasion, were ready to put him to death at any moment; being restrained only by a special prohibition which Dion now thought it time to remove. Accordingly, with his privity, they made their way into the house of Herakleides, and slew him.[258]

This dark deed abolished all remaining hope of obtaining Syracusan freedom from the hands of Dion, and stamped him as the mere successor of the Dionysian despotism. It was in vain that he attended the obsequies of Herakleides with his full military force, excusing his well-known crime to the people, on the plea, that Syracuse could never be at peace while two such rivals were both in active political life. Under the circumstances of the case, the remark was an insulting derision; though it might have been advanced with pertinence as a reason for sending Herakleides away, at

the moment when he before spared him. Dion had now conferred upon his rival the melancholy honor of dying as a martyr to Syracusan freedom; and in that light he was bitterly mourned by the people. No man after this murder could think himself secure. Having once employed the soldiers as executioners of his own political antipathies, Dion proceeded to lend himself more and more to their exigencies. He provided for them pay and largesses, great in amount, first at the cost of his opponents in the city, next at that of his friends, until at length discontent became universal. Among the general body of the citizens, Dion became detested as a tyrant, and the more detested because he had presented himself as a liberator; while the soldiers also were in great part disaffected to him.[259]

The spies and police of the Dionysian dynasty not having been yet reëstablished, there was ample liberty at least of speech and censure; so that Dion was soon furnished with full indications of the sentiment entertained towards him. He became disquieted and irritable at this change of public feeling;[260] angry with the people, yet at the same time ashamed of himself. The murder of Herakleides sat heavy on his soul. The same man whom he had spared before when in the wrong, he had now slain when in the right. The maxims of the Academy which had imparted to him so much self-satisfaction in the former act, could hardly fail to occasion a proportionate sickness of self-reproach in the latter. Dion was not a mere power-seeker, nor prepared for all that endless apparatus of mistrustful precaution, indispensable to a Grecian despot. When told that his life was in danger, he replied that he would rather perish at once by the hands of the first assassin, than live in perpetual diffidence, towards friends as well as enemies.[261]

One thus too good for a despot, and yet unfit for a popular leader, could not remain long in the precarious position occupied by Dion. His intimate friend, the Athenian Kallippus, seeing that the man who could destroy him would become popular with the Syracusans as well as with a large portion of the soldiery, formed a conspiracy accordingly. He stood high in the confidence of Dion, had been his companion during his exile at Athens, had accompanied him to Sicily, and entered Syracuse by his side. But Plato, anxious for the credit of the Academy, is careful to inform us, that this inauspicious friendship arose, not out of fellowship in philosophy, but out of common hospitalities, and especially common initiation in the Eleusinian mysteries.[262] Brave and forward in battle, Kallippus enjoyed much credit with the soldiery. He was conveniently placed for tampering with them, and by a crafty stratagem, he even insured the unconscious connivance of Dion himself. Having learnt that plots were formed against his life, Dion talked about them to Kallippus, who offered himself to undertake the part of spy, and by simulated partnership to detect as well as to betray the conspirators. Under this confidence, Kallippus had full licence for carrying on his intrigues unimpeded, since Dion disregarded the many warnings which reached him. [263] Among the rumors raised out of Dion’s new position, and industriously circulated by Kallippus—one was, that he was about to call back Apollokrates, son of Dionysius,

as his partner and successor to the despotism—as a substitute for the youthful son who had recently perished. By these and other reports, Dion became more and more discredited, while Kallippus secretly organized a wider circle of adherents. His plot however did not escape the penetration of Aristomachê and Aretê; who having, first addressed unavailing hints to Dion, at last took upon them to question Kallippus himself. The latter not only denied the charge, but even confirmed his denial, at their instance, by one of the most solemn and terrific oaths recognized in Grecian religion; going into the sacred grove of Demeter and Persephonê, touching the purple robe of the goddess, and taking in his hand a lighted torch.[264]

Inquiry being thus eluded, there came on presently the day of the Koreia:—the festival of these very Two goddesses in whose name and presence Kallippus had forsworn. This was the day which he had fixed for execution. The strong points of defence in Syracuse were confided beforehand to his principal adherents while his brother Philostrates[265] kept a trireme manned in the harbor ready for flight in case the scheme should miscarry. While Dion, taking no part in the festival, remained at home, Kallippus caused his house to be surrounded by confidential soldiers, and then sent into it a select company of Zakynthians, unarmed, as if for the purpose of addressing Dion on business. These men, young and of distinguished muscular strength, being admitted into the house, put aside or intimidated the slaves, none of whom manifested any zeal or attachment. They then made their way up to Dion's apartment, and attempted to throw him down and strangle him. So strenuously did he resist, however, that they found it impossible to kill him without arms; which they were perplexed how to procure, being afraid to open the doors, lest aid might be introduced against them. At length one of their number descended to a back-door, and procured from a Syracusan without, named Lykon, a short sword; of the Laconian sort, and of peculiar workmanship. With this weapon they put Dion to death.[266] They then seized Aristomachê and Aretê, the sister and wife of Dion. These unfortunate women were cast into prison, where they were long detained, and where the latter was delivered of a posthumous son.

Thus perished Dion, having lived only about a year after his expulsion of the Dionysian dynasty from Syracuse—but a year too long for his own fame. Notwithstanding the events of those last months, there is no doubt that he was a man essentially differing from the class of Grecian despots: a man, not of aspirations purely personal, nor thirsting merely for multitudes of submissive subjects and a victorious army—but with large public-minded purposes attached as coördinate to his own ambitious views. He wished to perpetuate his name as the founder of a polity, cast in something of the general features of Sparta; which, while it did not shock Hellenic instincts, should reach farther than political institutions generally aim to do, so as to remodel the sentiments and habits of the citizens, on principles suited to philosophers like Plato. Brought up as Dion was from childhood at the court of the elder Dionysius, unused to that established legality, free speech, and habit of active citi-

zenship, from whence a large portion of Hellenic virtue flowed—the wonder is how he acquired so much public conviction and true magnanimity of soul—not how he missed acquiring more. The influence of Plato during his youth stamped his mature character; but that influence (as Plato himself tells us) found a rare predisposition in the pupil. Still, Dion had no experience of the working of a free and popular government. The atmosphere in which his youth was passed was that of an energetic despotism; while the aspiration which he imbibed from Plato was, to restrain and regularize that despotism, and to administer to the people a certain dose of political liberty, yet reserving to himself the task of settling how much was good for them, and the power of preventing them from acquiring more.

How this project—the natural growth of Dion's mind, for which his tastes and capacities were suited—was violently thrust aside through the alienated feelings of the younger Dionysius—has been already recounted. The position of Dion was now completely altered. He became a banished, ill-used man, stung with contemptuous antipathy against Dionysius, and eager to put down his despotism over Syracuse. Here were new motives apparently falling in with the old project. But the conditions of the problem had altogether changed. Dion could not overthrow Dionysius without "taking the Syracusan people into partnership" (to use the phrase of Herodotus[267] respecting the Athenian Kleisthenes)—without promising them full freedom, as an inducement for their hearty coöperation—without giving them arms, and awakening in them the stirring impulses of Grecian citizenship, all the more violent because they had been so long trodden down.[268] With these new allies he knew not how to deal. He had no experience of a free and jealous popular mind in persuasion, he was utterly unpractised: his manners were haughty and displeasing. Moreover, his kindred with the Dionysian family exposed him to antipathy from two different quarters. Like the Duke of Orleans (Égalité) at the end of 1792, in the first French Revolution—he was hated both by the royalists, because, though related to the reigning dynasty, he had taken an active part against it—and by sincere democrats, because they suspected him of a design to put himself in its place. To Dion, such coalition of antipathies was a serious hindrance; presenting a strong basis of support for all his rivals, especially for the unscrupulous Herakleides. The bad treatment which he underwent both from the Syracusans and from Herakleides, during the time when the officers of Dionysius still remained masters in Ortygia, has been already related. Dion however behaved, though not always with prudence, yet with so much generous energy against the common enemy, that he put down his rival, and maintained his ascendency unshaken, until the surrender of Ortygia.

That surrender brought his power to a maximum. It was the turning-point and crisis of his life. A splendid opportunity was now opened, of earning for himself fame and gratitude. He might have attached his name to an act as sublime and impressive as any in Grecian history, which, in an evil hour, he left to be performed in after days by Timoleon—the razing of the Dionysian stronghold, and the erection of courts of

justice on its site. He might have taken the lead in organizing, under the discussion and consent of the people, a good and free government, which, more or less exempt from defect as it might have been, would at least have satisfied them, and would have spared Syracuse those ten years of suffering which intervened until Timoleon came to make the possibility a fact. Dion might have done all that Timoleon did—and might have done it more easily, since he was less embarrassed both by the other towns in Sicily and by the Carthaginians. Unfortunately he still thought himself strong enough to resume his original project. In spite of the spirit, kindled partly by himself, among the Syracusans—in spite of the repugnance, already unequivocally manifested, on the mere suspicion of his despotic designs—he fancied himself competent to treat the Syracusans as a tame and passive herd; to carve out for them just as much liberty as he thought right, and to require them to be satisfied with it; nay, even worse, to defer giving them any liberty at all, on the plea, or pretence, of full consultation with advisers of his own choice.

Through this deplorable mistake, alike mischievous to Syracuse and to himself, Dion made his government one of pure force. He placed himself in a groove wherein he was fatally condemned to move on from bad to worse, without possibility of amendment. He had already made a martyr of Herakleides, and he would have been compelled to make other martyrs besides, had his life continued. It is fortunate for his reputation that his career was arrested so early, before he had become bad enough to forfeit that sympathy and esteem with which the philosopher Plato still mourns his death, appeasing his own disappointment by throwing the blame of Dion’s failure on every one but Dion himself.

CHAPTER LXXXV.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS DOWN TO THE CLOSE OF THE EXPEDITION OF TIMOLEON. B. C. 353-336.

The assassination of Dion, as recounted in my last chapter, appears to have been skilfully planned and executed for the purpose of its contriver, the Athenian Kallippus. Succeeding at once to the command of the soldiers, among whom he had before been very popular,—and to the mastery of Ortygia,—he was practically supreme at Syracuse. We read in Cornelius Nepos, that after the assassination of Dion there was deep public sorrow, and a strong reaction in his favor, testified by splendid obsequies attended by the mass of the population.[269] But this statement is difficult to believe; not merely because Kallippus long remained undisturbed master, but because he also threw into prison the female relatives of Dion—his sister Aristomachê and his pregnant wife Aretê, avenging by such act of malignity the false oath which he had so lately been compelled to take, in order to satisfy their suspicions.[270] Aretê was delivered of a son in the prison. It would seem that these unhappy women were kept in confinement during all the time, more than a year, that Kallippus remained master. On his being deposed, they were released; when a Syracusan named Hiketas, a friend of the deceased Dion, affected to take them under his protection. After a short period of kind treatment, he put them on board a vessel to be sent to Peloponnesus, but caused them to be slain on the voyage, and their bodies to be sunk in the sea. To this cruel deed he is said to have been instigated by the enemies of Dion; and the act shows but too plainly how implacable those enemies were.[271]

How Kallippus maintained himself in Syracuse—by what support, or violences, or promises—and against what difficulties he had to contend—we are not permitted to know. He seems at first to have made promises of restoring liberty; and we are even told, that he addressed a public letter to his country, the city of Athens;[272] wherein he doubtless laid claim to the honors of tyrannicide; representing himself as the liberator of Syracuse. How this was received by the Athenian assembly, we are not informed. But to Plato and the frequenters of the Academy, the news of Dion's death occasioned the most profound sorrow, as may still be read in the philosopher's letters.

Kallippus maintained himself for a year in full splendor and dominion. Discontents had then grown up; and the friends of Dion—or perhaps the enemies of Kallippus assuming that name—showed themselves with force in Syracuse. However, Kallippus defeated them, and forced them to take refuge in Leontini;[273] of which town we presently find Hiketas despot. Encouraged probably by this success, Kallippus committed many enormities, and made himself so odious,[274] that the expelled Dionysian family began to conceive hopes of recovering their dominion. He had gone

forth from Syracuse on an expedition against Katana; of which absence Hipparinus took advantage to effect his entry into Syracuse, at the head of a force sufficient, combined with popular discontent, to shut him out of the city. Kallippus speedily returned, but was defeated by Hipparinus, and compelled to content himself with the unprofitable exchange of Katana in place of Syracuse.[275]

Hipparinus and Nysæus were the two sons of Dionysius the elder, by Aristomachê, and were therefore nephews of Dion. Though Hipparinus probably became master of Ortygia, the strongest portion of Syracuse, yet it would appear that in the other portions of Syracuse there were opposing parties who contested his rule; first, the partisans of Dionysius the younger, and of his family—next, the mass who desired to get rid of both the families, and to establish a free popular constitution. Such is the state of facts which we gather from the letters of Plato.[276] But we are too destitute of memorials to make out anything distinct respecting the condition of Syracuse or of Sicily between 353 B. C. and 344 B. C.—from the death of Dion to the invitation sent to Corinth, which brought about the mission of Timoleon. We are assured generally that it was a period of intolerable conflicts, disorders, and suffering; that even the temples and tombs were neglected;[277] that the people were everywhere trampled down by despots and foreign mercenaries; that the despots were frequently overthrown by violence or treachery, yet only to be succeeded by others as bad or worse; that the multiplication of foreign soldiers, seldom regularly paid, spread pillage and violence everywhere.[278] The philosopher Plato—in a letter written about a year or more after the death of Dion (seemingly after the expulsion of Kallippus) and addressed to the surviving relatives and friends of the latter—draws a lamentable picture of the state both of Syracuse and Sicily. He goes so far as to say, that under the distraction and desolation which prevailed, the Hellenic race and language were likely to perish in the island, and give place to the Punic or Oscan.[279] He adjures the contending parties at Syracuse to avert this miserable issue by coming to a compromise, and by constituting a moderate and popular government,—yet with some rights reserved to the ruling families, among whom he desires to see a fraternal partnership established, tripartite in its character; including Dionysius the younger (now at Lokri)—Hipparinus son of the elder Dionysius—and the son of Dion. On the absolute necessity of such compromise and concord, to preserve both people and despots from one common ruin, Plato delivers the most pathetic admonitions. He recommends a triple coördinate kingship, passing by hereditary transmission in the families of the three persons just named; and including the presidency of religious ceremonies with an ample measure of dignity and veneration, but very little active political power. Advising that impartial arbitrators, respected by all, should be invoked to settle terms for the compromise, he earnestly implores each of the combatants to acquiesce peaceably in their adjudication.[280]

To Plato,—who saw before him the line double of Spartan kings, the only hereditary kings in Greece,—the proposition of three coördinate kingly families did not ap-

pear at all impracticable; nor indeed was it so, considering the small extent of political power allotted to them. But amidst the angry passions which then raged, and the mass of evil which had been done and suffered on all sides, it was not likely that any pacific arbitrator, of whatever position or character, would find a hearing, or would be enabled to effect any such salutary adjustment as had emanated from the Mantinean Dêmônax at Kyrênê—between the discontented Kyreneans and the dynasty of the Battiad princes.[281] Plato's recommendation passed unheeded. He died in 348-347 B. C., without seeing any mitigation of those Sicilian calamities which saddened the last years of his long life. On the contrary, the condition of Syracuse grew worse instead of better. The younger Dionysius contrived to effect his return, expelling Hipparinus and Nysæus from Ortygia, and establishing himself there again as master. As he had a long train of past humiliation to avenge, his rule was of that oppressive character which the ancient proverb recognized as belonging to kings restored from exile.[282]

Of all these princes descended from the elder Dionysius, not one inherited the sobriety and temperance which had contributed so much to his success. All of them are said to have been of drunken and dissolute habits[283]—Dionysius the younger, and his son Apollokrates, as well as Hipparinus and Nysæus. Hipparinus was assassinated while in a fit of intoxication; so that Nysæus became the representative of this family, until he was expelled from Ortygia by the return of the younger Dionysius.

That prince, since his first expulsion from Syracuse, had chiefly resided at Lokri in Italy, of which city his mother Doris was a native. It has already been stated that the elder Dionysius had augmented and nursed up Lokri by every means in his power, as an appurtenance of his own dominion at Syracuse. He had added to its territory all the southernmost peninsula of Italy (comprehended within a line drawn from the Gulf of Terina to that of Skylletium), once belonging to Rhegium, Kaulonia, and Hipponium. But though the power of Lokri was thus increased, it had ceased to be a free city, being converted into a dependency of the Dionysian family.[284] As such, it became the residence of the second Dionysius, when he could no longer maintain himself in Syracuse. We know little of what he did; though we are told that he revived a portion of the dismantled city of Rhegium under the name of Phœbia.[285] Rhegium itself reappears shortly afterwards as a community under its own name, and was probably reconstituted at the complete downfall of the second Dionysius.

The season between 356-346 B. C., was one of great pressure and suffering for all the Italiot Greeks, arising from the increased power of the inland Lucanians and Bruttians. These Bruttians, who occupied the southernmost Calabria, were a fraction detached from the general body of Lucanians and self-emancipated; having consisted chiefly of indigenous rural serfs in the mountain communities, who threw off the sway of their Lucanian masters, and formed an independent aggregate for themselves. These men, especially in the energetic effort which marked their early independence, were formidable enemies of the Greeks on the coast, from Tarentum to

the Sicilian strait; and more than a match even for the Spartans and Epirots invited over by the Greeks as auxiliaries.

It appears that the second Dionysius, when he retired to Lokri after the first loss of his power at Syracuse, soon found his rule unacceptable and his person unpopular. He maintained himself, seemingly from the beginning, by means of two distinct citadels in the town, with a standing army under the command of the Spartan Pharax, a man of profligacy and violence.[286] The conduct of Dionysius became at last so odious, that nothing short of extreme force could keep down the resentment of the citizens. We read that he was in the habit of practising the most licentious outrage towards the marriageable maidens of good family in Lokri. The detestation thus raised against him was repressed by his superior force—not, we may be sure, without numerous cruelties perpetrated against individual persons who stood on their defence—until the moment arrived when he and his son Apollokrates effected their second return to Ortygia. To ensure so important an acquisition, Dionysius diminished his military force at Lokri, where he at the same time left his wife, his two daughters, and his youthful son. But after his departure, the Lokrians rose in insurrection, overpowered the reduced garrison, and took captive these unfortunate members of his family. Upon their guiltless heads fell all the terrors of retaliation for the enormities of the despot. It was in vain that both Dionysius himself, and the Tarentines[287] supplicated permission to redeem the captives at the highest ransom. In vain was Lokri besieged, and its territory desolated. The Lokrians could neither be seduced by bribes, nor deterred by threats, from satiating the full extremity of vindictive fury. After multiplied cruelties and brutalities, the wife and family of Dionysius were at length relieved from farther suffering by being strangled.[288] With this revolting tragedy terminated the inauspicious marital connection begun between the elder Dionysius and the oligarchy of Lokri.

By the manner in which Dionysius exercised his power at Lokri, we may judge how he would behave at Syracuse. The Syracusans endured more evil than ever, without knowing where to look for help. Hiketas the Syracusan (once the friend of Dion, ultimately the murderer of the slain Dion's widow and sister), had now established himself as despot at Leontini. To him they turned as an auxiliary, hoping thus to obtain force sufficient for the expulsion of Dionysius. Hiketas gladly accepted the proposition, with full purpose of reaping the reward of such expulsion, when achieved, for himself. Moreover, a formidable cloud was now gathering from the side of Carthage. What causes had rendered Carthage inactive for the last few years, while Sicily was so weak and disunited—we do not know; but she had now become once more aggressive, extending her alliances among the despots of the island, and pouring in a large force and fleet, so as to menace the independence both of Sicily and of Southern Italy.[289] The appearance of this new enemy drove the Syracusans to despair, and left them no hope of safety except in assistance from Corinth. To that city they sent a pathetic and urgent appeal, setting forth both the actual suffering

and the approaching peril from without. And such indeed was the peril, that even to a calm observer, it might well seem as if the mournful prophecy of Plato was on the point of receiving fulfilment—Hellenism as well as freedom becoming extinct on the island.

To the invocation of Corinthian aid, Hiketas was a party; yet an unwilling party. He had made up his mind that for his purpose, it was better to join the Carthaginians, with whom he had already opened negotiations—and to employ their forces, first in expelling Dionysius, next in ruling Syracuse for himself. But these were schemes not to be yet divulged: accordingly, Hiketas affected to concur in the pressing entreaty sent by the Syracusans to Corinth, intending from the beginning to frustrate its success.[290] He expected indeed that the Corinthians would themselves decline compliance: for the enterprise proposed to them was full of difficulty; they had neither injury to avenge, nor profit to expect; while the force of sympathy, doubtless not inconsiderable, with a suffering colony, would probably be neutralized by the unsettled and degraded condition into which all Central Greece was now rapidly sinking, under the ambitious strides of Philip of Macedon.

The Syracusan envoys reached Corinth at a favorable moment. But it is melancholy to advert to the aggregate diminution of Grecian power, as compared with the time when (seventy years before) their forefathers had sent thither to solicit aid against the besieging armament of Athens; a time when Athens, Sparta, and Syracuse herself, were all in exuberant vigor as well as unimpaired freedom. However, the Corinthians happened at this juncture to have their hands as well as their minds tolerably free, so that the voice of genuine affliction, transmitted from the most esteemed of all their colonies, was heard with favor and sympathy. A decree was passed, heartily and unanimously, to grant the aid solicited.[291]

The next step was to choose a leader. But a leader was not easily found. The enterprise presented little temptation, with danger and difficulty abundant as well as certain. The hopeless discord of Syracuse for years past, was well known to all the leading Corinthian politicians or generals. Of all or most of these, the names were successively put up by the archons; but all with one accord declined. At length, while the archons hesitated whom to fix upon, an unknown voice in the crowd pronounced the name of Timoleon, son of Timodemus. The mover seemed prompted by divine inspiration;[292] so little obvious was the choice, and so preëminently excellent did it prove. Timoleon was named—without difficulty, and without much intention of doing him honor—to a post which all the other leading men declined.

Some points must be here noticed in the previous history of this remarkable man. He belonged to an illustrious family in Corinth, and was now of mature age—perhaps about fifty. He was distinguished no less for his courage than for the gentleness of his disposition. Little moved either by personal vanity or by ambition, he was devoted in his patriotism, and unreserved in his hatred of despots as well as of traitors.[293]

The government of Corinth was, and always had been, oligarchical; but it was a regular, constitutional, oligarchy; while the Corinthian antipathy against despots was of old standing[294]—hardly less strong than that of democratical Athens. As a soldier in the ranks of Corinthian hoplites, the bravery of Timoleon, and his submission to discipline, were alike remarkable.

These points of his character stood out the more forcibly from contrast with his elder brother Timophanes; who possessed the soldierlike merits of bravery and energetic enterprise, but combined with them an unprincipled ambition, and an unscrupulous prosecution of selfish advancement at all cost to others. The military qualities of Timophanes, however, gained for him so much popularity, that he was placed high as an officer in the Corinthian service. Timoleon, animated with a full measure of brotherly attachment, not only tried to screen his defects as well as to set off his merits, but also incurred the greatest perils for the purpose of saving his life. In a battle against the Argeians and Kleonæans, Timophanes was commanding the cavalry, when his horse, being wounded, threw him on the ground, very near to the enemy. The remaining horsemen fled, leaving their commander to what seemed certain destruction; but Timoleon, who was serving among the hoplites, rushed singly forth from the ranks with his utmost speed, and covered Timophanes with his shield, when the enemy were just about to pierce him. He made head single-handed against them, warding off numerous spears and darts, and successfully protected his fallen brother until succor arrived; though at the cost of several wounds to himself. [295]

This act of generous devotion raised great admiration towards Timoleon. But it also procured sympathy for Timophanes, who less deserved it. The Corinthians had recently incurred great risk of seeing their city fall into the hands of their Athenian allies, who had laid a plan to seize it, but were disappointed through timely notice given at Corinth.[296] To arm the people being regarded as dangerous to the existing oligarchy,[297] it was judged expedient to equip a standing force of four hundred paid foreign soldiers, and establish them as a permanent garrison in the strong and lofty citadel. The command of this garrison, with the mastery of the fort, was intrusted to Timophanes. A worse choice could not have been made. The new commander—seconded not only by his regiment and his strong position, but also by some violent partisans whom he took into his pay and armed, among the poorer citizens—speedily stood forth as despot, taking the whole government into his own hands. He seized numbers of the chief citizens, probably all the members of the oligarchical councils who resisted his orders, and put them to death without even form of trial.[298] Now, when it was too late, the Corinthians repented of the mistaken vote which had raised up a new Periander among them. But to Timoleon, the crimes of his brother occasioned an agony of shame and sorrow. He first went up to the acropolis[299] to remonstrate with him; conjuring him emphatically, by the most sacred motives public as well as private, to renounce his disastrous projects. Timophanes repudiated the

appeal with contempt. Timoleon had now to choose between his brother and his country. Again he went to the acropolis, accompanied by Æschylus, brother of the wife of Timophanes—by the prophet Orthagoras, his intimate friend—perhaps also by another friend named Telekleides. Admitted into the presence of Timophanes, they renewed their prayers and supplications; urging him even yet to recede from his tyrannical courses. But all their pleading was without effect. Timophanes first laughed them to scorn; presently, he became exasperated, and would hear no more. Finding words unavailing, they now drew their swords and put him to death. Timoleon lent no hand in the deed, but stood a little way off, with his face hidden, and in a flood of tears.[300]

With the life of Timophanes passed away the despotism which had already begun its crushing influence upon the Corinthians. The mercenary force was either dismissed, or placed in safe hands; the acropolis became again part of a free city; the Corinthian constitution was revived as before. In what manner this change was accomplished, or with what measure of violence it was accompanied, we are left in ignorance; for Plutarch tells us hardly anything except what personally concerns Timoleon. We learn however that the expressions of joy among the citizens, at the death of Timophanes and the restoration of the constitution, were vehement and universal. So strongly did this tide of sentiment run, as to carry along with it, in appearance, even those who really regretted the departed despotism. Afraid to say what they really felt about the deed, these men gave only the more abundant utterance to their hatred of the doer. Though it was good that Timophanes should be killed (they said), yet that he should be killed by his brother, and his brother-in-law, was a deed which tainted both the actors with inexpiable guilt and abomination. The majority of the Corinthian public, however, as well as the most distinguished citizens, took a view completely opposite. They expressed the warmest admiration as well for the doer as for the deed. They extolled the combination of warm family affection with devoted magnanimity and patriotism, each in its right place and properly balanced, which marked the conduct of Timoleon. He had displayed his fraternal affection by encountering the greatest perils in the battle, in order to preserve the life of Timophanes. But when that brother, instead of an innocent citizen, became the worst enemy of Corinth, Timoleon had then obeyed the imperative call of patriotism, to the disregard not less of his own comfort and interest than of fraternal affection.[301]

Such was the decided verdict pronounced by the majority—a majority as well in value as in number—respecting the behavior of Timoleon. In his mind, however, the general strain of encomium was not sufficient to drown, or even to compensate, the language of reproach, in itself so much more pungent, which emanated from the minority. Among that minority too was found one person whose single voice told with profound impression—his mother Demaristê, mother also of the slain Timophanes. Demaristê not only thought of her murdered son with the keenest maternal sorrow, but felt intense horror and execration for the authors of the deed. She imprecated

curses on the head of Timoleon, refused even to see him again, and shut her doors against his visits, in spite of earnest supplications.

There wanted nothing more to render Timoleon thoroughly miserable, amidst the almost universal gratitude of Corinth. Of his strong fraternal affection for Timophanes, his previous conduct leaves no doubt. Such affection had to be overcome before he accompanied his tyrannicidal friends to the acropolis, and doubtless flowed back with extreme bitterness upon his soul, after the deed was done. But when to this internal source of distress, was added the sight of persons who shrank from contact with him as a fratricide, together with the sting of the maternal Erinnys—he became agonized even to distraction. Life was odious to him; he refused for some time all food, and determined to starve himself to death. Nothing but the pressing solicitude of friends prevented him from executing the resolve. But no consoling voice could impart to him spirit for the duties of public life. He fled the city and the haunts of men, buried himself in solitude amidst his fields in the country, and refrained from seeing or speaking to any one. For several years he thus hid himself like a self-condemned criminal; and even when time had somewhat mitigated the intensity of his anguish, he still shunned every prominent position, performing nothing more than his indispensable duties as a citizen. An interval of twenty years[302] had now elapsed from the death of Timophanes, to the arrival of the Syracusan application for aid. During all this time, Timoleon, in spite of the sympathy and willingness of admiring fellow-citizens, had never once chosen to undertake any important command or office. At length the *vox Dei* is heard, unexpectedly, amidst the crowd; dispelling the tormenting nightmare which had so long oppressed his soul, and restoring him to healthy and honorable action.

There is no doubt that the conduct of Timoleon and Æschylus in killing Timophanes was in the highest degree tutelary to Corinth. The despot had already imbrued his hands in the blood of his countrymen, and would have been condemned, by fatal necessity, to go on from bad to worse, multiplying the number of victims, as a condition of preserving his own power. To say that the deed ought not to have been done by near relatives, was tantamount to saying, that it ought not to have been done at all; for none but near relatives could have obtained that easy access which enabled them to effect it. And even Timoleon and Æschylus could not make the attempt without the greatest hazard to themselves. Nothing was more likely than that the death of Timophanes would be avenged on the spot; nor are we told how they escaped such vengeance from the soldiers at hand. It has been already stated that the contemporary sentiment towards Timoleon was divided between admiration of the heroic patriot, and abhorrence of the fratricide; yet with a large preponderance on the side of admiration, especially in the highest and best minds. In modern times the preponderance would be in the opposite scale. The sentiment of duty towards family covers a larger proportion of the field of morality, as compared with obligations towards country, than it did in ancient times; while that intense antipathy

against a despot who overtops and overrides the laws, regarding him as the worst of criminals—which stood in the foreground of the ancient virtuous feeling—has now disappeared. Usurpation of the supreme authority is regarded generally among the European public as a crime, only where it displaces an established king already in possession; where there is no king, the successful usurper finds sympathy rather than censure: and few readers would have been displeased with Timoleon, had he even seconded his brother's attempt. But in the view of Timoleon and of his age generally, even neutrality appeared in the light of treason to his country, when no other man but him could rescue her from the despot. This sentiment is strikingly embodied in the comments of Plutarch; who admires the fraternal tyrannicide, as an act of sublime patriotism, and only complains that the internal emotions of Timoleon were not on a level with the sublimity of the act; that the great mental suffering which he endured afterwards, argued an unworthy weakness of character; that the conviction of imperative patriotic duty, having been once deliberately adopted, ought to have steeled him against scruples, and preserved him from that after-shame and repentance which spoiled half the glory of an heroic act. The antithesis, between Plutarch and the modern European point of view, is here pointed; though I think his criticism unwarranted. There is no reason to presume that Timoleon ever felt ashamed and repentant for having killed his brother. Placed in the mournful condition of a man agitated by conflicting sentiments, and obeying that which he deemed to carry the most sacred obligation, he of necessity suffered from the violation of the other. Probably the reflection that he had himself saved the life of Timophanes, only that the latter might destroy the liberties of his country—contributed materially to his ultimate resolution; a resolution, in which Æschylus, another near relative, took even a larger share than he.

It was in this state of mind that Timoleon was called upon to take the command of the auxiliaries for Syracuse. As soon as the vote had passed, Telekleides addressed to him a few words, emphatically exhorting him to strain every nerve, and to show what he was worth—with this remarkable point in conclusion—"If you now come off with success and glory, we shall pass for having slain a despot; if you fail, we shall be held as fratricides."[303]

He immediately commenced his preparation of ships and soldiers. But the Corinthians, though they had resolved on the expedition, were not prepared either to vote any considerable subsidy, or to serve in large numbers as volunteers. The means of Timoleon were so extremely limited, that he was unable to equip more than seven triremes, to which the Korkyræans (animated by common sympathy for Syracuse, as of old in the time of the despot Hippokrates[304]) added two more, and the Leukadians one. Nor could he muster more than one thousand soldiers, reinforced afterwards on the voyage to twelve hundred. A few of the principal Corinthians—Eukleides, Telemachus and Neon, among them—accompanied him. But the soldiers seem to have been chiefly miscellaneous mercenaries,—some of whom had

served under the Phokians in the Sacred war (recently brought to a close), and had incurred so much odium as partners in the spoliation of the Delphian temple, that they were glad to take foreign service anywhere.[305]

Some enthusiasm was indeed required to determine volunteers in an enterprise of which the formidable difficulties, and the doubtful reward, were obvious from the beginning. But even before the preparations were completed, news came which seemed to render it all but hopeless. Hiketas sent a second mission, retracting all that he said in the first, and desiring that no expedition might be sent from Corinth. Not having received Corinthian aid in time (he said), he had been compelled to enter into alliance with the Carthaginians, who would not permit any Corinthian soldiers to set foot in Sicily. This communication, greatly exasperating the Corinthians against Hiketas, rendered them more hearty in votes to put him down. Yet their zeal for active service, far from being increased, was probably even abated by the aggravation of obstacles thus revealed. If Timoleon even reached Sicily, he would find numberless enemies, without a single friend of importance:—for without Hiketas, the Syracusan people were almost helpless. But it now seemed impossible that Timoleon with his small force could ever touch the Sicilian shore, in the face of a numerous and active Carthaginian fleet.[306]

While human circumstances thus seemed hostile, the gods held out to Timoleon the most favorable signs and omens. Not only did he receive an encouraging answer at Delphi, but while he was actually in the temple, a fillet with intertwined wreaths and symbols of victory fell from one of the statues upon his head. The priestesses of Persephonê learnt from the goddess in a dream, that she was about to sail with Timoleon for Sicily, her own favorite island. Accordingly he caused a new special trireme to be fitted out, sacred to the Two goddesses (Dêmêtêr and Persephonê) who were about to accompany him. And when, after leaving Korkyra, the squadron struck across for a night voyage to the Italian coast, this sacred trireme was seen illumined by a blaze of light from heaven; while a burning torch on high, similar to that which was usually carried in the Eleusinian mysteries, ran along with the ship and guided the pilot to the proper landing place at Metapontum. Such manifestations of divine presence and encouragement, properly certified and commented upon by the prophets, rendered the voyage one of universal hopefulness to the armament.[307]

These hopes, however, were sadly damped, when after disregarding a formal notice from a Carthaginian man-of-war, they sailed down the coast of Italy and at last reached Rhegium. This city, having been before partially revived under the name of Phœbia, by the younger Dionysius, appears now as reconstituted under its old name and with its full former autonomy, since the overthrow of his rule at Lokri and in Italy generally. Twenty Carthaginian triremes, double the force of Timoleon, were found at Rhegium awaiting his arrival—with envoys from Hiketas aboard. These envoys came with what they pretended to be good news. "Hiketas had recently gained a capital victory over Dionysius, whom he had expelled from most part of Syracuse, and was

now blocking up in Ortygia; with hopes of soon starving him out, by the aid of a Carthaginian fleet. The common enemy being thus at the end of his resources, the war could not be prolonged. Hiketas therefore trusted that Timoleon would send back to Corinth his fleet and troops, now become superfluous. If Timoleon would do this, he (Hiketas) would be delighted to see him personally at Syracuse, and would gladly consult him in the resettlement of that unhappy city. But he could not admit the Corinthian armament into the island; moreover, even had he been willing, the Carthaginians peremptorily forbade it, and were prepared, in case of need, to repel it with their superior naval force now in the strait."[308]

The game which Hiketas was playing with the Carthaginians now stood plainly revealed, to the vehement indignation of the armament. Instead of being their friend, or even neutral, he was nothing less than a pronounced enemy, emancipating Syracuse from Dionysius only to divide it between himself and the Carthaginians. Yet with all the ardor of the armament, it was impossible to cross the strait in opposition to an enemy's fleet of double force. Accordingly Timoleon resorted to a stratagem, in which the leaders and people of Rhegium, eagerly sympathizing with his projects of Sicilian emancipation, coöperated. In an interview with the envoys of Hiketas as well as with the Carthaginian commanders, he affected to accept the conditions prescribed by Hiketas; admitting at once that it was useless to stand out. But he at the same time reminded them, that he had been intrusted with the command of the armament for Sicilian purposes,—and that he should be a disgraced man, if he now conducted it back without touching the island; except under the pressure of some necessity not merely real, but demonstrable to all and attested by unexceptionable witnesses. He therefore desired them to appear, along with him, before the public assembly of Rhegium, a neutral city and common friend of both parties. They would then publicly repeat the communication which they had already made to him, and they would enter into formal engagement for the good treatment of the Syracusans, as soon as Dionysius should be expelled. Such proceeding would make the people of Rhegium witnesses on both points. They would testify on his (Timoleon's) behalf, when he came to defend himself at Corinth, that he had turned his back only before invincible necessity, and that he had exacted everything in his power in the way of guarantee for Syracuse; they would testify also on behalf of the Syracusans, in case the guarantee now given should be hereafter evaded.[309]

Neither the envoys of Hiketas, nor the Carthaginian commanders, had any motive to decline what seemed to them an unmeaning ceremony. Both of them accordingly attended, along with Timoleon, before the public assembly of Rhegium formally convened. The gates of the city were closed (a practice usual during the time of a public assembly): the Carthaginian men-of-war lay as usual near at hand, but in no state for immediate movement, and perhaps with many of the crews ashore; since all chance of hostility seemed to be past. What had been already communicated to Timoleon from Hiketas and the Carthaginians, was now repeated in formal deposition

before the assembly; the envoys of Hiketas probably going into the case more at length, with certain flourishes of speech prompted by their own vanity. Timoleon stood by as an attentive listener; but before he could rise to reply, various Rhegine speakers came forward with comments or questions, which called up the envoys again. A long time was thus insensibly wasted, Timoleon often trying to get an opportunity to speak, but being always apparently constrained to give way to some obtrusive Rhegine. During this long time, however, his triremes in the harbor were not idle. One by one, with as little noise as possible, they quitted their anchorage and rowed out to sea, directing their course towards Sicily. The Carthaginian fleet, though seeing this proceeding, neither knew what it meant, nor had any directions to prevent it. At length the other Grecian triremes were all afloat and in progress; that of Timoleon alone remaining in the harbor. Intimation being secretly given to him as he sat in the assembly, he slipped away from the crowd, his friends concealing his escape—and got aboard immediately. His absence was not discovered at first, the debate continuing as if he were still present, and intentionally prolonged by the Rhegine speakers. At length the truth could no longer be kept back. The envoys and the Carthaginians found out that the assembly and the debate were mere stratagems, and that their real enemy had disappeared. But they found it out too late. Timoleon with his triremes was already on the voyage to Tauromenium in Sicily, where all arrived safe and without opposition. Overreached and humiliated, his enemies left the assembly in vehement wrath against the Rhegines, who reminded them that Carthaginians ought to be the last to complain of deception in others.[310]

The well-managed stratagem, whereby Timoleon had overcome a difficulty to all appearance insurmountable, exalted both his own fame and the spirits of his soldiers. They were now safe in Sicily, at Tauromenium, a recent settlement near the site of the ancient Naxos: receiving hearty welcome from Andromachus, the leading citizen of the place—whose influence was so mildly exercised, and gave such complete satisfaction, that it continued through and after the reform of Timoleon, when the citizens might certainly have swept it away if they had desired. Andromachus, having been forward in inviting Timoleon to come, now prepared to coöperate with him, and returned a spirited reply to the menaces sent over from Rhegium by the Carthaginians, after they had vainly pursued the Corinthian squadron to Tauromenium.

But Andromachus and Tauromenium were but petty auxiliaries compared with the enemies against whom Timoleon had to contend; enemies now more formidable than ever. For Hiketas, incensed with the stratagem practised at Rhegium, and apprehensive of interruption to the blockade which he was carrying on against Ortygia, sent for an additional squadron of Carthaginian men-of-war to Syracuse; the harbor of which place was presently completely beset.[311] A large Carthaginian land force was also acting under Hanno in the western regions of the island, with considerable success against the Campanians of Entella and others.[312] The Sicilian towns had

their native despots, Mamerkus at Katana—Leptines at Apollonia[313]—Nikodemus at Kentoripa—Apolloniades at Agyrium[314]—from whom Timoleon could expect no aid, except in so far as they might feel predominant fear of the Carthaginians. And the Syracusans, even when they heard of his arrival at Tauromenium, scarcely ventured to indulge hopes of serious relief from such a handful of men, against the formidable array of Hiketas and the Carthaginians under their walls. Moreover, what guarantee had they that Timoleon would turn out better than Dion, Kallippus, and others before him? seductive promisers of emancipation, who, if they succeeded, forgot the words by which they had won men's hearts, and thought only of appropriating to themselves the sceptre of the previous despot, perhaps even aggravating all that was bad in his rule? Such was the question asked by many a suffering citizen of Syracuse, amidst that despair and sickness of heart which made the name of an armed liberator sound only like a new deceiver and a new scourge.[315]

It was by acts alone that Timoleon could refute such well-grounded suspicions. But at first, no one believed in him; nor could he escape the baneful effects of that mistrust which his predecessors had everywhere inspired. The messengers whom he sent round were so coldly received, that he seemed likely to find no allies beyond the walls of Tauromenium.

At length one invitation, of great importance, reached him—from the town of Adranum, about forty miles inland from Tauromenium; a native Sikel town, seemingly in part hellenized, inconsiderable in size, but venerated as sacred to the god Adranus, whose worship was diffused throughout all Sicily. The Adranites being politically divided, at the same time that one party sent the invitation to Timoleon, the other despatched a similar message to Hiketas. Either at Syracuse or Leontini, Hiketas was nearer to Adranum than Timoleon at Tauromenium; and lost no time in marching thither, with five thousand troops, to occupy so important a place. He arrived there in the evening, found no enemy, and established his camp without the walls, believing himself already master of the place. Timoleon, with his inferior numbers, knew that he had no chance of success except in surprise. Accordingly, on setting out from Tauromenium, he made no great progress the first day, in order that no report of his approach might reach Adranum; but on the next morning he marched with the greatest possible effort, taking the shortest, yet most rugged paths. On arriving within about three miles of Adranum, he was informed that the troops from Syracuse, having just finished their march, had encamped near the town, not aware of any enemy near. His officers were anxious that the men should be refreshed after their very fatiguing march, before they ventured to attack an army four times superior in number. But Timoleon earnestly protested against any such delay, entreating them to follow him at once against the enemy, as the only chance of finding them unprepared. To encourage them, he at once took up his shield and marched at their head, carrying it on his arm (the shield of the general was habitually carried for him by an orderly), in spite of the fatiguing march, which he had himself performed on foot as well as they.

The soldiers obeyed, and the effort was crowned by complete success. The troops of Hiketas, unarmed and at their suppers, were taken so completely by surprise, that in spite of their superior number, they fled with scarce any resistance. From the rapidity of their flight, three hundred of them only were slain, But six hundred were made prisoners, and the whole camp, including its appurtenances, was taken, with scarcely the loss of a man. Hiketas escaped with the rest to Syracuse.[316]

This victory, so rapidly and skilfully won—and the acquisition of Adranum which followed it—produced the strongest sensation throughout Sicily. It counted even for more than a victory; it was a declaration of the gods in favor of Timoleon. The inhabitants of the holy town, opening their gates and approaching him with awe-stricken reverence, recounted the visible manifestations of the god Adranus in his favor. At the moment when the battle was commencing, they had seen the portals of their temple spontaneously burst open, and the god brandishing his spear, with profuse perspiration on his face.[317] Such facts,—verified and attested in a place of peculiar sanctity, and circulated from thence throughout the neighboring communities,—contributed hardly less than the victory to exalt the glory of Timoleon. He received offers of alliance from Tyndaris and several other towns, as well as from Mamerkus despot of Katana, one of the most warlike and powerful princes in the island.[318] So numerous were the reinforcements thus acquired, and so much was his confidence enhanced by recent success, that he now ventured to march even under the walls of Syracuse, and defy Hiketas; who did not think it prudent to hazard a second engagement with the victor of Adranum.[319]

Hiketas was still master of all Syracuse—except Ortygia, against which he had constructed lines of blockade, in conjunction with the Carthaginian fleet occupying the harbor. Timoleon was in no condition to attack the place, and would have been obliged speedily to retire, as his enemies did not choose to come out. But it was soon seen that the manifestations of the Two goddesses, and of the god Adranus, in his favor, were neither barren nor delusive. A real boon was now thrown into his lap, such as neither skill nor valor could have won. Dionysius, blocked up in Ortygia with a scanty supply of provisions, saw from his walls the approaching army of Timoleon, and heard of the victory of Adranum. He had already begun to despair of his own position of Ortygia;[320] where indeed he might perhaps hold out by bold effort and steady endurance, but without any reasonable chance of again becoming master of Syracuse; a chance which Timoleon and the Corinthian intervention cut off more decidedly than ever. Dionysius was a man not only without the energetic character and personal ascendency of his father, which might have made head against such difficulties—but indolent and drunken in his habits, not relishing a sceptre when it could only be maintained by hard fighting, nor stubborn enough to stand out to the last merely as a cause of war.[321] Under these dispositions, the arrival of Timoleon both suggested to him the idea, and furnished him with the means, of making his resignation subservient to the purchase of a safe asylum and comfortable future mainte-

nance: for to a Grecian despot, with the odium of past severities accumulated upon his head, abnegation of power was hardly ever possible, consistent with personal security.[322] But Dionysius felt assured that he might trust to the guarantee of Timoleon and the Corinthians for shelter and protection at Corinth, with as much property as he could carry away with him; since he had the means of purchasing such guarantee by the surrender of Ortygia—a treasure of inestimable worth. Accordingly he resolved to propose a capitulation, and sent envoys to Timoleon for the purpose.

There was little difficulty in arranging terms. Dionysius stipulated only for a safe transit with his movable property to Corinth, and for an undisturbed residence in that city; tendering in exchange the unconditional surrender of Ortygia with all its garrison, arms, and magazines. The convention was concluded forthwith, and three Corinthian officers—Telemachus, Eukleides and Neon—were sent in with four hundred men to take charge of the place. Their entrance was accomplished safely, though they were obliged to elude the blockade by stealing in at several times, and in small companies. Making over to them the possession of Ortygia with the command of its garrison, Dionysius passed, with some money and a small number of companions, into the camp of Timoleon; who conveyed him away, leaving at the same time the neighborhood of Syracuse.[323]

Conceive the position and feelings of Dionysius, a prisoner in the camp of Timoleon, traversing that island over which his father as well as himself had reigned all-powerful, and knowing himself to be the object of either hatred or contempt to every one,—except so far as the immense boon which he had conferred, by surrendering Ortygia, purchased for him an indulgent forbearance! He was doubtless eager for immediate departure to Corinth, while Timoleon was no less anxious to send him thither, as the living evidence of triumph accomplished. Although not fifty days[324] had yet elapsed, since Timoleon's landing in Sicily, he was enabled already to announce a decisive victory, a great confederacy grouped around him, and the possession of the inexpugnable position of Ortygia, with a garrison equal in number to his own army; the despatches being accompanied by the presence of that very despot, bearing the terrific name of Dionysius, against whom the expedition had been chiefly aimed! Timoleon sent a special trireme[325] to Corinth, carrying Dionysius, and communicating important events, together with the convention which guaranteed to the dethroned ruler an undisturbed residence in that city.

The impression produced at Corinth by the arrival of this trireme and its passengers was powerful beyond all parallel. Astonishment and admiration were universal; for the expedition of Timoleon had started as a desperate venture, in which scarce one among the leading Corinthians had been disposed to embark; nor had any man conceived the possibility of success so rapid as well as so complete. But the victorious prospect in Sicily, with service under the fortunate general, was now the general passion of the citizens. A reinforcement of two thousand hoplites and two hundred cavalry was immediately voted and equipped.[326]

If the triumph excited wonder and joy, the person of Dionysius himself appealed no less powerfully to other feelings. A fallen despot was a sight denied to Grecian eyes; whoever aspired to despotism, put his all to hazard, forfeiting his chance of retiring to a private station. By a remarkable concurrence of circumstances, the exception to this rule was presented just where it was least likely to take place; in the case of the most formidable and odious despotism which had ever overridden the Grecian world. For nearly half a century prior to the expedition of Dion against Syracuse, every one had been accustomed to pronounce the name of Dionysius with a mixture of fear and hatred—the sentiment of prostration before irresistible force. How much difficulty Dion himself found, in overcoming this impression in the minds of his own soldiers, has been already related. Though dissipated by the success of Dion, the antecedent alarm became again revived, when Dionysius recovered his possession of Ortygia, and when the Syracusans made pathetic appeal to Corinth for aid against him. Now, on a sudden, the representative of this extinct greatness, himself bearing the awful name of Dionysius, enters Corinth under a convention, suing only for the humble domicile and unpretending security of a private citizen.[327] The Greek mind was keenly sensitive to such contrasts, which entered largely into every man's views of human affairs, and were reproduced in a thousand forms by writers and speakers. The affluence of visitors—who crowded to gaze upon and speak to Dionysius, not merely from Corinth, but from other cities of Greece—was immense; some in simple curiosity, others with compassion, a few even with insulting derision. The anecdotes which are recounted seem intended to convey a degrading impression of this last period of his career. But even the common offices of life—the purchase of unguents and condiments at the tavern[328]—the nicety of criticism displayed respecting robes and furniture[329]—looked degrading when performed by the ex-despot of Syracuse. His habit of drinking largely, already contracted, was not likely to become amended in these days of mortification; yet on the whole his conduct seems to have had more dignity than could have been expected. His literary tastes, manifested during the time of his intercourse with Plato, are implied even in the anecdotes intended to disparage him. Thus he is said to have opened a school for teaching boys to read, and to have instructed the public singers in the art of singing or reciting poetry.[330] His name served to subsequent writers, both Greek and Roman,—as those of Crœsus, Polykrates, and Xerxes, serve to Herodotus—for an instance to point a moral on the mutability of human events. Yet the anecdotes recorded about him can rarely be verified, nor can we distinguish real matters of fact from those suitable and impressive myths which so pregnant a situation was sure to bring forth.

Among those who visited him at Corinth was Aristoxenus of Tarentum: for the Tarentine leaders, first introduced by Plato, had maintained their correspondence with Dionysius even after his first expulsion from Syracuse to Lokri, and had vainly endeavored to preserve his unfortunate wife and daughters from the retributive vengeance of the Lokrians. During the palmy days of Dionysius, his envoy Polyarchus had been sent on a mission to Tarentum, where he came into conversation with the

chief magistrate Archytas. This conversation Aristoxenus had recorded in writing; probably from the personal testimony of Archytas, whose biography he composed. Polyarchus dwelt upon wealth, power, and sensual enjoyments, as the sole objects worth living for; pronouncing those who possessed them in large masses, as the only beings deserving admiration. At the summit of all stood the Persian King, whom Polyarchus extolled as the most enviable and admirable of mortals. "Next to the Persian King (said he), though with a very long interval, comes our despot of Syracuse."[331] What had become of Polyarchus, we do not know; but Aristoxenus lived to see the envied Dionysius under the altered phase of his life at Corinth, and probably to witness the ruin of the Persian Kings also. On being asked, what had been the cause of his displeasure against Plato, Dionysius replied, in language widely differing from that of his former envoy Polyarchus, that amidst the many evils which surrounded a despot, none was so mischievous as the unwillingness of his so-called friends to tell him the truth. Such false friends had poisoned the good feeling between him and Plato.[332] This anecdote bears greater mark of being genuine, than others which we read more witty and pungent. The Cynic philosopher Diogenes treated Dionysius with haughty scorn for submitting to live in a private station after having enjoyed so overruling an ascendency. Such was more or less the sentiment of every visitor who saw him; but the matter to be lamented is, that he had not been in a private station from the beginning. He was by nature unfit to tread, even with profit to himself, the perilous and thorny path of a Grecian despot.

The reinforcements decreed by the Corinthians, though equipped without delay and forwarded to Thurii in Italy, were prevented from proceeding farther on shipboard by the Carthaginian squadron at the strait, and were condemned to wait for a favorable opportunity.[333] But the greatest of all reinforcements to Timoleon was, the acquisition of Ortygia. It contained not merely a garrison of two thousand soldiers—who passed (probably much to their own satisfaction) from the declining cause of Dionysius to the victorious banner of Timoleon—but also every species of military stores. There were horses, engines for siege and battery, missiles of every sort, and above all, shields and spears to the amazing number of seventy thousand—if Plutarch's statement is exact.[334] Having dismissed Dionysius, Timoleon organized a service of small craft from Katana to convey provisions by sea to Ortygia, eluding the Carthaginian guard squadron. He found means to do this with tolerable success, [335] availing himself of winds or bad weather, when the ships of war could not obstruct the entrance of the lesser harbor. Meanwhile he himself returned to Adranum, a post convenient for watching both Leontini and Syracuse. Here two assassins, bribed by Hiketas, were on the point of taking his life, while sacrificing at a festival; and were only prevented by an accident so remarkable, that every one recognized the visible intervention of the gods to protect him.[336]

Meanwhile Hiketas, being resolved to acquire possession of Ortygia, invoked the aid of the full Carthaginian force under Magon. The great harbor of Syracuse was

presently occupied by an overwhelming fleet of one hundred and fifty Carthaginian ships of war, while a land force, said to consist of sixty thousand men, came also to join Hiketas, and were quartered by him within the walls of Syracuse. Never before had any Carthaginian troops got footing within those walls. Syracusan liberty, perhaps Syracusan Hellenism, now appeared extinct. Even Ortygia, in spite of the bravery of its garrison under the Corinthian Neon, seemed not long tenable, against repeated attack and battery of the walls, combined with strict blockade to keep out supplies by sea. Still, however, though the garrison was distressed, some small craft with provisions from Katana contrived to slip in; a fact, which induced Hiketas and Magon to form the plan of attacking that town, thinking themselves strong enough to accomplish this by a part of their force, without discontinuing the siege of Ortygia. Accordingly they sailed forth from the harbor, and marched from the city of Syracuse, with the best part of their armament, to attack Katana, leaving Ortygia still under blockade. But the commanders left behind were so negligent in their watch, that Neon soon saw from the walls of Ortygia the opportunity of attacking them with advantage. Making a sudden and vigorous sally, he fell upon the blockading army unawares, routed them at all points with serious loss, and pressed his pursuit so warmly, that he got possession of Achradina, expelling them from that important section of the city. The provisions and money, acquired herein at a critical moment, rendered this victory important. But what gave it the chief value was, the possession of Achradina which Neon immediately caused to be joined on to Ortygia by a new line of fortifications, and thus held the two in combination.[337] Ortygia had been before (as I have already remarked) completely distinct from Achradina. It is probable that the population of Achradina, delighted to be liberated from the Carthaginians, lent zealous aid to Neon both in the defence of their own walls, and in the construction of the new connecting lines towards Ortygia; for which the numerous intervening tombs would supply materials.

This gallant exploit of Neon permanently changed the position of the combatants at Syracuse. A horseman started instantly to convey the bad news to Hiketas and Magon near Katana. Both of them returned forthwith; but they returned only to occupy half of the city—Tycha, Neapolis, and Epipolæ. It became extremely difficult to prosecute a successful siege or blockade of Ortygia and Achradina united: besides that Neon had now obtained abundant supplies for the moment.

Meanwhile Timoleon too was approaching, reinforced by the new Corinthian division; who, having been at first detained at Thurii, and becoming sick of delay, had made their way inland, across the Bruttian territory, to Rhegium. They were fortunate enough to find the strait unguarded; for the Carthaginian admiral Hanno—having seen their ships laid up at Thurii, and not anticipating their advance by land—had first returned with his squadron to the Strait of Messina, and next, hoping by a stratagem to frighten the garrison of Ortygia into surrender, had sailed to the harbor of Syracuse with his triremes decorated as if after a victory. His seamen with wreaths

round their heads, shouted as they passed into the harbor under the walls of Ortygia, that the Corinthian squadron approaching the strait had been all captured, and exhibited as proofs of the victory certain Grecian shields hung up aboard. By this silly fabrication, Hanno probably produced a serious dismay among the garrison of Ortygia. But he purchased such temporary satisfaction at the cost of leaving the strait unguarded, and allowing the Corinthian division to cross unopposed from Italy into Sicily. On reaching Rhegium, they not only found the strait free, but also a complete and sudden calm, succeeding upon several days of stormy weather. Embarking immediately on such ferry boats and fishing craft as they could find, and swimming their horses alongside by the bridle, they reached the Sicilian coast without loss or difficulty.[338]

Thus did the gods again show their favor towards Timoleon by an unusual combination of circumstances, and by smiting the enemy with blindness. So much did the tide of success run along with him, that the important town of Messênê declared itself among his allies, admitting the new Corinthian soldiers immediately on their landing. With little delay, they proceeded forward to join Timoleon; who thought himself strong enough, notwithstanding that even with this reinforcement he could only command four thousand men, to march up to the vicinity of Syracuse, and there to confront the immeasurably superior force of his enemies.[339] He appears to have encamped near the Olympieion, and the bridge over the river Anapus.

Though Timoleon was sure of the coöperation of Neon and the Corinthian garrison in Ortygia and Achradina, yet he was separated from them by the numerous force of Hiketas and Magon, who occupied Epipolæ, Neapolis, and Tycha, together with the low ground between Epipolæ and the Great Harbor; while the large Carthaginian fleet filled the Harbor itself. On a reasonable calculation, Timoleon seemed to have little chance of success. But suspicion had already begun in the mind of Magon, sowing the seeds of disunion between him and Hiketas. The alliance between Carthaginians and Greeks was one unnatural to both parties, and liable to be crossed, at every mischance, by mutual distrust, growing out of antipathy which each party felt in itself and knew to subsist in the other. The unfortunate scheme of marching to Katana, with the capital victory gained by Neon in consequence of that absence, made Magon believe that Hiketas was betraying him. Such apprehensions were strengthened, when he saw in his front the army of Timoleon, posted on the river Anapus—and when he felt that he was in a Greek city generally disaffected to him, while Neon was at his rear in Ortygia and Achradina. Under such circumstances, Magon conceived the whole safety of his Carthaginians as depending on the zealous and faithful coöperation of Hiketas, in whom he had now ceased to confide. And his mistrust, once suggested, was aggravated by the friendly communication which he saw going on between the soldiers of Timoleon and those of Hiketas. These soldiers, all Greeks and mercenaries fighting for a country not their own, encountered each other, on the field of battle, like enemies,—but conversed in a pacific and amicable

way, during intervals, in their respective camps. Both were now engaged, without disturbing each other, in catching eels amidst the marshy and watery ground between Epipolæ and the Anapus. Interchanging remarks freely, they were admiring the splendor and magnitude of Syracuse with its great maritime convenience,—when one of Timoleon's soldiers observed to the opposite party—"And this magnificent city, you, Greeks as you are, are striving to barbarise, planting these Carthaginian cutthroats nearer to us than they now are; though our first anxiety ought to be, to keep them as far off as possible from Greece. Do you really suppose that they have brought up this host from the Atlantic and the pillars of Herakles, all for the sake of Hiketas and his rule? Why, if Hiketas took measure of affairs like a true ruler, he would not thus turn out his brethren, and bring in an enemy to his country; he would ensure to himself an honorable sway, by coming to an understanding with the Corinthians and Timoleon." Such was the colloquy passing between the soldiers of Timoleon and those of Hiketas, and speedily made known to the Carthaginians. Having made apparently strong impression on those to whom it was addressed, it justified alarm in Magon; who was led to believe that he could no longer trust his Sicilian allies. Without any delay, he put all his troops aboard the fleet, and in spite of the most strenuous remonstrances from Hiketas sailed away to Africa.[340]

On the next day, when Timoleon approached to the attack, he was amazed to find the Carthaginian army and fleet withdrawn. His soldiers, scarcely believing their eyes, laughed to scorn the cowardice of Magon. Still however Hiketas determined to defend Syracuse with his own troops, in spite of the severe blow inflicted by Magon's desertion. That desertion had laid open both the Harbor, and the lower ground near the Harbor; so that Timoleon was enabled to come into direct communication with his garrison in Ortygia and Achradina, and to lay plans for a triple simultaneous onset. He himself undertook to attack the southern front of Epipolæ towards the river Anapus, where the city was strongest; the Corinthian Isias was instructed to make a vigorous assault from Achradina, or the eastern side; while Deinarchus and Demaretus, the generals who had conducted the recent reinforcement from Corinth, were ordered to attack the northern wall of Epipolæ, or the Hexapylon;[341] they were probably sent round from Ortygia, by sea, to land at Trogilus. Hiketas, holding as he did the aggregate consisting of Epipolæ, Tycha, and Neapolis, was assailed on three sides at once. He had a most defensible position, which a good commander, with brave and faithful troops, might have maintained against forces more numerous than those of Timoleon. Yet in spite of such advantages, no effective resistance was made, nor even attempted. Timoleon not only took the place, but took it without the loss of a single man, killed or wounded. Hiketas and his followers fled to Leontini. [342]

The desertion of Magon explains of course a great deal of discouragement among the soldiers of Hiketas. But when we read the astonishing facility of the capture, it is evident that there must have been something more than discouragement. The sol-

diers on defence were really unwilling to use their arms for the purpose of repelling Timoleon, and keeping up the dominion of Hiketas in Syracuse. When we find this sentiment so powerfully manifested, we cannot but discern that the aversion of these men to serve, in what they looked upon as a Carthaginian cause, threw into the hands of Timoleon an easy victory, and that the mistrustful retreat of Magon was not so absurd and cowardly as Plutarch represents.[343]

The Grecian public, however, not minutely scrutinizing preliminary events, heard the easy capture as a fact, and heard it with unbounded enthusiasm. From Sicily and Italy the news rapidly spread to Corinth and other parts of Greece. Everywhere the sentiment was the same; astonishment and admiration, not merely at the magnitude of the conquest, but also at the ease and rapidity with which it had been achieved. The arrival of the captive Dionysius at Corinth had been in itself a most impressive event. But now the Corinthians learnt the disappearance of the large Carthaginian host and the total capture of Syracuse, without the loss of a man; and that too before they were even assured that their second reinforcement, which they knew to have been blocked up at Thurii, had been able to touch the Sicilian shore.

Such transcendent novelties excited even in Greece, and much more in Sicily itself, a sentiment towards Timoleon such as hardly any Greek had ever yet drawn to himself. His bravery, his skilful plans, his quickness of movement, were indeed deservedly admired. But in this respect, others had equalled him before; and we may remark that even the Corinthian Neon, in his capture of Achradina, had rivalled anything performed by his superior officer. But that which stood without like or second in Timoleon—that which set a peculiar stamp upon all his meritorious qualities—was, his superhuman good fortune; or—what in the eyes of most Greeks was the same thing in other words—the unbounded favor with which the gods had cherished both his person and his enterprise. Though greatly praised as a brave and able man, Timoleon was still more affectionately hailed as an enviable man.[344] "Never had the gods been so manifest in their dispensations of kindness towards any mortal.[345]" The issue, which Telekleides had announced as being upon trial when Timoleon was named, now stood triumphantly determined. After the capture of Syracuse, we may be sure that no one ever denounced Timoleon as a fratricide;—every one extolled him as a tyrannicide. The great exploits of other eminent men, such as Agesilaus and Epaminondas, had been achieved at the cost of hardship, severe fighting, wounds and death to those concerned, etc., all of which counted as so many deductions from the perfect mental satisfaction of the spectator. Like an oration or poem smelling of the lamp, they bore too clearly the marks of preliminary toil and fatigue. But Timoleon, as the immortal gods descending to combat on the plain of Troy, accomplished splendid feats,—overthrew what seemed insuperable obstacles—by a mere first appearance, and without an effort. He exhibited to view a magnificent result, executed with all that apparent facility belonging as a privilege to the inspirations of first-rate

genius.[346] Such a spectacle of virtue and good fortune combined—glorious consummation with graceful facility—was new to the Grecian world.

For all that he had done, Timoleon took little credit to himself. In the despatch which announced to the Corinthians his *Veni, Vidi, Vici*, as well as in his discourses at Syracuse, he ascribed the whole achievement to fortune or to the gods, whom he thanked for having inscribed his name as nominal mover of their decree for liberating Sicily.[347] We need not doubt that he firmly believed himself to be a favored instrument of the divine will, and that he was even more astonished than others at the way in which locked gates flew open before him. But even if he had not believed it himself, there was great prudence in putting this coloring on the facts; not simply because he thereby deadened the attacks of envy, but because, under the pretence of modesty, he really exalted himself much higher. He purchased for himself a greater hold on men's minds towards his future achievements, as the beloved of the gods, than he would ever have possessed as only a highly endowed mortal. And though what he had already done was prodigious, there still remained much undone; new difficulties, not the same in kind, yet hardly less in magnitude, to be combated.

It was not only new difficulties, but also new temptations, which Timoleon had to combat. Now began for him that moment of trial, fatal to so many Greeks before him. Proof was to be shown, whether he could swallow, without intoxication or perversion, the cup of success administered to him in such overflowing fulness. He was now complete master of Syracuse; master of it too with the fortifications of Ortygia yet standing,—with all the gloomy means of despotic compression, material and moral, yet remaining in his hand. In respect of personal admiration and prestige of success, he stood greatly above Dion, and yet more above the elder Dionysius in the early part of his career. To set up for himself as despot at Syracuse, burying in oblivion all that he had said or promised before, was a step natural and feasible; not indeed without peril or difficulty, but carrying with it chances of success equal to those of other nascent despotisms, and more than sufficient to tempt a leading Greek politician of average morality. Probably most people in Sicily actually expected that he would avail himself of his unparalleled position to stand forth as a new Dionysius. Many friends and partisans would strenuously recommend it. They would even deride him as an idiot (as Solon had been called in his time[348]) for not taking the boon which the gods set before him, and for not hauling up the net when the fish were already caught in it. There would not be wanting other advisers to insinuate the like recommendation under the pretence of patriotic disinterestedness, and regard for the people whom he had come to liberate. The Syracusans (it would be contended), unfit for a free constitution, must be supplied with liberty in small doses, of which Timoleon was the best judge: their best interests require that Timoleon should keep in his hands the anti-popular power with little present diminution, in order to restrain their follies, and ensure to them benefits which they would miss if left to their own free determination.

Considerations of this latter character had doubtless greatly weighed with Dion in the hour of his victory, over and above mere naked ambition, so as to plunge him into that fatal misjudgment and misconduct out of which he never recovered. But the lesson deducible from the last sad months of Dion's career was not lost upon Timoleon. He was found proof, not merely against seductions within his own bosom, but against provocations or plausibilities from without. Neither for self-regarding purposes, nor for beneficent purposes, would he be persuaded to grasp and perpetuate the anti-popular power. The moment of trial was that in which the genuine heroism and rectitude of judgment united in his character, first shone forth with its full brightness.

Master as he now was of all Syracuse, with its fivefold aggregate, Ortygia, Achradina, Tycha, Neapolis, and Epipolæ—he determined to strike down at once that great monument of servitude which the elder Dionysius had imposed upon his fellow citizens. Without a moment's delay, he laid his hand to the work. He invited by proclamation every Syracusan who chose, to come with iron instruments, and coöperate with him in demolishing the separate stronghold, fortification, and residence, constructed by the elder Dionysius in Ortygia; as well as the splendid funeral monument erected to the memory of that despot by his son and successor.[349] This was the first public act executed in Syracuse by his order; the first manifestation of the restored sovereignty of the people; the first outpouring of sentiment, at once free, hearty, and unanimous, among men trodden down by half a century of servitude; the first fraternizing coöperation of Timoleon and his soldiers with them, for the purpose of converting the promise of liberation into an assured fact. That the actual work of demolition was executed by the hands and crowbars of the Syracusans themselves, rendered the whole proceeding an impressive compact between them and Timoleon. It cleared away all mistake, all possibility of suspicion, as to his future designs. It showed that he had not merely forsworn despotism for himself, but that he was bent on rendering it impossible for any one else, when he began by overthrowing what was not only the conspicuous memento, but also the most potent instrument, of the past despots. It achieved the inestimable good of inspiring at once confidence in his future proceedings, and disposing the Syracusans to listen voluntarily to his advice. And it was beneficial, not merely in smoothing the way to farther measures of pacific reconstruction, but also in discharging the reactionary antipathies of the Syracusans, inevitable after so long an oppression, upon unconscious stones; and thus leaving less of it to be wreaked on the heads of political rivals, compromised in the former proceedings.

This important act of demolition was farther made subservient to a work of new construction, not less significant of the spirit in which Timoleon had determined to proceed. Having cleared away the obnoxious fortress, he erected upon the same site, and probably with the same materials, courts for future judicature. The most striking

symbol and instrument of popular government thus met the eye as a local substitute for that of the past despotism.

Deep was the gratitude of the Syracusans for these proceedings—the first fruits of Timoleon's established ascendency. And if we regard the intrinsic importance of the act itself—the manner in which an emphatic meaning was made to tell as well upon the Syracusan eye as upon the Syracusan mind—the proof evinced not merely of disinterested patriotism, but also of prudence in estimating the necessities of the actual situation—lastly, the foundation thus laid for accomplishing farther good—if we take all these matters together, we shall feel that Timoleon's demolition of the Dionysian Bastile, and erection in its place of a building for the administration of justice, was among the most impressive phenomena in Grecian history.

The work which remained to be done was indeed such as to require the best spirit, energy and discretion, both on his part and on that of the Syracusans. Through long oppression and suffering, the city was so impoverished and desolate, that the market-place (if we were to believe what must be an exaggeration of Plutarch) served as pasture for horses, and as a place of soft repose for the grooms who attended them. Other cities of Sicily exhibited the like evidence of decay, desertion, and poverty. The manifestations of city life had almost ceased in Sicily. Men were afraid to come into the city, which they left to the despot and his mercenaries, retiring themselves to live on their fields and farms, and shrinking from all acts of citizenship. Even the fields were but half cultivated, so as to produce nothing beyond bare subsistence. It was the first anxiety of Timoleon to revive the once haughty spirit of Syracuse out of this depth of insecurity and abasement; to which revival no act could be more conducive than his first proceedings in Ortygia. His next step was to bring together, by invitations and proclamations everywhere circulated, those exiles who had been expelled, or forced to seek refuge elsewhere, during the recent oppression. Many of these, who had found shelter in various parts of Sicily and Italy, obeyed his summons with glad readiness.[350] But there were others, who had fled to Greece or the Ægean islands, and were out of the hearing of any proclamations from Timoleon. To reach persons thus remote, recourse was had, by him and by the Syracusans conjointly, to Corinthian intervention. The Syracusans felt so keenly how much was required to be done for the secure reorganization of their city as a free community, that they eagerly concurred with Timoleon in entreating the Corinthians to undertake, a second time, the honorable task of founders of Syracuse.[351]

Two esteemed citizens, Kephalus and Dionysius, were sent from Corinth to coöperate with Timoleon and the Syracusans, in constituting the community anew, on a free and popular basis, and in preparing an amended legislation.[352] These commissioners adopted, for their main text and theme, the democratical constitution and laws as established by Dioklês about seventy years before, which the usurpation of Dionysius had subverted when they were not more than seven years old. Kephalus professed to do nothing more than revive the laws of Dioklês, with such comments,

modifications, and adaptations, as the change of times and circumstances had rendered necessary.[353] In the laws respecting inheritance and property, he is said to have made no change at all; but unfortunately we are left without any information what were the laws of Dioklês, or how they were now modified. It is certain, however, that the political constitution of Dioklês was a democracy, and that the constitution as now reëstablished was democratical also.[354] Beyond this general fact we can assert nothing.

Though a free popular constitution, however, was absolutely indispensable, and a good constitution a great boon—it was not the only pressing necessity for Syracuse. There was required, no less an importation of new citizens; and not merely of poor men bringing with them their arms and their industry, but also of persons in affluent or easy circumstances, competent to purchase lands and houses. Besides much land ruined or gone out of cultivation, the general poverty of the residents was extreme; while at the same time the public exigencies were considerable, since it was essential, among other things, to provide pay for those very soldiers of Timoleon to whom they owed their liberation. The extent of poverty was painfully attested by the fact that they were constrained to sell those public statues which formed the ornaments of Syracuse and its temples; a cruel wound to the sentiments of every Grecian community. From this compulsory auction, however, they excepted by special vote the statue of Gelon, in testimony of gratitude for his capital victory at Himera over the Carthaginians.[355]

For the renovation of a community thus destitute, new funds as well as new men were wanted; and the Corinthians exerted themselves actively to procure both. Their first proclamation was indeed addressed specially to Syracusan exiles, whom they invited to resume their residence at Syracuse as free and autonomous citizens under a just allotment of lands. They caused such proclamation to be publicly made at all the Pan-hellenic and local festivals; prefaced by a certified assurance that the Corinthians had already overthrown both the despotism and the despot—a fact which the notorious presence of Dionysius himself at Corinth contributed to spread more widely than any formal announcement. They farther engaged, if the exiles would muster at Corinth, to provide transports, convoy, and leaders, to Syracuse, free of all cost. The number of exiles, who profited by the invitation and came to Corinth, though not inconsiderable, was still hardly strong enough to enter upon the proposed Sicilian renovation. They themselves therefore entreated the Corinthians to invite additional colonists from other Grecian cities. It was usually not difficult to find persons disposed to embark in a new settlement, if founded under promising circumstances, and effected under the positive management of a powerful presiding city.[356] There were many opulent persons anxious to exchange the condition of metics in an old city for that of full citizens in a new one. Hence the more general proclamation now issued by the Corinthians attracted numerous applicants, and a large force of

colonists was presently assembled at Corinth; an aggregate of ten thousand persons, including the Syracusan exiles.[357]

When conveyed to Syracuse, by the fleet and under the formal sanction of the Corinthian government, these colonists found a still larger number there assembled, partly Syracusan exiles, yet principally emigrants from the different cities of Sicily and Italy. The Italian Greeks, at this time hard pressed by the constantly augmenting force of the Lucanians and Bruttians, were becoming so unable to defend themselves without foreign aid, that several were probably disposed to seek other homes. The invitation of Timoleon counted even more than that of the Corinthians as an allurement to new comers—from the unbounded admiration and confidence which he now inspired; more especially as he was actually present at Syracuse. Accordingly, the total of immigrants from all quarters (restored exiles as well as others) to Syracuse in its renovated freedom was not less than sixty thousand.[358]

Nothing can be more mortifying than to find ourselves without information as to the manner in which Timoleon and Kephalus dealt with this large influx. Such a state of things, as it produces many new embarrassments and conflicting interests, so it calls for a degree of resource and original judgment which furnishes good measure of the capacity of all persons concerned, rendering the juncture particularly interesting and instructive. Unfortunately we are not permitted to know the details. The land of Syracuse is said to have been distributed, and the houses to have been sold for one thousand talents—the large sum of 230,000*l*. A right of preëmption was allowed to the Syracusan exiles for repurchasing the houses formerly their own. As the houses were sold, and that too for a considerable price—so we may presume that the lands were sold also, and that the incoming settlers did not receive their lots gratuitously. But how they were sold, or how much of the territory was sold, we are left in ignorance. It is certain, however, that the effect of the new immigration was not only to renew the force and population of Syracuse, but also to furnish relief to the extreme poverty of the antecedent residents. A great deal of new money must thus have been brought in.[359]

Such important changes doubtless occupied a considerable time, though we are not enabled to arrange them in months or years. In the meantime Timoleon continued to act in such a manner as to retain, and even to strengthen, the confidence and attachment of the Syracusans. He employed his forces actively in putting down and expelling the remaining despots throughout the island. He first attacked Hiketas, his old enemy, at Leontini; and compelled him to capitulate, on condition of demolishing the fortified citadel, abdicating his rule, and living as a private citizen in the town. Leptines, despot of Apollonia and of several other neighboring townships, was also constrained to submit, and to embrace the offer of a transport to Corinth.[360]

It appears that the submission of Hiketas was merely a feint, to obtain time for strengthening himself by urging the Carthaginians to try another invasion of Sicily.

[361] They were the more disposed to this step as Timoleon, anxious to relieve the Syracusans, sent his soldiers under the Corinthian Deinarchus to find pay and plunder for themselves in the Carthaginian possessions near the western corner of Sicily. This invasion, while it abundantly supplied the wants of the soldiers, encouraged Entella and several other towns to revolt from Carthage. The indignation among the Carthaginians had been violent, when Magon returned after suddenly abandoning the harbor of Syracuse to Timoleon. Unable to make his defence satisfactory, Magon only escaped a worse death by suicide, after which his dead body was crucified by public order. And the Carthaginians now resolved on a fresh effort, to repair their honor as well as to defend their territory.[362]

The effort was made on a vast scale, and with long previous preparations. An army said to consist of seventy thousand men, under Hasdrubal and Hamilkar, was disembarked at Lilybæum, on the western corner of the island; besides which there was a fleet of two hundred triremes, and one thousand attendant vessels carrying provisions, warlike stores, engines for sieges, war-chariots with four horses, etc.[363] But the most conspicuous proof of earnest effort, over and above numbers and expense, was furnished by the presence of no less than ten thousand native infantry from Carthage; men clothed with panoplies costly, complete, and far heavier than ordinary—carrying white shields and wearing elaborate breastplates besides. These men brought to the campaign ample private baggage; splendid goblets and other articles of gold and silver, such as beseemed the rich families of that rich city. The *élite* of the division—twenty-five hundred in number, or one-fourth part—formed what was called the Sacred Band of Carthage.[364] It has been already stated, that in general, the Carthaginians caused their military service to be performed by hired foreigners, with few of their own citizens. Hence this army stood particularly distinguished, and appeared the more formidable on their landing; carrying panic, by the mere report, all over Sicily not excepting even Syracuse. The Corinthian troops ravaging the Carthaginian province were obliged to retreat in haste, and sent to Timoleon for reinforcement.

The miscellaneous body of immigrants recently domiciliated at Syracuse, employed in the cares inseparable from new settlement, had not come prepared to face so terrible a foe. Though Timoleon used every effort to stimulate their courage, and though his exhortations met with full apparent response, yet such was the panic prevailing, that comparatively few would follow him to the field. He could assemble no greater total than twelve thousand men; including about three thousand Syracusan citizens—the paid force which he had round him at Syracuse—that other paid force under Deinarchus, who had been just compelled by the invaders to evacuate the Carthaginian province—and finally such allies as would join.[365] His cavalry was about one thousand in number. Nevertheless, in spite of so great an inferiority, Timoleon determined to advance and meet the enemy in their own province, before they should have carried ravage over the territory of Syracuse and her allies. But when he

approached near to the border, within the territory of Agrigentum, the alarm and mistrust of his army threatened to arrest his farther progress. An officer among his mercenaries, named Thrasius, took advantage of the prevailing feeling to raise a mutiny against him, persuading the soldiers that Timoleon was madly hurrying them on to certain ruin, against an enemy six times superior in number, and in a hostile country eight days' march from Syracuse; so that there would be neither salvation for them in case of reverse, nor interment if they were slain. Their pay being considerably in arrear Thrasius urged them to return to Syracuse for the purpose of extorting the money, instead of following a commander, who could not or would not requite them, upon such desperate service. Such was the success and plausibility of these recommendations, under the actual discouragement, that they could hardly be counterworked by all the efforts of Timoleon. Nor was there ever any conjuncture in which his influence, derived as well from unbounded personal esteem as from belief in his favor with the gods, was so near failing. As it was, though he succeeded in heartening up and retaining the large body of his army, yet Thrasius, with one thousand of the mercenaries, insisted upon returning, and actually did return, to Syracuse. Moreover Timoleon was obliged to send an order along with them to the authorities at home, that these men must immediately, and at all cost, receive their arrears of pay. The wonder is, that he succeeded in his efforts to retain the rest, after insuring to the mutineers a lot which seemed so much safer and more enviable. Thrasius, a brave man, having engaged in the service of the Phokians Philomêlus and Onomarchus, had been concerned in the pillage of the Delphian temple, which drew upon him the aversion of the Grecian world.[366] How many of the one thousand seceding soldiers, who now followed him to Syracuse, had been partners in the same sacrilegious act, we cannot tell. But it is certain that they were men who had taken service with Timoleon in hopes of a period, not merely of fighting, but also of lucrative license, such as his generous regard for the settled inhabitants would not permit.

Having succeeded in keeping up the spirits of his remaining army, and affecting to treat the departure of so many cowards as a positive advantage, Timoleon marched on westward into the Carthaginian province, until he approached within a short distance of the river Krimêsus, a stream which rises in the mountainous region south of Panormus (Palermo), runs nearly southward, and falls into the sea near Selinus. Some mules, carrying loads of parsley, met him on the road; a fact which called forth again the half-suppressed alarm of the soldiers, since parsley was habitually employed for the wreaths deposited on tombstones. But Timoleon, taking a handful of it and weaving a wreath for his own head, exclaimed, "This is our Corinthian symbol of victory: it is the sacred herb with which we decorate our victors at the Isthmian festival. It comes to us here spontaneously, as an earnest of our approaching success." Insisting emphatically on this theme, and crowning himself as well as his officers with the parsley, he rekindled the spirits of the army, and conducted them forward to the top of the eminence, immediately above the course of the Krimêsus. [367]

It was just at that moment that the Carthaginian army were passing the river, on their march to meet him. The confused noise and clatter of their approach were plainly heard; though the mist of a May morning,[368] overhanging the valley, still concealed from the eye the army crossing. Presently the mist ascended from the lower ground to the hill tops around, leaving the river and the Carthaginians beneath in conspicuous view. Formidable was the aspect which they presented. The war-chariots-and-four,[369] which formed their front, had already crossed the river, and appear to have been halting a little way in advance. Next to them followed the native Carthaginians, ten thousand chosen hoplites with white shields, who had also in part crossed and were still crossing; while the main body of the host, the foreign mercenaries, were pressing behind in a disorderly mass to get to the bank, which appears to have been in part rugged. Seeing how favorable was the moment for attacking them, while thus disarrayed and bisected by the river, Timoleon, after a short exhortation, gave orders immediately to charge down the hill.[370] His Sicilian allies, with some mercenaries intermingled, were on the two wings; while he himself, with the Syracusans and the best of the mercenaries, occupied the centre. Demaretus with his cavalry was ordered to assail the Carthaginians first, before they could form regularly. But the chariots in their front, protecting the greater part of the line, left him only the power of getting at them partially through the vacant intervals. Timoleon, soon perceiving that his cavalry accomplished little, recalled them and ordered them to charge on the flanks, while he himself, with all the force of his infantry, undertook to attack in front. Accordingly, seizing his shield from the attendant, he marched forward in advance, calling aloud to the infantry around to be of good cheer and follow. Never had his voice been heard so predominant and heart-stirring; the effect of it was powerfully felt on the spirits of all around, who even believed that they heard a god speaking along with him.[371] Reëchoing his shout emphatically, they marched forward to the charge with the utmost alacrity—in compact order, and under the sound of trumpets.

The infantry were probably able to evade or break through the bulwark of interposed chariots with greater ease than the cavalry, though Plutarch does not tell us how this was done. Timoleon and his soldiers then came into close and furious contest with the chosen Carthaginian infantry, who resisted with a courage worthy of their reputation. Their vast shields, iron breastplates, and brazen helmets (forming altogether armor heavier than was worn usually even by Grecian hoplites), enabled them to repel the spear-thrusts of the Grecian assailants, who were compelled to take to their swords, and thus to procure themselves admission within the line of Carthaginian spears, so as to break their ranks. Such use of swords is what we rarely read of in a Grecian battle. Though the contest was bravely maintained by the Carthaginians, yet they were too much loaded with armor to admit of anything but fighting in a dense mass. They were already losing their front rank warriors, the picked men of the whole, and beginning to fight at a disadvantage—when the gods, yet farther befriending Timoleon, set the seal to their discomfiture by an intervention

manifest and terrific.[372] A storm of the most violent character began. The hill-tops were shrouded in complete darkness; the wind blew a hurricane; rain and hail poured abundantly, with all the awful accompaniments of thunder and lightning. To the Greeks, this storm was of little inconvenience, because it came in their backs. But to the Carthaginians, pelting as it did directly in their faces, it occasioned both great suffering, and soul-subduing alarm. The rain and hail beat, and the lightning flashed, in their faces, so that they could not see to deal with hostile combatants: the noise of the wind, and of hail rattling against their armor, prevented the orders of their officers from being heard: the folds of their voluminous military tunics were surcharged with rain-water, so as to embarrass their movements: the ground presently became so muddy that they could not keep their footing; and when they once slipped, the weight of their equipment forbade all recovery. The Greeks, comparatively free from inconvenience, and encouraged by the evident disablement of their enemies, pressed them with redoubled energy. At length, when the four hundred front rank men of the Carthaginians had perished by a brave death in their places, the rest of the White-shields turned their backs and sought relief in flight. But flight, too, was all but impossible. They encountered their own troops in the rear advancing up, and trying to cross the Krimêsus; which river itself was becoming every minute fuller and more turbid, through the violent rain. The attempt to recross was one of such unspeakable confusion, that numbers perished in the torrent. Dispersing in total rout, the whole Carthaginian army thought only of escape, leaving their camp and baggage a prey to the victors, who pursued them across the river and over the hills on the other side, inflicting prodigious slaughter. In this pursuit the cavalry of Timoleon, not very effective during the battle, rendered excellent service; pressing the fugitive Carthaginians one over another in mass, and driving them, overloaded with their armor, into mud and water, from whence they could not get clear.[373]

No victory in Grecian history was ever more complete than that of Timoleon at the Krimêsus. Ten thousand Carthaginians are said to have been slain, and fifteen thousand made prisoners. Upon these numbers no stress is to be laid; but it is certain that the total of both must have been very great. Of the war-chariots, many were broken during the action, and all that remained, two hundred in number, fell into the hands of the victors. But that which rendered the loss most serious, and most painfully felt at Carthage, was, that it fell chiefly upon the native Carthaginian troops, and much less upon the foreign mercenaries. It is even said that the Sacred Battalion of Carthage, comprising twenty-five hundred soldiers belonging to the most considerable families in Carthage, were all slain to a man; a statement, doubtless, exaggerated, yet implying a fearful real destruction. Many of these soldiers purchased safe escape by throwing away their ornamented shields and costly breastplates, which the victors picked up in great numbers—one thousand breastplates, and not less than ten thousand shields. Altogether, the spoil collected was immense—in arms, in baggage, and in gold and silver from the plundered camp; occupying the Greeks so long in the work of pursuit and capture, that they did not find time to

erect their trophy until the third day after the battle. Timoleon left the chief part of the plunder,[374] as well as most part of the prisoners, in the hands of the individual captors, who enriched themselves amply by the day's work. Yet there still remained a large total for the public Syracusan chest; five thousand prisoners, and a miscellaneous spoil of armor and precious articles, piled up in imposing magnificence around the general's tent.

The Carthaginian fugitives did not rest until they reached Lilybæum. And even there, such was their discouragement—so profound their conviction that the wrath of the gods was upon them—that they could scarcely be induced to go on shipboard for the purpose of returning to Carthage; persuaded as they were that if once caught out at sea, the gods in their present displeasure would never let them reach land. [375] At Carthage itself also, the sorrow and depression was unparalleled: sorrow private as well as public, from the loss of so great a number of principal citizens. It was even feared that the victorious Timoleon would instantly cross the sea and attack Carthage on her own soil. Immediate efforts were however made to furnish a fresh army for Sicily, composed of foreign mercenaries with few or no native citizens. Giskon, the son of Hanno, who passed for their most energetic citizen, was recalled from exile, and directed to get together this new armament.

The subduing impression of the wrath of the gods, under which the Carthaginians labored, arose from the fact that their defeat had been owing not less to the terrific storm, than to the arms of Timoleon. Conversely, in regard to Timoleon himself, the very same fact produced an impression of awe-striking wonder and envy. If there were any sceptics who doubted before either the reality of special interventions by the gods, or the marked kindness which determined the gods to send such interventions to the service of Timoleon—the victory of the Krimêsus must have convinced them. The storm alike violent and opportune, coming at the back of the Greeks and in the faces of the Carthaginians, was a manifestation of divine favor scarcely less conspicuous than those vouchsafed to Diomedes or Æneas in the Iliad.[376] And the sentiment thus raised towards Timoleon—or, rather previously raised, and now yet farther confirmed—became blended with that genuine admiration which he had richly earned by his rapid and well-conducted movements, as well as by a force of character striking enough to uphold, under the most critical circumstances, the courage of a desponding army. His victory at the Krimêsus, like his victory at Adranum, was gained mainly by that extreme speed in advance, which brought him upon an unprepared enemy at a vulnerable moment. And the news of it which he despatched at once to Corinth,—accompanied with a cargo of showy Carthaginian shields to decorate the Corinthian temples,—diffused throughout Central Greece both joy for the event and increased honor to his name, commemorated by the inscription attached —"The Corinthians and the general Timoleon, after liberating the Sicilian Greeks from the Carthaginians, have dedicated these shields as offerings of gratitude to the gods."[377]

Leaving most of his paid troops to carry on war in the Carthaginian province, Timoleon conducted his Syracusans home. His first proceeding was, at once to dismiss Thrasius with the one thousand paid soldiers who had deserted him before the battle. He commanded them to quit Sicily, allowing them only twenty-four hours to depart from Syracuse itself. Probably under the circumstances, they were not less anxious to go away than he was to dismiss them. But they went away only to destruction; for having crossed the Strait of Messina and taken possession of a maritime site in Italy on the Southern sea, the Bruttians of the inland entrapped them by professions of simulated friendship, and slew them all.[378]

Timoleon had now to deal with two Grecian enemies—Hiketas and Mamerkus—the despots of Leontini and Katana. By the extraordinary rapidity of his movements, he had crushed the great invading host of Carthage, before it came into coöperation with these two allies. Both now wrote in terror to Carthage, soliciting a new armament, as indispensable for their security not less than for the Carthaginian interest in the island; Timoleon being the common enemy of both. Presently Giskon son of Hanno, having been recalled on purpose out of banishment, arrived from Carthage with a considerable force—seventy triremes, and a body of Grecian mercenaries. It was rare for the Carthaginians to employ Grecian mercenaries; but the battle of Krimêsus is said to have persuaded them that there were no soldiers to be compared to Greeks. The force of Giskon was apparently distributed partly in the Carthaginian province at the western angle of the island—partly in the neighborhood of Mylæ and Messênê on the north-east, where Mamerkus joined him with the troops of Katana. Messênê appears to have recently fallen under the power of a despot named Hippon, who acted as their ally. To both points Timoleon despatched a portion of his mercenary force, without going himself in command; on both, his troops at first experienced partial defeats; two divisions of them, one comprising four hundred men, being cut to pieces. But such partial reverses were, in the religious appreciation of the time, proofs more conspicuous than ever of the peculiar favor shown by the gods towards Timoleon. For the soldiers thus slain had been concerned in the pillage of the Delphian temple, and were therefore marked out for the divine wrath; but the gods suspended the sentence during the time when the soldiers were serving under Timoleon in person, in order that he might not be the sufferer; and executed it now in his absence, when execution would occasion the least possible inconvenience to him. [379]

Mamerkus and Hiketas, however, not adopting this interpretation of their recent successes against Timoleon, were full of hope and confidence. The former dedicated the shields of the slain mercenaries to the gods, with an inscription of insolent triumph: the latter—taking advantage of the absence of Timoleon, who had made an expedition against a place not far off called Kalauria—undertook an inroad into the Syracusan territory. Not content with inflicting great damage and carrying off an ample booty, Hiketas, in returning home, insulted Timoleon and the small force along

with him by passing immediately under the walls of Kalauria. Suffering him to pass by, Timoleon pursued, though his force consisted only of cavalry and light troops, with few or no hoplites. He found Hiketas posted on the farther side of the Damurias; a river with rugged banks and a ford of considerable difficulty. Yet notwithstanding this good defensive position, the troops of Timoleon were so impatient to attack, and each of his cavalry officers was so anxious to be first in the charge, that he was obliged to decide the priority by lot. The attack was then valiantly made, and the troops of Hiketas completely defeated. One thousand of them were slain in the action, while the remainder only escaped by flight and throwing away of their shields.[380]

It was now the turn of Timoleon to attack Hiketas in his own domain of Leontini. Here his usual good fortune followed him. The soldiers in garrison—either discontented with the behavior of Hiketas at the battle of the Damurias, or awe-struck with that divine favor which waited on Timoleon—mutinied and surrendered the place into his hands; and not merely the place, but also Hiketas himself in chains, with his son Eupolemus, and his general Euthymus, a man of singular bravery as well as a victorious athlete at the games. All three were put to death; Hiketas and his son as despots and traitors; and Euthymus, chiefly in consequence of insulting sarcasms against the Corinthians, publicly uttered at Leontini. The wife and daughters of Hiketas were conveyed as prisoners to Syracuse, where they were condemned to death by public vote of the Syracusan assembly. This vote was passed in express revenge for the previous crime of Hiketas, in putting to death the widow, sister, and son, of Dion. Though Timoleon might probably have saved the unfortunate women by a strong exertion of influence, he did not interfere. The general feeling of the people accounted this cruel, but special, retaliation right under the circumstances; and Timoleon, as he could not have convinced them of the contrary, so he did not think it right to urge them to put their feeling aside as a simple satisfaction to him. Yet the act leaves a deserved stain upon a reputation such as his.[381] The women were treated on both sides as adjective beings, through whose lives revenge was to be taken against a political enemy.

Next came the turn of Mamerkus, who had assembled near Katana a considerable force, strengthened by a body of Carthaginian allies under Giskon. He was attacked and defeated by Timoleon near the river Abolus, with a loss of two thousand men, many of them belonging to the Carthaginian division. We know nothing but the simple fact of this battle; which probably made serious impression upon the Carthaginians, since they speedily afterwards sent earnest propositions for peace, deserting their Sicilian allies. Peace was accordingly concluded; on terms however which left the Carthaginian dominion in Sicily much the same as it had been at the end of the reign of the elder Dionysius, as well as at the landing of Dion in Sicily.[382] The line of separation was fixed at the river Halykus, or Lykus, which flows into the southern sea near Herakleia Minoa, and formed the western boundary of the territory of Agrigen-

tum. All westward of the Halykus was recognized as Carthaginian: but it was stipulated that if any Greeks within that territory desired to emigrate and become inmates of Syracuse, they should be allowed freely to come with their families and their property. It was farther covenanted that all the territory eastward of the Halykus should be considered not only as Greek, but as free Greek, distributed among so many free cities, and exempt from despots. And the Carthaginians formally covenanted that they would neither aid, nor adopt as ally, any Grecian despot in Sicily.[383] In the first treaty concluded by the elder Dionysius with the Carthaginians, it had been stipulated by an express article that the Syracusans should be subject to him.[384] Here is one of the many contrasts between Dionysius and Timoleon.

Having thus relieved himself from his most formidable enemy, Timoleon put a speedy end to the war in other parts of the island. Mamerkus in fact despaired of farther defence without foreign aid. He crossed over with a squadron into Italy to ask for the introduction of a Lucanian army into Sicily;[385] which he might perhaps have obtained, since that warlike nation were now very powerful—had not his own seamen abandoned him, and carried back their vessels to Katana, surrendering both the city and themselves to Timoleon. The same thing, and even more, had been done a little before by the troops of Hiketas at Leontini, who had even delivered up Hiketas himself as prisoner; so powerful, seemingly, was the ascendency exercised by the name of Timoleon, with the prestige of his perpetual success. Mamerkus could now find no refuge except at Messênê, where he was welcomed by the despot Hippon. But Timoleon speedily came thither with a force ample enough to besiege Messênê by land and by sea. After a certain length of resistance,[386] the town was surrendered to him, while Hippon tried to make his escape secretly on shipboard. But he was captured and brought back into the midst of the Messenian population, who, under a sentiment of bitter hatred and vengeance, planted him in the midst of the crowded theatre and there put him to death with insult, summoning all the boys from school into the theatre to witness what was considered an elevating scene. Mamerkus, without attempting to escape, surrendered himself prisoner to Timoleon; only stipulating that his fate should be determined by the Syracusan assembly after a fair hearing, but that Timoleon himself should say nothing to his disfavor. He was accordingly brought to Syracuse, and placed on his trial before the assembled people, whom he addressed in an elaborate discourse; probably skilfully composed, since he is said to have possessed considerable talent as a poet.[387] But no eloquence could surmount the rooted aversion entertained by the Syracusans for his person and character. Being heard with murmurs, and seeing that he had no chance of obtaining a favorable verdict, he suddenly threw aside his garment and rushed with violent despair against one of the stone seats, head foremost, in hopes of giving himself a fatal blow. But not succeeding in this attempted suicide, he was led out of the theatre and executed like a robber.[388]

Timoleon had now nearly accomplished his confirmed purpose of extirpating every despotism in Sicily. There remained yet Nikodemus as despot at Kentoripa, and Apolloniades at Agyrium. Both of these he speedily dethroned or expelled, restoring the two cities to the condition of free communities. He also expelled from the town of Ætna those Campanian mercenaries who had been planted there by the elder Dionysius.[389] In this way did he proceed until there remained only free communities, without a single despot, in the Grecian portion of Sicily.

Of the details of his proceedings our scanty information permits us to say but little. But the great purpose with which he had started from Corinth was now achieved. After having put down all the other despotisms in Sicily, there remained for him but one farther triumph—the noblest and rarest of all—to lay down his own. This he performed without any delay, immediately on returning to Syracuse from his military proceedings. Congratulating the Syracusans on the triumphant consummation already attained, he entreated them to dispense with his farther services as sole commander; the rather as his eyesight was now failing.[390] It is probable enough that this demand was at first refused, and that he was warmly requested to retain his functions; but if such was the fact, he did not the less persist, and the people, willing or not, acceded. We ought farther to note, that not only did he resign his generalship, but he resigned it at once and immediately, after the complete execution of his proclaimed purpose, to emancipate the Sicilian Greeks from foreign enemies as well as from despot-enemies; just as, on first acquiring possession of Syracuse, he had begun his authoritative career, without a moment's delay, by ordering the demolition of the Dionysian stronghold, and the construction of a court of justice in its place.[391] By this instantaneous proceeding he forestalled the growth of that suspicion which delay would assuredly have raised, and for which the free communities of Greece had in general such ample reason. And it is not the least of his many merits, that while conscious of good intentions himself, he had also the good sense to see that others could not look into his bosom; that all their presumptions, except what were created by his own conduct, would be derived from men worse than him—and therefore unfavorable. Hence it was necessary for him to be prompt and forward, even to a sort of ostentation, in exhibiting the amplest positive proof of his real purposes, so as to stifle beforehand the growth of suspicion.

He was now a private citizen of Syracuse, having neither paid soldiers under his command nor any other public function. As a reward for his splendid services, the Syracusans voted to him a house in the city, and a landed property among the best in the neighborhood. Here he fixed his residence, sending for his wife and family to Corinth.[392]

Yet though Timoleon had renounced every species of official authority, and all means of constraint, his influence as an adviser over the judgment, feelings and actions, not only of Syracusans, but of Sicilians generally, was as great as ever; perhaps greater—because the fact of his spontaneous resignation gave him one title

more to confidence. Rarely is it allowed to mortal man, to establish so transcendent a claim to confidence and esteem as Timoleon now presented; upon so many different grounds, and with so little of alloy or abatement. To possess a counsellor whom every one reverenced, without suspicions or fears of any kind—who had not only given conspicuous proofs of uncommon energy combined with skilful management, but enjoyed besides, in a peculiar degree, the favor of the gods—was a benefit unspeakably precious to the Sicilians at this juncture. For it was now the time when not merely Syracuse, but other cities of Sicily also, were aiming to strengthen their reconstituted free communities by a fresh supply of citizens from abroad. During the sixty years which had elapsed since the first formidable invasion wherein the Carthaginian Hannibal had conquered Selinus, there had been a series of causes all tending to cripple and diminish, and none to renovate, the Grecian population of Sicily. The Carthaginian attacks, the successful despotism of the first Dionysius, and the disturbed reign of the second,—all contributed to the same result. About the year 352-351 B. C., Plato (as has been already mentioned) expresses his fear of an extinction of Hellenism in Sicily giving place before Phenician or Campanian force.[393] And what was a sad possibility, even in 352-351 B. C.—had become nearer to a probability in 344 B. C., before Timoleon landed, in the then miserable condition of the island.

His unparalleled success and matchless personal behavior combined with the active countenance of Corinth without—had completely turned the tide. In the belief of all Greeks, Sicily was now a land restored to Hellenism and freedom, but requiring new colonists as well to partake, as to guard, these capital privileges. The example of colonization, under the auspices of Corinth, had been set at Syracuse, and was speedily followed elsewhere, especially at Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina. All these three cities had suffered cruelly during those formidable Carthaginian invasions which immediately preceded the despotism of Dionysius at Syracuse. They had had no opportunity, during the continuance of the Dionysian dynasty, even to make up what they had then lost; far less to acquire accessions from without. At the same time, all three (especially Agrigentum) recollected their former scale of opulence and power, as it had stood prior to 407 B. C. It was with eagerness therefore that they availed themselves of the new life and security imparted to Sicily by the career of Timoleon to replenish their exhausted numbers; by recalling those whom former suffering had driven away, and by inviting fresh colonists besides. Megellus and Pheristus, citizens of Elea on the southern coast of Italy (which was probably at this time distressed by the pressure of Lucanians from the interior), conducted a colony to Agrigentum: Gorgus, from Keos, went with another band to Gela: in both cases, a proportion of expatriated citizens returned among them. Kamarina, too, and Agyrium received large accessions of inhabitants. The inhabitants of Leontini are said to have removed their habitations to Syracuse; a statement difficult to understand, and probably only partially true, as the city and its name still continued to exist.[394]

Unfortunately the proceedings of Timoleon come before us (through Diodorus and Plutarch) in a manner so vague and confused, that we can rarely trace the sequence or assign the date of particular facts.[395] But about the general circumstances, with their character and bearing, there is no room either for mistake or doubt. That which rhetors and sophists like Lysias had preached in their panegyrical harangues[396]—that for which Plato sighed, in the epistles of his old age—commending it, after Dion's death, to the surviving partisans of Dion, as having been the unexecuted purpose of their departed leader—the renewal of freedom and Hellenism throughout the island—was now made a reality under the auspices of Timoleon. The houses, the temples, the walls, were rescued from decay; the lands from comparative barrenness. For it was not merely his personal reputation and achievements which constituted the main allurement to new colonists, but also his superintending advice which regulated their destination when they arrived. Without the least power of constraint, or even official dignity, he was consulted as a sort of general Œkist or Patron-Founder, by the affectionate regard of the settlers in every part of Sicily. The distribution or sale of lands, the modification required in existing laws and customs, the new political constitutions, etc., were all submitted to his review. No settlement gave satisfaction, except such as he had pronounced or approved; none which he had approved was contested.[397]

In the situation in which Sicily was now placed, it is clear that numberless matters of doubt and difficulty would inevitably arise; that the claims and interests of pre-existing residents, returning exiles and new immigrants, would often be conflicting; that the rites and customs of different fractions composing the new whole, might have to be modified for the sake of mutual harmony; that the settlers, coming from oligarchies as well as democracies might bring with them different ideas as to the proper features of a political constitution; that the apportionment or sale of lands, and the adjustment of old debts, presented but too many chances of angry dispute; that there were, in fact, a thousand novelties in the situation, which could not be determined either by precedent, or by any peremptory rule, but must be left to the equity of a supreme arbitrator. Here then the advantages were unspeakable of having a man like Timoleon to appeal to; a man not only really without sinister bias, but recognized by every one as being so; a man whom every one loved, trusted, and was grieved to offend; a man who sought not to impose his own will upon free communities, but addressed them as freemen, building only upon their reason and sentiments, and carrying out in all his recommendations of detail those instincts of free speech, universal vote, and equal laws, which formed the germ of political obligation in the minds of Greeks generally. It would have been gratifying to know how Timoleon settled the many new and difficult questions which must have been submitted to him as referee. There is no situation in human society so valuable to study, as that in which routine is of necessity broken through, and the constructive faculties called into active exertion. Nor was there ever perhaps throughout Grecian history, a simultaneous colonization, and simultaneous recasting of political institutions, more exten-

sive than that which now took place in Sicily. Unfortunately we are permitted to know only the general fact, without either the charm or the instruction which would have been presented by the details. Timoleon was, in Sicily, that which Epaminondas had been at the foundation of Messênê and Megalopolis, though with far greater power: and we have to deplore the like ignorance respecting the detail proceedings of both these great men.

But though the sphere of Timoleon's activity was coextensive with Sicily, his residence, his citizenship, and his peculiar interests and duties were at Syracuse. That city, like most of the other Sicilian towns, had been born anew, with a numerous body of settlers and altered political institutions. I have already mentioned that Kephalus and others, invited from Corinth by express vote of the Syracusans, had reëstablished the democratical institution of Dioklês, with suitable modifications. The new era of liberty was marked by the establishment of a new sacred office, that of Amphipolus or Attendant Priest of Zeus Olympius; an office changed annually, appointed by lot (doubtless under some conditions of qualification which are not made known to us,[398]) and intended, like the Archon Eponymus at Athens, as the recognized name to distinguish each Syracusan year. In this work of constitutional reform, as well as in all the labors and adjustments connected with the new settlers, Timoleon took a prominent part. But so soon as the new constitution was consummated and set at work, he declined undertaking any specific duties or exercising any powers under it. Enjoying the highest measure of public esteem, and loaded with honorary and grateful votes from the people, he had the wisdom as well as the virtue to prefer living as a private citizen; a resolution doubtless promoted by his increasing failure of eyesight, which presently became total blindness.[399] He dwelt in the house assigned to him by public vote of the people, which he had consecrated to the Holy God, and within which he had set apart a chapel to the goddess Automatia,—the goddess under whose auspices blessings and glory came as it were of themselves. [400] To this goddess he offered sacrifice, as the great and constant patroness who had accompanied him from Corinth through all his proceedings in Sicily.

By refusing the official prominence tendered to him, and by keeping away from the details of public life, Timoleon escaped the jealousy sure to attend upon influence so prodigious as his. But in truth, for all great and important matters, this very modesty increased instead of diminishing his real ascendency. Here as elsewhere, the goddess Automatia worked for him, and brought to him docile listeners without his own seeking. Though the Syracusans transacted their ordinary business through others, yet when any matter of serious difficulty occurred, the presence of Timoleon was specially invoked in the discussion. During the later months of his life, when he had become blind, his arrival in the assembly was a solemn scene. Having been brought in his car drawn by mules across the market-place to the door of the theatre wherein the assembly was held, attendants then led or drew the car into the theatre amidst the assembled people, who testified their affection by the warmest shouts

and congratulations. As soon as he had returned their welcome, and silence was restored, the discussion to which he had been invited took place, Timoleon sitting on his car and listening. Having heard the matter thus debated, he delivered his own opinion, which was usually ratified at once by the show of hands of the assembly. He then took leave of the people and retired, the attendants again leading the car out of the theatre, and the same cheers of attachment accompanying his departure; while the assembly proceeded with its other and more ordinary business.[401]

Such is the impressive and picturesque description given (doubtless by Athanis or some other eye-witness[402]) of the relations between the Syracusan people and the blind Timoleon, after his power had been abdicated, and when there remained to him nothing except his character and moral ascendency. It is easy to see that the solemnities of interposition, here recounted, must have been reserved for those cases in which the assembly had been disturbed by some unusual violence or collision of parties. For such critical junctures, where numbers were perhaps nearly balanced, and where the disappointment of an angry minority threatened to beget some permanent feud, the benefit was inestimable, of an umpire whom both parties revered, and before whom neither thought it a dishonor to yield. Keeping aloof from the details and embarrassments of daily political life, and preserving himself (like the Salaminian trireme, to use a phrase which Plutarch applies to Perikles at Athens) for occasions at once momentous and difficult, Timoleon filled up a gap occasionally dangerous to all free societies; but which even at Athens had always remained a gap, because there was no Athenian at once actually worthy, and known to be worthy, to fill it. We may even wonder how he continued worthy, when the intense popular sentiment in his favor tended so strongly to turn his head, and when no contradiction or censure against him was tolerated.

Two persons, Laphystius and Demænetus, called by the obnoxious names of sycophants and demagogues, were bold enough to try the experiment. The former required him to give bail in a lawsuit; the latter, in a public discourse, censured various parts of his military campaigns. The public indignation against both these men was vehement; yet there can be little doubt that Laphystius applied to Timoleon a legal process applicable universally to every citizen: what may have been the pertinence of the censures of Demænetus, we are unable to say. However, Timoleon availed himself of the well-meant impatience of the people to protect him either from legal process or from censure, only to administer to them a serious and valuable lesson. Protesting against all interruption to the legal process of Laphystius, he proclaimed emphatically that this was the precise purpose for which he had so long labored, and combated—in order that every Syracusan citizen might be enabled to appeal to the laws and exercise freely his legal rights. And while he thought it unnecessary to rebut in detail the objections taken against his previous generalship, he publicly declared his gratitude to the gods, for having granted his prayer that he might witness all Syracusans in possession of full liberty of speech.[403]

We obtain little from the biographers of Timoleon, except a few incidents, striking, impressive, and somewhat theatrical, like those just recounted. But what is really important is, the tone and temper which these incidents reveal, both in Timoleon and in the Syracusan people. To see him unperverted by a career of superhuman success, retaining the same hearty convictions with which he had started from Corinth; renouncing power, the most ardent of all aspirations with a Greek politician, and descending to a private station, in spite of every external inducement to the contrary; resisting the temptation to impose his own will upon the people, and respecting their free speech and public vote in a manner which made it imperatively necessary for every one else to follow his example; foregoing command, and contenting himself with advice when his opinion was asked—all this presents a model of genuine and intelligent public spirit, such as is associated with few other names except that of Timoleon. That the Syracusan people should have yielded to such conduct and obedience not merely voluntary, but heartfelt and almost reverential, is no matter of wonder. And we may be quite sure that the opinion of Timoleon, tranquilly and unostentatiously consulted, was the guiding star which they followed on most points of moment or difficulty; over and above those of exceptional cases of aggravated dissent where he was called in with such imposing ceremony as an umpire. On the value of such an oracle close at hand it is needless to insist; especially in a city which for the last half century had known nothing but the dominion of force, and amidst a new miscellaneous aggregate composed of Greek settlers from many different quarters.

Timoleon now enjoyed, as he had amply earned, what Xenophon calls "that good, not human, but divine—command over willing men—given manifestly to persons of genuine and highly trained temperance of character.[404]" In him the condition indicated by Xenophon was found completely realized—temperance in the largest and most comprehensive sense of the word—not simply sobriety and continence (which had belonged to the elder Dionysius also), but an absence of that fatal thirst for coercive power at all price, which in Greece was the fruitful parent of the greater crimes and enormities.

Timoleon lived to see his great work of Sicilian enfranchisement consummated, to carry it through all its incipient difficulties, and to see it prosperously moving on. Not Syracuse alone, but the other Grecian cities in the island also, enjoyed under their revived free institutions a state of security, comfort, and affluence, to which they had been long strangers. The lands became again industriously tilled; the fertile soil yielded anew abundant exports; the temples were restored from their previous decay, and adorned with the votive offerings of pious munificence.[405] The same state of prosperous and active freedom, which had followed on the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty a hundred and twenty years before, and lasted about fifty years, without either despots within or invaders from without—was now again made prevalent throughout Sicily under the auspices of Timoleon. It did not indeed last so long. It

was broken up in the year 316 B. C., twenty-four years after the battle of the Krimêsus, by the despot Agathokles, whose father was among the immigrants to Syracuse under the settlement of Timoleon. But the interval of security and freedom with which Sicily was blessed between these two epochs, she owed to the generous patriotism and intelligent counsel of Timoleon. There are few other names among the Grecian annals, with which we can connect so large an amount of predetermined and beneficent result.

Endeared to the Syracusans as a common father and benefactor,[406] and exhibited as their hero to all visitors from Greece, he passed the remainder of his life amidst the fulness of affectionate honor. Unfortunately for the Syracusans, that remainder was but too short; for he died of an illness apparently slight, in the year 337-336 B. C.—three or four years after the battle of the Krimêsus. Profound and unfeigned was the sorrow which his death excited, universally, throughout Sicily. Not merely the Syracusans, but crowds from all other parts of the island, attended to do honor to his funeral, which was splendidly celebrated at the public cost. Some of the chosen youths of the city carried the bier whereon his body was deposited: a countless procession of men and women followed, in their festival attire, crowned with wreaths, and mingling with their tears admiration and envy for their departed liberator. The procession was made to pass over that ground which presented the most honorable memento of Timoleon; where the demolished Dionysian stronghold had once reared its head, and where the court of justice was now placed, at the entrance of Ortygia. At length it reached the Nekropolis, between Ortygia and Achradina, where a massive funeral pile had been prepared. As soon as the bier had been placed on this pile, and fire was about to be applied, the herald Demetrius, distinguished for the powers of his voice, proclaimed with loud announcement as follows:—

"The Syracusan people solemnize, at the cost of two hundred minæ, the funeral of this man, the Corinthian Timoleon, son of Timodemus. They have passed a vote to honor him for all future time with festival matches in music, horse and chariot race, and gymnastics,—because, after having put down the despots, subdued the foreign enemy, and re-colonized the greatest among the ruined cities, he restored to the Sicilian Greeks their constitution and laws."

A sepulchral monument, seemingly with this inscription recorded on it, was erected to the memory of Timoleon in the agora of Syracuse. To this monument other buildings were presently annexed; porticos, for the assembling of persons in business or conversation—and palæstræ, for the exercises of youths. The aggregate of buildings all taken together was called the Timoleontion.[407]

When we reflect that the fatal battle of Chæroneia had taken place the year before Timoleon's decease, and that his native city Corinth as well as all her neighbors were sinking deeper and deeper into the degradation of subject towns of Macedonia,

we shall not regret, for his sake, that a timely death relieved him from so mournful a spectacle. It was owing to him that the Sicilian Greeks were rescued, for nearly one generation, from the like fate. He had the rare glory of maintaining to the end, and executing to the full, the promise of liberation with which he had gone forth from Corinth. His early years had been years of acute suffering—and that, too, incurred in the cause of freedom—arising out of the death of his brother; his later period, manifesting the like sense of duty under happier auspices, had richly repaid him, by successes overpassing all reasonable expectation, and by the ample flow of gratitude and attachment poured forth to him amidst the liberated Sicilians. His character appears most noble, and most instructive, if we contrast him with Dion. Timoleon had been brought up as the citizen of a free, though oligarchical community in Greece, surrounded by other free communities, and amidst universal hatred of despots. The politicians whom he had learnt to esteem were men trained in this school, maintaining a qualified ascendency against more or less of open competition from rivals, and obliged to look for the means of carrying their views apart from simple dictation. Moreover, the person whom Timoleon had selected for his peculiar model, was Epaminondas, the noblest model that Greece afforded.[408] It was to this example that Timoleon owed in part his energetic patriotism combined with freedom from personal ambition—his gentleness of political antipathy—and the perfect habits of conciliatory and popular dealing—which he manifested amidst so many new and trying scenes to the end of his career.

Now the education of Dion (as I have recounted in the preceding chapter) had been something totally different. He was the member of a despotic family, and had learnt his experience under the energetic, but perfectly self-willed, march of the elder Dionysius. Of the temper or exigencies of a community of freemen, he had never learnt to take account. Plunged in this corrupting atmosphere, he had nevertheless imbibed generous and public-spirited aspirations: he had come to hold in abhorrence a government of will, and to look for glory in contributing to replace it by a qualified freedom and a government of laws. But the source from whence he drank was, the Academy and its illustrious teacher Plato; not from practical life, nor from the best practical politicians like Epaminondas. Accordingly, he had imbibed at the same time the idea, that though despotism was a bad thing, government thoroughly popular was a bad thing also; that, in other words, as soon as he had put down the despotism, it lay with him to determine how much liberty he would allow, or what laws he would sanction, for the community; that instead of a despot, he was to become a despotic lawgiver.

Here then lay the main difference between the two conquerors of Dionysius. The mournful letters written by Plato after the death of Dion contrast strikingly with the enviable end of Timoleon, and with the grateful inscription of the Syracusans on his tomb.

CHAPTER LXXXVI.

CENTRAL GREECE: THE ACCESSION OF PHILIP OF MACEDON TO THE BIRTH OF ALEXANDER. 359-356 B. C.

My last preceding chapters have followed the history of the Sicilian Greeks through long years of despotism, suffering, and impoverishment, into a period of renovated freedom and comparative happiness, accomplished under the beneficent auspices of Timoleon, between 344-336 B. C. It will now be proper to resume the thread of events in Central Greece, at the point where they were left at the close of the preceding volume—the accession of Philip of Macedon in 360-359 B. C. The death of Philip took place in 336 B. C.; and the closing years of his life will bring before us the last struggles of full Hellenic freedom; a result standing in mournful contrast with the achievements of the contemporary liberator Timoleon in Sicily.

No such struggles could have appeared within the limits of possibility, even to the most far-sighted politician either of Greece or of Macedon—at the time when Philip mounted the throne. Among the hopes and fears of most Grecian cities, Macedonia then passed wholly unnoticed; in Athens, Olynthus, Thasus, Thessaly, and a few others, it formed an item not without moment, yet by no means of first-rate magnitude.

The Hellenic world was now in a state different from anything which had been seen since the repulse of Xerxes in 480-479 B. C. The defeat and degradation of Sparta had set free the inland states from the only presiding city whom they had ever learned to look up to. Her imperial ascendency, long possessed and grievously abused, had been put down by the successes of Epaminondas and the Thebans. She was no longer the head of a numerous body of subordinate allies, sending deputies to her periodical synods—submitting their external politics to her influence—placing their military contingents under command of her officers (xenagi)—and even administering their internal government through oligarchies devoted to her purposes, with the reinforcement, wherever needed, of a Spartan harmost and garrison. She no longer found on her northern frontier a number of detached Arcadian villages, each separately manageable under leaders devoted to her, and furnishing her with hardy soldiers; nor had she the friendly city of Tegea, tied to her by a long-standing philo-Laconian oligarchy and tradition. Under the strong revolution of feeling which followed on the defeat of the Spartans at Leuktra, the small Arcadian communities, encouraged and guided by Epaminondas, had consolidated themselves into the great fortified city of Megalopolis, now the centre of a Pan-Arcadian confederacy, with a synod (called the Ten thousand) frequently assembled there to decide upon matters of interest and policy common to the various sections of the Arcadian name. Tegea too had undergone a political revolution; so that these two cities, conterminous with

each other and forming together the northern frontier of Sparta, converted her Arcadian neighbors from valuable instruments into formidable enemies.

But this loss of foreign auxiliary force and dignity was not the worst which Sparta had suffered. On her north-western frontier (conterminous also with Megalopolis) stood the newly-constituted city of Messênê, representing an amputation of nearly one-half of Spartan territory and substance. The western and more fertile half of Laconia had been severed from Sparta, and was divided between Messênê and various other independent cities; being tilled chiefly by those who had once been Periœki and Helots of Sparta.

In the phase of Grecian history on which we are now about to enter—when the collective Hellenic world, for the first time since the invasion of Xerxes, was about to be thrown upon its defence against a foreign enemy from Macedonia—this altered position of Sparta was a circumstance of grave moment. Not only were the Peloponnesians disunited, and deprived of their common chief; but Megalopolis and Messênê, knowing the intense hostility of Sparta against them—and her great superiority of force even reduced as she was, to all that they could muster—lived in perpetual dread of her attack. Their neighbors the Argeians, standing enemies of Sparta, were well-disposed to protect them; but such aid was insufficient for their defence, without extra-Peloponnesian alliance. Accordingly we shall find them leaning upon the support either of Thebes or of Athens, whichever could be had; and ultimately even welcoming the arms of Philip of Macedon, as protector against the inexpiable hostility of Sparta. Elis—placed in the same situation with reference to Triphylia, as Sparta with reference to Messênê—complained that the Triphylians, whom she looked upon as subjects, had been admitted as freemen into the Arcadian federation. We shall find Sparta endeavoring to engage Elis in political combinations, intended to ensure, to both, the recovery of lost dominion.[409] Of these combinations more will be said hereafter; at present I merely notice the general fact that the degradation of Sparta, combined with her perpetually menaced aggression against Messênê and Arcadia, disorganized Peloponnesus, and destroyed its powers of Pan-hellenic defence against the new foreign enemy now slowly arising.

The once powerful Peloponnesian system was in fact completely broken up. Corinth, Sikyon, Phlius, Trœzen, and Epidaurus, valuable as secondary states and as allies of Sparta, were now detached from all political combination, aiming only to keep clear, each for itself, of all share in collision between Sparta and Thebes.[410] It would appear also that Corinth had recently been oppressed and disturbed by the temporary despotism of Timophanes, described in my last chapter; though the date of that event cannot be precisely made out.

But the grand and preponderating forces of Hellas now resided, for the first time in our history, without, and not within, Peloponnesus; at Athens and Thebes. Both these cities were in full vigor and efficiency. Athens had a numerous fleet, a flourish-

ing commerce, a considerable body of maritime and insular allies, sending deputies to her synod and contributing to a common fund for the maintenance of the joint security. She was by far the greatest maritime power of Greece. I have recounted in my last preceding volume, how her general Timotheus had acquired for her the important island of Samos, together with Pydna, Methônê, and Potidæa, in the Thermaic Gulf; how he failed (as Iphikrates had failed before him) in more than one attempt upon Amphipolis; how he planted Athenian conquest and settlers in the Thracian Chersonese, which territory, after having been attacked and endangered by the Thracian prince Kotys, was regained by the continued efforts of Athens in the year 358 B. C. Athens had sustained no considerable loss, during the struggles which ended in the pacification after the battle of Mantinea; and her condition appears on the whole to have been better than it had ever been since her disasters at the close of the Peloponnesian war.

The power of Thebes also was imposing and formidable. She had indeed lost many of those Peloponnesian allies who formed the overwhelming array of Epaminondas when he first invaded Laconia, under the fresh anti-Spartan impulse immediately succeeding the battle of Leuktra. She retained only Argos, together with Tegea, Megalopolis, and Messênê. The last three added little to her strength, and needed her watchful support; a price which Epaminondas had been perfectly willing to pay for the establishment of a strong frontier against Sparta. But the body of extra Peloponnesian allies grouped round Thebes was still considerable:[411] the Phokians and Lokrians, the Malians, the Herakleots, most of the Thessalians, and most (if not all) of the inhabitants of Eubœa; perhaps also the Akarnanians. The Phokians were indeed reluctant allies, disposed to circumscribe their obligations within the narrowest limits of mutual defence in case of invasion and we shall presently find the relations between the two becoming positively hostile. Besides these allies, the Thebans possessed the valuable position of Oropus, on the north-eastern frontier of Attica; a town which had been wrested from Athens six years before, to the profound mortification of the Athenians.

But ever and above allies without Bœotia, Thebes had prodigiously increased the power of her city within Bœotia. She had appropriated to herself the territories of Platæa and Thespiæ on her southern frontier, and of Koroneia and Orchomenus near upon her northern; by conquest and partial expulsion of their prior inhabitants. How and when these acquisitions had been brought about, has been explained in my preceding volume:[412] here I merely recall the fact, to appreciate the position of Thebes in 359 B. C.—that these four towns, having been in 372 B. C. autonomous—joined with her only by the definite obligations of the Bœotian confederacy—and partly even in actual hostility against her—had now lost their autonomy with their free citizens, and had become absorbed into her property and sovereignty. The domain of Thebes thus extended across Bœotia from the frontiers of Phokis[413] on the north-west to the frontiers of Attica on the south.

The new position thus acquired by Thebes in Bœotia, purchased at the cost of extinguishing three or four autonomous cities, is a fact of much moment in reference to the period now before us; not simply because it swelled the power and pride of the Thebans themselves; but also because it raised a strong body of unfavorable sentiment against them in the Hellenic mind. Just at the time when the Spartans had lost nearly one-half of Laconia, the Thebans had annexed to their own city one-third of the free Bœotian territory. The revival of free Messenian citizenship, after a suspended existence of more than two centuries, had recently been welcomed with universal satisfaction. How much would that same feeling be shocked when Thebes extinguished, for her own aggrandizement, four autonomous communities, all of her own Bœotian kindred—one of these communities too being Orchomenus, respected both for its antiquity and its traditionary legends! Little pains was taken to canvass the circumstances of the case, and to inquire whether Thebes had exceeded the measure of rigor warranted by the war-code of the time. In the patriotic and national conceptions of every Greek, Hellas consisted of an aggregate of autonomous, fraternal, city-communities. The extinction of any one of these was like the amputation of a limb from the organized body. Repugnance towards Thebes, arising out of these proceedings, affected strongly the public opinion of the time, and manifests itself especially in the language of Athenian orators, exaggerated by mortification on account of the loss of Oropus.[414]

The great body of Thessalians, as well as the Magnetes and the Phthiot Achæans, were among those subject to the ascendency of Thebes. Even the powerful and cruel despot, Alexander of Pheræ, was numbered in this catalogue.[415] The cities of fertile Thessaly, possessed by powerful oligarchies with numerous dependent serfs, were generally a prey to intestine conflict and municipal rivalry with each other; disorderly as well as faithless.[416] The Aleuadæ, chiefs at Larissa—and the Skopadæ, at Krannon—had been once the ascendent families in the country. But in the hands of Lykophron and the energetic Jason, Pheræ had been exalted to the first rank. Under Jason as tagus (federal general), the whole force of Thessaly was united, together with a large number of circumjacent tributaries, Macedonian, Epirotic, Dolopian, etc., and a well-organized standing army of mercenaries besides. He could muster eight thousand cavalry, twenty thousand hoplites, and peltasts or light infantry in numbers far more considerable.[417] A military power of such magnitude, in the hands of one alike able and aspiring, raised universal alarm, and would doubtless have been employed in some great scheme of conquest, either within or without Greece, had not Jason been suddenly cut off by assassination in 370 B. C., in the year succeeding the battle of Leuktra.[418] His brothers Polyphron and Polydorus succeeded to his position as tagus, but not to his abilities or influence. The latter a brutal tyrant, put to death the former, and was in his turn slain, after a short interval, by a successor yet worse, his nephew Alexander, who lived and retained power at Pheræ, for about ten years (368-358 B. C.).

During a portion of that time Alexander contended with success against the Thebans, and maintained his ascendency in Thessaly. But before the battle of Mantineia in 362 B. C., he had been reduced into the condition of a dependent ally of Thebes, and had furnished a contingent to the army which marched under Epaminondas into Peloponnesus. During the year 362-361 B. C., he even turned his hostilities against Athens, the enemy of Thebes; carrying on a naval war against her, not without partial success, and damage to her commerce.[419] And as the foreign ascendency of Thebes everywhere was probably impaired by the death of her great leader Epaminondas, Alexander of Pheræ recovered strength; continuing to be the greatest potentate in Thessaly, as well as the most sanguinary tyrant, until the time of his death in the beginning of 359 B. C.[420] He then perished, in the vigor of age and in the fulness of power. Against oppressed subjects or neighbors he could take security by means of mercenary guards; but he was slain by the contrivance of his wife Thêbê and the act of her brothers:—a memorable illustration of the general position laid down by Xenophon, that the Grecian despot could calculate neither on security nor on affection anywhere, and that his most dangerous enemies were to be found among his own household or kindred.[421] The brutal life of Alexander, and the cruelty of his proceedings, had inspired his wife with mingled hatred and fear. Moreover she had learnt from words dropped in a fit of intoxication, that he was intending to put to death her brothers Tisiphonus, Pytholaus, and Lykophron—and along with them herself; partly because she was childless, and he had formed the design of remarrying with the widow of the late despot Jason, who resided at Thebes. Accordingly Thêbê, apprising her brothers of their peril, concerted with them the means of assassinating Alexander. The bed-chamber which she shared with him was in an upper story, accessible only by a removable staircase or ladder; at the foot of which there lay every night a fierce mastiff in chains, and a Thracian soldier tattooed after the fashion of his country. The whole house moreover was regularly occupied by a company of guards; and it is even said that the wardrobe and closets of Thêbê were searched every evening for concealed weapons. These numerous precautions of mistrust, however, were baffled by her artifice. She concealed her brothers during all the day in a safe adjacent hiding-place. At night Alexander, coming to bed intoxicated, soon fell fast asleep; upon which Thêbê stole out of the room—directed the dog to be removed from the foot of the stairs, under pretence that the despot wished to enjoy undisturbed repose—and then called her armed brothers. After spreading wool upon the stairs, in order that their tread might be noiseless, she went again up into the bed-room, and brought away the sword of Alexander, which always hung near him. Notwithstanding this encouragement, however, the three young men, still trembling at the magnitude of the risk, hesitated to mount the stair; nor could they be prevailed upon to do so, except by her distinct threat, that if they flinched, she would awaken Alexander and expose them. At length they mounted, and entered the bed-chamber, wherein a lamp was burning; while Thêbê, having opened the door for them, again closed it, and posted herself to hold the bar. The brothers then ap-

proached the bed: one seized the sleeping despot by the feet, another by the hair of his head, and the third with a sword thrust him through.[422]

After successfully and securely consummating this deed, popular on account of the odious character of the slain despot, Thêbê contrived to win over the mercenary troops, and to insure the sceptre to herself and her eldest brother Tisiphonus. After this change, it would appear that the power of the new princes was not so great as that of Alexander had been, so that additional elements of weakness and discord were introduced into Thessaly. This is to be noted as one of the material circumstances paving the way for Philip of Macedon to acquire ascendency in Greece—as will hereafter appear.

It was in the year 360-359 B. C., that Perdikkas, elder brother and predecessor of Philip on the throne of Macedonia, was slain, in the flower of his age. He perished, according to one account, in a bloody battle with the Illyrians, wherein four thousand Macedonians fell also; according to another statement, by the hands of assassins and the treacherous subornation of his mother Eurydikê.[423] Of the exploits of Perdikkas during the five years of his reign we know little. He had assisted the Athenian general Timotheus in war against the Olynthian confederacy, and in the capture of Pydna, Potidæa, Torônê, and other neighboring places; while on the other hand he had opposed the Athenians in their attempt against Amphipolis, securing that important place by a Macedonian garrison, both against them and for himself. He was engaged in serious conflicts with the Illyrians.[424] It appears too that he was not without some literary inclinations—was an admirer of intellectual men, and in correspondence with Plato at Athens. Distinguished philosophers or sophists, like Plato and Isokrates, enjoyed renown, combined with a certain measure of influence, throughout the whole range of the Grecian world. Forty years before, Archelaus king of Macedonia had shown favor to Plato,[425] then a young man, as well as to his master Sokrates. Amyntas, the father both of Perdikkas and of Philip, had throughout his reign cultivated the friendship of leading Athenians, especially Iphikrates and Timotheus; the former of whom he had even adopted as his son; Aristotle, afterwards so eminent as a philosopher (son of Nikomachus the confidential physician of Amyntas[426]), had been for some time studying at Athens as a pupil of Plato; moreover Perdikkas during his reign had resident with him a friend of the philosopher—Euphræus of Oreus. Perdikkas lent himself much to the guidance of Euphræus, who directed him in the choice of his associates, and permitted none to be his guests except persons of studious habits; thus exciting much disgust among the military Macedonians.[427] It is a signal testimony to the reputation of Plato, that we find his advice courted, at one and the same time, by Dionysius the younger at Syracuse, and by Perdikkas in Macedonia.

On the suggestion of Plato, conveyed through Euphræus, Perdikkas was induced to bestow upon his own brother Philip a portion of territory or an appanage in Macedonia. In 368 B. C. (during the reign of Alexander elder brother of Perdikkas and

Philip), Pelopidas had reduced Macedonia to partial submission and had taken hostages for its fidelity; among which hostages was the youthful Philip, then about fifteen years of age. In this character Philip remained about two or three years at Thebes.[428] How or when he left that city, we cannot clearly make out. He seems to have returned to Macedonia after the murder of Alexander by Ptolemy Alorites; probably without opposition from the Thebans, since his value as a hostage was then diminished. The fact that he was confided (together with his brother Perdikkas) by his mother Eurydikê to the protection of the Athenian general Iphikrates, then on the coast of Macedonia—has been recounted in a previous chapter. How Philip fared during the regency of Ptolemy Alorites in Macedonia, we do not know; we might ever suspect that he would return back to Thebes as a safer residence. But when his brother Perdikkas, having slain Ptolemy Alorites, became king, Philip resided in Macedonia, and even obtained from Perdikkas (as already stated), through the persuasion of Plato, a separate district to govern as subordinate. Here he remained until the death of Perdikkas in 360-359 B. C.; organizing a separate military force of his own (like Derdas in 382 B. C., when the Lacedæmonians made war upon Olynthus;[429]) and probably serving at its head in the wars carried on by his brother.

The time passed by Philip at Thebes, however, from fifteen to eighteen years of age, was an event of much importance in determining his future character.[430] Though detained at Thebes, Philip was treated with courtesy and respect. He resided with Pammenes, one of the principal citizens; he probably enjoyed good literary and rhetorical teaching, since as a speaker, in after life, he possessed considerable talent; [431] and he may also have received some instruction in philosophy, though he never subsequently manifested any taste for it, and though the assertion of his having been taught by Pythagoreans merits little credence. But the lesson, most indelible of all, which he imbibed at Thebes, was derived from the society and from the living example of men like Epaminondas and Pelopidas. These were leading citizens, manifesting those qualities which insured for them the steady admiration of a free community—and of a Theban community, more given to action than to speech; moreover they were both of them distinguished military leaders—one of them the ablest organizer and the most scientific tactician of his day. The spectacle of the Theban military force, excellent both as cavalry and as infantry under the training of such a man as Epaminondas, was eminently suggestive to a young Macedonian prince; and became still more efficacious when combined with the personal conversation of the victor of Leuktra—the first man whom Philip learnt to admire, and whom he strove to imitate in his military career.[432] His mind was early stored with the most advanced strategic ideas of the day, and thrown into the track of reflection, comparison, and invention, on the art of war.

When transferred from Thebes to the subordinate government of a district in Macedonia under his elder brother Perdikkas, Philip organized a military force; and in so doing had the opportunity of applying to practice, though at first on a limited

scale, the lessons learnt from the illustrious Thebans. He was thus at the head of troops belonging to and organized by himself—when the unexpected death of Perdikkas opened to him the prospect of succeeding to the throne. But it was a prospect full of doubt and hazard. Perdikkas had left an infant son; there existed, moreover, three princes, Archelaus, Aridæus, and Menelaus,[433] sons of Amyntas by another wife or mistress Gygæa, and therefore half-brothers of Perdikkas and Philip: there were also two other pretenders to the crown—Pausanias (who had before aspired to the throne after the death of Amyntas), seconded by a Thracian prince—and Argæus, aided by the Athenians. To these dangers was to be added, attack from the neighboring barbaric nations, Illyrians, Pæonians, and Thracians—always ready[434] to assail and plunder Macedonia at every moment of intestine weakness. It would appear that Perdikkas, shortly before his death, had sustained a severe defeat, with the loss of four thousand men, from the Illyrians: his death followed, either from a wound then received, or by the machinations of his mother Eurydikê. Perhaps both the wound in battle and the assassination, may be real facts.[435]

Philip at first assumed the government of the country as guardian of his young nephew Amyntas the son of Perdikkas. But the difficulties of the conjuncture were so formidable, that the Macedonians around constrained him to assume the crown.[436] Of his three half-brothers he put to death one, and was only prevented from killing the other two by their flight into exile; we shall find them hereafter at Olynthus. They had either found, or were thought likely to find, a party in Macedonia to sustain their pretensions to the crown.[437]

The succession to the throne in Macedonia, though descending in a particular family, was open to frequent and bloody dispute between the individual members of that family, and usually fell to the most daring and unscrupulous among them. None but an energetic man, indeed, could well maintain himself there, especially under the circumstances of Philip's accession. The Macedonian monarchy has been called a limited monarchy; and in a large sense of the word, this proposition is true. But what the limitations were, or how they were made operative, we do not know. That there were some ancient forms and customs, which the king habitually respected, we cannot doubt;[438] as there probably were also among the Illyrian tribes, the Epirots, and others of the neighboring warlike nations. A general assembly was occasionally convened, for the purpose of consenting to some important proposition, or trying some conspicuous accused person. But though such ceremonies were recognized and sometimes occurred, the occasions were rare in which they interposed any serious constitutional check upon the regal authority.[439] The facts of Macedonian history, as far as they come before us, exhibit the kings acting on their own feelings and carrying out their own schemes—consulting whom they please and when they please—subject only to the necessity of not offending too violently the sentiments of that military population whom they commanded. Philip and Alexander, combining regal station with personal ability and unexampled success, were more powerful than any of

their predecessors. Each of them required extraordinary efforts from their soldiers, whom they were therefore obliged to keep in willing obedience and attachment; just as Jason of Pheræ had done before with his standing army of mercenaries.[440] During the reign of Alexander the army manifests itself as the only power by his side to which even he is constrained occasionally to bow; after his death, its power becomes for a time still more ascendent. But so far as the history of Macedonia is known to us, I perceive no evidence of coördinate political bodies, or standing apparatus (either aristocratical or popular) to check the power of the king—such as to justify in any way the comparison drawn by a modern historian between the Macedonian and English constitutions.

The first proceeding of Philip, in dealing with his numerous enemies, was to buy off the Thracians by seasonable presents and promises; so that the competition of Pausanias for the throne became no longer dangerous. There remained as assailants the Athenians with Argæus from seaward, and the Illyrians from landward.

But Philip showed dexterity and energy sufficient to make head against all. While he hastened to reorganize the force of the country, to extend the application of those improved military arrangements which he had already been attempting in his own province, and to encourage his friends and soldiers by collective harangues,[441] in a style and spirit such as the Macedonians had never before heard from regal lips—he contrived to fence off the attack of the Athenians until a more convenient moment.

He knew that the possession of Amphipolis was the great purpose for which they had been carrying on war against Macedonia for some years, and for which they now espoused the cause of Argæus. Accordingly he professed his readiness at once to give up to them this important place, withdrawing the Macedonian garrison whereby Perdikkas had held it against them, and leaving the town to its own citizens. This act was probably construed by the Athenians as tantamount to an actual cession; for even if Amphipolis should still hold out against them, they doubted not of their power to reduce it when unaided. Philip farther despatched letters to Athens, expressing an anxious desire to be received into her alliance, on the same friendly terms as his father Amyntas before him.[442] These proceedings seem to have had the effect of making the Athenians lukewarm in the cause of Argæus. For Mantias the Athenian admiral, though he conveyed that prince by sea to Methônê, yet stayed in the seaport himself, while Argæus marched inland—with some returning exiles, a body of mercenaries, and a few Athenian volunteers—to Ægæ or Edessa;[443] hoping to procure admission into that ancient capital of the Macedonian kings. But the inhabitants refused to receive him; and in his march back, to Methônê, he was attacked and completely defeated by Philip. His fugitive troops found shelter on a neighboring eminence, but were speedily obliged to surrender. Philip suffered the greater part of them to depart on terms, requiring only that Argæus and the Macedonian exiles should be delivered up to him. He treated the Athenian citizens with especial courtesy, preserved to them all their property, and sent them home full of

gratitude, with conciliatory messages to the people of Athens. The exiles, Argæus among them, having become his prisoners, were probably put to death.[444]

The prudent lenity exhibited by Philip towards the Athenian prisoners, combined with his evacuation of Amphipolis, produced the most favorable effect upon the temper of the Athenian public, and disposed them to accept his pacific offers. Peace was accordingly concluded. Philip renounced all claim to Amphipolis, acknowledging that town as a possession rightfully belonging to Athens.[445] By such renunciation he really abandoned no rightful possession; for Amphipolis had never belonged to the Macedonian kings; nor had any Macedonian soldiers ever entered it until three or four years before, when the citizens had invoked aid from Perdikkas to share in the defence against Athens. But the Athenians appeared to have gained the chief prize for which they had been so long struggling. They congratulated themselves in the hope, probably set forth with confidence by the speakers who supported the peace, that the Amphipolitans alone would never think of resisting the acknowledged claims of Athens.

Philip was thus relieved from enemies on the coast, and had his hands free to deal with the Illyrians and Pæonians of the interior. He marched into the territory of the Pæonians (seemingly along the upper course of the river Axius), whom he found weakened by the recent death of their king Agis. He defeated their troops, and reduced them to submit to Macedonian supremacy. From thence he proceeded to attack the Illyrians—a more serious and formidable undertaking. The names *Illyrians*, *Pæonians*, *Thracians*, etc., did not designate any united national masses, but were applied to a great number of kindred tribes or clans, each distinct, separately governed, and having its particular name and customs. The Illyrian and Pæonian tribes occupied a wide space of territory to the north and north-west of Macedonia, over the modern Bosnia nearly to the Julian Alps and the river Save. But during the middle of the fourth century before Christ, it seems that a large immigration of Gallic tribes from the westward was taking place, invading the territory of the more northerly Illyrians and Pæonians, circumscribing their occupancy and security, and driving them farther southward; sometimes impelling them to find subsistence and plunder by invasions of Macedonia or by maritime piracies against Grecian commerce in the Adriatic.[446] The Illyrians had become more dangerous neighbors to Macedonia than they were in the time of Thucydides; and it seems that a recent coalition of their warriors, for purposes of invasion and plunder, was now in the zenith of its force. It was under a chief named Bardylis, who had raised himself to command from the humble occupation of a charcoal burner; a man renowned for his bravery, but yet more renowned for dealings rigidly just towards his soldiers, especially in the distribution of plunder.[447] Bardylis and his Illyrians had possessed themselves of a considerable portion of Western Macedonia (west of Mount Bermius), occupying for the most part the towns, villages, and plains,[448] and restricting the native Macedonians to the defensible, yet barren hills. Philip marched to attack them, at the head of a

force which he had now contrived to increase to the number of ten thousand foot and six hundred horse. The numbers of Bardylis were about equal; yet on hearing of Philip's approach, he sent a proposition tendering peace, on the condition that each party should retain what it actually possessed. His proposition being rejected, the two armies speedily met. Philip had collected around him on the right wing his chosen Macedonian troops, with whom he made his most vigorous onset: manœuvring at the same time with a body of cavalry so as to attack the left flank of the Illyrians. The battle, contested with the utmost obstinacy on both sides, was for some time undecided; nor could the king of Macedon break the oblong square into which his enemies had formed themselves. But at length his cavalry were enabled to charge them so effectively in flank and rear, that victory declared in his favor. The Illyrians fled, were vigorously pursued with the loss of seven thousand men, and never again rallied. Bardylis presently sued for peace, and consented to purchase it by renouncing all his conquests in Macedonia; while Philip pushed his victory so strenuously, as to reduce to subjection all the tribes eastward of Lake Lychnidus.[449]

These operations against the inland neighbors of Macedonia must have occupied a year or two. During that interval, Philip left Amphipolis to itself, having withdrawn from it the Macedonian garrison as a means of conciliating the Athenians. We might have expected that they would forthwith have availed themselves of the opening and taken active measures for regaining Amphipolis. They knew the value of that city: they considered it as of right theirs; they had long been anxious for its repossession, and had even besieged it five years before, though seemingly only with a mercenary force, which was repelled mainly by the aid of Philip's predecessor Perdikkas. Amphipolis was not likely to surrender to them voluntarily; but when thrown upon its own resources, it might perhaps have been assailed with success. Yet they remained without making any attempt on the region at the mouth of the river Strymon. We must recollect (as has been narrated in my last preceding volume[450]), that during 359 B. C., and the first part of 358 B. C., they were carrying on operations in the Thracian Chersonese, against Charidemus and Kersobleptes, with small success and disgraceful embarrassment. These vexatious operations in the Chersonese—in which peninsula many Athenians were interested as private proprietors, besides the public claims of the city—may perhaps have absorbed wholly the attention of Athens, so as to induce her to postpone the acquisition of Amphipolis until they were concluded; a conclusion which did not arrive (as we shall presently see) until immediately before she became plunged in the dangerous crisis of the Social War. I know no better explanation of the singular circumstance, that Athens, though so anxious, both before and after, for the possession of Amphipolis, made no attempt to acquire it during more than a year after its evacuation by Philip; unless indeed we are to rank this opportunity among the many which she lost (according to Demosthenes[451]) from pure negligence; little suspecting how speedily such opportunity would disappear.

In 358 B. C., an opening was afforded to the Athenians for regaining their influence in Eubœa; and for this island, so near their own shores, they struck a more vigorous blow than for the distant possessions of Amphipolis. At the revival of the maritime confederacy under Athens (immediately after 378 B. C.), most of the cities in Eubœa had joined it voluntarily; but after the battle of Leuktra (in 371 B. C.), the island passed under Theban supremacy. Accordingly Eubœans from all the cities served in the army of Epaminondas, both in his first and his last expedition into Peloponnesus (369-362 B. C.).[452] Moreover, Orôpus, the frontier town of Attica and Bœotia—immediately opposite to Eubœa, having been wrested from Athens[453] in 366 B. C. by a body of exiles crossing the strait from Eretria, through the management of the Eretrian despot Themison—had been placed in the keeping of the Thebans, with whom it still remained. But in the year 358 B. C., discontent began in the Eubœan cities, from what cause we know not, against the supremacy of Thebes; whereupon a powerful Theban force was sent into the island to keep them down. A severe contest ensued, in which if Thebes had succeeded, Chalkis and Eretria might possibly have shared the fate of Orchomenus.[454] These cities sent urgent messages entreating aid from the Athenians, who were powerfully moved by the apprehension of seeing their hated neighbor Thebes reinforced by so large an acquisition close to their borders. The public assembly, already disposed to sympathize with the petitioners, was kindled into enthusiasm by the abrupt and emphatic appeal of Timotheus son of Konon.[455] "How! Athenians (said he), when you have the Thebans actually in the island, are you still here debating what is to be done, or how you shall deal with the case? Will you not fill the sea with triremes? Will you not start up at once, hasten down to Peiræus, and haul the triremes down to the water?" This animated apostrophe, reported and doubtless heard by Demosthenes himself, was cordially responded to by the people. The force of Athens, military as well as naval, was equipped with an eagerness, and sent forth with a celerity, seldom paralleled. Such was the general enthusiasm, that the costly office of trierarchy was for the first time undertaken by volunteers, instead of awaiting the more tardy process of singling out those rich men whose turn it was to serve, with the chance of still farther delay from the legal process called Antidosis or Exchange of property,[456] instituted by any one of the persons so chosen who might think himself hardly used by the requisition. Demosthenes himself was among the volunteer trierarchs; he and a person named Philinus being co-trierarchs of the same ship. We are told that in three or in five days the Athenian fleet and army, under the command of Timotheus,[457] were landed in full force on Eubœa; and that in the course of thirty days the Thebans were so completely worsted, as to be forced to evacuate it under capitulation. A body of mercenaries under Chares contributed to the Athenian success. Yet it seems not clear that the success was so easy and rapid as the orators are fond of asserting.[458] However, their boast, often afterwards repeated, is so far well-founded, that Athens fully accomplished her object, rescued the Eubœans from Thebes, and received the testimonial of their gratitude in the form of a golden wreath dedicated in the Athenian

acropolis.[459] The Eubœan cities, while acknowledged as autonomous, continued at the same time to be enrolled as members of the Athenian confederacy, sending deputies to the synod at Athens; towards the general purposes of which they paid an annual tribute, assessed at five talents each for Oreus (or Histiæa) and Eretria.[460]

On the conclusion of this Eubœan enterprise, Chares with his mercenaries was sent forward to the Chersonese, where he at length extorted from Charidemus and Kersobleptes the evacuation of that peninsula and its cession to Athens, after a long train of dilatory manœuvres and bad faith on their part. I have in my last preceding volume, described these events, remarking at the same time that Athens attained at this moment the maximum of her renewed foreign power and second confederacy, which had begun in 378 B. C.[461] But this period of exaltation was very short. It was speedily overthrown by two important events—the Social war and the conquests of Philip in Thrace.

The Athenian confederacy, recently strengthened by the rescue of Eubœa, numbered among its members a large proportion of the islands in the Ægean as well as the Grecian seaports in Thrace. The list included the islands Lesbos, Chios, Samos (this last now partially occupied by a body of Athenian Kleruchs or settlers), Kos and Rhodes; together with the important city of Byzantium. It was shortly after the recent success in Eubœa, that Chios, Kos, Rhodes, and Byzantium revolted from Athens by concert, raising a serious war against her, known by the name of the Social War.

Respecting the proximate causes of this outbreak, we find, unfortunately, little information. There was now, and had always been since 378 B. C., a synod of deputies from all the confederate cities habitually assembling at Athens; such as had not subsisted under the first Athenian empire in its full maturity. How far the Synod worked efficiently, we do not know. At least it must have afforded to the allies, if aggrieved, a full opportunity of making their complaints heard; and of criticising the application of the common fund, to which each of them contributed. But I have remarked in the preceding volume, that the Athenian confederacy, which had begun (378 B. C.) in a generous and equal spirit of common maritime defence,[462] had gradually become perverted, since the humiliation of the great enemy Sparta at Leuktra, towards purposes and interests more exclusively Athenian. Athens had been conquering the island of Samos—Pydna, Potidæa, and Methônê, on the coast of Macedonia and Thrace—and the Thracian Chersonese; all of them acquisitions made for herself alone, without any advantage to the confederate synod—and made, too, in great part, to become the private property of her own citizens as kleruchs, in direct breach of her public resolution, passed in 378 B. C., not to permit any appropriation of lands by Athenian citizens out of Attica.

In proportion as Athens came to act more for her own separate aggrandizement, and less for interests common to the whole confederacy, the adherence of the larger

confederate states grew more and more reluctant. But what contributed yet farther to detach them from Athens, was, the behavior of her armaments on service, consisting in great proportion of mercenaries, scantily and irregularly paid; whose disorderly and rapacious exaction, especially at the cost of the confederates of Athens, are characterized in strong terms by all the contemporary orators—Demosthenes, Æschines, Isokrates, etc. The commander, having no means of paying his soldiers, was often compelled to obey their predatory impulses, and conduct them to the easiest place from whence money could be obtained; indeed, some of the commanders, especially Chares, were themselves not less ready than their soldiers to profit by such depredations.[463] Hence the armaments sent out by Athens sometimes saw little of the enemy whom they were sent to combat, preferring the easier and more lucrative proceeding of levying contributions from friends, and of plundering the trading-vessels met with at sea. Nor was it practicable for Athens to prevent such misconduct, when her own citizens refused to serve personally, and when she employed foreigners, hired for the occasion, but seldom regularly paid.[464] The suffering, alarm, and alienation arising from hence among the confederates, was not less mischievous than discreditable to Athens. We cannot doubt that complaints in abundance were raised in the confederate synod; but they must have been unavailing, since the abuse continued until the period shortly preceding the battle of Chæroneia.

Amidst such apparent dispositions on the part of Athens to neglect the interests of the confederacy for purposes of her own and to tolerate or encourage the continued positive depredations of unpaid armaments—discontent naturally grew up, manifesting itself most powerfully among some of the larger dependencies near the Asiatic coast. The islands of Chios, Kos, and Rhodes, together with the important city of Byzantium on the Thracian Bosphorus, took counsel together, and declared themselves detached from Athens and her confederacy. According to the spirit of the convention, sworn at Sparta, immediately before the battle of Leuktra, and of the subsequent alliance, sworn at Athens, a few months afterwards[465]—obligatory and indefeasible confederacies stood generally condemned among the Greeks, so that these islands were justified in simply seceding when they thought fit. But their secession, which probably Athens would, under all circumstances, have resisted, was proclaimed in a hostile manner, accompanied with accusations of treacherous purposes on her part against them. It was moreover fomented by the intrigues, as well as aided by the arms, of the Karian prince Mausôlus.[466] Since the peace of Antalkidas, the whole Asiatic coast had been under the unresisted dominion either of satraps or subordinate princes dependent upon Persia, who were watching for opportunities of extending their conquests in the neighboring islands. Mausôlus appears to have occupied both Rhodes and Kos; provoking in the former island a revolution which placed it under an oligarchy, not only devoted to him, but farther sustained by the presence of a considerable force of his mercenary troops.[467] The government of Chios appears to have been always oligarchical; which fact was one ground for want of sympathy between the Chians and Athens. Lastly, the Byzantines had also a spe-

cial ground for discontent; since they assumed the privilege of detaining and taxing the corn-ships from the Euxine in their passage through the Bosphorus[468]—while Athens, as chief of the insular confederacy, claimed that right for herself, and at any rate protested against the use of such power by any other city for its own separate profit.

This revolt, the beginning of what is termed the Social War, was a formidable shock to the foreign ascendency of Athens. Among all her confederates, Chios was the largest and most powerful, the entire island being under one single government. Old men, like Plato and Isokrates, might perhaps recollect the affright occasioned at Athens fifty-four years before (B. C. 412) by the news of the former revolt of Chios, [469] shortly after the great disaster before Syracuse. And probably the alarm was not much less, when the Athenians were now apprised of the quadruple defection among their confederates near the Asiatic coast. The joint armament of all four was mustered at Chios, whither Mausôlus also sent a reinforcement. The Athenians equipped a fleet with land-forces on board, to attack the island; and on this critical occasion we may presume that their citizens would overcome the reluctance to serve in person. Chabrias was placed in command of the fleet, Chares of the land-force; the latter was disembarked on the island, and a joint attack upon the town of Chios, by sea and land at the same moment, was concerted. When Chares marched up to the walls, the Chians and their allies felt strong enough to come forth and hazard a battle, with no decisive result; while Chabrias at the same time attempted with the fleet to force his way into the harbor. But the precautions for defence had been effectively taken, and the Chian seamen were resolute. Chabrias, leading the attack with his characteristic impetuosity, became entangled among the enemy's vessels, was attacked on all sides, and fell gallantly fighting. The other Athenian ships either were not forward in following him, or could make no impression. Their attack completely failed, and the fleet was obliged to retire, with little loss apparently, except that of the brave admiral. Chares with his land-force having been again taken aboard, the Athenians forthwith sailed away from Chios.[470]

This repulse at Chios was a serious misfortune to Athens. Such was the dearth of military men and the decline of the military spirit, in that city, that the loss of a warlike citizen, daring as a soldier and tried as a commander, like Chabrias, was never afterwards repaired. To the Chians and their allies, on the other hand, the event was highly encouraging. They were enabled, not merely to maintain their revolt, but even to obtain fresh support, and to draw into the like defection other allies of Athens,—among them, seemingly, Sestos, and other cities on the Hellespont. For some months they appear to have remained masters of the sea, with a fleet of one hundred triremes, disembarking and inflicting devastation on the Athenian islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samos, and elsewhere, so as to collect a sum for defraying their expenses. They were even strong enough to press the town of Samos, by close siege, until at length the Athenians, not without delay and difficulty, got together a

fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes, under the joint command of Chares, Iphikrates with his son Menestheus, and Timotheus. Notwithstanding that Samos was under siege, the Athenian admirals thought it prudent to direct their first efforts to the reduction of Byzantium; probably from the paramount importance of keeping open the two straits between the Euxine and the Ægean, in order that the corn-ships, out of the former, might come through in safety.[471] To protect Byzantium, the Chians and their allies raised the siege of Samos, and sailed forthwith to the Hellespont, in which narrow strait both fleets were collected,—as the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had been during the closing years of the Peloponnesian war. A plan of naval action had been concerted by the three Athenian commanders, and was on the point of taking place, when there supervened a sudden storm, which in the judgment both of Iphikrates and Timotheus, rendered it rash and perilous to persist in the execution. They therefore held off, while Chares, judging differently, called upon the trierachs and seamen to follow him, and rushed into the fight without his colleagues. He was defeated, or at least was obliged to retire without accomplishing anything. But so incensed was he against his two colleagues, that he wrote a despatch to Athens accusing them of corruption and culpable backwardness against the enemy.[472]

The three joint admirals were thus placed not merely in opposition, but in bitter conflict, among themselves. At the trial of accountability, undergone by all of them not long afterwards at Athens, Chares stood forward as the formal accuser of his two colleagues, who in their turn also accused him. He was seconded in his attack by Aristophon, one of the most practised orators of the day. Both of them charged Iphikrates and Timotheus with having received bribes from the Chians and Rhodians, [473] and betrayed their trust; by deserting Chares at the critical moment when it had been determined beforehand to fight, and when an important success might have been gained.

How the justice of the case stood, we cannot decide. The characters of Iphikrates and Timotheus raise strong presumption that they were in the right and their accuser in the wrong. Yet it must be recollected that the Athenian public, (and probably every other public,—ancient or modern,—Roman, English, or French), would naturally sympathize with the forward and daring admiral, who led the way into action, fearing neither the storm nor the enemy, and calling upon his colleagues to follow. Iphikrates and Timotheus doubtless insisted upon the rashness of his proceedings, and set forth the violence of the gale. But this again would be denied by Chares, and would stand as a point where the evidence was contradictory; captains and seamen being produced as witnesses on both sides, and the fleet being probably divided into two opposing parties. The feelings of the Athenian Dikasts might naturally be, that Iphikrates and Timotheus ought never to have let their colleague go into action unassisted, even though they disapproved of the proceeding. Iphikrates defended himself partly by impeaching the behavior of Chares, partly by bitter retort upon his

other accuser Aristophon. "Would *you* (he asked), betray the fleet for money?" "No," was the reply. "Well, then, *you*, Aristophon, would not betray the fleet; shall *I*, Iphikrates do so?"[474]

The issue of this important cause was, that Iphikrates was acquitted, while Timotheus was found guilty and condemned to the large fine of one hundred talents. Upon what causes such difference of sentence turned, we make out imperfectly. And it appears that Iphikrates, far from exonerating himself by throwing blame on Timotheus, emphatically assumed the responsibility of the whole proceeding; while his son, Menestheus tendered an accurate account within his own knowledge, of all the funds received and disbursed by the army.[475]

The cause assigned by Isokrates, the personal friend of Timotheus, is, the extreme unpopularity of the latter in the city. Though as a general and on foreign service, Timotheus conducted himself not only with scrupulous justice to every one, but with rare forbearance towards the maritime allies whom other generals vexed and plundered,—yet at home his demeanor was intolerably arrogant and offensive, especially towards the leading speakers who took part in public affairs. While recognized as a man of ability and as a general who had rendered valuable service, he had thus incurred personal unpopularity and made numerous enemies; chiefly among those most able to do him harm. Isokrates tells us that he had himself frequently remonstrated with Timotheus (as Plato admonished Dion), on this serious fault, which overclouded his real ability, caused him to be totally misunderstood, and laid up against him a fund of popular dislike sure to take melancholy effect on some suitable occasion. Timotheus (according to Isokrates), though admitting the justice of the reproof, was unable to conquer his own natural disposition.[476] If such was the bearing of this eminent man, as described by his intimate friend, we may judge how it would incense unfriendly politicians and even indifferent persons who knew him only from his obvious exterior. Iphikrates, though by nature a proud man, was more discreet and conciliatory in his demeanor, and more alive to the mischief of political odium.[477] Moreover, he seems to have been an effective speaker[478] in public, and his popularity among the military men in Athens was so marked, that on this very trial many of them manifested their sympathy by appearing in arms near the Dikastery.[479] Under these circumstances, we may easily understand that Chares and Aristophon might find it convenient to press their charge more pointedly against Timotheus than against Iphikrates; and that the Dikastery, while condemning the former, may have been less convinced of the guilt of the latter, and better satisfied in every way to acquit him.[480]

A fine of one hundred talents is said to have been imposed upon Timotheus, the largest fine (according to Isokrates), ever imposed at Athens. Upon his condemnation he retired to Chalkis, where he died three years afterwards, in 354 B. C. In the year succeeding his death, his memory was still very unpopular; yet it appears that the fine was remitted to his family, and that his son Konon was allowed to compro-

mise the demand by a disbursement of the smaller sum of ten talents for the repairs of the city walls. It seems evident that Timotheus by his retirement evaded payment of the full fine; so that his son Konon appears after him as one of the richest citizens in Athens.[481]

The loss of such a citizen as Timotheus was a fresh misfortune to her. He had conducted her armies with signal success, maintained the honor of her name throughout the eastern and western seas, and greatly extended the list of her foreign allies. She had recently lost Chabrias in battle; a second general, Timotheus, was now taken from her; and the third, Iphikrates, though acquitted at the last trial, seems, as far as we can make out, never to have been subsequently employed on military command. These three were the last eminent military citizens at Athens; for Phokion, though brave and deserving, was not to be compared with either of them. On the other hand, Chares, a man of great personal courage, but of no other merit, was now in the full swing of reputation. The recent judicial feud between the three Athenian admirals had been doubly injurious to Athens, first as discrediting Iphikrates and Timotheus, next as exalting Chares, to whom the sole command was now confided.

In the succeeding year, 356 B. C., Chares conducted another powerful fleet to attack the revolted allies. Being however not furnished with adequate funds from home to pay his troops, chiefly foreign mercenaries, he thought it expedient, on his own responsibility, to accept an offer from Artabazus (satrap of Daskylium and the region south of the Propontis), then in revolt against the Persian king.[482] Chares joined Artabazus with his own army, reinforced by additional bodies of mercenaries recently disbanded by the Persian satraps. With this entire force he gave battle to the king's troops under the command of Tithraustes, and gained a splendid victory; upon which Artabazus remunerated him so liberally, as to place the whole Athenian army in temporary affluence. The Athenians at home were at first much displeased with their general, for violating his instructions, and withdrawing his army from its prescribed and legitimate task. The news of his victory, however, and of the lucrative recompense following it, somewhat mollified them. But presently they learned that the Persian king, indignant at such a gratuitous aggression on their part, was equipping a large fleet to second the operations of their enemies. Intimidated by the prospect of Persian attack, they became anxious to conclude a peace with the revolted allies; who, on their part, were not less anxious to terminate the war. Embassies being exchanged, and negotiations opened, in the ensuing year (355 B. C., the third of the war), a peace was sworn, whereby the Athenians recognized the complete autonomy, and severance from their confederacy, of the revolted cities, Chios, Rhodes, Kos, and Byzantium.[483]

Such was the termination of the Social War, which fatally impaired the power, and lowered the dignity, of Athens. Imperfectly as we know the events, it seems clear that her efforts to meet this formidable revolt were feeble and inadequate; evincing a

sad downfall of energy since the year 412 B. C., when she had contended with transcendent vigor against similar and even greater calamities, only a year after her irreparable disaster before Syracuse. Inglorious as the result of the Social War was, it had nevertheless been costly, and left Athens poor. The annual revenues of her confederacy were greatly lessened by the secession of so many important cities, and her public treasury was exhausted. It is just at this time that the activity of Demosthenes as a public adviser begins. In a speech delivered this year (355 B. C.), he notes the poverty of the treasury; and refers back to it in discourses of after time as a fact but too notorious.[484]

But the misfortunes arising to Athens from the Social War did not come alone. It had the farther effect of rendering her less competent for defence against the early aggressions of Philip of Macedon.

That prince, during the first year of his accession (359 B. C.), had sought to conciliate Athens by various measures, but especially by withdrawing his garrison from Amphipolis, while he was establishing his military strength in the interior against the Illyrians and Pæonians. He had employed in this manner a period apparently somewhat less than two years; and employed it with such success, as to humble his enemies in the interior, and get together a force competent for aggressive operations against the cities on the coast. During this interval, Amphipolis remained a free and independent city; formally renounced by Philip, and not assailed by the Athenians. Why they let slip this favorable opportunity of again enforcing by arms pretensions on which they laid so much stress—I have before partially (though not very satisfactorily) explained. Philip was not the man to let them enjoy the opportunity longer than he could help, or to defer the moment of active operations as they did. Towards the close of 358 B. C., finding his hands free from impediments in the interior, he forthwith commenced the siege of Amphipolis. The inhabitants are said to have been unfavorably disposed towards him, and to have given him many causes for war.[485] It is not easy to understand what these causes could have been, seeing that so short a time before, the town had been garrisoned by Macedonians invoked as protectors against Athens; nor were the inhabitants in any condition to act aggressively against Philip.

Having in vain summoned Amphipolis to surrender, Philip commenced a strenuous siege, assailing the walls with battering-rams and other military engines. The weak points of the fortification must have been well known to him, from his own soldiers who had been recently in garrison. The inhabitants defended themselves with vigor; but such was now the change of circumstances, that they were forced to solicit their ancient enemy Athens for aid against the Macedonian prince. Their envoys Hierax and Stratokles, reaching Athens shortly after the successful close of the Athenian expedition to Eubœa, presented themselves before the public assembly, urgently inviting the Athenians to come forthwith and occupy Amphipolis, as the only chance of rescue from Macedonian dominion.[486] We are not certain whether the Social War

had yet broken out; if it had, Athens would be too much pressed with anxieties arising out of so formidable a revolt, to have means disposable even for the tempting recovery of the long-lost Amphipolis. But at any rate Philip had foreseen and counterworked the prayers of the Amphipolitans. He sent a courteous letter to the Athenians, acquainting them that he was besieging the town, yet recognizing it as belonging of right to them, and promising to restore it to them when he should have succeeded in the capture.[487]

Much of the future history of Greece turned upon the manner in which Athens dealt with these two conflicting messages. The situation of Amphipolis, commanding the passage over the Strymon, was not only all-important—as shutting up Macedonia to the eastward and as opening the gold regions around Mount Pangæus—but was also easily defensible by the Athenians from seaward, if once acquired. Had they been clear-sighted in the appreciation of chances, and vigilant in respect to future defence, they might now have acquired this important place, and might have held it against the utmost efforts of Philip. But that fatal inaction which had become their general besetting sin, was on the present occasion encouraged by some plausible, yet delusive, pleas. The news of the danger of the Amphipolitans would be not unwelcome at Athens—where strong aversion was entertained towards them, as refractory occupants of a territory not their own, and as having occasioned repeated loss and humiliation to the Athenian arms. Nor could the Athenians at once shift their point of view, so as to contemplate the question on the ground of policy alone, and to recognize these old enemies as persons whose interests had now come into harmony with their own. On the other hand, the present temper of the Athenians towards Philip was highly favorable. Not only had they made peace with him during the preceding year, but they also felt that he had treated them well both in evacuating Amphipolis and in dismissing honorably their citizens who had been taken prisoners in the army of his competitor Argæus.[488] Hence they were predisposed to credit his positive assurance, that he only wished to take the place in order to expel a troublesome population who had wronged and annoyed him, and that he would readily hand it over to its rightful owners the Athenians. To grant the application of the Amphipolitans for aid, would thus appear, at Athens, to be courting a new war and breaking with a valuable friend, in order to protect an odious enemy, and to secure an acquisition which would at all events come to them, even if they remained still, through the cession of Philip. It is necessary to dwell upon the motives which determined Athens on this occasion to refrain from interference; since there were probably few of her resolutions which she afterwards more bitterly regretted. The letter of assurance from Philip was received and trusted; the envoys from Amphipolis were dismissed with a refusal.

Deprived of all hope of aid from Athens, the Amphipolitans still held out as long as they could. But a party in the town entered into correspondence with Philip to betray it, and the defence thus gradually became feebler. At length he made a breach

in the walls, sufficient, with the aid of partisans within, to carry the city by assault, not without a brave resistance from those who still remained faithful. All the citizens unfriendly to him were expelled or fled, the rest were treated with lenity; but we are told that little favor was shown by Philip towards those who had helped in the betrayal.[489]

Amphipolis was to Philip an acquisition of unspeakable importance, not less for defence than for offence. It was not only the most convenient maritime station in Thrace, but it also threw open to him all the country east of the Strymon, and especially the gold region near Mount Pangæus. He established himself firmly in his new position, which continued from henceforward one of the bulwarks of Macedonia, until the conquest of that kingdom by the Romans. He took no steps to fulfil his promise of handing over the place to the Athenians, who doubtless sent embassies to demand it. The Social War, indeed, which just now broke out, absorbed all their care and all their forces, so that they were unable, amidst their disastrous reverses at Chios and elsewhere, to take energetic measures in reference to Philip and Amphipolis. Nevertheless he still did not peremptorily refuse the surrender, but continued to amuse the Athenians with delusive hopes, suggested through his partisans, paid or voluntary, in the public assembly.

It was the more necessary for him to postpone any open breach with Athens, because the Olynthians had conceived serious alarm from his conquest of Amphipolis, and had sent to negotiate a treaty of amity and alliance with the Athenians. Such an alliance, had it been concluded, would have impeded the farther schemes of Philip. But his partisans at Athens procured the dismissal of the Olynthian envoys, by renewed assurances that the Macedonian prince was still the friend of Athens, and still disposed to cede Amphipolis as her legitimate possession. They represented, however, that he had good ground for complaining that Athens continued to retain Pydna, an ancient Macedonian seaport.[490] Accordingly they proposed to open negotiations with him for the exchange of Pydna against Amphipolis. But as the Pydnæans were known to be adverse to the transfer, secrecy was indispensable in the preliminary proceedings, so that Antiphon and Charidemus, the two envoys named, took their instructions from the Senate and made their reports only to the Senate. The public assembly being informed that negotiations, unavoidably secret, were proceeding, to ensure the acquisition of Amphipolis—was persuaded to repel the advances of Olynthus, as well as to look upon Philip still as a friend.[491]

The proffered alliance of the Olynthians was thus rejected, as the entreaty of the Amphipolitans for aid had previously been. Athens had good reason to repent of both. The secret negotiation brought her no nearer to the possession of Amphipolis. It ended in nothing, or in worse than nothing, as it amused her with delusive expectations, while Philip opened a treaty with the Olynthians, irritated, of course, by their recent repulse at Athens. As yet he had maintained pacific relations with the Athenians, even while holding Amphipolis contrary to his engagement. But he now altered

his policy, and contracted alliance with the Olynthians; whose friendship he purchased not only by ceding to them the district of Anthemus (lying between Olynthus and Therma, and disputed by the Olynthians with former Macedonian kings), but also by conquering and handing over to them the important Athenian possession of Potidæa.[492] We know no particulars of these important transactions. Our scanty authorities merely inform us, that during the first two years (358-356 B. C.), while Athens was absorbed by her disastrous Social War, Philip began to act as her avowed enemy. He conquered from her not only Pydna and other places for himself, but also Potidæa for the Olynthians. We are told that Pydna was betrayed to Philip by a party of traitors in the town;[493] and he probably availed himself of the secret propositions made by Athens respecting the exchange of Pydna for Amphipolis, to exasperate the Pydnæans against her bad faith; since they would have good ground for resenting the project of transferring them underhand, contrary to their own inclination. Pydna was the first place besieged and captured. Several of its inhabitants, on the ground of prior offence towards Macedonia,[494] are said to have been slain, while even those who had betrayed the town were contemptuously treated. The siege lasted long enough to transmit news to Athens, and to receive aid, had the Athenians acted with proper celerity in despatching forces. But either the pressure of the Social War—or the impatience of personal service as well as of pecuniary payment—or both causes operating together—made them behindhand with the exigency. Several Athenian citizens were taken in Pydna and sold into slavery, some being ransomed by Demosthenes out of his own funds; yet we cannot make out clearly that any relief at all was sent from Athens.[495] If any was sent, it came too late.

Equal tardiness was shown in the relief sent to Potidæa[496]—though the siege, carried on jointly by Philip and the Olynthians, was both long and costly[497]—and though there were a body of Athenian settlers (Kleruchs) resident there, whom the capture of the place expelled from their houses and properties.[498] Even for the rescue of these fellow-citizens, it does not appear that any native Athenians would undertake the burden of personal service; the relieving force despatched seems to have consisted of a general with mercenary foreigners; who, as no pay was provided for them, postponed the enterprise on which they were sent to the temptation of plundering elsewhere for their own profit.[499] It was thus that Philip, without any express declaration of war, commenced a series of hostile measures against Athens, and deprived her of several valuable maritime possessions on the coast of Macedonia and Thrace, besides his breach of faith respecting the cession of Amphipolis.[500] After her losses from the Social War, and her disappointment about Amphipolis, she was yet farther mortified by seeing Pydna pass into his hands, and Potidæa (the most important possession in Thrace next to Amphipolis) into those of Olynthus. Her impoverished settlers returned home, doubtless with bitter complaint against the aggression, but also with just vexation against the tardiness of their countrymen in sending relief.

These two years had been so employed by Philip as to advance prodigiously his power and ascendency. He had deprived Athens of her hold upon the Thermaic gulf, in which she now seems only to have retained the town of Methônê, instead of the series of ports round the gulf acquired for her by Timotheus.[501] He had conciliated the good-will of the Olynthians by his cession of Anthemus and Potidæa; the latter place, from its commanding situation on the isthmus of Pallenê, giving them the mastery of that peninsula,[502] and ensuring (what to Philip was of great importance) their enmity with Athens. He not only improved the maritime conveniences of Amphipolis, but also extended his acquisitions into the auriferous regions of Mount Pangæus eastward of the Strymon. He possessed himself of that productive country immediately facing the island of Thasos; where both Thasians and Athenians had once contended for the rights of mining, and from whence, apparently, both had extracted valuable produce. In the interior of this region he founded a new city called Philippi, enlarged from a previous town called Krenides, recently founded by the Thasians; and he took such effective measures for increasing the metallic works in the neighborhood, that they presently yielded to him a large revenue; according to Diodorus, not less than one thousand talents per annum.[503] He caused a new gold coin to be struck, bearing a name derived from his own. The fresh source of wealth thus opened was of the greatest moment to him, as furnishing means to meet the constantly increasing expense of his military force. He had full employment to keep his soldiers in training: for the nations of the interior—Illyrians, Pæonians, and Thracians—humbled but not subdued, rose again in arms, and tried again jointly to reclaim their independence. The army of Philip—under his general Parmenio, of whom we now hear for the first time—defeated them, and again reduced them to submission.[504]

It was during this interval too that Philip married Olympias, daughter of Neoptolemus prince of the Molossi,[505] and descended from the ancient Molossian kings, who boasted of an heroic Æakid genealogy. Philip had seen her at the religious mysteries in the island of Samothrace, where both were initiated at the same time. In violence of temper—in jealous, cruel, and vindictive disposition—she forms almost a parallel to the Persian queens Amestris and Parysatis. The Epirotic women, as well as the Thracian, were much given to the Bacchanalian religious rites, celebrated with fierce ecstasy amid the mountain solitudes in honor of Dionysius.[506] To this species of religious excitement Olympias was peculiarly susceptible. She is said to have been fond of tame snakes playing around her, and to have indulged in ceremonies of magic and incantation.[507] Her temper and character became, after no long time, repulsive and even alarming to Philip. But in the year 356 B. C. she bore to him a son, afterwards renowned as Alexander the Great. It was in the summer of this year, not long after the taking of Potidæa, that Philip received nearly at the same time, three messages with good news—the birth of his son; the defeat of the Illyrians by Parmenio; and the success of one of his running horses at the Olympic games.[508]

CHAPTER LXXXVII.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SACRED WAR TO THAT OF THE OLYNTHIAN WAR.

It has been recounted in the preceding chapter, how Philip, during the continuance of the Social War, aggrandized himself in Macedonia and Thrace at the expense of Athens, by the acquisition of Amphipolis, Pydna, and Potidæa—the two last actually taken from her, the first captured only under false assurances held out to her while he was besieging it: how he had farther strengthened himself by enlisting Olynthus both as an ally of his own, and as an enemy of the Athenians. He had thus begun the war against Athens, usually spoken of as the war about Amphipolis, which lasted without any formal peace for twelve years. The resistance opposed by Athens to these his first aggressions had been faint and ineffective—partly owing to embarrassments. But the Social War had not yet terminated, when new embarrassments and complications, of a far more formidable nature, sprang up elsewhere—known by the name of the Sacred War, rending the very entrails of the Hellenic world, and profitable only to the indefatigable aggressor in Macedonia.

The Amphiktyonic assembly, which we shall now find exalted into an inauspicious notoriety, was an Hellenic institution ancient and venerable, but rarely invested with practical efficiency. Though political by occasion, it was religious in its main purpose, associated with the worship of Apollo at Delphi and of Dêmêtêr at Thermopylæ. Its assemblies were held twice annually—in spring at Delphi, in autumn at Thermopylæ; while in every fourth year it presided at the celebration of the great Pythian festival near Delphi, or appointed persons to preside in its name. It consisted of deputies called Hieromnemones and Pylagoræ, sent by the twelve ancient nations or fractions of the Hellenic name, who were recognized as its constituent body: Thessalians, Bœotians, Dorians, Ionians, Perrhæbians, Magnêtes, Lokrians, Œtæans or Ænianes, Achæans, Malians, Phokians, Dolopes. These were the twelve nations, sole partners in the Amphiktyonic sacred rites and meetings: each nation, small and great alike, having two votes in the decision and no more; and each city, small and great alike, contributing equally to make up the two votes of that nation to which it belonged. Thus Sparta counted only as one of the various communities forming the Dorian nation: Athens, in like manner in the Ionian, not superior in rank to Erythræ or Priênê. [509]

That during the preceding century, the Amphiktyonic assembly had meddled rarely, and had never meddled to any important purpose, in the political affairs of Greece—is proved by the fact that it is not once mentioned either in the history of Thucydides, or in the Hellenica of Xenophon. But after the humiliation of Sparta at Leuktra, this great religious convocation of the Hellenic world, after long torpor, be-

gan to meet for the despatch of business. Unfortunately its manifestations of activity were for the most part abusive and mischievous. Probably not long after the battle of Leuktra, though we do not know the precise year—the Thebans exhibited before the Amphiktyons an accusation against Sparta, for having treacherously seized the Kadmeia (the citadel of Thebes) in a period of profound peace. Sentence of condemnation was pronounced against her,[510] together with a fine of five hundred talents, doubled after a certain interval of non-payment. The act here put in accusation was indisputably a gross political wrong; and a pretence, though a very slight pretence, for bringing political wrong under cognizance of the Amphiktyons, might be found in the tenor of the old oath taken by each included city.[511] Still, every one knew that for generations past, the assembly had taken no actual cognizance of political wrong; so that both trial and sentence were alike glaring departures from understood Grecian custom—proving only the humiliation of Sparta and the insolence of Thebes. The Spartans of course did not submit to pay, nor were there any means of enforcement against them. No practical effect followed therefore, except (probably) the exclusion of Sparta from the Amphiktyonic assembly—as well as from the Delphian temple and the Pythian games. Indirectly, however, the example was most pernicious, as demonstrating that the authority of a Pan-hellenic convocation, venerable from its religious antiquity; could be abused to satisfy the political antipathies of a single leading state.

In the year 357 B. C., a second attempt was made by Thebes to employ the authority of the Amphiktyonic assembly as a means of crushing her neighbors the Phokians. The latter had been, from old time, border-enemies of the Thebans, Lokrians, and Thessalians. Until the battle of Leuktra, they had fought as allies of Sparta against Thebes, but had submitted to Thebes after that battle, and had continued to be her allies, though less and less cordial, until the battle of Mantinea and the death of Epaminondas.[512] Since that time, the old antipathy appears to have been rekindled, especially on the part of Thebes. Irritated against the Phokians probably as having broken off from a sworn alliance, she determined to raise against them an accusation in the Amphiktyonic assembly. As to the substantive ground of accusation, we find different statements. According to one witness, they were accused of having cultivated some portion of the Kirrhæan plain, consecrated from of old to Apollo; according to another, they were charged with an aggressive invasion of Bœotia; while, according to a third, the war was caused by their having carried off Theano, a married Theban woman. Pausanias confesses that he cannot distinctly make out what was the allegation against them.[513] Assisted by the antipathy of the Thessalians and Lokrians, not less vehement than her own, Thebes had no difficulty in obtaining sentence of condemnation against the Phokians. A fine was imposed upon them; of what amount we are not told, but so heavy as to be far beyond their means of payment.

It was thus that the Thebans, who had never been able to attach to themselves a powerful confederacy such as that which formerly held its meetings at Sparta, supplied the deficiency by abusing their ascendency in the Amphiktyonic assembly to procure vengeance upon political enemies. A certain time was allowed for liquidating the fine, which the Phokians had neither means nor inclination to do. Complaint of the fact was then made at the next meeting of the Amphiktyons, when a decisive resolution was adopted, and engraven along with the rest on a column in the Delphian temple, to expropriate the recusant Phokians, and consecrate all their territory to Apollo—as Kirrha with its fertile plain had been treated two centuries before. It became necessary, at the same time, for the maintenance of consistency and equal dealing, to revive the mention of the previous fine still remaining unpaid by the Lacedæmonians; against whom it was proposed to pass a vote of something like excommunication.

Such impending dangers, likely to be soon realized under the instigation of Thebes, excited a resolute spirit of resistance among the Phokians. A wealthy and leading citizen of the Phokian town Ledon, named Philomelus son of Theotimus, stood forward as the head of this sentiment, setting himself energetically to organize means for the preservation of Phokian liberty as well as property. Among his assembled countrymen, he protested against the gross injustice of the recent sentence, amercing them in an enormous sum exceeding their means; when the strip of land, where they were alleged to have trespassed on the property of the god, was at best narrow and insignificant. Nothing was left, now, to avert from them utter ruin, except a bold front and an obstinate resistance, which he (Philomelus) would pledge himself to conduct with success, if they would intrust him with full powers. The Phokians (he contended) were the original and legitimate administrators of the Delphian temple—a privilege of which they had been wrongfully dispossessed by the Amphiktyonic assembly and the Delphians. "Let us reply to our enemies (he urged) by re-asserting our lost rights and seizing the temple; we shall obtain support and countenance from many Grecian states, whose interest is the same as our own, to resist the unjust decrees of the Amphiktyons.[514] Our enemies the Thebans (he added) are plotting the seizure of the temple for themselves, through the corrupt connivance of an Amphiktyonic majority: let us anticipate and prevent their injustice."[515]

Here a new question was raised, respecting the right of presidency over the most venerated sanctuary in Greece; a question fraught with ruin to the peace of the Hellenic world. The claim of the Phokians was not a mere fiction, but founded on an ancient reality, and doubtless believed by themselves to be just. Delphi and its inhabitants were originally a portion of the Phokian name. In the Homeric Catalogue, which Philomelus emphatically cited, it stands enumerated among the Phokians commanded by Schedius and Epistrophus, under the name of the "rocky Pytho,"—a name still applied to it by Herodotus.[516] The Delphians had acquired sufficient force to sever themselves from their Phokian brethren—to stand out as a community by

themselves—and to assume the lucrative privilege of administering the temple as their own peculiar. Their severance had been first brought about, and their pretensions as administrators espoused by Sparta,[517] upon whose powerful interest they mainly depended. But the Phokians had never ceased to press their claim, and so far was the dispute from being settled against them, even in 450 B. C., that they then had in their hands the actual administration. The Spartans despatched an army for the express purpose of taking it away from them and transferring it to the Delphians; but very shortly afterwards, when the Spartan forces had retired, the Athenians marched thither, and dispossessed the Delphians,[518] restoring the temple to the Phokians. This contest went by the name of the Sacred War. At that time the Athenians were masters of most parts of Bœotia, as well as of Megara and Pegæ; and had they continued so, the Phokians would probably have been sustained in their administration of the holy place; the rights of the Delphians on one side, against those of the Phokians on the other, being then obviously dependent on the comparative strength of Athens and Sparta. But presently evil days came upon Athens, so that she lost all her inland possessions north of Attica, and could no longer uphold her allies in Phokis. The Phokians now in fact passed into allies of Sparta, and were forced to relinquish their temple-management to the Delphians; who were confirmed in it by a formal article of the peace of Nikias in 421 B. C.,[519] and retained it without question, under the recognized Hellenic supremacy of Sparta, down to the battle of Leuktra. Even then, too, it continued undisturbed; since Thebes was nowise inclined to favor the claim of her enemies the Phokians, but was on the contrary glad to be assisted in crushing them by their rivals the Delphians, who, as managers of the temple, could materially contribute to a severe sentence of the Amphiktyonic assembly.

We see thus that the claim now advanced by Philomelus was not fictitious, but genuine, and felt by himself as well as by other Phokians to be the recovery of an ancient privilege, lost only through superior force.[520] His views being heartily embraced by his countrymen, he was nominated general with full powers. It was his first measure to go to Sparta, upon whose aid he counted, in consequence of the heavy fine which still stood imposed upon her by the Amphiktyonic sentence. He explained his views privately to king Archidamus, engaging, if the Phokians should become masters of the temple, to erase the sentence and fine from the column of record. Archidamus did not dare to promise him public countenance or support; the rather, as Sparta had always been the chief supporter of the Delphian presidency (as against the Phokian) over the temple. But in secret he warmly encouraged the scheme; furnishing a sum of fifteen talents, besides a few mercenary soldiers, towards its execution. With this aid Philomelus returned home, provided an equal sum of fifteen talents from his own purse, and collected a body of peltasts, Phokians as well as strangers. He then executed his design against Delphi, attacking suddenly both the town and the temple, and capturing them, as it would appear, with little opposition. To the alarmed Delphians, generally, he promised security and good treat-

ment; but he put to death the members of the Gens (or Clan) called Thrakidæ, and seized their property: these men constituted one among several holy Gentes, leading conductors of the political and religious agency of the place.[521] It is probable, that when thus suddenly assailed, they had sent to solicit aid from their neighbors, the Lokrians of Amphissa; for Philomelus was scarcely in possession of Delphi, when these latter marched up to the rescue. He defeated them however with serious loss, and compelled them to return home.

Thus completely successful in his first attempt, Philomelus lost no time in announcing solemnly and formally his real purpose. He proclaimed that he had come only to resume for the Phokians their ancient rights as administrators; that the treasures of the temple should be safe and respected as before; that no impiety or illegality of any kind should be tolerated; and that the temple and its oracle would be opened, as heretofore, for visitors, sacrificers, and inquirers. At the same time, well aware that his Lokrian enemies at Amphissa were very near, he erected a wall to protect the town and temple, which appears to have been hitherto undefended,—especially its western side. He further increased his levies of troops. While the Phokians, inspirited with this first advantage, obeyed his call in considerable numbers, he also attracted new mercenaries from abroad by the offer of higher pay. He was presently at the head of five thousand men, strong enough to hold a difficult post like Delphi against all immediate attack. But being still anxious to appease Grecian sentiment and avert hostility, he despatched envoys to all the principal states,—not merely to Sparta and Athens, but also to his enemy Thebes. His envoys were instructed to offer solemn assurances, that the Phokians had taken Delphi simply to reclaim their paternal right of presidency, against past wrongful usurpation; that they were prepared to give any security required by the Hellenic body, for strict preservation of the valuables in the temple, and to exhibit and verify all, by weight and number, before examiners; that conscious of their own rectitude of purpose, they did not hesitate to entreat positive support against their enemies, or at any rate, neutrality.[522] The answers sent to Philomelus were not all of the same tenor. On this memorable event, the sentiments of the Grecian world were painfully divided. While Athens, Sparta, the Peloponnesian Achæans and some other states in Peloponnesus, recognized the possession of the Phokians, and agreed to assist them in retaining it,—the Thebans and Thessalians declared strenuously against them, supported by all the states north of Bœotia, Lokrians, Dorians, Ænianes, Phthiot-Achæans, Magnêtes, Perrhæbians, Athamânes, and Dolopes. Several of these last were dependents of the Thessalians, and followed their example; many of them moreover belonging to the Amphiktyonic constituency, must have taken part in the votes of condemnation just rescinded by the Phokians.

We may clearly see that it was not at first the intention of Philomelus or his Phokian comrades to lay hands on the property of the Delphian temple; and Philomelus, while taking pains to set himself right in the eyes of Greece, tried to

keep the prophetic agency of the temple in its ordinary working, so as to meet the exigencies of sacrificers and inquirers as before. He required the Pythian priestess to mount the tripod, submit herself to the prophetic inspiration, and pronounce the word thus put into her mouth, as usual. But the priestess,—chosen by the Delphians, and probably herself a member of one among the sacred Delphian Gentes,—obstinately refused to obey him; especially as the first question which he addressed concerned his own usurpation, and his chances of success against enemies. On his injunctions, that she should prophesy according to the traditional rites,—she replied that these rites were precisely what he had just overthrown; upon which he laid hold of her, and attempted to place her on the tripod by force. Subdued and frightened for her own personal safety, the priestess exclaimed involuntarily, that he might do what he chose. Philomelus gladly took this as an answer, favorable to his purpose. He caused it to be put in writing and proclaimed, as an oracle from the god, sanctioning and licensing his designs. He convened a special meeting of his partisans and the Delphians generally, wherein appeal was made to this encouraging answer, as warranting full confidence with reference to the impending war. So it was construed by all around, and confirmatory evidence was derived from farther signs and omens occurring at the moment.[523] It is probable, however, that Philomelus took care for the future to name a new priestess, more favorable to his interest, and disposed to deliver oracular answers under the new administrators in the same manner as under the old.

Though so large a portion of the Grecian name had thus declared war against the Phokians, yet none at first appear to have made hostile movements, except the Lokrians, with whom Philomelus was fully competent to deal. He found himself strong enough to overrun and plunder their territory, engaging in some indecisive skirmishes. At first the Lokrians would not even give up the bodies of his slain soldiers for burial, alleging that sacrilegious men were condemned by the general custom of Greece to be cast out without sepulture. Nor did they desist from their refusal until he threatened retaliation towards the bodies of their own slain.[524] So bitter was the exasperation arising out of this deplorable war throughout the Hellenic world! Even against the Lokrians alone, however, Philomelus soon found himself in want of money, for the payment of his soldiers,—native Phokians as well as mercenary strangers. Accordingly, while he still adhered to his pledge to respect the temple property, he did not think himself precluded from levying a forced contribution on the properties of his enemies, the wealthy Delphian citizens; and his arms were soon crowned with a brilliant success against the Lokrians, in a battle fought near the Rocks called Phædriades; a craggy and difficult locality so close to Delphi, that the Lokrians must evidently have been the aggressors, marching up with a view to relieve the town. They were defeated with great loss, both in slain and in prisoners; several of them only escaping the spear of the enemy by casting themselves to certain death down the precipitous cliffs.[525]

This victory, while imparting courage to the Phokians, proved the signal for fresh exertions among their numerous enemies. The loud complaints of the defeated Lokrians raised universal sympathy; and the Thebans, now pressed by fear, as well as animated by hatred, of the Phokians, put themselves at the head of the movement. Sending round envoys to the Thessalians and the other Amphiktyonic states, they invoked aid and urged the necessity of mustering a common force,—"to assist the god,"—to vindicate the judicial dignity of the Amphiktyonic assembly,—and to put down the sacrilegious Phokians.[526] It appears that a special meeting of the assembly itself was convened; probably at Thermopylæ, since Delphi was in possession of the enemy. Decided resolutions were here taken to form an Amphiktyonic army of execution; accompanied by severe sentences of fine and other punishments, against the Phokian leaders, by name Philomelus and Onomarchus,—perhaps brothers, but at least joint commanders, together with others.[527]

The perils of the Phokians now became imminent. Their own unaided strength was nowise sufficient to resist the confederacy about to arm in defence of the Amphiktyonic assembly;[528] nor does it appear that either Athens or Sparta had as yet given them anything more than promises and encouragement. Their only chance of effective resistance lay in the levy of a large mercenary force; for which purpose neither their own funds, nor any farther aid derivable from private confiscation, could be made adequate. There remained no other resource except to employ the treasures and valuables in the Delphian temple, upon which accordingly Philomelus now laid hands. He did so, however, as his previous conduct evinced, with sincere reluctance, probably with various professions at first of borrowing only a given sum, destined to meet the actual emergency, and intended to be repaid as soon as safety should be provided for.[529] But whatever may have been his intentions at the outset, all such reserves or limits, or obligations to repay, were speedily forgotten in practice. When the feeling which protected the fund was broken through, it was as easy to take much as little, and the claimants became more numerous and importunate; besides which the exigencies of the war never ceased, and the implacable repugnance raised by the spoliation amidst half of the Grecian world, left to the Phokians no security except under the protection of a continued mercenary force.[530] Nor were Philomelus and his successors satisfied without also enriching their friends and adorning their wives or favorites.

Availing himself of the large resources of the temple, Philomelus raised the pay of his troops to a sum half as large again as before, and issued proclamations inviting new levies at the same rate. Through such tempting offers he was speedily enabled to muster a force, horse and foot together, said to amount to 10,000 men; chiefly, as we are told, men of peculiarly wicked and reckless character, since no pious Greek would enlist in such a service. With these he attacked the Lokrians, who were however now assisted by the Thebans from one side, and by the Thessalians with their circumjacent allies from the other. Philomelus gained successive advantages against

both of them, and conceived increased hopes from a reinforcement of 1500 Achæans who came to him from Peloponnesus. The war assumed a peculiarly ferocious character; for the Thebans,[531] confident in their superior force and chance of success, even though the Delphian treasure was employed against them, began by putting to death all their prisoners, as sacrilegious men standing condemned by the Amphiktyonic assembly. This so exasperated the troops of Philomelus, that they constrained him to retaliate upon the Bœotian prisoners. For some time such rigorous inflictions were continued on both sides, until at length the Thebans felt compelled to desist, and Philomelus followed their example. The war lasted a while with indecisive results, the Thebans and their allies being greatly superior in number. But presently Philomelus incautiously exposed himself to attack in an unfavorable position, near the town of Neon, amidst embarrassing woods and rocks. He was here defeated with severe loss, and his army dispersed; himself receiving several wounds, and fighting with desperate bravery, until farther resistance became impossible. He then tried to escape, but found himself driven to the brink of a precipice, where he could only avoid the tortures of captivity by leaping down and perishing. The remnant of his vanquished army was rallied at some distance by Onomarchus.[532]

The Thebans and their allies, instead of pressing the important victory recently gained over Philomelus, seem to have supposed that the Phokians would now disperse or submit of their own accord, and accordingly returned home. Their remissness gave time to Onomarchus to reorganize his dispirited countrymen. Convening at Delphi a general assembly of Phokians and allies, he strenuously exhorted them to persevere in the projects, and avenge the death, of their late general. He found, however, no inconsiderable amount of opposition; for many of the Phokians—noway prepared for the struggle in which they now found themselves embarked, and themselves ashamed of the spoliation of the temple—were anxious by some accommodation to put themselves again within the pale of Hellenic religious sentiment. Onomarchus doubtless replied, and with too good reason, that peace was unattainable upon any terms short of absolute ruin; and that there was no course open except to maintain their ground as they stood, by renewed efforts of force. But even if the necessities of the case had been less imperative, he would have been able to overbear all opposition of his own countrymen through the numerous mercenary strangers, now in Phokis and present at the assembly under the name of allies.[533] In fact, so irresistible was his ascendency by means of this large paid force under his command, that both Demosthenes and Æschines[534] denominate him (as well as his predecessor and his successor) not general, but despot, of the Phokians. The soldiers were not less anxious than Onomarchus to prosecute the war, and to employ the yet unexhausted wealth of the temple in every way conducive to ultimate success. In this sense the assembly decreed, naming Onomarchus general with full powers for carrying the decree into effect.

His energetic measures presently retrieved the Phokian cause. Employing the temple-funds still more profusely than Philomelus, he invited fresh soldiers from all quarters, and found himself, after some time, at the head of a larger army than before. The temple exhibited many donatives, not only of gold and silver, but also of brass and iron. While Onomarchus melted the precious metals and coined them into money, he at the same time turned the brass and iron into arms;[535] so that he was enabled to equip both his own soldiers disarmed in the recent defeat, and a class of volunteers poorer than the ordinary self-armed mercenaries. Besides paying soldiers, he scattered everywhere presents or bribes to gain influential partisans in the cities favorable to his cause; probably Athens and Sparta first of all. We are told that the Spartan king Archidamus, with his wife Deïnicha, were among the recipients; indeed the same corrupt participation was imputed, by the statement of the hostile-minded Messenians,[536] to the Spartan ephors and senate. Even among enemies, Onomarchus employed his gold with effect, contriving thus to gain or neutralize a portion of the Thessalians; among them the powerful despots of Pheræ, whom we afterwards find allied to him. Thus was the great Delphian treasure turned to account in every way; and the unscrupulous Phokian despot strengthened his hands yet farther, by seizing such of his fellow-countrymen as had been prominent in opposition to his views, putting them to death, and confiscating their property.[537]

Through such combination of profuse allurement, corruption, and violence, the tide began to turn again in favor of the Phokians. Onomarchus found himself shortly at the head of a formidable army, which he marched forth from Delphi, and subdued successively the Lokrians of Amphissa, the Epiknemidian Lokrians, and the neighboring territory of Doris. He carried his conquests even as far as the vicinity of Thermopylæ; capturing Thronium, one of the towns which commanded that important pass, and reducing its inhabitants to slavery. It is probable that he also took Nikæa and Alpônus—two other valuable positions near Thermopylæ, which we know to have been in the power of the Phokians until the moment immediately preceding their ruin—since we find him henceforward master of Thermopylæ, and speedily opening his communications with Thessaly.[538] Besides this extension of dominion to the north and east of Phokis, Onomarchus also invaded Bœotia. The Thebans, now deprived of their northern allies, did not at first meet him in the field, so that he was enabled to capture Orchomenus. But when he proceeded to attack Chæroneia, they made an effective effort to relieve the place. They brought out their forces, and defeated him, in an action not very decisive, yet sufficient to constrain him to retire into Phokis.

Probably the Thebans were at this time much pressed, and prevented from acting effectively against the Phokians, by want of money. We know at least that in the midst of the Phokian war they hired out a force of 5000 hoplites commanded by Pammenes, to Artabazus the revolted Phrygian satrap. Here Pammenes with his soldiers acquired some renown, gaining two important victories over the Persians.[539]

The Thebans, it would seem, having no fleet and no maritime dependencies, were less afraid of giving offence to the Great King than Athens had been, when she interdicted Chares from aiding Artabazus, and acquiesced in the unfavorable pacification which terminated the Social War. How long Pammenes and the Thebans remained in Asia, we are not informed. But in spite of the victories gained by them, Artabazus was not long able to maintain himself against the Persian arms. Three years afterwards, we hear of him and his brother-in-law Memnon as expelled from Asia, and as exiles residing with Philip of Macedon.[540]

While Pammenes was serving under Artabazus, the Athenian general Chares recaptured Sestos in the Hellespont, which appears to have revolted from Athens during the Social War. He treated the captive Sestians with rigor; putting to death the men of military age, and selling the remainder as slaves.[541] This was an important acquisition for Athens, as a condition of security in the Chersonese as well as of preponderance in the Hellespont.

Alarmed at the successes of Chares in the Hellespont, the Thracian prince Kersobleptes now entered on an intrigue with Pammenes in Asia, and with Philip of Macedon (who was on the coast of Thrace, attacking Abdêra and Maroneia), for the purpose of checking the progress of the Athenian arms. Philip appears to have made a forward movement, and to have menaced the possessions of Athens in the Chersonese; but his access thither was forbidden by Amadokus, another prince of Thrace, master of the intermediate territory, as well as by the presence of Chares with his fleet off the Thracian coast.[542] Apollonides of Kardia was the agent of Kersobleptes; who however finding his schemes abortive, and intimidated by the presence of Chares, came to terms with Athens, and surrendered to her the portion of the Chersonese which still remained to him, with the exception of Kardia. The Athenians sent to the Chersonese a farther detachment of Kleruchs or out-settlers, for whom considerable room must have been made as well by the depopulation of Sestos, as by the recent cession from Kersobleptes.[543] It was in the ensuing year (352 B. C.) that the Athenians also despatched a fresh batch of 2000 citizens as settlers to Samos, in addition to those who had been sent thither thirteen years before.[544]

The mention of Philip as attacking Maroneia and menacing the Thracian Chersonese, shows the indefatigable activity of that prince and the steady enlargement of his power. In 358 B. C., he had taken Amphipolis; before 355 B. C., he had captured Pydna and Potidæa, founded the new town of Philippi, and opened for himself the resource of the adjoining auriferous region; he had established relations with Thessaly, assisting the great family of the Aleuadæ at Larissa in their struggle against Lykophron and Peitholaus, the despots of Pheræ:[545] he had farther again chastised the interior tribes bordering on Macedonia, Thracians. Pæonians, and Illyrians, who were never long at rest, and who had combined to regain their independence.[546] It appears to have been in 354-353 B. C., that he attacked Methônê, the last remaining possession of Athens on the Macedonian coast. Situated on the Thermaic Gulf, Methônê was

doubtless a convenient station for Athenian privateers to intercept trading vessels, not merely to and from Macedonian ports, but also from Olynthus and Potidæa; so that the Olynthians, then in alliance with Philip against Athens, would be glad to see it pass into his power, and may perhaps have lent him their aid. He pressed the siege of the place with his usual vigor, employing all the engines and means of assault then known; while the besieged on their side were not less resolute in the defence. They repelled his attacks for so long a time, that news of the danger of the place reached Athens, and ample time was afforded for sending relief, had the Athenians been ready and vigorous in their movement. But unfortunately they had not even now learnt experience from the loss of Pydna and Potidæa. Either the Etesian winds usual in summer, or the storms of winter, both which circumstances were taken into account by Philip in adjusting the season of his enterprises[547]—or (which is more probable) the aversion of the Athenian respectable citizens to personal service on shipboard, and their slackness even in pecuniary payment—caused so much delay in preparations, that the expedition sent out did not reach Methônê until too late.[548] The Methonæans, having gallantly held out until all their means were exhausted, were at length compelled to surrender. Diodorus tells us that Philip granted terms so far lenient as to allow them to depart with the clothes on their backs.[549] But this can hardly be accurate, since we know that there were Athenian citizens among them sold as slaves, some of whom were ransomed by Demosthenes with his own money.[550]

Being now master of the last port possessed by Athens in the Thermaic Gulf—an acquisition of great importance, which had never before[551] belonged to the Macedonian kings—Philip was enabled to extend his military operations to the neighborhood of the Thracian Chersonese on the one side, and to that of Thermopylæ on the other. How he threatened the Chersonese, has been already related; and his campaign in Thessaly was yet more important. That country was, as usual, torn by intestine disputes. Lykophron the despot of Pheræ possessed the greatest sway; while the Aleuadæ of Larissa, too weak to contend against him with their own forces, invited assistance from Philip; who entered Thessaly with a powerful army. Such a reinforcement so completely altered the balance of Thessalian power, that Lykophron in his turn was compelled to entreat aid from Onomarchus and the Phokians.

So strong were the Phokians now, that they were more than a match for the Thebans with their other hostile neighbors, and had means to spare for combating Philip in Thessaly. As their force consisted of a large body of mercenaries, whom they were constrained for security to retain in pay—to keep them employed beyond the border was a point not undesirable. Hence they readily entered upon the Thessalian campaign. At this moment they counted, in the comparative assessment of Hellenic forces, as an item of first-rate magnitude. They were hailed both by Athenians and Spartans as the natural enemy and counterpoise of Thebes, alike odious to both. While the Phokians maintained their actual power, Athens could manage her foreign

policy abroad, and Sparta her designs in Peloponnesus, with diminished apprehensions of being counterworked by Thebes. Both Athens and Sparta had at first supported the Phokians against unjust persecution by Thebes and abuse of Amphiktyonic jurisdiction, before the spoliation of the Delphian temple was consummated or even anticipated. And though, when that spoliation actually occurred, it was doubtless viewed with reprobation among Athenians, accustomed to unlimited freedom of public discussion—as well as at Sparta, in so far as it became known amidst the habitual secrecy of public affairs—nevertheless political interests so far prevailed, that the Phokians (perhaps in part by aid of bribery) were still countenanced, though not much assisted, as useful rivals to Thebes.[552] To restrain "the Leuktric insolence of the Thebans,"[553] and to see the Bœotian towns Orchomenus, Thespiæ, Platæa, restored to their pristine autonomy, was an object of paramount desire with each of the two ancient heads of Greece. So far both Athens and Sparta felt in unison. But Sparta cherished a farther hope—in which Athens by no means concurred—to avail herself of the embarrassments of Thebes for the purpose of breaking up Megalopolis and Messênê, and recovering her former Peloponnesian dominion. These two new Peloponnesian cities, erected by Epaminondas on the frontier of Laconia, had been hitherto upheld against Sparta by the certainty of Theban interference if they were menaced. But so little did Thebes seem in a condition to interfere, while Onomarchus and the Phokians were triumphant in 353-352 B. C., that the Megalopolitans despatched envoys to Athens to entreat protection and alliance, while the Spartans on their side sent to oppose the petition.

It is on occasion of the political debates in Athens during the years 354 and 353 B. C., that we first have before us the Athenian Demosthenes, as adviser of his countrymen in the public assembly. His first discourse of public advice was delivered in 354-353 B. C., on an alarm of approaching war with Persia; his second, in 353-352 B. C., was intended to point out the policy proper for Athens in dealing with the Spartan and Megalopolitan envoys.

A few words must here be said about this eminent man, who forms the principal ornament of the declining Hellenic world. He was about twenty-seven years old; being born, according to what seems the most probable among contradictory accounts, in 382-381 B. C.[554] His father, named also Demosthenes, was a citizen of considerable property, and of a character so unimpeachable that even Æschines says nothing against him; his mother Kleobulê was one of the two daughters and coheiresses of a citizen named Gylon,[555] an Athenian exile, who, having become rich as a proprietor of land and exporter of corn in Bosphorus, sent his two daughters to Athens; where, possessing handsome dowries, they married two Athenian citizens—Democharès and the elder Demosthenes. The latter was a man of considerable wealth, and carried on two distinct manufactories; one of swords or knives, employing thirty-two slaves—the other, of couches or beds, employing twenty. In the new schedule of citizens and of taxable property, introduced in the archonship of Nausinikus (378 B. C.), the elder

Demosthenes was enrolled among the richest class, the leaders of Symmories. But he died about 375 B. C., leaving his son Demosthenes seven years old, with a younger daughter about five years of age. The boy and his large paternal property were confided to the care of three guardians named under his father's will. These guardians—though the father, in hopes of ensuring their fidelity, had bequeathed to them considerable legacies, away from his own son, and though all of them were rich men as well as family connections and friends—administered the property with such negligence and dishonesty, that only a sum comparatively small was left, when they came to render account to their ward. At the age of sixteen years complete, Demosthenes attained his civil majority, and became entitled by the Athenian law to the administration of his own property. During his minority, his guardians had continued to enrol him among the wealthiest class (as his father had ranked before), and to pay the increased rate of direct taxation chargeable upon that class; but the real sum handed over to him by his guardians was too small to justify such a position. Though his father had died worth fourteen talents,—which would be diminished by the sums bequeathed as legacies, but ought to have been increased in greater proportion by the interest on the property for the ten years of minority, had it been properly administered—the sum paid to young Demosthenes on his majority was less than two talents, while the guardians not only gave in dishonest accounts, but professed not to be able to produce the father's will. After repeated complaints and remonstrances, he brought a judicial action against one of them—Aphobus, and obtained a verdict carrying damages to the amount of ten talents. Payment however was still evaded by the debtor. Five speeches remain delivered by Demosthenes, three against Aphobus, two against Onêtor, brother-in-law of Aphobus. At the date of the latest oration, Demosthenes had still received nothing; nor do we know how much he ultimately realized, though it would seem that the difficulties thrown in his way were such as to compel him to forego the greater part of the claim. Nor is it certain whether he ever brought the actions, of which he speaks as intended, against the other two guardians Demophon and Therippides.[556]

Demosthenes received during his youth the ordinary grammatical and rhetorical education of a wealthy Athenian. Even as a boy, he is said to have manifested extraordinary appetite and interest for rhetorical exercise. By earnest entreaty, he prevailed on his tutors to conduct him to hear Kallistratus, one of the ablest speakers in Athens, delivering an harangue in the Dikastery on the matter of Oropus.[557] This harangue, producing a profound impression upon Demosthenes, stimulated his fondness for rhetorical studies. Still more was the passion excited, when on attaining his majority, he found himself cheated of most of his paternal property, and constrained to claim his rights by a suit at law against his guardians. Being obliged, according to Athenian practice, to plead his own cause personally, he was made to feel keenly the helpless condition of an incompetent speaker, and the necessity of acquiring oratorical power, not simply as an instrument of ambition, but even as a means of individual defence and safety.[558] It appears also that he was, from childhood, of sickly

constitution and feeble muscular frame; so that partly from his own disinclination, partly from the solicitude of his mother, he took little part either as boy or youth in the exercises of the palæstra. His delicate clothing, and somewhat effeminate habits, procured for him as a boy the nickname of Batalus, which remained attached to him most part of his life, and which his enemies tried to connect with degrading imputations.[559] Such comparative bodily disability probably contributed to incite his thirst for mental and rhetorical acquisitions, as the only road to celebrity open. But it at the same time disqualified him from appropriating to himself the full range of a comprehensive Grecian education, as conceived by Plato, Isokrates, and Aristotle; an education applying alike to thought, word, and action—combining bodily strength, endurance, and fearlessness, with an enlarged mental capacity and a power of making it felt by speech. The disproportion between the physical energy, and the mental force, of Demosthenes, beginning in childhood, is recorded and lamented in the inscription placed on his statue after his death.[560]

As a youth of eighteen years of age, Demosthenes found himself with a known and good family position at Athens, being ranked in the class of richest citizens and liable to the performance of liturgies and trierarchy as his father had been before him;[561] yet with a real fortune very inadequate to the outlay expected from him—embarrassed by a legal proceeding against guardians wealthy as well as unscrupulous—and an object of dislike and annoyance from other wealthy men, such as Meidias and his brother Thrasylochus,[562] friends of those guardians. His family position gave him a good introduction to public affairs, for which he proceeded to train himself carefully; first as a writer of speeches for others, next as a speaker in his own person. Plato and Isokrates were both at this moment in full celebrity, visited at Athens by pupils from every part of Greece; Isæus also, who had studied under Isokrates, was in great reputation as a composer of judicial harangues for plaintiffs or defendants in civil causes. Demosthenes put himself under the teaching of Isæus (who is said to have assisted him in composing the speeches against his guardians), and also profited largely by the discourse of Plato, of Isokrates, and others. As an ardent aspirant he would seek instruction from most of the best sources, theoretical as well as practical—writers as well as lecturers.[563] But besides living teachers, there was one of the past generation who contributed largely to his improvement. He studied Thucydides with indefatigable labor and attention; according to one account, he copied the whole history eight times over with his own hand; according to another, he learnt it all by heart, so as to be able to rewrite it from memory when the manuscript was accidentally destroyed. Without minutely criticising these details, we ascertain at least that Thucydides was the object of his peculiar study and imitation. How much the composition of Demosthenes was fashioned by the reading of Thucydides—reproducing the daring, majestic and impressive phraseology, yet without the overstrained brevity and involutions of that great historian—and contriving to blend with it a perspicuity and grace not inferior to Lysias—may be seen illustrated in the elaborate criticism of the rhetor Dionysius.[564]

While thus striking out for himself a bold and original style, Demosthenes had still greater difficulties to overcome in regard to the external requisites of an orator. He was not endowed by nature, like Æschines, with a magnificent voice; nor, like Demades, with a ready flow of vehement improvisation. His thoughts required to be put together by careful preparation; his voice was bad and even lisping—his breath short—his gesticulation ungraceful; moreover he was overawed and embarrassed by the manifestations of the multitude. Such an accumulation of natural impediments were at least equal to those of which Isokrates complains, as having debarred him all his life from addressing the public assembly, and restrained him to a select audience of friends or pupils. The energy and success with which Demosthenes overcame his defects, in such manner as to satisfy a critical assembly like the Athenian, is one of the most memorable circumstances in the general history of self-education. Repeated humiliation and repulse only spurred him on to fresh solitary efforts for improvement. He corrected his defective elocution by speaking with pebbles in his mouth; he prepared himself to overcome the noise of the assembly by declaiming in stormy weather on the sea-shore of Phalerum; he opened his lungs by running, and extended his powers of holding breath by pronouncing sentences in marching up-hill; he sometimes passed two or three months without interruption in a subterranean chamber, practising night and day either in composition or declamation, and shaving one half of his head in order to disqualify himself from going abroad. After several trials without success before the assembly, his courage was on the point of giving way, when Eunomus and other old citizens reassured him by comparing the matter of his speeches to those of Perikles, and exhorting him to persevere a little longer in the correction of his external defects. On another occasion, he was pouring forth his disappointment to Satyrus the actor, who undertook to explain to him the cause, desiring him to repeat in his own way a speech out of Sophokles, which he (Satyrus) proceeded to repeat after him, with suitable accent and delivery. Demosthenes, profoundly struck with the difference, began anew the task of self-improvement; probably taking constant lessons from good models. In his unremitting private practice, he devoted himself especially to acquiring a graceful action, keeping watch on all his movements while declaiming before a tall looking-glass.[565] After pertinacious efforts for several years, he was rewarded at length with complete success. His delivery became full of decision and vehemence, highly popular with the general body of the assembly; though some critics censured his modulation as artificial and out of nature, and savoring of low stage-effect; while others, in the same spirit, condemned his speeches as over-labored and smelling of the lamp.[566]

So great was the importance assigned by Demosthenes himself to these external means of effect, that he is said to have pronounced "Action" to be the first, second, and third requisite for an orator. If we grant this estimate to be correct, with reference to actual hearers, we must recollect that his speeches are, (not less truly than the history of Thucydides), "an everlasting possession rather than a display for momentary effect." Even among his contemporaries, the effect of the speeches, when

read apart from the speaker, was very powerful. There were some who thought that their full excellence could only be thus appreciated;[567] while to the after-world, who know them only by reading, they have been and still are the objects of an admiration reaching its highest pitch in the enthusiastic sentiment of the fastidious rhetor Dionysius.[568] The action of Demosthenes,—consummate as it doubtless was, and highly as he may himself have prized an accomplishment so laboriously earned,—produced its effect only in conjunction with the matter of Demosthenes; his thoughts, sentiments, words, and above all, his sagacity in appreciating and advising on the actual situation. His political wisdom, and his lofty patriotic *idéal*, are in truth quite as remarkable as his oratory. By what training he attained either the one or the other of these qualities, we are unfortunately not permitted to know. Our informants have little interest in him except as a speaker; they tell us neither what he learned, nor from whom, nor by what companions, or party-associates, his political point of view was formed. But we shall hardly err in supposing that his attentive meditation of Thucydides supplied him, not merely with force and majesty of expression, but also with that conception of Athens in her foretime which he is perpetually impressing on his countrymen,—Athens at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, in days of exuberant energy, and under the advice of her noblest statesman.

In other respects, we are left in ignorance as to the mental history of Demosthenes. Before he acquired reputation as a public adviser, he was already known as a logographer, or composer of discourses to be delivered either by speakers in the public assembly or by litigants in the Dikastery; for which compositions he was paid, according to usual practice at Athens. He had also pleaded in person before the Dikastery; in support of an accusation preferred by others against a law, proposed by Leptines, for abrogating votes of immunity passed by the city in favor of individuals, and restraining such grants in future. Nothing can be more remarkable, in this speech against Leptines, than the intensity with which the young speaker enforces the necessity of strict and faithful adherence to engagements on the part of the people, in spite of great occasional inconvenience in so doing. It would appear that he was in habitual association with some wealthy youths,—among others, with Apollodorus son of the wealthy banker, Pasion, whom he undertook to instruct in the art of speaking. This we learn from the denunciations of his rival, Æschines;[569] who accuses him of having thus made his way into various wealthy families,—especially where there was an orphan youth and a widowed mother,—using unworthy artifices to defraud and ruin them. How much truth there may be in such imputations, we cannot tell. But Æschines was not unwarranted in applying to his rival the obnoxious appellations of logographer and sophist; appellations all the more disparaging, because Demosthenes belonged to a trierarchic family, of the highest class in point of wealth.[570]

It will be proper here to notice another contemporary adviser, who stands in marked antithesis and rivalry to Demosthenes. Phokion was a citizen of small means,

son of a pestle-maker. Born about the year 402 B. C., he was about twenty years older than Demosthenes. At what precise time his political importance commenced, we do not know; but he lived to the great age of eighty-four, and was a conspicuous man throughout the last half-century of his life. He becomes known first as a military officer, having served in subordinate command under Chabrias, to whom he was greatly attached, at the battle of Naxos in 376 B. C. He was a man of thorough personal bravery, and considerable talents for command; of hardy and enduring temperament, insensible to cold or fatigue; strictly simple in his habits, and above all, superior to every kind of personal corruption. His abstinence from plunder and peculation, when on naval expeditions, formed an honorable contrast with other Athenian admirals, and procured for him much esteem on the part of the maritime allies. Hence, probably, his surname of Phokion the Good.[571]

I have already remarked how deep and strong was the hold acquired on the Athenian people, by any public man who once established for himself a character above suspicion on the score of personal corruption. Among Athenian politicians, but too many were not innocent on this point; moreover, even when a man was really innocent, there were often circumstances in his life which rendered more or less of doubt admissible against him; thus Demosthenes,—being known not only as a person of somewhat costly habits, but also as frequenting wealthy houses, and receiving money for speeches composed or rhetoric communicated,—was sure to be accused, justly or unjustly, by his enemies, of having cheated rich clients, and would never obtain unquestioned credit for a high pecuniary independence, even in regard to the public affairs; although he certainly was not corrupt, nor generally believed to be corrupt,—at least during the period which this volume embraces, down to the death of Philip.[572] But Phokion would receive neither money nor gifts from any one,—was notoriously and obviously poor,—went barefoot and without an upper garment even in very cold weather,—had only one female slave to attend on his wife; while he had enjoyed commands sufficient to enrich him if he had chosen. His personal incorruptibility thus stood forth prominently to the public eye; and combined as it was with bravery and fair generalship, procured for him testimonies of confidence greater than those accorded even to Perikles. He was elected no less than forty-five times to the annual office of Stratêgus or General of the city,—that is, one of the Board of Ten so denominated, the greatest executive function at Athens,—and elected too, without having ever on any occasion solicited the office, or even been present at the choice. [573] In all Athenian history, we read of no similar multiplication of distinct appointments and honors to the same individual.

According to the picture of Athens and her democracy, as usually presented by historians, we are taught to believe that the only road open to honors or political influence, was, by a seductive address, and by courting the people with fine speeches, unworthy flattery, or unmeasured promises. Those who take this view of the Athenian character, will find it difficult to explain the career of Phokion. He was no orator,

—from disdain rather than incompetence.[574] Besides receiving a good education, he had profited by the conversation of Plato, as well as of Xenokrates, in the Academy; [575] and we are not surprised that in their school he contracted a contempt for popular oratory, as well as a love for brief, concentrated, pungent reply. Once, when about to speak in public, he was observed to be particularly absorbed in thought. "You seem meditative, Phokion," said a friend. "Ay, by Zeus," was the reply; "I am meditating whether I cannot in some way abridge the speech which I am just about to address to the Athenians." He knew so well, however, on what points to strike, that his telling brevity, strengthened by the weight of character and position, cut through the fine oratory of Demosthenes more effectively than any counter-oratory from men like Æschines. Demosthenes himself greatly feared Phokion as an opponent, and was heard to observe, on seeing him rise to speak, "Here comes the cleaver of my harangues."[576] Polyeuktus,—himself an orator and a friend of Demosthenes,—drew a distinction highly complimentary to Phokion, by saying, that "Demosthenes was the finest orator, but Phokion the most formidable in speech."[577] In public policy, in means of political effect, and in personal character,—Phokion was the direct antithesis of Demosthenes; whose warlike eloquence, unwarlike disposition, paid speech-writing, and delicate habits of life, he doubtless alike despised.

As Phokion had in his nature little of the professed orator, so he had still less of the flatterer. He affected and sustained the character of a blunt soldier, who speaks out his full mind without suppression or ornament, careless whether it be acceptable to hearers or not.[578] His estimate of his countrymen was thoroughly and undisguisedly contemptuous. This is manifest in his whole proceedings; and appears especially in the memorable remark ascribed to him, on an occasion when something that he had said in the public assembly met with peculiar applause. Turning round to a friend, he asked, "Have I not, unconsciously, said something bad?" His manners, moreover, were surly and repulsive, though his disposition is said to have been kind. He had learnt, in the Academy, a sort of Spartan self-suppression and rigor of life. [579] No one ever saw him either laughing, or weeping, or bathing in the public baths.

If, then, Phokion attained the unparalleled honor of being chosen forty-five times general, we may be sure that there were other means of reaching it besides the arts of oratory and demagogy. We may indeed ask with surprise, how it was possible for him to attain it, in the face of so many repulsive circumstances, by the mere force of bravery and honesty; especially as he never performed any supereminent service, [580] though on various occasions he conducted himself with credit and ability. The answer to this question may be found in the fact that Phokion, though not a flatterer of the people, went decidedly along with the capital weakness of the people. While despising their judgment, he manifested no greater foresight, as to the public interests and security of Athens, than they did. The Athenian people had doubtless many infirmities and committed many errors; but the worst error of all, during the interval

between 360-336 B. C., was their unconquerable repugnance to the efforts, personal and pecuniary, required for prosecuting a hearty war against Philip. Of this aversion to a strenuous foreign policy, Phokion made himself the champion;[581] addressing, in his own vein, sarcastic taunts against those who called for action against Philip, as if they were mere brawlers and cowards, watching for opportunities to enrich themselves at the public expense. Eubulus the orator was among the leading statesmen who formed what may be called the peace-party at Athens, and who continually resisted or discouraged energetic warlike efforts, striving to keep out of sight the idea of Philip as a dangerous enemy. Of this peace-party, there were doubtless some who acted corruptly, in the direct pay of Philip. But many others of them, without any taint of personal corruption, espoused the same policy merely because they found it easier, for the time, to administer the city under peace than under war—because war was burdensome and disagreeable, to themselves as well as to their fellow-citizens—and because they either did not, or would not, look forward to the consequences of inaction. Now it was a great advantage to this peace-party, who wanted a military leader as partner to their civil and rhetorical leaders, to strengthen themselves by a colleague like Phokion; a man not only of unsuspected probity, but peculiarly disinterested in advising peace, since his importance would have been exalted by war.[582] Moreover most of the eminent military leaders had now come to love only the license of war, and to disdain the details of the war-office at home; while Phokion,[583] and he almost alone among them, was content to stay at Athens, and keep up that combination of civil with military efficiency which had been, formerly, habitual. Hence he was sustained, by the peace-party and by the aversion to warlike effort prevalent among the public, in a sort of perpetuity of the strategic functions, without any solicitation or care for personal popularity on his own part.

The influence of Phokion as a public adviser, during the period embraced in this volume, down to the battle of Chæroneia, was eminently mischievous to Athens: all the more mischievous, partly (like that of Nikias) from the respectability of his personal qualities—partly because he espoused and sanctioned the most dangerous infirmity of the Athenian mind. His biographers mislead our judgment by pointing our attention chiefly to the last twenty years of his long life, after the battle of Chæroneia. At that time, when the victorious military force of Macedonia had been fully organized, and that of Greece comparatively prostrated, it might be argued plausibly (I do not say decisively, even then) that submission to Macedonia had become a fatal necessity; and that attempts to resist could only end by converting bad into worse. But the peace-policy of Phokion—which might be called prudence after the accession of Alexander—was ruinously imprudent as well as dishonorable during the reign of Philip. The odds were all against Philip in his early years; they shifted and became more and more in his favor, only because his game was played well, and that of his opponents badly. The superiority of force was at first so much on the side of Athens, that if she had been willing to employ it, she might have made sure of keeping Philip at least within the limits of Macedonia. All depended upon her will;

upon the question, whether her citizens were prepared in their own minds to incur the expense and fatigue of a vigorous foreign policy—whether they would handle their pikes, open their purses, and forego the comforts of home, for the maintenance of Grecian and Athenian liberty against a growing, but not as yet irresistible destroyer. To such a sacrifice the Athenians could not bring themselves to submit; and in consequence of that reluctance, they were driven in the end to a much graver and more irreparable sacrifice—the loss of liberty, dignity, and security. Now it was precisely at such a moment, and when such a question was pending, that the influence of the peace-loving Phokion was most ruinous. His anxiety that the citizens should be buried at home in their own sepulchres—his despair, mingled with contempt, of his countrymen and their refined habits—his hatred of the orators who might profit by an increased war-expenditure[584]—all contributed to make him discourage public effort, and await passively the preponderance of the Macedonian arms; thus playing the game of Philip, and siding, though himself incorruptible, with the orators in Philip's pay.

The love of peace, either in a community or in an individual, usually commands sympathy without farther inquiry, though there are times of growing danger from without, in which the adviser of peace is the worst guide that can be followed. Since the Peloponnesian war, a revolution had been silently going on in Greece, whereby the duties of soldiership had passed to a great degree from citizen militia into the hands of paid mercenaries. The resident citizens generally had become averse to the burden of military service; while on the other hand the miscellaneous aggregate of Greeks willing to carry arms anywhere and looking merely for pay, had greatly augmented. Very differently had the case once stood. The Athenian citizen of 432 B. C.—by concurrent testimony of the eulogist Perikles and of the unfriendly Corinthians—was ever ready to brave the danger, fatigue, and privation, of foreign expeditions, for the glory of Athens. "He accounted it holidaywork to do duty in her service (it is an enemy who speaks[585]); he wasted his body for her as though it had been the body of another." Embracing with passion the idea of imperial Athens, he knew that she could only be upheld by the energetic efforts of her individual citizens, and that the talk in her public assemblies, though useful as a preliminary to action, was mischievous if allowed as a substitute for action.[586] Such was the Periklean Athenian of 431 B. C. But this energy had been crushed in the disasters closing the Peloponnesian war, and had never again revived. The Demosthenic Athenian of 360 B. C. had as it were grown old. Pugnacity, Pan-hellenic championship, and the love of enterprise, had died within him. He was a quiet, home-keeping, refined citizen, attached to the democratic constitution, and executing with cheerful pride his ordinary city-duties under it; but immersed in industrial or professional pursuits, in domestic comforts, in the impressive manifestations of the public religion, in the atmosphere of discussion and thought, intellectual as well as political. To renounce all this for foreign and continued military service, he considered as a hardship not to be endured, except under the pressure of danger near and immediate. Precautionary exigencies against distant

perils, however real, could not be brought home to his feelings; even to pay others for serving in his place, was a duty which he could scarcely be induced to perform.

Not merely in Athens, but also among the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta, the resident citizens had contracted the like indisposition to military service. In the year 431 B. C., these Peloponnesians (here too we have the concurrent testimony of Perikles and Archidamus[587]) had been forward for service with their persons, and only backward when asked for money. In 383 B. C., Sparta found them so reluctant to join her standard, especially for operations beyond sea, that she was forced to admit into her confederacy the principle of pecuniary commutation;[588] just as Athens had done (about 460-450 B. C.) with the unwarlike islanders enrolled in her confederacy of Delos.[589]

Amidst this increasing indisposition to citizen military service, the floating, miscellaneous bands who made soldiership a livelihood under any one who would pay them, increased in number from year to year. In 402-401 B. C., when the Cyreian army (the Ten Thousand Greeks) were levied, it had been found difficult to bring so many together; large premiums were given to the chiefs or enlisting agents; the recruits consisted, in great part, of settled men tempted by lucrative promises away from their homes.[590] But active men ready for paid foreign service were perpetually multiplying, from poverty, exile, or love of enterprise[591]; they were put under constant training and greatly improved, by Iphikrates and others, as peltasts or light infantry to serve in conjunction with the citizen force of hoplites. Jason of Pheræ brought together a greater and better trained mercenary force than had ever been seen since the Cyreians in their upward march[592]; the Phokians also in the Sacred War, having command over the Delphian treasures, surrounded themselves with a formidable array of mercenary soldiers. There arose (as in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in modern Europe) Condottieri like Charidemus and others—generals having mercenary bands under their command, and hiring themselves out to any prince or potentate who would employ and pay them. Of these armed rovers—poor, brave, desperate, and held by no civic ties—Isokrates makes repeated complaint, as one of the most serious misfortunes of Greece.[593] Such wanderers, indeed, usually formed the natural emigrants in new colonial enterprises. But it so happened that few Hellenic colonies were formed during the interval between 400-350 B. C.; in fact, the space open to Hellenic colonization was becoming more circumscribed by the peace of Antalkidas—by the despotism of Dionysius—and by the increase of Lucanians, Bruttians, and the inland powers generally. Isokrates, while extolling the great service formerly rendered to the Hellenic world by Athens, in setting on foot the Ionic emigration, and thus providing new homes for so many unsettled Greeks—insists on the absolute necessity of similar means of emigration in his own day. He urges on Philip to put himself at the head of an Hellenic conquest of Asia Minor, and thus to acquire territory which might furnish settlement to the multitudes of homeless, roving, exiles, who lived by the sword, and disturbed the peace of Greece.[594]

This decline of the citizen militia, and growing aversion to personal service, or military exercises—together with the contemporaneous increase of the professional soldiery unmoved by civic obligations—is one of the capital facts of the Demosthenic age. Though not peculiar to Athens, it strikes us more forcibly at Athens, where the spirit of self-imposed individual effort had once been so high wrought—but where also the charm and stimulus[595] of peaceful existence was most diversified, and the activity of industrial pursuit most continuous. It was a fatal severance of the active force of society from political freedom and intelligence breaking up that many-sided combination, of cultivated thought with vigorous deed, which formed the Hellenic *idéal*—and throwing the defence of Greece upon armed men looking up only to their general or their paymaster. But what made it irreparably fatal, was that just at this moment the Grecian world was thrown upon its defence against Macedonia led by a young prince of indefatigable enterprise; who had imbibed, and was capable even of improving, the best ideas of military organization[596] started by Epaminondas and Iphikrates. Philip (as described by his enemy Demosthenes) possessed all that forward and unconquerable love of action which the Athenians had manifested in 431 B. C., as we know from enemies as well as from friends; while the Macedonian population also retained, amidst rudeness and poverty, that military aptitude and readiness which had dwindled away within the walls of the Grecian cities.

Though as yet neither disciplined nor formidable, they were an excellent raw material for soldiers, in the hands of an organizing genius like Philip. They were still (as their predecessors had been in the time of the first Perdikkas,[597] when the king's wife baked cakes with her own hand on the hearth), mountain shepherds ill-clothed and ill-housed—eating and drinking from wooden platters and cups—destitute to a great degree, not merely of cities, but of fixed residences.[598] The men of substance were armed with breastplates and made good cavalry; but the infantry were a rabble destitute of order,[599] armed with wicker shields and rusty swords, and contending at disadvantage, though constantly kept on the alert, to repel the inroads of their Illyrian or Thracian neighbors. Among some Macedonian tribes, the man who had never slain an enemy was marked by a degrading badge.[600] These were the men whom Philip on becoming king found under his rule; not good soldiers, but excellent recruits to be formed into soldiers. Poverty, endurance, and bodies inured to toil, were the natural attributes, well appreciated by ancient politicians, of a military population destined to make conquests. Such had been the native Persians, at their first outburst under Cyrus the Great; such were even the Greeks at the invasion of Xerxes, when the Spartan King Demaratus reckoned poverty both as an inmate of Greece, and as a guarantee of Grecian courage.[601]

Now it was against these rude Macedonians, to whom camp-life presented chances of plunder without any sacrifice, that the industrious and refined Athenian citizen had to go forth and fight, renouncing his trade, family, and festivals; a task the more severe, as the perpetual aggressions and systematized warfare of his new

enemies could only be countervailed by an equal continuity of effort on his part. For such personal devotion, combined with the anxieties of preventive vigilance, the Athenians of the Periklean age would have been prepared, but those of the Demosthenic age were not; though their whole freedom and security were in the end found to be at stake.

Without this brief sketch of the great military change in Greece since the Peloponnesian war—the decline of the citizen force and the increase of mercenaries—the reader would scarcely understand either the proceedings of Athens in reference to Philip, or the career of Demosthenes on which we are now about to enter.

Having by assiduous labor acquired for himself these high powers both of speech and of composition, Demosthenes stood forward in 354 B. C. to devote them to the service of the public. His first address to the assembly is not less interesting, objectively, as a memorial of the actual Hellenic political world in that year—than subjectively, as an evidence of his own manner of appreciating its exigencies.[602] At that moment, the predominant apprehension at Athens arose from reports respecting the Great King, who was said to be contemplating measures of hostility against Greece, and against Athens in particular, in consequence of the aid recently lent by the Athenian general Chares to the revolted Persian satrap Artabazus. By this apprehension—which had already, in part, determined the Athenians (a year before) to make peace with their revolted insular allies, and close the Social War—the public mind still continued agitated. A Persian armament of three hundred sail, with a large force of Grecian mercenaries—and an invasion of Greece—was talked of as probable.[603] It appears that Mausôlus, prince or satrap of Karia, who had been the principal agent in inflaming the Social War, still prosecuted hostilities against the islands even after the peace, announcing that he acted in execution of the king's designs; so that the Athenians sent envoys to remonstrate with him.[604] The Persians seem also to have been collecting inland forces, which were employed some years afterwards in reconquering Egypt, but of which the destination was not at this moment declared. Hence the alarm now prevalent at Athens. It is material to note—as a mark in the tide of events—that few persons as yet entertained apprehensions about Philip of Macedon, though that prince was augmenting steadily his military force as well as his conquests. Nay, Philip afterwards asserted that during this alarm of Persian invasion, he was himself one of the parties invited to assist in the defence of Greece.[605]

Though the Macedonian power had not yet become obviously formidable, we trace in the present speech of Demosthenes that same Pan-hellenic patriotism which afterwards rendered him so strenuous in blowing the trumpet against Philip. The obligation incumbent upon all Greeks, but upon Athens especially, on account of her traditions and her station, to uphold Hellenic liberty against the foreigner at all cost, is insisted on with an emphasis and dignity worthy of Perikles.[606] But while Demosthenes thus impresses upon his countrymen noble and Pan-hellenic purposes, he does not rest content with eloquent declamation, or negative criticism on the past.

His recommendations as to means are positive and explicit; implying an attentive survey and a sagacious appreciation of the surrounding circumstances. While keeping before his countrymen a favorable view of their position, he never promises them success except on condition of earnest and persevering individual efforts, with arms and with money: and he exhausts all his invention in the unpopular task of shaming them, by direct reproach as well as by oblique insinuation, out of that aversion to personal military service, which, for the misfortune of Athens, had become a confirmed habit. Such positive and practical character as to means, always contemplating the full exigencies of a given situation—combined with the constant presentation of Athens as the pledged champion of Grecian freedom, and with appeals to Athenian foretime, not as a patrimony to rest upon, but as an example to imitate—constitute the imperishable charm of these harangues of Demosthenes, not less memorable than their excellence as rhetorical compositions. In the latter merit, indeed, his rival Æschines is less inferior to him than in the former.

In no one of the speeches of Demosthenes is the spirit of practical wisdom more predominant than in this his earliest known discourse to the public assembly—on the Symmories—delivered by a young man of twenty-seven years of age, who could have had little other teaching except from the decried classes of sophists, rhetors, and actors. While proclaiming the king of Persia as the common and dangerous enemy of the Grecian name, he contends that no evidence of impending Persian attack had yet transpired, sufficiently obvious and glaring to warrant Athens in sending round[607] to invoke a general league of Greeks, as previous speakers had suggested. He deprecates on the one hand any step calculated to provoke the Persian king or bring on a war—and on the other hand, any premature appeal to the Greeks for combination, before they themselves were impressed with a feeling of common danger. Nothing but such common terror could bring about union among the different Hellenic cities; nothing else could silence those standing jealousies and antipathies, which rendered intestine war so frequent, and would probably enable the Persian king to purchase several Greeks for his own allies against the rest.

"Let us neither be immoderately afraid of the Great King, nor on the other hand be ourselves the first to begin the war and wrong him—as well on our own account as from the bad feeling and mistrust prevalent among the Greeks around us. If indeed we, with the full and unanimous force of Greece, could attack him unassisted, I should have held that even wrong, done towards him, was no wrong at all. But since this is impossible, I contend that we must take care not to give the king a pretence for enforcing claims of right on behalf of the other Greeks. While we remain quiet, he cannot do any such thing without being mistrusted; but if we have been the first to begin war, he will naturally seem to mean sincere friendship to the others, on account of their aversion to us. Do not, therefore, expose to light the sad distempers of the Hellenic world, by calling together its members when you will not persuade

them, and by going to war when you will have no adequate force; but keep the peace, confiding in yourselves, and making full preparation."[608]

It is this necessity of making preparation, which constitutes the special purpose of Demosthenes in his harangue. He produces an elaborate plan, matured by careful reflection,[609] for improving and extending the classification by Symmories; proposing a more convenient and systematic distribution of the leading citizens as well as of the total financial and nautical means—such as to ensure both the ready equipment of armed force whenever required, and a fair apportionment both of effort and of expense among the citizens. Into the details of this plan of economical reform, which are explained with the precision of an administrator and not with the vagueness of a rhetor, I do not here enter; especially as we do not know that it was actually adopted. But the spirit in which it was proposed deserves all attention, as proclaiming, even at this early day, the home-truth which the orator reiterates in so many subsequent harangues. "In the preparation which I propose to you, Athenians (he says), the first and most important point is, that your minds shall be so set, as that each man individually will be willing and forward in doing his duty. For you see plainly, that of all those matters on which you have determined collectively, and on which each man individually has looked upon the duty of execution as devolving upon himself—not one has ever slipped through your hands; while, on the contrary, whenever, after determination has been taken, you have stood looking at one another, no man intending to do anything himself, but every one throwing the burthen of action upon his neighbor—nothing has ever succeeded. Assuming you, therefore, to be thus disposed and wound up to the proper pitch, I recommend,"[610] etc.

This is the true Demosthenic vein of exhortation, running with unabated force through the Philippics and Olynthiacs, and striving to revive that conjunction—of which Perikles had boasted as an established fact in the Athenian character[611]—energetic individual action following upon full public debate and collective resolution. How often here, and elsewhere, does the orator denounce the uselessness of voters in the public assembly, even after such votes had been passed—if the citizens individually hung back, and shrunk from the fatigue or the pecuniary burthen indispensable for execution! Demus in the Pnyx (to use, in an altered sense, an Aristophanic comparison)[612] still remained Pan-hellenic and patriotic, when Demus at home had come to think that the city would march safely by itself without any sacrifice on his part, and that he was at liberty to become absorbed in his property, family, religion, and recreations. And so Athens might really have proceeded, in her enjoyment of liberty, wealth, refinement, and individual security—could the Grecian world have been guaranteed against the formidable Macedonian enemy from without.

It was in the ensuing year, when the alarm respecting Persia had worn off, that the Athenians were called on to discuss the conflicting applications of Sparta and of Megalopolis. The success of the Phokians appeared to be such as to prevent Thebes, especially while her troops, under Pammenes, were absent in Asia, from interfering

in Peloponnesus for the protection of Megalopolis. There were even at Athens politicians who confidently predicted the approaching humiliation of Thebes,[613] together with the emancipation and reconstitution of those Bœotian towns which she now held in dependence—Orchomenus, Thespiæ, and Platæa; predictions cordially welcomed by the Miso-Theban sentiment at Athens. To the Spartans, the moment appeared favorable for breaking up Megalopolis and recovering Messênê; in which scheme they hoped to interest not only Athens, but also Elis, Phlius, and some other Peloponnesian states. To Athens they offered aid for the recovery of Orôpus, now and for about twelve years past in the hands of the Thebans; to Elis and Phlius they also tendered assistance for regaining respectively Triphylia and the Trikaranum, from the Arcadians and Argeians.[614] This political combination was warmly espoused by a considerable party at Athens; being recommended not less by aversion to Thebes than by the anxious desire for repossessing the border town of Orôpus. But it was combated by others, and by Demosthenes among the number, who could not be tempted by any bait to acquiesce in the reconstitution of Lacedæmonian power as it had stood before the battle of Leuktra. In the Athenian assembly, the discussion was animated and even angry; the envoys from Megalopolis, as well as those from Sparta on the other side, finding strenuous partisans.[615]

Demosthenes strikes a course professedly middle between the two, yet really in favor of defending Megalopolis against Spartan reconquest. We remark in this oration (as in the oration De Symmoriis, a year before) that there is no allusion to Philip; a point to be noticed as evidence of the gradual changes in the Demosthenic point of view. All the arguments urged turn upon Hellenic and Athenian interests, without reference to the likelihood of hostilities from without. In fact, Demosthenes lays down as a position not to be disputed by any one, that for the interest of Athens, both Sparta and Thebes ought to be weak; neither of them in condition to disturb her security;[616]—a position, unfortunately, but too well recognized among all the leading Grecian states in their reciprocal dealings with each other, rendering the Pan-hellenic aggregate comparatively defenceless against Philip or any skilful aggressor from without. While, however, affirming a general maxim, in itself questionable and perilous, Demosthenes deduces from it nothing but judicious consequences. In regard to Sparta, he insists only on keeping her *in statu quo*, and maintaining inviolate against her the independence of Megalopolis and Messênê. He will not be prevailed upon to surrender to her these two cities, even by the seductive prospect of assistance to Athens in recovering Orôpus, and in reviving the autonomy of the Bœotian cities. At that moment the prevalent disposition among the Athenian public was antipathy against Thebes, combined with a certain sympathy in favor of Sparta, whom they had aided at the battle of Mantineia against the Megalopolitans.[617] Though himself sharing this sentiment,[618] Demosthenes will not suffer his countrymen to be misled by it. He recommends that Athens shall herself take up the Theban policy in regard to Megalopolis and Messênê, so as to protect these two cities against Sparta; the rather, as by such a proceeding the Thebans will be excluded from Peloponnesus,

and their general influence narrowed. He even goes so far as to say, that if Sparta should succeed in reconquering Megalopolis and Messênê, Athens must again become the ally of the Thebans to restrain her farther aggrandizement.[619]

As far as we make out from imperfect information, it seems that the views of Demosthenes did not prevail, and that the Athenians declined to undertake the protection of Megalopolis against Sparta; since we presently find the Thebans continuing to afford that protection, as they had done before. The aggressive schemes of Sparta appear to have been broached at the moment when the Phokians under Onomarchus were so decidedly superior to Thebes as to place that city in some embarrassment. But the superiority of the Phokians was soon lessened by their collision with a more formidable enemy—Philip of Macedon.

That prince had been already partially interfering in Thessalian affairs,[620] at the instigation of Eudikus and Simus, chiefs of the Aleuadæ of Larissa, against Lykophron the despot of Pheræ. But his recent acquisition of Methônê left him more at liberty to extend his conquests southward, and to bring a larger force to bear on the dissensions of Thessaly. In that country, the great cities were,[621] as usual, contending for supremacy, and holding in subjection the smaller by means of garrisons; while Lykophron of Pheræ was exerting himself to regain that ascendency over the whole, which had once been possessed by Jason and Alexander. Philip now marched into the country and attacked him so vigorously as to constrain him to invoke aid from the Phokians. Onomarchus, at that time victorious over the Thebans and master as far as Thermopylæ, was interested in checking the farther progress of Philip southward and extending his own ascendency. He sent into Thessaly a force of seven thousand men, under his brother Phayllus, to sustain Lykophron. But Phayllus failed altogether; being defeated and driven out of Thessaly by Philip, so that Lykophron of Pheræ was in greater danger than ever. Upon this, Onomarchus went himself thither with the full force of Phokians and foreign mercenaries. An obstinate, and seemingly a protracted contest now took place, in the course of which he was at first decidedly victorious. He defeated Philip in two battles, with such severe loss that the Macedonian army was withdrawn from Thessaly, while Lykophron with his Phokian allies remained masters of the country.[622]

This great success of the Phokian arms was followed up by farther victory in Bœotia. Onomarchus renewed his invasion of that territory, defeated the Thebans in battle, and made himself master of Koroneia, in addition to Orchomenus, which he held before.[623] It would seem that the Thebans were at this time deprived of much of their force, which was serving in Asia under Artabazus, and which, perhaps from these very reverses, they presently recalled. The Phokians, on the other hand, were at the height of their power. At this juncture falls, probably, the aggressive combination of the Spartans against Megalopolis, and the debate, before noticed, in the Athenian assembly.

Philip was for some time in embarrassment from his defeats in Thessaly. His soldiers, discouraged and even mutinous, would hardly consent to remain under his standard. By great pains, and animated exhortation, he at last succeeded in reanimating them. After a certain interval for restoration and reinforcement, he advanced with a fresh army into Thessaly, and resumed his operations against Lykophron; who was obliged again to solicit aid from Onomarchus, and to promise that all Thessaly should henceforward be held under his dependence. Onomarchus accordingly joined him in Thessaly with a large army, said to consist of twenty thousand foot and five hundred cavalry. But he found on this occasion, within the country, more obstinate resistance than before; for the cruel dynasty of Pheræ had probably abused their previous victory by aggravated violence and rapacity, so as to throw into the arms of their enemy a multitude of exiles. On Philip's coming into Thessaly with a new army, the Thessalians embraced his cause so warmly, that he soon found himself at the head of an army of twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse. Onomarchus met him in the field, somewhere near the southern coast of Thessaly; not diffident of success, as well from his recent victories, as from the neighborhood of an Athenian fleet under Chares, coöperating with him. Here a battle was joined, and obstinately contested between the two armies, nearly equal in numbers of infantry. Philip exalted the courage of his soldiers by decorating them with laurel wreaths,[624] as crusaders in the service of the god against the despoilers of the Delphian temple; while the Thessalians also, forming the best cavalry in Greece and fighting with earnest valor, gave decisive advantage to his cause. The defeat of the forces of Onomarchus and Lykophron was complete. Six thousand of them are said to have been slain, and three thousand to have been taken prisoners; the remainder escaped either by flight, or by throwing away their arms, and swimming off to the Athenian ships. Onomarchus himself perished. According to one account, he was slain by his own mercenaries, provoked by his cowardice: according to another account, he was drowned—being carried into the sea by an unruly horse, and trying to escape to the ships. Philip caused his dead body to be crucified, and drowned all the prisoners as men guilty of sacrilege.[625]

This victory procured for Philip great renown as the avenger of the Delphian god—and became an important step in his career of aggrandizement. It not only terminated the power of the Phokians north of Thermopylæ, but also finally crushed the powerful dynasty of Pheræ in Thessaly. Philip laid siege to that city, upon which Lykophron and Peitholaus, surrounded by an adverse population and unable to make any long defence, capitulated, and surrendered it to him; retiring with their mercenaries, two thousand in number, into Phokis.[626] Having obtained possession of Pheræ and proclaimed it a free city, Philip proceeded to besiege the neighboring town of Pagasæ, the most valuable maritime station in Thessaly. How long Pagasæ resisted, we do not know; but long enough to send intimation to Athens, with entreaties for succor. The Athenians, alarmed at the successive conquests of Philip, were well-disposed to keep this important post out of his hands, which their naval

power fully enabled them to do. But here again (as in the previous examples of Pydna, Potidæa, and Methônê), the aversion to personal service among the citizens individually—and the impediments as to apportionment of duty or cost, whenever actual outgoing was called for—produced the untoward result, that though an expedition was voted and despatched, it did not arrive in time.[627] Pagasæ surrendered and came into the power of Philip; who fortified and garrisoned it for himself, thus becoming master of the Pagasæan gulf, the great maritime inlet of Thessaly.

Philip was probably occupied for a certain time in making good his dominion over Thessaly. But as soon as sufficient precautions had been taken for this purpose, he sought to push his advantage over the Phokians by invading them in their own territory. He marched to Thermopylæ, still proclaiming as his aim the liberation of the Delphian temple and the punishment of its sacrilegious robbers; while he at the same time conciliated the favor of the Thessalians by promising to restore to them the Pylæa, or half-yearly Amphiktyonic festival at Thermopylæ, which the Phokians had discontinued.[628] The Phokians, though masters of this almost inexpugnable pass, seemed to have been so much disheartened by their recent defeat, and the death of Onomarchus, that they felt unable to maintain it long. The news of such a danger, transmitted to Athens, excited extraordinary agitation. The importance of defending Thermopylæ—and of prohibiting the victorious king of Macedon from coming to coöperate with the Thebans on the southern side of it,[629] not merely against the Phokians, but probably also against Attica—were so powerfully felt, that the usual hesitations and delay of the Athenians in respect to military expeditions were overcome. Chiefly from this cause—but partly also, we may suppose, from the vexatious disappointment recently incurred in the attempt to relieve Pagasæ—an Athenian armament under Nausikles (not less than five thousand foot and four hundred horse, according to Diodorus[630]) was fitted out with not less vigor and celerity than had been displayed against the Thebans in Eubœa, seven years before. Athenian citizens shook off their lethargy, and promptly volunteered. They reached Thermopylæ in good time, placing the pass in such a condition of defence that Philip did not attack it at all. Often afterwards does Demosthenes,[631] in combating the general remissness of his countrymen when military exigencies arose, remind them of this unwonted act of energetic movement, crowned with complete effect. With little or no loss, the Athenians succeeded in guarding both themselves and their allies against a very menacing contingency, simply by the promptitude of their action. The cost of the armament altogether was more than two hundred talents; and from the stress which Demosthenes lays on that portion of the expense which was defrayed by the soldiers privately and individually,[632] we may gather that these soldiers (as in the Sicilian expedition under Nikias[633]) were in considerable proportion opulent citizens. Among a portion of the Grecian public, however, the Athenians incurred obloquy as accomplices in the Phokian sacrilege, and enemies of the Delphian god.[634]

But though Philip was thus kept out of Southern Greece, and the Phokians enabled to reorganize themselves against Thebes, yet in Thessaly and without the straits of Thermopylæ, Macedonian ascendency was henceforward an uncontested fact. Before we follow his subsequent proceedings, however, it will be convenient to turn to events both in Phokis and in Peloponnesus.

In the depressed condition of the Phokians after the defeat of Onomarchus, they obtained reinforcement not only from Athens, but also from Sparta (one thousand men), and from the Peloponnesian Achæans (two thousand men[635]). Phayllus, the successor (by some called brother) of Onomarchus, put himself again in a condition of defence. He had recourse a third time to that yet unexhausted store—the Delphian treasures and valuables. He despoiled the temple to a greater extent than Philomelus, and not less than Onomarchus; incurring aggravated odium from the fact, that he could not now supply himself without laying hands on offerings of conspicuous magnificence and antiquity, which his two predecessors had spared. It was thus that the splendid golden donatives of the Lydian king Krœsus were now melted down and turned into money; one hundred and seventeen bricks or ingots of gold, most of them weighing two talents each; three hundred and sixty golden goblets, together with a female statue three cubits high, and a lion, of the same metal—said to have weighed in the aggregate thirty talents.[636] The abstraction of such ornaments, striking and venerable in the eyes of the numerous visitors of the temple, was doubtless deeply felt among the Grecian public. And the indignation was aggravated by the fact that beautiful youths or women, favorites of Onomarchus or Phayllus, received some of the most precious gifts, and wore the most noted ornaments, which had decorated the temple—even the necklaces of Helen and Eriphylê. One woman, a flute-player named Bromias, not only received from Phayllus a silver cup and a golden wreath (the former dedicated in the temple by the Phokæans, the latter by the Peparethians), but was also introduced by him, in his capacity of superintendent of the Pythian festival, to contend for the prize in playing the sacred Hymn. As the competitors for such prize had always been men, the assembled crowd so loudly resented the novelty, that Bromias was obliged to withdraw.[637] Moreover profuse largesses, and flagrant malversation, became more notorious than ever.[638] The Phokian leaders displayed with ostentation their newly-acquired wealth, and either imported for the first time bought slaves, or at least greatly multiplied the pre-existing number. It had before been the practice in Phokis, we are told, for the wealthy men to be served by the poor youthful freemen of the country; and complaints arose among the latter class that their daily bread was thus taken away.[639]

Notwithstanding the indignation excited by these proceedings not only throughout Greece, but even in Phokis itself,—Phayllus carried his point of levying a fresh army of mercenaries, and of purchasing new alliances among the smaller cities. Both Athens and Sparta profited more or less by the distribution; though the cost of the Athenian expedition to Thermopylæ, which rescued the Phokians from destruction,

seems clearly to have been paid by the Athenians themselves.[640] Phayllus carried on war for some time against both the Bœotians and Lokrians. He is represented by Diodorus to have lost several battles. But it is certain that the general result was not unfavorable to him; that he kept possession of Orchomenus in Bœotia; and that his power remained without substantial diminution.[641]

The stress of war seems, for the time, to have been transferred to Peloponnesus, whither a portion both of the Phokian and Theban troops went to coöperate. The Lacedæmonians had at length opened their campaign against Megalopolis, of which I have already spoken as having been debated before the Athenian public assembly. Their plan seems to have been formed some months before, when Onomarchus was at the maximum of his power, and when Thebes was supposed to be in danger; but it was not executed until after his defeat and death, when the Phokians, depressed for the time, were rescued only by the prompt interference of Athens,—and when the Thebans had their hands comparatively free. Moreover, the Theban division which had been sent into Asia under Pammenes a year or two before, to assist Artabazus, may now be presumed to have returned; especially as we know that no very long time afterwards, Artabazus appears as completely defeated by the Persian troops,—expelled from Asia, and constrained to take refuge, together with his brother-in-law Memnon, under the protection of Philip.[642] The Megalopolitans had sent envoys to entreat aid from Athens, under the apprehension that Thebes would not be in a condition to assist them. It may be doubted whether Athens would have granted their prayer, in spite of the advice of Demosthenes,—but the Thebans had now again become strong enough to uphold with their own force their natural allies in Peloponnesus.

Accordingly, when the Lacedæmonian army under king Archidamus invaded the Megalopolitan territory, a competent force was soon brought together to oppose them; furnished partly by the Argeians,—who had been engaged during the preceding year in a border warfare with Sparta, and had experienced a partial defeat at Orneæ,[643]—partly by the Sikyonians and Messenians, who came in full muster. Besides this, the forces on both sides from Bœotia and Phokis were transferred to Peloponnesus. The Thebans sent four thousand foot, and five hundred horse, under Kephision, to the aid of Megalopolis; while the Spartans not only recalled their own troops from Phokis, but also procured three thousand of the mercenaries in the service of Phayllus, and one hundred and fifty Thessalian horse from Likophron, the expelled despot of Pheræ. Archidamus received his reinforcements, and got together his aggregate forces earlier than the enemy. He advanced first into Arcadia, where he posted himself near Mantinea, thus cutting off the Argeians from Megalopolis; he next invaded the territory of Argos, attacked Orneæ, and defeated the Argeians in a partial action. Presently the Thebans arrived, and effected a junction with their Argeian and Arcadian allies. The united force was greatly superior in number to the Lacedæmonians; but such superiority was counterbalanced by the bad discipline of

the Thebans, who had sadly declined on this point during the interval of ten years since the death of Epaminondas. A battle ensued, partially advantageous to the Lacedæmonians; while the Argeians and Arcadians chose to go home to their neighboring cities. The Lacedæmonians also, having ravaged a portion of Arcadia, and stormed the Arcadian town of Helissus, presently recrossed their own frontier and returned to Sparta. They left, however, a division in Arcadia under Anaxander, who, engaging with the Thebans near Telphusa, was worsted with great loss and made prisoner. In two other battles, also, the Thebans were successively victorious; in a third, they were vanquished by the Lacedæmonians. With such balanced and undecided success was the war carried on until, at length, the Lacedæmonians proposed and concluded peace with Megalopolis. Either formally, or by implication, they were forced to recognize the autonomy of that city; thus abandoning, for the time at least, their aggressive purposes, which Demosthenes had combated and sought to frustrate before the Athenian assembly. The Thebans on their side returned home, having accomplished their object of protecting Megalopolis and Messênê; and we may presume that the Phokian allies of Sparta were sent home also.[644]

The war between the Bœotians and Phokians had doubtless slackened during this episode in Peloponnesus; but it still went on in a series of partial actions, on the river Kephissus, at Koroneia, at Abæ in Phokis, and near the Lokrian town of Naryx. For the most part, the Phokians are said to have been worsted; and their commander, Phayllus, presently died of a painful disease,—the suitable punishment (in the point of view of a Grecian historian[645]) for his sacrilegious deeds. He left as his successor Phalækus, a young man, son of Onomarchus, under the guardianship and advice of an experienced friend named Mnaseas. But Mnaseas was soon surprised at night, defeated, and slain, by the Thebans while Phalækus, left to his own resources, was defeated in two battles near Chæroneia, and was unable to hinder his enemies from ravaging a large part of the Phokian territory.[646]

We know the successive incidents of this ten years' Sacred War only from the meagre annals of Diodorus,—whose warm sympathy in favor of the religious side of the question seems to betray him into exaggeration of the victories of the Thebans, or at least into some omission of counterbalancing reverses. For in spite of these successive victories, the Phokians were noway put down, but remained in possession of the Bœotian town of Orchomenus; moreover, the Thebans became so tired out and impoverished by the war, that they confined themselves presently to desultory incursions and skirmishes.[647] Their losses fell wholly upon their own citizens and their own funds; while the Phokians fought with foreign mercenaries and with the treasures of the temple.[648] The increasing poverty of the Thebans even induced them to send an embassy to the Persian king, entreating pecuniary aid; which drew from him a present of three hundred talents. As he was at this time organizing a fresh expedition on an immense scale, for the reconquest of Phenicia and Egypt, after more than one preceding failure, he required Grecian soldiers as much as the

Greeks required his money. Hence we shall see presently that the Thebans were able to send him an equivalent.

In the war just recounted on the Laconian and Arcadian frontier, the Athenians had taken no part. Their struggle with Philip had been becoming from month to month more serious and embarrassing. By occupying in time the defensible pass of Thermopylæ, they had indeed prevented him both from crushing the Phokians and from meddling with the Southern states of Greece. But the final battle wherein he had defeated Onomarchus, had materially increased both his power and his military reputation. The numbers on both sides were very great; the result was decisive, and ruinous to the vanquished; moreover, we cannot doubt that the Macedonian phalanx, with the other military improvements and manœuvres which Philip had been gradually organizing since his accession, was now exhibited in formidable efficiency. The King of Macedon had become the ascendent soldier and potentate, hanging on the skirts of the Grecian world, exciting fears or hopes, or both at once, in every city throughout its limits. In the first Philippic of Demosthenes, and in his oration against Aristokrates, (delivered between midsummer 352 B. C. and midsummer 351 B. C.), we discern evident marks of the terrors which Philip had come to inspire, within a year after his repulse from Thermopylæ, to reflecting Grecian politicians. "It is impossible for Athens (says the orator[649]) to provide any land-force competent to contend in the field against that of Philip."

The reputation of his generalship and his indefatigable activity was already everywhere felt; as well as that of the officers and soldiers, partly native Macedonians, partly chosen Greeks, whom he had assembled round him,[650]—especially the lochages or front-rank men of the phalanx and the hypaspistæ. Moreover, the excellent cavalry of Thessaly became embodied from henceforward as an element in the Macedonian army; since Philip had acquired unbounded ascendency in that country, from his expulsion of the Pheræan despots and their auxiliaries the Phokians. The philo-Macedonian party in the Thessalian cities had constituted him federal chief (or in some sort Tagus) of the country, not only enrolling their cavalry in his armies, but also placing at his disposal the customs and market-dues, which formed a standing common fund for supporting the Thessalian collective administration.[651] The financial means of Philip, for payment of his foreign troops, and prosecution of his military enterprises, were thus materially increased.

But besides his irresistible land-force, Philip had now become master of no inconsiderable naval power also. During the early years of the war, though he had taken not only Amphipolis, but also all the Athenian possessions on the Macedonian coast, yet the exports from his territory had been interrupted by the naval force of Athens, so as to lessen seriously the produce of his export duties.[652] But he had now contrived to get together a sufficient number of armed ships and privateers, if not to ward off such damage from himself, at least to retaliate it upon Athens. Her navy, indeed, was still incomparably superior, but the languor and remissness of her citizens

refused to bring it out with efficiency; while Philip had opened for himself a new avenue to maritime power by his acquisition of Pheræ and Pagasæ, and by establishing his ascendency over the Magnêtes and their territory, round the eastern border of the Pagasæan Gulf. That gulf (now known by the name of Volo), is still the great inlet and outlet for Thessalian trade; the eastern coast of Thessaly, along the line of Mount Pelion, being craggy and harborless.[653] The naval force belonging to Pheræ and its seaport Pagasæ, was very considerable, and had been so even from the times of the despots, Jason and Alexander;[654] at one moment painfully felt even by Athens. All these ships now passed into the service of Philip, together with the dues on export and import levied round the Pagasæan Gulf; the command of which he farther secured by erecting suitable fortifications on the Magnesian shore, and by placing a garrison in Pagasæ.[655] Such additional naval means, combined with what he already possessed at Amphipolis and elsewhere, made him speedily annoying, if not formidable, to Athens, even at sea. His triremes showed themselves everywhere, probably in small and rapidly moving squadrons. He levied large contributions on the insular allies of Athens, and paid the costs of war greatly out of the capture of merchant vessels in the Ægean. His squadrons made incursions on the Athenian islands of Lemnos and Imbros, carrying off several Athenian citizens as prisoners. They even stretched southward as far as Geræstus, the southern promontory of Eubœa, where they not only fell in with and captured a lucrative squadron of corn-ships, but also insulted the coast of Attica itself in the opposite bay of Marathon, towing off as a prize one of the sacred triremes.[656] Such was the mischief successfully inflicted by the flying squadrons of Philip, though Athens had probably a considerable number of cruisers at sea, and certainly a far superior number of ships at home in Peiræus. Her commerce, and even her coasts, were disturbed and endangered; her insular allies suffered yet more. Eubœa especially, the nearest and most important of all her allies, separated only by a narrow strait from the Pagasæan Gulf and the southern coast of Phthiotis, was now within the immediate reach not only of Philip's marauding vessels, but also of his political intrigues.

It was thus that the war against Philip turned more and more to the disgrace and disadvantage of the Athenians. Though they had begun it in the hope of punishing him for his duplicity in appropriating Amphipolis, they had been themselves the losers by the capture of Pydna, Potidæa, Methônê, etc.; and they were now thrown upon the defensive, without security for their maritime allies, their commerce, or their coasts.[657] The intelligence of these various losses and insults endured at sea, in spite of indisputable maritime preponderance, called forth at Athens acrimonious complaints against the generals of the state, and exaggerated outbursts of enmity against Philip.[658] That prince, having spent a few months, after his repulse from Thermopylæ, in Thessaly, and having so far established his ascendency over that country that he could leave the completion of the task to his officers, pushed with his characteristic activity into Thrace. He there took part in the disputes between various native princes, expelling some, confirming or installing others, and extending his own

dominion at the cost of all.[659] Among these princes were probably Kersobleptes, and Amadokus; for Philip carried his aggressions to the immediate neighborhood of the Thracian Chersonese.

In November, 352 B. C., intelligence reached Athens, that he was in Thrace besieging Heræon Teichos; a place so near to the Chersonese,[660] that the Athenian possessions and colonists in that peninsula were threatened with considerable danger. So great was the alarm and excitement caused by this news, that a vote was immediately passed in the public assembly to equip a fleet of forty triremes,—to man it with Athenian citizens, all persons up to the age of forty-five being made liable to serve on the expedition,—and to raise sixty talents by a direct property tax. At first active steps were taken to accelerate the armament. But before the difficulties of detail could be surmounted,—before it could be determined, amidst the general aversion to personal service, what citizens should go abroad, and how the burthen of trierarchy should be distributed,—fresh messengers arrived from the Chersonese, reporting first that Philip had fallen sick, next that he was actually dead.[661] The last-mentioned report proved false; but the sickness of Philip was an actual fact, and seems to have been severe enough to cause a temporary suspension of his military operations. Though the opportunity became thus only the more favorable for attacking Philip, yet the Athenians, no longer spurred on by the fear of farther immediate danger, relapsed into their former languor, and renounced or postponed their intended armament. After passing the whole ensuing summer in inaction, they could only be prevailed upon, in the month of September 351, to despatch to Thrace a feeble force under the mercenary chief Charidemus; ten triremes, without any soldiers aboard, and with no more than five talents in money.[662]

At this time Charidemus was at the height of his popularity. It was supposed that he could raise and maintain a mercenary band by his own ingenuity and valor. His friends confidently averred, before the Athenian assembly, that he was the only man capable of putting down Philip, and conquering Amphipolis.[663] One of these partisans, Aristokrates, even went so far as to propose that a vote should be passed ensuring inviolability to his person, and enacting that any one who killed him should be seized wherever found in the territory of Athens or her allies. This proposition was attacked judicially by an accuser named Euthykles, who borrowed a memorable discourse from the pen of Demosthenes.

It was thus that the real sickness, and reported death, of Philip which ought to have operated as a stimulus to the Athenians by exposing to them their enemy during a moment of peculiar weakness, proved rather an opiate exaggerating their chronic lethargy, and cheating them into a belief that no farther efforts were needed. That belief appears to have been proclaimed by the leading, best-known, and senior speakers, those who gave the tone to the public assembly, and who were principally relied upon for advice. These men,—probably Eubulus at their head, and Phokion, so constantly named as general, along with him,—either did not feel, or could not bring

themselves to proclaim, the painful necessity of personal military service and increased taxation. Though repeated debates took place on the insults offered to Athens in her maritime dignity, and on the sufferings of those allies to whom she owed protection,—combined with accusations against the generals, and complaints of the inefficiency of such mercenary foreigners as Athens took into commission but never paid,—still, the recognized public advisers shrank from appeal to the dormant patriotism or personal endurance of the citizens. The serious, but indispensable, duty which they thus omitted, was performed for them by a younger competitor, far beneath them in established footing and influence,—Demosthenes, now about thirty years old,—in an harangue, known as the first Philippic.

We have already had before us this aspiring man, as a public adviser in the assembly. In his first parliamentary harangue two years before,[664] he had begun to inculcate on his countrymen the general lesson of energy and self-reliance, and to remind them of that which the comfort, activity, and peaceful refinement of Athenian life, had a constant tendency to put out of sight:—That the City, as a whole, could not maintain her security and dignity against enemies, unless each citizen individually, besides his home-duties, were prepared to take his fair share, readily and without evasion, of the hardship and cost of personal service abroad.[665] But he had then been called upon to deal (in his discourse De Symmoriis) only with the contingency of Persian hostilities—possible indeed, yet neither near nor declared; he now renews the same exhortation under more pressing exigencies. He has to protect interests already suffering, and to repel dishonorable insults, becoming from month to month more frequent, from an indefatigable enemy. Successive assemblies have been occupied with complaints from sufferers, amidst a sentiment of unwonted chagrin and helplessness among the public—yet with no material comfort from the leading and established speakers; who content themselves with inveighing against the negligence of the mercenaries—taken into service by Athens but never paid—and with threatening to impeach the generals. The assembly, wearied by repetition of topics promising no improvement for the future, is convoked, probably to hear some farther instance of damage committed by the Macedonian cruisers, when Demosthenes, breaking through the common formalities of precedence, rises first to address them.

It had once been the practice at Athens, that the herald formally proclaimed, when a public assembly was opened—"Who among the citizens above fifty years old wishes to speak? and after them, which of the other citizens in his turn?"[666] Though this old proclamation had fallen into disuse, the habit still remained, that speakers of advanced age and experience rose first after the debate had been opened by the presiding magistrates. But the relations of Athens with Philip had been so often discussed, that all these men had already delivered their sentiments and exhausted their recommendations. "Had their recommendations been good, you need not have

been now debating the same topic over again"[667]—says Demosthenes, as an apology for standing forward out of his turn to produce his own views.

His views indeed were so new, so independent of party-sympathies or antipathies, and so plain-spoken in comments on the past as well as in demands for the future—that they would hardly have been proposed except by a speaker instinct with the ideal of the Periklean foretime, familiar to him from his study of Thucydides. In explicit language, Demosthenes throws the blame of the public misfortunes, not simply on the past advisers and generals of the people, but also on the people themselves.[668] It is from this proclaimed fact that he starts, as his main ground of hope for future improvement. Athens contended formerly with honor against the Lacedæmonians; and now also, she will exchange disgrace for victory in her war against Philip, if her citizens individually will shake off their past inertness and negligence, each of them henceforward becoming ready to undertake his full share of personal duty in the common cause. Athens had undergone enough humiliation, and more than enough, to teach her this lesson. She might learn it farther from her enemy Philip himself, who had raised himself from small beginnings, and heaped losses as well as shame upon her, mainly by his own personal energy, perseverance, and ability; while the Athenian citizens had been hitherto so backward as individuals, and so unprepared as a public, that even if a lucky turn of fortune were to hand over to them Amphipolis, they would be in no condition to seize it.[669] Should the rumor prove true, that this Philip were dead, they would soon make for themselves another Philip equally troublesome.

After thus severely commenting on the past apathy of the citizens, and insisting upon a change of disposition as indispensable, Demosthenes proceeds to specify the particular acts whereby such change ought to be manifested. He entreats them not to be startled by the novelty of his plan, but to hear him patiently to the end. It is the result of his own meditations; other citizens may have better to propose; if they have, he shall not be found to stand in their way. What is past, cannot be helped; nor is extemporaneous speech the best way of providing remedies for a difficult future.[670]

He advises first, that a fleet of fifty triremes shall be immediately put in readiness; that the citizens shall firmly resolve to serve in person on board, whenever the occasion may require, and that triremes and other vessels shall be specially fitted out for half of the horsemen of the city, who shall serve personally also. This force is to be kept ready to sail at a moment's notice, and to meet Philip in any of his sudden out-marches—to Chersonesus, to Thermopylæ, to Olynthus, etc.[671]

Secondly, that a farther permanent force shall be set on foot immediately, to take the aggressive, and carry on active continuous warfare against Philip, by harassing him in various points of his own country. Two thousand infantry, and two hundred horse, will be sufficient; but it is essential that one-fourth part—five hundred of the

former and fifty of the latter—shall be citizens of Athens. The remainder are to be foreign mercenaries; ten swift sailing war triremes are also to be provided to protect the transports against the naval force of Philip. The citizens are to serve by relays, relieving each other; every one for a time fixed beforehand, yet none for a very long time.[672] The orator then proceeds to calculate the cost of such a standing force for one year. He assigns to each seaman, and to each foot soldier, ten drachmæ per month, or two oboli per day; to each horseman, thirty drachmæ per month, or one drachma (six oboli) per day. No difference is made between the Athenian citizen and the foreigner. The sum here assigned is not full pay, but simply the cost of each man's maintenance. At the same time, Demosthenes pledges himself, that if thus much be furnished by the state, the remainder of a full pay (or as much again) will be made up by what the soldiers will themselves acquire in the war; and that too, without wrong done to allies or neutral Greeks. The total annual cost thus incurred will be ninety-two talents (= about £22,000.) He does not give any estimate of the probable cost of his other armament, of fifty triremes; which are to be equipped and ready at a moment's notice for emergencies, but not sent out on permanent service.

His next task is, to provide ways and means for meeting such additional cost of ninety-two talents. Here he produces and reads to the assembly, a special financial scheme, drawn up in writing. Not being actually embodied in the speech, the scheme has been unfortunately lost; though its contents would help us materially to appreciate the views of Demosthenes.[673] It must have been more or less complicated in its details; not a simple proposition for an *eisphora* or property-tax, which would have been announced in a sentence of the orator's speech.

Assuming the money, the ships, and the armament for permanent service, to be provided, Demosthenes proposes that a formal law be passed, making such permanent service peremptory; the general in command being held responsible for the efficient employment of the force.[674] The islands, the maritime allies, and the commerce of the Ægean would then become secure; while the profits of Philip from his captures at sea would be arrested.[675] The quarters of the armament might be established, during winter or bad weather, in Skiathos, Thasos, Lemnos, or other adjoining islands, from whence they could act at all times against Philip on his own coast; while from Athens it was difficult to arrive thither either during the prevalence of the Etesian winds or during winter—the seasons usually selected by Philip for his aggressions.[676]

The aggregate means of Athens (Demosthenes affirmed) in men, money, ships, hoplites, horsemen, were greater than could be found anywhere else. But hitherto they had never been properly employed. The Athenians, like awkward pugilists, waited for Philip to strike, and then put up their hand to follow his blow. They never sought to look him in the face—nor to be ready with a good defensive system beforehand—nor to anticipate him in offensive operations.[677] While their religious festivals, the Panathenaic, Dionysiac, and others, were not only celebrated with costly

splendor, but prearranged with the most careful pains, so that nothing was ever wanting in detail at the moment of execution—their military force was left without organization or predetermined system. Whenever any new encroachment of Philip was made known, nothing was found ready to meet it; fresh decrees were to be voted, modified, and put in execution, for each special occasion; the time for action was wasted in preparation, and before a force could be placed on shipboard, the moment for execution had passed.[678] This practice of waiting for Philip to act offensively, and then sending aid to the point attacked, was ruinous; the war must be carried on by a standing force put in motion beforehand.[679]

To provide and pay such a standing force, is one of the main points in the project of Demosthenes. The absolute necessity that it shall consist, in large proportion at least, of citizens, is another. To this latter point he reverts again and again, insisting that the foreign mercenaries—sent out to make their pay where or how they could, and unaccompanied by Athenian citizens—were at best useless and untrustworthy. They did more mischief to friends and allies, who were terrified at the very tidings of their approach—than to the enemy.[680] The general, unprovided with funds to pay them, was compelled to follow them wheresoever they chose to go, disregarding his orders received from the city. To try him afterwards for that which he could not help, was unprofitable disgrace. But if the troops were regularly paid; if, besides, a considerable proportion of them were Athenian citizens, themselves interested in success, and inspectors of all that was done; then the general would be found willing and able to attack the enemy with vigor—and might be held to a rigorous accountability, if he did not. Such was the only way in which the formidable and ever-growing force of their enemy Philip could be successfully combated. As matters now stood, the inefficiency of Athenian operations was so ridiculous, that men might be tempted to doubt whether Athens was really in earnest. Her chief military officers—her ten generals, ten taxiarchs, ten phylarchs, and two hipparchs, annually chosen—were busied only in the affairs of the city and in the showy religious processions. They left the real business of war to a foreign general named Menelaus.[681] Such a system was disgraceful. The honor of Athens ought to be maintained by her own citizens, both as generals and as soldiers.

Such are the principal features in the discourse called the First Philippic; the earliest public harangue delivered by Demosthenes to the Athenian assembly, in reference to the war with Philip. It is not merely a splendid piece of oratory, emphatic and forcible in its appeal to the emotions; bringing the audience by many different roads, to the main conviction which the orator seeks to impress; profoundly animated with genuine Pan-hellenic patriotism, and with the dignity of that free Grecian world now threatened by a monarch from without. It has other merits besides, not less important in themselves, and lying more immediately within the scope of the historian. We find Demosthenes, yet only thirty years old—young in political life—and thirteen years before the battle of Chæroneia—taking accurate measure of the political rela-

tions between Athens and Philip; examining those relations during the past, pointing out how they had become every year more unfavorable, and foretelling the dangerous contingencies of the future, unless better precautions were taken; exposing with courageous frankness not only the past mismanagement of public men, but also those defective dispositions of the people themselves wherein such management had its root; lastly, after fault found, adventuring on his own responsibility to propose specific measures of correction, and urging upon reluctant citizens a painful imposition of personal hardship as well as of taxation. We shall find him insisting on the same obligation, irksome alike to the leading politicians and to the people,[682] throughout all the Olynthiacs and Philippics. We note his warnings given at this early day, when timely prevention would have been easily practicable; and his superiority to elder politicians like Eubulus and Phokion, in prudent appreciation, in foresight, and in courage of speaking out unpalatable truths. More than twenty years after this period, when Athens had lost the game and was in her phase of humiliation, Demosthenes (in repelling the charges of those who imputed her misfortune to his bad advice) measures the real extent to which a political statesman is properly responsible. The first of all things is—"To see events in their beginnings—to discern tendencies beforehand, and proclaim them beforehand to others—to abridge as much as possible the rubs, impediments, jealousies, and tardy movements, inseparable from the march of a free city—and to infuse among the citizens harmony, friendly feelings, and zeal for the performance of their duties."[683] The first Philippic is alone sufficient to prove, how justly Demosthenes lays claim to the merit of having "seen events in their beginnings" and given timely warning to his countrymen. It will also go to show, along with other proofs hereafter to be seen, that he was not less honest and judicious in his attempts to fulfil the remaining portion of the statesman's duty—that of working up his countrymen to unanimous and resolute enterprise; to the pitch requisite not merely for speaking and voting, but for acting and suffering, against the public enemy.

We know neither the actual course, nor the concluding vote, of this debate, wherein Demosthenes took a part so unexpectedly prominent. But we know that neither of the two positive measures which he recommends was carried into effect. The working armament was not sent out, nor was the home-force, destined to be held in reserve for instant movement in case of emergency, ever got ready. It was not until the following month of September (the oration being delivered some time in the first half of 351 B. C.), that any actual force was sent against Philip; and even then nothing more was done than to send the mercenary chief Charidemus to the Chersonese, with ten triremes, and five talents in money, but no soldiers.[684] Nor is there any probability that Demosthenes even obtained a favorable vote of the assembly; though strong votes against Philip were often passed without being ever put in execution afterwards.[685]

Demosthenes was doubtless opposed by those senior statesmen whose duty it would have been to come forward themselves with the same propositions assuming the necessity to be undeniable. But what ground was taken in opposing him, we do not know. There existed at that time in Athens a certain party or section who undervalued Philip as an enemy not really formidable—far less formidable than the Persian king.[686] The reports of Persian force and preparation, prevalent two years before when Demosthenes delivered his harangue on the Symmories, seem still to have continued, and may partly explain the inaction again Philip. Such reports would be magnified, or fabricated, by another Athenian party much more dangerous; in communication with, and probably paid by, Philip himself. To this party Demosthenes makes his earliest allusion in the first Philippic,[687] and reverts to them on many occasions afterwards. We may be very certain that there were Athenian citizens serving as Philip's secret agents, though we cannot assign their names. It would be not less his interest to purchase such auxiliaries, than to employ paid spies in his operations of war:[688] while the prevalent political antipathies at Athens, coupled with the laxity of public morality in individuals, would render it perfectly practicable to obtain suitable instruments. That not only at Athens, but also at Amphipolis, Potidæa, Olynthus and elsewhere, Philip achieved his successes, partly by purchasing corrupt partisans among the leaders of his enemies—is an assertion so intrinsically probable, that we may readily believe it, though advanced chiefly by unfriendly witnesses. Such corruption alone, indeed, would not have availed him, but it was eminently useful when combined with well-employed force and military genius.

CHAPTER LXXXVIII.

EUBOIC AND OLYNTHIAN WARS.

If even in Athens, at the date of the first Philippic of Demosthenes, the uneasiness about Philip was considerable, much more serious had it become among his neighbors the Olynthians. He had gained them over, four years before, by transferring to them the territory of Anthemus—and the still more important town of Potidæa, captured by his own arms from Athens. Grateful for these cessions, they had become his allies in his war with Athens, whom they hated on every ground. But a material change had since taken place. Since the loss of Methônê, Athens, expelled from the coast of Thrace and Macedonia, had ceased to be a hostile neighbor, or to inspire alarm to the Olynthians; while the immense increase in the power of Philip, combined with his ability and ambition alike manifest, had overlaid their gratitude for the past by a sentiment of fear for the future. It was but too clear that a prince who stretched his encroaching arms in all directions—to Thermopylæ, to Illyria, and to Thrace—would not long suffer the fertile peninsula between the Thermaic and Strymonic gulfs to remain occupied by free Grecian communities. Accordingly, it seems that after the great victory of Philip in Thessaly over the Phokians (in the first half of 352 B. C.), the Olynthians manifested their uneasiness by seceding from alliance with him against Athens. They concluded peace with that city, and manifested such friendly sentiments that an alliance began to be thought possible. This peace seems to have been concluded before November 352 B. C.[689]

Here was an important change of policy on the part of the Olynthians. Though they probably intended it, not as a measure of hostility against Philip, but simply as a precaution to ensure to themselves recourse elsewhere in case of becoming exposed to his attack, it was not likely that he would either draw or recognize any such distinction. He would probably consider that by the cession of Potidæa, he had purchased their coöperation against Athens, and would treat their secession as at least making an end to all amicable relations.

A few months afterwards (at the date of the first Philippic[690]) we find that he, or his soldiers, had attacked, and made sudden excursions into their territory, close adjoining to his own.

In this state of partial hostility, yet without proclaimed or vigorous war, matters seem to have remained throughout the year 351 B. C. Philip was engaged during that year in his Thracian expedition, where he fell sick, so that aggressive enterprise was for the time suspended. Meanwhile the Athenians seem to have proposed to Olynthus a scheme of decided alliance against Philip.[691] But the Olynthians had too much to fear from him, to become themselves the aggressors. They still probably

hoped that he might find sufficient enemies and occupation elsewhere, among Thracians, Illyrians, Pæonians, Arymbas and the Epirots, and Athenians;[692] at any rate, they would not be the first to provoke a contest. This state of reciprocal mistrust[693] continued for several months, until at length Philip began serious operations against them; not very long after his recovery from the sickness in Thrace, and seemingly towards the middle of 350 B. C.;[694] a little before the beginning of Olympiad 107, 3.

It was probably during the continuance of such semi-hostile relations that two half-brothers of Philip, sons of his father Amyntas by another mother, sought and obtained shelter at Olynthus. They came as his enemies; for he had put to death already one of their brothers, and they themselves only escaped the same fate by flight. Whether they had committed any positive act to provoke his wrath, we are not informed; but such tragedies were not unfrequent in the Macedonian regal family. While Olynthus was friendly and grateful to Philip, these exiles would not have resorted thither; but they were now favorably received, and may perhaps have held out hopes that in case of war they could raise a Macedonian party against Philip. To that prince, the reception of his fugitive enemies served as a plausible pretence for war—which he doubtless would under all circumstances have prosecuted—against Olynthus; and it seems to have been so put forward in his public declarations.[695]

But Philip, in accomplishing his conquests, knew well how to blend the influences of deceit and seduction with those of arms, and to divide or corrupt those whom he intended to subdue. To such insidious approaches Olynthus was in many ways open. The power of that city consisted, in great part, in her position as chief of a numerous confederacy, including a large proportion, though probably not all, of the Grecian cities in the peninsula of Chalkidikê. Among the different members of such a confederacy, there was more or less of dissentient interest or sentiment, which accidental circumstances might inflame so as to induce a wish for separation. In each city moreover, and in Olynthus itself, there were ambitious citizens competing for power, and not scrupulous as to the means whereby it was to be acquired or retained. In each of them, Philip could open intrigues, and enlist partisans; in some, he would probably receive invitations to do so; for the greatness of his exploits, while it inspired alarm in some quarters, raised hopes among disappointed and jealous minorities. If, through such predisposing circumstances, he either made or found partisans and traitors in the distant cities of Peloponnesus, much more was this practicable for him in the neighboring peninsula of Chalkidikê. Olynthus and the other cities were nearly all conterminous with the Macedonian territory, some probably with boundaries not clearly settled. Perdikkas II. had given to the Olynthians (at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war[696]) a portion of his territory near the Lake Bolbê: Philip himself had given to them the district of Anthemus. Possessed of so much neighboring land, he had the means, with little loss to himself, of materially favoring or enriching such individual citizens, of Olynthus or other cities, as chose to promote his designs. Besides direct bribes, where that mode of proceeding was most effective, he

could grant the right of gratuitous pasture to the flocks and herds of one, and furnish abundant supplies of timber to another. Master as he now was of Amphipolis and Philippi, he could at pleasure open or close to them the speculations of the gold mines of Mount Pangæus, for which they had always hankered.[697] If his privateers harassed even the powerful Athens, and the islands under her protection, much more vexatious would they be to his neighbors in the Chalkidic peninsula, which they as it were encircled, from the Thermaic Gulf on one side to the Strymonic Gulf on the other. Lastly, we cannot doubt that some individuals in these cities had found it profitable to take service, civil or military, under Philip, which would supply him with correspondents and adherents among their friends and relatives.

It will thus be easily seen, that with reference to Olynthus and her confederate cities, Philip had at his command means of private benefit and annoyance to such an extent, as would ensure to him the coöperation of a venal and traitorous minority in each; such minority of course blending its proceedings, and concealing its purposes, among the standing political feuds of the place. These means however were only preliminary to the direct use of the sword. His seductions and presents commenced the work, but his excellent generalship and soldiers—the phalanx, the hypaspistæ, and the cavalry, all now brought into admirable training during the ten years of his reign—completed it.

Though Demosthenes in one passage goes so far as to say that Philip rated his established influence so high as to expect to incorporate the Chalkidic confederacy in his empire without serious difficulty and without even real war[698]—there is ground for believing that he encountered strenuous resistance, avenged by unmeasured rigors after the victory. The two years and a half between Midsummer 350 B. C., and the commencement of 347 B. C. (the two last years of Olympiad 107 and the nine first months of Olympiad 108), were productive of phænomena more terror-striking than anything in the recent annals of Greece. No less than thirty-two free Grecian cities in Chalkidikê were taken and destroyed, the inhabitants being reduced to slavery, by Philip. Among them was Olynthus, one of the most powerful, flourishing, and energetic members of the Hellenic brotherhood; Apollonia, whose inhabitants would now repent the untoward obstinacy of their fathers (thirty-two years before) in repudiating a generous and equal confederacy with Olynthus, and invoking Spartan aid to revive the falling power of Philip's father, Amyntas; and Stageira, the birth-place of Aristotle. The destruction of thirty-two free Hellenic communities in two years by a foreign prince, was a calamity the like of which had never occurred since the suppression of the Ionic revolt and the invasion of Xerxes. I have already recounted in a previous chapter[699] the manifestation of wrath at the festival of the ninety-ninth Olympiad (394 B. C.) against the envoys of the elder Dionysius of Syracuse, who had captured and subverted five or six free Hellenic communities in Italy and Sicily. Far more vehement would be the sentiment of awe and terror, after the Olynthian war, against the Macedonian destroyer of thirty-two Chalkidic cities. We shall find this

plainly indicated in the phænomena immediately succeeding. We shall see Athens terrified into a peace alike dishonorable and improvident, which even Demosthenes does not venture to oppose; we shall see Æschines passing out of a free spoken Athenian citizen into a servile worshipper, if not a paid agent, of Philip: we shall observe Isokrates, once the champion of Pan-hellenic freedom and integrity, ostentatiously proclaiming Philip as the master and arbiter of Greece, while persuading him at the same time to use his power well for the purpose of conquering Persia. These were terrible times; suitably illustrated in their cruel details by the gangs of enslaved Chalkidic Greeks of both sexes, seen passing even into Peloponnesus[700] as the property of new grantees who extolled the munificence of the donor Philip; and suitably ushered in by awful celestial signs, showers of fire and blood falling from the heavens to the earth, in testimony of the wrath of the gods.[701]

While, however, we make out with tolerable clearness the general result of Philip's Olynthian war, and the terror which it struck into the Grecian mind—we are not only left without information as to its details, but are even perplexed by its chronology. I have already remarked, that though the Olynthians had contracted such suspicions of Philip, even before the beginning of 351 B. C., as to induce them to make peace with his enemy Athens—they had nevertheless, declined the overtures of Athens for a closer alliance, not wishing to bring upon themselves decided hostility from so powerful a neighbor, until his aggressions should become such as to leave them no choice. We have no precise information as to Philip's movements after his operations in Thrace and his sickness in 351 B. C. But we know that it was not in his nature to remain inactive; that he was incessantly pushing his conquests; and that no conquest could be so important to him as that of Olynthus and the Chalkidic peninsula. Accordingly, we are not surprised to find, that the Olynthian and Chalkidian confederates became the object of his direct hostility in 350 B. C. He raised pretences for attack against one or other of these cities separately; avoiding to deal with the confederacy as a whole, and disclaiming, by special envoys,[702] all purposes injurious to Olynthus.

Probably the philippizing party in that city may have dwelt upon this disclaimer as satisfactory, and given as many false assurances about the purposes of Philip, as we shall find Æschines hereafter uttering at Athens. But the general body of citizens were not so deceived. Feeling that the time had come when it was prudent to close with the previous Athenian overtures, they sent envoys to Athens to propose alliance and invite coöperation against Philip. Their first propositions were doubtless not couched in the language of urgency and distress. They were not as yet in any actual danger; their power was great in reality, and estimated at its full value abroad; moreover, as prudent diplomatists, they would naturally overstate their own dignity and the magnitude of what they were offering. Of course they would ask for Athenian aid to be sent to Chalkidikê—since it was there that the war was being carried on; but

they would ask for aid in order to act energetically against the common enemy, and repress the growth of his power—not to avert immediate danger menacing Olynthus.

There needed no discussion to induce the Athenians to accept this alliance. It was what they had long been seeking, and they willingly closed with the proposition. Of course they also promised—what indeed was almost involved in the acceptance—to send a force to coöperate against Philip in Chalkidikê. On this first recognition of Olynthus as an ally—or perhaps shortly afterwards, but before circumstances had at all changed—Demosthenes delivered his earliest Olynthiac harangue. Of the three memorable compositions so denominated, the earliest is, in my judgment, that which stands *second* in the edited order. Their true chronological order has long been, and still is, matter of controversy; the best conclusion which I can form, is that the first and the second are erroneously placed, but that the third is really the latest;[703] all of them being delivered during the six or seven last months of 350 B. C.

In this his earliest advocacy (the speech which stands printed as the second Olynthiac), Demosthenes insists upon the advantageous contingency which has just turned up for Athens, through the blessing of the gods, in the spontaneous tender of so valuable an ally. He recommends that aid be despatched to the new ally; the most prompt and effective aid will please him the best. But this recommendation is contained in a single sentence, in the middle of the speech; it is neither repeated a second time, nor emphatically insisted upon, nor enlarged by specification of quantity or quality of aid to be sent. No allusion is made to necessities or danger of Olynthus, nor to the chance that Philip might conquer the town; still less to ulterior contingencies, that Philip, if he did conquer it, might carry the seat of war from his own coasts to those of Attica. On the contrary, Demosthenes adverts to the power of the Olynthians—to the situation of their territory, close on Philip's flanks—to their fixed resolution that they will never again enter into amity or compromise with him—as evidences how valuable their alliance will prove to Athens; enabling her to prosecute with improved success the war against Philip, and to retrieve the disgraceful losses brought upon her by previous remissness. The main purpose of the orator is to inflame his countrymen into more hearty and vigorous efforts for the prosecution of this general war; while to furnish aid to the Olynthians, is only a secondary purpose, and a part of the larger scheme. "I shall not (says the orator) expatiate on the formidable power of Philip as an argument to urge you to the performance of your public duty. That would be too much both of compliment to him and of disparagement to you. I should, indeed, myself have thought him truly formidable, if he had achieved his present eminence by means consistent with justice. But he has aggrandized himself, partly through your negligence and improvidence, partly by treacherous means —by taking into pay corrupt partisans at Athens, and by cheating successively Olynthians, Thessalians, and all his other allies. These allies, having now detected his treachery, are deserting him; without them, his power will crumble away. Moreover, the Macedonians themselves have no sympathy with his personal ambition; they are

fatigued with the labor imposed upon them by his endless military movements, and impoverished by the closing of their ports through the war. His vaunted officers are men of worthless and dissolute habits; his personal companions are thieves, vile ministers of amusement, outcasts from our cities. His past good fortune imparts to all this real weakness a fallacious air of strength; and doubtless his good fortune has been very great. But the fortune of Athens, and her title to the benevolent aid of the gods is still greater—if only you, Athenians, will do your duty. Yet here you are, sitting still, doing nothing. The sluggard cannot even command his friends to work for him—much less the gods. I do not wonder, that Philip, always in the field, always in movement, doing everything for himself, never letting slip an opportunity—prevails over you who merely talk, inquire, and vote, without action. Nay—the contrary would be wonderful—if under such circumstances, he had *not* been the conqueror. But what I do wonder at is, that you Athenians—who in former days contended for Panhellenic freedom against the Lacedæmonians—who, scorning unjust aggrandizement for yourselves, fought in person and lavished your substance to protect the rights of other Greeks—that *you* now shrink from personal service and payment of money for the defence of your own possessions. You, who have so often rescued others, can now sit still after having lost so much of your own! I wonder you do not look back to that conduct of yours which has brought your affairs into this state of ruin, and ask yourselves how they can ever mend, while such conduct remains unchanged. It was much easier at first to preserve what we once had, than to recover it now that it is lost; we have nothing now left to lose—we have everything to recover. This must be done by ourselves, and at once; we must furnish money, we must serve in person by turns; we must give our generals means to do their work well, and then exact from them a severe account afterwards—which we cannot do so long as we ourselves will neither pay nor serve. We must correct that abuse which has grown up, whereby particular symmories in the state combine to exempt themselves from burdensome duties, and to cast them all unjustly upon others. We must not only come forward vigorously and heartily, with person and with money, but each man must embrace faithfully his fair share of patriotic obligation."

Such are the main points of the earliest discourse delivered by Demosthenes on the subject of Olynthus. In the mind of modern readers, as in that of the rhetor Dionysius,[704] there is an unconscious tendency to imagine that these memorable pleadings must have worked persuasion, and to magnify the efficiency of their author as an historical and directing person. But there are no facts to bear out such an impression. Demosthenes was still comparatively a young man—thirty-one years of age; admired indeed for his speeches and his compositions written to be spoken by others;[705] but as yet not enjoying much practical influence. It is moreover certain—to his honor—that he described and measured foreign dangers before they were recognized by ordinary politicians; that he advised a course, energetic and salutary indeed, but painful for the people to act upon, and disagreeable for recognized leaders to propose; that these leaders, such as Eubulus and others, were accordingly ad-

verse to him. The tone of Demosthenes in these speeches is that of one who feels that he is contending against heavy odds—combating an habitual and deep-seated reluctance. He is an earnest remonstrant—an opposition speaker—contributing to raise up gradually a body of public sentiment and conviction which ultimately may pass into act. His rival Eubulus is the ministerial spokesman, whom the majority, both rich and poor, followed; a man not at all corrupt (so far as we know), but of simple conservative routine, evading all painful necessities and extraordinary precautions; conciliating the rich by resisting a property-tax, and the general body of citizens by refusing to meddle with the Theôric expenditure.

The Athenians did not follow the counsel of Demosthenes. They accepted the Olynthian alliance, but took no active step to coöperate with Olynthus in the war against Philip.[706] Such unhappily was their usual habit. The habit of Philip was the opposite. We need no witness to satisfy us, that he would not slacken in his attack—and that in the course of a month or two, he would master more than one of the Chalkidic cities, perhaps defeating the Olynthian forces also. The Olynthians would discover that they had gained nothing by their new allies; while the philippizing party among themselves would take advantage of the remissness of Athens to depreciate her promises as worthless or insincere, and to press for accommodation with the enemy.[707] Complaints would presently reach Athens, brought by fresh envoys from the Olynthians, and probably also from the Chalkidians, who were the greatest sufferers by Philip's arms. They would naturally justify this renewed application by expatiating on the victorious progress of Philip; they would now call for aid more urgently, and might even glance at the possibility of Philip's conquest of Chalkidikê. It was in this advanced stage of the proceedings that Demosthenes again exerted himself in the cause, delivering that speech which stands first in the printed order of the Olynthiacs.

Here we have, not a Philippic, but a true Olynthiac. Olynthus is no longer part and parcel of a larger theme, upon the whole of which Demosthenes intends to discourse; but stands out as the prominent feature and specialty of his pleading. It is now pronounced to be in danger and in pressing need of succor; moreover its preservation is strenuously pressed upon the Athenians, as essential to their own safety. While it stands with its confederacy around it, the Athenians can fight Philip on his own coast; if it falls, there is nothing to prevent him from transferring the war into Attica, and assailing them on their own soil.[708] Demosthenes is wound up to a higher pitch of emphasis, complaining of the lukewarmness of his countrymen on a crisis which calls aloud for instant action.[709] He again urges that a vote be at once passed to assist Olynthus, and two armaments despatched as quickly as possible; one to preserve to Olynthus her confederate cities—the other, to make a diversion by simultaneous attack on Philip at home. Without such two-fold aid (he says) the cities cannot be preserved.[710] Advice of aid generally he had already given, though less emphatically, in his previous harangue; but he now superadds a new suggestion—

that Athenian envoys shall be sent thither, not merely to announce the coming of the force, but also to remain at Olynthus and watch over the course of events. For he is afraid, that unless such immediate encouragement be sent, Philip may, even without the tedious process of a siege, frighten or cajole the Olynthian confederacy into submission; partly by reminding them that Athens had done nothing for them, and by denouncing her as a treacherous and worthless ally.[711] Philip would be glad to entrap them into some plausible capitulation; and though they knew that they could have no security for his keeping the terms of it afterwards, still he might succeed, if Athens remained idle. Now, if ever, was the time for Athenians to come forward and do their duty without default; to serve in person and submit to the necessary amount of direct taxation. They had no longer the smallest pretence for continued inaction; the very conjuncture which they had so long desired, had turned up of itself—war between Olynthus and Philip, and that too upon grounds special to Olynthus—not at the instigation of Athens.[712] The Olynthian alliance had been thrown in the way of Athens by the peculiar goodness of the gods, to enable her to repair her numerous past errors and short-comings. She ought to look well and deal rightly with these last remaining opportunities, in order to wipe off the shame of the past; but if she now let slip Olynthus and suffer Philip to conquer it, there was nothing else to hinder him from marching whithersoever he chose. His ambition was so insatiable, his activity so incessant, that, assuming Athens to persist in her careless inaction, he would carry the war forward from Thrace into Attica—of which the ruinous consequences were but too clear.[713]

"I maintain (continued the orator) that you ought to lend aid at the present crisis in two ways; by preserving for the Olynthians their confederated cities, through a body of troops sent out for that express purpose—and by employing at the same time other troops and other triremes to act aggressively against Philip's own coast. If you neglect either of these measures, I fear that the expedition will fail. As to the pecuniary provision, you have already more money than any other city, available for purposes of war; if you will pay that money to soldiers on service, no need exists for farther provision—if not, then need exists; but above all things, money *must* be found. What then! I shall be asked—are you moving that the Theôric fund shall be devoted to war purposes? Not I, by Zeus. I merely express my conviction, that soldiers *must* be equipped, and that receipt of public money, and performance of public service, ought to go hand in hand; but your practice is to take the public money, without any such condition, for the festivals. Accordingly, nothing remains except that all should directly contribute; much, if much is wanted—little, if little will suffice. Money must be had; without it, not a single essential step can be taken. There are moreover different ways and means suggested by others. Choose any one of these which you think advantageous; and lay a vigorous grasp on events while the opportunity still lasts."[714]

It was thus that Demosthenes addressed his countrymen some time after the Olynthians had been received as allies, but before any auxiliary force had been either sent to them or even positively decreed—yet when such postponement of action had inspired them with mistrust, threatening to throw them, even without resistance, into the hands of Philip and their own philippizing party. We observe in Demosthenes the same sagacious appreciation, both of the present and the future, as we have already remarked in the first Philippic—foresight of the terrible consequences of this Olynthian war, while as yet distant and unobserved by others. We perceive the same good sense and courage in invoking the right remedies; though his propositions of personal military service, direct taxation, or the diversion of the Theôric fund—were all of them the most unpopular which could be made. The last of the three, indeed, he does not embody in a substantive motion; nor could he move it without positive illegality, which would have rendered him liable to the indictment called Graphê Paranomon. But he approaches it near enough to raise in the public mind the question as it really stood—that money must be had; that there were only two ways of getting it—direct taxation, and appropriation of the festival fund; and that the latter of these ought to be restored as well as the former. We shall find this question about the Theôric Fund coming forward again more than once, and shall have presently to notice it more at large.

At some time after this new harangue of Demosthenes—how long after it, or how far in consequence of it, we cannot say—the Athenians commissioned and sent a body of foreign mercenaries to the aid of the Olynthians and Chalkidians. The outfit and transport of these troops was in part defrayed by voluntary subscriptions from rich Athenian citizens. But no Athenian citizen-soldiers were sent; nor was any money assigned for the pay of the mercenaries. The expedition appears to have been sent towards the autumn of 350 B. C., as far as we can pretend to affirm anything respecting the obscure chronology of this period.[715] It presently gained some victory over Philip or Philip's generals, and was enabled to transmit good news to Athens, which excited much exultation there, and led the people to fancy that they were in a fair way of taking revenge on Philip for past miscarriages. According to some speakers, not only were the Olynthians beyond all reach of danger, but Philip was in a fair way of being punished and humbled. It is indeed possible that the success may really have been something considerable, such as to check Philip's progress for the time. Though victorious on the whole, he must have experienced partial and temporary reverses, otherwise he would have concluded the war before the early spring of 347 B. C. Whether this success coincided with that of the Athenian general Chares over Philip's general Adæus,[716] we cannot say.

But Demosthenes had sagacity enough to perceive, and frankness to proclaim, that it was a success noway decisive of the war generally; worse than nothing, if it induced the Athenians to fancy that they had carried their point.

To correct the delusive fancy, that enough had been done—to combat that chronic malady under which the Athenians so readily found encouragement and excuses for inaction—to revive in them the conviction, that they had contracted a debt, yet unpaid, towards their Olynthian allies and towards their own ultimate security—is the scope of Demosthenes in his third Olynthiac harangue; third in the printed order, and third also, according to my judgment, in order of time; delivered towards the close of the year 350 B. C.[717] Like Perikles, he was not less watchful to abate extravagant and unseasonable illusions of triumph in his countrymen, than to raise their spirits in moments of undue alarm and despondency.[718]

"The talk which I hear about punishing Philip (says Demosthenes, in substance) is founded on a false basis. The real facts of the case teach us a very different lesson. [719] They bid us look well to our own security, that we be not ourselves the sufferers, and that we preserve our allies. There *was* indeed a time—and that too within my remembrance not long ago—when we might have held our own and punished Philip besides; but now, our first care must be to preserve our own allies. After we have made this sure, then it will be time to think of punishing others. The present juncture calls for anxious deliberation. Do not again commit the same error as you committed three years ago. When Philip was besieging Heræum in Thrace, you passed an energetic decree to send an expedition against him: presently came reports that he was sick, and that he was dead: this good news made you fancy that the expedition was unnecessary, and you let it drop. If you had executed promptly what you resolved, Philip would have been put down *then*, and would have given you no further trouble.[720]

"Those matters indeed are past, and cannot be mended. But I advert to them now, because the present war-crisis is very similar, and I trust you will not make the like mistake again. If you do not send aid to Olynthus with all your force and means, you will play Philip's game for him now, exactly as you did then. You have been long anxious and working to get the Olynthians into war with Philip. This has now happened: what choice remains, except to aid them heartily and vigorously? You will be covered with shame, if you do not. But this is not all. Your own security at home requires it of you also; for there is nothing to hinder Philip, if he conquers Olynthus, from invading Attica. The Phokians are exhausted in funds—and the Thebans are your enemies.

"All this is superfluous, I shall be told. We have already resolved unanimously to succor Olynthus, and we will succor it. We only want you to tell us how. You will be surprised, perhaps, at my answer. Appoint Nomothetæ at once.[721] Do not submit to them any propositions for new laws, for you have laws enough already—but only repeal such of the existing laws as are hurtful at the present juncture—I mean, those which regard the Theôric fund (I speak out thus plainly), and some which bear on the citizens in military service. By the former, you hand over money, which ought to go to soldiers on service, in Theôric distribution among those who stay at home. By

the latter, you let off without penalty those who evade service, and discourage those who wish to do their duty. When you have repealed these mischievous laws, and rendered it safe to proclaim salutary truths, then expect some one to come forward with a formal motion such as you all know to be required. But until you do this, expect not that any one will make these indispensable propositions on your behalf, with the certainty of ruin at your hands. You will find no such man; especially as he would only incur unjust punishment for himself, without any benefit to the city—while his punishment would make it yet more formidable to speak out upon that subject in future, than it is even now. Moreover, the same men who proposed these laws should also take upon them to propose the repeal; for it is not right that these men should continue to enjoy a popularity which is working mischief to the whole city, while the unpopularity of a reform beneficial to us all, falls on the head of the reforming mover. But while you retain this prohibition, you can neither tolerate that any one among you shall be powerful enough to infringe a law with impunity—nor expect that any one will be fool enough to run with his eyes open into punishment."

I lament that my space confines me to this brief and meagre abstract of one of the most splendid harangues ever delivered—the third Olynthiac of Demosthenes. The partial advantage gained over Philip being prodigiously over-rated, the Athenians seemed to fancy that they had done enough, and were receding from their resolution to assist Olynthus energetically. As on so many other occasions, so on this—Demosthenes undertook to combat a prevalent sentiment which he deemed unfounded and unseasonable. With what courage, wisdom, and dexterity—so superior to the insulting sarcasms of Phokion—does he execute this self-imposed duty, well knowing its unpopularity!

Whether any movement was made by the Athenians in consequence of the third Olynthiac of Demosthenes, we cannot determine. We have no ground for believing the affirmative; while we are certain that the specific measure which he recommended—the sending of an armament of citizens personally serving—was not at that time (before the end of 350 B. C.) carried into effect. At or before the commencement of 349 B. C., the foreign relations of Athens began to be disturbed by another supervening embarrassment—the revolt of Eubœa.

After the successful expedition of 358 B. C., whereby the Athenians had expelled the Thebans from Eubœa, that island remained for some years in undisturbed connection with Athens. Chalkis, Eretria, and Oreus, its three principal cities, sent each a member to the synod of allies holding session at Athens, and paid their annual quota (seemingly five talents each) to the confederate fund.[722] During the third quarter of 352 B. C., Menestratus the despot or principal citizen of Eretria is cited as a particularly devoted friend of Athens.[723] But this state of things changed shortly after Philip conquered Thessaly and made himself master of the Pagasæan Gulf (in 353 and the first half of 352 B. C.). His power was then established immediately over against Oreus and the northern coast of Eubœa, with which island his means of com-

munication became easy and frequent. Before the date of the first Philippic of Demosthenes (seemingly towards the summer of 351 B. C.) Philip had opened correspondences in Eubœa, and had despatched thither various letters, some of which the orator reads in the course of that speech to the Athenian assembly. The actual words of the letters are not given; but from the criticism of the orator himself, we discern that they were highly offensive to Athenian feelings; instigating the Eubœans probably to sever themselves from Athens, with offers of Macedonian aid towards that object.[724] Philip's naval warfare also brought his cruisers to Geræstus in Eubœa, where they captured several Athenian corn-ships;[725] insulting even the opposite coast of Attica at Marathon, so as to lower the reputation of Athens among her allies. Accordingly, in each of the Eubœan cities, parties were soon formed aiming at the acquisition of dominion through the support of Philip; while for the same purpose detachments of mercenaries could also be procured across the western Eubœan strait, out of the large numbers now under arms in Phokis.

About the beginning of 349 B. C.—while the war of Philip, unknown to us in its details, against the Olynthians and Chalkidians, was still going on, with more or less of help from mercenaries sent by Athens—hostilities, probably raised by the intrigues of Philip, broke out at Eretria in Eubœa. An Eretrian named Plutarch (we do not know what had become of Menestratus), with a certain number of soldiers at his disposal, but opposed by enemies yet more powerful, professed to represent Athenian interests in his city, and sent to Athens to ask for aid. Demosthenes, suspecting this man to be a traitor, dissuaded compliance with the application.[726] But Plutarch had powerful friends at Athens, seemingly among the party of Eubulus; one of whom, Meidias, a violent personal enemy of Demosthenes, while advocating the grant of aid, tried even to get up a charge against Demosthenes, of having himself fomented these troubles in Eubœa against the reputed philo-Athenian Plutarch.[727] The Athenian assembly determined to despatch a force under Phokion; who accordingly crossed into the island, somewhat before the time of the festival Anthesteria (February) with a body of hoplites.[728] The cost of fitting out triremes for this transport, was in part defrayed by voluntary contributions from rich Athenians; several of whom, Nikêratus, Euktêmon, Euthydemus, contributed each the outfit of one vessel. [729] A certain proportion of the horsemen of the city were sent also; yet the entire force was not very large, as it was supposed that the partisans there to be found would make up the deficiency.

This hope however turned out fallacious. After an apparently friendly reception and a certain stay at or near Eretria, Phokion found himself betrayed. Kallias, an ambitious leader of Chalkis, collected as much Eubœan force as he could, declared openly against Athens, and called in Macedonian aid (probably from Philip's commanders in the neighboring Pagasæan Gulf); while his brother Taurosthenes hired a detachment of mercenaries out of Phokis.[730] The anti-Athenian force thus became more formidable than Phokion could fairly cope with; while the support yielded to

him in the island was less than he expected. Crossing the eminence named Kotylæum, he took a position near the town and hippodrome of Tamynæ, on high ground bordered by a ravine; Plutarch still professing friendship, and encamping with his mercenaries along with him. Phokion's position was strong; yet the Athenians were outnumbered and beleaguered so as to occasion great alarm.[731] Many of the slack and disorderly soldiers deserted; a loss which Phokion affected to despise—though he at the same time sent to Athens to make known his difficulties and press for reinforcement. Meanwhile he kept on the defensive in his camp, which the enemy marched up to attack. Disregarding his order, and acting with a deliberate treason which was accounted at Athens unparalleled—Plutarch advanced forward out of the camp to meet them; but presently fled, drawing along with his flight the Athenian horse, who had also advanced in some disorder. Phokion with the infantry was now in the greatest danger. The enemy, attacking vigorously, were plucking up the palisade, and on the point of forcing his camp. But his measures were so well taken, and his hoplites behaved with so much intrepidity and steadiness in this trying emergency, that he repelled the assailants with loss, and gained a complete victory. Thallus and Kineas distinguished themselves by his side; Kleophanes also was conspicuous in partially rallying the broken horsemen; while Æschines the orator, serving among the hoplites, was complimented for his bravery, and sent to Athens to carry the first news of the victory.[732] Phokion pursued his success, expelled Plutarch from Eretria, and captured a strong fort called Zaretra, near the narrowest part of the island. He released all his Greek captives, fearing that the Athenians, incensed at the recent treachery, should resolve upon treating them with extreme harshness.[733] Kallias seems to have left the island and found shelter with Philip.[734]

The news brought by Æschines (before the Dionysiac festival) of the victory of Tamynæ, relieved the Athenians from great anxiety. On the former despatch from Phokion, the Senate had resolved to send to Eubœa another armament, including the remaining half of the cavalry, a reinforcement of hoplites, and a fresh squadron of triremes. But the victory enabled them to dispense[735] with any immediate reinforcement, and to celebrate the Dionysiac festival with cheerfulness. The festival was on this year of more than usual notoriety. Demosthenes, serving in it as chorêgus for his tribe the Pandionis, was brutally insulted, in the theatre and amid the full pomp of the ceremony, by his enemy the wealthy Meidias; who, besides other outrages, struck him several times with his fist on the head. The insult was the more poignant, because Meidias at this time held the high office of Hipparch, or one of the commanders of the horse. It was the practice at Athens to convene a public assembly immediately after the Dionysiac festival, for the special purpose of receiving notifications and hearing complaints about matters which had occurred at the festival itself. At this special assembly Demosthenes preferred a complaint against Meidias for the unwarrantable outrage offered, and found warm sympathy among the people, who passed a unanimous vote of censure. This procedure (called Probolê), did not by itself carry any punishment, but served as a sort of *præjudicium*, or finding of a true

bill; enabling Demosthenes to quote the public as a witness to the main fact of insult, and encouraging him to pursue Meidias before the regular tribunals; which he did a few months afterwards, but was induced to accept from Meidias the self-imposed fine of thirty minæ before the final passing of sentence by the Dikasts.[736]

From the despatches of Phokion, the treason of Plutarch of Eretria had become manifest; so that Demosthenes gained credit for his previous remarks on the impolicy of granting the armament; while the friends of Plutarch—Hegesilaus and others of the party of Eubulus—incurred displeasure; and some, as it appears, were afterwards tried.[737] But he was reproached by his enemies for having been absent from the battle of Tamynæ; and a citizen named Euktêmon, at the instigation of Meidias, threatened an indictment against him for desertion of his post. Whether Demosthenes had actually gone over to Eubœa as a hoplite in the army of Phokion, and obtained leave of absence to come back for the Dionysia—or whether he did not go at all—we are unable to say. In either case, his duties as chorêgus for this year furnished a conclusive excuse; so that Euktêmon, though he formally hung up before the statues of the Eponymous Heroes public proclamation of his intended indictment, never thought fit to take even the first step for bringing it to actual trial, and incurred legal disgrace for such non-performance of his engagement.[738] Nevertheless the opprobrious and undeserved epithet of deserter was ever afterwards applied to Demosthenes by Æschines and his other enemies; and Meidias even heaped the like vituperation upon most of those who took part in that assembly[739] wherein the Probolê or vote of censure against him had been passed. Not long after the Dionysiac festival, however, it was found necessary to send fresh troops, both horsemen and hoplites, to Eubœa; probably to relieve either some or all of those already serving there. Demosthenes on this occasion put on his armor and served as a hoplite in the island. Meidias also went to Argura in Eubœa, as commander of the horsemen: yet, when the horsemen were summoned to join the Athenian army, he did not join along with them, but remained as trierarch of a trireme the outfit of which he had himself defrayed.[740] How long the army stayed in Eubœa, we do not know. It appears that Demosthenes had returned to Athens by the time when the annual Senate was chosen in the last month of the Attic year (Skirrophorion—June); having probably by that time been relieved. He was named (by the lot) among the Five Hundred Senators for the coming Attic year (beginning Midsummer 349 B. C. = Olymp. 107, 4);[741] his old enemy Meidias in vain impugning his qualification as he passed through the Dokimasy or preliminary examination previous to entering office.

What the Athenian army did farther in Eubœa, we cannot make out. Phokion was recalled—we do not know when—and replaced by a general named Molossus; who is said to have managed the war very unsuccessfully, and even to have been made prisoner himself by the enemy.[742] The hostile parties in the island, sided by Philip, were not subdued, nor was it until the summer of 348 B. C. that they applied for

peace. Even then, it appears, none was concluded, so that the Eubœans remained unfriendly to Athens until the peace with Philip in 346 B. C.

But while the Athenians were thus tasked for the maintenance of Eubœa, they found it necessary to undertake more effective measures for the relief of Olynthus, and they thus had upon their hands at the same time the burthen of two wars. We know that they had to provide force for both Eubœa and Olynthus at once;[743] and that the occasion which called for these simultaneous efforts was one of stringent urgency. The Olynthian requisition and communications made themselves so strongly felt, as to induce Athens to do, what Demosthenes in his three Olynthiacs had vainly insisted on during the preceding summer and autumn—to send thither a force of native Athenians, in the first half of 349 B. C. Of the horsemen who had gone from Athens to Eubœa, under Meidias, to serve under Phokion, either all, or a part, crossed by sea from Eubœa to Olynthus, during that half-year.[744] Meidias did not cross with them, but came back as trierarch in his trireme to Athens. Now the Athenian horsemen were not merely citizens, but citizens of wealth and consequence; moreover the transport of them by sea was troublesome as well as costly. The sending of such troops implies a strenuous effort and sense of urgency on the part of Athens. We may farther conclude that a more numerous body of hoplites were sent along with the horsemen at the same time; for horsemen would hardly under any circumstances be sent across sea alone; moreover Olynthus stood most in need of auxiliary hoplites, since her native force consisted chiefly of horsemen and peltasts. [745]

The evidence derived from the speech against Neæra being thus corroborated by the still better evidence of the speech against Meidias, we are made certain of the important fact, that the first half of the year 349 B. C. was one in which Athens was driven to great public exertions—even to armaments of native citizens—for the support of Olynthus as well as for the maintenance of Eubœa. What the Athenians achieved, indeed, or helped to achieve, by these expeditions to Olynthus—or how long they stayed there—we have no information. But we may reasonably presume—though Philip during this year 349 B. C., probably conquered a certain number of the thirty-two Chalkidic towns—that the allied forces, Olynthian, Chalkidic and Athenian, contended against him with no inconsiderable effect, and threw back his conquest of Chalkidikê into the following year. After a summer's campaign in that peninsula, the Athenian citizens would probably come home. We learn that the Olynthians made prisoner a Macedonian of rank named Derdas, with other Macedonians attached to him.[746]

So extraordinary a military effort, however, made by the Athenians in the first half of 349 B. C.—to recover Eubœa and to protect Olynthus at once—naturally placed them in a state of financial embarrassment. Of this, one proof is to be found in the fact, that for some time there was not sufficient money to pay the Dikasteries, which

accordingly sat little; so that few causes were tried for some time—for how long we do not know.[747]

To meet in part the pecuniary wants of the moment, a courageous effort was made by the senator Apollodorus. He moved a decree in the Senate, that it should be submitted to the vote of the public assembly, whether the surplus of revenue, over and above the ordinary and permanent peace establishment of the city, should be paid to the Theôric Fund for the various religious festivals—or should be devoted to the pay, outfit, and transport of soldiers for the actual war. The Senate approved the motion of Apollodorus, and adopted a (probouleuma) preliminary resolution authorizing him to submit it to the public assembly. Under such authority, Apollodorus made the motion in the assembly, where also he was fully successful. The assembly (without a single dissentient voice, we are told) passed a decree enjoining that the surplus of revenue should under the actual pressure of war be devoted to the pay and other wants of soldiers. Notwithstanding such unanimity, however, a citizen named Stephanus impeached both the decree and its mover on the score of illegality, under the Graphê Paranomon. Apollodorus was brought before the Dikastery, and there found guilty; mainly (according to his friend and relative the prosecutor of Neæra) through suborned witnesses and false allegations foreign to the substance of the impeachment. When the verdict of guilty had been pronounced, Stephanus as accuser assessed the measure of punishment at the large fine of fifteen talents, refusing to listen to any supplications from the friends of Apollodorus, when they entreated him to name a lower sum. The Dikasts however, more lenient than Stephanus, were satisfied to adopt the measure of fine assessed by Apollodorus upon himself—one talent—which he actually paid.[748]

There can hardly be a stronger evidence both of the urgency and poverty of the moment, than the fact, that both Senate and people passed this decree of Apollodorus. That fact there is no room for doubting. But the additional statement—that there was not a single dissentient, and that every one, both at the time and afterwards, always pronounced the motion to have been an excellent one[749]—is probably an exaggeration. For it is not to be imagined that the powerful party, who habitually resisted the diversion of money from the Theôric Fund to war purposes, should have been wholly silent or actually concurrent on this occasion, though they may have been outvoted. The motion of Apollodorus was one which could not be made without distinctly breaking the law, and rendering the mover liable to those penal consequences which afterwards actually fell upon him. Now, that even a majority, both of senate and assembly, should have overleaped this illegality, is a proof sufficiently remarkable how strongly the crisis pressed upon their minds.

The expedition of Athenian citizens, sent to Olynthus before Midsummer 349 B. C., would probably return after a campaign of two or three months, and after having rendered some service against the Macedonian army. The warlike operations of Philip against the Chalkidians and Olynthians were noway relaxed. He pressed the Chalkidi-

ans more and more closely throughout all the ensuing eighteen months (from Midsummer 349 B. C. to the early spring of 347 B. C.). During the year Olymp. 407, 4, if the citation from Philochorus[750] is to be trusted, the Athenians despatched to their aid three expeditions; one, at the request of the Olynthians, who sent envoys to pray for it—consisting of two thousand peltasts under Chares, in thirty ships partly manned by Athenian seamen. A second under Charidemus, at the earnest entreaty of the suffering Chalkidians; consisting of eighteen triremes, four thousand peltasts and one hundred and fifty horsemen. Charidemus, in conjunction with the Olynthians, marched over Bottiæa and the peninsula of Pallênê, laying waste the country; whether he achieved any important success, we do not know. Respecting both Chares and Charidemus, the anecdotes descending to us are of insolence, extortion, and amorous indulgences, rather than of military exploits.[751] It is clear that neither the one nor the other achieved anything effectual against Philip, whose arms and corruption made terrible progress in Chalkidikê. So grievously did the strength of the Olynthians fail, that they transmitted a last and most urgent appeal to Athens; imploring the Athenians not to abandon them to ruin, but to send them a force of citizens in addition to the mercenaries already there. The Athenians complied, despatching thither seventeen triremes, two thousand hoplites, and three hundred horsemen, all under the command of Chares.

To make out anything of the successive steps of this important war is impossible; but we discern that during this latter portion of the Olynthian war, the efforts made by Athens were considerable. Demosthenes (in a speech six years afterwards) affirms that the Athenians had sent to the aid of Olynthus four thousand citizens, ten thousand mercenaries, and fifty triremes.[752] He represents the Chalkidic cities as having been betrayed successively to Philip by corrupt and traitorous citizens. That the conquest was achieved greatly by the aid of corruption, we cannot doubt; but the orator's language carries no accurate information. Mekyberna and Torônê are said to have been among the towns betrayed without resistance.[753] After Philip had captured the thirty-two Chalkidic cities, he marched against Olynthus itself, with its confederate neighbors,—the Thracian Methônê and Apollonia. In forcing the passage of the river Sardon, he encountered such resistance that his troops were at first repulsed; and he was himself obliged to seek safety by swimming back across the river. He was moreover wounded in the eye by an Olynthian archer, named Aster, and lost the sight of that eye completely, notwithstanding the skill of his Greek surgeon, Kritobulus.[754] On arriving within forty furlongs of Olynthus, he sent to the inhabitants a peremptory summons, intimating that either they must evacuate the city, or he must leave Macedonia.[755] Rejecting this notice, they determined to defend their town to the last. A considerable portion of the last Athenian citizen-armament was still in the town to aid in the defence;[756] so that the Olynthians might reasonably calculate that Athens would strain every nerve to guard her own citizens against captivity. But their hopes were disappointed. How long the siege lasted,—or whether there was time for Athens to send farther reinforcement, we cannot say. The Olynthians are

said to have repulsed several assaults of Philip with loss; but according to Demosthenes, the philippizing party, headed by the venal Euthykrates and Lasthenes, brought about the banishment of their chief opponent Apollonides, nullified all measures for energetic defence, and treasonably surrendered the city. Two defeats were sustained near its walls, and one of the generals of this party, having five hundred cavalry under his command, betrayed them designedly into the hands of the invader. [757] Olynthus, with all its inhabitants and property, at length fell into the hands of Philip. His mastery of the Chalkidic peninsula thus became complete towards the end of winter, 348-347 B. C.

Miserable was the ruin which fell upon this flourishing peninsula. The persons of the Olynthians,—men, women and children,—were sold into slavery. The wealth of the city gave to Philip the means of recompensing his soldiers for the toils of the war; the city itself he is said to have destroyed, together with Apollonia, Methônê, Stageira, etc.,—in all, thirty-two Chalkidic cities. Demosthenes, speaking about five years afterwards, says that they were so thoroughly and cruelly ruined as to leave their very sites scarcely discernible.[758] Making every allowance for exaggeration, we may fairly believe that they were dismantled, and bereft of all citizen proprietors; that the buildings and visible marks of Hellenic city-life were broken up or left to decay; that the remaining houses, as well as the villages around, were tenanted by dependent cultivators or slaves,—now working for the benefit of new Macedonian proprietors, in great part nonresident, and probably of favored Grecian grantees also. [759] Though various Greeks thus received their recompense for services rendered to Philip, yet Demosthenes affirms that Euthykrates and Lasthenes, the traitors who had sold Olynthus, were not among the number; or at least that, not long afterwards, they were dismissed with dishonor and contempt.[760]

In this Olynthian war,—ruinous to the Chalkidic Greeks, terrific to all other Greeks, and doubling the power of Philip,—Athens too must have incurred a serious amount of expense. We find it stated loosely, that in her entire war against Philip,—from the time of his capture of Amphipolis in 358-357 B. C. down to the peace of 346 B. C. or shortly afterwards,—she had expended not less than fifteen hundred talents.[761] On these computations no great stress is to be laid; but we may well believe that her outlay was considerable. In spite of all reluctance, she was obliged to do something; what she did was both too little, and too intermittent,—done behind time so as to produce no satisfactory result; but nevertheless, the aggregate cost, in a series of years, was a large one. During the latter portion of the Olynthian war, as far as we can judge, she really seems to have made efforts, though she had done little in the beginning. We may presume that the cost must have been defrayed, in part at least, by a direct property-tax; for the condemnation of Apollodorus put an end to the proposition of taking from the Theôric Fund.[762] Means may also have been found of economizing from the other expenses of the state.

Though the appropriation of the Theôric Fund to other purposes continued to be thus interdicted to any formal motion, yet, in the way of suggestion and insinuation it was from time to time glanced at by Demosthenes, and others;—and whenever money was wanted for war, the question whether it should be taken from this source or from direct property-tax, was indirectly revived. The appropriation of the Theôric Fund, however, remained unchanged until the very eve of the battle of Chæroneia. Just before that Dies Iræ, when Philip was actually fortifying Elateia, the fund was made applicable to war-purposes; the views of Demosthenes were realized,—twelve years after he had begun to enforce them.

This question about the Theôric expenditure is rarely presented by modern authors in the real way that it affected the Athenian mind. It has been sometimes treated as a sort of almsgiving to the poor,—and sometimes as an expenditure by the Athenians upon their pleasures. Neither the one nor the other gives a full or correct view of the case; each only brings out a part of the truth.

Doubtless, the Athenian democracy cared much for the pleasures of the citizens. It provided for them the largest amount of refined and imaginative pleasures ever tasted by any community known to history; pleasures essentially social and multitudinous, attaching the citizens to each other, rich and poor, by the strong tie of community of enjoyment.

But pleasure, though an usual accessory, was not the primary idea or predominant purpose of the Theôric expenditure. That expenditure was essentially religious in its character, incurred only for various festivals, and devoted exclusively to the honor of the gods. The ancient religion, not simply at Athens, but throughout Greece and the contemporary world,—very different in this respect from the modern,—included within itself and its manifestations nearly the whole range of social pleasures.[763] Now the Theôric Fund was essentially the Church-Fund at Athens; that upon which were charged all the expenses incurred by the state in the festivals and the worship of the gods. The Diobely, or distribution of two oboli to each present citizen, was one part of this expenditure; given in order to ensure that every citizen should have the opportunity of attending the festival, and doing honor to the god; never given to any one who was out of Attica because, of course, he could not attend;[764] but given to all alike within the country, rich or poor.[765] It was essential to that universal communion which formed a prominent feature of the festival, not less in regard to the god, than in regard to the city;[766] but it was only one portion of the total disbursements covered by the Theôric Fund. To this general religious fund it was provided by law that the surplus of ordinary revenue should be paid over, after all the cost of the peace establishment had been defrayed. There was no appropriation more thoroughly coming home to the common sentiment, more conducive as a binding force to the unity of the city, or more productive of satisfaction to each individual citizen.

We neither know the amount of the Theôric Fund, nor of the distributions connected with it. We cannot, therefore, say what proportion it formed of the whole peace-expenditure,—itself unknown also. But we cannot doubt that it was large. To be sparing of expenditure in manifestations for the honor of the gods, was accounted the reverse of virtue by Greeks generally; and the Athenians especially, whose eyes were every day contemplating the glories of their acropolis, would learn a different lesson,—moreover, magnificent religious display was believed to conciliate the protection and favor of the gods.[767] We may affirm, however, upon the strongest presumptions, that this religious expenditure did not absorb any funds required for the other branches of a peace-establishment. Neither naval, nor military, nor administrative exigencies, were starved in order to augment the Theôric surplus. Eubulus was distinguished for his excellent keeping of the docks and arsenals, and for his care in replacing the decayed triremes by new ones. And after all the wants of a well-mounted peace-establishment were satisfied, no Athenian had scruple in appropriating what remained under the conspiring impulses of piety, pleasure and social brotherhood.

It is true that the Athenians might have laid up that surplus annually in the acropolis, to form an accumulating war-fund. Such provision had been made half a century before, under the full energy and imperial power of Athens, when she had a larger revenue, with numerous tribute-paying allies, and when Perikles presided over her councils. It might have been better if she had done something of the same kind in the age after the Peloponnesian war. Perhaps, if men like Perikles, or even like Demosthenes, had enjoyed marked ascendency, she would have been advised and prevailed on to continue such a precaution. But before we can measure the extent of improvidence with which Athens is here fairly chargeable, we ought to know what was the sum thus expended on the festivals. What amount of money could have been stored up for the contingency of war, even if all the festivals and all the distributions had been suppressed? How far would it have been possible, in any other case than that of obvious present necessity, to carry economy into the festival-expenditure,—truly denominated by Demades the cement of the political system,[768]—without impairing in the bosom of each individual that sentiment of communion, religious, social and patriotic, which made the Athenians a City, and not a simple multiplication of units? These are points on which we ought to have information, before we can fairly graduate our censure upon Athens for not converting her Theôric Fund into an accumulated capital to meet the contingency of war. We ought also to ask, as matter for impartial comparison, how many governments, ancient or modern, have ever thought it requisite to lay up during peace a stock of money available for war?

The Athenian peace-establishment maintained more ships of war, larger docks, and better-stored arsenals, than any city in Greece, besides expending forty talents annually upon the Horsemen of the state, and doubtless something farther (though we know not how much) upon the other descriptions of military force. All this, let it

be observed, and the Theôric expenditure besides, was defrayed without direct taxation, which was reserved for the extraordinary cost incident to a state of war, and was held to be sufficient to meet it, without any accumulated war-fund. When the war against Philip became serious, the proprietary classes at Athens, those included in the schedule of assessment, were called upon to defray the expense by a direct tax, from which they had been quite free in time of peace. They tried to evade this burthen by requiring that the festival-fund should be appropriated instead;[769] thus menacing what was dearest to the feelings of the majority of the citizens. The ground which they took was the same in principle, as if the proprietors in France or Belgium claimed to exempt themselves from direct taxation for the cost of a war, by first taking either all or half of the annual sum voted out of the budget for the maintenance of religion.[770] We may judge how strong a feeling would be raised among the Athenian public generally, by the proposal of impoverishing the festival expenditure in order to save a property-tax. Doubtless, after the proprietary class had borne a certain burthen of direct taxation, their complaints would become legitimate. The cost of the festivals could not be kept up undiminished, under severe and continued pressure of war. As a second and subsidiary resource, it would become essential to apply the whole or a part of the fund in alleviation of the burthens of the war. But even if all had been so applied, the fund could not have been large enough to dispense with the necessity of a property-tax besides.

We see this conflict of interests,—between direct taxation on one side, and the festival-fund on the other as a means of paying for war,—running through the Demosthenic orations, and especially marked in the fourth Philippic.[771] Unhappily, the conflict served as an excuse to both parties for throwing the blame on each other, and starving the war; as well as for giving effect to the repugnance, shared by both rich and poor, against personal military service abroad. Demosthenes sides with neither, tries to mediate between them, and calls for patriotic sacrifice from both alike. Having before him an active and living enemy, with the liberties of Greece as well as of Athens at stake,—he urges every species of sacrifice at once—personal service, direct-tax payments, abnegation of the festivals. Sometimes the one demand stands most prominent, sometimes the other; but oftenest of all, comes his appeal for personal service. Under such military necessities, in fact the Theôric expenditure became mischievous, not merely because it absorbed the public money, but also because it chained the citizens to their home and disinclined them to active service abroad. The great charm and body of sentiment connected with the festival, essentially connected as it was with presence in Attica, operated as a bane; at an exigency when one-third or one-fourth of the citizens ought to have been doing hard duty as soldiers on the coasts of Macedonia or Thrace, against an enemy who never slept. Unfortunately for the Athenians, they could not be convinced, by all the patriotic eloquence of Demosthenes, that the festivals which fed their piety and brightened their home-existence during peace, were unmaintainable during such a war, and must be renounced for a time, if the liberty and security of Athens were to be preserved. The

same want of energy which made them shrink from the hardship of personal service, also rendered them indisposed to so great a sacrifice as that of their festivals; nor indeed would it have availed them to spare all the cost of their festivals, had their remissness as soldiers still continued. Nothing less could have saved them, than simultaneous compliance with all the three requisitions urged by Demosthenes in 350 B. C.; which compliance ultimately came, but came too late, in 339-338 B. C.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER LXXXVIII.

ON THE ORDER OF THE OLYNTHIAC ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.

RESPECTING the true chronological order of these three harangues, dissentient opinions have been transmitted from ancient times, and still continue among modern critics.

Dionysius of Halikarnassus cites the three speeches by their initial words, but places them in a different chronological order from that in which they stand edited. He gives the second as being first in the series; the third, as second; and the first, as third.

It will be understood that I always speak of and describe these speeches by the order in which they stand edited; though, as far as I can judge, that order is not the true one.

Edited Order	I.	II.	III.
Order of Dionysius	II.	III.	I.

The greater number of modern critics defend the edited order; the main arguments for which have been ably stated in a dissertation published by Petrenz in 1833. Dindorf, in his edition of Demosthenes, places this Dissertation in front of his notes to the Olynthiacs; affirming that it is conclusive, and sets the question at rest. Böhnecke also, (Forschungen, p. 151), treats the question as no longer open to doubt.

On the other hand, Flathe (Geschichte Makedoniens, p. 183-187) expresses himself with equal confidence in favor of the order stated by Dionysius. A much higher authority, Dr. Thirlwall, agrees in the same opinion; though with less confidence, and with a juster appreciation of our inadequate means for settling the question. See the Appendix iii. to the 5th volume of his History of Greece, p. 512.

Though I have not come to the same conclusion as Dr. Thirlwall, I agree with him, that unqualified confidence, in any conclusion as to the order of these harangues, is unsuitable and not warranted by the amount of evidence. We have nothing to proceed upon except the internal evidence of the speeches, taken in conjunction with the contemporaneous history; of which we know little or nothing from information in detail.

On the best judgment that I can form, I cannot adopt wholly either the edited order or that of Dionysius, though agreeing in part with both. I concur with Dionysius and Dr. Thirlwall in placing the second Olynthiac *first* of the three. I concur with the edited order in placing the third *last*. I observe, in Dr. Thirlwall's Appendix, that this arrangement has been vindicated in a Dissertation by Stueve. I have not seen this Dissertation; and my own conclusion was deduced (even before I knew that it had ever been advocated elsewhere) only from an attentive study of the speeches.

Edited Order	I.	II.	III.
Order of Dionysius	II.	III.	I.
Order of Stueve (which I think the most probable)	II.	I.	III.

To consider, first, the proper place of the *second* Olynthiac (I mean that which stands second in the edited order).

The most remarkable characteristic of this oration is, that scarcely anything is said in it about Olynthus. It is, in fact, a Philippic rather than an Olynthiac. This characteristic is not merely admitted, but strongly put forward, by Petrenz, p. 11:—"Quid! quod ipsorum Olynthiorum hac quidem in causâ tantum uno loco facta mentio est—ut uno illo versiculo sublato, vix ex ipsâ oratione, quâ in causâ esset habita, certis rationibus evinci posset." How are we to explain the absence of all reference to Olynthus? According to Petrenz, it is because the orator had already, in his former harangue, said all that could be necessary in respect to the wants of Olynthus, and the necessity of upholding that city even for the safety of Athens; he might now therefore calculate that his first discourse remained impressed on his countrymen, and that all that was required was, to combat the extraordinary fear of Philip which hindered them from giving effect to a resolution already taken to assist the Olynthians.

In this hypothesis I am unable to acquiesce. It may appear natural to a reader of Demosthenes, who passes from the first printed discourse to the second without any intervening time to forget what he has just read. But it will hardly fit the case of a real speaker in busy Athens. Neither Demosthenes in the fluctuating Athenian assem-

bly—nor even any orator in the more fixed English Parliament or American Congress—could be rash enough to calculate that a discourse delivered some time before had remained engraven on the minds of his audience. If Demosthenes had previously addressed the Athenians with so strong a conviction of the distress of Olynthus, and of the motives for Athens to assist Olynthus, as is embodied in the first discourse—if his speech, however well received, was not acted upon, so that in the course of a certain time he had to address them again for the same purpose—I cannot believe that he would allude to Olynthus only once by the by, and that he would merely dilate upon the general chances and conditions of the war between Athens and Philip. However well calculated the second Olynthiac may be "ad concitandos exacerbandosque civium animos" (to use the words of Petrenz), it is not peculiarly calculated to procure aid to Olynthus. If the orator had failed to procure such aid by a discourse like the first Olynthiac, he would never resort to a discourse like the second Olynthiac to make good the deficiency; would repeat anew, and more impressively than before, the danger of Olynthus, and the danger to Athens herself if she suffered Olynthus to fall. This would be the way to accomplish his object, and at the same time to combat the fear of Philip in the minds of the Athenians.

According to my view of the subject, the omission (or mere single passing notice) of Olynthus clearly shows that the wants of that city, and the urgency of assisting it, were *not* the main drift of Demosthenes in the second Olynthiac. His main drift is, to encourage and stimulate his countrymen in their general war against Philip; taking in, thankfully, the new ally Olynthus, whom they have just acquired—but taking her only as a valuable auxiliary (ἐν προσθήκης μέρει), to coöperate with Athens against Philip as well as to receive aid from Athens—not presenting her either as peculiarly needing succor, or as likely, if allowed to perish, to expose the vitals of Athens.

Now a speech of this character is what I cannot satisfactorily explain, as following after the totally different spirit of the first Olynthiac; but it is natural and explicable, if we suppose it to precede the first Olynthiac. Olynthus does not approach Athens at first in *formâ pauperis*, as if she were in danger and requiring aid against an overwhelming enemy. She presents herself as an equal, offering to coöperate against a common enemy, and tendering an alliance which the Athenians had hitherto sought in vain. She will, of course, want aid,—but she can give coöperation of equal value. Demosthenes advises to assist her; this comes of course, when her alliance is accepted:—but he dwells more forcibly upon the value of what she will *give* to the Athenians, in the way of coöperation against Philip. Nay, it is remarkable that the territorial vicinity of Olynthus to Philip is exhibited, not as a peril to *her* which the Athenians must assist her in averting, but as a godsend to enable them the better to attack Philip in conjunction with her. Moreover Olynthus is represented, not as apprehending any danger from Philip's arms, but as having recently discovered how dangerous it is to be in alliance with him. Let us thank the gods (says Demosthenes at the opening of the second Olynthiac)—τὸ τοὺς πολεμήσοντας Φιλίππῳ γεγενῆσθαι καὶ χώραν ὅμορον καὶ δύναμίν τινα κεκτημένους, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἁπάντων, τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ πολέμου γνώμην τοιαύτην ἔχοντας, ὥστε τὰς πρὸς ἐκεῖνον διαλλαγὰς, πρῶτον μὲν ἀπίστους, εἶτα τῆς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδος νομίζειν ἀνάστασιν εἶναι, δαιμονίᾳ τινι καὶ θείᾳ παντάπασιν ἔοικεν εὐεργεσίᾳ (p. 18).

The general tenor of the second Olynthiac is in harmony with this opening. Demosthenes looks forward to a vigorous aggressive war carried on by Athens and Olynthus jointly against Philip, and he enters at large into the general chances of such war, noticing the vulnerable as well as odious points of Philip, and striving (as Petrenz justly remarks) to "excite and exasperate the minds of the citizens."

Such is the first bright promise of the Olynthian alliance with Athens. But Athens, as usual, makes no exertions; leaving the Olynthians and Chalkidians to contend against Philip by themselves. It is presently found that he gains advantages over them; bad news comes from Thrace, and probably complaining envoys to announce them. It is then that Demosthenes delivers his first Olynthiac, so much more urgent in its tone respecting Olynthus. The main topic is now—"Protect the Olynthians; save their confederate cities; think what will happen if they are ruined; there is nothing to hinder Philip, in that case, from marching into Attica." The views of Demosthenes have changed from the offensive to the defensive.

I cannot but think, therefore, that all the internal evidence of the Olynthiacs indicates the second as prior in point of time both to the first and to the third. Stueve (as cited by Dr. Thirlwall) mentions another reason tending to the same conclusion. Nothing is said in the second Olynthiac about meddling with the Theôric Fund; whereas in the first, that subject is distinctly adverted to—and in the third, forcibly and repeatedly pressed, though with sufficient artifice to save the illegality. This is difficult to explain, assuming the second to be posterior to the first; but noway difficult, if we suppose the second to be the earliest of the three, and to be delivered with the purpose which I have pointed out.

On the other hand, this manner of handling the Theôric Fund in the third oration, as compared with the first, is one strong reason for believing (as Petrenz justly contends) that the third is posterior to the first—and not

prior, as Dionysius places it.

As to the third Olynthiac, its drift and purpose appear to me correctly stated in the argument prefixed by Libanius. It was delivered after Athens had sent some succor to Olynthus; whereas, both the first and the second were spoken before anything at all had yet been done. I think there is good ground for following Libanius (as Petrenz and others do) in his statement that the third oration recognizes Athens as having done *something*, which the two first do not; though Dr. Thirlwall (p. 509) agrees with Jacobs in doubting such a distinction. The successes of mercenaries, reported at Athens (p. 38), must surely have been successes of mercenaries commissioned by her; and the triumphant hopes, noticed by Demosthenes as actually prevalent, are most naturally explained by supposing such news to have arrived. Demosthenes says no more than he can help about the success actually gained, because he thinks it of no serious importance. He wishes to set before the people, as a corrective to the undue confidence prevalent, that all the real danger yet remained to be dealt with.

Though Athens had done something, she had done little—sent no citizens—provided no pay. This Demosthenes urges her to do without delay, and dwells upon the Theôric Fund as one means of obtaining money along with personal service. Dr. Thirlwall indeed argues that the first Olynthiac is more urgent than the third, in setting forth the crisis; from whence he infers that it is posterior in time. His argument is partly founded upon a sentence near the beginning of the first Olynthiac, wherein the safety of *Athens herself* is mentioned as involved—τῶν πραγμάτων ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἀντιληπτέον ἐστὶν, εἴπερ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας αὐτῶν φροντίζετε: upon which I may remark, that the reading αὐτῶν is not universally admitted. Dindorf, in his edition, reads αὐτῶν, referring it to πραγμάτων: and stating in his note that αὐτῶν is the reading of the vulgate, first changed by Reiske into αὐτῶν on the authority of the Codex Bavaricus. But even if we grant that the first Olynthiac depicts the crisis as more dangerous and urgent than the third, we cannot infer that the first is posterior to the third. The third was delivered immediately after news received of success near Olynthus; Olynthian affairs did really prosper for the moment and to a certain extent—though the amount of prosperity was greatly exaggerated by the public. Demosthenes sets himself to combat this exaggeration; he passes as lightly as he can over the recent good news, but he cannot avoid allowing something for them, and throwing the danger of Olynthus a little back into more distant contingency. At the same time he states it in the strongest manner, both section 2 and sections 9, 10.

Without being insensible, therefore, to the fallibility of all opinions founded upon such imperfect evidence, I think that the true chronological order of the Olynthiacs is that proposed by Stueve, II. I. III. With Dionysius I agree so far as to put the second first; and with the common order, in putting the third last.

CHAPTER LXXXIX.

FROM THE CAPTURE OF OLYNTHUS TO THE TERMINATION OF THE SACRED WAR BY PHILIP.

It was during the early spring of 347 B. C., as far as we can make out, that Olynthus, after having previously seen the thirty Chalkidic cities conquered, underwent herself the like fate from the arms of Philip. Exile and poverty became the lot of such Olynthians and Chalkidians as could make their escape; while the greater number of both sexes were sold into slavery. A few painful traces present themselves of the diversities of suffering which befel these unhappy victims. Atrestidas, an Arcadian who had probably served in the Macedonian army, received from Philip a grant of thirty Olynthian slaves, chiefly women and children, who were seen following him in a string as he travelled homeward through the Grecian cities. Many young Olynthian women were bought for the purpose of having their persons turned to account by their new proprietors. Of these purchasers, one, an Athenian citizen who had exposed his new purchase at Athens, was tried and condemned for the proceeding by the Dikastery.[772] Other anecdotes come before us, inaccurate probably as to names and details,[773] yet illustrating the general hardships brought upon this once free Chalkidic population. Meanwhile the victor Philip was at the maximum of his glory. In commemoration of his conquests, he celebrated a splendid festival to the Olympian Zeus in Macedonia, with unbounded hospitality, and prizes of every sort, for matches and exhibitions, both gymnastic and poetical. His donations were munificent, as well to the Grecian and Macedonian officers who had served him, as to the eminent poets or actors who pleased his taste. Satyrus the comic actor, refusing all presents for himself, asked and obtained from him the release of two young women taken in Olynthus, daughters of his friend the Pydnæan Apollophanes, who had been one of the persons concerned in the death of Philip's elder brother Alexander. Satyrus announced his intention not only of ensuring freedom to these young women, but likewise of providing portions for them and giving them out in marriage.[774] Philip also found at Olynthus his two exile half-brothers, who had served as pretexts for the war —and put both of them to death.[775]

It has already been stated that Athens had sent to Olynthus more than one considerable reinforcement, especially during the last year of the war. Though we are ignorant what these expeditions achieved, or even how much was their exact force, we find reason to suspect that they were employed by Chares and other generals to no good purpose. The opponents of Chares accused him, as well as Deiares and other mercenary chiefs, of having wasted the naval and military strength of the city in idle enterprises or rapacious extortions upon the traders of the Ægean. They summed up 1500 talents and 150 triremes thus lost to Athens, besides wide-spread odium in-

curred among the islanders by the unjust contributions levied upon them to enrich the general.[776] In addition to this disgraceful ill-success, came now the fearful ruin in Olynthus and Chalkidikê, and the great aggrandizement of their enemy Philip. The loss of Olynthus, with the miserable captivity of its population, would have been sufficient of themselves to excite powerful sentiment among the Athenians. But there was a farther circumstance which came yet more home to their feelings. Many of their own citizens were serving in Olynthus as an auxiliary garrison, and had now become captives along with the rest.[777] No such calamity as this had befallen Athens for a century past, since the defeat of Tolmides at Koroneia in Bœotia. The whole Athenian people, and especially the relations of the captives, were full of agitation and anxiety, increased by alarming news from other quarters. The conquest threatened the security of all the Athenian possessions in Lemnos, Imbros, and the Chersonese. This last peninsula, especially, was altogether unprotected against Philip, who was even reported to be on his march thither; insomuch that the Athenian settlers within it began to forsake their properties and transfer their families to Athens. Amidst the grief and apprehension which disturbed the Athenian mind, many special assemblies were held to discuss suitable remedies. What was done, we are not exactly informed. But it seems that no one knew where the general Chares, with his armament, was; so that it became necessary even for his friends in the assembly to echo the strong expressions of displeasure among the people, and to send a light vessel immediately in search of him.[778]

The gravity of the crisis forced even Eubulus and others among the statesmen hitherto languid in the war, to hold a more energetic language than before against Philip. Denouncing him now as the common enemy of Greece,[779] they proposed missions into Peloponnesus and elsewhere for the purpose of animating the Grecian states into confederacy against him. Æschines assisted strenuously in procuring the adoption of this proposition, and was himself named as one of the envoys into Peloponnesus.[780]

This able orator, immortalized as the rival of Demosthenes, has come before us hitherto only as a soldier in various Athenian expeditions—to Phlius in Peloponnesus (368)—to the battle of Mantineia (362)—and to Eubœa under Phokion (349 B. C.); in which last he had earned the favorable notice of the general, and had been sent to Athens with the news of the victory at Tamynæ. Æschines was about six years older than Demosthenes, but born in a much humbler and poorer station. His father Atromêtus taught to boys the elements of letters; his mother Glaukothea made a living by presiding over certain religious assemblies and rites of initiation, intended chiefly for poor communicants; the boy Æschines assisting both one and the other in a mental capacity. Such at least is the statement which comes to us, enriched with various degrading details, on the doubtful authority of his rival Demosthenes;[781] who also affirms, what we may accept as generally true, that Æschines had passed his early manhood partly as an actor, partly as a scribe or reader to the official

boards. For both functions he possessed some natural advantages—an athletic frame, a powerful voice, a ready flow of unpremeditated speech. After some years passed as scribe, in which he made himself useful to Eubulus and others, he was chosen public scribe to the assembly—acquired familiarity with the administrative and parliamentary business of the city—and thus elevated himself by degrees to influence as a speaker. In rhetorical power, he seems to have been surpassed only by Demosthenes.[782]

As envoy of Athens despatched under the motion of Eubulus, Æschines proceeded into Peloponnesus in the spring of 347; others being sent at the same time to other Grecian cities. Among other places, he visited Megalopolis, where he was heard before the Arcadian collective assembly called the Ten Thousand. He addressed them in a strain of animated exhortation, adjuring them to combine with Athens for the defence of the liberties of Greece against Philip, and inveighing strenuously against those traitors who, in Arcadia as well as in other parts of Greece, sold themselves to the aggressor and paralyzed all resistance. He encountered however much opposition from a speaker named Hieronymus, who espoused the interest of Philip in the assembly: and though he professed to bring back some flattering hopes, it is certain that neither in Arcadia, nor elsewhere in Peloponnesus, was his influence of any real efficacy.[783] The strongest feeling among the Arcadians was fear and dislike of Sparta, which rendered them in the main indifferent, if not favorable, to the Macedonian successes. In returning from Arcadia to Athens, Æschines met the Arcadian Atrestidas, with the unhappy troop of Olynthian slaves following; a sight which so deeply affected the Athenian orator, that he dwelt upon it afterwards in his speech before the assembly, with indignant sympathy; deploring the sad effects of Grecian dissension, and the ruin produced by Philip's combined employment of arms and corruption.

Æschines returned probably about the middle of the summer of 347 B. C. Other envoys, sent to more distant cities, remained out longer; some indeed even until the ensuing winter. Though it appears that some envoys from other cities were induced in return to visit Athens, yet no sincere or hearty coöperation against Philip could be obtained in any part of Greece. While Philip, in the fulness of triumph, was celebrating his magnificent Olympic festival in Macedonia, the Athenians were disheartened by finding that they could expect little support from independent Greeks, and were left to act only with their own narrow synod of allies. Hence Eubulus and Æschines became earnest partisans of peace, and Demosthenes also seems to have been driven by the general despondency into a willingness to negotiate. The two orators, though they afterwards became bitter rivals, were at this juncture not very discordant in sentiment. On the other hand, the philippizing speakers at Athens held a bolder tone than ever. As Philip found his ports greatly blocked up by the Athenian cruisers, he was likely to profit by his existing ascendency for the purpose of strengthening his naval equipments. Now there was no place so abundantly supplied

as Athens, with marine stores and muniments for armed ships. Probably there were agents or speculators taking measures to supply Philip with these articles, and it was against them that a decree of the assembly was now directed, adopted on the motion of a senator named Timarchus—to punish with death all who should export from Athens to Philip either arms or stores for ships of war.[784] This severe decree, however, was passed at the same time that the disposition towards peace, if peace were attainable, was on the increase at Athens.

Some months before the capture of Olynthus, ideas of peace had already been started, partly through the indirect overtures of Philip himself. During the summer of 348 B. C., the Eubœans had tried to negotiate an accommodation with Athens; the contest in Eubœa, though we know no particulars of it, having never wholly ceased for the last year and a half. Nor does it appear that any peace was even now concluded; for Eubœa is spoken of as under the dependence of Philip during the ensuing year.[785] The Eubœan envoys, however, intimated that Philip had desired them to communicate from him a wish to finish the war and conclude peace with Athens.[786] Though Philip had at this time conquered the larger portion of Chalkidikê, and was proceeding successfully against the remainder, it was still his interest to detach Athens from the war, if he could. Her manner of carrying on war was indeed faint and slack; yet she did him much harm at sea, and she was the only city competent to organize an extensive Grecian confederacy against him; which, though it had not yet been brought about, was at least a possible contingency under her presidency.

An Athenian of influence named Phrynon had been captured by Philip's cruisers, during the truce of the Olympic festival in 348 B. C.: after a certain detention, he procured from home the required ransom and obtained his release. On returning to Athens, he had sufficient credit to prevail on the public assembly to send another citizen along with him, as public envoy from the city to Philip; in order to aid him in getting back his ransom, which he alleged to have been wrongfully demanded from one captured during the holy truce. Though this seems a strange proceeding during mid-war,[787] yet the Athenian people took up the case with sympathy; Ktesiphon was named envoy, and went with Phrynon to Philip, whom they must have found engaged in the war against Olynthus. Being received in the most courteous manner, they not only obtained restitution of the ransom, but were completely won over by Philip. With his usual good policy, he had seized the opportunity of gaining (we may properly say, of bribing, since the restoration of ransom was substantially a bribe) two powerful Athenian citizens, whom he now sent back to Athens as his pronounced partisans.

Phrynon and Ktesiphon, on their return, expatiated warmly on the generosity of Philip, and reported much about his flattering expressions towards Athens, and his reluctance to continue the war against her. The public assembly being favorably disposed, a citizen named Philokrates, who now comes before us for the first time, proposed a decree, granting to Philip leave to send a herald and envoys, if he chose, to

treat for peace; which was what Philip was anxious to do, according to the allegation of Ktesiphon. The decree was passed unanimously in the assembly, but the mover Philokrates was impeached some time afterwards before the Dikastery, as for an illegal proposition, by a citizen named Lykinus. On the cause coming to trial, the Dikastery pronounced an acquittal so triumphant, that Lykinus did not even obtain the fifth part of the suffrages. Philokrates being so sick as to be unable to do justice to his own case, Demosthenes stood forward as his supporter, and made a long speech in his favor.[788]

The motion of Philokrates determined nothing positive, and only made an opening; of which, however, it did not suit Philip's purpose to avail himself. But we see that ideas of peace had been thrown out by some persons at Athens, even during the last months of the Olynthian war, and while a body of Athenian citizens were actually assisting Olynthus against the besieging force of Philip. Presently arrived the terrible news of the fall of Olynthus, and of the captivity of the Athenian citizens in garrison there. While this great alarm (as has been already stated) gave birth to new missions for anti-Macedonian alliances, it enlisted on the side of peace all the friends of those captives whose lives were now in Philip's hands. The sorrow thus directly inflicted on many private families, together with the force of individual sympathy widely diffused among the citizens, operated powerfully upon the decisions of the public assembly. A century before, the Athenians had relinquished all their acquisitions in Bœotia, in order to recover their captives taken in the defeat of Tolmides at Koroneia; and during the Peloponnesian war, the policy of the Spartans had been chiefly guided for three or four years by the anxiety to ensure the restoration of the captives of Sphakteria. Moreover, several Athenians of personal consequence were taken at Olynthus; among them, Eukratus and Iatrokles. Shortly after the news arrived, the relatives of these two men, presenting themselves before the assembly in the solemn guise of suppliants, deposited an olive branch on the altar hard by, and entreated that care might be had for the safety of their captive kinsmen.[789] This appeal, echoed as it would be by the cries of so many other citizens in the like distress, called forth unanimous sympathy in the assembly. Both Philokrates and Demosthenes spoke in favor of it; Demosthenes probably, as having been a strenuous advocate of the war, was the more anxious to shew that he was keenly alive to so much individual suffering. It was resolved to open indirect negotiations with Philip for the release of the captives, through some of the great tragic and comic actors; who, travelling in the exercise of their profession to every city in Greece, were everywhere regarded in some sort as privileged persons. One of these, Neoptolemus,[790] had already availed himself of his favored profession and liberty of transit to assist in Philip's intrigues and correspondences at Athens; another, Aristodemus, was also in good esteem with Philip; both were probably going to Macedonia to take part in the splendid Olympic festival there preparing. They were charged to make application, and take the best steps in their power, for the safety or release of the captives.[791]

It would appear that these actors were by no means expeditious in the performance of their mission. They probably spent some time in their professional avocations in Macedonia; and Aristodemus, not being a responsible envoy, delayed some time even after his return, before he made any report. That his mission had not been wholly fruitless, however, became presently evident from the arrival of the captive Iatrokles, whom Philip had released without ransom. The Senate then summoned Aristodemus before them, inviting him to make a general report of his proceedings, which he did; first before the Senate,—next, before the public assembly. He affirmed that Philip had entertained his propositions kindly, and that he was in the best dispositions towards Athens; desirous not only to be at peace with her, but even to be admitted as her ally. Demosthenes, then a senator, moved a vote of thanks and a wreath to Aristodemus.[792]

This report, as far as we can make out, appears to have been made about September or October 347 B. C.; Æschines, and the other roving commissioners sent out by Athens to raise up anti-Macedonian combinations, had returned with nothing but disheartening announcement of refusal or lukewarmness. And there occurred also about the same time in Phokis and Thermopylæ, other events of grave augury to Athens, showing that the Sacred War and the contest between the Phokians and Thebans was turning,—as all events had turned for the last ten years,—to the farther aggrandizement of Philip.

During the preceding two years, the Phokians, now under the command of Phalækus, in place of Phayllus, had maintained their position against Thebes; had kept possession of the Bœotian towns, Orchomenus, Koroneia, and Korsia, and were still masters of Alpônus, Thronium, and Nikæa, as well as of the important pass of Thermopylæ adjoining.[793] But though on the whole successful in regard to Thebes, they had fallen into dissension among themselves. The mercenary force, necessary to their defence, could only be maintained by continued appropriation of the Delphian treasures; an appropriation becoming from year to year both less lucrative and more odious. By successive spoliation of gold and silver ornaments, the temple is said to have been stripped of ten thousand talents (about two million three hundred thousand pounds), all its available wealth; so that the Phokian leaders were now reduced to dig for an unauthenticated treasure, supposed (on the faith of a verse in the Iliad, as well as on other grounds of surmise), to lie concealed beneath its stone floor. Their search, however, was not only unsuccessful, but arrested, as we are told, by violent earthquakes, significant of the anger of Apollo.[794]

As the Delphian treasure became less and less, so the means of Phalækus to pay troops and maintain ascendency declined. While the foreign mercenaries relaxed in their obedience, his opponents in Phokis manifested increased animosity against his continued sacrilege. So greatly did these opponents increase in power, that they deposed Phalækus, elected Deinokrates with two others in his place, and instituted a strict inquiry into the antecedent appropriation of the Delphian treasure. Gross pecu-

lation was found to have been committed for the profit of individual leaders, especially one named Philon; who, on being seized and put to the torture, disclosed the names of several accomplices. These men were tried, compelled to refund, and ultimately put to death.[795] Phalækus however still retained his ascendency over the mercenaries, about eight thousand in number, so as to hold Thermopylæ and the places adjacent, and even presently to be re-appointed general.[796]

Such intestine dispute, combined with the gradual exhaustion of the temple-funds, sensibly diminished the power of the Phokians. Yet they still remained too strong for their enemies the Thebans; who, deprived of Orchomenus and Koroneia, impoverished by military efforts of nine years, and unable to terminate the contest by their own force, resolved to invoke foreign aid. An opportunity might perhaps have been obtained for closing the war by some compromise, if it had been possible now to bring about an accommodation between Thebes and Athens; which some of the philo-Theban orators, (Demosthenes seemingly among them), attempted, under the prevalent uneasiness about Philip.[797] But the adverse sentiments in both cities, especially in Thebes, were found invincible; and the Thebans, little anticipating consequences, determined to invoke the ruinous intervention of the conqueror of Olynthus. The Thessalians, already valuable allies of Philip, joined them in soliciting him to crush the Phokians, and to restore the ancient Thessalian privilege of the Pylæa, (or regular yearly Amphiktyonic meeting at Thermopylæ), which the Phokians had suppressed during the last ten years. This joint prayer for intervention was preferred in the name of the Delphian god, investing Philip with the august character of champion of the Amphiktyonic assembly, to rescue the Delphian temple from its sacrilegious plunderers.

The King of Macedon, with his past conquests and his well-known spirit of aggressive enterprise, was now a sort of present deity, ready to lend force to all the selfish ambition, or blind fear and antipathy, prevalent among the discontented fractions of the Hellenic world. While his intrigues had procured numerous partisans even in the centre of Peloponnesus,—as Æschines, on return from his mission, had denounced, not having yet himself enlisted in the number,—he was now furnished with a pious pretence, and invited by powerful cities, to penetrate into the heart of Greece, within its last line of common defence, Thermopylæ.

The application of the Thebans to Philip excited much alarm in Phokis. A Macedonian army under Parmenio did actually enter Thessaly,—where we find them, three months later, besieging Halus.[798] Reports seem to have been spread, about September 347 B. C., that the Macedonians were about to march to Thermopylæ; upon which the Phokians took alarm, and sent envoys to Athens as well as to Sparta, entreating aid to enable them to hold the pass, and offering to deliver up the three important towns near it,—Alpônus, Thronium, and Nikæa. So much were the Athenians alarmed by the message, that they not only ordered Proxenus, their general at Oreus, to take immediate possession of the pass, but also passed a decree to equip

fifty triremes, and to send forth their military citizens under thirty years of age, with an energy like that displayed when they checked Philip before at the same place. But it appears that the application had been made by the party in Phokis opposed to Phalækus. So vehemently did that chief resent the proceeding, that he threw the Phokian envoys into prison on their return; refusing to admit either Proxenus or Archidamus into possession of Thermopylæ, and even dismissing without recognition the Athenian heralds, who came in their regular rounds to proclaim the solemn truce of the Eleusinian mysteries.[799] This proceeding on the part of Phalækus was dictated seemingly by jealousy of Athens and Sparta, and by fear that they would support the party opposed to him in Phokis. It could not have originated (as Æschines alleges) in superior confidence and liking towards Philip; for if Phalækus had entertained such sentiments, he might have admitted the Macedonian troops at once; which he did not do until ten months later, under the greatest pressure of circumstances.

Such insulting repudiation of the aid tendered by Proxenus at Thermopylæ, combined with the distracted state of parties in Phokis, menaced Athens with a new embarrassment. Though Phalækus still held the pass, his conduct had been such as to raise doubts whether he might not treat separately with Philip. Here was another circumstance operating on Athens,—besides the refusal of coöperation from other Greeks and the danger of her captives at Olynthus,—to dishearten her in the prosecution of the war, and to strengthen the case of those who advocated peace. It was a circumstance the more weighty, because it really involved the question of safety or exposure to her own territory, through the opening of the pass of Thermopylæ. It was here that she was now under the necessity of keeping watch; being thrown on the defensive for her own security at home,—not, as before, stretching out a long arm for the protection of distant possessions such as the Chersonese, or distant allies such as the Olynthians. So speedily had the predictions of Demosthenes been realized, that if the Athenians refused to carry on strenuous war against Philip on *his* coast, they would bring upon themselves the graver evil of having to resist him on or near their own frontier.

The maintenance of freedom in the Hellenic world against the extra-Hellenic invader, now turned once more upon the pass of Thermopylæ; as it had turned one hundred and thirty-three years before, during the onward march of the Persian Xerxes.

To Philip, that pass was of incalculable importance. It was his only road into Greece; it could not be forced by any land-army; while at sea the Athenian fleet was stronger than his. In spite of the general remissness of Athens in warlike undertakings, she had now twice manifested her readiness for a vigorous effort to maintain Thermopylæ against him. To become master of the position, it was necessary that he should disarm Athens by concluding peace,—keep her in ignorance or delusion as to his real purposes,—prevent her from conceiving alarm or sending aid to Ther-

mopylæ,—and then overawe or buy off the isolated Phokians. How ably and cunningly his diplomacy was managed for this purpose, will presently appear.[800]

On the other hand, to Athens, to Sparta, and to the general cause of Pan-hellenic independence, it was of capital moment that Philip should be kept on the outside of Thermopylæ. And here Athens had more at stake than the rest; since not merely her influence abroad, but the safety of her own city and territory against invasion, was involved in the question. The Thebans had already invited the presence of Philip, himself always ready even without invitation, to come within the pass; it was the first interest, as well as the first duty, of Athens, to counterwork them, and to keep him out. With tolerable prudence, her guarantee of the past might have been made effective; but we shall find her measures ending only in shame and disappointment, through the flagrant improvidence, and apparent corruption, of her own negotiators.

The increasing discouragement as to war, and yearning for peace, which prevailed at Athens during the summer and autumn of 347 B. C., has been already described. We may be sure that the friends of the captives taken at Olynthus would be importunate in demanding peace, because there was no other way of procuring their release; since Philip did not choose to exchange them for money, reserving them as an item in political negotiation. At length, about the month of November, the public assembly decreed that envoys should be sent to Philip to ascertain on what conditions peace could be made; ten Athenian envoys, and one from the synod of confederate allies, sitting at Athens. The mover of the decree was Philokrates, the same who had moved the previous decree permitting Philip to send envoys if he chose. Of this permission Philip had not availed himself, in spite of all that the philippizers at Athens had alleged about his anxiety for peace and alliance with the city. It suited his purpose to have the negotiations carried on in Macedonia, where he could act better upon the individual negotiators of Athens.

The decree having been passed in the assembly, ten envoys were chosen: Philokrates, Demosthenes, Æschines, Ktesiphon, Phrynon, Iatroklês, Derkyllus, Kimon, Nausiklês, and Aristodemus the actor. Aglaokreon of Tenedos was selected to accompany them, as representative of the allied synod. Of these envoys, Ktesiphon, Phrynon, and Iatroklês, had already been gained over as partisans by Philip while in Macedonia; moreover, Aristodemus was a person to whom, in his histrionic profession, the favor of Philip was more valuable than the interests of Athens. Æschines was proposed by Nausiklês; Demosthenes, by Philokrates the mover.[801] Though Demosthenes had been before so earnest in advocating vigorous prosecution of the war, it does not appear that he was now adverse to the opening of negotiations. Had he been ever so adverse, he would probably have failed in obtaining even a hearing, in the existing temper of the public mind. He thought indeed that Athens inflicted so much damage on her enemy by ruining the Macedonian maritime commerce, that she was not under the necessity of submitting to peace on bad or humiliating terms. [802] But still he did not oppose the overtures, nor did his opposition begin until after-

wards, when he saw the turn which the negotiations were taking. Nor, on the other hand, was Æschines as yet suspected of a leaning towards Philip. Both he and Demosthenes obeyed, at this moment, the impulse of opinion generally prevalent at Athens. Their subsequent discordant views and bitter rivalry grew out of the embassy itself; out of its result and the behavior of Æschines.

The eleven envoys were appointed to visit Philip, not with any power of concluding peace, but simply to discuss with him and ascertain on what terms peace could be had. So much is certain; though we do not possess the original decree under which they were nominated. Having sent before them a herald to obtain a safe-conduct from Philip, they left Athens about December 347 B. C., and proceeded by sea to Oreus, on the northern coast of Eubœa, where they expected to meet the returning herald. Finding that he had not yet come back, they crossed the strait at once, without waiting for him, into the Pagasæan Gulf, where Parmenio with a Macedonian army was then besieging Halus. To him they notified their arrival, and received permission to pass on, first to Pagasæ, next to Larissa. Here they met their own returning herald, under whose safeguard they pursued their journey to Pella.[803]

Our information respecting this (first) embassy proceeds almost wholly from Æschines. He tells us that Demosthenes was, from the very day of setting out, intolerably troublesome both to him and to his brother envoys; malignant, faithless, and watching for such matters as might be turned against them in the way of accusation afterwards; lastly, boastful even to absurd excess, of his own powers of eloquence. In Greece, it was the usual habit to transact diplomatic business, like other political matters, publicly before the governing number—the council, if the constitution happened to be oligarchical—the general assembly, if democratical. Pursuant to this habit, the envoys were called upon to appear before Philip in his full pomp and state, and there address to him formal harangues (either by one or more of their number as they chose), setting forth the case of Athens; after which Philip would deliver his reply in the like publicity, either with his own lips or by those of a chosen minister. The Athenian envoys resolved among themselves, that when introduced, each of them should address Philip, in the order of seniority; Demosthenes being the youngest of the Ten, and Æschines next above him. Accordingly, when summoned before Philip, Ktesiphon, the oldest envoy, began with a short address; the other seven followed with equal brevity, while the stress of the business was left to Æschines and Demosthenes.[804]

Æschines recounts in abridgment to the Athenians, with much satisfaction, his own elaborate harangue, establishing the right of Athens to Amphipolis, the wrong done by Philip in taking it and holding it against her, and his paramount obligation to make restitution—but touching upon no other subject whatever.[805] He then proceeds to state—probably with yet greater satisfaction—that Demosthenes, who followed next, becoming terrified and confused, utterly broke down, forgot his prepared speech, and was obliged to stop short, in spite of courteous encouragements from

Philip.[806] Gross failure, after full preparation, on the part of the greatest orator of ancient or modern times, appears at first hearing so incredible, that we are disposed to treat it as a pure fabrication of his opponent. Yet I incline to believe that the fact was substantially as Æschines states it; and that Demosthenes was partially divested of his oratorical powers by finding himself not only speaking before the enemy whom he had so bitterly denounced, but surrounded by all the evidences of Macedonian power, and doubtless exposed to unequivocal marks of well-earned hatred, from those Macedonians who took less pains than Philip to disguise their real feelings.[807]

Having dismissed the envoys after their harangues, and taken a short time for consideration, Philip recalled them into his presence. He then delivered his reply with his own lips, combating especially the arguments of Æschines, and according to that orator, with such pertinence and presence of mind, as to excite the admiration of all the envoys, Demosthenes among the rest. What Philip said, we do not learn from Æschines; who expatiates only on the shuffling, artifice, and false pretences of Demosthenes, to conceal his failure as an orator, and to put himself on a point of advantage above his colleagues. Of these personalities it is impossible to say how much is true; and even were they true, they are scarcely matter of general history.

It was about the beginning of March when the envoys returned to Athens. Some were completely fascinated by the hospitable treatment and engaging manners of Philip,[808] especially when entertaining them at the banquet: with others, he had come to an understanding at once more intimate and more corrupt. They brought back a letter from Philip, which was read both in the Senate and the assembly; while Demosthenes, senator of that year, not only praised them all in the Senate, but also became himself the mover of a resolution that they should be crowned with a wreath of honor, and invited to dine next day in the prytaneium.[809]

We have hardly any means of appreciating the real proceedings of this embassy, or the matters treated in discussion with Philip. Æschines tells us nothing, except the formalities of the interview, and the speeches about Amphipolis. But we shall at any rate do him no injustice, if we judge him upon his own account; which, if it does not represent what he actually did, represents what he wished to be thought to have done. His own account certainly shows a strange misconception of the actual situation of affairs. In order to justify himself for being desirous of peace, he lays considerable stress on the losing game which Athens had been playing during the war, and on the probability of yet farther loss if she persisted. He completes the cheerless picture by adding—what was doubtless but too familiar to his Athenian audience—that Philip on his side, marching from one success to another, had raised the Macedonian kingdom to an elevation truly formidable, by the recent extinction of Olynthus. Yet under this state of comparative force between the two contending parties, Æschines presents himself before Philip with a demand of exorbitant magnitude,—for the cession of Amphipolis. He says not a word about anything else. He delivers an eloquent harangue to convince Philip of the incontestible right of Athens to Amphipolis, and to

prove to him that he was in the wrong for taking and keeping it. He affects to think, that by this process he should induce Philip to part with a town, the most capital and unparalleled position in all his dominions; which he had now possessed for twelve years, and which placed him in communication with his new foundation Philippi and the auriferous region around it. The arguments of Æschines would have been much to the purpose, in an action tried between two litigants before an impartial Dikastery at Athens. But here were two belligerent parties, in a given ratio of strength and position as to the future, debating terms of peace. That an envoy on the part of Athens, the losing party, should now stand forward to demand from a victorious enemy the very place which formed the original cause of the war, and which had become far more valuable to Philip than when he first took it—was a pretension altogether preposterous. When Æschines reproduces his eloquent speech reclaiming Amphipolis, as having been the principal necessity and most honorable achievement of his diplomatic mission, he only shows how little qualified he was to render real service to Athens in that capacity—to say nothing as yet about corruption. The Athenian people, extremely retentive of past convictions, had it deeply impressed on their minds that Amphipolis was theirs by right; and probably the first envoys to Macedonia,—Aristodemus, Neoptolemus, Ktesiphon, Phrynon,[810] etc.—had been so cajoled by the courteous phrases, deceptions, and presents of Philip, that they represented him on their return as not unwilling to purchase friendship with Athens by the restoration of Amphipolis. To this delusive expectation in the Athenian mind Æschines addressed himself, when he took credit for his earnest pleading before Philip on behalf of Athenian right to the place, as if it were the sole purpose of his mission.[811] We shall see him throughout, in his character of envoy, not only fostering the actual delusions of the public at Athens, but even circulating gross fictions and impostures of his own, respecting the proceedings and purposes of Philip.

It was on or about the first day of the month Elaphebolion[812] (March) when the envoys reached Athens on returning from the court of Philip. They brought a letter from him couched in the most friendly terms; expressing great anxiety not only to be at peace with Athens, but also to become her ally; stating moreover that he was prepared to render her valuable service, and that he would have specified more particularly what the service would be, if he could have felt certain that he should be received as her ally.[813] But in spite of such amenities of language, affording an occasion for his partisans in the assembly, Æschines, Philokrates, Ktesiphon, Phrynon, Iatroklês and others, to expatiate upon his excellent dispositions, Philip would grant no better terms of peace than that each party should retain what they already possessed. Pursuant to this general principle, the Chersonesus was assured to Athens, of which Æschines appears to have made some boast.[814] Moreover, at the moment when the envoys were quitting Pella to return home, Philip was also leaving it at the head of his army on an expedition against Kersobleptes in Thrace. He gave a special pledge to the envoys that he would not attack the Chersonese, until the Athenians should have had an opportunity of debating,—accepting or rejecting the propositions

of peace. His envoys, Antipater and Parmenio, received orders to visit Athens with little delay; and a Macedonian herald accompanied the Athenian envoys on their return.[815]

Having ascertained on what terms peace could be had, the envoys were competent to advise the Athenian people, and prepare them for a definite conclusion, as soon as this Macedonian mission should arrive. They first gave an account of their proceedings to the public assembly. Ktesiphon, the oldest, who spake first, expatiated on the graceful presence and manners of Philip, as well as upon the charm of his company in wine-drinking.[816] Æschines dwelt upon his powerful and pertinent oratory; after which he recounted the principal occurrences of the journey, and the debate with Philip, intimating that in the previous understanding of the envoys among themselves, the duty of speaking about Amphipolis had been confided to Demosthenes, in case any point should have been omitted by the previous speakers. Demosthenes then made his own statement, in language (according to Æschines) censorious and even insulting towards his colleagues; especially affirming that Æschines, in his vanity, chose to preoccupy all the best points in his own speech, leaving none open for any one else.[817] Demosthenes next proceeded to move various decrees; one, to greet by libation the herald who had accompanied them from Philip,—and the Macedonian envoys who were expected; another, providing that the prytanes should convene a special assembly on the eighth day of Elaphebolion, (a day sacred to Æsculapius, on which generally no public business was ever transacted), in order that if the envoys from Macedonia had then arrived, the people might discuss without delay their political relations with Philip; a third, to commend the behavior of the Athenian envoys (his colleagues and himself), and to invite them to dinner in the prytaneium. Demosthenes farther moved in the Senate, that when Philip's envoys came, they should be accommodated with seats of honor at the Dionysiac festival.[818]

Presently, these Macedonian envoys, Antipater, Parmenio and Eurylochus, arrived; yet not early enough to allow the full debate to take place on the assembly of the eighth of Elaphebolion. Accordingly (as it would seem, in that very assembly), Demosthenes proposed and carried a fresh decree, fixing two later days for the special assemblies to discuss peace and alliance with Macedonia. The days named were the eighteenth and nineteenth days of the current month Elaphebolion (March); immediately after the Dionysiac festival, and the assembly in the temple of Dionysius which followed upon it.[819] At the same time Demosthenes showed great personal civility to the Macedonian envoys, inviting them to a splendid entertainment, and not only conducting them to their place of honor at the Dionysiac festival, but also providing for them comfortable seats and cushions.[820]

Besides the public assembly held by the Athenians themselves, to receive report from their ten envoys returned out of Macedonia, the synod of Athenian confederates was also assembled to hear the report of Aglaokreon, who had gone as their repre-

sentative along with the Ten. This synod agreed to a resolution, important in reference to the approaching debate in the Athenian assembly, yet unfortunately nowhere given to us entire, but only in partial and indirect notice from the two rival orators. It has been already mentioned that since the capture of Olynthus, the Athenians had sent forth envoys throughout a large portion of Greece, urging the various cities to unite with them either in conjoint war against Philip, or in conjoint peace to obtain some mutual guarantee against his farther encroachments. Of these missions, the greater number had altogether failed, demonstrating the hopelessness of the Athenian project. But some had been so far successful, that deputies, more or fewer, were actually present in Athens, pursuant to the invitation; while a certain number were still absent and expected to return,—the same individuals having perhaps been sent to different places at some distance from each other. The resolution of the synod (noway binding upon the Athenian people, but merely recommendatory), was adapted to this state of affairs, and to the dispositions recently manifested at Athens towards conjoint action with other Greeks against Philip. The synod advised, that immediately on the return of the envoys still absent on mission (when probably all such Greeks, as were willing even to talk over the proposition, would send their deputies also), the Athenian prytanes should convene two public assemblies, according to the laws, for the purpose of debating and deciding the question of peace. Whatever decision might be here taken, the synod adopted it beforehand as their own. They farther recommended that an article should be annexed, reserving an interval of three months for any Grecian city not a party to the peace, to declare its adhesion, to inscribe its name on the column of record, and to be included under the same conditions as the rest. Apparently this resolution of the synod was adopted before the arrival of the Macedonian deputies in Athens, and before the last-mentioned decree proposed by Demosthenes in the public assembly; which decree, fixing two days, (the 18th and 19th of Elaphebolion), for decision of the question of peace and alliance with Philip, coincided in part with the resolution of the synod.[821]

Accordingly, after the great Dionysiac festival, these two prescribed assemblies were held,—on the 18th and 19th of Elaphebolion. The three ambassadors from Philip, Parmenio, Antipater, and Eurylochus were present, both at the festival and the assemblies.[822] The general question of the relations between Athens and Philip being here submitted for discussion, the resolution of the confederate synod was at the same time communicated. Of this resolution the most significant article was, that the synod accepted beforehand the decree of the Athenian assembly, whatever that might be; the other articles were recommendations, doubtless heard with respect, and constituting a theme for speakers to insist on, yet carrying no positive authority. But in the pleadings of the two rival orators some years afterwards, (from which alone we know the facts), the entire resolution of the synod appears invested with a factitious importance; because each of them had an interest in professing to have supported it,—each accuses the other of having opposed it; both wished to disconnect themselves from Philokrates, then a disgraced exile, and from the peace moved

by him, which had become discredited. It was Philokrates who stood forward in the assembly as the prominent mover of peace and alliance with Philip. His motion did not embrace either of the recommendations of the synod, respecting absent envoys, and interval to be left for adhesions from other Greeks; nor did he confine himself, as the synod had done, to the proposition of peace with Philip. He proposed that not only peace, but alliance, should be concluded between the Athenians and Philip; who had expressed by letter his great anxiety both for one and for the other. He included in his proposition, Philip with all his allies, on one side,—and Athens, with all her allies, on the other; making special exception, however, of two among the allies of Athens, the Phokians, and the town of Halus near the Pagasæan Gulf, recently under siege by Parmenio.[823]

What part Æschines and Demosthenes took in reference to this motion, it is not easy to determine. In their speeches, delivered three years afterwards, both denounce Philokrates; each accuses the other of having supported him; each affirms himself to have advocated the recommendations of the synod. The contradictions between the two, and between Æschines in his earlier and Æschines in his later speech, are here very glaring. Thus, Demosthenes accuses his rival of having, on the 18th of the month or on the first of the two assemblies, delivered a speech strongly opposed to Philokrates;[824] but of having changed his politics during the night and spoken on the 19th in support of the latter, so warmly as to convert the hearers when they were predisposed the other way. Æschines altogether denies such sudden change of opinion; alleging that he made but one speech, and that in favor of the recommendation of the synod; and averring moreover that to speak on the second assembly-day was impossible, since that day was exclusively consecrated to putting questions and voting, so that no oratory was allowed.[825] Yet Æschines, though in his earlier harangue (De Fals. Leg.) he insists so strenuously on this impossibility of speaking on the 19th,—in his later harangue (against Ktesiphon) accuses Demosthenes of having spoken at great length on that very day, the 19th, and of having thereby altered the temper of the assembly.[826]

In spite, however, of the discredit thus thrown by Æschines upon his own denial, I do not believe the sudden change of speech in the assembly, ascribed to him by Demosthenes. It is too unexplained, and in itself too improbable, to be credited on the mere assertion of a rival. But I think it certain that neither he, nor Demosthenes, can have advocated the recommendations of the synod, though both profess to have done so,—if we are to believe the statement of Æschines (we have no statement from Demosthenes), as to the tenor of those recommendations. For the synod (according to Æschines) had recommended to await the return of the absent envoys before the question of peace was debated. Now this proposition was impracticable under the circumstances; since it amounted to nothing less than an indefinite postponement of the question. But the Macedonian envoys, Antipater and Parmenio, were now in Athens, and actually present in the assembly; having come, by special

invitation, for the purpose either of concluding peace or of breaking off the negotiation; and Philip had agreed (as Æschines[827] himself states), to refrain from all attack on the Chersonese, while the Athenians were debating about peace. Under these conditions, it was imperatively necessary to give some decisive and immediate answer to the Macedonian envoys. To tell them—"We can say nothing positive at present; you must wait until our absent envoys return, and until we ascertain how many Greeks we can get into our alliance," would have been not only in itself preposterous, but would have been construed by able men like Antipater and Parmenio as a mere dilatory manœuvre for breaking off the peace altogether. Neither Demosthenes nor Æschines can have really supported such a proposition, whatever both may pretend three years afterwards. For at that time of the actual discussion, not only Æschines himself, but the general public of Athens were strongly anxious for peace; while Demosthenes, though less anxious, was favorable to it.[828] Neither of them were at all disposed to frustrate the negotiations by insidious delay; nor, if they had been so disposed, would the Athenian public have tolerated the attempt.

On the best conclusion which I can form, Demosthenes supported the motion of Philokrates (enacting both peace and alliance with Philip), except only that special clause which excluded both the Phokians and the town of Halus, and which was ultimately negatived by the assembly.[829] That Æschines supported the same motion entire, and in a still more unqualified manner, we may infer from his remarkable admission in the oration against Timarchus[830] (delivered in the year after the peace, and three years before his own trial), wherein he acknowledges himself as joint author of the peace along with Philokrates, and avows his hearty approbation of the conduct and language of Philip, even after the ruin of the Phokians. Eubulus, the friend and partisan of Æschines, told the Athenians[831] the plain alternative: "You must either march forthwith to Peiræus, serve on shipboard, pay direct taxes, and convert the Theôric Fund to military purposes,—or else you must vote the terms of peace moved by Philokrates." Our inference respecting the conduct of Æschines is strengthened by what is here affirmed respecting Eubulus. Demosthenes had been vainly urging upon his countrymen, for the last five years, at a time when Philip was less formidable, the real adoption of these energetic measures; Eubulus, his opponent, now holds them out *in terrorem*, as an irksome and intolerable necessity, constraining the people to vote for the terms of peace proposed. And however painful it might be to acquiesce in the *statu quo*, which recognized Philip as master of Amphipolis and of so many other possessions once belonging to Athens,—I do not believe that even Demosthenes, at the time when the peace was actually under debate, would put the conclusion of it to hazard, by denouncing the shame of such unavoidable cession, though he professes three years afterwards to have vehemently opposed it.[832]

I suspect therefore that the terms of peace proposed by Philokrates met with unqualified support from one of our two rival orators, and with only partial opposition,

to one special clause, from the other. However this may be, the proposition passed, with no other modification (so far as we know) except the omission of that clause which specially excepted Halus and the Phokians. Philokrates provided, that all the possessions actually in the hands of each of the belligerent parties, should remain to each, without disturbance from the other;[833] that on these principles, there should be both peace and alliance between Athens with all her allies on the one side, and Philip with all his allies on the other. These were the only parties included in the treaty. Nothing was said about other Greeks, not allies either of Philip or of Athens. [834] Nor was any special mention made about Kersobleptes.[835]

Such was the decree of peace and alliance, enacted on the second of the two assembly-days,—the nineteenth of the month Elaphebolion. Of course, without the fault of any one, it was all to the advantage of Philip. He was in the superior position; and it sanctioned his retention of all his conquests. For Athens, the inferior party, the benefit to be expected was, that she would prevent these conquests from being yet farther multiplied, and protect herself against being driven from bad to worse.

But it presently appeared that even thus much was not realized. On the twenty-fifth day of the same month[836] (six days after the previous assembly), a fresh assembly was held, for the purpose of providing ratification by solemn oath for the treaty which had been just decreed. It was now moved and enacted, that the same ten citizens, who had been before accredited to Philip, should again be sent to Macedonia for the purpose of receiving the oaths from him and from his allies.[837] Next, it was resolved that the Athenians, together with the deputies of their allies then present in Athens, should take the oath forthwith, in the presence of Philip's envoys.

But now arose the critical question, Who were to be included as allies of Athens? Were the Phokians and Kersobleptes to be included? The one and the other represented those two capital positions,[838] Thermopylæ and the Hellespont, which Philip was sure to covet, and which it most behooved Athens to ensure against him. The assembly, by its recent vote, had struck out the special exclusion of the Phokians proposed by Philokrates, thus by implication admitting them as allies along with the rest. They were in truth allies of old standing and valuable; they had probably envoys present in Athens, but no deputies sitting in the synod. Nor had Kersobleptes any such deputy in that body; but a citizen of Lampsakus, named Kritobulus, claimed on this occasion to act for him, and to take the oaths in his name.

As to the manner of dealing with Kersobleptes, Æschines tells us two stories (one in the earlier oration, the other in the later) quite different from each other; and agreeing only in this—that in both Demosthenes is described as one of the presiding magistrates of the public assembly, as having done all that he could to prevent the envoy of Kersobleptes from being admitted to take the oaths as an ally of Athens. Amidst such discrepancies, to state in detail what passed is impossible. But it seems clear,—both from Æschines (in his earliest speech) and Demosthenes,—first, that the

envoy from Kersobleptes, not having a seat in the confederate synod, but presenting himself and claiming to be sworn as an ally of Athens, found his claim disputed; secondly, that upon this dispute arising, the question was submitted to the vote of the public assembly, who decided that Kersobleptes was an ally, and should be admitted to take the oath as such.[839]

Antipater and Parmenio, on the part of Philip, did not refuse to recognize Kersobleptes as an ally of Athens, and to receive his oath. But in regard to the Phokians, they announced a determination distinctly opposite. They gave notice, at or after the assembly of the 25th Elaphebolion, that Philip positively refused to admit the Phokians as parties to the convention.

This determination, formally announced by Antipater at Athens, must probably have been made known by Philip himself to Philokrates and Æschines, when on mission in Macedonia. Hence Philokrates, in his motion about the terms of peace, had proposed that the Phokians and Halus should be specially excluded (as I have already related). Now, however, when the Athenian assembly, by expressly repudiating such exclusion, had determined that the Phokians should be received as parties, while the envoys of Philip were not less express in rejecting them,—the leaders of the peace, Æschines and Philokrates, were in great embarrassment. They had no other way of surmounting the difficulty, except by holding out mendacious promises, and unauthorized assurances of future intention in the name of Philip. Accordingly, they confidently announced that the King of Macedon, though precluded by his relations with the Thebans and Thessalians (necessary to him while he remained at war with Athens), from openly receiving the Phokians as allies, was nevertheless in his heart decidedly adverse to the Thebans; and that, if his hands were once set free by concluding peace with Athens, he would interfere in the quarrel just in the manner that the Athenians would desire; that he would uphold the Phokians, put down the insolence of Thebes, and even break up the integrity of the city; restoring also the autonomy of Thespiæ, Platæa and the other Bœotian towns, now in Theban dependence. The general assurances,—previously circulated by Aristodemus, Ktesiphon, and others,—of Philip's anxiety to win favorable opinions from the Athenians, were now still farther magnified into a supposed community of antipathy against Thebes; and even into a disposition to compensate Athens for the loss of Amphipolis, by making her complete mistress of Eubœa as well as by recovering for her Orôpus.

By such glowing fabrications and falsehoods, confidently asseverated, Philokrates, Æschines, and the other partisans of Philip present, completely deluded the assembly; and induced them, not indeed to decree the special exclusion of the Phokians, as Philokrates had at first proposed,—but to swear the convention with Antipater and Parmenio without the Phokians.[840] These latter were thus shut out in fact, though by the general words of the peace, Athens had recognized their right to be included. Their deputies were probably present, claimed to be admitted, and were refused by Antipater, without any peremptory protest on the part of Athens.

This tissue, not of mere exaggerations, but of impudent and monstrous falsehood, respecting the purposes of Philip,—will be seen to continue until he had carried his point of penetrating within the pass of Thermopylæ, and even afterwards. We can hardly wonder that the people believed it, when proclaimed and guaranteed to them by Philokrates, Æschines, and the other envoys, who had been sent into Macedonia for the express purpose of examining on the spot and reporting, and whose assurance was the natural authority for the people to rely upon. In this case, the deceptions found easier credence and welcome because they were in complete harmony with the wishes and hopes of Athens, and with the prevalent thirst for peace. To betray allies like the Phokians appeared of little consequence, when once it became a settled conviction that the Phokians themselves would be no losers by it. But this plea, though sufficient as a tolerable excuse for the Athenian people, will not serve for a statesman like Demosthenes; who, on this occasion (as far as we can make out even from his own language), did not enter any emphatic protest against the tacit omission of the Phokians, though he had opposed the clause (in the motion of Philokrates) which formally omitted them by name. Three months afterwards, when the ruin of the isolated Phokians was about to be consummated as a fact, we shall find Demosthenes earnest in warning and denunciation; but there is reason to presume that his opposition[841] was at best only faint, when the positive refusal of Antipater was first proclaimed against that acquiescence on the part of Athens, whereby the Phokians were really surrendered to Philip. Yet in truth this was the great diplomatic turning-point, from whence the sin of Athens, against duty to allies as well as against her own security, took its rise. It was a false step of serious magnitude, difficult, if not impossible, to retrieve afterwards. Probably the temper of the Athenians, then eager for peace, trembling for the lives of their captives, and prepossessed with the positive assurances of Æschines and Philokrates,—would have heard with repugnance any strong protest against abandoning the Phokians, which threatened to send Antipater home in disgust and intercept the coming peace,—the more so as Demosthenes, if he called in question the assurances of Æschines as to the projects of Philip, would have no positive facts to produce in refuting them, and would be constrained to take the ground of mere scepticism and negation;[842] of which a public, charmed with hopeful auguries and already disarmed through the mere comfortable anticipations of peace, would be very impatient. Nevertheless, we might have expected from a statesman like Demosthenes, that he would have begun his energetic opposition to the disastrous treaty of 346 B. C., at that moment when the most disastrous and disgraceful portion of it,—the abandonment of the Phokians,—was first shuffled in.

After the assembly of the 25th Elaphebolion, Antipater administered the oaths of peace and alliance to Athens and to all her other allies (seemingly including the envoy of Kersobleptes) in the Board-room of the Generals.[843] It now became the duty of the ten Athenian envoys, with one more from the confederate synod,—the same

persons who had been employed in the first embassy,—to go and receive the oaths from Philip. Let us see how this duty was performed.

The decree of the assembly, under which these envoys held their trust, was large and comprehensive. They were to receive an oath, of amity and alliance with Athens and her allies, from Philip as well as from the chief magistrate in each city allied with him. They were forbidden (by a curious restriction) to hold any intercourse singly and individually with Philip;[844] but they were farther enjoined, by a comprehensive general clause, "to do anything else which might be within their power for the advantage of Athens."—"It was our duty as prudent envoys (says Æschines to the Athenian people) to take a right measure of the whole state of affairs, as they concerned either you or Philip."[845] Upon these rational views of the duties of the envoys, however, Æschines unfortunately did not act. It was Demosthenes who acted upon them, and who insisted, immediately after the departure of Antipater and Parmenio, on going straight to the place where Philip actually was; in order that they might administer the oath to him with as little delay as possible. It was not only certain that the King of Macedon, the most active of living men, would push his conquests up to the last moment; but it was farther known to Æschines and the envoys, that he had left Pella to make war against Kersobleptes in Thrace, at the time when they returned from their first embassy.[846] Moreover, on the day of, or the day after, the public assembly last described (that is, on the 25th or 26th of the month Elaphebolion), a despatch had reached Athens from Chares, the Athenian commander at the Hellespont, intimating that Philip had gained important advantages in Thrace, had taken the important place called the Sacred Mountain, and deprived Kersobleptes of great part of his kingdom.[847] Such successive conquests on the part of Philip strengthened the reasons for despatch on the part of the envoys, and for going straight to Thrace to arrest his progress. As the peace concluded was based on the *uti possidetis*, dating from the day on which the Macedonian envoys had administered the oaths at Athens,—Philip was bound to restore all conquests made after that day. But it did not escape Demosthenes, that this was an obligation which Philip was likely to evade; and which the Athenian people, bent as they were on peace, were very unlikely to enforce.[848] The more quickly the envoys reached him, the fewer would be the places in dispute, the sooner would he be reduced to inaction,—or at least, if he still continued to act, the more speedily would his insincerity be exposed.

Impressed with this necessity for an immediate interview with Philip, Demosthenes urged his colleagues to set out at once. But they resisted his remonstrances, and chose to remain at Athens; which, we may remark, was probably in a state of rejoicing and festivity in consequence of the recent peace. So reckless was their procrastination and reluctance to depart, that on the 3d of the month Munychion (April —nine days after the solemnity of oath-taking before Antipater and Parmenio) Demosthenes made complaint and moved a resolution in the Senate, peremptorily ordering them to begin their journey forthwith, and enjoining Proxenus the Athenian

commander at Oreus in Eubœa, to transport them without delay to the place where Philip was, wherever that might be.[849] But though the envoys were forced to leave Athens and repair to Oreus, nothing was gained in respect to the main object; for they, as well as Proxenus, took upon them to disobey the express order of the Senate, and never went to find Philip. After a certain stay at Oreus, they moved forward by leisurely journeys to Macedonia; where they remained inactive at Pella until the return of Philip from Thrace, fifty days after they had left Athens.[850]

Had the envoys done their duty as Demosthenes recommended, they might have reached the camp of Philip in Thrace within five or six days after the conclusion of the peace at Athens; had they been even content to obey the express orders of the Senate, they might have reached it within the same interval after the 3d of Munychion; so that from pure neglect, or deliberate collusion, on their part, Philip was allowed more than a month to prosecute his conquests in Thrace, after the Athenians on their side had sworn to peace. During this interval, he captured Doriskus with several other Thracian towns; some of them garrisoned by Athenian soldiers; and completely reduced Kersobleptes, whose son he brought back as prisoner and hostage. [851] The manner in which these envoys, employed in an important mission at the public expense, wasted six weeks of a critical juncture in doing nothing—and that too in defiance of an express order from the Senate—confirms the supposition before stated, and would even of itself raise a strong presumption, that the leaders among them were lending themselves corruptly to the schemes of Philip.

The protests and remonstrances addressed by Demosthenes to his colleagues, became warmer and more unmeasured as the delay was prolonged.[852] His colleagues doubtless grew angry on their side, so that the harmony of the embassy was overthrown. Æschines affirms that none of the other envoys would associate with Demosthenes, either in the road or at the resting-places.[853]

Pella was now the centre of hope, fear, and intrigue, for the entire Grecian world. Ambassadors were already there from Thebes, Sparta, Eubœa, and Phokis; moreover a large Macedonian army was assembled around, ready for immediate action.

At length the Athenian envoys, after so long a delay of their own making, found themselves in the presence of Philip. And we should have expected that they would forthwith perform their special commission by administering the oaths. But they still went on postponing this ceremony, and saying nothing about the obligation incumbent on him, to restore all the places captured since the day of taking the oaths to Antipater at Athens;[854] places, which had now indeed become so numerous, through waste of time on the part of the envoys themselves, that Philip was not likely to yield the point even if demanded. In a conference held with his colleagues, Æschines—assuming credit to himself for a view larger than that taken by them, of the ambassadorial duties—treated the administration of the oath as merely secondary; he insisted on the propriety of addressing Philip on the subject of the in-

tended expedition to Thermopylæ (which he was on the point of undertaking, as was plain from the large force mustered near Pella), and exhorting him to employ it so as to humble Thebes and reconstitute the Bœotian cities. The envoys (he said) ought not to be afraid of braving any ill-will that might be manifested by the Thebans. Demosthenes (according to the statement of Æschines) opposed this recommendation —insisting that the envoys ought not to mingle in disputes belonging to other parts of Greece, but to confine themselves to their special mission—and declared that he should take no notice of Philip's march to Thermopylæ.[855] At length, after much discussion, it was agreed among the envoys, that each of them, when called before Philip, should say what he thought fit, and that the youngest should speak first.

According to this rule, Demosthenes was first heard, and delivered a speech (if we are to believe Æschines) not only leaving out all useful comment upon the actual situation, but so spiteful towards his colleagues, and so full of extravagant flattery to Philip, as to put the hearers to shame.[856] The turn now came to Æschines, who repeats in abridgment his own long oration delivered to Philip. We can reason upon it with some confidence, in our estimate of Æschines, though we cannot trust his reports about Demosthenes. Æschines addressed himself exclusively to the subject of Philip's intended expedition to Thermopylæ. He exhorted Philip to settle the controversy, pending with respect to the Amphiktyons and the Delphian temple, by peaceful arbitration and not by arms. But if armed interference was inevitable, Philip ought carefully to inform himself of the ancient and holy bond whereby the Amphiktyonic synod was held together. That synod consisted of twelve different nations or sections of the Hellenic name, each including many cities small as well as great; each holding two votes and no more; each binding itself by an impressive oath, to uphold and protect every other Amphiktyonic city. Under this venerable sanction, the Bœotian cities, being Amphiktyonic like the rest, were entitled to protection against the Thebans their destroyers. The purpose of Philip's expedition, to restore the Amphiktyonic council, was (Æschines admitted) holy and just.[857] He ought to carry it through in the same spirit; punishing the individuals originally concerned in the seizure of the Delphian temple, but not the cities to which they belonged, provided those cities were willing to give up the wrong-doers. But if Philip should go beyond this point, and confirm the unjust dominion of Thebes over the other Bœotian towns, he would do wrong on his own side, add to the number of his enemies, and reap no gratitude from those whom he favored.[858]

Demosthenes, in his comments upon this second embassy, touches little on what either Æschines or himself said to Philip. He professes to have gone on the second embassy with much reluctance, having detected the treacherous purposes of Æschines and Philokrates. Nay, he would have positively refused to go (he tells us) had he not bound himself by a promise made during the first embassy, to some of the poor Athenian prisoners in Macedonia, to provide for them the means of release. He dwells much upon his disbursements for their ransom during the second em-

bassy, and his efforts to obtain the consent of Philip.[859] This (he says) was all that lay in his power to do, as an individual; in regard to the collective proceedings of the embassy, he was constantly outvoted. He affirms that he detected the foul play of Æschines and the rest with Philip; that he had written a despatch to send home for the purpose of exposing it; that his colleagues not only prevented him from forwarding it, but sent another despatch of their own with false information.[860] Then, he had resolved to come home personally, for the same purpose, sooner than his colleagues, and had actually hired a merchant-vessel—but was hindered by Philip from sailing out of Macedonia.[861]

The general description here given by Demosthenes, of his own conduct during the second embassy, is probably true. Indeed, it coincided substantially with the statement of Æschines, who complains of him as in a state of constant and vexatious opposition to his colleagues. We must recollect that Demosthenes had no means of knowing what the particular projects of Philip really were. This was a secret to every one except Philip himself, with his confidential agents or partisans. Whatever Demosthenes might suspect, he had no public evidence by which to impress his suspicions upon others, or to countervail confident assertions on the favorable side transmitted home by his colleagues.

The army of Philip was now ready, and he was on the point of marching southward towards Thessaly and Thermopylæ. That pass was still held by the Phokians, with a body of Lacedæmonian auxiliaries;[862] a force quite sufficient to maintain it against Philip's open attack, and likely to be strengthened by Athens from seaward, if the Athenians came to penetrate his real purposes. It was therefore essential to Philip to keep alive a certain belief in the minds of others, that he was marching southward with intentions favorable to the Phokians,—though not to proclaim it in any such authentic manner as to alienate his actual allies the Thebans and Thessalians. And the Athenian envoys were his most useful agents in circulating the imposture.

Some of the Macedonian officers round Philip gave explicit assurance, that the purpose of his march was to conquer Thebes, and reconstitute the Bœotian cities. So far, indeed, was this deception carried, that (according to Æschines) the Theban envoys in Macedonia, and the Thebans themselves, became seriously alarmed.[863] The movements of Philip were now the pivot on which Grecian affairs turned, and Pella the scene wherein the greatest cities in Greece were bidding for his favor. While the Thebans and Thessalians were calling upon him to proclaim himself openly Amphiktyonic champion against the Phokians,—the Phokian envoys,[864] together with those from Sparta and Athens, were endeavoring to enlist him in their cause against Thebes. Wishing to isolate the Phokians from such support, Philip made many tempting promises to the Lacedæmonian envoys; who, on their side, came to open quarrel, and indulged in open menace, against those of Thebes.[865] Such was the disgraceful auction, wherein these once great states, in prosecution of their mutual an-

tipathies, bartered away to a foreign prince the dignity of the Hellenic name and the independence of the Hellenic world;[866] following the example set by Sparta in her applications to the Great King, during the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, and at the peace of Antalkidas. Amidst such a crowd of humble petitioners and expectants, all trembling to offend him,—with the aid too of Æschines, Philokrates, and the other Athenian envoys who consented to play his game,—Philip had little difficulty in keeping alive the hopes of all, and preventing the formation of any common force or decisive resolution to resist him.[867]

After completing his march southward through Thessaly, he reached Pheræ near the Pagasæan Gulf, at the head of a powerful army of Macedonians and allies. The Phokian envoys accompanied his march, and were treated, if not as friends, at least in such manner as to make it appear doubtful whether Philip was going to attack the Phokians or the Thebans.[868] It was at Pheræ that the Athenian envoys at length administered the oath both to Philip and to his allies.[869] This was done the last thing before they returned to Athens; which city they reached on the 13th of the month Skirrophorion;[870] after an absence of seventy days, comprising all the intervening month Thargelion, and the remnant (from the third day) of the month Munychion. They accepted, as representatives of the allied cities, all whom Philip sent to them; though Demosthenes remarks that their instructions directed them to administer the oath to the chief magistrate in each city respectively.[871] And among the cities whom they admitted to take the oath as Philip's allies, was comprised Kardia, on the borders of the Thracian Chersonese. The Athenians considered Kardia as within the limits of the Chersonese, and therefore as belonging to them.[872]

It was thus that the envoys postponed both the execution of their special mission, and their return, until the last moment, when Philip was within three days' march of Thermopylæ. That they so postponed it, in corrupt connivance with him, is the allegation of Demosthenes, sustained by all the probabilities of the case. Philip was anxious to come upon Thermopylæ by surprise,[873] and to leave as little time as possible either to the Phokians or to Athens for organizing defence. The oath, which ought to have been administered in Thrace,—but at any rate at Pella—was not taken until Philip had got as near as possible to the important pass; nor had the envoys visited one single city among his allies in execution of their mandate. And as Æschines was well aware that this would provoke inquiry, he took the precaution of bringing with him a letter from Philip to the Athenian people, couched in the most friendly terms; wherein Philip took upon himself any blame which might fall upon the envoys, affirming that they themselves had been anxious to go and visit the allied cities, but that he had detained them in order that they might assist him in accommodating the difference between the cities of Halus and Pharsalus. This letter, affording farther presumption of the connivance between the envoys and Philip, was besides founded on a false pretence; for Halus was (either at that very time or

shortly afterwards) conquered by his arms, given up to the Pharsalians, and its population sold or expelled.[874]

In administering the oaths at Pheræ to Philip and his allies, Æschines and the majority of the Athenian envoys had formally and publicly pronounced the Phokians to be excluded and out of the treaty, and had said nothing about Kersobleptes. This was, if not a departure from their mandate, at least a step beyond it; for the Athenian people had expressly rejected the same exclusion when proposed by Philokrates at Athens; though when the Macedonian envoy declared that he could not admit the Phokians, the Athenians had consented to swear the treaty without them. Probably Philip and his allies would not consent to take the oath, to Athens and her allies, without an express declaration that the Phokians were out of the pale.[875] But though Philokrates and Æschines thus openly repudiated the Phokians, they still persisted in affirming that the intentions of Philip towards that people were highly favorable. They affirmed this probably to the Phokians themselves, as an excuse for having pronounced the special exclusion; they repeated it loudly and emphatically at Athens, immediately on their return. It was then that Demosthenes also, after having been outvoted and silenced during the mission, obtained an opportunity for making his own protest public. Being among the senators of that year, he made his report to the Senate forthwith, seemingly on the day, or the day next but one, after his arrival, before a large audience of private citizens standing by to witness so important a proceeding. He recounted all the proceedings of the embassy,—recalling the hopes and promises under which Æschines and others had persuaded the Athenians to agree to the peace,—arraigning these envoys as fabricators, in collusion with Philip, of falsehoods and delusive assurances,—and accusing them of having already by their unwarrantable delays betrayed Kersobleptes to ruin. Demosthenes at the same time made known to the Senate the near approach and rapid march of Philip; entreating them to interpose even now at the eleventh hour, for the purpose of preventing what yet remained, the Phokians and Thermopylæ, from being given up under the like treacherous fallacies.[876] A fleet of fifty triremes had been voted, and were ready at a moment's notice to be employed on sudden occasion.[877] The majority of the Senate went decidedly along with Demosthenes, and passed a resolution[878] in that sense to be submitted to the public assembly. So adverse was this resolution to the envoys, that it neither commended them nor invited them to dinner in the prytaneium; an insult (according to Demosthenes) without any former precedent.

On the 16th of the month Skirrophorion, three days after the return of the envoys, the first public assembly was held: where, according to usual form, the resolution just passed by the Senate ought to have been discussed. But it was not even read to the assembly; for immediately on the opening of business (so Demosthenes tells us), Æschines rose and proceeded to address the people, who were naturally impatient to hear him before any one else, speaking as he did in the name of his colleagues generally.[879] He said nothing either about the recent statements of Demos-

thenes before the Senate, or the senatorial resolution following, or even the past history of the embassy—but passed at once to the actual state of affairs, and the coming future. He acquainted the people that Philip, having sworn the oaths at Pheræ, had by this time reached Thermopylæ with his army. "But he comes there (said Æschines) as the friend and ally of Athens, the protector of the Phokians, the restorer of the enslaved Bœotian cities, and the enemy of Thebes alone. We your envoys have satisfied him that the Thebans are the real wrong-doers, not only in their oppression towards the Bœotian cities, but also in regard to the spoliation of the temple, which they had conspired to perpetrate earlier than the Phokians. I (Æschines) exposed in an emphatic speech before Philip the iniquities of the Thebans, for which proceeding they have set a price on my life. You Athenians will hear, in two or three days, without any trouble of your own, that Philip is vigorously prosecuting the siege of Thebes. You will find that he will capture and break up that city—that he will exact from the Thebans compensation for the treasure ravished from Delphi—and that he will restore the subjugated communities of Platæa and Thespiæ. Nay more—you will hear of benefits still more direct, which we have determined Philip to confer upon you, but which it would not be prudent as yet to particularize. Eubœa will be restored to you as a compensation for Amphipolis: the Eubœans have already expressed the greatest alarm at the confidential relations between Athens and Philip, and the probability of his ceding to you their island. There are other matters too, on which I do not wish to speak out fully, because I have false friends even among my own colleagues." These last ambiguous allusions were generally understood, and proclaimed by the persons round the orator, to refer to Oropus, the ancient possession of Athens, now in the hands of Thebes.[880] Such glowing promises, of benefits to come, were probably crowned by the announcement, more worthy of credit, that Philip had engaged to send back all the Athenian prisoners by the coming Panathenaic festival,[881] which fell during the next month Hekatombæon.

The first impression of the Athenians, on hearing Æschines, was that of surprise, alarm, and displeasure, at the unforeseen vicinity of Philip;[882] which left no time for deliberation, and scarcely the minimum of time for instant precautionary occupation of Thermopylæ, if such a step were deemed necessary. But the sequel of the speech—proclaiming to them the speedy accomplishment of such favorable results, together with the gratification of their antipathy against Thebes—effaced this sentiment, and filled them with agreeable prospects. It was in vain that Demosthenes rose to reply, arraigned the assurances as fallacious, and tried to bring forward the same statement as had already prevailed with the Senate. The people refused to hear him; Philokrates with the other friends of Æschines hooted him off; and the majority were so full of the satisfactory prospect opened to them, that all mistrust or impeachment of its truth appeared spiteful and vexatious.[883] It is to be remembered that these were the same promises previously made to them by Philokrates and others, nearly three months before, when the peace with Philip was first voted. The immediate accomplishment of them was now again promised on the same authority—by envoys

who had communicated a second time with Philip, and thus had farther means of information—so that the comfortable anticipation previously raised was confirmed and strengthened. No one thought of the danger of admitting Philip within Thermopylæ, when the purpose of his coming was understood to be, the protection of the Phokians, and the punishment of the hated Thebans. Demosthenes was scarcely allowed even to make a protest, or to disclaim responsibility as to the result. Æschines triumphantly assumed the responsibility to himself; while Philokrates amused the people by saying: "No wonder, Athenians, that Demosthenes and I should not think alike; he is an ungenial water-drinker; I am fond of wine."[884]

It was during this temper of the assembly that the letter of Philip, brought by the envoys, was produced and read. His abundant expressions of regard, and promises of future benefit, to Athens, were warmly applauded; while, prepossessed as the hearers were, none of them discerned, nor was any speaker permitted to point out, that these expressions were thoroughly vague and general, and that not a word was said about the Thebans or the Phokians.[885] Philokrates next proposed a decree, extolling Philip for his just and beneficent promises—providing that the peace and alliance with him should be extended, not merely to the existing Athenians, but also to their posterity—and enacting that if the Phokians should still refuse to yield possession of the Delphian temple to the Amphiktyons, the people of Athens would compel them to do so by armed intervention.[886]

During the few days immediately succeeding the return of the envoys to Athens (on the 13th of Skirrophorion), Philip wrote two successive letters, inviting the Athenian troops to join him forthwith at Thermopylæ.[887] Probably these were sent at the moment when Phalækus, the Phokian leader at that pass, answered his first summons by a negative reply.[888] The two letters must have been despatched one immediately after the other, betraying considerable anxiety on the part of Philip; which it is not difficult to understand. He could not be at first certain what effect would be produced by his unforeseen arrival at Thermopylæ on the public mind at Athens. In spite of all the persuasions of Æschines and Philokrates, the Athenians might conceive so much alarm as to obstruct his admission within that important barrier; while Phalækus and the Phokians—having a powerful mercenary force, competent, even unaided, to a resistance of some length—were sure to attempt resistance, if any hope of aid were held out to them from Athens. Moreover it would be difficult for Philip to carry on prolonged military operations in the neighborhood, from the want of provisions; the lands having been unsown through the continued antecedent war, and the Athenian triremes being at hand to intercept his supplies by sea.[889] Hence it was important to him to keep the Athenians in illusion and quiescence for the moment; to which purpose his letters were well adapted, in whichever way they were taken. If the Athenians came to Thermopylæ, they would come as his allies—not as allies of the Phokians. Not only would they be in the midst of his superior force and therefore as it were hostages;[890] but they would be removed from

contact with the Phokians, and would bring to bear upon the latter an additional force of intimidation. If, on the contrary, the Athenians determined not to come, they would at any rate interpret his desire for their presence as a proof that he contemplated no purposes at variance with their wishes and interests; and would trust the assurances, given by Æschines and his other partisans at Athens, that he secretly meant well towards the Phokians. This last alternative was what Philip both desired and anticipated. He wished only to deprive the Phokians of all chance of aid from Athens, and to be left to deal with them himself. His letters served to blind the Athenian public, but his partisans took care not to move the assembly[891] to a direct compliance with their invitation. Indeed the proposal of such an expedition (besides the standing dislike of the citizens towards military service) would have been singularly repulsive, seeing that the Athenians would have had to appear, ostensibly at least, in arms against their Phokian allies. The conditional menace of the Athenian assembly against the Phokians (in case of refusal to surrender the temple to the Amphiktyons), decreed on the motion of Philokrates, was in itself sufficiently harsh, against allies of ten years' standing; and was tantamount at least to a declaration that Athens would not interfere on their behalf—which was all that Philip wanted.

Among the hearers of these debates at Athens, were deputies from these very Phokians, whose fate now hung in suspense. It has already been stated that during the preceding September, while the Phokians were torn by intestine dissensions, Phalækus, the chief of the mercenaries, had repudiated aid (invited by his Phokian opponents), both from Athens and Sparta;[892] feeling strong enough to hold Thermopylæ by his own force. During the intervening months, however, both his strength and his pride had declined. Though he still occupied Thermopylæ with eight thousand or ten thousand mercenaries, and still retained superiority over Thebes, with possession of Orchomenus, Koroneia, and other places taken from the Thebans,[893] —yet his financial resources had become so insufficient for a numerous force, and the soldiers had grown so disorderly from want of regular pay,[894] that he thought it prudent to invite aid from Sparta during the spring,—while Athens was deserting the Phokians to make terms with Philip. Archidamus accordingly came to Thermopylæ with one thousand Lacedæmonian auxiliaries.[895] The defensive force thus assembled was amply sufficient against Philip by land; but that important pass could not be held without the coöperation of a superior fleet at sea.[896] Now the Phokians had powerful enemies even within the pass—the Thebans; and there was no obstacle, except the Athenian fleet under Proxenus at Oreus,[897] to prevent Philip from landing troops in the rear of Thermopylæ, joining the Thebans, and making himself master of Phokis from the side towards Bœotia.

To the safety of the Phokians, therefore, the continued maritime protection of Athens was indispensable; and they doubtless watched with trembling anxiety the deceitful phases of Athenian diplomacy during the winter and spring of 347-346 B. C. Their deputies must have been present at Athens when the treaty was concluded

and sworn in March 346 B. C. Though compelled to endure not only the refusal of Antipater excluding them from the oath, but also the consent of their Athenian allies, tacitly acted upon without being formally announced, to take the oath without them,—they nevertheless heard the assurances, confidently addressed by Philokrates and Æschines to the people, that this refusal was a mere feint to deceive the Thessalians and Thebans,—that Philip would stand forward as the protector of the Phokians, and that all his real hostile purposes were directed against Thebes. How the Phokians interpreted such tortuous and contradictory policy, we are not told. But their fate hung upon the determination of Athens; and during the time when the Ten Athenian envoys were negotiating or intriguing with Philip at Pella, Phokian envoys were there also, trying to establish some understanding with Philip, through Lacedæmonian and Athenian support. Both Philip and Æschines probably amused them with favorable promises. And though, when the oaths were at last administered to Philip at Pheræ, the Phokians were formally pronounced to be excluded,—still the fair words of Æschines, and his assurances of Philip's good intentions towards them, were not discontinued.

While Philip marched straight from Pheræ to Thermopylæ,—and while the Athenian envoys returned to Athens,—Phokian deputies visited Athens also, to learn the last determination of the Athenian people, upon which their own destiny turned. Though Philip, on reaching the neighborhood of Thermopylæ, summoned the Phokian leader, Phalækus to surrender the pass, and offered him terms,—Phalækus would make no reply until his deputies returned to Athens.[898] These deputies, present at the public assembly of the 16th Skirrophorion, heard the same fallacious assurances as before respecting Philip's designs, repeated by Philokrates and Æschines with unabated impudence, and still accepted by the people. But they also heard, in the very same assembly, the decree proposed by Philokrates and adopted, that unless the Phokians restored the Delphian temple forthwith to the Amphiktyons, the Athenian people would compel them to do so by armed force. If the Phokians still cherished hopes, this conditional declaration of war, from a city which still continued by name to be their ally, opened their eyes, and satisfied them that no hope was left except to make the best terms they could with Philip.[899] To defend Thermopylæ successfully without Athens, much more against Athens, was impracticable.

Leaving Athens after the assembly of the 16th Skirrophorion, the Phokian deputies carried back the tidings of what had passed to Phalækus, whom they reached at Nikæa, near Thermopylæ, about the 20th of the same month.[900] Three days afterwards, Phalækus, with his powerful army of eight thousand or ten thousand mercenary infantry and one thousand cavalry, had concluded a convention with Philip. The Lacedæmonian auxiliaries, perceiving the insincere policy of Athens, and the certain ruin of the Phokians, had gone away a little before.[901] It was stipulated in the convention that Phalækus should evacuate the territory, and retire wherever else he pleased, with his entire mercenary force and with all such Phokians as chose

to accompany him. The remaining natives threw themselves upon the mercy of the conqueror.

All the towns in Phokis, twenty-two in number, together with the pass of Thermopylæ, were placed in the hands of Philip; all surrendering at discretion; all without resistance. The moment Philip was thus master of the country, he joined his forces with those of the Thebans, and proclaimed his purpose of acting thoroughly upon their policy; of transferring to them a considerable portion of Phokis; of restoring to them Orchomenus, Korsiæ, and Koroneia, Bœotian towns which the Phokians had taken from them; and of keeping the rest of Bœotia in their dependence, just as he found it.[902]

In the meantime, the Athenians, after having passed the decree above mentioned, re-appointed (in the very same assembly of the 16th Skirrophorion, June), the same ten envoys to carry intelligence of it to Philip, and to be witnesses of the accomplishment of the splendid promises made in his name. But Demosthenes immediately swore off, and refused to serve; while Æschines, though he did not swear off, was nevertheless so much indisposed, as to be unable to go. This at least is his own statement; though Demosthenes affirms that the illness was a mere concerted pretence, in order that Æschines might remain at home to counterwork any reaction of public feeling at Athens, likely to arise on the arrival of the bad news, which Æschines knew to be at hand, from Phokis.[903] Others having been chosen in place of Æschines and Demosthenes,[904] the ten envoys set out, and proceeded as far as Chalkis in Eubœa. It was there that they learned the fatal intelligence from the main land on the other side of the Eubœan strait. On the 23d of Skirrophorion, Phalækus and all the Phokian towns had surrendered; Philip was master of Thermopylæ, had joined his forces with the Thebans, and proclaimed an unqualified philo-Theban policy; on the 27th of Skirrophorion, Derkyllus, one of the envoys, arrived in haste back at Athens, having stopped short in his mission on hearing the facts.

At the moment when he arrived, the people were holding an assembly in the Peiræus, on matters connected with the docks and arsenal; and to this assembly, actually sitting, Derkyllus made his unexpected report.[905] The shock to the public of Athens was prodigious. Not only were all their splendid anticipations of anti-Theban policy from Philip (hitherto believed and welcomed by the people on the positive assurances of Philokrates and Æschines) now dashed to the ground—not only were the Athenians smitten with the consciousness that they had been overreached by Philip, that they had played into the hands of their enemies the Thebans, and that they had betrayed their allies the Phokians to ruin—but they felt also that they had yielded up Thermopylæ, the defence at once of Attica and of Greece, and that the road to Athens lay open to their worst enemies the Thebans, now aided by Macedonian force. Under this pressure of surprise, sorrow, and terror, the Athenians, on the motion of Kallisthenes, passed these votes:—To put the Peiræus, as well as the fortresses throughout Attica, in immediate defence—To bring within these walls, for

safety, all the women and children, and all the movable property, now spread abroad in Attica—To celebrate the approaching festival of the Herakleia, not in the country, as was usual, but in the interior of Athens.[906]

Such were the significant votes, the like of which had not been passed at Athens since the Peloponnesian war, attesting the terrible reaction of feeling occasioned at Athens by the disastrous news from Phokis. Æschines had now recovered from his indisposition; or (if we are to believe Demosthenes) found it convenient to lay aside the pretence. He set out as self-appointed envoy, without any new nomination by the people—probably with such of the Ten as were favorable to his views—to Philip and to the joint Macedonian and Theban army in Phokis. And what is yet more remarkable, he took his journey thither through Thebes itself;[907] though his speeches and his policy had been for months past (according to his own statement) violently anti-Theban;[908] and though he had affirmed (this, however, rests upon the testimony of his rival) that the Thebans had set a price upon his head. Having joined Philip, Æschines took part in the festive sacrifices and solemn pæans celebrated by the Macedonians, Thebans and Thessalians,[909] in commemoration and thanksgiving for their easy, though long-deferred, triumph over the Phokians, and for the conclusion of the Ten-Years Sacred War.

Shortly after Philip had become master of Thermopylæ and Phokis, he communicated his success in a letter to the Athenians. His letter betokened a full consciousness of the fear and repugnance which his recent unexpected proceedings had excited at Athens:[910] but in other respects, it was conciliatory and even seductive; expressing great regard for them as his sworn allies, and promising again that they should reap solid fruits from the alliance. It allayed that keen apprehension of Macedonian and Theban attack, which had induced the Athenians recently to sanction the precautionary measures proposed by Kallisthenes. In his subsequent communications also with Athens, Philip found his advantage in continuing to profess the same friendship and to intersperse similar promises;[911] which, when enlarged upon by his partisans in the assembly, contributed to please the Athenians and to lull them into repose, thus enabling him to carry on without opposition real measures of an insidious or hostile character. Even shortly after Philip's passage of Thermopylæ, when he was in full coöperation with the Thebans and Thessalians, Æschines boldly justified him by the assertion, that these Thebans and Thessalians had been too strong for him, and had constrained him against his will to act on their policy, both to the ruin of the Phokians and to the offence of Athens.[912] And we cannot doubt that the restoration of the prisoners taken at Olynthus, which must soon have occurred, diffused a lively satisfaction at Athens, and tended for the time to countervail the mortifying public results of her recent policy.

Master as he now was of Phokis, at the head of an irresistible force of Macedonians and Thebans, Philip restored the Delphian temple to its inhabitants, and convoked anew the Amphiktyonic assembly, which had not met since the seizure of the

temple by Philomelus. The Amphiktyons reassembled under feelings of vindictive antipathy against the Phokians, and of unqualified devotion to Philip. Their first vote was to dispossess the Phokians of their place in the assembly as one of the twelve ancient Amphiktyonic races, and to confer upon Philip the place and two votes (each of the twelve races had two votes) thus left vacant. All the rights to which the Phokians laid claim over the Delphian temple were formally cancelled. All the towns in Phokis, twenty-two in number, were dismantled and broken up into villages. Abæ alone was spared; being preserved by its ancient and oracular temple of Apollo, and by the fact that its inhabitants had taken no part in the spoliation of Delphi.[913] No village was allowed to contain more than fifty houses, nor to be nearer to another than a minimum distance of one furlong. Under such restriction, the Phokians were still allowed to possess and cultivate their territory, with the exception of a certain portion of the frontier transferred to the Thebans;[914] but they were required to pay to the Delphian temple an annual tribute of fifty talents, until the wealth taken away should have been made good. The horses of the Phokians were directed to be sold; their arms were to be cast down the precipices of Parnassus, or burnt. Such Phokians as had participated individually in the spoliation, were proclaimed accursed, and rendered liable to arrest wherever they were found.[915]

By the same Amphiktyonic assembly, farther, the Lacedæmonians, as having been allies of the Phokians, were dispossessed of their franchise, that is, of their right to concur in the Amphiktyonic suffrage of the Dorian nation. This vote probably emanated from the political antipathies of the Argeians and Messenians.[916]

The sentence, rigorous as it is, pronounced by the Amphiktyons against the Phokians, was merciful as compared with some of the propositions made in the assembly. The Œtæans went so far as to propose, that all the Phokians of military age should be cast down the precipice; and Æschines takes credit to himself for having induced the assembly to hear their defence, and thereby preserved their lives.[917] But though the terms of the sentence may have been thus softened, we may be sure that the execution of it by Thebans, Thessalians, and other foreigners quartered on the country,—all bitter enemies of the Phokian name, and giving vent to their antipathies under the mask of pious indignation against sacrilege,—went far beyond the literal terms in active cruelty. That the Phokians were stripped and slain[918]—that children were torn from their parents, wives from their husbands, and the images of the gods from their temples,—that Philip took for himself the lion's share of the plunder and movable property,—all these are facts naturally to be expected, as incidental to the violent measure of breaking up the cities and scattering the inhabitants. Of those, however, who had taken known part in the spoliation of the temple, the greater number went into exile with Phalækus; and not they alone, but even all such of the moderate and meritorious citizens as could find means to emigrate.[919] Many of them obtained shelter at Athens. The poorer Phokians remained at home by necessity. But such was the destruction inflicted by the conquerors, that even two or

three years afterwards, when Demosthenes and other Athenian envoys passed through the country in their way to the Amphiktyonic meeting at Delphi, they saw nothing but evidences of misery; old men, women and little children, without adults, —ruined houses, impoverished villages, half-cultivated fields.[920] Well might Demosthenes say that events more terrific and momentous had never occurred in the Grecian world, either in his own time or in that of his predecessors.[921]

It was but two years since the conquest and ruin of Olynthus, and of thirty-two Chalkidic Grecian cities besides, had spread abroad everywhere the terror and majesty of Philip's name. But he was now exalted to a still higher pinnacle by the destruction of the Phokians, the capture of Thermopylæ, and the sight of a permanent Macedonian garrison, occupying from henceforward Nikæa and other places commanding the pass.[922] He was extolled as restorer of the Amphiktyonic assembly, and as avenging champion of the Delphian god, against the sacrilegious Phokians. That he should have acquired possession of an unassailable pass, dismissed the formidable force of Phalækus, and become master of twenty-two Phokian cites, all without striking a blow,—was accounted the most wonderful of all his exploits. It strengthened more than ever the prestige of his constant good fortune. Having been now, by the vote of the Amphiktyons, invested with the right of Amphiktyonic suffrage previously exercised by the Phokians, he acquired a new Hellenic rank, with increased facilities for encroachment and predominance in Hellenic affairs. Moreover, in the month of August 346 B. C., about two months after the surrender of Phokis to Philip, the season recurring for celebrating the great Pythian festival, after the usual interval of four years, the Amphiktyons conferred upon Philip the signal honor of nominating him president to celebrate this festival, in conjunction with the Thebans and Thessalians;[923] an honorary preëminence, which ranked among the loftiest aspirations of ambitious Grecian despots, and which Jason, of Pheræ, had prepared to appropriate for himself twenty-four years before, at the moment when he was assassinated.[924] It was in vain that the Athenians, mortified and indignant at the unexpected prostration of their hopes and the utter ruin of their allies, refused to send deputies to the Amphiktyons,—affected even to disregard the assembly as irregular, —and refrained from despatching their sacred legation as usual, to sacrifice at the Pythian festival.[925] The Amphiktyonic vote did not the less pass; without the concurrence, indeed, either of Athens or of Sparta, yet with the hearty support not only of Thebans and Thessalians, but also of Argeians, Messenians, Arcadians, and all those who counted upon Philip as a probable auxiliary against their dangerous Spartan neighbor.[926] And when envoys from Philip and from the Thessalians arrived at Athens, notifying that he had been invested with the Amphiktyonic suffrage, and inviting the concurrence of Athens in his reception,—prudential considerations obliged the Athenians, though against their feelings, to pass a vote of concurrence. Even Demosthenes was afraid to break the recent peace, however inglorious,—and to draw upon Athens a general Amphiktyonic war, headed by the King of Macedon. [927]

Here then was a momentous political change doubly fatal to the Hellenic world; first, in the new position of Philip both as master of the keys of Greece and as recognized Amphiktyonic leader, with means of direct access and influence even on the inmost cities of Peloponnesus; next, in the lowered banner, and uncovered frontier, of Athens, disgraced by the betrayal both of her Phokian allies and of the general safety of Greece,—and recompensed only in so far as she regained her captives.

How came the Athenians to sanction a peace at once dishonorable and ruinous, yielding to Philip that important pass, the common rampart of Attica and of Southern Greece, which he could never have carried in war at the point of the sword? Doubtless, the explanation of this proceeding is to be found, partly in the general state of the Athenian mind; repugnance to military cost and effort,—sickness and shame at their past war with Philip,—alarm from the prodigious success of his arms,—and pressing anxiety to recover the captives taken at Olynthus. But the feelings here noticed, powerful as they were, would not have ended in such a peace, had they not been seconded by the deliberate dishonesty of Æschines and a majority of his colleagues; who deceived their countrymen with a tissue of false assurances as to the purposes of Philip, and delayed their proceedings on the second embassy in such a manner that he was actually at Thermopylæ before the real danger of the pass was known at Athens.

Making all just allowance for mistrust of Demosthenes as a witness, there appears in the admissions of Æschines himself sufficient evidence of corruption. His reply to Demosthenes, though successfully meeting some collateral aggravations, seldom touches, and never repels, the main articles of impeachment against himself. The dilatory measures of the second embassy,—the postponement of the oath-taking until Philip was within three days' march of Thermopylæ,—the keeping back of information about the danger of that pass, until the Athenians were left without leisure for deliberating on the conjuncture,—all these grave charges remain without denial or justification. The refusal to depart at once on the second embassy, and to go straight to Philip in Thrace for the protection of Kersobleptes, is indeed explained, but in a manner which makes the case rather worse than better. And the gravest matter of all—the false assurances given to the Athenian public respecting Philip's purposes,—are plainly admitted by Æschines.[928]

In regard to these public assurances given by Æschines about Philip's intentions, corrupt mendacity appears to me the only supposition admissible. There is nothing, even in his own account, to explain how he came to be beguiled into such flagrant misjudgment; while the hypothesis of honest error is yet farther refuted by his own subsequent conduct. "If (argues Demosthenes), Æschines had been sincerely misled by Philip, so as to pledge his own veracity and character to the truth of positive assurances given publicly before his countrymen, respecting Philip's designs,—then on finding that the result belied him, and that he had fatally misled those whom he undertook to guide, he would be smitten with compunction, and would in particular

abominate the name of Philip as one who had disgraced him and made him an unconscious instrument of treachery. But the fact has been totally otherwise; immediately after the peace, Æschines visited Philip to share his triumph, and has been ever since his avowed partisan and advocate."[929] Such conduct is inconsistent with the supposition of honest mistake, and goes to prove,—what the proceedings of the second embassy all bear out,—that Æschines was the hired agent of Philip for deliberately deceiving his countrymen with gross falsehood. Even as reported by himself, the language of Æschines betokens his ready surrender of Grecian freedom, and his recognition of Philip as a master; for he gives not only his consent, but his approbation, to the entry of Philip within Thermopylæ,[930] only exhorting him, when he comes there, to act against Thebes and in defence of the Bœotian cities. This, in an Athenian envoy, argues a blindness little short of treason. The irreparable misfortune, both for Athens and for free Greece generally, was to bring Philip within Thermopylæ, with power sufficient to put down Thebes and reconstitute Bœotia,—even if it could have been made sure that such would be the first employment of his power. The same negotiator, who had begun his mission by the preposterous flourish of calling upon Philip to give up Amphipolis, ended by treacherously handing over to him a new conquest which he could not otherwise have acquired. Thermopylæ, betrayed once before by Ephialtes the Malian to Xerxes, was now betrayed a second time by the Athenian envoys to an extra-Hellenic power yet more formidable.

The ruinous peace of 346 B. C. was thus brought upon Athens not simply by mistaken impulses of her own, but also by the corruption of Æschines and the major part of her envoys. Demosthenes had certainly no hand in the result. He stood in decided opposition to the majority of the envoys; a fact manifest as well from his own assurances, as from the complaints vented against him, as a colleague insupportably troublesome, by Æschines. Demosthenes affirms, too, that after fruitless opposition to the policy of the majority, he tried to make known their misconduct to his countrymen at home both by personal return, and by letter; and that in both cases his attempts were frustrated. Whether he did all that he could towards this object, cannot be determined; but we find no proof of any short-coming. The only point upon which Demosthenes appears open to censure, is, on his omission to protest emphatically during the debates of the month Elaphebolion at Athens, when the Phokians were first practically excluded from the treaty. I discover no other fault established on probable grounds against him, amidst the multifarious accusations, chiefly personal and foreign to the main issue, preferred by his opponent.

Respecting Philokrates—the actual mover, in the Athenian assembly, of all the important resolutions tending to bring about this peace—we learn that being impeached by Hyperides[931] not long afterwards, he retired from Athens without standing trial, and was condemned in his absence. Both he and Æschines (so Demosthenes asserts) had received from Philip bribes and grants out of the spoils of Olynthus; and Philokrates, especially, displayed his newly-acquired wealth at Athens

with impudent ostentation.[932] These are allegations in themselves probable, though coming from a political rival. The peace, having disappointed every one's hopes, came speedily to be regarded with shame and regret, of which Philokrates bore the brunt as its chief author. Both Æschines and Demosthenes sought to cast upon each other the imputation of confederacy with Philokrates.

The pious feeling of Diodorus leads him to describe, with peculiar seriousness, the divine judgments which fell on all those concerned in despoiling the Delphian temple. Phalækus, with his mercenaries out of Phokis, retired first into Peloponnesus; from thence seeking to cross to Tarentum, he was forced back when actually on shipboard by a mutiny of his soldiers, and passed into Krete. Here he took service with the inhabitants of Knossus against those of Lyktus. Over the latter he gained a victory, and their city was only rescued from him by the unexpected arrival of the Spartan king Archidamus. That prince, recently the auxiliary of Phalækus in Phokis, was now on his way across the sea towards Tarentum; near which city he was slain a few years afterwards. Phalækus, repulsed from Lyktus, next laid siege to Kydonia, and was bringing up engines to batter the walls, when a storm of thunder and lightning arose, so violent, that his engines "were burnt by the divine fire,"[933] and he himself with several soldiers perished in trying to extinguish the flames. His remaining army passed into Peloponnesus, where they embraced the cause of some Eleian exiles against the government of Elis; but were vanquished, compelled to surrender, and either sold into slavery or put to death.[934] Even the wives of the Phokian leaders, who had adorned themselves with some of the sacred donatives out of the Delphian Temple, were visited with the like extremity of suffering. And while the gods dealt thus rigorously with the authors of the sacrilege, they exhibited favor no less manifest towards their champion Philip, whom they exalted more and more towards the pinnacle of honor and dominion.[935]

CHAPTER XC.

FROM THE PEACE OF 346 B. C., TO THE BATTLE OF CHÆRONEIA AND THE DEATH OF PHILIP.

I HAVE described in my last chapter the conclusion of the Sacred War, and the reëstablishment of the Amphiktyonic assembly by Philip; together with the dishonorable peace of 346 B. C., whereby Athens, after a war, feeble in management and inglorious in result, was betrayed by the treachery of her own envoys into the abandonment of the pass of Thermopylæ;—a new sacrifice, not required by her actual position, and more fatal to her future security than any of the previous losses. This important pass, the key of Greece, had now come into possession of Philip, who occupied it, together with the Phokian territory, by a permanent garrison of his own troops.[936] The Amphiktyonic assembly had become an instrument for his exaltation. Both Thebans and Thessalians were devoted to his interest; rejoicing in the ruin of their common enemies the Phokians, without reflecting on the more formidable power now established on their frontiers. Though the power of Thebes had been positively increased by regaining Orchomenus and Koroneia, yet, comparatively speaking, the new position of Philip brought upon her, as well as upon Athens and the rest of Greece, a degradation and extraneous mastery such as had never before been endured.[937]

This new position of Philip, as champion of the Amphiktyonic assembly, and within the line of common Grecian defence, was profoundly felt by Demosthenes. A short time after the surrender of Thermopylæ, when the Thessalian and Macedonian envoys had arrived at Athens, announcing the recent determination of the Amphiktyons to confer upon Philip the place in that assembly from whence the Phokians had been just expelled, concurrence of Athens in this vote was invited; but the Athenians, mortified and exasperated at the recent turn of events, were hardly disposed to acquiesce. Here we find Demosthenes taking the cautious side, and strongly advising compliance. He insists upon the necessity of refraining from any measure calculated to break the existing peace, however deplorable may have been its conditions; and of giving no pretence to the Amphiktyons for voting conjoint war against Athens, to be executed by Philip.[938] These recommendations, prudent under the circumstances, prove that Demosthenes, though dissatisfied with the peace, was anxious to keep it now that it was made; and that if he afterwards came to renew his exhortations to war, this was owing to new encroachments and more menacing attitude on the part of Philip.

We have other evidences, besides the Demosthenic speech just cited, to attest the effect of Philip's new position on the Grecian mind. Shortly after the peace, and before the breaking up of the Phokian towns into villages had been fully carried into

detail—Isokrates published his letter addressed to Philip—the Oratio ad Philippum. The purpose of this letter is, to invite Philip to reconcile the four great cities of Greece—Sparta, Athens, Thebes, and Argos; to put himself at the head of their united force, as well as of Greece generally; and to invade Asia, for the purpose of overthrowing the Persian empire, of liberating the Asiatic Greeks, and of providing new homes for the unsettled wanderers in Greece. The remarkable point here is, that Isokrates puts the Hellenic world under subordination and pupilage to Philip, renouncing all idea of it as a self-sustaining and self-regulating system. He extols Philip's exploits, good fortune, and power, above all historical parallels—treats him unequivocally as the chief of Greece—and only exhorts him to make as good use of his power, as his ancestor Herakles had made in early times.[939] He recommends him, by impartial and conciliatory behavior towards all, to acquire for himself the same devoted esteem among the Greeks as that which now prevailed among his own Macedonian officers—or as that which existed among the Lacedæmonians towards the Spartan kings.[940] Great and melancholy indeed is the change which had come over the old age of Isokrates, since he published the Panegyrical Oration (380 B. C.—thirty-four years before) wherein he invokes a united Pan-hellenic expedition against Asia, under the joint guidance of the two Hellenic chiefs by land and sea—Sparta and Athens; and wherein he indignantly denounces Sparta for having, at the peace of Antalkidas, introduced for her own purposes a Persian rescript to impose laws on the Grecian world. The prostration of Grecian dignity, serious as it was, involved in the peace of Antalkidas, was far less disgraceful than that recommended by Isokrates towards Philip—himself indeed personally of Hellenic parentage, but a Macedonian or barbarian (as Demosthenes[941] terms him) by power and position. As Æschines, when employed in embassy from Athens to Philip, thought that his principal duty consisted in trying to persuade him by eloquence to restore Amphipolis to Athens, and put down Thebes—so Isokrates relies upon his skilful pen to dispose the new chief to a good use of imperial power—to make him protector of Greece, and conquerer of Asia. If copious and elegant flattery could work such a miracle, Isokrates might hope for success. But it is painful to note the increasing subservience, on the part of estimable Athenian freemen like Isokrates, to a foreign potentate; and the declining sentiment of Hellenic independence and dignity, conspicuous after the peace of 346 B. C. in reference to Philip.

From Isokrates as well as from Demosthenes, we thus obtain evidence of the imposing and intimidating effect of Philip's name in Greece after the peace of 346 B. C. Ochus, the Persian king, was at this time embarrassed by unsubdued revolt among his subjects; which Isokrates urges as one motive for Philip to attack him. Not only Egypt, but also Phenicia and Cyprus, were in revolt against the Persian king. One expedition (if not two) on a large scale, undertaken by him for the purpose of reconquering Egypt, had been disgracefully repulsed, in consequence of the ability of the generals (Diophantus an Athenian and Lamius a Spartan) who commanded the Grecian mercenaries in the service of the Egyptian prince Nektanebus.[942] About the

time of the peace of 346 B. C. in Greece, however, Ochus appears to have renewed with better success his attack on Cyprus, Phenicia, and Egypt. To reconquer Cyprus, he put in requisition the force of the Karian prince Idrieus (brother and successor of Mausolus and Artemisia), at this time not only the most powerful prince in Asia Minor, but also master of the Grecian islands Chios, Kos, and Rhodes, probably by means of an internal oligarchy in each, who ruled in his interest and through his soldiers.[943] Idrieus sent to Cyprus a force of forty triremes and eight thousand mercenary troops, under the command of the Athenian Phokion and of Evagoras, an exiled member of the dynasty reigning at Salamis in the island. After a long siege of Salamis itself, which was held against the Persian king by Protagoras, probably another member of the same dynasty—and after extensive operations throughout the rest of this rich island, affording copious plunder to the soldiers, so as to attract numerous volunteers from the mainland—all Cyprus was again brought under the Persian authority.[944]

The Phenicians had revolted from Ochus at the same time as the Cypriots, and in concert with Nektanebus prince of Egypt, from whom they received a reinforcement of four thousand Greek mercenaries under Mentor the Rhodian. Of the three great Phenician cities, Sidon, Tyre, and Aradus—each a separate political community, but administering their common affairs at a joint town called Tripolis, composed of three separate walled circuits, a furlong apart from each other—Sidon was at once the oldest, the richest, and the greatest sufferer from Persian oppression. Hence the Sidonian population, with their prince Tennes, stood foremost in the revolt against Ochus, employing their great wealth in hiring soldiers, preparing arms, and accumulating every means of defence. In the first outbreak they expelled the Persian garrison, seized and punished some of the principal officers, and destroyed the adjoining palace and park reserved for the satrap or king. Having farther defeated the neighboring satraps of Kilikia and Syria, they strengthened the defences of the city by triple ditches, heightened walls, and a fleet of one hundred triremes and quinqueremes. Incensed at these proceedings, Ochus marched with an immense force from Babylon. But his means of corruption served him better than his arms. The Sidonian prince Tennes, in combination with Mentor, entered into private bargain with him, betrayed to him first one hundred of the principal citizens, and next placed the Persian army in possession of the city-walls. Ochus, having slain the hundred citizens surrendered to him, together with five hundred more who came to him with boughs of supplication, intimated his purpose of taking signal revenge on the Sidonians generally; who took the desperate resolution, first of burning their fleet that no one might escape—next, of shutting themselves up with their families, and setting fire each man to his own house. In this deplorable conflagration forty thousand persons are said to have perished; and such was the wealth destroyed, that the privilege of searching the ruins was purchased for a large sum of money. Instead of rewarding the traitor Tennes, Ochus concluded the tragedy by putting him to death.[945]

Flushed with this unexpected success, Ochus marched with an immense force against Egypt. He had in his army ten thousand Greeks; six thousand by requisition from the Greek cities in Asia Minor; three thousand by request from Argos; and one thousand from Thebes.[946] To Athens and Sparta, he had sent a like request, but had received from both a courteous refusal. His army, Greek and Asiatic, the largest which Persia had sent forth for many years, was distributed into three divisions, each commanded by one Greek and one Persian general; one of the three divisions was confided to Mentor and the eunuch Bagoas, the two ablest servants of the Persian king. The Egyptian prince Nektanebus, having been long aware of the impending attack, had also assembled a numerous force: no less than twenty thousand mercenary Greeks, with a far larger body of Egyptians and Libyans. He had also taken special care to put the eastern branch of the Nile, with the fortress of Pelusium at its mouth, in a full state of defence. But these ample means of defence were rendered unavailing, partly by his own unskilfulness and incompetence, partly by the ability and cunning of Mentor and Bagoas. Nektanebus was obliged to retire into Ethiopia; all Egypt fell, with little resistance, into the hands of the Persians; the fortified places capitulated—the temples were pillaged, with an immense booty to the victors—and even the sacred archives of the temples were carried off, to be afterwards resold to the priests for an additional sum of money. The wealthy territory of Egypt again became a Persian province, under the satrap Pherendates; while Ochus returned to Babylon, with a large increase both of dominion and of reputation. The Greek mercenaries were dismissed to return home, with an ample harvest both of pay and plunder.[947] They constituted in fact the principal element of force on both sides; some Greeks enabled the Persian king to subdue revolters,[948] while others lent their strength to the revolters against him.

By this reconquest of Phenicia and Egypt, Ochus relieved himself from that contempt into which he had fallen through the failure of his former expedition,[949] and even exalted the Persian empire in force and credit to a point nearly as high as it had ever occupied before. The Rhodian Mentor, and the Persian Bagoas, both of whom had distinguished themselves in the Egyptian campaign, became from this time among his most effective officers. Bagoas accompanied Ochus into the interior provinces, retaining his full confidence; while Mentor, rewarded with a sum of 100 talents, and loaded with Egyptian plunder, was invested with the satrapy of the Asiatic seaboard.[950] He here got together a considerable body of Greek mercenaries, with whom he rendered signal service to the Persian king. Though the whole coast was understood to belong to the Persian empire, yet there were many separate strong towns and positions, held by chiefs who had their own military force; neither paying tribute nor obeying orders. Among these chiefs, one of the most conspicuous was Hermeias, who resided in the stronghold of Atarneus (on the mainland opposite to Lesbos), but had in pay many troops and kept garrisons in many neighboring places. Though partially disabled by accidental injury in childhood,[951] Hermeias was a man of singular energy and ability, and had conquered for himself this dominion. But what

has contributed most to his celebrity, is, that he was the attached friend and admirer of Aristotle; who passed three years with him at Atarneus, after the death of Plato in 348-347 B. C.—and who has commemorated his merits in a noble ode. By treachery and false promises, Mentor seduced Hermeias into an interview, seized his person, and employed his signet-ring to send counterfeit orders whereby he became master of Atarneus and all the remaining places held by Hermeias. Thus, by successful perfidy, Mentor reduced the most vigorous of the independent chiefs on the Asiatic coast; after which, by successive conquests of the same kind, he at length brought the whole coast effectively under Persian dominion.[952]

The peace between Philip and the Athenians lasted without any formal renunciation on either side for more than six years; from March 346 B. C. to beyond Midsummer 340 B. C. But though never formally renounced during that interval, it became gradually more and more violated in practice by both parties. To furnish a consecutive history of the events of these few years, is beyond our power. We have nothing to guide us but a few orations of Demosthenes;[953] which, while conveying a lively idea of the feeling of the time, touch, by way of allusion, and as materials for reasoning, upon some few facts; yet hardly enabling us to string together those facts into an historical series. A brief sketch of the general tendencies of this period is all that we can venture upon.

Philip was the great aggressor of the age. The movement everywhere, in or near Greece, began with him, and with those parties in the various cities, who acted on his instigation and looked up to him for support. We hear of his direct intervention, or of the effects of his exciting suggestions, everywhere; in Peloponnesus, at Ambrakia and Leukas, in Eubœa, and in Thrace. The inhabitants of Megalopolis, Messênê, and Argos, were soliciting his presence in Peloponnesus, and his active coöperation against Sparta. Philip intimated a purpose of going there himself, and sent in the mean time soldiers and money, with a formal injunction to Sparta that she must renounce all pretension to Messênê.[954] He established a footing in Elis, [955] by furnishing troops to an oligarchical faction, and enabling them to become masters of the government, after a violent revolution. Connected probably with this intervention in Elis, was his capture of the three Eleian colonies, Pandosia, Bucheta, and Elateia, on the coast of the Epirotic Kassopia, near the Gulf of Ambrakia. He made over these three towns to his brother-in-law Alexander, whom he exalted to be prince of the Epirotic Molossians[956]—deposing the reigning prince Arrhybas. He farther attacked the two principal Grecian cities in that region, Ambrakia and Leukas; but here he appears to have failed.[957] Detachments of his troops showed themselves near Megara and Eretria, to the aid of philippizing parties in these cities and to the serious alarm of the Athenians. Philip established more firmly his dominion over Thessaly, distributing the country into four divisions, and planting a garrison in Pheræ, the city most disaffected to him.[958] We also read, that he again overran and subdued the Illyrian, Dardanian, and Pæonian tribes on his northern and western

boundary; capturing many of their towns, and bringing back much spoil; and that he defeated the Thracian prince Kersobleptes, to the great satisfaction of the Greek cities on and near the Hellespont.[959] He is said farther to have redistributed the population of Macedonia, transferring inhabitants from one town to another according as he desired to favor or discourage residence—to the great misery and suffering of the families so removed.[960]

Such was the exuberant activity of Philip, felt everywhere from the coasts of the Propontis to those of the Ionian sea and the Corinthian Gulf. Every year his power increased; while the cities of the Grecian world remained passive, uncombined, and without recognizing any one of their own number as leader. The philippizing factions were everywhere rising in arms or conspiring to seize the governments for their own account under Philip's auspices; while those who clung to free and popular Hellenism were discouraged and thrown on the defensive.[961]

It was Philip's policy to avoid or postpone any breach of peace with Athens; the only power under whom Grecian combination against him was practicable. But a politician like Demosthenes foresaw clearly enough the coming absorption of the Grecian world, Athens included, into the dominion of Macedonia, unless some means could be found of reviving among its members a spirit of vigorous and united defence. In or before the year 344 B. C., we find this orator again coming forward in the Athenian assembly, persuading his countrymen to send a mission into Peloponnesus, and going himself among the envoys.[962] He addressed both to the Messenians and Argeians emphatic remonstrances on their devotion to Philip; reminding them that from excessive fear and antipathy towards Sparta, they were betraying to him their own freedom, as well as that of all their Hellenic brethren.[963] Though heard with approbation, he does not flatter himself with having worked any practical change in their views.[964] But it appears that envoys reached Athens (in 344-343 B. C.), to whom some answer was required, and it is in suggesting that answer that Demosthenes delivers his second Philippic. He denounces Philip anew, as an aggressor stretching his power on every side, violating the peace with Athens, and preparing ruin for the Grecian world.[965] Without advising immediate war, he calls on the Athenians to keep watch and ward, and to organize defensive alliance among the Greeks generally.

The activity of Athens, unfortunately, was shown in nothing but words; to set off against the vigorous deeds of Philip. But they were words of Demosthenes, the force of which was felt by Philip's partisans in Greece, and occasioned such annoyance to Philip himself that he sent to Athens more than once envoys and letters of remonstrance. His envoy, an eloquent Byzantine named Python,[966] addressed the Athenian assembly with much success, complaining of the calumnies of the orators against Philip—asserting emphatically that Philip was animated with the best sentiments towards Athens, and desired only to have an opportunity of rendering service to her—and offering to review and amend the terms of the late peace. Such general

assurances of friendship, given with eloquence and emphasis, produced considerable effect in the Athenian assembly, as they had done from the mouth of Æschines during the discussions on the peace. The proposal of Python was taken up by the Athenians, and two amendments were proposed. 1. Instead of the existing words of the peace—"that each party should have what they actually had"—it was moved to substitute this phrase—"That each party should have their own."[967] 2. That not merely the allies of Athens and of Philip, but also all the other Greeks, should be included in the peace; That all of them should remain free and autonomous; That if any of them were attacked, the parties to the treaty on both sides would lend them armed assistance forthwith. 3. That Philip should be required to make restitution of those places, Doriskus, Serreium, etc., which he had captured from Kersobleptes after the day when peace was sworn at Athens.

The first amendment appears to have been moved by a citizen named Hegesippus, a strenuous anti-philippizing politician, supporting the same views as Demosthenes. Python, with the other envoys of Philip, present in the assembly, either accepted these amendments, or at least did not protest against them. He partook of the public hospitality of the city as upon an understanding mutually settled.[968] Hegesippus with other Athenians was sent to Macedonia to procure the ratification of Philip; who admitted the justice of the second amendment, offered arbitration respecting the third, but refused to ratify the first—disavowing both the general proposition, and the subsequent acceptance of his envoys at Athens.[969] Moreover he displayed great harshness in the reception of Hegesippus and his colleagues; banishing from Macedonia the Athenian poet Xenokleides, for having shown hospitality towards them.[970] The original treaty, therefore, remained unaltered.

Hegesippus and his colleagues had gone to Macedonia, not simply to present for Philip's acceptance the two amendments just indicated, but also to demand from him the restoration of the little island of Halonnesus (near Skiathos), which he had taken since the peace. Philip denied that the island belonged to the Athenians, or that they had any right to make such a demand; affirming that he had taken it, not from them, but from a pirate named Sostratus, who was endangering the navigation of the neighboring sea—and that it now belonged to him. If the Athenians disputed this, he offered to submit the question to arbitration; to *restore* the island to Athens, should the arbitrators decide against him—or to *give* it to her, even should they decide in his favor.[971]

Since we know that Philip treated Hegesippus and the other envoys with peculiar harshness, it is probable that the diplomatic argument between them, about Halonnesus as well as about other matters, was conducted with angry feeling on both sides. Hence an island, in itself small and insignificant, became the subject of prolonged altercation for two or three years. When Hegesippus and Demosthenes maintained that Philip had wronged the Athenians about Halonnesus, and that it could only be received from him in restitution of rightful Athenian ownership, not as a gift

proprio motu—Æschines and others treated the question with derision, as a controversy about syllables.[972] "Philip (they said) offers to give us Halonnesus. Let us take it, and set the question at rest. What need to care whether he *gives it* to us, or *gives it back* to us?" The comic writers made various jests on the same verbal distinction, as though it were a mere silly subtlety. But though party-orators and wits might here find a point to turn or a sarcasm to place, it is certain that well-conducted diplomacy, modern as well as ancient, has been always careful to note the distinction as important. The question here had no reference to capture during war, but during peace. No modern diplomatist will accept restitution of what has been unlawfully taken, if he is called upon to recognize it as gratuitous cession from the captor. The plea of Philip —that he had taken the island, not from Athens, but from the pirate Sostratus—was not a valid excuse, assuming that the island really belonged to Athens. If Sostratus had committed piratical damage, Philip ought to have applied to Athens for redress, which he evidently did not do. It was only in case of redress being refused, that he could be entitled to right himself by force; and even then, it may be doubted whether his taking of the island could give him any right to it against Athens. The Athenians refused his proposition of arbitration; partly because they were satisfied of their own right to the island—partly because they were jealous of admitting Philip to any recognized right of interference with their insular ascendency.[973]

Halonnesus remained under garrison by Philip, forming one among many topics of angry communication by letters and by envoys, between him and Athens—until at length (seemingly about 341 B. C.) the inhabitants of the neighboring island of Peparêthus retook it and carried off his garrison. Upon this proceeding, Philip addressed several remonstrances, both to the Peparethians and to the Athenians. Obtaining no redress, he attacked Peparêthus and took severe revenge upon the inhabitants. The Athenians then ordered their admiral to make reprisals upon him, so that the war, though not yet actually declared, was approaching nearer and nearer towards renewal.[974]

But it was not only in Halonnesus that Athens found herself beset by Philip and the philippizing factions. Even her own frontier on the side towards Bœotia now required constant watching, since the Thebans had been relieved from their Phokian enemies; so that she was obliged to keep garrisons of hoplites at Drymus and Panaktum.[975] In Megara an insurgent party under Perilaus had laid plans for seizing the city through the aid of a body of Philip's troops, which could easily be sent from the Macedonian army now occupying Phokis, by sea to Pegæ, the Megarian post on the Krissæan Gulf. Apprized of this conspiracy, the Megarian government solicited aid from Athens. Phokion, conducting the Athenian hoplites to Megara with the utmost celerity, assured the safety of the city, and at the same time reëstablished the Long Walls to Nisæa, so as to render it always accessible to Athenians by sea.[976] In Eubœa, the cities of Oreus and Eretria fell into the hands of the philippizing leaders, and became hostile to Athens. In Oreus, the greater part of the citizens were per-

suaded to second the views of Philip's chief adherent, Philistides; who prevailed on them to silence the remonstrances, and imprison the person, of the opposing leader Euphræus, as a disturber of the public peace. Philistides then, watching his opportunity, procured the introduction of a body of Macedonian troops, by means of whom he assured to himself the rule of the city as Philip's instrument; while Euphræus, agonized with grief and alarm, slew himself in prison. At Eretria, Kleitarchus with others carried on the like conspiracy. Having expelled their principal opponents, and refused admission to Athenian envoys, they procured a thousand Macedonian troops under Hipponikus; they thus mastered Eretria itself, and destroyed the fortified seaport called Porthmus, in order to break the easy communication with Athens. Oreus and Eretria are represented by Demosthenes as suffering miserable oppression under these two despots, Philistides and Kleitarchus.[977] On the other hand, Chalkis, the chief city in Eubœa, appears to have been still free, and leaning to Athens rather than to Philip, under the predominant influence of a leading citizen named Kallias.

At this time, it appears, Philip was personally occupied with operations in Thrace; where he passed at least eleven months and probably more,[978] leaving the management of affairs in Eubœa to his commanders in Phokis and Thessaly. He was now seemingly preparing his schemes for mastering the important outlets from the Euxine into the Ægean—the Bosphorus and Hellespont—and the Greek cities on those coasts. Upon these straits depended the main supply of imported corn for Athens and a large part of the Grecian world; and hence the great value of the Athenian possession of the Chersonese.

Respecting this peninsula, angry disputes now arose. To protect her settlers there established, Athens had sent Diopeithes with a body of mercenaries—unprovided with pay, however, and left to levy contributions where they could; while Philip had taken under his protection and garrisoned Kardia—a city situated within the peninsula near its isthmus, but ill-disposed to Athens, asserting independence, and admitted at the peace of 346 B. C., by Æschines and the Athenian envoys, as an ally of Philip to take part in the peace-oaths.[979] In conjunction with the Kardians, Philip had appropriated and distributed lands which the Athenian settlers affirmed to be theirs; and when they complained, he insisted that they should deal with Kardia as an independent city, by reference to arbitration.[980] This they refused, though their envoy Æschines had recognized Kardia as an independent ally of Philip when the peace was sworn.

Here was a state of conflicting pretensions, out of which hostilities were sure to grow. The Macedonian troops overran the Chersonese, while Diopeithes on his side made excursions out of the peninsula, invading portions of Thrace subject to Philip; who sent letters of remonstrance to Athens.[981] While thus complaining at Athens, Philip was at the same time pushing his conquests in Thrace against the Thracian princes Kersobleptes, Teres, and Sitalkes,[982] upon whom the honorary grant of Athenian citizenship had been conferred.

The complaints of Philip, and the speeches of his partisans at Athens, raised a strong feeling against Diopeithes at Athens, so that the people seemed disposed to recall and punish him. It is against this step that Demosthenes protests in his speech on the Chersonese. Both that speech, and his third Philippic were delivered in 341-340 B. C.; seemingly in the last half of 341 B. C. In both, he resumes that energetic and uncompromising tone of hostility towards Philip, which had characterized the first Philippic and the Olynthiacs. He calls upon his countrymen not only to sustain Diopeithes, but also to renew the war vigorously against Philip in every other way. Philip (he says), while pretending in words to keep the peace, had long ago broken it by his acts, and by aggressions in numberless quarters. If Athens chose to imitate him by keeping the peace in name, let her do so; but at any rate, let her imitate him also by prosecuting a strenuous war in reality.[983] Chersonesus, the ancient possession of Athens, could be protected only by encouraging and reinforcing Diopeithes; Byzantium also was sure to become the next object of Philip's attack, and ought to be preserved, as essential to the interests of Athens, though hitherto the Byzantines had been disaffected towards her. But even these interests, important as they were, must be viewed only as parts of a still more important whole. The Hellenic world altogether was in imminent danger;[984] overridden by Philip's prodigious military force; torn in pieces by local factions leaning upon his support; and sinking every day into degradation more irrecoverable. There was no hope of rescue for the Hellenic name except from the energetic and well-directed military action of Athens. She must stand forth in all her might and resolution; her citizens must serve in person, pay direct taxes readily, and forego for the time their festival-fund; when they had thus shown themselves ready to bear the real pinch and hardship of the contest, then let them send round envoys to invoke the aid of other Greeks against the common enemy.[985]

Such, in its general tone, is the striking harangue known as the third Philippic. It appears that the Athenians were now coming round more into harmony with Demosthenes than they had ever been before. They perceived,—what the orator had long ago pointed out,—that Philip went on pushing from one acquisition to another, and became only the more dangerous in proportion as others were quiescent. They were really alarmed for the safety of the two important positions of the Hellespont and Bosphorus. From this time to the battle of Chæroneia, the positive influence of Demosthenes in determining the proceedings of his countrymen, becomes very considerable. He had already been employed several times as envoy,—to Peloponnesus (344-343 B. C.), to Ambrakia, Leukas, Korkyra, the Illyrians, and Thessaly. He now moved, first a mission of envoys to Eubœa, where a plan of operations was probably concerted with Kallias and the Chalkidians,—and subsequently, the despatch of a military force to the same island, against Oreus and Eretria.[986] This expedition, commanded by Phokion, was successful. Oreus and Eretria were liberated; Kleitarchus and Philistides, with the Macedonian troops, were expelled from the island, though both in vain tried to propitiate Athens.[987] Kallias, also, with the Chalkidians of Eu-

bœa, and the Megarians, contributed as auxiliaries to this success.[988] On his proposition, supported by Demosthenes, the attendance and tribute from deputies of the Euboic cities to the synod at Athens, were renounced; and in place of it was constituted an Euboic synod, sitting at Chalkis; independent of, yet allied with, Athens.[989] In this Euboic synod Kallias was the leading man; forward both as a partisan of Athens and as an enemy of Philip. He pushed his attack beyond the limits of Eubœa to the Gulf of Pagasæ, from whence probably came the Macedonian troops who had formed the garrison of Oreus under Philistides. He here captured several of the towns allied with or garrisoned by Philip; together with various Macedonian vessels, the crews of which he sold as slaves. For these successes the Athenians awarded to him a public vote of thanks.[990] He also employed himself (during the autumn and winter of 341-340 B. C.) in travelling as missionary throughout Peloponnesus, to organize a confederacy against Philip. In that mission he strenuously urged the cities to send deputies to a congress at Athens, in the ensuing month Anthesterion (February), 340 B. C. But though he made flattering announcement at Athens of concurrence and support promised to him, the projected congress came to nothing.[991]

While the important success in Eubœa relieved Athens from anxiety on that side, Demosthenes was sent as envoy to the Chersonese and to Byzantium. He would doubtless encourage Diopeithes, and may perhaps have carried to him some reinforcements. But his services were principally useful at Byzantium. That city had long been badly disposed towards Athens,—from recollections of the Social War, and from jealousy about the dues on corn-ships passing the Bosphorus; moreover, it had been for some time in alliance with Philip; who was now exerting all his efforts to prevail on the Byzantines to join him in active warfare against Athens. So effectively did Demosthenes employ his eloquence, at Byzantium, that he frustrated this purpose, overcame the unfriendly sentiment of the citizens, and brought them to see how much it concerned both their interest and their safety to combine with Athens in resisting the farther preponderance of Philip. The Byzantines, together with their allies and neighbors the Perinthians, contracted alliance with Athens. Demosthenes takes just pride in having achieved for his countrymen this success as a statesman and diplomatist, in spite of adverse probabilities. Had Philip been able to obtain the active coöperation of Byzantium and Perinthus, he would have become master of the corn-supply, and probably of the Hellespont also, so that war in those regions would have become almost impracticable for Athens.[992]

As this unexpected revolution in the policy of Byzantium was eminently advantageous to Athens, so it was proportionally mortifying to Philip; who resented it so much, that he shortly afterwards commenced the siege of Perinthus by land and sea, [993] a little before midsummer 340 B. C. He brought up his fleet through the Hellespont into the Propontis, and protected it in its passage, against the attack of the Athenians in the Chersonese,[994] by causing his land-force to traverse and lay waste that peninsula. This was a violation of Athenian territory, adding one more to the al-

ready accumulated causes of war. At the same time, it appears that he now let loose his cruisers against the Athenian merchantmen, many of which he captured and appropriated. These captures, together with the incursions on the Chersonese, served as last additional provocations, working up the minds of the Athenians to a positive declaration of war.[995] Shortly after midsummer 340 B. C., at the beginning of the archonship of Theophrastus, they passed a formal decree[996] to remove the column on which the peace of 346 B. C. stood recorded, and to renew the war openly and explicitly against Philip. It seems probable that this was done while Demosthenes was still absent on his mission at the Hellespont and Bosphorus; for he expressly states that none of the decrees immediately bringing on hostilities were moved by him, but all of them by other citizens;[997] a statement which we may reasonably believe, since he would be rather proud than ashamed of such an initiative.

About the same time, as it would appear, Philip on his side, addressed a manifesto and declaration of war to the Athenians. In this paper he enumerated many wrongs done by them to him, and still remaining unredressed in spite of formal remonstrance; for which wrongs he announced his intention of taking a just revenge by open hostilities.[998] He adverted to the seizure, on Macedonian soil, of Nikias his herald carrying despatches; the Athenians (he alleged) had detained this herald as prisoner for ten months and had read the despatches publicly in their assembly. He complained that Athens had encouraged the inhabitants of Thasos, in harboring triremes from Byzantium and privateers from other quarters, to the annoyance of Macedonian commerce. He dwelt on the aggressive proceedings of Diopeithes in Thrace, and of Kallias in the Gulf of Pagasæ. He denounced the application made by Athens to the Persians for aid against him, as a departure from Hellenic patriotism, and from the Athenian maxims of aforetime. He alluded to the unbecoming intervention of Athens in defence of the Thracian princes Teres and Kersobleptes, neither of them among the sworn partners in the peace, against him; to the protection conferred by Athens on the inhabitants of Peparethus, whom he had punished for hostilities against his garrison in Halonnesus; to the danger incurred by his fleet in sailing up the Hellespont, from the hostilities of the Athenian settlers in the Chersonese, who had coöperated with his enemies the Byzantines, and had rendered it necessary for him to guard the ships by marching a land-force through the Chersonese. He vindicated his own proceedings in aiding his allies the inhabitants of Kardia, complaining that the Athenians had refused to submit their differences with that city to an equitable arbitration. He repelled the Athenian pretensions of right to Amphipolis, asserting his own better right to the place, on all grounds. He insisted especially on the offensive behavior of the Athenians, in refusing, when he had sent envoys conjointly with all his allies, to "conclude a just convention on behalf of the Greeks generally"—"Had you acceded to this proposition (he said), you might have placed out of danger all those who really suspected my purposes, or you might have exposed me publicly as the most worthless of men. It was to the interest of your people to accede, but not to the interest of your orators. To them—as those affirm who know

your government best—peace is war, and war, peace; for they always make money at the expense of your generals, either as accusers or as defenders; moreover by reviling in the public assembly your leading citizens at home, and other men of eminence abroad, they acquire with the multitude credit for popular dispositions. It would be easy for me, by the most trifling presents, to silence their invectives and make them trumpet my praises. But I should be ashamed of appearing to purchase your good-will from *them*.[999]"

It is of little moment to verify or appreciate the particular complaints here set forth, even if we had adequate information for the purpose. Under the feeling which had prevailed during the last two years between the Athenians and Philip, we cannot doubt that many detached acts of a hostile character had been committed on their side as well as on his. Philip's allegation—that he had repeatedly proposed to them amicable adjustment of differences—whether true or not, is little to the purpose. It was greatly to his interest to keep Athens at peace and tranquil, while he established his ascendency everywhere else, and accumulated a power for ultimate employment such as she would be unable to resist. The Athenians had at length been made to feel, that farther acquiescence in these proceedings would only ensure to them the amount of favor tendered by Polyphemus to Odysseus—that they should be devoured last. But the lecture which he thinks fit to administer both to them and to their popular orators, is little better than insulting derision. It is strange to read encomiums on peace—as if it were indisputably advantageous to the Athenian public, and as if recommendations of war originated only with venal and calumnious orators for their own profit—pronounced by the greatest aggressor and conqueror of his age, whose whole life was passed in war and in the elaborate organization of great military force; and addressed to a people whose leading infirmity then was, an aversion almost unconquerable to the personal hardships and pecuniary sacrifices of effective war. This passage of the manifesto may probably be intended as a theme for Æschines and the other philippizing partisans in the Athenian assembly.

War was now an avowed fact on both sides. At the instigation of Demosthenes and others, the Athenians decreed to equip a naval force, which was sent under Chares to the Hellespont and Propontis.

Meanwhile Philip brought up to the siege of Perinthus an army of thirty thousand men, and a stock of engines and projectiles such as had never before been seen. [1000] His attack on this place was remarkable not only for great bravery and perseverance on both sides, but also for the extended scale of the military operations. [1001] Perinthus was strong and defensible; situated on a promontory terminating in abrupt cliffs southward towards the Propontis, unassailable from seaward, but sloping, though with a steep declivity towards the land, with which it was joined by an isthmus of not more than a furlong in breadth. Across this isthmus stretched the outer wall, behind which were seen the houses of the town, lofty, strongly built, and rising one above the other in terraces up the ascent of the promontory. Philip

pressed the place with repeated assaults on the outer wall; battering it with rams, undermining it by sap, and rolling up movable towers said to be one hundred and twenty feet in height (higher even than the towers of the Perinthian wall), so as to chase away the defenders by missiles, and to attempt an assault by boarding-planks hand to hand. The Perinthians, defending themselves with energetic valor, repelled him for a long time from the outer wall. At length the besieging engines, with the reiterated attacks of Macedonian soldiers animated by Philip's promises, overpowered this wall, and drove them back into the town. It was found, however, that the town itself supplied a new defensible position to its citizens. The lower range of houses, united by strong barricades across the streets, enabled the Perinthians still to hold out. In spite of all their efforts, however, the town would have shared the fate of Olynthus, had they not been sustained by effective foreign aid. Not only did their Byzantine kinsmen exhaust themselves to furnish every sort of assistance by sea, but also the Athenian fleet, and Persian satraps on the Asiatic side of the Propontis, coöperated. A body of Grecian mercenaries under Apollodorus, sent across from Asia by the Phrygian satrap Arsites, together with ample supplies of stores by sea, placed Perinthus in condition to defy the besiegers.[1002]

After a siege which can hardly have lasted less than three months, Philip found all his efforts against Perinthus baffled. He then changed his plan, withdrew a portion of his forces, and suddenly appeared before Byzantium. The walls were strong, but inadequately manned and prepared; much of the Byzantine force being in service at Perinthus. Among several vigorous attacks, Philip contrived to effect a surprise on a dark and stormy night, which was very near succeeding. The Byzantines defended themselves bravely, and even defeated his fleet; but they too were rescued chiefly by foreign aid. The Athenians—now acting under the inspirations of Demosthenes, who exhorted them to bury in a generous oblivion all their past grounds of offence against Byzantium—sent a still more powerful fleet to the rescue, under the vigorous guidance of Phokion[1003] instead of the loose and rapacious Chares. Moreover the danger of Byzantium called forth strenuous efforts from the chief islanders of the Ægean—Chians, Rhodians, Koans, etc., to whom it was highly important that Philip should not become master of the great passage for imported corn into the Grecian seas. The large combined fleet thus assembled was fully sufficient to protect Byzantium.[1004] Compelled to abandon the siege of that city as well as of Perinthus, Philip was farther baffled in an attack on the Chersonese. Phokion not only maintained against him the full security of the Propontis and its adjoining straits, but also gained various advantages over him both by land and sea.[1005]

These operations probably occupied the last six months of 340 B. C. They constituted the most important success gained by Athens, and the most serious reverse experienced by Philip, since the commencement of war between them. Coming as they did immediately after the liberation of Eubœa in the previous year, they materially improved the position of Athens against Philip. Phokion and his fleet not only

saved the citizens of Byzantium from all the misery of a capture by Macedonian soldiers, but checked privateering, and protected the trade-ships so efficaciously, that corn became unusually abundant and cheap both at Athens and throughout Greece: [1006] and Demosthenes, as statesman and diplomatist, enjoyed the credit of having converted Eubœa into a friendly and covering neighbor for Athens, instead of being a shelter for Philip's marauding cruisers—as well as of bringing round Byzantium from the Macedonian alliance to that of Athens, and thus preventing both the Hellespont and the corn-trade from passing into Philip's hands.[1007] The warmest votes of thanks, together with wreaths in token of gratitude, were decreed to Athens by the public assemblies of Byzantium, Perinthus, and the various towns of the Chersonese; [1008] while the Athenian public assembly also decreed and publicly proclaimed a similar vote of thanks and admiration to Demosthenes. The decree, moved by Aristonikus, was so unanimously popular at the time, that neither Æschines nor any of the other enemies of Demosthenes thought it safe to impeach the mover.[1009]

In the recent military operations, on so large a scale, against Byzantium and Perinthus, Philip had found himself in conflict not merely with Athens, but also with Chians, Rhodians and others; an unusually large muster of confederate Greeks. To break up this confederacy, he found it convenient to propose peace, and to abandon his designs against Byzantium and Perinthus—the point on which the alarm of the confederates chiefly turned. By withdrawing his forces from the Propontis, he was enabled to conclude peace with the Byzantines and most of the maritime Greeks who had joined in relieving them. The combination against him was thus dissolved, though with Athens[1010] and her more intimate allies his naval war still continued. While he multiplied cruisers and privateers to make up by prizes his heavy outlay during the late sieges, he undertook with his land-force an enterprize, during the spring of 339 B. C., against the Scythian king Atheas; whose country, between Mount Hæmus and the Danube, he invaded with success, bringing away as spoil a multitude of youthful slaves of both sexes, as well as cattle. On his return however across Mount Hæmus, he was attacked on a sudden by the Thracian tribe Triballi, and sustained a defeat; losing all his accompanying captives, and being badly wounded through the thigh.[1011] This expedition and its consequences occupied Philip during the spring and summer of 339 B. C.

Meanwhile the naval war of Athens against Philip was more effectively carried on, and her marine better organized, than ever it had been before. This was chiefly owing to an important reform proposed and carried by Demosthenes, immediately on the declaration of war against Philip in the summer of 340 B. C. Enjoying as he did, now after long public experience, the increased confidence of his fellow-citizens, and being named superintendent of the navy,[1012] he employed his influence not only in procuring energetic interference both as to Eubœa and Byzantium, but also in correcting deep-seated abuses which nullified the efficiency of the Athenian marine department.

The law of Periander (adopted in 357 B. C.) had distributed the burthen of the trierarchy among the twelve hundred richest citizens on the taxable property-schedule, arranged in twenty fractions called Symmories, of sixty persons each. Among these men, the three hundred richest, standing distinguished, as leaders of the Symmories, were invested with the direction and enforcement of all that concerned their collective agency and duties. The purpose of this law had been to transfer the cost of trierarchy—a sum of about forty, fifty or sixty minæ for each trireme, defraying more or less of the outfit—which had originally been borne by a single rich man as his turn came round, and afterwards by two rich men in conjunction—to a partnership more or less numerous, consisting of five, six, or even fifteen or sixteen members of the same symmory. The number of such partners varied according to the number of triremes required by the state to be fitted out in any one year. If only few triremes were required, sixteen contributors might be allotted to defray collectively the trierarchic cost of each: if on the other hand many triremes were needed, a less number of partners, perhaps no more than five or six, could be allotted to each—since the total number of citizens whose turn it was to be assessed in that particular year was fixed. The assessment upon each partner was of course heavier, in proportion as the number of partners assigned to a trireme was smaller. Each member of the partnership, whether it consisted of five, of six, or of sixteen, contributed in equal proportion towards the cost.[1013] The richer members of the partnership thus paid no greater sum than the poorer; and sometimes even evaded any payment of their own, by contracting with some one to discharge the duties of the post, on condition of a total sum not greater than that which they had themselves collected from these poorer members.

According to Demosthenes, the poorer members of these trierarchic symmories were sometimes pressed down almost to ruin by the sums demanded; so that they complained bitterly, and even planted themselves in the characteristic attitude of suppliants at Munychia or elsewhere in the city. When their liabilities to the state were not furnished in time, they became subject to imprisonment by the officers superintending the outfit of the armament In addition to such private hardship, there arose great public mischief from the money not being at once forthcoming; the armament being delayed in its departure, and forced to leave Peiræus either in bad condition or without its full numbers. Hence arose in great part, the ill-success of Athens in her maritime enterprises against Philip, before the peace of 346 B. C.[1014]

The same influences, which had led originally to the introduction of such abuses, stood opposed to the orator in his attempted amendment. The body of Three Hundred, the richest men in the state—the leader or richest individual in each symmory, with those who stood second or third in order of wealth—employed every effort to throw out the proposition, and tendered large bribes to Demosthenes (if we may credit his assertion) as inducements for dropping it. He was impeached moreover under the Graphê Paranomon, as mover of an unconstitutional or illegal decree. It re-

quired no small share of firmness and public spirit, combined with approved eloquence and an established name, to enable Demosthenes to contend against these mighty enemies.

His new law caused the charge of trierarchy to be levied upon all the members of the symmories, or upon all above a certain minimum of property, in proportion to their rated property; but it seems, if we rightly make out, to have somewhat heightened the minimum, so that the aggregate number of persons chargeable was diminished.[1015] Every citizen rated at ten talents was assessed singly for the charge of trierarchy belonging to one trireme; if rated at twenty talents, for the trierarchy of two; at thirty talents, for the trierarchy of three; if above thirty talents, for that of three triremes and a service boat—which was held to be the maximum payable by any single individual. Citizens rated at less than ten talents, were grouped together into ratings of ten talents in the aggregate, in order to bear collectively the trierarchy of one of a trireme; the contributions furnished by each person in the group being proportional to the sum for which he stood rated. This new proposition, while materially relieving the poorer citizens, made large addition to the assessments of the rich. A man rated at twenty talents, who had before been chargeable for only the sixteenth part of the expense of one trierarchy, along with partners much poorer than himself but equally assessed—now became chargeable with the entire expense of two trierarchies. All persons liable were assessed in fair proportion to the sum for which they stood rated in the schedule. When the impeachment against Demosthenes came to be tried before the Dikastery, he was acquitted by more than four-fifths of the Dikasts; so that the accuser was compelled to pay the established fine. And so animated was the temper of the public at that moment, in favor of vigorous measures for prosecuting the war just declared, that they went heartily along with him, and adopted the main features of his trierarchic reform. The resistance from the rich, however, though insufficient to throw out the measure, constrained him to modify it more than once, during the progress of the discussion;[1016] partly in consequence of the opposition of Æschines, whom he accuses of having been hired by the rich for the purpose.[1017] It is deeply to be regretted that the speeches of both of them—especially those of Demosthenes, which must have been numerous—have not been preserved.

Thus were the trierarchic symmories distributed and assessed anew upon each man in the ratio of his wealth, and therefore most largely upon the Three Hundred richest.[1018] How long the law remained unchanged, we do not know. But it was found to work admirably well; and Demosthenes boasts that during the entire war (that is, from the renewal of the war about August 340 B. C., to the battle of Chæroneia in August 338 B. C.) all the trierarchs named under the law were ready in time without complaint or suffering; while the ships, well-equipped and exempt from the previous causes of delay, were found prompt and effective for all exigencies. Not one was either left behind, or lost at sea, throughout these two years.[1019]

Probably the first fruits of the Demosthenic reform in Athenian naval administration, was, the fleet equipped under Phokion, which acted so successfully at and near Byzantium. The operations of Athenians at sea, though not known in detail, appear to have been better conducted and more prosperous in their general effect than they had ever been since the Social War. But there arose now a grave and melancholy dispute in the interior of Greece, which threw her upon her defence by land. This new disturbing cause was nothing less than another Sacred War, declared by the Amphiktyonic assembly against the Lokrians of Amphissa. Kindled chiefly by the Athenian Æschines, it more than compensated Philip for his repulse at Byzantium and his defeat by the Triballi; bringing, like the former Sacred War, aggrandizement to him alone, and ruin to Grecian liberty.

I have recounted, in the fourth volume of this work,[1020] the first Sacred War recorded in Grecian history (590-580 B. C.), about two centuries before the birth of Æschines and Demosthenes. That war had been undertaken by the Amphiktyonic Greeks to punish, and ended by destroying, the flourishing seaport of Kirrha, situated near the mouth of the river Pleistus, on the coast of the fertile plain stretching from the southern declivity of Delphi to the sea. Kirrha was originally the port of Delphi; and of the ancient Phokian town of Krissa, to which Delphi was once an annexed sanctuary.[1021] But in process of time Kirrha increased at the expense of both; through profits accumulated from the innumerable visitors by sea who landed there as the nearest access to the temple. The prosperous Kirrhæans, inspiring jealousy at Delphi and Krissa, were accused of extortion in the tolls levied from visitors, as well as of other guilty or offensive proceedings. An Amphiktyonic war, wherein the Athenian Solon stood prominently forward, being declared against them, Kirrha was taken and destroyed. Its fertile plain was consecrated to the Delphian god, under an oath taken by all the Amphiktyonic members, with solemn pledges and formidable imprecations against all disturbers. The entire space between the temple and the sea now became, as the oracle had required, sacred property of the god; that is, incapable of being tilled, planted, or occupied in any permanent way, by man, and devoted only to spontaneous herbage with pasturing animals.

But though the Delphians thus procured the extirpation of their troublesome neighbors at Kirrha, it was indispensable that on or near the same spot there should exist a town and port, for the accommodation of the guests who came from all quarters to Delphi; the more so, as such persons, not merely visitors, but also traders with goods to sell, now came in greater multitudes than ever, from the increased attractions imparted out of the rich spoils of Kirrha itself, to the Pythian festival. How this want was at first supplied, while the remembrance of the oath was yet fresh, we are not informed. But in process of time Kirrha became reoccupied and refortified by the western neighbors of Delphi—the Lokrians of Amphissa—on whose borders it stood, and for whom probably it served as a port not less than for Delphi. These new occupants received the guests coming to the temple, enriched themselves by the ac-

companying profit and took into cultivation a certain portion of the plain around the town.[1022]

At what period the occupation by the Lokrians had its origin, we are unable to say. So much however we make out—not merely from Demosthenes, but even from Æschines—that in their time it was an ancient and established occupation—not a recent intrusion or novelty. The town was fortified; the space immediately adjacent being tilled and claimed by the Lokrians as their own.[1023] This indeed was a departure from the oath, sworn by Solon with his Amphiktyonic contemporaries, to consecrate Kirrha and its lands to the Delphian god. But if that oath had been literally carried out, the god himself, and the Delphians among whom he dwelt, would have been the principal losers; because the want of a convenient port would have been a serious discouragement, if not a positive barrier, against the arrival of visitors, most of whom came by sea. Accordingly the renovation of the town and port of Kirrha, doubtless on a modest scale, together with a space of adjacent land for tillage, was at least tolerated, if not encouraged. Much of the plain, indeed, still remained unfilled and unplanted, as the property of Apollo; the boundaries being perhaps not accurately drawn.

While the Lokrians had thus been serviceable to the Delphian temple by occupying Kirrha, they had been still more valuable as its foremost auxiliaries and protectors against the Phokians, their enemies of long standing.[1024] One of the first objects of Philomelus the Phokian, after defeating the Lokrian armed force, was to fortify the sacred precinct of Delphi on its western side, against their attacks;[1025] and we cannot doubt that their position in close neighborhood to Delphi must have been one of positive suffering as well as of danger, during the years when the Phokian leaders, with their numerous mercenary bands, remained in victorious occupation of the temple, and probably of the harbor of Kirrha also. The subsequent turn of fortune,—when Philip crushed the Phokians and when the Amphiktyonic assembly was reorganized, with him as its chief,—must have found the Amphissian Lokrians among the warmest allies and sympathizers. Resuming possession of Kirrha, they may perhaps have been emboldened, in such a moment of triumphant reaction, to enlarge their occupancy round the walls to a greater extent than they had done before. Moreover they were animated with feelings attached to Thebes; and were hostile to Athens, as the ally and upholder of their enemies the Phokians.

Matters were in this condition when the spring meeting of the Amphiktyonic assembly (February or March 339 B. C.) was held at Delphi. Diognetus was named by the Athenians to attend it as Hieromnemon, or chief legate; with three Pylagoræ or vice-legates, Æschines, Meidias, and Thrasykles.[1026] We need hardly believe Demosthenes, when he states that the name of Æschines was put up without foreknowledge on the part of any one; and that though it passed, yet not more than two or three hands were held up in his favor.[1027] Soon after they reached Delphi, Dio-

gnetus was seized with a fever, so that the task of speaking in the Amphiktyonic assembly was confided to Æschines.

There stood in the Delphian temple some golden or gilt shields dedicated as an offering out of the spoils taken at the battle of Platæa, a century and a half before,—with an inscription to this effect,—"Dedicated by the Athenians, out of the spoils of Persians and Thebans engaged in joint battle against the Greeks." It appears that these shields had recently been set up afresh (having been perhaps stript of their gilding by the Phokian plunderers), in a new cell or chapel, without the full customary forms of prayer or solemnities;[1028] which perhaps might be supposed unnecessary, as the offering was not now dedicated for the first time. The inscription, little noticed and perhaps obscured by the lapse of time on the original shields, would now stand forth brightly and conspicuously on the new gilding; reviving historical recollections highly offensive to the Thebans,[1029] and to the Amphissian Lokrians as friends of Thebes. These latter not only remonstrated against it in the Amphiktyonic assembly, but were even preparing (if we are to believe Æschines), to accuse Athens of impiety; and to invoke against her a fine of fifty talents, for omission of the religious solemnities.[1030] But this is denied by Demosthenes;[1031] who states that the Lokrians could not bring any such accusation against Athens without sending a formal summons,—which they had never sent. Demosthenes would be doubtless right as to the regular form, probably also as to the actual fact; though Æschines accuses him of having received bribes[1032] to defend the iniquities of the Lokrians. Whether the Lokrians went so far as to invoke a penalty, or not,—at any rate they spoke in terms of complaint against the proceeding. Such complaint was not without real foundation; since it was better for the common safety of Hellenic liberty against the Macedonian aggressor, that the treason of Thebes at the battle of Platæa should stand as a matter of past antiquity, rather than be republished in a new edition. But this was not the ground taken by the complainants, nor could they directly impeach the right of Athens to burnish up her old donatives. Accordingly they assailed the act on the allegation of impiety, as not having been preceded by the proper religious solemnities; whereby they obtained the opportunity of inveighing against Athens, as ally of the Phokians in their recent sacrilege, and enemy of Thebes the steadfast champion of the god.

"The Amphiktyons being assembled (I here give the main recital, though not the exact words, of Æschines), a friendly person came to acquaint us that the Amphissians were bringing on their accusation against Athens. My sick colleagues requested me immediately to enter the assembly and undertake her defence. I made haste to comply, and was just beginning to speak, when an Amphissian,—of extreme rudeness and brutality,—perhaps even under the influence of some misguiding divine impulse,—interrupted me and exclaimed,—'Do not hear him, men of Hellas! Do not permit the name of the Athenian people to be pronounced among you at this holy season! Turn them out of the sacred ground, like men under a curse.' With that he

denounced us for our alliance with the Phokians, and poured out many other outrageous invectives against the city.

"To me (continues Æschines) all this was intolerable to hear; I cannot even now think on it with calmness—and at the moment, I was provoked to anger such as I had never felt in my life before. The thought crossed me that I would retort upon the Amphissians for their impious invasion of the Kirrhæan land. That plain, lying immediately below the sacred precinct in which we were assembled, was visible throughout. 'You see, Amphiktyons (said I), that plain cultivated by the Amphissians, with buildings erected in it for farming and pottery! You have before your eyes the harbor, consecrated by the oath of your forefathers, now occupied and fortified. You know of yourselves, without needing witnesses to tell you, that these Amphissians have levied tolls and are taking profit out of the sacred harbor!' I then caused to be read publicly the ancient oracle, the oath, and the imprecations (pronounced after the first Sacred War, wherein Kirrha was destroyed). Then continuing, I said—'Here am I, ready to defend the god and the sacred property, according to the oath of our forefathers, with hand, foot, voice, and all the powers that I possess. I stand prepared to clear my own city of her obligations to the gods do you take counsel forthwith for yourselves. You are here about to offer sacrifice and pray to the gods for good things, publicly and individually. Look well then,—where will you find voice, or soul, or eyes, or courage, to pronounce such supplications, if you permit these accursed Amphissians to remain unpunished, when they have come under the imprecations of the recorded oath? Recollect that the oath distinctly proclaims the sufferings awaiting all impious transgressors, and even menaces those who tolerate their proceedings, by declaring,—They who do not stand forward to vindicate Apollo, Artemis, Latona, and Athênê Pronæa, may not sacrifice undefiled or with favorable acceptance.'"

Such is the graphic and impressive description,[1033] given by Æschines himself some years afterwards to the Athenian assembly, of his own address to the Amphiktyonic meeting in spring 339 B. C.; on the lofty sight of the Delphian Pylæa, with Kirrha and its plain spread out before his eyes, and with the ancient oath and all its fearful imprecations recorded on the brass plate hard by, readable by every one. His speech, received with loud shouts, roused violent passion in the bosoms of the Amphiktyons, as well as of the hearers assembled round. The audience at Delphi was not like that of Athens. Athenian citizens were accustomed to excellent oratory, and to the task of balancing opposite arguments: though susceptible of high-wrought intellectual excitement—admiration or repugnance as the case might be—they discharged it all in the final vote, and then went home to their private affairs. But to the comparatively rude men at Delphi, the speech of a first-rate Athenian orator was a rarity. When Æschines, with great rhetorical force, unexpectedly revived in their imaginations the ancient and terrific history of the curse of Kirrha[1034]—assisted by all the force of visible and local association—they were worked up to madness; while

in such minds as theirs, the emotion raised would not pass off by simple voting, but required to be discharged by instant action.

How intense and ungovernable that emotion became, is shown by the monstrous proceedings which followed. The original charge of impiety brought against Athens, set forth by the Amphissian speaker coarsely and ineffectively, and indeed noway lending itself to exaggeration—was now altogether forgotten in the more heinous impiety of which Æschines had accused the Amphissians themselves. About the necessity of punishing them, there was but one language. The Amphissian speakers appear to have fled—since even their persons would hardly have been safe amidst such an excitement. And if the day had not been already far advanced, the multitude would have rushed at once down from the scene of debate to Kirrha.[1035] On account of the lateness of the hour, a resolution was passed which the herald formally proclaimed,—That on the morrow at daybreak, the whole Delphian population, of sixteen years and upwards, freemen as well as slaves, should muster at the sacrificing place, provided with spades and pickaxes: That the assembly of Amphiktyonic legates would there meet them, to act in defence of the god and the sacred property: That if there were any city whose deputies did not appear, it should be excluded from the temple, and proclaimed unholy and accursed.[1036]

At daybreak, accordingly, the muster took place. The Delphian multitude came with their implements for demolition:—the Amphiktyons with Æschines placed themselves at the head:—and all marched down to the port of Kirrha. Those there resident—probably astounded and terrified at so furious an inroad from an entire population with whom, a few hours before, they had been on friendly terms—abandoned the place without resistance, and ran to acquaint their fellow-citizens at Amphissa. The Amphiktyons with their followers then entered Kirrha, demolished all the harbor-conveniences, and even set fire to the houses in the town. This Æschines himself tells us; and we may be very sure (though he does not tell us) that the multitude thus set on were not contented with simply demolishing, but plundered and carried away whatever they could lay hands on. Presently, however, the Amphissians, whose town was on the high ground about seven or eight miles west of Delphi, apprised of the destruction of their property and seeing their houses in flames, arrived in haste to the rescue, with their full-armed force. The Amphiktyons and the Delphian multitude were obliged in their turn to evacuate Kirrha, and hurry back to Delphi at their best speed. They were in the greatest personal danger. According to Demosthenes, some were actually seized; but they must have been set at liberty almost immediately.[1037] None were put to death; an escape which they probably owed to the respect borne by the Amphissians, even under such exasperating circumstances, to the Amphiktyonic function.

On the morning after this narrow escape, the president, a Thessalian of Pharsalus, named Kottyphus, convoked a full Amphiktyonic Ekklesia; that is, not merely the Amphiktyons proper, or the legates and co-legates deputed from the vari-

ous cities,—but also, along with them, the promiscuous multitude present for purpose of sacrifice and consultation of the oracle. Loud and indignant were the denunciations pronounced in this meeting against the Amphissians; while Athens was eulogized as having taken the lead in vindicating the rights of Apollo. It was finally resolved that the Amphissians should be punished as sinners against the god and the sacred domain, as well as against the Amphiktyons personally; that the legates should now go home, to consult each his respective city; and that as soon as some positive resolution for executory measures could be obtained, each should come to a special meeting, appointed at Thermopylæ for a future day,—seemingly not far distant, and certainly prior to the regular season of autumnal convocation.

Thus was the spark applied, and the flame kindled, of a second Amphiktyonic war, between six and seven years after the conclusion of the former in 346 B. C. What has been just recounted comes to us from Æschines, himself the witness as well as the incendiary. We here judge him, not from accusations preferred by his rival Demosthenes, but from his own depositions; and from facts which he details not simply without regret, but with a strong feeling of pride. It is impossible to read them without becoming sensible of the profound misfortune which had come over the Grecian world; since the unanimity or dissidence of its component portions were now determined, not by political congresses at Athens or Sparta, but by debates in the religious convocation at Delphi and Thermopylæ. Here we have the political sentiment of the Amphissian Lokrians,—their sympathy for Thebes, and dislike to Athens,—dictating complaint and invective against the Athenians on the allegation of impiety. Against every one, it was commonly easy to find matter for such an allegation, if parties were on the look-out for it; while defence was difficult, and the fuel for kindling religious antipathy all at the command of the accuser. Accordingly Æschines troubles himself little with the defence, but plants himself at once on the vantage-ground of the accuser, and retorts the like charge of impiety against the Amphissians, on totally different allegations. By superior oratory, as well as by the appeal to an ancient historical fact of a character peculiarly terror-striking, he exasperates the Amphiktyons to a pitch of religious ardor, in vindication of the god, such as to make them disdain alike the suggestions either of social justice or of political prudence. Demosthenes—giving credit to the Amphiktyons for something like the equity of procedure, familiar to Athenian ideas and practice—affirmed that no charge against Athens could have been made before them by the Lokrians, because no charge would be entertained without previous notice given to Athens. But Æschines, when accusing the Lokrians,—on a matter of which he had given no notice, and which it first crossed his mind to mention at the moment when he made his speech[1038]—found these Amphiktyons so inflammable in their religious antipathies, that they forthwith call out and head the Delphian mob armed with pickaxes for demolition. To evoke, from a far-gone and half-forgotten past, the memory of that fierce religious feud, for the purpose of extruding established proprietors, friends and defenders of the temple, from an occupancy wherein they rendered essential service to the numerous visitors of Delphi—to

execute this purpose with brutal violence, creating the maximum of exasperation in the sufferers, endangering the lives of the Amphiktyonic legates, and raising another Sacred War pregnant with calamitous results—this was an amount of mischief such as the bitterest enemy of Greece could hardly have surpassed. The prior imputations of irreligion, thrown out by the Lokrian orator against Athens, may have been futile and malicious; but the retort of Æschines was far worse, extending as well as embittering the poison of pious discord, and plunging the Amphiktyonic assembly in a contest from which there was no exit except by the sword of Philip.

Some comments on this proceeding appeared requisite, partly because it is the only distinct matter known to us, from an actual witness, respecting the Amphiktyonic council—partly from its ruinous consequences, which will presently appear. At first, indeed, these consequences did not manifest themselves; and when Æschines returned to Athens, he told his story to the satisfaction of the people. We may presume that he reported the proceedings at the time in the same manner as he stated them afterwards, in the oration now preserved. The Athenians, indignant at the accusation brought by the Lokrians against Athens, were disposed to take part in that movement of pious enthusiasm which Æschines had kindled on the subject of Kirrha, pursuant to the ancient oath sworn by their forefathers.[1039] So forcibly was the religious point of view of this question thrust upon the public mind, that the opposition of Demosthenes was hardly listened to. He laid open at once the consequences of what had happened, saying—"Æschines, you are bringing war into Attica—an Amphiktyonic war." But his predictions were cried down as allusions or mere manifestations of party feeling against a rival.[1040] Æschines denounced him openly as the hired agent of the impious Lokrians;[1041] a charge sufficiently refuted by the conduct of these Lokrians themselves, who are described by Æschines as gratuitously insulting Athens.

But though the general feeling at Athens, immediately after the return of Æschines, was favorable to his proceedings at Delphi, it did not long continue so. Nor is the change difficult to understand. The first mention of the old oath, and the original devastation of Kirrha, sanctioned by the name and authority of Solon, would naturally turn the Athenian mind into a strong feeling of pious sentiment against the tenants of that accursed spot. But farther information would tend to prove that the Lokrians were more sinned against than sinning; that the occupation of Kirrha as a harbor was a convenience to all Greeks, and most of all to the temple itself; lastly, that the imputations said to have been cast by the Lokrians upon Athens had either never been made at all (so we find Demosthenes affirming), or were nothing worse than an unauthorized burst of ill-temper from some rude individual.—Though Æschines had obtained at first a vote of approbation for his proceedings, yet when his proposition came to be made—that Athens should take part in the special Amphiktyonic meeting convened for punishing the Amphissians—the opposition of Demosthenes was found more effective. Both the Senate, and the public assembly

passed a resolution peremptorily forbidding all interference on the part of Athens at that special meeting. "The Hieromnemon and the Pylagoræ of Athens (so the decree prescribed) shall take no part either in word or deed or resolution, with the persons assembled at that special meeting. They shall visit Delphi and Thermopylæ at the regular times fixed by our forefathers." This important decree marks the change of opinion at Athens. Æschines indeed tells us, that it was only procured by crafty manœuvre on the part of Demosthenes; being hurried through in a thin assembly, at the close of business, when most citizens (and Æschines among them) had gone away. But there is nothing to confirm such insinuations; moreover Æschines, if he had still retained the public sentiment in his favor, could easily have baffled the tricks of his rival.[1042]

The special meeting of Amphiktyons at Thermopylæ accordingly took place, at some time between the two regular periods of spring and autumn. No legates attended from Athens—nor any from Thebes; a fact made known to us by Æschines, and remarkable as evincing an incipient tendency towards concurrence, such as had never existed before, between these two important cities. The remaining legates met, determined to levy a joint force for the purpose of punishing the Amphissians, and chose the president Kottyphus general. According to Æschines, this force was brought together, marched against the Lokrians, and reduced them to submission, but granted to them indulgent terms; requiring from them a fine to the Delphian god, payable at stated intervals—sentencing some of the Lokrian leaders to banishment as having instigated the encroachment on the sacred domain—and recalling others who had opposed it. But the Lokrians (he says), after the force had retired, broke faith, paid nothing, and brought back all the guilty leaders. Demosthenes, on the contrary, states, that Kottyphus summoned contingents from the various Amphiktyonic states; but some never came at all, while those that did come were lukewarm and inefficient; so that the purpose altogether miscarried.[1043] The account of Demosthenes is the more probable of the two: for we know from Æschines himself that neither Athens nor Thebes took part in the proceeding, while Sparta had been excluded from the Amphiktyonic council in 346 B. C. There remained therefore only the secondary and smaller states. Of these, the Peloponnesians, even if inclined, could not easily come, since they could neither march by land through Bœotia, nor come with ease by sea while the Amphissians were masters of the port of Kirrha; and the Thessalians and their neighbors were not likely to take so intense an interest in the enterprize as to carry it through without the rest. Moreover, the party who were only waiting for a pretext to invite the interference of Philip, would rather prefer to do nothing, in order to show how impossible it was to act without him. Hence we may fairly assume that what Æschines represents as indulgent terms granted to the Lokrians and afterwards violated by them, was at best nothing more than a temporary accommodation; concluded because Kottyphus could not do anything—probably did not wish to do anything—without the intervention of Philip.

The next Pylæa, or the autumnal meeting of the Amphiktyons at Thermopylæ, now arrived; yet the Lokrians were still unsubdued. Kottyphus and his party now made the formal proposition to invoke the aid of Philip. "If you do not consent (they told the Amphiktyons[1044]), you must come forward personally in force, subscribe ample funds, and fine all defaulters. Choose which you prefer." The determination of the Amphiktyons was taken to invoke the interference of Philip; appointing him commander of the combined force, and champion of the god, in the new Sacred War, as he had been in the former.

At the autumnal meeting[1045] where this fatal measure of calling in Philip was adopted, legates from Athens were doubtless present (Æschines among them), according to usual custom; for the decree of Demosthenes had enacted that the usual custom should be followed, though it had forbidden the presence of legates at the special or extraordinary meeting. Æschines[1046] was not backward in advocating the application to Philip; nor indeed could he take any other course, consistently with what he had done at the preceding spring meeting. He himself only laments that Athens suffered herself to be deterred, by the corrupt suggestions of Demosthenes, from heading the crusade against Amphissa, when the gods themselves had singled her out for that pious duty.[1047] What part Thebes took in the nomination of Philip, or whether her legates attended at the autumnal Amphiktyonic meeting, we do not know. But it is to be remembered that one of the twelve Amphiktyonic double suffrages now belonged to the Macedonians themselves; while many of the remaining members had become dependent on Macedonia—the Thessalians, Phthiot Achæans, Perrhæbians, Dolopians, Magnetes, etc.[1048] It was probably not very difficult for Kottyphus and Æschines to procure a vote investing Philip with the command. Even those who were not favorable might dread the charge of impiety if they opposed it.

During the spring and summer of this year 339 B. C. (the interval between the two Amphiktyonic meetings), Philip had been engaged in his expedition against the Scythians, and in his battle, while returning, against the Triballi, wherein he received the severe wound already mentioned. His recovery from this wound was completed, when the Amphiktyonic vote, conferring upon him the command, was passed. He readily accepted a mission which his partisans, and probably his bribes, had been mainly concerned in procuring. Immediately collecting his forces, he marched southward through Thessaly and Thermopylæ, proclaiming his purpose of avenging the Delphian god upon the unholy Lokrians of Amphissa. The Amphiktyonic deputies, and the Amphiktyonic contingents in greater or less numbers, accompanied his march. In passing through Thermopylæ, he took Nikæa (one of the towns most essential to the security of the pass) from the Thebans, in whose hands it had remained since his conquest of Phokis in 346 B. C., though with a Macedonian garrison sharing in the occupation.[1049] Not being yet assured of the concurrence of the Thebans in his farther projects, he thought it safer to consign this important town to the Thessalians, who were thoroughly in his dependence.

His march from Thermopylæ whether to Delphi and Amphissa, or into Bœotia, lay through Phokis. That unfortunate territory still continued in the defenceless condition to which it had been condemned by the Amphiktyonic sentence of 346 B. C., without a single fortified town, occupied merely by small dispersed villages and by a population scanty as well as poor. On reaching Elateia, once the principal Phokian town, but now dismantled, Philip halted his army, and began forthwith to reëstablish the walls, converting it into a strong place for permanent military occupation. He at the same time occupied Kytinium,[1050] the principal town in the little territory of Doris, in the upper portion of the valley of the river Kephissus, situated in the short mountain road from Thermopylæ to Amphissa.

The seizure of Elateia by Philip, coupled with his operations for reconstituting it as a permanent military post, was an event of the gravest moment, exciting surprise and uneasiness throughout a large portion of the Grecian world. Hitherto he had proclaimed himself as general acting under the Amphiktyonic vote of nomination, and as on his march simply to vindicate the Delphian god against sacrilegious Lokrians. Had such been his real purpose, however, he would have had no occasion to halt at Elateia, much less to re-fortify and garrison it. Accordingly it now became evident that he meant something different—or at least something ulterior. He himself indeed no longer affected to conceal his real purposes. Sending envoys to Thebes, he announced that he had come to attack the Athenians, and earnestly invited her coöperation as his ally, against enemies odious to her as well as to himself. But if the Thebans, in spite of an excellent opportunity to crush an ancient foe, should still determine to stand aloof—he claimed of them at least a free passage through Bœotia, that he might invade Attica with his own forces.[1051]

The relations between Athens and Thebes at this moment were altogether unfriendly. There had indeed been no actual armed conflict between them since the conclusion of the Sacred War in 346 B. C. Yet the old sentiment of enmity and jealousy, dating from earlier days and aggravated during that war, still continued unabated. To soften this reciprocal dislike, and to bring about coöperation with Thebes, had always been the aim of some Athenian politicians—Eubulus—Aristophon—and Demosthenes himself, whom Æschines tries to discredit as having been complimented and corrupted by the Thebans.[1052] Nevertheless, in spite of various visits and embassies to Thebes, where a philo-Athenian minority also subsisted, nothing had ever been accomplished.[1053] The enmity still remained, and had been even artificially aggravated (if we are to believe Demosthenes[1054]) during the six months which elapsed since the breaking out of the Amphissian quarrel, by Æschines and the partisans of Philip in both cities.

The ill-will subsisting between Athens and Thebes at the moment when Philip took possession of Elateia, was so acknowledged, that he had good reason for looking upon confederacy of the two against him as impossible.[1055] To enforce the request, that Thebes, already his ally, would continue to act as such at this critical

juncture, he despatched thither envoys not merely Macedonian, but also Thessalian, Dolopian, Phthiot Achæan, Ætolian, and Ænianes—the Amphiktyonic allies who were now accompanying his march.[1056]

If such were the hopes, and the reasonable hopes, of Philip, we may easily understand how intense was the alarm among the Athenians, when they first heard of the occupation of Elateia. Should the Thebans comply, Philip would be in three days on the frontier of Attica; and from the sentiment understood as well as felt to be prevalent, the Athenians could not but anticipate, that free passage, and a Theban reinforcement besides, would be readily granted. Ten years before, Demosthenes himself (in his first Olynthiac) had asserted that the Thebans would gladly join Philip in an attack on Attica.[1057] If such was then the alienation, it had been increasing rather than diminishing ever since. As the march of Philip had hitherto been not merely rapid, but also understood as directed towards Delphi and Amphissa, the Athenians had made no preparations for the defence of their frontier. Neither their families nor their movable property had yet been carried within walls. Nevertheless they had now to expect, within little more than forty-eight hours, an invading army as formidable and desolating as any of those during the Peloponnesian war, under a commander far abler than Archidamus or Agis.[1058]

Though the general history of this important period can be made out only in outline, we are fortunate enough to obtain from Demosthenes a striking narrative, in some detail, of the proceedings at Athens immediately after the news of the capture of Elateia by Philip. It was evening when the messenger arrived, just at the time when the prytanes (or senators of the presiding tribe) were at supper in their official residence. Immediately breaking up their meal, some ran to call the generals whose duty it was to convoke the public assembly, with the trumpeter who gave public notice thereof; so that the Senate and assembly were convoked for the next morning at daybreak. Others bestirred themselves in clearing out the market-place, which was full of booths and stands, for traders selling merchandize. They even set fire to these booths, in their hurry to get the space clear. Such was the excitement and terror throughout the city, that the public assembly was crowded at the earliest dawn, even before the Senate could go through their forms and present themselves for the opening ceremonies. At length the Senate joined the assembly, and the prytanes came forward to announce the news, producing the messenger with his public deposition. The herald then proclaimed the usual words—"Who wishes to speak?" Not a man came forward. He proclaimed it again and again; yet still no one rose.

At length, after a considerable interval of silence, Demosthenes rose to speak. He addressed himself to that alarming conviction which beset the minds of all, though no one had yet given it utterance—that the Thebans were in hearty sympathy with Philip. "Suffer not yourselves (he said) to believe any such thing. If the fact had been so, Philip would have been already on your frontier, without halting at Elateia. He has a large body of partisans at Thebes, procured by fraud and corruption; but he has

not the whole city. There is yet a considerable Theban party, adverse to him and favorable to you. It is for the purpose of emboldening his own partisans in Thebes, overawing his opponents, and thus extorting a positive declaration from the city in his favor—that he is making display of his force at Elateia. And in this he will succeed, unless you, Athenians, shall exert yourselves vigorously and prudently in counteraction. If you, acting on your old aversion towards Thebes, shall now hold aloof, Philip's partisans in the city will become all-powerful, so that the whole Theban force will march along with him against Attica. For your own security, you must shake off these old feelings, however well-grounded—and stand forward for the protection of Thebes, as being in greater danger than yourselves. March forth your entire military strength to the frontier, and thus embolden your partisans in Thebes, to speak out openly against their philippizing opponents who rely upon the army at Elateia. Next, send ten envoys to Thebes; giving them full powers, in conjunction with the generals, to call in your military force whenever they think fit. Let your envoys demand neither concessions nor conditions from the Thebans; let them simply tender the full force of Athens to assist the Thebans in their present straits. If the offer be accepted, you will have secured an ally inestimable for your own safety, while acting with a generosity worthy of Athens; if it be refused, the Thebans will have themselves to blame, and you will at least stand unimpeached on the score of honor as well as of policy."[1059]

The recommendation of Demosthenes, alike wise and generous, was embodied in a decree and adopted by the Athenians without opposition.[1060] Neither Æschines, nor any one else, said a word against it. Demosthenes himself, being named chief of the ten envoys, proceeded forthwith to Thebes; while the military force of Attica was at the same time marched to the frontier.

At Thebes they found the envoys of Philip and his allies, and the philippizing Thebans full of triumph; while the friends of Athens were so dispirited, that the first letters of Demosthenes, sent home immediately on reaching Thebes, were of a gloomy cast.[1061] According to Grecian custom, the two opposing legations were heard in turn before the Theban assembly. Amyntas and Klearchus were the Macedonian envoys, together with the eloquent Byzantine Python, as chief spokesman, and the Thessalians Daochus and Thrasylaus.[1062] Having the first word, as established allies of Thebes, these orators found it an easy theme to denounce Athens, and to support their case by the general tenor of past history since the battle of Leuktra. The Macedonian orator contrasted the perpetual hostility of Athens with the valuable aid furnished to Thebes by Philip, when he rescued her from the Phokians, and confirmed her ascendency over Bœotia. "If (said the orator) Philip had stipulated, before he assisted you against the Phokians, that you should grant him in return a free passage against Attica, you would have gladly acceded. Will you refuse it now, when he has rendered to you the service without stipulation? Either let us pass through to Attica—

or join our march; whereby you will enrich yourself with the plunder of that country, instead of being impoverished by having Bœotia as the seat of war."[1063]

All these topics were so thoroughly in harmony with the previous sentiments of the Thebans, that they must have made a lively impression. How Demosthenes replied to them, we are not permitted to know. His powers of oratory must have been severely tasked; for the preëstablished feeling was all adverse, and he had nothing to work upon, except fear, on the part of Thebes, of too near contact with the Macedonian arms—combined with her gratitude for the spontaneous and unconditional tender of Athens. And even as to fears, the Thebans had only to choose between admitting the Athenian army or that of Philip; a choice in which all presumption was in favor of the latter, as present ally and recent benefactor—against the former, as standing rival and enemy. Such was the result anticipated by the hopes of Philip as well as by the fears of Athens. Yet with all the chances thus against him, Demosthenes carried his point in the Theban assembly; determining them to accept the offered alliance of Athens and to brave the hostility of Philip. He boasts with good reason, of such a diplomatic and oratorical triumph;[1064] by which he not only obtained a powerful ally against Philip, but also—a benefit yet more important—rescued Attica from being overrun by a united Macedonian and Theban army. Justly does the contemporary historian Theopompus extol the unrivalled eloquence whereby Demosthenes kindled in the bosoms of the Thebans a generous flame of Pan-hellenic patriotism. But it was not simply by superior eloquence[1065]—though that doubtless was an essential condition—that his triumph at Thebes was achieved. It was still more owing to the wise and generous offer which he carried with him, and which he had himself prevailed on the Athenians to make—of unconditional alliance without any references to the jealousies and animosities of the past, and on terms even favorable to Thebes, as being mere exposed than Athens in the war against Philip.[1066]

The answer brought back by Demosthenes was cheering. The important alliance, combining Athens and Thebes in defensive war against Philip, had been successfully brought about. The Athenian army, already mustered in Attica, was invited into Bœotia, and marched to Thebes without delay. While a portion of them joined the Theban force at the northern frontier of Bœotia to resist the approach of Philip, the rest were left in quarters at Thebes. And Demosthenes extols not only the kindness with which they were received in private houses, but also their correct and orderly behavior amidst the families and properties of the Thebans; not a single complaint being preferred against them.[1067] The antipathy and jealousy between the two cities seemed effaced in cordial coöperation against the common enemy. Of the cost of the joint operations, on land and sea, two-thirds were undertaken by Athens. The command was shared equally between the allies; and the centre of operations was constituted at Thebes.[1068]

In this as well as in other ways, the dangerous vicinity of Philip, giving increased ascendency to Demosthenes, impressed upon the counsels of Athens a vigor long unknown. The orator prevailed upon his countrymen to suspend the expenditure going on upon the improvement of their docks and the construction of a new arsenal, in order that more money might be devoted to military operations. He also carried a farther point which he had long aimed at accomplishing by indirect means, but always in vain; the conversion of the Theoric Fund to military purposes.[1069] So preponderant was the impression of danger at Athens, that Demosthenes was now able to propose this motion directly, and with success. Of course, he must first have moved to suspend the standing enactment, whereby it was made penal even to submit the motion.

To Philip, meanwhile, the new alliance was a severe disappointment and a serious obstacle. Having calculated on the continued adhesion of Thebes, to which he conceived himself entitled as a return for benefits conferred—and having been doubtless assured by his partisans in the city that they could promise him Theban coöperation against Athens, as soon as he should appear on the frontier with an overawing army—he was disconcerted at the sudden junction of these two powerful cities, unexpected alike by friends and enemies. Henceforward we shall find him hating Thebes, as guilty of desertion and ingratitude, worse than Athens, his manifest enemy.[1070] But having failed in inducing the Thebans to follow his lead against Athens, he thought it expedient again to resume his profession of acting on behalf of the Delphian god against Amphissa,—and to write to his allies in Peloponnesus to come and join him, for this specific purpose. His letters were pressing, often repeated, and implying much embarrassment, according to Demosthenes.[1071] As far as we can judge they do not seem to have produced much effect; nor was it easy for the Peloponnesians to join Philip—either by land, while Bœotia was hostile—or by sea while the Amphissians held Kirrha, and the Athenians had a superior navy.

War was now carried on, in Phokis and on the frontiers of Bœotia, during the autumn and winter of 339-338 B. C. The Athenians and Thebans not only maintained their ground against Philip, but even gained some advantages over him; especially in two engagements—called the battle on the river, and the winter-battle—of which Demosthenes finds room to boast, and which called forth manifestations of rejoicing and sacrifice, when made known at Athens.[1072] To Demosthenes himself, as the chief adviser of the Theban alliance, a wreath of gold was proposed by Demomeles and Hyperides, and decreed by the people; and though a citizen named Diondas impeached the mover for an illegal decree, yet he did not even obtain the fifth part of the suffrages of the Dikastery, and therefore became liable to the fine of one thousand drachms.[1073] Demosthenes was crowned with public proclamation at the Dionysiac festival of March 338 B. C.[1074]

But the most memorable step taken by the Athenians and Thebans, in this joint war against Philip, was that of reconstituting the Phokians as an independent and

self-defending section of the Hellenic name. On the part of the Thebans, hitherto the bitterest enemies of the Phokians, this proceeding evinced adoption of an improved and generous policy, worthy of the Pan-hellenic cause in which they had now embarked. In 346 B. C., the Phokians had been conquered and ruined by the arms of Philip, under condemnation pronounced by the Amphiktyons. Their cities had all been dismantled, and their population distributed in villages, impoverished, or driven into exile. These exiles, many of whom were at Athens, now returned, and the Phokian population were aided by the Athenians and Thebans in reoccupying and securing their towns.[1075] Some indeed of these towns were so small, such as Parapotamii[1076] and others, that it was thought inexpedient to reconstitute them. Their population was transferred to the others, as a means of increased strength. Ambrysus, in the south-western portion of Phokis, was refortified by the Athenians and Thebans with peculiar care and solidity. It was surrounded with a double circle of wall of the black stone of the country; each wall being fifteen feet high and nearly six feet in thickness, with an interval of six feet between the two.[1077] These walls were seen, five centuries afterwards, by the traveller Pausanias, who numbers them among the most solid defensive structures in the ancient world.[1078] Ambrysus was valuable to the Athenians and Thebans as a military position for the defence of Bœotia, inasmuch as it lay on that rough southerly road near the sea, which the Lacedæmonian king Kleombrotus[1079] had forced when he marched from Phokis to the position of Leuktra; eluding Epaminondas and the main Theban force, who were posted to resist him on the more frequented road by Koroneia. Moreover, by occupying the south-western parts of Phokis on the Corinthian Gulf, they prevented the arrival of reinforcements to Philip by sea out of Peloponnesus.

The war in Phokis, prosecuted seemingly upon a large scale and with much activity, between Philip and his allies on one side, and the Athenians and Thebans with their allies on the other—ended with the fatal battle of Chæroneia, fought in August 338 B. C.; having continued about ten months from the time when Philip, after being named general at the Amphiktyonic assembly (about the autumnal equinox), marched southward and occupied Elateia.[1080] But respecting the intermediate events, we are unfortunately without distinct information. We pick up only a few hints and allusions which do not enable us to understand what passed. We cannot make out either the auxiliaries engaged, or the total numbers in the field, on either side. Demosthenes boasts of having procured for Athens as allies, the Eubœans, Achæans, Corinthians, Thebans, Megarians, Leukadians, and Korkyræans—arraying along with the Athenian soldiers not less than fifteen thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry;[1081] and pecuniary contributions besides, to no inconsiderable amount, for the payment of mercenary troops. Whether all these troops fought either in Phokis or at Chæroneia, we cannot determine; we verify the Achæans and the Corinthians.[1082] As far as we can trust Demosthenes, the autumn and winter of 339-338 B. C. was a season of advantages gained by the Athenians and Thebans over Philip, and of rejoicing in their two cities; not without much embarrassment to Philip,

testified by his urgent requisitions of aid from his Peloponnesian allies, with which they did not comply. Demosthenes was the war-minister of the day, exercising greater influence than the generals—deliberating at Thebes in concert with the Bœotarchs—advising and swaying the Theban public assembly as well as the Athenian—and probably in mission to other cities also, for the purpose of pressing military efforts.[1083] The crown bestowed upon him at the Dionysiac festival (March 338 B. C.) marks the pinnacle of his glory and the meridian of his hopes, when there seemed a fair chance of successfully resisting the Macedonian invasion.

Philip had calculated on the positive aid of Thebes; at the very worst, upon her neutrality between him and Athens. That she would cordially join Athens, neither he nor any one else imagined; nor could so improbable a result have been brought about, had not the game of Athens been played with unusual decision and judgment by Demosthenes. Accordingly, when opposed by the unexpected junction of the Theban and Athenian force, it is not wonderful that Philip should have been at first repulsed. Such disadvantages would hardly indeed drive him to send instant propositions of peace;[1084] but they would admonish him to bring up fresh forces, and to renew his invasion during the ensuing spring and summer with means adequate to the known resistance. It seems probable that the full strength of the Macedonian army, now brought to a high excellence of organization after the continued improvements of his twenty years' reign—would be marched into Phokis during the summer of 338 B. C., to put down the most formidable combination of enemies that Philip had ever encountered. His youthful son Alexander, now eighteen years of age, came along with them.

It is among the accusations urged by Æschines against Demosthenes, that in levying mercenary troops, he wrongfully took the public money to pay men who never appeared; and farther, that he placed at the disposal of the Amphissians a large body of ten thousand mercenary troops, thus withdrawing them from the main Athenian and Bœotian army; whereby Philip was enabled to cut to pieces the mercenaries separately, while the entire force, if kept together, could never have been defeated. Æschines affirms that he himself strenuously opposed this separation of forces, the consequences of which were disastrous and discouraging to the whole cause.[1085] It would appear that Philip attacked and took Amphissa. We read of his having deceived the Athenians and Thebans by a false despatch intended to be intercepted; so as to induce them to abandon their guard of the road which led to that place.[1086] The sacred domain was restored, and the Amphissians, or at least such of them as had taken a leading part against Delphi, were banished.[1087]

It was on the seventh day of the month Metageitnion (the second month of the Attic year, corresponding nearly to August) that the allied Grecian army met Philip near Chæroneia; the last Bœotian town on the frontiers of Phokis. He seems to have been now strong enough to attempt to force his way into Bœotia, and is said to have drawn down the allies from a strong position into the plain, by laying waste the

neighboring fields.[1088] His numbers are stated by Diodorus at thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse; he doubtless had with him Thessalians and other allies from Northern Greece; but not a single ally from Peloponnesus. Of the united Greeks opposed to him, the total is not known.[1089] We can therefore make no comparison as to numbers, though the superiority of the Macedonian army in organization is incontestable. The largest Grecian contingents were those of Athens, under Lysikles and Chares—and of Thebes, commanded by Theagenes; there were, besides, Phokians, Achæans, and Corinthians—probably also Eubœans and Megarians. The Lacedæmonians, Messenians, Arcadians, Eleians, and Argeians, took no part in the war.[1090] All of them had doubtless been solicited on both sides; by Demosthenes as well as by the partisans of Philip. But jealousy and fear of Sparta led the last four states rather to look towards Philip as a protector against her—though on this occasion they took no positive part.

The command of the army was shared between the Athenians and Thebans, and its movements determined by the joint decision of their statesmen and generals. As to statesmen, the presence of Demosthenes at least ensured to them sound and patriotic counsel powerfully set forth; as to generals, not one of the three was fit for an emergency so grave and terrible. It was the sad fortune of Greece, that at this crisis of her liberty, when everything was staked on the issue of the campaign, neither an Epaminondas nor an Iphikrates was at hand. Phokion was absent as commander of the Athenian fleet in the Hellespont or the Ægean.[1091] Portents were said to have occurred—oracles, and prophecies, were in circulation—calculated to discourage the Greeks; but Demosthenes, animated by the sight of so numerous an army hearty and combined in defence of Grecian independence, treated all such stories with the same indifference[1092] as Epaminondas had shown before the battle of Leuktra, and accused the Delphian priestess of philippizing. Nay, so confident was he in the result (according to the statement of Æschines), that when Philip, himself apprehensive, was prepared to offer terms of peace, and the Bœotarchs inclined to accept them—Demosthenes alone stood out, denouncing as a traitor any one who should broach the proposition of peace,[1093] and boasting that if the Thebans were afraid, his countrymen the Athenians desired nothing better than a free passage through Bœotia to attack Philip single-handed. This is advanced as an accusation by Æschines; who however himself furnishes the justification of his rival, by intimating that the Bœotarchs were so eager for peace, that they proposed, even before the negotiations had begun, to send home the Athenian soldiers into Attica, in order that deliberations might be taken concerning the peace. We can hardly be surprised that Demosthenes "became out of his mind"[1094] (such is the expression of Æschines) on hearing a proposition so fraught with imprudence. Philip would have gained his point even without a battle, if, by holding out the lure of negotiation for peace, he could have prevailed upon the allied army to disperse. To have united the full force of Athens and Thebes, with other subordinate states, in the same ranks and for the same purpose, was a rare good fortune, not likely to be reproduced, should it once

slip away. And if Demosthenes, by warm or even passionate remonstrance, prevented such premature dispersion, he rendered the valuable service of ensuring to Grecian liberty a full trial of strength under circumstances not unpromising; and at the very worst, a catastrophe worthy and honorable.

In the field of battle near Chæroneia, Philip himself commanded a chosen body of troops on the wing opposed to the Athenians, while his youthful son, Alexander, aided by experienced officers, commanded against the Thebans on the other wing. Respecting the course of the battle, we are scarcely permitted to know anything. It is said to have been so obstinately contested, that for some time the result was doubtful. The Sacred Band of Thebes, who charged in one portion of the Theban phalanx, exhausted all their strength and energy in an unavailing attempt to bear down the stronger phalanx and multiplied pikes opposed to them. The youthful Alexander[1095] here first displayed his great military energy and ability. After a long and murderous struggle, the Theban Sacred Band were all overpowered and perished in their ranks, [1096] while the Theban phalanx was broken and pushed back. Philip on his side was still engaged in undecided conflict with the Athenians, whose first onset is said to have been so impetuous, as to put to flight some of the troops in his army; insomuch that the Athenian general exclaimed in triumph, "Let us pursue them even to Macedonia."[1097] It is farther said that Philip on his side simulated a retreat, for the purpose of inducing them to pursue and to break their order. We read another statement, more likely to be true—that the Athenian hoplites, though full of energy at the first shock, could not endure fatigue and prolonged struggle like the trained veterans in the opposite ranks.[1098] Having steadily repelled them for a considerable time, Philip became emulous on witnessing the success of his son, and redoubled his efforts; so as to break and disperse them. The whole Grecian army was thus put to flight with severe loss.[1099]

The Macedonian phalanx, as armed and organized by Philip, was sixteen deep; less deep than that of the Thebans either at Delium or at Leuktra. It had veteran soldiers of great strength and complete training, in its front ranks; yet probably soldiers hardly superior to the Sacred Band, who formed the Theban front rank. But its great superiority was in the length of the Macedonian pike or sarissa—in the number of these weapons which projected in front of the foremost soldiers—and the long practice of the men to manage this impenetrable array of pikes in an efficient manner. The value of Philip's improved phalanx was attested by his victory at Chæroneia.

But the victory was not gained by the phalanx alone. The military organization of Philip comprised an aggregate of many sorts of troops besides the phalanx; the body-guards, horse as well as foot—the hypaspistæ, or light hoplites—the light cavalry, bowmen, slingers, etc. When we read the military operations of Alexander, three years afterwards, in the very first year of his reign, before he could have made any addition of his own to the force inherited from Philip; and when we see with what efficiency all these various descriptions of troops are employed in the field;[1100] we

may feel assured that Philip both had them near him and employed them at the battle of Chæroneia.

One thousand Athenian citizens perished in this disastrous field; two thousand more fell into the hands of Philip as prisoners.[1101] The Theban loss is said also to have been terrible, as well as the Achæan.[1102] But we do not know the numbers; nor have we any statement of the Macedonian loss. Demosthenes, himself present in the ranks of the hoplites, shared in the flight of his defeated countrymen. He is accused by his political enemies of having behaved with extreme and disgraceful cowardice; but we see plainly from the continued confidence and respect shown to him by the general body of his countrymen, that they cannot have credited the imputation. The two Athenian generals Chares and Lysikles, both escaped from the field. The latter was afterwards publicly accused at Athens by the orator Lykurgus—a citizen highly respected for his integrity and diligence in the management of the finances, and severe in arraigning political delinquents. Lysikles was condemned to death by the Dikastery.[1103] What there was to distinguish his conduct from that of his colleague Chares—who certainly was not condemned, and is not even stated to have been accused—we do not know. The memory of the Theban general Theagenes[1104] also, though he fell in the battle, was assailed by charges of treason.

Unspeakable was the agony at Athens, on the report of this disaster, with a multitude of citizens as yet unknown left on the field or prisoners, and a victorious enemy within three or four days' march of the city. The whole population, even old men, women, and children, were spread about the streets in all the violence of grief and terror, interchanging effusions of distress and sympathy, and questioning every fugitive as he arrived about the safety of their relatives in the battle.[1105] The flower of the citizens of military age had been engaged; and before the extent of loss had been ascertained, it was feared that none except the elders would be left to defend the city. At length the definite loss became known: severe indeed and terrible—yet not a total shipwreck, like that of the army of Nikias in Sicily.

As on that trying occasion, so now: amidst all the distress and alarm, it was not in the Athenian character to despair. The mass of citizens hastened unbidden to form a public assembly,[1106] wherein the most energetic resolutions were taken for defence. Decrees were passed enjoining every one to carry his family and property out of the open country of Attica into the various strongholds; directing the body of the senators, who by general rule were exempt from military service, to march down in arms to Peiræus, and put that harbor in condition to stand a siege; placing every man without exception at the disposal of the generals, as a soldier for defence, and imposing the penalties of treason on every one who fled;[1107] enfranchising all slaves fit for bearing arms, granting the citizenship to metics under the same circumstances, and restoring to the full privilege of citizens those who had been disfranchised by judicial sentence.[1108] This last-mentioned decree was proposed by Hyperides; but several others were moved by Demosthenes, who, notwithstanding the late

misfortune of the Athenian arms, was listened to with undiminished respect and confidence. The general measures requisite for strengthening the walls, opening ditches, distributing military posts and constructing earthwork, were decreed on his motion; and he seems to have been named member of a special Board for superintending the fortifications.[1109] Not only he, but also most of the conspicuous citizens and habitual speakers in the assembly, came forward with large private contributions to meet the pressing wants of the moment.[1110] Every man in the city lent a hand to make good the defective points in the fortification. Materials were obtained by felling the trees near the city, and even by taking stones from the adjacent sepulchres[1111] —as had been done after the Persian war when the walls were built under the contrivance of Themistokles.[1112] The temples were stripped of the arms suspended within them, for the purpose of equipping unarmed citizens.[1113] By such earnest and unanimous efforts, the defences of the city and of Peiræus were soon materially improved. At sea Athens had nothing to fear. Her powerful naval force was untouched, and her superiority to Philip on that element incontestable. Envoys were sent to Trœzen, Epidaurus, Andros, Keos, and other places, to solicit aid, and collect money; in one or other of which embassies Demosthenes served, after he had provided for the immediate exigencies of defence.[1114]

What was the immediate result of these applications to other cities, we do not know. But the effect produced upon some of these Ægean islands by the reported prostration of Athens, is remarkable. An Athenian citizen named Leokrates, instead of staying at Athens to join in the defence, listened only to a disgraceful timidity,[1115] and fled forthwith from Peiræus with his family and property. He hastened to Rhodes, where he circulated the false news that Athens was already taken and the Peiræus under siege. Immediately on hearing this intelligence, and believing it to be true, the Rhodians with their triremes began a cruise to seize the merchant-vessels at sea.[1116] Hence we learn, indirectly, that the Athenian naval power constituted the standing protection for these merchant vessels; insomuch that so soon as that protection was removed, armed cruisers began to prey upon them from various islands in the Ægean.

Such were the precautions taken at Athens after this fatal day. But Athens lay at a distance of three or four days' march from the field of Chæroneia; while Thebes, being much nearer, bore the first attack of Philip. Of the behavior of that prince after his victory, we have contradictory statements. According to one account, he indulged in the most insulting and licentious exultation on the field of battle, jesting especially on the oratory and motions of Demosthenes; a temper, from which he was brought round by the courageous reproof of Demades, then his prisoner as one of the Athenian hoplites.[1117] At first he even refused to grant permission to inter the slain, when the herald came from Lebadeia to make the customary demand.[1118] According to another account, the demeanor of Philip towards the defeated Athenians was gentle and forbearing.[1119] However the fact may have stood as to his first manifes-

tations, it is certain that his positive measures were harsh towards Thebes and lenient towards Athens. He sold the Theban captives into slavery; he is said also to have exacted a price for the liberty granted to bury the Theban slain—which liberty, according to Grecian custom, was never refused and certainly never sold, by the victor. Whether Thebes made any farther resistance, or stood a siege, we do not know. But presently the city fell into Philip's power, who put to death several of the leading citizens, banished others, and confiscated the property of both. A council of Three Hundred—composed of philippizing Thebans, for the most part just recalled from exile—was invested with the government of the city, and with powers of life and death over every one.[1120] The state of Thebes became much the same as it had been when the Spartan Phœbidas, in concert with the Theban party headed by Leontiades, surprised the Kadmeia. A Macedonian garrison was now placed in the Kadmeia, as a Spartan garrison had been placed then. Supported by this garrison, the philippizing Thebans were uncontrolled masters of the city; with full power, and no reluctance, to gratify their political antipathies. At the same time, Philip restored the minor Bœotian towns—Orchomenus, and Platæa, probably also Thespiæ and Koroneia—to the condition of free communities instead of subjection to Thebes.[1121]

At Athens also, the philippizing orators raised their voices loudly and confidently, denouncing Demosthenes and his policy. New speakers,[1122] who would hardly have come forward before, were now put up against him. The accusations however altogether failed; the people continued to trust him, omitting no measure of defence which he suggested. Æschines, who had before disclaimed all connection with Philip, now altered his tone, and made boast of the ties of friendship and hospitality subsisting between that prince and himself.[1123] He tendered his services to go as envoy to the Macedonian camp; whither he appears to have been sent, doubtless with others, perhaps with Xenokrates and Phokion.[1124] Among them was Demades also, having been just released from his captivity. Either by the persuasions of Demades, or by a change in his own dispositions, Philip had now become inclined to treat with Athens on favorable terms. The bodies of the slain Athenians were burned by the victors, and their ashes collected to be carried to Athens; though the formal application of the herald to the same effect, had been previously refused.[1125] Æschines (according to the assertion of Demosthenes) took part as a sympathizing guest in the banquet and festivities whereby Philip celebrated his triumph over Grecian liberty.[1126] At length Demades with the other envoys returned to Athens, reporting the consent of Philip to conclude peace, to give back the numerous prisoners in his hands, and also to transfer Oropus from the Thebans to Athens.

Demades proposed the conclusion of peace to the Athenian assembly, by whom it was readily decreed. To escape invasion and siege by the Macedonian army, was doubtless an unspeakable relief; while the recovery of the two thousand prisoners without ransom, was an acquisition of great importance, not merely to the city collectively, but to the sympathies of numerous relatives. Lastly, to regain Oropus—a

possession which they had once enjoyed, and for which they had long wrangled with the Thebans—was a farther cause of satisfaction. Such conditions were doubtless acceptable at Athens. But there was a submission to be made on the other side, which to the contemporaries of Perikles would have seemed intolerable, even as the price of averted invasion or recovered captives. The Athenians were required to acknowledge the exaltation of Philip to the headship of the Grecian world, and to promote the like acknowledgment by all other Greeks, in a congress to be speedily convened. They were to renounce all pretensions of headship, not only for themselves, but for every other Grecian state; to recognize not Sparta or Thebes, but the king of Macedon, as Pan-hellenic chief; to acquiesce in the transition of Greece from the position of a free, self-determining, political aggregate, into a provincial dependency of the kings of Pella and Ægæ. It is not easy to conceive a more terrible shock to that traditional sentiment of pride and patriotism, inherited from forefathers, who, after repelling and worsting the Persians, had first organized the maritime Greeks into a confederacy running parallel with and supplementary to the non-maritime Greeks allied with Sparta; thus keeping out foreign dominion and casting the Grecian world into a system founded on native sympathies and free government. Such traditional sentiment, though it no longer governed the character of the Athenians or impressed upon them motives of action, had still a strong hold upon their imagination and memory, where it had been constantly kept alive by the eloquence of Demosthenes and others. The peace of Demades, recognizing Philip as chief of Greece, was a renunciation of all this proud historical past, and the acceptance of a new and degraded position, for Athens as well as for Greece generally.

Polybius praises the generosity of Philip in granting such favorable terms, and even affirms, not very accurately, that he secured thereby the steady gratitude and attachment of the Athenians.[1127] But Philip would have gained nothing by killing his prisoners; not to mention that he would have provoked an implacable spirit of revenge among the Athenians. By selling his prisoners for slaves he would have gained something, but by the use actually made of them he gained more. The recognition of his Hellenic supremacy by Athens was the capital step for the prosecution of his objects. It ensured him against dissentients among the remaining Grecian states, whose adhesion had not yet been made certain, and who might possibly have stood out against a proposition so novel and so anti-Hellenic, had Athens set them the example. Moreover, if Philip had not purchased the recognition of Athens in this way, he might have failed in trying to extort it by force. For though, being master of the field, he could lay waste Attica with impunity, and even establish a permanent fortress in it like Dekeleia—yet the fleet of Athens was as strong as ever, and her preponderance at sea irresistible. Under these circumstances, Athens and Peiræus might have been defended against him, as Byzantium and Perinthus had been, two years before; the Athenian fleet might have obstructed his operations in many ways; and the siege of Athens might have called forth a burst of Hellenic sympathy, such as to embarrass his farther progress. Thebes—an inland city, hated by the other Bœotian cities—was

prostrated by the battle of Chæroneia, and left without any means of successful defence. But the same blow was not absolutely mortal to Athens, united in her population throughout all the area of Attica, and superior at sea. We may see therefore, that—with such difficulties before him if he pushed the Athenians to despair—Philip acted wisely in employing his victory and his prisoners to procure her recognition of his headship. His political game was well-played, now as always; but to the praise of generosity bestowed by Polybius, he has little claim.

Besides the recognition of Philip as chief of Greece, the Athenians, on the motion of Demades, passed various honorary and complimentary votes in his favor; of what precise nature we do not know.[1128] Immediate relief from danger, with the restoration of two thousand captive citizens, were sufficient to render the peace popular at the first moment; moreover, the Athenians, as if conscious of failing resolution and strength, were now entering upon that career of flattery to powerful kings, which we shall hereafter find them pushing to disgraceful extravagance. It was probably during the prevalence of this sentiment, which did not long continue, that the youthful Alexander of Macedon, accompanied by Antipater, paid a visit to Athens.[1129]

Meanwhile the respect enjoyed by Demosthenes among his countrymen was noway lessened. Though his political opponents thought the season favorable for bringing many impeachments against him, none of them proved successful: and when the time came for electing a public orator to deliver the funeral discourse at the obsequies celebrated for the slain at Chæroneia—he was invested with that solemn duty, not only in preference to Æschines, who was put up in competition, but also to Demades the recent mover of the peace[1130]—and honored with strong marks of esteem and sympathy from the surviving relatives of these gallant citizens. Moreover it farther appears that Demosthenes was continued in an important financial post as one of the joint managers of the Theôric Fund, and as member of a Board for purchasing corn; he was also continued, or shortly afterwards re-appointed, superintendent of the walls and defences of the city. The orator Hyperides, the political coadjutor of Demosthenes, was impeached by Aristogeiton under the Graphê Paranomon, for his illegal and unconstitutional decree (proposed under the immediate terror of the defeat at Chæroneia), to grant manumission to the slaves, citizenship to metics, and restoration of citizenship to those who had been disfranchised by judicial sentence. The occurrence of peace had removed all necessity for acting upon this decree; nevertheless an impeachment was entered and brought against its mover. Hyperides, unable to deny its illegality, placed his defence on the true and obvious ground—"The Macedonian arms (he said) darkened my vision. It was not I who moved the decree; it was the battle of Chæroneia."[1131] The substantive defence was admitted by the Dikastery; while the bold oratorical turn attracted notice from rhetorical critics.

Having thus subjugated and garrisoned Thebes—having reconstituted the anti-Theban cities in Bœotia—having constrained Athens to submission and dependent al-

liance—and having established a garrison in Ambrakia, at the same time mastering Akarnania, and banishing the leading Akarnanians who were opposed to him—Philip next proceeded to carry his arms into Peloponnesus. He found little positive resistance anywhere, except in the territory of Sparta. The Corinthians, Argeians, Messenians, Eleians, and many Arcadians, all submitted to his dominion; some even courted his alliance, from fear and antipathy against Sparta. Philip invaded Laconia with an army too powerful for the Spartans to resist in the field. He laid waste the country, and took some detached posts; but he did not take, nor do we know that he even attacked, Sparta itself. The Spartans could not resist; yet would they neither submit, nor ask for peace. It appears that Philip cut down their territory and narrowed their boundaries on all the three sides; towards Argos, Messênê, and Megalopolis.[1132] We have no precise account of the details of his proceedings; but it is clear that he did just what seemed to him good, and that the governments of all the Peloponnesian cities came into the hands of his partisans. Sparta was the only city which stood out against him; maintaining her ancient freedom and dignity, under circumstances of feebleness and humiliation, with more unshaken resolution than Athens.

Philip next proceeded to convene a congress of Grecian cities at Corinth. He here announced himself as resolved on an expedition against the Persian king, for the purpose both of liberating the Asiatic Greeks, and avenging the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. The general vote of the congress nominated him leader of the united Greeks for this purpose, and decreed a Grecian force to join him, to be formed of contingents furnished by the various cities. The total of the force promised is stated only by Justin, who gives it at two hundred thousand foot, and fifteen thousand horse; an army which Greece certainly could not have furnished, and which we can hardly believe to have been even promised.[1133] The Spartans stood aloof from the congress, continuing to refuse all recognition of the headship of Philip. The Athenians attended and concurred in the vote; which was in fact the next step to carry out the peace made by Demades. They were required to furnish a well-equipped fleet to serve under Philip; and they were at the same time divested of their dignity of chiefs of a maritime confederacy, the islands being enrolled as maritime dependencies of Philip, instead of continuing to send deputies to a synod meeting at Athens.[1134] It appears that Samos was still recognized as belonging to them[1135]—or at least such portion of the island as was occupied by the numerous Athenian kleruchs or out-settlers, first established in the island after the conquest by Timotheus in 365 B. C., and afterwards reinforced. For several years afterwards, the naval force in the dockyards of Athens still continued large and powerful; but her maritime ascendency henceforward disappears.

The Athenians, deeply mortified by such humiliation, were reminded by Phokion that it was a necessary result of the peace which they had accepted on the motion of Demades, and that it was now too late to murmur.[1136] We cannot wonder at their

feelings. Together with the other free cities of Greece, they were enrolled as contributory appendages of the king of Macedon; a revolution, to them more galling than to the rest, since they passed at once, not merely from simple autonomy, but from a condition of superior dignity, into the common dependence. Athens had only to sanction the scheme dictated by Philip and to furnish her quota towards the execution. Moreover, this scheme—the invasion of Persia—had ceased to be an object of genuine aspiration throughout the Grecian world. The Great King, no longer inspiring terror to Greece collectively, might now be regarded as likely to lend protection against Macedonian oppression. To emancipate the Asiatic Greeks from Persian dominion would be in itself an enterprise grateful to Grecian feeling, though all such wishes must have been gradually dying out since the peace of Antalkidas. But emancipation, accomplished by Philip, would be only a transfer of the Asiatic Greeks from Persian dominion to his. The synod of Corinth served no purpose except to harness the Greeks to his car, for a distant enterprise lucrative to his soldiers and suited to his insatiable ambition.

It was in 337 B. C. that this Persian expedition was concerted and resolved. During that year preparations were made of sufficient magnitude to exhaust the finances of Philip;[1137] who was at the same time engaged in military operations, and fought a severe battle against the Illyrian king Pleurias.[1138] In the spring of 336 B. C., a portion of the Macedonian army under Parmenio and Attalus, was sent across to Asia to commence military operations; Philip himself intending speedily to follow.[1139]

Such however was not the fate reserved for him. Not long before, he had taken the resolution of repudiating, on the allegation of infidelity, his wife Olympias; who is said to have become repugnant to him, from the furious and savage impulses of her character. He had successively married several wives, the last of whom was Kleopatra, niece of the Macedonian Attalus. It was at her instance that he is said to have repudiated Olympias; who retired to her brother Alexander of Epirus.[1140] This step provoked violent dissensions among the partisans of the two queens, and even between Philip and his son Alexander, who expressed a strong resentment at the repudiation of his mother. Amidst the intoxication of the marriage banquet, Attalus proposed a toast and prayer, that there might speedily appear a legitimate son, from Philip and Kleopatra, to succeed to the Macedonian throne. Upon which Alexander exclaimed in wrath—"Do you then proclaim *me* as a bastard?"—at the same time hurling a goblet at him. Incensed at this proceeding, Philip started up, drew his sword, and made furiously at his son; but fell to the ground from passion and intoxication. This accident alone preserved the life of Alexander; who retorted—"Here is a man, preparing to cross from Europe into Asia—who yet cannot step surely from one couch to another.[1141]" After this violent quarrel the father and son separated. Alexander conducted his mother into Epirus, and then went himself to the Illyrian king. Some months afterwards, at the instance of the Corinthian Demaratus, Philip sent for him back, and became reconciled to him; but another cause of displeasure

soon arose, because Alexander had opened a negotiation for marriage with the daughter of the satrap of Karia. Rejecting such an alliance as unworthy, Philip sharply reproved his son, and banished from Macedonia several courtiers whom he suspected as intimate with Alexander;[1142] while the friends of Attalus stood high in favor.

Such were the animosities distracting the court and family of Philip. A son had just been born to him from his new wife Kleopatra.[1143] His expedition against Persia, resolved and prepared during the preceding year, had been actually commenced; Parmenio and Attalus having been sent across to Asia with the first division, to be followed presently by himself with the remaining army. But Philip foresaw that during his absence danger might arise from the furious Olympias, bitterly exasperated by the recent events, and instigating her brother Alexander king of Epirus, with whom she was now residing. Philip indeed held a Macedonian garrison in Ambrakia,[1144] the chief Grecian city on the Epirotic border; and he had also contributed much to establish Alexander as prince. But he now deemed it essential to conciliate him still farther, by a special tie of alliance; giving to him in marriage Kleopatra, his daughter by Olympias.[1145] For this marriage, celebrated at Ægæ in Macedonia in August 336 B. C., Philip provided festivals of the utmost cost and splendor, commemorating at the same time the recent birth of his son by Kleopatra.[1146] Banquets, munificent presents, gymnastic and musical matches, tragic exhibitions,[1147] among which Neoptolemus the actor performed in the tragedy of Kinyras, etc. with every species of attraction known to the age—were accumulated, in order to reconcile the dissentient parties in Macedonia, and to render the effect imposing on the minds of the Greeks; who, from every city, sent deputies for congratulation. Statues of the twelve great gods, admirably executed, were carried in solemn procession into the theatre; immediately after them, the statue of Philip himself as a thirteenth god.[1148]

Amidst this festive multitude, however, there were not wanting discontented partisans of Olympias and Alexander, to both of whom the young queen with her newborn child threatened a formidable rivalry. There was also a malcontent yet more dangerous—Pausanias, one of the royal body-guards, a noble youth born in the district called Orestis in Upper Macedonia; who, from causes of offence peculiar to himself, nourished a deadly hatred against Philip. The provocation which he had received is one which we can neither conveniently transcribe, nor indeed accurately make out, amidst discrepancies of statement. It was Attalus, the uncle of the new queen Kleopatra, who had given the provocation, by inflicting upon Pausanias an outrage of the most brutal and revolting character. Even for so monstrous an act, no regular justice could be had in Macedonia, against a powerful man. Pausanias complained to Philip in person. According to one account, Philip put aside the complaint with evasions, and even treated it with ridicule; according to another account, he expressed his displeasure at the act, and tried to console Pausanias by pecuniary presents. But he granted neither redress nor satisfaction to the sentiment of an outraged man.

[1149] Accordingly Pausanias determined to take revenge for himself. Instead of revenging himself on Attalus—who indeed was out of his reach, being at the head of the Macedonian troops in Asia—his wrath fixed upon Philip himself, by whom the demand for redress had been refused. It appears that this turn of sentiment, diverting the appetite for revenge away from the real criminal, was not wholly spontaneous on the part of Pausanias, but was artfully instigated by various party conspirators who wished to destroy Philip. The enemies of Attalus and queen Kleopatra (who herself is said to have treated Pausanias with insult[1150])—being of course also partisans of Olympias and Alexander—were well disposed to make use of the maddened Pausanias as an instrument, and to direct his exasperation against the king. He had poured forth his complaints both to Olympias and to Alexander; the former is said to have worked him up vehemently against her late husband—and even the latter repeated to him a verse out of Euripides, wherein the fierce Medea, deserted by her husband Jason who had married the daughter of the Corinthian king Kreon, vows to include in her revenge the king himself, together with her husband and his new wife.[1151] That the vindictive Olympias would positively spur on Pausanias to assassinate Philip, is highly probable. Respecting Alexander, though he also was accused, there is no sufficient evidence to warrant a similar assertion; but that some among his partisans—men eager to consult his feelings and to ensure his succession—lent their encouragements, appears tolerably well established. A Greek sophist named Hermokrates is also said to have contributed to the deed, though seemingly without intention, by his conversation; and the Persian king (an improbable report) by his gold.[1152]

Unconscious of the plot, Philip was about to enter the theatre, already crowded with spectators. As he approached the door, clothed in a white robe, he felt so exalted with impressions of his own dignity, and so confident in the admiring sympathy of the surrounding multitude, that he advanced both unarmed and unprotected, directing his guards to hold back. At this moment Pausanias, standing near with a Gallic sword concealed under his garment, rushed upon him, thrust the weapon through his body, and killed him. Having accomplished his purpose, the assassin immediately ran off, and tried to reach the gates, where he had previously caused horses to be stationed. Being strong and active, he might have succeeded in effecting his escape—like most of the assassins of Jason of Pheræ[1153] under circumstances very similar—had not his foot stumbled amidst some vine-stocks. The guards and friends of Philip were at first paralyzed with astonishment and consternation. At length however some hastened to assist the dying king; while others rushed in pursuit of Pausanias. Leonnatus and Perdikkas overtook him and slew him immediately.[1154]

In what way, or to what extent, the accomplices of Pausanias lent him aid, we are not permitted to know. It is possible that they may have posted themselves artfully so as to obstruct pursuit, and favor his chance of escape; which would appear extremely small, after a deed of such unmeasured audacity. Three only of the reputed accomplices are known to us by name—three brothers from the Lynkestian district of

Upper Macedonia—Alexander, Heromenes, and Arrhibæus, sons of Æropus;[1155] but it seems that there were others besides. The Lynkestian Alexander—whose father-in-law Antipater was one of the most conspicuous and confidential officers in the service of Philip—belonged to a good family in Macedonia, perhaps even descendants from the ancient family of the princes of Lynkestis.[1156] It was he, who, immediately after Pausanias had assassinated Philip, hastened to salute the prince Alexander as king, helped him to put on his armor, and marched as one of his guards to take possession of the regal palace.[1157]

This "prima vox"[1158] was not simply an omen or presage to Alexander of empire to come, but essentially serviceable to him as a real determining cause or condition. The succession to the Macedonian throne was often disturbed by feud or bloodshed among the members of the regal family; and under the latter circumstances of Philip's reign, such disturbance was peculiarly probable. He had been on bad terms with Alexander, and on still worse terms with Olympias. While banishing persons attached to Alexander, he had lent his ear to Attalus with the partisans of the new queen Kleopatra. Had these latter got the first start after the assassination, they would have organized an opposition to Alexander in favor of the infant prince; which opposition might have had some chances of success, since they had been in favor with the deceased king, and were therefore in possession of many important posts. But the deed of Pausanias took them unprepared, and for the moment paralyzed them; while, before they could recover or take concert, one of the accomplices of the assassin ran to put Alexander in motion without delay. A decisive initiatory movement from him and his friends, at this critical juncture, determined waverers and forestalled opposition. We need not wonder therefore that Alexander, when king, testified extraordinary gratitude and esteem for his Lynkestian namesake; not simply exempting him from the punishment of death inflicted on the other accomplices, but also promoting him to great honors and important military commands. Neither Alexander and Olympias on the one side, nor Attalus and Kleopatra on the other, were personally safe, except by acquiring the succession. It was one of the earliest proceedings of Alexander to send over a special officer to Asia, for the purpose of bringing home Attalus prisoner, or of putting him to death; the last of which was done, seemingly through the coöperation of Parmenio (who was in joint command with Attalus) and his son Philotas.[1159] The unfortunate Kleopatra and her child were both put to death shortly afterwards.[1160] Other persons also were slain, of whom I shall speak farther in describing the reign of Alexander.

We could have wished to learn from some person actually present, the immediate effect produced upon the great miscellaneous crowd in the theatre, when the sudden murder of Philip first became known. Among the Greeks present, there were doubtless many who welcomed it with silent satisfaction, as seeming to reopen for them the door of freedom. One person alone dared to manifest satisfaction; and that one was Olympias.[1161]

Thus perished the destroyer of freedom and independence in the Hellenic world, at the age of forty-six or forty-seven, after a reign of twenty-three years.[1162] Our information about him is signally defective. Neither his means, nor his plans, nor the difficulties which he overcame, nor his interior government, are known to us with exactness or upon contemporary historical authority. But the great results of his reign, and the main lines of his character, stand out incontestably. At his accession, the Macedonian kingdom was a narrow territory round Pella, excluded partially, by independent and powerful Grecian cities, even from the neighboring sea-coast. At his death, Macedonian ascendency was established from the coasts of the Propontis to those of the Ionian Sea, and the Ambrakian, Messenian, and Saronic Gulfs. Within these boundaries, all the cities recognized the supremacy of Philip; except only Sparta, and mountaineers like the Ætolians and others, defended by a rugged home. Good fortune had waited on Philip's steps, with a few rare interruptions;[1163] but it was good fortune crowning the efforts of a rare talent, political and military. Indeed the restless ambition, the indefatigable personal activity and endurance, and the adventurous courage, of Philip, were such as, in a king, suffice almost of themselves to guarantee success, even with abilities much inferior to his. That among the causes of Philip's conquests, one was corruption, employed abundantly to foment discord and purchase partisans among neighbors and enemies—that with winning and agreeable manners, he combined recklessness in false promises, deceit and extortion even towards allies, and unscrupulous perjury when it suited his purpose—this we find affirmed, and there is no reason for disbelieving it.[1164] Such dissolving forces smoothed the way for an efficient and admirable army, organized, and usually commanded, by himself. Its organization adopted and enlarged the best processes of scientific warfare employed by Epaminondas and Iphikrates.[1165] Begun as well as completed by Philip, and bequeathed as an engine ready-made for the conquests of Alexander, it constitutes an epoch in military history. But the more we extol the genius of Philip as a conqueror, formed for successful encroachment and aggrandizement at the expense of all his neighbors—the less can we find room for that mildness and moderation which some authors discover in his character. If, on some occasions of his life, such attributes may fairly be recognized, we have to set against them the destruction of the thirty-two Greek cities in Chalkidikê and the wholesale transportation of reluctant and miserable families from one inhabitancy to another.

Besides his skill as a general and a politician, Philip was no mean proficient in the Grecian accomplishments of rhetoric and letters. The testimony of Æschines as to his effective powers of speaking, though requiring some allowance, is not to be rejected. Isokrates addresses him as a friend of letters and philosophy; a reputation which his choice of Aristotle as instructor of his son Alexander, tends to bear out. Yet in Philip, as in the two Dionysii of Syracuse and other despots, these tastes were not found inconsistent either with the crimes of ambition, or the licenses of inordinate appetite. The contemporary historian Theopompus, a warm admirer of Philip's genius, stigmatizes not only the perfidy, of his public dealings, but also the drunkenness, gambling,

and excesses of all kinds in which he indulged—encouraging the like in those around him. His Macedonian and Grecian body-guard, eight hundred in number, was a troop in which no decent man could live; distinguished indeed for military bravery and aptitude, but sated with plunder, and stained with such shameless treachery, sanguinary rapacity, and unbridled lust, as befitted only Centaurs and Læstrygons.[1166] The number of Philip's mistresses and wives was almost on an Oriental scale;[1167] and the dissensions thus introduced into his court through his offspring by different mothers, were fraught with mischievous consequences.

In appreciating the genius of Philip, we have to appreciate also the parties to whom he stood opposed. His good fortune was nowhere more conspicuous than in the fact, that he fell upon those days of disunion and backwardness in Greece (indicated in the last sentence of Xenophon's Hellenica) when there was neither leading city prepared to keep watch, nor leading general to take command, nor citizen-soldiers willing and ready to endure the hardships of steady service. Philip combated no opponents like Epaminondas, or Agesilaus, or Iphikrates. How different might have been his career, had Epaminondas survived the victory of Mantineia, gained only two years before Philip's accession! To oppose Philip, there needed a man like himself, competent not only to advise and project, but to command in person, to stimulate the zeal of citizen-soldiers, and to set the example of braving danger and fatigue. Unfortunately for Greece, no such leader stood forward. In counsel and speech Demosthenes sufficed for the emergency. Twice before the battle of Chæroneia—at Byzantium and at Thebes—did he signally frustrate Philip's combinations. But he was not formed to take the lead in action, nor was there any one near him to supply the defect. In the field, Philip encountered only that "public inefficiency," at Athens and elsewhere in Greece, of which even Æschines complains;[1168] and to this decay of Grecian energy, not less than to his own distinguished attributes, the unparalleled success of his reign was owing. We shall find during the reign of his son Alexander (to be described in our next volume) the like genius and vigor exhibited on a still larger scale, and achieving still more wonderful results; while the once stirring politics of Greece, after one feeble effort, sink yet lower, into the nullity of a subject-province.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Diodor. xiii. 86-114; xiv. 70; xv. 24. Another pestilence is alluded to by Diodorus in 368 B. C. (Diodor. xv. 73).

Movers notices the intense and frequent sufferings of the ancient Phœnicians, in their own country, from pestilence; and the fearful expiations to which these sufferings gave rise (Die Phönizier, vol. ii. part ii. p. 9).

[2] Diodor. xiv. 78.

[3] Diodor. xiv. 78. Διονύσιος δ᾽ εἰς Μεσσήνην κατῴκισε χιλίους μὲν Λοκροὺς, τετρακισχιλίους δὲ Μεδιμναίους, ἐξακοσίους δὲ τῶν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου Μεσσηνίων, ἔκ τε Ζακύνθου καὶ Ναυπάκτου φευγόντων.

The Medimnæans are completely unknown. Cluverius and Wesseling conjecture *Medmæans*, from Medmæ or Medamæ, noticed by Strabo as a town in the south of Italy. But this supposition cannot be adopted as certain; especially as the total of persons named is so large. The conjecture of Palmerius—Μηθυμναίους—has still less to recommend it. See the note of Wesseling.

[4] Diodor. xiv. 78.

[5] Diodor. xiv. 87.

[6] Diodor. xiv. 78. εἰς τὴν τῶν Σικελῶν χώραν πλεονάκις στρατεύσας, etc. Wesseling shows in his note, that these words, and those which follow must refer to Dionysius.

[7] Diodor. xiv. 87-103.

[8] Diodor. xiv. 8, 87, 106

[9] Diodor. xiv. 88.

[10] Diodor. xiv. 88. μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἀτυχίαν ταύτην, Ἀκραγαντῖνοι καὶ Μεσσνήνιοι τοὺς τὰ Διονυσίου φρονοῦντας μεταστησάμενοι, τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀντείχοντο, καὶ τῆς τοῦ τυράννου συμμαχίας ἀπέστησαν.

It appears to me that the words καὶ Μεσσνήνιοι in this sentence cannot be correct. The Messenians were a new population just established by Dionysius, and relying upon him for protection against Rhegium: moreover they will appear, during the events immediately succeeding, constantly in conjunction with him, and objects of attack by his enemies.

I cannot but think that Diodorus has here inadvertently placed the word Μεσσνήνιοι instead of a name belonging to some other community—what community, we cannot tell.

[11] Diodor. xiv. 90-95.

[12] Diodor. xiii. 113.

[13] Diodor xiv. 90.

[14] Diodor. xiv. 95, 96.

[15] Diodor. xiv. 96.

[16] Livy, iv. 37-44; Strabo, v. p. 243-250. Diodorus (xii. 31-76) places the commencement of the Campanian nation in 438 B. C., and their conquest of Cumæ in 421 B. C. Skylax in his Periplus mentions both Cumæ and Neapolis as in Campania (s. 10.) Thucydides speaks of Cumæ as being ἐν Ὀπικίᾳ (vi. 4).

[17] Strabo, v. p. 246.

[18] Thucydides (vii. 53-57) does not mention *Campanians* (he mentions Tyrrhenians) as serving in the besieging Athenian armament before Syracuse (414-413 B. C.) He does not introduce the name *Campanians* at all; though alluding to Iberian mercenaries as men whom Athens calculated on engaging in her service (vi. 90).

But Diodorus mentions, that eight hundred Campanians were engaged by the Chalkidian cities in Sicily for service with the Athenians under Nikias, and that they had escaped during the disasters of the Athenian army (xiii. 44).

The conquest of Cumæ in 416 B. C. opened to these Campanian Samnites an outlet for hired military service beyond sea. Cumæ being in its Origin Chalkidic, would naturally be in correspondence with the Chalkidic cities in Sicily. This forms the link of connection, which explains to us how the Campanians came into service in 413 B. C. under the Athenian general before Syracuse, and afterwards so frequently under others in Sicily (Diodor. xiii. 62-80, etc.).

[19] Strabo, vi. p. 253, 254. See a valuable section on this subject in Niebuhr, Römisch. Geschichte, vol. i. p. 94-98.

It appears that the Syracusan historian Antiochus made no mention either of Lucanians or of Bruttians, though he enumerated the inhabitants of the exact line of territory afterwards occupied by these two nations. After repeating the statement of Antiochus that this territory was occupied by Italians, Œnotrians, and Chonians, Strabo proceeds to say—Οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἁπλουστέρως εἴρηκε καὶ ἀρχαϊκῶς, οὐδὲν διορίσας περὶ τῶν Λευκανῶν καὶ τῶν Βρεττίων. The German translator Grosskurd understands these words as meaning, that Antiochus "did not distinguish the Lucanians from the Bruttians." But if we read the paragraph through, it will appear, I think, that Strabo means to say, that Antiochus had stated nothing positive respecting either Lucanians or Bruttians. Niebuhr (p. 96 *ut suprà*) affirms that Antiochus represented the Lucanians as having extended themselves as far as Läus; which I cannot find.

The date of Antiochus seems not precisely ascertainable. His work on Sicilian history was carried down from early times to 424 B. C. (Diodor. xii. 71). His silence respecting the Lucanians goes to confirm the belief that the date of their conquest of the territory called Lucania was considerably later than that year.

Polyænus (ii. 10. 2-4) mentions war as carried on by the inhabitants of Thurii, under Kleandridas the father of Gylippus, against the Lucanians. From the age and circumstances of Kleandridas, this can hardly be later than 420 B. C.

[20] Strabo, vi. p. 256. The Periplus of Skylax (s. 12, 13) recognizes Lucania as extending down to Rhegium. The date to which this Periplus refers appears to be about 370-360 B. C.: see an instructive article among Niebuhr's Kleine Schriften, p. 105-130. Skylax does not mention the Bruttians (Klausen, Hekatæus and Skylax, p. 274. Berlin, 1831).

[21] Diodor. xiv. 91-101. Compare Polybius, ii. 39. When Nikias on his way to Sicily, came near to Rhegium and invited the Rhegines to coöperate against Syracuse, the Rhegines declined, replying, ὅ,τι ἂν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἰταλιώταις ξυνδοκῇ, τοῦτο ποιήσειν (Thucyd. vi. 44).

[22] Diodor. xiv. 101.

[23] Diodor. xiv. 100.

[24] Diodor. xiv 100.

[25] Herodot. vi. 21; Strabo, vi. p. 253.

[26] See the description of this mountainous region between the Tarentine Gulf and the Tyrrhenian Sea, in an interesting work by a French General employed in Calabria in 1809—Calabria during a military residence of Three Years, Letters, 17, 18, 19 (translated and published by Effingham Wilson. London, 1832).

[27] Diodor. xiv. 101. βουλόμενοι Λᾶον, πόλιν εὐδαίμονα, πολιορκῆσαι. This appears the true reading: it is an acute conjecture proposed by Niebuhr (Römisch. Geschicht. i. p. 96) in place of the words—βουλόμενοι λαὸν καὶ πόλιν εὐδαίμονα, πολιορκῆσαι.

[28] Diodor. xiv. 102.

[29] Diodor. xiv. 103.

[30] Polybius (i. 6) gives us the true name of this river: Diodorus calls it the river *Helôris*.

[31] Diodor. xiv. 105. παρέδωκαν αὑτοὺς περὶ ὀγδόην ὥραν, ἤδη τὰ σώματα παρείμενοι.

[32] Diodor. xiv. 105. Καὶ πάντων αὐτοῦ ὑποπτευόντων τὸ θηριῶδες, τοὐναντίον ἐφάνη πάντων ἐπιεικέστατος.

[33] Diodor. xiv. 105. καὶ σχεδὸν τοῦτ᾽ ἔδοξε πράττειν ἐν τῷ ζῆν κάλλιστον. Strabo, vi. p. 261.

[34] Diodor. xiv. 106. καὶ παρακαλέσαι μηδὲν περὶ αὐτῶν ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον βουλεύεσθαι.

[35] Diodor. xiv. 106.

[36] Diodor. xiv. 106, 107.

[37] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 332 D. Διονύσιος δὲ εἰς μίαν πόλιν ἀθροίσας πᾶσαν Σικελίαν ὑπὸ σοφίας, etc.

[38] Diodor. xiv. 107, 108. Polyænus relates this stratagem of Dionysius about the provisions, as if it had been practised at the siege of Himera, and not of Rhegium (Polyæn. v. 3, 10).

[39] Diodor. xiv. 112. Ὁ δὲ Φύτων, κατὰ τὴν πολιορκίαν στρατηγὸς ἀγαθὸς γεγενημένος, καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ἐπαινούμενος, οὐκ ἀγεννῶς ὑπέμενε τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς τελευτῆς τιμωρίαν· ἀλλ᾽ ἀκατάπληκτον τὴν ψυχὴν φυλάξας, καὶ βοῶν, ὅτι τὴν πόλιν οὐ βουληθεὶς προδοῦναι Διονυσίῳ τυγχάνει τῆς τιμωρίας, ἣν αὐτῷ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐκείνῳ συντόμως ἐπιστήσει· ὥστε τὴν ἀρετὴν τάνδρὸς καὶ παρὰ τοῖς στρατιώταις τοῦ Διονυσίου κατελεεῖσθαι, καί τινας ἤδη θορυβεῖν. Ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος, εὐλαβηθεὶς μή τινες τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀποτολμήσωσιν ἐξαρπάζειν τὸν Φύτωνα, παυσάμενος τῆς τιμωρίας, κατεπόντωσε τὸν ἀτυχῆ μετὰ τῆς συγγενείας. Οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἀναξίως τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκνόμοις περιέπεσε τιμωρίαις, καὶ πολλοὺς ἔσχε καὶ τότε τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς ἀλγήσαντας τὴν συμφορὰν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ποιητὰς τοὺς θρηνήσοντας τὸ τῆς περιπετείας ἐλεεινόν.

[40] Strabo, vi. p. 258 ἐπιφανῆ δ᾽ οὖν πόλιν οὖσαν … κατασκάψαι Διονύσιον, etc.

[41] Polybius, ii. 39, 67.

[42] Polybius, i. 6.

[43] Chap. LXXVI. Vol. X.

[44] Livy has preserved the mention of this important acquisition of Dionysius (xxiv. 3).

"Sed arx Crotonis, unâ parte imminens mari, alterâ vergente in agrum, situ tantum naturali quondam munita, postea et muro cincta est, quâ per aversas rupes ab Dionysio Siciliæ tyranno per dolum fuerat capta."

Justin also (xx. 5) mentions the attack of Dionysius upon Kroton.

We may, with tolerable certainty, refer the capture to the present part of the career of Dionysius.

See also Ælian, V. H. xii. 61.

[45] Aristotel. Auscult. Mirab. s. 96; Athenæus, xii. p. 541; Diodor. xiv. 77.

Polemon specified this costly robe, in his work Περὶ τῶν ἐν Καρχηδόνι Πέπλων….

[46] Strabo, vi. p. 261.

[47] Strabo, v. p. 241. It would seem that the two maritime towns, said to have been founded on the coast of Apulia on the Adriatic by Dionysius the *younger* during the first years of his reign—according to Diodorus (xvi. 5)—must have been really founded by the *elder* Dionysius, near about the time to which we have now reached.

[48] Diodor. xv. 13, 14.

[49] Diodor. xv. 14; Strabo, v. p. 226; Servius ad Virgil. Æneid. x. 184.

[50] Justin, xx. 5; Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 1, 20.

[51] See Pseudo-Aristotel. Œconomic. ii. 20-41; Cicero, De Natur. Deor. iii. 34, 82, 85: in which passages, however, there must be several incorrect assertions as to the actual temples pillaged; for Dionysius could not have been in Peloponnesus to rob the temple of Zeus at *Olympia*, or of Æsculapius at *Epidaurus*.

Athenæus (xv. p. 693) recounts an anecdote that Dionysius plundered the temple of Æsculapius at *Syracuse* of a valuable golden table; which is far more probable.

[52] Diodor. xv. 74. See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fast. Hellen. ad ann. 367 B. C.

[53] See a different version of the story about Philoxenus in Plutarch, De Fortun. Alexand. Magni, p. 334 C.

[54] Diodor. xiv. 109; xv. 6.

[55] See Vol. VII. of this History, Ch. LV. p. 57 *seqq.*

[56] See above, in this work, Vol. X. Ch. LXXVII. p. 76. I have already noticed the peculiarity of this Olympic festival of 384 B. C., in reference to the position and sentiment of the Greeks in Peloponnesus and Asia. I am now obliged to notice it again, in reference to the Greeks of Sicily and Italy—especially to Dionysius.

[57] Diodor. xv. 14. Παρὰ δ᾽ Ἠλείοις Ὀλυμπιὰς ἤχθη ἐννενηκοστὴ ἐννάτη (B. C. 384), καθ᾽ ἣν ἐνίκα στάδιον Δίκων Συρακούσιος.

Pausanias, vi. 3, 5. Δίκων δὲ ὁ Καλλιμβρότου πέντε μὲν Πυθοῖ δρόμου νίκας, τρεῖς δὲ ἀνείλετο Ἰσθμίων, τέσσαρας δὲ ἐν Νεμέᾳ, καὶ Ὀλυμπιακὰς μίαν μὲν ἐν παισὶ, δύο δὲ ἄλλας ἀνδρῶν· καὶ οἱ καὶ ἀνδριάντες ἴσοι ταῖς νίκαις εἰσὶν ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ· παιδὶ μὲν δὴ ὄντι αὐτῷ Καυλωνιάτῃ, καθάπερ γε καὶ ἦν, ὑπῆρξεν ἀναγορευθῆναι· τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τούτου Συρακούσιον αὐτὸν ἀνηγόρευσεν ἐπὶ χρήμασι.

Pausanias here states, that Dikon received a bribe to permit himself to be proclaimed as a Syracusan, and not as a Kauloniate. Such corruption did occasionally take place (compare another case of similar bribery, attempted by Syracusan envoys, Pausan. vi. 2, 4), prompted by the vanity of the Grecian cities to appropriate to themselves the celebrity of a distinguished victor at Olympia. But in this instance, the blame imputed to Dikon is more than he deserves. Kaulonia had been already depopulated and incorporated with Lokri; the inhabitants being taken away to Syracuse and made Syracusan citizens (Diodor. xiv. 106). Dikon therefore could not have been proclaimed a Kauloniate, even had he desired it—when the city of Kaulonia no longer existed. The city was indeed afterwards reëstablished; and this circumstance doubtless contributed to mislead Pausanias, who does not seem to have been aware of its temporary subversion by Dionysius.

[58] Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysâ, p. 452, Reisk.

[59] Lysias, Fragm. Orat. 33. ap. Dionys. Hal. p. 521. ὁρῶν οὕτως αἰσχρῶς διακειμένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν αὐτῆς ὄντα ὑπὸ τῷ βαρβάρῳ, πολλὰς δὲ πόλεις ὑπὸ τυράννων ἀναστάτους γεγενημένας.

[60] Lysias, Fr. Or. 33. *l. c.* Ἐπίστασθε δὲ, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῶν κρατούντων τῆς θαλάττης, τῶν δὲ χρημάτων βασιλεὺς ταμίας· τὰ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων σώματα τῶν δαπανᾶσθαι δυναμένων· ναῦς δὲ πολλὰς αὐτὸς κέκτηται, πολλὰς δ᾽ ὁ τύραννος τῆς Σικελίας.

[61] Lysias, Orat. Frag. *l. c.* Θαυμάζω δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους πάντων μάλιστα, τίνι ποτε γνώμῃ χρώμενοι, καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν, ἡγεμόνες ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐκ ἀδίκως, etc.

Οὐ γὰρ ἀλλοτρίας δεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς νομίζειν ἀλλ᾽ οἰκείας· οὐδ᾽ ἀναμεῖναι, ἕως ἂν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς αἱ δυνάμεις ἀμφοτέρων ἔλθωσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἕως ἔτι ἔξεστι, τὴν τούτων ὕβριν κωλῦσαι.

I give in the text the principal points of what remains out of this discourse of Lysias, without confining myself to the words.

[62] Diodor. xv. 23. οἱ μέγιστοι τῶν τότε δυναστῶν, etc.

[63] Diodor. xv. 13.

[64] Isokrates holds similar language, both about the destructive conquests of Dionysius, and the past sufferings and present danger of Hellas, in his Orat. IV. (Panegyric.) composed about 380 B. C., and (probably enough) read at the Olympic festival of that year (s. 197). ἴσως δ᾽ ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς εὐηθείας πολλοὶ καταγελάσειαν, εἰ δυστυχίας ἀνδρῶν ὀδυροίμην ἐν τοιούτοις καιροῖς, ἐν οἷς Ἰταλία μὲν ἀνάστατος γέγονε, Σικελία δὲ καταδεδούλωται (compare s. 145), τοσαῦται δὲ πόλεις τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐκδέδονται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μέρη τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις ἐστίν.

Isokrates had addressed a letter to the elder Dionysius. He alludes briefly to it in his Orat. ad Philippum (Orat. v. s. 93), in terms which appear to indicate that it was bold and plain spoken (θρασύτερον τῶν ἄλλων). The first letter, among the ten ascribed to Isokrates, purports to be a letter to Dionysius; but it seems rather (to judge by the last words) to be the preface of a letter about to follow. Nothing distinct can be made out from it as it now stands.

[65] Strabo, v. p. 212.

[66] Dionys. Hal. p. 519. Jud. de Lysiâ. Ἐστὶ δή τις αὐτῷ πανηγυρικὸς λόγος, ἐν ᾧ πείθει τοὺς Ἕλληνας … ἐκβάλλειν Διονύσιον τὸν τύραννον τῆς ἀρχῆς, καὶ Σικελίαν ἐλευθερῶσαι, ἄρξασθαί τε τῆς ἐχθρᾶς αὐτίκα μάλα, διαρπάσαντας τὴν τοῦ τυράννου σκηνὴν χρυσῷ τε καὶ πορφύρᾳ καὶ ἄλλῳ πλούτῳ πολλῷ κεκοσμημένην, etc.

Diodor. xiv. 109. Λυσίας … προετρέπετο τὰ πλήθη μὴ προσδέχεσθαι τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἀγῶσι τοὺς ἐξ ἀσεβεστάτης τυραννίδος ἀπεσταλμένους θεωρούς.

Compare Plutarch Vit. x. Orator, p. 836 D.

[67] Diodor. xiv. 109. ὥστε τινὰς τολμῆσαι διαρπάζειν τὰς σκηνάς.

[68] Diodor. xiv. 109.

[69] Diodor. xiv. 109.

[70] Diodor. xv. 7. Ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος, ἀκούσας τὴν τῶν ποιημάτων καταφρόνησιν, ἐνέπεσεν εἰς ὑπερβολὴν λύπης. Ἀεὶ δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ πάθους ἐπίτασιν λαμβάνοντος, μανιωδὴς διάθεσις κάτεσχε τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ, καὶ φθονεῖν αὐτῷ φάσκων ἅπαντας, τοὺς φίλους ὑπώπτευεν ὡς ἐπιβουλεύοντας· καὶ πέρας, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο προῆλθε λύπης καὶ παρακοπῆς, ὥστε τῶν φίλων πολλοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ ψευδέσιν αἰτίαις ἀνελεῖν, οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ καὶ ἐφυγάδευσεν· ἐν οἷς ἦν Φίλιστος καὶ Λεπτίνης ὁ ἀδελφὸς, etc.

[71] For the banishment, and the return of Philistus and Leptinês, compare Diodor. xv. 7, and Plutarch, Dion. c. 11. Probably it was on this occasion that Polyxenus, the brother-in-law of Dionysius, took flight as the only means of preserving his life (Plutarch, Dion. c. 21).

Plutarch mentions the incident which offended Dionysius and caused both Philistus and Leptinês to be banished. Diodorus does not notice this incident; yet it is not irreconcilable with his narrative. Plutarch does not mention the banishment of Leptinês, but only that of Philistus.

On the other hand, he affirms (and Nepos also, Dion. c. 3) that Philistus did not return until after the death of the elder Dionysius, while Diodorus states his return conjointly with that of Leptinês—not indicating any difference of time. Here I follow Plutarch's statement as the more probable.

There is, however, one point which is perplexing. Plutarch (Timoleon, c. 15) animadverts upon a passage in the history of Philistus, wherein that historian had dwelt, with a pathos which Plutarch thinks childish and excessive, upon the melancholy condition of the daughters of Leptinês, "who had fallen from the splendor of a court into a poor and mean condition." How is this reconcilable with the fact stated by Diodorus, that Leptinês was recalled from exile by Dionysius after a short time, taken into favor again, and invested with command at the battle of Kronium, where he was slain? It seems difficult to believe that Philistus could have insisted with so much sympathy upon the privations endured by the daughters of Leptinês, if the exile of the father had lasted only a short time.

[72] In a former chapter of this History (Vol. X. Ch. LXXVII. p. 75), I have already shown grounds, derived from the circumstances of Central Greece and Persia, for referring the discourse of Lysias, just noticed, to Olympiad 99 or 384 B. C. I here add certain additional reasons, derived from what is said about Dionysius, towards the same conclusion.

In xiv. 109, Diodorus describes the events of 388 B. C., the year of Olympiad 98, during which Dionysius was still engaged in war in Italy, besieging Rhegium. He says that Dionysius made unparalleled efforts to send a great display to this festival; a splendid legation, with richly decorated tents, several fine chariots-and-four, and poems to be recited by the best actors. He states that Lysias the orator delivered a strong invective against him, exciting those who heard it to exclude the Syracusan despot from sacrificing, and to plunder the rich tents. He then details how the purposes of Dionysius failed miserably on every point; the fine tents were assailed, the chariots all ran wrong or were broken, the poems were hissed, the ships returning to Syracuse were wrecked, etc. Yet in spite of this accumulation of misfortunes (he tells us) Dionysius was completely soothed by his flatterers (who told him that such envy always followed upon greatness), and did not desist from poetical efforts.

Again, in xv. 6, 7, Diodorus describes the events of 386 B. C. Here he again tells us, that Dionysius, persevering in his poetical occupations, composed verses which were very indifferent—that he was angry with and punished Philoxenus and others who criticized them freely—that he sent some of these compositions to be recited at the Olympic festival, with the best actors and reciters—that the poems, in spite of these advantages, were despised and derided by the Olympic audience—that Dionysius was distressed by this repulse, even to anguish and

madness, and to the various severities and cruelties against his friends which have been already mentioned in my text.

Now upon this we must remark:—

1. The year 386 B. C. is *not* an Olympic year. Accordingly, the proceedings described by Diodorus in xv. 6, 7, all done by Dionysius after his hands were free from war, must be transferred to the next Olympic year, 384 B. C. The year in which Dionysius was so deeply stung by the events of Olympia, must therefore have been 384 B. C., or Olympiad 99 (relating to 388 B. C.).

2. Compare Diodor. xiv. 109 with xv. 7. In the first passage, Dionysius is represented as making the most prodigious efforts to display himself at Olympia in every way, by fine tents, chariots, poems, etc.—and also as having undergone the signal insult from the orator Lysias, with the most disgraceful failure in every way. Yet all this he is described to have borne with tolerable equanimity, being soothed by his flatterers. But, in xv. 7 (relating to 386 B. C., or more probably to 384 B. C.) he is represented as having merely failed in respect to the effect of his poems; nothing whatever being said about display of any other kind, nor about an harangue from Lysias, nor insult to the envoys or the tents. Yet the simple repulse of the poems is on this occasion affirmed to have thrown Dionysius into a paroxysm of sorrow and madness.

Now if the great and insulting treatment, which Diodorus refers to 388 B. C., could be borne patiently by Dionysius—how are we to believe that he was driven mad by the far less striking failure in 384 B. C.? Surely it stands to reason that the violent invective of Lysias and the profound humiliation of Dionysius, are parts of one and the same Olympic phænomenon; the former as cause, or an essential part of the cause—the latter as effect. The facts will then read consistently and in proper harmony. As they now appear in Diodorus, there is no rational explanation of the terrible suffering of Dionysius described in xv. 7; it appears like a comic exaggeration of reality.

3. Again, the prodigious efforts and outlay, which Diodorus affirms Dionysius to have made in 388 B. C. for display at the Olympic games—come just at the time when Dionysius, being in the middle of his Italian war, could hardly have had either leisure or funds to devote so much to the other purpose; whereas at the next Olympic festival, or 384 B. C., he was free from war, and had nothing to divert him from preparing with great efforts all the means of Olympic success.

It appears to me that the facts which Diodorus has stated are nearly all correct, but that he has misdated them, referring to 388 B. C., or Olymp. 98—what properly belongs to 384 B. C., or Olymp. 99. Very possibly Dionysius may have sent one or more chariots to run in the former of the two Olympiads; but his signal efforts, with his insulting failure brought about partly by Lysias, belong to the latter.

Dionysius of Halikarnassus, to whom we owe the citation from the oration of Lysias, does not specify to which of the Olympiads it belongs.

[73] Diodor. xv. 7. διὸ καὶ ποιήματα γράφειν ὑπεστήσατο μετὰ πολλῆς σπουδῆς, καὶ τοὺς ἐν τούτοις δόξαν ἔχοντας μετεπέμπετο, καὶ προτιμῶν αὐτοὺς συνδιέτριβε, καὶ τῶν ποιημάτων ἐπιστάτας καὶ διορθωτὰς εἶχεν.

The Syracusan historian Athanis (or Athenis) had noticed some peculiar phrases which appeared in the verses of Dionysius: see Athenæus, iii. p. 98.

[74] Thucyd. vi. 16. Οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες καὶ ὑπὲρ δύναμιν μείζω ἡμῶν τὴν πόλιν ἐνόμισαν, τῷ ἐμῷ διαπρεπεῖ τῆς Ὀλυμπιάζε θεωρίας (speech of Alkibiadês).

[75] See a striking passage in the discourse called *Archidamus* (Or. vi. s. 111, 112) of Isokrates, in which the Spartans are made to feel keenly their altered position after the defeat of Leuktra: especially the insupportable pain of encountering, when they attended the Olympic festival, slights or disparagement from the spectators, embittered by open taunts from the reëstablished Messenians—instead of the honor and reverence which they had become accustomed to expect.

This may help us to form some estimate of the painful sentiment of Dionysius, when his envoys returned from the Olympic festival of 384 B. C.

[76] There are different statements about the precise year in which Plato was born: see Diogenes Laert. iii. 1-6. The accounts fluctuate between 429 and 428 B. C.; and Hermodorus (ap. Diog. L. iii. 6) appears to have put it in 427 B. C.: see Corsini, Fast. Attic. iii. p. 230; Ast. Platon's Leben, p. 14.

Plato (Epistol. vii. p. 324) states himself to have been about (σχεδὸν) forty years of age when he visited Sicily for the first time. If we accept as the date of his birth 428 B. C., he would be forty years of age in 388 B. C.

It seems improbable that the conversation of Plato with Dion at Syracuse (which was continued sufficiently long to exercise a marked and permanent influence on the character of the latter), and his interviews with Dionysius, should have taken place while Dionysius was carrying on the Italian war or the siege of Rhegium. I think that the date of the interview must be placed after the capture of Rhegium in 387 B. C. And the expression of Plato (given in a letter written more than thirty years afterwards) about his own age, is not to be taken as excluding the supposition that he might have been forty-one or forty-two when he came to Syracuse.

Athenæus (xi. p. 507) mentions the visit of Plato.

[77] Plutarch, Dion. c. 5.

[78] Plutarch, Dion, c. 5; Diodor. xv. 7; Diogen. Laert. iii. 17; Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 2.

[79] Diodor. xiv. 6.3. It was in the construction of these extensive fortifications, seemingly, that Dionysius demolished the chapel which had been erected by the Syracusans in honor of Dioklês (Diodor. xiii. 635).

Serra di Falco (Antichità di Sicilia, vol. iv. p. 107) thinks that Dionysius constructed only the northern wall up the cliff of Epipolæ, not the southern. This latter (in his opinion) was not constructed until the time of Hiero II.

I dissent from him on this point. The passage here referred to in Diodorus affords to my mind sufficient evidence that the elder Dionysius constructed both the southern wall of Epipolæ and the fortification of Neapolis. The same conclusion moreover appears to result from what we read of the proceedings of Dion and Timoleon afterwards.

[80] Diodor. xv. 13.

[81] See Plato, Epist. vii. p. 333, 336—also some striking lines, addressed by the poet Theokritus to Hiero II. despot at Syracuse in the succeeding century: Theokrit. xvi. 75-85.

Dionysius—ἐζήτει λαβεῖν πρόφασιν εὔλογον τοῦ πολέμου, etc.

[82] Diodor. xv. 15.

[83] Diodor. xv. 15.

[84] Diodor. xv. 16, 17.

[85] Diodor. xv. 17.

[86] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 333 A. After reciting the advice which Dion and he had given to Dionysius the younger, he proceeds to say—ἕτοιμον γὰρ εἶναι, τούτων γενομένων, πολὺ μᾶλλον δουλώσασθαι Καρχηδονίους τῆς ἐπὶ Γέλωνος αὐτοῖς γενομένης δουλείας, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ, ὥσπερ νῦν τοὐναντίον, ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ φόρον ἐτάξατο φέρειν τοῖς βαρβάροις, etc.

[87] Diodor. xv. 24.

[88] Strabo, vi. p. 261; Pliny, H. N. iii. 10. The latter calls the isthmus twenty miles broad, and says that Dionysius wished (intercisam) to cut it through: Strabo says that he proposed to wall it across (διατειχίζειν), which is more probable.

[89] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 2, 4, 33; vii i. 20-28. Diodor. xv. 70.

[90] Diodor. xxii. p. 304.

[91] Diodor. xv. 73; xvi. 5.

[92] Diodor. xv. 74.

[93] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 15.

[94] Polyb. xv. 35. Διὸ καὶ Πόπλιον Σκιπίωνά φασι, τὸν πρῶτον καταπολεμήσαντα Καρχηδονίους, ἐρωτηθέντα, τίνας ὑπολαμβάνει πραγματικωτάτους ἄνδρας γεγονέναι καὶ σὺν νῷ τολμηροτάτους, εἰπεῖν, τοὺς περὶ Ἀγαθοκλέα καὶ Διονύσιον τοὺς Σικελιώτας.

[95] Plutarch, Dion, c. 7.

[96] The example of Dionysius—his long career of success and quiet death—is among those cited by Cotta in Cicero (De Nat. Deor. iii. 33, 81, 85) to refute the doctrine of Balbus, as to the providence of the gods and their moral government over human affairs.

[97] Isokratês, Or. v. (Philipp.) s. 73. Διονύσιος … ἐπιθυμήσας μοναρχίας ἀλόγως καὶ μανικῶς, καὶ τολμήσας ἅπαντα πράττειν τὰ φέροντα πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην, etc.

[98] Thucyd. vi. 55. ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πρότερον ξύνηθες, τοῖς μὲν πολίταις φοβερὸν, τοῖς δὲ ἐπικούροις ἀκριβὲς, πολλῷ τῷ περιόντι τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς ἐκράτησε (Hippias).

On the liberality of the elder Dionysius to his mercenaries, see an allusion in Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 348 A.

The extension and improvement of engines for warlike purposes, under Dionysius, was noticed as a sort of epoch (Athenæus, De Machinis ap. Mathemat. Veteres, ed. Paris, p. 3).

[99] Cornelius Nepos, De Regibus, c. 2. "Dionysius prior, et manu fortis, et belli peritus fuit, et, id quod in tyranno non facile reperitur, minime libidinosus, non luxuriosus, non avarus, nullius rei denique cupidus, nisi singularis perpetuique imperii, ob eamque rem crudelis. Nam dum id studuit munire, nullius pepercit vitæ, quem ejus insidiatorem putaret." To the same purpose Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 20.

[100] Aristotel. Politic. v. 9, 5.

[101] Pseudo-Aristotel. Œconomic. ii. c. 21, 42; Cicero, De Nat. Deorum, iii. 34, 83, 84; Valerius Maxim. i. 1.

[102] Plutarch, Dion, c. 28; Plutarch, De Curiositate, p. 523 A; Aristotel. Politic. v. 9, 3. The titles of these spies—αἱ ποταγωγίδες καλούμεναι—as we read in Aristotle; or οἱ ποταγωγεῖς—as we find in Plutarch—may perhaps both be correct.

[103] Cicero in Verrem, v. 55, 143.

[104] Plutarch, De Fortunâ Alexandr. Magni, p. 338 B. What were the crimes of Dionysius which Pausanias had read and describes by the general words Διονυσίου τὰ ἀνοσιώτατα—and which he accuses Philistus of having intentionally omitted in his history—we cannot now tell (Pausan. i. 13, 2: compare Plutarch, Dion, c. 36). An author named Amyntianus, contemporary with Pausanias, and among those perused by Photius (Codex 131), had composed parallel lives of Dionysius and the Emperor Domitian.

[105] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 332 A; Aristotel. Politic. v. 5, 6.

[106] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 332 D. Διονύσιος δὲ εἰς μίαν πόλιν ἀθροίσας πᾶσαν Σικελίαν ὑπὸ σοφίας, πιστεύων οὐδενὶ, μόγις ἐσώθη, etc.

This brief, but significant expression of Plato, attests the excessive mistrust which haunted Dionysius, as a general fact; which is illustrated by the anecdotes of Cicero, Tuscul. Disput. v. 20, 23; and De Officiis, ii. 7; Plutarch, Dion, c. 9; Diodor. xiv. 2.

The well-known anecdote of Damoklês, and the sword which Dionysius caused to be suspended over his head by a horsehair, in the midst of the enjoyments of the banquet, as an illustration how little was the value of grandeur in the midst of terror—is recounted by Cicero.

[107] Plutarch, Dion, c. 3; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 6.

[108] This sentiment, pronounced by Plato, Isokratês, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, etc., is nowhere so forcibly laid out as in the dialogue of Xenophon called *Hiero*—of which indeed it forms the text and theme. Whoever reads this picture of the position of a Grecian τύραννος, will see that it was scarcely possible for a man so placed to be other than a cruel and oppressive ruler.

[109] See the citation from Plato, in a note immediately preceding.

[110] Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 315 E. (to the younger Dionysius). Φασὶ δ᾽ οὐκ ὀλίγοι λέγειν σε πρός τινας τῶν παρά σε πρεσβευόντων, ὡς ἄρα σοῦ ποτὲ λέγοντος ἀκούσας ἐγὼ μέλλοντος τάς τε Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἰκίζειν, καὶ Συρακουσίους ἐπικουφίσαι, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀντὶ τυραννίδος εἰς βασιλείαν μεταστήσαντα, ταῦτ᾽ ἄρα σὲ μέν τοτε διεκώλυσα, σοῦ σφόδρα προθυμουμένου, νῦν δὲ Δίωνα διδάσκοιμι δρᾷν αὐτὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τοῖς διανοήμασι τοῖς σοῖς τὴν σὴν ἀρχὴν ἀφαιρούμεθά σε.

Ibid. p. 319 C. Μή με διάβαλλε λέγων, ὡς οὐκ εἴων σε πόλεις Ἑλληνίδας ἐῤῥούσας ὑπὸ βαρβάρων οἰκίζειν, οὐδὲ Συρακουσίους ἐπικουφίσαι … ὡς ἐγὼ μὲν ἐκέλευον, σὺ δ᾽ οὐκ ἤθελες πράττειν αὐτά.

Again, see Epistol. vii. p. 331 F. 332 B. 334 D. 336 A.-D.—and the brief notice given by Photius (Codex, 93) of the lost historical works of Arrian, respecting Dion and Timoleon.

Epistol. viii. p. 357 A. (What Dion intended to do, had he not been prevented by death)—Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα Σικελίαν ἂν τὴν ἄλλην κατῴκισα, τοὺς μὲν βαρβάρους ἣν νῦν ἔχουσιν ἀφελόμενος, ὅσοι μὴ ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας διεπολέμησαν πρὸς τὴν τυραννίδα, τοὺς δ᾽ ἔμπροσθεν οἰκητὰς τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τόπων εἰς τὰς ἀρχαίας καὶ πατρῴας οἰκήσεις κατοικίσας. Compare Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 2. αἱ δὲ πλεῖσται πόλεις ὑπὸ βαρβάρων μιγάδων καὶ στρατιωτῶν ἀμίσθων κατείχοντο.

The βάρβαροι to whom Plato alludes in this last passage, are not the Carthaginians (none of whom could be expected to come in and fight for the purpose of putting down the despotism at Syracuse), but the Campanian and other mercenaries provided for by the elder Dionysius on the lands of the extruded Greeks. These men would have the strongest interest in upholding the despotism, if the maintenance of their own properties was connected with it. Dion thought it prudent to conciliate this powerful force by promising confirmation of their properties to such of them as would act upon the side of freedom.

[111] Both Diodorus (xvi. 9) and Cornelius Nepos (Dion, c. 5) speak of one hundred thousand foot and ten thousand horse. The former speaks of four hundred ships of war; the latter of five hundred.

The numbers of foot and horse appear evidently exaggerated. Both authors must have copied from the same original; possibly Ephorus.

[112] Plutarch, Dion, c. 6; Theopompus, Fr. 204, ed. Didot. ap. Athenæum, x. p. 435; Diodor. xvi. 6; Cornel. Nepos (Dion, c. 1).

The Scholiast on Plato's fourth Epistle gives information respecting the personal relations and marriages of the elder Dionysius, not wholly agreeing with what is stated in the sixth chapter of Plutarch's Life of Dion.

[113] Plutarch, Dion, c. 3. The age of the younger Dionysius is nowhere positively specified. But in the year 356 B. C.—or 355 B. C., at the latest—he had a son, Apollokratês, old enough to be entrusted with the command of Ortygia, when he himself evacuated it for the first time (Plutarch, Dion, c. 37). We cannot suppose Apollokratês to have been less than sixteen years of age at the moment when he was entrusted with such a function, having his mother and sisters under his charge (c. 50). Apollokratês therefore must have been born at least as early as 372 B. C.; perhaps even earlier. Suppose Dionysius the younger to have been twenty years of age when Apollokratês was born; he would thus be in his twenty-fifth year in the beginning of 367 B. C., when Dionysius the elder died. The expressions of Plato, as to the youth of Dionysius the younger at that juncture, are not unsuitable to such an age.

[114] Aristotel. Polit. v. 5, 6.

[115] Plato Epistol. vii. p. 347 A. Compare the offer of Dion to maintain fifty triremes at his own expense (Plutarch, Dion, c. 6.)

[116] Dion was fifty-five years of age at the time of his death, in the fourth year after his departure from Peloponnesus (Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 10).

His death took place seemingly about 354 B. C. He would thus be born about 408 B. C.

[117] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 326 D. ἐλθόντα δέ με ὁ ταύτῃ λεγόμενος αὖ βίος εὐδαίμων, Ἰταλιωτικῶν τε καὶ Συρακουσίων τραπεζῶν πλήρης, οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἤρεσκε, δίς τε τῆς ἡμέρας ἐμπιμπλάμενον ζῆν καὶ μηδέποτε κοιμώμενον μόνον νύκτωρ, etc.

[118] Cicero, De Finibus, v. 20; De Republic. i. 10. Jamblichus (Vit. Pythagoræ, c. 199) calls Dion a member of the Pythagorean brotherhood, which may be doubted; but his assertion that Dion procured for Plato, though only by means of a large price (one hundred minæ), the possession of a book composed by the Pythagorean Philolaus, seems not improbable. The ancient Pythagoreans wrote nothing. Philolaus (seemingly about contemporary with Sokrates) was the first Pythagorean who left any written memorial. That this book could only be obtained by the intervention of an influential Syracusan—and even by him only for a large price—is easy to believe.

See the instructive Dissertation of Gruppe, Ueber die Fragmente des Archytas und der älteren Pythagoreer, p. 24, 26, 48, etc.

[119] See a remarkable passage, Plato, Epist. vii p. 328 F.

[120] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 335 F. Δίωνα γὰρ ἐγὼ σαφῶς οἶδα, ὡς οἷόν τε περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἄνθρωπον διϊσχυρίζεσθαι, ὅτι τὴν ἀρχὴν εἰ κατέσχεν, ὡς οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐπ᾽ ἄλλο γε σχῆμα τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐτράπετο, ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ—Συρακούσας μὲν πρῶτον, τὴν πατρίδα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ, ἐπεὶ τὴν δουλείαν αὐτῆς ἀπήλλαξε καὶ φαιδρύνας ἐλευθερίῳ ἐν σχήματι κατέστησε, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἂν πάσῃ μηχάνῃ ἐκόσμησε νόμοις τοῖς προσήκουσί τε καὶ ἀρίστοις τοὺς πολίτας—τό τε ἑφεξῆς τούτοις προυθυμεῖτ᾽ ἂν πρᾶξαι, πᾶσαν Σικελίαν κατοικίζειν καὶ ἐλευθέραν ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ποιεῖν, τοὺς μὲν ἐκβάλλων, τοὺς δὲ χειρούμενος ῥᾷον Ἱέρωνος, etc.

Compare the beginning of the same epistle, p. 324 A.

[121] Plato, Epist. iv. p. 320 F. (addressed to Dion). … ὡς οὖν ὑπὸ πάντων ὁρώμενος παρασκευάζου τόν τε Λυκοῦργον ἐκεῖνον ἀρχαῖον ἀποδείξων, καὶ τὸν Κῦρον καὶ εἴτις ἄλλος πώποτε ἔδοξεν ἦθει καὶ πολιτείᾳ διενεγκεῖν, etc.

[122] Plutarch, Kleomenes, c. 2-11.

[123] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 327 A. Δίων μὲν γὰρ δὴ μάλ᾽ εὐμαθὴς ὢν πρός τε τἆλλα, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς τότε ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ λεγομένους λόγους, οὕτως ὀξέως ὑπήκουσε καὶ σφόδρα, ὡς οὐδεὶς πώποτε ὧν ἐγὼ προσέτυχον νέων, καὶ τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον ζῆν ἠθέλησε διαφερόντως τῶν πολλῶν Ἰταλιωτῶν καὶ Σικελιωτῶν, ἀρετὴν περὶ πλείονος ἡδονῆς τῆς τε ἄλλης τρυφῆς ποιούμενος· ὅθεν ἐπαχθέστερον τοῖς περὶ τὰ τυραννικὰ νόμιμα ζῶσιν ἐβίω, μέχρι τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ περὶ Διονύσιον γενομένου.

Plutarch, Dion, c. 4. ὡς πρῶτον ἐγεύσατο λόγου καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἡγεμονικῆς πρὸς ἀρετήν, ἀνεφλέχθη τὴν ψυχὴν, etc.

[124] See the story in Jamblichus (Vit. Pythagoræ, c. 189) of a company of Syracusan troops under Eurymenes the brother of Dion, sent to lay in ambuscade for some Pythagoreans between Tarentum and Metapontum. The story has not the air of truth; but the state of circumstances, which it supposes, illustrates the relation between Dionysius and the cities in the Tarentine Gulf.

[125] Plutarch, Dion, c. 5, 6; Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 1, 2.

[126] Plutarch, Dion, c. 17, 49. Respecting the rarity of the vote of Spartan citizenship, see a remarkable passage of Herodotus, ix. 33-35.

Plutarch states that the Spartans voted their citizenship to Dion during his exile, while he was in Peloponnesus after the year 367 B. C., at enmity with the younger Dionysius then despot of Syracuse; whom (according to Plutarch) the Spartans took the risk of offending, in order that they might testify their extreme admiration for Dion.

I cannot but think that Plutarch is mistaken as to the time of this grant. In and after 367 B. C. the Spartans were under great depression, playing the losing game against Thebes. It is scarcely conceivable that they should be imprudent enough to alienate a valuable ally for the sake of gratuitously honoring an exile whom he hated and had banished. Whereas if we suppose the vote to have been passed during the lifetime of the elder Dionysius, it would count as a compliment to him as well as to Dion, and would thus be an act of political prudence as well as of genuine respect. Plutarch speaks as if he supposed that Dion was never in Peloponnesus until the time of his exile, which is, in my judgment, highly improbable.

[127] Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 2; Plutarch, Dion, c. 6.

[128] Diodor. xv. 74.

[129] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 338 E. Ὁ δὲ οὔτε ἄλλως ἐστὶν ἀφυὴς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μανθάνειν δύναμιν, φιλότιμος δὲ θαυμαστῶς, etc. Compare p. 330 A. p. 328 B.; also Epist. iii. p. 316 C. p. 317 E.

Plutarch, Dion, c. 7-9.

[130] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 332 E. ἐπειδὴ τὰ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτῷ συνεβεβήκει οὕτως ἀνομιλήτῳ μὲν παιδείας, ἀνομιλήτῳ δὲ συνουσιῶν τῶν προσηκουσῶν γεγονέναι, etc.

[131] Plutarch Dion, c. 6.

[132] Plutarch, Dion, c. 7. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Διονύσιος ὑπερφυῶς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ἐθαύμασε καὶ τὴν προθυμίαν ἠγάπησεν.

[133] Dionysius II. was engaged at war at the time when Plato first visited him at Syracuse, within the year immediately after his accession (Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 317 A). We may reasonably presume that this was the war with Carthage.

Compare Diodorus (xvi. 5), who mentions that the younger Dionysius also carried on war for some little time, in a languid manner, against the Lucanians; and that he founded two cities on the coast of Apulia in the Adriatic. I think it probable that these two last-mentioned foundations were acts of Dionysius I., not of Dionysius II. They were not likely to be undertaken by a young prince of backward disposition, at his first accession.

[134] Tacitus, Histor. ii. 49. "Othoni sepulcrum exstructum est, modicum, et mansurum."

A person named Timæus was immortalized as the constructor of the funeral pile: see Athenæus, v. p. 206. Both Göller (Timæi Fragm. 95) and M. Didot (Timæi Fr. 126) have referred this passage to Timæus the historian, and have supposed it to relate to the description given by Timæus of the funeral-pile. But the passage in Athenæus seems to me to indicate Timæus as the *builder*, not the *describer*, of this famous πυρά.

It is he who is meant, probably, in the passage of Cicero (De Naturâ Deor. iii. 35)—(Dionysius) "in suo lectulo mortuus in *Tympanidis rogum illatus est*, eamque potestatem quam ipse per scelus erat nactus, quasi justam et legitimam hereditatis loco filio tradidit." This seems at least the best way of explaining a passage which perplexes the editors: see the note of Davis.

[135] Plutarch (De Exilio. p. 637) and Cornelius Nepos (Dion, c. 3) represent that Philistus was recalled at the persuasion of the enemies of Dion, as a counterpoise and corrective to the ascendency of the latter over Dionysius the younger. Though Philistus afterwards actually performed this part, I doubt whether such was the motive which caused him to be recalled. He seems to have come back *before* the obsequies of Dionysius the elder; that is, very early after the commencement of the new reign. Philistus had described, in his history, these obsequies in a manner so elaborate and copious, that this passage in his work excited the special notice of the ancient critics (see Philisti Fragment. 42, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 34). I venture to think that this proves him to have been *present* at the obsequies; which would of course be very impressive to him, since they were among the first things which he saw after his long exile.

[136] Plutarch, Dion, c. 11. Ταῦτα πολλάκις τοῦ Δίωνος παραινοῦντος, καὶ τῶν λόγων τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἔστιν οὕστινας ὑποσπείροντος, etc.

[137] Plutarch, Dion, c. 10, 11; Plato, Epist. vii. p. 327 C.

[138] Plato, Epist. vii. p. 328 A. p. 335 E.; Plato, Republic, vi. p. 499 C. D.

[139] Plato, Epist. vii. p. 327 E. … Ὃ δὴ καὶ νῦν εἰ διαπράξαιτο ἐν Διονυσίῳ ὡς ἐπεχείρησε, μεγάλας ἐλπίδας εἶχεν, ἄνευ σφαγῶν καὶ θανάτων καὶ τῶν νῦν γεγονότων κακῶν, βίον ἂν εὐδαίμονα καὶ ἀληθινὸν ἐν πάσῃ τῇ χώρᾳ κατασκευάσαι.

[140] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 333 B. Ταὐτὸν πρὸς Δίωνα Συρακόσιοι τότε ἔπαθον, ὅπερ καὶ Διονύσιος, ὅτε αὐτὸν ἐπεχείρει παιδεύσας καὶ θρέψας βασιλέα τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄξιον, οὕτω κοινωνεῖν αὐτῷ τοῦ βίου παντός.

[141] Plato, Epist. vii. p. 327 E.; Plutarch. Dion, c. 11. ἔσχεν ἔρως τὸν Διονύσιον ὀξὺς καὶ περιμανὴς τῶν τε λόγων καὶ τῆς συνουσίας τοῦ Πλάτωνος. Εὐθὺς οὖν Ἀθήναζε πολλὰ μὲν ἐφοίτα γράμματα παρὰ τοῦ Διονυσίου, πολλαὶ δ᾽ ἐπισκήψεις τοῦ Δίωνος, ἄλλαι δ᾽ ἐξ Ἰταλίας παρὰ τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν, etc.

[142] Plato, Epist. vii. p. 328.

[143] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 328. Ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ διανοίᾳ καὶ τόλμῃ ἀπῆρα οἴκοθεν, οὐχ ᾗ τινὲς ἐδόξαζον, ἀλλ᾽ αἰσχυνόμενος μὲν ἐμαυτὸν τὸ μέγιστον, μὴ δόξαιμί ποτε ἐμαυτῷ παντάπασι λόγος μόνον ἀτεχνῶς εἶναί τις, ἔργου δὲ οὐδενὸς ἄν ποτε ἑκὼν ἀνθάψασθαι, κινδυνεύσειν δὲ προδοῦναι πρῶτον μὲν τὴν Δίωνος ξενίαν ἐν κινδύνοις ὄντως γεγονότος οὐ σμικροῖς· εἴτ᾽ οὖν πάθοι τι, εἴτ᾽ ἐκπεσὼν ὑπὸ Διονυσίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐχθρῶν ἔλθοι παρ᾽ ἡμᾶς φεύγων, καὶ ἀνέροιτο, εἰπών, etc.

[144] This is contained in the words οὐχ ᾗ τινὲς ἐδόξαζον—before cited.

[145] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 350 E. ταῦτα εἶπον μεμισηκὼς τὴν περὶ Σικελίαν πλάνην καὶ ἀτυχίαν, etc.

Xenokrates seems to have accompanied Plato to Sicily (Diogen. Laert. iv. 2, 1).

[146] Plutarch, De Adulator, et Amici Discrimine, p. 52 C.

[147] Plutarch, Dion, c. 13. Οὐ παύσῃ καταρώμενος ἡμῖν;

[148] Plutarch, Dion, c. 14. Ἔνιοι δὲ προσεποιοῦντο δυσχεραίνειν, εἰ πρότερον μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ναυτικαῖς καὶ πεζικαῖς δυνάμεσι δεῦρο πλεύσαντες ἀπώλοντο καὶ διεφθάρησαν πρότερον ἢ λαβεῖν Συρακούσας, νυνὶ δὲ δι᾽ ἑνὸς σοφιστοῦ καταλύουσι τὴν Διονυσίου τυραννίδα, etc.

Plato is here described as a *Sophist*, in the language of those who did not like him. Plato, the great authority who is always quoted in disparagement of the persons called *Sophists*, is as much entitled to the name as they, and is called so equally by unfriendly commentators. I drew particular attention to this fact in my sixty-eighth chapter (Vol. VIII.), where I endeavored to show that there was no school, sect, or body of persons distinguished by uniformity of doctrine or practice, properly called *Sophists*, and that the name was common to all literary men or teachers, when spoken of in an unfriendly spirit.

[149] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 330 B. Ἐγὼ δὲ πάντα ὑπέμενον, τὴν πρώτην διάνοιαν φυλάττων ᾗπερ ἀφικόμην, εἴπως εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἔλθοι τῆς φιλοσόφου ζωῆς (Dionysius)—ὁ δ᾽ ἐνίκησεν ἀντιτείνων.

[150] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 332 E. Ἃ δὴ καὶ Διονυσίῳ συνεβουλεύομεν ἐγὼ καὶ Δίων, ἐπειδὴ τὰ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτῷ συνεβεβήκει, οὕτως ἀνομιλήτῳ μὲν παιδείας, ἀνομιλήτῳ δὲ συνουσιῶν τῶν προσηκουσῶν γεγονέναι, πρῶτον ἐπὶ ταῦτα ὁρμήσαντα φίλους ἄλλους αὐτῷ τῶν οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ ἡλικιωτῶν καὶ συμφώνους πρὸς ἀρετὴν κτήσασθαι, μάλιστα δὲ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ, τούτου γὰρ αὐτὸν θαυμαστῶς ἐνδεᾶ γεγονέναι· λέγοντες οὐκ ἐναργῶς οὕτως—οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἀσφαλὲς—ὡς οὕτω μὲν πᾶς ἀνὴρ αὐτόν τε καὶ ἐκείνους ὧν ἂν ἡγεμὼν γένηται σώσει, μὴ ταύτῃ δὲ τραπόμενος τἀναντία πάντα ἀποτελεῖ· πορευθεὶς δὲ ὡς λέγομεν, καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἔμφρονα καὶ σώφρονα ποιησάμενος, εἰ τὰς ἐξηρημωμένας Σικελίας πόλεις κατοικίσειε νόμοις τε ξυνδήσειε καὶ πολιτείαις, etc.

Compare also p. 331 F.

[151] Horat. Satir. ii. 1, 17.

"Haud mihi deero
Cum res ipsa feret. Nisi dextro tempore, Flacci
Verba per attentam non ibunt Cæsaris aurem.
Cui male si palpere, recalcitrat undique tutus."

[152] Plato, Epist. iii. 315 E. Φάσι δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγοι λέγειν σε πρός τινας τῶν παρά σε πρεσβευόντων, ὡς ἄρα σοῦ ποτὲ λέγοντος ἀκούσας ἐγὼ μέλλοντος τάς τε Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἰκίζειν, καὶ Συρακουσίους ἐπικουφίσαι, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀντὶ τυραννίδος εἰς βασιλείαν μεταστήσαντα, ταῦτ᾽ ἄρα σὲ μὲν τότε, ὡς σὺ φῇς, διεκώλυσα—νῦν δὲ Δίωνα διδάσκοιμι δρᾷν αὐτὰ, καὶ τοῖς διανοήμασι τοῖς σοῖς τὴν σὴν ἀρχὴν ἀφαιρούμεθά σε….

Ibid. p. 319 B. εἶπες δὲ καὶ μάλ᾽ ἁπλάστως γελῶν, εἰ μέμνημαι, ὡς Παιδευθέντα με ἐκέλευες ποιεῖν πάντα ταῦτα, ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν. Ἔφην ἐγὼ Κάλλιστα μνημονεῦσαί σε.

Cornelius Nepos (Dion, c. 3) gives to Plato the credit, which belongs altogether to Dion, of having inspired Dionysius with these ideas.

[153] Plutarch, De Adulator, et Amici Discrimine, p. 52 E. We may set against this, however, a passage in one of the other treatises of Plutarch (Philosophand. cum Principibus, p. 779 *ad finem*), in which he observes, that Plato, coming to Sicily with the hope of converting his political doctrines into laws through the agency of Dionysius, found the latter already corrupted by power, unsusceptible of cure, and deaf to admonition.

[154] Plato, Phædon, c. 88. p. 89 D. Οὐκοῦν αἰσχρόν; καὶ δῆλον, ὅτι ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τἀνθρώπεια ὁ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις;

He is expounding the causes and growth of misanthropic dispositions; one of the most striking passages in his dialogues.

[155] Plutarch, Dion, c. 14, Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 333 C. Ὁ δὲ (Dionysius) τοῖς διαβάλλουσι (ἐπίστευε) καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς ἐπιβουλεύων τῇ τυραννίδι Δίων πράττοι πάντα ὅσα ἔπραττεν ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ, ἵνα ὁ μὲν (Diony-

sius) παιδείᾳ δὴ τὸν νοῦν κληθεὶς ἀμελοῖ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπιτρέψας ἐκείνῳ, ὁ δὲ (Dion) σφετερίσαιτο, καὶ Διονύσιον ἐκβάλοι ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς δόλῳ.

[156] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 329 C. ἐλθὼν δὲ, οὐ γὰρ δεῖ μηκύνειν, εὗρον στάσεως τὰ περὶ Διονύσιον μεστὰ ξύμπαντα καὶ διαβολῶν πρὸς τὴν τυραννίδα Δίωνος πέρι· ἤμυνον μὲν οὖν καθ᾽ ὅσον ἠδυνάμην, σμικρὰ δ᾽ οἷός τε ἦ, etc.

[157] The story is found in Plutarch (Dion, c. 14), who refers to Timæus as his authority. It is confirmed in the main by Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 329 D. μηνὶ δὴ σχεδὸν ἴσως τετάρτῳ Δίωνα Διονύσιος, αἰτιώμενος ἐπιβουλεύειν τῇ τυραννίδι, σμικρὸν εἰς πλοῖον ἐμβιβάσας, ἐξέβαλεν ἀτίμως.

Diodorus (xvi. 6) states that Dionysius sought to put Dion to death, and that he only escaped by flight. But the version of Plato and Plutarch is to be preferred.

Justin (xxi. 1, 2) gives an account, different from all, of the reign and proceedings of the younger Dionysius. I cannot imagine what authority he followed. He does not even name Dion.

[158] Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 315 F.; Epist. vii. p. 329 D.; p. 340 A. Plutarch, Dion, c. 15.

[159] Plato, Epist. vii. p. 329, 330.

[160] Plato, Epist. vii. p. 338 C.

[161] Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 317 B. C.

[162] Plato, Epist. vii. p. 338-346; Plutarch, Dion, c. 19. Æschines, the companion of Sokrates along with Plato, is said to have passed a long time at Syracuse with Dionysius, until the expulsion of that despot (Diogen. Laert. ii. 63).

[163] Plutarch, De Fortunâ Alex. Magn. p. 338 B. Δωρίδος ἐκ μητρὸς Φοίβου κοινώμασι βλαστών.

[164] See a passage in Plato, Epistol. ii. p. 314 E.

[165] Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 318 A.; vii. p. 346, 347. Plutarch, Dion, c. 15, 16.

[166] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 15—on the authority of Aristoxenus.

[167] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 350 A. B.

[168] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 350 C. The return of Plato and his first meeting with Dion is said to have excited considerable sensation among the spectators at the festival (Diogenes Laert. iii. 25).

The Olympic festival here alluded to, must be (I conceive) that of 366 B. C.: the same also in Epistol. ii. p. 310 D.

[169] Plutarch, Dion, c. 21; Cornel. Nepos, Dion, c. 4.

[170] Plutarch, Dion, c. 17; Athenæus, xi. p. 508. Plato appears also to have received, when at Athens, pecuniary assistance remitted by Dionysius from Syracuse, towards expenses of a similar kind, as well as towards furnishing a dowry for certain poor nieces. Dion and Dionysius had both aided him (Plato, Epistol. xiii. p. 361).

An author named Onêtor affirmed that Dionysius had given to Plato the prodigious sum of eighty talents; a story obviously exaggerated (Diogenes Laert. iii. 9).

[171] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 350 F.

[172] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 350. This is the account which Plato gives *after* the death of Dion, when affairs had taken a disastrous turn, about the extent of his own interference in the enterprise. But Dionysius supposed him to have been more decided in his countenance of the expedition; and Plato's letter addressed to Dion himself, after the victory of the latter at Syracuse, seems to bear out that supposition.

Compare Epistol. iii. p. 315 E.; iv. p. 320 A.

[173] Plutarch, Dion, c. 22. Eudemus was afterwards slain in one of the combats at Syracuse (Aristotle apud Ciceron. Tusc. Disp. i. 25, 53).

[174] Plutarch, Dion, c. 23-25.

[175] Aristotel. Politic. v. 8, 17.

[176] See Orat. adv. Leptinem, s. 179. p. 506: an oration delivered about two years afterwards; not long after the victory of Dion.

Compare Diodor. xvi. 9; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 2.

[177] Plutarch, Dion, c. 22. Speusippus, from Athens, corresponded both with Dion and with Dionysius at Syracuse; at least there was a correspondence between them, read as genuine by Diogenes Laertius (iv. 1, 2, 5).

[178] Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 318 C.

[179] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 348 B. Οἱ δ᾽ ἐφέροντο εὐθὺς πρὸς τὰ τείχη, παιῶνά τινα ἀναβοήσαντες βάρβαρον καὶ πολεμικόν· οὗ δὴ περιδεὴς Διονύσιος γενόμενος, etc.

[180] Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 318; vii. p. 348, 349.

[181] Plato, Epist. vii. p. 348 A. … ἐπεχείρησεν ὀλιγομισθοτέρους ποιεῖν παρὰ τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἔθη, etc.

[182] Plutarch, Dion, c. 32; Diodor. xvi. 6-16.

[183] Aristotel. Politic. v. 8, 14; Plutarch, Dion, c. 7. These habits must have probably grown upon him since the second departure of Plato, who does not notice them in his letters.

[184] Plutarch, Dion, c. 23. ἀνὴρ παρηκμακὼς ἤδη, etc.

[185] Plutarch, Dion, c. 22; Diodor. xvi. 10.

[186] Thucyd. vii. 50. See Volume VII. of this History, Chap. lx. p. 314.

[187] Plutarch, Dion, c. 24.

[188] Plutarch, Dion, c. 26; Diodor. xvi. 10, 11.

[189] Plutarch, Dion, c. 25.

[190] Thucyd. vi. 104.

[191] Diodor. xvi. 10.

[192] Plutarch, Dion, c. 26, 27; Diodor. xvi. 9.

[193] Plutarch, (Dion, c. 27) gives the numbers who joined him at about five thousand men, which is very credible. Diodorus gives the number exaggerated, at twenty thousand (xvi. 9).

[194] Plutarch, Dion, c. 27. These picturesque details about the march of Dion are the more worthy of notice, as Plutarch had before him the narrative of Timonides, a companion of Dion, and actually engaged in the expedition. Timonides wrote an account of what passed to Speusippus at Athens, doubtless for the information of Plato and their friends in the Academy (Plutarch, Dion, c. 31-35).

Diogenes Laertius mentions also a person named *Simonides* who wrote to Speusippus, τὰς ἱστορίας ἐν αἷς κατατετάχει τὰς πράξεις Διωνός τε καὶ Βίωνος (iv. 1, 5). Probably *Simonides* may be a misnomer for *Timonides*.

Arrian, the author of the Anabasis of Alexander, had written narratives of the exploits both of Dion and Timoleon. Unfortunately these have not been preserved; indeed Photius himself seems never to have seen them (Photius, Codex, 92).

[195] Plutarch, Dion, c. 29. Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ εἰσῆλθεν ὁ Δίων κατὰ τὰς Μενιτίδας πύλας, etc.

Most of the best critics here concur in thinking, that the reading ought to be τὰς Τεμενιτίδας πύλας. The statue and sacred ground of Apollo Temenites was the most remarkable feature in this portion of Syracuse, and would naturally be selected to furnish a name for the gates. No meaning can be assigned for the phrase Μενιτίδας.

[196] Plutarch, Dion, c. 27, 28, 29. Diodorus (xvi. 10) also mentions the striking fact of the wreaths worn by this approaching army.

[197] Plutarch, Dion, c. 27.

[198] Plutarch, De Curiositate, p. 523 A.

[199] Plutarch, Dion. c. 28; Diodor. xvi. 10.

[200] Cicero in Verr. iv. 53. "Altera autem est urbs Syracusis, cui nomen Acradina est: in quâ forum maximum, pulcherrimæ porticus, ornatissimum prytaneum, amplissima est curia, templumque egregium Jovis Olympii; cæteræque urbis partes, *unâ totâ viâ perpetuâ*, multisque transversis, divisæ, privatis ædificiis continentur."

[201] Plutarch, Dion, c. 29: Diodor. xvi. 11. Compare the manifestations of the inhabitants of Skionê towards Brasidas (Thucyd. iv. 121).

[202] Plutarch, Dion, c. 29; Diodor. xvi. 10, 11. The description which Plutarch gives of the position of this sun-dial is distinct, and the harangue which Dion delivered, while standing upon it, is an impressive fact:—Ἦν δ' ὑπὸ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ τὰ πεντάπυλα, Διονυσίου κατασκευάσαντος, ἡλιοτρόπιον καταφανὲς καὶ ὑψηλόν. Ἐπὶ τούτῳ προσβὰς ἐδημηγόρησε, καὶ παρώρμησε τοὺς πολίτας ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας.

The sun-dial was thus *under* the acropolis, that is, in the low ground immediately adjoining to Ortygia; near the place where the elder Dionysius is stated to have placed his large porticos and market-house (Diodor. xiv. 7), and where the younger Dionysius erected the funeral monument to his father (xv. 74). In order to arrive at the sun-dial, Dion must have descended from the height of Achradina. Now Plutarch mentions that Dion *went up* through Achradina (ἀνῄει διὰ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς). It is plain that he must have come down again from Achradina, though Plutarch does not specially mention it. And if he brought his men close under the walls of the enemy's garrison, this can hardly have been for any other reason than that which I have assigned in the text.

Plutarch indicates the separate localities with tolerable clearness, but he does not give a perspicuous description of the whole march. Thus, he says that Dion, "wishing to harangue the people himself, *went up* through Achradina," (Βουλόμενος δὲ καὶ δι' ἑαυτοῦ προσαγορεῦσαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἀνῄει διὰ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς), while the place from which Dion did harangue the people, was *down under* the acropolis of Ortygia.

Diodorus is still less clear about the localities, nor does he say anything about the sun-dial or the exact spot from whence Dion spoke, though he mentions the march of Dion through Achradina.

It seems probable that what Plutarch calls τὰ πεντάπυλα are the same as what Diodorus (xv. 74) indicates in the words ταῖς βασιλικαῖς καλουμέναις πύλαις.

[203] Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 5.

[204] Plutarch, Dion, c. 29.

[205] Plutarch, Dion, c. 29; Diodor. xvi. 12. Plutarch says, τὴν δὲ ἀκρόπολιν ἀπετείχισε—Diodorus is more specific—Τῶν δὲ Συρακοσίων κατεσκευακότων ἐκ θαλάσσης εἰς θάλασσαν διατειχίσματα, etc. These are valuable words as indicating the line and the two terminations of Dion's blockading cross-wall.

[206] Plutarch, Dion, c. 29.

[207] This return of Dionysius, seven days after the coming of Dion, is specified both by Plutarch and Diodorus (Plutarch, Dion, c. 26-29; Diodor. xvi. 11).

[208] Diodor. xvi. 16.

[209] Plutarch, Dion, c. 30. ἐμπλήσας ἀκράτου. It is rare that we read of this proceeding with soldiers in antiquity. Diodor. xvi. 11, 12. τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν.

[210] Diodor. xvi. 12. Ὁ δὲ Δίων ἀνελπίστως παρεσπονδημένος, μετὰ τῶν ἀρίστων στρατιωτῶν ἁπήντα τοῖς πολεμίοις· καὶ συνάψας μάχην, πολὺν ἐποίει φόνον ἐν σταδίῳ. Ὀλίγῳ δὴ διαστήματι, τῆς διατειχίου ἔσω, μάχης οὔσης, συνέδραμε πλῆθος στρατιωτῶν εἰς στένον τόπον.

The text here is not quite clear (see Wesseling's note); but we gather from the passage information about the topography of Syracuse.

[211] Plutarch, Dion, c. 30; Diodor. xvi. 12, 13.

[212] Diodor. xvi. 13.

[213] Diodor. xvi. 16. Plutarch states that Herakleides brought only seven triremes. But the force stated by Diodorus (given in my text) appears more probable. It is difficult otherwise to explain the number of ships which the Syracusans presently appear as possessing. Moreover the great importance, which Herakleides steps into, as opposed to Dion, is more easily accounted for.

[214] Plutarch, Dion, c. 35. About the Athenian seamen in Ortygia, see a remarkable passage of Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 350 A. When Plato was at Syracuse, in danger from the mercenaries, the Athenian seamen, there employed, gave warning to him as their countryman.

[215] Diodor. xvi. 16.

[216] Diodor. xvi. 16.

[217] See a Fragment of the fortieth Book of the Philippica of Theopompus (Theopomp. Fragm. 212, ed. Didot), which seems to refer to this point of time.

[218] Diodor. xvi. 16; Plutarch, Dion, c. 35.

[219] Plato, Epist. iv. p. 321 B. … ἐνθυμοῦ δὲ καὶ ὅτι δοκεῖς τισὶν ἐνδεεστέρως τοῦ προσήκοντος θεραπευτικὸς εἶναι· μὴ οὖν λανθανέτω σε ὅτι διὰ τοῦ ἀρέσκειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὸ πράττειν ἐστίν, ἡ δ᾽ αὐθάδεια ἐρημίᾳ ξύνοικος.

[220] Plutarch, Dion, c. 32.

[221] Plutarch, Dion, c. 33. It would seem that this Herakleides is the person alluded to in the fragment from the fortieth Book of the Philippica of Theopompus (Theop. Fr. 212, ed. Didot):—

Προστάται δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἦσαν τῶν μὲν Συρακουσίων Ἄθηνις καὶ Ἡρακλείδης, τῶν δὲ μισθοφόρων Ἀρχέλαος ὁ Δυμαῖος.

Probably also, Athênis is the same person named as *Athanis* or *Athanas* by Diodorus and Plutarch, (Diodor. xv. 94; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23-37). He wrote a history of Syracusan affairs during the period of Dion and Timoleon, beginning from 362 B. C., and continuing the history of Philistus. See Historicorum Græc. Fragm. ed. Didot, vol. ii. p. 81.

[222] Plutarch, Dion, c. 31.

[223] Plutarch, Dion, c. 32.

[224] Plutarch, Dion, c. 34.

[225] Plutarch, Dion, c. 37; Diodor. xvi. 17.

[226] Plutarch, Dion, c. 37; Diodor. xvi. 17.

[227] Plutarch, Dion, c. 38. θέρους μεσοῦντος, etc.

[228] Plutarch, Dion, c. 38.

[229] Plutarch, Dion, c. 39; Diodor. xvi. 17.

[230] Plutarch, Dion, c. 40.

[231] Plutarch, Dion, c. 41; Diodor. xvi. 18, 19.

[232] Plutarch, Dion, c. 45.

[233] Diodor. xvi. 20. διανύσας ὀξέως τὴν εἰς Συρακούσσας ὁδὸν, ἦκε πρὸς τὰ Ἐξάπυλα, etc. Plutarch, Dion, c. 45. εἰσέβαλε διὰ τῶν πυλῶν εἰς τὴν Ἑκατόμπεδον λεγομένην, etc.

[234] Plutarch, Dion, c. 45. ὀρθίους λόχους ποιῶν καὶ διαιρῶν τὰς ἡγεμονίας, ὅπως πολλαχόθεν ἅμα προσφέροιτο φοβερώτερον.

[235] Plutarch, Dion, c. 46. παρατεταγμένων παρὰ τὸ τείχισμα χαλεπὴν ἔχον καὶ δυσεκβίαστον τὴν πρόσοδον.

To a person who, after penetrating into the interior of the wall of Epipolæ, stood on the slope, and looked down eastward, the outer wall of Tycha, Achradina, and Neapolis, might be said to form one τείχισμα; not indeed in one and the same line or direction, yet continuous from the northern to the southern brink of Epipolæ.

[236] Plutarch, Dion, c. 46. Ὡς δὲ προσέμιξαν τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἐν χερσὶ μὲν ὀλίγων πρὸς ὀλίγους ἐγένετο μάχη, διὰ τὴν στενότητα καὶ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τοῦ τόπου, etc.

[237] Plutarch, Dion, c. 45, 46; Diodor. xvi. 20.

[238] Plutarch, Dion, c. 47. Ὁ δὲ Δίων παραμυθούμενος αὐτοὺς ἔλεγεν, etc.

[239] Plutarch, Dion, c. 47.

[240] See Vol. VIII. Ch. lxiv. p. 165 of this History.

[241] Plutarch, Dion, c. 48.

[242] Diodor. xvi. 20.

[243] Plutarch, Dion, c. 48.

[244] Plutarch, Dion, c. 48. καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὴν ἀπορία καὶ σπάνις ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις, etc.

[245] Plutarch, Dion, c. 49.

[246] Plutarch, Dion, c. 50.

[247] Plutarch, Dion, c. 50.

[248] Plutarch, Dion, c. 51.

[249] Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 5.

[250] Juvenal, Satir. x. 381.

"Quid illo cive (Marius) tulisset
Imperium in terris, quid Roma beatius unquam,
Si circumducto captivorum agmine, et omni
Bellorum pompâ, animam exhalasset opimam,
Cum de Teutonico vellet descendere curru?"

[251] Plutarch, Dion, c. 52.

[252] Plutarch, Dion, c. 52. Τοῦ μέντοι περὶ τὰς ὁμιλίας ὄγκου καὶ τοῦ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ἀτενοῦς ἐφιλονείκει μηδὲν ὑφελεῖν μηδὲ χαλάσαι, καίτοι τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῷ χάριτος ἐνδεῶν ὄντων, καὶ Πλάτωνος ἐπιτιμῶντος, etc.

[253] Plutarch, Dion, c. 52.

[254] Plutarch, Dion, c. 53; Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 334, 336; viii. p. 356.

[255] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 335 F. p. 351 A.; Epistol. viii. p. 357 A.

[256] Plutarch, Dion, c. 53.

[257] Plutarch, Dion. c. 53. Ἔπειτα κατηγόρει τοῦ Δίωνος ὅτι τὴν ἄκραν οὐ κατέσκαψε, καὶ τῷ δήμῳ τὸν Διονυσίου τάφον ὡρμημένῳ λῦσαι καὶ τὸν νεκρὸν ἐκβαλεῖν οὐκ ἐπέτρεψε, etc.

Compare Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 22.

[258] Plutarch, Dion, c. 53; Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 6.

[259] Cornel. Nepos, Dion, c. 7.

[260] Cornelius Nepos, Dion. c. 7. "Insuetus male audiendi," etc.

[261] Plutarch, Dion, c. 56. Ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν Δίων, ἐπὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὸν Ἡρακλείδην ἀχθόμενος, καὶ τὸν φόνον ἐκεῖνον, ὥς τινα τοῦ βίου καὶ τῶν πράξεων αὐτῷ κηλῖδα προκειμένην, δυσχεραίνων ἀεὶ καὶ βαρυνόμενος εἶπεν,

ὅτι πολλάκις ἤδη θνήσκειν ἕτοιμός ἐστι καὶ παρέχειν τῷ βουλομένῳ σφάττειν αὐτὸν, εἰ ζῆν δεήσει μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φίλους φυλαττόμενον.

Compare Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 176 F.

[262] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 333 F.: compare Plutarch. Dion. c. 17, 28, 54.

Athenæus, on the contrary, states that Kallippus was a pupil of Plato, and fellow pupil with Dion in the school (Athenæus, xi. p. 508).

The statement of Plato hardly goes so far as to negative the supposition that Kallippus may have frequented his school and received instruction there, for a time greater or less. But it refutes the idea, that the friendship of Dion and Kallippus arose out of these philosophical tastes common to both; which Athenæus seems to have intended to convey.

[263] Plutarch, Dion, c. 54; Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 8.

[264] Plutarch, Dion. c. 56.

[265] Plato alludes to the two brothers whom Dion made his friends at Athens, and who ultimately slew him; but without mentioning the name of either (Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 333 F.).

The third Athenian—whose fidelity he emphatically contrasts with the falsehood of these two—appears to mean, himself—Plato. Compare pp. 333 and 334.

[266] Plutarch, Dion, c. 57; Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 9; Diodor. xvi. 31.

[267] Herodotus, v. 66. ἐσσούμενος δ᾽ ὁ Κλεισθένης τὸν δῆμον προσεταιρίζεται.

[268] Cicero de Officiis, ii. 7. "Acriores morsus intermissæ libertatis quam retentæ."

[269] Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 10.

[270] Plutarch, Dion, c. 56, 57.

[271] Plutarch, Dion, c. 58.

[272] Plutarch, Dion, c. 58.

[273] Plutarch, Dion, c. 58; Diodor. xvi. 31-36.

[274] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 11; Plutarch, compar. Timoleon and Paul Emil, c. 2.

[275] This seems to result from Plutarch, Dion, c. 58, compared with Diodor. xvi. 36.

[276] Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 353, 355, 356.

[277] Plato, Epist. viii. 356 B. ἐλεῶν δὲ πατρίδα καὶ ἱερῶν ἀθεραπευσίαν καὶ τάφους, etc.

[278] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 1.

[279] Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 353 F. … διολέσθαι δ᾽ ὑπὸ τοῦ κύκλου τούτου καὶ τὸ τυραννικὸν ἅπαν καὶ τὸ δημοτικὸν γένος, ἥξει δὲ, ἐάν περ τῶν εἰκότων γίγνηταί τι καὶ ἀπευκτῶν, σχεδὸν εἰς ἐρημίαν τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς φωνῆς Σικελία πᾶσα, Φοινίκων ἢ Ὀπικῶν μεταβαλοῦσα εἴς τινα δυναστεῖαν καὶ κράτος. Τούτων δὴ χρὴ πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας τέμνειν φάρμακον.

[280] Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 356.

[281] Herodot. iv. 161.

[282] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 1.

… Regnabis sanguine multo

Ad regnum quisquis venit ab exilio.

[283] Aristotle and Theopompus, ap. Athenæum, x. p. 435, 436; Theopomp. Fragm. 146, 204, 213, ed. Didot.

[284] Aristotel. Politic. v. 6, 7.

[285] Strabo, vi. p. 258.

[286] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 11; Compar. Timoleon and Paul. Emil. c. 2; Theopompus ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 536; Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 821 D. About the two citadels in Lokri, see Livy, xxix. 6.

It may have been probably a predatory fleet in the service of the younger Dionysius, which Livy mentions to have been ravaging about this time the coast of Latium, coöperating with the Gauls against portions of the Roman territory (Livy, vii. 25, 26).

[287] It would appear that relations of amity, or amicable dependence, still subsisted between Dionysius the younger and the Tarentines. There was seen, in the prytaneum or government-house of Tarentum, a splendid chandelier with three hundred and sixty-five burners, a present from Dionysius (Euphorion, ap. Athenæum, xv. p. 700).

[288] Strabo, vi. p. 259, 260; Athenæus, xii. p. 541.

[289] Diodor. xvi. 67.

[290] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 2.

[291] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 3.

[292] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 3. ἀλλὰ θεοῦ τινος, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰς νοῦν ἐμβαλόντος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, etc.

[293] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 3 … φιλόπατρις δὲ καὶ πρᾶος διαφερόντως, ὅσα μὴ σφόδρα μισοτύραννος εἶναι καὶ μισοπόνηρος.

[294] Herodot. v. 92.

[295] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4. At what time this battle took place cannot be made out.

[296] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4. Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οἱ Κορίνθιοι, δεδιότες μὴ πάθοιεν οἷα καὶ πρότερον ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων ἀποβαλόντες τὴν πόλιν, etc.

The Corinthians were carrying on war, in conjunction with Athens and Sparta, against Thebes, when (in 366 B. C.) the Athenians laid their plan for seizing the city. The Corinthians, having heard of it in time, took measures to frustrate it. See Xenophon, Hellen. vii. 4, 4-5.

[297] Aristotel. Politic, v. 5, 9.

[298] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4. συχνοὺς ἀνελὼν ἀκρίτους τῶν πρώτων πολιτῶν, ἀνέδειξεν αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν τύραννον.

Diodorus (xvi. 65) coincides in the main fact—but differs in several details.

[299] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4. αὖθις ἀνέβη πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν, etc.

[300] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4; Cornelius Nepos, Timol. c. 1; Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 808 A. That Telekleides was present and took part in the deed—though Plutarch directly names only Æschylus and Orthagoras—seems to be implied in an indirect allusion afterwards (c. 7), where Telekleides says to Timoleon after his nomination to the Sicilian command, Ἂν νῦν καλῶς ἀγωνίσῃς τύραννον ἀνῃρηκέναι δόξομεν· ἂν δὲ φαυλῶς, ἀδελφόν.

The presence of the prophet seems to show, that they had just been offering sacrifice, to ascertain the will of the gods respecting what they were about to do.

Nepos says that Timoleon was not actually present at the moment of his brother's death, but stood out of the room to prevent assistance from arriving.

Diodorus (xvi. 65) states that Timoleon slew his brother in the market place. But the account of Plutarch appears preferable.

[301] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 5.

[302] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 7.

[303] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 7. Diodorus (xvi. 65) states this striking antithesis as if it was put by the senate to Timoleon, on conferring upon him the new command. He represents the application from Syracuse as having come to Corinth shortly after the death of Timophanes, and while the trial of Timoleon was yet pending. He says that the senate nominated Timoleon to the command, in order to escape the necessity of pronouncing sentence one way or the other.

I follow the account of Plutarch, as preferable, in recognizing a long interval between the death of Timophanes and the application from Syracuse an interval of much mental suffering to Timoleon.

[304] Herodot. vii. 155.

[305] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 8, 11, 12, 30; Diodor, xvi. 66; Plutarch, Ser. Num. Vind. p. 552. In the Aristotelian treatise, Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, s. 9, Timoleon is said to have had *nine* ships.

[306] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 7.

[307] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 8; Diodor. xvi. 66.

[308] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 9; Diodor. xvi. 68.

[309] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 10.

[310] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 10, 11.

[311] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 11.

[312] Diodor. xvi. 67.

[313] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13-24; Diodor. xvi. 72.

[314] Diodor. xvi. 82.

[315] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 11.

[316] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 12; Diodor. xvi. 68. Diodorus and Plutarch agree in the numbers both of killed and of prisoners on the side of Hiketas.

[317] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 12.

[318] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13; Diodor. xvi. 69.

[319] Diodor. xvi. 68, 69. That Timoleon marched up to Syracuse, is stated by Diodorus, though not by Plutarch. I follow Diodorus so far; because it makes the subsequent proceedings in regard to Dionysius more clear and intelligible.

But Diodorus adds two further matters, which cannot be correct. He affirms that Timoleon pursued Hiketas at a running pace (δρομαῖος) immediately from the field of battle at Adranum to Syracuse; and that he then got possession of the portion of Syracuse called Epipolæ.

Now it was with some difficulty that Timoleon could get his troops even up to the field of battle at Adranum, without some previous repose; so long and fatiguing was the march which they had undergone from Tauromenium. It is therefore impossible that they can have been either inclined or competent to pursue (at a rapid pace) Hiketas immediately from the field of battle at Adranum to Syracuse.

Next, it will appear from subsequent operations, that Timoleon did not, on this occasion, get possession of any other portion of Syracuse than the Islet Ortygia, surrendered to him by Dionysius. He did not enter Epipolæ until afterwards.

[320] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13. ἀπειρηκὼς ἤδη ταῖς ἐλπίσι καὶ μικρὸν ἀπολιπὼν ἐκπολιορκεῖσθαι, etc.

[321] Tacitus, Histor. iii. 70. Respecting the last days of the Emperor Vitellius, "Ipse, neque jubendi neque vetandi potens, non jam Imperator, sed tantum belli causa erat."

[322] See, among other illustrations of this fact, the striking remark of Solon (Plutarch, Solon, c. 14).

[323] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13; Diodor. xvi. 70. Diodorus appears to me to misdate these facts; placing the capitulation of Dionysius and the surrender of Ortygia to Timoleon, *after* the capture of the other portion of Syracuse by Timoleon. I follow Plutarch's chronology, which places the capitulation of Ortygia first.

[324] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 16.

[325] Theopompus stated that Dionysius had gone from Sicily to Corinth in a merchant ship (νηΐ στρογγύλῃ). Timæus contradicted this assertion seemingly with his habitual asperity, and stated that Dionysius had been sent in a ship of war (νηΐ μακρᾷ). See Timæus, Fragment 133; Theopompus, Fragm. 216, ed. Didot.

Diodorus (xvi. 70) copies Theopompus.

Polybius (xii. 4 *a*) censures Timæus for cavilling at such small inaccuracies, as if the difference between the two were not worth noticing. Probably the language of Timæus may have deserved blame as ill-mannered; but the matter of fact appears to me to have been perfectly worth correcting. To send Dionysius in a trireme, was treating him as prisoner in a respectful manner, which Timoleon was doubtless bound to do; and which he would be inclined to do on his own account—seeing that he had a strong interest in making the entry of Dionysius as a captive into Corinth, an impressive sight. Moreover the trireme would reach Corinth more speedily than the merchantman.

That Dionysius should go in a merchant-ship, was one additional evidence of fallen fortune; and this seems to have been the reason why it was taken up by Theopompus—from the passion, prevalent among so many Greek authors, for exaggerating contrasts.

[326] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13, 14, 15.

[327] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 14; Diodor. xvi. 70. The remarks of Tacitus upon the last hours of the Emperor Vitellius have their application to the Greek feeling on this occasion (Histor. iii. 68):—"Nec quisquam adeo rerum humanarum immemor, quem non commoveret illa facies; Romanum principem, et generis humani paulo ante dominum, relictâ fortunæ suæ sede, exire de imperio. *Nihil tale viderant, nihil audierant*," etc.

[328] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 14; Theopomp. Fragm. 217, ed. Didot.; Justin xxi. 5.

[329] Timæus, ap. Polybium. xii. 24.

[330] Plutarch, Timol. c. 14; Cicero, Tuscul. Disp. iii. 12, 7. His remark, that Dionysius opened the school from anxiety still to have the pleasure of exercising authority, can hardly be meant as serious.

We cannot suppose that Dionysius in his exile at Corinth suffered under any want of a comfortable income: for it is mentioned, that all his movable furniture (ἐπισκευὴ) was bought by his namesake Dionysius, the fortunate despot of the Pontic Herakleia; and this furniture was so magnificent, that the acquisition of it is counted among the peculiar marks of ornament and dignity to the Herakleotic dynasty:—see the Fragments of the historian Memnon of Herakleia, ch. iv. p. 10, ed. Orell. apud Photium Cod. 224.

[331] Aristoxenus, Fragm. 15, ed. Didot. ap. Athenæum, p. 545. δεύτερον δὲ, φησὶ, τὸν ἡμέτερον τύραννον θείη τις ἂν, καίπερ πολὺ λειπόμενον.

One sees that the word τύραννος was used even by those who intended no unfriendly sense—applied by an admiring envoy to his master.

[332] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 15. Aristoxenus heard from Dionysius at Corinth the remarkable anecdote about the faithful attachment of the two Pythagorean friends, Damon and Phintias. Dionysius had been strongly impressed with the incident, and was fond of relating it (πολλάκις ἡμῖν διηγεῖτο, Aristoxen. Fragm. 9, ed. Didot; apud Jamblichum Vit. Pythag. s. 233).

[333] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 16.

[334] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13.

[335] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 18.

[336] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 16.

[337] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 18. … Ὁ δὲ Κορίνθιος Νέων, κατιδὼν ἀπὸ τῆς ἄκρας τοὺς ὑπολελειμμένους τῶν πολεμίων ἀργῶς καὶ ἀμελῶς φυλάττοντας, ἐξαίφνης ἐνέπεσε διεσπαρμένοις αὐτοῖς· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀνελών, τοὺς δὲ τρεψάμενος, ἐκράτησε καὶ κατέσχε τὴν λεγομένην Ἀχραδινὴν, ὃ κράτιστον ἐδόκει καὶ ἀθραυστότατον ὑπάρχειν τῆς Συρακουσίων μέρος πόλεως, τρόπον τινα συγκειμένης καὶ συνηρμοσμένης ἐκ πλειόνων πόλεων. Εὐπορήσας δὲ καὶ σίτου καὶ χρημάτων οὐκ ἀφῆκε τὸν τόπον, οὐδ᾽ ἀνεχώρησε πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄκραν, ἀλλὰ φραξάμενος τὸν περίβολον τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς καὶ συνάψας τοῖς ἐρύμασι πρὸς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, διεφύλαττε.

[338] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 19.

[339] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 20.

[340] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 20.

[341] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 21. The account given by Plutarch of Timoleon's attack is very intelligible. He states that the side of Epipolæ fronting southwards or towards the river Anapus was the strongest.

Saverio Cavallari (Zur Topographie von Syrakus, p. 22) confirms this, by remarking that the northern side of Epipolæ, towards Trogilus, is the weakest, and easiest for access or attack.

We thus see that Epipolæ was the *last* portion of Syracuse which Timoleon mastered—not the *first* portion, as Diodorus states (xvi. 69).

[342] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 21.

[343] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 20, 21. Diodorus also implies the same verdict (xvi. 69), though his account is brief as well as obscure.

[344] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 21. Τὸ μὲν ἁλῶναι τὴν πόλιν (Syracuse) κατ᾽ ἄκρας καὶ γενέσθαι ταχέως ὑποχείριον ἐκπεσόντων τῶν πολεμίων, δίκαιον ἀναθεῖναι τῇ τῶν μαχομένων ἀνδραγαθίᾳ καὶ τῇ δεινότητι τοῦ στρατηγοῦ· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν τινα μηδὲ τρωθῆναι τῶν Κορινθίων, ἴδιον ἔργον αὐτῆς ἡ Τιμολέοντος ἐπεδείξατο τύχη, καθάπερ διαμιλλωμένη πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς, ἵνα τῶν ἐπαινουμένων αὐτοῦ τὰ μακαριζόμενα μᾶλλον οἱ πυνθανόμενοι θαυμάζωσιν.

[345] Homer, Odyss. iii. 219 (Nestor addressing Telemachus).

Εἰ γάρ σ᾽ ὣς ἔθελοι φιλέειν γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη,
Ὡς τότ᾽ Ὀδυσσῆος περικήδετο κυδαλίμοιο
Δήμῳ ἔνι Τρώων, ὅθι πάσχομεν ἄλγε᾽ Ἀχαῖοι—
Οὐ γάρ πω ἴδον ὧδε θεοὺς ἀναφανδὰ φιλεῦντας,
Ὡς κείνῳ ἀναφανδὰ παρίστατο Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη.

[346] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36. μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ πολὺ τὸ ῥᾳδίως ἔχουσα (ἡ Τιμολέοντος στρατηγία) φαίνεται, τοῖς εὖ καὶ δικαίως λογιζομένοις, οὐ τύχης ἔργον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀρετῆς εὐτυχούσης.

[347] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36; Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 4; Plutarch, De Sui Laude, p. 542 E.

[348] Solon, Fragm. 26, ed. Schneid.; Plutarch, Solon, c. 14.

Οὐκ ἔφυ Σόλων βαθύφρων, οὐδὲ βουλήεις ἀνήρ·
Ἐσθλὰ γὰρ θεοῦ διδόντος, αὐτὸς οὐκ ἐδέξατο.
Περιβαλὼν δ᾽ ἄγραν, ἀγασθεὶς οὐκ ἀνέσπασεν μέγα
Δίκτυον, θυμοῦ θ᾽ ἁμαρτῇ καὶ φρενῶν ἀποσφαλείς.

[349] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 22. Γενόμενος δὲ τῆς ἀκρᾶς κύριος, οὐκ ἔπαθε Δίωνι ταὐτὸ πάθος, οὐδ᾽ ἐφείσατο τοῦ τόπου διὰ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὴν πολυτέλειαν τῆς κατασκευῆς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκεῖνον διαβαλοῦσαν, εἶτ᾽ ἀπολέσασαν ὑποψίαν φυλαξάμενος, ἐκήρυξε τῶν Συρακοσίων τὸν βουλόμενον παρεῖναι μετὰ σιδήρου καὶ συνεφάπτεσθαι τῶν τυραννικῶν ἐρυμάτων. Ὡς δὲ πάντες ἀνέβησαν, ἀρχὴν ἐλευθερίας ποιησάμενοι βεβαιοτάτην

τὸ κήρυγμα καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκείνην, οὐ μόνον τὴν ἄκραν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς οἰκίας καὶ τὰ μνήματα τῶν τυράννων ἀνέτρεψαν καὶ κατέσκαψαν. Εὐθὺς δὲ τὸν τόπον συνομαλύνας, ἐνῳκοδόμησε τὰ δικαστήρια, χαριζόμενος τοῖς πολίταις, καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος ὑπερτέραν ποιῶν τὴν δημοκρατίαν.

Compare Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 3.

[350] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23; Diodor. xvi. 83.

[351] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23.

[352] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 24.

[353] Diodor. xiii. 35; xvi. 81.

[354] Diodor. xvi. 70.

[355] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23; Dion Chrysostom, Orat. xxxvii. p. 460.

[356] Compare the case of the Corinthian proclamation respecting Epidamnus, Thucyd. i. 27; the Lacedæmonian foundation of Herakleia, Thucyd. iii. 93; the proclamation of the Battiad Arkesilaus at Samos, for a new body of settlers to Kyrênê (Herodot. iv. 163).

[357] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23. Diodorus states only five thousand (xvi. 82) as coming from Corinth.

[358] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23. To justify his statement of this large total, Plutarch here mentions (I wish he did so oftener) the author from whom he copied it—Athanis, or Athanas. That author was a native Syracusan, who wrote a history of Syracusan affairs from the termination of the history of Philistus in 363 or 362 B. C., down to the death of Timoleon in 337 B. C.; thus including all the proceedings of Dion and Timoleon. It is deeply to be lamented that nothing remains of his work (Diodor. xv. 94; Fragment. Historic. Græc. ed. Didot, vol. ii. p. 81). His name seems to be mentioned in Theopompus (Fr. 212, ed. Didot) as joint commander of the Syracusan troops, along with Herakleides.

[359] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23. καὶ γενομένοις αὐτοῖς ἑξακισμυρίοις τὸ πλῆθος, ὡς Ἄθανις εἴρηκε, τὴν μὲν χώραν διένειμε, τὰς δὲ οἰκίας ἀπέδοτο χιλίων ταλάντων, ἅμα μὲν ὑπολειπόμενος τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Συρακουσίοις ἐξωνεῖσθαι τὰς αὐτῶν, ἅμα δὲ χρημάτων εὐπορίαν τῷ δήμῳ μηχανώμενος οὕτως πενομένῳ καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα καὶ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, ὥστε, etc.

Diodorus (xvi. 82) affirms that forty thousand new settlers were admitted εἰς τὴν Συρακουσίαν τὴν ἀδιαίρετον, and that ten thousand were settled in the fine and fertile territory of Agyrium. This latter measure was taken certainly, after the despot of Agyrium had been put down by Timoleon. We should have been glad to have an explanation of τὴν Συρακουσίαν τὴν ἀδιαίρετον: in the absence of information, conjecture as to the meaning is vain.

[360] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 24.

[361] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 30. Diodor. (xvi. 72) does not mention that Hiketas submitted at all. He states that Timoleon was repulsed in attacking Leontini; and that Hiketas afterwards attacked Syracuse, but was repulsed with loss, during the absence of Timoleon in his expedition against Leptines.

[362] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 24; Diodor. xvi. 73.

[363] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 25; Diodor. xvi. 77. They agree in the main about the numerical items, and seem to have copied from the same authority.

[364] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27; Diodor. xvi. 80.

[365] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 25; Diodor. xvi. 78. Diodorus gives the total of Timoleon's force at twelve thousand men; Plutarch at only six thousand. The larger total appears to me most probable, under the circumstances. Plutarch seems to have taken account only of the paid force who were with Timoleon at Syracuse, and not to have enumerated that other division, which, having been sent to ravage the Carthaginian province, had been compelled to retire and rejoin Timoleon when the great Carthaginian host landed.

Diodorus and Plutarch follow in the main the same authorities respecting this campaign.

[366] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 30.

[367] The anecdote about the parsley is given both in Plutarch (Timol. c. 26) and Diodorus (xvi. 79).

The upper portion of the river Krimêsus, near which this battle was fought, was in the mountainous region called by Diodorus ἡ Σελινουντία δυσχωρία: through which lay the road between Selinus and Panormus (Diodor. xxiii. Frag. p. 333, ed. Wess.).

[368] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27. ἰσταμένου θέρους ὥραν—λήγοντι μηνὶ Θαργηλίωνι, etc.

[369] Of these war-chariots they are said to have had not less than two thousand, in the unsuccessful battle which they fought against Agathokles in Africa, near Carthage (Diodor. xx. 10).

After the time of Pyrrhus, they came to employ tame elephants trained for war.

[370] It appears from Polybius that Timæus ascribed to Timoleon, immediately before this battle, an harangue which Polybius pronounces to be absurd and unsuitable (Timæus, Fr. 134, ed. Didot; Polyb. xii. 26 *a*).

[371] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27. Ἀναλαβὼν τὴν ἀσπίδα καὶ βοήσας ἔπεσθαι καὶ θαῤῥεῖν τοῖς πέζοις ἔδοξεν ὑπερφυεῖ φωνῇ καὶ μείζονι κεχρῆσθαι τοῦ συνήθους, εἴτε τῷ πάθει παρὰ τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ τὸν ἐνθουσιασμὸν οὕτω διατεινάμενος, εἴτε δαιμονίου τινὸς, ὡς τοῖς πολλοῖς τότε παρέστη, συνεπιφθεγξαμένου.

[372] Diodor. xvi. 79. Περιεγένοντο γὰρ ἀνελπίστως τῶν πολεμίων, οὐ μόνον διὰ τὰς ἰδίας ἀνδραγαθίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν θεῶν συνεργίαν.

[373] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27, 28; Diodor. xvi. 79, 80.

[374] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 29; Diodor. xvi. 80, 81.

[375] Diodor. xvi. 81. Τοσαύτη δ᾽ αὐτοὺς κατάπληξις καὶ δέος κατεῖχεν, ὥστε μὴ τολμᾷν εἰς τὰς ναῦς ἐμβαίνειν, μηδ᾽ ἀποπλεῖν εἰς τὴν Λιβύην, ὡς διὰ τὴν τῶν θεῶν ἀλλοτριότητα πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ Λιβυκοῦ πελάγους καταποθησομένους. Compare the account of the religious terror of the Carthaginians, after their defeat by Agathokles (Diodor. xx. 14).

So, in the argument between Andokides and his accusers, before the Dikastery at Athens—the accusers contend that Andokides clearly does not believe in the gods, because, after the great impiety which he has committed, he has still not been afraid afterwards to make sea voyages (Lysias, cont. Andokid. s. 19).

On the other hand, Andokides himself argues triumphantly, from the fact of his having passed safely through sea voyages in the winter, that he is *not* an object of displeasure to the gods.

"If the gods thought that I had wronged them, they would not have omitted to punish me, when they caught me in the greatest danger. For what danger can be greater than a sea voyage in winter-time? The gods had then both my life and my property in their power; and yet they preserved me. Was it not then open to them so to manage, as that I should not even obtain interment for my body?....Have the gods then preserved me from the dangers of sea and pirates, merely to let me perish at Athens by the act of my villanous accuser Kephisius? No, Dikasts; the dangers of *accusation and trial are human*; but *the dangers encountered at sea are divine*. If, therefore, we are to surmise about the sentiments of the gods, I think they will be extremely displeased and angry, if they see a man, whom they themselves have preserved, destroyed by others." (Andokides, De Mysteriis, s. 137-139). ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἡγοῦμαι χρῆναι νομίζειν τοὺς τοιούτους κινδύνους ἀνθρωπίνους, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ θάλασσαν θείους. Εἴπερ οὖν δεῖ τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὑπονοεῖν, πολὺ ἂν αὐτοὺς οἶμαι ἐγὼ ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν, εἰ τοὺς ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν σωζομένους, ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων ἀπολλυμένους ὁρῷεν.

Compare Plutarch, Paul. Emil. c. 36. μάλιστα κατὰ πλοῦν ἐδεδιειν τὴν μεταβολὴν τοῦ δαίμονος, etc.

[376] Claudian, De Tertio Consulatu Honorii, v. 93.

"Te propter, gelidis Aquilo de monte procellis
Obruit adversas acies, revolutaque tela
Vertit in auctores, et turbine reppulit hastas.
O nimium dilecte Deo, cui fundit ab antris
Æolus armatas hyemes; cui militat æther,
Et conjurati veniunt ad classica venti."

Compare a passage in the speech of Thrasybulus, Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 14.

[377] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 29; Diodor. xvi. 80.

[378] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 30; Diodor. xvi. 82.

[379] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 30. Ἐξ ὧν καὶ μάλιστα τὴν Τιμολέοντος εὐτυχίαν συνέβη γενέσθαι διώνυμον…. Τὴν μὲν οὖν πρὸς Τιμολέοντα τῶν θεῶν εὐμένειαν, οὐχ ἧττον ἐν αἷς προσέκρουσε πράξεσιν ἢ περὶ ἃς κατώρθου, θαυμάζεσθαι συνέβαινεν.

Compare Plutarch, De Serâ Num. Vind. p. 552 F.

[380] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 31.

[381] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 33.

[382] Diodor. xv. 17. Minoa (Herakleia) was a Carthaginian possession when Dion landed (Plutarch, Dion, c. 25).

Cornelius Nepos (Timoleon, c. 2) states erroneously, that the Carthaginians were completely expelled from Sicily by Timoleon.

[383] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 34; Diodor. xvi. 82.

[384] Diodor. xiii. 114.

[385] Cornelius Nepos (Timoleon, c. 2) calls Mamerkus an Italian general who had come into Sicily to aid the despots. It is possible enough that he may have been an Italiot Greek; for he must have been a Greek, from the manner in which Plutarch speaks of his poetical compositions.

[386] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 37.

[387] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 31.

[388] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 34.

[389] Diodor. xvi. 82.

[390] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 37. Ὡς δὲ ἐπανῆλθεν εἰς Συρακούσας, εὐθὺς ἀποθέσθαι τὴν μοναρχίαν καὶ παραιτεῖσθαι τοὺς πολίτας, τῶν πραγμάτων εἰς τὸ κάλλιστον ἡκόντων τέλος.

[391] Plutarch, *l. c.* εὐθὺς ἀποθέσθαι τὴν μοναρχίαν: compare c. 22.

[392] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36.

[393] Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 353 F.

[394] Diodor. xvi. 65, 82; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 35.

[395] Eight years elapsed from the time when Timoleon departed with his expedition from Corinth to the time of his death; from 345-344 B. C. to 337-336 B. C. (Diodorus, xvi. 90; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 37).

The battle of the Krimêsus is assigned by Diodorus to 340 B. C. But as to the other military achievements of Timoleon in Sicily, Diodorus and Plutarch are neither precise, nor in accordance with each other.

[396] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 37. μόνος, ἐφ᾽ ἃς οἱ σοφισταὶ διὰ τῶν λόγων τῶν πανηγυρικῶν ἀεὶ παρεκάλουν πράξεις τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἐν αὐταῖς ἀριστεύσας, etc.

[397] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 35. Οἷς οὐ μόνον ἀσφάλειαν ἐκ πολέμου τοσούτου καὶ γαλήνην ἱδρυομένοις παρεῖχεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τἄλλα παρασκευάσας καὶ συμπροθυμηθεὶς ὥσπερ οἰκιστὴς ἠγαπᾶτο. Καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ διακειμένων ὁμοίως πρὸς αὐτὸν, οὐ πολέμου τις λύσις, οὐ νόμων θέσις, οὐ χώρας κατοικισμὸς, οὐ πολιτείας διάταξις, ἐδόκει καλῶς ἔχειν, ἧς ἐκεῖνος μὴ προσάψαιτο μηδὲ κατακοσμήσειεν, ὥσπερ ἔργῳ συντελουμένῳ δημιουργὸς ἐπιθεὶς τινα χάριν θεοφιλῆ καὶ πρέπουσαν.

Compare Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 3.

[398] Diodor. xvi. 70; Cicero in Verrem, ii. 51.

[399] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 38.

[400] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 38. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς οἰκίας ἱερὸν ἱδρυσάμενος Αὐτοματίας ἔθυσεν, αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν οἰκίαν Ἱερῷ Δαίμονι καθιέρωσεν.

Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 4; Plutarch, Reip. Gerend. Præcept. p. 816 D.

The idea of Αὐτοματία is not the same as that of Τύχη, though the word is sometimes translated as if it were. It is more nearly the same as Ἀγαθὴ Τύχη—though still, as it seems to me, not exactly the same.

[401] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 38; Cornel. Nepos, Timoleon, c. 4.

[402] It occurs in Cornelius Nepos prior to Plutarch, and was probably copied by both from the same authority.

[403] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 37; Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 5.

[404] Xenoph. Œconomic. xxi. 12. Οὐ γὰρ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ὅλον τουτὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπινον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ θεῖον, τὸ ἐθελόντων ἄρχειν· σαφῶς δὲ δίδοται τοῖς ἀληθινῶς σωφροσύνῃ τετελεσμένοις. Τὸ δὲ ἀκόντων τυραννεῖν διδόασιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὓς ἂν ἡγῶνται ἀξίους εἶναι βιοτεύειν, ὥσπερ ὁ Τάνταλος ἐν ᾅδου λέγεται τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον διατρίβειν, φοβούμενος μὴ δὶς ἀποθάνῃ.

[405] Diodor. xvi. 83.

[406] Plutarch. Timoleon, c. 39. Ἐν τοιαύτῃ δὲ γηροτροφούμενος τιμῇ μετ᾽ εὐνοίας, ὥσπερ πατὴρ κοινὸς, ἐκ μικρᾶς προφάσεως τῷ χρόνῳ συνεφαψαμένης ἐτελεύτησεν.

[407] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 39; Diodor, xvi. 90.

[408] Plutarch. Timoleon, c. 36. Ὁ μάλιστα ζηλωθεὶς ὑπὸ Τιμολέοντος Ἐπαμεινώνδας, etc.

Polybius reckons Hermokrates, Timoleon, and Pyrrhus, to be the most complete men of action (πραγματικωτάτους) of all those who had played a conspicuous part in Sicilian affairs (Polyb. xii. 25. ed. Didot).

[409] Demosthenes, Orat. pro Megalopolit. p. 203, 204, s. 6-10; p. 206. s. 18—and indeed the whole Oration, which is an instructive exposition of policy.

[410] Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 6, 10.

[411] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 5, 23; vii 5, 4. Diodor. xv. 62. The Akarnanians had been allies of Thebes at the time of the first expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus; whether they remained so at the time of his last expedition, is not certain. But as the Theban ascendency over Thessaly was much greater at the last of those two periods than at the first, we may be sure that they had not lost their hold upon the Lokrians and Malians who (as well as the Phokians) lay between Bœotia and Thessaly.

[412] Vol. X. Ch. lxxvii. p. 161; Ch. lxxviii. p. 195; Ch. lxxx. p. 312.

[413] Orchomenus was conterminous with the Phokian territory (Pausanias, ix. 39, 1.)

[414] Isokrates, Or. viii. De Pace, s. 21; Demosthenes adv. Leptinem, p. 490. s. 121; pro Megalopol. p. 208. s. 29; Philippic ii. p. 69. s. 15.

[415] Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 5, 4; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 35. Wachsmuth states, in my judgment, erroneously, that Thebes was disappointed in her attempt to establish ascendency in Thessaly (Hellenisch. Alterthümer, vol. ii. x. p. 338).

[416] Plato, Kriton, p. 53 D; Xenoph. Memorab. i. 2. 24; Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 15. s. 23; Demosth. cont. Aristokratem, p. 658. s. 133.

"Pergit ire (the Roman consul Quinctius Flamininus) in Thessaliam: ubi non liberandæ modo civitates erant, sed ex omni colluvione et confusione in aliquam tolerabilem formam redigendæ. Nec enim temporum modo vitiis, ac violentiâ et licentiâ regiâ (*i. e.* the Macedonian) turbati erant; sed inquieto etiam ingenio gentis, nec comitia, nec conventum nec concilium ullum, non per seditionem et tumultum, jam inde a principio ad nostram usque ætatem, traducentis" (Livy, xxxiv. 51).

[417] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 19.

[418] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 32.

[419] Demosthenes adv. Polyklem. p. 1207. s. 5, 6; Diodor. xv. 61-95. See my previous Volume X. Ch. lxxx. p. 370.

[420] I concur with Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. ad. ann. 359 B. C., and Appendix, c. 15) in thinking that this is the probable date of the assassination of Alexander of Pheræ; which event is mentioned by Didorus (xvi. 14) under the year 357-356 B. C., yet in conjunction with a series of subsequent events, and in a manner scarcely constraining us to believe that he meant to affirm the assassination itself as having actually taken place in that year.

To the arguments adduced by Mr. Clinton, another may be added, borrowed from the expression of Plutarch (Pelopidas, c. 35) ὀλίγον ὕστερον. He states that the assassination of Alexander occurred "a little while" after the period when the Thebans, avenging the death of Pelopidas, reduced that despot to submission. Now this reduction cannot be placed later than 363 B. C. That interval therefore which Plutarch calls "a little while," will be three years, if we place the assassination in 359 B. C., six years, if we place it in 357-356 B. C. Three years is a more suitable interpretation of the words than *six* years.

[421] Xenoph. Hiero, i. 38; ii. 10; iii. 8.

[422] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 36, 37; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 35; Conon, ap. Photium, Narr. 50. Codex, 186; Cicero, de Offic. ii. 7. The details of the assassination, given in these authors, differ. I have principally followed Xenophon, and have admitted nothing positively inconsistent with his statements.

[423] Justin, vii. 5; Diodor. xvi. 2. The allusion in the speech of Philotas immediately prior to his execution (Curtius, vi. 43. p. 591, Mützell) supports the affirmation of Justin—that Perdikkas was assassinated.

[424] Antipater (the general of Philip and viceroy of his son Alexander in Macedonia) is said to have left an historical work, Περδίκκου πράξεις Ἰλλυρικὰς (Suidas, v. Ἀντίπατρος), which can hardly refer to any other Perdikkas than the one now before us.

[425] Athenæus, xi. p. 506 E. Πλάτων, ὃν Σπεύσιππός φησι φίλτατον ὄντα Ἀρχελάῳ, etc.

[426] Diogenes Laert. v. 1, 1.

[427] Athenæus, xi. p. 506 E. p. 508 E. The fourth among the letters of Plato (alluded to by Diogenes Laert. iii. 62) is addressed to Perdikkas partly in recommendation and praise of Euphræus. There appears nothing to prove it to be spurious; but whether it be spurious or genuine, the fact that Plato corresponded with Perdikkas is sufficiently probable.

[428] Justin, vi. 9; vii. 5. "Philippus obses triennio Thebis habitus," etc.

Compare Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 26; Diodor. xv. 67; xvi. 2; and the copious note of Wesseling upon the latter passage. The two passages of Diodorus are not very consistent; in the latter, he states that Philip had been deposited at Thebes by the Illyrians, to whom he had been made over as a hostage by his father Amyntas. This is highly improbable; as well for other reasons (assigned by Wesseling), as because the Illyrians, if they ever received him as a hostage, would not send him to Thebes, but keep him in their own possession. The memorable interview described by Æschines—between the Athenian general Iphikrates and the Macedonian queen Eurydikê with her two youthful sons Perdikkas and Philip—must have taken place some time before the death of Ptolemy Alorites, and before the accession of Perdikkas. The expressions of Æschines do not, perhaps, necessarily compel us to suppose the interview to have taken place *immediately* after the death of Alexander (Æschines, Fal. Leg. p. 31, 32): yet it is difficult to reconcile the statement of the orator with the recognition of three years' continuous residence at Thebes. Flathe (Geschichte Makedoniens, vol. i. p. 39-47) supposes Æschines to have allowed himself an oratorical misrepresentation, when he states that Philip was present in Macedonia at the interview with Iphikrates. This is an unsatisfactory mode of escaping from the difficulty; but the chronological statements, as they now stand, can hardly be all correct. It is possible that Philip may have gone again back to Thebes, or may have been sent back, after the interview with Iphikrates; we might thus obtain a space of three years for his stay, at two several times, in that city. We are not to suppose that his condition at Thebes was one of durance and ill-treatment. See Mr. Clinton, Fast. Hell. App. iv. p. 229.

[429] Athenæus, xi. p. 506. διατρέφων δ' ἐνταῦθα δύναμιν (Philippus), etc. About Derdas, see Xenoph. Hellen. v. 2, 38.

[430] It was in after times a frequent practice with the Roman Senate, when imposing terms of peace on kings half-conquered, to require hostages for fidelity, with a young prince of the royal blood among the number;

and it commonly happened that the latter, after a few years' residence at Rome, returned home an altered man on many points.

See the case of Demetrius, younger son of the last Philip of Macedon, and younger brother of Perseus (Livy, xxxiii. 13; xxxix. 53; xl. 5), of the young Parthian princes, Vonones (Tacitus, Annal. ii. 1, 2), Phraates (Tacit. Annal. vi. 32), Meherdates (Tacit. Ann. xii. 10, 11).

[431] Even in the opinion of very competent judges: see Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 18. p. 253.

[432] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 26. ζηλωτὴς γεγονέναι ἔδοξεν Ἐπαμεινώνδου, τὸ περὶ τοὺς πολέμους καὶ τὰς στρατηγίας δραστήριον ἴσως κατανοήσας, ὃ μικρὸν ἦν τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀρετῆς μόριον, etc.

[433] Justin, vii. 4. Menelaus, the father of Amyntas and grandfather of Philip, is stated to have been an illegitimate son; while Amyntas himself is said to have been originally an attendant or slave of Æropus (Ælian, V. H. xii. 43). Our information respecting the relations of the successive kings, and pretenders to the throne, in Macedonia, is obscure and unsatisfactory. Justin (*l. c.*) agrees with Ælian in calling the father of Amyntas Menelaus; but Dexippus (ap. Syncellum, p. 263) calls him Aridæus; while Diodorus (xiv. 92) calls him Tharraleus.

[434] Justin, xxix. 1.

[435] Diodor xvi. 2; Justin, vii. 5; Quint. Curt. vi. 48, 26.

[436] Justin, vii. 5. Amyntas lived through the reign of Philip, and was afterwards put to death by Alexander, on the charge of conspiracy. See Justin, xii 6; Quintus Curtius, vi. 34, 17; with the note of Mützell.

[437] Justin, viii. 3. "Post hæc Olynthios aggreditur (Philip): receperant enim per misericordiam, post cædem unius, duos fratres ejus, quos Philippus, ex novercâ genitos, velut participes regni, interficere gestiebat."

[438] Arrian, Exp. Alex. iv. 11. οὐ βίᾳ, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ Μακεδόνων ἄρχοντες διετέλεσαν (Alexander and his ancestors before him).

[439] The trial of Philotas, who is accused by Alexander for conspiracy before an assembly of the Macedonian soldiers near to head-quarters, is the example most insisted on of the prevalence of this custom, of public trial in criminal accusations. Quintus Curtius says (vi. 32. 25), "De capitalibus rebus vetusto Macedonum more inquirebat exercitus; in pace erat vulgi: et nihil potestas regum valebat, nisi prius valuisset auctoritas." Compare Arrian, iii. 26; Diodor. xvii. 79, 80.

That this was an ancient Macedonian custom, in reference to conspicuous persons accused of treason, we may readily believe; and that an officer of the great rank and military reputation of Philotas, if suspected of treason, could hardly be dealt with in any other way. If he was condemned, all his relatives and kinsmen, whether implicated or not, became involved in the same condemnation. Several among the kinsmen of Philotas either fled or killed themselves; and Alexander then issued an edict pardoning them all, except Parmenio; who was in Media, and whom he sent secret orders instantly to despatch. If the proceedings against Philotas, as described by Curtius, are to be taken as correct, it is rather an appeal made by Alexander to the soldiery, for their consent to his killing a dangerous enemy, than an investigation of guilt or innocence.

Olympias, during the intestine contests which followed after the death of Alexander, seems to have put to death as many illustrious Macedonians as she chose, without any form of trial. But when her enemy Kassander got the upper hand, subdued and captured her, he did not venture to put her to death without obtaining the consent of a Macedonian assembly (Diodor. xix. 11, 51; Justin, xiv. 6; Pausanias, i. 11, 2). These Macedonian assemblies, insofar as we read of them, appear to be summoned chiefly as mere instruments to sanction some predetermined purpose of the king or the military leader predominant at the time. Flathe (Geschicht. Makedon. p. 43-45) greatly overrates, in my judgment, the rights and powers enjoyed by the Macedonian people.

[440] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 6, 16.

[441] Diodor. xvi. 2, 3.

[442] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 660. s. 144.

[443] Diodor. xvi. 3; Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 660 *ut sup.* τῶν ἡμετέρων τινὰς πολιτῶν, etc. Justin, vii 6.

[444] Diodor. xvi. 3.

[445] Diodor. xvi. 4.

[446] See the remarks of Niebuhr, on these migrations of Gallic tribes from the west, and their effect upon the prior population established between the Danube and the Ægean Sea (Niehbuhr, Vorträge über alte Geschichte, vol. iii. p. 225, 281; also the earlier work of the same author—Kleine Schriften, Untersuchungen über die Geschichte der Skythen, p. 375).

[447] Theopompus, Fragm. 35, ed. Didot; Cicero de Officiis, ii. 11; Diodor. xvi. 4.

[448] Arrian, vii. 9, 2, 3.

[449] Diodor. xvi. 4-8. Frontinus (Strategem. ii. 3, 2) mentions a battle gained by Philip against the Illyrians; wherein, observing that their chosen troops were in the centre, he placed his own greatest strength in his right wing, attacked and beat their left wing; then came upon their centre in flank and defeated their whole army. Whether this be the battle alluded to, we cannot say. The tactics employed are the same as those of Epaminondas at Leuktra and Mantinea; strengthening one wing peculiarly for the offensive, and keeping back the rest of the army upon the defensive.

[450] See Vol. X. Ch. lxxx. p. 379 *seqq.*

[451] Demosthenes, Orat. de Chersonese, p. 98, s. 34. φέρε γὰρ, πρὸς Διὸς, εἰ λόγον ὑμᾶς ἀπαιτήσειαν οἱ Ἕλληνες ὧν νυνὶ παρείκατε καιρῶν διὰ ῥᾳθυμίαν, etc.

[452] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 5, 23. Εὐβοεῖς ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων: also vii. 5, 4. Βοιωτοὺς ἔχων πάντας καὶ Εὐβοέας (Epaminondas), etc.

Winiewski, in his instructive commentary upon the historical facts of the Oration of Demosthenes de Coronâ, states erroneously that Eubœa continued in the dependence of Athens without interruption from 377 to 358 B. C. (Winiewski, Commentarii Historici et Chronologici in Demosthenis Orationem de Coronâ, p. 30).

[453] Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 4, 1; Diodor. xv. 76; Demosthen. de Coronâ, p. 259. s. 123.

[454] Demosthenes, Orat. de Chersones. p. 108. s. 80. τοὺς Εὐβοέας σώζειν, ὅτε Θηβαῖοι κατεδουλοῦντ᾽ αὐτοὺς, etc.: compare Demosthen. de Coronâ, p. 259. s. 123. Θηβαίων σφετεριζομένων τὴν Εὔβοιαν, etc.; and Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 397. c. 31. ἐπειδὴ διέβησαν εἰς Εὔβοιαν Θηβαῖοι, καταδουλώσασθαι τὰς πόλεις πειρώμενοι, etc.

[455] Demosthen. Orat. de Chersones. p. 108. s. 80. Εἶπέ μοι, βουλεύεσθε, ἔφη (Timotheus), Θηβαίους ἔχοντες ἐν νήσῳ, τί χρήσεσθε, καὶ τί δεῖ ποιεῖν; Οὐκ ἐμπλήσετε τὴν θάλασσαν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τριηρῶν; Οὐκ ἀναστάντες ἤδη πορεύσεσθε εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ; Οὐ καθέλξετε τὰς ναῦς;

[456] See, in illustration of these delays, Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 50 s. 42.

Any citizen who thought that he had been called upon out of his fair turn to serve a trierarchy or other expensive duty, and that another citizen had been unduly spared, might tender to this latter an exchange of properties, offering to undertake the duty if the other's property were made over to him. The person, to whom tender was made, was compelled to do one of three things; either, 1. to show, at legal process, that it was not his turn, and that he was not liable; 2. or to relieve the citizen tendering from the trierarchy just imposed upon him; 3. or to accept the exchange, receiving the other's property, and making over his own property in return; in which case the citizen tendering undertook the trierarchy.

This obligatory exchange of properties, with the legal process attached to it, was called Antidosis.

[457] That Timotheus was commander, is not distinctly stated by Demosthenes, but may be inferred from Plutarch, De Gloriâ Athen. p. 350 F. ἐν ᾧ Τιμόθεος Εὔβοιαν ἠλευθέρου, which, in the case of a military man like Timotheus, can hardly allude merely to the speech which he made in the assembly. Diokles is mentioned by Demosthenes as having concluded the convention with the Thebans; but this does not necessarily imply that he was commander: see Demosth. cont. Meidiam, p. 570 s. 219.

About Philinus as colleague of Demosthenes in the trierarchy, see Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 566. s. 204.

[458] Diodorus (xvi. 7) states that the contest in Eubœa lasted for some considerable time.

Demosthenes talks of the expedition as having reached its destination in three days, Æschines in five days; the latter states also that within thirty days the Thebans were vanquished and expelled (Demosthenes cont. An-

drotion. p. 597. s. 17; Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 397. c. 31).

About Chares and the mercenaries, see Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 678. s. 206.

[459] Demosthenes cont. Androtion. p. 616. s. 89; cont. Timokrat. p. 756. s. 205.

[460] Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 401, 403, 404. c. 32. 33; Demosthenes pro Megalopolitan. p. 204. s. 16.

[461] See Vol. X. Ch. lxxx. p. 381, 382.

[462] Demosthenes, De Rhodior. Libertat. p. 194. s. 17. παρὸν αὐτοῖς (the Rhodians) Ἕλλησι καὶ βελτίοσιν αὐτῶν ὑμῖν ἐξ ἴσου συμμαχεῖν, etc.

[463] Diodor. xv. 95.

[464] Demosthenes, Philip, i. 46. s. 28. ἐξ οὗ δ᾽ αὐτὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ τὰ ξενικὰ ὑμῖν στρατεύεται, τοὺς φίλους νικᾷ καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους, οἱ δ᾽ ἐχθροὶ μείζους τοῦ δέοντος γεγόνασιν. Καὶ παρακύψαντα ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς πόλεως πόλεμον, πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον ἢ πανταχοῦ μᾶλλον οἴχεται πλέοντα· ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς ἀκολουθεῖ· εἰκότως· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄρχειν μὴ διδόντα μισθόν.

Ibid. p. 53. s. 51. Ὅποι δ᾽ ἂν στρατηγὸν καὶ ψήφισμα κενὸν καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος ἐλπίδας ἐκπέμψητε, οὐδὲν ὑμῖν τῶν δεόντων γίγνεται, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ καταγελῶσιν, οἱ δὲ σύμμαχοι τεθνᾶσι τῷ δέει τοὺς τοιούτους ἀποστόλους.

Ibid. p. 53. s. 53. Νῦν δ᾽ εἰς τοῦθ᾽ ἥκει τὰ πράγματα αἰσχύνης, ὥστε τῶν στρατηγῶν ἕκαστος δὶς καὶ τρὶς κρίνεται παρ᾽ ὑμῖν περὶ θανάτου, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς οὐδεὶς οὐδ᾽ ἅπαξ αὐτῶν ἀγωνίσασθαι περὶ θανάτου τολμᾷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῶν ἀνδραποδιστῶν καὶ λωποδυτῶν θάνατον μᾶλλον αἱροῦνται τοῦ προσήκοντος.

Compare Olynthiac ii. p. 26. s. 28; De Chersoneso, p. 95. s. 24-27, cont. Aristokrat. p. 639. s. 69; De Republ. Ordinand. περὶ Συντάξεως, p. 167. s. 7. Also Æschines de Fals. Legat. p. 264. c. 24; Isokrates, De Pace, s. 57. 160.

[465] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 3, 18; vi. 5, 2.

[466] Demosthenes, De Rhodior. Libertat. p. 191. s. 3. ἠτιάσαντο γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἐπιβουλεύειν αὐτοῖς Χῖοι καὶ Βυζάντιοι καὶ Ῥόδιοι, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα συνέστησαν ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς τὸν τελευταῖον τουτονὶ πόλεμον· φανήσεται δ᾽ ὁ μὲν πρυτανεύσας ταῦτα καὶ πείσας Μαύσωλος, φίλος εἶναι φάσκων Ῥοδίων, τὴν ἐλευθερίαν αὐτῶν ἀφῃρημένος.

[467] Demosthen. de Rhodior. Libert. p. 195. s. 17. p. 198 s. 34; de Pace, p. 63. s. 25; Diodor. xvi. 7.

[468] Demosthen. de Pace, p. 63. s. 25. (ἐῶμεν) τὸν Κᾶρα τὰς νήσους καταλαμβάνειν, Χῖον καὶ Κῶν καὶ Ῥόδον, καὶ Βυζαντίους κατάγειν τὰ πλοῖα, etc.

Compare Demosthenes adv. Polykl. p. 1207 s. 6. p. 1211. s. 22; adv. Leptinem, p. 475. s. 68.

[469] Thucyd. viii. 15.

[470] The account of this event comes to us in a meagre and defective manner, Diodorus xvi. 7; Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 4; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 6.

Demosthenes, in an harangue delivered three years afterwards, mentions the death of Chabrias, and eulogizes his conduct at Chios among his other glorious deeds; but gives no particulars (Demosth. cont. Leptin. p. 481, 482).

Cornelius Nepos says that Chabrias was not commander, but only serving as a private soldier on shipboard. I think this less probable than the statement of Diodorus, that he was joint-commander with Chares.

[471] It appears that there was a great and general scarcity of corn during this year 357 B. C. Demosthenes adv. Leptinem, p. 467. s. 38. προπέρυσι σιτοδείας παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις γενομένης, etc. That oration was delivered in 355 B. C.

[472] I follow chiefly the account given of these transactions by Diodorus, meagre and unsatisfactory as it is (xvi. 21). Nepos (Timotheus, c. 3) differs from Diodorus on several points. He states that both Samos and the Hellespont had revolted from Athens; and that the locality in which Chares made his attack, contrary to the judgment of his two colleagues, was near Samos—not in the Hellespont. He affirms farther that Menestheus,

son of Iphikrates, was named as colleague of Chares; and that Iphikrates and Timotheus were appointed as advisers of Menestheus.

As to the last assertion—that Timotheus only served as adviser to his junior relative and not as a general formally named—this is not probable in itself; nor seemingly consistent with Isokrates (Or. xv. De Permutat. s. 137), who represents Timotheus as afterwards passing through the usual trial of accountability. Nor can Nepos be correct in saying that Samos had now revolted: for we find it still in possession of Athens after the Social War, and we know that a fresh batch of Athenian Kleruchs were afterwards sent there.

On the other hand, I think Nepos is probably right in his assertion, that the Hellespont now revolted ("descierat Hellespontus"). This is a fact in itself noway improbable, and helping us to understand how it happened that Chares conquered Sestos afterwards in 353 B. C. (Diodor. xvi. 34), and that the Athenians are said to have *then* recovered the Chersonesus from Kersobleptes.

Polyænus (iii. 9, 29) has a story representing the reluctance of Iphikrates to fight, as having been manifested near Embata; a locality not agreeing either with Nepos or with Diodorus. Embata was on the continent of Asia, in the territory of Erythræ.

See respecting the relations of Athens with Sestos, my last preceding volume, Vol. X. Ch. lxxx. p. 380 note.

Our evidence respecting this period is so very defective, that nothing like certainty is attainable.

[473] Deinarchus cont. Philokl. s. 17. ἕκατον ταλάντων τιμήσαντες (Τιμόθεον), ὅτι χρήματ᾽ αὐτὸν Ἀριστοφῶν ἔφη παρὰ Χίων εἰληφέναι καὶ Ῥοδίων: compare Deinarch. cont. Demosthen. s. 15, where the same charge of bribery is alluded to, though αὐτὸς ἔφη is put in place of αὐτὸν Ἀριστοφῶν ἔφη, seemingly by mistake of the transcriber.

[474] See Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii. 24; iii. 10. Quintilian, Inst. Or. v. 12, 10.

[475] Isokrates, Or. xv. (Permutat.) s. 137. εἰ τοσαύτας μὲν πόλεις ἑλόντα, μηδεμίαν δ᾽ ἀπολέσαντα, περὶ προδοσίας ἔκρινε (ἡ πόλις Τιμόθεον), καὶ πάλιν εἰ διδόντος εὐθύνας αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὰς μὲν πράξεις Ἰφικράτους ἀναδεχομένου, τὸν δ᾽ ὑπὲρ τῶν χρημάτων λόγον Μενεσθέως, τούτους μὲν ἀπέλυσε, Τιμόθεον δὲ τοσούτοις ἐζημίωσε χρήμασιν, ὅσοις οὐδένα πώποτε τῶν προγεγενημένων.

[476] Isokrates, Or. xv. (Permutat.) s. 146. Ταῦτα δ᾽ ἀκούων ὀρθῶς μὲν ἔφασκέ με λέγειν, οὐ μὴν οἷός τ᾽ ἦν τὴν φύσιν μεταβαλεῖν, etc.

Isokrates goes at some length into the subject from s. 137 to s. 147. The discourse was composed seemingly in 353 B. C., about one year after the death of Timotheus, and four years after the trial here described.

[477] Demosthenes cont. Meidiam, p. 534, 535; Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 2. 39.

[478] Dionysius Halikarnass., Judicium de Lysiâ, p. 481; Justin, vi. 5. Aristotle in his Rhetorica borrows several illustrations on rhetorical points from the speeches of Iphikrates; but none from any speeches of Timotheus.

[479] Polyænus, iii. 9, 29. That this may have been done with the privity and even by the contrivance of Iphikrates, is probable enough. But it seems to me that any obvious purpose of intimidating the Dikastery would have been likely to do him more harm than good.

[480] Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, p. 224 *seqq.*), while collecting and discussing instructively all the facts respecting these two commanders, places the date of this memorable trial in the year 354 B. C.; three years after the events to which it relates, and two years after the peace which concluded the Social War. Mr. Clinton (Fast. Hellenici, B. C. 354) gives the same statement. I dissent from their opinion on the date and think that the trial must have occurred very soon after the abortive battle in the Hellespont—that is in 357 B. C. (or 356 B. C.), while the Social War was still going on.

Rehdantz and Mr. Clinton rely on the statement of Dionysius Halikarnass. (De Dinarcho Judicium, p. 667). Speaking of an oration falsely ascribed to Deinarchus, Dionysius says, that it was spoken before the maturity of that orator—εἴρηται γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ Τιμοθέου ζῶντος, κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῆς μετὰ Μενεσθέως στρατηγίας, ἐφ᾽ ᾗ τὰς εὐθύνας ὑποσχὼν, ἐάλω. Τιμόθεος δὲ τὰς εὐθύνας ὑπέσχηκεν ἐπὶ Διοτίμου, τοῦ μετὰ Καλλίστρατον, ὅτε καὶ…. These are the last words in the MS., so that the sentence stands defective; Mr. Clinton supplies ἐτελεύτησεν, which is very probable.

The archonship of Diotimus is in 354-353 B. C.; so that Dionysius here states the trial to have taken place in 354 B. C. But on the other hand, the same Dionysius, in another passage, states the same trial to have taken place while the Social War was yet going on; that is, some time between 358 and 355 B. C. De Lysiâ Judicium, p. 480. ἐν γὰρ τῷ συμμαχικῷ πολέμῳ τὴν εἰσαγγελίαν Ἰφικράτης ἠγώνισται, καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας ὑπέσχηκε τῆς στρατηγίας, ὡς ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου γίγνεται καταφανές· οὗτος δὲ ὁ πόλεμος πίπτει κατὰ Ἀγαθοκλέα καὶ Ἐλπίνην ἄρχοντας. The archonships of Agathokles and Elpines cover the interval between Midsummer 357 B. C. and Midsummer 355 B. C.

It is plain that these two passages of Dionysius contradict each other. Rehdantz and Mr. Clinton notice the contradiction, but treat the passage first cited as containing the truth, and the other as erroneous. I cannot but think that the passage last cited is entitled to most credit, and that the true date of the trial was 357-356 B. C., not 354 B. C. When Dionysius asserts that the trial took place while the Social War was yet going on, he adds, "as is evident from the speech itself—ὡς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίγνεται τοῦ λόγου καταφανές." Here therefore there was no possibility of being misled by erroneous tables; the evidence is direct and complete; whereas he does not tell us on what authority he made the other assertion, about the archonship of Diotimus. Next, it is surely improbable that the abortive combat in the Hellespont, and the fierce quarrel between Chares and his colleagues, probably accompanied with great excitement in the fleet, could have remained without judicial settlement for three years. Lastly, assuming the statement about the archonship of Diotimus to be a mistake, we can easily see how the mistake arose. Dionysius has confounded the year in which Timotheus died, with the year of his trial. He seems to have died in 354 B. C. I will add that the text in this passage is not beyond suspicion.

[481] Cornelius Nepos, Timoth. c. 4; Rehdantz, Vit. Iph., Ch. et Timoth. p. 235; Isokrates, Or. xv. (Permutat.) s. 108, 110. 137.

[482] Diodor. xvi. 22. Demosthenes (Philippic. i. p. 46. s. 28) has an emphatic passage, alluding to this proceeding on the part of Chares; which he represents as a necessary result of the remissness of the Athenians, who would neither serve personally themselves, nor supply their general with money to pay his foreign troops—and as a measure which the general could not avoid.

… ἐξ οὗ δ᾽ αὐτὰ καθ᾽ αὐτὰ τὰ ξενικὰ ὑμῖν στρατεύεται, τοὺς φίλους νικᾷ καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους, οἱ δ᾽ ἐχθροὶ μείζους τοῦ δέοντος γεγόνασιν, καὶ παρακύψαντα ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς πόλεως πόλεμον, πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον καὶ πανταχοῦ μᾶλλον οἴχεται πλέοντα· ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς ἀκολουθεῖ· εἰκότως—οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄρχειν, μὴ διδόντα μισθόν. Compare the Scholia on the same oration, a passage which occurs somewhat earlier, p. 44. s. 22.

It seems evident, from this passage, that the Athenians were at first displeased with such diversion from the regular purpose of the war, though the payment from Artabazus afterwards partially reconciled them to it; which is somewhat different from the statement of Diodorus.

From an inscription (cited in Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc., p. 158) we make out that Chares, Charidemus, and Phokion, were about this time in joint-command of the Athenian fleet near Lesbos, and that they were in some negotiation as to pecuniary supplies with the Persian Orontes on the mainland. But the inscription is so mutilated, that no distinct matter of fact can be ascertained.

[483] Diodor. xvi. 22. I place little reliance on the Argument prefixed to the Oration of Isokrates De Pace. As far as I am able to understand the facts of this obscure period, it appears to me that the author of that Argument has joined them together erroneously, and misconceived the situation.

The assertion of Demosthenes, in the Oration against Leptines (p. 481. s. 90), respecting the behavior of the Chians towards the memory of Chabrias, seems rather to imply that the peace with Chios had been concluded before that oration was delivered. It was delivered in the very year of the peace 355 B. C.

[484] Demosthenes adv. Leptinem, p. 464. s. 26, 27; and De Coronâ, p. 305 s. 293.

[485] Diodor. xvi. 8.

[486] Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 11. s. 8 … εἰ γὰρ, ὅθ᾽ ἥκομεν Εὐβοεῦσι βεβοηθηκότες καὶ παρῆσαν Ἀμφιπολιτῶν Ἱέραξ καὶ Στρατοκλῆς ἐπὶ τουτὶ τὸ βῆμα, κελεύοντες ἡμᾶς πλεῖν καὶ παραλαμβάνειν τὴν πόλιν, τὴν αὐτὴν παρειχόμεθ᾽ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν προθυμίαν ἥνπερ ὑπὲρ τῆς Εὐβοέων σωτηρίας, εἶχετ᾽ ἂν Ἀμφίπολιν τότε καὶ πάντων τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα ἂν ἦτε ἀπαλλαγμένοι πραγμάτων.

[487] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 659. s. 138. … κἀκεῖνο εἰδότες, ὅτι Φίλιππος, ὅτε μὲν Ἀμφίπολιν ἐπολιόρκει, ἵν᾽ ὑμῖν παραδῷ, πολιορκεῖν ἔφη· ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἔλαβε, καὶ Ποτείδαιαν προσαφείλετο.

Also the Oration De Halonneso, p. 83. s. 28. … τῆς δ᾽ ἐπιστολῆς, ἣν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἔπεμψεν (Philip) ὅτ᾽ Ἀμφίπολιν ἐπολιόρκει, ἐπιλέλησται, ἐν ᾗ ὡμολόγει τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν ὑμετέραν εἶναι· ἔφη γὰρ ἐκπολιορκήσας ὑμῖν ἀποδώσειν ὡς οὖσαν ὑμετέραν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τῶν ἐχόντων.

[488] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 660. s. 144.

[489] Diodor. xvi. 8, with the passage from Libanius cited in Wesseling's note. Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 10. s. 5.

Hierax and Stratokles were the Amphipolitan envoys despatched to Athens to ask for aid against Philip. An Inscription yet remains, recording the sentence of perpetual banishment of Philo and Stratokles. See Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. No. 2008.

[490] Thucyd. i. 61, 137; Diodor. xiii. 49. Pydna had been acquired to Athens by Timotheus.

[491] This secret negotiation, about the exchange of Pydna for Amphipolis, is alluded to briefly by Demosthenes, and appears to have been fully noticed by Theopompus (Demosthenes, Olynth. ii. p. 19. s. 6. with the comments of Ulpian; Theopompus, Fr. 189, ed. Didot).

[492] Demosthenes, Philipp. ii. p. 71. s. 22.

[493] Demosthen. adv. Leptinem, p. 476. s. 71. … φέρε δὴ κἀκεῖνο ἐξετάσωμεν, οἱ προδόντες τὴν Πύδναν καὶ τἄλλα χωρία τῷ Φιλίππῳ τῷ ποτ᾽ ἐπαρθέντες ὑμᾶς ἠδίκουν; ἢ πᾶσι πρόδηλον τοῦτο, ὅτι ταῖς παρ᾽ ἐκείνου δωρειαῖς, ἃς διὰ ταῦτα ἔσεσθαι σφίσιν ἡγοῦντο;

Compare Olynthiac i. p. 10. s. 5.

This discourse was pronounced in 355 B. C., thus affording confirmatory evidence of the date assigned to the surrender of Pydna and Potidæa.

What the "other places" here alluded to by Demosthenes are (besides Pydna and Potidæa), we do not know. It appears by Diodorus (xvi. 31) that Methônê was not taken till 354-353 B. C.

[494] The conquests of Philip are always enumerated by Demosthenes in this order, Amphipolis, Pydna, Potidæa, Methônê, etc., Olynthiac i. p. 11. s. 9. p. 12. s. 13; Philippic i. p. 41. s. 6; De Coronâ, p. 248. s. 85.

See Ulpian ad Demosthenem, Olynth. i. p. 10. s. 5; also Diodor. xvi. 8 and Wesseling's note.

[495] In the public vote of gratitude passed many years afterwards by the Athenian assembly towards Demosthenes, his merits are recited; and among them we find this contribution towards the relief of captives at Pydna, Methônê, and Olynthus (Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator, p. 851).

[496] Compare Demosthenes, Olynthiac i. p. 11. s. 9; Philippic i. p. 50. s. 40 (where he mentions the expedition to Potidæa as having come too late, but does not mention any expedition for relief of Pydna.)

[497] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 656. s. 128. πρὸς ὑμᾶς πολεμῶν, χρήματα πολλὰ ἀναλώσας (Philip, in the siege of Potidæa). In this oration (delivered B. C. 352) Demosthenes treats the capture of Potidæa as mainly the work of Philip; in the second Olynthiac, he speaks as if Philip had been a secondary agent, a useful adjunct to the Olynthians in the siege, πάλιν αὖ πρὸς Ποτίδαιαν Ὀλυνθίοις ἐφάνη τι τοῦτο συναμφότερον—*i. e.* the Macedonian power was προσθήκη τις οὐ σμικρά…. The first representation, delivered two or three years before the second, is doubtless the more correct.

[498] Demosthenes, Philipp. ii. p. 71. s. 22. Ποτίδαιαν δ᾽ ἐδίδου, τοὺς Ἀθηναίων ἀποίκους ἐκβάλλων (Philip gave it to the Olynthians), καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐχθρὰν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτὸς ἀνῄρητο, τὴν χώραν δ᾽ ἐκείνοις ἐδεδώκει καρποῦσθαι. The passage in the Oratio de Halonneso (p. 79. s. 10) alludes to this same extrusion and expropriation of the Athenian Kleruchs, though Vœmel and Franke (erroneously, I think) suppose it to allude to the treatment of these Kleruchs by Philip some years afterwards, when he took Potidæa for himself. We may be sure that no Athenian Kleruchs were permitted to stay at Potidæa even after the first capture.

[499] The general description given in the first Philippic of Demosthenes of the ἀπόστολοι from Athens, may doubtless be applied to the expedition for the relief of Potidæa—Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 46. s. 28. p. 53, s. 52. and the general tenor of the harangue.

[500] Diodorus (xvi. 8), in mentioning the capture of Potidæa, considers it an evidence of the kind disposition of Philip, and of his great respect for the dignity of Athens (φιλανθρώπως προσενεγκάμενος) that he spared

the persons of these Athenians in the place, and permitted them to depart. But it was a great wrong, under the circumstances, that he should expel and expropriate them, when no offence had been given to him, and when there was no formal war (Demosth. Or. de Halonneso, p. 79. s. 10).

Diodorus states also that Philip gave Pydna, as well as Potidæa, to the Olynthians; which is not correct.

[501] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 41. s. 6 … εἴχομέν ποτε ἡμεῖς Πύδναν καὶ Ποτίδαιαν καὶ Μεθώνην, καὶ πάντα τὸν τόπον τοῦτον οἰκεῖον κύκλῳ, etc.

[502] Demosthenes, Philipp. ii. p. 70. s. 22.

[503] Diodor. xvi. 4-8; Harpokration v. Δάτον. Herodot. ix. 74.

[504] Diodor. xvi. 22; Plutarch, Alexand. c. 3.

[505] Justin, vii. 6.

[506] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 2. 3. The Bacchæ of Euripides contains a powerful description of these exciting ceremonies.

[507] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 2. ἡ δὲ Ὀλυμπιὰς μᾶλλον ἑτέρων ζηλώσασα τὰς κατοχὰς, καὶ τοὺς ἐνθουσιασμοὺς ἐξάγουσα βαρβαρικώτερον, ὄφεις μεγάλους χειροήθεις ἐφείλκετο τοῖς θιάσοις, etc.

Compare Duris apud Athenæum, xiii. p. 560.

[508] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 3; Justin, xii. 19.

[509] Æschines, De Fals. Legat. p. 280. c. 36. For particulars respecting the Amphiktyonic assembly see the treatise of Tittman, Ueber den Amphiktyonischen Bund, p. 37, 45, *seqq.*

[510] Diodor. xvi. 23-29; Justin, viii. 1.

[511] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. p. 279. c. 35.

[512] Compare Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 5, 23, and vii. 5, 4. About the feud of the Thessalians and Phokians, see Herodot. vii. 176, viii. 27; Æschines, De Fals. Leg. p. 289. c. 43—of the Lokrians and Phokians, Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 5, 3; Pausanias, iii. 9, 4.

[513] Diodor. xvi. 23; Justin, viii. 1; Pausanias, x. 2, 1; Duris ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 560. Justin says, "Causa et origo hujus mali, Thebani fuere; qui cum rerum potirentur, secundam fortunam imbecillo animo ferentes, victos armis Lacedæmonios et Phocenses, quasi parva supplicia cædibus et rapinis luissent, apud commune Græciæ concilium superbe accusaverunt Lacedæmoniis crimini datum, quod arcem Thebanam induciarum tempore occupassent; Phocensibus, quod Bœotiam depopulati essent; prorsus quasi post arma et bellum locum legibus reliquissent."

[514] Diodor. xvi. 23, 24; Pausanias, x. 2, 1.

[515] That this design, imputed to the Thebans, was a part of the case made out by the Phokians for themselves, we may feel assured from the passage in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 347. s. 22. Demosthenes charges Æschines with having made false promises and statements to the Athenian assembly, on returning from his embassy in 346 B. C. Æschines told the Athenians (so Demosthenes affirms) that he had persuaded Philip to act altogether in the interest and policy of Athens; that the Athenians would very presently see Thebes besieged by Philip, and the Bœotian towns restored; and furthermore, τῷ θεῷ δὲ τὰ χρήματα εἰσπραττόμενα, οὐ παρὰ Φωκέων, ἀλλὰ παρὰ Θηβαίων τῶν βουλευσάντων τὴν κατάληψιν τοῦ ἱεροῦ διδάσκειν γὰρ αὐτὸς ἔφη τὸν Φίλιππον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἧττον ἠσεβήκασιν οἱ βεβουλευκότες τῶν ταῖς χερσὶ πραξάντων, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα χρήμαθ᾽ ἑαυτῷ τοὺς Θηβαίους ἐπικεκηρυχέναι.

How far Æschines really promised to the Athenians that which Demosthenes here alleges him to have promised—is a matter to be investigated when we arrive at the transactions of the year 346 B. C. But it seems to me clear that the imputation (true or false) against the Thebans, of having been themselves in conspiracy to seize the temple, must have emanated first from the Phokians, as part of the justification of their own proceedings. If the Thebans ever conceived such an idea, it must have been *before* the actual occupation of the temple by the Phokians, if they were falsely charged with conceiving it, the false charge would also be preferred at the time. Demosthenes would hardly invent it twelve years after the Phokian occupation.

[516] Herodot. i. 54.

[517] Strabo, ix. p. 423.

[518] Thucyd. i. 12.

[519] Thucyd. v. 18.

[520] Justin (viii. 1) takes no notice of this first position of the Phokians in regard to the temple of Delphi. He treats them as if they had been despoilers of the temple even at first; "velut deo irascentes."

[521] Diodor. xvi. 24. Hesychius (v. Λαφριάδαι) mentions another phratry or gens at Delphi, called Laphriadæ. See Wilhelm Götte, Das Delphische Orakel, p. 83. Leipsic, 1839.

It is stated by Pausanias, that the Phokians were bent upon dealing with Delphi and its inhabitants in the harshest manner; intending to kill all the men of military age, to sell the remaining population as slaves, and to raze the whole town to the ground. Archidamus, king of Sparta, (according to Pausanias) induced the Phokians to abandon this resolution (Pausan. iii. 10, 4).

At what moment the Phokians ever determined on this step—or, indeed, whether they ever really determined on it—we cannot feel any certainty. Nor can we decide confidently, whether Pausanias borrowed the statement from Theopompus, whom he quotes a little before.

[522] Didorus xvi. 27. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας τὰς ἐπισημοτάτας τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πόλεων ἀπέστειλεν, ἀπολογούμενος, ὅτι κατείληπται τοὺς Δελφοὺς, οὐ τοῖς ἱεροῖς χρήμασιν ἐπιβουλεύων, ἀλλὰ τῆς τοῦ ἱεροῦ προστασίας ἀμφισβητῶν· εἶναι γὰρ Φωκέων αὐτὴν ἰδίαν ἐν τοῖς παλαιοῖς χρόνοις ἀποδεδειγμένην. Τῶν δὲ χρημάτων τὸν λόγον ἔφη πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἀποδώσειν, καὶ τόν τε σταθμὸν καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀναθημάτων ἕτοιμος εἶναι παραδιδόναι τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐξετάζειν. Ἠξίου δὲ, ἄν τις δι᾽ ἐχθρὰν ἢ φθόνον πολέμῃ Φωκεῦσι, μάλιστα μὲν ξυμμαχεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή γε, τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν.

In reference to the engagement taken by Philomelus, that he would exhibit and verify, before any general Hellenic examiners, all the valuable property in the Delphian temple, by weight and number of articles—the reader will find interesting matter of comparison in the Attic Inscriptions. No. 137-142, vol. i. of Boeckh's Corpus Inscriptt. Græcarum—with Boeckh's valuable commentary. These are the records of the numerous gold and silver donatives, preserved in the Parthenon, handed over by the treasurers of the goddess annually appointed, to their successors at the end of the year, from one Panathenaic festival to the next. The weight of each article is formally recorded, and the new articles received each year (ἐπέτεια) are specified. Where an article is transferred without being weighed (ἄσταθμον), the fact is noticed. That the precious donatives in the Delphian temple also, were carefully weighed, we may judge by the statement of Herodotus, that the golden lion dedicated by Krœsus had lost a fraction of its weight in the conflagration of the building (Herodot. i. 50).

Pausanias (x. 2, 1) does not advert to the difference between the first and the second part of the proceedings of Philomelus; first, the seizure of the temple, without any spoliation of the treasure, but simply upon the plea that the Phokians had the best right to administer its affairs; next, the seizure of the treasure and donatives of the temple—which he came to afterwards, when he found it necessary for defence.

[523] Diodor. xvi. 25, 26, 27.

[524] Diodor. xvi. 25.

[525] Diodor. xvi. 28.

[526] Diodor. xvi. 28. ψηφισαμένων δὲ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων τὸν πρὸς Φωκεῖς πόλεμον, πολλὴ ταραχὴ καὶ διάστασις ἦν καθ᾽ ὅλην τὴν Ἑλλάδα. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔκριναν βοηθεῖν τῷ θεῷ, καὶ τοὺς Φωκεῖς, ὡς ἱεροσύλους, κολάζειν· οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τῶν Φωκέων βοήθειαν ἀπέκλιναν.

[527] Diodor. xvi. 32. about Onomarchus—πολλαῖς γὰρ καὶ μεγάλαις δίκαις ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων ἦν καταδεδικασμένος ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις, etc.

Onomarchus is denominated the colleague of Philomelus, cap. 31, and his brother, cap. 61.

[528] Even in 374 B. C., three years before the battle of Leuktra, the Phokians had been unable to defend themselves against Thebes without aid from Sparta (Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 1).

[529] Diodor. xvi. 30. ἠναγκάζετο (Philomelus) τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἐπιβαλεῖν τὰς χεῖρας καὶ συλᾶν τὸ μαντεῖον. A similar proposition had been started by the Corinthian envoys in the congress at Sparta, shortly before the Peloponnesian war; they suggested as one of their ways and means the borrowing from the treasures

of Delphi and Olympia, to be afterwards repaid (Thucyd. i. 121). Perikles made the like proposition in the Athenian assembly; "for purposes of security," the property of the temples might be employed to defray the cost of war, subject to the obligation of replacing the whole afterwards (χρησαμένους τε ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ ἔφη χρῆναι μὴ ἐλάσσω ἀντικαταστῆσαι πάλιν, Thucyd. ii. 13). After the disaster before Syracuse, and during the years of struggle intervening before the close of the war, the Athenians were driven by financial distress to appropriate to public purposes many of the rich donatives in the Parthenon, which they were never afterwards able to replace. Of this abstraction, proof is found in the Inscriptions published by Boeckh, Corp. Inscript. No. 137-142, which contain the official records of the successive Boards of Treasurers of Athênê. It is stated in an instructive recent Dissertation, by J. L. Ussing (De Parthenone ejusque partibus Disputatio, p. 3. Copenhagen, 1849), "Multæ in arce Athenarum inventæ sunt tabulæ Quæstorum Minervæ, in quibus quotannis inscribebant, quænam vasa aurea aliæque res pretiosæ in æde Minervæ dedicata extarent. Harum longe maxima pars ante Euclidem archontem scripta est…: Nec tamen una tabula templi dona continebat universa, sed separatim quæ in Pronao, quæ in Hecatompedo, quæ in Parthenone (the part of the temple specially so called), servabantur, separatim suis quæque lapidibus consignata erant. Singulari quadam fortuna contigit, ut inde ab anno 434 B. C., ad 407 B. C., tam multa fragmenta tabularum servata sint, ut hos donorum catalogos aliquatenus restituere possimus. In quo etiam ad historiam illius temporis pertinet, quod florentibus Athenarum rebus opes Deæ semper augeri, fractis autem bello Siculo, inde ab anno 412 B. C., eas paulatim deminui videmus…. Urgente pecuniæ inopia Athenienses ad Deam confugiebant, et jam ante annum 406 B. C., pleraque Pronai dona ablata esse videmus. Proximis annis sine dubio nec Hecatompedo nec Parthenoni pepercerunt; nec mirum est, post bellum Peloponnesiacum ex antiquis illis donis fere nulla comparere."

[530] Theopompus, Frag. 182, ed. Didot; Athenæ. xiii. p. 605, vi. p. 232; Ephorus, Frag. 155, ed. Didot; Diodor. xvi. 64.

[531] Isokrates, Orat. v. (ad Philippum) s. 60. τελευτῶντες δὲ πρὸς Φωκέας πόλεμον ἐξήνεγκαν (the Thebans), ὡς τῶν τε πόλεων ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ κρατήσοντες, τόν τε τόπον ἅπαντα τὸν περιέχοντα κατασχήσοντες, τῶν τε χρημάτων τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς περιγενησόμενοι ταῖς ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων δαπάναις.

[532] Diodor. xvi. 31; Pausan. x. 2, 1. The dates and duration of these events are only known to us in a loose and superficial manner from the narrative of Diodorus.

[533] Diodor. xvi. 32. Οἱ δὲ Φωκεῖς—ἐπανῆλθον εἰς Δελφοὺς καὶ συνελθόντες μετὰ τῶν συμμάχων εἰς κοινὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐβουλεύοντο περὶ τοῦ πολέμου.

[534] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 286. c. 41. τῶν ἐν Φωκεῦσι τυράννων, etc. Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 661. s. 147. Φαύλλος ὁ Φωκεὺς ἤ τις ἄλλος δυναστὴς, etc.

[535] Diodor. xvi. 33. The numerous iron spits, dedicated by the courtezan Rhodôpis at Delphi, may probably have been applied to this military purpose. Herodotus (ii. 135) saw them at Delphi; in the time of Plutarch, the guide of the Temple only showed the place in which they had once stood (Plutarch, De Pythiæ Oraculis, p. 400).

[536] Theopompus, Frag. 255, ed. Didot; Pausanias, iii. 10, 2; iv. 5, 1. As Archidamus is said to have furnished fifteen talents privately to Philomelus (Diodor. xvi. 24), he may, perhaps, have received now repayment out of the temple property.

[537] Diodor. xvi. 33.

[538] Diodor. xvi. 33. His account of the operations of Onomarchus is, as usual, very meagre—εἰς δὲ τὴν πολεμίαν ἐμβαλὼν, Θρόνιον μὲν ἐκπολιορκήσας ἐξηνδραποδίσατο, Ἀμφισσεῖς δὲ καταπληξάμενος, τὰς δ᾽ ἐν Δωριεῦσι πόλεις πορθήσας, τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν ἐδῄωσεν.

That Thronium, with Alpônus and Nikæa, were the three places which commanded the pass of Thermopylæ—and that all the three were in possession of the Phokians immediately before they were conquered by Philip of Macedon in 346 B. C.—we know from Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 286. c. 41.

… πρέσβεις πρὸς ὑμᾶς (the Athenians) ἦλθον ἐκ Φωκέων, βοηθεῖν αὐτοῖς κελεύοντες, καὶ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι παραδώσειν Ἀλπωνὸν καὶ Θρόνιον καὶ Νίκαιαν, τὰ τῶν παρόδων τῶν εἰς Πύλας χωρία κύρια.

In order to conquer Thronium, Onomarchus must have marched through and mastered the Epiknemidian Lokrians; and though no place except Thronium is specified by Diodorus, it seems plain that Onomarchus can not have conquered Thronium alone.

[539] Diodor. xvi. 34.

[540] Diodor. xvi. 52.

[541] Diodor. xvi. 34.

[542] Polyænus, iv. 2, 22, seems to belong to this juncture.

[543] We derive what is here stated from the comparison of two passages, put together as well as the uncertainty of their tenor admits, Diodor. xvi. 34, with Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 681. s. 219 (s. 183, in Weber's edition, whose note ought to be consulted). Demosthenes says, Φιλίππου γὰρ εἰς Μαρώνειαν ἐλθόντος ἔπεμψε (Kersobleptes) πρὸς αὐτὸν Ἀπολλωνίδην, πίστεις δοὺς ἐκείνῳ καὶ Παμμένει· καὶ εἰ μὴ κρατῶν τῆς χώρας Ἀμάδοκος ἀπεῖπε Φιλίππῳ μὴ ἐπιβαίνειν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ἐν μέσῳ πολεμεῖν ἡμᾶς πρὸς Καρδιανοὺς ἤδη καὶ Κερσοβλέπτην. Καὶ ὅτι ταῦτ᾽ ἀληθῆ λέγω, λαβὲ τὴν Χάρητος ἐπιστολήν.

The mention of Pammenes, as being within reach of communication with Kersobleptes—the mention of Chares as being at the Chersonese, and sending home despatches—and the notice of Philip as being at Maroneia—all conspire to connect this passage with the year 353-352 B. C., and with the facts referred to that year by Diodorus, xvi. 34. There is an interval of five years between the presence of Chares here alluded to, and the presence of Chares noticed before in the same oration, p. 678. s. 206, immediately after the successful expedition to Eubœa in 358 B. C. During these five years, Kersobleptes had acted in a hostile manner towards Athens in the neighborhood of the Chersonese (p. 680. s. 214), and also towards the two rival Thracian princes, friends of Athens. At the same time Sestos had again revolted; the forces of Athens being engaged in the Social War, from 358 to 355 B. C. In 353 B. C. Chares is at the Hellespont, recovers Sestos, and again defeats the intrigues of Kersobleptes, who makes cession to Athens of a portion of territory which he still held in the Chersonese. Diodorus ascribes this cession of Kersobleptes to the motive of aversion towards Philip and good-will towards the Athenians. Possibly these may have been the motives pretended by Kersobleptes, to whom a certain party at Athens gave credit for more favorable dispositions than the Demosthenic oration against Aristokrates recognizes—as we may see from that oration itself. But I rather apprehend that Diodorus, in describing Kersobleptes as hostile to Philip, and friendly to Athens, has applied to the year 353 B. C. a state of relations which did not become true until a later date, nearer to the time when peace was made between Philip and the Athenians in 346 B. C.

[544] Dionysius, Hal. Judic. de Dinarcho, p. 664; Strabo. xiv. p. 638.

[545] Diodor. xvi, 14. This passage relates to the year 357-356 B. C., and possibly Philip may have begun to meddle in the Thessalian party-disputes even as early as that year; but his effective interference comes two or three years later. See the general order of Philip's aggressions indicated by Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 12. s. 13.

[546] Diodor. xvi. 22.

[547] See a striking passage in Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 48. s. 35. There was another place called Methônê—the Thracian Methônê—situated in the Chalkidic or Thracian peninsula, near Olynthus and Apollonia—of which we shall hear presently.

[548] Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 50. s. 40; Olynth. i. p. 11. s. 9.

[549] Diodorus (xvi. 31-34) mentions the capture of Methônê by Philip twice, in two successive years: first, in 354-353 B. C.; again, more copiously, in 353-352 B. C. In my judgment, the earlier of the two dates is the more probable. In 353-352 B. C., Philip carried on his war in Thrace, near Abdera and Maroneia—and also his war against Onomarchus in Thessaly; which transactions seem enough to fill up the time. From the language of Demosthenes (Olynth. i. p. 12. s. 13), we see that Philip did not attack Thessaly until after the capture of Methônê. Diodorus as well as Strabo (vii. p. 330), and Justin (vii. 6) state that Philip was wounded and lost the sight of one eye in this siege. But this seems to have happened afterwards, near the Thracian Methônê.

Compare Justin, vii. 6; Polyænus, iv. 2. 15. Under the year 354-353 B. C., Diodorus mentions not only the capture of Methônê by Philip, but also the capture of *Pagæ*. Παγὰς δὲ χειρωσάμενος, ἠνάγκασεν ὑποταγῆναι. *Pagæ* is unknown, anywhere near Macedonia and Thessaly. Wesseling and Mr. Clinton suppose *Pagasæ* in Thessaly to be meant. But it seems to me impossible that Philip, who had no considerable power at sea, can have taken Pagasæ, before his wars in Thessaly, and before he had become master of Pheræ, which events did not occur until one year or two years afterwards. Pagasæ is the port of Pheræ, and Lykophron the despot of Pheræ

was still powerful and unconquered. If, therefore, the word intended by Diodorus be Παγασὰς instead of Παγὰς, I think the matter of fact asserted cannot be correct.

[550] This fact is mentioned in the public vote of gratitude passed by the Athenian people to Demosthenes (Plutarch, Vitæ X. Orat. p. 851).

[551] Thucyd. vi. 7. Μεθώνην τὴν ὅμορον Μακεδονίᾳ, etc.

[552] Such is the description of Athenian feeling, as it then stood, given by Demosthenes twenty-four years afterwards in the Oration De Coronâ, p. 230. s. 21.

Τοῦ γὰρ Φωκικοῦ συστάντος πολέμου, πρῶτον μὲν ὑμεῖς οὕτω διέκεισθε, ὥστε Φωκέας μὲν βούλεσθαι σωθῆναι, καίπερ οὐ δίκαια ποιοῦντας ὁρῶντες, Θηβαίοις δ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ἂν ἐφησθῆναι παθοῦσιν, οὐκ ἀλόγως οὐδ᾽ ἀδίκως αὐτοῖς ὀργιζόμενοι, etc.

[553] Diodor. xvi. 58. Βουλόμενος τὰ Λευκτρικὰ φρονήματα συστεῖλαι τῶν Βοιωτῶν, etc., an expression used in reference to Philip a few years afterwards, but more animated and emphatic than we usually find in Diodorus, who, perhaps, borrowed it from Theopompus.

[554] The birth-year of Demosthenes is matter of notorious controversy. No one of the statements respecting it rests upon evidence thoroughly convincing.

The question has been examined with much care and ability both by Mr. Clinton (Fasti Hellen. Appen. xx.) and by Dr. Thirlwall (Histor. G. vol. v. Appen. i. p. 485 seq.); by Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 1-94) more copiously than cautiously, but still with much instruction; also by K. F. Hermann (De Anno Natali Demosthenis), and many other critics.

In adopting the year Olymp. 99. 3 (the archonship of Evander, 382-381 B. C.), I agree with the conclusion of Mr. Clinton and of K. F. Hermann; differing from Dr. Thirlwall, who prefers the previous year (Olymp. 99. 2)—and from Böhnecke, who vindicates the year affirmed by Dionysius (Olymp. 99. 4).

Mr. Clinton fixes the *first month* of Olymp. 99. 3, as the month in which Demosthenes was born. This appears to me greater precision than the evidence warrants.

[555] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 4; Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 78. c. 57; Demosth. cont. Aphob. B. p. 835. According to Æschines, Gylon was put on his trial for having betrayed Nymphæum to the enemy; but not appearing, was sentenced to death in his absence, and became an exile. He then went to Bosphorus (Pantikapæum), obtained the favor of the king (probably Satyrus—see Mr. Clinton's Appendix on the kings of Bosphorus—Fasti Hellenic. Append. xiii, p. 282), together with the grant of a district called Kepi, and married the daughter of a rich man there; by whom he had two daughters. In after-days, he sent these two daughters to Athens, where one of them, Kleobulê, was married to the elder Demosthenes. Æschines has probably exaggerated the gravity of the sentence against Gylon, who seems only to have been fined. The guardians of Demosthenes assert no more than that Gylon was fined, and died with the fine unpaid, while Demosthenes asserts that the fine *was* paid.

Upon the facts here stated by Æschines, a few explanatory remarks will be useful. Demosthenes being born 382-381 B. C., this would probably throw the birth of his mother Kleobulê to some period near the close of the Peloponnesian war, 405-404 B. C. We see, therefore, that the establishment of Gylon in the kingdom of Bosphorus, and his nuptial connection there formed, must have taken place during the closing years of the Peloponnesian war; between 412 B. C. (the year after the Athenian catastrophe at Syracuse) and 405 B. C.

These were years of great misfortune to Athens. After the disaster at Syracuse, she could no longer maintain ascendency over, or grant protection to, a distant tributary like Nymphæum in the Tauric Chersonese. It was therefore natural that the Athenian citizens there settled, engaged probably in the export trade of corn to Athens, should seek security by making the best bargain they could with the neighboring kings of Bosphorus. In this transaction Gylon seems to have stood conspicuously forward, gaining both favor and profit to himself. And when, after the close of the war, the corn-trade again became comparatively unimpeded, he was in a situation to carry it on upon a large and lucrative scale. Another example of Greeks who gained favor, held office, and made fortunes, under Satyrus in the Bosphorus, is given in the Oratio (xvii.) Trapezitica of Isokrates, s. 3, 14. Compare also the case of Mantitheus the Athenian (Lysias pro Mantitheo, Or. xvi. s. 4), who was sent by his father to reside with Satyrus for some time, before the close of the Peloponnesian war; which shows that Satyrus was at that time, when Nymphæum was probably placed under his protection, in friendly relations with Athens.

I may remark that the woman whom Gylon married, though Æschines calls her a Scythian woman, may be supposed more probably to have been the daughter of some Greek (not an Athenian) resident in Bosphorus.

[556] Demosth. cont. Onetor. ii. p. 880. κεκομισμένον μηδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐθέλοντα ποιεῖν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς, εἴτι τῶν δεόντων ἐβούλεσθε πράττειν.

That he ultimately got much less than he was entitled to, appears from his own statement in the oration against Meidias, p. 540.

See Westermann, De Litibus quas Demosthenes oravit ipse, cap. i. p. 15, 16.

Plutarch (Vit. X Oratt. p. 844) says that he voluntarily refrained from enforcing the judgment obtained. I do not clearly understand what is meant by Æschines (cont. Ktesiph. p. 78), when he designates Demosthenes as τὰ πατρῷα καταγελάστως προέμενος.

[557] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 5; Vit. X Orator. p. 844; Hermippus ap. Aul. Gell. iii. 13. Nothing positive can be made out respecting this famous trial; neither the date, nor the exact point in question, nor the manner in which Kallistratus was concerned in it—nor who were his opponents. Many conjectures have been proposed, differing materially one from the other, and all uncertain.

These conjectures are brought together and examined in Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, p. 111-114.

In the month of November, 361 B. C., Kallistratus was in exile at Methônê in the Thermaic Gulf. He had been twice condemned to death by the Athenians (Demosth. cont. Polykl. p. 1221). But when these condemnations took place, we do not know.

[558] Plutarch. Demosth. c. 4. Such a view of the necessity of a power of public speaking, is put forward by Kallikles in the Gorgias of Plato, p. 486, 511. c. 90, 142. τὴν ῥητορικὴν τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις διασώζουσαν, etc. Compare Aristot. Rhetoric, i. 1, 3. Ἄτοπον, εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχρὸν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ, λόγῳ δὲ, οὐκ αἰσχρόν· ὃ μᾶλλον ἴδιόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου τῆς τοῦ σώματος χρείας.

The comparison of Aristotle is instructive as to the point of view of a free Greek. "If it be disgraceful not to be able to protect yourself by your bodily force, it is equally so not to be able to protect yourself by your powers of speaking; which is in a more peculiar manner the privilege of man." See also Tacitus, Dialog. de Orator. c. 5.

[559] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 4; Æschines cont. Timarch. p. 17, 18. c. 27, with Scholia, De Fal. Leg. p. 41. c. 31. εἰ γάρ τις σοῦ τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα χλανίσκια περικλώμενος καὶ τοὺς μαλακοὺς χιτωνίσκους, ἐν οἷς τοὺς κατὰ τῶν φίλων λόγους γράφεις, περιενέγκας, δοίη εἰς τὰς χεῖρας τῶν δικαστῶν, οἶμαι ἂν αὐτοὺς εἴτις μὴ προειπὼν ταῦτα ποιήσειεν, ἀπορήσειν εἴτε γυναικὸς εἴτε ἀνδρὸς εἰλήφασιν ἐσθῆτα. Compare Æsch. Fal. Leg. p. 45.

The foundation of the nickname *Batalus* is not clear, and was differently understood by different persons; compare also Libanius, Vita Demosth. p. 294, ap Westermann, Scriptores Biographici. But it can hardly have been a very discreditable foundation, since Demosthenes takes the name to himself, De Coronâ, p. 289.

[560] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 30.

Εἴπερ ἴσην ῥώμην γνώμῃ, Δημόσθενες, εἶχες,

Οὔποτ᾽ ἂν Ἑλλήνων ἦρξεν Ἄρης Μακεδών.

[561] Position of Demosthenes, πατὴρ τριηραρχικὸς—χρυσέα κρηπὶς, κατὰ Πίνδαρον, etc. (Lucian, Encomium Demosth. vol. iii. p. 499, ed. Reitz.)

[562] See the account given by Demosthenes (cont. Meidiam, p. 539, 540) of the manner in which Meidias and Thrasylochus first began their persecution of him, while the suit against his guardians was still going on. These guardians attempted to get rid of the suit by inducing Thrasylochus to force upon him an exchange of properties (Antidosis), tendered by Thrasylochus, who had just been put down for a trierarchy. If the exchange had been effected, Thrasylochus would have given the guardians a release. Demosthenes could only avoid it by consenting to incur the cost of the trierarchy—20 minæ.

[563] Demosthenes both studied attentively the dialogues, and heard the discourse, of Plato (Cicero, Brutus, 31, 121; Orator. 4, 15; Plutarch, Vit. X Orator. p. 844). Tacitus, Dialog. de Orator. c. 32.

[564] Dionys. Hal. De Thucydide Judicium, p. 944; De Admirab. Vi. Dicend. Demosthen. p. 982, 983.

[565] These and other details are given in Plutarch's Life of Demosthenes, c. 4, 9. They depend upon good evidence; for he cites Demetrius the Phalerean, who heard them himself from Demosthenes in the latter years of his life. The subterranean chamber where Demosthenes practised, was shown at Athens even in the time of Plutarch.

Cicero (who also refers to Demetrius Phalereus), De Divinat. ii. 46, 96. Libanius, Zosimus, and Photius, give generally the same statements, with some variations.

[566] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 9. Ἐπεὶ τόλμαν γε καὶ θάρσος οἱ λεχθέντες ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ λόγοι τῶν γραφέντων μᾶλλον εἶχον· εἴ τι δεῖ πιστεύειν Ἐρατοσθένει καὶ Δημητρίῳ τῷ Φαληρεῖ καὶ τοῖς κωμικοῖς. Ὧν Ἐρατοσθένης μέν φησιν αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις πολλαχοῦ γεγονέναι παράβακχον, ὁ δὲ Φαληρεὺς τὸν ἔμμετρον ἐκεῖνον ὅρκον ὁμόσαι ποτε πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιῶντα. Again, c. 11. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς ὑποκρινόμενος ἤρεσκε θαυμαστῶς, οἱ δὲ χαριέντες ταπεινὸν ἡγοῦντο καὶ ἀγεννὲς αὐτοῦ τὸ πλάσμα καὶ μαλακὸν, ὧν καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεύς ἐστιν.

This sentence is illustrated by a passage in Quintilian, i. 8. 2. "Sit autem in primis lectio virilis, et cum suavitate quadam gravis: et non quidem prosæ similis—quia carmen est, et se poetæ canere testantur—non tamen in canticum dissoluta, nec *plasmate* (ut nunc a plerisque fit) effeminata."

The meaning of *plasma*, in the technical language of rhetoricians contemporary with Quintilian, seems different from that which it bears in Dionysius, p. 1060-1061. But whether Plutarch has exactly rendered to us what Demetrius Phalereus said of Demosthenes—whether Demetrius spoke of the modulation of Demosthenes as being *low* and *vulgar*—I cannot but doubt. Æschines urges very different reproaches against him—overmuch labor and affectation, but combined with bitterness and malignity (adv. Ktesiph. p. 78-86). He denounces the *character* of Demosthenes as low and vulgar—but not his oratorical delivery. The expression ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιῶν, which Plutarch cites from Demetrius Phalereus, hardly suits well with ταπεινὸν καὶ ἀγεννές.

[567] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 11. Αἰσίωνα δέ φησιν Ἕρμιππος, ἐρωτηθέντα περὶ τῶν πάλαι ῥητόρων καὶ τῶν καθ᾽ αὐτὸν, εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἀκούων μὲν ἄν τις ἐθαύμασεν ἐκείνους εὐκόσμως καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς τῷ δήμῳ

διαλεγομένους, ἀναγινωσκόμενοι δὲ οἱ Δημοσθένους λόγοι πολὺ τῇ κατασκευῇ καὶ δυνάμει διαφέρουσιν.

[568] Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dicend. Demosth. p. 1022, a very remarkable passage.

[569] Æschines cont. Timarch. p. 16, 24.

[570] Æschines cont. Timarchum, p. 13, 17, 25, cont. Ktesiphont. p. 78. Περὶ δὲ τὴν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν δίαιταν τίς ἐστιν; Ἐκ τριηράρχου λογογράφος ἀνεφάνη, τὰ πατρῷα καταγελάστως προέμενος, etc.

See also Demosthenes, De Fals. Legat. p. 417-420.

Compare the shame of the rich youth Hippokrates, in the Platonic dialogue called Protagoras, when the idea is broached that he is about to visit Protagoras for the purpose of becoming himself a sophist (Plato, Protagor. p. 154 F, 163 A, cap. 8-19).

[571] Ælian, V. H. iii. 47; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 10; Cornelius Nepos, Phokion, c. 1.

[572] I introduce here this reservation as to time, not as meaning to affirm the contrary with regard to the period after Philip's death, but as wishing to postpone for the present the consideration of the later charges against Demosthenes—the receipt of money from Persia, and the abstraction from the treasures of Harpalus. I shall examine these points at the proper time.

[573] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 8. Ὁμολογεῖται γὰρ, ὅτι πέντε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα στρατηγίας ἔλαβεν οὐδ᾽ ἅπαξ ἀρχαιρεσίοις παρατυχὼν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπόντα μεταπεμπομένων αὐτὸν ἀεὶ καὶ χειροτονούντων, ὥστε θαυμάζειν τοὺς οὐκ εὖ φρονοῦντας τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι πλεῖστα τοῦ Φωκίωνος ἀντικρούοντος αὐτῷ καὶ μηδὲν εἰπόντος πώποτε μηδὲ πράξαντος πρὸς χάριν, ὥσπερ ἀξιοῦσι τοὺς βασιλεῖς τοῖς κόλαξι χρῆσθαι μετὰ τὸ κατὰ χειρὸς ὕδωρ, ἐχρῆτο οὗτος τοῖς μὲν κομψοτέροις καὶ ἱλαροῖς ἐν παιδιᾶς μέρει δημαγωγοῖς, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀεὶ νήφων καὶ σπουδάζων τὸν αὐστηρότατον καὶ φρονιμώτατον ἐκάλει τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ μόνον ἢ μᾶλλον ταῖς βουλήσεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁρμαῖς ἀντιτασσόμενον.

[574] Tacit. Dialog. de Clar. Orator. c. 2. "Aper, communi eruditione imbutus, contemnebat potius literas quam nesciebat."

[575] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 4, 14.

[576] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 5. ἡ τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων κοπὶς πάρεστιν.

[577] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 5. εἰπεῖν—ὅτι ῥήτωρ μὲν ἄριστος εἴη Δημοσθένης, εἰπεῖν δὲ δεινότατος ὁ Φωκίων.

[578] So Tacitus, after reporting the exact reply of the tribune Subrias Flavius, when examined as an accomplice in the conspiracy against Nero—"Ipsa retuli verba: quia non, ut Senecæ, vulgata erant; nec minus nosci decebat sensus militaris viri incomptos sed validos."

[579] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 4, 5.

[580] Cornelius Nepos (Phocion, c. 1) found in his authors no account of the military exploits of Phokion but much about his personal integrity.

[581] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 8. Οὕτω δὲ συντάξας ἑαυτὸν ἐπολιτεύετο μὲν ἀεὶ πρὸς εἰρήνην καὶ ἡσυχίαν, etc.

[582] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16. See the first repartee there ascribed to Phokion.

[583] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7.

[584] See the replies of Phokion in Plutarch, Phokion, c. 23.

[585] I have more than once referred to the memorable picture of the Athenian character, in contrast with the Spartan, drawn by the Corinthian envoy at Sparta in 432 B. C. (Thucyd. i. 70, 71). Among the many attributes, indicative of exuberant energy and activity, I select those which were most required, and most found wanting, as the means of keeping back Philip.

1. Παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταὶ, καὶ παρὰ γνώμην κινδυνευταὶ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες.

2. Ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς μελλητὰς καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους (in opposition to *you*, Spartans).

3. Τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν ἀλλοτριωτάτοις ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως χρῶνται, τῇ γνώμῃ δὲ οἰκειοτάτῃ ἐς τὸ πράσσειν τι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς, etc.

4. Καὶ ταῦτα μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων δι᾽ ὅλου τοῦ αἰῶνος μοχθοῦσι, καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ κτᾶσθαι καὶ μήτε ἑορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πρᾶξαι, ξυμφοράν τε οὐχ ἧσσον ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα ἢ ἀσχολίαν ἐπίπονον, etc.

To the same purpose Perikles expresses himself in his funeral oration of the ensuing year; extolling the vigor and courage of his countrymen, as alike forward and indefatigable—yet as combined also with a love of public discussion, and a taste for all the refinements of peaceful and intellectual life (Thucyd. ii. 40, 41).

[586] Thucyd. ii. 40, 41, 43. τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἔργῳ θεωμένους καὶ ἐραστὰς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς, καὶ ὅταν ὑμῖν μεγάλη δόξῃ εἶναι, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, etc.

Compare ii. 63—the last speech of Perikles.

[587] Thucyd. i. 80, 81, 141.

[588] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 2, 21. The allied cities furnished money instead of men in the expedition of Mnasippus to Korkyra (Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 2, 16).

[589] Thucyd. i. 99.

[590] Isokrates, Orat. v. (Philipp.) s. 112. … ἐν ἐκείνοις δὲ τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἦν ξενικὸν οὐδέν, ὥστ᾽ ἀναγκαζόμενοι ξενολογεῖν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, πλέον ἀνήλισκον εἰς τὰς διδομένας τοῖς συλλέγουσι δωρεὰς, ἢ τὴν εἰς τοὺς στρατιώτας μισθοφοράν.

About the liberal rewards of Cyrus to the generals Klearchus, Proxenus, and others, for getting together the army, and to the soldiers themselves also, see Xenoph. Anabas. i. 1, 9; i. 3, 4; iii. 1, 4; vi. 8, 48.

[591] See the mention of the mercenary Greeks in the service of the satrapess Mania in Æolis—of the satraps, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, and of the Spartan Agesilaus—Iphikrates and others, Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 1, 13; iii. 3, 15; iv. 2, 5; iv. 3, 15; iv. 4, 14; iv. 8, 35; vii. 5, 10.

Compare Harpokration—Ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ—and Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 46.

[592] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 5.

[593] Isokrates pours forth this complaint in many places: in the fourth or Panegyrical Oration (B. C. 380); in the eighth or Oratio de Pace (356 B. C.); in the fifth or Oratio ad Philippum (346 B. C.). The latest of these discourses is delivered in the strongest language. See Orat. Panegyr. s. 195 τοὺς δ᾽ ἐπὶ ξένης μετὰ παιδῶν καὶ γυναικῶν ἀλᾶσθαι, πολλοὺς δὲ δι᾽ ἔνδειαν τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἐπικουρεῖν (*i. e.* to become an ἐπικοῦρος, or paid soldier in foreign service) ἀναγκαζομένους ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τοῖς φίλοις μαχομένους ἀποθνήσκειν. See also Orat. De Pace (viii.) s. 53, 56, 58; Orat. ad. Philipp. (v.) s. 112. οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει τὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ὥστε ῥᾷον εἶναι συστῆσαι στρατόπεδον μεῖζον καὶ κρεῖττον ἐκ τῶν πλανωμένων ἢ τῶν πολιτευομένων, etc…. also s. 142, 149; Orat. de Permutat. (xv.) s. 122. ἐν τοῖς στρατοπέδοις τοῖς πλανωμένοις κατατετριμμένος, etc. A melancholy picture of the like evils is also presented in the ninth Epistle of Isokrates, to Archidamus, s. 9, 12. Compare Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 665. s. 162.

For an example of a disappointed lover who seeks distraction by taking foreign military service, see Theokritus, xiv. 58.

[594] Isokrates ad Philipp. (v.) s. 142-144. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κτίσαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ, καὶ κατοικίσαι τοὺς νῦν μὲν πλανωμένους δι᾽ ἔνδειαν τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν καὶ λυμαινομένους οἷς ἂν ἐντύχωσιν. Οὓς εἰ μὴ παύσομεν ἀθροιζομένους, βίον αὐτοῖς ἱκανὸν πορίσαντες, λήσουσιν ἡμᾶς τοσοῦτοι γενόμενοι τὸ πλῆθος, ὥστε μηδὲν ἧττον αὐτοὺς εἶναι φοβεροὺς τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἢ τοῖς βαρβάροις, etc.

[595] Thucyd. ii. 41 (the funeral harangue of Perikles)—ξυνελὼν τε λέγω τήν τε πόλιν πᾶσαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσιν εἶναι, καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον δοκεῖν ἂν μοι τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα παρ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν εἴδη καὶ μετὰ χαρίτων μάλιστ᾽ ἂν εὐτραπέλως τὸ σῶμα αὔταρκες παρέχεσθαι.

[596] The remarkable organization of the Macedonian army, with its systematic combination of different arms and sorts of troops—was the work of Philip. Alexander found it ready made to his hands, in the very first months of his reign. It must doubtless have been gradually formed; year after year improved by Philip; and we

should be glad to be enabled to trace the steps of his progress. But unfortunately we are left without any information about the military measures of Philip, beyond bare facts and results. Accordingly I am compelled to postpone what is to be said about the Macedonian military organization until the reign of Alexander, about whose operations we have valuable details.

[597] Herodot. viii. 137.

[598] This poor condition of the Macedonian population at the accession of Philip, is set forth in the striking speech made thirty-six years afterwards by Alexander the Great (in 323 B. C., a few months before his death) to his soldiers, satiated with conquest and plunder, but discontented with his increasing insolence and Orientalism.

Arrian, Exp. Alex. vii. 9. Φίλιππος γὰρ παραλαβὼν ὑμᾶς πλανήτας καὶ ἀπόρους, ἐν διφθέραις τοὺς πολλοὺς νέμοντας ἀνὰ τὰ ὄρη πρόβατα κατὰ ὀλίγα, καὶ περὶ τούτων κακῶς μαχομένους Ἰλλυρίοις καὶ Τριβαλλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ὁμόροις Θρᾳξί, χλαμύδας μὲν ὑμῖν ἀντὶ τῶν διφθερῶν φορεῖν ἔδωκε, κατήγαγε δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὀρῶν ἐς τὰ πεδία, etc.

Other points are added in the version given by Quintus Curtius of the same speech (x. 10)—"En tandem! Illyriorum paulo ante et Persarum tributariis, Asia et tot gentium spolia fastidio sunt. Modo sub Philippo seminudis, amicula ex purpura sordent: aurum et argentum oculi ferre non possunt; lignea enim vasa desiderant, et ex cratibus scuta et rubiginem gladiorum."

[599] Thucydides (ii. 100) recognizes the goodness of the Macedonian cavalry: so also Xenophon, in the Spartan expedition against Olynthus (Hellen. v. 2, 40).

That the infantry were of little military efficiency, we see from the judgment of Brasidas—Thucyd. iv. 26. compare also ii. 100.

See O. Müller's short tract on the Macedonians, annexed to his History of the Dorians, s. 33.

[600] Aristot. Polit. vii. 2, 6.

[601] Herodot. vii. 102. τῇ Ἑλλάδι πενίη μὲν αἰεί κοτε σύντροφός ἐστι, etc.

About the Persians, Herodot. i. 71; Arrian, v. 4, 13.

[602] The oration De Symmoriis is placed by Dionysius of Halikarnassus in the archonship of Diotimus, 354-353 B. C. (Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum. p. 724). And it is plainly composed prior to the expedition sent by the Thebans under Pammenês to assist the revolted Artabazus against the Great King; which expedition is placed by Diodorus (xvi. 34) in the ensuing year 353-352 B. C. Whoever will examine the way in which Demosthenes argues, in the Oration De Symmoriis (p. 187. s. 40-42), as to the relations of the Thebans with Persia—will see that he cannot have known anything about assistance given by the Thebans to Artabazus against Persia.

[603] Diodor. xvi. 21.

[604] Demosthenes cont. Timokratem, s. 15; see also the second Argument prefixed to that Oration.

[605] See Epistola Philipp. ap. Demosthen. p. 160. s. 6.

[606] Demosthenes, De Symmoriis, p. 179. s. 7. Οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἴσης ὁρῶ τοῖς τ᾽ ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι καὶ ὑμῖν περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα τὴν βουλὴν οὖσαν—ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνων μὲν πολλοῖς ἐνδέχεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ τῶν ἰδίᾳ τι συμφερόντων διοικουμένοις τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἀμελῆσαι, ὑμῖν δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἀδικουμένοις παρὰ τῶν ἀδικούντων καλόν ἐστι λαβεῖν ταύτην τὴν δίκην, ἐᾶσαί τινας αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῷ βαρβάρῳ γενέσθαι.

[607] Demosthen. De Symmor. p. 181. s. 14.

[608] Demosthen. De Symmor. p. 188. s. 42-46. … Ὥστ᾽ οὔτε φοβεῖσθαί φημι δεῖν πέρα τοῦ μετρίου, οὔθ᾽ ὑπαχθῆναι προτέρους ἐκφέρειν τὸν πόλεμον….

… Τοῦτον ἡμεῖς φοβώμεθα; μηδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ μηδ᾽ ἀδικῶμεν, αὐτῶν ἡμῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπιστίας· ἐπεὶ εἴ γ᾽ ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἦν μετὰ πάντων ἐπιθέσθαι μόνῳ, οὐδ᾽ ἀδικεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐκεῖνον ἀδίκημ᾽ ἂν ἔθηκα. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει, φυλάττεσθαί φημι δεῖν μὴ πρόφασιν δῶμεν βασιλεῖ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ζητεῖν· ἡσυχίαν μὲν γὰρ ἐχόντων ὑμῶν, ὕποπτος ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτό τι πράττων—πόλεμον δὲ ποιησαμένων προτέρων εἰκότως ἂν δοκοίη διὰ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐχθρὰν τοῖς ἄλλοις φίλος εἶναι βούλεσθαι. Μὴ οὖν ἐξελέγξητε ὡς κακῶς ἔχει τὰ Ἑλληνικά, συγκαλοῦντες ὅτ᾽ οὐ πείσετε, καὶ πολεμοῦντες ὅτ᾽ οὐ δυνήσεσθε· ἀλλ᾽ ἔχετε ἡσυχίαν θαῤῥοῦντες καὶ παρασκευαζόμενοι.

[609] Demosthen. De Symmor. p. 181. s. 17. Τὴν μὲν παρασκευὴν, ὅπως ὡς ἄριστα καὶ τάχιστα γενήσεται, πάνυ πολλὰ πράγματα ἔσχον σκοπῶν.

[610] Demosthenes, De Symmoriis, p. 182. s. 18. Ἔστι τοίνυν πρῶτον μὲν τῆς παρασκευῆς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ μέγιστον, οὕτω διακεῖσθαι τὰς γνώμας ὑμᾶς, ὡς ἕκαστον ἕκοντα προθύμως ὅ,τι ἂν δέῃ ποιήσοντα. Ὁρᾶτε γὰρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι, ὅσα μὲν πώποθ᾽ ἅπαντες ὑμεῖς ἠβουλήθητε, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τὸ πράττειν αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ προσήκειν ἡγήσατο, οὐδὲν πώποθ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἐξέφυγεν· ὅσα δ᾽ ἠβουλήθητε μὲν, μετὰ ταῦτα δ᾽ ἀπεβλέψατε πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὡς αὐτὸς μὲν ἕκαστος οὐ ποιήσων, τὸν δὲ πλησίον πράξοντα, οὐδὲν πώποθ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐγένετο. Ἐχόντων δ᾽ ὑμῶν οὕτω καὶ αρωξυμμένων, etc.

[611] Thucyd. ii. 39, 40.

[612] Aristophanes, Equit. 750.

[613] Demosthenes, Orat. pro Megalopolitanis, p. 203. s. 5. p. 210. s. 36. Ἔστι τοίνυν ἔν τινι τοιούτῳ καιρῷ τὰ πράγματα νῦν, εἴ τι δεῖ τοῖς εἰρημένοις πολλάκις παρ᾽ ὑμῖν λόγοις τεκμήρασθαι, ὥστε Θηβαίους μὲν Ὀρχομενοῦ καὶ Θεσπιῶν καὶ Πλαταιῶν οἰκισθεισῶν ἀσθενεῖς γενέσθαι, etc. Ἂν μὲν τοίνυν καταπολεμηθῶσιν οἱ Θηβαῖοι, ὥσπερ αὐτοὺς δεῖ, etc.

Compare Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 654. s. 120.

[614] Demosthenes pro Megalopol. p. 206. s. 18; compare Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 2, 1-5.

[615] Demosthenes pro Megalopolit. p. 202. s. 1.

[616] Demosthen. pro Megalop. p. 203. s. 5, 6. Compare a similar sentiment, Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 654. s. 120.

[617] Demosthen. pro Megalop. p. 203. s. 7, 9. p. 207. s. 22.

[618] See Demosthen. cont. Leptinem, p. 489. s. 172 (delivered 355 B. C.) and Olynthiac i. p. 16. s. 27.

[619] Demosthenes pro Megalopol. p. 207. s. 24.

[620] Diodor. xvi. 14; Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 241. s. 60. Harpokration v. Σίμος.

[621] Isokrates, Orat. viii. (De Pace) s. 143, 144.

[622] Diodor. xvi. 35.

[623] Diodor. xvi. 35.

[624] This fact is mentioned by Justin (vii. 2), and seems likely to be true, from the severity with which Philip, after his victory, treated the Phokian prisoners. But the farther statement of Justin is not likely to be true—that the Phokians, on beholding the insignia of the god, threw away their arms and fled without resistance.

[625] Diodor. xvi. 55; Pausan. x. 2, 3; Philo Judæus apud Eusebium Præp. Evang. viii. p. 392. Diodorus states that Chares with the Athenian fleet was sailing by, *accidentally*. But this seems highly improbable. It cannot but be supposed that he was destined to coöperate with the Phokians.

[626] Diodor. xvi. 37.

[627] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 50. s. 40. Καίτοι, τί δήποτε νομίζετε … τοὺς ἀποστόλους πάντας ὑμῖν ὑστερίζειν τῶν καιρῶν, τὸν εἰς Μεθώνην, τὸν εἰς Παγασὰς, τὸν εἰς Ποτίδαιαν, etc.

Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 11. s. 9. Καὶ πάλιν ἥνικα Πύδνα, Ποτίδαια, Μεθώνη, Παγασαὶ—πολιορκούμενα ἀπηγγέλλετο, εἰ τότε τούτων ἑνὶ τῷ πρώτῳ προθύμως καὶ ὡς προσῆκεν ἐβοηθήσαμεν αὐτοὶ, etc.

The first Philippic was delivered in 352-351 B. C., which proves that Philip's capture of Pagasæ cannot have been later than that year. Nor can it have been earlier than his capture of Pheræ—as I have before remarked in reference to the passage of Diodorus (xvi. 31), where it seems to be placed in 354-353 B. C.; if Παγὰς is to be taken for Παγασάς.

I apprehend that the first campaign of Philip in Thessaly against the Phokians, wherein he was beaten and driven out by Onomarchus, may be placed in the summer of 353 B. C. The second entrance into Thessaly, with

the defeat and death of Onomarchus, belongs to the early spring of 352 B. C. The capture of Pheræ and Pagasæ comes immediately afterwards; then the expedition of Philip to Thermopylæ, where his progress was arrested by the Athenians comes about Midsummer 352 B. C.

[628] Demosthenes, De Pace, p. 62. s. 23; Philippic ii. p. 71. s. 24; De Fals. Legat. p. 443. s. 365.

[629] Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. p. 367. s. 94. p. 446. s. 375. Τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὑμῶν ὅτι τῷ Φωκέων πολέμῳ καὶ τῷ κυρίους εἶναι Πυλῶν Φωκέας, ἥ τε ἀπὸ Θηβαίων ἄδεια ὑπῆρχεν ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ μηδέποτ᾽ ἐλθεῖν ἂν εἰς Πελοπόννησον μηδ᾽ εἰς Εὔβοιαν Φίλιππον μηδὲ Θηβαίους;

[630] Diodor. xvi. 37, 38.

[631] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 44. s. 20; De Coronâ, p. 236. s. 40; De Fals. Leg. p. 444. s. 366.

[632] Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. p. 367. s. 95.

[633] Thucyd. vi. 31.

[634] Justin, vii. 2. His rhetorical exaggerations ought not to make us reject the expression of this opinion against Athens, as a real fact.

[635] Demosthenes (Fals. Leg. p. 443) affirms that no one else except Athens assisted or rescued the Phokians in this emergency. But Diodorus (xvi. 37) mentions succors from the other allies also; and there seems no ground for disbelieving him. The boast of Demosthenes, however, that Athens single-handed saved the Phokians, is not incorrect as to the main fact, though overstated in the expression. For the Athenians, commanding a naval force, and on this rare occasion rapid in their movements, reached Thermopylæ in time to arrest the progress of Philip, and before the Peloponnesian troops could arrive. The Athenian expedition to Thermopylæ seems to have occurred about May 352 B. C.—as far as we can make out the chronology of the time.

[636] Diodor. xvi. 56. The account of these donatives of Krœsus may be read in Herodotus (i. 50, 51), who saw them at Delphi. As to the exact weight and number, there is some discrepancy between him and Diodorus; moreover the text of Herodotus himself is not free from obscurity.

[637] Theopomp. Fragm. 182, 183; Phylarchus, Frag. 60, ed. Didot; Anaximenes and Ephorus ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 231, 232. The Pythian games here alluded to must have been those celebrated in August or September 350 B. C. It would seem therefore that Phayllus survived over that period.

[638] Diodor. xvi. 56, 57. The story annexed about Iphikrates and the ships of Dionysius of Syracuse—a story which, at all events, comes quite out of its chronological place—appears to me not worthy of credit, in the manner in which Diodorus here gives it. The squadron of Dionysius, which Iphikrates captured on the coast of Korkyra, was coming to the aid and at the request of the Lacedæmonians, then at war with Athens (Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 2, 33). It was therefore a fair capture for an Athenian general, together with all on board. If, amidst the cargo, there happened to be presents intended for Olympia and Delphi, these, as being on board of ships of war, would follow the fate of the other persons and things along with them. They would not be considered as the property of the god until they had been actually dedicated in his temple. Nor would the person sending them be entitled to invoke the privilege of a consecrated cargo unless he divested it of hostile accompaniment. The letter of complaint to the Athenians, which Diodorus gives as having been sent by Dionysius, seems to me neither genuine nor even plausible.

[639] Timæus, Fragm. 67, ed. Didot; ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 264-272.

[640] Diodor. xvi. 57: compare Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 367.

[641] Diodor. xvi. 37, 38.

[642] Diodor. xvi. 52.

[643] Diodor. xvi. 34.

[644] Diodor. xvi. 39.

[645] Diodor. xvi. 38.

[646] Diodor. xvi. 38, 39.

[647] Diodor. xvi. 40. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων, Θηβαῖοι κάμνοντες τῷ πρὸς Φωκεῖς πολέμῳ, καὶ χρημάτων ἀπορούμενοι, πρέσβεις ἐξέπεμψαν πρὸς τὸν τῶν Περσῶν βασιλέα…. Τοῖς δὲ Βοιωτοῖς καὶ τοῖς Φωκεῦσιν ἀκροβολισμοὶ μὲν καὶ χώρας καταδρομαὶ συνέστησαν, πράξεις δὲ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν (351-350 B. C.—according to the chronology of Diodorus) οὐ συνετελέσθησαν.

[648] Isokrates, Orat. v. (ad Philipp.) s. 61.

[649] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 46. s. 26. (352-351 B. C.)

Compare Philippic iii. p. 124. s. 63.

[650] Demosthenes, Olynth. ii. p. 23. s. 17. (delivered in 350 B. C.) … Οἱ δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὸν ὄντες ξένοι καὶ πεζέταιροι δόξαν μὲν καὶ ἔχουσιν ὡς εἰσὶ θαυμαστοὶ καὶ συγκεκροτημένοι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, etc.

[651] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 657. s. 133 (352-351 B. C.); also Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 15. s. 23. (349 B. C.) ἤκουον δ᾽ ἔγωγέ τινων ὡς οὐδὲ τοὺς λιμένας καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς ἔτι δώσοιεν αὐτῷ καρποῦσθαι· τὰ γὰρ κοινὰ τὰ Θετταλῶν ἀπὸ τούτων δέοι διοικεῖν, οὐ Φίλιππον λαμβάνειν· εἰ δὲ τούτων ἀποστερηθήσεται τῶν χρημάτων, εἰς στενὸν κομιδῇ τὰ τῆς τροφῆς τοῖς ξένοις αὐτῷ καταστήσεται.

[652] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 657. s. 131-133 (352-351 B. C.); compare Isokrates, Orat. v. (ad Philipp. s. 5.)

[653] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 4, 56; Hermippus ap. Athenæum, i. p. 27. About the lucrative commerce in the Gulf, in reference to Demetrias and Thebæ Phthiotides, see Livy, xxxix. 25.

[654] Demosthenes cont. Polykl. p. 1207; De Coronâ Trierarchicâ, p. 1230; Diodor. xv. 95; Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 11.

[655] Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 15. s. 23. Καὶ γὰρ Παγασὰς ἀπαιτεῖν αὐτόν εἰσιν ἐψηφισμένοι (the Thessalians re-demand the place from Philip), καὶ Μαγνησίαν κεκωλύκασι τειχίζειν. In Olynth. ii. p. 21. s. 11. it stands —καὶ γὰρ νῦν εἰσὶν ἐψηφισμένοι Παγασὰς ἀπαιτεῖν, καὶ περὶ Μαγνησίας λόγους ποιεῖσθαι. I take the latter expression to state the fact with more strict precision; the Thessalians passed a vote to *remonstrate* with Philip; it is not probable that they *actually hindered him*. And if he afterwards "gave to them Magnesia," as we are told in a later oration delivered 344 B. C. (Philippic ii. p. 71. s. 24), he probably gave it with reserve of the fortified posts to himself; since we know that his ascendency over Thessaly was not only not relaxed, but became more violent and compressive.

The value which the Macedonian kings always continued to set, from this time forward, upon Magnesia and the recess of the Pagasæan Gulf, is shown in the foundation of the city of Demetrias in that important position, by Demetrius Poliorketes, about sixty years afterwards. Demetrias, Chalkis, and Corinth came to be considered the most commanding positions in Greece.

This fine bay, with the fertile territory lying on its shores under Mount Pelion, are well described by colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iv. ch. 41. p. 373 *seqq.* I doubt whether either Ulpian (ad Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 24) or colonel Leake (p. 381) are borne out in supposing that there was any *town* called *Magnesia* on the shores of the Gulf. None such is mentioned either by Strabo or by Skylax; and I apprehend that the passages above cited from Demosthenes mean *Magnesia the region* inhabited by the Magnetes; as in Demosthenes cont. Neæram. p. 1382. s. 141.

[656] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 46. s. 25. δεῖ γὰρ, ἔχοντος ἐκείνου ναυτικὸν, καὶ ταχειῶν τριηρῶν ἡμῖν, ὅπως ἀσφαλῶς ἡ δύναμις πλέῃ.—p. 49. s. 38. Πρῶτον μὲν, τὸν μέγιστον τῶν ἐκείνου πόρων ἀφαιρήσεσθε· ἔστι δ᾽ οὗτος τίς; ἀπὸ τῶν ὑμετέρων ὑμῖν πολεμεῖ συμμάχων, ἄγων καὶ φέρων τοὺς πλέοντας τὴν θάλασσαν. Ἔπειτα, τί πρὸς τοῦτῳ; τοῦ πάσχειν αὐτοὶ κακῶς ἔξω γενήσεσθε, οὐχ ὥσπερ τὸν παρελθόντα χρόνον εἰς Λῆμνον καὶ Ἴμβρον ἐμβαλὼν αἰχμαλώτους πολίτας ὑμετέρους ᾤχετ᾽ ἄγων, πρὸς τῷ Γεραιστῷ τὰ πλοῖα συλλαβὼν ἀμύθητα χρήματ᾽ ἐξέλεξε, τὰ τελευταῖα εἰς Μαραθῶνα ἀπέβη, καὶ τὴν ἱερὰν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας ᾤχετ᾽ ἔχων τριήρη, etc.

We can hardly be certain that the Sacred Trireme thus taken was either the Paralus or the Salaminia; there may have been other sacred triremes besides these two.

[657] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 52. s. 49. ὁρῶν τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν τοῦ πολέμου γεγενημένην ὑπὲρ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι Φίλιππον, τὴν δὲ τελευτὴν οὖσαν ἤδη ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παθεῖν κακῶς ὑπὸ Φιλίππου. (Between Midsummer 352 and Midsummer 351 B. C.)

[658] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 660. s. 144. p. 656. s. 130. Ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μάλιστα δοκῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ἐχθρὸς εἶναι Φίλιππος οὑτοσί, etc. (this harangue also between Midsummer 352 and Midsummer 351 B. C.)

[659] Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13.

[660] Demosthenes, Olynth. iii. p. 29. s. 5 (delivered in the latter half of 350 B. C.)

… ἀπηγγέλθη Φίλιππος ὑμῖν ἐν Θράκῃ, τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ἔτος τουτὶ, Ἠραῖον τεῖχος πολιορκῶν, τότε τοίνυν μὴν μὲν ἦν Μαιμακτηριών, etc.

This Thracian expedition of Philip (alluded to also in Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13) stands fixed to the date of November 352 B. C., on reasonably good grounds.

That the town or fortress called Ἠραῖον Τεῖχος was near to the Chersonese, cannot be doubted. The commentators identify it with Ἠραῖον, mentioned by Herodotus (iv. 90) as being near Perinthus. But this hypothesis is open to much doubt. Ἠραῖον Τεῖχος is not quite the same as Ἠραῖον; nor was the latter place very near to the Chersonese; nor would Philip be yet in a condition to provoke or menace so powerful a city as Perinthus—though he did so ten years afterwards. (Diodor. xvi. 74).

I cannot think that we know where Ἠραῖον Τεῖχος was situated; except that it was in Thrace, and near the Chersonese.

[661] Demosthenes, Olynth. iii. p. 29, 30. ὡς γὰρ ἠγγέλθη Φίλιππος ἀσθενῶν ἢ τεθνεὼς (ἦλθε γὰρ ἀμφότερα), etc. These reports of the sickness and death of Philip in Thrace are alluded to in the first Philippic, p. 43. s. 14. The expedition of Philip threatening the Chersonese, and the vote passed by the Athenians when they first heard of this expedition, are also alluded to in the first Philippic, p. 44. s. 20. p. 51. s. 46. καὶ ὑμεῖς, ἂν ἐν Χερρονήσῳ πύθησθε Φίλιππον, ἐκεῖσε βοηθεῖν ψηφίζεσθε, etc. When Philip was besieging Ἠραῖον Τεῖχος, he was said to be ἐν Χερρονήσῳ.

[662] Demosthenes, Olynth. iii. p. 30. s. 6.

[663] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 625. s. 14. p. 682, 683. This oration, delivered between Midsummer 352 and Midsummer 351 B. C., seems to have been prior to November 352 B. C., when the news reached Athens that Philip was besieging Ἠραῖον Τεῖχος.

[664] I adopt the date accepted by most critics, on the authority of Dionysius of Halikarnassus, to the first Philippic; the archonship of Aristodemus 352-351 B. C. It belongs, I think, to the latter half of that year.

The statements of Dionysius bearing on this oration have been much called in question; to a certain extent, with good reason, in what he states about the *sixth Philippic* (ad Ammæum, p. 736). What he calls the *sixth*, is in reality the *fifth* in his own enumeration, coming next after the first Philippic and the three Olynthiacs. To the Oratio De Pace, which is properly the sixth in his enumeration, he assigns no ordinal number whatever. What is still more perplexing—he gives as the initial words of what he calls the *sixth* Philippic, certain words which occur in the middle of the first Philippic, immediately after the financial scheme read by Demosthenes to the people, the words, Ἃ μὲν ἡμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δεδυνήμεθα εὑρεῖν ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν (Philipp. i. p. 48). If this were correct, we should have to divide the first Philippic into two parts, and recognize the latter part (after the words ἃ μὲν ἡμεῖς) as a separate and later oration. Some critics, among them Dr. Thirlwall, agree so far with Dionysius as to separate the latter part from the former, and to view it as a portion of some later oration. I follow the more common opinion, accepting the oration as one. There is a confusion, either in the text or the affirmations, of Dionysius, which has never yet been, perhaps cannot be, satisfactorily cleared up.

Böhnecke (in his Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Attischen Redner, p. 222 seq.) has gone into a full and elaborate examination of the first Philippic and all the controversy respecting it. He rejects the statement of Dionysius altogether. He considers that the oration as it stands now is one whole, but delivered three years later than Dionysius asserts: not in 351 B. C., but in the Spring of 348 B. C., after the three Olynthiacs, and a little before the fall of Olynthus. He notices various chronological points (in my judgment none of them proving his point) tending to show that the harangue cannot have been delivered so early as 351 B. C. But I think the difficulty of supposing that the oration was spoken at so late a period of the Olynthian war, and yet that nothing is said in it about that war, and next to nothing about Olynthus itself—is greater than any of those difficulties which Böhnecke tries to make good against the earlier date.

[665] Demosthenes, De Symmor. p. 182. s. 18.

[666] Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 366.

[667] Demosthen. Philipp. i. init. … Εἰ μὲν περὶ καινοῦ τινὸς πράγματος προὐτίθετο λέγειν, ἐπισχὼν ἂν ἕως οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν εἰωθότων γνώμην ἀπεφήναντο … ἐπειδὴ δὲ περὶ ὧν πολλάκις εἰρήκασιν οὗτοι πρότερον συμβαίνει καὶ νυνὶ σκοπεῖν, ἡγοῦμαι καὶ πρῶτος ἀναστὰς εἰκότως ἂν συγγνώμης τυγχάνειν· εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου τὰ δέοντα οὗτοι συνεβούλευσαν, οὐδὲν ἂν ὑμᾶς νῦν ἔδει βουλεύεσθαι.

[668] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 40, 41. Ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων ποιούντων ὑμῶν κακῶς τὰ πράγματα ἔχει· ἐπεί τοι, εἰ πάνθ' ἃ προσῆκε πραττόντων οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδ' ἂν ἐλπὶς ἦν αὐτὰ βελτίω γενέσθαι, etc. Again, p. 42. Ἂν τοίνυν καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐθελήσητε γενέσθαι γνώμης νῦν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐ πρότερον, … καὶ παύσησθε αὐτὸς μὲν οὐδὲν ἕκαστος ποιήσειν ἐλπίζων, τὸν δὲ πλησίον πάνθ' ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ πράξειν, etc.

Compare the previous harangue, De Symmoriis, p. 182. s. 18.

[669] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 43. s. 15. ὡς δὲ νῦν ἔχετε, οὐδὲ διδόντων τῶν καιρῶν Ἀμφίπολιν δέξασθαι δύναισθ' ἄν, ἀπηρτημένοι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς καὶ ταῖς γνώμαις.

[670] Demosthenes, Philip. i. p. 44. … ἐπειδὰν ἅπαντα ἀκούσητε, κρίνατε—μὴ πρότερον προλαμβάνετε· μηδ' ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς δοκῶ τινὶ καινὴν παρασκευὴν λέγειν, ἀναβάλλειν με τὰ πράγματα ἡγείσθω· οὐ γὰρ οἱ ταχὺ καὶ τήμερον εἰπόντες μάλιστα εἰς δέον λέγουσιν, etc.

… Οἶμαι τοίνυν ἐγὼ ταῦτα λέγειν ἔχειν, μὴ κωλύων εἴ τις ἄλλος ἐπαγγέλλεταί τι.

This deprecatory tone deserves notice, and the difficulty which the speaker anticipates in obtaining a hearing.

[671] Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 44, 45.

[672] Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 45, 46.

[673] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 48, 49. Ἃ δ' ὑπάρξαι δεῖ παρ' ὑμῶν, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀγὼ γέγραφα.

[674] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 49. s. 37.

[675] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 49. s. 38, 39.

[676] Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 48, 49. "The obstinacy and violence of the Etesian winds, in July and August, are well known to those who have had to struggle with them in the Ægean during that season" (Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iv. ch. 42. p. 426).

The Etesian winds, blowing from the north, made it difficult to reach Macedonia from Athens.

Compare Demosthenes, De Rebus Chersonesi, p. 93. s. 14.

[677] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 51. s. 46. … ὑμεῖς δὲ, πλείστην δύναμιν ἁπάντων ἔχοντες, τριηρεῖς, ὁπλίτας, ἱππέας, χρημάτων πρόσοδον, τούτων μὲν μέχρι τῆς τήμερον ἡμέρας οὐδενὶ πώποτε εἰς δέον τι κέχρησθε.

[678] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 50. ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἄτακτα, ἀδιόρθωτα, ἀόριστα, ἅπαντα. Τοιγαροῦν ἅμα ἀκηκόαμέν τι καὶ τριηράρχους καθίσταμεν, καὶ τούτοις ἀντιδόσεις ποιούμεθα καὶ περὶ χρημάτων πόρου σκοποῦμεν, etc.

[679] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 48, 49. δεῖ—μὴ βοηθείαις πολεμεῖν (ὑστεριοῦμεν γὰρ ἁπάντων) ἀλλὰ παρασκευῇ συνεχεῖ καὶ δυνάμει.

Compare his Oration De Rebus Chersonesi, p. 92. s. 11.

[680] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 46. s. 28. ἐξ οὗ δ' αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ τὰ ξενικὰ ὑμῖν στρατεύεται, τοὺς φίλους νικᾷ καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους, οἱ δ' ἐχθροὶ μείζους τοῦ δέοντος γεγόνασι· καὶ παρακύψαντα ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς πόλεως πόλεμον, πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον καὶ πανταχοῖ μᾶλλον οἴχεται πλέοντα, ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς ἀκολουθεῖ, εἰκότως· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄρχειν μὴ διδόντα μισθόν. Τί οὖν κελεύω; τὰς προφάσεις ἀφελεῖν καὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν, μισθὸν πορίσαντας καὶ στρατιώτας οἰκείους ὥσπερ ἐπόπτας τῶν στρατηγουμένων παρακαταστήσαντας, etc.

… p 53. s. 51. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ καταγελῶσιν, οἱ δὲ σύμμαχοι τεθνᾶσι τῷ δέει τοὺς τοιούτους ἀποστόλους, etc.

[681] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 47. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε γέλως ἔσθ᾽ ὡς χρώμεθα τοῖς πράγμασι.

[682] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 54 s. 58. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὔτ᾽ ἄλλοτε πώποτε πρὸς χάριν εἰλόμην λέγειν, ὅ,τι ἂν μὴ καὶ συνοίσειν πεπεισμένος ὦ, νῦν τε ἃ γιγνώσκω πάνθ᾽ ἁπλῶς, οὐδὲν ὑποστειλάμενος, πεπαῤῥησίασμαι. Ἐβουλόμην δ᾽ ἄν, ὥσπερ ὅτι ὑμῖν συμφέρει τὰ βέλτιστα ἀκούειν οἶδα, οὕτως εἰδέναι συνοῖσον καὶ τῷ τὰ βέλτιστα εἰπόντι· πολλῷ γὰρ ἂν ἥδιον εἶπον. Νῦν δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀδήλοις οὖσι τοῖς ἀπὸ τούτων ἐμαυτῷ γενησομένοις, ὅμως ἐπὶ τῷ συνοίσειν ὑμῖν, ἂν πράξητε, ταῦτα πεπεῖσθαι λέγειν αἱροῦμαι.

[683] Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 308. s. 306. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὧν γ᾽ ἂν ὁ ῥήτωρ ὑπεύθυνος εἴη, πᾶσαν ἐξέτασιν λάμβανε· οὐ παραιτοῦμαι. Τίνα οὖν ἐστὶ ταῦτα; Ἰδεῖν τὰ πράγματα ἀρχόμενα, καὶ προαισθέσθαι καὶ προειπεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις. Ταῦτα πέπρακταί μοι. Καὶ ἔτι τὰς ἐκασταχοῦ βραδυτῆτας, ὄκνους, ἀγνοίας, φιλονεικίας, ἃ πολιτικὰ ταῖς πόλεσι πρόσεστιν ἁπάσαις καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ἁμαρτήματα, ταῦθ᾽ ὡς εἰς ἐλάχιστα συστεῖλαι, καὶ τοὐνάντιον εἰς ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ τοῦ τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν ὁρμὴν προτρέψαι.

[684] Demosthenes, Olynth. iii. p. 29. s. 5.

[685] Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 48. s. 34; Olynth. ii. p. 21. s. 12; Olynth. iii. p. 29. s. 5. p. 32. s. 16; De Rhodiorum Libertate, p. 190. s. 1. And not merely votes against Philip, but against others also, remained either unexecuted or inadequately executed (Demosthenes, De Republicâ Ordinandâ, p. 175, 176).

[686] Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libertat. p. 197. s. 31. ὁρῶ δ᾽ ὑμῶν ἐνίους Φιλίππου μὲν ὡς ἄρ᾽ οὐδενὸς ἀξίου πολλάκις ὀλιγωροῦντας, βασιλέα δ᾽ ὡς ἰσχυρὸν ἐχθρὸν οἷς ἂν προέληται φοβουμένους. Εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν ὡς φαῦλον οὐκ ἀμυνούμεθα, τῷ δὲ ὡς φοβερῷ πάνθ᾽ ὑπείξομεν, πρὸς τίνας παραταξόμεθα;

This oration was delivered in 351-350 B. C.; a few months after the first Philippic.

[687] Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 45. s. 21; Olynthiac ii. p. 19. s. 4.

[688] Compare the advice of the Thebans to Mardonius in 479 B. C.—during the Persian invasion of Greece (Herodot. ix. 2).

[689] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 656. s. 129. ἐκεῖνοι (Olynthians) ἕως μὲν ἐώρων αὐτὸν (Philip) τηλικοῦτον ἡλίκος ὢν πιστὸς ὑπῆρχε, σύμμαχοί τε ἦσαν, καὶ δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον ἡμῖν ἐπολέμουν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἶδον μείζω τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς πίστεως γιγνόμενον … ὑμᾶς, οὓς ἴσασιν ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἥδιστ᾽ ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἐκείνου φίλους καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Φίλιππον ἀποκτείναντας, φίλους πεποίηνται, φασὶ δὲ καὶ συμμάχους ποιήσεσθαι.

We know from Dionysius that this oration was delivered between Midsummer 352 B. C. and Midsummer 351 B. C. I have already remarked that it must have been delivered, in my judgment, before the month Mæmakterion (November) 352 B. C.

[690] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 44. s. 20. … ἐπὶ τὰς ἐξαίφνης ταύτας ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας χώρας αὐτοῦ στρατείας, εἰς Πύλας καὶ Χερῤῥόνησον καὶ Ὄλυνθον καὶ ὅποι βούλεται.

[691] Demosthenes, Olynthiac i. p. 11. s. 7. … νυνὶ γὰρ, ὃ πάντες ἐθρύλλουν τέως, Ὀλυνθίους ἐκπολεμῆσαι δεῖν Φιλίππῳ, γέγονεν αὐτόματον, καὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὡς ἂν ὑμῖν μάλιστα συμφέροι. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν πεισθέντες ἀνείλοντο τὸν πόλεμον, σφαλεροὶ σύμμαχοι καὶ μέχρι του ταῦτ᾽ ἂν ἐγνωκότες ἦσαν ἴσως, etc.

Compare Olynth. iii. p. 30. s. 9. and p. 32. s. 18. οὐχ οὕς, εἰ πολεμήσαιεν, ἑτοίμως σώσειν ὑπισχνούμεθα, οὗτοι νῦν πολεμοῦνται;

[692] Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13.

[693] Demosthen. Olynth. iii. p. 30. s. 8. οὔτε Φίλιππος ἐθάῤῥει τούτους, οὔθ᾽ οὗτοι Φίλιππον, etc.

[694] Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13. … ἠσθένησε· πάλιν ῥαΐσας οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ῥᾳθυμεῖν ἀπέκλινεν, ἀλλ᾽ εὐθὺς Ὀλυνθίοις ἐπεχείρησεν.

What length of time is denoted by the adverb εὐθὺς, must of course be matter of conjecture. If the expression had been found in the Oration De Coronâ, delivered twenty years afterwards, we might have construed εὐθὺς very loosely. But it occurs here in an oration delivered probably in the latter half of 350 B. C., but certainly not later than the first half of 348 B. C. Accordingly, it is hardly reasonable to assign to the interval here designated by εὐθὺς (that between Philip's recovery and his serious attack upon the Olynthians) a longer time than six months. We should then suppose this attack to have been commenced about the last quartet of Olymp. 107, 2; or in the first half of 350 B. C. This is the view of Böhnecke, and, I think, very probable (Forschungen, p. 211).

[695] Justin, viii. 3; Orosius, iii. 12. Justin states this as the *cause* of the attack made by Philip on Olynthus—which I do not believe. But I see no ground for doubting the fact itself—or for doubting that Philip laid hold of it as a *pretext*. He found the half-brothers in Olynthus when the city was taken, and put both of them to death.

[696] Thucyd. i. 58.

[697] Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 425, 426; Xenophon, Hellen. v. 2. 17.

[698] Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 15. s. 22. οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐξήνεγκε τὸν πόλεμόν ποτε τοῦτον ἐκεῖνος, εἰ πολεμεῖν ᾠήθη δεήσειν αὐτὸν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐπιὼν ἅπαντα τότε ἤλπιζε τὰ πράγματα ἀναιρήσεσθαι, κᾆτα διέψευσται. Τοῦτο δὴ πρῶτον αὐτὸν ταράττει παρὰ γνώμην γεγονὸς, etc.

[699] See ch. lxxxiii. p. 35 of this Volume.

[700] Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 439. Æschines himself met a person named Atrestidas followed by one of these sorrowful troops. We may be sure that this case was only one among many.

[701] Pliny, H. N. ii. 27. "Fit et cœli ipsius hiatus, quod vocant chasma. Fit et sanguineâ specie (quo nihil terribilius mortalium timori est) incendium ad terras cadens inde; *sicut Olympiadis centesimæ septimæ anno tertio, cum rex Philippus Græciam quateret*. Atque ego hæc statis temporibus naturæ, ut cetera, arbitror existere; non (ut plerique) variis de causis, quas ingeniorum acumen excogitat. *Quippe ingentium malorum fuere prænuntia*; sed ea accidisse non quia hæc facta sunt arbitror, verum hæc ideo facta, quia incasura erant illa: raritate autem occultam eorum esse rationem, ideoque non sicut exortus supra dictos defectusque et multa alia nosci."

The precision of this chronological note makes it valuable. Olymp. 107, 3—corresponds to the year between Midsummer 350 and Midsummer 349 B. C.

Taylor, who cites this passage in his Prolegomena ad Demosthenem (ap. Reiske Oratt. Gr. vol. viii. p. 756), takes the liberty, without any manuscript authority, of altering *tertio* into *quarto*; which Böhnecke justly pronounces to be unreasonable (Forschungen, p. 212). The passage as it stands is an evidence, not merely to authenticate the terrific character of the time, but also to prove, among other evidences, that the attack of Philip on the Olynthians and Chalkidians began in 350-349 B. C.—not in the following Olympic year, or in the time after Midsummer 349 B. C.

Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 201-221) has gone into an examination of the dates and events of this Olynthian war, and has arranged them in a manner different from any preceding critic. His examination is acute and instructive, including however some reasonings of little force or pertinence. I follow him generally, in placing the beginning of the Olynthian war, and the Olynthiacs of Demosthenes, before Olymp. 107, 4. This is the best opinion which I can form, on matters lamentably unattested and uncertain.

[702] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 113. That Philip not only attacked, but even subdued, the thirty-two Chalkidic cities, before he marched directly and finally to assail Olynthus—is stated in the Fragment of Kallisthenes ap. Stobæum, Eclog. Tit. vii. p. 92.

Kallisthenes, whose history is lost, was a native of Olynthus, born a few years before the capture of the city.

[703] Some remarks will be found on the order of the Olynthiacs, in an Appendix to the present chapter.

It must be understood that I always speak of the Olynthiacs as *first*, *second*, and *third*, according to the common and edited order; though I cannot adopt that order as correct.

[704] Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæ. p. 736. μετὰ γὰρ ἄρχοντα Καλλίμαχον, ἐφ᾽ οὗ τὰς εἰς Ὄλυνθον βοηθείας ἀπέστειλαν Ἀθηναῖοι, πεισθέντες ὑπὸ Δημοσθένους, etc.

He connects the three Olynthiacs of Demosthenes, with the three Athenian armaments sent to Olynthus in the year following Midsummer 349 B. C.; for which armaments he had just before cited Philochorus.

[705] This is evident from the sneers of Meidias: see the oration of Demosthenes cont. Meidiam, p. 575, 576. (spoken in the year following—349-348 B. C.)

I observe, not without regret, that Demosthenes himself is not ashamed to put the like sneers into the mouth of a client speaking before the Dikastery—against Lakritus—"this very clever man, who has paid ten minæ to Isokrates for a course of rhetoric, and thinks himself able to talk you over as he pleases," etc. (Demosth. adv. Lakrit. p. 938).

[706] An orator of the next generation (Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. p. 102, s. 99) taunts Demosthenes as a mere opposition-talker, in contrast with the excellent administration of the finances and marine under Eubulus—ποῖαι γὰρ τριήρεις εἰσὶ κατεσκευασμέναι διὰ τοῦτον (Demosthenes) ὥσπερ επὶ Εὐβούλου, τῇ πόλει; ἢ ποῖοι νεώσοικοι τούτου πολιτευομένου γεγόνασι; The administration of Eubulus must have left a creditable remembrance, to be thus cited afterwards.

See Theopompus ap. Harpokr. v. Εὔβουλος; Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. p. 812. Compare also Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 435; and Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 57. c. 11.

[707] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 9. ὡς ἔστι μάλιστα τοῦτο δέος, μὴ πανοῦργος ὢν καὶ δεινὸς ἄνθρωπος (Philip) πράγμασι χρῆσθαι τὰ μὲν εἴκων ἡνίκ᾽ ἂν τύχῃ, τὰ δ᾽ ἀπειλῶν, τὰ δ᾽ ἡμᾶς διαβάλλων καὶ τὴν ἀπουσίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν τρέψῃ τε καὶ παρασπάσηταί τι τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων.

This occurs in the next subsequent speech of Demosthenes, intimating what Philip and his partisans had already deduced as inference from the past neglect of the Athenians to send any aid to Olynthus. Of course, no such inference could be started until some time had been allowed for expectation and disappointment; which is one among many reasons for believing the first Olynthiac to be posterior in time to the second.

[708] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 12, 13.

[709] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 9.

[710] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 14. Φημὶ δὴ διχῇ βοηθητέον εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασιν ὑμῖν· τῷ τε τὰς πόλεις τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις σῴζειν, καὶ τοὺς τοῦτο ποιήσοντας στρατιώτας ἐκπέμπειν—καὶ τῷ τὴν ἐκείνου χώραν κακῶς ποιεῖν καὶ τριήρεσι καὶ στρατιώταις ἑτέροις· εἰ δὲ θατέρου τούτων ὀλιγωρήσετε, ὀκνῶ μὴ μάταιος ὑμῶν ἡ στρατεία γένηται.

[711] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 9, 10.

[712] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 11.

[713] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 12, 13, 16. … εἰ δὲ προησόμεθα καὶ τούτους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, εἶτ᾽ Ὄλυνθον ἐκεῖνος καταστρέψεται, φρασάτω τις ἐμοὶ, τί τὸ κωλῦον ἔτ᾽ αὐτὸν ἔσται βαδίζειν ὅποι βούλεται.

… τίς οὕτως εὐήθης ἐστὶν ὑμῶν ὅστις ἀγνοεῖ τὸν ἐκεῖθεν πόλεμον δεῦρο ἥξοντα, ἂν ἀμελήσωμεν;

[714] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 15.

[715] In my view, it is necessary to separate entirely the proceedings alluded to in the Demosthenic Olynthiacs, from the three expeditions to Olynthus mentioned by Philochorus during the following year—349-348 B. C., the archonship of Kallimachus. I see no reason to controvert the statement of Philochorus, that there were three expeditions during that year, such as he describes. But he must be mistaken (or Dionysius must have copied him erroneously) in setting forth those three expeditions *as the whole Olynthian war*, and the first of the three as being the beginning of the war. The Olynthian war began in 350 B. C., and the three Olynthiacs of Demosthenes refer, in my judgment, to the first months of the war. But it lasted until the early spring of 347 B. C., so that the armaments mentioned by Philochorus may have occurred during the last half of the war. I cannot but think that Dionysius, being satisfied with finding *three* expeditions to Olynthus which might be attached as results to the *three* orations of Demosthenes, was too hastily copied out the three from Philochorus, and has assigned the date of 349-348 B. C. to the three *orations*, simply because he found that date given to the three *expeditions* by Philochorus.

The revolt in Eubœa, the expedition of Phokion with the battle of Tamynæ and the prolonged war in that island, began about January or February 349 B. C., and continued throughout that year and the next. Mr. Clinton even places these events a year earlier; in which I do not concur, but which, if adopted, would throw back the beginning of the Olynthian war one year farther still. It is certain that there was one Athenian expedition at least sent to Olynthus *before the Eubœan war*, (Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 566-578)—an expedition so considerable that voluntary donations from the rich citizens were obtained towards the cost. Here is good proof (better than Philochorus, if indeed it be inconsistent with what he really said) that the Athenians not only contracted the alliance of Olynthus, but actually assisted Olynthus, during the year 350 B. C. Now the Olynthiacs of Demosthenes present to my mind strong evidence of belonging to the earliest months of the Olynthian war. I think it reasonable, therefore, to suppose that the expedition of foreign mercenaries to Olynthus, which the third Olynthiac implies as having been sent, is the same as that for which the ἐπιδόσεις mentioned in the Meidiana were required. See Böhnecke, Forschungen, p. 202; and K. F. Hermann, De Anno Natali Demosthenis, p. 9.

[716] Theopompus ap. Athenæ;, xii. p. 532. This victory would seem to belong more naturally (as Dr. Thirlwall remarks) to the operations of Chares and Onomarchus against Philip in Thessaly, in 353-352 B. C. But the point cannot be determined.

[717] Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 29. μέμνησθε, ὅτ᾽ ἀπηγγέλθη Φίλιππος ὑμῖν ἐν Θράκῃ τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ἔτος τουτὶ, Ἠραῖον τεῖχος πολιορκῶν· τότε τοίνυν μὴν μὲν ἦν Μαιμακτηριὼν, etc. This was the month Mæmakterion or November 352 B. C. Calculating forward from that date, τρίτον ἔτος means *the next year but one*; that is the Attic year Olymp. 107. 3, or the year between Midsummer 350 and Midsummer 349 B. C. Dionysius of Halikarnassus says (p. 726)—Καλλιμάχου τοῦ τρίτου μετὰ Θέσσαλον ἄρξαντος—though there was only one archon between Thessalus and Kallimachus. When Demosthenes says τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ἔτος—it is clear that both cannot be accurate; we must choose one or the other; and τρίτον ἔτος brings us to the year 350-349 B. C.

To show that the oration was probably spoken during the first half of that year, or before February 349 B. C., another point of evidence may be noticed.

At the time when the third Olynthiac was spoken, *no* expedition of Athenian *citizens* had yet been sent to the help of Olynthus. But we shall see, presently, that Athenian citizens *were* sent thither during the first half of 349 B. C.

Indeed, it would be singular, if the Olynthiacs had been spoken *after* the expedition to Eubœa, that Demosthenes should make no allusion in any one of them to that expedition, an affair of so much moment and interest, which kept Athens in serious agitation during much of the year, and was followed by prolonged war in that neighboring island. In the third Olynthiac, Demosthenes alludes to taking arms against Corinth and Megara (p. 34). Would he be likely to leave the far more important proceedings in Eubœa unnoticed? Would he say nothing about the grave crisis in which the decree of Apollodorus was proposed? This difficulty disappears when we recognize the Olynthiacs as anterior to the Euboic war.

[718] Thucyd. ii. 65. Ὅποτε γοῦν αἴσθοιτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησσεν (Perikles) εἰς τὸ φοβεῖσθαι· καὶ δεδιότας αὖ ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν.

Compare the Argument of the third Olynthiac by Libanius.

[719] Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 28, 29. Τοὺς μὲν γὰρ λόγους περὶ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι Φίλιππον ὁρῶ γιγνομένους, τὰ δὲ πράγματα εἰς τοῦτο προήκοντα, ὥστε ὅπως μὴ πεισόμεθα αὐτοὶ πρότερον κακῶς σκέψασθαι δέον.

… τοῦθ᾽ ἱκανὸν προλαβεῖν ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν πρώτην, ὅπως τοὺς συμμάχους σώσομεν.

[720] Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 30.

[721] Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 31, 32.

[722] Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. p. 67, 68.

[723] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 661. φέρ᾽, ἐὰν δὲ δὴ καὶ Μενέστρατος ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἐρετριεὺς ἀξιοῖ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτῷ ψηφίσασθαι, ἢ Φάϋλλος ὁ Φωκεὺς, etc.

[724] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 51.

[725] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 49.

[726] Demosthenes, De Pace, p. 58.

[727] Demosthenes cont. Meidiam, p. 550. … καὶ τῶν ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ πραγμάτων, ἃ Πλούταρχος ὁ τούτου ξένος καὶ φίλος διεπράξατο, ὡς ἐγὼ αἴτιός εἰμι κατεσκεύαζε, πρὸ τοῦ τὸ πρᾶγμα γενέσθαι φανερὸν διὰ Πλουτάρχου γεγονός.

[728] Demosth. cont. Meidiam, p. 558; cont. Bœotum de Nomine, p. 999. The mention of the χόες in the latter passage, being the second day of the festival called Anthesteria, identifies the month.

[729] Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 566, 567.

[730] Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 399. … Ταυροσθένης, τοὺς Φωκικοὺς ξένους διαβιβάσας, etc. There is no ground for inferring from this passage (with Böhnecke, p. 20, and others), that the Phokians themselves seconded Philip in organizing Eubœan parties against Athens. The Phokians were then in alliance with Athens, and would not be likely to concur in a step alike injurious and offensive to her, without any good to themselves. But

some of the mercenaries on service in Phokis might easily be tempted to change their service and cross to Eubœa, by the promise of a handsome gratuity.

[731] Demosth. cont. Meidiam, p. 567. ἐπειδὴ δὲ πολιορκεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐν Ταμύναις στρατιώτας ἐξηγγέλλετο, etc.

[732] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 300. c. 53; cont. Ktesiphont. p. 399. c. 32. Plutarch, Phokion, c. 13. Plutarch has no clear idea of the different contests carried on in the island of Eubœa. He passes on, without a note of transition, from this war in the island (in 349-348 B. C.) to the subsequent war in 341 B. C.

Nothing indeed can be more obscure and difficult to disentangle than the sequence of Eubœan transactions.

It is to be observed that Æschines lays the blame of the treachery, whereby the Athenian army was entrapped and endangered, on Kallias of Chalkis; while Demosthenes throws it on Plutarch of Eretria. Probably both Plutarch and Kallias deserved the stigma. But Demosthenes is on this occasion more worthy of credit than Æschines, since the harangue against Meidias, in which the assertion occurs, was delivered only a few months after the battle of Tamynæ; while the allegation of Æschines is contained in his harangue against Ktesiphon, which was not spoken till many years afterwards.

[733] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 13.

[734] Æschines indeed says, that Kallias, having been forgiven by Athens on this occasion, afterwards, gratuitously and from pure hostility and ingratitude to Athens, went to Philip. But I think this is probably an exaggeration. The orator is making a strong point against Kallias, who afterwards became connected with Demosthenes, and rendered considerable service to Athens in Eubœa.

The treason of Kallias and Taurosthenes is alluded to by Deinarchus in his harangue against Demosthenes, s. 45.

[735] Demosthenes cont. Meidiam, p. 567.

[736] Æschines cont. Ktesiph. p. 61; Plutarch, Demosth. c. 12. Westermann and many other critics (De Litibus quas Demosthenes oravit ipse, p. 25-28) maintain that the discourse against Meidias can never have been really spoken by Demosthenes to the Dikastery, since if it had been spoken, he could not afterwards have entered into the compromise. But it is surely possible, that he may have delivered the discourse and obtained judgment in his favor; and then afterwards—when the second vote of the Dikasts was about to come on, for estimation of the penalty—may have accepted the offer of the defendant to pay a moderate fine (compare Demosth. cont. Neæram, p. 1348) in fear of exasperating too far the powerful friends around Meidias. The action of Demosthenes against Meidias was certainly an ἀγὼν τιμητός. About προβολὴ, see Meier and Schömann, Der Attische Prozess, p. 271.

[737] Demosthenes, De Pace, p. 58; De Fals. Leg. p. 434—with the Scholion.

[738] Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 548. … ἐφ᾽ ᾗ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος (Euktemon) ἠτίμωκεν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐπεξελθὼν, οὐδεμιᾶς ἔγωγ᾽ ἔτι προσδέομαι δίκης, ἀλλ᾽ ἱκανὴν ἔχω.

Æschines says that Nikodemus entered an indictment against Demosthenes for deserting his place in the ranks; but that he was bought off by Demosthenes, and refrained from bringing it before the Dikastery (Æsch. Fals. Leg. p. 292).

[739] Demosth. cont. Meid. p. 577.

[740] Demosth. cont. Meid. p. 558-567.

[741] Demosth. cont. Meid. p. 551.

[742] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 14; Pausanias, i. 36, 3.

[743] Demosthen. cont. Neæram, p. 1346. … συμβάντος τῇ πόλει καιροῦ τοιούτου καὶ πολέμου, ἐν ᾧ ἦν ἃ κρατήσασιν ὑμῖν μεγίστοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἶναι, καὶ ἀναμφισβητήτως τά τε ὑμέτερα αὐτῶν κεκομίσθαι καὶ καταπεπολεμηκέναι Φίλιππον—ἢ ὑστερήσασι τῇ βοηθείᾳ καὶ προεμένοις τοὺς συμμάχους, δι᾽ ἀπορίαν χρημάτων καταλυθέντος τοῦ στρατοπέδου, τούτους τ᾽ ἀπολέσαι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν ἀπίστους εἶναι δοκεῖν, καὶ κινδυνεύειν περὶ τῶν ὑπολοίπων, περί τε Λήμνου καὶ Ἴμβρου καὶ Σκύρου καὶ Χερρονήσου—καὶ μελλόντων στρατεύεσθαι ὑμῶν πανδημεὶ εἴς τε Εὔβοιαν καὶ Ὄλυνθον—ἔγραψε ψήφισμα ἐν τῇ βουλῇ Ἀπολλόδωρος βουλεύων, etc.

This speech was delivered before the Dikastery by a person named Theomnestus, in support of an indictment against Neæra—perhaps six or eight years after 349 B. C. Whether Demosthenes was the author of the speech or not, its value as evidence will not be materially altered.

[744] Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 578. … οὗτος τῶν μεθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ στρατευσαμένων ἱππέων, ὅτε εἰς Ὄλυνθον διέβησαν, ἐλθὼν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν κατηγόρει. Compare the same oration, p. 558—περὶ δὲ τῶν συστρατευσαμένων εἰς Ἄργουραν (in Eubœa) ἴστε δήπου πάντες οἷα ἐδημηγόρησε παρ᾽ ὑμῖν, ὅτ᾽ ἦκεν ἐκ Χαλκίδος, κατηγορῶν καὶ φάσκων ὄνειδος ἐξελθεῖν τὴν στρατιὰν ταύτην τῇ πόλει.

This transit of the Athenian horsemen to Olynthus, which took place after the battle of Tamynæ, is a distinct occurrence from the voluntary contributions at Athens towards an Olynthian expedition (ἐπιδόσεις εἰς Ὄλυνθον—Demosth. cont. Meidiam, p. 566); which contributions took place before the battle of Tamynæ, and before the expedition to Eubœa of which that battle made part.

These horsemen went from Eubœa to Olynthus *before Meidias returned to Athens*. But we know that he returned to Athens before the beginning of the new Attic or Olympic year (Olymp. 107, 4, 349-348 B. C.); that is, speaking approximatively, before the 1st of July 349 B. C. For he was present at Athens and accused Demosthenes in the senatorial Dokimasy, or preliminary examination, which all senators underwent before they took their seats with the beginning of the new year (Demosth. cont. Meid. p. 551).

It seems, therefore, clear that the Athenian expedition—certainly horsemen, and probably hoplites also—went to Olynthus before July 1, 349 B. C. I alluded to this expedition of Athenian citizens to Olynthus in a previous note—as connected with the date of the third Olynthiac of Demosthenes.

[745] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 2, 41; v. 3, 3-6.

[746] Theopompus, Fragm. 155; ap. Athenæum, x. p. 436; Ælian, V. H. ii. 41.

[747] See Demosthenes adv. Bœotum De Nomine, p. 999. … καὶ εἰ μισθὸς ἐπορίσθη τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, εἰσῆγον ἂν δῆλον ὅτι. This oration was spoken shortly after the battle of Tamynæ, p. 999.

[748] Demosthen. cont. Neær. p. 1346, 1347.

[749] Demosthen. cont. Neær. p. 1346. ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν ἔτι, ἄν που λόγος γέγνηται, ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ πάντων, ὡς τὰ βέλτιστα εἴπας ἄδικα πάθοι.

[750] Philochorus ap. Dionys. Hal. ad Amm. p. 734, 735. Philochorus tells us that the Athenians *now* contracted the alliance with Olynthus; which certainly is not accurate. The alliance had been contracted in the preceding year.

[751] Theopomp. Fragm. 183-238; Athenæus, xii. p. 532.

[752] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 426.

[753] Diodor. xvi. 52.

[754] Kallisthenes ap. Stobæum, t. vii. p. 92; Plutarch, Parallel. c. 8; Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 117. Kritobulus could not save the sight of the eye, but he is said to have prevented any visible disfigurement. "Magna et Critobulo fama est, extracta Philippi regis oculo sagitta et citra deformitatem oris curata, orbitate luminis" (Pliny, H. N. vii. 37).

[755] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 113.

[756] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30.

[757] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 125-128; Fals. Leg. p. 426; Diodor. xvi. 53.

[758] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 117; Justin, viii. 3.

[759] Demosthenes, (Fals. Leg. p. 386) says, that both Philokrates and Æschines received from Philip, not only presents of timber and corn, but also grants of productive and valuable farms in the Olynthian territory. He calls some Olynthian witnesses to prove his assertion; but their testimony is not given at length.

[760] Demosth. De Chersones. p. 99. The existence of these Olynthian traitors, sold to Philip, proves that he could not have needed the aid of the Stageirite philosopher Aristotle to indicate to him who were the richest Olynthian citizens, at the time when the prisoners were put up for sale as slaves. The Athenian Democharès,

about thirty years afterwards, in his virulent speech against the philosophers, alleged that Aristotle had rendered this disgraceful service to Philip (Aristokles ap. Eusebium, Præp. Ev. p. 792) Wesseling (ad Diodor. xvi. 53) refutes the charge by saying that Aristotle was at that time, along with Hermeias, at Atarneus; a refutation not very conclusive, which I am glad to be able to strengthen.

[761] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 37. c. 24. Demosthenes (Olynth. iii. p. 36) mentions the same amount of public money as having been wasted εἰς οὐδὲν δέον—even in the early part of the Olynthiac war and before the Eubœan war. As evidences of actual amount, such statements are of no value.

[762] Ulpian, in his Commentary on the first Olynthiac, tells us that after the fine imposed upon Apollodorus, Eubulus moved and carried a law, enacting that any future motion to encroach on the Theôric Fund should be punished with death.

The authority of Ulpian is not sufficient to accredit this statement. The fine inflicted by the Dikastery upon Apollodorus was lenient; we may therefore reasonably doubt whether the popular sentiment would go along with the speaker in making the like offence capital in future.

[763] Among the many passages which illustrate this association in the Greek mind, between the idea of a religious festival, and that of enjoyment—we may take the expressions of Herodotus about the great festival at Sparta called Hyakinthia. In the summer of 479 B. C., the Spartans were tardy in bringing out their military force for the defence of Attica—being engaged in that festival. Οἱ γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὄρταζόν τε τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον, καὶ σφι ἦν Ὑακίνθια· περὶ πλείστου δ᾽ ἦγον τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πορσύνειν (Herod. ix. 7). Presently the Athenian envoys come to Sparta to complain of the delay in the following language: Ὑμεῖς μὲν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, αὐτοῦ τῇδε μένοντες, Ὑακινθιά τε ἄγετε καὶ παίζετε, καταπροδόντες τοὺς συμμάχους.

Here the expressions "to fulfil the requirements of the god," and "to amuse themselves," are used in description of the same festival, and almost as equivalents.

[764] Harpokration, v. Θεωρικά … διένειμεν Εὔβουλος εἰς τὴν θυσίαν, ἵνα πάντες ἑορτάζωσι, καὶ μηδεὶς τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπολίπηται δι᾽ ἀσθένειαν τῶν ἰδίων…. Ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἐξῆν τοῖς ἀποδημοῦσι θεωρικὸν λαμβάνειν, Ὑπερίδης δεδήλωκεν ἐν τῷ κατ᾽ Ἀρχεστρατίδου.

[765] See Demosth. adv. Leocharem, p. 1091, 1092; Philipp. iv. p. 141. Compare also Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Att. s. 69.

[766] See the directions of the old oracles quoted by Demosthenes cont. Meidiam, p. 531. ἱστάναι ὡραίων Βρομίῳ χάριν ἄμμιγα πάντας, etc. στεφανηφορεῖν ἐλευθέρους καὶ δούλους, etc.

[767] See the boast of Isokrates, Orat. iv. (Panegyr.) s. 40; Plato, Alkibiad. ii. p. 148. Xenophon (Vectigal. vi. 1.), in proposing some schemes for the improvement of the Athenian revenue, sets forth as one of the advantages, that "the religious festivals will be celebrated then with still greater magnificence than they are now."

[768] Plutarch, Quæstion. Platonic. p. 1011. ὡς ἔλεγε Δημάδης, κόλλαν ὀνομάζων τὰ θεωρικὰ τοῦ πολιτεύματος (erroneously written θεωρητικὰ).

[769] According to the author of the oration against Neæra, the law did actually provide, that in time of war, the surplus revenue should be devoted to warlike purposes—κελευόντων τῶν νόμων, ὅταν πόλεμος ᾖ, τὰ περιόντα χρήματα τῆς διοικήσεως στρατιωτικὰ εἶναι (p. 1346). But it seems to me that this must be a misstatement, got up to suit the speaker's case. If the law had been so, Apollodorus would have committed no illegality in his motion; moreover, all the fencing and manœuvring of Demosthenes in his first and third Olynthiacs would have been to no purpose.

[770] The case here put, though analogous in principle, makes against the Athenian proprietors, in degree; for, even in time of peace, one half of the French revenue is raised by direct taxation.

[771] Demosth. Philipp. iv. p. 141-143; De Republicâ Ordinandâ, p. 167. Whether these two orations were actually delivered in their present form may perhaps be doubted. But I allude to them with confidence as Demosthenic compositions; put together out of Demosthenic fragments and thoughts.

[772] Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 93; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 439, 440. Demosthenes asserts also that Olynthian women were given, as a present, by Philip to Philokrates (p. 386-440). The outrage which he imputes (p. 401) to Æschines and Phrynon in Macedonia, against the Olynthian woman—is not to be received as a fact,

since it is indignantly denied by Æschines (Fals. Leg. init. and p. 48). Yet it is probably but too faithful a picture of real deeds, committed by others, if not by Æschines.

[773] The story of the old man of Olynthus (Seneca, Controv. v. 10) bought by Parrhasius the painter and tortured in order to form a subject for a painting of the suffering Prometheus—is more than doubtful: since Parrhasius, already in high repute as a painter before 400 B. C. (see Xenoph. Mem. iii. 10), can hardly have been still flourishing in 347 B. C. It discloses, however, at least, one of the many forms of slave-suffering occasionally realized.

[774] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 384-401; Diodor. xvi. 55.

[775] Justin, viii. 3.

[776] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 37. c. 24.

[777] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30.

[778] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 37.

[779] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 434. καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ δήμῳ κατηρῶ (you, Eubulus) Φιλίππῳ, καὶ κατὰ τῶν παίδων ὤμνυες ἦ μὴν ἀπολωλέναι Φίλιππον ἂν βούλεσθαι, etc.

[780] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 438, 439.

[781] Demosthenes affirms this at two distinct times—Fals. Leg. p. 415-431; De Coronâ, p. 313.

Stechow (Vita Æschinis, p. 1-10) brings together the little which can be made out respecting Æschines.

[782] Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dicend. Demosth. p. 1063; Cicero, Orator, c. 9, 29.

[783] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 344-438; Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 38. The conduct of Æschines at this juncture is much the same, as described by his rival, and as admitted by himself. It was, in truth, among the most honorable epochs of his life.

[784] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 433. This decree must have been proposed by Timarchus either towards the close of Olymp. 108, 1—or towards the beginning of the following year, Olymp. 108, 2; that is, not long before, or not long after, Midsummer 347 B. C. But which of these two dates is to be preferred, is matter of controversy. Franke (Prolegom. ad Æschin. cont. Timarchum, p. xxxviii.—xli.) thinks that Timarchus was senator in Olymp. 108, 1—and proposed the decree then; he supposes the oration of Æschines to have been delivered in the beginning of Olymp. 108, 3—and that the expression (p. 11) announcing Timarchus as having been senator "the year before" (πέρυσιν), is to be construed loosely as signifying "the year but one before."

Mr. Clinton, Boeckh, and Westermann, suppose the oration of Æschines against Timarchus to have been delivered in Olymp. 108, 4—not in Olymp. 108, 3. On that supposition, if we take the word πέρυσιν in its usual sense, Timarchus was senator in 108, 3. Now it is certain that he did not propose the decree forbidding the export of naval stores to Philip, at a date so late as 108, 3; because the peace with Philip was concluded in Elaphebolion Olymp. 108, 2. (March, 346 B. C.) But the supposition might be admissible, that Timarchus was senator in two different years,—both in Olymp. 108, 1 and in Olymp. 108, 3 (not in two consecutive years). In that case, the senatorial year of Timarchus, to which Æschines alludes (cont. Timarch. p. 11), would be Olymp. 108, 3, while the other senatorial year, in which Timarchus moved the decree prohibiting export, would be Olymp. 108, 1.

Nevertheless, I agree with the views of Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 294) who thinks that the oration was delivered Olymp. 108, 3—and that Timarchus had been senator and had proposed the decree prohibiting export of stores to Philip, in the year preceding,—that is, Olymp. 108, 2; at the beginning of the year,—Midsummer 347 B. C.

[785] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 348-445.

[786] Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 29.

[787] There is more than one singularity in the narrative given by Æschines about Phrynon. The complaint of Phrynon implies an assumption, that the Olympic truce suspended the operations of war everywhere throughout Greece between belligerent Greeks. But such was not the maxim recognized or acted on; so far as we know the operations of warfare. Vœmel (Proleg. ad Demosth. De Pace, p. 246) feeling this difficulty, understands the

Olympic truce, here mentioned, to refer to the Olympic festival celebrated by Philip himself in Macedonia, in the spring or summer of 347 B. C. This would remove the difficulty about the effect of the truce; for Philip of course would respect his own proclaimed truce. But it is liable to another objection: that Æschines plainly indicates the capture of Phrynon to have been *anterior* to the fall of Olynthus. Besides, Æschines would hardly use the words ἐν ταῖς Ὀλυμπικαῖς σπονδαῖς, without any special addition, to signify the Macedonian games.

[788] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 7; cont. Ktesiph. p. 63. Our knowledge of these events is derived almost wholly from one, or other, or both, of the two rival orators, in their speeches delivered four or five years afterwards, on the trial De Falsâ Legatione. Demosthenes seeks to prove that before the embassy to Macedonia, in which he and Æschines were jointly concerned, Æschines was eager for continued war against Philip, and only became the partisan of Philip during and after the embassy. Æschines does not deny that he made efforts at that juncture to get up more effective war against Philip; nor is the fact at all dishonorable to him. On the other hand, he seeks to prove against Demosthenes, that he (Demosthenes) was at that time both a partisan of peace with Philip, and a friend of Philokrates to whom he afterwards became so bitterly opposed. For this purpose Æschines adverts to the motion of Philokrates about permitting Philip to send envoys to Athens—and the speech of Demosthenes in the Dikastery in favor of Philokrates.

It would prove nothing discreditable to Demosthenes if both these allegations were held to be correct. The motion of Philokrates was altogether indefinite, pledging Athens to nothing; and Demosthenes might well think it unreasonable to impeach a statesman for such a motion.

[789] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 8. Ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους Ὄλυνθος ἥλω, καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων ἐγκατελήφθησαν πολιτῶν, ὧν ἦν Ἰατροκλῆς καὶ Εὔκρατος. Ὑπὲρ δὴ τούτων ἱκετηρίαν θέντες οἱ οἰκεῖοι, ἐδέοντο ὑμῶν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιήσασθαι· παρελθόντες δ᾽ αὐτοῖς συνηγόρουν Φιλοκράτης καὶ Δημοσθένης, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ Αἰσχίνης.

To illustrate the effect of this impressive ceremony upon the Athenian assembly, we may recall the memorable scene mentioned by Xenophon and Diodorus (Xen. Hell. i. 7, 8; Diodor. xiii. 101) after the battle of Arginusæ, when the relatives of the warriors who had perished on board of the foundered ships, presented themselves before the assembly with shaven heads and in mourning garb. Compare also, about presentments of solemn supplication to the assembly, Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 262—with the note of Dissen, and Æschines contra Timarchum p. 9. c. 13.

[790] Demosth. De Pace, p. 58.

[791] Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 8) mentions only Aristodemus. But from various passages in the oration of Demosthenes (De Fals. Leg. p. 344, 346, 371, 443), we gather that the actor Neoptolemus must have been conjoined with him; perhaps also the Athenian Ktesiphon, though this is less certain. Demosthenes mentions Aristodemus again, in the speech De Coronâ (p. 232) as the first originator of the peace.

Demosthenes (De Pace, p. 58) had, even before this, denounced Neoptolemus as playing a corrupt game, for the purposes of Philip, at Athens. Soon after the peace, Neoptolemus sold up all his property at Athens, and went to reside in Macedonia.

[792] Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 8.

[793] Diodor. xvi. 58; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 385-387; Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 45. c. 41.

[794] Diodor. xvi. 56.

[795] Diodor. xvi. 56, 57.

[796] Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 62. c. 41; Diodor. xvi. 59. Φάλαικον, πάλιν τῆς στρατηγίας ἠξιωμένον, etc.

[797] Æschines cont. Ktesiph. p. 73. c. 44; Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 231. Demosthenes, in his oration De Coronâ, spoken many years after the facts, affirms the contingency of alliance between Athens and Thebes at this juncture, as having been much more probable than he ventures to state it in the earlier speech De Falsâ Legatione.

[798] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 392.

[799] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 41. It is this notice of the μυστηριωτίδες σπονδαὶ which serves as indication of time for the event. The Eleusinian mysteries were celebrated in the month Boëdromion (September). These events took place in September, 347 B. C., Olymp. 108, 2—the archonship of Themistokles at Athens.

There is also a farther indication of time given by Æschines: that the event happened before he was nominated envoy,—πρὶν ἐμὲ χειροτονηθῆναι πρεσβευτήν (p. 46. c. 41). This refutes the supposition of Vœmel (Proleg. ad Demosth. de Pace, p. 255), who refers the proceeding to the following month Elaphebolion (March), on the ground of some other words of Æschines, intimating "that the news reached Athens while the Athenians were deliberating about the peace." Böhnecke, too, supposes that the mysteries here alluded to are the lesser mysteries, celebrated in Anthesterion; not the greater, which belong to Boëdromion. This supposition appears to me improbable and unnecessary. We may reasonably believe that there were many discussions on the peace at Athens, before the envoys were actually nominated. Some of these debates may well have taken place in the month Boëdromion.

[800] It is at this juncture, in trying to make out the diplomatic transactions between Athens and Philip, from the summer of 347 to that of 346 B. C., that we find ourselves plunged amidst the contradictory assertions of the two rival orators,—Demosthenes and Æschines; with very little of genuine historical authority to control them. In 343-342 B. C., Demosthenes impeached Æschines for corrupt betrayal of the interest of Athens in the second of his three embassies to Philip (in 346 B. C.). The long harangue (De Falsâ Legatione), still remaining, wherein his charge stands embodied, enters into copious details respecting the peace with its immediate antecedents and consequents. We possess also the speech delivered by Æschines in his own defence, and in counter-accusation of Demosthenes; a speech going over the same ground, suitably to his own purpose and point of view. Lastly, we have the two speeches, delivered several years later (in 330 B. C.), of Æschines in prosecuting Ktesiphon, and of Demosthenes in defending him; wherein the conduct of Demosthenes as to the peace of 346 B. C. again becomes matter of controversy. All these harangues are interesting, not merely as eloquent compositions, but also from the striking conception which they impart of the living sentiment and controversy of the time. But when we try to extract from them real and authentic matter of history, they become painfully embarrassing; so glaring are the contradictions not only between the two rivals, but also between the earlier and later discourses of the same orator himself, especially Æschines; so evident is the spirit of perversion, so unscrupulous are the manifestations of hostile feeling, on both sides. We can place little faith in the allegations of either orator against the other, except where some collateral grounds of fact or probability can be adduced in confirmation. But the allegations of each as to matters which do not make against the other, are valuable; even the misrepresentations, since we have them on both sides, will sometimes afford mutual correction: and we shall often find it practicable to detect a basis of real matter of fact which one or both may seek to pervert, but which neither can venture to set aside, or can keep wholly out of sight. It is indeed deeply to be lamented that we know little of the history except so much as it suits the one or the other of these rival orators, each animated by purposes totally at variance with that of the historian, to make known either by direct notice or oblique allusion.

[801] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30. s. 9. p. 31. c. 10. p. 34. c. 20; Argumentum ii ad Demosth. Fals. Leg.

[802] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p 442. Compare p. 369, 387, 391.

[803] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 392.

[804] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 31. c. 10, 11.

[805] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 31. c. 11.

[806] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 32. c. 13, 14.

[807] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 32, 33. c. 15. Demosthenes himself says little or nothing about this first embassy, and nothing at all either about his own speech or that of Æschines.

[808] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 33. c. 17, 18. The effect of the manner and behavior of Philip upon Ktesiphon the envoy, is forcibly stated here by Æschines.

[809] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 34. c. 19; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 414. This vote of thanks, and invitation to dinner, appears to have been so uniform a custom, that Demosthenes (Fals. Leg. p. 350) comments upon the withholding of the compliment, when the second embassy returned, as a disgrace without parallel. That Demosthenes should have proposed a motion of such customary formality, is a fact of little moment any way. It rather proves that the relations of Demosthenes with his colleagues during the embassy, cannot have been so ill-tempered as Æschines had affirmed. Demosthenes himself admits that he did not begin to suspect his colleagues until the debates at Athens after the return of this first embassy.

[810] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 344. Compare p. 371. τοὺς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης πρέσβεις πέμπειν ὡς Φίλιππον ἐπείσθητε ὑπ᾽ Ἀριστοδήμου καὶ Νεοπτολέμου καὶ Κτησιφῶντος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπαγγελλόντων οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ὑγιὲς, etc.

[811] There is great contradiction between the two orators, Æschines and Demosthenes, as to this speech of Æschines before Philip respecting Amphipolis. Demosthenes represents Æschines as having said in this report to the people on his return, "I (Æschines) said nothing about Amphipolis, in order that I might leave that subject fresh for Demosthenes," etc.

Compare Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 421; Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 33, 34. c. 18, 19, 21.

As to this particular matter of fact, I incline to believe Æschines rather than his rival. He probably did make an eloquent speech about Amphipolis before Philip.

[812] The eighth day of Elaphebolion fell some little time after their arrival, so that possibly they may have even reached Athens on the last days of the month Anthesterion (Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 63. c. 24). The reader will understand that the Grecian lunar months do not correspond precisely, but only approximatively, with ours.

[813] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 353, 354. … ὁ γὰρ εἰς τὴν προτέραν γράψας ἐπιστολὴν, ἣν ἠνέγκαμεν ἡμεῖς, ὅτι "ἔγραφόν τ᾽ ἂν καὶ διαῤῥήδην, ἥλικα ὑμᾶς εὖ ποιήσω, εἰ εὖ ᾔδειν καὶ τὴν συμμαχίαν μοι γενησομένην," etc. Compare Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 85. Æschines alludes to this letter, Fals. Leg. p. 34. c. 21.

[814] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p 365.

[815] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39. c. 26; Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 63. c. 23. παρηγγέλλετο δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν (Kersobleptes) ἤδη στρατεία, etc.

[816] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 34. c. 20. τῆς ἐν τοῖς πότοις ἐπιδεξιότητος—συμπιεῖν δεινὸς ἦν (c. 21).

[817] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 34, 35. c. 21; Dem. Fals. Leg. p. 421. Yet Æschines, when describing the same facts in his oration against Ktesiphon (p. 62. c. 23), simply says that Demosthenes gave to the assembly an account of the proceedings of the first embassy, similar to that given by the other envoys—ταὐτὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις πρέσβεσιν ἀπήγγειλε, etc.

The point noticed in the text (that Demosthenes charged Æschines with reluctance to let any one else have anything to say) is one which appears both in Æschines and Demosthenes, De Fals. Legat., and may therefore in

the main be regarded as having really occurred. But probably the statement made by Demosthenes to the people as to the proceedings of the embassy, *was* substantially the same as that of his colleagues. For though the later oration of Æschines is, in itself, less trustworthy evidence than the earlier—yet when we find two different statements of Æschines respecting Demosthenes, we may reasonably presume that the one which is *least unfavorable* is the *most credible* of the two.

[818] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 34, 35, 42. c 20, 21, 34; Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. p. 62, 63. c. 23, 24. In the first of the two speeches, Æschines makes no mention of the decree proposed by Demosthenes relative to the assembly on the eighth of Elaphebolion. He mentions it in the speech against Ktesiphon, with considerable specification.

[819] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 36. c. 22. ἕτερον ψήφισμα, Æsch. adv. Ktesiph. p. 63. c. 24. This last decree, fixing the two special days of the month, could scarcely have been proposed until after Philip's envoys had actually reached Athens.

[820] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 42. c. 34; adv. Ktesiphont. p. 62. c. 22; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 414; De Coronâ, p. 234. This courtesy and politeness towards the Macedonian envoys is admitted by Demosthenes himself. It was not a circumstance of which he had any reason to be ashamed.

[821] I insert in the text what appears to me the probable truth about this resolution of the confederate synod. The point is obscure, and has been differently viewed by different commentators.

Demosthenes affirms, in his earlier speech (De Fals. Leg. p. 346), that Æschines held disgraceful language in his speech before the public assembly on the 19th Elaphebolion (to the effect that Athens ought to act for herself alone, and to take no thought for any other Greeks except such as had assisted her); and that, too, in the presence and hearing of those envoys from other Grecian cities, whom the Athenians had sent for at the instigation of Æschines himself. The presence of these envoys in the assembly, here implied, is not the main charge, but a collateral aggravation; nevertheless, Æschines (as is often the case throughout his defence) bestows nearly all his care upon the aggravation, taking comparatively little notice of the main charge. He asserts with great emphasis (Fals. Leg. p. 35), that the envoys sent out from Athens on mission had *not returned*, and that there were *no envoys present* from any Grecian cities.

It seems to me reasonable here to believe the assertion of Demosthenes, that there *were* envoys from other Grecian cities present; although he himself in his later oration (De Coronâ, p. 232, 233) speaks as if such were not the fact, as if all the Greeks had been long found out as recreants in the cause of liberty, and as if no envoys from Athens were then absent on mission. I accept the *positive* assertion of Æschines as true—that there were Athenian envoys then absent on mission, who might possibly, on their return, bring in with them deputies from other Greeks; but I do not admit his *negative* assertion—that no Athenian envoys had returned from their mission, and that no deputies had come in from other Greeks. That among many Athenian envoys sent out, *all* should fail—appears to me very improbable.

If we follow the argument of Æschines (in the speech De Fals. Leg.), we shall see that it is quite enough if we suppose *some* of the envoys sent out on mission, and not *all* of them, to be absent. To prove this fact, he adduces (p. 35, 36) the resolution of the confederate synod, alluding to the absent envoys, and recommending a certain course to be taken after their return. This does not necessarily imply that *all* were absent. Stechow remarks justly, that some of the envoys would necessarily be out a long time, having to visit more than one city, and perhaps cities distant from each other (Vita Æschinis, p. 41).

I also accept what Æschines says about the resolution of the confederate synod, as being substantially true. About the actual import of this resolution, he is consistent with himself, both in the earlier and in the later oration. Winiewski (Comment. Historic. in Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 74-77) and Westermann (De Litibus quas Demosthenes oravit ipse, p. 38-42) affirm, I think without reason, that the import of this resolution is differently represented by Æschines in the earlier and in the later orations. What is really different in the two orations, is the way in which Æschines perverts the import of the resolution to inculpate Demosthenes; affirming in the later oration, that if Athens had waited for the return of her envoys on mission, she might have made peace with Philip jointly with a large body of Grecian allies; and that it was Demosthenes who hindered her from doing this, by hurrying on the discussions about the peace (Æsch. adv. Ktesiph. p. 61-63), etc. Westermann thinks that the synod would not take upon them to prescribe how many assemblies the Athenians should convene for the purpose of debating about peace. But it seems to have been a common practice with the Athenians, about peace or other special and important matters, to convene two assemblies on two days immediately succeeding: all that

the synod here recommended was, that the Athenians should follow the usual custom—προγράψαι τοὺς πρυτάνεις ἐκκλησίας δύο κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, etc. That two assemblies, neither less nor more, should be convened for the purpose, was a point of no material importance; except that it indicated a determination to decide the question at once—*sans désemparer*.

[822] Æschines, adv. Ktesiph. p. 64.

[823] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 391. τήν τε γὰρ εἰρήνην οὐχὶ δυνηθέντων ὡς ἐπεχείρησαν οὗτοι, "πλὴν Ἀλέων καὶ Φωκέων," γράψαι—ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκασθέντος ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν τοῦ Φιλοκράτους ταῦτα μὲν ἀπαλείψαι, γράψαι δ᾽ ἀντικρὺς "Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίων συμμάχους," etc.

[824] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 345, 346.

[825] Æschines. Fals. Leg. p. 36.

[826] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 63, 64.

[827] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39.

[828] From the considerations here stated, we can appreciate the charges of Æschines against Demosthenes, even on his own showing; though the precise course of either is not very clear.

He accuses Demosthenes of having sold himself to Philip (adv. Ktes. p. 63, 64); a charge utterly futile and incredible, refuted by the whole conduct of Demosthenes, both before and after. Whether Demosthenes received bribes from Harpalus—or from the Persian court—will be matter of future inquiry. But the allegation that he had been bribed by Philip is absurd. Æschines himself confesses that it was quite at variance with the received opinion at Athens (adv. Ktes. p. 62. c. 22).

He accuses Demosthenes of having, under the influence of these bribes, opposed and frustrated the recommendation of the confederate synod—of having hurried on the debate about peace at once—and of having thus prevented Athens from waiting for the return of her absent envoys, which would have enabled her to make peace in conjunction with a powerful body of coöperating Greeks. This charge is advanced by Æschines, first in the speech De Fals. Leg. p. 36—next, with greater length and emphasis, in the later speech, adv. Ktesiph. p. 63, 64. From what has been said in the text, it will be seen that such indefinite postponement, when Antipater and Parmenio were present in Athens by invitation, was altogether impossible, without breaking off the negotiation. Not to mention, that Æschines himself affirms, in the strongest language, the ascertained impossibility of prevailing upon any other Greeks to join Athens, and complains bitterly of their backward dispositions (Fals. Leg. p. 38. c. 25). In this point Demosthenes perfectly concurs with him (De Coronâ, p. 231, 232). So that even if postponement could have been had, it would have been productive of no benefit, nor of any increase of force, to Athens, since the Greeks were not inclined to coöperate with her.

The charge of Æschines against Demosthenes is thus untenable, and suggests its own refutation, even from the mouth of the accuser himself. Demosthenes indeed replies to it in a different manner. When Æschines says —"You hurried on the discussion about peace, without allowing Athens to await the return of her envoys, then absent on mission"—Demosthenes answers—"There were *no* Athenian envoys then absent on mission. All the Greeks had been long ago detected as incurably apathetic." (De Coronâ, p. 233). This is a slashing and decisive reply, which it might perhaps be safe for Demosthenes to hazard, at an interval of thirteen years after the events. But it is fortunate that another answer can be provided; for I conceive the assertion to be neither correct in point of fact, nor consistent with the statements of Demosthenes himself in the speech De Falsâ Legatione.

[829] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 391-430. Æschines affirms strongly, in his later oration against Ktesiphon (p. 63), that Demosthenes warmly advocated the motion of Philokrates for alliance as well as peace with Philip. He professes to give the precise phrase used by Demosthenes—which he censures as an inelegant phrase—οὐ δεῖν ἀποῤῥῆξαι τῆς εἰρήνης τὴν συμμαχίαν, etc. He adds that Demosthenes called up the Macedonian ambassador Antipater to the rostrum, put a question to him, and obtained an answer concerted beforehand. How much of this is true, I cannot say. The version given by Æschines in his later speech, is, as usual, different from that in his earlier.

The accusation against Demosthenes, of corrupt collusion with Antipater, is incredible and absurd.

[830] Æschines, adv. Timarch. p. 24, 25. c. 34. παρεμβάλλων (Demosthenes) τὰς ἐμὰς δημηγορίας, καὶ ψέγων τὴν εἰρήνην τὴν δι᾽ ἐμοῦ καὶ Φιλοκράτους γεγενημένην, ὥστε οὐδὲ ἀπαντήσεσθαί με

ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον ἀπολογησόμενον, ὅταν τὰς τῆς πρεσβείας εὐθύνας διδῶ, etc. … Φίλιππον δὲ νῦν μὲν διὰ τὴν τῶν λόγων εὐφημίαν ἐπαινῶ, etc.

[831] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 434. φήσας (Eubulus) καταβαίνειν εἰς Πειραιᾶ δεῖν ἤδη καὶ χρήματ᾽ εἰσφέρειν καὶ τὰ θεωρικὰ στρατιωτικὰ ποιεῖν—ἢ χειροτονεῖν ἃ συνεῖπε μὲν οὗτος (Æschines) ἔγραψε δ᾽ ὁ βδελυρὸς Φιλοκράτης.

[832] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 385.

[833] Pseudo-Demosthen. De Halonneso, p. 81-83. Demosthenes, in one passage (Fals. Leg. p. 385), speaks as if it were a part of the Athenian oath—that they would oppose and treat as enemies all who should try to save from Philip and to restore to Athens the places now recognized as Philip's possession for the future. Though Vœmel (Proleg. ad Demosth. De Pace, p. 265) and Böhnecke (p. 303) insert these words as a part of the actual formula, I doubt whether they are anything more than a constructive expansion, given by Demosthenes himself, of the import of the formula.

[834] This fact we learn from the subsequent discussions about *amending* the peace, mentioned in Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 84.

[835] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 33. c. 26.

[836] This date is preserved by Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 64. c. 27. ἕκτῃ φθίνοντος τοῦ Ἐλαφηβολιῶνος μηνὸς, etc. In the earlier oration (De Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 29) Æschines states that Demosthenes was among the Proedri or presiding senators of a public assembly held ἑβδόμῃ φθίνοντος—the day before. It is possible that there might have been two public assemblies held, on two successive days (the 23d and 24th, or the 24th and 25th, according as the month Elaphebolion happened in that year to have 30 days or 29 days), and that Demosthenes may have been among the Proedri in both. But the transaction described (in the oration against Ktesiphon) as having happened on the latter of the two days—must have preceded that which is mentioned (in the Oration De Fals. Leg.) as having happened on the earlier of the two days; or at least cannot have followed it; so that there seems to be an inaccuracy in one or in the other. If the word ἕκτῃ, in the oration against Ktesiphon, and ἑβδόμῃ in the speech on the False Legation, are both correct, the transactions mentioned in the one cannot be reconciled chronologically with those narrated in the other. Various conjectural alterations have bean proposed. See Vœmel, Prolegg. ad Demosth. Orat. De Pace, p. 257; Böhnecke, Forschungen, p. 399.

[837] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39. ἤδη δὲ ἡμῶν κεχειροτονημένων εἰς τοὺς ὅρκους, οὔπω δὲ ἀπῃρκότων ἐπὶ τὴν ὑστέραν πρεσβείαν, ἐκκλησία γίνεται, etc.

This ἐκκλησία seems to be the same as that which is named by Æschines in the speech against Ktesiphon, as having been held on the 25th Elaphebolion.

[838] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 397. καίτοι δύο χρησιμωτέρους τόπους τῆς οἰκουμένης οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς ἐπιδείξαι τῇ πόλει, κατὰ μὲν γῆν, Πυλῶν—ἐκ θαλάττης δὲ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου· ἃ συναμφότερα οὗτοι πεπράκασιν αἰσχρῶς καὶ καθ᾽ ὑμῶν ἐγκεχειρίκασι Φιλίππῳ.

[839] Compare Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39. c. 26, with Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 64. c. 27.

Franke (Proleg. ad Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 30, 31) has some severe comments on the discrepancy between the two statements.

That the question was put, and affirmed by vote, to admit Kersobleptes appears from the statement of Æschines in the speech De Fals. Leg.—τὸ ψήφισμα ἐπεψηφίσθη—ἐψηφισμένου δὲ τοῦ δήμου. Compare Demosth. De Fals. Leg. p. 398, and Demosthen. Philipp. iv. p. 133.

Philip, in his letter some years afterwards to the Athenians, affirmed that Kersobleptes wished to be admitted to take the oaths, but was excluded by the Athenian generals, who declared him to be an enemy of Athens (Epist. Phil. ap. Demosth. p. 160). If it be true that the generals tried to exclude him, their exclusion must have been overruled by the vote of the assembly.

[840] Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 444. ἐντεῦθεν οἱ μὲν παρ᾽ ἐκείνου πρέσβεις προὔλεγον ὑμῖν ὅτι Φωκέας οὐ προσδέχεται Φίλιππος συμμάχους, οὗτοι δ᾽ ἐκδεχόμενοι τοιαῦτ᾽ ἐδημηγόρουν, ὡς φανερῶς μὲν οὐχὶ καλῶς ἔχει τῷ Φιλίππῳ προσδέξασθαι τοὺς Φωκέας συμμάχους, διὰ τοὺς Θηβαίους καὶ τοὺς Θετταλοὺς, ἂν δὲ γένηται τῶν πραγμάτων κύριος καὶ τῆς

εἰρήνης τύχῃ, ἅπερ ἂν συνθέσθαι νῦν ἀξιώσαιμεν αὐτὸν, ταῦτα ποιήσει τότε. Τὴν μὲν τοίνυν εἰρήνην ταύταις ταῖς ἐλπίσι καὶ ταῖς ἐπαγωγαῖς εὕροντο παρ᾽ ὑμῶν ἄνευ Φωκέων.

Ibid. p. 409. Εἰ δὲ πάντα τἀναντία τούτων καὶ πολλὰ καὶ φιλάνθρωπα εἰπόντες Φίλιππον, φιλεῖν τὴν πόλιν, Φωκέας σώσειν, Θηβαίους παύσειν τῆς ὕβρεως, ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις μείζονα ἢ κατ᾽ Ἀμφίπολιν εὖ ποιήσειν ὑμᾶς, ἐὰν τύχῃ τῆς εἰρήνης, Εὔβοιαν, Ὠρωπὸν ἀποδώσειν—εἰ ταῦτ᾽ εἰπόντες καὶ ὑποσχόμενοι πάντ᾽ ἐξηπατήκασι καὶ πεφενακίκασι, etc.

Compare also, p. 346, 388, 391, about the false promises under which the Athenians were induced to consent to the peace—τῶν ὑποσχέσεων, ἐφ᾽ αἷς εὑρίσκετο (Philip) τὴν εἰρήνην. The same false promises put forward *before* the peace and determining the Athenians to conclude it, are also noticed by Demosthenes in the second Philippic (p. 69), τὰς ὑποσχέσεις, ἐφ᾽ αἷς τῆς εἰρήνης ἔτυχεν (Philip)—p. 72. τοὺς ἐνεγκόντας τὰς ὑποσχέσεις, ἐφ᾽ αἷς ἐπείσθητε ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰρήνην. This second Philippic is one year earlier in date than the oration de Falsâ Legatione, and is better authority than that oration, not merely on account of its earlier date, but because it is a parliamentary harangue, not tainted with an accusatory purpose nor mentioning Æschines by name.

[841] Demosthenes speaks of the omission of the Phokians, in taking the oaths at Athens, as if it were a matter of small importance (Fals. Leg. p. 387, 388; compare p. 372); that is, on the supposition that the promises made by Æschines turned out to be realized.

In his speech De Pace (p. 59), he takes credit for his protests on behalf of the Phokians; but only for protests made *after his* return from the second embassy—not for protests made when Antipater refused to admit the Phokians to the oaths.

Westermann (De Litibus quas Demosthenes oravit ipse, p. 48) suspects that Demosthenes did not see through the deception of Æschines until the Phokians were utterly ruined. This, perhaps, goes beyond the truth; but at the time when the oaths were exchanged at Athens, he either had not clearly detected the consequences of that miserable shuffle into which Athens was tricked by Philokrates, etc.—or he was afraid to proclaim them emphatically.

[842] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 355. τραχέως δ᾽ ὑμῶν τῷ "μηδὲ προσδοκᾷν" σχόντων, etc. (the Athenian public were displeased with Demosthenes when he told them that he did not expect the promises of Æschines to be realized; this was after the second embassy, but it illustrates the temper of the assembly even before the second embassy)—ibid. p. 349. τίς γὰρ ἂν ἠνέσχετο, τηλικαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα ἔσεσθαι προσδοκῶν ἀγαθὰ, ἢ ταῦθ᾽ ὡς οὐκ ἔσται λέγοντός τινος, ἢ κατηγοροῦντος τῶν πεπραγμένων τούτοις;

How unpopular it was to set up mere negative mistrust against glowing promises of benefits to come, is here strongly urged by Demosthenes.

Respecting the premature disarming of the Athenians, see Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 234.

[843] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39. c. 27.

[844] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 430. οὐ τὸ μὲν ψήφισμα "οὐδαμοῦ μόνους ἐντυγχάνειν Φιλίππῳ," οὗτοι δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἐπαύσαντο ἰδίᾳ χρηματίζοντες;

[845] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 41. c. 32. Τὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων ὀρθῶς βουλεύσασθαι, ὅσα καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἐστιν ἢ Φίλιππον, τοῦτο ἤδη ἔργον ἐστὶ πρεσβέων φρονίμων…. Ἀφίγμεθα δ᾽ ἡμεῖς ἔχοντες τοῦ δήμου ψήφισμα, ἐν ᾧ γέγραπται, Πράττειν δὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις, καὶ ἄλλ᾽ ὅ,τι ἂν δύνωνται ἀγαθόν.

[846] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39. c. 26.

[847] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 29. ὅτι Κερσοβλέπτης ἀπολώλεκε τὴν ἀρχὴν, καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν ὄρος κατείληφε Φίλιππος.

There is no fair ground for supposing that the words ἀπολώλεκε τὴν ἀρχὴν are the actual words used by Chares, or that Kersobleptes was affirmed by Chares to have lost everything that he had. It suited the argument of Æschines to give the statement in a sweeping and exaggerated form.

[848] See the just and prudent reasoning of Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 388, and De Coronâ, p. 234.

Compare also Pseudo-Demosthenes, De Halonneso, p. 85, 86.

[849] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 389; De Coronâ, p. 234. Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 29, 30) recognizes the fact that this decree was passed by the Senate on the 3d of Munychion, and that the envoys left Athens in consequence of it. He does not mention that it was proposed by Demosthenes. Æschines here confirms, in a very important manner, the fact of the delay, as alleged by Demosthenes, while the explanation which he gives, why the envoys did not go to Thrace, is altogether without value.

A document, purporting to be this decree, is given in Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 234, but the authenticity is too doubtful to admit of citing it.

[850] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 390.

[851] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 38. c. 26; Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 85; Fals. Leg. p. 390-448: compare Philippic iii. p. 114. Among the Thracian places captured by Philip during this interval, Demosthenes enumerates the Sacred Mountain. But this is said to have been captured before the end of Elaphebolion, if Æschines quotes correctly from the letter of Chares, Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 29.

[852] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 390.

[853] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 41. c. 30. Demosthenes (and doubtless the other envoys also) walked on the journey, with two slaves to carry his clothes and bedding. In the pack carried by one slave, was a talent in money, destined to aid some of the poor prisoners towards their ransom.

[854] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 388. ἢ γὰρ παρόντων (we the envoys) καὶ κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα αὐτὸν (Philip) ἐξορκωσάντων, ἃ μὲν εἰλήφει τῆς πόλεως, ἀποδώσειν, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀφέξεσθαι—ἢ μὴ ποιοῦντος ταῦτα ἀπαγγελεῖν ἡμᾶς εὐθέως δεῦρο, etc.

[855] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 42. c. 33. πορεύεται Φίλιππος εἰς Πύλας· ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἐγκαλύπτομαι, etc. This is the language which Æschines affirms to have been held by Demosthenes during the embassy. It is totally at variance with all that Demosthenes affirms, over and over again, respecting his own proceedings; and (in my judgment) with all the probabilities of the case.

[856] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 42. c. 34.

[857] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 43. c. 36. Τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴν τῆς στρατείας ταύτης ὁσίαν καὶ δικαίαν ἀπεφηνάμην εἶναι, etc.

… Ἀπεφηνάμην ὅτι ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, μὴ περιορᾷν κατεσκαμμένας τὰς ἐν Βοιωτοῖς πόλεις, ὅτι δὴ ἦσαν Ἀμφικτυονίδες καὶ ἔνορκοι.

[858] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 43. c. 37; compare Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 347.

[859] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 393, 394, 395.

[860] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 396. καὶ τὴν μὲν γραφεῖσαν ἐπιστολὴν ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπεψηφίσαντο μὴ πέμπειν, αὐτοὶ δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ὑγιὲς γράψαντες ἔπεμψαν. Compare p. 419.

[861] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 445. ἐγὼ δ᾽, ὥσπερ ἀκηκόατ᾽ ἤδη πολλάκις, οὐχὶ δυνηθεὶς προαπελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μισθωσάμενος πλοῖον κατακωλυθεὶς ἐκπλεῦσαι. Compare p. 357.—οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἐμὲ, ἡνίκα δεῦρο ἀποπλεῖν ἐβουλόμην, κατεκώλυεν (Philip), etc.

[862] The Lacedæmonian troops remained at Thermopylæ until a little time before Philip reached it (Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 365).

[863] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41. αὐτοὶ δὲ οὐκ ἠπόρουν καὶ ἐφοβοῦντο οἱ τῶν Θηβαίων πρέσβεις; … τῶν δ᾽ ἑταίρων τινες τῶν Φιλίππου οὐ διαῤῥήδην πρός τινας ἡμῶν ἔλεγον, ὅτι τὰς ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ πόλεις κατοικιεῖ Φίλιππος; Θηβαῖοι δ᾽ οὐκ ἐξεληλύθεσαν πανδημεὶ, ἀπιστοῦντες τοῖς πράγμασιν;

Demosthenes greatly eulogizes the incorruptibility and hearty efforts of the Theban envoys (Fals. Leg. p. 384); which assertion is probably nothing better at bottom, than a rhetorical contrast, to discredit Æschines—fit to be inserted in the numerous list of oratorical exaggerations and perversions of history, collected in the interesting Treatise of Weiske, De Hyperbolê, errorum in Historiâ Philippi commissorum genitrice (Meissen, 1819).

[864] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 113; Justin, viii. 4. "Contra Phocensium legati, adhibitis Lacedæmoniis et Atheniensibus, bellum deprecabantur, cujus ab eo dilationem ter jam emerant." I do not understand to what

facts Justin refers, when he states, that the Phokians "had already purchased thrice from Philip a postponement of war."

[865] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 365. τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μετεπέμπετο, πάντα τὰ πράγματα ὑποσχόμενος πράξειν ἐκείνοις, etc.

Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41. Λακεδαιμονίοι δὲ οὐ μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν τἀναντία Θηβαίοις ἐπρέσβευον, καὶ τελευτῶντες προσέκρουον φανερῶς ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, καὶ διηπείλουν τοῖς τῶν Θηβαίων πρέσβεισιν;

[866] This thought is strikingly presented by Justin (viii. 4), probably from Theopompus—"Fœdum prorsus miserandumque spectaculum, Græciam, etiam nunc et viribus et dignitate orbis terrarum principem, regum certo gentiumque semper victricem et multarum adhuc urbium dominam, alienis excubare sedibus, aut rogantem bellum aut deprecantem: in alterius ope omnem spem posuisse orbis terrarum vindices; eoque discordia sua civilibusque bellis redactos, ut adulentur ultro sordidam paulo ante clientelæ suæ partem: et hæc potissimum facere Thebanos Lacedæmoniosque, antea inter se imperii, nunc gratiæ imperantis, æmulos."

[867] Justin, viii. 4.

[868] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 113. τοῦτο δ᾽ εἰς Φωκέας ὡς πρὸς συμμάχους ἐπορεύετο, καὶ πρέσβεις Φωκέων ἦσαν οἳ παρηκολούθουν αὐτῷ πορευομένῳ· καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἤριζον πολλοὶ, Θηβαίοις οὐ λυσιτελήσειν τὴν ἐκείνου πάροδον. The words παρ᾽ ἡμῖν denote the Athenian envoys (of whom Demosthenes was one) and the persons around them, marching along with Philip; the oaths not having been yet taken.

[869] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 390. The oath was administered in the inn in front of the chapel of the Dioskuri, near Pheræ.

[870] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 359. In more than one passage, he states their absence from Athens to have lasted three entire months (p. 390; also De Coronâ, p. 235). But this is an exaggeration of the time. The decree of the Senate, which constrained them to depart, was passed on the third of Munychion. Assuming that they set out on that very day (though it is more probable that they did not set out until the ensuing day), their absence would only have lasted seventy days.

[871] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 430. The Magnesian and Achæan cities round the Pagasæan Gulf, all except Halus, were included in the oath as allies of Philip (Epistola Philippi ap. Demosthen. p. 159).

[872] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 395. Compare Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 87.

[873] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 351. ἦν γὰρ τοῦτο πρῶτον ἁπάντων τῶν ἀδικημάτων, τὸ τὸν Φίλιππον ἐπιστῆσαι τοῖς πράγμασι τούτοις, καὶ δέον ὑμᾶς ἀκοῦσαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, εἶτα βουλεύσασθαι, μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ πράττειν ὅ,τι δόξαι, ἅμα ἀκούειν κἀκεῖνον παρεῖναι, καὶ μηδ᾽ ὅ,τι χρὴ ποιεῖν ῥᾴδιον εἰπεῖν εἶναι. Compare Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 236. πάλιν ὠνεῖται παρ᾽ αὐτῶν ὅπως μὴ ἅπίωμεν ἐκ Μακεδονίας ἕως τὰ τῆς στρατείας τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς Φωκέας εὐτρεπῆ ποιήσαιτο, etc.

[874] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 352, 353; ad Philipp. Epistol. p. 152. Demosthenes affirms farther that Æschines himself *wrote* the letter in Philip's name. Æschines denies that he wrote it, and sustains his denial upon sufficient grounds. But he does not deny that he brought it (Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 44. c. 40, 41).

The inhabitants of Pharsalus were attached to Philip; while those of Pheræ were opposed to him as much as they dared, and even refused (according to Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 444) to join his army on this expedition. The old rivalry between the two cities here again appears.

[875] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 355. ἐκ τοῦ, ὅτε τοὺς ὅρκους ἤμελλε Φίλιππος ὀμνύναι τοὺς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, ἐκσπόνδους ἀποφανθῆναι τοὺς Φωκέας ὑπὸ τούτων, ὃ σιωπᾷν καὶ ἐᾷν εἰκὸς ἦν, εἴπερ ἤμελλον σώζεσθαι. Compare p. 395. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν Φωκεῖς ἐκσπόνδους καὶ Ἀλεῖς ἀπέφηναν καὶ Κερσοβλέπτην, παρὰ τὸ ψήφισμα καὶ τὰ πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρημένα, etc.; also p. 430.

[876] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 346.

[877] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 444. ἐφ᾽ ἣν αἱ πεντήκοντα τριήρεις ὅμως ἐφώρμουν, etc. Compare Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 33.

[878] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 350, 351. Demosthenes causes this resolution of the Senate (προβούλευμα) to be read to the Dikasts, together with the testimony of the senator who moved it. The document is not found *verbatim*, but Demosthenes comments upon it before the Dikasts after it has been read, and especially points

out that it contains neither praise nor invitation, which the Senate was always in the habit of voting to returning envoys. This is sufficient to refute the allegation of Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 44. c. 38), that Demosthenes himself moved a resolution to praise the envoys and invite them to a banquet in the Prytaneium. Æschines does not produce such resolution, nor cause it to be read before the Dikasts.

[879] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 347, 351, 352. τοῦτο μὲν οὐδεὶς ἀνέγνω τῷ δήμῳ τὸ προβούλευμα, οὐδ᾽ ἤκουσεν ὁ δῆμος, ἀναστὰς δ᾽ οὗτος ἐδημηγόρει. The date of the 16th Skirrophorion is specified, p. 359.

[880] I have here condensed the substance of what is stated by Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 347, 348, 351, 352, 364, 411, etc. Another statement, to the same effect, made by Demosthenes in the Oration De Pace (delivered only a few months after the assembly here described, and not a judicial accusation against Æschines, but a deliberative harangue before the public assembly), is even better evidence than the accusatory speech De Falsâ Legatione—ἡνίκα τοὺς ὅρκους τοὺς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης ἀπειληφότες ἤκομεν οἱ πρέσβεις, τότε Θεσπιάς τινων καὶ Πλαταιὰς ὑπισχνουμένων οἰκισθήσεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν Φωκέας τὸν Φίλιππον, ἂν γένηται κύριος, σώσειν, τὴν δὲ Θηβαίων πόλιν διοικιεῖν, καὶ τὸν Ὠρωπὸν ὑμῖν ὑπάρξειν, καὶ τὴν Εὔβοιαν ἀντ᾽ Ἀμφιπόλεως ἀποδοθήσεσθαι, καὶ τοιαύτας ἐλπίδας καὶ φενακισμοὺς, οἷς ἐπαχθέντες ὑμεῖς οὔτε συμφόρως οὔτ᾽ ἴσως οὔτε καλῶς προεῖσθε Φωκέας … οὐδὲν τούτων οὔτ᾽ ἐξαπατήσας οὔτε σιγήσας ἐγὼ φανήσομαι, ἀλλὰ προειπὼν ὑμῖν, ὡς οἶδ᾽ ὅτι μνημονεύετε, ὅτι ταῦτα οὔτε οἶδα οὔτε προσδοκῶ, νομίζω δὲ τὸν λέγοντα ληρεῖν (De Pace, p. 59).

Compare also Philippic ii. p. 72, 73, where Demosthenes repeats the like assertion; also De Chersoneso, p. 105; De Coronâ, p. 236, 237.

[881] Demosthenes states (Fals. Leg. p. 394. εἰς τὰ Παναθήναια φήσας ἀποπέμψειν) that *he* received this assurance from Philip, while he was busying himself during the mission in efforts to procure the ransom or liberation of the prisoners. But we may be sure that Æschines, so much more in the favor of Philip, must have received it also, since it would form so admirable a point for his first speech at Athens, in this critical juncture.

[882] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 352. ὥσθ᾽ ὑμᾶς, ἐκπεπληγμένους τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ Φιλίππου, καὶ τούτοις ὀργιζομένους ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ προηγγελκέναι, πρᾳοτέρους γενέσθαι τινὸς, πάνθ᾽ ὅσ᾽ ἐβούλεσθ᾽ ὑμῖν ἔσεσθαι προσδοκήσαντας, etc.

[883] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 348, 349, 352. οἱ δ᾽ ἀντιλέγοντες ὄχλος ἄλλως καὶ βασκανία κατεφαίνετο, etc.

[884] Dem. Fals. Leg. p. 355; Phil. ii. p. 73.

[885] Dem. Fals. Leg. p. 353.

[886] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 356. Οὗτος (Æschines) ἦν ὁ λέγων ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑπισχνούμενος· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς παρὰ τούτου λόγους ὡρμηκότας λαβὼν ὑμᾶς ὁ Φιλοκράτης, ἐγγράφει τοῦτ᾽ εἰς τὸ ψήφισμα, ἐὰν μὴ ποιῶσι Φωκεῖς ἃ δεῖ, καὶ παραδίδωσι τοῖς Ἀμφικτύοσι τὸ ἱερὸν, ὅτι βοηθήσει ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τοὺς διακωλύοντας ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι.

The fact, that by this motion of Philokrates the peace was extended to "the posterity" of the Athenians—is dwelt upon by Demosthenes as "the greatest disgrace of all;" with an intensity of emphasis which it is difficult to enter into (Philippic ii. p. 73).

[887] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 357. Demosthenes causes the two letters to be read, and proceeds—Αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἐπιστολαὶ καλοῦσιν αὖται, καὶ νὴ Δία ἤδη γε.

So also Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 4. ὑμῖν δὲ ταῦθ᾽ ὁρῶν οὐκ ἔγραψεν ἐπιστολὴν ὁ Φίλιππος, ἐξιέναι πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει βοηθήσοντας τοῖς δικαίοις; Æschines only notices one of the two letters. Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 412) conceives the letters as having been written and sent between the 16th and 23d of the month Skirrophorion.

[888] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 359.

[889] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 379.

[890] This was among the grounds of objection, taken by Demosthenes and his friends, against the despatch of forces to Thermopylæ in compliance with the letter of Philip—according to the assertion of Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41); who treats the objection with contempt, though it seems well-grounded and reasonable.

[891] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 356, 357.

[892] Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41.

[893] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 387.

[894] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41. This statement of Æschines—about the declining strength of the Phokians and the causes thereof—has every appearance of being correct in point of fact; though it will not sustain the conclusions which he builds upon it.

Compare Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 30 (delivered four years earlier) ἀπειρηκότων δὲ χρήμασι Φωκέων, etc.

[895] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 365; Diodor. xvi. 59.

[896] For the defence of Thermopylæ, at the period of the invasion of Xerxes, the Grecian fleet at Artemisium was not less essential than the land force of Leonidas encamped in the pass itself.

[897] That the Phokians could not maintain Thermopylæ without the aid of Athens—and that Philip could march to the frontier of Attica, without any intermediate obstacle to prevent him, if Olynthus were suffered to fall into his hand—is laid down emphatically by Demosthenes in the first Olynthiac, nearly four years before the month of Skirrophorion, 346 B. C.

Ἂν δ᾽ ἐκεῖνα Φίλιππος λάβῃ, τίς αὐτὸν κωλύσει δεῦρο βαδίζειν; Θηβαῖοι; οἳ, εἰ μὴ λίαν πικρὸν εἰπεῖν, καὶ συνεισβαλοῦσιν ἑτοίμως. Ἀλλὰ Φωκεῖς; οἱ τὴν οἰκείαν οὐχ οἷοί τε ὄντες φυλάττειν, ἐὰν μὴ βοηθήσεθ᾽ ὑμεῖς (Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 16).

[898] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 359. ἥκομεν δὲ δεῦρο ἀπὸ τῆς πρεσβείας τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς ὅρκους τρίτῃ ἐπὶ δέκα τοῦ Σκιῤῥοφοριῶνος μηνὸς, καὶ παρῆν ὁ Φίλιππος ἐν Πύλαις ἤδη καὶ τοῖς Φωκεῦσιν ἐπηγγέλλετο ὧν οὐδὲν ἐπίστευον ἐκεῖνοι. Σημεῖον δὲ—οὐ γὰρ ἂν δεῦρ᾽ ἦκον ὡς ὑμᾶς … παρῆσαν γὰρ οἱ τῶν Φωκέων πρέσβεις ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ τί ἀπαγγελοῦσιν οὗτοι (Æschines, Philokrates, etc.) καὶ τί ψηφιεῖσθε ὑμεῖς, ἐπιμελὲς εἰδέναι.

[899] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 357. οἱ μὲν τοίνυν Φωκεῖς, ὡς τὰ παρ᾽ ὑμῶν ἐπύθοντο ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας καὶ τό τε ψήφισμα τοῦτ᾽ ἔλαβον τὸ τοῦ Φιλοκράτους, καὶ τὴν ἀπαγγελίαν ἐπύθοντο τὴν τούτου καὶ τὰς ὑποσχέσεις—κατὰ πάντας τοὺς τρόπους ἀπώλοντο.

Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 45. c. 41) touches upon the statements made by Demosthenes respecting the envoys of Phalækus at Athens, and the effect of the news which they carried back in determining the capitulation. He complains of them generally as being "got up against him" (ὁ κατήγορος μεμηχάνηται), but he does not contradict them upon any specific point. Nor does he at all succeed in repelling the main argument, brought home with great precision of date by Demosthenes.

[900] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 359: compare Diodor. xvi. 59. In this passage, Demosthenes reckons up *seven* days between the final assembly at Athens, and the capitulation concluded by the Phokians. In another passage, he states the same interval at only *five* days (p. 365); which is doubtless inaccurate. In a third passage, the same interval, seemingly, stands at five or six days, p. 379.

[901] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 356-365. ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἦκεν (Philip) εἰς Πύλας, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δ᾽ αἰσθόμενοι τὴν ἐνέδραν ὑπεχώρησαν, etc.

[902] Demosth. Fals. Leg p. 359, 360, 365, 379, 413. ὁ δὲ (Æschines) τοσοῦτον δεῖ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τινα αἰχμάλωτον σῶσαι, ὥσθ᾽ ὅλον τόπον καὶ πλεῖν ἢ μυρίους μὲν ὁπλίτας, ὁμοῦ δὲ χιλίους ἱππέας τῶν ὑπαρχόντων συμμάχων, ὅπως αἰχμάλωτοι γένωνται Φιλίππῳ συμπαρεσκεύασεν.

Diodorus (xvi. 59) states the mercenaries of Phalækus at eight thousand men.

Because the Phokians capitulated to Philip and not to the Thebans (p. 360)—because not one of their towns made any resistance—Demosthenes argues that this proves their confidence in the favorable dispositions of Philip, as testified by Æschines. But he overstrains this argument against Æschines. The Phokians had no choice but to surrender, as soon as all chance of Athenian aid was manifestly shut out. The belief of favorable dispositions on the part of Philip, was doubtless an auxiliary motive, but not the primary or predominant.

[903] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 378; Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 30. It appears that the ten envoys were not all the same—τῶν ἄλλων τοῦς πλείστους τοὺς αὐτοὺς, etc.

[904] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 380. οὔθ᾽ ὅτι πρεσβευτὴς ἄλλος ᾑρητο ἀνθ᾽ αὐτοῦ, etc.

Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 43) does not seem to deny this distinctly.

[905] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 359, 360, 365, 379.

[906] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 368-379. Æschines also acknowledges the passing of this vote, for bringing in the movable property of Athens into a place of safety; though he naturally says very little about it (Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 42).

In the oration of Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 238, this decree, moved by Kallisthenes, is not only alluded to, but purports to be given *verbatim*. The date as we there read it—the 21st of the month Mæmakterion—is unquestionably wrong; for the real decree must have been passed in the concluding days of the month Skirrophorion, immediately after hearing the report of Derkyllus. This manifest error of date will not permit us to believe in the authenticity of the document. Of these supposed original documents, inserted in the oration De Coronâ, Droysen and other critics have shown some to be decidedly spurious; and all are so doubtful that I forbear to cite them as authority.

[907] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 380.

[908] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 41. c. 32. p. 43. c. 36. Æschines accuses Demosthenes of traitorous partiality for Thebes.

[909] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 380; De Coronâ, p. 321. Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 49, 50) admits, and tries to justify, the proceeding.

[910] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 237, 238, 239. It is evident that Demosthenes found little in the letter which could be turned against Philip. Its tone must have been plausible and winning.

A letter is inserted *verbatim* in this oration, professing to be the letter of Philip to the Athenians. I agree with those critics who doubt or disbelieve the genuineness of this letter, and therefore I do not cite it. If Demosthenes had had before him a letter so peremptory and insolent in its tone, he would have animadverted upon it much more severely.

[911] Æschines went on boasting about the excellent dispositions of Philip towards Athens, and the great benefits which Philip promised to confer upon her, for at least several months after this capture of Thermopylæ Æschines, cont. Timarch. p. 24. c. 33. Φίλιππον δὲ νῦν μὲν διὰ τὴν τῶν λόγων εὐφημίαν ἐπαινῶ· ἐὰν δ᾽ αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἔργοις γένηται, οἷος νῦν ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς ὑποσχέσεσιν, ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ῥᾴδιον τὸν καθ᾽ αὑτοῦ ποιήσεται ἔπαινον.

This oration was delivered apparently about the middle of Olymp. 108, 3; some months after the conquest of Thermopylæ by Philip.

[912] Demosth. De Pace, p. 62, Philippic ii. p. 69.

[913] Pausanias, x. 3, 2.

[914] This transfer to the Thebans is not mentioned by Diodorus, but seems contained in the words of Demosthenes (Fals. Leg. p. 385)—τῆς τῶν Φωκέων χώρας ὁπόσην βούλονται: compare p. 380.

[915] Diodor. xvi. 60; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 385. ὅλων τῶν τειχῶν καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἀναιρέσεις. Demosthenes causes this severe sentence of the Amphiktyonic council to be read to the Dikastery (Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 361.) Unfortunately it has not been preserved.

[916] Pausanias, x. 8, 2.

[917] Æschines, Fals. Leg p. 47. c. 44.

[918] Justin, viii. 5. "Victi igitur necessitate, pactâ salute se dediderunt. Sed pactio ejus fidei fuit, cujus antea fuerat deprecati belli promissio. Igitur cæduntur passim rapiunturque: non liberi parentibus, non conjuges maritis, non deorum simulacra templis suis relinquuntur. Unum tantum miseris solatium fuit, quod cum Philippus portione prædæ socios fraudasset, nihil rerum suarum apud inimicos viderunt."

Compare Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 366.

[919] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 47. c. 44; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 366; Demosthen. De Pace, p. 61. ὅτι τοὺς Φωκέων φυγάδας σώζομεν, etc.

[920] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 361. θέαμα δεινὸν καὶ ἐλεεινόν· ὅτε γὰρ νῦν ἐπορευόμεθα εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἦν ὁρᾷν ἡμῖν πάντα ταῦτα, οἰκίας κατεσκαμμένας, τείχη περιῃρημένα, χώραν ἔρημον τῶν ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, γύναια δὲ καὶ παιδάρια ὀλίγα καὶ πρεσβύτας ἀνθρώπους οἰκτροὺς, οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς δύναιτ᾽ ἐφικέσθαι τῷ λόγῳ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν νῦν ὄντων.

As this oration was delivered in 343-342 B. C., the adverb of time νῦν may be reasonably referred to the early part of that year, and the journey to Delphi was perhaps undertaken for the spring meeting of the Amphiktyonic council of that year; between two and three years after the destruction of the Phokians by Philip.

[921] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 361.

[922] Demosth. ad Philipp. Epistolam, p. 153. Νικαίαν μὲν φρουρᾷ κατέχων, etc.

[923] Diodor. xvi. 60. τιθέναι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τῶν Πυθίων Φίλιππον μετὰ Βοιωτῶν καὶ Θετταλῶν, διὰ τὸ Κορινθίους μετεσχηκέναι τοῖς Φωκεῦσι τῆς εἰς τὸ θεῖον παρανομίας.

The reason here assigned by Diodorus, why the Amphiktyons placed the celebration of the Pythian festival in the hands of Philip, cannot be understood. It may be true, as matter of fact, that the Corinthians had allied themselves with the Phokians during the Sacred War—though there is no other evidence of the fact except this passage. But the Corinthians were never invested with any authoritative character in reference to the *Pythian* festival. They were the recognized presidents of the *Isthmian* festival. I cannot but think that Diodorus has been misled by a confusion of these two festivals one with the other.

[924] Xenoph. Hellen. vi.

[925] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 380-398. οὕτω δεινὰ καὶ σχέτλια ἡγουμένων τοὺς ταλαιπώρους πάσχειν Φωκέας, ὥστε μήτε τοὺς ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς θεωροὺς μήτε τοὺς θεσμοθέτας εἰς τὰ Πύθια πέμψαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποστῆναι τῆς πατρίου θεωρίας, etc. Demosth. De Pace, p. 60. τοὺς συνεληλυθότας τούτους καὶ φάσκοντας Ἀμφικτύονας εἶναι, etc.

[926] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 61; Philippic ii. p. 68, 69.

[927] Demosth. De Pace, p. 60-63; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 375. In the latter passage, p. 375, Demosthenes accuses Æschines of having been the only orator in the city who spoke in favor of the proposition, there being a strong feeling in the assembly and in the people against it. Demosthenes must have forgotten, or did not wish to remember, his own harangue De Pace, delivered three years before. In spite of the repugnance of the people, very easy to understand, I conclude that the decree must have passed; since, if it had been rejected, consequences must have arisen which would have come to our knowledge.

[928] Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 43. c. 37. Τοῦτο οὐκ ἀπαγγεῖλαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὑποσχέσθαι μέ φησίν.

Compare p. 43. c. 36. p. 46. c. 41. p. 52. c. 54—also p. 31-41—also the speech against Ktesiphon, p. 65. c. 30. ὡς τάχιστα εἴσω Πυλῶν Φίλιππος παρῆλθε καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐν Φωκεῦσι πόλεις παραδόξως ἀναστάτους ἐποίησε, etc.

[929] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 373, 374. I translate the substance of the argument, not the words.

[930] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 43. c. 36. In rebutting the charge against him of having betrayed the Phokians to Philip, Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 46, 47) dwells upon the circumstance, that none of the Phokian exiles appeared to assist in the accusation, and that some three or four Phokians and Bœotians (whom he calls by name) were ready to appear as witnesses in his favor.

The reason, why none of them appeared against him, appears to me sufficiently explained by Demosthenes. The Phokians were in a state far too prostrate and terror-stricken to incur new enmities, or to come forward as accusers of one of the Athenian partisans of Philip, whose soldiers were in possession of their country.

The reason why some of them appeared in his favor is also explained by Æschines himself, when he states that he had pleaded for them before the Amphiktyonic assembly, and had obtained for them a mitigation of that extreme penalty which their most violent enemies urged against them. To captives at the mercy of their opponents, such an interference might well appear deserving of gratitude; quite apart from the question, how far Æschines as envoy, by his previous communications to the Athenian people, had contributed to betray Thermopylæ and the Phokians to Philip.

[931] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 376.

[932] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 375, 376, 377, 386

[933] Diodor. xvi. 63. ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου πυρὸς κατεφλέχθησαν, etc.

[934] Diodor. xvi. 61, 62, 63.

[935] Diodor. xvi. 64; Justin, viii. 2. "Dignum itaque qui a Diis proximus habeatur, per quem Deorum majestas vindicata sit."

Some of these mercenaries, however, who had been employed in Phokis perished in Sicily in the service of Timoleon—as has been already related.

[936] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 119.

[937] Demosth. De Pace, p. 62. νυνὶ δὲ Θηβαίοις πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὴν χώραν κεκομίσθαι, κάλλιστα πέπρακται, πρὸς δὲ τιμὴν καὶ δόξαν, αἴσχιστα, etc.

[938] Demosth. De Pace, p. 60, 61.

[939] Isokrates. Or. v. ad Philipp. s. 128-135.

[940] Isokrat. Or. v. ad Philipp. s. 91. ὅταν οὕτω διαθῇς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ὥσπερ ὁρᾷς Λακεδαιμονίους τε πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτῶν βασιλέας ἔχοντας, τοὺς δ᾽ ἑταίρους τοὺς σοὺς πρὸς σὲ διακειμένους. Ἔστι δ᾽ οὐ χαλεπὸν τυχεῖν τούτων, ἢν ἐθελήσῃς κοινὸς ἅπασι γενέσθαι, etc.

[941] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 118.

[942] Isokrates, Or. v. Philipp. s. 118; Diodor. xv. 40, 44, 48. Diodorus alludes three several times to this repulse of Ochus from Egypt. Compare Demosth. De Rhod. Libert. p. 193.

Trogus mentioned three different expeditions of Ochus against Egypt (Argument. ad Justin. lib. x).

[943] Isokrates, Or. v. Philipp. s. 102. Ἰδριέα γε τὸν εὐπορώτατον τῶν νῦν περὶ τὴν ἤπειρον, etc.

Demosth. De Pace, p. 63. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐῶμεν—καὶ τὸν Κᾶρα τὰς νήσους καταλαμβάνειν, Χίον καὶ Κῶν καὶ Ῥόδον, etc. An oration delivered in the latter half of 346 B. C. after the peace.

Compare Demosth. De Rhod. Libertat. p. 121, an oration four years earlier.

[944] Diodor. xvi. 42-46. In the Inscription No. 87. of Boeckh's Corpus Inscriptt., we find a decree passed by the Athenians recognizing friendship and hospitality with the Sidonian prince Strato—from whom they seem to have received a donation of ten talents. The note of date in this decree is not preserved; but M. Boeckh conceives it to date between Olympiad 101-104.

[945] Diodor. xvi. 42, 43, 45. "Occisis optimatibus Sidona cepit Ochus" (Trogus, Argum. ad Justin. lib x).

[946] Diodor. xvi. 47; Isokrates, Or. xii. Panathenaic. s. 171.

[947] Diodor. xvi. 47-51. Ley, Fata et Conditio, Ægypti sub Regno Persarum, p. 25, 26.

[948] Isokrates, Or. iv. Philipp. s. 149. καὶ τοὺς ἀφισταμένους τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς βασιλέως συγκαταστρεφόμεθα, etc.

[949] Isokrates, Or. iv. Philipp. s. 117, 121, 160. Diodorus places the successful expeditions of Ochus against Phenicia and Egypt during the three years between 351-348 B. C. (Diodor. xvi. 40-52). In my judgment, they were not executed until after the conclusion of the peace between Philip and Athens in March 346 B. C.; they were probably brought to a close in the two summers of 346-345 B. C. The Discourse or Letter of Isokrates to Philip appears better evidence on this point of chronology, than the assertion of Diodorus. The Discourse of Isokrates was published shortly after the peace of March 346 B. C., and addressed to a prince perfectly well informed of all the public events of his time. One of the main arguments used by Isokrates to induce Philip to attack the Persian empire, is the weakness of Ochus in consequence of Egypt and Phenicia being still in revolt and unsubdued—and the contempt into which Ochus had fallen from having tried to reconquer Egypt and having been ignominiously repulsed—ἀπῆλθεν ἐκεῖθεν (Ochus) οὐ μόνον ἡττηθεὶς ἀλλὰ καὶ καταγελασθεὶς, καὶ δόξας οὔτε βασιλεύειν οὔτε στρατηγεῖν ἄξιος εἶναι (s. 188) … οὕτω σφόδρα μεμισημένος καὶ καταπεφρονημένος ὑφ᾽ ἁπάντων ὡς οὐδεὶς πώποτε τῶν βασιλευσάντων (s. 160).

The reconquest of Egypt by Ochus, with an immense army and a large number of Greeks engaged on both sides, must have been one of the most impressive events of the age. Diodorus may perhaps have confounded the date of the *first* expedition, wherein Ochus failed, with that of the *second*, wherein he succeeded.

[950] Diodor. xvi. 50-52.

[951] Strabo, xvi. p. 610. Suidas v. Aristotelis—θλιβίας ἐκ παιδός.

[952] Diodorus places the appointment of Mentor to the satrapy of the Asiatic coast, and his seizure of Hermeias, in Olymp. 107, 4 (349-348 B. C.), immediately after the successful invasion of Egypt.

But this date cannot be correct, since Aristotle visited Hermeias at Atarneus after the death of Plato, and passed three years with him—from the archonship of Theophilus (348-347 B. C. Olymp. 108, 1), in which year Plato died—to the archonship of Eubulus (345-344 B. C. Olymp. 108, 4) (Vita Aristotelis ap. Dionys. Hal. Epist. ad Ammæum, c. 5; Scriptt. Biographici, p. 397, ed. Westermann); Diogen. Laert. v. 7.

Here is another reason confirming the remark made in my former note, that Diodorus has placed the conquest of Egypt by Ochus three or four years too early; since the appointment of Mentor to the satrapy of the Asiatic coast follows naturally and immediately after the distinguished part which he had taken in the conquest of Egypt.

The seizure of Hermeias by Mentor must probably have taken place about 343 B. C. The stay of Aristotle with Hermeias will probably have occupied the three years between 347 and 344 B. C.

Respecting the chronology of these events, Mr. Clinton follows Diodorus; Böhnecke dissents from him—rightly, in my judgment (Forschungen, p. 460-734, note). Böhnecke seems to think that the person mentioned in Demosth. Philipp. iv. (p. 139, 140) as having been seized and carried up prisoner to the king of Persia, accused of plotting with Philip measures of hostility against the latter—is Hermeias. This is not in itself improbable, but the authority of the commentator Ulpian seems hardly sufficient to warrant us in positively asserting the identity.

It is remarkable that Diodorus makes no mention of the peace of 346 B. C. between Philip and the Athenians.

[953]

		Delivered in
Demosthenes,	Philippic ii.	B. C. 344-343
——	De Halonneso, not genuine	B. C. 343-342
——	De Falsâ Legatione	*ib.*
Æschines,	De Falsâ Legatione	*ib.*
Demosthenes,	De Chersoneso	B. C. 342-341
——	Philipp. iii.	*ib.*
——	Philipp. iv.	B. C. 341-340
——	ad Philipp. Epist.	B. C. 340-339

[954] Demosth. De Pace, p. 61; Philippic ii. p. 69.

[955] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 424; Pausan. iv. 28, 3.

[956] Justin, viii. 6. Diodorus states that Alexander did not become prince until after the death of Arrhybas (xvi. 72).

[957] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 84; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 424-435; Philippic iii. p. 117-120; Philippic iv. p. 133.

As these enterprises of Philip against Ambrakia and Leukas are not noticed in the second Philippic, but only in orations of later date, we may perhaps presume that they did not take place till after Olymp. 109, 1 = B. C. 344-343. But this is not a very certain inference.

[958] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 368, 424, 436; Philipp. iii. 117, 118. iv. p. 133; De Coronâ, p. 324; Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 84.

Compare Harpokration v. Δεκαδαρχία.

[959] Diodor. xvi. 69, 71.

[960] Justin, viii. 5, 6. "Reversus in regnum, ut pecora pastores nunc in hybernos, nunc in æstivos saltus trajiciunt—sic ille populos et urbes, ut illi vel replenda vel derelinquenda quæquæ loca videbantur, ad libidinem suam transfert. Miseranda ubique facies et similis excidio erat," etc. Compare Livy, xl. 3, where similar proceedings of Philip son of Demetrius (B. C. 182) are described.

[961] See a striking passage in the fourth Philippic of Demosthenes, p. 132.

[962] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 252.

[963] Demosth. Philipp. ii. p. 71, 72. Demosthenes himself reports to the Athenian assembly (in 344-343 B. C.) what he had said to the Messenians and Argeians.

[964] Demosth. Philipp. ii. p. 72.

[965] Demosth. Philipp. ii. p. 66-72. Who these envoys were, or from whence they came, does not appear from the oration. Libanius in his Argument says that they had come jointly from Philip, from the Argeians, and from the Messenians. Dionysius Hal. (ad Ammæum, p. 737) states that they came out of Peloponnesus.

I cannot bring myself to believe, on the authority of Libanius, that there were any envoys present from Philip. The tenor of the discourse appears to contradict that supposition.

[966] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81, 82. Winiewski (Comment Histor. in Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 140) thinks that the embassy of Python to Athens is the very embassy to which the second Philippic of Demosthenes provides or introduces a reply. I agree with Böhnecke in regarding this supposition as improbable.

[967] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81. Περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰρήνης, ἣν ἔδοσαν ἡμῖν οἱ πρέσβεις οἱ παρ᾽ ἐκείνου πεμφθέντες ἐπανορθώσασθαι, ὅτι ἐπηνωρθωσάμεθα, ὃ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὁμολογεῖται δίκαιον εἶναι, ἑκατέρους ἔχειν τὰ ἑαυτῶν, ἀμφισβητεῖ (Philip) μὴ δεδωκέναι, μηδὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις ταῦτ᾽ εἰρηκέναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, etc.

Compare Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 398.

[968] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81. See Ulpian ad Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 364.

[969] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81, 84, 85. ἀμφισβητεῖ μὴ δεδωκέναι (Philip contends that he never tendered the terms of peace for amendment) μηδὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις ταῦτ᾽ εἰρηκέναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς … Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα (the second amendment) ὁμολογῶν ἐν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ, ὡς ἀκούετε, δικαιόν τ᾽ εἶναι καὶ δέχεσθαι, etc.

[970] Hegesippus was much denounced by the philippizing orators at Athens (Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 364). His embassy to Philip has been treated by some authors as enforcing a "grossly sophistical construction of an article in the peace," which Philip justly resented. But in my judgment it was no construction of the original treaty, nor was there any sophistry on the part of Athens. It was an amended clause, presented by the Athenians in place of the original. They never affirmed that the amended clause meant the same thing as the clause prior to amendment. On the contrary, they imply that the meaning is *not* the same—and it is on that ground that they submit the amended form of words.

[971] Compare Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 77, and the Epistola Philippi, p. 162. The former says, ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοιούτους λόγους, ὅτε πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπρεσβεύσαμεν, ὡς λῃστὰς ἀφελόμενος ταύτην τὴν νῆσον κτήσαιτο, καὶ προσήκειν αὐτὴν ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι.

Philip's letter agrees as to the main facts.

[972] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 65. c. 30. περὶ συλλαβῶν διαφερόμενος, etc.

[973] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 78-80.

[974] Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 162. The oration of Pseudo-Demosthenes De Halonneso is a discourse addressed to the people on one of these epistolary communications of Philip, brought by some envoys who had also addressed the people *vivâ voce*. The letter of Philip adverted to several other topics besides, but that of Halonnesus came first.

[975] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 446. I take these words to denote, not any one particular outmarch to these places, but a standing guard kept there, since the exposure of the northern frontier of Attica after the peace. For

the great importance of Panaktum, as a frontier position between Athens and Thebes, see Thucydides, v. 35, 36, 39.

[976] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 368, 435, 446, 448; Philippic iv. p. 133; De Coronâ, p. 324; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.

[977] The general state of things, as here given, at Oreus and Eretria, existed at the time when Demosthenes delivered his two orations—the third Philippic and the oration on the Chersonese; in the late spring and summer of 341 B. C.—De Chersoneso, p. 98, 99, 104; Philipp. iii. p. 112, 115, 125, 126.

… δουλεύουσί γε μαστιγούμενοι καὶ στρεβλούμενοι (the people of Eretria under Kleitarchus, p. 128).

[978] Demosth. De Chersoneso, p. 99.

[979] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p 677. De Fals. Leg. p. 396; De Chersoneso, p. 104, 105.

[980] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 87.

[981] Demosth. De Chersoneso, p. 93; Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 87; Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 161.

[982] Epistol. Philipp. *l. c.*

[983] Philippic iii. p. 112.

[984] Philippic iii. p. 118, 119.

[985] Philippic iii. p. 129, 130.

[986] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 252.

[987] Diodor. xvi. 74.

[988] Stephanus Byz. v. Ὠρεός.

[989] Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. p. 67, 68. Æschines greatly stigmatizes Demosthenes for having deprived the Athenian synod of these important members. But the Eubœan members certainly had not been productive of any good to Athens by their attendance, real or nominal, at her synod, for some years past. The formation of a free Euboic synod probably afforded the best chance of ensuring real harmony between the island and Athens.

Æschines gives here a long detail of allegations, about the corrupt intrigues between Demosthenes and Kallias at Athens. Many of these allegations are impossible to reconcile with what we know of the course of history at the time. We must recollect that Æschines makes the statement eleven years after the events.

[990] Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 159.

[991] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. *l. c.* Æschines here specifies the month, but not the year. It appears to me that Anthesterion, 340 B. C. (Olymp. 109, 4) is the most likely date; though Böhnecke and others place it a year earlier.

[992] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 254, 304, 308. βουλόμενος τῆς σιτοπομπίας κύριος γενέσθαι (Philip), παρελθὼν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης Βυζαντίους συμμάχους ὄντας αὐτῷ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἠξίου συμπολεμεῖν τὸν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πόλεμον, etc.

ἡ μὲν ἐμὴ πολίτεια … ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἔχειν Φίλιππον, λαβόντα Βυζάντιον, συμπολεμεῖν τοὺς Βυζαντίους μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν (ἐποίησεν) … Τίς ὁ κωλύσας τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἀλλοτριωθῆναι κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους; (p. 255.)

Compare Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 90.

That Demosthenes foresaw, several months earlier, the plans of Philip upon Byzantium, is evident from the orations De Chersoneso, p. 93-106, and Philippic iii. p. 115.

[993] Diodor. xvi. 74.

[994] Epistola Philippi ap. Demosth. p. 163.

[995] That these were the two last causes which immediately preceded and determined the declaration of war, we may see by Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 249—Καὶ μὴν τὴν εἰρήνην γ᾽ ἐκεῖνος ἔλυσε τὰ πλοῖα λαβὼν,

οὐχ ἡ πόλις, etc.

Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ φανερῶς ἤδη τὰ πλοῖα ἐσεσύλητο, Χερρόνησος ἐπορθεῖτο, ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐπορεύεθ᾽ ἅνθρωπος, οὐκέτ᾽ ἐν ἀμφισβητησίμῳ τὰ πράγματα ἦν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνειστήκει πόλεμος, etc. (p. 274.)

[996] Philochorus, Frag. 135. ed. Didot; Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum, p. 738-741; Diodorus, xvi. 77. The citation given by Dionysius out of Philochorus is on one point not quite accurate. It states that Demosthenes moved the decisive resolution for declaring war; whereas Demosthenes himself tells us that none of the motions at this juncture were made by him (De Coronâ, p. 250).

[997] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 250. It will be seen that I take no notice of the two decrees of the Athenians, and the letter of Philip, embodied in the oration De Coronâ, p. 249, 250, 251. I have already stated that all the documents which we read as attached to this oration are so tainted either with manifest error or with causes of doubt, that I cannot cite them as authorities in this history, wherever they stand alone. Accordingly, I take no account either of the supposed siege of Selymbria, mentioned in Philip's pretended letter, but mentioned nowhere else—nor of the twenty Athenian ships captured by the Macedonian admiral Amyntas, and afterwards restored by Philip on the remonstrance of the Athenians, mentioned in the pretended Athenian decree moved by Eubulus. Neither Demosthenes, nor Philochorus, nor Diodorus, nor Justin, says anything about the siege of Selymbria, though all of them allude to the attacks on Byzantium and Perinthus. I do not believe that the siege of Selymbria ever occurred. Moreover, Athenian vessels captured, but afterwards restored by Philip on remonstrance from the Athenians, can hardly have been the actual cause of war.

The pretended decrees and letter do not fit the passage of Demosthenes to which they are attached.

[998] Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 165. This Epistle of Philip to the Athenians appears here inserted among the orations of Demosthenes. Some critics reject it as spurious; but I see no sufficient ground for such an opinion. Whether it be the composition of Philip himself, or of some Greek employed in Philip's cabinet, is a point which we have no means of determining.

The oration of Demosthenes which is said to be delivered in reply to this letter of Philip (Orat. xi), is, in my judgment, wrongly described. Not only it has no peculiar bearing on the points contained in the letter—but it must also be two or three months later in date, since it mentions the aid sent by the Persian satraps to Perinthus, and the raising of the siege of that city by Philip (p. 153).

[999] Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 159, 164; compare Isokrates. Or. v. (Philip.) s. 82.

[1000] How much improvement Philip had made in engines for siege, as a part of his general military organization—is attested in a curious passage of a later author on mechanics. Athenæus, De Machinis ap. Auctor. Mathem. Veter. p. 3, ed. Paris.—ἐπίδοσιν δὲ ἔλαβεν ἡ τοαιύτη μηχανοποιΐα ἅπασα κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Διονυσίου τοῦ Σικελιώτου τυραννίδα, κατά τε τὴν Φιλίππου τοῦ Ἀμύντου βασίλειαν, ὅτε ἐπολιόρκει Βυζαντίους Φίλιππος. Εὐημέρει δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ τέχνῃ Πολύειδος ὁ Θεσσαλὸς, οὗ οἱ μαθηταὶ συνεστρατεύοντο Ἀλεξάνδρῳ.

Respecting the engines employed by Dionysius of Syracuse, see Diodor. xiv. 42, 48, 50.

[1001] Diodor. xvi. 74-76; Plutarch, Vit. Alexandri, c. 70; also Laconic. Apophthegm. p. 215, and De Fortunâ Alexan. p. 339.

[1002] Demosth. ad Philip. Epistol. p. 153; Diodor. xvi. 75; Pausanias, i. 29, 7.

[1003] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 14; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 848-851. To this fleet of Phokion, Demosthenes contributed the outfit of a trireme, while the orator Hyperides sailed with the fleet as trierarch. See Boeckh, Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen, p. 441, 442, 498. From that source the obscure chronology of the period now before us derives some light; since it becomes certain that the expedition of Chares began during the archonship of Nichomaclides; that is, in the year *before* Midsummer 340 B. C.; while the expedition of Phokion and Kephisophon began in the year following—*after* Midsummer 340 B. C.

See some anecdotes respecting this siege of Byzantium by Philip, collected from later authors (Dionysius Byzantinus, Hesychius Milesius, and others) by the diligence of Böhnecke—Forschungen, p. 470 *seqq.*

[1004] Diodor. xvi. 77: Plutarch, Demosthen. c. 17.

[1005] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 14.

[1006] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 255; Plutarch, De Glor. Athen. p. 350.

[1007] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 305, 306, 307: comp. p. 253. μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ τοὺς ἀποστόλους πάντας ἀπέστειλα, καθ᾽ οὓς Χερρόνησος ἐσώθη, καὶ Βυζάντιον καὶ πάντες οἱ σύμμαχοι, etc.

[1008] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 255, 257. That these votes of thanks were passed, is authenticated by the words of the oration itself. Documents are inserted in the oration, purporting to be the decree of the Byzantines and Perinthians, and that of the Chersonesite cities. I do not venture to cite these as genuine, considering how many of the other documents annexed to this oration are decidedly spurious.

[1009] Demosth. p. 253. Aristonikus is again mentioned, p. 302. A document appears, p. 253, purporting to be the vote of the Athenians to thank and crown Demosthenes, proposed by Aristonikus. The name of the Athenian archon is wrong, as in all the other documents embodied in this oration, where the name of an Athenian archon appears.

[1010] Diodorus (xvi. 77) mentions this peace; stating that Philip raised the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus, and made peace πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους.

Wesseling (ad loc.) and Weiske (De Hyperbolê, ii. p. 41) both doubt the reality of this peace. Neither Böhnecke nor Winiewski recognize it. Mr. Clinton admits it in a note to his Appendix 16. p. 292; though he does not insert it in his column of events in the tables.

I perfectly concur with these authors in dissenting from Diodorus, so far as *Athens* is concerned. The supposition that peace was concluded between Philip and Athens at this time is distinctly negatived by the language of Demosthenes (De Coronâ, p. 275, 276); indirectly also by Æschines. Both from Demosthenes and from Philochorus it appeals sufficiently clear, in my judgment, that the war between Philip and the Athenians went on without interruption from the summer of 340 B. C., to the battle of Chæroneia, in August 338.

But I see no reason for disbelieving Diodorus, in so far as he states that Philip made peace with the other Greeks—Byzantines, Perinthians, Chians, Rhodians, etc.

[1011] Justin, ix. 2, 3. Æschines alludes to this expedition against the Scythians during the spring of the archon Theophrastus, or 339 B. C. (Æschin. cont. Ktesiph. p. 71).

[1012] Æschines cont. Ktesiph. p. 85. c. 80. ἐπιστάτης τοῦ ναυτικοῦ.

[1013] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 260-262. ἦν γὰρ αὐτοῖς (τοῖς ἡγεμόσι τῶν συμμοριῶν) ἐκ μὲν τῶν προτέρων νόμων συνεκκαίδεκα λειτουργεῖν—αὐτοῖς μὲν μικρὰ καὶ οὐδὲν ἀναλίσκουσιν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἀπόρους τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπιτρίβουσιν … ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ νόμου τὸ γιγνόμενον κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἕκαστον τιθέναι· καὶ δυοῖν ἐφάνη τριήραρχος ὁ τῆς μιᾶς ἕκτος καὶ δέκατος πρότερον συντελής· οὐδὲ γὰρ τριηράρχους ἔτι ὠνόμαζον ἑαυτούς, ἀλλὰ συντελεῖς.

The trierarchy, and the trierarchic symmories, at Athens, are subjects not perfectly known; the best expositions respecting them are to be found in Boeckh's Public Economy of Athens (b. iv. ch. 11-13), and in his other work, Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen (ch. xi. xii. xiii.); besides Parreidt, De Symmoriis, part ii. p. 22, seq.

The fragment of Hyperides (cited by Harpokration v. Συμμορία) alluding to the trierarchic reform of Demosthenes, though briefly and obscurely, is an interesting confirmation of the oration De Coronâ.

[1014] There is a point in the earlier oration of Demosthenes De Symmoriis, illustrating the grievance which he now reformed. That grievance consisted, for one main portion, in the fact, that the richest citizen in a trierarchic partnership paid a sum no greater (sometimes even less) than the poorest. Now it is remarkable that this unfair apportionment of charge might have occurred, and is noway guarded against, in the symmories as proposed by Demosthenes himself. His symmories, each comprising sixty persons or one-twentieth of the total active twelve hundred, are directed to divide themselves into five fractions of twelve persons each, or a hundredth of the twelve hundred. Each group of twelve is to comprise the richest alongside of the poorest members of the sixty (ἀνταναπληροῦντας πρὸς τὸν εὐπορώτατον ἀεὶ τοὺς ἀπορωτάτους, p. 182), so that each group would contain individuals very unequal in wealth, though the aggregate wealth of one group would be nearly equal to that of another. These twelve persons were to defray collectively the cost of trierarchy for one ship, two ships, or three ships, according to the number of ships which the state might require (p. 183). But Demosthenes nowhere points out in what proportions they were to share the expense among them; whether the richest citizens among the twelve were to pay only an equal sum with the poorest, or a sum greater in proportion to their wealth. There is nothing in his project to prevent the richer members from insisting that all should pay equally. This is the very abuse that he denounced afterwards (in 340 B. C.), as actually realized—and corrected by a new law.

The oration of Demosthenes De Symmoriis, omitting as it does all positive determination as to proportions of payment, helps us to understand how the abuse grew up.

[1015] Æschines (adv. Ktesiph. p. 86) charges Demosthenes with "having stolen away from the city the trierarchs of sixty-five swift sailing vessels." This implies, I imagine, that the new law diminished the total number of persons chargeable with trierarchy.

[1016] Deinarchus adv. Demosthen. p. 95. s. 43. Εἰσί τινες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ τῶν ἐν τοῖς τριακοσίοις γεγενημένων, ὅθ᾽ οὗτος (Demosthenes) ἐτίθει τὸν περὶ τῶν τριηράρχων νόμον. Οὐ φράσετε τοῖς πλησίον ὅτι τρία τάλαντα λαβὼν μετέγραφε καὶ μετεσκεύαζε τὸν νόμον καθ᾽ ἑκάστην ἐκκλησίαν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπώλει ὧν εἰλήφει τὴν τιμὴν, τὰ δ᾽ ἀποδόμενος οὐκ ἐβεβαίου;

Without accepting this assertion of a hostile speaker, so far as it goes to accuse Demosthenes of having accepted bribes—we may safely accept it, so far as it affirms that he made several changes and modifications in the law before it finally passed; a fact not at all surprising, considering the intense opposition which it called forth.

Some of the Dikasts, before whom Deinarchus was pleading, had been included among the Three Hundred (that is, the richest citizens in the State) when Demosthenes proposed his trierarchic reform. This will show, among various other proofs which might be produced, that the Athenian Dikasts did not always belong to the poorest class of citizens, as the jests of Aristophanes would lead us to believe.

[1017] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 329. Boeckh (Attisch. Seewesen, p. 183, and Publ. Econ. Ath. iv. 14) thinks that this passage—διτάλαντον δ᾽ εἶχες ἔρανον δωρεὰν παρὰ τῶν ἡγεμόνων τῶν συμμοριῶν, ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἐλυμήνω τὸν τριηραρχικὸν νόμον—must allude to injury done by Æschines to the law in later years, after it became a law. But I am unable to see the reason for so restricting its meaning. The rich men would surely bribe most highly, and raise most opposition, against the first passing of the law, as they were then most likely to be successful; and Æschines, whether bribed or not bribed, would most naturally as well as most effectively stand out against the novelty introduced by his rival, without waiting to see it actually become a part of the laws of the State.

[1018] See the citation from Hyperides in Harpokrat. v. Συμμορία. The Symmories are mentioned in Inscription xiv. of Boeckh's Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen (p. 465), which Inscription bears the date of 325 B. C. Many of these Inscriptions name individual citizens, in different numbers three, five, or six, as joint trierarchs of the same vessel.

[1019] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 262.

[1020] Chap. xxviii. p. 62 *seqq.*

[1021] For the topography of the country round Delphi, see the instructive work of Ulrichs, Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland (Bremen, 1840) chapters i. and ii. about Kirrha and Krissa.

[1022] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 69; compare Livy, xlii. 5; Pausanias, x. 37, 4. The distance from Delphi to Kirrha is given by Pausanias at sixty stadia, or about seven English miles: by Strabo at eighty stadia.

[1023] Æschines, *l. c.*; Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 277. τὴν χώραν ἣν οἱ μὲν Ἀμφισσεῖς σφῶν αὐτῶν γεωργεῖν ἔφασαν, οὗτος δὲ (Æschines) τῆς ἱερᾶς χώρας ἠτιᾶτο εἶναι, etc.

[1024] Diodor. xvi. 24; Thucyd. iii. 101.

[1025] Diodor. xvi. 25.

[1026] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 69.

[1027] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277.

[1028] This must have been an ἀποκατάστασις τῶν ἀναθημάτων (compare Plutarch, Demetrius, c. 13), requiring to be preceded by solemn ceremonies, sometimes specially directed by the oracle.

[1029] How painfully the Thebans of the Demosthenic age felt the recollection of the alliance of their ancestors with the Persians at Platæa, we may read in Demosthenes, De Symmoriis, p. 187.

It appears that the Thebans also had erected a new chapel at Delphi (after 346 B. C.) out of the spoils acquired from the conquered Phokians—ὁ ἀπὸ Φωκέων ναὸς, ὃν ἱδρύσαντο Θηβαῖοι (Diodor. xvii. 10).

[1030] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 70. The words of his speech do not however give either a full or a clear account of the transaction; which I have endeavored, as well as I can, to supply in the text.

[1031] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277.

[1032] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 69.

[1033] Æschines adv. Ktesiph, p. 70.

[1034] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 277. ὡς δὲ τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀξίωμα λαβὼν (Æschines) ἀφίκετο εἰς τοὺς Ἀμφικτύονας, πάντα τἄλλ᾽ ἀφεὶς καὶ παριδὼν ἐπέραινεν ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἐμισθώθη, καὶ λόγους εὐπροσώπους καὶ μύθους, ὅθεν ἡ Κιρραία χώρα καθιερώθη, συνθεὶς καὶ διεξελθὼν, ἀνθρώπους ἀπείρους λόγων καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὐ προορωμένους, τοὺς Ἀμφικτύονας, πείθει ψηφίσασθαι, etc.

[1035] Æschin. adv. Ktesiph. p. 70. κραυγὴ πολλὴ καὶ θόρυβος ἦν τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων, καὶ λόγος ἦν οὐκέτι περὶ τῶν ἀσπίδων ἃς ἡμεῖς ἀνέθεμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀμφισσέων τιμωρίας. Ἤδη δὲ πόρρω τῆς ἡμέρας οὔσης, προελθὼν ὁ κῆρυξ, etc.

[1036] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 71.

[1037] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277. According to the second decree of the Amphiktyons cited in this oration (p. 278), some of the Amphiktyons were wounded. But I concur with Droysen, Franke, and others, in disputing the genuineness of these decrees; and the assertion, that some of the Amphiktyons were wounded, is one among the grounds for disputing it: for if such had been the fact, Æschines could hardly have failed to mention it; since it would have suited exactly the drift and purpose of his speech.

Æschines is by far the best witness for the proceedings at this spring meeting of the Amphiktyons. He was not only present, but the leading person concerned; if he makes a wrong statement, it must be by design. But if the facts as stated by Æschines are at all near the truth, it is hardly possible that the two decrees cited in Demosthenes can have been the real decrees passed by the Amphiktyons. The substance of what was resolved, as given by Æschines, pp. 70, 71, is materially different from the first decree quoted in the oration of Demosthenes, p. 278. There is no mention, in the letter, of those vivid and prominent circumstances—the summoning of all the Delphians, freemen and slaves above sixteen years of age, with spades and mattocks—the exclusion from the temple, and the cursing, of any city which did not appear to take part.

The compiler of those decrees appears to have had only Demosthenes before him, and to have known nothing of Æschines. Of the violent proceedings of the Amphiktyons, both provoked and described by Æschines, Demosthenes says nothing.

[1038] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 70. ἐπῆλθε δ᾽ οὖν μοι ἐπὶ τὴν γνώμην μνησθῆναι τῆς τῶν Ἀμφισσέων περὶ τὴν γῆν τὴν ἱερὰν ἀσεβείας, etc.

[1039] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 71. καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἡμῶν ἀποδεξαμένου τοῦ δήμου, καὶ τῆς πόλεως πάσης προαιρουμένης εὐσεβεῖν, etc. Οὐκ ἐᾷ (Demosthenes) μεμνῆσθαι τῶν ὅρκων, οὓς οἱ πρόγονοι ὤμοσαν, οὐδὲ τῆς ἀρᾶς οὐδὲ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ μαντείας.

[1040] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 275.

[1041] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 69-71.

[1042] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 71.

[1043] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277; Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 72.

[1044] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 277, 278.

[1045] The chronology of the events here recounted has been differently conceived by different authors. According to my view, the first motion raised by Æschines against the Amphissian Lokrians, occurred in the spring meeting of the Amphiktyons at Delphi in 339 B. C. (the year of the archon Theophrastus at Athens); next, there was held a special or extraordinary meeting of Amphiktyons, and a warlike manifestation against the Lokrians; after which came the regular autumnal meeting at Thermopylæ (B. C. 339—September—the year of the archon Lysimachides at Athens), where the vote was passed to call in the military interference of Philip.

This chronology does not, indeed, agree with the two so-called decrees of the Amphiktyons, and with the documentary statement—Ἄρχων Μνησιθείδης, Ἀνθεστηριῶνος ἕκτῃ ἐπὶ δέκα—which we read as incorporated in

the oration De Coronâ, p. 279. But I have already stated that I think these documents spurious.

The archon Mnesitheides (like all the other archons named in the documents recited in the oration De Coronâ) is a wrong name, and cannot have been quoted from any genuine document. Next, the first decree of the Amphiktyons is not in harmony with the statement of Æschines, himself the great mover, of what the Amphiktyons really did. Lastly, the second decree plainly intimates that the person who composed the two decrees conceived the nomination of Philip to have taken place in the very same Amphiktyonic assembly as the first movement against the Lokrians. The same words, ἐπὶ ἱερέως Κλειναγόρου, ἐαρινῆς πυλαίας—prefixed to both decrees, must be understood to indicate the same assembly. Mr. Clinton's supposition that the first decree was passed at the spring meeting of 339 B. C.—and the second at the spring meeting of 338 B. C.—Kleinagoras being the eponymus in both years—appears to me nowise probable. The special purpose and value of an eponymus would disappear, if the same person served in that capacity for two successive years. Boeckh adopts the conjecture of Reiske, altering ἐαρινῆς πυλαίας in the second decree into ὀπωρινῆς πυλαίας. This would bring the second decree into better harmony with chronology; but there is nothing in the state of the text to justify such an innovation. Böhnecke (Forsch. p. 498-508) adopts a supposition yet more improbable. He supposes that Æschines was chosen Pylagoras at the beginning of the Attic year 340-339 B. C., and that he attended first at Delphi at the *autumnal* meeting of the Amphiktyons 340 B. C.; that he there raised the violent storm which he himself describes in his speech; and that he afterwards, at the subsequent spring meeting, came both the two decrees which we now read in the oration De Coronâ. But the first of these two decrees can never have come *after* the outrageous proceeding described by Æschines. I will add, that in the form of decree, the president Kottyphus is called an Arcadian; whereas Æschines designates him as a *Pharsalian*.

[1046] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 278.

[1047] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 72 … τῶν μὲν θεῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς εὐσεβείας ἡμῖν παραδεδωκότων, τῆς δὲ Δημοσθένους δωροδοκίας ἐμποδὼν γεγενημένης.

[1048] See Isokrates, Orat. V. (Philipp.) s. 22. 23.

[1049] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 73. ἐπειδὴ Φίλιππος αὐτῶν ἀφελόμενος Νίκαιαν Θετταλοῖς παρέδωκε, etc.

Compare Demosthen. ad Philipp. Epistol. p. 153. ὑποπτεύεται δὲ ὑπὸ Θηβαίων Νίκαιαν μὲν φρουρᾷ κατέχων, etc.

[1050] Philochorus ap. Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum, p. 742.

[1051] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 293-299. Justin, ix. 3, "diu dissimulatum bellum Atheniensibus infert." This expression is correct in the sense, that Philip, who had hitherto pretended to be on his march against Amphissa, disclosed his real purpose to be against Athens at the moment when he seized Elateia. Otherwise, he had been at open war with Athens, ever since the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus in the preceding year.

[1052] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46, 47.

[1053] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 73; Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 281.

[1054] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 276, 281, 284. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖσε ἐπάνειμι, ὅτι τὸν ἐν Ἀμφίσσῃ πόλεμον τούτου (Æschines) μὲν ποιήσαντος, συμπεραναμένων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συνέργων αὐτοῦ τὴν πρὸς Θηβαίους ἐχθρὰν, συνέβη τὸν Φίλιππον ἐλθεῖν ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς, οὗπερ ἕνεκα τὰς πόλεις οὗτοι συνέκρουον, etc. Οὕτω μέχρι πόῤῥω προήγαγον οὗτοι τὴν ἐχθράν.

[1055] Demosth. De Coronâ—ἦκεν ἔχων (Philip) τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν Ἐλάτειαν κατέλαβεν, ὡς οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἴ τι γένοιτο ἔτι συμπνευσάντων ἂν ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων.

[1056] Philochorus ap. Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum, p. 742.

[1057] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 16. Ἂν δ᾽ ἐκεῖνα Φίλιππος λάβῃ, τίς αὐτὸν κωλύσει δεῦρο βαδίζειν; Θηβαῖοι; οἳ, εἰ μὴ λίαν πικρὸν εἰπεῖν, καὶ συνεισβαλοῦσιν ἑτοίμως.

[1058] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 304. ἡ γὰρ ἐμὴ πολιτεία, ἧς οὗτος (Æschines) κατηγορεῖ, ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ Θηβαίους μετὰ Φιλίππου συνεμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν χώραν, ὃ πάντες ᾤοντο, μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν παραταξαμένους ἐκεῖνον κωλύειν ἐποίησεν, etc.

[1059] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 286, 287; Diodor. xvi. 84. I have given the substance, in brief, of what Demosthenes represents himself to have said.

[1060] This decree, or a document claiming to be such, is given *verbatim* in Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 289, 290. It bears date on the 16th of the month Skirrophorion (June), under the archonship of Nausikles. This archon is a wrong or pseud-eponymous archon: and the document, to say nothing of its verbosity, implies that Athens was now about to pass out of pacific relations with Philip, and to begin war against him—which is contrary to the real fact.

There also appear inserted, a few pages before, in the same speech (p. 282), four other documents, purporting to relate to the time immediately preceding the capture of Elateia by Philip. 1. A decree of the Athenians, dated in the month Elaphebolion of the archon *Heropythus*. 2. Another decree, in the month Munychion of the same *archon*. 3. An answer addressed by Philip to the Athenians. 4. An answer addressed by Philip to the Thebans.

Here again, the archon called *Heropythus* is a wrong and unknown archon. Such manifest error of date would alone be enough to preclude me from trusting the document as genuine. Droysen is right, in my judgment, in rejecting all these five documents as spurious. The answer of Philip to the Athenians is adapted to the two decrees of the Athenians, and cannot be genuine if they are spurious.

These decrees, too, like that dated in Skirrophorion, are not consistent with the true relations between Athens and Philip. They imply that she was at peace with him, and that hostilities were first undertaken against him by her after his occupation of Elateia; whereas open war had been prevailing between them for more than a year, ever since the summer of 340 B. C., and the maritime operations against him in the Propontis. That the

war was going on without interruption during all this period—that Philip could not get near to Athens to strike a blow at her and close the war, except by bringing the Thebans and Thessalians into coöperation with him—and that for the attainment of this last purpose, he caused the Amphissian war to be kindled, through the corrupt agency of Æschines—is the express statement of Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 275, 276. Hence I find it impossible to believe in the authenticity either of the four documents here quoted, or of this supposed very long decree of the Athenians, on forming their alliance with Thebes, bearing date on the 16th of the month Skirrophorion, and cited De Coronâ, p. 289. I will add, that the two decrees which we read in p. 282, profess themselves as having been passed in the months Elaphebolion and Munychion, and bear the name of the archon *Heropythus*; while the decree cited, p. 289, bears date the 16th of Skirrophorion, and the name of a different archon, *Nausikles*. Now if the decrees were genuine, the events which are described in both must have happened under the same archon, at an interval of about six weeks between the last day of Munychion and the 16th of Skirrophorion. It is impossible to suppose an interval of one year and six weeks between them.

It appears to me, on reading attentively the words of Demosthenes himself, that the *falsarius* or person who composed these four first documents, has not properly conceived what it was that Demosthenes caused to be read by the public secretary. The point which Demosthenes is here making, is to show how ably he had managed, and how well he had deserved of his country, by bringing the Thebans into alliance with Athens immediately after Philip's capture of Elateia. For this purpose he dwells upon the bad state of feeling between Athens and Thebes before that event, brought about by the secret instigations of Philip through corrupt partisans in both places. Now it is to illustrate this hostile feeling *between Athens and Thebes*, that he causes the secretary to read certain decrees and answers—ἐν οἷς δ' ἦτη ἤδη τὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τουτωνὶ τῶν ψηφισμάτων ἀκούσαντες καὶ τῶν ἀποκρίσεων εἴσεσθε. Καί μοι λέγε ταῦτα λαβών…. (p. 282). The documents here announced to be read do not bear upon the relations between *Athens and Philip* (which were those of active warfare, needing no illustration)—but to the relation between *Athens and Thebes*. There had plainly been interchanges of bickering and ungracious feeling between the two cities, manifested in public decrees or public answers to complaints or remonstrances. Instead of which, the two Athenian decrees, which we now read as following, are addressed, not to the Thebans, but to Philip; the first of them does not mention Thebes at all; the second mentions Thebes only to recite as a ground of complaint against Philip, that he was trying to put the two cities at variance; and this too, among other grounds of complaint, much more grave and imputing more hostile purposes. Then follow two answers—which are not answers between Athens and Thebes, as they ought to be—but answers from Philip, the first to the Athenians, the second to the Thebans. Neither the decrees, nor the answers, as they here stand, go to illustrate the point at which Demosthenes is aiming—the bad feeling and mutual provocations which had been exchanged a little before between Athens and Thebes. Neither the one nor the other justify the words of the orator immediately after the documents have been read—Οὕτω διαθεὶς ὁ Φίλιππος τὰς πόλεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας διὰ τούτων (through Æschines and his supporters), καὶ τούτοις ἐπαρθεὶς τοῖς ψηφίσμασι καὶ ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν, ἦκεν ἔχων τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν Ἐλάτειαν κατέλαβεν, ὡς οὐδ' ἂν εἴ τι γένοιτο ἔτι συμπνευσάντων ἂν ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων.

Demosthenes describes Philip as acting upon Thebes and Athens through the agency of corrupt citizens in each; the author of these documents conceives Philip as acting by his own despatches.

The decree of the 16th Skirrophorion enacts, not only that there shall be alliance with Thebes, but also that the right of *intermarriage* between the two cities shall be established. Now at the moment when the decree was passed, the Thebans both had been, and still were, on bad terms with Athens, so that it was doubtful whether they would entertain or reject the proposition; nay, the chances even were, that they would reject it and join Philip. We can hardly believe it possible, that under such a state of probabilities, the Athenians would go so far as to pronounce for the establishment of *intermarriage* between the two cities.

[1061] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 298.

[1062] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 18. Daochus and Thrasylaus are named by Demosthenes as Thessalian partisans of Philip (Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 324).

[1063] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 298, 299. Aristot. Rhetoric. ii. 23; Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum, p. 744; Diodor. xvi. 85.

[1064] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 304-307. εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ μετέγνωσαν εὐθέως, ὡς ταῦτ' εἶδον, οἱ Θηβαῖοι, καὶ μεθ' ἡμῶν ἐγένοντο, etc.

[1065] Theopompus, Frag. 239, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Demosth. c. 18.

[1066] We may here trust the more fully the boasts made by Demosthenes of his own statesmanship and oratory, since we possess the comments of Æschines, and therefore know the worst that can be said by an unfriendly critic. Æschines (adv. Ktesiph. p. 73, 74) says that the Thebans were induced to join Athens, not by the oratory of Demosthenes, but by the fear of Philip's near approach, and by their displeasure in consequence of having Nikæa taken from them. Demosthenes says in fact the same. Doubtless the ablest orator must be furnished with some suitable points to work up in his pleadings. But the orators on the other side would find in the history of the past a far more copious collection of matters, capable of being appealed to as causes of antipathy against Athens, and of favour to Philip; and against this superior case Demosthenes had to contend.

[1067] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 299, 300.

[1068] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 74.

[1069] Philochorus Frag. 135, ed. Didot; Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum, p. 742.

[1070] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 73. Æschines remarks the fact—but perverts the inferences deducible from it.

[1071] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 279. Δὸς δή μοι τὴν ἐπιστολὴν, ἥν, ὡς οὐχ ὑπήκουον οἱ Θηβαῖοι, πέμπει πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ συμμάχους ὁ Φίλιππος, ἵν᾽ εἴδητε καὶ ἐκ ταύτης σαφῶς ὅτι τὴν μὲν ἀληθῆ πρόφασιν τῶν πραγμάτων, τὸ ταῦτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ τοὺς Θηβαίους καὶ ὑμᾶς πράττειν, ἀπεκρύπτετο, κοινὰ δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἀμφικτύοσι δόξαντα ποιεῖν προσεποιεῖτο, etc.

Then follows a letter, purporting to be written by Philip to the Peloponnesians. I concur with Droysen in mistrusting its authenticity. I do not rest any statements on its evidence. The Macedonian month Löus does not appear to coincide with the Attic Boëdromion; nor is it probable that Philip in writing to Peloponnesians, would allude at all to Attic months. Various subsequent letters written by Philip to the Peloponnesians, and intimating much embarrassment, are alluded to by Demosthenes further on—Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵας τότ᾽ ἠφίει φωνὰς ὁ Φίλιππος καὶ ἐν οἵαις ἦν ταραχαῖς ἐπὶ τούτοις, ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστολῶν ἐκείνου μαθήσεσθε ἃς εἰς Πελοπόννησον ἔπεμπεν (p. 301, 302). Demosthenes causes the letters to be read publicly, but no letters appear *verbatim*.

[1072] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 300.

[1073] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 302; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator., p. 848.

[1074] That Demosthenes was crowned at the Dionysiac festival (March 338 B. C.) is contended by Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 534, 535); upon grounds which seem sufficient, against the opinion of Boeckh and Winiewski (Comment. ad Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 250), who think that he was not crowned until the Panathenaic festival, in the ensuing July.

[1075] Pausanias, x. 3, 2.

[1076] Pausanias, x. 33, 4.

[1077] Pausanias, x. 36, 2.

[1078] Pausanias, iv. 31, 5. He places the fortifications of Ambrysus in a class with those of Byzantium and Rhodes.

[1079] Pausan. ix. 13, 2; Diodor. xv. 53; Xenoph. Hell. vi. 4, 3.

[1080] The chronology of this period has caused much perplexity, and has been differently arranged by different authors. But it will be found that all the difficulties and controversies regarding it have arisen from resting on the spurious decrees embodied in the speech of Demosthenes De Coronâ, as if they were so much genuine history. Mr. Clinton, in his Fasti Hellenici, cites these decrees as if they were parts of Demosthenes himself. When we once put aside these documents, the general statements both of Demosthenes and Æschines, though they are not precise or specific, will appear perfectly clear and consistent respecting the chronology of the period.

That the battle of Chæroneia took place on the 7th of the Attic month Metageitnion (August) B. C. 338 (the second month of the archon Chærondas at Athens)—is affirmed by Plutarch (Camill. c. 19) and generally admitted.

The time when Philip first occupied Elateia has been stated by Mr. Clinton and most authors as the preceding month of Skirrophorion, fifty days or thereabouts earlier. But this rests exclusively on the evidence of the pretended decree, for alliance between Athens and Thebes, which appears in Demosthenes De Coronâ, p. 289.

Even those who defend the authenticity of the decree, can hardly confide in the truth of the month-date, when the name of the archon Nausikles is confessedly wrong. To me neither this document, nor the other so-called Athenian decrees professing to bear date in Munychion and Elaphebolion (p. 282), carry any evidence whatever.

The general statements both of Demosthenes and Æschines, indicate the appointment of Philip as Amphiktyonic general to have been made in the autumnal convocation of Amphiktyons at Thermopylæ. Shortly after this appointment, Philip marched his army into Greece with the professed purpose of acting upon it. In this march he came upon Elateia and began to fortify it; probably about the month of October 339 B. C. The Athenians, Thebans, and other Greeks, carried on the war against him in Phokis for about ten months, until the battle of Chæroneia. That this war must have lasted as long as ten months, we may see by the facts mentioned in my last page—the reëstablishment of the Phokians and their towns, and especially the elaborate fortification of Ambrysus. Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 533) points out justly (though I do not agree with his general arrangement of the events of the war) that this restoration of the Phokian towns implies a considerable interval between the occupation of Elateia and the battle of Chæroneia. We have also two battles gained against Philip, one of them a μάχη χειμερινὴ, which perfectly suits with this arrangement.

[1081] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 306; Plutarch, Demosth. c. 17. In the decree of the Athenian people (Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 850) passed after the death of Demosthenes, granting various honors and a statue to his memory—it is recorded that he brought in by his persuasions not only the allies enumerated in the text, but also the Lokrians and the Messenians; and that he procured from the allies a total contribution of above five hundred talents. The Messenians, however, certainly did not fight at Chæroneia; nor is it correct to say that Demosthenes induced the Amphissian Lokrians to become allies of Athens.

[1082] Strabo, ix. p. 414; Pausanias, vii. 6, 3.

[1083] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 48. Æschines (adv. Ktesiph. p. 74) puts these same facts—the great personal ascendency of Demosthenes at this period—in an invidious point of view.

[1084] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 18. ὥστε εὐθὺς ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι δεόμενον εἰρήνης, etc.

It is possible that Philip may have tried to disunite the enemies assembled against him, by separate propositions addressed to some of them.

[1085] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 74. Deinarchus mentions a Theban named Proxenus, whom he calls a traitor, as having commanded these mercenary troops at Amphissa (Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p. 99).

[1086] Polyænus, iv. 2, 8.

[1087] We gather this from the edict issued by Polysperchon some years afterwards (Diodor. xviii. 56).

[1088] Polyænus, iv. 2, 14.

[1089] Diodorus affirms that Philip's army was superior in number; Justin states the reverse (Diodor. xvi. 85; Justin, ix. 3).

[1090] Pausanias, iv. 2, 82; v. 4, 5; viii. 6, 1.

[1091] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.

[1092] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 19, 20; Æschin. adv. Ktesiph. p. 72.

[1093] Æschin. adv. Ktesiph. p. 74, 75.

[1094] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 75. Ὡς δ᾽ οὐ προσεῖχον αὐτῷ (Δημοσθένει) οἱ ἄρχοντες οἱ ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς ὑμετέρους πάλιν ἀνέστρεψαν ἐξεληλυθότας, ἵνα βουλεύσαισθε περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, ἐνταῦθα παντάπασιν ἔκφρων ἐγένετο, etc.

It is, seemingly, this disposition on the part of Philip to open negotiations which is alluded to by Plutarch as having been (Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16) favorably received by Phokion.

[1095] Diodor. xvi. 85. Alexander himself, after his vast conquests in Asia and shortly before his death, alludes briefly to his own presence at Chæroneia, in a speech delivered to his army (Arrian, vii. 9, 5).

[1096] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18.

[1097] Polyænus, iv. 2, 2. He mentions Stratokles as the Athenian general from whom this exclamation came. We know from Æschines (adv. Ktesiph. p. 74) that Stratokles was general of the Athenian troops at or near Thebes shortly after the alliance with the Thebans was formed. But it seems that Chares and Lysikles commanded at Chæroneia. It is possible, therefore, that the anecdote reported by Polyænus may refer to one of the earlier battles fought, before that of Chæroneia.

[1098] Polyænus, iv. 2, 7; Frontinus.

[1099] Diodor. xvi. 85, 86.

[1100] Arrian, Exp. Alex. i. 2, 3, 10.

[1101] This is the statement of the contemporary orators (Demades, Frag. p. 179) Lykurgus (ap. Diodor. xvi. 85; adv. Leokratem, p. 236. c. 36) and Demosthenes (De Coronâ, p. 314). The latter does not specify the number of prisoners, though he states the slain at one thousand. Compare Pausanias, vii. 10, 2.

[1102] Pausanias, vii. 6, 3.

[1103] Diodor. xvi. 88.

[1104] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 12; Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p. 99. Compare the Pseudo-Demosthenic Oratio Funebr. p. 1395.

[1105] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 164, 166. c. 11; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 99.

[1106] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 146. Γεγενημένης γὰρ τῆς ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχης, καὶ συνδραμόντων ἁπάντων ὑμῶν εἰς ἐκκλησίαν, ἐψηφίσατο ὁ δῆμος, παῖδας μὲν καὶ γυναῖκας ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν εἰς τὰ τείχη κατακομίζειν, etc.

[1107] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 177. c. 13.

[1108] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 170. c. 11. ἥνιχ᾽ ὁρᾷν ἦν τὸν δῆμον ψηφισάμενον τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐλευθέρους, τοὺς δὲ ξένους Ἀθηναίους, τοὺς δὲ ἀτίμους ἐντίμους. The orator causes this decree, proposed by Hyperides, to be read publicly by the secretary, in court.

Compare Pseudo-Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 849. and Demosth. cont. Aristog. p. 803.

[1109] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 309; Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p. 100.

[1110] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 329; Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p. 100; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 851.

[1111] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 172. c. 11; Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 87.

[1112] Thucyd. i. 93.

[1113] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. *l. c.*

[1114] Lykurgus (adv. Leokrat. p. 171 c. 11) mentions these embassies; Deinarchus (adv. Demosth. p. 100) affirms that Demosthenes provided for himself an escape from the city as an envoy—αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν πρεσβευτὴν κατασκεύασας, ἵν᾽ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀποδραίη, etc. Compare Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 76.

The two hostile orators treat such temporary absence of Demosthenes on the embassy to obtain aid, as if it were a cowardly desertion of his post. This is a construction altogether unjust.

[1115] Leokrates was not the only Athenian who fled, or tried to flee. Another was seized in the attempt (according to Æschines) and condemned to death by the Council of Areopagus (Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 89). A member of the Areopagus itself, named Autolykus (the same probably who is mentioned with peculiar respect by Æschines cont. Timarchum, p. 12), sent away his family for safety; Lykurgus afterwards impeached him for it, and he was condemned by the Dikastery (Harpokration v. Αὐτόλυκος).

[1116] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 149. Οὕτω δὲ σφόδρα ταῦτ᾽ ἐπίστευσαν οἱ Ῥόδιοι, ὥστε τριήρεις πληρώσαντες τὰ πλοῖα κατῆγον, etc.

[1117] Diodor. xvi. 87. The story respecting Demades is told somewhat differently in Sextus Empiricus adv. Grammaticos, p. 281.

[1118] Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator, p. 849.

[1119] Justin, ix. 4; Polybius, v. 10; Theopomp. Frag. 262. See the note of Wichers ad Theopompi Fragmenta, p. 259.

[1120] Justin, ix. 4. Dienarch. cont. Demosth. s. 20. p. 92.

[1121] Pausanias, iv. 25, 5; ix. 1, 3.

[1122] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 310. οὐ δι᾽ ἑαυτῶν τό γε πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ὧν μάλισθ᾽ ὑπελάμβανον ἀγνοήσεσθαι, etc.

So the enemies of Alkibiades put up against him in the assembly speakers of affected candor and impartiality —ἄλλους ῥήτορας ἐνιέντες, etc. Thucyd. vi. 29.

[1123] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 319, 320.

[1124] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 319. ὃς εὐθέως μετὰ τὴν μάχην πρεσβευτὴς ἐπορεύου πρὸς Φίλιππον, etc. Compare Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16. Diogen. Laert. iv. 5. in his Life of the Philosopher Xenokrates.

[1125] Demades, Fragment. Orat. p. 179. χιλίων ταφὴ Ἀθηναίων μαρτυρεῖ μοι, κηδευθεῖσα ταῖς τῶν ἐναντίων χερσὶν, ἃς ἀντὶ πολεμίων φιλίας ἐποίησα τοῖς ἀποθανοῦσιν. Ἐνταῦθα ἐπιστὰς τοῖς πράγμασιν ἔγραψα τὴν εἰρήνην· ὁμολογῶ. Ἔγραψα καὶ Φιλίππῳ τιμάς· οὐκ ἀρνοῦμαι· δισχιλίους γὰρ αἰχμαλώτους ἄνευ λύτρων καὶ χίλια πολιτῶν σώματα χωρὶς κήρυκος, καὶ τὸν Ὠρωπὸν ἄνευ πρεσβείας λαβὼν ὑμῖν, ταῦτ᾽ ἔγραψα. See also Suidas v. Δημάδης.

[1126] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 321.

[1127] Polybius, v. 10; xvii. 14; Diodor. Fragm. lib. xxxii.

[1128] Demades, Frag. p. 179. ἔγραψα καὶ Φιλίππῳ τιμὰς, οὐκ ἀρνοῦμαι, etc. Compare Arrian, Exp. Alex. i. 2, 3—καὶ πλείονα ἔτι τῶν Φιλίππῳ δοθέντων Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐς τιμὴν ξυγχωρῆσαι, etc., and Clemens Alex. Admonit. ad Gent. p. 36 B. τὸν Μακεδόνα Φίλιππον ἐν Κυνοσάργει νομοθετοῦντες προσκυνεῖν, etc.

[1129] Justin, ix. 4.

[1130] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 310-320.

[1131] Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 849.

[1132] Polybius, ix. 28, 33, xvii. 14; Tacitus, Annal. iv. 43; Strabo, viii. p. 361; Pausanias, ii. 20, 1. viii. 7, 4. viii. 27, 8. From Diodorus xvii. 3, we see how much this adhesion to Philip was obtained under the pressure of necessity.

[1133] Justin, ix. 5.

[1134] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16; Pausanias, i. 25, 3. Τὸ γὰρ ἀτύχημα τὸ ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ ἅπασι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἦρξε κακοῦ, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς ὑπεριδόντας, καὶ ὅσοι μετὰ Μακεδόνων ἐτάχθησαν. Τὰς μὲν δὴ πολλὰς Φίλιππος τῶν πόλεων εἶλεν. Ἀθηναίοις δὲ λόγῳ συνθέμενος, ἔργῳ σφᾶς μάλιστα ἐκάκωσε, νήσους τε ἀφελόμενος καὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ ναυτικὰ παύσας ἀρχῆς.

[1135] Diodor. xviii. 56. Σάμον δὲ δίδομεν Ἀθηναίοις, ἐπειδὴ καὶ Φίλιππος ἔδωκεν ὁ πατήρ. Compare Plutarch, Alexand. c. 28.

[1136] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.

[1137] Arrian, vii. 9, 5.

[1138] Diodor. xvi. 93.

[1139] Justin, ix. 5; Diodor. xvi. 91.

[1140] Athenæus, xiii. p. 557; Justin, ix. 7.

[1141] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 9; Justin, ix. 7; Diodor. xvi. 91-93.

[1142] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 10; Arrian, iii. 6, 5.

[1143] Pausanias (viii. 7, 5) mentions a son born to Philip by Kleopatra; Diodorus (xvii. 2) also notices a son. Justin in one place (ix. 7) mentions a daughter, and in another place (xi. 2) a son named Caranus. Satyrus (ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 557) states that a daughter named Eurôpê was born to him by Kleopatra.

It appears that the son was born only a short time before the last festival and the assassination of Philip, But I incline to think that the marriage with Kleopatra may well have taken place two years or more before that event, and that there may have been a daughter born before the son. Certainly Justin distinguishes the two, stating that the daughter was killed by order of Olympias, and the son by that of Alexander (ix. 7; xi. 2).

Arrian (iii. 6, 5) seems to mean *Kleopatra* the wife of Philip, though he speaks of Eurydikê.

[1144] Diodor. xvii. 3.

[1145] This Kleopatra—daughter of Philip, sister of Alexander the Great, and bearing the same name as Philip's last wife—was thus niece of the Epirotic Alexander, her husband. Alliances of that degree of kindred were then neither disreputable nor unfrequent.

[1146] Diodor. xvii. 2.

[1147] Josephus, Antiq. xix. 1, 13; Suetonius, Caligula, c. 57. See Mr. Clinton's Appendix (4) on the Kings of Macedonia. Fast. Hellen. p. 230, note.

[1148] Diodor. xvi. 92.

[1149] Aristot. Polit. v. 8. 10. Ἡ Φιλίππου (ἐπίθεσις) ὑπὸ Παυσανίου, διὰ τὸ ἐᾶσαι ὑβρισθῆναι αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ Ἄτταλον, etc. Justin, ix. 6; Diodor. xvi. 93.

[1150] Plutarch, Alex. c. 10.

[1151] Plutarch, Alex. c. 10.

[1152] Arrian, Exp. Alex. ii. 14, 10.

[1153] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 32.

[1154] Diodor. xvi. 94; Justin, ix. 7; Plutarch, Alex. c. 10.

[1155] Arrian, Exp. Alex. i. 25, 1.

[1156] Justin, xii. 14; Quintus Curtius, vii. 1, 5, with the note of Mützell.

[1157] Arrian, i. 25, 2; Justin, xi. 2. "Soli Alexandro Lyncistarum fratri pepercit, servans in eo auspicium dignitatis suæ; nam regem eum primus salutaverat."

[1158] Tacitus, Hist. ii. 80. "Dum quæritur tempus locusque, quodque in re tali difficillimum est, *prima vox*; dum animo spes, timor, ratio, casus observantur; egressum cubiculo Vespasianum, pauci milites solito adsistentes ordine, *Imperatorem* salutavere. Tum cæteri accurrere, *Cæsarem*, et *Augustum*, et omnia principatus vocabula cumulare: mens a metu ad fortunam transierat."

[1159] Quintus Curtius, vii. 1, 3; Diodorus, xvii. 2, 5. Compare Justin, xi. 5.

[1160] Justin, ix. 7; xi. 2. Pausanias, viii. 7, 5; Plutarch, Alex. c. 10.

According to Pausanias, Olympias caused Kleopatra and her infant boy to perish by a horrible death; being roasted or baked on a brazen vessel surrounded by fire. According to Justin, Olympias first slew the daughter of Kleopatra on her mother's bosom, and then caused Kleopatra herself to be hanged; while Alexander put to death Caranus, the infant son of Kleopatra. Plutarch says nothing about this; but states that the cruel treatment of Kleopatra was inflicted by order of Olympias during the absence of Alexander, and that he was much displeased at it. The main fact, that Kleopatra and her infant child were despatched by violence, seems not open to reasonable doubt; though we cannot verify the details.

[1161] After the solemn funeral of Philip, Olympias took down and burned the body of Pausanias (which had been crucified), providing for him a sepulchral monument and an annual ceremony of commemoration. Justin, ix. 7.

[1162] Justin (ix. 3) calls Philip forty-seven years of age; Pausanias (viii. 7, 4) speaks of him as forty-six. See Mr. Clinton's Fast. Hellen. Appen. 4. p. 227.

[1163] Theopompus, Frag. 265. ap. Athenæ. iii. p. 77. καὶ εὐτυχῆσαι πάντα Φίλιππον. Compare Demosth. Olynth. ii. p. 24.

[1164] Theopomp. Frag. 249; Theopompus ap. Polybium, viii. 11. ἀδικώτατον δὲ καὶ κακοπραγμονέστατον περὶ τὰς τῶν φίλων καὶ συμμάχων κατασκευὰς, πλείστας δὲ πόλεις ἐξηνδραποδισμένον καὶ πεπραξικοπηκότα μετὰ δόλου καὶ βίας, etc.

Justin, ix. 8. Pausanias, vii. 7, 3; vii. 10, 4; viii. 7, 4. Diodor. xvi. 54.

The language of Pausanias about Philip, after doing justice to his great conquests and exploits, is very strong—ὅς γε καὶ ὅρκους θεῶν κατεπάτησεν ἀεὶ, καὶ σπονδὰς ἐπὶ πάντι ἐψεύσατο, πίστιν τε ἠτίμασε μάλιστα ἀνθρώπων, etc. By such conduct, according to Pausanias, Philip brought the divine wrath both upon himself and upon his race, which became extinct with the next generation.

[1165] A striking passage occurs, too long to cite, in the third Philippic of Demosthenes (p. 123-124) attesting the marvellous stride made by Philip in the art and means of effective warfare.

[1166] Theopomp. Frag. 249. Ἁπλῶς δ᾽ εἰπεῖν … ἡγοῦμαι τοιαῦτα θηρία γεγονέναι, καὶ τοιοῦτον τοὺς φίλους καὶ τους ἑταίρους Φιλίππου προσαγορευθέντας, οἵους οὔτε τοὺς Κενταύρους τοὺς τὸ Πήλιον κατασχόντας, οὔτε τοὺς Λαιστρυγόνας τοὺς Λεοντῖνον πεδίον οἰκήσαντας, οὔτ᾽ ἄλλους οὐδ᾽ ὁποίους.

Compare Athenæ. iv. p. 166, 167; vi. p. 260, 261. Demosthen. Olynth. ii. p. 23.

Polybius (viii. 11) censures Theopompus for self-contradiction, in ascribing to Philip both unprincipled means and intemperate habits, and yet extolling his ability and energy as a king. But I see no contradiction between the two. The love of enjoyment was not suffered to stand in the way of Philip's military and political schemes, either in himself or his officers. The master-passion overpowered all appetites; but when that passion did not require effort, intemperance was the habitual relaxation. Polybius neither produces any sufficient facts, nor cites any contemporary authority, to refute Theopompus.

It is to be observed that the statements of Theopompus, respecting both the public and private conduct of Philip, are as disparaging as anything in Demosthenes.

[1167] Satyrus ap. Athenæ. xiii. p. 557. Ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος ἀεὶ κατὰ πόλεμον ἐγάμει, etc.

[1168] Æschines cont. Timarchum, p. 26. εἶτα τί θαυμάζομεν τὴν κοινὴν ἀπραξίαν, τοιούτων ῥητόρων ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ δήμου γνώμας ἐπιγραφομένων;

Æschines would ascribe this public inefficiency—which many admitted and deplored, though few except Demosthenes persevered in contending against it—to the fact that men of scandalous private lives (like Timarchus) were permitted, against the law, to move decrees in the public assembly. Compare Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 37.



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

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CHAPTER XCI.

FIRST PERIOD OF THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT — SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF THEBES.

State of Greece at Alexander's accession — dependence on the Macedonian kings. — Unwilling subjection of the Greeks — influence of Grecian intelligence on Macedonia. — Basis of Alexander's character — not Hellenic. — Boyhood and Education of Alexander. — He receives instruction from Aristotle. — Early political action and maturity of Alexander — his quarrels with his father. Family discord. — Uncertainty of Alexander's position during the last year of Philip. — Impression produced by the sudden death of Philip. — Accession of Alexander — his energy and judgment. — Accomplices of Pausanias are slain by Alexander — Amyntas and others are slain by him also. — Sentiment at Athens on the death of Philip — language of Demosthenes — inclination to resist Macedonia, yet without overt act. — Discontent in Greece — but no positive movement. — March of Alexander into Greece — submission of Athens. — Alexander is chosen Imperator of the Greeks in the convention at Corinth — continued refusal of concurrence by Sparta. — Conditions of the vote thus passed — privileges granted to the cities. — Authority claimed by Alexander under the convention — degradation of the leading Grecian states. — Encroachments and tyranny of the Macedonian officers in Greece — complaints of the orators at Athens. — Violations of the convention at sea by Macedonian officers. — Language of the complaining Athenians — they insist only on strict observance of the convention. Boldness of their language. — Encouragements held out by Persia to the Greeks. — Correspondence of Demosthenes with Persia — justifiable and politic. — March of Alexander into Thrace. He forces his way over Mount Hæmus. — His victory over the Triballi. — He crosses the Danube, defeats the Getæ, and returns back. — Embassy of Gauls to Alexander. His self-conceit. — Victories of Alexander over Kleitus and the Illyrians. — The Thebans declare their independence against Macedonia. — They are encouraged by Alexander's long absence in Thrace, and by reports of his death. — The Theban exiles from Athens get possession of Thebes. — They besiege the Macedonians in the Kadmeia, and entreat aid from other Greeks. Favorable sympathies shown towards them, but no positive aid. — Chances of Thebes and liberation, not unfavorable. — Rapid march and unexpected arrival of Alexander with his army before Thebes. His good fortune as to the time of hearing the news. — Siege of Thebes. Proclamation of Alexander. Determination of the Thebans to resist. — Capture of Thebes by assault. Massacre of the population. — Thebes is razed; the Theban captives sold as slaves; the territory distributed among the neighboring cities. — The Kadmeia is occupied as a Macedonian Military post. Retribution upon the Thebans from Orchomenus and Platæa. — Sentiments of Alexander, at the time and afterwards, respecting the destruction of Thebes. — Extreme terror spread throughout Greece. Sympathy of the Athenians towards the Theban exiles. — Alexander demands the surrender of the chief anti-Macedonian leaders at Athens. Memorable debate at Athens. The demand refused. — Embassy of the Athenians to Alexander. He is persuaded to acquiesce in the refusal, and to be satisfied with the banishment of Charidemus and Ephialtes. — Influence of Phokion in obtaining these milder terms — his increased ascendency at Athens. — Alexander at Corinth — obedience of the Grecian synod — interview with the philosopher Diogenes. — Reconstitution of Orchomenus and Platæa. Return of Alexander to Pella. — Military operations of Parmenio in Asia Minor against Memnon.

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CHAPTER XCII.

ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER.

During Alexander's reign, the history of Greece is nearly a blank. To what extent the Asiatic projects of Alexander belonged to Grecian history. — Pan-hellenic pretences set up by Alexander. The real feeling of the Greeks was adverse to his success. — Analogy of Alexander's relation to the Greeks — with those of the Emperor Napoleon to the Confederation of the Rhine. — Greece an appendage, but a valuable appendage, to Macedo-

nia. — Extraordinary military endowments and capacity of Alexander. — Changes in Grecian warfare, antecedent and contributory to the military organization of Macedonia. — Macedonian military condition before Philip. Good and firm cavalry: poor infantry. — Philip re-arms and reorganizes the infantry. Long Macedonian pike or sarissa. — Macedonian phalanx — how armed and arrayed. — It was originally destined to contend against the Grecian hoplites as organized by Epaminondas. — Regiments and divisions of the phalanx — heavy-armed infantry. — Light infantry of the line — Hypaspistæ, or Guards. — Light troops generally — mostly foreigners. — Macedonian cavalry — its excellence — how regimented. — The select Macedonian Body-guards. The Royal Pages. — Foreign auxiliaries — Grecian hoplites — Thessalian cavalry — Pæonians — Illyrians — Thracians, etc. — Magazines, war-office, and depôt, at Pella. — Macedonian aptitudes — purely military — military pride stood to them in lieu of national sentiment. — Measures of Alexander previous to his departure for Asia. Antipater left as viceroy at Pella. — March of Alexander to the Hellespont. Passage across to Asia. — Visit of Alexander to Ilium. — Analogy of Alexander to the Greek heroes. — Review and total of the Macedonian army in Asia. — Chief Macedonian officers. — Greeks in Alexander's service — Eumenes of Kardia. — Persian forces — Mentor and Memnon the Rhodians. — Succession of the Persian crown — Ochus — Darius Codomannus. — Preparations of Darius for defence. — Operations of Memnon before Alexander's arrival. — Superiority of the Persians at sea: their imprudence in letting Alexander cross the Hellespont unopposed. — Persian force assembled in Phrygia, under Arsites and others. — Advice of Memnon, to avoid fighting on land, and to employ the fleet for aggressive warfare in Macedonia and Greece. — Arsites rejects Memnon's advice, and determines to fight. — The Persians take post on the river Granikus. — Alexander reaches the Granikus, and resolves to force the passage at once, in spite of the dissuasion of Permenio. — Disposition of the two armies. — Battle of the Granikus. — Cavalry battle. — Personal danger of Alexander. His life saved by Kleitus. Complete victory of Alexander. Destruction of the Grecian infantry on the side of the Persians. — Loss of the Persians — numbers of their leading men slain. — Small loss of the Macedonians. — Alexander's kindness to his wounded soldiers, and severe treatment of the Grecian prisoners. — Unskilfulness of the Persian leaders. Immense impression produced by Alexander's victory. — Terror and submission of the Asiatics to Alexander. Surrender of the strong fortress of Sardis. — He marches from Sardis to the coast. Capture of Ephesus. — He finds the first resistance at Miletus. — Near approach of the Persian fleet. Memnon is made commander-in-chief of the Persians. — The Macedonian fleet occupies the harbor of Miletus, and keeps out the Persians. Alexander declines naval combat. His debate with Parmenio. — Alexander besieges Miletus. Capture of the city. — The Persian fleet retires to Halikarnassus. Alexander disbands his own fleet. — March of Alexander to Halikarnassus. Ada queen of Karia joins him. Strong garrison, and good defensive preparation, at Halikarnassus. — Siege of Halikarnassus. Bravery of the garrison, under Ephialtes the Athenian. — Desperate sally of Ephialtes — at first successful, but repulsed — he himself is slain. — Memnon is forced to abandon Halikarnassus, and withdraw the garrison by sea, retaining only the citadel. Alexander enters Halikarnassus. — Winter campaign of Alexander along the southern coast of Asia Minor. — Alexander concludes his winter campaign at Gordium. Capture of Kelænæ. — Appendix on the Macedonian Sarissa.

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CHAPTER XCIII.

SECOND AND THIRD ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER — BATTLE OF ISSUS — SIEGE OF TYRE.

Alexander cuts the Gordian knot. — He refuses the liberation of the Athenian prisoners. — Progress of Memnon and the Persian fleet — they acquire Chios and a large part of Lesbos — they besiege Mitylene. Death of Memnon. Capture of Mitylene. — Hopes excited in Greece by the Persian fleet, but ruined by the death of Memnon. — Memnon's death an irreparable mischief to Darius. — Change in Darius's plan caused by this event. He resolves to take the offensive on land. His immense land-force. — Free speech and sound judgment of Charidemus. He is put to death by Darius. — Darius abandoned Memnon's plans, just at the time when he had the best defensive position for executing them with effect. — Darius recalls the Grecian mercenaries from the fleet. — Criticism of Arrian on Darius's plan. — March of Alexander from Gordium through Paphlagonia and Kappadokia. — He arrives at the line of Mount Taurus — difficulties of the pass. — Conduct of Arsames, the Persian satrap. Alexander passes Mount Taurus without the least resistance. He enters Tarsus. — Dangerous illness of Alexander. His confidence in the physician Philippus, who cures him. — Operations of Alexander in Kilikia. — March of Alexander out of Kilikia, through Issus, to Myriandrus. — March of Darius from the interior to the eastern side of Mount Amanus. Immense numbers of his army: great wealth and ostentation in it: the treasure and baggage sent to Damascus. — Position of Darius on the plain eastward of Mount Amanus. He throws open the mountain passes, to let Alexander come through and fight a pitched battle. — Impatience of

Darius at the delay of Alexander in Kilikia. He crosses Mount Amanus to attack Alexander in the defiles of Kilikia. — He arrives in Alexander's rear, and captures Issus. — Return of Alexander from Myriandrus: his address to his army. — Position of the Macedonian army south of the river Pinarus. — Position of the Persian army north of the Pinarus. — Battle of Issus. — Alarm and immediate flight of Darius — defeat of the Persians. — Vigorous and destructive pursuit by Alexander — capture of the mother and wife of Darius. — Courteous treatment of the regal female prisoners by Alexander. — Complete dispersion of the Persian army — Darius recrosses the Euphrates — escape of some Perso-Grecian mercenaries. — Prodigious effect produced by the victory of Issus. — Effects produced in Greece by the battle of Issus. Anti-Macedonian projects crushed. — Capture of Damascus by the Macedonians, with the Persian treasure and prisoners. Capture and treatment of the Athenian Iphikrates. Altered relative position of Greeks and Macedonians. — Alexander in Phenicia. Aradus, Byblus, and Sidon open their gates to him. — Letter of Darius soliciting peace and the restitution of the regal captives. Haughty reply of Alexander. — Importance of the voluntary surrender of the Phenician towns to Alexander. — Alexander appears before Tyre — readiness of the Tyrians to surrender, yet not without a point reserved — he determines to besiege the city. — Exorbitant dispositions and conduct of Alexander. — He prepares to besiege Tyre — situation of the place. — Chances of the Tyrians — their resolution not unreasonable. — Alexander constructs a mole across the strait between Tyre and the mainland. The project is defeated. — Surrender of the princes of Cyprus to Alexander — He gets hold of the main Phenician and Cyprian fleet. — He appears before Tyre with a numerous fleet, and blocks up the place by sea. — Capture of Tyre by storm — desperate resistance by the citizens. — Surviving males, 2000 in number, hanged by order of Alexander — The remaining captives sold. — Duration of the siege for seven months. Sacrifice of Alexander to Herakles. — Second letter from Darius to Alexander, who requires unconditional submission. — The Macedonian fleet overpowers the Persian and becomes master of the Ægean with the islands. — March of Alexander towards Egypt — siege of Gaza. — His first assaults fail — he is wounded — he erects an immense mound round the town. — Gaza is taken by storm, after a siege of two months. — The garrison are all slain, except the governor Batis, who becomes prisoner, severely wounded. — Wrath of Alexander against Batis, whom he causes to be tied to a chariot, and dragged round the town. — Alexander enters Egypt, and occupies it without resistance — He determines on founding Alexandria. — His visit to the temple and oracle of Ammon. The oracle proclaims him to be the son of Zeus. — Arrangements made by Alexander at Memphis. — Grecian prisoners brought from the Ægean. — He proceeds to Phenicia — message from Athens. Splendid festivals. Reinforcements sent to Antipater. — He marches to the Euphrates — crosses it without opposition at Thapsakus. — March across from the Euphrates to the Tigris. Alexander fords the Tigris above Nineveh, without resistance. — Eclipse of the moon. Alexander approaches near the army of Darius in position. — Inaction of Darius since the defeat at Issus. — Paralyzing effect upon him produced by the captivity of his mother and wife. — Good treatment of the captive females by Alexander — necessary to keep up their value as hostages. — Immense army collected by Darius, in the plains eastward of the Tigris — near Arbela. — He fixes the spot for encamping and awaiting the attack of Alexander — in a level plain near Gaugamela. — His equipment and preparation — better arms — numerous scythed chariots — elephants. — Position and battle array of Darius. — Preliminary movements of Alexander — discussions with Parmenio and other officers. His careful reconnoitring in person. — Dispositions of Alexander for the attack — array of the troops. — Battle of Arbela. — Cowardice of Darius — he sets the example of flight — defeat of the Persians. — Combat on the Persian right between Mazæus and Parmenio. Flight of the Persian host — energetic pursuit by Alexander. — Escape of Darius. Capture of the Persian camp, and of Arbela. — Loss in the battle. Completeness of the victory. Entire and irreparable dispersion of the Persian army. — Causes of the defeat — cowardice of Darius. Uselessness of his immense numbers. — Generalship of Alexander. — Surrender of Babylon and Susa, the two great capitals of Persia. Alexander enters Babylon. Immense treasures acquired in both places. — Alexander acts as king of Persia, and nominates satraps. He marches to Susa. He remodels the divisions of his army. — Alexander marches into Persis proper — he conquers the refractory Uxii, in the intermediate mountains. — Difficult pass called the Susian Gates, on the way to Persepolis. Ariobarzanes the satrap repulses Alexander, who finds means to turn the pass, and conquer it. — Alexander enters Persepolis. Mutilated Grecian captives. — Immense wealth, and national monuments of every sort, accumulated in Persepolis. — Alexander appropriates and carries away the regal treasures, and then gives up Persepolis to be plundered and burnt by the soldiers. — Alexander rests his troops, and employs himself in conquering the rest of Persis. — Darius a fugitive in Media.

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CHAPTER XCIV.

MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CONQUESTS OF ALEXANDER, AFTER HIS WINTER QUARTERS IN PERSIS, DOWN TO HIS DEATH AT BABYLON.

The first four Asiatic campaigns of Alexander — their direct bearing and importance in reference to Grecian history. — His last seven years, farther eastward, had no similar bearing upon Greece. — Darius at Ekbatana — seeks escape towards Baktria, when he hears of Alexander approaching. — Alexander enters Ekbatana — establishes there his depôt and base of operations. — Alexander sends home the Thessalian cavalry — necessity for him now to pursue a more desultory warfare. — Alexander pursues Darius to the Caspian Gates, but fails in overtaking him. — Conspiracy formed against Darius by Bessus and others, who seize his person. — Prodigious efforts of Alexander to overtake and get possession of Darius. He surprises the Persian corps, but Bessus puts Darius to death. — Disappointment of Alexander when he missed taking Darius alive. Regal funeral bestowed upon Darius. His fate and conduct. — Repose of Alexander and his army at Hekatompylus in Parthia. Commencing alteration in his demeanor. He becomes Asiatized and despotic. — Gradual aggravation of these new habits, from the present moment. — Alexander conquers the mountains immediately south of the Caspian. He requires the Greek mercenaries to surrender at discretion. Envoys from Sparta and other Greek cities brought to him — how treated. — March of Alexander farther Eastward — his successes in Asia and Drangiana. — Proceedings against Philotas, son of Parmenio, in Drangiana. Military greatness and consideration of the family. — Revelation of an intended conspiracy made by Kebalinus to Philotas, for the purpose of being communicated to Alexander. Philotas does not mention it to Alexander. It is communicated to the latter through another channel. — Alexander is at first angry with Philotas, but accepts his explanation, and professes to pass over the fact. — Ancient grudge against Philotas — advantage taken of the incident to ruin him. — Kraterus and others are jealous of Parmenio and Philotas. Alexander is persuaded to put them both to death. — Arrest of Philotas. Alexander accuses him before the assembled soldiers. He is condemned. — Philotas is put to the torture, and forced to confess, both against himself and Parmenio. — Parmenio is slain at Ekbatana, by order and contrivance of Alexander. Mutiny of the soldiers when they learn the assassination of Parmenio — appeased by the production of Alexander's order. — Fear and disgust produced by the killing of Parmenio and Philotas. — Conquest of the Paropamisadæ, etc. Foundation of Alexandria *ad Caucasum*. — Alexander crosses the Hindoo-Koosh, and conquers Baktria. Bessus is made prisoner. — Massacre of the Branchidæ and their families, perpetrated by Alexander in Sogdiana. — Alexander at Marakanda and on the Jaxartes. — Foundation of Alexandria *ad Jaxartem*. Limit of march northward. — Alexander at Zariaspa in Baktria — he causes Bessus to be mutilated and slain. — Farther subjugation of Baktria and Sogdiana. Halt at Marakanda. — Banquet at Marakanda. — Character and position of Kleitus. — Boasts of Alexander and his flatterers — repugnance of Macedonian officers felt but not expressed. — Scene at the banquet — vehement remonstrance of Kleitus. — Furious wrath of Alexander — he murders Kleitus. — Intense remorse of Alexander, immediately after the deed. — Active and successful operations of Alexander in Sogdiana. — Capture of two inexpugnable positions — the Sogdian rock — the rock of Choriênes. Passion of Alexander for Roxana. — Alexander at Baktra — marriage with Roxana. His demand for prostration or worship from all. — Public harangue of Anaxarchus during a banquet, exhorting every one to render this worship. — Public reply of Kallisthenes, opposing it. Character and history of Kallisthenes. — The reply of Kallisthenes is favorably heard by the guests — the proposition for worship is dropped. — Coldness and disfavor of Alexander towards Kallisthenes. — Honorable frankness and courage of Kallisthenes. — Kallisthenes becomes odious to Alexander. — Conspiracy of the royal pages against Alexander's life — it is divulged — they are put to torture, but implicate no one else; they are put to death. — Kallisthenes is arrested as an accomplice — antipathy manifested by Alexander against him and against Aristotle also. — Kallisthenes is tortured and hanged. — Alexander reduces the country between the Hindoo-Koosh and the Indus. — Conquest of tribes on the right bank of the Indus — the rock of Aornos. — Alexander crosses the Indus — forces the passage of the Hydaspes, defeating Porus — generous treatment of Porus. — His farther conquests in the Punjab. Sangala the last of them. — He reaches the Hyphasis (Sutledge), the farthest of the rivers of the Punjab. His army refuses to march farther. — Alexander returns to the Hydaspes. — He constructs a fleet and sails down the Hydaspes and the Indus. Dangerous wound of Alexander in attacking the Malli. — New cities and posts to be established on the Indus — Alexander reaches the ocean — effect of the first sight of tides. — March of Alexander by land westward through the desert of Gedrosia — sufferings and losses in the army. — Alexander and the army come back to Persis. — Conduct of Alexander at Persepolis. Punishment of the satrap Orsines. — He marches to Susa — junction with the fleet under Nearchus, after it had sailed round from the mouth of the Indus. — Alexander at Susa as Great King. Subjects of uneasiness to him — the satraps — the Macedonian soldiers. — Past conduct of the satraps — several of them are punished by Alexander — alarm among them all — flight of Harpalus. — Discontents of the Macedonian soldiers with the Asiatizing intermarriages promoted by Alexander. — Their dis-

content with the new Asiatic soldiers levied and disciplined by Alexander. — Interest of Alexander in the fleet, which sails up the Tigris to Opis. — Notice of partial discharge to the Macedonian soldiers — they mutiny — wrath of Alexander — he disbands them all. — Remorse and humiliation of the soldiers — Alexander is appeased — reconciliation. — Partial disbanding — body of veterans placed under command of Kraterus to return — New projects of conquests contemplated by Alexander — measures for enlarging his fleet. — Visit to Ekbatana — death of Hephæstion — violent sorrow of Alexander. — Alexander exterminates the Kossæi. — March of Alexander to Babylon. Numerous embassies which met him on the way. — Alexander at Babylon — his great preparations for the circumnavigation and conquest of Arabia. — Alexander on shipboard, on the Euphrates and in the marshes adjoining. His plans for improving the navigation and flow of the river. — Large reinforcements arrive, Grecian and Asiatic. New array ordered by Alexander, for Macedonians and Persians in the same files and companies. — Splendid funeral obsequies of Hephæstion. — General feasting and intemperance in the army. Alexander is seized with a dangerous fever. Details of his illness. — No hope of his life. Consternation and grief in the army. Last interview with his soldiers. His death — Effect produced on the imagination of contemporaries by the career and death of Alexander. — Had Alexander lived, he must have achieved things greater still. — Question raised by Livy, about the chances of Alexander if he had attacked the Romans. — Unrivalled excellence as a military man. — Alexander as a ruler, apart from military affairs — not deserving of esteem. — Alexander would have continued the system of the Persian empire, with no other improvement except that of a strong organization. — Absence of nationality in Alexander — purpose of fusing the different varieties of mankind into one common type of subjection. — Mistake of supposing Alexander to be the intentional diffuser of Greek civilization. His ideas compared with those of Aristotle. — Number of new cities founded in Asia by Alexander. — It was not Alexander, but the Diadochi after him, who chiefly hellenized Asia. — How far Asia was ever really hellenized — the great fact was, that the Greek language became universally diffused. — Greco-Asiatic cities. — Increase of the means of communication between various parts of the world. — Interest of Alexander in science and literature — not great.

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CHAPTER XCV.

GRECIAN AFFAIRS FROM THE LANDING OF ALEXANDER IN ASIA TO THE CLOSE OF THE LAMIAN WAR.

State of the Grecian world when Alexander crossed the Hellespont. — Grecian spirit might have been called into action if the Persians had played their game well. — Hopes raised in Greece, first by the Persian fleet in the Ægean, next by the two great Persian armies on land. — Public acts and policy at Athens — decidedly pacific. — Phokion and Demades were leading ministers at Athens — they were of macedonizing politics. — Demosthenes and Lykurgus, though not in the ascendent politically, are nevertheless still public men of importance. Financial activity of Lykurgus. — Position of Demosthenes — his prudent conduct — Anti-Macedonian movement from Sparta — King Agis visits the Persian admirals in the Ægean. His attempts both in Krete and in the Peloponnesus. — Agis levies an army in Peloponnesus, and makes open declaration against Antipater. — Agis, at first partially successful, is completely defeated by Antipater, and slain. — Complete submission of all Greece to Antipater — Spartan envoys sent up to Alexander in Asia. — Untoward result of the defensive efforts of Greece — want of combination. — Position of parties at Athens during the struggle of Agis — reaction of the macedonizing party after his defeat. — Judicial contest between Æschines and Demosthenes. Preliminary circumstances as to the proposition of Ktesiphon, and the indictment by Æschines. — Accusatory harangue of Æschines, nominally against the proposition of Ktesiphon, really against the political life of Demosthenes. — Appreciation of Æschines, on independent evidence, as an accuser of Demosthenes. — Reply of Demosthenes — oration De Coronâ. — Funeral oration of extinct Grecian freedom. — Verdict of the Dikasts — triumph of Demosthenes — exile of Æschines. — Causes of the exile of Æschines — he was the means of procuring coronation for Demosthenes. — Subsequent accusation against Demosthenes, in the affair of Harpalus. — Flight of Harpalus to Athens — his previous conduct and relations with Athens. — False reports conveyed to Alexander, that the Athenians had identified themselves with Harpalus. — Circumstances attending the arrival of Harpalus at Sunium — debate in the Athenian assembly — promises held out by Harpalus — the Athenians seem at first favorably disposed towards him. — Phokion and Demosthenes both agree in dissuading the Athenians from taking up Harpalus. — Demand by Antipater for the surrender of Harpalus — the Athenians refuse to comply, but they arrest Harpalus and sequestrate his treasure for Alexander. — Demosthenes moves the decree for arrest of Harpalus, who is arrested, but escapes. — Conduct of Demosthenes in regard to the treasure of Harpalus — deficiency of the sum counted and realized, as compared with the sum announced by Harpalus. — Suspicions about this money — Demosthenes moves that the Areopagus shall in-

vestigate the matter — the Areopagites bring in a report against Demosthenes himself, with Demades and others, as guilty of corrupt appropriation. Demosthenes is tried on this charge, condemned, and goes into exile. — Was Demosthenes guilty of such corrupt appropriation? Circumstances as known in the case. — Demosthenes could not have received the money from Harpalus, since he opposed him from first to last. — Had Demosthenes the means of embezzling, after the money had passed out of the control of Harpalus? Answer in the negative. Accusatory speech of Deinarchus — virulent invective destitute of facts. — Change of mind respecting Demosthenes, in the Athenean public, in a few months. — Probable reality of the case, respecting the money of Harpalus, and the sentence of the Areopagus. — Rescript of Alexander to the Grecian cities, directing that the exiles should be recalled in each. — Purpose of the rescript — to provide partisans for Alexander in each of the cities. Discontents in Greece. — Effect produced in Greece, by the death of Alexander. The Athenians declare themselves champions of the liberation of Greece, in spite of Phokion's opposition. — The Ætolians and many other Greeks join the confederacy for liberation — activity of the Athenian Leosthenes as General. — Athenian envoys sent round to invite co-operation from the various Greeks. — Assistance lent to the Athenian envoys by Demosthenes, though in exile. — He is recalled to Athens, and receives an enthusiastic welcome. — Large Grecian confederacy against Antipater — nevertheless without Sparta. Bœotia strongly in the Macedonian interest. Leosthenes with the confederate army marches into Thessaly. — Battle in Thessaly — victory of Leosthenes over Antipater, who is compelled to throw himself into Lamia, and await succors from Asia — Leosthenes forms the blockade of Lamia: he is slain. — Misfortune of the death of Leosthenes. Antiphilus is named in his place. Relaxed efforts of the Grecian army. — Leonnatus, with a Macedonian army from Asia, arrives in Thessaly. His defeat and death. — Antipater escapes from Lamia, and takes the command. — War carried on by sea between the Macedonian and Athenian fleets. — Reluctance of the Greek contingents to remain on long-continued service. The army in Thessaly is thinned by many returning home. — Expected arrival of Kraterus to reinforce Antipater. Relations between the Macedonian officers. — State of the regal family, and of the Macedonian generals and soldiery, after the death of Alexander. — Philip Aridæus is proclaimed king: the satrapies are distributed among the principal officers. — Perdikkas the chief representative of central authority, assisted by Eumenes of Kardia. — List of projects entertained by Alexander at the time of his death. The generals dismiss them as too vast. — Plans of Leonnatus and Kleopatra. — Kraterus joins Antipater in Macedonia with a powerful army. Battle of Krannon in Thessaly. Antipater gains a victory over the Greeks though not a complete one. — Antiphilus tries to open negotiations with Antipater, who refuses to treat except with each city singly. Discouragement among the Greeks. Each city treats separately. Antipater grants favorable terms to all, except Athenians and Ætolians. Antipater and his army in Bœotia — Athens left alone and unable to resist. Demosthenes and the other anti-Macedonian orators take flight. Embassy of Phokion, Xenokrates, and others to Antipater. — Severe terms imposed upon Athens by Antipater. — Disfranchisement and deportation of the 12,000 poorest Athenian citizens. — Hardship suffered by the deported poor of Athens — Macedonian garrison placed in Munychia. — Demosthenes, Hyperides, and others, are condemned to death in their absence. Antipater sends officers to track and seize the Grecian exiles. He puts Hyperides to death. — Demosthenes in sanctuary at Kalauria — Archias with Thracian soldiers comes to seize him — he takes poison, and dies. — Miserable condition of Greece — life and character of Demosthenes. — Dishonorable position of Phokion at Athens under the Macedonian occupation.

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CHAPTER XCVI.

FROM THE LAMIAN WAR TO THE CLOSE OF THE HISTORY OF FREE HELLAS AND HELLENISM.

Antipater purges and remodels the Peloponnesian cities. He attacks the Ætolians, with a view of departing them across to Asia. His presence becomes necessary in Asia: he concludes a pacification with the Ætolians. — Plans of Perdikkas — intrigues with the princesses at Pella. — Antigonus detects the intrigues, and reveals them to Antipater and Kraterus. — Unpropitious turn of fortune for the Greeks, in reference to the Lamian war. — Antipater and Kraterus in Asia — Perdikkas marches to attack Ptolemy in Egypt, but is killed by a mutiny of his own troops. Union of Antipater, Ptolemy, Antigonus, etc. New distribution of the satrapies, made at Triparadeisus. — War between Antigonus and Eumenes in Asia. Energy and ability of Eumenes. He is worsted and blocked up in Nora. — Sickness and death of Antipater. The Athenian orator Demades is put to death in Macedonia — Antipater sets aside his son Kassander, and names Polysperchon viceroy. Discontent and opposition of Kassander. — Kassander sets up for himself, gets possession of Munychia, and forms alliance with Ptolemy and Antigonus against Polysperchon. Plans of Polysperchon — alliance with Olympias in Europe, and with Eumenes in Asia — enfranchisement of the Grecian cities. — Ineffectual attempts of

Eumenes to uphold the imperial dynasty in Asia: his gallantry and ability: he is betrayed by his own soldiers, and slain by Antigonus. — Edict issued by Polysperchon at Pella, in the name of the imperial dynasty — subverting the Antipatrian oligarchies in the Grecian cities, restoring political exiles, and granting free constitutions to each. — Letters and measures of Polysperchon to enforce the edict. State of Athens: exiles returning: complicated political parties: danger of Phokion. — Negotiations of the Athenians with Nikanor, governor of Munychia for Kassander. — Nikanor seizes Peiræus by surprise. 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CHAPTER XCVII.

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

MAP SHEWING THE MARCHES OF ALEXANDER.

CHAPTER XCI.

FIRST PERIOD OF THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT — SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF THEBES.

My last preceding volume ended with the assassination of Philip of Macedon, and the accession of his son Alexander the Great, then twenty years of age.

It demonstrates the altered complexion of Grecian history, that we are now obliged to seek for marking events in the succession to the Macedonian crown, or in the ordinances of Macedonian kings. In fact, the Hellenic world has ceased to be autonomous. In Sicily, indeed, the free and constitutional march, revived by Timoleon, is still destined to continue for a few years longer; but all the Grecian cities south of Mount Olympus have descended into dependents of Macedonia. Such dependence, established as a fact by the battle of Chæroneia and by the subsequent victorious march of Philip over Peloponnesus, was acknowledged in form by the vote of the Grecian synod at Corinth. While even the Athenians had been compelled to concur in submission, Sparta alone, braving all consequences, continued inflexible in her refusal. The adherence of Thebes was not trusted to the word of the Thebans, but ensured by the Macedonian garrison established in her citadel, called the Kadmeia. Each Hellenic city, small and great,—maritime, inland, and insular—(with the single exception of Sparta), was thus enrolled as a separate unit in the list of subject-allies attached to the imperial headship of Philip.

Under these circumstances, the history of conquered Greece loses its separate course, and becomes merged in that of conquering Macedonia. Nevertheless, there are particular reasons which constrain the historian of Greece to carry on the two together for a few years longer. First, conquered Greece exercised a powerful action on her conqueror—"Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit". The Macedonians, though speaking a language of their own, had neither language for communicating with others, nor literature, nor philosophy, except Grecian and derived from Greeks. Philip, while causing himself to be chosen chief of Hellas, was himself not only partially hellenized, but an eager candidate for Hellenic admiration. He demanded the headship under the declared pretence of satisfying the old antipathy against Persia. Next, the conquests of Alexander, though essentially Macedonian, operated indirectly as the initiatory step of a series of events, diffusing Hellenic language (with some tinge of Hellenic literature) over a large breadth of Asia,—opening that territory to the better observation, in some degree even to the superintendence, of intelligent Greeks—and thus producing consequences important in many ways to the history of mankind. Lastly, the generation of free Greeks upon whom the battle of Chæroneia fell, were not disposed to lie quiet if any opportunity occurred for shaking off their Macedonian

masters. The present volume will record the unavailing efforts made for this purpose, in which Demosthenes and most of the other leaders perished.

Alexander (born in July 356 B. C.), like his father Philip, was not a Greek, but a Macedonian and Epirot, partially imbued with Grecian sentiment and intelligence. It is true that his ancestors, some centuries before, had been emigrants from Argos; but the kings of Macedonia had long lost all trace of any such peculiarity as might originally have distinguished them from their subjects. The basis of Philip's character was Macedonian, not Greek: it was the self-will of a barbarian prince, not the *ingenium civile*, or sense of reciprocal obligation and right in society with others, which marked more or less even the most powerful members of a Grecian city, whether oligarchical or democratical. If this was true of Philip, it was still more true of Alexander, who inherited the violent temperament and headstrong will of his furious Epirotic mother Olympias.

A kinsman of Olympias, named Leonidas, and an Akarnanian named Lysimachus, are mentioned as the chief tutors to whom Alexander's childhood was entrusted.[1] Of course the Iliad of Homer was among the first things which he learnt as a boy. Throughout most of his life, he retained a passionate interest in this poem, a copy of which, said to have been corrected by Aristotle, he carried with him in his military campaigns. We are not told, nor is it probable, that he felt any similar attachment for the less warlike Odyssey. Even as a child, he learnt to identify himself in sympathy with Achilles,—his ancestor by the mother's side, according to the Æakid pedigree. The tutor Lysimachus won his heart by calling himself Phœnix—Alexander, Achilles—and Philip, by the name of Peleus. Of Alexander's boyish poetical recitations, one anecdote remains, both curious and of unquestionable authenticity. He was ten years old, when the Athenian legation, including both Æschines and Demosthenes, came to Pella to treat about peace. While Philip entertained them at table, in his usual agreeable and convivial manner, the boy Alexander recited for their amusement certain passages of poetry which he had learnt—and delivered, in response with another boy, a dialogue out of one of the Grecian dramas.[2]

At the age of thirteen, Alexander was placed under the instruction of Aristotle, whom Philip expressly invited for the purpose, and whose father Nikomachus had been both friend and physician of Philip's father Amyntas. What course of study Alexander was made to go through, we unfortunately cannot state. He enjoyed the teaching of Aristotle for at least three years, and we are told that he devoted himself to it with ardor, contracting a strong attachment to his preceptor. His powers of addressing an audience, though not so well attested as those of his father, were always found sufficient for his purpose: moreover, he retained, even in the midst of his fatiguing Asiatic campaigns, an interest in Greek literature and poetry.

At what precise moment, during the lifetime of his father, Alexander first took part in active service, we do not know. It is said that once, when quite a youth, he

received some Persian envoys during the absence of his father; and that he surprised them by the maturity of his demeanor, as well as by the political bearing and pertinence of his questions.[3] Though only sixteen years of age, in 340 B. C., he was left at home as regent while Philip was engaged in the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus. He put down a revolt of the neighboring Thracian tribe called Mædi, took one of their towns, and founded it anew under the title of Alexandria; the earliest town which bore that name, afterwards applied to so many other towns planted by him. In the march of Philip into Greece (338 B. C.), Alexander took part, commanded one of the wings at the battle of Chæroneia, and is said to have first gained the advantage on his side over the Theban sacred band.[4]

Yet notwithstanding such marks of confidence and coöperation, other incidents occurred producing bitter animosity between the father and the son. By his wife Olympias, Philip had as offspring Alexander and Kleopatra: by a Thessalian mistress named Philinna, he had a son named Aridæus (afterwards called Philip Aridæus:) he had also daughters named Kynna (or Kynanê) and Thessalonikê. Olympias, a woman of sanguinary and implacable disposition, had rendered herself so odious to him, that he repudiated her, and married a new wife named Kleopatra. I have recounted in the preceding volume[5] the indignation felt by Alexander at this proceeding, and the violent altercation which occurred during the conviviality of the marriage banquet; where Philip actually snatched his sword, threatened his son's life, and was only prevented from executing the threat by falling down through intoxication. After this quarrel, Alexander retired from Macedonia, conducting his mother to her brother Alexander king of Epirus. A son was born to Philip by Kleopatra. Her brother or uncle Attalus acquired high favor. Her kinsmen and partisans generally were also promoted, while Ptolemy, Nearchus, and other persons attached to Alexander, were banished.[6]

The prospects of Alexander were thus full of uncertainty and peril, up to the very day of Philip's assassination. The succession to the Macedonian crown, though transmitted in the same family, was by no means assured as to individual members; moreover, in the regal house of Macedonia[7] (as among the kings called Diadochi, who acquired dominion after the death of Alexander the Great), violent feuds and standing mistrust between father, sons, and brethren, were ordinary phænomena, to which the family of the Antigonids formed an honorable exception. Between Alexander and Olympias on the one side, and Kleopatra with her son and Attalus on the other, a murderous contest was sure to arise. Kleopatra was at this time in the ascendent; Olympias was violent and mischievous; and Philip was only forty-seven years of age. Hence the future threatened nothing but aggravated dissension and difficulties for Alexander. Moreover his strong will and imperious temper, eminently suitable for supreme command, disqualified him from playing a subordinate part, even to his own father. The prudence of Philip, when about to depart on his Asiatic expedition, induced him to attempt to heal these family dissensions by giving his

daughter Kleopatra in marriage to her uncle Alexander of Epirus, brother of Olympias. It was during the splendid marriage festival, then celebrated at Ægæ, that he was assassinated—Olympias, Kleopatra, and Alexander, being all present, while Attalus was in Asia, commanding the Macedonian division sent forward in advance, jointly with Parmenio. Had Philip escaped this catastrophe, he would doubtless have carried on the war in Asia Minor with quite as much energy and skill as it was afterwards prosecuted by Alexander: though we may doubt whether the father would have stretched out to those ulterior undertakings which, gigantic and far-reaching as they were, fell short of the insatiable ambition of the son. But successful as Philip might have been in Asia, he would hardly have escaped gloomy family feuds; with Alexander as a mutinous son, under the instigations of Olympias,—and with Kleopatra on the other side, feeling that her own safety depended upon the removal of regal or quasi-regal competitors.

From such formidable perils, visible in the distance, if not immediately impending, the sword of Pausanias guaranteed both Alexander and the Macedonian kingdom. But at the moment when the blow was struck, and when the Lynkestian Alexander, one of those privy to it, ran to forestall resistance and place the crown on the head of Alexander the Great[8]—no one knew what to expect from the young prince thus suddenly exalted at the age of twenty years. The sudden death of Philip in the fulness of glory and ambitious hopes, must have produced the strongest impression, first upon the festive crowd assembled,—next throughout Macedonia,—lastly, upon the foreigners whom he had reduced to dependence, from the Danube to the borders of Pæonia. All these dependencies were held only by the fear of Macedonian force. It remained to be proved whether the youthful son of Philip was capable of putting down opposition and upholding the powerful organization created by his father. Moreover Perdikkas, the elder brother and predecessor of Philip, had left a son named Amyntas, now at least twenty-four years of age, to whom many looked as the proper successor.[9]

But Alexander, present and proclaimed at once by his friends, showed himself both in word and deed, perfectly competent to the emergency. He mustered, caressed, and conciliated, the divisions of the Macedonian army and the chief officers. His addresses were judicious and energetic, engaging that the dignity of the kingdom should be maintained unimpaired,[10] and that even the Asiatic projects already proclaimed should be prosecuted with as much vigor as if Philip still lived.

It was one of the first measures of Alexander to celebrate with magnificent solemnities the funeral of his deceased father. While the preparations for it were going on, he instituted researches to find out and punish the accomplices of Pausanias. Of these indeed, the most illustrious person mentioned to us—Olympias—was not only protected by her position from punishment, but retained great ascendency over her son to the end of his life. Three other persons are mentioned by name as accomplices—brothers and persons of good family from the district of Upper Macedonia

called Lynkêstis—Alexander, Heromenes, and Arrhabæus, sons of Aëropus. The two latter were put to death, but the first of the three was spared, and even promoted to important charges, as a reward for his useful forwardness in instantly saluting Alexander king.[11] Others also, we know not how many, were executed; and Alexander seems to have imagined that there still remained some undetected.[12] The Persian king boasted in public letters,[13] with how much truth we cannot say, that he too had been among the instigators of Pausanias.

Among the persons slain about this time by Alexander, we may number his first-cousin and brother-in-law Amyntas—son of Perdikkas (the elder brother of the deceased Philip): Amyntas was a boy when his father Perdikkas died. Though having a preferable claim to the succession, according to usage, he had been put aside by his uncle Philip, on the ground of his age and of the strenuous efforts required on commencing a new reign. Philip had however given in marriage to this Amyntas his daughter (by an Illyrian mother) Kynna. Nevertheless, Alexander now put him to death,[14] on accusation of conspiracy: under what precise circumstances, does not appear—but probably Amyntas (who besides being the son of Philip's elder brother, was at least twenty-four years of age, while Alexander was only twenty) conceived himself as having a better right to the succession, and was so conceived by many others. The infant son of Kleopatra by Philip is said to have been killed by Alexander, as a rival in the succession; Kleopatra herself was afterwards put to death by Olympias during his absence, and to his regret. Attalus, also, uncle of Kleopatra and joint commander of the Macedonian army in Asia, was assassinated under the private orders of Alexander, by Hekatæus and Philotas.[15] Another Amyntas, son of Antiochus (there seems to have been several Macedonians named Amyntas) fled for safety into Asia:[16] probably others, who felt themselves to be objects of suspicion, did the like—since by the Macedonian custom, not merely a person convicted of high treason, but all his kindred along with him, were put to death.[17]

By unequivocal manifestations of energy and address, and by despatching rivals or dangerous malcontents, Alexander thus speedily fortified his position on the throne at home. But from the foreign dependents of Macedonia—Greeks, Thracians, and Illyrians—the like acknowledgment was not so easily obtained. Most of them were disposed to throw off the yoke; yet none dared to take the initiative of moving, and the suddenness of Philip's death found them altogether unprepared for combination. By that event the Greeks were discharged from all engagement, since the vote of the confederacy had elected him personally as Imperator. They were now at liberty, in so far as there was any liberty at all in the proceeding, to elect any one else, or to abstain from reëlecting at all, and even to let the confederacy expire. Now it was only under constraint and intimidation, as was well known both in Greece and Macedonia, that they had conferred this dignity even on Philip—who had earned it by splendid exploits, and had proved himself the ablest captain and politician of the age. They were by no means inclined to transfer it to a youth like Alexander, until he had

shown himself capable of bringing the like coercion to bear, and extorting the same submission. The wish to break loose from Macedonia, widely spread throughout the Grecian cities, found open expression from Demosthenes and others in the assembly at Athens. That orator (if we are to believe his rival Æschines), having received private intelligence of the assassination of Philip, through certain spies of Charidemus, before it was publicly known to others—pretended to have had it revealed to him in a dream by the gods. Appearing in the assembly with his gayest attire, he congratulated his countrymen on the death of their greatest enemy, and pronounced high encomiums on the brave tyrannicide of Pausanias, which he would probably compare to that of Harmodius and Aristogeiton.[18] He depreciated the abilities of Alexander, calling him Margites (the name of a silly character in one of the Homeric poems), and intimating that he would be too much distracted with embarrassments and ceremonial duties at home, to have leisure for a foreign march.[19] Such, according to Æschines, was the language of Demosthenes on the first news of Philip's death. We cannot doubt that the public of Athens, as well as Demosthenes, felt great joy at an event which seemed to open to them fresh chances of freedom, and that the motion for a sacrifice of thanksgiving,[20] in spite of Phokion's opposition, was readily adopted. But though the manifestation of sentiment at Athens was thus anti-Macedonian, exhibiting aversion to the renewal of that obedience which had been recently promised to Philip, Demosthenes did not go so far as to declare any positive hostility.[21] He tried to open communication with the Persians in Asia Minor, and also, if we may believe Diodorus, with the Macedonian commander in Asia Minor, Attalus. But neither of the two missions was successful. Attalus sent his letter to Alexander; while the Persian king,[22] probably relieved by the death of Philip from immediate fear of Macedonian power, despatched a peremptory refusal to Athens, intimating that he would furnish no more money.[23]

Not merely in Athens, but in other Grecian States also, the death of Philip excited aspirations for freedom. The Lacedæmonians, who, though unsupported, had stood out inflexibly against any obedience to him, were now on the watch for new allies; while the Arcadians, Argeians, and Eleians, manifested sentiments adverse to Macedonia. The Ambrakiots expelled the garrison placed by Philip in their city; the Ætolians passed a vote to assist in restoring those Akarnanian exiles whom he had banished.[24] On the other hand, the Thessalians manifested unshaken adherence to Macedonia. But the Macedonian garrison at Thebes, and the macedonizing Thebans who now governed that city,[25] were probably the main obstacles to any combined manifestation in favor of Hellenic autonomy.

Apprised of these impulses prevalent throughout the Grecian world, Alexander felt the necessity of checking them by a demonstration immediate, as well as intimidating. The energy and rapidity of his proceedings speedily overawed all those who had speculated on his youth, or had adopted the epithets applied to him by Demosthenes. Having surmounted, in a shorter time than was supposed possible, the diffi-

culties of his newly-acquired position at home, he marched into Greece at the head of a formidable army, seemingly about two months after the death of Philip. He was favorably received by the Thessalians, who passed a vote constituting Alexander head of Greece in place of his father Philip; which vote was speedily confirmed by the Amphiktyonic assembly, convoked at Thermopylæ. Alexander next advanced to Thebes, and from thence over the isthmus of Corinth into Peloponnesus. The details of his march we do not know; but his great force, probably not inferior to that which had conquered at Chæroneia, spread terror everywhere, silencing all except his partisans. Nowhere was the alarm greater than at Athens. The Athenians recollecting both the speeches of their orators and the votes of their assembly,—offensive at least, if not hostile, to the Macedonians—trembled lest the march of Alexander should be directed against their city, and accordingly made preparation for standing a siege. All citizens were enjoined to bring in their families and properties from the country, insomuch that the space within the walls was full both of fugitives and of cattle.[26] At the same time, the assembly adopted, on the motion of Demades, a resolution of apology and full submission to Alexander: they not only recognized him as chief of Greece, but conferred upon him divine honors, in terms even more emphatic than those bestowed on Philip.[27] The mover, with other legates, carried the resolution to Alexander, whom they found at Thebes, and who accepted their submission. A young speaker named Pytheas is said to have opposed the vote in the Athenian assembly.[28] Whether Demosthenes did the like—or whether, under the feeling of disappointed anticipations and overwhelming Macedonian force, he condemned himself to silence,—we cannot say. That he did not go with Demades on the mission to Alexander, seems a matter of course, though he is said to have been appointed by public vote to do so, and to have declined the duty. He accompanied the legation as far as Mount Kithæron, on the frontier, and then returned to Athens.[29] We read with astonishment that Æschines and his other enemies denounced this step as a cowardly desertion. No envoy could be so odious to Alexander, or so likely to provoke refusal for the proposition which he carried, as Demosthenes. To employ him in such a mission would have been absurd; except for the purpose probably intended by his enemies, that he might be either detained by the conqueror as an expiatory victim,[30] or sent back as a pardoned and humiliated prisoner.

After displaying his force in various portions of Peloponnesus, Alexander returned to Corinth, where he convened deputies from the Grecian cities generally. The list of those cities which obeyed the summons is not before us, but probably it included nearly all the cities of Central Greece. We know only that the Lacedæmonians continued to stand aloof, refusing all concurrence. Alexander asked from the assembled deputies the same appointment which the victorious Philip had required and obtained two years before—the hegemony or headship of the Greeks collectively for the purpose of prosecuting war against Persia.[31] To the request of a prince at the head of an irresistible army, one answer only was admissible. He was nominated Imperator

with full powers, by land and sea. Overawed by the presence and sentiment of Macedonian force, all acquiesced in this vote except the Lacedæmonians.

The convention sanctioned by Alexander was probably the same as that settled by and with his father Philip. Its grand and significant feature was, that it recognized Hellas as a confederacy under the Macedonian prince as imperator, president, or executive head and arm. It crowned him with a legal sanction as keeper of the peace within Greece, and conqueror abroad in the name of Greece. Of its other conditions, some are made known to us by subsequent complaints; such conditions as, being equitable and tutelary towards the members generally, the Macedonian chief found it inconvenient to observe, and speedily began to violate. Each Hellenic city was pronounced, by the first article of the convention, to be free and autonomous. In each, the existing political constitution was recognized as it stood; all other cities were forbidden to interfere with it, or to second any attack by its hostile exiles.[32] No new despot was to be established; no dispossessed despot was to be restored.[33] Each city became bound to discourage in every other, as far as possible, all illegal violence —such as political executions, confiscation, spoliation, redivision of land or abolition of debts, factious manumission of slaves, etc.[34] To each was guaranteed freedom of navigation; maritime capture was prohibited, on pain of enmity from all.[35] Each was forbidden to send armed vessels into the harbor of any other, or to build vessels or engage seamen there.[36] By each, an oath was taken to observe these conditions, to declare war against all who violated them, and to keep them inscribed on a commemorative column. Provision seems to have been made for admitting any additional city[37] on its subsequent application, though it might not have been a party to the original contract. Moreover, it appears that a standing military force, under Macedonian orders, was provided to enforce observance of the convention; and that the synod of deputies was contemplated as likely to meet periodically.[38]

Such was the convention, in so far as we know its terms, agreed to by the Grecian deputies at Corinth with Alexander; but with Alexander at the head of an irresistible army. He proclaimed it as the "public statute of the Greeks",[39] constituting a paramount obligation, of which he was the enforcer, binding on all, and authorizing him to treat all transgressors as rebels. It was set forth as counterpart of, and substitute for, the convention of Antalkidas, which we shall presently see the officers of Darius trying to revive against him—the headship of Persia against that of Macedonia. Such is the melancholy degradation of the Grecian World, that its cities have no alternative except to choose between these two foreign potentates—or to invite the help of Darius, the most distant and least dangerous, whose headship could hardly be more than nominal, against a neighbor sure to be domineering and compressive, and likely enough to be tyrannical. Of the once powerful Hellenic chiefs and competitors—Sparta, Athens, Thebes—under each of whom the Grecian world had been upheld as an independent and self-determining aggregate, admitting the free play of native sentiment and character, under circumstances more or less advantageous—

the two last are now confounded as common units (one even held under garrison) among the subject allies of Alexander; while Sparta preserves only the dignity of an isolated independence.

It appears that during the nine months which succeeded the swearing of the convention, Alexander and his officers (after his return to Macedonia) were active, both by armed force and by mission of envoys, in procuring new adhesions and in re-modelling the governments of various cities suitably to their own views. Complaints of such aggressions were raised in the public assembly of Athens, the only place in Greece where any liberty of discussion still survived. An oration, pronounced by Demosthenes, Hyperides, or one of the contemporary, anti-Macedonian politicians (about the spring or early summer of 335 B. C.),[40] imparts to us some idea both of the Macedonian interventions steadily going on, and of the unavailing remonstrances raised against them by individual Athenian citizens. At the time of this oration, such remonstrances had already been often repeated. They were always met by the macedonizing Athenians with peremptory declarations that the convention must be observed. But in reply, the remonstrants urged, that it was unfair to call upon Athens for strict observance of the convention, while the Macedonians and their partisans in the various cities were perpetually violating it for their own profit. Alexander and his officers (affirms this orator) had never once laid down their arms since the convention was settled. They had been perpetually tampering with the governments of the various cities, to promote their own partisans to power.[41] In Messênê, Sikyon, and Pellênê, they had subverted the popular constitutions, banished many citizens, and established friends of their own as despots. The Macedonian force, destined as a public guarantee to enforce the observance of the convention, had been employed only to overrule its best conditions, and to arm the hands of factious partisans.[42] Thus Alexander in his capacity of Imperator, disregarding all the restraints of the convention, acted as chief despot for the maintenance of subordinate despots in the separate cities.[43] Even at Athens, this imperial authority had rescinded sentences of the dikastery, and compelled the adoption of measures contrary to the laws and constitution.[44]

At sea, the wrongful aggressions of Alexander or his officers had been not less manifest than on land. The convention, guaranteeing to all cities the right of free navigation, distinctly forbade each to take or detain vessels belonging to any other. Nevertheless the Macedonians had seized, in the Hellespont, all the merchantmen coming out with cargoes from the Euxine, and carried them into Tenedos, where they were detained, under various fraudulent pretences, in spite of remonstrances from the proprietors and cities whose supply of corn was thus intercepted. Among these sufferers, Athens stood conspicuous; since consumers of imported corn, shipowners, and merchants, were more numerous there than elsewhere. The Athenians, addressing complaints and remonstrances without effect, became at length so incensed, and perhaps uneasy about their provisions, that they passed a decree to

equip and despatch 100 triremes, appointing Menestheus (son of Iphikrates) admiral. By this strenuous manifestation, the Macedonians were induced to release the detained vessels. Had the detention been prolonged, the Athenian fleet would have sailed to extort redress by force; so that, as Athens was more than a match for Macedon on sea, the maritime empire of the latter would have been overthrown, while even on land much encouragement would have been given to malcontents against it.[45] Another incident had occurred, less grave than this, yet still dwelt upon by the orator as an infringement of the convention, and as an insult to Athenians. Though an express article of the convention prohibited armed ships of one city from entering the harbor of another, still a Macedonian trireme had been sent into Pieræus to ask permission that smaller vessels might be built there for Macedonian account. This was offensive to a large proportion of Athenians, not only as violating the convention, but as a manifest step towards employing the nautical equipments and seamen of Athens for the augmentation of the Macedonian navy.[46]

"Let those speakers who are perpetually admonishing us to observe the convention (the orator contends), prevail on the imperial chief to set the example of observing it on his part. I too impress upon you the like observance. To a democracy nothing is more essential than scrupulous regard to equity and justice.[47] But the convention itself enjoins all its members to make war against transgressors; and pursuant to this article, you ought to make war against Macedon.[48] Be assured that all Greeks will see that the war is neither directed against them nor brought on by your fault.[49] At this juncture, such a step for the maintenance of your own freedom as well as Hellenic freedom generally, will be not less opportune and advantageous than it is just.[50] The time is come for shaking off your disgraceful submission to others, and your oblivion of our own past dignity.[51] If you encourage me, I am prepared to make a formal motion—To declare war against the violators of the convention, as the convention itself directs."[52]

A formal motion for declaring war would have brought upon the mover a prosecution under the Graphê Paranomôn. Accordingly, though intimating clearly that he thought the actual juncture (what it was, we do not know) suitable, he declined to incur such responsibility without seeing beforehand a manifestation of public sentiment sufficient to give him hopes of a favorable verdict from the Dikastery. The motion was probably not made. But a speech so bold, even though not followed up by a motion, is in itself significant of the state of feeling in Greece during the months immediately following the Alexandrine convention. This harangue is only one among many delivered in the Athenian assembly, complaining of Macedonian supremacy as exercised under the convention. It is plain that the acts of Macedonian officers were such as to furnish ample ground for complaint; and the detention of all the trading ships coming out of the Euxine, shows us that even the subsistence of Athens and the islands had become more or less endangered. Though the Athenians resorted to

no armed interference, their assembly at least afforded a theatre where public protest could be raised and public sympathy manifested.

It is probable too that at this time Demosthenes and the other anti-Macedonian speakers were encouraged by assurances and subsidies from Persia. Though the death of Philip, and the accession of an untried youth of twenty, had led Darius to believe for the moment that all danger of Asiatic invasion was past, yet his apprehensions were now revived by Alexander's manifested energy, and by the renewal of the Grecian league under his supremacy.[53] It was apparently during the spring of 335 B. C., that Darius sent money to sustain the anti-Macedonian party at Athens and elsewhere. Æschines affirms, and Deinarchus afterwards repeats (both of them orators hostile to Demosthenes)—That about this time, Darius sent to Athens 300 talents, which the Athenian people refused, but which Demosthenes took, reserving however 70 talents out of the sum for his own private purse: That public inquiry was afterwards instituted on the subject. Yet nothing is alleged as having been made out; [54] at least Demosthenes was neither condemned, nor even brought (as far as appears) to any formal trial. Out of such data we can elicit no specific fact. But they warrant the general conclusion, that Darius, or the satraps in Asia Minor, sent money to Athens in the spring of 335 B. C., and letters or emissaries to excite hostilities against Alexander.

That Demosthenes, and probably other leading orators, received such remittances from Persia, is no evidence of that personal corruption which is imputed to them by their enemies. It is no way proved that Demosthenes applied the money to his own private purposes. To receive and expend it in trying to organize combinations for the enfranchisement of Greece, was a proceeding which he would avow as not only legitimate but patriotic. It was aid obtained from one foreign prince to enable Hellas to throw off the worse dominion of another. At this moment, the political interests of Persia coincided with that of all Greeks who aspired to freedom. Darius had no chance of becoming master of Greece; but his own security prescribed to him to protect her from being made an appendage of the Macedonian kingdom, and his means of doing so were at this moment ample, had they been efficaciously put forth. Now the purpose of a Greek patriot would be to preserve the integrity and autonomy of the Hellenic world against all foreign interference. To invoke the aid of Persia against Hellenic enemies,—as Sparta had done both in the Peloponnesian war and at the peace of Antalkidas, and as Thebes and Athens had followed her example in doing afterwards—was an unwarrantable proceeding: but to invoke the same aid against the dominion of another foreigner, at once nearer and more formidable, was open to no blame on the score either of patriotism or policy. Demosthenes had vainly urged his countrymen to act with energy against Philip, at a time when they might by their own efforts have upheld the existing autonomy both for Athens and for Greece generally. He now seconded or invited Darius, at a time when Greece single-handed had become incompetent to the struggle against Alexander, the common en-

emy both of Grecian liberty and of the Persian empire. Unfortunately for Athens as well as for himself, Darius, with full means of resistance in his hands, played his game against Alexander even with more stupidity and improvidence than Athens had played hers against Philip.

While such were the aggressions of Macedonian officers in the exercise of their new imperial authority, throughout Greece and the islands—and such the growing manifestations of repugnance to it at Athens—Alexander had returned home to push the preparations for his Persian campaign. He did not however think it prudent to transport his main force into Asia, until he had made his power and personal ascendency felt by the Macedonian dependencies, westward, northward, and north-eastward of Pella—Illyrians, Pæonians, and Thracians. Under these general names were comprised a number[55] of distinct tribes, or nations, warlike and for the most part predatory. Having remained unconquered until the victories of Philip, they were not kept in subjection even by him without difficulty: nor were they at all likely to obey his youthful successor, until they had seen some sensible evidence of his personal energy.

Accordingly, in the spring, Alexander put himself at the head of a large force, and marched in an easterly direction from Amphipolis, through the narrow Sapæan pass between Philippi and the sea.[56] In ten days' march he reached the difficult mountain path over which alone he could cross Mount Hæmus (Balkan.) Here he found a body of the free Thracians and of armed merchants of the country, assembled to oppose his progress; posted on the high ground with waggons in their front, which it was their purpose to roll down the steep declivity against the advancing ranks of the Macedonians. Alexander eluded this danger by ordering his soldiers either to open their ranks, so as to let the waggons go through freely—or where there was no room for such loose array, to throw themselves on the ground with their shields closely packed together and slanting over their bodies; so that the waggons, dashing down the steep and coming against the shields, were carried off the ground, and made to bound over the bodies of the men to the space below. All the waggons rolled down without killing a single man. The Thracians, badly armed, were then easily dispersed by the Macedonian attack, with the loss of 1500 men killed, and all their women and children made prisoners.[57] The captives and plunder were sent back under an escort to be sold at the seaports.

Having thus forced the mountain road, Alexander led his army over the chain of Mount Hæmus, and marched against the Triballi: a powerful Thracian tribe,—extending (as far as can be determined) from the plain of Kossovo in modern Servia northward towards the Danube,—whom Philip had conquered, yet not without considerable resistance and even occasional defeat. Their prince Syrmus had already retired with the women and children of the tribe into an island of the Danube called Peukê, where many other Thracians had also sought shelter. The main force of the Triballi took post in woody ground on the banks of the rivet Zyginus, about three days'

march from the Danube. Being tempted however, by an annoyance from the Macedonian light-armed, to emerge from their covered position into the open plain, they were here attacked by Alexander with his cavalry and infantry, in close combat, and completely defeated. Three thousand of them were slain, but the rest mostly eluded pursuit by means of the wood, so that they lost few prisoners. The loss of the Macedonians was only eleven horsemen and forty foot slain; according to the statement of Ptolemy, son of Lagus, then one of Alexander's confidential officers, and afterwards founder of the dynasty of Greco-Egyptian kings.[58]

Three days' march, from the scene of action, brought Alexander to the Danube, where he found some armed ships which had been previously ordered to sail (probably with stores of provision) from Byzantium round by the Euxine and up the river. He first employed these ships in trying to land a body of troops on the island of Peukê; but his attempt was frustrated by the steep banks, the rapid stream, and the resolute front of the defenders on shore. To compensate for this disappointment, Alexander resolved to make a display of his strength by crossing the Danube and attacking the Getæ; tribes, chiefly horsemen armed with bows,[59] analogous to the Thracians in habits and language. They occupied the left bank of the river, from which their town was about four miles distant. The terror of the Macedonian successes had brought together a body of 4000 Getæ, visible from the opposite shore, to resist any crossing. Accordingly Alexander got together a quantity of the rude boats (hollowed out of a single trunk) employed for transport on the river, and caused the tent-skins of the army to be stuffed with hay in order to support rafts. He then put himself on shipboard during the night, and contrived to carry across the river a body of 4000 infantry, and 1500 cavalry; landing on a part of the bank where there was high standing wheat and no enemy's post. The Getæ, intimidated not less by this successful passage than by the excellent array of Alexander's army, hardly stayed to sustain a charge of cavalry, but hastened to abandon their poorly fortified town and retire father away from the river. Entering the town without resistance, he destroyed it, carried away such movables as he found, and then returned to the river without delay. Before he quitted the northern bank, he offered sacrifice to Zeus the Preserver—to Hêraklês—and to the god Ister (Danube) himself, whom he thanked for having shown himself not impassable.[60] On the very same day, he recrossed the river to his camp; after an empty demonstration of force, intended to prove that he could do what neither his father nor any Grecian army had ever yet done, and what every one deemed impossible—crossing the greatest of all known rivers without a bridge and in the face of an enemy.[61]

The terror spread by Alexander's military operations was so great, that not only the Triballi, but the other autonomous Thracians around, sent envoys tendering presents or tribute, and soliciting peace. Alexander granted their request. His mind being bent upon war with Asia, he was satisfied with having intimidated these tribes

so as to deter them from rising during his absence. What conditions he imposed, we do not know, but he accepted the presents.[62]

While these applications from the Thracians were under debate, envoys arrived from a tribe of Gauls occupying a distant mountainous region westward towards the Ionic Gulf. Though strangers to Alexander, they had heard so much of the recent exploits, that they came with demands to be admitted to his friendship. They were distinguished both for tall stature and for boastful language. Alexander readily exchanged with them assurances of alliance. Entertaining them at a feast, he asked, in the course of conversation, what it was that they were most afraid of, among human contingencies? They replied, that they feared no man, nor any danger, except only, lest the heaven should fall upon them. Their answer disappointed Alexander, who had expected that they would name him, as the person of whom they were most afraid; so prodigious was his conceit of his own exploits. He observed to his friends that these Gauls were swaggerers. Yet if we attend to the sentiment rather than the language, we shall see that such an epithet applies with equal or greater propriety to Alexander himself. The anecdote is chiefly interesting as it proves at how early an age the exorbitant self-esteem, which we shall hereafter find him manifesting, began. That after the battle of Issus he should fancy himself superhuman, we can hardly be astonished; but he was as yet only in the first year of his reign, and had accomplished nothing beyond his march into Thrace and his victory over the Triballi.

After arranging these matters, he marched in a south-westerly direction into the territory of the Agriânes and the other Pæonians, between the rivers Strymon and Axius in the highest portion of their course. Here he was met by a body of Agriânes under their prince Langarus, who had already contracted a personal friendship for him at Pella before Philip's death. News came that the Illyrian Kleitus, son of Bardylis, who had been subdued by Philip, had revolted at Pelion (a strong post south of lake Lychnidus, on the west side of the chain of Skardus and Pindus, near the place where that chain is broken by the cleft called the Klissura of Tzangon or Devol[63])—and that the western Illyrians, called Taulantii, under their prince Glaukias, were on the march to assist him. Accordingly Alexander proceeded thither forthwith, leaving Langarus to deal with the Illyrian tribe Autariatæ, who had threatened to oppose his progress. He marched along the bank and up the course of the Erigon, from a point near where it joins the Axius.[64] On approaching Pelion, he found the Illyrians posted in front of the town and on the heights around, awaiting the arrival of Glaukias their promised ally. While Alexander was making his dispositions for attack, they offered their sacrifices to the gods: the victims being three boys, three girls, and three black rams. At first they stepped boldly forward to meet him, but before coming to close quarters, they turned and fled into the town with such haste that the slain victims were left lying on the spot.[65] Having thus driven in the defenders, Alexander was preparing to draw a wall of circumvallation round the Pelion, when he was interrupted by the arrival of Glaukias with so large a force as to compel him to

abandon the project. A body of cavalry, sent out from the Macedonian camp under Philotas to forage, were in danger of being cut off by Glaukias, and were only rescued by the arrival of Alexander himself with a reinforcement. In the face of this superior force, it was necessary to bring off the Macedonian army, through a narrow line of road along the river Eordaikus, where in some places there was only room for four abreast, with hill or marsh everywhere around. By a series of bold and skilful manœuvres, and by effective employment of his battering-train or projectile machines to protect the rear-guard, Alexander completely baffled the enemy, and brought off his army without loss.[66] Moreover these Illyrians, who had not known how to make use of such advantages of position, abandoned themselves to disorder as soon as their enemy had retreated, neglecting all precautions for the safety of their camp. Apprised of this carelessness, Alexander made a forced night-march back, at the head of his Agrianian division and light troops supported by the remaining army. He surprised the Illyrians in their camp before daylight. The success of this attack against a sleeping and unguarded army was so complete, that the Illyrians fled at once without resistance. Many were slain or taken prisoners; the rest, throwing away their arms, hurried away homeward, pursued by Alexander for a considerable distance. The Illyrian prince Kleitus was forced to evacuate Pelion, which place he burned, and then retired into the territory of Glaukias.[67]

Just as Alexander had completed this victory over Kleitus and the Taulantian auxiliaries, and before he had returned home, news reached him of a menacing character. The Thebans had declared themselves independent of him, and were besieging his garrison in the Kadmeia.

Of this event, alike important and disastrous to those who stood forward, the immediate antecedents are very imperfectly known to us. It has already been remarked that the vote of submission on the part of the Greeks to Alexander as Imperator, during the preceding autumn, had been passed only under the intimidation of a present Macedonian force. Though the Spartans alone had courage to proclaim their dissent, the Athenians, Arcadians, Ætolians, and others, were well known even to Alexander himself, as ready to do the like on any serious reverse to the Macedonian arms.[68] Moreover the energy and ability displayed by Alexander had taught the Persian king that all danger to himself was not removed by the death of Philip, and induced him either to send, or to promise, pecuniary aid to the anti-Macedonian Greeks. We have already noticed the manifestation of anti-Macedonian sentiment at Athens—proclaimed by several of the most eminent orators—Demosthenes, Lykurgus, Hyperides, and others; as well as by active military men like Charidemus and Ephialtes,[69] who probably spoke out more boldly when Alexander was absent on the Danube. In other cities, the same sentiment doubtless found advocates, though less distinguished; but at Thebes, where it could not be openly proclaimed, it prevailed with the greatest force.[70] The Thebans suffered an oppression from which most of the other cities were free—the presence of a Macedonian garrison in their citadel; just as they had

endured, fifty years before, the curb of a Spartan garrison after the fraud of Phœbidas and Leontiades. In this case, as in the former, the effect was to arm the macedonizing leaders with absolute power over their fellow-citizens, and to inflict upon the latter not merely the public mischief of extinguishing all free speech, but also multiplied individual insults and injuries, prompted by the lust and rapacity of rulers, foreign as well as domestic.[71] A number of Theban citizens, among them the freest and boldest spirits, were in exile at Athens, receiving from the public indeed nothing beyond a safe home, but secretly encouraged to hope for better things by Demosthenes and the other anti-Macedonian leaders.[72] In like manner, fifty years before, it was at Athens, and from private Athenian citizens, that the Thebans Pelopidas and Mellon had found that sympathy which enabled them to organize their daring conspiracy for rescuing Thebes from the Spartans. That enterprise, admired throughout Greece as alike adventurous, skilful, and heroic, was the model present to the imagination of the Theban exiles, to be copied if any tolerable opportunity occurred.

Such was the feeling in Greece, during the long absence of Alexander on his march into Thrace and Illyria; a period of four or five months, ending at August 335 B. C. Not only was Alexander thus long absent, but he sent home no reports of his proceedings. Couriers were likely enough to be intercepted among the mountains and robbers of Thrace; and even if they reached Pella, their despatches were not publicly read, as such communications would have been read to the Athenian assembly. Accordingly we are not surprised to hear that rumors arose of his having been defeated and slain. Among these reports, both multiplied and confident, one was even certified by a liar who pretended to have just arrived from Thrace, to have been an eye-witness of the fact, and to have been himself wounded in the action against the Triballi, where Alexander had perished.[73] This welcome news, not fabricated, but too hastily credited, by Demosthenes and Lykurgus,[74] was announced to the Athenian assembly. In spite of doubts expressed by Demades and Phokion, it was believed not only by the Athenians and the Theban exiles there present, but also by the Arcadians, Eleians, Ætolians and other Greeks. For a considerable time, through the absence of Alexander, it remained uncontradicted, which increased the confidence in its truth.

It was upon the full belief in this rumor, of Alexander's defeat and death, that the Grecian cities proceeded. The event severed by itself their connection with Macedonia. There was neither son nor adult brother to succeed to the throne: so that not merely the foreign ascendency, but even the intestine unity, of Macedonia, was likely to be broken up. In regard to Athens, Arcadia, Elis, Ætolia, etc., the anti-Macedonian sentiment was doubtless vehemently manifested, but no special action was called for. It was otherwise in regard to Thebes. Phœnix, Prochytes, and other Theban exiles at Athens, immediately laid their plan for liberating their city and expelling the Macedonian garrison from the Kadmeia. Assisted with arms and money by Demosthenes and

other Athenian citizens, and invited by their partisans at Thebes, they suddenly entered that city in arms. Though unable to carry the Kadmeia by surprise, they seized in the city, and put to death, Amyntas, a principal Macedonian officer, with Timolaus, one of the leading macedonizing Thebans.[75] They then immediately convoked a general assembly of the Thebans, to whom they earnestly appealed for a vigorous effort to expel the Macedonians, and reconquer the ancient freedom of the city. Expatiating upon the misdeeds of the garrison and upon the oppressions of those Thebans who governed by means of the garrison, they proclaimed that the happy moment of liberation had now arrived, through the recent death of Alexander. They doubtless recalled the memory of Pelopidas, and the glorious enterprise, cherished by all Theban patriots, whereby he had rescued the city from Spartan occupation, forty-six years before. To this appeal the Thebans cordially responded. The assembly passed a vote, declaring severance from Macedonia, and autonomy of Thebes—and naming as Bœotarchs some of the returned exiles, with others of the same party, for the purpose of energetic measures against the garrison in the Kadmeia.[76]

Unfortunately for Thebes, none of these new Bœotarchs were men of the stamp of Epaminondas, probably not even of Pelopidas. Yet their scheme, though from its melancholy result it is generally denounced as insane, really promised better at first than that of the anti-Spartan conspirators in 380 B. C. The Kadmeia was instantly summoned; hopes being perhaps indulged, that the Macedonian commander would surrender it with as little resistance as the Spartan harmost had done. But such hopes were not realized. Philip had probably caused the citadel to be both strengthened and provisioned. The garrison defied the Theban leaders, who did not feel themselves strong enough to give orders for an assault, as Pelopidas in his time was prepared to do, if surrender had been denied.[77] They contented themselves with drawing and guarding a double line of circumvallation round the Kadmeia, so as to prevent both sallies from within and supplies from without.[78] They then sent envoys in the melancholy equipment of suppliants, to the Arcadians and others, representing that their recent movement was directed, not against Hellenic union, but against Macedonian oppression and outrage, which pressed upon them with intolerable bitterness. As Greeks and freemen, they entreated aid to rescue them from such a calamity. They obtained much favorable sympathy, with some promise and even half-performance. Many of the leading orators at Athens—Demosthenes, Lykurgus, Hyperides, and others—together with the military men Charidemus and Ephialtes—strongly urged their countrymen to declare in favor of Thebes and send aid against the Kadmeia. But the citizens generally, following Demades and Phokion, waited to be better assured both of Alexander's death and of its consequences, before they would incur the hazard of open hostility against Macedonia, though they seem to have declared sympathy with the Theban revolution.[79] Demosthenes farther went as envoy into Peloponnesus, while the Macedonian Antipater also sent round urgent applications to the Peloponnesian cities, requiring their contingents, as members of the confederacy under Alexander, to act against Thebes. The eloquence of Demos-

thenes, backed by his money, or by Persian money administered through him, prevailed on the Peloponnesians to refuse compliance with Antipater and to send no contingents against Thebes.[80] The Eleians and Ætolians held out general assurances favorable to the revolution at Thebes, while the Arcadians even went so far as to send out some troops to second it, though they did not advance beyond the isthmus.[81]

Here was a crisis in Grecian affairs, opening new possibilities for the recovery of freedom. Had the Arcadians and other Greeks lent decisive aid to Thebes—had Athens acted even with as much energy as she did twelve years afterwards during the Lamian war, occupying Thermopylæ with an army and a fleet—the gates of Greece might well have been barred against a new Macedonian force, even with Alexander alive and at its head. That the struggle of Thebes was not regarded at the time, even by macedonizing Greeks, as hopeless, is shown by the subsequent observations both of Æschines and Deinarchus at Athens. Æschines (delivering five years afterwards his oration against Ktesiphon) accuses Demosthenes of having by his perverse backwardness brought about the ruin of Thebes. The foreign mercenaries forming part of the garrison of the Kadmeia were ready (Æschines affirms) to deliver up that fortress, on receiving five talents: the Arcadian generals would have brought up their troops to the aid of Thebes, if nine or ten talents had been paid to them—having repudiated the solicitations of Antipater. Demosthenes (say these two orators) having in his possession 300 talents from the Persian king, to instigate anti-Macedonian movements in Greece, was supplicated by the Theban envoys to furnish money for these purposes, but refused the request, kept the money for himself, and thus prevented both the surrender of the Kadmeia and the onward march of the Arcadians.[82] The charge here advanced against Demosthenes appears utterly incredible. To suppose that anti-Macedonian movements counted for so little in his eyes, is an hypothesis belied by his whole history. But the fact that such allegations were made by Æschines only five years afterwards, proves the reports and the feelings of the time—that the chances of successful resistance to Macedonia on the part of the Thebans were not deemed unfavorable. And when the Athenians, following the counsels of Demades and Phokion, refused to aid Thebes or occupy Thermopylæ—they perhaps consulted the safety of Athens separately, but they receded from the generous and Pan-hellenic patriotism which had animated their ancestors against Xerxes and Mardonius.[83]

The Thebans, though left in this ungenerous isolation, pressed the blockade of the Kadmeia, and would presently have reduced the Macedonian garrison, had they not been surprised by the awe-striking event—Alexander arriving in person at Onchêstus in Bœotia, at the head of his victorious army. The first news of his being alive was furnished by his arrival at Onchêstus. No one could at first believe the fact. The Theban leaders contended that it was another Alexander, the son of Aëropus, at the head of a Macedonian army of relief.[84]

In this incident we may note two features, which characterized Alexander to the end of his life; matchless celerity of movement, and no less remarkable favor of fortune. Had news of the Theban rising first reached him while on the Danube or among the distant Triballi,—or even when embarrassed in the difficult region round Pelion,—he could hardly by any effort have arrived in time to save the Kadmeia. But he learnt it just when he had vanquished Kleitus and Glaukias, so that his hands were perfectly free—and also when he was in a position peculiarly near and convenient for a straight march into Greece without going back to Pella. From the pass of Tschangon (or of the river Devol), near which Alexander's last victories were gained, his road lay southward, following downwards in part the higher course of the river Haliakmon, through Upper Macedonia or the regions called Eordæa and Elymeia which lay on his left, while the heights of Pindus and the upper course of the river Aous, occupied by the Epirots called Tymphæi and Parauæi, were on the right. On the seventh day of march, crossing the lower ridges of the Cambunian mountains (which separate Olympus from Pindus and Upper Macedonia from Thessaly), Alexander reached the Thessalian town of Pelinna. Six days more brought him to the Bœotian Onchestus.[85] He was already within Thermopylæ, before any Greeks were aware that he was in march, or even that he was alive. The question about occupying Thermopylæ by a Grecian force was thus set aside. The difficulty of forcing that pass, and the necessity of forestalling Athens in it by stratagem or celerity, was present to the mind of Alexander, as it had been to that of Philip in his expedition of 346 B. C., against the Phokians.

His arrival, in itself a most formidable event, told with double force on the Greeks from its extreme suddenness. We can hardly doubt that both Athenians and Thebans had communications at Pella—that they looked upon any Macedonian invasion as likely to come from thence—and that they expected Alexander himself (assuming him to be still living, contrary to their belief) back in his capital before he began any new enterprise. Upon this hypothesis—in itself probable, and such as would have been realized if Alexander had not already advanced so far southward at the moment when he received the news[86]—they would at least have known beforehand of his approach, and would have had the option of a defensive combination open. As it happened, his unexpected appearance in the heart of Greece precluded all combinations, and checked all idea of resistance.

Two days after his arrival in Bœotia, he marched his army round Thebes, so as to encamp on the south side of the city; whereby he both intercepted the communication of the Thebans with Athens, and exhibited his force more visibly to the garrison in the Kadmeia. The Thebans, though alone and without hope of succor, maintained their courage unshaken. Alexander deferred the attack for a day or two, in hopes that they would submit; he wished to avoid an assault which might cost the lives of many of his soldiers, whom he required for his Asiatic schemes. He even made public proclamation,[87] demanding the surrender of the anti-Macedonian leaders Phœnix

and Prochytes, but offering to any other Theban who chose to quit the city, permission to come and join him on the terms of the convention sworn in the preceding autumn. A general assembly being convened, the macedonizing Thebans enforced the prudence of submission to an irresistible force. But the leaders recently returned from exile, who had headed the rising, warmly opposed this proposition, contending for resistance to the death. In them, such resolution may not be wonderful, since (as Arrian[88] remarks) they had gone too far to hope for lenity. As it appears however that the mass of citizens deliberately adopted the same resolution, in spite of strong persuasion to the contrary,[89] we see plainly that they had already felt the bitterness of Macedonian dominion, and that sooner than endure a renewal of it, sure to be yet worse, coupled with the dishonor of surrendering their leaders—they had made up their minds to perish with the freedom of their city. At a time when the sentiment of Hellas as an autonomous system was passing away, and when Grecian courage was degenerating into a mere instrument for the aggrandizement of Macedonian chiefs, these countrymen of Epaminondas and Pelopidas set an example of devoted self-sacrifice in the cause of Grecian liberty, not less honorable than that of Leonidas at Thermopylæ, and only less esteemed because it proved infructuous.

In reply to the proclamation of Alexander, the Thebans made from their walls a counter-proclamation, demanding the surrender of his officers Antipater and Philotas, and inviting every one to join them, who desired, in concert with the Persian king and the Thebans, to liberate the Greeks and put down the despot of Hellas.[90] Such a haughty defiance and retort incensed Alexander to the quick. He brought up his battering engines and prepared everything for storming the town. Of the murderous assault which followed, we find different accounts, not agreeing with each other, yet not wholly irreconcilable. It appears that the Thebans had erected, probably in connection with their operations against the Kadmeia, an outwork defended by a double palisade. Their walls were guarded by the least effective soldiers, metics and liberated slaves; while their best troops were bold enough to go forth in front of the gates and give battle. Alexander divided his army into three divisions; one under Perdikkas and Amyntas, against the outwork—a second, destined to combat the Thebans who sallied out—and a third, held in reserve. Between the second of these three divisions, and the Thebans in front of the gates, the battle was so obstinately contested, that success at one time seemed doubtful, and Alexander was forced to order up his reserve. The first Macedonian success was gained by Perdikkas,[91] who, aided by the division of Amyntas and also by the Agrianian regiment and the bowmen carried the first of the two outworks, as well as a postern gate which had been left unguarded. His troops also stormed the second outwork, though he himself was severely wounded and borne away to the camp. Here the Theban defenders fled back into the city, along the hollow way which led to the temple of Herakles, pursued by the light troops, in advance of the rest. Upon these men, however, the Thebans presently turned, repelling them with the loss of Eurybotas their commanding officer and seventy men slain. In pursuing these bowmen, the ranks of the Thebans became

somewhat disordered, so that they were unable to resist the steady charge of the Macedonian guards and heavy infantry coming up in support. They were broken, and pushed back into the city; their rout being rendered still more complete by a sally of the Macedonian garrison out of the Kadmeia. The assailants being victorious on this side, the Thebans who were maintaining the combat without the gates were compelled to retreat, and the advancing Macedonians forced their way into the town along with them. Within the town, however, the fighting still continued; the Thebans resisting in organized bodies as long as they could; and when broken, still resisting even single-handed. None of the military population sued for mercy; most of them were slain in the streets; but a few cavalry and infantry cut their way out into the plain and escaped. The fight now degenerated into a carnage. The Macedonians with their Pæonian contingents were incensed with the obstinate resistance; while various Greeks serving as auxiliaries—Phokians, Orchomenians, Thespians, Platæans,—had to avenge ancient and grievous injuries endured from Thebes. Such furious feelings were satiated by an indiscriminate massacre of all who came in their way, without distinction of age or sex—old men, women, and children, in houses and even in temples. This wholesale slaughter was accompanied of course by all the plunder and manifold outrage with which victorious assailants usually reward themselves.[92]

More than five hundred Macedonians are asserted to have been slain, and six thousand Thebans. Thirty thousand captives were collected.[93] The final destiny of these captives, and of Thebes itself, was submitted by Alexander to the Orchomenians, Platæans, Phokians, and other Grecian auxiliaries in the assault. He must have known well beforehand what the sentence of such judges would be. They pronounced, that the city of Thebes should be razed to the ground: that the Kadmeia alone should be maintained, as a military post with Macedonian garrison: that the Theban territory should be distributed among the allies themselves: that Orchomenus and Platæa should be rebuilt and fortified: that all the captive Thebans, men, women, and children, should be sold as slaves—excepting only priests and priestesses, and such as were connected by recognized ties of hospitality with Philip or Alexander, or such as had been *proxeni* of the Macedonians; that the Thebans who had escaped should be proclaimed outlaws, liable to arrest and death, wherever they were found; and that every Grecian city should be interdicted from harboring them. [94]

This overwhelming sentence, in spite of an appeal for lenity by a Theban[95] named Kleadas, was passed by the Grecian auxiliaries of Alexander, and executed by Alexander himself, who made but one addition to the excepting clauses. He left the house of Pindar standing, and spared the descendants of the poet. With these reserves, Thebes was effaced from the earth. The Theban territory was partitioned among the reconstituted cities of Orchomenus and Platæa. Nothing, except the Macedonian military post at the Kadmeia, remained to mark the place where the chief of the Bœotian confederacy had once stood. The captives were all sold, and are

said to have yielded 440 talents; large prices being offered by bidders from feelings of hostility towards the city.[96] Diodorus tells us that this sentence was passed by the general synod of Greeks. But we are not called upon to believe that this synod, subservient though it was sure to be when called upon to deliberate under the armed force of Alexander, could be brought to sanction such a ruin upon one of the first and most ancient Hellenic cities. For we learn from Arrian that the question was discussed and settled only by the Grecian auxiliaries who had taken part with Alexander;[97] and that the sentence therefore represents the bitter antipathies of the Orchomenians, Platæans, etc. Without doubt, these cities had sustained harsh and cruel treatment from Thebes. In so far as they were concerned, the retribution upon the Thebans was merited. Those persons, however, who (as Arrian tells us) pronounced the catastrophe to be a divine judgment upon Thebes for having joined Xerxes against Greece[98] a century and a half before,—must have forgotten that not only the Orchomenians, but even Alexander of Macedon, the namesake and predecessor of the destroying conqueror, had served in the army of Xerxes along with the Thebans.

Arrian vainly endeavors to transfer from Alexander to the minor Bœotian towns the odium of this cruel destruction—unparalleled in Grecian history (as he himself says), when we look to the magnitude of the city; yet surpassed in the aggregate by the subversion, under the arms of Philip, of no less than thirty-two free Chalkidic cities, thirteen years before. The known antipathy of these Bœotians was invoked by Alexander to color an infliction which satisfied at once his sentiment, by destroying an enemy who defied him—and his policy, by serving as a terrific example to keep down other Greeks.[99] But though such were the views which governed him at the moment, he came afterwards to look back upon the proceeding with shame and sorrow. The shock to Hellenic feeling, when a city was subverted, arose not merely from the violent extinction of life, property, liberty, and social or political institutions—but also from the obliteration of legends and the suppression of religious observances, thus wronging and provoking the local gods and heroes. We shall presently find Alexander himself sacrificing at Ilium,[100] in order to appease the wrath of Priam, still subsisting and efficacious, against himself and his race, as being descended from Neoptolemus the slayer of Priam. By his harsh treatment of Thebes, he incurred the displeasure of Dionysus, the god of wine, said to have been born in that city, and one of the principal figures in Theban legend. It was to inspirations of the offended Dionysus that Alexander believed himself to owe that ungovernable drunken passion under which he afterwards killed Kleitus, as well as the refusal of his Macedonian soldiers to follow him farther into India.[101] If Alexander in after days thus repented of his own act, we may be sure that the like repugnance was felt still more strongly by others; and we can understand the sentiment under which, a few years after his decease, the Macedonian Kassander, son of Antipater, restored the destroyed city.

At the time, however, the effect produced by the destruction of Thebes was one of unmitigated terror throughout the Grecian cities. All of them sought to make their peace with the conqueror. The Arcadian contingent not only returned home from the Isthmus, but even condemned their leaders to death. The Eleians recalled their chief macedonizing citizens out of exile into ascendency at home. Each tribe of Ætolians sent envoys to Alexander, entreating forgiveness for the manifestations against him. At Athens, we read with surprise that on the very day when Thebes was assaulted and taken, the great festival of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr, with its multitudinous procession of votaries from Athens to Eleusis, was actually taking place, at a distance of two days' march from the besieged city. Most Theban fugitives who contrived to escape, fled to Attica as the nearest place of refuge, communicating to the Athenians their own distress and terror. The festival was forthwith suspended. Every one hurried within the walls of Athens,[102] carrying with him his movable property into a state of security. Under the general alarm prevalent, that the conqueror would march directly into Attica, and under the hurry of preparation for defence,—the persons both most alarmed and most in real danger were, of course, Demosthenes, Lykurgus, Charidemus, and those others who had been loudest in speech against Macedonia, and had tried to prevail on the Athenians to espouse openly the cause of Thebes. Yet notwithstanding such terror of consequences to themselves, the Athenians afforded shelter and sympathy to the miserable Theban fugitives. They continued to do this even when they must have known that they were contravening the edict of proscription just sanctioned by Alexander.

Shortly afterwards, envoys arrived from that monarch with a menacing letter, formally demanding the surrender of eight or ten leading citizens of Athens—Demosthenes, Lykurgus, Hyperides, Polyeuktus, Mœroklês, Diotimus,[103] Ephialtes, and Charidemus. Of these the first four were eminent orators, the last two military men; all strenuous advocates of an anti-Macedonian policy. Alexander in his letter denounced the ten as the causes of the battle of Chæroneia, of the offensive resolutions which had been adopted at Athens after the death of Philip, and even of the recent hostile proceedings of the Thebans.[104] This momentous summons, involving the right of free speech and public debate at Athens, was submitted to the assembly. A similar demand had just been made upon the Thebans, and the consequences of refusal were to be read no less plainly in the destruction of their city than in the threats of the conqueror. That even under such trying circumstances, neither orators nor people failed in courage—we know as a general fact; though we have not the advantage (as Livy had in his time) of reading the speeches made in the debate.[105] Demosthenes, insisting that the fate of the citizens generally could not be severed from that of the specific victims, is said to have recounted in the course of his speech, the old fable—of the wolf requiring the sheep to make over to him their protecting dogs, as a condition of peace—and then, devouring the unprotected sheep forthwith. He, and those demanded along with him, claimed the protection of the people, in whose cause alone they had incurred the wrath of the conqueror. Phokion

on the other hand—silent at first, and rising only under constraint by special calls from the popular voice—contended that there was not force enough to resist Alexander, and that the persons in question must be given up. He even made appeal to themselves individually, reminding them of the self-devotion of the daughters of Erechtheus, memorable in Attic legend—and calling on them to surrender themselves voluntarily for the purpose of perverting public calamity He added, that he (Phokion) would rejoice to offer up either himself, or his best friend, if by such sacrifice he could save the city.[106] Lykurgus, one of the orators whose extradition was required, answered this speech of Phokion with vehemence and bitterness; and the public sentiment went along with him, indignantly repudiating Phokion's advice. By a resolute patriotism highly honorable at this trying juncture, it was decreed that the persons demanded should not be surrendered.[107]

On the motion of Demades, an embassy was sent to Alexander, deprecating his wrath against the ten, and engaging to punish them by judicial sentence, if any crime could be proved against them. Demades, who is said to have received from Demosthenes a bribe of five talents, undertook this mission. But Alexander was at first inexorable; refusing even to hear the envoys, and persisting in his requisition. It was only by the intervention of a second embassy, headed by Phokion, that a remission of terms was obtained. Alexander was persuaded to withdraw his requisition, and to be satisfied with the banishment of Charidemus and Ephialtes, the two anti-Macedonian military leaders. Both of them accordingly, and seemingly other Athenians with them, passed into Asia, where they took service under Darius.[108]

It was indeed no part of Alexander's plan to undertake a siege of Athens, which might prove long and difficult, since the Athenians had a superior naval force, with the sea open to them, and the chance of effective support from Persia. When therefore he saw, that his demand for the ten orators would be firmly resisted, considerations of policy gradually overcame his wrath, and induced him to relax.

Phokion returned to Athens as the bearer of Alexander's concessions, thus relieving the Athenians from extreme anxiety and peril. His influence—already great and of long standing, since for years past he had been perpetually re-elected general—became greater than ever, while that of Demosthenes and the other anti-Macedonian orators must have been lowered. It was no mean advantage to Alexander, victorious as he was, to secure the incorruptible Phokion as leader of the macedonizing party at Athens. His projects against Persia were mainly exposed to failure from the possibility of opposition being raised against him in Greece by the agency of Persian money and ships. To keep Athens out of such combinations, he had to rely upon the personal influence and party of Phokion, whom he knew to have always dissuaded her from resistance to the ever-growing aggrandizement of his father Philip. In his conversation with Phokion on the intended Asiatic expedition, Alexander took some pains to flatter the pride of Athens by describing her as second only to himself, and as entitled to the headship of Greece, in case any thing should happen to him.[109] Such compli-

ments were suitable to be repeated in the Athenian assembly: indeed the Macedonian prince might naturally prefer the idea of Athenian headship to that of Spartan, seeing that Sparta stood aloof from him, an open recusant.

The animosity of Alexander being appeased, Athens resumed her position as a member of the confederacy under his imperial authority. Without visiting Attica, he now marched to the Isthmus of Corinth, where he probably received from various Grecian cities deputations deprecating his displeasure, and proclaiming their submission to his imperial authority. He also probably presided at a meeting of the Grecian synod, where he would dictate the contingents required for his intended Asiatic expedition in the ensuing spring. To the universal deference and submission which greeted him, one exception was found—the Cynic philosopher Diogenes, who resided at Corinth, satisfied with a tub for shelter, and with the coarsest and most self-denying existence. Alexander approached him with a numerous suite, and asked him if he wished for anything; upon which Diogenes is said to have replied,—"Nothing, except that you would stand a little out of my sunshine." Both the philosopher and his reply provoked laughter from the bystanders, but Alexander himself was so impressed with the independent and self-sufficing character manifested, that he exclaimed,—"If I were not Alexander, I would be Diogenes."[110]

Having visited the oracle of Delphi, and received or extorted from the priestess[111] an answer bearing favorable promise for his Asiatic schemes, he returned to Macedonia before the winter. The most important permanent effect of his stay in Greece was the reconstitution of Bœotia; that is, the destruction of Thebes, and the reconstitution of Orchomenus, Thespiæ, and Platæa, dividing between them the Theban territory; all guarded and controlled by a Macedonian garrison in the Kadmeia. It would have been interesting to learn some details about this process of destruction and restitution of the Bœotian towns; a process not only calling forth strong manifestations of sentiment, but also involving important and difficult questions to settle. But unfortunately we are not permitted to know anything beyond the general fact.

Alexander left Greece for Pella in the autumn of 335 B. C., and never saw it again.

It appears, that during this summer, while he was occupied in his Illyrian and Theban operations, the Macedonian force under Parmenio in Asia had had to contend against a Persian army, or Greek mercenaries, commanded by Memnon the Rhodian. Parmenio, marching into Æolis, besieged and took Grynium; after which he attacked Pitanê, but was compelled by Memnon to raise the siege. Memnon even gained a victory over the Macedonian force under Kallas in the Troad, compelling them to retire to Rhœteum. But he failed in an attempt to surprise Kyzikus, and was obliged to content himself with plundering the adjoining territory.[112] It is affirmed that Darius was engaged this summer in making large preparations, naval as well as military, to resist

the intended expedition of Alexander. Yet all that we hear of what was actually done implies nothing beyond a moderate force.

CHAPTER XCII.

ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER.

A YEAR and some months had sufficed for Alexander to make a first display of his energy and military skill, destined for achievements yet greater; and to crush the growing aspirations for freedom among Greeks on the south, as well as among Thracians on the north, of Macedonia. The ensuing winter was employed in completing his preparations; so that early in the spring of 334 B. C., his army destined for the conquest of Asia was mustered between Pella and Amphipolis, while his fleet was at hand to lend support.

The whole of Alexander's remaining life—from his crossing the Hellespont in March or April 334 B. C., to his death at Babylon in June 323 B. C., eleven years and two or three months—was passed in Asia, amidst unceasing military operations, and ever-multiplied conquests. He never lived to revisit Macedonia; but his achievements were on so transcendent a scale, his acquisitions of territory so unmeasured, and his thirst for farther aggrandizement still so insatiate, that Macedonia sinks into insignificance in the list of his possessions. Much more do the Grecian cities dwindle into outlying appendages of a newly-grown Oriental empire. During all these eleven years, the history of Greece is almost a blank, except here and there a few scattered events. It is only at the death of Alexander that the Grecian cities again awaken into active movement.

The Asiatic conquests of Alexander do not belong directly and literally to the province of an historian of Greece. They were achieved by armies of which the general, the principal officers, and most part of the soldiers, were Macedonian. The Greeks who served with him were only auxiliaries, along with the Thracians and Pæonians. Though more numerous than all the other auxiliaries, they did not constitute, like the Ten Thousand Greeks in the army of the younger Cyrus, the force on which he mainly relied for victory. His chief-secretary, Eumenes of Kardia, was a Greek, and probably most of the civil and intellectual functions connected with the service were also performed by Greeks. Many Greeks also served in the army of Persia against him, and composed indeed a larger proportion of the real force (disregarding mere numbers) in the army of Darius than in that of Alexander. Hence the expedition becomes indirectly incorporated with the stream of Grecian history by the powerful auxiliary agency of Greeks on both sides—and still more, by its connection with previous projects, dreams, and legends, long antecedent to the aggrandizement of Macedon—as well as by the character which Alexander thought fit to assume. To take revenge on Persia for the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and to liberate the Asiatic Greeks, had been the scheme of the Spartan Agesilaus, and of the Pheræan Jason; with hopes grounded on the memorable expedition and safe return of the Ten

Thousand. It had been recommended by the rhetor Isokrates, first to the combined force of Greece, while yet Grecian cities were free, under the joint headship of Athens and Sparta—next, to Philip of Macedon as the chief of united Greece, when his victorious arms had extorted a recognition of headship, setting aside both Athens and Sparta. The enterprising ambition of Philip was well pleased to be nominated chief of Greece for the execution of this project. From him it passed to his yet more ambitious son.

Though really a scheme of Macedonian appetite and for Macedonian aggrandizement, the expedition against Asia thus becomes thrust into the series of Grecian events, under the Pan-hellenic pretence of retaliation for the long past insults of Xerxes. I call it a *pretence*, because it had ceased to be a real Hellenic feeling, and served now two different purposes; first, to ennoble the undertaking in the eyes of Alexander himself, whose mind was very accessible to religious and legendary sentiment, and who willingly identified himself with Agamemnon or Achilles, immortalized as executors of the collective vengeance of Greece for Asiatic insult—next, to assist in keeping the Greeks quiet during his absence. He was himself aware that the real sympathies of the Greeks were rather adverse than favorable to his success.

Apart from this body of extinct sentiment, ostentatiously rekindled for Alexander's purposes, the position of the Greeks in reference to his Asiatic conquests was very much the same as that of the German contingents, especially those of the Confederation of the Rhine, who served in the grand army with which the Emperor Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812. They had no public interest in the victory of the invader, which could end only by reducing them to still greater prostration. They were likely to adhere to their leader as long as his power continued unimpaired, but no longer. Yet Napoleon thought himself entitled to reckon upon them as if they had been Frenchmen, and to denounce the Germans in the service of Russia as traitors who had forfeited the allegiance which they owed to him. We find him drawing the same pointed distinction between the Russian and the German prisoners taken, as Alexander made between Asiatic and Grecian prisoners. These Grecian prisoners the Macedonian prince reproached as guilty of treason against the proclaimed statute of collective Hellas, whereby he had been declared general, and the Persian king a public enemy.[113]

Hellas, as a political aggregate, has now ceased to exist, except in so far as Alexander employs the name for his own purposes. Its component members are annexed as appendages, doubtless of considerable value, to the Macedonian kingdom. Fourteen years before Alexander's accession, Demosthenes, while instigating the Athenians to uphold Olynthus against Philip, had told them[114]—"The Macedonian power, considered as an appendage, is of no mean value; but by itself, it is weak and full of embarrassments." Inverting the position of the parties, these words represent exactly what Greece herself had become, in reference to Macedonia and Persia, at the time of Alexander's accession. Had the Persians played their game with tolerable

prudence and vigor, his success would have been measured by the degree to which he could appropriate Grecian force to himself, and withhold it from his enemy.

Alexander's memorable and illustrious manifestations, on which we are now entering, are those, not of the ruler or politician, but of the general and the soldier. In this character his appearance forms a sort of historical epoch. It is not merely in soldier-like qualities—in the most forward and even adventurous bravery—in indefatigable personal activity, and in endurance as to hardship and fatigue,—that he stands pre-eminent; though these qualities alone, when found in a king, act so powerfully on those under his command, that they suffice to produce great achievements, even when combined with generalship not surpassing the average of his age. But in generalship, Alexander was yet more above the level of his contemporaries. His strategic combinations, his employment of different descriptions of force conspiring towards one end, his long-sighted plans for the prosecution of campaigns, his constant foresight and resource against new difficulties, together with rapidity of movement even in the worst country—all on a scale of prodigious magnitude—are without parallel in ancient history. They carry the art of systematic and scientific welfare to a degree of efficiency, such as even successors trained in his school were unable to keep up unimpaired.

We must recollect however that Alexander found the Macedonian military system built up by Philip, and had only to apply and enlarge it. As transmitted to him, it embodied the accumulated result and matured fruit of a series of successive improvements, applied by Grecian tacticians to the primitive Hellenic arrangements. During the sixty years before the accession of Alexander, the art of war had been conspicuously progressive—to the sad detriment of Grecian political freedom. "Everything around us (says Demosthenes addressing the people of Athens in 342 B. C.), has been in advance for some years past—nothing is like what it was formerly—but nowhere is the alteration and enlargement more conspicuous than in the affairs of war. Formerly, the Lacedæmonians as well as other Greeks did nothing more than invade each other's territory, during the four or five summer months, with their native force of citizen hoplites: in winter they stayed at home. But now we see Philip in constant action, winter as well as summer, attacking all around him, not merely with Macedonian hoplites, but with cavalry, light infantry, bowmen, foreigners of all descriptions, and siege-batteries."[115]

I have in my last two volumes dwelt upon this progressive change in the character of Grecian soldiership. At Athens, and in most other parts of Greece, the burghers had become averse to hard and active military service. The use of arms had passed mainly to professional soldiers, who, without any feeling of citizenship, served wherever good pay was offered, and became immensely multiplied, to the detriment and danger of Grecian society.[116] Many of these mercenaries were lightly armed—peltasts served in combination with the hoplites.[117] Iphikrates greatly improved and partly re-armed the peltasts; whom he employed conjointly with hoplites so effec-

tively as to astonish his contemporaries.[118] His innovation was farther developed by the great military genius of Epaminondas; who not only made infantry and cavalry, light-armed and heavy-armed, conspire to one scheme of operations, but also completely altered the received principles of battle-manœuvring, by concentrating an irresistible force of attack on one point of the enemy's line, and keeping the rest of his own line more on the defensive. Besides these important improvements, realized by generals in actual practice, intelligent officers like Xenophon embodied the results of their military experience in valuable published criticisms.[119] Such were the lessons which the Macedonian Philip learnt and applied to the enslavement of those Greeks, especially of the Thebans, from whom they were derived. In his youth, as a hostage at Thebes, he had probably conversed with Epaminondas, and must certainly have become familiar with the Theban military arrangements. He had every motive, not merely from ambition, of conquest, but even from the necessities of defence, to turn them to account: and he brought to the task military genius and aptitude of the highest order. In arms, in evolutions, in engines, in regimenting, in war-office arrangements, he introduced important novelties; bequeathing to his successors the Macedonian military system, which, with improvements by his son, lasted until the conquest of the country by Rome, near two centuries afterwards.

The military force of Macedonia, in the times anterior to Philip, appears to have consisted, like that of Thessaly, in a well-armed and well-mounted cavalry, formed from the substantial proprietors of the country—and in a numerous assemblage of peltasts or light infantry (somewhat analogous to the Thessalian Penestæ): these latter were the rural population, shepherds or cultivators, who tended sheep and cattle, or tilled the earth, among the spacious mountains and valleys of Upper Macedonia. The Grecian towns near the coast, and the few Macedonian towns in the interior, had citizen-hoplites better armed; but foot-service was not in honor among the natives, and the Macedonian infantry in their general character were hardly more than a rabble. At the period of Philip's accession, they were armed with nothing better than rusty swords and wicker shields, noway sufficient to make head against the inroads of their Thracian and Illyrian neighbors; before whom they were constantly compelled to flee for refuge up into the mountains.[120] Their condition was that of a poor herdsman, half-naked or covered only with hides, and eating from wooden platters: not much different from that of the population of Upper Macedonia three centuries before, when first visited by Perdikkas the ancestor of the Macedonian kings, and when the wife of the native prince baked bread with her own hands.[121] On the other hand, though the Macedonian infantry was thus indifferent, the cavalry of the country was excellent, both in the Peloponnesian war, and in the war carried on by Sparta against Olynthus more than twenty years afterwards.[122] These horsemen, like the Thessalians, charged in compact order, carrying as their principal weapon of offence, not javelins to be hurled, but the short thrusting-pike for close combat.

Thus defective was the military organization which Philip found. Under his auspices it was cast altogether anew. The poor and hardy Landwehr of Macedonia, constantly on the defensive against predatory neighbors, formed an excellent material for soldiers, and proved not intractable to the innovations of a warlike prince. They were placed under constant training in the regular rank and file of heavy infantry: they were moreover brought to adopt a new description of arm, not only in itself very difficult to manage, but also comparatively useless to the soldier when fighting single-handed, and only available by a body of men in close order, trained to move or stand together. The new weapon, of which we first hear the name in the army of Philip, was the sarissa—the Macedonian pike or lance. The sarissa was used both by the infantry of his phalanx, and by particular regiments of his cavalry; in both cases it was long, though that of the phalanx was much the longer of the two. The regiments of cavalry called Sarissophori or Lancers were a sort of light-horse, carrying a long lance, and distinguished from the heavier cavalry intended for the shock of hand combat, who carried the xyston or short pike. The sarissa of this cavalry may have been fourteen feet in length, as long as the Cossack pike now is; that of the infantry in phalanx was not less than twenty-one feet long. This dimension is so prodigious and so unwieldy, that we should hardly believe it, if it did not come attested by the distinct assertion of an historian like Polybius.

The extraordinary reach of the sarissa or pike constituted the prominent attribute and force of the Macedonian phalanx. The phalangites were drawn up in files generally sixteen deep, each called a Lochus; with an interval of three feet between each two soldiers from front to rear. In front stood the lochage, a man of superior strength, and of tried military experience. The second and third men in the file, as well as the rearmost man who brought up the whole, were also picked soldiers, receiving larger pay than the rest. Now the sarissa, when in horizontal position, was held with both hands (distinguished in this respect from the pike of the Grecian hoplite, which occupied only one hand, the other being required for the shield), and so held that it projected fifteen feet before the body of the pikeman; while the hinder portion of six feet so weighted as to make the pressure convenient in such division. Hence, the sarissa of the man standing second in the file, projected twelve feet beyond the front rank; that of the third man, nine feet; these of the fourth and fifth ranks, respectively six feet and three feet. There was thus presented a quintuple series of pikes by each file, to meet an advancing enemy. Of these five, the three first would be decidedly of greater projection, and even the fourth of not less projection, than the pikes of Grecian hoplites coming up as enemies to the charge. The ranks behind the fifth, while serving to sustain and press onward the front, did not carry the sarissa in a horizontal position, but slanted it over the shoulders of those before them, so as to break the force of any darts or arrows which might be shot over head from the rear ranks of the enemy.[123]

The phalangite (soldier of the phalanx) was farther provided with a short sword, a circular shield of rather more than two feet in diameter, a breast-piece, leggings, and a kausia or broad-brimmed-hat—the head-covering common in the Macedonian army. But the long pikes were in truth the main weapons of defence as well as of offence. They were destined to contend against the charge of Grecian hoplites with the one-handed pike and heavy shield; especially against the most formidable manifestation of that force, the deep Theban column organized by Epaminondas. This was what Philip had to deal with, at his accession, as the irresistible infantry of Greece, bearing down everything before it by thrust of pike and propulsion of shield. He provided the means of vanquishing it, by training his poor Macedonian infantry to the systematic use of the long two-handed pike. The Theban column, charging a phalanx so armed, found themselves unable to break into the array of protended pikes, or to come to push of shield. We are told that at the battle of Chæroneia, the front rank Theban soldiers, the chosen men of the city, all perished on the ground; and this is not wonderful, when we conceive them as rushing, by their own courage as well as by the pressure upon them from behind, upon a wall of Pikes double the length of their own. We must look at Philip's phalanx with reference to the enemies before him, not with reference to the later Roman organization, which Polybius brings into comparison. It answered perfectly the purposes of Philip, who wanted mainly to stand the shock in front, thus overpowering Grecian hoplites in their own mode of attack. Now Polybius informs us, that the phalanx was never once beaten, in front and on ground suitable for it; and wherever the ground was fit for hoplites, it was also fit for the phalanx. The inconveniences of Philip's array, and of the long pikes, arose from the incapacity of the phalanx to change its front or keep its order on unequal ground; but such inconveniences were hardly less felt by Grecian hoplites.[124]

The Macedonian phalanx, denominated the Pezetæri[125] or Foot Companions of the King, comprised the general body of native infantry, as distinguished from special *corps d'armée*. The largest division of it which we find mentioned under Alexander, and which appears under the command of a general of division, is called a Taxis. How many of these Taxeis there were in all, we do not know; the original Asiatic army of Alexander (apart from what he left at home) included six of them, coinciding apparently with the provincial allotments of the country: Orestæ, Lynkestæ, Elimiotæ, Tymphæi, etc.[126] The writers on tactics give us a systematic scale of distribution (ascending from the lowest unit, the Lochus of sixteen men, by successive multiples of two, up to the quadruple phalanx of 16,384 men) as pervading the Macedonian army. Among these divisions, that which stands out as most fundamental and constant, is the Syntagma, which contained sixteen Lochi. Forming thus a square of sixteen men in front and depth, or 256 men, it was at the same time a distinct aggregate or permanent battalion, having attached to it five supernumeraries, an ensign, a rear-man, a trumpeter, a herald, and an attendant or orderly.[127] Two of these Syntagmas composed a body of 512 men, called a Pentakosiarchy, which in Philip's time is said to have been the ordinary regiment, acting together under a sep-

arate command; but several of these were doubled by Alexander when he reorganized his army at Susa,[128] so as to form regiments of 1024 men, each under its Chiliarch, and each comprising four Syntagmas. All this systematic distribution of the Macedonian military force when at home, appears to have been arranged by the genius of Philip. On actual foreign service, no numerical precision could be observed; a regiment or a division could not always contain the same fixed number of men. But as to the array, a depth of sixteen, for the files of the phalangites, appears to have been regarded as important and characteristic,[129] perhaps essential to impart a feeling of confidence to the troops. It was a depth much greater than was common with Grecian hoplites, and never surpassed by any Greeks except the Thebans.

But the phalanx, though an essential item, was yet only one among many, in the varied military organization introduced by Philip. It was neither intended, nor fit, to act alone; being clumsy in changing front to protect itself either in flank or rear, and unable to adapt itself to uneven ground. There was another description of infantry organized by Philip called the Hypaspists—shield-bearers or Guards;[130] originally few in number, and employed for personal defence of the prince—but afterwards enlarged into several distinct *corps d'armée*. These Hypaspists or Guards were light infantry of the line;[131] they were hoplites, keeping regular array and intended for close combat, but more lightly armed, and more fit for diversities of circumstance and position, than the phalanx. They seem to have fought with the one-handed pike and shield, like the Greeks; and not to have carried the two-handed phalangite pike or sarissa. They occupied a sort of intermediate place between the heavy infantry of the phalanx properly so called—and the peltasts and light troops generally. Alexander in his later campaigns had them distributed into Chiliarchies (how the distribution stood earlier, we have no distinct information), at least three in number, and probably more.[132] We find them employed by him in forward and aggressive movements; first his light troops and cavalry begin the attack; next, the hypaspists come to follow it up; lastly, the phalanx is brought up to support them. The hypaspists are used also for assault of walled places, and for rapid night marches.[133] What was the total number of them, we do not know.[134]

Besides the phalanx, and the hypaspists or Guards, the Macedonian army as employed by Philip and Alexander included a numerous assemblage of desultory or irregular troops, partly native Macedonians, partly foreigners, Thracians, Pæonians, etc. They were of different descriptions; peltasts, darters, and bowmen. The best of them appear to have been the Agriânes, a Pæonian tribe expert in the use of the javelin. All of them were kept in vigorous movement by Alexander, on the flanks and in front of his heavy infantry, or intermingled with his cavalry,—as well as for pursuit after the enemy was defeated.

Lastly, the cavalry in Alexander's army was also admirable—at least equal, and seemingly even superior in efficiency, to his best infantry.[135] I have already mentioned that cavalry was the choice native force of Macedonia, long before the reign of

Philip; by whom it had been extended and improved.[136] The heavy cavalry, wholly or chiefly composed of native Macedonians, was known by the denomination of the Companions. There was besides a new and lighter variety of cavalry, apparently introduced by Philip, and called the Sarissophori, or Lancers, used like Cossacks for advanced posts or scouring the country. The sarissa which they carried was probably much shorter than that of the phalanx; but it was long, if compared with the xyston or thrusting pike used by the heavy cavalry for the shock of close combat. Arrian, in describing the army of Alexander at Arbêla, enumerates eight distinct squadrons of this heavy cavalry—or cavalry of the Companions; but the total number included in the Macedonian army at Alexander's accession, is not known. Among the squadrons, several at least (if not all) were named after particular towns or districts of the country—Bottiæa, Amphipolis, Apollonia, Anthemus, etc.;[137] there was one or more, distinguished as the Royal Squadron—the Agêma or leading body of cavalry—at the head of which Alexander generally charged, himself among the foremost of the actual combatants.[138]

The distribution of the cavalry into squadrons was that which Alexander found at his accession; but he altered it, when he remodelled the arrangements of his army (in 330 B. C.), at Susa, so as to subdivide the squadron into two Lochi, and to establish the Lochus for the elementary division of cavalry, as it had always been of infantry.[139] His reforms went thus to cut down the primary body of cavalry from the squadron to the half-squadron or Lochus, while they tended to bring the infantry together into larger bodies—from cohorts of 500 each to cohorts of 1000 men each.

Among the Hypaspists or Guards, also, we find an Agêma or chosen cohort, which was called upon oftener than the rest to begin the fight. A still more select corps were, the Body-Guards; a small company of tried and confidential men, individually known to Alexander, always attached to his person, and acting as adjutants or as commanders for special service. These Body-Guards appear to have been chosen persons promoted out of the Royal Youths or Pages; an institution first established by Philip, and evincing the pains taken by him to bring the leading Macedonians into military organization as well as into dependence on his own person. The Royal Youths, sons of the chief persons throughout Macedonia, were taken by Philip into service, and kept in permanent residence around him for purposes of domestic attendance and companionship. They maintained perpetual guard of his palace, alternating among themselves the hours of daily and nightly watch; they received his horse from the grooms, assisted him to mount, and accompanied him if he went to the chase: they introduced persons who came to solicit interviews, and admitted his mistresses by night through a special door. They enjoyed the privilege of sitting down to dinner with him, as well as that of never being flogged except by his special order.[140] The precise number of the company we do not know; but it must have been not small, since fifty of these youths were brought out from Macedonia at once by Amyntas to join Alexander and to be added to the company at Babylon.[141] At

the same time the mortality among them was probably considerable; since, in accompanying Alexander, they endured even more than the prodigious fatigues which he imposed upon himself.[142] The training in this corps was a preparation first for becoming Body-guards of Alexander,—next, for appointment to the great and important military commands. Accordingly, it had been the first stage of advancement to most of the Diadochi, or great officers of Alexander, who after his death carved kingdoms for themselves out of his conquests.

It was thus that the native Macedonian force was enlarged and diversified by Philip, including at his death—1. The phalanx, Foot-companions, or general mass of heavy infantry, drilled to the use of the long two-handed pike or sarissa—2. The Hypaspists, or lighter-armed corps of foot-guards—3. The Companions, or heavy cavalry, the ancient indigenous force consisting of the more opulent or substantial Macedonians—4. The lighter cavalry, lancers, or Sarissophori.—With these were joined foreign auxiliaries of great value. The Thessalians, whom Philip had partly subjugated and partly gained over, furnished him with a body of heavy cavalry not inferior to the native Macedonian. From various parts of Greece he derived hoplites, volunteers taken into his pay, armed with the full-sized shield and one-handed pike. From the warlike tribes of Thracians, Pæonians, Illyrians, etc., whom he had subdued around him, he levied contingents of light troops of various descriptions, peltasts, bowmen, darters, etc., all excellent in their way, and eminently serviceable to his combinations, in conjunction with the heavier masses. Lastly, Philip had completed his military arrangements by organizing what may be called an effective siege-train for sieges as well as for battles; a stock of projectile and battering machines, superior to anything at that time extant. We find this artillery used by Alexander in the very first year of his reign, in his campaign against the Illyrians.[143] Even in his most distant Indian marches, he either carried it with him, or had the means of constructing new engines for the occasion. There was no part of his military equipment more essential to his conquests. The victorious sieges of Alexander are among his most memorable exploits.

To all this large, multifarious, and systematized array of actual force, are to be added the civil establishments, the depôts, magazines of arms, provision for remounts, drill officers and adjutants, etc., indispensable for maintaining it in constant training and efficiency. At the time of Philip's accession, Pella was an unimportant place;[144] at his death, it was not only strong as a fortification and place of deposit for regal treasure, but also the permanent centre, war-office, and training quarters, of the greatest military force then known. The military registers as well as the traditions of Macedonian discipline were preserved there until the fall of the monarchy. [145] Philip had employed his life in organizing this powerful instrument of dominion. His revenues, large as they were, both from mines and from tributary conquests, had been exhausted in the work, so that he had left at his decease a debt of 500 talents.

But his son Alexander found the instrument ready made, with excellent officers, and trained veterans for the front ranks of his phalanx.[146]

This scientific organization of military force, on a large scale and with all the varieties of arming and equipment made to co-operate for one end, is the great fact of Macedonian history. Nothing of the same kind and magnitude had ever before been seen. The Macedonians, like Epirots and Ætolians, had no other aptitude or marking quality except those of soldiership. Their rude and scattered tribes manifest no definite political institutions and little sentiment of national brotherhood; their union was mainly that of occasional fellowship in arms under the king as chief. Philip the son of Amyntas was the first to organize this military union into a system permanently and efficaciously operative, achieving by means of it conquests such as to create in the Macedonians a common pride of superiority in arms, which served as substitute for political institutions or nationality. Such pride was still farther exalted by the really superhuman career of Alexander. The Macedonian kingdom was nothing but a well-combined military machine, illustrating the irresistible superiority of the rudest men, trained in arms and conducted by an able general, not merely over undisciplined multitudes, but also over free, courageous, and disciplined, citizenship with highly gifted intelligence.

During the winter of 335-334 B. C., after the destruction of Thebes and the return of Alexander from Greece to Pella, his final preparations were made for the Asiatic expedition. The Macedonian army with the auxiliary contingents destined for this enterprise were brought together early in the spring. Antipater, one of the oldest and ablest officers of Philip, was appointed to act as viceroy of Macedonia during the king's absence. A military force, stated at 12,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry,[147] was left with him to keep down the cities of Greece, to resist aggressions from the Persian fleet, and to repress discontents at home. Such discontents were likely to be instigated by leading Macedonians or pretenders to the throne, especially as Alexander had no direct heir: and we are told that Antipater and Parmenio advised postponement of the expedition until the young king could leave behind him an heir of his own lineage.[148] Alexander overruled these representations; yet he did not disdain to lessen the perils at home by putting to death such men as he principally feared or mistrusted, especially the kinsmen of Philip's last wife Kleopatra.[149] Of the dependent tribes around, the most energetic chiefs accompanied his army into Asia, either by their own preference or at his requisition. After these precautions, the tranquillity of Macedonia was entrusted to the prudence and fidelity of Antipater, which were still farther ensured by the fact that three of his sons accompanied the king's army and person.[150] Though unpopular in his deportment,[151] Antipater discharged the duties of his very responsible position with zeal and ability; notwithstanding the dangerous enmity of Olympias, against whom he sent many complaints to Alexander when in Asia, whilst she on her side wrote frequent but unavailing letters with a view to ruin him in the esteem of her son. After a long period of unabated confidence,

Alexander began during the last years of his life to dislike and mistrust Antipater. He always treated Olympias with the greatest respect; trying however to restrain her from meddling with political affairs, and complaining sometimes of her imperious exigencies and violence.[152]

The army intended for Asia, having been assembled at Pella, was conducted by Alexander himself first to Amphipolis, where it crossed the Strymon; next along the road near the coast to the river Nestus and to the towns of Abdêra and Maroneia; then through Thrace across the rivers Hebrus and Melas; lastly, through the Thracian Chersonese to Sestos. Here it was met by his fleet, consisting of 160 triremes, with a number of trading vessels besides;[153] made up in large proportions from contingents furnished by Athens and Grecian cities.[154] The passage of the whole army, infantry, cavalry, and machines, on ships, across the strait from Sestos in Europe to Abydos in Asia,—was superintended by Parmenio, and accomplished without either difficulty or resistance. But Alexander himself, separating from the army at Sestos, went down to Elæus at the southern extremity of the Chersonese. Here stood the chapel and sacred precinct of the hero Protesilaus, who was slain by Hektor; having been the first Greek (according to the legend of the Trojan war) who touched the shore of Troy. Alexander, whose imagination was then full of Homeric reminiscences, offered sacrifice to the hero, praying that his own disembarkation might terminate more auspiciously.

He then sailed across in the admiral's trireme, steering with his own hand, to the landing place near Ilium called the Harbor of the Achæans. At mid-channel of the strait, he sacrificed a bull, with libations out of a golden goblet, to Poseidon and the Nereids. Himself too in full armor, he was the first (like Protesilaus) to tread the Asiatic shore; but he found no enemy like Hektor to meet him. From hence, mounting the hill on which Ilium was placed, he sacrificed to the patron-goddess Athênê; and deposited in her temple his own panoply, taking in exchange some of the arms said to have been worn by the heroes in the Trojan war, which he caused to be carried by guards along with him in his subsequent battles. Among other real or supposed monuments of this interesting legend, the Ilians showed to him the residence of Priam with its altar of Zeus Herkeios, where that unhappy old king was alleged to have been slain by Neoptolemus. Numbering Neoptolemus among his ancestors, Alexander felt himself to be the object of Priam's yet unappeased wrath; and accordingly offered sacrifice to him at the same altar, for the purpose of expiation and reconciliation. On the tomb and monumental column of Achilles, father of Neoptolemus, he not only placed a decorative garland, but also went through the customary ceremony of anointing himself with oil and running naked round it: exclaiming how much he envied the lot of Achilles, who had been blest during life with a faithful friend, and after death, with a great poet to celebrate his exploits. Lastly, to commemorate his crossing, Alexander erected permanent altars, in honor of Zeus, Athênê, and Hêrak-

lês; both on the point of Europe which his army had quitted, and on that of Asia where it had landed.[155]

The proceedings of Alexander, on the ever-memorable site of Ilium, are interesting as they reveal one side of his imposing character—the vein of legendary sympathy and religious sentiment wherein alone consisted his analogy with the Greeks. The young Macedonian prince had nothing of that sense of correlative right and obligation, which characterized the free Greeks of the city-community. But he was in many points a reproduction of the heroic Greeks,[156] his warlike ancestors in legend, Achilles and Neoptolemus, and others of that Æakid race, unparalleled in the attributes of force—a man of violent impulse in all directions, sometimes generous, often vindictive—ardent in his individual affections both of love and hatred, but devoured especially by an inextinguishable pugnacity, appetite for conquest, and thirst for establishing at all cost his superiority of force over others—"Jura negat sibi nata, nihil non arrogat armis"—taking pride, not simply in victorious generalship and direction of the arms of soldiers, but also in the personal forwardness of an Homeric chief, the foremost to encounter both danger and hardship. To dispositions resembling those of Achilles, Alexander indeed added one attribute of a far higher order. As a general, he surpassed his age in provident and even long-sighted combinations. With all his exuberant courage and sanguine temper, nothing was ever omitted in the way of systematic military precaution. Thus much be borrowed, though with many improvements of his own, from Grecian intelligence as applied to soldiership. But the character and dispositions, which he took with him to Asia, had the features, both striking and repulsive, of Achilles, rather than those of Agesilaus or Epaminondas.

The army, when reviewed on the Asiatic shore after its crossing, presented a total of 30,000 infantry, and 4500 cavalry, thus distributed:—

Infantry.	
Macedonian phalanx and hypaspists	12,000
Allies	7,000
Mercenaries	5,000
Under the command of Parmenio	24,000
Odryssians, Triballi (both Thracians), and Illyrians	5,000
Agriânes and archers	1,000
Total Infantry	30,000
Cavalry.	
Macedonian heavy—under Philotas son of Parmenio	1,500
Thessalian (also heavy)—under Kallas	1,500
Miscellaneous Grecian—under Erigyius	600
Thracian and Pæonian (light)—under Kassander	900
Total Cavalry	4,500

Such seems the most trustworthy enumeration of Alexander's first invading army. There were however other accounts, the highest of which stated as much as 43,000 infantry with 4000 cavalry.[157] Besides these troops, also, there must have been an effective train of projectile machines and engines, for battles and sieges, which we shall soon find in operation. As to money, the military chest of Alexander, exhausted in part by profuse donatives to his Macedonian officers,[158] was as poorly furnished as that of Napoleon Buonaparte on first entering Italy for his brilliant campaign of 1796. According to Aristobulus, he had with him only seventy talents; according to another authority, no more than the means of maintaining his army for thirty days. Nor had he even been able to bring together his auxiliaries, or complete the outfit of his army, without incurring a debt of 800 talents, in addition to that of 500 talents contracted by his father Philip.[159] Though Plutarch[160] wonders at the smallness of the force with which Alexander contemplated the execution of such great projects, yet the fact is, that in infantry he was far above any force which the Persians had to oppose him;[161] not to speak of comparative discipline and organization, surpassing even that of the Grecian mercenaries, who formed the only good infantry in the Persian service; while his cavalry, though inferior as to number, was superior in quality and in the shock of close combat.

Most of the officers exercising important command in Alexander's army were native Macedonians. His intimate personal friend Hephæstion, as well as his bodyguards Leonnatus and Lysimachus, were natives of Pella: Ptolemy the son of Lagus, and Pithon, were Eordians from Upper Macedonia; Kraterus and Perdikkas, from the district of Upper Macedonia called Orestis;[162] Antipater with his son Kassander, Kleitus son of Drôpides, Parmenio with his two sons Philôtas and Nikanor, Seleukus, Kœnus, Amyntas, Philippus (these two last names were borne by more than one person), Antigonus, Neoptolemus,[163] Meleager, Peukestes, etc., all these seem to have been native Macedonians. All or most of them had been trained to war under Philip, in whose service Parmenio and Antipater, especially, had occupied a high rank.

Of the many Greeks in Alexander's service, we hear of few in important station. Medius, a Thessalian from Larissa, was among his familiar companions; but the ablest and most distinguished of all was Eumenes, a native of Kardia in the Thracian Chersonese. Eumenes, combining an excellent Grecian education with bodily activity and enterprise, had attracted when a young man the notice of Philip and had been appointed as his secretary. After discharging these duties for seven years until the death of Philip, he was continued by Alexander in the post of chief secretary during the whole of that king's life.[164] He conducted most of Alexander's correspondence, and the daily record of his proceedings, which was kept under the name of the Royal Ephemerides. But though his special duties were thus of a civil character, he was not less eminent as an officer in the field. Occasionally entrusted with high military command, he received from Alexander signal recompenses and tokens of esteem. In spite of these great qualities—or perhaps in consequence of them—he was the ob-

ject of marked jealousy and dislike[165] on the part of the Macedonians,—from Hephæstion the friend, and Neoptolemus the chief armor-bearer, of Alexander, down to the principal soldiers of the phalanx. Neoptolemus despised Eumenes as an unwarlike penman. The contemptuous pride with which Macedonians had now come to look down on Greeks, is a notable characteristic of the victorious army of Alexander, as well as a new feature in history; retorting the ancient Hellenic sentiment in which Demosthenes, a few years before, had indulged towards the Macedonians.[166]

Though Alexander has been allowed to land in Asia unopposed, an army was already assembled under the Persian satraps within a few days' march of Abydos. Since the reconquest of Egypt and Phenicia, about eight or nine years before, by the Persian king Ochus, the power of that empire had been restored to a point equal to any anterior epoch since the repulse of Xerxes from Greece. The Persian successes in Egypt had been achieved mainly by the arms of Greek mercenaries, under the conduct and through the craft of the Rhodian general Mentor; who, being seconded by the preponderant influence of the eunuch Bagôas, confidential minister of Ochus, obtained not only ample presents, but also the appointment of military commander on the Hellespont and the Asiatic seaboard.[167] He procured the recall of his brother Memnon, who with his brother-in-law Artabazus had been obliged to leave Asia from unsuccessful revolt against the Persians, and had found shelter with Philip.[168] He farther subdued, by force or by fraud, various Greek and Asiatic chieftains on the Asiatic coast; among them, the distinguished Hermeias, friend of Aristotle, and master of the strong post of Atarneus.[169] These successes of Mentor seem to have occurred about 343 B. C. He, and his brother Memnon after him, upheld vigorously the authority of the Persian king in the regions near the Hellespont. It was probably by them that troops were sent across the strait both to rescue the besieged town of Perinthus from Philip, and to act against that prince in other parts of Thrace;[170] that an Asiatic chief, who was intriguing to facilitate Philip's intended invasion of Asia, was seized and sent prisoner to the Persian court; and that envoys from Athens, soliciting aid against Philip, were forwarded to the same place.[171]

Ochus, though successful in regaining the full extent of Persian dominion, was a sanguinary tyrant, who shed by wholesale the blood of his family and courtiers. About the year 338 B. C., he died, poisoned by the eunuch Bagôas, who placed upon the throne Arses, one of the king's sons, killing all the rest. After two years, however, Bagôas conceived mistrust of Arses, and put him to death also, together with all his children; thus leaving no direct descendant of the regal family alive. He then exalted to the throne one of his friends named Darius Codomannus (descended from one of the brothers of Artaxerxes Memnon), who had acquired glory, in a recent war against the Kadusians, by killing in single combat a formidable champion of the enemy's army. Presently, however, Bagôas attempted to poison Darius also; but the latter, detecting the snare, forced him to drink the deadly draught himself.[172] In spite of such murders and change in the line of succession, which Alexander afterwards re-

proached to Darius[173]—the authority of Darius seems to have been recognized, without any material opposition, throughout all the Persian empire.

Succeeding to the throne in the early part of B. C. 336, when Philip was organizing the projected invasion of Persia, and when the first Macedonian division under Parmenio and Attalus was already making war in Asia—Darius prepared measures of defence at home, and tried to encourage anti-Macedonian movements in Greece.[174] On the assassination of Philip by Pausanias, the Persian king publicly proclaimed himself (probably untruly) as having instigated the deed, and alluded in contemptuous terms to the youthful Alexander.[175] Conceiving the danger from Macedonia to be past, he imprudently slackened his efforts and withheld his supplies during the first months of Alexander's reign, when the latter might have been seriously embarrassed in Greece and in Europe by the effective employment of Persian ships and money. But the recent successes of Alexander in Thrace, Illyria, and Bœotia, satisfied Darius that the danger was not past, so that he resumed his preparations for defence. The Phenician fleet was ordered to be equipped: the satraps in Phrygia and Lydia got together a considerable force, consisting in part of Grecian mercenaries; while Memnon, on the seaboard, was furnished with the means of taking 5000 of these mercenaries under his separate command.[176]

We cannot trace with any exactness the course of these events, during the nineteen months between Alexander's accession and his landing in Asia (August 336 B. C., to March or April 334 B. C.) We learn generally that Memnon was active and even aggressive on the north-eastern coast of the Ægean. Marching northward from his own territory (the region of Assus or Atarneus skirting the Gulf of Adramyttium[177]) across the range of Mount Ida, he came suddenly upon the town of Kyzikus on the Propontis. He failed, however, though only by a little, in his attempt to surprise it, and was forced to content himself with a rich booty from the district around.[178] The Macedonian generals Parmenio and Kallas had crossed into Asia with bodies of troops. Parmenio, acting in Æolis, took Grynium, but was compelled by Memnon to raise the siege of Pitanê; while Kallas, in the Troad, was attacked, defeated, and compelled to retire to Rhœteium.[179]

We thus see that during the season preceding the landing of Alexander, the Persians were in considerable force, and Memnon both active and successful even against the Macedonian generals, on the region north-east of the Ægean. This may help to explain that fatal imprudence, whereby the Persians permitted Alexander to carry over without opposition his grand army into Asia, in the spring of 334 B. C. They possessed ample means of guarding the Hellespont, had they chosen to bring up their fleet, which, comprising as it did the force of the Phenician towns, was decidedly superior to any naval armament at the disposal of Alexander. The Persian fleet actually came into the Ægean a few weeks afterwards. Now Alexander's designs, preparations, and even intended time of march, must have been well known not merely to Memnon, but to the Persian satraps in Asia Minor, who had got together

troops to oppose him. These satraps unfortunately supposed themselves to be a match for him in the field, disregarding the pronounced opinion of Memnon to the contrary, and even overruling his prudent advice by mistrustful and calumnious imputations.

At the time of Alexander's landing, a powerful Persian force was already assembled near Zeleia in the Hellespontine Phrygia, under command of Arsites the Phrygian satrap, supported by several other leading Persians—Spithridates (satrap of Lydia and Ionia), Pharnakes, Atizyes, Mithridates, Rhomithres, Niphates, Petines, etc. Forty of these men were of high rank (denominated kinsmen of Darius), and distinguished for personal valor. The greater number of the army consisted of cavalry, including Medes, Baktrians, Hyrkanians, Kappadokians, Paphlagonians, etc.[180] In cavalry they greatly outnumbered Alexander; but their infantry was much inferior in number,[181] composed however, in large proportion, of Grecian mercenaries. The Persian total is given by Arrian as 20,000 cavalry, and nearly 20,000 mercenary foot; by Diodorus as 10,000 cavalry, and 100,000 infantry; by Justin even at 600,000. The numbers of Arrian are the more credible; in those of Diodorus, the total of infantry is certainly much above the truth—that of cavalry probably below it.

Memnon, who was present with his sons and with his own division, earnestly dissuaded the Persian leaders from hazarding a battle. Reminding them that the Macedonians were not only much superior in infantry, but also encouraged by the leadership of Alexander—he enforced the necessity of employing their numerous cavalry to destroy the forage and provisions, and if necessary, even towns themselves—in order to render any considerable advance of the invading force impracticable. While keeping strictly on the defensive in Asia, he recommended that aggressive war should be carried into Macedonia; that the fleet should be brought up, a powerful land-force put aboard, and strenuous efforts made, not only to attack the vulnerable points of Alexander at home, but also to encourage active hostility against him from the Greeks and other neighbors.[182]

Had this plan been energetically executed by Persian arms and money, we can hardly doubt that Antipater in Macedonia would speedily have found himself pressed by serious dangers and embarrassments, and that Alexander would have been forced to come back and protect his own dominions; perhaps prevented by the Persian fleet from bringing back his whole army. At any rate, his schemes of Asiatic invasion must for the time have been suspended. But he was rescued from this dilemma by the ignorance, pride, and pecuniary interests of the Persian leaders. Unable to appreciate Alexander's military superiority, and conscious at the same time of their own personal bravery, they repudiated the proposition of retreat as dishonorable, insinuating that Memnon desired to prolong the war in order to exalt his own importance in the eyes of Darius. This sentiment of military dignity was farther strengthened by the fact, that the Persian military leaders, deriving all their revenues from the land, would have been impoverished by destroying the landed produce. Arsites, in whose terri-

tory the army stood, and upon whom the scheme would first take effect, haughtily announced that he would not permit a single house in it to be burnt.[183] Occupying the same satrapy as Pharnabazus had possessed sixty years before, he felt that he would be reduced to the same straits as Pharnabazus under the pressure of Agesilaus—"of not being able to procure a dinner in his own country".[184] The proposition of Memnon was rejected, and it was resolved to await the arrival of Alexander on the banks of the river Granikus.

This unimportant stream, commemorated in the Iliad, and immortalized by its association with the name of Alexander, takes its rise from one of the heights of Mount Ida near Skêpsis,[185] and flows northward into the Propontis, which it reaches at a point somewhat east of the Greek town of Parium. It is of no great depth: near the point where the Persians encamped, it seems to have been fordable in many places; but its right bank was somewhat high and steep, thus offering obstruction to an enemy's attack. The Persians, marching forward from Zeleia, took up a position near the eastern side of the Granikus, where the last declivities of Mount Ida descend into the plain of Adrasteia, a Greek city situated between Priapus and Parium.[186]

Meanwhile Alexander marched onward towards this position, from Arisbê (where he had reviewed his army)—on the first day to Perkôtê, on the second to the river Praktius, on the third to Hermôtus; receiving on his way the spontaneous surrender of the town of Priapus. Aware that the enemy was not far distant, he threw out in advance a body of scouts under Amyntas, consisting of four squadrons of light cavalry and one of the heavy Macedonian (Companion) cavalry. From Hermôtus (the fourth day from Arisbê) he marched direct towards the Granikus, in careful order, with his main phalanx in double files, his cavalry on each wing, and the baggage in the rear. On approaching the river, he made his dispositions for immediate attack, though Parmenio advised waiting until the next morning. Knowing well, like Memnon on the other side, that the chances of a pitched battle were all against the Persians, he resolved to leave them no opportunity of decamping during the night.

In Alexander's array, the phalanx or heavy infantry formed the central body. The six Taxeis or divisions, of which it consisted, were commanded (reckoning from right to left) by Perdikkas, Kœnus, Amyntas son of Andromenes, Philippus, Meleager, and Kraterus.[187] Immediately on the right of the phalanx, were the hypaspistæ, or light infantry, under Nikanor son of Parmenio—then the light horse or lancers, the Pæonians, and the Apolloniate squadron of Companion-cavalry commanded by the Ilarch Sokrates, all under Amyntas son of Arrhibæus—lastly the full body of Companion-cavalry, the bowmen, and the Agrianian darters, all under Philôtas (son of Parmenio), whose division formed the extreme right.[188] The left flank of the phalanx was in like manner protected by three distinct divisions of cavalry or lighter troops—first, by the Thracians, under Agathon—next, by the cavalry of the allies, under Philippus, son of Menelaus—lastly, by the Thessalian cavalry, under Kallas, whose division formed the extreme left. Alexander himself took the command of the right, giving that of the left

to Parmenio; by right and left are meant the two halves of the army, each of them including three Taxeis or divisions of the phalanx with the cavalry on its flank—for there was no recognized centre under a distinct command. On the other side of the Granikus, the Persian cavalry lined the bank. The Medes and Baktrians were on their right, under Rheomithres—the Paphlagonians and Hyrkanians in the centre, under Arsites and Spithridates—on the left were Memnon and Arsamenes, with their divisions.[189] The Persian infantry, both Asiatic and Grecian, were kept back in reserve; the cavalry alone being relied upon to dispute the passage of the river.

In this array, both parties remained for some time, watching each other in anxious silence.[190] There being no firing or smoke, as with modern armies, all the details on each side were clearly visible to the other; so that the Persians easily recognized Alexander himself on the Macedonian right from the splendor of his armor and military costume, as well as from the respectful demeanor of those around him. Their principal leaders accordingly thronged to their own left, which they reinforced with the main strength of their cavalry, in order to oppose him personally. Presently he addressed a few words of encouragement to the troops, and gave the order for advance. He directed the first attack to be made by the squadron of Companion-cavalry whose turn it was on that day to take the lead—(the squadron of Apollonia, of which Sokrates was captain—commanded on this day by Ptolemæus son of Philippus) supported by the light horse or Lancers, the Pæonian darters (infantry), and one division of regularly armed infantry, seemingly hypaspistæ.[191] He then himself entered the river, at the head of the right half of the army, cavalry and infantry, which advanced under sound of trumpets and with the usual war-shouts. As the occasional depths of water prevented a straightforward march with one uniform line, the Macedonians slanted their course suitably to the fordable spaces; keeping their front extended so as to approach the opposite bank as much as possible in line, and not in separate columns with flanks exposed to the Persian cavalry.[192] Not merely the right under Alexander, but also the left under Parmenio, advanced and crossed in the same movement and under the like precautions.

The foremost detachment under Ptolemy and Amyntas, on reaching the opposite bank, encountered a strenuous resistance, concentrated as it was here upon one point. They found Memnon and his sons with the best of the Persian cavalry immediately in their front; some on the summit of the bank, from whence they hurled down their javelins—others down at the water's-edge, so as to come to closer quarters. The Macedonians tried every effort to make good their landing, and push their way by main force through the Persian horse, but in vain. Having both lower ground and insecure footing, they could make no impression, but were thrust back with some loss, and retired upon the main body which Alexander was now bringing across. On his approaching the shore, the same struggle was renewed around his person with increased fervor on both sides. He was himself among the foremost, and all near him were animated by his example. The horsemen on both sides became jammed to-

gether, and the contest was one of physical force and pressure by man and horse; but the Macedonians had a great advantage in being accustomed to the use of the strong close-fighting pike, while the Persian weapon was the missile javelin. At length the resistance was surmounted, and Alexander with those around him, gradually thrusting back the defenders, made good their way up the high bank to the level ground. At other points the resistance was not equally vigorous. The left and centre of the Macedonians, crossing at the same time on all practicable spaces along the whole line, overpowered the Persians stationed on the slope, and got up to the level ground with comparative facility.[193] Indeed no cavalry could possibly stand on the bank to offer opposition to the phalanx with its array of long pikes, wherever this could reach the ascent in any continuous front. The easy crossing of the Macedonians at other points helped to constrain those Persians, who were contending with Alexander himself on the slope, to recede to the level ground above.

Here again, as at the water's edge, Alexander was foremost in personal conflict. His pike having been broken, he turned to a soldier near him—Aretis, one of the horseguards who generally aided him in mounting his horse—and asked for another. But this man, having broken his pike also, showed the fragment to Alexander, requesting him to ask some one else; upon which the Corinthian Demaratus, one of the Companion-cavalry close at hand, gave him his weapon instead. Thus armed anew, Alexander spurred his horse forward against Mithridates (son-in-law of Darius), who was bringing up a column of cavalry to attack him, but was himself considerably in advance of it. Alexander thrust his pike into the face of Mithridates, and laid him prostrate on the ground: he then turned to another of the Persian leaders, Rhœsakes, who struck him a blow on the head with his scymetar, knocked off a portion of his helmet, but did not penetrate beyond. Alexander avenged this blow by thrusting Rhœsakes through the body with his pike.[194] Meanwhile a third Persian leader, Spithridates, was actually close behind Alexander, with hand and scymetar uplifted to cut him down. At this critical moment, Kleitus son of Dropides—one of the ancient officers of Philip, high in the Macedonian service—struck with full force at the uplifted arm of Spithridates and severed it from the body, thus preserving Alexander's life. Other leading Persians, kinsmen of Spithridates, rushed desperately on Alexander, who received many blows on his armor, and was in much danger. But the efforts of his companions near were redoubled, both to defend his person and to second his adventurous daring. It was on that point that the Persian cavalry was first broken. On the left of the Macedonian line, the Thessalian cavalry also fought with vigor and success;[195] and the light-armed foot, intermingled with Alexander's cavalry generally, did great damage to the enemy. The rout of the Persian cavalry, once begun, speedily became general. They fled in all directions, pursued by the Macedonians.

But Alexander and his officers soon checked this ardor of pursuit, calling back their cavalry to complete his victory. The Persian infantry, Asiatics as well as Greeks,

had remained without movement or orders, looking on the cavalry battle which had just disastrously terminated. To them Alexander immediately turned his attention. [196] He brought up his phalanx and hypaspistæ to attack them in front, while his cavalry assailed on all sides their unprotected flanks and rear; he himself charged with the cavalry, and had a horse killed under him. His infantry alone was more numerous than they, so that against such odds the result could hardly be doubtful. The greater part of these mercenaries, after a valiant resistance, were cut to pieces on the field. We are told that none escaped, except 2000 made prisoners, and some who remained concealed in the field among the dead bodies.[197]

In this complete and signal defeat, the loss of the Persian cavalry was not very serious in mere number—for only 1000 of them were slain. But the slaughter of the leading Persians, who had exposed themselves with extreme bravery in the personal conflict against Alexander, was terrible. There were slain not only Mithridates, Rhœsakes, and Spithridates, whose names have been already mentioned,—but also Pharnakes, brother-in-law of Darius, Mithrobarzanes satrap of Kappadokia, Atizyes, Niphates, Petines, and others; all Persians of rank and consequence. Arsites, the satrap of Phrygia, whose rashness had mainly caused the rejection of Memnon's advice, escaped from the field, but died shortly afterwards by his own hand, from anguish and humiliation.[198] The Persian or Perso-Grecian infantry, though probably more of them individually escaped than is implied in Arrian's account, was as a body irretrievably ruined. No force was either left in the field, or could be afterwards reassembled in Asia Minor.

The loss on the side of Alexander is said to have been very small. Twenty-five of the Companion-cavalry, belonging to the division under Ptolemy and Amyntas, were slain in the first unsuccessful attempt to pass the river. Of the other cavalry, sixty in all were slain; of the infantry, thirty. This is given to us as the entire loss on the side of Alexander.[199] It is only the number of killed; that of the wounded is not stated; but assuming it to be ten times the number of killed, the total of both together will be 1265.[200] If this be correct, the resistance of the Persian cavalry, except near that point where Alexander himself and the Persian chiefs came into conflict, cannot have been either serious or long protracted. But when we add farther the contest with the infantry, the smallness of the total assigned for Macedonian killed and wounded will appear still more surprising. The total of the Persian infantry is stated at nearly 20,000, most part of them Greek mercenaries. Of these only 2000 were made prisoners; nearly all the rest (according to Arrian) were slain. Now the Greek mercenaries were well armed, and not likely to let themselves be slain with impunity; moreover Plutarch expressly affirms that they resisted with desperate valor, and that most of the Macedonian loss was incurred in the conflict against them. It is not easy therefore to comprehend how the total number of slain can be brought within the statement of Arrian.[201]

After the victory, Alexander manifested the greatest solicitude for his wounded soldiers, whom he visited and consoled in person. Of the twenty-five Companions slain, he caused brazen statues, by Lysippus, to be erected at Dium in Macedonia, where they were still standing in the time of Arrian. To the surviving relatives of all the slain he also granted immunity from taxation and from personal service. The dead bodies were honorably buried, those of the enemy as well as of his own soldiers. The two thousand Greeks in the Persian service who had become his prisoners, were put in chains, and transported to Macedonia, there to work as slaves; to which treatment Alexander condemned them on the ground that they had taken arms on behalf of the foreigner against Greece, in contravention of the general vote passed by the synod at Corinth. At the same time, he sent to Athens three hundred panoplies selected from the spoil, to be dedicated to Athênê in the acropolis with this inscription—"Alexander son of Philip, and the Greeks, except the Lacedæmonians (*present these offerings*), out of the spoils of the foreigners inhabiting Asia."[202] Though the vote to which Alexander appealed represented no existing Grecian aspiration, and granted only a sanction which could not be safely refused, yet he found satisfaction in clothing his own self-aggrandizing impulse under the name of a supposed Pan-hellenic purpose: which was at the same time useful, as strengthening his hold upon the Greeks, who were the only persons competent, either as officers or soldiers, to uphold the Persian empire against him. His conquests were the extinction of genuine Hellenism, though they diffused an exterior varnish of it, and especially the Greek language, over much of the Oriental world. True Grecian interests lay more on the side of Darius than of Alexander.

The battle of the Granikus, brought on by Arsites and the other satraps contrary to the advice of Memnon, was moreover so unskilfully fought by them, that the gallantry of their infantry, the most formidable corps of Greeks that had ever been in the Persian service, was rendered of little use. The battle, properly speaking, was fought only by the Persian cavalry;[203] the infantry was left to be surrounded and destroyed afterwards.

No victory could be more decisive or terror-striking than that of Alexander. There remained no force in the field to oppose him. The impression made by so great a public catastrophe was enhanced by two accompanying circumstances; first, by the number of Persian grandees who perished, realizing almost the wailings of Atossa, Xerxes, and the Chorus, in the Persæ of Æschylus,[204] after the battle of Salamis—next, by the chivalrous and successful prowess of Alexander himself, who, emulating the Homeric Achilles, not only rushed foremost into the *mélée*, but killed two of these grandees with his own hand. Such exploits, impressive even when we read of them now, must at the moment when they occurred have acted most powerfully upon the imagination of contemporaries.

Several of the neighboring Mysian mountaineers, though mutinous subjects towards Persia, came down to make submission to him, and were permitted to occupy

their lands under the same tribute as they had paid before. The inhabitants of the neighboring Grecian city of Zeleia, whose troops had served with the Persians, surrendered and obtained their pardon; Alexander admitting the plea that they had served only under constraint. He then sent Parmenio to attack Daskylium, the stronghold and chief residence of the satrap of Phrygia. Even this place was evacuated by the garrison and surrendered, doubtless with a considerable treasure therein. The whole satrapy of Phrygia thus fell into Alexander's power, and was appointed to be administered by Kallas for his behalf, levying the same amount of tribute as had been paid before.[205] He himself then marched, with his main force, in a southerly direction towards Sardis—the chief town of Lydia, and the main station of the Persians in Asia Minor. The citadel of Sardis—situated on a lofty and steep rock projecting from Mount Tmolus, fortified by a triple wall with an adequate garrison—was accounted impregnable, and at any rate could hardly have been taken by anything less than a long blockade,[206] which would have allowed time for the arrival of the fleet and the operations of Memnon. Yet such was the terror which now accompanied the Macedonian conqueror, that when he arrived within eight miles of Sardis, he met not only a deputation of the chief citizens, but also the Persian governor of the citadel, Mithrines. The town, citadel, garrison, and treasure Were delivered up to him without a blow. Fortunately for Alexander, there were not in Asia any Persian governors of courage and fidelity such as had been displayed by Maskames and Boges after the repulse of Xerxes from Greece.[207] Alexander treated Mithrines with courtesy and honor, granted freedom to the Sardians and to the other Lydians generally, with the use of their own Lydian laws. The betrayal of Sardis by Mithrines was a signal good fortune to Alexander. On going up to the citadel, he contemplated with astonishment its prodigious strength; congratulating himself on so easy an acquisition, and giving directions to build there a temple of Olympian Zeus, on the spot where the old palace of the kings of Lydia had been situated. He named Pausanias governor of the citadel, with a garrison of Peloponnesians from Argos; Asander, satrap of the country; and Nikias, collector of tribute.[208] The freedom granted to the Lydians, whatever it may have amounted to, did not exonerate them from paying the usual tribute.

From Sardis, he ordered Kallas, the new satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia—and Alexander son of Aëropus, who had been promoted in place of Kallas to the command of the Thessalian cavalry—to attack Atarneus and the district belonging to Memnon, on the Asiatic coast opposite Lesbos. Meanwhile he himself directed his march to Ephesus, which he reached on the fourth day. Both at Ephesus and at Miletus—the two principal strongholds of the Persians on the coast, as Sardis was in the interior—the sudden catastrophe at the Granikus had struck unspeakable terror. Hegesistratus, governor of the Persian garrison (Greek mercenaries) at Miletus, sent letters to Alexander offering to surrender the town on his approach; while the garrison at Ephesus, with the Macedonian exile Amyntas, got on board two triremes in the harbor, and fled. It appears that there had been recently a political revolution in the town, conducted by Syrphax and other leaders, who had established an oligarchical

government. These men, banishing their political opponents, had committed depredations on the temple of Artemis, overthrown the statue of Philip of Macedon dedicated therein, and destroyed the sepulchre of Heropythus the liberator in the agora.[209] Some of the party, though abandoned by their garrison, were still trying to invoke aid from Memnon, who however was yet at a distance. Alexander entered the town without resistance, restored the exiles, established a democratical constitution, and directed that the tribute heretofore paid to the Persians should now be paid to the Ephesian Artemis. Syrphax and his family sought refuge in the temple, from whence they were dragged by the people and stoned to death. More of the same party would have been despatched, had not the popular vengeance been restrained by Alexander; who displayed an honorable and prudent moderation.[210]

Thus master of Ephesus, Alexander found himself in communication with his fleet, under the command of Nikanor; and received propositions of surrender from the two neighboring inland cities, Magnesia and Tralleis. To occupy these cities, he despatched Parmenio with 5000 foot (half of them Macedonians) and 200 of the Companion-cavalry; while he at the same time sent Antimachus with an equal force in a northerly direction, to liberate the various cities of Æolic and Ionic Greeks. This officer was instructed to put down in each of them the ruling oligarchy, which acted with a mercenary garrison as an instrument of Persian supremacy—to place the government in the hands of the citizens—and to abolish all payment of tribute. He himself—after taking part in a solemn festival and procession to the temple of Ephesian Artemis, with his whole army in battle array—marched southward towards Miletus; his fleet under Nikanor proceeding thither by sea.[211] He expected probably to enter Miletus with as little resistance as Ephesus. But his hopes were disappointed: Hegesistratus, commander of the garrison in that town, though under the immediate terror of the defeat at the Granikus he had written to offer submission, had now altered his tone, and determined to hold out. The formidable Persian fleet,[212] four hundred sail of Phenician and Cyprian ships of war with well-trained seamen, was approaching.

This naval force, which a few weeks earlier would have prevented Alexander from crossing into Asia, now afforded the only hope of arresting the rapidity and ease of his conquests. What steps had been taken by the Persian officers since the defeat at the Granikus, we do not hear. Many of them had fled, along with Memnon, to Miletus;[213] and they were probably disposed, under the present desperate circumstances, to accept the command of Memnon as their only hope of safety, though they had despised his counsel on the day of the battle. Whether the towns in Memnon's principality of Atarneus had attempted any resistance against the Macedonians, we do not know. His interests however were so closely identified with those of Persia, that he had sent up his wife and children as hostages, to induce Darius to entrust him with the supreme conduct of the war. Orders to this effect were presently sent down by that prince;[214] but at the first arrival of the fleet, it seems not to have been under the command of Memnon, who was however probably on board.

It came too late to aid in the defence of Miletus. Three days before its arrival, Nikanor the Macedonian admiral, with his fleet of one hundred and sixty ships, had occupied the island of Ladê, which commanded the harbor of that city. Alexander found the outer portion of Miletus evacuated, and took it without resistance. He was making preparations to besiege the inner city, and had already transported 4000 troops across to the island of Ladê, when the powerful Persian fleet came in sight, but found itself excluded from Miletus, and obliged to take moorings under the neighboring promontory of Mykalê. Unwilling to abandon without a battle the command of the sea, Parmenio advised Alexander to fight this fleet, offering himself to share the hazard aboard. But Alexander disapproved the proposition, affirming that his fleet was inferior not less in skill than in numbers; that the high training of the Macedonians would tell for nothing on shipboard; and that a naval defeat would be the signal for insurrection in Greece. Besides debating such prudential reasons, Alexander and Parmenio also differed about the religious promise of the case. On the sea-shore, near the stern of the Macedonian ships, Parmenio had seen an eagle, which filled him with confidence that the ships would prove victorious. But Alexander contended that this interpretation was incorrect. Though the eagle doubtless promised to him victory, yet it had been seen on land—and therefore his victories would be on land: hence the result signified was, that he would overcome the Persian fleet, by means of land-operations.[215] This part of the debate, between two practical military men of ability, is not the least interesting of the whole; illustrating as it does, not only the religious susceptibilities of the age, but also the pliancy of the interpretative process, lending itself equally well to inferences totally opposite. The difference between a sagacious and a dull-witted prophet, accommodating ambiguous omens to useful or mischievous conclusions, was one of very material importance in the ancient world.

Alexander now prepared vigorously to assault Miletus, repudiating with disdain an offer brought to him by a Milesian citizen named Glaukippus—that the city should be neutral and open to him as well as to the Persians. His fleet under Nikanor occupied the harbor, blocked up its narrow mouth against the Persians, and made threatening demonstrations from the water's edge; while he himself brought up his battering-engines against the walls, shook or overthrew them in several places, and then stormed the city. The Milesians, with the Grecian mercenary garrison, made a brave defence, but were overpowered by the impetuosity of the assault. A large number of them were slain, and there was no way of escape except by jumping into little boats, or swimming off upon the hollow of the shield. Even of these fugitives, most part were killed by the seamen of the Macedonian triremes; but a division of 300 Grecian mercenaries got on to an isolated rock near the mouth of the harbor, and there prepared to sell their lives dearly. Alexander, as soon as his soldiers were thoroughly masters of the city, went himself on shipboard to attack the mercenaries on the rock, taking with him ladders in order to effect a landing upon it. But when he saw that they were resolved on a desperate defence, he preferred admitting them to terms of ca-

pitulation, and received them into his own service.[216] To the surviving Milesian citizens he granted the condition of a free city, while he caused all the remaining prisoners to be sold as slaves.

The powerful Persian fleet, from the neighboring promontory of Mykalê, was compelled to witness, without being able to prevent, the capture of Miletus, and was presently withdrawn to Halikarnassus. At the same time Alexander came to the resolution of disbanding his own fleet; which, while costing more than he could then afford, was nevertheless unfit to cope with the enemy in open sea. He calculated that by concentrating all his efforts on land-operations, especially against the cities on the coast, he should exclude the Persian fleet from all effective hold on Asia Minor, and ensure that country to himself. He therefore paid off all the ships, retaining only a moderate squadron for the purposes of transport.[217]

Before this time, probably, the whole Asiatic coast northward of Miletus—including the Ionic and Æolic cities and the principality of Memnon—had either accepted willingly the dominion of Alexander, or had been reduced by his detachments. Accordingly he now directed his march southward from Miletus, towards Karia, and especially towards Halikarnassus, the principal city of that territory. On entering Karia, he was met by Ada, a member of the Karian princely family, who tendered to him her town of Alinda and her other possessions, adopting him as her son, and entreating his protection. Not many years earlier, under Mausôlus and Artemisia, the powerful princes of this family had been formidable to all the Grecian islands. It was the custom of Karia that brothers and sisters of the reigning family intermarried with each other: Mausôlus and his wife Artemisia were succeeded by Idrieus and his wife Ada, all four being brothers and sisters, sons and daughters of Hekatomnus. On the death of Idrieus, his widow Ada, was expelled from Halikarnassus and other parts of Karia by her surviving brother Pixodarus; though she still preserved some strong towns, which proved a welcome addition to the conquests of Alexander. Pixodarus, on the contrary, who had given his daughter in marriage to a leading Persian named Orontobates, warmly espoused the Persian cause, and made Halikarnassus a capital point of resistance against the invader.[218]

But it was not by him alone that this city was defended. The Persian fleet had repaired thither from Miletus; Memnon, now invested by Darius with supreme command on the Asiatic coast and the Ægean, was there in person. There was not only Orontobates with many other Asiatics, but also a large garrison of mercenary Greeks, commanded by Ephialtes, a brave Athenian exile. The city, strong both by nature and by art, with a surrounding ditch forty-five feet broad and twenty-two feet deep,[219] had been still farther strengthened under the prolonged superintendence of Memnon;[220] lastly, there were two citadels, a fortified harbor, with its entrance fronting the south, abundant magazines of arms, and good provision of defensive engines. The siege of Halikarnassus was the most arduous enterprise which Alexander had yet undertaken. Instead of attacking it by land and sea at once, as at Miletus, he could

make his approaches only from the land, while the defenders were powerfully aided from seaward by the Persian ships with their numerous crews.

His first efforts, directed against the gate on the north or north-east of the city, which led towards Mylasa, were interrupted by frequent sallies and discharges from the engines on the walls. After a few days thus spent without much avail, he passed with a large section of his army to the western side of the town, towards the outlying portion of the projecting tongue of land, on which Halikarnassus and Myndus (the latter farther westward) were situated. While making demonstrations on this side of Halikarnassus, he at the same time attempted a night-attack on Myndus, but was obliged to retire after some hours of fruitless effort. He then confined himself to the siege of Halikarnassus. His soldiers, protected from missiles by movable penthouses (called Tortoises), gradually filled up the wide and deep ditch round the town, so as to open a level road for his engines (rolling towers of wood) to come up close to the walls. The engines being brought up close, the work of demolition was successfully prosecuted; notwithstanding vigorous sallies from the garrison, repulsed; though not without loss and difficulty, by the Macedonians. Presently the shock of the battering-engines had overthrown two towers of the city-wall, together with two intermediate breadths of wall; and a third tower was beginning to totter. The besieged were employed in erecting an inner wall of brick to cover the open space, and a wooden tower of the great height of 150 feet for the purpose of casting projectiles.[221] It appears that Alexander waited for the full demolition of the third tower, before he thought the breach wide enough to be stormed; but an assault was prematurely brought on by two adventurous soldiers from the division of Perdikkas.[222] These men, elate with wine, rushed up single-handed to attack the Mylasean gate, and slew the foremost of the defenders who came out to oppose them, until at length, reinforcements arriving successively on both sides, a general combat took place at a short distance from the wall. In the end, the Macedonians were victorious, and drove the besieged back into the city. Such was the confusion, that the city might then have been assaulted and taken, had measures been prepared for it beforehand. The third tower was speedily overthrown; nevertheless, before this could be accomplished, the besieged had already completed their half-moon within, against which accordingly, on the next day, Alexander pushed forward his engines. In this advanced position, however, being as it were within the circle of the city-wall, the Macedonians were exposed to discharges not only from engines in their front, but also from the towers yet standing on each side of them. Moreover, at night, a fresh sally was made with so much impetuosity, that some of the covering wicker-work of the engines, and even the main wood-work of one of them, was burnt. It was not without difficulty that Philôtas and Hellanikus, the officers on guard, preserved the remainder; nor were the besieged finally driven in, until Alexander himself appeared with reinforcements.[223] Though his troops had been victors in these successive combats, yet he could not carry off his dead, who lay close to the walls, without soliciting a truce for burial. Such request usually counted as a confession of defeat: nevertheless Alexan-

der solicited the truce, which was granted by Memnon, in spite of the contrary opinion of Ephialtes.[224]

After a few days of interval, for burying his dead and repairing the engines, Alexander recommenced attack upon the half-moon, under his own personal superintendence. Among the leaders within, a conviction gained ground that the place could not long hold out. Ephialtes especially, resolved not to survive the capture, and seeing that the only chance of preservation consisted in destroying the besieging engines, obtained permission from Memnon to put himself at the head of a last desperate sally.[225] He took immediately near him 2000 chosen troops, half to encounter the enemy, half with torches to burn the engines. At daybreak, all the gates being suddenly and simultaneously thrown open, sallying parties rushed out from each against the besiegers; the engines from within supporting them by multiplied discharges of missiles. Ephialtes with his division, marching straight against the Macedonians on guard at the main point of attack, assailed them impetuously, while his torch-bearers tried to set the engines on fire. Himself distinguished no less for personal strength than for valor, he occupied the front rank, and was so well seconded by the courage and good array of his soldiers charging in deep column, that for a time he gained advantage. Some of the engines were successfully fired, and the advanced guard of the Macedonian troops, consisting of young troops, gave way and fled. They were rallied partly by the efforts of Alexander, but still more by the older Macedonian soldiers, companions in all Philip's campaigns; who, standing exempt from night-watches, were encamped more in the rear. These veterans, among whom one Atharrias was the most conspicuous, upbraiding the cowardice of their comrades,[226] cast themselves into their accustomed phalanx-array, and thus both withstood and repulsed the charge of the victorious enemy. Ephialtes, foremost among the combatants, was slain, the rest were driven back to the city, and the burning engines were saved with some damage. During this same time, an obstinate conflict had also taken place at the gate called Tripylon, where the besieged had made another sally, over a narrow bridge thrown across the ditch. Here the Macedonians were under the command of Ptolemy (not the son of Lagus), one of the king's bodyguards. He, with two or three other conspicuous officers, perished in the severe struggle which ensued, but the sallying party were at length repulsed and driven into the city.[227] The loss of the besieged was severe, in trying to get again within the walls, under vigorous pursuit from the Macedonians.

By this last unsuccessful effort, the defensive force of Halikarnassus was broken. Memnon and Orontobates, satisfied that no longer defence of the town was practicable, took advantage of the night to set fire to their wooden projectile engines and towers, as well as to their magazines of arms, with the houses near the exterior wall, while they carried away the troops, stores, and inhabitants, partly to the citadel called Salmakis—partly to the neighboring islet called Arkonnesus—partly to the island of Kos.[228] Though thus evacuating the town, however, they still kept good gar-

risons well-provisioned in the two citadels belonging to it. The conflagration, stimulated by a strong wind, spread widely. It was only extinguished by the orders of Alexander, when he entered the town, and put to death all those whom he found with firebrands. He directed that the Halikarnassians found in the houses should be spared, but that the city itself should be demolished. He assigned the whole of Karia to Ada, as a principality, doubtless under condition of tribute. As the citadels still occupied by the enemy were strong enough to require a long siege, he did not think it necessary to remain in person for the purpose of reducing them; but surrounding them with a wall of blockade, he left Ptolemy and 3000 men to guard it.[229]

Having concluded the siege of Halikarnassus, Alexander sent back his artillery to Tralles, ordering Parmenio, with a large portion of the cavalry, the allied infantry, and the baggage waggons, to Sardis.

The ensuing winter months he employed in the conquest of Lykia, Pamphylia, and Pisidia. All this southern coast of Asia Minor is mountainous; the range of Mount Taurus descending nearly to the sea, so as to leave little or no intervening breadth of plain. In spite of great strength of situation, such was the terror of Alexander's arms, that all the Lykian towns—Hyparna, Telmissus, Pinara, Xanthus, Patara, and thirty others—submitted to him without a blow.[230] One alone among them, called Marmareis, resisted to desperation.[231] On reaching the territory called Milyas, the Phrygian frontier of Lykia, Alexander received the surrender of the Greek maritime city, Phasêlis. He assisted the Phaselites in destroying a mountain fort erected and garrisoned against them by the neighboring Pisidian mountaineers, and paid a public compliment to the sepulchre of their deceased townsman, the rhetorician Theodektes.[232]

After this brief halt at Phasêlis, Alexander directed his course to Pergê in Pamphylia. The ordinary mountain road, by which he sent most of his army, was so difficult as to require some leveling by Thracian light troops sent in advance for the purpose. But the king himself, with a select detachment, took a road more difficult still, under the mountains by the brink of the sea, called Klimax. When the wind blew from the south, this road was covered by such a depth of water as to be impracticable; for some time before he reached the spot, the wind had blown strong from the south—but as he came near, the special providence of the gods (so he and his friends conceived it) brought on a change to the north, so that the sea receded and left an available passage, though his soldiers had the water up to their waists.[233] From Pergê he marched on to Sidê, receiving on his way envoys from Aspendus, who offered to surrender their city, but deprecated the entrance of a garrison; which they were allowed to buy off promising fifty talents in money, together with the horses which they were bringing up as tribute for the Persian king. Having left a garrison at Sidê, he advanced onward to a strong place called Syllium, defended by brave natives with a body of mercenaries to aid them. These men held out, and even repulsed a first assault; which Alexander could not stay to repeat, being apprised that

the Aspendians had refused to execute the conditions imposed, and had put their city in a state of defence. Returning rapidly, he constrained them to submission, and then marched back to Pergê; from whence he directed his course towards the greater Phrygia,[234] through the difficult mountains, and almost indomitable population, of Pisidia.

After remaining in the Pisidian mountains long enough to reduce several towns or strong posts, Alexander proceeded northward into Phrygia, passing by the salt lake called Askanius to the steep and impregnable fortress of Kelænæ, garrisoned by 1000 Karians, and 100 mercenary Greeks. These men, having no hope of relief from the Persians, offered to deliver up the fortress, unless such relief should arrive before the sixtieth day.[235] Alexander accepted the propositions, remained ten days at Kelænæ, and left there Antigonus (afterwards the most powerful among his successors) as satrap of Phrygia, with 1500 men. He then marched northward to Gordium on the river Sangarius, where Parmenio was directed to meet him, and where his winter-campaign was concluded.[236]

APPENDIX.

ON THE LENGTH OF THE MACEDONIAN SARISSA OR PIKE.

THE statements here given about the length of the sarissa carried by the phalangite, are taken from Polybius, whose description is on all points both clear and consistent with itself. "The sarissa (he says) is sixteen cubits long, according to the original theory; and fourteen cubits as adapted to actual practice"—τὸ δὲ τῶν σαρισσῶν μέγεθός ἐστι, κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπόθεσιν, ἑκκαίδεκα πηχῶν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἁρμογὴν τὴν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, δεκατεσσάρων. Τούτων δὲ τοὺς τέσσαρας ἀφαιρεῖ τὸ μεταξὺ ταῖν χεροῖν διάστημα, καὶ τὸ κατόπιν σήκωμα τῆς προβολῆς (xviii. 12).

The difference here indicated by Polybius between the length in theory, and that in practice, may probably be understood to mean, that the phalangites, when in exercise, used pikes of the greater length; when on service, of the smaller: just as the Roman soldiers were trained in their exercises to use arms heavier than they employed against an enemy.

Of the later tactic writers, Leo (Tact. vi. 39) and Constantine Porphyrogenitus, repeat the double measurement of the sarissa as given by Polybius. Arrian (Tact. c. 12) and Polyænus (ii. 29, 2) state its length at sixteen cubits—Ælian (Tact. c. 14) gives fourteen cubits. All these authors follow either Polybius, or some other authority concurrent with him. None of them contradict him, though none state the case so clearly as he does.

Messrs. Rüstow and Köchly (Gesch. des Griech. Kriegswesens, p. 238), authors of the best work that I know respecting ancient military matters, reject the authority of Polybius as it here stands. They maintain that the passage must be corrupt, and that Polybius must have meant to say that the sarissa was sixteen *feet* in length—not sixteen *cubits*. I cannot subscribe to their opinion, nor do I think that their criticism on Polybius is a just one.

First, they reason as if Polybius had said that the sarissa of actual service was *sixteen* cubits long. Computing the weight of such a weapon from the thickness required in the shaft, they pronounce that it would be unmanageable. But Polybius gives the actual length as only *fourteen* cubits: a very material difference. If we accept the hypothesis of these authors—that corruption of the text has made us read *cubits* where we ought to have read *feet*,—it will follow that the length of the sarissa, as given by Polybius, would be *fourteen feet*, not *sixteen feet*. Now this length is not sufficient to justify various passages in which its prodigious length is set forth.

Next, they impute to Polybius a contradiction in saying that the Roman soldier occupied a space of three feet, equal to that occupied by a Macedonian soldier—and yet that in the fight, he had two Macedonian soldiers and ten pikes opposed to him (xviii. 13). But there is here no contradiction at all: for Polybius expressly says that the Roman, though occupying three feet when the legion was drawn up in order, required, when fighting, an expansion of the ranks and an increased interval to the extent of three feet behind him and on each side of him (χάλασμα καὶ διάστασιν ἀλλήλων ἔχειν δεήσει τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐλάχιστον τρεῖς πόδας κατ᾽ ἐπιστάτην καὶ παραστάτην) in order to allow full play for his sword and shield. It is therefore perfectly true that each Roman soldier, when actually marching up to attack the phalanx, occupied as much ground as two phalangites, and had ten pikes to deal with.

Farther, it is impossible to suppose that Polybius, in speaking of *cubits*, really meant *feet*; because (cap. 12) he speaks of *three feet* as the interval between each rank in the file, and these *three feet* are clearly made equal to *two cubits*. His computation will not come right, if in place of *cubits* you substitute *feet*.

We must therefore take the assertion of Polybius as we find it: that the pike of the phalangite was fourteen cubits or twenty-one feet in length. Now Polybius had every means of being well informed on such a point. He was above thirty years of age at the time of the last war of the Romans against the Macedonian king Perseus, in which war he himself served. He was intimately acquainted with Scipio, the son of Paulus Emilius, who gained the battle of Pydna. Lastly, he had paid great attention to tactics, and had even written an express work on the subject.

It might indeed be imagined, that the statement of Polybius, though true as to his own time, was not true as to the time of Philip and Alexander. But there is nothing to countenance such a suspicion—which moreover is expressly disclaimed by Rüstow and Köchly.

Doubtless twenty-one feet is a prodigious length, unmanageable, except by men properly trained, and inconvenient for all evolutions. But these are just the terms under which the pike of the phalangite is always spoken of.

So Livy, xxxi. 39, "Erant pleraque silvestria circa, incommoda phalangi maximè Macedonum: quæ, nisi ubi *prælongis hastis* velut vallum ante clypeos objecit (quod ut fiat, libero campo opus est) nullius admodum usus est." Compare also Livy, xliv. 40, 41, where, among other intimations of the immense length of the pike, we find, "Si carptim aggrediendo, circumagere *immobilem longitudine et gravitate hastam* cogas, confusâ strue implicatur:" also xxxiii. 8, 9.

Xenophon tells us that the Ten Thousand Greeks in their retreat had to fight their way across the territory of the Chalybes, who carried a pike *fifteen cubits* long, together with a short sword; he does not mention a shield, but they wore greaves and helmets (Anab. iv. 7, 15). This is a length greater than what Polybius ascribes to the pike of the Macedonian phalangite. The Mosynœki defended their citadel "with pikes so long and thick that a man could hardly carry them" (Anabas. v. 4, 25). In the Iliad, when the Trojans are pressing hard upon the Greek ships, and seeking to set them on fire, Ajax is described as planting himself upon the poop, and keeping off the assailants with a thrusting-pike of twenty-two cubits or thirty-three feet in length (ξυστὸν ναὑμαχον ἐν παλάμῃσιν —δυωκαιεικοσίπηχυ, Iliad, xv. 678). The spear of Hektor is ten cubits, or eleven cubits, in length—intended to be hurled (Iliad vi. 319; viii. 494)—the reading is not settled whether ἔγχος ἔχ᾽ ἐνδεκάπηχυ, or ἔγχος ἔχεν δεκάπηχυ.

The Swiss infantry, and the German Landsknechte, in the sixteenth century, were in many respects a reproduction of the Macedonian phalanx: close ranks, deep files, long pikes, and the three or four first ranks, composed of the strongest and bravest men in the regiment—either officers, or picked soldiers receiving double pay. The length and impenetrable array of their pikes enabled them to resist the charge of the heavy cavalry or men at arms: they were irresistible in front, unless an enemy could find means to break in among the pikes, which was sometimes, though rarely, done. Their great confidence was in the length of the pike—Macciavelli says of them (Ritratti dell' Alamagna, Opere t. iv. p. 159; and Dell' Arte della Guerra, p. 232-236), "Dicono tenere tale ordine, che non é possibile entrare tra loro, né accostarseli, quanto é la picca lunga. Sono ottime genti in campagna, à far giornata: ma per espugnare terra non vagliono, e poco nel difenderlo: ed universalmente, dove non possano tenere l' ordine loro della milizia, non vagliono."

CHAPTER XCIII.

SECOND AND THIRD ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER — BATTLE OF ISSUS — SIEGE OF TYRE.

It was about February or March 333 B. C., when Alexander reached Gordium; where he appears to have halted for some time, giving to the troops who had been with him in Pisidia a repose doubtless needful. While at Gordium, he performed the memorable exploit familiarly known as the cutting of the Gordian knot. There was preserved in the citadel an ancient waggon of rude structure, said by the legend to have once belonged to the peasant Gordius and his son Midas—the primitive rustic kings of Phrygia, designated as such by the gods, and chosen by the people. The cord (composed of fibres from the bark of the cornel tree), attaching the yoke of this waggon to the pole, was so twisted and entangled as to form a knot of singular complexity, which no one had ever been able to untie. An oracle had pronounced, that to the person who should untie it the empire of Asia was destined. When Alexander went up to see this ancient relic, the surrounding multitude, Phrygian as well as Macedonian, were full of expectation that the conqueror of the Granikus and of Halikarnassus would overcome the difficulties of the knot, and acquire the promised empire. But Alexander, on inspecting the knot, was as much perplexed as others had been before him, until at length, in a fit of impatience, he drew his sword and severed the cord in two. By every one this was accepted as a solution of the problem, thus making good his title to the empire of Asia; a belief which the gods ratified by a storm of thunder and lightning during the ensuing night.[237]

At Gordium, Alexander was visited by envoys from Athens, entreating the liberation of the Athenian prisoners taken at the Granikus, who were now at work chained in the Macedonian mines. But he refused this prayer until a more convenient season. Aware that the Greeks were held attached to him only by their fears, and that, if opportunity occurred, a large fraction of them would take part with the Persians, he did not think it prudent to relax his hold upon their conduct.[238]

Such opportunity seemed now not unlikely to occur. Memnon, excluded from efficacious action on the continent since the loss of Halikarnassus, was employed among the islands of the Ægean (during the first half of 333 B. C.), with the purpose of carrying war into Greece and Macedonia. Invested with the most ample command, he had a large Phenician fleet and a considerable body of Grecian mercenaries, together with his nephew Pharnabazus and the Persian Autophradates. Having acquired the important island of Chios, through the co-operation of a part of its inhabitants, he next landed on Lesbos, where four out of the five cities, either from fear or preference, declared in his favor; while Mitylênê, the greatest of the five, already occupied by a Macedonian garrison, stood out against him. Memnon accordingly disembarked

his troops and commenced the blockade of the city both by sea and land, surrounding it with a double palisade wall from sea to sea. In the midst of this operation he died of sickness; but his nephew Pharnabazus, to whom he had consigned the command provisionally, until the pleasure of Darius could be known, prosecuted his measures vigorously, and brought the city to a capitulation. It was stipulated that the garrison introduced by Alexander should be dismissed; that the column, recording alliance with him, should be demolished; that the Mityleneans should become allies of Darius, upon the terms of the old convention called by the name of Antalkidas; and that the citizens in banishment should be recalled, with restitution of half their property. But Pharnabazus, as soon as admitted, violated the capitulation at once. He not only extorted contributions, but introduced a garrison under Lykomêdes, and established a returned exile named Diogenes as despot.[239] Such breach of faith was ill calculated to assist the farther extension of Persian influence in Greece.

Had the Persian fleet been equally active a year earlier, Alexander's army could never have landed in Asia. Nevertheless, the acquisitions of Chios and Lesbos, late as they were in coming, were highly important as promising future progress. Several of the Cyclades islands sent to tender their adhesion to the Persian cause; the fleet was expected in Eubœa, and the Spartans began to count upon aid for an anti-Macedonian movement.[240] But all these hopes were destroyed by the unexpected decease of Memnon.

It was not merely the superior ability of Memnon, but also his established reputation both with Greeks and Persians, which rendered his death a fatal blow to the interests of Darius. The Persians had with them other Greek officers—brave and able—probably some not unfit to execute the full Memnonian schemes. But none of them had gone through the same experience in the art of exercising command among Orientals—none of them had acquired the confidence of Darius to the same extent, so as to be invested with the real guidance of operations, and upheld against court-calumnies. Though Alexander had now become master of Asia Minor, yet the Persians had ample means, if effectively used, of defending all that yet remained, and even of seriously disturbing him at home. But with Memnon vanished the last chance of employing these means with wisdom or energy. The full value of his loss was better appreciated by the intelligent enemy whom he opposed, than by the feeble master whom he served. The death of Memnon lessening the efficiency of the Persians at sea, allowed full leisure to reorganize the Macedonian fleet,[241] and to employ the undivided land-force for farther inland conquest.[242]

If Alexander was a gainer in respect to his own operations by the death of this eminent Rhodian, he was yet more a gainer by the change of policy which that event induced Darius to adopt. The Persian king resolved to renounce the defensive schemes of Memnon, and to take the offensive against the Macedonians on land. His troops, already summoned from the various parts of the empire, had partially arrived, and were still coming in.[243] Their numbers became greater and greater,

amounting at length to a vast and multitudinous host, the total of which is given by some as 600,000 men; by others, as 400,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry. The spectacle of this showy and imposing mass, in every variety of arms, costume, and language, filled the mind of Darius with confidence; especially as there were among them between 20,000 and 30,000 Grecian mercenaries. The Persian courtiers, themselves elate and sanguine, stimulated and exaggerated the same feeling in the king himself, who became confirmed in his persuasion that his enemies could never resist him. From Sogdiana, Baktria, and India, the contingents had not yet had time to arrive; but most of those between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian sea had come in—Persians, Medes, Armenians, Derbikes, Barkanians, Hyrkanians, Katdakes, etc.; all of whom, mustered in the plains of Mesopotamia, are said to have been counted, like the troops of Xerxes in the plain of Doriskus, by paling off a space capable of containing exactly 10,000 men, and passing all the soldiers through it in succession.[244] Neither Darius himself, nor any of those around him, had ever before seen so overwhelming a manifestation of the Persian imperial force. To an Oriental eye, incapable of appreciating the real conditions of military preponderance,—accustomed only to the gross and visible computation of numbers and physical strength,—the king who marched forth at the head of such an army appeared like a god on earth, certain to trample down all before him—just as most Greeks had conceived respecting Xerxes, [245] and by stronger reason Xerxes respecting himself, a century and a half before. Because all this turned out a ruinous mistake, the description of the feeling, given in Curtius and Diodorus, is often mistrusted as baseless rhetoric. Yet it is in reality the self-suggested illusion of untaught men, as opposed to trained and scientific judgment.

But though such was the persuasion of Orientals, it found no response in the bosom of an intelligent Athenian. Among the Greeks now near Darius, was the Athenian exile Charidemus, who having incurred the implacable enmity of Alexander, had been forced to quit Athens after the Macedonian capture of Thebes, and had fled together with Ephialtes to the Persians. Darius, elate with the apparent omnipotence of his army under review, and hearing but one voice of devoted concurrence from the courtiers around him, asked the opinion of Charidemus, in full expectation of receiving an affirmative reply. So completely were the hopes of Charidemus bound up with the success of Darius, that he would not suppress his convictions, however unpalatable, at a moment when there was yet a possibility that they might prove useful. He replied (with the same frankness as Demaratus had once employed towards Xerxes), that the vast multitude now before him were unfit to cope with the comparatively small number of the invaders. He advised Darius to place no reliance on Asiatics, but to employ his immense treasures in subsidizing an increased army of Grecian mercenaries. He tendered his own hearty services either to assist or to command. To Darius, what he said was alike surprising and offensive; in the Persian courtiers, it provoked intolerable wrath. Intoxicated as they all were with the spectacle of their present muster, it seemed to them a combination of insult with absurdity, to pro-

nounce Asiatics worthless as compared with Macedonians, and to teach the king that his empire could be defended by none but Greeks. They denounced Charidemus as a traitor who wished to acquire the king's confidence in order to betray him to Alexander. Darius, himself stung with the reply, and still farther exasperated by the clamors of his courtiers, seized with his own hands the girdle of Charidemus, and consigned him to the guards for execution. "You will discover too late (exclaimed the Athenian), the truth of what I have said. My avenger will soon be upon you."[246]

Filled as he now was with certain anticipations of success and glory, Darius resolved to assume in person the command of his army, and march down to overwhelm Alexander. From this moment, his land-army became the really important and aggressive force, with which he himself was to act. Herein we note his distinct abandonment of the plans of Memnon—the turning-point of his future fortune. He abandoned them, too, at the precise moment when they might have been most safely and completely executed. For at the time of the battle of the Granikus, when Memnon's counsel was originally given, the defensive part of it was not easy to act upon; since the Persians had no very strong or commanding position. But now, in the spring of 333 B. C., they had a line of defence as good as they could possibly desire; advantages, indeed, scarcely to be paralleled elsewhere. In the first place, there was the line of Mount Taurus, barring the entrance of Alexander into Kilikia; a line of defence (as will presently appear) nearly inexpugnable. Next, even if Alexander had succeeded in forcing this line and mastering Kilikia, there would yet remain the narrow road between Mount Amanus and the sea, called the Amanian Gates, and the Gates of Kilikia and Assyria—and after that, the passes over Mount Amanus itself—all indispensable for Alexander to pass through, and capable of being held, with proper precautions, against the strongest force of attack. A better opportunity, for executing the defensive part of Memnon's scheme, could not present itself; and he himself must doubtless have reckoned that such advantages would not be thrown away.

The momentous change of policy, on the part of the Persian king, was manifested by the order which he sent to the fleet after receiving intelligence of the death of Memnon. Confirming the appointment of Pharnabazus (made provisionally by the dying Memnon) as admiral, he at the same time despatched Thymôdes (son of Mentor and nephew of Memnon) to bring away from the fleet the Grecian mercenaries who served aboard, to be incorporated with the main Persian army.[247] Here was a clear proof that the main stress of offensive operations was henceforward to be transferred from the sea to the land.

It is the more important to note such desertion of policy, on the part of Darius, as the critical turning-point in the Greco-Persian drama—because Arrian and the other historians leave it out of sight, and set before us little except the secondary points in the case. Thus, for example, they condemn the imprudence of Darius, for coming to fight Alexander within the narrow space near Issus, instead of waiting for him on the

spacious plains beyond Mount Amanus. Now, unquestionably, granting that a general battle was inevitable, this step augmented the chances in favor of the Macedonians. But it was a step upon which no material consequences turned; for the Persian army under Darius was hardly less unfit for a pitched battle in the open plain; as was afterwards proved at Arbela. The real imprudence—the neglect of the Memnonian warning—consisted in fighting the battle at all. Mountains and defiles were the real strength of the Persians, to be held as posts of defence against the invader. If Darius erred, it was not so much in relinquishing the open plain of Sochi, as in originally preferring that plain with a pitched battle, to the strong lines of defence offered by Taurus and Amanus.

The narrative of Arrian, exact perhaps in what it affirms, is not only brief and incomplete, but even omits on various occasions to put in relief the really important and determining points.

While halting at Gordium, Alexander was joined by those newly-married Macedonians whom he had sent home to winter, and who now came back with reinforcements to the number of 3000 infantry and 300 cavalry, together with 200 Thessalian cavalry, and 150 Eleians.[248] As soon as his troops had been sufficiently rested, he marched (probably about the latter half of May) towards Paphlagonia and Kappadokia. At Ankyra he was met by a deputation from the Paphlagonians, who submitted themselves to his discretion, only entreating that he would not conduct his army into their country. Accepting these terms, he placed them under the government of Kallas, his satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. Advancing farther, he subdued the whole of Kappadokia, even to a considerable extent beyond the Halys, leaving therein Sabiktas as satrap.[249]

Having established security in his rear, Alexander marched southward towards Mount Taurus. He reached a post called the Camp of Cyrus, at the northern foot of that mountain, near the pass Tauri-pylæ, or Kilikian Gates, which forms the regular communication, between Kappadokia on the north side, and Kilikia on the south, of this great chain. The long road ascending and descending was generally narrow, winding, and rugged, sometimes between two steep and high banks; and it included, near its southern termination, one spot particularly obstructed and difficult. From ancient times, down to the present, the main road from Asia Minor into Kilikia and Syria has run through this pass. During the Roman empire, it must doubtless have received many improvements, so as to render the traffic comparatively easier. Yet the description given of it by modern travellers represents it to be as difficult as any road ever traversed by an army.[250] Seventy years before Alexander, it had been traversed by the younger Cyrus with the 10,000 Greeks, in his march up to attack his brother Artaxerxes; and Xenophon,[251] who then went through it, pronounces it absolutely impracticable for an army, if opposed by any occupying force. So thoroughly persuaded was Cyrus himself of this fact, that he had prepared a fleet, in case he found the pass occupied, to land troops by sea in Kilikia in the rear of the defenders;

and great indeed was his astonishment, to discover that the habitual recklessness of Persian management had left the defile unguarded. The narrowest part, while hardly sufficient to contain four armed men abreast, was shut in by precipitous rock on each side.[252] Here, if anywhere, was the spot in which the defensive policy of Memnon might have been made sure. To Alexander, inferior as he was by sea, the resource employed by the younger Cyrus was not open.

Yet Arsames, the Persian satrap commanding at Tarsus in Kilikia, having received seemingly from his master no instructions, or worse than none, acted as if ignorant of the existence of his enterprising enemy north of Mount Taurus. On the first approach of Alexander, the few Persian soldiers occupying the pass fled without striking a blow, being seemingly unprepared for any enemy more formidable than mountain-robbers. Alexander thus became master of this almost insuperable barrier, without the loss of a man.[253] On the ensuing day, he marched his whole army over it into Kilikia, and arriving in a few hours at Tarsus, found the town already evacuated by Arsames.[254]

At Tarsus Alexander made a long halt; much longer than he intended. Either from excessive fatigue—or from bathing while hot in the chilly water of the river Kydnus—he was seized with a violent fever, which presently increased to so dangerous a pitch that his life was despaired of. Amidst the grief and alarm with which this misfortune filled the army, none of the physicians would venture to administer remedies, for fear of being held responsible for what threatened to be a fatal result.[255] One alone among them, an Akarnanian named Philippus, long known and trusted by Alexander, engaged to cure him by a violent purgative draught. Alexander directed him to prepare it; but before the time for taking it arrived, he received a confidential letter from Parmenio, entreating him to beware of Philippus, who had been bribed by Darius to poison him. After reading the letter, he put it under his pillow. Presently came Philippus with the medicine, which Alexander accepted and swallowed without remark, at the same time giving Philippus the letter to read, and watching the expression of his countenance. The look, words, and gestures of the physician were such as completely to reassure him. Philippus, indignantly repudiating the calumny, repeated his full confidence in the medicine, and pledged himself to abide the result. At first it operated so violently as to make Alexander seemingly worse, and even to bring him to death's door; but after a certain interval, its healing effects became manifest. The fever was subdued, and Alexander was pronounced out of danger, to the delight of the whole army.[256] A reasonable time sufficed, to restore him to his former health and vigor.

It was his first operation, after recovery, to send forward Parmenio, at the head of the Greeks, Thessalians, and Thracians, in his army, for the purpose of clearing the forward route and of securing the pass called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria.[257] This narrow road, bounded by the range of Mount Amanus on the east and by the sea on the west, had been once barred by a double cross-wall with gates for passage, mark-

ing the original boundaries of Kilikia and Syria. The Gates, about six days' march beyond Tarsus,[258] were found guarded, but the guard fled with little resistance. At the same time Alexander himself, conducting the Macedonian troops in a south-westerly direction from Tarsus, employed some time in mastering and regulating the towns of Anchialus and Soli, as well as the Kilikian mountaineers. Then, returning to Tarsus, and recommencing his forward march, he advanced with the infantry and with his chosen squadron of cavalry, first to Magarsus near the mouth of the river Pyramus, next to Mallus; the general body of cavalry, under Philôtus, being sent by a more direct route across the Alëian plain. Mallus, sacred to the prophet Amphilocus as a patron-hero, was said to be a colony from Argos; on both these grounds Alexander was disposed to treat it with peculiar respect. He offered solemn sacrifice to Amphilocus, exempted Mallus from tribute, and appeased some troublesome discord among the citizens.[259]

It was at Mallus that he received his first distinct communication respecting Darius and the main Persian army; which was said to be encamped at Sochi in Syria, on the eastern side of Mount Amanus, about two days' march from the mountain pass now called Beylan. That pass, traversing the Amanian range, forms the continuance of the main road from Asia Minor into Syria, after having passed first over Taurus, and next through the difficult point of ground above specified (called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria), between Mount Amanus and the sea. Assembling his principal officers, Alexander communicated to them the position of Darius, now encamped in a spacious plain with prodigious superiority of numbers, especially of cavalry. Though the locality was thus rather favorable to the enemy, yet the Macedonians, full of hopes and courage, called upon Alexander to lead them forthwith against him. Accordingly Alexander, well pleased with their alacrity, began his forward march on the following morning. He passed through Issus, where he left some sick and wounded under a moderate guard—then through the Gates of Kilikia and Syria. At the second day's march from those Gates, he reached the seaport of Myriandrus, the first town of Syria or Phenicia.[260]

Here, having been detained in his camp one day by a dreadful storm, he received intelligence which altogether changed his plans. The Persian army had been marched away from Sochi, and was now in Kilikia, following in his rear. It had already got possession of Issus.

Darius had marched out of the interior his vast and miscellaneous host, stated at 600,000 men. His mother, his wife, his harem, his children, his personal attendants of every description, accompanied him, to witness what was anticipated as a certain triumph. All the apparatus of ostentation and luxury was provided in abundance, for the king and for his Persian grandees. The baggage was enormous: of gold and silver alone, we are told, that there was enough to furnish load for 600 mules and 300 camels.[261] A temporary bridge being thrown over the Euphrates, five days were required to enable the whole army to cross.[262] Much of the treasure and baggage,

however, was not allowed to follow the army to the vicinity of Mount Amanus, but was sent under a guard to Damascus in Syria.

At the head of such an overwhelming host, Darius was eager to bring on at once a general battle. It was not sufficient for him simply to keep back an enemy, whom, when once in presence, he calculated on crushing altogether. Accordingly, he had given no orders (as we have just seen) to defend the line of the Taurus; he had admitted Alexander unopposed into Kilikia, and he intended to let him enter in like manner through the remaining strong passes—first, the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, between Mount Amanus and the sea—next, the pass, now called Beylan, across Amanus itself. He both expected and wished that his enemy should come into the plain to fight, there to be trodden down by the countless horsemen of Persia.

But such anticipation was not at once realized. The movements of Alexander, hitherto so rapid and unremitting, seemed suspended. We have already noticed the dangerous fever which threatened his life, occasioning not only a long halt, but much uneasiness among the Macedonian army. All was doubtless reported to the Persians, with abundant exaggerations: and when Alexander, immediately after recovery, instead of marching forward towards them, turned away from them to subdue the western portion of Kilikia, this again was construed by Darius as an evidence of hesitation and fear. It is even asserted that Parmenio wished to await the attack of the Persians in Kilikia, and that Alexander at first consented to do so.[263] At any rate, Darius, after a certain interval, contracted the persuasion, and was assured by his Asiatic councillors and courtiers, that the Macedonians, though audacious and triumphant against frontier satraps, now hung back intimidated by the approaching majesty and full muster of the empire, and that they would not stand to resist his attack. Under this impression Darius resolved upon an advance into Kilikia with all his army. Thymôdes indeed, and other intelligent Grecian advisers—together with the Macedonian exile Amyntas—deprecated his new resolution, entreating him to persevere in his original purpose. They pledged themselves that Alexander would come forth to attack him wherever he was, and that too, speedily. They dwelt on the imprudence of fighting in the narrow defiles of Kilikia, where his numbers, and especially his vast cavalry, would be useless. Their advice, however, was not only disregarded by Darius, but denounced by the Persian councillors as traitorous.[264] Even some of the Greeks in the camp shared, and transmitted in their letters to Athens, the blind confidence of the monarch. The order was forthwith given for the whole army to quit the plains of Syria and march across Mount Amanus into Kilikia.[265] To cross, by any pass, over such a range as that of Mount Amanus, with a numerous army, heavy baggage, and ostentatious train (including all the suite necessary for the regal family), must have been a work of no inconsiderable time; and the only two passes over this mountain were, both of them, narrow and easily defensible.[266] Darius followed the northernmost of the two, which brought him into the rear of his enemy.

Thus at the same time that the Macedonians were marching southward to cross Mount Amanus by the southern pass, and attack Darius in the plain—Darius was coming over into Kilikia by the northern pass to drive them before him back into Macedonia.[267] Reaching Issus, seemingly about two days after they had left it, he became master of their sick and wounded left in the town. With odious brutality, his grandees impelled him to inflict upon these poor men either death or amputation of hands and arms.[268] He then marched forward—along the same road by the shore of the Gulf which had already been followed by Alexander—and encamped on the banks of the river Pinarus.

The fugitives from Issus hastened to inform Alexander, whom they overtook at Myriandrus. So astonished was he, that he refused to believe the news, until it had been confirmed by some officers whom he sent northward along the coast of the Gulf in a small galley, and to whom the vast Persian multitude on the shore was distinctly visible. Then, assembling the chief officers, he communicated to them the near approach of the enemy, expatiating on the favorable auspices under which a battle would now take place.[269] His address was hailed with acclamation by his hearers, who demanded only to be led against the enemy.[270]

His distance from the Persian position may have been about eighteen miles.[271] By an evening march, after supper, he reached at midnight the narrow defile (between Mount Amanus and the sea) called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, through which he had marched two days before. Again master of that important position, he rested there the last portion of the night, and advanced forward at daybreak northward towards Darius. At first the breadth of practicable road was so confined, as to admit only a narrow column of march, with the cavalry following the infantry; presently it widened, enabling Alexander to enlarge his front by bringing up successively the divisions of the phalanx. On approaching near to the river Pinarus (which flowed across the pass), he adopted his order of battle. on the extreme right he placed the hypaspists, or light division of hoplites; next (reckoning from right to left), five Taxeis or divisions of the phalanx, under Kœnus, Perdikkas, Meleager, Ptolemy, and Amyntas. Of these three last or left divisions, Kraterus had the general command; himself subject to the orders of Parmenio, who commanded the entire left half of the army. The breadth of plain between the mountains on the right, and the sea on the left, is said to have been not more than fourteen stadia, or about one English mile and a half.[272] From fear of being outflanked by the superior numbers of the Persians, he gave strict orders to Parmenio to keep close to the sea. His Macedonian cavalry, the Companions, together with the Thessalians, were placed on his right flank; as were also the Agrianes, and the principal portion of the light infantry. The Peloponnesian and allied cavalry, with the Thracian and Kretan light infantry, were sent on the left flank to Parmenio.[273]

Darius, informed that Alexander was approaching, resolved to fight where he was encamped, behind the river Pinarus. He, however, threw across the river a force of

30,000 cavalry, and 20,000 infantry, to ensure the undisturbed formation of his main force behind the river.[274] He composed his phalanx or main line of battle, of 90,000 hoplites; 30,000 Greek hoplites in the centre, and 30,000 Asiatics armed as hoplites (called Kardakes), on each side of these Greeks. These men—not distributed into separate divisions, but grouped in one body or multitude[275]—filled the breadth between the mountains and the sea. On the mountains to his left, he placed a body of 20,000 men, intended to act against the right flank and rear of Alexander. But for the great numerical mass of his vast host, he could find no room to act; accordingly they remained useless in the rear of his Greek and Asiatic hoplites, yet not formed into any body of reserve, or kept disposable for assisting in case of need. When his line was thoroughly formed, he recalled to the left bank of the Pinarus the 30,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry which he had sent across as a protecting force. A part of this cavalry were sent to his extreme left wing, but the mountain ground was found unsuitable for them to act, so that they were forced to cross the right wing, where accordingly the great mass of the Persian cavalry became assembled. Darius himself in his chariot was in the centre of the line, behind the Grecian hoplites. In the front of his whole line ran the river or rivulet Pinarus; the banks of which, in many parts naturally steep, he obstructed in some places by embankments.[276]

As soon as Alexander, by the retirement of the Persian covering detachment, was enabled to perceive the final dispositions of Darius, he made some alteration in his own, transferring his Thessalian cavalry by a rear movement from his right to his left wing, and bringing forward the lancer-cavalry or sarissophori, as well as the light infantry, Pæonians, and archers, to the front of his right. The Agrianians, together with some cavalry and another body of archers, were detached from the general line to form an oblique front against the 20,000 Persians posted on the hill to outflank him. As these 20,000 men came near enough to threaten his flank, Alexander directed the Agrianians to attack them, and to drive them farther away on the hills. They manifested so little firmness, and gave way so easily, that he felt no dread of any serious aggressive movement from them. He therefore contented himself with holding back in reserve against them a body of 300 heavy cavalry; while he placed the Agrianians and the rest on the right of his main line, in order to make his front equal to that of his enemies.[277]

Having thus formed his array, after giving the troops a certain halt after their march, he advanced at a very slow pace, anxious to maintain his own front even, and anticipating that the enemy might cross the Pinarus to meet him. But as they did not move, he continued his advance, preserving the uniformity of the front, until he arrived within bowshot, when he himself, at the head of his cavalry, hypaspists, and divisions of the phalanx on the right, accelerated his pace, crossed the river at a quick step, and fell upon the Kardakes or Asiatic hoplites on the Persian left. Unprepared for the suddenness and vehemence of this attack, these Kardakes scarcely resisted a moment, but gave way as soon as they came to close quarters, and fled,

vigorously pressed by the Macedonian right. Darius, who was in his chariot in the centre, perceived that this untoward desertion exposed his person from the left flank. Seized with panic, he caused his chariot to be turned round, and fled with all speed among the foremost fugitives.[278] He kept to his chariot as long as the ground permitted, but quitted it on reaching some rugged ravines, and mounted on horseback to make sure of escape; in such terror, that he cast away his bow, his shield, and his regal mantle. He does not seem to have given a single order, nor to have made the smallest effort to repair a first misfortune. The flight of the king was the signal for all who observed it to flee also; so that the vast host in the rear were quickly to be seen trampling one another down, in their efforts to get through the difficult ground out of the reach of the enemy. Darius was himself not merely the centre of union for all the miscellaneous contingents composing the army, but also the sole commander; so that after his flight there was no one left to give any general order.

This great battle—we ought rather to say, that which ought to have been a great battle—was thus lost,—through the giving way of the Asiatic hoplites on the Persian left, and the immediate flight of Darius,—within a few minutes after its commencement. But the centre and right of the Persians, not yet apprised of these misfortunes, behaved with gallantry. When Alexander made his rapid dash forward with the right, under his own immediate command, the phalanx in his left centre (which was under Kraterus and Parmenio) either did not receive the same accelerating order, or found itself both retarded and disordered by greater steepness in the banks of the Pinarus. Here it was charged by the Grecian mercenaries, the best troops in the Persian service. The combat which took place was obstinate, and the Macedonian loss not inconsiderable; the general of division, Ptolemy son of Seleukus, with 120 of the front rank men or choice phalangites, being slain. But presently Alexander, having completed the rout on the enemies' left, brought back his victorious troops from the pursuit, attacked the Grecian mercenaries in flank, and gave decisive superiority to their enemies. These Grecian mercenaries were beaten and forced to retire. On finding that Darius himself had fled, they got away from the field as well as they could, yet seemingly in good order. There is even reason to suppose that a part of them forced their way up the mountains or through the Macedonian line, and made their escape southward.[279]

Meanwhile on the Persian right, towards the sea, the heavy-armed Persian cavalry had shown much bravery. They were bold enough to cross the Pinarus[280] and vigorously to charge the Thessalians; with whom they maintained a close contest, until the news spread that Darius had disappeared, and that the left of the army was routed. They then turned their backs and fled, sustaining terrible damage from their enemies in the retreat. Of the Kardakes on the *right* flank of the Grecian hoplites in the Persian line, we hear nothing, nor of the Macedonian infantry opposed to them. Perhaps these Kardakes came little into action, since the cavalry on their part of the

field were so severely engaged. At any rate they took part in the general flight of the Persians, as soon as Darius was known to have left the field.[281]

The rout of the Persians being completed, Alexander began a vigorous pursuit. The destruction and slaughter of the fugitives was prodigious. Amidst so small a breadth of practicable ground, narrowed sometimes into a defile and broken by frequent watercourses, their vast numbers found no room, and trod one another down. As many perished in this way as by the sword of the conquerors; insomuch that Ptolemy (afterwards king of Egypt, the companion and historian of Alexander) recounts that he himself in the pursuit came to a ravine choked up with dead bodies, of which he made a bridge to pass over it.[282] The pursuit was continued as long as the light of a November day allowed; but the battle had not begun till a late hour. The camp of Darius was taken together with his mother, his wife, his sister, his infant son, and two daughters. His chariot, his shield, and his bow also fell into the power of the conquerors; and a sum of 3000 talents in money was found, though much of the treasure had been sent to Damascus. The total loss of the Persians is said to have amounted to 10,000 horse and 100,000 foot; among the slain moreover were several eminent Persian grandees,—Arsames, Rheomithres, and Atizyes, who had commanded at the Granikus—Sabakes, satrap of Egypt. Of the Macedonians we are told that 300 foot and 150 horse were killed. Alexander himself was slightly wounded in the thigh by a sword.[283]

The mother, wife, and family of Darius, who became captives, were treated by Alexander's order with the utmost consideration and respect. When Alexander returned at night from the pursuit, he found the regal tent reserved and prepared for him. In an inner compartment of it he heard the tears and wailings of women. He was informed that the mourners were the mother and wife of Darius, who had learnt that the bow and shield of Darius had been taken, and were giving loose to their grief under the belief that Darius himself was killed. Alexander immediately sent Leonnatus to assure them that Darius was still living, and to promise further that they should be allowed to preserve the regal title and state—his war against Darius being undertaken not from any feelings of hatred, but as a fair contest for the empire of Asia.[284] Besides this anecdote, which depends on good authority, many others, uncertified or untrue, were recounted about his kind behavior to these princesses; and Alexander himself, shortly after the battle, seems to have heard fictions about it, which he thought himself obliged to contradict in a letter. It is certain, (from the extract now remaining of this letter) that he never saw, nor ever entertained the idea of seeing, the captive wife of Darius, said to be the most beautiful woman in Asia; moreover he even declined to hear encomiums upon her beauty.[285]

How this vast host of fugitives got out of the narrow limits of Kilikia, or how many of them quitted that country by the same pass over Mount Amanus as that by which they had entered it—we cannot make out. It is probable that many, and Darius himself among the number, made their escape across the mountain by various subordi-

nate roads and by-paths; which, though unfit for a regular army with baggage, would be found a welcome resource by scattered companies. Darius managed to get together 4000 of the fugitives, with whom he hastened to Thapsakus, and there re-crossed the Euphrates. The only remnant of force, still in a position of defence after the battle, consisted of 8000 of the Grecian mercenaries under Amyntas and Thymôdes. These men, fighting their way out of Kilikia (seemingly towards the south, by or near Myriandrus), marched to Tripolis on the coast of Phenicia, where they still found the same vessels in which they had themselves been brought from the armament of Lesbos. Seizing sufficient means of transport, and destroying the rest to prevent pursuit, they immediately crossed over to Cyprus, and from thence to Egypt.[286] With this single exception, the enormous Persian host disappears with the battle of Issus. We hear of no attempt to rally or reform, nor of any fresh Persian force afoot until two years afterwards. The booty acquired by the victors was immense, not merely in gold and silver, but also in captives for the slave-merchant. On the morrow of the battle, Alexander offered a solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, with three altars erected on the banks of the Pinarus; while he at the same time buried the dead, consoled the wounded, and rewarded or complimented all who had distinguished themselves.[287]

No victory recorded in history was ever more complete in itself, or more far-stretching in its consequences, than that of Issus. Not only was the Persian force destroyed or dispersed, but the efforts of Darius for recovery were paralyzed by the capture of his family. Portions of the dissipated army of Issus may be traced, re-appearing in different places for operations of detail; but we shall find no farther resistance to Alexander and his main force, except from the brave freemen of two fortified cities. Everywhere an overwhelming sentiment of admiration and terror was spread abroad, towards the force, skill, or good fortune of Alexander, by whichever name it might be called—together with contempt for the real value of a Persian army, in spite of so much imposing pomp and numerical show; a contempt, not new to intelligent Greeks, but now communicated even to vulgar minds by the recent unparalleled catastrophe. Both as general and as soldier, indeed, the consummate excellence of Alexander stood conspicuous, not less than the signal deficiency of Darius. The fault in the latter, upon which most remark is usually made, was, that of fighting the battle, not in an open plain, but in a narrow valley, whereby his superiority of number was rendered unprofitable. But this (as I have already observed) was only one among many mistakes, and by no means the most serious. The result would have been the same, had the battle been fought in the plains to the eastward of Mount Amanus. Superior numbers are of little avail on any ground unless there be a general who knows how to make use of them; unless they be distributed into separate divisions ready to combine for offensive action on many points at once, or at any rate to lend support to each other in defence, so that a defeat of one fraction is not a defeat of the whole. The faith of Darius in simple multitude was altogether blind and childish;[288] nay, that faith, though overweening beforehand, disappeared at once when

he found his enemies did not run away, but faced him boldly—as was seen by his attitude on the banks of the Pinarus, where he stood to be attacked instead of executing his threat of treading down the handful opposed to him.[289] But it was not merely as a general, that Darius acted in such a manner as to render the loss of the battle certain. Had his dispositions been ever so skilful, his personal cowardice, in quitting the field and thinking only of his own safety, would have sufficed to nullify their effect.[290] Though the Persian grandees are generally conspicuous for personal courage, yet we shall find Darius hereafter again exhibiting the like melancholy timidity, and the like incompetence for using numbers with effect, at the battle of Arbela, though fought in a spacious plain chosen by himself.

Happy was it for Memnon, that he did not live to see the renunciation of his schemes, and the ruin consequent upon it! The fleet in the Ægean, which had been transferred at his death to Pharnabazus, though weakened by the loss of those mercenaries whom Darius had recalled to Issus, and disheartened by a serious defeat which the Persian Orontobates had received from the Macedonians in Karia,[291] was nevertheless not inactive in trying to organize an anti-Macedonian manifestation in Greece. While Pharnabazus was at the island of Siphnos with his 100 triremes, he was visited by the Lacedæmonian king Agis, who pressed him to embark for Peloponnesus as large a force as he could spare, to second a movement projected by the Spartans. But such aggressive plans were at once crushed by the terror-striking news of the battle of Issus. Apprehending a revolt in the island of Chios as the result of this news, Pharnabazus immediately sailed thither with a large detachment. Agis, obtaining nothing more than a subsidy of thirty talents and a squadron of ten triremes, was obliged to renounce his projects in Peloponnesus, and to content himself with directing some operations in Krete, to be conducted by his brother Agesilaus; while he himself remained among the islands, and ultimately accompanied the Persian Autophradates to Halikarnassus.[292] It appears, however, that he afterwards went to conduct the operations in Krete, and that he had considerable success in that island, bringing several Kretan towns to join the Persians.[293] On the whole, however, the victory of Issus overawed all free spirit throughout Greece, and formed a guarantee to Alexander for at least a temporary quiescence. The philo-Macedonian synod, assembled at Corinth during the Isthmian festival, manifested their joy by sending to him an embassy of congratulation and a wreath of gold.[294]

With little delay after his victory, Alexander marched through Kœle-Syria to the Phenician coast, detaching Parmenio in his way to attack Damascus, whither Darius, before the battle, had sent most part of his treasure with many confidential officers, Persian women of rank, and envoys. Though the place might have held out a considerable siege, it was surrendered without resistance by the treason or cowardice of the governor; who made a feint of trying to convey away the treasure, but took care that it should fall into the hands of the enemy.[295] There was captured a large treasure—with a prodigious number and variety of attendants and ministers of luxury,

belonging to the court and the grandees.[296] Moreover the prisoners made were so numerous, that most of the great Persian families had to deplore the loss of some relative, male or female. There were among them the widow and daughters of king Ochus, the predecessor of Darius—the daughter of Darius's brother Oxathres—the wives of Artabazus, and of Pharnabazus—the three daughters of Mentor, and Barsinê, widow of the deceased Memnon with her child, sent up by Memnon to serve as an hostage for his fidelity. There were also several eminent Grecian exiles, Theban, Lacedæmonian and Athenian, who had fled to Darius, and whom he had thought fit to send to Damascus, instead of allowing them to use their pikes with the army at Issus. The Theban and Athenian exiles were at once released by Alexander; the Lacedæmonians were for the time put under arrest, but not detained long. Among the Athenian exiles was a person of noble name and parentage—Iphikrates, son of the great Athenian officer of that name.[297] The captive Iphikrates not only received his liberty, but was induced by courteous and honorable treatment to remain with Alexander. He died however shortly afterwards from sickness, and his ashes were then collected, by order of Alexander, to be sent to his family at Athens.

I have already stated in a former volume[298] that the elder Iphikrates had been adopted by Alexander's grandfather into the regal family of Macedonia, as the savior of their throne: probably this was the circumstance which determined the superior favor shown to the son, rather than any sentiment either towards Athens or towards the military genius of the father. The difference of position, between Iphikrates the father and Iphikrates the son, is one among the painful evidences of the downward march of Hellenism; the father, a distinguished officer moving amidst a circle of freemen, sustaining by arms the security and dignity of his own fellow-citizens, and even interfering for the rescue of the Macedonian regal family; the son, condemned to witness the degradation of his native city by Macedonian arms, and deprived of all other means of reviving or rescuing her, except such as could be found in the service of an Oriental prince, whose stupidity and cowardice threw away at once his own security and the freedom of Greece.

Master of Damascus and of Kœle-Syria, Alexander advanced onward to Phenicia. The first Phenician town which he approached was Marathus, on the mainland opposite the islet of Aradus, forming, along with that islet and some other neighboring towns, the domain of the Aradian prince Gerostratus. That prince was himself now serving with his naval contingent among the Persian fleet in the Ægean; but his son Strata, acting as viceroy at home, despatched to Alexander his homage with a golden wreath, and made over to him at once Aradus with the neighboring towns included in its domain. The example of Strato was followed, first by the inhabitants of Byblus, the next Phenician city in a southerly direction; next, by the great city of Sidon, the queen and parent of all Phenician prosperity. The Sidonians even sent envoys to meet him and invite his approach.[299] Their sentiments were unfavorable to the Persians, from remembrance of the bloody and perfidious proceedings which

(about eighteen years before) had marked the recapture of their city by the armies of Ochus.[300] Nevertheless, the naval contingents both of Byblus and of Sidon (as well as that of Aradus), were at this moment sailing in the Ægean with the Persian admiral Autophradates, and formed a large proportion of his entire fleet.[301]

While Alexander was still at Marathus, however, previous to his onward march, he received both envoys and a letter from Darius, asking for the restitution of his mother, wife, and children—and tendering friendship and alliance, as from one king to another. Darius farther attempted to show, that the Macedonian Philip had begun the wrong against Persia,—that Alexander had continued it—and that he himself (Darius) had acted merely in self-defence. In reply, Alexander wrote a letter, wherein he set forth his own case against Darius, proclaiming himself the appointed leader of the Greeks, to avenge the ancient invasion of Greece by Xerxes. He then alleged various complaints against Darius, whom he accused of having instigated the assassination of Philip, as well as the hostilities of the anti-Macedonian cities in Greece. "Now (continued he), by the grace of the gods, I have been victorious, first over your satraps, next over yourself. I have taken care of all who submit to me, and made them satisfied with their lot. Come yourself to me also, as to the master of all Asia. Come without fear of suffering harm; ask me, and you shall receive back your mother and wife, and anything else which you please. When next you write to me, however, address me not as an equal, but as lord of Asia and of all that belongs to you; otherwise I shall deal with you as a wrong-doer. If you intend to contest the kingdom with me, stand and fight for it, and do not run away. I shall march forward against you, wherever you may be."[302]

This memorable correspondence, which led to no result, is of importance only as it marks the character of Alexander, with whom fighting and conquering were both the business and the luxury of life, and to whom all assumption of equality and independence with himself, even on the part of other kings—every thing short of submission and obedience—appeared in the light of wrong and insult to be avenged. The recital of comparative injuries, on each side, was mere unmeaning pretence. The real and only question was (as Alexander himself had put it in his message to the captive Sisygambis[303]) which of the two should be master of Asia.

The decision of this question, already sufficiently advanced on the morrow after the battle of Issus, was placed almost beyond doubt by the rapid and unopposed successes of Alexander among most of the Phenician cities. The last hopes of Persia now turned chiefly upon the sentiments of these Phenicians. The greater part of the Persian fleet in the Ægean was composed of Phenician triremes, partly from the coast of Syria, partly from the island of Cyprus. If the Phenician towns made submission to Alexander, it was certain that their ships and seamen would either return home spontaneously or be recalled; thus depriving the Persian quiver of its best remaining arrow. But if the Phenician towns held out resolutely against him, one and all, so as to put him under the necessity of besieging them in succession—each lend-

ing aid to the rest by sea, with superiority of naval force, and more than one of them being situated upon islets—the obstacles to be overcome would have been so multiplied, that even Alexander's energy and ability might hardly have proved sufficient for them: at any rate, he would have had hard work before him for perhaps two years, opening the door to many new accidents and efforts. It was therefore a signal good fortune to Alexander when the prince of the islet of Aradus spontaneously surrendered to him that difficult city, and when the example was followed by the still greater city of Sidon. The Phenicians, taking them generally, had no positive tie to the Persians; neither had they much confederate attachment one towards the other, although as separate communities they were brave and enterprising. Among the Sidonians, there was even a prevalent feeling of aversion to the Persians, from the cause above mentioned. Hence the prince of Aradus, upon whom Alexander's march first came, had little certainty of aid from his neighbors, if he resolved to hold out; and still less disposition to hold out single-handed, after the battle of Issus had proclaimed the irresistible force of Alexander not less than the impotence of Persia. One after another, all these important Phenician seaports, except Tyre, fell into the hands of Alexander without striking a blow. At Sidon, the reigning prince Strato, reputed as philo-Persian, was deposed, and a person named Abdalonymus—of the reigning family, yet poor in circumstances—was appointed in his room.[304]

With his usual rapidity, Alexander marched onward towards Tyre; the most powerful among the Phenician cities, though apparently less ancient than Sidon. Even on the march, he was met by a deputation from Tyre, composed of the most eminent men in the city, and headed by the son of the Tyrian prince Azemilchus, who was himself absent commanding the Tyrian contingent in the Persian fleet. These men brought large presents and supplies for the Macedonian army, together with a golden wreath of honor; announcing formally that the Tyrians were prepared to do whatever Alexander commanded.[305] In reply, he commended the dispositions of the city, accepted the presents, and desired the deputation to communicate at home, that he wished to enter Tyre and offer sacrifice to Herakles. The Phenician god Melkart was supposed identical with the Grecian Herakles, and was thus ancestor of the Macedonian kings. His temple at Tyre was of the most venerable antiquity; moreover the injunction, to sacrifice there, is said to have been conveyed to Alexander in an oracle.[306] The Tyrians at home, after deliberating on this message, sent out an answer declining to comply, and intimating that they would not admit within their walls either Macedonians or Persians; but that as to all other points, they would obey Alexander's orders.[307] They added that his wish to sacrifice to Herakles might be accomplished without entering their city, since there was in Palætyrus (on the mainland over against the islet of Tyre, separated from it only by the narrow strait) a temple of that god yet more ancient and venerable than their own.[308] Incensed at this qualified adhesion, in which he took note only of the point refused,—Alexander dismissed the envoys with angry menaces, and immediately resolved on taking Tyre by force.[309]

Those who (like Diodorus) treat such refusal on the part of the Tyrians as foolish wilfulness,[310] have not fully considered how much the demand included. When Alexander made a solemn sacrifice to Artemis at Ephesus, he marched to her temple with his whole force armed and in battle army.[311] We cannot doubt that his sacrifice at Tyre to Herakles—his ancestral Hero, whose especial attribute was force—would have been celebrated with an array equally formidable, as in fact it was, after the town had been taken.[312] The Tyrians were thus required to admit within their walls an irresistible military force; which might indeed be withdrawn after the sacrifice was completed, but which might also remain, either wholly or in part, as permanent garrison of an almost impregnable position. They had not endured such treatment from Persia, nor were they disposed to endure it from a new master. It was in fact hazarding their all; submitting at once to a fate which might be as bad as could befall them after a successful siege. On the other hand, when we reflect that the Tyrians promised everything short of submission to military occupation, we see that Alexander, had he been so inclined, could have obtained from them all that was really essential to his purpose, without the necessity of besieging the town. The great value of Phenician cities consisted in their fleet, which now acted with the Persians, and gave to them the command of the sea.[313] Had Alexander required that this fleet should be withdrawn from the Persians and placed in his service, there can be no doubt that he would have obtained it readily. The Tyrians had no motive to devote themselves for Persia, nor did they probably (as Arrian supposes) attempt to trim between the two belligerents, as if the contest were still undecided.[314] Yet rather than hand over their city to the chances of a Macedonian soldiery, they resolved to brave the hazards of a siege. The pride of Alexander, impatient of opposition even to his most extreme demands, prompted him to take a step politically unprofitable, in order to make display of his power, by degrading and crushing, with or without a siege, one of the most ancient, spirited, wealthy and intelligent communities of the ancient world.

Tyre was situated on an islet nearly half a mile from the mainland;[315] the channel between the two being shallow towards the land, but reaching a depth of eighteen feet in the part adjoining the city. The islet was completely surrounded by prodigious walls, the loftiest portion of which, on the side fronting the mainland, reached a height not less than 150 feet, with corresponding solidity and base.[316] Besides these external fortifications, there was a brave and numerous population within, aided by a good stock of arms, machines, ships, provisions, and other things essential to defence.

It was not without reason, therefore, that the Tyrians, when driven to their last resource, entertained hopes of holding out even against the formidable arm of Alexander; and against Alexander as he then stood, they might have held out successfully; for he had as yet no fleet, and they could defy any attack made simply from land. The question turned upon the Phenician and Cyprian ships, which were

for the most part (the Tyrian among them) in the Ægean under the Persian admiral. Alexander—master as he was of Aradus, Byblus, Sidon, and all the Phenician cities except Tyre—calculated that the seamen belonging to these cities would follow their countrymen at home and bring away their ships to join him. He hoped also, as the victorious potentate, to draw to himself the willing adhesion of the Cyprian cities. This could hardly have failed to happen if he had treated the Tyrians with decent consideration; but it was no longer certain, now that he had made them his enemies.

What passed among the Persian fleet under Autophradates in the Ægean, when they were informed, first that Alexander was master of the other Phenician cities; next, that he was commencing the siege of Tyre—we know very imperfectly. The Tyrian prince Azemilchus brought home his ships for the defence of his own city;[317] the Sidonian and Aradian ships also went home, no longer serving against a power to whom their own cities had submitted; but the Cyprians hesitated longer before they declared themselves. If Darius, or even Autophradates without Darius, instead of abandoning Tyre altogether (as they actually did), had energetically aided the resistance which it offered to Alexander, as the interests of Persia dictated—the Cypriot ships might not improbably have been retained on that side in the struggle. Lastly, the Tyrians might indulge a hope, that their Phenician brethren, if ready to serve Alexander against Persia, would be nowise hearty as his instruments for crushing a kindred city. These contingencies, though ultimately they all turned out in favor of Alexander, were in the beginning sufficiently promising to justify the intrepid resolution of the Tyrians; who were farther encouraged by promises of aid from the powerful fleets of their colony Carthage. To that city, whose deputies were then within their walls for some religious solemnities, they sent many of their wives and children.[318]

Alexander began the siege of Tyre without any fleet; the Sidonian and Aradian ships not having yet come. It was his first task to construct a solid mole two hundred feet broad, reaching across the half mile channel between the mainland and the islet. He pressed into his service laboring hands by thousands from the neighborhood; he had stones in abundance from Palætyrus, and wood from the forests in Lebanon. But the work, though prosecuted with ardor and perseverance, under pressing instigations from Alexander, was tedious and toilsome, even near the mainland, where the Tyrians could do little to impede it; and became far more tedious as it advanced into the sea, so as to be exposed to their obstruction, as well as to damage from winds and waves. The Tyrian triremes and small boats perpetually annoyed the workmen, and destroyed parts of the work, in spite of all the protection devised by the Macedonians, who planted two towers in front of their advancing mole, and discharged projectiles from engines provided for the purpose. At length, by unremitting efforts, the mole was pushed forward until it came nearly across the channel to the city wall; when suddenly, on a day of strong wind, the Tyrians sent forth a fireship loaded with combustibles, which they drove against the front of the mole and set fire to the two towers. At the same time, the full naval force of the city, ships and little boats, was

sent forth to land men at once on all parts of the mole. So successful was this attack, that all the Macedonian engines were burnt,—the outer wood-work which kept the mole together was torn up in many places,—and a large part of the structure came to pieces.[319]

Alexander had thus not only to construct fresh engines, but also to begin the mole nearly anew. He resolved to give it greater breadth and strength, for the purpose of carrying more towers abreast in front, and for better defence against lateral attacks. But it had now become plain to him, that while the Tyrians were masters of the sea, no efforts by land alone would enable him to take the town. Leaving Perdikkas and Kraterus to reconstruct the mole and build new engines, he himself repaired to Sidon, for the purpose of assembling as large a fleet as he could. He got together triremes from various quarters—two from Rhodes, ten from the seaports in Lykia, three from Soli and Mallus. But his principal force was obtained by putting in requisition the ships of the Phenician towns, Sidon, Byblus, and Aradus, now subject to him. These ships, eighty in number, had left the Persian admiral and come to Sidon, there awaiting his orders; while not long afterwards, the princes of Cyprus came thither also, tendering to him their powerful fleet of 120 ships of war.[320] He was now master of a fleet of 200 sail, comprising the most part and the best part, of the Persian navy. This was the consummation of Macedonian triumph—the last real and effective weapon wrested from the grasp of Persia. The prognostic afforded by the eagle near the ships at Miletus, as interpreted by Alexander, had now been fulfilled; since by successful operations on land, he had conquered and brought into his power a superior Persian fleet.[321]

Having directed these ships to complete their equipments and training, with Macedonians as soldiers on board, Alexander put himself at the head of some light troops for an expedition of eleven days against the Arabian mountaineers on Libanus, whom he dispersed or put down, though not without some personal exposure and hazard.[322] On returning to Sidon, he found Kleander arrived with a reinforcement of 4000 Grecian hoplites, welcome auxiliaries for prosecuting the siege. Then, going aboard his fleet in the harbor of Sidon, he sailed with it in good battle order to Tyre, hoping that the Tyrians would come out and fight. But they kept within, struck with surprise and consternation; having not before known that their fellow-Phenicians were now among the besiegers. Alexander, having ascertained that the Tyrians would not accept a sea-fight, immediately caused their two harbors to be blocked up and watched; that on the north, towards Sidon, by the Cyprians—that on the south, towards Egypt, by the Phenicians.[323]

From this time forward, the doom of Tyre was certain. The Tyrians could no longer offer obstruction to the mole, which was completed across the channel and brought up to the town. Engines were planted upon it to batter the walls: movable towers were rolled up to take them by assault; attack was also made from seaward. Yet though reduced altogether to the defensive, the Tyrians still displayed obstinate

bravery, and exhausted all the resources of ingenuity in repelling the besiegers. So gigantic was the strength of the wall fronting the mole, and even that of the northern side fronting Sidon, that none of Alexander's engines could make any breach in it; but on the south side towards Egypt he was more successful. A large breach having been made in this south-wall, he assaulted it with two ships manned by the hypaspists and the soldiers of his phalanx: he himself commanded in one and Admêtus in the other. At the same time he caused the town to be menaced all round, at every approachable point, for the purpose of distracting the attention of the defenders. Himself and his two ships having been rowed close up to the breach in the south wall, boarding bridges were thrown out from each deck, upon which he and Admêtus rushed forward with their respective storming-parties. Admêtus got upon the wall, but was there slain; Alexander also was among the first to mount, and the two parties got such a footing on the wall as to overpower all resistance. At the same time, his ships also forced their way into the two harbors, so that Tyre came on all sides into his power.[324]

Though the walls were now lost, and resistance had become desperate, the gallant defenders did not lose their courage. They barricaded the streets, and concentrated their strength especially at a defensible post called the Agenorion, or chapel of Agenor. Here the battle again raged furiously until they were overpowered by the Macedonians, incensed with the long toils of the previous siege, as well as by the slaughter of some of their prisoners, whom the Tyrians had killed publicly on the battlements. All who took shelter in the temple of Hêraklês were spared by Alexander from respect to the sanctuary: among the number were the prince Azemilchus, a few leading Tyrians, the Carthaginian envoys, and some children of both sexes. The Sidonians also, displaying a tardy sentiment of kindred, and making partial amends for the share which they had taken in the capture, preserved some lives from the sword of the conqueror.[325] But the greater number of the adult freemen perished with arms in their hands; while 2000 of them who survived, either from disabling wounds, or from the fatigue of the slaughterers, were hanged on the sea-shore by order of Alexander.[326] The females, the children, and the slaves, were sold to the slave-merchant. The number sold is said to have been about 30,000: a total rather small, as we must assume slaves to be included; but we are told that many had been previously sent away to Carthage.[327]

Thus master of Tyre, Alexander marched into the city and consummated his much-desired sacrifice to Herakles. His whole force, land and naval, fully armed and arrayed, took part in the procession. A more costly hecatomb had never been offered to that god, when we consider that it had been purchased by all the toils of an unnecessary siege, and by the extirpation of these free and high-spirited citizens, his former worshippers. What the loss of the Macedonians had been, we cannot say. The number of their slain is stated by Arrian at 400, which must be greatly beneath the truth; for the courage and skill of the besieged had prolonged the siege to the prodi-

gious period of seven months, though Alexander had left no means untried to accomplish it sooner.[328]

Towards the close of the siege of Tyre, Alexander received and rejected a second proposition from Darius, offering 10,000 talents, with the cession of all the territory westward of the Euphrates, as ransom for his mother and wife, and proposing that Alexander should become his son-in-law as well as his ally. "If I were Alexander (said Parmenio) I should accept such terms, instead of plunging into farther peril."—"So would I (replied Alexander) if I were Parmenio; but since I am Alexander, I must return a different answer." His answer to Darius was to this effect—"I want neither your money nor your cession. All your money and territory are already mine, and you are tendering to me a part in place of the whole. If I choose to marry your daughter, I *shall* marry her—whether you give her to me or not. Come hither to me, if you wish to obtain from me any act of friendship."[329] Alexander might spare the submissive and the prostrate; but he could not brook an equal or a competitor, and his language towards them was that of brutal insolence. Of course this was the last message sent by Darius, who now saw, if he had not before seen, that he had no chance open except by the renewal of war.

Being thus entire master of Syria, Phenicia, and Palestine, and having accepted the voluntary submission of the Jews, Alexander marched forward to conquer Egypt. He had determined, before he undertook any farther expedition into the interior of the Persian empire, to make himself master of all the coast-lands which kept open the communications of the Persians with Greece, so as to secure his rear against any serious hostility. His great fear was, of Grecian soldiers or cities raised against him by Persian gold;[330] and Egypt was the last remaining possession of the Persians, which gave them the means of acting upon Greece. Those means were indeed now prodigiously curtailed by the feeble condition of the Persian fleet in the Ægean, unable to contend with the increasing fleet of the Macedonian admirals Hegelochus and Amphoterus, now numbering 160 sail.[331] During the summer of 332 B. C., while Alexander was prosecuting the siege of Tyre, these admirals recovered all the important acquisitions—Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos—which had been made by Memnon for the Persian interests. The inhabitants of Tenedos invited them and ensured their success; those of Chios attempted to do the same, but were coerced by Pharnabazus, who retained the city by means of his insular partisans, Apollonides and others, with a military force. The Macedonian admirals laid siege to the town, and were presently enabled to carry it by their friends within. Pharnabazus was here captured with his entire force; twelve triremes thoroughly armed and manned, thirty store-ships, several privateers, and 3000 Grecian mercenaries. Aristonikus, philo-Persian despot of Methymna—arriving at Chios shortly afterwards, but ignorant of the capture—was entrapped into the harbor, and made prisoner. There remained only Mitylênê, which was held for the Persians by the Athenian Chares, with a garrison of 2000 men; who, however, seeing no hope of holding out against the Macedonians, consented to evac-

uate the city on condition of a free departure. The Persians were thus expelled from the sea, from all footing among the Grecian islands, and from the vicinity of Greece and Macedonia.[332]

These successes were in full progress, when Alexander himself directed his march from Tyre to Egypt, stopping in his way to besiege Gaza. This considerable town, the last before entering on the desert track between Syria and Egypt, was situated between one and two miles from the sea. It was built upon a lofty artificial mound, and encircled with a high wall; but its main defence was derived from the deep sands immediately around it, as well as from the mud and quicksand on its coast. It was defended by a brave man, the eunuch Batis, with a strong garrison of Arabs, and abundant provision of every kind. Confiding in the strength of the place, Batis refused to admit Alexander. Moreover his judgment was confirmed by the Macedonian engineers themselves, who, when Alexander first surveyed the walls, pronounced it to be impregnable, chiefly from the height of its supporting mound. But Alexander could not endure the thought of tacitly confessing his inability to take Gaza. The more difficult the enterprise, the greater was the charm for him, and the greater would be the astonishment produced all around when he should be seen to have triumphed.[333]

He began by erecting a mound south of the city, close by the wall, for the purpose of bringing up his battering engines. This external mound was completed, and the engines had begun to batter the wall, when a well-planned sally by the garrison overthrew the assailants and destroyed the engines. The timely aid of Alexander himself with his hypaspists, protected their retreat; but he himself, after escaping a snare from a pretended Arabian deserter, received a severe wound through the shield and the breastplate into the shoulder, by a dart discharged from a catapult; as the prophet Aristander had predicted—giving assurance at the same time, that Gaza would fall into his hands.[334] During the treatment of his wound, he ordered the engines employed at Tyre to be brought up by sea; and caused his mound to be carried around the whole circumference of the town, so as to render it approachable from every point. This Herculean work, the description of which we read with astonishment, was 250 feet high all round, and two stadia (1240 feet) broad[335]; the loose sand around could hardly have been suitable, so that materials must have been brought up from a distance. The undertaking was at length completed; in what length of time we do not know, but it must have been considerable—though doubtless thousands of laborers would be pressed in from the circumjacent country.[336]

Gaza was now attacked at all points by battering-rams, by mines, and by projectile engines with various missiles. Presently the Walls were breached in several places, though the defenders were unremitting in their efforts to repair the damaged parts. Alexander attempted three distinct general assaults; but in all three he was repulsed by the bravery of the Gazæans. At length, after still farther breaching the wall, he renewed for the fourth time his attempt to storm. The entire Macedonian phalanx being brought up to attack at different points, the greatest emulation

reigned among the officers. The Æakid Neoptolemus was first to mount the wall; but the other divisions manifested hardly less ardor, and the town was at length taken. Its gallant defenders resisted, with unabated spirit, to the last; and all fell in their posts, the incensed soldiery being no way disposed to give quarter.

One prisoner alone was reserved for special treatment—the prince or governor himself, the eunuch Batis; who, having manifested the greatest energy and valor, was taken severely wounded, yet still alive. In this condition he was brought by Leonatus and Philôtas into the presence of Alexander, who cast upon him looks of vengeance and fury. The Macedonian prince had undertaken the siege mainly in order to prove to the world that he could overcome difficulties insuperable to others. But he had incurred so much loss, spent so much time and labor, and undergone so many repulses before he succeeded,—that the palm of honor belonged rather to the minority vanquished than to the multitude of victors. To such disappointment, which would sting Alexander in the tenderest point, is to be added the fact, that he had himself incurred great personal risk and received a severe wound. Here was ample ground for violent anger; which was moreover still farther exasperated by the appearance of Batis—an eunuch—a black man—tall and robust, but at the same time fat and lumpish—and doubtless at the moment covered with blood and dirt. Such visible circumstances, repulsive to eyes familiar with Grecian gymnastics, contributed to kindle the wrath of Alexander to its highest pitch. After the siege of Tyre, his indignation had been satiated by the hanging of the 2000 surviving combatants; here, to discharge the pressure of a still stronger feeling, there remained only the single captive, upon whom therefore he resolved to inflict a punishment as novel as it was cruel. He directed the feet of Batis to be bored, and brazen rings to be passed through them; after which the naked body of this brave man, yet surviving, was tied with cords to the tail of a chariot driven by Alexander himself, and dragged at full speed amidst the triumphant jeers and shouts of the army.[337] Herein Alexander, emulous even from childhood of the exploits of his legendary ancestor Achilles, copied the ignominious treatment described in the Iliad as inflicted on the dead body of Hektor.[338]

This proceeding of Alexander, the product of Homeric reminiscences operating upon an infuriated and vindictive temperament, stands out in respect of barbarity from all that we read respecting the treatment of conquered towns in antiquity. His remaining measures were conformable to received usage. The wives and children of the Gazæans were sold into slavery. New inhabitants were admitted from the neighborhood, and a garrison was placed there to hold the town for the Macedonians.[339]

The two sieges of Tyre and Gaza, which occupied both together nine mouths,[340] were the hardest fighting that Alexander had ever encountered, or in fact ever did encounter throughout his life. After such toils, the march to Egypt, which he now commenced (October 332 B. C.), was an affair of holiday and triumph. Mazakes, the satrap of Egypt, having few Persian troops and a disaffected native population, was

noway disposed to resist the approaching conqueror. Seven days' march brought Alexander and his army from Gaza to Pelusium, the frontier fortress of Egypt, commanding the eastern branch of the Nile, whither his fleet, under the command of Hephæstion, had come also. Here he found not only open gates and a submissive governor, but also crowds of Egyptians assembled to welcome him.[341] He placed a garrison in Pelusium, sent his fleet up the river to Memphis, and marched himself to the same place by land. The satrap Mazakes surrendered himself, with all the treasure in the city, 800 talents in amount, and much precious furniture. Here Alexander reposed some time, offering splendid sacrifices to the gods generally, and especially to the Egyptian god Apis; to which he added gymnastic and musical matches, sending to Greece for the most distinguished artists.

From Memphis, he descended the westernmost branch of the Nile to Kanôpus at its mouth, from whence he sailed westerly along the shore to look at the island of Pharos, celebrated in Homer, and the lake Mareôtis. Reckoning Egypt now as a portion of his empire, and considering that the business of keeping down an unquiet population, as well as of collecting a large revenue, would have to be performed by his extraneous land and sea force, he saw the necessity of withdrawing the seat of government from Memphis, where both the Persians and the natives had maintained it, and of founding a new city of his own on the seaboard, convenient for communication with Greece and Macedonia. His imagination, susceptible to all Homeric impressions and influenced by a dream, first fixed upon the isle of Pharos as a suitable place for his intended city.[342] Perceiving soon, however, that this little isle was inadequate by itself, he included it as part of a larger city to be founded on the adjacent mainland. The gods were consulted, and encouraging responses were obtained; upon which Alexander himself marked out the circuit of the walls, the direction of the principal streets, and the sites of numerous temples to Grecian gods as well as Egyptian.[343] It was thus that the first stone was laid of the mighty, populous, and busy Alexandria; which however the founder himself never lived to see, and wherein he was only destined to repose as a corpse. The site of the place, between the sea and the Lake Mareôtis, was found airy and healthy, as well as convenient for shipping and commerce. The protecting island of Pharos gave the means of forming two good harbors for ships coming by sea, on a coast harborless elsewhere; while the Lake Mareôtis, communicating by various canals with the river Nile, received with facility the exportable produce from the interior.[344] As soon as houses were ready, commencement was made by transporting to them in mass the population of the neighboring town of Kanôpus, and probably of other towns besides, by the intendant Kleomenes.[345]

Alexandria became afterwards the capital of the Ptolemaic princes. It acquired immense grandeur and population during their rule of two centuries and a half, when their enormous revenues were spent greatly in its improvement and decoration. But we cannot reasonably ascribe to Alexander himself any prescience of such an impos-

ing future. He intended it as a place from which he could conveniently rule Egypt, considered as a portion of his extensive empire all round the Ægean; and had Egypt remained thus a fraction, instead of becoming a substantive imperial whole, Alexandria would probably not have risen beyond mediocrity.[346]

The other most notable incident, which distinguished the four or five months' stay of Alexander in Egypt, was his march through the sandy desert to the temple of Zeus Ammon. This is chiefly memorable as it marks his increasing self-adoration and inflation above the limits of humanity. His achievements during the last three years had so transcended the expectations of every one, himself included—the gods had given to him such incessant good fortune, and so paralyzed or put down his enemies—that the hypothesis of a superhuman personality seemed the natural explanation of such a superhuman career.[347] He had to look back to the heroic legends, and to his ancestors Perseus and Herakles, to find a worthy prototype.[348] Conceiving himself to be (like them) the son of Zeus, with only a nominal human parentage, he resolved to go and ascertain the fact by questioning the infallible oracle of Zeus Ammon. His march of several days, through a sandy desert—always fatiguing, sometimes perilous, was distinguished by manifest evidences of the favor of the gods. Unexpected rain fell just when the thirsty soldiers required water. When the guides lost their track, from shifting of the sand, on a sudden two speaking serpents, or two ravens, appeared preceding the march and indicating the right direction. Such were the statements made by Ptolemy, Aristobulus, and Kallisthenes, companions and contemporaries; while Arrian, four centuries afterwards, announces his positive conviction that there was a divine intervention on behalf of Alexander, though he cannot satisfy himself about the details.[349] The priest of Zeus Ammon addressed Alexander, as being the son of the god, and farther assured him that his career would be one of uninterrupted victory, until he was taken away to the gods; while his friends also, who consulted the oracle for their own satisfaction, received for answer that the rendering of divine honors to him would be acceptable to Zeus. After profuse sacrifices and presents, Alexander quitted the oracle, with a full and sincere faith that he really was the son of Zeus Ammon; which faith was farther confirmed by declarations transmitted to him from other oracles—that of Erythræ in Ionia, and of Branchidæ near Miletus.[350] Though he did not directly order himself to be addressed as the son of Zeus, he was pleased with those who volunteered such a recognition, and angry with sceptics or scoffers, who disbelieved the oracle of Ammon. Plutarch thinks that this was a mere political manœuvre of Alexander, for the purpose of overawing the non-Hellenic population over whom he was enlarging his empire.[351] But it seems rather to have been a genuine faith,—a simple exaggeration of that exorbitant vanity which from the beginning reigned so largely in his bosom. He was indeed aware that it was repugnant to the leading Macedonians in many ways, but especially as a deliberate insult to the memory of Philip. This is the theme always touched upon in moments of dissatisfaction. To Parmenio, to Philôtas, to Kleitus, and other principal officers, the insolence of the king in disclaiming Philip and putting himself above the level of hu-

manity, appeared highly offensive. Discontents on this subject among the Macedonian officers, though condemned to silence by fear and admiration of Alexander, became serious, and will be found re-appearing hereafter.[352]

The last month of Alexander's stay in Egypt was passed at Memphis. While nominating various officers for the permanent administration of the country, he also received a visit of Hegelochus his admiral, who brought as prisoners Aristonikus of Methymna, and other despots of the various insular Grecian cities. Alexander ordered them to be handed over to their respective cities, to be dealt with as the citizens pleased; all except the Chian Apollonides, who was sent to Elephantinê in the south of Egypt for detention. In most of the cities, the despots had incurred such violent hatred, that when delivered up, they were tortured and put to death.[353] Pharnabazus also had been among the prisoners, but had found means to escape from his guards when the fleet touched at Kos.[354]

In the early spring, after receiving reinforcements of Greeks and Thracians, Alexander marched into Phenicia. It was there that he regulated the affairs of Phenicia, Syria, and Greece, prior to his intended expedition into the interior against Darius. He punished the inhabitants of Samaria, who had revolted and burnt alive the Macedonian prefect Andromachus.[355] In addition to all the business transacted, Alexander made costly presents to the Tyrian Herakles, and offered splendid sacrifices to other gods. Choice festivals with tragedy were also celebrated, analogous to the Dionysia at Athens, with the best actors and chorists contending for the prize. The princes of Cyprus vied with each other in doing honor to the son of Zeus Ammon; each undertaking the duty of chorêgus, getting up at his own cost a drama with distinguished chorus and actors, and striving to obtain the prize from pre-appointed judges—as was practised among the ten tribes at Athens.[356]

In the midst of these religious and festive exhibitions, Alexander was collecting magazines for his march into the interior.[357] He had already sent forward a detachment to Thapsacus, the usual ford of the Euphrates, to throw bridges over the river. The Persian Mazæus was on guard on the other side, with a small force of 3000 men, 2000 of them Greeks; not sufficient to hinder the bridges from being built, but only to hinder them from being carried completely over to the left bank. After eleven days of march from Phenicia, Alexander and his whole army reached Thapsakus. Mazæus, on the other side, as soon as he saw the main army arrive, withdrew his small force without delay, and retreated to the Tigris; so that the two bridges were completed, and Alexander crossed forthwith.[358]

Once over the Euphrates, Alexander had the option of marching down the left bank of that river to Babylon, the chief city of the Persian empire, and the natural place to find Darius.[359] But this march (as we know from Xenophon, who made it with the Ten Thousand Greeks) would be one of extreme suffering and through a desert country where no provisions were to be got. Moreover, Mazæus in retreating

had taken a north-easterly direction towards the upper part of the Tigris; and some prisoners reported that Darius with his main army was behind the Tigris, intending to defend the passage of that river against Alexander. The Tigris appears not to be fordable below Nineveh (Mosul). Accordingly he directed his march, first nearly northward, having the Euphrates on his left hand; next eastward across Northern Mesopotamia, having the Armenian mountains on his left hand. On reaching the ford of the Tigris, he found it absolutely undefended. Not a single enemy being in sight, he forded the river as soon as possible, with all his infantry, cavalry, and baggage. The difficulties and perils of crossing were extreme, from the depth of the water, above their breasts, the rapidity of the current, and the slippery footing.[360] A resolute and vigilant enemy might have rendered the passage almost impossible. But the good fortune of Alexander was not less conspicuous in what his enemies left undone, than in what they actually did.[361]

After this fatiguing passage, Alexander rested for two days. During the night an eclipse of the moon occurred, nearly total; which spread consternation among the army, combined with complaints against his overweening insolence, and mistrust as to the unknown regions on which they were entering. Alexander, while offering solemn sacrifices to Sun, Moon, and Earth, combated the prevailing depression by declarations from his own prophet Aristander and from Egyptian astrologers, who proclaimed that Helios favored the Greeks, and Selênê the Persians; hence the eclipse of the moon portended victory to the Macedonians—and victory too (so Aristander promised), before the next new moon. Having thus reassured the soldiers, Alexander marched for four days in a south-easterly direction through the territory called Aturia, with the Tigris on his right hand, and the Gordyene or Kurd mountains on his left. Encountering a small advanced guard of the Persians, he here learnt from prisoners that Darius with his main host was not far off.[362]

Nearly two years had elapsed since the ruinous defeat of Issus. What Darius had been doing during this long interval, and especially during the first half of it, we are unable to say. We hear only of one proceeding on his part—his missions, twice repeated, to Alexander, tendering or entreating peace, with the especial view of recovering his captive family. Nothing else does he appear to have done, either to retrieve the losses of the past, or to avert the perils of the future; nothing, to save his fleet from passing into the hands of the conqueror; nothing, to relieve either Tyre or Gaza, the sieges of which collectively occupied Alexander for near ten months. The disgraceful flight of Darius at Issus had already lost him the confidence of several of his most valuable servants. The Macedonian exile Amyntas, a brave and energetic man, with the best of the Grecian mercenaries, gave up the Persian cause as lost,[363] and tried to set up for himself, in which attempt he failed and perished in Egypt. The satrap of Egypt, penetrated with contempt for the timidity of his master, was induced, by that reason as well as by others, to throw open the country to Alexander.

[364] Having incurred so deplorable a loss, as well in reputation as in territory, Darius had the strongest motives to redeem it by augmented vigor.

But he was paralyzed by the fact, that his mother, his wife, and several of his children, had fallen into the hands of the conqueror. Among the countless advantages growing out of the victory of Issus, this acquisition was not the least. It placed Darius in the condition of one who had given hostages for good behavior to his enemy. The Persian kings were often in the habit of exacting from satraps or generals the deposit of their wives and families, as a pledge for fidelity; and Darius himself had received this guarantee from Memnon, as a condition of entrusting him with the Persian fleet.[365] Bound by the like chains himself, towards one who had now become his superior, Darius was afraid to act with energy, lest success should bring down evil upon his captive family. By allowing Alexander to subdue unopposed all the territory west of the Euphrates, he hoped to be allowed to retain his empire eastward, and to ransom back his family at an enormous price. Such propositions did satisfy Parmenio, and would probably have satisfied even Philip, had Philip been the victor. The insatiate nature of Alexander had not yet been fully proved. It was only when the latter contemptuously rejected everything short of surrender at discretion, that Darius began to take measures east of the Euphrates for defending what yet remained.

The conduct of Alexander towards the regal hostages, honorable as it was to his sentiment, evinced at the same time that he knew their value as a subject of political negotiation.[366] It was essential that he should treat them with the full deference due to their rank, if he desired to keep up their price as hostages in the eyes of Darius as well as of his own army. He carried them along with his army, from the coast of Syria, over the bridge of the Euphrates, and even through the waters of the Tigris. To them, this must have proved a severe toil; and in fact, the queen Statira became so worn out that she died shortly after crossing the Tigris;[367] to him also, it must have been an onerous obligation, since he not only sought to ensure to them all their accustomed pomp, but must have assigned a considerable guard to watch them, at a moment when he was marching into an unknown country, and required all his military resources to be disposable. Simply for safe detention, the hostages would have been better guarded and might have been treated with still greater ceremony, in a city or a fortress. But Alexander probably wished to have them near him, in case of the possible contingency of serious reverses to his army on the eastern side of the Tigris. Assuming such a misfortune to happen, the surrender of them might ensure a safe retreat under circumstances otherwise fatal to its accomplishment.

Being at length convinced that Alexander would not be satisfied with any prize short of the entire Persian empire, Darius summoned all his forces to defend what he still retained. He brought together a host said to be superior in number to that which had been defeated at Issus.[368] Contingents arrived from the farthest extremities of the vast Persian territory—from the Caspian sea, the rivers Oxus and Indus, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea. The plains eastward of the Tigris, about the latitude of

the modern town of Mosul, between that river and the Gordyene mountains (Zagros), were fixed upon for the muster of this prodigious multitude; partly conducted by Darius himself from Babylon, partly arriving there by different routes from the north, east, and south. Arbêla—a considerable town about twenty miles east of the Great Zab river, still known under the name of Erbil, as a caravan station on the ordinary road between Erzeroum and Bagdad—was fixed on as the muster-place or head-quarters, where the chief magazines were collected and the heavy baggage lodged, and near which the troops were first assembled and exercised.[369]

But the spot predetermined for a pitched battle was, the neighborhood of Gaugamela near the river Bumôdus, about thirty miles west of Arbêla, towards the Tigris, and about as much south-east of Mosul—a spacious and level plain, with nothing more than a few undulating slopes, and without any trees. It was by nature well adapted for drawing up a numerous army, especially for the free manœuvres of cavalry, and the rush of scythed chariots; moreover, the Persian officers had been careful beforehand to level artificially such of the slopes as they thought inconvenient.[370] There seemed every thing in the ground to favor the operation both of the vast total, and the special forces, of Darius; who fancied that his defeat at Issus had been occasioned altogether by his having adventured himself in the narrow defiles of Kilikia—and that on open and level ground his superior numbers must be triumphant. He was even anxious that Alexander should come and attack him on the plain. Hence the undefended passage of the Tigris.

For those who looked only to numbers, the host assembled at Arbêla might well inspire confidence; for it is said to have consisted of 1,000,000 of infantry[371]—40,000 cavalry—200 scythed chariots—and fifteen elephants; of which animals we now read for the first time in a field of battle. But besides the numbers, Darius had provided for his troops more effective arms; instead of mere javelins, strong swords and short thrusting pikes, such as the Macedonian cavalry wielded so admirably in close combat—together with shields for the infantry and breastplates for the horsemen.[372] He counted much also on the terrific charge of the chariots, each of which had a pole projecting before the horses and terminating in a sharp point, together with three sword-blades stretching from the yoke on each side, and scythes also laterally from the naves of the wheels.[373]

Informed of the approach of Alexander, about the time when the Macedonian army first reached the Tigris, Darius moved from Arbêla, where his baggage and treasure were left—crossed by bridges the river Lykus or Great Zab, an operation which occupied five days—and marched to take post on the prepared ground near Gaugamela. His battle array was formed—of the Baktrians on the extreme left, under command of Bessus the satrap of Baktria; next, the Dahæ and Arachôti, under command of Barsäentes, satrap of Arachosia; then the native Persians, horse and foot alternating—the Susians, under Oxathres,—and the Kadusians. On the extreme right were the contingents of Syria both east and west of the Euphrates, under Mazæus;

then the Medes, under Atropates; next, the Parthians, Sakæ, Tapyrians, and Hyrkanians, all cavalry, under Phrataphernes; then the Albanians and the Sakesinæ. Darius himself was in the centre, with the choice troops of the army near and around him—the Persian select Horse-guards, called the king's kinsmen—the Persian foot-guards, carrying pikes with a golden apple at the butt-end—a regiment of Karians, or descendants of Karians, who had been abstracted from their homes and planted as colonists in the interior of the empire—the contingent of Mardi, good archers—and lastly, the mercenary Greeks, of number unknown, in whom Darius placed his greatest confidence.

Such was the first or main line of the Persians. In the rear of it stood deep masses of Babylonians,—inhabitants of Sittakê down to the Persian Gulf—Uxians, from the territory adjoining Susiana to the east—and others in unknown multitude. In front of it were posted the scythed chariots, with small advanced bodies of cavalry—Scythians and Baktrians on the left, with one hundred chariots—Armenians and Kappadokians on the right, with fifty more—and the remaining fifty chariots in front of the centre.[374]

Alexander had advanced within about seven miles of the Persian army, and four days' march since his crossing the Tigris—when he first learnt from Persian prisoners how near his enemies were. He at once halted, established on the spot a camp with ditch and stockade; and remained there for four days, in order that the soldiers might repose. On the night of the fourth day, he moved forward, yet leaving under guard in the camp the baggage, the prisoners, and the ineffectives. He began his march, over a range of low elevations which divided him from the enemy, hoping to approach and attack them at daybreak. But his progress was so retarded, that day broke, and the two armies first came in sight, when he was still on the descending slope of the ground, more than three miles distant. On seeing the enemy, he halted, and called together his principal officers, to consult whether he should not prosecute his march and commence the attack forthwith.[375] Though most of them pronounced for the affirmative, yet Parmenio contended that this course would be rash; that the ground before them, with all its difficulties, natural or artificial, was unknown, and that the enemy's position, which they now saw for the first time, ought to be carefully reconnoitred. Adopting this latter view, Alexander halted for the day; yet still retaining his battle order, and forming a new entrenched camp, to which the baggage and the prisoners were now brought forward from the preceding day's encampment.[376] He himself spent the day, with an escort of cavalry and light troops, in reconnoitring both the intermediate ground and the enemy, who did not interrupt him, in spite of their immense superiority in cavalry. Parmenio, with Polysperchon and others, advised him to attack the enemy in the night; which promised some advantages, since Persian armies were notoriously unmanageable by night,[377] and since their camp had no defence. But on the other hand, the plan involved so many disadvantages and perils, that Alexander rejected it; declaring—with an emphasis in-

tentionally enhanced, since he spoke in the hearing of many others—that he disdained the meanness of stealing a victory; that he both would conquer, and could conquer, Darius fairly and in open daylight.[378] Having then addressed to his officers a few brief encouragements, which met with enthusiastic response, he dismissed them to their evening meal and repose.

On the next morning, he marshalled his army, consisting of 40,000 foot, and 7000 horse, in two lines.[379] The first or main line was composed, on the right, of the eight squadrons of Companion-cavalry, each with its separate captain, but all under the command of Philôtas, son of Parmenio. Next (proceeding from right to left) came the Agêma or chosen band of the Hypaspistæ—then the remaining Hypaspistæ, under Nikanor—then the phalanx properly so called, distributed into six divisions, under the command of Kœnus, Perdikkas, Meleager, Polysperchon, Simmias, and Kraterus, respectively.[380] Next on the left of the phalanx, were ranged the allied Grecian cavalry, Lokrian and Phokian, Phthiot, Malians, and Peloponnesians; after whom, at the extreme left, came the Thessalians under Philippus—among the best cavalry in the army, hardly inferior to the Macedonian Companions. As in the two former battles, Alexander himself took the command of the right half of the army, confiding the left to Parmenio.

Behind this main line, was placed a second or body of reserve, intended to guard against attacks in the flanks and rear, which the superior numbers of the Persians rendered probable. For this purpose, Alexander reserved,—on the right, the light cavalry or Lancers—the Pæonians, under Aretes and Aristo—half the Agrianes, under Attalus—the Macedonian archers, under Brisson—and the mercenaries of old service, under Kleander; on the left, various bodies of Thracian and allied cavalry, under their separate officers. All these different regiments were held ready to repel attack either in flank or rear. In front of the main line were some advanced squadrons of cavalry and light troops—Grecian cavalry, under Menidas on the right, and under Andromachus on the left—a brigade of darters under Balakrus, together with Agrianian darters, and some bowmen. Lastly, the Thracian infantry were left to guard the camp and baggage.[381]

Forewarned by a deserter, Alexander avoided the places where iron spikes had been planted to damage the Macedonian cavalry.[382] He himself, at the head of the Royal Squadron, on the extreme right, led the march obliquely in that direction, keeping his right somewhat in advance. As he neared the enemy, he saw Darius himself with the Persian left centre immediately opposed to him—Persian guards, Indians, Albanians, and Karians. Alexander went on inclining to the right, and Darius stretching his front towards the left to counteract this movement, but still greatly outflanking the Macedonians to the left. Alexander had now got so far to his right, that he was almost beyond the ground levelled by Darius for the operations of his chariots in front. To check any farther movement in this direction, the Baktrian 1000 horse and the Scythians in front of the Persian left, were ordered to make a circuit

and attack the Macedonian right flank. Alexander detached against them his regiment of cavalry under Menidas, and the action thus began.[383]

The Baktrian horse, perceiving the advance of Menidas, turned from their circuitous movement to attack him, and at first drove him back until he was supported by the other advanced detachments—Pæonians and Grecian cavalry. The Baktrians, defeated in their turn, were supported by the satrap Bessus with the main body of Baktrians and Scythians in the left portion of Darius's line. The action was here for some time warmly contested, with some loss to the Greeks; who at length however, by a more compact order against enemies whose fighting was broken and desultory, succeeded in pushing them out of their place in the line, and thus making a partial opening in it.[384]

While this conflict was still going on, Darius had ordered his scythed chariots to charge, and his main line to follow them, calculating on the disorder which he expected that they would occasion. But the chariots were found of little service. The horses were terrified, checked, or wounded, by the Macedonian archers and darters in front; who even found means to seize the reins, pull down the drivers, and kill the horses. Of the hundred chariots in Darius's front, intended to beat down the Macedonian ranks by simultaneous pressure along their whole line, many were altogether stopped or disabled; some turned right round, the horses refusing to face the protended pikes, or being scared with the noise of pike and shield struck together; some which reached the Macedonian line, were let through without mischief by the soldiers opening their ranks; a few only inflicted wounds or damage.[385]

As soon as the chariots were thus disposed of, and the Persian main force laid open as advancing behind them, Alexander gave orders to the troops of his main line, who had hitherto been perfectly silent,[386] to raise the war-shout and charge at a quick pace; at the same time directing Aretes with the Pæonians to repel the assailants on his right flank. He himself, discontinuing his slanting movement to the right, turned towards the Persian line, and dashed, at the head of all the Companion-cavalry, into that partial opening in it, which had been made by the flank movement of the Baktrians. Having by this opening got partly within the line, he pushed straight towards the person of Darius; his cavalry engaging in the closest hand-combat, and thrusting with their short pikes at the faces of the Persians. Here, as at the Granikus, the latter were discomposed by this mode of fighting—accustomed as they were to rely on the use of missiles, with rapid wheeling of the horse for renewed attack.[387] They were unable to prevent Alexander and his cavalry from gaining ground and approaching nearer to Darius; while at the same time, the Macedonian phalanx in front, with its compact order and long protended pikes, pressed upon the Persian line opposed to it. For a short interval, the combat here was close and obstinate; and it might have been much prolonged—since the best troops of Darius's army—Greeks, Karians, Persian guards, regal kinsmen, etc., were here posted,—had the king's courage been equal to that of his soldiers. But here, even worse than at Issus, the

flight of the army began with Darius himself. It had been the recommendation of Cyrus the younger, in attacking the army of his brother Artaxerxes at Kunaxa, to aim the main blow at the spot where his brother was in person—since he well knew that victory there was victory everywhere. Having already once followed this scheme successfully at Issus, Alexander repeated it with still more signal success at Arbêla. Darius, who had long been in fear, from the time when he first beheld his formidable enemy on the neighboring hills, became still more alarmed when he saw the scythed chariots prove a failure, and when the Macedonians, suddenly breaking out from absolute silence into an universal war-cry, came to close quarters with his troops, pressing towards and menacing the conspicuous chariot on which he stood.[388] The sight and hearing of this terrific *mêlée*, combined with the prestige already attaching to Alexander's name, completely overthrew the courage and self-possession of Darius. He caused his chariot to be turned round, and himself set the example of flight. [389]

From this moment, the battle, though it had lasted so short a time, was irreparably lost. The king's flight, followed of course immediately by that of the numerous attendants around him, spread dismay among all his troops, leaving them neither centre of command, nor chief to fight for. The best soldiers in his army, being those immediately around him, were under these circumstances the first to give way. The fierce onset of Alexander with the Companion-cavalry, and the unremitting pressure of the phalanx in front was obstructed by little else than a mass of disordered fugitives. During the same time, Aretes with his Pæonians had defeated the Baktrians on the right flank,[390] so that Alexander was free to pursue the routed main body,—which he did most energetically. The cloud of dust raised by the dense multitude is said to have been so thick, that nothing could be clearly seen, nor could the pursuers distinguish the track taken by Darius himself. Amidst this darkness, the cries and noises from all sides were only the more impressive; especially the sound from the whips of the charioteers, pushing their horses to full speed.[391] It was the dust alone which saved Darius himself from being overtaken by the pursuing cavalry.

While Alexander was thus fully successful on his right and centre, the scene on his left under Parmenio was different. Mazæus, who commanded the Persian right, after launching his scythed chariots (which may possibly have done more damage than those launched on the Persian left, though we have no direct information about them), followed it up by vigorously charging the Grecian and Thessalian horse in his front, and also by sending round a detachment of cavalry to attack them on their left flank.[392] Here the battle was obstinately contested, and success for some time doubtful. Even after the flight of Darius, Parmenio found himself so much pressed, that he sent a message to Alexander. Alexander, though full of mortification at relinquishing the pursuit, checked his troops, and brought them back to the assistance of his left, by the shortest course across the field of battle. The two left divisions of the phalanx, under Simmias and Kraterus, had already stopped short in the pursuit, on

receiving the like message from Parmenio; leaving the other four divisions to follow the advanced movement of Alexander.[393] Hence there arose a gap in the midst of the phalanx, between the four right divisions, and the two left; into which gap a brigade of Indian and Persian cavalry darted, galloping through the midst of the Macedonian line to get into the rear and attack the baggage.[394] At first this movement was successful, the guard was found unprepared, and the Persian prisoners rose at once to set themselves free; though Sisygambis, whom these prisoners were above measure anxious to liberate, refused to accept their aid, either from mistrust of their force, or gratitude for the good treatment received from Alexander.[395] But while these assailants were engaged in plundering the baggage, they were attacked in the rear by the troops forming the second Macedonian line, who though at first taken by surprise, had now had time to face about and reach the camp. Many of the Persian brigade were thus slain, the rest got off as they could.[396]

Mazæus maintained for a certain time fair equality, on his own side of the battle, even after the flight of Darius. But when, to the paralyzing effect of that fact in itself, there was added the spectacle of its disastrous effects on the left half of the Persian army, neither he nor his soldiers could persevere with unabated vigor in a useless combat. The Thessalian and Grecian horse, on the other hand, animated by the turn of fortune in their favor, pressed their enemies with redoubled energy and at length drove them to flight; so that Parmenio was victor, on his own side and with his own forces, before the succors from Alexander reached him.[397]

In conducting those succors, on his way back from the pursuit, Alexander traversed the whole field of battle, and thus met face to face some of the best Persian and Parthian cavalry, who were among the last to retire. The battle was already lost, and they were seeking only to escape. As they could not turn back, and had no chance for their lives except by forcing their way through his Companion-cavalry, the combat here was desperate and murderous; all at close quarters, cut and thrust with hand weapons on both sides contrary to the Persian custom. Sixty of the Macedonian cavalry were slain; and a still greater number, including Hephæstion, Kœnus, and Menidas, were wounded, and Alexander himself encountered great personal danger. He is said to have been victorious; yet probably most of these brave men forced their way through and escaped, though leaving many of their number on the field.[398]

Having rejoined his left, and ascertained that it was not only out of danger, but victorious, Alexander resumed his pursuit of the flying Persians, in which Parmenio now took part.[399] The host of Darius was only a multitude of disorderly fugitives, horse and foot mingled together. The greater part of them had taken no share in the battle. Here, as at Issus, they remained crowded in stationary and unprofitable masses, ready to catch the contagion of terror and to swell the number of runaways, so soon as the comparatively small proportion of real combatants in the front had been beaten. On recommencing the pursuit, Alexander pushed forward with such celerity, that numbers of the fugitives were slain or taken, especially at the passage

of the river Lykus;[400] where he was obliged to halt for a while, since his men as well as their horses were exhausted. At midnight, he again pushed forward, with such cavalry as could follow him, to Arbêla, in hopes of capturing the person of Darius. In this he was disappointed, though he reached Arbêla the next day. Darius had merely passed through it, leaving an undefended town, with his bow, shield, chariot, a large treasure, and rich equipage, as prey to the victor. Parmenio had also occupied without resistance the Persian camp near the field of battle, capturing the baggage, the camels, and the elephants.[401]

To state anything like positive numbers of slain or prisoners, is impossible. According to Arrian, 300,000 Persians were slain, and many more taken prisoners. Diodorus puts the slain at 90,000, Curtius at 40,000. The Macedonian killed were, according to Arrian, not more than 100—according to Curtius, 300: Diodorus states the slain at 500, besides a great number of wounded.[402] The estimate of Arrian is obviously too great on one side, and too small on the other; but whatever may be the numerical truth, it is certain that the prodigious army of Darius was all either killed, taken, or dispersed, at the battle of Arbêla. No attempt to form a subsequent army ever succeeded; we read of nothing stronger than divisions or detachments. The miscellaneous contingents of this once mighty empire, such at least among them as survived, dispersed to their respective homes and could never be again mustered in mass.

The defeat of Arbêla was in fact the death blow of the Persian empire. It converted Alexander into the Great King, and Darius into nothing better than a fugitive pretender. Among all the causes of the defeat—here as at Issus—the most prominent and indisputable was the cowardice of Darius himself. Under a king deficient not merely in the virtues of a general, but even in those of a private soldier, and who nevertheless insisted on commanding in person—nothing short of ruin could ensue. To those brave Persians whom he dragged into ruin along with him and who knew the real facts, he must have appeared as the betrayer of the empire. We shall have to recall this state of sentiment, when we describe hereafter the conspiracy formed by the Baktrian satrap Bessus. Nevertheless, even if Darius had behaved with unimpeachable courage, there is little reason to believe, that the defeat of Arbêla, much less that of Issus, could have been converted into a victory. Mere immensity of number, even with immensity of space, was of no efficacy without skill as well as bravery in the commander. Three-fourths of the Persian army were mere spectators, who did nothing, and produced absolutely no effect. The flank movement against Alexander's right, instead of being made by some unemployed division, was so carried into effect, as to distract the Baktrian troops from their place in the front line, and thus to create a fatal break, of which Alexander availed himself for his own formidable charge in front. In spite of amplitude of space—the condition wanting at Issus,—the attacks of the Persians on Alexander's flanks and rear were feeble and inefficient. After all, Darius relied mainly upon his front line of battle, strengthened by the scythed

chariots; these latter being found unprofitable, there remained only the direct conflict, wherein the strong point of the Macedonians resided.

On the other hand, in so far as we can follow the dispositions of Alexander, they appear the most signal example recorded in antiquity, of military genius and sagacious combination. He had really as great an available force as his enemies, because every company in his army was turned to account, either in actual combat, or in reserve against definite and reasonable contingences. All his successes, and this most of all, were fairly earned by his own genius and indefatigable effort, combined with the admirable organization of his army. But his good fortune was no less conspicuous in the unceasing faults committed by his enemies. Except during the short period of Memnon's command, the Persian king exhibited nothing but ignorant rashness alternating with disgraceful apathy; turning to no account his vast real power of resistance in detail—keeping back his treasures to become the booty of the victor—suffering the cities which stoutly held out to perish unassisted—and committing the whole fate of the empire on two successive occasions, to that very hazard which Alexander most desired.

The decisive character of the victory was manifested at once by the surrender of the two great capitals of the Persian empire—Babylon and Susa. To Babylon, Alexander marched in person; to Susa, he sent Philoxenus. As he approached Babylon, the satrap Mazæus met him with the keys of the city; Bagophanes, collector of the revenue, decorated the road of march with altars, sacrifices, and scattered flowers; while the general Babylonian population and their Chaldæan priests poured forth in crowds with acclamations and presents. Susa was yielded to Philoxenus with the same readiness, as Babylon to Alexander.[403] The sum of treasure acquired at Babylon was great: sufficient to furnish a large donative to the troops—600 drachms per man to the Macedonian cavalry, 500 to the foreign cavalry, 200 to the Macedonian infantry, and something less to the foreign infantry.[404] But the treasure found and appropriated at Susa was yet greater. It is stated at 50,000 talents[405] (= about £11,500,000 sterling), a sum which we might have deemed incredible, if we did not find it greatly exceeded by what is subsequently reported about the treasures in Persepolis. Of this Susian treasure four-fifths are said to have been in uncoined gold and silver, the remainder in golden Darics[406]; the untouched accumulations of several preceding kings, who had husbanded them against a season of unforeseen urgency. A moderate portion of this immense wealth, employed by Darius three years earlier to push the operations of his fleet, subsidize able Grecian Officers, and organize anti-Macedonian resistance—would have preserved both his life and his crown.

Alexander rested his troops for more than thirty days amidst the luxurious indulgences of Babylon. He gratified the feelings of the population and the Chaldæan priests by solemn sacrifices to Belus, as well as by directing that the temple of that god, and the other temples destroyed in the preceding century by Xerxes, should be rebuilt.[407] Treating the Persian empire now as an established conquest, he nomi-

nated the various satraps. He confirmed the Persian Mazæus in the satrapy of Babylon, but put along with them two Greeks as assistants and guarantees—Apollodorus of Amphipolis, as commander of the military force—Asklepiodorus as collector of the revenue. He rewarded the Persian traitor Mithrines, who had surrendered at his approach the strong citadel of Sardis, with the satrapy of Armenia. To that of Syria and Phenicia, he appointed Menes, who took with him 3000 talents, to be remitted to Antipater for levying new troops against the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus.[408] The march of Alexander from Babylon to Susa occupied twenty days; an easy route through a country abundantly supplied. At Susa he was joined by Amyntas son of Andromenes, with a large reinforcement of about 15,000 men—Macedonians, Greeks, and Thracians. There were both cavalry and infantry—and what is not the least remarkable, fifty Macedonian youths of noble family, soliciting admission into Alexander's corps of pages.[409] The incorporation of these new-comers into the army afforded him the opportunity for remodelling on several points the organization of his different divisions, the smaller as well as the larger.[410]

After some delay at Susa—and after confirming the Persian Abulites, who had surrendered the city, in his satrapy, yet not without two Grecian officers as guarantees, one commanding the military force, the other governor of the citadel—Alexander crossed the river Eulæus or Pasitigris, and directed his march to the south-east towards Persis proper, the ancient hearth or primitive seat from whence the original Persian conquerors had issued.[411] Between Susa and Persis lay a mountainous region occupied by the Uxii—rude but warlike shepherds, to whom the Great King himself had always been obliged to pay a tribute whenever he went from Susa to Persepolis, being unable with his inefficient military organization to overcome the difficulties of such a pass held by an enemy. The Uxii now demanded the like tribute from Alexander, who replied by inviting them to meet him at their pass and receive it. Meanwhile a new and little frequented mountain track had been made known to him, over which he conducted in person a detachment of troops so rapidly and secretly as to surprise the mountaineers in their own villages. He thus not only opened the usual mountain pass for the transit of his main army, but so cut to pieces and humiliated the Uxii, that they were forced to sue for pardon. Alexander was at first disposed to extirpate or expel them; but at length, at the request of the captive Sisygambis, permitted them to remain as subjects of the satrap of Susa, imposing a tribute of sheep, horses, and cattle, the only payment which their poverty allowed.[412]

But bad as the Uxian pass had been, there remained another still worse—called the Susian or Persian gates,[413] in the mountains which surrounded the plain of Persepolis, the centre of Persis proper. Ariobarzanes, satrap of the province, held this pass; a narrow defile walled across, with mountain positions on both sides, from whence the defenders, while out of reach themselves, could shower down missiles upon an approaching enemy. After four days of march, Alexander reached on the fifth day the Susian Gates; which, inexpugnable as they seemed, he attacked on the

ensuing morning. In spite of all the courage of his soldiers, however, he sustained loss without damaging his enemy, and was obliged to return to his camp. He was informed that there was no other track by which this difficult pass could be turned; but there was a long circuitous march of many days whereby it might be evaded, and another entrance found into the plain of Persepolis. To recede from any enterprise as impracticable, was a humiliation which Alexander had never yet endured. On farther inquiry, a Lykian captive, who had been for many years tending sheep as a slave on the mountains, acquainted him with the existence of a track known only to himself, whereby he might come on the flank of Ariobarzanes. Leaving Kraterus in command of the camp, with orders to attack the pass in front, when he should hear the trumpet give signal—Alexander marched forth at night at the head of a light detachment, under the guidance of the Lykian. He had to surmount incredible hardship and difficulty—the more so as it was mid-winter, and the mountain was covered with snow; yet such were the efforts of his soldiers and the rapidity of his movements, that he surprised all the Persian outposts, and came upon Ariobarzanes altogether unprepared. Attacked as they were at the same time by Kraterus also, the troops of the satrap were forced to abandon the Gates, and were for the most part cut to pieces. Many perished in their flight among the rocks and precipices; the satrap himself being one of a few that escaped.[414]

Though the citadel of Persepolis is described as one of the strongest of fortresses,[415] yet after this unexpected conquest of a pass hitherto deemed inexpugnable, few had courage to think of holding it against Alexander. Nevertheless Ariobarzanes, hastening thither from the conquered pass, still strove to organize a defence, and at least to carry off the regal treasure, which some in the town were already preparing to pillage. But Tiridates, commander of the garrison, fearing the wrath of the conqueror, resisted this, and despatched a message entreating Alexander to hasten his march. Accordingly Alexander, at the head of his cavalry, set forth with the utmost speed, and arrived in time to detain and appropriate the whole. Ariobarzanes, in a vain attempt to resist, was slain with all his companions. Persepolis and Pasargadæ—the two peculiar capitals of the Persian race, the latter memorable as containing the sepulchre of Cyrus the Great—both fell into the hands of the conqueror.[416]

On approaching Persepolis, the compassion of the army was powerfully moved by the sight of about 800 Grecian captives, all of them mutilated in some frightful and distressing way, by loss of legs, arms, eyes, ears, or some other bodily members. Mutilation was a punishment commonly inflicted in that age by Oriental governors, even by such as were not accounted cruel. Thus Xenophon, in eulogizing the rigid justice of Cyrus the younger, remarks that in the public roads of his satrapy, men were often seen who had been deprived of their arms or legs, or otherwise mutilated, by penal authority.[417] Many of these maimed captives at Persepolis were old, and had lived for years in their unfortunate condition. They had been brought up

from various Greek cities by order of some of the preceding Persian kings; but on what pretences they had been thus cruelly dealt with, we are not informed. Alexander, moved to tears at such a spectacle, offered to restore them to their respective homes, with a comfortable provision for the future. But most of them felt so ashamed of returning to their homes, that they entreated to be allowed to remain all together in Persis, with lands assigned to them, and with dependent cultivators to raise produce for them. Alexander granted their request in the fullest measure, conferring besides upon each an ample donation of money, clothing, and cattle.[418]

The sight of these mutilated Greeks was well calculated to excite not merely sympathy for them, but rage against the Persians, in the bosoms of all spectators. Alexander seized this opportunity, as well for satiating the anger and cupidity of his soldiers, as for manifesting himself in his self-assumed character of avenger of Greece against the Persians, to punish the wrongs done by Xerxes a century and a half before. He was now amidst the native tribes and seats of the Persians, the descendants of those rude warriors who, under the first Cyrus, had overspread Western Asia from the Indus to the Ægean. In this their home the Persian kings had accumulated their national edifices, their regal sepulchres, the inscriptions commemorative of their religious or legendary sentiment, with many trophies and acquisitions arising out of their conquests. For the purposes of the Great King's empire, Babylon, or Susa, or Ekbatana, were more central and convenient residences; but Persepolis was still regarded as the heart of Persian nationality. It was the chief magazine, though not the only one, of those annual accumulations from the imperial revenue, which each king successively increased, and which none seems to have ever diminished. Moreover, the Persian grandees and officers, who held the lucrative satrapies and posts of the empire, were continually sending wealth home to Persis, for themselves or their relatives. We may therefore reasonably believe what we find asserted, that Persepolis possessed at this time more wealth, public and private, than any place within the range of Grecian or Macedonian knowledge.[419]

Convening his principal officers, Alexander denounced Persepolis as the most hostile of all Asiatic cities,—the home of those impious invaders of Greece, whom he had come to attack. He proclaimed his intention of abandoning it to be plundered, as well as of burning the citadel. In this resolution he persisted, notwithstanding the remonstrance of Parmenio, who reminded him that the act would be a mere injury to himself by ruining his own property, and that the Asiatics would construe it as evidence of an intention to retire speedily, without founding any permanent dominion in the country.[420] After appropriating the regal treasure—to the alleged amount of 120,000 talents in gold and silver = £27,600,000 sterling[421]—Alexander set fire to the citadel. A host of mules, with 5000 camels, were sent for from Mesopotamia and elsewhere, to carry off this prodigious treasure; the whole of which was conveyed out of Persis proper, partly to be taken along with Alexander himself in his ulterior marches, partly to be lodged in Susa and Ekbatana. Six thousand talents more,

found in Pasargadæ, were added to the spoil.[422] The persons and property of the inhabitants were abandoned to the license of the soldiers, who obtained an immense booty, not merely in gold and silver, but also in rich clothing, furniture, and ostentatious ornaments of every kind. The male inhabitants were slain,[423] the females dragged into servitude; except such as obtained safety by flight, or burned themselves with their property in their own houses. Among the soldiers themselves, much angry scrambling took place for the possession of precious articles, not without occasional bloodshed.[424] As soon as their ferocity and cupidity had been satiated, Alexander arrested the massacre. His encouragement and sanction of it was not a burst of transient fury, provoked by unexpected length of resistance, such as the hanging of the 2000 Tyrians and the dragging of Batis at Gaza—but a deliberate proceeding, intended partly as a recompense and gratification to the soldiery, but still more as an imposing manifestation of retributive vengeance against the descendants of the ancient Persian invaders. In his own letters seen by Plutarch, Alexander described the massacre of the native Persians as having been ordered by him on grounds of state policy.[425]

As it was now winter or very early spring, he suffered his main army to enjoy a month or more of repose at or near Persepolis. But he himself, at the head of a rapidly moving division, traversed the interior of Persia proper; conquering or receiving into submission the various towns and villages.[426] The greatest resistance which he experienced was offered by the rude and warlike tribe called the Mardi; but worse than any enemy was the severity of the season and the rugged destitution of a frozen country. Neither physical difficulties, however, nor human enemies, could arrest the march of Alexander. He returned from his expedition, complete master of Persis; and in the spring, quitted that province with his whole army, to follow Darius into Media. He left only a garrison of 3000 Macedonians at Persepolis, preserving to Tiridates, who had surrendered to him the place, the title of satrap.[427]

Darius was now a fugitive, with the mere title of king, and with a simple bodyguard rather than an army. On leaving Arbêla after the defeat, he had struck in an easterly direction across the mountains into Media; having only a few attendants round him, and thinking himself too happy to preserve his own life from an indefatigable pursuer.[428] He calculated that, once across these mountains, Alexander would leave him for a time unmolested, in haste to march southward for the purpose of appropriating the great and real prizes of the campaign—Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis. The last struggles of this ill-starred prince will be recounted in another chapter.

CHAPTER XCIV.

MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CONQUESTS OF ALEXANDER, AFTER HIS WINTER-QUARTERS IN PERSIS, DOWN TO HIS DEATH AT BABYLON.

FROM this time forward to the close of Alexander's life—a period of about seven years—his time was spent in conquering the eastern half of the Persian empire, together with various independent tribes lying beyond its extreme boundary. But neither Greece, nor Asia Minor, nor any of his previous western acquisitions, was he ever destined to see again.

Now, in regard to the history of Greece—the subject of these volumes—the first portion of Alexander's Asiatic campaigns (from his crossing the Hellespont to the conquest of Persis, a period of four years, March 334 B. C., to March 330 B. C.), though not of direct bearing, is yet of material importance. Having in his first year completed the subjugation of the Hellenic world, he had by these subsequent campaigns absorbed it as a small fraction into the vast Persian empire, renovated under his imperial sceptre. He had accomplished a result substantially the same as would have been brought about if the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, destined, a century and a half before, to incorporate Greece with the Persian monarchy, had succeeded instead of failing.[429] Towards the kings of Macedonia alone, the subjugation of Greece would never have become complete, so long as she could receive help from the native Persian kings, who were perfectly adequate as a countervailing and tutelary force, had they known how to play their game. But all hope for Greece from without was extinguished, when Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis became subject to the same ruler as Pella and Amphipolis—and that ruler too, the ablest general, and most insatiate aggressor, of his age; to whose name was attached the prestige of success almost superhuman. Still, against even this overwhelming power, some of the bravest of the Greeks at home tried to achieve their liberation with the sword: we shall see presently how sadly the attempt miscarried.

But though the first four years of Alexander's Asiatic expedition, in which he conquered the Western half of the Persian empire, had thus an important effect on the condition and destinies of the Grecian cities—his last seven years, on which we are now about to enter, employed chiefly in conquering the Eastern half, scarcely touched these cities in any way. The stupendous marches to the rivers Jaxartes, Indus, and Hyphasis, which carried his victorious arms over so wide a space of Central Asia, not only added nothing to his power over the Greeks, but even withdrew him from all dealings with them, and placed him almost beyond their cognizance. To the historian of Greece, therefore, these latter campaigns can hardly be regarded as included within the range of his subject. They deserve to be told, as examples of military skill and energy, and as illustrating the character of the most illustrious general

of antiquity—one who, though not a Greek, had become the master of all Greeks. But I shall not think it necessary to recount them in any detail, like the battles of Issus and Arbêla.

About six or seven months had elapsed from the battle of Arbêla to the time when Alexander prepared to quit his most recent conquest—Persis proper. During all this time, Darius had remained at Ekbatana,[430] the chief city of Media, clinging to the hope, that Alexander, when possessed of the three southern capitals and the best part of the Persian empire, might have reached the point of satiation, and might leave him unmolested in the more barren East. As soon as he learnt that Alexander was in movement towards him, he sent forward his harem and his baggage to Hyrkania, on the south-eastern border of the Caspian sea. Himself, with the small force around him, followed in the same direction, carrying off the treasure in the city (7000 talents= £1,610,000 in amount), and passed through the Caspian Grates into the territory of Parthyênê. His only chance was to escape to Baktria at the eastern extremity of the empire, ruining the country in his way for the purpose of retarding pursuers. But this chance diminished every day, from desertion among his few followers, and angry disgust among many who remained.[431]

Eight days after Darius had quitted Ekbatana, Alexander entered it. How many days had been occupied in his march from Persepolis, we cannot say: in itself a long march, it had been farther prolonged, partly by the necessity of subduing the intervening mountaineers called Parætakeni,[432] partly by rumors exaggerating the Persian force at Ekbatana, and inducing him to advance with precaution and regular array. Possessed of Ekbatana—the last capital stronghold of the Persian kings, and their ordinary residence during the summer months—he halted to rest his troops, and establish a new base of operations for his future proceedings eastward. He made Ekbatana his principal depôt; depositing in the citadel, under the care of Harpalus as treasurer, with a garrison of 6000 or 7000 Macedonians, the accumulated treasures of his past conquests, out of Susa and Persepolis; amounting, we are told, to the enormous sum of 180,000 talents = £41,400,000 sterling.[433] Parmenio was invested with the chief command of this important post, and of the military force left in Media; of which territory Oxodates, a Persian who had been imprisoned at Susa by Darius, was named satrap.[434]

At Ekbatana Alexander was joined by a fresh force of 6000 Grecian mercenaries, [435] who had marched from Kilikia into the interior, probably crossing the Euphrates and Tigris at the same points as Alexander himself had crossed. Hence he was enabled the better to dismiss his Thessalian cavalry, with other Greeks who had been serving during his four years of Asiatic war, and who now wished to go home.[436] He distributed among them the sum of 2000 talents in addition to their full pay, and gave them the price of their horses, which they sold before departure. The operations which he was now about to commence against the eastern territories of Persia were not against regular armies, but against flying corps and distinct native tribes,

relying for defence chiefly on the difficulties which mountains, deserts, privation, or mere distance, would throw in the way of an assailant. For these purposes he required an increased number of light troops, and was obliged to impose even upon his heavy-armed cavalry the most rapid and fatiguing marches, such as none but his Macedonian Companions would have been contented to execute; moreover he was called upon to act less with large masses, and more with small and broken divisions. He now therefore for the first time established a regular Taxis, or division of horse-bowmen.[437]

Remaining at Ekbatana no longer than was sufficient for these new arrangements, Alexander recommenced his pursuit of Darius. He hoped to get before Darius to the Caspian Gates, at the north-eastern extremity of Media; by which Gates[438] was understood a mountain-pass, or rather a road of many hours' march, including several difficult passes stretching eastward along the southern side of the great range of Taurus towards Parthia. He marched with his Companion-cavalry, the light-horse, the Agrianians, and the bowmen—the greater part of the phalanx keeping up as well as it could—to Rhagæ, about fifty miles north of the Caspian Gates; which town he reached in eleven days, by exertions so severe that many men as well as horses were disabled on the road. But in spite of all speed, he learnt that Darius had already passed through the Caspian Gates. After five days of halt at Rhagæ, indispensable for his army, Alexander passed them also. A day's march on the other side of them, he was joined by two eminent Persians, Bagistanes and Antibêlus, who informed him that Darius was already dethroned and in imminent danger of losing his life.[439]

The conspirators by whom this had been done, were Bessus, satrap of Baktria—Barsaentes, satrap of Drangiana and Arachosia—and Nabarzanes, general of the regal guards. The small force of Darius having been thinned by daily desertion, most of those who remained were the contingents of the still unconquered territories, Baktria, Arachosia, and Drangiana, under the orders of their respective satraps. The Grecian mercenaries, 1500 in number, and Artabazus, with a band under his special command, adhered inflexibly to Darius, but the soldiers of Eastern Asia followed their own satraps. Bessus and his colleagues intended to make their peace with Alexander by surrendering Darius, should Alexander pursue so vigorously as to leave them no hope of escape; but if they could obtain time to reach Baktria and Sogdiana, they resolved to organize an energetic resistance, under their own joint command, for the defence of those eastern provinces—the most warlike population of the empire.[440] Under the desperate circumstances of the case, this plan was perhaps the least unpromising that could be proposed. The chance of resisting Alexander, small as it was at the best, became absolutely nothing under the command of Darius, who had twice set the example of flight from the field of battle, betraying both his friends and his empire, even when surrounded by the full force of Persia. For brave and energetic Persians, unless they were prepared at once to submit to the invader, there was no

choice but to set aside Darius; nor does it appear that the conspirators intended at first anything worse. At a village called Thara in Parthia, they bound him in chains of gold—placed him in a covered chariot surrounded by the Baktrian troops,—and thus carried him onward, retreating as fast as they could; Bessus assuming the command. Artabazus, with the Grecian mercenaries, too feeble to prevent the proceeding, quitted the army in disgust, and sought refuge among the mountains of the Tapuri bordering on Hyrkania towards the Caspian Sea.[441]

On hearing this intelligence, Alexander strained every nerve to overtake the fugitives and get possession of the person of Darius. At the head of his Companion-cavalry, his light-horse, and a body of infantry picked out for their strength and activity, he put himself in instant march, with nothing but arms and two days' provisions for each man; leaving Kraterus to bring on the main body by easier journeys. A forced march of two nights and one day, interrupted only by a short midday repose (it was now the month of July), brought him at daybreak to the Persian camp which his informant Bagistanes had quitted. But Bessus and his troops were already beyond it, having made considerable advance in their flight; upon which Alexander, notwithstanding the exhaustion both of men and horses, pushed on with increased speed through all the night to the ensuing day at noon. He there found himself in the village where Bessus had encamped on the preceding day. Yet learning from deserters that his enemies had resolved to hasten their retreat by night marches, he despaired of overtaking them, unless he could find some shorter road. He was informed that there was another shorter, but leading through a waterless desert. Setting out by this road late in the day with his cavalry, he got over no less than forty-five miles during the night, so as to come on Bessus by complete surprise on the following morning. The Persians, marching in disorder without arms, and having no expectation of an enemy, were so panic-struck at the sudden appearance of their indefatigable conqueror, that they dispersed and fled without any attempt to resist. In this critical moment, Bessus and Barsaentes urged Darius to leave his chariot, mount his horse, and accompany them in their flight. But he refused to comply. They were determined however that he should not fall alive into the hands of Alexander, whereby his name would have been employed against them, and would have materially lessened their chance of defending the eastern provinces; they were moreover incensed by his refusal, and had contracted a feeling of hatred and contempt to which they were glad to give effect. Casting their javelins at him, they left him mortally wounded, and then pursued their flight.[442] His chariot, not distinguished by any visible mark, nor known even to the Persian soldiers themselves, was for some time not detected by the pursuers. At length a Macedonian soldier named Polystratus found him expiring, and is said to have received his last words; wherein he expressed thanks to Alexander for the kind treatment of his captive female relatives, and satisfaction that the Persian throne, lost to himself, was about to pass to so generous a conqueror. It is at least certain that he never lived to see Alexander himself.[443]

Alexander had made the prodigious and indefatigable marches of the last four days, not without destruction to many men and horses, for the express purpose of taking Darius alive. It would have been a gratification to his vanity to exhibit the Great King as a helpless captive, rescued from his own servants by the sword of his enemy, and spared to occupy some subordinate command as a token of ostentatious indulgence. Moreover, apart from such feelings, it would have been a point of real advantage to seize the person of Darius, by means of whose name Alexander would have been enabled to stifle all farther resistance in the extensive and imperfectly known regions eastward of the Caspian Gates. The satraps of these regions had now gone thither with their hands free, to kindle as much Asiatic sentiment and levy as large a force as they could, against the Macedonian conqueror; who was obliged to follow them, if he wished to complete the subjugation of the empire. We can understand therefore that Alexander was deeply mortified in deriving no result from this ruinously fatiguing march, and can the better explain that savage wrath which we shall hereafter find him manifesting against the satrap Bessus.

Alexander caused the body of Darius to be buried with full pomp and ceremonial, in the regal sepulchres of Persis. The last days of this unfortunate prince have been described with almost tragic pathos by historians; and there are few subjects in history better calculated to excite such a feeling, if we regard simply the magnitude of his fall, from the highest pitch of power and splendor to defeat, degradation, and assassination. But an impartial review will not allow us to forget that the main cause of such ruin was his own blindness—his long apathy after the battle of Issus, and abandonment of Tyre and Gaza, in the fond hope of repurchasing queens whom he had himself exposed to captivity—lastly, what is still less pardonable, his personal cowardice in both the two decisive battles deliberately brought about by himself. If we follow his conduct throughout the struggle, we shall find little of that which renders a defeated prince either respectable or interesting. Those who had the greatest reason to denounce and despise him were his friends and his countrymen, whom he possessed ample means of defending, yet threw those means away. On the other hand, no one had better grounds for indulgence towards him than his conqueror; for whom he had kept unused the countless treasures of the three capitals, and for whom he had lightened in every way the difficulties of a conquest, in itself hardly less than impracticable.[444]

The recent forced march, undertaken by Alexander for the purpose of securing Darius as a captive, had been distressing in the extreme to his soldiers, who required a certain period of repose and compensation. This was granted to them at the town of Hekatompylus in Parthia, where the whole army was again united. Besides abundant supplies from the neighboring region, the soldiers here received a donative derived from the large booty taken in the camp of Darius.[445] In the enjoyment and revelry universal throughout the army, Alexander himself partook. His indulgences in the banquet and in wine-drinking, to which he was always addicted when leisure al-

lowed were now unusually multiplied and prolonged. Public solemnities were celebrated, together with theatrical exhibitions by artists who joined the army from Greece. But the change of most importance in Alexander's conduct was, that he now began to feel and act manifestly as successor of Darius on the Persian throne; to disdain the comparative simplicity of Macedonian habits, and to assume the pomp, the ostentatious apparatus of luxuries, and even the dress, of a Persian king.

To many of Alexander's soldiers, the conquest of Persia appeared to be consummated and the war finished, by the death of Darius. They were reluctant to exchange the repose and enjoyments of Hekatompylus for fresh fatigues; but Alexander, assembling the select regiments, addressed to them an emphatic appeal which revived the ardor of all.[446] His first march was, across one of the passes from the south to the north of Mount Elburz, into Hyrkania, the region bordering the south-eastern corner of the Caspian Sea. Here he found no resistance; the Hyrkanian satrap Phrataphernes, together with Nabarzanes, Artabazus, and other eminent Persians, surrendered themselves to him, and were favorably received. The Greek mercenaries, 1500 in number, who had served with Darius, but had retired when that monarch was placed under arrest by Bessus, sent envoys requesting to be allowed to surrender on capitulation. But Alexander—reproaching them with guilt for having taken service with the Persians, in contravention of the vote passed by the Hellenic synod—required them to surrender at discretion; which they expressed their readiness to do, praying that an officer might be despatched to conduct them to him in safety.[447] The Macedonian Andronikus was sent for this purpose, while Alexander undertook an expedition into the mountains of the Mardi; a name seemingly borne by several distinct tribes in parts remote from each other, but all poor and brave mountaineers. These Mardi occupied parts of the northern slope of the range of Mount Elburz a few miles from the Caspian Sea (Mazanderan and Ghilan). Alexander pursued them into all their retreats,—overcame them, when they stood on their defence, with great slaughter,—and reduced the remnant of the half-destroyed tribes to sue for peace. [448]

From this march, which had carried him in a westerly direction, he returned to Hyrkania. At the first halt he was met by the Grecian mercenaries who came to surrender themselves, as well as by various Grecian envoys from Sparta, Chalkedon, and Sinôpe, who had accompanied Darius in his flight. Alexander put the Lacedæmonians under arrest, but liberated the other envoys, considering Chalkedon and Sinôpe to have been subjects of Darius, not members of the Hellenic synod. As to the mercenaries, he made a distinction between those who had enlisted in the Persian service before the recognition of Philip as leader of Greece—and those whose enlistment had been of later date. The former he liberated at once; the latter he required to remain in his service under the command of Andronikus, on the same pay as they had hitherto received.[449] Such was the untoward conclusion of Grecian mercenary service with Persia; a system whereby the Persian monarchs, had they known how to

employ it with tolerable ability, might well have maintained their empire even against such an enemy as Alexander.[450]

After fifteen days of repose and festivity at Zeudracarta, the chief town of Hyrkania, Alexander marched eastward with his united army through Parthia into Aria—the region adjoining the modern Herat with its river now known as Herirood. Satibarzanes, the satrap of Aria, came to him near the border, to a town named Susia, [451] submitted, and was allowed to retain his satrapy; while Alexander, merely skirting the northern border of Aria, marched in a direction nearly east towards Baktria against the satrap Bessus, who was reported as having proclaimed himself King of Persia. But it was discovered, after three or four days, that Satibarzanes was in league with Bessus; upon which Alexander suspended for the present his plans against Baktria, and turned by forced marches to Artakoana, the chief city of Aria. [452] His return was so unexpectedly rapid, that the Arians were overawed, and Satibarzanes was obliged to escape. A few days enabled him to crush the disaffected Arians and to await the arrival of his rear division under Kraterus. He then marched southward into the territory of the Drangi, or Drangiana (the modern Seiestan), where he found no resistance—the satrap Barsaentes having sought safety among some of the Indians.[453]

In the chief town of Drangiana occurred the revolting tragedy, of which Philotas was the first victim, and his father Parmenio the second. Parmenio, now seventy years of age, and therefore little qualified for the fatigue inseparable from the invasion of the eastern satrapies, had been left in the important post of commanding the great depôt and treasure at Ekbatana. His long military experience, and confidential position even under Philip, rendered him the second person in the Macedonian army, next to Alexander himself. His three sons were all soldiers. The youngest of them, Hektor, had been accidentally drowned in the Nile, while in the suite of Alexander in Egypt; the second, Nikanor, had commanded the hypaspists or light infantry, but had died of illness, fortunately for himself, a short time before;[454] the eldest, Philotas, occupied the high rank of general of the Companion-cavalry, in daily communication with Alexander, from whom he received personal orders.

A revelation came to Philotas, from Kebalinus, brother of a youth named Nikomachus, that a soldier, named Dimnus of Chalastra, had made boast to Nikomachus, his intimate friend or beloved person, under vows of secrecy, of an intended conspiracy against Alexander, inviting him to become an accomplice.[455] Nikomachus, at first struck with abhorrence, at length simulated compliance, asked who were the accomplices of Dimnus, and received intimation of a few names; all of which he presently communicated to his brother Kebalinus, for the purpose of being divulged. Kebalinus told the facts to Philotas, entreating him to mention them to Alexander. But Philotas, though every day in communication with the king, neglected to do this for two days; upon which Kebalinus began to suspect him of connivance, and caused the revelation to be made to Alexander through one of the pages named Metron. Dimnus

was immediately arrested, but ran himself through with his sword, and expired without making any declaration.[456]

Of this conspiracy, real or pretended, every thing rested on the testimony of Nikomachus. Alexander indignantly sent for Philotas, demanding why he had omitted for two days to communicate what he had heard. Philotas replied, that the source from which it came was too contemptible to deserve notice—that it would have been ridiculous to attach importance to the simple declarations of such a youth as Nikomachus, recounting the foolish boasts addressed to him by a lover. Alexander received, or affected to receive, the explanation, gave his hand to Philotas, invited him to supper, and talked to him with his usual familiarity.[457]

But it soon appeared that advantage was to be taken of this incident for the disgrace and ruin of Philotas, whose free-spoken criticisms on the pretended divine paternity,—-coupled with boasts, that he and his father Parmenio had been chief agents in the conquest of Asia,—had neither been forgotten nor forgiven. These, and other self-praises, disparaging to the glory of Alexander, had been divulged by a mistress to whom Philotas was attached; a beautiful Macedonian woman of Pydna, named Antigonê, who, having first been made a prize in visiting Samothrace by the Persian admiral Autophradates, was afterwards taken amidst the spoils of Damascus by the Macedonians victorious at Issus. The reports of Antigonê, respecting some unguarded language held by Philotas to her, had come to the knowledge of Kraterus, who brought her to Alexander, and caused her to repeat them to him. Alexander desired her to take secret note of the confidential expressions of Philotas, and report them from time to time to himself.[458]

It thus turned out that Alexander, though continuing to Philotas his high military rank, and talking to him constantly with seeming confidence, had for at least eighteen months, ever since his conquest of Egypt and perhaps even earlier, disliked and suspected him, keeping him under perpetual watch through the suborned and secret communications of a treacherous mistress.[459] Some of the generals around Alexander—especially Kraterus, the first suborner of Antigonê—fomented these suspicions, from jealousy of the great ascendency of Parmenio and his family. Moreover, Philotas himself was ostentatious and overbearing in his demeanor, so as to have made many enemies among the soldiers.[460] But whatever may have been his defects on this head—defects which he shared with the other Macedonian generals, all gorged with plunder and presents[461]—his fidelity as well as his military merits stand attested by the fact that Alexander had continued to employ him in the highest and most confidential command throughout all the long subsequent interval; and that Parmenio was now general at Ekbatana, the most important military appointment which the king had to confer. Even granting the deposition of Nikomachus to be trustworthy, there was nothing to implicate Philotas, whose name had not been included among the accomplices said to have been enumerated by Dimnus. There was not a tittle of evidence against him, except the fact that the deposition had been made known to him,

and that he had seen Alexander twice without communicating it. Upon this single fact, however, Kraterus, and the other enemies of Philotas, worked so effectually as to inflame the suspicions and the pre-existing ill-will of Alexander into fierce rancor. He resolved on the disgrace, torture, and death of Philotas,—and on the death of Parmenio besides.[462]

To accomplish this, however, against the two highest officers in the Macedonian service, one of them enjoying a separate and distant command—required management. Alexander was obliged to carry the feelings of the soldiers along with him, and to obtain a condemnation from the army; according to an ancient Macedonian custom, in regard to capital crimes, though (as it seems) not uniformly practised. Alexander not only kept the resolution secret, but is even said to have invited Philotas to supper with the other officers, conversing with him just as usual.[463] In the middle of the night, Philotas was arrested while asleep in his bed,—put in chains,—and clothed in an ignoble garb. A military assembly was convened at daybreak, before which Alexander appeared with the chief officers in his confidence. Addressing the soldiers in a vehement tone of mingled sorrow and anger, he proclaimed to them that his life had just been providentially rescued from a dangerous conspiracy organized by two men hitherto trusted as his best friends—Philotas and Parmenio—through the intended agency of a soldier named Dimnus, who had slain himself when arrested. The dead body of Dimnus was then exhibited to the meeting, while Nikomachus and Kebalinus were brought forward to tell their story. A letter from Parmenio to his sons Philotas and Nikanor, found among the papers seized on the arrest, was read to the meeting. Its terms were altogether vague and unmeaning; but Alexander chose to construe them as it suited his purpose.[464]

We may easily conceive the impression produced upon these assembled soldiers by such denunciations from Alexander himself—revelations of his own personal danger, and reproaches against treacherous friends. Amyntas, and even Kœnus, the brother-in-law of Philotas, were yet more unmeasured in their invectives against the accused.[465] They, as well as the other officers with whom the arrest had been concerted, set the example of violent manifestation against him, and ardent sympathy with the king's danger. Philotas was heard in his defence, which though strenuously denying the charge, is said to have been feeble. It was indeed sure to be so, coming from one seized thus suddenly, and overwhelmed with disadvantages; while a degree of courage, absolutely heroic, would have been required for any one else to rise and presume to criticise the proofs. A soldier named Bolon harangued his comrades on the insupportable insolence of Philotas, who always (he said) treated the soldiers with contempt, turning them out of their quarters to make room for his countless retinue of slaves. Though this allegation (probably enough well-founded) was no way connected with the charge of treason against the king, it harmonized fully with the temper of the assembly, and wound them up to the last pitch of fury. The royal

pages began the cry, echoed by all around, that they would with their own hands tear the parricide in pieces.[466]

It would have been fortunate for Philotas if their wrath had been sufficiently ungovernable to instigate the execution of such a sentence on the spot. But this did not suit the purpose of his enemies. Aware that he had been condemned upon the regal word, with nothing better than the faintest negative ground of suspicion, they determined to extort from him a confession such as would justify their own purposes, not only against him, but against his father Parmenio—whom there was as yet nothing to implicate. Accordingly, during the ensuing night, Philotas was put to the torture. Hephæstion, Krateros, and Kœnus—the last of the three being brother-in-law of Philotas[467]—themselves superintended the ministers of physical suffering. Alexander himself too was at hand, but concealed by a curtain. It is said that Philotas manifested little firmness under torture, and that Alexander, an unseen witness, indulged in sneers against the cowardice of one who had fought by his side in so many battles.[468] All who stood by were enemies, and likely to describe the conduct of Philotas in such manner as to justify their own hatred. The tortures inflicted,[469] cruel in the extreme and long-continued, wrung from him at last a confession, implicating his father along with himself. He was put to death; and at the same time, all those whose names had been indicated by Nikomachus, were slain also—apparently by being stoned, without preliminary torture. Philotas had serving in the army a numerous kindred, all of whom were struck with consternation at the news of his being tortured. It was the Macedonian law that all kinsmen of a man guilty of treason were doomed to death along with him. Accordingly, some of these men slew themselves, others fled from the camp, seeking refuge wherever they could. Such was the terror and tumult in the camp, that Alexander was obliged to proclaim a suspension of this sanguinary law for the occasion.[470]

It now remained to kill Parmenio, who could not be safely left alive after the atrocities used towards Philotas; and to kill him, moreover, before he could have time to hear of them, since he was not only the oldest, most respected, and most influential of all Macedonian officers, but also in separate command of the great depôt at Ekbatana. Alexander summoned to his presence one of the Companions named Polydamas; a particular friend, comrade, or *aide de camp*, of Parmenio. Every friend of Philotas felt at this moment that his life hung by a thread; so that Polydamas entered the king's presence in extreme terror, the rather as he was ordered to bring with him his two younger brothers. Alexander addressed him, denouncing Parmenio as a traitor, and intimating that Polydamas would be required to carry a swift and confidential message to Ekbatana, ordering his execution. Polydamas was selected as the attached friend of Parmenio, and therefore as best calculated to deceive him. Two letters were placed in his hands, addressed to Parmenio; one from Alexander himself, conveying ostensibly military communications and orders; the other, signed with the seal-ring of the deceased Philotas, and purporting to be addressed by the son to the

father. Together with these, Polydamas received the real and important despatch, addressed by Alexander to Kleander and Menidas, the officers immediately subordinate to Parmenio at Ekbatana; proclaiming Parmenio guilty of high treason, and directing them to kill him at once. Large rewards were offered to Polydamas if he performed this commission with success, while his two brothers were retained as hostages against scruples or compunction. He promised even more than was demanded—too happy to purchase this reprieve from what had seemed impending death. Furnished with native guides and with swift dromedaries, he struck by the straightest road across the desert of Khorasan, and arrived at Ekbatana on the eleventh day—a distance usually requiring more than thirty days to traverse.[471] Entering the camp by night, without the knowledge of Parmenio, he delivered his despatch to Kleander, with whom he concerted measures. On the morrow he was admitted to Parmenio, while walking in his garden with Kleander and the other officers marked out by Alexander's order as his executioners. Polydamas ran to embrace his old friend, and was heartily welcomed by the unsuspecting veteran, to whom he presented the letters professedly coming from Alexander and Philotas. While Parmenio was absorbed in the perusal, he was suddenly assailed by a mortal stab from the hand and sword of Kleander. Other wounds were heaped upon him as he fell, by the remaining officers,—the last even after life had departed.[472]

The soldiers in Ekbatana, on hearing of this bloody deed, burst into furious mutiny, surrounded the garden wall, and threatened to break in for the purpose of avenging their general, unless Polydamas and the other murderers should be delivered to them. But Kleander, admitting a few of the ringleaders, exhibited to them Alexander's written orders, to which the soldiers yielded, not without murmurs of reluctance and indignation. Most of them dispersed, yet a few remained, entreating permission to bury Parmenio's body. Even this was long refused by Kleander, from dread of the king's displeasure. At last, however, thinking it prudent to comply in part, he cut off the head, delivering to them the trunk alone for burial. The head was sent to Alexander.[473]

Among the many tragical deeds recounted throughout the course of this history, there is none more revolting than the fate of these two generals. Alexander, violent in all his impulses, displayed on this occasion a personal rancor worthy of his ferocious mother Olympias, exasperated rather than softened by the magnitude of past services.[474] When we see the greatest officers of the Macedonian army directing in person, and under the eye of Alexander, the laceration and burning of the naked body of their colleague Philotas, and assassinating with their own hands the veteran Parmenio,—we feel how much we have passed out of the region of Greek civic feeling into that of the more savage Illyrian warrior, partially orientalized. It is not surprising to read, that Antipater, viceroy of Macedonia, who had shared with Parmenio the favor and confidence of Philip as well as of Alexander, should tremble when informed of such proceedings, and cast about for a refuge against the like possibilities

to himself. Many other officers were alike alarmed and disgusted with the transactions.[475] Hence Alexander, opening and examining the letters sent home from his army to Macedonia, detected such strong expressions of indignation, that he thought it prudent to transfer many pronounced malcontents into a division by themselves, parting them off from the remaining army.[476] Instead of appointing any substitute for Philotas in the command of the Companion-cavalry, he cast that body into two divisions, nominating Hephæstion to the command of one and Kleitus to that of the other.[477]

The autumn and winter were spent by Alexander in reducing Drangiana, Gedrosia, Arachosia, and the Paropamisadæ; the modern Seiestan, Afghanistan, and the Western part of Kabul, lying between Ghazna on the north, Kandahar or Kelat on the south, and Furrah in the west. He experienced no combined resistance, but his troops suffered severely from cold and privation.[478] Near the southern termination of one of the passes of the Hindoo-Koosh (apparently north-east of the town of Kabul) he founded a new city, called Alexandria ad Caucasum, where he planted 7000 old soldiers, Macedonians, and others as colonists.[479] Towards the close of Winter he crossed over the mighty range of the Hindoo-Koosh; a march of fifteen days through regions of snow, and fraught with hardship to his army. On reaching the north side of these mountains, he found himself in Baktria.

The Baktrian leader Bessus, who had assumed the title of king, could muster no more than a small force, with which he laid waste the country, and then retired across the river Oxus into Sogdiana, destroying all the boats. Alexander overran Baktria with scarce any resistance; the chief places, Baktra (Balkh) and Aornos surrendering to him on the first demonstration of attack. Having named Artabazus satrap of Baktria, and placed Archelaus with a garrison in Aornos,[480] he marched northward towards the river Oxus, the boundary between Baktria and Sogdiana. It was a march of extreme hardship; reaching for two or three days across a sandy desert destitute of water, and under very hot weather, The Oxus, six furlongs in breadth, deep, and rapid, was the most formidable river that the Macedonians had yet seen.[481] Alexander transported his army across it on the tent-skins inflated and stuffed with straw. It seems surprising that Bessus did not avail himself of this favorable opportunity for resisting a passage in itself so difficult; he had however been abandoned by his Baktrian cavalry at the moment when he quitted their territory. Some of his companions, Spitamenes and others, terrified at the news that Alexander had crossed the Oxus, were anxious to make their own peace by betraying their leader.[482] They sent a proposition to this effect; upon which Ptolemy with a light division was sent forward by Alexander, and was enabled, by extreme celerity of movements, to surprise and seize Bessus in a village. Alexander ordered that he should be held in chains, naked and with a collar round his neck, at the side of the road along which the army were marching. On reaching the spot, Alexander stopped his chariot, and sternly demanded from Bessus, on what pretence he had first arrested, and afterwards slain,

his king and benefactor Darius. Bessus replied, that he had not done this single-handed; others were concerned in it along with him, to procure for themselves lenient treatment from Alexander. The king said no more, but ordered Bessus to be scourged, and then sent back as prisoner to Baktra[483]—where we shall again hear of him.

In his onward march, Alexander approached a small town, inhabited by the Branchidæ; descendants of those Branchidæ near Miletus on the coast of Ionia, who had administered the great temple and oracle of Apollo on Cape Poseidion, and who had yielded up the treasures of that temple to the Persian king Xerxes, 150 years before. This surrender had brought upon them so much odium, that when the dominion of Xerxes was overthrown on the coast, they retired with him into the interior of Asia. He assigned to them lands in the distant region of Sogdiana, where their descendants had ever since remained; bilingual and partially dis-hellenized, yet still attached to their traditions and origin. Delighted to find themselves once more in commerce with Greeks, they poured forth to meet and welcome the army, tendering all that they possessed. Alexander, when he heard who they were and what was their parentage, desired the Milesians in his army to determine how they should be treated. But as these Milesians were neither decided nor unanimous, Alexander announced that he would determine for himself. Having first occupied the city in person with a select detachment, he posted his army all round the walls, and then gave orders not only to plunder it, but to massacre the entire population—men, women, and children. They were slain without arms or attempt at resistance, resorting to nothing but prayers and suppliant manifestations. Alexander next commanded the walls to be levelled, and the sacred groves cut down, so that no habitable site might remain, nor any thing except solitude and sterility.[484] Such was the revenge taken upon these unhappy victims for the deeds of their ancestors in the fourth or fifth generation before. Alexander doubtless considered himself to be executing the wrath of Apollo against an accursed race who had robbed the temple of the god.[485] The Macedonian expedition had been proclaimed to be undertaken originally for the purpose of revenging upon the contemporary Persians the ancient wrongs done to Greece by Xerxes; so that Alexander would follow out the same sentiment in revenging upon the contemporary Branchidæ the acts of their ancestors—yet more guilty than Xerxes, in his belief. The massacre of this unfortunate population was in fact an example of human sacrifice on the largest scale, offered to the gods by the religious impulses of Alexander, and worthy to be compared to that of the Carthaginian general Hannibal, when he sacrificed 3000 Grecian prisoners on the field of Himera, where his grandfather Hamilkar had been slain seventy years before.[486]

Alexander then continued his onward progress, first to Marakanda (Samarcand), the chief town of Sogdiana—next, to the river Jaxartes, which he and his companions, in their imperfect geographical notions, believed to be the Tanais, the boundary between Asia, and Europe.[487] In his march, he left garrisons in various towns,[488]

but experienced no resistance, though detached bodies of the natives hovered on his flanks. Some of these bodies, having cut off a few of his foragers, took refuge afterwards on a steep and rugged mountain, conceived to be unassailable. Thither however Alexander pursued them, at the head of his lightest and most active troops. Though at first repulsed, he succeeded in scaling and capturing the place. Of its defenders, thirty thousand in number, three fourths were either put to the sword, or perished in jumping down the precipices. Several of his soldiers were wounded with arrows, and he himself received a shot from one of them through his leg.[489] But here, as elsewhere, we perceive that nearly all the Orientals whom Alexander subdued were men little suited for close combat hand to hand,—fighting only with missiles.

Here, on the river Jaxartes, Alexander projected the foundation of a new city to bear his name; intended partly as a protection against incursions from the Scythian Nomads on the other side of the river, partly as a facility for himself to cross over and subdue them, which he intended to do as soon as he could find opportunity.[490] He was however called off for the time by the news of a wide-spread revolt among the newly-conquered inhabitants both of Sogdiana and Baktria. He suppressed the revolt with his habitual vigor and celerity, distributing his troops so as to capture five townships in two days, and Kyropolis or Kyra, the largest of the neighboring Sogdian towns (founded by the Persian Cyrus), immediately afterwards. He put all the defenders and inhabitants to the sword. Returning then to the Jaxartes, he completed in twenty days the fortifications of his new town of Alexandria (perhaps at or near Khodjend), with suitable sacrifices and festivities to the gods. He planted in it some Macedonian veterans and Grecian mercenaries, together with volunteer settlers from the natives around.[491] An army of Scythian Nomads, showing themselves on the other side of the river, piqued his vanity to cross over and attack them. Carrying over a division of his army on inflated skins, he defeated them with little difficulty, pursuing them briskly into the desert. But the weather was intensely hot, and the army suffered much from thirst; while the little water to be found was so bad, that it brought upon Alexander a diarrhœa which endangered his life.[492] This chase, of a few miles on the right bank of the Jaxartes (seemingly in the present Khanat of Kokand), marked the utmost limit of Alexander's progress northward.

Shortly afterwards, a Macedonian detachment, unskilfully conducted, was destroyed in Sogdiana by Spitamenes and the Scythians: a rare misfortune, which Alexander avenged by overrunning the region[493] near the river Polytimêtus (the Kohik), and putting to the sword the inhabitants of all the towns which he took. He then recrossed the Oxus, to rest during the extreme season of winter at Zariaspa in Baktria, from whence his communications with the West and with Macedonia were more easy, and where he received various reinforcements of Greek troops.[494] Bessus, who had been here retained as a prisoner, was now brought forward amidst a public assembly; wherein Alexander, having first reproached him for his treason to

Darius, caused his nose and ears to be cut off—and sent him in this condition to Ekbatana, to be finally slain by the Medes and Persians.[495] Mutilation was a practice altogether Oriental and non-Hellenic: even Arrian, admiring and indulgent as he is towards his hero, censures this savage order, as one among many proofs how much Alexander had taken on Oriental dispositions. We may remark that his extreme wrath on this occasion was founded partly on disappointment that Bessus had frustrated his toilsome efforts for taking Darius alive—partly on the fact that the satrap had committed treason against the king's person, which it was the policy as well as the feeling of Alexander to surround with a circle of Deity.[496] For as to traitors against Persia, as a cause and country, Alexander had never discouraged, and had sometimes signally recompensed them. Mithrines, the governor of Sardis, who opened to him the gates of that almost impregnable fortress immediately after the battle of the Granikus—the traitor who perhaps, next to Darius himself, had done most harm to the Persian cause—obtained from him high favor and promotion.[497]

The rude but spirited tribes of Baktria and Sogdiana were as yet but imperfectly subdued, seconded as their resistance was by wide spaces of sandy desert, by the neighborhood of the Scythian Nomads, and by the presence of Spitamenes as a leader. Alexander, distributing his army into five divisions, traversed the country and put down all resistance, while he also took measures for establishing several military posts, or new towns in convenient places.[498] After some time the whole army was reunited at the chief place of Sogdiana—Marakanda—where some halt and repose was given.[499]

During this halt at Marakanda (Samarcand) the memorable banquet occurred wherein Alexander murdered Kleitus. It has been already related that Kleitus had saved his life at the battle of the Granikus, by cutting off the sword arm of the Persian Spithridates when already uplifted to strike him from behind. Since the death of Philotas, the important function of general of the Companion-cavalry had been divided between Hephæstion and Kleitus. Moreover, the family of Kleitus had been attached to Philip, by ties so ancient, that his sister, Lanikê, had been selected as the nurse of Alexander himself when a child. Two of her sons had already perished in the Asiatic battles. If, therefore, there were any man who stood high in the service, or was privileged to speak his mind freely to Alexander, it was Kleitus.

In this banquet at Marakanda, when wine, according to the Macedonian habit, had been abundantly drunk, and when Alexander, Kleitus, and most of the other guests were already nearly intoxicated, enthusiasts or flatterers heaped immoderate eulogies upon the king's past achievements.[500] They exalted him above all the most venerated legendary heroes; they proclaimed that his superhuman deeds proved his divine paternity, and that he had earned an apotheosis like Herakles, which nothing but envy could withhold from him during his life. Alexander himself joined in these boasts, and even took credit for the later victories of the reign of his father, whose abilities and glory he depreciated. To the old Macedonian officers, such an insult cast

on the memory of Philip was deeply offensive. But among them all, none had been more indignant than Kleitus, with the growing insolence of Alexander—his assumed filiation from Zeus Ammon, which put aside Philip as unworthy—his preference for Persian attendants, who granted or refused admittance to his person—his extending to Macedonian soldiers the contemptuous treatment habitually endured by Asiatics, and even allowing them to be scourged by Persian hands and Persian rods.[501] The pride of a Macedonian general in the stupendous successes of the last five years, was effaced by his mortification when he saw that they tended only to merge his countrymen amidst a crowd of servile Asiatics, and to inflame the prince with high-flown aspirations transmitted from Xerxes or Ochus. But whatever might be the internal thoughts of Macedonian officers, they held their peace before Alexander, whose formidable character and exorbitant self-estimation would tolerate no criticism.

At the banquet of Marakanda, this long suppressed repugnance found an issue, accidental indeed and unpremeditated, but for that very reason all the more violent and unmeasured. The wine, which made Alexander more boastful and his flatterers fulsome to excess, overpowered altogether the reserve of Kleitus. He rebuked the impiety of those who degraded the ancient heroes in order to make a pedestal for Alexander. He protested against the injustice of disparaging the exalted and legitimate fame of Philip; whose achievements he loudly extolled, pronouncing them to be equal, and even superior to those of his son. For the exploits of Alexander, splendid as they were, had been accomplished, not by himself alone, but by that unconquerable Macedonian force which he had found ready made to his hands;[502] whereas those of Philip had been his own—since he had found Macedonia prostrate and disorganized, and had had to create for himself both soldiers, and a military system. The great instruments of Alexander's victories had been Philip's old soldiers, whom he now despised—and among them Parmenio, whom he had put to death.

Remarks such as these, poured forth in the coarse language of a half-intoxicated Macedonian veteran, provoked loud contradiction from many, and gave poignant offence to Alexander; who now for the first time heard the open outburst of disapprobation, before concealed and known to him only by surmise. But wrath and contradiction, both from him and from others, only made Kleitus more reckless in the outpouring of his own feelings, now discharged with delight after having been so long pent up. He passed from the old Macedonian soldiers to himself individually. Stretching forth his right hand towards Alexander, he exclaimed—"Recollect that you owe your life to me; this hand preserved you at the Granikus. Listen to the outspoken language of truth, or else abstain from asking freemen to supper, and confine yourself to the society of barbaric slaves." All these reproaches stung Alexander to the quick. But nothing was so intolerable to him as the respectful sympathy for Parmenio, which brought to his memory one of the blackest deeds of his life—and the reminiscence of his preservation at the Granikus, which lowered him into the position of a debtor towards the very censor under whose reproof he was now smarting. At length

wrath and intoxication together drove him into uncontrollable fury. He started from his couch, and felt for his dagger to spring at Kleitus; but the dagger had been put out of reach by one of his attendants. In a loud voice and with the Macedonian word of command, he summoned the body guards and ordered the trumpeter to sound an alarm. But no one obeyed so grave an order, given in his condition of drunkenness. His principal officers, Ptolemy, Perdikkas and others, clung round him, held his arms and body, and besought him to abstain from violence; others at the same time tried to silence Kleitus and hurry him out of the hall, which had now become a scene of tumult and consternation. But Kleitus was not in a humor to confess himself in the wrong by retiring; while Alexander, furious at the opposition now, for the first time, offered to his will, exclaimed, that his officers held him in chains as Bessus had held Darius, and left him nothing but the name of a king. Though anxious to restrain his movements, they doubtless did not dare to employ much physical force; so that his great personal strength, and continued efforts, presently set him free. He then snatched a pike from one of the soldiers, rushed upon Kleitus, and thrust him through on the spot, exclaiming, "Go now to Philip and Parmenio".[503]

No sooner was the deed perpetrated, than the feelings of Alexander underwent an entire revolution. The spectacle of Kleitus, a bleeding corpse on the floor,—the marks of stupefaction and horror evident in all the spectators, and the reaction from a furious impulse instantaneously satiated—plunged him at once into the opposite extreme of remorse and self-condemnation. Hastening out of the hall, and retiring to bed, he passed three days in an agony of distress, without food or drink. He burst into tears and multiplied exclamations on his own mad act; he dwelt upon the name of Kleitus and Lanikê with the debt of gratitude which he owed to each, and denounced himself as unworthy to live after having requited such services with a foul murder.[504] His friends at length prevailed on him to take food, and return to activity. All joined in trying to restore his self-satisfaction. The Macedonian army passed a public vote that Kleitus had been justly slain, and that his body should remain unburied; which afforded opportunity to Alexander to reverse the vote, and to direct that it should be buried by his own order.[505] The prophets comforted him by the assurance that his murderous impulse had arisen, not from his own natural mind, but from a maddening perversion intentionally brought on by the god Dionysus, to avenge the omission of a sacrifice due to him on the day of the banquet, but withheld.[506] Lastly, the Greek sophist or philosopher, Anaxarchus of Abdera, revived Alexander's spirits by well-timed flattery, treating his sensibility as nothing better than generous weakness; reminding him that in his exalted position of conqueror and Great King, he was entitled to prescribe what was right and just, instead of submitting himself to laws dictated from without.[507] Kallisthenes the philosopher was also summoned, along with Anaxarchus, to the king's presence, for the same purpose of offering consolatory reflections. But he is said to have adopted a tone of discourse altogether different, and to have given offence rather than satisfaction to Alexander.

To such remedial influences, and probably still more to the absolute necessity for action, Alexander's remorse at length yielded. Like the other emotions of his fiery soul, it was violent and overpowering while it lasted. But it cannot be shown to have left any durable trace on his character, nor any effects justifying the unbounded admiration of Arrian; who has little but blame to bestow on the murdered Kleitus, while he expresses the strongest sympathy for the mental suffering of the murderer.

After ten days,[508] Alexander again put his army in motion, to complete the subjugation of Sogdiana. He found no enemy capable of meeting him in pitched battle; yet Spitamenes, with the Sogdians and some Scythian allies, raised much hostility of detail, which it cost another year to put down. Alexander underwent the greatest fatigue and hardships in his marches through the mountainous parts of this wide, rugged, and poorly supplied country, with rocky positions, strong by nature, which his enemies sought to defend. One of these fastnesses, held by a native chief named Sisymithres, seemed almost unattackable, and was indeed taken rather by intimidation than by actual force.[509] The Scythians, after a partial success over a small Macedonian detachment, were at length so thoroughly beaten and overawed, that they slew Spitamenes and sent his head to the conqueror as a propitiatory offering.[510]

After a short rest at Naütaka during the extreme winter, Alexander resumed operations, by attacking a strong post called the Sogdian Rock, whither a large number of fugitives had assembled, with an ample supply of provision. It was a precipice supposed to be inexpugnable; and would seemingly have proved so, in spite of the energy and abilities of Alexander, had not the occupants altogether neglected their guard, and yielded at the mere sight of a handful of Macedonians who had scrambled up the precipice. Among the captives, taken by Alexander on this rock, were the wife and family of the Baktrian chief Oxyartes; one of whose daughters, named Roxana, so captivated Alexander by her beauty that he resolved to make her his wife.[511] He then passed out of Sogdiana into the neighboring territory Parætakênê, where there was another inexpugnable site called the Rock of Choriênes, which he was also fortunate enough to reduce.[512]

From hence Alexander went to Baktra. Sending Kraterus with a division to put the last hand to the reduction of Parætakênê, he himself remained at Baktra, preparing for his expedition across the Hindoo-Koosh to the conquest of India. As a security for the tranquillity of Baktria and Sogdiana during his absence, he levied 30,000 young soldiers from those countries to accompany him.[513]

It was at Baktra that Alexander celebrated his marriage with the captive Roxana. Amidst the repose and festivities connected with that event, the Oriental temper which he was now acquiring displayed itself more forcibly than ever. He could no longer be satisfied without obtaining prostration, or worship, from Greeks and Macedonians as well as from Persians; a public and unanimous recognition of his divine

origin and superhuman dignity. Some Greeks and Macedonians had already rendered to him this homage. Nevertheless to the greater number, in spite of their extreme deference and admiration for him, it was repugnant and degrading. Even the imperious Alexander shrank from issuing public and formal orders on such a subject; but a manœuvre was concerted, with his privity, by the Persians and certain compliant Greek sophists or philosophers, for the purpose of carrying the point by surprise.

During a banquet at Baktra, the philosopher Anaxarchus, addressing the assembly in a prepared harangue, extolled Alexander's exploits as greatly surpassing those of Dionysus and Herakles. He proclaimed that Alexander had already done more than enough to establish a title to divine honors from the Macedonians; who, (he said) would assuredly worship Alexander after his death, and ought in justice to worship him during his life, forthwith.[514]

This harangue was applauded, and similar sentiments were enforced, by others favorable to the plan; who proceeded to set the example of immediate compliance, and were themselves the first to tender worship. Most of the Macedonian officers sat unmoved, disgusted at the speech. But though disgusted they said nothing. To reply to a speech doubtless well-turned and flowing, required some powers of oratory; moreover, it was well known that whoever dared to reply stood marked out for the antipathy of Alexander. The fate of Kleitus, who had arraigned the same sentiments in the banqueting hall of Marakanda, was fresh in the recollection of every one. The repugnance which many felt, but none ventured to express, at length found an organ in Kallisthenes of Olynthus.

This philosopher, whose melancholy fate imparts a peculiar interest to his name, was nephew of Aristotle, and had enjoyed through his uncle an early acquaintance with Alexander during the boyhood of the latter. At the recommendation of Aristotle, Kallisthenes had accompanied Alexander in his Asiatic expedition. He was a man of much literary and rhetorical talent, which he turned towards the composition of history—and to the history of recent times.[515] Alexander, full of ardor for conquest, was at the same time anxious that his achievements should be commemorated by poets and men of letters;[516] there were seasons also when he enjoyed their conversation. On both these grounds, he invited several of them to accompany the army. The more prudent among them declined, but Kallisthenes obeyed, partly in hopes of procuring the reconstitution of his native city Olynthus, as Aristotle had obtained the like favor for Stageira.[517] Kallisthenes had composed a narrative (not preserved) of Alexander's exploits, which certainly reached to the battle of Arbela, and may perhaps have gone down farther. The few fragments of this narrative remaining seem to betoken extreme admiration, not merely of the bravery and ability, but also of the transcendent and unbroken good fortune, of Alexander—marking him out as the chosen favorite of the gods. This feeling was perfectly natural under the grandeur of the events. Insofar as we can judge from one or two specimens, Kallisthenes was full of complimentary tribute to the hero of his history. But the character of Alexander him-

self had undergone a material change during the six years between his first landing in Asia and his campaign in Sogdiana. All his worst qualities had been developed by unparalleled success and by Asiatic example. He required larger doses of flattery, and had now come to thirst, not merely for the reputation of divine paternity, but for the actual manifestations of worship as towards a god.

To the literary Greeks who accompanied Alexander, this change in his temper must have been especially palpable and full of serious consequence; since it was chiefly manifested, not at periods of active military duty, but at his hours of leisure, when he recreated himself by their conversation and discourses. Several of these Greeks—Anaxarchus, Kleon, the poet Agis of Argos—accommodated themselves to the change, and wound up their flatteries to the pitch required. Kallisthenes could not do so. He was a man of sedate character, of simple, severe, and almost unsocial habits—to whose sobriety the long Macedonian potations were distasteful. Aristotle said of him, that he was a great and powerful speaker, but that he had no judgment; according to other reports, he was a vain and arrogant man, who boasted that Alexander's reputation and immortality were dependent on the composition and tone of *his* history.[518] Of personal vanity,—a common quality among literary Greeks,—Kallisthenes probably had his full share. But there is no ground for believing that *his* character had altered. Whatever his vanity may have been, it had given no offence to Alexander during the earlier years, nor would it have given offence now, had not Alexander himself become a different man.

On occasion of the demonstration led up by Anaxarchus at the banquet, Kallisthenes had been invited by Hephæstion to join in the worship intended to be proposed towards Alexander; and Hephæstion afterwards alleged, that he had promised to comply.[519] But his actual conduct affords reasonable ground for believing that he made no such promise; for he not only thought it his duty to refuse the act of worship, but also to state publicly his reasons for disapproving it; the more so, as he perceived that most of the Macedonians present felt like himself. He contended that the distinction between gods and men was one which could not be confounded without impiety and wrong. Alexander had amply earned,—as a man, a general, and a king,—the highest honors compatible with humanity; but to exalt him into a god would be both an injury to him, and an offence to the gods. Anaxarchus (he said) was the last person from whom such a proposition ought to come, because he was one of those whose only title to Alexander's society was founded upon his capacity to give instructive and wholesome counsel.[520]

Kallisthenes here spoke out, what numbers of his hearers felt. The speech was not only approved, but so warmly applauded by the Macedonians present, especially the older officers,—that Alexander thought it prudent to forbid all farther discussion upon this delicate subject. Presently the Persians present, according to Asiatic custom, approached him and performed their prostration; after which Alexander pledged, in successive goblets of wine, those Greeks and Macedonians with whom he

had held previous concert. To each of them the goblet was handed, and each, after drinking to answer the pledge, approached the king, made his prostration, and then received a salute. Lastly, Alexander sent the pledge to Kallisthenes, who, after drinking like the rest, approached him, for the purpose of receiving the salute, but without any prostration. Of this omission Alexander was expressly informed by one of the Companions; upon which he declined to admit Kallisthenes to a salute. The latter retired, observing, "Then I shall go away, worse off than others as far as the salute goes."[521]

Kallisthenes was imprudent, and even blamable, in making this last observation, which without any necessity or advantage, aggravated the offence already given to Alexander. He was more imprudent still, if we look simply to his own personal safety in standing forward publicly to protest against the suggestion for rendering divine honors to that prince, and in thus creating the main offence which even in itself was inexpiable. But here the occasion was one serious and important, so as to convert the imprudence into an act of genuine moral courage. The question was, not about obeying an order given by Alexander, for no order had been given—but about accepting or rejecting a motion made by Anaxarchus; which Alexander, by a shabby, preconcerted manœuvre, affected to leave to the free decision of the assembly, in full confidence that no one would be found intrepid enough to oppose it. If one Greek sophist made a proposition, in itself servile and disgraceful, another sophist could do himself nothing but honor by entering public protest against it; more especially since this was done (as we may see by the report in Arrian) in terms no way insulting, but full of respectful admiration, towards Alexander personally. The perfect success of the speech is in itself a proof of the propriety of its tone;[522] for the Macedonian officers would feel indifference, if not contempt towards a rhetor like Kallisthenes, while towards Alexander they had the greatest deference short of actual worship. There are few occasions on which the free spirit of Greek letters and Greek citizenship, in their protest against exorbitant individual insolence, appears more conspicuous and estimable than in the speech of Kallisthenes.[523] Arrian disapproves the purpose of Alexander, and strongly blames the motion of Anaxarchus; nevertheless, such is his anxiety to find some excuse for Alexander, that he also blames Kallisthenes for unseasonable frankness, folly, and insolence, in offering opposition. He might have said with some truth, that Kallisthenes would have done well to withdraw earlier (if indeed he could have withdrawn without offence) from the camp of Alexander, in which no lettered Greek could now associate without abnegating his freedom of speech and sentiment, and emulating the servility of Anaxarchus. But being present, as Kallisthenes was, in the hall at Baktra when the proposition of Anaxarchus was made, and when silence would have been assent—his protest against it was both seasonable and dignified; and all the more dignified for being fraught with danger to himself.

Kallisthenes knew that danger well, and was quickly enabled to recognize it in the altered demeanor of Alexander towards him. He was, from that day, a marked man in two senses: first, to Alexander himself, as well as to the rival sophists and all promoters of the intended deification,—for hatred, and for getting up some accusatory pretence such as might serve to ruin him; next, to the more free-spirited Macedonians, indignant witnesses of Alexander's increased insolence, and admirers of the courageous Greek who had protested against the motion of Anaxarchus. By such men he was doubtless much extolled; which praises aggravated his danger, as they were sure to be reported to Alexander. The pretext for his ruin was not long wanting.

Among those who admired and sought the conversation of Kallisthenes, was Hermolaus, one of the royal pages—the band, selected from noble Macedonian families, who did duty about the person of the king. It had happened that this young man, one of Alexander's companions in the chase, on seeing a wild boar rushing up to attack the king, darted his javelin, and slew the animal. Alexander, angry to be anticipated in killing the boar, ordered Hermolaus to be scourged before all the other pages, and deprived him of his horse.[524] Thus humiliated and outraged—for an act not merely innocent, but the omission of which, if Alexander had sustained any injury from the boar, might have been held punishable—Hermolaus became resolutely bent on revenge.[525] He enlisted in the project his intimate friend Sostratus, with several others among the pages, and it was agreed among them to kill Alexander in his chamber, on the first night when they were all on guard together. The appointed night arrived, without any divulgation of their secret; yet the scheme was frustrated by the accident, that Alexander continued till daybreak drinking with his officers, and never retired to bed. On the morrow, one of the conspirators, becoming alarmed or repentant, divulged the scheme to his friend Charikles, with the names of those concerned. Eurylochus, brother to Charikles, apprised by him of what he had heard, immediately informed Ptolemy, through whom it was conveyed to Alexander. By Alexander's order, the persons indicated were arrested and put to the torture;[526] under which they confessed that they had themselves conspired to kill him, but named no other accomplices, and even denied that any one else was privy to the scheme. In this denial they persisted, though extreme suffering was applied to extort the revelation of new names. They were then brought up and arraigned as conspirators before the assembled Macedonian soldiers. There their confession was repeated. It is even said that Hermolaus, in repeating it, boasted of the enterprise as legitimate and glorious; denouncing the tyranny and cruelty of Alexander us having become insupportable to a freeman. Whether such boast was actually made or not, the persons brought up were pronounced guilty, and stoned to death forthwith by the soldiers. [527]

The pages thus executed were young men of good Macedonian families, for whose condemnation accordingly, Alexander had thought it necessary to invoke—what he was sure of obtaining against any one—the sentence of the soldiers. To sat-

isfy his hatred against Kallisthenes—not a Macedonian, but only a Greek citizen, one of the surviving remnants of the subverted city of Olynthus—no such formality was required.[528] As yet, there was not a shadow of proof to implicate this philosopher; for obnoxious as his name was known to be, Hermolaus and his companions had, with exemplary fortitude, declined to purchase the chance of respite from extreme torture by pronouncing it. Their confessions,—all extorted by suffering, unless confirmed by other evidence, of which we do not know whether any was taken—were hardly of the least value, even against themselves; but against Kallisthenes, they had no bearing whatever; nay, they tended indirectly, not to convict, but to absolve him. In his case, therefore, as in that of Philotas before, it was necessary to pick up matter of suspicious tendency from his reported remarks and conversations. He was alleged[529] to have addressed dangerous and inflammatory language to the pages, holding up Alexander to odium, instigating them to conspiracy, and pointing out Athens as a place of refuge; he was moreover well known to have been often in conversation with Hermolaus. For a man of the violent temper and omnipotent authority of Alexander, such indications were quite sufficient as grounds of action against one whom he hated.

On this occasion, we have the state of Alexander's mind disclosed by himself, in one of the references to his letters given by Plutarch. Writing to Kraterus and to others immediately afterwards, Alexander distinctly stated that the pages throughout all their torture had deposed against no one but themselves. Nevertheless, in another letter, addressed to Antipater in Macedonia, he used these expressions—"The pages were stoned to death by the Macedonians; but I myself shall punish the sophist, as well as those who sent him out here, and those who harbor in their cities conspirators against me."[530] The sophist Kallisthenes had been sent out by Aristotle, who is here designated; and probably the Athenians after him. Fortunately for Aristotle, he was not at Baktra, but at Athens. That he could have had any concern in the conspiracy of the pages, was impossible. In this savage outburst of menace against his absent preceptor, Alexander discloses the real state of feeling which prompted him to the destruction of Kallisthenes; hatred towards that spirit of citizenship and free speech, which Kallisthenes not only cherished, in common with Aristotle and most other literary Greeks, but had courageously manifested in his protest against the motion for worshipping a mortal.

Kallisthenes was first put to the torture and then hanged.[531] His tragical fate excited a profound sentiment of sympathy and indignation among the philosophers of antiquity.[532]

The halts of Alexander were formidable to friends and companions; his marches, to the unconquered natives whom he chose to treat as enemies. On the return of Kraterus from Sogdiana, Alexander began his march from Baktra (Balkh) southward to the mountain range Paropamisus or Caucasus (Hindoo-Koosh); leaving however at Baktra Amyntas, with a large force of 10,000 foot and 3500 horse, to keep these in-

tractable territories in subjugation.[533] His march over the mountains occupied ten days; he then visited his newly-founded city Alexandria in the Paropamisadæ. At or near the river Kophen (Kabool river), he was joined by Taxiles, a powerful Indian prince, who brought as a present twenty-five elephants, and whose alliance was very valuable to him. He then divided his army, sending one division under Hephæstion and Perdikkas, towards the territory called Peukelaôtis (apparently that immediately north of the confluence of the Kabool river with the Indus); and conducting the remainder himself in an easterly direction, over the mountainous regions between the Hindoo-Koosh and the right bank of the Indus. Hephæstion was ordered, after subduing all enemies in his way, to prepare a bridge ready for passing the Indus by the time when Alexander should arrive. Astes, prince of Peukelaôtis, was taken and slain in the city where he had shut himself up; but the reduction of it cost Hephæstion a siege of thirty days.[534]

Alexander, with his own half of the army, undertook the reduction of the Aspasii, the Guræi, and the Assakeni, tribes occupying mountainous and difficult localities along the southern slopes of the Hindoo-Koosh; but neither they nor their various towns mentioned—Arigæon, Massaga, Bazira, Ora, Dyrta, etc., except perhaps the remarkable rock of Aornos,[535] near the Indus—can be more exactly identified. These tribes were generally brave, and seconded by towns of strong position as well as by a rugged country, in many parts utterly without roads.[536] But their defence was conducted with little union, no military skill, and miserable weapons; so that they were no way qualified to oppose the excellent combination and rapid movements of Alexander, together with the confident attack and very superior arms, offensive, as well as defensive, of his soldiers. All those who attempted resistance were successively attacked, overpowered and slain. Even those who did not resist, but fled to the mountains, were pursued, and either slaughtered or sold for slaves. The only way of escaping the sword was to remain, submit, and await the fiat of the invader. Such a series of uninterrupted successes, all achieved with little loss, it is rare in military history to read. The capture of the rock of Aornos was peculiarly gratifying to Alexander, because it enjoyed the legendary reputation of having been assailed in vain by Herakles—and indeed he himself had deemed it, at first sight, unassailable. After having thus subdued the upper regions (above Attock or the confluence of the Kabul river) on the right bank of the Indus, he availed himself of some forests alongside to fell timber and build boats. These boats were sent down the stream, to the point where Hephæstion and Perdikkas were preparing the bridge.[537]

Such fatiguing operations of Alexander, accomplished amidst all the hardships of winter, were followed by a halt of thirty days, to refresh the soldiers before he crossed the Indus, in the early spring of 326 B. C.[538] It is presumed, probably enough, that he crossed at or near Attock, the passage now frequented. He first marched to Taxila, where the prince Taxilus at once submitted, and reinforced the army with a strong contingent of Indian soldiers. His alliance and information was

found extremely valuable. The whole neighboring territory submitted, and was placed under Philippus as satrap, with a garrison and depôt at Taxila. He experienced no resistance until he reached the river Hydaspes (Jelum), on the other side of which the Indian prince Porus stood prepared to dispute the passage; a brave man, with a formidable force, better armed than Indians generally were, and with many trained elephants; which animals the Macedonians had never yet encountered in battle. By a series of admirable military combinations, Alexander eluded the vigilance of Porus, stole the passage of the river at a point a few miles above, and completely defeated the Indian army. In spite of their elephants, which were skilfully managed, the Indians could not long withstand the shock of close combat, against such cavalry and infantry as the Macedonian. Porus, a prince of gigantic stature, mounted on an elephant, fought with the utmost gallantry, rallying his broken troops and keeping them together until the last. Having seen two of his sons slain, himself wounded and perishing with thirst, he was only preserved by the special directions of Alexander. When Porus was brought before him, Alexander was struck with admiration at his stature, beauty, and undaunted bearing.[539] Addressing him first, he asked, what Porus wished to be done for him. "That you should treat me as a king," was the reply of Porus. Alexander, delighted with these words, behaved towards Porus with the utmost courtesy and generosity; not only ensuring to him his actual kingdom, but enlarging it by new additions. He found in Porus a faithful and efficient ally. This was the greatest day of Alexander's life; if we take together the splendor and difficulty of the military achievement, and the generous treatment of his conquered opponent. [540]

Alexander celebrated his victory by sacrifices to the gods, and festivities on the banks of the Hydaspes; where he also gave directions for the foundation of two cities —Nikæa, on the eastern bank; and Bukephalia, on the western, so named in commemoration of his favorite horse, who died here of age and fatigue.[541] Leaving Kraterus to lay out and erect these new establishments, as well as to keep up communication, he conducted his army onward in an easterly direction towards the river Akesines (Chenab).[542] His recent victory had spread terror around; the Glaukæ, a powerful Indian tribe, with thirty-seven towns and many populous villages, submitted, and were placed under the dominion of Porus; while embassies of submission were also received from two considerable princes—Abisares, and a second Porus, hitherto at enmity with his namesake. The passage of the great river Akesines, now full and impetuous in its current, was accomplished by boats and by inflated hides, yet not without difficulty and danger. From thence he proceeded onward in the same direction, across the Punjab—finding no enemies, but leaving detachments at suitable posts to keep up his communications and ensure his supplies—to the river Hydraotes or Ravee; which, though not less broad and full than the Akesines, was comparatively tranquil, so as to be crossed with facility.[543] Here some free Indian tribes, Kathæans and others, had the courage to resist. They first attempted to maintain themselves in Sangala by surrounding their town with a triple entrenchment of wag-

gons. These being attacked and carried, they were driven within the walls, which they now began to despair of defending, and resolved to evacuate by night. But the project was divulged to Alexander by deserters, and frustrated by his vigilance. On the next day, he took the town by storm, putting to the sword 17,000 Indians, and taking (according to Arrian) 70,000 captives. His own loss before the town was less than 100 killed, and 1200 wounded. Two neighboring towns, in alliance with Sangala, were evacuated by their terrified inhabitants. Alexander pursued, but could not overtake them, except 500 sick or weakly persons, whom his soldiers put to death. Demolishing the town of Sangala, he added the territory to the dominion of Porus, then present, with a contingent of 5000 Indians.[544]

Sangala was the easternmost of all Alexander's conquests. Presently his march brought him to the river Hyphasis (Sutledge), the last of the rivers in the Punjab—seemingly at a point below its confluence with the Beas. Beyond this river, broad and rapid, Alexander was informed that there lay a desert of eleven days' march, extending to a still greater river called the Ganges; beyond which dwelt the Gandaridæ, the most powerful, warlike, and populous, of all the Indian tribes, distinguished for the number and training of their elephants.[545] The prospect of a difficult march, and of an enemy esteemed invincible, only instigated his ardor. He gave orders for the crossing. But here for the first time his army, officers as well as soldiers, manifested symptoms of uncontrollable weariness; murmuring aloud at these endless toils, and marches they knew not whither. They had already over-passed the limits where Dionysus and Herakles were said to have stopped: they were travelling into regions hitherto unvisited either by Greeks or by Persians, merely for the purpose of provoking and conquering new enemies. Of victories they were sated; of their plunder, abundant as it was, they had no enjoyment;[546] the hardships of a perpetual onward march, often excessively accelerated, had exhausted both men and horses; moreover, their advance from the Hydaspes had been accomplished in the wet season, under rains more violent and continued than they had ever before experienced.[547] Informed of the reigning discontent, Alexander assembled his officers and harangued them, endeavoring to revive in them that forward spirit and promptitude which he had hitherto found not inadequate to his own.[548] But he entirely failed. No one indeed dared openly to contradict him. Kœnus alone hazarded some words of timid dissuasion; the rest manifested a passive and sullen repugnance, even when he proclaimed that those who desired might return, with the shame of having deserted their king, while he would march forward with the volunteers only. After a suspense of two days, passed in solitary and silent mortification—he still apparently persisted in his determination, and offered the sacrifice usual previous to the passage of a river. The victims were inauspicious; he bowed to the will of the gods; and gave orders for return, to the unanimous and unbounded delight of his army.[549]

To mark the last extremity of his eastward progress, he erected twelve altars of extraordinary height and dimension on the western bank of the Hyphasis, offering

sacrifices of thanks to the gods, with the usual festivities, and matches of agility and force. Then, having committed all the territory west of the Hyphasis to the government of Porus, he marched back, repassed the Hydraotes and Akesines, and returned to the Hydaspes near the point where he had first crossed it. The two new cities—Bukephalia and Nikæa—which he had left orders for commencing on that river, had suffered much from the rains and inundations during his forward march to the Hyphasis, and now required the aid of the army to repair the damage.[550] The heavy rains continued throughout most of his return march to the Hydaspes.[551]

On coming back to this river, Alexander received a large reinforcement both of cavalry and infantry, sent to him from Europe, together with 25,000 new panoplies, and a considerable stock of medicines.[552] Had these reinforcements reached him on the Hyphasis, it seems not impossible that he might have prevailed on his army to accompany him in his farther advance to the Ganges and the regions beyond. He now employed himself, assisted by Porus and Taxilus, in collecting and constructing a fleet for sailing down the Hydaspes and thence down to the mouth of the Indus. By the early part of November, a fleet of nearly 2000 boats or vessels of various sizes having been prepared, he began his voyage.[553] Kraterus marched with one division of the army, along the right bank of the Hydaspes—Hephæstion on the left bank with the remainder, including 200 elephants; Nearchus had the command of the fleet in the river, on board of which was Alexander himself. He pursued his voyage slowly down the river, to the confluence of the Hydaspes with the Akesines—with the Hydraotes—and with the Hyphasis—all pouring, in one united stream, into the Indus. He sailed down the Indus to its junction with the Indian Ocean. Altogether this voyage occupied nine months,[554] from November 326 B. C. to August 325 B. C. But it was a voyage full of active military operations on both sides of the river. Alexander perpetually disembarked to attack, subdue, and slaughter all such nations near the banks as did not voluntarily submit. Among them were the Malli and Oxydrakæ, free and brave tribes, who resolved to defend their liberty, but, unfortunately for themselves, were habitually at variance, and could not now accomplish any hearty co-operation against the common invader.[555] Alexander first assailed the Malli with his usual celerity and vigor, beat them with slaughter in the field, and took several of their towns.[556] There remained only their last and strongest town, from which the defenders were already driven out and forced to retire to the citadel.[557] Thither they were pursued by the Macedonians, Alexander being among the foremost, with only a few guards near him. Impatient because the troops with their scaling-ladders did not come up more rapidly, he mounted upon a ladder that happened to be at hand, attended only by Peukestes and one or two others, with an adventurous courage even transcending what he was wont to display. Having cleared the wall by killing several of its defenders, he jumped down into the interior of the citadel, and made head for some time, nearly alone, against all within. He received however a bad wound from an arrow in the breast, and was on the point of fainting, when his

soldiers burst in, rescued him, and took the place. Every person within, man, woman, and child, was slain.[558]

The wound of Alexander was so severe, that he was at first reported to be dead to the great consternation and distress of the army. However, he became soon sufficiently recovered to show himself, and to receive their ardent congratulations, in the camp established at the point of junction between the Hydraotes (Ravee) and Akesines (Chenab).[559] His voyage down the river, though delayed by the care of his wound, was soon resumed and prosecuted, with the same active operations by his land-force on both sides to subjugate all the Indian tribes and cities within accessible distance. At the junction of the river Akesines (Punjnud) with the Indus, Alexander directed the foundation of a new city, with adequate docks and conveniences for ship-building, whereby he expected to command the internal navigation.[560] Having no farther occasion now for so large a land-force, he sent a large portion of it, under Kraterus, westward (seemingly through the pass now called Bolan) into Karmania. [561] He established another military and naval post at Pattala, where the Delta of the Indus divided; and he then sailed, with a portion of his fleet, down the right arm of the river to have the first sight of the Indian Ocean. The view of ebbing and flowing tide, of which none had had experience on the scale there exhibited, occasioned to all much astonishment and alarm.[562]

The fleet was now left to be conducted by the admiral Nearchus, from the mouth of the Indus round by the Persian Gulf to that of the Tigris: a memorable nautical enterprise in Grecian antiquity. Alexander himself (about the month of August) began his march by land westward through the territories of the Arabitæ and the Oritæ, and afterwards through the deserts of Gedrosia. Pura, the principal town of the Gedrosians, was sixty days' march from the boundary of the Oritæ.[563]

Here his army, though without any formidable opposing enemy, underwent the most severe and deplorable sufferings; their march being through a sandy and trackless desert, with short supplies of food and still shorter supplies of water, under a burning sun. The loss in men, horses, and baggage-cattle from thirst, fatigue, and disease was prodigious; and it required all the unconquerable energy of Alexander to bring through even the diminished number.[564] At Pura the army obtained repose and refreshment, and was enabled to march forward into Karmania, where Kraterus joined them with his division from the Indus, and Kleander with the division which had been left at Ekbatana. Kleander, accused of heinous crimes in his late command, was put to death or imprisoned: several of his comrades were executed. To recompense the soldiers for their recent distress in Gedrosia, the king conducted them for seven days in drunken bacchanalian procession through Karmania, himself and all his friends taking part in the revelry; an imitation of the jovial festivity and triumph with which the god Dionysus had marched back from the conquest of India.[565]

During the halt in Karmania Alexander had the satisfaction of seeing his admiral Nearchus,[566] who had brought the fleet round from the mouth of the Indus to the harbor called Harmozeia (Ormuz), not far from the entrance of the Persian Gulf; a voyage of much hardship and distress, along the barren coasts of the Oritæ, the Gedrosians, and the Ichthyophagi.[567] Nearchus, highly commended and honored, was presently sent back to complete his voyage as far as the mouth of the Euphrates; while Hephæstion also was directed to conduct the larger portion of the army, with the elephants and heavy baggage, by the road near the coast from Karmania into Persis. This road, though circuitous, was the most convenient, as it was now the winter season;[568] but Alexander himself, with the lighter divisions of his army, took the more direct mountain road from Karmania to Pasargadæ and Persepolis. Visiting the tomb of Cyrus the Great, founder of the Persian empire, he was incensed to find it violated and pillaged. He caused it to be carefully restored, put to death a Macedonian named Polymachus as the offender, and tortured the Magian guardians of it for the purpose of discovering accomplices, but in vain.[569] Orsines, satrap of Persis, was however accused of connivance in the deed, as well as of various acts of murder and spoliation: according to Curtius, he was not only innocent, but had manifested both good faith and devotion to Alexander;[570] in spite of which he became a victim of the hostility of the favorite eunuch Bagoas, who both poisoned the king's mind with calumnies of his own, and suborned other accusers with false testimony. Whatever may be the truth of the story, Alexander caused Orsines to be hanged; naming as satrap Peukestes, whose favor was now high, partly as comrade and preserver of the king in his imminent danger at the citadel of the Malli,—partly from his having adopted the Persian dress, manners, and language more completely than any other Macedonian.[571]

It was about February, in 324 B. C.,[572] that Alexander marched out of Persis to Susa. During this progress, at the point where he crossed the Pasitigris, he was again joined by Nearchus, who having completed his circumnavigation from the mouth of the Indus to that of the Euphrates, had sailed back with the fleet from the latter river and come up the Pasitigris.[573] It is probable that the division of Hephæstion also rejoined him at Susa, and that the whole army was there for the first time brought together, after the separation in Karmania.

In Susa and Susiana Alexander spent some months. For the first time since his accession to the throne, he had now no military operations in hand or in immediate prospect. No enemy was before him, until it pleased him to go in quest of a new one;—nor indeed could any new one be found, except at a prodigious distance. He had emerged from the perils of the untrodden East, and had returned into the ordinary localities and conditions of Persian rule, occupying that capital city from whence the great Achæmenid kings had been accustomed to govern the Western as well as the Eastern portions of their vast empire. To their post, and to their irritable love of servility, Alexander had succeeded; but bringing with him a restless energy such as

none of them except the first founder Cyrus had manifested—and a splendid military genius, such as was unknown alike to Cyrus and to his successors.

In the new position of Alexander, his principal subjects of uneasiness were, the satraps and the Macedonian soldiers. During the long interval (more than five years) which had elapsed since he marched eastward from Hyrkania in pursuit of Bessus, the satraps had necessarily been left much to themselves. Some had imagined that he would never return; an anticipation noway unreasonable, since his own impulse towards forward march was so insatiate that he was only constrained to return by the resolute opposition of his own soldiers; moreover his dangerous wound among the Malli, and his calamitous march through Gedrôsia, had given rise to reports of his death, credited for some time even by Olympias and Kleopatra in Macedonia.[574] Under these uncertainties, some satraps stood accused of having pillaged rich temples, and committed acts of violence towards individuals. Apart from all criminality, real or alleged, several of them, also, had taken into pay bodies of mercenary troops, partly as a necessary means of authority in their respective districts, partly as a protection to themselves in the event of Alexander's decease. Respecting the conduct of the satraps and their officers, many denunciations and complaints were sent in; to which Alexander listened readily and even eagerly, punishing the accused with indiscriminate rigor, and resenting especially the suspicion that they had calculated upon his death.[575] Among those executed, were Abulites, satrap of Susiana, with his son Oxathres; the latter was even slain by the hands of Alexander himself, with a sarissa[576]—the dispensation of punishment becoming in his hands an outburst of exasperated temper. He also despatched peremptory orders to all the satraps, enjoining them to dismiss their mercenary troops without delay.[577] This measure produced considerable effect on the condition of Greece—about which I shall speak in a subsequent chapter. Harpalus, satrap of Babylon (about whom also more, presently), having squandered large sums out of the revenues of the post upon ostentatious luxury, became terrified when Alexander was approaching Susiana, and fled to Greece with a large treasure and a small body of soldiers.[578] Serious alarm was felt among all the satraps and officers, innocent as well as guilty. That the most guilty were not those who fared worst, we may see by the case of Kleomenes in Egypt, who remained unmolested in his government, though his iniquities were no secret.[579]

Among the Macedonian soldiers, discontent had been perpetually growing, from the numerous proofs which they witnessed that Alexander had made his election for an Asiatic character, and abnegated his own country. Besides his habitual adoption of the Persian costume and ceremonial, he now celebrated a sort of national Asiatic marriage at Susa. He had already married the captive Roxana, in Baktria; he next took two additional wives—Statira, daughter of Darius—and Parysatis, daughter of the preceding king Ochus. He at the same time caused eighty of his principal friends and officers, some very reluctantly, to marry (according to Persian rites) wives selected from the noblest Persian families, providing dowries for all of them.[580] He

made presents besides, to all those Macedonians who gave in their names as having married Persian women. Splendid festivities[581] accompanied these nuptials, with honorary rewards distributed to favorites and meritorious officers. Macedonians and Persians, the two imperial races, one in Europe, the other in Asia, were thus intended to be amalgamated. To soften the aversion of the soldiers generally towards these Asiatising marriages,[582] Alexander issued proclamation that he would himself discharge their debts, inviting all who owed money to give in their names with an intimation of the sums due. It was known that the debtors were numerous; yet few came to enter their names. The soldiers suspected the proclamation as a stratagem, intended for the purpose of detecting such as were spendthrifts, and obtaining a pretext for punishment: a remarkable evidence how little confidence or affection Alexander now inspired, and how completely the sentiment entertained towards him was that of fear mingled with admiration. He himself was much hurt at their mistrust, and openly complained of it; at the same time proclaiming that paymasters and tables should be planted openly in the camp, and that any soldier might come and ask for money enough to pay his debts, without being bound to give in his name. Assured of secrecy, they now made application in such numbers that the total distributed was prodigiously great; reaching, according to some, to 10,000 talents—according to Arrian, not less than 20,000 talents or £4,600,000 sterling.[583]

Large as this donative was, it probably gave but partial satisfaction, since the most steady and well-conducted soldiers could have received no benefit, except in so far as they might choose to come forward with fictitious debts. A new modification moreover was in store for the soldiers generally. There arrived from the various satrapies—even from those most distant, Sogdiana, Baktria, Aria, Drangiana, Arachosia, etc.—contingents of young and fresh native troops, amounting in total to 30,000 men; all armed and drilled in the Macedonian manner. From the time when the Macedonians had refused to cross the river Hyphasis and march forward into India, Alexander saw, that for his large aggressive schemes it was necessary to disband the old soldiers, and to organize an army at once more fresh and more submissive. He accordingly despatched orders to the satraps to raise and discipline new Asiatic levies, of vigorous native youths; and the fruit of these orders was now seen. [584] Alexander reviewed the new levies, whom he called the Epigoni, with great satisfaction. He moreover incorporated many native Persians, both officers and soldiers, into the Companion-cavalry, the most honorable service in the army; making the important change of arming them with the short Macedonian thrusting-pike in place of the missile Persian javelin. They were found such apt soldiers, and the genius of Alexander for military organization was so consummate, that he saw himself soon released from his dependence on the Macedonian veterans; a change evident enough to them as well as to him.[585]

The novelty and success of Nearchus in his exploring voyage had excited in Alexander an eager appetite for naval operations. Going on board his fleet in the Pa-

sitigris (the Karun, the river on the east side of Susa), he sailed in person down to the Persian Gulf, surveyed the coast as far as the mouth of the Tigris, and then sailed up the latter river as far as Opis. Hephæstion meanwhile, commanding the army, marched by land in concert with this voyage, and came back to Opis, where Alexander disembarked.[586]

Sufficient experiment had now been made with the Asiatic levies, to enable Alexander to dispense with many of his Macedonian veterans. Calling together the army, he intimated his intention of sending home those who were unfit for service either from age or wounds, but of allotting to them presents at departure sufficient to place them in an enviable condition, and attract fresh Macedonian substitutes. On hearing this intimation, all the long-standing discontent of the soldiers at once broke out. They felt themselves set aside as worn out and useless,—and set aside, not to make room for younger men of their own country, but in favor of those Asiatics into whose arms their king had now passed. They demanded with a loud voice that he should dismiss them all—advising him by way of taunt to make his future conquests along with his father Ammon. These manifestations so incensed Alexander, that he leaped down from the elevated platform on which he had stood to speak, rushed with a few of his guards among the crowd of soldiers, and seized or caused to be seized thirteen of those apparently most forward, ordering them immediately to be put to death. The multitude were thoroughly overawed and reduced to silence, upon which Alexander remounted the platform and addressed them in a speech of considerable length. He boasted of the great exploits of Philip, and of his own still greater: he affirmed that all the benefit of his conquests had gone to the Macedonians, and that he himself had derived from them nothing but a double share of the common labors, hardships, wounds, and perils. Reproaching them as base deserters from a king who had gained for them all these unparalleled acquisitions, he concluded by giving discharge to all—commanding them forthwith to depart.[587]

After this speech—teeming (as we read it in Arrian) with that exorbitant self-exaltation which formed the leading feature in his character—Alexander hurried away into the palace, where he remained shut up for two days without admitting any one except his immediate attendants. His guards departed along with him, leaving the discontented soldiers stupefied and motionless. Receiving no farther orders, nor any of the accustomed military indications,[588] they were left in the helpless condition of soldiers constrained to resolve for themselves, and at the same time altogether dependent upon Alexander whom they had offended. On the third day, they learnt that he had convened the Persian officers, and had invested them with the chief military commands, distributing the newly arrived Epigoni into divisions of infantry and cavalry, all with Macedonian military titles, and passing over the Macedonians themselves as if they did not exist. At this news, the soldiers were overwhelmed with shame and remorse. They rushed to the gates of the palace, threw down their arms, and supplicated with tears and groans for Alexander’s pardon. Presently he came

out, and was himself moved to tears by seeing their prostrate deportment. After testifying his full reconciliation, he caused a solemn sacrifice to be celebrated, coupled with a multitudinous banquet of mixed Macedonians and Persians. The Grecian prophets, the Persian magi and all the guests present, united in prayer and libation for fusion, harmony, and community of empire, between the two nations.[589]

This complete victory over his own soldiers was probably as gratifying to Alexander as any one gained during his past life; carrying as it did a consoling retribution for the memorable stoppage on the banks of the Hyphasis, which he had neither forgotten nor forgiven. He selected 10,000 of the oldest and most exhausted among the soldiers to be sent home under Kraterus, giving to each full pay until the time of arrival in Macedonia, with a donation of one talent besides. He intended that Kraterus, who was in bad health, should remain in Europe as viceroy of Macedonia, and that Antipater should come out to Asia with a reinforcement of troops.[590] Pursuant to this resolution, the 10,000 soldiers were now singled out for return, and separated from the main army. Yet it does not appear that they actually did return, during the ten months of Alexander's remaining life.

Of the important edict issued this summer by Alexander to the Grecian cities, and read at the Olympic festival in July—directing each city to recall its exiled citizens—I shall speak in a future chapter. He had now accomplished his object of organizing a land force, half Macedonian, half Asiatic. But since the expedition of Nearchus, he had become bent upon a large extension of his naval force also; which was indeed an indispensable condition towards his immediate projects of conquering Arabia, and of pushing both nautical exploration and aggrandizement from the Persian Gulf round the Arabian coast. He despatched orders to the Phenician ports, directing that a numerous fleet should be built; and that the ships should then be taken to pieces, and conveyed across to Thapsakus on the Euphrates, from whence they would sail down to Babylon. At that place, he directed the construction of other ships from the numerous cypress trees around—as well as the formation of an enormous harbor in the river at Babylon, adequate to the accommodation of 1000 ships of war. Mikkalus, a Greek of Klazomenæ, was sent to Phenicia with 500 talents, to enlist, or to purchase, seamen for the crews. It was calculated that these preparations (probably under the superintendence of Nearchus) would be completed by the spring, for which period contingents were summoned to Babylon for the expedition against Arabia.[591]

In the mean time, Alexander himself paid a visit to Ekbatana, the ordinary summer residence of the Persian kings. He conducted his army by leisurely marches, reviewing by the way the ancient regal parks of the celebrated breed called Nisæan horses now greatly reduced in number.[592] On the march, a violent altercation occurred between his personal favorite Hephæstion,—and his secretary Eumenes, the most able, dexterous, and long-sighted man in his service. Eumenes, as a Greek of Kardia, had been always regarded with slight and jealousy by the Macedonian officers, especially by Hephæstion; Alexander now took pains to reconcile the two, ex-

periencing no difficulty with Eumenes, but much with Hephæstion.[593] During his stay at Ekbatana, he celebrated magnificent sacrifices and festivities, with gymnastic and musical exhibitions, which were farther enlivened, according to the Macedonian habits, by banquets and excessive wine-drinking. Amidst these proceedings, Hephæstion was seized with a fever. The vigor of his constitution emboldened him to neglect all care or regimen, so that in a few days the disease carried him off. The final crisis came on suddenly, and Alexander was warned of it while sitting in the theatre; but though he instantly hurried to the bedside, he found Hephæstion already dead. His sorrow for this loss was unbounded, manifesting itself in excesses suitable to the general violence of his impulses, whether of affection or of antipathy. Like Achilles mourning for Patroklus, he cast himself on the ground near the dead body, and remained there wailing for several hours; he refused all care, and even food, for two days; he cut his hair close, and commanded that all the horses and mules in the camp should have their manes cut close also; he not only suspended the festivities, but interdicted all music and every sign of joy in the camp; he directed that the battlements of the walls belonging to the neighboring cities should be struck off; he hung, or crucified, the physician Glaukias, who had prescribed for Hephæstion; he ordered that a vast funeral pile should be erected at Babylon, at a cost given to us as 10,000 talents (£2,300,000), to celebrate the obsequies; he sent messengers to the oracle of Ammon, to inquire whether it was permitted to worship Hephæstion as a god. Many of those around him, accommodating themselves to this passionate impulse of the ruler, began at once to show a sort of worship towards the deceased, by devoting to him themselves and their arms; of which Eumenes set the example, conscious of his own personal danger, if Alexander should suspect him of being pleased at the death of his recent rival. Perdikkas was instructed to convey the body in solemn procession to Babylon, there to be burnt in state when preparations should be completed.[594]

Alexander stayed at Ekbatana until winter was at hand, seeking distraction from his grief in exaggerated splendor of festivals and ostentation of life. His temper became so much more irascible and furious, that no one approached him without fear, and he was propitiated by the most extravagant flatteries.[595] At length he roused himself and found his true consolation, in gratifying the primary passions of his nature—fighting and man-hunting.[596] Between Media and Persis, dwelt the tribes called Kossæi, amidst a region of lofty, trackless, inaccessible mountains. Brave and predatory, they had defied the attacks of the Persian kings. Alexander now conducted against them a powerful force, and in spite of increased difficulties arising from the wintry season, pushed them from point to point, following them into the loftiest and most impenetrable recesses of their mountains. These efforts were continued for forty days, under himself and Ptolemy, until the entire male population was slain; which passed for an acceptable offering to the manes of Hephæstion.[597]

Not long afterwards, Alexander commenced his progress to Babylon; but in slow marches, farther retarded by various foreign embassies which met him on the road. So widely had the terror of his name and achievements been spread, that several of these envoys came from the most distant regions. There were some from the various tribes of Lybia—from Carthage—from Sicily and Sardinia—from the Illyrians and Thracians—from the Lucanians, Bruttians, and Tuscans, in Italy—nay, even (some affirmed) from the Romans, as yet a people of moderate power.[598] But there were other names yet more surprising—Æthiopians, from the extreme south, beyond Egypt—Scythians from the north, beyond the Danube—Iberians and Gauls, from the far west, beyond the Mediterranean Sea. Legates also arrived from various Grecian cities, partly to tender congratulations and compliments upon his matchless successes, partly to remonstrate against his sweeping mandate for the general restoration of the Grecian exiles.[599] It was remarked that these Grecian legates approached him with wreaths on their heads, tendering golden wreaths to him,—as if they were coming into the presence of a god.[600] The proofs which Alexander received even from distant tribes with names and costumes unknown to him, of fear for his enmity and anxiety for his favor, were such as had never been shown to any historical person, and such as entirely to explain his superhuman arrogance.

In the midst of this exuberant pride and good fortune, however, dark omens and prophecies crowded upon him as he approached Babylon. Of these the most remarkable was, the warning of the Chaldean priests, who apprised him, soon after he crossed the Tigris, that it would be dangerous for him to enter that city, and exhorted him to remain outside of the gates. At first he was inclined to obey; but his scruples were overruled, either by arguments from the Greek sophist Anaxarchus, or by the shame of shutting himself out from the most memorable city of the empire, where his great naval preparations were now going on. He found Nearchus with his fleet, who had come up from the mouth of the river,—and also the ships directed to be built in Phenicia, which had come down the river from Thapsakus, together with large numbers of seafaring men to serve aboard.[601] The ships of cypress-wood, and the large docks, which he had ordered to be constructed at Babylon, were likewise in full progress. He lost no time in concerting with Nearchus the details of an expedition into Arabia and the Persian Gulf, by his land-force and naval force coöperating. From various naval officers, who had been sent to survey the Persian Gulf and now made their reports, he learned that though there were no serious difficulties within it or along its southern coast, yet to double the eastern cape which terminated that coast—to circumnavigate the unknown peninsula of Arabia—and thus to reach the Red Sea—was an enterprise perilous at least, if not impracticable.[602] But to achieve that which other men thought impracticable, was the leading passion of Alexander. He resolved to circumnavigate Arabia as well as to conquer the Arabians, from whom it was sufficient offence that they had sent no envoys to him. He also contemplated the foundation of a great maritime city in the interior of the Persian Gulf, to rival in wealth and commerce the cities of Phenicia.[603]

Amidst preparations for this expedition—and while the immense funeral pile destined for Hephæstion was being built—Alexander sailed down the Euphrates to the great dyke called Pallakopas, about ninety miles below Babylon; a sluice constructed by the ancient Assyrian kings, for the purpose of being opened when the river was too full, so as to let off the water into the interminable marshes stretching out near the western bank. The sluice being reported not to work well, he projected the construction of a new one somewhat farther down. He then sailed through the Pallakopas in order to survey the marshes, together with the tombs of the ancient Assyrian kings which had been erected among them. Himself steering his vessel, with the kausia on his head, and the regal diadem above it,[604] he passed some time among these lakes and swamps, which were so extensive that his fleet lost the way among them. He stayed long enough also to direct, and even commence, the foundation of a new city, in what seemed to him a convenient spot.[605]

On returning to Babylon, Alexander found large reinforcements arrived there—partly under Philoxenus, Menander, and Menidas, from Lydia and Karia—partly 20,000 Persians, under Peukestes the satrap. He caused these Persians to be incorporated in the files of the Macedonian phalanx. According to the standing custom, each of these files was sixteen deep, and each soldier was armed with the long pike or sarissa wielded by two hands; the lochage, or front-rank man, being always an officer receiving double pay, of great strength and attested valor—and those second and third in the file, as well as the rearmost man of all, being likewise strong and good men, receiving larger pay than the rest. Alexander, in his new arrangement, retained the three first ranks and the rear rank unchanged, as well as the same depth of file; but he substituted twelve Persians in place of the twelve Macedonians who followed after the third-rank man; so that the file was composed first of the lochage and two other chosen Macedonians, each armed with the sarissa—then of twelve Persians armed in their own manner with bow or javelin—lastly, of a Macedonian with his sarissa bringing up the the rear.[606] In this Macedonico-Persian file, the front would have only three projecting pikes, instead of five, as the ordinary Macedonian phalanx presented; but then, in compensation, the Persian soldiers would be able to hurl their javelins at an advancing enemy, over the heads of their three front-rank men. The supervening death of Alexander prevented the actual execution of this reform, interesting as being his last project for amalgamating Persians and Macedonians into one military force.

Besides thus modifying the phalanx, Alexander also passed in review his fleet, which was now fully equipped. The order was actually given for departing, so soon as the obsequies of Hephæstion should be celebrated. This was the last act which remained for him to fulfil. The splendid funeral pile stood ready—two hundred feet high, occupying a square area, of which the side was nearly one furlong, loaded with mostly decorations from the zeal, real and simulated, of the Macedonian officers. The invention of artists was exhausted, in long discussions with the king himself, to pro-

duce at all cost an exhibition of magnificence singular and stupendous. The outlay (probably with addition of the festivals immediately following) is stated at 12,000 talents, or £2,760,000 sterling.[607] Alexander awaited the order from the oracle of Ammon, having sent thither messengers to inquire what measure of reverential honor he might properly and piously show to his departed friend.[608] The answer was now brought back, intimating that Hephæstion was to be worshipped as a Hero—the secondary form of worship, not on a level with that paid to the gods. Delighted with this divine testimony to Hephæstion, Alexander caused the pile to be lighted, and the obsequies celebrated, in a manner suitable to the injunctions of the oracle.[609] He farther directed that magnificent chapels or sacred edifices should be erected for the worship and honor of Hephæstion, at Alexandria in Egypt,—at Pella in Macedonia,—and probably in other cities also.[610]

Respecting the honors intended for Hephæstion at Alexandria, he addressed to Kleomenes, the satrap of Egypt, a despatch which becomes in part known to us. I have already stated that Kleomenes was among the worst of the satraps; having committed multiplied public crimes, of which Alexander was not uninformed. The regal despatch enjoined him to erect in commemoration of Hephæstion a chapel on the terra firma of Alexandria, with a splendid turret on the islet of Pharos; and to provide besides that all mercantile written contracts, as a condition of validity, should be inscribed with the name of Hephæstion. Alexander concluded thus: "If on coming I find the Egyptian temples and the chapels of Hephæstion completed in the best manner, I will forgive you for all your past crimes; and in future, whatever magnitude of crime you may commit, you shall suffer no bad treatment from me."[611] This despatch strikingly illustrates how much the wrong doings of satraps were secondary considerations in his view, compared with splendid manifestations towards the gods and personal attachments towards friends.

The intense sorrow felt by Alexander for the death of Hephæstion—not merely an attached friend, but of the same age and exuberant vigor as himself—laid his mind open to gloomy forebodings from numerous omens, as well as to jealous mistrust even of his oldest officers. Antipater especially, no longer protected against the calumnies of Olympias by the support of Hephæstion,[612] fell more and more into discredit; whilst his son Kassander, who had recently come into Asia with a Macedonian reinforcement, underwent from Alexander during irascible moments much insulting violence. In spite of the dissuasive warning of the Chaldean priests,[613] Alexander had been persuaded to distrust their sincerity, and had entered Babylon, though not without hesitation and uneasiness. However, when, after having entered the town, he went out of it again safely on his expedition for the survey of the lower Euphrates, he conceived himself to have exposed them as deceitful alarmists, and returned to the city with increased confidence, for the obsequies of his deceased friend.[614]

The sacrifices connected with these obsequies were on the most prodigious scale. Victims enough were offered to furnish a feast for the army, who also received ample distributions of wine. Alexander himself presided at the feast, and abandoned himself to conviviality like the rest. Already full of wine, he was persuaded by his friend Medius to sup with him, and to pass the whole night in yet farther drinking, with the boisterous indulgence called by the Greeks Kômus or Revelry. Having slept off his intoxication during the next day, he in the evening again supped with Medius, and spent a second night in the like unmeasured indulgence.[615] It appears that he already had the seeds of fever upon him, which was so fatally aggravated by this intemperance that he was too ill to return to his palace. He took the bath, and slept in the house of Medius; on the next morning, he was unable to rise. After having been carried out on a couch to celebrate sacrifice (which was his daily habit), he was obliged to lie in bed all day. Nevertheless he summoned the generals to his presence, prescribing all the details of the impending expedition, and ordering that the land-force should begin its march on the fourth day following, while the fleet, with himself aboard, would sail on the fifth day. In the evening, he was carried on a couch across the Euphrates into a garden on the other side, where he bathed and rested for the night. The fever still continued, so that in the morning, after bathing and being carried out to perform the sacrifices, he remained on his couch all day, talking and playing at dice with Medius; in the evening, he bathed, sacrificed again, and ate a light supper, but endured a bad night with increased fever. The next two days passed in the same manner, the fever becoming worse and worse; nevertheless Alexander still summoned Nearchus to his bedside, discussed with him many points about his maritime projects, and repeated his order that the fleet should be ready by the third day. On the ensuing morning the fever was violent; Alexander reposed all day in a bathing-house in the garden, yet still calling in the generals to direct the filling up of vacancies among the officers, and ordering that the armament should be ready to move. Throughout the two next days, his malady became hourly more aggravated. On the last day of the two, Alexander could with difficulty support the being lifted out of bed to perform the sacrifice; even then, however, he continued to give orders to the generals about the expedition. On the morrow, though desperately ill, he still made the effort requisite for performing the sacrifice; he was then carried across from the garden-house to the palace, giving orders that the generals and officers should remain in permanent attendance in and near the hall. He caused some of them to be called to his bedside; but though he knew them perfectly, he had by this time become incapable of utterance. One of his last words spoken is said to have been, on being asked to whom he bequeathed his kingdom, "*To the strongest*;" one of his last acts was, to take the signet ring from his finger, and hand it to Perdikkas. [616]

For two nights and a day he continued in this state, without either amendment or repose. Meanwhile, the news of his malady had spread through the army, filling them with grief and consternation. Many of the soldiers, eager to see him once more,

forced their way into the palace, and were admitted unarmed. They passed along by the bedside, with all the demonstrations of affliction and sympathy: Alexander knew them, and made show of friendly recognition as well as he could; but was unable to say a word. Several of the generals slept in the temple of Serapis, hoping to be informed by the god in a dream whether they ought to bring Alexander into it, as a suppliant to experience the divine healing power. The god informed them in their dream, that Alexander ought not to be brought into the temple—that it would be better for him to be left where he was. In the afternoon he expired—June 323 B. C.—after a life of thirty-two years and eight months—and a reign of twelve years and eight months.[617]

The death of Alexander, thus suddenly cut off by a fever in the plenitude of health, vigor, and aspirations, was an event impressive as well as important, in the highest possible degree, to his contemporaries far and near. When the first report of it was brought to Athens, the orator Demades exclaimed:—"It cannot be true: if Alexander were dead, the whole habitable world would have smelt of his carcass."[618] This coarse but emphatic comparison illustrates the immediate, powerful, and wide-reaching impression produced by the sudden extinction of the great conqueror. It was felt by each of the many remote envoys who had so recently come to propitiate this far-shooting Apollo—by every man among the nations who had sent these envoys—throughout Europe, Asia, and Africa, as then known,—to affect either his actual condition or his probable future.[619] The first growth and development of Macedonia, during the twenty-two years preceding the battle of Chæroneia, from an embarrassed secondary State into the first of all known powers, had excited the astonishment of contemporaries, and admiration for Philip's organizing genius. But the achievements of Alexander, during his twelve years of reign, throwing Philip into the shade, had been on a scale so much grander and vaster, and so completely without serious reverse or even interruption, as to transcend the measure, not only of human expectation, but almost of human belief. The Great King (as the king of Persia was called by excellence) was, and had long been, the type of worldly power and felicity, even down to the time when Alexander crossed the Hellespont. Within four years and three months from this event, by one stupendous defeat after another, Darius had lost all his Western Empire, and had become a fugitive eastward of the Caspian Gates, escaping captivity at the hands of Alexander only to perish by those of the satrap Bessus. All antecedent historical parallels—the ruin and captivity of the Lydian Crœsus, the expulsion and mean life of the Syracusan Dionysius, both of them impressive examples of the mutability of human condition,—sank into trifles compared with the overthrow of this towering Persian colossus. The orator Æschines expressed the genuine sentiment of a Grecian spectator, when he exclaimed (in a speech delivered at Athens shortly before the death of Darius):—"What is there among the list of strange and unexpected events, that has not occurred in our time? Our lives have transcended the limits of humanity; we are born to serve as a theme for incredible tales to posterity. Is not the Persian king—who dug through Athos and bridged the

Hellespont,—who demanded earth and water from the Greeks,—who dared to proclaim himself, in public epistles, master of all mankind from the rising to the setting sun—is not *he* now struggling to the last, not for dominion over others, but for the safety of his own person?"[620]

Such were the sentiments excited by Alexander's career even in the middle of 330 B. C., more than seven years before his death. During the following seven years, his additional achievements had carried astonishment yet farther. He had mastered, in defiance of fatigue, hardship, and combat, not merely all the eastern half of the Persian empire, but unknown Indian regions beyond its easternmost limits. Besides Macedonia, Greece, and Thrace, he possessed all that immense treasure and military force which had once rendered the Great King so formidable. By no contemporary man had any such power ever been known or conceived. With the turn of imagination then prevalent, many were doubtless disposed to take him for a god on earth, as Grecian spectators had once supposed with regard to Xerxes, when they beheld the innumerable Persian host crossing the Hellespont.[621]

Exalted to this prodigious grandeur, Alexander was at the time of his death little more than thirty-two years old—the age at which a citizen of Athens was growing into important commands; ten years less than the age for a consul at Rome;[622] two years younger than the age at which Timour first acquired the crown, and began his foreign conquests.[623] His extraordinary bodily powers were unabated; he had acquired a large stock of military experience; and what was still more important, his appetite for farther conquest was as voracious, and his readiness to purchase it at the largest cost of toil or danger, as complete, as it had been when he first crossed the Hellespont. Great as his past career had been, his future achievements, with such increased means and experience, were likely to be yet greater. His ambition would have been satisfied with nothing less than the conquest of the whole habitable world as then known;[624] and if his life had been prolonged, he would probably have accomplished it. Nowhere (so far as our knowledge reaches) did there reside any military power capable of making head against him; nor were his soldiers, when he commanded them, daunted or baffled by any extremity of cold, heat, or fatigue. The patriotic feelings of Livy dispose him to maintain[625] that Alexander, had he invaded Italy and assailed Romans or Samnites, would have failed and perished like his relative Alexander of Epirus. But this conclusion cannot be accepted. If we grant the courage and discipline of the Roman infantry to have been equal to the best infantry of Alexander's army, the same cannot be said of the Roman cavalry as compared with the Macedonian Companions. Still less is it likely that a Roman consul, annually changed, would have been found a match for Alexander in military genius and combinations; nor, even if personally equal, would he have possessed the same variety of troops and arms, each effective in its separate way, and all conspiring to one common purpose—nor the same unbounded influence over their minds in stimulating them to full effort. I do not think that even the Romans could have successfully re-

sisted Alexander the Great; though it is certain that he never throughout all his long marches encountered such enemies as they, nor even such as Samnites and Lucanians—combining courage, patriotism, discipline, with effective arms both for defence and for close combat.[626]

Among all the qualities which go to constitute the highest military excellence, either as a general or as a soldier, none was wanting in the character of Alexander. Together with his own chivalrous courage—sometimes indeed both excessive and unseasonable, so as to form the only military defect which can be fairly imputed to him—we trace in all his operations the most careful dispositions taken beforehand, vigilant precaution in guarding against possible reverse, and abundant resource in adapting himself to new contingences. Amidst constant success, these precautionary combinations were never discontinued. His achievements are the earliest recorded evidence of scientific military organization on a large scale, and of its overwhelming effects. Alexander overawes the imagination more than any other personage of antiquity, by the matchless development of all that constitutes effective force—as an individual warrior, and as organizer and leader of armed masses; not merely the blind impetuosity ascribed by Homer to Ares, but also the intelligent, methodized, and all-subduing compression which he personifies in Athênê. But all his great qualities were fit for use only against enemies; in which category indeed were numbered all mankind, known and unknown, except those who chose to submit to him. In his Indian campaigns, amidst tribes of utter strangers, we perceive that not only those who stand on their defence, but also those who abandon their property and flee to the mountains, are alike pursued and slaughtered.

Apart from the transcendent merits of Alexander as a soldier and a general, some authors give him credit for grand and beneficent views on the subject of imperial government, and for intentions highly favorable to the improvement of mankind. I see no ground for adopting this opinion. As far as we can venture to anticipate what would have been Alexander's future, we see nothing in prospect except years of ever-repeated aggression and conquest, not to be concluded until he had traversed and subjugated all the inhabited globe. The acquisition of universal dominion—conceived not metaphorically, but literally, and conceived with greater facility in consequence of the imperfect geographical knowledge of the time—was the master-passion of his soul. At the moment of his death, he was commencing fresh aggression in the south against the Arabians, to an indefinite extent;[627] while his vast projects against the western tribes in Africa and Europe, as far as the pillars of Herakles, were consigned in the orders and memoranda confidentially communicated to Kraterus.[628] Italy, Gaul, and Spain, would have been successively attacked and conquered; the enterprises proposed to him when in Baktria by the Chorasmian prince Pharasmanes, but postponed then until a more convenient season, would have been next taken up, and he would have marched from the Danube northward round the Euxine and Palus Mæotis against the Scythians and the tribes of Caucasus.[629] There re-

mained moreover the Asiatic regions east of the Hyphasis, which his soldiers had refused to enter upon, but which he certainly would have invaded at a future opportunity, were it only to efface the poignant humiliation of having been compelled to relinquish his proclaimed purpose. Though this sounds like romance and hyperbole, it was nothing more than the real insatiate aspiration of Alexander, who looked upon every new acquisition mainly as a capital for acquiring more.[630] "You are a man like all of us, Alexander—except that you abandon your home (said the naked Indian to him[631]) like a meddlesome destroyer, to invade the most distant regions; enduring hardship yourself, and inflicting hardship upon others." Now, how an empire thus boundless and heterogeneous, such as no prince has ever yet realized, could have been administered with any superior advantages to subjects—it would be difficult to show. The mere task of acquiring and maintaining—of keeping satraps and tribute-gatherers in authority as well as in subordination—of suppressing resistances ever liable to recur in regions distant by months of march[632]—would occupy the whole life of a world-conqueror, without leaving any leisure for the improvements suited to peace and stability, if we give him credit for such purposes in theory.

But even this last is more than can be granted. Alexander's acts indicate that he desired nothing better than to take up the traditions of the Persian empire; a tribute-levying and army-levying system, under Macedonians, in large proportion, as his instruments; yet partly also under the very same Persians who had administered before, provided they submitted to him. It has indeed been extolled among his merits that he was thus willing to re-appoint Persian grandees (putting their armed force however under the command of a Macedonian officer)—and to continue native princes in their dominions, if they did willing homage to him, as tributary subordinates. But all this had been done before him by the Persian kings, whose system it was to leave the conquered princes undisturbed, subject only to the payment of tribute, and to the obligation of furnishing a military contingent when required.[633] In like manner Alexander's Asiatic empire would thus have been composed of an aggregate of satrapies and dependent principalities, furnishing money and soldiers; in other respects, left to the discretion of local rule, with occasional extreme inflictions of punishment, but no systematic examination or control.[634] Upon this, the condition of Asiatic empire in all ages, Alexander would have grafted one special improvement: the military organization of the empire, feeble under the Achæmenid princes, would have been greatly strengthened by his genius, and by the able officers formed in his school, both for foreign aggression and for home control.[635]

The Persian empire was a miscellaneous aggregate, with no strong feeling of nationality. The Macedonian conqueror who seized its throne was still more indifferent to national sentiment. He was neither Macedonian nor Greek. Though the absence of this prejudice has sometimes been mounted to him as a virtue, it only made room, in my opinion, for prejudices yet worse. The substitute for it was an exorbitant personality and self-estimation, manifested even in his earliest years, and inflamed by ex-

traordinary success into the belief in divine parentage; which, while setting him above the idea of communion with any special nationality, made him conceive all mankind as subjects under one common sceptre to be wielded by himself. To this universal empire the Persian king made the nearest approach,[636] according to the opinions then prevalent. Accordingly Alexander, when victorious, accepted the position and pretensions of the overthrown Persian court as approaching most nearly to his full due. He became more Persian than either Macedonian or Greek. While himself adopting, as far as he could safely venture, the personal habits of the Persian court, he took studied pains to transform his Macedonian officers into Persian grandees, encouraging and even forcing intermarriages with Persian women according to Persian rites. At the time of Alexander's death, there was comprised, in his written orders given to Kraterus, a plan for the wholesale transportation of inhabitants, both out of Europe into Asia, and out of Asia into Europe, in order to fuse these populations into one by multiplying intermarriages and intercourse.[637] Such reciprocal translation of peoples would have been felt as eminently odious, and could not have been accomplished without coercive authority.[638] It is rash to speculate upon unexecuted purposes; but, as far as we can judge, such compulsory mingling of the different races promises nothing favorable to the happiness of any of them, though it might serve as an imposing novelty and memento of imperial omnipotence.

In respect of intelligence and combining genius, Alexander was Hellenic to the full; in respect of disposition and purpose, no one could be less Hellenic. The acts attesting his Oriental violence of impulse, unmeasured self-will,[639] and exaction of reverence above the limits of humanity—have been already recounted. To describe him as a son of Hellas, imbued with the political maxims of Aristotle, and bent on the systematic diffusion of Hellenic culture for the improvement of mankind[640]—is, in my judgment, an estimate of his character contrary to the evidence. Alexander is indeed said to have invited suggestions from Aristotle as to the best mode of colonizing; but his temper altered so much, after a few years of Asiatic conquest, that he came not only to lose all deference for Aristotle's advice, but even to hate him bitterly.[641] Moreover, though the philosopher's full suggestions have not been preserved, yet we are told generally that he recommended Alexander to behave to the Greeks as a leader or president, or limited chief—and to the Barbarians (non-Hellenes) as a master;[642] a distinction substantially coinciding with that pointed out by Burke in his speeches at the beginning of the American war, between the principles of government proper to be followed by England in the American colonies, and in British India. No Greek thinker believed the Asiatics to be capable of that free civil polity[643] upon which the march of every Grecian community was based. Aristotle did not wish to degrade the Asiatics below the level to which they had been accustomed, but rather to preserve the Greeks from being degraded to the same level. Now Alexander recognized no such distinction as that drawn by his preceptor. He treated Greeks and Asiatics alike, not by elevating the latter, but by degrading the former. Though he employed all indiscriminately as instruments, yet he presently

found the free speech of Greeks, and even of Macedonians, so distasteful and offensive, that his preferences turned more and more in favor of the servile Asiatic sentiment and customs. Instead of hellenizing Asia, he was tending to asiatize Macedonia and Hellas. His temper and character, as modified by a few years of conquest, rendered him quite unfit to follow the course recommended by Aristotle towards the Greeks—quite as unfit as any of the Persian kings, or as the French Emperor Napoleon, to endure that partial frustration, compromise, and smart from free criticism, which is inseparable from the position of a limited chief. Among a multitude of subjects more diverse-colored than even the army of Xerxes, it is quite possible that he might have turned his power towards the improvement of the rudest portions. We are told (though the fact is difficult to credit, from his want of time) that he abolished various barbarisms of the Hyrkanians, Arachosians, and Sogdians.[644] But Macedonians as well as Greeks would have been pure losers by being absorbed into an immense Asiatic aggregate.

Plutarch states that Alexander founded more than seventy new cities in Asia.[645] So large a number of them is neither verifiable nor probable, unless we either reckon up simple military posts, or borrow from the list of foundations really established by his successors. Except Alexandria in Egypt, none of the cities founded by Alexander himself can be shown to have attained any great development. Nearly all were planted among the remote, warlike, and turbulent peoples eastward of the Caspian Gates. Such establishments were really fortified posts to hold the country in subjection: Alexander lodged in them detachments from his army; but none of these detachments can well have been large, since he could not afford materially to weaken his army, while active military operations were still going on and while farther advance was in contemplation. More of these settlements were founded in Sogdiana than elsewhere; but respecting the Sogdian foundations, we know that the Greeks whom he established there, chained to the spot only by fear of his power, broke away in mutiny immediately on the news of his death.[646] Some Greek soldiers in Alexander's army on the Jaxartes or the Hydaspes, sick and weary of his interminable marches, might prefer being enrolled among the colonists of a new city on one of these unknown rivers, to the ever-repeated routine of exhausting duty.[647] But it is certain that no volunteer emigrants would go forth to settle at distances such as their imaginations could hardly conceive. The absorbing appetite of Alexander was conquest, to the East, West, South, and North; the cities which he planted were established, for the most part, as garrisons to maintain his most distant and most precarious acquisitions. The purpose of colonization was altogether subordinate; and that of hellenizing Asia, so far as we can see, was not even contemplated, much less realized.

This process of hellenizing Asia—in so far as Asia was ever hellenized—which has often been ascribed to Alexander, was in reality the work of the Diadochi who came after him; though his conquests doubtless opened the door and established the mili-

tary ascendency which rendered such a work practicable. The position, the aspirations, and the interests of these Diadochi—Antigonus, Ptolemy, Seleukus, Lysimachus, etc.—were materially different from those of Alexander. They had neither appetite nor means for new and remote conquest; their great rivalry was with each other; each sought to strengthen himself near home against the rest. It became a matter of fashion and pride with them, not less than of interest, to found new cities immortalizing their family names. These foundations were chiefly made in the regions of Asia near and known to Greeks, where Alexander had planted none. Thus the great and numerous foundations of Seleukus Nikator and his successors covered Syria, Mesopotamia, and parts of Asia Minor. All these regions were known to Greeks, and more or less tempting to new Grecian immigrants—not out of reach or hearing of the Olympic and other festivals, as the Jaxartes and the Indus were. In this way a considerable influx of new hellenic blood was poured into Asia during the century succeeding Alexander,—probably in great measure from Italy and Sicily, where the condition of the Greek cities became still more calamitous—besides the numerous Greeks who took service as individuals under these Asiatic kings. Greeks, and Macedonians speaking Greek, became predominant, if not in numbers, at least in importance, throughout most of the cities in Western Asia. In particular, the Macedonian military organization, discipline, and administration, was maintained systematically among these Asiatic kings. In the account of the battle of Magnesia, fought by the Seleukid king Atiochus the Great against the Romans in 190 B. C., the Macedonian phalanx, constituting the main force of his Asiatic army, appears in all its completeness, just as it stood under Philip and Perseus in Macedonia itself.[648]

When it is said however that Asia became hellenized under Alexander's successors, the phrase requires explanation. Hellenism, properly so called—the aggregate of habits, sentiments, energies, and intelligence, manifested by the Greeks during their epoch of autonomy[649]—never passed over into Asia; neither the highest qualities of the Greek mind, not even the entire character of ordinary Greeks. This genuine Hellenism could not subsist under the overruling compression of Alexander, nor even under the less irresistible pressure of his successors. Its living force, productive genius, self-organizing power, and active spirit of political communion, were stifled, and gradually died out. All that passed into Asia was a faint and partial resemblance of it, carrying the superficial marks of the original. The administration of the Greco-Asiatic kings was not hellenic (as it has been sometimes called), but completely despotic, as that of the Persians had been before. Whoever follows their history, until the period of Roman dominion, will see that it turned upon the tastes, temper, and ability of the prince, and on the circumstances of the regal family. Viewing their government as a system, its prominent difference as compared with their Persian predecessors, consisted in their retaining the military traditions and organization of Philip and Alexander, an elaborate scheme of discipline and manœuvring, which would not be kept up without permanent official grades and a higher measure of intelligence than had ever been displayed under the Achæmenid kings, who had no military

school or training whatever. Hence a great number of individual Greeks found employment in the military as well as in the civil service of these Greco-Asiatic kings. The intelligent Greek, instead of a citizen of Hellas, became the instrument of a foreign prince; the details of government were managed to a great degree by Greek officials, and always in the Greek language.

Moreover, besides this, there was the still more important fact of the many new cities founded in Asia by the Seleukidæ and the other contemporary kings. Each of these cities had a considerable infusion of Greek and Macedonian citizens, among the native Orientals located there, often brought by compulsion from neighboring villages. In what numerical ratio these two elements of the civic population stood to each other, we cannot say. But the Greeks and Macedonians were the leading and active portion, who exercised the greatest assimilating force, gave imposing effect to the public manifestations of religion, had wider views and sympathies, dealt with the central government, and carried on that contracted measure of municipal autonomy which the city was permitted to retain. In these cities the Greek inhabitants, though debarred from political freedom, enjoyed a range of social activity suited to their tastes. In each, Greek was the language of public business and dealing; each formed a centre of attraction and commerce for an extensive neighborhood; all together, they were the main hellenic or quasi-hellenic element in Asia under the Greco-Asiatic kings, as contrasted with the rustic villages, where native manners, and probably native speech, still continued with little modification. But the Greeks of Antioch, or Alexandria, or Seleukeia, were not like citizens of Athens or Thebes, nor even like men of Tarentum or Ephesus. While they communicated their language to Orientals, they became themselves substantially orientalized. Their feelings, judgments, and habits of action, ceased to be hellenic. Polybius, when he visited Alexandria, looked with surprise and aversion on the Greeks there resident, though they were superior to the non-hellenic population, whom he considered worthless.[650] Greek social habits, festivals, and legends, passed with the hellenic settlers into Asia; all becoming amalgamated and transformed so as to suit a new Asiatic abode. Important social and political consequences turned upon the diffusion of the language, and upon the establishment of such a common medium of communication throughout Western Asia. But after all, the hellenized Asiatic was not so much a Greek as a foreigner with Grecian speech, exterior varnish, and superficial manifestations; distinguished fundamentally from those Greek citizens with whom the present history has been concerned. So he would have been considered by Sophokles, by Thucydides, by Sokrates.

Thus much is necessary in order to understand the bearing of Alexander's conquests, not only upon the hellenic population, but upon hellenic attributes and peculiarities. While crushing the Greeks as communities at home, these conquests opened a wider range to the Greeks as individuals abroad; and produced—perhaps the best of all their effects—a great increase of intercommunication, multiplication of roads,

extension of commercial dealing, and enlarged facilities for the acquisition of geographical knowledge. There already existed in the Persian empire an easy and convenient royal road (established by Darius son of Hystaspes and described as well as admired by Herodotus) for the three months' journey between Sardis and Susa; and there must have been another regular road from Susa and Ekbatana to Baktria, Sogdiana, and India. Alexander, had he lived, would doubtless have multiplied on a still larger scale the communications both by sea and land between the various parts of his world-empire. We read that among the gigantic projects which he was contemplating when surprised by death, one was, the construction of a road all along the northern coast of Africa, as far as the Pillars of Herakles.[651] He had intended to found a new maritime city on the Persian Gulf, at the mouth of the Euphrates, and to incur much outlay for regulating the flow of water in its lower course. The river would probably have been thus made again to afford the same conveniences, both for navigation and irrigation, as it appears to have furnished in earlier times under the ancient Babylonian kings. Orders had been also given for constructing a fleet to explore the Caspian Sea. Alexander believed that sea to be connected with the Eastern Ocean,[652] and intended to make it his point of departure for circumnavigating the eastern limits of Asia, which country yet remained for him to conquer. The voyage already performed by Nearchus, from the mouth of the Indus to that of the Euphrates, was in those days a splendid maritime achievement; to which another still greater was on the point of being added—the circumnavigation of Arabia from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea; though here we must remark, that this same voyage (from the mouth of the Indus round Arabia into the Red Sea) had been performed in thirty months, a century and a half before, by Skylax of Karyanda, under the orders of Darius son of Hystaspes;[653] yet, though recorded by Herodotus, forgotten (as it would appear) by Alexander and his contemporaries. This enlarged and systematic exploration of the earth, combined with increased means of communication among its inhabitants, is the main feature in Alexander's career which presents itself as promising real consequences beneficial to humanity.

We read that Alexander felt so much interest in the extension of science, that he gave to Aristotle the immense sum of 800 talents in money, placing under his directions several thousand men, for the purpose of prosecuting zoological researches.[654] These exaggerations are probably the work of those enemies of the philosopher who decried him as a pensioner of the Macedonian court; but it is probable enough that Philip, and Alexander in the early part of his reign, may have helped Aristotle in the difficult process of getting together facts and specimens for observation—from esteem towards him personally, rather than from interest in his discoveries. The intellectual turn of Alexander was towards literature, poetry, and history. He was fond of the Iliad especially, as well as of the Attic tragedians; so that Harpalus, being directed to send some books to him in Upper Asia, selected as the most acceptable packet various tragedies of Æschylus, Sophokles, and Euripides, with the dithyrambic poems of Telestes and the histories of Phlistus.[655]

CHAPTER XCV.

GRECIAN AFFAIRS FROM THE LANDING OF ALEXANDER IN ASIA TO THE CLOSE OF THE LAMIAN WAR.

EVEN in 334 B. C., when Alexander first entered upon his Asiatic campaigns, the Grecian cities, great as well as small, had been robbed of all their free agency, and existed only as appendages of the kingdom of Macedonia. Several of them were occupied by Macedonian garrisons, or governed by local despots who leaned upon such armed force for support. There existed among them no common idea or public sentiment, formally proclaimed and acted on, except such as it suited Alexander's purpose to encourage. The miso-Persian sentiment—once a genuine expression of Hellenic patriotism, to the recollection of which Demosthenes was wont to appeal, in animating the Athenians to action against Macedonia, but now extinct and supplanted by nearer apprehensions—had been converted by Alexander to his own purposes, as a pretext for headship, and a help for ensuring submission during his absence in Asia. Greece had become a province of Macedonia; the affairs of the Greeks (observes Aristotle in illustrating a philosophical discussion) are "in the hands of the king."[656] A public synod of the Greeks sat from time to time at Corinth; but it represented only philo-Macedonian sentiment; all that we know of its proceedings consisted in congratulations to Alexander on his victories. There is no Grecian history of public or political import; there are no facts except the local and municipal details of each city —"the streets and fountains which we are repairing and the battlements which we are whitening", to use a phrase of Demosthenes[657]—the good management of the Athenian finances by the orator Lykurgus, and the contentions of orators respecting private disputes or politics of the past.

But though Grecian history is thus stagnant and suspended during the first years of Alexander's Asiatic campaigns, it might at any moment have become animated with an active spirit of self-emancipation, if he had experienced reverses, or if the Persians had administered their own affairs with skill and vigor. I have already stated, that during the first two years of the war, the Persian fleet (we ought rather to say, the Phenician fleet in the Persian service) had a decided superiority at sea. Darius possessed untold treasures which might have indefinitely increased that superiority and multiplied his means of transmarine action, had he chosen to follow the advice of Memnon, by acting vigorously from the sea and strictly on the defensive by land. The movement or quiescence of the Greeks therefore depended on the turn of affairs in Asia; as Alexander himself was well aware.

During the winter of 334-333 B. C., Memnon with the Persian fleet appeared to be making progress among the islands in the Ægean,[658] and the anti-Macedonian Greeks were expecting him farther westward in Eubœa and Peloponnesus. Their

hopes being dashed by his unexpected death, and still more by Darius's abandonment of the Memnonian plans, they had next to wait for the chance of what might be achieved by the immense Persian land-force. Even down to the eve of the battle of Issus, Demosthenes[659] and others (as has already been mentioned) were encouraged by their correspondents in Asia to anticipate success for Darius even in pitched battle. But after the great disaster at Issus, during a year and a half (from November 333 B. C. to March or April 331 B. C.), no hope was possible. The Persian force seemed extinct, and Darius was so paralyzed by the captivity of his family, that he suffered even the citizens of Tyre and Gaza to perish in their gallant efforts of defence, without the least effort to save them. At length, in the spring of 331 B. C., the prospects again appeared to improve. A second Persian army, countless like the first, was assembling eastward of the Tigris; Alexander advanced into the interior, many weeks' march from the shores of the Mediterranean, to attack them; and the Persians doubtless transmitted encouragements with money to enterprising men in Greece, in hopes of provoking auxiliary movements. Presently (October 331 B. C.) came the catastrophe at Arbela; after which no demonstration against Alexander could have been attempted with any reasonable hope of success.

Such was the varying point of view under which the contest in Asia presented itself to Grecian spectators, during the three years and a half between the landing of Alexander in Asia and the battle of Arbela. As to the leading states in Greece, we have to look at Athens and Sparta only; for Thebes had been destroyed and demolished as a city; and what had been once the citadel of the Kadmeia was now a Macedonian garrison.[660] Moreover, besides that garrison, the Bœotian cities, Orchomenus, Platæa, etc., were themselves strongholds of Macedonian dependence; being hostile to Thebes of old, and having received among themselves assignments of all the Theban lands.[661] In case of any movement in Greece, therefore, Antipater, the viceroy of Macedonia, might fairly count on finding in Greece interested allies, serving as no mean check upon Attica.

At Athens, the reigning sentiment was decidedly pacific. Few were disposed to brave the prince who had just given so fearful an evidence of his force by the destruction of Thebes and the enslavement of the Thebans. Ephialtes and Charidemus, the military citizens at Athens most anti-Macedonian in sentiment, had been demanded as prisoners by Alexander, and had withdrawn to Asia, there to take service with Darius. Other Athenians, men of energy and action, had followed their example, and had fought against Alexander at the Granikus, where they became his prisoners, and were sent to Macedonia to work in fetters at the mines. Ephialtes perished at the siege of Halikarnassus, while defending the place with the utmost gallantry; Charidemus suffered a more unworthy death from the shameful sentence of Darius. The anti-Macedonian leaders who remained at Athens, such as Demosthenes and Lykurgus, were not generals or men of action, but statesmen and orators. They were fully aware that submission to Alexander was a painful necessity, though they watched

not the less anxiously for any reverse which might happen to him, such as to make it possible for Athens to head a new struggle on behalf of Grecian freedom.

But it was not Demosthenes nor Lykurgus who now guided the general policy of Athens.[662] For the twelve years between the destruction of Thebes and the death of Alexander, Phokion and Demades were her ministers for foreign affairs; two men of totally opposite characters, but coinciding in pacific views, and in looking to the favor of Alexander and Antipater as the principal end to be attained. Twenty Athenian triremes were sent to act with the Macedonian fleet, during Alexander's first campaign in Asia; these, together with the Athenian prisoners taken at the Granikus, served to him farther as a guarantee for the continued submission of the Athenians generally.[663] There can be no doubt that the pacific policy of Phokion was now prudent and essential to Athens, though the same cannot be said (as I have remarked in the proper place) for his advocacy of the like policy twenty years before, when Philip's power was growing and might have been arrested by vigorous opposition. It suited the purpose of Antipater to ensure his hold upon Athens by frequent presents to Demades, a man of luxurious and extravagant habits. But Phokion, incorruptible as well as poor to the end, declined all similar offers, though often made to him, not only by Antipater, but even by Alexander.[664]

It deserves particular notice, that though the macedonizing policy was now decidedly in the ascendent—accepted, even by dissentients, as the only course admissible under the circumstances, and confirmed the more by each successive victory of Alexander—yet statesmen, like Lykurgus and Demosthenes, of notorious anti-Macedonian sentiment, still held a conspicuous and influential position, though of course restricted to matters of internal administration. Thus Lykurgus continued to be the real acting minister of finance, for three successive Panathenaic intervals of four years each, or for an uninterrupted period of twelve years. He superintended not merely the entire collection, but also the entire disbursement of the public revenue; rendering strict periodical account, yet with a financial authority greater than had belonged to any statesman since Perikles. He improved the gymnasia and stadia of the city—multiplied the donatives and sacred furniture in the temples—enlarged, or constructed anew, docks and arsenals,—provided a considerable stock of arms and equipments, military as well as naval—and maintained four hundred triremes in a seaworthy condition, for the protection of Athenian commerce. In these extensive functions he was never superseded, though Alexander at one time sent to require the surrender of his person, which was refused by the Athenian people.[665] The main cause of his firm hold upon the public mind, was, his known and indisputable pecuniary probity, wherein he was the parallel of Phokion.

As to Demosthenes, he did not hold any such commanding public appointments as Lykurgus; but he enjoyed great esteem and sympathy from the people generally, for his marked line of public counsel during the past. The proof of this is to be found in one very significant fact. The indictment, against Ktesiphon's motion for crowning

Demosthenes, was instituted by Æschines, and official entry made of it, before the death of Philip—which event occurred in August 336 B. C. Yet Æschines did not venture to bring it on for trial until August 330 B. C., after Antipater had subdued the ill-fated rising of the Lacedæmonian king Agis; and even at that advantageous moment, when the macedonizers seemed in full triumph, he signally failed. We thus perceive, that though Phokion and Demades were now the leaders of Athenian affairs, as representing a policy which every one felt to be unavoidable—yet the preponderant sentiment of the people went with Demosthenes and Lykurgus. In fact, we shall see that after the Lamian war, Antipater thought it requisite to subdue or punish this sentiment by disfranchising or deporting two-thirds of the citizens.[666] It seems however that the anti-Macedonian statesmen were very cautious of giving offence to Alexander, between 334 and 330 B. C. Ktesiphon accepted a mission of condolence to Kleopatra, sister of Alexander, on the death of her husband Alexander of Epirus; and Demosthenes stands accused of having sent humble and crouching letters to Alexander (the Great) in Phenicia, during the spring of 331 B. C. This assertion of Æschines, though not to be trusted as correct, indicates the general prudence of Demosthenes as to his known and formidable enemy.[667]

It was not from Athens, but from Sparta, that anti-Macedonian movements now took rise.

In the decisive battle unsuccessfully fought by Athens and Thebes at Chæroneia against Philip, the Spartans had not been concerned. Their king Archidamus,—who had been active conjointly with Athens in the Sacred War, trying to uphold the Phokians against Philip and the Thebans,—had afterwards withdrawn himself from Central Greece to assist the Tarentines in Italy, and had been slain in a battle against the Messapians.[668] He was succeeded by his son Agis, a brave and enterprising man, under whom the Spartans, though abstaining from hostilities against Philip, resolutely declined to take part in the synod at Corinth, whereby the Macedonian prince was nominated Leader of the Greeks; and even persisted in the same denial on Alexander's nomination also. When Alexander sent to Athens three hundred panoplies after his victory at the Granikus, to be dedicated in the temple of Athênê, he expressly proclaimed in the inscription, that they were dedicated "by Alexander and the Greeks, *excepting the Lacedæmonians*."[669] Agis took the lead in trying to procure Persian aid for anti-Macedonian operations in Greece. Towards the close of summer 333 B. C., a little before the battle of Issus, he visited the Persian admirals at Chios, to solicit men and money for intended action in Peloponnesus.[670] At that moment, they were not zealous in the direction of Greece, anticipating (as most Asiatics then did) the complete destruction of Alexander in Kilikia. As soon, however, as the disaster of Issus became known, they placed at the disposal of Agis thirty talents and ten triremes; which he employed, under his brother Agesilaus, in making himself master of Krete—feeling that no movement in Greece could be expected at such a discouraging crisis. Agis himself soon afterwards went to that island, having

strengthened himself by a division of the Greek mercenaries who had fought under Darius at Issus. In Krete, he appears to have had considerable temporary success; and even in Peloponnesus, he organized some demonstrations, which Alexander sent Amphoterus with a large naval force to repress, in the spring of 331 B. C.[671] At that time, Phenicia, Egypt, and all the naval mastery of the Ægean, had passed into the hands of the conqueror, so that the Persians had no direct means of acting upon Greece. Probably Amphoterus recovered Krete, but he had no land-force to attack Agis in Peloponnesus.

In October 331 B. C., Darius was beaten at Arbela and became a fugitive in Media, leaving Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis, with the bulk of his immense treasures, as a prey to the conqueror during the coming winter. After such prodigious accessions to Alexander's force, it would seem that any anti-Macedonian movement, during the spring of 330 B. C., must have been obviously hopeless and even insane. Yet it was just then that King Agis found means to enlarge his scale of operations in Peloponnesus, and prevailed on a considerable body of new allies to join him. As to himself personally, he and the Lacedæmonians had been previously in a state of proclaimed war with Macedonia,[672] and therefore incurred little additional risk; moreover, it was one of the effects of the Asiatic disasters to cast back upon Greece small hands of soldiers who had hitherto found service in the Persian armies. These men willingly came to Cape Tænarus to enlist under a warlike king of Sparta; so that Agis found himself at the head of a force which appeared considerable to Peloponnesians, familiar only with the narrow scale of Grecian war-muster, though insignificant as against Alexander or his viceroy in Macedonia.[673] An unexpected ray of hope broke out from the revolt of Memnon, the Macedonian governor of Thrace. Antipater was thus compelled to withdraw some of his forces to a considerable distance from Greece; while Alexander, victorious as he was, being in Persis or Media, east of Mount Zagros, appeared in the eyes of a Greek to have reached the utmost limits of the habitable world.[674] Of this partial encouragement Agis took advantage, to march out of Lakonia with all the troops, mercenary and native, that he could muster. He called on the Peloponnesians for a last effort against Macedonian dominion, while Darius still retained all the eastern half of his empire, and while support from him in men and money might yet be anticipated.[675]

Respecting this war, we know very few details. At first, a flush of success appeared in attend Agis. The Eleians, the Achæans (except Pellênê), the Arcadians (except Megalopolis) and some other Peloponnesians, joined his standard; so that he was enabled to collect an army stated at 20,000 foot and 2000 horse. Defeating the first Macedonian forces sent against him, he proceeded to lay siege to Megalopolis; which city, now as previously, was the stronghold of Macedonian influence in the peninsula, and was probably occupied by a Macedonian garrison. An impulse manifested itself at Athens in favor of active sympathy, and equipment of a fleet to aid this anti-Macedonian effort. It was resisted by Phokion and Demades, doubtless upon

all views of prudence, but especially upon one financial ground, taken by the latter, that the people would be compelled to forego the Theoric distribution.[676] Even Demosthenes himself, under circumstances so obviously discouraging, could not recommend the formidable step of declaring against Alexander—though he seems to have indulged in the expression of general anti-Macedonian sympathies, and to have complained of the helplessness into which Athens had been brought by past bad policy. [677] Antipater, closing the war in Thrace on the best terms that he could, hastened into Greece with his full forces, and reached Peloponnesus in time to relieve Megalopolis, which had begun to be in danger. One decisive battle, which took place in Arcadia, sufficed to terminate the war. Agis and his army, the Lacedæmonians especially, fought with gallantry and desperation, but were completely defeated. Five thousand of their men were slain, including Agis himself; who, though covered with wounds, disdained to leave the field, and fell resisting to the last. The victors, according to one account, lost 3500 men; according to another, 1000 slain, together with a great many wounded. This was a greater loss than Alexander had sustained either at Issus or at Arbela; a plain proof that Agis and his companions, however unfortunate in the result, had manifested courage worthy of the best days of Sparta.

The allied forces were now so completely crushed, that all submitted to Antipater. After consulting the philo-Macedonian synod at Corinth, he condemned the Achæans and Eleians to pay 120 talents to Megalopolis, and exacted from the Tegeans the punishment of those among their leading men who had advised the war.[678] But he would not take upon him to determine the treatment of the Lacedæmonians, without special reference to Alexander. Requiring from them fifty hostages, he sent up to Alexander in Asia some Lacedæmonian envoys or prisoners, to throw themselves on his mercy.[679] We are told that they did not reach the king until a long time afterwards, at Baktra;[680] what he decided about Sparta generally, we do not know.

The rising of the Thebans, not many months after Alexander's accession, had been the first attempt of the Greeks to emancipate themselves from Macedonian dominion; this enterprise of Agis was the second. Both unfortunately had been partial, without the possibility of any extensive or organized combination beforehand; both ended miserably, riveting the chains of Greece more powerfully than ever. Thus was the self-defensive force of Greece extinguished piecemeal. The scheme of Agis was in fact desperate from the very outset, as against the gigantic power of Alexander; and would perhaps never have been undertaken, had not Agis himself been already compromised in hostility against Macedonia, before the destruction of the Persian force at Issus. This unfortunate prince, without any superior ability (so far as we know), manifested a devoted courage and patriotism worthy of his predecessor Leonidas at Thermopylæ; whose renown stands higher, only because the cause in which he fell ultimately triumphed. The Athenians and Ætolians, neither of whom took part with Agis, were now left, without Thebes and Sparta, as the two great military powers of Greece which will appear presently, when we come to the last strug-

gle for Grecian independence—the Lamian war; better combined and more promising, yet not less disastrous in its result.

Though the strongest considerations of prudence kept Athens quiet during this anti-Macedonian movement in Peloponnesus, a powerful sympathy must have been raised among her citizens while the struggle was going on. Had Agis gained the victory over Antipater, the Athenians might probably have declared in his favor; and although no independent position could have been permanently maintained against so overwhelming an enemy as Alexander, yet considering that he was thoroughly occupied and far in the interior of Asia, Greece might have held out against Antipater for an interval not inconsiderable. In the face of such eventualities, the fears of the macedonizing statesmen now in power at Athens, the hopes of their opponents, and the reciprocal antipathies of both, must have become unusually manifest; so that the reaction afterwards, when the Macedonian power became more irresistible than ever, was considered by the enemies of Demosthenes to offer a favorable opportunity for ruining and dishonoring him.

To the political peculiarity of this juncture we owe the judicial contest between the two great Athenian orators; the memorable accusation of Æschines against Ktesiphon, for having proposed a crown to Demosthenes—and the still more memorable defence of Demosthenes, on behalf of his friend as well as of himself. It was in the autumn or winter of 337-336 B. C., that Ktesiphon had proposed this vote of public honor in favor of Demosthenes, and had obtained the probouleuma or preliminary acquiescence of the senate; it was in the same Attic year, and not long afterwards, that Æschines attacked the proposition under the Graphê Paranomôn, as illegal, unconstitutional, mischievous, and founded on false allegations.[681] More than six years had thus elapsed since the formal entry of the accusation; yet Æschines had not chosen to bring it to actual trial; which indeed could not be done without some risk to himself, before the numerous and popular judicature of Athens. Twice or thrice before his accusation was entered, other persons had moved to confer the same honor upon Demosthenes,[682] and had been indicted under the Graphê Paranomôn; but with such signal ill-success, that their accusers did not obtain so much as one-fifth of the suffrages of the Dikasts, and therefore incurred (under the standing regulation of the Attic law) a penalty of 1000 drachmæ. The like danger awaited Æschines; and although, in reference to the illegality of Ktesiphon's motion (which was the direct and ostensible purpose aimed at under the Graphê Paranomôn), his indictment was grounded on special circumstances such as the previous accusers may not have been able to show, still it was not his real object to confine himself within this narrow and technical argument. He intended to enlarge the range of accusation, so as to include the whole character and policy of Demosthenes; who would thus, if the verdict went against him, stand publicly dishonored both as citizen and as politician. Unless this latter purpose were accomplished, indeed, Æschines gained nothing by bringing the indictment into court; for the mere entry of the in-

dictment would have already produced the effect of preventing the probouleuma from passing into a decree, and the crown from being actually conferred. Doubtless Ktesiphon and Demosthenes might have forced Æschines to the alternative of either dropping his indictment or bringing it into the Dikastery. But this was a forward challenge, which, in reference to a purely honorary vote, they had not felt bold enough to send; especially after the capture of Thebes in 335 B. C. when the victorious Alexander demanded the surrender of Demosthenes with several other citizens.

In this state of abeyance and compromise—Demosthenes enjoying the inchoate honor of a complimentary vote from the senate, Æschines intercepting it from being matured into a vote of the people—both the vote and the indictment had remained for rather more than six years. But the accuser now felt encouraged to push his indictment to trial, under the reactionary party feeling, following on abortive anti-Macedonian hopes, which succeeded to the complete victory of Antipater over Agis, and which brought about the accusation of anti-Macedonian citizens in Naxos, Thasos, and other Grecian cities also.[683] Amidst the fears prevalent that the victor would carry his resentment still farther, Æschines could now urge that Athens was disgraced by having adopted or even approved the policy of Demosthenes,[684] and that an emphatic condemnation of him was the only way of clearing her from the charge of privity with those who had raised the standard against Macedonian supremacy. In an able and bitter harangue, Æschines first shows that the motion of Ktesiphon was illegal, in consequence of the public official appointments held by Demosthenes at the moment when it was proposed—next he enters at large into the whole life and character of Demosthenes, to prove him unworthy of such an honor, even if there had been no formal grounds of objection. He distributes the entire life of Demosthenes into four periods, the first ending at the peace of 346 B. C., between Philip and the Athenians—the second, ending with the breaking out of the next ensuing war in 341-340 B. C.—the third, ending with the disaster at Chæroneia—the fourth, comprising all the time following.[685] Throughout all the four periods, he denounces the conduct of Demosthenes as having been corrupt, treacherous, cowardly, and ruinous to the city. What is more surprising still—he expressly charges him with gross subservience both to Philip and to Alexander, at the very time when he was taking credit for a patriotic and intrepid opposition to them.[686]

That Athens had undergone sad defeat and humiliation, having been driven from her independent and even presidential position into the degraded character of a subject Macedonian city, since the time when Demosthenes first began political life—was a fact but too indisputable. Æschines even makes this a part of his case; arraigning the traitorous mismanagement of Demosthenes as the cause of so melancholy a revolution, and denouncing him as candidate for public compliment or no better plea than a series of public calamities.[687] Having thus animadverted on the conduct of Demosthenes prior to the battle of Chæroneia, Æschines proceeds to the more recent past, and contends that Demosthenes cannot be sincere in his pretended en-

mity to Alexander, because he has let slip three successive occasions, all highly favorable, for instigating Athens to hostility against the Macedonians. Of these three occasions, the first was, when Alexander first crossed into Asia; the second, immediately before the battle of Issus; the third, during the flush of success obtained by Agis in Peloponnesus.[688] On neither of these occasions did Demosthenes call for any public action against Macedonia; a proof (according to Æschines) that his anti-Macedonian professions were insincere.

I have more than once remarked, that considering the bitter enmity between the two orators, it is rarely safe to trust the unsupported allegation of either against the other. But in regard to the last-mentioned charges advanced by Æschines, there is enough of known fact, and we have independent evidence, such as is not often before us, to appreciate him as an accuser of Demosthenes. The victorious career of Alexander, set forth in the preceding chapters, proves amply that not one of the three periods, here indicated by Æschines, presented even decent encouragement for a reasonable Athenian patriot, to involve his country in warfare against so formidable an enemy. Nothing can be more frivolous than these charges against Demosthenes, of having omitted promising seasons for anti-Macedonian operations. Partly for this reason, probably, Demosthenes does not notice them in his reply; still more, perhaps, on another ground, that it was not safe to speak out what he thought and felt about Alexander. His reply dwells altogether upon the period before the death of Philip. Of the boundless empire subsequently acquired, by the son of Philip, he speaks only to mourn it as a wretched visitation of fortune, which has desolated alike the Hellenic and the barbaric world—in which Athens has been engulfed along with others—and from which even those faithless and trimming Greeks, who helped to aggrandize Philip, have not escaped better than Athens, nor indeed so well.[689]

I shall not here touch upon the Demosthenic speech De Coronâ in a rhetorical point of view, nor add anything to those encomiums which have been pronounced upon it with one voice, both in ancient and in modern times, as the unapproachable masterpiece of Grecian oratory. To this work it belongs as a portion of Grecian history; a retrospect of the efforts made by a patriot and a statesman to uphold the dignity of Athens and the autonomy of the Grecian world, against a dangerous aggressor from without. How these efforts were directed, and how they lamentably failed, has been recounted in my last preceding volume. Demosthenes here passes them in review, replying to the criminations against his public conduct during the interval of ten years, between the peace of 346 B. C., (or the period immediately preceding it) and the death of Philip. It is remarkable, that though professing to enter upon a defence of his whole public life,[690] he nevertheless can afford to leave unnoticed that portion of it which is perhaps the most honorable to him—the early period of his first Philippics and Olynthiacs—when, though a politician as yet immature and of no established footing, he was the first to descry in the distance the perils threatened by Philip's aggrandizement, and the loudest in calling for timely and energetic precau-

tions against it; in spite of apathy and murmurs from older politicians as well as from the general public. Beginning with the peace of 346 B. C., Demosthenes vindicates his own share in the antecedents of that event against the charges of Æschines, whom he denounces as the cause of all the mischief; a controversy which I have already tried to elucidate, in my last volume. Passing next to the period after that peace—to the four years first of hostile diplomacy, then of hostile action, against Philip, which ended with the disaster of Chæroneia—Demosthenes is not satisfied with simple vindication. He re-asserts this policy as matter of pride and honor, in spite of its results. He congratulates his countrymen on having manifested a Pan-hellenic patriotism worthy of their forefathers, and takes to himself only the credit of having been forward to proclaim and carry out this glorious sentiment common to all. Fortune has been adverse; yet the vigorous anti-Macedonian policy was no mistake; Demosthenes swears it by the combatants of Marathon, Platæa and Salamis.[691] To have had a foreign dominion obtruded upon Greece, is an overwhelming calamity; but to have had this accomplished without strenuous resistance on the part of Athens, would have been calamity aggravated by dishonor.

Conceived in this sublime strain, the reply of Demosthenes to his rival has an historical value, as a funeral oration of extinct Athenian and Grecian freedom. Six years before, the orator had been appointed by his countrymen to deliver the usual public oration over the warriors slain at Chæroneia. That speech is now lost, but it probably touched upon the same topics. Though the sphere of action, of every Greek city as well as of every Greek citizen, was now cramped and confined by irresistible Macedonian force; there still remained the sentiment of full political freedom and dignity enjoyed during the past—the admiration of ancestors who had once defended it successfully—and the sympathy with leaders who had recently stood forward to uphold it, however unsuccessfully. It is among the most memorable facts in Grecian history, that in spite of the victory of Philip at Chæroneia—in spite of the subsequent conquest of Thebes by Alexander, and the danger of Athens after it—in spite of the Asiatic conquests which had since thrown all Persian force into the hands of the Macedonian king—the Athenian people could never be persuaded either to repudiate Demosthenes, or to disclaim sympathy with his political policy. How much art and ability was employed, to induce them to do so, by his numerous enemies, the speech of Æschines is enough to teach us. And when we consider how easily the public sicken of schemes which end in misfortune—how great a mental relief is usually obtained by throwing blame on unsuccessful leaders—it would have been no matter of surprise, if, in one of the many prosecutions wherein the fame of Demosthenes was involved, the Dikasts had given a verdict unfavorable to him. That he always came off acquitted, and even honorably acquitted, is a proof of rare fidelity and steadiness of mind in the Athenians. It is a proof that those noble, patriotic, and Pan-hellenic sentiments, which we constantly find inculcated in his orations, throughout a period of twenty years, had sunk into the minds of his hearers; and that amidst the many gen-

eral allegations of corruption against him, loudly proclaimed by his enemies, there was no one well-ascertained fact which they could substantiate before the Dikastery.

The indictment now preferred by Æschines against Ktesiphon only procured for Demosthenes a new triumph. When the suffrages of the Dikasts were counted, Æschines did not obtain so much as one fifth. He became therefore liable to the customary fine of 1000 drachmæ. It appears that he quitted Athens immediately, without paying the fine, and retired into Asia, from whence he never returned. He is said to have opened a rhetorical school at Rhodes, and to have gone into the interior of Asia during the last year of Alexander's life (at the time when that monarch was ordaining on the Grecian cities compulsory restoration of all their exiles), in order to procure assistance for returning to Athens. This project was disappointed by Alexander's death.[692]

We cannot suppose that Æschines was unable to pay the fine of 1000 drachmæ, or to find friends who would pay it for him. It was not therefore legal compulsion, but the extreme disappointment and humiliation of so signal a defeat, which made him leave Athens. We must remember that this was a gratuitous challenge sent by himself; that the celebrity of the two rivals had brought together auditors, not merely from Athens, but from various other Grecian cities; and that the effect of the speech of Demosthenes in his own defence,—delivered with all his perfection of voice and action, and not only electrifying hearers by the sublimity of its public sentiment, but also full of admirably managed self-praise, and contemptuous bitterness towards his rival—must have been inexpressibly powerful and commanding. Probably the friends of Æschines became themselves angry with him for having brought the indictment forward. For the effect of his defeat must have been that the vote of the Senate which he indicted, was brought forward and passed in the public assembly; and that Demosthenes must have received a public coronation.[693] In no other way, under the existing circumstances of Athens, could Demosthenes have obtained so emphatic a compliment. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that such a mortification was insupportable to Æschines. He became disgusted with his native city. We read that afterwards, in his rhetorical school at Rhodes, he one day declaimed, as a lesson to his pupils, the successful oration of his rival, De Coronâ. Of course it excited a burst of admiration. "What, if you had heard the beast himself speak it!"—exclaimed Æschines.

From this memorable triumph of the illustrious orator and defendant, we have to pass to another trial—a direct accusation brought against him, from which he did not escape so successfully. We are compelled here to jump over five years and a half (August 330 B. C., to January 324 B. C.), during which we have no information about Grecian history; the interval between Alexander's march into Baktria and his return to Persis and Susiana. Displeased with the conduct of the satraps during his absence, Alexander put to death or punished several, and directed the rest to disband without delay the mercenary soldiers whom they had taken into pay. This peremptory order

filled both Asia and Europe with roving detachments of unprovided soldiers, some of whom sought subsistence in the Grecian islands and on the Lacedæmonian southern coast, at Cape Tænarus in Laconia.

It was about this period (the beginning of 324 B. C.), that Harpalus the satrap of Babylonia and Syria, becoming alarmed at the prospect of being punished by Alexander for his ostentatious prodigalities, fled from Asia into Greece, with a considerable treasure and a body of 5000 soldiers.[694] While satrap, he had invited into Asia, in succession, two Athenian women as mistresses, Pythionikê and Glykera, to each of whom he was much attached, and whom he entertained with lavish expense and pomp. On the death of the first, he testified his sorrow by two costly funereal monuments to her memory; one at Babylon, the other in Attica, between Athens and Eleusis. With Glykera he is said to have resided at Tarsus in Kilikia,—to have ordered that men should prostrate themselves before her, and address her as queen—and to have erected her statue along with his own at Rhossus, a seaport on the confines of Kilikia and Syria.[695] To please these mistresses, or perhaps to ensure a retreat for himself in case of need, he had sent to Athens profuse gifts of wheat for distribution among the people, for which he had received votes of thanks with the grant of Athenian citizenship.[696] Moreover he had consigned to Charikles, son-in-law of Phokion, the task of erecting the monument in Attica to the honor of Pythionikê; with a large remittance of money for the purpose.[697] The profit or embezzlement arising out of this expenditure secured to him the good will of Charikles—a man very different from his father-in-law, the honest and austere Phokion. Other Athenians were probably conciliated by various presents, so that when Harpalus found it convenient to quit Asia, about the beginning of 324 B. C., he had already acquired some hold both on the public of Athens and on some of her leading men. He sailed with his treasure and his armament straight to Cape Sunium in Attica, from whence he sent to ask shelter and protection in that city.[698]

The first reports transmitted to Asia appear to have proclaimed that the Athenians had welcomed Harpalus as a friend and ally, thrown off the Macedonian yoke, and prepared for a war to re-establish Hellenic freedom. Such is the color of the case, as presented in the satiric drama called Agên, exhibited before Alexander in the Dionysiac festival at Susa, in February or March 324 B. C. Such news, connecting itself in Alexander's mind with the recent defeat of Zopyrion in Thrace and other disorders of the disbanded mercenaries, incensed him so much, that he at first ordered a fleet to be equipped, determining to cross over and attack Athens in person.[699] But he was presently calmed by more correct intelligence, certifying that the Athenians had positively refused to espouse the cause of Harpalus.[700]

The fact of such final rejection by the Athenians is quite indisputable. But it seems, as far as we can make out from imperfect evidence, that this step was not taken without debate, nor without symptoms of a contrary disposition, sufficient to explain the rumors first sent to Alexander. The first arrival of Harpalus with his arma-

ment at Sunium, indeed, excited alarm, as if he were coming to take possession of Peiræus; and the admiral Philokles was instructed to adopt precautions for defence of the harbor.[701] But Harpalus, sending away his armament to Krete or to Tænarus, solicited and obtained permission to come to Athens, with a single ship and his own personal attendants. What was of still greater moment, he brought with him a large sum of money, amounting, we are told to upwards of 700 talents, or more than £160,000. We must recollect that he was already favorably known to the people by large presents of corn, which had procured for him a vote of citizenship. He now threw himself upon their gratitude as a suppliant seeking protection against the wrath of Alexander; and while entreating from the Athenians an interference so hazardous to themselves, he did not omit to encourage them by exaggerating the means at his own disposal. He expatiated on the universal hatred and discontent felt against Alexander, and held out assurance of being joined by powerful allies, foreign as well as Greek, if once a city like Athens would raise the standard of liberation.[702] To many Athenian patriots, more ardent than long-sighted, such appeals inspired both sympathy and confidence. Moreover Harpalus would of course purchase every influential partisan who would accept a bribe; in addition to men like Charikles, who were already in his interest. His cause was espoused by Hyperides,[703] an earnest anti-Macedonian citizen, and an orator second only to Demosthenes. There seems good reason for believing that at first, a strong feeling was excited in favor of taking part with the exile; the people not being daunted even by the idea of war with Alexander.[704]

Phokion, whom Harpalus vainly endeavored to corrupt, resisted of course the proposition of espousing his cause. And Demosthenes also resisted it, not less decidedly, from the very outset.[705] Notwithstanding all his hatred of Macedonian supremacy, he could not be blind to the insanity of declaring war against Alexander. Indeed those who study his orations throughout, will find his counsels quite as much distinguished for prudence as for vigorous patriotism. His prudence, on this occasion, however, proved injurious to his political position; for while it incensed Hyperides and the more sanguine anti-Macedonians, it probably did not gain for himself anything beyond a temporary truce from his old macedonizing opponents.

The joint opposition of politicians so discordant as Demosthenes and Phokion, prevailed over the impulse which the partisans of Harpalus had created. No decree could be obtained in his favor. Presently however the case was complicated by the coming of envoys from Antipater and Olympias in Macedonia, requiring that he should be surrendered.[706] The like requisition was also addressed by the Macedonian admiral Philoxenus, who arrived with a small squadron from Asia. These demands were refused, at the instance of Phokion no less than of Demosthenes. Nevertheless the prospects of Macedonian vengeance were now brought in such fearful proximity before the people, that all disposition to support Harpalus gave way to the necessity of propitiating Alexander. A decree was passed to arrest Harpalus, and to

place all his money under sequestration in the acropolis, until special directions could be received from Alexander; to whom, apparently, envoys were sent, carrying with them the slaves of Harpalus to be interrogated by him, and instructed to solicit a lenient sentence at his hands.[707] Now it was Demosthenes who moved these decrees for personal arrest and for sequestration of the money;[708] whereby he incurred still warmer resentment from Hyperides and the other Harpalian partisans, who denounced him as a subservient creature of the all-powerful monarch. Harpalus was confined, but presently made his escape; probably much to the satisfaction of Phokion, Demosthenes, and every one else; for even those who were most anxious to get rid of him would recoil from the odium and dishonor of surrendering him, even under constraint, to a certain death. He fled to Krete, where he was soon after slain by one of his own companions.[709]

At the time when the decrees for arrest and sequestration were passed, Demosthenes requested a citizen near him to ask Harpalus publicly in the assembly, what was the amount of his money, which the people had just resolved to impound.[710] Harpalus answered, 720 talents; and Demosthenes proclaimed this sum to the people, on the authority of Harpalus, dwelling with some emphasis upon its magnitude. But when the money came to be counted in the acropolis, it was discovered that there was in reality no more than 350 talents. Now it is said that Demosthenes did not at once communicate to the people this prodigious deficiency in the real sum as compared with the announcement of Harpalus, repeated in the public assembly by himself. The impression prevailed, for how long a time we do not know, that 720 Harpalian talents had actually been lodged in the acropolis; and when the truth became at length known, great surprise and outcry were excited.[711] It was assumed that the missing half of the sum set forth must have been employed in corruption; and suspicions prevailed against almost all the orators, Demosthenes and Hyperides both included.

In this state of doubt, Demosthenes moved that the Senate of Areopagus should investigate the matter and report who were the presumed delinquents[712] fit to be indicted before the Dikastery; he declared in the speech accompanying his motion that the real delinquents, whoever they might be, deserved to be capitally punished. The Areopagites delayed their report for six months, though Demosthenes is said to have called for it with some impatience. Search was made in the houses of the leading orators, excepting only one who was recently married.[713] At length the report appeared, enumerating several names of citizens chargeable with the appropriation of this money, and specifying how much had been taken by each. Among these names were Demosthenes himself, charged with 20 talents—Demades charged with 6000 golden staters—and other citizens, with different sums attached to their names. [714] Upon this report, ten[715] public accusers were appointed to prosecute the indictment against the persons specified, before the Dikastery. Among the accusers was Hyperides, whose name had not been comprised in the Areopagitic report. De-

mosthenes was brought to trial, first of all the persons accused, before a numerous Dikastery of 1500 citizens,[716] who confirmed the report of the Areopagites, found him guilty, and condemned him to pay fifty talents to the state. Not being able to discharge this large fine, he was put in prison; but after some days he found means to escape, and fled to Trœzen in Peloponnesus, where he passed some months as a dispirited and sorrowing exile, until the death of Alexander.[717] What was done with the other citizens included in the Areopagitic report, we do not know. It appears that Demades[718]—who was among those comprised, and who is especially attacked, along with Demosthenes, by both Hyperides and Deinarchus—did not appear to take his trial, and therefore must have been driven into exile; yet if so, he must have speedily returned, since he seems to have been at Athens when Alexander died. Philokles and Aristogeiton were also brought to trial as being included by the Areopagus in the list of delinquents; but how their trial ended, does not appear.[719]

This condemnation and banishment of Demosthenes—unquestionably the greatest orator, and one of the greatest citizens, in Athenian antiquity,—is the most painful result of the debates respecting the exile Harpalus. Demosthenes himself denied the charge; but unfortunately we possess neither his defence, nor the facts alleged in evidence against him; so that our means of forming a positive conclusion are imperfect. At the same time, judging from the circumstances as far as we know them—there are several which go to show his innocence, and none which tend to prove him guilty. If we are called upon to believe that he received money from Harpalus, we must know for what service the payment was made. Did Demosthenes take part with Harpalus, and advise the Athenians to espouse his cause? Did he even keep silence, and abstain from advising them to reject the propositions? Quite the reverse. Demosthenes was from the beginning a declared opponent of Harpalus, and of all measures for supporting his cause. Plutarch indeed tells an anecdote—that Demosthenes began by opposing Harpalus, but that presently he was fascinated by the beauty of a golden cup among the Harpalian treasures. Harpalus, perceiving his admiration, sent to him on the ensuing night the golden cup, together with twenty talents, which Demosthenes accepted. A few days afterwards, when the cause of Harpalus was again debated in the public assembly, the orator appeared with his throat enveloped in woollen wrappers, and affected to have lost his voice; upon which the people, detecting this simulated inability as dictated by the bribe which had been given, expressed their displeasure partly by sarcastic taunts, partly by indignant murmuring. [720] So stands the anecdote in Plutarch. But we have proof that it is untrue. Demosthenes may indeed have been disabled by sore throat from speaking at some particular assembly; so far the story may be accurate; but that he desisted from opposing Harpalus (the real point of the allegation against him) is certainly not true; for we know from his accusers Deinarchus and Hyperides, that it was he who made the final motion for imprisoning Harpalus and sequestrating the Harpalian treasure in trust for Alexander. In fact, Hyperides himself denounces Demosthenes, as having from subservience to Alexander, closed the door against Harpalus and his prospects.[721] Such

direct and continued opposition is a conclusive proof that Demosthenes was neither paid nor bought by Harpalus. The only service which he rendered to the exile was, by refusing to deliver him to Antipater, and by not preventing his escape from imprisonment. Now in this refusal even Phokion concurred; and probably the best Athenians, of all parties, were desirous of favoring the escape of an exile whom it would have been odious to hand over to a Macedonian executioner. Insofar as it was a crime not to have prevented the escape of Harpalus, the crime was committed as much by Phokion as by Demosthenes; and indeed more, seeing that Phokion was one of the generals, exercising the most important administrative duties—while Demosthenes was only an orator and mover in the assembly. Moreover, Harpalus had no means of requiting the persons, whoever they were, to whom he owed his escape; for the same motion which decreed his arrest, decreed also the sequestration of his money, and thus removed it from his own control.[722]

The charge therefore made against Demosthenes by his two accusers,—that he received money *from* Harpalus,—is one which all the facts known to us tend to refute. But this is not quite the whole case. Had Demosthenes the means of embezzling the money, after it had passed out of the control of Harpalus? To this question also we may reply in the negative, so far as Athenian practice enables us to judge. Demosthenes had moved, and the people had voted, that these treasures should be lodged in trust for Alexander, in the acropolis; a place where all the Athenian public money was habitually kept—in the back chamber of the Parthenon. When placed in that chamber, these new treasures would come under the custody of the officers of the Athenian exchequer; and would be just as much out of the reach of Demosthenes as the rest of the public money. What more could Phokion himself have done to preserve the Harpalian fund intact, than to put it in the recognized place of surety? Then, as to the intermediate process, of taking the money from Harpalus up to the acropolis, there is no proof,—and in my judgment no probability,—that Demosthenes was at all concerned in it. Even to count, verify, and weigh, a sum of above £80,000—not in bank notes or bills of exchange, but subdivided in numerous and heavy coins (staters, darics, tetradrachms), likely to be not even Attic, but Asiatic—must have been a tedious duty requiring to be performed by competent reckoners, and foreign to the habits of Demosthenes. The officers of the Athenian treasury must have gone through this labor, providing the slaves or mules requisite for carrying so heavy a burthen up to the acropolis. Now we have ample evidence from the remaining Inscriptions, that the details of transfering and verifying the public property, at Athens, were performed habitually with laborious accuracy. Least of all would such accuracy be found wanting in the case of the large Harpalian treasure, where the very passing of the decree implied great fear of Alexander. If Harpalus, on being publicly questioned in the assembly—What was the sum to be carried up into the acropolis,—answered by stating the amount which he had originally brought and not that which he had remaining—Demosthenes might surely repeat that statement immediately after him, without being understood thereby to bind himself down as guar-

antee for its accuracy. An adverse pleader, like Hyperides, might indeed turn a point in his speech[723]—"*You* told the assembly that there were 700 talents, and now *you* produce no more than half"—but the imputation wrapped up in these words against the probity of Demosthenes, is utterly groundless. Lastly, when the true amount was ascertained, to make report thereof was the duty of the officers of the treasury. Demosthenes could only learn it from them; and it might certainly be proper in him, though in no sense an imperative duty, to inform himself on the point, seeing that he had unconsciously helped to give publicity to a false statement. The true statement was given; but we neither know by whom, nor how soon.[724]

Reviewing the facts known to us, therefore, we find them all tending to refute the charge against Demosthenes. This conclusion will certainly be strengthened by reading the accusatory speech composed by Deinarchus; which is mere virulent invective, barren of facts and evidentiary matter, and running over all the life of Demosthenes for the preceding twenty years. That the speech of Hyperides also was of the like desultory character, the remaining fragments indicate. Even the report made by the Areopagus contained no recital of facts—no justificatory matter—nothing except a specification of names with the sums for which each of them is chargeable.[725] It appears to have been made *ex-parte*, as far as we can judge—that is, made without hearing these persons in their own defence, unless they happened to be themselves Areopagites. Yet this report is held forth both by Hyperides and Deinarchus as being in itself conclusive proof which the Dikasts could not reject. When Demosthenes demanded, as every defendant naturally would, that the charge against him should be proved by some positive evidence, Hyperides sets aside the demand as nothing better than cavil and special pleading.[726]

One farther consideration remains to be noticed. Only nine months after the verdict of the Dikastery against Demosthenes, Alexander died. Presently the Athenians and other Greeks rose against Antipater in the struggle called the Lamian war. Demosthenes was then recalled; received from his countrymen an enthusiastic welcome, such as had never been accorded to any returning exile since the days of Alkibiades; took a leading part in the management of the war; and perished, on its disastrous termination, along with his accuser Hyperides.

Such speedy revolution of opinion about Demosthenes, countenances the conclusion which seems to me suggested by the other circumstances of the case—that the verdict against him was not judicial, but political; growing out of the embarrassing necessities of the time.

There can be no doubt that Harpalus, to whom a declaration of active support from the Athenians was matter of life and death, distributed various bribes to all consenting recipients, who could promote his views,—and probably even to some who simply refrained from opposing them; to all, in short, except pronounced opponents. If we were to judge from probabilities alone, we should say that Hyperides himself,

as one of the chief supporters, would also be among the largest recipients.[727] Here was abundant bribery—notorious in the mass, though perhaps untraceable in the detail—all consummated during the flush of promise which marked the early discussions of the Harpalian case. When the tide of sentiment turned—when fear of Macedonian force became the overwhelming sentiment—when Harpalus and his treasures were impounded in trust for Alexander—all these numerous receivers of bribes were already compromised and alarmed. They themselves probably, in order to divert suspicion, were among the loudest in demanding investigation and punishment against delinquents. Moreover, the city was responsible for 700 talents to Alexander, while no more than 350 were forthcoming.[728] It was indispensable that some definite individuals should be pronounced guilty and punished, partly in order to put down the reciprocal criminations circulating through the city, partly in order to appease the displeasure of Alexander about the pecuniary deficiency. But how to find out who were the guilty? There was no official Prosecutor-general; the number of persons suspected would place the matter beyond the reach of private accusations; perhaps the course recommended by Demosthenes himself was the best, to consign this preliminary investigation to the Areopagites.

Six months elapsed before these Areopagites made their report. Now it is impossible to suppose that all this time could have been spent in the investigation of facts—and if it had been, the report when published would have contained some trace of these facts, instead of embodying a mere list of names and sums. The probability is, that their time was passed quite as much in party-discussions as in investigating facts; that dissentient parties were long in coming to an agreement whom they should sacrifice; and that when they did agree, it was a political rather than a judicial sentence, singling out Demosthenes as a victim highly acceptable to Alexander, and embodying Demades also, by way of compromise, in the same list of delinquents—two opposite politicians, both at the moment obnoxious. I have already observed that Demosthenes was at that time unpopular with both the reigning parties: with the philo-Macedonians, from long date, and not without sufficient reason; with the anti-Macedonians, because he had stood prominent in opposing Harpalus. His accusers count upon the hatred of the former against him, as a matter of course; they recommend him to the hatred of the latter, as a base creature of Alexander. The Dikasts doubtless included men of both parties; and as a collective body, they might probably feel, that to ratify the list presented by the Areopagus was the only way of finally closing a subject replete with danger and discord.

Such seems the probable history of the Harpalian transactions. It leaves Demosthenes innocent of corrupt profit, not less than Phokion; but to the Athenian politicians generally, it is noway creditable; while it exhibits the judicial conscience of Athens as under pressure of dangers from without, worked upon by party-intrigues within.[729]

During the half-year and more which elapsed between the arrival of Harpalus at Athens, and the trial of Demosthenes, one event at least of considerable moment occurred in Greece. Alexander sent Nicanor to the great Olympic festival held in this year, with a formal letter or rescript, directing every Grecian city to recall all its citizens that were in exile, except such as were under the taint of impiety. The rescript, which was publicly read at the festival by the herald who had gained the prize for loudness of voice, was heard with the utmost enthusiasm by 20,000 exiles, who had mustered there from intimations that such a step was intended. It ran thus: "King Alexander to the exiles out of the Grecian cities—We have not been authors of your banishment, but we will be authors of your restoration to your native cities. We have written to Antipater about this matter, directing him to apply force to such cities as will not recall you of their own accord."[730]

It is plain that many exiles had been pouring out their complaints and accusations before Alexander, and had found him a willing auditor. But we do not know by what representations this rescript had been procured. It would seem that Antipater had orders farther, to restrain or modify the confederacies of the Achæan and Arcadian cities;[731] and to enforce not merely recall of the exiles, but restitution of their properties.[732]

That the imperial rescript was dictated by mistrust of the tone of sentiment in the Grecian cities generally, and intended to fill each city with devoted partisans of Alexander—we cannot doubt. It was on his part a high-handed and sweeping exercise of sovereignty—setting aside the conditions under which he had been named leader of Greece—disdaining even to inquire into particular cases, and to attempt a distinction between just and unjust sentences—overruling in the mass the political and judicial authorities in every city. It proclaimed with bitter emphasis the servitude of the hellenic world. Exiles restored under the coercive order of Alexander, were sure to look to Macedonia for support, to despise their own home authorities, and to fill their respective cities with enfeebling discord. Most of the cities, not daring to resist, appear to have yielded a reluctant obedience; but both the Athenians and Ætolians are said to have refused to execute the order.[733] It is one evidence of the disgust raised by the rescript at Athens, that Demosthenes is severely reproached by Deinarchus, because, as chief of the Athenian Theôry or sacred legation to the Olympic festival, he was seen there publicly consorting and in familiar converse with Nikanor.[734]

In the winter or early spring of 323 B. C. several Grecian cities sent envoys into Asia to remonstrate with Alexander against the measure; we may presume that the Athenians were among them; but we do not know whether the remonstrance produced any effect.[735] There appears to have been considerable discontent in Greece during this winter and spring (323 B. C.). The disbanded soldiers out of Asia still maintained a camp at Tænarus; where Leosthenes, an energetic Athenian of anti-Macedonian sentiments, accepted the command of them, and even attracted fresh merce-

nary soldiers from Asia, under concert with various confederates at Athens, and with the Ætolians.[736] Of the money, said to be 5000 talents, brought by Harpalus out of Asia, the greater part had not been taken by Harpalus to Athens, but apparently left with his officers for the maintenance of the troops who had accompanied him over.

Such was the general position of affairs, when Alexander died at Babylon in June 323 B. C. This astounding news, for which no one could have been prepared, must have become diffused throughout Greece during the month of July. It opened the most favorable prospects to all lovers of freedom and sufferers by Macedonian dominion. The imperial military force resembled the gigantic Polyphemus after his eye had been blinded by Odysseus:[737] Alexander had left no competent heir, nor did any one imagine that his vast empire could be kept together in effective unity by other hands. Antipater in Macedonia was threatened with the defection of various subject neighbors.[738]

No sooner was the death of Alexander indisputably certified, than the anti-Macedonian leaders in Athens vehemently instigated the people to declare themselves first champions of Hellenic freedom, and to organize a confederacy throughout Greece for that object. Demosthenes was then in exile; but Leosthenes, Hyperides and other orators of the same party, found themselves able to kindle in their countrymen a strenuous feeling and determination, in spite of decided opposition on the part of Phokion and his partisans.[739] The rich men for the most part took the side of Phokion, but the mass of the citizens were fired by the animating recollection of their ancestors and by the hopes of reconquering Grecian freedom. A vote was passed, publicly proclaiming their resolution to that effect. It was decreed that 200 quadriremes, and 40 triremes should be equipped; that all Athenians under 40 years of age should be in military requisition; and that envoys should be sent round to the various Grecian cities, earnestly invoking their alliance in the work of self-emancipation.[740] Phokion, though a pronounced opponent of such warlike projects, still remained at Athens, and still, apparently, continued in his functions as one of the generals.[741] But Pytheas, Kallimedon, and others of his friends, fled to Antipater, whom they strenuously assisted in trying to check the intended movement throughout Greece.

Leosthenes, aided by some money and arms from Athens, put himself at the head of the mercenaries assembled at Tænarus, and passed across the Gulf into Ætolia. Here he was joined by the Ætolians and Akarnanians, who eagerly entered into the league with Athens for expelling the Macedonians from Greece. Proceeding onward towards Thermopylæ and Thessaly, he met with favor and encouragement almost everywhere. The cause of Grecian freedom was espoused by the Phokians, Lokrians, Dorians, Ænianes, Athamantes, and Dolopes; by most of the Malians, Œtæans, Thessalians, and Achæans of Phthiôtis; by the inhabitants of Leukas, and by some of the Molossians. Promises were also held out of co-operation from various Illyrian and Thracian tribes. In Peloponnesus, the Argeians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians,

Trœzenians, Eleians, and Messenians, enrolled themselves in the league, as well as the Karystians in Eubœa.[742] These adhesions were partly procured by Hyperides and other Athenian envoys, who visited the several cities; while Pytheas and other envoys were going round in like matter to advocate the cause of Antipater. The two sides were thus publicly argued by able pleaders before different public assemblies. In these debates, the advantage was generally on the side of the Athenian orators, whose efforts moreover were powerfully seconded by the voluntary aid of Demosthenes, then living as an exile in Peloponnesus.

To Demosthenes the death of Alexander, and the new prospect of organizing an anti-Macedonian confederacy with some tolerable chance of success, came more welcome than to any one else. He gladly embraced the opportunity of joining and assisting the Athenian envoys, who felt the full value of his energetic eloquence, in the various Peloponnesian towns. So effective was the service which he thus rendered to his country, that the Athenians not only passed a vote to enable him to return, but sent a trireme to fetch him to Peiræus. Great was the joy and enthusiasm on his arrival. The archons, the priests, and the entire body of citizens, came down to the harbor to welcome his landing, and escorted him to the city. Full of impassioned emotion, Demosthenes poured forth his gratitude for having been allowed to see such a day, and to enjoy a triumph greater even than that which had been conferred on Alkibiades on returning from exile; since it had been granted spontaneously, and not extorted by force. His fine could not be remitted, consistently with Athenian custom; but the people passed a vote granting to him fifty talents as superintendent of the periodical sacrifice to Zeus Soter; and his execution of this duty was held equivalent to a liquidation of the fine.[743]

What part Demosthenes took in the plans or details of the war, we are not permitted to know. Vigorous operations were now carried on, under the military command of Leosthenes. The confederacy against Antipater included a larger assemblage of Hellenic states than that which had resisted Xerxes in 480 B. C. Nevertheless, the name of Sparta does not appear in the list. It was a melancholy drawback to the chances of Greece, in this her last struggle for emancipation, that the force of Sparta had been altogether crushed in the gallant but ill-concerted effort of Agis against Antipater seven years before, and had not since recovered. The great stronghold of Macedonian interest, in the interior of Greece, was Bœotia. Platæa, Orchomenus, and the other ancient enemies of Thebes, having received from Alexander the domain once belonging to Thebes herself, were well aware that this arrangement could only be upheld by the continued pressure of Macedonian supremacy in Greece. It seems probable also that there were Macedonian garrisons in the Kadmeia—in Corinth—and in Megalopolis; moreover, that the Arcadian and Achæan cities had been macedonized by the measures taken against them under Alexander's orders in the preceding summer;[744] for we find no mention made of these cities in the coming contest. The Athenians equipped a considerable land-force to join Leosthenes at

Thermopylæ; a citizen force of 5000 infantry and 500 cavalry, with 2000 mercenaries besides. But the resolute opposition of the Bœotian cities hindered them from advancing beyond Mount Kithæron, until Leosthenes himself, marching from Thermopylæ to join them with a part of his army, attacked the Bœotian troops, gained a complete victory, and opened the passage. He now proceeded with the full Hellenic muster, including Ætolians and Athenians, into Thessaly to meet Antipater, who was advancing from Macedonia into Greece at the head of the force immediately at his disposal—13,000 infantry, and 600 cavalry—and with a fleet of 110 ships of war co-operating on the coast.[745]

Antipater was probably not prepared for this rapid and imposing assemblage of the combined Greeks at Thermopylæ, nor for the energetic movements of Leosthenes. Still less was he prepared for the defection of the Thessalian cavalry, who, having always formed an important element in the Macedonian army, now lent their strength to the Greeks. He despatched urgent messages to the Macedonian commanders in Asia—Kraterus, Leonnatus, Philotas, etc., soliciting reinforcements; but in the mean time, though inferior in numbers, he thought it expedient to accept the challenge of Leosthenes. In the battle which ensued, however, he was completely defeated, and even cut off from the possibility of retreating into Macedonia; so that no resource was left to him except the fortified town of Lamia (near to the river Spercheius, beyond the southern border of Thessaly), where he calculated on holding out until relief came from Asia. Leosthenes immediately commenced the siege of Lamia, and pressed it with the utmost energy, making several attempts to storm the town; but its fortifications were strong, with a garrison ample and efficient —so that he was repulsed with considerable loss. Unfortunately he possessed no battering train nor engineers, such as had formed so powerful an element in the military successes of Philip and Alexander. He therefore found himself compelled to turn the siege into a blockade, and to adopt systematic measures for intercepting the supply of provisions. In this he had every chance of succeeding, and of capturing the person of Antipater. Hellenic prospects looked bright and encouraging; nothing was heard in Athens and the other cities except congratulations and thanksgivings.[746] Phokion, on hearing the confident language of those around him remarked—"The stadium (or short course) has been done brilliantly, but I fear we shall not have strength to hold out for the long course."[747] At this critical moment, Leosthenes, in inspecting the blockading trenches, was wounded on the head by a large stone, projected from one of the catapults on the city-walls, and expired in two days.[748] A funeral oration in his honor, as well as in that of the other combatants against Antipater, was pronounced at Athens by Hyperides, on whom the people devolved that duty in preference to Demosthenes.

The death of this eminent general, in the full tide of success, was a hard blow struck by fortune at the cause of Grecian freedom. For the last generation, Athens had produced several excellent orators, and one who combined splendid oratory with

wise and patriotic counsels. But during all that time, none of her citizens, before Leosthenes had displayed military genius and ardor along with Panhellenic purposes. His death appears to have saved Antipater from defeat and captivity. The difficulty was very great, of keeping together a miscellaneous army of Greeks, who after the battle, easily persuaded themselves that the war was finished, and desired to go home—perhaps under promise of returning. Even during the lifetime of Leosthenes, the Ætolians, the most powerful contingent of the army, had obtained leave to go home, from some domestic urgency, real or pretended.[749] When he was slain, there was no second in command; nor, even if there had been, could the personal influence of one officer be transferred to another. Reference was made to Athens, where, after some debate, Antiphilus was chosen commander, after the proposition to name Phokion had been made and rejected.[750] But during this interval there was no authority to direct military operations, or even to keep the army together; so that the precious moments for rendering the blockade really stringent, were lost, and Antipater was enabled to maintain himself until the arrival of Leonnatus from Asia to his aid. How dangerous the position of Antipater was, we may judge from the fact, that he solicited peace, but was required by the besiegers to surrender at discretion[751]—with which condition he refused to comply.

Antiphilus appears to have been a brave and competent officer. But before he could reduce Lamia, Leonnatus with a Macedonian army had crossed the Hellespont from Asia, and arrived at the frontiers of Thessaly. So many of the Grecian contingents had left the camp, that Antiphilus was not strong enough at once to continue the blockade and to combat the relieving army. Accordingly, he raised the blockade, and moved off by rapid marches to attack Leonnatus apart from Antipater. He accomplished this operation with vigor and success. Through the superior efficiency of the Thessalian cavalry under Menon, he gained an important advantage in a cavalry battle over Leonnatus, who was himself slain;[752] and the Macedonian phalanx having its flanks and rear thus exposed, retired from the plain to more difficult ground, leaving the Greeks masters of the field with the dead bodies. On the very next day, Antipater came up with the troops from Lamia, and took command of the defeated army. He did not however think it expedient to renew the combat, but withdrew his army from Thessaly into Macedonia, keeping in his march the high ground, out of the reach of cavalry.[753]

During the same time generally as these operations in Thessaly, it appears that war was carried on actively by sea. We hear of a descent by Mikion with a Macedonian fleet at Rhamnus on the eastern coast of Attica, repulsed by Phokion; also of a Macedonian fleet, of 240 sail, under Kleitus, engaging in two battles with the Athenian fleet under Eetion, near the islands called Echinades, at the mouth of the Achelous, on the western Ætolian coast. The Athenians were defeated in both actions, and great efforts were made at Athens to build new vessels for the purpose of filling up the losses sustained.[754] Our information is not sufficient to reveal the purposes

or details of these proceedings. But it seems probable that the Macedonian fleet were attacking Ætolia through Œniadæ, the citizens of which town had recently been expelled by the Ætolians;[755] and perhaps this may have been the reason why the Ætolian contingent was withdrawn from Thessaly.

In spite of such untoward events at sea, the cause of Panhellenic liberty seemed on the whole prosperous. Though the capital opportunity had been missed, of taking Antipater captive in Lamia, still he had been expelled from Greece, and was unable, by means of his own forces in Macedonia, to regain his footing. The Grecian contingents had behaved with bravery and unanimity in prosecution of the common purpose; and what had been already achieved was quite sufficient to justify the rising, as a fair risk, promising reasonable hopes of success. Nevertheless Greek citizens were not like trained Macedonian soldiers. After a term of service not much prolonged, they wanted to go back to their families and properties, hardly less after a victory than after a defeat. Hence the army of Antiphilus in Thessaly became much thinned,[756] though still remaining large enough to keep back the Macedonian forces of Antipater, even augmented as they had been by Leonnatus—and to compel him to await the still more powerful reinforcement destined to follow under Kraterus.

In explaining the relations between these three Macedonian commanders—Antipater, Leonnatus, and Kraterus—it is necessary to go back to June 323 B. C., the period of Alexander's death, and to review the condition into which his vast and mighty empire had fallen. I shall do this briefly, and only so far as it bears on the last struggles and final subjugation of the Grecian world.

On the unexpected death of Alexander, the camp at Babylon with its large force became a scene of discord. He left no offspring, except a child named Herakles, by his mistress Barsinê. Roxana, one of his wives, was indeed pregnant; and amidst the uncertainties of the moment, the first disposition of many was to await the birth of her child. She herself, anxious to shut out rivalry, caused Statira, the queen whom Alexander had last married to be entrapped and assassinated along with her sister. [757] There was, however, at Babylon, a brother of Alexander, named Aridæus (son of Philip by a Thessalian mistress), already of full age though feeble in intelligence, towards whom a still larger party leaned. In Macedonia, there were Olympias, Alexander's mother—Kleopatra, his sister, widow of the Epirotic Alexander—and Kynanê,[758] another sister, widow of Amyntas (cousin of Alexander the Great, and put to death by him); all of them disposed to take advantage of their relationship to the deceased conqueror, in the scramble now opened for power.

After a violent dispute between the cavalry and the infantry at Babylon, Aridæus was proclaimed king under the name of Philip Aridæus. Perdikkas was named as his guardian and chief minister; among the other chief officers, the various satrapies and fractions of the empire were distributed. Egypt and Libya were assigned to Ptolemy; Syria to Laomedon; Kilikia to Philôtas; Pamphylia, Lykia, and the greater Phrygia, to

Antigonus; Karia, to Asander; Lydia, to Menander; the Hellespontine Phrygia, to Leonnatus; Kappadokia and Paphlagonia, to the Kardian Eumenes; Media, to Pithon. The eastern satrapies were left in the hands of the actual holders.

In Europe, the distributors gave Thrace with the Chersonese to Lysimachus; the countries west of Thrace, including (along with Illyrians, Triballi, Agrianes, and Epirots) Macedonia and Greece, to Antipater and Kraterus.[759] We thus find the Grecian cities handed over to new masters, as fragments of the vast intestate estate left by Alexander. The empty form of convening and consulting a synod of deputies at Corinth, was no longer thought necessary.

All the above-named officers were considered as local lieutenants, administering portions of an empire one and indivisible, under Aridæus. The principal officers who enjoyed central authority, bearing on the entire empire, were, Perdikkas, chiliarch of the horse (the post occupied by Hephæstion until his death), a sort of vizir,[760] and Seleukus, commander of the Horse Guards. No one at this moment talked of dividing the empire. But it soon appeared that Perdikkas, profiting by the weakness of Aridæus, had determined to leave to him nothing more than the imperial name, and to engross for himself the real authority. Still, however, in his disputes with the other chiefs, he represented the imperial family, and the integrity of the empire, contending against severality and local independence. In this task (besides his brother Alketas), his ablest and most effective auxiliary was Eumenes of Kardia, secretary of Alexander for several years until his death. It was one of the earliest proceedings of Perdikkas to wrest Kappadokia from the local chief Ariarathes (who had contrived to hold it all through the reign of Alexander), and to transfer it to Eumenes, to whom it had been allotted in the general scheme of division.[761]

At the moment of Alexander's death, Kraterus was in Kilikia, at the head of an army of veteran Macedonian soldiers. He had been directed to conduct them home into Macedonia, with orders to remain there himself in place of Antipater, who was to come over to Asia with fresh reinforcements. Kraterus had with him a paper of written instructions from Alexander, embodying projects on the most gigantic scale; for western conquest—transportation of inhabitants by wholesale from Europe into Asia and Asia into Europe—erection of magnificent religious edifices in various parts of Greece and Macedonia, etc. This list was submitted by Perdikkas to the officers and soldiers around him, who dismissed the projects as too vast for any one but Alexander to think of.[762] Kraterus and Antipater had each a concurrent claim to Greece and Macedonia, and the distributors of the empire had allotted these countries to them jointly, not venturing to exclude either. Amidst the conflicting pretensions of these great Macedonian officers, Leonnatus also cherished hopes of the same prize. He was satrap of the Asiatic territory bordering upon the Hellespont, and had received propositions from Kleopatra at Pella, inviting him to marry her and assume the government of Macedonia. About the same time, urgent messages were also sent to him (through Hekatæus despot of Kardia) from Antipater, immediately after the de-

feat preceding the siege of Lamia, entreating his co-operation against the Greeks. Leonnatus accordingly came, intending to assist Antipater against the Greeks, but also to dispossess him of the government of Macedonia and marry Kleopatra.[763] This scheme remained unexecuted, because (as has been already related) Leonnatus was slain in his first encounter with the Greeks. To them, his death was a grave misfortune; to Antipater, it was an advantage which more than countervailed the defeat, since it relieved him from a dangerous rival.

It was not till the ensuing summer that Kraterus found leisure to conduct his army into Macedonia. By this junction, Antipater to whom he ceded the command, found himself at the head of a powerful army—40,000 heavy infantry, 5000 cavalry, and 3000 archers and slingers. He again marched into Thessaly against the Greeks under Antiphilus; and the two armies came in sight on the Thessalian plains near Krannon. The Grecian army consisted of 25,000 infantry, and 3500 cavalry—the latter, Thessalians under Menon, of admirable efficiency. The soldiers in general were brave, but insubordinate; while the contingents of many cities had gone home without returning, in spite of urgent remonstrances from the commander. Hoping to be rejoined by these absentees, Antiphilus and Menon tried at first to defer fighting; but Antipater forced them to a battle. Though Menon with his Thessalian cavalry defeated and dispersed the Macedonian cavalry, the Grecian infantry were unable to resist the superior number of Antipater's infantry, and the heavy pressure of the phalanx. They were beaten back and gave way, yet retiring in tolerable order, the Macedonian phalanx being incompetent for pursuit, to some difficult neighboring ground, where they were soon joined by their victorious cavalry. The loss of the Greeks is said to have been 500 men; that of the Macedonians, 120.[764]

The defeat of Krannon (August 322 B. C.) was no way decisive or ruinous, nor would it probably have crushed the spirit of Leosthenes, had he been alive and in command. The coming up of the absentee contingents might still have enabled the Greeks to make head. But Antiphilus and Menon, after holding counsel, declined to await and accelerate that junction. They thought themselves under the necessity of sending to open negotiations for peace with Antipater; who however returned for answer, that he would not recognize or treat with any Grecian confederacy, and that he would receive no propositions except from each city severally. Upon this the Grecian commanders at once resolved to continue the war, and to invoke reinforcements from their countrymen. But their own manifestation of timidity had destroyed the chance that remained of such reinforcements arriving. While Antipater commenced a vigorous and successful course of action against the Thessalian cities separately, the Greeks became more and more dispirited and alarmed. City after city sent its envoys to entreat peace from Antipater, who granted lenient terms to each, reserving only the Athenians and Ætolians. In a few days, the combined Grecian army was dispersed; Antiphilus with the Athenians returned into Attica; Antipater followed them

southward as far as Bœotia, taking up his quarters at the Macedonian post on the Kadmeia, once the Hellenic Thebes—within two days' march of Athens.[765]

Against the overwhelming force thus on the frontiers of Attica, the Athenians had no means of defence. The principal anti-Macedonian orators, especially Demosthenes and Hyperides, retired from the city at once, seeking sanctuary in the temples of Kalauria and Ægina. Phokion and Demades, as the envoys most acceptable to Antipater, were sent to Kadmeia as bearers of the submission of the city, and petitioners for lenient terms. Demades is said to have been at this time disfranchised and disqualified from public speaking—having been indicted and found guilty thrice (some say seven times) under the Graphê Paranomon; but the Athenians passed a special vote of relief, to enable him to resume his functions of citizen. Neither Phokion nor Demades, however, could prevail upon Antipater to acquiesce in anything short of the surrender of Athens at discretion; the same terms as Leosthenes had required from Antipater himself at Lamia. Kraterus was even bent upon marching forward into Attica, to dictate terms under the walls of Athens; and it was not without difficulty that Phokion obtained the abandonment of this intention; after which he returned to Athens with the answer. The people had no choice except to throw themselves on the mercy of Antipater;[766] and Phokion and Demades came back to Thebes to learn his determination. This time they were accompanied by the philosopher Xenokrates—the successor of Plato and Speusippus, as presiding teacher in the school of the Academy. Though not a citizen of Athens, Xenokrates had long resided there; and it was supposed that his dignified character and intellectual eminence might be efficacious in mitigating the wrath of the conqueror. Aristotle had quitted Athens for Chalkis before this time; otherwise he, the personal friend of Antipater, would have been probably selected for this painful mission. In point of fact, Xenokrates did no good, being harshly received, and almost put to silence by Antipater. One reason of this may be, that he had been to a certain extent the rival of Aristotle; and it must be added to his honor, that he maintained a higher and more independent tone than either of the other envoys.[767]

According to the terms dictated by Antipater, the Athenians were required to pay a sum equal to the whole cost of the war; to surrender Demosthenes, Hyperides, and seemingly at least two other anti-Macedonian orators; to receive a Macedonian garrison in Munychia; to abandon their democratical constitution and disfranchise all their poorer citizens. Most of these poor men were to be transported from their homes, and to receive new lands on a foreign shore. The Athenian colonists in Samos were to be dipossessed and the island retransferred to the Samian exiles and natives.

It is said that Phokion and Demades heard these terms with satisfaction, as lenient and reasonable. Xenokrates entered against them the strongest protest which the occasion admitted, when he said[768]—"If Antipater looks upon us as slaves, the terms are moderate; if as freemen, they are severe." To Phokion's entreaty, that the

introduction of the garrison might be dispensed with, Antipater replied in the negative, intimating that the garrison would be not less serviceable to Phokion himself than to the Macedonians; while Kallimedon also, an Athenian exile there present, repelled the proposition with scorn. Respecting the island of Samos, Antipater was prevailed upon to allow a special reference to the imperial authority.

If Phokion thought these terms lenient, we must imagine that he expected a sentence of destruction against Athens, such as Alexander had pronounced and executed against Thebes. Under no other comparison can they appear lenient. Out of 21,000 qualified citizens of Athens, all those who did not possess property to the amount of 2000 drachmæ were condemned to disfranchisement and deportation. The number below this prescribed qualification, who came under the penalty, was 12,000, or three-fifths of the whole. They were set aside as turbulent, noisy democrats; the 9000 richest citizens, the "party of order", were left in exclusive possession, not only of the citizenship, but of the city. The condemned 12,000 were deported out of Attica, some to Thrace, some to the Illyrian or Italian coast, some to Libya or the Kyrenaic territory. Besides the multitude banished simply on the score of comparative poverty, the marked anti-Macedonian politicians were banished also, including Agnonides, the friend of Demosthenes, and one of his earnest advocates when accused respecting the Harpalian treasures.[769] At the request of Phokion, Antipater consented to render the deportation less sweeping than he had originally intended, so far as to permit some exiles, Agnonides among the rest, to remain within the limits of Peloponnesus.[770] We shall see him presently contemplating a still more wholesale deportation of the Ætolian people.

It is deeply to be lamented that this important revolution, not only cutting down Athens to less than one-half of her citizen population, but involving a deportation fraught with individual hardship and suffering, is communicated to us only in two or three sentences of Plutarch and Diodorus, without any details from contemporary observers. It is called by Diodorus a return to the Solonian constitution; but the comparison disgraces the name of that admirable lawgiver, whose changes, taken as a whole, were prodigiously liberal and enfranchising, compared with what he found established. The deportation ordained by Antipater must indeed have brought upon the poor citizens of Athens a state of suffering in foreign lands analogous to that which Solon describes as having preceded his Seisachtheia, or measure for the relief of debtors.[771] What rules the nine thousand remaining citizens adopted for their new constitution, we do not know. Whatever they did, must now have been subject to the consent of Antipater and the Macedonian garrison, which entered Munychia, under the command of Menyllus, on the twentieth day of the month Boedromion (September), rather more than a month after the battle of Krannon. The day of its entry presented a sorrowful contrast. It was the day on which, during the annual ceremony of the mysteries of Eleusinian Demeter, the multitudinous festal procession of citizens escorted the god Iacchus from Athens to Eleusis.[772]

One of the earliest measures of the nine thousand was, to condemn to death, at the motion of Demades, the distinguished anti-Macedonian orators who had already fled—Demosthenes, Hyperides, Aristonikus, and Himeræus, brother of the citizen afterwards celebrated as Demetrius the Phalerean. The three last having taken refuge in Ægina, and Demosthenes in Kalauria, all of them were out of the reach of an Athenian sentence, but not beyond that of the Macedonian sword. At this miserable season, Greece was full of similar exiles, the anti-Macedonian leaders out of all the cities which had taken part in the Lamian war. The officers of Antipater, called in the language of the time the Exile-Hunters,[773] were everywhere on the look-out to seize these proscribed men; many of the orators, from other cities as well as from Athens, were slain; and there was no refuge except the mountains of Ætolia for any of them.[774] One of these officers, a Thurian named Archias, who had once been a tragic actor, passed over with a company of Thracian soldiers to Ægina, where he seized the three Athenian orators—Hyperides, Aristonikus, and Himeræus—dragging them out of the sanctuary of the Æakeion or chapel of Æakus. They were all sent as prisoners to Antipater, who had by this time marched forward with his army to Corinth and Kleonæ in Peloponnesus. All were there put to death, by his order. It is even said, and on respectable authority, that the tongue of Hyperides was cut out before he was slain; according to another statement, he himself bit it out—being put to the torture, and resolving to make revelation of secrets impossible. Respecting the details of his death, there were several different stories.[775]

Having conducted these prisoners to Antipater, Archias proceeded with his Thracians to Kalauria in search of Demosthenes. The temple of Poseidon there situated, in which the orator had taken sanctuary, was held in such high veneration, that Archias, hesitating to drag him out by force, tried to persuade him to come forth voluntarily, under promise that he should suffer no harm. But Demosthenes, well aware of the fate which awaited him, swallowed poison in the temple, and when the dose was beginning to take effect, came out of the sacred ground, expiring immediately after he had passed the boundary. The accompanying circumstances were recounted in several different ways.[776] Eratosthenes (to whose authority I lean) affirmed that Demosthenes carried the poison in a ring round his arm; others said that it was suspended in a linen bag round his neck; according to a third story, it was contained in a writing-quill, which he was seen to bite and suck, while composing a last letter to Antipater. Amidst these contradictory details, we can only affirm as certain, that the poison which he had provided beforehand preserved him from the sword of Antipater, and perhaps from having his tongue cut out. The most remarkable assertion was that of Democharès, nephew of Demosthenes, made in his harangues at Athens a few years afterwards. Democharès asserted that his uncle had not taken poison, but had been softly withdrawn from the world by a special providence of the gods, just at the moment essential to rescue him from the cruelty of the Macedonians. It is not less to be noted, as an illustration of the vein of sentiment afterwards prevalent, that

Archias the Exile-Hunter was affirmed to have perished in the utmost dishonor and wretchedness.[777]

The violent deaths of these illustrious orators, the disfranchisement and deportation of the Athenian Demos, the suppression of the public Dikasteries, the occupation of Athens by a Macedonian garrison, and of Greece generally by Macedonian Exile-Hunters—are events belonging to one and the same calamitous tragedy, and marking the extinction of the autonomous hellenic world. Of Hyperides as a citizen we know only the general fact, that he maintained from first to last, and with oratorical ability inferior only to Demosthenes, a strenuous opposition to Macedonian dominion over Greece; though his prosecution of Demosthenes respecting the Harpalian treasure appears (as far as it comes before us) discreditable. Of Demosthenes we know more—enough to form a judgment of him both as citizen and statesman. At the time of his death he was about sixty-two years of age, and we have before us his first Philippic, delivered thirty years before (352-351 B. C.). We are thus sure, that even at that early day, he took a sagacious and provident measure of the danger which threatened Grecian liberty from the energy and encroachments of Philip. He impressed upon his countrymen this coming danger, at a time when the older and more influential politicians either could not or would not see it; he called aloud upon his fellow-citizens for personal service and pecuniary contributions, enforcing the call by all the artifices of consummate oratory, when such distasteful propositions only entailed unpopularity upon himself. At the period when Demosthenes first addressed these earnest appeals to his countrymen, long before the fall of Olynthus, the power of Philip, though formidable, might have been kept perfectly well within the limits of Macedonia and Thrace; and would probably have been so kept, had Demosthenes possessed in 351 B. C. as much public influence as he had acquired ten years afterwards, in 341 B. C.

Throughout the whole career of Demosthenes as a public adviser, down to the battle of Chæroneia, we trace the same combination of earnest patriotism with wise and long-sighted policy. During the three years' war which ended with the battle of Chæroneia, the Athenians in the main followed his counsel; and disastrous as were the ultimate military results of that war, for which Demosthenes could not be responsible—its earlier periods were creditable and successful, its general scheme was the best that the case admitted, and its diplomatic management universally triumphant. But what invests the purposes and policy of Demosthenes with peculiar grandeur, is, that they were not simply Athenian, but in an eminent degree Panhellenic also. It was not Athens only that he sought to defend against Philip, but the whole hellenic world. In this he towers above the greatest of his predecessors for half a century before his birth—Perikles, Archidamus, Agesilaus, Epaminondas; whose policy was Athenian, Spartan, Theban, rather than hellenic. He carries us back to the time of the invasion of Xerxes and the generation immediately succeeding it, when the struggles and sufferings of the Athenians against Persia were consecrated by complete

identity of interest with collective Greece. The sentiments to which Demosthenes appeals throughout his numerous orations, are those of the noblest and largest patriotism; trying to inflame the ancient Grecian sentiment, of an autonomous hellenic world, as the indispensable condition of a dignified and desirable existence[778]—but inculcating at the same time that these blessings could only be preserved by toil, self-sacrifice, devotion of fortune, and willingness to brave hard and steady personal service.

From the destruction of Thebes by Alexander in 335 B. C., to the Lamian war after his death, the policy of Athens neither was nor could be conducted by Demosthenes. But, condemned as he was to comparative inefficacy, he yet rendered material service to Athens, in the Harpalian affair of 324 B. C. If, instead of opposing the alliance of the city with Harpalus, he had supported it as warmly as Hyperides—the exaggerated promises of the exile might probably have prevailed, and war would have been declared against Alexander. In respect to the charge of having been corrupted by Harpalus, I have already shown reasons for believing him innocent. The Lamian war, the closing scene of his activity, was not of his original suggestion, since he was in exile at its commencement. But he threw himself into it with unreserved ardor, and was greatly instrumental in procuring the large number of adhesions which it obtained from so many Grecian states. In spite of its disastrous result, it was, like the battle of Chæroneia, a glorious effort for the recovery of Grecian liberty, undertaken under circumstances which promised a fair chance of success. There was no excessive rashness in calculating on distractions in the empire left by Alexander—on mutual hostility among the principal officers—and on the probability of having only to make head against Antipater and Macedonia, with little or no reinforcement from Asia. Disastrous as the enterprise ultimately proved, yet the risk was one fairly worth incurring, with so noble an object at stake; and could the war have been protracted another year, its termination would probably have been very different. We shall see this presently when we come to follow Asiatic events. After a catastrophe so ruinous, extinguishing free speech in Greece, and dispersing the Athenian Demos to distant lands, Demosthenes himself could hardly have desired, at the age of sixty-two, to prolong his existence as a fugitive beyond sea.

Of the speeches which he composed for private litigants, occasionally also for himself, before the Dikastery—and of the numerous stimulating and admonitory harangues on the public affairs of the moment, which he had addressed to his assembled countrymen, a few remain for the admiration of posterity. These harangues serve to us, not only as evidence of his unrivalled excellence as an orator, but as one of the chief sources from which we are enabled to appreciate the last phase of free Grecian life, as an acting and working reality.

CHAPTER XCVI.

FROM THE LAMIAN WAR TO THE CLOSE OF THE HISTORY OF FREE HELLAS AND HELLENISM.

The death of Demosthenes, with its tragical circumstances recounted in my last chapter, is on the whole less melancholy than the prolonged life of Phokion, as agent of Macedonian supremacy in a city half-depopulated, where he had been born a free citizen, and which he had so long helped to administer as a free community. The dishonor of Phokion's position must have been aggravated by the distress in Athens, arising both out of the violent deportation of one-half of its free citizens, and out of the compulsory return of the Athenian settlers from Samos; which island was now taken from Athens, after she had occupied it forty-three years, and restored to the Samian people and to their recalled exiles, by a rescript of Perdikkas in the name of Aridæus.[779] Occupying this obnoxious elevation, Phokion exercised authority with his usual probity and mildness. Exerting himself to guard the citizens from being annoyed by disorders on the part of the garrison of Munychia, he kept up friendly intercourse with its commander Menyllus, though refusing all presents both from him and from Antipater. He was anxious to bestow the gift of citizenship upon the philosopher Xenokrates, who was only a metic, or resident non-freeman; but Xenokrates declined the offer, remarking, that he would accept no place in a constitution against which he had protested as envoy.[780] This mark of courageous independence, not a little remarkable while the Macedonians were masters of the city, was a tacit reproach to the pliant submission of Phokion.

Throughout Peloponnesus, Antipater purged and remodelled the cities, Argos, Megalopolis, and others, as he had done at Athens; installing in each an oligarchy of his own partisans—sometimes with a Macedonian garrison—and putting to death, deporting, or expelling, hostile, or intractable, or democratical citizens.[781] Having completed the subjugation of Peloponnesus, he passed across the Corinthian Gulf to attack the Ætolians, now the only Greeks remaining unsubdued. It was the purpose of Antipater, not merely to conquer this warlike and rude people, but to transport them in mass across into Asia, and march them up to the interior deserts of the empire.[782] His army was too powerful to be resisted on even ground, so that all the more accessible towns and villages fell into his hands. But the Ætolians defended themselves bravely, withdrew their families into the high towns and mountain tops of their very rugged country, and caused serious loss to the Macedonian invaders. Nevertheless, Kraterus, who had carried on war of the same kind with Alexander in Sogdiana, manifested so much skill in seizing the points of communication, that he intercepted all their supplies and reduced them to extreme distress, amidst the winter which had now supervened. The Ætolians, in spite of bravery and endurance, must

soon have been compelled to surrender from cold and hunger, had not the unexpected arrival of Antigonus from Asia communicated such news to Antipater and Kraterus, as induced them to prepare for marching back to Macedonia, with a view to the crossing of the Hellespont and operating in Asia. They concluded a pacification with the Ætolians—postponing till a future period their design of deporting that people,—and withdrew into Macedonia; where Antipater cemented his alliance with Kraterus by giving to him his daughter Phila in marriage.[783]

Another daughter of Antipater, named Nikæa, had been sent over to Asia not long before, to become the wife of Perdikkas. That general, acting as guardian or prime minister to the kings of Alexander's family (who are now spoken of in the plural number, since Roxana had given birth to a posthumous son, called Alexander, and made king jointly with Philip Aridæus), had at first sought close combination with Antipater, demanding his daughter in marriage. But new views were presently opened to him by the intrigues of the princesses at Pella (Olympias, with her daughter Kleopatra, widow of the Molossian Alexander)—who had always been at variance with Antipater, even throughout the life of Alexander—and Kynanê (daughter of Philip by an Illyrian mother, and widow of Amyntas, first cousin of Alexander, but slain by Alexander's order) with her daughter Eurydikê. It has been already mentioned that Kleopatra had offered herself in marriage to Leonnatus, inviting him to come over and occupy the throne of Macedonia: he had obeyed the call, but had been slain in his first battle against the Greeks, thus relieving Antipater from a dangerous rival. The first project of Olympias being thus frustrated, she had sent to Perdikkas proposing to him a marriage with Kleopatra. Perdikkas had already pledged himself to the daughter of Antipater; nevertheless he now debated whether his ambition would not be better served by breaking his pledge, and accepting the new proposition. To this step he was advised by Eumenes, his ablest friend and coadjutor, steadily attached to the interest of the regal family, and withal personally hated by Antipater. But Alketas, brother of Perdikkas, represented that it would be hazardous to provoke openly and immediately the wrath of Antipater. Accordingly Perdikkas resolved to accept Nikæa for the moment, but to send her away after no long time, and take Kleopatra; to whom secret assurances from him were conveyed by Eumenes. Kynanê also (daughter of Philip and widow of his nephew Amyntas) a warlike and ambitious woman, had brought into Asia her daughter Eurydikê for the purpose of espousing the king Philip Aridæus. Being averse to this marriage, and probably instigated by Olympias also, Perdikkas and Alketas put Kynanê to death. But the indignation excited among the soldiers by this deed was so furious as to menace their safety, and they were forced to permit the marriage of the king with Eurydikê.[784]

All these intrigues were going on through the summer of 322 B. C., while the Lamian war was still effectively prosecuted by the Greeks. About the autumn of the year, Antigonus (called Monophthalmus), the satrap of Phrygia, detected these secret intrigues of Perdikkas; who, for that and other reasons, began to look on him as an

enemy, and to plot against his life. Apprised of his danger, Antigonus made his escape from Asia into Europe to acquaint Antipater and Kraterus with the hostile manœuvres of Perdikkas; upon which news, the two generals, immediately abandoning the Ætolian war, withdrew their army from Greece for the more important object of counteracting Perdikkas in Asia.

To us, these contests of the Macedonian officers belong only so far as they affect the Greeks. And we see, by the events just noticed, how unpropitious to the Greeks were the turns of Fortune, throughout the Lamian war: the grave of Grecian liberty, not for the actual combatants only, but for their posterity also.[785] Until the battle of Krannon and the surrender of Athens, everything fell out so as to relieve Antipater from embarrassment, and impart to him double force. The intrigues of the princesses at Pella, who were well known to hate him, first raised up Leonnatus, next Perdikkas, against him. Had Leonnatus lived, the arm of Antipater would have been at least weakened, if not paralyzed; had Perdikkas declared himself earlier, the forces of Antipater must have been withdrawn to oppose him, and the battle of Krannon would probably have had a different issue. As soon as Perdikkas became hostile to Antipater, it was his policy to sustain and seek alliance with the Greeks, as we shall find him presently doing with the Ætolians.[786] Through causes thus purely accidental, Antipater obtained an interval of a few months, during which his hands were not only free, but armed with new and unexpected strength from Leonnatus and Kraterus, to close the Lamian war. The disastrous issue of that war was therefore in great part the effect of casualties, among which we must include the death of Leosthenes himself. Such issue is not to be regarded as proving that the project was desperate or ill-conceived on the part of its promoters, who had full right to reckon, among the probabilities of their case, the effects of discord between the Macedonian chiefs.

In the spring of 321 B. C., Antipater and Kraterus, having concerted operations with Ptolemy governor of Egypt, crossed into Asia, and began their conflict with Perdikkas; who himself, having the kings along with him, marched against Egypt to attack Ptolemy; leaving his brother Alketas, in conjunction with Eumenes as general, to maintain his cause in Kappadokia and Asia Minor. Alketas, discouraged by the adverse feeling of the Macedonians generally, threw up the enterprise as hopeless. But Eumenes, though embarrassed and menaced in every way by the treacherous jealousy of his own Macedonian officers, and by the discontent of the soldiers against him as a Greek—and though compelled to conceal from these soldiers the fact that Kraterus, who was popular among them, commanded on the opposite side,—displayed nevertheless so much ability that he gained an important victory,[787] in which both Neoptolemus and Kraterus perished. Neoptolemus was killed by Eumenes with his own hand, after a personal conflict desperate in the extreme and long doubtful, and at the cost of a severe wound to himself.[788] After the victory, he found Kraterus still alive, though expiring from his wound. Deeply afflicted at the sight, he did his ut-

most to restore the dying man; and when this proved to be impossible, caused his dead body to be honorably shrouded and transmitted into Macedonia for burial.

This new proof of the military ability and vigor of Eumenes, together with the death of two such important officers as Kraterus and Neoptolemus—proved ruinous to the victor himself, without serving the cause in which he fought. Perdikkas his chief did not live to hear of it. That general was so overbearing and tyrannical in his demeanor towards the other officers—and withal so unsuccessful in his first operations against Ptolemy on the Pelusiac branch of the Nile—that his own army mutinied and slew him.[789] His troops joined Ptolemy, whose conciliatory behavior gained their goodwill. Only two days after this revolution, a messenger from Eumenes reached the camp, announcing his victory and the death of Kraterus. Had this intelligence been received by Perdikkas himself at the head of his army, the course of subsequent events might have been sensibly altered. Eumenes would have occupied the most commanding position in Asia, as general of the kings of the Alexandrine family, to whom both his interests and his feelings attached him. But the news, arriving at the moment when it did, caused throughout the army only the most violent exasperation against him; not simply as ally of the odious Perdikkas, but as cause of death to the esteemed Kraterus. He, together with Alketas and fifty officers, was voted by the soldiers a public enemy. No measures were kept with him henceforward by Macedonian officers or soldiers. At the same time several officers attached to Perdikkas in the camp, and also Atalanta his sister, were slain.[790]

By the death of Perdikkas, and the defection of his soldiers, complete preponderance was thrown into the hands of Antipater, Ptolemy, and Antigonus. Antipater was invited to join the army, now consisting of the forces both of Ptolemy and Perdikkas united. He was there invested with the guardianship of the persons of the kings, and with the sort of ministerial supremacy previously held by Perdikkas. He was however exposed to much difficulty, and even to great personal danger, from the intrigues of the princess Eurydikê, who displayed a masculine boldness in publicly haranguing the soldiers—and from the discontents of the army, who claimed presents, formerly promised to them by Alexander, which there were no funds to liquidate at the moment. At Triparadisus in Syria, Antipater made a second distribution of the satrapies of the empire; somewhat modified, yet coinciding in the main with that which had been drawn up shortly after the death of Alexander. To Ptolemy was assured Egypt and Libya,—to Antigonus, the Greater Phrygia, Lykia, and Pamphylia—as each had had before.[791]

Antigonus was placed in command of the principal Macedonian army in Asia, to crush Eumenes and the other chief adherents of Perdikkas; most of whom had been condemned to death by a vote of the Macedonian army. After a certain interval, Antipater himself, accompanied by the kings, returned to Macedonia, having eluded by artifice a renewed demand on the part of his soldiers for the promised presents. The war of Antigonus, first against Eumenes in Kappadokia, next against Alketas and the

other partisans of Perdikkas in Pisidia, lasted for many months, but was at length successfully finished.[792] Eumenes, beset by the constant treachery and insubordination of the Macedonians, was defeated and driven out of the field. He took refuge with a handful of men in the impregnable and well-stored fortress of Nora in Kappadokia, where he held out a long blockade, apparently more than a year, against Antigonus.[793]

Before the prolonged blockade of Nora had been brought to a close, Antipater, being of very advanced age, fell into sickness, and presently died. One of his latest acts was, to put to death the Athenian orator Demades, who had been sent to Macedonia as envoy to solicit the removal of the Macedonian garrison at Munychia. Antipater had promised, or given hopes, that if the oligarchy which he had constituted at Athens maintained unshaken adherence to Macedonia, he would withdraw the garrison. The Athenians endeavored to prevail on Phokion to go to Macedonia as solicitor for the fulfilment of this promise; but he steadily refused. Demades, who willingly undertook the mission, reached Macedonia at a moment very untoward for himself. The papers of the deceased Perdikkas had come into possession of his opponents; and among them had been found a letter written to him by Demades, inviting him to cross over and rescue Greece from her dependence "on an old and rotten warp"—meaning Antipater. This letter gave great offence to Antipater—the rather, as Demades is said to have been his habitual pensioner—and still greater offence to his son Kassander; who caused Demades with his son to be seized—first killed the son in the immediate presence and even embrace of the father—and then slew the father himself, with bitter invective against his ingratitude.[794] All the accounts which we read depict Demades, in general terms, as a prodigal spendthrift and a venal and corrupt politician. We have no ground for questioning this statement: at the same time, we have no specific facts to prove it.

Antipater by his last directions appointed Polysperchon, one of Alexander's veteran officers, to be chief administrator, with full powers on behalf of the imperial dynasty; while he assigned to his own son Kassander only the second place, as Chiliarch, or general of the body-guard.[795] He thought that this disposition of power would be more generally acceptable throughout the empire, as Polysperchon was older and of longer military service than any other among Alexander's generals. Moreover, Antipater was especially afraid of letting dominion fall into the hands of the princesses;[796] all of whom—Olympias, Kleopatra, and Eurydikê—were energetic characters; and the first of the three (who had retired to Epirus from enmity towards Antipater) furious and implacable.

But the views of Antipater were disappointed from the beginning, because Kassander would not submit to the second place, nor tolerate Polysperchon as his superior. Immediately after the death of Antipater, but before it became publicly known, Kassander despatched Nikanor with pretended orders from Antipater to supersede Menyllus in the government of Munychia. To this order Menyllus yielded. But when

after a few days the Athenian public came to learn the real truth, they were displeased with Phokion for having permitted the change to be made—assuming that he knew the real state of the facts, and might have kept out the new commander.[797] Kassander, while securing this important post in the hands of a confirmed partisan, affected to acquiesce in the authority of Polysperchon, and to occupy himself with a hunting-party in the country. He at the same time sent confidential adherents to the Hellespont and other places in furtherance of his schemes; and especially to contract alliance with Antigonus in Asia and with Ptolemy in Egypt. His envoys being generally well received, he himself soon quitted Macedonia suddenly, and went to concert measures with Antigonus in Asia.[798] It suited the policy of Ptolemy, and still more that of Antigonus, to aid him against Polysperchon and the imperial dynasty. On the death of Antipater, Antigonus had resolved to make himself the real sovereign of the Asiatic Alexandrine empire, possessing as he did the most powerful military force within it.

Even before this time the imperial dynasty had been a name rather than a reality; yet still a respected name. But now, the preference shown to Polysperchon by the deceased Antipater, and the secession of Kassander, placed all the real great powers in active hostility against the dynasty. Polysperchon and his friends were not blind to the difficulties of their position. The principal officers in Macedonia having been convened to deliberate, it was resolved to invite Olympias out of Epirus, that she might assume the tutelage of her grandson Alexander (son of Roxana)—to place the Asiatic interests of the dynasty in the hands of Eumenes, appointing him to the supreme command[799]—and to combat Kassander in Europe, by assuring to themselves the general goodwill and support of the Greeks. This last object was to be obtained by granting to the Greeks general enfranchisement, and by subverting the Antipatrian oligarchies and military governments now paramount throughout the cities.

The last hope of maintaining the unity of Alexander's empire in Asia, against the counter-interests of the great Macedonian officers, who were steadily tending to divide and appropriate it—now lay in the fidelity and military skill of Eumenes. At his disposal Polysperchon placed the imperial treasures and soldiers in Asia; especially the brave, but faithless and disorderly, Argyraspides. Olympias also addressed to him a pathetic letter, asking his counsel as the only friend and savior to whom the imperial family could now look. Eumenes replied by assuring them of his devoted adherence to their cause. But he at the same time advised Olympias not to come out of Epirus into Macedonia; or if she did come, at all events to abstain from vindictive and cruel proceedings. Both these recommendations, honorable as well to his prudence as to his humanity, were disregarded by the old queen. She came into Macedonia to take the management of affairs; and although her imposing title, of mother to the great conqueror, raised a strong favorable feeling, yet her multiplied executions of the Antipatrian partisans excited fatal enmity against a dynasty already tottering. Nevertheless Eumenes, though his advice had been disregarded, devoted himself in

Asia with unshaken fidelity to the Alexandrine family, resisting the most tempting invitations to take part with Antigonus against them.[800] His example contributed much to keep alive the same active sentiment in those around him; indeed, without him, the imperial family would have had no sincere or commanding representative in Asia. His gallant struggles, first in Kilikia and Phenicia, next (when driven from the coast), in Susiana, Persis, Media, and Parætakênê—continued for two years against the greatly preponderant forces of Ptolemy, Antigonus, and Seleukus, and against the never-ceasing treachery of his own officers and troops[801]—do not belong to Grecian history. They are however among the most memorable exploits of antiquity. While even in a military point of view, they are hardly inferior to the combinations of Alexander himself—they evince, besides, a flexibility and aptitude such as Alexander neither possessed nor required, for overcoming the thousand difficulties raised by traitors and mutineers around him. To the last, Eumenes remained unsubdued; he was betrayed to Antigonus by the base and venal treachery of his own soldiers, the Macedonian Argyraspides.[802]

For the interests of the imperial dynasty (the extinction of which we shall presently follow), it is perhaps to be regretted that they did not abandon Asia at once, at the death of Antipater, and concentrate their attention on Macedonia alone, summoning over Eumenes to aid them. To keep together in unity the vast aggregate of Asia was manifestly impracticable, even with his consummate ability. Indeed, we read that Olympias wished for his presence in Europe, not trusting any one but him as protector of the child Alexander.[803] In Macedonia, apart from Asia, Eumenes, if the violent temper of Olympias had permitted him, might have upheld the dynasty; which, having at that time a decided interest in conciliating the Greeks, might probably have sanctioned his sympathies in favor of free Hellenic community.[804]

On learning the death of Antipater, most of the Greek cities had sent envoys to Pella.[805] To all the governments of these cities, composed as they were of his creatures, it was a matter of the utmost moment to know what course the new Macedonian authority would adopt. Polysperchon, persuaded that they would all adhere to Kassander, and that his only chance of combating that rival was by enlisting popular sympathy and interests in Greece, or at least by subverting these Antipatrian oligarchies—drew up in conjunction with his counsellors a proclamation which he issued in the name of the dynasty.

After reciting the steady goodwill of Philip and Alexander towards Greece, he affirmed that this feeling had been interrupted by the untoward Lamian war, originating with some ill-judged Greeks, and ending in the infliction of many severe calamities upon the various cities. But all these severities (he continued) had proceeded from the generals (Antipater and Kraterus): the kings had now determined to redress them. It was accordingly proclaimed that the political constitution of each city should be restored, as it had stood in the times of Philip and Alexander; that before the thirtieth of the month Xanthikus, all those who had been condemned to banishment, or

deported, by the generals, should be recalled and received back; that their properties should be restored, and past sentences against them rescinded; that they should live in amnesty as to the past, and good feeling as to the future, with the remaining citizens. From this act of recall were excluded, the exiles of Amphissa, Trikka, Pharkadon, and Herakleia, together with a certain number of Megalopolitans, implicated in one particular conspiracy. In the particular case of those cities, the governments of which had been denounced as hostile by Philip or Alexander, special reference and consultation was opened with Pella, for some modification to meet the circumstances. As to Athens, it was decreed that Samos should be restored to her, but not Orôpus; in all other respects, she was placed on the same footing as in the days of Philip and Alexander. "All the Greeks (concluded this proclamation) shall pass decrees, forbidding every one either to bear arms or otherwise act in hostility against us—on pain of exile and confiscation of goods, for himself and his family. On this and on all other matters, we have ordered Polysperchon to take proper measures. Obey him—as we have before written you to do; for we shall not omit to notice those who on any point disregard our proclamation."[806]

Such was the new edict issued by the kings, or rather by Polysperchon in their names. It directed the removal of all the garrisons, and the subversion of all the oligarchies, established by Antipater after the Lamian war. It ordered the recall of the host of exiles then expelled. It revived the state of things prevalent before the death of Alexander—which indeed itself had been, for the most part, an aggregate of macedonizing oligarchies interspersed with Macedonian garrisons. To the existing Antipatrian oligarchies, however, it was a deathblow; and so it must have been understood by the Grecian envoys—including probably deputations from the exiles, as well as envoys from the civic governments—to whom Polysperchon delivered it at Pella. Not content with the general edict, Polysperchon addressed special letters to Argos and various other cities, commanding that the Antipatrian leading men should be banished with confiscation of property, and in some cases put to death;[807] the names being probably furnished to him by the exiles. Lastly, as it was clear that such stringent measures could not be executed without force,—the rather as these oligarchies would be upheld by Kassander from without—Polysperchon resolved to conduct a large military force into Greece; sending thither first, however, a considerable detachment, for immediate operations, under his son Alexander.

To Athens, as well as to other cities, Polysperchon addressed special letters, promising restoration of the democracy and recall of the exiles. At Athens, such change was a greater revolution than elsewhere, because the multitude of exiles and persons deported had been the greatest. To the existing nine thousand Athenian citizens, it was doubtless odious and alarming; while to Phokion with the other leading Antipatrians, it threatened not only loss of power, but probably nothing less than the alternative of flight or death.[808] The state of interests at Athens, however, was now singularly novel and complicated. There were the Antipatrians and the nine thousand

qualified citizens. There were the exiles, who, under the new edict, speedily began re-entering the city, and reclaiming their citizenship as well as their properties. Polysperchon and his son were known to be soon coming with a powerful force. Lastly, there was Nikanor, who held Munychia with a garrison, neither for Polysperchon, nor for the Athenians, but for Kassander; the latter being himself also expected with a force from Asia. Here then were several parties; each distinct in views and interests from the rest—some decidedly hostile to each other.

The first contest arose between the Athenians and Nikanor respecting Munychia; which they required him to evacuate, pursuant to the recent proclamation. Nikanor on his side returned an evasive answer, promising compliance as soon as circumstances permitted, but in the mean time entreating the Athenians to continue in alliance with Kassander, as they had been with his father Antipater.[809] He seems to have indulged hopes of prevailing on them to declare in his favor—and not without plausible grounds, since the Antipatrian leaders and a proportion of the nine thousand citizens could not but dread the execution of Polysperchon's edict. And he had also what was of still greater moment—the secret connivance and support of Phokion: who put himself in intimate relation with Nikanor, as he had before done with Menyllus[810]—and who had greater reason than any one else to dread the edict of Polysperchon. At a public assembly held in Peiræus to discuss the subject, Nikanor even ventured to present himself in person, in the company and under the introduction of Phokion, who was anxious that the Athenians should entertain the proposition of alliance with Kassander. But with the people, the prominent wish was to get rid altogether of the foreign garrison, and to procure the evacuation of Munychia—for which object, of course, the returned exiles would be even more anxious than the nine thousand. Accordingly, the assembly refused to hear any propositions from Nikanor; while Derkyllus with others even proposed to seize his person. It was Phokion who ensured to him the means of escaping; even in spite of serious wrath from his fellow-citizens, to whom he pleaded, that he had made himself guarantee for Nikanor's personal safety.[811]

Foreseeing the gravity of the impending contest, Nikanor had been secretly introducing fresh soldiers into Munychia. And when he found that he could not obtain any declared support from the Athenians, he laid a scheme for surprising and occupying the town and harbor of Peiræus, of which Munychia formed the adjoining eminence and harbor, on the southern side of the little peninsula. Notwithstanding all his precautions, it became known to various Athenians that he was tampering with persons in Peiræus, and collecting troops in the neighboring isle of Salamis. So much anxiety was expressed in the Athenian assembly for the safety of Peiræus, that a decree was passed, enjoining all citizens to hold themselves in arms for its protection, under Phokion as general. Nevertheless Phokion, disregarding such a decree, took no precautions, affirming that he would himself be answerable for Nikanor. Presently that officer, making an unexpected attack from Munychia and Salamis, took Peiræus by

surprise, placed both the town and harbor under military occupation, and cut off its communication with Athens by a ditch and palisade. On this palpable aggression, the Athenians rushed to arms. But Phokion as general damped their ardor, and even declined to head them in an attack for the recovery of Peiræus before Nikanor should have had time to strengthen himself in it. He went however, with Konon (son of Timotheus), to remonstrate with Nikanor, and to renew the demand that he should evacuate, under the recent proclamation, all the posts which he held in garrison. But Nikanor would give no other answer, except that he held his commission from Kassander, to whom they must address their application.[812] He thus again tried to bring Athens into communication with Kassander.

The occupation of Peiræus in addition to Munychia was a serious calamity to the Athenians, making them worse off than they had been even under Antipater. Peiræus, rich, active, and commercial, containing the Athenian arsenal, docks, and muniments of war, was in many respects more valuable than Athens itself; for all purposes of war, far more valuable. Kassander had now an excellent place of arms and base, which Munychia alone would not have afforded, for his operations in Greece against Polysperchon; upon whom therefore the loss fell hardly less severely than upon the Athenians. Now Phokion, in his function as general, had been forewarned of the danger, might have guarded against it, and ought to have done so. This was a grave dereliction of duty, and admits of hardly any other explanation except that of treasonable connivance. It seems that Phokion, foreseeing his own ruin and that of his friends in the triumph of Polysperchon and the return of the exiles, was desirous of favoring the seizure of Peiræus by Nikanor, as a means of constraining Athens to adopt the alliance with Kassander; which alliance indeed would probably have been brought about, had Kassander reached Peiræus by sea sooner than the first troops of Polysperchon by land. Phokion was here guilty, at the very least, of culpable neglect, and probably of still more culpable treason, on an occasion seriously injuring both Polysperchon and the Athenians; a fact which we must not forget, when we come to read presently the bitter animosity exhibited against him.[813]

The news, that Nikanor had possessed himself of Peiræus, produced a strong sensation. Presently arrived a letter addressed to him by Olympias herself, commanding him to surrender the place to the Athenians, upon whom she wished to confer entire autonomy. But Nikanor declined obedience to her order, still waiting for support from Kassander. The arrival of Alexander (Polysperchon's son) with a body of troops, encouraged the Athenians to believe that he was come to assist in carrying Peiræus by force, for the purpose of restoring it to them. Their hopes, however, were again disappointed. Though encamped near Peiræus, Alexander made no demand for the Athenian forces to co-operate with him in attacking it; but entered into open parley with Nikanor, whom he endeavored to persuade or corrupt into surrendering the place.[814] When this negotiation failed, he resolved to wait for the arrival of his father, who was already on his march towards Attica with the main army. His own

force unassisted was probably not sufficient to attack Peiræus; nor did he choose to invoke assistance from the Athenians, to whom he would then have been compelled to make over the place when taken, which they so ardently desired. The Athenians were thus as far from their object as ever; moreover, by this delay the opportunity of attacking the place was altogether thrown away; for Kassander with his armament reached it before Polysperchon.

It was Phokion and his immediate colleagues who induced Alexander to adopt this insidious policy; to decline reconquering Peiræus for the Athenians, and to appropriate it for himself. To Phokion, the reconstitution of autonomous Athens, with its democracy and restored exiles, and without any foreign controlling force—was an assured sentence of banishment, if not of death. Not having been able to obtain protection from the foreign force of Nikanor and Kassander, he and his friends resolved to throw themselves upon that of Alexander and Polysperchon. They went to meet Alexander as he entered Attica—represented the impolicy of his relinquishing so important a military position as Peiræus, while the war was yet unfinished,—and offered to co-operate with him for this purpose, by proper management of the Athenian public. Alexander was pleased with these suggestions, accepted Phokion with the others as his leading adherents at Athens, and looked upon Peiræus as a capture to be secured for himself.[815] Numerous returning Athenian exiles accompanied Alexander's army. It seems that Phokion was desirous of admitting the troops, along with the exiles, as friends and allies into the walls of Athens, so as to make Alexander master of the city—but that this project was impracticable in consequence of the mistrust created among the Athenians by the parleys of Alexander with Nikanor.[816]

The strategic function of Phokion, however, so often conferred and re-conferred upon him—and his power of doing either good or evil—now approached its close. As soon as the returning exiles found themselves in sufficient numbers, they called for a revision of the list of state-officers, and for the re-establishment of the democratical forms. They passed a vote to depose those who had held office under the Antipatrian oligarchy and who still continued to hold it down to the actual moment. Among these Phokion stood first: along with him were his son-in-law Charikles, the Phalerean Demetrius, Kallimedon, Nikokles, Thudippus, Hegemon, and Philokles. These persons were not only deposed, but condemned, some to death, some to banishment and confiscation of property. Demetrius, Charikles, and Kallimedon sought safety by leaving Attica; but Phokion and the rest merely went to Alexander's camp, throwing themselves upon his protection on the faith of the recent understanding. [817] Alexander not only received them courteously, but gave them letters to his father Polysperchon, requesting safety and protection for them, as men who had embraced his cause, and who were still eager to do all in their power to support him. [818] Armed with these letters, Phokion and his companions went through Bœotia and Phokis to meet Polysperchon on his march southward. They were accompanied by

Deinarchus and by a Platæan named Solon, both of them passing for friends of Polysperchon.[819]

The Athenian democracy, just reconstituted, which had passed the recent condemnatory votes, was disquieted at the news that Alexander had espoused the cause of Phokion and had recommended the like policy to his father. It was possible that Polysperchon might seek, with his powerful army, both to occupy Athens and to capture Peiræus, and might avail himself of Phokion (like Antipater after the Lamian war) as a convenient instrument of government. It seems plain that this was the project of Alexander, and that he counted on Phokion as a ready auxiliary in both. Now the restored democrats, though owing their restoration to Polysperchon, were much less compliant towards him than Phokion had been. Not only they would not admit him into the city, but they would not even acquiesce in his separate occupation of Munychia and Peiræus. On the proposition of Agnonides and Archestratus, they sent a deputation to Polysperchon accusing Phokion and his comrades of high treason; yet at the same time claiming for Athens the full and undiminished benefit of the late regal proclamation—autonomy and democracy, with restoration of Peiræus and Munychia free and ungarrisoned.[820]

The deputation reached Polysperchon at Pharyges in Phokis, as early as Phokion's company, which had been detained for some days at Elateia by the sickness of Deinarchus. That delay was unfortunate for Phokion. Had he seen Polysperchon, and presented the letter of Alexander, before the Athenian accusers arrived, he might probably have obtained a more favorable reception. But as the arrival of the two parties was nearly simultaneous, Polysperchon heard both of them at the same audience, before King Philip Aridæus in his throne with the gilt ceiling above it. When Agnonides,—chief of the Athenian deputation, and formerly friend and advocate of Demosthenes in the Harpalian cause—found himself face to face with Phokion and his friends, their reciprocal invectives at first produced nothing but confusion; until Agnonides himself exclaimed—"Pack us all into one cage and send us back to Athens to receive judgment from the Athenians." The king laughed at this observation, but the bystanders around insisted upon more orderly proceedings, and Agnonides then set forth the two demands of the Athenians—condemnation of Phokion and his friends, partly as accomplices of Antipater, partly as having betrayed Peiræus to Nikanor—and the full benefit of the late regal proclamation to Athens.[821] Now, on the last of these two heads, Polysperchon was noway disposed to yield—nor to hand over Peiræus to the Athenians as soon as he should take it. On this matter, accordingly, he replied by refusal or evasion. But he was all the more disposed to satisfy the Athenians on the other matter—the surrender of Phokion; especially as the sentiment now prevalent at Athens evinced clearly that Phokion could not be again useful to him as an instrument. Thus disposed to sacrifice Phokion, Polysperchon heard his defence with impatience, interrupted him several times, and so disgusted him, that he at length struck the ground with his stick, and held his peace. Hegemon, another of

the accused, was yet more harshly treated. When he appealed to Polysperchon himself, as having been personally cognizant of his (the speaker's) good dispositions towards the Athenian people (he had probably been sent to Pella, as envoy for redress of grievances under the Antipatrian oligarchy), Polysperchon exclaimed—"Do not utter falsehoods against me before the king." Moreover, king Philip himself was so incensed, as to start from his throne and snatch his spear; with which he would have run Hegemon through,—imitating the worst impulses of his illustrious brother—had he not been held back by Polysperchon. The sentence could not be doubtful. Phokion and his companions were delivered over as prisoners to the Athenian deputation, together with a letter from the king, intimating that in his conviction they were traitors, but that he left them to be judged by the Athenians, now restored to freedom and autonomy.[822]

The Macedonian Kleitus was instructed to convey them to Athens as prisoners under a guard. Mournful was the spectacle as they entered the city; being carried along the Kerameikus in carts, through sympathizing friends and an embittered multitude, until they reached the theatre, wherein the assembly was to be convened. That assembly was composed of every one who chose to enter, and is said to have contained many foreigners and slaves. But it would have been fortunate for Phokion had such really been the case; for foreigners and slaves had no cause of antipathy towards him. The assembly was mainly composed of Phokion's keenest enemies, the citizens just returned from exile or deportation; among whom may doubtless have been intermixed more or less of non-qualified persons, since the lists had probably not yet been verified. When the assembly was about to be opened, the friends of Phokion moved, that on occasion of so important a trial, foreigners and slaves should be sent away. This was in every sense an impolitic proceeding; for the restored exiles, chiefly poor men, took it as an insult to themselves, and became only the more embittered, exclaiming against the oligarchs who were trying to exclude them.

It is not easy to conceive stronger grounds of exasperation than those which inflamed the bosoms of these returned exiles. We must recollect that at the close of the Lamian war, the Athenian democracy had been forcibly subverted. Demosthenes and its principal leaders had been slain, some of them with antecedent cruelties; the poorer multitude, in number more than half of the qualified citizens, had been banished or deported into distant regions. To all the public shame and calamity, there was thus superadded a vast mass of individual suffering and impoverishment, the mischiefs of which were very imperfectly healed, even by that unexpected contingency which had again thrown open to them their native city. Accordingly, when these men returned from different regions, each hearing from the rest new tales of past hardship, they felt the bitterest hatred against the authors of the Antipatrian revolution; and among these authors Phokion stood distinctly marked. For although he had neither originated nor advised these severities, yet he and his friends, as administering the Antipatrian government at Athens, must have been agents in carrying

them out, and had rendered themselves distinctly liable to the fearful penalties pronounced by the psephism of Demophantus,[823] consecrated by an oath taken by Athenians generally, against any one who should hold an official post after the government was subverted.

When these restored citizens thus saw Phokion brought before them, for the first time after their return, the common feeling of antipathy against him burst out into furious manifestations. Agnonides the principal accuser, supported by Epikurus[824] and Demophilus, found their denunciations welcomed and even anticipated, when they arraigned Phokion as a criminal who had lent his hand to the subversion of the constitution,—to the sufferings of his deported fellow-citizens,—and to the holding of Athens in subjection under a foreign potentate; in addition to which, the betrayal of Peiræus to Nikanor[825] constituted a new crime; fastening on the people the yoke of Kassander, when autonomy had been promised to them by the recent imperial edict. After the accusation was concluded, Phokion was called on for his defence; but he found it impossible to obtain a hearing. Attempting several times to speak, he was as often interrupted by angry shouts; several of his friends were cried down in like manner; until at length he gave up the case in despair, and exclaimed, "For myself, Athenians, I plead guilty; I pronounce against myself the sentence of death for my political conduct; but why are you to sentence these men near me, who are not guilty?" "Because they are your friends, Phokion"—was the exclamation of those around. Phokion then said no more; while Agnonides proposed a decree, to the effect, that the assembled people should decide by show of hands, whether the persons now arraigned were guilty or not; and that if declared guilty, they should be put to death. Some persons present cried out, that the penalty of torture ought to precede death; but this savage proposition, utterly at variance with Athenian law in respect to citizens, was repudiated not less by Agnonides than by the Macedonian officer Kleitus. The decree was then passed; after which the show of hands was called for. Nearly every hand in the assembly was held up in condemnation; each man even rose from his seat to make the effect more imposing; and some went so far as to put on wreaths in token of triumph. To many of them doubtless, the gratification of this intense and unanimous vindictive impulse,—in their view not merely legitimate, but patriotic,—must have been among the happiest moments of life.[826]

After sentence, the five condemned persons, Phokion, Nikokles, Thudippus, Hegemon, and Pythokles, were consigned to the supreme magistrates of Police, called The Eleven, and led to prison for the purpose of having the customary dose of poison administered. Hostile bystanders ran alongside, taunting and reviling them. It is even said that one man planted himself in the front, and spat upon Phokion; who turned to the public officers and exclaimed—"Will no one check this indecent fellow?" This was the only emotion which he manifested; in other respects, his tranquillity and self-possession were resolutely maintained, during this soul-subduing march from the theatre to the prison, amidst the wailings of his friends, the broken spirit of

his four comrades, and the fiercest demonstrations of antipathy from his fellow-citizens generally. One ray of comfort presented itself as he entered the prison. It was the nineteenth of the month Munychion, the day on which the Athenian Horsemen or Knights (the richest class in the city, men for the most part of oligarchical sentiments) celebrated their festal procession with wreaths on their heads in honor of Zeus. Several of these horsemen halted in passing, took off their wreaths, and wept as they looked through the gratings of the prison.

Being asked whether he had anything to tell his son Phokus, Phokion replied—"I tell him emphatically, not to hold evil memory of the Athenians." The draught of hemlock was then administered to all five—to Phokion last. Having been condemned for treason, they were not buried in Attica; nor were Phokion's friends allowed to light a funeral pile for the burning of his body; which was carried out of Attica into the Megarid, by a hired agent named Konopion, and there burnt by fire obtained at Megara. The wife of Phokion, with her maids, poured libations and marked the spot by a small mound of earth; she also collected the bones and brought them back to Athens in her bosom, during the secrecy of night. She buried them near her own domestic hearth, with this address—"Beloved Hestia, I confide to thee these relics of a good man. Restore them to his own family vault, as soon as the Athenians shall come to their senses."[827]

After a short time (we are told by Plutarch) the Athenians did thus come to their senses. They discovered that Phokion had been a faithful and excellent public servant, repented of their severity towards him, celebrated his funeral obsequies at the public expense, erected a statue in his honor, and put to death Agnonides by public judicial sentence; while Epikurus and Demophilus fled from the city and were slain by Phokion's son.[828]

These facts are ostensibly correct; but Plutarch omits to notice the real explanation of them. Within two or three months after the death of Phokion, Kassander, already in possession of Peiræus and Munychia, became also master of Athens; the oligarchical or Phokionic party again acquired predominance; Demetrius the Phalerean was recalled from exile, and placed to administer the city under Kassander, as Phokion had administered it under Antipater.

No wonder, that under such circumstances, the memory of Phokion should be honored. But this is a very different thing from spontaneous change of popular opinion respecting him. I see no reason why such change of opinion should have occurred, nor do I believe that it did occur. The Demos of Athens, banished and deported in mass, had the best ground for hating Phokion, and were not likely to become ashamed of the feeling. Though he was personally mild and incorruptible, they derived no benefit from these virtues. To them it was of little moment that he should steadily refuse all presents from Antipater, when he did Antipater's work gratuitously. Considered as a judicial trial, the last scene of Phokion before the people in the the-

atre is nothing better than a cruel imposture; considered as a manifestation of public opinion already settled, it is one for which the facts of the past supplied ample warrant.

We cannot indeed read without painful sympathy the narrative of an old man above eighty,—personally brave, mild, and superior to all pecuniary temptation, so far as his positive administration was concerned,—perishing under an intense and crushing storm of popular execration. But when we look at the whole case—when we survey, not merely the details of Phokion's administration, but the grand public objects which those details subserved, and towards which he conducted his fellow-citizens—we shall see that this judgment is fully merited. In Phokion's patriotism—for so doubtless he himself sincerely conceived it—no account was taken of Athenian independence; of the autonomy or self-management of the Hellenic world; of the conditions, in reference to foreign kings, under which alone such autonomy could exist. He had neither the Panhellenic sentiment of Aristeides, Kallikratidas, and Demosthenes—nor the narrower Athenian sentiment, like the devotion of Agesilaus to Sparta, and of Epaminondas to Thebes. To Phokion it was indifferent whether Greece was an aggregate of autonomous cities, with Athens as first or second among them—or one of the satrapies under the Macedonian kings. Now this was among the most fatal defects of a Grecian public man. The sentiment in which Phokion was wanting, lay at the bottom of all those splendid achievements which have given to Greece a substantive and pre-eminent place in the history of the world. Had Themistokles, Arsiteides, and Leonidas resembled him, Greece would have passed quietly under the dominion of Persia, and the brilliant, though checkered, century and more of independent politics which succeeded the repulse of Xerxes would never have occurred. It was precisely during the fifty years of Phokion's political and military influence, that the Greeks were degraded from a state of freedom, and Athens from ascendency as well as freedom, into absolute servitude. Insofar as this great public misfortune can be imputed to any one man—to no one was it more ascribable than to Phokion. He was stratêgus during most of the long series of years when Philip's power was growing; it was his duty to look ahead for the safety of his countrymen, and to combat the yet immature giant. He heard the warnings of Demosthenes, and he possessed exactly those qualities which were wanting to Demosthenes—military energy and aptitude. Had he lent his influence to inform the short-sightedness, to stimulate the inertia, to direct the armed efforts, of his countrymen, the kings of Macedon might have been kept within their own limits, and the future history of Greece might have been altogether different. Unfortunately, he took the opposite side. He acted with Æschines and the Philippizers; without receiving money from Philip, he did gratuitously all that Philip desired— by nullifying and sneering down the efforts of Demosthenes and the other active politicians. After the battle of Chæroneia, Phokion received from Philip first, and from Alexander afterwards, marks of esteem not shown towards any other Athenian. This was both the fruit and the proof of his past political action—anti-Hellenic as well as anti-Athenian. Having done much, in the earlier part of his life, to

promote the subjugation of Greece under the Macedonian kings, he contributed somewhat, during the latter half, to lighten the severity of their dominion; and it is the most honorable point in his character that he always refrained from abusing their marked favor towards himself, for purposes either of personal gain or of oppression over his fellow-citizens. Alexander not only wrote letters to him, even during the plenitude of imperial power, in terms of respectful friendship, but tendered to him the largest presents—at one time the sum of 100 talents, at another time the choice of four towns on the coast of Asia Minor, as Xerxes gave to Themistokles. He even expressed his displeasure when Phokion, refusing everything, consented only to request the liberation of three Grecian prisoners confined at Sardis.[829]

The Lamian war and its consequences, were Phokion's ruin. He continued at Athens, throughout that war, freely declaring his opinion against it; for it is to be remarked, that in spite of his known macedonizing politics, the people neither banished nor degraded him, but contented themselves with following the counsels of others. On the disastrous termination of the war, Phokion undertook the thankless and dishonorable function of satrap under Antipater at Athens, with the Macedonian garrison at Munychia to back him. He became the subordinate agent of a conqueror who not only slaughtered the chief Athenian orators, but disfranchised and deported the Demos in mass. Having accepted partnership and responsibility in these proceedings, Phokion was no longer safe except under the protection of a foreign prince. After the liberal proclamation issued in the name of the Macedonian kings, permitting the return of the banished Demos, he sought safety for himself, first by that treasonable connivance which enabled Nikanor to seize the Peiræus, next by courting Polysperchon the enemy of Nikanor. A voluntary expatriation (along with his friend the Phalerean Demetrius) would have been less dangerous, and less discreditable, than these manœuvres, which still farther darkened the close of his life, without averting from him, after all, the necessity of facing the restored Demos. The intense and unanimous wrath of the people against him is an instructive, though a distressing spectacle. It was directed, not against the man or the administrator—for in both characters Phokion had been blameless, except as to the last collusion with Nikanor in the seizure of the Peiræus—but against his public policy. It was the last protest of extinct Grecian freedom, speaking as it were from the tomb in a voice of thunder, against that fatal system of mistrust, inertia, self-seeking, and corruption, which had betrayed the once autonomous Athens to a foreign conqueror.

I have already mentioned that Polysperchon with his army was in Phokis when Phokion was brought before him, on his march towards Peloponnesus. Perhaps he may have been detained by negotiation with the Ætolians, who embraced his alliance.[830] At any rate he was tardy in his march, for before he reached Attica, Kassander arrived at Peiræus to join Nikanor with a fleet of thirty-five ships and 4000 soldiers obtained from Antigonus. On learning this fact, Polysperchon hastened his march also, and presented himself under the walls of Athens and Peiræus with a

large force of 20,000 Macedonians, 4000 Greek allies, 1000 cavalry, and sixty-five elephants; animals which were now seen for the first time in European Greece. He at first besieged Kassander in Peiræus, but finding it difficult to procure subsistence in Attica for so numerous an army, he marched with the larger portion into Peloponnesus, leaving his son Alexander with a division to make head against Kassander. Either approaching in person the various Peloponnesian towns—or addressing them by means of envoys—he enjoined the subversion of the Antipatrian oligarchies, and the restoration of liberty and free speech to the mass of the citizens.[831] In most of the towns, this revolution was accomplished; but in Megalopolis, the oligarchy held out; not only forcing Polysperchon to besiege the city, but even defending it against him successfully. He made two or three attempts to storm it, by movable towers, by undermining the walls, and even by the aid of elephants; but he was repulsed in all of them,[832] and obliged to relinquish the siege with considerable loss of reputation. His admiral Kleitus was soon afterwards defeated in the Propontis, with the loss of his whole fleet, by Nikanor (whom Kassander had sent from Peiræus) and Antigonus. [833]

After these two defeats, Polysperchon seems to have evacuated Peloponnesus, and to have carried his forces across the Corinthian Gulf into Epirus, to join Olympias. His party was greatly weakened all over Greece, and that of Kassander proportionally strengthened. The first effect of this was, the surrender of Athens. The Athenians in the city, including all or many of the restored exiles, could no longer endure that complete severance from the sea, to which the occupation of Peiræus and Munychia by Kassander had reduced them. Athens without a port was hardly tenable; in fact, Peiræus was considered by its great constructor, Themistokles, as more indispensable to the Athenians than Athens itself.[834] The subsistence of the people was derived in large proportion from imported corn, received through Peiræus; where also the trade and industrial operations were carried on, most of the revenue collected, and the arsenals, docks, ships, etc. of the state kept up. It became evident that Nikanor, by seizing on the Peiræus, had rendered Athens disarmed and helpless; so that the irreparable mischief done by Phokion, in conniving at that seizure, was felt more and more every day. Hence the Athenians, unable to capture the port themselves, and hopeless of obtaining it through Polysperchon, felt constrained to listen to the partisans of Kassander, who proposed that terms should be made with him. It was agreed that they should become friends and allies of Kassander; that they should have full enjoyment of their city, with the port Peiræus, their ships and revenues; that the exiles and deported citizens should be readmitted; that the political franchise should for the future be enjoyed by all citizens who possessed 1000 drachmæ of property and upwards; that Kassander should hold Munychia with a governor and garrison, until the war against Polysperchon was brought to a close; and that he should also name some one Athenian citizen, in whose hands the supreme government of the city should be vested. Kassander named Demetrius the Phalerean (*i. e.* an Athenian of the Deme Phalerum), one of the colleagues of Phokion; who

had gone into voluntary exile since the death of Antipater, but had recently returned.[835]

This convention restored substantially at Athens the Antipatrian government; yet without the severities which had marked its original establishment—and with some modifications in various ways. It made Kassander virtually master of the city (as Antipater had been before him), by means of his governing nominee, upheld by the garrison, and by the fortification of Munychia; which had now been greatly enlarged and strengthened,[836] holding a practical command over Peiræus, though that port was nominally relinquished to the Athenians. But there was no slaughter of orators, no expulsion of citizens: moreover, even the minimum of 1000 drachmæ, fixed for the political franchise, though excluding the multitude, must have been felt as an improvement compared with the higher limit of 2000 drachmæ prescribed by Antipater. Kassander was not, like his father, at the head of an overwhelming force, master of Greece. He had Polysperchon in the field against him with a rival army and an established ascendency in many of the Grecian cities; it was therefore his interest to abstain from measures of obvious harshness towards the Athenian people.

Towards this end his choice of the Phalerean Demetrius appears to have been judicious. That citizen continued to administer Athens, as satrap or despot under Kassander, for ten years. He was an accomplished literary man, friend both of the philosopher Theophrastus, who had succeeded to the school of Aristotle—and of the rhetor Deinarchus. He is described also as a person of expensive and luxurious habits; towards which he devoted the most of the Athenian public revenue, 1200 talents in amount, if Duris is to be believed. His administration is said to have been discreet and moderate. We know little of its details, but we are told that he made sumptuary laws, especially restricting the cost and ostentation of funerals.[837] He himself extolled his own decennial period as one of abundance and flourishing commerce at Athens.[838] But we learn from others, and the fact is highly probable, that it was a period of distress and humiliation, both at Athens and in other Grecian towns; and that Athenians, as well as others, welcomed new projects of colonization (such as that of Ophellas from Kyrênê) not simply from prospects of advantage, but also as an escape from existing evils.[839]

What forms of nominal democracy were kept up during this interval, we cannot discover. The popular judicature must have been continued for private suits and accusations, since Deinarchus is said to have been in large practice as a logographer, or composer of discourses for others.[840] But the fact that three hundred and sixty statues were erected in honor of Demetrius while his administration was still going on, demonstrates the gross flattery of his partisans, the subjection of the people, and the practical abolition of all free-spoken censure or pronounced opposition. We learn that, in some one of the ten years of his administration, a census was taken of the inhabitants of Attica; and that there were numbered, 21,000 citizens, 10,000 metics, and 400,000 slaves.[841] Of this important enumeration we know the bare fact, with-

out its special purpose or even its precise date. Perhaps some of those citizens, who had been banished or deported at the close of the Lamian war, may have returned and continued to reside at Athens. But there still seems to have remained, during all the continuance of the Kassandrian Oligarchy, a body of adverse Athenian exiles, watching for an opportunity of overthrowing it, and seeking aid for that purpose from the Ætolians and others.[842]

The acquisition of Athens by Kassander, followed up by his capture of Panaktum and Salamis, and seconded by his moderation towards the Athenians, procured for him considerable support in Peloponnesus, whither he proceeded with his army.[843] Many of the cities, intimidated or persuaded, joined him and deserted Polysperchon; while the Spartans, now feeling for the first time their defenceless condition, thought it prudent to surround their city with walls.[844] This fact, among many others contemporaneous, testifies emphatically, how the characteristic sentiments of the Hellenic autonomous world were now dying out everywhere. The maintenance of Sparta as an unwalled city, was one of the deepest and most cherished of the Lykurgean traditions; a standing proof of the fearless bearing and self-confidence of the Spartans against dangers from without. The erection of the walls showed their own conviction, but too well borne out by the real circumstances around them, that the pressure of the foreigner had become so overwhelming as hardly to leave them even safety at home.

The warfare between Kassander and Polysperchon became now embittered by a feud among the members of the Macedonian imperial family. King Philip Aridæus and his wife Eurydikê, alarmed and indignant at the restoration of Olympias which Polysperchon was projecting, solicited aid from Kassander, and tried to place the force of Macedonia at his disposal. In this however they failed. Olympias, assisted not only by Polysperchon, but by the Epirotic prince Æakides, made her entry into Macedonia out of Epirus, apparently in the autumn of 317 B. C. She brought with her Roxana and her child—the widow and son of Alexander the Great. The Macedonian soldiers, assembled by Philip Aridæus and Eurydikê to resist her, were so overawed by her name and the recollection of Alexander, that they refused to fight, and thus ensured to her an easy victory. Philip and Eurydikê became her prisoners; the former she caused to be slain; to the latter she offered only an option between the sword, the halter, and poison. The old queen next proceeded to satiate her revenge against the family of Antipater. One hundred leading Macedonians, friends of Kassander, were put to death, together with his brother Nikanor;[845] while the sepulchre of his deceased brother Iollas, accused of having poisoned Alexander the Great, was broken up.

During the winter, Olympias remained thus completely predominant in Macedonia; where her position seemed strong, since her allies the Ætolians were masters of the pass at Thermopylæ, while Kassander was kept employed in Peloponnesus by the force under Alexander, son of Polysperchon. But Kassander, disengaging himself

from these embarrassments, and eluding Thermopylæ by a maritime transit to Thessaly, seized the Perrhæbian passes before they had been put under guard, and entered Macedonia without resistance. Olympias, having no army competent to meet him in the field, was forced to shut herself up in the maritime fortress of Pydna, with Roxana, the child Alexander, and Thessalonikê daughter of her late husband Philip son of Amyntas.[846] Here Kassander blocked her up for several months by sea, as well as by land, and succeeded in defeating all the efforts of Polysperchon and Æakides to relieve her. In the spring of the ensuing year (316 B. C.), she was forced by intolerable famine to surrender. Kassander promised her nothing more than personal safety, requiring from her the surrender of the two great fortresses, Pella and Amphipolis, which made him master of Macedonia. Presently however, the relatives of those numerous victims, who had perished by order of Olympias, were encouraged by Kassander to demand her life in retribution. They found little difficulty in obtaining a verdict of condemnation against her from what was called a Macedonian assembly. Nevertheless, such was the sentiment of awe and reverence connected with her name, that no one except these injured men themselves could be found to execute the sentence. She died with a courage worthy of her rank and domineering character. Kassander took Thessalonikê to wife—confined Roxana with the child Alexander in the fortress of Amphipolis—where (after a certain interval) he caused both of them to be slain.[847]

While Kassander was thus master of Macedonia—and while the imperial family were disappearing from the scene in that country—the defeat and death of Eumenes (which happened nearly at the same time as the capture of Olympias[848]) removed the last faithful partisan of that family in Asia. But at the same time, it left in the hands of Antigonus such overwhelming preponderance throughout Asia, that he aspired to become vicar and master of the entire Alexandrine empire, as well as to avenge upon Kassander the extirpation of the regal family. His power appeared indeed so formidable, that Kassander of Macedonia, Lysimachus of Thrace, Ptolemy of Egypt, and Seleukus of Babylonia, entered into a convention, which gradually ripened into an active alliance, against him.

During the struggles between these powerful princes, Greece appears simply as a group of subject cities, held, garrisoned, grasped at, or coveted, by all of them. Polysperchon, abandoning all hopes in Macedonia after the death of Olympias, had been forced to take refuge among the Ætolians, leaving his son Alexander to make the best struggle that he could in Peloponnesus; so that Kassander was now decidedly preponderant throughout the Hellenic regions. After fixing himself on the throne of Macedonia, he perpetuated his own name by founding, on the isthmus of the peninsula of Pallênê and near the site where Potidæa had stood, the new city of Kassandreia; into which he congregated a large number of inhabitants from the neighborhood, and especially the remnant of the citizens of Olynthus and Potidæa,—towns taken and destroyed by Philip more than thirty years before.[849] He next marched

into Peloponnesus with his army against Alexander son of Polysperchon. Passing through Bœotia, he undertook the task of restoring the city of Thebes, which had been destroyed twenty years previously by Alexander the Great, and had ever since existed only as a military post on the ancient citadel called Kadmeia. The other Bœotian towns, to whom the old Theban territory had been assigned, were persuaded or constrained to relinquish it; and Kassander invited from all parts of Greece the Theban exiles or their descendants. From sympathy with these exiles, and also with the ancient celebrity of the city, many Greeks, even from Italy and Sicily, contributed to the restoration. The Athenians, now administered by Demetrius Phalereus under Kassander's supremacy, were particularly forward in the work; the Messenians and Megalopolitans, whose ancestors had owed so much to the Theban Epaminondas, lent strenuous aid. Thebes was re-established in the original area which it had occupied before Alexander's siege; and was held by a Kassandrian garrison in the Kadmeia, destined for the mastery of Bœotia and Greece.[850]

After some stay at Thebes, Kassander advanced toward Peloponnesus. Alexander (son of Polysperchon) having fortified the Isthmus, he was forced to embark his troops with his elephants at Megara, and cross over the Saronic Gulf to Epidaurus. He dispossessed Alexander of Argos, of Messenia, and even of his position on the Isthmus, where he left a powerful detachment, and then returned to Macedonia.[851] His increasing power raised both apprehension and hatred in the bosom of Antigonus, who endeavored to come to terms with him, but in vain.[852] Kassander preferred the alliance with Ptolemy, Seleukus, and Lysimachus—against Antigonus, who was now master of nearly the whole of Asia, inspiring common dread to all of them.[853] Accordingly, from Asia to Peloponnesus, with arms and money Antigonus despatched the Milesian Aristodemus to strengthen Alexander against Kassander; whom he further denounced as an enemy of the Macedonian name, because he had slain Olympias, imprisoned the other members of the regal family, and re-established the Olynthian exiles. He caused the absent Kassander to be condemned by what was called a Macedonian assembly, upon these and other charges.

Antigonus farther proclaimed, by the voice of this assembly, that all the Greeks should be free, self-governing, and exempt from garrisons or military occupation.[854] It was expected that these brilliant promises would enlist partisans in Greece against Kassander; accordingly Ptolemy ruler of Egypt, one of the enemies of Antigonus, thought fit to issue similar proclamations a few months afterwards, tendering to the Greeks the same boon from himself.[855] These promises, neither executed, not intended to be executed, by either of the kings, appear to have produced little or no effect upon the Greeks.

The arrival of Aristodemus in Peloponnesus had re-animated the party of Alexander, (son of Polysperchon), against whom Kassander was again obliged to bring his full forces from Macedonia. Though successful against Alexander at Argos, Orchomenus, and other places, Kassander was not able to crush him, and presently thought it

prudent to gain him over. He offered to him the separate government of Peloponnesus, though in subordination to himself: Alexander accepted the offer, becoming Kassander's ally[856]—and carried on war, jointly with him, against Aristodemus, with varying success, until he was presently assassinated by some private enemies. Nevertheless his widow Kratesipolis, a woman of courage and energy, still maintained herself in considerable force at Sikyon.[857] Kassander's most obstinate enemies were the Ætolians, of whom we now first hear formal mention as a substantive confederacy.[858] These Ætolians became the allies of Antigonus as they had been before of Polysperchon, extending their predatory ravages even as far as Attica. Protected against foreign garrisons, partly by their rude and fierce habits, partly by their mountainous territory, they were almost the only Greeks who could still be called free. Kassander tried to keep them in check through their neighbors the Akarnanians, whom he induced to adopt a more concentrated habit of residence, consolidating their numerous petty townships into a few considerable towns,—Stratus, Sauria, and Agrinium—convenient posts for Macedonian garrisons. He also made himself master of Leukas, Apollonia, and Epidamnus, defeating the Illyrian king Glaukias, so that his dominion now extended across from the Thermaic to the Adriatic Gulf.[859] His general Philippus gained two important victories over the Ætolians and Epirots, forcing the former to relinquish some of their most accessible towns.[860]

The power of Antigonus in Asia underwent a material diminution, by the successful and permanent establishment which Seleukus now acquired in Babylonia; from which event the era of the succeeding Seleukidæ takes its origin. In Greece, however, Antigonus gained ground on Kassander. He sent thither his nephew Ptolemy with a large force to liberate the Greeks, or in other words, to expel the Kassandrian garrisons; while he at the same time distracted Kassander's attention by threatening to cross the Hellespont and invade Macedonia. This Ptolemy (not the Egyptian) expelled the soldiers of Kassander from Eubœa, Bœotia, and Phokis. Chalkis in Eubœa was at this time the chief military station of Kassander; Thebes (which he had recently re-established) was in alliance with him; but the remaining Bœotian towns were hostile to him. Ptolemy, having taken Chalkis—the citizens of which he conciliated by leaving them without any garrison—together with Oropus, Eretria, and Karystus—entered Attica and presented himself before Athens. So much disposition to treat with him was manifested in the city, that Demetrius the Phalerean was obliged to gain time by pretending to open negotiations with Antigonus, while Ptolemy withdrew from Attica. Nearly at the same epoch, Apollonia, Epidamnus, and Leukas, found means, assisted by an armament from Korkyra, to drive out Kassander's garrisons, and to escape from his dominion.[861] The affairs of Antigonus were now prospering in Greece, but they were much thrown back by the discontent and treachery of his admiral Telesphorus, who seized Elis and even plundered the sacred treasures of Olympia. Ptolemy presently put him down, and restored these treasures to the god.[862]

In the ensuing year, a convention was concluded between Antigonus, on one side —and Kassander, Ptolemy (the Egyptian) and Lysimachus, on the other, whereby the supreme command in Macedonia was guaranteed to Kassander, until the maturity of Alexander son of Roxana; Thrace being at the same time assured to Lysimachus, Egypt to Ptolemy, and the whole of Asia to Antigonus. It was at the same time covenanted by all, that the Hellenic cities should be free.[863] Towards the execution of this last clause, however, nothing was actually done. Nor does it appear that the treaty had any other effect, except to inspire Kassander with increased jealousy about Roxana and her child; both of whom (as has been already stated) he caused to be secretly assassinated soon afterwards, by the governor Glaukias, in the fortress of Amphipolis, where they had been confined.[864] The forces of Antigonus, under his general Ptolemy, still remained in Greece. But this general presently (310 B. C.) revolted from Antigonus, and placed them in co-operation with Kassander; while Ptolemy of Egypt, accusing Antigonus of having contravened the treaty by garrisoning various Grecian cities, renewed the war and the triple alliance against him.[865]

Polysperchon,—who had hitherto maintained a local dominion over various parts of Peloponnesus, with a military force distributed in Messênê and other towns[866]—was now encouraged by Antigonus to espouse the cause of Herakles (son of Alexander by Barsinê), and to place him on the throne of Macedonia in opposition to Kassander. This young prince Herakles, now seventeen years of age, was sent to Greece from Pergamus in Asia, and his pretensions to the throne were assisted not only by a considerable party in Macedonia itself, but also by the Ætolians. Polysperchon invaded Macedonia, with favorable prospects of establishing the young prince; yet he thought it advantageous to accept treacherous propositions from Kassander, who offered to him partnership in the sovereignty of Macedonia, with an independent army and dominion in Peloponnesus. Polysperchon, tempted by these offers, assassinated the young prince Herakles, and withdrew his army towards Peloponnesus. But he found such unexpected opposition, in his march through Bœotia, from Bœotians and Peloponnesians, that he was forced to take up his winter quarters in Lokris[867] (309 B. C.). From this time forward, as far as we can make out, he commanded in Southern Greece as subordinate ally or partner of Kassander;[868] whose Macedonian dominion, thus confirmed, seems to have included Akarnania and Amphilochia on the Ambrakian Gulf, together with the town of Ambrakia itself, and a supremacy over many of the Epirots.

The assassination of Herakles was speedily followed by that of Kleopatra, sister of Alexander the Great, and daughter of Philip and Olympias. She had been for some time at Sardis, nominally at liberty, yet under watch by the governor, who received his orders from Antigonus; she was now preparing to quit that place, for the purpose of joining Ptolemy in Egypt, and of becoming his wife. She had been invoked as auxiliary, or courted in marriage, by several of the great Macedonian chiefs, without any result. Now, however, Antigonus, afraid of the influence which her name might throw

into the scale of his rival Ptolemy, caused her to be secretly murdered as she was preparing for her departure; throwing the blame of the deed on some of her women, whom he punished with death.[869] All the relatives of Alexander the Great (except Thessalonikê wife of Kassander, daughter of Philip by a Thessalian mistress) thus successively perished, and all by the orders of one or other among his principal officers. The imperial family, with the prestige of its name, thus came to an end.

Ptolemy of Egypt now set sail for Greece with a powerful armament. He acquired possession of the important cities—Sikyon and Corinth—which were handed over to him by Kratesipolis, widow of Alexander son of Polysperchon. He then made known by proclamation his purpose as a liberator, inviting aid from the Peloponnesian cities themselves against the garrisons of Kassander. From some he received encouraging answers and promises; but none of them made any movement, or seconded him by armed demonstrations. He thought it prudent therefore to conclude a truce with Kassander and retire from Greece, leaving however secure garrisons in Sikyon and Corinth.[870] The Grecian cities had now become tame and passive. Feeling their own incapacity of self-defence, and averse to auxiliary efforts, which brought upon them enmity without any prospect of advantage—they awaited only the turns of foreign interference and the behests of the potentates around them.

The Grecian ascendency of Kassander, however, was in the following year exposed to a graver shock than it had ever yet encountered—by the sudden invasion of Demetrius called Poliorketes, son of Antigonus. This young prince, sailing from Ephesus with a formidable armament, contrived to conceal his purposes so closely, that he actually entered the harbor of Peiræus (on the 26th of the month Thargelion—May) without expectation, or resistance from any one; his fleet being mistaken for the fleet of the Egyptian Ptolemy. The Phalerean Demetrius, taken unawares, and attempting too late to guard the harbor, found himself compelled to leave it in possession of the enemy, and to retire within the walls of Athens; while Dionysius, the Kassandrian governor, maintained himself with his garrison in Munychia, yet without any army competent to meet the invaders in the field. This accomplished Phalerean, who had administered for ten years as the viceroy and with the force of Kassander, now felt his position and influence at Athens overthrown, and even his personal safety endangered. He with other Athenians went as envoys on the ensuing day to ascertain what terms would be granted. The young prince ostentatiously proclaimed, that it was the intention of his father Antigonus and himself to restore and guarantee to the Athenians unqualified freedom and autonomy. Hence the Phalerean Demetrius foresaw that his internal opponents, condemned as they had been to compulsory silence during the last ten years, would now proclaim themselves with irresistible violence, so that there was no safety for him except in retreat. He accordingly asked and obtained permission from the invader to retire to Thebes, from whence he passed over soon after to Ptolemy in Egypt. The Athenians in the city declared in favor of Demetrius Poliorketes; who however refused to enter the walls until he should have

besieged and captured Munychia, as well as Megara, with their Kassandrian garrisons. In a short time he accomplished both these objects. Indeed energy, skill, and effective use of engines, in besieging fortified places, were among the most conspicuous features in his character; procuring for him the surname whereby he is known to history. He proclaimed the Megarians free, levelling to the ground the fortifications of Munychia, as an earnest to the Athenians that they should be relieved for the future from all foreign garrison.[871]

After these successes, Demetrius Poliorketes made his triumphant entry into Athens. He announced to the people, in formal assembly, that they were now again a free democracy, liberated from all dominion either of soldiers from abroad or oligarchs at home. He also promised them a farther boon from his father Antigonus and himself—150,000 medimni of corn for distribution, and ship-timber in quantity sufficient for constructing 100 triremes. Both these announcements were received with grateful exultation. The feelings of the people were testified not merely in votes of thanks and admiration towards the young conqueror, but in effusions of unmeasured and exorbitant flattery. Stratokles (who has already been before us as one of the accusers of Demosthenes in the Harpalian affair) with others exhausted their invention in devising new varieties of compliment and adulation. Antigonus and Demetrius were proclaimed to be not only kings, but gods and saviors: a high priest of these saviors was to be annually chosen, after whom each successive year was to be named (instead of being named after the first of the nine Archons, as had hitherto been the custom), and the dates of decrees and contracts commemorated; the month Munychion was re-named as Demetrion—two new tribes, to be called Antigonis and Demetrias, were constituted in addition to the preceding ten:—the annual senate was appointed to consist of 600 members instead of 500; the portraits and exploits of Antigonus and Demetrius were to be woven, along with those of Zeus and Athênê, into the splendid and voluminous robe periodically carried in procession, as an offering at the Panathenaic festival; the spot of ground where Demetrius had alighted from his chariot, was consecrated with an altar erected in honor of Demetrius Katæbates or the Descender. Several other similar votes were passed, recognizing, and worshipping as gods, the saviors Antigonus and Demetrius. Nay, we are told that temples or altars were voted to Phila-Aphroditê, in honor of Phila wife of Demetrius; and a like compliment was paid to his two mistresses, Leæna and Lamia. Altars are said to have been also dedicated to Adeimantus and others, his convivial companions or flatterers.[872] At the same time the numerous statues which had been erected in honor of the Phalerean Demetrius during his decennial government, were overthrown, and some of them even turned to ignoble purposes, in order to cast greater scorn upon the past ruler.[873] The demonstrations of servile flattery at Athens, towards Demetrius Poliorketes, were in fact so extravagantly overdone, that he himself is said to have been disgusted with them, and to have expressed contempt for these degenerate Athenians of his own time.[874]

In reviewing such degrading proceedings, we must recollect that thirty-one years had now elapsed since the battle of Chæroneia, and that during all this time the Athenians had been under the practical ascendancy, and constantly augmenting pressure, of foreign potentates. The sentiment of this dependence on Macedonia had been continually strengthened by all the subsequent events—by the capture and destruction of Thebes, and the subsequent overwhelming conquests of Alexander—by the deplorable conclusion of the Lamian war, the slaughter of the free-spoken orators, the death of the energetic military leaders, and the deportation of Athenian citizens—lastly, by the continued presence of a Macedonian garrison in Peiræus or Munychia. By Phokion, Demetrius Phalereus, and the other leading statesmen of this long period, submission to Macedonia had been inculcated as a virtue, while the recollection of the dignity and grandeur of old autonomous Athens had been effaced or denounced as a mischievous dream. The fifteen years between the close of the Lamian war and the arrival of Demetrius Poliorketes (322-307 B. C.), had witnessed no free play, nor public discussion and expression, of conflicting opinions; the short period during which Phokion was condemned must be excepted, but that lasted only long enough to give room for the outburst of a preconceived but suppressed antipathy.

During this thirty years, of which the last half had been an aggravation of the first, a new generation of Athenians had grown up, accustomed to an altered phase of political existence. How few of those who received Demetrius Poliorketes, had taken part in the battle of Chæroneia, or listened to the stirring exhortations of Demosthenes in the war which preceded that disaster![875] Of the citizens who yet retained courage and patriotism to struggle again for their freedom after the death of Alexander, how many must have perished with Leosthenes in the Lamian war! The Athenians of 307 B. C. had come to conceive their own city, and Hellas generally, as dependent first on Kassander, next on the possible intervention of his equally overweening rivals, Ptolemy, Antigonus, Lysimachus, etc. If they shook off the yoke of one potentate, it could only be by the protectorate of another. The sentiment of political self-reliance and autonomy had fled; the conception of a citizen military force, furnished by confederate and co-operating cities, had been superseded by the spectacle of vast standing armies, organized by the heirs of Alexander and of his traditions.

Two centuries before (510 B. C.), when the Lacedæmonians expelled the despot Hippias and his mercenaries from Athens, there sprang up at once among the Athenian people a forward and devoted patriotism, which made them willing to brave, and competent to avert, all dangers in defence of their newly-acquired liberty.[876] At that time, the enemies by whom they were threatened were Lacedæmonians, Thebans, Æginetans, Chalkidians, and the like (for the Persian force did not present itself until after some interval, and attacked not Athens alone, but Greece collectively). These hostile forces, though superior in number and apparent value to those of Athens, were yet not so disproportionate as to engender hopelessness and despair.

Very different were the facts in 307 B. C., when Demetrius Poliorketes removed the Kassandrian mercenaries with their fortress Munychia, and proclaimed Athens free. To maintain that freedom by their own strength—in opposition to the evident superiority of organized force residing in the potentates around, one or more of whom had nearly all Greece under military occupation,—was an enterprise too hopeless to have been attempted even by men such as the combatants of Marathon or the contemporaries of Perikles. "Who would be free, themselves must strike the blow!" but the Athenians had not force enough to strike it; and the liberty proclaimed by Demetrius Poliorketes was a boon dependent upon him for its extent and even for its continuance. The Athenian assembly of that day was held under his army as masters of Attica, as it had been held a few months before under the controlling force of the Phalerean Demetrius together with the Kassandrian governor of Munychia; and the most fulsome votes of adulation proposed in honor of Demetrius Poliorketes by his partisans, though perhaps disapproved by many, would hardly find a single pronounced opponent.

One man, however, there was, who ventured to oppose several of the votes—the nephew of Demosthenes—Demochares; who deserves to be commemorated as the last known spokesman of free Athenian citizenship. We know only that such were his general politics, and that his opposition to the obsequious rhetor Stratokles ended in banishment, four years afterwards.[877] He appears to have discharged the functions of general during this period—to have been active in strengthening the fortifications and military equipment of the city—and to have been employed in occasional missions.[878]

The altered politics of Athens were manifested by impeachment against Demetrius Phalereus and other leading partisans of the late Kassandrian government. He and many others had already gone into voluntary exile; when their trials came on, they were not forthcoming, and all were condemned to death. But all those who remained, and presented themselves for trial, were acquitted;[879] so little was there of reactionary violence on this occasion. Stratokles also proposed a decree, commemorating the orator Lykurgus (who had been dead about seventeen years) by a statue, an honorary inscription, and a grant of maintenance in the Prytaneum to his eldest surviving descendant.[880] Among those who accompanied the Phalerean Demetrius into exile was the rhetor or logographer Deinarchus.

The friendship of this obnoxious Phalerean, and of Kassander also, towards the philosopher Theophrastus, seems to have been one main cause which occasioned the enactment of a restrictive law against the liberty of philosophizing. It was decreed, on the proposition of a citizen named Sophokles, that no philosopher should be allowed to open a school or teach, except under special sanction obtained from a vote of the Senate and people. Such was the disgust and apprehension occasioned by the new restriction, that all the philosophers with one accord left Athens. This spirited protest, against authoritative restriction on the liberty of philosophy and

teaching, found responsive sympathy among the Athenians. The celebrity of the schools and professors was in fact the only characteristic mark of dignity still remaining to them—when their power had become extinct, and when even their independence and free constitution had degenerated into a mere name. It was moreover the great temptation for young men, coming from all parts of Greece, to visit Athens. Accordingly, a year had hardly passed, when Philon, impeaching Sophokles the author of the law, under the Graphê Paranomôn, prevailed on the Dikastery to find him guilty, and condemn him to a fine of five talents. The restrictive law being thus repealed, the philosophers returned.[881] It is remarkable that Democharès stood forward as one of its advocates; defending Sophokles against the accuser Philon. From scanty notices remaining of the speech of Democharès, we gather that, while censuring the opinions no less than the characters of Plato and Aristotle, he denounced yet more bitterly their pupils, as being for the most part ambitious, violent, and treacherous men. He cited by name several among them, who had subverted the freedom of their respective cities, and committed gross outrages against their fellow-citizens.[882]

Athenian envoys were despatched to Antigonus in Asia, to testify the gratitude of the people, and communicate the recent complimentary votes. Antigonus not only received them graciously, but sent to Athens, according to the promise made by his son, a large present of 150,000 medimni of wheat, with timber sufficient for 100 ships. He at the same time directed Demetrius to convene at Athens a synod of deputies from the allied Grecian cities, where resolutions might be taken for the common interests of Greece.[883] It was his interest at this moment to raise up a temporary self-sustaining authority in Greece, for the purpose of upholding the alliance with himself, during the absence of Demetrius; whom he was compelled to summon into Asia with his army—requiring his services for the war against Ptolemy in Syria and Cyprus.

The following three years were spent by Demetrius—1. In victorious operations near Cyprus, defeating Ptolemy and making himself master of that island; after which Antigonus and Demetrius assumed the title of kings, and the example was followed by Ptolemy, in Egypt—by Lysimachus, in Thrace—and by Seleukus in Babylonia, Mesopotamia, and Syria[884]—thus abolishing even the titular remembrance of Alexander's family. 2. In an unsuccessful invasion of Egypt by land and sea, repulsed with great loss. 3. In the siege of Rhodes. The brave and intelligent citizens of this island resisted for more than a year the most strenuous attacks and the most formidable siege-equipments of Demetrius Poliorketes. All their efforts however would have been vain had they not been assisted by large reinforcements and supplies from Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Kassander. Such are the conditions under which alone even the most resolute and intelligent Greeks can now retain their circumscribed sphere of autonomy. The siege was at length terminated by a compromise; the Rhodians submitted to enrol themselves as allies of Demetrius, yet under proviso not to act against Ptolemy.[885] Towards the latter they carried their grateful devotion so far,

as to erect a temple to him, called the Ptolemæum, and to worship him (under the sanction of the oracle of Ammon) as a god.[886] Amidst the rocks and shoals through which Grecian cities were now condemned to steer, menaced on every side by kings more powerful than themselves, and afterwards by the giant-republic of Rome—the Rhodians conducted their political affairs with greater prudence and dignity than any other Grecian city.

Shortly after the departure of Demetrius from Greece to Cyprus, Kassander and Polysperchon renewed the war in Peloponnesus and its neighborhood.[887] We make out no particulars respecting this war. The Ætolians were in hostility with Athens, and committed annoying depredations.[888] The fleet of Athens, repaired or increased by the timber received from Antigonus, was made to furnish thirty quadriremes to assist Demetrius in Cyprus, and was employed in certain operations near the island of Amorgos, wherein it suffered defeat.[889] But we can discover little respecting the course of the war, except that Kassander gained ground upon the Athenians, and that about the beginning of 303 B. C., he was blockading or threatening to blockade, Athens. The Athenians invoked the aid of Demetrius Poliorketes, who, having recently concluded an accommodation with the Rhodians, came again across from Asia, with a powerful fleet and army, to Aulis in Bœotia.[890] He was received at Athens with demonstrations of honor equal or superior to those which had marked his previous visit. He seems to have passed a year and a half, partly at Athens, partly in military operations carried successfully over many parts of Greece. He compelled the Bœotians to evacuate the Eubœan city of Chalkis, and to relinquish their alliance with Kassander. He drove that prince out of Attica—expelled his garrisons from the two frontier fortresses of Attica,—Phylê and Panaktum—and pursued him as far as Thermopylæ. He captured, or obtained by bribing the garrisons, the important towns of Corinth, Argos, and Sikyon; mastering also Ægium, Bura, all the Arcadian towns (except Mantineia), and various other towns in Peloponnesus.[891] He celebrated, as president, the great festival of the Heræa at Argos; on which occasion he married Deidameia, sister of Pyrrhus, the young king of Epirus. He prevailed on the Sikyonians to transfer to a short distance the site of their city, conferring upon the new city the name of Demetrias.[892] At a Grecian synod, convened in Corinth under his own letters of invitation, he received by acclamation the appointment of leader or Emperor of the Greeks, as it had been conferred on Philip and Alexander. He even extended his attacks as far as Leukas and Korkyra. The greater part of Greece seems to have been either occupied by his garrisons, or enlisted among his subordinates.

So much was Kassander intimidated by these successes, that he sent envoys to Asia, soliciting peace from Antigonus; who, however, elate and full of arrogance, refused to listen to any terms short of surrender at discretion. Kassander, thus driven to despair, renewed his applications to Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleukus. All these princes felt equally menaced by the power and dispositions of Antigonus—and all resolved upon an energetic combination to put him down.[893]

After uninterrupted prosperity in Greece, throughout the summer of 302 B. C., Demetrius returned from Leukas to Athens, about the month of September, near the time of the Eleusinian mysteries.[894] He was welcomed by festive processions, hymns, pæans, choric dances, and bacchanalian odes of joyous congratulation. One of these hymns is preserved, sung by a chorus of Ithyphalli—masked revellers, with their heads and arms encircled by wreaths,—clothed in white tunics, and in feminine garments reaching almost to the feet.[895]

This song is curious, as indicating the hopes and fears prevalent among Athenians of that day, and as affording a measure of their self-appreciation. It is moreover among the latest Grecian documents that we possess, bearing on actual and present reality. The poet, addressing Demetrius as a god, boasts that two of the greatest and best-beloved of all divine beings are visiting Attica at the same moment—Demeter (coming for the season of her mysteries), and Demetrius, son of Poseidon and Aphroditê. "To thee we pray (the hymn proceeds); for other gods are either afar off —or have no ears—or do not exist—or care nothing about us; but *thee* we see before us, not in wood or marble, but in real presence. First of all things, establish peace; for thou hast the power—and chastise that Sphinx who domineers, not merely over Thebes, but over all Greece—the Ætolian, who, (like the old Sphinx) rushes from his station on the rock to snatch and carry away our persons, and against whom we cannot fight. At all times, the Ætolians robbed their neighbors; but now, they rob far as well as near.[896]"

Effusions such as these, while displaying unmeasured idolatry and subservience towards Demetrius, are yet more remarkable, as betraying a loss of force, a senility, and a consciousness of defenceless and degraded position, such as we are astonished to find publicly proclaimed at Athens. It is not only against the foreign potentates that the Athenians avow themselves incapable of self-defence, but even against the incursions of the Ætolians.—Greeks like themselves, though warlike, rude, and restless.[897] When such were the feelings of a people, once the most daring, confident, and organizing—and still the most intelligent—in Greece, we may see that the history of the Greeks as a separate nation or race is reaching its close—and that from henceforward they must become merged in one or other of the stronger currents that surround them.

After his past successes, Demetrius passed some months in enjoyment and luxury at Athens. He was lodged in the Parthenon, being considered as the guest of the goddess Athênê. But his dissolute habits provoked the louder comments, from being indulged in such a domicile; while the violences which he offered to beautiful youths of good family led to various scenes truly tragical. The subservient manifestations of the Athenians towards him, however, continued unabated. It is even affirmed, that, in order to compensate for something which he had taken amiss, they passed a formal decree, on the proposition of Stratokles, declaring that every thing which Demetrius might command was holy in regard to the gods, and just in regard to

men.[898] The banishment of Democharès is said to have been brought on by his sarcastic comments upon this decree.[899] In the month Munychion (April) Demetrius mustered his forces and his Grecian allies for a march into Thessaly against Kassander; but before his departure, he was anxious to be initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries. It was however not the regular time for this ceremony; the Lesser Mysteries being celebrated in February, the Greater in September. The Athenians overruled the difficulty by passing a special vote, enabling him to be initiated at once, and to receive in immediate succession, the preparatory and the final initiation, between which ceremonies a year of interval was habitually required. Accordingly, he placed himself disarmed in the hands of the priests, and received both first and second initiation in the month of April, immediately before his departure from Athens.[900]

Demetrius conducted into Thessaly an army of 56,000 men; of whom 25,000 were Grecian allies—so extensive was his sway at this moment over the Grecian cities.[901] But after two or three months of hostilities, partially successful, against Kassander, he was summoned into Asia by Antigonus to assist in meeting the formidable army of the allies—Ptolemy, Seleukus, Lysimachus, and Kassander. Before retiring from Greece, Demetrius concluded a truce with Kassander, whereby it was stipulated that the Grecian cities, both in Europe and Asia, should be permanently autonomous and free from garrison or control. This stipulation served only as an honorable pretext for leaving Greece; Demetrius had little expectation that it would be observed.[902] In the ensuing spring was fought the decisive battle of Ipsus in Phrygia (B. C. 300), by Antigonus and Demetrius, against Ptolemy, Seleukus, and Lysimachus; with a large army and many elephants on both sides. Antigonus was completely defeated and slain, at the age of more than eighty years. His Asiatic dominion was broken up, chiefly to the profit of Seleukus, whose dynasty became from henceforward ascendent, from the coast of Syria eastward to the Caspian Gates and Parthia; sometimes, though imperfectly, farther eastward, nearly to the Indus.[903]

The effects of the battle of Ipsus were speedily felt in Greece. The Athenians passed a decree proclaiming themselves neutral, and excluding both the belligerent parties from Attica. Demetrius, retiring with the remnant of his defeated army, and embarking at Ephesus to sail to Athens, was met on the voyage by Athenian envoys, who respectfully acquainted him that he would not be admitted. At the same time, his wife Deidameia, whom he had left at Athens, was sent away by the Athenians under an honorable escort to Megara, while some ships of war which he had left in the Peiræus were also restored to him. Demetrius, indignant at this unexpected defection of a city which had recently heaped upon him such fulsome adulation, was still farther mortified by the loss of most of his other possessions in Greece.[904] His garrisons were for the most part expelled, and the cities passed into Kassandrian keeping or dominion. His fortunes were indeed partially restored by concluding a peace with Seleukus, who married his daughter. This alliance withdrew Demetrius to Syria, while Greece appears to have fallen more and more under the Kassandrian

parties. It was one of these partisans, Lachares, who, seconded by Kassander's soldiers, acquired a despotism at Athens such as had been possessed by the Phalerean Demetrius, but employed in a manner far more cruel and oppressive. Various exiles driven out by his tyranny invited Demetrius Poliorketes, who passed over again from Asia into Greece, recovered portions of Peloponnesus, and laid siege to Athens. He blocked up the city by sea and land, so that the pressure of famine presently became intolerable. Lachares having made his escape, the people opened their gates to Demetrius, not without great fear of the treatment awaiting them. But he behaved with forbearance, and even with generosity. He spared them all, supplied them with a large donation of corn, and contented himself with taking military occupation of the city, naming his own friends as magistrates. He put garrisons, however, not only into Peiræus and Munychia, but also into the hill called Museum, a part of the walled circle of Athens itself[905] (B. C. 298).

While Demetrius was thus strengthening himself in Greece, he lost all his footing both in Cyprus, Syria, and Kilikia, which passed into the hands of Ptolemy and Seleukus. New prospects however were opened to him in Macedonia by the death of Kassander (his brother-in-law, brother of his wife Phila) and the family feuds supervening thereupon. Philippus, eldest son of Kassander, succeeded his father, but died of sickness after something more than a year. Between the two remaining sons, Antipater and Alexander, a sanguinary hostility broke out. Antipater slew his mother Thessalonikê, and threatened the life of his brother, who in his turn invited aid both from Demetrius, and from the Epirotic king Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus being ready first, marched into Macedonia, and expelled Antipater; receiving as his recompense the territory called Tymphæa (between Epirus and Macedonia), together with Akarnania, Amphilochia, and the town of Ambrakia, which became henceforward his chief city and residence.[906] Antipater sought shelter in Thrace with his father-in-law Lysimachus; by whose order, however, he was presently slain. Demetrius, occupied with other matters, was more tardy in obeying the summons; but, on entering into Macedonia, he found himself strong enough to dispossess and kill Alexander (who had indeed invited him, but is said to have laid a train for assassinating him), and seized the Macedonian crown; not without the assent of a considerable party, to whom the name and the deeds of Kassander and his sons were alike odious.[907]

Demetrius became thus master of Macedonia, together with the greater part of Greece, including Athens, Megara, and much of Peloponnesus. He undertook an expedition into Bœotia, for the purpose of conquering Thebes; in which attempt he succeeded, not without a double siege of that city, which made an obstinate resistance. He left as viceroy in Bœotia the historian, Hieronymus of Kardia,[908] once the attached friend and fellow-citizen of Eumenes. But Greece as a whole was managed by Antigonus (afterwards called Antigonus Gonatas) son of Demetrius, who maintained his supremacy unshaken during all his father's lifetime; even though Demetrius was deprived of Macedonia by the temporary combination of Lysimachus

with Pyrrhus, and afterwards remained (until his death in 283 B. C.) a captive in the hands of Seleukus. After a brief possession of the crown of Macedonia successively by Seleukus, Ptolemy, Keraunus, Meleager, Antipater, and Sosthenes—Antigonus Gonatas regained it in 277 B. C. His descendants the Antigonid kings maintained it until the battle of Pydna in 168 B. C.; when Perseus, the last of them, was overthrown, and his kingdom incorporated with the Roman conquests.[909]

Of Greece during this period we can give no account, except that the greater number of its cities were in dependence upon Demetrius and his son Antigonus; either under occupation by Macedonian garrisons, or ruled by local despots who leaned on foreign mercenaries and Macedonian support. The spirit of the Greeks was broken, and their habits of combined sentiment and action had disappeared. The invasion of the Gauls indeed awakened them into a temporary union for the defence of Thermopylæ in 279 B. C. So intolerable was the cruelty and spoliation of those barbarian invaders, that the cities as well as Antigonus were driven by fear to the efforts necessary for repelling them.[910] A gallant army of Hellenic confederates was mustered. In the mountains of Ætolia and in the neighborhood of Delphi, most of the Gallic horde with their king Brennus perished. But this burst of spirit did not interrupt the continuance of the Macedonian dominion in Greece, which Antigonus Gonatas continued to hold throughout most of a long reign. He greatly extended the system begun by his predecessors, of isolating each Grecian city from alliances with other cities in its neighborhood—planting in most of them local despots—and compressing the most important by means of garrisons.[911] Among all Greeks, the Spartans and the Ætolians stood most free from foreign occupation, and were the least crippled in their power of self-action. The Achæan league too developed itself afterwards as a renovated sprout from the ruined tree of Grecian liberty,[912] though never attaining to anything better than a feeble and puny life, nor capable of sustaining itself without foreign aid.[913]

With this after-growth, or half-revival, I shall not meddle. It forms the Greece of Polybius, which that author treats, in my opinion justly, as having no history of its own,[914] but as an appendage attached to some foreign centre and principal among its neighbors—Macedonia, Egypt, Syria, Rome. Each of these neighbors acted upon the destinies of Greece more powerfully than the Greeks themselves. The Greeks to whom these volumes have been devoted—those of Homer, Archilochus, Solon, Æschylus, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Demosthenes—present as their most marked characteristic a loose aggregation of autonomous tribes or communities, acting and reacting freely among themselves, with little or no pressure from foreigners. The main interest of the narrative has consisted in the spontaneous grouping of the different Hellenic fractions—in the self-prompted cooperations and conflicts—the abortive attempts to bring about something like an effective federal organization, or to maintain two permanent rival confederacies—the energetic ambition, and heroic endurance, of men to whom Hellas was the entire political world. The freedom

of Hellas, the life and soul of this history from its commencement, disappeared completely during the first years of Alexander's reign. After following to their tombs the generation of Greeks contemporary with him, men like Demosthenes and Phokion, born in a state of freedom—I have pursued the history into that gulf of Grecian nullity which marks the succeeding century; exhibiting sad evidence of the degrading servility, and suppliant king-worship, into which the countrymen of Aristeides and Perikles had been driven, by their own conscious weakness under overwhelming pressure from without.

I cannot better complete that picture than by showing what the leading democratical citizen became, under the altered atmosphere which now bedimmed his city. Democharès, the nephew of Demosthenes, has been mentioned as one of the few distinguished Athenians in this last generation. He was more than once chosen to the highest public offices;[915] he was conspicuous for his free speech, both as an orator and as an historian, in the face of powerful enemies; he remained throughout a long life faithfully attached to the democratical constitution, and was banished for a time by its opponents. In the year 280 B. C., he prevailed on the Athenians to erect a public monument, with a commemorative inscription, to his uncle Demosthenes. Seven or eight years afterwards, Democharès himself died, aged nearly eighty. His son Laches proposed and obtained a public decree, that a statue should be erected, with an annexed inscription, to his honor. We read in the decree a recital of the distinguished public services, whereby Democharès merited this compliment from his countrymen. All that the proposer of the decree, his son and fellow-citizen, can find to recite, as ennobling the last half of the father's public life (since his return from exile), is as follows:—1. He contracted the public expenses, and introduced a more frugal management. 2. He undertook an embassy to King Lysimachus, from whom he obtained two presents for the people, one of thirty talents, the other of one hundred talents. 3. He proposed the vote for sending envoys to King Ptolemy in Egypt, from whom fifty talents were obtained for the people. 4. He went as envoy to Antipater, received from him twenty talents, and delivered them to the people at the Eleusinian festival.[916]

When such begging missions are the deeds, for which Athens both employed and recompensed her most eminent citizens, an historian accustomed to the Grecian world as described by Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, feels that the life has departed from his subject, and with sadness and humiliation brings his narrative to a close.

CHAPTER XCVII.

SICILIAN AND ITALIAN GREEKS. — AGATHOKLES.

It has been convenient, throughout all this work, to keep the history of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks distinct from that of the Central and Asiatic. We parted last from the Sicilian Greeks,[917] at the death of their champion the Corinthian Timoleon (337 B. C.), by whose energetic exploits, and generous political policy, they had been almost regenerated—rescued from foreign enemies, protected against intestine discord, and invigorated by a large reinforcement of new colonists. For the twenty years next succeeding the death of Timoleon, the history of Syracuse and Sicily is an absolute blank; which is deeply to be regretted, since the position of these cities included so much novelty—so many subjects for debate, for peremptory settlement, or for amicable compromise—that the annals of their proceedings must have been peculiarly interesting. Twenty years after the death of Timoleon, we find the government of Syracuse described as an oligarchy; implying that the constitution established by Timoleon must have been changed either by violence or by consent. The oligarchy is stated as consisting of 600 chief men, among whom Sosistratus and Herakleides appear as leaders.[918] We hear generally that the Syracusans had been engaged in wars, and that Sosistratus either first originated, or first firmly established, his oligarchy, after an expedition undertaken to the coast of Italy, to assist the citizens of Kroton against their interior neighbors and assailants the Bruttians.

Not merely Kroton, but other Grecian cities also on the coast of Italy, appear to have been exposed to causes of danger and decline, similar to those which were operating upon so many other portions of the Hellenic world. Their non-Hellenic neighbors in the interior were growing too powerful and too aggressive to leave them in peace or security. The Messapians, the Lucanians, the Bruttians, and other native Italian tribes, were acquiring that increased strength which became ultimately all concentrated under the mighty republic of Rome. I have in my preceding volume recounted the acts of the two Syracusan despots, the elder and younger Dionysius, on this Italian coast.[919] Though the elder gained some advantage over the Lucanians, yet the interference of both contributed only to enfeeble and humiliate the Italiot Greeks. Not long before the battle of Chæroneia (340-338 B. C.), the Tarentines found themselves so hard pressed by the Messapians, that they sent to Sparta, their mother-city, to entreat assistance. The Spartan king Archidamus son of Agesilaus, perhaps ashamed of the nullity of his country since the close of the Sacred War, complied with their prayer, and sailed at the head of a mercenary force to Italy. How long his operations there lasted, we do not know; but they ended by his being defeated and killed, near the time of the battle of Chæroneia[920] (338 B. C.).

About six years after this event, the Tarentines, being still pressed by the same formidable neighbors, invoked the aid of the Epirotic Alexander, king of the Molossians, and brother of Olympias. These Epirots now, during the general decline of Grecian force, rise into an importance which they had never before enjoyed[921]. Philip of Macedon, having married Olympias, not only secured his brother-in-law on the Molossian throne, but strengthened his authority over subjects not habitually obedient. It was through Macedonian interference that the Molossian Alexander first obtained (though subject to Macedonian ascendency) the important city of Ambrakia; which thus passed out of a free Hellenic community into the capital and seaport of the Epirotic kings. Alexander farther cemented his union with Macedonia by marrying his own niece Kleopatra, daughter of Philip and Olympias. In fact, during the lives of Philip and Alexander the Great, the Epirotic kingdom appears a sort of adjunct to the Macedonian; governed by Olympias either jointly with her brother the Molossian Alexander—or as regent after his death.[922]

It was about the year after the battle of Issus that the Molossian Alexander undertook his expedition into Italy;[923] doubtless instigated in part by emulation of the Asiatic glories of his nephew and namesake. Though he found enemies more formidable than the Persians at Issus, yet his success was at first considerable. He gained victories over the Messapians, the Lucanians, and the Samnites; he conquered the Lucanian town of Consentia, and the Bruttian town of Tereina; he established an alliance with the Pœdiculi, and exchanged friendly messages with the Romans. As far as we can make out from scanty data, he seems to have calculated on establishing a comprehensive dominion in the south of Italy, over all its population—over Greek cities, Lucanians, and Bruttians. He demanded and obtained three hundred of the chief Lucanian and Messapian families, whom he sent over as hostages to Epirus. Several exiles of these nations joined him as partisans. He farther endeavored to transfer the congress of the Greco-Italian cities, which had been usually held at the Tarentine colony of Herakleia, to Thurii; intending probably to procure for himself a compliant synod like that serving the purpose of his Macedonian nephew at Corinth. But the tide of his fortune at length turned. The Tarentines became disgusted and alarmed; his Lucanian partisans proved faithless; the stormy weather in the Calabrian Apennines broke up the communication between his different detachments, and exposed them to be cut off in detail. He himself perished, by the hands of a Lucanian exile, in crossing the river Acheron, and near the town of Pandosia. This was held to be a memorable attestation of the prophetic veracity of the oracle; since he had received advice from Dodona to beware of Pandosia and Acheron; two names which he well knew, and therefore avoided, in Epirus—but which he had not before known to exist in Italy.[924]

The Greco-Italian cities had thus dwindled down into a prize to be contended for between the Epirotic kings and the native Italian powers—as they again became, still more conspicuously, fifty years afterwards, during the war between Pyrrhus and the

Romans. They were now left to seek foreign aid, where they could obtain it, and to become the prey of adventurers. It is in this capacity that we hear of them as receiving assistance from Syracuse, and that the formidable name of Agathokles first comes before us—seemingly about 320 B. C.[925] The Syracusan force, sent to Italy to assist the Krotoniates against their enemies the Bruttians, was commanded by a general named Antander, whose brother Agathokles served with him in a subordinate command.

To pass over the birth and childhood of Agathokles—respecting which, romantic anecdotes are told, as about most eminent men,—it appears that his father, a Rhegine exile named Karkinus, came from Therma (in the Carthaginian portion of Sicily) to settle at Syracuse, at the time when Timoleon invited and received new Grecian settlers to the citizenship of the latter city. Karkinus was in comparative poverty, following the trade of a potter; which his son Agathokles learnt also, being about eighteen years of age when domiciliated with his father at Syracuse.[926] Though starting from this humble beginning, and even notorious for the profligacy and rapacity of his youthful habits, Agathokles soon attained a conspicuous position, partly from his own superior personal qualities, partly from the favor of a wealthy Syracusan named Damas. The young potter was handsome, tall, and of gigantic strength; he performed with distinction the military service required from him as a citizen, wearing a panoply so heavy, that no other soldier could fight with it; he was moreover ready, audacious, and emphatic in public harangue. Damas became much attached to him, and not only supplied him profusely with money, but also, when placed in command of a Syracusan army against the Agrigentines, nominated him one of the subordinate officers. In this capacity Agathokles acquired great reputation, for courage in battle, ability in command, and fluency of speech. Presently Damas died of sickness, leaving a widow without children. Agathokles married the widow, and thus raised himself to a high fortune and position in Syracuse.[927]

Of the oligarchy which now prevailed at Syracuse, we have no particulars, nor do we know how it had come to be substituted for the more popular forms established by Timoleon. We hear only generally that the oligarchical leaders, Sosistratus and Herakleides, were unprincipled and sanguinary men.[928] By this government an expedition was despatched from Syracuse to the Italian coast, to assist the inhabitants of Kroton against their aggressive neighbors the Bruttians. Antander, brother of Agathokles, was one of the generals commanding this armament, and Agathokles himself served in it as a subordinate officer. We neither know the date, the duration, nor the issue, of this expedition.

But it afforded a fresh opportunity to Agathokles to display his adventurous bravery and military genius, which procured for him high encomium. He was supposed by some, on his return to Syracuse, to be entitled to the first prize for valor; but Sosistratus and the other oligarchical leaders withheld it from him and preferred another. So deeply was Agathokles incensed by this refusal, that he publicly inveighed against

them among the people, as men aspiring to despotism. His opposition being unsuccessful, and drawing upon him the enmity of the government, he retired to the coast of Italy.

Here he levied a military band of Grecian exiles and Campanian mercenaries, which he maintained by various enterprises for or against the Grecian cities. He attacked Kroton, but was repulsed with loss; he took service with the Tarentines, fought for some time against their enemies, but at length became suspected and dismissed; he then joined himself with the inhabitants of Rhegium, assisting in the defence of the town against a Syracusan aggression. He even made two attempts to obtain admission by force into Syracuse, and to seize the government.[929] Though repulsed in both of them, he nevertheless contrived to maintain a footing in Sicily, was appointed general at the town of Morgantium, and captured Leontini, within a short distance north of Syracuse. Some time afterwards, a revolution took place at Syracuse, whereby Sosistratus and the oligarchy were dispossessed and exiled with many of their partisans.

Under the new government, Agathokles obtained his recall, and soon gained increased ascendency. The dispossessed exiles contrived to raise forces, and to carry on a formidable war against Syracuse from without; they even obtained assistance from the Carthaginians, so as to establish themselves at Gela, on the southern confines of the Syracusan territory. In the military operations thus rendered necessary, Agathokles took a forward part, distinguishing himself among the ablest and most enterprising officers. He tried, with 1000 soldiers, to surprise Gela by night; but finding the enemy on their guard, he was repulsed with loss and severely wounded; yet by an able manœuvre he brought off all his remaining detachment. Though thus energetic against the public enemy, however, he at the same time inspired both hatred and alarm for his dangerous designs, to the Syracusans within. The Corinthian Akestorides, who had been named general of the city—probably from recollection of the distinguished services formerly rendered by the Corinthian Timoleon—becoming persuaded that the presence of Agathokles was full of peril to the city, ordered him to depart, and provided men to assassinate him on the road during the night. But Agathokles, suspecting their design, disguised himself in the garb of a beggar, appointing another man to travel in the manner which would be naturally expected from himself. This substitute was slain in the dark by the assassins, while Agathokles escaped by favor of his disguise. He and his partisans appear to have found shelter with the Carthaginians in Sicily.[930]

Not long afterwards, another change took place in the government of Syracuse, whereby the oligarchical exiles were recalled, and peace made with the Carthaginians. It appears that a senate of 600 was again installed as the chief political body; probably not the same men as before, and with some democratical modifications. At the same time, negotiations were opened, through the mediation of the Carthaginian commander Hamilkar, between the Syracusans and Agathokles. The mischiefs of in-

testine conflict, amidst the numerous discordant parties in the city, pressed hard upon every one, and hopes were entertained that all might be brought to agree in terminating them. Agathokles affected to enter cordially into these projects of amnesty and reconciliation. The Carthaginian general Hamilkar, who had so recently aided Sosistratus and the Syracusan oligarchy, now did his best to promote the recall of Agathokles, and even made himself responsible for the good and pacific behavior of that exile. Agathokles, and the other exiles along with him were accordingly restored. A public assembly was convened in the temple of Demeter, in the presence of Hamilkar; where Agathokles swore by the most awful oaths, with his hands touching the altar and statue of the goddess, that he would behave as a good citizen of Syracuse, uphold faithfully the existing government, and carry out the engagements of the Carthaginian mediators—abstaining from encroachments on the rights and possessions of Carthage in Sicily. His oaths and promises were delivered with so much apparent sincerity, accompanied by emphatic harangues, that the people were persuaded to name him general and guardian of the peace, for the purpose of realizing the general aspirations towards harmony. Such appointment was recommended (it seems) by Hamilkar.[931]

All this train of artifice had been concerted by Agathokles with Hamilkar, for the purpose of enabling the former to seize the supreme power. As general of the city, Agathokles had the direction of the military force. Under the pretence of marching against some refractory exiles at Erbita in the interior, he got together 3000 soldiers strenuously devoted to him—mercenaries and citizens of desperate character—to which Hamilkar added a reinforcement of Africans. As if about to march forth, he mustered his troops at daybreak in the Timoleonteon (chapel or precinct consecrated to Timoleon), while Peisarchus and Dekles, two chiefs of the senate already assembled, were invited with forty others to transact with him some closing business. Having these men in his power, Agathokles suddenly turned upon them, and denounced them to the soldiers as guilty of conspiring his death. Then, receiving from the soldiers a response full of ardor, he ordered them immediately to proceed to a general massacre of the senate and their leading partisans, with full permission of licentious plunder in the houses of these victims, the richest men in Syracuse. The soldiers rushed into the street with ferocious joy to execute this order. They slew not only the senators, but many others also, unarmed and unprepared; each man selecting victims personally obnoxious to him. They broke open the doors of the rich, or climbed over the roofs, massacred the proprietors within, and ravished the females. They chased the unsuspecting fugitives through the streets, not sparing even those who took refuge in the temples. Many of these unfortunate sufferers rushed for safety to the gates, but found them closed and guarded by special order of Agathokles; so that they were obliged to let themselves down from the walls, in which many perished miserably. For two days Syracuse was thus a prey to the sanguinary, rapacious, and lustful impulses of the soldiery; four thousand citizens had been already slain, and many more were seized as prisoners. The political purposes of Agathokles, as

well as the passions of the soldiers, being then sated, he arrested the massacre. He concluded this bloody feat by killing such of his prisoners as were most obnoxious to him, and banishing the rest. The total number of expelled or fugitive Syracusans is stated at 6000; who found a hospitable shelter and home at Agrigentum. One act of lenity is mentioned, and ought not to be omitted amidst this scene of horror. Deinokrates, one among the prisoners, was liberated by Agathokles from motives of former friendship: he too, probably, went into voluntary exile.[932]

After a massacre thus perpetrated in the midst of profound peace, and in the full confidence of a solemn act of mutual reconciliation immediately preceding—surpassing the worst deeds of the elder Dionysius, and indeed (we might almost say) of all other Grecian despots—Agathokles convened what he called an assembly of the people. Such of the citizens as were either oligarchical, or wealthy, or in any way unfriendly to him, had been already either slain or expelled; so that the assembly probably included few besides his own soldiers: Agathokles, addressing them in terms of congratulation on the recent glorious exploit, whereby they had purged the city of its oligarchical tyrants—proclaimed that the Syracusan people had now reconquered their full liberty. He affected to be weary of the toils of command, and anxious only for a life of quiet equality as one among the many; in token of which he threw off his general's cloak and put on a common civil garment. But those whom he addressed, fresh from the recent massacre and plunder, felt that their whole security depended upon the maintenance of his supremacy, and loudly protested that they would not accept his resignation. Agathokles, with pretended reluctance, told them, that if they insisted, he would comply, but upon the peremptory condition of enjoying a single-handed authority, without any colleagues or counsellors for whose misdeeds he was to be responsible. The assembly replied by conferring upon him, with unanimous acclamations, the post of general with unlimited power, or despot.[933]

Thus was constituted a new despot of Syracuse about fifty years after the decease of the elder Dionysius, and twenty-two years after Timoleon had rooted out the Dionysian dynasty, establishing on its ruins a free polity. On accepting the post, Agathokles took pains to proclaim that he would tolerate no farther massacre or plunder, and that his government would for the future be mild and beneficent. He particularly studied to conciliate the poorer citizens, to whom he promised abolition of debts and a new distribution of lands. How far he carried out this project systematically, we do not know; but he conferred positive donations on many of the poor—which he had abundant means of doing, out of the properties of the numerous exiles recently expelled. He was full of promises to every one, displaying courteous and popular manners, and abstaining from all ostentation of guards, or ceremonial attendants, or a diadem. He at the same time applied himself vigorously to strengthen his military and naval force, his magazines of arms and stores, and his revenues. He speedily extended his authority over all the territorial domain of Syracuse, with her subject towns, and carried his arms successfully over many other parts of Sicily.[934]

The Carthaginian general Hamilkar, whose complicity or connivance had helped Agathokles to this blood-stained elevation, appears to have permitted him without opposition to extend his dominion over a large portion of Sicily, and even to plunder the towns in alliance with Carthage itself. Complaints having been made to Carthage, this officer was superseded, and another general (also named Hamilkar) was sent in his place. We are unable to trace in detail the proceedings of Agathokles during the first years of his despotism; but he went on enlarging his sway over the neighboring cities, while the Syracusan exiles, whom he had expelled, found a home partly at Agrigentum (under Deinokrates), partly at Messênê. About the year 314 B. C., we hear that he made an attempt on Messênê, which he was on the point of seizing, had he not been stopped by the interference of the Carthaginians (perhaps the newly-appointed Hamilkar), who now at length protested against his violation of the convention; meaning (as we must presume, for we know of no other convention) the oath which had been sworn by Agathokles at Syracuse under the guarantee of the Carthaginians.[935] Though thus disappointed at Messênê, Agathokles seized Abakænum—where he slew the leading citizens opposed to him,—and carried on his aggressions elsewhere so effectively, that the leaders at Agrigentum, instigated by the Syracusan exiles there harbored, became convinced of the danger of leaving such encroachments unresisted.[936] The people of Agrigentum came to the resolution of taking up arms on behalf of the liberties of Sicily, and allied themselves with Gela and Messênê for the purpose.

But the fearful example of Agathokles himself rendered them so apprehensive of the dangers from any military leader, at once native and energetic, that they resolved to invite a foreigner. Some Syracusan exiles were sent to Sparta, to choose and invoke some Spartan of eminence and ability, as Archidamus had recently been called to Tarentum—and even more, as Timoleon had been brought from Corinth, with results so signally beneficent. The old Spartan king Kleomenes (of the Eurysthenid race) had a son Akrotatus, then unpopular at home,[937] and well disposed towards foreign warfare. This prince, without even consulting the Ephors, listened at once to the envoys, and left Peloponnesus with a small squadron, intending to cross by Korkyra and the coast of Italy to Agrigentum. Unfavorable winds drove him as far north as Apollonia, and delayed his arrival at Tarentum; in which city, originally a Spartan colony, he met with a cordial reception, and obtained a vote of twenty vessels to assist his enterprise of liberating Syracuse from Agathokles. He reached Agrigentum with favorable hopes, was received with all the honors due to a Spartan prince, and undertook the command. Bitterly did he disappoint his party. He was incompetent as a general; he dissipated in presents or luxuries the money intended for the campaign, emulating Asiatic despots; his conduct was arrogant, tyrannical, and even sanguinary. The disgust which he inspired was brought to a height, when he caused Sosistratus, the leader of the Syracusan exiles, to be assassinated at a banquet. Immediately the exiles rose in a body to avenge this murder; while Akrotatus, deposed by the Agrigentines, only found safety in flight.[938]

To this young Spartan prince, had he possessed a noble heart and energetic qualities, there was here presented a career of equal grandeur with that of Timoleon—against an enemy able indeed and formidable, yet not so superior in force as to render success impossible. It is melancholy to see Akrotatus, from simple worthlessness of character, throwing away such an opportunity; at a time when Sicily was the only soil on which a glorious Hellenic career was still open—when no similar exploits were practicable by any Hellenic leader in Central Greece, from the overwhelming superiority of force possessed by the surrounding kings.

The misconduct of Akrotatus broke up all hopes of active operations against Agathokles. Peace was presently concluded with the latter by the Agrigentines and their allies, under the mediation of the Carthaginian general Hamilkar. By the terms of this convention, all the Greek cities in Sicily were declared autonomous, yet under the hegemony of Agathokles; excepting only Himera, Selinus, and Herakleia, which were actually, and were declared still to continue, under Carthage. Messênê was the only Grecian city standing aloof from this convention; as such, therefore still remaining open to the Syracusan exiles. The terms were so favorable to Agathokles, that they were much disapproved at Carthage.[939] Agathokles, recognized as chief and having no enemy in the field, employed himself actively in strengthening his hold on the other cities, and in enlarging his military means at home. He sent a force against Messênê, to require the expulsion of the Syracusan exiles from that city, and to procure at the same time the recall of the Messenian exiles, partisans of his own, and companions of his army. His generals extorted these two points from the Messenians. Agathokles, having thus broken the force of Messênê, secured to himself the town still more completely, by sending for those Messenian citizens who had chiefly opposed him, and putting them all to death, as well as his leading opponents at Tauromenium. The number thus massacred was not less than six hundred.[940]

It only remained for Agathokles to seize Agrigentum. Thither he accordingly marched. But Deinokrates and the Syracusan exiles, expelled from Messênê, had made themselves heard at Carthage, insisting on the perils to that city from the encroachments of Agathokles. The Carthaginians alarmed sent a fleet of sixty sail, whereby alone Agrigentum, already under siege by Agathokles, was preserved. The recent convention was now broken on all sides, and Agathokles kept no farther measures with the Carthaginians. He ravaged all their Sicilian territory, and destroyed some of their forts; while the Carthaginians on their side made a sudden descent with their fleet on the harbor of Syracuse. They could achieve nothing more, however, than the capture of one Athenian merchant-vessel, out of two there riding. They disgraced their acquisition by the cruel act (not uncommon in Carthaginian warfare) of cutting of the hands of the captive crew; for which, in a few days, retaliation was exercised upon the crews of some of their own ships, taken by the cruisers of Agathokles.[941]

The defence of Agrigentum now rested principally on the Carthaginians in Sicily, who took up a position on the hill called Eknomus—in the territory of Gela, a little to the west of the Agrigentine border. Here Agathokles approached to offer them battle—having been emboldened by two important successes obtained over Deinokrates and the Syracusan exiles, near Kentoripa and Gallaria.[942] So superior was his force, however, that the Carthaginians thought it prudent to remain in their camp; and Agathokles returned in triumph to Syracuse, where he adorned the temples with his recently acquired spoils. The balance of force was soon altered by the despatch of a large armament from Carthage under Hamilkar, consisting of 130 ships of war, with numerous other transport ships, carrying many soldiers—2000 native Carthaginians, partly men of rank—10,000 Africans—1000 Campanian heavy-armed and 1000 Balearic slingers. The fleet underwent in its passage so terrific a storm, that many of the vessels sunk with all on board, and it arrived with very diminished numbers in Sicily. The loss fell upon the native Carthaginian soldiers with peculiar severity; insomuch that when the news reached Carthage, a public mourning was proclaimed, and the city walls were hung with black serge.

Those who reached Sicily, however, were quite sufficient to place Hamilkar in an imposing superiority of number as compared with Agathokles. He encamped on or near Eknomus, summoned all the reinforcements that his Sicilian allies could furnish, and collected additional mercenaries; so that he was soon at the head of 40,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry.[943] At the same time, a Carthaginian armed squadron, detached to the strait of Messênê, fell in with twenty armed ships belonging to Agathokles, and captured them all with their crews. The Sicilian cities were held to Agathokles principally by terror, and were likely to turn against him, if the Carthaginians exhibited sufficient strength to protect them. This the despot knew and dreaded; especially respecting Gela, which was not far from the Carthaginian camp. Had he announced himself openly as intending to place a garrison in Gela, he feared that the citizens might forestall him by calling in Hamilkar. Accordingly he detached thither, on various pretences, several small parties of soldiers, who presently found themselves united in a number sufficient to seize the town. Agathokles then marched into Gela with his main force. Distrusting the adherence of the citizens, he let loose his soldiers upon them, massacred four thousand persons, and compelled the remainder, as a condition of sparing their lives, to bring in to him all their money and valuables. Having by this atrocity both struck universal terror and enriched himself, he advanced onward towards the Carthaginian camp, and occupied a hill called Phalarion opposite to it.[944] The two camps were separated by a level plain or valley nearly five miles broad, through which ran the river Himera.[945]

For some days of the hottest season (the dog-days), both armies remained stationary, neither of them choosing to make the attack. At length Agathokles gained what he thought a favorable opportunity. A detachment from the Carthaginian camp sallied forth in pursuit of some Grecian plunderers; Agathokles posted some men in

ambush, who fell upon this detachment unawares, threw it into disorder, and pursued it back to the camp. Following up this partial success, Agathokles brought forward his whole force, crossed the river Himera, and began a general attack. This advance not being expected, the Grecian assailants seemed at first on the point of succeeding. They filled up a portion of the ditch, tore up the Stockade, and were forcing their way into the camp. They were however repulsed by redoubled efforts, and new troops coming up, on the part of the defenders; mainly, too, by the very effective action of the 1000 Balearic slingers in Hamilkar's army, who hurled stones weighing a pound each, against which the Grecian armor was an inadequate defence. Still Agathokles, noway discouraged, caused the attack to be renewed on several points at once and with apparent success, when a reinforcement landed from Carthage—the expectation of which may perhaps have induced Hamilkar to refrain from any general attack. These new troops joined in the battle, coming upon the rear of the Greeks; who were intimidated and disordered by such unforeseen assailants, while the Carthaginians in their front, animated to more energetic effort, first repulsed them from the camp, and then pressed them vigorously back. After holding their ground for some time against their double enemy, the Greeks at length fled in disorder back to their own camp, recrossing the river Himera. The interval was between four and five miles of nearly level ground, over which they were actively pursued and severely handled by the Carthaginian cavalry, 5000 in number. Moreover, in crossing the river, many of them drank eagerly, from thirst, fatigue, and the heat of the weather; the saltness of the water proved so destructive to them, that numerous dead bodies are said to have been found unwounded on the banks.[946] At length they obtained shelter in their own camp, after a loss of 7000 men; while the loss of the victors is estimated at 500.

Agathokles, after this great disaster, did not attempt to maintain his camp, but set it on fire, and returned to Gela; which was well fortified and provisioned, capable of a long defence. Here he intended to maintain himself against Hamilkar, at least until the Syracusan harvest (probably already begun) should be completed. But Hamilkar, having ascertained the strength of Gela, thought it prudent to refrain from a siege, and employed himself in operations for the purpose of strengthening his party in Sicily. His great victory at the Himera had produced the strongest effect upon many of the Sicilian cities, who were held to Agathokles by no other bonds except those of fear. Hamilkar issued conciliatory proclamations, inviting them all to become his allies, and marching his troops towards the most convenient points. Presently Kamarina, Leontini, Katana, Tauromenium, Messênê, Abakænum, with several other smaller towns and forts, sent to tender themselves as allies; and the conduct of Hamilkar towards all was so mild and equitable, as to give universal satisfaction. Agathokles appears to have been thus dispossessed of most part of the island, retaining little besides Gela and Syracuse. Even the harbor of Syracuse was watched by a Carthaginian fleet, placed to intercept foreign supplies. Returning to Syracuse after Hamilkar had renounced all attempts on Gela, Agathokles collected the corn from the

neighborhood, and put the fortifications in the best state of defence. He had every reason to feel assured that the Carthaginians, encouraged by their recent success, and reinforced by allies from the whole island, would soon press the siege of Syracuse with all their energy; while for himself, hated by all, there was no hope of extraneous support, and little hope of a successful defence.[947]

In this apparently desperate situation, he conceived the idea of a novelty alike daring, ingenious, and effective; surrounded indeed with difficulties in the execution, but promising, if successfully executed, to change altogether the prospects of the war.

He resolved to carry a force across from Syracuse to Africa, and attack the Carthaginians on their own soil. No Greek, so far as we know, had ever conceived the like scheme before; no one certainly had ever executed it. In the memory of man, the African territory of Carthage had never been visited by hostile foot. It was known that the Carthaginians would be not only unprepared to meet an attack at home, but unable even to imagine it as practicable. It was known that their territory was rich, and their African subjects harshly treated, discontented, and likely to seize the first opportunity for revolting. The landing of any hostile force near Carthage would strike such a blow, as at least to cause the recall of the Carthaginian armament in Sicily, and thus relieve Syracuse; perhaps the consequences of it might be yet greater.

How to execute the scheme was the grand difficulty—for the Carthaginians were superior not merely on land, but also at sea. Agathokles had no chance except by keeping his purpose secret, and even unsuspected. He fitted out an armament, announced as about to sail forth from Syracuse on a secret expedition, against some unknown town on the Sicilian coast. He selected for this purpose his best troops, especially his horsemen, few of whom had been slain at the battle of the Himera; he could not transport horses, but he put the horsemen aboard with their saddles and bridles, entertaining full assurance that he could procure horses in Africa. In selecting soldiers for his expedition, he was careful to take one member from many different families, to serve as hostage for the fidelity of those left behind. He liberated, and enrolled among his soldiers, many of the strongest and most resolute slaves. To provide the requisite funds, his expedients were manifold; he borrowed from merchants, seized the money belonging to orphans, stripped the women of their precious ornaments, and even plundered the richest temples. By all these proceedings, the hatred as well as fear towards him was aggravated, especially among the more opulent families. Agathokles publicly proclaimed, that the siege of Syracuse, which the Carthaginians were now commencing, would be long and terrible—that he and his soldiers were accustomed to hardships and could endure them, but that those, who felt themselves unequal to the effort, might retire with their properties while it was yet time. Many of the wealthier families—to a number stated as 1600 persons—profited by this permission; but as they were leaving the city, Agathokles set his merce-

naries upon them, slew them all, and appropriated their possessions to himself.[948] By such tricks and enormities, he provided funds enough for an armament of sixty ships, well filled with soldiers. Not one of these soldiers knew where they were going; there was a general talk about the madness of Agathokles; nevertheless such was their confidence in his bravery and military resource, that they obeyed his orders without asking questions. To act as viceroy of Syracuse during his own absence, Agathokles named Antander his brother, aided by an Ætolian officer named Erymnon.[949]

The armament was equipped and ready, without any suspicion on the part of the Carthaginian fleet blockading the harbor. It happened one day that the approach of some corn-ships seduced this fleet into a pursuit; the mouth of the harbor being thus left unguarded, Agathokles took the opportunity of striking with his armament into the open sea. As soon as the Carthaginian fleet saw him sailing forth, they neglected the corn-ships, and prepared for battle, which they presumed that he was come to offer. To their surprise, he stood out to sea as fast as he could; they then pushed out in pursuit of him, but he had already got a considerable advance and strove to keep it. Towards nightfall however they neared him so much, that he was only saved by the darkness. During the night he made considerable way; but on the next day there occurred an eclipse of the sun so nearly total, that it became perfectly dark, and the stars were visible. The mariners were so terrified at this phenomenon, that all the artifice and ascendency of Agathokles were required to inspire them with new courage. At length, after six days and nights, they approached the coast of Africa. The Carthaginian ships had pursued them at a venture, in the direction towards Africa; and they appeared in sight, just as Agathokles was nearing the land. Strenuous efforts were employed by the mariners on both sides to touch land first; Agathokles secured that advantage, and was enabled to put himself into such a posture of defence that he repulsed the attack of the Carthaginian ships, and secured the disembarcation of his own soldiers, at a point called the Latomiæ or Stone quarries.[950]

After establishing his position ashore, and refreshing his soldiers, the first proceeding of Agathokles was to burn his vessels; a proceeding which seemed to carry an air of desperate boldness. Yet in truth the ships were now useless—for, if he was unsuccessful on land, they were not enough to enable him to return in the face of the Carthaginian fleet; they were even worse than useless, since, if he retained them, it was requisite that he should leave a portion of his army to guard them, and thus enfeeble his means of action for the really important achievements on land. Convening his soldiers in assembly near the ships, he first offered a sacrifice to Demeter and Persephonê—the patron goddesses of Sicily, and of Syracuse in particular. He then apprised his soldiers, that during the recent crossing and danger from the Carthaginian pursuers, he had addressed a vow to these goddesses—engaging to make a burnt-offering of his ships in their honor, if they would preserve him safe across to Africa. The goddesses had granted this boon; they had farther, by favorably

responding to the sacrifice just offered, promised full success to his African projects: it became therefore incumbent on him to fulfil his vow with exactness. Torches being new brought, Agathokles took one in his hand, and mounted on the stern of the admiral's ship, directing each of the trierarchs to do the like on his own ship. All were set on fire simultaneously, amidst the sound of trumpets, and the mingled prayers and shouts of the soldiers.[951]

Though Agathokles had succeeded in animating his soldiers with a factitious excitement, for the accomplishment of this purpose, yet so soon as they saw the conflagration decided and irrevocable, thus cutting off all their communication with home—their spirits fell, and they began to despair of their prospects. Without allowing them time to dwell upon the novelty of the situation, Agathokles conducted them at once against the nearest Carthaginian town, called Megalê-Polis.[952] His march lay for the most part through a rich territory in the highest cultivation. The passing glance which we thus obtain into the condition of the territory near Carthage is of peculiar interest; more especially when contrasted with the desolation of the same coast, now and for centuries past. The corn-land, the plantations both of vines and olives, the extensive and well-stocked gardens, the size and equipment of the farm buildings, the large outlay for artificial irrigation, the agreeable country-houses belonging to wealthy Carthaginians, etc., all excited the astonishment, and stimulated the cupidity, of Agathokles and his soldiers. Moreover, the towns were not only very numerous, but all open and unfortified, except Carthage itself and a few others on the coast.[953]

The Carthaginians, besides having little fear of invasion by sea, were disposed to mistrust their subject cities, which they ruled habitually with harshness and oppression.[954] The Liby-Phenicians appear to have been unused to arms—a race of timid cultivators and traffickers, accustomed to subjection and practised in the deceit necessary for lightening it.[955] Agathokles, having marched through this land of abundance, assaulted Megalêpolis without delay. The inhabitants, unprepared for attack, distracted with surprise and terror, made little resistance. Agathokles easily took the town, abandoning both the persons of the inhabitants and all the rich property within, to his soldiers; who enriched themselves with a prodigious booty both from town and country—furniture, cattle, and slaves. From hence he advanced farther southward to the town called Tunês (the modern Tunis, at the distance of only fourteen miles south-west of Carthage itself), which he took by storm in like manner. He fortified Tunês as a permanent position; but he kept his main force united in camp, knowing well that he should presently have an imposing army against him in the field, and severe battles to fight.[956]

The Carthaginian fleet had pursued Agathokles during his crossing from Syracuse, in perfect ignorance of his plans. When he landed in Africa, on their own territory, and even burnt his fleet, they at first flattered themselves with the belief that they held him prisoner. But as soon as they saw him commence his march in military array

against Megalêpolis, they divined his real purposes, and were filled with apprehension. Carrying off the brazen prow-ornaments of his burnt and abandoned ships, they made sail for Carthage, sending forward a swift vessel to communicate first what had occurred. Before this vessel arrived, however, the landing of Agathokles had been already made known at Carthage, where it excited the utmost surprise and consternation; since no one supposed that he could have accomplished such an adventure without having previously destroyed the Carthaginian army and fleet in Sicily. From this extreme dismay they were presently relieved by the arrival of the messengers from their fleet; whereby they learnt the real state of affairs in Sicily. They now made the best preparations in their power to resist Agathokles. Hanno and Bomilkar, two men of leading families, were named generals conjointly. They were bitter political rivals,—but this very rivalry was by some construed as an advantage, since each would serve as a check upon the other and as a guarantee to the state; or, what is more probable, each had a party sufficiently strong to prevent the separate election of the other.[957] These two generals, unable to wait for distant succors, led out the native forces of the city, stated at 40,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry, derived altogether from citizens and residents—with 2000 war-chariots. They took post on an eminence (somewhere between Tunis and Carthage) not far from Agathokles; Bomilkar commanding on the left, where the ground was so difficult that he was unable to extend his front, and was obliged to admit an unusual depth of files; while Hanno was on the right, having in his front rank the Sacred Band of Carthage, a corps of 2500 distinguished citizens, better armed and braver than the rest. So much did the Carthaginians outnumber the invaders—and so confident were they of victory—that they carried with them 20,000 pairs of handcuffs for their anticipated prisoners.[958]

Agathokles placed himself on the left, with 1000 chosen hoplites round him, to combat the Sacred Band; the command of his right he gave to his son Archagathus. His troops—Syracusans, miscellaneous mercenary Greeks, Campanians or Samnites, Tuscans, and Gauls—scarcely equalled in numbers one-half of the enemy. Some of the ships' crews were even without arms,—a deficiency, which Agathokles could only supply in appearance, by giving to them the leather cases or wrappers of shields, stretched out upon sticks. The outstretched wrappers thus exhibited looked from a distance like shields; so that these men, stationed in the rear, had the appearance of a reserve of hoplites. As the soldiers however were still discouraged, Agathokles tried to hearten them up by another device yet more singular, for which indeed he must have made deliberate provision beforehand. In various parts of the camp, he let fly a number of owls, which perched upon the shields and helmets of the soldiers. These birds, the favorite of Athênê, were supposed and generally asserted to promise victory; the minds of the soldiers are reported to have been much reassured by the sight.

The Carthaginian war-chariots and cavalry, which charged first, made little or no impression; but the infantry of their right pressed the Greeks seriously. Especially

Hanno, with the Sacred Band around him, behaved with the utmost bravery and forwardness, and seemed to be gaining advantage, when he was unfortunately slain. His death not only discouraged his own troops, but became fatal to the army, by giving opportunity for treason to his colleague Bomilkar. This man had long secretly meditated the project of rendering himself despot of Carthage. As a means of attaining that end, he deliberately sought to bring reverses upon her; and no sooner had he heard of Hanno's death, than he gave orders for his own wing to retreat. The Sacred Band, though fighting with unshaken valor, were left unsupported, attacked in rear as well as front, and compelled to give way along with the rest. The whole Carthaginian army was defeated and driven back to Carthage. Their camp fell into the hands of Agathokles, who found among their baggage the very handcuffs which they had brought for fettering their expected captives.[959]

This victory made Agathokles for the time master of the open country. He transmitted the news to Sicily, by a boat of thirty oars, constructed expressly for the purpose—since he had no ships of his own remaining. Having fortified Tunês and established it as his central position, he commenced operations along the eastern coast (Zeugitana and Byzakium, as the northern and southern portions of it were afterwards denominated by the Romans) against the towns dependent on Carthage.[960]

In that city, meanwhile, all was terror and despondency in consequence of the recent defeat. It was well known that the African subjects generally entertained nothing but fear and hatred towards the reigning city. Neither the native Libyans or Africans,—nor the mixed race called Liby-Phœnicians, who inhabited the towns[961]—could be depended on if their services were really needed. The distress of the Carthaginians took the form of religious fears and repentance. They looked back with remorse on the impiety of their past lives, and on their omissions of duty towards the gods. To the Tyrian Herakles, they had been slack in transmitting the dues and presents required by their religion; a backwardness which they now endeavored to make up by sending envoys to Tyre, with prayers and supplications, with rich presents, and especially with models in gold and silver of their sacred temples and shrines. Towards Kronus, or Moloch, they also felt that they had conducted themselves sinfully. The worship acceptable to that god required the sacrifice of young children, born of free and opulent parents, and even the choice child of the family. But it was now found out, on investigation, that many parents had recently put a fraud upon the god, by surreptitiously buying poor children, feeding them well, and then sacrificing them as their own. This discovery seemed at once to explain why Kronus had become offended, and what had brought upon them the recent defeat. They made an emphatic atonement, by selecting 200 children from the most illustrious families in Carthage, and offering them up to Kronus at a great public sacrifice; besides which, 300 parents, finding themselves denounced for similar omissions in the past, displayed their repentance by voluntarily immolating their own children for the public safety. The statue of Kronus,—placed with outstretched hands to receive

the victim tendered to him, with fire immediately underneath—was fed on that solemnity certainly with 200, and probably with 500, living children.[962] By this monstrous holocaust the full religious duty being discharged, and forgiveness obtained from the god, the mental distress of the Carthaginians was healed.

Having thus relieved their consciences on the score of religious obligation, the Carthaginians despatched envoys to Hamilkar in Sicily, acquainting him with the recent calamity, desiring him to send a reinforcement, and transmitting to him the brazen prow ornaments taken from the ships of Agathokles. They at the same time equipped a fresh army, with which they marched forth to attack Tunês. Agathokles had fortified that town, and established a strong camp before it; but he had withdrawn his main force to prosecute operations against the maritime towns on the eastern coast of the territory of Carthage. Among these towns, he first attacked Neapolis with success, granting to the inhabitants favorable terms. He then advanced farther southwards towards Adrumetum, of which he commenced the siege, with the assistance of a neighboring Libyan prince named Elymas, who now joined him. While Agathokles was engaged in the siege of Adrumetum, the Carthaginians attacked his position at Tunês, drove his soldiers out of the fortified camp into the town, and began to batter the defences of the town itself. Apprised of this danger while besieging Adrumetum, but nevertheless reluctant to raise the siege,—Agathokles left his main army before it, stole away with only a few soldiers and some camp-followers, and conducting them to an elevated spot—halfway between Adrumetum and Tunês, yet visible from both—he caused them to kindle at night upon this eminence a prodigious number of fires.[963] The effect, of these fires, seen from Adrumetum on one side and from Tunês on the other, was, to produce the utmost terror at both places. The Carthaginians besieging Tunês fancied that Agathokles with his whole army was coming to attack them, and forthwith abandoned the siege in disorder, leaving their engines behind. The defenders of Adrumetum, interpreting these fires as evidence of a large reinforcement on its way to join the besieging army, were so discouraged that they surrendered the town on capitulation.[964]

By this same stratagem—if the narrative can be trusted—Agathokles both relieved Tunês, and acquired possession of Adrumetum. Pushing his conquests yet farther south, he besieged and took Thapsus, with several other towns on the coast to a considerable distance southward.[965] He also occupied and fortified the important position called Aspis, on the south-east of the headland Cape Bon, and not far distant from it; a point convenient for maritime communication with Sicily.[966]

By a series of such acquisitions, comprising in all not less than 200 dependencies of Carthage, Agathokles became master along the eastern coast.[967] He next endeavored to subdue the towns in the interior, into which he advanced as far as several days' march. But he was recalled by intelligence from his soldiers at Tunês, that the Carthaginians had marched out again to attack them, and had already retaken some of his conquests. Returning suddenly by forced marches, he came upon them

by surprise, and drove in their advanced parties with considerable loss; while he also gained an important victory over the Libyan prince Elymas, who had rejoined the Carthaginians, but was now defeated and slain.[968] The Carthaginians, however, though thus again humbled and discouraged, still maintained the field, strongly entrenched, between Carthage and Tunês.

Meanwhile the affairs of Agathokles at Syracuse had taken a turn unexpectedly favorable. He had left that city blocked up partially by sea and with a victorious enemy encamped near it; so that supplies found admission with difficulty. In this condition, Hamilkar, commander of the Carthaginian army, received from Carthage the messengers announcing their recent defeat in Africa; yet also bringing the brazen prow ornaments taken from the ships of Agathokles. He ordered the envoys to conceal the real truth, and to spread abroad news that Agathokles had been destroyed with his armament; in proof of which he produced the prow ornaments,—an undoubted evidence that the ships had really been destroyed. Sending envoys with these evidences into Syracuse, to be exhibited to Antander, and the ether authorities, Hamilkar demanded from them the surrender of the city, under promise of safety and favorable terms; at the same time marching his army close up to it, with the view of making an attack. Antander with others, believing the information and despairing of successful resistance, were disposed to comply; but Erymnon the Ætolian insisted on holding out until they had fuller certainty. This resolution Antander adopted. At the same time, mistrusting those citizens of Syracuse who were relatives or friends of the exiles without, he ordered them all to leave the city immediately, with their wives and families. No less than 8000 persons were expelled under this mandate. They were consigned to the mercy of Hamilkar, and his army without; who not only suffered them to pass, but treated them with kindness. Syracuse was now a scene of aggravated wretchedness and despondency; not less from this late calamitous expulsion, than from the grief of those who believed that their relatives in Africa had perished with Agathokles. Hamilkar had brought up his battering-engines, and was preparing to assault the town, when Nearchus, the messenger from Agathokles, arrived from Africa after a voyage of five days, having under favor of darkness escaped, though only just escaped, the blockading squadron. From him the Syracusan government learnt the real truth, and the victorious position of Agathokles. There was no farther talk of capitulation; Hamilkar—having tried a partial assault, which was vigorously repulsed,—withdrew his army, and detached from it a reinforcement of 5000 men to the aid of his countrymen in Africa.[969]

During some months, he seems to have employed himself in partial operations for extending the Carthaginian dominion throughout Sicily. But at length he concerted measures with the Syracusan exile Deinokrates, who was at the head of a numerous body of his exiled countrymen, for a renewed attack upon Syracuse. His fleet already blockaded the harbor, and he now with his army, stated as 120,000 men, destroyed the neighboring lands, hoping to starve out the inhabitants. Approaching close to the

walls of the city, he occupied the Olympieion, or temple of Zeus Olympius, near the river Anapus and the interior coast of the Great Harbor. From hence—probably under the conduct of Deinokrates and the other exiles, well-acquainted with the ground—he undertook by a night-march to ascend the circuitous and difficult mountain track, for the purpose of surprising the fort called Euryalus, at the highest point of Epipolæ, and the western apex of the Syracusan lines of fortification. This was the same enterprise, at the same hour, and with the same main purpose, as that of Demosthenes during the Athenian siege, after he had brought the second armament from Athens to the relief of Nikias.[970] Even Demosthenes, though conducting his march with greater precaution than Hamilkar, and successful in surprising the fort of Euryalus, had been driven down again with disastrous loss. Moreover, since his time, this fort Euryalus, instead of being left detached, had been embodied by the elder Dionysius as an integral portion of the fortifications of the city. It formed the apex or point of junction for the two converging walls—one skirting the northern cliff, the other the southern cliff, of Epipolæ.[971] The surprise intended by Hamilkar—difficult in the extreme, if at all practicable—seems to have been unskilfully conducted. It was attempted with a confused multitude, incapable of that steady order requisite for night-movements. His troops, losing their way in the darkness, straggled, and even mistook each other for enemies; while the Syracusan guards from Euryalus, alarmed by the noise, attacked them vigorously and put them to the rout. Their loss, in trying to escape down the steep declivity, was prodigious; and Hamilkar himself, making brave efforts to rally them, became prisoner to the Syracusans. What lent peculiar interest to this incident, in the eyes of a pious Greek, was that it served to illustrate and confirm the truth of prophecy. Hamilkar had been assured by a prophet that he would sup that night in Syracuse; and this assurance had in part emboldened him to the attack, since he naturally calculated on entering the city as a conqueror.[972] He did indeed take his evening meal in Syracuse, literally fulfilling the augury. Immediately after it, he was handed over to the relatives of the slain, who first paraded him through the city in chains, then inflicted on him the worst tortures, and lastly killed him. His head was cut off and sent to Africa.[973]

The loss and humiliation sustained in this repulse—together with the death of Hamilkar, and the discord ensuing between the exiles under Deinokrates and the Carthaginian soldiers—completely broke up the besieging army. At the same time, the Agrigentines, profiting by the depression both of Carthaginians and exiles, stood forward publicly, proclaiming themselves as champions of the cause of autonomous city government throughout Sicily, under their own presidency, against both the Carthaginians on one side, and the despot Agathokles on the other. They chose for their general a citizen named Xenodokus, who set himself with vigor to the task of expelling everywhere the mercenary garrisons which held the cities in subjection. He began first with Gela, the city immediately adjoining Agrigentum, found a party of the citizens disposed to aid him, and in conjunction with them, overthrew the Agathoklean garrison. The Geloans, thus liberated, seconded cordially his efforts to extend

the like benefits to others. The popular banner proclaimed by Agrigentum proved so welcome, that many cities eagerly invited her aid to shake off the yoke of the soldiery in their respective citadels, and regain their free governments.[974] Enna, Erbessus, Echetla,[975] Leontini, and Kamarina, were all thus relieved from the dominion of Agathokles; while other cities were in like manner emancipated from the sway of the Carthaginians; and joined the Agrigentine confederacy. The Agathoklean government at Syracuse was not strong enough to resist such spirited manifestations. Syracuse still continued to be blocked up by the Carthaginian fleet; though the blockade was less efficacious, and supplies were now introduced more abundantly than before.[976]

The ascendency of Agathokles was thus rather on the wane in Sicily: but in Africa, he had become more powerful than ever—not without perilous hazards which brought him occasionally to the brink of ruin. On receiving from Syracuse the head of the captive Hamilkar, he rode forth close to the camp of the Carthaginians, and held it up to their view in triumph; they made respectful prostration before it, but the sight was astounding and mournful to them.[977] While they were thus in despondency, however, a strange vicissitude was on the point of putting their enemy into their hands. A violent mutiny broke out in the camp of Agathokles at Tunês, arising out of a drunken altercation between his son Archagathus and an Ætolian officer named Lykiskus; which ended in the murder of the latter by the former. The comrades of Lykiskus rose in arms with fury to avenge him, calling for the head of Archagathus. They found sympathy with the whole army; who seized the opportunity of demanding their arrears of outstanding pay, chose new generals, and took regular possession of Tunês with its defensive works. The Carthaginians, informed of this outbreak, immediately sent envoys to treat with the mutineers, offering to them large presents and double pay in the service of Carthage. Their offer was at first so favorably entertained, that the envoys returned with confident hopes of success; when Agathokles, as a last resource, clothed himself in mean garb, and threw himself on the mercy of the soldiers. He addressed them in a pathetic appeal, imploring them not to desert him, and even drew his sword to kill himself before their faces. With such art did he manage this scene, that the feelings of the soldiers underwent a sudden and complete revolution. They not only became reconciled to him, but even greeted him with enthusiasm, calling on him to resume the dress and functions of general, and promising unabated obedience for the future.[978] Agathokles gladly obeyed the call, and took advantage of their renewed ardor to attack forthwith the Carthaginians; who, expecting nothing less, were defeated with considerable loss.[979]

In spite of this check, the Carthaginians presently sent a considerable force into the interior, for the purpose of reconquering or regaining the disaffected Numidian tribes. They met with good success in this enterprise; but the Numidians were in the main faithless and indifferent to both the belligerents, seeking only to turn the war to

their own profit. Agathokles, leaving his son in command at Tunês, followed the Carthaginians into the interior with a large portion of his army. The Carthaginian generals were cautious, and kept themselves in strong position. Nevertheless Agathokles felt confident enough to assail them in their camp; and after great effort, with severe loss on his own side, he gained an indecisive victory. This advantage however was countervailed by the fact, that during the action the Numidians assailed his camp, slew all the defenders, and carried off nearly all the slaves and baggage. The loss on the Carthaginian side fell most severely upon the Greek soldiers in their pay; most of them exiles under Klinon, and some Syracusan exiles. These men behaved with signal gallantry, and were nearly all slain, either during the battle or after the battle, by Agathokles.[980]

It had now become manifest, however, to this daring invader that the force of resistance possessed by Carthage was more than he could overcome—that though humbling and impoverishing her for the moment, he could not bring the war to a triumphant close; since the city itself, occupying the isthmus of a peninsula from sea to sea, and surrounded with the strongest fortifications, could not be besieged except by means far superior to his.[981] We have already seen, that though he had gained victories and seized rich plunder, he had not been able to provide even regular pay for his soldiers, whose fidelity was consequently precarious. Nor could he expect reinforcements from Sicily; where his power was on the whole declining, though Syracuse itself was in less danger than before. He therefore resolved to invoke aid from Ophellas at Kyrênê and despatched Orthon as envoy for that purpose.[982]

To Kyrênê and what was afterwards called its Pentapolis (i. e. the five neighboring Grecian towns, Kyrênê, its port Apollonia, Barka, Teucheira, and Hesperides), an earlier chapter of this history has already been devoted.[983] Unfortunately information respecting them, for a century and more anterior to Alexander the Great, is almost wholly wanting. Established among a Libyan population, many of whom were domiciliated with the Greeks as fellow-residents, these Kyreneans had imbibed many Libyan habits in war, in peace, and in religion; of which their fine breed of horses, employed both for the festival chariot-matches and in battle, was one example. The Libyan tribes, useful as neighbors, servants, and customers,[984] were frequently also troublesome as enemies. In 413 B. C. we hear accidentally that Hesperides was besieged by Libyan tribes, and rescued by some Peloponnesian hoplites on their way to Syracuse during the Athenian siege.[985] About 401 B. C. (shortly after the close of the Peloponnesian war), the same city was again so hard pressed by the same enemies, that she threw open her citizenship to any Greek new-comer who would aid in repelling them. This invitation was accepted by several of the Messenians, just then expelled from Peloponnesus, and proscribed by the Spartans; they went to Africa, but, becoming involved in intestine warfare among the citizens of Kyrênê, a large proportion of them perished.[986] Except these scanty notices, we hear nothing about the Greco-Libyan Pentapolis in relation to Grecian affairs, before the time of Alexander. It

would appear that the trade with the native African tribes, between the Gulfs called the Greater and Lesser Syrtis, was divided between Kyrênê (meaning the Kyrenaic Pentapolis) and Carthage—at a boundary point called the Altars of the Philæni, ennobled by a commemorative legend; immediately east of these Altars was Automala, the westernmost factory of Kyrênê.[987] We cannot doubt that the relations, commercial and otherwise, between Kyrênê and Carthage, the two great emporia on the coast of Africa, were constant and often lucrative—though not always friendly.

In the year 331 B. C., when the victorious Alexander overran Egypt, the inhabitants of Kyrênê sent to tender presents and submission to him, and became enrolled among his subjects.[988] We hear nothing more about them until the last year of Alexander's life (324 B. C. to 323 B. C.). About that time, the exiles from Kyrênê and Barka, probably enough emboldened by the rescript of Alexander (proclaimed at the Olympic festival of 324 B. C., and directing that all Grecian exiles, except those guilty of sacrilege, should be recalled forthwith), determined to accomplish their return by force. To this end they invited from Krete an officer named Thimbron; who, having slain Harpalus after his flight from Athens (recounted in a previous chapter), had quartered himself in Krete, with the treasure, the ships, and the 6000 mercenaries, brought over from Asia by that satrap.[989] Thimbron willingly carried over his army to their assistance, intending to conquer for himself a principality in Libya. He landed near Kyrênê, defeated the Kyrenean forces with great slaughter, and made himself master of Apollonia, the fortified port of that city, distant from it nearly ten miles. The towns of Barka and Hesperides sided with him; so that he was strong enough to force the Kyreneans to a disadvantageous treaty. They covenanted to pay 500 talents,—to surrender to him half of their war-chariots for his ulterior projects—and to leave him in possession of Apollonia. While he plundered the merchants in the harbor, he proclaimed his intention of subjugating the independent Libyan tribes, and probably of stretching his conquests to Carthage.[990] His schemes were however frustrated by one of his own officers, a Kretan named Mnasikles; who deserted to the Kyreneans, and encouraged them to set aside the recent convention. Thimbron, after seizing such citizens of Kyrênê as happened to be at Apollonia, attacked Kyrênê itself, but was repulsed; and the Kyreneans were then bold enough to invade the territory of Barka and Hesperides. To aid them, Thimbron moved his quarters from Apollonia; but during his absence, Mnasikles contrived to surprise that valuable port; thus mastering at once his base of operations, the station for his fleet, and all the baggage of his soldiers. Thimbron's fleet could not be long maintained without a harbor. The seamen, landing here and there for victuals and water, were cut off by the native Libyans, while the vessels were dispersed by storms.[991]

The Kyreneans, now full of hope, encountered Thimbron in the field, and defeated him. Yet though reduced to distress, he contrived to obtain possession of Teucheira; to which port he invoked as auxiliaries 2500 fresh soldiers, out of the loose mercenary bands dispersed near Cape Tænarus in Peloponnesus. This rein-

forcement again put him in a condition for battle. The Kyreneans on their side also thought it necessary to obtain succor, partly from the neighboring Libyans, partly from Carthage. They got together a force stated as 30,000 men, with which they met him in the field. But, on this occasion they were totally routed, with the loss of all their generals and much of their army. Thimbron was now in the full tide of success; he pressed both Kyrênê and the harbor so vigorously, that famine began to prevail, and sedition broke out among the citizens. The oligarchical men, expelled by the more popular party, sought shelter, some in the camp of Thimbron; some at the court of Ptolemy in Egypt.[992]

I have already mentioned, that in the partition after the decease of Alexander, Egypt had been assigned to Ptolemy. Seizing with eagerness the opportunity of annexing to it so valuable a possession as the Kyrenaic Pentapolis, this chief sent an adequate force under Ophellas to put down Thimbron and restore the exiles. His success was complete. All the cities in the Pentapolis were reduced; Thimbron, worsted and pursued as a fugitive, was seized in his flight by some Libyans, and brought prisoner to Teucheira; the citizens of which place (by permission of the Olynthian Epikydes, governor for Ptolemy), first tortured him, and then conveyed him to Apollonia to be hanged. A final visit from Ptolemy himself regulated the affairs of the Pentapolis, which were incorporated with his dominions and placed under the government of Ophellas.[993]

It was thus that the rich and flourishing Kyrênê, an interesting portion of the once autonomous Hellenic world, passed like the rest under one of the Macedonian Diadochi. As the proof and guarantee of this new sovereignty, we find erected within the walls of the city, a strong and completely detached citadel, occupied by a Macedonian or Egyptian garrison (like Munychia at Athens), and forming the stronghold of the viceroy. Ten years afterwards (B. C. 312) the Kyreneans made an attempt to emancipate themselves, and besieged this citadel; but being again put down by an army and fleet which Ptolemy despatched under Agis from Egypt,[994] Kyrênê passed once more under the vice-royalty of Ophellas.[995]

To this viceroy Agathokles now sent envoys, invoking his aid against Carthage. Ophellas was an officer of consideration and experience. He had served under Alexander, and had married an Athenian wife, Euthydikê,—a lineal descendant from Miltiades the victor of Marathon, and belonging to a family still distinguished at Athens. In inviting Ophellas to undertake jointly the conquest of Carthage, the envoys proposed that he should himself hold it when conquered. Agathokles (they said) wished only to overthrow the Carthaginian dominion in Sicily, being well aware that he could not hold that island in conjunction with an African dominion. To Ophellas, [996] such an invitation proved extremely seducing. He was already on the look out for aggrandizement towards the west, and had sent an exploring nautical expedition along the northern coast of Africa, even to some distance round and beyond the Strait of Gibraltar.[997] Moreover, to all military adventurers, both on sea and on land,

the season was one of boundless speculative promise. They had before them not only the prodigious career of Alexander himself, but the successful encroachments of the great officers his successors. In the second distribution, made at Triparadeisus, of the Alexandrine empire, Antipater had assigned to Ptolemy not merely Egypt and Libya, but also an undefined amount of territory west of Libya, to be afterwards acquired;[998] the conquest of which was known to have been among the projects of Alexander, had he lived longer. To this conquest Ophellas was now specially called, either as the viceroy or the independent equal of Ptolemy, by the invitation of Agathokles. Having learnt in the service of Alexander not to fear long marches, he embraced the proposition with eagerness. He undertook an expedition from Kyrênê on the largest scale. Through his wife's relatives, he was enabled to make known his projects at Athens, where, as well as in other parts of Greece, they found much favor. At this season, the Kassandrian oligarchies were paramount not only at Athens, but generally throughout Greece. Under the prevalent degradation and suffering, there was ample ground for discontent, and no liberty of expressing it; many persons therefore were found disposed either to accept army-service with Ophellas, or to enrol themselves in a foreign colony under his auspices. To set out under the military protection of this powerful chief—to colonize the mighty Carthage, supposed to be already enfeebled by the victories of Agathokles—to appropriate the wealth, the fertile landed possessions, and the maritime position, of her citizens—was a prize well calculated to seduce men dissatisfied with their homes, and not well informed of the intervening difficulties.[999]

Under such hopes, many Grecian colonists joined Ophellas at Kyrênê, some even with wives and children. The total number is stated at 10,000. Ophellas conducted them forth at the head of a well appointed army of 10,000 infantry, 600 cavalry, and 100 war-chariots; each chariot carrying the driver and two fighting men. Marching with this miscellaneous body of soldiers and colonists, he reached in eighteen days the post of Automalæ—the westernmost factory of Kyrênê.[1000] From thence he proceeded westward along the shore between the two Syrtes, in many parts a sandy, trackless desert, without wood and almost without water (with the exception of particular points of fertility), and infested by serpents many and venomous. At one time, all his provisions were exhausted; he passed through the territory of the natives called Lotophagi, near the lesser Syrtis; where the army had nothing to eat except the fruit of the lotus, which there abounded.[1001] Ophellas met with no enemies; but the sufferings of every kind endured by his soldiers—still more of course by the less hardy colonists and their families—were most distressing. After miseries endured for more than two months, he joined Agathokles in the Carthaginian territory; With what abatement of number, we do not know, but his loss must have been considerable. [1002]

Ophellas little knew the man whose invitation and alliance he had accepted. Agathokles at first received him with the warmest protestations of attachment, wel-

coming the new-comers with profuse hospitality, and supplying to them full means of refreshment and renovation after their past sufferings. Having thus gained the confidence and favorable sympathies of all, he proceeded to turn it to his own purposes. Convening suddenly the most devoted among his own soldiers, he denounced Ophellas as guilty of plotting against his life. They listened to him with the same feelings of credulous rage as the Macedonian soldiers exhibited when Alexander denounced Philotas before them. Agathokles then at once called them to arms, set upon Ophellas unawares, and slew him with his more immediate defenders. Among the soldiers of Ophellas, this act excited horror and indignation, no less than surprise; but Agathokles at length succeeded in bringing them to terms, partly by deceitful pretexts, partly by intimidation: for this unfortunate army, left without any commander of fixed purpose, had no resource except to enter into his service.[1003] He thus found himself (like Antipater after the death of Leonnatus) master of a double army, and relieved from a troublesome rival. The colonists of Ophellas—more unfortunate still, since they could be of no service to Agathokles—were put by him on board some merchant vessels, which he was sending to Syracuse with spoil. The weather becoming stormy, many of these vessels foundered at sea,—some were driven off and wrecked on the coast of Italy—and a few only reached Syracuse.[1004] Thus miserably perished the Kyrenean expedition of Ophellas; one of the most commanding and powerful schemes, for joint conquest and colonization, that ever set out from any Grecian city.

It would have fared ill with Agathokles, had the Carthaginians been at hand, and ready to attack him in the confusion immediately succeeding the death of Ophellas. It would also have fared yet worse with Carthage, had Agathokles been in a position to attack her during the terrible sedition excited, nearly at the same time, within her walls by the general Bomilkar.[1005] This traitor (as has been already stated) had long cherished the design to render himself despot, and had been watching for a favorable opportunity. Having purposely caused the loss of the first battle—fought in conjunction with his brave colleague Hanno, against Agathokles—he had since carried on the war with a view to his own project (which explains in part the continued reverses of the Carthaginians); he now thought that the time was come for openly raising his standard. Availing himself of a military muster in the quarter of the city called Neapolis, he first dismissed the general body of the soldiers, retaining near him only a trusty band of 500 citizens, and 4000 mercenaries. At the head of these, he then fell upon the unsuspecting city: dividing them into five detachments, and slaughtering indiscriminately the unarmed citizens in the streets, as well as in the great market-place. At first the Carthaginians were astounded and paralyzed. Gradually however they took courage, stood upon their defence against the assailants, combatted them in the streets and poured upon them missiles from the house-tops. After a prolonged conflict, the partisans of Bomilkar found themselves worsted, and were glad to avail themselves of the mediation of some elder citizens. They laid down their arms on promise of pardon. The promise was faithfully kept by the victors, except in regard to

Bomilkar himself; who was hanged in the market-place, having first undergone severe tortures.[1006]

Though the Carthaginians had thus escaped from an extreme peril, yet the effects of so formidable a conspiracy weakened them for some time against their enemy without; while Agathokles on the other hand, reinforced by the army from Kyrênê, was stronger than ever. So elate did he feel, that he assumed the title of King;[1007] following herein the example of the great Macedonian officers, Antigonus, Ptolemy, Seleukus, Lysimachus, and Kassander; the memory of Alexander being now discarded, as his heirs had been already put to death. Agathokles, already master of nearly all the dependent towns east and south-east of Carthage, proceeded to carry his arms to the north-west of the city. He attacked Utica,—the second city next to Carthage in importance, and older indeed than Carthage itself—situated on the western or opposite shore of the Carthaginian Gulf, and visible from Carthage, though distant from it twenty-seven miles around the Gulf on land.[1008] The Uticans had hitherto remained faithful to Carthage, in spite of her reverses, and of defection elsewhere.[1009] Agathokles marched into their territory with such unexpected rapidity (he had hitherto been on the south-east of Carthage, and he now suddenly moved to the north-west of that city), that he seized the persons of three hundred leading citizens, who had not yet taken the precaution of retiring within the city. Having vainly tried to prevail on the Uticans to surrender, he assailed their walls, attaching in front of his battering engines the three hundred Utican prisoners; so that the citizens, in hurling missiles of defence, were constrained to inflict death on their own comrades and relatives. They nevertheless resisted the assault with unshaken resolution; but Agathokles found means to force an entrance through a weak part of the walls, and thus became master of the city. He made it a scene of indiscriminate slaughter, massacring the inhabitants, armed and unarmed, and hanging up the prisoners. He further captured the town of Hippu-Akra, about thirty miles north-west of Utica, which had also remained faithful to Carthage—and which now, after a brave defence, experienced the like pitiless treatment.[1010] The Carthaginians, seemingly not yet recovered from their recent shock, did not interfere, even to rescue these two important places; so that Agathokles, firmly established in Tunês as a centre of operations, extended his African dominion more widely than ever all round Carthage, both on the coast and in the interior; while he interrupted the supplies of Carthage itself, and reduced the inhabitants to great privations.[1011] He even occupied and fortified strongly a place called Hippagreta, between Utica and Carthage; thus pushing his posts within a short distance both east and west of her gates.[1012]

In this prosperous condition of his African affairs, he thought the opportunity favorable for retrieving his diminished ascendency in Sicily; to which island he accordingly crossed over, with 2000 men, leaving the command in Africa to his son Archagathus. That young man was at first successful, and seemed even in course of enlarging his father's conquests. His general Eumachus overran a wide range of interior

Numidia, capturing Tokæ, Phellinê, Meschelæ, Akris, and another town bearing the same name of Hippu-Akra—and enriching his soldiers with a considerable plunder. But in a second expedition, endeavoring to carry his arms yet farther into the interior, he was worsted in an attack upon a town called Miltinê, and compelled to retreat. We read that he marched through one mountainous region abounding in wild cats—and another, in which there were a great number of apes, who lived in the most tame and familiar manner in the houses with men—being greatly caressed, and even worshipped as gods.[1013]

The Carthaginians however had now regained internal harmony and power of action. Their senate and their generals were emulous, both in vigor and in provident combinations, against the common enemy. They sent forth 30,000 men, a larger force than they had yet had in the field; forming three distinct camps, under Hanno, Imilkon, and Adherbal, partly in the interior, partly on the coast. Archagathus, leaving a sufficient guard at Tunês, marched to meet them, distributing his army in three divisions also; two, under himself and Æschrion, besides the corps under Eumachus in the mountainous region. He was however unsuccessful at all points. Hanno, contriving to surprise the division of Æschrion, gained a complete victory, wherein Æschrion himself with more than 4000 men were slain. Imilkon was yet more fortunate in his operations against Eumachus, whom he entrapped by simulated flight into an ambuscade, and attacked at such advantage, that the Grecian army was routed and cut off from all retreat. A remnant of them defended themselves for some time on a neighboring hill, but being without water, nearly all soon perished, from thirst, fatigue, and the sword of the conqueror.[1014]

By such reverses, destroying two-thirds of the Agathoklean army, Archagathus was placed in serious peril. He was obliged to concentrate his force in Tunês, calling in nearly all his outlying detachments. At the same time, those Liby-Phenician cities, and rural Libyan tribes, who had before joined Agathokles, now detached themselves from him when his power was evidently declining, and made their peace with Carthage. The victorious Carthaginian generals established fortified camps round Tunês, so as to restrain the excursions of Archagathus; while with their fleet they blocked up his harbor. Presently provisions became short, and much despondency prevailed among the Grecian army. Archagathus transmitted this discouraging news to his father in Sicily, with urgent entreaties that he would come to the rescue.[1015]

The career of Agathokles in Sicily, since his departure from Africa, had been checkered, and on the whole unproductive. Just before his arrival in the island,[1016] his generals Leptines and Demophilus had gained an important victory over the Agrigentine forces commanded by Xenodokus, who were disabled from keeping the field. This disaster was a fatal discouragement both to the Agrigentines, and to the cause which they had espoused as champions—free and autonomous city-government with equal confederacy for self-defence, under the presidency of Agrigentum.[1017] The outlying cities confederate with Agrigentum were left without military protection, and

exposed to the attacks of Leptines, animated and fortified by the recent arrival of his master Agathokles. That despot landed at Selinus—subdued Herakleia, Therma, and Kephaloidion, on or near the northern coast of Sicily—then crossed the interior of the island to Syracuse. In his march he assaulted Kentoripa, having some partisans within, but was repulsed with loss. At Apollonia,[1018] he was also unsuccessful in his first attempt; but being stung with mortification, he resumed the assault next day, and at length, by great efforts, carried the town. To avenge his loss, which had been severe, he massacred most of the citizens, and abandoned the town to plunder.[1019]

From hence he proceeded to Syracuse, which he now revisited after an absence of (apparently) more than two years in Africa. During all this interval, the Syracusan harbor had been watched by a Carthaginian fleet, obstructing the entry of provisions, and causing partial scarcity.[1020] But there was no blockading army on land; nor had the dominion of Agathokles, upheld as it was by his brother Antander and his mercenary force, been at all shaken. His arrival inspired his partisans and soldiers with new courage, while it spread terror throughout most parts of Sicily. To contend with the Carthaginian blockading squadron, he made efforts to procure maritime aid from the Tyrrhenian ports in Italy;[1021] while on land, his forces were now preponderant—owing to the recent defeat, and broken spirit, of the Agrigentines. But his prospects were suddenly checked by the enterprising move of his old enemy—the Syracusan exile Deinokrates; who made profession of taking up that generous policy which the Agrigentines had tacitly let fall—announcing himself as the champion of autonomous city-government, and equal confederacy, throughout Sicily. Deinokrates received ready adhesion from most of the cities belonging to the Agrigentine confederacy—all of them who were alarmed by finding that the weakness or fears of their presiding city had left them unprotected against Agathokles. He was soon at the head of a powerful army—20,000 foot, and 1500 horse. Moreover a large proportion of his army were not citizen militia, but practised soldiers; for the most part exiles, driven from their homes by the distractions and violences of the Agathoklean æra.[1022] For military purposes, both he and his soldiers were far more strenuous and effective than the Agrigentines under Xenodokus had been. He not only kept the field against Agathokles, but several times offered him battle, which the despot did not feel confidence enough to accept. Agathokles could do no more than maintain himself in Syracuse, while the Sicilian cities generally were put in security against his aggressions.

Amidst this unprosperous course of affairs in Sicily, Agathokles received messengers from his son, reporting the defeats in Africa. Preparing immediately to revisit that country, he was fortunate enough to obtain a reinforcement of Tyrrhenian ships of war, which enabled him to overcome the Carthaginian blockading squadron at the mouth of the Syracusan harbor. A clear passage to Africa was thus secured for himself, together with ample supplies of imported provisions for the Syracusans.[1023] Though still unable to combat Deinokrates in the field, Agathokles was emboldened by his recent naval victory to send forth Leptines with a force to invade the Agrigen-

tines—the jealous rivals, rather than the allies, of Deinokrates. The Agrigentine army —under the general Xenodokus, whom Leptines had before defeated—consisted of citizen militia mustered on the occasion; while the Agathoklean mercenaries, conducted by Leptines, had made arms a profession, and were used to fighting as well as to hardships.[1024] Here as elsewhere in Greece, we find the civic and patriotic energy trampled down by professional soldiership, and reduced to operate only as an obsequious instrument for administrative details.

Xenodokus, conscious of the inferiority of his Agrigentine force, was reluctant to hazard a battle. Driven to this imprudence by the taunts of his soldiers, he was defeated a second time by Leptines, and became so apprehensive of the wrath of the Agrigentines, that he thought it expedient to retire to Gela. After a period of rejoicing, for his recent victories by land as well as by sea, Agathokles passed over to Africa, where he found his son, with the army at Tunês in great despondency and privation, and almost mutiny for want of pay. They still amounted to 6000 Grecian mercenaries, 6000 Gauls, Samnites, and Tyrrhenians—1500 cavalry—and no less than 6000 (if the number be correct) Libyan war-chariots. There were also a numerous body of Libyan allies; faithless time-servers, watching for the turn of fortune. The Carthaginians, occupying strong camps in the vicinity of Tunês, and abundantly supplied, awaited patiently the destroying effects of privation and suffering on their enemies. So desperate was the position of Agathokles, that he was compelled to go forth and fight. Having tried in vain to draw the Carthaginians down into the plain, he at length attacked them in the full strength of their entrenchments. But in spite of the most strenuous efforts, his troops were repulsed with great slaughter, and driven back to their camp.[1025]

The night succeeding this battle was a scene of disorder and panic in both camps; even in that of the victorious Carthaginians. The latter, according to the ordinances of their religion, eager to return their heartfelt thanks to the gods for this great victory, sacrificed to them as a choice offering the handsomest prisoners captured.[1026] During this process, the tent or tabernacle consecrated to the gods, close to the altar as well as to the general's tent, accidentally took fire. The tents being formed by mere wooden posts, connected by a thatch of hay or straw both on roof and sides,—the fire spread rapidly, and the entire camp was burnt, together with many soldiers who tried to arrest the conflagration. So distracting was the terror occasioned by this catastrophe, that the whole Carthaginian army for the time dispersed; and Agathokles, had he been prepared, might have destroyed them. But it happened that at the same hour, his own camp was thrown into utter confusion by a different accident, rendering his soldiers incapable of being brought into action.[1027]

His position at Tunês had now become desperate. His Libyan allies had all declared against him, after the recent defeat. He could neither continue to hold Tunês, nor carry away his troops to Sicily; for he had but few vessels, and the Carthaginians were masters at sea. Seeing no resource, he resolved to embark secretly with his

younger son Herakleides; abandoning Archagathus and the army to their fate. But Archagathus and the other officers, suspecting his purpose, were thoroughly resolved that the man who had brought them into destruction should not thus slip away and betray them. As Agathokles was on the point of going aboard at night, he found himself watched, arrested, and held prisoner, by the indignant soldiery. The whole town now became a scene of disorder and tumult, aggravated by the rumor that the enemy were marching up to attack them. Amidst the general alarm, the guards who had been set over Agathokles, thinking his services indispensable for defence, brought him out with his fetters still on. When the soldiers saw him in this condition, their sentiment towards him again reverted to pity and admiration, notwithstanding his projected desertion; moreover they hoped for his guidance to resist the impending attack. With one voice they called upon the guards to strike off his chains and set him free. Agathokles was again at liberty. But insensible to everything except his own personal safety, he presently stole away, leaped unperceived into a skiff, with a few attendants, but without either of his sons,—and was lucky enough to arrive, in spite of stormy November weather, on the coast of Sicily.[1028]

So terrible was the fury of the soldiers, on discovering that Agathokles had accomplished his desertion, that they slew both his sons, Archagathus and Herakleides. No resource was left but to elect new generals, and make the best terms they could with Carthage. They were still a formidable body, retaining in their hands various other towns besides Tunês; so that the Carthaginians, relieved from all fear of Agathokles, thought it prudent to grant an easy capitulation. It was agreed that all the towns should be restored to the Carthaginians, on payment of 300 talents; that such soldiers as chose to enter into the African service of Carthage, should be received on full pay; but that such as preferred returning to Sicily should be transported thither, with permission to reside in the Carthaginian town of Solus (or Soluntum). On these terms the convention was concluded, and the army finally broken up. Some indeed among the Grecian garrisons, quartered in the outlying posts, being rash enough to dissent and hold out, were besieged and taken by the Carthaginian force. Their commanders were crucified, and the soldiers condemned to rural work as fettered slaves. [1029]

Thus miserably terminated the expedition of Agathokles to Africa, after an interval of four years from the time of his landing. By the *vana mirantes*,[1030] who looked out for curious coincidences (probably Timæus), it was remarked, that his ultimate flight, with the slaughter of his two sons, occurred exactly on the same day of the year following his assassination of Ophellas.[1031] Ancient writers extol, with good reason, the bold and striking conception of transferring the war to Africa, at the very moment when he was himself besieged in Syracuse by a superior Carthaginian force. But while admitting the military resource, skill, and energy, of Agathokles, we must not forget that his success in Africa was materially furthered by the treasonable conduct of the Carthaginian general Bomilkar—an accidental coincidence in point of

time. Nor is it to be overlooked, that Agathokles missed the opportunity of turning his first success to account, at a moment when the Carthaginians would probably have purchased his evacuation of Africa by making large concessions to him in Sicily.[1032] He imprudently persisted in the war, though the complete conquest of Carthage was beyond his strength—and though it was still more beyond his strength to prosecute effective war, simultaneously and for a long time, in Sicily and in Africa. The African subjects of Carthage were not attached to her; but neither were they attached to him;—nor, on the long run, did they do him any serious good. Agathokles is a man of force and fraud—consummate in the use of both. His whole life is a series of successful adventures, and strokes of bold ingenuity to extricate himself from difficulties; but there is wanting in him all predetermined general plan, or measured range of ambition, to which these single exploits might be made subservient.

After his passage from Africa, Agathokles landed on the western corner of Sicily near the town of Egesta, which was then in alliance with him. He sent to Syracuse for a reinforcement. But he was hard pressed for money; he suspected, or pretended to suspect, the Egestæans of disaffection; accordingly, on receiving his new force, he employed it to commit revolting massacre and plunder in Egesta. The town is reported to have contained 10,000 citizens. Of these Agathokles caused the poorer men to be for the most part murdered; the richer were cruelly tortured, and even their wives tortured and mutilated, to compel revelations of concealed wealth; the children of both sexes were transported to Italy, and there sold as slaves to the Bruttians. The original population being thus nearly extirpated, Agathokles changed the name of the town to Dikæopolis, assigning it as a residence to such deserters as might join him.[1033] This atrocity, more suitable to Africa[1034] than Greece (where the mutilation of women is almost unheard of), was probably the way in which his savage pride obtained some kind of retaliatory satisfaction for the recent calamity and humiliation in Africa. Under the like sentiment, he perpetrated another deed of blood at Syracuse. Having learnt that the soldiers, whom he had deserted at Tunês, had after his departure put to death his two sons, he gave orders to Antander his brother (viceroy of Syracuse), to massacre all the relatives of those Syracusans who had served him in the African expedition. This order was fulfilled by Antander (we are assured) accurately and to the letter. Neither age or sex—grandsire or infant—wife or mother—were spared by the Agathoklean executioners. We may be sure that their properties were plundered at the same time; we hear of no mutilations.[1035]

Still Agathokles tried to maintain his hold on the Sicilian towns which remained to him; but his cruelties as well as his reverses had produced a strong sentiment against him, and even his general Pasiphilus revolted to join Deinokrates. That exile was now at the head of an army stated at 20,000 men, the most formidable military force in Sicily; so that Agathokles, feeling the inadequacy of his own means, sent to solicit peace, and to offer tempting conditions. He announced his readiness to evacuate Syracuse altogether, and to be content, if two maritime towns on the northern

coast of the island—Therma and Kephaloidion—were assigned to his mercenaries and himself. Under this proposition, Deinokrates, and the other Syracusan exiles, had the opportunity of entering Syracuse, and reconstituting the free city-government. Had Deinokrates been another Timoleon, the city might now have acquired and enjoyed another temporary sunshine of autonomy and prosperity; but his ambition was thoroughly selfish. As commander of this large army, he enjoyed a station of power and license such as he was not likely to obtain under the reconstituted city-government of Syracuse. He therefore evaded the propositions of Agathokles, requiring still larger concessions; until at length the Syracusan exiles in his own army (partly instigated by emissaries from Agathokles himself) began to suspect his selfish projects, and to waver in their fidelity to him. Meanwhile Agathokles, being repudiated by Deinokrates, addressed himself to the Carthaginians, and concluded a treaty with them, restoring or guaranteeing to them all the possessions that they had ever enjoyed in Sicily. In return for this concession, he received from them a sum of money, and a large supply of corn.[1036]

Relieved from Carthaginian hostility, Agathokles presently ventured to march against the army of Deinokrates. The latter was indeed greatly superior in strength, but many of his soldiers were now lukewarm or disaffected, and Agathokles had established among them correspondences upon which he could rely. At a great battle fought near Torgium, many of them went over on the field to Agathokles, giving to him a complete victory. The army of Deinokrates was completely dispersed. Shortly afterwards a considerable body among them (4000 men, or 7000 men, according to different statements) surrendered to the victor on terms. As soon as they had delivered up their arms, Agathokles, regardless of his covenant, caused them to be surrounded by his own army, and massacred.[1037]

It appears as if the recent victory had been the result of a secret and treacherous compact between Agathokles and Deinokrates; and as if the prisoners massacred by Agathokles were those of whom Deinokrates wished to rid himself as malcontents; for immediately after the battle, a reconciliation took place between the two. Agathokles admitted the other as a sort of partner in his despotism; while Deinokrates not only brought into the partnership all the military means and strong posts which he had been two years in acquiring, but also betrayed to Agathokles the revolted general Pasiphilus with the town of Gela occupied by the latter. It is noticed as singular, that Agathokles, generally faithless and unscrupulous towards both friends and enemies, kept up the best understanding and confidence with Deinokrates to the end of his life.[1038]

The despot had now regained full power at Syracuse, together with a great extent of dominion in Sicily. The remainder of his restless existence was spent in operations of hostility or plunder against more northerly enemies—the Liparæan isles[1039]—the Italian cities and the Bruttians—the island of Korkyra. We are unable to follow his proceedings in detail. He was threatened with a formidable attack[1040] by the

Spartan prince Kleonymus, who was invited by the Tarentines to aid them against the Lucanians and Romans. But Kleonymus found enough to occupy him elsewhere, without visiting Sicily. He collected a considerable force on the coast of Italy, undertook operations with success against the Lucanians, and even captured the town of Thurii. But the Romans, now pushing their intervention even to the Tarentine Gulf, drove him off and retook the town; moreover his own behavior was so tyrannical and profligate, as to draw upon him universal hatred. Returning from Italy to Korkyra, Kleonymus made himself master of that important island, intending to employ it as a base of operations both against Greece and against Italy.[1041] He failed however in various expeditions both in the Tarentine Gulf and the Adriatic. Demetrius Poliorketes and Kassander alike tried to conclude an alliance with him; but in vain.[1042] At a subsequent period, Korkyra was besieged by Kassander with a large naval and military force; Kleonymus then retired (or perhaps had previously retired) to Sparta. Kassander, having reduced the island to great straits, was on the point of taking it, when it was relieved by Agathokles with a powerful armament. That despot was engaged in operations on the coast of Italy against the Bruttians when his aid to Korkyra was solicited; he destroyed most part of the Macedonian fleet, and then seized the island for himself.[1043] On returning from this victorious expedition to the Italian coast, where he had left a detachment of his Ligurian and Tuscan mercenaries, he was informed that these mercenaries had been turbulent during his absence, in demanding the pay due to them from his grandson Archagathus. He caused them all to be slain, to the number of 2000.[1044]

As far as we can trace the events of the last years of Agathokles, we find him seizing the towns of Kroton and Hipponia in Italy, establishing an alliance with Demetrius Poliorketes,[1045] and giving his daughter Lanassa in marriage to the youthful Pyrrhus king of Epirus. At the age of seventy-two, still in the plenitude of vigor as well as of power, he was projecting a fresh expedition against the Carthaginians in Africa, with two hundred of the largest ships of war, when his career was brought to a close by sickness and by domestic enemies.

He proclaimed as future successor to his dominion, his son, named Agathokles; but Archagathus his grandson (son of Archagathus who had perished in Africa), a young prince of more conspicuous qualities, had already been singled out for the most important command, and was now at the head of the army near Ætna. The old Agathokles, wishing to strengthen the hands of his intended successor, sent his favored son Agathokles to Ætna, with written orders directing that Archagathus should yield up to him the command. Archagathus, noway disposed to obey, invited his uncle Agathokles to a banquet, and killed him; after which he contrived the poisoning of his grandfather the old despot himself. The instrument of his purpose was Mænon; a citizen of Egesta, enslaved at the time when Agathokles massacred most of the Egestæan population. The beauty of his person procured him much favor with Agathokles; but he had never forgotten, and had always been anxious to avenge, the

bloody outrage on his fellow-citizens. To accomplish this purpose, the opportunity was now opened to him, together with a promise of protection, through Archagathus. He accordingly poisoned Agathokles, as we are told, by means of a medicated quill, handed to him for cleaning his teeth after dinner.[1046] Combining together the various accounts, it seems probable that Agathokles was at the time sick —that this sickness may have been the reason why he was so anxious to strengthen the position of his intended successor—and that his death was as much the effect of his malady as of the poison. Archagathus, after murdering his uncle, seems by means of his army to have made himself real master of the Syracusan power; while the old despot, defenceless on a sick bed, could do no more than provide for the safety of his Egyptian wife Theoxena and his two young children, by despatching them on shipboard with all his rich movable treasures to Alexandria. Having secured this object, amidst extreme grief on the part of those around, he expired.[1047]

The great lines in the character of Agathokles are well marked. He was of the stamp of Gelon and the elder Dionysius—a soldier of fortune, who raised himself from the meanest beginnings to the summit of political power—and who, in the acquisition as well as maintenance of that power, displayed an extent of energy, perseverance, and military resource, not surpassed by any one, even of the generals formed in Alexander's school. He was an adept in that art at which all aspiring men of his age aimed—the handling of mercenary soldiers for the extinction of political liberty and security at home, and for predatory aggrandizement abroad. I have already noticed the opinion delivered by Scipio Africanus—that the elder Dionysius and Agathokles were the most daring, sagacious, and capable men of action within his knowledge.[1048] Apart from this enterprising genius, employed in the service of unmeasured personal ambition, we know nothing of Agathokles except his sanguinary, faithless, and nefarious dispositions; in which attributes also he stands pre-eminent, above all his known contemporaries, and above nearly all predecessors.[1049] Notwithstanding his often-proved perfidy, he seems to have had a joviality and apparent simplicity of manner (the same is recounted of Cæsar Borgia) which amused men and put them off their guard, throwing them perpetually into his trap.[1050]

Agathokles, however, though among the worst of Greeks, was yet a Greek. During his government of thirty-two years, the course of events in Sicily continued under Hellenic agency, without the preponderant intervention of any foreign power. The power of Agathokles indeed rested mainly on foreign mercenaries; but so had that of Dionysius and Gelon before him; and he as well as they, kept up vigorously the old conflict against the Carthaginian power in the island. Grecian history in Sicily thus continues down to the death of Agathokles; but it continues no longer. After his death, Hellenic power and interests become incapable of self-support, and sink into a secondary and subservient position, overridden or contended for by foreigners. Syracuse and the other cities passed from one despot to another, and were torn with discord arising out of the crowds of foreign mercenaries who had obtained footing

among them. At the same time, the Carthaginians made increased efforts to push their conquests in the island, without finding any sufficient internal resistance; so that they would have taken Syracuse, and made Sicily their own, had not Pyrrhus king of Epirus (the son-in-law of Agathokles) interposed to arrest their progress. From this time forward, the Greeks of Sicily become a prize to be contended for—first between the Carthaginians and Pyrrhus—next, between the Carthaginians and Romans[1051]—until at length they dwindle into subjects of Rome; corn-growers for the Roman plebs, clients under the patronage of the Roman Marcelli, victims of the rapacity of Verres, and suppliants for the tutelary eloquence of Cicero. The historian of self-acting Hellas loses sight of them at the death of Agathokles.

CHAPTER XCVIII.

OUTLYING HELLENIC CITIES.

1 IN GAUL AND SPAIN.

2 ON THE COAST OF THE EUXINE.

To complete the picture of the Hellenic world while yet in its period of full life, in freedom and self-action, or even during its decline into the half-life of a dependent condition—we must say a few words respecting some of its members lying apart from the general history, yet of not inconsiderable importance. The Greeks of Massalia formed its western wing; the Pontic Greeks (those on the shores of the Euxine), its eastern; both of them the outermost radiations of Hellenism, where it was always militant against foreign elements, and often adulterated by them. It is indeed little that we have the means of saying; but that little must not be left unsaid.

In my third volume (ch. xxii. p. 397), I briefly noticed the foundation and first proceedings of Massalia (the modern Marseilles), on the Mediterranean coast of Gaul or Liguria. This Ionic city, founded by the enterprising Phokæans of Asia Minor, a little before their own seaboard was subjugated by the Persians, had a life and career of its own, apart from those political events which determined the condition of its Hellenic sisters in Asia, Peloponnesus, Italy, or Sicily. The Massaliots maintained their own relations of commerce, friendship or hostility with their barbaric neighbors, the Ligurians, Gauls, and Iberians, without becoming involved in the larger political confederacies of the Hellenic world. They carried out from their mother-city established habits of adventurous coast navigation and commercial activity. Their situation, distant from other Greeks and sustained by a force hardly sufficient even for defence, imposed upon them the necessity both of political harmony at home, and of prudence and persuasive agency in their mode of dealing with neighbors. That they were found equal to this necessity, appears sufficiently attested by the few general statements transmitted in respect to them; though their history in its details is unknown. Their city was strong by position, situated upon a promontory washed on three sides by the sea, well-fortified, and possessing a convenient harbor securely closed against enemies.[1052] The domain around it however appears not to have been large, nor did their population extend itself much into the interior. The land around was less adapted for corn than for the vine and the olive; wine was supplied by the Massaliots throughout Gaul.[1053] It was on shipboard that their courage and skill was chiefly displayed; it was by maritime enterprise that their power, their

wealth, and their colonial expansion was obtained. In an age when piracy was common, the Massaliot ships and seamen were effective in attack and defence not less than in transport and commercial interchange; while their numerous maritime successes were attested by many trophies adorning the temples.[1054] The city contained docks and arsenals admirably provided with provisions, stores, arms, and all the various muniments of naval war.[1055] Except the Phenicians and Carthaginians, these Massaliots were the only enterprising mariners in the Western Mediterranean; from the year 500 B. C. downward, after the energy of the Ionic Greeks had been crushed by inland potentates. The Iberian and Gallic tribes were essentially landsmen, not occupying permanent stations on the coast, nor having any vocation for the sea; but the Ligurians, though chiefly mountaineers, were annoying neighbors to Massalia as well by their piracies at sea as from their depredations by land.[1056] To all these landsmen, however, depredators as they were, the visit of the trader soon made itself felt as a want, both for import and export; and to this want the Massaliots, with their colonies, were the only ministers, along the Gulfs of Genoa and Lyons, from Luna (the frontier of Tuscany) to the Dianium (Cape della Nao) in Spain. [1057] It was not until the first century before the Christian era that they were outstripped in this career by Narbon, and a few other neighbors, exalted into Roman colonies.

Along the coast on both sides of their own city, the Massaliots planted colonies, each commended to the protection, and consecrated by the statue and peculiar rites, of their own patron goddess, the Ephesian Artemis.[1058] Towards the east were Tauroentium, Olbia, Antipolis, Nikæa, and the Portus Monœki; towards the west, on the coast of Spain, were Rhoda, Emporiæ, Alônê, Hemeroskopium, and Artemisium or Dianium. These colonies were established chiefly on outlying capes or sometimes islets, at once near and safe; they were intended more as shelter and accommodation for maritime traffic, and as depots for trade with the interior,—than for the purpose of spreading inland, and including a numerous outlying population round the walls. The circumstances of Emporiæ were the most remarkable. That town was built originally on a little uninhabited islet off the coast of Iberia; after a certain interval, it became extended to the adjoining mainland, and a body of native Iberians were admitted to joint residence within the new-walled circuit there established. This new circuit however was divided in half by an intervening wall, on one side of which dwelt the Iberians, on the other side the Greeks. One gate alone was permitted, for intercommunication, guarded night and day by appointed magistrates, one of whom was perpetually on the spot. Every night, one third of the Greek citizens kept guard on the walls, or at least held themselves prepared to do so. How long these strict and fatiguing precautions were found necessary, we do not know; but after a certain time they were relaxed, and the intervening wall disappeared, so that Greeks and Iberians freely coalesced into one community.[1059] It is not often that we are allowed to see so much in detail the early difficulties and dangers of a Grecian colony. Massalia itself was situated under nearly similar circumstances among the rude Ligurian Salyes; we

hear of these Ligurians hiring themselves as laborers to dig on the fields of Massaliot proprietors.[1060] The various tribes of Ligurians, Gauls, and Iberians extended down to the coast, so that there was no safe road along it, nor any communication except by sea, until the conquests of the Romans in the second and first century before the Christian era.[1061]

The government of Massalia was oligarchical, carried on chiefly by a Senate or Great Council of Six Hundred (called Timuchi), elected for life—and by a small council of fifteen, chosen among this larger body to take turn in executive duties.[1062] The public habits of the administrators are said to have been extremely vigilant and circumspect; the private habits of the citizens, frugal and temperate—a maximum being fixed by law for dowries and marriage-ceremonies.[1063] They were careful in their dealings with the native tribes, with whom they appear to have maintained relations generally friendly. The historian Ephorus (whose history closed about 340 B. C.) represented the Gauls as especially phil-hellenic;[1064] an impression which he could hardly have derived from any but Massaliot informants. The Massaliots (who in the first century before Christ were *trilingues*, speaking Greek, Latin, and Gallic[1065]) contributed to engraft upon these unlettered men a certain refinement and variety of wants, and to lay the foundation of that taste for letters which afterwards became largely diffused throughout the Roman Province of Gaul. At sea, and in traffic, the Phenicians and Carthaginians were their formidable rivals. This was among the causes which threw them betimes into alliance and active co-operation with Rome, under whose rule they obtained favorable treatment, when the blessing of freedom was no longer within their reach.

Enough is known about Massalia to show that the city was a genuine specimen of Hellenism and Hellenic influences—acting not by force or constraint, but simply by superior intelligence and activity—by power of ministering to wants which must otherwise have remained unsupplied—and by the assimilating effect of a lettered civilization upon ruder neighbors. This is the more to be noticed as it contrasts strikingly with the Macedonian influences which have occupied so much of the present volume; force admirably organized and wielded by Alexander, yet still nothing but force. The loss of all details respecting the history of Massalia is greatly to be lamented; and hardly less, that of the writings of Pytheas, an intelligent Massaliotic navigator, who, at this early age (330-320 B. C.),[1066] with an adventurous boldness even more than Phokæan, sailed through the Pillars of Herakles and from thence northward along the coast of Spain, Gaul, Britain, Germany—perhaps yet farther. Probably no Greek except a Massaliot could have accomplished such a voyage; which in his case deserves the greater sympathy, as there was no other reward for the difficulties and dangers braved, except the gratification of an intelligent curiosity. It seems plain that the publication of his "Survey of the Earth"—much consulted by Eratosthenes, though the criticisms which have reached us through Polybius and Strabo dwell chiefly upon its mistakes, real or supposed—made an epoch in ancient geographical knowledge.

From the western wing of the Hellenic world, we pass to the eastern—the Euxine Sea. Of the Pentapolis on its western coast south of the Danube (Apollonia, Mesembria, Kallatis, Odessus, and probably Istrus)—and of Tyras near the mouth of the river so called (now Dniester)—we have little to record, though Istrus and Apollonia were among the towns whose political constitutions Aristotle thought worthy of his examination.[1067] But Herakleia on the south coast, and Pantikapæum or Bosporus between the Euxine and the Palus Mæotis (now Sea of Azof), are not thus unknown to history; nor can Sinôpê (on the south coast) and Olbia (on the north-west) be altogether passed over. Though lying apart from the political headship of Athens or Sparta, all these cities were legitimate members of the Hellenic brotherhood. All supplied spectators and competitors for the Pan-hellenic festivals—pupils to the rhetors and philosophers—purchasers, and sometimes even rivals, to the artists. All too were (like Massalia and Kyrênê) adulterated partially—Olbia and Bosporus considerably—by admixture of a non-hellenic element.

Of Sinôpê, and its three dependent colonies Kotyôra, Kerasus, and Trapezus, I have already said something,[1068] in describing the retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks. Like Massalia with its dependencies Antipolis, Nikæa, and others—Sinôpê enjoyed not merely practical independence, but considerable prosperity and local dignity, at the time when Xenophon and his companions marched through those regions. The citizens were on terms of equal alliance, mutually advantageous, with Korylas prince of Paphlagonia, on the borders of whose territory they dwelt. It is probable that they figured on the tribute list of the Persian king as a portion of Paphlagonia, and paid an annual sum; but here ended their subjection. Their behavior towards the Ten Thousand Greeks, pronounced enemies of the Persian king, was that of an independent city. Neither they, nor even the inland Paphlagonians, warlike and turbulent, were molested with Persian governors or military occupation.[1069] Alexander however numbered them among the subjects of Persia; and it is a remarkable fact, that envoys from Sinôpê were found remaining with Darius almost to his last hour, after he had become a conquered fugitive, and had lost his armies, his capitals, and his treasures. These Sinopian envoys fell into the hands of Alexander; who set them at liberty with the remark, that since they were not members of the Hellenic confederacy, but subjects of Persia—their presence as envoys near Darius was very excusable.[1070] The position of Sinôpê placed her out of the direct range of the hostilities carried on by Alexander's successors against each other; and the ancient Kappadokian princes of the Mithridatic family (professedly descendants of the Persian Achæmenidæ),[1071] who ultimately ripened into the king of Pontus, had not become sufficiently powerful to swallow up her independence until the reign of Pharnakes, in the second century before Christ. Sinôpê then passed under his dominion; exchanging (like others) the condition of a free Grecian city for that of a subject of the barbaric kings of Pontus, with a citadel and mercenary garrison to keep her citizens in obedience. We know nothing however of the intermediate events.

Respecting the Pontic Herakleia, our ignorance is not so complete. That city—much nearer than Sinôpê to the mouth of the Thracian Bosporus, and distant by sea from Byzantium only one long day's voyage of a rowboat—was established by Megarians and Bœotians on the coast of the Mariandyni. These natives were subdued, and reduced to a kind of serfdom; whereby they became slaves, yet with a proviso that they should never be sold out of the territory. Adjoining, on the westward, between Herakleia and Byzantium, were the Bithynian Thracians—villagers not merely independent, but warlike and fierce wreckers, who cruelly maltreated any Greeks stranded on their coast.[1072] We are told in general terms that the government of Herakleia was oligarchical;[1073] perhaps in the hands of the descendants of the principal original colonists, who partitioned among themselves the territory with its Mariandynian serfs, and who formed a small but rich minority among the total population. We hear of them as powerful at sea, and as being able to man, through their numerous serfs, a considerable fleet, with which they invaded the territory of Leukon prince of the Kimmerian Bosporus.[1074] They were also engaged in land-war with Mithridates, a prince of the ancient Persian family established as district rulers in Northern Kappadokia.[1075]

Towards 380-370 B. C., the Herakleots became disturbed by violent party-contentions within the city. As far as we can divine from a few obscure hints, these contentions began among the oligarchy themselves;[1076] some of whom opposed, and partially threw open, a close political monopoly—yet not without a struggle, in the course of which an energetic citizen named Klearchus was banished. Presently however the contest assumed larger dimensions; the plebs sought admission into the constitution, and are even said to have required abolition of debts with a redivision of the lands.[1077] A democratical constitution was established; but it was speedily menaced by conspiracies of the rich, to guard against which, the classification of the citizens was altered. Instead of three tribes, and four centuries, all were distributed anew into sixty-four centuries; the tribes being discontinued. It would appear that in the original four centuries, the rich men had been so enrolled as to form separate military divisions (probably their rustic serfs being armed along with them)—-while the three tribes had contained all the rest of the people; so that the effect of thus multiplying the centuries was, to divest the rich of their separate military enrolment, and to disseminate them in many different regiments along with a greater number of poor.[1078]

Still however the demands of the people were not fully granted, and dissension continued. Not merely the poorer citizens, but also the population of serfs—homogeneous, speaking the same language, and sympathizing with each other, like Helots or Penestæ—when once agitated by the hope of liberty, were with difficulty appeased. The government, though greatly democratized, found itself unable to maintain tranquillity, and invoked assistance from without. Application was made first, to the Athenian Timotheus—next, to the Theban Epaminondas; but neither of them would inter-

fere—nor was there, indeed, any motive to tempt them. At length application was made to the exiled citizen Klearchus.

This exile, now about forty years of age, intelligent, audacious and unprincipled, had passed four years at Athens partly in hearing the lessons of Plato and Isokrates—and had watched with emulous curiosity the brilliant fortune of the despot Dionysius at Syracuse, in whom both these philosophers took interest.[1079] During his banishment, moreover, he had done what was common with Grecian exiles; he had taken service with the enemy of his native city, the neighboring prince Mithridates, [1080] and probably enough against the city itself. As an officer, he distinguished himself much; acquiring renown with the prince and influence over the minds of soldiers. Hence his friends, and a party in Herakleia, became anxious to recall him, as moderator and protector under the grievous political discords prevailing. It was the oligarchical party who invited him to come back, at the head of a body of troops, as their auxiliary in keeping down the plebs. Klearchus accepted their invitation; but with the full purpose of making himself the Dionysius of Herakleia. Obtaining from Mithridates a powerful body of mercenaries, under secret promise to hold the city only as his prefect, he marched thither with the proclaimed purpose of maintaining order, and upholding the government. As his mercenary soldiers were soon found troublesome companions, he obtained permission to construct a separate stronghold in the city, under color of keeping them apart in the stricter discipline of a barrack. [1081] Having thus secured a strong position, he invited Mithridates into the city, to receive the promised possession; but instead of performing this engagement, he detained the prince as prisoner, and only released him on payment of a considerable ransom. He next cheated, still more grossly, the oligarchy who had recalled him; denouncing their past misrule, declaring himself their mortal enemy, and espousing the pretensions as well as the antipathies of the plebs. The latter willingly seconded him in his measures—even extreme measures of cruelty and spoliation—against their political enemies. A large number of the rich were killed, imprisoned, or impoverished and banished; their slaves or serfs, too, were not only manumitted by order of the new despot, but also married to the wives and daughters of the exiles. The most tragical scenes arose out of these forced marriages; many of the women even killed themselves, some after having first killed their new husbands. Among the exiles, a party, driven to despair, procured assistance from without, and tried to obtain by force readmittance into the city; but they were totally defeated by Klearchus, who after this victory became more brutal and unrelenting than ever.[1082]

He was now in irresistible power; despot of the whole city, plebs as well as oligarchy. Such he continued to be for twelve years; during which he displayed great warlike energy against exterior enemies, together with unabated cruelty towards the citizens. He farther indulged in the most overweening insolence of personal demeanor, adopting an Oriental costume and ornaments, and proclaiming himself the son of Zeus—as Alexander the Great did after him. Amidst all these enormities, how-

ever, his literary tastes did not forsake him; he collected a library, at that time a very rare possession.[1083] Many were the conspiracies attempted by suffering citizens against this tyrant; but his vigilance baffled and punished all. At length two young men, Chion and Leonidas (they too having been among the hearers of Plato), found an opportunity to stab him at a Dionysiac festival. They, with those who seconded them, were slain by his guards, after a gallant resistance; but Klearchus himself died of the wound, in torture and mental remorse.[1084]

His death unfortunately brought no relief to the Herakleots. The two sons whom he left, Timotheus and Dionysius, were both minors; but his brother Satyrus, administering in their name, grasped the sceptre and continued the despotism, with cruelty not merely undiminished, but even aggravated and sharpened by the past assassination. Not inferior to his predecessor in energy and vigilance, Satyrus was in this respect different, that he was altogether rude and unlettered. Moreover he was rigidly scrupulous in preserving the crown for his brother's children, as soon as they should be of age. To ensure to them an undisturbed succession, he took every precaution to avoid begetting children of his own by his wife.[1085] After a rule of seven years, Satyrus died of a lingering and painful distemper.

The government of Herakleia now devolved on Timotheus, who exhibited a contrast, alike marked and beneficent, with his father and uncle. Renouncing all their cruelty and constraint, he set at liberty every man whom he found in prison. He was strict in dispensing justice, but mild and even liberal in all his dealings towards the citizens. At the same time, he was a man of adventurous courage, carrying on successful war against foreign enemies, and making his power respected all round. With his younger brother Dionysius, he maintained perfect harmony, treating him as an equal and partner. Though thus using his power generously towards the Herakleots, he was, however, still a despot, and retained the characteristic marks of despotism—the strong citadel, fortified separately from the town, with a commanding mercenary force. After a reign of about nine years, he died, deeply mourned by every one.[1086]

Dionysius, who succeeded him, fell upon unsettled times, full both of hope and fear; opening chances of aggrandizement, yet with many new dangers and uncertainties. The sovereignty which he inherited doubtless included, not simply the city of Herakleia, but also foreign dependencies and possessions in its neighborhood; for his three predecessors[1087] had been all enterprising chiefs, commanding a considerable aggressive force. At the commencement of his reign, indeed, the ascendency of Memnon and the Persian force in the north-western part of Asia Minor was at a higher pitch than ordinary; it appears too that Klearchus—and probably his successors also—had always taken care to keep on the best terms with the Persian court.[1088] But presently came the invasion of Alexander (334 B. C.), with the battle of the Granikus, which totally extinguished the Persian power in Asia Minor, and was followed, after no long interval, by the entire conquest of the Persian empire. The Persian control being now removed from Asia Minor—while Alexander with the great

Macedonian force merely passed through it to the east, leaving viceroys behind him —new hopes of independence or aggrandizement began to arise among the native princes in Bithynia, Paphlagonia, and Kappadokia. The Bithynian prince even contended successfully in the field against Kalas, who had been appointed by Alexander as satrap in Phrygia.[1089] The Herakleot Dionysius, on the other hand, enemy by position of these Bithynians, courted the new Macedonian potentates, playing his political game with much skill in every way. He kept his forces well in hand, and his dominions carefully guarded; he ruled in a mild and popular manner, so as to preserve among the Herakleots the same feelings of attachment which had been inspired by his predecessor. While the citizens of the neighboring Sinôpê (as has been already related) sent their envoys to Darius, Dionysius kept his eyes upon Alexander; taking care to establish a footing at Pella, and being peculiarly assiduous in attentions to Alexander's sister, the princess Kleopatra.[1090] He was the better qualified for this courtly service, as he was a man of elegant and ostentatious tastes, and had purchased from his namesake, the fallen Syracusan Dionysius, all the rich furniture of the Dionysian family, highly available for presents.[1091]

By the favor of Antipater and the regency at Pella, the Herakleotic despot was enabled both to maintain and extend his dominions, until the return of Alexander to Susa and Babylon in 324 B. C. All other authority was now superseded by the personal will of the omnipotent conqueror; who, mistrusting all his delegates—Antipater, the princesses, and the satraps—listened readily to complainants from all quarters, and took particular pride in espousing the pretensions of Grecian exiles. I have already recounted how in June 324 B. C., Alexander promulgated at the Olympic festival a sweeping edict, directing that in every Grecian city the exiles should be restored—by force, if force was required. Among the various Grecian exiles, those from Herakleia were not backward in soliciting his support, to obtain their own restoration, as well as the expulsion of the despot. As they were entitled, along with others, to the benefit of the recent edict, the position of Dionysius became one of extreme danger. He now reaped the full benefit of his antecedent prudence, in having maintained both his popularity with the Herakleots at home, and his influence with Antipater, to whom the enforcement of the edict was entrusted. He was thus enabled to ward off the danger for a time; and his good fortune rescued him from it altogether, by the death of Alexander in June 323 B. C. That event, coming as it did unexpectedly upon every one, filled Dionysius with such extravagant joy, that he fell into a swoon: and he commemorated it by erecting a statue in honor of Euthymia, or the tranquillizing goddess. His position however seemed again precarious, when the Herakleotic exiles renewed their solicitations to Perdikkas: who favored their cause, and might probably have restored them, if he had chosen to direct his march towards the Hellespont against Antipater and Kraterus, instead of undertaking the ill-advised expedition against Egypt, wherein he perished.[1092]

The tide of fortune now turned more than ever in favor of Dionysius. With Antipater and Kraterus, the preponderant potentates in his neighborhood, he was on the best terms; and it happened at this juncture to suit the political views of Kraterus to dismiss his Persian wife Amastris (niece of the late Persian king Darius, and conferred upon Kraterus by Alexander when he himself married Statira), for the purpose of espousing Phila daughter of Antipater. Amastris was given in marriage to Dionysius; for him, a splendid exaltation—attesting the personal influence which he had previously acquired. His new wife, herself a woman of ability and energy, brought to him a large sum from the regal treasure, as well as the means of greatly extending his dominion round Herakleia. Noway corrupted by this good fortune, he still persevered both in his conciliating rule at home, and his prudent alliances abroad, making himself especially useful to Antigonus. That great chief, preponderant throughout most parts of Asia Minor, was establishing his ascendency in Bithynia and the neighborhood of the Propontis, by founding the city of Antigonia in the rich plain adjoining the Askanian Lake.[1093] Dionysius lent effective maritime aid to Antigonus, in that war which ended by his conquest of Cyprus from the Egyptian Ptolemy (307 B. C.) To the other Ptolemy, nephew and general of Antigonus, Dionysius gave his daughter in marriage; and even felt himself powerful enough to assume the title of king, after Antigonus, Lysimachus, and the Egyptian Ptolemy had done the like.[1094] He died, after reigning thirty years with consummate political skill and uninterrupted prosperity—except that during the last few years he lost his health from excessive corpulence.[1095]

Dionysius left three children under age—Klearchus, Oxathres and a daughter—by his wife Amastris; whom he constituted regent, and who, partly through the cordial support of Antigonus, maintained the Herakleotic dominion unimpaired. Presently Lysimachus, king of Thrace and of the Thracian Chersonese (on the isthmus of which he had founded the city of Lysimacheia), coveted this as a valuable alliance, paid his court to Amastris, and married her. The Herakleotic queen thus enjoyed double protection, and was enabled to avoid taking a part in the formidable conflict of Ipsus (300 B. C.); wherein the allies Lysimachus, Kassander, Ptolemy, and Seleukus were victorious over Antigonus. The latter being slain, and his Asiatic power crushed, Lysimachus got possession of Antigonia, the recent foundation of his rival in Bithynia, and changed its name to Nikæa.[1096] After a certain time, however, Lysimachus became desirous of marrying Arsinoê, daughter of the Egyptian Ptolemy; accordingly, Amastris divorced herself from him, and set up for herself separately as regent of Herakleia. Her two sons being now nearly of age, she founded and fortified, for her own residence, the neighboring city of Amastris, about sixty miles eastward of Herakleia on the coast of the Euxine.[1097] These young men, Klearchus and Oxathres, assumed the government of Herakleia, and entered upon various warlike enterprises; of which we know only, that Klearchus accompanied Lysimachus in his expedition against the Getæ, sharing the fate of that prince, who was defeated and taken prisoner. Both afterwards obtained their release, and Klearchus returned to Herakleia;

where he ruled in a cruel and oppressive manner, and even committed the enormity (in conjunction with his brother Oxathres) of killing his mother Amastris. This crime was avenged by her former husband Lysimachus; who, coming to Herakleia under professions of friendship (B. C. 286), caused Klearchus and Oxathres to be put to death, seized their treasure, and keeping separate possession of the citadel only, allowed the Herakleots to establish a popular government.[1098]

Lysimachus, however, was soon persuaded by his wife Arsinoê to make over Herakleia to her, as it had been formerly possessed by Amastris; and Arsinoê sent thither a Kymæan officer named Herakleides, who carried with him force sufficient to re-establish the former despotism, with its oppressions and cruelties. For other purposes too, not less mischievous, the influence of Arsinoê was all-powerful. She prevailed upon Lysimachus to kill his eldest son (by a former marriage) Agathokles, a young prince of the most estimable and eminent qualities. Such an atrocity, exciting universal abhorrence among the subjects of Lysimachus, enabled his rival Seleukus to attack him with success. In a great battle fought between these two princes, Lysimachus was defeated and slain—by the hand and javelin of a citizen of Herakleia, named Malakon.[1099]

This victory transferred the dominions of the vanquished prince to Seleukus. At Herakleia too, its effect was so powerful, that the citizens were enabled to shake off their despotism. They at first tried to make terms with the governor Herakleides, offering him money as an inducement to withdraw. From him they obtained only an angry refusal; yet his subordinate officers of mercenaries, and commanders of detached posts in the Herakleotic territory, mistrusting their own power of holding out, accepted an amicable compromise with the citizens, who tendered to them full liquidation of arrears of pay, together with the citizenship. The Herakleots were this enabled to discard Herakleides, and regain their popular government. They signalized their revolution by the impressive ceremony of demolishing their Bastile—the detached fort or stronghold within the city, which had served for eighty-four years as the characteristic symbol, and indispensable engine, of the antecedent despotism. [1100] The city, now again a free commonwealth, was farther reinforced by the junction of Nymphis (the historian) and other Herakleotic citizens, who had hitherto been in exile. These men were restored, and welcomed by their fellow-citizens in full friendship and harmony; yet with express proviso, that no demand should be made for the restitution of their properties, long since confiscated.[1101] To the victor Seleukus, however, and his officer Aphrodisius, the bold bearing of the newly-emancipated Herakleots proved offensive. They would probably have incurred great danger from him, had not his mind been first set upon the conquest of Macedonia in the accomplishment of which he was murdered by Ptolemy Keraunus.

The Herakleots thus became again a commonwealth of free citizens, without any detached citadel or mercenary garrison; yet they lost, seemingly through the growing force and aggressions of some inland dynasts, several of their outlying depen-

dencies—Kierus, Tium, and Amastris. The two former they recovered some time afterwards by purchase, and they wished also to purchase back Amastris; but Eumenes, who held it, hated them so much, that he repudiated their money, and handed over the place gratuitously to the Kappadokian chief Ariobarzanes.[1102] That their maritime power was at this time very great, we may see by the astonishing account given of their immense ships,—numerously manned, and furnished with many brave combatants on the deck—which fought with eminent distinction in the naval battle between Ptolemy Keraunus (murderer and successor of Seleukus) and Antigonus Gonatas.[1103]

It is not my purpose to follow lower down the destinies of Herakleia. It maintained its internal autonomy, with considerable maritime power, a dignified and prudent administration, and a partial, though sadly circumscribed, liberty of foreign action—until the successful war of the Romans against Mithridates (B. C. 69). In Asia Minor, the Hellenic cities on the coast were partly enabled to postpone the epoch of their subjugation, by the great division of power which prevailed in the interior; for the potentates, of Bithynia, Pergamus, Kappadokia, Pontus, Syria, were in almost perpetual discord—while all of them were menaced by the intrusion of the warlike and predatory Gauls, who extorted for themselves settlements in Galatia (B. C. 276). The kings, the enemies of civic freedom, were kept partially in check by these new and formidable neighbors,[1104] who were themselves however hardly less formidable to the Grecian cities on the coast.[1105] Sinôpê, Herakleia, Byzantium,—and even Rhodes, in spite of the advantage of an insular position,—isolated relics of what had once been an Hellenic aggregate, become from henceforward cribbed and confined by inland neighbors almost at their gates[1106]—dependent on the barbaric potentates, between whom they were compelled to trim, making themselves useful in turn to all. It was however frequent with these barbaric princes to derive their wives, mistresses, ministers, negotiators, officers, engineers, literati, artists, actors, and intermediate agents both for ornament and recreation—from some Greek city. Among them all, more or less of Hellenic influence became thus insinuated; along with the Greek language which spread its roots everywhere—even among the Gauls or Galatians, the rudest and latest of the foreign immigrants.

Of the Grecian maritime towns in the Euxine south of the Danube—Apollonia, Mesembria, Odêssus, Kallatis, Tomi, and Istrus—five (seemingly without Tomi) formed a confederate Pentapolis.[1107] About the year 312 B. C., we hear of them as under the power of Lysimachus king of Thrace, who kept a garrison in Kallatis—probably in the rest also. They made a struggle to shake off his yoke, obtaining assistance from some of the neighboring Thracians and Scythians, as well as from Antigonus. But Lysimachus, after a contest which seems to have lasted three or four years, overpowered both their allies and them, reducing them again into subjection. [1108] Kallatis sustained a long siege, dismissing some of its ineffective residents; who were received and sheltered by Eumelus prince of Bosporus. It was in pushing his

conquests yet farther northward, in the steppe between the rivers Danube and Dniester, that Lysimachus came into conflict with the powerful prince of the Getæ—Dromichætes; by whom he was defeated and captured, but generously released.[1109] I have already mentioned that the empire of Lysimachus ended with his last defeat and death by Seleukus—(281 B. C.). By his death, the cities of the Pontic Pentapolis regained a temporary independence. But their barbaric neighbors became more and more formidable, being reinforced seemingly by immigration of fresh hordes from Asia; thus the Sarmatians, who in Herodotus's time were on the east of the Tanais, appear, three centuries afterwards, even south of the Danube. By these tribes—Thracians, Getæ, Scythians, and Sarmatians—the Greek cities of this Pentapolis were successively pillaged. Though renewed indeed afterwards, from the necessity of some place of traffic, even for the pillagers themselves—they were but poorly renewed, with a large infusion of barbaric residents.[1110] Such was the condition in which the exile Ovid found Tomi, near the beginning of the Christian era. The Tomitans were more than half barbaric, and their Greek not easily intelligible. The Sarmatian or Getic horse-bowmen, with their poisoned arrows, ever hovered near, galloped even up to the gates, and carried off the unwary cultivators into slavery. Even within a furlong of the town, there was no security either for person or property. The residents were clothed in skins, or leather; while the women, ignorant both of spinning and weaving, were employed either in grinding corn or in carrying on their heads the pitchers of water.[1111]

By these same barbarians, Olbia also (on the right bank of the Hypanis or Bug near its mouth) became robbed of that comfort and prosperity which it had enjoyed when visited by Herodotus. In his day, the Olbians lived on good terms with the Scythian tribes in their neighborhood. They paid a stipulated tribute, giving presents besides to the prince and his immediate favorites; and on these conditions, their persons and properties were respected. The Scythian prince Skylês (son of an Hellenic mother from Istrus, who had familiarized him with Greek speech and letters) had built a fine house in the town, and spent in it a month, from attachment to Greek manners and religion, while his Scythian army lay near the gates without molesting any one.[1112] It is true, that this proceeding cost Skylês his life; for the Scythians would not tolerate their own prince in the practice of foreign religious rites, though they did not quarrel with the same rites when observed by the Greeks.[1113] To their own customs the Scythians adhered tenaciously, and those customs were often sanguinary, ferocious, and brutish. Still they were warriors, rather than robbers—they abstained from habitual pillage, and maintained with the Greeks a reputation for honesty and fair dealing, which became proverbial with the early poets. Such were the Scythians as seen by Herodotus (probably about 440 to 430 B. C.); and the picture drawn by Ephorus a century afterwards (about 340 B. C.), appears to have been not materially different.[1114] But after that time it gradually altered. New tribes seem to have come in—the Sarmatians out of the East—the Gauls out of the West; from Thrace northward to the Tanais and the Palus Mæotis, the most different tribes be-

came intermingled—Gauls, Thracians, Getæ, Scythians, Sarmatians, etc.[1115] Olbia was in an open plain, with no defence except its walls and the adjoining river Hypanis, frozen over in the winter. The hybrid Helleno-Scythian race, formed by intermarriages of Greeks with Scythians—and the various Scythian tribes who had become partially sedentary cultivators of corn for exportation—had probably also acquired habits less warlike than the tribes of primitive barbaric type. At any rate, even if capable of defending themselves, they could not continue their production and commerce under repeated hostile incursions.

A valuable inscription remaining enables us to compare the Olbia (or Borysthenes) seen by Herodotus, with the same town in the second century B. C.[1116] At this latter period, the city was diminished in population, impoverished in finances, exposed to constantly increasing exactions and menace from the passing barbaric hordes, and scarcely able to defend against them even the security of its walls. Sometimes there approached the barbaric chief Saitapharnes with his personal suite, sometimes his whole tribe or horde in mass, called Saii. Whenever they came, they required to be appeased by presents, greater than the treasury could supply, and borrowed only from the voluntary help of rich citizens; while even these presents did not always avert ill treatment or pillage. Already the citizens of Olbia had repelled various attacks, partly by taking into pay a semi-Hellenic population in their neighborhood (Mix-Hellenes, like the Liby-Phenicians in Africa); but the inroads became more alarming, and their means of defence less, through the uncertain fidelity of these Mix-Hellenes, as well as of their own slaves—the latter probably barbaric natives purchased from the interior.[1117] In the midst of public poverty, it was necessary to enlarge and strengthen the fortifications; for they were threatened with the advent of the Gauls—who inspired such terror that the Scythians and other barbarians were likely to seek their own safety by extorting admission within the walls of Olbia. Moreover even corn was scarce, and extravagantly dear. There had been repeated failures in the produce of the lands around, famine was apprehended, and efforts were needed, greater than the treasury could sustain, to lay in a stock at the public expense. Among the many points of contrast with Herodotus, this is perhaps the most striking; for in his time, corn was the great produce and the principal export from Olbia; the growth had now been suspended, or was at least perpetually cut off, by increased devastation and insecurity.

After perpetual attacks, and even several captures, by barbaric neighbors—this unfortunate city, about fifty years before the Christian era, was at length so miserably sacked by the Getæ, as to become for a time abandoned.[1118] Presently, however, the fugitives partially returned, to re-establish themselves on a reduced scale. For the very same barbarians who had persecuted and plundered them, still required an emporium with a certain amount of import and export, such as none but Greek settlers could provide; moreover it was from the coast near Olbia, and from care of its inhabitants, that many of the neighboring tribes derived their supply of salt.[1119]

Hence arose a puny after-growth of Olbia—preserving the name, traditions, and part of the locality, of the deserted city—by the return of a portion of the colonists with an infusion of Scythian or Sarmatian residents; an infusion indeed so large, as seriously to dishellenize both the speech and the personal names in the town.[1120]

To this second edition of Olbia, the rhetor Dion Chrysostom paid a summer visit (about a century after the Christian era), of which he has left a brief but interesting account. Within the wide area once filled by the original Olbia—the former circumference of which was marked by crumbling walls and towers—the second town occupied a narrow corner; with poor houses, low walls, and temples having no other ornament except the ancient statues mutilated by the plunderers. The citizens dwelt in perpetual insecurity, constantly under arms or on guard; for the barbaric horsemen, in spite of sentinels posted to announce their approach, often carried off prisoners, cattle, or property, from the immediate neighborhood of the gates. The picture drawn of Olbia by Dion confirms in a remarkable way that given of Tomi by Ovid. And what imparts to it a touching interest is, that the Greeks whom Dion saw contending with the difficulties, privations, and dangers of this inhospitable outpost, still retained the activity, the elegance, and the intellectual aspirations of their Ionic breed; in this respect much superior to the Tomitans of Ovid. In particular, they were passionate admirers of Homer; a considerable proportion of the Greeks of Olbia could repeat the Iliad from memory.[1121] Achilles (localized under the surname of Pontarches, on numerous islands and capes in the Euxine) was among the chief divine or heroic persons to whom they addressed their prayers.[1122] Amidst Grecian life, thus degraded and verging towards its extinction, and stripped even of the purity of living speech—the thread of imaginative and traditional sentiment thus continues without suspension or abatement.

Respecting Bosporus or Pantikapæum (for both names denote the same city, though the former name often comprehends the whole annexed dominion), founded by Milesian settlers[1123] on the European side of the Kimmerian Bosporus (near Kertsch), we first hear, about the period when Xerxes was repulsed from Greece (480-479 B. C.). It was the centre of a dominion including Phanagoria, Kepi, Hermonassa, and other Greek cities on the Asiatic side of the strait; and is said to have been governed by what seems to have been an oligarchy—called the Archæanaktidæ, for forty-two years[1124] (480-438 B. C.).

After them we have a series of princes standing out individually by name, and succeeding each other in the same family. Spartokus I. was succeeded by Seleukus; next comes Spartokus II.; then Satyrus I. (407-393 B. C.); Leukon (393-353 B. C.); Spartokus III. (353-348 B. C.); Parisades I. (348-310 B. C.); Satyrus II., Prytanis, Eumelus (310-304 B. C.); Spartokus IV. (304-284 B. C.); Parisades II.[1125] During the reigns of these princes, a connection of some intimacy subsisted between Athens and Bosporus; a connection not political, since the Bosporanic princes had little interest in the contentions about Hellenic hegemony—but of private intercourse, commer-

cial interchange, and reciprocal good offices. The eastern corner of the Tauric Chersonesus, between Pantikapæum and Theodosia, was well-suited for the production of corn; while plenty of fish, as well as salt, was to be had in or near the Palus Mæotis. Corn, salted fish and meat, hides, and barbaric slaves in considerable numbers, were in demand among all the Greeks round the Ægean, and not least at Athens, where Scythian slaves were numerous;[1126] while oil and wine, with other products of more southern regions, were acceptable in Bosporus and the other Pontic ports. This important traffic seems to have been mainly carried on in ships and by capital belonging to Athens and other Ægean maritime towns; and must have been greatly under the protection and regulation of the Athenians, so long as their maritime empire subsisted. Enterprising citizens of Athens went to Bosporus (as to Thrace and the Thracian Chersonesus), to push their fortunes; merchants from other cities found it advantageous to settle as resident strangers or metics at Athens, where they were more in contact with the protecting authority, and obtained readier access to the judicial tribunals. It was probably during the period preceding the great disaster at Syracuse in 413 B. C., that Athens first acquired her position as a mercantile centre for the trade with the Euxine; which we afterwards find her retaining, even with reduced power, in the time of Demosthenes.

How strong was the position enjoyed by Athens in Bosporus, during her unimpaired empire, we may judge from the fact, that Nymphæum (south of Pantikapæum, between that town and Theodosia) was among her tributary towns, and paid a talent annually.[1127] Not until the misfortunes of Athens in the closing years of the Peloponnesian war, did Nymphæum pass into the hands of the Bosporanic princes; betrayed (according to Æschines) by the maternal grandfather of Demosthenes, the Athenian Gylon; who however probably did nothing more than obey a necessity rendered unavoidable by the fallen condition of Athens.[1128] We thus see that Nymphæum, in the midst of the Bosporanic dominion, was not only a member of the Athenian empire, but also contained influential Athenian citizens, engaged in the corn-trade. Gylon was rewarded by a large grant of land at Kepi—probably other Athenians of Nymphæum were rewarded also—by the Bosporanic prince; who did not grudge a good price for such an acquisition. We find also other instances,—both of Athenian citizens sent out to reside with the prince Satyrus,—and of Pontic Greeks who, already in correspondence and friendship with various individual Athenians, consign their sons to be initiated in the commerce, society, and refinements of Athens.[1129] Such facts attest the correspondence and intercourse of that city, during her imperial greatness, with Bosporus.

The Bosporanic prince Satyrus was in the best relations with Athens, and even seems to have had authorized representatives there to enforce his requests, which met with very great attention.[1130] He treated the Athenian merchants at Bosporus with equity and even favor, granting to them a preference in the export of corn when there was not enough for all.[1131] His son Leukon not only continued the preference

to Athenian exporting ships, but also granted to them remission of the export duty (of one-thirtieth part), which he exacted from all other traders. Such an exemption is reckoned as equivalent to an annual present of 13,000 medimni of corn (the medimnus being about 1⅓ bushel); the total quantity of corn brought from Bosporus to Athens in a full year being 400,000 medimni.[1132] It is easy to see moreover that such a premium must have thrown nearly the whole exporting trade into the hands of Athenian merchants. The Athenians requited this favor by public votes of gratitude and honor, conferring upon Leukon the citizenship, together with immunity from all the regular burthens attaching to property at Athens. There was lying in that city money belonging to Leukon;[1133] who was therefore open (under the proposition of Leptines) to that conditional summons for exchange of properties, technically termed Antidosis. In his time, moreover, the corn-trade of Bosporus appears to have been farther extended; for we learn that he established an export from Theodosia as well as from Pantikapæum. His successor Parisades I. continuing to Athenian exporters of corn the same privilege of immunity from export duty, obtained from Athens still higher honors than Leukon; for we learn that his statue, together with those of two relatives, was erected in the agora, on the motion of Demosthenes.[1134] The connection of Bosporus with Athens was durable as well as intimate; its corn-trade being of high importance to the subsistence of the people. Every Athenian exporter was bound by law to bring his cargo in the first instance to Athens. The freighting and navigating of ships for that purpose, together with the advance of money by rich capitalists (citizens and metics) upon interest and conditions enforced by the Athenian judicature, was a standing and profitable business. And we may appreciate the value of equitable treatment, not to say favor, from the kings of Bosporus—when we contrast it with the fraudulent and extortionate behavior of Kleomenes, satrap of Egypt, in reference to the export of Egyptian corn.[1135]

The political condition of the Greeks at Bosporus was somewhat peculiar. The hereditary princes (above enumerated), who ruled them substantially as despots, assumed no other title (in respect to the Greeks) than that of Archon. They paid tribute to the powerful Scythian tribes who bounded them on the European side, and even thought it necessary to carry a ditch across the narrow isthmus, from some point near Theodosia northward to the Palus Mæotis, as a protection against incursions.[1136] Their dominion did not extend farther west than Theodosia; this ditch was their extreme western boundary; and even for the land within it, they paid tribute. But on the Asiatic side of the strait, they were lords paramount for a considerable distance, over the feebler and less warlike tribes who pass under the common name of Mæotæ or Mæêtae—the Sindi, Toreti, Dandarii, Thatês, etc. Inscriptions, yet remaining, of Parisades I. record him as King of these various barbaric tribes, but as Archon of Bosporus and Theodosia.[1137] His dominion on the Asiatic side of the Kimmerian Bosporus, sustained by Grecian and Thracian mercenaries, was of considerable (though to us unknown) extent, reaching to somewhere near the borders of Caucasus.[1138]

Parisades I. on his death left three sons—Satyrus, Prytanis, and Eumelus. Satyrus, as the eldest, succeeded; but Eumelus claimed the crown, sought aid without, and prevailed on various neighbors—among them a powerful Thracian king named Ariopharnes—to espouse his cause. At the head of an army said to consist of 20,000 horse and 22,000 foot, the two allies marched to attack the territories of Satyrus, who advanced to meet them, with 2000 Grecian mercenaries, and 2000 Thracians of his own, reinforced by a numerous body of Scythian allies—20,000 foot, and 10,000 horse, and carrying with him a plentiful supply of provisions in waggons. He gained a complete victory, compelling Eumelus and Ariopharnes to retreat and seek refuge in the regal residence of the latter, near the river Thapsis; a fortress built of timber, and surrounded with forest, river, marsh, and rock, so as to be very difficult of approach. Satyrus, having first plundered the country around, which supplied a rich booty of prisoners and cattle, proceeded to assail his enemies in their almost impracticable position. But though he, and Meniskus his general of mercenaries, made the most strenuous efforts, and even carried some of the outworks, they were repulsed from the fortress itself; and Satyrus, exposing himself forwardly to extricate Meniskus, received a wound of which he shortly died—after a reign of nine months. Meniskus, raising the siege, withdrew the army to Gargaza; from whence he conveyed back the regal corpse to Pantikapæum.[1139]

Prytanis, the next brother, rejecting an offer of partition tendered by Eumelus, assumed the sceptre, and marched forth to continue the struggle. But the tide of fortune now turned in favor of Eumelus; who took Gargaza with several other places, worsted his brother in battle, and so blocked him up in the isthmus near the Palus Mæotis, that he was forced to capitulate and resign his pretensions. Eumelus entered Pantikapæum as conqueror. Nevertheless, the defeated Prytanis, in spite of his recent covenant, made a renewed attempt upon the crown; wherein he was again baffled, forced to escape to Kêpi, and there slain. To assure himself of the throne, Eumelus put to death the wives and children of both his two brothers, Satyrus and Prytanis—together with all their principal friends. One youth alone—Parisades, son of Satyrus—escaped and found protection with the Scythian prince Agarus.

Eumelus had now put down all rivals; yet his recent cruelties had occasioned wrath and disgust among the Bosporanic citizens. He convoked them in assembly, to excuse his past conduct, and promised good government for the future; at the same time guaranteeing to them their full civic constitution, with such privileges and immunities as they had before enjoyed, and freedom from direct taxation.[1140] Such assurances, combined probably with an imposing mercenary force, appeased or at least silenced the prevailing disaffection. Eumelus kept his promises so far as to govern in a mild and popular spirit. While thus rendering himself acceptable at home, he maintained an energetic foreign policy, and made several conquests among the surrounding tribes. He constituted himself a sort of protector of the Euxine, repressing the piracies of the Heniochi and Achæi (among the Caucasian mountains to the east)

as well as of the Tauri in the Chersonesus (Crimea); much to the satisfaction of the Byzantines, Sinopians, and other Pontic Greeks. He received a portion of the fugitives from Kallatis, when besieged by Lysimachus, and provided for them a settlement in his dominions. Having thus acquired great reputation, Eumelus was in the full career of conquest and aggrandizement, when an accident terminated his life, after a reign of rather more than five years. In returning from Scythia to Pantikapæum, in a four-wheeled carriage (or waggon) and four with a tent upon it, his horses took fright and ran away. Perceiving that they were carrying him towards a precipice, he tried to jump out; but his sword becoming entangled in the wheel, he was killed on the spot. [1141] He was succeeded by his son Spartokus IV., who reigned twenty years (304-284 B. C.); afterwards came the son of Spartokus, Parisades II.; with whose name our information breaks off.[1142]

This dynasty, the Spartokidæ, though they ruled the Greeks of Bosporus as despots by means of a foreign mercenary force—yet seem to have exercised power with equity and moderation.[1143] Had Eumelus lived, he might probably have established an extensive empire over the barbaric tribes on all sides of him. But empire over such subjects was seldom permanent; nor did his successors long maintain even as much as he left. We have no means of following their fortunes in detail; but we know that about a century B. C., the then reigning prince, Parisades IV., found himself so pressed and squeezed by the Scythians,[1144] that he was forced (like Olbia and the Pentapolis) to forego his independence; and to call in, as auxiliary or master, the formidable Mithridates Eupator of Pontus; from whom a new dynasty of Bosporanic kings began—subject however after no long interval, to the dominion and interference of Rome.

These Mithridatic princes lie beyond our period; but the cities of Bosporus under the Spartokid princes, in the fourth century B. C., deserve to be ranked among the conspicuous features of the living Hellenic world. They were not indeed purely Hellenic, but presented a considerable admixture of Scythian or Oriental manners; analogous to the mixture of the Hellenic and Libyan elements at Kyrênê with its Battiad princes. Among the facts attesting the wealth and power of these Spartokid princes, and of the Bosporanic community, we may number the imposing groups of mighty sepulchral tumuli near Kertch (Pantikapæum); some of which have been recently examined, while the greater part still remain unopened. These spacious chambers of stone—enclosed in vast hillocks (Kurgans), cyclopian works piled up with prodigious labor and cost—have been found to contain not only a profusion of ornaments of the precious metals (gold, silver, and electron, or a mixture of four parts of gold to one of silver), but also numerous vases, implements, and works of art, illustrating the life and ideas of the Bosporanic population. "The contents of the tumuli already opened are so multifarious, that from the sepulchres of Pantikapæum alone, we might become acquainted with everything which served the Greeks either for necessary use, or for the decoration of domestic life."[1145] Statues, reliefs and frescoes on the walls,

have been found, on varied subjects both of war and peace, and often of very fine execution; besides these, numerous carvings in wood, and vessels of bronze or terra cotta; with necklaces, armlets, bracelets, rings, drinking cups, etc. of precious metal —several with colored beads attached.[1146] The costumes, equipment, and physiognomy represented, are indeed a mixture of Hellenic and barbaric; moreover, even the profusion of gold chains and other precious ornaments, indicates a tone of sentiment partially orientalized, in those for whom they were destined.

But the design as well as the execution comes clearly out of the Hellenic workshop; and there is good ground for believing, that in the fourth century B. C., Pantikapæum was the seat, not only of enterprising and wealthy citizens, but also of strenuous and well-directed artistic genius. Such manifestations of the refinements of Hellenism, in this remote and little-noticed city, form an important addition to the picture of Hellas as a whole,—prior to its days of subjection,—which it has been the purpose of this history to present.

I have now brought down the history of Greece to the point of time marked out in the Preface to my First Volume—the close of the generation contemporary with Alexander—the epoch, from whence dates not only the extinction of Grecian political freedom and self-action, but also the decay of productive genius, and the debasement of that consummate literary and rhetorical excellence which the fourth century B. C. had seen exhibited in Plato and Demosthenes.[1147] The contents of this last Volume indicate but too clearly that Greece as a separate subject of history no longer exists; for one full half of it is employed in depicting Alexander and his conquests—ἄγριον αἰχμητὴν, κρατερὸν μήστωρα φόβοιο[1148]—that Non-Hellenic conqueror into whose vast possessions the Greeks are absorbed, with their intellectual brightness bedimmed, their spirit broken, and half their virtue taken away by Zeus—the melancholy emasculation inflicted (according to Homer) upon victims overtaken by the day of slavery.[1149]

One branch of intellectual energy there was, and one alone, which continued to flourish, comparatively little impaired, under the preponderance of the Macedonian sword—the spirit of speculation and philosophy. During the century which we have just gone through, this spirit was embodied in several eminent persons, whose names have been scarcely adverted to in this history. Among these names, indeed, there are two, of peculiar grandeur, whom I have brought partially before the reader, because both of them belong to general history as well as to philosophy; Plato, as citizen of Athens, companion of Sokrates at his trial, and counsellor of Dionysius in his glory—Aristotle, as the teacher of Alexander. I had at one time hoped to include in my present work a record of them as philosophers also, and an estimate of their

speculative characteristics; but I find the subject far too vast to be compressed into such a space as this volume would afford. The exposition of the tenets of distinguished thinkers is not now numbered by historians, either ancient or modern, among the duties incumbent upon them, nor yet among the natural expectations of their readers; but is reserved for the special historian of philosophy. Accordingly, I have brought my history of Greece to a close, without attempting to do justice either to Plato or to Aristotle. I hope to contribute something towards supplying this defect, the magnitude of which I fully appreciate, in a separate work, devoted specially to an account of Greek speculative philosophy in the fourth century B. C.

APPENDIX.

ON ISSUS AND ITS NEIGHBORHOOD, AS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR.

THE exact battle-field of Issus cannot be certainly assigned, upon the evidence accessible to us. But it may be determined, within a few miles north or south; and what is even more important—the general features of the locality, as well as the preliminary movements of the contending armies, admit of being clearly conceived and represented.

That the battle was fought in some portion of the narrow space intervening between the eastern coast of the Gulf of Issus and the western flank of Mount Amanus—that Alexander's left and Darius's right, rested on the sea, and their right and left respectively on the mountain—that Darius came upon Alexander unexpectedly from the rear, thus causing him to return back a day's march from Myriandrus, and to reoccupy a pass which he had already passed through and quitted—these points are clearly given, and appear to me not open to question. We know that the river Pinarus, on which the battle was fought, was at a certain distance *south* of Issus, the last town of Kilikia before entering Syria (Arrian, ii. 7. 2)—ἐς δὲ τὴν ὑστεραίαν προὐχώρει (Darius from Issus) ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν Πίναρον—Ritter erroneously states that Issus was *upon* the river Pinarus, which he even calls *the Issus river* (Erdkunde, Theil iv. Abth. 2. p. 1797-1806). We know also that this river was at some distance *north* of the maritime pass called the Gates of Kilikia and Assyria, through which Alexander passed and repassed.

But when we proceed, beyond these data (the last of them only vague and relative), to fix the exact battle-field, we are reduced to conjecture. Dr. Thirlwall, in an appendix to the sixth volume of his history, has collected and discussed very ably the different opinions of various geographers.

To those whom he has cited, may be added—Mr. Ainsworth's Essay on the Cilician and Syrian Gates (in the Transactions of the Geographical Society for 1837)—Mützel's Topographical Notes on the third book of Quintus Curtius—and the last volume of Ritter's Erdkunde, published only this year (1855), ch. xxvii. p. 1778 *seqq.*

We know from Xenophon that Issus was a considerable town close to the sea—two days' march from the river Pyramus, and one day's march northward of the maritime pass called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria. That it was near the north-eastern corner of the Gulf, may also be collected from Strabo, who reckons the shortest line across Asia Minor, as stretching from Sinôpê or Amisus *to Issus*—and who also lays down the Egyptian sea as having its northern termination *at Issus* (Strabo, xiv. p. 677; xvi. p. 749). The probable site of Issus has been differently determined by different authors; Rennell (Illustrations of the Geography of the Anabasis, p. 42-48) places it near Oseler or Yusler; as far as I can judge, this seems too far distant from the head of the Gulf, towards the south.

In respect to the maritime pass, called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, there is much discrepancy between Xenophon and Arrian. It is evident that, in Xenophon's time, this pass and the road of march through it lay between the mountains and the sea,—and that the obstructions (walls blocking up the passage), which he calls insurmountable by force, were mainly of artificial creation. But when Alexander passed, no walls existed. The artificial obstructions had disappeared during the seventy years between Xenophon and Alexander; and we can assign a probable reason why. In Xenophon's time, Kilikia was occupied by the native prince Syennesis, who, though tributary, maintained a certain degree of independence even in regard to the Great King, and therefore kept a wall guarded by his own soldiers on his boundary towards Syria. But in Alexander's time, Kilikia was occupied, like Syria, by a Persian satrap. Artificial boundary walls, between two conterminous satrapies under the same master, were unnecessary; and must even have been found inconvenient, during the great collective military operations of the Persian satraps against the revolted Evagoras of Cyprus (principally carried on from Kilikia as a base, about 380 B. C., Diodor. xv. 2)—as well as in the subsequent operations against the Phenician towns (Diodor. xvi. 42). Hence we may discern a reason why all artificial obstructions may have been swept away before the time of Alexander; leaving only the natural difficulties of the neighboring ground, upon which Xenophon has not touched.

The spot still retained its old name—"The Gates of Kilikia and Syria"—even after walls and gates had been dispensed with. But that name, in Arrian's description, designates a difficult and narrow point of the road *over hills and rocks*; a point which Major Rennell (Illustrations, p. 54) supposes to have been about a mile south of the river and walls described by Xenophon. However this may be, the precise spot designated by Xenophon seems probably to be sought about seven miles north of Scanderoon, near the ruins now known as Jonas's Pillars (or Sakal Tutan), and the Castle of Merkes, where a river called *Merkes*, *Mahersy*, or *Kara-su*, flows across from the

mountain to the sea. That this river is the same with the Kersus of Xenophon, is the opinion of Rennell, Ainsworth, and Mützel; as well as of Colonel Callier, who surveyed the country when accompanying the army of Ibrahim Pacha as engineer (cited by Ritter, Erdk. p. 1792). At the spot here mentioned, the gulf indents eastward, while the western flank of Amanus approaches very close to it, and drops with unusual steepness towards it. Hence the road now followed does not pass between the mountain and the sea, but ascends over a portion of the mountain, and descends again afterwards to the low ground skirting the sea. Northward of Merkes, the space between the mountain and the sea gradually widens, towards Bayas. At some distance to the north of Bayas occurs the river now called Delle Tschai, which is considered I think with probability, to be the Pinarus, where the battle between Alexander and Darius was fought. This opinion however is not unanimous; Kinneir identifies the *Merkes* with the Pinarus. Moreover, there are several different streams which cross the space between Mount Amanus and the sea. Des Monceaux notices six streams as having been crossed between the Castle of Merkes and Bayas; and five more streams between Bayas and Ayas (Mützel ad Curtium, p. 105). Which among these is the Pinarus, cannot be settled without more or less of doubt.

Besides the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, noted by Xenophon and Arrian in the above passages, there are also other Gates called *the Amanian Gates*, which are spoken of in a perplexing manner. Dr. Thirlwall insists with propriety on the necessity of distinguishing the *maritime* passes, between Mount Amanus and the sea—from the *inland* passes, which crossed over the ridge of Mount Amanus itself. But this distinction seems not uniformly observed by ancient authors, when we compare Strabo, Arrian, and Kallisthenes. Strabo uses the phrase, *Amanian Gates*, twice (xiv. p. 676; xvi. p. 751); in both cases designating a *maritime pass*, and not a pass *over* the mountain,—yet designating one maritime pass in the page first referred to, and another in the second. In xiv. p. 676—he means by αἱ Ἀμανίδες πύλαι, the spot called by modern travellers Demir Kapu, between Ægæ and Issus, or between Mopsuestia and Issus; while in xvi. 751—he means by the same words that which I have been explaining as the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, on the eastern side of the Gulf of Issus. In fact, Strabo seems to conceive as a whole the strip of land between Mount Amanus and the Gulf, beginning at Demir Kapu, and ending at the Gates of Kilikia and Syria—and to call both the beginning and the end of it by the same name—the Amanian Gates. But he does not use this last phrase to designate the passage over or across Mount Amanus; neither does Arrian; who in describing the march of Darius from Sochi into Kilikia, says (ii. 7, 1)—ὑπερβαλὼν δὴ τὸ ὄρος Δαρεῖος τὸ κατὰ τὰς πύλας τὰς Ἀμανικὰς καλουμένας, ὡς ἐπὶ Ἴσσον προῆγε, καὶ ἐγένετο κατόπιν Ἀλεξάνδρου λαθών. Here, let it be observed, we do not read ὑπερβαλὼν τὰς πύλας—nor can I think that the words mean, as the translator gives them—"transiit Amanum, *eundo per Pylas Amanicas*." The words rather signify, that Darius "crossed over the mountain where it adjoined the Amanian Gates"—*i. e.* where it adjoined the strip of land skirting the Gulf, and lying between those two extreme points which Strabo denominates *Amanian Gates*. Arrian employs this last phrase more loosely than Strabo, yet still with reference to the maritime strip, and not to a *col* over the mountain ridge.

On the other hand, Kallisthenes (if he is rightly represented by Polybius, who recites his statement, not his words, xii. 17) uses the words *Amanian Gates* to signify the passage by which Darius entered Kilikia—that is, the passage *over* the mountain. That which Xenophon and Arrian call the *Gates of Kilikia and Syria*—and which Strabo calls *Amanian Gates*—is described by Polybius as τὰ στενὰ, καὶ τὰς λεγομένας ἐν τῇ Κιλικίᾳ πύλας.

It seems pretty certain that this must have been Darius's line of march, because he came down immediately upon Issus, and then marched forward to the river Pinarus. Had he entered Kilikia by the pass of Beylan, he must have passed the Pinarus *before* he reached Issus. The positive grounds for admitting a practicable pass near the 37th parallel, are indeed called in question by Mützel (ad Curtium, p. 102, 103), and are not in themselves conclusive; still I hold them sufficient, when taken in conjunction with the probabilities of the case. This pass was, however, we may suppose, less frequented than the maritime line of road through the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, and the pass of Beylan; which, as the more usual, was preferred both by the Cyreians and by Alexander.

Respecting the march of Alexander, Dr. Thirlwall here starts a question, substantially to this effect: "Since Alexander intended to march through the pass of Beylan for the purpose of attacking the Persian camp at Sochi, what could have caused him to go to Myriandrus, which was more south than Beylan, and out of his road?" Dr. Thirlwall feels this difficulty so forcibly, that in order to eliminate it, he is inclined to accept the hypothesis of Mr. Williams, which places Myriandrus at Bayas, and the Kiliko-Syrian Gates at Demir-Kapu; an hypothesis which appears to me inadmissible on various grounds, and against which Mr. Ainsworth (in his Essay on the Cilician and Syrian Gates) has produced several very forcible objections.

I confess that I do not feel the difficulty on which Dr. Thirlwall insists. When we see that Cyrus and the Ten Thousand went to Myriandrus, in their way to the pass of Beylan, we may reasonably infer that, whether that

town was in the direct line or not, it was at least in the *usual* road of march—which does not always coincide with the direct line. But to waive this supposition, however—let us assume that there existed another shorter road leading to Beylan without passing by Myriandrus—there would still be reason enough to induce Alexander to go somewhat out of his way, in order to visit Myriandrus. For it was an important object with him to secure the sea ports in his rear, in case of a possible reverse. Suppose him repulsed and forced to retreat—it would be a material assistance to his retreat, to have assured himself beforehand of Myriandrus as well as the other seaports. In the approaching months, we shall find him just as careful to make sure of the Phenician cities on the coast, before he marches into the interior to attack Darius at Arbela.

Farther, Alexander, marching to attack Darius, had nothing to gain by haste, and nothing to lose by coming up to Sochi three days later. He knew that the enormous Persian host would not try to escape; it would either await him at Sochi, or else advance into Kilikia to attack him there. The longer he tarried, the more likely they were to do the latter, which was what he desired. He had nothing to lose therefore in any way, and some chance of gain, by prolonging his march to Sochi for as long a time as was necessary to secure Myriandrus. There is no more difficulty, I think, in understanding why he went to Myriandrus, than why he went westward from Tarsus (still more out of his line of advance) to Soli and Anchialus.

It seems probable (as Rennell, p. 56, and others think), that the site of Myriandrus is now some distance inland; that there has been an accretion of new land and morass on the coast.

The modern town of Scanderoon occupies the site of Ἀλεξανδρεία κατ᾽ Ἴσσον, founded (probably by order of Alexander himself) in commemoration of the victory of Issus. According to Ritter (p. 1791), "Alexander had the great idea of establishing there an emporium for the traffic of the East with Europe, as at the other Alexandria for the trade of the East with Egypt." The importance of the site of Scanderoon, in antiquity, is here greatly exaggerated. I know no proof that Alexander had the idea which Ritter ascribes to him; and it is certain that his successors had no such idea; because they founded the great cities of Antioch and Seleukeia (in Pieria), both of them carrying the course of trade up the Orontes, and therefore diverting it away from Scanderoon. This latter town is only of importance as being the harbor of Aleppo; a city (Berœa) of little consequence in antiquity, while Antioch became the first city in the East, and Seleukeia among the first: see Ritter, p. 1152.

END.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 5, 6.

[2] Æschines cont. Timarch. p. 167.

[3] Plutarch, Alex. 5.

[4] Plutarch, Alex. 9. Justin says that Alexander was the companion of his father during part of the war in Thrace (ix. 1).

[5] Vol. XI. Ch. xc. p. 513.

[6] Plutarch, Alex. 10. Arrian, iii. 6, 8.

[7] See the third chapter of Plutarch's life of Demetrius Poliorkêtês; which presents a vivid description of the feelings prevalent between members of regal families in those ages. Demetrius, coming home from the chase with his hunting javelins in his hand, goes up to his father Antigonus, salutes him, and sits down by his side without disarming. This is extolled as an unparalleled proof of the confidence and affection subsisting between the father and the son. In the families of all the other Diadochi (says Plutarch) murders of sons, mothers, and wives, were frequent—murders of brothers were even common, assumed to be precautions necessary for security. Οὕτως ἄρα πάντη δυσκωνοίνητον ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ μεστὸν ἀπιστίας καὶ δυσνοίας, ὥστε ἀγάλλεσθαι τὸν μέγιστον τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου διαδόχων καὶ πρεσβύτατον, ὅτι μὴ φοβεῖται τὸν υἱὸν, ἀλλὰ προσίεται τὴν λόγχην ἔχοντα τοῦ σώματος πλήσιον. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ μόνος, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὁ οἶκος οὗτος ἐπὶ πλείστας διαδοχὰς τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν ἐκαθάρευσε, μᾶλλον δὲ εἷς μόνος τῶν ἀπ᾽ Ἀντιγόνου Φίλιππος ἀνεῖλεν υἱόν. Αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι σχεδὸν ἁπᾶσαι διαδοχαὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἔχουσι παίδων, πολλῶν δὲ μητέρων φόνους καὶ γυναικῶν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδελφοὺς ἀναιρεῖν, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι τὰ αἰτήματα λαμβάνουσιν, οὕτω συνεχωρεῖτο κοινόν τι νομιζόμενον αἴτημα καὶ βασιλικὸν ὑπὲρ ἀσφαλείας.

Compare Tacitus, Histor. v. 8, about the family feuds of the kings of Judæa; and Xenoph. Hieron. iii. 8.

In noticing the Antigonid family as a favorable exception, we must confine our assertion to the first century of that family. The bloody tragedy of Perseus and Demetrius shortly preceded the ruin of the empire.

[8] Arrian, i. 25, 2; Justin, xi. 2. See Vol. XI. p. 517.

[9] Arrian, De Rebus post Alexandrum, Fragm. ap. Photium, cod. 92. p. 220; Plutarch, De Fortunâ Alex. Magn. p. 327. πᾶσα δὲ ὕπουλος ἦν ἡ Μακεδονία (after the death of Philip) πρὸς Ἀμύνταν ἀποβλέπουσα καὶ τοὺς Ἀερόπου παῖδας.

[10] Diod. xvii. 2.

[11] Arrian, i. 25, 2; Curtius, vii. 1, 6. Alexander son of Aëropus was son-in-law of Antipater. The case of this Alexander—and of Olympias—afforded a certain basis to those who said (Curtius, vi. 43) that Alexander had dealt favorably with the accomplices of Pausanias.

[12] Plutarch, Alexand. 10-27; Diodor. xvii. 51; Justin, xi. 11.

[13] Arrian, ii. 14, 10.

[14] Curtius, vi. 9, 17. vi. 10, 24. Arrian mentioned this Amyntas son of Perdikkas (as well as the fact of his having been put to death by Alexander before the Asiatic expedition), in the lost work τὰ μετὰ Ἀλέξανδρον—see Photius Cod. 92. p. 220. But Arrian, in his account of Alexander's expedition, *does not mention* the fact; which shows that his silence is not to be assumed as a conclusive reason for discrediting allegations of others.

Compare Polyænus, v. 60; and Plutarch, Fort. Alex. Magn. p. 327.

It was during this expedition into Thrace and Illyria, about eight months after his accession, that Alexander promised to give his sister Kynna in marriage to Langarus prince of the Agrianes (Arrian, Exp. Al. M. i. 5, 7). Langarus died of sickness soon after; so that this marriage never took place. But when the promise was made,

Kynna must have been a widow. Her husband Amyntas must therefore have been put to death during the first months of Alexander's reign.

[15] See my last preceding volume, Chap. xc. p. 518; Diod. xvii. 2; Curtius, vii. 1, 6; Justin, ix. 7 xi. 2. xii. 6; Plutarch, Alexand. 10; Pausanias, viii. 7, 5.

[16] Arrian, i. 17 10; Plutarch, Alex. 20, Curtius, iii. 28, 18.

[17] Curtius, vi. 42, 20. Compare with this custom, a passage in the Ajax of Sophokles, v. 725.

[18] Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. c. 29. p. 469. c. 78 p. 608; Plutarch, Demosth. 22.

[19] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 547. c. 50.

[20] Plutarch, Phokion, 16.

[21] We gather this from Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 551. c. 52.

[22] Diodorus (xvii. 5) mentions this communication of Demosthenes to Attalus; which, however, I cannot but think improbable. Probably Charidemus was the organ of the communications.

[23] This letter from Darius is distinctly alluded to, and even a sentence cited from it, by Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 633, 634. c. 88. We know that Darius wrote in very different language not long afterwards, near the time when Alexander crossed into Asia (Arrian, ii. 14, 11). The first letter must have been sent shortly after Philip's death, when Darius was publicly boasting of having procured the deed, and before he had yet learnt to fear Alexander. Compare Diodor. xvii. 7.

[24] Diodor. xvii. 3.

[25] Diodorus (xvii. 3) says that the Thebans passed a vote to expel the Macedonian garrison in the Kadmeia. But I have little hesitation in rejecting this statement. We may be sure that the presence of the Macedonian garrison was connected with the predominance in the city of a party favorable to Macedonia. In the ensuing year, when the resistance really occurred, this was done by the anti-Macedonian party, who then got back from exile.

[26] Demadis Fragment. ὑπὲρ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, p. 180.

[27] Arrian, i. 1, 4.

[28] Plutarch, Reipub. Ger. Præcept. p. 804.

[29] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 564. c. 50; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 57; Diodor. xvii. 4; Plutarch, Demosth. c. 23 (Plutarch confounds the proceedings of this year with those of the succeeding year). Demades, in the fragment of his oration remaining to us, makes no allusion to this proceeding of Demosthenes.

The decree, naming Demosthenes among the envoys, is likely enough to have been passed chiefly by the votes of his enemies. It was always open to an Athenian citizen to accept or decline such an appointment.

[30] Several years afterwards, Demades himself was put to death by Antipater, to whom he had been sent as envoy from Athens (Diodor. xviii. 48).

[31] Arrian, i. 1, 2. αἰτεῖν παρ᾽ αὐτῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς Πέρσας στρατείας, ἥντινα Φιλίππῳ ἤδη ἔδοσαν· καὶ αἰτήσαντα λαβεῖν παρὰ πάντων, πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων, etc.

Arrian speaks as if this request had been addressed only to the Greeks *within* Peloponnesus; moreover he mentions no assembly at Corinth, which is noticed (though with some confusion) by Diodorus, Justin, and Plutarch. Cities out of Peloponnesus, as well as within it, must have been included; unless we suppose that the resolution of the Amphiktyonic assembly, which had been previously passed, was held to comprehend all the extra-Peloponnesian cities, which seems not probable.

[32] Demosthenes (or Pseudo-Demosthenes), Orat. xvii. De Fœdere Alexandrino, p. 213, 214. ἐπιτάττει ἡ συνθήκη εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ, ἐλευθέρους εἶναι καὶ αὐτονόμους τοὺς Ἕλληνας.—Ἐστὶ γὰρ γεγραμμένον, ἐάν τινες τὰς πολιτείας τὰς παρ᾽ ἑκάστοις οὔσας, ὅτε τοὺς ὅρκους τοὺς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης ὤμνυσαν, καταλύσωσι, πολεμίους εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς τῆς εἰρήνης μετέχουσιν….

[33] Demosthen. Orat. de Fœdere Alex. p. 213.

[34] Demosth. ib. p 215.

[35] Demosth. ib. p. 217. ἔστι γὰρ δήπου ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις, τὴν θάλατταν πλεῖν τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς εἰρήνης, καὶ μηδένα κωλύειν αὐτοὺς μηδὲ κατάγειν πλοῖον μηδενὸς τούτων· ἐὰν δέ τις παρὰ ταῦτα ποιῇ, πολέμιον εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς τῆς εἰρήνης μετέχουσιν….

[36] Demosth. ib. p. 218, 219. Böhnecke, in his instructive comments on this convention (Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Attischen Redner, p. 623), has treated the prohibition here mentioned as if it were one specially binding the Macedonians not to sail with armed ships into the Peiræus. This undoubtedly is the particular case on which the orator insists; but I conceive it to have been only a particular case under a general prohibitory rule.

[37] Arrian, ii. 1, 7; ii. 2, 4. Demosth. de Fœd. Alex, p. 213. Tenedos, Mitylênê, Antissa, and Eresus, can hardly have been members of the convention when first sworn.

[38] Demosth. Orat. de Fœd. Alex. p. 215. ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοὺς συνεδρεύοντας καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ φυλακῇ τεταγμένους, ὅπως ἐν ταῖς κοινωνούσαις πόλεσι μὴ γίγνωνται θάνατοι μηδὲ φυγαὶ παρὰ τοὺς κειμένους ταῖς πόλεσι νόμους…. Οἱ δὲ τοσοῦτον δέουσι τούτων τι κωλύειν, ὥστε καὶ συγκατασκευάζουσιν, etc. (p. 216).

The persons designated by οἱ δὲ, and denounced throughout this oration generally, are, Alexander or the Macedonian officers and soldiers.

A passage in Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 14, leads to the supposition, that a standing Macedonian force was kept at Corinth, occupying the Isthmus. The Thebans, however, declared against Macedonia (in August or September 335 B. C.), and proceeding to besiege the Macedonian garrison in the Kadmeia, sent envoys to entreat aid from the Arcadians. "These envoys (says Deinarchus) got with difficulty by sea to the Arcadians"—οἳ κατὰ θάλασσαν μόλις ἀφίκοντο πρὸς ἐκείνους. Whence should this difficulty arise, except from a Macedonian occupation of Corinth?

[39] Arrian, i. 16, 10. παρὰ τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. After the death of Darius, Alexander pronounced that the Grecian mercenaries who had been serving with that prince, were highly criminal for having contravened the general vote of the Greeks (παρὰ τὰ δόγματα τὰ Ἑλλήνων), except such as had taken service before that vote was passed, and except the Sinopeans, whom Alexander considered as subjects of Persia and not partakers τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Ἑλλήνων (Arrian, iii. 23, 15; iii. 24, 8, 9).

[40] This is the oration περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συνθηκῶν already more than once alluded to above. Though standing among the Demosthenic works, it is supposed by Libanius as well as by most modern critics not to be the production of Demosthenes—upon internal grounds of style, which are certainly forcible. Libanius says that it bears much resemblance to the style of Hyperides. At any rate, there seems no reason to doubt that it is a genuine oration of one of the contemporary orators. I agree with Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 629) in thinking that it must have been delivered a few months after the convention with Alexander, before the taking of Thebes.

[41] Demosthenes (or Pseudo-Demosth.), Orat. De Fœdere Alex. p. 216. Οὕτω μὲν τοίνυν ῥᾳδίως τὰ ὅπλα ἐπήνεγκε ὁ Μακεδὼν, ὥστε οὐδὲ κατέθετο πώποτε, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιέρχεται καθ᾽ ὅσον δύναται, etc.

[42] Demosth. ib. p. 214, 215.

[43] Demosth. (or Pseudo-Demosth.) Orat. De Fœdere Alex. p. 212, 214, 215, 220, where the orator speaks of Alexander as the τύραννος of Greece.

The orator argues (p. 213) that the Macedonians had recognized despotism as contrary to the convention, in so far as to expel the despots from the towns of Antissa and Eresus in Lesbos. But probably these despots were in correspondence with the Persians on the opposite mainland, or with Memnon.

[44] Demosth. ib. p. 215. τοὺς δ᾽ ἰδίους ὑμᾶς νόμους ἀναγκάζουσι λύειν, τοὺς μὲν κεκριμένους ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἀφιέντες, ἕτερα δὲ παμπλήθη τοιαῦτα βιαζόμενοι παρανομεῖν….

[45] Demosth. (or Pseudo-Demosth.) Orat. De Fœdere Alex. p. 217. εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπεροψίας ἦλθον, ὥστε εἰς Τένεδον ἅπαντα τὰ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλοῖα κατήγαγον, καὶ σκευωρούμενοι περὶ αὐτὰ οὐ πρότερον ἀφεῖσαν, πρὶν ὑμεῖς ἐψηφίσασθε τριήρεις ἑκατον πληροῦν καὶ καθέλκειν εὐθὺς τότε—ὃ παρ᾽ ἐλάχιστον ἐποίησεν αὐτοὺς ἀφαιρεθῆναι δικαίως τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἡγεμονίαν…. p. 218. Ἕως γὰρ ἂν ἐξῇ τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν καὶ μόνοις

ἀναμφισβητήτως εἶναι κυρίοις (the Athenians), τοῖς γε κατὰ γῆν πρὸς τῇ ὑπαρχούσῃ δυνάμει ἐστὶ προβολὰς ἑτέρας ἰσχυροτέρας εὑρέσθαι, etc.

We know that Alexander caused a squadron of ships to sail round to and up the Danube from Byzantium (Arrian, i. 3, 3), to meet him after his march by land from the southern coast of Thrace. It is not improbable that the Athenian vessels detained may have come loaded with a supply of corn, and that the detention of the corn-ships may have been intended to facilitate this operation.

[46] Demosth. (or Pseudo-Demosth.) Orat. De Fœdere Alex. p. 219.

[47] Demosth. ib. p. 211. οἶμαι γὰρ οὐδὲν οὕτω τοῖς δημοκρατουμένοις πρέπειν, ὡς περὶ τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον σπουδάζειν.

I give here the main sense, without binding myself to the exact phrases.

[48] Demosth. ib. p. 213. καὶ γὰρ ἔτι προσγέγραπται ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις, πολέμιον εἶναι, τὸν ἐκεῖνα ἅπερ Ἀλέξανδρος ποιοῦντα, ἁπᾶσι τοῖς τῆς εἰρήνης κοινωνοῦσι, καὶ τὴν χώραν αὐτοῦ, καὶ στρατεύεσθαι ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν ἅπαντας. Compare p. 214 init.

[49] Demosth. ib. p. 217. οὐδεὶς ὑμῖν ἐγκαλέσει ποτε τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὡς ἄρα παρέβητέ τι τῶν κοινῇ ὁμολογηθέντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ χάριν ἕξουσιν ὅτι μόνοι ἐξηλέγξατε τοὺς ταῦτα ποιοῦντας, etc.

[50] Demosth. ib. p. 214. νυνὶ δ᾽, ὅτ᾽ εἰς ταὐτὸ δίκαιον ἅμα καὶ ὁ καιρὸς καὶ τὸ σύμφερον συνδεδράμηκεν, ἄλλον ἄρα τινὰ χρόνον ἀναμενεῖτε τῆς ἰδίας ἐλευθερίας ἅμα καὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἀντιλαβέσθαι;

[51] Demosth. ib. p. 220. εἰ ἄρα ποτὲ δεῖ παύσασθαι αἰσχρῶς ἑτέροις ἀκολουθοῦντας, ἀλλὰ μηδ᾽ ἀναμνησθῆναι μηδεμιᾶς φιλοτιμίας τῶν ἐξ ἀρχαιοτάτου καὶ πλείστου καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἡμῖν ὑπαρχουσῶν.

[52] Demosth. (or Pseudo-Demosth.) Orat. De Fœdere Alex. ἐὰν οὖν κελεύητε, γράψω, καθάπερ αἱ συνθῆκαι κελεύουσι, πολεμεῖν τοῖς παραβεβηκόσιν.

[53] Diodorus, xvii. 7.

[54] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 634; Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 11-19, p. 9-14. It is Æschines who states that the 300 talents were sent to the Athenian people, and refused by them.

Three years later, after the battle of Issus, Alexander in his letter to Darius accuses that prince of having sent both letters and money into Greece, for the purpose of exciting war against him. Alexander states that the Lacedæmonians accepted the money, but that all the other Grecian cities refused it (Arrian, ii. 14, 9). There is no reason to doubt these facts; but I find nothing identifying the precise point of time to which Alexander alludes.

[55] Strabo speaks of the Thracian ἔθνη as twenty-two in number, capable of sending out 200,000 foot, and 15,000 horses (Strabo, vii. Fragm. Vatic. 48).

[56] Strabo, vii. p. 331 (Fragm.); Arrian, i. 1, 6; Appian, Bell. Civil. iv. 87, 105, 106. Appian gives (iv. 103) a good general description of the almost impassable and trackless country to the north and north-east of Philippi.

[57] Arrian, i. 1, 12, 17. The precise locality of that steep road whereby Alexander crossed the Balkan, cannot be determined. Baron von Moltke, in his account of the Russian campaign in Bulgaria (1828-1829), gives an enumeration of four roads, passable by an army, crossing this chain from north to south (see chap. i. of that work). But whether Alexander passed by any one of these four, or by some other road still more to the west, we cannot tell.

[58] Arrian, i. 2.

[59] Strabo, vii. p. 303.

[60] Arrian, i. 4, 2-7.

[61] Neither the point where Alexander crossed the Danube,—nor the situation of the island called Peukê,—nor the identity of the river Lyginus—nor the part of Mount Hæmus which Alexander forced his way over—can be determined. The data given by Arrian are too brief and too meagre to make out with assurance any part of his march after he crossed the Nestus. The facts reported by the historian represent only a small portion of what Alexander really did in this expedition.

It seems clear, however, that the main purpose of Alexander was to attack and humble the Triballi. Their locality is known generally as the region where the modern Servia joins Bulgaria. They reached eastward (in the times of Thucydides, ii. 96) as far as the river Oskius or Isker, which crosses the chain of Hæmus from south to north, passes by the modern city of Sophia, and falls into the Danube. Now Alexander, in order to conduct his army from the eastern bank of the river Nestus, near its mouth, to the country of the Triballi, would naturally pass through Philippopolis, which city appears to have been founded by his father Philip, and therefore probably had a regular road of communication to the maritime regions. (See Stephanus Byz. v. Φιλιππόπολις.) Alexander would cross Mount Hæmus, then, somewhere north-west of Philippopolis. We read in the year 376 B. C. (Diodor. xv. 36) of an invasion of Abdêra by the Triballi; which shows that there was a road, not unfit for an army, from their territory to the eastern side of the mouth of the river Nestus, where Abdêra was situated. This was the road which Alexander is likely to have followed. But he must probably have made a considerable circuit to the eastward; for the route which Paul Lucas describes himself as having taken direct from Philippopolis to Drama, can hardly have been fit for an army.

The river Lyginus may perhaps be the modern Isker, but this is not certain. The Island called Peukê is still more perplexing. Strabo speaks of it as if it were near the mouth of the Danube (vii. p. 301-305). But it seems impossible that either the range of the Triballi, or the march of Alexander, can have extended so far eastward. Since Strabo (as well as Arrian) copied Alexander's march from Ptolemy, whose authority is very good, we are compelled to suppose that there was a second island called Peukê higher up the river.

The Geography of Thrace is so little known, that we cannot wonder at our inability to identify these places. We are acquainted, and that but imperfectly, with the two high roads, both starting from Byzantium or Constantinople. 1. The one (called the King's Road, from having been in part the march of Xerxes in his invasion of Greece, Livy, xxxix. 27; Herodot. vii. 115) crossing the Hebrus and the Nestus, touching the northern coast of the Ægean Sea at Neapolis, a little south of Philippi, then crossing the Strymon at Amphipolis, and stretching through Pella across Inner Macedonia and Illyria to Dyrrachium (the Via Egnatia). 2. The other, taking a more northerly course, passing along the upper valley of the Hebrus from Adrianople to Philippopolis, then through Sardicia (Sophia) and Naissus (Nisch), to the Danube near Belgrade; being the high road now followed from Constantinople to Belgrade.

But apart from these two roads, scarcely anything whatever is known of the country. Especially the mountainous region of Rhodopê, bounded on the west by the Strymon, on the north and east by the Hebrus, and on the south by the Ægean, is a Terra Incognita, except the few Grecian colonies on the coast. Very few travellers have passed along, or described the southern or King's Road, while the region in the interior, apart from the high road, was absolutely unexplored until the visit of M. Viquesnel in 1847, under scientific mission from the French government. The brief, but interesting account, composed by M. Viquesnel, of this rugged and impracticable district, is contained in the "Archives des Missions Scientifiques et Litteraires", for 1850, published at Paris. Unfortunately, the map intended to accompany that account has not yet been prepared; but the published data, as far as they go, have been employed by Kiepert in constructing his recent map of Turkey in Europe; the best map of these regions now existing, though still very imperfect. The Illustrations (Erläuterungen) annexed by Kiepert to his map of Turkey, show the defective data on which the chartography of this country is founded. Until the survey of M. Viquesnel, the higher part of the course of the Strymon, and nearly all the course of the Nestus, may be said to have been wholly unknown.

[62] Arrian, i. 4, 5; Strabo, vii. p. 301.

[63] For the situation of Pelion, compare Livy, xxxi. 33, 34, and the remarks of Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii. ch. 28. p. 310-324.

[64] Assuming Alexander to have been in the Territory of the Triballi, the modern Servia, he would in this march follow mainly the road which is now frequented between Belgrade and Bitolia; through the plain of Kossovo, Pristina, Katschanik (rounding on the north-eastern side the Ljubatrin, the north-eastern promontory terminating the chain of Skardus), Uschkub, Kuprili, along the higher course of the Axius or Vardar, until the point where the Erigon or Tscherna joins that river below Kuprili. Here he would be among the Pæonians and Agrianes, on the east—and the Dardani and Autariatæ, seemingly on the north and west. If he then followed the course of the Erigon, he would pass through the portions of Macedonia then called Deuripia and Pelagonia: he would go between the ridges of the mountains, through which the Erigon breaks, called Nidje on the south, and Babuna on the north. He would pass afterwards to Florina, and not to Bitolia.

See Kiepert's map of these regions—a portion of his recent map of Turkey in Europe—and Griesbach's description of the general track.

[65] Arrian, i. 5, 12.

[66] Arrian, i. 6, 3-18.

[67] Arrian, i. 6, 19-22.

[68] Arrian, i. 7, 5.

[69] Ælian, V. H. xii. 57.

[70] Demades, ὑπὲρ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, s. 14. Θηβαῖοι δὲ μέγιστον εἶχον δεσμὸν τὴν τῶν Μακεδόνων φρουρὰν, ὑφ᾽ ἧς οὐ μόνον τὰς χεῖρας συνεδέθησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν παῤῥησίαν ἀφῄρηντο….

[71] The Thebans, in setting forth their complaints to the Arcadians, stated—ὅτι οὐ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας φιλίαν Θηβαῖοι διαλῦσαι βουλόμενοι, τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπανέστησαν, οὐδ᾽ ἐναντίον τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὐδὲν πράξοντες, ἀλλὰ τὰ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐν τῇ πόλει γινόμενα φέρειν οὐκέτι δυνάμενοι, οὐδὲ τὴν δούλειαν ὑπομένειν, οὐδὲ τὰς ὕβρεις ὁρᾷν τὰς εἰς τὰ ἐλεύθερα σώματα γινομένας.

See Demades περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, s. 13, the speech of Cleadas, Justin, xi. 4; and (Deinarchus cont. Demosth. s. 20) compare Livy, xxxix. 27—about the working of the Macedonian garrison at Maroncia, in the time of Philip son of Demetrius.

[72] Demades περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, Fragm. ad fin.

[73] Arrian, i. 7, 3. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ πολὺς ὁ λόγος (of the death of Alexander) καὶ παρὰ πολλῶν ἐφοίτα, ὅτι τε χρόνον ἀπῆν οὐκ ὀλίγον καὶ ὅτι οὐδεμία ἀγγελία παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἀφῖκτο, etc.

[74] Demades περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, ad fin. ἡνίκα Δημοσθένης καὶ Λυκοῦργος τῷ μὲν λόγῳ παραταττόμενοι τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἐνίκων ἐν Τριβάλλοις, μόνον δ᾽ οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος νεκρὸν τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον προέθηκαν … ἐμὲ δὲ στυγνὸν καὶ περίλυπον ἔφασκον εἶναι μὴ συνευδοκοῦντα, etc.

Justin, xi. 2. "Demosthenem oratorem, qui Macedonum deletas omnes cum rege copias à Triballis affirmaverit, producto in concionem auctore, qui in eo praelio, in quo rex ceciderit, se quoque vulneratum diceret."

Compare Tacitus, Histor. i. 34. "Vix dum egresso Pisone, occisum in castris Othonem, vagus primum et incertus rumor, mox, ut *in magnis mendaciis, interfuisse se quidam, et vidisse affirmabant*, credulà famâ inter gaudentes et incuriosos…. Obvius in palatio Julius Atticus, speculator, cruentum gladium ostentans, occisum *à se* Othonem exclamavit."

It is stated that Alexander was really wounded in the head by a stone, in the action with the Illyrians (Plutarch, Fortun. Alex. p. 327).

[75] Arrian, i. 7, 1: compare Deinarchus cont. Demosthenes, s. 75. p. 53.

[76] Arrian, i. 7, 3-17.

[77] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 4, 11. See Volume X. Ch. lxxvii. p. 81 of this History.

[78] Arrian, i. 7, 14.

[79] Diodor. xvii. 8.

[80] Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 14. s. 19. καὶ Ἀρκάδων ἡκόντων εἰς εσθμὸν, καὶ τὴν μὲν παρὰ Ἀντιπάτρου πρεσβείαν ἄπρακτον ἀποστειλάντων, etc.

In the vote passed by the people of Athens some years afterwards, awarding a statue and other honors to Demosthenes, these proceedings in Peloponnesus are enumerated among his titles to public gratitude—καὶ ὡς ἐκώλυσε Πελοποννησίους ἐπὶ Θήβας Ἀλεξάνδρῳ βοηθῆσαι, χρήματα δοὺς καὶ αὐτὸς πρεσβεύσας, etc. (Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator. p. 850).

[81] Arrian, i. 10, 2; Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. p. 634.

[82] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 634; Deinarch. adv. Demosth. p. 15, 16. s. 19-22.

[83] See Herod. viii. 143. Demosthenes in his orations frequently insists on the different rank and position of Athens, as compared with those of the smaller Grecian states—and of the higher and more arduous obligations consequent thereupon. This is one grand point of distinction between his policy and that of Phokion. See a striking passage in the speech De Coronâ, p. 245. s. 77; and Orat. De Republ. Ordinand. p. 176. s. 37.

Isokrates holds the same language touching the obligations of Sparta,—in the speech which he puts into the mouth of Archidamus. "No one will quarrel with Epidaurians and Phliasians, for looking only how they can get through and keep themselves in being. But for Lacedæmonians, it is impossible to aim simply at preservation and nothing beyond—by any means, whatever they may be. If we cannot preserve ourselves with honor, we ought to prefer a glorious death." (Isokrates, Orat. vi. Archid. s. 106.)

The backward and narrow policy, which Isokrates here proclaims as fit for Epidaurus and Phlius, but not for Sparta—is precisely what Phokion always recommended for Athens, even while Philip's power was yet nascent and unsettled.

[84] Arrian, i. 7, 9.

[85] Arrian, i. 7. 6. See, respecting this region, Colonel Leake's Travels in Northern Greece, ch. vi. p. 300-304; ch. xxviii. p. 303-305, etc.; and for Alexander's line of march, the map at the end of the volume.

[86] Diodorus (xvii. 9) incorrectly says that Alexander came back unexpectedly from *Thrace*. Had this been the fact, he would have come by Pella.

[87] Diodor. xvii. 9; Plutarch. Alexand. 11.

[88] Arrian, i. 7, 16.

[89] Diodor. xvii. 9.

[90] Diodor. xvii. 9.

[91] The attack of Perdikkas was represented by Ptolemy, from whom Arrian copies (i. 8, 1), not only as being the first and only attack made by the Macedonian army on Thebes, but also as made by Perdikkas *without orders from Alexander*, who was forced to support it in order to preserve Perdikkas from being overwhelmed by the Thebans. According to Ptolemy and Arrian, therefore, the storming of Thebes took place both without the orders, and against the wishes, of Alexander; the capture moreover was effected rapidly with little trouble to the besieging army (ἡ ἅλωσις δι᾽ ὀλίγου τε καὶ οὐ ξὺν πόνῳ τῶν ἐλόντων ξυνενεχθεῖσα, Arr. i. 9, 9): the bloodshed and pillage was committed by the vindictive sentiment of the Bœotian allies.

Diodorus had before him a very different account. He affirms that Alexander both combined and ordered the assault—that the Thebans behaved like bold and desperate men, resisting obstinately and for a long time—that the slaughter afterwards was committed by the general body of the assailants; the Bœotian allies being doubtless conspicuous among them. Diodorus gives this account at some length, and with his customary rhetorical amplifications. Plutarch and Justin are more brief; but coincide in the same general view, and not in that of Arrian. Polyænus again (iv. 3 12) gives something different from all.

To me it appears that the narrative of Diodorus is (in its basis, and striking off rhetorical amplifications) more credible than that of Arrian. Admitting the attack made by Perdikkas, I conceive it to have been a portion of the general plan of Alexander. I cannot think it probable that Perdikkas attacked without orders, or that Thebes was captured with little resistance. It was captured by *one* assault (Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 524), but by an assault well-combined and stoutly contested—not by one begun without preparation or order, and successful after hardly any resistance. Alexander, after having offered what he thought liberal terms, was not the man to shrink from carrying his point by force; nor would the Thebans have refused those terms, unless their minds had been made up for strenuous and desperate defence, without hope of ultimate success.

What authority Diodorus followed, we do not know. He may have followed Kleitarchus, a contemporary and an Æolian, who must have had good means of information respecting such an event as the capture of Thebes (see Geier, Alexandri M. Historiarum Scriptores ætate suppares, Leips. 1844, p. 6-152; and Vossius, De Historicis Græcis. i. x. p. 90, ed. Westermann). I have due respect for the authority of Ptolemy, but I cannot go along with Geier and other critics who set aside all other witnesses, even contemporary, respecting Alexander, as worthy of little credit, unless where such witnesses are confirmed by Ptolemy or Aristobulus. We must remember that Ptolemy did not compose his book until after he became king of Egypt, in 306 B. C.; nor indeed until after the battle of Ipsus in 301, according to Geier (p. 1); at least twenty-nine years after the sack of Thebes. Moreover,

Ptolemy was not ashamed of what Geier calls (p. 11) the "pious fraud" of announcing, that two speaking serpents conducted the army of Alexander to the holy precinct of Zeus Ammon (Arrian, iii. 3). Lastly, it will be found that the depositions which are found in other historians, but not in Ptolemy and Aristobulus, relate principally to matters discreditable to Alexander. That Ptolemy and Aristobulus *omitted*, is in my judgment far more probable, than that other historians *invented*. Admiring biographers would easily excuse themselves for refusing to proclaim to the world such acts as the massacre of the Branchidæ, or the dragging of the wounded Batiz at Gaza.

[92] Arrian, i. 8; Diodor. xvii. 12, 13.

[93] Diodorus (xvii. 14) and Plutarch (Alexand. 11) agree in giving the totals of 6000 and 30,000.

[94] Arrian, i. 9; Diodor. xvii. 14.

[95] Justin, xi. 4.

[96] Diodor. xvii. 14; Justin, xi. 4: "pretium non ex ementium commodo, sed ex inimicorum odio extenditur."

[97] Arrian, i. 9, 13. Τοῖς δὲ μετασχοῦσι τοῦ ἔργου ξυμμάχοις, οἷς δὴ καὶ ἐπέτρεψεν Ἀλέξανδρος τὰ κατὰ τὰς Θήβας διαθεῖναι, ἔδοξε, etc.

[98] Arrian, i. 9, 10. He informs us (i. 9, 12) that there were many previous portents which foreshadowed this ruin: Diodorus (xvii. 10) on the contrary, enumerates many previous signs, all tending to encourage the Thebans.

[99] Plutarch, Alex. 11. ἡ μὲν πόλις ἥλω καὶ διαρπασθεῖσα κατεσκάφη, τὸ μὲν ὅλον προσδοκήσαντος αὐτοῦ τοὺς Ἕλληνας πάθει τηλικούτῳ ἐκπλαγέντας καὶ πτήξαντας ἀτρεμήσειν, ἄλλως δὲ καὶ καλλωπισαμένου χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς τῶν συμμάχων ἐγκλήμασιν.

[100] Arrian, i. 11, 13. To illustrate farther the feeling of the Greeks, respecting the wrath of the gods arising from the discontinuance of worship where it had been long continued—I transcribe a passage from Colonel Sleeman's work respecting the Hindoos, whose religious feelings are on so many points analogous to those of the Hellênes:—

"Human sacrifices were certainly offered in the city of Saugor during the whole Mahratta government, up to the year 1800—when they were put a stop to by the local governor, Assa Sahib, a very humane man. I once heard a learned Brahmin priest say, that he thought the decline of his (Assa Sahib's) family and government arose from this innovation. 'There is (said he) no sin in not offering human sacrifices to the gods, where none have been offered; *but where the gods have been accustomed to them, they are very naturally annoyed when the rite is abolished, and visit the place and the people with all kinds of calamity*.' The priest did not seem to think that there was anything singular in this mode of reasoning: perhaps three Brahmin priests out of four would have reasoned in the same manner." (Sleeman, Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official, vol. i. ch. xv. p. 130).

[101] Plutarch, Alex. 13: compare Justin, xi. 4; and Isokrates ad Philipp. (Or. v. s. 35), where he recommends Thebes to Philip on the ground of pre-eminent worship towards Herakles.

It deserves notice, that while Alexander himself repented of the destruction of Thebes, the macedonizing orator at Athens describes it as a just, though deplorable penalty, brought by the Thebans upon themselves by reckless insanity of conduct (Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 524).

[102] Arrian, i. 10, 4.

[103] The name of Diotimus is mentioned by Arrian (i. 10, 6), but not by Plutarch; who names Demon instead of him (Plutarch, Demosth. c. 23) and Kallisthenes instead of Hyperides. We know nothing about Diotimus, except that Demosthenes (De Coronâ, p. 264) alludes to him along with Charidemus, as having received an expression of gratitude from the people, in requital for a present of shields which he had made. He is mentioned also, along with Charidemus and others, in the third of the Demosthenic epistles, p. 1482.

[104] Arrian, i. 10, 6; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 847. ἐξήτει αὐτὸν (Demosthenes) ἀπειλῶν εἰ μὴ δοίησαν. Diodor. xvii. 15; Plutarch, Demosth. 23.

[105] Livy; ix. 18. "(Alexander), adversus quem Athenis, in civitate fractâ Macedonum armis, cernente tum maxime prope fumantes Thebarum ruinas, concionari libere ausi sint homines,—id quod ex monumentis ora-

tionum patet", etc.

[106] Plutarch, Phokion, 9-17; Diodor. xvii. 15.

[107] Diodor. xvii. 15. Ὁ δὲ δῆμος τοῦτον μὲν (Phokion) τοῖς θορύβοις ἐξέβαλε, προσάντως ἀκούων τοὺς λόγους.

[108] Arrian, i. 10, 8; Diodor. xvii. 15; Plutarch, Phokion, 17; Justin, xi. 4; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 26.

Arrian states that the visit of Demades with nine other Athenian envoys to Alexander, occurred *prior* to the demand of Alexander for the extradition of the ten citizens. He (Arrian) affirms that immediately on hearing the capture of Thebes, the Athenians passed a vote, on the motion of Demades, to send ten envoys, for the purpose of expressing satisfaction that Alexander had come home safely from the Illyrians, and that he had punished the Thebans for their revolt. Alexander (according to Arrian) received this mission courteously, but replied by sending a letter to the Athenian people, insisting on the surrender of the ten citizens.

Now both Diodorus and Plutarch represent the mission of Demades as *posterior* to the demand made by Alexander for the ten citizens; and that it was intended to meet and deprecate that demand.

In my judgment, Arrian's tale is the less credible of the two. I think it highly improbable that the Athenians would by public vote express satisfaction that Alexander had punished the Thebans for their revolt. If the macedonizing party at Athens was strong enough to carry so ignominious a vote, they would also have been strong enough to carry the subsequent proposition of Phokion—that the ten citizens demanded should be surrendered. The fact, that the Athenians afforded willing shelter to the Theban fugitives, is a farther reason for disbelieving this alleged vote.

[109] Plutarch, Phokion, 17; Plutarch, Alexand. 13.

[110] Plutarch, Alex. 14.

[111] Plutarch, Alex. 14.

[112] Diodor. xvi. 7.

[113] Arrian, i. 16, 10; i. 29, 9, about the Grecian prisoners taken at the victory of the Granikus—ὅσους δὲ αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους ἔλαβε, τούτους δὲ δήσας ἐν πέδαις, εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἀπέπεμψεν ἐργάζεσθαι, ὅτι παρὰ τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, Ἕλληνες ὄντες, ἐναντία τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὲρ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐμάχοντο. Also iii. 23, 15, about the Grecian soldiers serving with the Persians, and made prisoners in Hyrkania—Ἀδικεῖν γὰρ μεγάλα (said Alexander) τοὺς στρατευομένους ἐναντία τῇ Ἑλλάδι παρὰ τοῖς βαρβάροις παρὰ τὰ δόγματα τῶν Ἑλλήνων.

Toward the end of October 1812, near Moscow, General Winzingerode, a German officer in the Russian service,—with his aide-de-camp a native Russian, Narishkin,—became prisoner of the French. He was brought to Napoleon—"At the sight of that German general, all the secret resentments of Napoleon took fire. 'Who are you (he exclaimed)? a man without a country! When I was at war with the Austrians, I found you in their ranks. Austria has become my ally, and you have entered into the Russian service. You have been one of the warmest instigators of the present war. Nevertheless, you are a native of the Confederation of the Rhine: *you are my subject*. You are not an ordinary enemy: you are a rebel: I have a right to bring you to trial. *Gens d'armes*, seize this man!' Then addressing the aide-de-camp of Winzingerode, Napoleon said, 'As for you, Count Narishkin, I have nothing to reproach you with: you are a Russian, you are doing your duty.'" (Ségur's account of the Campaign in Russia, book ix. ch. vi. p. 132.)

Napoleon did not realize these threats against Winzingerode; but his language expresses just the same sentiment as that of Alexander towards the captive Greeks.

[114] Demosth. Olynth. ii. p. 14 Ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἡ Μακεδονικὴ δύναμις καὶ ἀρχὴ ἐν μὲν προσθήκῃ μερίς ἐστὶ τις οὐ σμικρὰ, οἷον ὑπῆρξέ ποθ' ὑμῖν ἐπὶ Τιμοθέου πρὸς Ὀλυνθίους … αὐτὴ δὲ καθ' αὑτὴν ἀσθενὴς καὶ πολλῶν κακῶν ἐστὶ μεστὴ.

[115] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 123, 124: compare Olynth. ii. p. 22. I give here the substance of what is said by the orator, not strictly adhering to his words.

[116] Isokrates, in several of his discourses, notes the gradual increase of these mercenaries—men without regular means of subsistence, or fixed residence, or civic obligations. Or. iv. (Panegyr.) s. 195; Or. v. (Philippus), s. 112-142; Or. viii. (De Pace), s. 31-56.

[117] Xenoph. Magist. Equit. ix. 4. Οἶδα δ᾽ ἐγὼ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ ἱππικὸν ἀρξάμενον εὐδοκιμεῖν, ἐπεὶ ξένους ἱππέας προσέλαβον· καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι πανταχοῦ τὰ ξενικὰ ὁρῶ εὐδοκιμοῦντα.

Compare Demosth. Philippic. i. p. 46; Xenoph. Hellenic. iv. 4, 14; Isokrates, Orat. vii. (Areopagit.), s. 93.

[118] For an explanation of the improved arming of peltasts introduced by Iphikrates, see Vol. IX. Ch. lxxv. p. 335 of this History. Respecting these improvements, the statements both of Diodorus (xv. 44) and of Nepos are obscure. MM. Rüstow and Köchly (in their valuable work, Geschichte des Griechischen Kriegswesens, Aarau, 1852, B. ii. p. 164) have interpreted the statements in a sense to which I cannot subscribe. They think that Iphikrates altered not only the arming of peltasts, but also that of hoplites; a supposition, which I see nothing to justify.

[119] Besides the many scattered remarks in the Anabasis, the Cyropædia is full of discussion and criticism on military phænomena. It is remarkable to what an extent Xenophon had present to his mind all the exigencies of war, and the different ways of meeting them. See as an example, Cyropæd. vi. 2; ii. 1.

The work on sieges, by Æneas (Poliorketica), is certainly anterior to the military improvements of Philip of Macedon: probably about the beginning of his reign. See the preface to it by Rüstow and Köchly, p. 8, in their edition of Die Griechischen Kriegs-schriftsteller, Leips. 1853. In this work, allusion is made to several others, now lost, by the same author—Παρασκευαστικὴ βίβλος, Πoριστικὴ Βίβλος, Στρατοπεδευτικὴ, etc.

[120] See the striking speech addressed by Alexander to the discontented Macedonian soldiers, a few months before his death, at Opis or Susa (Arrian, vii).

… Φίλιππος γὰρ παραλαβὼν ὑμᾶς πλανήτας καὶ ἀπόρους, ἐν διφθέραις τοὺς πολλοὺς νέμοντας ἀνὰ τὰ ὄρη πρόβατα κατὰ ὀλίγα, καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτων κακῶς μαχομένους Ἰλλυριοῖς τε καὶ Τριβαλλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ὁμόροις Θρᾳξί, χλαμύδας μὲν ὑμῖν ἀντὶ τῶν διφθερῶν φορεῖν ἔδωκε, κατήγαγε δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὀρῶν ἐς τὰ πεδία, ἀξιομάχους καταστήσας τοῖς προσχώροις τῶν βαρβάρων, ὡς μὴ χωρίων ἔτι ὀχυρότητι πιστεύοντας μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἀρετῇ σώζεσθαι….

In the version of the same speech given by Curtius (x. 10, 23), we find, "Modo sub Philippo seminudis, amicula ex purpurâ sordent, aurum et argentum oculi ferre non possunt: lignea enim vasa desiderant, et ex cratibus scuta rubiginemque gladiorum", etc.

Compare the description given by Thucydides, iv. 124, of the army of Brasidas and Perdikkas, where the Macedonian foot are described as ἄλλος ὅμιλος τῶν βαρβάρων πολύς.

[121] Herodot. viii. 137.

[122] Thucyd. ii. 100; Xenoph. Hellen. v. 2, 40-42.

[123] Respecting the length of the pike of the Macedonian phalanx, see Appendix to this Chapter.

[124] The impression of admiration, and even terror, with which the Roman general Paulus Emilius was seized, on first seeing the Macedonian phalanx in battle array at Pydna—has been recorded by Polybius (Polybius, Fragm. xxix. 6, 11; Livy, xliv. 40).

[125] Harpokration and Photius, v. Πεζέταιροι, Demosth. Olynth. ii. p. 23; Arrian, iv. 23, 1. τῶν πεζεταίρων καλουμένων τὰς Τάξεις, and ii. 23, 2, etc.

Since we know from Demosthenes that the pezetæri date from the time of Philip, it is probable that the passage of Anaximenes (as cited by Harpokration and Photius) which refers them to Alexander, has ascribed to the son what really belongs to the father. The term ἑταῖροι, in reference to the kings of Macedonia, first appears in Plutarch, Pelopidas, 27, in reference to Ptolemy, before the time of Philip; see Otto Abel, Makedonien vor König Philip, p. 129 (the passage of Ælian referred to by him seems of little moment). The term Companions or Comrades had under Philip a meaning purely military, designating foreigners as well as Macedonians serving in his army: see Theopompus, Frag. 249. The term, originally applied only to a select few, was by degrees extended to the corps generally.

[126] Arrian, i. 14, 3; iii. 16, 19; Diodor. xvii. 57. Compare the note of Schmieder on the above passage of Arrian; also Droysen, Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen, p. 95, 96, and the elaborate note of Mützel on Curtius, v. 2, 3. p. 400.

The passage of Arrian (his description of Alexander's army arrayed at the Granikus) is confused, and seems erroneous in some words of the text; yet it may be held to justify the supposition of six Taxeis of pezetæri in Alexander's phalanx on that day. There seem also to be six Taxeis at Arbêla (iii. 11, 16).

[127] Arrian. Tactic. c. 10; Ælian. Tactic. c. 9.

[128] Curtius, v. 2, 3.

[129] This is to be seen in the arrangement made by Alexander a short time before his death, when he incorporated Macedonian and Persian soldiers in the same lochus; the normal depth of sixteen was retained; all the front ranks or privileged men being Macedonians. The Macedonians were much hurt at seeing their native regimental array shared with Asiatics (Arrian, vii. 11, 5; vii. 23, 4-8).

[130] The proper meaning of ὑπασπισταὶ, as guards or personal attendants on the prince, appears in Arrian, i. 5, 3; vii. 8, 6.

Neoptolemus, as ἀρχιυπασπιστὴς to Alexander, carried the shield and lance of the latter, on formal occasions (Plutarch, Eumenes, 1).

[131] Arrian, ii. 4, 3, 4; ii. 20, 5.

[132] Arrian, iv. 30, 11; v. 23, 11.

[133] Arrian, ii. 20, 5; ii. 23, 6; iii. 18, 8.

[134] Droysen and Schmieder give the number of hypaspists in Alexander's army at Issus, as 6000. That this opinion rests on no sufficient evidence, has been shown by Mützel (ad Curtium, v. 2, 3. p. 399). But that the number of hypaspists left by Philip at his death was 6000 seems not improbable.

[135] See Arrian, v. 14, 1; v. 16, 4; Curtius, vi. 9, 22. "Equitatui, optimæ exercitûs parti", etc.

[136] We are told that Philip, after his expedition against the Scythians about three years before his death, exacted and sent into Macedonia 20,000 chosen mares, in order to improve the breed of Macedonian horses. The regal haras were in the neighborhood of Pella (Justin, ix. 2; Strabo, xvi. p. 752, in which passage of Strabo, *the details* apply to the *haras* of Seleukus Nikator at Apameia, not to that of Philip at Pella).

[137] Arrian, i. 2, 8, 9 (where we also find mentioned τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἄνωθεν Μακεδονίας ἱππέας), i. 12, 12; ii. 9, 6; iii. 11, 12.

About the ἱππεῖς σαρισσόφοροι, see i. 13, 1.

It is possible that there may have been sixteen squadrons of heavy cavalry, and eight squadrons of the Sarissophori,—each squadron from 180 to 250 men—as Rüstow and Köchly conceive (p. 243). But there is no sufficient evidence to prove it; nor can I think it safe to assume, as they do, that Alexander carried over with him to Asia *just half* of the Macedonian entire force.

[138] Arrian, iii. 11, 11; iii. 13, 1; iii. 18, 8. In the first of these passages, we have ἴλαι βασιλικαὶ in the plural (iii. 11, 12). It seems too that the different ἴλαι alternated with each other in the foremost position, or ἡγεμονία for particular days (Arrian, i. 14, 9).

[139] Arrian, iii. 16, 19.

[140] Arrian, iv. 13, 1. Ἐκ Φιλίππου ἦν ἤδη καθεστηκὸς, τῶν ἐν τέλει Μακεδόνων τοὺς παῖδας, ὅσοι ἐς ἡλικίαν ἐμειρακίσαντο, καταλέγεσθαι ἐς θεραπείαν τοῦ βασιλέως. Τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην δίαιταν τοῦ σώματος διακονεῖσθαι βασιλεῖ, καὶ κοιμώμενον φυλάσσειν, τούτοις ἐπετέτραπτο· καὶ ὁπότε ἐξελαύνοι βασιλεὺς, τοὺς ἵππους παρὰ τῶν ἱπποκόμων δεχόμενοι ἐκεῖνοι προσῆγον, καὶ ἀνέβαλον οὗτοι βασιλέα τὸν Περσικὸν τρόπον, καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ θήρᾳ φιλοτιμίας βασιλεῖ κοινωνοὶ ἦσαν, etc.

Curtius, viii. 6. 1. "Mos erat principibus Macedonum adultos liberos regibus tradere, ad munia haud multum servilibus ministeriis abhorrentia. Excubabant servatis noctium vicibus proximi foribus ejus ædis, in quâ rex aquiescebat. Per hos pellices introducebantur, alio aditu quam quem armati obsidebant. Iidem acceptos ab agasonibus equos, quum rex ascensurus esset, admovebant; comitabanturque et venantem, et in præliis, omnibus artibus studiorum liberalium exculti. Præcipuus honor habebatur, quod licebat sedentibus vesci cum rege. Castigandi eos verberibus nullius potestas præter ipsum erat. Hæc cohors velut seminarium ducum præfectorumque

apud Macedonas fuit: hinc habuere posteri reges, quorum stirpibus post multas ætates Romani opes ademerunt." Compare Curtius, v. 6, 42; and Ælian, V. H. xiv. 49.

This information is interesting, as an illustration of Macedonian manners and customs, which are very little known to us. In the last hours of the Macedonian monarchy, after the defeat at Pydna (168 B. C.), the *pueri regii* followed the defeated king Perseus to the sanctuary at Samothrace, and never quitted him until the moment when he surrendered himself to the Romans (Livy, xlv. 5).

As an illustration of the scourging, applied as a punishment to these young Macedonians of rank, see the case of Dekamnichus, handed over by king Archelaus to Euripides, to be flogged (Aristotle, Polit. v. 8, 13).

[141] Curtius, v. 6, 42; Diodor. xvii. 65.

[142] We read this about the youthful Philippus, brother of Lysimachus (Curtius, viii. 2, 36).

[143] Arrian, i. 6, 17.

[144] Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 247.

[145] Livy. xlii. 51; xliv. 46, also the comparison in Strabo, xvi. p. 752, between the military establishments of Seleukus Nikator at Apameia in Syria, and those of Philip at Pella in Macedonia.

[146] Justin, xi. 6. About the debt of 500 talents left by Philip, see the words of Alexander, Arrian, vii. 9, 10. Diodorus affirms (xvi. 8) that Philip's annual return from the gold mines was 1000 talents; a total not much to be trusted.

[147] Diodor. xvii. 17.

[148] Diodor. xvii. 16.

[149] Justin, xi. 5. "Proficiscens ad Persicum bellum, omnes novercæ suæ cognatos, quos Philippus in excelsiorem dignitatis locum provehens imperiis præfecerat, interfecit. Sed nec suis, qui apti regno videbantur, pepercit; ne qua materia seditionis procul se agente in Macedoniâ remaneret." Compare also xii. 6, where the Pausanias mentioned as having been put to death by Alexander is not the assassin of Philip. Pausanias was a common Macedonian name (see Diodor. xvi. 93).

I see no reason for distrusting the general fact here asserted by Justin. We know from Arrian (who mentioned the fact incidentally in his work τὰ μετὰ Ἀλέξανδρον, though he says nothing about it in his account of the expedition of Alexander—see Photius, Cod. 92. p. 220) that Alexander put to death, in the early period of his reign, his first cousin and brother-in-law Amyntas. Much less would he scruple to kill the friends or relatives of Kleopatra. Neither Alexander nor Antipater would account such proceeding anything else than a reasonable measure of prudential policy. By the Macedonian common law, when a man was found guilty of treason, all his relatives were condemned to die along with him (Curtius, vi. 11, 20).

Plutarch (De Fortunâ Alex. Magn. p. 342) has a general allusion to these precautionary executions ordered by Alexander. Fortune (he says) imposed upon Alexander δεινὴν πρὸς ἄνδρας ὁμοφύλους καὶ συγγενεῖς διὰ φόνου καὶ σιδήρου καὶ πυρὸς ἀνάγκην ἀμύνης, ἀτερπέστατον τέλος ἔχουσαν.

[150] Kassander commanded a corps of Thracians and Pæonians: Iollas and Philippus were attached to the king's person (Arrian, vii. 27, 2; Justin, xii. 14; Diodor. xvii. 17).

[151] Justin, xvi. 1, 14. "Antipatrum—amariorem semper ministrum regni, quam ipsos reges, fuisse", etc.

[152] Plutarch, Alexand. 25-39; Arrian, vii. 12, 12. He was wont to say, that his mother exacted from him a heavy house-rent for his domicile of ten months.

Kleopatra also (sister of Alexander and daughter of Olympias) exercised considerable influence in the government. Dionysius, despot of the Pontic Herakleia, maintained himself against opposition in his government, during Alexander's life, mainly by paying assiduous court to her (Memnon. Heracl. c. 4. ap. Photium, Cod. 224).

[153] Arrian, i. 11, 9.

[154] The Athenians furnished twenty ships of war. Diodor. xvii. 22.

[155] Arrian, i. 11; Plutarch, Alexand. 15; Justin, xi. 5. The ceremony of running round the column of Achilles still subsisted in the time of Plutarch—ἀλειψάμενος λίπα καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἑταίρων συναναδραμὼν γυμνὸς,

ὥσπερ ἔθος ἔστιν, etc. Philostratus, five centuries after Alexander, conveys a vivid picture of the numerous legendary and religious associations connected with the plain of Troy and with the tomb of Protesilaus at Elæus, and of the many rites and ceremonies performed there even in his time (Philostrat. Heroica, xix. 14, 15. p. 742, ed. Olearius—δρόμοις δ᾽ ἐῤῥυθμισμένοις συνηλάλαζον, ἀνακαλοῦντες τὸν Ἀχιλλέα, etc., and the pages preceding and following).

Dikæarchus (Fragm. 19, ed. Didot. ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 603) had treated in a special work about the sacrifices offered to Athênê at Ilium (Περὶ τῆς ἐν Ἰλίῳ θυσίας) by Alexander, and by many others before him; by Xerxes (Herodot. vii. 43), who offered up 1000 oxen—by Mindarus (Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 4), etc. In describing the proceedings of Alexander at Ilium, Dikæarchus appears he have dwelt much on the warm sympathy which that prince exhibited for the affection between Achilles and Patroklus: which sympathy Dikæarchus illustrated by characterizing Alexander as φιλόπαις ἐκμανῶς, and by recounting his public admiration for the eunuch Bagôas: compare Curtius, x. i. 25—about Bagôas.

[156] Plutarch, Fort. Al. M. ii. p. 334. Βριθὺς ὁπλιτοπάλας, δαΐος ἀντιπάλοις—ταύτην ἔχων τέχνην προγονικὴν ἀπ᾽ Αἰακιδῶν, etc.

Ἄλκην μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκεν Ὀλύμπιος Αἰακίδῃσι,

Νοῦν δ᾽ Ἀμυθαονίδαις, πλοῦτον δ᾽ ἔπορ᾽ Ἀτρεΐδῃσιν.

(Hesiod. Fragment. 223, ed. Marktscheffel.)

Like Achilles, Alexander was distinguished for swiftness of foot (Plutarch, Fort. Al. M. i. p. 331).

[157] Diodor. xvii. 17. Plutarch (Alexand. 15) says that the highest numbers which he had read of, were,—43,000 infantry with 5000 cavalry: the lowest numbers, 30,000 infantry with 4000 cavalry (assuming the correction of Sintenis, τετρακισχιλίους in place of πεντακισχιλίους, to be well founded, as it probably is—compare Plutarch, Fort. Alex. M. i. p. 327).

According to Plutarch (Fort. Al. M. p. 327), both Ptolemy and Aristobulus stated the number of infantry to be 30,000; but Ptolemy gave the cavalry as 5000, Aristobulus, as only 4000. Nevertheless, Arrian—who professes to follow mainly Ptolemy and Aristobulus, whenever they agree—states the number of infantry as "not much more than 30,000; the cavalry as more than 5000" (Exp. Al. i. 11, 4). Anaximenes alleged 43,000 infantry, with 5500 cavalry. Kallisthenes (ap. Polybium. xii. 19) stated 40,000 infantry, with 4500 cavalry. Justin (xi. 6) gives 32,000 infantry, with 4500 cavalry.

My statement in the text follows Diodorus, who stands distinguished, by recounting not merely the total, but the component items besides. In regard to the total of infantry, he agrees with Ptolemy and Aristobulus: as to cavalry, his statement is a mean between the two.

[158] Plutarch, Alexand. 15.

[159] Arrian, vii. 9, 10—the speech which he puts in the mouth of Alexander himself—and Curtius, x. 2, 24.

Onesikritus stated that Alexander owed at this time a debt of 200 talents (Plutarch, Alex. 15).

[160] Plutarch, Fort. Alex. M. i. p. 327; Justin, xi. 6.

[161] Arrian, i. 13, 4.

[162] Arrian, vi. 28, 6; Arrian, Indica, 18; Justin, xv. 3-4. Porphyry (Fragm. ap. Syncellum, Frag. Histor. Græc. vol. iii. p. 695-698) speaks of Lysimachus as a Thessalian from Kranon; but this must be a mistake: compare Justin, xv. 3.

[163] Neoptolemus belonged, like Alexander himself, to the Æakid gens (Arrian, ii. 27, 9).

[164] Plutarch, Eumenes, c. 1; Cornelius Nepos, Eumen. c. 1.

[165] Arrian, vii. 13, 1; Plutarch, Eum. 2, 3, 8, 10.

[166] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 19, respecting Philip—οὐ μόνον οὐχ Ἕλληνος ὄντος, οὐδὲ προσήκοντος οὐδὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ βαρβάρου ἐντεῦθεν ὅθεν καλὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁλέθρου Μακεδόνος, ὅθεν οὐδ᾽ ἀνδράποδον σπουδαῖον οὐδὲν ἦν πρότερον πρίασθαι.

Compare this with the exclamations of the Macedonian soldiers (called Argyraspides) against their distinguished chief Eumenes, calling him Χερρόνησίτης ὄλεθρος (Plutarch, Eumenes, 18).

[167] See, in reference to these incidents, my last preceding volume, Vol. XI. Ch. xc. p. 441 *seq.*

[168] Diodor. xvi. 52; Curtius, vi. 4, 25; vi. 5, 2. Curtius mentions also Manapis, another Persian exile, who had fled from Ochus to Philip.

[169] Diodor. xvi. 52. About the strength of the fortress of Athens, see Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 2, 11; Diodor. xiii. 64. It had been held in defiance of the Persians, even before the time of Hermeias—Isokrates. Compare also Isokrates, Or. iv. (Panegyr.) s. 167.

[170] Letter of Alexander, addressed to Darius after the battle of Issus, apud Arrian, ii. 14, 7. Other troops sent by the Persians into Thrace (besides those despatched to the relief of Perinthus), are here alluded to.

[171] Demosthenes, Philippic. iv. p. 139, 140; Epistola Philippi apud Demosthen. p. 160.

[172] Diodor. xvii. 5; Justin, x. 3; Curtius, x. 5, 22.

[173] Arrian, ii. 14, 10.

[174] Diodor. xvii. 7.

[175] Arrian, ii. 14, 11.

[176] Diodor. xvii. 7.

[177] Diodor. xvii. 7: compare Arrian, i. 17, 9. ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν Μέμνονος ἔπεμψεν—which doubtless means this region, conquered by Mentor from Hermeias of Atarneus.

[178] Diodor. xvii. 7; Polyænus, v. 34, 5.

[179] Diodor. xvii. 7. We read also of military operations near Magnesia between Parmenio and Memnon (Polyænus, v. 34, 4).

[180] Diodor. xvii. 18, 19; Arrian, i. 12, 14; i. 16, 5.

[181] Arrian, i. 12, 16; i. 13, 4.

[182] Compare the policy recommended by Memnon, as set forth in Arrian (i. 12, 16), and in Diodorus (xvii. 18). The superiority of Diodorus is here incontestable. He proclaims distinctly both the defensive and the offensive side of Memnon's policy; which, when taken together, form a scheme of operations no less effective than prudent. But Arrian omits all notice of the offensive policy, and mentions only the defensive—the retreat and destruction of the country; which, if adopted alone, could hardly have been reckoned upon for success, in starving out Alexander, and might reasonably be called in question by the Persian generals. Moreover, we should form but a poor idea of Memnon's ability, if in this emergency he neglected to avail himself of the irresistible Persian fleet.

I notice the rather this point of superiority of Diodorus, because recent critics have manifested a tendency to place too exclusive a confidence in Arrian, and to discredit almost all allegations respecting Alexander except such as Arrian either certifies or countenances. Arrian is a very valuable historian; he has the merit of giving us plain narrative without rhetoric, which contrasts favorably both with Diodorus and with Curtius; but he must not be set up as the only trustworthy witness.

[183] Arrian, i. 12, 18.

[184] Xenophon, Hellenic. iv. 1, 33.

[185] Strabo, xiii. p. 602. The rivers Skamander, Æsepus, and Granikus, all rise from the same height, called Kotylus. This comes from Demetrius, a native of Skepsis.

[186] Diodor. xvii. 18, 19. Οἱ βάρβαροι, τὴν ὑπώρειαν κατειλημμένοι, etc. "prima congressio in campis Adrastiis fuit." Justin, xi. 6: compare Strabo, xiii. p. 587, 588.

[187] Arrian, i. 14, 3. The text of Arrian is not clear. The name of Kraterus occurs twice. Various explanations are proposed. The words ἔστε ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς ξυμπάσης τάξεως seem to prove that there were three τάξεις of the phalanx (Kraterus, Meleager, and Philippus) included in the left half of the army—and three others

(Perdikkas, Kœnus, and Amyntas) in the right half; while the words ἐπὶ δὲ, ἡ Κρατέρου τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου appear wrongly inserted. There is no good reason for admitting two distinguished officers, each named Kraterus. The name of Philippus and his τάξις is repeated twice; once in counting from the right of the τάξεις,—once again in counting from the left.

[188] Plutarch states that Alexander struck into the river with thirteen squadrons (ἴλαι) of cavalry. Whether this total includes all then present in the field, or only the Companion-cavalry—we cannot determine (Plutarch, Alex. 16).

[189] Diodor. xvii. 19.

[190] Arrian, i. 14, 8. Χρόνον μὲν δὴ ἀμφότερα τὰ στρατεύματα, ἐπ᾽ ἀκροῦ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐφεστῶτες, ὑπὸ τοῦ τὸ μέλλον ὀκνεῖν ἡσυχίαν ἦγον· καὶ σιγὴ ἦν πολλὴ ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρων.

[191] Arrian, i. 14, 9. τοὺς προδρόμους ἱππέας mean the same cavalry as those who are called (in 14, 2) σαρισσοφόρους ἱππέας, under Amyntas son of Arrhibæus.

[192] Arrian, i. 14, 10. Αὐτὸς δὲ (Alexander) ἄγων τὸ δέξιον κέρας … ἐμβαίνει ἐς τὸν πόρον, λοξὴν ἀεὶ παρατείνων τὴν τάξιν, ᾗ παρεῖλκε τὸ ῥεῦμα, ἵνα δὴ μὴ ἐκβαίνοντι αὐτῷ οἱ Πέρσαι κατὰ κέρας προσπίπτοιεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς, ὡς ἀνυστὸν, τῇ φάλαγγι προσμίξῃ αὐτοῖς.

Apparently, this passage λοξὴν ἀεὶ παρατείνων τὴν τάξιν, ᾗ παρεῖλκε τὸ ῥεῦμα is to be interpreted by the phrase which follows describing the purpose to be accomplished.

I cannot think that the words imply a movement *in échelon*, as Rüstow and Köchly contend (Geschichte des Griechischen Kriegswesens, p. 271)—nor a crossing of the river against the stream, to break the force of the current, as is the opinion of others.

[193] Arrian, i. 15, 5. Καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν (Alexander himself) ξυνειστήκει μάχη καρτερὰ, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἄλλαι ἐπ᾽ ἄλλαις τῶν τάξεων τοῖς Μακεδόσι διέβαινον οὐ χαλεπῶς ἤδη.

These words deserve attention, because they show how incomplete Arrian's description of the battle had before been. Dwelling almost exclusively upon the personal presence and achievements of Alexander, he had said little even about the right half of the army, and nothing at all about the left half of it under Parmenio. We discover from these words that *all* the τάξεις of the phalanx (not only the three in Alexander's half, but also the three in Parmenio's half) passed the river nearly at the same time, and for the most part, with little or no resistance.

[194] Arrian, i. 15, 6-12; Diodor. xvi. 20; Plutarch, Alex. 16. These authors differ in the details. I follow Arrian.

[195] Diodor. xvii. 21.

[196] Arrian, i. 16, 1. Plutarch says that the infantry, on seeing the cavalry routed, demanded to capitulate on terms with Alexander; but this seems hardly probable.

[197] Arrian, i. 16, 4; Diodor. xvii. 21. Diodorus says that on the part of the Persians more than 10,000 foot were killed, with 2000 cavalry; and that more than 20,000 men were made prisoners.

[198] Arrian, i. 16, 5, 6.

[199] Arrian, i. 16, 7, 8.

[200] Arrian, in describing another battle, considers that the proportion of twelve to one, between wounded and killed, is above what could have been expected (v. 24, 8). Rüstow and Köchly (p. 273) state that in modern battles, the ordinary proportion of wounded to killed is from 8:1 to 10:1.

[201] Arrian, i. 16, 8; Plutarch, Alexand. 16. Aristobulus (apud Plutarch. *l. c.*) said that there were slain, among the companions of Alexander (τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον) thirty-four persons, of whom nine were infantry. This coincides with Arrian's statement about the twenty-five companions of the cavalry, slain.

[202] Arrian, i. 16, 10, 11.

[203] Arrian usually calls the battle of the Granikus an ἱππομαχία (i. 17, 10 and elsewhere).

The battle was fought in the Attic month Thargelion: probably the beginning of May (Plutarch, Camillus, 19).

[204] Æschylus, Pers. 950 *seqq.*

[205] Arrian, i. 17, 1, 2.

[206] About the almost impregnable fortifications and position of Sardis, see Polybius, vii. 15-18; Herod. i. 84. It held out for nearly two years against Antiochus III. (B. C. 216), and was taken at last only by the extreme carelessness of the defenders; even then, the citadel was still held.

[207] Herodot. vii. 106, 107.

[208] Arrian, i. 17, 5-9; Diodor. xvii. 21.

[209] Arrian, i. 17, 12. Respecting these commotions at Ephesus, which had preceded the expedition of Alexander, we have no information: nor are we told who Heropythus was or under what circumstances he had liberated Ephesus. It would have been interesting to know these facts, as illustrating the condition of the Asiatic Greeks previous to Alexander's invasion.

[210] Arrian, i. 17, 10-13.

[211] Arrian, i. 18, 5, 6.

[212] Arrian, i. 18, 10-13.

[213] Diodor. xvii. 22.

[214] Diodor. xvii. 23.

[215] Arrian, i. 18, 9-15; i. 20, 2.

[216] Arrian, i. 19; Diodor. xvii. 22.

[217] Arrian, i. 20, 1-4; Diodor. xvii. 22. At the same time, the statement of Diodorus can hardly be correct (xvii. 24), that Alexander sent his battering engines from Miletus to Halikarnassus by sea. This would only have exposed them to be captured by the Persian fleet. We shall see that Alexander reorganized his entire fleet during the ensuing year.

[218] Arrian, i. 23, 11, 12; Diodor. xvii. 24; Strabo, xiv. p. 657.

[219] Arrian, i. 20, 13.

[220] Arrian, i. 20, 5. ξύμπαντα ταῦτα Μέμνων τε αὐτὸς παρὼν ἐκ πολλοῦ παρεσκευάκει, etc.

[221] Compare Arrian, i. 21, 7, 8; Diodor. xvii. 25, 26.

[222] Both Arrian, (i. 21, 5) and Diodorus (xvii. 25) mention this proceeding of the two soldiers of Perdikkas, though Diodorus says that it occurred at night, which cannot well be true.

[223] Arrian, i. 21, 7-12.

[224] Diodor. xvii. 25.

[225] The last desperate struggle of the besieged, is what stands described in i. 22 of Arrian, and in xvii. 26, 27 of Diodorus; though the two descriptions are very different. Arrian does not name Ephialtes at Halikarnassus. He follows the Macedonian authors, Ptolemy and Aristobulus; who probably dwelt only on Memnon and the Persians as their real enemies, treating the Greeks in general as a portion of the hostile force. On the other hand, Diodorus and Curtius appear to have followed, in great part, Grecian authors; in whose view eminent Athenian exiles, like Ephialtes and Charidemus, counted for much more.

The fact here mentioned by Diodorus, that Ephialtes drove back the young Macedonian guard, and that the battle was restored only by the extraordinary efforts of the old guard—is one of much interest, which I see no reason for mistrusting, though Arrian says nothing about it. Curtius (v. 2; viii. 1) makes allusion to it on a subsequent occasion, naming Atharrias: the part of his work in which it ought to have been narrated, is lost. On this, as on other occasions, Arrian slurs over the partial reverses, obstructions, and losses, of Alexander's career. His authorities probably did so before him.

[226] Diodor. xvi. 27; Curtius, v. 1. viii. 2. … οἱ γὰρ πρεσβύτατοι τῶν Μακεδόνων, διὰ μὲν τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀπολελυμένοι τῶν κινδύνων, συνεστρατευμένοι δὲ Φιλίππῳ … τοῖς μὲν φυγομαχοῦσι νεωτέροις πικρῶς ὠνείδισαν τὴν ἀνανδρίαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ συναθροισθέντες καὶ συνασπίσαντες, ὑπέστησαν τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἤδη νενικηκέναι….

[227] Arrian, i. 22, 5.

[228] Arrian, i. 23, 3, 4; Diodor. xvii. 27.

[229] Arrian, i. 23, 11; Diodor. xvii. 7; Strabo, xiv. p. 657.

[230] Arrian, i. 24, 6-9.

[231] Diodor. xvii. 28.

[232] Arrian, i. 24, 11; Plutarch, Alexand. 17.

[233] Arrian, i. 26, 4. οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ θείου, ὡς αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ἀμφ᾽ αὐτὸν ἐξηγοῦντο, etc. Strabo, xiv. p. 666; Curtius, v. 3, 22.

Plutarch's words (Alexand. 17) must be taken to mean that Alexander did not boast so much of this special favor from the gods, as some of his panegyrists boasted for him.

[234] Arrian, i. 27, 1-8

[235] Curtius. iii. 1, 8.

[236] Arrian, i. 29, 1-5.

[237] Arrian, ii. 3; Curtius, iii. 2, 17; Plutarch, Alex. 18; Justin, xi. 7.

[238] Arrian, i. 29, 8.

[239] Arrian, ii. 1, 4-9.

[240] Diodor. xvii. 29.

[241] Arrian, ii. 2, 6; Curtius, iii. 3, 19; iii. 4, 8. "Nondum enim Memnonem vitâ excessisse cognoverat (Alexander)—satis gnarus, cuncta in expedito fore, si nihil ab eo moveretur."

[242] Diodor. xvi. 31.

[243] Diodor. xvii. 30, 31. Diodorus represents the Persian king as having begun to issue letters of convocation for the troops, *after* he heard the death of Memnon; which cannot be true. The letters must have been sent out before.

[244] Curtius, iii. 2.

[245] Herodot. vii. 56—and the colloquy between Xerxes and Demaratus, vii. 103, 104—where the language put by Herodotus into the mouth of Xerxes is natural and instructive. On the other hand, the superior penetration of Cyrus the younger expresses supreme contempt for the military inefficiency of an Asiatic multitude—Xenophon, Anabas. i. 7, 4. Compare the blunt language of the Arcadian Antiochus—Xen. Hellen. vii. i. 38; and Cyropæd. viii. 8, 20.

[246] Curtius, iii. 2, 10-20; Diodor. xvii. 30.

[247] Arrian, ii. 2, 1; ii. 13, 3. Curtius, iii. 3, 1.

[248] Arrian, i. 29. 6.

[249] Arrian, ii. 4, 2; Curtius, iii. 1, 22; Plutarch, Alex. 18.

[250] Respecting this pass, see Vol. IX. Ch. lxix. p. 20 of the present History. There are now two passes over Taurus, from Erekli on the north side of the mountain—one, the easternmost descending upon Adana in Kilikia—the other, the westernmost, upon Tarsus. In the war (1832) between the Turks and Ibrahim Pacha, the Turkish commander left the westernmost pass undefended, so that Ibrahim Pacha passed from Tarsus along it without opposition. The Turkish troops occupied the easternmost pass, but defended themselves badly, so that the passage was forced by the Egyptians (Histoire de la Guerre de Mehemed Ali, par Cadalvène et Barrault, p. 243).

Alexander crossed Taurus by the easternmost of the two passes.

[251] Xenoph. Anabas. i. 2. 21; Diodor. xiv. 20.

[252] Curtius, iii. 4, 11.

[253] Curtius, iii. 4, 11. "Contemplatus locorum situm (Alexander), non alias dicitur magis admiratus esse felicitatem suam", etc.

See Plutarch, Demetrius, 47, where Agathokles (son of Lysimachus) holds the line of Taurus against Demetrius Poliorkêtes.

[254] Arrian, ii. 4, 3-8; Curtius, iii. 4. Curtius ascribes to Arsames the intention of executing what had been recommended by Memnon before the battle of Granikus—to desolate the country in order to check Alexander's advance. But this can hardly be the right interpretation of the proceeding. Arrian's account seems more reasonable.

[255] When Hephæstion died of fever at Ekbatana, nine years afterwards, Alexander caused the physician who had attended him to be crucified (Plutarch, Alexand. 72; Arrian, vii. 14).

[256] This interesting anecdote is recounted, with more or less of rhetoric and amplification, in all the historians—Arrian, ii. 4; Diodor. xvii. 31; Plutarch, Alexand. 19; Curtius, iii. 5; Justin, xi. 8.

It is one mark of the difference produced in the character of Alexander, by superhuman successes continued for four years—to contrast the generous confidence which he displayed towards Philippus, with his cruel prejudgment and torture of Philôtas four years afterwards.

[257] Arrian, ii. 5, 1; Diodor. xvii. 32; Curtius, iii. 7, 6.

[258] Cyrus the younger was five days in marching from Tarsus to Issus, and one day more from Issus to the gates of Kilikia and Syria.—Xenoph. Anab. i. 4, 1; Vol. IX. Chap. lxix. p. 27 of this history.

[259] Arrian, ii, 5, 11.

[260] Arrian, ii. 6.

[261] Curtius, iii. 3, 24.

[262] Curtius, iii. 7, 1.

[263] Curtius, iii. 7, 8.

[264] From Æschines (cont. Ktesiphont. p. 552) it seems that Demosthenes, and the anti-Macedonian statesmen at Athens, received letters at this moment written in high spirits, intimating that Alexander was "caught and pinned up" in Kilikia. Demosthenes (if we may believe Æschines) went about showing these letters, and boasting of the good news which was at hand. Josephus (Ant. Jud. xi. 8, 3) also reports the confident anticipations of Persian success, entertained by Sanballat at Samaria, as well as by all the Asiatics around.

[265] Arrian, ii. 6; Curtius, iii. 8, 2; Diodor. xvii. 32.

[266] Cicero, Epist. ad Famil. xv. 4. See the instructive commentary of Mützel ad Curtium, iii. 8, p. 103, 104. I have given in an Appendix to this Volume, some explanatory comments on the ground near Issus.

[267] Plutarch (Alexand. 20) states this general fact correctly; but he is mistaken in saying that the two armies missed one another in the night, etc.

[268] Arrian, ii. 7, 2; Curtius, iii. 8, 14. I have mentioned, a few pages back, that about a fortnight before, Alexander had sent Parmenio forward from Tarsus to secure the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, while he himself marched backward to Soli and Anchilaus. He and Parmenio must have been separated at this time by a distance, not less than eight days of ordinary march. If during this interval, Darius had arrived at Issus, he would have been just between them, and would have cut them off one from the other. It was Alexander's good luck that so grave an embarrassment did not occur.

[269] Arrian, ii. 7, 8.

[270] Arrian, ii. 7; Curtius, iii. 10; Diodor. xvii. 33.

[271] Kallisthenes called the distance 100 stadia (ap. Polyb. xii. 19). This seems likely to be under the truth.

Polybius criticises severely the description given by Kallisthenes of the march of Alexander. Not having before us the words of Kallisthenes himself, we are hardly in a condition to appreciate the goodness of the criticism; which in some points is certainly overstrained.

[272] Kallisthenes ap. Polybium, xii. 17.

[273] Arrian, ii. 8, 4-13.

[274] Compare Kallisthenes ap. Polyb. xii. 17.; and Arrian, ii. 8, 8. Considering how narrow the space was, such numerous bodies as these 30,000 horse and 20,000 foot must have found little facility in moving. Kallisthenes did not notice them, as far as we can collect from Polybius.

[275] Arrian, ii. 8, 9. Τοσούτους γὰρ ἐπὶ φάλαγγος ἁπλῆς ἐδέχετο τὸ χωρίον, ἵνα ἐτάσσοντο.

The depth of this single phalanx is not given, nor do we know the exact width of the ground which it occupied. Assuming a depth of sixteen, and one pace in breadth to each soldier, 4000 men would stand in the breadth of a stadium of 250 paces; and therefore 80,000 men in a breadth of twenty stadia (see the calculation of Rüstow and Köchly, p. 280, about the Macedonian line). Assuming a depth of twenty-six, 6500 men would stand in the stadium, and therefore 90,000 in a total breadth of 14 stadia, which is that given by Kallisthenes. But there must have been intervals left, greater or less, we know not how many; the covering detachments, which had been thrown out before the river Pinarus, must have found some means of passing through to the rear, when recalled.

Mr. Kinneir states that the breadth between Mount Amanus and the sea varies between one mile and a half (English) and three miles. The fourteen stadia of Kallisthenes are equivalent to nearly one English mile and three-quarters.

Neither in ancient nor in modern times have Oriental armies ever been trained, by native officers, to regularity of march or array—see Malcolm, Hist. of Persia, ch. xxiii. vol. ii. p. 498; Volney, Travels in Egypt and Syria, vol. i. p. 124.

[276] Arrian, ii. 10, 2. Kallisthenes appears to have reckoned the mercenaries composing the Persian phalanx at 30,000—and the cavalry at 30,000. He does not seem to have taken account of the Kardakes. Yet Polybius in his criticism tries to make out that there was not room for an array of even 60,000; while Arrian enumerates 90,000 hoplites, not including cavalry (Polyb. xii. 18).

[277] Arrian, ii. 9; Kallisthenes ap. Polyb. xii. 17. The slackness of this Persian corps on the flank, and the ease with which Alexander drove them back—a material point in reference to the battle—are noticed by Curtius, iii. 9, 11.

[278] Arrian, ii. 11, 6. εὐθὺς, ὡς εἶχεν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἅρματος, ξὺν τοῖς πρώτοις ἔφευγε, etc.

This simple statement of Arrian is far more credible than the highly wrought details given by Diodorus (xvii. 34) and Curtius (iii. 11, 9) about a direct charge of Alexander upon the chariot of Darius, and a murderous combat immediately round that chariot, in which the horses became wounded and unmanageable, so as to be on the point of overturning it. Chares even went so far as to affirm that Alexander had come into personal conflict with Darius, from whom he had received his wound in the thigh (Plutarch, Alex. 20). Plutarch had seen the letter addressed by Alexander to Antipater, simply intimating that he had received a slight wound in the thigh.

In respect to this point, as to so many others, Diodorus and Curtius have copied the same authority.

Kallisthenes (ap. Polyb. xii. 22) stated that Alexander had laid his plan of attack with a view to bear upon the person of Darius, which is not improbable (compare Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 22), and was in fact realized, since the first successful charge of the Macedonians came so near to Darius as to alarm him for the safety of his own person. To the question put by Polybius—How did Alexander know in what part of the army Darius was?—we may reply, that the chariot and person of Darius would doubtless be conspicuous: moreover the Persian kings were habitually in the centre—and Cyrus the younger, at the battle of Kunaxa, directed the attack to be made exactly against the person of his brother Artaxerxes.

After the battle of Kunaxa, Artaxerxes assumed to himself the honor of having slain Cyrus with his own hand, and put to death those who had really done the deed, because they boasted of it (Plutarch, Artax. 16).

[279] This is the supposition of Mr. Williams, and it appears to me probable though Mr. Ainsworth calls it in question, in consequence of the difficulties of the ground southward of Myriandrus towards the sea. [See Mr. Ainsworth's Essay on the Cilician and Syrian Gates, Journal of the Geograph. Society, 1838, p. 194]. These Greeks, being merely fugitives with arms in their hands—with neither cavalry nor baggage—could make their way over very difficult ground.

[280] Arrian, ii. 11, 3; Curtius, iii. 11, 13. Kallisthenes stated the same thing as Arrian—that this Persian cavalry had crossed the Pinarus, and charged the Thessalians with bravery. Polybius censures him for it, as if he had affirmed something false and absurd (xii. 18). This shows that the criticisms of Polybius are not to be accepted without reserve. He reasons as if the Macedonian phalanx *could* not cross the Pinarus—converting a difficulty into an impossibility (xii. 22).

[281] Arrian, ii. 11; Curtius, iii. 11.

[282] Arrian, i. 11, 11; Kallisthenes ap. Polyb. xii 20.

[283] Arrian, ii. 11; Diodor. xvii. Curtius (ii. 11, 27) says that the Macedonians lost thirty-two foot and one hundred and fifty horse, killed; with 504 men wounded;—Justin states, 130 foot, and 150 horse (xi. 9).

[284] Arrian, ii. 12, 8—from Ptolemy and Aristobulus. Compare Diodor. xvii. 36; Curtius, iii. 11, 24; iii. 12, 17.

[285] Plutarch, Alex. 22. ἐγὼ γὰρ (Alexander) οὐχ ὅτι ἑωρακὼς ἂν εὑρεθείην τὴν Δαρείου γυναῖκα ἢ βεβουλευμένος ἰδεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τῶν λεγόντων περὶ τῆς εὐμορφίας αὐτῆς προσδεδεγμένος τὸν λόγον.

[286] Arrian, ii. 13, 2, 3; Diodor. xvii. 48. Curtius says that these Greeks got away by by-paths across the mountains (Amanus)—which may be true (Curtius, iii. 11, 19).

[287] Arrian, ii. 12, 1; Curtius, iii. 12, 27; Diodor. xvii. 40. The "Aræ Alexandri, in radicibus Amani", are mentioned by Cicero (ad Famil. xv. 4) When commanding in Kilikia he encamped there with his army four days.

[288] See this faith put forward in the speech of Xerxes—Herodot. vii. 48; compare the speech of Achæmenes, vii. 236.

[289] Arrian, ii. 10, 2. καὶ ταύτῃ ὡς δῆλος ἐγένετο (Darius) τοῖς ἀμφ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρον τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένος (a remarkable expression borrowed from Thucydides, iv. 34). Compare Arrian, ii. 6, 7.

[290] Immediately before the battle of Kunaxa, Cyrus the younger was asked by some of the Grecian Officers, whether he thought that his brother Artaxerxes (who had as yet made no resistance) would fight—"To be sure he will (was the reply) if he is the son of Darius and Parysatis, and my brother, I shall not obtain the crown without fighting!" Personal cowardice, in a king of Persia at the head of his army, seemed inconceivable (Xenoph. Anab. i. 7, 9)

[291] Arrian, ii. 5, 8.

[292] Arrian, ii. 13, 4-8.

[293] Diodor. xvii. 48.

[294] Diodor. xvii. 48; Curtius, iv. 5, 11. Curtius seems to mention this vote later, but it must evidently have been passed at the first Isthmian festival after the battle of Issus.

[295] Arrian, ii. 11, 13; Curtius, iii. 13. The words of Arrian (ii. 15, 1)—ὀπίσω κομίσαντα ἐς Δαμασκὸν—confirm the statement of Curtius, that this treasure was captured by Parmenio, not in the town, but in the hands of fugitives who were conveying it away from the town.

[296] A fragment of the letter from Parmenio to Alexander is preserved, giving a detailed list of the articles of booty (Athenæus, xiii. p. 607).

[297] Arrian, ii. 15, 5; Curtius, iii. 13, 13-16. There is some discrepancy between the two (compare Arrian, iii. 24, 7) as to the names of the Lacedæmonian envoys.

[298] See above, in the History, Vol. X. Ch. lxxvii. p. 108; Vol. X. Ch. lxxix. p. 251; and Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 263. c. 13.

Alexander himself had consented to be adopted by Ada princess of Karia as her son (Arrian, i. 23, 12).

[299] Arrian, ii. 14, 11; ii. 15, 8.

[300] Diodor. xvi. 45.

[301] Arrian, ii. 15, 8; ii. 20, 1. Curtius, iv. 1, 6-16.

[302] Arrian, ii. 14; Curtius, iv. i. 10; Diodor. xvii. 39. I give the substance of this correspondence from Arrian. Both Curtius and Diodorus represent Darius as offering great sums of money and large cessions of territory, in exchange for the restitution of the captives. Arrian says nothing of the kind.

[303] Arrian, ii. 12, 9.

[304] Curtius, iv. 1, 20-25; Justin, xi. 10. Diodorus (xvii. 47) tells the story as if it had occurred at Tyre, and not at Sidon; which is highly improbable.

[305] Arrian. iii 15, 9. ὡς ἐγνωκότων Τυρίων πράσσειν, ὅ,τι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλῃ Ἀλέξανδρος. Compare Curtius, iv. 2, 3.

[306] Curtius (*ut suprà*) adds these motives: Arrian asserts nothing beyond the simple request. The statement of Curtius represents what is likely to have been the real fact and real feeling of Alexander.

It is certainly true that Curtius overloads his narrative with rhetorical and dramatic amplification; but it is not less true that Arrian falls into the opposite extreme—squeezing out *his* narrative until little is left beyond the dry skeleton.

[307] Arrian, ii. 16, 11.

[308] Curtius, iv. 2, 4; Justin, xi. 10. This item, both prudent and probable, in the reply of the Tyrians, is not noticed by Arrian.

[309] Arrian, ii. 16, 11. τοὺς μὲν πρέσβεις πρὸς ὀργὴν ὀπίσω ἀπέπεμψεν, etc. Curtius, iv. 2, 5. "Non tenuit iram, cujus alioqui potens non erat", etc.

[310] Diodorus, xvii. 40. Οἱ δὲ Τύριοι, βουλομένου τοῦ βασιλέως τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ τῷ Τυρίῳ θῦσαι, προπετέστερον διεκώλυσαν αὐτὸν τῆς εἰς τὴν πόλιν εἰσόδου.

[311] Arrian, i. 18, 4.

[312] Arrian, ii. 24, 10.

[313] This is the view expressed by Alexander himself, in his address to the army, inviting them to undertake the siege of Tyre (Arrian, ii. 17, 3-8).

[314] Arrian, ii. 16, 12. Curtius says (iv. 2, 2), "Tyros facilius *societatem* Alexandri acceptura videbatur, quam *imperium*." This is representing the pretensions of the Tyrians as greater than the fact warrants. They did not refuse the *imperium* of Alexander, though they declined compliance with one extreme demand.

Ptolemy I. (son of Lagus) afterwards made himself master of Jerusalem, by entering the town on the Sabbath, under pretence of offering sacrifice (Josephus, Antiq. Jud. xii. 1).

[315] Curtius, iv. 2, 7, 8. The site of Tyre at the present day presents nothing in the least conformable to the description of Alexander's time.

[316] Arrian, ii. 18, 3; ii. 21, 4; ii. 22, 8.

[317] Azemilchus was with Autophradates when Alexander declared hostility against Tyre (Arrian, ii. 15, 10); he was in Tyre when it was captured (Arrian, ii. 24, 8).

[318] Curtius, iv. 2, 10; Arrian, ii. 24, 8; Diodor. xvli. 40, 41. Curtius (iv. 2, 15) says that Alexander sent envoys to the Tyrians to invite them to peace; that the Tyrians not only refused the propositions, but put the deputies to death, contrary to the law of nations. Arrian mentions nothing about this sending of deputies, which he would hardly have omitted to do had he found it stated in his authorities, since it tends to justify the proceedings of Alexander. Moreover it is not conformable to Alexander's temperament, after what had passed between him and the Tyrians.

[319] Arrian, ii. 18, 19; Diodor. xvii. 42; Curtius, iv. 3, 6, 7.

[320] Arrian. ii. 20, 1-4; Curtius, iv. 2, 14. It evinces how strongly Arrian looks at everything from Alexander's point of view, when we find him telling us, that that monarch *forgave* the Phenicians and Cyprians for their adherence and past service in the Persian fleet, considering that they had acted under compulsion.

[321] Arrian, i. 18, 15. In the siege of Tyre (four centuries earlier) by the Assyrian monarch Salmaneser, Sidon and other Phenician towns had lent their ships to the besieger (Menander apud Joseph. Antiq. Jud. ix. 14, 2).

[322] Arrian, ii. 20, 5; Plutarch, Alexander, 24.

[323] Arrian, ii. 20, 9-16; Curtius, iv. 3, 11.

[324] Arrian, ii. 23, 24; Curtius, iv. 4, 11; Diodor. xvii. 46.

[325] Curtius, iv. 4, 15.

[326] This is mentioned both by Curtius (iv. 4, 17) and by Diodorus (xvii. 46). It is not mentioned by Arrian, and perhaps may not have found a place in Ptolemy or Aristobulus; but I see no ground for disbelieving it.

[327] Arrian, iv. 24, 9; Diodorus, xvii. 46.

[328] The resuscitating force of commercial industry is seen by the fact, that in spite of this total destruction, Tyre again rose to be a wealthy and flourishing city (Strabo, xvi. p. 757).

[329] Arrian, ii. 25, 5; Curtius, iv. 5. The answer is more insolent in the naked simplicity of Arrian, than in the pomp of Curtius. Plutarch (Alexand. 29) both abridges and softens it. Diodorus also gives the answer differently (xvii. 54)—and represents the embassy as coming somewhat later in time, after Alexander's return from Egypt.

[330] Arrian, ii. 17, 4.

[331] Curtius, iv. 5, 14.

[332] Curtius, iv. 5, 14-22; Arrian, iii. 2, 4-8.

[333] Arrian, ii. 26, 5. Οἱ δὲ μηχανοποιοὶ γνώμην ἀπεδείκνυντο, ἄπορον εἶναι βίᾳ ἑλεῖν τὸ τεῖχος, διὰ ὕψος τοῦ χώματος· ἀλλ᾽ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐδόκει αἱρετέον εἶναι, ὅσῳ ἀπορώτερον· ἐκπλήξειν γὰρ τοὺς πολεμίους τὸ ἔργον τῷ παραλόγῳ ἐπὶ μέγα, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἑλεῖν αἰσχρὸν εἶναί οἱ, λεγόμενον ἔς τε τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ Δαρεῖον.

About the fidelity, and obstinate defensive courage, shown more than once by the inhabitants of Gaza—see Polybius, xvi. 40.

[334] Arrian, ii. 26, 27; Curtius, iv. 6, 12-18; Plutarch, Alexand. 25.

[335] Arrian, ii. 27, 5. χῶμα χωννύναι ἐν κύκλῳ παντόθεν τῆς πόλεως. It is certainly possible, as Droysen remarks (Gesch. Alex. des Grossen, p. 199), that παντόθεν is not to be interpreted with literal strictness, but only as meaning in *many different portions* of the walled circuit.

Yet if this had been intended, Arrian would surely have said χώματα in the plural, not χῶμα.

[336] Diodorus (xvii. 48) states the whole duration of the siege as two months. This seems rather under than over the probable truth.

[337] Curtius, iv. 6, 25-30; Dionys. Hal. De Comp. Verbor. p. 123-125—with the citation there given from Hegesias of Magnesia. Diodorus (xvii. 48, 49) simply mentions Gaza in two sentences, but gives no details of any kind.

Arrian says nothing about the treatment of Batis, nor did he probably find anything about it in Ptolemy or Aristobulus. There are assignable reasons why they should pass it over in silence, as disgraceful to Alexander. But Arrian, at the same time, says nothing inconsistent with or contradicting the statement of Curtius; while he himself recognizes how emulous Alexander was of the proceedings of Achilles (vii. 14, 7).

The passage describing this scene, cited from the lost author Hegesias by Dionysius of Halikarnassus, as an example of bad rhythm and taste, has the merit of bringing out the details respecting the person of Batis, which were well calculated to disgust and aggravate the wrath of Alexander. The bad taste of Hegesias as a writer does not diminish his credibility as a witness.

[338] Arrian. vii. 14, 7.

[339] Arrian, ii. 27. 11. About the circumstances and siege of Gaza see the work of Stark, Gaza and die Philistäische Küste, p. 242, Leip. 1852.

[340] Diodor. xvii. 48; Josephus, Antiq. xi. 4.

[341] Arrian, iii. 1, 3; Curtius iv. 7, 1, 2; Diodor. xvii. 49.

[342] Curtius, iv. 8, 1-4; Plutarch, Alexand. 26.

[343] Arrian, iii. 1, 8; Curtius, iv. 8, 2-6; Diodor. xvii. 52.

[344] Strabo, xvii. p. 793. Other authors however speak of the salubrity of Alexandria less favorably than Strabo: see St. Croix, Examen des Hist. d' Alexandre, p. 287.

[345] Pseudo-Aristotle, Œconomic. ii. 32.

[346] Arrian, iii. 5, 4-9. Tacitus (Annal. i. 11) says about Egypt under the Romans—"provinciam aditu difficilem, annonæ fecundam, superstitione et lasciviâ discordem et mobilem, insciam legum, ignaram magistratuum", etc. Compare Polybius ap. Strabon. xvii. p. 797.

[347] Diodor. xvii. 51. τεκμήρια δ᾽ ἔσεσθαι τῆς ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσεως τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι κατορθωμάτων (answer of the priest of Ammon to Alexander).

[348] Arrian, iii. 3, 2.

[349] Arrian, iii. 3, 12. Καὶ ὅτι μὲν θεῖόν τι ξυνεπέλαβεν αὐτῷ, ἔχω ἰσχυρίσασθαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ εἰκὸς ταύτῃ ἔχει· τὸ δ᾽ ἀτρεκὲς τοῦ λόγου ἀφείλοντο οἱ ἄλλῃ καὶ ἄλλῃ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ἐξηγησάμενοι.

Compare Curtius, iv. 7, 12-15; Diodor. xvii. 49-51; Plutarch, Alex. 27; Kallisthenes ap. Strabon. xvii. p. 814.

[350] Kallisthenes, Fragm. xvi. ap. Alexand. Magn. Histor. Scriptor. ed. Geier. p. 257; Strabo, xvii. p. 814.

[351] Plutarch, Alexand. 28. Arrian, hints at the same explanation (vii. 29, 6).

[352] Curtius, iv. 10, 3—"fastidio esse patriam, abdicari Philippum patrem cœlum vanis cogitationibus petere." Arrian, iii. 26, 1; Curtius, vi. 9, 18; vi. 11, 23.

[353] Curtius, iv. 8, 11.

[354] Arrian, iii. 2, 8, 9.

[355] Curtius, iv. 8, 10.

[356] Plutarch, Alexand. 29; Arrian, *l. c.*

[357] Arrian, iii. 6, 12.

[358] Arrian, iii. 7, 1-6; Curtius, iv. 9, 12—"undecimis castris pervenit ad Euphraten."

[359] So Alexander considers Babylon (Arrian, ii. 17, 3-10)—προχωρησάντων ξὺν τῇ δυνάμει ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνά τε καὶ Δαρεῖον … τόν τε ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνος στόλον ποιησόμεθα, etc. This is the explanation of Arrian's remark, iii. 7, 6—where he assigns the reason why Alexander, after passing the Euphrates at Thapsakus, did not take the straight road towards Babylon. Cyrus the younger marched directly to Babylon to attack Artaxerxes. Susa, Ekbatana, and Persepolis were more distant, and less exposed to an enemy from the west.

[360] Arrian, iii. 7, 8; Diodor. xvii. 55; Curtius. iv. 9, 17-24. "Magna munimenta regni Tigris atque Euphrates erant", is a part of the speech put into the mouth of Darius before the battle of Arbela, by Curtius, (iv. 14, 10). Both these great defences were abandoned.

[361] Curtius, iv. 9, 23; Plutarch, Alexand. 39.

[362] Arrian, iii. 7, 12; iii. 8, 3. Curtius, iv. 10, 11-18.

[363] Arrian, ii. 13; Curtius, iv. 1, 27-30—"cum in illo statu rerum id quemque, quod occupasset, habiturum arbitraretur" (Amyntas).

[364] Arrian, iii. 1, 3. τήν τε ἐν Ἰσσῷ μάχην ὅπως συνέβη πεπυσμένος (the satrap of Egypt) καὶ Δαρεῖον ὅτι αἰσχρᾷ φυγῇ ἔφυγε, etc.

[365] Diodor. xvii. 23. Compare Xenophon, Anabasis, i. 4, 9; Herodotus, vii. 10.

[366] The praise bestowed upon the continence of Alexander, for refusing to visit Statira the wife of Darius, is exaggerated even to absurdity.

In regard to women, Alexander was by temperament cold, the opposite of his father Philip. During his youth, his development was so tardy, that there was even a surmise of some physical disability (Hieronymus ap. Athenæ. x. p. 435). As to the most beautiful persons, of both sexes, he had only to refuse the numerous tenders made to him by those who sought to gain his favor (Plutarch, Alex. 22). Moreover, after the capture of Damascus, he did select for himself, from among the female captives, Barsinê, the widow of his illustrious rival Memnon; daughter of Artabazus, a beautiful woman of engaging manners, and above all, distinguished, by having received Hellenic education, from the simply Oriental harem of Darius (Plutarch, Alex. 21). In adopting the widow of Memnon as his mistress, Alexander may probably have had present to his imagination the example of his legendary ancestor Neoptolemus, whose tender relations with Andromache, widow of his enemy Hektor, would not be forgotten by any reader of Euripides. Alexander had by Barsinê a son called Herakles.

Lastly, Alexander was so absorbed by ambition,—so overcharged with the duties and difficulties of command, which he always performed himself—and so continually engaged in fatiguing bodily effort,—that he had little leisure left for indulgences; such leisure as he had, he preferred devoting to wine-parties with the society and conversation of his officers.

[367] Curtius, iv. 10, 19. "Itineris continui labore animique ægritudine fatigata", etc.

Curtius and Justin mention a third embassy sent by Darius (immediately after having heard of the death and honorable obsequies of Statira) to Alexander, asking for peace. The other authors allude only to two tentatives of this kind; and the third seems by no means probable.

[368] Arrian, iii. 7, 7.

[369] Diodorus, xvii. 53; Curtius, iv. 9, 9.

[370] Arrian, iii. 8, 12. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὅσα ἀνώμαλα αὐτοῦ ἐς ἱππασίαν, ταῦτά τε ἐκ πολλοῦ οἱ Πέρσαι τοῖς τε ἅρμασιν ἐπελαύνειν εὐπετῆ πεποιήκεσαν καὶ τῇ ἵππῳ ἱππάσιμα.

[371] This is the total given by Arrian as what he found set forth (ἐλέγετο), probably the best information which Ptolemy and Aristobulus could procure (Arrian, iii. 8, 8).

Diodorus (xvii. 53) says 800,000 foot, 200,000 horse, and 200 scythed chariots. Justin (xi. 12) gives 400,000 foot and 100,000 horse. Plutarch (Alex. 31) talks generally of a million of men. Curtius states the army to have been almost twice as large as that which had fought in Kilikia (iv. 9, 3); he gives the total as 200,000 foot, and 45,000 horse (iv. 12, 13).

[372] Diodor. xvii. 53; Curtius, iv. 9, 2.

[373] Curtius, iv. 9, 3; Diodor. xvii. 53. Notwithstanding the instructive note of Mützel upon this passage of Curtius, the mode in which these chariots were armed is not clear on all points.

[374] The Persian battle order here given by Arrian (iii. 11), is taken from Aristobulus, who affirmed that it was so set down in the official scheme of the battle, drawn up by the Persian officers, and afterwards captured with the baggage of Darius. Though thus authentic as far as it goes, it is not complete, even as to names—while it says nothing about numbers or depth or extent of front. Several names, of various contingents stated to have been present in the field, are not placed in the official return—thus the Sogdiani, the Arians, and the Indian mountaineers are mentioned by Arrian as having joined Darius (iii. 8); the Kossæans, by Diodorus (xvii. 59); the Sogdiani, Massagetæ, Belitæ, Kossæans, Gortyæ, Phrygians, and Kataonians, by Curtius (iv. 12).

[375] Arrian, iii. 9, 5-7.

[376] Arrian, iii. 9, 2-8. It is not expressly mentioned by Arrian that the baggage, etc. was brought forward from the first camp to the second. But we see that such must have been the fact, from what happened during the battle. Alexander's baggage, which was plundered by a body of Persian cavalry, cannot have been so far in the rear of the army as the distance of the first camp would require. This coincides also with Curtius, iv. 13, 35. The words ἔγνω ἀπολείπειν (Arrian, iii. 9, 2), indicate the contemplation of a purpose which was not accomplished—ὡς ἅμ᾽ ἡμέρᾳ προσμῖξαι τοῖς πολεμίοις (iii. 9, 3). Instead of "coming into conflict" with the enemy at break of day—Alexander only arrived within sight of them at break of day; he then halted the whole day and night within sight of their position; and naturally brought up his baggage, having no motive to leave it so far in the rear.

[377] Xenoph. Anabas. iii. 4, 35.

[378] Arrian, iii. 10, 3; Curtius, iv. 13, 4-10.

[379] Arrian, iii. 12, 1-9.

[380] Arrian, ii. 11; Diodor. xvii. 57; Curtius, iv. 13, 26-30.

[381] Arrian, iii. 12, 2-6; Curtius, iv. 13, 30-32; Diodor. xvii. 57.

[382] Curtius, iv. 13, 36; Polyænus, iv. 3, 17.

[383] Arrian, iii. 13, 1-5.

[384] Arrian, iii. 13, 9.

[385] About the chariots. Arrian, iii. 13, 11; Curtius, iv. 15, 14; Diodor. xvii. 57, 58.

Arrian mentions distinctly only those chariots which were launched on Darius's left, immediately opposite to Alexander. But it is plain that the chariots along the whole line must have been let off at one and the same signal—which we may understand as implied in the words of Curtius—"Ipse (Darius) ante se falcatos currus habebat, quos signo dato universos in hostem effudit" (iv. 14, 3).

The scythed chariots of Artaxerxes, at the battle of Kunaxa, did no mischief (Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 10-20). At the battle of Magnesia, gained by the Romans (B. C. 190) over the Syrian king Antiochus, his chariots were not only driven back, but spread disorder among their own troops (Appian, Reb. Syriac. 33).

[386] See the remarkable passage in the address of Alexander to his soldiers previous to the battle, about the necessity of absolute silence until the moment came for the terrific war-shout (Arrian, iii. 9, 14): compare Thucyd. ii. 89—a similar direction from Phormio to the Athenians.

[387] Arrian, iii. 15, 4. οὔτε ἀκοντισμῷ ἔτι, οὔτε ἐξελιγμοῖς τῶν ἵππων, ἥπερ ἱππομαχίας δίκη, ἐχρῶντο—about the Persian cavalry when driven to despair.

[388] Arrian, iii. 14, 2. ἦγε δρόμῳ τε καὶ ἀλαλαγμῷ ὡς ἐπὶ αὐτὸν Δαρεῖον—Diodor. xvii. 60. Alexander μετὰ τῆς βασιλικῆς ἴλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων ἱππέων ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν ἤλαυνε τὸν Δαρεῖον.

[389] Arrian, iii. 14, 3. Καὶ χρόνον μέν τινα ὀλίγον ἐν χερσὶν ἡ μάχη ἐγένετο. Ὡς δὲ οἵ τε ἱππεῖς οἱ ἀμφ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀλέξανδρος εὐρώστως ἐνέκειντο, ὠθισμοῖς τε χρώμενοι, καὶ τοῖς ξυστοῖς τὰ πρόσωπα τῶν Περσῶν κόπτοντες, ἥ τε φάλαγξ ἡ Μακεδονικὴ, πυκνὴ καὶ ταῖς σαρίσσαις πεφρικυῖα, ἐμβέβληκεν ἤδη αὐτοῖς, καὶ πάντα ὁμοῦ τὰ δεινὰ καὶ πάλαι ἤδη φοβερῷ ὄντι Δαρείῳ ἐφαίνετο, πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἐπιστρέψας ἔφευγεν. At Issus, Arrian states that "Darius fled along with the first" (ii. 11, 6); at Arbela here, he states that "Darius was the first to turn and flee;" an expression yet stronger and more distinct. Curtius and Diodorus, who seem here as elsewhere to follow generally the same authorities, give details, respecting the conduct of Darius, which are not to be reconciled with Arrian, and which are decidedly less credible than Arrian's narrative. The fact that the two kings were here (as at Issus) near, and probably visible, to each other, has served as a basis for much embroidery. The statement that Darius, standing on his chariot, hurled his spear against the advancing Macedonians—and that Alexander also hurled his spear at Darius, but missing him, killed the charioteer—is picturesque and Homeric, but has no air of reality. Curtius and Diodorus tell us that this fall of the charioteer was mistaken for the fall of the king, and struck the Persian army with consternation, causing them forthwith to take flight, and thus ultimately forcing Darius to flee also (Diodor. xvii. 60; Curt. iv. 15, 26-32). But this is noway probable; since the real fight then going on was close, and with hand-weapons.

[390] Arrian, iii. 14, 4.

[391] Diodor. xvii. 60; Curtius, iv. 15, 32, 33. The cloud of dust, and the noise of the whips, are specified both by Diodorus and Curtius.

[392] Curtius, iv. 16, 1; Diodorus, xvii. 59, 60; Arrian, iii. 14, 11. The two first authors are here superior to Arrian, who scarcely mentions at all this vigorous charge of Mazæus, though he alludes to the effects produced by it.

[393] Arrian, iii. 14, 6. He speaks directly here only of the τάξις under the command of Simmias; but it is plain that what he says must be understood of the τάξις commanded by Kraterus also. Of the six τάξεις or divisions of the phalanx, that of Kraterus stood at the extreme left—that of Simmias (who commanded on this day the τάξις of Amyntas son of Andromenes) next to it (iii. 11, 16). If therefore the τάξις of Simmias was kept back from pursuit, on account of the pressure upon the general Macedonian left (iii. 14, 6)—*à fortiori*, the τάξις of Kraterus must have been kept back in like manner.

[394] Arrian, iii. 14, 7.

[395] Curtius. iv. 15, 9-11; Diodor. xvii. 59. Curtius and Diodorus represent the brigade of cavalry who plundered the camp and rescued the prisoners, to have been sent round by Mazæus from the Persian right; while Arrian states, more probably, that they got through the break accidentally left in the phalanx, and traversed the Macedonian lines.

[396] Arrian, iii. 14, 10. Curtius represents this brigade as having been driven off by Aretes and a detachment sent expressly by Alexander himself. Diodorus describes it as if it had not been defeated at all, but had ridden back to Mazæus after plundering the baggage. Neither of these accounts is so probable as that of Arrian.

[397] Diodor. xvii. 60. Ὁ Παρμενίων … μόλις ἐτρέψατο τοὺς βαρβάρους, μάλιστα καταπλαγέντας τῇ κατὰ τὸν Δαρεῖον φυγῇ. Curtius, iv. 16, 4-7. "Interim ad Mazæum fama superati regis pervenerat. Itaque, quanquam validior erat, tamen fortunâ partium territus, perculsis languidius instabat." Arrian, iv. 14, 11; iv. 15, 8.

[398] Arrian, iii. 15, 6. Curtius also alludes to this combat; but with many particulars very different from Arrian (iv. 16, 19-25).

[399] Arrian, iii. 15, 9.

[400] Arrian, iii. 15, 10. Curtius (iv. 16, 12-18) gives aggravated details about the sufferings of the fugitives in passing the river Lykus—which are probably founded on fact. But he makes the mistake of supposing that Alexander had got as far as this river in his first pursuit, from which he was called back to assist Parmenio.

[401] Arrian, iii. 15, 14; Curtius, v. 1, 10.

[402] Arrian, iii. 15, 16; Curtius, iv. 16, 27, Diodor. xvii. 61.

[403] Arrian, iii. 16, 5-11; Diodor. xvii. 64; Curtius, v. 1, 17-20.

[404] Curtius, v. 1, 45; Diodor. xvii. 64.

[405] Arrian states this total of 50,000 talents (iii. 16. 12).

I have taken them as Attic talents; if they were Æginæan talents, the value of them would be greater in the proportion of five to three.

[406] Curtius, v. 2, 11; Diodor. xvii. 66.

[407] Arrian, iii. 16, 6-9: compare Strabo, xvi. p. 738.

[408] Arrian, iii. 16, 16; Curtius, v. 1, 44; Diodor. xvii. 64. Curtius and Diodorus do not exactly coincide with Arrian; but the discrepancy here is not very important.

[409] Curtius, v. 1, 42: compare Diodor. xvii. 65; Arrian, iii, 16, 18.

[410] Arrian, iii. 16, 20; Curtius, v. 2, 6; Diodor. xvii. 65. Respecting this reorganization, begun now at Susa and carried farther during the next year at Ekbatana, see Rüstow and Köchly, Griechisches Kriegswesen, p. 252 *seq.*

One among the changes now made was, that the divisions of cavalry—which, having hitherto coincided with various local districts or towns in Macedonia, had been officered accordingly—were re-distributed and mingled together (Curtius, v. 2, 6).

[411] Arrian, iii. 17, 1. Ἄρας δὲ ἐκ Σούσων, καὶ διαβὰς τὸν Πασιτίγρην ποταμὸν, ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὴν Οὐξίων γῆν.

The Persian Susa was situated between two rivers; the Choaspes (now Kherkha) on the west; the Eulæus or Pasitigris, now Karun, on the east; both rivers distinguished for excellent water. The Eulæus appears to have been called Pasitigris in the lower part of its course—Pliny, H. N. xxxi. 21. "Parthorum reges ex Choaspe et Eulæo tantum bibunt."

Ritter has given an elaborate exposition respecting these two rivers and the site of the Persian Susa (Erdkunde, part ix. book iii. West-Asien, p. 291-320).

[412] Arrian, iii. 17; Curtius. v. 3, 5-12; Diodor. xvii. 67; Strabo, xv. p. 729. It would seem that the road taken by Alexander in this march, was that described by Kinneir, through Bebahan and Kala-Sefid to Schiraz (Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire, p. 72). Nothing can exceed the difficulties of the territory for military operation.

No certainty is attainable, however, respecting the ancient geography of these regions. Mr. Long's Map of Ancient Persia shows how little can be made out.

[413] See the instructive notes of Mützel—on Quintus Curtius, v. 10, 3; and v. 12, 17, discussing the topography of this region, in so far as it is known from modern travellers. He supposes the Susian Gates to have been near Kala-Sefid, west of the plain of Merdasht or Persepolis. Herein he dissents from Ritter, apparently on good grounds, as far as an opinion can be formed.

[414] Arrian, iii. 18, 1-14; Curtius, v. 4, 10-20; Diodor. xvii. 68.

[415] Diodor. xvii. 71.

[416] Arrian, iii. 18, 16; Curtius, v. 4, 5; Diodor. xvii. 69.

[417] Xenoph. Anabas. i. 9, 13. Similar habits have always prevailed among Orientals. "The most atrocious part of the Mohammedan system of punishment, is, that which regards theft and robbery. Mutilation, by cutting off the hand or the foot, is the prescribed remedy for all higher degrees of the offence" (Mill, History of British India, book iii. ch. 5. p. 447).

"Tippoo Saib used to cut off the right hands and noses of the British camp-followers that fell into his hands" (Elphinstone, Hist. of India, vol. i. p. 380. ch. xi.).

A recent traveller notices the many mutilated persons, female as well as male, who are to be seen in the northern part of Scinde (Burton, Scenes in Scinde, vol. ii. p. 281).

[418] Diodor. xvii. 69; Curtius, v. 5; Justin, xi. 14. Arrian does not mention these mutilated captives; but I see no reason to mistrust the deposition of the three authors by whom it is certified. Curtius talks of 4000 captives; the other two mention 800. Diodorus calls them —Ἕλληνες ὑπὸ τῶν πρότερον βασιλέων ἀνάστατοι γεγονότες, ὀκτακόσιοι μὲν σχεδὸν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντες, ταῖς δ᾽ ἡλικίαις οἱ πλεῖστοι μὲν γεγηρακότες, ἠκρωτηριασμένοι δὲ πάντες, etc. Some ἀνάρπαστοι πρὸς βασιλέα διὰ σοφίαν are noticed in Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 33; compare Herodot. iii. 93; iv. 204. I have already mentioned the mutilation of the Macedonian invalids, taken at Issus by Darius.

Probably these Greek captives were mingled with a number of other captives, Asiatics and others, who had been treated in the same manner. None but the Greek captives would be likely to show themselves to Alexander and his army, because none but they would calculate on obtaining sympathy from an army of Macedonians and Greeks. It would have been interesting to know who these captives were, or how they came to be thus cruelly used. The two persons among them, named by Curtius as spokesmen in the interview with Alexander, are—Euktemon, a Kymæan—and Theætêtus, an Athenian.

[419] Diodor. xvii. 70. πλουσιωτάτης οὔσης τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν ἥλιον, etc. Curtius, v. 6, 2, 3.

[420] Arrian, iii. 18, 18; Diodor. xvii. 70; Curtius, v. 6, 1; Strabo, xv. p. 731.

[421] This amount is given both by Diodorus (xvii. 71) and by Curtius (v. 6, 9). We see however from Strabo that there were different statements as to the amount. Such overwhelming figures deserve no confidence upon any evidence short of an official return. At the same time, we ought to expect a very great sum, considering the long series of years that had been spent in amassing it. Alexander's own letters (Plutarch, Alex. 37) stated that enough was carried away to load 10,000 mule carts and 5000 camels.

To explain the fact, of a large accumulated treasure in the Persian capitals, it must be remarked, that what we are accustomed to consider as expenses of government, were not defrayed out of the regal treasure. The military force, speaking generally, was not paid by the Great King, but summoned by requisition from the provinces, upon which the cost of maintaining the soldiers fell, over and above the ordinary tribute. The king's numerous servants and attendants received no pay in money, but in kind; provisions for maintaining the court with its retinue were furnished by the provinces, over and above the tribute. See Herodot. i. 192; and iii. 91—and a good passage of Heeren, setting forth the small public disbursement out of the regal treasure, in his account of the internal constitution of the ancient Persian Empire (Ideen über die Politik and den Verkehr der Völker der alten Welt, part i. Abth. 1. p. 511-519).

Respecting modern Persia, Jaubert remarks (Voyage en Arménie et en Perse, Paris, 1821, p. 272, ch. 30) —"Si les sommes que l'on verse dans le trésor du Shah ne sont pas exorbitantes, comparativement à l'étendue et à la population de la Perse, elles n'en sortent pas non plus que pour des dépenses indispensables qui n'en absorbent pas la moitié. Le reste est converti en lingots, en pierreries, et en divers objets d'une grande valeur et d'un transport facile en cas d'évènement: ce qui doit suffire pour empêcher qu'on ne trouve exagérés les rapports que tous les voyageurs ont faits de la magnificence de la cour de Perse. Les Perses sont assez clairvoyans pour pénétrer les motifs réels qui portent Futteh Ali Shah à thésauriser."

When Nadir-Shah conquered the Mogul Emperor Mohammed, and entered Delhi in 1739,—the imperial treasure and effects which fell into his hands is said to have amounted to £32,000,000 sterling, besides heavy contributions levied on the inhabitants (Mill, History of British India, vol. ii, B. iii, ch. 4, p. 403).—Runjeet Sing left at his death (1839) a treasure of £8,000,000 sterling: with jewels and other effects to several millions more. [The Punjaub, by Col. Steinbach, p. 16. London, 1845].

Mr. Mill remarks in another place, that "in Hindostan, gold, silver, and gems are most commonly hoarded, and not devoted to production" (vol. i, p. 254, B. ii. ch. 5).

Herodotus (iii. 96) tells us that the gold and silver brought to the Persian regal treasure was poured in a melted state into earthern vessels; when it cooled, the earthern vessel was withdrawn, and the solid metallic mass left standing; a portion of it was cut off when occasion required for disbursements. This practice warrants the supposition that a large portion of it was habitually accumulated, and not expended.

[422] Arrian, iii. 18, 17. He does not give the amount which I transcribe from Curtius, v. 6, 10.

[423] Diodor. xvii. 70. Οἱ Μακεδόνες ἐπῄεσαν, τοὺς μὲν ἄνδρας πάντας φονεύοντες, τὰς δὲ κτήσεις διαρπάζοντες, etc. Curtius, v. 6, 6.

[424] Diodor. xvii. 70, 71; Curtius, v. 6, 3-7. These two authors concur in the main features of the massacre and plunder in Persepolis, permitted to the soldiers of Alexander. Arrian does not mention it; he mentions only the deliberate resolution of Alexander to burn the palace or citadel, out of revenge on the Persian name. And such feeling, assuming it to exist, would also naturally dictate the general license to plunder and massacre. Himself entertaining such vindictive feeling, and regarding it as legitimate, Alexander would either presume it to exist, or love to kindle it, in his soldiers; by whom indeed the license to plunder would be sufficiently welcomed, with or without any antecedent sentiment of vengeance.

The story (told by Diodorus, Curtius, and Plutarch, Alex. 38) that Alexander, in the drunkenness of a banquet, was first instigated by the courtesan Thais to set fire to the palace of Persepolis, and accompanied her to begin the conflagration with his own hand—may perhaps be so far true, that he really showed himself in the scene and helped in the burning. But that his resolution to burn was deliberately taken, and even maintained against the opposition of esteemed officers, is established on the authority of Arrian.

[425] Plutarch, Alexand. 37. Φόνον μὲν οὖν ἐνταῦθα πολὺν τῶν ἁλισκομένων γενέσθαι συνέπεσε· γράφει γὰρ αὐτὸς, ὡς νομίζων αὐτῷ τοῦτο λυσιτελεῖν ἐκέλευεν ἀποσφάττεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους· νομίσματος δὲ εὑρεῖν πλῆθος ὅσον ἐν Σούσοις, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην κατασκευὴν καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐκκομισθῆναί φησι μυρίοις ὁρικοῖς ζεύγεσι, καὶ πεντακισχιλίαις καμήλοις. That ἐνταῦθα means Persepolis, is shown by the immediately following comparison with the treasure found at Susa.

[426] Diod. xvii. 73; Curtius, v. 6, 12-20.

[427] Curtius, v. 6, 11.

[428] Arrian, iii. 16, 1-4.

[429] Compare the language addressed by Alexander to his weary soldiers, on the banks of the Hyphasis (Arrian, v. 26), with that which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Xerxes, when announcing his intended expedition against Greece (Herodot. vii. 8).

[430] I see no reason for doubting that the Ekbatana here meant is the modern Hamadan. See a valuable Appendix added by Dr. Thirlwall to the sixth volume of his History of Greece, in which this question is argued against Mr. Williams.

Sir John Malcolm observes—"There can hardly be said to be any roads in Persia; nor are they much required, for the use of wheel carriages has not yet been introduced into that kingdom. Nothing can be more rugged and difficult than the paths which have been cut over the mountains by which it is bounded and intersected" (ch. xxiv. vol. ii. p. 525).

In this respect, indeed, as in others, the modern state of Persia must be inferior to the ancient; witness the description given by Herodotus of the road between Sardis and Susa.

[431] Arrian, iii. 19, 2-9; iii. 20, 3.

[432] Arrian, iii. 19, 5.

[433] Arrian, iii. 19, 14; Diodor. xvii. 80. Diodorus had before stated (xvii. 66, 71) the treasure in Susa as being 49,000 talents, and that in Persepolis as 120,000. Arrian announces the treasure in Susa as 50,000 talents—Curtius gives the uncoined gold and silver alone as 50,000 talents (v. 8, 11). The treasure of both places was transported to Ekbatana.

[434] Arrian, iii. 20, 4.

[435] Curtius, v. 23, 12.

[436] Arrian, iii. 19, 10: compare v. 27, 7.

[437] Arrian, iii. 24, 1. ἤδη γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ἱππακοντισταὶ ἦσαν τάξις.

See the remarks of Rüstow and Köchly upon the change made by Alexander in his military organization about this period, as soon as he found that there was no farther chance of a large collected Persian force, able to meet him in the field (Geschichte des Griech. Kriegswesens, p. 252 *seq.*).

The change which they point out was real,—but I think they exaggerate it in degree.

[438] The passes called the Caspian Gates appear to be those described by Morier, Fraser, and other modern travellers, as the series of narrow valleys and defiles called Ser-Desch, Sirdari, or Serdara Kahn,—on the southernmost of the two roads which lead eastward from Teheran towards Damaghan, and thence farther eastward towards Mesched and Herat. See the note of Mützel in his edition of Curtius, v. 35, 2, p. 489; also Morier, Second Journey through Persia, p. 363; Fraser's Narrative of a Journey into Khorasan, p. 291.

The long range of mountains, called by the ancients Taurus, extends from Lesser Media and Armenia in an easterly direction along the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. Its northern declivity, covered by prodigious forests with valleys and plains of no great breadth reaching to the Caspian, comprehends the moist and fertile territories now denominated Ghilan and Mazanderan. The eastern portion of Mazanderan was known in ancient times as Hyrkania, then productive and populous; while the mountain range itself was occupied by various rude and warlike tribes—Kadusii, Mardi, Tapyri, etc. The mountain range, now called Elburz, includes among other lofty eminences the very high peak of Demavend.

The road from Ekbatana to Baktra, along which both the flight of Darius and the pursuit of Alexander lay, passed along the broken ground skirting the southern flank of the mountain range Elburz. Of this broken ground the Caspian Gates formed the worst and most difficult portion.

[439] Arrian, iii. 20, 21.

[440] Masistes, after the shocking outrage upon his wife by Queen Amestris, was going to Baktria to organize a revolt: see Herodot. ix. 113—about the importance of that satrapy.

[441] Arrian, iii. 21-23. Justin (xi. 15) specifies the name of the place—Thara. Both he and Curtius mention the *golden chain* (Curtius, 34, 20). Probably the conspirators made use of some chains which had formed a part of the ornaments of the royal wardrobe. Among the presents given by Darius son of Hystaspes to the surgeon Demokedes, there were two pairs of golden chains—Δωρέεται δή μιν Δαρεῖος πεδέων χρυσέων δύο ζεύγεσιν—Herodot. iii. 130: compare iii. 15. The Persian king and grandees habitually wore golden chains round neck and arms.

[442]

"Rarus apud Medos regum cruor; unaque cuncto
Pœna manet generi; quamvis crudelibus æque
Paretur dominis." (Claudian. in Eutrop. ii. p. 478.)

Court conspiracies and assassinations of the prince, however were not unknown either among the Achæmenidæ or the Arsakidæ.

[443] This account of the remarkable incidents immediately preceding the death of Darius, is taken mainly from Arrian (iii. 21), and seems one of the most authentic chapters of his work. He is very sparing in telling what passed in the Persian camp; he mentions indeed only the communications made by the Persian deserters to Alexander.

Curtius (v. 27-34) gives the narrative far more vaguely and loosely than Arrian, but with ample details of what was going on in the Persian camp. We should have been glad to know from whom these details were borrowed. In the main they do not contradict the narrative of Arrian, but rather amplify and dilute it.

Diodorus (xvii. 73), Plutarch (Alexand. 42, 43), and Justin (xi. 15) give no new information.

[444] Arrian (iii. 22) gives an indulgent criticism on Darius, dwelling chiefly upon his misfortunes, but calling him ἀνδρὶ τὰ μὲν πολέμια, εἴπερ τινὶ ἄλλῳ, μαλθακῷ τε καὶ οὐ φρενήρει, etc.

[445] Curtius, vi. 5, 10; vi. 6, 15. Diodor. xvii. 74. Hekatompylus was an important position, where several roads joined (Polyb. x. 28). It was situated on one of the roads running eastward from the Caspian Gates, on the southern flank of Mount Taurus (Elburz). Its locality cannot be fixed with certainty: Ritter (Erdkunde, part viii. 465, 467) with others conceives it to have been near Damaghan; Forbiger (Handbuch der Alten Geographie, vol. ii. p. 549) places it further eastward, near Jai-Jerm. Mr. Long notes it on his map, as *site unknown*.

[446] This was attested by his own letters to Antipater, which Plutarch had seen (Plutarch, Alexand. 47). Curtius composes a long speech for Alexander (vi. 7, 9).

[447] Arrian, iii. 23, 15.

[448] Arrian, iii. 24, 4. In reference to the mountain tribes called Mardi, who are mentioned in several different localities—on the parts of Mount Taurus south of the Caspian, in Armenia, on Mount Zagros, and in Persis proper (see Strabo, xi. p. 508-523; Herodot. i. 125), we may note, that the Nomadic tribes, who constitute a considerable fraction of the population of the modern Persian Empire, are at this day found under the same name in spots widely distant: see Jaubert, Voyage en Arménie et en Perse, p. 254.

[449] Arrian, iii. 24, 8; Curtius, vi. 5, 9. An Athenian officer named Demokrates slew himself in despair, disdaining to surrender.

[450] See a curious passage on this subject, at the end of the Cyropædia of Xenophon.

[451] Arrian, iii. 25, 3-8. Droysen and Dr. Thirlwall identify Susia with the town now called Tûs or Toos, a few miles north-west of Mesched. Professor Wilson (Ariana Antiqua, p. 177) thinks that this is too much to the west, and too far from Herat: he conceives Susia to be Zuzan, on the desert side of the mountains west of Herat. Mr. Prinsep (notes on the historical results deducible from discoveries in Afghanistan, p. 14) places it at Subzawar, south of Herat, and within the region of fertility.

Tûs seems to lie in the line of Alexander's march, more than the other two places indicated; Subzawar is too far to the south. Alexander appears to have first directed his march from Parthia to Baktria (in the line from Asterabad to Baikh through Margiana), merely touching the borders of Aria in his route.

[452] Artakoana, as well as the subsequent city of Alexandria in Ariis, are both supposed by Wilson to coincide with the locality of Herat (Wilson, Ariana Antiqua, p. 152-177).

There are two routes from Herat to Asterabad, at the south-east corner of the Caspian; one by Schahrood which is 533 English miles; the other by Mesched, which is 688 English miles (Wilson, p. 149).

[453] Arrian, iii. 25; Curtius, vi. 24, 36. The territory of the Drangi, or Zarangi, southward from Aria, coincides generally with the modern Seistan, adjoining the lake now called Zareh, which receives the waters of the river Hilmend.

[454] Arrian, iii. 25, 6; Curtius, iv. 8, 7; vi. 6, 19.

[455] Curtius, vi. 7, 2. "Dimnus, modicæ apud regem auctoritates et gratiæ, exoleti, cui Nicomacho erat nomen, amore flagrabat, obsequio uni sibi dediti corporis vinctus." Plutarch, Alex. 49; Diodor. xvii. 79.

[456] Curt. vi. 7, 29; Plutarch, Alex. 49. The latter says that Dimnus resisted the officer sent to arrest him, and was killed by him in the combat.

[457] Curtius, vi. 7, 33. "Philotas respondit, Cebalinum quidem scorti sermonem ad se detulisse, sed ipsum tam levi auctori nihil credidisse—veritum, ne jurgium inter amatorem et exoletum non sine risu aliorum detulisset."

[458] Plutarch, Alexand. 48.

[459] Plutarch, Alexand. 48, 49. Πρὸς δὲ αὐτὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἐκ πάνυ πολλῶν χρόνων ἐτύγχανε διαβεβλημένος (Philotas).... Ὁ μὲν οὖν Φιλώτας ἐπιβουλευόμενος οὕτως ἠγνόει, καὶ συνῆν τῇ Ἀντιγόνῃ πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς ὀργὴν καὶ μεγαλαυχίαν ῥήματα καὶ λόγους κατὰ τοῦ βασιλέως ἀνεπιτηδείους προϊέμενος.

Both Ptolemy and Aristobulus recognized these previous communications made to Alexander against Philotas in Egypt, but stated that he did not believe them (Arrian, iii. 26, 1).

[460] Plutarch, Alexand. 40-48; Curtius, vi. 11, 3.

[461] Phylarchus, Fragment. 41. ed. Didot, ap. Athenæum, xii. p. 539; Plutarch, Alexand. 39, 40. Even Eumenes enriched himself much; though being only secretary, and a Greek, he could not take the same liberties as the great native Macedonian generals (Plutarch, Eumenes, 2).

[462] Plutarch, Alexand. 49; Curtius, vi. 8.

[463] Curtius, vi. 8, 16. "Invitatus est etiam Philotas ad ultimas sibi epulas et rex non cœnare modo, sed etiam familiariter colloqui, cum eo quam damnaverat, sustinuit."

[464] Arrian, iii. 26, 2. Λέγει δὲ Πτολεμαῖος εἰσαχθῆναι εἰς Μακεδόνας Φιλώταν, καὶ κατηγορῆσαι αὐτοῦ ἰσχυρῶς Ἀλέξανδρον, etc. Curtius, vi. 9, 13; Diodorus, xvii, 80.

[465] Curtius, vi. 9, 30.

[466] Curtius, vi. 11, 8. "Tum vero universa concio accensa est, et a corporis custodibus initium factum, clamantibus, discerpendum esse parricidam manibus eorum. Id quidam Philotas, qui graviora supplicia metueret, haud sane iniquo animo audiebat."

[467] Curtius, vi. 9, 30; vi. 11, 11.

[468] Plutarch, Alexand. 49.

[469] Curtius, vi. 11, 15, "Per ultimos deinde cruciatus, utpote et damnatus et inimicis in gratiam regis torquentibus, laceratur. Ac primo quidam, quanquam hinc ignis, illinc verbera, jam non ad quæstionem, sed ad pœnam, ingerebantur, non vocem modo, sed etiam gemitus habuit in potestate; sed postquam intumescens corpus ulceribus flagellorum ictus nudis ossibus incussos ferre non poterat", etc.

[470] Curtius, vi. 11, 20.

[471] Strabo, xv. p. 724; Diodor. xvii. 80; Curtius, vii. 2, 11-18.

[472] Curtius, vii. 2, 27. The proceedings respecting Philotas and Parmenio are recounted in the greatest detail by Curtius; but his details are in general harmony with the brief heads given by Arrian from Ptolemy and Aristobulus—except as to one material point. Plutarch (Alex. 49), Diodorus (xvii. 79, 80), and Justin (xii. 5), also state the fact in the same manner.

Ptolemy and Aristobulus, according to the narrative of Arrian, appear to have considered that Philotas was really implicated in a conspiracy against Alexander's life. But when we analyze what they are reported to have said, their opinion will not be found entitled to much weight. In the first place, they state (Arrian, iii. 26, 1) that the *conspiracy of Philotas had been before made known to Alexander while he was in Egypt*, but that he did not then believe it. Now eighteen months had elapsed since the stay in Egypt; and the idea of a conspiracy going on for eighteen months is preposterous. That Philotas was in a mood in which he might be supposed likely to conspire, is one proposition; that he actually did conspire is another; Arrian and his authorities run the two together as if they were one. As to the evidence purporting to prove that Philotas did conspire, Arrian tells us that "the informers came forward before the assembled soldiers and convicted Philotas with the rest by other *indicia* not obscure, *but chiefly by this*—that Philotas confessed to have heard of a conspiracy going on, without mentioning it to Alexander, though twice a day in his presence"—καὶ τοὺς μηνυτὰς τοῦ ἔργου παρελθόντας ἐξελέγξαι Φιλώταν τε καὶ τοὺς ἀμφ᾽ αὐτὸν ἄλλοις τε ἐλέγχοις οὐκ ἀφανέσι, καὶ μάλιστα δὴ ὅτι αὐτὸς Φιλώτας πεπύσθαι μὲν—συνέφη, etc. What these other *indicia* were, we are not told; but we may see how slender was their value, when we learn that the non-revelation admitted by Philotas was stronger than any of them. The non-revelation, when we recollect that Nikomachus was the *only* informant (Arrian loosely talks of μηνυτὰς, as if there were more), proves absolutely nothing as to the complicity of Philotas, though it may prove something as to his indiscretion. Even on this minor charge, Curtius puts into his mouth a very sufficient exculpation. But if Alexander had taken a different view, and dismissed or even confined him for it, there would have been little room for remark.

The point upon which Arrian is at variance with Curtius, is, that he states "Philotas with the rest to have been shot to death by the Macedonians"—thus, seemingly contradicting, at least by implication, the fact of his having been tortured. Now Plutarch, Diodorus, and Justin, all concur with Curtius in affirming that he was tortured. On such a matter, I prefer their united authority to that of Ptolemy and Aristobulus. These two last-mentioned authors were probably quite content to believe in the complicity of Philotas upon the authority of Alexander himself; without troubling themselves to criticise the proofs. They tell us that Alexander vehemently denounced (κατηγορῆσαι ἰσχυρῶς) Philotas before the assembled soldiers. After this, any mere shadow or pretence of proof would be sufficient. Moreover, let us recollect that Ptolemy obtained his promotion, to be one of the confidential *body guards* (σωματοφύλακες), out of this very conspiracy, real or fictitious; he was promoted to the post of the condemned Demetrius (Arrian, iii. 27. 11).

How little Ptolemy and Aristobulus cared to do justice to any one whom Alexander hated, may be seen by what they say afterwards about the philosopher Kallisthenes. Both of them affirmed that the pages, condemned for conspiracy against Alexander, deposed against Kallisthenes as having instigated them to the deed (Arrian, iv. 14, 1). Now we know, from the authority of Alexander himself, whose letters Plutarch quotes (Alexand. 55), that the pages denied the privity of any one else—maintaining the project to have been altogether their own. To their great honor, the pages persisted in this deposition, even under extreme tortures—though they knew that a deposition against Kallisthenes was desired from them.

My belief is, that Diodorus, Plutarch, Curtius, and Justin, are correct in stating that Philotas was tortured. Ptolemy and Aristobulus have thought themselves warranted in omitting this fact, which they probably had little satisfaction in reflecting upon. If Philotas was not tortured, there could have been no evidence at all against Parmenio—for the only evidence against the latter was the extorted confession of Philotas.

[473] Curtius, vii. 2, 32, 33.

[474] Contrast the conduct of Alexander towards Philotas and Parmenio, with that of Cyrus the younger towards the conspirator Orontes, as described in Xenophon, Anabas. i. 6.

[475] Plutarch, Alexand. 49.

[476] Curtius, vii. 2, 36; Diodor. xvii. 80; Justin, xii. 5.

[477] Arrian, iii. 27, 8.

[478] Arrian, iii. 28, 2. About the geography, compare Wilson's Ariana Antiqua, p. 173-178. "By perambulator, the distance from Herat to Kandahar is 371 miles; from Kandahar to Kabul, 309: total 688 miles (English)." The principal city in Drangiana (Seiestan) mentioned by the subsequent Greek geographers is, Prophthasia; existing seemingly before Alexander's arrival. See the fragments of his *mensores*, ap. Didot, Fragm. Hist. Alex. Magn. p. 135; Pliny, H. N. vi. 21. The quantity of remains of ancient cities, still to be found in this territory, is remarkable. Wilson observes this (p. 154).

[479] Arrian, iii. 28, 6; Curtius, vii. 3, 23; Diodor. xvii. 83. Alexandria in Ariis is probably Herat; Alexandria in Arachosia is probably Kandahar. But neither the one nor the other is mentioned as having been founded by *Alexander*, either in Arrian or Curtius, or Diodorus. The name Alexandria does not prove that they were founded by him; for several of the Diadochi called their own foundations by his name (Strabo, xiii. p. 593). Considering how very short a time Alexander spent in these regions, the wonder is, that he could have found time to establish those foundations which are expressly ascribed to him by Arrian and his other historians. The authority of Pliny and Steph. Byzant. is hardly sufficient to warrant us in ascribing to him more. The exact site of Alexandria ad Caucasum cannot be determined, for want of sufficient topographical data. There seems much probability that it was at the place called Beghram, twenty-five miles north-east of Kabul—in the way between Kabul on the south side of the Hindoo-Koosh, and Anderhab on the north side. The prodigious number of coins and relics, Greek as well as Mohammedan, discovered by Mr. Masson at Beghram, supply better evidence for identifying the site with that of Alexandria ad Caucasum, than can be pleaded on behalf of any other locality. See Masson's Narrative of Journeys in Afghanistan, etc., vol. iii. ch. 7. p 148 *seqq.*

In crossing the Hindoo-Koosh from south to north Alexander probably marched by the pass of Bamian, which seems the only one among the four passes open to an army in the winter. See Wood's Journey to the Oxus, p 195.

[480] Arrian, iii. 29, 3; Curtius, vii. 5, 1.

[481] Arrian, iii. 29, 4; Strabo, xi. p. 509. Evidently Ptolemy and Aristobulus were much more awe-struck with the Oxus, than with either the Tigris or the Euphrates. Arrian (iv. 6, 13) takes his standard of comparison, in regard to rivers, from the river Peneius in Thessaly.

[482] Curtius, vii. 5, 19. The exactness of Quintus Curtius, in describing the general features of Baktria and Sogdiana, is attested in the strongest language by modern travellers. See Burnes's Travels into Bokhara, vol. ii. ch. 8. p. 211, 2nd edit.; also Morier, Second Journey in Persia, p. 282.

But in the geographical details of the country, we are at fault. We have not sufficient data to identify more than one or two of the localities mentioned, in the narrative of Alexander's proceedings, either by Curtius or Arrian. That Marakanda is the modern Samarkand—the river Polytimetus, the modern Kohik—and Baktra or Zari-

aspa the modern Balkh—appears certain; but the attempts made by commentators to assign the site of other places are not such as to carry conviction.

In fact, these countries, at the present moment, are known only superficially as to their general scenery; for purposes of measurement and geography, they are almost unknown; as may be seen by any one who reads the Introduction to Erskine's translation of the Memoirs of Sultan Baber.

[483] Arrian. iii. 30, 5-10. These details are peculiarly authentic, as coming from Ptolemy, the person chiefly concerned.

Aristobulus agreed in the description of the guise in which Bessus was exhibited, but stated that he was brought up in this way by Spitamenes and Dataphernes. Curtius (vii. 24, 36) follows this version. Diodorus also gives an account very like it, mentioning nothing about Ptolemy (xvii. 83).

[484] Curtius, vii. 23; Plutarch de Serâ Numinis Vindictâ, p. 557 B; Strabo xi. p. 518: compare also xiv. p. 634, and xvii. p. 814. This last-mentioned passage of Strabo helps us to understand the peculiarly strong pious fervor with which Alexander regarded the temple and oracle of Branchidæ. At the time when Alexander went up to the oracle of Ammon in Egypt, for the purpose of affiliating himself to Zeus Ammon, there came to him envoys from Miletus, announcing that the oracle at Branchidæ, which had been silent ever since the time of Xerxes, had just begun to give prophecy, and had certified the fact that Alexander was the son of Zeus, besides many other encouraging predictions.

The massacre of the Branchidæ by Alexander was described by Diodorus, but was contained in that part of the seventeenth book which is lost; there is a great lacuna in the MSS. after cap. 83. The fact is distinctly indicated in the table of contents prefixed to Book xvii.

Arrian makes no mention of these descendants of the Branchidæ in Sogdiana, nor of the destruction of the town and its inhabitants by Alexander. Perhaps neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus, said anything about it. Their silence is not at all difficult to explain, nor does it, in my judgment, impeach the credibility of the narrative. They do not feel under obligation to give publicity to the worst acts of their hero.

[485] The Delphian oracle pronounced, in explaining the subjugation and ruin of Krœsus king of Lydia, that he had thereby expiated the sin of his ancestor in the fifth generation before (Herodot. i. 91: compare vi. 86). Immediately before the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war, the Lacedæmonians called upon the Athenians to expel the descendants of those who had taken part in the Kylonian sacrilege, 180 years before; they addressed this injunction with a view to procure the banishment of Perikles, yet still τοῖς θεοῖς πρῶτον τιμωροῦντες (Thucyd. i. 125-127).

The idea that the sins of fathers were visited upon their descendants, even to the third and fourth generation, had great currency in the ancient world.

[486] Diodor. xiii. 62. See Vol. X. Ch. lxxxi. p 413 of this History.

[487] Pliny, H. N. vi. 16. In the Meteorologica of Aristotle (i. 13, 15-18) we read that the rivers Bahtrus, Choaspes, and Araxes flowed from the lofty mountain Parnasus (Paropamisus?) in Asia; and that the Araxes bifurcated, one branch forming the Tanais, which fell into the Palus Mæotis. For this fact he refers to the γῆς περιὸδοι current in his time. It seems plain that by the Araxes Aristotle must mean the Jaxartes. We see, therefore, that Alexander and his companions, in identifying the Jaxartes with the Tanais, only followed the geographical descriptions and ideas current in their time. Humboldt remarks several cases in which the Greek geographers were fond of supposing bifurcation of rivers (Asie Centrale, vol. ii. p. 291).

[488] Arrian, iv. 1, 5.

[489] Arrian, iii. 30, 17.

[490] Arrian, iv. 1, 3

[491] Arrian, iv. 3, 17; Curtius, vii. 6, 25.

[492] Arrian. iv. 5, 6; Curtius, vii. 9.

[493] Arrian, iv. 6, 11; Curtius, vii. 9, 22. The river, called by the Macedonians Polytimetus (Strabo, xi. p. 518), now bears the name of Kohik or Zurufshan. It rises in the mountains east of Samarkand, and flowing westward on the north of that city and of Bokhara. It does not reach so far as the Oxus; during the full time of

the year, it falls into a lake called Karakul; during the dry months, it is lost in the sands, as Arrian states (Burnes's Travels, vol. ii. ch. xi. p. 299. ed. 2nd.).

[494] Arrian, iv. 7, 1; Curtius, vii. 10, 12.

[495] Arrian, iv. 7, 5.

[496] After describing the scene at Rome, when the Emperor Galba was deposed and assassinated in the forum, Tacitus observes—"Plures quam centum et viginti libellos præmia exposcentium, ob aliquam notabilem illà die operam, Vitellius posteà invenit, omnesque conquiri et interfici jussit: *non honore Galbæ, sed tradito principibus more, munimentum ad præsens, in posterum ultionem*" (Tacitus, Hist. i. 44).

[497] Arrian, i. 17, 3; iii. 16, 8. Curtius, iii. 12, 6; v. 1, 44.

[498] Curtius (vii. 10, 15) mentions six cities (oppida) founded by Alexander in these regions; apparently somewhere north of the Oxus, but the sites cannot be made out. Justin (xii. 5) alludes to twelve foundations in Baktria and Sogdiana.

[499] Arrian, iv. 16, 4; Curtius, vii. 10, 1. "Sogdiana regio magnâ ex parte deserta est; octingenta ferè stadia in latitudinem vastæ solitudines tenent."

Respecting the same country (Sogdiana and Baktria), Mr. Erskine observes (Introduction to the Memoirs of Sultan Baber, p. xliii.):—"The face of the country is extremely broken, and divided by lofty hills; even the plains are diversified by great varieties of soil,—some extensive districts along the Kohik river, nearly the whole of Ferghana (along the Jaxartes), the greater part of Kwarizm along the branches of the Oxus, with the large portions of Balkh, Badakshan, Kesh, and Hissar, being of uncommon fertility; while the greater part of the rest is a barren waste, and in some places a sandy desert. Indeed the whole country north of the Oxus has a decided tendency to degenerate into desert, and many of its most fruitful spaces are nearly surrounded by barren sands; so that the population of all these districts still, as in the time of Baber, consists of the fixed inhabitants of the cities and fertile lands, and of the unsettled and roving wanderers of the desert, who dwell in tents of felt, and live on the produce of their flocks."

[500] Arrian, iv. 8, 7.

[501] Plutarch, Alexand. 51. Nothing can be more touching than the words put by Plutarch into the mouth of Kleitus—Ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ νῦν χαίρομεν, Ἀλέξανδρε, τοιαῦτα τέλη τῶν πόνων κομιζόμενοι, μακαρίζομεν δὲ τοὺς ἤδη τεθνηκότας πρὶν ἐπιδεῖν Μηδικαῖς ῥάβδοις ξαινομένους Μακεδόνας, καὶ Περσῶν δεομένους ἵνα τῷ βασιλεῖ προσέλθωμεν.

[502] Arrian, iv. 8, 8. οὔκουν μόνον γε (Ἀλέξανδρον) καταπρᾶξαι αὐτὰ, ἀλλὰ τὸ γὰρ πολὺ μέρος Μακεδόνων εἶναι τὰ ἔργα, etc.

[503] Arrian, iv. 8; Curtius, viii. 1; Plutarch, Alexand. 50, 51; Justin, xii. 6.

The description given by Diodorus was contained in the lost part of his seventeenth book; the table of contents, prefixed thereunto, notes the incident briefly.

All the authors describe in the same general way the commencement, progress, and result, of this impressive scene in the banqueting hall of Marakanda; but they differ materially in the details. In giving what seems to me the most probable account, I have borrowed partly from all, yet following mostly the account given by Arrian from Ptolemy, himself present. For Arrian's narrative down to sect. 14 of c. 8 (before the words Ἀριστόβουλος δὲ) may fairly be presumed to be derived from Ptolemy.

Both Plutarch and Curtius describe the scene in a manner more dishonorable to Alexander than Arrian; and at the same time (in my judgment) less probable. Plutarch says that the brawl took its rise from a poet named Pierion singing a song which turned into derision those Macedonians who had been recently defeated in Sogdiana; that Alexander and those around him greatly applauded this satire; that Kleitus protested against such an insult to soldiers, who, though unfortunate, had behaved with unimpeachable bravery; that Alexander then turned upon Kleitus saying, that he was seeking an excuse for himself by extenuating cowardice in others; that Kleitus retorted by reminding him of the preservation of his life at the Granikus. Alexander is thus made to provoke the quarrel by aspersing the courage of Kleitus, which I think noway probable; nor would he be likely to encourage a song of that tenor.

Curtius agrees with Arrian in ascribing the origin of the mischief to the extravagant boasts of Alexander and his flatterers, and to their depreciation of Philip. He then tells us that Kleitus, on hearing their unseemly talk, turned round and whispered to his neighbor some lines out of the Andromachê of Euripides (which lines Plutarch also ascribes to him, though at a later moment); that Alexander, not hearing the words, asked what had been said, but no one would tell him; at length Kleitus himself repeated the sentiment in language of his own. This would suit a literary Greek; but an old Macedonian officer half intoxicated, when animated by a vehement sentiment, would hardly express it by whispering a Greek poetical quotation to his neighbor. He would either hold his tongue, or speak what he felt broadly and directly. Nevertheless Curtius has stated two points very material to the case, which do not appear in Arrian. 1. It was Alexander himself, not his flatterers, who vilipended Philip; at least the flatterers only did so after him, and following his example. The topic would be dangerous for them to originate, and might easily be carried too far. 2. Among all the topics touched upon by Kleitus, none was so intolerable as the open expression of sympathy, friendship, and regret for Parmenio. This stung Alexander in the sorest point of his conscience; he must have known that there were many present who sympathized with it; and it was probably the main cause which worked him up to phrenzy. Moreover we may be pretty sure that Kleitus, while expatiating upon Philip, would not forget Philip's general in chief and his own old friend, Parmenio.

I cannot believe the statement of Aristobulus, that Kleitus was forced by his friends out of the hall, and afterward returned to it of his own accord, to defy Alexander once more. It seems plain from Arrian that Ptolemy said no such thing. The murderous impulse of Alexander was gratified on the spot, and without delay, as soon as he got clear from the gentle restraint of his surrounding friends.

[504] Arrian, iv. 9, 4; Curtius, viii. 2, 2.

[505] Curtius, viii. 2, 12. "Quoque minus cædis puderet, jure interfectum Clitum Macedones decernunt; sepulturâ quoque prohibituri, ni rex humari jussisset."

In explanation of this monstrous verdict of the soldiers, we must recollect that the safety of the whole army (now at Samarcand, almost beyond the boundary of inhabited regions, ἔξω τῆς οἰκουμένης) was felt to depend on the life of Alexander. Compare Justin, xii. 6, 15.

[506] Arrian, iv. 9, 6. Alexander imagined himself to have incurred the displeasure of Dionysus by having sacked and destroyed the city of Thebes, the supposed birth-place and favorite locality of that god (Plutarch, Alex. 13).

The maddening delusion brought upon men by the wrath of Dionysus is awfully depicted in the Bacchæ of Euripides. Under the influence of that delusion, Agavê, mother of Pentheus, tears her son in pieces and bears away his head in triumph, not knowing what is in her hands. Compare also Eurip. Hippolyt. 440-1412.

[507] Arrian, iv. 9, 10; Plutarch. Alex. 52.

[508] Curtius, viii. 2, 13—"decem diebus ad confirmandum pudorem apud Maracanda consumptis", etc.

[509] Curtius, viii. 2, 20-30.

[510] Arrian, iv. 17, 11. Curtius (viii. 3) gives a different narrative of the death of Spitamenes.

[511] Arrian, iv. 18, 19.

[512] Arrian, iv. 21. Our geographical knowledge does not enable us to verify these localities, or to follow Alexander in his marches of detail.

[513] Curtius, viii. 5, 1; Arrian, iv. 22, 2.

[514] Arrian, iv. 10, 7-9. Curtius (viii. 5, 9-13) represents the speech proposing divine honors to have been delivered, not by Anaxarchus, but by another lettered Greek, a Sicilian named Kleon. The tenor of the speech is substantially the same, as given by both authors.

[515] Kallisthenes had composed three historical works—1. Hellenica—from the year 387-357 B. C. 2. History of the sacred war—from 357-346 B. C. 3. Τὰ κατ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρον. His style is said by Cicero to have been rhetorical; but the Alexandrine critics included him in their Canon of Historians. See Didot, Fragm. Hist. Alex. Magn. p. 6-9.

[516] See the observation ascribed to him expressing envy towards Achilles for having been immortalized by Homer (Arrian, i. 12, 2).

[517] It is said that Ephorus, Xenokrates, and Menedemus, all declined the invitation of Alexander (Plutarch, De Stoicorum Repugnantiis, p. 1043). Respecting Menedemus, the fact can hardly be so: he must have been then too young to be invited.

[518] Arrian, iv. 10, 2; Plutarch, Alex. 53, 54. It is remarkable that Timmæus denounced Kallisthenes as having in his historical work flattered Alexander to excess (Polybius, xii. 12). Kallisthenes seems to have recognized various special interpositions of the gods, to aid Alexander's successes—see Fragments 25 and 36 of the Fragmenta Callisthenis in the edition of Didot.

In reading the censure which Arrian passes on the arrogant pretensions of Kallisthenes, we ought at the same time to read the pretensions raised by Arrian on his own behalf as an historian (i. 12, 7-9)—καὶ ἐπὶ τῷδε οὐκ ἀπαξιῶ ἐμαυτὸν τῶν πρώτων ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῇ Ἑλλάδι, εἴπερ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις, etc. I doubt much whether Kallisthenes pitched his self-estimation so high. In this chapter, Arrian recounts, that Alexander envied Achilles for having been fortunate enough to obtain such a poet as Homer for panegyrist; and Arrian laments that Alexander had not, as yet, found an historian equal to his deserts. This, in point of fact, is a re-assertion of the same truth which Kallisthenes stands condemned for asserting—that the fame even of the greatest warrior depends upon his commemorators. The boastfulness of a poet is at least pardonable, when he exclaims, like Theokritus, Idyll. xvi. 73—

> Ἔσσεται οὗτος ἀνὴρ, ὃς ἐμεῦ κεχρήσετ᾽ ἀοιδοῦ,
>
> Ῥέξας ἢ Ἀχιλεὺς ὅσσον μέγας, ἢ βαρὺς Αἴας
>
> Ἐν πεδίῳ Σιμόεντος, ὅθι Φρυγὸς ἠρίον Ἴλου.

[519] Plutarch, Alex. 55.

[520] Arrian, iv. 11. ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ τε καὶ παιδεύσει Ἀλεξάνδρῳ συνόντα.

[521] Arrian, iv. 12, 7. φιλήματι ἔλαττον ἔχων ἄπειμι.

[522] Arrian, iv. 12, 1. ἀνιᾶσαι μὲν μεγαλωστὶ Ἀλέξανδρον, Μακεδόσι δὲ πρὸς θυμοῦ εἰπεῖν….

Curtius, viii. 5, 20. "Æquis auribus Callisthenes velut vindex publicæ libertatis audiebatur. Expresserat non assensionem modo, sed etiam vocem, seniorum præcipuè quibus gravis erat inveterati moris externa mutatio."

[523] There was no sentiment more deeply rooted in the free Grecian mind, prior to Alexander's conquests, than the repugnance to arrogant aspirations on the part of the fortunate man, swelling himself above the limits of humanity—and the belief that such aspirations were followed by the Nemesis of the gods. In the dying speech which Xenophon puts into the mouth of Cyrus the Great, we find—"Ye gods, I thank you much, that I have been sensible of your care for me, and that I have never in my successes raised my thoughts above the measure of man" (Cyropæd. viii. 7, 3). Among the most striking illustrations of this sentiment is, the story of Solon and Crœsus (Herodot. i. 32-34).

I shall recount in the next chapter examples of monstrous flattery on the part of the Athenians, proving how this sentiment expired with their freedom.

[524] Plutarch, Alexand. 54. He refers to Hermippus, who mentions what was told to Aristotle by Strœbus, the reader attendant on Kallisthenes.

[525] Arrian, iv. 13; Curtius, viii. 6, 7.

[526] Arrian, iv. 13, 13.

[527] Arrian, iv, 14, 4. Curtius expands this scene into great detail; composing a long speech for Hermolaus, and another for Alexander (viii. 6, 7, 8).

He says that the soldiers who executed these pages, tortured them first, in order to manifest zeal for Alexander (viii. 8, 20).

[528] "Quem, si Macedo esset (Callisthenem), tecum introduxissem, dignissimum te discipulo magistrum: nunc Olynthio non idem juris est" (Curtius. viii. 8, 19—speech of Alexander before the soldiers addressing Hermolaus especially).

[529] Plutarch, Alexand. 55; Arrian, iv. 10, 4.

[530] Plutarch, Alex. 55. Καίτοι τῶν περὶ Ἑρμόλαον οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ διὰ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνάγκης Καλλισθένους κατεῖπεν. Ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος αὐτὸς εὐθὺς γράφων Κρατερῷ καὶ Ἀττάλῳ καὶ Ἀλκέτᾳ φησὶ τοὺς παῖδας βασανιζομένους ὁμολογεῖν, ὡς αὐτοὶ ταῦτα πράξειαν, ἄλλος δὲ οὐδεὶς συνειδείη. Ὕστερον δὲ γράφων πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον, καὶ τὸν Καλλισθένην συνεπαιτιασάμενος, Οἱ μὲν παῖδές, φησιν, ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων κατελεύσθησαν, τὸν δὲ σοφιστὴν ἐγὼ κολάσω, καὶ τοὺς ἐκπέμψαντας αὐτὸν, καὶ τοὺς ὑποδεχομένους ταῖς πόλεσι τοὺς ἐμοὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντας … ἄντικρυς ἔν γε τούτοις ἀποκαλυπτόμενος πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην, etc.

About the hostile dispositions of Alexander towards Aristotle, see Dio Chrysostom, Orat. 64. de Fortunâ, p. 598.

Kraterus was at this time absent in Sogdiana, engaged in finishing the suppression of the resistance (Arrian, iv. 22, 1). To him, therefore, Alexander would naturally write.

This statement, from the pen of Alexander himself, distinctly contradicts and refutes (as I have before observed) the affirmation of Ptolemy and Aristobulus as given by Arrian (iv. 14, 1)—that the pages deposed against Kallisthenes.

[531] Arrian, iv. 14, 5. Curtius also says—"Callisthenes quoque tortus interiit, initi consilii in caput regis innoxius, sed haudquaquam aulæ et assentantium accommodatus ingenio (viii. 8, 21)." Compare Plutarch, Alex. 55.

This is the statement of Ptolemy; who was himself concerned in the transactions, and was the officer through whom the conspiracy of the pages had been revealed. His partiality might permit him to omit or soften what was discreditable to Alexander, but he may be fully trusted when he records an act of cruelty. Aristobulus and others affirmed that Kallisthenes was put in chains and carried about in this condition for some time; after which he died of disease and a wretched state of body. But the witnesses here are persons whose means of information we do not know to be so good as those of Ptolemy; besides that, the statement is intrinsically less probable.

[532] See the language of Seneca, Nat. Quæst. vi. 23; Plutarch, De Adulator. et Amici Discrimine, p. 65; Theophrast. ap. Ciceron. Tusc. Disp. iii. 10.

Curtius says that this treatment of Kallisthenes was followed by a late repentance on the part of Alexander (viii. 8, 23). On this point there is no other evidence—nor can I think the statement probable.

[533] Arrian, iv. 22, 4.

[534] Arrian, iv. 22, 8-12.

[535] Respecting the rock called Aornos, a valuable and elaborate article, entitled "Gradus ad Aornon" has been published by Major Abbott in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, No. iv. 1854. This article gives much information, collected mainly by inquiries on the spot, and accompanied by a map, about the very little known country west of the Indus, between the Kabool river on the south, and the Hindoo-Koosh on the north.

Major Abbott attempts to follow the march and operations of Alexander, from Alexandria ad Caucasum to the rock of Aornos (p. 311 *seq.*). He shows highly probable reason for believing that the Aornos described by Arrian is the Mount Mahabunn, near the right bank of the Indus (lat. 34° 20′), about sixty miles above its confluence with the Kabool river. "The whole account of Arrian of the rock Aornos is a faithful picture of the Mahabunn. It was the most remarkable feature of the country. It was the refuge of all the neighboring tribes. It was covered with forest. It had good soil sufficient for a thousand ploughs, and pure springs of water everywhere abounded. It was 4125 feet above the plain, and fourteen miles in circuit. The summit was a plain where cavalry could act. It would be difficult to offer a more faithful description of the Mahabunn. The side on which Alexander scaled the main summit had certainly the character of a rock. But the whole description of Arrian indicates a table mountain" (p. 341). The Mahabunn "is a mountain table, scarped on the east by tremendous precipices, from which descends one large spur down upon the Indus between Sitana and Umb" (p. 340).

To this similarity in so many local features, is to be added the remarkable coincidence of name, between the town Embolima, where Arrian states that Alexander established his camp for the purpose of attacking Aornos—and the modern names Umb and Balimah (between the Mahabunn and the Indus)—"the one in the river valley,

the other on the mountain immediately above it" (p. 344). Mount Mahabunn is the natural refuge for the people of the neighborhood from a conqueror, and was among the places taken by Nadir Shah (p. 338).

A strong case of identity is thus made out between this mountain and the Aornos *described by Arrian*. But undoubtedly it does not coincide with the Aornos *described by Curtius*, who compares Aornos to a Meta (the conical goal of the stadium), and says that the Indus washed its base,—that at the first assault several Macedonian soldiers were hurled down into the river. This close juxtaposition of the Indus has been the principal feature looked for by travellers who have sought for Aornos; but no place has yet been found answering the conditions required. We have here to make our election between Arrian and Curtius. Now there is a general presumption in Arrian's favor, in the description of military operations, where he makes a positive statement; but in this case, the presumption is peculiarly strong, because Ptolemy was in the most conspicuous and difficult command for the capture of Aornos, and was therefore likely to be particular in the description of a scene where he had reaped much glory.

[536] Arrian, iv. 30, 13. ἡ στρατιὰ αὐτῷ ὠδοποίει τὸ πρόσω ἰοῦσα, ἄπορα ἄλλως ὄντα τὰ ταύτῃ χωρία, etc.

The countries here traversed by Alexander include parts of Kafiristan, Swart, Bajore, Chitral, the neighborhood of the Kameh and other affluents of the river Kabul before it falls into the Indus near Attock. Most of this is Terra Incognita even at present; especially Kafiristan, a territory inhabited by a population said to be rude and barbarous, but which has never been conquered—nor indeed ever visited by strangers. It is remarkable, that among the inhabitants of Kafiristan,—as well as among those of Badakshan, on the other or northern side of the Hindoo-Koosh—there exist traditions respecting Alexander, together with a sort of belief that they themselves are descended from his soldiers. See Ritter's Erdkunde, part vii. book iii. p. 200 *seq.*; Burnes's Travels, vol. iii. ch. 4. p. 186, 2nd ed.; Wilson, Ariana Antiqua, p. 194 *seq.*

[537] Arrian, iv. 30, 16; v. 7, 2.

[538] The halt of thirty days is mentioned by Diodorus, xvii. 86. For the proof that these operations took place in winter, see the valuable citation from Aristobulus given in Strabo (xv. p. 691).

[539] Arrian. v. 19, 1. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ὡς προσάγοντα ἐπύθετο, προσιππεύσας πρὸ τῆς τάξεως σὺν ὀλίγοις τῶν ἑταίρων ἁπαντᾷ τῷ Πώρῳ, καὶ ἐπιστήσας τὸν ἵππον, τό τε μέγεθος ἐθαύμαζεν ὑπὲρ πέντε πήχεις μάλιστα ξυμβαῖνον, καὶ τὸ κάλλος τοῦ Πώρου, καὶ ὅτι οὐ δεδουλωμένος τῇ γνώμῃ ἐφαίνετο, etc.

We see here how Alexander was struck with the stature and personal beauty of Porus, and how much these visual impressions contributed to determine, or at least to strengthen, his favorable sympathies towards the captive prince. This illustrates what I have observed in the last chapter, in recounting his treatment of the eunuch Batis after the capture of Gaza; that the repulsive appearance of Batis greatly heightened Alexander's indignation. With a man of such violent impulses as Alexander, these external impressions were of no inconsiderable moment.

[540] These operations are described in Arrian, v. 9. v. 19 (we may remark that Ptolemy and Aristobulus, though both present, differed on many points, v. 14); Curtius, viii. 13, 14; Diodor. xvii. 87, 88. According to Plutarch (Alex. 60), Alexander dwelt much upon the battle in his own letters.

There are two principal points—Jelum and Julalpoor—where high roads from the Indus now cross the Hydaspes. Each of these points have been assigned by different writers, as the probable scene of the crossing of the river by Alexander. Of the two Jelum (rather higher up the river than Julalpoor) seems the more probable. Burnes points out that near Jelum the river is divided into five or six channels with islands (Travels, vol. ii. ch. 2. p. 50, 2nd ed.). Captain Abbott (in the Journal of the Asiatic Society, Calcutta, Dec. 1848) has given an interesting memoir on the features and course of the Hydaspes a little above Jelum, comparing them with the particulars stated by Arrian, and showing highly plausible reasons in support of this hypothesis—that the crossing took place near Jelum.

Diodorus mentions a halt of thirty days, after the victory (xvii. 89), which seems not probable. Both he and Curtius allude to numerous serpents, by which the army was annoyed between the Akesines and the Hydraotes (Curtius, ix. 1, 11).

[541] Arrian states (v. 19, 5) that the victory over Porus was gained in the month Munychion of the archon Hegemon at Athens—that is, about the end of April, 326 B. C. This date is not to be reconciled with another passage, v. 9, 6—where he says that the summer solstice had already passed, and that all the rivers of the Punjab were full of water, turbid and violent.

This swelling of the rivers begins about June; they do not attain their full height until August. Moreover, the description of the battle, as given both by Arrian and by Curtius, implies that it took place after the rainy season had begun (Arrian, v. 9, 7; v. 12, 5. Curtius, viii. 14, 4).

Some critics have proposed to read *Metageitnion* (July-August) as the month, instead of *Munychion*; an alteration approved by Mr. Clinton and received into the text by Schmieder. But if this alteration be admitted, the name of the Athenian archon must be altered also; for Metageitnion of the archon Hegemon would be eight months earlier (July-August, 327 B. C.); and at this date Alexander had not as yet crossed the Indus, as the passage of Aristobulus (ap. Strabo. xv. p. 691) plainly shows—and as Droysen and Mützel remark. Alexander did not cross the Indus before the spring of 326 B. C. If, in place of the archon Hegemon, we substitute the next following archon Chremês (and it is remarkable that Diodorus assigns the battle to this later archonship, xvii. 87), this would be July-August 326 B. C.; which would be a more admissible date for the battle than the preceding month of Munychion. At the same time, the substitution of Metageitnion *is* mere conjecture; and seems to leave hardly time enough for the subsequent events. As far as an opinion can be formed, it would seem that the battle was fought about the end of June or beginning of July 326 B. C. after the rainy season had commenced; towards the close of the archonship of Hegemon, and the beginning of that of Chremes.

[542] Arrian, v. 20; Diodor. xvii. 95. Lieut. Wood (Journey to the source of the Oxus, p. 11-39) remarks that the large rivers of the Punjab change their course so often and so considerably, that monuments and indications of Alexander's march in that territory cannot be expected to remain, especially in ground near rivers.

[543] Arrian, v. 20.

[544] Arrian, v, 23, 24; Curtius, ix. 1, 15.

[545] Curtius, ix. 2, 3; Diodor. xvii. 93; Plutarch, Alex. 62.

[546] Curtius, ix. 3, 11 (speech of Kœnus). "Quoto cuique lorica est? Quis equum habet? Jube quæri, quam multos servi ipsorum persecuti sint, quid cuique supersit ex prædâ. Omnium victores, omnium inopes sumus."

[547] Aristobulus ap. Strabo. xv. p. 691-697. ὕεσθαι συνεχῶς. Arrian, v, 29, 8; Diodor. xvii. 93. χειμῶνες ἄγριοι κατερράγησαν ἐφ᾽ ἡμέρας ἑβδομήκοντα, καὶ βρονταὶ συνεχεῖς καὶ κεραυνοὶ κατέσκηπτον, etc.

[548] In the speech which Arrian (v. 25, 26) puts into the mouth of Alexander, the most curious point is, the geographical views which he promulgates. "We have not much farther now to march (he was standing on the western bank of the Sutledge) to the river Ganges, and the great Eastern Sea which surrounds the whole earth. The Hyrkanian (Caspian) Sea joins on to this great sea on one side, the Persian Gulf on the other; after we have subdued all those nations which lie before us eastward towards the Great Sea, and northward towards the Hyrkanian Sea, we shall then sail by water first to the Persian Gulf, next round Libya to the pillars of Herakles; from thence we shall march back all through Libya, and add it to all Asia as parts of our empire." (I here abridge rather than translate).

It is remarkable, that while Alexander made so prodigious an error in narrowing the eastern limits of Asia, the Ptolemaic geography, recognized in the time of Columbus, made an error not less in the opposite direction, stretching it too far to the East. It was upon the faith of this last mistake, that Columbus projected his voyage of circumnavigation from Western Europe, expecting to come to the eastern coast of Asia from the West, after no great length of voyage.

[549] Arrian, v. 28, 7. The fact that Alexander, under all this insuperable repugnance of his soldiers, still offered the sacrifice preliminary to crossing—is curious as an illustration of his character, and was specially attested by Ptolemy.

[550] Arrian, v. 29, 8; Diodor. xvii. 95.

[551] Aristobulus ap. Strab. xv. p. 691—until the rising of Arkturus. Diodorus says, 70 days (xvii. 73), which seems more probable.

[552] Diodor. xvii. 95; Curtius, ix. 3, 21.

[553] The voyage was commenced a few days before the setting of the Pleiades (Aristobulus, ap. Strab. xv. p. 692).

For the number of the ships, see Ptolemy ap. Arrian, vi. 2, 8.

On seeing crocodiles in the Indus, Alexander was at first led to suppose that it was the same river as the Nile, and that he had discovered the higher course of the Nile, from whence it flowed into Egypt. This is curious, as an illustration of the geographical knowledge of the time (Arrian, vi. 1, 3).

[554] Aristobulus ap. Strab. xv. p. 692. Aristobulus said that the downward voyage occupied ten months; this seems longer than the exact reality. Moreover Aristobulus said that they had no rain during all the voyage down, through all the summer months: Nearchus stated the contrary (Strabo, *l. c.*).

[555] Curtius, ix. 4, 15; Diodor. xvii 98.

[556] Arrian, vi. 7, 8.

[557] This last stronghold of the Malli is supposed, by Mr. Cunningham and others, to have been the modern city of Multan. The river Ravee or Hydraotes is said to have formerly run past the city of Multan into the Chenab or Akesines.

[558] Arrian, vi. 9, 10, 11. He notices the great discrepancy in the various accounts given of this achievement and dangerous wound of Alexander.

Compare Diodor. xvii. 98, 99; Curtius, ix. 4, 5; Plutarch, Alex. 63.

[559] Arrian, xi. 13.

[560] Arrian, xi. 15, 5.

[561] Arrian, xi. 17, 6; Strabo, xv. p. 721.

[562] Arrian, xi. 18, 19; Curtius, ix. 9. He reached Pattala towards the middle or end of July, περὶ κυνὸς ἐπιτολήν (Strabo, xv. p. 692).

The site of Pattala has been usually looked for near the modern Tatta. But Dr. Kennedy, in his recent 'Narrative of the Campaign of the Army of the Indus in Scinde and Kabool' (ch. v. p. 104), shows some reasons for thinking that it must have been considerably higher up the river than Tatta; somewhere near Sehwan. "The delta commencing about 130 miles above the sea, its northern apex would be somewhere midway between Hyderabad and Sehwan; where local traditions still speak of ancient cities destroyed, and of greater changes having occurred than in any other part of the course of the Indus."

The constant changes in the course of the Indus, however (compare p. 73 of his work), noticed by all observers, render every attempt at such identification conjectural—see Wood's Journey to the Oxus, p. 12.

[563] Arrian, vi. 24, 2; Strabo, xv. p. 723.

[564] Arrian, vi. 25, 26; Curtius. ix. 10; Plutarch, Alex. 66.

[565] Curtius, ix. 10; Diodor. xvii. 106; Plutarch, Alex. 67. Arrian (vi. 28) found this festal progress mentioned in some authorities, but not in others. Neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus mentioned it. Accordingly Arrian refuses to believe it. There may have been exaggerations or falsities as to the details of the march; but as a general fact, I see no sufficient ground for disbelieving it. A season of excessive license to the soldiers, after their extreme suffering in Gedrosia, was by no means unnatural to grant. Moreover, it corresponds to the general conception of the returning march of Dionysus in antiquity, while the imitation of that god was quite in conformity with Alexander's turn of sentiment.

I have already remarked, that the silence of Ptolemy and Aristobulus is too strongly insisted on, both by Arrian and by others, as a reason for disbelieving affirmations respecting Alexander.

Arrian and Curtius (x. 1) differ in their statements about the treatment of Kleander. According to Arrian, he was put to death; according to Curtius, he was spared from death, and simply put in prison, in consequence of the important service which he had rendered by killing Parmenio with his own hand; while 600 of his accomplices and agents were put to death.

[566] Nearchus had begun his voyage about the end of September, or beginning of October (Arrian, Indic. 21; Strabo, xv. p. 721).

[567] Arrian, vi. 28, 7; Arrian, Indica, c. 33-37.

[568] Arrian, vi. 28, 12-29, 1.

[569] Plutarch, Alex. 69; Arrian, vi. 29, 17; Strabo, xv. p. 730.

[570] Arrian, vi. 30, 2; Curtius, x. 1, 23-38. "Hic fuit exitus nobilissimi Persarum, nec insontis modo, sed eximiæ quoque benignitatis in regem." The great favor which the beautiful eunuch Bagoas (though Arrian does not mention him) enjoyed with Alexander, and the exalted position which he occupied, are attested by good contemporary evidence, especially the philosopher Dikæarchus—see Athenæ. xiii. p. 603; Dikæarch. Fragm. 19. ap. Hist. Græc. Fragm. Didot, vol. ii. p. 241. Compare the Fragments of Eumenes and Diodotus (Ælian, V. H. iii. 23) in Didot, Fragm. Scriptor. Hist. Alex. Magni, p. 121; Plutarch De Adul. et Amic. Discrim. p. 65.

[571] Arrian, vi. 30; Curtius, x. 1, 22-30.

[572] Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. B. C. 325, also Append. p. 232) places the arrival of Alexander in Susiana, on his return march, in the month of February B. C. 325; a year too early, in my opinion. I have before remarked on the views of Mr. Clinton respecting the date of Alexander's victory over Porus on the Hydaspes, where he alters the name of the month as it stands in the text of Arrian (following Schmieder's conjecture), and supposes that battle to have occurred in August B. C. 327 instead of April B. C. 326. Mr. Clinton antedates by one year all the proceedings of Alexander subsequent to his quitting Baktria for the last time in the summer of

B. C. 327. Dr. Vincent's remark—"that the supposition of *two winters* occurring after Alexander's return to Susa is not borne out by the historians" (see Clinton. p. 232), is a perfectly just one; and Mitford has not replied to it in a satisfactory manner. In my judgment, there was only an interval of sixteen months (not an interval of twenty-eight months, as Mr. Clinton supposes) between the return of Alexander to Susa and his death at Babylon (Feb. 324 B. C. to June 323 B. C.).

[573] Arrian, vii. 5. 9; Arrian, Indica, c. 42. The voluntary death of Kalanus the Indian Gymnosophist must have taken place at Susa (where Diodorus places it—xvii. 107), and not in Persis; for Nearchus was seemingly present at the memorable scene of the funeral pile (Arrian, vii. 3, 9)—and he was not with Alexander in Persis.

[574] Plutarch, Alexand. 68.

[575] Arrian, vii. 4, 2-5; Diodor. xvii. 108; Curtius, x. 1, 7. "Cœperat esse præceps ad repræsentanda supplicia, item ad deteriora credenda" (Curtius, x. 1, 39).

[576] Plutarch, Alex. 68.

[577] Diodor. xvii. 106-111.

[578] Among the accusations which reached Alexander against this satrap, we are surprised to find a letter addressed to him (ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον ἐπιστολῇ) by the Greek historian Theopompus; who set forth with indignation the extravagant gifts and honors heaped by Harpalus upon his two successive mistresses—Pythionikê and Glykera; celebrated Hetæræ from Athens. These proceedings Theopompus describes as insults to Alexander (Theopompus ap. Athenæ. xiii. p. 586-595; Fragment. 277, 278 ed. Didot).

The satyric drama called Ἀγὴν, represented before Alexander at a period subsequent to the flight of Harpalus, cannot have been represented (as Athenæus states it to have been) on the banks of *the Hydaspes*, because Harpalus did not make his escape until he was frightened by the approach of Alexander *returning* from India. At the Hydaspes, Alexander was still on his outward progress; very far off, and without any idea of returning. It appears to me that the words of Athenæus respecting this drama—ἐδίδαξε Διονυσίων ὄντων ἐπὶ τοῦ Ὑδάσπου τοῦ ποταμοῦ (xiii, p. 595)—involve a mistake or misreading; and that it ought to stand ἐπὶ τοῦ Χοάσπου τοῦ ποταμοῦ. I may remark that the words *Medus Hydaspes* in Virgil, Georg. iv. 211, probably involve the same confusion. The Choaspes was the river, near Susa; and this drama was performed before Alexander at Susa during the Dionysia of the year 324 B. C., after Harpalus had fled. The Dionysia were in the month Elaphebolion; now Alexander did not fight Porus on the Hydaspes until the succeeding month Munychion at the earliest—and probably later. And even if we suppose (which is not probable) that he reached the Hydaspes in Elaphebolion, he would have no leisure to celebrate dramas and a Dionysiac festival, while the army of Porus was waiting for him on the opposite bank. Moreover it is no way probable that, on the remote Hydaspes, he had any actors or chorus, or means of celebrating dramas at all.

[579] Arrian, vii. 18, 2; vii. 23, 9-13.

[580] Arrian, vii. 4, 6-9. By these two marriages, Alexander thus engrafted himself upon the two lines of antecedent Persian Kings. Ochus was of the Achæmenid family, but Darius Codomannus, father of Statira, was not of that family; he began a new lineage. About the overweening regal state of Alexander, outdoing even the previous Persian kings, see Phylarchus ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 539.

[581] Chares ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 538.

[582] Arrian, vii. 6, 3. καὶ τοὺς γάμους ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῷ Περσικῷ ποιηθέντας οὐ πρὸς θυμοῦ γενέσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς αὐτῶν, οὐδὲ τῶν γημάντων ἐστὶν οἷς, etc.

[583] Arrian, vii. 5; Plutarch, Alexand. 70; Curtius, x. 2, 9; Diodor. xvii. 109.

[584] Diodor. xvii. 108. It must have taken some time to get together and discipline these young troops; Alexander must therefore have sent the orders from India.

[585] Arrian, vii. 6.

[586] Arrian, vii. 7.

[587] Arrian, vii. 9, 10; Plutarch, Alex. 71; Curtius, x. 2; Justin, xii. 11.

[588] See the description given by Tacitus (Hist. ii. 29) of the bringing round of the Vitellian army,—which had mutinied against the general Fabius Valens:—"Tum Alphenus Varus, præfectus castrorum, deflagrante paula-

tim seditione, addit consilium—vetitis obire vigilias centurionibus, omisso tubæ sono, quo miles ad belli munia cieetur. Igitur torpere cuncti, circumspectare inter se attoniti, *et id ipsum, quod nemo regeret, paventes*; silentio, patientiâ, postremo precibus et lacrymis veniam quærebant. Ut vero deformis et fiens, et præter spem incolumis, Valens processit, gaudium, miseratio, favor; versi in lætitiam (ut est vulgus utroque immodicum) laudantes gratantesque, circumdatum aquilis signisque, in tribunal ferunt."

Compare also the narrative in Xenophon (Anab. i. 3) of the embarrassment of the Ten Thousand Greeks at Tarsus, when they at first refused to obey Klearchus and march against the Great King.

[589] Arrian, vii. 11.

[590] Arrian, vii. 12, 1-7; Justin, xii. 12. Kraterus was especially popular with the Macedonian soldiers, because he had always opposed, as much as he dared, the Oriental transformation of Alexander (Plutarch, Eumenes, 6).

[591] Arrian, vii. 19. He also sent an officer named Herakleides to the shores of the Caspian sea, with orders to construct ships and make a survey of that sea (vii. 16).

[592] Arrian, vii. 13, 2; Diodor. xvii. 110. How leisurely the march was may be seen in Diodorus.

The direction of Alexander's march from Susa to Ekbatana, along a frequented and good road which Diodorus in another place calls a royal road (xix. 19), is traced by Ritter, deriving his information chiefly from the recent researches of Major Rawlinson. The larger portion of the way lay along the western side of the chain of Mount Zagros, and on the right bank of the river Kerkha (Ritter, Erdkunde, part ix. b. 3. p. 329, West Asia).

[593] Arrian, vii. 13, 1; Plutarch, Eumenes, 2.

[594] Arrian, vii. 14; Plutarch, Alexand. 72; Diodor. xvii. 110. It will not do to follow the canon of evidence tacitly assumed by Arrian, who thinks himself authorized to discredit all the details of Alexander's conduct on this occasion, which transgress the limits of a dignified, though vehement sorrow.

When Masistius was slain, in the Persian army commanded by Mardonius in Bœotia, the manes of the horses were cut, as token of mourning: compare also Plutarch, Pelopidas, 33; and Euripid. Alkestis, 442.

[595] See the curious extracts from Ephippus the Chalkidian,—seemingly a contemporary, if not an eye-witness (ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 537, 538)—εὐφημία δὲ καὶ σιγὴ κατεῖχε πάντας ὑπὸ δέους τοὺς παρόντας· ἀφόρητος γὰρ ἦν (Alexander) καὶ φονικός· ἐδόκει γὰρ εἶναι μελαγχολικὸς, etc.

[596] I translate here, literally, Plutarch's expression—Τοῦ δὲ πένθους παρηγορίᾳ τῷ πολέμῳ χρώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ θήραν καὶ κυνηγέσιον ἀνθρώπων ἐξῆλθε, καὶ τὸ Κοσσαίων ἔθνος κατεστρέψατο, πάντας ἡβηδὸν ἀποσφάττων. Τοῦτο δὲ Ἡφαιστίωνος ἐναγισμὸς ἐκαλεῖτο (Plutarch, Alexand. 72: compare Polyænus, iv. 3, 31).

[597] Arrian, vii. 15; Plutarch, Alex. 72; Diodor. xvii. 111. This general slaughter, however, can only be true of portions of the Kossæan name; for Kossæans occur in after years (Diodor. xix. 19.).

[598] Pliny, H. N. iii. 9. The story in Strabo, v. p. 232, can hardly apply to Alexander the Great. Livy (ix. 18) conceives that the Romans knew nothing of Alexander even by report, but this appears to me not credible.

On the whole, though the point is doubtful, I incline to believe the assertion of a Roman embassy to Alexander. Nevertheless, there were various false statements which afterwards became current about it—one of which may be seen in Memnon's history of the Pontic Herakleia ap. Photium, Cod. 224; Orelli Fragment. Memnon, p. 36. Kleitarchus (contemporary of Alexander), whom Pliny quotes, can have had no motive to insert falsely the name of Romans, which in his time was nowise important.

[599] Arrian, vii. 15; Justin, xii. 13; Diodor. xvii. 113. The story mentioned by Justin in another place (xxi. 6) is probably referable to this season of Alexander's career. A Carthaginian named Hamilkar Rhodanus, was sent by his city to Alexander; really as an emissary to acquaint himself with the king's real designs, which occasioned to the Carthaginians serious alarm—but under color of being an exile tendering his services. Justin says that Parmenio introduced Hamilkar—which must, I think, be an error.

[600] Arrian, vii. 19, 1; vii. 23, 3.

[601] Arrian, vii. 19, 5-12; Diodor. xvii. 112.

[602] Arrian, vii. 20, 15; Arrian, Indica, 43. To undertake this circumnavigation, Alexander had despatched a ship-master of Soli in Cyprus, named Hiero; who becoming alarmed at the distance to which he was advancing, and at the apparently interminable stretch of Arabia towards the south, returned without accomplishing the object.

Even in the time of Arrian, in the second century after the Christian era, Arabia had never been circumnavigated, from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea—at least so far as his knowledge extended.

[603] Arrian, vii. 19, 11.

[604] Arrian, vii. 22, 2, 3; Strabo, xvi. p. 741.

[605] Arrian, vii. 21, 11. πόλιν ἐξῳκοδόμησέ τε καὶ ἐτείχισε.

[606] Arrian, vii. 23, 5. Even when performing the purely military operation of passing these soldiers in review, inspecting their exercise, and determining their array,—Alexander sat upon the regal throne, surrounded by Asiatic eunuchs; his principal officers sat upon couches with silver feet, near to him (Arrian, vii. 24, 4). This is among the evidences of his altered manners.

[607] Diodorus, xvii. 115; Plutarch, Alex. 72.

[608] Arrian, vii. 23, 8.

[609] Diodor. xvii. 114, 115: compare Arrian, vii. 14, 16; Plutarch, Alexand. 75.

[610] Arrian, vii. 23, 10-13; Diod. xviii. 4. Diodorus speaks indeed, in this passage, of the πυρὰ or funeral pile in honor of Hephæstion, as if it were among the vast expenses included among the memoranda left by Alexander (after his decease) of prospective schemes. But the funeral pile had already been erected at Babylon, as Diodorus himself had informed us.

What Alexander left unexecuted at his decease, but intended to execute if he had lived, was the splendid edifices and chapels in Hephæstion's honor—as we see by Arrian, vii. 23, 10. And Diodorus must be supposed to allude to these intended sacred buildings, though he has inadvertently spoken of the funeral pile. Kraterus, who was under orders to return to Macedonia, was to have built one at Pella.

The Olynthian Ephippus had composed a book περὶ τῆς Ἡφαιστίωνος καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ταφῆς, of which there appear four or five citations in Athenæus. He dwelt especially on the luxurious habits of Alexander, and on his unmeasured potations—common to him with other Macedonians.

[611] Arrian, vii. 23, 9-14. Καὶ Κλεομένει ἀνδρὶ κακῷ, καὶ πολλὰ ἀδικήματα ἀδικήσαντι ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, ἐπιστέλλει ἐπιστολήν…. Ἢν γὰρ καταλάβω ἐγὼ (ἔλεγε τὰ γράμματα) τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καλῶς κατεσκευασμένα καὶ τὰ ἡρῷα τὰ Ἡφαιστίωνος, εἴτε τι πρότερον ἡμάρτηκας, ἀφήσω σε τούτων, καὶ τολοιπόν, ὁπηλίκον ἂν ἁμάρτῃς, οὐδὲν πείσῃ ἐξ ἐμοῦ ἄχαρι.—In the oration of Demosthenes against Dionysodoras (p. 1285), Kleomenes appears as enriching himself by the monopoly of corn exported from Egypt: compare Pseudo-Aristot. Œconom. c. 33. Kleomenes was afterwards put to death by the first Ptolemy, who became king of Egypt (Pausanias, i. 6, 3).

[612] Plutarch, Alex. 74; Diodor. xvii. 114.

[613] Arrian, vii. 16, 9; vii. 17, 6. Plutarch, Alex. 73. Diodor. xvii. 112.

[614] Arrian, vii. 22, 1. Αὐτὸς δὲ ὡς ἐξελέγξας δὴ τῶν Χαλδαίων μαντείαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν πεπονθὼς εἴη ἐν Βαβυλῶνι ἄχαρι (ἀλλ᾽ ἔφθη γὰρ ἐλάσας ἔξω Βαβυλῶνος πρίν τι παθεῖν) ἀνέπλει αὖθις κατὰ τὰ ἕλη θαῤῥῶν, etc.

The uneasiness here caused by these prophecies and omens, in the mind of the most fearless man of his age, is worthy of notice as a psychological fact, and is perfectly attested by the authority of Aristobulus and Nearchus. It appears that Anaxarchus and other Grecian philosophers encouraged him by their reasonings to despise all prophecy, but especially that of the Chaldæan priests; who (they alleged) wished to keep Alexander out of Babylon in order that they might continue to possess the large revenues of the temple of Belus, which they had wrongfully appropriated; Alexander being disposed to rebuild that ruined temple, and to re-establish the suspended sacrifices to which its revenues had been originally devoted (Arrian, vii. 17; Diodor. xvii. 112). Not many days afterwards, Alexander greatly repented of having given way to these dangerous reasoners, who by their sophistical cavils set aside the power and the warnings of destiny (Diodor. xvii. 116).

[615] Arrian, vii. 24, 25. Diodorus states (xvii. 117) that Alexander, on this convivial night, swallowed the contents of a large goblet called the cup of Herakles, and felt very ill after it; a statement repeated by various other writers of antiquity, and which I see no reason for discrediting, though some modern critics treat it with contempt. The royal Ephemerides, or Court Journal, attested only the general fact of his long potations and the long sleep which followed them: see Athenæus, x. p. 434.

To drink to intoxication at a funeral, was required as a token of respectful sympathy towards the deceased—see the last words of the Indian Kalanus before he ascended the funeral pile—Plutarch, Alexander, 69.

[616] These last two facts are mentioned by Arrian (vii. 26, 5) and Diodorus (xvii. 117), and Justin (xii. 15): but they found no place in the Court Journal. Curtius (x. v. 4) gives them with some enlargement.

[617] The details, respecting the last illness of Alexander, are peculiarly authentic, being extracted both by Arrian and by Plutarch, from the Ephemerides Regiæ, or short Court Journal; which was habitually kept by his secretary Eumenes, and another Greek named Diodotus (Athenæ. x. p. 434): see Arrian, vii. 25, 26; Plutarch, Alex. 76.

It is surprising that throughout all the course of this malady no mention is made of any physician as having been consulted. No advice was asked; if we except the application to the temple of Serapis, during the last day of Alexander's life. A few months before, Alexander had hanged or crucified the physician who attended Hephæstion in his last illness. Hence it seems probable that he either despised or mistrusted medical advice, and would not permit any to be invoked. His views must have been much altered since his dangerous fever at Tarsus, and the successful treatment of it by the Akarnanian physician Philippus.

Though the fever (see some remarks from Littré attached to Didot's Fragm. Script. Alex. Magn. p. 124) which caused Alexander's death is here a plain fact satisfactorily made out, yet a different story was circulated some time afterwards, and gained partial credit (Plutarch De Invidiâ, p. 538), that he had been poisoned. The poison was said to have been provided by Aristotle,—sent over to Asia by Antipater through his son Kassander,—and administered by Iollas (another son of Antipater), Alexander's cupbearer (Arrian, vii. 27, 2; Curtius, x. 10, 17; Diodor. xvii. 118; Justin, xii. 13). It is quite natural that fever and intemperance (which latter moreover was frequent with Alexander) should not be regarded as causes sufficiently marked and impressive to explain a decease at once so unexpected and so momentous. There seems ground for supposing, however, that the report was intentionally fomented, if not originally broached, by the party-enemies of Antipater and Kassander—especially by the rancorous Olympias. The violent enmity afterwards displayed by Kassander against Olympias, and all the family of Alexander helped to encourage the report. In the life of Hyperides in Plutarch, (Vit. X. Oratt. p. 849) it is stated, that he proposed at Athens public honors to Iollas for having given the poison to Alexander. If there is any truth in this, it might be a stratagem for casting discredit on Antipater (father of Iollas), against whom the Athenians entered into the Lamian war, immediately after the death of Alexander.

[618] Plutarch, Phokion, 22; Demetrius Phaler. De Elocution. s. 300. Οὐ τέθνηκεν Ἀλέξανδρος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι—ὥζε γὰρ ἂν ἡ οἰκουμένη τοῦ νεκροῦ.

[619] Dionysius, despot of the Pontic Herakleia, fainted away with joy when he heard of Alexander's death, and erected a statue of Εὐθυμία or Comfort (Memn. Heracl. Fragm. ap. Photium, Cod. 224. c. 4).

[620] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 524. c. 43. Τοιγάρτοι τί τῶν ἀνελπίστων καὶ ἀπροσδοκήτων ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν οὐ γέγονεν! οὐ γὰρ βίον γ᾽ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπινον βεβιώκαμεν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς παραδοξολογίαν τοῖς ἐσομένοις μεθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἔφυμεν. Οὐχ ὁ μὲν τῶν Περσῶν βασιλεὺς, ὁ τὸν Ἄθων διορύξας καὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ζεύξας, ὁ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ τοὺς Ἕλληνας αἰτῶν, ὁ τολμῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς γράφειν ὅτι δεσπότης ἐστὶν ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀφ᾽ ἡλίου ἀνιόντος μέχρι δυομένου, νῦν οὐ περὶ τοῦ κύριος ἑτέρων εἶναι διαγωνίζεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη περὶ τῆς τοῦ σώματος σωτηρίας;

Compare the striking fragment, of a like tenor, out of the lost work of the Phalerean Demetrius—Περὶ τῆς τύχης—Fragment. Histor. Græcor. vol. ii. p. 368.

[621] Herodot. vii. 56.

[622] Cicero, Philippic. v. 17, 48.

[623] See Histoire de Timour-Bec, par Cherefeddin Ali, translated by Petit de la Croix, vol. i. p. 203.

[624] This is the remark of his great admirer Arrian, vii. 1, 6.

[625] Livy, ix. 17-19. A discussion of Alexander's chances against the Romans—extremely interesting and beautiful, though the case appears to me very partially set forth. I agree with Niebuhr in dissenting from Livy's result; and with Plutarch in considering it as one of the boons of fortune to the Romans, that Alexander did not live long enough to attack them (Plutarch de Fortunâ Romanor. p. 326).

Livy however had great reason for complaining of those Greek authors (he calls them "levissimi ex Græcis") who said that the Romans would have quailed before the terrible reputation of Alexander, and submitted without resistance. Assuredly his victory over them would have been dearly bought.

[626] Alexander of Epirus is said to have remarked, that he, in his expeditions into Italy, had fallen upon the ἀνδρωνῖτις or chamber of the men; while his nephew (Alexander the Great), in invading Asia, had fallen upon the γυναικωνῖτις or chamber of the women (Aulus Gellius, xvii. 21; Curtius, viii. 1, 37).

[627] Arrian, vii. 28, 5.

[628] Diodor. xviii. 4.

[629] Arrian, iv. 15, 11.

[630] Arrian, vii. 19, 12. Τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ἄπληστος ἦν τοῦ κτᾶσθαί τι ἀεὶ Ἀλέξανδρος. Compare vii. 1, 3-7; vii. 15, 6, and the speech made by Alexander to his soldiers on the banks of the Hyphasis, when he was trying to persuade them to march forward, v. 26 *seq.* We must remember that Arrian had before him the work of Ptolemy, who would give, in all probability, the substance of this memorable speech from his own hearing.

[631] Arrian, vii. 1, 8. σὺ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὢν, παραπλήσιος τοῖς ἄλλοις, πλήν γε δὴ, ὅτι πολυπράγμων καὶ ἀτάσθαλος, ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας τοσαύτην γῆν ἐπεξέρχῃ, πράγματα ἔχων τε καὶ παρέχων ἄλλοις.

[632] Arrian, vii. 4, 4, 5.

[633] Herodot. iii. 15. Alexander offered to Phokion (Plutarch, Phok. 18) his choice between four Asiatic cities, of which (that is, of any one of them) he was to enjoy the revenues; just as Artaxerxes Longimanus had acted towards Themistokles, in recompense for his treason. Phokion refused the offer.

[634] See the punishment of Sisamnes by Kambyses (Herodot. v. 25).

[635] The rhetor Aristeides, in his Encomium on Rome, has some good remarks on the character and ascendancy of Alexander, exercised by will and personal authority, as contrasted with the systematic and legal working of the Roman empire (Orat. xiv. p. 332-360, vol. i. ed. Dindorf).

[636] Xenoph. Cyropæd. viii. 6, 21; Anabas. i. 7, 6; Herodot. vii. 8, 13: compare Arrian, v. 26, 4-10.

[637] Diodor. xviii. 4. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πόλεων συνοικισμοὺς καὶ σωμάτων μεταγωγὰς ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην, καὶ κατὰ τοὐναντίον ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν, ὅπως τὰς μεγίστας ἠπείρους ταῖς ἐπιγαμίαις καὶ ταῖς οἰκειώσεσιν εἰς κοινὴν ὁμόνοιαν καὶ συγγενικὴν καταστήσῃ.

[638] See the effect produced upon the Ionians by the false statement of Histiæus (Herodot. vi. 3) with Wesseling's note—and the eagerness of the Pæonians to return (Herod. v. 98; also Justin, viii. 5).

Antipater afterwards intended to transport the Ætolians in mass from their own country into Asia, if he had succeeded in conquering them (Diodor. xviii. 25). Compare Pausanias (i. 9, 8-10) about the forcible measures used by Lysimachus, in transporting new inhabitants, at Ephesus and Lysimacheia.

[639] Livy, ix. 18. "Referre in tanto rege piget superbam mutationem vistis, et desideratas humi jacentium adulationes, etiam victis Macedonibus graves, nedum victoribus: en fœda supplicia, et inter vinum et epulas cædes amicorum, et vanitatem ementiendæ stirpis. Quid si vini amor in dies fieret acrior? quid si trux et præfervida ira? (*nec quidquam dubium inter scriptores refero*) nullane hæc damna imperatoriis virtutibus ducimus?"

The appeal here made by Livy to the full attestation of these points in Alexander's character deserves notice. He had doubtless more authorities before him than we possess.

[640] Among other eulogists of Alexander, it is sufficient to name Droysen—in his two works, both of great historical research—Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen—and Geschichte des Hellenismus oder der Bildung des Hellenischen Staaten Systemes (Hamburg, 1843). See especially the last and most recent work, p. 27 *seqq.*, p. 651 *seqq.*—and elsewhere *passim*.

[641] Plutarch, Alex. 55-74.

[642] Plutarch, Fortun. Alex. M. p. 329. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ἔργον παρέσχεν· οὐ γὰρ, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης συνεβούλευεν αὐτῷ, τοῖς μὲν Ἕλλησιν ἡγεμονικῶς, τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις δεσποτικῶς χρώμενον … ἀλλὰ κοινὸς ἥκειν θεόθεν ἁρμοστὴς καὶ διαλλακτὴς τῶν ὅλων νομίζων, οὓς τῷ λόγῳ μὴ συνῆγε, τοῖς ὅπλοις βιαζόμενος, εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συνενεγκὼν τὰ παντάχοθεν, etc.

Strabo (or Eratosthenes, see Strabo, i. p. 66) and Plutarch understand the expression of Aristotle erroneously—as if that philosopher had meant to recommend harsh and cruel treatment of the non-Hellenes, and kind treatment only towards Greeks. That Aristotle could have meant no such thing, is evident from the whole tenor of his treatise on Politics. The distinction really intended is between a greater and a less measure of extra-popular authority—not between kind and unkind purposes in the exercise of authority. Compare Tacitus, Annal. xii. 11—the advice of the Emperor Claudius to the Parthian prince Meherdates.

[643] Aristot. Politic. i. 1, 5; vii. 6, 1. See the memorable comparison drawn by Aristotle (Polit. vii. 6) between the Europeans and Asiatics generally. He pronounces the former to be courageous and energetic, but wanting in intelligence or powers of political combination; the latter to be intelligent and clever in contrivance, but destitute of courage. Neither of them have more than a "one-legged aptitude" (φὐσιν μονόκωλον); the Greek alone possesses both the courage and intelligence united. The Asiatics are condemned to perpetual subjection; the Greeks might govern the world could they but combine in one political society.

[644] Plutarch, Fortun. Alex. M. p. 328. The stay of Alexander in these countries was however so short, that even with the best will he could not have enforced the suppression of any inveterate customs.

[645] Plutarch, Fortun. Al. M. p. 328. Plutarch mentions, a few lines afterwards, Seleukeia in Mesopotamia, as if he thought that it was among the cities established by Alexander himself. This shows that he has not been exact in distinguishing foundations made by Alexander, from those originated by Seleukus and the other Diadochi.

The elaborate article of Droysen (in the Appendix to his Geschichte des Hellenismus, p. 588-651), ascribes to Alexander the largest plans of colonization in Asia, and enumerates a great number of cities alleged to have been founded by him. But in regard to the majority of these foundations, the evidence upon which Droysen grounds his belief that Alexander was the founder, appears to me altogether slender and unsatisfactory. If Alexander founded so many cities as Droysen imagines, how does it happen that Arrian mentions only so comparatively small a number? The argument derived from Arrian's silence, for rejecting what is affirmed by other ancients respecting Alexander, is indeed employed by modern authors (and by Droysen himself among them), far oftener than I think warrantable. But if there be any one proceeding of Alexander more than another, in respect of which the silence of Arrian ought to make us suspicious—it is the foundation of a new colony; a solemn act, requiring delay and multiplied regulations, intended for perpetuity, and redounding to the honor of the founder. I do not believe in any colonies founded by Alexander, beyond those comparatively few which Arrian mentions, except such as rest upon some other express and good testimony. Whoever will read through Droysen's list, will see that most of the names in it will not stand this test. The short life, and rapid movements, of Alexander, are of themselves the strongest presumption against his having founded so large a number of colonies.

[646] Diodor. xvii. 99; xviii. 7. Curtius, ix. 7, 1. Curtius observes (vii. 10, 15) respecting Alexander's colonies in Sogdiana—that they were founded "velut frœni domitarum gentium; nunc originis suæ oblita serviunt, quibus imperaverunt."

[647] See the plain-spoken outburst of the Thurian Antileon, one of the soldiers in Xenophon's Ten Thousand Greeks, when the army reached Trapezus (Xenoph. Anabas. v. 1, 2).

[648] Appian, Syriac. 32.

[649] This is the sense in which I have always used the word Hellenism, throughout the present Work.

With Droysen, the word *Hellenismus—Das Hellenistische Staatensystem*—is applied to the state of things which followed upon Alexander's death; to the aggregate of kingdoms into which Alexander's conquests become distributed, having for their point of similarity the common use of Greek speech, a certain proportion of Greeks both as inhabitants and as officers, and a partial streak of Hellenic culture.

I cannot but think that such an employment of the word is misleading. At any rate, its sense must be constantly kept in mind, in order that it may not be confounded with *hellenism* in the stricter meaning.

[650] Strabo, xvii. p. 797, ὁ γοῦν Πολύβιος, γεγονὼς ἐν τῇ πόλει (Alexandria), βδελύττεται τὴν ταύτῃ κατάστασιν, etc.

The Museum of Alexandria (with its library) must be carefully distinguished from the city and the people. It was an artificial institution, which took its rise altogether from the personal taste and munificence of the earlier Ptolemies, especially the second. It was one of the noblest and most useful institutions recorded in history, and forms the most honorable monument of what Droysen calls the *hellenistic* period, between the death of Alexander and the extension of the Roman empire into Asia. But this Museum, though situated at Alexandria, had no peculiar connection with the city or its population; it was a College of literary Fellows (if we may employ a modern word) congregated out of various Grecian towns. Eratosthenes, Kallimuchus, Aristophanes, Aristarchus, were not natives of Alexandria.

[651] Diodor. xviii. 4. Pausanias (ii. 1. 5) observes that Alexander wished to cut through Mount Mimas (in Asia. Minor), but that this was the only one, among all his undertakings, which did not succeed. "So difficult is it (he goes on) to put force upon the divine arrangements", τὰ θεῖα βιάσασθαι. He wished to cut through the isthmus between Teos and Klazomenæ, so as to avoid the navigation round the cliffs of Mimas (σκόπελον νιφόεντα Μίμαντος—Aristophan. Nub. 274) between Chios and Erythræ. Probably this was among the projects suggested to Alexander, in the last year of his life. We have no other information about it.

[652] Arrian, v. 26, 2.

[653] Herodot. iv. 44: compare iii. 102. That Arrian had not present to his memory this narrative of Herodotus, is plain from the last chapter of his Indica; though in his history of Alexander he alludes several times to Herodotus. Some authors have concluded from Arrian's silence that he disbelieved the fact: if he had disbelieved it, I think that he would have mentioned the statement of Herodotus nevertheless, with an intimation that he did not think it worthy of credit. Moreover, Arrian's disbelief (even granting that such was the state of his mind) is not to be held as a conclusive disproof of the story. I confess that I see no sufficient reason for discrediting the narrative of Herodotus—though some eminent modern writers are of an opposite opinion.

[654] Pliny, H. N. viii. 17; Athenæus, ix. p. 398. See Schneider's Preface to his edition of Aristotle's Historiæ De Animalibus, p. xxxix. *seq.*

[655] Plutarch, Alexand. 8.

[656] Aristot. Physic. iv. 3. p. 210 a. 21. ἔτι ὡς ἐν βασιλεῖ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ κινητικῷ.

[657] Demosthen. Olynthiac. iii. p. 36.

[658] Arrian, ii. 1.

[659] Æschines cont. Ktesiph. p. 552.

[660] Vita Demosthenis ap. Westermann, Scriptt. Biograph. p. 301. φρουρὰν καταστήσαντος Ἀλέξανδρου ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις μετὰ τὸ κατασκάψαι τοὺς Θηβαίους, etc.

[661] Pausanias, i. 25, 4.

[662] "Since Macedonian dominion became paramount (observes Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 331), Æschines and men of his stamp are in full ascendency and affluence—I am impotent: there is no place at Athens for free citizens and counsellors, but only for men who do what they are ordered, and flatter the ruling potentate."

[663] Arrian, i. 29, 8.

[664] Plutarch, Phokion, 30.

[665] See the remarkable decree in honor of Lykurgus, passed by the Athenian people seventeen or eighteen years after his death, in the archonship of Anaxikrates, B. C. 307 (Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 852). The reciting portion of this decree, constituting four-fifths of the whole, goes over the public conduct of Lykurgus, and is very valuable.

It seems that the twelve years of financial administration exercised by Lykurgus, are to be taken probably, either from 342-330 B. C.—or four years later, from 338-326 B. C. Boeckh leaves the point undetermined between the two. Droysen and Meier prefer the earlier period—O. Müller the later. (Boeckh, Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen, also the second edition of his Staatshaushaltung der Athener, vol. ii. p. 114-118).

The total of public money, recorded by the Inscription as having passed through the hands of Lykurgus in the twelve years, was 18,900 talents = £4,340,000, or thereabouts. He is said to have held, besides, in deposit, a great deal of money entrusted to him by private individuals. His official duties as treasurer were discharged, for the first four years, in his own name: during the last eight years, in the names of two different friends.

[666] Plutarch, Phokion, 28.

[667] Æschines (adv. Ktesiph. p. 635) mentions this mission of Ktesiphon to Kleopatra. He also (in the same oration, p. 550) charges Demosthenes with having sent letters to Alexander, soliciting pardon and favor. He states that a young man named Aristion, a friend of Demosthenes, was much about the person of Alexander, and that through him the letters were sent. He cites as his authority the seamen of the public Athenian vessel called *Paralus*, and the Athenian envoys who went to Alexander in Phenicia in the spring or summer of 331 B. C. (compare Arrian, iii. 6, 3). Hyperides also seems to have advanced the like allegation against Demosthenes—see Harpokration, v. Ἀριστίων.

The fragments of the oration of Hyperides in defence of Euxenippus (recently published by Mr. Churchill Babington), delivered at some period during the reign of Alexander, give general evidence of the wide-spread feeling of jealous aversion to the existing Macedonian ascendancy. Euxenippus had been accused of devotion to Macedonia; Hyperides strenuously denies it, saying that Euxenippus had never been in Macedonia, nor ever conversed with any Macedonian who came to Athens. Even boys at school (says Hyperides) know the names of the corrupt orators, or servile flatterers, who serve Macedonia—Euxenippus is not among them (p 11, 12).

[668] Plutarch, Camill. 19; Diodor. xvi. 88; Plutarch, Agis, 3.

[669] Arrian, i. 16, 11: compare Pausan. vii. 10, 1.

[670] Arrian, ii. 13, 4.

[671] Arrian, iii. 6, 4; Diodor. xvii. 48; Curtius, iv. 1, 39. It is to this war in Krete, between Agis and the Macedonian party and troops, that Aristotle probably alludes (in the few words contained, Politica, ii. 7, 8), as having exposed the weakness of the Kretan institutions—see Schneider's note on the passage. At least we do not know of any other event, suitable to the words.

[672] Alexander, as soon as he got possession of the Persian treasures at Susa (about December 331 B. C.), sent a large remittance of 3000 talents to Antipater, as means for carrying on the war against the Lacedæmonians (Arrian, iii. 16. 17). The manifestations of Agis in Peloponnesus had begun in the spring of 331 B. C. (Arrian, iii. 6, 4); but his aggressive movements in Peloponnesus did not assume formidable proportions until the spring of 330 B. C. At the date of the speech of Æschines against Ktesiphon (August 330 B. C.), the decisive battle by which Antipater crushed the forces of Agis had only recently occurred; for the Lacedæmonian prisoners were only *about to be sent* to Alexander to learn their fate (Æsch. adv. Kt. p. 524). Curtius (vii. 1, 21) is certainly mistaken in saying that the contest was terminated before the battle of Arbela. Moreover, there were Lacedæmonian envoys, present with Darius until a few days before his death (July 330 B. C.), who afterwards fell into the hands of Alexander (Arrian iii. 24, 7); these men could hardly have known of the prostration of their country at home. I suppose the victory of Antipater to have taken place about June 330 B. C.—and the Peloponnesian armament of Agis to have been got together about three months before (March 330 B. C.).

Mr. Clinton (Fast. H. App. c. 4. p. 234) discusses the chronology of this event, but in a manner which I cannot think satisfactory. He seems inclined to put it some months earlier. I see no necessity for construing the dictum ascribed to Alexander (Plutarch, Agesilaus, 15) as proving close coincidence of time between the battle of Arbela and the final defeat of Agis.

[673] Alexander in Media, when informed of the whole affair after the death of Agis, spoke of it with contempt as a battle of frogs and mice, if we are to believe the dictum of Plutarch, Agesilaus, 15.

[674] Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. p. 553. ὁ δ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρος ἔξω τῆς ἄρκτου καὶ τῆς οἰκουμένης ὀλίγου δεῖν πάσης μεθειστήκει, etc.

[675] Diodor. xvii. 62; Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. s. 35.

[676] Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. p. 818.

[677] This is what we make out, as to the conduct of Demosthenes, from Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 553.

It is however difficult to believe, what Æschines insinuates, that Demosthenes boasted of having himself got up the Lacedæmonian movement—and yet that he made no proposition or suggestion for countenancing it. Demosthenes can hardly have lent any positive aid to the proceeding, though of course his anti-Macedonian feelings would be counted upon, in case things took a favorable turn.

Deinarchus (*ut suprà*) also accuses Demosthenes of having remained inactive at this critical moment.

[678] Curtius, vi. 1, 15-20; Diodor. xvii. 63-73. After the defeat, a suspensive decree was passed by the Spartans, releasing from ἀτιμία those who had escaped from the battle—as had been done after Leuktra (Diodor. xix. 70).

[679] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 524.

[680] Curtius, vii. 4, 32.

[681] Among the various documents, real or pretended, inserted in the oration of Demosthenes De Coronâ, there appears one (p. 266) purporting to be the very decree moved by Ktesiphon; and another (p. 243) purporting to be the accusation preferred by Æschines. I have already stated that I agree with Droysen in mistrusting all the documents annexed to this oration; all of them bear the name of wrong archons, most of them names of unknown archons; some of them do not fit the place in which they appear. See my preceding Vol. XI. Ch. lxxxix. p. 424; Ch. xc. p. 456-486.

We know from the statement of Æschines himself that the motion of Ktesiphon was made after the appointment of Demosthenes to be one of the inspectors of the fortifications of the city; and that this appointment took place in the last month of the archon Chærondas (June 337 B. C.—see Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 421-426). We also know that the accusation of Æschines against Ktesiphon was preferred before the assassination of Philip, which took place in August 336 B. C. (Æschin. ib. p. 612, 613). It thus appears that the motion of Ktesiphon (with the probouleuma which followed upon it) must have occurred some time during the autumn or winter of 337-336 B. C.—that the accusation of Æschines must have been handed in shortly after it—and that this accusation cannot have been handed in at the date borne by the pseudo-document, p. 243—the month Elaphebolion of the archon Chærondas, which would be anterior to the appointment of Demosthenes. Moreover, whoever compares the so-called motion of Ktesiphon, as it stands inserted Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 266, with the words in which Æschines himself (Adv. Ktesiph. p. 631. ὅθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ψηφίσματος ἐποιήσω, see also p. 439) describes the exordium of that motion, will see that it cannot be genuine.

[682] Demosthenes De Coronâ, p. 253, 302, 303, 310. He says (p. 267-313) that he had been crowned *often* (πολλάκις) by the Athenians and other Greek cities. The crown which he received on the motion of Aristonikus (after the successes against Philip at Byzantium and the Chersonesus, etc. in 340 B. C.) was the *second* crown (p. 253)—Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 848.

[683] Demosthenes De Coronâ, p. 294.

[684] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 645. διαβέβληται δ᾽ ἡμῶν ἡ πόλις ἐκ τῶν Δημοσθένους πολιτευμάτων περὶ τοὺς νῦν καιρούς· δόξετε δ᾽ ἐὰν μὲν τοῦτον στεφανώσητε, ὁμογνώμονες εἶναι τοῖς παραβαίνουσι τὴν κοινὴν εἰρήνην· ἐὰν δὲ τοὐναντίον τούτου πράξητε, ἀπολύσετε τὸν δῆμον τῶν αἰτιῶν.—Compare with this, the last sentence of the oration of Demosthenes in reply, where he puts up a prayer to the gods—ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς λοιποῖς τὴν ταχίστην ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν ἐπηρτημένων φόβων δότε καὶ σωτηρίαν ἀσφαλῆ.

The mention by Æschines (immediately before) of the Pythian games, as about to be celebrated in a few days, marks the date of this judicial trial—August, 330 B. C.

[685] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 443.

[686] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. pp. 449, 456, 467, 551.

[687] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. pp. 526, 538, 541.

[688] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 551-553.

[689] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 311-316.

[690] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 227. μέλλων τοῦ τε ἰδίου βίου παντός, ὡς ἔοικε, λόγον διδόναι τήμερον καὶ τῶν κοινῇ πεπολιτευμένων, etc.

[691] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 297. ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἡμάρτετε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἁπάντων ἐλευθερίας καὶ σωτηρίας κίνδυνον ἀράμενοι—οὐ μὰ τοὺς Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων καὶ τοὺς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς παραταξαμένους καὶ τοὺς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχήσαντας, etc., the oath so often cited and admired.

[692] See the various lives of Æschines—in Westermann, Scriptores Biographici, pp. 268, 269.

[693] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 315. ἀλλὰ νυνὶ τήμερον ἐγὼ μὲν ὑπὲρ τοῦ στεφανωθῆναι δοκιμάζομαι, τὸ δὲ μήδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ἀδικεῖν ἀνωμολόγημαι—σοὶ δὲ συκοφάντῃ μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖν ὑπάρχει, κινδυνεύεις δὲ εἴτε δεῖ σε ἔτι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, εἴτ᾽ ἤδη πεπαῦσθαι μὴ μεταλαβόντα τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων, etc.

Yet Æschines had become opulent, according to Demosthenes, p. 329.

[694] Diodor. xvii. 108. He states the treasure brought out of Asia by Harpalus as 5000 talents.

[695] See the fragments of the letter or pamphlet of Theopompus addressed to Alexander, while Harpalus was still at Tarsus, and before his flight to Athens—Theopomp. Fragm. 277, 278, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 586-595. Theopompus speaks in the present tense—καὶ ὁρᾷ (Harpalus) ὑπὸ τοῦ λάου προσκυνουμένην (Glykera), etc. Kleitarchus stated these facts, as well as Theopompus (Athenæ. ibid.).

[696] Athenæus, xiii. p. 596—the extract from the satirical drama called Agên, represented before Alexander at Susa, in the Dionysiac festival or early months of 324 B. C.

[697] Plutarch, Phokion, 22; Pausanias, i. 37, 4; Dikæarchi Fragment. 72. ed. Didot.

Plutarch's narrative is misleading, inasmuch as it seems to imply that Harpalus gave this money to Charikles *after* his arrival at Athens. We know from Theopompus (Fr. 277) that the monument had been finished some time before Harpalus quitted Asia. Plutarch treats it as a mean structure, unworthy of the sum expended on it; but both Dikæarchus and Pausanias describe it as stately and magnificent.

[698] Curtius, x. 2, 1.

[699] Curtius, x. 2, 1. "Igitur triginta navibus Sunium transmittunt" (Harpalus and his company), "unde portum urbis petere decreverunt. His cognitis, rex Harpalo Atheniensibusque juxta infestus, classem parari jubet, Athenas protinus petiturus." Compare Justin, xiii. 5, 7—who mentions this hostile intention in Alexander's mind, but gives a different account of the cause of it.

The extract from the drama *Agên* (given in Athenæus, xiii. p. 596) represents the reports which excited this anger of Alexander. It was said that Athens had repudiated her slavery, with the abundance which she had before enjoyed under it,—to enter upon a struggle for freedom, with the certainty of present privations and future ruin:—

A. ὅτε μὲν ἔφασκον (the Athenians) δοῦλον ἐκτῆσθαι βίον,
ἱκανὸν ἐδείπνουν· νῦν δὲ, τὸν χέδροπα μόνον
καὶ τὸν μάραθον ἔσθουσι, πυροὺς δ᾽ οὐ μάλα.

B. καὶ μὴν ἀκούω μυριάδας τὸν Ἅρπαλον
αὐτοῖσι τῶν Ἀγῆνος οὐκ ἐλάττονας
σίτου παραπέμψαι, καὶ πολίτην γεγονέναι.

A. Γλυκέρας ὁ σῖτος οὗτος ἦν· ἔσται δ᾽ ἴσως
αὐτοῖσιν ὁλέθρου κοὐκ ἑταίρας ἀῤῥαβών.

I conceive this drama Agên to have been represented on the banks of the *Choaspes* (not the *Hydaspes*—see my note in the Chapter immediately preceding, p. 240), that is, at Susa, in the Dionysia of 324 B. C. It is interesting as a record of the feelings of the time.

[700] Nevertheless the impression, that Alexander was intending to besiege Athens, must have prevailed in the army for several months longer, during the autumn of 324 B. C. when he was at Ekbatana. Ephippus the historian, in recounting the flatteries addressed to Alexander at Ekbatana, mentions the rhodomontade of a soldier named Gorgus—Γόργος ὁ ὁπλοφύλαξ Ἀλέξανδρον Ἄμμωνος υἱὸν στεφανοῖ χρυσοῖς τρισχιλίοις, καὶ ὅταν Ἀθήνας πολιορκῇ, μυρίαις πανοπλίαις καὶ ταῖς ἴσαις καταπέλταις καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις βέλεσιν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἱκανοῖς (Ephippus ap. Athenæum, xii. p. 538. Fragment. 3. ed. Didot).

[701] Deinarchus adv. Philokl. s. 1. φάσκων κωλύσειν Ἅρπαλον εἰς τὸν Πειραῖα καταπλεῦσαι, στατηγὸς ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τὰ νεώρια καὶ τὴν Μουνυχίαν κεχειροτονημένος, etc. Deinarchus adv. Aristogeiton, s. 4. ὃς παρ᾽ Ἁρπάλου λαβεῖν χρήματα ἐτόλμησεν, ὃν ᾔσθεθ᾽ ἥκειν καταληψόμενον τὴν πόλιν ὑμῶν, etc.

[702] See the new and interesting, though unfortunately scanty, fragments of the oration of Hyperides against Demosthenes, published and elucidated by Mr. Churchill Babington from a recently discovered Egyptian papyrus (Cambridge, 1850). From Fragm. 14 (p. 38 of Mr. Babington's edition) we may see that the promises mentioned in the text were actually held out by Harpalus—indeed we might almost have presumed it without positive evidence. Hyperides addresses Demosthenes—ταύτας ὑπ…ις τῷ ψηφίσματι, συλλαβὼν τὸν Ἅρπαλον· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἅπαντας πρεσβεύεσθαι πεποίηκας ὡς Ἀλέξανδρον, οὐκ ἔχοντας ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν ἀποστροφήν· τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους, οἳ αὐτοὶ ἂν ἦκον φέροντες εἰς ταὐτὸ τὴν δύναμιν, ἔχοντες τὰ χρήματα καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ὅσους ἕκαστος αὐτῶν εἶχε, τούτους σύμπαντας οὐ μόνον κεκώλυκας ἀποστῆναι ἐκείνου τῇ συλλήψει τοῦ Ἁρπάλου, ἀλλὰ καὶ….

From the language thus used by Hyperides in his accusation, we are made to perceive what prospects he (and of course Harpalus, upon whose authority he must have spoken) had held out to the people when the case was first under discussion.

The fragment here cited is complete as to the main sense, not requiring very great help from conjecture. In some of the other fragments, the conjectural restorations of Mr. Babington, though highly probable and judicious, form too large a proportion of the whole to admit of our citing them with confidence as testimony.

[703] Pollux, x. 159.

[704] Plutarch, De Vitioso Pudore, p. 531. τῶν γὰρ Ἀθηναίων ὡρμημένων Ἁρπάλῳ βοηθεῖν, καὶ κορυσσόντων ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον, ἐξαίφνης ἐπεφάνη Φιλόξενος, ὁ τῶν ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ πραγμάτων Ἀλεξάνδρου στρατηγός· ἐκπλαγέντος δὲ τοῦ δήμου, καὶ σιωπῶντος διὰ τὸν φόβον, ὁ Δημοσθένης—Τί ποιήσουσιν, ἔφη, πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον ἰδόντες, οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι πρὸς τὸν λύχνον ἀντιβλέπειν;

[705] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 21; Plutarch, Demosthen. 25.

[706] Diodor. xvii. 108.

[707] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 69. ἐὰν τοὺς παῖδας καταπέμψῃ (Alexander) πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς νῦν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνακεκομισμένους, καὶ τούτων ἀξιοῖ τὴν ἀληθείαν πυθέσθαι, etc.

[708] See the fragment cited in a preceding note from the oration of Hyperides against Demosthenes. That it was *Demosthenes* who moved the decree for depositing the money in the acropolis, we learn also from one of his other accusers—the citizen who delivered the speech composed by Deinarchus (adv. Demosthen. sect. 68, 71, 89)—ἔγραψεν αὐτὸς, ἐν τῷ δήμῳ Δημοσθένης, ὡς δηλονότι δικαίου τοῦ πράγματος ὄντος, φυλάττειν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τὰ εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἀφικόμενα μετὰ Ἁρπάλου χρήματα.

Deinarchus (adv. Demosth. s. 97-106) accuses Demosthenes of base flattery to Alexander. Hyperides also makes the same charge—see the Fragments in Mr. Babington's edition, sect. 2. Fr. 11. p. 12; sect. 3. Fr. 5. p. 34.

[709] Pausan. ii. 33, 4; Diodor. xvii. 108.

[710] This material fact, of the question publicly put to Harpalus in the assembly by some one at the request of Demosthenes, appears in the Fragments of Hyperides, p. 5, 7, 9, ed. Babington—καθήμενος κάτω ὑπὸ τῇ κατατομῇ, ἐκέλευσε … τὸν χορευτὴν ἐρωτῆσαι τὸν Ἅρπαλον ὁπόσα εἴη τὰ χρήματα τὰ ἀνοισθησόμενα εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν· ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι ἑπτακόσια, etc.

The term κατατομὴ (see Mr. Babington's note) "designates a broad passage occurring at intervals between the concentrically arranged benches of seats in a theatre, and running parallel with them."

[711] Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 846. In the life of Demosthenes given by Photius (Cod. 265, p. 494) it is stated that only 308 talents were found.

[712] That this motion was made by Demosthenes himself, is a point strongly pressed by his accuser Deinarchus—adv. Demosth. s. 5. 62, 84, etc.: compare also the Fragm. of Hyperides, p. 59, ed. Babington.

Deinarchus, in his loose rhetoric, tries to put the case as if Demosthenes had proposed to recognize the sentence of the Areopagus as final and peremptory, and stood therefore condemned upon the authority invoked by himself. But this is refuted sufficiently by the mere fact that the trial was instituted afterwards; besides that, it is repugnant to the judicial practice of Athens.

[713] Plutarch, Demosth. 26. We learn from Deinarchus (adv. Demosth. s. 46) that the report of the Areopagites was not delivered until after an interval of six months. About their delay and the impatience of Demosthenes see Fragm. Hyperides, pp. 12-33, ed. Babington.

[714] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 92. See the Fragm. of Hyperides in Mr. Babington, p. 18.

[715] Deinarchus adv. Aristogeiton, s. 6. Stratokles was one of the accusers.

[716] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 108, 109.

[717] Plutarch, Demosth. 26.

[718] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 104.

[719] See the two orations composed by Deinarchus, against Philokles and Aristogeiton.

In the second and third Epistles ascribed to Demosthenes (p. 1470, 1483, 1485), he is made to state, that he alone had been condemned by the Dykastery, because his trial had come on first—that Aristogeiton and all the others tried were acquitted, though the charge against all was the same, and the evidence against all was the same also—viz. nothing more than the simple report of the Areopagus. As I agree with those who hold these epistles to be probably spurious, I cannot believe, on such authority alone, that all the other persons tried were acquitted—a fact highly improbable in itself.

[720] Plutarch, Demosth. 25: compare also Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 846; and Photius, Life of Demosth. Cod. 265, p. 494.

[721] See the fragment of Hyperides in Mr. Babington's edition, pp. 37, 38 (a fragment already cited in a preceding note), insisting upon the prodigious mischief which Demosthenes had done by his decree for arresting (σύλληψις) Harpalus.

[722] In the Life of Demosthenes apud Photium (Cod. 265), the service alleged to have been rendered by him to Harpalus, and for which he was charged with having received 1000 Darics, is put as I have stated it in the text—Demosthenes first spoke publicly against receiving Harpalus, but presently Δαρεικοὺς χιλίους (ὥς φασι) λαβὼν πρὸς τοὺς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ λέγοντας μετετάξατο (then follow the particular acts whereby this alleged change of sentiment was manifested, which particular acts are described as follows)—καὶ βουλομένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων Ἀντιπάτρῳ προδοῦναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀντεῖπεν, τά τε Ἁρπάλεια χρήματα εἰς ἀκρόπολιν ἔγραψεν ἀποθέσθαι, μηδὲ τῷ δήμῳ τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν ἀποσημηνάμενος.

That Demosthenes should first oppose the reception of Harpalus—and then afterwards oppose the surrender of Harpalus to Antipater's requisition—is here represented as a change of politics requiring the hypothesis of a bribe to explain it. But it is in reality no change at all. The two proceedings are perfectly consistent with each other, and both of them defensible.

[723] Fragm. Hyperides, p. 7, ed. Babington—ἐν τῷ δήμῳ ἑπτακόσια φήσας εἶναι τάλαντα, νῦν τὰ ἡμίση ἀναφέρεις;

In p. 26 of the same Fragments, we find Hyperides reproaching Demosthenes for not having kept effective custody over the person of Harpalus; for not having proposed any decree providing a special custody; for not having made known beforehand, or prosecuted afterwards, the negligence of the ordinary jailers. This is to make Demosthenes responsible for the performance of *all* the administrative duties of the city; for the good conduct of the treasurers and the jailers.

We must recollect that Hyperides had been the loudest advocate of Harpalus, and had done all he could to induce the Athenians to adopt the cause of that exile against Alexander. One of the charges (already cited from

his speech) against Demosthenes, is, that Demosthenes prevented this from being accomplished. Yet here is another charge from the same speaker, to the effect that Demosthenes did not keep Harpalus under effective custody for the sword of the Macedonian executioner!

The line of accusation taken by Hyperides is full of shameful inconsistencies.

[724] In the Life of Demosthenes (Plutarch, Vit. X Oratt. p. 846), the charge of corruption against him is made to rest chiefly on the fact, that he did not make this communication to the people—καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μήτε τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνακομισθέντων μεμηνυκὼς μήτε τῶν φυλασσόντων ἀμελείαν, etc. The biography apud Photium seems to state it as if Demosthenes did not communicate the amount, *at the time* when he proposed the decree of sequestration. This last statement we are enabled to contradict, from the testimony of Hyperides.

[725] Hyperid. Fragm. p. 18, ed. Babington. τὰς γὰρ ἀποφάσεις πάσας τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν χρημάτων Ἁρπάλου, πάσας ὁμοίως ἡ βουλὴ πεποίηται, καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς κατὰ πάντων· καὶ οὐδεμιᾷ προσγέγραφε, δι᾽ ὅτι ἕκαστον ἀποφαίνει· ἀλλ᾽ ἐπικεφάλαιον γράψασα, ὁπόσον ἕκαστος εἴληφε χρυσίον, τοῦτ᾽ οὖν ὀφειλέτω….

[726] Hyperid. Frag. p. 20, ed. Babingt. ἐγὼ δ᾽ ὅτι μὲν ἔλαβες τὸ χρυσίον, ἱκανὸν οἶμαι εἶναι σημεῖον τοῖς δικασταῖς, τὸ τὴν βουλὴν σοῦ καταγνῶναι (see Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 46, and the beginning of the second Demosthenic epistle).

Hyperid. p. 16, ed Babingt. Καὶ συκοφαντεῖς τὴν βουλὴν, προκλήσεις προτιθεὶς, καὶ ἐρωτῶν ἐν ταῖς προκλήσεσιν, πόθεν ἔλαβες τὸ χρυσίον, καὶ τίς ἦν σοὶ ὁ δοὺς, καὶ πῶς; τελευταῖον δ᾽ ἴσως ἐρωτήσεις, καὶ εἰ ἐχρήσω τῷ χρυσίῳ, ὥσπερ τραπεζιτικὸν λόγον παρὰ τῆς βουλῆς ἀπαιτῶν.

This monstrous sentence creates a strong presumption in favor of the defendant,—and a still stronger presumption against the accuser. Compare Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 6, 7.

The biographer apud Photium states that Hyperides and four other orators procured (κατεσκεύασαν) the condemnation of Demosthenes by the Areopagus.

[727] The biographer of Hyperides (Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 48) tells us that he was the only orator who kept himself unbribed; the comic writer Timokles names Hyperides along with Demosthenes and others as recipients (ap. Athenæ. viii. p. 342).

[728] See this point urged by Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 69, 70.

[729] We read in Pausanias (ii. 33, 4) that the Macedonian admiral Philoxenus, having afterwards seized one of the slaves of Harpalus, learnt from him the names of those Athenians whom his master had corrupted; and that Demosthenes was *not* among them. As far as this statement goes, it serves to exculpate Demosthenes. Yet I cannot assign so much importance to it as Bishop Thirlwall seems to do. His narrative of the Harpalian transactions is able and discriminating (Hist. vol. vii. ch. 56. p. 170 *seqq.*).

[730] Diodor. xix. 8.

[731] See the Fragments of Hyperides, p. 36, ed. Babington.

[732] Curtius, x. 2, 6.

[733] Curtius, x. 2, 6. The statement of Diodorus (xviii. 8)—that the rescript was popular and acceptable to all Greeks, except the Athenians and Ætolians—cannot be credited. It was popular, doubtless, with the exiles themselves, and their immediate friends.

[734] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 81; compare Hyperid. Fragm. p. 36, ed. Babington.

[735] Diodor. xvii. 113.

[736] Diodor. xvii. 111: compare xviii. 21. Pausanias (i. 25, 5; viii. 52, 2) affirms that Leosthenes brought over 50,000 of these mercenaries from Asia into Peloponnesus, during the lifetime of Alexander, and against Alexander's will. The number here given seems incredible; but it is probable enough that he induced some to come across.—Justin (xiii. 5) mentions that armed resistance was prepared by the Athenians and Ætolians against Alexander himself during the latter months of his life, in reference to the mandate enjoining recall of the exiles. He seems to overstate the magnitude of their doings, before the death of Alexander.

[737] A striking comparison made by the orator Demades (Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 181).

[738] See Frontinus, Stratagem, ii. 11, 4.

[739] Plutarch, Phokion, 23. In the Fragments of Dexippus, there appear short extracts of two speeches, seemingly composed by that author in his history of these transactions; one which he ascribes to Hyperides instigating the war, the other to Phokion, against it (Fragm. Hist. Græc. vol. iii. p. 668).

[740] Diodor. xviii. 10. Diodorus states that the Athenians sent the Harpalian treasures to the aid of Leosthenes. He seems to fancy that Harpalus had brought to Athens all the 5000 talents which he had carried away from Asia; but it is certain, that no more than 700 or 720 talents were declared by Harpalus in the Athenian assembly—and of these only half were really forthcoming. Moreover, Diodorus is not consistent with himself, when he says afterwards (xviii. 19) that Thimbron, who killed Harpalus in Krete, got possession of the Harpalian treasures and mercenaries, and carried them over to Kyrênê in Africa.

[741] It is to this season, apparently, that the anecdote (if true) must be referred—The Athenians were eager to invade Bœotia unseasonably; Phokion, as general of eighty years old, kept them back, by calling out the citizens of sixty years old and upwards for service, and offering to march himself at their head (Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præcept. p. 818).

[742] Diodor. xviii. 11; Pausanias, i. 25, 4.

[743] Plutarch, Demosth. 27.

[744] See the Fragments of Hyperides, p. 36, ed. Babington. καὶ περὶ τοῦ τοὺς κοινοὺς συλλόγους Ἀχαιῶν τε καὶ Ἀρκάδων … we do not know what was done to these district confederacies, but it seems that some considerable change was made in them, at the time when Alexander's decree for restoring the exiles was promulgated.

[745] Diodor. xviii. 13.

[746] Plutarch, Phokion, 23, 24.

[747] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 23; Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præcept. p. 803.

[748] Diodor. xviii. 12, 13.

[749] Diodor. xviii. 13-15.

[750] Plutarch, Phokion, 24.

[751] Diodor. xviii. 11; Plutarch, Phokion, 26.

[752] Plutarch, Phokion, 25; Diodor. xviii. 14, 15: compare Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 1.

[753] Diodor. xviii. 15.

[754] Diodor. xviii. 15.

[755] Diodor. xviii. 8.

[756] Diodor. xviii. 17.

[757] Plutarch, Alexand. 77.

[758] Arrian, De Rebus post Alexandrum, vi. ap. Photium, Cod. 92.

[759] Arrian, De Rebus post Alexand. *ut supra*; Diodor. xviii. 3, 4; Curtius, x. 10; Dexippus, Fragmenta ap. Photium, Cod. 82, ap. Fragm. Hist. Græc. vol. iii. p. 667, ed. Didot (De Rebus post Alexandrum).

[760] Arrian and Dexippus—De Reb. post Alex. *ut supra*: compare Diodor. xviii. 48.

[761] Diodor. xviii. 16.

[762] Diodor. xviii. 4.

[763] Plutarch, Eumenes, 3.

[764] Diodor. xviii. 17; Plutarch, Phokion, 26.

[765] Diodor. xviii. 17; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 26.

[766] Democharès, the nephew of Demosthenes, who had held a bold language and taken active part against Antipater throughout the Lamian war, is said to have delivered a public harangue recommending resistance even at this last moment. At least such was the story connected with his statue, erected a few years afterwards at Athens, representing him in the costume of an orator, but with a sword in hand—Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 847: compare Polybius, xii. 13.

[767] Plutarch, Phokion, 27; Diodor. xviii. 18.

[768] Plutarch, Phokion, 27. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι πρέσβεις ἠγάπησαν ὡς φιλανθρώπους τὰς διαλύσεις, πλὴν τοῦ Ξενοκράτους, etc. Pausanias even states (vii. 10, 1) that Antipater was disposed to grant more lenient terms, but was dissuaded from doing so by Demades.

[769] See Fragments of Hyperides adv. Demosth. p. 61-65, ed. Babington.

[770] Diodor. xviii. 18. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες πλείους τῶν μυρίων (instead of δισμυρίων, which seems a mistake) καὶ δισχιλίων μετεστάθησαν ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος· οἱ δὲ τὴν ὡρισμένην τίμησιν ἔχοντες περὶ ἐννακισχιλίους, ἀπεδείχθησαν κύριοι τῆς τε πόλεως καὶ τῆς χώρας, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς Σόλωνος νόμους ἐπολιτεύοντο. Plutarch states the disfranchised as above 12,000.

Plutarch, Phokion, 28, 29. Ὅμως δ᾽ οὖν ὁ Φωκίων καὶ φυγῆς ἀπήλλαξε πολλοὺς δεηθεὶς τοῦ Ἀντιπάτρου· καὶ φεύγουσι διεπράξατο, μὴ καθάπερ οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν μεθισταμένων ὑπὲρ τὰ Κεραύνια ὄρη καὶ τὸν Ταίναρον ἐκπεσεῖν τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ κατοικεῖν, ὧν ἦν καὶ Ἀγνωνίδης ὁ συκοφάντης.

Diodorus and Plutarch (c. 29) mention that Antipater assigned residences in Thrace for the expatriated. Those who went beyond the Keraunian mountains must have gone either to the Illyrian coast, Apollonia or Epidamnus—or to the Gulf of Tarentum. Those who went beyond Tænarus would probably be sent to Libya: see Thucydides, vii. 19, 10; vii. 50, 2.

[771] Plutarch, Phokion, 28. ἐκπεπολιορκημένοις ἐῴκεσαν: compare Solon, Fragment 28, ed. Gaisford.

[772] Plutarch, Phokion, 28.

[773] Plutarch, Demosth. 28. Ἀρχίας ὁ κληθεὶς Φυγαδοθήρας. Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 846.

[774] Polybius, ix. 29, 30. This is stated, as matter of traditional pride, by an Ætolian speaker more than a century afterwards. In the speech of his Akarnanian opponent, there is nothing to contradict it—while the fact is in itself highly probable.

See Westermann, Geschichte der Beredtsamkeit in Griechenland, ch. 71, note 4.

[775] Plutarch, Demosth. 28; Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 849; Photius, p. 496.

[776] Plutarch, Demosth. 30. τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων, ὅσοι γεγράφασί τι περὶ αὐτοῦ, παμπολλοὶ δ᾽ εἰσὶ, τὰς διαφορὰς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐπεξελθεῖν, etc.

The taunts on Archias's profession, as an actor, and as an indifferent actor, which Plutarch puts into the mouth of Demosthenes (c. 29), appear to me not worthy either of the man or of the occasion; nor are they sufficiently avouched to induce me to transcribe them. Whatever bitterness of spirit Demosthenes might choose to manifest, at such a moment, would surely be vented on the chief enemy, Antipater; not upon the mere instrument.

[777] Plutarch, Demosth. 30; Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 846; Photius, p. 494; Arrian, De Rebus post Alexand. vi. ap. Photium, Cod. 92.

[778] Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 324. οὗτοι—τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὸ μηδένα ἔχειν δεσπότην αὐτῶν, ἃ τοῖς προτέροις Ἕλλησιν ὅροι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἦσαν καὶ κανόνες, ἀνατετραφότες, etc.

[779] Diodor. xviii. 18; Diogen. Laert. x. 1, 1. I have endeavored to show, in the Tenth Volume of this History (Ch. lxxix. p. 297, note), that Diodorus is correct in giving forty-three years, as the duration of the Athenian Kleruchies in Samos; although both Wesseling and Mr. Clinton impugn his statement. The Athenian occupation of Samos *began* immediately after the conquest of the island by Timotheus, in 366-365 B. C.; but additional batches of colonists were sent thither in later years.

[780] Plutarch, Phokion, 29, 30.

[781] Diodor. xviii. 55, 56, 57, 68, 69. φανεροῦ δ᾽ ὄντος, ὅτι Κάσανδρος τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πόλεων ἀνθέξεται, διὰ τὸ τὰς μὲν αὐτῶν πατρικαῖς φρουραῖς φυλάττεσθαι, τὰς δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ὀλιγαρχιῶν διοικεῖσθαι, κυριευομένας ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀντιπάτρου φίλων καὶ ξένων.

That citizens were not only banished, but deported, by Antipater from various other cities besides Athens, we may see from the edict issued by Polysperchon shortly after the death of Antipater (Diod. xviii. 56)—καὶ τοὺς μεταστάντας ἢ φυγόντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων στρατηγῶν (*i. e.* Antipater and Kraterus), ἀφ᾽ ὧν χρόνων Ἀλέξανδρος εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν διέβη, κατάγομεν, etc.

[782] Diodor. xviii. 25. διεγνωκότες ὕστερον αὐτοὺς καταπολεμῆσαι, καὶ μεταστῆσαι πανοικίους ἅπαντας εἰς τὴν ἐρημίαν καὶ πορρώτατω τῆς Ἀσίας κειμένην χώραν.

[783] Diodor. xviii. 18-25.

[784] Diodor. xviii. 23; Arrian, De Rebus post Alex. vi. ap. Phot. Cod. 92. Diodorus alludes to the murder of Kynanê or Kynna, in another place (xix. 52).

Compare Polyænus, viii. 60—who mentions the murder of Kynanê by Alketas, but gives a somewhat different explanation of her purpose in passing into Asia.

About Kynanê, see Duris, Fragm. 24, in Fragment. Hist. Græc. vol. ii. p. 475; Athenæ. xiii. p. 560.

[785] The fine lines of Lucan (Phars. vii. 640) on the effects of the battle of Pharsalia, may be cited here:—

"Majus ab hac acie, quam quod sua sæcula ferrent,
Vulnus habent populi: plus est quam vita salusque
Quod perit: in totum mundi prosternimur ævum.
Vincitur his gladiis omnis, quæ serviet, ætas.
Proxima quid soboles, aut quid meruere nepotes,
In regnum nasci?" etc.

[786] Diodor. xviii. 38. Ἀντιπάτρου δ᾽ εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν διαβεβηκότος, Αἰτωλοὶ κατὰ τὰς πρὸς Περδίκκαν συνθήκας ἐστράτευσαν εἰς τὴν Θετταλίαν, etc.

[787] Plutarch, Eumenes, 7; Cornel. Nepos, Eumenes, c. 4. Eumenes had trained a body of Asiatic and Thracian cavalry to fight in close combat with the short pike and sword of the Macedonian Companions—relinquishing the javelin, the missiles, and the alternation of charging and retiring usual to Asiatics.

Diodorus (xviii. 30, 31, 32) gives an account at some length of this battle. He as well as Plutarch may probably have borrowed from Hieronymus of Kardia.

[788] Arrian ap. Photium, Cod. 92; Justin, xiii. 8; Diodor. xviii. 33.

[789] Diodor. xviii. 36.

[790] Plutarch, Eumenes, 8; Cornel. Nepos, Eumenes, 4; Diodor. xviii. 36, 37.

[791] Diodor. xviii. 39. Arrian, ap. Photium.

[792] Arrian, De Rebus post Alexandr. lib. ix. 10. ap. Photium, Cod. 92; Diodor. xviii. 39, 40, 46; Plutarch, Eumenes, 3, 4.

[793] Plutarch, Eumenes, 10, 11; Cornel. Nepos, Eumenes, c. 5; Diodor. xviii. 41.

[794] Plutarch, Phokion, 30; Diodor. xviii. 48; Plutarch, Demosth. 31; Arrian, De Reb. post Alex. vi. ap. Photium, Cod. 92.

In the life of Phokion, Plutarch has written inadvertently *Antigonus* instead of *Perdikkas*.

It is not easy to see, however, how Deinarchus can have been the accuser of Demades on such a matter—as Arrian and Plutarch state. Arrian seems to put the death of Demades too early, from his anxiety to bring it into

immediate juxtaposition with the death of Demosthenes, whose condemnation Demades had proposed in the Athenian assembly.

[795] Diod. xviii. 48.

[796] Diod. xix. 11.

[797] Plutarch, Phokion, 31. Diodorus (xviii. 64) says also that Nikanor was nominated by Kassander.

[798] Diodor. xviii. 54.

[799] Diodor. xviii. 49-58.

[800] Plutarch, Eumenes, 11, 12; Cornelius Nepos, Eumenes, c. 6; Diodor. xviii. 58-62.

Diodor. xviii, 58. ἦκε δὲ καὶ παρ᾽ Ὀλυμπιάδος αὐτῷ γράμματα, δεομένης καὶ λιπαρούσης βοηθεῖν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι καὶ ἑαυτῇ· μόνον γὰρ ἐκεῖνον πιστότατον ἀπολελεῖφθαι τῶν φίλων, καὶ δυνάμενον διορθώσασθαι τὴν ἐρημίαν τῆς βασιλικῆς οἰκίας.

Cornelius Nepos, Eumenes, 6. "Ad hunc (Eumenem) Olympias, quum literas et nuntios misisset in Asiam, consultum, utrum repetitum Macedoniam veniret (nam tum in Epiro habitabat) et eas res occuparet—huic ille primum suasit ne se moveret, et expectaret quoad Alexandri filius regnum adipisceretur. Sin aliquâ cupiditate raperetur in Macedoniam, omnium injuriarum oblivisceretur, et in neminem acerbiore uteretur imperio. Horum illa nihil fecit. Nam et in Macedoniam profecta est, et ibi crudelissime se gessit." Compare Justin, xiv. 6; Diodor. xix. 11.

The details respecting Eumenes may be considered probably as depending on unusually good authority. His friend Hieronymus of Kardia had written a copious history of his own time; which, though now lost, was accessible both to Diodorus and Plutarch. Hieronymus was serving with Eumenes, and was taken prisoner along with him by Antigonus; who spared him and treated him well, while Eumenes was put to death (Diodor. xix. 44). Plutarch had also read letters of Eumenes (Plut. Eum. 11).

[801] Diodor. xviii. 63-72; xix. 11, 17, 32, 44.

[802] Plutarch (Eumenes, 16-18), Cornelius Nepos (10-13), and Justin (xiv. 3, 4) describe in considerable detail the touching circumstances attending the tradition and capture of Eumenes. On this point Diodorus is more brief; but he recounts at much length the preceding military operations between Eumenes and Antigonus (xix. 17, 32, 44).

The original source of these particulars must probably be, the history of Hieronymus of Kardia, himself present, and copied, more or less accurately, by others.

[803] Plutarch, Eumenes, 13; Diodor. xviii. 58.

[804] Plutarch, Eumenes, 3.

[805] Diodor. xviii. 55. εὐθὺς οὖν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων παρόντας πρεσβευτὰς προσκαλεσάμενοι, etc.

[806] Diodor. xviii. 56. In this chapter the proclamation is given *verbatim*. For the exceptions made in respect to Amphissa, Trikka, Herakleia, etc., we do not know the grounds.

Reference is made to prior edicts of the kings—ὑμεῖς οὖν, καθάπερ ὑμῖν καὶ πρότερον ἐγράψαμεν, ἀκούετε τούτου (Πολυσπέρχοντος). These words must allude to written answers given to particular cities, in reply to special applications. No general proclamation, earlier than this, can have been issued since the death of Antipater.

[807] Diodor. xviii. 57.

[808] Plutarch, Phokion, 32. The opinion of Plutarch, however, that Polysperchon intended this measure as a mere trick to ruin Phokion, is only correct so far—that Polysperchon wished to put down the Antipatrian oligarchies everywhere, and that Phokion was the leading person of that oligarchy at Athens.

[809] Diodor. xviii. 64.

[810] Plutarch, Phokion, 31.

[811] Plutarch, Phokion, 32.

[812] Diodor. xviii. 64; Plutarch, Phokion, 32; Cornelius Nepos, Phokion, 2.

[813] Cornelius Nepos, Phokion, 2. "Concidit autem maxime uno crimine: quod cum apud eum summum esset imperium populi, et Nicanorem, Cassandri præfectum, insidiari Piræo Atheniensium, a Dercyllo moneretur: idemque postularet, ut provideret, ne commeatibus civitas privaretur—huic, audiente populo, Phocion negavit esse periculam, seque ejus rei obsidem fore pollicitus est. Neque ita multo post Nicanor Piræo est potitus. Ad quem recuperandum cum populus armatus concurrisset, ille non modo neminem ad arma vocavit, sed ne armatis quidem præsse voluit, sine qua Athenæ omnino esse non possunt."

[814] Diodor. xviii. 65; Plutarch, Phokion, 33.

[815] Diodor. xviii. 65. Τῶν γὰρ Ἀντιπάτρῳ γεγονότων φίλων τινὲς (ὑπῆρχον) καὶ οἱ περὶ Φωκίωνα φοβούμενοι τὰς ἐκ τῶν νόμων τιμωρίας, ὑπήντησαν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, καὶ διδάξαντες τὸ συμφέρον, ἔπεισαν αὐτὸν ἰδίᾳ κατέχειν τὰ φρούρια, καὶ μὴ παραδιδόναι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, μέχρις ἂν ὁ Κάσσανδρος καταπολεμήθῃ.

[816] Plutarch, Phokion, 33; Diod. xviii. 65. 66. This seems to me the probable sequence of facts, combining Plutarch with Diodorus. Plutarch takes no notice of the negotiation opened by Phokion with Alexander, and the understanding established between them; which is stated in the clearest manner by Diodorus, and appears to me a material circumstance. On the other hand, Plutarch mentions (though Diodorus does not) that Alexander was anxious to seize Athens itself, and was very near succeeding. Plutarch seems to conceive that it was the exiles who were disposed to let him in; but if that had been the case, he probably would have been let in when the exiles became preponderant. It was Phokion, I conceive, who was desirous, for his own personal safety, of admitting the foreign troops.

[817] Diodor. xviii. 65; Plutarch, Phokion, 35.

[818] Diodor. xviii. 66. Προσδεχθέντες δὲ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ (Alexander) φιλοφρόνως, γράμματα ἔλαβον πρὸς τὸν πατέρα Πολυσπέρχοντα, ὅπως μηδὲν πάθωσιν οἱ περὶ Φωκίωνα τἀκείνου πεφρονηκότες, καὶ νῦν ἐπαγγελλόμενοι πάντα συμπράξειν.

This application of Phokion to Alexander, and the letters obtained to Polysperchon, are not mentioned by Plutarch, though they are important circumstances in following the last days of Phokion's life.

[819] Plutarch, Phokion, 33.

[820] Diodor. xviii. 66.

[821] Plutarch, Phokion, 33; Cornel. Nepos. Phokion, 3. "Hic (Phocion), ab Agnonide accusatus, quod Piræum Nicanori prodidisset, ex consilii sententiâ, in custodiam conjectus, Athenas deductus est, ut ibi de eo legibus fieret judicium."

Plutarch says that Polysperchon, before he gave this hearing to both parties, ordered *the Corinthian Deinarchus* to be tortured and to be put to death. Now the person so named cannot be Deinarchus, the logographer—of whom we have some specimens remaining, and who was alive even as late as 292 B. C.—though he too was a Corinthian. Either, therefore, there were two Corinthians, both bearing this same name (as Westermann supposes—Gesch. der Beredtsamkeit, sect. 72), or the statement of Plutarch must allude to an order given but not carried into effect—which latter seems to me most probable.

[822] Plutarch, Phokion, 33, 34; Diodor. xviii. 66.

[823] Andokides de Mysteriis, sect. 96, 97; Lycurgus adv. Leokrat. s. 127.

[824] *Not* the eminent philosopher so named.

[825] Cornel. Nepos, Phoc. 4. "Plurimi vero ita exacuerentur propter proditionis suspicionem Piræi, maximeque quod adversus populi commoda in senectute steterat."

[826] Diodor. xviii. 66, 67; Plutarch, Phokion, 34, 35; Cornelius Nepos, Phokion, 2, 3.

[827] Plutarch, Phokion, 36, 37. Two other anecdotes are recounted by Plutarch, which seem to be of doubtful authenticity. Nikokles entreated that he might be allowed to swallow his potion before Phokion; upon which the latter replied—"Your request, Nikokles, is sad and mournful; but as I have never yet refused you anything throughout my life, I grant this also."

After the four first had drunk, all except Phokion, no more hemlock was left; upon which the jailer said that he would not prepare any more, unless twelve drachmæ of money were given to him to buy the material. Some

hesitation took place, until Phokion asked one of his friends to supply the money, sarcastically remarking, that it was hard if a man could not even die *gratis* at Athens.

As to the first of these anecdotes—if we read, in Plato's Phædon (152-155), the details of the death of Sokrates,—we shall see that death by hemlock was not caused instantaneously, but in a gradual and painless manner; the person who had swallowed the potion being desired to walk about for some time, until his legs grew heavy, and then to lie down in bed, after which he gradually chilled and became insensible, first in the extremities, next in the vital centres. Under these circumstances, the question—which of the persons condemned should swallow the first of the five potions—could be of very little moment.

Then, as to the alleged niggardly stock of hemlock in the Athenian prison—what would have been the alternative, if Phokion's friend had not furnished the twelve drachmæ? Would he have remained in confinement, without being put to death? Certainly not; for he was under capital sentence. Would he have been put to death by the sword or some other unexpensive instrument? This is at variance with the analogy of Athenian practice. If there be any truth in the story, we must suppose that the Eleven had allotted to this jailer a stock of hemlock (or the price thereof) really adequate to five potions, but that he by accident or awkwardness had wasted a part of it, so that it would have been necessary for him to supply the deficiency out of his own pocket. From this embarrassment he was rescued by Phokion and his friend; and Phokion's sarcasm touches upon the strangeness of a man being called upon to pay for his own execution.

[828] Plutarch, Phokion, 38

[829] Plutarch, Phokion, 18; Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 188.

[830] Diodor. xix. 35.

[831] Diodor. xviii. 69.

[832] Diodor. xxiii. 70, 71.

[833] Diodor. xviii. 72.

[834] Thucyd. i. 93.

[835] Diodor. xviii. 74.

[836] See the notice of Munychia, as it stood ten years afterwards (Diodor. xx. 45).

[837] Cicero, De Legg. ii. 26, 66; Strabo, ix. p. 398; Pausanias, i. 25, 5. τὐραννόν τε Ἀθηναίοις ἔπραξε γενέσθαι Δημήτριον, etc. Duris ap. Athenæum, xii. 542. Fragm. 27. vol. iii. p. 477. Frag. Hist. Græc.

The Phalerean Demetrius composed, among numerous historical, philosophical, and literary works, a narrative of his own decennial administration (Diogenes Laert. v. 5, 9; Strabo, ib.)—περὶ τῆς δεκαετίας.

The statement of 1200 talents, as the annual revenue handled by Demetrius, deserves little credit.

[838] See the Fragment of Democharès, 2. Fragment. Historic. Græc. ed. Didot, vol. ii. p. 448, ap. Polyb. xii. 13. Democharès, nephew of the orator Demosthenes, was the political opponent of Demetrius Phalereus, whom he reproached with these boasts about commercial prosperity, when the liberty and dignity of the city were overthrown. To such boasts of Demetrius Phalereus probably belongs the statement cited from him by Strabo (iii. p. 147) about the laborious works in the Attic mines at Laureium.

[839] Diodor. xx. 40. ὥσθ᾽ ὑπελάμβανον μὴ μόνον ἐγκρατεῖς ἔσεσθαι πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι.

[840] Dionys. Halic. Judicium de Dinarcho, p. 633, 634; Plutarch, Demetrius, 10. λόγῳ μὲν ὀλιγαρχικῆς, ἔργῳ δὲ μοναρχικῆς, καταστάσεως γενομένης διὰ τὴν τοῦ Φαληρέως δύναμιν, etc.

[841] Ktesikles ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 272. Mr. Fynes Clinton (following Wesseling), supplies the defect in the text of Athenæus, so as to assign the census to the 115th Olympiad. This conjecture *may* be right, yet the reasons for it are not conclusive. The census may have been either in the 116th, or in the 117th Olympiad; we have no means of determining which. The administration of Phalerean Demetrius covers the ten years between 317 and 307 B. C. (Fast. Hell. Append. p. 388).

Mr. Clinton (ad ann. 317 B. C. Fast. Hell.) observes respecting the census—"The 21,000 Athenians express those who had votes in the public assembly, or all the males above the age of twenty years; the 10,000 μέτοικοι described also the males of full age. When the women and children are computed, the total free population will be about 127,660; and 400,000 slaves, added to this total, will give about 527,660 for the total population of Attica." See also the Appendix to F. H. p. 390 *seq.*

This census is a very interesting fact; but our information respecting it is miserably scanty, and Mr. Clinton's interpretation of the different numbers is open to some remark. He cannot be right, I think, in saying—"The 21,000 Athenians express those who had votes in the assembly, *or* all the males above the age of twenty years." For we are expressly told, that under the administration of Demetrius Phalereus, all persons who did not possess 1000 drachmæ were excluded from the political franchise; and therefore a large number of males above the age of twenty years would have no vote in the assembly. Since the two categories are not coincident, then, to which shall we apply the number 21,000? To those who had votes? Or to the total number of free citizens, voting or not voting, above the age of twenty? The public assembly, during the administration of Demetrius Phalereus, appears to have been of little moment or efficacy; so that a distinct record, of the number of persons entitled to vote in it, is not likely to have been sought.

Then again, Mr. Clinton interprets the three numbers given, upon two principles totally distinct. The two first numbers (citizens and metics), he considers to designate only males of full age; the third number, of οἰκέται, he considers to include both sexes and all ages.

This is a conjecture which I think very doubtful, in the absence of farther knowledge. It implies that the enumerators take account of the *slave* women and children—but that they take no account of the *free* women and

children, wives and families of the citizens and metics. The number of the free women and children are wholly unrecorded, on Mr. Clinton's supposition. Now if, for the purposes of the census, it was necessary to enumerate the *slave* women and children—it surely would be not less necessary to enumerate the *free* women and children.

The word οἰκέται sometimes means, not slaves only, but the inmates of a family generally—free as well as slave. If such be its meaning here (which however there is not evidence enough to affirm), we eliminate the difficulty of supposing the slave women and children to be enumerated—and the free women and children *not* to be enumerated.

We should be able to reason more confidently, if we knew the purpose for which the census had been taken—whether with a view to military or political measures—to finance and taxation—or to the question of subsistence and importation of foreign corn (see Mr. Clinton's Fast. H. ad ann. 444 B. C., about another census taken in reference to imported corn).

[842] See Dionys. Halic. Judic. de Dinarcho, p. 658 Reisk.

[843] Diodor. xviii. 75.

[844] Justin, xiv. 5; Diodor. xviii. 75; Pausan. vii. 8, 3; Pausanias, i. 25, 5.

[845] Diodor. xix. 11; Justin, x. 14, 4; Pausanias, i. 11, 4.

[846] Diodor. xix. 36.

[847] Diodor. xix. 50, 51; Justin, xiv. 5; Pausan. i. 25, 5; ix. 7, 1.

[848] Even immediately before the death of Olympias, Aristonous, governor of Amphipolis in her interest, considered Eumenes to be still alive (Diodor. xix. 50).

[849] Diodor. xix. 52; Pausanias, v. 23, 2.

[850] Diodor. xix. 52, 54, 78; Pausan. ix. 7, 2-5. This seems an explanation of Kassander's proceeding, more probable than that given by Pausanias; who tells us that Kassander hated the memory of Alexander the Great, and wished to undo the consequences of his acts. That he did so hate Alexander, is however extremely credible: see Plutarch, Alexand. 74.

[851] Diodor. xix. 54.

[852] Diodor. xix. 56.

[853] Diodor. xix. 57.

[854] Diodor. xix. 61.

[855] Diodor. xix. 62.

[856] Diodor. xix. 63, 64.

[857] Diodor. xix. 62, 67.

[858] Diodor. xix. 66. Ἀριστόδημος, ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν δικαιολογησάμενος, προετρέψατο τὰ πλήθη βοηθεῖν τοῖς Ἀντιγόνου πράγμασιν, etc.

[859] Diodor. xix. 67, 68; Justin, xv. 2. See Brandstäter, Geschichte des Ætolischen Volkes und Bundes, p. 178 (Berlin, 1844).

[860] Diodor. xix. 74.

[861] Diodor. xix. 77, 78, 89.

[862] Diodor. xix. 87.

[863] Diodor. xix. 105.

[864] Diodor. xix. 105.

[865] Diodor. xx. 19.

[866] Messênê was garrisoned by Polysperchon (Diodor. xix. 64).

[867] Diodor. xx. 28; Trogus Pompeius—Proleg. ad Justin. xv. Justin. xv. 2.

[868] Diodor. xx. 100-103; Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 6. King Pyrrhus was of προγόνων ἀεὶ δεδουλευκότων Μακεδόσι—at least this was the reproach of Lysimachus (Plutarch, Phyrrhus, 12).

[869] Diodor. xx. 37 compare Justin, xiii. 6; xiv. 1.

[870] Diodor. xx. 37.

[871] Philochor. Fragm. 144, ed. Didot; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 8, 9. The occupation of Peiræus by Demetrius Poliorketes is related somewhat differently by Polyænus, iv. 7, 6.

[872] Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 47; Democharis ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 253.

[873] Diogen. Laert. v, 77. Among the numerous literary works (all lost) of the Phalerean Demetrius, one was entitled Ἀθηναίων καταδρομή (ib. v. 82).

[874] Democharis ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 253.

[875] Tacitus, Annal. i. 3. "Juniores post Actiacam victoriam, seniores plerique inter bella civium nati: quotusquisque reliquus, qui rempublicam vidisset?"

[876] Herodotus, v. 78.

[877] Plutarch, Demetr. 24.

[878] Polybius, xii. 13; Decretum apud Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 851.

[879] Philochori Fragm. 144, ed. Didot, ap. Dionys. Hal. p. 636.

[880] Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 842-852. Lykurgus at his death (about 324 B. C.) left three sons, who are said, shortly after his death, to have been prosecuted by Menesæchmus, and put in prison ("handed over to the Eleven"). But Thrasykles, supported by Demokles, stood forward on their behalf; and Demosthenes, then in banishment at Trœzen, wrote emphatic remonstrances to the Athenians against such unworthy treatment of the sons of a distinguished patriot. Accordingly the Athenians soon repented and released them.

This is what we find stated in Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 842. The third of the so-called Demosthenic Epistles purports to be the letter written on this subject by Demosthenes.

The harsh treatment of the sons of Lykurgus (whatever it may have amounted to, and whatever may have been its ground) certainly did not last long; for in the next page of the very same Plutarchian life (p. 843), an account is given of the family of Lykurgus, which was ancient and sacerdotal; and it is there stated that his sons after his death fully sustained the dignified position of the family.

On what ground they were accused, we cannot make out. According to the Demosthenic epistle (which epistles I have before stated that I do not believe to be authentic), it was upon some allegation, which, if valid at all, ought to have been urged against Lykurgus himself during his life (p. 1477, 1478); but Lykurgus had been always honorably acquitted, and always held thoroughly estimable, up to the day of his death (p. 1475).

[881] Diogen. Laert. v. 38. It is probably to this return of the philosophers that the φυγάδων κάθοδος mentioned by Philochorus, as foreshadowed by the omen in the Acropolis, alludes (Philochorus, Frag. 145, ed. Didot, ap Dionys. Hal. p. 637).

[882] See the few fragments of Democharis collected in Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum, ed. Didot, vol. ii. p. 445, with the notes of Carl Müller.

See likewise Athenæus, xiii. 610, with the fragment from the comic writer Alexis. It is there stated that Lysimachus also, king of Thrace, had banished the philosophers from his dominions.

Democharis might find (besides the persons named in Athenæ. v. 21, xi. 508) other authentic examples of pupils of Plato and Isokrates who had been atrocious and sanguinary tyrants in their native cities—see the case of Klearchus of Herakleia, Memnon ap. Photium, Cod. 224. cap. 1. Chion and Leonides, the two young citizens who slew Klearchus, and who perished in endeavoring to liberate their country—were also pupils of Plato (Justin, xvi. 5). In fact, aspiring youths, of all varieties of purpose, were likely to seek this mode of improvement. (Alexander the Great, too, the very impersonation of subduing force, had been the pupil of Aristotle).

[883] Diodor. xx. 46.

[884] Diodor. xx. 53; Plutarch, Demetr. 18.

[885] Diodor. xx. 99. Probably this proviso extended also to Lysimachus and Kassander (both of whom had assisted Rhodes) as well as to Ptolemy—though Diodorus does not expressly say so.

[886] Diodor. xx. 100.

[887] Diodor. xx. 100.

[888] That the Ætolians were just now most vexatious enemies to Athens, may be seen by the Ithyphallic ode addressed to Demetrius Poliorketes (Athenæus, vi. p. 253).

[889] Diodor. xx. 50; Plutarch, Demetr. 11. In reference to this defeat near Amorgos, Stratokles (the complaisant orator who moved the votes of flattery towards Demetrius and Antigonus) is said to have announced it first as a victory, to the great joy of the people. Presently evidences of the defeat arrived, and the people were angry with Stratokles. "What harm has happened to you? (replied he)—have you not had two days of pleasure and satisfaction?" This is at any rate a very good story.

[890] Diodor. xx. 100; Plutarch, Demetr. 23.

[891] Diodor. xx. 102, 103; Plutarch, Demetr. 23-25.

[892] Diodor. xx. 102; Plutarch, Demetr. 25; Pausanias, ii. 7, 1. The city was withdrawn partially from the sea, and approximated closely to the acropolis. The new city remained permanently: but the new name Demetrias gave place to the old name Sikyon.

[893] Diodor. xx. 106

[894] That he returned from Leukas about the time of these mysteries, is attested both by Democharès and by the Ithyphallic ode in Athenæus, vi. p. 253. See also Duris ap. Athenæ, xii. p. 535.

[895] Semus ap. Athenæum, xiv. p. 622.

[896] Athenæus, vi. p. 253.

Ἄλλοι μὲν ἢ μακρὰν γὰρ ἀπέχουσιν θεοὶ,
ἢ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὦτα,
ἢ οὐκ εἰσὶν, ἢ οὐ προσέχουσιν ἡμῖν οὐδὲ ἕν·
σὲ δὲ παρόνθ᾽ ὁρῶμεν,
οὐ ξύλινον, οὐδὲ λίθινον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀληθινόν.
Εὐχόμεσθα δὴ σοί·
πρῶτον μὲν εἰρήνην ποιῆσον, φίλτατε,
κύριος γὰρ εἶ σύ.
Τὴν δ᾽ οὐχὶ Θηβῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος,
Σφίγγα περικρατοῦσαν,
Αἰτωλὸς ὅστις ἐπὶ πέτρας καθήμενος,
ὥσπερ ἡ παλαιὰ,
τὰ σώμαθ᾽ ἡμῶν πάντ᾽ ἀναρπάσας φέρει,
κοὐκ ἔχω μάχεσθαι·
Αἰτωλικὸν γὰρ ἁρπάσαι τὰ τῶν πέλας,
νυνὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ πόῤῥω—
μάλιστα μὲν δὴ κόλασον αὐτὸς· εἰ δὲ μὴ,
Οἰδίπουν τιν᾽ εὗρε,
τὴν Σφίγγα ταύτην ὅστις ἢ κατακρημνιεῖ,
ἢ σπίνον ποιήσει.

[897] Compare Pausanias, vii. 7, 4.

[898] Plutarch, Demetr. 24.

[899] Such is the statement of Plutarch (Demetr. 24); but it seems not in harmony with the recital of the honorary decree, passed in 272 B. C., after the death of Democharès, commemorating his merits by a statue, etc. (Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 850). It is there recited that Democharès rendered services to Athens (fortifying and arming the city, concluding peace and alliance with the Bœotians, etc.) ἐπὶ τοῦ τετραετοῦς πολέμου, ἀνθ᾽ ὧν ἐξέπεσεν ὑπὸ τῶν καταλυσάντων τὸν δῆμον. Οἱ καταλύσαντες τὸν δῆμον cannot mean either Demetrius Poliorketes, or Stratokles. Moreover, we cannot determine when the "four years' war", or the alliance with the Bœotians, occurred. Neither the discussion of Mr. Clinton (Fast. H. 302 B. C., and Append. p. 380), nor the different hypothesis of Droysen, are satisfactory on this point—see Carl Müller's discussion on the fragments of Democharès, Fragm. Hist. Gr. v. ii. p. 446.

[900] Diodor. xx. 110. παραδοὺς οὖν αὐτὸν ἄνοπλον τοῖς ἱερεῦσι, καὶ πρὸ τῆς ὡρισμένης ἡμέρας μυηθεὶς, ἀνέζευξεν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν.

The account of this transaction in the text is taken from Diodorus, and is a simple one; a vote was passed granting special license to Demetrius, to receive the mysteries at once, though it was not the appointed season.

Plutarch (Demetr. 26) superadds other circumstances, several of which have the appearance of jest rather than reality. Pythodôrus the Daduch or Torch-bearer of the Mysteries stood alone in his protest against any celebration of the ceremony out of time: this is doubtless very credible. Then (according to Plutarch) the Athenians passed decrees, on the proposition of Stratokles, that the month Munychion should be called Anthesterion. This having been done, the Lesser Mysteries were celebrated, in which Demetrius was initiated. Next, the Athenians passed another decree, to the effect, that the month Munychion should be called Boêdromion—after which, the

Greater Mysteries (which belonged to the latter month) were forthwith celebrated. The comic writer Philippides said of Stratokles, that he had compressed the whole year into a single month.

This statement of Plutarch has very much the air of a caricature, by Philippides or some other witty man, of the simple decree mentioned by Diodorus—a special license to Demetrius to be initiated out of season. Compare another passage of Philippides against Stratokles (Plutarch, Demetr. 12).

[901] Diodor. xx. 110.

[902] Diodor. xx. 111. It must have been probably during this campaign that Demetrius began or projected the foundation of the important city of Demetrias on the Gulf of Magnesia, which afterwards became one of the great strongholds of the Macedonian ascendency in Greece (Strabo, ix. p. 436-443, in which latter passage, the reference to Hieronymus of Kardia seems to prove that that historian gave a full description of Demetrias and its foundation). See about Demetrias, Mannert, Geogr. v. Griech. vii. p. 591.

[903] Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hell. B. C. 301) places the battle of Ipsus in August 301 B. C.; which appears to me some months earlier than the reality. It is clear from Diodorus, (and indeed from Mr. Clinton's own admission) that winter-quarters in Asia intervened between the departure of Demetrius from Athens in or soon after April 301 B. C., and the battle of Ipsus. Moreover Demetrius, immediately after leaving Athens, carried on many operations against Kassander in Thessaly, before crossing over to Asia to join Antigonus (Diodor. xx. 110, 111).

[904] Plutarch, Demetr. 31.

[905] Plutarch, Demetr. 34, 35; Pausan. i. 25, 5. Pausanias states (i. 26, 2) that a gallant Athenian named Olympiodorus (we do not know when) encouraged his fellow-citizens to attack the Museum, Munychia, and Peiræus; and expelled the Macedonians from all of them. If this be correct, Munychia and Peiræus must have been afterwards reconquered by the Macedonians: for they were garrisoned (as well as Salamis and Sunium) by Antigonus Gonatas (Pausanias, ii. 8, 5; Plutarch, Aratus, 34).

[906] Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 6.

[907] Plutarch, Demetr. 36; Dexippus ap. Syncell. p. 264 *seq.*; Pausan. 7, 3; Justin, xvi. 1, 2.

[908] Plutarch, Demetr. 39.

[909] See Mr. Clinton's Fasti Hellenici, Append. 4. p. 236-239.

[910] Pausanias, i. 4, 1; x. 20, 1. Τοῖς δέ γε Ἕλλησι κατεπεπτώκει μὲν ἐς ἅπαν τὰ φρονήματα, τὸ δὲ ἰσχυρὸν τοῦ δείματος προῆγεν ἐς ἀνάγκην τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀμύνειν· ἐώρων δὲ τόν τε ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀγῶνα, οὐκ ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας γενησόμενον, καθὰ ἐπὶ τοῦ Μήδου πότε … ὡς οὖν ἀπολωλέναι δέον ἢ ἐπικρατεστέρους εἶναι, κατ᾽ ἄνδρα τε ἰδίᾳ καὶ αἱ πόλεις διέκειντο ἐν κοινῷ. (On the approach of the invading Gauls.)

[911] Polyb. ii. 40, 41. πλείστους γὰρ δὴ μονάρχους οὗτος (Antigonus Gonatas) ἐμφυτεῦσαι δοκεῖ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. Justin, xxvi. 1.

[912] Pausanias, vii. 17, 1. Ἅτε ἐκ δένδρου λελωβημένου, ἀνεβλάστησεν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὸ Ἀχαϊκόν.

[913] Plutarch, Aratus, 47. ἐθισθέντες γὰρ ἀλλοτρίαις σώζεσθαι χερσὶν, καὶ τοῖς Μακεδόνων ὅπλοις αὐτοὺς ὑπεσταλκότες (the Achæans), etc. Compare also c. 12, 13, 15, in reference to the earlier applications to Ptolemy king of Egypt.

[914] Polybius, i. 3, 4; ii. 37.

[915] Polybius, xii. 13.

[916] See the decree in Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 850. The Antipater here mentioned is the son of Kassander, not the father. There is no necessity for admitting the conjecture of Mr. Clinton (Fast. Hell. App. p. 380) that the name ought to be *Antigonus*, and not *Antipater*; although it may perhaps be true that Democharès was on favorable terms with Antigonus Gonatas (Diog. Laert. vii, 14).

Compare Carl Müller ad Democharis Fragm. apud Fragm. Hist. Græc. vol. ii. p. 446, ed. Didot.

[917] See my last preceding Vol. XI. Ch. lxxxv. p. 196.

[918] Diodor. xix. 3. It appears that Diodorus had recounted in his eighteenth Book the previous circumstances of these two leaders; but this part of his narrative is lost: see Wesseling's note.

[919] See Vol. XI. Ch. lxxxiii. p. 22; Ch. lxxxv. p. 133.

[920] Diodor. xvi. 88; Plutarch, Camill. 19; Pausan. iii. 10, 5. Plutarch even says that the two battles occurred on the same *day*.

[921] The Molossian King Neoptolemus was father both of Alexander (the Epirotic) and of Olympias. But as to the genealogy of the preceding kings, nothing certain can be made out: see Merleker, Darstellung des Landes und der Bewohner von Epeiros, Königsberg, 1844, p. 2-6.

[922] A curious proof how fully Olympias was queen of Epirus is preserved in the fragments (recently published by Mr. Babington) of the oration of Hyperides in defence of Euxenippus, p. 12. The Athenians, in obedience to an oracular mandate from the Dodonæan Zeus, had sent to Dodona a solemn embassy for sacrifice, and had dressed and adorned the statue of Diônê there situated. Olympias addressed a despatch to the Athenians, reproving them for this as a trespass upon her dominions—ὑπὲρ τούτων ὑμῖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἦλθε παρ' Ὀλυμπιάδος ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς, ὡς ἡ χώρα εἴη ἡ Μολοσσία αὐτῆς, ἐν ᾗ τὸ ἱερόν ἐστιν· οὔκουν προσῆκεν ἡμᾶς τῶν ἐκεῖ οὐδὲ ἓν κινεῖν. Olympias took a high and insolent tone in this letter (τὰς τραγῳδίας αὐτῆς καὶ τὰς κατηγορίας, etc.)

The date of this oration is at some period during the life of Alexander the Great—but cannot be more precisely ascertained. After the death of Alexander, Olympias passed much time in Epirus, where she thought herself more secure from the enmity of Antipater (Diodor. xviii. 49).

Dodona had been one of the most ancient places of pilgrimage for the Hellenic race—especially for the Athenians. The order here addressed to them,—that they should abstain from religious manifestations at this sanctuary—is a remarkable proof of the growing encroachments on free Hellenism; the more so, as Olympias sent offerings to temples at Athens when she chose and without asking permission—we learn this from the same fragment of Hyperides.

[923] Livy (viii. 3-24) places the date of this expedition of the Molossian Alexander eight years earlier; but it is universally recognized that this is a mistake.

[924] Livy, viii. 17-24; Justin, xii. 2; Strabo, vi. p. 280.

[925] Diodor. xix. 3.

[926] Timæus apud Polybium, xii. 15; Diodor. xix. 2.

[927] Diodor. xix. 3; Justin, xxii. 1. Justin states the earliest military exploits of Agathokles to have been against the Ætuæans, not against the Agrigentines.

[928] Diodor. xix. 3, 4. Diodorus had written more about this oligarchy in a part of his eighteenth book; which part is not preserved: see Wesseling's note.

[929] Diodor. xix. 4; Justin, xxii. 1. "Bis occupare imperium Syracusarum voluit; bis in exilium actus est."

In the same manner, the Syracusan exile Hermokrates had attempted to extort by force his return, at the head of 3000 men, and by means of partisans within; he failed and was slain—B. C. 408 (Diodor. xiii. 75).

[930] Diodor. xix. 5, 6. A similar stratagem is recounted of the Karian Datames (Cornelius Nepos, Datames, 9).

That Agathokles, on leaving Syracuse, went to the Carthaginians, appears to be implied in the words of Diodorus, c. 6—τοὺς αὐτῷ πρότερον συμπορευθέντας πρὸς Καρχηδονίους (see Wesseling's note on the translation of πρὸς). This fact is noticed merely incidentally, in the confused narrative of Diodorus; but it brings him to a certain extent into harmony with Justin (xxii. 2), who insists much on the combination between Agathokles and the Carthaginians, as one of the main helps whereby he was enabled to seize the supreme power.

[931] The account here given is the best which I can make out from Diodorus (xix. 5), Justin (xxii. 2),—Polyænus (v. 3, 8). The first two allude to the solemn oath taken by Agathokles—παραχθεὶς εἰς τὸ τῆς Δήμητρος ἱερὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν, ὤμοσε μηδὲν ἐναντιωθήσεσθαι τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ—"Tunc Hamilcari expositis ignibus Cereris tactisque in obsequia Pœnorum jurat." "Jurare in obsequia Pœnorum" can hardly be taken to mean that Syracuse was to become subject to Carthage; there was nothing antecedent to justify such a proceeding, nor does anything follow in the sequel which implies it.

Compare also the speech which Justin puts into the mouth of Bomilkar when executed for treason by the Carthaginians—"objectans illis (Carthaginiensibus) in Hamilcarem patruum suum tacita suffragia, quod Agathoclem *sociam illis facere, quam hostem, maluerit*" (xxii. 7). This points to previous collusion between Hamilkar and Agathokles.

[932] Diodor. xix. 8, 9; Justin, xxii. 2.

[933] Diodor. xix. 9.

[934] Diodor. xix. 9.; Justin, xxii. 2.

[935] Diodor. xix. 65. καθ᾽ ὃν δὴ χρόνον ἦκον ἐκ Καρχηδόνος πρέσβεις, οἳ τῷ μὲν Ἀγαθοκλεῖ περὶ τῶν πραχθέντων ἐπετίμησαν, ὡς παραβαίνοντι τὰς συνθήκας· τοῖς δὲ Μεσσηνίοις εἰρήνην παρεσκεύασαν, καὶ τὸ φρούριον ἀναγκάσαντες ἀποκαταστῆσαι τὸν τύραννον, ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς τὴν Λιβύην.

I do not know what συνθῆκαι can be here meant, except that oath described by Justin under the words "in obsequia Pœnorum jurat" (xxii. 2).

[936] Diodor. xix. 70. μὴ περιορᾷν Ἀγαθοκλέα συσκευαζόμενον τὰς πόλεις.

[937] Diodor. xix. 70. After the defeat of Agis by Antipater, the severe Lacedæmonian laws against those who fled from battle had been suspended for the occasion; as had been done before, after the defeat of Leuktra. Akrotatus had been the *only* person (μόνος) who opposed this suspension; whereby he incurred the most violent odium generally, but most especially from the citizens who profited by the suspension. These men carried their hatred so far, that they even attacked, beat him and conspired against his life (οὗτοι γὰρ συστραφέντες πληγάς τε ἐνεφόρησαν αὐτῷ καὶ διετέλουν ἐπιβουλεύοντες).

This is a curious indication of Spartan manners.

[938] Diodor. xix. 71.

[939] Diodor. xix. 71, 72, 102. When the convention specifies Herakleia, Selinus, and Himera, as being under the Carthaginians, this is to be understood as in addition to the primitive Carthaginian settlements of Solus, Panormus, Lilybæum, etc., about which no question could arise.

[940] Diodor. xix. 72: compare a different narrative—Polyænus, v. 15.

[941] Diodor. xix. 103. It must be noticed, however, that even Julius Cæsar, in his wars in Gaul, sometimes cut off the hands of his Gallic prisoners taken in arms, whom he called rebels (Bell. Gall. viii. 44).

[942] Diodor. xix. 103, 104.

[943] Diodor. xix. 106.

[944] Diodor. xix. 107, 108.

[945] Diodor. xix. 108, 109.

[946] Diodor. xix. 109.

[947] Diodor. xix. 110.

[948] Diodor. xx. 4, 5; Justin, xxii. 4. Compare Polyænus, 3-5.

[949] Diodor. xx. 4-16.

[950] Diodor. xx. 6. Procopius, Bell. Vand. i. 15. It is here stated, that for nine days' march eastward from Carthage, as far as Juka, the land is παντελῶς ἀλίμενος.

[951] This striking scene is described by Diodorus, xx. 7 (compare Justin, xxii. 6), probably enough copied from Kallias, the companion and panegyrist of Agathokles: see Diodor. xxi. Fragm. p. 281.

[952] Megalê-Polis is nowhere else mentioned—nor is it noticed by Forbiger in his list of towns in the Carthaginian territory (Handbuch der Alten Geographie, sect. 109).

Dr. Barth (Wanderungen auf den Küsten Ländern des Mittelmeeres, vol. i. p. 131-133) supposes that Agathokles landed at an indentation of the coast on the western face of that projecting tongue of land which terminates in Cape Bon (Promontorium Mercurii), forming the eastern boundary of the Gulf of Carthage. There are

stone quarries here, of the greatest extent as well as antiquity. Dr. Barth places Megalê-Polis not far off from this spot, on the same western face of the projecting land, and near the spot afterwards called Misua.

[953] Justin, xxii. 5. "Huc accedere, quod urbes castellaque Africæ non muris cinctæ, non in montibus positæ sint: sed in planis campis sine ullis munimentis jaceant: quas omnes metu excidii facile ad belli societatem perlici posse."

[954] Seven centuries and more after these events, we read that the Vandal king Genseric conquered Africa from the Romans—and that he demolished the fortifications of all the other towns except Carthage alone—from the like feeling of mistrust. This demolition materially facilitated the conquest of the Vandal kingdom by Belisarius, two generations afterwards (Procopius, Bell. Vandal. i. 5; i. 15).

[955] Livy (xxix. 25), in recounting the landing of Scipio in the Carthaginian territory in the latter years of the second Punic war, says, "Emporia ut peterent, gubernatoribus edixit. Fertilissimus ager, eoque abundans omnium copiâ rerum est regio, et imbelles (quod plerumque in uberi agro evenit) barbari sunt: priusque quam Carthagine subveniretur, opprimi videbantur posse."

About the harshness of the Carthaginian rule over their African subjects, see Diodor. xv. 77; Polyb. i. 72. In reference to the above passage of Polybius, however, we ought to keep in mind—That in describing this harshness, he speaks with *express and exclusive reference* to the conduct of the Carthaginians towards their subjects during the first Punic war (against Rome), when the Carthaginians themselves were hard pressed by the Romans and required everything that they could lay hands upon for self-defence. This passage of Polybius has been sometimes cited as if it attested the *ordinary* character and measure of Carthaginian dominion; which is contrary to the intention of the author.

[956] Diodor. xx. 8. Compare Polybius, i. 29, where he describes the first invasion of the Carthaginian territory by the Roman consul Regulus. Tunês was 120 stadia or about fourteen miles south-east of Carthage (Polyb. i. 67). The Tab. Peuting. reckons it only ten miles. It was made the central place for hostile operations against Carthage both by Regulus in the first Punic war (Polyb. i. 30),—by Matho and Spendius, in the rebellion of the mercenary soldiers and native Africans against Carthage, which followed on the close of the first Punic war (Polyb. i. 73)—and by the revolted Libyans in 396 B. C. (Diodor. xiv. 77).

Diodorus places Tunês at the distance of 2000 stadia from Carthage, which must undoubtedly be a mistake. He calls it *White Tunês*; an epithet drawn from the chalk cliffs adjoining.

[957] Diodor. xx. 10.

[958] Diodor. xx. 10-13. See, respecting the Sacred Band of Carthage (which was nearly cut to pieces by Timoleon at the battle of the Krimesus), Diodor. xvi. 80, 81; also Vol. XI. of this History, Chap. lxxxv. p. 171-177.

The amount of native or citizen-force given here by Diodorus (40,000 foot and 1000 horse) seems very great. Our data for appreciating it however are lamentably scanty; and we ought to expect a large total. The population of Carthage is said to have been 700,000 souls; even when it was besieged by the Romans in the third Punic war, and when its power was prodigiously lessened (Strabo, xvii. p. 833). Its military magazines, even in that reduced condition, were enormous,—as they stood immediately previous to their being given up to the Romans, under the treacherous delusions held out by Rome.

[959] Diodor. xx. 12. The loss of the Carthaginians was differently given—some authors stated it at 1000 men—others at 6000. The loss in the army of Agathokles was stated at 200 men.

[960] Diodor. xx. 17.

[961] Diodor. xx. 55.

[962] Diodor. xx. 14. ᾐτιῶντο δὲ καὶ τὸν Κρόνον αὐτοῖς ἐναντιοῦσθαι, καθόσον ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις θύοντες τούτῳ τῷ θεῷ τῶν υἱῶν τοὺς κρατίστους, ὕστερον ὠνούμενοι λάθρα παῖδας καὶ θρέψαντες ἔπεμπον ἐπὶ τὴν θυσίαν· καὶ ζητήσεως γενομένης, εὑρέθησάν τινες τῶν καθιερουργημένων ὑποβολιμαῖοι γεγονότες· τούτων δὲ λαβόντες ἔννοιαν, καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους πρὸς τοῖς τείχεσιν ὁρῶντες στρατοπεδεύοντας, ἐδεισιδαιμόνουν ὡς καταλελυκότες τὰς πατρίους τῶν θεῶν τιμάς· διορθώσασθαι δὲ τὰς ἀγνοίας σπεύδοντες, διακοσίους μὲν τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων παίδων προκρίναντες ἔθυσαν δημοσίᾳ· ἄλλοι δ᾽ ἐν διαβολαῖς ὄντες, ἑκουσίως ἑαυτοὺς ἔδοσαν, οὐκ ἐλάττους ὄντες τριακοσίων· ἦν δὲ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἀνδριὰς Κρόνου χαλκοῦς, ἐκτετακὼς τὰς χεῖρας ὑπτίας ἐγκεκλιμένας ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, ὥστε τὸν ἐπιτεθέντα τῶν παίδων ἀποκυλίεσθαι καὶ πίπτειν εἴς τι χάσμα πλῆρες πυρός. Compare Festus ap. Lactantium, Inst. Div. i. 21; Justin, xviii. 6, 12.

In this remarkable passage (the more remarkable because so little information concerning Carthaginian antiquity has reached us), one clause is not perfectly clear, respecting the three hundred who are said to have voluntarily *given themselves up*. Diodorus means (I apprehend) as Eusebius understood it, that these were fathers who gave up *their children* (not themselves) to be sacrificed. The victims here mentioned as sacrificed to Kronus were children, not adults (compare Diodor. xiii. 86): nothing is here said about adult victims. Wesseling in his note adheres to the literal meaning of the words, dissenting from Eusebius: but I think that the literal meaning is less in harmony with the general tenor of the paragraph. Instances of self-devotion, by persons torn with remorse, are indeed mentioned: see the case of Imilkon, Diodor. xiv. 76; Justin, xix. 3.

We read in the Fragment of Ennius—"Pœni sunt soliti suos sacrificare puellos:" see the chapter iv. of Münter's work, Religion der Karthager, on this subject.

[963] Diodor. xx. 17. λάθρα προσῆλθεν ἐπί τινα τόπον ὀρεινὸν, ὅθεν ὁρᾶσθαι δυνατὸν ἦν αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀδρυμητινῶν καὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων τῶν Τύνητα πολιορκούντων· νυκτὸς δὲ συντάξας τοῖς στρατιώταις ἐπὶ πολὺν τόπον πυρὰ καίειν, δόξαν ἐν εποίησε, τοῖς μὲν Καρχηδονίοις, ὡς μετὰ μεγάλης δυνάμεως ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς πορευόμενος, τοῖς δὲ πολιορκουμένοις, ὡς ἄλλης δυνάμεως ἀδρᾶς τοῖς πολεμίοις εἰς συμμαχίαν παραγεγενημένης.

[964] Diodor. xx. 17. The incident here recounted by Diodorus is curious, but quite distinct and intelligible. He had good authorities before him in his history of Agathokles. If true, it affords an evidence for determining, within some limits, the site of the ancient Adrumetum, which Mannert and Shaw place at Herkla— while Forbiger and Dr. Barth put it near the site of the modern port called Susa, still more to the southward, and at a prodigious distance from Tunis. Other anthem have placed it at Hamamat, more to the northward than Herkla, and nearer to Tunis.

Of these three sites, Hamamat is the only one which will consist with the narrative of Diodorus. Both the others are too distant. Hamamat is about forty-eight English miles from Tunis (see Barth, p. 184, with his note). This is as great a distance (if not too great) as can possibly be admitted; both Herkla and Susa are very much more distant, and therefore out of the question.

Nevertheless, the other evidence known to us tends apparently to place Adrumetum at Susa, and not at Hamamat (see Barth, p. 142-154; Forbiger, Handb. Geog. p. 845). It is therefore probable that the narrative of Diodorus is not true, or must apply to some other place on the coast (possibly Neapolis, the modern Nabel) taken by Agathokles, and not to Adrumetum.

[965] Diodor. xx. 17.

[966] Strabo, xvii. p. 834. Solinus (c. 30) talks of Aspis as founded by the *Siculi*. Aspis (called by the Romans Clypea), being on the eastern side of Cape Bon, was more convenient for communication with Sicily than either Carthage, or Tunis, or any part of the Gulf of Carthage, which was on the western side of Cape Bon. To get round that headland is, even at the present day, a difficult and uncertain enterprise for navigators: see the remarks of Dr. Barth, founded partly on his own personal experience (Wanderungen auf den Küstenländern des Mittelmeeres, i. p. 196). A ship coming from Sicily to Aspis was not under the necessity of getting round the headland.

In the case of Agathokles, there was a further reason for establishing his maritime position at Aspis. The Carthaginian fleet was superior to him at sea; accordingly they could easily interrupt his maritime communication from Sicily with Tunis, or with any point in the Gulf of Carthage. But it was not so easy for them to watch the coast at Aspis; for in order to do this, they must get from the Gulf round to Cape Bon.

[967] Diodor. xx. 17. The Roman consul Regulus, when he invaded Africa during the first Punic war, is said to have acquired, either by capture or voluntary adhesion, two hundred dependent cities of Carthage (Appian, Punica, c. 3). Respecting the prodigious number of towns in Northern Africa, see the very learned and instructive work of Mövers, Die Phönikier, vol. ii. p. 454 *seqq.* Even at the commencement of the third Punic war, when Carthage was so much reduced in power, she had still three hundred cities in Libya (Strabo, xvii. p. 833). It must be confessed that the name cities or towns (πόλεις) was used by some authors very vaguely. Thus Posidonius ridiculed the affirmation of Polybius (Strabo, iii. p. 162), that Tiberius Gracchus had destroyed three hundred πόλεις of the Celtiberians; Strabo censures others who spoke of one thousand πόλεις of the Iberians. Such a number could only be made good by including large κῶμαι.

[968] Diodor. xx. 17, 18.

[969] Diodor. xx. 15, 16.

[970] See Vol. VII. Ch. lx. p. 304 of this History.

[971] For a description of the fortifications added to Syracuse by the elder Dionysius, see Vol. X. Ch. lxxxii. p. 499 of this History.

[972] Diodor. xx. 29, 30. Cicero (Divinat. i. 24) notices this prophecy and its manner of fulfilment; but he gives a somewhat different version of the events preceding the capture of Hamilkar.

[973] Diodor. xx. 30. τὸν δ᾽ οὖν Ἀμίλκαν οἱ τῶν ἀπολωλότων συγγενεῖς δεδεμένον ἀγαγόντες διὰ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ δεινα῀ς αἰκίαις κατ᾽ αὐτοῦ χρησάμενοι, μετὰ τῆς ἐσχάτης ὕβρεως ἀνεῖλον.

[974] Diodor. xx. 31. διαβοηθείσης δὲ τῆς τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων ἐπιβολῆς κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν νῆσον, ἐνέπεσεν ὁρμὴ ταῖς πόλεσι πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.

[975] Enna is nearly in the centre of Sicily; Erbessus is not far to the north-east of Agrigentum; Echetla is placed by Polybius (i. 15) midway between the domain of Syracuse and that of Carthage.

[976] Diodor. xx. 32.

[977] Diodor. xx. 33. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, περιαλγεῖς γενόμενοι, καὶ βαρβαρικῶς προσκυνήσαντες, etc.

[978] Compare the description in Tacitus, Hist. ii. 29, of the mutiny in the Vitellian army commanded by Fabius Valens, at Ticinum.

"Postquam immissis lictoribus, Valens coercere seditionem cœptabat, ipsum invadunt (milites), saxa jaciunt, fugientem sequuntur.—Valens, servili veste, apud decurionem equitum tegebatur." (Presently the feeling changes, by the adroit management of Alphenus Varus, prefect of the camp)—then, "silentio, patientia, postremo precibus et lacrymis, veniam quærebant. Ut vero deformis et flens, et præter spem incolumis Valens processit, gaudium, miseratio, favor: versi in lætitiam (ut est vulgus utroque immodicum) laudantes gratantesque circumdatum aquilis signisque, in tribunal ferunt."

[979] Diodor. xx. 34.

[980] Diodor. xx. 39.

[981] Diodor. xx. 59. Ὁ δὲ τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἦν κίνδυνος, ἀπροσίτου τῆς πόλεως οὔσης διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν τειχῶν καὶ τῆς θαλάττης ὀχυρότητα.

[982] Diodor. xx. 40.

[983] See Vol. IV. Ch. xxvii. p. 29-49.

[984] See Isokrates, Or. iv. (Philipp.) s. 6, where he speaks of Kyrênê as a spot judiciously chosen for colonization; the natives near it being not dangerous, but suited for obedient neighbors and slaves.

[985] Thucyd. vii. 50.

[986] Pausan. iv. 26; Diodor. xiv. 34.

[987] Strabo, xvii. p. 836; Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. p. 126.

[988] Arrian, vii. 9, 12; Curtius, iv. 7, 9; Diodor. xvii. 49. It is said that the inhabitants of Kyrênê (exact date unknown) applied to Plato to make laws for them, but that he declined. See Thrige, Histor. Cyrênês, p. 191. We should be glad to have this statement better avouched.

[989] Diodor. xvii. 108, xviii. 19; Arrian, De Rebus; post Alexandr. vi. apud Photium, Cod. 92; Strabo, xvii. p. 837.

[990] Diodor. xviii. 19.

[991] Diodor. xvii. 20.

[992] Diodor. xviii. 21.

[993] Arrian, De Rebus post Alex. vi. ap. Phot. Cod. 92; Diodor. xviii. 21; Justin, xiii. 6, 20.

[994] Diodor. xix. 79. Οἱ Κυρηναῖοι … τὴν ἄκραν περιεστρατοπέδευσαν, ὡς αὔτικα μάλα τὴν φρουρὰν ἐκβαλοῦντες, etc.

[995] Justin (xxii. 7, 4) calls Ophellas "rex Cyrenarum;" but it is noway probable that he had become independent of Ptolemy—as Thrige (Hist. Cyrênês, p. 214) supposes. The expression in Plutarch (Demetrius, 14), Ὀφέλλᾳ τῷ ἄρξαντι Κυρήνης, does not necessarily imply an independent authority.

[996] Diodor. xx. 40.

[997] From an incidental allusion in Strabo (xvii. p. 826), we learn this fact—that Ophellas had surveyed the whole coast of Northern Africa, to the straits of Gibraltar, and round the old Phenician settlements on the western coast of modern Morocco. Some eminent critics (Grosskurd among them) reject the reading in Strabo—ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀφέλα (or Ὀφέλλα) περιπλοῦ, which is sustained by a very great preponderance of MSS. But I do not feel the force of their reasons; and the reading which they would substitute has nothing to recommend it. In my judgment, Ophellas, ruling in the Kyrenaica and indulging aspirations towards conquest westward, was a man both likely to order, and competent to bring about, an examination of the North African coast. The knowledge of this fact may have induced Agathokles to apply to him.

[998] Arrian, De Rebus post Alex. ap. Photium, Cod. 92. Αἴγυπτον μὲν γὰρ καὶ Λιβύην, καὶ τὴν ἐπέκεινα ταύτης τὴν πολλὴν, καὶ ὅ,τι περ ἂν πρὸς τούτοις δ᾽ ὅριον ἐπικτήσηται πρὸς δυομένου ἡλίου, Πτολεμαίου εἶναι.

[999] Diodor. xx. 40. πολλοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων προθύμως ὑπήκουσαν εἰς τὴν στρατείαν· οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων, ἔσπευδον κοινωνῆσαι τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, ἐλπίζοντες τήν τε κρατίστην τῆς Λιβύης κατακληρουχήσειν, καὶ τὸν ἐν Καρχηδόνι διαρπάσειν πλοῦτον.

As to the great encouragement held out to settlers, when a new colony was about to be founded by a powerful state, see Thucyd. iii. 93, about Herakleia Trachinia—πᾶς γάρ τις, Λακεδαιμονίων οἰκιζόντων, θαρσαλέως ᾔει, βέβαιαν νομίζων τὴν πόλιν.

[1000] Diodor. xx. 41.

[1001] Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. iv. 3. p. 127, ed. Schneider.

The philosopher would hear this fact from some of the Athenians concerned in the expedition.

[1002] Diodor. xx. 42. See the striking description of the miseries of this same march, made by Cato and his Roman troops after the death of Pompey, in Lucan, Pharsalia, ix. 382-940:—

"Vadimus in campos steriles, exustaque mundi.
Quà nimius Titan, et raræ in fontibus undæ,
Siccaque letiferis squalent serpentibus arva,
Durum iter."

The entire march of Ophellas must (I think) have lasted longer than two months; probably Diodorus speaks only of the more distressing or middle portion of it when he says—κατὰ τὴν ὁδοιπορίαν πλεῖον ἢ δύο μῆνας κακοπαθήσαντες, etc. (xx. 42).

[1003] Diodor. xx. 42; Justin. xxii. 7.

[1004] Diodor. xx. 44.

[1005] Diodor. xx. 43.

[1006] Diodor. xx. 44; Justin, xxii. 7. Compare the description given by Appian (Punic. 128), of the desperate defence made by the Carthaginians in the last siege of the city, against the assault of the Romans, from the house-tops and in the streets.

[1007] There are yet remaining coins—Ἀγαθοκλέος Βασιλέως—the earliest Sicilian coins that bear the name of a prince (Humphreys, Ancient Coins and Medals, p. 50).

[1008] Strabo, xvii. p. 832; Polyb. i. 73.

[1009] Polybius (i. 82) expressly states that the inhabitants of Utica and of Hippu-Akra (a little further to the west than Utica), remained faithful to Carthage throughout the hostilities carried on by Agathokles. This enables us to correct the passage wherein Diodorus describes the attack of Agathokles upon Utica (xx. 54)—ἐπὶ μὲν Ἰτυκαίους ἐστράτευσεν ἀφεστηκότας, ἄφνω δὲ αὐτῶν τῇ πόλει προσπεσών, etc. The word ἀφεστηκότας here is perplexing. It must mean that the Uticans had revolted *from Agathokles*; yet Diodorus has not before said a word about the Uticans, nor reported that they had either joined Agathokles, or been conquered by him. Everything that Diodorus has reported hitherto about Agathokles, relates to operations among the towns east or south-east of Carthage.

It appears to me that the passage ought to stand—ἐπὶ μὲν Ἰτυκαίους ἐστράτευσεν οὐκ ἀφεστηκότας, *i. e.* from Carthage; which introduces consistency into the narrative of Diodorus himself, while it brings him into harmony with Polybius.

[1010] Diodor. xx. 54, 55. In attacking Hippu-Akra (otherwise called Hippo-Zarytus, near the Promontorium Pulchrum, the northernmost point of Africa), Agathokles is said to have got the better in a naval battle—ναυμαχία περιγενόμενος. This implies that he must have got a fleet superior to the Carthaginians even in their own gulf; perhaps ships seized at Utica.

[1011] Diodor. xx. 59.

[1012] Appian distinctly mentions this place *Hippagreta* as having been fortified by Agathokles—and distinctly describes it as being between Utica and Carthage (Punic. 110). It cannot therefore be the same place as Hippu-Akra (or Hippo-Zarytus); which was considerably further from Carthage than Utica was.

[1013] Diodor. xx. 57, 58. It is vain to attempt to identify the places mentioned as visited and conquered by Eumachus. Our topographical knowledge is altogether insufficient. This second Hippu-Akra is supposed to be the same as Hippo-Regius; Tokæ may be Tucca Terebinthina, in the south-eastern region or Byzakium.

[1014] Diodor. xx. 59, 60.

[1015] Diodor. xx. 61.

[1016] Diodor. xx. 56. Ἀγαθοκλῆς δὲ, τῆς μάχης ἄρτι γεγενημένης, καταπλεύσας τῆς Σικελίας εἰς Σελινοῦντα, etc.

[1017] Diodor. xx. 56. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀκραγαντῖνοι ταύτῃ τῇ συμφορᾷ περιπεσόντες, διέλυσαν ἑαυτῶν μὲν τὴν καλλίστην ἐπιβολὴν, τῶν δὲ συμμάχων τὰς τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐλπίδας.

[1018] Apollonia was a town in the interior of the island, somewhat to the north-east of Enna (Cicero, Verr. iii. 43).

[1019] Diodor. xx. 56.

[1020] Diodor. xx. 62.

[1021] Diodor. xx. 61.

[1022] Diodor. xx. 57. καὶ πάντων τούτων ἐν φυγαῖς καὶ μελέταις τοῦ πονεῖν συνεχῶς γεγονότων, etc.

[1023] Diodor. xx. 61, 62.

[1024] Diodor. xx. 62.

[1025] Diodor. xx. 64; Justin, xxii. 8.

[1026] Diodor. xx. 65. See an incident somewhat similar (Herod. vii. 180)—the Persians, in the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, sacrificed the handsomest Grecian prisoner whom they captured on board the first prize-ship that fell into their hands.

[1027] Diodor. xx. 66, 67.

[1028] Diodor. xx. 69; Justin, xxii. 8. … τὸ δὲ πλῆθος, ὡς εἶδεν, εἰς ἔλεον ἐτράπη, καὶ πάντες ἐπεβόων ἀφεῖναι· ὁ δὲ λυθεὶς καὶ μετ᾽ ὀλίγων ἐμβὰς εἰς τὸ πορθμεῖον, ἔλαθεν ἐκπλεύσας κατὰ τὴν δύσιν τῆς Πλειάδος, χειμῶνος ὄντος.

[1029] Diodor. xx. 69.

[1030] Tacit. Annal. i. 9. "Multus hinc ipso de Augusto sermo, plerisque *vana mirantibus*—quod idem dies accepti quondam imperii princeps, et vitæ supremus—quod Nolæ in domo et cubiculo, in quo pater ejus Octavius, vitam finivisset", etc.

[1031] Diodor. xx. 70.

[1032] This is what Agathokles might have done, but did not do. Nevertheless, Valerius Maximus (vii. 4, 1) represents him as having actually done it, and praises his sagacity on that ground. Here is an example how little careful these collectors of anecdotes sometimes are about their facts.

[1033] Diodor. xx. 71. We do not know what happened afterwards with this town under its new population. But the old name Egesta was afterwards resumed.

[1034] Compare the proceedings of the Greco-Libyan princess Pheretimê (of the Battiad family) at Barka (Herodot. iv. 202).

[1035] Diodor. xx. 72. Hippokrates and Epikydes—those Syracusans who, about a century afterwards, induced Hieronymus of Syracuse to prefer the Carthaginian alliance to the Roman—had resided at Carthage for some time, and served in the army of Hannibal, because their grandfather had been banished from Syracuse as one concerned in killing Archagathus (Polyb. vii. 2).

[1036] Diodor. xx. 78, 79. Some said that the sum of money paid by the Carthaginians was 300 talents. Timæus stated it at 150 talents.

[1037] Diodor. xx. 89.

[1038] Diodor. xx. 90.

[1039] Diodor. xx. 101. This expedition of Agathokles against the Lyparæan isles seems to have been described in detail by his contemporary historian, the Syracusan Kallias: see the Fragments of that author, in Didot's Fragment. Hist. Græc. vol. ii. p. 383. Fragm. 4.

[1040] Diodor. xx. 104.

[1041] Diodor. xx. 104; Livy, x. 2. A curious anecdote appears in the Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mirabilibus (78) respecting two native Italians, Aulus and Caius, who tried to poison Kleonymus at Tarentum, but were detected and put to death by the Tarentines.

That Agathokles, in his operations on the coast of southern Italy, found himself in conflict with the Romans, and that their importance was now strongly felt—we may judge by the fact, that the Syracusan Kallias (contemporary and historian of Agathokles) appears to have given details respecting the origin and history of Rome. See the Fragments of Kallias, ap. Didot, Hist. Græc. Frag. vol. ii. p. 383; Fragm. 5—and Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. i. 72.

[1042] Diodor. xx. 105.

[1043] Diodor. xxi. Fragm. 2. p. 265.

[1044] Diodor. xxi. Fragm. 3. p. 266.

[1045] Diodor. xxi. Fragm. 4, 8, 11. p. 266-273.

[1046] Diodor. xxi. Fragm. 12. p. 276-278. Neither Justin (xxiii. 2) nor Trogus before him, (as it seems from the Prologue) alludes to poison. He represents Agathokles as having died by a violent distemper. He notices however the bloody family feud, and the murder of the uncle by the nephew.

[1047] Justin (xxiii. 2) dwells pathetically on this last parting between Agathokles and Theoxena. It is difficult to reconcile Justin's narrative with that of Diodorus; but on this point, as far as we can judge, I think him more credible than Diodorus.

[1048] Polyb. xv. 35. See above in this History, Vol. XI. Ch. lxxxiii. p. 46.

[1049] Polybius (ix. 23) says that Agathokles, though cruel in the extreme at the beginning of his career, and in the establishment of his power, yet became the mildest of men after his power was once established. The latter half of this statement is contradicted by all the particular facts which we know respecting Agathokles.

As to Timæus the historian, indeed (who had been banished from Sicily by Agathokles, and who wrote the history of the latter in five books), Polybius had good reason to censure him, as being unmeasured in his abuse

of Agathokles. For Timæus not only recounted of Agathokles numerous acts of nefarious cruelty—acts of course essentially public, and therefore capable of being known—but also told much scandal about his private habits, and represented him (which is still more absurd) as a man vulgar and despicable in point of ability. See the Fragments of Timæus ap. Histor. Græc. ed. Didot. Frag. 144-150.

All, or nearly all, the acts of Agathokles, as described in the preceding pages, have been copied from Diodorus; who had as good authorities before him as Polybius possessed. Diodorus does not copy the history of Agathokles from Timæus; on the contrary, he censures Timæus for his exaggerated acrimony and injustice towards Agathokles, in terms not less forcibly than those which Polybius employs (xxi. Fragm. p. 279). Diodorus cites Timæus by name, occasionally and in particular instances: but he evidently did not borrow from that author the main stream of his narrative. He seems to have had before him other authorities—among them some highly favorable to Agathokles—the Syracusan Kallias—and Antander, brother of Agathokles (xxi. p. 278-282).

[1050] Diodor. xx. 63.

[1051] The poet Theokritus (xvi. 75-80) expatiates on the bravery of the Syracusan Hiero II., and on the great warlike power of the Syracusans under him (B. C. 260-240), which he represents as making the Carthaginians tremble for their possessions in Sicily. Personally, Hiero seems to have deserved this praise—and to have deserved yet more praise for his mild and prudent internal administration of Syracuse. But his military force was altogether secondary in the great struggle between Rome and Carthage for the mastery of Sicily.

[1052] Cæsar, Bell. Gall. ii. 1; Strabo, iv. p. 179.

[1053] See Poseidonius ap. Athenæum, iv. p. 152.

[1054] Strabo, iv. p. 180.

[1055] Strabo (xii. p. 575) places Massalia in the same rank as Kyzikus, Rhodes and Carthage; types of maritime cities highly and effectively organized.

[1056] Livy, xl. 18; Polybius, xxx. 4.

[1057] The oration composed by Demosthenes πρὸς Ζηνόδεμιν, relates to an affair wherein a ship, captain, and mate, all from Massalia, are found engaged in the carrying trade between Athens and Syracuse (Demosth. p. 382 *seq.*).

[1058] Brückner, Histor. Massiliensium, c. 7 (Göttingen).

[1059] Livy, xxxiv. 8; Strabo. iii. p. 160. At Massalia, it is said that no armed stranger was ever allowed to enter the city, without depositing his arms at the gate (Justin, xliii. 4).

This precaution seems to have been adopted in other cities also: see Æneas, Poliorket. c. 30.

[1060] Strabo, iii. p. 165. A fact told to Poseidonius by a Massaliot proprietor who was his personal friend.

In the siege of Massalia by Cæsar, a detachment of Albici,—mountaineers not far from the town, and old allies or dependents—were brought in to help in the defence (Cæsar, Bell. G. i. 34).

[1061] Strabo, iv. p. 180.

[1062] Strabo, iv. p. 181; Cicero, De Republ. xxvii. Fragm. Vacancies in the senate seem to have been filled up from meritorious citizens generally—as far as we can judge by a brief allusion in Aristotle (Polit. vi. 7).

From another passage in the same work, it seems that the narrow basis of the oligarchy must have given rise to dissensions (v. 6). Aristotle had included the Μασσαλιωτῶν πολιτεία in his lost work Περὶ Πολιτειῶν.

[1063] Strabo, *l. c.* However, one author from whom Athenæus borrowed (xii. p. 523), described the Massaliots as luxurious in their habits.

[1064] Strabo, iv. p. 199. Ἔφορος δὲ ὑπερβάλλουσαν τῷ μεγέθει λέγει τὴν Κελτικήν, ὥστε ἥσπερ νῦν Ἰβηρίας καλοῦμεν ἐκείνοις τὰ πλεῖστα προσνέμειν μέχρι Γαδείρων, φιλέλληνάς τε ἀποφαίνει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ πολλὰ ἰδίως λέγει περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐοικότα τοῖς νῦν. Compare p. 181.

It is to be remembered that Ephorus was a native of the Asiatic Kymê the immediate neighbor of Phokæa, which was the metropolis of Massalia. The Massaliots never forgot or broke off their connection with Phokæa:

see the statement of their intercession with the Romans on behalf of Phokæa (Justin, xxxvii. 1). Ephorus therefore had good means of learning whatever Massaliot citizens were disposed to communicate.

[1065] Varro, Antiq. Fragm. p. 350, ed. Bipont.

[1066] See the Fragmenta Pytheæ collected by Arfwedson, Upsal, 1824. He wrote two works—1. Γῆς Περιόδος. 2. Περὶ Ὠκεανοῦ. His statements were greatly esteemed, and often followed, by Eratosthenes; partially followed by Hipparchus; harshly judged by Polybius, whom Strabo in the main follows. Even by those who judge him most severely, Pytheas is admitted to have been a good mathematician and astronomer (Strabo, iv. p. 201)—and to have travelled extensively in person. Like Herodotus, he must have been forced to report a great deal on hearsay; and all that he could do was to report the best hearsay information which reached him. It is evident that his writings made an epoch in geographical inquiries; though they doubtless contained numerous inaccuracies. See a fair estimate of Pytheas in Mannert, Geog. der Gr. und Römer, Introd. i. p. 73-86.

The Massaliotic Codex of Homer, possessed and consulted among others by the Alexandrine critics, affords presumption that the celebrity of Massalia as a place of Grecian literature and study (in which character it competed with Athens towards the commencement of the Roman empire) had its foundations laid at least in the third century before the Christian era.

[1067] Aristotle, Politic. v. 2, 11; v. 5, 2.

[1068] See Vol. IX. Ch. lxxi. p. 129 *seqq.*

[1069] See the remarkable life of the Karian Datames, by Cornelius Nepos, which gives some idea of the situation of Paphlagonia about 360-350 B. C. (cap. 7, 8). Compare Xenoph. Hellenic. iv. 1, 4.

[1070] Arrian, iii. 24, 8; Curtius, vi. 5, 6.

[1071] Polybius, v. 43.

[1072] Xenoph. Anab. vi. 6, 2.

[1073] Aristot. Polit. v. 5, 2; v. 5, 5. Another passage in the same work, however (v. 4, 2), says, that in Herakleia, the democracy was subverted immediately after the foundation of the colony, through the popular leaders; who committed injustice against the rich. These rich men were banished, but collected strength enough to return and subvert the democracy by force.

If this passage alludes to the same Herakleia (there were many towns of that name), the government must have been originally democratical. But the serfdom of the natives seems to imply an oligarchy.

[1074] Aristot. Polit. vii. 5, 7; Polyæn. vi. 9, 3, 4; compare Pseudo-Aristotle Œconomic. ii. 9.

The reign of Leukon lasted from about 392-352 B. C. The event alluded to by Polyænus must have occurred at some time during this interval.

[1075] Justin, xvi. 4.

[1076] Aristot. v. 5, 2; 5, 10.

[1077] Justin, xvi. 4.

[1078] Æneas, Poliorket. c. 11. I have given what seems the most probable explanation of a very obscure passage.

It is to be noted that the distribution of citizens into centuries (ἑκατοστύες) prevailed also at Byzantium; see Inscript. No. 2060 ap. Boeck. Corp. Inscr. Græc. p. 130. A citizen of Olbia, upon whom the citizenship of Byzantium is conferred, is allowed to enroll himself in any one of the ἑκατοστύες, that he prefers.

[1079] Diodor. xv. 81. ἐζήλωσε μὲν τὴν Διονυσίου τοῦ Συρακοσίου διαγωγὴν, etc. Memnon, Fragm. c. 1; Isokrates, Epist. vii.

It is here that the fragments of Memnon, as abstracted by Photius (Cod. 224), begin. Photius had seen only eight books of Memnon's History of Herakleia (Books ix.-xvi. inclusive); neither the first eight books (see the end of his Excerpta from Memnon), nor those after the sixteenth, had come under his view. This is greatly to be regretted, as we are thus shut out from the knowledge of Heraklean affairs anterior to Klearchus.

It happens, not unfrequently, with Photius, that he does not possess an entire work, but only parts of it; this is a curious fact, in reference to the libraries of the ninth century A. D.

The fragments of Memnon are collected out of Photius, together with those of Nymphis and other Herakleotic historians, and illustrated with useful notes and citations, in the edition of Orelli; as well as by K. Müller, in Didot's Fragm. Hist. Græc. tom. iii. p. 525. Memnon carried his history down to the time of Julius Cæsar, and appears to have lived shortly after the Christian era. Nymphis (whom he probably copied) was much older; having lived seemingly from about 300-230 B. C. (see the few Fragmenta remaining from him, in the same work, iii. p. 12). The work of the Herakleotic author Herodôrus seems to have been altogether upon legendary matter (see Fragm. in the same work, ii. p. 27). He was half a century earlier than Nymphis.

[1080] Suidas v. Κλέαρχος.

[1081] Polyænus, ii. 30, 1; Justin, xvi. 4. "A quibus revocatus in patriam, per quos in arce collocatus fuerat", etc.

Æneas (Poliorket. c. 12) cites this proceeding as an example of the mistake made by a political party, in calling in a greater number of mercenary auxiliaries than they could manage or keep in order.

[1082] Justin, xvi. 4, 5; Theopompus ap. Athenæ. iii. p. 85. Fragm. 200, ed. Didot.

[1083] Memnon, c. 1. The seventh Epistle of Isokrates, addressed to Timotheus son of Klearchus, recognizes generally this character of the latter with whose memory Isokrates disclaims all sympathy.

[1084] Memnon, c. 1; Justin, xvi. 5; Diodor. xvi 36.

[1085] Memnon, c. 2. ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ φιλαδελφίᾳ τὸ πρῶτον ἠνέγκατο· τὴν γὰρ ἀρχὴν τοῖς τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ παισὶν ἀνεπηρέαστον συντηρῶν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τῆς αὐτῶν κηδεμονίας λόγον ἐτίθετο, ὡς καὶ γυναικὶ συνὼν, καὶ τότε λίαν στεργομένῃ, μὴ ἀνασχέσθαι παιδοποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μηχανῇ πάσῃ γονῆς στέρησιν ἑαυτῷ δικάσαι, ὡς ἂν μήδ' ὅλως ὑπολίποι τινὰ ἐφεδρεύοντα τοῖς τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ παισίν.

In the Antigonid dynasty of Macedonia, we read that Demetrius, son of Antigonus Gonatas, died leaving his son Philip a boy. Antigonus called Doson, younger brother of Demetrius, assumed the regency on behalf of Philip; he married the widow of Demetrius, and had children by her; but he was so anxious to guard Philip's succession against all chance of being disturbed, that he refused to bring up his own children—Ὁ δὲ παιδῶν γενομένων ἐκ τῆς Χρυσηΐδος, οὐκ ἀνεθρέψατο, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῷ Φιλιππῷ περισώζων (Porphyry, Fragm. ap. Didot, Fragm. Histor. Græc. vol. iii. p. 701).

In the Greek and Roman world, the father was generally considered to have the right of determining whether he would or would not bring up a new-born child. The obligation was only supposed to commence when he accepted or sanctioned it, by taking up the child.

[1086] Memnon, c. 3. The Epistle of Isokrates (vii.) addressed to Timotheus in recommendation of a friend, is in harmony with this general character, but gives no new information.

Diodorus reckons Timotheus as immediately succeeding Klearchus his father—considering Satyrus simply as regent (xvi. 36).

[1087] We hear of Klearchus as having besieged Astakus (afterwards Nikomedia)—at the interior extremity of the north-eastern indentation of the Propontis, called the Gulf of Astakus (Polyænus, ii. 30, 3).

[1088] Memnon, c. 1.

[1089] Memnon, c. 20.

[1090] Memnon, c. 3.

[1091] Memnon, c. 3. See in this History, Vol. XI. Ch. lxxxv. p. 154.

[1092] Memnon, c. 4.

[1093] Strabo, xii. p. 565.

[1094] Memnon, c. 4: compare Diodor. xx. 53.

[1095] Nymphis, Fragm. 16. ap. Athenæum, xii. p. 549; Ælian, V. H. ix. 13.

[1096] Strabo, xii. p. 565. So also Antioch, on the Orontes in Syria, the great foundation of Seleukus Nikator, was established on or near the site of another Antigonia, also previously founded by Antigonus Monophthalmus (Strabo, xv. p. 750).

[1097] Strabo, xii. p. 544.

[1098] Memnon, c. 6.

[1099] Memnon, c. 7, 8.

[1100] Memnon, c. 9; Strabo, xii. p. 542.

[1101] Memnon, c. 11.

[1102] Memnon, c. 16. The inhabitants of Byzantium also purchased for a considerable sum the important position called the Ἱερὸν, at the entrance of the Euxine on the Asiatic side (Polybius, iv. 50).

These are rare examples, in ancient history, of cities acquiring territory or dependencies *by purchase*. Acquisitions were often made in this manner by the free German, Swiss, and Italian cities of mediæval Europe; but as to the Hellenic cities, I have not had occasion to record many such transactions in the course of this history.

[1103] Memnon, c. 13: compare Polyb. xviii. 34.

[1104] This is a remarkable observation made by Memnon, c. 19.

[1105] See the statement of Polybius, xxii. 24.

[1106] Contrast the independent and commanding position occupied by Byzantium in 399 B. C., acknowledging no superior except Sparta (Xenoph. Anab. vii. 1)—with its condition in the third century B. C.—harassed and pillaged almost to the gates of the town by the neighboring Thracians and Gauls, and only purchased immunity by continued money payments: see Polybius, iv. 45.

[1107] Strabo, vii. p. 319. Philip of Macedon defeated the Scythian prince Atheas or Ateas (about 340 B. C.) somewhere between Mount Hæmus and the Danube (Justin, ix. 2). But the relations of Ateas with the towns of Istrus and Apollonia, which are said to have brought Philip into the country, are very difficult to understand. It is most probable that these cities invited Philip as their defender.

In Inscription No. 2056 c. (in Boeckh's Corp. Inscript. Græc. part xi. p. 79), the five cities constituting the Pentapolis are not clearly named. Boeckh supposes them to be Apollonia, Mesembria, Odêssus, Kallatis, and Tomi; but Istrus seems more probable than Tomi. Odêssus was on the site of the modern Varna where the Inscription was found; greatly south of the modern town of Odessa, which is on the site of another town *Ordêsus*.

An Inscription (2056) immediately preceding the above, also found at Odêssus, contains a vote of thanks and honors to a certain citizen of Antioch, who resided with … (name imperfect), king of the Scythians and rendered great service to the Greeks by his influence.

[1108] Diodor. xix. 73; xx. 25.

[1109] Strabo, vii. p. 302-305; Pausanias, i. 9, 5.

[1110] Dion Chrysost. Orat. xxxvi. (Borysthenitica) p. 75, Reisk. εἶλον δὲ καὶ ταύτην (Olbia) Γέται, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἀριστέροις τοῦ Πόντου πόλεις, μέχρι Ἀπολλωνίας· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ σφόδρα ταπεινὰ τὰ πράγματα κατέστη τῶν ταύτῃ Ἑλλήνων· τῶν μὲν οὐκέτι συνοικισθεισῶν πόλεων, τῶν δὲ φαυλῶς, καὶ τῶν πλείστων βαρβάρων εἰς αὐτὰς συῤῥεόντων.

[1111] The picture drawn by Ovid, of his situation as an exile at Tomi, can never fail to interest, from the mere beauty and felicity of his expression; but it is not less interesting, as a real description of Hellenism in its last phase, degraded and overborne by adverse fates. The truth of Ovid's picture is fully borne out by the analogy of Olbia, presently to be mentioned. His complaints run through the five books of the Tristia, and the four books of Epistolæ ex Ponto (Trist. v. 10, 15).

"Innumeræ circa gentes fera bella minantur,
Quæ sibi non rapto vivere turpe putant.
Nil extra tutum est: tumulus defenditur ægre
Mœnibus exiguis ingenioque soli.
Cum minime credas, ut avis, densissimus hostis
Advolat, et prædam vix bene visus agit.
Sæpe intra muros clausis venientia portis
Per medias legimus noxia tela vias.
Est igitur rarus, qui colere audeat, isque
Hac arat infelix, hac tenet arma manu.
Vix ope castelli defendimur: et tamen intus
Mista facit Græcis barbara turba metum.
Quippe simul nobis habitat discrimine nullo
Barbarus, et tecti plus quoque parte tenet.
Quos ut non timeas, possis odisse, videndo
Pellibus et longâ corpora tecta comâ.
Hos quoque, qui geniti Graiâ creduntur ab urbe,
Pro patrio cultu Persica bracca tegit," etc.

This is a specimen out of many others: compare Trist. iii. 10, 53; iv. 1, 67; Epist. Pont. iii. 1.

Ovid dwells especially upon the fact that there was more of barbaric than of Hellenic speech at Tomi—"Graiaque quod Getico victa loquela sono est" (Trist. v. 2, 68). Woollen clothing, and the practice of spinning and weaving by the free women of the family, were among the most familiar circumstances of Grecian life; the absence of these feminine arts, and the use of skins or leather for clothing, were notable departures from Grecian habits (Ex Ponto, iii. 8):—

"Vellera dura ferunt pecudes; et Palladis uti
Arte Tomitanæ non didicere nurus.
Femina pro lanâ Cerealia munera frangit,
Suppositoque gravem vertice portat aquam."

[1112] Herodot. iv. 16-18. The town was called *Olbia* by its inhabitants, but *Borysthenes* usually by foreigners; though it was not on the Borysthenes river (Dnieper), but on the right bank of the Hypanis (Bug).

[1113] Herodot. iv. 76-80.

[1114] Strabo, vii. p. 302: Skymnus Chius, v. 112, who usually follows Ephorus.

The rhetor Dion tells us (Orat. xxxvi. init.) that he went to Olbia in order that he might *go through the Scythians to the Getæ*. This shows that in his time (about A. D. 100) the Scythians must have been between the Bug and Dniester—the Getæ nearer to the Danube—just as they had been four centuries earlier. But many new hordes were mingled with them.

[1115] Strabo, vii. p. 296-304.

[1116] This Inscription—No. 2058—in Boeckh's Inscr. Græc. part xi. p. 121 *seq.*—is among the most interesting in that noble collection. It records a vote of public gratitude and honor to a citizen of Olbia named Protogenes, and recites the valuable services which he as well as his father had rendered to the city. It thus describes the numerous situations of difficulty and danger from which he had contributed to extricate them. A vivid picture is presented to us of the distress of the city. The introduction prefixed by Boeckh (p. 86-89) is also very instructive.

Olbia is often spoken of by the name of *Borysthenes*, which name was given to it by foreigners, but not recognized by the citizens. Nor was it even situated on the Borysthenes river; but on the right or western bank of the Hypanis (Bug) river; not far from the modern Oczakoff.

The date of the above Inscription is not specified, and has been differently determined by various critics. Niebuhr assigns it (Untersuchungen über die Skythen, etc. in his Kleine Schriften, p. 387) to a time near the close of the second Punic war. Boeckh also believes that it is not much after that epoch. The terror inspired by the Gauls, even to other barbarians, appears to suit the second century B. C. better than it suits a later period.

The Inscription No. 2059 attests the great number of strangers resident at Olbia; strangers from eighteen different cities, of which the most remote is Miletus, the mother-city of Olbia.

[1117] On one occasion, we know not when, the citizens of Olbia are said to have been attacked by one Zopyrion, and to have succeeded in resisting him only by emancipating their slaves, and granting the citizenship to foreigners (Macrobius, Saturnal. i. 11).

[1118] Dion Chrys. (Or. xxxvi. p. 75), ἀεὶ μὲν πολεμεῖται, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἐάλωκε, etc.

[1119] Dion Chrysost. Orat. xxxvi. (Borysthenit.) p. 75, 76, Reisk.

[1120] See Boeckh's Commentary on the language and personal names of the Olbian Inscriptions, part xi. p. 108-116.

[1121] Dion, Orat. xxxvi. (Borysthenit.), p. 78, Reiske. … καὶ τἆλλα μὲν οὐκέτι σαφῶς ἑλληνίζοντες, διὰ τὸ ἐν μέσοις οἰκεῖν τοῖς βαρβάροις, ὅμως τήν γε Ἰλιάδα ὀλίγου πάντες ἴσασιν ἀπὸ στόματος. I translate the words ὀλίγου πάντες with some allowance for rhetoric.

The representation given by Dion of the youthful citizen of Olbia—Kallistratus—with whom he conversed, is curious as a picture of Greek manners in this remote land; a youth of eighteen years of age, with genuine Ionic features, and conspicuous for his beauty (εἶχε πολλοὺς ἐραστάς) a zealot for literature and philosophy, but especially for Homer; clothed in the costume of the place, suited for riding—the long leather trowsers, and short black cloak; constantly on horseback for defence of the town, and celebrated as a warrior even at that early age, having already killed or made prisoners several Sarmatians (p. 77).

[1122] See Inscriptions, Nos. 2076, 2077, ap. Boeckh; and Arrian's Periplus of the Euxine, ap. Geogr. Minor. p. 21, ed. Hudson.

[1123] Strabo, vii. p. 310.

[1124] Diodor. xii. 31.

[1125] See Mr. Clinton's Appendix on the Kings of Bosporus—Fast. Hellen. App. c. 13. p. 280. etc.; and Boeckh's Commentary on the same subject, Inscript. Græc. part xi. p. 91 *seq.*

[1126] Polybius (iv. 38) enumerates the principal articles of this Pontic trade; among the exports τά τε δέρματα καὶ τὸ τῶν εἰς τὰς δουλείας ἀγομένων σωμάτων πλῆθος, etc., where Schweighäuser has altered δέρματα to θρέμματα seemingly on the authority of one MS. only. I doubt the propriety of this change, as well as the facts of any large exportation of live cattle from the Pontus; whereas the exportation of hides was considerable: see Strabo, xi. p. 493.

The Scythian public slaves or policemen of Athens are well known. Σκύθαινα also is the name of a female slave (Aristoph. Lysistr. 184). Σκύθης, for the name of a slave, occurs as early as Theognis, v. 826.

Some of the salted preparations from the Pontus were extravagantly dear; Cato complained of a κεράμιον Ποντικῶν ταρίχον as sold for 300 drachmæ (Polyb. xxxi. 24).

[1127] Harpokration and Photius, v. Νυμφαῖον—from the ψηφίσματα collected by Kraterus. Compare Boeckh, in the second edition of his Staatshaushaltung der Athener, vol. ii. p. 658.

[1128] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 78. c. 57. See my last preceding Vol. XI. Ch. lxxxvii. p. 263.

[1129] Lysias, pro Mantitheo, Or. xvi. s. 4; Isokrates (Trapezitic.), Or. xvii. s. 5. The young man, whose case Isokrates sets forth, was sent to Athens by his father Sopæus, a rich Pontic Greek (s. 52) much in the confidence of Satyrus. Sopæus furnished his son with two ship-loads of corn, and with money besides—and then despatched him to Athens ἅμα κατ᾽ ἐμποριαν καὶ κατὰ θεωριαν.

[1130] Isokrates, Trapez. s. 5, 6. Sopæus, father of this pleader, had incurred the suspicions of Satyrus in the Pontus, and had been arrested; upon which Satyrus sends to Athens to seize the property of the son, to order him home,—and if he refused, then to require the Athenians to deliver him up—ἐπιστέλλει δὲ τοῖς ἐνθάδε ἐπιδημοῦσιν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου τά τε χρήματα παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ κομίσασθαι, etc.

[1131] Isokrates, Trapezit. s. 71. Demosthenes also recognizes favors from Satyrus—καὶ αὐτὸς (Leukon) καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι, etc. (adv. Leptin. p. 467).

[1132] Demosth. adv. Leptin., p. 467.

[1133] Demosth. adv. Leptin., p. 469.

[1134] Demosth. adv. Phormion., p. 917; Deinarchus adv. Demosth., p. 34. The name stands Berisades as printed in the oration; but it is plain that Parisades is the person designated. See Boeckh, Introd. ad Inscr. No. 2056, p. 92.

Deinarchus avers, that Demosthenes received an annual present of 1000 modii of corn from Bosporus.

[1135] Demosthen. adv. Dionysodor. p. 1285.

[1136] Strabo, vii. p. 310, 311.

[1137] See Inscript. Nos. 2117, 2118, 2119, in Boeckh's Collection, p. 156.

In the Memorabilia of Xenophon (ii. 1, 10). Sokrates cites the Scythians as an example of ruling people, and the Mæotæ as an example of subjects. Probably this refers to the position of the Bosporanic Greeks, who paid tribute to the Scythians, but ruled over the Mæotæ. The name *Mæotæ* seems confined to tribes on the Asiatic side of the Palus Mæotis; while the Scythians were on the European side of that sea. Sokrates and the Athenians had good means of being informed about the situation of the Bosporani and their neighbors on both sides. See K. Neumann, die Hellenen im Skythenlande, b. ii. p. 216.

[1138] This boundary is attested in another Inscription No. 2104, of the same collection. Inscription No. 2103, seems to indicate Arcadian mercenaries in the service of Leukon: about the mercenaries, see Diodor. xx. 22.

Parisades I. is said to have been worshipped as a god, after his death (Strabo, vii. p. 310).

[1139] Diodor. xx. 24 The scene of these military operations (as far as we can pretend to make it out from the brief and superficial narrative of Diodorus), seems to have been on the European side of Bosporus; somewhere between the Borysthenes river and the Isthmus of Perekop, in the territory called by Herodotus *Hylæa*. This is Niebuhr's opinion, which I think more probable than that of Boeckh, who supposes the operations to have occurred on the Asiatic territory of Bosporus. So far I concur with Niebuhr; but his reasons for placing Dromichætes king of the Getæ (the victor over Lysimachus), east of the Borysthenes, are noway satisfactory.

Compare Niebuhr's Untersuchungen über die Skythen, etc. (in his Kleine Schriften, p. 380). with Boeckh's Commentary on the Sarmatian Inscriptions, Corp. Ins. Græc. part xi. p. 83-103.

The mention by Diodorus of a wooden fortress, surrounded by morass and forest, is curious, and may be illustrated by the description in Herodotus (iv. 108) of the city of the Budini. This habit of building towns and fortifications of wood, prevailed among the Slavonic population in Russia and Poland until far down in the middle ages. See Paul Joseph Schaffarik, Slavische Alterhümer, in the German translation of Wuttke, vol. i. ch. 10 p. 192; also K. Neumann, Die Hellenen im Skythenlande, p. 91.

[1140] Diodor. xx. 24.

[1141] Diodor. xx. 25.

[1142] Diodor. xx. 100. Spartokus IV.—son of Eumelus—is recognized in one Attic Inscription (No. 107), and various Bosporanic (No. 2105, 2106, 2120) in Boeckh's Collection. Parisades II.—son of Spartokus—is recognized in another Bosporanic Inscription, No. 2107—seemingly also in No. 2120 *b.*

[1143] Strabo, vii. p. 310. Deinarchus however calls Parisades, Satyrus, and Gorgippus, τοὺς ἐχθίστους τύραννους (adv. Demosth. s. 44).

[1144] Strabo, vii. p. 310. οὐχ οἷός τε ὢν ἀντέχειν πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους, φόρον πραττομένους μείζω τοῦ πρότερον, etc.

[1145] Neumann, Die Hellenen im Skythenlande, p. 503.

[1146] An account of the recent discoveries near Kertch or Pantikapæum, will be found in Dubois de Montpéreux, Voyage dans le Caucase, vol. v. p. 135 *seqq.*; and in Neumann, Die Hellenen im Skythenlande, pp. 483-533. The last-mentioned work is peculiarly copious and instructive; relating what has been done since Dubois's travels, and containing abundant information derived from the recent memoirs of the St. Petersburg Literary Societies.

The local and special type, which shows itself so much on these works of art, justifies the inference that they were not brought from other Grecian cities, but executed by Grecian artists resident at Pantikapæum (p. 507). Two marble statues, a man and a woman, both larger than life, exhumed in 1850, are spoken of with peculiar admiration (p. 491). Coins of the third and fourth century B. C. have been found in several (p. 494, 495). A great number of the so-called Etruscan vases have also been discovered, probably fabricated from a species of clay still existing in the neighborhood: the figures on these vases are often excellent, with designs and scenes of every description, religious, festal, warlike, domestic (p. 522). Many of the sarcophagi are richly ornamented with carvings, in wood, ivory, etc; some admirably executed (p. 521).

Unfortunately, the belief prevails, and has long prevailed, among the neighboring population, that these tumuli contain hidden treasures. One of the most striking among them—called the Kul-Obo—was opened in 1830 by the Russian authorities. After great pains and trouble, the means of entrance were discovered, and the interior chamber was reached. It was the richest that had ever been opened; being found to contain some splendid golden ornaments, as well as many other relics. The Russian officers placed a guard to prevent any one from entering it; but the cupidity of the population of Kertch was so inflamed by the report of the expected treasure being discovered, that they forced the guard, broke into the interior, and pillaged most of the contents (p. 509). The Russian authorities have been generally anxious for the preservation and gradual excavation of these monuments, but have had to contend against repugnance and even rapacity on the part of the people near.

Dubois de Montpéreux gives an interesting description of the opening of these tumuli near Kertch—especially of the Kul-Obo, the richest of all, which he conceives to have belonged to one of the Spartokid kings, and the decorations of which were the product of Hellenic art:—

"Si l'on a enterré (he observes) un roi entouré d'un luxe Scythique, ce sont des Græcs et des artistes de cette nation qui ont travaillé à ses funerailles" (Voyage autour du Caucase, pp. 195, 213, 227). Pantikapæum and Phanagoria (he says) "se reconnoissent de loin à la foule de leurs tumulus" (p. 137).

[1147] How marked that degradation was, may be seen attested by Dionysius of Halikarnassus, De Antiquis Oratoribus, pp. 445, 446, Reiske—ἐν γὰρ δὴ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν χρόνοις ἡ μὲν ἀρχαία καὶ φιλόσοφος ῥητορικὴ προπηλακιζομένη καὶ δεινὰς ὕβρεις ὑπομένουσα κατελύετο, ἀρξαμένη μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Μακεδόνος τελευτῆς ἐκπνεῖν καὶ μαραίνεσθαι κατ᾽ ὀλίγον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἡλικίας μικροῦ δεήσασα εἰς τέλος ἠφανίσθαι. Compare Dionys. De Composit. Verbor. p. 29, 30, Reisk.; and Westermann, Geschichte der Griechischen Beredtsamkeit, s. 75-77.

[1148] Hom. Iliad, vi. 97.

[1149] Hom. Odyss. xvii. 322.—

ἥμισυ γάρ τ᾽ ἀρετῆς ἀποαίνυται εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς
ἀνέρος, εὖτ᾽ ἄν μιν κατὰ δούλιον ἦμαρ ἕλῃσιν.

LIST OF THE PLANS IN THE HISTORY

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Maliac Gulf and Thermopylæ v
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
MALIAC GULF
AND
THERMOPYLÆ
Olympic Stadia
10
20
R. SPERCHEIOS
ANTIKYRA
ANCIENT LINE OF COAST
PRESENT LINE OF COAST
PRESENT COURSE OF THE R. SPERCHEIOS
ALLUVIAL DEPOSITS
PRESENT MOUTHS
OETA STAGE
R. DYRAS
PRESENT COURSE
PYRA
MALIS (DN)
R. MELAS
COAST
ANTHELA
HOT SPRINGS
THERMODON R.
HOT SPRINGS
PHOKIAN WALL
AMPHIKTYONIC WALL
NIKAIA
ALPENO
SALT SPRINGS
CAMP OF XERXES
TRACHIS
HERAKLEIA
MALIAN GULF
LOKRIS
TEICHIUS
RHODINIA
KALLIDROMON
PASS OF THERMOPYLÆ
Mt. KALLIDROMOS
TARPHE
DORIS
PHOKIS


BAY OF ELEUSIS.
MEGARIS
ATTICA
ATHENS
PHALERON
BATTLE
OF
SALAMIS
B.C. 480.

PERSIAN CAMP
GARGAPHIA
ERYTHRAE
PLATÆA
AGORA
ASOPUS
R. OEROE
ISLAND HILL
ACROPOLIS
GRAECIA
Mt. K.
BATTLE OF PLATÆA
B.C 479.
a Persians.
b Athenians.
c Lacedæmonians
d Various Greek Allies
I First Position occupied by the opposing armies
II. Second Position.
III. Third Position.

PLAN ILLUSTRATING THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE ATHENIAN FLEET (UNDER PHORMIO) AND THE PELOPONNESIAN FLEET.
DESCRIBED IN THUCYDIDES, II. 86, 92.

A. First station of Phormio and the Athenian Fleet.
B. First station of the Peloponnesian Fleet.
C. Position of the Athenian Fleet in course towards Naupaktus at the moment before the battle.
D. Position of the Peloponnesian Fleet at the moment before the battle (in apparent course towards Naupaktus).

PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE

THE BATTLE OF AMPHIPOLIS



REFERENCES

1, Bridge (connecting Amphipolis w th Mount Pangæus) from whence Xiom surveyed the country.
2. Thracian Gate from whence Xiamidas sallied forth.
3 First Gate of the Long Wall.—Αἱ πρῶται πύλαι τοῦ μακροτείχους.
4 Gate lead ng from the town into the space enclosed by the Palisade.—Αἱ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔρυμα πύλαι.
5 Gate in the Palisade

The line across from the junction of lake and river on the north to a lower point of the river on the south, is the Long Wall constructed by Agnon.

The shorter line which cuts off the southern extremity of that wall and joins at its other end the river near the bridge is the Palisade.—Ἔρυμα.

PLAN I.—ILLUSTRATING THE OPERATIONS OF THE SIEGE BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF GYLIPPUS.



PLAN I.

SIEGE OF SYRACUSE BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF GYLIPPUS.

A, B, C, D. Wall of the Outer City of Syracuse at the time of the arrival of Nikias in Sicily.

E, F. Wall of Ortygia, or the Inner City of Syracuse, towards the land-side, at the same moment.

G, H, I. Additional or advanced fortification (including the Temenitês, and fronting the whole breadth of Epipolæ, Thucyd. vi. 75), built by the Syracusans in the autumn and winter of 415–414 B.C., after the first battle with Nikias near the river Anapus in the Great Harbour.

K. Athenian Circle or *Κύκλος* at Sykê (Thucyd. vi. 98–102), covered by its outwork in front, *δεκάπλεθρον προτείχισμα*.

K, L, M. Southern portion of the Athenian line of circumvallation, from the Circle to the Great Harbour.

N, O. First counter-wall or cross-wall (*ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος—ὑποτείχισμα*) erected by the Syracusans and carried *κρ* the slope of Epipolæ (*ὑποτειχίζειν*) from their own foremost city-wall to the edge of the southern cliff (Thucyd. vi. 100).

P, Q. Second counter-work, palisade and ditch, constructed by the Syracusans across the marsh, from their foremost city-wall to the Anapus (Thucyd. vi. 101).

K, R. Intended, but unfinished, line of circumvallation of the Athenians, from the northern side of their Circle to the outer sea at Trogilus.

PLAN II.—ILLUSTRATING THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS OF THE ATHENIANS AND SYRACUSANS WHEN DEMOSTHENES ARRIVED.



PLAN II.

SYRACUSE, AFTER THE ADDITIONAL DEFENCES PROVIDED BY GYLIPPUS, AND BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF DEMOSTHENES.

A, B, C, D. Wall of the Outer City of Syracuse, at the time of the first arrival of Nikias in Sicily.

E, F. Wall of Ortygia, or the Inner City, towards the land-side, at the same moment.

G, H, I. Additional or advanced fortification (including the Temenitês, and fronting the whole breadth of Epipolæ, Thucyd. vi.), built by the Syracusans in the autumn and winter of 415-414 B.C., after the first battle with Nikias.

K. Athenian Circle or Κύκλος at Sykê, covered by its outwork in front (δεκάπλεθρον προτείχισμα, Thucyd. vi. 102).

K, L, M. Southern portion of the Athenian line of circumvallation, from the Circle to the Great Harbour, in its finished condition of a double covered wall.

K, R. Intended, but unfinished, line of circumvallation of the Athenians, from the northern side of their Circle to the outer sea at Trogilus.

S, T, U. Third Syracusan counter-wall or cross-wall, the ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος or παρατείχισμα, or ἁπλοῦν τεῖχος constructed by Gylippus (Thucyd. vii. 4), cutting the northern portion of the Athenian line of circumvallation, and reaching from the city-wall to the northern cliff.

V. Outer fort constructed by Gylippus to defend the approach to Syracuse from Euryâlus down upon Epipolæ.

V, W, T. Wall of junction between this outer fort and the ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος—ξυνετείχισαν μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκάρσιου τείχους (Thucyd. vii. 7). The whole line, V, W, T, S, constitutes the παρατείχισμα (Thucyd. vii. 43).

X, X, X. Three Syracusan προτειχίσματα, or encampments for defending their line of wall.

L, Y, Z, V. Circuitous night-march of Demosthenês by the Euryâlus, to get behind and attack the Syracusan position on the uppermost ground of Epipolæ.

PLAN ILLUSTRATING THE MARCHES OF THE GREEKS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE BATTLE OF KUNAXA, AS DESCRIBED BY XENOPHON.



This Plan is intended simply to illustrate the narrative of Xenophon. The lines drawn to represent the course of the Wall of Media, as well as of the canals from the Tigris to the Euphrates, do not depend upon any positive evidence of remains now existing; but are accommodated to the narrative with the view of enabling the reader to comprehend it more clearly.

PLAN ILLUSTRATING THE MARCHES OF THE GREEKS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE BATTLE OF KUNAXA, AS DESCRIBED BY XENOPHON.



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BATTLE OF MANTINEIA.



BLACK LINE—March of Epaminondas from Tegea.
BLACK—Army of Epaminondas as formed for attack.
SHADED LINE—Opposing Army: Mantineians, Lacedæmonians, Athenians, Elcians, &c.

PLAN III.—ILLUSTRATING THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS OF THE ATHENIANS AND SYRACUSANS WHEN DEMOSTHENES ARRIVED.



Syracuse as it stood at the end of the reign of the elder Dionysius. The line of fortification along the northern side of Epipolæ was constructed by Dionysius before the commencement of his war with Carthage in 397 B.C. That along the southern side of the plateau was not built or even commenced until some years later, and did not exist at the time when Imilcon, with the Carthaginian army, lay before Syracuse in 396-395 B.C.


35
36
37
M. Taurus
Tarbas
(Pyramus)
Pylae (Kilikiae)
Bostanlik (Mandrenae)
Dorak
K I L I K I A
Adana (Adana)
(Sarus)
Tersus Tarsus
Kara Hissar
Tarsus Shai
Kydnus
Selefkun Shai
Aleian Plain
Pyramus R
Mesetlu
Soli (Pompejopolis)
(Mallus)
Magarsus
Karatash Burun
Gulf of Iskenderun (Issicus Sinus)
PLAN
to illustrate the
BATTLE OF ISSUS
Ain Zarba (Cesarea Anazarbus)
(Pyramus)
Jehan Tshai
Amanus (Alma Dagh Mons)
Gaur Dagh
Durdun Dagh
Jeh Misis or Jihan Kaleh
Pamphylian R.
Amanian Gate (Demirkapu)
Aias (Jihan)
Misis (Mopsuestia)
Selimi Meran
(Oeneandus or Ephiphania)
Pass of Darius
Issus
Pinarus R.
(Bajae)
Pylae Kilikiae Syriae
Gusel Dagh
Amanus
Iskenderun Alexandria ad Issum
Myriandrus
Beylan (Pylae Syriae)
Bagnas (Pagrae)
(Rhosus)
Ak Denis
Ras el Chansir (Rhosicum Prom.)
Antakieh (ANTIOCHIA)
(Seleukeia)
Duweik (Daphne)
Nahr el Asy (Orontes R.)
Pochi
Chanundarus (Gindarus)
Choros (Gyrrhus)
Killis (Kilizu)
HALEB or ALEPPO (Chalybon or Beroea)

SARDINIA
Karalis
Sardiniarum Pr.
Carbonarius Sinus
Plumbaria or Enosis I.
Tegula
Nora
Chersonesus
MARE
Galata I.
Hippo Zarytus
Carthaginensium Pr.
Hippo Regius
Hippacra Palus
Thermae Regiae
Cerne Mo.
Utica
Bagrada Fl.
Drakontion I.
Pulchrum Pr.
Karusa
Rusicmona
Apollinis Pr.
Hippagreta
MAGNA CARTHAGO
Aegimurus I.
Sinus Carthaginensis
Mercurii Pr.
Mycua
Megalia Dibis
Utyca or Aspis
Karpis
Kossyra I.
Kasala
Aquae Tibaritanae Minus
Tunes
Maxula
Inuca
Sicilibba
Tabraca
Thabraka
Tinga
Ad Diana
Thabraka Fl.
Tabba
Inbarbum Minus
Tukkabori
Gaitkaria
Oneilaba
ZEUGITANA
Kurubis
Neapolis
Hut Put
Ad Aqua
Membresa
Vallis
Vaga
Aquae
Simitthu
Bulla Regia
Koreva
Aquae Flumini
Thagura
Nova
Thibarka
Thuggo
Naraggara
Thaka
Musti
Drusiliana
Zama Regia
Sicca Veneria
Sinus Neapolitanus
Hadrumetum alt Justiniana
Tarachiae I.
Uzita
Ruspina
Leptis Parva
Thapsus
Agar
Salinae
Turris Hannibalis
Sullekti
Iasonia I.
Iasonia I.
Tisdrus
Aquae Regiae
Sarsura
Maskhanae
Acholla
Caput Vada or Beachodes Pr
Thapsae
Baraths
Ad Majores
Vegesela
Mesegere
Colonia Scillitana
Ubaba
Tufetula
Tapsitana
Kerkina I.
Thenae
Kerkenna I.
BYZACENA
Thelepte or Thala
Gemellae
Makomades Minores
Capsa
Syrtis Minor
Orbita
Triton Fl.
Menix or Iophagitis alt Girba
Thasarte
Thisdra or Tritum I.
Takape
Aquae Takapitanae
Gerba
Menix
Tichasa or Tiges
Agma or Fulgurita
Villa
Templum Veneris
Gulf of Gabes
Turris Tamnallena
Zitha Pr.
Thasurus
Templum
Pons Zita or Lutha
Judas Palus
Via Magna
Via Privata
Pisidon P.?
Aggar Selmepte
Triumis Palus
TRIPOLITANA
Ausere R.
Berezeos ?
Pisidis or Pisula
Augilae
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